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Current Events

Some Remarks on the Current Language Situation in Ukraine

Jennifer Pickurel

To put Ukrainian attempts at programming language behaviour into context, one must first explain the general principles of language planning. It should be remembered that language planning, while it includes political, historical, and psychological elements, is a social process which seeks to influence one particular social behaviour, that of language choice, knowledge, and usage.

Haugen's early definition of language planning included four steps: selection of code, standardisation, implementation, and elaboration.[1] Other researchers have attempted to expand upon this basic framework or to focus on a particular aspect of planning. In what seems to be one of the more complete definitions, Cooper defines language planning as 'deliberate efforts to influence the behavior of others with respect to the acquisition, structure, or functional allocation of their language codes'.[2] This encompasses several important issues relevant to language planning as an area of policy.

First, several questions must be answered: Who is attempting to influence language policy? Who is the target of this influence, and for what ends? This is particularly important as often linguistic means are used to accomplish other, non-linguistic goals, such as political hegemony or modernisation. Next, one must outline the means used to implement this action, such as education or official government policy. This provides a basic framework of analysis which establishes all the key players and their respective agendas.

Language planning can be further subdivided to flesh out the basic outline established above. Status planning implies a change in the attitude and probable usage of a language by a given population, such as raising the number of speakers or attempting to discourage the usage of a language by referring to it as a dialect. Corpus planning involves changes to the basic structure of the language itself. This type of planning may have several functions, such as purification, revival of an archaic language, reform, standardisation, or lexical modernisation.[3] Acquisition planning affects the number of speakers and the scope of a language. Naturally, these policies may influence each other, and may be expected to occur interdependently.

In the case of Ukrainian, language planning has been practised not only by Ukrainians seeking to develop and preserve their language but also by the Soviet

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[1] Haugen, quoted in Cobarrubias, Fishman (eds.), *Progress in Language Planning*, Moulton, 1983, p. 34.
[2] Cooper, Robert L., *Language Planning and Social Change*, chapter 2, pp. 30-31. Cooper compiles a list of twelve definitions which appear in other works on the subject, and seeks to include all the relevant elements in his final definition.
[3] Nahir, M. in Eastman, C., *Language Planning: An Introduction*, 1983, p. 43.

authorities, and in all three areas: from the 1930s onwards Ukrainian schools and teaching were the target of attempts to increase the use of Russian at the expense of Ukrainian, dictionaries and grammars in Ukrainian were edited or influenced to make the language more like Russian, and Russian was propagandised as the language which granted access to modernity and technology as against Ukrainian which was presented as a backward village language. Thus in order to succeed efforts to reverse the damage done over the past seventy years must attack the same areas in order to succeed – schools must encourage Ukrainian, examples of good language usage should be made available, and Ukrainian should be perceived as a career and social advantage.

This kind of reaction is hardly surprising given the extent to which Russification was practised in Ukraine. Several problems arose during that time which still vex policy-makers and language enthusiasts alike. Overt terrorist threats to well-known members of the intelligentsia were perhaps the best-known means used to 'encourage' citizens of the USSR to follow linguistic and political unification goals, but often other tactics were equally damaging. Under Soviet rule, stereotypes of Ukrainian as a language of the village, unfit for technological or scientific discussion, were aided by the literal and linguistic exodus of talent to Moscow.[4] Bilingualism, long touted as a positive influence for Ukraine, meant that Ukrainian words were replaced with Russian counterparts not only in dictionaries but also in the minds of speakers who could not keep the two linguistic codes separate. Russian was encouraged as the general lexical fund for all Soviet languages, and as a language of unity and Union-wide participation.[5] Gradually, using such policies, Russian came to replace Ukrainian in most social functions, including government and education. Since many people spoke Ukrainian at home, a *surzhyk* emerged – a mixture of the two languages, intelligible to speakers of both but lacking the status of either language.[6]

Sociolinguistic methods allow the study of linguistic behaviour as a barometer of society, so that an understanding of the former serves to illustrate and illuminate aspects of the latter. One would therefore expect a post-totalitarian society to display linguistic democratisation parallel to related social and political processes. Ukraine is currently having to work its way through what has been termed 'post-Soviet puberty', where old beliefs about the Ukrainian language must be challenged to aid the country in becoming a stable and mature world player.

One current is the de-ritualisation of Ukrainian, that is the move from an idealised view of Ukrainian as the language of Shevchenko and a symbol of defiance to a more democratic, everyday perception of the language as a means of varied types of expression. New challenges face the language, but a call for prag-

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[4] Dzyuba, I., 'Problemy i Perspektyvy' in *Quo Vadis Ukrayino?*, International School of Ukrainian Studies and Mayak Press, 1992.

[5] Ostash, Ihor, 'Suchasna movna polityka v Ukrayini', from *Quo Vadis Ukrayino?*, pp. 132-36; and Masenko, L.T., 'The role of official ideology in the 1970s in aggravating the deformation of the language situation in Ukraine', *Mova totalitarnoho suspilstva*, pp. 69-72, Kyiv, 1995.

[6] For more information on formation of such mixture languages see Fontaine, S., *Pidgins and Creoles*, London and New York: Longman Linguistic Library, 1988. She gives an extensive description of both, which adequately explains the way the *surzhyk* has emerged, and in addition provides useful information about language acquisition.

matism and common sense, for patriotism rather than chauvinistic nationalism, is emerging to compete with past radical viewpoints. The years since Ukrainian independence, or even since the 1989 language law have witnessed changes in thinking and a pronounced rejection of Russian, although economics and inertia continue to be obstacles to the development of Ukraine as an independent state with its own language.

Without laying blame or pointing a finger, one can characterise many of the writings in various journals from the early 1990s as ideological and often polemical. Language enthusiasts had long guarded, jealously, the beauty and purity of their language against a hostile Soviet onslaught, often in the face of real physical threats. As a nation without a political state, Ukrainians treated their language as a unifying feature, a symbol, and a banner of Ukrainian national identity. From the standpoint of political science, Arel characterises the new angle on history in Ukraine as 'exclusivist and victimized', meaning Ukrainians do not choose to recognise Kyivan Rus' as a shared history with Russia, but rather as theirs exclusively. Furthermore, once the common history with Russia begins in 1654, so too begins Russia's imperialistic and subjugating behaviour towards Ukraine.[7] While no one can doubt the sincerity of such patriotic emotions, pragmatism may not have been the primary concern.[8] Not only are there a number of Ukrainians who only speak Russian, and who could potentially be alienated in an aggressively Ukrainian-speaking state, but there are also the many Russians who voted for Ukrainian independence and see their future tied up with the new Ukrainian state.

In the years immediately preceding and following the establishment of independence, Ukraine faced two major problems, both of which were reflected in the lively linguistic debates of the time. Firstly, the new nation experienced an identity crisis, especially in relation to Russia, which challenged its self-image and sense of unity: could Ukraine define itself, or its language, except in contrast or comparison to Russia?

Second, decades of Russification had meant heavy linguistic casualties in a number of areas, which affected not only the use of Ukrainian, but its purity as well. Particularly in the south and east of Ukraine, a number of 'necessary' conditions have been met which produce linguistic assimilation, causing the number of Ukrainian speakers to drop. These include exposure, urbanisation, migration, and the linguistic closeness of Ukrainian and Russian.[9] Furthermore, there are problems of

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[7] Arel, *Ukraine. The temptation of the nationalizing state*, p. 25.

[8] Here one cannot avoid mention of Ukrainians, both in Ukraine and in the diaspora, who aggressively promote the language and a 'Ukrainian-based' view of Ukrainian history. (For an example of one extreme of this kind of thinking, see Zaharychuk, A., *The Ukrainian Alphabet*, which asserts that Ukrainian writing predates Sanskrit). Though such views are in the minority, and indeed not unique to Ukrainian culture, they make for entertaining reading. There is a dictionary published in Ukraine which claims to prove Ukrainian is older than Sanskrit, and numerous treatises asserting that Ukrainians are really Araty, an ancient super-race with a mission to Ukrainianise the world. Still others would have us believe that the alphabet, long credited to Cyril and Methodius, was actually a gift from God to a Ukrainian in Korsun. Given the colourfulness of such treatises, and the interest they add, one can only say they add to the variety of the spectrum of writings on Ukrainian language and make up for in flavour what they lack in accuracy.

[9] Silver, Brian D., 'Social Mobilization and Russification of Soviet Nationalities', *American Political Science Review*, vol. 68, no. 1 (1974), pp. 45-66.

perception, both among Ukrainians and among Russians in Ukraine, which create the impression that Ukrainian language may not offer the same opportunities to speakers as Russian. Others feel, as Solchanyk explains, 'that Ukraine is really part of Russia and that the Ukrainian language was invented by "separatists" in the nineteenth century',[10] which justifies both to Russians in Ukraine and to Russian-speaking Ukrainians a policy of close integration with Russia.

Just before Ukraine gained its independence, the government declared Ukrainian the 'State Language', although there is still discussion of the position of Russian in independent Ukraine, and its role alongside Ukrainian. Policy has evolved in an effort to respond satisfactorily to the needs of the population, starting with the tenets of the 1989 Law on Languages. (Note the plural ending of 'languages', evidence that law-makers were considering both languages at that time). This law stated that Ukrainian would be the sole language of administration, that it would be mandatory in all Russian schools as a second language, that the higher education institutions would eventually have to instruct in Ukrainian, and that public signs would be in Ukrainian, or at least in both languages.[11] In 1991 the Supreme Council adopted the 'Declaration of the Rights of Nationalities' which allowed the development of all the languages and cultures present in Ukraine.[12] One of the biggest differences between these two documents, as Arel observes, is the criteria used. The first document suggests basing the use of a second language on an ethnic criterion, i.e. where a nationality was 'compactly settled'. The second switches to a linguistic criterion, suggesting the use of whatever language is acceptable to the population of an area. The Law on National Minorities reverted to the ethnic criterion, although the Constitution uses the linguistic one. The distinction is particularly important given the number of Ukrainians who speak Russian as a first language. As Arel rightly observes, implementation of such a law would mean not only ethnic conflict between Russians and Ukrainians, but also language conflict between Ukrainian speakers and Russian speakers, including ethnic Ukrainians.[13]

The reality of the situation five years from independence is that difficulties remain in making the desire of nationalists and patriots meet the realities of contemporary Ukraine, especially given the legacy of decades of influence by Russia. While it is in theory desirable for Ukrainians to speak Ukrainian, many members of the intelligentsia class were educated in Russian and still use it daily at work and in official capacities. However, to allow Russian to stand alongside Ukrainian as a 'State Language', while affecting positively relations with Russia, would be too great a concession to the influence of Russian under the Soviets, and could hinder the spread of Ukrainian. Too often demands for a second state language are accompanied by other less palatable demands, for greater ties with

[10] Solchanyk, R., 'The Politics of Language in Ukraine', in RFE/RL Research Report, vol. 2, no. 10, March 1993, p. 2.

[11] Arel, D., 'Language Policies in Independent Ukraine. Towards one or two state languages?', *Nationalities Papers*, vol. 23, no. 3, 1995, p. 600.

[12] Arel, D., 'Ukraine: the temptation of the nationalizing state', p. 13.

[13] Arel, D., 'Language and the Politics of Ethnicity: The Case of Ukraine', Doctoral Thesis submitted to and published by University of Illinois at Urbana, 1993, p. 131.

Russia, dual citizenship, or a federated structure within Ukraine.[14] Nevertheless, a special reference to Russian occurs in the recently adopted constitution:

> The state language of Ukraine is the Ukrainian language.
>
> The State ensures the comprehensive development and functioning of the Ukrainian language in all spheres of social life throughout the entire territory of Ukraine.
>
> In Ukraine, the free development, use and protection of Russian, and[15] other languages of national minorities of Ukraine, is guaranteed.[16]

In any case, steps towards a total changeover to Ukrainian in all aspects of professional life cannot be taken immediately due to lack of knowledge on the part of much of the populace, and simple practical considerations including finance. Hence, this changeover, although virtually decided as a matter of policy, may take some time to become a tangible reality, and may in the meantime tend to encourage Russification at the expense of Ukrainian culture.[17] The factors most likely to be responsible for the delay in the implementation of the new policy are inertia from the decades of Russification and the reluctance of former party functionaries who are still in positions of influence.[18] Furthermore, the policy on the official use of Ukrainian which was enacted pre-independence was sufficiently loosely worded to allow Russian to remain a *de facto* official language, since there are no penalties laid down for those who do not comply with the requirement to learn and use Ukrainian in the work-place. An alternative is to emphasise the provision of incentives to learn and use Ukrainian, such as a tax on publications not in Ukrainian, the lack of advancement for those who do not speak Ukrainian, or requirements that exams for further education be given only in Ukrainian. Such ideas espouse the notion that the right to be educated in one's 'mother language' and the right to be served in that language are the two most central language rights. Enforcing this notion would mean that anyone wishing to participate fully in the new state, especially in the public sector, must have a good command of its language.

What else affects language behaviour? Policy can influence or even attempt to coerce, but in the end it represents ideal behaviours which may not reflect reality. One factor which certainly influences usage of Ukrainian is the perceived status of the language, or rather, the lack of it. Even without a specific policy demanding the use of Russian, and indeed in spite of the laws guaranteeing the usage of Ukrainian, there are social factors which may hinder the wide acceptance of Ukrainian as a language without stigma, which may be used neutrally in every situation.

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[14] Solchanyk, op. cit., p. 2.

[15] This 'and' was a matter of contention, and does not appear in the Ukrainian language version of the constitution. Russian speakers did not like to include themselves in the category of national minority, and wished the constitution to separate them from that group. Conversation, J. Dingley, 20 November 1996.

[16] *The Constitution of Ukraine*, official English translation, Ukrainian Legal Foundation, Kyiv, 1996, Article 10.

[17] Arel, D., 'Ukraine: the temptation of the nationalizing state', forthcoming in Vladimir Tismaneau (ed.), *Political Culture and Civil Society in the Former Soviet Union, the international politics of Eurasia*, vol. 4 (Series 2, editors: Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrot), Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1995.

[18] Holowinsky, I., 'Linguistic Policy as a Political Weapon', *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, vol. l, (1994), p. 17.

Clearly, those who set language policy envisage a future in which communication occurs in Ukrainian, and where the effects of Russification have been reversed sufficiently to allow Ukrainians to address each other in Ukrainian automatically, and without prompting or feeling self-conscious. To analyse language planning within this framework, one must assess the success of these policies as language planning, and surmise what remains to be addressed.

> Some of this is an obvious 'hangover' from the Soviet era in which nationalism was strongly discouraged. Academic journals and learned works appeared in Russian, which helped cement the association of Russian language with modernity, progress, technology, and urbanity. Nationalists are permanently on the defensive, ready to lash out at Russia's every slip – schoolyard behaviour which only undermines their legitimacy... Ask a Ukrainian to describe his culture, and the response is invariably framed as a comparison to Russia: Ukrainians are warmer, keep tidier houses, sing purer melodies. Enough with the comparatives.[19]

Some comparisons and even a little envy are understandable. Russia, as the inheritor of Soviet structures, sports many modern and flashy accoutrements which Ukraine has not yet managed to acquire. Russia maintains the lead in publishing and television, for example, because it has taken advantage of its inheritance and has not been forced to start from the ground up. Ukraine will need time to resolve these difficulties, and little improvement can be expected until there is money available to pour into developing Ukrainian language television programming, or into printing all types of reading matter in Ukrainian.

Language usage is also affected by subtler social threads which may prove harder to counteract or erase. Social class in Ukraine, unlike Western Europe or North America, is determined largely by education and profession. The lack, for obvious historical reasons, of an aristocracy has left the industrial and academic élite at the top of the class pyramid. Loyalties at this level depend on many things, but the nationally-conscious academic élite tend to be aligned with Ukrainian. As one might imagine, the industrial élite does not necessarily follow this example. The working classes, which were so glorified by the Soviets, make up the next sector. Bottom come the peasants, in spite of the rather nostalgic romanticisation of them in literature and folklore. Historically, Russian has been associated with the city and Ukrainian with the countryside. Therefore, traditionally, the top three strata of Ukrainian society have spoken Russian, and the peasants, who lacked social clout and status, spoke Ukrainian. While much of current language planning is trying to change this perception, the lack of prestige of Ukrainian, which stemmed from these principles, still persists.[20]

How far exactly is Ukraine along the road to linguistic and social stability? As one might expect, opinions vary. If one spent some time in the company of an inveterate Moscophile, with his endless nostalgia for the order of Stalin's rule, the construction and road repairs of Soviet times, and his never-ending praise for

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[19] Callaway, Anna, 'Getting through post-Soviet puberty', *Kiev Post*, 8-14 August 1996, p. 16.

[20] This is well documented elsewhere, most recently in Arel's doctoral thesis entitled 'Language and the Politics of Ethnicity: the Case of Ukraine', published by the University of Illinois at Urbana, 1993. This was substantiated with evidence from several interviews, including Nepyivoda, who remarked that had she spoken Ukrainian at school, she would have been ostracised by her elementary-aged peers.

Moscow's underground, its theatre, its television, and even Yeltsin, one would be tempted to despair of any progress in Ukraine. But such opinions represent only one end of the spectrum, and other, more optimistic voices can also be heard.

Outsiders are often more sanguine than natives. A certain Sergeant First Class Max Duke observed in summer 1996 that already Russian-monoglot military personnel were losing chances of promotion to their bilingual colleagues. While he admits that a lack of consensus on Ukrainian terminology has forced the American Embassy to use Russian interpreters, Duke nevertheless described a new attitude of the US government to Ukraine as a valuable potential partner.[21] Such linkages should be welcomed as a means of discouraging Ukraine from renewing its affiliation with Russia should Russian-US relations ever sour. Others have observed a sudden change in language of conversation at work from Russian to Ukrainian in the wake of the ratification of the constitution. This could be explained as national pride, or perhaps a lessening of anxiety about the potential consequences for speaking Ukrainian in the work-place.

Several of those interviewed mentioned another trend, or even fashion replacing Russian as the main influence. English is becoming widespread enough to have a significant impact on Ukrainian culture, perhaps as a result of re-alignment away from Russia and a desire to join in European culture.[22] On any street book-vendors sell English language course materials, books in English, as well as other foreign languages. Stalls which sell (illegally copied) cassettes usually have one set of Russian music, and one of English-language rock, both modern and classic pop music. Though foreign newspapers are somewhat difficult to find, many newsagents carry the local version of *Vogue, Harper's Bazaar,* or *Playboy.* Though these are available in Russian and not Ukrainian, the cultural influence is almost more interesting than the language used. Disney, Pepsi and Coke will soon be joined by McDonald's. Most young people study English at school, and seem to have no trouble incorporating Western imports into their culture.

Since many of those dealing with Ukraine have made an effort to translate their add campaigns into the local language (*zavzhdy Koka Kola* comes to mind), the linguistic effects of such new products may only reinforce the new orientation to the West. The social effects of Western imports, including not only American fast food, but French and German food and goods as well, should not be underestimated. The acceptance of foreign culture will mean a more ready acceptance of words from these donor cultures, and could therefore have significant linguistic consequences.

This is most readily observed already in computing vocabulary. No one really says *drukovka*, but uses *printer,* as well as *faks, kompyuter, vord for vindows* and others. This demonstrates the problem linguists face when trying to coin new terminology for Ukrainian, and find that foreign forms are already widely accepted and used.

Other areas manifest foreign influence as well: Ukrainians discuss *seks,* or refer to people as *homoseksualnyi,* which are obvious borrowings. Such topics high-

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[21] Interview, 4 July 1996, with SFC Max Duke, DAO office, US Embassy, Kyiv.
[22] This viewpoint, expressed by Professor Ermolenko in both interviews, is also analysed in the article by Ihor Ostash in *Quo Vadis Ukrayino?,* previously cited.

light another problem area, the open reference to sex and similar matters has always been taboo. With a more open culture gradually emerging, Ukraine is struggling to develop not only slang (a sure sign of democracy) but also the mental attitude which accepts such things as part of an open society. This is a prime subject for further research, which could characterise emerging slang, if there is any, especially that which may be different from the Russian slang used by most young people. The willingness to discuss issues such as homosexuality, birth control, pre-marital sex, or even disability or mental illness becomes less common with each successive age group. Here again, sociolinguist methods would allow the parallel development of comfort dealing with these topics and new linguistic terms for them to be studied. Particular areas are treated elsewhere, including media, publishing, education, and terminology. The general language climate and new questions and problems can be addressed more briefly. Recent work has shown that while many of the same concerns exist, social processes have opened the mythological box of Pandora for speakers of Ukrainian, and attitudes will have to change if they intend to discuss what they see in their own language.

Within the scope of this research, however, are general attitudes to terminology and the changing language, including a call from nearly everyone for a clean-up. Terminology has been defined in every area, and a new dictionary is available, so it remains for the proper Ukrainian words to be used and adopted to replace Russianisms. Criteria for new words in Ukrainian seem widely shared among *movoznavtsi* and others concerned.

There is a definite trend away from words perceived to be Russian. One example is the preference for *shtampovannya* over *shtampovka*, reflecting the choice of a Ukrainian ending over the Russian '-ovka'.[23] Some suggest avoiding obviously Polish words as well, but often words have been in the language so long they are no longer recognised as having foreign origin. Examples of words like these include *palyty* or *maydan*. There are Russian words which fit this category as well, such as *ploshcha, velosiped* or *sportsmen*.[24]

How do Ukrainians decide which words may stay in the language and which are too obviously remnants of Russification? Overall, the goal is to achieve and maintain a neutral language, suitable for everyday functions. The following suggestions were gathered from a variety of sources:

- the lexicon should be understandable;
- words should be pronounceable and not too long;
- obvious Ukrainian words should be kept;
- words should have Ukrainian roots;
- rules of Ukrainian word formation should be followed;
- words should not have any 'undesirable undercurrents';
- the new words should not replace existing Ukrainian ones;
- new words should be specific, widely used, and self-descriptive;
- Words should be kept which are approved by linguistic authorities.[25]

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[23] N. Nepyivoda, Interview 26 August 1996, Kyiv.

[24] S. Ermolenko, Interview, 22 August 1996, Kyiv.

[25] Ermolenko, Nepyivoda, and Krouglov, Alexandr, 'Issues in Translation and Lexicography', in *The Ukrainian Review*, vol. 42, no. 1, Spring 1995, pp. 19-26.

Common sense will dictate which words are useful enough to keep and which are archaic or unrecognisable for speakers. Ermolenko reflects this pragmatic attitude and suggests leaving usage to individual taste and sense, as this is a policy in itself. Personal style and feeling for the language are universal criteria, although there is concern that many people's sense of what is good Ukrainian has been damaged by bilingualism and years of hearing bad Ukrainian.

Amidst all the new influences, changing currents, and the Soviet hangover, how do language experts see the future in Ukraine? What are their hopes and worries for the language situation?

Everyone agrees that language is, out of sheer necessity, a peripheral issue, a symbol of the national struggle. The economy is struggling to improve, and there are still many people below the poverty line. The language situation is therefore not only a reflection of other battles, but is also directly related to them, since it cannot improve until social problems are resolved.

Bearing this in mind, one can observe that significant progress has been made. Several years ago, many people abroad were not aware that Ukraine was not simply a part of Russia. Now Ukraine is able to compete in the world arena, for example at the Olympics. As national morale improves with achievements internationally, the language problem can also improve.

At this stage, it is crucial that children begin to hear and speak Ukrainian so the sense of the language can be restored. For older people, codes which have become confused can be made distinct by teaching, so that people become aware of what is Ukrainian and what is Russian. Furthermore, Ukrainians will inevitably follow the example of their leaders, in government and at work. If 'bosses' and MPs make an effort, as did the President, to speak Ukrainian, people will take note and use the language themselves. More importance should be placed on publishing in Ukrainian, since there is not enough money at present. Finance exerts an influence on progress in all areas, since people need a motive and some kind of incentive to speak Ukrainian when many find it easier to speak Russian. Such incentives could include the threat of losing one's career without the ability to speak the state language, or the possibility of failing a university entrance examination without competency in Ukrainian.

These disparate threads reflect an ongoing process which is still far from complete. Some of the existing legislation is ambiguous, or mentions Russian in a manner which can only highlight the existing cultural, political, regional, and linguistic divide. While on the one hand language is a mirror of the problems existing in other areas of society, it could also become a tool to bind together the peoples of the new nation of Ukraine – providing the necessary encouragement, planning, and initiative are there.   ❏

The Likely Effects of Electoral Reform in Ukraine*

Sarah Birch

Asignificant body of empirical theory has been developed over the past forty years to explain the effects of electoral laws on party systems. Research in this field has generated a corpus of well-substantiated findings as to the effects of electoral systems on representative structures and governance in liberal democracies. Not only do political scientists now have good grounds from which to predict the likely effects of changes to electoral laws, but there are frequent suggestions that their findings would be of use to the framers of electoral regimes in democratising countries. Indeed, this body of work has been influential in shaping the views of many of those who advise the leaders of such states as to what type of electoral system to adopt.

Yet our knowledge of the effects of electoral laws remains underdeveloped. One of the reasons for this is that there has been little opportunity to analyse the workings of similar laws under radically different political and social circumstances. The recent experience of newly-competitive polities thus represents a valuable opportunity to test theories of electoral systems that have been elaborated primarily with respect to the established democracies of Western Europe and North America. Very little actual research has been done on the workings of electoral systems in newly-competitive polities,[1] and it is not obvious that the effects of given electoral institutions in established democracies will be those they have during the introduction of competitive politics. The principal idea behind this article is that the impact of electoral institutions in the early stages of competivisation differs in certain key respects from their influence at later stages, but that they do still have systematic effects which contribute importantly to the formation of parties and the shaping of representative structures. Analysis of these effects will make a valuable addition to our knowledge of the workings of electoral systems. It will also shed light on the conditions under which current theories are valid, as well as suggesting extensions to them.

Ukraine started in 1991 from a virtual *tabula rasa* of party system formation. The lengthy rule of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union had obliterated memory of competitive party politics from the minds of the vast majority of citizens. The weakness of parties at the time of the introduction of competitive elections meant that electoral institutions and electoral politics were especially important in shaping the young party system. Ukraine held its first parliamentary elections as an independent state in 1994. The electoral law that governed these elections differed little from the Soviet-era single-member majoritarian system

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[1] The most notable exception is Shugart and Carey, 1992. For previous work on the effects of electoral systems in Eastern Europe, see McGregor, 1993; Kuusela, 1994; Holmes, 1994; and Gebethner, 1996.

that had governed the elections of 1990. Following the 1994 elections, there was a general consensus that it would be desirable to move towards a more proportional system in order to 'increase the potential for electing a politically structured parliament which is more effective and more predictable' (as put by the head of the committee that eventually rewrote the law).[2] Legal experts, politicians, and the Ukrainian people themselves were agreed that the system had to be changed for these reasons.[3]

To the ears of Western psephologists, this justification would seen odd. The orthodoxy among those who study the effects of electoral systems is that plurality and majoritarian electoral laws promote stable party systems and single-party governments. In this context, lines of accountability are clear and governments have sufficiently unified support to govern effectively. Proportional systems, on the other hand, are likely to promote the proliferation of parties, necessitating coalition governments that are both unstable and unaccountable.[4] Why should law-makers in Ukraine move towards a proportional system in the hopes of producing a more structured and predictable parliament? Why has the majoritarian system failed to produce this result? There is reason to believe that the relationship between proportionality and parliamentary structure may depend on the level of development of the party system. In early stages of competivisation, if the party system is fluid or poorly entrenched, a majoritarian law will not have a reductive effect on the number of parties. Instead it will have the effect of encouraging the multiplication of many small regional parties, thereby fragmenting the party system. There will also be little incentive for candidates to join parties at all, especially if they can use existing organisational structures to mobilise support for their candidacies. This will tend to lead to a parliament that is highly heterogeneous with respect to party membership: there will be a large number of independent deputies, and 'party' candidates will represent numerous parties with regionally-defined support bases. In order to function effectively, MPs will have to organise, but many will either not be bound to parties at all or will be only weakly bound. The structure of the resultant faction system will therefore be rather different from the structure of the party system that competed for election. This will then lead to diminished accountability, as voters will have little means of predicting and no way of controlling the factional membership of their representatives. The structure of parliament is also likely to be unstable, as membership in a faction will be based more on ephemeral considerations of convenience than on strong ideological and institutional bonds. Under these circumstances, a move towards a more proportional system will be seen as a means of generating greater correspondence between the structure of the party system in the electorate and

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[2] O. Lavrynovych, interview in *Elections Today* 6.2 (1996), p. 18.

[3] See, for example, Futey, 1994; Kremen et al, 1994; International Foundation for Electoral Systems, 1994; Berezyuk, 1995; Buzduhan, 1995; Olkhovskyi and Tsvyk, 1995; Chornovil, 1995; Nix and Futey, 1996. Popular dislike of the law was gauged by means of a sample survey conducted by the International Foundation for Electoral Systems, which showed over 60 per cent to be in favour of reform and almost three quarters to prefer a law which required them to go to the polls only once (Nix and Futey, 1996, p. 20).

[4] For discussion and empirical analysis of these claims, see Rae, 1971; Taagepera and Shugart, 1989; Sartori, 1994; Lijphart, 1994.

Table 1: Notional Results I

Party	Number of Seats Won (actual)		Total Vote Share (actual)	No 2nd round majority requirement (simulated)		No TO or 2nd round majority requirements (simulated)		Plurality result with no TO requirement (simulated)	
Communist (KPU)	86	25.4%	12.72%	106	24.6%	108	24.0%	102	22.7%
Socialist (SPU)	14	4.1	3.09	17	3.9	18	4.0	20	4.4
Agrarian (SelPU)	19	5.3	2.74	19	4.2	18	4.0	19	4.2
National Salvation (PNVU)			<0.01						
Total Left	119	35.2%	18.55%	142	32.7%	144	32.0%	141	31.3%
Liberal (LPU)			0.60%						
Democratic Rebirth (PDVU)	4	1.2%	0.83	5	1.2%	5	1.1%	5	1.1%
Social Democratic (SDPU)	2	0.6	0.36	2	0.5	2	0.4	2	0.4
Green (PZU)			0.25						
Labour (PPU)	4	1.2	0.40	4	0.9	4	0.9	4	0.9
Civic Congress (HKU)	2	0.6	0.25	3	0.7	3	0.7	3	0.7
Labour Congress (TKU)			0.29	1	0.2	1	0.2	1	0.2
Justice (UPS)			0.14						
Liberal Democratic (LDPU)			0.03						
Slavic Unity (PSEU)			0.06						
Solidarity & Soc. Justice (UPSSS)			0.04						
Constitutional Democratic (KDP)			0.04						
Econ. Rebirth of Crimea (PEVK)			0.07						
Beer Lovers (UPShP)			0.01						
Total Centre	12	3.6%	3.37%	15	3.5%	15	3.3%	15	3.3%

Rukh (NRU)	20	5.9%	5.15%	28	6.5%	31	6.9%	33	7.3%
Republican (URP)	8	2.4	2.52	10	2.3	12	2.7	14	3.1
Democratic (DemPU)	2	0.6	1.08	2	0.5	2	0.4	4	0.9
Christian Democratic (KhDPU)	1	0.3	0.35	3	0.7	3	0.7	1	0.2
Peasant Democratic (USDP)			0.04						
Ukr. Christ. Democratic (UKhDP)			0.02						
Free Peasants (PVSU)			<0.01						
Total National Democratic	31	9.2%	9.16%	43	10.0%	48	10.7%	52	11.5%
Cong. of Ukr. Nationalists (KUN)	5	1.5%	1.25%	5	1.2%	5	1.1%	5	1.1%
Ukr. Conserv. Repub. (UKRP)	2	0.6	0.34	2	0.5	2	0.4	2	0.4
Ukr. Nat. Assembly (UNA)	1	0.3	0.51	1	0.2	1	0.2	1	0.2
Social Nationalists (SNPU)			0.17						
Org. of Ukr. Nationalists (OUN)			0.06						
State Ind. of Ukraine (DSU)			0.09						
Ukr. Nat. Conserv. (UNKP)			0.02						
Total Extreme Right	8	2.4%	2.44%	8	1.9%	8	1.7%	8	1.7%
All parties	170	50.3%	33.52%	207	48.0%	215	47.8%	216	48.0%
Independents	168	49.7%	66.48%	224	52.0%	235	52.2%	234	52.0%
Total seats filled	338	100%		431	95.8%	450	100%	450	100%
Deviation from proportionality (least squares method)		9.23			8.57		8.23		7.39

Source: Calculated from the 'Vybory-1994' database constructed by the Petro Mohyla Scientific Society of Kyiv. For the sake of consistency and comparability, figures were calculated on the basis of vote and seat percentages for the March-April electoral rounds only.

the structure of the party system in parliament, and hence greater stability in the latter and greater accountability to voters, which will bolster the legitimacy of parliament as an institution. This, I would argue, is precisely what has happened in Ukraine in the period following independence.

The result of the 1994 elections was a parliament in which 14 parties were represented, but party members held only a bare majority of the seats filled (see Table 1). The independent candidates were not, however, reluctant to join factions once parliament met. On the contrary, many signed up for several different factions at once, till a law was finally passed prohibiting this practice. Even since that time there has been a considerable amount of fluidity in the structure of the factions in parliament. This fluidity is in large part due to the mobility of non-party deputies, but an additional factor is undoubtedly the weak grip parties have over their members, many of whom were not formally nominated by them, and whose success in the elections was in many cases the result of personal rather than party support (Demokratychni initsiatyvy, 1994, pp. 7, 26).[5]

The consequences of this situation are fourfold. Firstly, lack of parliamentary structure has led to unpredictability of outcomes. This has meant higher transaction costs for factions, as considerable political resources are required to maintain coherence and discipline. Secondly, partisan instability has de-stabilised the policy process and generated immobilism; factions have an incentive to play for time in the hopes of cobbling together a majority for their position. Thirdly, as a result of legislative disarray, the institution of parliament has suffered. The disorganisation of the parliament allowed the executive to enhance its powers in the period when the new constitution was being drafted, and resulted in a constitution that magnifies the powers of the president at the expense of the parliament. The constant jockeying and in-fighting in parliament has also lowered it in the eyes of the public, whose low evaluation of parliament as an institution has given President Kuchma even more leverage by allowing him to bully parliament into acceding to his wishes by threatening to find some way of dissolving it. Knowing their chances of re-election are slim, deputies have strongly resisted putting themselves to the electoral test sooner than necessary.[6] Finally, parties that have a strong pre-existing organisational structure will be at a considerable advantage when overall organisation is poor, whereas those that are less internally disciplined will find the unstructured situation in parliament most difficult. In the post-Soviet context, the left-wing heirs to the old Communist Party have inherited a strong infrastructure and are thus in a position to benefit from the organisational weakness of their new competitors. It is not surprising therefore that it should have been the new parties that were most in favour of a change in the electoral law.

A second widely-perceived problem with the 1994 electoral law was that it failed in its basic function of selecting deputies. For an election in a given constituency to be valid under the law, electoral participation had to exceed fifty per cent, and the winning candidate was required to receive an absolute majority of

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[5] The weakness of party control over deputies also reflects the generally low esteem in which parties are held by the populace (Wyman et al, 1995, p. 540; Rose, 1995, p. 551; Miller et al, 1996).

[6] The low esteem in which the electorate hold the legislature has undoubtedly been one of the main causes of the steady decline in turnout levels in by-elections held since 1994.

the vote.[7] When the first elections were held under this law in March and April of 1994, low turnout caused twenty-one elections to be declared invalid. A further 91 contests failed to elect a deputy because neither of the candidates in the run-off received over fifty per cent of the vote.[8] The process of filling the empty seats carried on for over two years, costing much money, and generating considerable frustration (see Birch, 1996). Declining turnout levels in repeat elections led to the invalidation of increasing proportions of the contests in each successive round, and though most of the seats were eventually filled, the large number of empty seats had a destabilising effect on legislative activity. Firstly, it allowed relatively small numbers of deputies to obstruct parliamentary activity by failing to attend. Secondly, fluctuating numbers led to unpredictable results; as seats were gradually filled, the partisan structure of the body was subject to alteration, which enhanced the destabilisation caused by low party discipline. Finally, a number of crucial regions were left severely under-represented in the national legislature, most notably the city of Kyiv, where low turnout led with monotonous regularity to abortive elections from March 1994 through to December 1996.

In an effort to remedy these faults, a number of different organisations began work on alternative electoral laws after the 1994 elections. Four drafts were eventually developed, two by national-democratic political parties – Rukh and the Christian Democratic Party – one by the liberal Ukrainian Foundation for the Support of Reforms, and one by the parliamentary committee on legal reform, headed by Oleksander Lavrynovych. In as much as a majoritarian system benefits strong locally-based independent candidates at the expense of national parties, it was in the interest of the parties to alter the system. Though nominal independents make up a large proportion of the current parliament, their relative lack of internal organisation makes it considerably more difficult for them to promote their collective interest. Though the level of 'partification' in Ukraine may be low, it is nevertheless high enough for collective party interests to have played a dominant role in the redrafting of the electoral law. It is therefore not surprising that all major drafts are in agreement on the necessity of moving from a majoritarian to a mixed formula along the lines of the non-compensatory semi-proportional Russian system.[9] All four call for half (225) of the deputies to be elected from single-mandate territorial constituencies, and half from party lists. The various drafts differ as to whether they require absolute or relative majorities, whether they specify regional or national lists, whether or not they allow for preferential voting for the list seats, and what threshold they propose for the distribution of list seats.

The official Lavrynovych draft describes a system very close to the Russian model: plurality (relative majority) is to be sufficient for the territorial mandates,

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[7] The text of the law was published in *Holos Ukrayiny*, 27 November 1993. An English-language version can be found in the *Election Law Compendium of Central and Eastern Europe*, Kyiv: International Foundation for Electoral Systems, 1995.

[8] A small proportion of the Ukrainian electorate regularly employs the Soviet-era practice of voting against all the candidates on the ballot as a form of protest, and in a close race, these voters can depress totals for both lead candidates to under fifty per cent.

[9] The Lithuanian and Croatian systems are also of this type, which may be contrasted with the more usual mixed-member systems, such as those found in Germany, Albania, and Hungary where list seats are distributed so as to compensate (to greater or lesser degrees) for disproportionalities that result from the single-mandate selection process.

and national, party-determined lists are to fill the proportional seats. It differs from the Russian law in fixing a threshold of representation of three per cent instead of five per cent, and prescribing single nation-wide lists of candidates for all parties (Russian ballots for list seats include both national and region-specific candidates). There is also no turnout requirement in the Ukrainian draft, whereas twenty-five per cent of Russians must participate in any given constituency for that election to be valid.[10]

It has naturally been the Lavrynovych draft that has been given the most serious consideration by parliament, and it is this draft that will most certainly be the basis for the new electoral law. The bill was passed in first reading on 18 November 1995; a second reading, originally scheduled for March 1996, was postponed till after the new constitution had been adopted. Since then, legislative congestion arising from the need to harmonise existing legislation with the constitution has led to further delays in the second reading of the electoral bill, which is now scheduled for April 1997.[11] It is in the interests of all concerned to postpone a final decision on the bill as long as possible, so as to have the clearest picture of the political terrain they are likely to face in the 1998 elections. The last two electoral laws were passed in November for March elections, and work on the present bill could drag on for several more months. Nevertheless, the basic principles of the text currently under consideration will in all probability be incorporated into the final law.

What will be the effects of the changes envisaged? To what extent are they likely to achieve their three-fold aim of a) increasing the efficacy of the electoral process, b) structuring parliament, and c) promoting the consolidation of the party system? To answer these questions we must examine how the two components of the semi-proportional law can be expected to work in Ukraine. It is received wisdom among political scientists that plurality and majoritarian electoral systems magnify the take of large parties in the process of converting votes into seats (Duverger, 1959, p. 222; Sartori, 1994).[12] At a basic level, the Ukrainian results of 1994 conformed to this model. The seat share of the largest party, the Communist Party of Ukraine, was double its vote share (see Table 1), a distortion that accounted for over half the total deviation from proportionality. Yet the magnifying effect worked for the Communists alone, the overall deviation from proportionality was only 9.23.[13] Though this figure is more than double those found in Eastern European countries with proportional or semi-proportional electoral systems (McGregor, 1993, p. 13), it is lower than that which resulted from the Russian Duma elections of 1995 conducted according to a semi-proportional law (see Table 3), and considerably lower than the average for plurality systems (Taagepera and Shugart, 1989, p. 111).[14] The high overall degree of proportionality in

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[10] For a text of the Lavrynovych draft, see *Chas/Time*, 14 July 1995, pp. 4-5.

[11] Stipulation for a mixed electoral system was included in the Constitutional Accord between president and parliament passed in June 1995, but no specific prescriptions as to the electoral law were incorporated into the Constitution of June 1996.

[12] For a technical explanation of this effect, see Taagepera and Shugart, 1989, pp. 158-61.

[13] The least squares deviation from proportionality employed here is calculated by summing the squared differences between each party's vote share and its seat share, then dividing by two and taking the square root of the resulting figure. See Lijphart, 1994, pp. 60-61.

[14] McGregor and Taagepera and Shugart use a slightly different index from the one employed here, but this general relation holds regardless of the measure of disproportionality used.

the 1994 Ukrainian electoral results is puzzling. In the cases of the non-communist parties, little distortive tendency is evident. In fact, there is a remarkable degree of congruence between vote shares and seat shares for almost all Ukraine's major parties.

There are two possible ways of explaining this curious result. Firstly, it has been noted that the distortive effects of majoritarian systems are most pronounced in polities whose main political cleavages are not geographically determined. Where class or some other social-structural cleavage divides the electorate, large portions of the electorate in each constituency will find their votes going to minor party candidates who are not elected. If this pattern is spread evenly across the country, minor parties will suffer severe under-representation. If, however, the politically relevant groups in society are geographically concentrated, they will be more effective in securing representation (Curtice and Steed, 1982). With high levels of political regionalisation, the aggregated electoral majorities of territorially-based constituencies will reflect the political complexion of the country as a whole much more faithfully. There are two types of cleavage structure that will tend to generate territorially-based interests: rural/urban and ethno-regional cleavages. In agricultural areas, interests will often be closely linked to territorially-delimited regions, and will be opposed to urban interests (Barkan, 1995). The geographic concentration of politically mobilised ethnic groups will tend further to minimise the distortive effects of majority systems. To a large degree, the Ukrainian social structure does exhibit territorial cleavages both of the urban/rural and the ethnic type just described. These features are most pronounced in the west of the country, which is less urbanised and where ethnic distinctions are more marked. It is thus not surprising that the Communist vote – which has as its base the more industrial and more de-nationalised east – is the main source of electoral distortion, and that distortion is low for the parties of the right, which rely mostly on support from the west. The recent prohibition on regional parties is unlikely to alter this situation to any great extent; the country's most significant parties do for the most part have a national presence, though their strongest support is regionally concentrated (see Birch, 1996b).

A second possible explanation for the unusually high degree of congruence between vote share and seat share in the 1994 elections is, paradoxically, the fact that party affiliation may have been almost entirely irrelevant for large sectors of the electorate. If vote choice is made in ways that are based on non-party characteristics, then vote choice is effectively random from the point of view of partisan categories. With a large enough number of constituencies, random choices would yield the same outcome in single-member constituencies as in a fully proportional system. Given Ukrainian voters' relative unfamiliarity with political parties at the time of the 1994 elections,[15] it is likely that the random effect goes some way towards accounting for the proportional distribution of the parties' vote. The Communist Party, for which this effect failed to operate, was well known to all, and can be expected to have had powerful resonance for all. This would have made it less likely that voters would have treated KPU membership as an irrelevant attribute of a candidate.

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[15] Only 13 per cent of survey respondents could claim familiarity with the programme of *any* political party at the time of the 1994 elections (Demokratychni initsiatyvy, 1994, p. 22).

Table 2: Notional Results II

Party	Number of Seats Won (actual)		Total Vote Share (actual)	Simulated pure PR	Simulated PR w/ 5% threshold	Simulated PR w/ 3% threshold	Simulated mixed system w/ 3% threshold
Communist (KPU)	86	25.44%	12.72%	37.94%	48.51%	44.55%	33.63%
Socialist (SPU)	14	4.14	3.09	9.23	11.80	10.84	7.62
Agrarian (SelPU)	19	5.33	2.74	8.18	10.46	9.61	6.91
National Salvation (PNVU)			<0.01				
Total Left	119	35.21%	18.55%	55.35%	70.77%	65.00%	48.16%
Liberal (LPU)			0.60%	1.79%			
Democratic Rebirth (PDVU)	4	1.18%	0.83	2.47			0.55%
Social Democratic (SDPU)	2	0.59	0.36	1.07			0.20
Green (PZU)			0.25	0.74			
Labour (PPU)	4	1.18	0.40	1.18			0.45
Civic Congress (HKU)	2	0.59	0.25	0.75			0.35
Labour Congress (TKU)			0.29	0.86			0.10
Justice (UPS)			0.14	0.42			
Liberal Democratic (LDPU)			0.03	0.09			
Slavic Unity (PSEU)			0.06	0.19			
Solidarity & Soc. Justice (UPSSS)			0.04	0.13			
Constitutional Democratic (KDP)			0.04	0.13			
Econ. Rebirth of Crimea (PEVK)			0.07	0.21			
Beer Lovers (UPShP)			0.01	0.02			
Total Centre	12	3.55%	3.37%	10.05%			1.65%

Rukh (NRU)	20	5.92%	5.15%	15.36%	19.64%	18.04%	12.67%
Republican (URP)	8	2.37	2.52	7.51	9.60%	8.81	6.00
Democratic (DemPU)	2	0.59	1.08	3.22		3.78	2.34
Christian Democratic (KhDPU)	1	0.30	0.35	1.03			0.10
Peasant Democratic (USDP)			0.04	0.12			
Ukr. Christ. Democratic (UKhDP)			0.02	0.06			
Free Peasants (PVSU)			<0.01	0.01			
Total National Democratic		9.17%	9.16%	27.31%	29.24%	30.63%	21.11%
Cong. of Ukr. Nationalists (KUN)	5	1.48%	1.25%	3.72%		4.37%	2.74%
Ukr. Conserv. Repub. (UKRP)	2	0.59	0.34	1.02			0.20
Ukr. Nat. Assembly (UNA)	1	0.30	0.51	1.53			0.10
Social Nationalists (SNPU)			0.17	0.51			
Org. of Ukr. Nationalists (OUN)			0.06	0.17			
State Ind. of Ukraine (DSU)			0.09	0.25			
Ukr. Nat. Conserv. (UNKP)			0.02	0.07			
Total Extreme Right	8	2.37%	2.44%	7.27%		4.37%	3.04%
All parties	170	50.30%	33.52%	100%	100%	100%	74.00%
Independents	168	49.70%	66.48%				26.00%

Source: Calculated from the 'Vybory-1994' database constructed by the Petro Mohyla Scientific Society of Kyiv. For the sake of consistency and comparability, figures were calculated on the basis of vote and seat percentages for the March-April electoral rounds only.

Given the high degree of overall proportionality generated by the existing system, may it be that electoral reform in Ukraine will have little consequence for political outcomes? Prediction is always a dangerous business in politics, and it is not my aim to predict the outcome of the 1998 elections. There are too many factors in addition to the mere mechanics of the electoral law that affect electoral results. Even with the benefit of hindsight, it will be difficult to disentangle changes in outcomes due to the adoption of a new law, and those that are the result of other changes in the political landscape. Yet simulation of the effect of changes can suggest how the new law might operate differently from the old one, and because simulation requires data of some sort, I shall employ the results of the 1994 elections. Were these results determined mainly by conjunctural factors that will be of little relevance at the time of the 1998 elections, there would be grounds for questioning this approach. But there is reason to believe that there is a stable structure of political orientation beneath the surface of Ukraine's turbulent politics. Close longitudinal analyses of electoral results since 1989 have revealed a considerable degree of constancy in Ukrainian electoral behaviour (Birch, 1995; 1997; Wilson, 1997). This suggests that the distribution of support for parties in the parliamentary elections of 1994, while not a perfect indicator of support levels in 1998, can be taken as a rough predictor. And since the focus of the present analysis is the effect of electoral reform on the *relative* distribution of party support rather than on absolute levels, the results of the 1994 elections serve as a useful point of departure.

The one change on which virtually all sectors of the Ukrainian population were agreed was some provision for ensuring that elections would be efficient devices for selecting deputies. Given that in 91 of the 112 cases in which the March/April 1994 elections failed to elect a deputy this failure was attributable to the absolute majority requirement in the second round (which was apparently included in the law by mistake; Kremen et al, 1994, p. 12), the most obvious solution to this problem would be to revert to the law that governed the Ukrainian parliamentary elections of 1990. According to the 1990 law, a run-off would be held between the two top candidates if none managed to obtain an absolute majority in the first round, but a plurality would be sufficient for election in the run-off.[16] A reversion to this law would not have altered the results significantly. The left would have been slightly disadvantaged and the national-democrats would have fared slightly better, but the overall distribution of support would have remained the same (see Table 1, column 3).

Though low turnout was not a serious problem in March/April of 1994, it has been the main obstacle to filling vacant seats since that time. A turnout requirement may also be seen as an implicit violation of the voters' right not to exercise their franchise (International Foundation for Electoral Systems, 1994; Berezyuk, 1995). For reasons of efficacy and adherence to democratic principle, one of the alterations that had the most widespread support in Ukraine was removal of the turnout requirement. If both the turnout and the second round absolute majority requirements are lifted, the left suffers a further slight reduction in representation, and the national-democrats again gain slightly (see Table 1, column 4). Yet the draft law currently under consideration goes further than simple removal of

[16] The text of the 1990 law may be found in *Pravda Ukrayiny*, 1 November 1989, pp. 1-3.

barriers to election for the single-mandate seats; it further specifies a plurality rule rather than an absolute majority rule. If a plurality requirement had been in force in 1994 (*and* there had been no turnout requirement), the left would have suffered a reduction in representation of approximately four per cent in relation to the actual result. The national-democrats, by contrast, would have gained two per cent (see Table 1, column 5). It is clear that the cumulative effects of the changes so far described would not fundamentally have altered the results of the 1994 elections. Removal of the turnout requirement and the institution of a plurality rule are indeed incorporated into the new draft law, and such changes may well serve their intended purpose of stabilising the size of the legislature and facilitating the electoral process, but they will in all probability not in themselves result in a significant redistribution of legislative strength.[17]

It might be expected that the adoption of PR would bring about a redistribution of legislative forces much more comprehensive than mere fiddling with majority and turnout rules. The third column of Table 2 gives the notional seat percentages that a pure proportional system would have generated in 1994, had all independent candidates been eliminated and their support redistributed in proportion to the vote shares received by party candidates. There is some justification for this procedure. Andrew Wilson's careful analysis of the political orientations of deputies elected to the Supreme Council in 1994 has demonstrated that the majority of such deputies share the dominant political view of the region they represent (Wilson, 1997, pp. 139-40). Given the high degree of regionalisation of Ukrainian politics, this 'chameleon effect' tends to reinforce the partisan distribution in the legislature. It is thus fair to assume that the further 'partification' of Ukrainian politics brought about as a result of a move to a list electoral system will result in an even increase in party strength across the political spectrum, all else being equal.

Though it boosts the support of the national-democrats considerably, the simulation of pure PR yields an absolute majority to the left (see Table 2, column 3).[18] Moreover, if Ukraine were to adopt the five per cent threshold in force for list seats in Germany and Russia, the strength of the left would rise to a startling 70.8 per cent of list seats due to the elimination of minor parties (see Table 2, column 4). The law currently under consideration stipulates a threshold of three per cent; were this rule applied to all constituencies, enough minor parties would be eliminated for the left to garner nearly two-thirds of the total seats according to the 1994 vote distribution. Though Rukh and the Ukrainian Republican Party (URP) in the

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[17] A factor not considered here for want of means is the probable enhancement of the magnification of the Communist vote that will occur as a result of the reduction of the number of single-member seats in a semi-PR system. Higher levels of aggregation will naturally tend to increase effects that are evident under the present system; indeed, a simulation of this type of change in Britain showed that a doubling of constituency size would virtually wipe Labour out of the south of the country and the Conservatives out of Scotland (Dunleavy et al, 1992, p. 8). On the other hand, it might well be that there is a natural ceiling in Ukraine on left-wing support, in that many former current independents will be reluctant to associate themselves with this party, and there is a limit to the amount of popular support they can attract.

[18] No attempt is made here to estimate the likely effects of different methods of distributing list seats. While no method yields a perfectly proportional result, the results of all methods are close enough to proportionality for the difference not to be a significant consideration in an approximate analysis of the sort conducted here.

national-democratic camp would together win nearly a third of the parliamentary seats under such a regime, the left would still have close to a constitutional majority and would thus be in a position to control politics single-handed. The final simulation undertaken is that which most closely approximates the working of the current (Lavrynovych) draft law. This result (Table 2, column 6) was achieved by averaging the results of the previous three per cent threshold simulation with those for the plurality simulation. Under this model the left gets just under half of the seats in parliament, while the national-democratic camp wins about a fifth and would command nearly a quarter if they joined forces with the far right. The representation of centrist and far right parties is negligible, and many would be eliminated from actual representation by the workings of the formula for distributing proportional seats (the current draft specifies a least remainders formula). The balance of power clearly lies with the left and the national-democrats. The left is still the overall beneficiary under this scenario, but the relative distortion of its strength is more in line with that for the national-democratic camp. The seat proportion of the left parties would together be 2.59 times their combined vote proportion; the same figure for the national-democratic parties is 2.30. An aspect of the change less frequently remarked on is the effect it would have on the overall proportionality of the system. According to this simulation, the deviation from proportionality would be reduced from the 9.23 actually obtained in 1994 to 4.67. Though relatively low by majority standards, exaggerations generated by the existing system will be further reduced by a move to semi-PR. Not only will the new law render Ukrainian politics more effective and manageable, it will also render parliament more representative. The oft-claimed trade-off between 'effectiveness' and 'representation' is not an issue in the Ukrainian case, where the move to semi-proportionality is likely to have a positive-sum effect.

While instructive, these simulations obviously represent a gross over-simplification of the likely effects of electoral reform in Ukraine. In addition to the alteration in the aggregative mechanism by which votes are translated into seats, it is also necessary to consider the possible implications that changes in the law would have for candidate and voter strategies. Changes in voting behaviour as a result of altered electoral systems are extremely difficult to gauge. One relevant question is whether voters would opt for the same party on the list ballot as that chosen for the single-member seat. Research suggests that the great majority of Germans and Hungarians vote straight tickets (Benoit, 1996; Roberts, 1996), as apparently would the plurality-trained British, if given the opportunity (Dunleavy et al, 1992). Yet it is the Russian case that provides the most useful term of comparison, as the new Ukrainian law was modelled largely on rules adopted for the 1993 and 1995 Duma elections (see White et al, 1997, pp. 189-96), and the party structures of the two countries are roughly analogous. Parallels can be drawn between the four major winning parties in Ukraine's 1994 elections and the distribution of support in the single-member seats in the Russian Duma elections of 1995. The largest winners were in both cases the Communists, taking 25.4 per cent of the seats in the Supreme Council and 25.8 per cent of the single-member seats in the Duma. The Russian Agrarians were more successful than their Ukrainian counterparts, taking 8.8 per cent of the single-mandate seats to the SelPU's 5.3 per cent. This may de due to the fact that the Ukrainian Socialist Party was well-entrenched in Ukraine's rural centre. Overall the SPU gained 4.1

per cent of seats in 1994, while its closest equivalent in the Russian political perspective, Ryzhkov's soft left Power to the People! Party gained 4.0 per cent of Russia's territorial mandates. On the other end of the political spectrum, the most prominent reformist parties – Rukh in Ukraine, Yabloko in Russia – won 5.9 per cent and 6.2 per cent of the respective single-mandate seats. Both parties are distinguished from their main rival in the reform camp – the URP in Ukraine and Russia's Democratic Choice in Russia – by the fact of never having been associated with the ruling administration and thus having a reputation for clean hands.

At first glance it might seem that the performance of parties in the single-member seats would have little bearing on list outcomes. Survey evidence reveals that unlike Germans and Hungarians, most Russians split their tickets (Rose, 1995, p. 8), and the low profile of political parties in Ukraine would seem to suggest that Ukrainian voters would not feel constrained to coordinate their two votes along party lines either. Yet all the parties that scored well in Russia's single-member seats also cleared the five per cent threshold for the list seats, and the proportion of the list seats they received was not so different from their take in the single-member seats. (The exceptions are the Agrarians and Power to the People!, which did considerably worse on the lists.) The Communists also did slightly worse, which suggests that the left's strong grass-roots base puts it in a better position to win territorial mandates than list support. The same organisational legacies affect Ukraine's leftist parties, and we can expect a similar result on the Ukrainian lists. The left will in all likelihood perform well overall, and their seat share will be considerably augmented by the magnifying effect of the threshold, but they cannot be expected to do as well on the list as their proportion of the single-mandate seats would lead one to believe. There is little reason to believe that the main right-wing parties will see their relative strength change considerably as a result of the proposed reforms. Not only does their present seat share closely approximate their vote share, but the results of Russia's equivalent parties in the two types of seat was also similar.

Vladimir Zhirinovsky was perhaps the greatest beneficiary of Russia's switch to semi-proportionality. Though able to command almost no single-mandate seats, he has polled extremely well in Russia's list votes. Will a move towards proportionality in Ukraine bring to the fore a similar type of figure? This seems unlikely. Ukraine's ethnic mix leads to a situation in which nationalism has less widespread appeal than in Russia, and radical right-wing figures such as Stepan Khmara are unlikely to find much of a following. Moreover, the regional concentration of radical right-wing support in Ukraine mean that the far right is already efficient at turning votes into seats, and there is little reason to believe it would benefit substantially from party lists.

The advent of lists would, however, change the party system in one important way: the so-called 'party of power' would have a strong incentive to organise for the election under a party label, such as Our Home is Russia in 1995, or at least an electoral coalition such as the Non-Party Bloc to Support Reform in the Polish parliamentary elections of 1993.[19] The nature of the list system would mean that

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[19] The Popular Democratic Party may well play this role in 1998, though the high degree of fluidity of centrist politics in Ukraine makes speculation difficult at this stage.

Table 3: Russian Duma Election Results*

Party/Bloc	1993			1995		
	List votes	List seats	SM seats	List votes	List seats	SM seats
Russia's (Democratic) Choice	15.5%	17.8%	13.3%	3.9%		4.0%
LDP	22.9	26.2	2.2	11.2	22.2%	0.4
CPFR	12.4	14.2	7.1	22.3	44.0	25.8
Agrarian party	8.0	9.3	5.3	3.8		8.9
Yabloko	7.9	8.9	1.3	6.9	13.8	6.2
Women of Russia	8.1	9.3	0.9	4.6		1.3
PRES	6.8	8.0	0.4	0.4		0.4
DPR	5.5	6.2	0.4			
Civic Union	1.9	—	0.4			
Democratic Reform Movement	4.1	—	1.7			
Dignity and Charity	0.7	—	0.9			
Russia's Future	1.3	—	0.4			
Kedr	0.8	—	—	1.4		
Our Home is Russia				10.1	20.0	4.4
Power to the People!				1.6		4.0
KRO				4.3		2.2
Forward, Russia!				1.9		1.3
Ivan Rybkin Bloc				1.1		1.3
Pamfilova-Gurov-Lysenko				1.6		0.9
Communists-Working Russia				4.5		0.4
Workers' Self-Government				4.0		0.4
Trade Union and Industrialists				1.6		0.4
Govorukhin Bloc				1.0		0.4
Derzhava				2.6		
Independent			62.7			34.7

Source: White et al, 1997, pp. 123, 224.
* Includes parties that obtained at least 1.0 per cent of the list vote and/or at least two single-member seats in either election.
NB: The overall deviation from proportionality (least squares method) was 7.84 in 1993 and 10.77 in 1995. This calculation is based not on *vote proportions* of the list vote (as vote percentages for the single-member seats are not available) but on *seat proportions* for all constituencies.

such a bloc would do considerably better than Kuchma's Inter-Regional Bloc for Reforms, which performed miserably in 1994, despite the confidence the Ukrainian electorate manifested in its leader not four months later. Other independents would also have an incentive to join or form parties, which would most likely reduce their number as a proportion of single-mandate deputies. The proportion of independents in Russia's territorial constituencies dropped by almost half from 62.7 per cent in 1993 to 34.7 per cent in 1995 (White et al, 1997, pp. 123, 224), undoubtedly as a partial result of the partisan organisation required by list-centred electoral politics.

All in all, the proposed changes to the Ukrainian electoral law can be expected to affect the *strength* of the party system more than they will alter its *shape*. Because simultaneous election of the entire deputy corpus will replace the rolling elections of 1994-96, the party structure within parliament will have a fixed base on which to form, and the larger overall number of deputies will decrease the opportunities for any one group to block parliamentary activity by refusing to attend. If the Russian experience is anything to go by, the institutionalisation of list voting will not necessarily lead to strong party discipline or clear partisan divisions in the parliament. Yet the presence of party labels on the ballot will at least accustom the electorate to thinking in terms of collective actors in the legislature, and they will thus have more opportunity to engage in the type of praise- and blame-attribution that subtends notions of representative accountability. This is not meant to imply that a higher rate of party affiliation among deputies will *necessarily* lead to a more accountable parliament, but it is difficult to see how an accountable parliament could come into being without such an extension of partisanship.

The evidence presented here suggests that the overall partisan balance of the Supreme Council is unlikely to be greatly affected by a move to semi-PR, and that the territorialisation of Ukrainian politics is likely to persist. Other things being equal, the most probable outcome is the continuation of a near majority of the left, but not the two-thirds required to alter the constitution; the right will be a major player, but will be obliged to work with centrists to pass legislation. The centre is likely to consolidate, as the list component of the new system will oblige it to organise. The three per cent threshold for the list seats will seriously reduce the access of small parties to parliament, however. Even this modest threshold would have excluded all but seven of the parties whose members were supported in 1994. This will serve to further bolster the strength of the main parties in the legislature and make for a more 'manageable' system. In this respect, the proposed law is likely to achieve the ends desired of it: parliament will be more electable, more predictable, and the party system will have an incentive to consolidate. There is also reason to believe that the resultant parliament will be more representative in partisan terms than that generated by the majoritarian system.

From the point of view of political science, the most significant conclusion to be drawn from the foregoing analysis is that elections in democratising countries are different. The supposed trade-off in electoral design between effectiveness and representativeness does not necessarily hold for all polity types; in the Ukrainian case, the move towards a more proportional system is likely to further

both ends simultaneously. This might give pause to intrepid electoral engineers who make recommendations to newly-competitive systems on the basis of analyses of the so-called 'established democracies'. It suggests that proportional systems might be more conducive than majoritarian regimes to producing structured party systems in countries with 'virgin' electorates. Yet it also points to the necessity of recognising differences within the category of newly-competitive polities, for the same conclusion could not be drawn with respect to 'betrayed' electorates – those that have experienced a functioning multi-party system in living memory but have lost it in a tryst with authoritarianism. In this case the previously existing party system would be ready and waiting to be resuscitated, and the palimpsest of previous electoral politics could be expected to play a significant role in mapping the new electoral space (hence the difference between voter strategies in Hungary and Russia). If democratic institutions operate differently in newly-competitive democracies from the way they operate in established democracies, they also operate differently in newly-competitive polities with different types of past; comparative analysis would do well to bear this in mind.

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The Ukrainian Left: Still a Barrier to Reform?*

Andrew Wilson

According to the protocol attached to the Ukrainian constitution agreed in June 1996, new parliamentary elections are scheduled for March 1998. Whereas the left-wing parties were the main victors in the last elections held in spring 1994, Western commentators have expressed the hope that they will be a declining force this time round. At the same time, Western opinion has blamed the residual strength of the Ukrainian left for Ukraine's relatively late start (in autumn 1994) in economic and constitutional reform, and for the failure of either the Constitutional Agreement adopted in 1995 or the new Constitution of June 1996 to bring about a decisive acceleration of the pace of change. Moreover, in the one area where Ukraine has made more solid progress, namely the consolidation of national independence, the left has always been the main force questioning the wisdom of full separation from Russia.

In other works, I have discussed in detail the parties of the nationalist right in Ukraine and the history of the development of their leftist opponents.[1] This article aims to provide a postscript to the latter by examining the future prospects for the Ukrainian left, in particular how they are likely to approach the parliamentary elections scheduled for March 1998, and whether their opposition to the reform process in Ukraine is moderating as the parties slowly evolve towards a more 'national' and more 'social democratic' stance.

Ukraine has four major and two minor left-wing parties, listed in Table 1 below.

Table 1. Left-Wing Parties in Ukraine

Major	Minor	Date of Foundation
	Union of Communists of Ukraine (UCU)	December 1992
*Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU)		June 1993
	Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine (PSPU)	April 1996
*Socialist Party of Ukraine (SPU)		October 1991
*Villager Party of Ukraine (SelPU)		January 1992
	Agrarian Party of Ukraine (AgPU)	November 1996

* Parties of the original 'Left Bloc' in 1994

[1] For a more detailed study of the left-wing parties in Ukraine, see my article, 'The Ukrainian Left: In Transition to Social Democracy or Still in Thrall to the USSR?', *Europe-Asia Studies*, vol. 49 (1997). For the Ukrainian right, see my *Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1990s: A Minority Faith*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.

There is no doubt that the left-wing parties are still the strongest in Ukraine. The Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU) is the largest party in Ukraine, both in the parliament (Verkhovna Rada) and in the country at large. As of January 1997, its 92 deputies in parliament (which has 415 members out of a complement of 450) were three times the number of the next largest party (Rukh, the main nationalist party, had only 26). Moreover, the Communists had an estimated 120,000 members in the country at large, compared to Rukh's 50,000. Until the launch of the Agrarian Party in November 1996, the Villager Party (SelPU) was the only real political force in the Ukrainian countryside. Unlike Russia, the Communists and Villagers have also been partnered to date by a powerful Socialist Party (SPU).

In terms of overall membership and representation, the left parties have a clear comparative advantage over rival parties of the nationalist right and liberal centre, as shown in Table 2 below (the UCU have approximately 2,000 members, but are a ginger group who did not really participate in the 1994 elections; the Progressive Socialists have two deputies in parliament and approximately 1,000 members; no information is yet available for the Agrarian Party). Moreover, the parties of the right are over-dependent on their regional support base in Galicia and Kyiv city, while the figures for electoral representation of the centre parties at a local level demonstrate that they have little in the way of grass roots organisation.

Table 2. Strength of Main Left-Wing and Selected Other Political Parties

	Membership (1997)	National Deputies (1997)	Local Deputies (1997)
i) Left			
CPU	80,000–120,000	92	4,005
SPU	29,370	20	378
SelPU	65,000–100,000	19	932
ii) Right			
Rukh	50,000	26	965
Republicans	13,000	10	428
KUN	14,000	5	297
iii) Centre			
Liberals	40,000	12	20
Christian Democrats	12,000	10	53

Figures do not necessarily match those in Table 4. For example, the Communists originally lent the Socialists six deputies to help them establish a faction, but they remain members of the CPU. Information for deputies at a local level was only available for those originally elected in 1994.

Sources: *Ukrayina v 1996 rotsi*, Kyiv: Politychna dumka/Instytut postkomunistychnykh doslidzhen, 1997, p. 50; author's calculations from a report by the Secretariat of the Supreme Council of Ukraine, 'Zvedenyi statystychnyi zvit pro sklad deputativ, vykonavchykh komitetiv i postiynykh komisiy mistsevykh Rad narodnykh deputativ Ukrayiny vybory 26 chervnya 1994 roku'.

The CPU was established at a 'refoundation' congress in Donetsk in June 1993.[2] Although the new CPU saw itself as the successor to the old Communist Party of Ukraine that had been banned in August 1991, it was only allowed to establish itself as a new party. Nevertheless, the CPU was one of the most conservative successor parties in the whole of the former Soviet bloc.[3] Its nostalgia for the USSR was unambiguous; the party stood for 'the rebirth on a new and exclusively voluntary basis of a union of the fraternal peoples of the independent states formed on the territory of the USSR'.[4] Moreover, in domestic politics it showed little evidence of 'social democratisation', resolutely opposing all aspects of privatisation and market reform, and all manifestations of 'Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism'. Because of the Communists' opposition, the IMF-backed transformation plan launched by President Kuchma in October 1994 has proceeded in fits and starts, and parliament was engaged for two years from 1994 to 1996 in a bitter struggle for constitutional reform.

However, the CPU is not as monolithic as it sometimes appears, and the parliamentary party contains at least three main groups (there are no formal 'factions'). There are perhaps twenty 'national communist' deputies on the right of the party. However, their natural spokesman, Borys Oliynyk, chairman of the parliamentary foreign affairs committee, has recently been too ill to provide much-needed leadership. On the left are the 24 deputies (out of 34 in total) who joined the *Soyuz* ('Union') group in October 1995, which has called openly for a restored USSR.[5] The *Soyuz* group overlaps substantially with the Communists' Donbas caucus, led informally by Volodymyr Moyseyenko from Donetsk.

In the middle are the party mainstream, which in the past has been ideologically closer to the left than the right. Table 5 below shows how the centre has voted with the left on most key issues in parliament, or abstained, as in the June 1996 vote on the constitution. The fact that the party expelled five of those who voted for the constitution is indicative of where the party's centre of gravity still lies.[6]

The Union of Communists of Ukraine is a hard-line group originally formed to contest the ban on the CPU in 1991-93. Since the CPU's 'refoundation' in June 1993, it has found it difficult to carve out its own political niche. Significantly, there is no real opportunity in Ukraine for a party to the left of the CPU, as the CPU left occupies the relevant political space, whereas in Russia Gennadiy Zyuganov's Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) faces strong competition from Viktor Anpilov's Russian Communist Workers' Party, which won 4.5% of the vote in the December 1995 Duma elections.

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[2] See Hurenko, Stanislav, et al (eds.), *Kommunisticheskaya partiya Ukrainy: Khronika zapreta*, Donetsk: Interbuk, 1992, on the banning of the CPU in 1991, and *Partiya Kommunistov vozrozhdaetsya. Dokumenty i materialy vtorogo etapa Vseukrainskoi konferentsii kommunistov i sezd KPU*, Kherson: Party document, 1993, on the party's 'rebirth' in 1993.

[3] For the programmatic documents of the CPU see *Partiya Kommunistov vozrozhdaetsya...*, op. cit., 1993, and the documents from the second party congress in March 1995 in *Komunist*, nos. 11 and 12 (March) 1995.

[4] 'Za sotsialnuyu spravedlivost i spasenie dukhovnosti, za realnoe narodovlastie i dostoinuyu cheloveka zhizn. Platforma KPU na vyborakh v Verkhovnyi Sovet Ukrainy', *Komunist*, no. 1 (February) 1994.

[5] Melnichuk, Tatyana, 'Kto i dlya chego sozdal "Soyuz"?', *Vseukrainskie vedomosti*, 12 October 1995.

[6] *Segodnya*, 21 September 1996.

As in Russia, the Ukrainian Communists have traditionally been partnered by a 'Village' Party built on the remnants of the Agrarian Union of the Soviet era, the *Selyanska partiya Ukrayiny* or SelPU.[7] In the 1994 elections, the SelPU had no real competition in the Ukrainian countryside (with the exception of the nationalist stronghold of Galicia in western Ukraine), which it dominated by default, building a faction of 52 deputies by October 1994, then the second largest in parliament. However, although the SelPU fought the 1994 elections as part of a loosely united 'Left Bloc' with the Communists and Socialists (see below), its catch-all nature and rudimentary party structure (only one party congress has been held since 1992) have barely concealed underlying divisions which surfaced in June 1995. The 'Agrarian' faction in parliament split over President Leonid Kuchma's proposals for constitutional reform; 25 deputies renamed themselves the 'Agrarians for Reforms' and ceased to vote with the left, 28 deputies became the faction of the SelPU.

A further split occurred in late 1996. Differences in parliament were formalised in the country at large through the launch of an 'Agrarian Party of Ukraine' (*Ahrarna partiya Ukrayiny*), backed by Premier Pavlo Lazarenko and, reportedly, also by President Kuchma (the rivalry between the two men for the use of the new party as a power-base might undermine its prospects). On the other hand, in parliament a reunited 'Agrarian' faction was formed at the same time, with 38 members. First indications were that it was less of an equal merger than the 'Agrarians for Reforms' writ large, but at the time of writing no exact information about its voting behaviour in parliament was available. Moreover, uncertainty was also created by the departure of four deputies from the 'Agrarians for Reforms' for the new Constitutional Centre faction (see below).

The third major party of the left, the Socialist Party of Ukraine (SPU), is actually the oldest, and has moved furthest towards becoming a national party of the moderate left.[8] The SPU was founded in October 1991, when the Communist Party was still banned in Ukraine. Before its dissolution in August 1991, the Ukrainian Communist Party had contained both 'national communist' and orthodox internationalist factions, and the SPU's founder, Oleksander Moroz, originally hoped the new party would operate more in the former tradition and adopt a more 'modern' image. However, until the CPU was reborn in June 1993 the Socialist Party also acted as a haven for former Communists, and Moroz was unable to launch his 'modernisation' strategy until after the 1994 elections (as a result of which he was elected chairman of parliament).[9]

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[7] *Selyanska partiya* is here best translated as 'village' or 'villagers' party (*selo* means 'village'), in order to distinguish it from the Agrarian Party founded in November 1996 (see below). For the programme of the SelPU, see *Prohrama i statut Selyanskoyi partiyi Ukrayiny. Pryinyata Ustanovchoyu konferentsiyeyu SelPU 25 sichnya 1992 roku v m. Khersoni*, Kherson: Party document, 1992, and *Materialy I zyizdu Selyanskoyi partiyi Ukrayiny*, (Kyiv: Party document, 1993.

[8] For the SPU's political evolution, see *Materialy ustanovchoho zyizdu Sotsialistychnoyi partiyi Ukrayiny*, Kyiv: Party document, 1991; *Programma i ustav Sotsialisticheskoi partii Ukrainy (prinyaty II-m sezdom SPU, 28-29 noyabrya 1992 goda)*, Kyiv: Party brochure, 1993; and the material on the party's February 1996 conference in *Tovarysh*, nos. 8 and 9 (February) 1996.

[9] For Moroz's views, see the two collections of his speeches and essays, Moroz, Oleksandr, *Kudy idemo?*, Kyiv: Postup, 1993, and *Vybir*, Kyiv: Postup, 1994.

At the fourth party congress in April 1994 Moroz spoke of copying the 'Polish strategy' by taking the SPU in a more centrist direction and building a broad centre-left alliance of the type created by Alexander Kwasniewski's Democratic Left Alliance to win the September 1993 elections in Poland. The SPU also has its internal divisions, however, and the party left's opposition to Moroz's 'new course' led to a formal split over the winter of 1995-96, when two of the party's deputies, Nataliya Vitrenko and Volodymyr Marchenko, unsuccessfully challenged Moroz to give up either his position as chairman of parliament or his position as head of the party. Vitrenko and Marchenko were expelled, and formed the Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine in April 1996.[10] The latter has sought to carve out a niche for itself by opposing the drift to 'national liberalism'.

Together the Communists, Socialists and Agrarians won a plurality, if not a majority, of seats in the 1994 elections. Table 3 shows how the strength of the left in parliament remained relatively constant until 1996 (if the 25 members of the 'Agrarians for Reforms' are included after the Agrarians' split in June 1995, the percentage of seats controlled by the left was still 41.7% in November 1995 and 39.4% in May 1996). Only with the dissolution of the SelPU faction in late 1996 did the left begin to lose significant strength (the Communists voluntarily reduced their own numbers by five in September 1996 – see above).

Table 3. Development of the Main Left-Wing Groups in the 1994 Parliament

	CPU	SPU	PSPU	SelPU	(AforR)	All	Left%
Original*	95	14	—	24	—	338	39.4
July 1994	84	25	—	36	—	335	43.3
Oct 1994	90	30	—	52	—	395	43.5
Nov 1995	89	27	—	28	(25)	405	35.6
May 1996	92	25	2	25	(25)	424**	34.0
Jan 1997	86	25	2	— 38 —		415	36.4
							or (27.2)

* 'Original' is the number of deputies elected under a party label in spring 1994, subsequent rows show how the three *factions* developed over time.
** Not including Heorhiy Shevchenko and Mykola Kashlyakov of the CPU, who died in early 1996.

Sources: Arel, Dominique, and Wilson, Andrew, 'The Ukrainian Parliamentary Elections', *RFE/RL Research Report*, vol. 3, no. 26, 1 July 1994, p. 12; *Holos Ukrayiny*, 12 July 1994; *Vseukrainskie vedomosti*, 22 October 1994; 'Spysok deputatskykh hrup i fraktsiy u Verkhovniy Radi Ukrayiny za stanom na 1 lystopada 1995 roku'; *Holos Ukrayiny*, 1 and 22 February 1996; *Daily express*, 9 April 1996; *Ukrayina v 1996 rotsi*, Kyiv: Politychna dumka/Instytut postkomunistychnykh doslidzhen, 1997, p. 52.

[10] See the party's journal, *Batkivshchyna*, no. 1, 7 May 1996.

Moreover, Table 4 shows that the left factions (the Agrarians excepted) remained relatively stable in comparison to those of the centre and even the nationalist right. The centre has been particularly prone to realignment, with three new factions appearing in 1994-96; the 'Independents', 'Social-Market Choice', and 'Constitutional Centre', while the 'Centre' faction has disappeared completely (21 out of 29 of its members joined 'Constitutional Centre'). The right-wing camp was initially more solid, but in 1996 'Statehood' was wound up after its leading core, members of the Ukrainian Republican Party (URP), joined 'Constitutional Centre'. On the other hand, the URP has also formed a 'National Front' with the more radical Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists (KUN).

Table 4. Main Groups in the Ukrainian Parliament, 1994-97

	July 1994	February 1996	January 1997
Left			
Communists	84	99	86
Socialists	25	24	25
Agrarians (SelPU)	36	26	—
Centre			
Agrarians of Ukraine			
(Nov 96+)	—	—	38
Agrarians for Reforms	—	25	—
Unity	25	24	37
Interregional Bloc	25	22	28
'Independents'	—	25	25
Social Market Choice	—	31	24
Constitutional Centre	—	—	58
Centre	38	29	—
Reforms	27	30	29
Ukrainian Nationalist			
Rukh	27	29	26
Statehood	25	29	—
In no Faction	23	34	40
Total	335	418	415

Numbers do not add due to overlapping and movement between factions.

Sources: *Holos Ukrayiny*, 12 June 1994 and 22 February 1996; *Ukrayina v 1996 rotsi: analitychna dopovid*, Kyiv: Politychna dumka/Instytut postkomunistychnykh doslidzhen, 1997, p. 52.

The left has also been consistently successful in repeat election in 1994-96, with eleven new Communist deputies elected. However, apparent stability in terms of faction size and strength was not matched in voting patterns. In the immediate aftermath of the 1994 elections, with the right winning only a quarter of the seats and the centre incoherent, it seemed that the left was the dominant force in parliament. Moroz was elected speaker by 171 votes to 103, and the left showed its discipline in key votes such as the suspension of Ukraine's (limited) privatisation programme in July 1994, by 180 votes to 62.[11]

However, by late 1994 the strains of the reform process and the political realignment of the SPU and Agrarians were beginning to exact their toll on the unity of the left. Table 5 below shows that the Agrarians began to break ranks as early as autumn 1994 (Vote A), while the SPU has swung back and forth. The CPU, on the other hand, has been fairly consistently, if not monolithically, against most key reforms, at least until the 1996 vote on the constitution (Vote D).

Table 5. Loss of Left-Wing Voting Discipline in 1994-95

Vote A: October 1994 vote on government's first 'market' reform programme

Vote B: October 1994 vote on exemptions from privatisation programme

Vote C: June 1995 Constitutional Agreement

Vote D: June 1996 Constitution

Faction	CPU		SPU		Agrarians		Overall Vote	
	For	Ag	For	Ag	For	Ag	For	Ag
Vote A	29	46	18	4	36	0	231	54
Vote B	14	56	5	14	16	5	188	94
Vote C	3	64	6	8	17	1*	240	83
Vote D	20	29	17	6	21	0**	315	36

Sources: Bilous, Artur, 'Pivtory sotni reformatoriv shche ne ryatuyut ukrayinsku demokratiyu', *Demoz*, no. 5, 1995, pp. 8-13, at p. 9; Tomenko, Mykola, et al, *Verkhovna Rada Ukrayiny: paradyhmy i paradoksy*, issue 1, Kyiv: Ukrayinska perspektyva, 1995, p. 28; issue 2, p. 7; information supplied by Kataryna Wolczuk.

Where does the left go from here? Its support base seems relatively stable, but undynamic. The leaders of the CPU seem intent on recreating the Left Bloc of 1994, despite the indications from the 1996 Russian presidential election that such a strategy was unlikely to work. The SPU's search for allies in the political centre has not brought much success. One of Moroz's key targets, the Social Democratic Party of Ukraine (United) led by Vasyl Onopenko, the former Minister

[11] *Holos Ukrayiny*, 2 August 1994.

of Justice,[12] chose instead to join the *Mist* ('Bridge') coalition with the Labour Party (in reality a party of the east Ukrainian industrial élite) and the national-democrat Democratic Party of Ukraine. Moreover, there may be a greater degree of intra-camp competition in 1998 than in 1994, after the formation of the Progressive Socialists and the Agrarian Party.

The left's prospects obviously depend on the form of election law Ukraine finally adopts (see the article by Sarah Birch in this issue of *The Ukrainian Review*, pp. 12-29). Other things being equal, however, it is the parties of the centre and centre-left that offer the real threat to the left. The electoral base of the right is fairly stable, and they can once again expect around a quarter of the seats. However, the centre parties' disorganisation in 1994 led them to underperform, since when the partial successes of economic reform may have widened their political base. This time around parties such as *Mist*, the Popular Democrats, and even the Social Democrats may mount a stronger challenge to the left, while parties like the Liberals may encroach upon the left's natural territory in eastern Ukraine.

In the most likely scenario, the left will neither make significant gains nor collapse, in which case pressures for realignment are likely to grow and strengthen the hand of the SPU and moderate Agrarians. The key to realignment, however, remains the CPU, as by far the largest party on the left.   ❑

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[12] Onopenko's party was created in April 1996 as a result of the merger of the Social Democratic, Justice and Human Rights parties, and with 21,000 members is a key player of the centre-left.

Ukraine and Europe: Relations Since Independence

Roman Wolczuk

Introduction

The maelstrom caused by the collapse of the Soviet Union leaves Ukraine in a highly unusual predicament, finding itself as it does, in terms of its geography, history, and economy, on the periphery of two structurally changing systems:

1) geographically, Ukraine is the easternmost aspirant to the European Union with at least an outside chance of membership, yet at the same time was one of the westernmost members of a rapidly decomposing empire the remains of which still evidence difficulties with adapting to the new international situation;

2) historically, Ukraine is, on the one hand, in danger of losing out on a unique historical opportunity and being left out of the European economic and political space in which membership is being expanded to allow for finite increases in depth and breadth; however, this process of integration is occurring at such a pace that Ukraine may fail in both regards, something that may seal its destiny for many years to come; on the other hand its independence will go down in history as the lid on (rather than the last nail in) the coffin of a 74 year old political and economic cadaver;

3) in terms of its economy, the country is aiming to lock into a fast moving and evolving economic system preparing for the battles of the twenty-first century while simultaneously (and belatedly) trying to escape from the clutches of its impoverished and unprepared Russian neighbour, which it was once hoped would deliver economic salvation but now is seen to be incapable of providing for itself, let alone its neighbours, the necessary impetus for the technological leap that the new millennium will require from the front runners.

While Ukraine is not alone in some of these respects, its uniqueness lies in the fact that it combines all of these factors with size (as one of the larger countries of Europe) while having simultaneously to proceed rapidly along the path of state and nation building in order to help smooth over and ultimately try to bridge the historical, geographical, linguistic, ethnic, religious and political cleavages that so permeate the country. In other words, Ukraine represents an unprecedented combination of unresolved issues in a highly sensitive geopolitical position torn between the 'West' and 'Eurasia'. It is in this context that, since independence in 1991, Ukraine has been making vigorous and systematic efforts towards institutional integration with Europe while simultaneously blocking, slowing or non-participating in the renewal of institutional ties amongst the states of the former Soviet Union. This westward (re-)orientation can be seen as taking place on two levels.

On one level, the emphasis placed by the political élites on Ukraine's European heritage, culture, and history represent their efforts in trying to create (or recreate) a European, or more precisely, a Central European identity. Thus references to Ukraine's prominent role in European history (in the form of Kyivan

Rus') at the beginning of this millennium, the dynastic ties with Europe emanating from the period (for example, the daughter of Yaroslav the Wise, a ruler of Rus' in the eleventh century, became the queen of France), and subsequent military alliances with European powers (such as that between Hetman Mazepa and Charles XII of Sweden against Russia in the eighteenth century), serve as the backdrop to justifying the intensification of Ukraine's ties with Europe.[1]

On a more manifest level, however, it represents a pragmatic way of trying to deal with the very real economic, security, and political problems facing the states of the former Soviet Union (FSU) such as the drastic economic decline that has characterised their fate since independence – European institutions represent beacons of hope (or, indeed, salvation) and, crucially, a source of financial aid or at least facilitating access to it. Implicit within this is the growing realisation that Russia is decreasingly able to provide the economic stimulus for recovery; this is compounded by concerns as to future Russian domestic political developments and prevailing attitudes amongst the Moscow political élites as to how internal (e.g. Chechnya) and international (e.g. Crimea) issues should be resolved. Permeating all of the above is the fact that Russia, and its parliament in particular, is continuing to have difficulties in coming to terms with Ukraine as an independent entity.

As shall be seen in more detail below, the growing disparity in Ukrainian attitudes towards East and West is made most evident in the relations with international organisations pursued by successive Ukrainian governments. Thus while Russian advances have been spurned (Ukraine is not part of the CIS collective security system, has not signed the CIS charter, and is only an associate member of the CIS economic union, despite the proclaimed pre-election intentions of closer ties made by its second president, Leonid Kuchma) Ukraine's main objective, despite the seemingly insurmountable barriers, has become the political, economic, and security benefits that accrue from membership of the EU and increasingly meaningful partnership with (if not yet membership of) NATO.

This article aims to analyse the evolution of Ukrainian relations with European institutions, in the first instance, by providing a brief overview of the international context of European integration and Ukrainian independence, and, in the second, through a review of Ukraine-Europe institutional relations. The significance of this evolving political and economic relationship will then be made evident by contrasting it with that developing with Russia, which is best characterised as increasing political coolness.

The international context of Ukrainian independence and European integration

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 (and consequently Ukrainian independence) and the process of increasing European cohesiveness symbolised by '1992' are processes best understood in a global context.[2] If the Single European Act of 1986 and the 1992 Single Market initiative demonstrate the European Union's response to the changing structural context of international politics, *per-*

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[1] See Subtelny, Orest, *Ukraine, A History*, 2nd edition, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994.
[2] Van Ham, Peter, *The EC, Eastern Europe and European Unity – Discord, Collaboration and Integration since 1947*, London: Pinter, 1993.

estroika and *glasnost* have come to be perceived as evidence of the recognition by the Soviet *nomenklatura* of the seriously retarded nature not only of their industry in general, but microelectronics and high technology in particular. Thus as the European Union was adapting to international structural change (by aiming to take advantage of economies of scale presented by the single market along with all the harmonisation of markets that it entails) the result of Soviet liberalisation was in the first instance the rapid decomposition of the outer rim of the Soviet empire starting in 1989 and the dissolution of the empire itself, best symbolised by the proclamation of Ukrainian independence in 1991. As a result of the demise of the bipolar international structure, not only has the significance of the EU as a structural component of the change increased, but its role as a beacon for countries emerging from the decomposing Soviet system has gained in luminescence. This is amply evidenced by the headlong rush by much of Eastern and Central Europe into integration with Europe. Europe has come to symbolise salvation in more ways than one.

Evolution of Ukraine's relationship with 'Europe'

For the purposes of clarity and simplicity an institutional definition of Europe will be used as this best reflects the Ukrainian perspective of 'being European'. While this does not mean that historical and geographical links are ignored, arguably they serve little practical purpose in the resolution of current difficulties. The definition is thus somewhat utilitarian, emphasising the fact that Ukraine wishes to be part of Europe not only theoretically and historically but also in practice. This in turn means being a member of, and participant in the activities of the 'main' European institutions such as the Central European Initiative, the Central European Free Trade Area, the Council of Europe, the Western European Union, NATO, and the European Union; it also means deriving all of the benefits of membership. While not necessarily listed in order of importance, membership of the first few of these institutions represents the attainment of sub-goals in pursuit of a broader aim, namely closer partnership with (and possible eventual membership of) the last two. In other words, in the same way that membership of the various political, economic, and security institutions of postwar Western Europe – i.e. all the non-communist countries of Europe plus Turkey – helped define Europe (much to the chagrin of the communist Central and Eastern Europeans) during the Soviet era, so membership of these same institutions continues to function in this way.

From the very first days of his tenure, the government of Kravchuk pursued highly visible pro-Western/Central and East European countries (CEEC) and anti-CIS/Russia political and security policies.[3] These policies went far beyond establishing bilateral relations with immediate neighbours and were formalised in the

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[3] From the point of view of the Central European states the main benefit of an independent Ukraine is a comforting cordon between them and a still apparently imperially predisposed Russia. This was to some extent tempered by some long festering issues such as the still unresolved matter of treatment and rights of ethnic minorities in the region, a problem associated with the issue of border disputes such as that of Bukovina, Bessarabia, and Serpent Island (with Romania), Transcarpathia (with Slovakia) though some regions in Poland/Ukraine that may have been expected to produce

pursuit of entry into Central European institutions by forging closer links with such bodies. From a Ukrainian point of view these institutions had a complex role to play as membership: a) represented a window to the West through which Ukraine could see the potential benefits that may accrue from toeing the pro-Western line; b) provided contacts with countries that had trodden that path earlier, and hence could facilitate the process of Ukrainian membership of more 'Western' organisations; c) enabled Ukraine to tap into the momentum built up by the Central European states in their attempts at integration (and, theoretically, even assist in this process by becoming a member of a bloc of states that is expecting to join – something encouraged by the EU in those seeking to integrate according to some analysts[4]); d) could help differentiate Ukraine from the old Soviet and Russian economic and political structures; e) contributed to the creation of a distinct political identity for Ukraine itself; f) by a process of association would allow Ukraine to benefit from the new identity created by the Visegrad group of essentially European states simply rejoining Europe after a period of absence; in other words, it represented a good opportunity for a short cut; g) probably most importantly, allowed Ukraine to demonstrate a commitment to the economic and political reform seen as a prerequisite by the main international financial institutions to the provision of aid and loans.

However, while Central European institutions were clearly part of the 'masterplan', they represented stepping stones to membership of the more prominent European institutions, an objective pursued with a vitality that belied Ukraine's status as a new and inexperienced country, unendowed with a tried and tested foreign ministry. This is not, however, to suggest that Ukraine was being welcomed by the West with open arms. It is probably true to say that while in the days leading up to independence there was some confusion as to how to deal 'with the unruly child'[5] there is increasing recognition that an independent Ukraine is more than a transitory phenomenon.[6] However, despite the numerous early *faux pas* and discouragement Ukraine, from the very first days of independence, has been very active on the international scene and has ties with all of the significant intergovernmental organisations. The order in which these ties are discussed, while not representing a 'pecking order' in terms of priority, from the Ukrainian perspective indicate a certain hierarchy of prestige. Thus while membership of the Central

discord have singularly failed to do so (the Przemyszl region in Poland, and part Galicia in Ukraine). Nevertheless, Ukraine signed bilateral agreements with most of its neighbours to the west (apart from Romania for whom the issue of territory remained a far from settled matter) which affirmed the inviolability of existing borders, bilaterally rejected any territorial claims on each other, and guaranteed the rights of any ethnic minorities.

[4] Preston, Christopher, 'Obstacles to EU enlargement: the classical community method and the prospects for a wider Europe', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 1995, vol. 33 no. 3, pp. 451-64.

[5] One need only compare President Bush's pre-independence 'Chicken Kiev' speech with the grab-it-while-you-can approach to Ukraine extolled by Brzezinski, a former presidential security adviser, to note the discrepant view among the political élite in America; mirroring Bush's blunder, Margaret Thatcher, when replying to the Ukrainian parliament on her views on the prospect of an independent Ukraine, compared that objective with that of the Quebecois – a response that did not go down very well with western Ukrainian members of parliament.

[6] In a recent report by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Ukraine is being seen as increasingly significant in the wider context of European stability and that: 'Ukraine's success may be the singly most important determinant of Russia's peaceful integration into a new larger Euro-Atlantic

European Initiative (the first organisation to be discussed below) most probably exceeds in terms of usefulness that of the Council of Europe, membership of the latter confers a status which the former could never hope for.

a) Central European Initiative

In 1989 Italy, Austria, Hungary, Yugoslavia, and subsequently Czechoslovakia came together to form the Central European Initiative (which came to be called the Pentagonale). Poland joined in July 1991 despite the objections of Czechoslovakia, which itself became concerned at the damage that Polish membership may do to its own ambitions. Ostensibly, the organisation aimed to establish a platform for cooperation on political and economic issues in the region and thereby contribute to the stability of the region. An additional objective, however, was to facilitate the process of preparation undertaken by member-states for eventual entry into the European Union. The rationale for Ukrainian membership, aside from any symbolic significance, was therefore compelling. As a result, in November 1992 Ukraine took part in a meeting of foreign ministers of the CEI states in Austria with the Kravchuk administration pushing hard for acceptance. Indeed, by June 1993 Ukraine had made an application for membership, which was rejected in November of that same year. However, on the initiative of Italy, in March 1994 the notion of Associate Membership was mooted for Belarus, Bulgaria, Romania, and Ukraine. Associate Membership was attained by Ukraine in July 1994 and later that month representatives participated in the first meeting of the Association Council of the CEI. By that time the organisation had grown to include Hungary, Austria, Italy, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, and subsequently Macedonia. In October 1995 at a meeting of the leaders of the CEI members in Warsaw, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic came out in strong support of full Ukrainian membership of the organisation, obviously increasingly aware of the dangers of an isolated Ukraine, abandoned to its fate in the Tashkent agreement and an indication of the growing importance of the country in the region. As a result the foreign ministers of the member-states were authorised to accept Ukraine for membership at their next meeting in April 1996 in Austria. Eventually, in June 1996, (along with the four other associated members, Albania – which gained associate status at the end of 1994 – Bulgaria, Belarus, and Romania) Ukraine became a fully fledged-member.

b) Visegrad and CEFTA

Demonstrating the vigour with which Kravchuk set about allying himself with the Central European institutions, he was virtually simultaneously pursuing other western avenues somewhat closer to home and in 1991 attempted to gain membership of the Visegrad triangle. Ostensibly that organisation was set up to coor-

community. Therefore the West should 1) back up Ukrainian self-help policies with tangible support from both the international financial institutions and bilaterally and 2) convey to Russia that appropriate behaviour toward Ukraine is a prerequisite for Russia's economic, political and security integration with the West'. Centre for Strategic and International Studies, *Foreign Policy into the 21st century: the US leadership challenge*, Washington DC: CSIS, 1996.

dinate the efforts of Poland, Hungary, and the then Czechoslovakia in their inter-actions with European political and economic institutions, facilitate financial and trade flows amongst themselves, and collaborate on issues of security and ecology; in practice it was an attempt to escape from the sphere of influence still emanating from the East and to demonstrate their commitment to 'rejoining Europe'. It also served as a discriminating mechanism in that it created a clear line of differentiation between its members and those to their East. The purpose of this was twofold: on the one hand it avoided the accusation of interference in what Russia later would term its 'near abroad', while on the other it precluded the possibility of the backward state of the Ukrainian economy affecting the chances of the Visegrad states' application for European Union membership. It was on these grounds that in February 1992 Ukraine's application for membership was rejected. Ultimately this competitiveness came to undermine the effectiveness of the Visegrad group as a vehicle moving towards membership of the EU: with this as, in effect, their only common denominator, the group came to be dominated by internal rivalry, in particular Polish-Czech, with the latter concerned about the geopolitical location and economic plight of the former. Efforts by Romania and Bulgaria to join were thus also doomed to fail. With time, growing out of the free trade area established between Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic on 21 December 1991, and modelled on that of EFTA and hence to a large extent already harmonised with the trade requirements of the EU, the political nature of the Visegrad group evolved into a more economy-oriented Central European Free Trade Area.[7]

At the meeting of CEFTA members in Brno in 1995, Slovenia was accepted as a member, a status by then being actively pursued by Bulgaria and Romania, while Turkey, Croatia, and the Baltic states were considering the creation of a free trade area with the CEFTA states leaving Ukraine looking somewhat isolated.[8] Ukrainian efforts to get in by the side door have also been frustrated. For example, efforts to intensify trade between Ukraine and Slovakia (economically, the weakest of the CEFTA groups) have come to naught owing to Slovakia's Customs Union with the Czech Republic and the latter's intention to gain entry into the EU free from unnecessary hindrances. The main danger is that Ukraine will fail to gain entry to CEFTA because its members have already gained or are well on the way to gaining entry to the European Union.

c) Council of Europe

The significance of membership of the Council of Europe to Ukraine can be best understood by examining Article 1 of the Statute of that organisation which states that:

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[7] The CEFTA Agreement has as its main objectives: the application of the principle of the agreement to industrial and agricultural products; the removal of trade barriers on industrial goods by 01.01.2001, which coincides with the date of the removal of such barriers between the CEFTA countries and the EU; in contrast to the Euro-agreements which permit a 4-5 year period of grace in terms of the liberalisation of tariffs affecting infant industries, CEFTA allows for the gradual liberalisation of tariffs.

[8] However, Ukraine is unlikely to gain entry until it has: signed bilateral treaties on free trade with the CEFTA states; become a member of the WTO (anticipated for mid-1997); signed an association agreement with the EU (though the partnership and cooperation agreement allows for the creation of a free trade area between the two starting from 1998).

> The aim of the Council of Europe is to achieve a greater unity between its Members for the purpose of safeguarding and realizing the ideals and principles which are their common heritage and facilitating their economic and social progress.[9]

Quite simply, from a Ukrainian point of view, the reference to 'common heritage' of its members both defines and confirms Ukraine as a European state. Thus, owing to the organisation's role in affirming Ukraine's European identity and inheritance, membership was imbued with a particular significance; and the fact that this was achieved before Russia was not unsatisfying.[10] Following initial contacts in 1990, on 14 July 1992 Ukraine applied for membership; special status with the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council was granted in the following September.[11] In July 1994 a political dialogue was initiated between the Committee of Ministers of the Council and Ukraine, followed by the signing of a number of conventions of the Council throughout 1994, the most important of which was signed on 15 September 1995 (at the same time as the Council of Europe information centre was opened in Kyiv) that on the protection of ethnic minorities. Evidence as to the commitment and fervour with which Ukraine set about its task was provided by representatives of the Assembly, who, after a visit to Ukraine, 'reported "spectacular progress" in bringing the constitutional provisions and general legislation of Ukraine into conformity with the Council of Europe's general principles'.[12]

Especially praiseworthy, as far as the Council was concerned, was the successful resolution of the increasingly hostile relations between the president and parliament in Ukraine (which was seen to be in stark contrast to the manner in which Russia had solved its essentially identical problem): on 8 June 1995 a Constitutional Agreement was signed between the Ukrainian president and parliament, which, while being, in essence, a political agreement rather than a legislative act, from the view of the Council reflected an ability to deal with issues of fundamental national importance in a peaceful and institutional manner. The Council also voiced approval of the fact that despite the very large Russian ethnic minority in Crimea, the secessionist tendencies of the political élites there, the issue of the Black Sea Fleet, the claims made by the Russian parliament to Sevastopol, the strategic significance of the peninsula as an access point to warm water ports, all of these issues were resolved through constitutional means. Needless to say, all of the above was overshadowed by the ongoing war in Chechnya, a conflict brought about by a government in contrast to which the one in Ukraine could but draw praise from the international community for the moderate policies it adopted.

[9] Statutes of the Council of Europe as cited in Nugent, Neill, *The government and politics of the European Union*, 3rd edition, London: Macmillan, 1995.

[10] Russia joined in February 1996, three months after Ukraine.

[11] In order to prepare itself for acceptance into the Council a National Commission was created, which had as its main functions the preparation of recommendations regarding the harmonisation of Ukrainian legislation with that of generally accepted European legislation, as well as Ukrainian access to the conventions of the Council.

[12] Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. 1995 Session – Opinion No. 190, Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 1995. Assembly debate on 26 September 1995 (26th Sitting); see Doc. 7396, opinion of the Committee on Relations with European Non-Member Countries.

On 4 September 1995 the Political Committee of the Council came out in support of Ukrainian membership, followed on 8 September by unanimous agreement on the recommendation for Ukrainian membership by the Committee dealing with relations of non-member states. During the 1995 session of the Parliamentary Assembly it was recommended that Ukraine be invited to join the Council of Europe and be allocated 12 seats in the Assembly. The main point of concern was the lack of a constitution (despite the Constitutional Agreement) which the representative of the united left noted should be in place by July 1996.[13] Ukraine finally acceded on 9 November 1995 becoming the 37th member of the organisation. Russian application for membership was approved soon afterwards despite the war in Chechnya; although the Ukrainian delegation was split on the issue, it decided to approve Russian membership on the grounds that it was too dangerous to leave Russia beyond the hopefully restraining institutional framework of the body.

d) WEU

Owing to the increasing prominence of the WEU in terms of its relations with both the EU and NATO, links with the organisation were also pursued with a particular eagerness. Thus the early rejection of even participation in the Consultative Forum of the organisation was taken especially badly owing to the acceptance of Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania under the 6+3 formula (where the six are Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Romania). This decision was especially galling in light of the fact that while the six participated on the basis of their Associate Membership of the EU, according to the General Secretary of the WEU, the remaining three only did so on the basis of anticipated Associate Membership.[14] That this in no way dampened Ukrainian resolve was evidenced in June 1996, when President Kuchma, in his speech to the Assembly of the Western European Union, expressed dissatisfaction at the 6+3 formula and its implications of a new eastern border, and stressed Ukraine's willingness to accept 'all the responsibilities of associate membership'.[15] However, the real significance of the WEU lies in the fact that it represents the European arm of NATO and is evolving into the defensive arm of the EU, and it is these two that will be examined next.

e) NATO

NATO's eastward expansion has been a debate of primary importance since the earliest days of the collapse of the Soviet Union. One set of views contends variously that NATO's continued existence is necessary in order to maintain the North American military commitment to Europe, constrain increasing German continental ambitions (or conversely cloak Teutonic ambitions under a veneer of Anglo-Saxon respectability), and strengthen the foundations of common European defence and security. Expansion to the east is one way to justify this continued existence on the grounds of a new common enemy (in order to deal

[13] Ministerstvo Zakordonnykh Sprav Ukrayiny, 'Ukrayina i Rada Evropy', Zbirnyk Dovidkovo-Analitychnykh Materialiv, October 1995, no. 1, pp. 2-6.
[14] Dubyna, Olexander, 'Prahnemo do mitsnishykh kontaktiv', *Polityka i Chas*, 1994, June, pp. 9-10. Interview with the General Secretary of the Western European Union.
[15] *Uryadovyi Kurier*, 8 June 1996, no. 104-105.

with, perhaps, an eventually resurgent Russia and/or the growing threat emanating from the Muslim south) and the new-found role it has created for itself (i.e. peacekeeping as in the former Yugoslavia). An argument reflecting its more Eastern European origins suggests, again variously, that eastward NATO expansion is a sop to those for whom membership of the EU is barred, to fill the vacuum emanating from the collapse of the Soviet Union but not yet filled by Russia, contribute to the counterbalancing of Germany, protect the CEECs from destabilisation to their east, and even create a new front-line attracting the sort of economic and political support justified by such an exposed location.[16]

Whatever the arguments, Ukraine's primary objective in the NATO debate has been to avoid the problem of ending up as the buffer between the two emergent blocs as they jostle for position. On independence Ukraine was placed in something of a predicament, very obviously recognising the geopolitical reality of its situation. Nevertheless, it resisted Russian pressure for joint armed forces and created its own army; indeed, the original non-bloc neutrality status was adopted in response to (ongoing) Russian pressure to accede to the Tashkent Collective Security Agreement. The strategy of Ukraine since independence has been cautious though progressive: on the one hand, Ukraine has aimed to placate Russian sensibilities by, while not acquiescing to their objections, at least keeping them firmly in mind, and by insisting on their accommodation,[17] most obviously through the creation of a new security framework for the continent,[18] while on the other hand keeping all options open towards the West. As a result, in the five years since independence, Ukraine's relationship with NATO has undergone considerable change: the original commitment to neutrality and non-bloc status and overt refusal to join the Alliance has been replaced by a distinct softening on these assurances (along with a gradual reduction of its over-anxiety about the 'feelings' of Russia), an outspoken defence of NATO's right to expand and a refusal to countenance Russia's insistence on a veto over expansion,[19] envisaged as proceeding in 1997 to include Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic in the first round, and the Baltic states, Bulgaria, and Romania at some distant time in the future. As might be expected, Ukrainian membership of NATO, as far as Moscow is concerned, is out of the question. Indeed, Lieven quotes a senior Russian foreign policy adviser as saying that in response to Ukrainian membership of NATO:

> we would have to consider using their dependence on our oil and gas to do the greatest possible damage to the Ukrainian economy, causing destabilization by stirring up the Russians in Ukraine, especially in the Crimea, and greatly increasing military pressure over Sevastopol. This would lead to an international crisis of the first order.[20]

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[16] Theses of the Council of External and Defence Policies of Russia, 'Rossiya i NATO', *Zbirnyk Dovidkovo-Analitychnykh Materialiv*, November 1995, no. 3, pp. 14-16.

[17] Horbulin, Volodymyr, 'Ukraine's place in today's Europe', *Politics and the Times*, 1995, October-December, pp. 10-15.

[18] See, for example, President Kuchma's speech to the Western European Union, *Uryadovyi Kurier*, 8 June 1996, no. 104-105.

[19] Udovenko, Henadiy, 'An open, predictable and pragmatic foreign policy', *Politics and the Times*, 1995, October-December, pp. 16-23.

[20] Lieven, Anatol, 'Russian opposition to NATO expansion', *The World Today*, October 1995, pp. 196-99.

That this has not inhibited Ukraine is evidenced by the fact that, as early as February 1994, Ukraine signed up for the Partnership for Peace programme (and has been an enthusiastic participant in joint exercises ever since, in contrast to Russia, which, having joined reluctantly in June, has been a noticeably less eager associate, slighted at its not being accorded the status 'due' to a superpower), and has cooperated in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and contributed to NATO-led peacekeeping operations in the former Yugoslavia.

While far from suggesting that Ukraine is likely to join NATO, an issue on which the Russians are unlikely to compromise, a perceptible gap has now opened between former and current Ukrainian rhetoric (if not yet practice): as mentioned, the commitment to neutrality and non-bloc status which was in danger of leaving Ukraine in an uncomfortable limbo is gradually being replaced with a temptation to at least start considering the possibilities provided by NATO's refusal to discount the membership of any country. An example of this was provided by Volodymyr Horbulin, the Secretary of the Ukrainian National Security and Military Council, who, in response to difficulties in Black Sea Fleet talks with Russia in November 1996, suggested that Ukraine no longer excluded the possibility of joining NATO. This changing stance is probably attributable to a number of factors: firstly, the Chechnya *débâcle* sent a clear message as to the fact that, despite an apparently democratic administration in place in Moscow, the old dog has not yet learnt any new tricks; secondly, resurgent Russian imperialism as evidenced by the continuing Sevastopol and Black Sea Fleet saga (and the November 1996 resolution by the Duma to cancel its division); thirdly, the continuing pressures on Ukraine by Russia to join a military bloc, although Kyiv is more than likely steadfastly to refuse to do so, only too aware of the long-term ramifications of such a decision; fourthly, while aiming to avoid unnecessary antagonism, there is increasing awareness in Kyiv of relative Russian impotence in the face of NATO expansion, despite all of the huffing and puffing, which appears to be aimed at extracting concessions from the West.

f) European Union

Ukraine's relationship with the EU has undergone a qualitative transformation in the five years since independence. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union (rendering obsolete the 1989 Trade and Cooperation Agreement with the European Union), an embryonic relationship began to form between Kyiv and Brussels culminating in the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA), agreed on 23 March 1994 and signed by Kravchuk on 14 June 1994 ('beating' Russia by 10 days). Essentially, this agreement was similar to the Association Agreements signed with the Visegrad states, with the exception of the commitment to free trade, which was open to discussion only from 1998. Within the framework of this agreement Ukraine also benefited from the General System of Preferences, though, according to TACIS (the Programme of Technical Assistance provided to the CIS), despite the fact that over 50% of Ukraine's goods could benefit, it is not being used to full advantage.[21] As the PCA has not yet been ratified by all the par-

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[21] Center for European Policy Studies – European Expertise Service, *Ukrainian Economic Trends*, January 1996, pp. 63-65.

liaments, an Interim Agreement (IA) was signed by Kuchma in June 1995 (effective from 1 February 1996) on aspects of the Agreement not requiring ratification by the parliaments of the European nations. Despite and apart from the limited economic and political nature of the PCA (versions of which, after all, had been signed with a number of other former Soviet republics) the importance of its symbolic nature was underlined by Kuchma, who, in his speech to the WEU in June 1996,[22] felt compelled to castigate the member-states of the EU that had yet to ratify the Agreement.[23]

In terms of concrete assistance, it was anticipated that Ukraine's role in contributing to the demise of the Soviet Union and blocking the creation of any serious replacement would elicit a euphoric wave of support (in the form of loans, aid, and closer ties) from a grateful West. The resulting somewhat underwhelming response to Ukraine has essentially been coordinated by the European Union on behalf of the G24/G7 in collaboration with the IMF and the World Bank. Independently, the European Union is one of the principal international donors to Ukraine with ECU3.16 billion having been provided between 1991-96 in technical and financial assistance. The TACIS programme represents over ECU400 million of this, with ECU105 million going to the nuclear safety programme and ECU60.5 million to the EU/G-7 Action Plan for the Chornobyl shut down. It is anticipated that between 1996 and 1999 an estimated ECU538 million of TACIS funds will be channelled to Ukraine through the Country Action Programme, the EU/G-7 Plan for Chornobyl, and the Interstate, Nuclear Safety and Cross-border Cooperation Programmes. In addition, the EU is considering further macroeconomic assistance for 1997 to support the IMF-led programme for stabilisation and economic reform. The disappointing nature of these figures are, however, put into perspective by comparison with the estimated annual transfer of some $50 billion from Western to Eastern Germany since reunification, something likely to continue for up to a decade after the event.

Notwithstanding the limited nature of the assistance, this type of gradual integration with the world economic system brought immediate benefits to the beleaguered Ukrainian economy. While Kravchuk's failure to implement reform exacerbated the dire economic situation, it was Kuchma's vigorous and energetic grappling with the economy (and political system) that resulted in real and effective improvement and also attracted the moral and, crucially, financial support of Western institutions, thereby creating a virtuous cycle. This not only consolidated his domestic position as a leader that produced results, but also appears to have impacted on his attitude towards the West. As a result his original ambivalence has been replaced by the considerably more ambitious 'strategic goal of membership of the European Union'.[24] This represents a significant shift in orientation, and, despite the obvious obstacles in the way, is not to be underestimated as even the prospect of membership tends to assist in the transition to capitalism and the consolidation of the democratic process. Indeed, Baldwin argues that 'the CEECs

[22] *Uryadovyi Kurier*, 8 June 1996, no. 104-105.
[23] Only Spain, the United Kingdom, Denmark, Ireland, and Luxembourg had ratified the agreement by that stage.
[24] *Uryadovyi Kurier*, 8 June 1996, no. 104-105.

probably would be happy to be members even if entering meant no more than participating in the Single Market and symbolic affiliation with the West',[25] as a result of it reaffirming their return to 'first team' status. This is no less true for Ukraine and on these grounds alone exclusion of any prospective members (something the EU has studiously avoided) would be a very damaging strategy. In addition, from the point of view of the Western Europeans widening to the East (including Ukraine) is compelling on the grounds of its contribution to the stabilisation of these countries. Even here, however, there is dispute as to how the problem should be tackled and there is evidence to suggest Western élites are not agreed on how to proceed[26] as the political rationale for enlargement has economic consequences which present problems of entry for the Visegrad states let alone the considerably more impoverished former Soviet republics such as Ukraine. This issue pertains to the way the Union is funded and the way those funds are subsequently dispersed, and will be briefly examined next.

Around 80% of the EU budget is spent on two items. One of them, the Structural and Cohesion Fund, is designed to bridge the cleavages brought on by the economic and structural diversity of the European Union as it has enlarged and incorporated poorer states/regions which have subsequently benefited from the largesse of the fund. As it currently stands, regions (or in some cases entire countries) that have a per capita income of under 75% of the community per capita income are entitled to financial transfers, the objective of which is to increase the 'cohesion' of the Community. Although the figures vary depending on the estimate made for economic growth,[27] the fact remains that the very low per capita income of the Visegrad states (around 25% of those of the EU average) implies huge capital transfers from the rich Western states to the considerably poorer Eastern states for decades to come.[28] Additionally, such an enlargement would mean that the current 'poor four' (Spain, Ireland, Greece, and Portugal) would not only cease to be so and hence forfeit the capital transfers they currently benefit from, but would in fact become net beneficiaries; a situation which they are unlikely to accept without objecting. The second item is the vastly more expensive Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) designed to provide support for the European farm sector. Despite its essentially obsolete nature and unwelcome drain on resources, the power of the farm lobby precludes a rapid demise of the fund. Thus, as it stands, highly agricultural regions of the community benefit disproportionately from the fund. As the Visegrad states are no less agricultural, the expense of maintaining CAP with those new entrants would be prohibitive, overwhelmingly so if extended to Ukraine

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[25] Baldwin, Richard E., *Towards an Integrated Europe*, London: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 1994.

[26] In contrast to Chancellor Kohl who is favourably predisposed to widening to the East, Volker Rühe, Germany's finance minister, is sceptical about Poland's potential for membership of the EU, and is quoted as saying that 'You can join the Atlantic Alliance with old tanks, but joining the EU with old farm tractors causes problems', *The Economist*, November 9, 1996, vol. 341, no. 7991, p. 52.

[27] Baldwin, op.cit.

[28] *The Financial Times* (December 11, 1996) reports on the difficulties in assessing the costs of enlargement: 'Mr. Arie Oostlander, a Dutch Christian Democrat MEP said that the "wildest rumours" were circulating about the cost of enlargement, while the reality was that "adequate reliable information is not currently available"'. The cost of structural funding under current terms and conditions has been put at ECU14 billion.

(owing to its highly fertile *chornozem*, the black soil of the southern plains).[29] As a result Ukraine's proclaimed intention of eventually joining the EU, despite the arguments in favour of such a step, will continue to meet with insurmountable barriers for the distantly foreseeable future. The situation is further complicated by the issue of European deepening and widening, both of which are future, and indeed imminent, objectives of the Union. Both are proceeding apace, the corollary of which is that the criteria for entry for a country as far behind as Ukraine are becoming ever more unattainable.

Ukraine and the CIS/Russia

Concurrent with and, usually, in direct contrast to the above, were Ukrainian relations with Russia and the CIS. Soon after the Biełavieža Agreement (7-8 December 1991) signalling the end of the Soviet Union, Kravchuk started ploughing a lone furrow, gradually de-integrating Ukraine from its economic, political, and military ties with the republics of the former Soviet Union. That the relationship with Russia deteriorated very quickly was more than evident when Kravchuk refused to attend the CIS summit in Tashkent in May 1992, citing a scheduled meeting as an excuse. By 1993 Ukraine was openly rejecting Russian overtures: at the CIS summit in Minsk in January, the CIS charter providing for a new legal framework and closer relations was left unsigned by the Ukrainians (along with Turkmenistan). Ukraine's decision to conduct an independent economic policy was especially galling, and the non-participation in the creation of the Customs Union (March 1992) merely emphasised the single-minded determination to dissociate itself from Russia despite the obvious mutually beneficial interdependence. As recently as October 1996, at a meeting of CIS members, Ukraine failed to sign nearly half of the proposed documents (12 out of 25) and in particular continued to oppose military collaboration with CIS countries. Such recalcitrance may be best understood in the light of perceived Russian expectations as to what kind of vehicle the CIS is to be. Thus, for example, following the emergence of the CIS, Russia, as the self-proclaimed successor of the USSR, claimed for itself all related assets and properties along with responsibilities arising from international treaties signed by that body.[30] In contrast to the consultative role (to bring about a 'civilised divorce') anticipated by Ukraine, Russia envisaged and developed the CIS as an integrative body along the lines of the European Union, on the origins of which it was modelled. This took the form of the creation of various agreements such as the Interstate Eurasian Coal and Metals Association (à la the European Coal and Steel Community) and the Economic Union (again, à la the European Economic Community). Furthermore, by occupying the leadership positions of key organisations (e.g. such as the Interstate Economic Committee or the majority voting rights it has in many of the bodies[31]), maintaining control of them and using them to its advantage (e.g. the rouble based accounts settlements of the Interstate Bank ultimately results

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[29] It has been variously estimated that the cost of extending the CAP to the Visegrad states in its current format is between ECU12 billion and ECU50 billion, *The Financial Times*, December 11, 1996.

[30] Filipenko, Anton, 'The CIS Economic Union: pros and cons', *Politics and the Times*, 1995, October-December, pp. 58-65.

[31] Ibid.

in the provision of free credit for the Russian economy[32]), playing the 'energy dependence' card (an important ingredient in the glue binding Russia and Ukraine and hence the CIS together), the CIS had, from the point of view of Ukraine under the Presidency of Kravchuk, come to be seen as the vehicle by which Russia aimed to return to its former hegemonic status. If the expectations of a change in policy towards Russia resulting from a change in government were reasonable (and, as shall be seen, they were, for Kuchma portrayed himself as supporting renewed ties with Russia and stronger ties with the CIS) then they were soon dashed, as Kyiv continued its pursuit of institutional integration with the West and limited renewal with the East. And if there were any lingering doubts as to Kuchma's intentions towards economic, military or other forms of integration with the CIS, they were laid to rest during his speech to the Western European Union in June 1996, where, as mentioned above, not only did he underline his pro-European orientation, but shut the door quite categorically on any hopes for a new role for the CIS, let alone the revival of the USSR:

> I wish to underline the role of the CIS as a mechanism leading to a peaceful and democratic resolution of all the problems associated with the collapse of the USSR... and that it was on the initiative of Ukraine that the CIS was confirmed as neither a supranational nor state-like creation... Our country opposes any form of supranational activities on the part of the CIS. Furthermore, Ukraine is categorically against any efforts at reanimating in any shape or form the former Soviet Union.[33]

This sent a clear shot across the bows of the Russian Duma that had recently (March 1996) passed a resolution on precisely such a proposal. Further evidence of the turbulent relationship is the fact that the long awaited signing of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between Russia and Ukraine, a standard treaty between neighbouring countries, has been postponed on numerous occasions (the latest being April 1996) mainly due to the Black Sea Fleet dispute and all that it represents.

The confrontational nature of Ukraine-Russia politics, however, camouflages the continuing ties between the two countries. For example, under Kuchma (although not Kravchuk) changes in foreign investment legislation were undertaken with an eye to attracting Russian investment as a viable source of funds for the regeneration of the industrial base of Ukraine. Included were proposals for the creation of Financial Industrial Groups (to restore capital and industrial cooperation to facilitate recovery) and tax breaks for the renewal of traditional links between Ukrainian and Russian machine and aircraft building and other industries, though these have been blocked from proceeding through the Ukrainian parliament. Russia is still the dominant trade partner for Ukraine, with, in 1995, 43.5% of Ukrainian exports going to Russia, and 51.2% of imports coming from there.[34] (In addition, these figures fail to reflect not only the deals made in the shadow economy but also micro level trade on the basis of, for example, barter[35]). Despite

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[32] Ibid.

[33] *Uryadovyi Kurier*, 8 June 1996, no. 104-105.

[34] *Uryadovyi Kurier*, 8 February 1996.

[35] According to the official statistics, 30 per cent of exports and 23 per cent of imports were bartered in 1995, *Uryadovyi Kurier*, 8 February 1996.

the evidence which suggests that these figures have been declining since 1993[36] (even though artificially distorted by drastically higher energy prices), the fact remains that there continues to be a strong vein of interdependence linking the two countries obscured at the level of the political élites.

Conclusion

As far as the current administration is concerned, despite the centripetal pull of Russia and the mutual benefits derived from the existing interdependence between the two, considerable efforts have gone into creating economic, political, and military links with Europe. However, the wider context significantly limits the parameters within which Ukrainian foreign policy can make much progress in this direction.

Kluger[37] identifies three alternatives facing Ukraine:

1) the Finnish model whereby a westward oriented Ukraine is characterised by political and economic stability though at the price of military neutrality;

2) an eastward economic orientation and, again, military neutrality;

3) a reversion to the past and full integration into the economic and military structures of the CIS.

Current policy clearly reflects the first model, though it is not yet clear what form this westward orientation will take. Membership of CEFTA, an obvious next stage, is placed somewhat out of reach by current members who do not want to prejudice their own chance of access to the EU by carrying unnecessary baggage. However, things are developing swiftly, and the barriers to entry for the Visegrad states, let alone Ukraine, are becoming more challenging as the process of deepening picks up pace; yet membership continues to be a strategic objective of the Kuchma administration. Within this lies a profound incongruence, especially to a newly independent state such as Ukraine: European membership is becoming increasingly synonymous with (a degree of) loss of sovereignty, something that might be expected to be anathema to a country that has only just celebrated its fifth year of independence. Indeed, in the last five hundred years, the total period of Ukrainian independence can be counted in decades (if one is generous) rather than centuries. As far as neutrality is concerned, although its continuation is the most likely option for the foreseeable future, there has been a perceptible change in Ukraine's rhetoric and a question mark is beginning to hang over the neutral non-bloc status. However, despite the explicit and implicit Russian threats concerning their response in the event of any change unfavourable to them, any conflict would take the form of economic warfare rather than military clashes. For, in addition to the fact that the ties between the countries are so deep and multi-layered on a popular level as to make war between them inconceivable, there is the purely practical issue that neither state is in a position to conduct effective warfare. This is particularly true for Russia. On independence, Ukraine inherited the well-equipped westward facing and western based first strategic echelon, thereby leaving Russia with an exposed border with Ukraine. With Russia's most powerful forces based on the border with China,

[36] *Uryadovyi Kurier*, 8 February 1996.
[37] Kluger, Richard, *NATO expansion: the next steps*, The RAND Corporation, 1994.

blocked there by the CFE Treaty (which precludes westward redeployment without a breach of the treaty), Moscow is left with an ill-equipped and demoralised and far from combat-ready force on its border with Ukraine. Needless to say, the Russians are clamouring for a revision of the CFE Treaty.

Russian reactions, when the first wave of expansion of NATO becomes imminent, will be highly significant, and will serve as a pointer to the Ukrainian and European states as to how they should proceed in bringing Ukraine into the European fold, or if to proceed at all. There is always the danger that such an expansion may serve as a catalyst in uniting the fragmented forces in Russia and put Yeltsin (or whoever is in power) under pressure to respond in a manner likely to be unfavourable to Ukraine.

The second scenario envisaged by Kluger can be expected in the case of a change in the political leadership which would create doubt as to the continuity of the pro-European policy. While the current prime minister, Pavlo Lazarenko, is a strong contender for the leadership, the obvious candidate to introduce such a change would be Oleksander Moroz, the chairman of the Supreme Council and a probable candidate in the next presidential elections. Although now recognised as a statesman worthy of his position (as evidenced by his support for the acceptance of the constitution in June 1996), his international outlook is unclear; while, on the one hand, seemingly supportive of the Ukrainian westward orientation, he is, on the other, the leader of the Socialist Party in Ukraine and decidedly conservative in his economic outlook, rejecting monetarism and supportive of a command economy. Reintegration with the Russian/CIS system would come fairly naturally to him, though decreasingly so as Ukraine continues to plough its lone furrow and Russia gets accustomed to its independent neighbour. Continued neutrality would be popular with the West, though pressures from the Russian side would increase immeasurably, probably counterbalanced by that from the West.

That there is domestic support for the third model is not in doubt, but it appears to be dwindling. While up till now there has been limited domestic influence on the evolution of policy, if, for example, inflation were to flare up again in 1997[38] this may lead to a vocalisation of concerns, especially in eastern Ukraine.   ❏

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[38] As it is expected to, owing to the fact that the current salary backlog will have to be paid, Russian gas debts are due, and the final tranches of current Western loans are expected.

History

The Ukrainian Countryside During the Russian Revolution, 1917-19: The Limits of Peasant Mobilisation

Evan Ostryzniuk

The changing political landscape of the Russian Revolution and Civil War did not simply wash over the great mass of peasantry with the ebb and flow of battle lines and governments. Not only were attempts made to mobilise the peasantry on behalf of one or another interested party, but villages also autonomously sought to understand and manipulate the fluid political situations to their own advantage. The Revolution in the non-Russian western borderlands was at once a national and social movement, injecting an additional dynamic into a complex political situation. Ukraine presents a unique case, distinct from Russia proper since the political situations that evolved were significantly different and revolved largely around the Ukrainian peasantry. Each of the first three years of the Revolution witnessed dramatic transformations in the political situation in the country and the countryside. These changing scenes obliged the peasantry of Ukraine to attempt to understand and adapt, resulting in a variety of reactions. The two additional factors in the Ukrainian situation which made it distinct from central Russia were the proliferation of nationalism, as an integral part of rural politics, and the existence of rival governments. In 1917 the peaceful evolution of the Revolution eventually gave rise to the formation of a national-socialist government in the form of the Ukrainian Central Rada (Council) which, after the Bolshevik October coup in Petrograd, assumed power in the name of all the people in Ukraine. An attempt was made to extend the broadest possible form of democracy into the countryside, which was being imbued with national and revolutionary sentiment. In 1918 a reactionary-national government took power as the armies of the Central Powers consolidated their authority over the country. Foreign occupation, political repression, and conservative agrarian policies evoked the wrath of the peasantry and political activists of all ideological shades who joined their efforts to try to mobilise the Ukrainian people against these very unpopular turns of events. In the exigencies of 1919, peaceful democracy gave way to violent seizure of power as rival national-socialist governments claimed the allegiance of the peasantry. It remained important to invoke the spirit of national autonomy as well as social transformation in order to mobilise the peasantry.

Numerous factors went into a successful mobilisation which each of the three examples following will show. First, and most important, was the relationship between the peasantry, whose corporate existence was the village, and the intelligentsia, whose corporate existence was the political party and/or government agencies. The social gulf between them could only be bridged and mutual trust be established by a convergence of demands which would impel both to action.

In addition, there was the need for a central government which could claim to support the demands of the masses and also invoke a trust between the peasantry and intelligentsia. It was a negotiated relationship as each responded to the other when this suited their aims. The intelligentsia wished to create a state which the peasantry would support; the peasantry wished to support a state which the intelligentsia created. The ethnic-linguistic differences in Ukraine, which lay across class lines and political party affiliation, which likewise lay along ethnic-linguistic lines, made the political situation correspondingly more complex. Urban, Russian Bolsheviks had much difficulty in convincing the Ukrainian peasantry and rural Ukrainian intelligentsia that their government represented their interests. The failure of successive governments, who claimed authority over Ukraine as a whole, to concede to peasant demands caused the villages to close themselves off. Local activists were most successful in mobilising the peasantry on behalf of a cause. In Ukraine, where national and social-political elements were mixed, local meant ethnically Ukrainian. Only 'our' people, according to the peasantry, could be trusted, and 'our' meant of Ukrainian descent and imbued with national and socialist sentiment. As a Russian-urban based party, the Bolsheviks could only pick up minimal support in the countryside regardless of 'class'. The Hetmanate, as a representative of pre-revolutionary values, encountered an analogous problem. Right up to the end of the Civil War, the Ukrainian countryside refused to recognise any institution that did not have roots in rural Ukraine.

The amorphous character of rural politics and the fragmentation that was occurring within this class has resulted in conflicting interpretations of the nature of peasant insurgency in Ukraine during the Civil War. Several Western scholars suggest that Ukrainian peasant nationalism was a type of opportunism to legitimise land seizures and divide authority.[1] A few others contend that Ukrainian peasant nationalism had both social and national overtones which made it difficult to understand and manipulate, judging by the failure of any government to garner widespread and long-term support. Even Lenin is quoted as saying that with the onset of the German occupation 'Bolshevism has become tied to the national movement'.[2] Fundamentally, they all fail to take into account that the Ukrainian peasantry did not act as one trans-territorial collective entity capable of unified action, operating from a set series of ideas and motivations. While many of the motivations were similar, as revolutionary politics became increasingly complicated and the peasants more politically conscious fragmentation did occur. The effects of propaganda, the influence of agitators and village leaders on behalf of one cause or another, the diversity of inter-village politics, and regional peculiarities helped to splinter any kind of pan-peasant unity. The 'Tarashchantsi' revolt provides us with a good example of the political ambiguity which reigned in the countryside, the fragmenting of the rural community, and the unusual convergence of seemingly disparate ideological elements.

[1] Guthier, S.L., 'The Popular Base of Ukrainian Nationalism in 1917', *Slavic Review* 38, no. 1 (1979); Adams, A.E., 'The Great Ukrainian Jacquerie', in Hunczak, T. (ed.) *The Ukraine 1917-1921: A Study in Revolution*, Cambridge, Mass., 1977; Palij, M., *The Anarchism of Nestor Makhno, 1918-1920: An Aspect of the Ukrainian Revolution*, Seattle, 1976.

[2] Lamis, A.P., 'Some Observations on the Ukrainian National Movement and the Ukrainian Revolution, 1917-1921', *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 2, no. 4 (1978), pp. 525-31; *Istoriya SSSR*, tom 6, (1984), p. 345.

As the following examples will reveal, the peasantry could be mobilised or mobilise themselves effectively when the need arose regardless of the situation and pressures. The decision-making process of the peasantry operated on trust and the ability to negotiate with the outside world for the 'best deal', and was subject to rapid change. This helps explain the unreliability of peasant support for new governments, oscillating from enthusiastic support to neutrality to out-and-out hostility. The repeated creation of national governments reveals the perception from above that the Ukrainian peasantry could only be mobilised by a government of 'their' people: the Ukrainian people.

The three examples I use to illustrate the limits of peasant mobilisation during the Revolution in Ukraine are taken from each of the first three years of the Revolution: 1) the peasant congress movement in Ukraine of 1917, 2) the 'Tarashchantsi' rebellion in Kyiv province of 1918, and 3) a critical review of Soviet collective farms in Poltava province in 1919. These are episodes from three of the Ukrainian governments, including the first Ukrainian National Republic of the Ukrainian Central Rada, the Ukrainian State of Hetman Pavlo Skoropadskyi, and the second Soviet Ukrainian Government of the Communist Party of Ukraine. The diversity of these examples is illustrative of the adaptability of the Ukrainian peasantry and the difficulty in understanding patterns of motivation within the village. It reveals the levels of success in peasant mobilisation, relations with the intelligentsia, limits imposed by political and physical environments, and the absence of properly-functioning extra-village institutions.

The abdication of the Tsar in March 1917 was followed by the removal from power of the administrative apparatus of the empire in the countryside. To fill the power vacuum, the Provisional Government transferred some of its authority to local administrative but autonomous pre-revolutionary bodies which were almost exclusively controlled by the nobility – the *zemstva*. However, the *zemstva*, as an organ of the non-peasant rural élite, were neither trusted nor accepted as the legitimate inheritors of power in the countryside either by the bulk of the peasantry or by some of the rural intelligentsia. I have examined peasant congresses from a variety of localities in Ukraine held at different organisational levels, the resolutions of which were published in the leading periodicals of the time.[3] Most of these recorded congresses took place in the 'core' Ukrainian areas of Left-Bank and Right-Bank Ukraine, where the Ukrainian intelligentsia had a long existence and the ethnic composition of the peasantry was more homogeneous. Areas of

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[3] The congresses I have used are reported in the following sources: from *Volya* (Central Committee of the Ukrainian Social Democratic Party, Kyiv, edited by B. Martos) – No. 1 (July 9) Kaniv *povit*, Kyiv *guberniya* held on June 18; No. 1 (July 9) Hadyach *povit*, Poltava *guberniya* held in late June; No. 2 (July 16) Lityn *povit*, Podillya *guberniya* held on June 25; No. 2 (July 16) Zinkiv *povit*, Poltava *guberniya* held on June 24-25; No. 3 (July 23) Lyalychy *volost*, Surazh *povit*, Chernihiv *guberniya* held in early July; No. 4 (July 30) Kyiv *povit*, Kyiv *guberniya* held on June 9; No. 4 (July 30) Vinnytsya *povit*, Podillya *guberniya* held in late June; No. 6 (August 13) Kharkiv *guberniya* held on July 31; No. 6 (August 13) Olhopil *povit*, Podillya *guberniya* held on July 9; No. 7 (August 27) Katerynoslav *guberniya* held in late August; No. 8 (September 3) Saksahan *volost*, Verkhnedniprovsk *povit*, Katerynoslav *guberniya* held on August 6; No. 9 (September 10) Radomysl *povit*, Kyiv *guberniya* held on August 29; No. 9 (September 10) Zhytomyr *povit*, Volyn *guberniya* held on August 16-17; *Krestyanskyi Soyuz/Selyanska Spilka* (organ of Katerynoslav gubernial committee of the All-Russian Peasant Union, Katerynoslav) – No. 32 (August 26) Katerynoslav *povit*, Katerynoslav

the far south in Ukraine appear to be less active in the congress movement, but this perception may just be the result of a breakdown in communications as local activists, even Ukrainian national activists, were more likely to be tied to the major centre of Odesa. The Kyiv-centred press tended to reflect Kyiv-centred politics and report events in the city's environs, thus overshadowing events more distant. One congress from Yelizavethrad *povit* (district), Kherson *guberniya* (province) is recorded to have supported the All-Russian organs of power (Provisional Government, All-Russian Peasant Soviet, and the All-Russian Peasant Union) but favouring the concept of Ukrainian autonomy.

There emerged a recognition among the more politically conscious members of the peasantry that new representative bodies, controlled by the peasantry, must facilitate the transfer of power from the old to, as well as assist in the formation of, these new organs of power during this transitional period. The result was the peasant congress movement which swept the Ukrainian countryside from the spring of 1917 to the spring of 1918. As to exactly how the peasant congresses were organised and by whom has not been left on record. It appears, and considering the precedence of the 1905-7 revolutionary experience, that the congresses resembled an advanced form of village organisation of the *skhod*. Delegates were selected from the more prominent men of the village based on the traditional oligarchic democracy then prevailing. The congresses were held irregularly and corresponded to the agricultural cycle as well as to the changing political realities of the Revolution. There was a flurry of congress activity in June following the spring harvest, the foundation of the Land Committees, and the publication of the Ukrainian Central Rada's First Universal. Then came a lull during the summer months, and then a resurgence in the autumn after the failure of the Kerensky Offensive, the failed Kornilov uprising, and the approach of the next agricultural season. Most of the congresses took place at the *povit* or *guberniya* level with the participation of the local intelligentsia.

It is likely that the congresses were called at least initially by members of the local intelligentsia (teachers, agronomists, revolutionaries, co-operative workers) through the media of print or word-of-mouth. It is difficult to assess the level of intelligentsia participation in the congresses themselves. The rhetoric of the recorded protocols is of an educated standard and often corresponds closely to some of the main features of political party programmes. Many of the resolutions also reflected the specific needs of the peasantry of the local area or of Ukraine generally. The intelligentsia formulated peasant demands in a coherent manner ready for forwarding to the other and higher organs of power competing for allegiance. The rudimentary democracy of the congresses meant that all the resolutions had to be passed by a majority of the delegates – virtually all of whom were, of course, peasants. The intelligentsia may have wished to lead the peasantry or at least guide their actions, but despite mutual suspicion and the intrinsic differences brought on by class, their desires were sufficiently congruent for each to be

guberniya held on August 12; No. 33 (August 31) second congress of Uman *povit*, Kyiv *guberniya* held on June 29; *Narodnya Volya* (organ of the Central Ukrainian Co-operative Committee and the Ukrainian Peasant Union, Kyiv, edited by M. Kovalevskyi) – No. 2 (May 5) Radomysl *povit*, Kyiv *guberniya* held on April 29; No. 192 (December 30) third congress of Oleksandriysk *povit*, Kherson *guberniya* held in December.

able to support the other. The collective will of the local peasantry was to be formulated in a standardised manner, then sent off to the higher organs of power which were being created in Petrograd (Provisional Government) and Kyiv (Ukrainian Central Rada), as well as to the emerging local organs of power. One of the purposes of the congresses was to assist in the creation of new popular institutions such as the soviets, Land Committees, unions, and enlightenment societies. They wished to ensure the maintenance of a pan-peasant front against the forces of reaction and against estate landlords.

The emergence of a rival government in Kyiv to the one in Petrograd and the proliferation of political parties gave politics in Ukraine an added dimension compared with that in the central, ethnically Russian, provinces. This obliged the masses to raise their political consciousness in order to gauge and to negotiate through these complications. It also provided the peasantry with additional leverage against those authorities to whom they were opposed by offering support to their rivals. For the modern researcher, the peasant congress movement of 1917 has the advantage that it was the most open and vocal period of the Revolution, so that it is easier to discover and assess the optimum peasant demands of the time.

The social, economic, political, and national oppression suffered by the Ukrainian peasantry on the eve of 1917 was reflected in the near identical resolutions of all the peasant congresses. They reduce in effect to two basic demands: transfer of all land to the peasantry and diffusion of power to the locality. How this was to be brought about and in what forms new powers were to be created was the task of the congress as the lowest institution of peasant mass democracy. In most cases, the congresses demanded the transfer of all non-peasant land to the peasants without compensation to its former owners, a ban on the sale of land, and an orderly transition of property rights. Methods for land transfer varied depending on which organ of power the congress chose to recognise as being in concert with the village. Some supported the Land Committees (of the Provisional Government), some the Soviets (of the workers and soldiers), and some the Ukrainian Land Fund (programme of the Ukrainian Central Rada). All supported the organisation of the peasantry through some form of a Peasant Union and in most of the cases through the Ukrainian 'Selyanska Spilka', occasionally expressing enmity towards the All-Russian organisation centred in Moscow, which showed opposition to the Ukrainian movement.

Ukrainisation was the movement the peasant congresses supported for the creation of local autonomy. All congresses approved some form of Ukrainian national autonomy, usually expressed in support for the Ukrainian Central Rada.[4] Frequently, and especially after it had published its first Universal in June, peasant congresses and even peasant villages recognised this institution as the government of Ukraine or at least of the Ukrainians: Hadyach – 'help Central Rada establish autonomy'; Zinkiv – 'Central Rada as supreme power in Ukraine'; Kyiv – 'Central Rada as

[4] The Ukrainian Central Rada (Council, Soviet) was founded in March 1917 in Kyiv by a group of moderate Ukrainophiles as a lobby group and clearing house for the Ukrainian movement, but grew to such proportions that it soon claimed to be the pre-parliament for all Ukraine. After the Bolshevik coup of November 1917, the Central Rada declared a Ukrainian Republic and then on January 22, 1918 full independence. It was overthrown on April 29, 1918 by former Russian Army general, Pavlo Skoropadskyi.

highest legal organ in Ukraine'; Vinnytsya – 'Central Rada as highest organ of power'; Uman – 'Central Rada as Ukrainian Provisional Government'; Kharkiv – 'Central Rada as representative of all non-Ukrainian people living in Ukraine'; Katerynoslav – 'Central Rada as highest revolutionary organ in Ukraine'. Several recognised the authority of peasant soviets (Hadyach, Lityn, Zinkiv, Kyiv, Vinnytsya, Uman, Katerynoslav) revealing the fluidity of these new transitional institutions. However, there was widespread approval for all revolutionary organs of power so long as they appeared benevolent to the village and did not represent the old order. It was unwise to pledge support for only one institution when the full meaning and power of all rival or complementary institutions had not, as yet, been revealed. The specific competencies ascribed to various organs of power were not recognised or considered since the peasantry supported simultaneously soviets, Land Committees, and other groups, but under optimum conditions, they supported a national-socialist government with a high degree of devolution of power to the countryside. The Ukrainian Central Rada, with its many supporters in the countryside, seemed the best alternative. It is interesting to note that references to any political party are universally absent although some mention the need to struggle against counter-revolution.

The replacement of the socialist Ukrainian National Republic with the reactionary Ukrainian State of Hetman Pavlo Skoropadskyi entailed a reversal of agrarian policy: the new government demanded that all real estate appropriated from the landlords be returned to its original owners, and that private property be once again made legally inviolable. It also permitted an acceleration in the depredations of German and Austro-Hungarian Army requisition and punitive detachments. These anti-peasant policies contributed to great peasant dissatisfaction by the early summer of 1918, resulting in open warfare.[5] The most notorious and dangerous of these revolts was the 'Tarashchantsi' rebellion of June-August 1918 centred in the *povit* of Tarashcha in southern Kyiv *guberniya*. It was one of the earliest 'green'[6] movements which was to become the hallmark of revolutionary politics in Ukraine in 1919. The ability of local agitators to mobilise the local peasantry against local authority reveals the extent of animosity towards the new government and foreign occupation, and the popularity of local leaders. The movement's inability to connect with other foci of unrest into a Ukraine-wide revolt or to mobilise other peasants demonstrates the weakness of autonomous partisan movements. (In the case of the 'Tarashchantsi' rising, this inability would result in ultimate defeat). This movement, moreover, was neither connected to the Ukrainian National Union, whose underground network overthrew the Hetman in December 1918, nor to the Provisional Soviet Government located outside Ukraine proper in Kursk. The curious aspect of this episode was that it was led by former members of both the Ukrainian and Bolshevik governments. The reputed leaders of the 'Tarashchantsi' were former army officers of local origin: V.S. Belyas (Bolshevik), Hrebenko, Petrenko, and Shynkar (Ukrainian Party of Socialist-

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[5] The 'Hetmanate' was the right-wing government of Skoropadskyi which was supported by the German Army and opposed any socialist activity. It lasted until early December 1918 when the Directory of the Ukrainian National Republic replaced it by force of arms.

[6] 'Green' was the name given by Western scholars to the hundreds if not thousands of armed peasant resistance movements to the Bolsheviks which sprouted throughout the former Russian empire from 1918 to well into the 1920s. They were often organised by the peasantry itself and were rarely led by a political party or followed any specific ideology other than the devolution of power to the village.

Revolutionaries left-wing).[7] The Ukrainian National Union, centred in Biła Tserkva, was barely organised at this time and avoided participation in the revolt which it considered inopportune. After the defeat of the 'Tarashchantsi' in early August, the Bolshevik agitation committee across the neutral zone in Kursk attempted to rally peasant insurgents to revolt by issuing two decrees, neither of which were heeded by more than a handful of units located along the neutral zone.[8]

The source material on this revolt is to be found in the official reports of the *Derzhavna 'Varta'* (State Police) of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Hetman government. Although in early June little activity was reported, by mid-June reports began to arrive in Kyiv to the effect that several bands had been organised and were disarming the police.[9] This coincides with the organisation of the state police in the countryside to enforce the return of expropriated property to the landlords. Other reports mention the spread of anti-Hetman propaganda by returning soldiers and sailors. The insurgent leaders set up a 'Military-Revolutionary Headquarters' in one of the villages which were in revolt and began issuing orders to the other villages of Tarashcha. They did not claim to be representative of any government nor mentioned support for any political party. These orders reveal a desire to return to the politics of 1917 (orders No. 18 and No. 4: formation of Land Committees and village militias, convening of a Constituent Assembly), the usage of national politics prevalent in the Central Rada period (order No. 2: right of law over the violators of the Ukrainian people, return of the Central Rada), and military concerns.[10] According to the reports, agitators for the insurgency, who, to judge from the descriptions of their techniques were semi-intelligentsia, utilised basic national politics to mobilise the peasantry for the insurgents: 'without Jews, pans [landlords], Poles – Ukraine for the Ukrainians', and it was distinctly noted in the reports that none of the major Ukrainian parties were involved in this type of agitation.[11] A perceptive report as to the motivation of the revolt by the Zvenyhorod *starosta* (official government representative) is telling: '...revolt has political character derived from dissatisfaction with the new regime...', '...agitation only successful due to the abrogation of the Land Law of the Fourth Universal among the poor peasants...', 'needless punitive expeditions and massive requisitioning by the German Army...', 'failure of insurgency has convinced peasants of its futility...', 'insurgents hide in the forests, are affected by agitation because of their unculturedness (*bezkulturnost*)'.[12]

By mid-July the insurgents had an army of 30,000 and controlled most of the *povit*,[13] but superior German fire-power and a loss of the confidence of the local population which until until then had supported them, forced the remnants to

[7] Tsentralnyi Derzhavnyi Arkhiv Vyshchykh Orhaniv (TsDAVO) in Kyiv, fond 1216, spr. 72, ark. 49 (June 19), 66 (June ?), 193 (August 8).

[8] *Istoriya SSSR*, vol. 6 (Kyiv, 1984), pp. 344-48. The 'neutral zone' was a several-mile wide demilitarised strip demarcated in the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and established by the German Army, extending along the entire border between Ukraine and Soviet Russia to keep Bolshevik agitation and the civil war out of Ukraine.

[9] fond 1216, spr. 72, ark. 18-24 (June 1-5).

[10] fond 1216, spr. 72, ark. 49-51 (June 19), 96 (July 9); *Istoriya SSSR*, vol. 6, (1984), p. 346.

[11] fond 1216, spr. 73, ark. 372 (July 13).

[12] fond 1216, spr. 73, ark. 277-78 (July 16).

[13] fond 1216, spr. 72, ark. 124 (July 1-14). In fact, the insurgents held the town of Tarashcha from June 12-20 after which the German Army utilising several divisions with the complement of artillery retook the town.

withdraw east across the Dnipro.[14] The peasant population was fragmenting as many now preferred peaceful negotiations to failing insurgency. Furthermore, the rebels had begun to use terror against the locals and this naturally increased their alienation. The 'Tarashchantsi' eventually made it to Bolshevik-controlled territory and ultimately formed a unit within the Red Army which led the second invasion of Ukraine in late December 1918. The peasantry could only be mobilised and directed to a specific goal if an opportunity for success was apparent. Neither the attempts by the charismatic independent leaders of the 'Tarashchantsi' nor the distant Provisional Soviet Ukrainian government could rouse the majority to action. Only in late November, when the Germans were leaving and anarchy threatened the regime, did the majority respond to mobilisation. But this time it was the Ukrainian National Union led by Symon Petlyura that was able to rouse and direct the peasantry to help bring the new Ukrainian national-socialist government to power. The main reason for this success of the Ukrainian National Union was its internal network which had major supporters among the partisan bands and insurgents in many areas, while the Bolsheviks had nothing analogous. Many of the leaders had been members, in one form or another, of the Ukrainian Central Rada and had lost their positions after the Hetman came to power. They had remained among the people throughout the German occupation while the Bolsheviks, after their first attempt at government, had few supporters left, so that their appeals won little response. The 'Tarashchantsi' revolt illustrates one of the weaknesses of an unconnected partisan movement and the unique and changing political realities of Ukraine during the Revolution.

By the middle of 1919, the Red Army, with the help of large native partisan detachments, succeeded in driving the UNR Directory from eastern and central Ukraine. This permitted the re-establishment of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.[15] The prime motive for such a rapid invasion of Ukraine, despite the great threat from the south in the form of Denikin's Volunteer Army, was the need for provisions to supply the starving cities of industrial Russia. This is why so much attention was paid to the creation and maintenance of the 'Soviet-estates' or *sov-khozy* formed *en masse* from existing landlord estates, particularly as requisitioning supplies from the peasants was unreliable, inefficient, and at times downright dangerous. Reports from the Bolshevik agronomist Derevytsky in Lubni *povit*, Poltava *guberniya* and from the Commission on Soviet Estates in Romny *povit*, Poltava *guberniya* from the summer of 1919 illustrate the curious conditions prevailing in many parts of Ukraine.[16]

The reports reveal the great social, political, and administrative gulf that existed between the Bolshevik invaders and the peasantry. It is curious that the area is reported to be rather quiet, and the relative ease in the creation of *sov-khozy* suggests that little landlord property had been seized or destroyed. On only four of the eighteen estates was the inventory considered poor, and only one had been

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[14] fond 1216, spr. 72, ark. 106 (July 15), 188 (July 28-August 4), 174-81 (August 2-7).

[15] The 'Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic' was formed in exile in Russia by members of the Communist Party of Ukraine, who were a branch of the Russian Communist Party, in December 1918 to challenge the authority of the Directory. It entered Ukraine behind the bayonets of the Red Army in January 1919, and lasted until the invasion of the Russian Volunteer Army in August of the same year.

[16] TsDAVO, fond 27, spr. 47, ark. 57-62; fond 27, spr. 48, ark. 44-49.

looted completely. Poltava had been seized from the Directory during February, and it appears that little in the way of administration outside the major towns had been done. In Lubni, the local Soviet Land Departments were in disarray and had no power. Instructors had been driven away by the peasants and the local specialists were hiding in the towns. The acquiescence of the peasantry was due to the ameliorating abilities of the local communists, who were probably the Borotbisty, since there were no Russian or Ukrainian Communist Party cells operating in the area at that time. Poltavan Borotbisty, who were predominant in Left-Bank Ukraine, had abandoned the Ukrainian nationalist government of Petlyura after the abortive Labour Congress in Kyiv in January and had attended the Third All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets held in Kharkiv in March 1919 to negotiate entrance into the Soviet Ukrainian government.

Despite the five months of Soviet rule, little action had been taken on behalf of the Soviet government. Although the *sov-khozy* had been created and the spring planting had gone well, a situation had arisen which was ripe for disaster. The peasants had a negative attitude to collectivisation and none of them were willing to work on the estates due to a lack of money and their demand for land. Out of the fourteen estates in Romny where the peasants' wishes were reported, on nine estates the peasants wanted all the land and on the other five at least two-thirds of it. The Commission made no mention of the *Komitety Bednoty* (Committees of Poor Peasants), which the Bolsheviks were organising as the agent of class warfare and Soviet power in the village, but urged the need to distribute communist propaganda among the peasantry to attract them to Soviet policies. The *kombedy* had failed in Russia the previous summer and now failed in Ukraine as well. They were formally disbanded during the Bolshevik retreat and recreated in their Ukrainian version in 1920 as the *Komitety Nezamozhnykh Selyan* (Committees of Unprosperous Peasants). As in the previous years, the peasantry were awaiting positive action from the new government and were willing to negotiate a compromise over competency. Some villages were willing to let a small version of the *sov-khozy* exist in return for being allowed to distribute most of the land among themselves and for village autonomy.

The curious absence of rural anarchy, which pervades much of the literature on the Revolution, and which persisted in Poltava as late as 1919, two years after the Revolution, is illustrative of the strength of village organisation. In fact, during the so-called anarchy of the period between the publication of Lenin's Land Law in November 1917 and the German occupation in March 1918, few estates were spontaneously raided by angry mobs of peasants. Often it was either the local Land Committee or an *ad hoc* village committee which peacefully and systematically dismantled and distributed landlord estates. Members of the Land Committees reported to the Ukrainian Central Rada that, after their dispersal by Red Guards, the peasants were actively encouraged to seize estates but few took up the offer. The Bolsheviks caused the most havoc while villagers occupied the estates to protect property from destruction. After the Skoropadskyi coup, there was little problem in returning property to the former owners.

The military occupation of the region and the absence of representative institutions for the peasantry limited the extent to which the village could be mobilised in its own interests. But, likewise, the peasants could not be mobilised in

support of the Bolshevik government either. Villages began to organise *ad hoc* against the weak authorities to try and ensure the satisfaction of basic peasant demands but fragmentation imposed limits on this. The reports mention that individual villages had volunteered men for the Red Army but that their support for that Army was now wavering. The village was still intact but had become atomised and isolated.

The Ukrainian peasantry only took up arms in 1917, 1918, 1919 once other avenues to the higher authorities had been exhausted. Peasant demands were submitted to successive governments in good faith and some negotiation was possible, with recognition being contingent on the fulfilment of those demands. In all cases, the desire was for the village to become autonomous. The first priority of the peasantry was the desire for land – to be distributed by themselves with the aid of interested parties. In Ukraine, as elsewhere, the indigenisation of politics became one of the major themes of agrarian revolution; in Ukraine, however, it manifested itself in diverse and often violent forms of Ukrainisation. The explosion of activity released by the Revolution with which the mass of exploited and under-developed peasants had to come to terms led to great confusion and diversity of response. The chaos of revolutionary politics and the transitory nature of power left deep impressions on the Ukrainian peasantry but never truly managed to break the surface of the village 'corporation' of unified peasants. The Ukrainian peasantry had to adapt to a new situation using traditional and modern tools of understanding and organisation – and this was reflected in their diverse actions during the Russian Revolution.   ❑

The Arts

Scriptural Themes in Twentieth-Century Ukrainian Prose

Ihor Nabytovych

T
he origins of Ukrainian historical prose date from the mid-nineteenth century. The first historical novel in Ukrainian literature was Panteleymon Kulish's *Chorna Rada* (The Black Council, 1857) which portrayed events in Ukraine in the second half of the seventeenth century.

However, whereas in other European literatures, particularly English, the Bible early on became an endless source of themes for creative writing, in Ukrainian literature the use of Bible stories in artistic prose began only at the start of the twentieth century.

One of the factors promoting an interest in Biblical subjects in Ukrainian prose at this time was undoubtedly the first complete translation of the Bible into modern literary Ukrainian by Panteleymon Kulish, Ivan Pulyuy, and Ivan Nechuy-Levytskyi, which was published in 1904.[1]

There were several other reasons, too, why Ukrainian writers began to turn to Biblical subjects.

One motive may be termed ethno-psychological, since one of the characteristics of Ukrainians is their religiousness.[2] As Professor Leonid Rudnytskyi of the University of Philadelphia has noted, the whole of Ukrainian literature from the earliest times has been imbued with a sense of the religious.

> If we had such a thing as a magnet that could draw out all manifestations of religion, and we placed it against Ukrainian literature, then the latter would collapse; after the removal of all religious themes and motifs from it, little else would remain. We encounter this religious element in all eras of Ukrainian literature, in all its genres, schools, and periods.[3]

The first work of Ukrainian prose to make use of a Biblical subject and images for the creation of a historical tale was *Aviron* (Abiram) by Hnat Khotkevych,[4] published in 1910. This work is based on the events described in the book of Exodus, dealing with the Israelites' forty years' wandering in the desert, led by Moses.

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[1] Barvinskyi, Oleksander, 'P. Kulish ta I. Pulyuy, yak perekladchyky Sv. Pysma', *Nasha Kultura*, Warsaw, 1937, no. 4, pp. 179-83.

Panteleymon Kulish (1819-1897), writer, historian, ethnographer, and literary critic (for more details, see pp. 84-88; Ivan Pulyuy (1845-1918), physicist, electrical engineer, inventor, civic activist, and a scholar of ancient languages, including ancient Hebrew and Greek; Ivan Nechuy-Levytskyi (1838-1918), a well-known Ukrainian writer.

[2] Yaniv, Volodymyr, 'Relihiynist ukrayintsya z etnopsykholohichnoho pohlyadu', Yaniv, V., *Narysy do istoriyi ukrayinskoyi etnopsykholohiyi*, Munich: Ukrainian Free University, 1993, pp. 174-95.

[3] Rudnytskyi, Leonid, 'Vyyavy relihiynosty v ukrayinskiy sovyetskiy literaturi: 1953-1988. Sproba analizy', *Zbirnyk prats Yuvileynoho Konhresu u 1000-littya khryshchennya Rusy-Ukrayiny*, Munich, 1988/1989, p. 823.

[4] Hnat Khotkevych (1877-1938), writer, actor, and art critic.

The subject of the work are the events described in the Old Testament, and deals with the period of wandering of the Jewish people under the leadership of Moses between their escape from slavery in Egypt and their arrival at Mount Sinai.

The plot turns on the conflict described in the Holy Bible – the eternal problem of relations between the leader and the power he personifies, and the people, between the prophet and the crowd; the personal ambitions of the leader, an individual's craving for limitless power, and the aspirations of the whole people.

In the centre of *Aviron* is the prophet Moses, a leader who has brought his people to the foot of Mount Sinai. Khotkevych describes him through the eyes of the young boy Abiram: from enthusiastic support (and virtual deification) of him at the beginning, to total rejection at the end.

From the beginning of the 1920s, when eastern Ukraine was occupied by Soviet Russia, and Western Ukraine (Galicia) by the Poles, right up to the 1990s, Ukrainian literature followed two separate paths of development – one in Soviet Ukraine, and the other in Galicia (until it, too, was annexed by the USSR), and the diaspora.

The main rules for literature in the Ukrainian SSR were those of 'Socialist realism': loyalty to the official Marxist-Leninist Communist ideology, the 'class approach', the depiction of the masses as the motive forces of the historical process, and so forth. Two principal taboos were imposed on this literature: firstly, historical prose, and, indeed, Ukrainian literature as a whole, was not allowed to portray the Ukrainian struggle against Russian enslavement, or antagonism between Ukraine and Russia; secondly, contemporary Ukrainian literature was forbidden to use any Scriptural subjects, elements of mysticism, manifestations of religiousness, the Christian spirit and outlook, etc.

Nevertheless, in spite of the direct bans of the censorship, even during the period of the severest Communist repression, Ukrainian literature in the Ukrainian SSR managed to preserve a certain continuity of Christian traditions.

The development of Ukrainian literature in western Ukraine under Polish occupation in the inter-war years and in the diaspora took a different course, since here the writer was able, to a certain degree, to express freely his views, opinions, and non-partisan perception of history.

Ukrainian literature has very few great works of historical prose with a Biblical theme, since they could be written only outside Soviet Ukraine. These include the novel by Natalena Koroleva *Quid est Veritas?* (Chicago, 1961), the novel by Leonid Mosendz *Ostanniy prorok* (The Last Prophet, published in Toronto in 1960), and the tale by R. Volodymyr (Roman Kukhar) *Apostol Andriy Pervozvannyi* (Andrew, the First-Called Apostle, Buenos-Aires, 1984).

A great step forward in the assimilation of Gospel themes into Ukrainian artistic prose was made by the works of Natalena Koroleva, descended from the Spanish family of de Lecherd, famous since the Middle Ages. All her historical works – *1313* (the story of the pioneering work of Berthold Schwarz on gunpowder in the fourteenth century), *Son tini* (Dream of the Shade – a narrative of tragic love in the second century AD), *Predok* (Forefather – the story of the coming of the author's ancestor, Count de Lecherd, from Spain to Ukraine in the sixteenth century) – carry in them elements of the spirituality of the Gospels, and are imbued with faith that a person can and is able to fight for the attainment of the Christian ideals of Faith, Right, and Truth, while realising that on the thorny paths of the search for these ideals no human being can ever attain the absolute.

Natalena Koroleva lived and worked in the diaspora – in Czechoslovakia (although she was born in Spain).

Apart from traditions of the Christian world-view and the innate religious spirit of Ukrainians there were also other reasons for turning to Gospel subjects in Ukrainian prose.

An important role in the twentieth-century growth of Ukrainian self-awareness as a nation was played by the main events of Bible history, particularly the New Testament. Using Scriptural subjects, Ukrainian writers strove to interpret the historical fate of the Ukrainians through the prism of the history of the Children of Israel.

To a certain degree this focus on Gospel history, and the desire to create belletristic prose with religious and Christian subjects, motifs, and recollections was an attempt to produce works which under the atheist regime in power in Ukraine could not be written or published there. This filled the blank pages in Ukrainian literature, and extended the limits of Ukrainian prose to the European level.

At the same time, Ukrainian émigré writers, and those in pre-war western Ukraine, attempted to expound their historiosophical visions and ideas using New Testament subjects.

In particular, these tendencies are very characteristic of the works of Natalena Koroleva.

Koroleva's novel *Quid est Veritas?* was written in the mid-1930s, and became the peak of her creative career. The publication of this novel in the Lviv journal *Dzvony* in 1939 was interrupted by World War II and Russian occupation of Galicia. The work appeared as a separate book only some two decades later.[5]

The protagonist of this novel is Pontius Pilate. This figure had already appeared in a number of prose works in other literatures, in particular in the story by Anatole France *Procurator of Judea*, and the novel by M. Laurentin *Le Roman de Ponce Pilate* (1926). In the latter work, Pilate recounts his life. Almost at the same time as Laurentin was working on his novel, the Russian writer, Mikhail Bulgakov, was working on *Master i Margaryta* (The Master and Margarita) in which there is a 'novel within a novel', based on a scriptural subject; as in *Le Roman de Ponce Pilate*, the leading figures are Pilate and Yehoshua (Jesus Christ).

Koroleva's *Quid est Veritas?* is a myth, a legend in novel form, placed on a sound scholarly basis. This is a novel written with a thorough knowledge not only of the Holy Scriptures, but also the Apocrypha, historical sources and material of archaeological research.

In constructing the plot of her novel, the author as it were 'extracts' from their contextual setting the most important events, described in the Gospel, rather than simply repeating them in her work.

She carefully draws together all the threads of the narrative around one main story – the spiritual breakdown of the Procurator of Judea, Pontius Pilate. Koroleva's portrayal of Pilate is vivid and realistic.

The historian and ecclesiastic of the third-fourth centuries, Eusebius of Caesarea, writes in his *Church History* (II-7) that the Emperor Caligula removed Pilate from his post, and that, according to legend, Pilate committed suicide. According to another legend, Pilate was exiled to Gaul, where he died.

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[5] Koroleva, Natalena, *Quid est Veritas?*, Chicago, 1961.

Natalena Koroleva gives a different version, which is based on Provençal legend. Her Pilate, after condemning Christ to death, suffers a spiritual breakdown, and then embarks on a quest for the Holy Grail, the Chalice which had contained the blood of Christ. During a severe storm, he perishes, but is brought back to life by Lazarus, whom Christ had raised from the dead. The resurrected ex-procurator then begins a new ascetic life as St Marius.

All the works of Natalena Koroleva are imbued with the light of Christian love for Mankind, its fate and aspirations, experiences and sufferings. In some of her shorter works, stories, novellas, legends, and parables she treats other Gospel subjects in an artistic, belletristic manner.

In the collection *Podorozhniy* (The Wayfarer)[6] among other legends with Christian motifs and recollections is the one which gives the name to the collection, and is also based on a Biblical subject.

On the road from Jerusalem to Emmaus, Stephanos and Cleophas, who had come to believe in Christ, are speaking about Him. They meet the risen Jesus but do not recognise Him, and only realise that the Master had been with them when, during supper at an inn, 'the stranger blessed the bread, broke it, and gave it to the disciples of Jesus...'. Only when the innkeeper brought a lamp and the place where the wayfarer had been was empty, they understood who had been with them: 'At the moment when they had lost the Master, they found Him, and recognised Him'.

The collection *Vo dni ony* (In Those Days, 1935)[7] consists of thirteen stories closely bound up with Gospel subjects. A Canadian specialist on Koroleva's work, Oleksandra Kopach, states that this writer believed that her works were rather frames for evangelical stories. However, she says, 'at the same time – they are beautiful literary works, deeply imbued with symbols, and lit up with the reflection of the eternal. The Kingdom of God is revealed before our eyes... But this Kingdom is not up in the unattainable clouds, but here among people, poor or rich, in crowded marketplaces or in quiet churches. This Kingdom of God is in human souls'.[8]

The novella 'Prokazhenyi' (The Leper), which opens the collection, is a story about a young man from the town of Magdala, Levi, who was afflicted with leprosy and who was cured of it by the 'Nazarene prophet, Jesus of Galilee'. In his joy, Levi forgot to thank Jesus for what he had done.

Levi and Reboam (also cured of leprosy by Jesus) want to follow the Master forever. On the road they are attacked by the robber-band of Barabbas, who take their 'left-overs of the miraculous bread', the fragments of the loaves 'which the Master had miraculously multiplied for five thousand people'.

Finding themselves in Jerusalem and looking for work, they find employment with the High-Priest Caiaphas.

Levi's soul quickly degenerates. Even 'his certainty whether Jesus really cured him of that dreadful illness is shaken'. And when the Procurator asks the Jews whom he should spare, 'Jesus, your King, or Barabbas the Robber?', Levi together with Reboam

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[6] Koroleva, *Podorozhniy*, no place or date of publication.
[7] Koroleva, *Vo dni ony*, Lviv, 1935.
[8] Kopach, Oleksandra, *Natalena Koroleva*, Winnipeg: UVAN, 1962. Series 'Literatura', part 8, p. 18.

closed his eyes and yelled at the top of his voice:
  – Bar-a-bbas!…
He did not recognise his own voice, but howled on in unison with the whole crowd:
  – Barabbas!… .

The Apostle Peter, on his return from the tomb of the Lord ('In the House of Lazarus'), suffered because of his words: 'I know not the Man!', which he repeated three times, denying Christ. He recalls Jesus' parable about the two sons who did not keep their word to their father. One said 'I go not!' but in the end went. The other, 'I go!' but did not fulfil his promise.

Peter had promised: 'Even if everyone denies [Thee – Christ], I will lay down my life for Thee'. But in denying Jesus he 'understood that it is not so easy for an ordinary human, without an effort over himself, to master even his own word': Peter was an ordinary human being.

It is only when out of the pre-dawn mist Mary Magdalen appears carrying a torch and informs him that Christ 'has risen on the third day, as He had promised', that Peter realises why Jesus had not spoken about those who had made a promise and kept it, i.e. about Himself.

In 'Hadaryn' (Gadara) the Romans have imposed a great tax on the town of Gadara, and the town elders are pining for the Messiah, who will liberate them from bondage. But when they discover that Christ has cured the possessed Shemai, and that the devils cast out of him have entered into the pigs (which belonged to the wealthiest inhabitants of the town), and that the pigs have been drowned, they shut the town gates in the face of the Messiah.

In 'Poklyk' (The Call) Zacheus, the senior customs officer of Jericho, who until then had regarded himself as the centre of the whole world, learns from the beggar Rechum how he was miraculously cured by Christ, and himself hears the call of the Rabbi, and follows him.

The poor widow Dinah gives her last drachma to the temple and receives the blessing of Jesus ('Drakhma').

The customs officer Jeremathus repents of his sins, and aspires to live a righteous life ('Spovid' – The Confession).

Herod, thinking about the Messiah, and wishing to remain the ruler of Judea, orders all boys up to the age of two to be killed ('Irod' – Herod).

Judas Iscariot tries to find sense in the teachings of Jesus, and can in no way understand them. Realising the futility of his aspirations, he commits suicide ('Dlya spravy' – For the Cause).

In addition to these novellas, which are filled with light, the collection also includes those in which, by contrast, there appear evil and darkness. Into the Christmas night there steals the image of a teen-age boy who betrays his father to death ('Rizdvyana nich').

The novella 'Na hori' (On the Mountain) has echoes of 'Na Lazarevim khutori' (In the House of Lazarus): the Apostle Peter sees Christ speaking with the prophets, and again begins to understand that he, Peter, is a human, for 'only in Heaven, in the One God, can the human spirit become one with eternity, and for this, falling on his face, the future representative of Christ on earth implores…'. Peter appears here once again as the personification of the imperfection of the nature of the human soul.

When on the Sabbath after the death of Jesus His disciples have gathered and are mourning Him, Mary and the other women go out to tend His body. Beside the tomb 'there stood a Light, transparent as a rainbow – shining, like the sun – blinding, in the glow of shining dew. And there resounded the words:

– Why seek ye the living among the dead?' ('Yak mynula zh subota…' – And when the Sabbath was over…).

The final novella in the collection is 'Quid est Veritas?', which would later become the basis of the novel of that name. This novella consists of reflections by the Procurator of Judea, the free Roman Pontius Pilate, and the son of the enslaved Jewish people, Joseph of Arimathea, about the fate of the Jews and Jewish history. Here Koroleva attempts through the fate of the Jews to create a historiosophical vision of the fate of the Ukrainians, their mentality, and to reveal Ukrainian history through the prism of the history of relations between the Romans and the Jews.

Pilate is trying to understand what binds Joseph to the Jews:

> In actual fact, what can tie you, a man free in soul and clear thought, belonging more to the whole of humanity than to some particular people, what ties you to this people of slave mentality and an utterly servile character?
> Joseph's face remained unmovingly calm:
> – Pontius! How many centuries has this people passed in captivity? In a captivity all the harder in that they were separated from the victors by a faith, which was persecuted. That means their whole view of the world, all ideals, and moral standards – everything was persecuted and uprooted. Why is it strange that parents who were slaves could rear only slave-sons and grandsons?!
> – But you…
> – I… I, whatever I might do, whatever I might think, – I shall remain a son of my people. Even if I did not want this with all my heart. In blood and spirit I still remain theirs…

The novel by poet and prose writer Leonid Mosendz, *Ostanniy prorok* (The Last Prophet), is one of the peaks of Ukrainian historical prose.

After the Ukrainian National Republic was crushed in 1921, Mosendz was forced by political reasons to live abroad: in Czechoslovakia, and later Austria. He died of tuberculosis in Switzerland in 1948.

For more than ten years, until the closing days of his life, he had worked on this novel. But it was only published, in Toronto, twelve years after his death.[9] The protagonist of this novel is John the Baptist – Jochanan, the precursor of the Messiah, for whom 'for hundreds of years the people of Israel have been waiting'.

Ostanniy prorok is a polyphonic work. It is like a musical symphony resounding with various themes – thematic threads which weave together around one theme – the fate of John. There is also a second dominant leitmotif – the theme of waiting for the coming of the Messiah, who will free the Jewish people from Roman rule.

Initially, these two themes sound in various registers, differ in octaves, but gradually by the end of the work begin to sound like a single theme in two voices.

The fate of other protagonists: Herod, the legate Quintilius Varus of Syria, Jewish High-Priests, and others – sometimes come into the foreground, overpow-

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[9] Mosendz, Leonid, *Ostanniy prorok*, Toronto, 1960.

ering for the moment the two main themes, although the music of the work soon returns to the fundamental.

Bohdan Kravtsiv, a Ukrainian poet and literary scholar, in his introduction to the Toronto edition of the novel, wrote:

> The Last Prophet is a novel about the rise and growth of Ukrainian nationalism, personified by the Israelite Jochanan, the God-given, the future precursor of the Messiah – John the Baptist.
>
> This is a novel about the history of Ukrainian nationalism, an uncompromising, courageous national movement, the clear and sublime vision of which the author cherished in his imagination, lost in contemplation of the grand idea and idealised character of the bearers of this movement, who go forward towards their chosen goal stubbornly and consistently...[10]

The Last Prophet consists of three parts. The first, 'Batky' (The Parents), is a gentle-flowing narrative about Jochanan's parents, the righteous Zachariah and Elizabeth, who in their old age were granted a son. Elizabeth promises to dedicate her son to the service of God and the people. The second and third parts of the novel 'Vybranets' (The Chosen One) and 'Manivtsi' (Astray) are the history of the childhood, youth, and maturing of Jochanan, whom Elizabeth sends to be educated in the temple in Jerusalem. There he recognises the teaching and the Pharisees and Saducees for what they are, and understands the baseness of their aspirations and desires, hidden behind a show of righteousness and justice, and goes to the zealots, those who are fighting sword in hand for independence from Roman occupation, and against their own traitors. Some time later Jochanan leaves the zealots too.

The novel, alas, remained uncompleted. We know from various private letters of the author that he was also working on a fourth part, but the manuscript has not been found to this day.

The well-known novella of B. Domontovych (Viktor Petrov) *Apostoly* (The Apostles)[11] was written in displaced persons' camps after World War II. The literary critic Yuriy Shevelyov sees in it a reflection of the events of life in the camps.

The novella resembles a great marble bas-relief on which the carving tools of a master-craftsman have created a clear picture, but at the will of the writer the sculptures suddenly come to life from their dynamic stasis.

Each of Domontovych's Apostles is a living person with his own character, thoughts, and actions: Peter is uncompromising and rough; Judas – 'cunning, cynical, and careful'; Thomas is a sceptic and analyst. It is as though the writer constructs opposing pairs of antagonists: Jesus–Judas, Peter–Thomas.

In spite of Thomas's constant doubts about Christ, when 'the day was dawning, the day on which they crucified Jesus', Peter saw 'pain and sorrow' in Thomas's eyes. After denying Jesus, Peter 'saw that Thomas's lips were moving. He was praying. For himself? For Jesus? For him?'

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[10] Kravtsiv, Bohdan, 'Leonid Mosendz i yoho "Ostanniy prorok"', Mosendz, L., *Ostanniy prorok*, Toronto, 1960, pp. xxv-xxvi.

[11] Domontovych, V., 'Apostoly', *Ukrayinske Slovo. Khrestomatiya ukrayinskoyi literaturnoyi krytyky XX st. y 4 tomakh*, Kyiv: Ros, 1994, vol. 2, pp. 80-90.

At the end of the 1940s Yuriy Tys-Krokhmalyuk, a writer well-known in the diaspora, produced his story *Legenda* (The Legend).[12]

Tys-Krokhmalyuk creates his artistic version of the journey of the three wise men to the infant Jesus. One of them, the priest Balthazar, one of the magi of the ancestors of the Ukrainians, is bringing to Galilee from the banks of the Dnipro his greatest treasure – golden grains of wheat to lay at the feet of the Christ-child.

In 1984 Roman Kukhar, a Ukrainian writer and scholar from the USA, published in Buenos Aires (under the pseudonym R. Volodymyr) a historical story *Andriy Pervozvannyi* (Andrew the First-Called Apostle).[13] This was preceded by the author's sound research of primary sources from history, archaeology, and hagiography of the Apostle Andrew.[14]

In subject, the story is based, in addition to the Bible, on a legend recounted in the twelfth-century Ukrainian chronicle *Povist vremennykh lit* (Tale of Bygone Years) of how St Andrew the Apostle comes to the Ukrainian land to preach Christianity, and on the hills where Kyiv now stands, he places a cross.

Dying, crucified by Roman legionaries, Andrew recalls in a dream his long life: his parents' home, his meeting with John the Baptist, and later his life with Jesus, his subsequent journeys around the *Oecumene* on his apostolic mission, and particularly to the banks of the Dnipro.

After the fall of the Soviet Union, the two separate currents of development of Ukrainian literature, in Ukraine and in the diaspora, returned to a single channel. The meeting-point of these lines in artistic prose using Biblical subjects is a novel by Roman Ivanychuk, a prose-writer well-known in Ukraine, and the author of dozens of historical tales and novels, *Yevanheliye vid Tomy* (The Gospel according to Thomas).[15]

The epigraph to the novel is taken from the apocryphal Gospel of Thomas, 'Let him who is seeking, not stop seeking until he finds; when he finds he will be surprised'.

The Apocrypha-based novel, *The Gospel according to Thomas*, is a story of the doubts and suffering of the Apostle who was unable to believe that Jesus Christ was the Son of God. The unbelief and doubt which accompany Thomas from his first meeting with the Messiah do not leave him even when he touches with his finger the wounds of the risen Christ, and later, together with St Andrew the First-Called Apostle, will travel to the land of Oriyana – which one day would become Ukraine.

On getting to know the people of Oriyana, and comparing them with the Jews 'Thomas thought about the inexplicable unity between the peoples, separated from one another for innumerable stages in the foundations of their religions and everyday life...'.

In the reflections of Thomas on the fate of the Jews and the fate of the Oriyans/Ukrainians, the author, in allegories and symbols, analyses the history of

[12] Tys, Yuriy, 'Legenda', *Kalendar 'Prosvity'*, New York, 1950, pp. 122-31.

[13] Volodymyr, R., *Andriy Pervozvannyi*, Buenos-Aires, 1984.

[14] Kukhar, Roman, 'Shlyakhamy apostolskoyi misiyi v Ukrayinu sv. Andriya Pervozvannoho v svitli dzherelnoyi literatury', *Symbolae in honorem Volodymyri Janiw*, Munich: Ukrainian Free University, 1983, *Studia*, vol. X, pp. 597-608.

[15] Ivanychuk, Roman, 'Yevanheliye vid Tomy. Apokryphichnyi roman', *Dzvin*, 1995, no. 1, pp. 21-84.

Ukraine up to the present day, striving through the ethno-psychological characteristics of the Jews to understand the ethno-psychological, mental reasons for the ascents and descents, victories and failures of the Ukrainian people over the last thousand years.

While writing about Judea and its people, the author constantly has Ukraine in mind. 'Judea is the Temple', says Roman Ivanychuk, 'One can destroy half, two-thirds, three-quarters of the Hebrew people – and it will be reborn, will rise again and continue to live...'.

The novel *The Gospel according to Thomas* is so far the latest example of Biblical subjects in Ukrainian literature of the twentieth century. This, however, is certainly not the end. The new era will bring new high-level belletristic prose works, inspired by subjects from the Bible, and imbued with a lofty Christian spirit.   ❏

The British Association for Ukrainian Studies

An Association under this name was formed back in 1990. The time has now come for a re-launch. Academic interest in Ukraine has grown enormously over the past few years. This growth is reflected most directly in the appointment of three young scholars to posts in the Universities of Birmingham and Essex, and in the School of Slavonic and East European Studies (SSEES) of the University of London, and in the recent signing of agreements between the University of North London, SSEES, and the Institute for Ukrainian Studies of Kyiv Taras Shevchenko University for future cooperation in teaching and research.

The re-launch meeting is planned for the end of May or beginning of June. The exact date will be determined when we have more information about when Professor Petro Kononenko, Director of the Institute for Ukrainian Studies of Kyiv Taras Shevchenko University, will be in London again.

Further information can be obtained from me at SSEES, University of London, Malet Street, London, WC1E 7HU (Tel.: 0171 637-4934, ext. 4031; e-mail: jdingley@ssees.ac.uk), or by visiting the Association's brand-new web-site at http://www.bvx.ca/baus.

Jim Dingley

Poetry of the 1980s and 1990s:
The Aesthetic with a Taste
of the Social

Liliya Syrota

In the 1980s a number of literary groups emerged in Ukraine, whose members approached the ambient reality in a manner which ignored the then politically correct methods of Socialist realism. The creativity of this young avant-garde was aimed at the negation of that dogma. These poets were concerned with current and concrete issues of Ukrainian reality, without avoiding sensitive contradictions, which were often absurd, unresolvable, and shocking. By laying bare themes and problems unfashionable in the officially approved literature, these writers protested against any constraints on their activities.

Such unpoliticised questing literature was represented in Ukraine by the literary groups 'Bu-Ba-Bu', 'LuHoSad', 'Lost Charter', '8 Museum Lane', and others. The work of these groups was characterised by an authentic perception of being in generalised (universal) terms, focusing not so much on material things as on values and the perception of them in a historical context. We also observe a perception of life in concrete contours with the main emphasis on its details and individual aspects.

These young poets, who were all at that time under thirty years of age, included Viktor Neborak, Yu. Andrukhovych, O. Irvanets from 'Bu-Ba-Bu', Yuriy Pozayak, S. Lybon, Viktor Nedostup from 'Lost Charter', Ivan Luchuk, N. Honchar, R. Sadlovskyi from 'LuHoSad', and many others. Their experimental works were perceived as an accurate diagnosis of the malaise of contemporary reality. This was similar to the way in which young people perceived the course of life and criticised Soviet reality and the aesthetic principles of the poetics of previous generations. In their work these young people in many ways replicated the 'futurists' of the second and third decades of this century, who rejected traditional art forms, aspiring instead to shock the public. They recreated in poetic form the actual world of real existence. The poets created this world in such a way that everyone would feel at home in it.

Critics have described this line of development of Ukrainian literature in terms of 'alternative culture', 'counter-culture', 'the underground', on account of two aspects of it: its opposition to official literature and the creation of new poetics. Viktor Nedostup, one of the active participants of this process, has described the nature of this development: 'Alternative art... is not an avant-garde because it is always, to a certain degree, unfreedom... Alternative art is a reaction, and a contemporary reaction against more powerful totalitarian forces. Therefore, alternative art is more a psychological than a cultural phenomenon'.

The works of these artists have the nature of a grotesque discourse which casts doubts on the principles of construction of traditional realistic texts. It mixes up the various structural elements of the work in order to combine them anew on the basis of new laws, in which the individual elements already form a new poetical structure. This transformation is carried out according to the principle of deconstruction.

One of the principal features of the works of these groups is 'intertextuality' (Lidiya Stefanivska), produced by the use of elements of travesty, paraphrase, burlesque,[1] the counterpointing of quotations, etc. All these help to create a picture of the world in which, as in a fantastic baroque style, conscious and subconscious material become melded together. The name of one of the groups 'Bu-Ba-Bu' is an acronym made from the first two letters of the words 'burlesque', 'balahan', 'buffoonery'.[2] These literary devices became the foundations of the *Weltanschauung* of the work of many writers of the 1980s. Often they make use of collages and montages, constructed out of quotations from various literary works.

This new literature required a well-educated reader. The complete or partial fusion of the *Weltanschauung* systems of various eras, omitted at the whim of the contemporary author, can lead to a complexity of perception if the cultural level of the reader is lower than that of the author.

In these poetic texts we observe the traditional meaning of words becoming looser, forcing us to search in them for a new significance of the image. These writers do not have the faith (characteristic of the literary professions) in the power of the word to alter reality, or of the poet to influence society. These litterateurs perceive the world in terms of supra-ideological guide-lines: their poetry is created on an empirical basis. Their most frequent subjects are those of everyday life: eating, love, leisure (without any sentimental-romantic halo):

> We were eating jam on a June day,
> Sticky mouths conversed in silent chatter,
> And our throats and tongues in the right way
> Swallowed down the warm-raspberry matter.

> (Yuriy Pozayak)

The hero is split into hundreds of 'I's which demonstrate the multifaceted nature of his being, or else he is incapable of finding any purpose in his inner life. The content of the text is created by the author's focusing on the particular aspect of being in which the hero's life-space is concentrated – reflections, physical needs, everyday existence. To recreate this explicitly, the poets expand the expressive possibilities of the language, creating new variants of significant fusion at the level of technique, images, and the text as a whole. The poems describe the parts of the body, the nooks and crannies of human existence, together with key points of history, all correlated with the present. Wholeness is achieved by projecting the subject matter on to a single point in space-time – the present – irrespective of the borrowing of the principles of aesthetic perception of earlier literary trends and *Weltanschauungen* – folklore, baroque, romanticism, realism. The present is given a fantastic veil of exoticism. Against this backdrop the carnival of life takes place: the human being recognises beauty, without being aware that the material nature of luxuries is ashes, corruption, and loneli-

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[1] Travesty (Italian: *travestire*) is one of the grotesque-comic literary genres. Paraphrase (Greek: *paraphrasis*) is the conversion or translation of text into other words (e.g. poetry by prose and vice versa). Burlesque (Italian: *burlesco*) is a genre of comic poetry.

[2] Balahan was a wooden theatre in Russia in the eighteenth-nineteenth centuries, where comic intermedia were shown. Buffoonery (Italian: *buffonata*) is an entertainment in which the actor uses comic situations.

ness. The present may assume the features of a terrestrial world which is unreal, or, with a satirical/ironic portrayal, can become devoid of spiritual content and empirically terrifying. Thus Ivan Luchuk writes:

> Our present time is highly efficacious,
> From terror now the brow is wet all over,
> The moment, where it can, stifles us ever,
> And yet we have our own very own pulsation.

Although his environment is painted as cold and egoistic, the motif of the loneliness of the hero is not dominant. What we have is a human being conducting a dialogue with the environment. Its deeds, jargon, conditions of life (coffee-houses, drinking parties, the streets) are a complex, inescapable feature of being, in which the person lives, and which lives in him. In the works of the poets of the 1980s there is no propagandising of pseudo-values and pseudo-feelings, reality emerges with all the plausibility of the thing portrayed – '… this world is like a noose round the throat and round the earth by turns' (Viktor Neborak).

The fact that contemporary poetry promulgates a new type of theme has had a major effect on prosody. Free verse predominates, while strict-form genres have also undergone structural changes. Let us take as an example the 'sonnetines' of Ivan Luchuk, which he invented on the basis of the classical genre of the sonnet. The author himself has explained the difference:

> A sonnet must have a strict development of the subject… The subject of the sonnetine, on the other hand, has a free dynamic of development. Externally the sonnetine resembles a normal sonnet, but structurally – it is something different. The possibilities for modifying the plot of the sonnetine are very flexible… the author has the right to forget the rules of sonnet development and to express with greater freedom what vibrates within him, between his brain and his heart.

This qualitatively new perception and experience of reality is transmitted by a new expressive lexicon – including jargon and slang; there is a considerable amount of plays on words (active use is made of onomatopoeia, the rules of syntax are flouted, and grammar is distorted).

In the 1990s, with a changed socio-political situation in Ukraine, names have been reappearing on the Ukrainian cultural scene of writers whose works were banned in the Soviet Union. Over the past decade there has been a drawing together of the two branches of Ukrainian literature – that of Ukraine itself and the literature of the diaspora. In the current literary movement we can observe the 'rehabilitation' of various stages of its development – the modernism and avant-garde of the 1920s and 1930s, and the work of the dissidents – through the attention now being paid by the general reading public to the 'alternative' art of the 1980s. This rediscovery of the literary achievements of earlier generations has stimulated interest in a diversity of styles and genres. Whereas in the 1980s the ground-breaking trend in Ukrainian literature was represented by 'alternative' art, in the 1990s we observe that the denial of the aesthetic principles of the official literature produced by previous generations is disappearing, and that a trend to develop further the modernist lines, defined in Ukraine in the first half of the twentieth century, is now dominant. The views on creativity and associated

activities promulgated by the 'Bu-Ba-Bu', 'LuHoSad', 'Lost Charter', and other groups have also been accepted with approval by young people.

It is difficult to predict which of the new poets of the early 1990s will go on to achieve poetic heights, and win a lasting place in literature. It is difficult at present to pick out any one of them, since all of them recreate the world of their perceptions and feelings with originality, acting contrary to 'committed' art, and recognising no artistic limitations nor canons. Some of them have come together on the basis of aesthetic persuasion, others work in isolation, experimenting with words. The majority of these young writers have brought out individual collections, and are known through their publications in periodicals and recitals at literary evenings. A few years ago the '500' literary association was set up, bringing together writers from various regions of Ukraine. Many poets and prose writers are printed in its bulletin.

The 'New Degeneration' literary group came into being in 1992 in Ivano-Frankivsk. Its prominent members include Ivan Andrusyak, Stepan Protsyuk, and Ivan Tsyperdyuk. The 'new degenerates' (as they term themselves) apply their own approach to traditional themes, genres, and images, establishing a new conceptual perception of the environment and man. Ivan Tsyperdyuk is a representative of the literary school of Mykhailo Yatskiv and Bohdan-Ihor Antonych.[3] He favours the impressionist genre of poetry and prose, and is expanding its poetical principles, focusing his attention on depicting the impulse which produces the phenomenon of impression. Stepan Protsyuk anatomises the world, discovering new aspects of its social and natural existence. The philosophy of his poems is based on his own specific mode of thinking: the environment is an instant, and at a given point in space-time there coexist (contend and live) the *Weltanschauung*-moral principles of the attainment of life in various eras, which contribute to an understanding of the quintessence of present existence.

The 'Red Wagon' literary group was established in Kharkiv in 1992 by the poets Serhiy Zhadan, Rostyslav Melnykiv, and Ihor Pylypchuk. Today this group brings together a large number of poets, artists, and musicians. It has no official status. The works of this group, or rather literary-artistic corporation, have been published in Lviv, Kharkiv, Kyiv, and Ivano-Frankivsk. The focus of these young poets is the world which can be perceived by sight. In their works there is no sense of life being 'unreal'. For them, the lyrical hero is one who observes the course of life, and they pay particular attention to the social ills of society. In the works of Serhiy Zhadan no trace remains of any romantic halo round the portrayal of nature and man, and in its place there is the prosaic and workaday. The environment becomes faceless, too, in the works of Rostyslav Melnykiv. The latter poet turns more and more to the first day of creation of the world; while in his imagination he strives to create a new myth of the existence of the Earth.

Members of both groups use in their poems the stylistic features of burlesque, buffoonery, balahan, collage, and so on. Their deeper penetration into the problems of reality makes the present facing the reader terrifying: it shocks one with

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[3] Mykhailo Yatskiv (1873-1961), Ukrainian prose writer who consolidated modernism in Ukrainian literature at the turn of the century. Bohdan-Ihor Antonych (1909-37), Ukrainian poet, representative of the avant-garde of the 1930s.

its low level of needs, sordidness, and sense of tragedy. However, this perception of reality is not predominant. Far more often, these young poets try to portray their *alter ego* – which is hidden from the lack of spiritual values in the outside world. This *alter ego* is calm and lyrical, sometimes reduced to weariness and the primitive, but nevertheless sincere. The greyness of the present stimulates their heroes to interesting philosophising, and is conducive to experiencing various feelings. The lyricism of these works is not simply a reflex, but rather is evoked by the portrayal of those aspects of human life and nature, the revelation of which is associated with individual experience and the emotional anguish of existing as an individual.

Maksym Rozumnyi, one of the poets of the 1990s, has called contemporary art the art of illusion: reality, he says, is created deformed, in spite of the fact that the author aspires to speak the truth. In particular, he wrote:

> The artist/illusionist... initially observes life from the sphere of being, and then – vice versa. From this frequent and inconsistent change of stance there emerges a feeling of falseness, unreality. In some writers, illusionism is manifested through creative self-realisation, in others it adopts the form of self-irony, self-denial, and an intuitive, perceived dislocation.

Thus the reader is presented with works which are sincere, but in which the authors are unable to maintain a consistency of perception of nature and man. The reason is that in the course of their searchings the emphasis shifts from the socio-concrete sphere to that of philosophical and spiritual existence.

Alongside the literary trends developed by the 'New Degeneration' and 'Red Wagon' groups (where the emphasis is on deformed, degenerate phenomena which lie 'outside the frontier of beauty'), there is also a tendency to make active use in contemporary art of elements of folklore and ethnography, and to have recourse to national principles of philosophical thought and imagination about the world. This aspect of the literary process is developed in the works of Neda Nezhdana, Roman Skyba, Ihor Pavlyuk, et al.

Let us pause to consider the works of Neda Nezhdana in greater detail. This is a poet who consciously introduces national imagery into the poetic fabric of her work. Two time-frames – the past and the present – exist at the focus of her attention as two eras of opposing moral and ethical values. To give the present concrete form, she turns to the versified treasures of the past. For her, the past and present are not opposites, on the contrary, the spiritual existence of the past, carried forward into our generation, is now covered with a hard shell of present-day apathy and egoism. In the poem 'Those who wait' Neda Nezhdana recreates contemporary Ukrainian society, inhabited by 'those who wait', whose purpose in life is to stand and wait, whose psychological state is one of alarm and fear, and whose daily task is to search. For what...? For the quern[4] – the personification of fidelity to one's national roots:

> ... The glow-worms' land
> Will-o'-the-wisp you seem there empty-handed

---

[1] In Ukrainian literature, the image of the quern has become the symbol of the spiritual existence of the nation, and the preservation of its historical memory.

Land of the harbourless
Here even statues come down from their pedestals
And there they take on life though stones merely
And seek the quern in nook and crack
And since their hands are grimed and black
And since their lips are soundless ever
Then hide – but hide them not like words.
Those were all taken in your grandsire's day.
In place of footprint they have left but fear... .

The motif of loss, losing one's way, spiritual devastation re-echoes, too, in the poem 'The house which someone built'. Here the present is like an old building – gloomy, lonely, with boarded-up windows. The image of this structure, at first in beauty and later in ruin, is associated by this author with the establishment of social order or the ills of human existence. This house is like a complex and extra-ordinarily subtle musical instrument with a hundred notes – the stairways, where people live their individual lives, like each individual note. In the parallel thus formed, we not only perceive the structure of the world as a whole, we realise, too, that this is also the world of the individual being – equally complex and mys-terious. Through her poem Neda Nezhdana strives to focus attention on the prob-lem of preserving national Ukrainian spiritual values. She urges: '... So one small brick now bear to the new building there', and then you will hear its music. The present, left to itself, is terrible and frightful. And the person who loses selfhood (faith, honour, love, traditions, homeland, family) becomes simply 'him', 'her'.

In addition to their musings on the social and spiritual development of contem-porary life, these young poets are drawn to themes of love and nature. The philo-sophical-psychological inter-connection of the spheres of intimate and external life is conducive to a search for new facets of depicting them. These themes are addressed in particular by the young poets Kvitka, Oleh Hrytsenko, Viktoriya Stakh, Larysa Slyusak; and also occur in the works of, among others, Ivan Tsyperdyuk, Polina Halenko, Yuriy Bedryk, and Neda Nezhdana. Taking into account the spe-cific features of the subject-matter, critics very often describe the creative approach of these writers by the term 'post-sentimentalism'. Their works contain none of the typical tropes of Ukrainian tradition – the guelder-rose and the fir-tree[5] – no pane-gyrics to the steppe-land heroics of the past or today's independence. The most arcane aspects of intimate human life are depicted in unity with the surrounding extra-social environment. These authors are not interested in recreating the nuances of the sentiments of a couple in love, and transmitting to the world their irrational emotions, but, on the contrary, penetrate in depth into the post-logical complex system of relations between man and woman. They describe more than they feel. For them, love can make a bond between the individual and the entire world, how-ever this joyous feeling is unattainable by the mundane person. The hero is an eter-nal wanderer, who, searching for himself, finds himself and then loses himself again. The Skovoroda[6] approach to life becomes the foundation of the reflections of youth about the course of present-day reality. It helps today's writers to stand aside from the depiction of tragedy. The authors do not show their heroes in a state

[5] The guelder-rose and fir-tree are traditional symbols in Ukrainian national folk-lore.
[6] Hryhoriy Skovoroda (1722-94), Ukrainian poet, fabulist, and philosopher.

of death or insanity; they set out on their wanderings in contemplation or imagination, believing that beyond the natural and social space which can be reached empirically, there exists a different space, based on other laws. The lyrical heroes of Viktoriya Stakh, Maksym Rozumnyi, and Kvitka thirst for a spiritual cleansing from the filth of the world. For them love is an island where man hides from his environment. In Stakh there emerges the image of the traditional *vertep* puppet-theatre[7] – a game of a happy life of two hearts, in which man is frank and happy. However, there then comes the tragic realisation of the ephemeral nature of this state.

Interest in the baroque era, the most notable representative of which for Ukraine was Hryhoriy Skovoroda, has helped these young writers to recreate the dynamics of present-day reality, its tragedy. Whereas the poets of the 1980s used the baroque methods of irony and parody, emphasising the corporeal form of existence, the poets of the 1990s have a philosophical perception of material and spiritual existence, which has recourse to the experience of past generations. In addition, the works of these contemporary poets exhibit a fusion of traditional Ukrainian national imagery with the poetic experiments of the first years of the twentieth century – a development in poetics and philosophy which became possible only when Ukrainian literature was emancipated from the overlordship of Socialist realism.   ❏

[7] A *vertep* (literally 'crib') was a small two-tier puppet theatre, carried around in the seventeenth-eighteenth centuries to market places and homes. Its repertoire included not only nativity plays (as the name would imply), but also plays dealing with current social issues – enlivened by an authentic background of peasant, artisan, and Cossack life.

Literary Anniversaries

Yevhen Malanyuk
1897-1968

Yevhen Malanyuk was born on 20 January 1897 in the Chersonese, probably in Novo-Arkhanhelsk. He was educated at a technical school in Yelizavethrad, and then at the Polytechnic Institute of St Petersburg.

During World War I, he trained at the Kyiv Military School and then served as an officer in the Russian army. Following Ukraine's proclamation of independence in 1918, he became an officer in the forces of the Ukrainian National Republic. After the defeat of the latter, he was interned in Kalisz, and in 1920 emigrated to Czechoslovakia, where he studied at the Academy of Economics in Podebrady. After graduating in 1923, he moved to Poland, where he worked as an engineer (mainly in Warsaw).

In 1945, at the end of World War II, he found himself in Regensburg, where he worked as a school-teacher in a displaced persons' camp. From there he emigrated to the USA, where he died in 1968.

Malanyuk began his literary career while a prisoner-of-war in Kalisz, where he was a co-founder of the journal *Veselka*, in which his first poems appeared. His first collection of poems, *Stiletto and Stylus*, appeared in 1925. In all, he published nine new collections of poetry, two retrospective selections, a long narrative poem, *The Fifth Symphony*, and numerous essays and articles.

Although he spent all his adult life outside Soviet Ukraine, he followed closely events and developments there, in particular the literary renaissance of the 1920s, and its suppression in the 1930s. As the leading member of the 'heraldist' group of poets, Malanyuk had a considerable influence on developments in Ukrainian literature, both in the Ukrainian diaspora, in Polish-ruled western Ukraine of the inter-war years, and in Soviet Ukraine itself – an influence which the Soviet propagandists tried to minimise by terming him a 'Ukrainian Fascist'.

His poetry is imbued with a deep awareness of Ukrainian history, which frequently manifests itself as anger and pain for the loss of Ukrainian statehood, and which at times has a markedly apocalyptic tone. Stylistically, his work favours verse-forms, in particular quatrains – but this apparent simplicity is on occasion used to striking effect – as in the third line of *Exodus*, where the triple repetition not only prolongs the line – suggesting the sad tedium of the journey into exile, but also replicates the rhythm of the train. Likewise, his use of traditional Ukrainian symbols often reveals fresh insight, as in *The Cathedral*, in which St George is called the 'armoured brother' of Sophia – the Divine Wisdom. At the surface level, this evokes the fact that these are the dedications of the metropolitan cathedrals in Lviv and Kyiv; at the symbolic level, however, this creates a telling new image of the complementarity of the life of action and the life of the intellect.

EXODUS

Forget not these days, no, never:
Each fragment remains, each one.
The bullets roared, spread their terror
'Neath tired thunder of the guns.

And Ill-omened birds, assailing,
Flew over the trek of gloom,
To the West... To the West... To the West... the train was wailing,...
Behind – the East's laughter boomed.

A maw, blood-bespattered, gaped, glaring
Drunken air was death – weary, grim.
Where to find one who than Thee is fairer,
With our hearts filled with Thee to the brim?

1920

THE CATHEDRAL

> 'Saint George the Victory-Bearer has given us an
> example of faithfulness even unto blood'.
>
> *Metropolitan Andrey Sheptytskyi*
> *(May 1934)*

Below, there flourishes mischance,
Stupidity and treason haggle,
Above, victorious George, with lance
Pierces and maims the subtle dragon.

The dragon hisses, writhes in death,
And in its hiss, devoid of power,
An unclean power screams out its breath,
A fierce and raging unclean power.

Once more it hides till comes the day,
Once more shapes masks, names like a master,
Bright loveliness to screen away
With sores that blossom like stigmata.

In vain. Above domed quietness –
God's great eternity ripens here –
There grows, unchecked, to loftiness
The armoured brother of Sophia.

And he defends the lofty shrine,
Ark of renewal never fettered,
Fortress of faithfulness through time,
Fortress of faith even to blood-shed.

There, o'er the vanity of days
Of empty seeking, whither, where,
The vernal angers of love blaze,
The sword's cross, and the cross of prayer.

And in the gloom of evil time,
And the storm's lightning, sharply flaring,
Above the shadowed city, high
Rules Saint George the Victory-Bearer.

1938

AUGUST

'Herr, es ist Zeit!'
R.M. Rilke

Time, Lord, for solitude, humility.

All time reminds us of this fact, the weight
Of flesh deprived of plumage, the first silver
Upon the temples and the furrowed brow,
And there below the brow, those eyes, once burning
But now ever more deeply, deeply sunken,
And fading – those now satiated eyes...
For sight now turns inward upon itself,
Satiate with the human and mundane.

Time for humility, Lord, solitude.

Humility is first. So teach it then,
In sleepless nights, and in fate's apprehensions,
In petty vengeance of the days and times,
In weakness of disease – teach, teach that meekness
Which is the origin of primal virtue.
Thou gavest it, abundant beyond measure
To multitudes of Thy deserving servants,
Grant it to me, the least of them, today.

Time for humility, Lord, solitude.

Humble the spirit that is proud, ungrateful –
The legacy of a rebellious angel.
Each day of my life I drank thirstily,
And sought for everything, except the needful,
I perceived everything, save the unknown,
I strove for all, yet with a heart unseeing,
Heedless that under my audacious step
There remained leaves, trampled into destruction.

Time for humility, Lord, solitude.

O solitude, thou art, I know, the hardest,
Far harder to learn than humility,
Thou dost demand our concentrated efforts,
Like the spark that is born from flint and steel,
Like the last spasm of the victor's muscle,
Like the final step by which one reaches
The peak. For while humility is wisdom,
Solitude always remains – the height.

Time, Lord.

16.viii.1951
Summit, New Jersey

❏

Panteleymon Kulish
(1819-97)

Panteleymon Kulish was born in 1819, in Voronezh, then a small settlement in the Chernihiv region, into an old Cossack family. He was educated in the Novhorod-Siverskyi *gymnasium*, and then went on to the University of Kyiv, but was unable to complete his course there, owning to both financial and legal difficulties. He worked as a teacher in Lutsk (1842), and then in Kyiv (1843-45).

Under the influence of the folklorist and ethnographer Mykhaylo Maksymovych, Kulish became interested in Ukrainian ethnography and history, and, under the auspices of the Kyiv Archaeographic Commission, travelled around Right-Bank (West-Bank) Ukraine, studying its historical monuments, and getting to know local scholars. His earliest published work dates from this period – a historical novel *Mykhaylo Charnyshenko, or Little Russia 80 Years Ago*, and the epic *Ukrayina*.

In 1845 Kulish moved to St Petersburg, where in the autumn of that year he became a founding member of the clandestine Brotherhood of Sts Cyril and Methodius – a group of Ukrainian intellectuals (including such prominent writers as Taras Shevchenko and Mykola Kostomarov), who were united in their opposition to serfdom and all forms of oppression and ethnic hatred, and who dreamed of a future federation of all Slavonic nations, with each nation-state having its own government, but with a supra-national representative Slavonic Assembly over all. In 1847 he married the writer Hanna Barvinok (real name Oleksandra Bilozerska), with Shevchenko acting as Best Man.

Shortly afterwards, while on his way for a study trip abroad, Kulish was arrested in Warsaw, as part of a general action against the Brotherhood of Sts Cyril and Methodius. He was put on trial in St Petersburg – his main 'offence' in the eyes of the Russian authorities being his *Tale of the Ukrainian Nation*, in which he idealised Ukraine's Cossack past and promoted the idea of the abolition of serfdom. He was exiled to Tula and forbidden to publish. Kulish spent this period of banishment in the intensive study of foreign languages.

In 1850 he was allowed to return to St Petersburg, where, after the death of Nicholas I in 1854, he was able to publish his works. During the decade which followed, Kulish issued a number of major works in both Ukrainian and Russian, including *Zapiski o Yuzhnoy Rusi* (Notes on Southern Rus'), a collection of poems *Dosvidky* (Gleams of Dawn), and *Istoriya Ukrayiny od naydavnishykh chasiv* (History of Ukraine from Earliest Times)

During this time, too, he devised a phonetic orthography for Ukrainian, founded his own printing house, and from 1861 onwards published, together with his wife, the journal *Osnova* (Foundation).

In 1864 Kulish was appointed to a senior civil service post in Warsaw, where he used the opportunity of studying the Polish archives relating to Ukrainian history, but

soon lost his position on account of his contacts and correspondence with the Ukrainians of Galicia, who were striving to establish a new national-patriotic orientation in politics and literature. Kulish then travelled abroad, to the Austro-Hungarian empire, visiting Prague and Vienna, where, along with other literary work, he became a co-translator of the Bible (the first time that the scriptures were rendered into the modern Ukrainian vernacular). In 1871 he returned to the Russian empire, where he was appointed Editor of the *Journal of the Ministry of Means of Communication*, and continued his research into Ukraine's Cossack past. However, in place of his former romantic enthusiasm for the Cossacks, he became increasingly critical, finally coming to the conclusion that their role in history was essentially a negative one.

In 1876, after the Ems Edict of Tsar Alexander II, forbidding publishing in the Ukrainian language, Kulish left the Russian civil service and moved to Lviv, where in 1881 he brought out his second collection of poems *Khutorna poeziya* (Homestead poetry), which contains his poems and recollections of his arrest and trial in 1847. He became closely involved in the Ukrainian literary movement of Galicia, and also tried to resolve the centuries-old misunderstandings between Ukrainians and Poles, calling for brotherly amity between them. This appeal, however, only brought him the growing suspicion of the Ukrainian intelligentsia of Galicia. Consequently, Kulish retired to the homestead he had bought near Borzna, and spent his remaining years there in literary and scholarly work, including the translation into Ukrainian of the works of Shakespeare, Byron, Goethe, Schiller, and Heine. He died on 14 February 1897.

THREE MAIDEN'S TEARS

I

Ukrayina wept, lamenting,
Beating her breast sorely,
'O my sons, my dear-beloved,
What does fate hold for ye?

You that are my rosy flowers
Which cruel frost has broken,
You that are my eagles young
Which hawk has overtaken!

To whom, therefore now, can I
Bend my head, inclining,
I am left in my old age,
Without you, widowed, pining.

God of mercy! They fulfilled all
That Thy word expecteth,
Their own mother, poor, forlorn,
They honoured and respected.

And to brothers unenlightened,
Friendship's hand extended,
To all people they wished freedom,
Knowledge, peace unending.

Do not leave them, God of mercy,
For foes to mock o'er them;
But be mindful of their grandsires'
And great-grandsires' glory!

And lest any evil thing
Above their heads shall hover,
Send an angel with light wings
To be their guardian ever.

And grant that they may be aware
In that land, far-distant,
How I sorrow here for them
And offer prayers insistent'.

II

Had I but the nightingale's sweet voice for singing
And its soaring wings, and its power and freedom,
I would build no nest for myself in the spring-time,
I would fly, would fly, wherever my wish leads me.

To the orchards green, to open fields I'd hurry,
To the shadowed meadows I would fly forth, winging,
And I would not rest where ploughman turns the furrow,
And I would not rest where maiden fair is singing.

I would fly to where stone walls rise, then, keenly,
I would scan the prisons over, low and high,
I would find dear brothers, sons of Ukrayina,
Softly there from window to window I would fly.

Mournfully and sadly I would sing there for them,
So their tears would roll, their hearts would sigh to hear men,
So that from my singing there might rise before them
What was passing in the world they love so dearly.

III

Wind is blowing over Kyiv,
Sets the orchards swaying,
Grey Dnipro questions his old neighbours
The dumb hills, thus saying:

'Where now does he feast and revel,
Our son remembered dearly,
The nightingales are now in song,
But he comes not to hear them!

The Holy Ghost, Midsummer Day
And Peter-tide are done now,
And the salt-traders from their first
Journey homeward come now.

Already the rye turns to gold,
And reaping-time comes duly,
But he comes not – here at my side
To sit down and sing to me'.

The dumb hills echo in reply:
'So, old neighbour Dnipro,
Dids't thou not ask Ukrayina,
For whom she is weeping.

Hast thou not heard what the maidens
Sing with tearful yearning,
Nor what the waves speak with the banks
In softly whispered murmuring.

Go and ask the wild winds blowing
From the land of exile,
How our Bard with heavy knapsack
Under arms now revels'.

TO A KOBZA

Kobza of mine, thou immaculate pleasure!
Why art thou silent? O chime in quiet measure!
With the voice of holy truth and right, chime,
All of our bitter distress call to mind.
Maybe some heart, not yet crushed nor desponding,
Heavily beating, to heart will respond now,
As on a bandura string answers to string.

Who cannot with deeds then respond to thy calling
Let him respond with tears silently falling;
Thou with thine own true word chiming, invoking,
Wilt not let brothers' souls sink to slumber unbroken,
Let those who believe in thee not turn to stone now,
Let all thy foes be struck silent from woe, now –
Summon thy family here in great throng.

He who is rich in grief, let him come hither,
Silently to our own native home gather,
And upon benches bare shall we sit down,
And for our brothers now dead shall we mourn.
It is dark outside, no dawn-star is shining,
Down from the north comes a bitter wind whining,
And in the untended steppelands, wolves howl.

Kobza! Thou art our one comfort still gleaming,
Till from the dead shall arise Ukrayina,
Till she shall know a new life, a new spring,
To us the tale of our griefs chime and ring,
So that the weary heart, at thy quiet song now
Heavily beating, to heart shall respond now,
As on a bandura string answers to string.

❏

Ulyana Kravchenko
(1860-1947)

Yuliya Shnayder, who wrote under the name of Ulyana Kravchenko, was born on 18 April 1860, in the Drohobych region of western Ukraine, then under Austrian rule. After training as a teacher at the Lviv Pedagogic Seminary, from which she graduated in 1881, she worked for almost forty years as a teacher in various village schools in western Ukraine, becoming, at the same time, a pioneer of the movement for women's rights. In 1920, at the age of 60, she settled permanently in Przemysl in the Polish Republic, where she lived until her death on 5 March 1947.

She began writing (both prose and verse) while still a student, but had some difficulty in establishing herself, since the Shevchenko Literary Society in Lviv considered her work to have 'socialist' tendencies. However, the poet and literary scholar Ivan Franko did much to draw her work to the attention of the literary public, and she in her own work was considerably influenced by Franko.

In addition to numerous publications in journals and magazines, she published several collections of poetry, *Primavera* (1885), *On the New Path* (1891), and *There is Something in Life* (1921), and also collections of poetry for children, *Sparkles* (1921), *On the Road* (1921), *Swansong* (1924), *Whisper to us, Periwinkle* (1932), and also a collection of prose sketches, *A Teacher's Memoirs* (1935). Retrospective collections of her works were published in 1941, and (posthumously) in 1956 and 1958.

On, onward, like Proboy, thou fliest, roaring,
The roads well-trodden thou did'st never seek.
In thy breast dost thou feel a force to wreak
Victory o'er the new, all quietness scorning?

Pluck fir-trees up, like flowers in bright swarming,
And where a rock-crest bars the way, let speak
The great waves' thunder, smash through them, with shriek
Of triumph for the path that battle tore thee.

Break free from fetters! And greet us, ye valleys,
On high a scrap of sky and pasture tarries,
And gentle breeze that lulls the streams asleep.

How many hearts and souls would not have perished
In life's swamps, if on wings of ideals cherished
Their spirit could have soared to distance deep.   ❑

Reviews

The Ukrainian-Polish Defensive Alliance, 1919-1921. An Aspect of the Ukrainian Revolution. By Michael Palij (Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, Edmonton-Toronto, 1995), 391 pp

This book addresses one of the key phases in Ukraine's struggle for independence in the aftermath of the 1917 revolutions – the 'defensive alliance' between Poland and Ukraine against Soviet Russia in 1920. Looked at with the hindsight of history, it would appear only logical that, on the collapse of the Tsarist Russian empire, the two largest new states to claim their independence should form an alliance against the expansionism of Russia in its new Bolshevik guise. But this, at the time, was by no means obvious. For although, as Palij states in his opening paragraph, by 1920, '[t]he renascence of Russian power threatened both Ukraine and Poland; hence, the more farsighted leaders of those nations realized that only by combining forces could they resist occupation by Soviet Russia', there were many factors which militated against such an alliance. The immediate consequence of the re-emergence of independent Poland at the end of World War I was an attempt by the Poles to re-establish their old 'commonwealth' from the Baltic to the Black Sea – in pursuit of which, in 1919, Polish forces invaded the West Ukrainian National Republic (ZUNR), established on 1 November 1918, when the Austro-Hungarian empire collapsed. This campaign (in which the Poles had the tacit backing of France) had ended with the Polish occupation of 137,535 sq. km. of ethnic Ukrainian territory, with a Ukrainian population of over 6 million – an outcome which, not surprisingly, roused bitter feelings on the Ukrainian side. Likewise, back in the winter of 1917-18, Ukraine's incipient government, the Central Rada, had permitted the formation of various foreign military units in Ukraine, for the purpose of establishing national independence in their own countries. But the Polish formations (the largest) had in a number of cases violated the hospitality of the Ukrainians, interfering in internal affairs, requisitioning food and horses from the peasants, and taking punitive measures against them when they objected – thereby evoking considerable local resentment.

Furthermore, for such an alliance to be concluded, the Poles had to accept the idea of Ukrainian independence (albeit while holding on to the Ukrainian territory they had just seized). But not all Polish politicians were prepared to accept this – Roman Dmowski, for example, the leader of the right-wing Polish National Democratic Party (*Endecja*), dreamed of rebuilding the old Polish Commonwealth 'from sea to sea' – or failing that, of reaching a *modus vivendi* with Russia, on the lines of the Treaty of Andrusovo of 1667, with Ukraine, Belarus, and Lithuania divided between Russia and Poland. And, in January 1919, the Poles had elected a *sejm* (parliament) dominated by the *Endecja*.

Palij presents the alliance, therefore, not so much as one between governments, as between its two main advocates: Symon Petlyura, head of the Directorate of the Ukrainian National Republic, and Jozef Piłsudski, at that time the Polish Head of State. He begins his exposition, therefore, with two chapters devoted to the early lives of these two leaders, and at the end, after recounting and analysing the end of the campaign, carries the story forward to the assassination of Petlyura and the trial of his killer (Piłsudski, however, gets no similar closing chapter – only a five-line comment on his subsequent military career).

Palij is clearly interested in the alliance from a political, not a military point of view. There are none of the maps of troop movements and campaigns beloved by military historians. Indeed, out of the 202 narrative pages of the book, Chapter 10, 'The Polish-Ukrainian Offensive', occupies only 25 pages, and the actual joint campaign, leading up to the liberation of Kyiv from the Bolsheviks, a mere three. In an arena filled by many conflicting forces – Russian Bolsheviks, Denikin's Russian 'White' Volunteer Army, Poles, two 'regular' Ukrainian armies (belonging respectively to the Ukrainian National Republic and to the West Ukrainian National Republic), to say nothing of various groups of partisans, Palij focuses not on the actual mechanics of military victory and defeat, but on their political consequences.

The Polish invasion of the ZUNR, and the subsequent annexation of Eastern Galicia to Poland (in defiance of the thirteenth of President Wilson's famous fourteen points – 'An independent Polish state should be erected which should include the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations...') runs like a leitmotif throughout the work, bedevilling from the outset the future prospects of the alliance. So, too, does a certain ambiguity in Piłsudski's policy towards his eastern neighbours. He wanted a protective *cordon sanitaire* in the form of a federation of independent states between Poland and Russia, an idea which, according to Palij,

> stemmed not from a doctrine, but from Polish geopolitics and tradition. [Piłsudski] was convinced that Poland's independence could not be secured in the long run without other independent countries between Poland and Soviet Russia.

Nevertheless, according to the memoirs of his long-time close friend and supporter, Leon Wasilewski, Piłsudski 'agreed with Dmowski concerning Poland's eastern boundaries', and also planned to extend the frontier eastwards to incorporate regions of ethnically-mixed population. If this is true, then Piłsudski's views on this matter, so vital in reaching any agreement with Ukraine, differed from those of the *Endecja* in degree rather than in kind.

For Petlyura, the case was simple: he realised 'that Ukraine could not defend itself successfully without assistance from the West. Consequently he was compelled to seek Entente support through an alliance with Poland'. Furthermore, he considered 'that the basis for the development of Ukrainian statehood must be former Russian-ruled Ukraine, and he regarded its defense against Soviet Russia as his primary aim, even if it had to be at the expense of Western Ukraine'.

For both Petlyura and Piłsudski, the alliance, concluded under the threat of the westward advance of the Bolsheviks, was, Palij stresses, essentially a pragmatic and temporary one.

> [B]oth saw this agreement not as the beginning of a new era in relations between their two nations, but rather as a necessity dictated by the contemporary situation. Petliura viewed it as a tactical move aimed at establishing contact with Europe and

gaining a respite before continuing the struggle. Piłsudski was in a very favorable position to carry out his plans and ideas. Petliura, however, was in an impossible position, and the treaty with Poland was simply an act of desperation.

Not surprisingly, the treaty was heavily skewed in favour of the Poles. Even before 'negotiations could begin', the Ukrainian side 'was forced to issue a declaration on 2 December [1919] accepting the Zbruch River in Eastern Galicia and the Styr River in Western Volynia as the Polish-Ukrainian frontier' – that is, acquiescing in the Polish annexation of Western Ukraine. The resulting Treaty of Warsaw, signed in April 1920, which consisted both of a political agreement and a military convention, included a clause specifying that everything but the bare fact of the Treaty's existence was to remain secret, neither divulged to a third party nor published without the mutual consent of both sides – a secrecy, according to Palij, 'necessitated by the sweeping concessions accepted by Petliura'. Palij cites both parts of the Treaty in full, together with a detailed analysis of the inequalities involved – although the original text is so blatant that this hardly seems necessary.

While these negotiations were going on, Russia had resumed its old expansionist stance: 'The tsars had called their actions "the gathering up of Russian lands"', writes Palij, 'whereas Soviet Russia disguised its aims behind the slogan of workers' solidarity'. Palij, however, attempts to plot for the reader Piłsudski's shifting views and intention. Even now, it appears, Piłsudski was not determined upon attack. In the chapter: 'The Genesis of the Polish-Soviet Russian War', Palij attempts to analyse Piłsudski's changing views and attitudes, an exposition that, although well-documented, must to some extent be speculative – and at times suggests that Piłsudski himself was confused about the appropriate line of action. The main thrust of the argument, however, is fairly clear: Piłsudski, Palij says, saw the solution in a 'fait accompli' – an offensive, in mid-April 1920, against the Bolsheviks, (a view opposed by Poland's Prime Minister, Ignacy Paderewski, on the grounds that the Entente would oppose it). Piłsudski had hoped that the campaign could be conducted jointly with newly-independent Lithuania, but when the Lithuanian government in Kaunas rejected his proposals, he moved independently against the Bolsheviks in Vilnius, and occupied the city and the surrounding area – an action which the Lithuanians considered an invasion. Piłsudski followed up this victory with a drive to dislodge the Bolsheviks from Eastern Lithuania and Belarus. However, Denikin's Volunteer Army was now moving victoriously towards Moscow, and Piłsudski 'worried that if Denikin won the war, he would deny de jure recognition of Polish independence', and hoping for a 'prolonged war between the Whites and the Reds that would weaken both of them and give Poland time to strengthen its own forces for any future war', he began negotiations with the Bolsheviks. These, in the event, achieved little save the exchange of a few hundred prisoners of war – and gave the Bolsheviks time to defeat Denikin. By the end of 1919, Piłsudski was preparing for war – while at the same time '[a]pparently... willing to make peace with Soviet Russia on the condition that the Entente Powers would participate'. When the latter offered 'contradictory advice', Piłsudski tried to negotiate a peace with the Bolsheviks, while becoming increasingly convinced that they were not sincere. In March 1920, he told a journalist from *Le petit parisien* that 'Russia is a sworn imperialist... Its attack on Poland depends first of all on the

Ukrainian question. If the problem of Ukraine would be settled to its advantage, then it would advance on Poland'.

Under such circumstances conflict seemed inevitable and an alliance between Poland and Ukraine 'was the logical choice'.

The Polish-Ukrainian offensive – a few weeks into the spring of 1920 – itself ended with the liberation of Kyiv, following which the Polish High Command promised that its troops would withdraw from Ukraine once regular Ukrainian forces were organised and able to defend the country. (In the meantime, the Polish troops in Ukraine once again acted more like an army of occupation than allies). Piłsudski returned to Poland to high acclaim, even from his enemies in the *Endecja*. But the Poles failed to meet their obligations under the Treaty of Warsaw to help build up the Ukrainian army. The promised arms and equipment arrived 'very slowly and in limited quantities'. This can perhaps be in part justified by the fact that the Russian Bolsheviks were now advancing on Poland itself, through Belarus. But this cannot justify the fact that the Poles disarmed and interned Ukrainian anti-Bolshevik partisans, and 'seemed to consider' their late enemies, the Ukrainian Galician Army (UHA), 'more dangerous to Poland than the Bolsheviks', disarmed the UHA brigades, and kept their arms and equipment for themselves. The net result of the campaign was that, in August 1920, the Poles were able to turn back the Bolsheviks in what became known as the 'Miracle of the Vistula' – a victory to which the Polish General, Tadeusz Kutrzeba, later wrote that the 'Kyivan campaign' earlier in the year had 'contributed in a positive way'. However, in Palij's words:

> [i]n spite of substantial Ukrainian contributions and sacrifices in this joint campaign, however, Poland abandoned its ally, and the UNR [Ukrainian National Republic] was forced to fight the enemy alone. The struggle ended with the tragedy at Bazar and the subsequent occupation of Ukraine by the Bolsheviks.

The closing chapters deal with this Soviet campaign in Poland, the final collapse of the Ukrainian National Republic, the tragic 'Second Winter Campaign' of Ukrainian partisans against the Soviets, the Polish-Soviet Armistice, and the Peace Treaty of Riga, by which, indeed, Poland acquired large areas of Lithuanian, Belarusian, and Ukrainian territory. The fate of the Ukrainian army, interned in Poland, and of the Government-in-Exile are sketched briefly up to 1926, the year of Petlyura's assassination, and of Piłsudski's return to political power – which brought some improvement to the conditions of the internees. Finally, Palij attempts to set the brief, pragmatic alliance of 1920 in its historical context, suggesting that '[t]he treaty of Warsaw is a symbol of an historical current in Polish-Ukrainian relations that may well assert itself again' – a view justified, in fact, by the recent establishment of a joint Polish-Ukrainian peace-keeping force.

In spite of the complexity of the subject-matter, Palij presents – in as straightforward a manner as possible, given the confusion of the times – an account that is in the main lucid and well-documented. (This includes, incidentally, documentary evidence that Petlyura was not anti-Semitic, and that, indeed, he had in 1919 issued a special order declaring that crimes against the Jews would be severely punished – a matter of some importance, considering the claimed motivation of his assassin, and, indeed, the on-going controversies over that assassin's acquittal).

In spite of the complexity of his subject, Palij's exposition is lucid and logical, and seems set to become one of the standard texts on this significant moment in

Ukrainian history. There is only one notable infelicity, which perhaps could be considered before the book goes into a well-deserved second edition. Throughout the author uses the acronyms UNR and ZUNR to refer to the 'Ukrayinska Narodnya Respublika' and 'Zakhidno-Ukrayinska Narodnya Respublika'. But in the table of acronyms at the front of the book these are rendered as 'Ukrainian People's Republic' and 'Western Ukrainian People's Republic'. In view of the negative connotations which the subsequent Communist usage has imparted to the term 'People's Republic', 'National Republic' would surely be the better rendering.

National Geographic, vol. 190, no. 3, September 1996

This magazine, the official journal of the National Geographic Society, Washington, D.C., has a long-standing reputation for excellent photographic coverage. The issue under review is no exception. It includes an article, 'Searching for the Scythians', in which Mike Edwards, the Assistant Editor of the *National Geographic*, describes recent archaeological excavations in Ukraine and Russia of grave-mounds, and other sites of the Scythians – the ancient nomadic people of the steppe-lands. The style is popular, rather than scholarly, and the prose tends towards the florid:

> Arriving with dust and thunder, fierce horsemen from the East burst upon the European steppe some 700 years before Christ. Invincible for four centuries, these proud marauders grew rich on the dividends of conquest, decking even their horses with gold. Then, mysteriously, they vanished, leaving only tales of their courage and cruelty – and imposing tombs lavishly provisioned for eternity.

Likewise, Sisse Brimberg's photographs range from pictures of Scythian gold artefacts (where it is the skill of the original craftsman rather than that of the photographer, which impresses), reproductions of paintings by Gregory Manchess, interpreting the accounts given by Herodotus of the Scythian way of life and death, and scenes of modern life which – it is claimed – keep alive customs dating from Scythian times – an Ossetian funeral banquet, a Crimean shepherd watching over his flock from a horse-drawn wagon, and a young Ukrainian pulling a heavy Russian lorry in a strong-man competition!

However, while clearly aimed at a non-specialist audience, the scholarly content of the article is sound. Controversial theories are mentioned but left as open questions: 'Some archaeologists' (we are told) 'see evidence of female warriors in burial artifacts' – unlike the approach of Neal Ascherson, who in his *Black Sea – the Birthplace of Civilisation and Barbarism* (reviewed in *The Ukrainian Review*, no. 3, 1996, pp. 89-92) presents the existence of these women warriors as established fact.

Ukraine and European Security. By Tor Bukkvoll (Royal Institute of International Affairs/Pinter, London, 1997), 129pp. £27.50 (hardback), £10.99 (paperback)

This is a solidly-researched analysis (published as part of the 'Russia and Eurasia' programme of the Royal Institute of International Affairs) of what NATO Secretary-General Xavier Solana has described as Ukraine's 'absolutely unique' role in securing the stability of the European continent. In his introduction, Bukkvoll, a lecturer at the Norwegian Military Academy, defines three 'central' reasons that Ukraine occupies such a role: Ukrainian independence is a defining feature in the future security architecture of Europe, Ukraine is a 'crucial determinant' in the formation of the future Russia, and Ukraine is a 'potential candidate' for 'serious' ethnic conflict and separatism.

In addressing these topics, Bukkvoll focuses on three features of Ukraine during the six years since independence: the evolution of democracy, the potential for the mobilisation of ethnic-Russian anti-independence forces, and the relationship between Ukraine and Russia.

Regarding the first point, democracy, he gives a brief survey of political developments from independence up to the adoption of the constitution in June 1996, followed by outlines of the aims, programmes, and strengths of the major political parties and groups: Rukh, the Ukrainian Republican Party, the Democratic Party of Ukraine, New Ukraine, the Liberal Party of Ukraine, the Socialist Party of Ukraine, the Communist Party of Ukraine, and the Ukrainian National Assembly/Ukrainian National Self-Defence. He then considers the causes of social instability, insofar as they affect the democratisation process, coming to the conclusion that the 'dramatic' fall in the standard of living since independence and the strikes this has occasionally engendered may affect the political process (the Donbas miners' strikes of 1993 were, he said, 'probably the main reason' for bringing forward the date of the parliamentary and presidential elections to summer 1994), but are not a threat to Ukrainian democracy itself. He then addresses civilian-military relations, including the power struggles (of 1995-96) between Defence Minister Valeriy Shmarov and the generals. Here Bukkvoll concludes that although '[t]here is still some way to go before the armed forces are solidly under civilian control', nevertheless, the Ukrainian military establishment lacks the 'political clout' enjoyed by the military in Russia, and that there currently seems little threat of a major military participation in politics. In short, 'although few would yet call Ukraine a fully-fledged democracy, most indicators point to it moving decisively in that direction'.

The chapter on 'Ethnic mobilization and separatism' addresses the two pressing issues of the Russian minority in Ukraine and the case of the Crimean Tatars. As far as the Russian minority is concerned, Bukkvoll does not see them as a major security threat. The minority policy of the Ukrainian state is 'accommodating', and although the Russian minority is 'not entirely satisfied with its citizenship and cultural rights... the level of dissatisfaction is not high enough to spark ethnic mobilisation'. Moreover, in spite of Moscow's rhetoric about defending the Russians in the 'near abroad',

> there is a clear recognition among large parts of the Russian political elite that [Russian] separatist or irredentist efforts in Ukraine could spark a civil war in the country. This would create a massive inflow of refugees to Russia and endanger both Russian domestic political stability and the Russian reform process.

The issue of Crimea is, of course, more complex, involving both Russian claims and the aspirations of the Crimean Tatars. Unlike many scholars who focus on the Russian threat, it is the Tatars that Bukkvoll sees as the major threat to Crimea's – and hence Ukraine's – stability: the Tatars' socio-economic grievances are, he says, 'political dynamite', and although some compromise has been reached on their political demands, and their 'feeling of historical injustice' may diminish in time, they undoubtedly pose '[t]he most immediate danger to political stability on the peninsula'. Their 'incorporation into Crimean economic and political life, and cooperation with the majority Slavic population' are, Bukkvoll says, 'crucial issues' that both the Kyiv government and the Crimean authorities must solve.

The last major chapter, 'Ukraine and Russia', briefly outlines the all-too-well-known issues of the division of ex-Soviet military assets, and Russia's attempts to reclaim Crimea. Bukkvoll then considers systemic and third-country influences on Ukrainian-Russian relations (including Ukrainian relations with and illusions about 'the West', relations with Central European countries, and Ukraine's involvement in the Moldovan conflict. Economic factors – notably the problem of Russian oil and gas supplies, and Ukraine's fears of Russian 'imperial businessmen' are then addressed.

Finally, after citing some useful statistics on Ukraine's present and future military capabilities, Bukkvoll analyses four future political scenarios and the likelihood of conflict escalation in each case: 1) 'nationalists' in power in both Russia and Ukraine; 2) 'nationalists' in power in Ukraine and 'moderates' in power in Russia; 3) 'moderates' in Ukraine and 'nationalists' in Russia, and 4) 'moderates' in power in both. (Here, he explains, the terms 'nationalist' and 'moderate' relate to the Ukrainian-Russian issue only). Dismissing case 2 as too unlikely to address, he considers in the other three cases the 'spurs' likely to lead to conflict escalation and the possible outcome. Not surprisingly, he concludes that the risk of armed conflict is greatest in case 1 and least in case 4, while the most likely trigger for any conflict with Russia is the eruption of domestic conflict within Ukraine itself.

Finally, in a concluding summary, Bukkvoll stresses briefly the role which other countries could play in ameliorating the Ukrainian-Russian situation. Even though no country in the West or Central Europe is 'ready to declare itself on the Ukrainian side in a balancing act against Russia', they could, he urges, 'do a great deal in laying the groundwork for stable Ukrainian-Russian relations by giving Ukrainian domestic problems more attention'. 'Political mediation over Crimea, economic support, and promotion of foreign investment', he proposes, all 'serve to strengthen Ukraine at little risk of antagonizing Russia'.   ❑

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Current Events

Ukrainian Foreign Policy Formation in the Context of NATO Enlargement

Serhiy Tolstov

When one considers Ukraine's six-year-long experience of integration into the European political and economic space, it is essential to find out what forms of participation in the changing transatlantic security system and existing sub-regional cooperation mechanisms will prove most beneficial to its long-term national security. The processes of forming a new pan-European security structure raise several fundamental questions, such as: a) Which regional processes do not contradict the pan-European integration processes? b) Which of them promote and which contradict the formation of an effective pan-European security system? c) Will the existing pan-European institutions be able to cope with negative developments such as destructive intra-regional conflicts, and what changes must be made to ensure that even if these destructive tendencies do not raise the security level, at least they will not reduce it in the future? d) What role will Ukraine play on a regional level and in the political decision-making mechanisms concerning pan-European and Euro-Atlantic security problems?

The regional aspects of European international politics currently have a specific character due to the evident priority of European integration trends. Under such conditions regional cooperation mechanisms execute particular tasks. Their role could be vital in promoting interaction between member-states of the EU and NATO on the one hand, and those European countries which are not included in these organisations on the other. In this sense since regional cooperation structures involve more limited circles of participants, they could be extremely efficient in resolving tasks.

This applies in particular to such organisations and mechanisms as the Baltic Cooperation Council, the Northern Council, the Central European Initiative, etc.

Evolution of Basic Principles and Values

Current changes in the European political landscape are predominantly due to the desire of a large group of Central and Eastern European countries to achieve membership in the European Union and NATO. Nowadays the eastern part of Europe consists of three groups of states:

1. Central Europe, where changes are moving faster than in other areas, and where Western countries, particularly Germany, have a clear interest in helping the process of change.

2. South-Eastern Europe, where the situation in the Balkans is still complex and less certain, and which poses a threat to stability and European security.

3. Eastern Europe, a new geopolitical area which has appeared as a result of the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the emergence of a number of new independent European countries: Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine.

All the countries of the first and third areas, as independent states or republics, were members of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation and Comecon (CMEA). In the second, South-Eastern group, Bulgaria and Romania were members of the Warsaw Pact and Comecon throughout those organisations' existence, Albania initially joined both, but resigned from the Warsaw Pact in 1968 and ceased active participation in Comecon in 1961. The old 'large' Yugoslavia of the Communist era, being 'non-aligned', was formally a member of neither, but had a close special relationship with Comecon and participated in 19 of its joint projects. In Central Europe, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Poland constituted themselves 'the Visegrad group'. These countries showed a readiness to develop bilateral relations with Ukraine, but some of them, especially the Czech Republic, opposed the idea of accepting Ukraine's participation in a putative 'Visegrad Five' community.[1]

The idea of a broadly based alliance of post-Communist nations in Central and Eastern Europe was frequently raised in the first half of the 1990s. Various proposals for cooperation were based on an overall historical idea of 'Mitteleuropa', as well as on the assumption that a union of small and medium-sized post-Communist countries could be a significant force in the international system, which could oppose any rebirth of expansionist tendencies in Russia and also facilitate the integration of the members of this alliance into Europe.[2]

Several proposals for an association of Central and Eastern European states have been put forward: a Baltic-Black Sea Commonwealth or axis, the Central and Eastern European space of stability and security, NATO-2, etc. In the early 1990s there was a fairly broad spectrum of projects ranging from economic cooperation to a defence alliance. Most of these proposals were, however, not clearly worded, and neither the sphere of their operations nor possible implementation mechanisms were clearly specified.

Countries interested in Ukraine's deterrent potential had to consider opportunities (within the framework of Partnership for Peace – PfP – or in addition to it) to promote the modernisation of the Ukrainian armed forces and to invest in the military-industrial complex of Ukraine as a source of supply of armaments and munitions. Since the expansion of NATO was announced it has seemed more possible that under certain circumstances Poland could become a basis for the sub-regional security system. The creation of a joint Polish-Ukrainian battalion provides a good example of the existing opportunities for cooperation.

In the mid-1990s it became evident that all plans for autonomous Central and Eastern European integration had failed as a result of the dominant influence of West European integration mechanisms. All the Central European states are seek-

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[1] M.J. Calka, 'Poland's Eastern Policy in 1994', *The Yearbook of Polish Foreign Policy* (Warsaw, 1995), pp. 49-54; I. Brzezinski, 'Polish-Ukrainian Relations: the unnoticed strategic axis of Europe', *Geneza* (Kyiv), 1994, no. 1, pp. 190-94.

[2] Z. Brzezinski, 'The Cold War and its Aftermath', *Foreign Affairs*, 1992, vol. 71, no. 4, pp. 46-50.

ing NATO and EU membership, and consider that at present Ukraine is not even in the second or third tranche of candidates to join these European structures.

It now seems more or less evident that Central-Eastern Europe has no future as an independent geopolitical region. Therefore, some Ukrainian observers are now calling upon the decision-makers to put aside ideas of creating some new regional structure of military-political or economic type.[3] The Central European Initiative and the Central European Free Trade Agreement cannot be interpreted as an alternative to European integration. They can only play the role of preparatory structures assisting the countries of the region on their way to joining the EU. That is how the Central European states regard these structures. Thus, Ukraine's foreign policy should aim at synchronising its advancement to Europe with the Central European states. In this sense, it would be reasonable for Ukraine to enter the Central European free trade zone before Poland and other states of the region progress from the status of associate members of the European Union to full membership.

By 1994 the Baltic states had achieved some measure of political and economic stability as well as experience in foreign policy, and they began to devote greater attention to other nations of Eastern Europe. Documentary evidence of the Baltic states' increasing attention to Ukraine's role in ensuring political stability in Central and Eastern Europe is provided by the statement issued by the three Baltic presidents on 25 March 1994, as well as the joint communiqué issued by the three heads of government on 13 June 1994. According to the latter document, the stable development of Ukraine is of the utmost importance to stability in Europe. Ukraine also has a constant interest in cooperation with the Baltic states. This interest is guided both by foreign policy and economic considerations.

From this point of view, such more recent developments as the Joint Declaration of Ukraine and Lithuania of 23 September 1996, the strategic partnership of Ukraine and Poland, and the Joint Statement of the Presidents of Lithuania, Poland and Ukraine on the events in Belarus of 20 November 1996 reflect an important trend of real cooperation and coordination of foreign policy between these countries, aimed at securing both their mutual and national interests in regional and European processes.

From the standpoint of the Baltic states, Ukraine is their natural ally in searching for security and territorial integrity, although geographically it is situated on the periphery of the Baltic region. Ukraine's membership of the CIS is not an obstacle in this respect, because it is not a member of the latter's military-political structures (the Tashkent Treaty on Collective Security of 15 May 1992, etc.). Ukraine's military potential in conventional forces is so substantial that it can play a deterrent role vis-à-vis its neighbouring states.[4] As Alexei Arbatov stressed, 'the conditions of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) agreement to which Russia is subject permit it to have forces twice as large as those of Ukraine, and twice as strong as the forces of the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland and Hungary combined.[5] These estimates

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[3] *Den*, 23 January 1997.

[4] O. Potekhin, I. Oldberg, 'Military-Industrial Cooperation', *Ukraine and Integration in the East. Economic, Military, Military-Industrial Relations.* Ed. by Lena Jonson (Stockholm, 1995), pp. 69-79.

[5] A. Arbatov, 'The future of European security: Split or unity?', *Visions of European Security—focal point. Sweden and Northern Europe* (Stockholm, 1996), p. 243.

provide good grounds for Central and Eastern European nations to unite their efforts with Ukraine, thereby achieving joint parity with Russia.

In Leonid Kuchma's Presidential Administration the person with the most influence on security policy is Volodymyr Horbulin, the Secretary of the National Security and Defence Council. Taking into account that Ukraine has little chance of rapid inclusion into West European and Euro-Atlantic structures, in 1995-96 Horbulin expressed support for Ukraine's membership of a Central-Eastern European system of cooperation. At that time he believed that Ukraine could choose and follow one of the following five models of foreign policy strategy:

1. Joining the Tashkent Treaty on Collective Security, signed by some CIS states in 1992;

2. Joining NATO/WEU;

3. Participating in a Transatlantic and pan-European security structure, including the umbrella Atlantic Community and Atlantic Partnership Council;

4. Concluding a treaty guaranteeing the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and security of Ukraine, similar to the State Treaty on Restoration of Independent and Democratic Austria (1955);

5. Creating a separate Central-Eastern European regional security organisation, in which 'grey zone' countries would participate.[6]

In practical terms, the first two models are impossible to implement. Joining either the Tashkent Treaty or NATO conflicts with the legislation of Ukraine now in force, although President Kuchma and other top officials sometimes suggest that it is neither obligatory nor obvious that the future of the state must continue to be of a non-aligned character.

Full membership in NATO is also impossible because of geopolitical, social and financial obstacles. After visiting NATO Headquarters in early January 1997, Horbulin stated that Ukraine is not ready to join NATO for economic reasons, and also because it does not currently conform to NATO requirements concerning civil control over the armed forces.

Comparing the overall defence estimates of the first applicants to join NATO – the Visegrad group countries including Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic – under the existing ceilings of armaments specified by the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe with those of Ukraine is likewise disillusioning. The Visegrad group's expenses will amount to 87 per cent of Ukraine's defence needs. For Ukraine's defence expenditures to correspond to this, it would have to increase from 850 million to 5 billion dollars per year. This means that Ukraine would have to increase its military budget at least six-fold so that the proportion of the defence budget share in the total state budget would rise from 5.2 per cent to 43 per cent. Even the Soviet Union at the peak of the arms race spent not more than 35-38 per cent of the state budget on defence. In its current deep economic decline, Ukraine simply cannot bear the cost of joining NATO.

Therefore, the last three models remain to be examined. However, signing a treaty on the Austrian model, though it would provide the opportunity to fill a

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[6] V. Horbulin, 'Our Goals and Chances', *Polityka i chas* (Kyiv), 1996, no. 1, p. 8.

'security vacuum', would slow down Ukraine's political and economic integration into European structures.

As for the fifth model, a plan for creating a regional 'grey zone' association in Central and Eastern Europe is worth considering. Poland's 1991-92 proposal of a 'NATO-2' or Ukraine's 1993 initiative to establish a 'Central European zone of stability and security' have already been forgotten as unrealistic.

Some reasonable criticism has been expressed by Ukrainian observers and politicians regarding the consequences of the principle of 'geopolitical pluralism' as applied to Central-Eastern European realities. Thus Dmytro Vydrin (President Kuchma's internal policy adviser from 1994-95) and Dmytro Tabachnyk (Head of the Presidential Administration from 1994-96) stated: 'geopolitical pluralism within the limits of a common region (and at the same time within the limits of the integral economic and social-cultural complex) means the divergence of these countries' foreign-policies, which will certainly cause them to gravitate to leaders outside their own region...'.[7]

These remarks referred to Ukraine's non-aligned status and reflected the need for a stance which would prevent Ukraine's long-term isolation from the Euro-Atlantic security structures.

In Horbulin's earliest vision, Central European cooperation in its broadest sense is seen as a step towards involvement in a pan-European consolidation process.[8] From this standpoint, the Central European Initiative seems to have been regarded more as a special model of cooperation rather than the transitional model which it now appears in reality to be.

One of the tenets of Ukraine's foreign policy is that, as a result of its geopolitical situation, historical experience, cultural traditions, rich natural resources and sufficient economic, scientific, technical and intellectual potential, Ukraine possesses the capacity to become an influential regional state, capable of playing a significant role in providing political and economic stability in Europe. Since Ukraine is now a recognised factor in European relations, it is difficult to speak about security in Europe without considering the role and the place of Ukraine in the European geopolitical space.

Though Ukraine is not a candidate for EU or NATO membership, its independence is of vital concern to the West, according to the authors of one widely circulated RAND Corporation research paper on the problem of NATO enlargement.[9] The future orientation of Ukraine will be a main factor influencing the balance of forces in Eastern and Central Europe.

RAND Corporation experts predicted several scenarios of Ukraine's geopolitical future: a) Ukraine following the 'Finnish model' with pro-Western orientation, politically and economically stable but neutral in the military sphere. Its status in relations with Russia could be similar to that of Finland's vis-à-vis the Soviet Union during the

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[7] D. Vydrin, D. Tabachnyk, *Ukraine on the threshold of the XXI century: Political aspect* (Kyiv: Lybid), 1995, p. 268.

[8] Horbulin, op. cit., pp. 8-9.

[9] *Survival*, vol. 37, no. 1, Spring 1995, pp. 7-33.

Cold War; b) Ukraine increasingly realigning its economy towards Russia, while maintaining its neutrality ('light' Ukraine); c) Ukraine whose eastern areas have joined Russia and whose western areas are independent; d) Ukraine which has politically and economically reintegrated itself with Russia ('heavy' Ukraine).

The West would prefer to see a 'Finnish model' for Ukraine, i.e. politically and economically stable, with pro-Western orientation, but militarily neutral. The worst alternative from the Western point of view would be complete reintegration of Ukraine into Russia and the CIS. Nowadays Ukraine may be correctly defined as a 'light Ukraine'. The Ukrainian government has sought to establish working economic ties with the Russian economy, but has refused to join the CIS collective security institutions.

The question for the West was: will not Kyiv's economic reorientation towards Moscow and the CIS eventually lead to further military integration? And will not NATO enlargement aggravate Ukraine's security problems? Although economic ties between Ukraine and Russia have a good deal of justification, the military reorientation of Ukraine could destroy the balance of forces in Central-Eastern Europe. Therefore, after some period of doubts, Western policy is gradually focusing on the strengthening of Ukraine's independence and preventing Kyiv's military integration into the CIS. Despite the fact that the 'Finnish model' for Ukraine was considered by NATO to be the optimal variant, this scenario is unlikely without a substantial increase of political and economic support from the West.

The future security orientation of Ukraine will have a decisive influence upon NATO enlargement. Ukraine plays the role of a political buffer for the Central-Eastern European countries. To NATO Ukraine offers additional strategic depth in the case of new threats from Russia. If Ukraine were forced into strategic reintegration with Russia, all the parameters of NATO defence planning would change significantly. Ukraine's security orientation will be shaped by the security guarantees NATO provides to its new members in Central-Eastern Europe. If Ukraine becomes a stable and neutral state, this will greatly facilitate the security tasks of an enlarged NATO. If Ukraine reintegrates economically and politically with Russia, giving Russian armed forces access to those parts of Ukraine close to the Polish border, NATO will have to take a more decisive stand, perhaps including the forward deployment of Western detachments in Central and Eastern Europe.

After NATO enlargement, Ukraine as a non-aligned state could find itself playing the role of a buffer between two military blocs – the Tashkent Treaty and NATO. Under certain circumstances, NATO enlargement may lead to the erection of a new 'wall' and put Ukraine in an extremely difficult situation. 'On the other hand', in the opinion of Ukraine's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hennadiy Udovenko,

> no one has a right to 'veto' any country's choice to join NATO: this is the private business of that country and NATO. In this respect, we are, if one may say so, evolutionists; we favour a step-by-step examination of this question; we want Ukraine to be better able to defend its national interests, having become economically independent during this time. Therefore, we are opposed to speeding up the resolution of the NATO enlargement issue.[10]

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[10] H. Udovenko, 'Directions of Ukrainian Diplomacy', *Polityka i chas*, 1995, no. 10, p. 5.

Udovenko has also stressed that

Ukraine welcomes the openness of the North-Atlantic Alliance to cooperation and partnership with the new democracies of Eastern Europe. We believe that active participation in the PfP programme could play an important role in the evolutionary process of possible NATO enlargement. At the same time, we perceive it as one more confirmation of NATO's ability to transform itself into a broadened Euro-Atlantic security organisation.[11]

The two simultaneous processes of NATO enlargement and its transformation could develop side by side. The NATO enlargement process must not contradict the national security interests of certain Eastern European states, in particular, Ukraine's. After the publication of the study on NATO enlargement (September 1995) some new questions were put forward. Ukraine's political élite was concerned with the possible deployment of foreign armed forces and nuclear weapons on the territory of neighbouring states. Ukraine was one of the first countries in the world to eliminate such weapons and acceded to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1994 as a non-nuclear state. Western and East European leaders have given assurances that there is no need to deploy nuclear weapons in new NATO member countries. These assurances seem somewhat symbolic because it would not take much time to move tactical nuclear missiles eastwards under certain circumstances. In taking the decision to destroy the third largest nuclear arsenal in the world and thus achieve non-nuclear status, Ukraine hoped that the world community would realise the significance of such a step for ensuring the security interests of all countries.

Emerging Partnership with NATO

During 1995-97 the orientations of the foreign and security policy of the Ukrainian government élite have undergone a complex and remarkable evolution towards a pro-Atlantic stance. Ukraine has already become an active participant in NATO's PfP programme. In the Individual Partnership Programme (IPP), approved on 1 June 1995, NATO and Ukraine have agreed to cooperate in all 19 spheres of activities envisaged by PfP. These include cooperation in preparedness for civil emergencies and crisis management. Ukraine attaches great importance to the PfP consultation process. Practical military cooperation between Ukraine, the NATO member countries and other active participants in the PfP programme is being developed.

Ukraine actively contributes to the North Atlantic Cooperation Council's (NACC) activity. Since summer 1994 it has taken part in a number of field training exercises within the framework of PfP and has appointed a representative to the Coordination Partnership Centre and a liaison officer at NATO headquarters in Brussels.

In 1995 NATO and Ukraine held negotiations to strengthen relations so that they reflect Ukraine's weight and its growing role in European security. These steps include consultation mechanisms between NATO and Ukraine at different levels, including the '16+1' level, on the following subjects:

[11] H. Udovenko, 'Ukrainian Foreign Policy: Reality and Prospects', *Polityka i chas*, 1996, no. 1, p. 10.

- European security architecture and other political problems and questions in the security sphere;
  - Cooperation regarding conflict prevention and crisis response;
  - Operations to maintain peace, as well as humanitarian and other similar actions;
  - Nuclear security;
  - Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction;
  - Disarmament and arms control;
  - The implementation of NATO information activity in Ukraine, in cooperation with the Ukrainian government, etc.[12]

However, in view of the level of the security guaranties extended to Ukraine by NATO, the OSCE and the great powers (or, rather, the absence of effective guaranties), Ukraine has had to focus its efforts on creating and maintaining the military efficiency of its own armed forces.

The political independence and stability of Ukraine is widely recognised as a positive international factor which promotes better balance and security. From the point of view of today's prospects for Ukraine's participation in the new European security architecture, it is possible to envisage the theoretical possibility of the implementation of one of four variants of its status in the system of European and transatlantic cooperation structures. These can be arranged in the form of a hierarchy based on efficiency, security guarantees and stability criteria vis-à-vis the international position of the state.

Variant 1. The present-day status of Ukraine may be defined as a non-aligned state striving to increase its participation in European and transatlantic processes but finding itself in a strong economic and, to some extent, military dependence upon Russia. The non-aligned status of Ukraine was declared as a unilateral initiative, and external assurances concerning security guarantees refer predominantly to the nuclear threat (Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances to Ukraine, 1994). This state of affairs may be characterised as the least stable and transitional.

Variant 2. A state associated with the developing Atlantic Community in the form of an agreement on special partnership and cooperation with NATO. This form of involvement of Ukraine in the system of European security envisages consultation mechanisms relating to all problems posing an external threat to the security of the state or regional stability.

Variant 3. A non-aligned neutral state internationally recognised as such. Austria possessed a similar status under the conditions of the Treaty on the Restoration of Independent and Democratic Austria, 1955. Although this formula provides a fairly high degree of international security and guarantees, it significantly restricts the prospects and dynamics of the country's participation in the sphere of military and political cooperation.

Variant 4. From the point of view of international security, full membership in NATO and other associated Euro-Atlantic structures is considered the most stable position of the state.

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[12] NATO-Ukraine Joint Press Statement, NATO Press Service, Brussels, Press Release (95)83, 14 September 1995, pp. 1-3.

Today Ukraine's membership in NATO is not regarded as feasible due to various internal and external factors. But, at the same time, a number of Ukrainian political groups and parties are even now raising the question of the need to declare an aspiration to join the North Atlantic Alliance at some future date. Opinion polls conducted among experts (civil service officials, members of parliament, political scientists and journalists) suggest that there is great interest in developing cooperation with the Euro-Atlantic structures.

However, there is a definite gap between the trends in foreign policy and the internal conditions of the country's development. Hence neither the results to date of social and economic transformations nor the military and financial conditions, to say nothing about Russia's continuing naval presence in Crimea, will allow the question to be raised of Ukraine's entry to NATO in the near future.

During the recent visit to Ukraine, on 7 May 1997, of NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana, some details concerning NATO-Ukraine relations were clarified. At the NATO summit meeting in Madrid on 9 July 1997, a special partnership agreement is scheduled to be signed. According to Mr. Solana this agreement 'will recognise the international weight and significance of Ukraine and its undoubted potential to fulfil an important role in European security'.[13] Ukraine's membership in the Euro-Atlantic (or Atlantic) Partnership Council will ensure its involvement in the new security architecture with prospects for further integration. If the Ukraine-NATO agreement also contains provisions for extended security assurances from NATO, Ukraine's view of the stability criteria will be somewhere between the second and third models indicted above. Thus, its non-aligned status will effectively be reduced to non-participation in military defence alliances which are subject to considerable change.

In this context, Ukraine will concentrate its attention on interaction with such states as Sweden, Finland and Austria, which likewise do not participate in military-political alliances.

On the other hand, the regional and geopolitical features of Ukraine's position will determine interaction and foreign policy coordination with Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Slovakia, as well as with Georgia and Azerbaijan in the course of NATO enlargement, aimed at localising possible destabilising phenomena in the regional context.

The evident differences between Ukraine and Russia in their approach to the expected enlargement of NATO demand a more detailed examination of the 'Russian factor' in Eastern European politics. It is worth noting the recent clarification of Ukraine's current position which assumes the following:

1. Ukraine is not opposed to NATO enlargement.

2. Negotiations and relations of NATO with Ukraine and Russia have a parallel rather than mutually interlinked character since they are intended to resolve different and not-coincident tasks.

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[13] J. Solana, Speech by the Secretary General at the 'Ukrainian House', Kyiv, 7 May 1997.

Ukrainian-Russian Relations
and NATO Expansion

During his dialogue with Bill Clinton in Helsinki on 21 March 1997, Boris Yeltsin declared that Russia did not recognise NATO's enlargement and was not going to sign any agreements with the Alliance until its demands had been fully satisfied. These demands included: that the Baltic states and Ukraine should not be admitted to NATO; that no nuclear and additional conventional arms should be deployed on the territory of the new members; and that NATO should not use the former Warsaw Pact's military infrastructure.

Moscow's concern about the deployment of NATO troops on the territory of Poland bordering on the Kaliningrad region of the Russian Federation is understandable. But what threat would NATO land forces in Hungary and the Czech Republic pose to Russia?

In reality, Moscow's motives in opposing NATO enlargement are based on its geopolitical interest rather than on any perception of a growing military threat. Therefore, Russia's most important demand of NATO is that Ukraine and the Baltic states should be recognised as a zone of Russia's vital interest. Such recognition would, in fact, mean a division into spheres of influence in Europe. However, in Helsinki Bill Clinton did not agree with Yeltsin's view that the former Warsaw Pact countries must remain within Russia's sphere of influence. Thus, according to Washington's stance, the doors to the pan-European home still remain open to the Baltic states, Ukraine and Moldova.

Realising from the Helsinki meeting that the West was unwilling to make concessions, Russia began to search for ways of implementing an anti-NATO policy. Among the basic elements of such a policy one should note: firstly, an attempt to unite around itself Asian countries such as China, India and Iran on a common anti-American platform; secondly, to exacerbate differences between the leading NATO countries, such as France and Germany, in order to achieve non-deployment of NATO troops and non-use of the inherited military infrastructure on the territory of the new members of the Alliance; thirdly, to create a western bastion of Russia which would probably include Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine and the Kaliningrad oblast of the Russian Federation.

It is evident that Russia has little chance of persuading China or India to an overtly anti-American policy. The losses of these countries resulting from such a policy would exceed their gains. As for Iran, Russia could achieve such an alliance in exchange for selling it missile and nuclear technologies. This, however, might well result in Russia's international isolation.

Thus, Russia's main anti-NATO efforts will be concentrated on an attempt to change the balance of forces in Central and Eastern Europe. The mechanism of such a change will consist of preventing the deployment of NATO forces in Central and Eastern Europe and/or NATO's use of the Warsaw Pact military infrastructure remaining on the territory of the new members of the Alliance, together with the strengthening of Russia's military presence in Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus.

Russian military presence in these countries will become the central element of Russia's bastion against the West. On the one hand, such a presence makes it pos-

sible to influence the domestic political situation in these countries in a direction favourable to Russia. On the other, it could allow Russia to maintain a certain balance between its own advance deployment forces with those of NATO. Russia demands that NATO should not deploy its forces on the territory of the new members, but at the same time has its own military units stationed in countries which are not formally its military allies, namely the former 14th army in Moldova, a 30-thousand-strong unit of the Black Sea Fleet troops in Ukraine, and a 25-thousand-strong unit in Belarus.

Russia claims that NATO should not use the military infrastructure of the former Warsaw Pact on the territory of the new members, while itself using the ex-USSR military infrastructure on the territory of the Newly Independent States which are not bound by any military/political obligations to Russia.

Apart from the Russian land forces and frontier units on the Belarusian border, the first echelon of Russian air defence is deployed in Belarus. The Russian military installation in Baranovichi is a part of Russia's anti-missile early warning system. The installation in Vileyka is a part of the Russian Navy's communications system. According to Russian specialists, the building of such installations in Russia would take about 5-6 years and require some 7 trillion roubles plus the 10 trillion roubles needed to establish its own air defence alignment on its western borders.

The Russian military are conducting negotiations with their Belarusian colleagues about the handing over of the whole network of airfields in Belarus for joint use. All these airfields are ready to receive Russian combat aircraft and to maintain them at any time.

After the collapse of the USSR, Russia inherited 50 per cent of its airfield network. Today the Russian Air Force possesses about 100 airfields with concrete runways. Sixty-five per cent of them are situated in the European part of Russia. Therefore, the signing of a treaty with Belarus on the common use of the airfield network will, according to General Petr Deynekin, the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Air Force, provide wide opportunities for manoeuvre during the implementation of the tasks of the air force in the security of Russia's western borders, and is an adequate response to NATO's eastward enlargement.

Speaking against the deployment of nuclear weapons on the territory of the new members of NATO, Russia offers its support to the Belarusian initiatives concerning the creation of a nuclear-free zone in Eastern Europe. However, if this nuclear-free zone did not include the new NATO members, Russia would rather speak against its creation. But a situation could arise in which NATO and its new members would make a commitment not to deploy nuclear weapons in Europe, while Russia would be free of any such obligation. Such a course of events would be entirely feasible if, for instance, Belarus were to join the Russian Federation. Russia regards tactical nuclear weapons as a means of maintaining the balance of forces in Europe. Thus Yevgeniy Primakov, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, speaking at a conference on the prospects of creating a nuclear-free zone in Central-Eastern Europe, declared that the Kaliningrad oblast of the Russian Federation will never join such a zone.

It needs to be pointed out that the means of common military policy of Belarus and Russia include reinforcing Belarusian air defence by air force units of the Russian

Federation and a common roster of the air force of both countries. This will mean combat aircraft such as the Su-27 and Su-24, carrying tactical nuclear weapons, being based in Belarus notwithstanding the latter's international non-nuclear obligations. It is also likely that Russian strategic bombers may be deployed in Belarus.

The desire to avoid renewed confrontation between NATO and Russia, and to achieve stability and security in Europe implies a need to change the starting point of the dialogue between NATO and Russia from 'unilateral concessions in exchange for recognition of enlargement' to bilateral steps towards the demilitarisation of Central-Eastern Europe, by resolving such issues as the problem of the deployment of NATO and Russian tactical nuclear weapons in Central-Eastern Europe; the issue of non-deployment of NATO troops on the territory of the new NATO members and the non-deployment of Russian troops on the territory of Ukraine and Moldova; the problem of the non-use of the former Warsaw Pact's military infrastructure by NATO troops and the non-use of the ex-USSR's military infrastructure on the neighbouring countries' territory by Russia's military forces.

Major difficulties between Russia and Ukraine have been caused, to a large extent, by public claims on behalf of imperialist and nationalist forces in Russia. In view of this fact, it is clearly necessary to create a strategic system of advantages and protection mechanisms which would adequately oppose both evident or covert, consciously or unconsciously expressed aggressive behaviour of the right-wing expansionist forces of Russia in the various spheres of foreign and military policy and political, economic and cultural life. In fact, by taking action to counter these forces, Ukraine will not only protect itself from being forced back, once again, into a condition of subservience but also will serve the cause of democracy in Russia itself.

The first structural crisis in Ukrainian-Russian relations which affected all spheres of bilateral relations occurred in autumn 1996. It was provoked by the Russian government's imposition of a value added tax on goods imported from Ukraine, and was accompanied by various territorial and political claims made by Russia's legislature and a number of influential politicians. This crisis reflected a substantial decline in Ukraine's political dependency on Russia which has manifested itself in Ukraine's changing attitude to NATO-related issues. At the same time, it remains an imperative for Ukraine to maintain satisfactory relations with both Russia and the West. To be forced to choose between them could seriously undermine Ukraine's national interests.

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Since to date Ukraine's opportunities of choosing closer geostrategic and military cooperation with the West have been limited by various external factors, a policy of dependence on its own defence potential with simultaneous moves towards the creation of a collective security system, together with cooperation with military-political, economic, humanitarian and other institutions and contractual obligations would appear to be more reasonable.

Having defined non-participation in military blocs as one of the main principles of its foreign policy, Ukraine so far has not addressed the question of mem-

bership in any military-political union. But Ukraine's government retains the right to become a member of any military-political structure offering the prospect of becoming an integral part of a new pan-European security system. The non-aligned status of Ukraine is not regarded as limiting its wide-scale participation in programmes and mechanisms of multilateral European cooperation, aimed at the strengthening of pan-European and regional stability and security. Enlargement of NATO will not undermine the balance in Europe if it takes place parallel with the creation of a system of multidimensional interdependency of the countries of Eastern-Central Europe, including Ukraine. It must be recognised that the original idea of non-alignment has not given Ukraine sufficient opportunities to fill it with real geopolitical and legal content.

Contemporary domestic discussion on security matters has focused to date on the imbalances existing between the foreign policy dimension and the dynamics of internal social and economic development. Under some circumstances, 'special partnership' arrangements could become a form of fixing the status of semi-isolation and the bilateral dependence of Ukraine on both the West and Russia.[14]

The real threat of a new division in Europe comes not from mistaken decisions in foreign policy but from certain countries dropping out from the general paradigm of development. However, Ukraine's further participation in European integration processes depends on the success of profound internal economic and political reforms which may lessen if not eliminate the cultural and developmental barriers dividing it from Western and to some extent from Central Europe.

Official Kyiv attaches great importance to the principle of involvement in the new emerging security architecture of Europe, and attempts to diversify and deepen Ukraine's connections with other European states and institutions in the field of security cooperation. This is consistent with the basic principles of Ukraine's foreign policy, approved by parliament in 1993, which include support for the principle of indivisibility of international peace and European security.

These principles and approaches stipulate a pragmatism in Ukraine's foreign policy regarding the protection of its national interests by establishing a motivated balance of political and economic relations with the East and the West, and also with other regions of the world. ❏

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[14] O. Dergachov, 'Insecurity as an attribute of statehood', *The Political Thought* (Kyiv), 1997, no. 1, pp. 118-19.

Defining Citizenship and Political Community in Ukraine[1]

Louise Jackson
Kataryna Wolczuk

Citizenship is not only concerned with legal and socio-economic rights, it also defines the nature and terms of the belonging of an individual to a political community. The universalist notion of citizenship is based on the premise that the state creates the political community: all individuals who are subject in common to the same government and the same laws form a nation. While it is based on duties and rights, the former are fulfilled most of all by loyalty to a sovereign authority – the state and its institutions – eventually developing a sense of belonging and commonality. The communitarian notion of citizenship refers to the membership of a community (a nation), which is a pre-political phenomenon and is based on distinctive norms and values. Ethnic and linguistic bonds are the basic criteria for the membership of such a community. Finally, the multi-cultural notion of citizenship argues that a political community is made up of a plurality of national and ethnic communities. Membership of the state is thus 'materialised' through active participation in cultural communities, which together constitute a political community, while citizens enjoy equal legal and socio-economic rights. In reality, pure models do not exist and depending on the character of a society, the relations between citizenship and political community oscillate somewhere between these 'ideal types', and these as analytical abstractions are useful tools to aid comparison and analysis. Each of the above 'types' of citizenship have been associated with some fractions and tensions.[2]

This paper aims to offer a tentative framing of the concept of citizenship in Ukraine by analysing the key legislative acts passed in Ukraine. As will be argued, the formal description of Ukrainian citizenship and state regulations on the natio-

[2] In West Europe, where the universalist notion prevails, the fault lines tend to run between citizenship and non-citizenship on the one hand, and, on the other, the struggle for extension of full citizenship (inclusion of excluded or underprivileged groups) in the domain of rights and political participation. Citizenship in Western Europe is predominantly concerned with rights and the progressive extension of them. But citizenship also involves duties. This side of the coin – obligations to the community – are stressed across East-Central Europe, where a communitarian notion dominates as ethnically defined communities claim ownership of the state. As they can rarely do so without infringing the claims of other ethnic groups existing within the same state, in East-Central Europe the rift takes place between a dominant, eponymous majority and ethnic minorities. Multi-cultural citizenship is also not without its own problems as it has been criticised for exacerbating ethnic divisions and separatist tendencies rather than fostering a sense of loyalty, mutuality and belonging.

nal minorities point towards a multi-cultural, group-differentiated model. The Ukrainian state does not insist that political and national identities have to be congruent (a disjunction of nationality and citizenship) and grants collective rights to 'subnational' groups. Nevertheless, the nature of citizenship and its relationship with nationhood is a subject of ongoing public debate, and although Ukraine's legislation has been praised by international agencies, subsurface tensions over citizenship and terms of belonging, especially in regard to language, can be identified. The question of 'What binds Ukrainian citizens together into a shared political community?' is far from resolved.

Ukraine remains a fascinating case of a state and nation in the making and a pertinent question is what its future trajectory will be, and how the terms of citizens' belonging are going to be defined. Some observers expect a consolidation of civic, territorial, political identity to occur naturally with time, whereas others warn that existing tendencies towards the imposition of linguistic and cultural homogeneity may grow stronger.[3] However, at the moment, it would be premature to draw authoritative conclusions on the arrival either of a 'civic nation' or the 'nationalising state'. In this paper, our focus is on the complex frameworks through which different groups are included within the political community. Ukraine's legislation relating to citizenship can be seen as containing both civic and ethnic elements, and indeed at times they are difficult to separate. We suggest that Ukraine has evolved a form of 'multi-cultural' definition of political community, in which the recognition of full rights for minorities is balanced against the promotion of the leading role of the Ukrainian (ethnic) nation and culture.

Ukraine as a new state is certainly not unique in experiencing dilemmas and tensions. Even old nation-states re-examine their political and national identity as, for example, does France, where 'since the founding of the Fifth Republic, and especially in the past two decades, [t]he end of the crisis of legitimacy concerning the form of the *state* has permitted the luxury of raising questions about the nature of the French *nation*.[4] The conundrum in Ukraine, as indeed in any other new state, is that it does not have the luxury of 'doing one thing at a time'. Ukraine strives to secure its national integrity, while simultaneously aspiring to accommodate its historical multi-ethnic and multi-linguistic composition, and as a result, it is caught between the need to assert its distinctive national identity and the desire to match the international norms (and expectations) of tolerance and pluralism.

Ukrainian Conditions

If Russia's modernisation under the Soviet Union was dubbed 'misdevelopment',[5] the case of Ukraine could be conceptualised as dual 'misdevelopment': not only have the

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[3] For example, see: Andrew Wilson, *Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1990s. A Minority Faith* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) or Dominique Arel, 'Ukraine: The Temptation of the Nationalising State', in V. Tismaneanu (ed.), *Political Culture and Civil Society in the FSU* (M.E. Sharp, 1995).

[4] W. Safran, 'State, Nation, National Identity, and Citizenship: France as a Test Case', *International Political Science Review*, vol. 12 (1991), p. 224.

[5] Richard Sakwa, *Russian Politics and Society* (London and New York: Routledge, 1993).

emergence of modern social-economic structures been distorted as in Russia, but also the development of the modern Ukrainian nation has been hampered.

Ukraine was modernised under 'culturally close' colonialism, in which Ukrainian colonial subjects often participated in the decision-making of the empire as 'younger brothers'.[6] In such circumstances, nationalism as a product of 'favourable' conditions of industrialisation, mobility, mass literacy and public education failed to embrace the élites[7] and then the masses. Soviet modernisation produced a literate, urban, educated society but at the same time the Ukrainian 'ethnographic masses' were generally successfully (depending on the period in the Russian empire and then the USSR) 'integrated' into the Russian language and 'high' Soviet culture. This was especially the case in eastern and southern Ukraine where the high level of urbanisation (60-80 per cent) coincided with a high degree of Russification.[8] In addition, Ukraine experienced an influx of ethnic Russians, which by 1989 had reached 22 per cent, increasing the complexity of the ethnic 'question' in Ukraine still further. It has been argued that in modern Ukraine a significant part of the ethnic Ukrainian population lacks a clear sense of ethnic identity as defined by culture, language, sense of belonging, historical myths, etc.[9]

The Ethnic Composition of Ukraine (1989 census)[10]		
Ethnic Group	Population	% of Total Population
Ukrainian	37.4 million	73%
Russian	11.4 million	22%
Jewish	490,000	
Belarusian	444,000	
Moldovan	325,000	
Bulgarian	234,000	
Polish	219,000	
Hungarian	160,000	
Romanian	135,000	
Other	596,000	
Total	51.5 million	100%

[6] John A. Armstrong, *Ideology, Politics and Government in the Soviet Union*, 3rd ed. (London: Nelson, 1974), pp. 176-80.

[7] However, national communism kept resurfacing during the periods of liberalisation, as, for example, in the 1960s.

[8] However, Wilson has questioned the strength of the primordial ethnic Ukrainian identity. And if the population did not have a developed sense of ethnic belonging, how could it then be de-Ukrainised? See: Wilson, *Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1990s. A Minority Faith*, op.cit.

[9] For a more detailed discussion, see: Paul S. Pirie, 'National Identity and Politics in Southern and Eastern Ukraine', *Europe-Asia Studies*, vol. 48, no. 7 (November 1996), pp. 1079-104.

[10] See: T. Kuzio and A. Wilson, *Ukraine. From Perestroika to Independence* (London: Macmillan, New York: St. Martin's Press and Edmonton: Canadian Institute for Ukrainian Studies).

   The language issue is particularly complex in Ukraine. Russian and Ukrainian have common East Slavic roots and the majority of inhabitants of Ukraine can understand both Russian and Ukrainian, while 66 per cent of them considered Ukrainian to be their mother tongue in the 1989 census. However, one's definition of mother tongue is not necessarily the same as the language one feels most comfortable communicating in, or with which one identifies, and some researchers have adopted the category 'language of convenience' in surveys, in order to determine the size of the linguistic groups.[11] It was found that in eastern and southern Ukraine 81.5 per cent of the population uses Russian as their language of convenience. At the same time, however, it would be an oversimplification to assume that clearly identifiable, mutually exclusive and self-conscious groups of 'Russian speakers' and 'Ukrainian speakers' exist in Ukraine. In reality the situation is more complex because rather than clear groups, there is a continuum of language use with certain areas and people using a mixture of languages.[12] As both ethnic and linguistic groups are marked by fluid, blurred and overlapping boundaries, elaborating a framework for their incorporation into a political community presented one of the gravest challenges for the new state.

Creating Ukrainian Citizenship

The importance of creating Ukrainian citizenship can hardly be underestimated. Along with borders, state symbols, embassies and the army, it was a crucial attribute of the newly founded state. As a Ukrainian official recently asserted 'citizenship constitutes an intrinsic aspect of a state and its sovereignty, without which it cannot exist'.[13] Its significance can be seen in the fact that the first step towards greater autonomy, the Declaration of State Sovereignty adopted by the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet on 16 July 1990,[14] sought to outline its position on citizenship; this proved to be the most controversial point. At that time the Ukrainian parliament was divided between the Communist majority with 239 deputies, and the democratic opposition – the 'Narodna Rada'. The Communists had called for the dual citizenship of the Ukrainian SSR and the USSR, while the democratic opposition rejected this, arguing that it was legally contradictory. Eventually, a compro-

   [11] See: Dominique Arel and Valerii Khmelko, 'The Russian Factor and the Territorial Polarisation in Ukraine', *The Harriman Review*, no. 9 (March 1996). The language of convenience is defined as the language that respondents use in a survey interview at home when they are asked to use the language that they are most comfortable with.
   [12] For example, a hybrid of Russian and Ukrainian (*surzhik*) is widely spoken in Kyiv. Indeed, certain individuals might use a variety of languages in their everyday lives with different people in different contexts. The authors are indebted to Dr. S. Birch for the notion of a continuum of language use.
   [13] *Uryadovyi Kuryer*, 21 November 1996.
   [14] In essence, the declaration of sovereignty established the supremacy of the Ukrainian SSR laws over all-union laws but stopped well short of promoting full independence, or questioning Ukraine's membership of the USSR. It based its sovereignty on the existing Ukrainian SSR, and accepted its laws, borders and Constitution, and made no reference to links to any previous Ukrainian state. It also did not annul the 1922 Union Treaty. Although the declaration itself was merely a statement of intent and needed to be underpinned by legislation, nonetheless it was significant in providing the foundation for the subsequent declaration of independence and Constitution.

mise was worked out whereby citizens of the Ukrainian SSR had the right to retain their citizenship of the USSR. In fact this compromise remained rather ambiguous as the Ukrainian SSR and the USSR at this time were not separate legal bodies, and the USSR did not in fact exist independently of its 15 component republics, which included Ukraine. Effectively, the Declaration accepted the Ukrainian SSR Law on Citizenship as its basic position on citizenship and it went on to stress the equality before the law of all citizens regardless of origin, nationality, race, language, political views, religious beliefs, occupation, etc.[15]

On 24 August 1991, following the aborted coup in Moscow, the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet declared the independence of Ukraine. It established that only the Ukrainian Constitution, laws and decrees were valid on Ukrainian territory, with a referendum to be held on December 1 to affirm this Declaration. The Declaration made no explicit reference to citizenship, but the fact that Ukraine took this pivotal step towards its independence meant that the issue of citizenship had to be resolved within a short space of time. Six weeks later, on 8 October 1991, the Law on Citizenship was passed, at the same time as Ukraine refused to participate in All-Union political structures.[16] The Law adopted a territorial definition of citizenship, and membership of the new state was granted automatically to almost everyone who was living in Ukraine at the time the Law was passed (the so-called 'Zero Option').[17] It made it explicit that citizenship was granted irrespective of origin or status, nationality, race, sex, language, education, etc. Citizenship could be acquired by birth, if a parent or grandparent had been born in Ukraine, but the principle of descent was *territorial*, i.e. if one's parents were ethnic Russians and born in Ukraine, one would still have the right to claim citizenship. The Law on Citizenship made only one reference to – what could be tenuously defined as – ethnic attributes, stating that to become a Ukrainian citizen by naturalisation one must be able to communicate in Ukrainian at a basic level.[18]

The Ukrainian population confirmed the Declaration of Independence with a sweeping 90 per cent vote in favour in the referendum in December 1991. Effectively, the all-inclusive notion of citizenship became one of the fundamental attributes of the new state.[19] With no special privileges for people of Ukrainian ethnicity, there has been no basis for the formal exclusion of any category of the population from rights and benefits. No wonder that the Ukrainian political élites have been proud of their 'progressive', inclusive, non-discriminatory approach, which as they believe matches that of the modern, developed democratic states: 'The question of legal succession regarding citizenship was decided in Ukraine on de-

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[15] See: *The Ukrainian Review*, vol. 38, no. 3, 1990, pp. 69-71.

[16] See: *Pravda Ukrayiny*, 10 October 1991.

[17] Those excluded included people who committed crimes against humanity, and genocide or acts of violence towards the Ukrainian state.

[18] The ability to speak the language of the country concerned is, however, a common requirement which applicants for naturalisation have to satisfy.

[19] The Law 'On Changes Made to the Ukrainian Law "On Ukrainian Citizenship"' was adopted in April 1997. The amendments are not a radical departure from the 1991 law, they mainly elaborate and clarify certain procedural issues.

mocratic bases taking into account world experience', which effectively meant that 'overall people inhabiting Ukraine could accept the new independent Ukraine as their homeland more naturally and with less trauma'.[20] The assertion was that pluralistic citizenship would lead to the consolidation of the political community as 'a new civic nation-state based on territorial, not ethnic grounds'.[21]

Creating a Political Community:
Minorities and Language in Ukraine

This absence of ethnic criteria as a basis for citizenship was of particular importance in smoothing the process of international recognition of Ukraine and allaying the fears of the country's predominantly Russian-speaking population in the east and south, and the various ethnic minorities. However, at the same time there were also other, predominantly external, pressures at work. Russia put forward a programme to defend Russian(s') interests within the CIS, which raised fears among certain groups in Ukraine that this was an act of cultural aggression and that Russia still had political and cultural designs on Ukraine. Thus, the perceived pressure from Russia on Ukraine is counteracted by an emphasis on the distinctive, national character of the political community based on Ukrainian culture and language. Some believe that loyalty to the state based on a predominantly territorial identity is not enough to create the strong bonds of attachment within the political community needed to ensure the long-term integrity of the state and provide it with external legitimacy. Because of Ukraine's troubled history many ethnic Ukrainians do not have an enduring sense of their national identity, and a significant proportion regard Russian as their first language, particularly in the east and south. In contrast, some feel therefore that the state should put right what they perceive to be the consequences of centuries of oppression, and create the conditions necessary for the realisation of the linguistic and cultural 'potential' of the Ukrainian nation on the grounds that the Ukrainian state came into being, primarily, as a result of self-determination of the Ukrainian nation. There is a perceived need for the ethnic Ukrainian group to act as the 'foundation' around which a political community can be formed. As President Kravchuk stressed in 1992, all ethnic groups have to be included in the building of a civic nation, while the leading role of Ukrainians in the process of nation-state building has to be asserted.[22]

These competing pressures and agendas surfaced in the legislation on minorities and language. The various laws and declarations take the line that in Ukraine the political community is composed of multiple ethnic communities which are granted collective rights. However, the precise definitions of the political community, its constituent ethnic sub-communities and the very basis for granting those collective rights have evolved over time. Even the very question of 'Who are the minorities?' was, for a time, contested, although the resolution of this question is fundamental to deter-

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[20] Serhiy Tolstov, 'Dimensions of Inter-ethnic Relations in Ukraine', *The Ukrainian Review*, vol. 40, no. 2 (Summer 1993), p. 35.
[21] Ibid., p. 29.
[22] Ibid., p. 36.

mining the nature of political community in Ukraine, primarily because of the lack of congruence and indeed clarity of boundaries between ethnic and linguistic groups.

The Declaration of the Rights of National Minorities, issued by parliament on 1 November 1991, stressed the territorial principle of Ukraine's political community, stating that 'on the territory of Ukraine live citizens of over 100 nationalities, who together with ethnic Ukrainians make up the 52 million people of Ukraine' (*narod Ukrayiny*).[23] The Declaration put forward far-reaching rights for minorities, emphasised the government's commitment to providing equality for all citizens of Ukraine regardless of nationality, guaranteed all minorities the right to use their native language in all spheres of public life, including education, employment, the receiving and dissemination of information and stipulated that in areas of dense settlement of a national minority the language of that minority could function locally as a state language (Art.3). In addition to granting nationalities the free use of their language, the state took upon itself the obligation to create 'conditions suitable for the development of all national languages and cultures' (Art.2). Perhaps the most interesting point is that the Declaration granted citizens the free use of the Russian language, and permitted that within administrative-territorial units densely populated by members of several nationalities, *a language acceptable to that population* (sc. Russian) could function at a level equal to the state language. In addition, the Declaration included a general provision for the territorial autonomy of national minorities by guaranteeing the creation of national administrative units (Art.2). It is important to note that the Declaration was made just a month before the referendum on independence, and seems to have been part of a wider attempt to get all national groups to support the idea of Ukrainian independence and to convince them that they would have nothing to fear from an independent Ukrainian state.

The Law on National Minorities, which was adopted by the Supreme Rada on 25 June 1992, made the commitments of the pre-independence Declaration on Minorities law. In particular, this Law defines a 'national minority' as 'a group of citizens of Ukraine *who are not Ukrainian by nationality*, expressing a feeling of national self-consciousness and commonality amongst themselves' (Art. 3, our emphasis).[24] The Law thus adopts an ethnic principle for the recognition of minorities, rather than a linguistic one, and effectively one cannot be a member of a minority if one is Ukrainian.

The Law on National Minorities contained subtle, but significant changes from the Declaration of Minority Rights. For example the Declaration's general provision on the right of national minorities to territorial autonomy was not included in the Law. Also, the Law makes no mention of the right of free use of the Russian language by all citizens. The Law states that in areas where a national minority constitutes the majority of the overall population, then its language is permitted to function at a level equal to that of the state language, in the local area; (previously

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[23] See *Informatsiynyi Byuleten*, no. 2, June 1995, the Ministry for the Affairs of Nationalities, Migration and Cults, for the texts of the Declaration of Nationalities' Rights and the Law on National Minorities.

[24] It also put forward a voluntary principle of nationality, whereby citizens had the right to freely choose and revive their nationality.

in the Declaration, compact settlement was all that was necessary although the density was not specified). Thus, the right to use the Russian language as a state language was granted only in areas of dense settlement of ethnic Russians and not Russian speakers.

Language is significant in the context of citizenship because it is a part of the process of defining what it means to be a Ukrainian citizen, for example, the right to choose one's means of communication, and the right to use one's language freely, vs. the duty to respect the official language of the state. Effectively, the legislation, policies and public debate over what role languages should play in the new Ukrainian state touches on the status of various groups.

The 1989 Law on Language established Ukrainian as the sole state language[25] and put forward a time-scale for the introduction of Ukrainian in public spheres such as higher education and state administrative bodies. It also stated, however, that lack of knowledge of Ukrainian was *not sufficient grounds* for a person to be refused a job. At that time the Law was of symbolic rather than real significance, hence no real mechanisms for its implementation were put forward. From 1992 onwards, some progress was made with the implementation of the Law in Kyiv; however, the situation in the Kravchuk era was that while officially Ukrainian was the sole state language, it was accepted *de facto* that Russian would continue to be used in regions such as the east and south, and in effect little was done there to implement the Law on Language in full.[26] However, there has been considerable controversy and debate over whether Russian should be granted *official* status,[27] with some putting forward the view that the Russian language should have a special recognition by and within the state and not just be reduced to the status of a minority language. Political parties with their main power-base in southern and eastern Ukraine have called for official status for the Russian language (for example, the Communist Party, the Inter-regional Bloc for Reform), while some local authorities have declared Russian to be the official language on their territory. In reply, more nationalistically inclined politicians claim that the attempt to define Russian speakers as a distinctive minority group is tantamount to an attack on the Ukrainian nation.[28] The debate on language still continues, with Ukrainian nationalists criticising the slow pace of language reform in Ukraine, whilst other groups accused the state of forced Ukrainisation.[29]

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[25] For the full text of the law see: *Radyanska Ukrayina*, 3 November 1989.

[26] See: Dominique Arel, 'Language Politics in an Independent Ukraine: Towards One or Two State Languages', *Nationalities Papers*, vol. 23, no. 3, (September 1995).

[27] There has been considerable confusion as to what the 'state' and 'official' language should mean in practice and what the difference between them would be, see, for example, *Holos Ukrayiny*, 18 April 1994. The main essence of the debate in Ukraine was that although Ukrainian would be the state language, i.e. the symbolic language of the state, Russian would function as an official language, i.e. it could be used in the everyday life of the state, for example internally within organisations, enterprises, etc.

[28] For example, N. Porovskiy wrote of the attempts by enemies of Ukraine to show that a single Ukrainian nation did not exist by dividing it up into different regional and language groups (*Holos Ukrayiny*, 7 December 1995).

[29] The arguments put forward by proponents of Russian as an official language were that a majority of the population, including many ethnic minorities, use that language, and that in a democratic

While the notion of minorities has evolved in the aforesaid legislative acts, the new Ukrainian Constitution adopted in June 1996 implicitly confirmed a kind of hierarchy of 'constituent' communities forming the political community. The basic political community in Ukraine is described as the 'Ukrainian people' composed of 'citizens of Ukraine of all nationalities'. This political community is then made up of a hierarchy of different ethnic groups.

The Ukrainian People

> The Ukrainian Nation (*Natsiya*)
> The Indigenous Peoples
> National Minorities

1) The Ukrainian people comprises citizens of Ukraine.

2) The Ukrainian ethnic nation (*natsiya*). The Ukrainian nation is seen as having a special status in Ukraine, Article 11 of the Constitution summarises this: 'The state promotes the consolidation and development of the Ukrainian nation, of its historical consciousness, traditions and culture...'.

3) The indigenous peoples (*korinni natsiyi*). *Korinni natsiyi* are defined as minorities with no homelands outside Ukraine, and thus with a special kind of affiliation to the Ukrainian territory, and are to be granted extensive rights amounting to territorial autonomy.[30] A new law on indigenous peoples based on the Constitution (Art.93.2) is being drafted.

4) National minorities (with their respective homelands outside Ukraine) are granted the right to cultural autonomy (Art.10, 11, 53 and 119).[31]

Ukraine's stance on its minorities has evolved over time from a very vague but all-inclusive notion of minority rights, based on the notion of a territorial, multicultural political community in 1990, to one more clearly defined by 1996, differentiating as it does between groups. Ukraine seems to stand out as a somewhat paradoxical case because of this notion of some being 'more equal than others'. On the one hand, the fact that Ukraine is a multi-cultural society is not disputed. Ukrainians do not pretend to be the 'sole owners' of the state and national minori-

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Ukrainian state there should be freedom of language use. Opponents of official status for Russian argued that the predominance of the Russian language in Ukrainian society is artificial due to Russian colonisation and forced Russification, combined with active discrimination against the Ukrainian language in the past. They also argued that it threatened Ukrainian sovereignty, as Russian speakers are identified by some groups in the Russian Federation as 'Russians' who need Russian political and cultural protection, and that such arguments could be used to legitimise Russia's interference in Ukraine's domestic affairs. There is also the suspicion that Russian speakers are pro-Eurasian, and hence see a different future for Ukraine than the central élite and Ukrainian cultural intelligentsia.

[30] There are several indigenous peoples in Ukraine, mostly small groups such as the Karaims of Crimea. By far the most numerous are the Crimean Tatars, who were deported to Central Asia by Stalin for alleged collaboration with the Nazis during World War II, and who, since the mid-1980s, have been returning to Crimea.

[31] Popesku has suggested that the term 'indigenous' refers to both national minorities and peoples. However, the fact that the new law refers only to indigenous peoples would seem to discount this. See: *Holos Ukrayiny*, 3 December 1996.

ties have been recognised as state-constituting factors, as expressed in the first sentence of the new constitutional preamble. On the other hand, the emergent hierarchy of constituent communities differentiates between 'more' and 'less' indigenous groups (with ethnic Ukrainians belonging to the former), and different collective rights are granted accordingly. Such a multi-layered construction of the political community has diverse implications for various sections of society.

In particular, the rights of certain sections of the population, which cut across the formally sanctioned constituent communities have not been recognised. While the ethnic factor has been given full accreditation, the linguistic one has not. According to the Constitution, the state 'guarantees the free development, use and protection of Russian, [and] other languages of national minorities', nonetheless the state language is Ukrainian and the state 'guarantees the all round development and functioning of the Ukrainian language in all spheres of social life on all the territory of Ukraine' (Art.10). Hence, although Russian is specifically mentioned in the Constitution, it is effectively recognised only at the level of other minority languages, whereas the state has a special obligation to promote the Ukrainian language.

The Constitution was seen as a key factor in resolving the debate over language in Ukraine,[32] and the main question, once the Constitution was passed, was how the status of the Ukrainian language could be asserted in accordance with the Constitution and at what pace, without raising the fears of Russian speakers. It was felt that additional measures were needed, including a new law on language which would correspond more to the Constitution, and steps to promote the Ukrainisation of the mass media.[33] However, some local authorities have proclaimed Russian to be the state language on their territory alongside Ukrainian, while others have been very slow to implement Ukrainisation policies.[34] Also, some political organisations continue to voice opposition to the current state linguistic policies.[35] Finally, a lack of financial resources inhibits the implementation of such policies.

In the sphere of language, the Ukrainian state has again been caught in the dilemma of how to promote the consolidation of the Ukrainian ethnic group, while

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[32] For example, the Vice-Premier of Ukraine, I. Kuras, stressed that the Constitution had confirmed the status of Ukrainian as the state language, and that this must lead to an increase in the process of the introduction of Ukrainian as the state language (*Uryadovyi Kuryer*, 26 November 1996).

[33] *Ukrayina Moloda*, 28 December 1996.

[34] For example, in January 1997 Kharkiv city council declared that Russian would have equal status with Ukrainian in the city, and in March 1997 Donetsk regional council declared that Russian would have an equal status on its territory.

[35] For example, in Kharkiv a round table was organised by local representatives of the Civic Congress of Ukraine, and the Inter-regional Bloc for Reform, with representatives of the Communist and Socialist Parties, Slavic Unity, the National Cultural Society '*Rus*', trade unions, and the Union of Kharkiv Scientists were among those who attended. The organisers characterised the cultural and linguistic policies of the state as containing 'anti-democratic tendencies', and some speakers complained at what they perceived to be an attempt to annihilate the Russian language. The conference called for a clearer definition of the status of Russian at the state level, and argued that there would be negative consequences for the country if Russian was wiped out. As one speaker, the vice president of the regional civic congress organisation, A. Petukhov, put it 'a state which does not want to speak in the language of its citizens is criminal'. The round table was organised in response to a seminar which was held in Kyiv on the state language and the information space of Ukraine (*Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 8 May 1997).

at the same time respecting the rights of its national minorities and, of prime importance, not antagonising its Russophone citizens (whatever their ethnicity). President Kuchma summed up this dilemma when he said: 'Some complain about the slow pace [of the introduction of Ukrainian] – others about the artificial forcing of this process'.[36]

Conclusion

Multi-cultural citizenship, which separates ethnic and political identity, seems to be well suited to Ukrainian circumstances taking into account the multi-ethnic composition of its society. Thus, amongst post-Communist states, Ukraine has been praised for its progressive legislation on ethnic minorities, which declares the pluralist model of the state. The multi-ethnic Ukrainian state, where citizens are free to participate in their respective national/ethnic communities, has declared its aim to forge a new territorial, civic identity. But, at the same time, the construction of the political, non-ethnic nation is taking place, together with the assertion of the 'leading role of the eponymous majority'. In Ukraine this quandary has been resolved through a hierarchical framework of ethnic communities with differentiated rights, which together form the political community.

While ethnicity is recognised as a factor requiring protection, at the same time, the basic linguistic 'groups' (Russophones and Ukrainophones) which cut across constituent communities (ethnic Ukrainians and Russians) have not been formally recognised. And while ethnic minorities are guaranteed extensive minority rights and their duties are predominantly defined in terms of loyalty to the state, the obligation to cultivate and deepen Ukraine's cultural distinctiveness and sense of solidarity seems to fall on ethnic Ukrainians. And yet such a project may be as alien to ethnic (especially Russophone) Ukrainians as it is to ethnic minorities. Thus, rather than with minorities, the problem lies in defining the role and position, and effectively the obligations of members of the eponymous majority – the ethnic Ukrainians – to *'their'* state.

Even if 'linguistic' obligations are unlikely to be imposed efficiently in the near future,[37] practical limitations on political participation (mainly on the basis of a lack of competence in the Ukrainian language) cannot be ruled out, although it has to be stressed that at the moment it is not an impediment. Despite a historical tradition of ethnic tolerance and peaceful co-existence (most of the time), Ukraine's efforts to assert itself as a pluralistic nation-state may prove an unattainable ideal. And the underlying concern is that Ukraine may not live up to the high, pluralist standards, set in its legislation on minorities and the Constitution, since multi-cultural citizenship sits uneasily with asserting the role and ethnic revival of the Ukrainian nation. Ukraine is certainly not alone in being caught between conflicting agendas and pressures; however, it has to work out its own solution. The experience of other multi-national states with their particular historical, cultural and political con-

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[36] See: *Ukrayina Moloda*, 26 November 1996.
[37] Dominique Arel pointed to a very slow pace of Ukrainisation of education in 'A Lurking Cascade of Assimilation in Kiev?', *Post-Soviet Affairs*, vol. 12, no. 1 (1996), pp. 73-90.

junctions, indicates that no universal solution exists. And Kymlicka and Norman believe that 'it might be a mistake to suppose that one could develop a general theory about the role of either a common citizenship identity or a differentiated citizenship identity in promoting or hindering national unity'.[38]

When considering citizenship policies, one has to appreciate that the Ukrainian state is still highly amorphous and weak, and that Ukrainian society is highly fragmented. This makes the implementation of *any* policy, such as, for example, the fostering of a positive civic identity 'Ukraine as a homeland', or the pursuing of systematic 'Ukrainisation', difficult. There are also many other areas of citizenship still awaiting resolution in Ukraine, including migration legislation and the position of stateless persons (as seen from the difficulties encountered by the Crimean Tatars returning to the Crimean peninsula).

In our paper, we have considered the basic legal and political aspects of building the state as a community of equal citizens. Accordingly, we have concentrated here on the basic issues of ethnicity and language. Obviously, as in any community, there also exist other, less explicit, determinants of 'inclusion' and 'exclusion', such as gender, religion, etc. These, however, must remain a subject for future research.   ❏

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[38] Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman, 'Return of the Citizen: A Survey of Recent Work on Citizenship Theory', in Ronald Beiner (ed.), *Theorising Citizenship* (State University of New York Press, 1995), p. 309.

History

Contemporary English Accounts
of the Polish-Cossack Wars

Theodore Mackiw

I n 1648, during the closing days of the Thirty Years' War (1618-48), in Ukraine[1] the Cossacks rebelled and rose up against the Kingdom of Poland. The direct cause of this uprising was the personal grievance of the Cossack Captain, Bohdan Khmelnytskyi. Finding no justice, outraged and robbed of his possessions, Khmelnytskyi fled and joined the Zaporozhian Cossacks, who elected him their hetman.[2] To ensure military success and preclude any surprises from the rear, he concluded an alliance with the Crimean Tatars to gain military support. Now he was in a position to take vengeance, which developed into war against Poland (1648-67).[3]

This insurrection was an extraordinary event, which has no parallel in the rest of Europe at that time, with the exception of that of Holland against Spain (the Eighty Years' War – 1568-1648), which was not on the same level and took place under different circumstances. In 1648 the Cossacks tried to rebuild the social structure in Ukraine, on new, egalitarian principles. The struggle for national liberation by the Ukrainian people marked the failure of efforts to reform the structure of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth into a federation of three nations: the Poles, the Lithu-

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[1] Although the term Ukraine existed in the seventeenth century, it is, strictly speaking, anachronistic to speak of a Ukrainian nation at that time. Nevertheless, the term is used in this article to avoid ambiguity. For the normal terms were 'Rus'' (Ruthenia) and 'Rusyny'. But the precise meaning of these terms was fluid. 'Rus'' as a collective noun could be used in the Ukrainian lands to refer to the Orthodox faithful, the faithful of the Eastern Church (both Uniate and Orthodox Rus'), or ethnic Ukrainians and Belarusians who shared a common cultural-linguistic-historical heritage. The plural proper noun 'Rusyny' also covered the same range of meanings. In addition, Rus' as a geographical term referred to the Rus' palatinate, and also was used in various ways to describe a people, a culture, a faith, and a territory. For discussion see: Frank E. Sysyn, 'Ukrainian-Polish Relations in the Seventeenth Century', in Peter Potichnyj (ed.), *Poland and Ukraine: Past and Present* (Edmonton-Toronto: The Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1980), pp. 59-83.

[2] 'Hetman' derives from the old German 'Hoeftmann', which translated means Commander-in-Chief and was the official title of chief executive of the autonomous Ukrainian Military Republic (the Hetmanate, 1649-1764).

[3] There exists an extensive scholarly literature on Khmelnytskyi. The most important works are Mykhailo Hrushevskyi, *Istoriya Ukrainy-Rusy*, reprint, vols. I-X (New York, 1954-58), VIII, (2), pp. 151-65, also his *A History of Ukraine*, translated by O. J. Frederiksen (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948), pp. 277-318; Frank E. Sysyn *Between Poland and Ukraine. The Dilemma of Adam Kysil, 1600-1653* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 1985), pp. 319-21; George Vernadsky, *Bohdan: Hetman of Ukraine* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1941); Ivan Krypyakevych, *Bohdan Khmelnytskyi*, 2nd ed. (Lviv: Vyd. 'Svit', 1990); Janusz Kaczmarczyk, *Bohdan Chmielnicki* (Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 1988); Orest Subtelny, *Ukraine. A History* (Toronto: University Press, 1988), pp. 125–28; Dymitri Zlepko, *Der grosse Kosakenaufstand*, Ph.D. dissertation, Munich University (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrasowitz, 1988).

anians and the East-Slavonic 'Ruthenians'. The Ukrainian-Polish wars inflicted ir-reparable damage on the Commonwealth, which ended in the partition of Poland a century later. Moreover, the struggle of the Ukrainian people for freedom trans-ferred Ukraine from the Polish to the Russian orbit.[4]

Because Poland did not implement the terms of the peace treaties which ended this war – the Treaties of Zboriv (1649)[5] and Bila Tserkva (1651) – Khmel-nytskyi was forced to seek an alliance with Russia, which was concluded on 18 January 1654 in the city of Pereyaslav. This treaty, normally called the Treaty of Pereyaslav (although it should perhaps rather be called the Treaty of Moscow, since a draft of the Cossack terms was sent to the Russian capital, where after two weeks of negotiations it was accepted by the Tsar), was worded in so vague a manner that the two sides interpreted them in a fundamentally different way. From the Russian point of view, the Tsar, 'taking Ukraine under his lofty hand', turned the protectorate into annexation to Russia. The Hetman and his associates (*starshyna*), on the other hand, considered the Tsar's 'protection' simply as a military alliance in the war against Poland.[6]

Having concluded this alliance, the Hetman believed that the Cossacks would govern Ukraine according to long-established customs, and Moscow would assume the functions hitherto held by the Polish authorities. When, however, Moscow began to install military governors in Ukraine and attempted to collect taxes, the Cossack officers felt that there was no room for a foreign power. This caused con-fusion and irritation in Ukraine. The Hetman disapproved of Russian encroachment on Ukrainian autonomy by introducing Russian military governors in the Ukrainian cities and believed that for the best interests of his country he would have to break off relations with Moscow. However, his death on 6 August (NS) 1657 prevented a formal break.

The Cossack insurrection and wars against Poland aroused a great deal of in-terest in Europe. It was a sort of sensation, especially since the Cossacks allied with the 'infidel' Moslems, who were considered the prime enemy of Christi-anity. These events were frequently reported in the European press.

Accounts of the campaign were also published in England. Embryonic news-media were just beginning to emerge at this time in the form of broadsheets, newsletters and pamphlets, which dealt mainly with foreign events.

Publications such as *The Publick Intelligencer...*, *The Mercurius Politicus...*, *The Moderate Intelligencer...*, *A Briefe Relation...*, and others scrupulously re-ported the Cossack insurrection in the Kingdom of Poland. Thus, for example, *The Moderate Intelligencer* of 4 May 1648 (No. 163), using information from Danzig of 1 April 1648, reported that '... a great number of Cosaques of Sapo-

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[4] Ivan L. Rudnytsky, 'Polish-Ukrainian Relations: The Burden of History', Potichnyj, *Poland and Ukraine: Past and Present*, op. cit., pp. 10-11.

[5] For details see: T. Mackiw, 'Ukrainian-Polish Peace Treaty of Zboriv in the English and German Press of 1649 and Its Background', *The Ukrainian Review*, vol. 40, no. 2, Summer 1992, pp. 12-22, and vol. 40, no. 3, Autumn 1992, pp. 24-36.

[6] The various interpretations of the Treaty of Pereyaslav are summarised in John Basarab, *Pereiaslav 1654: A Historiographical Study* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1982).

roski being assembled together, after the beating of certaine Polonian Troops, were withdrawen into place between two Rivers…'. The same weekly of 4 October 1649 (No. 237) and *A Briefe Relation…* of 16 October 1649 (No. 3) published the terms of the Peace Treaty of Zboriv, which was concluded on 18 August 1649. The latter account described even the siege of the city of Zbarazh and the battle of the city of Zboriv.[7]

One particularly interesting account is the report in *The Publick Intelligencer* (18-25 January 1658, No. 118)[8] of the hostile reception of the Muscovite envoy, Artimon Matveev, at the residence of Khmelnytskyi's successor, Hetman Ivan Vyhovskyi, on 12 September 1657, based on information received from Koenigsberg dated 31 December 1658. This is of importance, not only for its intrinsic content, but because it closely parallels the account in the journal of a Ukrainian nobleman, Yakym Yerlych, resident at that time in Kyiv. *The Publick Intelligencer* account reads:

> … We are certified by a very good hand, a person that arrived here lately out of Moscovia, relating… that the Czar had dispatched his Ambassador to the General of the Cossacks, with these Articles; demanding. 1. That he should not bring above ten thousand men into the field. 2. That he should receive but ten thousand gilders for his pay *per annum*. 3. That the revenues and customes for the Brandewine and strong-water should belong and accrue to the Czar. 4. That the Generals Son should be sent into Moscovia to be informed in the doctrine of the Greek Religion. 5. That all the lands and possessions belonging to the nobility of the Cossacks should be yielded up to the Czar, and that every one should betake himself to their plough and tilage. 6. That they should submit themselves to his Patriarke, and kiss together one cross. Whereupon the said Ambassador received a suitable answer from the said General, who stroke him with a Polaxe into his face, saying unto him: Go and tell the Czar, that we have thus far assisted and carryed him into the Land of Lithuania, and that we can and will expell him again out of the same.

Likewise, according to Yerlych, when the Tsar learned of Khmelnytskyi's death (6 August 1657), he sent his envoy in September 1657 to Hetman Vyhovskyi with the following demands:

1. that the Cossacks recognise his [the Tsar's] appointee as the hetman,
2. that Muscovite commanders be in all cities and towns,
3. that all the taxes be delivered to the Tsar's treasury,
4. that Khmelnytskyi's son with his father's assets be sent to Moscow,
5. that the number of the Cossacks be limited to 12,000,
6. that the Cossacks pay for the lodging of Muscovite troops as they had paid for the Polish ones.

These demands upset the Cossacks so much that they beat the Tsar's envoy with their fists and shouted 'The same may happen to your Tsar. Khmelnytskyi, who took the oath, is dead and so his oath is dead'.[9]

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[7] See: Mackiw, 'Ukrainian-Polish Peace Treaty of Zboriv…', loc. cit.

[8] i.e. 1659 by the modern reckoning. Prior to the calendar reform of 1752, the year in England began on 25 March.

[9] K.W. Wójcicki (ed.), *Latopisiec albo kroniczka Joachima Jerlicza* (Warsaw, 1853), II, pp. 5-6.

The content and form (six points) of the report in *The Moderate Intelligencer* resemble strongly those of Yerlych's diary. All the more so, since both contain a motif which seems rather to reflect Yerlych's personal outlook than historical exactness. For it seems somewhat unlikely that the Cossacks, however angry, would have gone so far as to beat the Tsar's envoy, since such an act would have had serious diplomatic and political consequences.

Yerlych's account of the Cossacks' reactions is clearly coloured by his personal views. It is, however, quite credible that the Hetman called the Cossacks together during the envoy's stay, so that he could observe for himself their reaction to the Tsar's demands. These demands, we may note, were discussed by the Cossack Council on 25 September 1657 in the city of Korsun.[10]

In short, in spite of the undoubted bias of Yerlych's account, its content and form (the six points) is so similar to that of *The Publick Intelligencer* that one may with some justification postulate that it was the original source of the English account.   ❑

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[10] I.B. Grekov, *Iz istorii sovmestnoi borby Ukrainy i Rossii za osuschestvlenie reshenii Pereyaslavskoi rady (1657-1659 gg.). Vossoyedinenie Ukrainy s Rossiyey 1654-1954. Sbornik statey* (Moscow, 1954), pp. 318-19.

Metropolitan Isidore and the Union of Florence

Yuriy Peleshenko

The figure of Metropolitan Isidore – a notable churchman, humanist and writer – has long attracted the interest of historians and literary specialists alike. Although much has been written on his life and works by both Ukrainian and foreign scholars, no definitive work on this notable Ukrainian churchman has yet appeared. To date, most researchers have been influenced in their treatment of Isidore by their own personal adherence to one or another Christian denomination, which imparts to their works a certain subjectivity. We, however, shall try to give an objective assessment of the activities of this remarkable metropolitan in the history of the Ukrainian Church, basing ourselves on all available sources.

Isidore was born in the town of Monemvasía in the southern Peloponnesus in c. 1380-90, where, most probably, he entered the Monastery of St Michael and the Holy Angels.[1] The sources indicate that he came from an ordinary family but possessed extraordinary natural abilities, which ultimately brought him to Constantinople. There Isidore was appointed Abbot of the Monastery of St Demetrius, which had considerable influence within the Patriarchate of Constantinople. As holder of this high office, he was in a position of significant influence at the imperial court. According to certain sources, he was, for some time, Bishop of Solun.[2]

From Isidore's surviving letters,[3] we know that he was highly-educated and distinguished for his magnanimity of character and humanist outlook. He was truly captivated by 'harmony of phrases, seemliness of pronunciation, the power of the word and liveliness of thought',[4] often citing classical writers, who enriched his writings with images drawn from classical mythology. In his texts we find references to the gods of ancient Greece, the muses, the sirens, nectar and ambrosia. In his epistles to Guarino from Verona he writes that it is difficult for him to tear himself away from his beloved books, mentioning the works of Xenophon, Lucian and Athenaeus. The style of Isidore's epistles is extraordinarily expressive and emotional: if he cannot visit his friends, then he will sit somewhere on a bank and shed tears over his memories of conversations with them; but these moments of happiness are as short-lived as the tender flowers of spring. Following the literary etiquette of the time, Isidore constantly apologises for his inability to find a suitable phrase or image. He was very attracted to the idea of journeys to distant lands; he calls Manuel Chrysoloras who had been to France, Spain and Britain 'lucky'. On his own travels, during a short stay in Al-

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[1] Yosyf, Archbishop-Metropolitan, 'Tvorche oblychchya i hrib Kyivskoho mytropolyta i Tsarhorodskoho patriyarkha card. Isydora', *Bohosloviya*, vol. 25-28 (Rome, 1964), p. 2.

[2] Ibid, p. 9.

[3] For the text, see G. Regel, *Analecta Byzantino-Russica* (St Petersburg, 1891), pp. xxxviii, 59.

[4] O. Pirling, *Rossiya i papskiy prestol*, Book 1, Russkie i Florentiyskiy sobor (Moscow, 1912), p. 48.

bania, Isidore visited ancient monuments and took an interest in the ethnography of the Albanians. In his letters, the author writes in a straightforward manner, communicating with the Byzantine Emperor and high-ranking prelates as with equals. At the same time, he speaks out in defence of the poor and unfortunate, and appeals for pity, justice and Christian love towards one's fellow man.[5]

In 1430 Isidore drew up a memorandum[6] on the need to convene a Universal Council to remove the differences between the Western and Eastern churches, and effect reconciliation between Christian peoples.[7] At the present time, it is somewhat difficult to determine the internal reasons for this. Isidore may have been guided by the words of Jesus Christ on the unity of the church: 'There will be one flock and One Shepherd' (John: 10,16). It is likely that as a humanist he was fairly tolerant towards the difference between the two tendencies of Christianity. However, political motives may well have been predominant:[8] the Ottoman Turks had already occupied Bulgaria, defeated the Serbian army at Kosovo Polje, and were drawing an ever tighter circle around Constantinople. Certainly, it was the latter motive which determined the actions of the Byzantine Emperor John VIII Palaeologus, who was seeking aid from Western Europe as the price of such a union. He managed to get a cleric who shared this view elected Ecumenical Patriarch – Joseph II.[9]

Rome went to meet Constantinople half-way. Pope Martin V (d. 1431) and his successor, Eugene IV, began negotiations with Byzantium on the union of the churches. On 27 August 1431 a Council of the Catholic Church opened in Basle.[10] Initially, the participants of the Council of Basle were fairly sceptical of the attempts to unite the Western and Eastern churches, but after Pope Eugene IV had achieved certain successes in his negotiations with the Greeks, the mood of the Council changed, and the Catholic hierarchy, without even informing the Pope (who was then in Italy), dispatched their representatives to Constantinople. Emperor John VIII Palaeologus extended a warm welcome to the delegation from the Council of Basle, and immediately sent a Byzantine legation to Switzerland, in which Isidore had a place of honour.[11] On 15 October 1433 John Palaeologus and Patriarch Joseph II signed an epistle to Pope Eugene IV and the Council of Basle, in which they asked for negotiations on union to commence.

The Greek delegates arrived in Basle in July 1434. The chairman, Cardinal-legate Giuliano Caesarini, welcomed them, expressing the thought that the difference between the Catholics and Orthodox lies only in purely formal matters.

Isidore spoke on behalf of the Orthodox delegation, attempting to show by examples from history all the damage which had been caused by the hostility bet-

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[5] Ibid, pp. 48-51.

[6] For the text, see G. Mercati, *Scritti d'Icidoro il cardinale Ruteno.* (Studii e Tecti, N. 46) (Rome, 1926), pp. 161-63.

[7] Rev. M. Vavryk, 'Kardynal Isydor', *Materiyaly do istoriyi ukrayinskoyi tserkvy. Naukovi zapysky Ukrayinskoho vilnoho universytetu* (Munich-Rome-Paris, 1969), vol. 9-10, p. 51.

[8] A. Ziegler, *Die Union des Konzils von Florens in der russischen Kirche* (Würzburg), pp. 70-71.

[9] I. Vlasovskyi, *Narys istoriyi ukrayinskoyi pravoslavnoyi tserkvy* (New York-Kyiv-South Bound Brook, 1990), vol. 1, p. 116.

[10] J. Haller, *Concillium Basiliense. Studien und Dokumente* (Basle, 1896).

[11] Pirling, op. cit., pp. 46-48.

ween these two branches of Christianity and all the advantages which could be gained from reconciliation between them. Supporting the view of Cardinal Caesarini, Isidore stressed the insignificance of the causes which had brought about the schism in the Christian church. In his address, Isidore also alluded to the Kyivan Metropolitanate which it would be important to bring into union, too.[12] The restoration of peace between East and West, he believed, is the erection of a grand monument which will overshadow the Colossus of Rhodes. Its top will reach the heavens, and with its lustre it will cover the whole world, declared the representative of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in his peroration.[13] The Orthodox and Catholic sides reached a consensus that the best course towards union could be only a Universal Council. For the time being, the question of where it would be held was left open. On 7 September 1434, during a solemn session in the cathedral, the decree 'Sicut pia mater' was adopted and ratified by all the participants of the Council (including Isidore). However, the text of the decree had one faux pas: the fathers of the Council declared that having finished with the Hussites, they now aspired to settle old accounts with the Greeks. The Orthodox were thus classified together with heretics.

In Constantinople this was taken as an insult and the text of the decree had to be edited. The Catholic Church agreed to make the necessary changes, and the new version was adopted unanimously. However, despite the error made in Basle, Isidore continued to enjoy the trust of the Byzantine Emperor and the Patriarch of Constantinople.[14]

Negotiations between Byzantium and the West regarding the venue for the future Council continued until the end of 1435, when both sides agreed to hold it in the Italian town of Ferrara.[15]

In the years that followed, Isidore's activities were closely connected with Ukraine, the major part of which was incorporated in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, while Galicia formed part of the Kingdom of Poland.

The Metropolitan of Kyiv and All Rus', Photius, died in 1431. One of the candidates for the Metropolitanate was Bishop Herasym of Smolensk (previously of Volodymyr), who, in 1432, on the instructions of Grand Duke Svidrigailo of Lithuania, went to Constantinople to be consecrated. After his ordination by Patriarch Joseph II, Herasym held the Metropolitanate of Kyiv up to 26 July 1435, when he was burnt at the stake in Viciebsk on the orders of Svidrigailo, who accused him of treason as an accomplice of Sigismund Kejstutowicz, who had seized the throne of the Grand Duchy in Vilnius in September 1432.[16]

After Herasym's death, Moscow, with the consent of the Grand Duke of Lithuania, selected as a candidate for the Metropolitanate Bishop Iona of Ryazan and

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[12] Vavryk, op. cit., p. 52.
[13] See, Pirling, op. cit., pp. 51-52.
[14] Ibid, pp. 52-57.
[15] E. Golubinskiy, *Istoriya russkoy tserkvi*, vol. 2, first half of the volume (Moscow, 1900), p. 241.
[16] See, *Polnoe sobranie russkikh letopisey* (hereafter *PSRL*) (St Petersburg, 1850), vol. 5, p. 28; Golubinskiy, op. cit., p. 418; M. Hrushevskyi, *Istoriya Ukrayiny-Rusy*, vol. 4 (Kyiv, 1993), pp. 204, 217-18; vol. 5 (Kyiv, 1994), p. 404.

Murom, who soon afterwards went to Constantinople to be enthroned.[17] However, at some time in mid-1436, the Ecumenical Patriarch, Joseph II, without consulting either Moscow or the Grand Duke of Lithuania, installed Isidore as Metropolitan of Kyiv, a see which then included all the Orthodox eparchies in the Slavonic East.[18] The consecration of Isidore was obviously part of the Byzantine plan for a union between the Western and Eastern Christian churches with the participation of the eparchies of Ukraine, Belarus and the Grand Duchy of Moscow.

Isidore, Bishop Iona and the delegates of the Byzantine Emperor and the Grand Prince of Moscow, Vasiliy II Vasilievich, arrived in Moscow on 2 April 1437. The Nikon Chronicle describes this event as follows: 'The same spring on Tuesday of the Easter Holy Week, Metropolitan Isidore the Greek came to the Moscow Metropolitanate from Patriarch Iosif of Constantinople… '.[19] This Chronicle states that Isidore 'knew many languages and was a learned scholar',[20] while the Hustyn Chronicle states specifically that the Metropolitan 'was well-versed in the [holy] scriptures'.[21]

Initially, Grand Prince Vasiliy did not wish to receive the new Metropolitan, since he was most probably annoyed with Patriarch Joseph II and Emperor John VIII Palaeologus for ignoring his candidate, Iona. At least one can deduce this from Vasiliy's letter to Joseph II's successor as Patriarch of Constantinople, Mitrophanes.[22] But Isidore was a wise man possessed of diplomatic skills, probably knew the Slavonic language, and was able to communicate with the Grand Prince without an interpreter (hence it is not surprising that the Hustyn Chronicle refers to him as a Bulgarian).[23] Moreover, the Emperor's legate had petitioned the Grand Prince on Isidore's behalf and the new Metropolitan had the Patriarch's blessing. Vasiliy did not want to quarrel with Byzantium and so, in the end, he conceded, 'all right, we will accept him'.[24] Later he adopted a favourable stance towards Isidore: 'When we were compelled to submit to Isidore's authority, many bowed low before him and received him as a father and a teacher with great honour and good will, as we had with our former Metropolitans of Rus', thinking that he was one of us, too, not knowing then what he intended to do'.[25] The Nikon Chronicle also corroborates the fact that Isidore was given a solemn welcome: '… He was received with honour by Grand Prince Vasiliy Vasilievich; a service was conducted in the holy Cathedral Church of the Most Pure Mother of God, and Grand Prince Vasiliy Vasilievich held a banquet and gave him [Isidore] many fine gifts'.[26]

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[17] *Akty istoricheskie, sobrannye i izdannye arkheograficheskoyu komissieyu*, vol. 1 (St Petersburg, 1841), p. 84.
[18] Hrushevskyi, op. cit., vol. 5, pp. 404-5; Vlasovskyi, op. cit., pp. 115-16.
[19] *PSRL*, vol. 5, p. 123.
[20] Ibid.
[21] *PSRL* (St Petersburg, 1843), vol. 2, p. 354.
[22] See, *Akty istoricheskie*, vol. 1, no. 39, p. 73.
[23] *PSRL*, vol. 2, p. 354.
[24] *Akty istoricheskie*, vol. 1, no. 39, p. 73.
[25] Ibid.
[26] *PSRL*, vol. 5, p. 123.

After remaining in Moscow for five months, on 8 September 1437 (the Feast of the Nativity of the Blessed Virgin Mary)[27] Metropolitan Isidore set off for the Council of Ferrara. According to Isidore's companion, Simeon of Suzdal, the Metropolitan, when preparing for the journey, had promised the Grand Prince to 'affirm the faith and unite the church in Orthodoxy'.[28] It seems highly likely that during his stay in Moscow Isidore had obtained the full consent of the Grand Prince for his participation in the inter-church Council, as is corroborated by Vasiliy's efforts to ensure that the Muscovite church would be represented with dignity. The Metropolitan left for the Council with an entourage of over one hundred people. According to certain sources, while in Constantinople, Isidore had been instructed to bring bishops from his metropolitanate to Ferrara.[29] In actual fact, however, the delegation included only one bishop, Avramiy of Suzdal, together with a number of priests and monks; certain other bishops took part in a solemn ceremony of farewell.[30]

From Moscow Isidore travelled to Riga, with fairly lengthy halts in major towns on the way. On 14 September he arrived in Tver, where he remained for nine days, being made welcome by Prince Boris, Bishop Illya, the boyars and the common people. A solemn reception for Isidore was held by the higher lay and clerical authorities in Novgorod and Pskov.[31] The people of Novgorod donated money for his travelling expenses and for the assistance of the Greek archbishops.[32]

At the mouth of the Emajõgi in the town of Kospyr (Verbek) Isidore was met by the Catholic Bishop of Yuryev 'with great honour'.[33] In Yuryev (Dorpat, Derpt, Tartu), a solemn welcome was organised for the Kyivan Metropolitan by the people of the town, led by clergy of both confessions. Here Isidore greatly surprised the Orthodox, by first honouring the cross carried by the Catholics, and only then that carried by his fellow-Orthodox, and immediately following the Catholic cross into the Catholic church.[34]

Riga, where Isidore arrived on 4 February 1438, also staged a splendid welcome for him.[35] He stayed there for eight weeks, conducting negotiations with Grand Duke Sigismund regarding his further journey to Ukraine, Belarus and Lithuania. Sigismund was obviously somewhat critical of the idea of union, and considerable divergences developed between his views and Isidore's. This was probably the reason that Isidore refused to allow representatives of the Ukrainian-Belarusian church to participate, and on 5 May 1439 left Riga for the German town of Lübeck.[36]

[27] 'Khozhdennie mitropolita Isidora na Florentiyskiy sobor', *Concilium Florentinum. Documenta et scriptores*, vol. 11. Acta Slavica Concilii Florentini. Narrationes et documenta (Rome, 1976), p. 7.

[28] 'Povist svyashchennoinoka Simeona suzhdaltsa, kako rimskiy papa Evhe… … sostavlyal osmyi sobor so svoimi yedinomysleniki', *Concilium Florentinum*, op. cit., p. 80.

[29] A.V. Gorskiy, I.N. Ostroumov, *Istoriya Florentiyskogo sobora* (Moscow, 1847), pp. 31-32.

[30] *PSRL* vol. 5, p. 127; Golubinskiy, op. cit., pp. 431-33.

[31] 'Khozhdennie mitropolita Isidora…', pp. 7-9.

[32] *PSRL*, vol. 5, p. 127.

[33] 'Khozhdennie mitropolita Isidora…', p. 10.

[34] A.V. Kartashev, *Ocherki po istorii russkoy tserkvi*, vol. 1 (Paris, 1959), p. 351.

[35] 'Khozhdennie mitropolita Isidora…', pp. 11-12.

[36] Hrushevskyi, op. cit., vol. 5, p. 520; Buchynskyi, B., 'Studiyi z istoriyi tserkovnoyi uniyi'. I.

Isidore and his entourage spent almost the entire summer on their journey through Germany, Austria and Italy. From Lubeck their route lay through Leipzig, Bamberg, Nuremberg, Innsbruck, Trento and Padua. Finally, on 18 August 1438, Isidore arrived in Ferrara,[37] having been on the road for eleven months and ten days.

The Byzantine delegation, headed by Emperor John VIII Palaeologus, arrived in Ferrara much earlier (4 March), followed shortly afterwards by Patriarch Joseph. However, the Council did not begin immediately, inasmuch as, according to Simeon of Suzdal, the Greeks were waiting for Isidore, whom 'greater than all... [they] considered a great philosopher'.[38]

In actual fact, this was not the true reason for the delay. As already noted, the Byzantine Emperor was hoping that, once the churches were united, he would receive military and political support from West European rulers against the Turkish onslaught, and this meant that the lay rulers or their representatives had to be present at the Council. But, at that time, they all supported the Council of Basle, which was opposed to Pope Eugene IV, and in making preparations to reform the Catholic Church, considered the authority of the Ecumenical Council higher than that of the Pope. John VIII Palaeologus demanded that the Pope summon to Ferrara the kings or their representatives, and Eugene IV promised to send legates for them. It was thus decided to postpone the solemnities and review of the key questions of the union of the churches for four months, and in the meantime, not to waste time, to deal with the theological problems.[39]

On the Wednesday in Holy Week, 9 April 1438, Pope Eugene IV opened the Council of Ferrara. Twelve theologians each from the Western and the Eastern churches spent four months trying to resolve various points of dogma which were a cause of contention between the two Christian confessions.[40]

However, the Pope, the Patriarch of Constantinople, and the Byzantine Emperor waited for the lay rulers in vain. They never arrived. Finally, on 8 October 1438 the solemn session of the Ecumenical Council began. But the meetings held at Ferrara were essentially fruitless; the theologians of both sides, East and West, simply defended their own dogmas and would not compromise.

On 10 January 1439 a papal Bull was read in the cathedral of Ferrara, transferring the sessions to Florence. Officially, the reason for the change of venue was an outbreak of plague in Ferrara. Another version alleges that the wealthy burghers of Florence promised Eugene IV a loan of 40,000 ducats on condition that the Council be transferred to their city.

After a short break, the sessions resumed in Florence on 26 February 1439,[41] and continued, without result, until 24 March. Then the Pope told Patriarch Joseph II that by Easter (5 April) the representatives of the Eastern church should either agree to accept the teachings of the Western church or else go home.[42]

Isydorova uniya' *Zapysky Naukovoho tovarystva imeni Shevchenka* (hereafter *ZNTSh*), vol. 85 (1908), book 5, pp. 21-23; Vavryk, op. cit., p. 52.

[37] 'Khozhdennie mitropolita Isidora...', pp. 13-21; Ziegler, op. cit., pp. 81-85.

[38] 'Isidorov sobor i khozhenie yeho', *Concilium Florentinum*, vol. 11.

[39] Gorskiy, Ostroumov, op. cit., p. 49.

[40] A. Volkonskiy, *Katolichestvo i svyashchennoe predanie Vostoka* (Paris, 1933), p. 356.

[41] Gorskiy, Ostroumov, op. cit., p. 104.

[42] Ibid, p. 133.

Isidore took almost no part in the discussions; the main disputants were Mark of Ephesus (the co-adjutor and nominated successor of the Patriarch of Antioch) and Bessarion of Nicaea. But at the first meeting of the Orthodox after the Pope's ultimatum, Isidore said: 'It is better to unite in soul and heart with the Latins than to return with the matter unfinished; we can, naturally, return, but how are we to return, where, when?'. In other words, he meant that they could return but that this would bury any hope of saving Byzantium. Isidore had the support of Bessarion of Nicaea. Dositheus of Monemvasía, on the other hand, stated resolutely that he was prepared to die rather than to accept the Latin faith.[43] Then Pope Eugene IV and the Byzantine Emperor decided to prolong the discussions, which therefore continued until the end of May.

On Whit Sunday (27 May) the Pope invited all the Eastern bishops to his palace, reminded them of his efforts to unite the churches, his own concessions, the far-too-dilatory resolution of so important an issue by the Orthodox, and urged them to make every effort to reach church unity. Speaking on behalf of the whole Orthodox hierarchy, Metropolitan Isidore agreed with what the Pope had said, but stressed that they had all put in a great deal of work, and that 'all great issues require time and long meditation'.[44]

After his audience with the Pope, Isidore together with the Metropolitans of Nicaea, Lacedamonia (Sparta) and Mitylene went to the Byzantine Emperor and stated resolutely that if he, the Emperor, did not want union with Rome, then they would enter into such a union without him. These words had a great influence on the Emperor, who then summoned the bishops to a meeting.

The following day, 28 May, Emperor John VIII Palaeologus opened the said meeting and made a speech stressing the need for peace between the confessions. The most senior prelates declared an anathema on all who did not strive for union.[45] Isidore, supporting the desire for union, noted that all 'doubts and indecisiveness stem only from the division in which both churches presently find themselves', and stressed that: 'We have researched and compared the writings of the Western fathers, and saw that they are in full conformity with the writings of our fathers'. But it could be no other way, he continued, since, 'both the former and the latter spoke under the inspiration of one and the same Holy Spirit'.[46] But, nevertheless, some considerable time elapsed before the Orthodox bishops consented to union with Rome.

The work of the Council of Florence was interrupted by the death of Patriarch Joseph II on 10 June 1439. In expectation of imminent death, he left his last epistle to the Emperor, in which he noted that 'everything to which the Catholic and Apostolic Church adheres and teaches, I myself confess and accept in full'. The Patriarch recognised the Pope as the 'Father of fathers', Supreme Archbishop and Vicar of Christ.[47]

[43] Ibid, pp. 137-38.
[44] A. Volkonskiy, *Katolichestvo i svyashchennoye predanie Vostoka*, p. 361.
[45] Gorskiy, Ostroumov, op. cit., p. 151.
[46] Volkonskiy, op. cit., p. 362.
[47] Ibid, p. 364.

Isidore, who had great authority among the bishops, was able to overcome their stubbornness and doubts, and to convince the Orthodox delegation to agree to union with the Western church. The importance of Isidore's role at the Council of Florence is shown by the fact that, after the death of Joseph II, he was regarded as a likely candidate for the office of Ecumenical Patriarch.[48] Moreover, according to Simeon of Suzdal, Pope Eugene IV 'loved Metropolitan Isidore more than all'.[49]

On 25 June the Council of Basle (which the Catholic Church later declared to be uncanonical) condemned Pope Eugene IV as a heretic for failing to acknowledge the supremacy of the Ecumenical Council over the authority of the papacy, and declared him deposed. Eugene ignored their decision and together with all the other participants of the Council of Florence continued to work on resolving the points of contention between the Western and Eastern churches.

Finally, on 6 July 1439 a charter was officially promulgated on the union of the Orthodox and Catholic churches.[50] The Union of Florence declared that the Holy Spirit proceeds 'from the Father through the Son' (*ex Patre per Filium*), that during communion the priest may use unleavened or leavened bread (each following the traditions of his own church); the doctrine of Purgatory and the primacy of the Pope were acknowledged. The charter (Bull) was signed by Pope Eugene IV, Emperor John VIII Palaeologus, Metropolitan of Kyiv and all Rus' Isidor, and other church hierarchs who had participated in the Council of Florence. The only prelate to refuse to sign the act of union and who remained intractable in his defence of the traditional dogmas of the Orthodox church was Metropolitan Mark of Ephesus. Finally, Pope Eugene IV officiated at a liturgy held in the presence of the Eastern and Western clergy.

Shortly after, the delegates of the Council began to depart. Isidore and his entourage left Florence on 6 September, and nine days later reached Venice, where the Greek delegation, headed by the Byzantine Emperor, had already arrived.[51]

In Venice Isidore received a charter from the Pope, appointing him a cardinal and giving him the title of apostolic legate 'for Lithuania, Livonia, all Rus' and Poland'.[52]

Simeon of Suzdal states that Eugene IV gave Isidore 'much gold'.[53] But this does not mean that the latter was suborned in this way. Golubinskiy is completely justified in his belief that this was not a bribe but a loan from Florentine bankers which Isidore secured with the assistance of the Pope.[54] The Metropolitan required money, presumably just for his travelling expenses, and the Pope was not wealthy enough to offer a bribe sufficient to tempt a person who received tribute from all the churches in the Kyivan Metropolitanate.

[48] D.J. Geanekoples, 'The Council of Florence (1438-1439) and the Problem of Union Between the Greek and Latin Churches', *Church History* (New York, 1955), vol. 24, pp. 334-35.

[49] 'Povist svyashchennoinoka Simeona suzhdaltsa...', p. 90.

[50] For the test, see, *Drevnerusskiy tekst gramoty Florentiyskogo sobora* (Florence, 1971); J. Pitzipios, *L'Eglise Orientale*. 2. La réunion des deux Eglises (Rome, 1955), pp. 37-40; 'Textus Slavicus Bullae Unionis', *Concilium Florentinum*, vol. 11, pp. 129-35.

[51] 'Povist svyashchennoinoka Simeona suzhdaltsa...', p. 96.

[52] For the text, see, A. Theiner, *Vetera Monumenta Poloniae et Lithuaniae gentiumque finitimarum historiam illustrantia* (Rome, 1861), vol. 2, p. 41.

[53] 'Povist svyashchennoinoka Simeona suzhdaltsa...', p. 99.

[54] Golubinskiy, op. cit., vol. 2, first part of the volume, p. 441-42.

Isidore remained in Venice for over four months, visiting numerous Catholic churches, where he 'knelt' according to the Latin custom. There he had some kind of misunderstanding with Foma (Thomas) – the legate from Tver – and Simeon of Suzdal, so that the two of them fled from him to Moscow.[55]

On 22 December 1439 Isidore travelled by ship to the Croatian town of Senj, from where, via Zagreb, he headed for Buda, arriving in the Hungarian capital on 5 March 1440.[56]

While in Buda, Isidore issued a charter entitled: 'Epistle to the Polish and Lithuanian and German land and to all Rus'',[57] which outlines the fundamental principles of the treaty between the representatives of the Western and Eastern churches. Urging all the peoples of both rites to 'rejoice and be glad', Isidore proposes that Christians of the Greek rite should visit Catholic churches, make confession to Latin priests and receive communion from them, and that Christians of the Roman rite should do the converse. The epistle states clearly that the Orthodox and Catholic rites are equally holy, that there is no difference between the Greek and 'Latin' churches, 'which are now as one'.[58]

Therefore, as Hrushevskyi points out, Metropolitan Isidore understood the Union in the fullest and most radical meaning: all differences between the Eastern and Western churches had disappeared, and the rite itself was no longer of significance.[59] According to numerous documents,[60] Isidore himself acted according to this view, officiating at services in Latin churches according to the Eastern rite and taking part in those of the Latin clergy.

On 10 March 1440 Isidore and his entourage left the Hungarian capital for Poland. On 25 March the delegation of the Kyivan Metropolitan arrived in Sącz, where it was given a hospitable welcome by the Bishop of Cracow, Cardinal Zbigniew Oleśnicki.[61] From there the Metropolitan headed for Lviv, via Cracow, Tarnów, and Peremyshl. In Cracow Isidore met the Polish King, Władysław III, and his brother Casimir; there he also celebrated a mass according to the Greek rite in the Catholic cathedral,[62] and in Tarnów consecrated a Catholic church together with the Roman Catholic bishop.[63]

In Lviv the Ukrainian townspeople met Isidore quite coldly. According to the Ukrainian-Polish historian of the seventeenth century, Yuriy Varfolomey Zymoro-

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[55] 'Povist svyashchennoinoka Simeona suzhdaltsa…', p. 96.

[56] 'Khozhdennie mitropolita Isidora…', pp. 35-39.

[57] For the text, see, I. Franko, *Zibrannya tvoriv: U 50-ty t.* (Kyiv, 1983), vol. 40, pp. 213-14; *PSRL* (St Petersburg, 1853), vol. 6, p. 159; 'Litterae Encyclicae Isidori Metropolitae Budae, die 5 Martii 1440 datae', *Concilium Florentinum*, vol. 9, pp. 140-42.

[58] Ibid, p. 141.

[59] Hrushevskyi, op. cit., vol. 5, p. 522; J. Gill, s.j., 'Isidore's encyclical letter from Buda', *34CBB*, series II, vol. 4/10, 1st edition (Rome, 1963), pp. 1-8.

[60] Franko, op. cit., vol. 40, pp. 214-15; *Isidorov sobor i khozhenie yego*, p. 68.

[61] 'Khozhdennie mitropolita Isidora…', pp. 39-40; Golubinskiy, op. cit., vol. 2, 1st half, p. 445; Yosyf-Archbishop-Metropolitan, op. cit., p. 4.

[61] Golubinskiy, op. cit., vol. 2, 1st half, p. 446.

[62] Golubinskiy, op. cit, p. 446.

[63] A. Petrushevych, 'O sobornoy Bogorodichnoy tserkvi i svyatitelyakh v Galichi', *Galitskiy istoricheskiy sbornik* (Lviv, 1860), 3rd edition, p. 126.

vych, the people of Lviv did not want to attend services conducted by the Metropolitan of Kyiv.[64] Their attitude towards him can be explained as a protest against the Union and as evidence that the Ukrainians of Lviv, who were constantly harassed by the city authorities who consisted almost entirely of German-Catholic burghers, did not believe that the union of the churches would change anything.[65]

Isidore remained almost two months in Lviv and Halych, until 10 July 1440, and then proceeded, via Belz and Hrubeshiv, to Kholm,[66] where on 27 July 1440 he issued the 'Letter of Isidore Cardinal Metropolitan of Kyiv, Halych and all Rus'', written to the *Starosta* (castellan) of Kholm,[67] in which he asks the *starostas* and *voivodes* (palatines) of the town not to insult the priest Vavyla, who had complained to Isidore about persecution on the part of the local authorities, and the attempt to confiscate church land and property from him. This charter is, so far as we know, the first documentary evidence declaring the inviolability of the church property of the Ukrainian clergy following the signing of the Union with Rome. 'And we – as Orthodox Christians, Polish and Rus' – stand ready to be partakers of the Church of God and its priests, and not to grieve [the Holy Spirit]; for we are now, by the gift of God, one brotherhood of Christians – Latins and Rus'',[68] Isidore addressed the *Voivode* of Kholm, Hrytsko Kerdeyevych,[69] and the *starostas*, underlining the equality of the Christians of both rites and the declared unity of the Christian church. These words from the charter could be explained as meaning that the people of Kholm tried to confiscate the land from the priest Vavyla because he had recognised the Union, although, according to Golubinskiy, this is unlikely.[70]

On the morning of 28 July 1440 Isidore and his entourage departed, travelling via Volodava, Brest, Vaukavisk, Trakai to Vilnius, where he arrived on 13 or 14 August.[71] In the capital of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania Metropolitan Isidore may have tried to win support from the authorities for the establishment of the Union of Florence in the Ukrainian and Belarusian lands. But circumstances here were unfavourable to Isidore. Neither the lay nor the church authorities were sympathetic towards the Union.

On 6 March 1440 King Władysław III of Poland was elected King of Hungary as well. And, although, as has already been mentioned, he met the Kyivan Metropolitan in Cracow, it was unlikely that he was then giving much thought to church matters, preoccupied as he was with the problem 'of his new Hungarian kingdom'.[72] On 20 March 1440 a plot of the Lithuanian aristocracy resulted in the

[64] Ibid; Hrushevskyi, op. cit., vol. 5, p. 525.

[65] See, M. Chubatyi, 'Mytropolyt Isydor v perelomovyi moment v istoriyi ukrayinskoho narodu', *Bohosloviya*, vol. 25-26 (Rome, 1964), p. 28.

[66] 'Khozhdennie mitropolita Isidora...', p. 41.

[67] For the text, see, O. Bodyanskiy, 'O poiskakh moikh v Poznanskoy biblioteke', *Chtenie v obshchestve istorii i drevnostey rossiyskikh* (1846), no. 1, part. 1, pp. 13-14; 'List Isidora do starosty kholmskoho', *Concilium Florentinum*, vol. 9, pp. 144-45.

[68] Ibid, p. 145.

[69] Buchynskyi, op. cit., pp. 30-31.

[70] Golubinskiy, op. cit., vol. 2, 1st half, p. 45.

[71] 'Khozhdennie mitropolita Isidora...', p. 42.

[72] Hrushevskyi, op. cit., vol. 5, p. 523.

murder of Grand Duke Sigismund.[73] His successor, Casimir, did not feel too confident on the throne and was either unable or unwilling to interfere in such matters as the union of the churches.

The Roman Catholic hierarchy in Poland and Lithuania in general disapproved of the very fact of the Union of Ferrara-Florence. The local Latin clergy, naturally, was not against the idea of a union of the churches, but did not want the one signed by Isidore, which gave equal status to the Eastern and Western rites.[74] 'Poland wanted a union with the introduction of the Latin rite', wrote the Polish historian, A. Lewicki.[75] The second factor determining the negative attitude of the Catholic clergy towards the Union was that the Polish-Lithuanian hierarchy did not recognise either of the two claimants to the papacy, Eugene IV and Felix V, preserving their neutrality on this issue. Hence, formally, they could not accept the Union from a Pope whom they did not officially recognise. Then, in the spring of 1441, they openly went over to the side of the anti-Pope, Felix V, elected at the Council of Basle, which in turn did not recognise the Council of Ferrara-Florence and Eugene IV.[76] The Catholic Bishop of Vilnius, Matthias, an ardent supporter of the Council of Basle, showed himself openly hostile to Isidore, and forbade him to conduct a service in the Vilnius cathedral. In due course, Isidore complained to the Pope about him and a certain Archbishop Hening, saying that they were intriguing and inciting the people against him.[77]

At virtually the same time, the representatives of Moscow at the Council of Florence were passing through Belarus on their way home. They had a negative attitude towards the Union which had been signed there and, while passing through the territory of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, made no secret of their opinions.[78]

At the beginning of 1441 Isidore visited Kyiv. Here, during a service in the Cathedral of St Sophia, he prayed for the Pope, in effect propagating the idea of the Union.[79] The Grand Prince of Kyiv, Oleksander (Olelko) Volodymyrovych, on 5 February 1441, issued a charter to Isidore,[80] recognising him as the Metropolitan of Kyiv and all Rus'. Olelko granted Isidore the right to the Cathedral of St Sophia, all church property and the metropolitan tribute and consistory court. Characteristically, the charter did not refer to Isidore as a cardinal and legate, and there was not even a hint of the Union of Florence. Thus in Kyiv Isidore was recognised as the legitimate Metropolitan, but the fact of the union of the churches was ignored. Moreover, the Hustyn Chronicle states that Isidore in the vestments

[73] Ibid, vol. 4, pp. 229-30.

[74] Chubatyi, op. cit., p. 28.

[75] A. Lewicki, 'Unia Florencka w Polsce', *Rozprawy Wydzialu hist.-filosoficznego Akademiji Umiejetnocśi w Krakowie*, vol. 38 (1899).

[76] *PSRL*, vol. 2, p. 356; Hrushevskyi, op. cit., vol. 5, pp. 523-25; N. Polonska-Vasylenko, *Istoriya Ukrayiny*, vol. 1 (Kyiv, 1992), p. 329; O. Halecki, 'From Florence to Brest', *Sacrum Polonica Millennium*, vol. 5 (Rome, 1958), pp. 46-65.

[77] Hrushevskyi, op. cit., vol. 5, p. 524.

[78] Buchynskyi, op. cit., pp. 32-33.

[79] Ibid, p. 34.

[80] For the text, see, *Akty istoricheskie* (St Petersburg, 1846), vol. 1, p. 488.

of a cardinal 'was banished' from Kyiv.[81] However, it is unlikely that such an incident ever occurred.

The Prince of Smolensk, Yuriy Luhvenovych, also received Isidore favourably, and arrested and handed over to him his former companion and author of the account of the journey to the Council of Florence, Simeon of Suzdal, who had run away from him.[82] However, there is no concrete information concerning the position of Prince Yuriy and the other Ukrainian and Belarusian rulers to the Union of Florence in 1440-41. One may conclude that in Ukraine and Belarus (with the exception of Lviv) Isidore was in general welcomed hospitably, although his adherence to the Union and the fact that he was a cardinal were ignored.

On his return from Florence, Metropolitan Isidore remained in Ukraine, Belarus and Lithuania for around eleven months, after which he set off for Moscow, where he arrived on 19 March 1441.

Initially, in Moscow Isidore was seemingly recognised as 'our father Metropolitan of Kyiv and all Rus''.[83] As the papal legate and cardinal, Isidore entered the Cathedral of the Dormition in the Kremlin with a Latin crucifix. (Let us note that on a Latin crucifix the feet of the Saviour are generally shown laid one on top of the other and secured with a single nail, and not with two, as on the Orthodox crucifix; furthermore, Latin crucifixes normally do not have the arms of Christ extended at right-angles, but inclined, so that He is suspended by them). In this Cathedral the Metropolitan first held a service of intercession for the Grand Prince of Moscow and all Orthodox Christians, and then a mass during which he mentioned the name of Pope Eugene IV in the litanies. After the service, his archdeacon read the charter of the Council of Florence, and then handed to Grand Prince Vasiliy the charter from the Pope which asked the Prince to help implement the union of the churches. After that the prince, bishops and boyars were so confused that the latter were unable to advise Vasiliy what to do in the situation. The Chronicle says thus about this event: 'All the princes, boyars and many others said nothing, and moreover all the Rus' bishops remained silent; [it was as if they] dozed and slept'.[84] Therefore the apparent apathy of the clergy on such an important issue may be explained as their reluctance to introduce a system under which the Grand Prince could on his own direct the appointment of metropolitans.[85]

The Grand Prince thought over the situation for three days, and on the fourth issued an order for Isidore to be arrested, declared a heretic and handed over to the consistory court.[86]

This account from the Chronicle about Isidore's arrival in Moscow does not entirely correspond to historical fact and was most probably written at some later

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[81] *PSRL*, vol. 2, p. 355.

[82] See, A.S. Pavlov, 'Kriticheskie opyty po istorii drevnegrecheskoy polemiki protiv latynyan', *XIX Otchet Akademii Nauk o prisuzhdenii Uvarovskikh nagrad* (1878), p. 206.

[83] *Dogovornye i dukhovnye gramoty velikikh i udelnykh knyazey XIV-XVI vv.* (Moscow-Leningrad, 1950), no. 37.

[84] *PSRL*, vol. 5, p. 153.

[85] See, A.M. Sakharov, 'Tserkov i obrazovanie russkogo tsentralizovannogo gosudarstva', *Voprosy istorii* (1966), no. 1, p. 55; N.S. Borisov, *Russkaya tserkov v politicheskoy borbe XIV-XV vekov* (Moscow, 1986), pp. 142-44.

[86] Golubinskiy, op. cit, pp. 452-55; Bachynskyi, op. cit., p. 37.

date. As already mentioned, Isidore remained in Ukraine, Belarus and Lithuania for almost a year, by which time in Moscow they must surely have learned about the act of Union of the churches. Even more so, since Bishop Avramiy, who had arrived in Florence on 14 September 1440, and the legate Foma had already been able to report about Isidore and his activity.[87] At that time, too, information possibly arrived from Constantinople that many Greek bishops had protested against the Union with Rome and had even refused to concelebrate the liturgy with the Patriarch of Constantinople, Mitrophanes, elected on 4 May 1440.[88] There is also information that the monks of Mount Athos likewise protested against the Union, although representatives of several monasteries on Athos had signed the act of Union in Florence.[89] Therefore one may assume that the decision to arrest Isidore had been made in advance.

On the fourth day Isidore was arrested in the Chudovo monastery. Of course, it was illegal to arrest the Metropolitan of Kyiv and all Rus' in this way. Therefore Grand Prince Vasiliy convened a council of bishops, archimandrites, abbots and all the clergy and instructed this council to persuade Isidore to renounce the Union and repent. The Metropolitan refused.[90] After spending several months under guard, on the night of 15 September 1441 Isidore escaped and fled to Tver, where Prince Borys also arrested him. Only during Lent 1442 did the Prince of Tver release him (or facilitate his escape), and Isidore left for Novahrudak, where the Grand Duke of Lithuania, Casimir, was in residence.[91]

Isidore probably realised the dangers awaiting him in Moscow, and so refrained from returning there for a long time. By now he realised that it would be difficult to implement the Union in the Muscovite lands, since, as even the Russian historian A. Kartashev recognises, in the Muscovite state ignorance had inculcated a particular view of the purity of Orthodoxy, and externals had become confused with the inner content of Christianity.[92] This, too, was the outlook of Grand Prince Vasiliy. In his letter to Patriarch Mitrophanes of Constantinople, he wrote about the departure of Isidore from the Orthodox faith, his recognition of the supremacy of the Pope, use of a Latin crucifix, etc., and asked the Patriarch to appoint a new metropolitan from among his own people.[93]

Grand Prince Vasiliy's letter, his attitude towards Isidore and aversion to everything foreign shows that Moscow was moving spiritually further and further away not only from the West but also from Byzantium. According to Hrushevskyi, Moscow was simply waiting for the first opportunity to secede from the subordination of its hierarchy to the Patriarch.[94] Having renounced Isidore, Moscow was also fencing itself off from the Patriarch of Constantinople, who togeth-

[87] Ibid, p. 453.
[88] Gorskiy, Ostroumov, op. cit., pp. 183-87.
[89] Golubinskiy, op. cit., p. 456.
[90] *PSRL*, vol. 5, pp. 156-57.
[91] Pirling, op. cit., pp. 101-2; Golubinskiy, op. cit., pp. 256-58; Buchynskyi, op. cit., p. 116.
[92] Kartashev, op. cit., p. 368.
[93] For the text, see, *Akty istoricheskie*, pp. 71-75.
[94] Hrushevskyi, op. cit., vol. 5, p. 525.

er with Isidore had recognised the Union. Thus the Muscovite Grand Prince and clergy were now creating within their territories what they considered to be the only true Orthodox church.[95]

In the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, where Isidore arrived in the spring of 1442, the religious-political situation was also unfavourable to him. Grand Duke Casimir and the Latin clergy openly sided with the Council of Basle and Anti-Pope Felix V.[96] This meant that in Lithuania and the Kingdom of Poland no one regarded Isidore as a papal legate, and, consequently, the attitude of the lay authorities and the Roman Catholics towards him was negative. Nonetheless, Isidore stayed on in Ukraine and Belarus for a whole year. There he carried out the functions of a metropolitan, including, probably, the consecration of the Bishop of Kholm, Hryhoriy.[97]

Gradually, the religious-political situation in Ukraine began to change in Isidore's favour. On 22 March 1443 King Władysław III of Poland issued a charter[98] in Buda, in which he expressed his great joy in the long-awaited and now finally signed Union with the 'holy Roman and Universal church', and also granted equal rights to the Orthodox and Catholic clergy. He guaranteed 'to all churches and their bishops and prelates and clergy and other ecclesiastical ranks of Greek and Rus' piety, we allow all former rights, liberties, rites, customs and every freedom for all time'.[99]

This charter represented the first acknowledgement of Pope Eugene IV by the lay authorities. However, on 10 November 1444 Władysław III was killed at the Battle of Varna against the Turks, and it was not until 1447, when Casimir became King of Poland, that the local Catholic hierarchy recognised Eugene IV as the legitimate Pope.[100]

In the meantime, Isidore set off for Italy. On 11 July 1443 thirty cardinals met him in Sienna and escorted him to the palace of Eugene IV. The Pope received him in the presence of the whole consistory, and four days later Isidore was installed as a new member of the Sacred College.[101]

As has already been stated, there were various reactions in Byzantium to the Union of Florence. In spite of the official support of the Emperor, his brother, Constantine, and the new Patriarch, Mitrophanes, the adherents of the Union had little support among the people. Opposition to the Union was headed by the Despot Demetrius (the Emperor's brother), Metropolitan Mark of Ephesus and Henadiy Slokhariy (in religion, George), the future Ecumenical Patriarch (elected in 1453). The monks of Mounts Athos and Sinai did not approve of the Union of Florence either.[102] In April 1443 the Eastern Patriarchs, Joachim of Jerusalem,

[95] Ibid, pp. 525-26; Buchynskyi, op. cit., pp. 38-39; Chubatyi, op. cit., p. 30; M. Cherniavsky, 'The Reception of the Council of Florence in Moscow', *Church History* (New York, 1955), vol. 24, pp. 347-59.
[96] *PSRL*, vol. 2, p. 356.
[97] Buchynskyi, op. cit., p. 41.
[98] For the text, see, *Akty... Zapadnoy Rossii*, vol. 1, no. 42, pp. 56-57.
[99] Ibid, p. 56.
[100] Hrushevskyi, op. cit., vol. 5, p. 527.
[101] Pirling, op. cit., pp. 104-5.
[102] See, Gorskiy, Ostroumov, op. cit., pp. 190-91.

Philotheus of Alexandria and Dorotheus of Antioch, in a universal charter issued in Jerusalem, condemned the 'unclean' Council of Florence, Patriarch Mitrophanes of Constantinople and the bishops installed by him. Then on 1 August 1443 Mitrophanes died and Eugene IV decided to try somehow to repair the situation in Byzantium with the help of Isidore.

The Pope gave Isidore a mission 'to Greece and Rus'', and confirmed him in the office of legate. And on 28 August 1443 Isidore set off for the Byzantine capital.[103]

On 7 July 1445 Gregory III Mammas, who had taken part in the Council of Florence, became Patriarch of Constantinople. It is possible that he would not have been elected without Isidore.

Certain Roman sources state that in the summer of 1447 Isidore visited Kyiv.[104] However, there are no records of his presence in Ukraine at this time, and it is possible that he simply made preparations to visit Kyiv, but in the end did not go there.[105]

In the meantime, in Ukraine (at least in Volhynia) Isidore continued to be regarded as Metropolitan. During his stay in Constantinople, he, together with Patriarch Gregory III, ordained Danylo Bishop of Volodymyr and Brest.[106] There is information that in certain Ukrainian-Belarusian eparchies the name of Patriarch Gregory III was mentioned in the liturgy,[107] and on this basis, certainly, Isidore as well.

But the fact of Isidore's rejection by Moscow also had its effects in Ukraine and Belarus. Grand Prince Olelko of Kyiv, the brother-in-law of Muscovite Grand Prince Vasiliy, must have been aware of the religious-political situation in Moscow. Although Ukraine and Belarus recognised Isidore as the legitimate Metropolitan, nevertheless, many people shrank from committing themselves to the Union, remaining in what Hrushevskyi calls 'deadly passivity' – in actual fact ignoring it.[108] There is evidence that in 1446-48 Olelko asked pro-Union Patriarch Gregory III about the nature of the Union of Florence, stressing that in Ukraine it was causing much discord and conflict.[109]

Gregory III's reply to Olelko, dated 26 June 1447,[110] has survived. In it the Patriarch briefly recounts the content of the treaty between the Eastern and Western churches, its bases in canon law and dogma, and then leaves all other matters to Isidore: 'And when he comes to you… Metropolitan Isidore of Kyiv and all Rus'… will teach and show you in all words and deeds'.[111] The Patriarch of Constantinople also warns Olelko about certain metropolitans, bishops and icons, and asks the Grand Prince not to accept them. One cannot rule out that, in the words of B. Buchynskyi, 'errant

[103] B. Buchynskyi, 'Studiyi z istoriyi tserkovnoyi uniyi. II. Isydorova uniya', *ZNTSh*, vol. 86 (1908), book 6, pp. 6-7.
[104] Pirling, op. cit., p. 107; Buchynskyi, op. cit., II, p. 7; Yosyf Archbishop-Metropolitan, op. cit., p. 6.
[105] See, Hrushevskyi, op. cit., vol. 5, p. 527.
[106] Ibid, p. 528.
[107] Rev. M. Vavryk, 'Florentiyski uniyni tradytsiyi v Kyivskiy mytropoliyi 1450-60', *Zapysky ChSVV*, series II, vol. 4/10, 3rd-4th edition (Rome, 1963), pp. 341-43; Vavryk, 'Kardynal Isydor…', op. cit., p. 55.
[108] Hrushevskyi, op. cit., vol. 5, pp. 527-28.
[109] 'Litterae Gregorii III…', *Concilium Florentinum*, vol. 11, pp. 147-48; Hrushevskyi, op. cit. vol. 5, p. 528; Buchynskyi, op. cit., II, p. 8.
[110] For the text, see: A. Popov, *Istoriko-literaturnyi obzor drevnerusskikh polemicheskikh sochineniy protiv latynyan* (Moscow, 1875), pp. 332-34; *Concilium Florentium*, op. cit., pp. 147-49.
[111] Ibid., p. 148.

Greek bishops'[112] appeared in Ukraine and agitated against the Union. Strong anti-Union propaganda was being put out by the supporters of Metropolitan Mark of Ephesus as well as from Moldova and Moscow.[113]

Meanwhile, on 23 February 1447 Pope Eugene IV died, after which Isidore returned to Rome. Neither Patriarch Gregory III nor Isidore were able to break the resistance of the opponents of the Union. On 31 October 1448 Emperor John VIII Palaeologus died, but before his death he had renounced the Union.[114] Soon afterwards, in the Cathedral of St Sophia in Constantinople, a council was held, presided over by the Patriarchs of the East, who deposed Patriarch Gregory III and installed the Orthodox Athanasius in his place.[115] Shortly after, Gregory III Mammas departed for Rome.

After their rejection of Isidore, the Muscovite bishops seceded from the jurisdiction of the Patriarch of Constantinople and the metropolitan see of Kyiv was declared vacant.

On 5 December 1448 a council in Moscow unanimously elected Bishop Iona of Ryazan and Murom Metropolitan of all Rus'. The latter then issued a charter, the 'Epistle of Metropolitan Iona of Kyiv and all Rus' to Lithuania, to princes, lords, boyars, chief officials and governors, about [his] consecration to the Metropolitanate',[116] informing them of this event, and stressing that 'when Constantinople was Orthodox,... we received the [patriarchal] blessing and Metropolitan from there'.[117] Iona probably wanted by this letter to set himself right in the eyes of Ukraine and Belarus since he had been installed without patriarchal blessing, and to attempt to spread his authority to the parishes of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. This, too, was the aim of his charter of 31 January 1451 to Olelko ('Epistle from Iona Metropolitan to Prince Oleksander Volodymyrovych, in Kyiv'),[118] in which, alluding to history, Iona reminds the Prince of times past when Kyiv independently consecrated its own metropolitans and asks Olelko to defend the Orthodox faith. Iona's epistles to some extent achieved their aim: he succeeded in bringing to his side the lords of the council of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the feudal princes.[119]

The Grand Duke (King Casimir IV of Poland), who had certain obligations towards Iona,[120] now (31 January 1451) gave the latter the Orthodox eparchies of Ukraine and Belarus. In the charter,[121] ratifying Iona's rights, Casimir exhorted the princes, bishops and all the people of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania to respect

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[112] Buchynskyi, op. cit., II, p. 8.

[113] Vavryk, 'Kardynal Isydor...', op. cit., p. 54.

[114] Gorskiy, Ostroumov, op. cit., p. 197.

[115] Ibid, pp. 198-99.

[116] For the text, see: *Russkaya istoricheskaya biblioteka*, vol. 6, Pamyatniki drevnerusskogo kanonicheskogo prava, part 1 (St Petersburg, 1880), no. 64, pp. 539-42.

[117] Ibid, p. 540.

[118] For the text, see: ibid, pp. 555-64.

[119] Buchynskyi, op. cit., II, p. 18.

[120] Hrushevskyi, op. cit., vol. 5, p.528.

[121] For the text, see: *Akty istoricheskie...*, vol. 1, no. 42, pp. 85-86; *Russkaya istoricheskaya biblioteka*, vol. 6, no. 67, pp. 563-66.

the new Metropolitan, like those prelates who preceded him. Those present at the meeting in Vilnius which took this decision, included, in addition to members of the council of the Grand Duchy, Duke Svidrigailo, Olelko Volodymyrovych and a known enemy of Isidore, the Roman Catholic Bishop of Vilnius, Matthias.[122] Clearly, it was no coincidence that Olelko and Svidrigailo happened to be in Vilnius at that time: they were there as representatives of the princes of the Kyiv region and Volhynia, and it was they that probably carried the greatest weight regarding the recognition of Iona as Metropolitan. It is unlikely that Casimir would have countenanced his recognition if it did not have the support of the local princes and 'if he himself did not regard the issue of the Union as lost, still-born'.[123] The participation of Bishop Matthias in this action can only corroborate the view of Lewicki that the Roman clergy was opposed in principle to the Union, inasmuch as it maintained the difference between the Western and Eastern rites.[124]

The last bishop who still, probably, supported Isidore was Danylo, the Bishop of Volodymyr and Brest, whom Isidore had consecrated in Constantinople. But, on 28 October 1452, even Danylo renounced Isidore, the Pope and the Union of Florence, and acknowledged the jurisdiction of Iona.[125]

Thus the transfer of the Ukrainian-Belarusian church to the jurisdiction of the Orthodox Metropolitan during the lifetime of Isidore shows the total lack of support in the mid-fifteenth century for the idea of the subordination of the Eastern Christian church of Ukraine and Belarus to Rome. As Hrushevskyi pointed out, no one protested against the Union, but neither did they change their position towards the Latin church.[126] Polish historian Jan Długosz, a contemporary of these events, wrote: 'The union of the Latin church with the Greek lasted a very short while, for the Greeks and Rus', who were not present during its formation, mocked it and took it lightly'.[127]

What transpired in Vilnius was, as Ziegler pertinently observed,[128] a stab in the back to the very idea of the Union of Florence and the life credo of Isidore, who accused Bishop Matthias of depriving him of his eparchies. Cardinal Oleśnicki, however, defended Matthias before the Pope, stating that Isidore had been deprived of his see by the lay authorities.[129]

On 8 February 1451 Pope Nicholas V (1447-55) named Isidore Bishop of Sabina, and on 18 June gave him the eparchy of Cherviy. At the same time Isidore was granted the right to church lands in Bologna and Ferrara; and on 13 September a pension of 500 ducats was allocated to him.[130]

[122] Ibid, p. 566.
[123] Hrushevskyi, op. cit., vol. 5, p. 528.
[124] Lewicki, op. cit.
[125] 'Rukopisanie Danila yepiskopa', *Russkaya istoricheskaya biblioteka*, vol. 6, p. 585-88; *Concilium Florentinum*, vol. 11, pp. 151-54.
[126] Hrushevskyi, op. cit., vol. 5, p. 529.
[127] Ibid, p. 525.
[128] Ziegler, op. cit., p. 122.
[129] Pirling, op. cit., p. 110.
[130] Ibid, p. 111.

On 20 May 1452 Isidore left for Constantinople to conduct further negotiations on the Union. On 12 December 1452 in the Cathedral of St Sophia he solemnly read the act of the Union of Florence, following which he concelebrated a liturgy with Roman Catholic priests, during which he mentioned Pope Nicholas V and Patriarch Gregory III in the litanies.[131] But although the Byzantine Emperor, Constantine XI Palaeologus, supported the Union, the majority of the people were against it: Constantinople was split into two parties. Thus, weakened by religious conflict, the city could not long endure against the huge Turkish army. On 29 May 1453 Constantinople fell to the Ottomans.[132]

The Turks searched for Isidore in the captured city but he managed to escape. Isidore recounted the story of his rescue to the Sienese legate in Venice, Leonardo Benvolienti. On entering Constantinople, Sultan Mahomet II immediately demanded the head of the Metropolitan-Cardinal. Isidore's friends brought the Sultan the head of some other man, on which they had placed a red hat. However, the Metropolitan had secretly left Constantinople, and arrived in Crete on 7 July 1453. From there he wrote a letter to the Pope, warning the Christian world of the danger from the East. Isidore describes the number of Turks, speculates as to their intentions regarding Hungary and Italy, and proposes the organisation of a crusade. As for himself, he writes that he endured many trials and avoided many dangers. By November 1453 Isidore was in Venice, from where, soon afterwards, he moved to Rome.[133]

In the Eternal City, the Metropolitan lived mostly in the monastery adjoining the Church of St Blaise (San-Biaggio della Pagnotta), and in the summer took vacations on Lake Albano.[134]

On 21 July 1458 Pope Calixtus III (1455-58) appointed Isidore's fellow-campaigner, Gregory, as Metropolitan of Kyiv, Lithuania and Halych. The Muscovite eparchies were nominally left to Isidore. However, on 6 August Pope Calixtus III died, and Patriarch Gregory III Mammas (he died at the end of 1458), who was then living in Rome, consecrated Gregory Metropolitan of Kyiv. The charter conferring the metropolitan see upon Gregory was issued by the new Pope, Pius II, on 11 September 1458.[135]

Isidore's strength was failing. In April 1462 the relics of St Andrew were carried past the windows of his residence and he accompanied the procession to the Vatican. On his knees he tried to hearten his old friend Bessarion who was urging a crusade against the Turks. This effort completely drained the strength of the old Metropolitan, and on 27 April 1463 Isidore died, still dreaming of the liberation of Constantinople.[136]

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[131] Gorskiy, Ostroumov, pp. 201-2.
[132] See: *Rober de Klari. Zavoevanie Konstantinapolya* (Moscow, 1986); Yu.A. Petrosyan, *Drevney gorod na beregakh Bosphora* (Moscow, 1986), pp. 115-133.
[133] Pirling, op. cit., pp. 119-21; Yosyf Archbishop-Metropolitan, op. cit., pp. 9-10.
[134] Ibid, pp. 13-14.
[135] Golubinskiy, op. cit., pp. 503-4; Buchynskyi, 'Studiyi z istoriyi tserkovnoyi uniyi. II. Mytropolyt Hryhoriy', *ZNTSh*, vol. 88 (1909), book 2, pp. 5-22.
[136] Pirling, op. cit., pp. 140-42; Vavryk, 'Kardynal Isydor...', p. 56.

Isidore, Metropolitan of Kyiv and Cardinal, was sincerely devoted to the idea of the unity of the Christian church and remained faithful to the Union of Florence to the end of his life. He knew how to keep his oath and be devoted to his homeland.

In the meantime, Metropolitan Gregory had arrived in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. In their letter to Iona, the Ukrainian and Belarusian bishops underlined their loyalty to Orthodoxy, but went over to the jurisdiction of Gregory the Bulgarian. In 1470 the latter appealed to the Orthodox Patriarch of Constantinople to accept him under his *omophorium*. But it was only the next Patriarch, Dionysius, who recognised Gregory as Metropolitan of Kyiv. Shortly afterwards, in 1472, Gregory died.[137]

As Golubinskiy observes, the easy transfer of the Ukrainian-Belarusian bishops to the jurisdiction of Gregory indicates, in the first place, their desire to have their own metropolitan and to continue to remain apart from Moscow, which was becoming spiritually completely uncongenial to Ukraine and Belarus.[138]

In addition to political factors, the failure of the Union of Florence in Ukraine is also due to a fundamental reluctance to subordinate the Eastern church unconditionally to Roman dogma. Isidore himself was clearly fully aware of this, since he did not wish to remain in the Ukrainian-Belarusian eparchies, although, as we know, he was received quite hospitably there. Clearly, Isidore understood that, despite the apparent lack of resistance to the Union, it was impossible to implement it in Ukraine and Belarus.[139]   ❑

[137] Buchynskyi, op. cit., II. Mytropolyt Hryhoriy, pp. 5-22; I. Vlasovskyi, *Narys ukrayinskoyi pravoslavnoyi tserkvy*, pp. 118-19, 175-76; O. Halecki, 'The Ecclesiastical Separation of Kiev from Moscow in 1458', *Studien zur älteren Geschichte Ostereuropas* (Graz-Cologne, 1956), book 2, pp. 19-32.

[138] Golubinskiy, op. cit., , p. 505.

[139] Hrushevskyi, op. cit., vol. 5, p. 525; I. Franko, 'Istoriya ukrayinskoyi literatury', *Zibrannya tvoriv y 50-ty t.*, vol. 40, pp. 214-15.

Arts and Culture

Literary Anniversaries

Vasyl Grendzha-Donskyi
(1897-1974)

Vasyl Grendzha-Donskyi was born on 23 April 1897 in the village of Volovyi in Carpatho-Ukraine, then part of the Austro-Hungarian empire. He was educated in the local parish school, after which the deacon-schoolmaster employed him as an assistant in his parochial duties. These (according to Grendzha-Donskyi's autobiography) included watching by the dead and reading the psalter – a task also performed, in his early youth, by the greatest of Ukrainian poets, Taras Shevchenko. For a time he worked as a postman, living in the post-master's house, and making his rounds as fast as he could, so as to devote the rest of his time to reading – mainly books in Hungarian, belonging to his boss, the postmaster. But he found this literature 'foreign and aristocratic', with 'not a trace in it of anything native'. Indeed, he wrote later 'I did not even think that anything of the kind could even exist'. The post-master had a foster-daughter, somewhat older than Vasyl, who coached him in the evenings, taking him through the first four years of secondary education, so that, in 1915, he was able to sit the state diploma examination as a private candidate. Shortly after this, he was called up for military service and sent to the front, where, after eight months in the trenches, he suffered a chest wound. He was taken to a hospital in Budapest, remaining under its care for two years. During this time, he continued his studies, working through the first two years' syllabus of the Trade Academy, so that, when the war was over, one more year's study gave him the necessary qualification to become a book-keeper in a Budapest bank.

In 1921 he returned to Carpatho-Ukraine and began working at a bank in Uzhhorod, and, in his free time, helping produce the weekly *Rusyn*. The area had by now been transferred to the jurisdiction of the newly formed state of Czechoslovakia, whose rulers, hoping to win support, gave the intelligentsia of Carpatho-Ukraine wide scope to develop their national culture. In 1921 the Prosvita (Enlightenment) society was founded in Uzhhorod to promote Ukrainian education and culture, and in 1923 this society established its own journal *Pcholka* (The Bee), which provided a window for a number of young poets, including Grendzha-Donskyi.

Grendzha-Donskyi's first collection of poetry, *Kvity z Ternom* (Flowers with a thorn), which appeared in 1923, had little in common with the major trends of Ukrainian literature of its day, whether in the Soviet Union, or in Western Ukraine (then under Polish rule). Its style, vocabulary and technique derive largely from folk-tradition, and, in particular, folk-song. His language was that of everyday speech – specifically, the Verkhovyna dialect, focusing on patriotic, consciousness-raising themes. A second collection of his poems, *Zoloti klyuchi* (Golden keys), many of which focus on the history and legends of the area, appeared in 1923. The following year, in a third collection, *Shlyakhom ternovym* (By a thorny path) – which, unlike the preceding two, was written in the standard literary language of the time – his work took on a strongly insurgent note, so that the Czechoslovak authorities forbade him to recite such works at concerts and meetings. However, he paid no heed to this warning, and replied in the press that 'Grendzha-Donskyi is not the boy to be scared of a Commissar', and went on to criticise the Czechoslovak government even more strongly for its harsh treatment of the Ukrainians under its rule. The Czechoslovak police termed him the 'Ukrainian seditionist', confiscated his poems as they appeared in newspapers and journals, and, for one particular poem, 'They have partitioned Ukraine...', he was sentenced to three months' imprisonment.

During the next few years, Grendzha-Donskyi wrote relatively little poetry. His collection of poetry for children, *Kytytsya kvitok* (Posy of flowers), appeared in 1925; in 1926 a cycle of his poems appeared in the almanac *Trembita* (The Hutsul Bugle), and only ten years later did his next collection, *Tobi, ridnyi krayu* (To thee, O native land...), appear. He turned, instead, to prose. His first collection, *Opovidannya z Karpatskykh polonyn* (Tales from the Carpathian high-pastures), appeared in 1926. The following year he began to publish and edit *Nasha zemlya*, the first literary and social journal in Carpatho-Ukraine, advocating the view that the region was an inalienable part of the Ukrainian land and its population an inalienable part of the Ukrainian nation, and campaigning against the assimilationist policies of the Czechoslovak authorities. This journal appeared until 1929; various reasons have been suggested for its demise, the most probable being the constant confiscations and harassment from the Czechoslovak censorship. He included in this journal a number of his own short stories; these eventually appeared in book form in the collections *Pokryv tuman spivuchi riky* (The mist has covered the singing rivers, 1928) and *Nazustrich voli* (To meet freedom, 1930). He also produced a collection of tales dealing with the independence struggle (1918-19) of the Hutsuls of south-eastern Carpatho-Ukraine against the Romanians who were then occupying that region. He also produced two full-length prose works, *Ilko Lypey, Karpatskyi Rozbiynyk* (Ilko Lypey, the Carpathian Bandit, 1936) and *Petro Petrovych* (1937), a historical novel set in the fourteenth century.

In March 1939, following Hitler's invasion of the Czech lands, the Czechoslovak Republic ceased to exist. Carpatho-Ukraine was annexed by Hungary, and began its own struggle for independence. Many of its most prominent Ukrainian activists were interned by the Hungarians; they were subsequently released, however, following an appeal by President Avhustyn Voloshyn of the (short-lived)

Carpatho-Ukrainian Republic, and orders from the Germans. On his release, Grendzha-Donskyi, together with other ex-internees, crossed the frontier into Slovakia, and settled in Bratislava, where, for almost twenty years, he published nothing. At the beginning of the 1950s he was accused by the Communists of 'bourgeois nationalism'. Only in 1960, when, under Khrushchev, the rehabilitation of writers who had fallen victim to the Stalinist terror was under way, did nineteen of his poems appear in the almanac *Lastivka z Pryashivshchyny* (The swallow from the Pryashiv region), published in Kyiv. In 1964 a larger book of his selected works, *Shlyakhom ternovym* (On a thorny path), appeared, and by the 1970s, he was publishing regularly in various journals. This new burst of literary activity was cut short by his death on 25 February 1974.

In addition to his poems and prose tales, Grendzha-Donskyi also wrote a number of works for the theatre, ranging from five-minute sketches to full-length plays, and from prose comedies of traditional Ukrainian life, to poetic dramas on themes drawn from the folk-lore and legends of Carpatho-Ukraine. ❏

The Golden Keys to the Silver Land

And the prince threw the golden keys into the water, whereupon the sun was darkened and went behind the clouds... and hence there shall not be full light and happiness in the mountains, until the Rusalka of the Air shall find those golden keys and open with them the gate of the light... then shall the sun of freedom shine on the Carpathians

(folk-legend from Carpatho-Ukraine)

DRAMATIS PERSONAE

BORYS, Prince of the Silver Land
DOKIYA, his daughter
SYVOLOD, betrothed to Dokiya, later her husband
ISTRAT, Dokiya's son
A KINSWOMAN to Borys and Dokiya
Two ELDERS, Counsellors to Borys
CHABA, chieftain of the nomad warriors
PEASANT
A WOMAN
A SMALL BOY
A SHEPHERD
A WEAVER

Nomads, companions-at-arms, weavers, shepherds, people.

The action takes place in the remote past, during the nomad invasions.

SCENE ONE

*The Warriors' Hall of an ancient castle. Centre, against the wall, a princely throne.
On the walls hang ancient weapons: shields, battle-axes, helmets, morning-stars,
swords, spears, lances, and, apart, on the wall, hang the golden keys.*

*Into the Hall enters DOKIYA, dressed in white, with rich embroidery and a
golden girdle. Her long blond hair flows down her back, loosely bound with a
raspberry-coloured band. Behind her enters SYVOLOD, bare-headed with long
black hair. He wears a long white tunic with a leather belt from which hangs a
long sword. His breeks are yellow-brown and he is shod in bast-shoes of ancient
design.*

DOKIYA: *(leading SYVOLOD by the hand)*
            Come then, my love, into the Warriors' hall,
            To enter here not easily befalls,
            Where only princes do by custom enter
            And standing there, do listen to my father...

SYVOLOD: *(enraptured by the weapons, leaving DOKIYA for an instant)*
            Such wondrous arms! A Grecian blade *(looking at them)*
            So razor-sharp its metal,
            To make foes flee, all disarrayed,
            Ready it is for battle...
            And here a battle-axe, a morning-star,
            (he tries a leather helmet) A helm... indeed, it fits me well,
            What leather. Stone-hard, truly;
            So strong, and yet so light withal,
            An auroch's hide 'tis surely.
            And lances, out of iron, well-forged
            With such I have a wild boar slain,
            Through the brushwood at me he charged,
            I struck, and he ne'er rose again!

DOKIYA: So, too, my father slew a bear,
            When to approach him it did dare...

SYVOLOD: And here, in truth, a Roman shield.
            Halberds and axes mighty
            Though foeman drink from Tysa he'll
            Not win through to the highlands.
            Wondrous arms! To behold this sight
            I could stand fast here day and night.

DOKIYA: Oft-times thou shalt behold it yet,
            'Tis leisure time now, dearest,

Beloved, thou must not forget,
Our bridal day is nearing!

SYVOLOD: Indeed, beloved, pardon me,
My duty here so missing,
Bridegroom, not warrior should I be,
Now it is time for kissing! *(he kisses her)*

DOKIYA: My dearest, Syvolod my love,
Light of my life! My dearest dove!

SYVOLOD: How beautiful thine eyes are, truly,
How fragrant is thy hair,
Now let thy maiden lips say, duly:
'For me dost thou care?'

DOKIYA: If I loved thee not sincerely,
I'd not walk with thee, my dearest. *(SYVOLOD embraces her warmly)*
Thy lips like honey are to me,
And thy embrace is strong,
A secret I'll reveal to thee,
That I have loved thee long. *(she opens a window)*
I recall, in my childhood's course,
Close to that oak-tree yonder,
Thou in the tourney didst unhorse
Slavolyub, the great warrior,
Thou wast then still a beardless youth,
I – scarce out of the cradle,
Thou bor'st a golden helm, in truth,
And hauberk of fine chain-mail.
And thenceforth the thought came to me,
While we walk earth together,
I shall be faithful unto thee...

SYVOLOD: *(joyfully)* So shall it be forever!

DOKIYA: Eight years such dreams have filled my life,
Not vainly did I dream them.

SYVOLOD: One day, two days – then man and wife!
Is not the prospect pleasing?

KINSWOMAN: *(Knocks on the door and enters)*
Most noble maid, thy mother waits thee,
Come now to try thy wedding raiment.

(Exeunt omnes. A pause. The door opens. Enter Prince BORYS with his counsellors, the Elders). The prince has a black beard and long hair. He wears a long embroidered kaftan of ancient style. The elders wear long white shirts, girdled at the waist, and sleeveless, mountain jackets, trimmed with black stripes, white breeks, bast shoes, and cross-gartered linen foot-cloths).

BORYS: *(to the FIRST ELDER)* Tell me, has the nomad come!

1ST ELDER: He has!

BORYS: I am well used to them!

2nd ELDER: Sire, he seeks audience with thee!

BORYS: *(to the spear-man on guard at the door)*
             Let him come to us presently! *(He seats himself on the throne)*

(Enter CHABA wrapped in a leopard-skin and with a helmet on his head with a long plume. He has a bow and quiver at his back),

CHABA: *(bowing)* I bow, O prince, to thee and thine!
             I have come to the Silver Land...

BORYS: 'Tis thee, O nomad Chaba?

CHABA: Aye!

BORYS: Greetings! Speak, and thy thoughts unbend?

CHABA: Thou knowest, we have occupied
             All of Pannonia's valleys,
             But Silver Land we have passed by,
             No tribute take, nor tallies.
             I come to thee, though not in joy,
             Thou art with full rich in chattels,
             Hill-slopes with vineyards growing high,
             Horse-droves and herds of cattle.
             Thy goods are safe from us; for sure
             We have sufficient goods and more...
             But, noble prince, for honour's sake,
             Grant us three things, full quickly.
             First teach us from the vine to make
             That strange enchanting liquor;
             Second: to me thy daughter give
             As my third wife, I'll take her;

                    Then I'll as thy true brother live
                    By custom good and sacred.

BORYS: And third? What, Chaba, is thy will?
                    Two wishes thou hast told,
                    What bearest thou in thy heart still?

CHABA: Thirdly... the keys... of gold...

BORYS: Heed! Chaba. Gladly will I teach
                    Thee the wine-drink to brew.

CHABA: I thank thee, prince. With grateful speech,
                    I bow to thee, friend true!

BORYS: My daughter is already plighted,
                    Two days hence will her bridal be.
                    And, as thou knowest sure, to thee
                    Foreign she is; she is baptiséd
                    And our ways foreign are to thee.

CHABA: Give her to me!

BORYS: I cannot! Hear me!
                    To thee I'll never give her, no!

CHABA: I pour out foemen's blood, unsparing,
                    Fearsome we are, as thou dost know.
                    I was sure thou wouldst not refuse me,
                    Thou sayest... other suitors bold?
                    'Tis thy misfortune, thou didst choose so!...
                    So, give to me the keys of gold.

BORYS: I will not! Those keys, from times ancient,
                    Are the keys of the Silver Land,
                    From grandsires and forefathers ancient,
                    As heritage they did descend.
                    In those keys is sunlight hidden,
                    The freedom of our native heights,
                    And to the death we all are bidden
                    To guard them, precious as our sight.

CHABA: Thou wilt not give? Thou sayest so?

BORYS: So ask me not! I tell thee, No!

CHABA: This is an answer fit for fools!

BORYS: Not so: for thus the wise do speak,
            And mind and strength do wonders wreak,
            And those keys are our wisdom's tool.

CHABA: I shall not say 'farewell', Borys, now:
            My fires shall burn thy snug nest down!
            I'll drive you all into the Tysa,
            And in its waves your lives I'll drown!

BORYS: *(forcefully)* Enough, cursed Chaba! Off, now with thee!
            Get thee gone from my hall straighway!
            (He signals to the elders to usher him out)
            Or like a frog my sword shall spit thee!
            Thou devils' spawn! Begone, I say!

(The elders usher CHABA out, and return immediately. The prince sits pensively on his throne, resting his head on his hand).

1st ELDER: Such audience means war is brewing.

2nd ELDER: Thy words too bitter were, for sure.

BORYS: *(rising from the throne)* Speak with a savage, and thou too wilt
            Speak words of savagery. No more! (*exeunt omnes*)

CURTAIN

SCENE TWO (Twelve Years Later)

A mountain glade. To the right, a mountain road, with fir trees and beeches above it. To the right, a high, steep crag, below it a small but deep lake – the 'Eye of the Sea'. In the distance, pastures shimmer bluely. There can be heard the lowing of cattle, baaing of sheep and whinnying of horses. Herdsmen are driving the cattle up the mountains; slung on their backs they have axes, bundles, knapsacks, wooden mugs, and bedding. The creaking of wagons can be heard.

Enter the PEASANT, dressed in a rough white greatcoat and long tunic. He shouts to the fugitives, directing the whole expedition.

PEASANT: Up, from the valleys come,
            Chaba is nigh, that bitch's son!
            The nomad hordes are on their way,
            The old and sick and children young

They'll put to death without delay...
Fetch the beasts, leave none out a-grazing,
Bring all along with human kin.
To woods and mountains, kinsfolk, hasten!
Whither no nomad can creep in.
(shouting) Hey, Petro, turn now, leftward faring,
Drive, chase the torrent, boldly daring!
And thou, Ivan, run back below,
There's Yuriy crying out for aid,
He's in a bog-hole. Help him, so,
You've shoulders like a bison's made.

(enter a WOMAN, carrying bundles, with two small children, one in her arms)

WOMAN: What can I do now, what will happen
To my poor babes? I am alone.
Alone with babes 'tis hard to manage,
And help for me is nowhere, none.
My husband went off to the war
To bar the nomads from invading,
And so alone I strive, no more,
Than our bare lives so to save now.

BOY: Mama, I can't go on. Sorely
My legs have ached so long and drear.

WOMAN: Well then, what am I to do for thee?
(an ox-cart enters)

PEASANT: Give the children here.

(He takes the children and seats them on the cart, and then puts the WOMAN's bundles on it).
That's the way! On the wagon ride.
But keep thy feet tucked safe inside,
Sit there and let the blankets warm thee!

WOMAN: I thank thee, Fedir, for thine aid.

PEASANT: The owner deserves thanks, not me!
They're not my oxen, certainly!
(to the wagoner) Lead on the oxen, but take care!
The road, as thou canst see, climbs steeply,
Hard, stony too, so good watch keep now.
On thy way now. Forward go!

WOMAN: Farewell!

PEASANT: Goodbye! And good luck on the road!
(looking round) Our villagers are on the way,
Yet, there seems something... *(a cry is heard)*
Who's that, hey?

CHILDREN'S VOICES:
(offstage) Neighbour, 'tis we!

PEASANT: Three orphans they,
The foemen did their parents slay.
Well, I must go and give them aid. *(exit)*

(Enter a crowd of MEN and WOMEN. The men carry axes, wooden sticks and other equipment of woodcutters, the women carry mattocks and hoes).

CHORUS OF WOODCUTTERS:
To woods, to mountains, to ground-breaking
And each will find a place, indeed,
At once we'll build, a new start making,
And the woods everyone will feed,
Our mountains dear will guard us sure,
Our settlements strong shall endure,
Let the foes swords-music peal,
But Verkhovyna we'll not yield.
We shall hew good pathways going,
Our people shall their safety know.
Into the Silver Land no foeman
Shall never again venture, no!

(exeunt. Enter SHEPHERDS)

SHEPHERD: *(to a sheep)* Hi-up!
(to his helper) Quick, lad, drive them on,
For today we have to hurry,
To distant pastures get thee gone.

(A shepherd's flute falls from his girdle. Picking it up, he continues, sadly).

Thou fallest... Angry that thou play'st not?
My songs alas befit this day not,
Those songs thou knewst, on this black day
Who would have heart to hear thee play?
(enter the WEAVERS) Well, what news now?

A WEAVER: The fearsome Chaba
                    Encircling round the fortress came,
                    Since it by force he could not capture.
                    He fired it, gave it to the flames.

SHEPHERD: How could this be?

WEAVER: Hast thou heard never
                    Of the war-engines which cast flame,
                    Which burning resin can cast thither
                    A fortress to burn down amain?
                    Now cruel Chaba, fierce past measure,
                    Slays us and burns us with his fire.
                    So shepherd save thy flocks, thy treasure!

SHEPHERD: I drive them to the pastures high.
                    And up there we'll erect us
                    New cabins and sheepfolds beside,
                    In cattle and protection
                    All our well-being doth abide.

WEAVER: Bears, wolves and lynxes roam the woods.

SHEPHERD: But 'gainst them there are councils good.
                    Sharp-toothed wolves do not affright us.
                    Nor bears that in woods abide,
                    We have good dogs, fierce in fighting,
                    We have axes sharp besides.
                    Only slit-eyed Chaba fear we,
                    And he'll not win, thou he strive,
                    For these mountains will debar him,
                    – Our protection, they, our life.

(Exeunt. The song of the prince's COMPANIONS-AT-ARMS is heard from afar).

COMPANIONS:
                    The savage foe shall not defeat us,
                    For we are sons of the free peaks,
                    The mountain sun for us shines sweetly,
                    For us green forest murmuring speaks,
                    To us sing forth the silvern waters,
                    For us the verdure green appears
                    These stones and stocks exist but for us...
                    No stranger's foot shall venture here.
                    No foe shall drive his horses hither,
                    To pasture, nor our cabins ravage,

Our Silver Land, hallowed for ever,
Shall ne'er fall to invader savage.
All nature is our sure defender,
And our protection 'gainst all ill
Freedom lives in our blood forever,
Our whole folk freedom-loving still.
Our very babes drink deep of freedom,
With mother's milk they quaff it down,
Never shall foeman raise, proud-weening,
Above us his tyrannic throne.

(Enter the COMPANIONS-AT-ARMS. At the head of the second detachment of them is Prince BORYS wearing armour, considerably aged, and with a long grey beard, SYVOLOD, DOKIYA, and their ten-year-old son, ISTRAT, who likewise wears a small helmet and sword.

BORYS: *(to his sword-bearer)* Dokiya and young Istrat thou hast
            Safely through all the forest led,
            At evening do thou seek a house here,
            For the night find them a safe bed.
            (to Dokiya) Daughter, farewell, and thou too, Istrat!
            (he kisses and embraces them)
            A safe road here straight forward leads.

SYVOLOD: *(likewise making his farewells)*
            And as for us, myself and father,
            Be not afraid! Rest calm and sure!

ISTRAT: And will you leave us here? But why?

SYVOLOD: Son, we are going to the war.

ISTRAT: And am I not a warrior, father?

SYVOLOD: A warrior, yes, but small and young.

BORYS: And thy strength is still too meagre.

ISTRAT: But my sword is sharp and strong. *(draws his sword)*

DOKIYA: Istrat, my little son, my dearest!

BORYS: Thou art, indeed, a warrior bold,
            So guard thy mother 'gainst fate fearful.

SYVOLOD: A soldier does as he is told!

*(Exeunt DOKIYA, ISTRAT and the COMPANIONS-AT-ARMS. BORYS and
SYVOLOD watch them go. Then BORYS turns in the direction of the fort).*

BORYS: Above the river our fort blazes,
           When o'er the threshold I did pass,
           With mine own hand I lit the flames there,
           For that I could not hold it fast.
           But in the vales the foe must tarry,
           He'll never force such gates as these *(points to the mountains)*
           No one will e'er force them nor harry –
           (feeling in his pockets) But dost thou have the golden keys?

SYVOLOD: Yesterday on the wall I saw them,
           I thought that thou hast them with thee.

BORYS: Sorrow on sorrow falls upon me.
           Dread times for all come, certainly.
           For if the foe should chance to gain them,
           And with them ope the mountains tall,
           Then shall our folk fall into slavery,
           Our scions curse me, one and all.

SYVOLOD: *(Calling to a COMPANION-AT-ARMS)*
           Fetch a horse!
           (to the Prince) I shall go back,
           Farewell, hasten. For time lacks.

BORYS: I have no wish to see thee dead.

SYVOLOD: Out of the flames I'll bring them back. *(exit)*

BORYS: *(alone)* Dear mountains, say now, what will happen?
           I would die gladly from the sword,
           Or arrow shot my breast to shatter,
           So the gold keys would be restored.
           For I the threshold crossed without them,
           In smoke and mist and urgent haste.
           I failed to guard – base wretch undoubted –
           Our Silver Land and her strong gates…

(The forest begins to rustle, and the VOICE OF THE MOUNTAINS is heard).

VOICE OF THE MOUNTAINS:
           Cease, Borys, cease this black despairing,
           Let not unreason prove thy snaring.

(The waters of the lake begin to glow with fiery colours)

VOICE OF THE LAKE:
> Walk proud, Prince Borys, do not tremble,
> Thy folk can vanquish any trouble.

BORYS: Are ye then some mystic powers
> Of our folk?

VOICE OF THE MOUNTAINS:
> It is I; love and rage gave birth to me,
> It is I, in the heart I pour courage,
> It is I, Borys, I.

VOICE OF THE LAKE:
> This land of mountains and of waves
> Silvern, thy folk, O prince, shall save.

VOICE OF THE MOUNTAINS:
> It is I that, through years uncounted,
> Borys, was thy folk's strength undoubted,
> And who the tribe of shepherds wise
> Defended 'gainst foes enterprise.

BORYS: Praise to thee that on blackest day,
> Thou dost the folk's dread fears allay.

LAKE: Borys, fear not to lose this war, thy
> Son-in-law shall save the keys.

VOICE OF THE MOUNTAINS:
> Do thou remember the true story,
> Which thine own grandsire told to thee,
> This tale which the bards love and cherish,
> – From long gone ages certainly
> Of how the wild Pechenegs perished
> At thy folk's hands in Dnistr's woods.

BORYS: So let their scion's heed its message,
> Lest in the fight they fail and perish.
> I know it well. This story thus
> Is to be heard...

VOICE OF THE LAKE:
> *(Interrupting)*   But tell it to the end thou must

For in the mists of time's grey dawn,
This tale of Silver Land was born.

BORYS: *(after a pause, pensively)* When shepherd-forebears in past ages,
Did drive their flocks into these spaces,
Shepherd and herdsman, mountains bright
Did bid them welcome with good graces.
But here a Wood-gnome – evil sprite
Did dwell, a wood-gnome, a fiend hellish.
Quoth he: 'An ye dwell on this ground here.
Then each year on Midsummer's Night,
A fair young maiden ye must drown here...'
To Tysa's bank they bore the maidens,
Hurled them into the whirlpools there.
The Fiend to the wood bore them, hasting,
To the Rusalky-of-the-Air...
But then they brought a maid one day
(The hellish Fiend came for his prey),
For death the maiden they made ready,
And she was fair of face, for sure,
Swift of movement, valiant, steady
– Ustyna was the name she bore.
Ustyna whistled – and headlong
An auroch fierce to her did speed,
On it she leapt... on it she fled, then
Mage, elders, demon quaked, indeed.
Ustyna through the wood sped, saying
Her plaint... There Volos and Perun
Waited... far off, harp-notes were playing,
From lips and strings came a sweet tune.
The maiden quoth: 'That Fiend so wicked,
Full many a maid has drowned ere now!
Slay him!' Alas, Perun was tipsy,
No thunder-arrow did he throw!

VOICE OF THE LAKE:
Perun gave no help to the maid.
A sot, a rake, steeped in ill-dealing,
Who his friend's wife would fain be stealing...
Protector Volos gave her aid.

VOICE OF THE MOUNTAINS:
'Tis he protects the shepherd lads,
The flocks, the horse-droves and the herds.
For he, himself, throughout all ages,
Shepherds the bright stars at their grazing.

BORYS: When Volos heard of this fresh evil,
             Quoth he: 'Ustyna, vengeance take!
             Give poisoned food unto this devil,
             In the woods, a dead lynx decays...'
             She did obey... the Fiend – a glutton –
             Fell on it, ate it, bones and all,
             Much harm came to him from that supper –
             For forty days his vomit poured,
             Then he fell dead. Those hills and mountains
             Which he had spewed, all pearly now did soar.
             Then Volos spoke forth: 'These abounding
             Spaces are thy folk's, evermore'.
             The ring of mountains blue he closed then
             Defence for flocks and herds to make,
             And on Ustyna he bestowed then
             The Golden Keys that lock their gate.
             'See that thou letst no harm come to them,
             Protect them against evil hands,
             A force mysterious doth imbue them,
             No light task this gift, this command...'
             The heirs of fore-mother Ustyna
             Worthily kept due watch and ward,
             But I did leave them, without reason,
             Now, may the fire fall on my head.

VOICE OF THE LAKE:
             Thou hast now neighbours envious, spiteful,
             A swarm of woes now doth begin,
             So, lest worse troubles come to smite thee,
             Into my depths now, cast them down.

(Enter SYVOLOD. His coat is scorched).

SYVOLOD: *(triumphantly)* Here are the golden keys!

BORYS: *(overjoyed)*   My son!
(They embrace. BORYS looks at the keys and kisses them, and then hangs them on his girdle).
             In a dread moment, thou hast won
             The keys from out the foeman's hands.

(There is a sound of trumpets, as the enemy approach. Enter WARRIORS and COMPANIONS-AT-ARMS with drawn swords, and shields; the ARCHERS have their bows at the ready. They clamber up the stockade as if over a wall, and prepare to launch an attack. CHABA and his WAR-BAND enter).

CHABA: I have caught up with thee, Borys, now,
           With my horses of swift mettle,
           They have drunk deeply from the Tysa,
           Ready are we to give thee battle.

BORYS: Ha-ha! Be not presumptuous, Chaba,
           We shall do battle, but,... thereafter...

CHABA: Allegiance to the vizier
           I have sworn upon my sword.
           I call upon thee now to yield
           And give to us the keys of gold.

BORYS: The keys? Ha-ha!

(he takes the keys from his girdle, shows them to CHABA, lifts them high, and hurls them into the lake)
                              Well, there they are!

(Immediately there is a rattling sound. BORYS and his COMPANIONS-AT-ARMS leap up, an avalanche of rocks and boulders descends into the lake, the water foams. Impenetrable mountains rise up before the nomads. BORYS's laughter rings out, followed by the Chorus of COMPANIONS-AT-ARMS).

CHORUS OF COMPANIONS:
           All nature is our sure defender,
           And our protection 'gainst all ills,
           Freedom lives in our blood forever,
           Our whole folk freedom-loving still.
           Our infants drink right deep of freedom,
           With mother's milk they quaff it down,
           Never shall foeman raise, proud-weening,
           Above us his tyrannic throne.

(CHABA rages, shakes his head, makes menacing gestures and departs with his WAR-BAND).

CURTAIN

Ukrainian Studies

Twenty-Five Years of *Index on Censorship*

I *ndex on Censorship*, the only journal in the world specifically set up to moni-
tor the suppression or restriction of freedom of expression, wherever it occurs
world-wide, this year celebrates its silver jubilee. The celebration – and,
indeed, the continued existence of the journal – is tinged with irony. Clearly,
everyone, including its founders, would be happier if there were no longer any
need for such a journal to exist – if censorship, and
the regimes which impose it, had vanished from the
world. Indeed, when the Soviet Union fell apart in
1991, followed soon after by the disappearance of
another major villain – *Apartheid* – a number of pro-
democracy bodies which had supported *Index* can-
celled or substantially reduced their funding, as no
longer necessary. And *Index* itself for a time took a
retrospective stance regarding the ex-Soviet space,
publishing works from the no-longer-censored litera-
tures, including Ukrainian. But censorship, alas, con-
tinues, often in new, insidious forms, so that – in
toasting the journal at its silver jubilee party in Lon-
don, the current editor of *Index*, Ursula Owen, quot-
ed the ironic traditional toast of Soviet dissidents: 'Let
us drink to the success of our hopeless endeavour!'

Index, vol. 1, no.1,
spring 1972

'Hopeless' the task of *Index* may be; if that task is stamping out censorship, and the
tyranny and intolerance which engenders it, from the world. Nevertheless, in the
twenty-five years of its existence, *Index* has at least ensured that crimes against
freedom of expression do not go unmarked.

Through all its changes of format, one constant feature of the journal has been
'Index *Index*' – a detailed chronicle, state by state, of censorship and other forms
of oppression. The chosen format meant that all cases of repression in the USSR
were listed under 'Soviet Union'. Within that general section, material relating to a
specific republic is normally clearly identifiable: thus one has reports from the
Ukrainian Helsinki Monitoring Group, the Armenian Helsinki Monitoring Group,
the *Chronicle of the Lithuanian Catholic Church*, and so on. Researchers wishing
to use 'Index *Index*' as source material for a comprehensive survey of Soviet
repression in Ukraine should scan *all* items in the Soviet section, not only those
with a clearly indicated Ukrainian provenance. This is particularly important for the
first five years, before the establishment of the Ukrainian Helsinki Monitoring
Group, recorded in *Index*, vol. 6, no. 3, 1977. In that particular issue, 'Index *Index*'
not only records the founding of the Helsinki group, and of a Kyiv case involving
the physician Dr Mykola Kovtunenko and the writer and activist Mykola Rudenko,
it also records the arrest of Rudenko (in Kyiv) and 'O. Tykhy' (in Donetsk) in a sin-

gle paragraph with (and sandwiched between) the arrest of two prominent Moscow activists, Alexander Ginzburg and Yuri Orlov. Similarly, a year later (vol. 7, no. 3) 'Index *Index*' includes not only a long paragraph of news and reports from the Ukrainian Helsinki Monitoring Group, but also information on three Ukrainians (Yuri Vivtash, Vyacheslav Kirkushev and Iosif Terelya) interned in mental hospitals (in a paragraph on the political use of psychiatry in the USSR) and on Vitaly Kalynychenko, a member of the Ukrainian Helsinki Monitoring Group, listed among activists refused permission to leave the USSR. The same issue also notes the release from labour camp of the Armenian film director, Sergei Paradjanov, who had been sentenced on a number of vague charges including 'speculation in art objects, speculation in foreign currency' and homosexuality, although – 'Index

Vol. 22, no. 3, March 1993. Issue dedicated to Ukraine and Belarus.

Index' notes, '[i]t is widely believed, however, that the real reason for his imprisonment was non-conformity and, in particular, his protests on behalf of persecuted Ukrainian intellectuals'. (All names of individuals here are given in the forms published in 'Index *Index*', which, however conscientious the compilers, inevitably reflected, to a certain extent, the orthographic convention favoured by those transmitting the information).

In addition to monitoring the persecution of writers and the suppression of their works, *Index* also monitors the suppression of information on specific themes, deemed 'sensitive' by the governments or business interests concerned. This is not merely a matter of defence-related sensitivity or the protection of industrial secrets – but also of cases where governments or businesses have attempted to hush up the health and environmental consequences of their mistakes and misjudgements. The cover-up of the Chornobyl nuclear accident was a particular telling example of this – not only did the Soviet authorities not reveal the huge extent of the contamination for almost three years; they managed, at the same time, to convince world opinion that they were scrupulously following the new policy of *glasnost*: by official 'openness' about the contamination of the 30-kilometre exclusion zone around the stricken power-station, they gave a convincing impression that contamination was, in effect, limited to that zone. *Index* has carried two major features on the Chornobyl cover-up – in 1992 and for the tenth anniversary in 1996.

No. 1, 1996. Chornobyl tenth anniversary issue.

Except for a few specific cases, such as Chornobyl, where the effects of past cover-ups linger on, or for tributes to past victims of censorship (international

No. 3, 1997. Twenty-fifth anniversary issue.

awards, obituaries, etc.), no one would wish his or her country to feature prominently in *Index.* The legacy of Ukraine's non-independent past – including the problems of Crimea and the largely Russophone south-east on the one hand, and the Polish and Hungarian minorities in the west (with the resultant friction over inscriptions in cemeteries from the Polish-Ukrainian war of 1918 and the proposal to erect a statue commemorating the 1100th anniversary of the coming of the Magyars) on the other – means that Ukraine may well continue to feature, from time to time, in 'Index *Index'*. But so, indeed, do countries with a long-standing tradition of democracy – the United Kingdom over reporting restrictions in Northern Ireland, the USA over a Ku Klux Klan site on the Internet, and even France – the home of *Liberté, egalité, fraternité* – over phone-tapping of journalists, lawyers and politicians.

For a 'watchdog' journal, like *Index on Censorship*, is useless unless it can bark and bite; and if, occasionally, it has to bite the supposedly democratic hands which feed, and – in the case of the UK – house it, so much the better for democracy! Long may it continue to do so… until such time as its 'hopeless' endeavour triumphs, and censorship is banished from the world.   ❑

Ukrainian Studies Day

The School of Slavonic and East European Studies of the University of London will hold a Ukrainian Studies Day, on Friday, 3 October 1997.

Speakers will include Ukrainian Deputy Premier Professor Ivan Kuras and Professor Petro Kononenko, Director of the Institute for Ukrainian Studies in Kyiv.

For further details, contact Dr Andrew Wilson, at SSEES, University of London, Senate House, Malet Street, London WC1E 7HU.

News Briefs

'A New Page...'

On 31 May 1997 a Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership between Ukraine and the Russian Federation was signed by the Presidents of the two countries. The Treaty, together with the signing, shortly beforehand, of agreements settling the dispute over the Black Sea Fleet, were hailed in an official statement by the two Presidents as an 'Important landmark' in the ties between the two countries, the opening of 'a new page in the history of Russian-Ukrainian relations' and a 'firm foundation for the further development of mutually-beneficial cooperation'.

Such rhetoric is, of course, traditional on such occasions – and the effectiveness of any international treaty depends, ultimately, not only on the good intent of the signatories, but also of their successors. Nevertheless, after the confrontational and hostile stance which Russian politicians have all too often shown towards Ukraine over the past six years, the signing of this Treaty must rank as a significant development.

Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership between Ukraine and the Russian Federation

Ukraine and the Russian Federation, hereinafter referred to as the High Contracting Parties,

proceeding from the close historical ties and relations of friendship and cooperation between the peoples of Ukraine and Russia,

noting that the Treaty between the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, signed on 19 November 1990, contributed to the development of good-neighbourly relations between the two countries,

reaffirming their obligations arising from the Agreement between Ukraine and the Russian Federation on the further development of inter-state relations, signed in Dagomys on 23 June 1992,

believing that the strengthening of friendly relations, good-neighbourliness and mutually beneficial cooperation is in accord with the basic interests of their peoples and serves the cause of peace and international security,

striving to impart a new quality to these relations and strengthen their legal basis,

determined to ensure that democratic processes in both states are irreversible and constantly progressing,

mindful of the agreements reached within the framework of the Commonwealth of Independent States,

confirming their commitment to the standards of international law, above all, the aims and principles of the United Nations Charter,

and adhering to the obligations assumed within the framework of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe,

have agreed upon the following:

Article 1

The High Contracting Parties, as friendly, equal and sovereign states, shall base their relations on mutual respect and confidence, strategic partnership and cooperation.

Article 2

Pursuant to the provisions of the United Nations Charter and their commitments under the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the High Contracting Parties shall respect each other's territorial integrity and confirm the inviolability of their existing borders.

Article 3

The High Contracting Parties shall base their relations with each other on the principles of mutual respect, sovereign equality, territorial integrity, the inviolability of borders, peaceful settlement of disputes, non-use of force or the threat of force, including economic and other methods of pressure, the right of their peoples freely to determine their own fate, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, cooperation between states, the honest fulfilment of international commitments they have assumed and other universally recognised standards of international law.

Article 4

The High Contracting Parties proceed from the premise that their good-neighbourliness and cooperation are important factors in enhancing stability and security in Europe and all over the world. They shall implement close cooperation with the aim of strengthening international peace and security. They shall take the necessary measures to promote the process of universal disarmament, the creation and strengthening of a system of collective security in Europe, and also the enhancement of the peacemaking role of the UN and the greater effectiveness of regional security mechanisms.

The Parties shall apply their endeavours towards ensuring that the settlement of all disputes is by peaceful means only and shall cooperate in preventing and resolving conflicts and situations which effect their interests.

Article 5

The High Contracting Parties shall hold regular consultations to ensure the further deepening of bilateral relations and exchanging opinions on multilateral issues of mutual interest. In case of necessity, they shall coordinate their positions for the purpose of joint actions.

To this end and with the agreement of the Parties, regular summit meetings shall be convened. The foreign ministers of the Parties shall meet not less than twice a year.

Working meetings between representatives of other ministries and departments of the Parties shall be held as necessary to discuss issues of mutual interest.

The Parties may set up joint permanent or temporary commissions to deal with specific issues in various fields.

Article 6
Each of the High Contracting Parties shall refrain from participation in or support for any kind of action directed against the other High Contracting Party nor conclude with third parties any kind of agreement directed against the other Party. Neither of the Parties shall allow its territory to be used to the detriment of the security of the other Party.

Article 7
In the case of a situation arising which, in the opinion of one of the High Contracting Parties, creates a threat to peace, breaches peace or affects the interests of its national security, sovereignty and territorial integrity, it may request urgent and appropriate consultations with the other High Contracting Party. The Parties shall exchange appropriate information and, if necessary, carry out coordinated or joint measures to overcome the said situation.

Article 8
The High Contracting Parties shall develop their relations in the spheres of military and military-technical cooperation, the ensuring of state security and also cooperation in border issues, customs and export and immigration control on the basis of separate agreements.

Article 9
The High Contracting Parties, reaffirming their resolve to proceed with the reduction of armed forces and armaments, shall promote the process of disarmament and cooperate to ensure the scrupulous implementation of the agreements on the reduction of armed forces and armaments, including nuclear.

Article 10
Each of the High Contracting Parties shall guarantee to the citizens of the other Party the same rights and freedoms on the same principles and on the same scale as for its own citizens, except in the circumstances established by the national legislation of the Parties or international treaties.

Each of the Parties shall protect, under the established procedure, the rights of its citizens living on the territory of the other Party, pursuant to the obligations under the documents of the Organisation on Security and Cooperation in Europe and other universally acknowledged principles and standards of international law and

pursuant to agreements within the framework of the Commonwealth of Independent States to which they are signatories.

Article 11

The High Contracting Parties shall adopt on their territories the necessary measures, including the enactment of appropriate legislation, to prevent and halt any actions which constitute violence or an incitement to violence against individual persons or groups of citizens based on national, racial, ethnic or religious intolerance.

Article 12

The High Contracting Parties shall ensure the protection on their territories of the ethnic, cultural, language and religious identity of national minorities and shall create conditions to encourage such identity.

Each of the High Contracting Parties shall guarantee the right of persons belonging to national minorities, individually or jointly with other persons belonging to national minorities, freely to express, preserve and develop their ethnic, cultural, language or religious identity and maintain and develop their culture and not to be subjected to any attempts at assimilation against their will.

The High Contracting Parties shall guarantee the right of the persons belonging to national minorities fully and effectively to exercise their human rights and fundamental freedoms without any kind of discrimination and in conditions of full equality before the law.

The High Contracting Parties shall promote equal opportunities and conditions for the study of the Ukrainian language in the Russian Federation and the Russian language in Ukraine and the training of personnel to teach in these languages at educational establishments, and to this end shall provide state support in equal measure.

The High Contracting Parties shall conclude agreements on cooperation in these issues.

Article 13

The High Contracting Parties shall develop equitable and mutually advantageous cooperation in economic matters and shall refrain from any action which might inflict economic damage on the other. To this end, and mindful of the need for the phased creation and development of a common economic space by way of establishing conditions for the free movement of goods, services, capital and labour, the Parties shall take effective measures to coordinate strategies for implementing economic reforms, deepening of economic integration on the basis of mutual benefit and the harmonisation of their economic legislation.

The High Contracting Parties shall ensure a broad exchange of economic information and access to it by enterprises, entrepreneurs and scholars of both Parties.

The Parties shall strive to coordinate their financial, monetary-credit, budgetary, currency, investment, pricing, fiscal, trade and customs policies and to create equal

opportunities and guarantees for their economic entities, and shall facilitate the establishment and development of direct economic and trade relations at all levels, the specialisation and cooperation of technologically related industries, enterprises, associations, corporations, banks and commodity producers and consumers.

The High Contracting Parties shall promote the preservation and development on a mutually beneficial basis of production and scientific-technical cooperation between industrial enterprises in the elaboration and manufacture of contemporary research-intensive output, including for defence purposes.

Article 14
The High Contracting Parties shall ensure favourable conditions for direct trade and other economic relations and cooperation at the level of administrative-territorial entities pursuant to existing national legislation, paying special attention to the development of economic links between border regions.

Article 15
The High Contracting Parties shall assure favourable economic, financial and legal conditions for entrepreneurial and other economic activities by each other's enterprises and organisations, including the promotion and mutual protection of investments. The Parties shall encourage various forms of cooperation and direct links between economic entities in both countries irrespective of form of ownership.

Article 16
The High Contracting Parties shall cooperate in the UN and other international organisations, including economic and financial ones, and support each other's entry to international organisations and accession to the agreements and conventions of which either of the Parties is not a member.

Article 17
The High Contracting Parties shall expand cooperation in transport and ensure the freedom of transit of persons, cargoes and vehicles through each other's territory, pursuant to universally acknowledged standards of international law.

Carriage of cargoes and passengers by rail, air, sea, river and road transport between the two Parties in transit across their territories, including movements via sea, river and air ports, railway and road networks, and also via lines of communication, trunk pipelines and power transmission grids located on the territory of the other Party shall take place under the procedure and terms laid down in separate agreements.

Article 18
The High Contracting Parties shall cooperate in search and rescue operations and investigation of transport accidents.

Article 19
The High Contracting Parties shall ensure the observance of the legislation on state

property and the property of legal persons and citizens of one High Contracting Party being situated on the territory of the other High Contracting Party, pursuant to the legislation of the latter, unless otherwise stated in an agreement between the Parties.

The Parties proceed from the premise that questions of property relations affecting their interests shall be governed by separate agreements.

Article 20

The High Contracting Parties shall pay special attention to the development of cooperation to ensure the functioning of their national fuel and energy complexes, transport networks and communications and information systems, promoting the preservation, rational use and development of the complexes and unified systems existing in these fields.

Article 21

The High Contracting Parties, on the basis of separate agreements, shall cooperate in the study and use of outer space, the joint production and development of space-rocket technology on the principles of equality and mutual benefit and pursuant to international law. The High Contracting Parties shall promote the preservation and development of existing cooperation links between enterprises of the space-rocket sector.

Article 22

The High Contracting Parties shall render mutual assistance in dealing with emergencies resulting from accidents involving lines of communication, trunk pipelines, energy systems, railways and other facilities of mutual interest to the Parties.

The procedures for joint action in carrying out emergency and restoration work shall be defined by separate agreements.

Article 23

The High Contracting Parties shall cooperate in education, science, technology and in the development of research by encouraging direct links between their research organisations and carrying out joint programmes and projects, especially in the field of advanced technologies. Issues pertaining to the use of the results of joint research carried out in the course of cooperation shall be decided in each specific instance by the conclusion of separate agreements.

The Parties shall cooperate in personnel training and shall encourage the exchange of specialists, scholars, postgraduate students, work-experience trainees and students. They shall mutually recognise the equal validity of education certificates, academic degrees and titles and shall conclude a separate agreement on this issue.

The Parties shall exchange scientific and technical information and shall cooperate in the protection of copyright and related rights and other types of intellectual property pursuant to national legislation and the international obligations of their countries in this field.

Article 24

The High Contracting Parties shall develop cooperation in culture, literature, the arts, the mass media, tourism and sport.

The Parties shall cooperate in the preservation, restoration and use of their historical and cultural legacy.

The Parties shall make every endeavour to strengthen and expand professional exchanges and cooperation between groups, organisations and associations of persons engaged in literature and the arts, cinematography, book-publishing and archives of their countries, to organise festivals of traditional national culture, festivals and exhibitions of the arts, tours by artistic companies and individual performers, the exchange of cultural and specialist delegations at the state, regional and local levels, and to organise national cultural centres on the territory of their countries.

The Parties shall provide state support for the elaboration and implementation of joint projects to restore and develop the tourism industry, the development of new and promising recreation zones, and the preservation, restoration and effective use of historic, cultural and religious monuments and sites. They shall use every endeavour to encourage the strengthening of contacts between sport organisations and clubs and the joint staging of inter-state sports events.

The Parties shall jointly draw up and implement mutually beneficial programmes to develop the material and technical base of television and radio broadcasting, including satellite broadcasting, and shall ensure, on the basis of parity, the broadcasting of television and radio programmes in the Russian language in Ukraine and in the Ukrainian language in Russia.

The Parties shall promote the development of contacts between individuals, political parties, public movements, trade unions, religious organisations and associations, and health-and-fitness, sports, tourist and other associations and unions.

Separate agreements shall be concluded on the entire package of issues stipulated in this article.

Article 25

The High Contracting Parties shall cooperate in the protection and improvement of the natural environment, prevention of cross-border pollution, the rational and conservation-based use of nature, the elimination of the consequences of natural and technogenic emergencies, and shall support coordinated actions in this field at the regional and global levels, striving to establish a comprehensive system of international ecological safety.

The Parties shall proceed from the premise that issues of environmental protection and ecological safety, including the protection and use of the ecosystems and resources of the River Dnipro and other cross-border waterways, and also actions taken in the case of ecological emergencies shall be governed by separate agreements.

Article 26

The High Contracting Parties shall cooperate in the elimination of the consequences of the Chornobyl nuclear power station accident and shall conclude a separate agreement on this issue.

Article 27

The High Contracting Parties shall develop cooperation in the field of social welfare, including social security for citizens. They shall conclude special agreements to resolve issues of labour relations, employment, social welfare, compensation for injury or other damage to health arising from industrial accidents, the provision of social welfare for the citizens of one Party in current or past employment on the territory of the other Party, and other related issues requiring coordinated resolution.

The Parties shall ensure the unhindered and prompt remittance of pensions, benefits, maintenance, compensation payments for injury or other damage to health, and other social and welfare payments to the citizens of one of the Parties permanently or temporarily resident on the territory of the other Party.

Article 28

The High Contracting Parties shall cooperate on issues regarding restoration of the rights of deported nations pursuant to bilateral and multilateral agreements concluded within the framework of the CIS.

Article 29

The High Contracting Parties as Black Sea littoral states shall be ready to continue developing all-round cooperation in saving and preserving the natural environment in the Azov-Black Sea basin, conducting marine and climate research, using the recreational potentialities and natural resources of the Black and Azov Seas, and developing shipping and the operation of marine communication lines, ports and facilities.

Article 30

The High Contracting Parties shall acknowledge the importance of preserving a single technology in Ukraine and the Russian Federation for the collection, processing, distribution and use of hydrometeorological information and data on the state of the environment in the interests of their populations and national economies, and shall make every endeavour to develop cooperation in hydrometeorology and environmental monitoring.

Article 31

The High Contracting Parties shall attach particular importance to the development of mutually beneficial cooperation in health care, the improvement of public health, the production of pharmaceuticals and medical equipment and the training of highly-qualified personnel for the Parties' health care establishments.

Article 32

The High Contracting Parties Shall cooperate to resolve issues relating to the control of migration processes, including measures to prevent illegal migration from third countries, for which purpose they shall conclude a separate agreement.

Article 33

The High Contracting Parties shall cooperate in the fight against crime, first and foremost, organised crime and terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, including criminal acts against the safety of shipping, civil aviation and other forms of transport, and the illegal trade in radioactive materials, arms, narcotics and psychotropic substances and contraband, including illegal cross-border traffic in objects of cultural, historic and artistic value.

Article 34

The High Contracting Parties shall cooperate in legal matters on the basis of separate agreements.

Article 35

The High Contracting Parties shall facilitate the development of contacts and co-operation between the parliaments and parliamentarians of both states.

Article 36

This Treaty shall not affect the rights and obligations of the High Contracting Parties arising from other international treaties to which they are signatories.

Article 37

Disputes concerning the interpretation and implementation of the provisions of this Treaty shall be resolved through consultation and negotiation between the High Contracting Parties.

Article 38

The High Contracting Parties shall conclude other agreements, necessary for the implementation of the provisions of this Treaty, and other agreements in areas of mutual interest.

Article 39

This Treaty shall be subject to ratification and shall enter into force on the day of the exchange of protocols of ratification.

The Treaty of 19 November 1990 between the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic shall lapse on the day this Treaty comes into force.

Article 40

This Treaty shall have a term of ten years. It shall be renewed by default for further ten-year periods, if neither of the High Contracting Parties informs the other High

Contracting Party of its desire to terminate, such notification being given in writing and not less than six months prior to the expiry of the current ten-year term.

Article 41

This Treaty shall be subject to registration at the Secretariat of the United Nations Organisation, pursuant to Article 102 of the UN Charter.

Done in Kyiv on 31 May 1997 in two copies, each in the Ukrainian and Russian languages, both texts being of equal force.

Leonid Kuchma   *Boris Yeltsin*
President of Ukraine   President of the Russian Federation

Ukraine-NATO Sign Partnership Charter

The 'Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Ukraine', initialed on 29 May 1997 and signed by President Kuchma and Allied Heads of State and Government in Madrid on 8 July, is the culmination of what has been an intensive cooperation effort by NATO, Allied nations and the Ukrainian government.

This Charter builds upon a relationship between NATO and Ukraine which dates back to the early days of Ukrainian participation in the North Atlantic Co-operation Council in 1992 and to the Ukrainian Individual Partnership Programme of 1995. These activities paved the way for an active Ukrainian role in Partnership for Peace (PfP) and for an enhanced NATO-Ukraine relationship beyond PfP.

The Alliance and Ukraine have now taken this process one step forward. While Ukraine will be an active participant in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, further steps are required to reflect the importance which both NATO and Ukraine attach to their relationship. The first such step was the opening of the NATO Information and Documentation Centre in Kyiv, which Secretary General Javier Solana and Foreign Minister Hennadiy Udovenko inaugurated on 7 May 1997. This was the first such Centre to be opened in a NATO Partner Country.

The Charter is based on common principles shared by NATO and Ukraine and is designed to contribute to the strengthening of stability and democratic values in Central and Eastern Europe.

The implementation of the consultation and cooperation activities envisaged in the Charter will carry the partnership forward to a qualitatively new level in the years to come.

A NATO-Ukraine Commission will meet no less than twice a year and will review the overall relationship.

Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Ukraine

Madrid, 8 July 1997

I. Building an Enhanced NATO-Ukraine Relationship

1. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and its member States and Ukraine, hereinafter referred to as NATO and Ukraine,

   - building on a political commitment at the highest level;
   - recognizing the fundamental changes in the security environment in Europe which have inseparably linked the security of every state to that of all the others;
   - determined to strengthen mutual trust and cooperation in order to enhance security and stability, and to cooperate in building a stable, peaceful and undivided Europe;
   - stressing the profound transformation undertaken by NATO since the end of the Cold War and its continued adaptation to meet the changing circumstances of Euro-Atlantic security, including its support, on a case-by-case basis, of new missions of peacekeeping operations carried out under the authority of the United Nations Security Council or the responsibility of the OSCE;
   - welcoming the progress achieved by Ukraine and looking forward to further steps to develop its democratic institutions, to implement radical economic reforms, and to deepen the process of integration with the full range of European and Euro-Atlantic structures;
   - noting NATO's positive role in maintaining peace and stability in Europe and in promoting greater confidence and transparency in the Euro-Atlantic area, and its openness for cooperation with the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe, an inseparable part of which is Ukraine;
   - convinced that an independent, democratic and stable Ukraine is one of the key factors for ensuring stability in Central and Eastern Europe, and the continent as a whole;
   - mindful of the importance of a strong and enduring relationship between NATO and Ukraine and recognizing the solid progress made, across a broad range of activities, to develop an enhanced and strengthened relationship between NATO and Ukraine on the foundations created by the Joint Press Statement of 14 September 1995;
   - determined to further expand and intensify their cooperation in the framework of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, including the enhanced Partnership for Peace programme;
   - welcoming their practical cooperation within IFOR/SFOR and other peacekeeping operations on the territory of the former Yugoslavia;
   - sharing the view that the opening of the Alliance to new members, in ac-

cordance with Article 10 of the Washington Treaty, is directed at enhancing the stability of Europe, and the security of all countries in Europe without recreating dividing lines;

are committed, on the basis of this Charter, to further broaden and strengthen their cooperation and to develop a distinctive and effective partnership, which will promote further stability and common democratic values in Central and Eastern Europe.

II. Principles for the Development of NATO-Ukraine Relations

2. NATO and Ukraine will base their relationship on the principles, obligations and commitments under international law and international instruments, including the United Nations Charter, the Helsinki Final Act and subsequent OSCE documents. Accordingly, NATO and Ukraine reaffirm their commitment to:

   • the recognition that security of all states in the OSCE area is indivisible, that no state should pursue its security at the expense of that of another state, and that no state can regard any part of the OSCE region as its sphere of influence;
   • refrain from the threat or use of force against any state in any manner inconsistent with the United Nations Charter or Helsinki Final Act principles guiding participating States;
   • the inherent right of all states to choose and to implement freely their own security arrangements, and to be free to choose or change their security arrangements, including treaties of alliance, as they evolve;
   • respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of all other states, for the inviolability of frontiers, and the development of good-neighbourly relations;
   • the rule of law, the fostering of democracy, political pluralism and a market economy;
   • human rights and the rights of persons belonging to national minorities;
   • the prevention of conflicts and settlement of disputes by peaceful means in accordance with UN and OSCE principles.

3. Ukraine reaffirms its determination to carry forward its defence reforms, to strengthen democratic and civilian control of the armed forces, and to increase their interoperability with the forces of NATO and Partner countries. NATO reaffirms its support for Ukraine's efforts in these areas.

4. Ukraine welcomes NATO's continuing and active adaptation to meet the changing circumstances of Euro-Atlantic security, and its role, in cooperation with other international organizations such as the OSCE, the European Union, the Council of Europe and the Western European Union in promoting Euro-Atlantic security and fostering a general climate of trust and confidence in Europe.

III. Areas for Consultation and/or Cooperation between NATO and Ukraine

5. Reaffirming the common goal of implementation of a broad range of issues for consultation and cooperation, NATO and Ukraine commit themselves to develop and strengthen their consultation and/or cooperation in the areas described below. In this regard, NATO and Ukraine reaffirm their commitment to the full development of the EAPC and the enhanced PfP. This includes Ukrainian participation in operations, including peacekeeping operations, on a case-by-case basis, under the authority of the UN Security Council, or the responsibility of the OSCE, and, if CJTF are used in such cases, Ukrainian participation in them at an early stage on a case-by-case basis, subject to decisions by the North Atlantic Council on specific operations.

6. Consultations between NATO and Ukraine will cover issues of common concern, such as:

   • political and security related subjects, in particular the development of Euro-Atlantic security and stability, including the security of Ukraine;
   • conflict prevention, crisis management, peace support, conflict resolution and humanitarian operations, taking into account the roles of the United Nations and the OSCE in this field;
   • the political and defence aspects of nuclear, biological and chemical non-proliferation;
   • disarmament and arms control issues, including those related to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty), the Open Skies Treaty and confidence and security building measures in the 1994 Vienna Document;
   • arms exports and related technology transfers;
   • combatting drug-trafficking and terrorism.

7. Areas for consultation and cooperation, in particular through joint seminars, joint working groups, and other cooperative programmes, will cover a broad range of topics, such as:

   • civil emergency planning, and disaster preparedness;
   • civil-military relations, democratic control of the armed forces, and Ukrainian defence reform;
   • defence planning, budgeting, policy, strategy and national security concepts;
   • defence conversion;
   • NATO-Ukraine military cooperation and interoperability;
   • economic aspects of security;
   • science and technology issues;
   • environmental security issues, including nuclear safety;
   • aerospace research and development, through AGARD;
   • civil-military coordination of air traffic management and control.

8. In addition, NATO and Ukraine will explore to the broadest possible degree the following areas for cooperation:

- armaments cooperation (beyond the existing CNAD dialogue);
- military training, including PfP exercises on Ukrainian territory and NATO support for the Polish-Ukrainian peacekeeping battalion;
- promotion of defence cooperation between Ukraine and its neighbours.

9. Other areas for consultation and cooperation may be added, by mutual agreement, on the basis of experience gained.

10. Given the importance of information activities to improve reciprocal knowledge and understanding, NATO has established an Information and Documentation Centre in Kyiv. The Ukrainian side will provide its full support to the operation of the Centre in accordance with the Memorandum of Understanding between NATO and the Government of Ukraine signed at Kyiv on 7 May 1997.

IV. Practical Arrangements for Consultation and Cooperation between NATO and Ukraine

11. Consultation and cooperation as set out in this Charter will be implemented through:

- NATO-Ukraine meetings at the level of the North Atlantic Council at intervals to be mutually agreed;
- NATO-Ukraine meetings with appropriate NATO Committees as mutually agreed;
- reciprocal high level visits;
- mechanisms for military cooperation, including periodic meetings with NATO Chiefs of Defence and activities within the framework of the enhanced Partnership for Peace programme;
- a military liaison mission of Ukraine will be established as part of a Ukrainian mission to NATO in Brussels. NATO retains the right reciprocally to establish a NATO military liaison mission in Kyiv.

Meetings will normally take place at NATO Headquarters in Brussels. Under exceptional circumstances, they may be convened elsewhere, including in Ukraine, as mutually agreed. Meetings, as a rule, will take place on the basis of an agreed calendar.

12. NATO and Ukraine consider their relationship as an evolving, dynamic process. To ensure that they are developing their relationship and implementing the provisions of this Charter to the fullest extent possible, the North Atlantic Council will periodically meet with Ukraine as the NATO-Ukraine Commission, as a rule not less than twice a year. The NATO-Ukraine Commission will not duplicate the functions of other mechanisms described in this Charter, but instead would meet to assess broadly the implementation

of the relationship, survey planning for the future, and suggest ways to im-
prove or further develop cooperation between NATO and Ukraine.

13. NATO and Ukraine will encourage expanded dialogue and cooperation bet-
ween the North Atlantic Assembly and the Verkhovna Rada.

V. Cooperation for a More Secure Europe

14. NATO Allies will continue to support Ukrainian sovereignty and indepen-
dence, territorial integrity, democratic development, economic prosperity
and its status as a non-nuclear weapon state, and the principle of inviolabil-
ity of frontiers, as key factors of stability and security in Central and Eastern
Europe and in the continent as a whole.

15. NATO and Ukraine will develop a crisis consultative mechanism to consult
together whenever Ukraine perceives a direct threat to its territorial integri-
ty, political independence, or security.

16. NATO welcomes and supports the fact that Ukraine received security assur-
ances from all five nuclear-weapon states parties to the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as a non-nuclear weapon state party
to the NPT, and recalls the commitments undertaken by the United States
and the United Kingdom, together with Russia, and by France unilaterally,
which took the historic decision in Budapest in 1994 to provide Ukraine
with security assurances as a non-nuclear weapon state party to the NPT.

Ukraine's landmark decision to renounce nuclear weapons and to accede to
the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state greatly contributed to the strengthen-
ing of security and stability in Europe and has earned Ukraine special stature
in the world community. NATO welcomes Ukraine's decision to support the
indefinite extension of the NPT and its contribution to the withdrawal and
dismantlement of nuclear weapons which were based on its territory.

Ukraine's strengthened cooperation with NATO will enhance and deepen
the political dialogue between Ukraine and the members of the Alliance on
a broad range of security matters, including on nuclear issues. This will con-
tribute to the improvement of the overall security environment in Europe.

17. NATO and Ukraine note the entry into force of the CFE Flank Document on
15 May 1997. NATO and Ukraine will continue to cooperate on issues of mu-
tual interest such as CFE adaptation. NATO and Ukraine intend to improve
the operation of the CFE treaty in a changing environment and, through that,
the security of each state party, irrespective of whether it belongs to a politi-
cal-military alliance. They share the view that the presence of foreign troops
on the territory of a participating state must be in conformity with internatio-
nal law, the freely expressed consent of the host state or a relevant decision
of the United Nations Security Council.

18. Ukraine welcomes the statement by NATO members that 'enlarging the
Alliance will not require a change in NATO's current nuclear posture and,

therefore, NATO countries have no intention, no plan and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members nor any need to change any aspect of NATO's nuclear posture or nuclear policy – and do not foresee any future need to do so'.

19. NATO member States and Ukraine will continue fully to implement all agreements on disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control and confidence-building measures they are part of.

The present Charter takes effect upon its signature.

The present Charter is established in two originals in the English, French and Ukrainian languages, all three texts having equal validity.   ❏

FOR ALL UKRAINIAN STUDIES RESEARCHERS

The British Association of Ukrainian Studies web site is now up and running. It is located at http://www.bvx.ca/baus/

The site currently includes the following features:

• Latest Ukrainian Studies Events/News
• Register of Ukrainian Studies Researchers in the UK
• Ukrainian Studies Resources in Britain
• Selected Ukrainian Research Links (On-line publications, Government, etc.)
• Information for Ukrainians wishing to study in the UK
• Information on reading Cyrillic over the Internet
• Register of private accommodation in Ukraine for researchers

It would be helpful if you would send the following biographical information to us:

1. Full name and postal address
2. Brief c.v.
3. Research interests
4. List of up to five publications.

Please indicate if you prefer your e-mail address not to be posted on the web site.

If you know of other UK researchers in Ukrainian studies, please pass on details of the site to them.

Please visit and send your comments regarding the site to Paul Pirie (pspirie@sas.ac.uk).

Paul Pirie & Roman Zyla
BAUS

Reviews

A History of Ukrainian Literature. From the 11th to the End of the 19th Century. 2nd Edition. By Dmytro Čyževs'kyj with an Overview of the Twentieth Century by George S.N. Luckyj (Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences and Ukrainian Academic Press, New York and Englewood, Colorado, 1997), 815pp.

This is, in every sense, a monumental work. To Čyževs'kyj's original *magnum opus*, covering Ukrainian literature from its beginnings until – in effect – the death of Lesya Ukrayinka in 1913, there has been added what Luckyj terms a 'readers' guide', to the Ukrainian literature of the twentieth century. The latter, though deliberately eschewing any attempt at detailed criticism, and attempting (as Luckyj himself says) simply to give an 'overview', nevertheless, makes a valuable addition to the original, bringing the history of Ukrainian literature up to the present day (1995).

Čyževs'kyj's approach to his subject-matter is stylistic. 'The main purpose of periodization', he writes in his preface,

> is to characterize individual epochs. Here, the problems of the evolution of styles and of ideology become relevant. But the characterization of an epoch is not the final goal: it is also necessary to delimit the various periods, a task which is obviously not always easy.

Čyževs'kyj's 'scheme of the evolution of Ukrainian literature' is as follows:

> I. Period of monumental style – eleventh century.
> II. Period of ornamental style – twelfth and thirteenth centuries.
> III. Transitional period – fourteenth and fifteenth centuries (only a few monuments of this period have been preserved and these are in large part compilations of works that only border on literature).
> IV. Renaissance and Reformation – end of the sixteenth century.
> V. Baroque – seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
> VI. Classicism – end of the eighteenth century and the first 40 years of the nineteenth.
> VII. Romanticism – from the end of the 1820s to the beginning of the 1860s.
> VIII. Realism – from the 1860s onward. Writers of the Realistic school are still to be found today.
> IX. Modernism – from the beginning of the twentieth century onward. Ukrainian Modernism embraces various literary trends, in part original and in part linked with various contemporary trends of world literature such as Symbolism, Futurism, etc.

This approach provides ample scope for the analysis of texts not only for their content, and their relationship to the cultural, political and intellectual milieu which engendered them, but also to what Čyževs'kyj calls 'linguistic and stylistic devices'. This he does in brilliant and insightful detail – in refreshing contrast to many Ukrainian critics (both in Ukraine and in the diaspora) who so concentrate on the historical context and the 'message' of the writer that they overlook the technical mastery by which he/she conveys and enhances that message. For, however potent the content, unless

a work of literature strikes by its artistry deep roots into the imagination as well as the intellect of the reader/hearer, it will not have produced its full effect.

Not all scholars and literary critics would endorse Čyževs'kyj's approach, nor his emphasis on periodisation which, indeed, does contain certain risks. First and foremost, there is the possibility that works significantly out of step with the prevailing trend of a given period may be overlooked or relegated to a brief mention *en passant*. Čyževs'kyj, one must stress, does not fall into this trap – although he clearly experienced some difficulty with his chapter on 'Realism', not only because, writing in the diaspora, the libraries at his disposal lacked the writings of the Ukrainian realists, but also because the poetry of the period he designated as 'Realist' remained a 'repository of the vestiges of Romanticism whose strong roots in Ukraine resulted from the vital role it had played in the process of national revival'.

Strict periodisation, too, means that Ukraine's national poet, Taras Shevchenko, has to be dealt with in the context of the Romantics – occupying 70 per cent (28 pages out of 40) of the sub-chapter on 'Kievan [sic] Romanticism'. Such an arrangement may be challenged on a number of grounds – from the question in what sense Shevchenko's work may be said to be Kyivan, when he spent virtually none of his creative life in that city, or even in Ukraine, to the fact that Shevchenko's work, while certainly strongly influenced by Romanticism, is of such power and originality as to transcend the bounds of formal literary schools and conventions. For Shevchenko's work is truly *sui generis*, and as such well deserves a sub-chapter – or even a chapter – to itself. (To take an obvious analogy, few, if any, histories of the English theatre would deal with Shakespeare in a general chapter on 'Elizabethan and Jacobean drama').

Nevertheless, as Luckyj points out in his preface, although a 'caustic review' when this work first appeared, 'prompted a decisive turn in approaching literary history', the effects of which 'still resonate', nevertheless, the critics of Čyževs'kyj's works have so far not produced a new history of Ukrainian literature to replace it. It remains a standard work, and the appearance of this new, augmented English edition must be considered a major event in spreading knowledge of Ukraine and its literature in the English-speaking world.

Regarding this English version, with the exception of the additional material provided by Luckyj, the text is substantially that of the 1975 edition. To this, presumably, one must attribute not only the use of the form 'Kiev', instead of the now-official 'Kyiv', and other linguistic survivals from the Soviet period – 'Belorussian', rather than 'Belarusian', for example. (Though, since the text was presumably apparently reset, it should have been possible to make the necessary emendations). Certainly, Luckyj says in his preface, he has 'tried to correct' the 'many errors in the translation' which occurred in the first edition. In spite of his assurances, however, a number have still slipped through. Thus the sixth book of the Bible – 'Joshua' – is given as 'Nahum' (apparently a misreading of Joshua's patronymic 'son of Nun' – in Ukrainian 'Navyn'), while the work of St John Klimakos from which his cognomen is derived is called *'Climax'*. (It is unclear whether the translators intend this to represent the Greek original or an English translation – but if the former it should be spelt with an initial 'K', and if the latter it should be ren-

dered as 'The Ladder'). One may note, too, the curious passage in the list of stylistic features in Čyževs'kyj's introduction, which defines 'Metaphor (comparison)' as 'the replacement of one image by another which is similar to it' – and then cites two examples – 'the surrounding fields, *like a sea*' and 'the girl coos day and night *like a dove without its mate*'. But these are not metaphors at all, but similes – and one wonders at first reading how a scholar of such eminence could make such an error in elementary critical terminology. The key to the riddle lies in the word 'comparison'. For the Ukrainian 'porivnannya' does, indeed, have the basic sense of 'comparison', but it also means, in the context of literary criticism, 'simile'. Presumably Čyževs'kyj intended to treat these two, related, forms of imagery under the single heading: *Metafor (Porivnannya)* – i.e. 'Metaphor (Simile)'. The slip in translation here calls into doubt the competence of the original – and it is particularly regrettable, therefore, that it has still not been corrected.

Moreover, apart from such out-and-out errors, there are a number of infelicities, such as the expression 'verse poetry' – in effect, a tautology, since, although in English one may speak of a 'prose poem', the word 'poetry', used without qualification, implies the verse form. There are also a number of instances where the translators have failed to bring their text into line with normal English practice – for example, at times, they mechanically reproduce the original's use of an initial before the names of major writers (e.g. 'M. Hruševs'kyj' and 'F. Skoryna) where in English one would rather give the personal name in full – or, for persons of such eminence, omit it altogether. One must note, too, the inconsistencies in renderings of proper names from Kotlyarevskyi's *Aeneid*, which fluctuate between the Latin originals and Kotlyarevskyi's Ukrainicised versions. Since the whole humour of the poem lies in the fact that it is a travesty of Virgil's epic (with Trojans transmuted into Ukrainian Cossacks), it would be better to stick in English to the names familiar from the Latin original: Aeneas, Turnus, Latinus, Euryalus, Anchises – not Enej, Turn, Latin, Evrijal, Anxiz. At least in the cases of gods, the translators do stick to the accepted English forms – 'Venus', for example, not the Ukrainian 'Venera'.

These, however, are relatively minor blemishes, which – while they irritate – cannot detract from the overall value of the work, and which there will surely be an opportunity to eradicate in the future before the book goes, as one hopes it will, into a third edition.

Is the Holocaust Unique? Perspectives on Comparative Genocide.
Alan S. Rosenbaum, ed. (Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado and Oxford, 1996), xxi + 222pp, paperback, £10.95

This book, comprising a foreword, an editorial introduction and eight essays (each by a different author), addresses the problem raised in the title – how far, and to what respect, was Hitler's attempted 'Final Solution to the Jewish Question' unique, both in scale and intent. The issue is inevitably a delicate one. Not only have the activities of the 'Holocaust deniers' made many Jews over-sensitive to even the idea of discussing or evaluating it in the context of world history (as if the very act of dis-

cussion implied a hidden agenda of vitiating the tragedy), but also because they see
the Shoah as a validation of existence of the State of Israel. So long as there is a
Jewish state – they argue – to which Jews in danger in any part of the world have
an automatic right of admission, then no new dictator (of whatever political col-
oration) can attempt, once again, to exterminate the Jews. (Proponents of this argu-
ment tend to overlook its corollary – that the concentration of a sizeable proportion
of the world's Jews in a small area within easy bombing range from states virulent-
ly hostile to it, and dependent largely on a single source of water-supply – the
Kinnereth – leaves them potentially vulnerable to annihilation by nuclear or bio-
logical weapons!) Moreover, many Jews seem to find it easier to come to terms with
the deliberate annihilation of some 6 million of their ethnic and religious kin by
claiming the sites of their destruction as exclusively Jewish shrines – the fact that
Poles also perished in Auschwitz or Czechs at Theresienstadt renders the Jewish
tragedy less bearable for them; hence their demands
that there should be no memorial crosses to the Chris-
tian victims of these camps.

Nevertheless, although this book is written largely
from a Jewish perspective (six of the ten authors are
actively involved in Jewish studies), its purpose is not to
indulge in what Rosenbaum in his introduction terms
'the unseemly appearance of a competitive martyrdom',
indeed, as he points out, the Soviet Union under Stalin
and China under Mao 'had considerably larger numbers
of people slain than did Germany under Hitler'. It
addresses, rather, the 'core issue' of 'whether the Holo-
caust has a special or unique place on history's continu-
um of persecution, genocide, and mass death'. For,
Rosenbaum argues, if 'normative influences about "uni-
queness"... are to be warranted... the Holocaust requires
a rigorous, empirical comparison to other historical instances of mass death with suf-
ficiently relevant similarities'. The prime examples chosen in this book are the mas-
sacres of Armenians by the Turks in 1915, the forced famine in Ukraine in 1933,
Hitler's extermination of the gypsies, and – somewhat strangely – the Atlantic Slave
Trade of the eighteenth-nineteenth centuries. This latter comparison seems some-
what forced, since, in spite of the undoubted physical and mental suffering of the
victims of this trade, the basic premise of slave-trading is *not* to kill one's human
cargo, but to deliver it to market alive and sufficiently healthy to sell at a profit. Its
inclusion seems less due to any real scholarly relevance than to what the author of
this chapter, Seymour Drescher, terms the 'comparative impulse' – the 'enormous
increase in scholarly discussion and in the public visibility of the Holocaust in the
United States has', he says 'contributed to corresponding reflections on the place of
slavery in American and world history'. (In other words – dare one say it – 'political
correctness'). In addition, two more general chapters – 'The Uniqueness of the
Holocaust: The Historical Dimension' (Steven T. Katz) and 'Uniqueness as Denial:
The Politics of Genocide Scholarship' (David E. Stannard), also deal with the 'deci-
mation and population transfers of Native American peoples' while in 'The Armenian
Genocide as Precursor and Prototype of Twentieth-Century Genocide' Robert F.

IS THE
HOLOCAUST
UNIQUE?

❖ ❖ ❖

PERSPECTIVES ON
COMPARATIVE
GENOCIDE

Melson also draws comparisons with Nigeria/Biafra in the 1960s, and the Balkans in the 1990s. The 'historical perspective', one may note, is basically that of the twentieth century (save for two *excursi* into North American history of the eighteenth and nineteenth), with the more distant past (the Crusades, the destruction of Jerusalem) referred to only in passing. This means that one of the more striking potential parallels is omitted – which is particularly regrettable in view of the perception of Richard L. Rubenstein ('Religion and the Uniqueness of the Holocaust'), who sees the Holocaust as 'a modern version of a Christian holy war carried out by a neopagan National Socialist state hostile to Christianity'. Here, surely, it would have been relevant to refer to the 'holy wars' of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, directed against the pagans of North-East Europe, which in the case of the (original) Prussians, resulted not only in their physical annihilation, but also the assumption of their name by the descendants of the very warriors who had exterminated them!

To turn, however, to the material which will be of particular relevance to our readers, the Ukrainian famine of 1933 is treated by two authors: Barbara B. Green ('Stalinist Terror and the Question of Genocide: The Great Famine') and Katz in his chapter on the 'historical dimension'. We may note that the Armenian massacres are also discussed by two authors: Vahakn N. Dadrian (by his name, clearly an Armenian, and the author of a number of major works on the Armenian genocide) in 'The Comparative Aspects of the Armenian and Jewish Cases of Genocide: A Sociohistorical Perspective', and Robert F. Melson (co-director of the Jewish Studies Program at Purdue University) in 'The Armenian Genocide as Precursor and Prototype of Twentieth-Century Genocide'. Since, even the most detached academic cannot entirely free himself from his own cultural and psychological background – or even the scholarly milieu of his major field of work – this choice of authors provides, as it were, a stereoscopic view, allowing the problem to be seen in perspective. The Ukrainian case, however, is somewhat less fortunate in that neither of the authors who address the issue of the Famine appear to have any special expertise or professional involvement in Ukrainian studies. Professor Green, who authored the chapter on the Great Famine, according to her biographical note,

> is professor of political science (and former associate provost and vice president) at Cleveland State University, Ohio. She is the author of *The Dynamics of Russian Politics: A Short History* (1994). Her other writings have appeared in many professional journals. In a recent issue of *Wellesley* magazine (Winter 1994), First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton cited Green as among the best and most brilliant teachers she ever had.

Which is all very well – but does it qualify her to write on the Ukrainian famine? And, more precisely, how does it qualify her to treat the subject from a Ukrainian perspective, providing the kind of stereoscopic vision which, as we have noted, was accorded the Armenian massacres.

Green's chapter begins by outlining the conflicting views on the famine: those who see it as a 'deliberate and intended' attack on Ukraine, 'deliberately engineered by Stalin to crush the Ukrainian people' (Robert Conquest, James E. Mace, Marco Carynnyk), those who see it as part of an overall Soviet policy of transforming the peasantry, and who '[f]or the most part,... merge Ukrainians with Russians and then label them all "Russian"' (Robert Tucker, Adam Ulam, Martin Malia) and the maver-

ick Stephen Wheatcraft who argues that 'the famine was not created to weaken Ukrainian nationalism. Rather, Ukrainian nationalism was weakened as a consequence of the famine'. She then states her own view: that Ukrainian peasants suffered 'not because they were Ukrainians but because they were peasants' and that

> the deaths of millions of Ukrainians and other Soviet peoples in the famine of 1932-1933 are directly attributable to Stalin's attempt to totally reconstruct (sic) society through rapid industrialization, an effort in which he was determined that nothing would stand in his way... There were mass deaths and overwhelming suffering as a result of excessive grain procurement, but this was not genocide... My intent is to establish that this effort to totally reconstruct society can in itself account for the excess grain procurement that led to mass deaths and the famine.

Professor Green appears to bring to her subject less than an academic detachment. (The use of the word 'intent' – unless it is a lapse of style comparable to her repeated split infinitives – suggests a piece of work undertaken to argue a specific case – rather than a piece of unbiased research). In support of her view she quotes, among others, David R. Marples (a scholar who does have some background in Ukrainian affairs – albeit specialising in energy policy and the aftermath of the Chornobyl disaster). Marples, she says, 'after reviewing recent publications by the Institute of History of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, concludes:

> It is more logical to perceive Stalinist agricultural policies, for example, as motivated by a desire for the acquisition of grain rather than by an aversion to Ukrainians as an ethnic or national group... . Because the effects of Soviet policies have been so tragic, the worst motives on the part of the perpetrators are often assumed.

Not surprisingly, Green provides no conclusive evidence in support of her thesis. Mace and Conquest, she says,

> point to the fact that the famine stopped at the Byelorussian-Ukrainian border in the north and the Russo-Ukrainian border in the northeast. The Russo-Ukrainian border was closed by security troops to prevent Ukrainian peasants from getting out to find food. If they did manage to leave, they were not allowed to return with food. However, the border with Byelorussia apparently was not closed.

In other words, the famine was not deliberate, because starving Ukrainian peasants could cross the border into Belarus where the famine was less severe.

But, leaving aside the question of whether, in the conditions of the 1930s, it would have been possible to police the entire length of that border, in the very next paragraph, Green in effect contradicts her own assertion.

> On April 22, 1933, Stalin and Molotov circulated a directive in response to mass exodus from the North Caucasus and Ukraine to the central regions of Russia and Byelorussia... Local authorities and the OGPU were ordered to prevent mass departures and to immediately arrest the 'peasants' of the Ukraine and North Caucasus who made their way north....

The border might not be sealed, but Ukrainians were not permitted to find safety in Belarus!

Discussion of whether or not the Famine was 'genocide' depends, of course, on how one defines genocide. Green does not offer a satisfactory definition – merely a quotation from Michael Ignatieff's *Blood and Belonging* (see *The Ukrainian Re-*

view, vol. 41, no. 1, 1994) – the book from the TV series of the same name, based on personal memories and impressions, not scholarly rigour. She takes the line, however, that the Famine was not genocide because a) it was not (in her view) intentional, and b) that it did not aim at killing Ukrainians *per se*. 'The purpose was not to exterminate Ukrainians as a people simply because they were Ukrainians. Extermination was not an end in itself'.

Katz, while not committing himself as to whether the Famine was, in fact, deliberate, concurs with Green that it was not genocide. While not wishing 'to support any diminution or denial of this vast collective tragedy', he says, even if one considers that the Famine was deliberately engineered, it

> do[es] *not* constitute the technical crime of genocide... [T]he ruthless campaign against Ukrainian nationalism that destroyed a majority of the indigenous Ukrainian cultural and political elite, in addition to a significant segment of the peasant population of the region, is most correctly categorized as an instance of nationalist conflict and internal colonialism rather than as an example of genocide. Stalin did not intend to exterminate the entire population of Ukraine,... he wanted to exploit them. Eliminating the whole of a vanquished helot population makes no more sense than slaughtering one's slaves.

The difference between the Famine and the Shoah, he concludes, is that 'Stalin intended that after the famine there should still be Ukrainians, though not Ukrainianism; Hitler intended that after Auschwitz there would be neither Jews nor Judaism'.

But this, again, raises the question: how much is the physical survival of a nation's gene-pool worth if its whole identity is destroyed? History knows all too many instances of the disappearance from the map of conquered peoples – but relatively few of total annihilation. Assimilation by enslavement – preceded, if necessary, by the slaughter of potential leaders (as Astyanax is murdered in Euripides' *Trojan Women*) – was, for millennia, the norm of conquest. (As Arnold Toynbee has pointed out, the Jews' survival of the Babylonian captivity as an ethnic/religious entity was an unprecedented phenomenon in the ancient world).

There certainly appears to be an alternative school of thought which considers that the destruction of the consciousness of ethnic identity is also genocide (the term is used, for example, by the Australian aborigines in their current campaign for compensation in respect of the assimilationist policies of former governments). Some writers on the subject – whether for moral or linguistic reasons – draw a distinction between (physical) 'genocide' and the destruction of a nation's identity – 'ethnocide'.

That the contributors to this book in the main ignore the 'ethnocide' dimension is undoubtedly a major flaw – particularly in the context of Ukraine. Regrettable, too, is the fact that the main writer on the Famine appears to have no special competence in Ukrainian affairs, and treats it from a seemingly preconceived and Russo-centric standpoint.

Nevertheless, with all its faults, the book provides an interesting insight into what Stannard terms 'genocide politics', in particular his assertion in the concluding paragraph to the collection – that

> there is no longer any excuse for maintaining the self-serving masquerade of Jewish genocide uniqueness – the endlessly refined and revised deception that serves equally to deny the sufferings of others, and thus, in murderous complicity with both past and present genocidal regimes, to place those terribly damaged others even closer to harms' way.

'Theirs But to Do and Die'. The Poetry of the Charge of the Light
Brigade at Balaklava, 25 October 1854. By Patrick Waddington
(Astra Press, Nottingham, 1995), 224 pp. illustrated

The 'Charge of the Light Brigade' – both the event, and the poem by the then Poet
Laureate, Alfred, Lord Tennyson – have, over the past 140 years, become part of
the British collective psyche. Yet out of the tens of millions who recall at least part
of the poem from their school-days, few would be able to name the country in
which it took place. Apart from the poem, Balaklava (more commonly spelt 'Bala-
clava'), evokes, first and foremost, a type of knitted head-gear. At the most, they
might associate it with the Crimean War. But until 14 September 1994, when, short-
ly before the 140th anniversary of the Charge, a memorial was erected to the fallen,
few would have associated it with Ukraine. Yet, as Patrick Waddington points out
in the closing sentence of this book, it is in Ukraine that 'the battle site and its
untold casualties now lie'.

As George Orwell observed (in a passage from *The Lion and the Unicorn: So-
cialism and the English Genius*, quoted by Mr Waddington in his introduction),

> English literature, like other literatures, is full of battle-poems, but... the ones that have
> won for themselves a kind of popularity are always a tale of disasters and retreats... The
> most stirring battle-poem in English is about a brigade of cavalry which charged in the
> wrong direction.

Orwell's remark is open to challenge: the two great monologues from Shake-
speare's *Henry V*, before the battles of Harfleur and Agincourt, refer to events which
were English victories, and which (even if generally run together in the memory of
the man-in-the-street) do, undoubtedly, enjoy the 'kind of popularity' of which
Orwell spoke. Nevertheless, in general terms, Orwell is right – and the Charge of
the Light Brigade is a notable example of a tradition which goes back to the very
roots of English poetry, to the 'Finnsburg fragment' and The Battle of Maldon – to
the unflinching bravery of heroes faced with impossible odds.

Perhaps because of the appeal of such a subject, Tennyson's poem was by no
means the only one inspired by the Charge. In this collection, Mr Waddington pre-
sents, alongside the Laureate's tribute, an additional 45, plus three 'poems arising'
– one dealing with a reunion banquet, 21 years after the event, and the other two
with the destitution facing the last survivors in old age. Thus, in all, the collection
comprises 49 poems, beginning with Tennyson's magnificent tribute, and ending
with Rudyard Kipling's bitterly ironic 'The Last of the Light Brigade'. Of the authors
of the 47 intervening pieces, only a few are familiar names today: Richard D.
Blackmore, author of *Lorna Doone*, and Julia Ward Howe of Boston, Massachu-
setts, author of 'The battle hymn of the Republic'. The others cover a wide range
of professions and social groups, including a member of the British nobility (the
first Earl of Ellesmere), a Cambridge undergraduate (and winner of the Chancellor's
prize for poetry – John Sumner Gilbert), a satirist from *Punch* (Tom Taylor), a bar-
rister (Sir Francis Hastings Charles Doyle), an actor (George Barlow), a Colonel in
the British Army (Henry Dunn O'Halloran), a coal merchant (Robert Franklin), a
'Retired Liverpool Merchant' (otherwise unidentified) and a number of women,

including one (Lydia Mellard of Edinburgh), whom Mr Waddington postulates may have been one of Florence Nightingale's nurses. They come from national and local papers throughout the English-speaking world, and also from individual collections of poems. Several originally had musical settings, and one was seemingly intended for a full-scale theatrical performance.

Styles range from individual quatrains (including a sea-shanty) to elaborate odes and sonnets. The quality of the verse ranges from excellent to abysmal, with the less skilled poets indulging in such Victorian tricks of style as the capitalisation of significant words and a regrettable tendency to be over-clever with rhyme:

> Mid the battle's seething lava,
> And each man who fell shall have a
> Proud inscription – BALAKLAVA –
>   Which shall never fade away.

or

> Far away, the Russian Eagles
>   Soar o'er smoking hill and dell,
> And their hordes, like howling beagles,
>   Dense and countless, round them yell!
> Thundering cannon, deadly mortar,
> Sweep the field on every quarter!
> Never, since the days of Jesus,
> Trembled so the Chersonesus!

or, the type-setters' nightmare of

> *Madly magnificent!* – it may be GLORY!
> No doubt 'twill brightly shine in future story;
> (Thus spake, and grimly smiled, a veteran hoary),
> The like in DARING, earth may never see,
> BUT 'TIS NOT <u>WAR</u> – whatever ELSE it be.
> Mourn, Britain, mourn, each martyred hero's loss,
> No nobler deeds have earned *'Victoria's Cross'*.
> Imperial Rome <u>ONE</u> *Quintus Curtius* found;
>   *'Six hundred'* here,
>   Unknown to fear,
> Have left their memory on Crimean ground!

The moods range from patriotic pride to elegies for the fallen; a few poems try to justify the commanders, Cardigan and Lucan, or to assert that in reality no one 'had blundered', and that the Charge, in spite of the huge death toll, was a military necessity. A number of pieces stress the role of individual components of the Light Brigade – the Irish and Scots in particular. Many see the Charge (however disastrous in itself) as part of a larger struggle against tyranny:

> God of Battles! but 'twere glorious to have mounted Victory's Car,
> When the Cavalry of Europe smote the squadrons of the Czar!
> 'Tis brave while banners wave, to be where Freedom's Champions are.
> And burst upon the Enemy like Gods from clouds of War!

or

> Tell ye the Despot to his face
> We'll meet him where – in pride of place
> His loftiest banners fly.

or

> We'll scatter those serfs of Muscovy
> If they dare approach us here.

And all contributions, irrespective of their poetic merits or the viewpoint of the individual author, exhibit an undoubted sincerity that mirrors the public response to a disastrous event in a war which marked the beginning of such modern techniques of journalism as correspondents at the front, war artists – and photography.

Mr Waddington's book, however, gives us far more than the poems. There is an extensive preface, going into the historical background of the Crimean War, the Battle of Balaklava, and the 'blunder' which triggered the Charge. Each poem, moreover, is accompanied by biographical notes on its author (representing a considerable research effort on the compiler's part), and some observations on style and content. There is a well-chosen selection of illustrations, from imaginative renderings of the Charge itself to a *Punch* cartoon showing the various reactions of a typical Victorian family as *paterfamilias* reads aloud the newspaper account of the Charge – from the small son playing at being a gallant cavalryman to the older daughters' concern over the fate of brothers or sweethearts. Finally, there is an extensive General Bibliography and also a specific Bibliography on Crimean War poetry in general. In short, this book presents some fascinating insights into mid-Victorian social, military and literary history, at a time when the accident of war had brought to the foreground of British consciousness an area of Europe which – almost a century and a half later – their descendants would learn is Ukraine.   ❑

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Current Events

Ukraine in the Context
of NATO Enlargement

Roman Wolczuk

ATO enlargement throws up more questions than it answers in terms of its
implications for Ukraine's relations with both the West and the East. If up
till now Ukraine would claim that it had pursued a line of benign equi-
distance between the two poles, Russia, its traditional 'ally', would most probably
choose to differ; Europe (and the US) on the other hand have probably been sur-
prised at the sudden intimacy on the part of the Ukrainians. However, with en-
largement the stakes have now changed more profoundly than could have been
foreseen by Ukraine when it went its own way in 1991. Hence, Ukraine is facing
choices for which it is ill-prepared, primarily in terms of a society divided on a
regional, ethnic, linguistic, political and even religious basis. This article will aim to
identify the impact of these variables on Ukraine's reaction to NATO expansion
(and the limitations they put on that reaction). It will begin with an overview of
Russian-Ukrainian and Europe/NATO-Ukrainian relations since independence and
then proceed to elaborate in particular on the attitude held by the political élites
towards these events.

External Constraints in the Evolution of
Ukraine's Foreign and Security Policy

Russia and Ukraine

In the days immediately following independence in 1991, Ukraine's foreign and
security policy was characterised by three key features: a commitment to neutrali-
ty, non-bloc status and a preparedness to rid itself of nuclear weapons.[1] Despite
the somewhat supercilious tone which tends to accompany any reference made
by the Ukrainians to the achievement of, in particular, the last of these aims, this
policy was, in reality, imposed on Kyiv by external factors; it was not the unselfish-
ly altruistic act it is often made out to be. It was a policy determined by the sheer
volatility of the circumstances surrounding Ukraine's sudden and unexpected ap-
pearance on the international scene (the August coup, the proclamation of inde-
pendence, the Belavezha Agreement signalling the collapse of the Soviet Union,
the humiliation and ousting of Gorbachev as President of the Soviet Union – all in

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[1] 'Declaration on the State Sovereignty of Ukraine', 16 July 1990. The declaration refers to the inten-
tion 'to become in the future a permanently neutral state, which does not participate in military blocs
and which maintains three non-nuclear principles: not to accept, manufacture or acquire nuclear
weapons'.

the space of a few short months) cobbled together by individuals who had, almost literally, overnight metamorphosed from colonial administrators into foreign policy makers. As a result, policy was being made on the hoof by an inexperienced foreign office staff[2] in conjunction with a bewildered and divided political élite.[3] Under the circumstances, Ukraine needed a policy that would buy time and offer it some protection (i.e. breathing space) in the short term, to gain the trust of a suspicious and fearful West on the one hand, and at least a temporary respite from a domineering, implacable and inconsolable Russian neighbour on the other. Since the latter was of more immediate concern, the policy of, in particular, non-alignment and neutrality was designed to display its non-hostile intent. *Within* this context, it has to be recognised that independence had as much to do with a conservative domestic polity aghast at the economic and political liberalism sweeping Russia under Yeltsin (with all of the associated ramifications of change in a resistant Ukraine), as it did with any sort of strivings towards independence (as evidenced by the increasingly vociferous west Ukrainian nationalists whose voice was now being heard increasingly loudly in Kyiv). *Beyond* this context, however, it was soon clear that the long-term implications of any reorientation towards the West would be profound – the Soviet Union had fallen behind badly in economic competition and the technological race, and for Ukraine to be tied inextricably to Russia (economically and politically as it had been till now) meant the type of eventual obsolescence that path dependency[4] leads to; a turn to Europe represented a possible, though by no means probable, way out of this decline.

The steely determination of the newly independent state to go it alone was demonstrated early on by its policy regarding the armed forces. Two days after the coup attempt, on 24 August 1991 the Ukrainian parliament, keen to avoid the mistakes of the previous independent administration,[5] set about creating its own armed forces by claiming for itself the Soviet forces on its territory. Owing to the role of Ukraine – and, in particular, that of the Carpathian Military District – as the front line in any attack, the new state inherited no less than some 40 per cent of the total forces of the USSR – 1.2 million soldiers together with some of the best Soviet equipment. The numbers and quality of these troops give some idea of the priority attributed to 'the Ukrainian border region' in Soviet strategic planning. The blow that this delivered to Russia's wish to maintain a unified military body was not as galling as the fact that the 'common defence space', namely the strategically critical early warning system (based in Kyiv, Minsk and Riga on the west-

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[2] Despite being a founder member and having a seat at the United Nations since its inception, Ukraine's role prior to independence was simply to add its vote to that of the USSR. In addition, although the Ukrainian SSR had an office dealing with foreign affairs, this was little more than an administrative addendum to that in Moscow.

[3] At this stage, i.e. immediately following independence, the national democrats and the nationalists clearly had the upper hand in taking initiatives in parliament, especially now that their most important recruit, i.e. Leonid Kravchuk, was in charge. On 30 August 1991 the Communist Party was formally banned.

[4] Douglas C. North, *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

[5] The short-lived and non-militarised Ukrainian National Republic, 1917-20.

ern side), was suddenly left with gaping holes (which were eventually rectified by the setting up of a unified air defence system at the 1995 CIS summit).[6]

Once having made its contribution to stabilising a highly volatile situation and having dealt with the greatest immediate threat to independence, Ukraine has ever since been making a sustained effort at turning independence into something more than a 'geographical expression'.[7] In this regard, in addition to its refusal to sign the Collective Security Treaty in May 1992 and its ongoing and obstinate reluctance to being drawn into any non-economic CIS bodies ever since,[8] particularly noteworthy has been the stand taken by Ukraine over Russian claims to Crimea and Sevastopol and their implicit threat to the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the new state. From the Russian point of view, claims to these long held territories, aside from any psychological attachment, represent an attempt to hang on to a semblance of military influence in Ukraine and the Black Sea region. Hardly less important are the wider strategic implications: the Russians have an eye to some future time when they will be able to reclaim mastery over the Black Sea (with a rejuvenated fleet) thereby limiting the growing Turkish influence in the Muslim world, and to take advantage of the access through the Bosphorus and Dardanelles to the Mediterranean. More directly, there is the potential threat to Ukraine's maritime trade, and in the longer term the possibility that any efforts at energy independence from Russia (for example, through the building of the Odesa oil terminal – which is proceeding very slowly through lack of funds) would be undermined. From a strictly military-strategic Ukrainian point of view, it represents a point of naked vulnerability. In theory, Ukraine's only fully safe border is its southern littoral, but, in practice, this is hardly so, split as it is by a Crimea dominated by Russians,[9] and a Sevastopol firmly in the grasp of the pro-Moscow Black Sea Fleet. It hardly needs a military strategist to point out that Russian preoccupations with the peninsula are more than symbolic.

The military-territorial dimension represents only one of the possible ways by which Russia can exert pressure on Ukraine in order to limit the encroachment of the West and to keep Kyiv within Moscow's sphere of influence. Others include Russian oil and Ukraine's utter dependence on it,[10] the 11 million ethnic Russians concentrated in the highly industrialised and hard currency earning Eastern and Southern Ukraine[11] and the mutual economic interdependence of the two states. Despite the fact that trade between the two countries has tailed off fairly drastically since independence (with overall Ukrainian imports of Russian goods down from 70 per cent in 1991 to 50 per cent in 1996, for example) they are still each the

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[6] Nevertheless, Ukraine remains outside the many CIS structures, always apprehensive about the supranational role ultimately envisaged for the organisation. See: Anton Filipenko, 'The CIS Economic Union: Pros and Cons', *Politics and the Times* (1995), October-December, pp. 58-65.

[7] James Sherr, *Ukraine, Russia, Europe* (Conflict Studies Research Centre, October 1996).

[8] Filipenko, op. cit.

[9] Russians make up 67 per cent of the population of Crimea.

[10] Aslund suggests that oil imports were reduced by 75 per cent in the years following independence. Anders Aslund, 'Ukraine: From Crisis to Reform', *Post Soviet Prospects*, vol. III, no. 2, March 1995.

[11] It has been suggested that Donetsk and Dnipropetrovsk collectively earn something approaching 40 per cent of Ukraine's foreign currency. Grzegorz Gorny, 'Wojna Klanów', *Więz*, Padziernik 1996.

major trading partner of the other. However, despite this mutual economic reliance, Ukraine is reluctant to get too deeply entangled with the CIS economic and political structures, owing to its now well-grounded suspicion that current interparliamentary CIS institutions are likely to evolve into supranational institutions effectively under Russian control.[12] Ukrainian researchers point to the proposed voting system in the CIS Interparliamentary Assembly as a good example of this. Voting in this institution was supposed to be on the basis of one vote per delegation with motions requiring 'a consensus' (i.e. unanimity) in order to be carried. However, hidden amongst the clauses was the proposal that 'the one vote per delegation will apply as long as no other decisions have been taken which supersede the aforementioned point'; hence, it is not difficult to envisage a situation in which such superseding decisions might be made. A good example of such a situation might be the suggestion made in the Russian Duma in April 1995 for voting to take place 'on a quota basis', i.e. with votes weighted according to percentage of the population, with Russia getting something like 40 per cent of the vote (in line with the fact that it has 40 per cent of the total CIS population) and Ukraine 17 per cent. If decisions in the CIS body were subsequently to be made on the basis of a qualified majority (which, incidentally, has been mooted, and could at present be easily achieved by the Russians thanks to the current automatic support of Lukašenka's Belarus), the Ukrainians could be easily outvoted on all major issues, so that their role in that body would be reduced to that of observers.[13]

It should be pointed out, however, that portraying Ukraine as the enemy/traitor has its advantages. Firstly, it provides an underpinning for the Belarusian-Russian *rapprochement* in the face of domestic objections (as, of course, does NATO enlargement). Secondly, it helps maintain the cohesion of an apparently disintegrating Russia: while the Eastern regions and constituent republics of the Russian Federation may be keen to withhold taxes from Moscow, they are also astute enough to recognise the security benefits provided by the armed forces of a unified Russian state. Thirdly, by continuing to identify NATO as the enemy in the West and treating Ukraine's western border as the line which must *not* be crossed, the impoverished military is attempting to stimulate an increase in the drastically reduced expenditure on hardware. 'Ukraine – the Traitor' even serves personal ambitions; it is difficult to interpret the mayor of Moscow Yuriy Luzhkov's outbursts on 'Russian Crimea' as anything other than electioneering for the presidency.

Overall, Ukrainian-Russian relations can be analysed on a number of levels. Russia refers to an 'independent Ukraine' through gritted teeth, formally acknowledging the status accorded it by international protocol. On a more practical level, this has been accompanied by efforts to maintain the country within its sphere of influence and ultimately reintegrate it with Russia, in line with the strategies outlined in documents such as 'Will the Soviet Union be reanimated in 2005?'.[14] In this context, a Ukraine sidling up to NATO, let alone *in it*, is the ultimate abhorrence.

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[12] Filipenko, op. cit.

[13] Correspondence with Mykhailo Honchar from the National Institute of Strategic Studies, Kyiv.

[14] Volodymyr Zvihlyanych, 'Pryvid Integratsiyi v Rosiyi: Uroky Dlya Zakhodu i Ukrayiny', *Politychnyi Portret Ukrayiny*, no. 18, 1997, pp. 3-23.

Ukraine and the West

Ukraine's past, as a constituent republic of the USSR, means that its relations with Russia differ qualitatively and quantitatively from those of the former 'satellites' of Central and Eastern Europe, and this, by default, relegates Kyiv to a different league when it comes to relations with the West. Despite this, while Ukraine has been trying to keep Russia at arm's length, the same cannot be said for its relationship with the West. Its efforts at European integration through institutional relationships[15] have been characterised by their vigour and were evident from the very first days of independence. The fact that, in the early days, this was a somewhat one-sided effort on the part of Ukraine, not reciprocated by actors in the West, was something of an irritation in Kyiv (where it was clearly felt that Ukraine was entitled to some sort of reward for its contribution to the dissolution of the USSR) as was made clear by President Kuchma in a speech to representatives of the diplomatic corps in Kyiv in 1994:

> unfortunately, I cannot say that Ukraine is being treated as an equal partner, with full and fair rights, in its cooperation with European and other Western countries, as we had expected... owing to a lack of understanding of Ukraine as a political and economic partner, [and] a certain degree of prejudice and egoism [sic].[16]

This reflects the fact that the West continued to be suspicious of the true intentions of the newly independent state: by the time Leonid Kuchma was elected president in July 1994 the lack of reform under his predecessor, Leonid Kravchuk, was choking an already gasping economy, leading to a degree of exasperation internationally with the latter; in addition, there had been hiccups in the Supreme Council in the ratification of START 1,[17] and on more than one occasion the Ukrainian parliament had expressed a distinct unwillingness to part with its nuclear weapons. By now, too, grave doubts had developed about Russia's commitment to democracy, evolved by such developments as: the storming of the Russian parliament in October 1993, the prolonged war in Chechnya, ongoing 'peacekeeping' duties in the 'near abroad', continual references to Russian ownership of Crimea/Sevastopol,[18] and the worrying popularity of Zhirinovskiy and (later) Lebed in the presidential elections. In other words, Ukraine and Russia combined to represent all that was least salubrious about post-communist states. Nevertheless, the major European institutions responded cautiously though favourably to the tentative steps made by each of these to form relations.[19]

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[15] See my article: Roman Wolczuk, 'Ukraine and Europe: Relations Since Independence, *The Ukrainian Review*, vol. 44, no. 1, Spring 1997.

[16] *Uryadovyi Kuryer*, 26 July 1994, no. 115, p. 3.

[17] Finally signed on 3 February 1994, entering into force on 5 December 1994 only after Ukraine had deposited its instrument of NPT ratification.

[18] In 1992 the Supreme Soviet of Russia passed a motion recognising as unlawful the transfer to Ukraine of Crimea in 1954; in 1993 a resolution was passed in the Duma on the 'Russian status' of Sevastopol; towards the end of 1996 the whole issue of Crimea, Sevastopol and the Black Sea Fleet became once again the subject of debate in the Duma.

[19] Roman Wolczuk, op. cit.

However, from the beginning it was evident that the West had a hidden agenda in its dealings with the Newly Independent States. An example of this is the Partnership for Peace (PfP) agreement signed between Ukraine and NATO in February 1994. PfP appears to have been designed to undermine attempts at any CIS military cooperation; a strategy which was vindicated once it emerged that Moscow regarded membership of the CIS Collective Security Treaty as incompatible with the PfP framework: the partnership agreements were designed by NATO on a country-by-country basis thereby limiting the scope for the creation of a collective CIS framework.

In line with this *divide et impera* strategy Ukrainian enthusiasm for PfP and intransigence in the face of pressure to accede to the Tashkent Treaty was soon to be rewarded in other spheres.

Of particular interest in this regard has been the development of relations with the Western European Union (WEU) – the putative military arm of the EU. Owing to the increasingly integral role of the WEU both in NATO and the EU, this has obvious and potentially far-reaching ramifications for Ukraine's ultimate 'strategic objective'[20] of membership of the European Union.

On many occasions, Kuchma has placed considerable emphasis on associate partnership with the WEU.[21] Hence when Ukraine was rejected from participating even in the Consultative Forum of the organisation, this decision was taken badly by Kyiv, particularly since Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania had been accepted under the 6+3 formula (where the six are Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania). This decision was especially galling in light of the fact that while the 'six' participated on the basis of their Associate Membership of the EU, the 'three', according to the General Secretary of the WEU, did so only on the basis of *anticipated* Associate Membership.[22] That this in no way dampened Ukrainian resolve was evidenced in June 1996, when President Kuchma, in his speech to the Assembly of the Western European Union, expressed his dissatisfaction with the 6+3 formula and its implications of a new eastern border, and stressed Ukraine's willingness to accept 'all the responsibilities of associate membership'.[23]

There was thus great disappointment at Ukraine's being rebuffed time after time, most recently during the visit to Kyiv in September 1996 by Jose Cutileiro,[24] the Secretary General of the WEU, who referred again to the need for an Association Agreement to be signed between Ukraine and the EU before associate partnership could be granted.

There are, however, some difficulties in determining the exact nature of the WEU and its relationship with both NATO and the EU: the body is currently being used as material in a tug of war between 'Atlanticists' (i.e. the British) and the 'integrationists' (i.e. the French and Germans), and the whole issue clearly has some

[20] *Uryadovyi Kuryer*, 8 June 1996, no. 104-105.
[21] Ibid.
[22] Oleksander Dubyna, 'Prahnemo do mitsnishykh kontaktiv', *Polityka i Chas*, 1994, June, pp. 9-10. Interview with the General Secretary of the Western European Union.
[23] *Uryadovyi Kuryer*, 8 June 1996, no. 104-105.
[24] *Ukrayina Moloda*, 21 September 1996, no. 104 (520).

way to go before it is likely to be resolved.[25] Nevertheless, from Ukraine's point of view, associate partnership represents the most likely opportunity of entry by the 'back door' at some time in the future, by being automatically carried along by the WEU in the general integration process.

Even Ukraine's membership of NATO is now being mooted in official circles as a possibility. Following the onset of the war in Chechnya, it was very soon apparent that the Russian army was a shadow of its former (Soviet) self, relatively impotent in the face of bedraggled though fiercely resistant militia; facing criticism at home and humiliation on the international scene, Moscow was and continues to be powerless to prevent NATO enlargement and unable to prevent the development of increasingly strong ties between Ukraine and the West. Thus once it was clear that the first round of enlargement would proceed without too much concrete objection from the Russians, Ukraine was apparently given a fairly explicit 'all clear' to start considering the issue. At the conclusion of the visit of Volodymyr Horbulin, the Secretary of the Council of Security and Defence, to Washington in September 1996, 'the American side made it patently clear that the choice of whether to join NATO or not lies only with Ukraine. The door is always open'.[26]

While Kyiv is clearly taking advantage of this warmer relationship in its battle of wills with Moscow (it is also probably being used to extract concessions from the Russians), the fact remains that Ukraine is now the recipient of the third largest amount of US aid, after Egypt and Israel, further testimony to the recognition that Ukraine has now gone beyond being a 'geographical expression' and, as shall be seen below, may in fact serve as a useful tool in the West's dealings with Russia. There is clearly an awareness on the part of the West that Ukraine is more than a transitory phenomenon. Indeed, despite the ongoing difficulties, Ukraine has probably sustained the most prolonged period of genuine independence in its history, and, compared to previous episodes, is more favourably equipped to continue to do so for some time to come.

Ukraine in the wider context

From Kyiv's point of view the challenge presented by NATO expansion lies in the effect that its reverberations are likely to have on Ukraine. To understand fully the nature of the forces unleashed in both the East and West by enlargement, and which Ukraine must now face, it is necessary to consider the 'broad picture', an exercise which, in spite of its necessary simplifications, is not without some merit.

Quite simply, since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe has taken on a pivotal importance owing to the power vacuum that exists in the region. In this context (bolstered by historical experience), one of NATO's primary responsibilities in Europe is to keep the Germans and Russians apart and out of each other's territory:

> Put in the parlance of the strategist, NATO's core mission is to prevent the overall domination of Europe by a hostile power or bloc of powers which strive to deny the conti-

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[25] Despite recent efforts on the part of the Franco-German alliance to turn the WEU into a more meaningful defence arm, supported by 10 EU states, objections made by Britain and the four neutral member states means that 'the Paris-Bonn plan is dead'. *Financial Times*, 6 May 1997.

[26] *Narodna Armiya*, 27 September 1996, no. 160 (1150).

nent of its overall freedom and security.... The US has a vital interest in the freedom and security of Europe regardless of whether a hostile attack is imminent. Who is to say whether Russia or some other country may or may not be a threat to Europe ten or twenty years from now? It is not the immediacy of the threat that counts, but the depth of America's vital interest in the basic security condition of Europe.[27]

Thus, in the context of any emergent Russia-West confrontation implied in the above, it becomes reasonable to conceptualise Ukraine as the centre ground, which in the case of a stalemate would leave Ukraine precisely in the limbo it desperately wishes to avoid; in the case of an (unlikely) clash it becomes the battle ground. Either way, Ukraine is not an actor, merely the stage.

Within this stark framework, the NATO/US presence in Europe becomes justified by the perception of threat presented by an admittedly enfeebled though still powerful Russia, still intent on carrying the mantle of the Soviet 'evil empire' and keeping Ukraine under its influence. By overcoming and replacing this influence, a favourably inclined Ukraine becomes a shield behind which NATO can continue to consolidate.

Conversely, as Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic gradually become incorporated into the NATO structure, the Russians increasingly perceive a neutral (or, indeed, pro-Russian) Ukraine as a buffer – an area of protection against the Germans – a role it has played effectively in the past. It is therefore not surprising that Ukraine's current wooing of NATO is causing alarm in Moscow, since from a Russian point of view it is difficult to interpret NATO expansion in general as anything other than a threat. The 'facts' now facing the Russians are compelling: the creation of a new 'enemy' boundary on Poland's eastern border, a thousand kilometres closer than before, with the balance of conventional forces now dramatically in favour of the Western alliance,[28] with a substantial proportion of them, despite all of the pseudo-appeasement gestures, facing eastwards. That Russia feels threatened and hence forced to spend very scarce resources protecting itself against the ever eastwards spread of the 'mortal enemy' on the one hand, and the southern threat of Muslim fundamentalism on the other, is a bonus to NATO.

Somewhat paradoxically, the above scenario would also suggest that Russia should welcome limited NATO/US troops on the European continent (though clearly not extending as far as Ukraine or even the Central European states for that matter), something that analysts suggest was the case during the preparations for the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions in the 1970s:

Apparently the Soviets' decision to participate [in the talks] was based on the belief that, for the present, keeping the United States in Europe would be in their best interest. Beginning with the call to include the United States in any all-European security conference, the Soviets reversed their previous policy of getting the United States entirely

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[27] John Hillen, 'Getting NATO back to basics', *Backgrounder No. 7* (The Heritage Foundation), 7 February 1996.

[28] Oleksander Moroz (the Speaker of Parliament) has suggested that 'the weapons imbalance' is about 3:1 in NATO's favour, rising to 4:1 after the accession of the Visegrad states. See *Holos Ukrayiny*, 14 September 1996. Using a more specific example, the number of tanks under NATO's command is 20,000 (rising by another 3,000 when the Visegrad states join), compared to Russia's 6,400. See: Jonathan Dean, 'Future of CFE Treaty', *Basic paper no. 17*, 6 May 1996.

out of Europe. Unable to prevent a rearmed and formidable West German nation whose armed forces had nuclear delivery means, the Soviets obviously had rethought their previous policy and decided that retention of US forces in Europe, certainly for the near term, was desirable in order to keep the FRG in check.[29]

(Intriguingly, when the Polish Premier Tadeusz Mazowiecki came to power in summer 1989 he apparently considered the possibility of the Soviets remaining in power as providing some sort of counterbalance to German resurgence, before dismissing it).

Contemporary parallels are obvious: in anticipation of German economic resurgence when Eastern Germany finally comes 'on stream' (i.e. becomes a net contributor to the government coffers), the fear is that military power may become commensurate with Teutonic economic might. Currently, although some argue that Germany is becoming increasingly tightly integrated (and hence, they hope, restricted) in the European political and economic alliance, and thus that this particular threat appears to be receding,[30] others suggest that this integration is merely a cloak behind which Germany is trying to reclaim its former territories in Poland.[31]

That Russia does not welcome NATO expansion eastwards is therefore perhaps not as surprising as the fact that the West seems genuinely perplexed by Russian obstinacy in refusing to reach out and grasp the hand of 'friendship' that NATO appears to be extending through the PfP programme. As has been pointed out by Ruggie:[32] 'it is truly astonishing that the concept of territoriality has been so little studied by students of international politics'; arguably this is nowhere more true than in Central and Eastern Europe.

However, NATO expansion is even more insidious for Moscow in that it poses a threat to the Russian (and indeed Ukrainian) armaments industry. Enticed by the prospect of NATO entry, potential members are looking to consolidate their candidacy through the purchase, and in cases of unaffordability, co-manufacture of Western (i.e. US) technology. Not only does this alarm and further alienate the Russians, it also deprives them of much needed markets and sources of hard currency. That this is a political rather than a strictly military decision may be seen from the facts that, firstly, there is no requirement on the part of new members to ensure interoperability of equipment (Germany already uses ex-Soviet equipment, namely 24 MiG-29 Russian fighter aircraft); and, secondly, the armaments of most NATO aspirants are in the main, even if somewhat obsolete, of a satisfactory standard, especially compared to those of second-tier NATO members such as Greece and Spain.[33] Such purchases are also a further sign of the eroding influence of Moscow in the region and the growing political and economic ascendancy of the West.

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[29] John G. Keliher, *The Negotiations on Mutual and Balance Force Reductions* (Pergammon Press, 1984).

[30] Robert J. Art, 'Why Western Europe Needs the United States and NATO', *Political Science Quarterly*, 111 (Spring 1996).

[31] Interview with John Galtung in *Ost-West Gegeninformationen*, December 1995.

[32] John G. Ruggie 'Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations', *International Organization*, 1993, 47(1), pp. 139-74.

[33] Susannah Dyer and Tasos Kokkinides, 'Arming Central and Eastern Europe', *Basic paper no. 12*, 27 September 1995.

Whatever the reality, the fact remains that Ukraine finds itself between the devil and the deep blue sea, pressured as it is by the competing demands of East and West: in its most literal sense, the European watershed of power would appear to have moved demonstrably eastward from Berlin to Kyiv, with the Ukrainian capital the symbolic new point of contention for if not control then at least dominant influence in the European region. And while the continental balance of forces ultimately broke Germany in two, Ukraine is already a country of two parts (rather than the oft quoted 'halves'), split by regional, ethnic, linguistic and political cleavages. While this is not to suggest that Western and Eastern Ukraine will go their separate ways, these external forces, in conjunction with the internal divisions, may combine to produce an irresistible force for change. Much will depend on how the political actors on the domestic scene respond to the challenges presented on a continental level. It is thus to the domestic scene that we shall turn to next.

The Domestic Response to NATO Enlargement

From the Ukrainian perspective, the main source of concern is that each of the two main actors see Ukraine as the medium by which their respective objectives can be attained. However, despite being in a position in which resistance to these continental-wide forces is to say the least a challenge, the political élite in Kyiv has not been passive, and has continuously sought to influence and limit the actions of the players who will ultimately determine its geopolitical 'fate'. As Sherr argues:

> Kuchma is convinced that Ukraine will have no chance of remaining independent without 'a special relationship' with Russia i.e. without Russian consent. Equally, he believes that there will be no chance of securing Russian consent unless Ukraine has strong ties with the West and unless the West displays a strong stake in an independent Ukraine.[34]

In other words, Ukraine is performing a balancing act, playing one partner off against the other. By edging up to the West, Kyiv hopes to subdue Eastern hostility and force Moscow to recognise that Ukraine now has choices; conversely, the threat of greater proximity to the East (and possible restitution of the empire) stimulates Western efforts to attract Ukraine as a partner. Implicit within this policy is a recognition by Kyiv of the challenges facing Ukraine in a structurally changing world: while integration with Europe offers, in spite of the cultural, historic and economic ties with Russia, at least the outside chance of being part of the integrationist revolution (evolution?) now sweeping that continent, it fails to offer immediate solutions to Ukraine's dire economic problems, something which Moscow has, too, only the partial potential to provide. Such objectivity is not shared by the whole political élite which itself reflects the profoundly divided and polarised Ukrainian society. An explanation is necessary.

At the societal level, Ukrainian politics since independence have been typically represented as a regional clash between East Ukraine and West Ukraine with the former aiming for closer ties with Russia and the CIS, and the latter clamouring for a stronger relationship with Europe (i.e. the security of ties with NATO,

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[34] Sherr, op. cit.

and the economic benefits of being part of the EU). This 'West versus East' label, while something of an oversimplification, is in fact a convenient heuristic,[35] and will be used to reflect the differing historical experiences of the various regions of Ukraine, which have come to be felt at the ethnic, linguistic, religious and, crucially, political levels. The issue is further complicated by considerable interaction between these levels, as a result of which they tend to be mutually reinforcing.

In ethnic terms, Ukraine is essentially a state of two parts (72.7 per cent or 37.4 million Ukrainians, and 22.1 per cent or 11.4 million Russians – 80 per cent of whom are urban dwellers based in the south and east), linguistically it comprises two different though overlapping parts (43.4 per cent are Ukrainophones and 56.6 per cent are Russophones),[36] while ethno-geographically it is mixed (with sizeable Russian minorities in the eastern and southern regions along with Kyiv, an outright Russian majority in Crimea, and not insignificant Russian minorities in the western regions).[37] It is noteworthy that a large proportion of ethnic Ukrainians are in fact Russophones; it is likewise significant that researchers find a strong correlation between language used (the 'language of convenience') and attitudes towards the 'Russian issue'.[38] This will be examined in more detail below.

The above ethnic and linguistic mix is the product of a convoluted historical process extending over the last five centuries, during which much of the territory now known as Ukraine came to be subordinated to Russia (or Muscovy).[39] While Central, Eastern and Southern Ukraine gradually came to form a territorial integrity formalised in the creation of the Ukrainian SSR in 1920, Western Ukraine was only incorporated at the beginning of World War II, and hence has experienced a very different set of circumstances to those of the rest of Ukraine. Thus, while 'Greater Ukraine' (as it came to be colloquially called) has been variously exposed to Russification, mass immigration of ethnic Russians, collectivisation and industrialisation over the centuries, Western Ukraine (which formed part of the Austro-Hungarian empire and subsequently the Polish Second Republic) only experienced Russian/Soviet practices from 1939 onwards; as a result, there are profound regional differences in political attitudes, perceptions and expectations.

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[35] Dominique Arel, *'Ukraine: A Country Report'* (1996). Prepared for the Minority Rights Group (USA). Arel divides Ukraine into five regions:
   a) Left Bank (Central East Ukraine): the three provinces east of the Dnipro (Dnieper);
   b) Right Bank (Central West Ukraine): the six provinces west of the Dnipro, in addition to Kyiv;
   c) Eastern Ukraine: the five provinces east of the Left Bank, in the main on the border with Russia;
   d) Southern Ukraine: the four coastal provinces on the Black Sea, including Sevastopol;
   e) Western Ukraine: the seven provinces west of the Right Bank.
   For convenience these five regions are then classified as either 'East' (to include Left Bank, Eastern and Southern Ukraine) or 'West' (Right Bank and Western Ukraine).
[36] Arel suggests that three-quarters of the 'west' is Ukrainophone, while three-quarters of the 'east' is Russophone.
[37] For a comprehensive discussion of this much misunderstood issue see: Dominique Arel and Valeri Khmelko, 'The Russian Factor and Territorial Polarization in Ukraine', *The Harriman Review,* Spring 1996, vol. 9, no. 2, pp. 81-92.
[38] Ibid.
[39] Orest Subtelny, *Ukraine: a History,* 2nd Edition (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994).

It is on the basis of these divergent experiences that the spread of political affiliation at a popular level across Ukraine since independence can be best understood. As a result, to suggest that the west is pro-Western and the east is pro-Russian is a crude though accurate reflection of reality. This is best exemplified by recent opinion polls on regional attitudes towards NATO which showed a 'west' clearly in favour of stronger ties with the West, and an 'east' similarly so inclined towards the East (see Table 1); significantly, the largest proportion preferred Ukraine to maintain non-aligned status. A similarly predictable regional disparity emerges in perceptions of NATO as an aggressive military bloc (see Table 2), though again a significant proportion perceived it primarily as a defence organisation. While these divergences *per se* may not be of direct concern to Kyiv, and may appear slight in the context of this discussion, they acquire a greater degree of significance in the light of other research. Of particular note here are the findings that show a strong and highly significant statistical correlation between language usage (which, as has been mentioned, is in the main a regional phenomenon with the west mainly Ukrainophone, and the east essentially Russophone) and attitudes towards East and West: Ukrainophones tend to be pro-Western while Russophones are pro-Russian. This led Arel to conclude that:

> On the Russian factor, the West and East [of Ukraine] have diametrically opposed attitudes, setting the stage for a political confrontation... 'Pro-Russian' touches on sensitive issues of both internal and external policy in Ukraine: the status of languages and the status of Ukraine vis-à-vis Russia and the CIS.[40]

The long- (or even short-) term repercussions of such divisions are difficult to determine. Using a geological analogy, they are a fault-line in the Ukrainian ethnolinguistic landscape that may remain quiescent for a while to come – though like any geological fault-line, they may one day cause havoc through the sheer unpredictability and intensity of the shocks they produce. And, as with geological fault-lines, although geologists know where in the earth's crust these fault-lines lie, their predictions of the likelihood and strength of any future earthquakes they may generate owe at least as much to art as to science.

While popular opinion is not unimportant, the political apathy which characterises the bulk of the population means that the division in attitudes on foreign policy and NATO expansion among the political élite is of far greater significance. The provisions made by the institutional and newly adopted constitutional framework incorporate both the role of the executive and the legislature. While the legislature is given the authority to 'determine the principles of domestic and foreign policy' (Article 85, Para. 5) the President 'represents the state in international relations, administers the foreign political activity of the state, conducts negotiations and concludes international treaties of Ukraine'. In reality, the distinction is less clear-cut. Currently, the Ukrainian political spectrum is essentially characterised by three viewpoints on NATO expansion. These divergences reflect the fact that the legislature is effectively polarised on the issue, with one pole more favoured by

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[40] Dominique Arel and Valeri Khmelko 'The Russian Factor and Territorial Polarization in Ukraine', *The Harriman Review*, Spring 1996, vol. 9, no. 2, pp. 81-92.

the executive than the other: favourable to expansion (as espoused by the national democrats), against expansion (the Socialists/Communists), and the current policy of the Ukrainian government, favourable to conditional expansion. Each shall now be examined in turn.

The right-of-centre – the national democrats

Leaning towards the right-of-centre, the national democrats are essentially central and western-based Ukrainophones, with no representation in the south and east.[41] Their 'European' credentials are demonstrated by the fact that they are decidedly pro-reform, willingly supporting any obligation of membership of European institutions and are intent on participating in the 'European wide process'. They are, however, realistic enough to recognise the need for limited economic cooperation with, though less than full participation in, the CIS. As a result, they are less virulent in their anti-Russian public proclamations than the far Right, though are more explicitly and doggedly pro-West, using this stance as a framework by which to shape foreign policy. Predictably, they interpret Russian foreign policy as geared towards the reanimation of the Russian empire and perceive the creation of the CIS as nothing more than Russian imperialism reasserting itself, free of Marxist-Leninist baggage. Particular attention is drawn to Article 4 of the CIS Treaty regarding 'co-operation on defensive policies and the defence of borders', which they interpret as implying that 'internal' borders would over time become administrative boundaries of regions, as opposed to perimeters defining sovereign states. Viewed as even more insidious are Articles 30 and 31 referring to the command of joint defensive forces and border troops respectively – each is regarded as a direct threat to the sovereignty of Ukraine. From this standpoint, Russia's efforts to protect its western flank by keeping Ukraine as far away as possible from the NATO enlargement process represents nothing more than an effort to reanimate its empire. Russia is vehemently opposed to NATO enlargement to the east. Even more worrying to the national democrats is the fact that the Russians have also made the threat of unspecified countermeasures, reminiscent of the Soviet response to the entry of Germany into NATO in March 1955, where the 'unspecified countermeasures' turned out to be the creation of the Warsaw Pact. The concern of the national democrats is obvious: any such countermeasure is likely to be a meaningless gesture without the inclusion of Ukraine. From this perspective, the obvious solution is proximity to NATO, the closer the better.

Although somewhat marginalised in the power games in parliament, due to their relatively narrow Ukrainophone and western and central power-base, the national democrats exert considerable influence on the President through their 'support' role in parliament. Following his election in 1994, Kuchma's plan for economic and constitutional reform put him on a collision course with his main body of supporters in parliament; this consisted primarily of the eastern and south-

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[41] Andrew Wilson, *Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1990s* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

TABLE 1
% responses in answer to the question:
'How would you like to see Ukraine in the future?'

	Independent/ non-bloc status	In a bloc with Russia and Belarus	In a new USSR	In the CIS	As part of Russia	In a bloc with Western states	Hard to say
Kyiv	25	15	13	7	5	23	13
North	17	17	12	5	2	15	33
Centre	43	13	6	3	2	9	24
North East	17	27	20	14	7	11	4
North West	44	10	5	4	0	19	19
South East	28	20	16	12	2	9	14
West	32	2	2	0	0	50	13
South West	28	6	9	9	0	18	30
South	8	32	23	12	3	8	14
Crimea	9	22	25	20	8	3	14
East	20	26	19	16	3	7	9
Ukraine	**25**	**19**	**14**	**9**	**3**	**15**	**17**

Taken from: *Politychnyi Portret Ukrayiny*, 1997, no. 18.
Based on a quota sample of 1200 subjects, selected from 11 regions of Ukraine: Kyiv, the North (consisting of Zhytomyr, Chernihiv and Kyiv – excluding Kyiv – provinces), the Centre (Vinnytsya, Kirovohrad, Poltava, Cherkasy and Khmelnytskyi provinces), the North East (Sumy and Kharkiv provinces), the North West (Volyn and Rivne provinces), the South East (Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhya provinces), the West (Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv and Ternopil provinces), the South West (Transcarpathian and Chernivtsi provinces), the South (Mykolayiv, Odesa and Kherson provinces), Crimea, and finally the East (Donetsk and Luhansk provinces).

ern Ukrainian pro-reform liberals (who failed to support the previous President, Leonid Kravchuk, owing to his total lack of reform) and leftist hard-liners – both of which groups had initially supported Kuchma due to his non-nationalist outlook and announced intention to get the economy back on course. (The two groups, however, had different perceptions of how the latter would be accomplished, the former favouring reform, and the latter – closer relations with Russia). Once, however, Kuchma began to address the issues of constitutional and economic reform (which failed to find favour with the leftists), and lacking a national power-base, he came to rely more and more on the centrist-right factions, i.e. the national democrats, who were gradually won over by the President on account of his international and domestic policies: not only did he reject the issue of dual citizenship (demanded by Russia) for Russians in Ukraine and play down his original intention to raise the status of the Russian language in Ukraine to that of an official language, he himself switched from using Russian to Ukrainian. In other words, he confounded the expectations of all groups, whether they had voted for him as President or against him. A similar phenomenon occurred regarding his foreign policy outlook. Kuchma's original pro-Russian/CIS economic policy 'pragmatism' was based on a reorientation of interest to the East and towards countries which could realistically help Ukrainian independence. This, however, was soon replaced, in the face of parliamentary opposition, by an explicitly pro-European and pro-NATO stance, which continued and built on much of the foundations laid by Kravchuk.[42] This may be attributed primarily to two factors. Firstly, Kuchma was becoming increasingly reliant on the national democrats to get his policies through parliament,[43] and became gradually more supportive of the nationalist agenda. Secondly, there was the flow of finance now coming in from the West, which – under the conditionality imposed by Western aid institutions – started flowing in significant quantities only when it became evident that Kuchma was serious about reform.[44] By introducing policies long espoused by the said Western institutions, Kuchma gained access to the coffers of the IMF and the World Bank at a time when his programme of reform was going through a turbulent patch; as a result, the link between conditionality and reform became mutually reinforcing.

However, as has been mentioned, the structural features of the Ukrainian ethno-demographic landscape mean that the views of leftist forces and the constituencies that they represent could not be simply discounted. These will be examined next.

[42] Roman Wolczuk, op. cit.

[43] The national democrats proved themselves to be stalwart allies on two particularly critical occasions. On the first occasion, in June 1995, it was only with the support of the national democrats that the President managed to push through the interim Constitutional Agreement on the organisation and functioning of the powers of state and local self-government, until a new Constitution could be ratified. The second occasion, in June 1996, was the ratification process of the said Constitution, during which the centre-right united to defeat the left wing, which was desperate to delay the ratification process until after the Russian presidential election in July 1997 in the hope of a Communist or leftist winning. See Kataryna Wolczuk, 'Constitution Making in Ukraine'. Forthcoming.

[44] Roman Wolczuk, op. cit.

Socialists/Communists

As far as the Left is concerned, its strongly pro-CIS, pro-Russian, anti-capitalist and anti-Western arguments are in line with the ethnic Russian and Russophone linguistic composition of their power-base in the cities and rural areas of Southern, Eastern and Central Ukraine. Although broken down into two sometimes conflicting factions (the Communists of Ukraine and the Parliamentary Socialists and Agrarians), they are united in their desire to see a renewed union with Russia through membership of the CIS Inter-Parliamentary Assembly,[45] and, in the case of the Communists, are fervently opposed to cooperating with European and transatlantic bodies and international financial institutions. The Socialists are less fervent in their opposition to privatisation and free market economics than are the Communists – apart from the issue of private land ownership which they both oppose.

The left wing, which forms the largest grouping in parliament, has fallen out with the President, primarily on account of its objections to his economic policies. This, as we have already observed, has forced him to rely on the national democrats. As far as foreign policy is concerned, in comparison with the Communists, the Socialists have by far the greater say, owing to the position of their main proponent Oleksander Moroz, the Chairman of Parliament and the Leader of the Socialist Party, a post redolent with significance, evolved by nostalgia for its importance in the past. Furthermore, Article 107 of the Constitution states that: 'The chairman of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine may take part in the meetings of the Council of National Security and Defence of Ukraine', which is chaired by the President.

In contrast to the hard-line Communists who clamour for restoration of the USSR in all its political, economic and military guises, and who are vigorously opposed to NATO expansion, Moroz has adopted a milder though still firm line of equal resistance to being drawn into the fray on one side or the other. Recognising that in all probability Ukraine would have to pay the price for Russian implacability to expansion, he is against NATO expansion as currently proposed, although he argues that he would have no objections 'if it were to include Russia along with Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus'.[46] Doubtful of the official line that NATO as a defensive body will evolve into an organ of collective security, and fearing that with NATO expansion, Ukraine will be left high and dry in the no-man's land of buffer zone neutrality, fearing, too, the response expansion is likely to arouse in Russia as NATO forces appear on its western borders, Moroz expects Russian military matériel not only to appear on Ukraine's eastern border but in Belarus and Kaliningrad also, thereby undermining the security of the whole region. Indeed, he has even expressed doubts as to Ukraine's contribution to European security by asking (threatening?):'when NATO tanks arrive in Hungary and position themselves by the bridge recently opened by our presidents, in what direction are we supposed to face our tanks?'[47]

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[45] Indeed, Moroz had come to an agreement with the national democrats that he would agree to the entry of Ukraine into the Council of Europe on the condition that they would support membership of the CIS Inter-Parliamentary Assembly; this did not happen. Correspondence with Mykhailo Honchar from the National Institute of Strategic Studies, Kyiv.

[46] *Narodna Armiya*, 18 September 1996.

[47] *Kievskie Vedomosti*, 13 December 1996.

TABLE 2.
% responses in answer to the question:
'In your opinion, what kind of organisation is NATO?'

	Aggressive military bloc	Defensive union	Peacekeeping organisation	Other	Hard to say
Kyiv	10	53	14	5	18
North	8	27	17	0	47
Centre	14	24	17	1	44
North East	19	32	18	2	29
North West	3	42	22	0	33
South East	23	26	22	1	29
West	6	28	33	0	34
South West	3	17	14	0	66
South	22	16	10	0	52
Crimea	25	18	17	0	40
East	27	28	10	1	35
Ukraine	**16**	**27**	**17**	**1**	**39**

Taken from: *Politychnyi Portret Ukrayiny*, 1997, no. 18.
Based on a quota sample of 1200 subjects, selected from 11 regions of Ukraine: Kyiv, the North (consisting of Zhytomyr, Chernihiv and Kyiv – excluding Kyiv – provinces), the Centre (Vinnytsya, Kirovohrad, Poltava, Cherkasy and Khmelnytskyi provinces), the North East (Sumy and Kharkiv provinces), the North West (Volyn and Rivne provinces), the South East (Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhya provinces), the West (Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv and Ternopil provinces), the South West (Transcarpathian and Chernivtsi provinces), the South (Mykolayiv, Odesa and Kherson provinces), Crimea, and finally the East (Donetsk and Luhansk provinces).

Of particular concern is the possibility of nuclear weapons being deployed on the territories of the newly joined members of the Alliance, something that NATO consistently refuses to rule out. Appealing for a nuclear-free zone to be implemented in Central and Eastern Europe (a policy now adopted by the President), Moroz's proposal builds on a core of current neutral, non-nuclear states (Switzerland, Finland, Austria and Ukraine) to include the new members to NATO. As a result, its outright rejection is especially galling for the Ukrainians, following the intense pressure exerted on them to renounce nuclear weapons and accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear state. Of even greater and more general concern is the fact that the principles underlying NATO enlargement appear directly to contradict those of the NPT. While NPT Articles I and II respectively state that:

Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly or indirectly...

and

> Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices directly or indirectly...

the 1991 NATO Strategic Concept declares that:

> A credible Alliance nuclear posture and the demonstration of Alliance solidarity and common commitment to war prevention continue to require widespread participation by European Allies involved in collective defense planning in nuclear roles, in peacetime basing of nuclear forces on their territory and in command, control and consultation agreements.

The verbal juggling with which the United States tries and fails to camouflage this blatant contradiction[48] means that NATO enlargement leaves Kyiv somewhat bewildered as to what exactly nuclear non-proliferation is supposed in this context to mean.

As a result, Moroz has consistently come out in favour of an alternative to NATO expansion, arguing that the security of Ukraine is inextricably linked to the security of the continent. As opposed to the official policy which puts its hopes on NATO evolving into a pan-European security structure, Moroz sees this as a role for the OSCE, owing to its all-encompassing membership (53 European and non-European members at the last count). Speaking in terms of 'Helsinki Mark II' (i.e. in the shape of a conference in Kyiv proposed for the year 2000), Moroz envisages a pan-European security system based on declarations, voluntary commitments, sanctions against any undermining of peace and stability, mechanisms to enforce rapid conflict control and control over multilateral forces.[49]

It must be said that these proposals are hardly new and, if nothing else, deserve credit for their historical continuity. The confrontational nature of post-war superpower politics led to the increasing desirability of integrating what had by then become West Germany (in June 1949) into the emerging European Defence Community. As far as the Soviets were concerned, this was a worrying omen presaging the possible inclusion of the newly created state into the NATO alliance. In order to pre-empt this, in 1952 the Soviets proposed the reunification of Germany on the condition of neutrality, the removal of foreign bases from its territory, a commitment not to join any form of military organisation oriented against the Soviet Union, and an acceptance of limits placed on military production and size of armed forces. The failure of this strategy of trying to prevent West Germany from forming a strong relationship with the Allies was brought into sharp focus when in 1954 it was formally admitted to the Western European Union (ironically originally set up as an anti-German alliance) and NATO. Although the immediate Soviet response was the creation of the Warsaw Pact (1955), as part of its continuing strategy of neutralising the Germans, Moscow floated the idea of a collective

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[48] Nicola Butler, Otfried Nassauer, Daniel Plesch, 'Extending the Nuclear Umbrella: Undermining the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty', *Basic Note*, 7 February 1997.

[49] *Holos Ukrayiny*, 14 September 1996.

security system in Europe. This would be characterised in the main by the disso-
lution of the two military blocs and their replacement by a pan-European securi-
ty system, the removal of foreign (i.e. US) troops, the reduction of conventional
forces and prohibition of nuclear weapons, and the imposition of ceilings on the
number of troops of Security Council members of between 150,000-200,000 (and,
by implication, also on the resurgent German army, the Bundeswehr). Needless
to say, these proposals were rejected. However, the more realistic Rapacki Plan
(proposed by Polish Foreign Minister Rapacki in 1957) made more headway in
European capitals. Poland, concerned with the possibility of yet again becoming
the doormat of Europe with a newly established and not yet crystallised western
border, created at the expense of Germany at the Oder-Neisse line (to say noth-
ing of its newly formed eastern border), saw its own best interests not only in the
continued division of Germany but also its remaining demilitarised, irrespective
of any formal recognition of these new boundaries by Germany. The Rapacki
Plan targeted the increasingly likely and to the Poles extremely worrying possi-
bility of the transfer of nuclear weapons to Germany by proposing that if the lat-
ter were prepared to prohibit the stockpiling and/or production of nuclear
weapons on its territory, Poland would do the same; it was soon joined in this
proposal by Czechoslovakia. As the Plan evolved to include the nuclear weapons
of other states, and, crucially, the notion of balanced conventional forces, it fell
out of favour both with the East and the West.[50]

Clearly, the idea of nuclear-free zones and all-embracing security structures has
considerable appeal to the Central and East Europeans, who are all too aware that
in any confrontation between the major powers, they are likely to get dragged in
volens-nolens. Realistically, these proposals have little chance of success, since
they lack appeal in European and North American capitals, despite the support
Moroz claims to have received from some of them.[51]

The government, clearly aware of Moroz's lack of support, has pursued a line
that tries to incorporate elements of both poles of the political spectrum and
hence to bridge the divide, while at the same time seeking to accommodate this
policy within the constraints imposed by wider forces.

Official policy

Since it was first mooted, Kyiv's attitude towards NATO expansion has been one
of apparently positive passivity: on the one hand, opposing Russia's claimed right
of veto over expansion and supporting the right of any country to apply, while on
the other discounting the probability of its own application (notwithstanding the
occasional tactical manoeuvre). Ever looking for an opportunity to further its
prospects for integration into key European institutions, Kyiv appears to be using
expansion as an opportunity to further its own ambitions, making its support/lack
of opposition conditional on a Euro-agreement being signed with the EU and as-
sociate partnership of WEU.

[50] John G. Keliher, op. cit.
[51] *Zerkalo Nedeli*, 12-18 November 1996.

However, if the national democrats are heartened by such efforts, the Socialists likewise find consolation in the fact that both Kuchma and Foreign Minister Hennadiy Udovenko reiterate at every available opportunity the desirability of a nuclear-free zone in the centre of Europe as an integral component of an evolving security framework for the region. In his speech to the OSCE in Lisbon in December 1996, President Kuchma stated that:

> In our view, Ukraine, more than any other country, has the full right to touch on the issue of non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of the states of Central and Eastern Europe, and to be able to depend on understanding and support for its position.[52]

Earlier, in response to Moroz's speech at a seminar of the North Atlantic Assembly in Kyiv in September 1996, Udovenko, while criticising some elements of that speech, had advocated a similar pan-European approach to solving Ukraine's East-West dilemma.[53] Recognising the weaknesses of the OSCE (its policy of decision making by consensus, its overlarge membership, the sheer diversity of members ranging from Liechtenstein to Kyrgyzstan) and then discounting it as a solution, his proposal builds on NATO, as the key actor, evolving into a pan-European security structure in conjunction with other institutions (i.e. WEU, Council of Europe, EU, with a special emphasis on the role of IFOR in the military sphere, and the civil aspect under OSCE).

Evidence of the continual balancing act performed by the Ukrainian government is the emphasis placed on three distinct components perceived as fundamental to European security and stability, and seen by Kyiv as indispensable if new continental divisions are to be avoided:

1) guaranteed openness of NATO and the EU to new members;

2) a deepening of relations between the two institutions and interested parties;

3) a consideration of the interests and concerns of all states of the region during preparations for NATO enlargement.[54]

The Ukrainians clearly have high hopes for the future.

Conclusion

It has now become a truism to suggest that NATO expansion represents a major shift in the balance of power, now even more in favour of the Western alliance. The 'grand design' would suggest that this strategy represents one of gradual attrition – taking advantage of Soviet and then Russian weakening and consequently loss of grip over the surrounding regions. Although Russia still has a hold on Ukraine, this is gradually being replaced by the West. And while the West would never risk an out-and-out confrontation, it is clearly willing to test the boundaries of what is possible (on its part), so as to assess what is probable (i.e. the likely response of the Russians): the NATO manoeuvres in the summer of 1997 off the coast of Crimea are a fairly blatant demonstration of this desire to test the waters (figuratively and literally).

[52] *Uryadovyi Kuryer*, 5 December 1996.
[53] *Narodna Armiya*, 18 September 1996.
[54] Ibid.

Much now hinges on domestic developments in Ukraine. The present government continues to pursue a policy in which both sides of the political spectrum have a vested interest. Up till now, this is a strategy that has borne fruit: it has maintained the cohesiveness of a state divided, both on the popular and the élite level, regarding the fundamental changes taking place to the east and west simultaneously. While there is no evidence of these differing attitudes being transferred into action, it is not difficult to envisage circumstances in which this might occur. A new president in either Ukraine or Russia who favoured a return to the past would be more than sufficient. A loss of interest by Europe and the West, triggered perhaps by a *peripateia* in the fortunes of Russia, would be another possibility. Whatever the future scenario, it is precisely in the type of context now emerging in Europe that Ukraine's particular structural weaknesses become even more glaring. ❏

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BAUS

The 'Chameleon' Nature of Ukraine's East-West Relations

Jennifer D.P. Moroney

Following the enlargement of NATO to include Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, a new dividing line in Europe could develop between the states inside and outside NATO. Part of such a boundary would lie between Poland and Ukraine. NATO enlargement is creating a geopolitical environment, which will have implications for the future of relations not just between Russia and the West, but for relations within the region itself. In this context, several questions merit further examination: What are Ukraine's options in terms of strategic alignment – Europe or Eurasia?[1] How important is Ukraine to European security in the eyes of Western governments? Why is Kyiv teetering between neutrality/non-bloc status and semi-alignment? Why does Ukraine behave in foreign and security policy like the ever-changing chameleon?

Ukraine is in a rather unique geopolitical position in this regard. The need to deal with drastic internal dilemmas, such as unsuitable economic conditions, ethnic divisions and the consolidation of the country's independence, as well as external challenges, such as the fundamental question of its sovereignty is constraining for this newly independent state. Furthermore, there is considerable external pressure on Kyiv to conform to Western expectations, and this often limits its capacity to make independent foreign policy decisions, and hence is one reason for Kyiv's indecisiveness in its external relations.

The demands made on Ukraine since its independence have been far-reaching and extensive. The West wants Ukraine to consolidate its democracy, relinquish its nuclear capabilities, integrate more closely in Central and Eastern Europe's (CEE) regional organisations such as CEFTA, and pursue policies characteristic of a 'Western' state. Russia, on the other hand, would like to see Ukraine integrate more closely into CIS structures – specifically the military structures – begin to repay its massive energy dept, and, in general, remain within the Russian sphere of influence.

Several reasons for Kyiv's indecisive behaviour can be pinpointed: relations with Russia and the CIS and the dependency thereon for energy supplies; a declared desire to cooperate with Western institutions, such as NATO and the EU; and the fact that Ukraine is still searching for an identity, which has to do with both internal and external factors, including the pressures of having to choose between East and West. Firstly, as regards the constraining nature of relations with Russia, Ukraine currently relies on its large eastern neighbour for 90 per cent of its oil supplies, and on Turkmenistan for all its natural gas, and has managed to accumulate an insurmountable energy debt. This situation, at times, has been a very limiting factor in Ukraine's Russia policy, as may be seen in the recent Rus-

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[1] This question would assume that Ukraine even has a choice.

sian-Ukrainian negotiations and eventual *rapprochement* in the Black Sea Fleet (BSF) Accords.[2]

The BSF agreement was signed on 28 May 1997, after it had been originally rejected by Russia in October 1996. On the surface, it appears that Ukraine has achieved much by this agreement. However, the Treaty contains provisions which, if implemented, could move Ukraine's economy and its defence industry nearer to Russia rather that towards the West's market economies, which would complicate closer integration into the Western security structures. But two political breakthroughs have been achieved as a result of this agreement. Firstly, Crimea, Sevastopol and the BSF have been recognised by Russia as *de jure* Ukrainian territory. Secondly, Russia officially declared that the impediments to fuel supplies, such as tariffs and energy cuts hitherto imposed on Ukraine were 'artificial', and, in effect, admitted that they had been applied for political reasons. These barriers to normal trade have now supposedly been removed, and, subsequently, Ukraine's burden of debt to Russia has been reduced. Yet one specific issue was deliberately avoided – Ukraine's defence and foreign policy orientation are not defined in the agreements. Instead, the joint statement contains a provision to 'cooperate in ensuring the security of the southern borders of our two countries', which, seemingly, implies a (non-explicit) defence obligation, and appears to reintroduce the idea of an external CIS border through the back door.[3]

Under the terms of the military agreements, the port of Sevastopol will be leased by Russia for twenty years, with the option of renewal for another five years. During this time, Russia is expected to move its part of the fleet to its naval base at Novorossiysk. The principal concession was Ukraine's right to refer to Sevastopol as the headquarters of the Ukrainian Navy and base its own ships there in the future. Russia has agreed to pay a rent of $97.7 million a year for the facilities, which over twenty years will cover $1.95 billion of Ukraine's outstanding $3 billion debt for energy supplies. The negotiations over these figures have been greatly in Russia's favour, since the original demand from Ukraine was for $423 million per annum, while Russia only offered $72 million per annum.[4]

Also in Russia's favour was Ukraine's decision to establish a 'coordinated structural policy' in the economic sphere. This will include the promotion of Russian-Ukrainian financial industrial groups; the development of joint defence and space projects, including the building of a Russian-Ukrainian satellite launch vehicle (the Dnipro) from missiles withdrawn from military service; and the establishment of a joint energy concept which would promote the supply and transport of Russian oil and gas. But this coordinated structural policy can be seen as integration into the CIS by another name.[5] Yet, Ukraine's official policy is to diversify its energy suppliers, and it has actively sought alternative solutions to its present dependency dilemma. Kyiv has recently concluded a long-sought agreement with

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[2] See James Sherr, 'Russia-Ukraine Rapprochement? The Black Sea Accords', *Survival*, Autumn 1997, no. 3 for a detailed account of the settlement.

[3] Sherr, p. 40.

[4] Sherr, p. 43.

[5] Sherr, p. 44.

the Turkish government to build an oil pipeline that will connect the Mediterranean and Black Sea coasts of Asia Minor. This pipeline will be used to transport oil from Africa and the Middle East to Ukraine, thereby reducing the latter's dependence on Russia.[6]

If the normalisation of relations with Russia had been Ukraine's primary foreign policy goal, the economic accords could be considered a success. However, Ukraine has always pursued a parallel goal – integration into Western economic and security structures – and in this respect the agreement has taken Ukraine one step back. The agreement will resolve the issue of Ukraine's outstanding debt, but at the cost of preserving and even strengthening Russia's position as a creditor.

The second reason for Ukraine's changeable nature in East-West relations is related to its desire to be accepted as a European state by the West. Ukraine has been confronted by strong suggestions and often outright demands made on it by the West. Following independence in 1991, Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk concentrated his efforts on state-building as well as trying to establish close ties with European political, economic and security structures. The latter effort encountered numerous setbacks, not least because of Ukraine's reluctance to relinquish the Soviet nuclear weapons stationed on its soil. Ukraine's use of these weapons as a bargaining counter for increased Western economic support backfired: Western institutions made it clear to Ukraine that denuclearisation was a prerequisite for further economic and political support. As a result, Western/Ukrainian relations remained largely frozen until these issues were resolved. Also, as both Europe and the USA initially pursued a Russo-centric policy, little attention was paid to Ukraine and other CIS countries, except for the problem of nuclear weapons. In more recent years, Ukraine's failure to implement serious economic reform curtailed for a time its ability to obtain adequate assistance from Western financial institutions.[7]

After these initial setbacks, Ukraine began to make active efforts to establish closer ties with the West and its structures. Ukraine ratified the START I Treaty in February 1994, and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in November 1994, became a member of the Partnership for Peace and the North Atlantic Cooperation Council in February 1994, and initialised a partnership agreement with the European Union in March 1994. All of these actions helped to ease the concern which the West had felt about Ukraine in 1993-94, and anchored Ukraine more firmly to the West. In spite of joining those Western partnership agreements and its membership of the CIS, Ukraine's official policy was and is one of neutrality – in particular, resisting Russian pressure to join the CIS Collective Security Treaty.

In September 1995 Ukrainian officials began to talk about developing a 'special partnership' with NATO which would go further than the ties offered as a member of PfP. This expanded agreement would include regular political and close

[6] See 'New oil arteries increasingly bypass Russian territory', *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press*, 23 July 1997, no. 25.

[7] F. Stephen Larrabee, 'Ukraine's Balancing Act', *Survival*, Summer 1996, vol. 38, no. 2.

military consultation, including participation in some NATO bodies whose activities are of direct interest to Ukraine. The Ukrainian negotiators asked for a special 'associate status' in NATO, to include everything but an Article 5 security guarantee. The ambitious draft agreement also called for the opening of a special NATO information centre in Kyiv.

During the Madrid Summit in July 1997, when NATO officially invited three new states to join the Alliance, Ukraine also concluded a special charter with NATO. The signing of the 'Charter on a Distinctive Ukraine-NATO Partnership' on the last day of the summit was the only event that went smoothly and caused no disagreements among the participants. However, this document is far less specific than the Russia-NATO Founding Act which had been concluded in May. The agreement with Ukraine proved to be little more than a political declaration. Relations with Ukraine will be handled by a commission, although it was not specified who will sit on this commission or when it will meet, other than a minimum of twice a year. The agreement also provides for a NATO Information and Document Centre to be based in Kyiv. This centre will be the first of its kind and will serve two purposes: to explain the Alliance's activities to the Ukrainian public which should help to eliminate the negative stereotypes, instilled in the popular consciousness by Soviet propaganda, and serve as a channel by which Brussels can gain information about Ukraine.[8]

The following forms of cooperation were also specified: consultation in the event of future conflict, various types of military cooperation and joint peacekeeping operations within the framework of a Polish-Ukrainian battalion. Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma declared that the charter is purely an interim document, and NATO Secretary-General Solana said that the signing of the charter is not an end, but a beginning. He also made it clear that Ukraine could become a fully-fledged member of the Alliance in the future.[9]

In addition to relations with NATO and the partnership agreement with the EU, Ukraine has sought ties with the WEU. But this has so far been limited to a regular exchange of visits and the sharing of some information. In the Kirschberg declaration of 9 May 1994, the WEU Council of Ministers agreed to grant associate partner status to those countries that were about to conclude association agreements with the EU. Included were the six ex-Comecon East European states and the three Baltic states – but not Ukraine – on the grounds that these countries were considered potential future EU members, and Ukraine was not. Ukraine argued that it should be granted associated-partner status, but its neutrality policy and membership of the CIS are regarded as incompatible with WEU membership.

The third explanation for Ukraine's chameleon-like behaviour is not a tangible one, which makes it difficult to measure. Ukraine as a society and a nation has not yet developed an identity of its own. Ukraine's declaration of independence in

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[8] See 'Ukraine is NATO information territory', *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press*, 11 June 1997, no. 19.

[9] See 'Vague Ukraine-NATO Charter is signed', *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press*, 13 August 1997, no. 28.

1991 necessitated the development of a concept of Ukrainian nationhood that would include all citizens of the state, regardless of ethnicity – a remarkably difficult task in view of its ethnic configuration and large Russian minority. Furthermore, it is still searching for its role in the international community. Many Western policy-makers are also still prone to viewing Ukraine as a buffer state between Russia and the West. Ukrainian officials frequently emphasise the need to build a comprehensive system of European security that would not exclude any country and avoid the creation of new blocs and dividing lines in Europe.

Ukrainian political leaders have on a number of occasions expressed concern about possible NATO enlargement, most notably during President Kuchma's visit to Washington in November 1994. Policy-makers have commented that too hasty an enlargement could further accentuate Ukraine's dubious role as a buffer between Russia and an expanded NATO. In December of the same year, the head of the analysis department of the Ukrainian foreign ministry, Oleksander Tsvetkov, said that he could see nothing but harm for Ukraine in an enlarged NATO. However, a back-door reassessment took place in May 1995 during a visit by President Clinton to Kyiv, when Kuchma surprised many observers by stating that Ukraine would no longer oppose the process, and that he believed NATO to be the only guarantor of stability in Europe. Officially, Kyiv would now support the admission of Poland, Ukraine's closest strategic partner in CEE, to the alliance. Ukraine has also contended that no country should have the right to veto the participation of any country in a political-military alliance. A slower timetable, Ukrainian officials believe, would give Ukraine time to stabilise and reduce the chances of Ukraine becoming a buffer.

In March 1996 Kuchma went one step further in supporting the expansion of the Alliance by saying that the future of Ukraine does not necessarily have to be as a non-aligned country. Furthermore, when speaking at a conference on European security in Moscow in June 1996, the Ukrainian foreign minister, Hennadiy Udovenko, stated that Ukraine might strive to get an 'associate status' with NATO. (Later, he had to retract his words when it was pointed out to him that the NATO Charter does not provide for such a status – at least in its present form).

More recently, on 28 August 1997, President Kuchma announced two major changes in the direction of Ukraine's security policy. He stated that 'Ukraine does not intend to join NATO structures', although he would not rule out future cooperation with the Alliance. At the same time, Kuchma declared that Kyiv no longer intends to be bound by the provisions of the Collective Security Treaty signed in 1992 by the seven members of the CIS. The President's announcement that Ukraine will not seek membership of NATO certainly contradicts earlier statements by Ukrainian officials who had stated that Kyiv's strategic objective was to join the Western alliance at some point in the future. So may one conclude that Kyiv has definitely decided to pursue a policy of neutrality in terms of strategic alignment? This is altogether doubtful, but Kuchma's remarks represent three broad changes across the region.

First of all, it was no coincidence that Kuchma's declaration came only one day after troops landed in Crimea as part of the PfP joint exercise, 'Operation Sea

Breeze', which included Ukraine, Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey and Georgia, as well as the USA. These manoeuvres prompted sharp criticism from Moscow, but reaffirmed Western support for Ukraine. Secondly, Ukraine's shift reflects the ever-closer demise of the CIS as an organisation relevant to the security needs of the former Soviet Union. Kuchma, moreover, went on to declare that Ukraine would give preference to bilateral ties with Russia rather than multilateral ties in the forum of the CIS. Thirdly, the shift in Ukrainian security policy reflects the normalisation of relations between Kyiv and Moscow. It also highlights Russia's willingness to look upon Ukraine as a truly independent state, as well as that of Ukraine to view Russia as something other than an enemy.[10] However, whether or not Ukraine intends to seek NATO membership in the future, the enlargement of the Alliance is and will continue to be a powerful dynamic in both East-West as well as in regional relations.

But as far as Ukraine's strategic choice is concerned – will it be Europe or Eurasia? Since independence, policy-makers and research circles have tried to find an answer to the paradox of Ukraine's national security, as well as to attempt to define the directions of strategic moves in the geopolitical environment. These attempts have been guided by the formula 'movement in all directions', which is a far cry from 'neither East nor West'. The question of strategic choice was clear – either enter the 'civilised' arena of Western Europe, confirming Ukraine's historic place in it, or be reintegrated into a Eurasian geopolitical environment made up of post-Soviet states, with Russia as the natural nucleus. The current political process demonstrates that, step by step, the European political arena is becoming a bipolar geopolitical structure, with NATO and the EU at one extreme and Eurasia with Russia and its clear areas of influence at the other.[11] However, Ukraine should not be forced to choose its strategic orientation, and, indeed, at present it is clearly unable to choose.

But when discussing choosing sides, one must also consider intensified regional cooperation as a means of decreasing Ukrainian insecurities, as well as boosting relations with both the West and Russia. Before Madrid, NATO member-states were trying to find a way out of a delicate situation – how to accommodate the new democracies of East Central Europe without alienating Russia. Regional cooperation was viewed as an essential element of the enlargement process, and appeared to be a way of softening the possible new dividing lines. The promotion of regular contact within CEE was seen as a way in which the neighbouring countries could exchange information, and discuss mutual concerns such as organised crime, drug trafficking, terrorism and the joint handling of accidents and emergencies in border regions, as well as participating in local military confidence-building activities. A new Western attitude began to emerge: that regional cooperation did not contradict national interests, and could even facilitate inte-

    [10] Paul Goble, 'A state outside a bloc', *RFE/RL Newsline*, 2 September 1997, vol. 1, no. 108.
    [11] Nikolai Kulinich, 'Ukraine in the New Geopolitical Environment, Issues of Regional and Subregional Security', in Karen Dawisha, *The Making of Foreign Policy in Russia and the New States of Eurasia* (Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 131.

gration into Western structures. In this respect, the new Hungarian-Slovak, Hungarian-Romanian and Polish-Ukrainian *rapprochements* are important contributors to the stability and security of Europe.[12]

Specifically, the new found friendship between Poland and Ukraine, East Central Europe's two largest countries, should become a kind of testing ground for future 'ins' and 'outs' of the enlargement process. Yet, regional cooperation will not provide a substitute and compensation, nor security assurances to Ukraine and the other 'outs'. However, this cooperation, reinforced with direct ties to the West's institutions, would link them closer to the 'ins', thus decreasing feelings of isolation and insecurity. Western governments should therefore consider what practical help – both financial and training – they could offer to projects aimed at furthering regional cooperation, especially between Ukraine and Poland.

Ideally, if Ukraine does seek to return to Europe in the future, it should do so through the 'back door', by deepening its bilateral ties with Poland and the other states that have been invited to join NATO and the EU. Kyiv needs Warsaw's experience and advocacy in its own efforts in economic reform, state-building, and integration into East Central Europe's regional organisations.[13] The Polish-Ukrainian partnership could, furthermore, become the new pillar of stability in East Central Europe, similar to the Franco-German cooperation after World War II, which laid the foundation for stability in Western Europe. By using this subtle back door entrance to the West, Kyiv will also diminish the chances of alarming Russia.

For the Russian government has at least three major means of restricting Ukraine's capacity to make a strategic choice. Taking a more hard-lined approach to Ukraine, Moscow could again use the dependency situation to put political pressure on Kyiv; trade barriers against Ukrainian goods could be applied (as is currently happening with Ukrainian sugar), which would certainly hurt Ukrainian producers more than Russian consumers; and Russia could decide to encourage a new wave of separatism in Crimea and in the Donbas region, where the ethnic Russian population is sizeable[14] (although it is doubtful whether this would make serious trouble for Kyiv).

Together with a discussion of Ukraine's strategic geopolitical choices, one must also consider just how important Ukraine is to European security in the eyes of its neighbours, and, in particular, the West. Ukraine is not at present a serious candidate for NATO, EU or WEU membership, nor is it likely to be in the near future. Ukraine's present and short-term achievements with the West can be summarised as follows: 1) active participation in all PfP and NACC activities that do not demand membership; 2) the implementation of the new special agreement with NATO signed at the Madrid Summit, raising it *de facto* to the level of the Russia-NATO Founding Act; and 3) assurances that membership at a later date is not ruled out. These accomplishments are largely psychological, suggesting that Western organi-

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[12] Oleksandr Pavliuk, 'Ukraine and Regional Cooperation in Central and Eastern Europe', *Security Dialogue*, 1997, vol. 28(3), p. 357.

[13] Pavliuk, p. 354.

[14] Tor Bukkvoll, 'Ukraine and NATO: The Politics of Soft Cooperation', *Security Dialogue*, 1997, vol. 28(3), p. 367.

sations are interested in keeping Ukraine at arm's length by encouraging economic and political reform, with the shallow promise that perhaps, someday, Ukraine can be one of 'us'. Yet one should not denigrate psychological reassurances, for they are precious to Kyiv, and can indeed act as a spur to the desired reforms which may soon lead to Ukraine being considered a truly 'European' nation.

Ukraine is unarguably in a unique position as regards relations with its neighbours. Because of its current dependence on Russia for energy supplies and on the CIS for the majority of its trade relations, Ukraine is forced to make occasional concessions to Russia. Its return to the CIS military structure as an observer in February 1997, as well as settlement in the Black Sea Fleet division are prime examples of Ukraine in concessionary mood. On the other hand, Ukraine has expressed a desire to deepen relations with NATO, the EU and other Western institutions. Furthermore, Ukraine is also actively involved with solidifying interstate relations within CEE, specifically with Poland, which has supported Ukraine on many levels, most recently advocating its membership in CEFTA. But if combined external pressures are the reason why Ukrainian policy-makers so frequently change their policies, what effect will NATO enlargement have on Kyiv's ability to carry out its chosen security policy?

In attempting to predict Ukraine's future, one must take three major factors into account. Firstly, the attitude of the United States and its consistency in supporting Ukraine is crucial. It is vital for Ukraine that the USA remains opposed to the division of the region into new spheres of influence, but instead takes into consideration the national interests of all states in CEE. Secondly, Russia's position and the developments in Ukrainian-Russian relations must be taken into account. Russia is faced with a critical choice, which cannot be long deferred: whether to make real its proclaimed commitment to becoming a democratic country with a prosperous market economy and friendly relations with the West, or to try and create a new empire, which would be psychologically impossible without incorporating Ukraine. Yet, any attempts to restore the old empire would surely drive Ukraine closer to NATO.[15]

Finally, policies and developments in Ukraine itself, as well as the country's attempts to come to terms with its identity are perhaps the most crucial factors in determining Kyiv's ability to act independently. Success in carrying out reforms, a transition to a market economy, the recovery of lagging industry and agricultural productivity are all important elements in Ukraine's economic re-generation. Without rapid and far-reaching economic reforms, Ukrainian policy-makers will continue to be vulnerable to the outside pressures which have over the past six years forced them all too often to appease and conform to the external environment like an ever-changing chameleon.   ❏

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[15] Ambassador Yurii Shcherbak, 'The geopolitical situation of Ukraine at present and in the future', *Analysis of Current Events*, August 1997, vol. 9, no. 8.

Mykhailo Hrushevsky
History of Ukraine-Rus'

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
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Strategic Challenges of State-Building in Ukraine

Vasyl Kremen

Today, I have the honour to represent Ukraine before you, a state reborn only six years ago on 24 August 1991. The proclamation of its independence brought to life the age-old yearning of our ancestors to be the masters of their own land, the shapers of their own destiny. Only at the third attempt was this country, equal to France and Italy in size and population, able to establish itself as a state in the centre of Europe.

An objective and unbiased analysis of the past six years of state-building in Ukraine gives one every reason to be confident that our chosen road is irreversible: the road of consolidating independence by carrying out radical social, political and economic reforms.

This path cannot be called easy. Only dreamers and idealists could expect such a development. But our choice is final and irreversible: Ukraine has become a democratic state with a policy oriented towards ensuring the rights of its citizens and satisfying their needs, towards the establishment of a civil society.

We should have liked to have had fewer difficulties, failures and mistakes, but in spite of them all, over the past six years, positive changes have predominated in every sphere.

A year has passed since the adoption of the Constitution of Ukraine. The idea of an independent state, which runs through the Constitution, has taken deep roots in people's minds. The Constitution is a legal confirmation of our society's choice of market economy, and outlines the social and economic structure of the state. Socio-political processes have become stable and predictable. There are all grounds for concluding that during these six years of independence a foundation has been laid for further state-building.

I believe that the adoption of the Constitution was one of our greatest achievements, which consolidated the democratic foundations of society, and made it impossible to return to the past. This event was a historic one and decisive for our nation, which had existed for a long time under a different political and economic system.

The Constitution of Ukraine demonstrated very clearly the self-determination of the Ukrainian people, and has shown, both to ourselves and the world at large, our ability to pursue a balanced, far-sighted and consistent policy.

The Constitution has provided Ukrainian society and the entire world with a clear and comprehensive answer to the question of where we are going: that is, towards a sovereign and independent, democratic, socially-oriented, law-governed state, in which the individual and his or her life and health, dignity, immunity and security are recognised as the highest social values.

Since today Ukraine's statehood is a reality, we are able to list the priorities of our future policy in the following order: the individual, the family, society, the state.

Much attention is being given to shaping the political system of our country and forming a civil society. For this reason, the President of Ukraine, Leonid Kuchma, and the government attach special importance to the drafting of new laws on elections, and the legal regulation of the activities of political parties, trade unions, and other public and political organisations.

In any democratic society the role of political parties as the main watchdogs of stability and the development of democratic institutions are of tremendous importance. The independence of Ukraine encouraged the appearance of a large number of parties and political groups. We wish these to have a well-organised and more numerous membership, and to be more influential in their support of the complicated process of state-building. The existence of political forces, mainly of the extreme left, should also be noted as one of Ukraine's realities. Such factions try to exploit the difficult economic situation, and are evidently interested in the failure of the reforms, since they would like to restore the former USSR with its integrated political and economic systems and foreign political orientation.

An undoubted gain of the Ukrainian nation is freedom of conscience, and the restoration of the proper place of the church and religion in society. This becomes particularly evident, if we compare the current situation with the decades of state atheism. For instance, the number of clergymen has increased by 5,000 since 1991 and now totals 18,000. The spectrum of religions has expanded from 37 to 65 faiths and denominations. About 3,000 houses of worship and 8,000 religions artefacts have been returned to religious groups and institutions. To date, 1,165 new churches have been completed and 1,868 are under construction.

It should be pointed out that we have defined strategic approaches to social reforms, with culture, education, science and health care given pride of place. The role in the country's life of these basic values of statehood, social consciousness and national security requires a comprehensive national system of social policy, which should be laid down not on the basis of existing social and economic realities, but rather on that of the future prospects and goals of our development.

Ukraine is a state with a multi-ethnic population, consisting of more than 100 nationalities. And we are proud that since gaining our independence we have managed to establish a harmonious state-regulated system of inter-ethnic processes, which is on a par with international standards, and which can ensure the fully-fledged revival of all our peoples, guarantee them universally recognised human rights, and assure social peace.

The international community is well aware of Ukraine's efforts to resettle the Crimean Tatars and other deported peoples. We are solving this problem by our own means and resources; there are many difficulties, but we are gradually overcoming them.

We are aware that we still have to pay a high price for the transition from a command administrative system to a market economy. And we are trying, first of all, to alleviate the situation of the most vulnerable groups of our population, and to ensure that assistance reaches its target. In spite of the lack of financial re-

sources, we are doing everything possible to avoid cutting our social programmes. The strategy and tactics of our social policy are outlined in the Basic Document for 1997-2000.

I believe that next year we shall undoubtedly witness a gradual economic growth in Ukraine, and the forging of a socially oriented market economy.

All the necessary conditions for making this a reality are now in place. These are both internal, as illustrated by the political stability in Ukraine, and external.

Our country has laid down sound foundations for a market economy, which we recognise as the basis for economic stabilisation and growth. It is evident that the transformation of the economy requires hard and complicated work, but there is no other way out. This is understood at all levels – from the state leadership to the general public. Production levels have been declining for years. The stimuli needed to raise output have not been employed. The manufacturing complex is still largely wasteful of resources and energy. Moreover, it is directly dependent on supplies of fossil fuels from Russia. The taxation system, too, is far from being perfect.

I do not attribute this less-than-attractive situation to the economic policy of the present Ukrainian leadership, but I have to admit that, in previous years, rational steps were not always timely and consistent. Today, we have a clear economic reform strategy, set out by the President of Ukraine in 1994 soon after his election. Its principal points are: to achieve and maintain financial stability, to control inflation, to restructure, denationalise and develop the private sector of the economy, and to create favourable conditions for foreign investment. The adoption of the new Constitution is a favourable factor in this respect, guaranteeing the equality of all citizens before the law, and government protection of ownership and economic rights. It also ensures the right to own land, the right to private property, and the right to entrepreneurship.

The position of the government in guiding the economy is gradually becoming more rational. An efficient economy is achieved through pragmatism rather than sentiment. The new government has started to act in this way.

A clear example is the coal-mining reform programme, aimed at closing down many enterprises which are unprofitable and without prospects.

There have been positive changes in budgetary policy and budgetary discipline. The only way to overcome the budget crisis is to be strict, and not over-spend the budgetary limits. And although part of the population bears the burden, since there are delays in wages, salaries and welfare payments, while government enterprises and institutions are inadequately funded, we are making this sacrifice in order to preserve the budget, to maintain financial stability, and thus to support conditions for normal economic processes.

At the present time we are already seeing some concrete achievements in financial stabilisation and the strengthening of the national monetary unit.

Strict control over the money in circulation by the government and the National Bank of Ukraine has enabled us to overcome inflation.

Rate of Inflation

Annual indicators:	Monthly average:
1993 – over 10,000%	1992 – 29.1%
1994 – 501%	1993 – 47.1%
1995 – 182%	1994 –14.7%
1996 – 44%	1995 – 9.0%
1997 – draft budget 20%	1996 – 2.9%

Target for 2000 – 10%.
In March 1997 the monthly rate dropped to 0.001%

Achieving stabilisation in this way has made it possible for us to initiate monetary reform – to introduce a full-fledged national currency – the hryvnya – in 1996. We consider its success to be a catalyst for encouraging certain national fund holders to participate more actively in trade and investment.

As concerns the balance of trade, only last year it increased in volume by 16 per cent. The trend is now towards the levelling of the balance of trade. In 1996 the current account deficit made up 1.9 per cent of GDP, which is lower than in many Central and East European countries.

Our foreign debt, likewise, is proportionally considerably lower than that of our neighbours.

Since, at present, Ukraine's financial resources are limited, it is necessary to define priority sectors for investment. First and foremost, we are taking care of those industries, which produce finished goods, satisfy domestic demand, have significant export potential and contribute to employment. These include, in particular, light manufacturing, machine-building, engineering, metallurgy and the food and chemical industries. In the agrarian sector they include technologies for the processing and storing of agricultural produce. This sector is especially promising for us, for about 40 per cent of the world's black earth is concentrated in Ukraine.

We have every reason to speak about the increasing interest of foreign investors in Ukraine. The amount of foreign investments into the Ukrainian economy has virtually doubled each year. And although the overall figures are still not large – about US $1.5 billion – the growth dynamics are promising. Such world famous corporations as Boeing, Siemens, Sumitomo, British Petroleum, De la Rue plc, Glaxo Wellcome plc, BNFL, Royal Dutch, Shell, Daewoo and others have entered the Ukrainian market, which is another very positive development.

Direct foreign investment into the Ukrainian economy on 1 January 1997 amounted to $1.4 bn. The leading foreign investors are:

USA	$245.3mn. (Ukrainian investments in USA $1.4mn.)
Germany	$182.9mn.
Netherlands	$119.2mn.
Russian Federation	$114.1mn. (Ukrainian investments in RF $55.2mn.)
Great Britain	$94.8mn.

Cyprus $72.9mn. (Ukrainian investments in Cyprus $2.36mn.)
Switzerland $51.5mn. (Ukrainian investments in Switzerland $7.7mn.)

First and foremost, in accordance with the needs of the domestic market, we pay special attention to the companies whose cooperation will allow us to obtain up-to-date technologies in ship- and vehicle-building, the aerospace industry, agricultural machine-building, manufacturing of consumer durables and radio electronic appliances.

This year, we are starting a new stage of market reforms linked with our policy of economic growth. Its guidelines are:

• extended taxation and budgetary reform to reduce tax pressure on manufacturers by almost 25 per cent;

• introduction of accelerated depreciation to increase the investment resources of enterprises;

• transition from voucher privatisation to cash sales of state enterprises in order to ensure reliable and efficient ownership; an active social policy coordinated to the rate of economic recovery;

• taking new constructive steps to inject foreign capital into the national economy.

I should like to dwell on the latter at greater length, for it is linked with the achievement of our strategic target – the gradual and equal accession of Ukraine to the world and European economy.

I am happy to point out that we find understanding and support from the IMF, the World Bank, EBRD, EU and other international institutions, and leading countries of the world, in particular, the USA, the UK, Germany, Japan and others – both in this respect and as concerns market reforms in general.

Cooperation between Ukraine and the World Bank has expanded significantly. The Country Assistance Strategy for 1996-98 has been agreed, with a lending scenario of about US $1 billion a year. In addition, a mutual action plan has been developed, which includes several top priority projects. Altogether more than 30 structural investment projects in key reform areas and sectors are now at different phases of preparation. These include:

• Energy Market Development Project (US $316mn.):

• Coal Sector Adjustment Project (US $300mn.):

• Agricultural Sector Adjustment Loan (US $300mn.). The first tranches of the loans for all these projects have already been granted to Ukraine.

I am often asked whether Ukraine guarantees protection of foreign investments. I am competent to say: 'Yes, it does'.

Our legislation does not limit the activities of foreign investors; it assures protection against enforced withdrawal and illegal actions by government agencies. It envisages payment of compensation and return of capital if investment activities are discontinued.

I will mention only two further points which in my view are sensitive.

Firstly, the products of enterprises with foreign investments may be exported from Ukraine without being subject to licensing and quota regulations.

Secondly, foreign investors may transfer their incomes from Ukraine to any other country, once taxes and other statutory payments have been made, as is envisaged in all civilised countries.

Government guarantees are also provided by bilateral intergovernmental agreements on the mutual protection of investments. Ukraine has signed such agreements with about 40 countries.

We are developing other measures which will contribute to further improvement of the investment climate in Ukraine.

I hope that all these factors will ensure a substantial increase in the flow of foreign investment into our economy, and extend and diversify the links of Ukrainian business with the business world in various economic and technological spheres.

I understand that Ukraine's integration into the world economy requires our accession to GATT/WTO. Today the process of harmonising Ukrainian legislation with respective WTO agreements is in progress.

We are doing everything necessary for Ukraine to become a full-fledged member of this influential and authoritative institution in 1998.

I should like to go into more detail about privatisation, which is such a sensitive issue for us. Ukraine has laid the foundations of an open economy. The property of small-, medium- and large-scale enterprises, which was formerly, in the main, state-owned, is undergoing intensive privatisation. This process is obviously complicated and even painful, and is often accompanied with corruption. However, we are proceeding on the clear understanding that this is the only way to find the most efficient owners and manufacturers. Small-scale privatisation has been completed in Ukraine and large- and medium-scale privatisation has been considerably accelerated. More than half of all industrial output is now produced by the non-government sector.

About 50,000 Ukrainian enterprises have already changed their organisational and legal form of management. They produced about 60 per cent of the total amount of industrial output last year.

Agrarian reform is picking up speed, the legal basis for private ownership of land and new joint-stock production structures have been established. There are now over 40,000 private farms in operation.

A market infrastructure is under development. Today, we have in Ukraine 85 commodity exchanges, 3 stock exchanges, more than 200 commercial banks, 680 investment companies and funds, 900 trust companies and 350 auditing firms.

I am sorry if my address has contained too many figures, but this was done deliberately, to substantiate the following important conclusion: the development of private ownership is making great progress in Ukraine. You are well aware that this is a most important factor of successful free market reforms. And it is equally important as a proof of their irreversibility. Certainly, not everything in this respect has gone as planned, but the progress is self-evident. I think that it is imperative to stress here the following point: we could hardly have been able to achieve such changes without the appropriate assistance from other countries, including the UK. Ukraine appreciates such support in the development of banking, rational use of energy, environmental protection and the training of the staff required for implementing such reforms.

Unfortunately, Chornobyl is a problem making Ukraine unique. About 11 years ago, the ominous word 'Chornobyl' was added to the international vocabulary. It was the fate of our country to experience that tragedy.

We are counting on the assistance of the European Community in general and the UK in particular to mobilise financial resources for decommissioning the Chornobyl nuclear power plant. Ukraine alone cannot solve this problem, which is of global importance.

The after-effects of the Chornobyl disaster will be felt for decades. The world community recognises that dealing with them is the responsibility of the whole of mankind and all countries. Not only moral support is needed, but also direct financial and material participation.

Nevertheless, I have to point out that there has been a certain decline in interest in this problem, though I have no doubt that everyone is well aware of what a burden it is to our state budget. We hope that the international community will be as resolute and consistent in this respect as Ukraine, while relinquishing deadly nuclear weapons.

Finally, I should like to emphasise that the problems and tasks of Ukraine and certain other countries with economies in transition are unprecedented in the modern history of mankind regarding their scale and difficulty.

For that reason, we stress the need to take concerted efforts and to sow a good seed which would bring forth an abundant crop.

That would be a success for Ukraine, Europe and the whole of the world community.

Legalisation of the 'Shadow' Economy: National Traits of the Transition Period

Serhiy Tolstov

Since autumn 1996, the 'legalisation' of the conditions of development of the Ukrainian economy has featured in socio-political discussion ever more frequently. The point here is not only that there are significant capital and commodity flows circulating in what is termed the 'shadow sector', but also that, in order to evade taxes and the ruinous supervisory activities of the state fiscal and licensing bodies, an ever-growing number of business transactions by fully official and legal enterprises are being conducted in a manner typical of the 'shadow' structures.

The transfer of the economy into the 'shadow' may be considered as being simultaneously both a cause and a result of very many phenomena of contemporary life in Ukraine, in particular, the chronic budgetary crisis, the delays in paying wages and pensions, the decline in the competitiveness of indigenous industrial production, etc. However, it is quite obvious that until recently the state, by implementing an absurd tax policy, obstructed – one might almost say deliberately – the restoration of the scale of production in the 'official' economy, not to mention stable economic growth, and made no attempt even to notice the catastrophic consequences of its own economic policy.

According to experts, the level of 'shadowisation' of the economy in Ukraine affects more than 50 per cent of the gross domestic product (GDP). This index is approximately equal to the analogous statistics of Argentina and the Philippines on the eve of the market reforms of the 1980s, and is higher than the relevant part of the 'shadow' economy in the GDP of Russia. In the Baltic republics the 'shadow' sector accounts for nearly 30 per cent of commodities and services. In Poland the figure does not exceed 20 per cent, while in the industrially developed European democracies it constitutes between 7-12 per cent of GDP.

In neighbouring Poland throughout the 1990s, governments of various political orientation implemented a tax policy aimed at stimulating the economy, having first secured an annual growth of 5 per cent, and increased the roles of domestic consumer demand and investment. In Ukraine, however, ministers of the economy and of finance have sometimes not seen fit to make use of the Laffer curve, while an on-going reduction in consumer demand has led to further falls in tax revenues to the budget and to a further escalation of Ukraine's already excessive dependence on foreign trade. In turn, the country's sensitivity to economic developments abroad has created favourable conditions for domestic economic difficulties to be, on occasion, exacerbated as a result of unfavourable developments in economic relations with Russia and Ukraine's other major trading partners.

At the same time, the market transformation envisages substantial changes in the economic functions of the state, including the transition from direct administrative control and supervision to indirect economic regulation via such essentially market mechanisms as taxation, the investment regime and the export of capital, bank rates, the regulation of the exchange rates of the national currency, etc.

The fact that the Ukrainian economy is persistently unresponsive to market regulation via monetary and other classical Western schemes seems paradoxical. One reason for this phenomenon is undoubtedly the underdevelopment of market mechanisms, due to delays in the introduction of profound reforms in the economic sphere, the failure to complete the privatisation of state property, the underdevelopment of the banking system, etc. However, it is impossible, too, to understand this phenomenon, without taking into account the real structural connections and the true role of the 'shadow' sector in the Ukrainian economy.

On 15 October 1996, when he presented to parliament the three-year Programme of government activity, the then Prime Minister Pavlo Lazarenko stated that the main mechanism of this programme would be the complex reform of the tax system and the legalisation of 'shadow' incomes of non-criminal origin. He further underlined that 'the present tax policy has ruined indigenous industry'.

After several years of silent inactivity, the government had finally recognised that exorbitant tax pressure had gone beyond all reasonable bounds and might well lead to a national catastrophe. Hence, in the specific circumstances prevailing in Ukraine, the legalisation of the 'shadow' economy should not be treated as a separate issue, but should rather be discussed within the context of a general normalisation of the conditions of economic life and the abolition of unjustified economic privileges and irksome double standards. In the autumn of 1996 the government began preparations for a complex tax reform, setting as its goal the reduction of the over-all tax burden on economic subjects at the beginning of 1997.

It should be noted that this package of tax legislation was drafted in haste by a commission consisting of Viktor Pynzenyk and S. Teryokhin with sporadic interventions from members of the presidential administration, and had a number of major deficits. The said commission also proposed the abolition of a significant number of the social privileges introduced under 'real socialism', which over the past two years had, in reality, become fictitious. Moreover, the methodology of the new laws fully conformed with the recommendations of the International Monetary Fund – the principal sponsor financing Ukraine's budget deficit. However, this alone cannot explain the persistent opposition which the new legislation encountered both in and outside parliament. It is noteworthy that this opposition came not only from the left, but also from a significant section of the state administrative bureaucracy, which has no interest in normalising economic conditions in Ukraine. The new tax legislation, despite all its flaws, meant the straightforward legalisation of the 'shadow' economy and envisaged the reduction of the general part of GDP, levied in the form of taxes, and the widening of the taxation-base. As a result, it envisaged the creation of conditions which would free entrepreneurs from the administrative control of officials and reduce informal protectionism.

The crux of the present conflict surrounding tax legislation was to a considerable extent affected by the divergence of interests between financial-economic and state-bureaucratic circles. The informal financial-economic groups which grew up in the Ukrainian transitional economy between 1990-96, and which demand the legalisation of accumulated capital and property, are exhibiting a completely understandable interest in the establishment of clearly defined and stable

economic conditions, and would like to get free from the day-to-day supervision by state officials. The timing of Ukraine's transition to European business standards and the creation of conditions for the growth in the production of goods and services depends on how quickly and painlessly the legalisation of the conditions of entrepreneurial activity and the implementation of new economic legislation will take place.

The Ukrainian Way to Capitalism

The development of market socio-economic relations in Ukraine occurred during the long-drawn-out and difficult disengagement from the Soviet *nomenklatura*-bureaucratic system. The determining factors of this transition were the re-distribution of former state property and the gradual introduction of market principles of economic regulation. The process of changing ownership rights and forms of management of state property ground to a virtual halt, which presented the bureaucracy with the optimal conditions for adapting to the new situation.

The interests of the bureaucratic élite were sufficiently well reflected in the forms and methods of the privatisation of large and medium-sized state enterprises in 1993-96, which, in the vast majority of cases, allowed the former officials to maintain control over the privatised industrial enterprises after a nominal change of their form of ownership.

During the 1990s, in the course of the process of market transformation in Ukraine, a series of branch and regional financial-economic groups were formed, which represented the interests of the state administrative bureaucracy and management-level personnel from the financial, industrial and trade sectors of the economy. The former were based on the branch groups, which had emerged back in the Soviet era. The corps of directors and the branch lobbyists who represented its interests in the former parliament instigated the fall of Vitold Fokin's government in 1992. At that time, the government demonstrated considerable intransigence regarding any lessening of branch-based supervision of the economy, thereby obstructing the attempts of directors to free themselves from the supervision of ministries and to acquire the status of full owners in 'their own' (albeit formally still unprivatised) plants and factories. At the end of the Soviet era, the Council of Ministers consisted of only 17 ministries and government departments. In 1992-93 the ministries lost their administrative control over the economic activity of enterprises, which were granted full freedom in their economic activities. However, with the sacking of Fokin's Cabinet, the number of ministries and departments began to increase uncontrollably and at present there are more than 50 of them. The increase in the number of ministries was undoubtedly connected with the post-independence state-building process, but was also related to the strengthening of essentially bureaucratic tendencies. This is one of the primary and basic causes of Ukraine's chronic budgetary difficulties and the worsening of the problem of the budget deficit over the last few years. Narrowly departmental interests, in conjunction with the transition to world prices in settling accounts with energy carriers, contributed to the gigantic inflationary leap of 10,800 per cent in 1993. Then, in 1993-94, during and as a result of administrative reform then taking place

(in the course of which many of the functions of local government organs came to an end), the first regional administrative-economic groups began to appear.

Following the presidential and parliamentary elections of 1994, conditions were created for the emergence of informal administrative-economic groups with a privileged status, and focused on structures of executive state power. In the opinion of certain Ukrainian economic experts, the birth and formation of 'central' administrative-economic groups took place in 1995-96.

Business and Government

Together with the processes of reorganisation of state power and change of form and methods of managing the economy there was also a 're-distribution of roles' in the system of informal economic control in territorial regions and fundamental sectors of production of profitable, competitive production. In 1995-96 these circumstances began to exacerbate the divergences between the individual regional administrative-economic groups, and led to the emergence of the first major conflicts between central and regional groups. The most bitter conflicts were in Crimea (where, according to the press, there exist at least three significant informal business structures of a semi-criminal nature) and also in the Donbas. The emergence of these regional administrative-economic groups was expedited and facilitated by the introduction of a state 'vertical' of executive power in the form of provincial and district state administrations.

The formation of this 'vertical' was vigorously debated in 1992-94. In 1993 Leonid Kravchuk issued a decree transferring the functions of the management of state property in the Donetsk, Luhansk, Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhya provinces to the local provincial state administrations 'as an experiment'. The transfer of state power to heads of provincial councils took place after President Leonid Kuchma issued, on 9 August 1994, decrees on direct presidential control over the Cabinet of Ministers and on the direct subordination to the president of the heads of councils in the provinces and districts, and also in Kyiv, its district capitals and Sevastopol.

As a result, in some regions, the 'horizontal' industrial structures, which had been formed at the beginning of the 1990s around the branch ministries, were marginalised or liquidated, under the influence of the provincial executive structures. The development of the administrative-economic group was based on the principle of forming an optimum self-sufficient structure, to include one or several banks, investment- and trade-agencies, law practices, defence firms, etc. The formation of such a structure is accompanied, as a rule, by an unavoidable clash of interests with criminal groups which control illegal businesses and run rackets, while also owning legitimate enterprises. This conflict can be resolved either using the state law-enforcement agencies to destroy and drive out the criminal-mafia organisations, or else, in some places, by incorporating the leaders of the 'shadow' structures into the administrative-economic groups.

The principal condition for the activity and functional superiority of an informal financial-economic group is its access to the structures of state power at the regional and local level, which enables them to use state institutions to protect themselves and to advance the interests of enterprises and organisations under

their control. The central link, or the nerve-centre of such a group consists, as a rule, of the leaders of individual structures of the state authorities, individual banking institutions and industrial enterprises. Although the informal financial-economic structures which grew up in Ukraine in 1994-96 are not officially registered or legally recognised, their influence can be felt in all spheres of business. Moreover, the press recognises these structures as being almost the true masters of the post-communist economy, referring to them most frequently as 'clans'. Recently, these administrative-economic structures or 'clans' have been showing increasing signs of political activity, aimed at achieving a direct influence on political processes in the state.

The 'Clans' and Politics

Since there is no official information on the existence of 'clans' (or, if it does exist, it is treated as classified), these groups can be distinguished and identified only at the empirical level.

On the basis of incomplete data, typical symptoms and numerous reports in the press, the 'agrarian clan', linked with the collective-state farm leadership, can be characterised as an example of an informal branch group. It is represented in the political sphere by Oleksander Tkachenko (deputy speaker of the Supreme Council), Serhiy Dovhan (leader of the Peasant Party) and Yuriy Karasyk (Minister of Agriculture).

The story about the unprofitable deals sanctioned by Tkachenko's company 'Zemlya i lyudy' and the ministry of agriculture to buy US 'John Deere' combine-harvesters, seed, unsuitable fodder, etc. received extremely wide publicity. The Peasant Party, founded in Kherson in 1992, has for a long time spoken in parliament as the recognised 'agricultural lobby'. This group, which many political analysts consider a 'phantom party', represents mainly the interests of collective farm leaders and the administrative bureaucracy of the agricultural regions. It considers itself, however, to be the representative of the interests of all rural inhabitants and employees of the agricultural complex. The most characteristic policy of this party is its opposition to the parcelling out and selling off of collective farm land, and its efforts to halt privatisation, particularly in the agricultural sector. When, on 5 December 1996, a new, market-oriented Agrarian Party of Ukraine was founded, with a far more modern programme, which also claimed to represent the interests of rural inhabitants, the leaders of the Peasant Party took this extremely badly, perceiving the appearance of this new political rival as a stab in the back.

Perhaps the most well-known and most frequently mentioned of all the regional clans is the 'Donetsk clan', which is associated with the names of Volodymyr Shcherban (up to 18 July 1996 head of the Donetsk provincial state administration) and the late Yevhen Shcherban, who was president of the ATON transnational corporation between 1994-96. On 3 November 1996 Yevhen Shcherban was gunned down at Donetsk airport on his return from Moscow.

The history of the formation of the 'Donetsk clan' is, simultaneously, both unique (being imbued with scandalous and sensational details) and in many ways typical of the development of the informal administrative-economic structures of Ukraine.

The specific socio-economic conditions associated with the crisis in the coal-mining industry, the wearing-out of equipment in metallurgy and a steep decline in oil-refining has, during the 1990s, given rise to the chronic social tensions in the Donetsk region, vocalised in the population's open and constant dissatisfaction with government economic policy. The situation in the Donbas has undermined the position of the old Soviet *nomenklatura* and enabled those communists whose power-base is formed by the former party bureaucracy of the lowest level to exert a significant influence. In 1994 Volodymyr Shcherban, a former director of a department store, was elected head of the provincial council by direct vote. Earlier, Shcherban, who enjoyed the support of private business interests in the region, had been deputy head of the Donetsk municipal executive council. He was also *ex officio* head of the organs of executive power in Donetsk province. By supporting some enterprises and putting pressure on others, the 'Donetsk clan' established significant control over the economy of the region by using such levers as the local tax inspectorate, the regional department of internal affairs, the procuracy and other government institutions.

As its channel of political influence on the national scale, the 'Donetsk clan' made use of the Liberal Party, founded in Donetsk in October 1991. Nevertheless, in the 1994 elections it was able to form and control the 'Social-Market Choice' faction by drawing into it more than 30 MPs (independents or belonging to other factions and parties). The adherence of former Prime Minister Yevhen Marchuk to the leadership of 'Social-Market Choice' allows one to draw certain conclusions as to a possible intensified power struggle for the leadership of the Party and the 'clan' as a whole.

However, these territorial financial-economic groups or 'clans' are by no means identical in form or origin. They can be formed on the basis of either sectoral or regional interests. As a rule, their internal hierarchy is determined by the influence of certain top-ranking state officials and the most affluent businessmen.

Administrative-economic groups, with the exception of the sectoral ones, are far more reminiscent of concerns and monopolistic associations than bodies set up to create various conditions oriented on the general-economic climate. In this interpretation the only thing which can lead to a substantial change of macroeconomic conditions is for a particular central administrative-economic group to exert a dominant influence on the economic policy of the country. At the same time, the total influence on state policy of the lobbyists of regional and branch administrative-economic groups has so far been slight, due to their evident differences concerning macroeconomic issues. As a result, their lobbying has in general focused on extending their influence over specific regions and the most attractive enterprises. The next stage in their activity may possibly be an attempt to establish their control over government policy so as to ensure a national economic policy favourable to them.

Divorce Ukrainian Style?

With the adoption of the Constitution which superseded the (temporary) Constitutional Agreement (8 June 1995-28 June 1996), the main regional 'clans' and financial-economic groups increased their lobbying over the drafting and debating

of a series of Constitutional bills required for the norms of the new Constitution to be implemented.

As a result, the MPs representing the interests of regional and provincial administrations have become significantly more active in parliament, particularly those from areas which have traditionally been keenest in getting regional interests embodied in the law – Kharkiv, Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, Odesa, Vinnytsya and Lviv. Supporters of the main opposition leaders and potential presidential candidates (in the 1999 election) are also playing an active role in ensuring the temporary majority needed to pass specific economic laws. The formation of new, and at first glance surprising, parliamentary and extra-parliamentary alliances and coalitions, based on the convergence of interests of leading financial-economic groups, seems entirely probable.

It seems, on the whole, unlikely that over the next few years it will be possible to avoid an exacerbation of the differences between the most influential administrative-economic and financial-economic groups as the possibilities of extensive forms of development created by the initial distribution of state property and resources become exhausted. Symptomatic, too, of the structuring of political and economic interests in society is the fact that certain state and political leaders have already set up staffs to prepare for next year's parliamentary election, investing significant funds and organisational efforts into this.

For the informal financial-economic groups which came into being in Ukraine during the transition period and which are the true masters of the Ukrainian economy, their present semi-legal status is inconvenient and even dangerous. The ambiguities in the current legislation on property rights and business activity hinder the proper legalisation of economic conditions and the return to the state of the significant capital, exported abroad between 1989-96. Meanwhile, the divergence of interests of the financial-economic and state-bureaucratic circles hastens their inevitable divorce.

It is paradoxical that the state officials concerned are those who, in their time, actively helped establish these informal administrative-economic and financial-economic groups as a means of personal enrichment and economic control. However, as a result of the initial accumulation of capital and the privatisation of state property, the interests of the administrative bureaucracy and financial-industrial circles have continued to diverge. In the present situation, the longer that strict economic control is asserted by officials, the more it will be perceived by business groups as a major stumbling-block to their entrepreneurial activities. If 'shadow' capital is legalised, the use of protectionism by state institutions to get material income and profit will be perceived as an anachronism incompatible with the conditions of the civilised market. Then, with the implementation of appropriate changes in the law, one may hope that financial-economic groups will find it no longer necessary to use extra-economic means to achieve essentially economic goals. At the same time, only the legalisation of the 'shadow' economy and an inflow of Western investors can accelerate changes in the economic behaviour of Ukrainian businessmen.

Conversely, the longer that a double standard is preserved in economic life, the more firmly will the conditions for the existence of the shadow economy be established. Moreover, an ever-increasing number of economic transactions will continue to be transferred to the 'shadow' sphere – a phenomenon which deprives the budget of income revenues, accustoms society to abuses and corruption by bureaucrats, and creates a general feeling of fatigue and apathy, and that 'nothing can be done' to improve the situation.

Hence, a change from the organisation of covert regional and sectoral groups working to their own economic advantage to official and (legalised) semi-governmental industrial-financial groups would mean a real step forward in the transition from a corrupt post-Soviet oligarchy to more modern forms of capitalist society.

Such a transition envisages the victory of the principles of party politics through expected ratification by parliament of a new law on elections based on proportional representation and, as a result, the formation of responsible party government on the basis of a firm parliamentary majority.

If this, indeed, takes place, the Ukrainian economy and political system will acquire a far greater stability and compatibility with European economic and political standards, and this, in turn, will open the door for fully-fledged integrated co-operation with the developed countries of the world.   ❏

Arts and Culture

The Tragic Fate of a Sculptor

Vitaliy Khanko

Mykhailo Havrylko is recognised as one of the classic exponents of Ukrainian plastic art. His work has been discussed in general terms by the art historians and critics Mykola Holubets, Yu. Mykhailovych and Dmytro Antonovych, and is also described in histories and surveys of Ukrainian art and encyclopaedias published in Ukraine and Canada (in English). Nevertheless, his life and work are still all-too-little known.

As a young man, the future sculptor had become a committed opponent of the Tsarist regime, and was arrested three times for his political activities. He was a member of the Revolutionary Ukrainian Party, a soldier of the Ukrainian Sich Riflemen and a representative of the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine in prisoner-of-war camps in Austria during World War I. He fought against the Bolsheviks in the army of the Ukrainian National Republic, and died with other partisans in his native Poltava region. This complex biography meant that Soviet officialdom imposed a partial taboo on the name of Mykhailo Havrylko. It was permitted to mention him only within the context of works on Shevchenkiana and the evolution of Ukrainian sculpture of the pre-Revolutionary era. Moreover, scholars were obliged to accentuate, first and foremost, the principles of realism on which his work was based, and to devote only a few grudging pre-prepared censored sentences to him. Only in independent Ukraine have the young art critics O. Noha and B. Savytskyi from Lviv been able to shed light, once again, on this important and original figure in Ukrainian art.

Mykhailo Havrylko was born on 5 October 1882 close to the village of Runivshchyna near Poltava, in the 'Cossack homesteads' (which included the homesteads of Havrylko, Olefira and Fysuna) on the River Svynkivka. Mykhailo's father – Omelyan – who came from an old Cossack family, also had three other sons – Nychypor, Ivan and Stepan. I am indebted to Danylo Fusyn, a childhood friend of Mykhailo Havrylko, for this information.

Havrylko's path in life took him first from his native homestead to Myrhorod, where he studied art (1899-1904) in the Hohol School of Applied Art and was the

first student of Opanas Slaston, a graphic artist widely-known throughout Ukraine, an illustrator of Shevchenko's 'Haydamaky', painter, architect, ceramist, art critic and lecturer. Havrylko then spent a short time in St Petersburg, where he was imprisoned for his part in a student strike. He later was arrested twice more for 'anti-tsarist propaganda' – for calling for an independent Ukraine and land for the peasants. This meant that he was no longer permitted to study within the Russian Empire. Havrylko, therefore, went to Lviv (then under Austrian rule), and from there on to Cracow. Between 1907-12 he studied at the Cracow Academy of Art, where he was the most able student of Professor Kostyantyn Lyashka.

In Cracow there was quite a large community of Ukrainians. Havrylko became close to such Ukrainian intellectuals as the young *litterateur* and professor of the Jagiellonian University, Bohdan Lepkyi; the future notable historian, sociologist and politician, Vyacheslav Lypynskyi; and also Volodymyr Temnytskyi and Roman Stelmakh. The latter, in his memoirs, remarked that Havrylko sang very well and when 'I frequently listen to his ballads, then I recall that with such a voice one should sing only in the steppes'.[1]

In addition to his original talent for carving, Havrylko also had some skills as a poet. In 1909 he compiled a collection of his early poetry, and, with the help of Kost Pankivskyi, published in Cracow an 80-page volume: *Na rumovyshchakh.* Havrylko's poetical works are virtually unknown to scholars of Ukrainian literature. His work is characteristic of the Ukrainian poetry of the early 1900s, when the nationally-conscious youth was speaking out boldly in support of the freedom of Ukraine. The following, inspired by his six-month incarceration in a St Petersburg prison, is a typical example:

> Thunder, thunders! Blaze forth swiftly,
> Stormclouds o'er the earth come flying,
> Let me melt together with ye,
> With my soul so grieving, sighing!...
>
> Thunders thunder, walls fall shattered,
> Shattered prison bars are falling,
> Warders fearful, like ghosts, pallid,
> On the name of God are calling.
>
> Thunder, thunders! Blaze forth swiftly,
> Let all prison bars be shattered,
> Let the gates of iron fall, battered,
> Let me take my revels with ye!
>
> Thunder thunders, let men swoon now,
> Let my warders turn to stone now,
> And in the wild levin-flaring,
> Out of the darkness bear me, bear me!

[1] Roman Stelmakhiv, 'Dva proekty pamyatnykiv T. Shevchenkovi: Mykhailo Havrylko. Spomyn pro tvortsya proektu pamyatnyka T. Shevchenka v Kyyevi', *Zhyttya i Znannya,* Lviv, 1932, no. 6 (54), p. 161.

Likewise, the following lines dated February 1905:

> Nightingales in cherry orchards
> Shall pour music flowing,
> And in answer maiden's singing
> Shall rise, swelling, growing.
> Everything will weep and sing now,
> Drunken with strange wonders,
> Rest will come to my poor heart, so
> Crushed by tempests' thunders.

In the poem 'To the noble spirit of my father', just as in the painting produced in Cracow in March 1909, his filial piety creates a portrait of someone whom he loves dearly:

> And, like a grey dove, my poor father,
> All in vain shall coo with yearning,
> And climb the hill in his deep sorrow,
> Looking to see his son returning.
> He will come not, he will come never,
> Under his native roof to rest now
> Nor lay his head, storm-tossed and battered,
> Once more upon his father's breast now.

However, scanning the issues of the journal *Literaturno-naukovyi Vistnyk* for 1910, I came across an extremely unfavourable review of the poems of the young poet by M. Yevshan.[2]

During his first year of studies in Cracow, Havrylko began work on a portrait of Taras Shevchenko. According to the Kyivan journal *Ridnyi Kray*, a bust of Shevchenko by Havrylko was exhibited at the Shevchenko commemoration in Poltava in 1908. The Lviv newspaper *Dilo* is more specific, saying that Havrylko had produced, 'fine works, like the colossal bust of T. Shevchenko in the theatre in Poltava and a smaller one in the Ukrainian museum of Tarnovskyi in Chernihiv'.[3]

During 1909-11 Havrylko produced a number of notable works, including 'Hannusya' (1909), busts of Markiyan Shashkevych (1910) and Taras Shevchenko (1911), and 'Portrait of a Woman' (1911). Somewhat later came the 'Bandura Player' (1914) and 'Cossack on a Horse'. In 1911 he designed medallions with the portrait of Shevchenko, which were popular in Galicia and Bukovyna. The newspaper *Dilo* gave the following details about this:

During the commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the death of the poet and during work on a design for a monument in Kyiv, the chisel of our talented young artist-engraver M. Havrylko produced two new portraits in the form of bas-reliefs, and in profile and two-thirds full-face. Both are competent, and, indeed, belong to the best of all such works in this field to date. The smaller format is being sold by the 'Zhinocha Hromada' [Women's Assembly organisation], and the proceeds are designated for the Ridna shkola [National

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[2] M. Yevshan, review in *Literaturno-naukovyi Vistnyk*, Kyiv, 1910, vol. 4, book 5, May, pp. 413-14.
[3] 'Molodyi artyst-rizbar z Ukrayiny, p. Mykhailo Havrylko…', *Dilo*, Lviv, 1908, 20 July (7 July OS), no. 160, p. 3.

School]. Due to the fact that the relief is of fairly small size, and hence does not require a special place on the wall, and also due to its artistic and decorative qualities, this relief deserves to be distributed as widely as possible. Casting is carried out in the workshop of Prof. I. Levytskyi, and the resulting reliefs come in several shades of colour, so that the portrait may be adapted to the specific decor of different rooms.[4]

In addition, Havrylko worked intensively and successfully on his design for the Shevchenko monument in Kyiv, which he submitted to the first competition in Kyiv. His proposed design, submitted under the slogan 'Achieve – or cease to breathe!' won first prize. Havrylko's design was a work of considerable artistry, where he clearly expressed the power of his talent and his understanding of Taras Shevchenko as a prophet and spokesman of Ukraine, the irresistible pull of the Ukrainian people towards freedom and protest against tyranny and oppression.

His maquette for the monument included a majestic figure of the poet on a lofty, slender, tapering pedestal, and below, around the perimeter – four groups of compositions, each of 3-5 figures on subjects from the history of Ukraine. This monumental work (or, rather, reproductions of it) achieved popularity on account of its purely artistic resolution of the theme, together with its understanding and illumination of the national spirit and idea. Reactionary official circles and deracinés members of the jury did all they could to get the competition cancelled, and then rejected Havrylko's submission. Subsequent international competitions proved unsuccessful so that right up to the period of the Ukrainian National Republic (1918-20) no proper monument to Shevchenko was erected in Kyiv.

Deliberating on this situation, Havrylko (who combined the talents of a plastic artist, poet and publicist) wrote:

> Our serf soul is so riddled with holes that to this very day it has no national will of its own, and is afraid to make an independent move until a foreigner gives it his 'blessing'. Not only do our 'intelligentsia' regard our tongue as 'crude and inept', but these self-same enlightened Ukrainians likewise regard our artists as 'crude and inept' for the expression of higher feelings, and so to this day we not only have no school of art, nor even a museum, all our art is dispersed around foreign treasure-houses, and the very guiding stars of Ukrainian rebirth call to all exponents of the arts from the whole world to express together the profound feelings of the Ukrainian people, measure by artificial standards its profound depths of pain and suffering.[5]

A few paragraphs on, Havrylko continues:

> And what we need is not to keep our noses turned windward and sniff out 'trends' in art, but to begin at the beginning through honest independent work on a native foundation, beginning with the corporeal form and ending with the spiritual, as the Greeks did. And they began with whistle-pipes and dolls, like our potters from Opishnya,[6] and finished with the Venus de Milo and Nike…

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[4] 'Portret Shevchenka', *Dilo*, 1911, 16 March (3 March OS), no. 59, p. 6.

[5] 'Havrylko Mykhailo, khudozhnyk-rizbar. V spravi konkursu proektiv pamyatnyka T.H. Shevchenkovi', *Ukrayinska khata*, Kyiv, 1911, July-August, p. 360.

[6] Opishnya, Zinkiv district, Poltava oblast, factory 'Khudozhniy keramik', an affiliate of the production-artistic union 'Poltavchanka'. One of the oldest centres of Ukrainian folk art (decorative weaving, ceramic products, embroidery). The craftsmen of Opishnya produce figure vessels which they decorate with plants ornaments, ceramic toys and small sculptures. Known since the seventeenth century.

We should start with a monument, for it is vain to put our hopes in foreigners, our seeking our destiny beyond the seas will yield no good result. We need no beggarly collection of foreign cast-offs, we will give our mother, if not a sumptuous imperial robe, then at least a sumptuously embroidered shirt, but this will be *our own*, and it is better – better – one's own patched garment than one grabbed from abroad. And until we throw off the foreign cataract from our slavish souls and eyes, we will not be able to find strength and faith in ourselves, we will not achieve in our hearts our national 'holy of the holies', ... and until then, my brothers, all our bustling about will be futile, we will not live and will not leave footsteps on the ground behind us...[7]

After a brilliant finish to his academic studies, Havrylko went to Paris, where he worked for a year, perfecting his techniques, in the atelier of Antoine Bourdelle, one of the leading lights of French sculpture at that time. A letter dating from this time, from Havrylko to his first tutor in art, Opanas Slaston, has survived. In it, Havrylko wrote:

I have visited Prof. Bourdelle. He made much of me: showed me two of his workshops, and even said he would bring a photograph of one of them to me at the academy. He showed foreigners my Hutsul-work axe and explained to them my national origin as a Ukrainian, and the French were very surprised because they do not understand, first of all what nation this is, for they regard everything as 'Russe' were it even a samoyed, and therefore it is difficult to impress on the French that our traitors, werewolves, the 'petit Russe' say, and stress, and confuse things, saying that that is all the same 'Russe'.[8]

As a lofty example and standard of art Havrylko chose for himself the most prominent sculptor of the Renaissance, the Italian Michelangelo. Under his influence, Havrylko, according to the art critic Yukhym Mykhailov, 'glorifies strength, power, courage, movement'. The Lvivian Mykola Holubets calls him a 'belated romantic'.

With the outbreak of World War I, Havrylko joined the first company of the Ukrainian Sich Riflemen. On the instructions of the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine, he carried out cultural and educational work in the camps in Austria for prisoners-of-war from the Russian army, particularly for Ukrainians. In a camp for Ukrainian prisoners-of-war in Freistadt, Havrylko, together with Prof. V. Simovych and M. Chaykovskyi, Drs. R. Domchevskyi and Y. Okhrymovych, worked on raising the national self-awareness in Ukrainian soldiers. Havrylko went to the front with the rank of lieutenant and fought at Bolekhiv, Halych, Zolota Lypa, Strypa and Nastasiv.

During his military service, Havrylko lacked the facilities to work on his sculptures. However, in 1917, when he was living for a short time in Lviv, he gave considerable thought to a new design for a monument to Shevchenko and also produced a copper medallion of Prince Svyatoslav I, the father of Volodymyr the Great.

The following year, Havrylko crossed with the Sich Riflemen from Galicia to Left-Bank Ukraine. On 20 October 1918, he wrote to the Minister of National Education as follows:

I, the signatory, at this time am carrying out various duties pertaining to an officer in the 3 Regiment of the 1 Rifleman-Cossack Division in Konotop. However, being a sculptor

[7] 'Havrylko Mykhailo, khudozhnyk-rizbar...', op. cit., pp. 362-63.
[8] Letter by Mykhailo Havrylko to Opanas Slaston, dated 17-18 June 1911, Central State Archive-Museum of Literature and Art of Ukraine, holding 194, file 1, collection 15, folio 2.

by profession, I believe that I can be most useful in that branch of human life to which I have natural talents and for which I have been trained. Moreover, my soul has become perturbed by the fact that the Ukrainian government has reopened the question of a monument to T.H. Shevchenko, but that as a regimental officer, carrying out all petty and unproductive duties, I will have no opportunity to make the necessary preparations to submit my work in a possible future competition for a new design for the said monument, and in general I have no chance to engage in the sculpture and art to which I am temperamentally suited.[9]

By 1919 Havrylko was living in Poltava, where his younger brother, Nychypor, lived. In the autumn of that year, he began working in the Poltavan Union of Consumer Associations. The journal *Poltavskyi kooperator* gives an account of his artistic work:

The well-known Ukrainian sculptor Mykh. Havrylko, in accordance with a commission from the P.S.S.T-e [Poltavan Union of Consumer Associations], is making a clay bust of Taras Shevchenko. When it is completed, a mould will be made from which sturdy concrete busts will be cast. Every village community which respects the memory of our celebrated bard Taras Shevchenko and wants, therefore, to erect a monument to him, will be able to buy this bust from the Union, and, with the help of a civil engineer, to implement this plan.[10]

The well-known statistician and writer, Dmytro Solovey, wrote that Havrylko was allocated a separate room in a building on Sinnyi square and

he began to mould the bust from grey clay, specially brought from Opishnya. For a long time, Mykh. Havrylko was greatly concerned about how to recreate the spirit of the poet's face, to give him the expression which he wanted. In the end, he achieved his aim. All that remained was dressing the bust and beginning to prepare the mould.[11]

However, as a former officer of the army of the Ukrainian National Republic, the Cheka was watching Havrylko carefully. According to Solovey, at the end of the summer of 1920, Cheka agents came to Havrylko's workshop to arrest the sculptor, but he had managed to make his escape. Havrylko united his artistic work with active participation in the fight for Ukrainian freedom. He became commander of a partisan unit. Solovey quotes an acquaintance as testimony that Havrylko commanded the uprising in the district of Dukanka-Bozhkove, and was captured and shot in Poltava. The news of the heroic death of this sincere patriot, soldier and notable artist spread throughout Ukraine and beyond its borders. Ukrainian scholars and art historians made due note of this. For example, Professor Dmytro Antonovych of the Ukrainian Free University writes that:

this tempestuous artist and romantic lay down his life in the whirlwind of revolutionary events: he was murdered by the Bolsheviks. Before his death, Havrylko managed to

[9] Letter by Mykhailo Havrylko to the Minister of Education and the Arts, dated 13 November 1918. Central State Archive of the Poltava Oblast, holding 837, file 1, collection 34, folio 428.

[10] 'Vyhotovlennya byustiv T. Shevchenka dlya pamyatnykiv', *Poltavskyi kooperator*, 1920, no. 1-8, January-April, p. 81.

[11] Dmytro Solovey, *Rozhrom Poltavy: Spohady z chasiv Vyzvolnykh zmahan ukrayinskoho narodu. 1914-1921*, 2nd expanded edition (Poltava, 1994), pp. 150-51.

'The Farewell' (detail from a design for a
monument to Taras Shevchenko).
Plaster-cast, 1911.

complete several busts of Shevchenko
in Left-Bank Ukraine, but violent death
cut short his work on his final, original-
ly conceived, bust of Shevchenko.[12]

Mykhailo Havrylko is one of the
best-known Ukrainian sculptors of the
twentieth century, who was violently
killed in his prime. His work requires
further careful study, and an objective
reading of all available material and a
viewing of the known works of this
artist. The well-loved monuments to
Taras Shevchenko in Kharkiv, Kyiv
and Kaniv are based on the monument
which Havrylko designed in 1910. The
Shevchenko monuments produced by
Ivan Kavaleridze are in either the real-
ist or constructivist style. Fedir Bala-
venskyi's bust and monument, erected
in Kyiv during the Ukrainian National
Republic, was a typical product of 'po-
pulist' style. Similar monuments were
unveiled throughout the whole of Uk-
raine in the period from 1910 to 1930.
But only Mykhailo Havrylko pursued
his own path, and his true feeling for
monumental art, artistic portrayal, nati-
onal foundations and plastic form truly
expressed the greatness of the poet
Shevchenko and the idea of national
renaissance.   ❏

[12] Dmytro Antonovych, 'Ukrayinska skulptura', *Ukrayinska kultura: Lektsiyi za red. Dmytra Anto-
novycha* (Kyiv: Lybid, 1993), p. 303.

Literary Anniversaries

Marko Vovchok
(1834-1907)

Mariya Vilinska was born in Orel in 1834, the daughter of a petty landowner of mixed Polish-Ukrainian descent. After a childhood spent in affluent conditions, she was educated at a boarding school for the daughters of gentlefolk in Kharkiv (1845-48), and then went to live with an aunt in Orel. Here, in Orel, she met Opanas Markovych, a Ukrainian of Serbian origin, who was exiled there in 1847 for his participation in the illegal 'Brotherhood of Sts Cyril and Methodius' – a group of young Ukrainian intellectuals in St Petersburg, which advocated the principles of democracy and the equal brotherhood of all Slav nations.

Although Mariya had already learned something about the past of Ukraine from her grandfather, who had taught her Ukrainian songs, it was Markovych who first awoke in her a feeling of rapport and personal involvement with Ukraine's history and struggle for freedom. This triggered her self-awareness as a Ukrainian, and also prompted her, in 1851, at the age of 17, to accept Markovych's proposal of marriage.

The union, however, was not a happy one, possibly due to the discrepancy in the couple's ages (Markovych was twelve years her senior), while various material difficulties and a personal tragedy – the death of their only daughter in infancy – drove the couple further apart. The birth of a son in 1853 failed to cure their problems. By 1857, the couple were living apart, and, in 1860, they divorced.

By now Mariya, under the masculine pseudonym of 'Marko Vovchok', had become a major figure on the Ukrainian literary scene, with the appearance, in 1857, of the first volume of her *Narodni opovidannya* (Folk Stories). But (although a second volume of *Narodni opovidannya* appeared in 1862) the failure of her marriage seems to have left Mariya for a time apathetic towards things Ukrainian. After leaving her husband, she had gone to St Petersburg and Moscow, where she made the acquaintance of such leading Russian writers as Nekrasov, Chernishevskiy, Kavelin, Pisemskyi and Turgenev. The latter translated many of her stories into Russian, and, in 1859, she went abroad with him, eventually settling in Paris. From then on, she wrote not in Ukrainian but in Russian or French.

While in Paris, Mariya lived the usually financially precarious life of a free-lance writer, oscillating between penury and bouts of relative affluence. She corresponded with Aleksandr Herzen, the editor and publisher of the most famous of Russian émigré journals – the London-based *Kolokol*, and with other Russian activists such as Bakunin and Lavrov. During her years abroad, she also visited England, Germany and Switzerland. Finally, in 1867, she returned to St Petersburg.

Back in the Russian empire, she found great changes for the worse. *Osnova*, the journal which had published her Ukrainian stories, had long been closed down. Her former husband, Opanas Markovych, was dead, as, too, was Taras Shevchenko, the greatest of Ukrainian poets, who in his last years had been greatly impressed with her talent. Publication in the Ukrainian language was now virtually impossible. However, her considerable linguistic talents (she knew eight languages) enabled her to find work translating leading works of European literature into Russian. During this time, she formed a relationship with the Russian critic D. Pisarev, who was seven years her junior. However, as with her marriage to Markovych, her life with Pisarev was not happy. However, the shock of his death in 1868 (he was drowned in front of her eyes) effectively put an end to her literary activities. Soon afterwards, she married a Russian petty official Lobach-Zhuchenko, and went with him to the Caucasus.

For more than 30 years she published nothing – although for part of this time, at least, she was engaged in collecting Ukrainian folklore, and compiling a Ukrainian dictionary. Then, in 1902, (when she was living in Bohuslav) a story of hers entitled 'The Devil's Adventure' appeared in the journal *Kievskaya starina*. But no further works followed, and, on 10 August 1907, she died at her husband's homestead near Nalchyk in the Caucasus, where she is buried.

The first collection of *Narodni opovidannya* by 'Marko Vovchok' appeared in 1857. Like a number of nineteenth century women authors, she feared that her work would not be taken seriously if it were known that a woman had written it. (In England, at approximately the same time, Mary Ann Evans was writing as 'George Eliot', and the Brontë sisters had adopted the ambiguous pseudonyms of Acton, Currer and Ellis Bell). However, the identity of the author seems to have been discovered fairly rapidly. In January 1859, she visited Shevchenko in St Petersburg, where the latter, worn beyond his years by the harsh conditions of his Central Asian exile, hailed her (in lines abounding with linguistic echoes of the Old Testament) as the 'daughter' and 'prophet' who, he hoped, would keep the Ukrainian cause alive after him. (In memory of this meeting, he also dedicated to her one of his most exquisite short works, the vignette: 'She reaped the wheat in serfdom's labour', see: *The Ukrainian Review*, vol. 11, no. 4, 1964, p. 66).

In spite of the relative brevity of her creative life – particularly as far as works written in Ukrainian are concerned, Marko Vovchok, both in her subject matter, rooted in scenes of Ukrainian peasant life and folk-love motifs, and in the new qualities which she imparted to Ukrainian prose, did, indeed, do much to fulfil Shevchenko's hopes.

* * *

Taras Shevchenko

To Marko Vovchok

Lately, beyond the Urals straying,
I wandered, and of God besought
That our truth should not pass away so,
That our word should not die. I prayed so,
And it was granted – for the Lord
Sent thee to us, a prophet kindly,
One to reprove with sternest chiding
Cruel, insatiate men. My light,
Thou art my holy star in truth,
Thou art to me the strength of youth.
Shine upon me, blazing bright,
And give new life to my poor heart,
That all exposed to every smart
Doth hunger here. Alive again,
Free thought to freedom I once more shall
Call from the coffin forth again,
And that free thought, then… thou, my fortune,
Our prophet, thou my dearest daughter,
That thought I shall call by thy name.

15.II.1859
St Petersburg

Marko Vovchok

The Salt-Trader

I

When our father died – may the earth lie light as a feather on him – he left us nine pairs of good draught-oxen. There were three of us brothers; I was the youngest, still a boy when father passed away. The middle one got married and gave up the salt-trading. Our mother had gone on at him: 'Give up the trading, son. I'm unhappy in the world now – at least you stay and cheer me up for a bit…'. Anyway, he was a weakling and quite often unwell.

My elder brother and I went on with the salt-trading. Hrytsko was a tall lad – dark, hazel-eyed, a lad like an eagle. Well, we went on trading… I'm old now, my daughter will be betrothed next autumn, but I still dream about it… the wide, unbounded steppe, the path stretching ahead, our curve-horned oxen plodding, the wagon creaking and the moon shining…

'Well, boy, have you counted the stars', Hryts would shout, like a bell boom-ing. And I would jump up.

Going from our village to Crimea, one had to pass through Kumytsi, a Cossack village, large, spread over two hills, with two stone-built churches, a river, all new houses with a fine, beautiful cherry-tree beside every one! A splendid village! Our aunt had married there, our mother's sister, so we could always go and stay with them. Our aunt was glad to see us; she would pester us with questions, lay on a lav-ish meal, and tell us her news. We would stop over with them on our way, and would then take it easy for two or three days: either my brother was waiting for some mate of his, or else the oxen needed a rest... For me, as a boy, everything was fine, whether I played with the boys there or perched on the fence like a rooster.

II

One spring we set out from home early, and stopped in Kumytsi as usual, on the evening of the third day. It was warm, and the cherry-trees were thick with blossom. Before we reached our aunt's house, Hryts halted the oxen and said:

'Look, Ivas, don't go away, little brother. I'll be back right away'.

'Where are you off to, Hryts?'

'I've just got to run round to a man I know. Don't leave the wagons!' And off he went, and I trailed him secretly: which of the people we knew was he going to see?

We crossed the street, and stopped outside a new house. Hryts whistled: waited a bit, then whistled again... a third time... Nothing at all to be heard. I seemed to be sitting on top of five stoves at once – what was going on? Hryts walked round the garden. And under an old cherry tree, which, it seemed, had the thickest blos-soms, there stood a lovely girl, like a bright star, with a blonde plait falling below her waist. She stood facing the new moon, and lifting her white hand, recited:

'New moon pale,
Like a nail!
Horns so fair are thine,
Eyes so bright are mine!'

As she began to recite this a second time, Hryts whistled very softly. The girl gave a start, like a grey cuckoo; she listened... Hryts drew closer,

'Hryts!', she said, 'Is that you, Hryts?'

I tried to get up close to listen, but, like a fool, I tumbled into a pit which was overgrown with nettles. What wretch dug a pit there right by the fence? Anyway, I'd heard enough. I legged it back to the wagons. Maybe Hryts would think that he'd flushed out a hare.

We stayed three days in Kumytsi. Hryts was waiting once more for people he knew – the wretches didn't show up! And he, in the meantime, went out every evening and came back at dawn. Chatting, with the village boys, I found out who owned the new house: Danylo Moroz. A strapping Cossack with a long moustache, and, moreover, a foul temper: he had a daughter, Maryna.

III

We arrived in Crimea safe and well. On the way back, as usual, we had to stop in Kumytsi. Hryts quickly made his excuses to Auntie, and ran off. But this evening he came back quickly, very gloomy about something.

In the morning, we sat down to have breakfast. Auntie said:

'Hryts, did you know, Danylo Moroz's daughter, Maryna?'

'What's that?'

'Her father's married her off – he forced the poor girl to it! How white she looked. They took her away to her in-laws like a corpse'.

I glanced at Hryts: he was listening and staring fixedly at the window.

'Once she was married, she disappeared behind a blank wall. She pined away, it seems, like a little fish. And she was a girl like the sun. She often used to run round to me, whisper things, ask questions…'.

'Who was she given to?'

'Why, Ivan Bondar – in Dzvonari, not far. Such a rich fellow!…'.

How my Hryts hung his head, all the way home.

IV

And all the time, mother:

'Get married, Hryts, get married! What's stopping you?'

'What's stopping me', Hryts would say, 'is that I haven't found the right girl; I don't want to marry just anyone!'

We would sit in the house, mother would start to grow sad, and then she would say:

'What lovely girls we've got in our village. Why, in Kyiv itself there's probably no one as pretty as Katrya Barabashivna'.

And she would look at Hryts.

'Indeed, there isn't', Hryts would say.

'Or Motrya Yakovenkova. Oo, she's a fine girl, really fine!'

'Motrya's fine, too'.

'And Melasya?'

'Melasya's pretty, as well'.

Then mother would start to weep. And so our Hryts remained a wanderer for ever.

Maryna – we learned from people's talk – soon died: they say that her husband treated her very badly. He's in his third marriage now.

V

By now, Hryts had grown grey as a dove, but he still went down to Crimea. He had no wish either to marry or stay home – he kept on with the salt-trading. Fate treated him well – the money came rolling in, but he took no pleasure in riches; he kept travelling mainly because he had come to love the salt-trader's life. At home, he was so quiet, he never made merry, indeed, he barely spoke at all. But out in the steppe, he was another man, as if his whole world had been raised up. He walked among the wagons briskly and boldly. Or he would sing: 'Tell me, fate, O tell me, Why art thou not to me As other folks' fates be!' until the steppe re-echoed.

How well he sang! When he sang 'Nechay', you would think that any moment the Cossacks would ride forth – and a shiver would run down your spine. He was a true salt-trader.

He had the church in our village re-shingled and the cross gilded. And he saved more than one poor man from destitution.

He had great respect for his mother. She outlived him; by then she had become all shrunken up, like an October mushroom, but she outlived the salt-trader.

It's three years since he died. He was a mighty trader to the end. When he was dying, he told us to dig up two chests of money under an oak in the forest; one for mother and one to give him a grand funeral; to build him a high grave-mound and to put a cross on it, made from a whole oak-tree. So we cut through the roots of the tree, trimmed the branches a bit, and set it up like a cross. It can be seen from far off in the steppe.

* * *

The Mother-in-Law

I

There once lived in our village a widow, Orlykha. I was still a small girl at the time, and I do not remember too much, but I heard this from my late mother, God rest her soul! Orlykha was her neighbour, over the fence. And Orlykha hovers in my memory, like a cloud – tall, with a red hood, and constantly raising her black brows.

Her husband was long dead, her elder son had been killed in Turkey, the younger lived at home, with his mother, and ran things. This lad was the pick of the village; with such a handsome face, lively, merry and hard-working. His mother thought highly of him, and watched over him and cared for him more than her very eyes.

Orlykha considered that her son should get married, and began to look around. Whenever the girls ran down the street, or lazed about on the grave-mound, Orlykha would turn up there, listening and watching.

'Don't run after a wealthy girl, son!', she would say. 'We're not rich people ourselves: look for one who is humble and good'.

'Fine, mama, you find what we need, and I'll marry her'.

While his mother was still looking, he found one for himself. He went to Vyshenky to the market and from that time onwards he started to go out every evening. His mother was the first to notice, and sooner than everyone else got to know that Vasyl was courting Hanna Korolivna.

'My son, my son', she said, 'don't run after that rich girl: she'll be far too proud, she's her father's daughter, fastidious and haughty – give her up!'

Vasyl fell to the ground and pleaded.
There was nothing to be done. They sent the matchmakers, who came back with the betrothal towels; the wedding was arranged; they brought the bride to her mother-in-law.

And what a dowry she brought! Good Lord above! Nine wagon-loads. And each wagon drawn by four grey oxen. Silk skirts, girdles like fire, jackets with silk embroidery...

The bride wore a golden wedding-hood, a veil like a wisp of smoke, and red corals down to her girdle. Everyone was amazed to behold her: like a rose in full flower. Only old Orlykha, when she offered her the bread and salt in welcome, looked her daughter-in-law in the eyes with a certain sadness.

II

A year went by. At first, the young Orlykha would walk about outside. When she talked and laughed even the old would become more cheerful, but after a while no one saw her any more, she remained in the house, in the homestead all

the time. (You see they built themselves a double house, with the young woman in one part, and the mother in the other).

Someone asked old Orlykha:

'Well, how are your young people? Have you got a nice little bride?'

'She's her father's daughter, you know', she replied, or else said nothing, as if she hadn't heard anything.

Once my mother was busy around the house. Hanna came out. Mother saw that she was very sad; she sat down beside her and said:

'What's the matter, Halochka? Why are your eyes so sunken? Why are you sad?'

Hanna clasped her hands, and the tears rolled down like pearl-barley:

'My mother-in-law hates me! She slanders me, she'd like to drive me out of this world, she reproaches me for being my father's daughter!... O my dear father! If you'd known how unhappy my fate would be, you'd have drowned me in a deep well while I was still in swaddling clothes!'

Mother asked what had happened, and how the quarrel started.

'She took against me right from the start. She ruined my best silk skirts, so that when you touch them, they fall to bits in your hands. She did it, she did it, I know! She sprinkled something into my chest... and my golden hoods are all tarnished and my red girdles have faded... she's spoiled all my things! All the time, she goes on at Vasyl: "Sell them, sell the oxen!" (which came from my father). And I say: "I don't want to. Why sell them?" Vasyl, indeed, did not drive them to the market, and she started attacking me. "You wicked girl! You've bereaved me all over again. You've turned my Vasyl against me. Just you wait, though! I'll pay you back!"'

'Give in to her, Halya', my mother said. 'What else can you do?'

'Why should I have to give in to her?' cried Hanna, 'I don't want to. *Those who nag must expect to get nagged back,* as they say!'

III

One night my mother could not sleep. She heard in the next-door orchard something whispering: she opened the window, and eavesdropped.

'Halya, my heart!', said Vasyl. 'Why have you been crying again?'

'Don't leave me here alone, Vasyl! I can't remember how I got through the day without you! It's hard and sad for me!'

'What's wrong, my darling? Is it mother? I begged her before I set out not to upset you'.

'She hasn't said a single word to me, Vasyl, I haven't set eyes on her all day. It was gloomy and sad in the house'.

'What is that Orlykha doing', mother thought to herself, 'She seems to be a reasonable person'.

<div align="center">IV</div>

Harvest time came. Vasyl's wheat stood tall, so beautiful, ear on ear. Our arable was next to theirs and mother and Hanna would go out to the field together. One morning, she waited and waited, and in the end went out alone. Hanna showed up only after lunch, and she was so pale and swaying on her feet that mother was frightened: what had happened to her?

'Something is burning near my heart, like a fire', Hanna said, 'and I could not stand up on my feet. I could hardly drag myself out to the field'.

'Was it your mother-in-law?', Mother asked.

'Oh, Auntie dear! Last night I saw her in our store-room. I woke up, and she was standing there, facing the moon, so white and with her bodice undone. I cried out, and she went away!'

'You must have imagined it, my child! Why should she come in during the night'.

'No, No, I saw her clearly!'

'And did Vasyl see her?'

'Vasyl wasn't home last night, he was away… And he won't believe me… I won't be able to reap a single sheaf today: I'm too weak to lift my arms. I will keep a look-out for Vasyl: he said that he'd be back towards evening, so he'll help me home'.

<div align="center">V</div>

Mother went off reaping. In the evening she looked, but there was no sign of Hanna: had she gone home? She asked the other reapers: they had not seen her go; she called, but there was no answer; and she went to the place where Hanna had been and there was no one. How strange! But then, walking between the stooks, she found her… She was lying there, as if asleep, pretty and fresh as a flower. There was a sheaf of wheat at her head; her arms were crossed… The Lord had sent such a bright calm evening; she lay there as if alive, among the wheat, with the ripe ears bending over her…

She ran for Vasyl: he was near at hand, reaping; she met him – he strolled over to her so cheerfully. When he saw his Hanna lying there lifeless, he took his scythe and cut his throat. No one could even blink an eye… and there he fell beside her.

VI

She rushed to old Orlykha. She met my mother at the gate, as if she had been waiting for her. Mother said:

'Your daughter-in-law is dead!'

The old woman clenched her teeth and slapped her lap,

'What to do! That's fate', she said.

She did not weep, not a single tear, only stood there white as a sheet.

Mother was frightened and did not know how to tell her about her son: and now here came the people, bringing them...

'Look, they're bringing them both!', Mother said.

'Both?' she screamed.

'Grandma, your Vasyl has passed away too!'

How she dashed off, how she ran! She almost knocked the corpse out of the hands of the bearers; she embraced its head and shrieked over it... And how terrifying she looked! Without her kerchief, her grey locks tumbling round her shoulders, her bodice undone, all covered with blood; she walked beside her son, shrieking all the way, as if God had taken away her wits.

They dressed the young couple and laid them out side by side on the table: some people went home, others stayed for the night. She marvelled that there was no sign of old Orlykha; it was as if the earth had swallowed her up. And then, next day, she found her lying against the fence, dead, and blue, blue as a lilac-bush.

They buried the young couple together, and the old woman further off. Their house stood tumble-down and empty: no one would buy it, because, they said, every evening when the moon rose, the shade of young Orlykha haunted the yard. In the depths of the night she would sit facing the moon, stretching out her white hands, waiting for her mother-in-law and reproaching her: 'I was young, and you sent me out of the world, old Orlykha'. ❑

Bohdan Ihor Antonych

(1909-37)

This year marks the 60th anniversary of the premature death of Bohdan Ihor Antonych, one of the most brilliant writers in Western (Polish-ruled) Ukraine during the 1930s.

Antonych was born on 5 October 1909, in the village of Novytsya in the Lemko region of Western Ukraine, the son of an Eastern-Rite Catholic priest. His childhood was eventful – during World War I, his family was forced to leave Novytsya, which was in the war zone, and ended up in Vienna, the capital of the moribund Austro-Hungarian empire. In 1919 they returned to Novytsya – now under Polish rule – where they found themselves under observation by the Polish police (Bohdan's uncle, his mother's brother, Oleksander Voloshynovych, had been sentenced to death by the regime of General Józef Piłsudski for his efforts to get the Lemko region of Western Ukraine transferred from Polish to Czechoslovak rule).

During his school-days, the young Antonych was distinguished not only by his devotion to his studies, but also by his musical talents: he not only played the violin, but also composed his own music, some examples of which became a regular part of the repertoire of the school orchestra.

In 1928 he entered Lviv University, studying in the Faculty of Philosophy, which at that time included courses in Ukrainian language and literature. Antonych studied the latter course, graduating in 1933.

In 1930, while still a student, he began writing for the press, using the pseudonym 'Ihor Ihorenko'. Also, while still a student, he became a co-editor (with the artists Volodymyr Havrylyuk and Volodymyr Lasovskyi) of the art journal *Karby*. After graduating, he began a free-lance career as poet, journalist and editor. In 1934 Antonych became an editor of the literary-artistic journal *Dazhboh*, published in Lviv, which during the five years of its existence (1930-35) printed, in particular, the works of young, patriotic poets. He also contributed poems to the literary journal *Dzvony*, associated with the Catholic writers' group 'Logos'.

He died in Lviv, on 6 July 1937, from pneumonia, following an apparently successful operation for appendicitis. He had never married, but at the time of his death was engaged; his fiancée, Olha Oliynyk, became one of the main sources for information concerning his early life.

During, in effect, some six years of creative life, Antonych produced three collections of poetry: *Pryvitannya zhyttya* (Greetings of Life, 1931), *Try persteni* (Three rings, 1934) and *Knyha Leva* (The Book of the Lion, 1936). He also produced a verse libretto for the first two acts of the opera *Dovbush* by Anton Rudnytskyi (the final act was completed, after his death, by Svyatoslav Hordynskyi). Two further collections of his poetry *Zelena Yevanheliya* (The Green Gospel) and

Rotatsiyi (Rotations) were published posthumously, in 1938, and *Vybrani poeziyi* (Selected Poems) in 1940.

Following the Soviet take-over of Western Ukraine, Antonych's work was banned for many years. He was 'rehabilitated' during the post-Stalin 'thaw', and in 1967 a collection of his works *Pisnya pro neznyshchenist materiyi* (Song of the Indestructibility of Matter) was published in Kyiv – with the significant omission of his highly patriotic 'Song of Kruty'. This poem was also omitted (not surprisingly) from the collection of his work *Persteni molodosti* published in Bratislava in 1966 and (more surprisingly) from his *Zibrani tvory* (New York-Winnipeg, 1967), although the latter collection was clearly intended to be as comprehensive as possible, including not only his poetry, but also his two acts of *Dovbush*, fragments of an unfinished novel, *Na tomu berezi* (On the Further Shore), articles and book reviews.

In his article 'That, which I shall say', he wrote: 'I myself in my poetry emphasise its national allegiance not only in content but also in form. I do this from an inner need of trust in the world which has emerged from it'. His lyrical poetry makes considerable use of traditional Lemko folk-lore motifs, combined with a personal philosophy containing a large element of pantheism. This approach, together with some stylistic features of his work – notably his extensive use of alliteration – not only fascinated his contemporaries, but also has influenced the work of several Ukrainian poets of the present day, notably Ihor Kalynets and Mykola Horbal.

Bohdan Ihor Antonych

The Song of Kruty

Let us recall in song the fame of Kruty,
The holiest of all our battle-sites,
Kruty, Kruty – bright torch towards the future,
Let us then lift our souls up to the heights.

Kruty! Kruty! Cliffs that to guard our country
Became a wall, defence for flesh and soul.
Kruty! Kruty! Unitedly and doughty,
Aiming straight-way to our most sacred goal.
Kruty! Kruty! Time now all debts to settle,
The Red foe now his penalty must pay,
Kruty! Kruty! An everlasting battle
To win a future and a brighter day.

Kruty! Kruty! Heroism, devotion,
And faithfulness that beyond death endures.
Kruty! Kruty! with ardent, proud oration
Thy song calls, leads us forward, evermore.

Lviv
Spring 1937

Autumn

Drawn-out days don ripeness, as early apples,
     Leaves fall light from the limes,
     A wagon's screech whines,
Round the wood now resounds the chaffinch's warble,

Towards sunset the sky's decks with fire are covered,
     Flocks in late hay-field,
     Grizzled mists greying,
Bedded below bright berries the bird-of-prey bother.

Pianissimo playing the piano of the grass,
     Drunk wind goes past.
Days grow ripe, ever less than of old,
Cocks crow in midnight cold,

and

aspen and awns
wasps swarm

it is
autumn already

and

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autumn

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mn.

□

The Poetic World of Leonid Mosendz
(On the 100th Anniversary of his birth)
Ihor Nabytovych

L eonid Mosendz – prosaist, poet, research che-
mist and political activist – was one of the most
vivid personalities in the general literary panora-
ma of the Ukrainian diaspora in the inter-war period
and the period of displaced persons' camps – (the
'DP-planets' as Ulas Samchuk called them). His literary
and critical legacy is imbued with the influence of
world culture: poetry, prose, literary criticism, and the
pictorial arts.

The Ukrainian-American poet Ostap Tarnavskyi st-
resses that:

> Leonid Mosendz is close to the problems of contempo-
> rary world literature. He is a writer of European culture
> and in his works themes predominate which are com-
mon to all humanity. The story 'Homo Lenis', the most popular prose work of
Mosendz among the Ukrainian reading public, is evidence not only that Mosendz is a
master of literary technique, but also that he is a writer who elaborates the problems
common to all humanity, first and foremost – the freedom of the individual. Even in
his poetry, which, to a large extent deals with patriotic themes, Mosendz appears as a
true European, far removed from the usual sentimental stereotype.[1]

Mosendz's interest in European literature is demonstrated, to take but one
example, by the poem 'The Volhynian Year',[2] which mentions many European
writers, such as André de Chénier, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, H.G. Wells,
Christian Morgenstern, Adam Mickiewicz, Friedrich Schiller, Rainer Maria Rilke
and John Keats; here, too, there are echoes of Samuel Richardson, François Ra-
belais, Miguel de Cervantes and Giovanni Boccaccio.

The literary critic Zenon Huzar, in his discussion of Mosendz's collection *Zodiac*,
speaks of the writer's constant allusions to European literature, culture and history:
'The poet is amazingly..., so to speak, European when he writes about Emperor
Rudolph and Brahe... The way of Newton, the depths of Erebus... minstrels, the
Flying Dutchman and many other such images'.[3]

In one of his poems written in the second half of the 1920s Mosendz says of
himself:

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[1] Ostap Tarnavskyi, 'Roman Leonida Mosendza', *Ukrayinska Literaturna Hazeta* (Munich, 1960),
no. 10, p. 7.

[2] Leonid Mosendz, *Volynskyi rik* (Munich, 1948).

[3] Zenon Huzar, 'Leonid Mosendz – poet', O. Bahan, Z. Huzar, B. Chervak, *Lytsari dukhu* (Droho-
bych, 1996), pp. 197-98.

Volumes of books I've perused and read through,
Volumes I wrote, books of mine...
Written or read, every of them drew
A drop of my soul for each line...

Leonid Mosendz's life-span was located in the turbulent five decades of Ukrainian history that made up the first half of the twentieth century: World War I, the collapse of the Russian empire and the establishment of a Ukrainian state, a fight for freedom and defeat, Soviet Russian occupation of Ukraine, exile, World War II, wandering, once again, in foreign lands, his death in far-off Switzerland, and then, after another half-century, the slow return of his works to the Ukrainian reader in his homeland.

Mosendz was born on 20 September 1897 in Mohyliv-Podilskyi. He came of a distinguished family, descended from a Lithuanian warrior of that name, renowned for his valour at the Battle of Grunwald, the decisive victory over the Teutonic Knights in 1410.

Later, the Mosendz family became Polonised, and the great-great-grandfather of the writer took part in the campaign against Russia under the banner of Kosciuszko in 1794.

Some of his maternal ancestors were Poles. This family, too, had also fought for long years against Moscow. One of his forebears, who fought in the Polish legions of Napoleon, was killed at the Battle of Leipzig in 1813.[4]

However, in the writer, Ukrainian blood prevailed over Lithuanian and Polish. In a private letter, Mosendz wrote, 'I am not a Pole, although I come from a Ukrainian-Polish-Lithuanian family, without a drop of Muscovite blood... I am not ashamed that my ancestors fought against the Teutonic order, and against the Muscovites and that many of them fell in honourable battle...'.[5]

Mosendz was educated at the Teachers' Training College in Vinnytsya, and during World War I was conscripted into the Tsarist Russian army. Later, he fought against the Russians in the army of the Ukrainian National Republic. He then worked for a time as a teacher, until he was arrested by the Polish police and interned in a Polish concentration camp. Following his release, he emigrated to Czechoslovakia.

The struggle for Ukrainian statehood formed the collection of stories *Homo Lenis* and several cycles of poems: 'Pomona militans', 'We Were', 'My Hospital' and 'Ballad of my Sworn-Brother'.

After graduating from the Ukrainian Economic Academy in Podebrady (Czechoslovakia) Mosendz devoted himself to scholarly work. In 1931 he successfully defended his dissertation for the degree of doctor of technical sciences.

Mosendz had begun to write poetry even before going to Czechoslovakia. While in Podebrady, he published his poems regularly and also began to write prose.

He created his own unique poetic world. In his poems (as also his prose works) he attempted to portray his perception of the contemporary world, to find

[4] Letter to his sister about the Mosendz family tree, *Ukrayinske slovo*, Khrestomatiya ukrayinskoyi literatury ta literaturnoyi krytyky XX st., vol. 2, p. 133.
[5] Bohdan Kravtsiv, 'Leonid Mosendz i yoho "Ostanniy prorok"', L. Mosendz, 'Ostanniy prorok' (Toronto, 1960), p. vii.

reasons why the fight for Ukrainian freedom had been lost, and, on the basis of his own historiosophical visions, to predict the future of Ukraine and the Ukrainian people.

A characteristic feature of Mosendz's works is his evocation of themes, ideas and motifs, subjects and images, familiar from the literature of other nations.

However, in his use of 'eternal' themes and motifs, subjects and images associated with European history, or the world of antiquity and mythology, the poet virtually always found a focal point through which they are projected on to Ukraine's history and contemporary situation, and the positive or negative elements of the Ukrainian ethno-psychology, and found in them overtones of the problems of Ukrainian life and ideas of Ukrainian nationalism, which were a vital issue to Mosendz and his contemporaries.

The second half of the 1920s and first half of the 1930s marked the peak of Mosendz's poetic creativity. From the second half of the 1930s onwards, to the end of his life he gave markedly less attention to poetry (he only wrote long narrative poems), and concentrated on prose works, and also literary criticism.

Leonid Mosendz's poetic output comprises the collection *Zodiac* (1941), the long poems 'Kanitfershtan' (1945) and 'The Volhynian Year' (1948), and some of the poems in the collection *The Devil's Parables* (1947), a literary hoax produced jointly with Yuriy Klen (Oswald Burghardt) and attributed to 'Porphyriy Horotak', and some individual poems which the author did not include in *Zodiac*, translations from the Chinese by 'Porphyriy Horotak', made after the death of Yuriy Klen, and a lyrical drama in verse 'The Eternal Ship'.

Mosendz belongs to the 'Prague school' of Ukrainian literature. Like other members of this group of Ukrainian nationalist poets, he published the main part of his works in *Vistnyk*. The editor of this political and literary periodical was the ideologue of Ukrainian nationalism Dmytro Dontsov.

The collection *Zodiac*[6] epitomises the poetic creativity of Mosendz from 1921-36. It contains a varied palette of themes and motifs.

The principal themes in his poetry are: the struggle for a Ukrainian state (which involves a diversity of motifs), the loss of homeland and forced exile, and the relationship of man and God. The image of Ukraine is inseparably bound up with these themes, which constantly appear in the poems under various images and symbols.

The lyrical drama 'The Eternal Ship'[7] takes the reader back to the sixteenth century, and the Eighty Years' War of the Netherlands against Spain. Those Dutchmen who rose to fight for the independence of their country die a hero's death. Those who leave their homeland seeking a new life elsewhere will wander eternally in the ocean of time aboard the ghost-ship.

The poem 'Kanitfershtan'[8] uses the motif known all over Europe of the traveller who constantly asks: 'Whose are these ships laden with rich cargo, whose are these fine buildings, and, finally, whose is this funeral?', and who takes the answer 'Kanitfershtan' ('I don't understand') to be the name of some rich man.

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[6] L. Mosendz, *Zodiak* (Prague, 1941).
[7] L. Mosendz, 'Vichnyi korabel', *Vistnyk*, 1933, book 10, pp. 708-24.
[8] L. Mosendz, *Kanitfershtan* (Innsbruck, 1945).

About the poem Yuriy Klen wrote,

> When one reads the title 'Kanitfershtan', one wonders whatever the author can have done with such a dusty old subject, the tale about a stupid man who set off on his travels around Holland; a story which turns up in all the old school readers and which long ago set the teeth on edge…
>
> But as soon as one starts to read, from the first page one perceives that out of this hackneyed subject, the poet has made something completely new, and different. A stupid dusty old story began to shine and sparkle with new colours…[9]

The poem 'The Volhynian Year' is dedicated to Mosendz's daughter and encapsulates memories of his childhood years spent in Volyn (Volhynia) – one of the most picturesque regions of Ukraine.

Leonid Mosendz's prose comprises two collections of stories, *Homo Lenis* and *Revenge* (Vidplata), the autobiographical tale *The Seeding*, essays ('The Birth of Don Quixote', 'While the Jug is Tilted', 'By the Grave of Peace'), a scholarly study, *Stein: Idea and Character*, and the novel *The Last Prophet*.

In the collection *Homo Lenis*[20] the writer portrays people of strong spirit and will – those who defend their native land with arms. The stories are set in the years following World War I and the beginning of the 1920s, the period of the rise and fall of the Ukrainian state under the onslaught of the forces of Communism. One of Mosendz's contemporaries wrote of the heroes of this collection that the 'author presents to the reader people who are very far from humble. These are all figures from our fight for freedom… Mosendz shows us only heroes of resolute will…'.[11]

The theme of revenge became the leitmotif of the whole series of stories by the writer in the collection *Revenge* (Vidplata)[12] (the name of the collection in the second edition is *Pomsta* – Vengeance[13]).

In a short foreword to the second edition, Mosendz presents his perception of retribution as one of the greatest stimuli to action in human life:

> 'the idea of revenge is the most essential stimulus of life', as Emerson says somewhere.
>
> And for our life we need this stimulus in the greatest measure. We do not fear any form of its manifestation. Let it even be revenge.
>
> This is not the revenge of a slave, but of a master. He who never carries out an act of retribution is on the same level as the object of retribution. But in transforming his intention into deeds, he sears above his quarry like a falcon – a bird of lofty flight – and strikes from above, always and only from above…[14]

The majority of the stories in the collection bring the reader to Europe of the Middle Ages. A dying pope takes his revenge on Cardinal Carucchio who once stole his leman. He appoints this cardinal a chamberlain so that he will never be able to become pope (*Revenge*).

[9] Yuriy Klen, 'Leonid Mosendz: Kanitfershtan', *Zveno*, 1946, no. 1, p. 74.

[10] L. Mosendz, *Lyudyna pokirna* (Lviv, 1937).

[11] L. Burachynska, 'Rozmakh prozy. Dovkola noveli v 1937', *Nazustrich*, 1938, no. 5, p. 2.

[12] L. Mosendz, *Vidplata* (Lviv, 1939).

[13] L. Mosendz, *Pomsta* (Prague, 1941).

[14] Ibid., p. 3.

The last descendant of the Pacchiola family of mediaeval Venice avenges the death of his father and uncle by killing the Doge ('I'ha pagata' – 'I have paid [my debt]').

The Baron of Rheinburg carries in his heart for half a century the insult by his serf and childhood companion who was his successful rival in love for a serf-girl. The childless baron decides to make their grandson his heir. The hero of the tale *The Seeding*[15] is a small boy, Nino, who grows up in an atmosphere of a Russified family (the story is set in the first years of the twentieth century). His father is a descendant of the Russified Ukrainian gentry, and his mother comes from an old Polish, but also Russified, family.

The work is autobiographical. The author paints the gradual growth of national self-awareness of the little boy, as he comes to realise that he is the heir of the free Ukrainian Cossacks and Haydamaks, and that his native language is Ukrainian.

The problem of returning to one's ancestral roots, and the awakening in the soul of the 'call of the blood', Mosendz also addressed in various ways in his later stories.

In 1935 Leonid Mosendz's book *Stein: Idea and Character* appeared.[16] This was a scholarly political biography of Carl von Stein (1757-1831), one of the leaders of the German fight against French domination, and one of the organisers of the coalition of European states against Napoleon.

Mosendz's best-known essays are 'The Birth of Don Quixote'[17] and 'While the Jug is Tilted'.[18] These lie on the border between historical-literary and philosophical essays. Although the former deals with a fictional character – the hero of the famous novel of Miguel de Cervantes, and the latter with a historical figure, Mohammed, they share the same theme – that of the formation of the heroic person able to do great deeds, and capable of rising up to fight for high ideals.

The works of the 1932 Nobel prize winner for literature are discussed by Mosendz in his article 'John Galsworthy'.[19] Mosendz sees Galsworthy's contribution to European literature in the

> characteristic feature of his works, which none of his English and European contemporaries possess: a powerful epic quality externally encapsulates several generations of English middle-class society, and internally – is defined by a broad portrayal of life with all the depths of its problems.[20]

There is no doubt that these principles which made Galsworthy one of the leading European writers of his day, Mosendz, too, sought to embody in his novel *The Last Prophet*.

Like the heroes of Galsworthy, Mosendz's heroes aspire towards action. Mosendz is influenced by Galsworthy's ability to build a lasting and sublime bridge of tradition, 'which connects the past of the nation with its future'. The English society which Galsworthy depicts,

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[15] L. Mosendz, *Zasiv* (Malin, Belgium, 1946).
[16] L. Mosendz, *Stein: ideya i kharakter* (Lviv, 1935).
[17] L. Mosendz, 'Narodzhennya Don Kikhota', *Samostiyna Dumka*, 1936, book 6-8, pp. 337-43.
[18] L. Mosendz, 'Poky vykhylyavsya hlechyk', *Zveno* (Innsbruck, 1945), no. 5, pp. 37-43.
[19] L. Mosendz, 'Dzhon Gelsvorsi', *Vistnyk*, 1933, book 3, pp. 220-21.
[20] Ibid., p. 220.

everywhere and always occupies... and shows such a convincing thirst for life, such powerful dominant impulses and the will to fight and win, that... the entire life pathos of the English nation becomes understandable.[21]

At the end of the 1930s Leonid Mosendz went to live in Carpathian Ukraine, and during World War II he lived in Bratislava.

After the war, he was forced to emigrate to Austria. He died in 1948 in a sanatorium in Blonau (Switzerland) following a surgical operation.

In the last years of his life, Mosendz worked on a historical novel about John the Baptist, *The Last Prophet*,[22] which was eventually published only twelve years after his death – in 1960 in Canada.

In this work, Mosendz continues a tradition established by the Ukrainian writers Ivan Franko, Lesya Ukrayinka, Hnat Khotkevych and Mosendz's contemporary Natalena Koroleva: to interpret through the prism of the Bible and the history of European peoples the historical perspective of his own nation. This great epic work enabled Mosendz to expound his own historiosophical ideas and visions.

Ostap Tarnavskyi stresses that the theme of *The Last Prophet* is the search of a people in moral decline under foreign occupation (which catalyses and accelerates its moral decay) for a path to political freedom and moral rebirth.[23]

The principal theme of the work, which runs through its entire structural fabric, is the affirmation of the idea that a people which desires to free itself from foreign domination must seek its own path, formulate its own ideology – the ideology of nationalism – and must endeavour, in spite of all adverse circumstances and the historical present, to go stubbornly and uncompromisingly along this path towards its goal.

Summarising, Tarnavskyi writes that

> Mosendz's novel is yet another account of the human search for the meaning of life, the search for truth which determines the order and value of human life. This Ukrainian writer has given us a work with a problem... which is eternally born and eternally renewed,[24]

and in another article he adds: 'Mosendz's book deals with a universal problem and should be a part of world literature'.[25]

Leonid Mosendz is also known as a translator. He translated from Czech (Antonín Klášterský, Petr Bezruč), German (Rainer Maria Rilke) and English poetry (Edgar Allen Poe, Sara Teasdale, Adelaide Crapsey, James Joyce and others).

Yuriy Klen and Leonid Mosendz created an interesting literary hoax: they invented a mythical poet, 'Porphyriy Horotak', wrote his 'biography', and published under that name a collection of poetry, *The Devil's Parables*,[26] which was a major success in the Ukrainian diaspora.

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[21] Ibid., p. 221.

[22] L. Mosendz, *Ostanniy prorok* (Toronto, 1960).

[23] Ostap Tarnavskyi, 'Lyudske zhyttya – tse shukannya pravdy', *Lysty do pryyateliv*, 1961, no. 11-12, p.16.

[24] Ibid., p. 18.

[25] Ostap Tarnavskyi, 'Ostanniy prorok. Ideolohichno-moralnyi traktat Mosendza', *Lysty do pryyateliv*, 1960, no. 9, p. 5.

[26] Porfyriy Horotak, *Dyyabolichni paraboly* (Salzburg, 1947).

Concerning his vocation as a poet, Mosendz wrote in a private letter:

> To be a writer, and, moreover, to be one today – is something more than just moving a
> pen over paper. It is a vocation from God. Just as, in times past, Giotto fasted and
> prayed before beginning a painting, so, too, today the spirit of the writer must be pure
> and worthy of those lofty words which his trained hand brings together on paper.[27]

He had a sacred belief in the great and bright future of his homeland. Eight
months before his death, he wrote to some friends:

> … Years ago, I had a dream: I was in Heaven, standing on a wide cloud under the dark,
> starry sky and an angel was showing me buildings. And in one of them was a huge
> plate-glass shop window, and in it on black pedestals there were glittering diamonds. I
> can see them! 'These are the peoples of the world', said the angel. 'And where is
> Ukraine?', I asked. 'There' – and he pointed to the seventh diamond in the line. It was
> not as big as those preceding it, but strong and shining, like a Gothic tower…[28]

Mosendz died far away from his native land. And only now, forty years after his
death, has he returned to it in his poems, stories, tales and novels…   ❏

Leonid Mosendz

Sonnet

'Bitter the taste of exile's bread!', we say,
'In strangers' homes, how steep the stairs rise for us!…
But our complaints hide in fatigue and boredom,
And the indifference of everyday.

The burning fires of lightnings seared away
Our urges, grown faint is the thunder's roaring,
In the deep night, on an old pathway, forward
We walk at random, without torches' ray.

But time calls us, sacrifice, deeds unfearing…
The blind and deaf hear not the thunder's words.
Where is the bard who has skill to insert

Into our hearts sharp eyes and keenest hearing,
And, out of Dante's hell bringing us clear,
Can raise us, yearning, for forgotten spheres?

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[27] 'Mosendz v lystakh. Osobyste', *Literaturno-Naukovyi Vistnyk* (Munich, 1949), book 2, p. 198.
[28] Ibid., p. 197.

Ballad of my Sworn-Brother

I

Together he grew up with me,
Friend, brother, more than that,
A dark-browed son of golden fields,
Tall son white homes begat –
And many were the names he bore:
Petro, Danylo, Hnat…

The quiet pool, the field of rye,
Forest's mysterious murk…
Together we went everywhere,
Our childish sight evoked
The bracken flower in summer's heat,
And where the vampire lurked…

On the school's benches side-by side,
We sat for many a year,
Together in the orchard dreamed,
By river winding near,
And learned the strange, perturbing touch
Of a girl's arms so dear.

But then, our paths took us apart
For many a year and long,
And yet we knew, wherever life
Should steer our course along,
We would not lose each other's tracks,
Among the pressing throng.

And we'd remember how and when
We'd met by chance some day,
And how above us as of old
The banners flew and waved –
On which the slogan did appear:
Courage and love alway!

Beneath it with my friend I along
The whole long pathway I've been.
Through the sands of the Hetmanate,
The hills of where Dnipro gleams,
Beneath the steppe-lands dusky wind,
Through gullies and ravines…

He always was my truest friend,
Friend, brother, more than that,
Grandson of steppe sworn-brothers, son
Ukrainian homes begat –
And many were the names he bore:
Petro, Danylo, Hnat...

II

Where the Buh like a serpent, curls
And twists as on it wends
Where Dnipro's mirror from afar,
Its steely greeting sends,
To misty Medubory we
Our last farewells extend.

Again! Again! Attack once more,
To your last bullet fight!...
To cast his weapons at the foe
None has the strength or might,
Again attack, shrapnel once more,
And echoing far and wide

To fields, to meadows, ploughland, lea,
Roars out 'Do not forget!
Wait for us, O dear native land,
For we shall come back yet!
And let these autumn days, Ukraine,
Be in thy memory set!'

The end... Draw the breach from the gun!
A foreign land now waits,
But my sworn-brother never would
Behold that distant state,
To drain the cup of valour from
The brim to lees – his fate.

Still from afar we saw him there,
The woods behind, closed fast,
And there the final weapon-flash
His eyes beheld at last,
A foreign land then drew us in
A whirlpool roaring, vast.

And I do not know where he fell,
Where valour's fire grew dark,
Perhaps 'Bazar'* above him stands,
As everlasting mark,
Or some Podilyan steep ravine
Is his eternal ark...

Or maybe in some Moscow jail
The hangman's cruel *fiat*
Slew him who was my brother-sworn,
(More than born-brother, that!)
And who a thousand names did bear –
Petro, Danylo, Hnat...

III

Let my life be a punishment,
And drive from me all rest,
If I should cease to think of you,
O friend and brother best!
If memories of our last fight
Vanish from out my breast.

And let my mother cast me off,
And turn from me thereat,
If I forget you died from northern
Hangman's cruel *fiat*,
And cease to think of him they called –
Petro, Danylo, Hnat...

* Bazar is a village in Narodychi district, Zhytomyr oblast, where 359 soldiers of the Army of the Ukrainian National Republic were shot by the Bolsheviks on 22 November 1921.

Per Aspera

Long night, like a long remembrance,
    Where all life does dance,
Once more must I on the slumberous
    Day's pathway advance.

Songs of victory with me bearing,
    Like a wandering scald,
Like Harald, on cruel, uncaring
    Gods once more I'll call.

In thy name, my one dear lady,
    I drink war's wine again.
To win back for thee, dear maiden
    The fields of Ukraine.

And thy features I'll engrave as
    The Madonna's face,
In a shrine's great Gothic cavern,
    Arches, columns' grace.

As thy faithful knight I'll ever
    Roam the wide world o'er,
And from out of hell or heaven,
    Mine for evermore,

I'll take thee, Princess. The age of
    Planets now has come:
In my hands I hold the sages'
    Wondrous, magic stone.

Memories of the bright day flow now
    Where thou art what is true.
And a clearly Faustian road now
    I must needs pursue.

❏

The Works of Panas Zalyvakha*

Viktor Melnyk

An interviewer once asked Panas Zalyvakha: 'which of your works do you consider the most interesting?' To which the artist replied: 'My most interesting work is possibly myself; inasmuch as I discovered myself, I was not exiled nor tormented to death, like Y. Sverstyuk's "Prodigal Son of Ukraine"'. And that is the sacred truth, the background to the work of this 72-year-old Ukrainian master from Ivano-Frankivsk. The aesthetic well-spring of his work can hardly be separated from his ethical position as a Ukrainian patriot, who responded to the powerful and evocative call of his thousand-year-old people of the steppes. This happened during the 1960s, at a time so significant for modern Ukrainian history, when he was a member of the group of now-famous people centred on the Kyivan Club of Creative Youth: Alla Horska, Ivan Svitlychnyi, Yevhen Sverstyuk, Viktor Zaretskyi, Ivan Dzyuba... Then came the testing times of the 'small zone' – the camp for political prisoners in Mordovia – and his return to Ivano-Frankivsk in 1970 – a locality within a similar, albeit 'larger zone' with its traps, secret recantations of certain former professional colleagues, alienation, surveillance on all sides, and the stones thrown at night through the windows of his unheated attic studio...

The coming of Ukrainian independence, together with other momentous events at the turn of the 1980s/90s, was marked by various exhibitions of Zalyvakha's works, first at the National Museum in Lviv, then in Ivano-Frankivsk (where, in 1962, his first one-man exhibition had been closed down), and later in Kyiv, Kaniv, Kharkiv, Ternopil... It would seem that this recognition, which was endorsed by his attainment, in 1995, of the Taras Shevchenko State Prize of Ukraine, together with this artist's active participation in the socio-political process of recent years, had brought things happily full circle. But this is far from being the case. The current exhibition of the paintings of Panas Zalyvakha in Great Britain – the first showing of his works on such a scale outside Ukraine – is a new departure for the artist, which also marks the resurgence of Ukrainian art and its assimilation into the cultural mainstream.

This present exhibition comprises works from the 1970s-90s, which represent only a small part of Zalyvakha's total accomplishments. He completed several hundred works in oil and tempera, graphics, ceramics, wood carvings, collages, as well as various murals, which he executed during the 1970s-80s to decorate numerous civic buildings in Ivano-Frankivsk. There was also the stained-glass window depicting Taras Shevchenko, commissioned for the main entrance hall of Kyiv State University, which was smashed for ideological reasons, and those works

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'The 'Philosophers'" School'. 1970s, canvas, oil.

which were destroyed or disappeared after the artist's imprisonment.

However heterogeneous the range of Panas Zalyvakha's subjects may appear at first glance, it in fact adheres to a set of relatively few but fairly well established, or, more precisely, well perceived themes nourished from within. When this artist rejected the remnants of naturalism and genre delimitation of the Academic school seen in his early work, he rid himself of pettiness and spontaneity in the selection of his themes. Seldom are any of his subjects, however closely connected to his personal experiences, a direct illustration of his own fate. 'The artist is a myth-maker, manifesting himself through the triad – individuality, nationality, humanity'; this is the credo of Panas Zalyvakha which neutralises in his works any symptoms of the secondary and the narrowly egotistical. This credo also explains whence comes that particular monumental *gravitas* of content and form which has the capacity to surprise in even his smallest works. In the mysterious world of his canvases there are no empty spaces. It is a world of constant movement. The archetypal symbols of heavenly bodies, fluid silhouettes of human figures, church domes, stylised depictions of the ancient Ukrainian kobza, and, on occasion, the solidity of the earth torn up by great furrows – vibrate and flow in an uninterrupted stream which unites events in time and space, top and bottom, body and spirit. Sometimes this primordial river of life engenders some image, such as the ominous tree/hand with severed branches/fingers ('Candlestick'), or unfolds into the space of the steppes ('The Bell-Ringer', 'Budding'). This art is filled with landscape thinking. And not simply because the artist has been living for thirty-five years and more in the city which Olena Kulchytska once rightly called the 'gateway to the Carpathians'.


'Candlestick', 1986, canvas, oil.

Zalyvakha does not paint material landscapes, particularly the mountain ones, so beloved of most local artists. His paintings exist in a *sui generis* 'artistic mountainscape' of the mytho-poietic memory of the people, which unfolds on the level of recollections of the primordial *universum* in which were first formed the archetypes of Ukrainians as land-tillers and collective perceptions of such concepts as Us and the Universe, Good and Evil, Heaven and Earth. It seems that the artist is constantly searching for a horoscope defining the positive and negative aspects of the national character, those implanted by foreigners and those acquired by indigenous experience. Fate is portrayed in his paintings, first and foremost, in female shapes: the Mother, the Protectrix, the proto-Slav Dana, the captive woman, Kateryna, Our Lady of Protection, but sometimes, too, by male hypostases: Perun, Svaroh, Cossack Mamay, the

'Street'. 1989, cardboard, oil.

Bard, or even a placid and patient ox with melancholy 'human' eyes ('Self portrait with Oxen'). The fluid and curving line of his paintings – that plastic expression of germination and spiritual resilience – interacts with the more static and tonal balanced colour, in a densely-packed semi-transparent structure, highly reminiscent of stained-glass windows, in which are resolved the natural forces of earth, water and fire, and the alternation of day and night. Line and colour are united rhythmically and form an original ornamental code in the shape of an Easter Egg or an ancient rug. The urban milieu with its choking density, stone walls and right angles is perceived as foreign, civilisation's method of enslaving nature and human individuality ('Roofs', 'Old Town'). Not only in his paintings but also in murals, his work has always been imbued with an aspiration to use plastic forms to overcome the straight-line de-spiritualisation of a bare wall or corner, or the strict functionality of a column by way of placing on it a modelled or mosaic relief of a lattice of fantastic trees, flowers, birds, etc. (interiors of the 'Medivnya' and 'Bilyi kamin' coffee shops and the 'Vatra' bar in Ivano-Frankivsk.

From time to time in his ideal world, among Zalyvakha's searches and strivings towards a spiritual Oecumene, founded on the strong, healthy psychology of the as yet unspoilt Ukrainian village-community, there appear ominous images of foreigners with symbols of enmity: wolves, ravens, an axe... The entire image-emotional make-up of the canvases changes beyond recognition. The format, as it were, compresses the internal space of the composition, forms are crystallised, lines are

'Morning (Captive)'. 1980, canvas, oil.

broken, forming barbed and latticed intersections, and the spectrum of colours becomes grey or else clashes discordantly. This means that the viewer is given a vision of the most tragic pages from the life of the artist himself ('En route to Exile', 'Fate', 'The "Philosophers'" School', the 'Visitors' Queue') or Ukraine's painful memories of Bolshevism, the 1933 Famine, the purges and deportations ('Homeland', 'On the Way', 'Grief'). Events, as for example in 'The "Philosophers'" School', which shows the surreptitious whispering of a morose group of prisoners in a prison yard suffused with an uncanny red like blood, take on a double and terrifying-grotesque hue. What is this? A conspiracy of prison narks against their next victim who is standing nearby, solitary and doomed, or perhaps a multivalent metaphor of an unjust trial in the Orwellian country of the absurd?

The works of the 1990s on view at this exhibition reveal a certain departure from the plastic language of the preceding period. In addition, the fact that the stratification of associative experiences and sacral-signative perception of colour and structural articulation of the surface remains equally powerful, has increased the distance between the image and its real prototypes ('Portrait', 'Prayer', the triptych 'Verticals'). The composition of the works, and also the rhythms of the component parts, are marked with a more pragmatically defined dynamism and neutral redistribution of forms. However, as before, the vertical prevails triumphantly – a formal and spiritual symbol of the heroic overcoming of adversity, activity and inspiration, which illuminated the whole difficult creative life of this brilliant artist.

* * *

Panas Zalyvakha: Curriculum Vitae

1925, 26 November – Panas Zalyvakha was born in the village of Husynka, Kupyanskyi district, Kharkiv oblast to the family of a blacksmith, Ivan Zalyvakha.

1933 – In an attempt to save itself from repression and the man-made famine in Ukraine, the Zalyvakha family moved to the 'Green Wedge' in the Far East of Russia.

1946 – After completing his education at the Art School in Irkutsk, Zalyvakha entered the Leningrad Academy of Arts (in 1947 this was renamed the 'I. Repin Leningrad Institute of Art').

1947 – Zalyvakha was expelled from the Institute for conduct 'unbecoming to a Soviet student'. (He and his friends refused to attend a meeting with a Deputy to the USSR Supreme Soviet held out of class time).

1948-54 – Zalyvakha worked as a plasterer on various building sites, while studying at the Leningrad Art-Pedagogical College. In 1949 he obtained a job with the Kaliningrad Artistic Foundation.

1955 – Zalyvakha resumed his studies at the I. Repin Leningrad Institute of Art.

1957 – Together with a group of students of the graphic arts, he made his first visit to Western Ukraine, to Kosiv. In the course of this visit, he met Professor M. Rudnytskyi.

1960 – Zalyvakha completed his studies at the Institute in the atelier of the artist V.I. Oreshnikov. He moved to Tyumen, where he took part in the provincial art exhibition.

1962 – He settled permanently in Ukraine, in Ivano-Frankivsk, where his first one-man exhibition was held, in the local ethnographic museum.

Beginning of the 1960s – He participated in the activities of the Kyivan Club of Creative Youth, and joined the literary-artistic circle of nationally conscious intelligentsia.

1964 – Together with Alla Horska, Lyudmyla Semykina, Halyna Sevruk and Halyna Zubchenko, Zalyvakha created the stained-glass window depicting Taras Shevchenko, commissioned for the main entrance hall of Kyiv State University. The window was smashed for ideological reasons on the day it was presented to the arts' commission.

1965-70 – Zalyvakha suffered repression; he was imprisoned in political camps in Mordovia.

'Prophet'. 1964, stained-glass window

'Faith, Hope and Charity'. 1980s, canvas, oil.

1970s-80s – After his return to Ivano-Frankivsk, Zalyvakha worked as a draughts-man in the state services' sector; later he worked as a designer in the public cater-ing trust. He produced much work in various art forms: easel painting, modelling and graphics. His individual works appeared at exhibitions of Ukrainian art in New York and Toronto.

1988 – His one-man exhibition was held in the National Museum in Lviv. Zaly-vakha's works began to become widely known.

1989 – His second one-man exhibition was held in Ivano-Frankivsk (Museum of Art, 146 works, catalogue). His work began to be mentioned for the first time in all-Ukrainian publications.

Beginning of the 1990s – Zalyvakha was awarded the Taras Shevchenko State Prize of Ukraine (1995), the Vasyl Stus Prize and the Oleksander and Leontiy Tara-sevych Prize. His one-man exhibitions were held in Lviv, Kyiv, Kharkiv, Ternopil and Ivano-Frankivsk.   ❏

Reviews

Ukraine between East and West. Essays on Cultural History to the Early Eighteenth Century. By Ihor Ševčenko (Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, Edmonton-Toronto, 1996) 234 pp., paperback

This is the first monograph in a new series planned by the Peter Jacyk Centre for Ukrainian Historical Research, a foundation whose mandate, as Frank E. Sysyn, the Director of the Centre, says in his foreword, is 'to publish important new and translated works in Ukrainian historical studies. The major project of the Centre for the next decade will be the publication of an English translation of the ten volumes of Mykhailo Hrushevskyi's *History of Ukraine-Rus'* '; in parallel to this, it will also publish a monograph series, covering 'new research, textbooks, source materials, and translations of classical historical works'. The fulfilment of this aim, Sysyn observes, has an 'auspicious beginning' in the present work.

The collection is founded on a series of lectures on Ukrainian history given at Harvard University in 1970-74, an era when, as Sysyn rightly points out: 'American universities rarely offered instruction in Ukrainian history, and when even specialists in Slavic studies paid scant attention to Ukraine'. The course was taught jointly with the 'renowned Turkcologist', Professor Omeljan Pritsak, however the 'many obligations of the two scholars postponed joint publication of their lectures'. Accordingly, the Jacyk Centre proposed to Professor Ševčenko that it should publish his contributions to the course 'in a format accessible to the general reader and, especially, to university students in courses of Ukrainian or early East European history'.

The title 'between East and West' is a fluid one. Kipling put the disputed area in Russia (arguing that Russians should be considered 'the most westerly of the east, not the most easterly of the west'). Conversely, ten years ago, a collection of scholarly essays, published under the auspices of The Royal Institute of International Affairs, bore the title *Germany between East and West*. In the post-Communist rebuilding of Central and Eastern Europe, the term 'between East and West' has been applied to several countries in the area. If it is to be more than a meaningless catch-phrase, however, its most natural application is to the great cultural divide signified by the interface of Byzantine Christianity on the one hand, and Roman Catholicism and its off-shoot, Protestantism, on the other, and by the manifestation of that divide, the Cyrillic and Latin alphabets. By that definition, today's Ukraine should lie firmly on the 'eastern' side of that watershed. Yet, as Ševčenko observes in his preface, Byzantium was not

> the only center from which determining cultural impulses reached Ukrainian lands in mediaeval and, above all, early modern times. Other influences came from the West in the early period, mainly through the mediation of Poland, especially during the time

when Ukrainian lands were part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth... This Western impact greatly contributed to making Ukrainians distinct from their northern neighbors [sc. The Muscovite-Russians]... In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the complicated interplay of Byzantine and Western cultural currents led to an intellectual ferment in Ukrainian lands... a ferment which contributed, indirectly, to the individuation of the Ukrainian elites.

This book, which covers the period from the introduction of Christianity into Kyivan Rus' up to the early eighteenth century, deals with 'the impact of the Byzantine South and of the mainly Polish West' upon Ukraine. (Ševčenko notes in his opening essay that Kyiv, is, by geographical longitude, further east than Byzantium). The influence of Muscovy-Russia is barely touched on 'due to the chronological limits of the volume', since

> [in] terms of cultural exchanges and even of expressions (self-interested or sincere) of religious and linguistic solidarity... Muscovy remained on the periphery of the early modern Ukrainian elite's attention and thinking down to the middle of the seventeenth century... [I]t was only after the battle of Poltava (1709) and Peter I's victory over Charles XII of Sweden, with Poland already eliminated as an adversary, that Russia was to play an ever-increasing role in shaping Ukraine's culture and destiny.

Other influences are also omitted. There is virtually no reference to the cultural links of Kyivan-Rus' with the Scandinavian 'West' – although these remained significant well into the twelfth century. Here the rationale is that these links were not 'phenomena of long duration' and failed to leave any lasting mark on the Ukrainian sense of self-identity. However, Ševčenko specifically points out in his preface the omission of Prof. Pritsak's contributions to the original course, particularly 'his special field, the impact exerted by the peoples of the steppe and by the Ottomans upon Ukraine'. For Turkic aspects, the reader is simply referred to the 'panoramic essay that Dr. Jaroslav Daškevyč published in 1991'.

Now this, it seems, begs the question: If the book is truly to address Ukraine's situation between 'East and West', then one can hardly leave out the effect on the Ukrainian character of the long conflicts, first with Turkic invaders from the steppes, and later with the expanding Ottoman empire. Particularly if, as the final essay in the collection, 'The Rise of National Identity to 1700', suggests, the main theme of this book is the rise of the Ukrainian self-awareness of the élite – a realisation which, Ševčenko says, became crystallised by the 'upheaval' of the Khmelnytskyi period – a period in which the awareness of the Turkish enemy was still a major factor in Ukrainian thought. (The *Sinopsis*, the first published work on history by an East European author, which appeared in Kyiv in the 1670s, for example, is strongly anti-Ottoman). Conversely, if the book is intended for undergraduates studying mediaeval and early modern Ukrainian and East European history, as the preface suggests, then the omission both of Turkic and Scandinavian influences could result all too easily in those important aspects failing to impinge on the students' minds. (All the more so in an academic climate based on clocking-up 'units' of course-work, rather than the traditional emphasis on solid reading all round a subject). Perhaps it is simply the title which is inappropriate – 'Ukraine between Rome and Byzantium' might have sensed better, particularly as

so much of the subject-matter is necessarily discussed within the context of relations between the two foci of European Christianity.

Within these limits, the book presents a fascinating and scholarly insight into the development of what would ultimately become the Ukrainian national psyche. It comprises twelve 'essays' – the term preferred by the author, and justly so, since they are far more self-contained than is normal to the chapters of a text-book. Of them seven have been previously published, not all in the most obvious settings – why, one wonders, was the essay on 'The Christianization of Kievan Rus'' published in the *Polish Review?* Several of those relating to the earlier times deal with Ukraine as viewed from without, from Byzantium, an interesting standpoint from which, for example, events of the conversion are seen, not as a phenomenon unique to Kyiv-Rus', but as part of the over-all pattern of Byzantine missions. One particularly interesting essay (No. 5), incidentally, at first glance falls outside the main theme of the book – Ukraine – dealing as it does with what must be considered the beginnings of Russian history, the rise of the Vladimir-Suzdal principality, the 'rival and epigone' of Kyiv in the century 1130-1230, a principality where 'the Russian nation was born and began to take shape [which] brings us to the point of differentiating Russians and Ukrainians'. This 'differentiation' is, of itself, a major factor in the self-awareness of Ukrainians. Even more important, however, is the fact that from the sixteenth century onwards, Russian historians have cited the 'continuity' of the sequence Kyiv-Vladimir-Moscow as 'evidence' that the rulers of Muscovy were the legitimate successors of Kyiv-Rus', and thus denying Ukraine an independent role in history, and reducing its identity to that of 'Little Russia'. Ševčenko goes into some detail on both the origins of Suzdal and the career and motivation of Yuriy Dolgorukiy, under whom the ascendancy of that principality began, and indicates that the nobles and officials whom Yuriy installed in Kyiv were resented by the population as aliens. Again, whereas earlier princes had contended for the right to rule in Kyiv (as, for example, in 1015, following the death of Volodymyr I), Prince Andrey Bogolyubskiy of Suzdal, as the Hypatian Chronicle records, sacked and plundered the city, taking away the population as captives, and carrying off the church treasures. As Ševčenko pertinently notes: '[w]hen an army sacks a city so thoroughly, the one who commands it has no intention of establishing himself there'. Indeed, Bogolyubskiy seems to have wanted 'ideological independence' from Kyiv, rejecting the installation in Vladimir of a bishop appointed by the Metropolitan of Kyiv and trying to set up a separate metropolitanate of his own. Yet, at the same time, he embarked on a major programme of church-building in Vladimir, replicating the most famous and well-loved Kyivan shrines. The question of the 'legitimacy' of Moscow's 'descent' from Kyiv is a complex and emotive one. Ševčenko makes a valiant effort to present all the available evidence in a spirit of academic detachment, but, over the centuries, the whole issue has become too emotive to be resolved by scholarly debate. His conclusion, however, though moderately expressed, is unequivocal:

> We should distinguish, however, between shifts of princely thrones of power from one territory to another, on the one hand, and cultural and linguistic continuity, on the other. Despite shifts in political power, cultural and linguistic continuity existed, without being

forcefully proclaimed, on the territory of present-day Ukraine, including Kiev, between the twelfth and the early seventeenth century, at which time old Kievan cultural traditions and claims came again to the fore (see Essays 8, 9 and 11). A similar link connects ancient Vladimir-Suzdal' with present-day Russia.

In other words, continuity throughout the centuries in Kyiv, and a parallel continuity between Vladimir-Suzdal and Moscow. Which, by implication, must surely mean that there is no continuity between Kyiv and Moscow.

Conventional histories of Ukraine normally move straight from the collapse of the Kyiv state to the rise of the western Ukrainian state of Halych. Ševčenko, however, at first (in the Vladimir-Suzdal essay) is somewhat dismissive of the importance of this western development, since

> this principality's rise was ephemeral, and by the first half of the fourteenth century it succumbed to its neighbors, Hungary, Poland and Lithuania. Moreover, no new nation came into being on its territory – in spite of some differences, both the present-day inhabitants of the former Halyč-Volhynian principality and the inhabitants of the Kiev land are Ukrainians.

The two essays which follow return to Byzantine matters – 'The Policy of the Byzantine Patriarchate in Eastern Europe in the Fourteenth Century' and 'Byzantium and the East Slavs after 1453', and the theme of Halych is only readdressed in Essay 8 – 'Poland in Ukrainian History'. This begins with brief mentions of the retaking of the 'area called the Červen' towns' from the Poles by Volodymyr I in 971 and the death of Prince Roman of Halych in the battle of Zawichost in 1205, then proceeds straight to the Polish expansion eastwards from the 1340s onwards. (In so doing, he ignores a 'western' link that, however ephemeral, would surely be at least of anecdotal interest to Anglophone readers – the fact that in the second recapture of the cities of Cherven by the Rus' in 1032, an inhabitant of the British Isles, Rognvaldr Brusason of Orkney, fought on the Rus' side (see *The Ukrainian Review*, No. 1, 1964). This lack of interest in Halych emphasises, yet again, the main interest of the book – the religious-cultural contest of Rome and Byzantium for the psyche of the emergent Ukrainian nation. The most significant references to Halych in the 'Polish' essay occur in the author's remarks on the 'Ukrainian school' in Polish literature – and the consequent intellectual legacy by which Polish readers even today view Ukraine as part of the Polish literary landscape – a phenomenon which Ševčenko suggests parallels the India of the Raj for English readers reared on Kipling and E.M. Forster.

For Ševčenko, the climax of the east/west interplay is undoubtedly the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries – with what Ševčenko terms 'the rebirth of the Rus' faith' – a term which for him seems to cover both the Union of Brest and the revival of Orthodoxy, the religious polemic literature generated in a conflict which was not simply Catholic versus Orthodox, but in which both these contending parties perceived a new threat – from Protestantism. The hero and epitome of this period, in Ševčenko's eyes, is Petro Mohyla – founder of the Kyiv *collegium* (later, Academy), who sought to use Latin scholarship and pedagogic methods borrowed from the Jesuits in order to strengthen the intellectual armoury of the Orthodox.

Mohyla's achievement, and that of the *collegium*, was, in Ševčenko's view, that

it provided an alternative to the outright Polonization of the Ukrainian elite, and it delayed its Russification until well after 1686. It thus helped strengthen, or at least preserve, that elite's feeling of 'otherness' from both Poles and Muscovites (and, subsequently, Russians), and created the basis for later, affirmative feelings of Ukrainian identity.

With this achievement, the book effectively ends. The final chapter, 'The Rise of National Consciousness to 1700', looks briefly at the role of the Khmelnytskyi uprising in forging national consciousness – and concludes that, in spite of later perceptions that it was 'decisive', at the time 'relevant articulate expressions' of its importance 'were few'. Nevertheless, the upheavals of the Khmelnytskyi period 'contribute[d] decisively to the Ukrainian elite's realization that their land, even if part of it was called *Malorossija* as time went on, was a separate entity'. And it was this consciousness, 'that would serve, along with the folklore, as the basis for the Romantic national revival of the early nineteenth century' – and so, though Ševčenko does not mention this – to the Ukrainian independence of the 1990s.

In conclusion, the reviewer would like to add a linguistic observation concerning the word *'suržyk'* which the author defines on p. 4 as

A mixture of wheat and rye; hence, a mixed language, such as the mixture of Ukrainian and Russian still used by part of the population in Ukraine's urban centres. Here the word refers to a language composed of the Polish and Ukrainian-Belarusian vernaculars and an admixture of the Church Slavonic sacred tongue.

The author is apparently unaware that there exists an English term for precisely that mixture of grains – obsolescent, certainly (since the sowing of such mixed seed is no longer common in agricultural practice), but still to be found in the larger dictionaries. And, by a strange coincidence, this word would provide an excellent English equivalent for *'suržyk'* in its derived, linguistic, meaning. For the word, which exists in two orthographical variants, is 'mislan' or 'mixlan'!

The Fall of Communism and the Rise of Nationalism. The INDEX reader. Ed. Ruth Petrie (Cassell, London, 1997) 222 pp, paperback

This is a selection of thirty-one essays and articles, drawn from *Index on Censorship* over the past 25 years. It is the first in a series of thematic collections to be produced by Cassell in connection with the silver jubilee of *Index* (see *The Ukrainian Review*, Vol. 44, No. 2, Summer 1997, pp. 68-70). The authors include many famous 'dissident' names – Andrei Amalrik, Andrei Sakharov, Roy Medvedev, Leszek Kolakowski and Václav Havel – as well as internationally known commentators such as Chris Cviic and Mark Frankland. Even Salman Rushdie makes an appearance – writing about Bosnia. All the former member-states of the Warsaw Pact are represented, except Bulgaria, as well as Serbia (Kosovo), Croatia, Bosnia and Albania. Apart from Russia, three republics of the former Soviet Union – Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Belarus – feature in separate articles. However, for some reason, the republics at the forefront of the struggle for independence and democracy – the Baltic republics and Ukraine – do not.

In view of the title of the book, these omissions are particularly surprising. Not only – as Irena Maryniak notes in her Preface – 'In 1980 the dissident physicist Dr Yury Orlov smuggled out a report from the labour camp where he was serving a lengthy sentence, estimating that 40 per cent of Soviet political prisoners were Ukrainians, 30 per cent Balts, with Armenians, Georgians and Crimean Tatars next in line'. Furthermore, Lithuania was the first of the 15 Union republics to declare full independence from Moscow (March, 1990), while it was the overwhelming Ukrainian vote for independence in the referendum of 1 December 1991, which dealt the tottering Soviet Union its *coup-de-grâce.*

This does not mean that the book contains no Ukrainian material whatsoever. The article on 'The Orlov Tribunal', listed as being by 'Lyudmila Alexeyeva and others', includes a statement by the Ukrainian mathematician Leonid Plyushch concerning his confinement in the Dnipropetrovsk 'Special' (i.e. penal) Psychiatric Hospital. (Since this book is meant to be a 'reader' for, one presumes, persons who are not experts in what used to be called 'Sovietology', a note should perhaps have been added that the disease of 'sluggish schizophrenia' from which Plyushch was diagnosed to be suffering was a uniquely Soviet 'disease' – which, according to its 'discoverer', Dr Aleksandr Snezhnevskiy, had no symptoms whatsoever – except an inordinate desire to criticise the existing political system!). Ukrainian matters also feature in the article 'USSR: Why the Empire's Subjects are Restless', by Bohdan Nahaylo (himself a Ukrainian), which was originally published in 1989. He gives, for example, information on the lack of Ukrainian-language schools (only 16 per cent of schools in the major cities used Ukrainian as the language of tuition, and approximately 50 per cent of the children in the republic were being taught in Russian, although Ukrainians made up 70 per cent of its population), the total lack of Ukrainian cultural facilities for the six million Ukrainians living in 'the Soviet Far East, Kazakhstan, Russia and Moldavia', the continuing ban on the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church and the Ukrainian Catholic Church, Ukrainian protests about the treatment of the 1988 Millennium of the 'Baptism of Kyiv' as a *Russian* event, and refers to the results of the Soviet elections of March 1980 as revealing the 'growing frustration and radicalisation in Ukraine, Moldavia and other republics'.

Such passing allusions, however, are hardly commensurate with the major role played by Ukraine in the downfall of the Soviet Union – nor, and this is perhaps of equal importance – its efforts since independence to avoid being drawn into a new Russian hegemony. Interesting and instructive as the individual articles are, the lack of a coherent treatment of Ukrainian matters must be considered a major defect in the book, and could give even today's university students (who were barely beginning secondary school when the Berlin Wall came down), a somewhat unbalanced over-view of the collapse of Moscow's Communist empire.

Ukrainian – A Complete Guide for Beginners. By Olena Bekh and James Dingley (Hodder and Stoughton, 'Teach Yourself Books', London, 1997), 299 pp, illustr., paperback, £9.99

The 'Teach Yourself' series of language manuals has long been, as noted in the preliminary matter to this volume, an 'authoritative source for self-guided learning' – a reputation that is more than maintained by this excellent Ukrainian course. However, to those familiar with the 'Teach Yourself' series of a few decades back – worthy, but somewhat staid volumes in their uniform yellow-and-navy covers, this present volume will come as a shock, from its multicoloured cover (an evocation of Ukrainian tradition, folklore and modern tourism), through its witty illustrations and dialogues dealing with the experiences of a British entrepreneur planning and making a business-cum-pleasure trip to Ukraine, the whole approach is lively and eminently up-to-date. The aim of the book, as stated in the preface, is fairly modest – to present, in the course of 18 units, 'a solid foundation' in 'the kind of Ukrainian that will be accepted and understood anywhere in Ukraine'.

Throughout, the emphasis is on practical use of the language. Each unit begins with a synopsis: 'In this unit you will learn:' which lists practical skills: in unit 1, for example, how to introduce and greet people, in unit 4 to make a telephone conversation, in unit 14 to discuss common ailments and use the Ukrainian medical service, and so on. This is followed by one or more illustrative dialogues, with the relevant vocabulary, and a section, 'How the language functions', dealing with specific points of grammar arising from the material in the unit so far. Then come exercises, notes on idiomatic usages, and, in some units, 'cultural notes' on such topics as currency, addressing an envelope, typical Ukrainian foods, etc., or maps (central Kyiv, the Kyiv metro).

The overall impression therefore is a book genuinely aimed at the traveller wishing to visit today's Ukraine, to whom the acquisition of a specific skill in language use is perceived as more relevant than by learning by rote a particular grammatical rule. Nevertheless, the grammatical basis of the work is sound. To take a random example: unit 14, 'I want to call out the doctor', deals with the following points of grammar: masculine nouns ending in -p, with genitive -ря (лíкар, кобзáр, Íгор), verbal constructions of the type у мéне болить гóрло, use of present tense after a past verb (Я ще вчóра відчувáв, що менé нýдить, a note on verbal aspect (perfectives in по- denoting a brief action), comparative and superlative of adjectives, and some idioms relating to health matters – all arising naturally from, and illustrated by, the material of the three dialogues in the unit.

In short, this book must be considered a major breakthrough in the teaching, and self-teaching, of Ukrainian. Although not the first course for Anglophone students, until recently, all such works, inevitably, reflected the 'cold war' climate (Yar Sla-

vutich's *Conversational Ukrainian*, for example, grew out of a language course for US servicemen) when the likelihood of visiting Ukraine was remote, and the perceived needs of those studying the language very different. Bekh and Dingley have therefore not only pinpointed the language skills needed by the visitor to today's Ukraine, but have also built, within the framework of what, at first glance, look like 'phrase-book needs', an excellently structured basic course in grammar and usage.

One has to point out, though, that the generally excellent standard of this book is marred by a number of typographical errors, often of so gross a kind that one cannot easily envisage the authors missing them, and can only suppose that they crept in after the final proofs were passed for publication. To mention but one, on p. 5, the last letter of the Ukrainian alphabet is given, in upper and lower case as 'R, r'(!) Since this gaffe is followed by an example, яблуко (spelt correctly), perceptive students will doubtless realise that there has been an error; but may well, as a result, suffer some loss of confidence in the accuracy of what follows. One would like to suggest to the publishers therefore that before this book goes into the further editions which it well deserves, the text should be checked, rechecked and checked again for errors.

English-Ukrainian Dictionary of Business. By Alexander Krouglov, Katya Kurylko and Dmytro Kostenko (MacFarland and Co, Inc., Jefferson, N. Carolina and London, 1997), 119 pp., hardback

This Dictionary is intended, according to the preface, 'first and foremost for business people in Ukraine and in English-speaking countries who are already, or intend to be, part of a commercial enterprise in that country'. In addition, the compilers suggest that it should also prove a 'valuable reference source' for translators, teachers and students of Ukrainian. It tacitly assumes a working knowledge of both English and Ukrainian, and provides only the minimum of grammatical information (gender of Ukrainian nouns), 'grammatical categories' (i.e. parts of speech) of English terms, and indications of some peculiarities (e.g. nouns used only in the singular or plural). No attempt is made to indicate the pronunciation of the English terms – however, for the benefit of Anglophone users, the stress of Ukrainian words is indicated.

The compilers reveal a sensitivity to the Ukrainian language not always found in lexicographers, many of whom are content simply to list existing terms, however clumsy or ill-conceived. Thus the preface particularly stresses that they 'have avoided forms that are not characteristic of Ukrainian (e.g. active participles with the ending -учий, -ючий, and others)', that third declension nouns are given with the ending 'и' in the genitive singular '(labor theory of value – робóча теóрія вáртости)' and that the Ukrainian letters г and ґ are differentiated. As the authors note, 'the language of the business world is in a state of constant flux', and one must commend them for taking advantage of this 'flux' to steer the business language away from 'uncharacteristic' forms (sc. Russicisms).

The vocabulary ranges from the long-established and technical (demurrage, futures, warranty) to slang – 'yankees' (in the sense of US stocks), 'dawn raid', and a

few terms equally new to both languages, such as 'zaibatsu'. The spelling convention is that of the USA, except, say the authors, 'in those cases when the term is restricted to the usage in other English-speaking countries and has a spelling which differs from the American'. This claim, however, is not always true in practice: under 'check', for example, we find the terms: 'check crossing', 'crossed check' and 'uncrossed check', followed, in each case, by the notation '(Великобритáнія, Австрáлія, Новá Зелáндія)'. But if this means that the terms are used only in those countries, surely the spelling appropriate to them – cheque – should have been used?

The book concludes with a useful list of English-language abbreviations, which includes not only specifically business terms but also acronyms for relevant international organisations: G7, UNCTAD, WTO and the like. There is no corresponding Ukrainian list – presumably because no generally accepted business abbreviations have yet evolved.

Soviet Schooling in the Second World War. By John Dunstan (Macmillan in association with the Centre for Russian and East European Studies, University of Birmingham, London, 1997), 264 pp., illustr., hardback

This book, by a leading specialist on Soviet education policy, addresses a period until now largely neglected by Western scholars – World War II. Indeed, to a large extent, the topic was also neglected in the Soviet Union, at least at the level of comprehensive scholarly analysis. The scope of this book, in both time and space, is clearly defined. It covers the whole of World War II, not simply that portion of it in which the Soviet Union featured as a belligerent, from June 1941 onwards, and deals with those territories actually under Soviet rule at a given moment. (Education in areas under Nazi occupation, including clandestine and partisan schools, will be, the author promises, the subject of a further book now in progress). Accordingly, Part I, 'Before the Great Patriotic War', begins with two brief introductory chapters on Soviet perceptions of the war prior to June 1941 and Soviet educational policy in the 1920s and 1930s. The discussion proper then opens (Chapter 3) with 'Imposing a System: The New Territories', the introduction of Soviet-style schooling in Western Ukraine and Belarus, the Baltic states and Moldova. This is followed by a general 'Schools Report 1940'. Part II, 'In Time of War', begins with a brief outline of the course of the war in general ('From German Invasion to Soviet Victory'), and then deals with specific problems of reorganisation and evacuation, the reorganisation of the curriculum in response to the practical and propaganda needs of wartime, and the experience of 'patriotic upbringing' and wartime conditions, as perceived by the school-children themselves. Finally, in Part III, 'From War to Peace', the author discusses the educational reforms of 1943, and the various

organisational problems which continued to trouble the Soviet authorities well into the post-war period.

Dr Dunstan, as he admits in his preface, knows only one of the major languages of the former Soviet Union – Russian. Partly for this reason, and partly because of the 'contemporary currency' of the Russian forms, he has standardised place names within the 'eve-of-war June 1941 frontiers of the USSR' in accordance with Russian usage, 'except in the case of a generally accepted English version'. 'No sub-text should be sought', he assures us. More cogent to the content of the book is the question: how far his linguistic constraints have affected the selection of material. His main primary sources, he tells us, are the Soviet educational press and professional journals of the time, and various reports (in particular those from the regional educational authorities – *oblono*) and other papers in the Russian Federation archives and also 'a handful of obkom (regional party committee) minutes at the former Party Archive'. As a result, his materials on the 'new territories' rely to some extent on secondary sources – some of which, e.g. N.P. Vakar's *Belorussia – The Making of a Nation* (1956), are hardly at the leading edge of current scholarship.

The takeovers in Western Ukraine and Western Belarus are dealt with together – and it is not always clear (without turning to the notes) to which republic Dunstan is referring. It is evident that he has more detailed materials available for Belarus than for Ukraine: for the academic year 1940/41 he notes that Belarus as a whole 'needed 16 000 new teachers, nearly 10 000 of them for its western territories, but it emerged about 4000 in deficit', and then adds, without figures, that 'Ukraine was also desperately short'. For Western Ukraine under Polish rule, Dunstan relies mainly on a Polish-American source (Jan T. Gross), a Russian-language work by N. Konstantinov, and – interestingly – British Foreign Office reports. The picture he presents seems substantially correct – a deteriorating situation, with the increasing Polonisation of what were officially Ukrainian language schools. The administrative details of the Soviet take-over are well documented in the sources available to the author: the change from Polish-style to Soviet-style schools, the abolition of fees for secondary education and other charges (e.g. for ink, equipment and reports) and the replacement of Polish by Ukrainian as the language of instruction in 'thousands of former Polish-medium schools'. However, for the closure of religious schools in Western Ukraine, he cites only the *Catholic Digest* and a transmission from Vatican Radio. In fact, a number of more authoritative references are available in English – for example, the reports of Metropolitan Andrey Sheptytskyi to the Vatican, given in Paul R. Magocsi (Ed.), *Morality and Reality. The Life and Times of Andrei Sheptyts'kyi* (Edmonton, Canada, 1989).

Apart from such obvious features as the change of language, the ban on religion, and the introduction of such subjects as Soviet history and geography, Dr Dunstan presents a number of curious and enlightening side-lights on the educational take-over. Since Soviet textbooks were in short supply, those of the previous regime were temporarily retained – but not in arithmetic, since the references to pre-Soviet goods and prices were 'embarrassing'! When, however, he discusses the resistance of young people to Soviet propaganda, his reliance on Gross tends to give the impression that it was predominantly the young Poles who were involved. Following Gross, for example, he writes that

[o]ne public meeting, for example, ended with the spectacle of the platform party
singing the 'Internationale', fists clenched, while the audience broke into the patriotic
hymn 'We want God'. Such contumacy was frequently displayed by older boys and
girls, even though they might be arrested for it.
      This was a Polish stance...

This implies that the participants of the meeting in question were all Poles. But
it is hard to imagine the Soviet *agitprop* teams organising separate meetings for
Poles and Ukrainians – and the hymn in question has words in both Polish and
Ukrainian! Dunstan does try to give the Ukrainian young people their due. He
stresses (without any source) that the 'Western Ukrainians' also 'baulked at the
enforced atheism', and cites a British diplomat who had visited Lviv and reported
the 'dislike and contempt' felt by young Ukrainians for the Russians, suggesting
that this was 'evidently fuelled by heavy-handed Soviet propaganda juxtaposed
with the disgrace of the Winter War'. Nevertheless, one cannot but feel that the
material available to him was, on this point, somewhat scanty.
      On how the schools actually operated, Dunstan makes a number of significant
points. There was a breakdown of discipline, arising 'directly' from the Soviet
practice of 'inciting [pupils] to inform on politically
suspect teachers and rewarding them for it'. There
was a major shortage of teachers, so that a new peda-
gogic institute was opened in Lviv and six new teach-
ers' institutes in Western Ukraine, an attempt was
made throughout Ukraine to compile a register of
teachers trained since 1934 who were working in
other professions. And, interestingly, the teaching of
Russian in Western Ukraine ran into difficulties, since
there was a shortage of textbooks and study aids.
      Passing on to the 'Schools Report 1940' (for which
he had an abundance of Russian-language material
available), Dunstan presents statistics on the numbers
and types of school, the content of syllabuses, and the
difficulties encountered in implementing the decrees
on compulsory education (over 100,000 Ukrainian
pupils left school 'without adequate reason' during
academic year 1938/39, while 274,178 children were not in school at all – some 7
per cent of the age-group for compulsory primary education). He demonstrates
that, contrary to the official Soviet line that the war was to blame for all the 'edu-
cational shortcomings of the decade', for example, the shift system – by which
pupils attended school only in the morning or only in the afternoon (or in some
instances, in the evening) – was already common in 1940.
      With the outbreak of war, much of Ukrainian territory was outside the scope of
this book, being under Nazi occupation, though there are some brief remarks on
schooling in besieged Odesa and Sevastopol (one school in the latter was estab-
lished in the champagne caves!), and some children – particularly from children's
homes – were evacuated eastwards (almost 40,000 such in 1941). Ukraine begins
to figure again only with the Soviet advance westwards – a period which coincides

with Union-wide changes in the school curriculum to foster Soviet patriotism and take account of the USSR's wartime alliances. Derogatory references to religion were 'prune[d] heavily', geography became 'comparatively objective about the British Empire and free from digs at "capitalist exploitation"'. History put special emphasis on past victories over Germans and 'the aggressive policy of Germany's ruling classes going back deep into the Middle Ages, their bestial cruelty towards the peoples conquered and enslaved by Germany, and their merciless butchery of the revolutionary movement within the country'. And literature classes 'were expected to add emotional appeal to messages from history' – while, at the same time, suffering a 15 per cent cut in class time (the time saved being devoted to military studies). And, in the course of these cuts, Dunstan tells us, while 'allocations for individual writers and works' were reduced and 'some treatment of literary genres and trends disappeared', the only author to vanish entirely (from the class IX syllabus) was – 'the Ukrainian national poet Taras Shevchenko, the study of whom was less likely to foster Soviet patriotism when it was great *Russian* writers who were paramount'. Presumably, Dunstan is referring here to the All-Union syllabus, since he then goes on to say that '[i]n Ukraine itself, more attention was paid to Soviet authors writing in Ukrainian, 18 of whom were specified'. But the disappearance of Shevchenko, however temporarily, is yet another incident in the long history of the censorship of that poet – and one which does not seem to have been noted by writers on the subject. (See, for example, V. Swoboda, 'Shevchenko and Censorship', *The Ukrainian Review*, No. 1, 1961, No. 1, 1962).

The final chapters: 'Preparing for Reconstruction' and 'Conclusions and Consequences' deal both with the physical need for reconstruction and the psychological after-effects – including the reluctance of many children to return to school discipline and routine. (In Ukraine, there was the further problem of children evacuated into Russia or Uzbekistan, who had had no Ukrainian lessons for up to three years and who 'were now expected to study that language at the level which they should have reached had they not been away'). Dunstan notes in particular the long-term effects of the war: upgraded status of military training in the curriculum and the introduction of labour training – and the removal of the 1929 innovation of 'socialist competition' from the class-room. The book is therefore of importance, not only for the light it throws on Soviet education during the abnormal conditions of wartime, but also for a better understanding of the decades that followed. And, in spite of certain deficiencies (first and foremost, from our point of view, the author's lack of access to Ukrainian sources on the pre-1941 situation in Western Ukraine), it must be deemed a valuable and important contribution in its field. ❏

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Current Events

Ukrainian Foreign Policy, Public Opinion and Political Thought

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During 1995–7, a number of substantial changes clearly took place in the formation and conduct of Ukrainian foreign policy. The government was fairly successful in eliminating unevenness and hesitations in defining the basic external and geopolitical orientations of the country. This evolution was reflected extremely clearly in recent statements on strategic policy, official comments on the treaties and agreements signed with Russia, Romania, Poland, Belarus and Moldova, and also official interpretations of the expected consequences of the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and Ukraine, signed on 9 July 1997 at the Madrid session of the North Atlantic Council. President Leonid Kuchma's administration redefined Ukraine's foreign policy goals as participation in the processes of European integration and the gradual development of cooperation with the Euro-Atlantic security structures. Entry into the European Union was announced as a long-term strategic foreign policy task in the European dimension. However, in view of the continuing difficulties of the Ukrainian economy and society, the achievement of this bold aim seems a very distant prospect indeed.

In 1997, Ukrainian public discussion on relations with the West in general and NATO in particular, was, for the most part, devoted to the general issues of Ukraine's foreign policy and participation in Sea Breeze-97 and other multinational military exercises within the framework of the Partnership for Peace programme (PfP). The overall discussion in the media and political experts indicated a definite attempt to re-evaluate stereotypes and an awareness of Ukraine's place in contemporary international relations. In this respect, it would be difficult, or near-impossible, to identify any general and commonly-shared trends in the evolution of public opinion, except, perhaps, support for strengthening the country's orientation towards the contemporary political and economic values of European civilisation. Nevertheless, the sheer volume of official comments, analytical articles and broadcasts, representing alternative views in both the printed and electronic media, increased significantly.

Comparative analysis of Ukrainian views on foreign policy revealed a substantial gap between the official position and course of the presidential administration and government, on the one hand, and the spectrum of sympathies of the various political parties and movements on the other. A notable gap was also observed between the views on foreign policy of the Ukrainian political élite and those of the rank-and-file citizens.

The foreign policy thinking of Ukraine was best known through the numerous official statements and comments of the President and the highest staff representatives of the National Security and Defence Council, the presidential administration, the Cabinet of Ministers and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. However, the various other concepts put forward by non-governmental and opposition groups remained in the shadow. The approach of the 1998 parliamentary elections increased interest in the alternative views and concepts of how Ukrainian foreign policy should be conducted, held by members of the political opposition and different social classes.

After the Madrid NATO summit, the foreign policy concept of the Ukrainian government became more clearly pro-Western. This was especially noticeable in the official approach to relations in the triangle Ukraine-USA/NATO-Russia. These issues were discussed most widely by Volodymyr Horbulin, the Secretary of the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine and one of the closest colleagues of President Leonid Kuchma.

In a well prepared and fairly concrete interview entitled 'Before and after Madrid', published in the Ukrainian government newspaper *Uryadovyi kuryer* on 26 July 1997, Horbulin put forth some general reflections. According to this interview, the government has come to the conclusion that the approach of NATO to the borders of Ukraine 'does not pose any threat to our state'. The invitation to Poland and Hungary to join NATO is significant. However, at present Ukraine cannot aspire to join NATO, since it currently does not meet the necessary criteria, and since there must be a desire on the part of NATO for Ukraine to join.[1]

On the differences in public opinion towards NATO, Horbulin noted that 'the time will come when all Ukrainians will understand that NATO poses no threat to us'.

Regarding relations between NATO and Russia, he pointed out some contradictions inherent in the Russia-NATO agreement, and stated that 'it is as if the issues were about the creation of mutual control'. However, despite the current divergent trends in public opinion in Russia about relations with the West, the reassuring trend of cooperation continues to gather momentum. '...Without Russia, there can be no system of collective security in Europe. We must accept this fact and develop our foreign policy on the basis of this reality', he stated.

Horbulin criticised the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine for the absence of 'a clearly defined system of cooperation with the military institutions of NATO'. He underlined the significance of the Ukraine-NATO Charter in the following areas: improving the defence capability of the state; the conditions for the export of weapons; and exchanging Ukraine's obsolescent equipment for more advanced technology, etc. He also hinted at financial assistance from NATO, covering expenses associated with Ukraine's participation in the PfP programme.

The Secretary of the National Security and Defence Council also referred to the passions raging around the multinational Sea Breeze-97 exercises as being the result of the political speculation of 'certain powers'.

He drew attention to the ineffectiveness of the OSCE in which 54 states have the right of veto on security issues. NATO, he said, is a more effective organisa-

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[1] Volodymyr Horbulin, 'Before and After Madrid', *Uryadovyi kuryer,* 26 July 1997.

tion in this respect. The creation of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) reveals that NATO is gradually beginning to transform itself. The activities of the EAPC 'allow for a significant strengthening in the atmosphere of trust in Europe'. Recent events indicate that the preconditions are developing 'for a new architecture of collective confidence in Europe'.

In connection with the Ukraine-European Union summit in Kyiv on 5 September, *Uryadovyi kuryer* published an interview with Horbulin, which focused on the issues of European integration. 'Experience makes it evident that the idea of participation in the EU, and also the NATO enlargement process, assists the stabilisation of the internal political situation and the strengthening of relations with neighbouring states', Horbulin said. He noted that current Ukrainian-EU relations are stalled, owing to the difficult economic situation in Ukraine, certain problems within the EU, and the high level of Ukraine's economic dependence on Russia.[2]

Horbulin expressed similar ideas in an article entitled 'Ukraine's Choice', in which he noted that the prospect of NATO membership had helped resolve problems between Hungary and Romania, between Slovakia and Hungary, and between Romania and Ukraine. The same, he indicated, may be said of the forthcoming EU enlargement.[3]

However, the Euro-Atlantic outlook of Ukraine's government has not been matched by a similar enthusiasm among many other groups of the political community.

In an article entitled 'Manoeuvres – yes, membership – no',[4] the President of the Atlantic Council of Ukraine, General Vadim Grechaninov, insisted that significant differences exist between the Ukraine-Russia Treaty and the Ukraine-NATO Charter (a reference to Article 6 of the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership between Ukraine and Russia of 31 May 1997, which rules out either party signing an agreement with a third country targeted at the other). In Grechaninov's opinion, it is possible to consider the security interests of Ukraine in a context in which both NATO and the military-political defence system of the Union of Russia and Belarus are reformed 'into a general, collective system of security'.

Several of the most difficult and controversial issues in relations with neighbouring states, which had poisoned the perception of foreign policy held by a majority of the population, have now been solved successfully, but this has not improved the expectations of the public regarding the security and stability of the state. Rank-and-file citizens in general share a feeling that the latest developments and changes in foreign policy have brought Ukraine no substantial nor rapidly perceptible benefits of an economic and/or security nature.

Public Opinion and Views on Foreign Policy

The attitudes of the population of Ukraine on foreign policy have been continuously monitored during 1994–7 by public opinion polls. An extremely detailed database was presented in several reports of the 1996–7 polls conducted by SOCIS-Gallup

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[2] *Uryadovyi kuryer*, 2 September 1997.
[3] V. Horbulin, 'Ukraine's Choice', *Holos Ukrayiny*, 4 September 1997.
[4] Vadim Grechaninov, 'Manoeuvres – yes, membership – no', *Den*, 29 July 1997.

Ukraine International, a marketing and sociological service based in Kyiv. Each survey included standard interviews with a minimum 1,200 respondents, selected by social and demographic criteria (age, sex, education, place of residence, etc.) to be representative of the adult population of Ukraine. The survey covered all regions of the country, and the interviews were conducted in respondents' homes.

The results of the polls indicated that the citizens' level of interest in politics was no higher than in the Soviet period. In May 1996, 31 per cent of respondents declared that they had no interest in politics at all, 60 per cent reported a partial interest, and only one-tenth expressed a 'considerable' interest. The prevailing 'moderate' level of interest in political processes is, to a considerable extent, explained by the predominance of 'first-rank' problems with which the population of Ukraine has been concerned over the past few years. These include the standard of living, personal security and health.

The results of the 1996 polls indicated that the Ukrainian population had only an insignificant level of confidence in the supreme institutions of state power and the politicians who, to a considerable extent, determine the foreign policy of the state.

On the basis of those surveys, average annual indices of confidence have been calculated on a scale ranging from -1 to +1. (A rating of -1 meant a total lack of confidence and +1 – total confidence). On this scale, the 1996 confidence level in the President of Ukraine was: -0.15, in the Verkhovna Rada (parliament): -0.4, in the government of Ukraine: -0.3, in the Armed Forces: +0.25, in the Speaker of the Verkhovna Rada: -0.28, in the Prime Minister: -0.28, in the Minister of Foreign Affairs: -0.18, in the Secretary of the National Security and Defence Council: -0.31, and in the Minister of Defence: -0.21.

The 1997 poll yielded the following figures. The confidence level in the President was: -0.31, in parliament: -0.56, in the Cabinet of Ministers: -0.49, in the Armed Forces: +0.17, in the Prime Minister: -0.29, in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: -0.18, in the Secretary of the National Security and Defence Council: -0.33, and in the Minister of Defence: -0.24.[5]

As we can see, the 1996 index of confidence in the leading politicians was negative, though it was nearer to zero than to a total lack of confidence. Only the Armed Forces had a positive index. This may seem positive but is not very inspiring against the general background of a crisis of confidence in the main institutions of the state.

The overall low level of confidence in the supreme branches of state power and leading state officials expressed by the public might be explained by a break in the linkage between power and responsibility. The public opinion polls showed that the population of Ukraine tended to consider the president, the government and parliament as responsible for the crisis in the country, first and foremost, because they have failed to carry out a substantial reform of the economy. At the same time, at the end of 1996, one-third of respondents considered that the real power in Ukraine was in the hands of the Mafia, while 23 per cent mentioned the corrupt

[5] Ukrainian Political and Economic Index, SOCIS-Gallup Ukraine International, Report No. 37, October 1997, p. 9.

state bureaucracy. Regarding a putative 'destructive role of the West', only 2 per cent of respondents considered that 'interference' by the International Monetary Fund and other foreign organisations played a role in domestic misfortunes.

The results of the 1996 polls indicated that support for Ukraine's independence was less convincing than when it was proclaimed in 1991. In November 1996, only 43 per cent of respondents said that they supported the 'independent develop-ment' of Ukraine, while about one-third expressed dissatisfaction with the Inde-pendence Act of 1991. Under such circumstances, it is reasonable to ask: with what countries did public opinion wish to link the future development of Ukraine?

Analysis of the data indicated that the citizens of Ukraine had three main types of views on foreign policy, i.e. 'post-Soviet', pro-Western and self-reliant.

In 1996, it was ties with the CIS which were dominant in the citizens' aware-ness. This reflected developments in the general domestic situation in the coun-try, though there was a significant divergence between regions. In particular, the inhabitants of the east and Crimea were the main supporters of integration within the CIS. A more balanced and moderate attitude was presented by respondents from the northern and southern regions, while the least support for this view was recorded in the central and western regions and in Kyiv. Conversely, the idea of reliance predominantly on Ukraine's own resources was specific to the public opinion of the western regions of the country, and received only minimum sup-port in the east and in Crimea.

It should be noted that since 1994, when the CIS Statute came into force, Uk-raine has not been a CIS 'member state' but possesses the undefined and legally neutral status of a CIS 'founder' and 'participant'.

In the 1996 opinion poll, approximately half the respondents supported devel-opment of relations between Ukraine and the CIS as a top priority, but only 23.7 per cent did so in 1997. It should be noted that in 1996 a significant proportion of the supporters of a pro-CIS policy supported extremely close links between Uk-raine and Russia, not excluding integration into a single state. In the 1997 poll (carried out in May and June), 24.3 per cent of respondents favoured the idea that Ukraine should form an East Slavonic bloc with Russia and Belarus.

On the average, the 1996 polls indicated support of around 20 per cent for a pro-Western orientation (13.8 per cent in 1997) and 20 per cent for self-reliance (16.1 per cent in 1997).[6]

The 1996–7 public opinion studies showed that one of the main expectations of Ukraine's membership of the CIS was intensive economic cooperation. In par-ticular, in spring 1996, more than one-third of respondents supported Ukraine's full and equal membership of the Economic Union of the CIS and one-tenth spoke in favour of an associate membership of the CIS, while one-fifth deemed it advisable for Ukraine to be 'a member of the CIS on the basis of bilateral agree-ments'. The 1997 poll showed that 52.5 per cent of respondents supported the development of relations with Russia and the CIS member-states as a priority.[7]

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[6] *The Ukrainian Society in 1994–1997* (Kyiv: The Democratic Initiatives Foundation, 1997), p. 2.
[7] Ibid.

According to the public opinion poll conducted in June 1997 by SOCIS-Gallup, 58 per cent supported the view that signing the Friendship Treaty was equally in the interest of both countries. Fourteen per cent thought that it focused mainly on the interests of Russia, while 9 per cent took the opposite view. One-fifth of respondents failed to define their attitude on this issue.

There was a certain regional divergence in attitude towards the Treaty. Thus, the main proportion of those who regarded the Treaty as an agreement between equal partners was found to be in the east (74 per cent). In the west, more than a quarter of respondents perceived the Treaty as being more beneficial to Ukraine, while more than one-third (35 per cent) thought that the national interests of both countries were equally served. It is noteworthy that almost half of those polled in the north-western region (45 per cent) did not reveal their attitude to the Treaty.

Such determinants as job, social-professional group or ethnicity of the respondents had no major influence on attitudes towards the Treaty. Thus, as a whole, the Ukrainians' attitude towards the Treaty between Ukraine and Russia was generally positive.

When the USSR broke up, relations between Ukraine and Russia were transformed into international relations between two independent actors. The interest of the population in these relations was explained by the fact that a significant proportion of the residents of Ukraine have fairly strong personal ties with Russia.

In the May 1996 poll, 35 per cent of respondents stated that they had relatives in Russia. This, to a considerable extent, determined their interest in Ukrainian-Russian relations. One should not, however, confuse Ukrainians' interest in these relations with whether or not they are worried about the political situation between Kyiv and Moscow.

Questioned about the 'first rank' problems they viewed as predominant, only a relatively small number of people mentioned Ukrainian-Russian intergovernmental relations. In 1996, this figure ranged between 6 and 12 per cent, approximately the same as that for such issues as corruption within the leadership of Ukraine and environmental problems.

In 1995–7, the Ukrainian government tried to establish closer contacts with the European Union and other European political and security institutions. In 1995, the country joined the Council of Europe. As a result, the level of public support for the development of expanding links with the European Union and other intergovernmental organisations took on particular importance.

The general attitudes of Ukrainians to the official aims and activities of the European Union were positive. However, the fact that a fairly significant portion of respondents (about 50 per cent) had no clear idea of the structure, activities or, indeed, the real nature of the EU, proved an obstacle to the formation of a positive image of it.

Ukraine's participation in the NATO Partnership for Peace programme and its relations with the North Atlantic Alliance were also researched. The problem of national security, which grew more acute after the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Ukraine, became a subject of keen discussion after certain influential political circles and parliamentary groups in Russia laid claim to both the former Soviet

Black Sea Fleet and the town of Sevastopol. Certain factions in Russia also openly questioned previous decisions of the Russian government and the international obligations it had assumed. How, under such circumstances, did the Ukrainian public mind evaluate the probability of Ukraine's further integration with NATO?

In December 1996, 12 per cent of respondents expressed general confidence in NATO, while 19 per cent took the opposite point of view, and about one-third reflected a neutral standpoint. On the necessity for Ukraine to join NATO and the time-scale for so doing, the situation was as follows.

In December 1996 and January 1997, approximately one-third of respondents spoke in favour of joining NATO. Half of them supported speeding up this process ('as soon as possible'). Another half considered that such a step would require a certain time. One-fifth of those polled opposed Ukraine's joining NATO. The decisive role in an eventual grading of orientations was played by the 41-45 per cent of respondents who had not clarified their attitude on the issue.

The January 1997 poll showed more complex and contradictory visions of foreign policy. It revealed that 25 per cent of respondents supported adopting a foreign policy of neutrality; 19 per cent backed joining a bloc with Russia and Belarus; 14 per cent favoured joining 'a new USSR'; 9 per cent favoured full membership of the CIS; 3 per cent wanted Ukraine to become a part of Russia; and 15 per cent favoured a bloc with the Western countries and Euro-Atlantic institutions.[8]

During the course of 1997, the number of supporters of cooperation with the West in general and with NATO in particular increased, while still remaining less than that of persons who put priority on cooperation with the CIS states.

The attitude of the Ukrainian population towards international financial assistance was of current significance, both for the development of the country's business contacts with international financial institutions, and also because foreign investment is urgently needed for the structural reshaping of the national economy.

The 1996 polls showed that, on the average, 60 per cent of respondents were, in general, in favour of Ukraine's receiving foreign financial assistance. It was interesting that an overwhelming majority of the supporters of such aid stipulated that it should be kept within 'reasonable limits'. This caution is understandable, if one takes into account the arguments of the opponents of Western assistance, who comprised almost one-third of the respondents.

The opponents of external financial aid thought that the danger for Ukraine lay in the fact that foreign credits and the like 'put Ukraine into a position of economic dependence on other states' (27 per cent) or 'was aimed at the imposition of other countries' political will upon Ukraine' (18 per cent). This perception was, however, largely due to inefficient use of this financial aid by Ukrainian government institutions.

Among the supporters of accepting financial assistance from the West, the view predominated that 'it was an elementary mutual assistance generally accepted in developed countries' and 'this was charitable assistance from a stronger partner to a weaker one'.

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[8] Yevhen Golovakha, Ilko Kucheriv, 'NATO and Public Opinion in Ukraine', *The Political Portrait of Ukraine*, no. 18, Kyiv, 1997, p. 112.

Among Western countries, the USA and Germany were mentioned most often as 'the main donors' (45 per cent and 40 per cent accordingly). One-fifth of respondents noted the importance of financial assistance from Canada where a numerous Ukrainian minority lives. France, the UK, Austria and Italy were the most rarely mentioned. It is also necessary to note that one-third of those polled found it difficult to answer this question.

The question 'Will 1997 be peaceful or less free from international conflicts, or an uneasy year with a great number of international confrontations, or the same as 1996?' was put to the participants of an international poll, conducted in November 1996 in a number of countries, under the patronage of Gallup International. In Ukraine, 17 per cent of respondents thought that a peaceful development of international relations in 1997 was quite possible, though a quarter of respondents were pessimistic about this. In comparison with the forecast for 1996, the disproportion between optimists and pessimists had somewhat decreased. In particular, 31 per cent of respondents had forecast that 1996 would be uneasy, while 15 per cent thought it would be peaceful and without conflicts.

Directions and State of Ukraine's Geopolitical Orientations: An Expert Evaluation

An interesting piece of comparative research into the current thinking in Ukraine on foreign and security policy was carried out by the Ukrainian Centre for Peace, Conversion and Conflict Resolution Studies during 1997. This research was based on opinion polls of experts professionally involved in issues and problems of foreign policy and national security. This study provided an excellent opportunity to compare the perceptions of public opinion with the views of the Ukrainian political élite and influential professional circles, functioning as advisors to government institutions.

The group of experts involved in these polls consisted of 40-45 specialists, representing the following four professional groups:

1. Officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and researchers from advisory bodies of government structures, such as the National Institute for Strategic Studies, the Institute of the World Economy and International Relations, etc. (11-12 experts).

2. Deputies of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, in particular, members of the parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs and CIS Relations, and the Committee on Defence and State Security. These represented the whole domestic political spectrum, including adherents of the right, centrist, and left ideological outlooks (10-12 experts).

3. Officers of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (of the rank of lieutenant-colonel and above), including professors and specialists of military colleges and research centres, most of whom had an academic degree. This group represented the attitudes of the professional military intellectual élite (10 experts).

4. Leading journalists who specialise in international issues and represent the most influential media organs. There are grounds to assume that these influence not only the formation of public opinion on the issues under consideration, but also the stance of the political establishments (8-10 experts).

The expert opinion polls were carried out in March, June and September 1997. The results indicated that there were four trends of thought:

a) Supporters of Ukraine's joining NATO.

b) Supporters of a neutral or non-aligned status.

c) Supporters of Ukraine's becoming a member of a CIS military-political bloc.

d) Supporters of Ukraine's becoming a NATO member, together with other CIS countries, however unrealistic.

This division into groups made it possible to observe gradual changes in the experts' attitude. At the same time, the invitation to certain leftists to join the experts (reflecting the membership of the aforesaid parliamentary committees) increased the range of attitudes.

The most recent expert evaluation of the foreign and security policy of Ukraine was carried out in September 1997. The experts polled consisted of 41 specialists, representing the four groups previously mentioned. More than 50 per cent of the experts had participated in the previous poll, in June.

Supporters of Ukraine's becoming a NATO member comprised 51.2 per cent of the experts polled; 36.6 per cent supported non-aligned or neutral status for Ukraine; supporters of Ukraine's joining a CIS military-political bloc comprised 7.3 per cent; and supporters of Ukraine's becoming a NATO member, together with other CIS countries – 4.9 per cent.

One must emphasise the conditional nature of the results of the expert poll, regarding an aligned (in the sense of joining NATO) or non-aligned status for Ukraine. One may even assume that there is no contradiction in principle between the supporters of the two dominant orientations – membership of NATO and non-aligned status.

The division of the experts into two dominant groups, the supporters of Ukraine's joining NATO (51.2 per cent) and non-aligned status (36.6 per cent), is of a somewhat conditional nature because most NATO supporters realise that Ukraine cannot apply to join the Alliance in the near future, i.e. within the next 1-3 years, while most of the experts seeking a non-aligned status for Ukraine realise that the state will hardly be able to conduct a classical policy of neutrality in the conditions of NATO's eastward enlargement and with states contiguous to Ukraine joining the Alliance. The increase in support for Ukraine's future membership of NATO among politicians and government officials reflects an understanding of the fact that Ukraine's non-aligned status has fulfilled its function of providing a way out of the sphere of exclusively Russian influence, preventing the transformation of the Tashkent Pact into a military bloc as a counterbalance to NATO. The supporters of Ukraine's becoming a NATO member regardless of other countries (47.6 per cent in March and 51.2 per cent in September) generally believe that the non-aligned status of Ukraine has reached the end of its functional resources and aims. They also assume that this status could, under certain circumstances, hinder Ukraine's further integration into the European and Euro-Atlantic community of nations.

On the other hand, supporters of Ukraine's officially maintaining a non-aligned international status saw this as providing state policy with the necessary space to manoeuvre. In this respect, up to mid-1997, the experts focused their main attention on the prevention of Russian attempts to drag Ukraine into a system of un-

equal military-political alliances and functional structures within the CIS. The forthcoming national parliamentary and subsequent presidential elections evoked other approaches and arguments for strengthening non-bloc status. This is ever more frequently treated as an instrument for preventing foreign states from increasing their legal intervention into the domestic affairs of Ukraine in support of the current government and administrative bureaucracy. It is important to stress a slow but steady increase in the supporters of non-aligned status (from 28.6 per cent to 36.6 per cent) at the expense of a decrease in the numbers giving priority to cooperation with the CIS (from 16.6 per cent in March to 12.2 per cent in September) or with no clear point of view.

Thus, a radical divergence in outlook was observed between the first two groups of experts (totalling 87.8 per cent of those polled) and the supporters of Ukraine's joining a military union of the CIS countries (7.3 per cent). The number of experts who reject the need to cooperate with NATO (4 experts) is of the same order as those who support Ukraine's joining a military union of the CIS states (2 experts). In comparison with previous expert polls, attitudes have not radically altered, although one may assume that the changes mentioned indicate a slight reorientation of the Kyiv foreign policy community and certain latent developments within its political consciousness.

The supporters of joining NATO formed the largest and most stable group in all three polls: 47.6 per cent in March, 46.3 per cent in June, and 51.2 per cent in September. The second largest group of supporters of a non-aligned or neutral Ukraine was likewise stable and even increased slowly to 36.6 per cent (28.6 per cent in March and 34.2 per cent in June 1997), as a result of more precise answers from some experts, who had preferred to propose their own variants in previous polls.

None of the views which gave priority to joint decision-making within the CIS reached 10 per cent. The 'participation of Ukraine in a CIS military union as an alternative to Ukraine's joining NATO' varied from 9.5 per cent in March to 7.3 per cent in June and September. Support for 'joining NATO together with the CIS states' varied from 7.1 per cent in March and June to 4.9 per cent in September 1997.

An important discriminant of the experts' attitudes was provided by their views on the state of external threats to Ukraine and its territorial integrity. Such threats 'really exist today', said 31.7 per cent of the experts (the same as in March). According to 43.9 per cent of respondents, there are no such threats at present but they could appear at any moment (50 per cent in March). Optimists considering that 'there is no threat at present and Ukraine has all the means necessary to prevent the appearance of such a threat' (which is also the main official task of Ukrainian diplomacy) comprised 9.8 per cent of experts (down to one-third of the June figure). Four experts said that a threat might develop in the future (timescale 1-2 or 3-5 years). This attitude may well have indicated dissatisfaction with the deep crisis in the Ukrainian economy and domestic political affairs, which made some respondents more concerned with how far the government could guarantee the stability and integrity of the state, rather than with any real external threat. The respondents were also dissatisfied with the level of security assurances stipulated in the Ukraine-NATO Charter.

The issue of changes in European security was of a somewhat tentative character for Ukrainian political thought, primarily due to the country's former permanent isolation from pan-European processes. During the 1990s, Ukrainian public opinion concentrated on predominantly domestic political and economic problems. On the other hand, it was generally perceived that European security as a whole is determined by the course of relations between Russia and NATO, and those between Russia and the candidates for entry into the Alliance. Therefore, from the point of view of the interests of NATO member-states and those of the Central-Eastern European states seeking NATO membership, the advancement of European security coincides with the task of consolidating the Alliance and strengthening its position as the basic military and political institution responsible for maintaining stability, and military and political security in Europe.

For current and prospective NATO members, these goals and interests may be considered fundamental. However, from the Central European point of view, the regulation of relations with Russia, and the defining of Russia's status and role in a new system of European international relations and security is an important, but by no means decisive, matter.

From the point of view of Ukrainian interests, however, it is relations between NATO and Russia which will have a decisive influence on the situation in this region of Eastern Europe and, to a considerable extent, on the formation of Ukrainian security policy, both at present and in the future.

Under such circumstances, it will be somewhat difficult to determine how far the interests of Ukraine and the NATO states will coincide as regards the strengthening of European security, until Ukraine's place in the new European security architecture, and the nature of the Ukrainian state structures' participation in collective decision-making on pan-European and regional security, has been clarified.

General Characteristics of Ukraine's Foreign Policy

The experts' evaluation of Ukraine's foreign policy as regards stability, deliberation and predictability has increased in comparison with both June and March (see Tables 1-3). One might consider that this contradicts the previous conclusion concerning the level of threat to the territorial integrity of Ukraine. We believe, however, that this reflected the relative stabilisation of foreign policy after the 'breakthrough' of spring and summer 1997.

Table 1. Stability[9]				
The proportion of experts, supporting the following view (per cent)				
	high	medium	low	zero
March	16.7	26.2	47.6	9.5
June	17.1	51.2	22.0	9.8
September	12.5	62.5 ·	17.5	7.5

[9] Monitoring Foreign and Security Policy. 1997: July, August, September (UCPCCRS, Kyiv, 1997), p. 57.

Table 2. Deliberation
The proportion of experts, supporting the following view (per cent)

	high	medium	low	zero
March	16.7	26.2	47.6	9.5
June	17.1	51.2	22.0	9.8
September	7.5	55.0	30.0	7.5

A trend of moderate but steady optimism was noticeable in estimations of the current state of international security both in Europe as a whole and in Ukraine. The majority of respondents felt it was improving (41.5 per cent), or that there was no change (41.5 per cent) and only 12 per cent thought that it was deteriorating. The situation was similar in the estimation of the state of Ukraine's external security: 27 per cent of experts considered that 'it was improving' (39 per cent in June); and 22 per cent stated that 'it was deteriorating' (27 per cent in June).

Responses to the question 'How far should Ukraine rely on its allies in pursuing foreign policy goals?' were as follows: high – 7 per cent, medium – 45 per cent, low – 35 per cent, zero – 13 per cent. These results have worsened compared to June. It seems the experts are of the opinion that Ukraine lacks reliable allies in this respect. On the issue of how far Ukraine is obliged to follow the lead of other states, the experts believe that Ukraine's dependence in this respect is high and increasing.

There were also certain changes in perceptions of the main trends in Ukraine's integration links:

Table 3. Predictability
The proportion of experts, supporting the following view (per cent)

	high	medium	low	zero
March	9.8	24.4	46.8	19.5
June	7.5	47.5	35.0	10.0
September	12.2	41.5	43.9	2.4

• integration processes in relations with 'the East', with Russia and other CIS countries, had become more intense than in March, but remained slow. This conclusion was due mainly to a lessening of changes leading to disintegration;
• integration in the Black Sea region had intensified slightly, but was still slow rather than medium;
• conversely, the development of the integrative contacts with the West had become slower than in the first half of 1997 and was continuing to decelerate.

It was considered that there had been positive changes as regards Ukraine's integration with Eastern-Central Europe, especially with the states of the Visegrad group.

In 1997, bilateral relations with other countries played a decisive role in the

improvement of Ukraine's international security position. Although the level of international guarantees to Ukraine's security was slowly rising, only 2.5 per cent of the experts considered that it was high (the same as in June); 20 per cent – medium (15 per cent in June); 71 per cent – low (the same as in June); 7 per cent – zero (13 per cent in June and 24 per cent in March).

It was also felt that there were no grounds for concluding that the adoption of the Ukraine-NATO Charter had meant 'a breakthrough' in this respect.

Although the extent to which Ukraine could rely on its own Armed Forces in its search for national security had stabilised, it remained dramatically low: 45 per cent of the experts believed that it was low, and 8 per cent – that it was zero. The same figures were reported by the March 1997 poll, while the June poll, conducted at a time of the Ukrainian 'foreign policy breakthrough', showed lower estimates of reliability of the Armed Forces as a guarantor of national security. Thus, political instruments of international relations and their institutional support within the state were recognised as the principal factors determining Ukraine's national security.

Bilateral Relations with Foreign Countries

The experts' assessment of which foreign countries were the principal partners of Ukraine showed an increased rating of relations with Russia and the other three most prominent actors – the USA, Germany and Poland, which played leading roles in Ukraine's foreign policy, and with which relations were regarded as the most important.

In September 1997, 90 per cent of experts considered that relations with the USA had become more important than those with Russia, which was mentioned by 78 per cent of respondents. Germany, which was mentioned as a priority partner by 80 per cent of respondents, came second, and Poland (mentioned by 50 per cent) was in fourth place. All other states were mentioned by a substantial minority of participants.

Respondents were also asked which countries' relations with Ukraine had developed most successfully and effectively. Poland occupied the first place (73 per cent of respondents) here, while the USA with 58 per cent had moved into second place, which in the June poll had gone to Russia.

Germany, Canada, Georgia and Azerbaijan occupied places four to seven respectively, with ratings only just over half those of Russia, which had moved into third place. Other states were mentioned by less than 3-13 per cent of the experts.

Analysis of such indicators as the status of Ukraine's bilateral relations with other states, the effectiveness of Ukrainian diplomacy in implementing its national interests, and the rating of the various countries and international organisations which can be considered as allies of Ukraine, allowed the following conclusions to be drawn.

In September 1997, survey ratings of the 'status of Ukraine's bilateral relations' rose considerably for most countries, with the exception of Russia and Romania, whereas the June 1997 poll had shown a serious decline in the ratings of Ukraine's relations with all countries except those two, which in mid-1997 were considered to be the most successful. The experts were once more asked to consider the Ukrainian-Russian Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership of 31

May 1997. They believed the following drawbacks of the Treaty to be the most important:

1) its declarative character – 60 per cent (42 per cent in June);

2) subordination of Ukraine's strategic interests to Russia – 30 per cent (30 per cent in June);

3) disparity between its priorities and the needs of Ukraine – 28 per cent (20 per cent in June).

This approach accords with the fact that 54 per cent of the experts believed the Treaty brought little benefits in bilateral relations and 20 per cent of them thought that it was fruitless. The experts' opinion was affected by the fact that the crisis in the Ukrainian-Russian trade relations continued after the conclusion of the Treaty. Sceptical attitudes towards Ukrainian-Russian reconciliation were also based on a number of statements and appeals which the State Duma of the Russian Federation passed in June-September, protesting against Ukraine-NATO cooperation. By November 1997, the parliaments of the two states had not even started the ratification procedures of the Treaty, although the speakers of both parliaments, Oleksander Moroz of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine and Gennadiy Seleznyov of the Russian State Duma, had agreed on 31 May in Kyiv to push forward simultaneous ratification of the Treaty in both parliaments.

The Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership between Ukraine and the Russian Federation and the agreements on the Black Sea Fleet have been widely discussed as regards their compliance with Ukraine's national interests. The Ukrainian-Russian Treaty, signed by Presidents Leonid Kuchma and Boris Yeltsin, was criticised for its declarative character and submission of Ukraine's strategic interests to Russia. Among the main shortcomings of the agreements on the Black Sea Fleet of 28 May 1997, different political groups most frequently mentioned the retention of a foreign military presence on the territory of Ukraine; the continuing presence of a potential threat to Ukraine's territorial integrity; and the fact that these agreements are incompatible with Ukraine's integration into European security structures.

The text of the Ukrainian-Russian Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership incorporated very few amendments, as a comparison with the initial draft of 12 August 1994 reveals. One may observe some ambiguities in Articles 4, 5, 6 and 7, which provide for 'greater effectiveness of regional security mechanisms', coordination, in case of necessity, of the parties' positions 'for the purpose of joint actions', and taking 'coordinated or joint measures' in situations which, in the opinion of one of the parties, breaches the peace or encroaches upon its national security.

After the signing of the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation, Article 6 of the Ukrainian-Russian Treaty, which provides for the parties' obligation to decline 'to participate in or support any actions against the other' party and 'not to conclude with third countries any treaty against the other party', cannot be interpreted as imposing constraints on Ukraine's cooperation with Euro-Atlantic security structures. On the other hand, Russian politicians will be able to regard these provisions as being

of an anti-Turkish character. In the case of a possible future crisis in relations between Russia and the US, the provisions of Article 6 of the Treaty cannot be automatically applied to Ukraine because the Treaty envisages a mechanism of consultations in every case (Article 7).

It is interesting that the Ukrainian-Russian Treaty contains no reference to 'strategic partnership', although the term figured largely in the political lexicon of bilateral relations throughout 1994–5. The Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation cannot therefore be regarded as an Act establishing Ukraine's political dependence on Russia. On the other hand, it appears to stipulate Ukraine's preserving a degree of neutrality in possible future conflicts involving Russia.

At the same time, we should note that the Treaty will enable the Ukrainian government to insist that Russia refrains from supporting separatist movements in Crimea and favouring other states' actions directed against Ukraine.

Overall, despite certain shortcomings of the May 1997 package of Ukrainian-Russian agreements, their implementation will provide a substantial reduction of conflict potential in bilateral relations. However, the prospects of this basic treaty being ratified by the State Duma of the Russian Federation seem the most problematic aspect of current relations between Ukraine and Russia. It is, likewise, doubtful that the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine will ratify the Treaty before the Russians do so.

Many experts expressed a general discontent with the three Ukrainian-Russian agreements on the Black Sea Fleet of 28 May 1997 and even with the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership. Their attitude reflected several specific features of current Ukrainian perceptions of foreign policy. This political culture grew up on the basis of two principal controversial components: remnants of the Soviet great-power ideas, and national anti-colonial aspirations.

The lingering effects of the great-power complex makes certain Ukrainians discontent with any agreements with Russia, even if these agreements seem objectively rather beneficial to Ukraine. It has frequently been argued that the Ukrainian-Russian agreements on division, on the terms and status of basing the Russian Black Sea Fleet on the territory of Ukraine, and on financial provisions related to the Russian naval base on the territory of Ukraine could have been concluded on similar terms back in 1994. But at that time Russia was making far bolder claims and imposing unrealistic conditions. In its turn, the 'anti-colonial syndrome' produces a superficial vulnerability in all aspects of relations between Ukraine and Russia, since from the national-patriotic point of view and in the opinion of a considerable part of the Ukrainian political élite, contemporary Russia is a successor of the Russian and Soviet empires, which were responsible for numerous tragedies in Ukraine's history.

Since the previous round of intergovernmental negotiations on bilateral relations between the two countries took place in 1993–4, the Russian leadership has had to put aside the stances and attributes of its imperial past in its foreign policy. Under these conditions, legalisation of the Russian Navy's long-term presence in Ukraine and a very low rent for the naval bases in Crimea began to be seen by Moscow as major achievements, not concessions. But preserving the Russian military presence in Ukraine, even on a restricted scale, effectively inhibits the inte-

gration of our state into Euro-Atlantic security structures and gives the Russian leadership a powerful lever for influencing Ukrainian domestic policy.

From the point of view of many members and supporters of national-democratic and national-patriotic movements and groupings in Ukraine, the signing of the package of Ukrainian-Russian agreements was premature. Official Kyiv, they consider, should have waited until circumstances were ripe for it to press for more advantageous terms regarding the Black Sea Fleet, up to its total withdrawal from the territory of Ukraine.

Furthermore, Ukrainian politicians are annoyed by the secret nature of the agreements on the Black Sea Fleet and the obstinate and deliberate unwillingness of the government to provide parliament with authentic copies of the documents.

The attitude of the presidential administration gives wide scope to the imagination, and has sparked allegations that the government has made secret concessions to Russia. It is interesting that the agreements on the Black Sea Fleet do not require ratification by the two parliaments concerned and come into effect on the date of signature, unlike the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership, which 'comes into effect on the date of the exchange of ratification instruments'.

In this context, it is frequently recalled that during the presidential elections of 1994 Kuchma was overtly supported by leading groups and the mass media in Russia and that before the current election campaign opened in Ukraine he had further and frequent contacts with the election think-tank of Boris Berezovskiy, the former Deputy Secretary of the Russian Security Council and now a financial magnate, and with public relations experts from the Russian NTV broadcasting company. Moreover, the signing of the agreements on the Black Sea Fleet, which are potential dynamite for any Ukrainian political career, was assigned to the prime ministers, while the two presidents signed only the high-profile but less controversial Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership.

Accordingly, national-democrats interpret the agreements on the Black Sea Fleet as a betrayal of Ukraine's interests and have called for them to be rejected during the ratification procedure in parliament. It was proposed to put pressure on the president in the following ways: threatening not to ratify the Ukrainian-Russian Treaty unless the agreements on the Black Sea Fleet were simultaneously submitted to parliament for ratification; submission of a bill on the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territory of Ukraine for the consideration of parliament (this bill was drawn up in November-December 1996, at which time President Kuchma promised to 'veto' such a law); launching proceedings to impeach the president, in order to annul the agreements on the long-term basing of the Russian Black Sea Fleet on the territory of Ukraine.

However, after concluding a series of politically and legally important agreements and treaties with neighbouring countries and the official signing of the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between NATO and Ukraine, the government was able to demonstrate, at least formally, Ukraine's 'even-handedness' towards both Russia and the West and its aim of a 'more balanced' policy and the effective protection of the national interests of the country. In particular, by November 1997, the tone of official statements and comments concerning the G-7's delay in

financing the project for the closure of the Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant and making the ruined No. 4 reactor ('the sarcophagus') environmentally safe had become perceptibly sharper.

According to the expert polls, over the period March–September 1997, there was a steady improvement in the rating of Ukraine's bilateral relations with Poland, the Baltic states (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia), Georgia, Moldova, Azerbaijan, China and Korea. In September, the average rating of Ukraine's bilateral relations (on a scale from 1 to 5) was greater than 3 for all states with only five exceptions – countries of Latin America (2.97), Belarus (2.83), France (2.82), states of the Asian and Pacific regions (2.70) and Russia (2.63).

The leading states – Poland, the Baltic republics, Canada, the USA and Georgia – received the highest ratings (over 4). Back in June 1997, however, only relations with Poland scored more than 4 (4.13), while Canada had scored 4.13 in March. The leading group remained constant, but there were some changes of the order of the states within it.

Poland was not only firmly recognised as one of the leading partners of Ukraine, but also strengthened its position. On the 5-point scale rating, it got the highest position in September – 4.27. Furthermore, 63.4 per cent of the experts also considered Poland to be Ukraine's ally. In this respect, Poland took over the place previously held by the USA, which in September had been named as an ally of Ukraine by only 41.5 per cent of the experts (in the June 1997 poll, the USA was identified as an ally of Ukraine by 63.2 per cent, and Poland – by 50 per cent; while in the March 1997 expert poll, the figures were: USA – 46.3 per cent, and Poland – 43.9 per cent). The success of Ukrainian diplomacy in developing good relations with Poland also received the highest rating (3.95 on the 5-point scale) of all the states and international organisations named in the survey.

The September 1997 poll also indicated a further strengthening of the position of the Baltic states as partners of Ukraine. They moved up into second place (after Poland) with a rating of 4.23 for the state of their relations with Ukraine, whereas in March they had ranked fourth with a score of 3.80. The effectiveness of Ukrainian diplomacy in this respect received a rating of 3.68, i.e. second place (after Poland).

The Baltic states were named as allies by 36.6 per cent of the experts. They are now back in third place (after Poland and the USA). This means that in September they not only recovered the place they held with 29.3 per cent in March (in June they fell to fourth place, after NATO, with 21.1 per cent), but also increased their rating.

In September, the third, fourth and fifth places were occupied respectively by Canada with 4.07 (fifth in June and first in March), the USA with 4.05 (third in June and in March) and Georgia with 4.05 (fifth in March and fourth in June).

The next six places were held as follows:

Sixth – by Germany (eighth in March, tenth in June), which had improved its position. Although the development of relations with Germany encountered some setbacks, the experts saw them as a high priority for Ukraine. The German dimension, which had a fairly low rating in June, considerably increased its importance in September. Germany's rating as an important ally almost doubled (24.4 per cent), in comparison with the June figure (13.2 per cent). In March, Germany was so identified by 19.5 per cent of the experts.

Seventh – Hungary (seventh in March, eighth in June).

Eighth and ninth – Azerbaijan (eighteenth in March, seventh in June) and Moldova (twelfth in March, sixth in June), which have constantly improved their ratings.

Tenth – the Czech Republic (eleventh in March and June).

Eleventh – Israel (sixth in March, ninth in June), a drop due to the improvement of the rating of other states, together with no major development of relations between Ukraine and Israel.

The identification of Poland as Ukraine's most steady partner and ally may be explained by the consistent support of the Polish government for Ukraine's interests in international organisations, including European institutions. The obvious coincidence of Ukrainian and Polish interests in matters of European security promoted cooperation between the two states.

Views of the USA as an ally depended on expectations of its support for Ukraine's interests in relations with Russia and development of Ukraine-NATO relations. At the same time, some doubts have arisen about Washington's discriminatory attitude towards the military-industrial complex of Ukraine. The level and intensity of the 'strategic partnership' between Ukraine and the USA depends, to a considerable degree, on the personal relationship between the governments of the two states.

A highly critical article by the popular journalist Volodymyr Skachko, entitled 'Dream gives rise to Indignation and Weakness, or Politics in Ukraine smells of Gas and Dirty Money', addressed the links between foreign policy, the economic independence of Ukraine and the processes of building up national capital. The author believes that it is ex-Prime Minister Pavlo Lazarenko, rather than President Leonid Kuchma, who is the genuine representative of national capital, saying that the President has displayed an excessive dependence on external financial assistance. If one believes the Russian newspaper *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, in 1994, Russia provided Kuchma with one hundred million dollars US through the Balkar Trading firm at the request of and for the presidential election campaign. However, in 1997, Kuchma has been seeking similar support from the United States. The plan of Shell International Gas Ltd. to purchase 49 per cent of the shares belonging to the state-owned Ukrainian stock company Ukrgazprom for the relatively modest sum of $1 ($1.5 billion US) may be explained by this. Thus, the closeness of Shell to the US Democratic administration could guarantee Kuchma the political support he needs in exchange for the sale of Ukrainian gas trunk pipelines to American companies, which would thus end the financial independence of the state, while guaranteeing Kuchma the financial support from American corporations which he needs to win the forthcoming presidential elections.[10]

Intensity and Possible Directions of Ukraine-NATO Cooperation

In September 1997, when asked 'what states or international organisations are Ukraine's principal allies', only 26.8 per cent of the experts mentioned NATO (almost the same as the March result of 24.4 per cent). This is only a third of the

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[10] Volodymyr Skachko, 'Dream Gives Rise to Indignation and Weakness, or Politics in Ukraine Smells of Gas and Dirty Money', *Zerkalo nedeli*, 26 July 1997.

figure for Poland (63.4 per cent). In June 1997, before the signing of the NATO-Ukraine Charter, the NATO rating as an ally was twice the latest figure (47.7 per cent). As regards its role in Ukraine-NATO relations, Ukrainian diplomacy was rated lower in September (3.46 according to the 5-point scale) than in June (3.60), although much higher than the March figure of 2.95.

The experts' view of the capacity of the Ukraine-NATO Charter (signed in Madrid on July 9) to ensure Ukraine's national interests is as follows: high – only 5.1 per cent, medium – 51.3 per cent, low – 33.3 per cent, zero – 10.3 per cent.

Among the main defects of the Charter, the experts named the 'absence of effective guarantees of Ukraine's security on the part of NATO' – 58.5 per cent, 'insufficient assurance of Ukraine's integration into European security structures' – 39.0 per cent, and 'declarative nature' – 34.1 per cent. At the same time, Ukraine's 'westward' integration process (NATO, the EU and other European institutions) has slowed down in comparison with June. The development of Ukraine's relations with the EU made the least progress of all the European and Euro-Atlantic institutions. This was shown by the Ukraine-EU summit held on 5 September in Kyiv.

Ukrainian political discussion on priorities in cooperation with NATO gives the impression of being rather naive. In particular, the excessive expectations of obtaining additional security guarantees from NATO has been a permanent myth in Ukrainian political thought. The emergence of this myth was associated with Ukraine's commitment to nuclear disarmament, which the Ukrainian authorities proclaimed in December 1991 and May 1992. Later, however, especially since 1993, the Ukrainian political leadership demanded additional external security guarantees for Ukraine from the permanent members of the UN Security Council, the USA and the G-7 states.

According to present NATO policy, however, the granting to Ukraine of adequate security guarantees seemed unrealistic. This would be possible only if it were to be fully admitted to the Alliance (under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, 1949). A special arrangement in the form of 'associate membership' of NATO was not a practical possibility, since this would require certain amendments to the Washington Treaty, which would erode the monolithic collective defence nature of the Alliance. Neither did this correspond to the interests of the USA.

Such arrangements, incidentally, do not apply to the idea of partial membership, for example, the participation in NATO's political institutions only, as was envisaged for France in 1966–96 and for Spain during the 1980s.

Thus, Ukrainian political thought indicated a striving towards establishing a new form of relations with NATO by an agreement on a 'distinctive' or, as the Ukrainian authorities officially term it, a 'special partnership'. Such a relationship was considered to be capable of formulating the Alliance's obligations to provide external assistance to Ukraine in the case of threats and challenges to its security from other states. We should note that this was the stance of the Ukrainian government, which knew that it was laying itself open to criticism if the agreement with NATO failed to contain any clear commitment by the latter to guarantee Ukraine such assistance.

At the same time, the emphasis placed by many experts on the need to create the prerequisites for Ukraine to join NATO in the future indicated their vision of

NATO as a pan-European and Euro-Atlantic organisation, participation in which would be necessary and inevitable for any state wishing to be part of the European integration process.

Many experts wanted the Ukraine-NATO document to contain a provision banning the deployment of nuclear weapons on the territory of the countries which will become members of NATO over the next few years. This seemed a rather specific but motivated reservation. On the one hand, it was a controversial demand from the point of view of the interests of Ukraine if it wishes to join NATO in the future. On the other, it may be explained by an unwillingness to have Moscow provoked by the siting of nuclear weapons in Central-Eastern Europe as a deterrent against Russia.

However, the anti-nuclear intentions of Ukrainian diplomatic circles and the political community were caused by dissatisfaction with the circumstances and consequences of nuclear disarmament, which has brought Ukraine neither the security guarantees expected by élite and rank-and-file public opinion, nor adequate financial assistance, and which was, moreover, accompanied by unprecedented pressure and open humiliation at the hands of both Russia and the West.

The present stage of relations between Ukraine and NATO bears clear signs of a transition period, which prevents the Ukrainian political élite from giving unambiguous answers to questions related to such issues as the changing European security architecture, international security guarantees for Ukraine, and the coincidence of Ukrainian national interests with those of the USA, the leading countries of Western Europe, etc.

The uncertainty of the experts' evaluations of the prospects and parameters of cooperation between Ukraine and NATO was, to a considerable extent, a result of the vagueness of official statements about the goals pursued in the negotiations on 'distinctive partnership' relations with NATO. These talks went on, with several breaks, from autumn 1996 to May 1997. On 28 August, after a meeting in Crimea with Russian Defence Minister Igor Sergeyev, President Kuchma declared that Ukraine will remain a non-aligned state and has no intention of joining either the Tashkent Pact or NATO. At the same time, the President noted that enhanced cooperation with NATO must not be ruled out.

In his numerous interviews and declarations, Ukrainian Minister of Foreign Affairs Hennadiy Udovenko also made a number of controversial remarks. His assurances that the Ukrainian government was not seeking to join NATO and that its non-aligned status would remain the keystone of Ukrainian foreign policy strategy contradicted, to a certain extent, his suggestions that Ukraine's future will not necessarily be a non-aligned one, and that the Constitution does not bar Ukraine from joining military alliances.

Up to autumn 1997, the Ukrainian government seemed to be basing its relations with NATO on 'possibilism', bargaining during long-term negotiations and consultations with NATO officials for maximum concessions, including a formal promise to regard Ukraine as a potential candidate for membership of the Alliance.

On the other hand, Russia's stance regarding the further development of contacts and cooperation between NATO and Ukraine remains negative. Although there was a certain softening of Russian official rhetoric after the Helsinki summit

meeting of Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin on 21 March 1997, this did not imply that Russia was about to modify its resistance to the expansion of relations between Ukraine and NATO, nor to agree with the strengthening of NATO's military presence in Eastern Europe. Hence, it was exceptionally important for Ukraine to acquire and provide ways of influencing the NATO decision-making process concerning Eastern Europe and its current policy of eastward expansion. This also presumed an urgent need for more realistic approaches to NATO policy tasks, which at that stage included both preparations to expand the number of member-states and to increase its sphere of control. This also explained NATO's cautious approach towards Russia, which, in the case of a successful NATO enlargement, would have to accept the new geopolitical realities and recognise NATO's superior responsibility in Central-Eastern Europe.

The September 1997 survey indicated major disillusionment among the experts as regards Ukraine-NATO relations. Nevertheless, supporters of Ukraine's joining NATO were still in the majority and did not change their views, even though they were dissatisfied with recent events in relations with the Alliance and considered the Ukraine-NATO Charter to have disappointed their earlier expectations.

The Ukrainian government was also dissatisfied with the course of Ukraine-NATO cooperation, but for different reasons. In particular, top government officials saw that the administrative bureaucracy was proving incapable of implementing the practical measures envisaged by the Ukraine-NATO Charter and individual PfP programme. The Secretary of the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine, Volodymyr Horbulin, mentioned these drawbacks at the first session of the State Interdepartmental Commission on Ukraine-NATO Cooperation, held on 2 October 1997 in Kyiv.[11]

Horbulin stated here that practical cooperation between Ukraine and NATO, including military cooperation, was unsatisfactory. The only solution, he said, is a radical increase in the responsibility of government bodies and officials regarding the individual partnership programme and the tasks laid down by the President aimed at developing Ukraine-NATO cooperation. A number of sections of the Ukraine-NATO cooperation programme are, he claimed, not being implemented; in particular, Ukraine had failed to implement all 20 points of compatibility, envisaged by the Partnership for Peace programme.

The session voted to develop a State Programme of Ukraine-NATO Cooperation in 1998–9, which the Commission would implement as a matter of top priority.

Following the meeting, First Deputy Foreign Minister Anton Buteyko told a briefing that the 1998 budget was expected to earmark special financing for the State Programme of Ukraine-NATO Cooperation in 1998–9.

The experts defined several groups among the main 'supporters of integration with the West, up to and including membership of NATO':

• the right-wing fractions of the Verkhovna Rada (according to 82-87 per cent of the experts);

• the leaders of financial and banking institutions (March – 66.7 per cent, June – 33.3 per cent, September – 47.5 per cent);

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[11] *Uryadovyi kuryer,* 4 October 1997.

   • centrists in the Verkhovna Rada (30.8-40.5 per cent) and middle-level businessmen (30.8-35.0 per cent);
   • generals and senior officials of the Armed Forces (March – 16.7 per cent, June – 28.2 per cent, September – 25.0 per cent);
   • other groups, such as the armaments industry, officers of the Armed Forces and academics made a negligible showing (2-10 per cent of the experts).

Among Ukraine's priorities in cooperation with NATO the experts designated, first of all, additional security guarantees for Ukraine (47.5 per cent), and the creation of prerequisites for Ukraine's possible accession to NATO (40.0 per cent). The importance of these is, however, decreasing, as, too, is the need for NATO's direct assistance in carrying out military reform in Ukraine (fourth place with 30.5 per cent). However, 'the need to bring political orientations into conformity in the context of NATO's eastward enlargement' is constantly increasing in importance. In September, it moved up into third place, with 27.5 per cent (June – 15.5 per cent, March – 16.7 per cent). The figures for the importance in Ukraine-NATO relations of 'participation in peacekeeping operations' (September – 27.5 per cent, June – 15.0 per cent, March – 16.7 per cent) and 'arms, equipment and military-technical service trade' (September – 22.5 per cent, June – 15.0 per cent, March – 11.9 per cent) have gone up steadily and now occupy fifth and seventh places respectively. Sixth and eighth places are held by 'joint development of concepts of military policy' – 25 per cent (26-27 per cent in June and March), and 'adjustment of military-technical policy, support of the Military-Industrial Complex' – 20.0 per cent (June – sixth place, with 22.5 per cent, March – ninth, with 14.3 per cent). Thus, the importance of these indicators has not changed since June. Trends in the experts' evaluations of other directions of Ukraine-NATO cooperation, including staff training, joint exercises and the view that 'there are no such directions, Ukraine does not need cooperation with NATO', merit no further discussion, since there were only minor changes in their ratings (less than 15 per cent).

Internal Factors of Ukraine's National Security Policy

None of the experts rated the efficiency of the parliamentary Committee for Defence and State Security as high; in September, 35 per cent of them considered it to be medium (June – 24 per cent), 54 per cent – low (June – 51 per cent), 11 per cent – zero (June – 24 per cent). We can see a certain improvement in the rating of this Committee. The same trend can be seen in the rating of the efficiency of the Committee for Foreign Affairs and Links with the CIS. According to the experts, the level of the military's support for state policy is growing: 33 per cent of those polled believe it is moderate (June – 33 per cent), 61 per cent – low (June – 53 per cent), 6 per cent – zero (June 14 per cent).

The pace of Ukraine's integration with Russia and the CIS is considered to be higher. Ten per cent of the experts believe it is intensive (March and June – 0 per cent), 40 per cent – medium or low, 50 per cent – zero or negative (June – 61 per cent, March – 76 per cent). The prospects of establishing efficient civilian control over the Armed Forces, as well as preconditions for overcoming the crisis in the military-industrial complex, have improved slightly.

The Ministry of Defence of Ukraine submitted a draft Programme of Development of Arms and Military Equipment for consideration by the president and government. The draft envisages modernisation of existing arms by Ukrainian, CIS and Western enterprises. Only 30-40 per cent of the 500 types of arms with which the Ukrainian Army is currently equipped satisfy modern standards. Ukraine's Defence Minister Oleksander Kuzmuk has announced that the Armed Forces will be equipped with new tanks in 1998, but this seems unlikely to be carried out. According to the experts, the Ukrainian Air Force, Navy and electronic defence systems are all urgently in need of re-equipment.

Sixty-four per cent of the experts believed that the defence capacity (combat readiness) of the Armed Forces of Ukraine continued to decline (86 per cent in March). Twenty-four per cent of them considered that it had not changed (10 per cent in March). One cannot be very optimistic about this trend. Such views had clearly been readjusted in the light of what happened with the previous, 1996, defence budget. A sum of 661.3 million Ukrainian hryvnas (UAH) was earmarked in the budget for servicemen's wages in 1996, but only UAH 601.3 million were actually paid out. Funding for special fuel purchases was stipulated as UAH 394.3 million (UAH 13.8 million were actually made available); for food supplies – UAH 236.5 million (UAH 211.0 million actually paid); UAH 184.0 million were specified for the purchase of new arms and military equipment (UAH 36.8 million actually paid); and UAH 10.6 million for the military medical services (UAH 6.3 million actually spent).

At the same time, the passing of the Law 'On the 1997 State Budget' may somewhat retard the rate of decline of the Armed Forces by allocating the minimum available resources for the Army's needs. According to a supplement to that law, dated 27 June 1997, the sum of UAH 1,472 million was allocated to national defence. This included: UAH 1,225 million for the maintenance of the Armed Forces; UAH 195 million for purchases of arms and military equipment; UAH 30 million for armaments' research and development; UAH 22.24 million for conscript training; UAH 10 million for dismantling strategic nuclear weapons. A sum of UAH 55.7 million was allotted for civil defence and emergency work by the Ministry of Emergency Situations and Protection of People from the Aftermath of the Chornobyl Disaster. As a comparison, we may note that around UAH 1,700 million were allocated to the Security Service, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and other internal military units. The latter comprised: UAH 216 million – for the Security Service; UAH 680 million – for the militia (police); UAH 75.22 million – for the troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs; UAH 240.33 million – for the criminal penitentiary system (prisons); UAH 169.24 million – for the Border Guard; UAH 65 million – for the National Guard; UAH 73.8 million – for the Government Communication Department of the Security Service of Ukraine; UAH 20 million – for the State Security Department; UAH 502,000 – for the General Presidential Military Inspectorate; UAH 75.017 million – for the customs authorities; and UAH 85 million – for the prosecution service.

The allocations for the 1997 defence programmes cover only 36 per cent of the minimum needs. In September 1997, a government draft of the budget for 1998

increased defence expenditure to UAH 1.5 billion. Parliament also voted to pay off the back wages owed by the Ministry of Defence to servicemen (some UAH 172 million).[12]

Conclusion

It is evident that the 1997 foreign policy developments, which were officially termed 'a breakthrough', had, in fact, no major influence on Ukrainian political thought.

According to political commentators, despite the importance of the 'breakthrough' of Ukrainian diplomacy in May and June 1997, its role should not be exaggerated, firstly, because the comparative normalisation in relations with Russia and Romania was, to a considerable extent, due to transformations, trends and determinants at the European macro-level, and, secondly, because this normalisation may seem much over-due, in view of the great economic losses to Ukraine as a result of long-lasting tensions in relations with Russia. Thirdly, the 'détente' in Ukrainian-Russian relations may prove to be short-lived due to a lack of lasting changes in bilateral economic relations, the presence in both countries of sizeable political groups with a vested interest in fanning mutual controversy, and Ukraine's ever-increasing dependence on Western financial aid.

The package of agreements concluded by Ukraine in May-June 1997, to a considerable extent, completed the process of adaptation to its new role in European and World politics as a state of moderate size and limited potential (leaving out certain tentative prospects, which might in theory be realised under favourable internal and external conditions in the distant future).

One could also observe a steady approach of Ukraine's ruling administrative and political élite towards cooperation with NATO.

On the other hand, Russia's attitude towards closer cooperation between NATO and Ukraine remained clearly negative.

The launch of the 1998 parliamentary election campaign revealed growing differences between the official domestic and foreign policy course of the government and various proposals of the opposition, not only the Communists and other leftist groups, including the Socialist and Agrarian Parties, but also by some centrist parties, including ex-Prime Minister Pavlo Lazarenko's Hromada (Community) Party and the United Social Democratic Party, headed by ex-Prime Minister Yevhen Marchuk.

The realities of today's Ukraine have focused attention on the growing gap between the vanguard and pro-European foreign policy of the administration and its ineffective domestic policy. Under these circumstances, it is possible to envisage two possible scenarios for the further development of the country.

The first would be a victory of the centrist opposition forces in the forthcoming parliamentary elections and the establishment of a responsible coalition government. Such a coalition would take a number of necessary decisions for economic

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[12] *Narodna Armiya*, 27 June 1997; Victor Luhovyk, 'Parliament nixes 1998 budget proposal', *The Kiev Post*, 16 October 1997.

recovery, normalisation of trade with Russia and promotion of Ukraine's participation in European integration. In this case, the price of recovery from economic depression would be substantially reduced. Ukraine would, as a result, have a chance to preserve and develop democratic institutions and maintain a relatively high standard of living for the majority of the population.

The second option would be a Constitutional coup d'état undertaken by the ruling state bureaucracy as happened in Belarus. In this case, an authoritarian regime of a 'Eurasian' type would be introduced, and Ukraine would become an unstable and depressed country on the periphery of Europe.   ❏

FOR ALL UKRAINIAN STUDIES RESEARCHERS

The British Association of Ukrainian Studies web site is now up and running. It is located at http://www.bvx.ca/baus/

The site currently includes the following features:

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• Information for Ukrainians wishing to study in the UK
• Information on reading Cyrillic over the Internet
• Register of private accommodation in Ukraine for researchers

It would be helpful if you would send the following biographical information to us:

1. Full name and postal address
2. Brief c.v.
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Paul Pirie & Roman Zyla
BAUS

Ukraine Returns to Europe

Vasyl Kremen

Six years ago, on 1 December 1991, the citizens of Ukraine made their choice, which can be expressed in one word: independence. We voted for self-responsibility, freedom and the revival of Ukraine as a European and world nation.

The re-emergence of Ukraine on the political map occurred during the period of transition from the Cold War and inter-bloc confrontation to the establishment of a new world order and the creation of a new European security architecture. It is the multidimensional nature of this process, with all its contradictions, which determines the formation of Ukraine's internal and foreign policy.

Ukraine, being a large European state and a natural component of the Central and Eastern European region, aims at overcoming prolonged artificial alienation from other nations of the continent. We perceive this as an illustration of historical justice, and as a return to our historic, cultural heritage.

The strategic goal of our country is integration into the European and Euro-Atlantic structures and we hope to find understanding for our intention to institutionalise relations with the European Union and the Western European Union, to deepen our partnership with NATO and to be active in shaping a new European security architecture.

However, for us this is not only a moment of truth but a well-thought-out pragmatic decision. We are taking into account the economic advantages of integration into Europe. At the same time we regard cooperation with the EU, the WEU and NATO as a priority component of Ukraine's national security. With our sensitive geopolitical situation it is a very important factor for our state. To carry out a radical economic transformation, with a stable and democratic development of society, while being involved in European integration processes is possible only with a strong and steady foundation.

The principal course of Ukrainian foreign policy is the deepening of Ukraine's relations with the European Union. We believe that the process of enactment of the Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation between Ukraine and the EU is nearly completed, bringing to the forefront the various issues relating to the comprehensive implementation of its provisions. In particular, it is very important to initiate joint work on the establishment of administrative structures to be responsible for specific areas of relations between Ukraine and the EU. This will include setting up a Council on Cooperation (in accordance with Article 85 of the Agreement) and a Committee on Parliamentary Cooperation (in accordance with Article 90 of the Agreement). A top priority in the relations between Ukraine and the EU is the creation of a free-trade zone between Ukraine and the EU. Since the formal start of negotiations on concluding the trade agreement coincides with Britain's presidency of the EU,

Ukraine is hoping for Britain's support for an early beginning of consultations on the subject and during the course of further negotiations.

Ukraine is keen to participate at the current stage in the on-going dialogue between the EU and its associate members.

We should like the EU to involve Ukraine more broadly in its multilateral relations. For example, we hope to be invited (with observer or special guest status) to the Europe-Asia summit to be held in London next April.

In line with the strategic goal of its foreign policy, Ukraine is interested in institutionalising its relations with the Western European Union at a level of an associate partner.

The development of regional cooperation is also an important stabilising factor. Ukraine, which considers its future membership of the European Union as a vital priority, is paying great attention to the deepening of relations with neighbouring states of Central and Eastern Europe. We are sure that the development of cooperation and mutually beneficial partnership relations between our states will promote regional stability and security, and the unity of the continent, and will increase our chances for fully-fledged integration in Europe. Ukraine has become a full member of the Central European Initiative. We consider this to be the beginning of the development of large-scale regional cooperation. We are interested in moving further, in particular we are seeking accession to the Central European Free Trade Agreement.

We realise that there are objective differences in the pace of economic and political integration of Central and Eastern European countries into the European and Euro-Atlantic structures. But we are confident that with enough political will it is possible to reach mutually acceptable agreements, envisaging the participation of these states in the basic structures of the EU, NATO and the WEU at different levels.

Ukraine has consistently conducted and is determined to continue a policy directed at strengthening security and stability in the whole world.

May I recall that last year we removed the last nuclear warhead from our territory, becoming the first country in history to change from being a nuclear state to a non-nuclear one. By so doing, Ukraine has demonstrated its own good will and also real possibility of nuclear disarmament as such, and has made a substantial contribution to the realisation of the ideal: 'A 21st century world without nuclear weapons'.

Events in Europe after since the Cold War have shown all too clearly that henceforth threats to the security of the continent will arise not from confrontations between military-political blocs, but rather from regional and local conflicts. A good example of this is the series of recent tragedies in the Balkans, Transdnistria, the Caucasus, etc. At the same time, discussions on the future of European security have so far been focused mainly on the issues of NATO and European Union enlargement, the role of the OSCE, etc. While we have no intention of denying the importance of these problems, we are certain that pan-European stability is impossible without strengthening regional security and without establishing mutually beneficial and good-neighbourly relations between individual nations. It is in this direction that the European countries, and in particular those of the Central and Eastern European region to which Ukraine belongs, should exert their best efforts. It was

for this very reason that we proposed to hold in Ukraine in 1999 a summit meeting of the Baltic and Black Sea states.

It is generally acknowledged that the future of the European security architecture, as an important component of global security, should be based upon principles of comprehensiveness, indivisibility and partnership and, in the long run, on collective rather than unilateral actions. It is in this context that Ukraine is developing its active cooperation with European and transatlantic structures.

Independent Ukraine is very young. Nevertheless, in six creative years of our sovereignty, the fulfilment of all the international obligations which we have voluntarily assumed, including those in the field of nuclear disarmament, have demonstrated our responsible attitude towards maintaining stability and providing security not only in the Central and Eastern European area, but in all of Europe.

Ukraine stands for a broad approach to European security, covering not only the military aspects but also political, ethnic, economic and ecological aspects as well. Furthermore, it supports the development of democratic processes in the region and the establishment of mutually beneficial friendly relations among the states. A necessary element in this new security is a collective capability to resist new challenges and threats, namely the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, drug-trafficking, international terrorism, organised crime and illegal migration. Since the end of the Cold War and the disappearance of the 'iron curtain', these negative phenomena have acquired a transcontinental nature. Ukraine recognises the indivisibility and comprehensive nature of European security, and accordingly this principle lies at the root of its policy in this field.

Ukraine views its own security in the context of pan-European and Euro-Atlantic security, and is interested in active participation in developing a new security architecture in the region. This is now one of our foremost foreign policy priorities. In our opinion, there should be a new system, based on the interaction of all existing institutions, in particular the OSCE, the EU, NATO, the WEU and the Council of Europe.

Today NATO is the most effective security structure of the Euro-Atlantic region, uniting stable, economically developed democracies, having prospects of becoming the core of a future pan-European security system. This is demonstrated by the Alliance's programme of developing relations with all interested countries of the region, both within the framework of a multinational NACC-PfP process and on a bilateral basis.

We highly appreciate the understanding and cooperative spirit which exists now between NATO and Ukraine. We feel that the Alliance understands and respects the stance and the role of Ukraine in European politics, as well as the difficulties currently existing in our national defence. Among the latest important events I would like to single out the signing in Madrid of the Charter on Special Partnership between Ukraine and NATO. The establishment of relations of special partnership with the Alliance has substantially strengthened confidence in Europe and has become one of the important elements in establishing a new European security system.

We consider NATO's evolution as one of the elements in the broad context of the European integration process and the development of a new European secu-

rity architecture. The process of enlargement cannot be separated or isolated from other integration processes taking place in Europe. At the same time, it cannot replace the relevant processes which could finally result in the creation of a flexible integral pan-European security architecture, guaranteeing the security and stability of all interested states in the region.

The last NATO summit confirmed the decision of the Alliance to enlarge eastwards. At the same time, this meeting became decisive for beginning the process of the practical formation of the European security and defence identity. Therefore, we understand the desire of Central-Eastern European countries to join the Alliance. To determine one's own national security policy and to decide on membership in military and political structures is, undoubtedly, the inalienable right of every state.

We are convinced that NATO enlargement should become an open, evolutionary process, accompanied by the development of international cooperation in the field of security with all the interested countries of the region, including non-applicants.

The partnership relations of Ukraine and Russia with NATO form a key point in this context. We are convinced that the expansion of NATO cooperation with Ukraine, which is the largest European country, and is of major strategic importance for European security and stability, will become an essential stabilising factor on the continent.

We welcomed the decision of NATO member-states on the deepening of cooperation in the field of security with partner-states, in particular through their participation in the Combined Joint Task Forces. We accept this as a development of the successful practical collaboration with NATO in the field of security, which began in Bosnia-Herzegovina during the IFOR operation. We are convinced that this widening of NATO's scope of activity to include collective and cooperative security manifests the Alliance's ability to adapt to present-day realities.

During enlargement, the inherent security interests of all states in the region, including nonapplicants, especially Ukraine, should be properly taken into account. This is one of the main conditions for the stability of the region. Nondeployment of weapons of mass destruction on the territory of the new members of the Alliance is of particular importance for Ukraine, which has voluntarily renounced nuclear weapons and recently removed the last nuclear warheads from its territory. For this reason, we have put forward the idea of establishing a 'nuclear-free zone' in Central and Eastern Europe. We are convinced that this can soften the impact of NATO enlargement on the situation within the region, and reduce the probable increase of distrust and competition between applicant and non-applicant states.

The establishment of a nuclear-free zone in Central and Eastern Europe would entirely be in accordance with the general trend towards reducing the level of nuclear confrontation. This could be one of the most positive achievements in international relations of the post-Cold War period. It corresponds both to NATO's policy of reducing its nuclear presence in Europe and its assertions that there is no need, from the point of view of defence, to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new member-states.

The geopolitical position of Ukraine requires reasonable, consistent and balanced relations with both the West and the East in economic and political matters. In this context, relations between Ukraine and Russia are of particular importance, and we consider them the most sensitive component of our national interests. Clearly, relations between our two countries go far beyond the framework of the CIS, of which we both are members, and even beyond the framework of European issues. Many serious politicians world-wide believe that these relations have a crucial impact on European and even global policy. Such views exist in Moscow (although they are not dominant there), and are shared in Kyiv and in the capitals of the world's leading powers. We may accept it with little fear of its being an exaggeration. Ukraine's current relations with Russia may be characterised as a succession of ups and downs. We believe that after the long-awaited visit of the President of Russia to Ukraine and the signing of the basic political treaty our two nations have a unique chance to advance our bilateral relationship to a stable, good-neighbourly partnership. The resolution of the problem of the division of the Black Sea Fleet has contributed to the enhancement of security in the Black Sea region, as well as on the European continent as a whole.

Of no less significance is the contribution of our country to radical positive changes in the region of Central and Eastern Europe, which stipulate creation of favourable conditions for a new, more stable and secure geopolitical situation on the continent as a whole.

Ukraine's conclusion of the basic political treaties with the Russian Federation and Romania, as well as of the agreement on state borders with the Republic of Belarus (the first such in the history of the newly independent states) were important steps in this direction.

The signing of the Joint Statement by the Presidents of Ukraine and Poland on Reconciliation and Unity was of exceptional significance for the improvement of the situation in Central and Eastern Europe. We regard this document as an example of a balanced and unbiased approach to the evaluation of complicated pages of history, and a deliverance from the burden of the past for the sake of developing a mutually beneficial cooperation now and in the future.

I should like to stress that Ukraine's relations with its Western partners, including the USA, UK and Germany are of the top priority. We are extremely grateful to all these nations for assisting us so actively in maintaining reforms.

But our country, which is so vital for global stability, needs help to maintain its internal stability, which is threatened permanently by economic crisis. Of course, Ukraine is among the biggest recipients of American aid. The United Kingdom and other countries are also providing help. But all this is still not enough, it is less than the economy of a big country like Ukraine needs and is able to absorb. I mean economic aid in the form of investments, technologies and know-how. The prosperous Ukraine which would emerge as a result of such concerted efforts, a country which could enter the next millennium as an equal member of the international community, would be a tremendous asset to global stability.

We must remember, too, the equal right of the present and future generations to a viable environment. It is our common obligation to join our efforts for the

sake of survival and the development of human civilisation. This was the essence of Ukraine's proposal to draw up, in the future, an international legal document to serve as a reliable legal basis for safe and sustainable development world-wide.

For Ukraine, environmental problems are not just a matter of abstract theory. The Chornobyl nuclear power plant accident has become a real national tragedy for my country. Every year, up to 15 per cent of the state budget is spent on reimbursing the losses caused by it and ensuring the social security payments to those affected by it.

Ukraine undertook a political commitment to decommission the Chornobyl nuclear power station by the end of the current millennium and is consistently taking measures to fulfil this obligation. We expect that other countries will also meet their commitments in this regard.

At the same time, the problem of Chornobyl cannot be limited only to the decommissioning of the nuclear power plant. This accident brought about a number of problems of a global nature which even the most developed nations would be hard put to solve alone.

Chornobyl today is not the problem of Ukraine only. While paying tribute to the effects of the world community in general and Europe in particular towards eliminating the consequences of the Chornobyl accident, I should like to emphasise that the overall solution to this global problem is simply impossible without large-scale international assistance.

In conclusion, I should like to mention once more that as step by step it overcomes its hardships and problems, our nation is eager to play a larger role in the creation of a new spirit of stability and prosperity in Europe, as well as in the whole Western Hemisphere. Ukraine is returning to Europe as a reliable partner, able to contribute to the crystallisation of a New Europe.   ❏

Relations between Ukraine and Romania in the Context of NATO Enlargement

Roman Wolczuk

Right up to the signing of the Treaty on Good-Neighbourly Relations and Cooperation in June 1997 (hereafter referred to as the Friendship Treaty), relations between Ukraine and Romania were soured by a territorial dispute. The issue concerned the formerly Romanian territories of Bukovyna, Bessarabia, Hertza and Serpent's Island, which were occupied by Soviet forces during or soon after the Second World War, and as a result formed a constituent part of post-Soviet Ukraine. From the first days of Ukrainian independence, Romania began to challenge Ukraine's right to these lands. While the issue was a substantial stumbling block in the way of the signing of the said Friendship Treaty between the two states, they were driven by competing objectives towards the final resolution of the dispute. Ukraine was primarily interested in the affirmation of its borders and consolidation of its fragile territorial integrity. Romania, on the other hand, was mesmerised by the prize of NATO membership, even at the cost of renouncing any territorial claims against its neighbours. This article traces the evolution of relations between the two states in the context of NATO enlargement. In doing so, it aims to demonstrate that recent relations between Ukraine and Romania will be understood more clearly when placed in the context of the integration process now taking place on the continent. It will be seen that while NATO enlargement has contributed tangentially to stability in Eastern Europe in the short to medium term, a long term resolution addressing the structural deficits of this volatile region has yet to be found.

The Territorial Dispute between Ukraine and Romania

Following independence in August 1991, it was of paramount interest to the government in Kyiv that Friendship Treaties were signed with all Ukraine's immediate neighbours. In addition to confirming Ukraine's borders, such treaties were perceived as consolidating Ukraine's position in the international system, and symbolising an acceptance of the new state. However, with independence, Ukraine had inherited a territorial dispute with Romania that precluded the signing of such a treaty and which had a number of far-reaching implications.[1] Firstly, by questioning the ownership of various Ukrainian territories, Romania challenged the sovereignty of the newly emergent Ukrainian state. Secondly, with this territorial claim, Romania undermined the integrity of a state already divided along ethnic and linguistic lines. Thirdly, there was a real possibility that any appeasement on the part of Kyiv would invite other, similar territorial challenges, especially on the part of Russia.

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[1] For a wider ranging discussion of this period see N. Dima, *Bessarabia and Bukovina: The Soviet-Romanian Territorial Dispute* (New York: East European Monographs, Columbia University, 1982).

The dispute revolved around the lands of Bukovyna, Bessarabia, Hertza and Serpent's Island, which, even prior to Ukrainian independence, had been a source of contention between Romania and the Soviet Union. Northern Bukovyna, Bessarabia and Hertza were occupied by Soviet forces in 1940, as provided for in the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact. (The last of these three territories, the town of Hertza, was delineated for occupation by the Soviet army when Molotov, the Soviet foreign minister, carelessly drew freehand a line on the map and inadvertently included the region). Following occupation, the USSR added the central six districts of Bessarabia to the Moldovan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (originally formed in 1924 on the eastern bank of the Dnister) to create the Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic. The Ukrainian SSR was allocated northern Bukovyna (which was transformed into the Chernivtsi Oblast), a section of northern Bessarabia (the region of Khotyn and the area around the unfortunate Hertza) and the remaining districts of southern Bessarabia (with the regions of Izmail and Ackerman added to the Odesa Oblast). Although the territories were reoccupied by the Romanians in June 1941, by 1944 they were firmly in Soviet hands again, and formally recognised as such in the Paris Peace Treaty with Romania in February 1947. While this Treaty included a basic territorial delimitation between the two states, it failed to provide for precise on-site identification of the border. In order to clarify this murky situation, on 4 February 1948 the Protocol on the Clarification of the State Border between the USSR and Romania was signed, which also delineated as Soviet territory Serpent's Island in the offshore waters of the Danube Delta.[2] (Located about 40 kilometres east of the Danube, this 0.17 km.sq. island-rock had until then been of little strategic significance, being in the unchallenged ownership of Romania). However, while the delimitation issue was dealt with satisfactorily in terms of land borders (the results of the Soviet-Romanian Commission on the Demarcation of Borders were enshrined in the Treaty on the Regime of the Soviet-Romanian border of 1949 and subsequently ratified by both parliaments[3]), insufficient attention was paid to marine border delimitation. As will be seen below, this was to prove a troublesome oversight.

Relations since Independence

There the matter effectively lay until the chaos, uncertainty and sheer disorientation surrounding the declaration of Ukrainian independence in August 1991 provided a window of opportunity for the Romanians to start pressing their claim to the various disputed territories with renewed vigour, hope and assertiveness. When, on 28 November 1991, the Romanian parliament urged its government to regain the territories lost as a result of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, the latter responded the very next day with a statement affirming that 'the recognition of

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[2] It has been suggested that in 1950 the Romanians agreed to 'give' the island to the USSR at the latter's request. For more on this issue see N. Dima, *Bessarabia and Bukovina*, op. cit.

[3] 'The Treaty on the Regime of the Soviet-Romanian Border, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance in Border Issues', concluded between the two states in February 1961, was in fact based on the 1947 Paris Treaty, the 1948 Protocol and the 1949 Treaty.

Ukraine's independence and the desire to develop mutually beneficial Romanian-Ukrainian relations do not entail the recognition of the inclusion in the territory of a newly independent Ukrainian state of northern Bukovyna, the Hertza region, the Khotyn region or the region of southern Bessarabia, which were forcibly annexed by the USSR and thereafter incorporated into the territorial structure of Ukraine on the basis of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact'.[4] In addition, in the months leading up to the Ukrainian referendum on independence in December 1991, the Romanian parliament resolved not to recognise as binding the voting in the disputed areas.[5] If the aim of this resolution was to gauge the mood of voters in these regions, the 92.8 per cent of voters in the Chernivtsi Oblast and 85.4 per cent in the Odesa Oblast who voted in favour of Ukrainian independence sent a clear message as to their views, despite the boycott of the referendum by some ethnic Romanians in parts of the Chernivtsi Oblast.

Relations between the two states remained strained during 1991–4. In 1995, they deteriorated significantly, triggered especially by the discovery of substantial amounts of mineral resources on the continental shelf surrounding Serpent's Island. In December 1995, Romania announced its intention of appealing to the International Court of Justice in the Hague regarding ownership of the island. This, in conjunction with Romania's declaration that existing agreements on the territorial status of the island were invalid, was interpreted by Kyiv as a territorial claim on Ukraine.[6] Ukraine's response was to update the facilities of the military garrison on Serpent's Island, and to establish a number of specialised installations (e.g. a seismic station) all as part of a comprehensive programme for the development of Ukraine's state border.[7]

Thus, in the early days of independence, Ukraine withstood some very serious challenges to its territorial integrity. The five issues (Bukovyna, Hertza, Bessarabia, Serpent's Island and the threat of mobilisation of the Romanian minority in Ukraine) were of such gravity that it was futile to talk about progress in Ukrainian-Romanian relations; they were deteriorating. Ukraine was in no position to acquiesce on any of the points concerning the Romanians, since any hint of weakness would have sent exactly the wrong signals to Ukraine's neighbours. On the other hand, the Romanian government, hampered by its small majority, was forced into responding to the demands of Romanian nationalists in parliament and pursuing an even more forceful line. Furthermore, the prospect of valuable minerals under the shelf around Serpent's Island was a temptation too succulent to resist.

The Catalyst to Progress: NATO Enlargement

The real stimulus to progress proved to be the Romanian desire to be amongst the states invited by the forthcoming NATO summit in Madrid in July 1997 to begin talks on membership. Although Ukraine was not likely to be involved in the loom-

   [4] Press Release of the Ukrainian Government: 'On the Situation Concerning the State Border Between Ukraine and Romania', 27 January 1997.
   [5] *Demokratychna Ukrayina,* 5 December 1991.
   [6] *OMRI Daily Digest,* 7 December 1995.
   [7] UNIAN News Agency, 10 February 1995.

ing NATO enlargement process directly, Kyiv was in a favourable position to take advantage of Romania's predicament. One of the criteria for NATO membership required that new members have no territorial disputes with any of its neighbours. Thus Bucharest urgently needed to put its relations with Kyiv in order if efforts at gaining NATO membership were to be meaningful. However, when the prime ministers of the two countries met in Izmail in March 1996, with the Madrid summit still on the far horizon, no progress was made on the Friendship Treaty. The main stumbling block remained, as ever, the Romanian insistence that any treaty recognising the Ukrainian-Romanian border should include a condemnation of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, which, of course, would imply that the 1939 transfer of territory from Romania to Ukraine was illegal. For its part, Kyiv was adamant in its refusal to get entrapped in the legal minefield associated with the denunciation of the act. Fearing that such a condemnation would leave Ukraine vulnerable to territorial claims, Kyiv countered by arguing that it was the USSR, rather than Ukraine, which was party to the Pact, adding that the Pact itself was invalidated by the 1941 attack of one party on the other. Furthermore, it was argued, Ukrainian deputies had in fact already condemned it once, as members of the USSR Congress of People's Deputies in 1989, which had passed a resolution repudiating the Pact. The Ukrainian Commission on Foreign Affairs, while not denying or disputing the repercussions of the Pact, responded to the Romanian demand by insisting that any reference to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact in any treaty be accompanied by a comment on Romanian territorial gains made at the expense of Ukraine in 1918 and those that resulted from agreements made between Antonescu[8] and Hitler during World War II,[9] a proposal at which the Romanians, in their turn, balked. An alternative Ukrainian suggestion of a general 'condemnation of the activities and crimes of totalitarian regimes, policy of force, etc.',[10] was similarly rejected by Bucharest.

The end to this *impasse* was provided by the defeat of President Iliescu of Romania in the elections in November 1996. It very soon became apparent that the new president, Emil Constantinescu, was willing to start making concessions in order to increase Romania's chances of joining NATO (especially in the light of the now looming Madrid summit). Thus Emil Bistreanu, the ambassador of Romania to Ukraine, made clear that Serpent's Island would no longer be the subject of any territorial claims, since Ukrainian ownership of the island, along with the borders which were delineated after the war, were recognised.[11] That this involved some degree of mental pain on the part of Bucharest was revealed by President Constantinescu himself, who, when visiting NATO headquarters, stated that 'northern Bukovyna had never belonged to either Ukraine or Russia, although the Romanians are prepared to make a "historical sacrifice" in order to enter NATO',[12] a view hardly likely to inspire the confidence of the Ukrainians. Despite this appar-

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[8] Romanian Premier from 1940, and generalissimo and commander of Romanian armies after joining in Germany's war against the Soviet Union in 1941.

[9] *Holos Ukrayiny*, 26 June 1996.

[10] Press release of the Ukrainian Government: 'Finalisation of the Draft Treaty Between Ukraine and Romania on Good-Neighbourly Relations and Cooperation', 27 January 1997.

[11] *Narodna Armiya,* 26 December 1996.

[12] *Ukrayina i Svit*, 8 February 1997.

ent concession, progress on the Treaty on Good-Neighbourly Relations and Co-operation (a draft version of which was ready by early 1997, following the eighth round of talks in Bucharest in January) was clearly taking place. Intriguingly, the sticking points had changed: recognition of the Ukrainian-Romanian border had now become conditional on the satisfactory delimitation of both the continental shelf off the Black Sea coast and exclusive economic zones. (The dropping of the condemnation of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact in the Friendship Treaty was a major concession on the part of the Romanians and is indicative of the price that Constantinescu, with the Madrid summit less than six months away, was willing to pay for the chance of NATO membership). In other words, the Treaty on Good-Neighbourly Relations and Cooperation was now being made contingent on the successful conclusion of a Treaty on the Regime of the State Borders, implying that the former ratifications were invalid. This was totally unacceptable to Kyiv.[13] While insisting that ownership of Serpent's Island was not subject to debate, for the reasons already stated, the Ukrainians acknowledged that there had as yet been no proper delimitation of the shelf around the island.[14] However, Kyiv was adamant that any such negotiations could only take place following the conclusion and ratification of a founding political treaty[15] confirming the current Romanian-Ukrainian border and repudiating any territorial claims against Ukraine.

An additional (and new) sticking point was the issue of the Romanian minorities in Ukraine. While this ostensibly concerned the existing discrepancy between Ukrainian and Romanian legislation with regard to citizenship, Kyiv suspected a more sinister motive behind Bucharest's manoeuvres.[16] This scepticism was exacerbated by what the Ukrainians saw as Romanian insistence that the Romanian minority in Ukraine be given collective rights in line with Recommendation 1201 of the Council of Europe. This Recommendation was interpreted by Ukrainian analysts as 'the right to autonomy of the Romanian ethnic minority in Ukraine'.[17] Ironically, the groundwork for this right to autonomy had been inadvertently done by the Ukrainians themselves. In Article 2 of the Declaration on the Rights of Minorities of Ukraine, issued in October 1991, 'the Ukrainian Government guarantees all minorities the right to secure their traditional areas of habitation and warrants the existence of national-administrative units', i.e. limited territorial autonomy.[18] It is something of a truism to suggest that this represents a threat to a country as ethnically and linguistically divided as Ukraine.

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[13] See note 3.

[14] According to a deputy of the Ukrainian parliament, Volodymyr Zerebetskyi, a member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the CIS: 'The problem lies in the fact that while the land border between the USSR and Romania was agreed, they did not agree on the marine border – oil was plentiful and nobody paid that much attention to the issue'. (Conversation with the author).

[15] *Holos Ukrayiny*, 22 January 1997.

[16] Ukrainian legislation (designed to eliminate the dangers associated with giving the Russian minority resident in Ukraine joint citizenship as demanded by Moscow) permits the possession of only one citizenship, while Romanian legislation allows for dual citizenship.

[17] *Holos Ukrayiny*, 22 January 1997.

[18] Although the declaration was enshrined in the law 'On National Minorities' (adopted in June 1992), the latter failed to fulfil the objectives of the declaration; because of the increasing threats to the territorial integrity of Ukraine, the law failed to mention the issue of territorial autonomy, despite

The Ukrainian-Romanian Treaty

Despite the above difficulties, there was a certain inevitability about the eventual signing of the Treaty on Good-Neighbourly Relations and Cooperation between the two states, especially if Bucharest was serious about NATO membership. The tactics adopted by the Ukrainians reflected the fact that they were conscious of the time constraints the Romanians were under: metaphorically speaking, the Madrid NATO summit was now clearly visible in the not-too-far distance. Bucharest desperately wished to avoid conceding too much to Kyiv in pursuit of membership, without actually getting it: signing a treaty with Kyiv was a necessary but obviously not sufficient condition of entry. The Romanians were, however, keenly aware that with a treaty signed, they only *might* gain an invitation; while without a treaty, they definitely would not be invited. The deadlock between the two sides was broken only on 28 April (the day before Romania presented its application to join NATO) at a meeting of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Council (BSEC). At this meeting, Presidents Kuchma and Constantinescu thrashed out the final details, opening the way to an agreement on the text of the basic Friendship Treaty in May 1997, after 10 bruising rounds of negotiations. The Friendship Treaty was finally signed on 2 June 1997, with less than 5 weeks to go before the Madrid summit in July.

The Ukrainians had got their way (i.e. made the least concessions) in what can only be described as a piece of brinkmanship. There is no mention of the infamous 1939 Pact, only a reference in the preamble to the 'unfair acts of totalitarian and military-dictatorial regimes, which in the past negatively influenced relations between the Ukrainian and Romanian nations'. In addition, and crucially for Ukraine, the existing territorial borders are affirmed (Article 2). Also, while Serpent's Island is acknowledged as the territory of Ukraine, the delimitation of the continental shelf (along with the exclusive economic zones in the Black Sea) is deferred for a period of two years, following which, if no agreement is reached, the matter will be referred to the International Court of Justice in the Hague.[19] In the meantime, the Ukrainians have agreed to refrain from stationing offensive weapons on the island.[20] (Significant, in the light of the multi-layered integration process, is Article 8, which refers to the development of Euroregions. Two are planned: 'Upper Prut' and 'Lower Danube'). Article 13 of the Friendship Treaty, the longest by a considerable margin, provides extensive rights for the Romanian minority in Ukraine (and vice versa) in line with Recommendation 1201, though with the important proviso that 'the Recommendation refers to collective rights and

securing extensive rights for national minorities. As a result, in its place, a new law is being proposed by the member of parliament for Chernivtsi Oblast in Northern Bukovina, Ivan Popescu, 'On Indigenous People, National Minorities and Ethnic Groups in Ukraine', which would provide for this territorial autonomy.

[19] According to the Ukrainians, the issue appears to hinge on the habitability of the island. They believe that if classified as 'habitable', international law provides for a 12-mile exclusion zone, a provision which does not apply in the case of non-habitable islands. (Author's conversation with Volodymyr Zerebetskyi, Member of the Ukrainian Parliament).

[20] Article 2 refers to a separate agreement regarding all of these matters, activated through an exchange of letters by the two foreign ministers, at the same time as the main Treaty.

does not require that either of the Parties confer relevant bodies the right to territorial autonomy based on ethnic criteria'.[21]

Overall, the signing of the Friendship Treaty represents a major achievement for Ukraine, although under the circumstances (and in hindsight) it would now appear that there could only have been one victor. Simply put, Romania was in a no-win situation: by failing to claim territories to which it felt it had a historically and morally justifiable right, it would do the inhabitants of these disputed lands a disservice. By claiming them, it laid itself open to the charge of trouble-making in a highly volatile part of the European continent, and, more seriously, would thereby prejudice its chances in the wider scheme of things. By contrast, Ukraine was in the luxurious position of being able to do no wrong: shielded by agreements, treaties and conventions, it was in legal (though perhaps not moral) terms invulnerable. The irony for the Romanians is that, in pursuit of their wider objectives, they conceded to the Ukrainians without achieving those objectives – at least in the short term. However, when viewed in isolation, the Friendship Treaty is a significant step forward: the ongoing territorial dispute was one of the very few in any part of Europe, and its resolution contributes to the peace and security of the region. Despite the fact that the Bucharest government incurred the wrath of the Romanian nationalists, who argued that the Friendship Treaty was rushed in pursuit of the elusive invitation to join NATO, it is highly unlikely that Ukrainian-Romanian relations will regress, since the Romanians have their eye firmly on the wider integration process.

The Moldovan Problem in Ukrainian-Romanian Relations

The greatest potential threat to continued harmony between Ukraine and Romania is represented by the volatile situation in Moldova. Disoriented by the death-throes of the Soviet Union, concerned by subsequent calls of the Moldovan Popular Front (an alliance of the nationalist opposition) for unconditional (re)union with Romania and threatened by the possibility of forcible 'Romanisation', the two main minorities in Moldova, the Turkic Gagauz[22] and the Slavs,[23] decided to act. They responded in the summer of 1990 with the creation of a 'Republic of Gagauzia' (spread intermittently over Southern Moldova) and a 'Republic of Transdnistria' (on the Eastern bank of the Dnister, a region that had never belonged to Romania) respectively. While such turmoil was hardly in the best interests of Ukraine, it certainly was something of a relief to Kyiv that the (re)unification of Moldova and Romania, and the renewed impetus such a union would provide for claims to the disputed territories, was avoided. While the issue of a Greater Romania died off and the Gagauz were pacified with a degree of territorial autonomy, the unresolved Transdnistrian

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[21] Author's translation.

[22] They make up 3.5 per cent of the population of Moldova and are located mainly in the south of the country.

[23] They consist mainly of Russophone Ukrainians and Russians and make up about 26 per cent of the population of Moldova. Sixty per cent of them are concentrated on the industrialised east bank of the Dnister.

problem lumbered on towards an eventual solution, one that would end up serving the long-term interests of Kyiv. The key to the resolution of the problem was provided by Moscow in February 1994, which recommended, in line with OSCE proposals, a compromise status for the Transdnistrian region. The result was a draft law 'On the Special Status of the Territory on the Left Bank of the Nistru (Transdnistria)', proposed in December 1995 by the parliament of Moldova. The law provided for the use of Russian and Ukrainian as official languages in the area, a degree of political, economic and socio-cultural autonomy, and, most importantly, the right to territorial self-determination in the event that the status of Moldova as an independent state was to change (i.e. if it was to unite with Romania). As far as the Ukrainians were concerned, this last point was a critical inclusion: by providing an escape clause for the minorities, the Moldovan authorities simultaneously (and inadvertently) assuaged Ukrainian fears by making eventual Moldovan reunification with Romania considerably less likely, at least in the near future.

Overall, while the issue of Transdnistria within Moldova has been settled for the moment, it is unlikely to have been permanently resolved.[24] The volatile mixture of sheer Romanian persistence, a substantial Russian military force, large Gagauz, Russian and Ukrainian minorities in their respective autonomous territories protected by the various escape clauses, all in a region notorious for its appeal to neighbouring powers, is hardly a recipe for peace and harmony.

Conclusion

For Ukrainian foreign policy, the signing of a treaty with Romania represents a major accomplishment, removing as it does a danger which not only undermined the territorial integrity of the new state but also threatened to set a precedent for territorial claims by other neighbours. That the dispute did not evolve into a security threat speaks as eloquently for Ukrainian foreign policy as it does for the Ukrainian military forces, for which the Romanians were no match. However, if in the immediate term relations between Ukraine and Romania appear to be evolving successfully, it is pertinent to recall that the stimulus has been extrinsic, rather than any inherent drive towards trouble-free relations, such as that which characterises Ukrainian-Polish relations, for example. The very circumstances under which the Friendship Treaty was signed would suggest that the relationship is reversible (especially if the nationalists came to power in Romania), dependent as it is on the continued successful evolution, openness and absorbability of the regional integration process to which it is so closely tied.   ❏

[24] On 10 August 1997, Smirnov issued a decree which established a commission on the delimitation of the borders of the 'Transdnistrian Republic'. *RFE/RL Newsline,* vol. 1, no. 100, part II. (21 August 1997).

Return from Exile, Return to Politics
Leadership, Political Mobilisation and National Identity among the Crimean Tatars

Timothy William Waters

This article will examine, from historical and political perspectives, the forces that have tended to create and maintain a unified polity and national identity among the Crimean Tatars since they were deported on Stalin's orders in 1944, and to assess the changes that may be expected in that polity now that large numbers of Tatars have been able to return to Crimea.

Specifically, I shall argue that while deportation and the conditions of their exile contributed to group cohesion among the Crimean Tatars, since their return to Crimea that cohesion has been subject to countervailing forces. This, in the course of time, may give rise to a partial and limited pluralism or fracturing in the Tatar polity – in a sense, a return to politics. For the time being, however, overall unity and cohesiveness should remain high.

The Tatars' Position in Crimea
Prior to the Second World War

At the time of their deportation, the Crimean Tatars already formed a coherent and identifiable nation,[1] comparable to most of the other recognised nations of Europe. This factor combined with several other characteristics of the Tatars to ensure that, after their deportation, they had the motivation and the wherewithal to maintain their unitary identity and mobilise for their eventual return.

Prior to the Russian conquest of Crimea, Tatars constituted 83 per cent of the peninsula's population.[2] Russia's annexation of Crimea in 1783 was recognised by the Sublime Porte in 1793, and this was followed by a wave of emigration of Tatars to Turkey. Further major emigrations occurred in 1860–3, during the 1870s, and in 1891–1902; the total emigration of Tatars reached several hundred thousand. By the census of 1897, the remaining 188,000 Tatars constituted only about one-third of the population of Crimea.[3] By 1923, the proportion of Tatars had fallen to only slightly more than one-quarter of the population, and by 1939, on the eve of the war, just 19 per cent.[4]

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[1] But see G. A. Bonch-Osmolovskiy, *Etnograficheskiy ocherk. Putevoditel po Krymu*, pp. 50-72, who states that, as of the 1920s, the Crimean Tatars did not form a single ethnos, but consisted of three major groupings – the Yaly Boiliu, or Southern Shore Tatars, the Tat (Tatlar) or Mountain Tatars, and the Nogai or Steppe Tatars, distinguished by linguistic, cultural and anthropological characteristics.

[2] See *Crimean Tatars, Repatriation and Conflict Prevention* (Open Society Institute: New York, 1996, hereafter OSI), p. 21. At that time, Russians totalled 5.7 per cent and Ukrainians 2.9 per cent.

[3] Ann Sheehy, *The Crimean Tatars and Volga Germans: Soviet Treatment of Two National Minorities*, Minority Rights Group, Report no. 6, August 1971.

[4] Eckehard Kraft, 'Ukraine: Der Kampf der Krimtataren um ihre Heimat', *Neue Zuercher Zeitung*, 27 September 1994, p. 14.

Thus, two important factors were in place well before the final deportations. A large diaspora existed, or at least the potential for one, and the Tatars were clearly and increasingly a minority within Crimea. Viewed together, these two factors suggest a third: even before the deportations, the diaspora population was larger than the homeland population.[5]

Despite the multi-ethnic nature of Crimea as a whole, the Tatars continued to live in relatively isolated and monoethnic settlements until well into this century.[6] The large-scale emigration of Tatars under Tsarist rule took place principally from the northern areas of the peninsula, which were largely emptied of Tatars, while the mountains and southern shore retained compact Tatar populations.[7] Furthermore, the Tsarist settlement policies created a parallel system of new Russian settlements, rather than taking over the existing Tatar ones; thus, major Tatar centres in the south retained their own prominence in the Tatar community, and these centres came to be 'closely associated' with the traditional Tatar way of life.[8]

Nevertheless, there was significant interaction and erosion of the formerly exclusive Tatar communities; by 1926, the largest single Tatar urban community was in 'Russian' Simferopol, and the process was evidently accelerating – in fact, Kliachin suggests that, had it not been for the deportation, the formerly separate 'supporting frameworks of population distribution [of the Russians and Tatars] would have ultimately merged into one, with the preservation of Bakchisarai, Karasubazar, Staryi Krym, and Perekop as nationality (primarily Crimean Tatar) centers'.[9] This, however, is only speculation; in any event, at the time of the deportation, the Tatars still retained separate settlement patterns, separate centres of population and a separate way of life.

A Tatar state was very briefly established at the end of 1917, but was crushed in January 1918 by Bolshevik forces. During the chaos of the post-Revolution Civil War, Crimea changed hands several times, but was firmly in the hands of the Bolsheviks by 1921.[10] The Communist grip on the territory was tenuous, and, partly to appease the Tatar population, in October 1921, the Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (Crimean ASSR) was established within the Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic.[11]

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[5] Up to 5 million descendants of Crimean Tatars currently live in Turkey, where they form a powerful lobby. See Dugyu Bazoblu Sezer, 'Balance of Power in the Black Sea in the Post-Cold War Era: Russia, Turkey, and Ukraine', in Maria Drohobycky (Ed), *Crimea: Dynamics, Challenges, Prospects* (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 1995), p. 182. See also OSI, p. 21. The figure of five million, though not contradicted, seems rather high, and should be clearly understood as an upper estimate, with the actual (undetermined) number somewhat lower.

[6] A. I. Kliachin, 'The Dynamics of Ethnic Systems of Population Distribution in the Crimea (In Connection with the Problem of the Return of the Crimean Tatars), *Anthropology and Archeology of Eurasia,* vol. 33, no. 2, 1994, p. 33.

[7] Ibid., pp. 28-9.

[8] Ibid., p. 32, and the references there cited.

[9] Ibid., p. 33.

[10] OSI, p. 20.

[11] An earlier plan for a Tatar Republic was embodied in the 1918 'New Order' of Imperial Germany. This republic would have included Crimea and also a strip of land on the far side of the Straits of Kerch. Despite its name, however, this republic was intended as a zone of German settlement. See

The early years of the Crimean ASSR (up to 1927, when the purges of Muslim 'national deviationists' began) saw Tatars '[enjoy] a more dominant political position in the republic than their numbers warranted[12]... Tatar was made an official language side by side with Russian; Tatar schools and theaters were opened, and Tatar literature and art were encouraged...'.[13] Despite being a minority in the province as a whole, Tatars were concentrated in certain areas, especially in the south, and 'dominated the cultural and social organizations in those sections'.[14]

These developments, whatever their true purpose in the eyes of the central leadership, were to have, after the deportations, a result which that leadership can hardly have intended: the earlier Soviet policy of fostering literacy and familiarity with Tatar literature and high culture in the Crimean ASSR fostered a sense of national pride, which later helped maintain a unitary identity among the Tatars deported to Central Asia.

Deportation to Central Asia

The first mass deportations of Tatars from Crimea occurred during the collectivisation drive: 'some 30,000 to 40,000 were deported to the Urals and Siberia, while a violent antireligious campaign at the same time led to the death or deportation of the majority of the Muslim clergy'.[15] However, the principal and decisive deportation of the entire Crimean Tatar population occurred during the Second World War.

It has been suggested that the deportation of the Tatars had been planned prior to the outbreak of the war.[16] Even if this is true, it had not been carried out before the rapid German advance into Crimea. There was considerable, though by no means universal, collaboration with the occupying German army;[17] however, there was also considerable Tatar participation in partisan units and in regular Red Army units. During the recapture of Crimea in early 1944, Tatar collaborators were executed in large numbers on the orders of military tribunals.[18]

On or about 18 May 1944, units of the NKVD rounded up virtually all the remaining Tatars in Crimea.[19] The conditions prevailing during the deportation were extraordinarily brutal, and large numbers died either during the deportation itself or during the first eighteen months in exile: Crimean Tatar accounts claim that 46

Lajos Pándi, *Köztes Európa 1763–1993* (Budapest: Osiris Századvég, 1995), pp. 272-3, Map 119, 'A német "új rend" kelet-Európában, 1918' (The German 'New Order' in Eastern Europe, 1918).
   [12] After 1926, the Soviet census results did not include specific breakdowns of data on the Crimean Tatars. See 'The Crimean Tatar Case', in Edward Allworth (Ed), *Tatars of the Crimea: The Struggle for Survival* (Duke University Press, 1988), p. 5.
   [13] Sheehy, op. cit., p. 9.
   [14] 'The Crimean Tatar Case', in Allworth, op. cit., p. 4.
   [15] Sheehy, op. cit., p. 9.
   [16] Ibid.
   [17] David Kowalewski, 'The Crimean Tatars: Ten Years of Rehabilitation, *Ethnic Groups*, vol. 2, no. 4, 1980, p. 345 (hereafter: Kowalewski, 'Ten Years...') estimates that some 20,000 Crimean Tatars volunteered to serve in the *Reichswehr*.
   [18] Sheehy, op. cit., p. 10.
   [19] The deportation was not publicly acknowledged until 25 June 1946, when the decree dissolving the Crimean and Chechen-Ingush ASSRs was published in *Izvestiya*.

per cent of all deportees died during this period, and even official Soviet sources estimate that no less than 18 per cent of all deportees died *en route*.[20]

The mass deportation during the Second World War was, of course, the defining event for the Crimean Tatar nation. At a stroke it put an end to the slow demographic retreat of the past 150 years and imbued all survivors with a searing memory of brutality and suffering, inflicted solely on account of their ethnic identity. This in its turn strengthened that identity and the Tatars around a single goal – return.

Nevertheless, the epic event of suddenly becoming a nation in exile could not of itself ensure unity of identity or explain the Tatars' highly effective mobilisation. Had, for example, the Tatars been dispersed across the Soviet Union, they might well have failed to maintain a strong national identity, and would almost surely not have been as organised in making their demands for return. However, the Tatars were nearly all deported to, and settled in, a single fairly compact zone. Geography is not destiny in the formation of the nation, but in this case it may have been decisive for its preservation.

Exile and Group Cohesion in Central Asia

The vast majority of Crimean Tatars were deported to Central Asia, principally to Uzbekistan. There were 467,000 Tatars in Uzbekistan in 1989, constituting 2.3 per cent of the population,[21] and making Tatars a larger group within the country than the (indigenous) Karakalpaks. Smaller numbers of Tatars were settled in Kyrgyzstan (70,000 in 1989, or 1.6 per cent; figures for 1939 and 1959 show a jump from 20,000 [1.4 per cent] to 56,000 [2.7 per cent]).[22] Allworth notes that the deportation of the Crimean Tatars to Central Asia 'represent[ed] the first large alteration suddenly to affect the ethnic makeup of the region since the influx of the Russians to southern Central Asia beg[an] in the late nineteenth century'.[23]

Sources on the Crimean Tatars' daily life in Central Asia and their relations with the native populations are sparse. These anthropological and interrelational aspects are important for any examination of group cohesion and national identity, since assimilation must always have been a potential alternative. Certainly, some cultural – and economic – factors may be discerned which would have at least laid the ground for maintaining a distinct identity and not assimilating. For example, as regards their traditional practice of Islam, 'the Crimean Tatar culture was particularly sophisticated and international, with influences from East and West converging in the region'.[24] There is no evidence that the Soviet regime treated the practice of Islam by Tatars any differently than that by Uzbeks, however, so

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[20] David R. Marples and David F. Duke, 'Ukraine, Russia, and the Question of Crimea', *Nationalities Papers,* vol. 23, no. 2, 1995, p. 267.
[21] *Pravda Vostoka,* 15 June 1990, p. 3. This gives no breakdown into Volga, Crimean or other Tatar groups.
[22] *Narodnoe Khozyaistvo Kirgizskoy SSR* (Frunze, 1982), p. 16. Also *Vestnik Statistiki,* no. 4, 1991. There is no breakdown into different Tatar groups.
[23] Allworth (Editor's Introduction), p. ix.
[24] Kliachin, op. cit., p. 47, editor's note a), referring generally to Alan W. Fisher, *Crimean Tatars* (Stanford: Hoover, 1978). 'Sophistication' is, of course, a highly subjective concept, but whatever the

the only relevance of any cultural differences in their two groups' respective practices would be to their own intergroup relations. Tatars were also proud of a perceived higher level of economic development than that of their Central Asian neighbours;[25] prior to their deportation, the Crimean Tatars had begun to specialise in cash crop cultivation – a factor which may have, at the time, contributed to the merging of their population distribution with the Russians,[26] but later provided an economic basis for group solidarity in Central Asia, as well as, ultimately, for their return to Crimea.

Some scholars have suggested that for the Crimean Tatars the family played an especially important role in maintaining identity:

> a vigorous group rapport appears to [have] create[d] a minimal institutional expression, under restrictive Soviet policies, so that group spirit, and life, stubbornly survive[d]... [D]espite uninterrupted ideological counterpressure, in the absence of formal social organization the Crimean Tatar family and its Muslim religion yet strengthen[ed] and solidif[ied] this particular Soviet nationality.[27]

Most scholars, however, put the greatest emphasis on the role of the leadership. Allworth notes, for example, that '[f]inding the secret of collective survival necessarily gives particular emphasis to the role of Crimean Tatar leadership and the ethnic group's self-identity over the last century'.[28] He cites the following factors:

> modern ethnic leadership undertaken without personal political ambition... cultural and social institutions resourcefully adapted or created to replace those destroyed or withdrawn by politicians, and a persistent, open drive to communicate the group's yearning for its civil and ethnic rights to the Soviet system's power centers.[29]

Kowalewski also focuses on the role of the leadership; in a statistical survey of public demonstrations and protests, he argues that the highly disciplined and organised nature of the Tatar movement, as well as its clearly focused strategy of dissident agitation, was aimed at the highest levels of Soviet power.[30]

Anecdotal evidence from Crimean Tatar *samizdat* literature suggests near unanimity for the goal of the movement; in one *samizdat* survey of 18,000 Crimean Tatars in Tashkent, only nine respondents stated that they were opposed to repatriation to Crimea and the reestablishment of an autonomous republic.[31] Kowa-

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truth of the matter – and certainly a number of scholars have made reference to the supposed 'superficial' adherence to Islam of many Central Asians – such references at least suggest the *perception* of cultural differences and feelings of superiority. In the end, these perceptions matter more to a group's evaluation of itself than does any more 'objective' analysis.

[25] Kowalewski, 'Ten Years...', p. 10.

[26] Kliachin, op. cit., p. 33.

[27] See 'The Crimean Tatar Case', in Allworth, op. cit., p. 5. See also, in the same collection, Mübeyyin Batu Altan: 'Structures: the Importance of Family – A Personal Memoir', pp. 275-86. However, while family is undoubtedly an important element, it is difficult to discern, in Batu Altan's analysis at least, what if any are the defining elements which set the Tatar family apart.

[28] 'The Crimean Tatar Case', in Allworth, op. cit., pp. 3-4.

[29] Ibid., pp. 7-8.

[30] Kowalewski, 'Ten Years...', pp. 343-58.

[31] Ibid., p. 346. The survey is held in the Radio Liberty Research *Arkhiv Samizdata* at 1033.

lewski suggests that 'the organizational strength and leadership of the movement has resulted in the massive support within the Crimean Tatar nation for the cause of repatriation. Also, Crimean Tatar membership in the Communist Party was extremely low, four to five times lower than for other nationalities',[32] which suggests a high level of agreement with and broad-based support for the Tatar political leadership. How did that leadership develop and what were its strategies?

After being abandoned in Central Asia with virtually no material support, the Tatars were in almost every case obliged to build their own settlements from scratch. Until 1956, the Tatars lived under a 'banishment regime' which strictly regulated their movements.[33] Naturally, they were quickly, and compulsorily, incorporated into the regional work-force; as a result, many Tatars settled in large urban centres. In time, they came to be quite prosperous by Soviet standards. During the first twelve years while the banishment regime was in force, no public political action was possible, and there seems to have been little organised clandestine effort. (It should be noted, however, that this is the period for which there is the least evidence available).

When the banishment regime was lifted, a Tatar movement began to develop, which Kowalewski describes as 'the rather familiar pattern of dissent: deprivation, expectation, frustration, and protest'.[34] He notes, however, that during the Soviet period, protest was always very disciplined, having 'almost universal participation and a remarkable degree of development'.[35] Three periods of activity can be distinguished: 'the spontaneous phase', from the lifting of the banishment restriction in 1956 until around 1960; 'the dissident phase' of renewed activity and attempts to return, which began after the 1967 decree which absolved the Tatars of collective war guilt and lasted until the late 1970s; and the 'Glasnost phase', a last round of activism, including spontaneous returns, from 1987 onwards, as Soviet central control grew progressively weaker.

The Spontaneous Phase: The only deported nationalities not fully rehabilitated and repatriated after the war were the Volga and other Soviet Germans, the Meshketian Turks and the Crimean Tatars.[36] After Khrushchev's speech at the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956 denouncing Stalin, the draconian banishment conditions were officially lifted (though, in practice, most restrictions remained in place) and the Tatars began putting pressure on Moscow to rehabilitate and repatriate them.[37] Some cultural activities were allowed, including a Crimean Tatar-language newspaper: *Lenin Bayragy* (Banner of Lenin), published in Tashkent.[38]

[32] Kowalewski, 'Ten Years...', p. 355.

[33] David Kowalewski, 'National Dissent in the Soviet Union: The Crimean Tatar Case', *Nationalities Papers*, vol. II, no. 2, 1974 (hereafter Kowalewski, 'National Dissent...'), p. 3.

[34] Ibid., p. 10.

[35] Ibid., p. 12.

[36] In all, eight nationalities were deported *en masse* during the war: the Volga and other Soviet Germans were deported as a precautionary measure, while the other seven – the Tatars, Kalmyks and five Caucasian nationalities – were deported in response to allegations of widespread collaboration with the German army. Following Khrushchev's condemnation of the deportations of five of the nationalities, the latter were rehabilitated by decree in 1957, and repatriated to their national territories, which were reconstituted as autonomous territories. See Sheehy, op. cit., pp. 5-6, and p. 29, note 2.

[37] Kowalewski 'Ten Years...', p. 345.

[38] OSI, p. 23, also Kowalewski, 'National Dissent...', p. 3.

Kowalewski argues that during the 'thaw' which followed the Twentieth Congress the Tatars developed a genuine, if limited, faith in the Party, believing that its officials were working for their eventual repatriation. This, he says, created rising expectations among the Tatars, who accordingly petitioned the authorities in large numbers and began organising strategy planning sessions in the place of work.[39] There were no demonstrations nor disruptive action, however, and organisation at this time was minimal. This period, in effect, revealed the continuing base of popular support for the idea of return upon which later leadership developed.

The Dissident Phase: Once it became apparent that no repatriation was being contemplated, disillusionment inevitably followed. Popular hopes were revived in the mid-1960s, however, as the process of political rehabilitation got under way. The Germans were rehabilitated politically in 1964, and the Crimean Tatars in 1967, when the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet issued an edict 'On Citizens of Tatar Nationality who lived in Crimea', which declared that:

> the facts of active complicity of a certain segment of the inhabitants of Crimea with the German aggressors were groundlessly extended to the whole Tatar population of Crimea. The groundless charges... should be dismissed, all the more because a new generation of people has entered into the working and political life of society.
> The Presidium... decrees: ...
> ... (2) To record that Tatars who had once lived in Crimea and who have now settled in the territory of the Uzbek and other republics of the Union, shall participate in social and political life, shall be elected as deputies in the Supreme Soviets and local Soviets of Workers' Deputies, shall hold responsible posts in Soviet, economic, and party organs, and shall have radio broadcasts and newspapers in their native language, as well as other cultural institutions... .[40]

A second action taken the same day, with reference to an edict dating back to 28 April 1956, decreed:

> To make known that the citizens of Tatar nationality who formerly lived in Crimea and members of their families shall enjoy the right of every citizen of the USSR to reside in every territory of the Soviet Union in accordance with the acting legislation concerning employment and the passport regime.[41]

In accordance with the liberalisation proclaimed in the decrees, concessions to Tatar cultural interests, including 'teaching of the Crimean Tatar language, newspaper circulation, and book publications', were granted.[42] In practice, the benefits were limited; for example, Tatar language courses were optional and accessible only to a small percentage of Tatar students. But the rehabilitation decrees neither restored the autonomous territories nor provided for repatriation,[43] and, furthermore, bureaucratic obstacles and intimidation effectively prevented any significant

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[39] Kowalewski, 'National Dissent...', p. 3.

[40] Edict of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, no. 1861-VII, 5 September 1967. The English translation is taken from Allworth, op. cit., p. 145.

[41] Disposition of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, p. 494. On the order of adaptation of Article 2 of the edict of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of 28 April 1956; no. 1862-VII, 5 September 1967. English translation taken from Allworth, op. cit., pp. 145-6.

[42] Kowalewski, 'Ten Years...', p. 353.

[43] Sheehy, op. cit., p. 5.

returns.[44] Actual returns following the 1967 decree were minimal: 'By the mid-1970s only 1,400 families – chosen by the authorities for their political passivity – had been allowed to settle legally'.[45] Kowalewski puts the number at 3,000 families, but notes 'tens of thousands of families' had applied to return, and that during the same period over 1.5 million Russians and Ukrainians were settled in Crimea.[46]

The initial optimism with which Crimean Tatar groups met the decrees faded rapidly with the recognition that their principal demand – the right to return – would not be fulfilled. Kowalewski suggests that at this point the Tatar movement 'took on dissident characteristics'.[47] The recognition that peaceful petitioning was not going to succeed encouraged the rise of a more organised, activist and militant cadre of Tatar leaders, including Mustafa Djemilev, who would later become the principal spokesman for the Tatars in the 1970s and 1980s and the president of their organisation in Crimea in the 1990s. This new leadership adopted 'more diverse tactics'[48] in the late 1960s and early 1970s, a period of heightened Tatar activity in response to the expectations created by the 1967 decree. These tactics, which attracted wider attention for their cause, included protesting during parades, allying with the Russian intelligentsia and petitioning the UN and foreign Communist leaders such as Nicolae Ceausescu.[49]

One study showed that the Crimean Tatars were the second most active group (after the Soviet Jews) in protesting, demonstrating and demanding increased rights.[50] Of course, these 'dissident' tactics met with no more success than the earlier petitions. The government cracked down on the leadership in a series of trials, and periodically deported Tatars who had either managed to remain in Crimea or else had returned illicitly. One observer notes:

> … [T]he regime has reacted to highly disciplined and peaceful Crimean Tatar dissent with a low level of concessions and a high level of repressions. Although a small proportion of families have attained registration, the slogan of local authorities, 'Crimea without Crimean Tatars', has remained the prevailing regime policy.[51]

By the mid-1970s, the movement had begun to retreat from its more activist stance.

The Glasnost Phase: Tactics remained fairly consistent throughout the second and third phases, but there was a marked decline in the level of activity after the early 1970s, and a dramatic upswing in the mid-1980s, when the Tatar leadership sensed that the political centre of Soviet society was weakening.[52] The shift from the

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[44] Kowalewski, 'Ten Years…', p. 345.

[45] Peter Reddaway, 'The Crimean Tatar Drive for Repatriation', in Allworth, op. cit., p. 195.

[46] Kowalewski, 'Ten Years…', p. 353.

[47] Ibid., p. 345.

[48] Kowalewski, 'National Dissent…', p. 9.

[49] Ibid., pp. 9-10.

[50] During the period 1965–78, Crimean Tatars accounted for 14.5 per cent of all such events, and Soviet Jews for 35 per cent. (See survey cited in Kowalewski, 'Ten years…', p. 346.

[51] Kowalewski, 'Ten Years…', p. 354.

[52] The weakening of the grip or resolve of the central authorities is reflected in the census figures; the recorded number of (self-identified) Crimean Tatars in the 1989 census was 268,739, more than twice the 132,272 recorded in 1979. This rise of 103.2 per cent cannot reasonably be ascribed to natural increase only. The consensus estimate puts the true number of Tatars in the Soviet Union in 1989

second phase to the third was not marked by any significant change in the Tatar leadership or population (except that the end of the second phase meant an effective retreat from high-level engagement). The principal difference was in results: in the third phase, the Tatars' 'dissident tactics' produced a series of grudging concessions and admissions by the Party leadership, culminating in the setting up, in 1987, of a commission headed by Andrey Gromyko. This claimed that it was impossible to allow the Tatars to return.[53] However, a second commission, in 1989, acknowledged in principle the right of the Tatar nation to return.[54]

Return to Crimea: Prospects for the Political Cohesion of the Tatar Nation in Crimea

Intragroup Factors – the Effects of the Return: Throughout the period of exile, the Tatars had never formalised their political leadership – in part a strategy to prevent its sudden decapitation. In response to the opportunity to repatriate and the rising threat of Crimean Russian secession – something which the Tatars opposed – the elements of the Tatar leadership convened a *kurultai* (convention) to appoint a formal leadership, in June 1991. The *kurultai* created the *mejlis,* the standing shadow parliament, and elected Djemilev its president.[55] This consolidation marked a shift in the political intentions and aspirations of the Tatar leadership: 'with the establishment of the mejlis, the Tatars signaled their intention to become a permanent and immovable part of the Crimean political landscape'.[56]

However, the shift to a more structured leadership also represented a reaction rather than an attempt to seize the initiative. The same *kurultai* adopted a 'Declaration of National Sovereignty of the Crimean Tatar People' and, in an attempt to stake a moral claim and forestall Russian pressure for the return of Crimea to the Russian SFSR, proclaimed its intention of forming a Tatar state in Crimea. The Tatar leadership was being overtaken by the speed of events.

In 1987, the Presidium declared its intention of finding a way of repatriating the Tatars to Crimea. At once, the spontaneous return of Tatars began: by 1989, over 38,000 Tatars were living in Crimea. By October 1990, over 120,000 had returned,[57] although there was still no officially sanctioned return or resettlement plan. Some of those who returned spontaneously were met with considerable, even violent, opposition from Crimean Russians and Ukrainians. Local authorities in Crimea also put obstacles in the way of the Tatars' returning or purchasing land, especially in the more crowded and coveted southern coastal sections. By 1993, when the returning Tatars had the approval and (limited) financial support of the (now inde-

at around half a million. See Muriel Atkin, 'Islamic Assertiveness and the Waning of the Old Soviet Order', *Nationalities Papers,* vol. XX, no. 1, 1992, p. 15.
    [53] Mustafa Cemiloglu, 'A History of the Crimean Tatar National Liberation Movement: A Sociopolitical Perspective', in Drohobycky, op. cit., p. 101. (N.B. Cemiloglu is the Tatar name of the long-time leader of the Crimean Tatar movement, generally known as Mustafa Djemilev).
    [54] OSI, p. 27.
    [55] Ibid., p. 28.
    [56] Ibid.
    [57] Ibid., p. 27.

pendent) Ukraine, a total of 260,000 had returned,[58] putting considerable strain on the housing market.

As a result, many Tatars have settled, at least temporarily, in the central and northern parts of the peninsula, and have generally established new settlements or shanty towns on the outskirts of established Slavic settlements. Thus, a new pattern of dual population settlement seems to be developing, mirroring the one that existed – albeit declining – prior to the deportation. This may be expected to increase the sense of group identity among the Tatars, since, in general, separate settlement patterns tend to reinforce economic and cultural interactions which in turn reinforce perceptions of group membership. The segregation of settlements should likewise favour political unity among the Tatars.

The economic consequences of the mass return, however, seem less favourable to continued political unity. Many Tatars have suffered a precipitous fall in their standard of living since returning to Crimea; a comfortable, if alien, life-style in Central Asia has been exchanged for a perhaps spiritually fulfilling but materially poor existence in shanty towns in the homeland.

During the Soviet era, the Crimean Tatars were generally (and fairly uniformly) affluent by Soviet standards.[59] However, the post-Soviet economic crisis and the disruption of their return to Crimea have produced radical economic disparities among the returned Tatars; '[f]or the second time within a 50-year span, Tatars found themselves having to build whole new communities from scratch',[60] and the results have not so far replicated the fairly uniform relative prosperity which they enjoyed in Central Asia. The Open Society Institute report on Crimea noted: 'Signs of stratification are plentiful in Tatar settlements, where hovels can stand next to opulent edifices… [One Crimean official] said roughly 15 percent of Tatars in the Crimea are wealthy and live well and a further 20 percent can enjoy relatively comfortable lifestyles. On the other hand, 35 percent live on the edge, while another 30 percent exist in abject poverty'.[61]

These new economic divisions among the Tatars may be expected to produce differing political values, which will, at the very least, provide an implicit counterpressure to efforts by the Tatar leadership to maintain political unity. Suffering can unify a group, but if that suffering is not perceived as being externally imposed its unifying effect is significantly less. If economic disparities become entrenched and if the Tatar leadership cannot realistically blame the disparities on others, it will become increasingly difficult to maintain Tatar political unity. Although, in the face of such a large latently hostile Russian majority in Crimea, it seems unlikely that these economic disparities will greatly weaken the Tatars' sense of common national identity, they may well discourage the leadership from relying too heavily on that identity as a force for political mobilisation.

However, any attempt to blame economic dislocations on 'others', e.g. the Russians or the Kyiv government, would also tend to radicalise the Tatar population,

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[58] Ibid.
[59] Ibid., p. 36.
[60] Ibid., p. 29.
[61] Ibid., p. 37.

which would represent a threat to the present moderately-oriented leadership. 'In mid-1996, the mejlis unequivocally stood on the side of restraint, arguing that Tatars would end up being the biggest losers if events ever turned violent in the Crimea. But... support for moderation was eroding'.[62] The hierarchy of the Tatar movement contains contradictory currents. 'Standing behind the top echelon in the mejlis are a significant number of Tatar activists – mostly on the country and town level – with great expectations and a weaker grasp of the realistic possibilities'.[63] In one of the few instances of uncontrolled violent demonstration in the Tatar movement, in summer 1995, local Tatars rioted in a Crimean town, leaving one dead.[64]

Indeed, the resolution and determination which the Tatar leadership showed during its long exile seems to have weakened now that events have 'caught up with the movement' and day-to-day concerns. 'To a certain degree, discontent among Crimean Tatars can be traced to the wide gap between reality and expectations that existed during the early years of repatriation'.[65] The leadership seems less certain of itself, and has shifted positions frequently, moving from advocacy of a Tatar state, to calculated opposition to Crimean autonomy, and again, recently, to a hard-line position of maximum autonomy for the Tatars.[66] These swings suggest that the political unity which for so long was characteristic of the Tatar community may now be breaking down. And the root cause, as I have suggested, has been their return from exile and the re-establishment of something like normal political life.[67]

One interesting comparison would be with dissident groups in other countries. Most of the previously relatively unified dissident movements of Eastern Europe fractured after attaining political power. One recent survey of regional dissident movements noted that:

> The life of a dissident provided poor training for 'normal politics... [T]he anti-Communist dissidents distinguished themselves by saying no, disobeying laws and ukases, and going to jail. They were uncompromising absolutists. Normal politics is concerned with finding the conditions to say yes, to compromise... The unity of the various [dissident groups] of 1989 has, predictably, eroded. When men and women banded together in virtual conspiracies against what appeared to be all-powerful regimes, they submerged differences in the name of discipline and survival. When greater choices became possible, they, like the rest of society, freely exercised them... [T]hey lost their political monopoly.[68]

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[62] Ibid., pp. 71-2.

[63] Ibid., p. 72.

[64] James Rupert, 'Tatars Return to an Inhospitable Home in Crimea; Back from Uzbekistan/Reversing the Trek of Stalinist Exile', *International Herald Tribune,* 11 January 1996.

[65] OSI, p. 38.

[66] In 1996, new appointments to the Mejlis produced a large turnover in membership and an increase in the power of the radical fraction, which may well presage a breakdown in Tatar cohesiveness. OSI, pp. 49, 92.

[67] This concept is explored, in the Central-Eastern European Context, by Joseph Rothschild, *Return to Diversity: A Political History of East Central Europe Since World War II* (Oxford University Press, 1993). Rothschild takes the view that post-Communist political patterns at least in part reflect the continuation of pre-Communist dynamics that were interrupted and suppressed by Communism. Although the situation of the Crimean Tatars is very different, the same mechanism may function.

[68] Michael T. Kaufman, 'From Dissidence to Dissonance', *Transition,* vol. 3, no. 3, 21 February 1997, p. 5.

In the case of the Tatars, one would expect this effect, though present, to be less significant, since – although they have achieved their principal goal (repatriation) – they have not attained true political power; the Tatars remain a political minority, and many of their previous dissident strategies may prove no less effective in political dealings with the Russian majority in Crimea.

Exogenous Factors – the Slavs: To a considerable degree, the future fate of the Tatars as a cohesive polity rests in the hands of the Slavic majority around them. Although they have repatriated themselves, they are still too small a group to establish a political majority or even become a decisive factor in Crimean politics. In the dispute between Russia and Ukraine, 'the rights and aspirations of the Crimean Tatars, who want the region to become "an independent state within a union of other states", have been marginalized'.[69] While Slavic attitudes and actions will not have much effect on the Tatars' sense of themselves as a nation, they may prove definitive regarding the limits within which that identity can be mobilised for political purposes by the Tatar leadership.

The Slavic populations of Crimea have been observed to exhibit a 'low level of tolerance and high level of hostility towards the non-Slavic nationalities'.[70] According to one survey:

> Within the Crimean region, 68 percent of the non-Tatar population (mostly Russian) expressed an unwillingness to see the Tatars return and only 23 percent said that they would favor allowing them to resettle… The salient factors fomenting this sentiment… was [sic] fear of competition in the job market as well as a reluctance to relinquish property that was confiscated from Tatars… Outside of the Crimean region, attitudes were more favorable towards Tatars.[71]

Nevertheless, the return of the Crimean Tatars is an established fact. Tatars account for around ten per cent of the population of Crimea,[72] and while the negative sentiments expressed in that survey may settle into an established resentment, the terms of reference will surely be different. Underlying concerns about employment and property may take different paths: tensions arising from competition for jobs may continue in various forms for an indefinite time, depending on economic circumstances, while a generalised fear among Russians and Ukrainians that property will be confiscated and returned to the Tatars would most likely abate if some general dispensation or agreement were enacted to 'settle the issue of compensation' once and for all.

Any proposal for such an agreement would, however, represent a serious test of the political unity of the Crimean Tatars.

The issue of whether to pursue a Crimean Tatar Republic seems less likely to divide the population, since in the demographic situation it is patently unrealistic.

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[69] Tamara Tershakovec, 'An Interview with Crimean Tatars: We Deserve Our Homeland Back', *Ukrainian Weekly,* LX (21), 24 May 1992, p. 4.

[70] Valentin Sazhin, 'Contemporary Relations among Nationalities in Ukraine' (summary report by Robert Monyak in 'Notes from the Harriman Institute Seminar on Soviet Republics and Regional Issues'), *Nationalities Papers,* vol. XXI, no. 2, 1993, p. 160.

[71] Ibid., p. 161.

[72] OSI, p. 21 gives the 1993 population breakdown as 9.6 per cent Tatars, 61.6 per cent Russians, 23.6 per cent Ukrainians, and 5.2 per cent 'others'.

It will attract only the most ideologically committed members, with perhaps lip service from most others. In fact, that goal was already effectively abandoned prior to the major wave of returns (and in that sense may be understood as a kind of *sine qua non* for Kyiv and Simferopol to approve return).

Future prospects: Will Tatar repatriation continue? And if so, how will it affect the demographic and political situation? At the present time, only half of the post-Soviet Tatars live in Crimea, the rest are still in Central Asia and Siberia.[73] Presumably, many of the Tatars who remain in Central Asia would also like to move to Crimea. In addition, there are the five million Crimean Tatars and their descendants who live in Turkey. A large return involving even a fraction of these people could possibly boost the Tatar population into second place, ahead of the Ukrainians. This might well make Kyiv much more reluctant to cooperate with the Tatars, and at the same time would present the Tatar leadership with a virtually insurmountable task in maintaining political unity in the face of potential rifts between the more established 'early returnees' and the 'newcomers', as well as between 'Soviet' and 'Turkish' Crimean Tatars, who have had significantly different political and cultural experiences for the last 70 years and more.

Such a scenario seems unlikely. Although there are considerable trade and business links between Crimean Tatars and their ethnic kin in Turkey, there have been almost no returns from Turkey. Moreover, even Soviet Crimean Tatar returns have peaked. The huge exodus of returnees from 1989 to 1992 'has been reduced to a trickle. Only about 5,000 Tatars arrived in both 1994 and 1995', and these were mostly relatives of those already there.[74] While a significant decrease is not surprising, such an extreme decline may suggest that the reports sent back by the first returnees were discouraging. Furthermore, those most interested in returning have probably now all done so, while those who remain elsewhere in the Former Soviet Union may well have little interest in returning to a Crimea they have never seen, or are too financially or emotionally committed to their present homes to be able or willing to leave.   ❏

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[73] Ibid., p. 27. This geographical divide puts strains on the Tatar leadership which is, unsurprisingly, located in Crimea.
[74] Ibid., pp. 39-40.

History

The Library of Petro Mohyla

Liudmila V. Charipova

A ny historian who tries to assess the achievements of so unique a figure in the history of the Orthodox Church as Petro Mohyla, 'a man of many worlds', as Ihor Ševčenko described him, comes up against the problem of the immensely complex and paradoxical nature of their subject. Mohyla was a devout Orthodox and a loyal subject of the Catholic king; a haughty aristocrat and great church hierarch, and a humble monk spending nights in vigils and flagellation; an outstanding intellectual, and a person of a somewhat tyrannical disposition. It should be understood, however, that Mohyla's personality was very typical of a traditionalist late-mediaeval world-view that he internalised.

One has to agree with M. Jugie, the author of an extensive entry on Mohyla in the *Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique*, who wrote: 'Même après les nombreuses recherches... la vie de Pierre Moghila, surtout dans sa première partie, reste enveloppée de bien des obscurités'.[1] Mohyla's life and work has always been and still remains a most interesting topic, and is a popular arena for disputes between historians, ecclesiastical historians in particular.

There are various types of historical evidence which may reveal the moral and intellectual springs of an individual's achievements. Private libraries undeniably belong among such sources of first-rate evidence. The aim of this article is to piece together and evaluate various items of information about Mohyla's book collection, in order to try and reconstruct its contents, and hence throw further light on Mohyla's intellectual background and inner 'workshop'.

1. *Mohyla's biography*

A brief outline of the known events of Petro Mohyla's life is in order here. It is believed that he was born in Sucheava, at the end of 1596. Simeon Mohyla, Petro's father, was the Palatine of Wallachia from 1601–2. After the death of his elder brother Jeremiah in 1606, Simeon succeeded him to the Moldavian throne, where he remained until 1607, the year of his death. Jeremiah Mohyla held the office of Palatine *(hospodar)* of Moldavia from 1595–1606. The Palatinate was under the sovereignty of Poland, and close family connections with the Polish aristocratic families brought the Mohylas the basic privileges of the Polish *szlachta*, including that of the *indygenat* (the right to possess land within the Kingdom of Poland and Grand Duchy of Lithuania).[2] In the instruction given to the papal nuncio

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[1] *Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique*, X, 1, Paris (1929), col. 2063.

[2] See, for instance, A. Jablonowski, *Akademia Kijowsko-Mohilianska: Zarys historyczny na tle rozwoju ogolnego cywilizacyi zachodiej na Rusi* (Cracow: Druk W. L. Anczyca i spolki, 1899–1900), p. 78.

Simonetta in 1606, Simeon Mohyla was referred to as 'a truly devout Orthodox, who was, at the same time, quite sympathetic to the Catholics, as well as his [late] brother Jeremiah whom Simeon succeeded to the [Moldavian] throne'.[3] After the premature death of Simeon Mohyla in 1607, his wife and children moved to Poland.

The years between 1608 and 1627 appear to be a decisive period in Petro Mohyla's life, particularly in terms of his future ecclesiastic career. The period embraced his post-primary education, most probably abroad, several years as a courtier and a military man in Poland, and also a 'transitional' period before he assumed the post of Archimandrite (Abbot) at the Kyiv Monastery of the Caves.

The available information concerning Petro's education is anything but abundant or positively reliable. Virtually all historians agree that he received his primary education from the teachers of the Lviv Dormition Brotherhood school. His subsequent higher training, took place, apparently, abroad, but there is no consensus as to where. One may note, in particular, the suggestion that it was at the Jesuit College at La Flèche in France.[4] According to an eighteenth-century manuscript biography of Mohyla, he 'spent his younger years studying the liberal arts',[5] which constituted the curriculum of all contemporary Jesuit colleges. Furthermore, the methods and principles on which Mohyla later based the College in Kyiv are evidence of a profound grounding in Jesuit methods, which he sometimes followed even in minor details. It seems to be very possible, however, that he broke off his education after completing the *studia humanitatis* (which concluded with rhetoric). His further studies, in philosophy and theology, may well have been undertaken later, between 1622 and 1627, when he had begun to contemplate a career in the Church.

Late in 1627, Mohyla was ordained as Archimandrite of the Kyiv Monastery of the Caves. Among his achievements while in office were the recovery of monastery lands which had been appropriated by lay landowners, the strengthening of discipline among the monastic community, and the redecoration and refurbishment of this, the greatest monastery of Rus', which had been long deferred due to lack of money. In 1631, Mohyla launched one of the most important projects of his life, the foundation of a school along Western lines in the Monastery of the Caves. In 1632, the school was merged with the school of the Kyiv Epiphany Brotherhood, to form the Kyiv Mohyla College, which its founder solemnly pledged to assist with books, teaching staff and other resources.

At the end of April 1633, when the Orthodox hierarchy was legally restored in Kyiv, Mohyla was consecrated as its Metropolitan. He immediately embarked on a series of important ecclesiastical reforms, which set the course for the mainstream

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[3] Quoted in Jablonowski, *Akademia Kijowsko-Mohilianska*, p. 78.

[4] For the origins of this version see V. Shchurat, *Ukrayinski zherela do istoriyi filosofiyi: istorychno-filosofichnyi nacherk* (Lviv, 1908), p. 29.

[5] The Institute of Manuscripts of the Vernadskyi National Library of Ukraine (Kyiv), fond I, no. 4084, fol. 1. According to P. Lebedintsev, this biography was compiled about the year 1770 by Yakov, the Abbot of the Kyiv Vydubytskyi Monastery (see fragments published by Lebedintsev under the title 'Petr Mogila, mitropolit Kievskiy', in *Kievskie gubernskie vedomosti*, no 43, part 2 (1859), pp. 297-300.

development of the Orthodox Church for two centuries to come. Mohyla paid considerable attention to the internal problems of the Church. He set high moral standards for those willing to become priests or to take monastic vows. Centralisation of ecclesiastical authority at all levels of the Orthodox hierarchy seems to have been a major aim. A hierarchical structure was created, with highly educated monks as visitators, and the Metropolitan himself at the head. (Some historians would argue that this structure was a conscious imitation of the administrative system of the Jesuit order.[6]) A new institution, an ecclesiastical consistory, based on the Catholic model was introduced in 1634–5. This was composed of monks of authority, experience and high learning, and was immediately subordinated to the Metropolitan. From that time onwards, clerics were no longer subject to the civil courts, but only to the consistory.

The patronage of Orthodox foundations and learning was highly esteemed by his contemporaries, and is duly appreciated by all modern historians. Mohyla also paid much attention to the printing press of the Monastery of the Caves. The problem of purifying canonical and liturgical texts had become an acute one by the late sixteenth century, especially in the Orthodox world, where the advent of print and its implications was relatively belated in comparison with contemporary Western developments. Therefore, Mohyla, a convinced campaigner for regularity and uniformity within the Orthodox Church, had taken the matter in his own hands. In 1629, he published his Λιετουργιαριον, or Order of Services (Λιετουργιαριον, si yest Sluzhebnik), which, by its comprehensive nature and fidelity to the Greek original, was an imcomparable improvement on all previous books of this kind. The text of Mohyla's Λιετουργιαριον thus remained in use, with only minor emendations, for more than two and a half centuries, up to the turn of the nineteenth-twentieth centuries. Mohyla's other fundamental works, *The Orthodox Confession of Faith* (Pravoslavnoe ispovedanie very; completed c. 1640) and *Ευχολογιον, Prayer-book or Rituale* (Ευχολογιον, albo Molitvoslov, ili Trebnik; published late in 1646), played a fundamental role in the establishment of a coherent system of Orthodox theology. These three works together (and, indeed, individually) present a whole complex of extremely controversial theological, ecclesiastical and political questions.

Mohyla died on New Year's Eve 1646 (Old Style, i.e. 10 January 1647 on the Gregorian Calendar). Nine days previously, he had drawn up his last will and testament. This is a document, in Polish, which includes Mohyla's personal credo and an appraisal of his life, instructions to his followers, and bequests of his worldly possessions to those whom he loved and for whom he felt responsible: his College (referred to as the *unicum pignus meum* – 'the only legacy' of Mohyla's earthly life'), the Monastery of the Caves, several Kyivan churches, monasteries and almshouses, and also his younger brother Moses. The will also bequeathed a considerable amount of money and real estate to the Kyiv College, together with his library, 'consisting of books in different languages'.[7]

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[6] See, for instance, Jablonowski, *Akademia Kijowsko-Mohilianska*, p. 167.
[7] See *Pamyatniki, izdannye Kievskoy komissiey dlya razbora drevnikh aktov*, 1-2 (Kyiv, 1898), p. 431; the original of the will is not extant.

2. *Methodological principles and historiographical background to Mohyla's private library*

The history of Petro Mohyla's book collection is a very complicated issue. Neither the time of its foundation, nor a relatively complete picture of its formation during Mohyla's lifetime, nor its fate after the founder's death have, to date, been definitely established. So, for instance, opinions vary as to whether this book collection, together with the College library, was destroyed when the Mohyla College buildings were burned by Cossack artillery in 1658 and looted in 1665 during the Polish invasion of Left-Bank Ukraine.[8] For instance, Makariy Bulgakov was not sure that the College library had survived the fire of 1658 and the Polish destruction of the College in 1665.[9] Viktor Askochenskiy, in turn, argued forcefully that it definitely could not have survived the calamities of 1658 and 1665.[10] However, an inventory of the contents of the Academy library compiled between 1772 and 1776 (the College was formally raised to the status of an Academy in 1701) indicates that a considerable number of books from Mohyla's collection were still in the Academy library in the 1770s: 'There are 3,304 volumes in the library of the Kyiv Academy... all have been contributed by the... Metropolitan of Kyiv, namely: *2,131 books donated by Petro Mohyla*... (my italics – L.Ch.)'.[11] This is clear evidence that Mohyla's collection could not have been seriously damaged in 1658 and 1665, and must have survived basically intact up to the 1780 fire that destroyed the Academy library. Furthermore, this fact was duly emphasised by Stepan Golubev and Vladimir Ikonnikov in the late nineteenth century.[12] The quoted figure of 2,131 volumes will be taken as a conditional quantitative starting-point for our discussion on Mohyla's private library. However, an important qualification should be made at this point. The collection, which had already been partially broken up by the 1770s (as we shall see later in this article), would have been considerably larger if kept intact.

Since documentary material on Mohyla's book collection is very sparse, the purpose of this article is basically a reconstruction derived from various evidence. First of

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[8] G. Gajecky, 'The Kiev Mohyla Academy and the Hetmanate', *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*, VIII, no. 1/2, p. 86.

[9] M. Bulgakov, *Istoriya Kievskoy Akademii* (St Petersburg, 1843), p. 135.

[10] V. Askochenskiy, *Kiev s ego drevneyshym uchilishchem Akademiey*, 1 (Kyiv, 1855), p. 290.

[11] *Akty i dokumenty, otnosyashchiesya k istorii Kievskoy Akademii*, ed. by N. Petrov, II, 4 (Kyiv, 1906), p. 66.

[12] S. Golubev, 'O sostave biblioteki Petra Mogily', *Trudy Tretego arkheologicheskogo s'ezda v Rossii, byvshego v Kieve v avguste 1874 goda*, 2 (Kyiv, 1878), p. 257; V. Ikonnikov, *Opyt russkoy istoriografii i ee protivniki*, I, 1 (Kyiv, 1891), p. 749. Nevertheless, the erroneous view that Mohyla's collection did not survive the seventeenth-century troubles in Kyiv continued to be repeated by certain authors (A. Jablonowski, *Akademia Kijowsko-Mohilianska*, p. 201; Amvrosiy Krylovskiy in his manuscript note 'Biblioteka byvshey Kievskoy Dukhovnoy Akademii' of 1925, which is now held at the the Institute of Manuscripts of the Vernadskyi National Library of Ukraine [fond 184, no. 67, f. 1v]). Surprisingly, it can be found even in a number of recent works, see, for example, V. Mykytas, *Ukrainski studenty i profesory* (Kyiv, 1994), p. 222; I. Torbakov, 'Paleotipy biblioteki Kievskoy dukhovnoy akademii', *Rukopysna ta knyzhkova spadshchyna Ukrayiny*, 2 (Kyiv, 1994), p. 117. The latter example should be attributed to a momentary slip on the part of the author, for, speaking of the quantity of volumes in Mohyla's library above on the same page, Torbakov actually refers to the figure of 2,131 books.

all, there is the evidence of surviving remnants of his library, which provide important data on the nature of the books (a rather wide range of authors, subjects, dates and places of publication), as well as a great variety of evidence relating to provenance (ownership inscriptions and stamps, notes concerning the purchase of books, *super-ex-libris* stamps on the bindings, etc.). In addition, one should mention here the eleven volumes of printed books and a manuscript codex donated by Mohyla to various Kyivan monasteries and churches. Although, strictly speaking, these were not part of the collection as of the time of Mohyla's death in 1647, and therefore could not be bequeathed to the College, they had been his property for a time. Secondly, there exist inventories of two large purchases of books made by Mohyla in 1632 and 1633. (These two lists survived in the original, compiled by Mohyla in his commonplace book). Thirdly, at the turn of the nineteenth-twentieth centuries, several books from Mohyla's collection were found in various places and mentioned by a number of authors in their works – although, unfortunately, the majority of them appear to have been subsequently lost. In his article on the library of Petro Mohyla, Golubev suggests a further method of reconstructing its contents, namely, to consider the books used and quoted by Mohyla and his milieu in their works as a part of his book collection.[13] Though this approach is undoubtedly important and relevant for the reconstruction of the intellectual atmosphere of the period, it does not seem a sound approach to the problem of the library itself, since the degree of 'approximation' appears too great for serious evidence. Likewise, Golubev's other suggestion that at least some of the books bearing the ownership inscriptions of Mohyla's closest associates (such as Yosyf Tryzna and Innokentiy Gizel) could originally have belonged to Mohyla himself should be rejected on the same grounds.[14]

Mohyla's commonplace book is an important document that, most probably, once belonged to his library (however, it is, in fact, rather a part of his personal archive). The commonplace book presents a collection of records of a most various nature – from sermons and pious meditations to household notes, known in historiography as 'The Notes of the Kyiv Metropolitan Petro Mohyla'. In the 1820s, Metropolitan Evgeniy (Bolkhovitinov) mentioned it as having been lost by that time.[15] However, in 1878, Golubev mentioned the commonplace book as being held at the St Sophia Cathedral in Kyiv, and published the two aforesaid lists of books purchased by Mohyla in 1632 and 1633 in his article on Mohyla's library.[16] Finally, in 1887, the entire contents of the book were published in a collection of documents relating to the southern and western parts of the Russian Empire (Ukraine and Belarus).[17] Since that time, all references to Mohyla's commonplace book cite these two publications, while the original seemed to have receded into oblivion. The author of the present article recently located it in the collection of manuscripts from the St Sophia Cathedral in Kyiv, currently held by the Institute of

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[13] Golubev, 'O sostave biblioteki Petra Mogily', pp. 258 and 266.

[14] Ibid., p. 260.

[15] [Evgeniy Bolkhovitinov], *Opisanie Kievosofiyskogo sobora i Kievskoy eparkhii* (Kyiv, 1825), p. 166.

[16] Golubev, 'O sostave biblioteki Petra Mogily', p. 263-5.

[17] *Arkhiv Yugo-Zapadnoy Rossii, izdannyi Komissiey dlya razbora drevnikh aktov*, I, 7 (Kyiv, 1887), pp. 49-189.

Manuscripts of the Vernadskyi National Library of Ukraine in Kyiv. It is a volume *in secundo*, comprising 116ff. of records, primarily in Mohyla's *manus propria*, bound in brown leather.[18]

3. *Surviving books*

Since the mid-nineteenth century, a varying number of books from Mohyla's collection have been reported by various authors as having survived: one, according to Bulgakov;[19] three, according to Vladimir Ikonnikov;[20] eight, according to Amvrosiy Krylovskiy;[21] 'about ten', according to historian Dmitriy Vishnevskiy;[22] and, finally, ten printed volumes, one manuscript and a Gospel donated to one of the Kyivan churches, according to Golubev.[23] The author of the present article has located altogether 40 volumes (41 titles, some bound together) of printed books, and two manuscript codices, which once belonged to Petro Mohyla. As has been mentioned, 11 printed volumes and a manuscript were donated by Petro Mohyla to five monasteries and churches in Kyiv. Hence, the remaining 29 printed volumes and one manuscript might be considered as belonging *de jure* to the library of the Kyiv College as a part of Mohyla's bequest of 1646.

3.1. *Books with the stamp of Simeon Mohyla – early acquisitions*

According to Mohyla's own words in his testament, he 'had gathered his library throughout all his life'.[24] This statement perhaps needs a small commentary. It is quite possible that at least some books that had previously belonged to his father, Simeon Mohyla, constituted a part (or even the basis) of Petro's own collection. Among the surviving books, there is a volume *in sextodecimo* by a Jesuit Franciscus Costerus, under the title *Universae sodalitatis Beatissimae Virginis Mariae, Libri V* (Antwerp, 1591).[25] On its last page, a small, round, black ownership stamp is found. It shows a bull's head with the Sun, the Moon and a star (the Moldavian coat-of-arms, one of the elements of the Mohylas' arms), surrounded by the text: 'Io. Simeon Mohyla, the Palatine' (Io / Simeon / Mohyla / voevoda) with the Mohylas' original hereditary coat-of-arms: two crossed swords, below in the centre.[26]

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[18] The Institute of Manuscripts of the Vernadskyi National Library of Ukraine (Kyiv), 367/676 s. The manuscript is described in: *Opisanie rukopisnykh sobraniy nakhodyashchikhsya v gorode Kieve*, ed by N. Petrov, 3 (Kyiv, 1904), p. 123.

[19] Bulgakov, *Istoriya Kievskoy Akademii*, p. 61.

[20] Ikonnikov, *Opyt russkoy istoriografii*, p. 749.

[21] The Institute of Manuscripts of the Vernadskyi National Library of Ukraine (Kyiv), fond 184, no. 67, f. 1v-2v.

[22] D. Vishnevskiy, *Kievskaya Akademiya v pervoy polovine XVII st.: Novye dannye, otnosyashchiesya k istorii etoy akademii za ukazannoe vremya* (Kyiv, 1903), p. 285.

[23] Golubev, 'O sostave biblioteki Petra Mogily', pp. 258-63.

[24] *Pamyatniki, izdannye Kievskoy Komissiey dlya razbora drevnikh aktov*, 1-2 (Kyiv, 1898), p. 431.

[25] Unless otherwise stated, all mentioned surviving books are now held at the Vernadskyi National Library of Ukraine in Kyiv.

[26] It is not quite clear what 'Io.' means in this context. Most probably, this is just a kind of initial indicating the name of Simeon's father, Ioann, as Simeon's second (patronymic) name ('Io[annov] Simeon').

Simeon Mohyla, a cultured man who knew Latin and was rather inclined to Catholic culture, might well have owned this book, which, after 1607, came to his son. Unfortunately, the title page of this volume is missing; consequently we do not have Petro Mohyla's ownership inscription on it, since it was usually on the title page of a book that he put his signature (obviously the page was lost thereafter). The text of such an inscription would have helped us to tell, at least approximately, when the volume came into Petro's possession.

Another volume, however, appears to contradict the above argument somewhat, namely St John Cassian's *Opera omnia*, vol. 2. This book is extremely interesting from several points of view. It bears the earliest known ownership inscription of Petro Mohyla. Although the inscription is not dated, the (barely legible) text helps; it reads (in Polish): 'From the books of His Excellency Lord Petro Mohyla, Son of the Palatine of the Moldavian Lands' (Z xieg J[...M...]: P: Piot[ra] Mohily [...] [woiwodycza?] Ziem Moldawskich). It is well known that after Mohyla's election to the office of Archimandrite of the Monastery of the Caves, he normally included his ecclesiastical title in every signature. The absence of such a title, therefore, may testify to the fact that he acquired the book before 1627. Both the author and the contents of the book may have had a special significance for Mohyla. The publishers recommend the author, John Cassian (360–432/5), on the title page, as the one 'quem alii eremitam, alii abbatem nuncupant'. The book, published in Douai in 1616, is the second volume of Cassian's *Opera omnia*. The front cover of a pigskin binding bears the Jesuit emblem: burning heart and the letters 'IHS'. The volume consists of two parts. The first consists of Cassian's renowned *Collationes Patrum xxiv*.[27] The second includes commentaries on the *Collationes* and other works of Cassian by Dionisius of Chartres (Dionisius Carthusianus), St Prosper of Aquitaine (a pro-Augustinian writer who condemned Cassian), Henricus Cuykius and Petrus Ciaconius, *Statuta duarum Congregationum, siue Capitulorum generalium Ord. D. Benedicti*, and indexes to the two volumes of Cassian's *Operum*. The book concludes with two poems: 'Carmen diuinum de vita monachorum' and 'Laus vita Monastica' by St Anselm of Canterbury. As this kind of reading usually assumes some special interest in a recipient,

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For further information on the Mohyla coat-of-arms in Petro's time, see Golubev, 'O sostave biblioteki Petra Mogily', *Trudy Tretego arkheologicheskogo s'ezda v Rossii*, pp. 259-60.

[27] The *Collationes Patrum xxiv* (Sermons of Twenty-Four Fathers) were 'published' in 419–29, and remained of importance to the Catholic theology for more than 1,000 years thereafter. They presented a general idea of the problem of spiritual life, diverse arguments of spiritual theology, and also dwelt on basic ascetic problems. In the Middle Ages, Cassian's name was often associated with the doctrine of Semi-Pelagianism (the *Collationis xiii* was especially dedicated to the matters connected with this doctrine). Its teaching stated that original sin was more a punishment than a true sin in the descendants of Adam, and that even with original sin man was still capable of achieving his own salvation, particularly in the early stages, and could long for it. The grace of God is necessary for salvation but is rendered efficacious by concourse with the human will, so that in a certain sense grace is a recompense for the use of one's own will, which thus concludes by meriting salvation. The great influence of Cassian on the long-term development of Catholic theology is testified by Alcuin, Rhabanus, Peter Damian and St Thomas Aquinas, by the authors of the *Devotio Moderna*, as well as by Ignatius Loyola, Rodrigues, and Bernardino Rossignoli (*New Catholic Encyclopedia*, III [New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1967], pp. 181-3).

it seems justifiable to assert that it was not by pure chance that the volume had come to Petro's hands. The book was published in Douai, in 1616.

However, in addition to the ownership inscription already mentioned, there is the familiar round ownership stamp with a bull's head and the name of Simeon Mohyla, this time placed at the beginning of the volume, on page 8, after the table of contents. Finally, there is an additional ownership inscription by Petro on the title page, reading: 'Petrus Mohila Archiepiscopus Metropolita Kiiouiensis', and dated '1639 Maii 30'. A final inscription on the title page of the volume *Ex Bibliotheca Kijevomohilana* shows that it later belonged to the College (Academy) library. So, what does all this additional information indicate?

In the first instance, according to the publication date, the book could by no means have belonged to Simeon Mohyla. The presence of his stamp is more likely the result of Petro's search for identity in approaching maturity, and certainly for a wholly respectable, honourable and stable kind of identity. To be a 'Son of the Palatine of the Moldavian Lands' was a high status, but could well have seemed insufficient to an ambitious aristocrat. After Hetman Jan Karol Chodkiewicz failed in his attempt to restore the Mohylas' rule in Moldavia in 1622, Petro could hardly have realistically seen himself as the heir to the Moldavian and Wallachian thrones. But, with his high aristocratic descent, the nature of a leader, the mind of a scholar and the devotion of a believer, he was able to think of another kind of 'identity', about a career in the church. Hence, an important book addressed to 'all the monks, and all the abbots' found its way into his library.

However, the presence of an earlier ownership inscription does not necessarily mean that 30 May 1639 was the date of purchase of the volume. Furthermore, 21 out of the 30 extant books of Mohyla (including one manuscript) also bear this date. Three books, according to their ownership inscriptions, were bought later, in the years 1645 and 1646, five volumes bear undated inscriptions. The remaining one is the volume with Simeon Mohyla's stamp discussed above. All this suggests that 30 May 1639 was, probably, the date when Mohyla had some kind of stock-taking of his library, possibly in connection with the compilation of a new catalogue.

3.2. Books with signatures dated 30 May 1639

In 1631, there died Mohyla's great friend and spiritual father Iov Boretskyi, an outstanding church figure, writer and scholar who had been the first Metropolitan of the Orthodox hierarchy which had been restored illegally in Rus' in 1620. According to his testament, Boretskyi bequeathed all his 'Greek and Latin books... [written] by different authors to his Excellency Lord [Petro Mohyla], Father Archimandrite of the Kyiv Monastery of the Caves'.[28] Unfortunately, not a single book of this bequest appears to have survived until the present. On the other hand, three volumes which had previ-

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[28] At the same time, all Slavonic and Polish books were left to the Kyivan Church of St Michael the Archangel, where Boretskyi ordered himself to be buried. Remarkably, Boretskyi also entrusted the future of his daughter Evpraksiya and sister Minodora to Petro Mohyla, whom he called 'my great benefactor' in this context. S. Golubev, *Petr Mogila i ego spodvizhniki (Opyt istoricheskogo issledovaniya)*, 1 (Kyiv, 1883), Appendices, p. 397.

ously belonged to Kyivan scholar Tarassiy Zemka, a well-known typographer at the print-shop of the Monastery of the Caves, are found among the surviving books. The author of the present article has not managed to find any document that could explain the presence of Zemka's books in Mohyla's library. However, it seems to be quite plausible that Zemka, who died in 1632, also left his books to Mohyla, who was renowned as a great book collector.[29] All three books are of a theological nature. The first, Petrus Besseus's *Conciones sive conceptus theologici,* was published in Cologne in 1611. It is not very clear from the ownership inscriptions who was the first owner of the volume. It could be either Tarassiy Zemka himself ('Ex libris R. Patris Tarassij Zemcae [Igume]ni Kiiouiensis') or some obscure Jacobus 'Sabinj' (whose barely legible ownership inscription has been crossed out). Neither inscription is dated. Mohyla's signature is dated 30 May 1639. Then come two inscriptions, the first: 'Ex bibliotheca Mohilana', most probably, made by a College librarian in the seventeenth century, while the second: 'Ex Bibliotheca Academiae Kijoviensis' must date from the eighteenth century. The second book, Laurentius Beyerlinck's *Promptuarium morale super euangelia festorum totius anni* (Cologne, 1618), also bears several signatures, first: 'Ex libris R. P. Tarassij Zemcae [Ig.]', and the second that of Mohyla: 'Ex catalogo librorum Illus[trissimi ac Reverendissimi] Dni Dni [Petri?] Metropolita Kiiouiensis [...] mp'). The third inscription is evidence of the fact that Mohyla actually supplied the College with the books from his own library. Dated 30 May 1639 (the presumed 'stock-taking'), it reads: 'Ex Biblioth. collegii Mohilaeani Kiiouien. A° 1639 Maj 30'. The third volume, Johann Andreas Coppenstein's *Bibliotheca Concionatorum sive Discursus Exegetici Reales* (Mainz, 1627), was first owned by a certain Ioannicus Wolkowicz, a monk of the Uniate Basilian Order, who left two inscriptions on the title page. The second (which is dated) reads: 'Bibliotheca concionatorum com[parata?] per me Ioannicus Wolkowicz Monachum Ordine Sancti Magni Basilij Jaroslavici Anno 1630° tempore Nu[ndinarum?], et in album librorum meo[num] exposita [...]' ([This] Compendium is acquired by me, Ioannes Wolkowicz, a Basilian monk from Yaroslav, in the year 1630, when there was a fair [in the city], and entered in the catalogue of my books). The inscription made by Zemka follows: 'Quam ego Jeromonachus Tarassius Zemca ab [ill.?] emi. Anno 1631 Februarij [1...]' (Which [book] I, Hieromonk Tarassius Zemka, bought from him, on [1...] February 1631). Next comes Mohyla's signature, dated 30 May 1639, and two inscriptions made already by the College (Academy) librarians in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

Among the volumes with Mohyla's ownership inscription dated 30 May 1639, there are three sets of several printed issues bound together, two of them comprising post-incunabula editions. The first consists of Urbanus Rhegius's *Catechismus minor puerorum generoso puero Ottoni Furster dicatus* (Halle, 1536), *Formulae quaedam,*

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[29] This idea was somewhat tacitly maintained by Petro Sotnichenko in his early work on the philosophical literature in the Academy library (P. Sontichenko, 'Biblioteka Kyevo-Mohylyanskoyi akademiyi: filosofski dzherela', *Vid Vyshenskoho do Skovorody: Z istoriyi filosofskoyi dumky na Ukrayini XVI-XVIII st.* [Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1972], p. 50); and developed more fully by him later (P. Sotnichenko, 'K istorii biblioteki Kievo-Mogilyanskoy akademii', *Istoriya stanovleniya i razvitiya akademicheskikh bibliotek* [Moscow, 1987], p. 91) and Zoya Khizhnyak (*Kievo-Mogilyanskaya akademiya* [Kyiv: Vyshcha shkola, 1988], p. 136).

caute et citra scandalum loquendi de praecipius Christianae Doctrinae locis (Wittenberg, 1536) of the same author; and two works by Antonius Corvinus, *Breves Expositiones super ea Euangelia quae in praecipius sanctorum praedicari solent* (Halle, 1537), and *Passio Christi in sex conciones,* without publication data. The second comprises Rodolphus Agricola's *De inventione dialectica, Libri III* ([Cologne], 1538), Erasmus Sarcerius's *Dialectica multis ac variis exemplis illustrata* (Leipzig, 1540), and *Orationes Philippicae latinae sanctae* of Demosthenes (Hanover, 1535). The third set of items bound together consists of two works of Rodolphus Gualtherus, *Archetypi Homiliarum in Acta Apostolorum per D. Lucam decripta* (Zurich, 1601), and *Archetypi Homiliarum in Omnes Apostolorum... epistolas* (Zurich, 1599), and the oration *De Pace et Concordia Ecclesiastica* (Zurich, [1601]) by Rodolphus Simlerus, 'Medicus Tigurinus', a tribute to Rodolphus Gualtherus.

Three volumes of selected commentaries and notes to Cicero's orations, *In omnes M. T. Ciceronis orationes selecta commentaria notae, scholia et annot. virorum doctissimorum Italiae, Galliae & Germaniae,* published in Cologne in 1621, with Mohyla's ownership inscription, dated 30 May 1639, have a peculiar inscription that was obviously made later: 'Ex Bibliotheca Collegii Mohilouiani Kiiouiensis [cum obitarum?] Pieczariensis'. These three volumes remained in the Academy library. Three volumes of works of St Basil the Great (*Opera D. Basilii Magni),* published in Basel in 1565, are bound as one and bear almost the same signature with only a slight modification: 'Ex Biblioth. Collegii Mohilaeani Kiiouiensis [Cum] obita[r]um Pieczariensium translatoru[m] [Kijouiam?] ad Confraternitatem'. This book is found in the book collection of the Kyiv Monastery of the Caves. Finally, there is a book dated 30 May 1639 in the collection of the St Sophia Cathedral in Kyiv. This is a volume of Byzantine pious moralistic treatises, translated into Church Slavonic and published in Ostrih, in 1607. Entitled *A Medicine for a sleeping Human Mind, and especially for Human Hearts hardened by the World and committed Sins, an address of St John Chrysostom to Theodore the Monk, and in his Person to Everyone who is familiar with Sins,*[30] it also includes the *Testament of Basil the Greek Caesar to his Son, Leo the Philosopher, the Prince and already crowned Caesar of the same Kingdom written in the Year 886.*[31] Both works were very well-known and popular among the Eastern Slavs, and were translated several times into Church Slavonic. This edition, from all appearances, was checked with Greek originals, in accordance with contemporary trends on revising fundamental texts. This volume bears no indication of having belonged to the library of the Kyiv College, which might well mean that it had never come to be there. As Mohyla's testament indicates, at the time of his death, his library was stored in the St Sophia Monastery and entrusted to the Prior.[32] It is hardly surprising, perhaps, that several books were left behind when the collection was moved to the College. Something similar seems to

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[30] Lekarstvo na ospalyi umysl chelovechiy, a osoblive na zatverdelye serdtsa lyudskie, zavedennye svetom albo yakimi grekhami, Bozhestvennogo Ioanna Zlatoustogo do Fedora Mnikha, a v osobe ego do kozhdogo cheloveka, kto znakom kolvek est grekhu.

[31] Testament Vasiliya Tsezarya Kgretskogo do syna svoego yuzh koronovannogo Lva Filozofa dedicha i tsesarya togo zh tsesarstva roku... 886 napisannyi.

[32] *Pamyatniki, izdannye Kievskoy Komissiey dlya razbora drevnikh aktov,* 1-2, p. 431.

have happened to a beautiful manuscript codex from Mohyla's collection, which includes St John Damascene's *Confession of Faith* (Izlozhenie very) and his *Dialectics* in Church Slavonic translation, as well as Andrey Kurbskiy's *Sermons* (Skazaniya) on St John Damascene. This manuscript bears two signatures, that of Mohyla, and another attributing it to the library of the St Sophia Cathedral in Kyiv.

Four books among those dated 30 May 1639 bear inscriptions testifying that they were purchased by Mohyla from different people. In the case of Georgius Bartholdus Pontanus's *Aureum Breviarium Concionatorum Sive Sermones Breves in Dominicos et Festos Dies Totius Anni* (Cologne, 1609), the earlier ownership inscription has been erased, so the name of the previous owner cannot be told.

Another book, Stanislas Socolovius's *De verae et falsae discrimine* (Cracow, 1583), in a beautiful specially commissioned binding has the previous owner's *super-ex-libris* on the back cover. The *super-ex-libris* belonged to Jan Muscenius of Kurzelów (Ioannes Muscenius Curelovius), a distinguished Polish humanist, doctor of theology and professor of the Cracow Academy in the late sixteenth century. The name of one other renowned Polish humanist, Maciej Kwasniewicz (Matthias Kwasniowicz, died 1633), is found on the front page of the volume. The inscription was obliterated with white paint. It is still partially legible if the page is held up to the light, although it is impossible to decypher either the beginning or the end: '[...] [Ordini S. Basilii] M. Matthia[s] [Kwasniowicz?] [professor Academiae Cracoviensis] [...] [huis] [liber?] ex Bibliotheca [...]'. Kwasniewicz was a great bibliophile of his time, having collected a significant library between the years 1594–1622. In 1613, he was appointed *provisor* to the library of the Cracow Academy *Collegium Maius*.[33]

Another vendor, from whom Mohyla bought the second part of Bartholomaeus Keckermannus's *Systematis logici plenoris* (Hannover, 1612), was Simon Simonidis (Szymon Szymonowicz, 1558–1629), one of the leading Polish poets of the period.

Andrey Muzhylovskiy, a priest from Slutsk, who then moved to the Monastery of the Caves, was one of who might be termed members of the 'Mohylan circle'. His name is found on the title page of Thomas Stapleton's *Promptuarium morale super Euangelia Dominicalia totius anni, Pars Hyemalis* (Mainz, 1610). As this was later crossed out, it may be assumed that he sold or presented the book to Petro Mohyla, whose signature comes next, dated 30 May 1639.

An *octavo* volume of Joannes Ludovicus Vives's *De veritate fidei christianae, Libri V* has no title page, but bears Mohyla's ownership inscription on the first page that is present. This may indicate the fact that the title page was already missing when Mohyla acquired it, since otherwise he would presumably have penned his inscription on it, as was his usual practice. The first *octavo* edition of *De veritate* was published in Basel, in 1544, and then in Lyons (1551) and Cologne (1568). Vives was a renowned Spanish humanist, and student of Erasmus, who emphatically advocated the establishment of academies and the spread of education.

Among the volumes dated 30 May 1639 there is also a book in Polish, *Katechism Rzymski to iest Nauka Chrzescianska za roskazaniem consilium Trydentskiego*,[34] published in 1603, in Kalisz.

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[33] M. Sipayllo, *Polskie superexlibrisy XVI–XVIII wieku* (Warsaw, 1988), p. 140.
[34] 'The Roman Catechism, that is Christian Doctrine as it is put by the Council of Trent'.

Another book with Mohyla's inscription dated 30 May 1639 has been recently found in the library of Kharkiv State University: Paulus Bottbachius's *Concionum Sacrarum Ex Vetustioribus, Orthodoxis, Approbatisque auctoribus* was published in Cologne, in 1633.[35] According to another ownership inscription, it once belonged to a certain Joasaph, who has not mentioned any other detail save for his first name. It is not difficult to postulate how this book could have reached Kharkiv. In 1726, a college was established in Kharkiv, and, as it usually happened, the Kyiv Academy alumni and professors went forth bearing their knowledge and experience. They also brought books from the Academy library. The book is mentioned in the 1828 catalogue of the library of the Kharkiv College.[36]

3.3. *Acquisitions of 1645–1646*

According to the first ownership inscription, the book entitled *Elucidatio in omnes psalmos* (Paris, 1540) had once belonged to Andrey Muzhilovskiy. Later, this ownership inscription was crossed out, and Mohyla's signature, in Polish, appeared: 'In 1645, Peter Mohyla, Metropolitan Archbishop of Kyiv, bought [this book] from Father Anatoliy Muzhilovskiy'.[37] The subsequent interesting history of the book can be traced: after Mohyla, it came to Innokentiy Gizel (ca. 1600–83), the Rector of the College (1645–56), Mohyla's immediate successor as the Archimandrite of the Monastery of the Caves (1656–83), who stated the fact of his ownership on the title page. However, his name was later crossed out, and another signature appeared: 'Ex Bibliotheca Collegii Mohilaeani Kiiouiensis'. Later, the volume was again removed from the library, and a new inscription appears: 'Ex Libris Athanazii [Myslawski (1731–96)] Archimandrit Peczariensis' (this is half erased and is difficult to decipher). Finally, the volume reached the library of the Monastery of the Caves, and is still held in that collection, which is now in the National Library in Kyiv

The inscriptions in two more books bought by Mohyla in 1646, Adam Opatovius's *Tractatus de sacramentis in genere et specie* (Cracow, 1642), and Heremias Drexelius's *Opera omnia* (Antwerp, 1643), state the fact of purchase and prices, but bear no details about the sellers.

3.4. *Undated ownership inscriptions*

The rest of Mohyla's surviving books have no dated ownership inscriptions; they simply bear his inscriptions testifying to the fact of their belonging to his library, and a few instances naming other obscure owners. These are St Epiphanius the Cyprian's (Epiphanius Episcopus Constantinae Cypri) *Contra octoagnita haereses opus, Libros III* (Basel, 1560); F. Ioannes's *Summa de exemplis et rerum similitudinibus locupletissima* (Antwerp, 1597); *De arte bene moriendi, Libri II* by the Jesuit, Robert Bellarmine

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[35] The Department of Rare Books and Manuscripts of the Central Academic Library of Kharkiv State University, RK 197320.

[36] The Central State Historical Archive of Ukraine in Kyiv, fond 711, op. 2, no. 1490, fol. 38v.

[37] 'Piotr Mohila Archiepiscop Metropolit Kiiowski Roku 1645 kupilem u oyca Anatoliia [sic] Muzhylowskiego'. Anatoliy Muzhilovskiy was the younger brother of Andrey Muzhilovskiy, mentioned above.

(Cologne, 1621); Gabriel Inchino's *Conciones de quatuor hominis novissimis* (Cologne, 1632) (according to a half-erased signature, this volume once belonged to a certain Matkowskj); and finally a set of works of the prominent Jesuit preacher Piotr Skarga, bound together. It includes: 'Sunday Sermons for the Whole Year' (*Kazania na niedziele y swieta calego roku*, Cracow, 1609), 'Occasional Sermons, with other Minor Works' (*Kazania przygodne, z inemi drobieyszemi pracami* (Cracow, 1610), and *Pro sacratissima Eucharistia Contra haeresim Caluinianam et Andream Volanum [in Lithuania Archimandritum]*, Cracow, 1610). According to the ownership inscriptions, apart from Mohyla, the volume had also belonged to a priest whose name was Jacob Miemlowicz. His two inscriptions provide some curious information. Calling himself a 'humble presbyter', Miemlowicz states that this book is number eleven in his collection, and that he is bequeathing it to the Kyiv Mohyla library, entreating prayers for his soul. The situation looks somewhat confusing for Miemlowicz's ownership inscription is also not dated, and it is impossible to tell who was the first owner of the volume. It is known, however, that Miemlowicz had studied in the Kyiv Brotherhood school in the late 1620s.[38]

3.5. *Books donated to Kyivan monasteries and churches*

From all appearances, donations of books, especially liturgical ones, to Orthodox monasteries and churches was a feature of Mohyla's regular patronage of these institutions. Eleven volumes (five titles) of the surviving books bear inscriptions testifying to such gifts. The first, entitled Λειτουργιαριον, *that is a Book of Rites from the Liturgies of St Basil, St John Chrysostom and their Predecessors,*[39] was, as is stated on the title page, composed by Mohyla, and printed in the print-shop of the Monastery of the Caves in 1629. According to the signature, in a form of a *skrepa*,[40] the copy was given to the Church of St Michael the Archangel, of the Kyiv Vydubytskyi Monastery, as a memorial to Mohyla and his parents. Mohyla is called here 'the re-builder and restorer of the Vydubytskyi Monastery after its total destruction by the renegade... Uniates' in the text of the inscription, written by Mohyla himself (as is stated in the end of the inscription). The donation was made on 23 November 1636.

Three copies of another book, the *Didactic Gospel, or Homilies for every Sunday and Great Feasts of the Year*[41] (also printed in the Monastery of the Caves 'by the order and blessing of the Father Metropolitan Petro Mohyla', in 1637), were donated: the first – to the Church of the Exaltation of the Holy Cross, of the Monastery of the Caves, on 15 January 1638; the second – to the Vydubytskyi Monastery, on 27 November 1638; and the third – to the Kyiv Golden-Domed Monastery of St Michael, on the same date. All three inscriptions are in Mohyla's handwriting.

[38] See Khizhnyak, *Kievo-Mogilyanskaya akademiya*, p. 45.
[39] Λειτουργιαριον, sy est Sluzhebnik, ot liturgii S: Vasiliya, Ioanna Zlatousta, i prezhdesvyashchennykh.
[40] *'Skrepa'* (Rus.) is an ownership or donation inscription, usually written at the foot of several pages at the beginning of a book.
[41] Evangelie uchitelnoe, albo kazanya na kazhduyu nedelyu i svyata urochistye.

A richly decorated volume of the Gospels, Ευαγγελιον, *that is the Gospel brought by the God-inspired Evangelists*,[42] printed by the Dormition Brotherhood in Lviv, 'with the Holy Patriarch's and his Excellency Lord Petro Mohyla's blessing', in 1636, was donated to the Church of the Saviour's Transfiguration at Berestov, in 1641.[43] The book did not retain its original binding, but all its ornaments were carefully replaced in their original position when it was rebound. The front cover of the book bears silver-gilt medallions representing the four Evangelists (in the corners) and the Mohyla coat-of-arms (in the upper centre). A gold medallion (in the lower centre) bears the donation inscription in Church Slavonic: '[This] Gospel is given to the Church of the Transfiguration of Our Lord, in Christ's glory, and in memory of himself and his parents, by Petro Mohyla, Metropolitan Archbishop of Kyiv, in the year 1641, November 1'.

Six volumes of a full collection of the *Menaion* for the whole year in Greek, each one consisting of the fasiscules for two months, bound together, published in Venice, in 1624–9, were given to the Monastery of the Caves, in 1641.

Finally, a beautiful manuscript of the Orthodox rites and sacraments, composed ('corrected') by Iov Boretskyi in 1632, as stated on the title page, was presented to the St Sophia Cathedral in Kyiv. From all appearances, this manuscript was specially commissioned for this purpose by Mohyla. The date of this donation has not been specified, but obviously was not earlier than 1633. The book *in folio* has three full-page water-colour illustrations representing St Basil the Great, St Gregory the Theologian and St John Chrysostom. (It has been suggested that Mohyla himself served as the model for St John Chrysostom. There might be a grain of truth in this view, for this picture looks rather life-like, less stereotyped than the other two). The name of the scribe, 'Lavrentii Iatskovich', is mentioned on the title page. Notably, the manuscript has a proper title page, which is very different to the common scribal practices in Rus' at that time. This seems to indicate a very clear and positive influence of printed books of the period.

Of all books donated by Mohyla, only the six volumes of the Greek *Menaion* and the manuscript have retained their original bindings. Remarkably, these have a *super-ex-libris* on the front cover – Mohyla's coat-of-arms with an inscription surrounding it: 'P[etr] M[ohyla] / P[ravoslavnyi] A[rkhiepiskop] / M[itropolit] K[ievskii] / E[kzarkha] K[onstantinopolskii] / A[rkhimandrit] P[echerskii]'.[44] It is reasonable to assume that all contributed books had originally had similar bindings.

The texts of all donation inscriptions follow the same pattern. The complete formula consists of: 1) Mohyla's name and his status; 2) the statement that a book is given 'in memory of himself and his parents'; 3) the name of the monastery or church to which the book is given; 4) an anathema on those who might dare to remove the book from that place; 5) the date; 6) Mohyla's signature. The Gospel, the Greek *Menaion*, and the manuscript of Orthodox rites and sacraments bear somewhat shorter inscriptions, omitting some of the above elements.

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[42] Ευαγγελιον syrech Blagovestie Bogodukhnovennykh Evangelist.

[43] The Central State Historical Archive of Ukraine in Kyiv, fond 739, op. 1, no. 43.

[44] Petro Mohyla, the Orthodox Archbishop, Metropolitan of Kyiv, Exarch of Constantinople, Archimandrite of the Monastery of the Caves.

According to the Kyivan bibliographer Svetlana Bulatova, one further book, a collective donation from a group of clerics with an inscription mentioning Mohyla's name, is now held in the National Library (Biblioteka Narodowa) in Warsaw. The volume of *Defensio quinque capitum* by Gennadius II Scholarus (Rome: Typ. Propaganda Fide, 1637), bears an inscription: 'Per me M. T. Ch. et P. Ab. urbe et osculo Patris rimeantem Illmo et R^{mo} Petro Mohilae nuncupato Metropolitano Kijoviensi, Totique eius Confraternitati offert Anno humanae Redemptionis supra 1644'.[45]

3.6. *Some conclusions on the surviving books*

The evidence of the surviving books indicates that Mohyla had no 'collector's' preferences as far as sizes, style of bindings, or other visual aspects were concerned. So, for instance, the sizes of his books vary from a large *folio* to a small *sextodecimo*, the first usually reserved for works for liturgical use, for example those given to the Kyivan monasteries and churches. The majority of the books are handy *octavos*, which, however, seems to be less the result of the owner's selection, than what the publishers regarded as the most convenient size for scholars. The same indifference to outward appearances is revealed in the style of the bindings (where the books retained their original covers). The only specially ordered decorated bindings are presentation bindings, apart from the one on the book that Mohyla bought from Jan Muscenius of Kurzelów, whose *super-ex-libris* appears on the back cover (see above).

The places of publication likewise differ. The leading centres of European printing seem to have supplied Mohyla with his reading: Cologne and Halle, Basel and Hanover, Paris and Leipzig, Antwerp and Wittenberg, Zurich and Mainz, Venice and Cracow. The wide-ranging character of Mohyla's interests determined the remarkably versatile nature of his library, different views, and different sources of knowledge.

One more notable feature may be observed: the absence among the surviving works of *incunabula*. By Mohyla's time, these oldest printed books had already turned into expensive rarities, greatly desired by collectors, but of moderate importance to scholars who could buy new, amended and corrected editions, relatively free from the errors often present in the *incunabula*. However, as the proportion of surviving books out of the original size of the Mohyla library is so small, this observation should be treated with caution.[46]

Finally, attention should be drawn to the language of Mohyla's inscriptions. Arguments about which language he might have regarded as his native one (which is different from the question of Mohyla's linguistic abilities) are fairly popular among historians.[47] Usually, the language of his signature matches the language of the book: Latin, Polish, Church Slavonic, Greek. However, the earliest of Mohyla's ownership inscriptions on a Latin book (see the discussion above on the books with the stamp of Simeon Mohyla) was made in Polish. The name of a poet, Lu-

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[45] This information was obtained orally.

[46] Actually, there is not a single *incunabulum* among all the surviving books from the Academy library.

[47] For an account of these arguments, see A. Zhukovskyi, *Petro Mohyla i pytannya yednosti tserkov* (Kyiv: Mystetstvo, 1997), pp. 19-21. Notably, as has already been mentioned, Mohyla's testament was composed in Polish.

catus (sic), a quotation from whom in Latin, possibly written by Mohyla, is found on a flyleaf at the beginning of the same book, is also written in the Polish manner, with the characteristic Polish 'Ł'. There is also a curious 'lapse' into Polish in one of the ownership inscriptions in the six volumes of Greek monthly readings (Βιβλιον του Σεπτεμβριου μηνος [και]... Οκτωβριου μηνος). Its Church Slavonic text (in Cyrillic) has been suddenly 'interrupted' by a Polish word (in Latin script): Petr Mohyla Arkhiepiskop Mitropolit Kiiovski v *leto* [1641].[48] The other five inscriptions keep the 'normal' Church Slavonic text. On the other hand, Mohyla's very personal note made on the flyleaf of a book that he bought in 1646 is in Church Slavonic (for the discussion on this note see below). These small pieces of evidence are obviously not meant to contribute to a rather futile discussion on Mohyla's national self-identification. This is simply an attempt to discover the language(s) in which he thought and in what context. This is, in a way, supported by the evidence of Mohyla's commonplace book. Its records were not addressed to the public, so to speak, presenting the author's 'inner workshop'. The languages of the records (save for the lists of books purchased in Warsaw and Cracow, composed in Latin) are in the current vernacular of Rus', Church Slavonic and Polish.

4. *Two purchases of books made in Warsaw and Cracow (1632 and 1633)*

In November 1632, the son of the late King Sigismund III was elected King of Poland – Władysław IV – in his father's place. Mohyla, who went to Warsaw to take part in the election *sejm* (diet), used the opportunity to make considerable purchases of books there. His original list enumerates 66 titles, of which 22 titles are crossed out and 44 were presumably bought.[49] The books listed are remarkable for their variety of subject-matter. Among the names of the authors we find Plautus, Tertullian, Juvenal, Seneca, Martial, Propertius, Clement of Alexandria, Gregory the Theologian, St Bernard, Prudentius,[50] Machiavelli, Calvin, Lipsius, Bodinus,[51] the Jesuits Nicholas Caussin and Higronius, as well as the *Epistolae obscurorum virorum*,[52] books on Arab history, trigonometry[53] and politics, and the poetry of Sarbiewski.[54] Concerning

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[48] Petro Mohyla, Metropolitan Archbishop of Kyiv, in the year 1641.

[49] For more information about these lists of purchases see the beginning of this article.

[50] Unfortunately, it is impossible to tell which Prudentius is meant – the Roman Christian poet Aurelius Prudentius Clemens (c. 348/50–410), or a Catholic priest Prudentius, who lived in the ninth century and was a fierce opponent of Semi-Pelagianism.

[51] Bodinus (Bodin), a French political philosopher renowned for his justification of religious tolerance. The original title of his work mentioned in Mohyla's list as *Conciones de Septem Sacramentis* is *Heptalomeres*. The book is written in the form of a discussion between the adherents of seven different religions. After its contents had come to be known to the public, Bodin was accused of atheism. Consequently, for a considerable time the work circulated in manuscript form, and was not published in full until 1857 (in Germany).

[52] A famous early sixteenth-century humanist pamphlet that ridiculed the obscurantists' fear of learning 'too much', and reflecting the opposition between the conventionalists and the innovators.

[53] Bartholomaeus Pitiscus's *Trigonometriae sive de dimensione triangulorum*, first published in Augsburg, in 1600.

[54] Maciej-Kazimierz Sarbiewski, an outstanding Polish poet of the 'Neo-Latin' trend, sometimes cal-

entry no. [64]: *Tuba nouissima*, Valeria Nichik argues that this was a book on optics and the invention of the telescope with the related idea of heliocentrism. Although this concept is not mentioned in Mohyla's works, it cannot be ruled out that he knew of Copernicus. Certainly, Innokentiy Gizel, one of the first alumni of the Kyiv College, and Mohyla's immediate successor as Archimandrite of the Monastery of the Caves, mentioned Copernicus in his lectures on natural philosophy.[55]

Neither the places nor the dates of publication are mentioned in the list. However, the bulk of books have prices mentioned. Prices are quoted in florins and groschen *(groszy)*, and differ considerably: from 1 florin 10 groschen to as much as 35 florins (a substantial sum of money at that time). Judging by the manner of crossing out the entries (the intensity of quill pressure, the ink colour, etc.), the process of selection was not executed at once.

In 1633, Władysław's coronation *sejm* took place in Cracow, and Mohyla again took the opportunity to get more books for his library. Another purchase was made. This list originally included 31 entries, with two titles later crossed out. Like the 1632 list, this second one is also rather varied in its contents. Such names as Avicenna, Pontanus, Ovid, Horace, Martial, Cicero, Manutius, St Ambrose and St Jerome, are mentioned in the list, as well as two volumes of Cnapius's lexicon. Prices vary from 1 to 45 florins. The nature of the books bought by Mohyla on this occasion suggests that some of them at least were meant for educational purposes. Cicero with commentaries, Ovid, Martial's works with commentaries, and Pontanus's textbooks on poetry seem too elementary for a scholar like Mohyla. This may well represent implementation of Mohyla's pledge to support the College. (In 1636, he wrote: 'I have supplied, I am supplying, and I will assist... the school with books, teaching staff and other resources... until the end of my life'[56]). Three volumes of commentaries on Cicero purchased in Cracow are found among the surviving books.

Since some surviving books from Mohyla's collection obviously did not have their title pages intact at the moment of purchase (so that Mohyla had to put his signatures on the first existing pages), one may reasonably assume that he bought second-hand as well as brand-new copies of books. However, it is impossible at present to tell which of the books included in the 1632 and 1633 lists were new and which were second-hand.

5. *Mohyla's books mentioned by different authors (other than surviving books)*

The 'Systematic catalogue of the library of the Kyiv Theological Academy', compiled by Krylovskiy and published in 1892, refers to a book as having belonged to Petro Mohyla (from all appearances, this was testified by ownership inscrip-

led 'a Polish Horace', a Jesuit preacher to the court of Władysław IV. In 1632, a beautiful edition of his poetry was published in Antwerp.

[55] V. Nichik, *Petro Mohyla v dukhovniy istoriyi Ukrayiny* (Kyiv, 1997), p. 15. Another possibility, however, is that it refers to the *Tuba novissima* of Johann Matthäus Meyfart (1626), a work on the Four Last Things (Death, Judgement, Heaven and Hell).

[56] *Prilozheniya k pervomu tomu issledovaniya Fedora Titova 'Tipografiya Kievo-Pecherskoy Lavry: istoricheskiy ocherk (1606–1616–1721)'* (Kyiv, 1918), pp. 316-7.

tions which also mentioned Stefan Kopystenskiy, a nephew of Zakhariya Kopystenskiy, Mohyla's predecessor as Archimandrite of the Monastery of the Caves). The book *in quatro*, entitled Δαμασκηνου μοναχου στουδιτου του Θεσσαλονικεως Βιβλιον ονομαζομενον Θησαυρος, was printed in Venice, in 1562.[57] Unfortunately, the volume is not present in the collection now. Further information about this book is found in Golubev's article on the library of Petro Mohyla – the name of the editor and the text of Mohyla's ownership inscription in Church Slavonic: 'Petro Mohyla, Metropolitan Archbishop of Kyiv, by his own hand, the year 1639, May 30'.[58]

Several other books are also named by Golubev in his article. The Ψαλτηριον τω Δαυιδ printed in Venice, in 1607, with Mohyla's signature: 'Πετρος Μογιλα αρχιεπισκοπος, 1639 Maii 30' (Petro Mohyla, Archbishop, 30 May 1639), and the Greek book of hymns, also edited in Venice, were then held in the library of the Kyiv Theological Academy.[59]

Of the three of Mohyla's books held in the library of the Monastery of the Caves in Golubev's time, two have survived until the present. Surprisingly, Golubev mentions only one of the six volumes of the Greek *Menaion*, namely, only the Βιβλιον του Ιαννουαριου μηνος (Venice, 1629). Firstly, he refers to only the January readings, without mentioning that the volume also contains the February lectionary. Secondly, it is not very clear why he did not find the other five volumes (the whole set of six volumes is now held at the National Library of Ukraine, in the collection of books of the Monastery of the Caves). Apart from those two, he also referred to the Ανθολογιον του ολου ενιαυτου πλουσιοτατον (Venice, 1587), which is now absent from the collection.[60]

Golubev found a volume of Khristofor Philalet's polemic work called *Apokrisis, or a due Response about the Council of Brest*[61] (most probably, the Ostrih edition of 1598) with Mohyla's ownership inscription, in the library of the Main Archive of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Empire. Another book of Mohyla was at that time held at the library of the Meletskyi Monastery of the Volhynian diocese.[62]

All the books referred to by Golubev as being held in the library of the St Sophia Cathedral in Kyiv have been retained intact in the collection until now.[63] He also mentions the volume of the Gospels donated to the Kyiv Church of the Transfiguration at Berestov, which is now held in the Central Historical Archive in Kyiv.[64]

Bulgakov, in his history of the Academy, mentioned Mohyla's book, which he called *A Treatise on the Sacraments* by Thomas Aquinas, as the one kept at the

[57] [A. Krylovskiy], *Sistematicheskiy katalog knig biblioteki Kievskoy Dukhovnoy Akademii*, I, 2 (Kyiv, 1892), p. 342, no. 5193.
[58] Golubev, 'O sostave biblioteki Petra Mogily', p. 258.
[59] Ibid., pp. 258-9.
[60] Ibid., pp. 259-60.
[61] '*Apokrisis* albo otpoved... o sbore beresteyskom'. 'Khristofor Philalet' is a pseudonym attributed to Polish historian Marcin Broniewski. *Apokrisis* presented a reply from the Protestant viewpoint to Piotr Skarga's book *Synod Brzeski i jego obrona* (The Synod of Brest and its Defence; 1597).
[62] Golubev, 'O sostave biblioteki Petra Mogily', pp. 262-3.
[63] Ibid., pp. 261-2.
[64] Ibid., p. 263.

Kyiv Theological Academy library in his time (the 1840s).[65] Citing him, Golubev modifies the title to *The Theological System of Thomas Aquinas,* but asserts that the book had been lost by the end of the nineteenth century.[66] However, it seems that both of them were in. The actual book that belonged to Mohyla is, by all appearances, the surviving one held in the collection of the Kyiv Theological Academy. Its full title is *Tractatus de sacramentis in Genere et Specie* (Cracow, 1642), but the author's name is Adam Opatovius (SJ). Moreover, there is a further book by the same author, entitled *Tractatum theologicorum, Ex I[ma] p[arte] Doct. Angelici [Thomae]* (Cracow, 1644). Most probably, the two titles somehow became confused in Bulgakov's mind (particularly as the two volumes look rather similar: they are of the same size – *in secundo* – and their bindings are also very much alike), which led to a further confusion. Golubev, in turn, would have been inclined to emend an 'incorrect' title of 'Aquinas's' work into the well-known *Summa Theologica.* Mohyla's copy of the *Tractatus de Sacramentis* bears a most interesting inscription in Church Slavonic, in what looks very much like Mohyla's own handwriting: '[A passage] on page 406 is very important to me, and is very much to my heart'.[67] On p. 406, next to 'Vide', written in ink in the margin, a passage from the decrees of the Council of Trent reads: 'Si quis dixerit eum qui post baptismum lapsus est, non posse per Dei gratiam resurgere anathema sit' (If someone shall say that one who, after Baptism, shall fall, cannot rise again by God's grace, let him be anathema).

Vishnevskiy also mentions books from Mohyla's collection, held in the libraries of the Smolensk Theological Academy (brought to Smolensk by Gedeon Vishnevskyi [† 1761] in the late 1720s, and bequeathed to the then Theological Seminary, which he had founded in the corpus of his own book collection), as well as in the Chernihiv Theological Academy library.[68] Likewise, Lavrentiy Gorka (1671–1737), who moved to Russia in 1722, brought Mohyla's books to Moscow and Vyatka as a part of his library. According to Gorka's will, his book collection was divided between the Moscow Theological Academy and the Vyatka Theological Seminary which he founded.[69] A reprehensible practice of some professors of the Kyiv Academy to take books from their *alma mater* when they departed, most probably, had begun even earlier than the 1720s.[70] This endorses the view that the number of books in Mohyla's library in its original state as of 1647, was greater, and probably considerably more so than 2,131.

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[65] Bulgakov, *Istoriya Kievskoy Akademii,* p. 61.
[66] Golubev, 'O sostave biblioteki Petra Mogily', p. 259.
[67] Na l[iste] 406 zelo mne polezno i podobno mne.
[68] Vishnevskiy, *Kievskaya Akademiya v pervoy polovine XVII st.,* p. 286.
[69] Khizhnyak, *Kievo-Mogilyanskaya akademiya,* p. 216.
[70] For instance, Vasiliy Putsek-Grigorovich (1706–82), later Metropolitan of Kazan and Sviyazhsk, who took a volume of Greek grammar from the Academy library when he went to Russia in the 1750s, gave it back to the Academy after 1780, together with other books from his private collection. In this case, the inscriptions look especially peculiar: (1) *Ex Bibliotheca Kijovomohiliana;* (2) *Ex libris Basilii Hryhorowicz;* (3) *Ex Bibliotheca illustrissimi Metropolitae Beniamin [Bibliothecae Kiioviensis applicatus].*

6. *Conclusions*

Although, at present, relatively little can be established about Petro Mohyla's private book collection, the information which is available allows one to see what seems to be its major feature. The broad yet consistent character of its owner's interests dictated the fairly versatile nature of the library, different sources of knowledge, and varied approaches to the vital problems with which the minds of Mohyla and the Kyivan 'Baroque milieu' which he created were concerned. It should be understood that the importance of Mohyla's role in Ukrainian culture lay less in the introduction of individual new ideas among the Kyivan intellectuals than in the establishment of a more or less coherent system of ideas, and, to some extent, that of new thinking patterns. Even as late as the 1770s, the book collection which Mohyla had bequeathed to the Kyiv College made up about two thirds of the total number of books held in its library. So massive an introduction of Western printed matter to Ukrainian intellectuals, as provided by his bequest, should not be overlooked or underestimated.

Books came to Mohyla's library from different countries, were acquired from different institutions and individuals, bringing together the power of knowledge. These works from all over Europe brought to Mohyla and his circle a broad vision and understanding of the whole range of contemporary thought. It is noteworthy that modern Ukrainian historiography seems to be slowly moving away from attempts to 'label' Mohyla either as a 'Catholicised and Polonised Wallachian', or as an abstract 'giant of a patriot', towards a broader understanding of his personality with a clear emphasis on his ecumenism. Ideas and concepts are not pure abstractions. In Mohyla's time, they had a material form in books. Moreover, as a library is not merely a pile of haphazardly collected volumes, but may be regarded as a distinct socio-cultural phenomenon, largely an accumulation of its owner's system of knowledge and inspiration, it can provide a perceptive historian with a closer insight into the intellectual background of the person under consideration. History requires a holistic view, in which everything is meaningful: even a single line inscribed in a book, or the fact that a particular book was owned by a certain individual.

Appendix

TRANSLATED TITLES OF GREEK AND
LATIN WORKS QUOTED IN THE TEXT

Universae sodalitatis Beatissimae Virginis Mariae, Libri V – The Universal
    Sodality of the Most Blessed Virgin Mary

Collationes Patrum xxiv – Sermons of Twenty-Four Fathers

*Statuta duarum Congregationum, siue Capitulorum generalium Ord. D.
    Benedicti* – Statutes of the Two Congregations or General Chapters of the
    Order of St Benedict

Carmen diuinum de vita monachorum – The Divine Song of the Monastic Life

Laus vita Monastica – Praise the Monastic Life

Conciones sive conceptus theologici – A Summary of Theological Concepts

Promptuarum morale super euangelia festorum totius anni – Moral Meditations on the Gospels of the Feasts of the Whole Year

Bibliotheca Concionatorum sive Discursus Exegetici Reales – Library of Sermons, or Discourse on Exegetical Writings

Catechismus minor puerorum generoso puero Ottoni Furster dicatus – Shorter Catechism for Children Composed for the Young Nobleman Otto Furster

Formulae quaedam, caute et citra scandalum loquendi de praecipius Christianae Doctrinae locis – Cautiously and Considerately Formulated Rules for Speaking on the More Important Points of Christian Doctrine

Breves Expositiones super ea Euangelia quae in praecipius sanctorum praedicarisolent – Brief Explanation of the Gospel preached by the Saints

Passio Christi in sex conciones – The Passion of Christ in Six Sermons

De inventione dialectica – On Dialectic Discovery

Dialectica multis ac varis exemplis illustrata – Dialectic Illustrated in Many and Various Examples

Orationes Philippicae latinae sanctae – Philippics in Church Latin

Archetypi Homiliarum in Acta Apostolorum per D. Lucam decripta – Archetypes of Homilies described in the Acts of the Apostles of St Luke

Archetypi Homiliarum in Omnes Apostolorum… epistolas – Archetypes of Homilies in all the Epistles of the Apostles

De Pace et Concordia Ecclesiastica – On Peace and Concord Within the Church

In omnes M. T. Ciceronis orationes selecta commentaria notae, scholia et annot. virorum doctissimorum Italiae, Galliae & Germaniae – Selected Notes, Commentaries and Annotations on all the Orations of Cicero, Written by the Most Distinguished Scholars of Italy, France and Germany

Aureum Breviarium Concionatorum Sive Sermones Breves in Dominicos et Festos Dies Totius Anni – Golden Collection, or Short Sermons for Sundays and Feastdays for the Whole Year

De verae et falsae discrimine – On Discrimination of the True and False

Systematis logici plenoris – The Complete System of Logic

Promptuarium morale super Euangelia Dominicalia totius anni – Moral Meditations on the Gospels for the Sundays of the Whole Year. Winter Part.

De veritate fidei christianae – On the Truth of the Christian Faith

Concionum Sacrarum Ex Vetustioribus, Orthodoxis, Approbatisque auctoribus – Collection of Pious Meditations Derived from Ancient Orthodox and Most Virtuous Authors

Elucidatio in omnes psalmos – Explanation for all the Psalms

Tractatus de sacramentis in genere et specie – A Treatise on the Sacraments, in Kind and Species

Opera omnia – Complete Works

Contra octoagnita haereses opus – A Treatise Against the Octoagnite Heresy

Summa de exemplis et rerum similitudinibus locupletissima – A Fullest Collection of Historical Examples

De arte bene moriendi – On Making a Good Death

Conciones de quatuor hominis novissimis – Sermons of Four Men of our Times

Pro sacratissima Eucharistia Contra haeresim Caluinianam et Andream Volanum – On the Most Holy Eucharist, Against the Heresy of Calvin and Andreas Volanus

Defensio quinque capitum – In Defence of the Five Chapters

Epistolae obscurorum virorum – Letters of Obscure Men

Tuba nouissima – either The Newly-Invented Tube, an unidentified work on the telescope, or else The Trumpet of Modern Times of Johann Matthäus Meyfart

Martiales cum Scholiis – Annotated Texts of Martial

Δαμασκηνου μοναχου στουδιτου του Θεσσαλονικεως Βιβλιον ονομαζομενον Θησαυρος – Thesaurus of Damascene the Studite

Ψαλτηριον τω Δαυιδ – The Psalter of David

Βιβλιον του Ιαννουαριου μηνος – Service Book for January

Ανθολογιον του ολου ενιαυτου πλουσιοτατον – Anthologion, or a Full Collection of Annual Prayers

Tractatum theologicorum, Ex I[ma] p[arte] Doct. Angelici [Thomae] – A Theological Treatise Based on the First Part of St Thomas's *Summa Theologica*

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Arts and Culture

Literary Anniversaries

Yuriy Klen (Oswald Burghardt)
(1891–1947)

This year marks the fiftieth anniversary of the death of 'Yuriy Klen', one of the major Ukrainian poets and scholars of literature in the first half of this century, and the author of a work which he envisaged as a national epic of Ukraine – 'Popil imperiy' (Ashes of the Empires).

Klen (real name Oswald Burghardt) was born on 22 September 1891, the son of German colonists, in Serbynivtsi, in Podillya.

He was educated at the Philological faculty of Kyiv University, and after graduating he published (in 1915) a study (written in Russian) of the latest analyses of poetic style. Shortly afterwards, he was exiled to Archangel province in northern Russia, under wartime regulations for persons of German descent. After the Russian Revolution, he returned to Ukraine, where he worked as a school-teacher in Baryshivka. Soon after his return, he became acquainted with the poet Mykola Zerov, and, under his influence, began his own literary career, principally as a translator of foreign literature (English, French and German).

During the 1920s, he became one of the group of five 'neoclassicist' poets (the five 'swans' of a celebrated sonnet by Mykhailo Dray-Khmara). This group encompassed writers of various styles; they were united, however, in their insistence that poetry should draw its inspiration from the 'springs' of world culture, their interest in canonical poetic forms (sonnets, *terza rima,* etc.) and their rejection of the 'proletarian' poetry deemed politically correct in the immediate post-Revolutionary period. In 1926–7, in the course of what became known as the 'Literary Discussion', the neoclassicists were repeatedly attacked in official Communist Party documents as exponents of 'bourgeois-nationalist ideology'. These polemics, and the growing constraints on creative literature imposed by the Communist ideologues, impelled Klen to emigrate, in 1931, to Germany.

There he held lectureships in Slavonic literature at Münster and other universities, at the same time continuing his literary work as a poet, translator and literary critic, and, in addition, short-story writer, and adopting the pseudonym Yuriy Klen. He became a member of the editorial board of the literary journal *Visnyk,* published in Lviv under the editorship of Dmytro Dontsov, and in this capacity had a considerable influence on literary developments in (Polish-ruled) West Ukraine

and in the Ukrainian diaspora. In 1937, he published a long poem, 'Proklyati roky' (The Accursed Years), about the persecution of Ukraine under Soviet rule.

During World War II, Klen found himself in Berlin, where there was a small group of Ukrainians, who – in spite of wartime conditions – managed to organise a literary circle where they read their works to each other. It was in this context, he himself wrote later, that he decided that the time had come for him to move from short poems to a more substantial work. The result was 'Ashes of the Empires' – a work in various poetic forms and genres, relating, now realistically, now symbolically, the recent and contemporary sufferings of Ukraine, set against his own, personal philosophical synthesis. At the time of his death, he had completed four parts of this work and fragments of the fifth. (It remained unpublished until 1957).

In 1943, in spite of the difficulties of wartime, Klen did manage to bring out a small collection of poems *Karavely* (Caravels) published in Prague.

After World War II, Klen lived in Austria, where he edited his own literary journal, *Litavry*, and then moved to Bavaria. In 1946, he produced his *Spohady pro neoklasykiv* (Recollections of the Neoclassicists), and, during the last year of his life, he joined with Leonid Mosendz (see *The Ukrainian Review*, No. 3, 1997, p. 73) in perpetrating a practical joke on the reading public of the Ukrainian diaspora, inventing the poet 'Porphyriy Horotak', and composing and publishing 'Horotak's' works as the collection *Diabolical Parables*.

Klen died in Augsburg, in December 1947, of exhaustion and cold. Within a few weeks of his death, a second edition of *Caravels* (reproduced photographically from the Prague edition) was brought out in Germany, in connection with a series of memorial lectures and readings organised among the Ukrainians in the Displaced Persons' camps.

In 1957, a posthumous collected edition of his works was inaugurated by the specially constituted 'Yuriy Klen Foundation', but only three volumes appeared at that time – Volume 1, containing 'The Accursed Years', his lyric poetry, and also poems in German, appeared only 35 years later, in 1992, under the imprint of the Shevchenko Scientific Society of America. A German-language monograph on his life and works *(Oswald Burghardt – Leben und Werken)* by his sister Josefina Burghardt, was published in Munich in 1962.

<p style="text-align:center">* * *</p>

The examples of Klen's works which follow are translated by Vera Rich.

Yuriy Klen

Merciless Days

Merciless days of steel, fierce, meet us.
In purple now the years are born.
A sun from copper beaten
Lights our way to centuries unknown.

Frenzied whirlwinds rage, the mountains rending,
From the depths buried thunders rise,
And meteors' dust descending
Is scattered in gold rage across the skies.

So the age greeted us upon the threshold
Of a life still unconceived…
So coming stormlight presses
Through black smoke of the years the heart to cleave.

Winds as if through fire-black wastelands driven,
Have revelled loudly through the soul,
No stars for us have risen
That through the dark led three Kings to their goal.

O blessed days of torment and damnation,
For we, now tempered by the snows,
Swathed round with conflagration,
Shall light the centuries with sky's red glow.

Into the future, ashes glowing hotly,
The deathless fire we've felt shall bear away,
And to the *Unforgotten*
Some bard in years to come due praise shall pay.

The Precursor

A loin-cloth made of camel-hair,
And sandals, primitive and wooden,
What path to the far-distance leading
The instant finger showed you there?

God's spirit in the breath of winds.
Locusts, wild honey, red cow-berries,
Water from out a rocky freshet,
A couch with moss and pebbles lined.

Let cities' hubbub roaring call,
Or, in quiet garden, cool, entrancing,
Herodias do her sinful dancing,
And lust into true talent crawl –

Like wave repelled by copper wall,
Allure and passion ebb away now,
In thy words there are forests neighing,
Groves rustle with their cedars tall.

The breadth of level fields did bloom
A hundred times with springtime drunken,
To flow forth in a vigour wondrous,
Into thy thunder's mighty boom.

Dread trumpeter of future years,
Thou dost proclaim another highway
Already at the feet now lying
Of Him who goes through storm and tears.

Thy testament's rigidity
Like dry wood He shall break asunder,
Like snowy standard then a wonder
Of flowers shall deck the orchard trees.

He it is that transmutes to wine,
The water from wells by thee sunken,
And on a thirst for beauty drunken,
We shall sing it throughout all time.

He generously and sincerely
Gifts the world with his graces kingly,
Like lilies robes us, raiment bringing
Hued like the multicoloured years.

And thou whom we follow in dread,
Thou so severe, so wrapped in sorrow,
Thy plough for us but drives a furrow,
A path to Edom's land to lead.

Thou art but watchword, whose bright flame
Through trushwood leaps, now, running riot,
Thou art a blest bell cast from iron,
A pathway that a sword made plain.

Volodymyr

I

The monk, sent hither from Byzantium,
Revealed a picture of the Day of Judgement,
The Prince saw heaven's blooms, Gehenna plumbless,
The artist's picture of the world to come.

Pay heed! For now draws nigh the day of doom,
The plain shall ring with black voice of the trumpet;
A path leads to eternity, and summoned,
Righteous and wicked rise up from the tomb.

And how can he that salty lake pass over,
That lake of tears which once Rohnida shed?
And brothers' blood in a great crimson river?

But slowly, now, the mists dissolve, and spread
Wide in the rosy hues that hope presages,
Bright gleams the unknown vista of the ages.

II

Moustache of gleaming gold, and silver head,
There in pollution and the dust they placed him,
Dnipro has lulled him to sleep with its spaces,
And all his days, like grass, are mown and dead.

And fate, ungenerous as it is said,
Numbering every breath, each movement tracing,
A new path upward to the stars is raising,
Marking new shoots and harvests in due stead.

Only the prince perceives, in a dream misted,
The city send a lion-roar to the distance,
Spreading its circle ever wider yet.

And he, astonished, cannot find a meaning
In this whirlpool of bustle, light and fret,
And the gold dome there in the sunlight gleaming.

III

Among the spread of grainfields ruling long,
Cast out of bronze, he stands in lofty station,
Below, toss billows of the chestnuts' ocean,
And from the Dnipro the wind bears a song.

Cloaked thus, he has met many a storm and strong,
In rags of cloud the years pass in smooth motion,
Now, booming under the aircrafts' commotion,
Red flags in evil conflagration throng.

To the skyline in spring casting his vision,
Each year the Prince sees the ice crack apace,
And muses how, after times inauspicious,

They all have vanished, leaving not a trace,
The wild Pecheneg, and the foe malicious,
And a smile plays then over his stern face.

Notes to the poems

'The Precursor', line 11: Klen appears to have misread or misremembered his source here. According to Matthew xiv, 6, it was the daughter of Herodias (called in legend Salome), who was the dancer.

'Volodymyr', I, line 10: 'Rohnida' (Norse Rǫgneidr), daughter of Prince Rohvolod (Rǫgnvaldr) of Polacak. She refused to marry Volodymyr, whereupon he sacked Polacak, killed her parents, and carried her off by force.

'Sounding Brass'

The essay which follows is an example of Klen's philosophical prose. Written in the aftermath of World War II, and only a few months before his death, it expresses the same message as contained in his unfinished epic-cycle 'Ashes of the Empires': the potential for destruction reached by humanity in the mid-twentieth century. (All the more poignantly so, when one recalls that Klen was himself of German descent – and that he lived in the Third Reich throughout the whole of its 12-year existence).

Klen's recognition that war in space had moved from the realm of science fiction into that of 'real possibility' is one of the earliest appearances of what would, in the decades that followed, become a major theme in Western political and military thinking, producing such concepts as 'Mutually Assured Destruction' (MAD), Ronald Reagan's 'Strategic Defense Initiative', as well as a whole range of movements (some well-conceived, some 'fuzzy') for a responsible use of the new, terrifying powers which man now had at his disposal.

His message, however, is couched in terms not of politics but of the Christian ethic of love, phrased in his recollections of Biblical language, which is all the more telling by not being exact quotations – showing that he was *not* working with a Bible on his desk as a source of useful references and images, but rather reproducing from memory texts which had become an integral part of his own philosophy and psyche.

17 May 1947

The Bible story which tells of the happy life in the Garden of Eden also tells of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, the fruit of which it was forbidden to eat. And, contradicting each other, there are two opposing statements. The Lord says: 'If you eat from this tree, you shall die the death'. The serpent says: 'Eat, and you shall be as gods!' This promise and this warning did not take effect immediately; they take effect slowly, throughout the life-span of humanity. Man is the only creature that can distinguish between good and evil. A predator which tears at a sheep because it is suffering the torments of hunger cannot so distinguish, and hence commits no sin. Man, mastering the secrets of nature step by step, becomes constantly more 'as gods'. The juice of the apple, once tasted, works in him like a slow poison, which gradually penetrates his entire being. The serpent's promise assumes forms which are ever more real. And the warning of the Lord? Man is becoming not only omniscient, but also a rival of God, the creator of new worlds: demiurge and destroyer. In a little while, maybe, he will be able to split up the moon into many separate bodies, or to create from their elements, whose mysteries he has long mastered, new moons – not, perhaps, new colonies to receive surplus humanity, but rather trans-atmospheric bases from which to fire down on enemy continents. The image of a space war has ceased to be a figment of fiction and is becoming a real possibility.

When we read the Apocalypse of St John, are we not amazed and terrified by the destructive ferocity of the Lord, with the 'pale horses', plagues of boils, the poisoning of the seas and wells, fire from heaven, and all the other torments, so that people, to escape from them, will flee into the hills and caves, crying 'Fall upon us! Cover us!' We *were* amazed… until we lived through the recent world war, and saw that all these apocalyptic terrors are not something which the Lord

will send, but which people will inflict on each other, that their destructive terror and ferocity have neither bounds nor limit. When St John in his dread vision beholds earthquakes and the huge hailstones which will fall and shatter everything, he is simply using old names for new subjects and new phenomena, since our terminology for them did not exist at that time. And the warning of the Lord 'You shall die the death' hangs ever over us.

Man has had to pay dearly for his knowledge: the price is his soul and his immortality. Is it not written in the Gospel? 'What shall it profit a man if he gain the whole world and suffer the loss of his soul?' All treasures, all power, all might, all such gains and acquisitions have to be paid for with the soul.

And does it not say elsewhere in the New Testament: 'If a man speak with the voices of all the angels and has not love within him, he is as sounding brass'.

Two lessons are clearly stressed here: to save one's soul; to have love within oneself. And have we not all saved our souls, leaving the places where we had dwelt for so long, and travelling far far away? We were driven, perhaps, first and foremost, by the threat of losing our lives, or putting our bodies at the risk of torture, but subconsciously, a still more terrible threat raised its voice – the threat of losing one's soul. For what were all the tortures of concentration camps, all the terror of the Siberian taiga, all the hunger and cold, compared with the slow quenching of the spark of the spirit, the drowning of our souls in the swamp, the gradual transformation into a submissive automaton, into the mere tool of a force which would have destroyed in us everything which we were accustomed to think of as moral, which would have raised up in us a new morality in which betrayal, denunciation and ruthlessness ranked as virtues? And if we fled from this terrible fate, escaping from the hypocrisy which presses a revolver into a son's hands for him to shoot his own mother as a 'counter-revolutionary', and if we are trying, taking the path of all noble fugitives, to save our souls, rather than losing them as the price of acquiring all the treasures of this world, can there be any more urgent demand upon us than: not to become 'sounding brass?'

The contemporary population of the West is still far from realising that only love will save it from falling into that chasm into which the 'pale horse' is carrying it at full gallop. When a Chinese Cardinal visited Paris and saw the placards depicting and describing the atrocities inflicted on the French during the war, he said: 'What you suffered is only a tenth part of what we had to suffer under the Japanese. But in our country, it was forbidden to put up such things lest they aroused a thirst for revenge and inspired a hatred which would have to be quenched when peace reigned once more'.

We are still far from this unwise wisdom of the East.

When Gandhi was asked what should be done to win people to Christianity, he replied, in all seriousness: 'You must live in accordance with Christ's testament'. That is, to win them by shining example. This Hindu had perceived the truth about the 'sounding brass' better than many a Christian.

While Christ's testament is recognised, at least theoretically, as the basis for relationships between individuals, it has not been invoked in relationships between nations, and even a theoretical acknowledgement of it was considered fool-

ishness and the romantic dream of crazy pacifists. It was thought: the worse it is for my neighbour, the better it is for me. The morality of the Nazis was: the more we destroy the foreigner, the more space there will be for us. The invocation of any moral principle was considered weakness and treachery. This anti-morality was a hundred per cent bankrupt. It turned out that extreme egotism was not only immoral, but also foolish, and that those who had led their lives by it, fell into the pit which they themselves had dug. So those people who did not listen to the voice of the heart, now have to listen to the voice of reason, which tells them the same message.

And we, too, in our community relations, do not we also have to listen to what the heart and common sense tell us? Not to honour those acquisitions, the gaining of which will entail the loss of our soul. To remember that even if we speak with all the voices of angels, we shall still remain only 'sounding brass' if we do not have within ourselves love for our neighbour, and respect for his person, equal to the respect which we demand for our own person?

Each one of use who has passed through terrible experiences, and who are disillusioned with the methods used so far to normalise life, are standing at the same crossroads where humanity stood when it suddenly realised that the promise of the serpent 'you shall be as goods', which put into his hands the power to destroy worlds and conquer space, is indissolubly bound up with the curse of the Lord 'You shall die the death', that this is a threat both of the physical destruction of mankind, and also our spiritual destruction, since the price to be paid for being 'as gods' turns out to be our soul.   ❏

Reviews

History of Ukraine-Rus'. Volume 1. From Prehistory to the Eleventh Century. By Mykhailo Hrushevsky, translated by Marta Skorupsky (Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, Edmonton–Toronto, 1997), 602 pp.

This book represents the first part of a major task undertaken by the Peter Jacyk Centre for Ukrainian Historical Studies, established at the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies at the University of Alberta in 1989. Jacyk's endowment of the Centre was accompanied by a request that the Centre should undertake the translation of the monumental *Istoriya Ukrayiny-Rusi* by Mykhailo Hrushevskyi, the scholar who, in effect, was the founding father of modern Ukrainian historiography. The Ukrainian original, in ten volumes, was published over the period 1898–1937. A single-volume abridged version in English appeared in 1948; but this, of necessity, omitted much of the detail which makes the original so valuable a work of scholarship.

This first volume, appearing as it does a few months before the centenary of the publication of the Ukrainian original, is thus the harbinger of what will undoubtedly prove of enormous significance and value, not only to Anglophone students of Ukrainian history, but also to historians whose field of interest touches only in part or peripherally on Ukraine (for example, specialists in the Habsburg or Ottoman empires), as well as those many scholars from other academic disciplines – economics, politics, and the like, who in the last few years developed a professional interest in Ukraine, but have insufficient knowledge, as yet, of the Ukrainian language to tackle Hrushevskyi in the original.

The current volume covers the period 'from the depths of prehistory', up to the death of the Grand Prince Volodymyr I of Kyiv in 1015, together with two Excursi, by Hrushevskyi, on 'The Earliest Chronicle of Kyiv' and 'The Normanist Theory'. To this original content, this edition adds an Editorial Preface to Volume 1, an introduction to the *History* by Frank E. Sysyn, and an Introduction to Volume 1 by Andrzej Poppe. The purpose of the latter – as will also be the aim of similar introductions to subsequent volumes – is, in Sysyn's words, 'to place [Hrushevskyi's] work in the content of the field'. Poppe, accordingly, not only sets Hrushevskyi's book in the context of his time – stressing, in particular, his scholarly evaluation of sources, and his break with tradition in beginning his history, not with the earliest written records, but with the earliest archaeological evidence of human habitation – but also contrasts it with the later distortions forced upon Soviet Ukrainian historians by the demands of Marxist-Leninist theory. 'It turned out to be fortunate', Poppe concludes, 'that after 1934 it was forbidden in Soviet Ukraine to cite Hrushevsky and his works, for this prevented them from being

disfigured and made to conform to the resolutions and immediate needs of the party of Lenin and Stalin'.

Wisely, no attempt has been made to emend or update Hrushevskyi's text. Where the editors considered it necessary to expand on a particular point, correct a misprint in the original, note variant interpretations of the Ukrainian text, or draw attention to the works of later scholars, this is done either within the conventional square brackets in the body of the text, or else in footnotes, in a typeface easily distinguishable from that used for the translation of Hrushevskyi's original. They have treated the text, in short, as befits what may justly be termed the founding classic of modern Ukrainian historiography.

Myths and Nationhood. Geoffrey Hosking and George Schöpflin (Eds.) (Hurst and Company, London, in association with the School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University of London, 1997), 214 pp.

This is a collection of papers from a two-day conference of the same name, held at the School of Slavonic and East European Studies (SSEES), in October 1996, as the first major venture of a proposed Centre for the Study of Nationalism in Europe. Since that time, the new funding and assessment procedures have forced SSEES to embark upon a major (and unwelcome) restructuring programme, which seems likely to mean a drastic reduction of its Central European programmes. Whether or not the proposed Centre for the Study of Nationalism ever takes permanent form, there can be no doubt that this book represents a major contribution to the field.

'Myth', in the sense used here, does not necessarily have the colloquial meaning of that which is untrue. Myths, according to the blurb on the back of the book, are 'central to the way we live… vital and necessary aspects of every community', the narratives which communities tell about themselves, 'about who they are, how they came to be and what they are striving to do… establish[ing] a coherence and a consistency for the members of a community and creat[ing] the assumptions that are seen as normal and natural'. In politics, moreover, 'myth has crucial functions in determining which parts of a community's self-image are seen as important and which are ignored... The nature of power, legitimacy, change, meanings, unity and diversity are all deeply affected by myth, as are questions of nationhood, ethnicity and conflict'.

These remarks (presumably by the editors) make abundantly clear the importance of 'myth' in this sense for the nations of the former Communist bloc which are now striving to re-establish their identity. Five such nations form the subject of these papers – the Czechs (Kieran Williams), Latvia (Agita Misāne and Aija Priedīte), Belarus and Ukraine (treated together by Andrew Wilson) and Russia (Geoffrey Hosking). There is also a study of 'The Myth of Zion

among East European Jewry' (John D. Klier). Three more general studies of myth
(Joanna Overing, George Schöpflin and Anthony Smith), two papers on myths
outside the post-Communist space – the USA (Susan-Mary Grant) and the Afri-
kaners (Bruce Cauthen), these latter serving, as it were, as a 'control experiment'
for the Central-East European experience. The same 'control' function is also
served by what may be termed an obituary for a state which failed to establish a
viable national myth – the German Democratic Republic (Mary Fulbrook), while
Sonja Puntscher Riekmann addresses one of the principal myths of the post-
Communist world – 'the myth of European Unity'. (The cover-illustration, inci-
dentally, relates to none of the topics discussed within in detail; it comes from an
earlier period of national resurgence; a reproduction of 'The Attack', painted in
1899 by the Finnish artist Edvard Isto (1865–1905), and representing the Russian
double-headed eagle attempting 'to wrench the lawbook from the grasp of the
Finnish maiden').

It is noteworthy that virtually all these studies are made from outside. Apart
from Dr Riekmann (Austria) and the two Latvians, the authors are all based in the
United Kingdom. This was probably due simply to matters of conference logistics
(and budgetary constraints!), though, doubtless, many scholars would consider it
an advisable procedure, conducive to academic detachment and impartiality. But,
as Professor Overing shows in her paper: 'The Role of Myth: An Anthropological
Perspective' which opens the volume, it is all too easy for the 'outside' scholar to
misunderstand how a specific myth, or 'myth' in general, is perceived by the
members of the community he or she is studying. The only two papers from
which one receives a real impression of how national myth is perceived by the
nation itself are (as one would expect) Misāne and Priedīte's 'National Mythology
in the History of Ideas in Latvia: A View from Religious Studies' and Norman
Davies's 'Polish National Mythologies'. (But Professor Davies writes as, and in-
deed, considers himself an 'insider', going so far as to refer to himself, in the
course of the paper, as a 'Cracovian'). For the rest, the reader can only view the
nation concerned from outside.

In the case of Andrew Wilson's analysis of 'Myths of National History in Belarus
and Ukraine' this exterior viewpoint may, at first glance, appear beneficial, since
such a comparison of two countries demands, by definition, an impartial detach-
ment. Dr Wilson addresses a problem of post-Soviet historiography specific to
these two countries alone within the post-Soviet space. 'Nationalist historians in
both states', he writes,

> have set themselves similar tasks: namely disentangling a national myth of descent from tra-
> ditional Russophile historiography, celebrating a lost 'Golden Age' before forcible incorpo-
> ration into the Russian sphere of influence, and demonstrating that, in contrast to autocratic
> and 'Asiatic' Russia, their nations are naturally democratic, demotic and 'European'.

In other words, they have to repossess for themselves the history of their terri-
tories before the expansion of Muscovy westward into their lands. This, as Dr
Wilson rightly notes, is far more difficult for Belarus than for Ukraine: the history
of Kyiv-Rus', albeit annexed by Russia, is well documented. The history of 'Po-
lacak-Rus', which Belarusian nationalist historians claim lay for the most part out-

side the Kyiv hegemony, if not actually at war with it, has no comparable documentary basis (the Polacak chronicles perished when Ivan IV ('the Terrible') burned that city, and its history has to be extrapolated from the Kyiv and Novgorod manuscripts). Furthermore, Belarus has nothing comparable to the Ukrainian Cossack period: ('Despite claims that some Belarusians travelled south to participate in the Ukrainian Cossack movement, its influence on Belarusian society could only be indirect'), and '[t]o establish a tradition of statehood in the medieval period, therefore, the Belarusians have to displace Lithuanian historiography, claiming that the state established by Mendaŭh (Mindaugas) in the late fourteenth century was in fact a Belarusian, not a Lithuanian, state, founded on the remnants of Polatskaia Rus' and Novaharadok'. Furthermore, Ukraine, Wilson notes, has a stronger sense of 'religious exceptionalism' both 'among Uniate West Ukrainians and the central Ukrainian intelligentsia, who are largely Autocephalous Orthodox'. And, perhaps most important, Belarus, following the partitions of the 'Polish' Commonwealth, fell entirely under Russian rule, whereas Ukraine had the invaluable asset of a 'piedmont' – Austrian-ruled Galicia – which served as an ark and a bridgehead for Ukrainian culture and tradition. At one point, indeed, Wilson seems to be leading up to a declaration that, whereas Ukraine has a corpus of historical myth capable of sustaining a nation-state, Belarus does not, and may well, therefore, like the GDR, prove an example of the Biblical dictum that 'Where there is no vision, the people perish' (Proverbs, xxviii,9).

Wilson, however, stops short of this prophecy. After a detailed analysis of the historical myths of both countries, including that of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, which far from promoting a sense of national unity, is, in Wilson's view, 'extremely divisive', he concludes that Ukraine, like Belarus, still lacks a historical mythology capable of carrying out all the tasks required of it in the building of nationhood and statehood. Ukraine, he says, has 'a relatively coherent narrative of origin and descent', which 'has powerful appeal to the nationally-conscious minority', but this 'because it excludes or caricatures genuinely complex aspects of the Ukrainian-Russian historical relationship,... runs the risk of alienating the Russian-speaking half of the population of Ukraine'. (Wilson here appears to fall into the trap of confusing Russophone with Russophile/ethnic Russian. Not all monoglot Russophone Ukrainians are so by choice). He makes the interesting point that '[t]he new president, Leonid Kuchma, has therefore preferred to emphasize relatively safe topics, the Cossack movement in particular, rather than the more divisive issues raised by his predecessor Leonid Kravchuk, such as the Great Famine of 1932–3, the UPA, or a history of Rus' without the Russians'.

However, (leaving aside the question of whether Kuchma can properly be described as a 'new' president, when at the time of the conference he was already more than half-way through his term of office) one has to query whether the Cossacks are really so 'non-divisive' a subject. The Ukrainian view of the Great Famine, UPA, and 'Rus' without the Russians' is certainly liable to antagonise ethnic Russians hankering for Moscow's rule and those who (left-wingers in particular) still perceive history in terms of the Soviet 'mythos' – but is the Cossack 'myth' non-controversial? According to Wilson:

From the mid-seventeenth century onwards… the Ukrainians have the all-important Cossack era to celebrate. Not only are the Cossacks lauded for their democratic traditions and defence of the (Orthodox) faith, but it is argued that they revived many of the traditions of Rus' and that the polity they established after Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi's rebellion in 1648 was a true Ukrainian *state* rather than just an anarchic refuge for runaway serfs. As the history of the Cossack 'Hetmanate' can be stretched up until the end of the eighteenth century, there is therefore a relatively short gap before 'national revival' begins early in the nineteenth century…

Not a mention of Pereyaslav nor Poltava – subjects interpreted in diametrically opposite ways by 'nationalist' historians in Ukraine and Russia! And, since in their ever changing pattern of alliances the Cossacks fought, at various times, Muscovites, Poles and Turks, too great an emphasis on the Cossacks could well prove 'divisive', not only to Ukrainian-Russian relations, but could also cause friction with those neighbours whom Kyiv now views as a counter-balance to Russia – Poland and Turkey.

While on the subject of the Cossacks, it is worth noting that Wilson makes no reference whatever to the person who perhaps did most to shape the Ukrainian perception of the past, and in particular the Cossack past – Ukraine's national poet, Taras Shevchenko. Indeed, throughout the book, the importance of poetry as a shaper and conduit for national myths (in all the variants – 'origin', 'golden age', 'heroic valour', 'suffering', 'redemption', etc. set out in Schöpflin's paper: 'The Functions of Myth and a Taxonomy of Myths') is largely neglected – with, once again, the notable exception of Davies and the Latvian study. It is Davies, therefore, not Wilson, who addresses the Cossack myth – and in particular, the uprising of 1768, in poetic terms. This rising – a particularly violent one – is the subject of Shevchenko's epic 'Haydamaky', the narrative of which shows a significant progression of mood from thoughtless blood-lust to tragedy and mourning… and in a prose afterword calls for an end to the traditional enmity of Ukrainian and Pole. Davies, viewing the rising from the Polish side, focuses on a similar message. In the context of this Rising, he writes,

> that one of the great prophetic figures of Polish (and Ukrainian) history and literature most usually makes his appearance. Little of certainty is known about the Cossack seer Mojsej Wernyhora. It is not even certain that he really existed, although one source suggests that he was born in Dymitrówka in left-bank Ukraine and that he fled to Poland after killing his brother. His prophecies first circulated by word of mouth, and were only later written down. In the nineteenth century, when the [Polish] Commonwealth had already been destroyed, he became a symbol of hope and resurrection. He spoke of a 'Golden Age' before the age of disasters, when all the peoples of the former Commonwealth, especially Poles and Ukrainians, had lived in unity. And he foretold the day when honour, harmony and happiness would return.

Wernyhora's ideals, Davies suggests, may well be relevant today, since 'a conscious policy of confraternity is the only barrier which stands between the sovereignty of the nations of Eastern Europe and the triumph of brute force'.

Such words must serve as a timely reminder that the content of this book, for all its undoubted academic value, is at the same time a matter of vital and practical

significance to the future of Europe, indeed to the entire world, since a general breakdown in the nation-building/state-building process in the former Communist lands could all too easily lead to a resumption of the Cold War – or worse. The new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe and the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union have before them a huge task of reconstruction not only in terms of the political and economic systems, but also at the level of the national psyches. Here national myth has a vital role to play: current hardships and difficulties may be borne more easily in the context of a sense of destiny, a heroic past to live up to, a golden past to be rebuilt. The book as a whole identifies and analyses the main role and problems of such mythopoesis. And Wilson's study in particular – though it lacks the perceptive level shown by Davies, Misāne and Priedīte – is, nevertheless, a commendable effort to come to grips with those problems in the particularly complex context of Belarus and Ukraine.

Borderland. A Journey Through the History of Ukraine. By Anna Reid
(London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1997) 258 pp., illustr. £18.99

During the six years since Ukraine emerged on to the world stage as an independent state, a number of books have appeared by writers who have suddenly discovered its existence. Some of these authors, like Michael Ignatieff and Anne Applebaum (see *The Ukrainian Review*, No. 1, 1994 and No. 4, 1994) have ancestral ties with Central-Eastern Europe, albeit not ethnic Ukrainian ones, others, like Neal Ascherson (see *The Ukrainian Review*, No. 3, 1996) have discovered Ukraine in the course of their professional work in the media. To Ukrainians, whether in the homeland or the diaspora, or to scholars who have devoted much of their working lives to Ukrainian studies, such books often prove irritating with their air of starry-eyed wonder mixed with half-understood facts, and on occasion downright error.

Anna Reid's book belongs to the second category. She spent two years in Ukraine (1993–5) as Kyiv correspondent for *The Economist* and *The Daily Telegraph*. Her qualifications for the task doubtless seemed impressive to her editors: a law degree from Oxford, followed by a Master's degree in Russian history and reform economics at London University's School of Slavonic and East European Studies. This book, one is told on the dust-jacket, 'combines' the author's 'research and her own experiences to chart Ukraine's tragic past'. Unfortunately, the research turns out to be less than comprehensive, and the 'experience' is related in an impressionistic manner and from a necessarily personal viewpoint.

Ms Reid proceeds from two basic premises, firstly, that '*Ukraina* is literally translated as "on the edge" or "borderland", and that is exactly what it is... Being a borderland meant two things. First, Ukrainians inherited a legacy of violence...

Second, they were left with a tenuous, equivocal sense of national identity'. Secondly, that Ukraine had no history of statehood prior to 1991.

Regarding the first premise, one may observe that onomastics can be misleading – and that today's Ukrainians regard themselves as being at the geographical centre of Europe. The second premise is more serious and runs counter to the historiography now being promoted in Ukraine as the basis of the nation/state-building process. True, Ms Reid acknowledges that 'Despite its short lifespan Kievan Rus – ancient, vast, civilised, impeccably European – makes history to be proud of'. But it is disputed history, claimed by both Ukrainians and Russians. Ms Reid does not overtly declare her own view on the controversy: simply saying that 'even as far back as Yaroslav, there were differences between northern Rus (the future Russia), and southern (future Ukraine and Belarus)'. The 'differences' she refers to are those of custom and culture (not the wars with which the early years of Yaroslav's reign was marked), and the 'northern Rus' she refers to was Novgorod, which cannot properly be said to constitute 'the future Russia', since it remained an independent polity until it was destroyed and its citizens massacred in the sixteenth century by Ivan IV ('the Terrible') of Muscovy.

Moving forward in time, the Halych kingdom is totally ignored. A whole chapter is devoted to Lviv, but goes back no further than the first Partition of the Polish Commonwealth – 1773 – when Lviv came under Austrian rule, and a substantial part of it is devoted to – of all people – Taras Shevchenko, who never set foot in Lviv, or, indeed, anywhere in Austrian-ruled Galicia. The Hetmanate figures here as 'Cossackdom', which in Ms Reid's view 'never formed anything approaching a state in the modern sense of the word. It had no borders, no written laws, no division between army and administration, and no permanent capital (the Sich moved several times in its career). Nor, since not all Ukrainians were Cossacks and not all Cossacks Ukrainians, did Cossackdom form an embryo Ukrainian nation'. The Ukrainian state of 1918–21 is written off as a mere 'attempt' at independence…

Granted this skewed approach, it is not surprising that the book abounds in errors, omissions and misunderstandings. Sometimes these are minor – 'Waldemar' is not a Scandinavian name 'Slavonicised' in Rus', but a rare example of the reverse process. To say that Queen Jadwiga of Poland died 'childless' after a 'disastr[ous]' marriage is misleading – she died a few days after giving birth to a daughter (who also died), and her husband was sufficiently devoted to her memory to continue her work of developing what became the Jagellonian University of Cracow. Others could be misleading: the account of Shevchenko becoming acquainted with Kostomarov is phrased in such a was as to suggest that the Brotherhood of Sts Cyril and Methodius operated out of Kyiv University. Very worrying indeed is her treatment of Ukrainian-Jewish relations, a painful subject, and one fraught with misunderstanding – which Ms Reid does nothing to improve. She makes the usual error of non-Ukrainophones of rendering the neutral Ukrainian word 'Zhyd' as 'Yid', when it simply means 'Jew', records a number of historical incidents of violence against Jews, but does not mention those occasions such as the Kyiv pogrom of 1905, incited by the police following the Tsar's proclamation of a Constitution, when the Metropolitan of Kyiv organised a religious procession in the path of the pogromists to try and turn them aside. Likewise, she gives the throw-away comment that, in

1941, the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) 'also organised "march groups" of young activists, who raced forward into eastern Ukraine setting up Ukrainian city administrations (many of which joined enthusiastically in the first Jewish massacres)'. This is slightly ambiguous – is she accusing the 'march groups' or the city administrations? – but, in either case, the charge is too serious to be made in a subordinate (and bracketed) clause. She cites as her source Philip Friedman's *Roads to Extinction: Essays on the Holocaust* (New York, 1980), which she describes in the bibliography as one of the two 'most balanced' treatments of the 'Ukrainian war record' she had found. (The other is David Marples' *Stalinism in Ukraine in the 1940s* (New York, 1992). But the very date of Friedman's work means that it cannot have been based on comprehensive research – including local fieldwork in Ukraine; and, as all scholars at that time recognised, such materials as were made available to them always bore the possibility of contamination by Soviet propaganda (which sought to blacken OUN and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army in every possible way). Certainly, Ms Reid devotes one long paragraph to the efforts of individual Ukrainians to save Jews from the Nazis, and to Metropolitan Sheptytskyi's pastoral letter 'Thou shalt not kill', condemning Nazi genocide, and his protest to Himmler that 'Ukrainian auxiliary police [we]re being forced to shoot Jews', but these instances fail to offset the overall negative impression. Incidentally, the chapter on the Jews in Ukraine is entitled 'The Vanished Nation: Ivano-Frankivsk', but there is no mention of the fact that the writer after whom the city was renamed, Ivan Franko, had throughout his life close and warm contacts with the Jews of the region, and in his short stories and novellas presented vivid and compelling pictures of Jewish life and society – as well as, in his poetry, drawing on Old Testament themes. Franko, however, is one of the many figures prominent in Ukrainian history who is – to say the least – underrepresented in this book. He is mentioned only as a 'socialist' and the author of the short story the 'Budget of the Beasts', with no mention of his poetry whatsoever. He receives, in fact, approximately the same lineage as such other memorable inhabitants of Ukraine as Count Leopold von Sacher-Masoch (after whom masochism is called) and Abraham Jan Ludvik Hoch – a.k.a. Robert Maxwell!

Nevertheless, the book is well-written and eminently 'readable', and Ms Reid's accounts of her own experiences are lively and memorable. Had she confined herself to writing simply a personal memoir of her time in Ukraine, one would commend these features as merits. But in a work which the 'Advance Praise' on the back of the wrapper says '[l]ooks likely to become a standard work on the subject for many years to come', one can only regret that her undoubted talents as a writer and *raconteuse* are so often let down by inaccuracies and omissions.

Linguistic Interrelations in Early Rus'. Northmen, Finns, and East Slavs (Ninth to Eleventh Centuries). By Bohdan Strumiński (Collana di Filologia e Letterature Slave, Vol. II, La Fenice Edizioni, Roma/Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, Edmonton/Toronto, 1996), 353 pp.

This is a fascinating – and at the same time potentially controversial – book. Fascinating, since it is at the leading edge of current linguistic research which both sheds new light and possible explanations on long-standing problems and textual

cruces. Controversial, since, by its very terms of reference, it covers the period of Varangian influence in Rus' – an influence whose extent has been disputed for close on three centuries between the (somewhat unfortunately named) 'Normanists', who claimed maximum Scandinavian influence (often implying that without such assistance, the East Slavonic tribes would never have achieved statehood), and their opponents, who, often more out of ethnic sentiment than impartial scholarship, denied it. (The controversy, up to the end of the last century, was ably summarised in an appendix to Volume 1 of Hrushevskyi's *History of Ukraine,* the new English translation of which is reviewed elsewhere in this issue). Since much of the evidence cited in the controversy is linguistic, notably the names of the Dnipro rapids cited by Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus in *De administrando imperii* in Slavonic and 'Rus-language' (the latter being clearly Scandinavian), even the most circumspect scholar can barely avoid trampling on the sensibilities of his more 'committed' colleagues in discussing this subject, even in a purely linguistic manner. And Struminski is, moreover, outspoken. He proclaims at the outset:

> The existence of the largest and most monolithic group of Slavic languages, the East Slavic group, poses a question that has not been answered by scholars: why was there such a closely related group on such a large territory inhabited by a number of East Slavic tribes… which must have developed at least some dialectal differences? This huge territory itself – some 1,000 km from Lake Il'men' to the Sula River and about the same distance from the Sjan/San River to the upper Oka ca. the year 1000 – should have been conducive to linguistic diversity rather than unity. So why unity? In a smaller territory of the original West Slavs… at least four linguistic groups developed… In another large area, but not as large as the East Slavic one… three groups developed…

Struminski suggests the following explanation for this 'amazing linguistic unity':

> it was the Northmen who united the diverse East Slavic tribes by establishing commercial routes and imposing on those tribes their own, Nordic, political authority and a single ecclesiastical organization borrowed from Byzantium in the Nordic period of East Slavic history, i.e., from the early ninth to the mid-eleventh centuries.

The purpose of the book is, therefore, not to prove this bold hypothesis, but simply to show that it is 'plausible', by 'demonstrat[ing] that the basic systemic features (practically speaking, the phonetic characteristics) that formed the distinctive traits of the East Slavic linguistic group developed precisely in that Nordic period'. The rest of the book consists of detailed phonological arguments to that end.

Struminski himself is, as he admits in his very first paragraph, a Normanist. He is also a linguist – in the academic sense of the word. And, as he points out, 'most of the statements in this controversy had been made by historians. Only a few had been made by linguists, and their contributions to the debate were usually limited in scope'. (Very true, and a point easy to overlook, considering how certain historians hurl at their opponents linguistic arguments which they themselves have grasped, at best, superficially). A sound linguistic survey of the problems is therefore undoubtedly welcome.

Struminski does not aim to be comprehensive. He has limited himself, he says, only to those topics to which he felt he could make a new scholarly contribution.

Some problems have been omitted entirely – he cites, for example, the etymology of *Изборьскъ*, for which, he tells us, 'I could not convince myself that I had found the right solution'.

Much of the book will prove hard going to all but a specialist in the field. This, granted its aim, is inevitable, but one may express the hope that, at some time, Strumiński will consider writing up some of his more notable conclusions in a form more comprehensible to historians. A number of his suggestions are, indeed, innovative. Thus, in the section 'The Gods of the Rus', he discusses the passage in the Primary Chronicle (Tale of Bygone Years), in which Helgi, the ruler of Kyiv, concludes a peace with the Byzantine Emperors Leo and Alexander, and according to the law of the Rus', swore 'by their weapons and *Перунъ*, their god, and *Волосъ*, the god of money [or wealth] (*скотьемъ богомъ*)'. 'Perun' is usually taken by scholars to be the equivalent of the Scandinavian Thor – since 'perun', as a common noun, exists, with the meaning 'thunder', in all three East-Slavonic languages. Strumiński argues, however, that the common noun is a loan-word from Polish, entering Belarusian and Ukrainian, where, he says, it has 'remained outside of the mainstream of the language', and Russian (likewise to a limited extent) in the eighteenth, but that '[i]n the tenth century there was simply no basis for native East Slavic *Perunъ* as a god's name'. Arguing further that for the oath of the Rus' to be of equal weight with that of the Byzantines (who 'kissed the cross'), Helgi and his men would have to swear by their most important god – Odin. *Перунъ*, Strumiński argues, 'must be a direct loanword from Old Nordic', and suggests as a source one of that god's many by-names *Fjǫrgynn*. Volosъ, who from the context is clearly a subordinate god, Strumiński argues, is Frey, whom, as Snorri says in his *Edda*, is the god of *fegafa* – gifts of cattle (or wealth – the Norse root, like the Slavonic word used in the Chronicle, includes both meanings). The link between Volosъ and Frey is cultural: there is an Old Icelandic word, *vǫlsi*, meaning a ritual phallus – and according to Adam of Bremen, Frey (whom Adam Latinises as *Fricco*), was represented in his temple at Uppsala with just such an appendage – of enormous size.

Equally interesting – and even more controversial – is Strumiński's discussion of the dating of the characteristic Ukrainian feature of pleophony. This arises in connection with the name of the first Christian ruler of Kyiv, who is referred to in an Old Icelandic poem by Eyjólfr Dáðaskáld, who died ca. 1000. Here it appears in an oblique case, from which one must postulate the nominative **Waldamarr.* This 'was borrowed from Old East Slavic **Voldimir/*Voldiměr*', before pleophony occurred, i.e. 'before the mid-eleventh century'. Hence, it would seem that the ruler known to modern Ukrainians as St Volodymyr called himself ** Voldimir* (or **Voldiměr*), while his great grandson, Volodymyr Monomakh, who ruled a century later, called himself **Volodimir* (or **Volodiměr*). It is noteworthy, however, that when Monomakh's grand-daughter married a Danish king, and named her son after her Kyivan grandfather, his name was not 'reborrowed' from the pleophon-

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Bohdan Strumiński

LA FENICE EDIZIONI   ROMA

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ic form, but entered in Danish as *Valdemar*. Here, incidentally, Strumiński gives no explanation and cites no reference for ascribing the occurrence of pleophony to the mid-eleventh century – and the non-specialist may well be left wondering whether this is something so well-known to all scholars as to need no reference, whether Strumiński has dealt with it elsewhere in what is, one has to say, a somewhat confusing book for the all but the most expert linguists – or whether reference has accidentally been omitted.

And – in a work that is, in general, excellently referenced – this is not the only instance of a statement being made without a clear source. In his discussion of Đórvaldr Koðransson's journey through Rus' to the Holy Land, and his subsequent death at the monastery of St John the Baptist at *Dröfn*, near Polacak, Strumiński dates Đórvaldr's 'trip to Constantinople' to the year 986. However, the Icelandic sources say that he went East after the battle of Svold, in which King Olaf Tryggvason disappeared from his ship, the Long Serpent, an event which took place, as the saga material on Đórvaldr specifically states, 'in the year M' (i.e. 1000). Strumiński may well have good reason for emending the date (he has argued elsewhere that the traditional dating of the conversion of Rus' is incorrect) – but one would like at least a reason for the change.

And, in spite of the predominantly high standard of linguistic scholarship, there is at least one palpable error. Strumiński rejects out of hand the theory that the *Малъфридъ*, whose death in the year 1000 is recorded by the Primary Chronicle without any explanation of her identity, was, in fact, the slave-concubine of Svyatoslav, Maluša (and hence the mother of Volodymyr I). 'Such an interpretation', says Strumiński, 'makes no philological sense', and '*Малуша* is an Old East Slavic female nickname meaning "Small, petite".' All very sound – although it must be said that names borrowed from one language into another may often acquire by-forms and diminutives already existing in their new linguistic environment. A brief acquaintance with the Ukrainian and Polish diasporas in Anglophone countries will reveal such anomalies as 'Terry' (> Terence) used as a diminutive of 'Taras', 'Bob' (> Robert) for Bohdan, 'Wendy' (derived by J. M. Barrie, from a child's lisped reduplicated description of herself as his 'fwendy-wendy') as a diminutive of 'Wanda', or 'Horace' used as the English equivalent of 'Orest'. But even if *Малъфридъ* is not *Малуша*, why is the latter described (correctly on p. 182 as 'Svjatoslav's concubine and slave', but on p. 190 as 'the slave-wife of Voldiměr? The future St Volodymyr was, in his pre-Christian years, notable for his wide-ranging sexual activity – but never, until now, was incest with his mother numbered among his sins!   ❏