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Current Events

Book Publishing in Ukraine: Disastrous but not Hopeless

Oleksandra Koval

In describing the state of the Ukrainian book market at the beginning of 1995, the main problem is to find something positive to say. The number of books printed, the number of titles published, the volume of sales – all are in apparently irreversible decline. Yet those of us who are involved in the Ukrainian book publishing industry can gain comfort and perhaps derive a little hope by analysing how we got into our sad situation. In a sense, we have a duty to share our experiences in the hope that our answers will be relevant to other countries and that we may learn from others so that we can halt and reverse the downward spiral.

It is appropriate to start by comparing the available statistics of 1993 with those of 1989, the last year of state control. In 1989, 8,449 titles were published. By 1993, this had shrunk to 5,013 titles. In the same four years the total number of books produced shrank from 189.5 million to 140.6 million. In 1989, 50 per cent of the books published were in the Ukrainian language, by 1993, this had fallen to 27 per cent. During the same years the circulation of newspapers decreased by 75 per cent. Printing presses appropriate for book production worked at only 39.1 per cent capacity. The situation for 1994 was even worse though there is no exact data yet to prove this fact.

These figures manifest what can only be called a rapid decay in the book industry, and the disintegration of those cultural and educational aspects of life which depend on books.

Four principal factors have contributed to this tragic situation:

• *The macroeconomic crisis* marked by hyperinflation (the inflation rate has increased 300,000-fold: 0.6 roubles to $1 in 1989, 150,000 karbovantsi to $1 in 1994).

The over-all volume of production has consequently fallen below critical level. Economic reforms, including privatisation and the restructuring of the economy, have been blocked by the pro-Communist governing élite.

• *The social crisis.* There is mass unemployment. Living standards are below the poverty line. Real per capita income has fallen more than tenfold since 1989; in 1989 the average monthly salary was 150 roubles (equivalent to $200), while in 1994 it amounted to 2.5 million karbovantsi (equivalent to $17), and the retirement pension – to 1.3 million karbovantsi ($8.60). So would-be book buyers are too impoverished to acquire books.

• *Culture-blind state policy.* Book printing in our country is subject to a profit tax of 30 per cent. Each employer, in effect, has to pay one-third of his employees' salary to the state as social security and other mandatory payments

Prices, Salaries, Allowances		
	In karbovantsi (Ukrainian currency)	In USD 1$=150,000 karbovantsi (15.02.1995)
Salary minimum (per month)	1,400,000	9.3
Average salary/wage (per month)	2,500,000	16.7
Pension (per month)	1,300,000	8.7
Students' stipend (per month)	900,000	6
Bread (1 kg)	20,000	0.13
Meat (1 kg)	150,000–300,000	1–2
Bus/tram/trolley bus one-way ticket	5,000	0.03
Train ticket (Lviv–Kyiv, 500 km)	1,500,000	10
Rent, conveniences (average, per month)	400,000	2.7
Book price (300 pages)	60,000–300,000	0.4–2.0
Album price	800,000–2,000,000	5.3–13.3
Newspaper price	10,000–40,000	0.06–0.26
Paper (1,000 kg)	150,000,000–170,000,000	1,000–1,130

(the salaries themselves are then taxed further, according to the general income tax schedules). No allowances are made for the social functions of the book. There are no state programmes supporting cultural development, either general or specific. Nor does the state provide incentives for enterprises, banks or any other institutions to support cultural activities. According to Ukraine's taxation laws, a would-be sponsor may offer his financial support only after he has paid the profit-tax and all other taxes on the money concerned; the recipient, moreover, is also liable for tax under the general taxation schedules.

• *Structural crisis in the book publishing industry.* It is hard to say which is in the worst state: production, publishing or distribution. Let us examine each one in turn.

Printing houses

These are still state property and are likely to remain so. The few private presses which exist have minuscule production capacity, since they use second-hand machinery with limited capability. Their present output is less than 1 per cent of total production.

There are some 550 state printing houses of various production capacities. Fifty per cent of their equipment is antiquated. Forty per cent of the printing process is hand operated, with machines designed to produce editions of 100,000 or more being used for short-run jobs. Though their production volume fell to 55.5 per cent last year, in comparison with 94.5 per cent in 1989, they still remain monopolists and set their own prices, which in many cases have no relation to economics. Although prices may be finally agreed by contract, they may be changed again and again. The state printers ignore agreed deadlines and care little for quality control. They enjoy total impunity. Their clients are helpless because there is no possibility of printing the books elsewhere.

The largest printing houses in Kyiv, Kharkiv, Simferopol and Uzhhorod give preference to clients from Russia and other CIS countries. The Russian-language book market is more than five times the size of the Ukrainian so the orders are larger. These clients pay in much more stable Russian or other foreign currencies, and can supply paper and other printing materials. Taking advantage of the general chaos and the weakness of legal institutions, the management of Ukrainian printing houses cheat their own tax inspectors, take bribes, illegally run off extra copies of best-sellers and sell them on the black market. Investment in such enterprises by the Ukrainian state is a waste of public money. For foreigners, it would be insanity.

Publishing houses

Prior to 1989, 23 state and four public publishing houses were in operation in Ukraine. There are 750 publishing houses now, including 24 state book publishing enterprises, 17 newspaper and magazine publishers (all subordinated to the Ministry of Press and Information), 23 state publishers (subordinated to the province [oblast] committees on the press), 128 publishers belonging to scien-

tific and educational institutions, museums, libraries, etc., 60 publishers belonging to public organisations, 16 – to religious organisations, and 4,000 private publishing houses (limited and joint ventures). Altogether, about 4,000 proprietors in Ukraine have laid claim to being in the publishing business.

Despite the increase in the amount of publishing houses, the situation in the book publishing industry has not improved.

Between January and September 1994, the state publishing houses had published 17.3 million copies of books, which constituted 36.9 per cent of the previous years' production for the same eight-month period. As for the non-state publishing sector, no reliable data are available, but the situation here seems to follow the same trend, with, perhaps, a slightly less rapid decrease.

The chief fear of the state publishing houses is that they will be privatised and, deprived of the state's protection, will drown in the open waters of the free market, losing what little they now have at their disposal in the way of premises, equipment, etc. What they yearn for is the restoration, at least in part, of the secure position they enjoyed under Communism, when state-controlled publishing houses, as faithful servants of the regime, had no need to worry about finance. Soon the government will no longer be able to finance them, and they will be out in the cold on their own.

While the administration of state publishing houses may be characterised as deficient in economic thinking, private publishers must, in most cases, be censured for a lack of social responsibility. Intent only on quick profits, they have flooded the book market with pirated Russian translations of detective novels, thrillers, provocative erotica and steamy fiction of certain Western writers.

Those publishing houses which concentrate on books in the Ukrainian language mostly bring out old literary works which were banned under the Soviet regime. Contemporary writings, Ukrainian and other, are ill-served. The thorough vetting, careful editing and professional advertising aimed at educated readers escape the publishers' attention. The economics of publishing in Ukraine today mean that publicity costs cannot exceed 2 per cent of the price of a book, without infringing on profits.

There are some independent publishing houses, of course, seeking to overcome all the obstacles that block efficient publishing. Among them are Prosvita Publishing House, Lviv; Osnova, Kyiv; Folio, Kharkiv; Ababahalamaha, Kyiv; Kobza, Kyiv; Stream, Lviv and others. For them there is no light at the end of the tunnel. We live from hand to mouth and work without vacations. In our search for all possible legal ways out of the impasse, we turn to our Western colleagues and to cultural and educational foundations. Of the latter, the most active in Ukraine is the "Open Society" of the Soros Foundation.

Distribution

The retail book trade in Ukraine is in a deplorable state. Before 1991, the entire book distribution system in Ukraine belonged to the state. There were two gigantic structures dealing in book distribution: Ukrknyha and Ukrkoopspilka. The first had 40 departments in the cities, and ran a network of storehouses,

library book distribution stores and 1,000 book shops; the second performed the same task for rural areas and was no less powerful.

In 1992, the city departments of Ukrknyha were dissolved by a presidential decree. This reform, progressive it seemed at the time, turned out to be disastrous for the Ukrainian book trade. Previously, in the prevailing conditions of continual shortages, artificially sustained by artificially low prices, book traders were book distributors rather than booksellers. The new situation put new challenging demands upon them. For most of Ukraine's book traders, hunting for buyers, looking for new approaches in their work, and setting up advertising arrangements proved too much, and they gradually moved over to selling all kinds of other goods, which promised a quick profit. The bookselling colossus proved to have feet of clay and fell apart. The few book shops which survived the wreck are striving desperately to exist by selling books. This is an agonising task, with old connections being broken, an information network yet to be established, and the situation in the country at large unfavourable for any improvement in the book publishing and distribution business.

There are also some private booksellers who have consciously chosen the book trade, but they, too, lack experience and often fall victim to the high-handedness of local government administrators and to organised crime. Their greatest worries are the absence of any all-Ukrainian book distribution and information network, lack of storage facilities and the high cost of transportation.

State policy in book distribution is implemented by the Ministry of Press and Information (the former State Committee on Printing, Publishing and Book Distribution), which is striving to regain its power and influence. Instead of tackling the most pressing problems of the Ukrainian book publishing industry, the ministry officials have drawn up and are vigorously lobbying in parliament a draft bill which, in the opinion of the present author, would be a major step backwards in the already tardy democratisation process. To date, publishers in Ukraine, like any other entrepreneurs, simply had to comply with the Law on Entrepreneurship. The new bill would put the publisher at a disadvantage in comparison with other entrepreneurs, since, according to this bill, a person wishing to run a publishing business would have to obtain a license from this ministry. Anyone familiar with the vagaries of the Ukrainian bureaucracy will be appalled by the consequences such a law might have for publishers and for the freedom of the press, proclaimed and guaranteed by the Ukrainian Constitution.

The most urgent problems facing Ukrainian publishers, printers and booksellers are:

- The constant escalation of production costs, due to the over-all economic crisis, resulting in a decrease in demand;
- The privatisation of printing houses and book shops is going forward far too slowly;
- The necessary distribution system is not being developed; the output of books, however modest in number, cannot be distributed throughout the country, so that the main publishing centres are overstocked, while there are shortages elsewhere;

- There are too few book shops, and their staff are insufficiently trained to cope with the current, ever-changing conditions;
- Publishers, as a rule, are not well-qualified, especially for the marketing business;
- The aesthetic and technical standard of printed books is low; once again this is due to the lack of qualifications of the designers and the use of obsolete equipment;
- There is no system of information exchange;
- A National ISBN Centre has yet to be established; Ukraine still uses Russian ISBN numbers;
- The national legislation on copyright does not work, and Ukraine has not yet signed any of the international conventions;
- There is no lobby in parliament to promote publishers' interests and reduce taxation pressure; and
- The public interest in all such matters is exceedingly low; and public opinion has not been formed.

How can we escape from this tunnel?

Of course, most of these problems cannot be solved until the economic situation stabilises, and this depends on how successfully the latest reforms are implemented; only this will help increase economic production, develop exports and stabilise the financial system.

Some problems, however, could be tackled at once by the state or even by such a small venture as the Prosvita Publishing House. As editors of a trade newspaper dealing with books and book publishing matters, we constantly lose money in producing it; nevertheless, we consider it indispensable as the only source of information in this field of culture.

Last year we organised the Ukraine Publishers' Forum, which was the first book fair in Ukraine to include seminars and discussions. We intend to hold another this year, on September 14-17. We are also planning to launch an international book shop in Lviv, to organise a seminar school for publishers and to establish a few book clubs.

All this will be accomplished sooner or later. As far as saving the Ukrainian book market is concerned, the sooner, the better. But here we must place our hopes on our Western colleagues, too, since the sooner our publishers adopt world standards in the publishing business, the quicker will Ukraine enter the world publishing community as an equal partner, with its probable sales volume approaching that of France or Germany. □

The Social Construction of Identities in Ukraine

Victor Stepanenko

Introduction

The fundamental transition of the political and socio-economic systems, culture, psychological attitudes and way of life, currently taking place in central and eastern Europe provides an unique opportunity for researchers to study some traditional theoretical questions in a new way. This becomes especially evident in the case of the Newly Independent States (NIS) established on the territory of the former Soviet Union. Almost all of these states face the problem of seeking their own identity (cultural, ethnic, political). Almost all of them have officially declared their political transformation to democracy and market economy. The process of "rediscovery of the past", "return of historical memory of the people" and "historical truth" is supplemented by the creation of new traditions and attempts to transfer "Western experience" (associated with the tradition of liberal capitalism) on to native soil.

In fact, a great process of the social construction of new cultural, ethnic and political entities is taking place. Certainly, this process is primarily associated with the political transition towards a democratic order and a new civic culture. But at the same time, the problems of building a nation-state also deserve profound study.

The process of nation-state building in Ukraine may be taken as a theoretical model for such an analysis. Ukraine represents one of the best examples of the complex processes of identity construction. This is due to the following special circumstances prevailing in Ukraine at the end of the twentieth century:

1) Ukraine is a typical transitional society. However, the transition to the new (system of basic values, way of life, structure and type of social institution, a legitimation of the social order etc.) is taking place amid a set of undefined, but clearly political, socio-economic and socio-cultural orientations. The question "Which kind of society are we building?" is very characteristic for the whole of society. Leonid Kuchma, the man who posed this question, became President of Ukraine in July 1994; hence the search for a future social and political perspective is now personified at the top level of the Ukrainian policy-making process.

2) The present Ukrainian state, which was proclaimed in August 1991, does not posses, however, a stable and developed tradition of statehood. The main consequence of this is that the people have not developed a political and civic culture. In such conditions, social solidarity and mobilisation pose a major problem. In addition, as is officially acknowledged, recent socio-economic failures have put in question the very existence of an independent Ukrainian state.[1]

3) The Ukrainian state and its policy-makers face the problem of forming a new ethno-cultural community – a Ukrainian nation in the sense not only of an

[1] "On the path of radical economic reforms": Report of the President of Ukraine on the main statements of economic and social policy, *Holos Ukrayiny*, 13 October 1994, No. 195.

ethnic but also a civic unit. It is assumed that the social and cultural background of this new entity will consist of Ukrainians and other peoples and ethnic groups, resident in Ukraine. In this sense it is possible to agree with Dr Roman Szporluk of Harvard University who says: "This is an extremely ambitious project in nation-building, a Yugoslavia in reverse".[2]

4) Ukraine as a state and culture occupies a position on the border between central and eastern Europe and Russia and, therefore, by virtue of geography, represents the traffic of political, cultural, historical, ethnic and religious influences between the East (Russia) and "the near West", and between the South (Turkey, the Balkan countries) and the North (the Baltic countries and Scandinavia).

A further point which is very important for the analysis of the construction of identities in the post-Soviet countries and in Ukraine in particular, is the global context, within which the post-Soviet transformation is taking place. The world as a whole (and not only the post-Communist countries, including Ukraine) is experiencing a fundamental shift into a new stage of social development. The definition of that stage cannot be fitted into a simple, two-way choice between "socialism" and "capitalism". Sometimes this new world order is defined as the "post-industrial society". But at the same time the practical realities of national-state building and social development in the former Communist countries, including Ukraine, as well as the ideological legitimisation of those processes, have not superseded the old ideological discourse.

"Communism" and "socialism" are now nothing more than ideological abstractions which no longer have any real meaning for the contemporary disappointed post-Soviet consciousness. The people no longer believe in any ideological dogmas and myths, not even the "capitalist myth", they simply believe in and want only a "normal life". That is, in my opinion, why sociological attempts to estimate the attitudes of the people towards ideological paradigms based on the old Soviet "dichotomised" logic are unsatisfied.[3] The outraged sociologists did not understand the logic shown by the people in their controversial answers, but this meant only that the people operated by practical common sense and "folk psychology", (including "the logic of survival") rather than ideological abstractions. It appears that the traditional cognitive structures of the former Soviet consciousness, which provided an ideal material for effective Communist manipulation have been, to some extent, destroyed. And attempts at social mobilisation and the creation of social solidarity on the base of new ideas such as a "national state", "national interests" and "democracy" seem to be ineffective. I shall return to this point later in greater detail but, for the moment, I should like to clarify certain theoretical postulates and concepts which form the basis of my analysis.

[2] Quoted in: "Unruly Child: A Survey of Ukraine", *The Economist*, 7 May 1994, p. 13.

[3] E. Golovakha, "Osoblyvosti politychnoyi svidomosti: Ambivalentnist suspilstva ta osobystosti" (The characteristics of political consciousness: the ambivalence of society and personality), *Politologichni chytannya*, No. 1, 1992, pp. 24-39.

Some theoretical postulates

The concept of the social construction of identity is fundamental to my consideration. Certainly, the "social constructionist" approach, developed, for example, by Berger and Luckmann[4] seems very fruitful for the analysis of the emerging political, cultural, social, and ethnic identities of central and eastern Europe. Indeed, this is the process of social construction (a shaping, a creation) of new social meanings (including the meanings of new identities). The theoretical model of "social construction" grasps the essence of the process which occurs as a result of interactions between identity-makers and the public, and through communication between the "macro" level of political decisions and the "micro" level of everyday life, including the individual.

I shall begin here from the basic sociological proposition that people create their common shared meaning and common sense by means of mutual communication and interaction.[5] We are not simply determined by circumstances; we are also able to create or, at least, to change the circumstances. However, people can change social reality only on the basis of some common and shared meanings. Hence the creation of common meanings, common self-understanding and, finally, a common meaning of identity is a crucial condition for the process of constructing. To some extent it is true that it is only people, who have already themselves been changed, who can change social reality. (But at the same time can one really change people without changing social reality?) In the case of Ukraine, Szporluk is in part correct when he says that only new generations of Ukrainians "those who were never in the Komsomol [the Young Communists' League], have had a chance to travel to normal places, and only dimly remember that Ukraine was ever part of something called the Soviet Union" will be able to change at all.[6] But this is not the whole truth.

This is a fundamental prerequisite for any social change and transformation. In our particular case, how can Ukraine be transformed from a part of the former Soviet Union, from merely formal, paper, independence, into a full-blooded civilised democratic, national state? How can one change the predominantly vague cultural identity of the people, the people who feel themselves as victimised, mostly second rate and provincial, into a new meaning and understanding of their identity as civilised people, and create feelings of national pride and dignity among people who are caught up in the constant daily struggle for survival? There are far more questions than answers.[7]

If one takes as a basic premise the idea that people can create a new social reality or change their lives only if they change their own understanding of

[4] P. Berger, T. Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality,* Garden City, New York, Doubleday, 1966.

[5] H. Blumer, *Symbolic Interactionism: Perspective and Method*, Englewood, Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1969.

[6] "Unruly Child...", p. 18.

[7] The Bolsheviks, who faced a similar problem in Russia after 1917, spoke of it, somewhat cynically, as the problem of the quality of their "human material". It was acknowledged that there existed no ideal human material for their purposes and that they would have to continue with the old "material", that is, the same people.

social reality and their own identity, then one may acknowledge that even the formal change of social institutions and structures (as well as symbols, the names of institutional and governmental bodies, streets, cities etc.) has a great significance in the creation of a psychological readiness for change. Of course, to construct or reconstruct a new social reality it is not sufficient simply to rename the old. However, the very process seems to be significant for the development of a new meaning of reality, since it is an attempt to introduce a new meaning, a new sense of identity. According to Strauss,[8] to identify something is to give it a name.

In the case of Ukraine, this was directly demonstrated in the course of the sharp political debates of 1991-92 about the introduction of "new" state symbols[9] and their role in independent Ukraine. From this point of view, I consider that the latest political intention of the Ukrainian reformers[10] to change the very name of the legislative arm of state power – "Rada" (the Ukrainian equivalent of the Russian word "Soviet") is of immense significance for the social construction of a new reality and identity in Ukraine.

Two historical methods and principles of constructing social reality

Basically, and extremely schematically, one may distinguish two main different "ideal types" of construction of a new identity and, therefore, a new social reality.

1) Construction "from above". In this case it is assumed that the role of the main creative force is played by a small group of identity-makers. Usually in history they are termed "revolutionaries" or "élite". The rest of the mass of population are socially passive. The "identity-makers", who may be intellectuals, ideologists, politicians, intelligentsia, artists, or poets (Taras Shevchenko and Adam Mickiewicz in the Ukrainian and Polish cases, respectively), assume the role of national prophets who introduce or even implant new meanings into the mass consciousness, mobilise the masses and create a new common meaning of identity for them.[11] The élite and identity-makers represent the subject of the process, in which the masses become, essentially, the object. The history of every revolutionary change in society presupposes this kind of creative activity subject to human consciousness and understanding. Broadly speaking, it is the élite not the masses themselves which create and introduce the new meanings.

[8] A. Strauss, *Mirrors and Masks: the Search for Identity*, San Francisco, The Sociology Press, 1969.

[9] These symbols, the trident and the blue-and-yellow flag were not, of course, "new"; they were the ancient emblems of Ukrainian statehood which had been forbidden by the Tsarist and later the Soviet rulers of Ukraine.

[10] Draft Bill: "On State Power and Local Self-Government in Ukraine", *Uryadovyi Kuryer*, No. 188, December 1994.

[11] According to the political development theory, the role of the élite and identity-makers is especially important in what are termed "transitional societies". See L. Pye (ed), *Communication and Political Development*, Princeton University Press, 1963). It is hardly coincidental that the intelligentsia, writers and poets have played a leading role in the social transformation of some post-Communist societies. The cases of Vaclav Havel in former Czechoslovakia and the "Rukh" movement of writers and intellectuals in Ukraine are noteworthy in this respect.

An outstanding example of this kind of identity transformation is the construction of a new social identity and reality under Soviet rule. (The *Sovietness* itself was a grandiose project of constructing a new artificial social identity which was intended to overcome all traditional national and cultural meanings. The identity-makers of that process were a rather small group of Communist élite). Another example worth mentioning is the creation of the modern state of Israel in 1948 and the restoration and introduction of Hebrew as the official state language.

According to contemporary social theory, in particular political development theory, this first type of construction of identity is the more characteristic and maybe the only one for countries emerging from totalitarian and authoritarian regimes – a class to which Ukraine undoubtedly belongs. There are two factors which are of decisive significance in this case. These are, firstly, the existence of an authoritative national élite, which assumes the responsibility for conducting and managing the process as well as for creating and legitimising the new social meaning, understanding and values. It is the task of this élite to mobilise the masses and to make the new social project attractive. The second important factor in the social construction of a new social reality is the existence of free, objective and responsible mass media, which play the role of national mediator between the élite and the masses. The media, too, are instruments for the introduction of new knowledge and meanings. They also carry out educational activities.[12]

2) The second type of social construction of identity presupposes the development of the process predominantly "from below", or, at the very least, the interaction between processes from "above" and "below". This is, in essence, a self-organising and self-creative mass process. The classic example of this is the United States. The American meaning of common identity is mainly a result of complex self-organising activity around common and shared meanings and ideas. The ideas of personal achievement and success, the promise of a better life for all, based on the ethics of personal and individual effort and responsibility, were the main elements of a specifically American civil religion and mythology which created in their turn the meanings of common American identity. The historical task of American policy- and identity-makers was mainly to articulate and express these shared meanings in the clearest possible way, in the form of a national ideology which acquired the status of a civil religion.[13]

In the case of Ukraine, the first period of Ukrainian independence (from August 1991 till at least July 1994) may be considered an attempt to follow the classic pattern of the first variant with active ideological and propaganda activity and a passive mass response. In the discussion which follows I shall attempt to show on what bases and principles this process took place and is continuing in Ukraine.

The problem of starting points in the social construction process

The key notion in my analysis will be the phenomenon of post-Soviet society. It seems to me that it is impossible to understand anything in contemporary Ukrainian or any other post-Soviet situation without referring to its ori-

[12] L. Pye, op cit., pp. 3-23.
[13] R. Bellah, "Civil religion", *Daedalus*, 1967.

gin. From this angle the "Ukrainian case" may be considered as a particular example of the transformation of the former Soviet identity.

The current Ukrainian ethnic and cultural identities are only in the course of formation (and restoration) and they are still submerged in the post-Soviet socio-cultural context. Insofar as the post-Soviet phenomenon coincides with universal "post-modern" experience, human subjectivity has become one of the decisive factors in a contemporary socio-culture.

Thus, it is possible to distinguish at least three main initial cultural elements in the process of construction of new identities in Ukraine. These are: 1) the earlier Ukrainian cultural tradition, 2) the Soviet cultural legacy, and 3) the elements of the new universal transnational culture. This situation of a plurality of meanings and a schizophrenic split between, basically, two value systems (the traditional Soviet and the new "Westernised") generates intense socio-cultural and psychological experience for the individual and for society.

At the same time, the Ukrainian socio-cultural situation has a certain specificity which distinguishes Ukraine from other post-Soviet societies.

Definitions of the socio-cultural specificity of the Ukrainian case and the problems of construction of a new ethno-cultural identity

For me, the word "between" may be one of the key concepts for the description of the Ukrainian socio-cultural situation, at least for an outside observer. But the ambivalent character of one's own identity is not simply a problem of historical research but rather a widespread socio-cultural experience for contemporary Ukrainians.

According to my observations and the data of numerous sociological surveys,[14] it is possible to distinguish at least four dominant types of Ukrainian ethno-cultural identity[15] in present-day Ukrainian society. These are:

1) The remaining former Soviet identity (these people generally identify themselves as former citizens of the great country – the Soviet Union).

2) The "little Russian" identity. These people, Ukrainian in ethnic origin, feel (and try to pretend to be) Russian rather than Ukrainian. This transformation is quite straightforward as the result of the historical, ethnic, cultural, religious, language closeness between the two nations as well as the long historical tradition of Russification and assimilation of the Ukrainian ethnos in the Russian empire and later under Soviet rule.

3) The case of the "unthinking Ukrainians" who define their ethnic identity by the principle: "We know we are not others (Russian, Polish, Jewish, Tatar etc.), but we do not know exactly who we are?"

[14] See, for example, E. Golovakha, N. Panina, et al., *Politicheskaya kultura naseleniya Ukrayiny* (Political culture of the population of Ukraine), Kyiv, Naukova Dumka, 1993.

[15] Here I restrict myself to the case of Ukrainian nationals in Ukraine. The cases of other ethnic groups (which make up more than 30% of the total population of Ukraine) and the complex variations of ambivalent identity arising from mixed ethnic and cultural origin, demand a separate and profound investigation.

4) The "conscious Ukrainians" who identify themselves clearly as Ukrainians, as a separate and ancient nation with its own common ancestors, a glorious history, a separate language, collective memory, its own national mythology, traditions, a pantheon of its own heroes, national symbols etc.

Certainly, this typology is merely schematic, and should not be blindly accepted without reservations. The true meaning of personal identity might well be a paradoxical combination of several types in one. Moreover, I consider that the mixed (or transitional) type is dominant in the present socio-cultural situation in Ukraine. But the typology established provides useful guidelines, as may be seen too by the data of numerous sociological surveys.

Thus, the Ukrainian ethno-cultural core, and, likewise, the meaning of identity, which is supposed to be common, is in fact divided in various ways. As a result of historical circumstances, Ukrainians are divided by regions (the main polarities being the "conscious" west on the one hand and the "Russified" east and south – on the other), by language (the main everyday language in the south-east, especially in the cities, is Russian, while Ukrainian is dominant in the western part), by religion (the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church is dominant in the west, the Russian Orthodox Church – in the eastern, southern and, in part, the central areas, and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church – in the central area).

Here two key problems arise:

1) How to unite such a disparate ethnos, and what common idea can be used to unite it? We shall return to this point later.

2) Between the two extreme polarities in the expression of Ukrainian identity, located respectively in the "nationalist" west and the "Communist" south-east, we discover the centre. This centre,[16] which represents the "silent majority" of the Ukrainian population, can be related mainly to types 2 and 3 above. These types of vague, indefinite and transitional identities appear to be the most dominant and the most conspicuous in present-day Ukrainian society. Taking these types as dominant patterns one can more clearly understand certain characteristics of the present socio-cultural situation in Ukraine.

The stigma of the "victimised ethnos"

It appears that a feeling of victimisation (in different senses and interpretations) is one of the characteristic features of the contemporary socio-cultural and psychological situation. This conclusion is not based only on the pessimistic view which the Ukrainian population has regarding prospects for the future.[17] (To some extent these views are a natural reflection of the profound economic crisis, the sharp drop in the standard of living and hyper-inflation which have characterised the situation in the country since the declaration of independence.) I mean rather a widespread feeling and mass experience of a constant profound

[16] Although the concept of "centre" properly refers to the central regions of Ukraine including the capital, Kyiv, this is not simply a geographical term, but rather a socio-cultural and psychological one.

[17] According to public opinion polls about expectations for 1994 conducted by Gallup in 50 countries, Ukrainians proved to be the most pessimistic of all those surveyed (*Kievskiye Vedomosti*, 4 January 1994).

fear, and the feelings of uncertainty, mistrust and disappointment which have become a common mass experience for the population of Ukraine.[18]

On the basis of my observations and the data of certain other researchers, it would appear that the majority of the population have no clear understanding of what is happening in Ukraine. They see themselves as victims and hostages of some mysterious and strange game, the rules of which are as yet beyond their understanding. The alleged sources of this suffering vary with individual perceptions, including the mafia, the government, the president, an unjust world order, Russians, Jews, Communists, nationalists, the market, the new businessmen etc. But common to all these perceptions is the view that they, the Ukrainians, are the victims of external forces and circumstances.

Certainly, an experience of victimisation is one of the direct consequences of the deep and far-reaching transformations which are radically changing the traditional daily life-style and psychology of the former Soviet people. In this sense, the mass experience of victimisation coincides too with what is termed the "consciousness of catastrophe". The terms "catastrophe" and "catastrophic" have became commonplace in descriptions and self-descriptions of the present Ukrainian situation since the disaster at the Chornobyl nuclear power plant near Kyiv in April 1986. And Chornobyl itself has turned into the symbol of national tragedy and one of the most traumatic experiences in the Ukrainian national consciousness in recent times.

Despite his own appeal to avoid spreading feelings of pessimism and disappointment among the population, but instead to try to consolidate for them political explanations and descriptions of the Ukrainian situation, President Kuchma's recent statements are themselves far from optimistic. I do not refer here to the objectivity and adherence to the facts required by such pronouncements, but rather a specific oratorical style which may be described as a necessity of normal objectivity and adherence to the facts. Here are some typical examples:

- "... The situation in the economy of Ukraine has no historical analogues...".
- "... Ukraine is a world leader as far as the deficit in the state budget is concerned".
- "... The level of inflation in Ukraine in 1993 was the highest in the world...".
- "... The standard of living of the people is declining catastrophically...".
- "... The process of the deindustrialisation of Ukraine is now underway...".
- "... We are standing on the brink of mass economic and ecological catastrophes".
- "... This threatens a nation-wide catastrophe...".
- "... We have no real resources for raising the standard of living of the population...".[19]
- "... Either we overcome and improve the situation and put a stop to the increasing crisis and the further impoverishment of the population, or else we are heading for total economic breakdown...".[20]
- "... God forbid that we should send our own people to the scaffold of History".[21]

[18] According to a poll conducted at the end of 1991, 74% of respondents agreed that "ordinary people are isolated from political life". (Golovakha, Panina et al., op cit., p. 29).

[19] Report of the President..., 13 October 1994.

[20] Report of the President of Ukraine for Editors, *Holos Ukrayiny*, No. 8, 18 January 1995.

[21] Report of the President of Ukraine to the Plenary Session of the Supreme Council, *Holos Ukrayiny*, No. 245, 24 December 1994.

Indeed, Ukrainian history, past and present, is tragic in the full sense of the word. Although this national history, and in particular its tragic moments, have remained, at least in part, in the collective memory of the population, the recent mass "discovery" of their own history has had a particularly powerful impact on the mass consciousness of contemporary Ukrainians during the first period of independence. On the one hand, the use by the Ukrainian identity-makers of selected facts of national history became one of the most effective means for ideological legitimisation and justification of the newly created independent state. History and history-based propaganda were used to provide a distinct ethnic consciousness and to construct the meaning of a common identity and destiny for the population of Ukraine.

But, on the other hand, all the failures and difficulties of independence can be explained easily (and are explained constantly) with the help of the same historical arguments, which basically take the line that "Ukrainians are a non-historical and non-governmental nation". The tragic meaning of all previous Ukrainian history and, allegedly, Ukraine's "eternal destiny to be a victim of History" or in current jargon "to be sent to the scaffold of History" were implicitly an important strand in this explanation. It also has given rise to a new and rather dangerous national mythology.

The problem of modernisation of traditional values in the process of social construction

The Ukrainian state created in 1991 exists not because of but in spite of the absence of that tradition of statehood which is associated historically with a developed meaning of one's own identity. In other words, the state arose in a situation which lacked two of the main traditional factors making up the necessary background for a sovereign state: namely 1) a developed sense of Nationhood; 2) a developed sense of Statehood. That is why in the Ukrainian case the process of the social construction of identity is of particularly great significance.

However, this construction would be impossible starting from "zero-level". At the very least, some sense of historical and cultural tradition (real or newly invented) is necessary. In the Ukrainian case, the role of national tradition and its constant renewal is especially important. Otherwise the question arises: how the Ukrainians still manage to survive as an ethno-cultural entity?

According to Anthony Smith,[22] traditions as well as ethnic memories, values, symbols and myths can be considered as "subjective elements in ethnic survival". The Ukrainian case might be a good confirmation of this hypothesis. Ukrainian cultural tradition which developed under pressure from the dominant official cultures of neighbouring nations (above all, Russian and Polish) has produced a strong resistant mechanism. Its main elements are a collective memory of the people, a language, a folklore (especially songs), such an important element of everyday culture as a national cuisine, and certain specific customs and festivals.

[22] A.D. Smith, "Chosen peoples: why ethnic groups survive", *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol. 15, No. 3, pp. 436-454.

But at the same time the original Ukrainian tradition has taken shape predominantly as a non-official subculture. This is a culture of historical resistance but not as yet of cultural construction. The Ukrainian cultural tradition is neither self-sufficient nor dominant in today's Ukraine. (Excluding the western part of the country, its sphere of existence and influence is now restricted mainly to villages and small towns.) This renders the effective use of that tradition in its pure "organic" form as a potential basis for the process of identity construction in Ukraine somewhat problematic.

What, though, does the concept of a contemporary Ukrainian tradition imply? If we take as our basic assumption the idea that a tradition is a historical socio-cultural phenomenon, created as a result of historical, economic, political, cultural and psychological interaction between people and their social practice, are we to include in our concept of contemporary Ukrainian tradition the "Soviet" or "socialist" values under which three generations of the people have grown up?

Whatever one's personal attitude to Ukrainian Soviet tradition may be, one has to accept its existence as a socio-cultural fact rather than simply a "serious obstacle" to social development. It must be acknowledged that the Soviet stage was, to a certain extent, an expression of the industrialisation of Ukrainian society (how and in what forms are separate questions). The real problem is not to deny that stage and period of history, but to utilise it in the process of identity construction.

It is now clear that this process should not simply consist of the restoration of national culture, but rather its modernisation. This implies the creation of new traditions and a new cultural synthesis corresponding to contemporary socio-cultural realities. The possibility of the construction of a new nationhood with its own new meaning of identity, based partly on the historical Ukrainian ethno-cultural identity, is not excluded.

Organisation of the process and identity-makers

Another important aspect of the social construction of identities in Ukraine concerns problems of organisation and the agents of that process. As we have indicated above, the crucial point here may be defined as follows: Is the process in the main self-organised and self-constructed (the "American" model) or directed from above (the former "Soviet" model).

It would appear that the Ukrainian case represents an example of slow transformation from the pure "Soviet" model to one closer to the "American" model, after the failure of the "policy of the national idea", which was effectively in force until July 1994. As a result of the special social and cultural conditions in Ukraine (a transitional society of post-Soviet type with a virtual absence of the preconditions for successful social change), the role of identity-makers in the process of creating new meanings of identity is particularly important. One may distinguish three main agents of that process.

1) *The state structures* (including the state mass media), whose officially declared policy is the creation of a fully-fledged, independent, democratic state. Initially, the idea of the state formally united two main political forces: the former Communist élite and the new national democratic movement.

The conservative Communist élite, which is the most powerful, the most organised and the most mobilised political force in Ukraine, has used national

and democratic slogans to preserve its dominant political position in society. It has successfully exploited the prevailing negative attitude to the Soviet empire and popular patriotic sentiments. But, paradoxically, this success meant at the same time the end, at least formally, of the Communist identity of that élite. In its 1994 survey on Ukraine, *The Economist* described this political force as follows:

> By dropping dogma in favour of personal economic interests and transforming the Communist party into the party of power, the old *nomenklatura* has strengthened its hand. The weakness of the central institutions of government makes it easy for old-boy networks to get round laws and regulations. Directors of state-owned enterprises and collective farms between them now spend 90% of officially-recorded GDP.[23]

On the other hand, the Ukrainian democratic forces, represented initially by Rukh (the Popular Movement of Ukraine for democratic transformation) and by the new democratic parties, regarded independence as the single necessary condition for a democratic revolution in Ukraine. But since almost all political power and the ultimate policy-deciding power remained in the hands of the former *nomenklatura*, the Ukrainian democrats were confronted with the dilemma: "democracy or independence". The rise of "national Communism" under whose wing Ukrainian democracy now found itself was a very characteristic and natural result of what has been termed an "unfinished revolution",[24] and reflects the socio-political ambivalence of post-Soviet and in particular the Ukrainian situation.

2) *Political parties and movements.* These are not mass movements but reflect the undeveloped nature of social interests and social groups in Ukraine. The lack of a developed democratic infrastructure is part of the Communist legacy in Ukraine. Excluding the Communist Party (which was the single political party in the former Soviet Union) and its related organisations there was no infrastructure for political participation by the people. Even now, in the main, such an infrastructure exists only formally. Despite the large number of newly created political parties, they are for the most part weak and do not represent the social and political interests of the mass of the population. This is largely due to the fact that, with the exception of a rather small group of newly created national bourgeoisie and the élite of the new state *nomenklatura*, the social structure and social interests of the majority of the inhabitants of Ukraine are neither differentiated nor defined. As a result, interest groups are likewise undeveloped.

3) *The Ukrainian cultural intelligentsia.* This was the main supporter of independence during the first period, from the end of the 1980s until recently. However, the failure of the state identity policy, based on the ideology of a national idea, meant that the intelligentsia in part lost its former significance as an identity-maker. According to the premises of political development theory, in cases like that of Ukraine, a democratic élite should remain the single and principal condition.[25] However, the reality of the Ukrainian situation can best be summed up in the phrase: "Wanted: a leader".[26]

[23] "Unruly Child...", p. 9.
[24] T. Kuzio, *Ukraine. The Unfinished Revolution,* London, Alliance Publishers, 1992.
[25] L. Pye (ed), *Communication and Political Development,* Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1963.
[26] "Unruly Child...", p.18.

The social construction process: the search for a common idea

One of the greatest difficulties in the process of construction of identities in Ukraine is the establishment of a common idea, common shared system of values, and, finally, a common civil religion which is extremely important for social change and transformation as well as for the common mobilisation of the people. Since August 1991, it is possible to distinguish three main ideological constructs and three corresponding discourses which claim to fulfil the role of common civil religion in Ukraine. These are:

1) The national idea, associated mainly with the idea of a separate Ukrainian state;
2) The democratic idea; and
3) The idea of survival.

1) The national idea

Despite the fact that Ukrainian independence was confirmed by a popular referendum on 1 December 1991 (92% voted for independence), for the majority who cast their vote for independence, the national idea was not the principal motive. More precisely, they were motivated not by the national idea in isolation, but rather in combination with strong democratic and economic elements (the hope of "living better" in a separate state).[27]

The attempts to use the national idea as the main ideological construct for the creation of a common meaning of identity and the social mobilisation of the Ukrainian population characterised the first period of Ukrainian independence. However, for the reasons already mentioned (the undeveloped tradition of nationhood, the divided nature of the ethno-cultural core, the plurality of the meaning of identity, and the demagogic use of the idea by the "party of power" for its own political ends), such attempts, it was eventually admitted officially, proved ineffective.

However, if one takes into consideration that in the Ukrainian historical context the national idea was associated mainly with the idea of a separate Ukrainian state, it may be acknowledged that this idea has now been realised, at least formally. The first period of independence was principally a period of ideological legitimisation of the state. And it is noteworthy that the first President of today's Ukraine, Leonid Kravchuk, who held office from 1991 to July 1994, was a former ideology chief of the Communist Party of Ukraine.

2) The democratic idea

The democratic idea was and still remains a more popular ideological construct which may create a wider basis for the potential collective mobilisation in Ukraine. In comparison with identity based on the "blood and soil" principle, the democratic idea presupposes the creation of a civil identity and meaning of civil nationhood. Another important point is the potential attractiveness of the democratic idea, which, in the Ukrainian case, is associated with civilised Western values.

[27] V. Stepanenko, "Ukrainian Independence: First Results and Lessons", *In Ukraine*, London, The Ukrainian Central Information Service, Vol. 2, No. 3, 1993, pp. 3-5.

Indeed, the concept of "democracy" is central to contemporary political, social, and cultural discourse as well as to the process of social construction of identities in Ukraine. The dominant attitude to this concept represents a rare example of relative civil unity, based on the principle: "Democracy in general is good".

Indeed, the democratic transformation of society has been the official political course of the Ukrainian state since it gained independence in 1991. Answering the crucial question: "What kind of society are we going to build?", the new Ukrainian President, Leonid Kuchma, elected in July 1994 affirmed: "Our purpose is the establishment in Ukraine of a society which is democratic, socially responsible, and based on the principle of solidarity".[28] The very term "democracy" as well as other concepts from a liberal vocabulary such as "civil society", "democratic rights and freedoms", "market economy" became very popular and widespread in the declarations of various political movements and parties in Ukraine. According to post-independence sociological surveys conducted in Ukraine, the majority of the population, surveyed over different social groups and regions, supported the idea of the democratic transformation of society.[29] But at the same time the concept of democracy clearly reflects the ambivalent and contradictory nature of Ukrainian public consciousness and the real policy-making process in the country. An opinion poll conducted at the beginning of 1991, for example, revealed a wide gap between the ideal notion of democracy based on the Western pattern and the actual practice of its embodiment, that is, the policy of "democratisation". In the opinion of the majority of respondents, "democratisation" was leading society in a direction diametrically opposed to true democracy.[30] This paradox can be explained partly by the specific nature of post-Soviet society in which two mutually exclusive systems of values and, respectively, two notions of democracy still exist. The people, as the polls showed, want to live in the conditions of a "Western-style" democracy, which they associate with freedom and a high standard of living, but at the same time fear uncertainty and the personal responsibility which is its social price. In addition, the dubious economic policy, which brought about the destruction of the old system, but which has not yet been replaced, has led to a deep crisis in all spheres of life in Ukraine.

Since this policy was conducted under pseudo-democratic slogans, the eventual result could be mass disillusionment with democracy itself and with the associated social prospects. In fact, the success of Communist and pro-Communist candidates in last year's parliamentary elections may be regarded as an early warning signal.

It must, however, be acknowledged that even from a theoretical point of view, Ukraine must be expected to experience serious difficulties in its democratic transformation, due to the lack (and even total absence) of some fundamental preconditions for successful democracy.

First of all, Ukraine, despite its geographical belonging to Europe, may be termed a "non-Western" country. This is not only because its Soviet legacy remains

[28] Report of the President of Ukraine..., 13 October 1994.
[29] Golovakha and Panina, op. cit., pp. 16-18.
[30] Ibid., pp. 9-10.

influential in all spheres of life, but rather due to the lack of characteristics essential for successful democracy such as the modernisation and rationalisation of life.

If technical development and industrialisation alone were taken as the decisive criteria of modernisation then the former Soviet Union could be considered as a fairly successful case of rapid industrialisation on the base of socialist economy. But recent attempts at the market-orientated modernisation of the former Soviet industry in Ukraine (which had inherited a disproportionate number of Soviet-era "industrial dinosaurs") failed. Instead, the "party of power", representing the former Soviet *nomenklatura* in Ukraine, "has achieved something that many might have thought impossible: to invent an economic system that is more inefficient than the command economy of the old Soviet Union".[31]

"Modernisation" and "rationalisation" are not only concepts of technical and economic development, but also concepts of its political consequences. It is no secret that Soviet-type "modernisation" was effected by severe political and ideological state control. The consequences were an abnormal centralisation of power and life in the former Soviet Union. This was one of the main reasons for further stagnation and degradation of economics and policy in the former Soviet Union. According to Schöpflin, "backwardness" is a common characteristic of Soviet influence in eastern Europe.[32] (However, his distinction between the countries of eastern Europe and the countries of the former Soviet Union is remarkable.[33]) There can be no doubt that contemporary Ukraine represents a vivid example of social backwardness of the post-Soviet type.

Another basic cause of difficulties in the democratic transformation in the country is the lack of a developed complex infrastructure of democratic institutions. As was noted above, this lack includes political parties, interest groups and mass media.

In fact, there still remains in Ukraine one main political force and political party which has never been registered. This is the so-called "party of power" – a "party" consisting mainly of the former Soviet political and economic élite, who are still in positions of power. Its "members" are more interested in their own survival than in the democratic transformation of society, although they may use democratic (or more correctly, populist) slogans for their own ends.

Finally, the electronic and printed media are not independent in the full sense of the word. They have yet to become the channels of democratic influence and political socialisation of the people. In addition, the dominant mass attitude to all the political institutions whatever their articulations and affiliation, is characterised by a high level of mistrust. The reasons are a painful memory of Communist ideological and propagandist activity, which pervaded all spheres of life and a relative decline in the attractiveness of democratic slogans after the failure of the socio-economic experiments of the first period of independence.

The real sign of alienation from politics is not the percentage of membership of various political organisations and parties – the figure 2-3% of the population is close to the average figure for Western countries – but a lack of confidence

[31] "Unruly child...", p. 4.
[32] G. Schöpflin, *Politics in Eastern Europe 1945-1992*, Blackwell, Oxford, 1993.
[33] Ibid.

in the main institutions of power in the country. This mistrust is expressed by the majority of the Ukrainian population.[34]

Another serious symptom is the fact that few members of the general public have their own personal opinions on key issues affecting the future of the country. The majority (about 57% at the end of 1991) of the Ukrainian population is a "silent majority", consisting of people who have no personal opinion about future socio-political prospects.[35]

In fact, in spite of all the official democratic declarations of the state, the real political direction of this transitional period and the more remote future remains an open question. Possible scenarios range from a future Western-style democracy to anarchy and the disintegration of traditional form of government, accompanied by social and ethnic conflicts, eventually leading to the imposition of a totalitarian regime – a gloomy, but, alas, all too possible option.

I, myself, however, am of the opinion that an alternative process of self-creation of identity-meanings is taking place at the "grass-roots" level in Ukraine. And this new emerging identity is based on a very simple and human idea – survival.

3) The idea of survival

In view of the profound crisis which extends to all spheres of social life, the question of survival has an all-too-literal meaning for Ukrainians. Paradoxically, the idea of survival, rather than the national or even the democratic idea, may turn out to be a real common ground uniting the population of Ukraine irrespective of ethnicity, gender, and/or political affiliation. According to the data of the independent sociological centre "Ukrainian barometer", 48.7% of the Ukrainian population expected President Kuchma to solve the problem of the prices on foodstuffs and basic consumer goods. In comparison, corruption and incompetence in the state, the problem which turned out to rank second in importance, attracted only 9.4% of respondents' votes.[36]

It would appear that current policy-making in Ukraine is intended to be based on this idea – I mean the political declarations of Leonid Kuchma. There is at least one remarkably interesting point in these declarations: the identification of survival with the start of the processes of the real economic reforms.[37]

For me, however, there is another principal and crucial point in the idea of survival, namely, triggering the processes of self-organisation and self-responsibility of the people. This would also imply the transformation of the process of social construction from above into a predominantly "grass roots" one. In fact, the processes of self-organisation and self-survival have already started to develop in the country at large. As one economist has pointed out: "If one believes the official economic statistics, there should be dead bodies lying

[34] Golovakha and Panina, op. cit., pp. 31-33.

[35] Ibid, pp. 18-19.

[36] "What problems do the citizens of Ukraine expect to have solved?", *Kievskiye Vedomosti*, 5 August 1994.

[37] Report of the President..., 13 October 1994.

about the streets... But, nevertheless, the major part of the population survives (and some even prospers) owing to the "shadow economy".[38] According to expert opinion, the official and "shadow" economies in Ukraine are currently of equal size.[39] Despite some negative consequences, the Ukrainian "shadow economy", as a phenomenon, is a bright reflection of self-organising processes, based on the idea of survival.

Indeed, the sooner the mass of the population stops relying on the hope of help from some benefactor on high or abroad, stops blaming its destiny, and looking for metaphysical explanations in its past and buckles down to organising its life itself, the sooner this mass of population will turn into a people and a nation. □

[38] V. Chernyak, "Who can enjoy life in Ukraine?", *Holos Ukrayiny*, 23 February 1995.
[39] Ibid.

UKRAINE AND WWII

Ukraine's Demographic Losses during WWII

Zynoviya Sluzhynska

According to Christian Streit,[1] during World War II Germany lost 3,250,000 members of the armed forces, (1,185,000 of these in Soviet prisoner-of-war camps) and 3,600,000 civilians, while the Soviet Union lost 20 million people, or 40 per cent of the total number of victims (55 million) of the Second World War. Of these Soviet victims, 10 million died in battle and from wounds, and 7 million were civilians. Out of a total of 5.7 million Soviet prisoners, 3.3 million died from shooting, starvation and disease.

The figure for the number of victims of the Soviet Union – 20 million – today seems an underestimate. Demographers now reckon that Soviet losses, as a direct or indirect result of the war, reached 48-50 million. Direct military losses totalled no less than 22 million people, including more than 10 million Red Army soldiers who perished on the battlefield or from wounds.[2]

Ukraine accounted for more than one fifth of the pre-war population of the Soviet Union and sustained 65 per cent of the total human losses during the war. In his diary, O.P. Dovzhenko writes: "During the war, Ukraine lost 13 million people. And this is, so to speak, to err on the optimistic side".[3] The falsification of the human losses was started by Stalin while the war was still going on. In 1941, in a speech marking the 24th anniversary of the October Revolution, Stalin declared that the Germans had so far lost more than 4 million people in battle, and the Soviet Union – 850,000. In actual fact, the imbalance was the other way round. According to Soviet military statistics, the USSR lost one million killed, 4 million wounded, 4 million prisoners and those who disappeared without trace, a total of 9 million.

The generally accepted rule-of-thumb was that every sixth inhabitant of Ukraine was killed. In 1940, the population of Ukraine was 41.3 million. Allowing for a net annual increase of close on 2 per cent, this means that on the eve of the outbreak of the war, Ukraine had a population of some 42 million. Every sixth inhabitant, therefore, means 7 million. Dovzhenko gives a figure almost twice this, that is 13 million people.[4] The Russian historian Kirsanov[5] gives the total human losses for the entire USSR as 46 million. The well-known archivist Yu. Teller[6] states that the overall losses of the military and civilian population exceeds 46 million people, of

[1] Christian Streit, *Keine Kameraden, Die Wehrmacht und die Sowjetischen Kriegsgefangen, 1941–1945*, 3rd edition (revised) 1991.

[2] V. Zilhalov and O. Laver, "Ukrayintsi vdoma i v sviti" (Ukrainians at home and in the world), *Dzvin*, 1993, No. 4-6, pp. 95, 101.

[3] O.P. Dovzhenko, "Shchodennyk" (Diary), in *Tvory* (Works), Vol. 5, Kyiv, Dnipro, 1966.

[4] Ibid.

[5] M. Kirsanov, cited by D. Tabachnyk in "Tsina Peremohy. Velyka Vitchyznyana viyna – znana i neznana" (The price of victory. The Great Patriotic War – known and unknown), *Nauka i suspilstvo*, 1990, No. 5, pp. 10-13.

[6] Cited in D. Tabachnyk, op. cit.

The total number of population in Ukraine, 1941–46 in thousands							
Regions	Years			Difference, 1941–45		Difference, 1941–46	
	1.1.1941	1.1.1945	1.1.1946		%		%
Eastern regions excluding Crimea	31,570	21,534	25,429	10,036	31.9	6,141	19.4
Western regions excluding Transcarpathia	9,397	5,849	6,670	3,548	37.8	2,727	29.0
Total	40,967	27,383	32,099	13,584	33.2	8,868	21.8

which 12 per cent (22 million) were soldiers. The USSR lost one quarter of its population. What proportion of these losses belonged to Ukraine? Tabachnyk[7] estimates 16 million. The calculations are approximate, but have a credible basis: falsified losses for the USSR – 20 million; true losses for the USSR – 46 million; falsified losses for Ukraine – 7 million.

It follows from the rule-of-three that the true total is 2.5 times the official one. Since the state of Ukraine's statistics is such that a researcher has to do his own calculations, it is extremely difficult to establish the true value of the losses. The numerical data is self-contradictory, varying from losses of 13 to 16 million people in Ukraine alone.

There is no doubt that more than half the losses were borne by Ukraine. Over all the territories of the USSR occupied by the Germans, 6,075,000 civilians were killed and 4.2 million persons deported to Germany and German-occupied western Europe. In Ukraine, 3,898,000 civilians and 1,367,000 prisoners-of-war died at the hands of the Nazis, and 2.2 million people were deported for slave labour.[8] According to German reports, in the first months of the war, many Red Army soldiers of various nationalities – Ukrainians, Belarusians, Estonians, Lithuanians and Latvians, were captured and "sent home" by the Germans. The number of prisoners taken at Bialystok and Miensk equalled 300,000, at Uman – 100,000, Homiel and Klyntsya – 80,000, near Kyiv – 600,000, in the district of Vyazma – 663,000.[9] According to Soviet information, 4.5 million men from Ukraine were mobilised into the Red Army. There is no accurate information about the numbers killed. There do exist documents of the Ministry of Social Security of the Ukrainian SSR, which give the number of families receiving pensions and financial assistance on account of deceased soldiers. These include 1.3 million families whose relatives died after 22 June 1941.[10] Foreign sources give the figures as 7 million killed at the front and 5 million deported for labour. According to Voronov and Pylyavets, the figures for the civilian population reached 4.5 million killed and 2.5 million deported.[11] Over the period 1941-45, the rural population fell by 27 per cent, i.e. 7,415,700 people.

The 3.8 million civilian losses in Ukraine included persons from various ethnic minorities. Before the war, some 1.5 million Jews lived in eastern Ukraine, with a further 1 million in western Ukraine and eastern Belarus. In Ukraine, the Nazis killed more than 2.5 million Jews. The Soviet authorities made no provision for the evacuation of those sections of the population which were under the greatest threat, hence the decades-long official secrecy about the number and ethnic composition of the victims of Babyn Yar (Babi Yar) or Zamarstyniv in Lviv. Among the civilian casualties the most tragic fate was that of the Jews. Only 1,934,300 people were evacuated at the beginning of the war, 1,819,600 – (94 per cent) from the eastern regions of Ukraine and 114,700 from the western regions.

[7] D. Tabachnyk, op. cit.

[8] A. L. Perkovskyi and S.I. Pirozhkov, "Demohrafichni vtraty Ukrayinskoyi RSR v 40-kh rr." (Ukrainian demographic losses in the 1940s), *Ukrayinskyi Istorychnyi Zhurnal*, 1990, No. 2, pp. 15-25.

[9] Zilhalov and Laver, op. cit.

[10] A.L. Perkovskyi and S.I. Pirozhkov, op. cit.

[11] I.O. Voronov and Yu.H. Pylyavets, "Holod 1946-1947" (Famine 1946-47), Kyiv, 1991, Series 1, *Chas i suspilstvo*, No. 1, p. 47.

Perkovskyi and Pirozhkov[12] give some extremely valuable data on the total population of Ukraine immediately before and at the end of the war (see Table). According to Soviet military statistics, between 1 January 1941 and 1 January 1945 the population of eastern Ukraine fell from 31.6 million to 21.5 million (a loss of 10.1 million), that of western Ukraine – from 9.3 million to 5.8 million (a loss of 3.5 million). The figures refer to the period after the deportation of 1,173,000 inhabitants of western Ukraine. Over the whole territory of Ukraine during the war the population decreased by 13,584,000.

By 1 July 1946, the population had increased to 4,716,000, due to the arrival of demobilised soldiers in western Ukraine, and the return of repatriated prisoners from Germany and evacuees from the east. In addition, there was a wave of immigration: more than 585,000 soldiers of the NKVD, 86,000 party officials and a large number of Russian-speaking business managers and lumpenised population from Russia arrived to take up permanent residence in Ukraine.[13]

The Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) suffered great losses at the hands of the Nazis. Almost 5,000 of its leaders and activists were shot, including the two brothers of Stepan Bandera (the OUN leader). More than 50 per cent of the prisoners in concentration camps were Ukrainians – including such prominent figures as Stepan Bandera, Andriy Melnyk, Taras Bulba-Borovets, Oleh Olzhych and many others. The number of Ukrainians murdered and shot by the Nazis in the Yaniv concentration camp in Lviv and at Babyn Yar in Kyiv still awaits a proper investigation. Together with thousands of Jews, at Babyn Yar there lie 648 members of the Ukrainian creative élite, in particular Olena Teliha, Mykhailo Teliha, Ivan Rohach, in all, 125,000 people of various ethnic origins.[14]

One must also mention the tragic fate of the soldiers of the "Galicia" Division, which the Germans threw into the Brody maelstrom, where 7-8,000 young men were killed. Those who survived ended their life in Soviet gulags. Another 11,000 members of the division were interned in Italy. None of them returned to Ukraine. Thereby the division "Galicia" cost Ukraine 20-22,000 deaths.

The losses of the Second World War also include victims of the NKVD among the civilian population and the soldiers of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA). A collection of documents in the Central State Archives of the October Revolution provides information about 65 NKVD military operations carried out over 20 days in March 1944, during which 9,624 soldiers were captured and 734 officers killed.[15] The fate of those captured is unknown. No statistics were kept, but usually the NKVD shot them straight away, although some of them, after interrogation and torture, were sentenced to long terms of imprisonment (25 years), and a very small proportion used as *agents provocateurs.*

In September 1944, under pressure from the Red Army, the Germans withdrew from Ukrainian territory completely. According to Arsen Panasenko,[16] Stalin's Com-

[12] A.L. Perkovskyi and S.I. Pyrozhkov, op. cit.

[13] Yu. Shapoval, "Skazaty vsyu pravdu" (To tell the whole truth), *Literaturna Ukrayina*, No. 39, 1 October 1992.

[14] Yu. Petrashevych, "Tini Babynoho yaru" (The shades of Babyn Yar), *Kyiv*, No. 1-6, 1994.

[15] M.F. Buhay, "Deportatsiya naselennya z Ukrayiny (30-50-ti roky)" (Deportation of the population from Ukraine, 1930s-50s), *Ukrayinskyi Istorychnyi Zhurnal*, 1990, No. 10, pp. 32-38.

[16] A. Panasenko, "Borotba Ukrayinskoho narodu z druhoyu bolshevytskoyu okupatsiyeyu" (Struggle of the Ukrainain people against the second Bolshevik occupation), *Ukrayinska Holovna Vyzvolna Rada* (Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council), Book 1, Vol. 8, Lviv, Litopys, 1992, pp. 162-80.

munist imperialism, as the military successor and heir of the great power testaments and traditions of the Russian empire, launched a particularly fierce drive for: the imposition of its ideological-political views and the physical and material destruction of the Ukrainian people and its liberation movement.

One means of physical destruction was the mass mobilisation of the western Ukrainian male population between the ages of 18 and 60.[17] Untrained and unarmed, they were thrown into the front line to certain death. For the Communist leadership this was no new discovery: they had used this method back in 1943, to force their way across the Dnipro (Dnieper). During this operation, some 300-350,000 unarmed civilians perished. The repetition of this forced crossing cost the villagers of the Kyiv region extremely dearly.

Another means of physical destruction, attested by the German archives and documents, was the activity of the Communists and the NKVD who worked in the Gestapo and used the Germans to destroy Ukrainian nationalists and politically aware Ukrainians.[18]

Apart from that, great losses were due to the activities of the NKVD "reconnaissance units". Innocent people were cruelly beaten, tortured and hanged. Villages were plundered and burned, great numbers of people were deported to Siberia, and the principle of family or collective responsibility, introduced by the Nazis, was adopted as a model. This terror evoked resistance, which in its turn led to an increase in the number of victims. In 14 districts of the Lviv region, between July 1944 and July 1947, 5,383 people were arrested, 2,200 were liquidated, and 2,348 deported to Siberia and the Donbas in eastern Ukraine. By 1946, units of the NKVD had already killed more than 303,000 people in this area.

The NKVD also applied ideological and political measures of demoralisation: promises, blackmail, bribery, propagating among the population ideas of betrayal and collaboration with the NKVD.

These calculations cannot fully reflect the demographic processes which occurred in Ukraine in those years. It must be remembered that at that time the Ukrainian SSR did not include Crimea or Transcarpathia. Statistical retrospective analyses of the population often ignore these territorial changes. Published sources give the situation for 1941, taking into account the present borders, including Crimea, which did not at that time belong to Ukraine, but not the population of Transcarpathia (which in the Czechoslovak census of 1935 was 780,000).

Demographic losses during the Second World War (1941-45), the resettlement of various strata of the population, the mixing of populations, emigration, immigration, the Nazi genocide, the Stalinist terror, the murders and torture of the NKVD, the mass deportations – all this still awaits accurate research. The figures are contradictory and for many years were treated as official secrets. The data given here simply represent an attempt to take into account all categories of the victims, but make no claim to completeness or absolute accuracy. □

[17] T. Chuprynka, "Do genezy Ukrayinskoyi Holovnoyi Vyzvolnoyi Rady" (On the genesis of the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council), *Litopys Ukrayinskoyi Powstanskoyi Armiyi* (Chronicle of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army), Vol. 9, Book 2, Lviv, 1992, pp. 392-410.

[18] W. Kosyk, *Ukrayina i Nimechchyna u Druhiy svitoviy viyni* (Ukraine and Germany in the Second World War), Paris-New York-Lviv, 1993, p. 659.

Ukrainian PoW Press in Italy, 1945-47

Natalya Sydorenko

On the eve of the conclusion of World War II and after the final capitulation of Hitler's Nazi rule, some two to three million Ukrainians found themselves in western Europe – mainly in Germany, Austria and Italy. Two principal paths brought these Ukrainians to Italy: 1) in May-June 1944, the Polish Expeditionary Corps, under the command of General Wladyslaw Anders, fought its way from Naples and Rome. This campaign is best known for the attack on Monte Cassino. Several dozen of the 2,000 Ukrainians, who were in the ranks of this Corps, are buried in the military cemetery at the foot of the mountain; 2) in May-June 1945, there were some 15,000 Ukrainians in Italy, the majority of whom were soldiers of the "Galicia" Division (from March 1945 – the 1st Division of the Ukrainian National Army), who surrendered to the British and were interned in prisoner-of-war camps near Bellaria and Rimini. There were also countless Ukrainian refugees in the displaced persons camps near Naples (Caserta, Capua, etc.); later Ukrainian refugees from Yugoslavia were for a short time settled in a camp near Trieste. These prisoners-of-war and refugees were, to some extent, cared for by the Ukrainian Aid Committee in Rome, which was set up on the initiative of Bishop Ivan Buchko.

In their two years in the prisoner-of-war camps, the Ukrainians built churches, opened libraries and schools, held further education courses, organised trade workshops and professional courses, formed orchestras, choirs, theatres and various societies, artistic, teacher and engineering-technical associations, and so on.

The bitter but true words of Bishop Ivan Buchko, spoken in the cramped church in Rimini, counselled hard work: "He, who relies on the grace of the stranger is doomed", became a doctrine that only faith in one's own strength and work will bring a better future.[1] Loss of faith and apathy gradually disappeared, and courage, and the desire to overcome life's misfortunes, and reach one's chosen goal, were reborn. There was a constant increase in the number of volunteers offering their help in the cultural and educational fields, to improve life in the camp community and to preserve the dignity of the Ukrainian community abroad.

The camp press, which attempted to fill a "gap in the plane of cultural life", was one such development. From June 1945 to May 1947, various periodicals and one-off publications were produced, some purely local and some which circulated more widely through the entire camp community, providing a constant service for the exiled Ukrainian community.

Through the various stages of growth and improvement of these journals, the inmates had to face many obstacles, set-backs and misfortunes. The majority of publications began as small news-posters, or rather hand-written sheets,

[1] *Batkivshchyna* (Homeland), 25 August 1946.

displayed on notice boards in the regimental lines or in the camp, and attracting groups of avid readers.

Somewhat similar was the small format newspaper intended for officers, who were located separately from the main ranks of the Division: several single-copy issues of the humorous periodical *Mokrym ryadnom* (Exposure) were published by a certain Ensign Terletskyi in the Mestre camp near Venice. In the summer of 1945, several short-lived regimental newspapers appeared in Bellaria: *Taborovi visti* (Camp news), *Taborovyk* (Inmate), and others. Typewritten in a few copies, such publications as *Ukrayinskyi kozak* (Ukrainian Cossack), *Batkivshchyna* (Homeland), *Nasha meta* (Our goal), *V nametakh* (In tents) were not particularly attractive to the eye – gingerish paper, smudged type with ink or hand-written corrections, crudely illustrated with pencil or crayon drawings. The only exception among these initial publications was the irritating *Osa* (Wasp), which "stung that only two weeks has passed" and it had already acquired an inter-camp reputation. It eventually moved to Britain, together with the former soldiers of the Division.

It was not an easy task to start a publishing venture in the restrictive conditions of the prisoner-of-war camps. There were no professional journalists, no access to general information, no proper printing system, a lack of paper, ink, equipment, and so on. Very often the early manuscripts were submitted to editors written in pencil, in some cases on toilet paper or on labels from food-tins. The newspaper *Zhyttya v tabori* (Life in the camp) began life with a typewriter, acquired from headquarters. Later a hectograph and some ink were obtained, and finally a small area was assigned to it in the main tent in the middle of the wind-swept camp. Thus the basic requirements for publication were gradually built up.

The longest-lived periodicals in the Bellaria-Rimini camps were *Zhyttya v tabori*, founded by the Students' group in September 1945, and the weekly *Batkivshchyna*, which developed into true chronicles of life in the camps.

The editor-in-chief of the former newspaper was originally Orest Horodyskyi, later Lyubomyr Rykhtytskyi, and then (towards the end) Volodymyr Gotskyi, who from the very start had been responsible for all the "dirty work" as technical editor. This was exceptionally demanding work, as sometimes he had to put together a newspaper virtually "from nothing". In his book *Z Peremyshlya do Rimini* (From Peremyshl to Rimini), Gotskyi wrote about the founder and chief organiser of the newspaper, Orest Horodyskyi, as follows: "... His lively character and ability to go outside the camp took him all over the place. He constantly brought back new materials, and wrote up the camp chronicle, for he had the opportunity to be at all events, in all parts of our camp".[2] Several pages later, Volodymyr Gotskyi noted with some regret: "Life is passing me by", for he had constantly to plunge into the editorial maelstrom, preparing materials for the next week's edition; often he only found out about the appearance of a choir or an orchestra, the opening of a school or courses, the arrival of guests and other news when Orest Horodyskyi handed him his reports and "Chronicle".

[2] Volodymyr Gotskyi, *Z Peremyshlya do Rimini* (From Peremyshl to Rimini), Memoirs, Vol. II, London, 1992, p. 156.

In two years of its existence as a weekly, and from 16 June 1946 onwards a daily, a number of talented young men – Volodymyr Kaplun, Mykola Volynskyi, Bohdan Budnyi, A. Tymkevych, A. Lototskyi, and others – worked on *Zhyttya v tabori.*

The newspaper also had a periodical supplement *Nash shlyakh* (Our path), which later developed into an independent literary and scholarly journal of the same name. This contained articles on literary themes, original works of poets and prose writers from the camps, translations and reprints. When a "Literary-Artistic Club" was founded in Rimini it took under its wing the editing of this journal. It was renamed *Hrono* (Cluster) and became a literary and artistic publication, edited by Dr Roman Kovalskyi and Bohdan Budnyi. The first issue of the revamped journal published a review of camp musical groups (ensembles led by Ensign Stepan Huminilovych and Ensign Havrylyuk, a chamber orchestra led by one Kravchuk and a mandolin orchestra, organised for the "Prosvita" Society by I. Samiylenko, as well as the jazz band of Osyp Holovatskyi, which operated outside the camp and entertained British military units). The second issue for 1947, in addition to a large selection of poems by Bohdan Bora, Yuriy Forys and Andriy Lehit, also published two stories entitled "Foreigners", by Stepan Elerson, and "Melody", by Ben d'Ye, as well as a play – "The wealthy peasant" – by the young tyro Fedir Malyn. Finally, the newspaper published an extensive chronicle of artistic life in and around Rimini.

Besides the weekly *Zhyttya v tabori*, there was the bi-weekly *Yunatskyi zryv* (Upsurge of youth), edited by Mykola Ohlyuk, which appeared between September 1945-May 1947. It carried articles on historical and political themes and scholarly and educational problems, as well as poems, feuilletons and memoirs; "Veselyi kutyk" (Merry corner) and "Little Selepko's sketches" were among its most popular features.

When times were lean, editorial boards would merge, as happened with *Osa* and *Zhyttya v tabori.* When conditions improved, however, they once again went their own separate ways, but sharing the same printing equipment. *Osa* was edited the whole time, in Rimini and later in London, by Volodymyr Kaplun, who was also known as a humorist, under the pseudonym Fed Yushka, and also for his numerous illustrations and caricatures in the press. The regular features of this bi-weekly were themselves humorous: "The Agency 'Vid vukha do vukha' (From ear to ear) reports...", "Tsikavi dribnychky" (Interesting knick-knacks), "Tovaryska khronika" (Matey chronicle), "Oholoshennya" (Announcements), as well as separate pages devoted to "Literary-artistic and other whims", camp folklore – "Sow and grow" and other features. One comes across unexpectedly grotesque, allegorical, satirical and simply jocular articles, verse, prose, signed Fyu-fyu, F-F, Tam-Tam, B, D-B, Nim-Chuk, Yur, ys, Korok, Shylo, Ko-tskyi, Pshyk, Hedz, Panko Chyryek. The illustrations and caricatures were always considered one of the high-spots of *Osa.* These were, for the most part, the work of Orest Slupchynskyi (pseudonym Ho-Ho), but one must not overlook the other artistic "confections", provided by the well-known camp "jesters", who signed themselves Ko-ka, M.F., Vo-ka, and others. No less attention should be paid to the regular letters to the editors filled

with never-ending appeals in a special language with its own dialectical overtones, signed Fydko Yushka.

The periodical never lost its satirical and cheerful tone, or its ability to joke about itself and about others. Thus, in the autumn of 1945, there appeared a note "Winter is coming" on the future plans of educational institutions in the Rimini camp and the new acquisitions of the periodical itself. In particular, it noted that *Osa* had now gone "on the strength", for the days when it had had to appear displayed like some "orphan" on a notice-board in the middle of the camp, were now over. From now on the weekly would be distributed on a par with *Zhyttya v tabori* and would find its way into every tent. It was obvious that the newspaper "gained in respect and could confidently look the oncoming winter in the eye".[3]

The print run of the inter-camp newspaper *Batkivshchyna*, grew from ten to two hundred, and finally to 1,000. It started off as *Ukrayinskyi kozak* (Ukrainian Cossack, which appeared in August 1945 in Bellaria, although its "geneaology" also goes back to *Strilets* [Rifleman] – the newspaper of the 31st regiment, which appeared at the front at the turn of 1944-45). *Batkivshchyna* began as a duplicated publication (October-November 1945, Bellaria), but eventually switched to photo type printing (from issue No. 9 in Rimini). The editors also changed: the founder, Semen Fedyuk, put out 33 issues of the newspaper, when worn out and exhausted with the work he was forced to undergo medical treatment, being replaced by V. Veryha (issues No. 34-45); finally the paper was produced by an editorial board.

For two years this periodical grew constantly, both in form in essence, and in content. The format and aesthetic appearance evolved, as did the quality of the publication; the shape of the first page gradually crystallised with socio-political and educational articles, touching on the problems of living history, civic life, the lighting of cultural torches abroad, and so on. All kinds of news flowed in to the columns of the periodical from the homeland, from the life of Ukrainian communities, from the whole world; it printed literary works (stories, novels, memoirs), reviews and reports, sometimes humour and caricatures. From 1946, there appeared a regular feature of caricatures "In a distorting mirror". The editorial board tried to keep it a pan-Ukrainian supra-party weekly, which would help give the soldiers in the camps a sense of unity.

The Ukrainian community in Italy also had other forms of information. The cultural-educational department of the camp in Rimini was also engaged in the preparation of news-posters, that is: *Prosvita* (Enlightenment), *Nedilya* (Sunday), *Taborovyk*, *Nashe zhyttya* (Our life). On 1 January 1946, a separate sub-department of the press was established, which encompassed the activity of five periodicals and a radio service (via a loudspeaker) and which published a daily bulletin "Radio News" (when *Zhyttya v tabori* went over to daily publication on 16 June 1946, the radio service was discontinued).

As the activities of the "Prosvita" Society became more diverse, so did its organs; in spring 1946, the periodicals *Prosvita* and *Byuleten obyednannya taborovykh*

[3] *Osa* (Wasp), 28 October 1945.

tovarystv "Prosvita" (Bulletin of the union of the camp "Prosvita" Societies) were launched as well as publications of the "Prosvita" branches in the various camp blocs: *Nasha meta* (the first bloc), *Nash holos* (Our voice – the third bloc, editor Vitaliy Bender), *Taborovyk* (the seventh bloc, editor T. Tymkiv).

The sports editorial board of the camp published the periodical *Na starti* (On your marks, editor Bohdan Pasichnyak), which was founded to give information about the specific keep fit activities of the Ukrainian community in Rimini, turning its attention first and foremost to the "numerous groups of inmates, who kick, run, jump, throw", ever calling to mind a giant ant-hill on the sports field.[4]

As we can see, the 15,000-strong camp community in Rimini had a quite varied camp-wide and local press, both the minor news-posters and large-circulation newspapers. At various times a certain rivalry on the part of this or that publication, and a constant defence of the title of camp-wide periodical could be felt; it was not easy to avoid often petty squabbles, which erupted out of political discussions. In view of this there was no lack in the press of feuilletons, ripostes, and sharp character-sketches. For example, the newspaper of the 1st regiment, *Nasha meta*, published an ironic and scurrilous portrayal of the Ukrainian publications in Italy in existence in the autumn of 1945. Although the author called all the camp periodicals without exception "bastards", he expressed some sympathy towards particular popular publications. Thus, in *Osa* he recognised a "pretty girl, a strapping wench", who had the habit of pouncing on innocent people – guests from the "homeland" (meaning here the Soviet military repatriation commissions). Her counterpart was the "handsome" *Ukrayinskyi kozak*: "The father, himself a demure man, is bringing up his son to be a firm patriot". The newly-appeared *Zhyttya v tabori* was portrayed as a "child of learning and the muse", and was wished luck in its diplomatic mission. The bi-weekly *Yunatskyi zryv* was impressive by reason of the "arrogance of those babes" from the youth battalion who founded it. At the same time *Nasha meta* also gave the best hopes that it would not let down expectations of its godfathers and older sisters in journalism.[5]

A review of periodicals in a similar humorous style appeared in *Osa*. This investigated the processes of building a symbolic temple to the Ukrainian publishing movement in Rimini. In particular this said: "... *Batkivshchyna* diligently gathers building materials and builds. Blown on by gusts of poetry, placed on the firm foundations of history, literature and politics...". In the general trend of *Zhyttya v tabori* one can perceive the hand of professors, doctors and other graduates who laboured over maintaining the academic and political level of this periodical.[6]

In the autumn of 1946, *Zhyttya v tabori*, and also *Batkivshchyna*, were transformed in nature into small publishing concerns which, in addition to their own periodicals, published various series of commemorative and propaganda

[4] *Na starti* (On your marks), 8 September 1946.
[5] *Nasha meta* (Our goal), No. 2, 1945, p. 11.
[6] *Osa*, 28 October 1945.

stamps, Christmas and New Year cards, various diplomas, as well as individual books. Among those who received the blessing of the editorial board of *Zhyttya v tabori* were the semi-fantastic tales and stories of Lyubomyr Rykhtytskyi ("Midsummer night's dream of Stepan Elerson"), the poems of Bohdan Bora (collections *U vyriyu* [In the warm regions], *V dorozi* [On the road]), and the "native writings" of Ivan Ohiyenko.

A spirit of competition on the part of the weekly *Batkivshchyna* was also apparent. In addition to a supplement entitled "Khvalim Hospoda" (Let us praise the Lord, 13 issues in all of which were published under the editorship of Fr Emanuyil Korduba from 17 March 1947 on). It also produced the Calendar for 1946, which indicated the most important dates in Ukrainian history, *Istoriya Rusiv* (History of the Rus' People) and *Natsionalne vidrodzhennya Karpatskoyi Ukrayiny* (The national rebirth of Carpathian Ukraine) – both works came from the pen of editor Semen Fedyuk – the collection of poems *Liryka* (Lyrics) by Andriy Lehit, the story "Obiznalys" by O. Devlad. The print run of these books ranged from 3 to 100 copies. A collection of 44 caricatures previously printed in *Osa* came out as a book in 1946 under the humorous title *Zibralas kompaniya* (The company has gathered). The artist was Orest Slupchynskyi (already well known under the pseudonym Ho-Ho). These widespread activities were to some extent assisted by the German printing house in Miramare, which donated paper, film, zinc plates and carried out all the actual printing work.

Much effort was put into setting up connections with other periodicals, Ukrainian institutions and private individuals, both in Italy and beyond. This was done on the initiative of the various editorial committees and with the support of the Ukrainian Aid Committee in Rome, and the mediation of Ukrainian priests.

Thus newspapers in Rimini, particularly *Zhyttya v tabori* and *Batkivshchyna*, exchanged with the newspapers *America*, *Svoboda* (Liberty), *Hromadska pora* (Civic time) from the USA, *Ukrayinske slovo* (Ukrainian word), *Chas* (Time), *Ukrayinska trybuna* (Ukrainian rostrum) from Germany, *Zveno* (The link) and *Novi dni* (New days) from Australia, *Ukrayinskyi robitnyk* (Ukrainian worker) from Canada, *Perelom* (Turning point) from Argentina, *Hash klych* (Our call) from England, *Visti* (News) from Belgium, *Ukrayinets u Frantsiyi* (Ukrainian in France) from Paris and others. Later the mailing list included Spain, Palestine, Brazil, Paraguay, China, Iraq, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, East Africa. As shown by the mailing list of *Zhyttya v tabori*, cited by Volodymyr Gotskyi in his book *Z Peremyshlya do Rimini*, this weekly was sent to Britain, to Hryhoriy Drabat and R. Smulka in London and to Captain Bohdan Panchuk in Edinburgh.[7] When the print run of the periodical was increased to 250 copies, 50 of these were earmarked for distribution outside the camp. This helped to establish an exchange of publications – to make use of Ukrainian periodicals from virtually all corners of the world gave the opportunity to establish professional journalistic links and to receive primary information about the fate of Ukrainians in Palestine, Turkey, Argentina, Canada and so on, to carry out research of an archival and informa-

[7] Volodymyr Gotskyi, op. cit., pp. 195-96.

tional nature, and to establish contacts with various committees or bureaux which attempted to locate missing friends and relatives.

In spite of all the difficulties (technical, material etc.) encountered in setting up publishing work in the camps in Italy, these periodicals managed to give historical accounts, basic articles, memoirs, brief news from the world and various countries, and an on-going camp chronicle. And with the appearance of every new issue the inmates avidly awaited their own printed word in Rimini, Bellaria, Cervia, Cesenatico, Riccione and other locations where officers, soldiers and nurses from the 1st Division of the Ukrainian National Army were located.

In October 1946, an exhibition of periodicals and books took place in the Rimini camp. In appearance and atmosphere it was reminiscent of a provincial "Prosvita" Society reading room somewhere in Galicia or Volhynia.

Today it is only from the camp newspapers of the time that we know of the existence of journals of the camp Plast (Scouts) – *Molode zhyttya* (Young life), *Plastun* (Scout), *Zapysky plastuna* (Scout's notes), and that the Ukrainian library in Rimini contained the works of Ivan Franko, Ivan Nechuy-Levytskyi, Omelyan Ohonovskyi, Yevhen Onatskyi, Natalena Koroleva, Leonid Mosendz, and others.[8] During relocation and resettlement, however, archive materials were lost and individual issues destroyed and whole sets of this plain history of camp life were left without a curator. Surviving copies of these publications are today museum rarities, but who is there to care for the discovery, compilation and location of these scattered materials?

To summarise, the PoW press became a clear proof of the industriousness, stubbornness and indestructibility of the spiritual culture of the Ukrainian people, which even under the worst conditions expressed its desire for knowledge, aspired to preserve its word, and to create a world of its own, both a spiritual and national world, which came to an end in May 1947, when thousands of Ukrainian soldiers were transferred to prisoner-of-war camps in Britain.

On the occasion of the publication of the 50th issue of *Zhyttya v tabori* in June 1946, Orest Horodyskyi, the organiser and moving spirit of the publishing house, stated: "With pride we look back at the path we have trodden, ... a pleasant path, conscious that the effort, which we put into publishing was made only to benefit the common good of our camp community".[9] Behind this well-considered phrase there lay hard and difficult work, spiritual aspirations, and the judicious rearing of the national idea abroad. □

[8] *Batkivshchyna*, 27 October 1946.
[9] *Zhyttya v tabori* (Life in camp), 16 June 1946.

The Jersey Files

Vera Rich

In summer 1940, with the fall of France imminent, the War Cabinet of the United Kingdom decided that the Channel Islands – Jersey, Guernsey, Alderney and Sark – were too close to the French coast to be defensible, and in any case, had no strategic significance. In spite of vehement objections from Winston Churchill, who had just taken over as Prime Minister, the islands were, accordingly, demilitarised. All troops were withdrawn, civilians who wished to leave were evacuated, and the islands were, in effect, abandoned to the Nazis. Adolf Hitler, on the other hand, rated the strategic value of the islands extremely high. The propaganda value of having captured even these small fragments of the British Empire was, he considered, enormous, and the islands themselves would make an excellent U-boat base as well as, in his post-war New Order, a perfect holiday resort for good Nazi families from the Reich. The islands, therefore, had to be defended against a possible British attempt at recapture. Between 1942 and 1944, vast quantities of money, matériel and human lives were expended on what Germany's military leaders began to refer to (in whispers) as the Führer's *Inselwahn* (island mania), which demanded the construction of massive fortifications and back-up facilities on Jersey, Guernsey and Alderney. (Sark, an independent Seignieurie, ruled at that time by its redoubtable Dame, Sybil Hathaway, was not included in the fortification project.)

The labour for these projects was provided, as in continental Europe, by the Todt Organisation. The Todt detachments in the Channel Islands were administered directly from France, and were outside the authorities either of the Island governments or the Nazi occupation forces. The work-force consisted of forced labourers, a large proportion of whom came from the then Soviet Union. The harsh living and working conditions, inadequate food and clothing, and draconian disciplinary measures took a heavy toll of life. Most of the prisoners who succumbed have no known grave; on Jersey, however, a few were buried in the Strangers' Cemetery, apparently to impress visiting neutrals that everything was being done decently and in due order.

"The Roll of Interment of Foreign Nationals who died during the German Occupation" lists 72 "Russians", many of whom, in fact, were Ukrainians, whose places of birth are recorded as "Shitomar" (i.e. Zhytomyr), Kiev (Kyiv), Winniza (Vinnytsya), and in one case simply, Ukraine. After the Liberation, the States (parliament) of Jersey, had a large Orthodox cross erected in the cemetery plot containing the "Russian" graves.

In late 1959, when I was General Secretary of the Anglo-Ukrainian Society (AUS), my attention was drawn to the existence of these Ukrainian graves. With the fifteenth anniversary of the Liberation approaching, I began, with the enthusiastic support of several of the Ukrainian council members of the AUS, to investigate the possibility of the Society's holding a memorial service there in May 1960, and possibly of dedicating a plaque commemorating not only those

Ukrainians who lie buried there, but the far greater number of those who perished on the islands and who have no known grave. At the same time, I proposed that the AUS should try to collect information from members of the local population who, during the Occupation, had been in clandestine contact with the prisoners. Although, officially, all such contacts were forbidden, during a brief visit to Jersey in January 1960, I learned that a number of the prisoners had, in fact, escaped, and were sheltered by the local population. Furthermore, as the war went on and conditions on the islands became more and more harsh, an occasional blind eye seems to have been turned to those prisoners who left the camps temporarily to get food from the local population, by begging, brow-beating, or outright theft.

Both projects, alas, were frustrated by internal tensions within the AUS. From the Ukrainian side, there was the question of whether the proposed service should be conducted by a Catholic or an Orthodox priest (ecumenism was then in its extreme infancy). On the British side there was – of all things – a class struggle between a trade union official who was secretary of the AUS branch in a northern manufacturing town, and who felt himself inspired to wage a private war not only against the aristocratic patrons and chairman of the AUS, but also against myself, apparently on account of my university education. As the result of what can only be seen at this remove in time as extreme pettiness, the Unionist managed to block the whole Jersey project, and – what else – to take over the General Secretaryship! Shortly afterwards, the AUS began a long slow decline into inactivity...

In the meantime, several letters had arrived from Jersey residents giving details of Ukrainian contacts, and enclosing precious memorabilia. These I retained, hoping that, sooner or later, an appropriate moment would come to publish this small, but significant, contribution to the history of one of the saddest British-Ukrainian contacts in history – the murder-by-neglect – and sometimes by direct action – of Ukrainian forced labourers on a Nazi-occupied possession of the British crown.

ʃ ʃ ʃ

From Rose E. Hübert

... As you may have been told, the "Russians" were daily at houses begging for food. Not content with being fed at one door they sometimes stole from farms & sheds & this, after a time, made us determine to discourage their visits by not feeding them, especially as one day 22 of them turned up!!! It was not easy to say "Russki raus" but the whole thing had snowballed to such an extent that we could no longer cope.

One day I returned from field work & there at my door was a young "Russian". Out came my sentence "Russki raus" and to my surprise without more ado the young man very dejectedly walked away. When I reached my *open* door there I found my baker had been & left our meagre ration of bread on a table near the door. My mother-in-law then told me that the "Russki" had been standing there at least a quarter of an hour so could so easily have made off with the bread. I ran after him & from that day on he was a daily midday visitor to our

home, where we gave him a bowl of soup, veg. & perhaps an egg & a slice of bread & butter to take back to the camp. He told us he came from the Ukraine & his name was Ivan Alexandrovitch MASEUR [Mazur]. He was about 20 & oh! so very much afraid of the dogs in the neighbourhood so much that when we heard the barking of dogs one of us would run down the lane to meet him. He was eventually transferred to St Brelade's but still came on rare occasions to see us. One Sunday when I returned from Church my neighbours told me that Ivan had been, & searched the neighbourhood for me as he & his friends were being sent to France the following week, to Caen he thought. Apparently he was in tears & begged the neighbours not to forget to let us know where he had gone. We never heard of him again, this was just before the fighting at Caen, so we can only think that Ivan lost his life there...



Ivan Mazur, Jersey, 1943-44

From Mrs Ellen B. Fedan

On July 21, 1943 my husband was fined for harbouring a Russian boy, aged 14 years of age – he was a very good type of boy – his handwriting was of an educated type – we knew only his Christian name – Demian – he had been brought from the Ukraine – we provided a good home for this boy for 2 ½ months – 'Wolfe' the Gestapo head of the Island (I think) came to my house & 'collected' him & his clothes – at the time of 'collection' Wolfe would not let us say goodbye – Demian just waved his hand whilst at his back two men were holding his arms. We do not know where Demian was taken – but a few days afterwards – a man – who in good health would have been a giant – but at that time was a 'thin giant' said when I asked after Demian – saying "Demian?" the man pointed towards town and said "Cartle" – I assumed he meant Elizabeth Castle – after the Liberation we learned that Elizabeth Castle had gruesome associations attached to it (however true or untrue that may be). We never saw Demian again. We learned from Demian he had escaped from his camp (a camp at L'Etacq containing thousands of Russians) 6 times – therefore we assumed he was dead – I had 7 men – who kept going from one place to another after Demian went away – two were always afraid of seeing one another, & I had to shove one into a room if the other one arrived whilst he was there. Their names were Alexis and Petrov [presumably "Petro" – Ed.] – we used to call Petrov Peter – he was an educated man – he had been a teacher of English – he told me he would not go back to Russia – but stay in Jersey till it was safe to get to England – Petrov was looked after in town [St Helier] with other people and myself by a Mrs Le Fleur – the son of this lady has an itinerant shop (bus) & calls on me each Monday –

they may be able to help re Peter and others. There was also a boy named Vassil (?) I do not know if I have spelt his name correctly – but he was a Ukrainian also who said he would not wish to go back to Russia – he spoke English too though not too well – he was a musician – he was in Jersey after the Liberation also. Demian's family, as far as we understood him – were separated three men (aged) being shot – & his mother and two sisters were taken by the Germans.

If what I have recalled is any help I shall be glad – but I think that the boy I kept for all those weeks did not survive – he was a boy any mother would have been proud to have called son – though I forgot to mention – his nose had sometime or other been broken giving him a "one-sided" look. He used to call us "Mamo" and "Papo". We never knew surnames – the names were very difficult to say. I regret not having learned them. At the time it was felt "The less we knew of names the better" – only a name to call a boy was all we asked...

From G.K. Hughes

... Most of the Nazi dirty work was done either in secrecy or at night after curfew. So there were not many witnesses.

At the time I was working on the walk that leads from St Aubin's to Corbière, looking after the shrubs & trees. The Germans decided to lay a railway along the footway and brought crowds of Russians there to do the job. Of course it was a serious offence to talk to them but one day, one of them broke away from the gang and came to me. Of course I could not understand what he said but managed to make out he wanted tobacco which I supplied him with. Whenever he could he came to me and one day he pointed to various shrubs and gave the Latin name, and as time went on with the aid of odd bits of French, Latin, German & English we got up a conversation. I could never catch his name but it ended in "enko" so he must have been a Ukrainian. This all had a humorous ending. When I first knew him he was dressed in an old sheepskin and rags and covered with vermin but when they were released I met several making their way to the harbour and one stopped and shook hands. He was my friend but was dressed in a grey suit grey velour hat and attaché case & umbrella. So that at least was one that got away and hadn't done himself too badly. By the way I had found out he was a nursery man by trade. He had a good knowledge of all plants. His home was somewhere by Kharkov.

One day I heard a terrific row and went to see what it was. There seemed to be a near rioting going on & one of the Todt Organization men seized a pick handle & felled two of the workers. They made the others pick them up – they were dead – and carry them to some sandhills & later on I asked one of the Todt men who they were & [he] just said "Ukrainians"...

From Mrs J. Curwood

... Here is a page from my old Autograph book, in which a member of the slave gang wrote.

In 1943, we used to live at Pont Marquet, in St Brelade. The slave labour[ers] were laying a railway track, very near our home. Each day lots of (Russians) as we then called them, came to our house begging for food. It was very difficult, as we had very little food ourselves, & we were seven in family. But a few of them we did help. One in particular. He was so very young, perhaps in his teens. My mother gave him a bowl of soup every day. We were so sorry for him. Each day when he finished his soup, he would kneel down and pray, making the sign of the cross, as he did so.

In September 1943 we moved away to another house. We tried to explain to him, & others, that we were going & that there would be no more soup for them. But I don't know if they ever understood us. I remember my father giving one or two of them a warm overcoat & trousers for the winter. They were very grateful. After we moved, we

never [saw] them again. If this one little fellow did live through it & returns home, it would be lovely to know of it.

Before we moved, we tried to make this young man understand that we wanted him to write his name & address. I still don't know if this was his home address he wrote or not, but this is what he wrote...

There were many different times that we helped the odd one but unfortunately we never did know their names, it just didn't seem important then. There was the young man, I found lying with his head injured, he was on the side of the track, I spoke to him, & he showed me his head. I ran home & begged my mother to give me some of her precious brandy, which she kept for sickness only. I took him a glass of it & he drank it up and sank back to rest. I had to leave him then as Germans were coming down the hill near by. When I went back later on in the day, he had gone. I don't know what happened to him. He talked of his friend who had lost his fingers. I think he was trying to tell me that he was going to walk back to camp...

From A.J. Scriven of *The Evening Post*

... [I have] received a visit from a Spaniard, now naturalised British, who was brought to Jersey by the Germans sometime around 1942. He worked at Val de la Mare, St Ouen parish as an engine driver and nearby was a camp with about 150 Russians of whom he estimated some 100 were Ukrainians. They were engaged on bunker work on what is known as the Five Mile Road. He was later transferred to Alderney and he tells me that there are over 40

graves there of Ukrainians, all of boys between the ages of 16 – 18 years of age. He has some graphic stories to tell of the brutality of SS guards in Alderney and Jersey.

I enclose a small photo which was taken at the time in Jersey and this shows the Spaniard in the middle back row. The others are Russians, Ukrainians with the exception of the man kneeling on the left of the picture, who he believes was a Mongolian... □

Ukrainian Poets and World War II

The impact of World War II on the Ukrainian writers caught up in it was considerable, both at the time and, for the survivors, afterwards in retrospect. To discuss its full range, even in broad outline, would require a lengthy volume. For the Ukrainian literary scene of the war years was unusually complex. On the one hand, for writers from eastern Ukraine, after the Sovietisation policies of the 1930s, it became, once again, possible to express Ukrainian ideals and aspirations openly. Indeed, in the latter years of the war, the Soviet authorities soft-pedalled their former exaltation of all things Russian, and, for the purposes of war propaganda, were prepared to permit the publication of Ukrainian patriotic ideas, which, in peace-time circumstances, they would have condemned as "nationalist". On the other hand, the issues involved in Ukraine were by no means as clear-cut as in other arenas of the war. Elsewhere, defence of one's country entailed only fighting against, or offering other forms of resistance to, the Nazis. But for Ukrainians, the struggle against Nazi Germany was only part of the picture; in western Ukraine, in particular, the war was seen as a two-pronged struggle against both Nazism and Russian Communism. In spite of the tumult and destruction of War, some organised literary life did survive. The Soviet annexation of Galicia (which had been under Polish rule during the inter-war years) meant renewed contacts between writers who had been isolated from each other for two decades. And, when circumstances permitted, new works of literature continued to appear, albeit in small print-runs and on less-than-elegant paper.

The selection which follows highlights a few of the most significant trends and personalities of those years.

Olena Teliha (1907–42), who, before the war, lived in Czechoslovakia and Poland, was one of the most talented poets associated with the west Ukrainian journal *Visnyk* (The Herald). During the war, she made her way to Kyiv as a member of a patriotic task-force, working in the German-occupied areas for the independence of Ukraine. In summer 1941, she became head of the newly established Society of Ukrainian Writers, which issued a journal *Litavry* (Kettle-Drums). However, from autumn 1941 onwards, the Nazi occupation regime began a clamp-down on active Ukrainian patriots, and early in 1942, Teliha was among a group of leading writers rounded up and summarily shot.

Vadym Lesych (1909–), a poet, journalist and art-critic, was born in west Ukraine. Before the war, he was particularly associated with the Warsaw-based Ukrainian quarterly *My* (We). After the war he settled in the USA.

Yar Slavutych (1918–), a poet, translator and philologist from eastern Ukraine, was conscripted into the Red Army. When the German army swept eastward, he was cut off behind the lines. He established a partisan group in the forest which later became incorporated into the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. After the war, Slavutych emigrated to North America. Since 1960, he has been a professor at the University of Alberta. The first of the poems published here evokes the style of the traditional Ukrainian *Duma* (Ballad), and has been set to music by the émigré Ukrainian composer, Hryhoriy Kytastyi. Its theme, the repatriation to the

Soviet Union of prisoners-of-war and former slave labourers from displaced persons camps in Germany under the terms of the Yalta agreement, was a major scandal to Western public opinion at the time. However, as Slavutych's poem makes clear, at least some representatives of the Allies were prepared, on occasion, to go against the agreement they were supposed to be enforcing.

Mykhaylo Orest (1901–63), the younger brother of the better-known "neo-classical" poet, Mykola Zerov, grew up and was educated in Kyiv, and settled in Germany after the war. He deals in his poetry mainly with mystical themes and the union of man with nature. Only rarely are there specific allusions in his works to contemporary events (the description of the bombing in one of the poems published here is an exception). The other two poems published here are not out of place in a "war" collection; they come from his first book, *Luny Lit* (Echoes of the Years), which was published in 1944. The title-page names the publisher as *Ukrayinske vydavnytsvo* (Ukrainian press) Krakow/Lviv. According to a hand-written note inscribed in Orest's own personal copy, there was a print-run of 2,000. Less than 10 copies are believed to have survived.

Olena Teliha

Evening Song

Outside the panes, day grows cold,
First lights in the window-panes glow...
Enclose in my fingers to hold
All hatred and wrath that you know.

Place on my knees the cold stones,
Stones of the harsh bitter days,
And, at my feet, silver-toned
Wormwood, there place it and lay.

That your heart, freed from fetters and light,
Sing, like a free bird, in your breast,
So that you, my all-strongest one, might
On my lips find new power and rest.

And with a warm kiss I'll dispel
(Soft as smile that on infant lips lies)
And quench the fierce flames of deep hell
That burn in your thoughts and your eyes.

And tomorrow at dawn, when the height
Is sundered by early reveille,
Into mirk smoke-palled with night
Myself I shall send, make you ready.

No weeping nor tears you'll take with you –
Later, alone. I shall weep!
But, sharp as a knife, I shall give you
My kiss, as a weapon to keep.

That, in the steel whine of the battle,
For war-cry, for silence, you'll hold
Lips dauntless as shot in their mettle,
And firm as the blade of a sword.

* * *

Sharp eyes staring wide in the darkness
Now the clock strikes; four o'clock, five...
And my heart in hot weariness parching,
I once more am sleepless this night.

Yet I'll rise, quite tranquil, tomorrow,
Thus as always, never a change,
Into life, like a dance free from sorrow,
To the hours of night make my way.

Crush my memory's dreams, ever living,
I'll give joy and laughter again,
Only to those is victory given,
Who have power to laugh even in pain.

The Immortal

From the street lamps light fell away
Down from the dying day, all tranquil,
But before its death, the day
Met with strange laughs the requiem candles.

And maybe every one of us
Has felt that laughter, force resistless,
Like a candle borne on past
The incline's limits.

And that is why, as in a dream
I walked the middle of the highways,
And the clear eyes I met, agleam,
Glanced not but, startled, opened widely.

But I have passed by all the fires
Like the lights of a stranger's portal,
For I have heard: the long desired
Is drawing near with gifts immortal.

A Sunny Memory

I

My black day trembled and, to liquid turning,
Melted in hot sun falling from above,
And it is you once more, in memory burning,
Always so near, and never yet beloved.

I have breathed an infusion, wonder-working,
Of laughter bright and words of sunbeam glow.
To fields and squares once more I am returning
Back to the paths I passed through long ago...

Where on the skyline there appeared no phantom,
Where on the scales of true and certain weight
Thus as still now, my friends, unsure, uncertain,
Were not dragged off by foes sure in their hate.

II

A July day, all yellow-red shining,
Chiming bell-like a joyful swarm seemed!
Did not our youth, in bell-like chiming,
Scatter far and wide from our dreams?

A race through the water vying,
Rest on verges the fields between,
Did not our youth, in bell-like chiming,
Strike on the waves' silver gleam?

And all bronzed from the sun's shining,
We roamed there through the green shade,
One to another our love confiding
For heroes' and for goddesses' grace.

III

Where are you smiling now, thinking, and walking,
With radiance unchanging of eyes sunshine-bright?
O my beloved lad, once more the water
Is warm, and July in warm fruits has grown ripe!

Vadym Lesych

To an Unknown Warrior

Come to me, all who lost the ringing
Impulse of pilgrimages, shattered
On the cross-roads of thundrous battles
Or on the latticed bars of prisons,
Or on wire tapestries of terror,
Wolf sorties into brushwood bristle,
With sawn-off gun on paths of thistle,
Staring where western skies bleed ever.

Come with tumbleweed and wormwood
Seething stubborn in resistance,
With threadbare beast-like existence,
Whose talons from the beasts took firmly
And brought – as it were, those truths' banner,
Which in our fathers' land, abundant,
Flourish in fiery wake's repentance –
To music's triple-thrumming clamour.

Come you who in eyes of brittle
Death have looked in meadows boundless,
Say how in the alarms resounded
In dark night raids your thunder's rattle.
How you took the last rusty bullet,
Fondlingly in pistol laid it,
Yourself into your temple let it,
When evil destiny betrayed you.

Come to me, you who are nameless,
Come like conscience, like a shadow,
Bring your mothers' shawls, all stained with
Their own blood, encrusted, spattered.
That to all loth to believe you,
They may bear witness unspoken,
– In bright icon-frames as token
Like Veronica's offered weaving.

Come and stand in grey ranks waiting,
Silent, stern, as ever standing,
Grace and graciousness forgetting
In your heart filled with deep anguish.
Speak a word, then, like a missile,
Struck unhandily from starkness,
It will gleam like a prayer in darkness,
That prayer will be an apostle.

Yar Slavutych

Song of Kempten

In the Bavarian city of Kempten
Christian daughters and sons of Ukraine were uniting.
Exiled by fighting,
They wept, and they chanted the psalter,
Knelt sadly together and prayed at the altar:

"Almighty and merciful Father,
Deliver us from our afflictions!
Let not Moscow's hired subverters assault our convictions!"

And in that congregation were three spies,
Three cutthroat assassins, the Kremlin-paid captains
Of seven hundred men.
They heard those prayers, and then
In truckloads brought their cohorts to the place.
They encircled the church and like vengeance descended –
Announced to the faithful their freedom was ended.

But the Ukrainians unrequiting,
Exiled by fighting,
Knelt down to the Virgin reciting
Entreaties against their assaulter.
And these are the words that they prayed at the altar:

"Mother of God, our Most Holy Saviour,
Thou didst protect the church of Pochayiv,
Thou didst deliver too our Kozak army.
We pray thee now, preserve our Christian heritage
From utter destruction.
Let not this frenzied army of red plunderers
Destroy us Ukrainians!

And in that congregation were three spies,
Three cutthroat assassins, the Kremlin-paid captains
Of seven hundred men.
They heard those prayers and then
Sent gum-chewing thugs with rifle butts
To smash the altar;
Hell-bent on slaughter,
They extended the halter.

But the sons of Ukraine unrequiting,
Exiled by fighting,
Stood firm, clasping hands at the altar.
They turned to the Mother of God and besought her
To shield them from the assaulter:

"Better that we guiltless people
Meet death on foreign soil fighting
Than bend an hour to Russian smiting.
Siberia will waste the pallid flesh of those who falter;
A frozen Ural mine shaft is the halter
That will yoke the human plunder of the Red defaulter.
Stalin, viper of our crucifixion,
Damned Herod, drunk with malediction,
Slay us ere we change this station
For your Russian prison of our nation!"

Then the paid traitors, the three Russian spies, assembled
Their cohorts, inciting
Them to start the blighting
Of the hapless Christians, whom they loaded
On trucks. Thus began their eastward eviction
Into the land of their afflictions.

But the Mother of God, our Most Holy Saviour,
Took mercy on the praying congregation
And filled the sons of Washington with indignation –
So they came to bring these guiltless souls salvation.

Thus the Ukrainian Christians were rescued.
Glory! Glory! Glory!

Ho! Laud to the Mother of God they raised,
Singing their joyful praise,
Glory! Glory! Glory!

Extract from "Daughter without a Name"

They came, those vandals, fearsome, ruthless,
And, by their wont, with hangman's frown
Of power, they mercilessly looted
The stores of village and town,
The distance smoked, the whole earth shivered,

And black smoke, poisonous and dread,
Through all wild Europe set aquiver
The corpses of the hanging dead.
And we? Who are we? Sorrow's witness!
To manhood in dull pain we won,
And only softly, in rare minutes,
We to the swampland bring the gun.
So then, insurgent's bullet, prosper!
Ring, renowned in ballad-strains.
The past by great-great-grandsires fostered
In the deep woods you've roused again.
You to achievements sempiternal
Have led the heavy driving ire
Against the foe. Winged-one eternal,
Be praised, bullet of battle-fires.
Be praised, you too, you valiant fighters,
Dedicated to freedom's war,
Who tearing down the wide horizon
The green shoots of insurgence bore
To Ukraina now united
Like truth whose brilliant rays abide.
So, in song that hymns deeds mighty,
Soar up, envoys of valour's pride!
"Land of Danylo in days olden,
Land of two Volodymyrs' might"
(You said) "their plumage have unfolded.
Accursed foeman, take your flight!"*

And we, hearts filled with exaltation,
Went to the woods. To the fire-storm.
As once against the Tatar nation,
Our units grew:
"To war! To war!"

*From insurgent leaflets which circulated in the Kyiv and Chernihiv regions.

MYKHAYLO OREST

Sunset
(fragment)

The light of day has gone – and the first
twilights are dreaming.

The river
lay down in the west.
The lofty banks
turned black already, but the river
– unshimmering, a white-white ribbon –
lies between their blackness in
profoundest peace.

The black trees in
the greatest immobility known to earth
upon the bank stand fretted
against the heavens, still not dark, there where the sun
went down.

O God, do Thou preserve
for joyfulness
my unjoyful spirit.

From the river
is borne a low and mighty choir of frogs.
They will echo still through countless years,
when I shall be no more.

O God, do Thou preserve
for joyfulness
my unjoyful spirit.

* * *

The spring has pierced her way and reigns triumphant...

Almighty God! Now with an unjoyful heart
I greet her coming. This the forty-third
Spring in my life; and yet she is the same.
The bushes quietly blaze against the sun,

Like brilliant splashes of a verdant fire,
Which with its chiming joy can softly kindle
Only those hearts which are not filled with anger;
The orchards are in flower (a white festal!)
And high above them there are clouds yet whiter
And the pure heavens in a deep blue burning.
Now all the trees unfurl young foliage –
Who is there who could find the words to tell
The beauty of its youth? Once in the dawn
Of earthly years, the sinless cherubim
Lovingly wove this verdant miracle
Out of the dreams which wrapped their paradise,
That joy might come to us and soft reminder
That somewhere hence they take us as their brothers.

Yesterday, in the town death, flying death
That had put on the guise of soulless birds
In blunted cruelty reaped in her harvest.
O you Satanic orgy, villainy
Unbridled, for you there is no forgiveness!

In fresh remembrance of nocturnal terrors
The heart is strangled, aches and wanes away.
What can this beauty and feast signify?
Does it but mock us? No, such cruelty
Can exist only among human-kind –
Like a mild reproach to evil-doing,
Like a bright memory of other, better,
More worthy and more honourable life,
The spring has pierced her way and reigns triumphant.

We earthlings, we are guilty, we ourselves
In our misfortunes and our expiations,
We are creators of our fate, to us
Was given at our free choice to release
From soul into reality: good or evil.
The demons loose their tempests and destroy us.
And no deliverance will be found from evils;
And yet the cause is in us, we ourselves
Have smashed the locks upon the gloomy coffers
Which it had been far better to forget;
We have let loose insatiable demons.
We granted to these demons word and voice.

So let us grasp these kindly intimations
While still they come gently to us, from out
The world's heart! Maybe it is not too late!

The spring will reach full flower and depart.

But shall I live long enough to greet
Anew the forty-fourth spring of my life?

1944

* * *

"What for me soundeth, what for me chimeth".
The Lay of Ihor's host

With hoof-beats' thunder-crash,
All the earth is filled.
Far off flares a flash
From a golden shield

Our hearts are set burning
By dust of sorrow yearning,
And by clouds of grieving
And by wind-storms seething,
And forever glimmers
And in gold fire shimmers,
For us the last mercy –
And the heart is weary!

The thunder-cavalcade
Suddenly is stilled,
And in the distance fades
The flare of golden shield.

□

All translations are by Vera Rich with the exception of the "Song of Kempten", which is taken from the collection *Oasis* (1960), translated by Morse Manley in collaboration with the author, Yar Slavutych.

The Arts

Welcome to the "Homestead"

Yuriy Zazymko

Last year Ukraine's National Association of Artists held its first exhibition, entitled "Khutir" (Homestead), in the State Museum of Representative Art. It included works of a number of artists well-known both in Ukraine and abroad, including: Andriy Antonyuk (Mykolayiv), Dmytro Stetsko (Ternopil), Opanas Zalyvakha (Ivano-Frankivsk), Borys Buryak (Lviv), Mykola Malyshko, Nina Denysova, Petro Honchar, Fedir Tetyanych, Mykola Storozhenko, Oleksander Ivakhnenko (Kyiv); three particularly interesting artists based in Odessa: Volodymyr Tsyupko, Viktor Marynyuk, and Serhiy Savchenko; the sculptors Vasyl Yarych, Yaroslava Motyka, Mykola Stepaniv (Lviv), Vitaliy Shyshov, and Oleh Lysheha (Kyiv), and Andriy Bokotey, who works in glass.

"St George", Valeriy Bondar

"Khutir" was an attempt to show and preserve within the ambience of modern culture the path of modern Ukrainian art, and its basis and roots within the tradition of Ukrainian modernism, in the internationally renowned works of Mykhailo Boychuk, Oleksander Arkhypenko, Kazymyr Malevych, Oleksander Bohomazov. "Khutir" was a self-perception by Ukrainians of their own strength and responsibility to the past and the future, and not merely some flirting with a name or the attempt to fence themselves off from the world behind a national symbol, of which the organisers of the exhibition have on occasion been accused.

According to Raisa Lysha, a poet from Sicheslav, the philosophical concept of "Khutir" is a place, shaped by the whole of culture in which the individual – the



"Angels", Stepan Kutsyi

artist – comes face to face with God, and from where his creative drive is renewed.

One of the organisers of the exhibition, Mykola Malyshko, said,

> The "Khutir" exhibition introduces the viewer to a circle of problems, characteristic of modern representative art, and attempts to solve them. The name of the Association itself, in my interpretation, imposes a great many obligations, and demands from artists a more responsible attitude towards the selection of their works, to participation in similar exhibitions... "Khutir" has evoked various responses: favourable, moderately-guarded, sharply negative... But that is already a certain phenomenon which by the very fact of its existence, in the whole spectrum of assessments needs a more detailed analysis, and its own artistic investigation... .

Later, the "Khutir" exhibition was shown with equal success in the National Museum of Lviv and in Khmelnytskyi.

Kyiv and Lviv one can understand, but why Khmelnytskyi? Because it was there that the first museum of modern Ukrainian representative art in Ukraine was set up, and this houses the works of almost all the members of the National Association of Artists. Thus it was in this city that the exhibition of the first Private View of "Khutir" found its culmination. □

Artist, Editor, Designer: The Works of Leonid Andriyevskyi

Volodymyr Pidhora

The course of history has meant that, in the twentieth century, it has been exceptionally difficult to lay the foundations of the Ukrainian culture of the future. There was hardly one true artist who did not rise up out of difficulties and after a struggle. The necessary conditions for the free development of the things of the spirit did not exist. On the contrary, the Ukrainian artist was always dependent, a slave. And very often he was unable to overcome adversity. No victory was ever complete, and was at times won at the expense of significant losses, and possessed the outward signs of failure.

In this context, we may consider the works of Leonid Andriyevskyi, who holds the title of Honoured Artist of Ukraine, a brilliant artist and book-designer of the national book, who in his time left an original creative experience, and who has today again returned to the easel. His layouts and artistic presentations of learned monographs and art albums are one of the pinnacles of this genre in Ukraine. Andriyevskyi's works include: *Kyiv i Kyivska zemlya v epokhu feodalnoyi rozdroblenosti XII-XIII storich* (Kyiv and the Kyiv land in the period of feudal fragmentation in the XII-XIII centuries, P. Tolochko, 1980); *Kriz viky. Kyiv v obrazotvorchomu mystetstvi XII-XX stolit* (Through the ages. Kyiv in the representative art of the XII-XX centuries, Yu. Belichko and V. Pidhora, 1982); *Muzey zakhidnoho ta skhidnoho mystetstva v Kyevi* (The Museum of Western and Eastern Art in Kyiv, L. Babentsova and Z. Ryabykina, 1983); *Starodavniy Kyiv* (Ancient Kyiv, P. Tolochko, 1983); *Odeskyi muzey zakhidnoho ta skhidnoho mystetstva* (The Odessa Museum of Western and Eastern Art, N. Lutskevych, O. Sokolov and O. Shelestova, 1984), *Ukrayinskyi portretnyi zhyvopys pershoyi polovyny XIX stolittya* (Ukrainian portraiture of the first half of the XIX century, V. Ruban, 1984); *Kyivskyi universytet. 1834-1984* (Kyiv University. 1834-1984, V. Pidhora, 1984); *Mystetstvo, narodzhene Zhovtnem. Ukrayinske obrazotvorche mystetstvo ta arkhitektura 1917-1987* (Art, the offspring of October. Ukrainian representative art and architecture 1917-1987, Yu. Belichko and S. Kilesso, 1987); *Ukrayinske narodne malyarstvo XIII-XX stolit* (Ukrainian folk art of the XIII-XX centuries, V. Svyentsitska and V. Otkovych, 1991); *Zhyvopysna Ukrayina* (Pictorial Ukraine, journal, 1992).

Out of all his creative achievements in book-design, Leonid Andriyevskyi is a talented author of elegant, integrated, festal, representative publications, the artistic structure and all the elements of which are clearly thought-out and harmonised. Therefore, naturally, authors, book-lovers and publishers both in and outside Ukraine know him as a master of the art of the book and entrust to him the most complex and difficult assignments. It is no wonder that his works, produced in collaboration with leading writers and art experts, have on several occasions been nominated for the Taras Shevchenko State prize of Ukraine –



Kyiv Museum of Western and Eastern Art, dust-cover, 1983

in 1987, 1993 – and again this year, when the art-treatise *Ukrayinske narodne malyarstvo XIII-XX stolit* (Ukrainian folk art of the XIII-XX centuries) was nominated for the highest state prize. As the artist responsible for its layout and design, Leonid Andriyevskyi was also mentioned in the nomination as the designer of all the excellent publications mentioned above.

Looking back today over the creative path of the artist, one can see that everything he did worked towards the independence of Ukraine and the rebirth of Ukrainian culture. Ukrainian history, art, museum collections, acquisitions of the Ukrainians throughout many centuries were made widely known in a brilliant



Kyiv and the Kyiv Land in the Period of Feudal Fragmentation in the XII-XIII Centuries, 1980

artistic form. Paradoxically, on this very account the artist was beaten up, and roughly handled. On the shelves of his studio there are layouts of unpublished publications; those books which came out were severely "edited", with entire gatherings torn out; crosses were excised from the pictures of churches, and from the picture of the St Michael monastery, for example, the heavenly host was "ejected". Decorative motifs, with especially significant overtones, were eliminated, for example, the emblematic lion in the album *Kriz viky* (Through the ages), politically "suspect" editions (for example the first edition of the album *Kyivskyi universytet*) were destroyed, print-runs were reduced, and designs impoverished. Very often the publication was only saved by the artist standing firm for his prin-



Chernihiv Museum of Art, cover, 1983

ciples and authority, but this kind of opposition had its limits. For, if the artist and his co-authors dared to oppose completely the demands made upon them by publishing and non-publishing circles, then the work would not see the light of day at all, and this would be a significant loss for Ukrainian culture. Despite the rudimentary nature and falsehood of the name *Mystetstvo, narodzhene Zhovtnem* (Art, the offspring of October), this 1987 album, with its 551 illustrations, was the most encyclopaedic publication on the history of modern Ukrainian representative art and architecture – a work of prime importance. For the first time, the authors of this work (including Andriyevskyi) managed to present, in the artistic

process, artists who were outside the official fetters: including Ivan Padalka, Vasyl Sedlyar, Oksana Pavlenko, Sofia Nalepynska-Boychuk, that is, representatives of the "Boychuk school". For the first time, it was shown how the portrayal of the national poet Taras Shevchenko, and hence, too, the immortality of the Ukrainian spirit, passed through all stages of the development of Ukrainian art. Strange as it may seem, the Kyiv and Odessa Museums of Western and Eastern Art were made the subject of wondrous albums, printed using Western-style technology, but the principal national treasure-house of Ukraine – the Kyiv State Museum of Ukrainian Pictorial Art – does not possess such an album (although Andriyevskyi proposed such a work to his publisher). *Ukrayinskyi portretnyi zhyvopys* (Ukrainian portraiture), on which the author, Dr V. Ruban, and Andriyevskyi worked for five years, has still not been published. And, to date, one of Leonid Andriyevskyi's unique works with a historically significant content, *Ukrayinska rukopysna knyha* (The Ukrainian Codex, Dr Yakym Zapasko), has still not appeared. The album *Kriz viky* has never been reprinted. The collection *Sto shedevriv ukrayinskoyi hrafiky* (One hundred masterpieces of Ukrainian graphics) has not been published. Thus, many books which Leonid Andriyevskyi produced or could have produced have had a sad fate.

Nevertheless, in spite of all the obstacles, much has been achieved. Some stood in his way, but others helped. Publishers were found who supported these efforts – friends, colleagues, the press: *Literaturna Ukrayina*, the journal *Obrazotvorchre mystetstvo* (Representative art), *Kultura i zhyttya* (Culture and life), radio and television. Progress has been made.

In addition to his purely artistic work, Andriyevskyi has often undertaken the task of artistic editor, which gave him an opportunity to bring his original and extraordinary creative plans to their logical fruition. The works he edited were always of a remarkably high quality. They included the *Slovnyk hidronimiv Ukrayiny* (Dictionary of Ukrainian hydronyms), *Zorovyi analiz u komakh* (Visual analysis in commas), the album *Serhiy Vasylkivskyi*, and the book *Nove v arkheolohiyi Kyeva* (New findings in the archaeology of Kyiv), which won a state prize for its authors as well as for Andriyevskyi. In every case, Andriyevskyi first made a detailed study of the composition and content of each work and developed the form and system of its polygraphic realisation.

The book *Ukrayinske narodne malyarstvo XIII-XX stolit* (Ukrainian folk art of the XIII-XX centuries) itself deserves a separate article. However, this book, and Leonid Andriyevskyi's long and fruitful creative activity are, without doubt, worthy of the Shevchenko prize. □

The Bridges of Opanas

Ihor Bondar-Stryi

Opanas Zalyvakha was born in 1925 in the Kharkiv region, eastern Ukraine. He studied art, first at a special secondary school attached to the Leningrad Academy of Art, and then at the Repin Institute of Painting, Sculpture and Architecture in Leningrad. (By a happy coincidence, Repin, the nineteenth century Ukrainian-born artist after whom the institute was named, had, in 1838, been instrumental in buying the freedom of the gifted young serf, Taras Shevchenko, the future national poet of Ukraine). Zalyvakha, who was greatly attracted by the ideas of contemporary Western philosophers such as Camus, Sartre and Herman Hesse, like many brilliant and original artists and writers of the all-too-brief cultural flowering of the 1960s, ended up serving five years in the Gulag. (He was arrested in 1965.)

In developing his own artistic style, Zalyvakha was influenced, first and foremost, by van Gogh and Cezanne. Yet, in spite of this, and in spite of his interest in west European philosophy, his work is profoundly Ukrainian in theme and interpretation, finding its inspiration, on the one hand, from the pagan gods of the dawn of Ukrainian history, and on the other, from the sights and images of the Gulag. His paintings thus form, as it were, secular icons of the revival of Ukrainian statehood. The essay which follows evokes one viewer's personal impression of an exhibition of Zalyvakha's works. – V.R.

§ § §

And so it came to pass that they always explained everything to us.

And, moreover, art! For it was strange for us, that is, "socialist in form, national in content".

And these "art-experts in mufti" explained with emphasis – it must be understood precisely as follows: "Just one step out of line, left or right, and – no warning – I'll shoot you for attempting to escape!"

The lying enemy strove to murder Ukrainian art, to put it behind bars, to persecute it.

They punished artists with subtlety – they took away their public. The artists endured this sentence of the spirit, they chose a path, they knew whither it led...

The road of Opanas Zalyvakha began with the return of his spirit to Ukraine.



"From Alpha...", 1979

From Ukraine, to the land beneath the Northern Lights, Opanas had gone, carrying the Cross he chose himself.

Throughout his life he has borne his Cross quietly, without despair, he bears it, he does not simply carry it around!

Maybe an artist becomes a people's artist when he is understood and loved by those people to whom he sends his artist's thoughts and testaments.



"The Prisoner", 1972

When and with what prizes is a "People's Artist" established? It is not the people who bestowed them, and so in the records the names of murdered artists stand alongside the sycophants, the prostitute-laureates.

Almost all the pictures of Opanas Zalyvakha are unnamed.

Names were created for them at the request of exhibition organisers, and, depending on the state of their psyche, were sometimes antithetical.

The artist leaves the viewer face-to-face with his creations for reflection and musings, without imposing his interpretation by giving the picture a name.

I do not aim to explain the works of Zalyvakha, equipping myself with such an "arsenal of waffle" as "multi-faceted aspect, astral phenomenon, abstract-primitive forms, symbiotic originality, vibrant colours"...

Well, maybe, that's enough.

Finally, an exhibition of Opanas in Kyiv.

I go with my daughters, I am on tenterhooks in case they see it, God forbid, with my eyes, for until now I could only tell them about the pictures of Uncle Opanas, but not a one could I show them.

We gaze at them in silence, I say nothing, I make no explanations...

Suddenly all three of us stand still.

My older daughter: "Daddy, is that uncle Vasyl Stus?"

My younger daughter, putting on a learned expression: "I think it's Ihor Antonych... Or maybe the young Taras Shevchenko in holy Kyiv, acknowledged by all Ukraine, and filled with hopes and expectations".

And I see in this man the poet of all Ukrainian poets, known and unknown, but honest, dedicated and unbroken...

And there is another work which makes its mark in blood on the memory...

A grey, finger-marked door, and in the door a food-hatch, a peep-hole – "everything as it should be".

On the door there is a bloody hand-print.

My older daughter: "Was Uncle Vasyl here?"

My younger daughter: "Daddy, I'll look in the 'peep-hole'".

I look too, and there – there is a mirror!

My eye is reflected in it. What is in it? What there is in the soul, for the eyes are the mirror of the soul.

Shortly before the exhibition closed, I visited it with a "camp-mate" of my father, uncle Mykhaylo, from Podillya.

He walked round for a long time, looking at it in silence.

It was only back home, in the evening, that he spoke: "I thought that he was only a painter, but he – just look what icons he paints...".

The Orantes of Opanas have been brought to their peak and have become icons.

Always our enemies have torn from us the spiritual heart-strings which bound generations of Ukrainians together. Between our generations there is a gigantic gap, which we cannot close even with our own bodies.

Only the bridges of the spirit, thrown across the chasm, will make the one road which will bring us to the Temple.

Between the generations, a bridge has been stretched – the bridge of Opanas Zalyvakha.

I bow my head in respect and gratitude for the bridges of Faith, Hope and Love which he has built with such sincerity and hope. □

News Briefings

President Bill Clinton in Kyiv

Contrary to the cold reception in Moscow, Kyivites came out by the thousands to cheer President Bill Clinton on his visit to the Ukrainain capital and his second to Ukraine.

The crowd went wild when Clinton, addressing the people of Ukraine from the Kyiv State University of Taras Shevchenko on Friday, 12 May, concluded his speech with the words: "Slava Ukraini" (Glory to Ukraine).

The American President showed a keen appreciation of Ukraine's current problems and told the nearly 200,000 people present that "For America, support for independent Ukraine, secure in its recognized borders, is not only a matter of sympathy, it is a matter of our national interest as well. We look to the day when a democratic and prosperous Ukraine is America's full political and economic partner in a bulwark of stability in Europe".

President Clinton, who arrived on Thursday, 11 May, said the United States will give Ukraine extra assistance to help complete its destruction of nuclear weapons and proceed with converting defence plants to civilian use, the presidents of both countries said on Thursday.

Bill Clinton and Leonid Kuchma, in a statement issued after a day of talks, announced that a Ukrainian cosmonaut would fly aboard the US space shuttle in October 1997. The statement also said that $10 million had been allocated to Ukraine for defence conversion, $10 million to help eliminate sites associated with what remained of Ukraine's share of the former Soviet nuclear arsenal and $7 million for other defence projects. Washington had allocated more than $1 million to help finance Ukrainian participation in NATO's Partnership for Peace programme and would provide a further $10 million next year – one-tenth of total financing for former Communist states.

Clinton praised Ukraine's Western-backed efforts to introduce reforms and reaffirmed a commitment to provide $250 million in credits to finance imports, the statement said. The leaders pledged to cooperate to restructure Ukraine's energy sector and improve nuclear reactor safety. Kyiv would work with the seven leading industrialised countries on closing Chornobyl – the site of the world's worst nuclear accident – by the year 2000. There was no word on funding for this.

Clinton, after a tough Moscow summit, praised Ukraine on Thursday for giving up its nuclear weapons and pledged to keep up support for Ukraine's market reform programme. Starting what looked almost sure to be a problem-free visit, Clinton told Kuchma that Ukraine's decision to give up former Soviet nuclear weapons had made "the Ukrainian people, the American people and the entire world much safer and more secure".

Kuchma told Clinton on Thursday that his country wanted a new world order that was free of aggression and dictatorship and that ruled out "a cold war and even a cold peace". Clinton told his host at the start of two days of talks that

Ukraine had taken bold decisions to rid itself of nuclear weapons and launch market reforms. He pledged that the United States would "stay the course with you". In a welcoming ceremony outside the presidential Mariyinskyi palace, Kuchma said the commemoration this week focused attention on Ukraine's huge war losses and repeated invasions in its 1000-year history.

Joint Statement by President of the United States William J. Clinton and President of Ukraine Leonid D. Kuchma

May 11-12 1995

On the occasion of his State visit to Ukraine on May 11-12, 1995, William J. Clinton, President of the United States, met with Leonid D. Kuchma, President of Ukraine, to discuss the strengthening of the US-Ukraine partnership, including in areas which sustain the process of reform and enhance Ukraine's place in the global community.

The Presidents have reviewed their joint accomplishments in broadening the bilateral partnership and pursuing the forward-looking agenda they defined during President Kuchma's State visit to the United States in November 1994. President Clinton noted the historic efforts now underway to revitalize the Ukrainian economy and underscored the importance of an economically vibrant, democratic and stable Ukraine in an increasingly integrated European and world community. President Clinton assured President Kuchma that the United States continues to give high priority to sustaining Ukraine's transition to market economy and to integrating Ukraine into the global economic community. President Kuchma expressed gratitude for the substantial support of the United States and underscored Ukraine's commitment to giving the highest priority to fundamental economic and political reform.

In the spirit of the Charter of American-Ukrainian Partnership, Friendship and Cooperation, signed during President Kuchma's State visit to the United States in 1994, the two Presidents agreed to a program of cooperation, assistance and consultation aimed at strengthening their growing partnership.

Bilateral and economic cooperation

President Clinton congratulated President Kuchma on Ukraine's implementation of a comprehensive economic reform program that is supported by the international community. He underscored the importance of Ukraine's continued implementation of economic reform. President Clinton noted, in particular, the important threshold Ukraine had crossed in securing a dollars 1.5 billion IMF stand-by program. President Kuchma welcomed international financial institution commitments to Ukraine which, in the last eight months, had reached dollars 2.7 billion. Both Presidents recognized the significance of these commitments in fulfilling the July 1994 Naples Pledge to provide dollars 4 billion in assistance over a two-year period. In addition to this, President Kuchma expressed satisfaction with the G-7 countries' recent pledge of almost dollars 1 billion in direct bilateral

financial support and reiterated Ukraine's desire to review progress on economic reform with G-7 governments. The two leaders also welcomed the support provided by Russia and Turkmenistan in rescheduling more than dollars 3 billion in Ukrainian arrears.

The two Presidents emphasized the importance of market-oriented reform as the path to realize the full potential of the Ukrainian economy. President Clinton reaffirmed US support for Ukraine's economic program and commended President Kuchma for his bold leadership in this regard. President Clinton reaffirmed the US commitment to provide dollars 250 million in support to help Ukraine meet its critical import needs in 1995. President Clinton noted that most of the assistance will be provided in the form of an innovative agricultural trade credit insurance facility and announced that assistance also be made available in the form of a new package of initiatives to help generate agricultural development in Ukraine. The package includes technical assistance for the development of an agricultural commodity exchange which will provide a private market alternative channel for such commodities, and technical assistance for the development of an agricultural market news system and for the safe handling of agricultural chemicals.

Recognizing needs in the health area, the Presidents noted the delivery, already underway, of medical equipment equal to a 1,000-bed hospital valued at dollars 17 million from the US Department of Defense to Donetsk.

President Clinton reaffirmed continuing US support for Ukrainian efforts to implement structural economic reforms that will attract private capital and provide the foundation for mutually beneficial trade relationships. The two Presidents reviewed US support for the development of capital markets, the development and regulation of investment funds, and a pilot program for share registries to facilitate both domestic and foreign investment. President Clinton announced a new program of technical assistance and training to support credit union development in response to Ukraine's interest in expanding the availability of savings and credit services to consumers and small businesses. President Kuchma reaffirmed his commitment to a bold program for massive privatization, creation of capital markets, rationalization of tax policy and development of a new legal framework to support a market economy. President Kuchma requested urgent international technical assistance to facilitate valuation of Ukrainian enterprises subject to privatization in the oil, gas and chemical industry. President Clinton recognized the importance of this proposal and of reforming this sector as a whole and encouraged President Kuchma to make this a priority in his discussion with the international donor community.

The Presidents underscored the vital role of trade and investment in invigorating Ukraine's economy and in integrating Ukraine into the global economic community. The Presidents recognized the strong potential for growth in US-Ukraine trade and investment, and noted the positive impact of recent and continuing economic reforms on Ukraine's business environment. In recognition of this, President Clinton announced that the US Export-Import Bank has reopened its programs in Ukraine, making available short- and medium-term financing for US exports guaranteed by the Ukrainian Government. The United States strongly

supports Ukraine's accession to the World Trade Organization and is providing assistance to the Ukrainian Government to support this process. Underscoring their determination to expand bilateral commercial relations, the Presidents announced that the second meeting of the Joint Commission on Trade and Investment will be held in July. This Commission serves as a primary vehicle for bilateral commercial cooperation launched during President Kuchma's State visit to Washington in November 1994. Both Presidents agreed, in order to showcase further the potential for commercial partnership between the two countries, that the Commission would organize a Conference on Trade and Investment to take place in the United States early in 1996. President Clinton also noted that the Overseas Private Investment Corporation's (OPIC) Central European Investment Conference, to be held in Chicago July 11, will include a special focus on Ukraine. President Clinton confirmed his support for the renewal of the US General System of Preferences program, which would include Ukraine as beneficiary country. He reiterated his Administration's recognition that Ukraine is an economy in transition to a free market and noted the Administration's intention to work closely with Ukraine in resolving bilateral market access issues in mutually satisfactory manner. These issues will be addressed through the Joint Commission on Trade and Investment, which will consider initiatives designed to reduce barriers to mutual market access, taking into account the problems Ukraine faces as an economy in transition.

Both Presidents stressed the growing importance of opportunities for private business, both Ukrainian and American, to develop key sectors of the Ukrainian economy, noting in particular the potential for agriculture, energy, aerospace, telecommunications, defense conversion and health. In this regard, both Presidents praised the recent successful OPIC mission in Ukraine, which included corporate leadership from major American companies and focused on defense conversion opportunities. The Presidents were pleased to note the announced formation of the US-Ukraine Business Council as an indication of the growing interest of US companies to establish commercial relationships with Ukraine.

Both leaders renewed their commitment to implement cooperative bilateral and multilateral programs aimed at the restructuring and reforming of Ukraine's energy sector and improving nuclear reactor safety. President Kuchma reaffirmed Ukraine's intention to work with the G-7 on Ukraine's energy sector, including step-by-step decommissioning of the Chornobyl reactors to be completed by the year 2000. President Clinton announced the US intention to support the establishment of an international nuclear safety and environmental center to promote a high level of nuclear safety, drawing on the skilled nuclear power employees in the Chornobyl region. He also announced US assistance to upgrade fire safety and operational safety at the Chornobyl nuclear plant until it can be decommissioned. The Presidents noted that the two countries signed a protocol that will facilitate cooperative research on thyroid cancer stemming from the Chornobyl accident.

Both Presidents agreed on the need for further close work in the G-7 task force to ensure the early implementation of energy sector reform initiatives. President Kuchma expressed appreciation for international efforts to ease

Ukraine's energy burden and stressed the urgent need to overcome this burden if Ukraine's economic recovery is to move forward more quickly.

The Presidents noted the signing of a Protocol to the Bilateral Civil Aviation Agreement to facilitate the growing volume of air travel between the two countries.

In continuation of civil space cooperation between the two countries, President Clinton and President Kuchma announced that a Ukrainian cosmonaut would fly aboard NASA space shuttle mission STS-87, scheduled for launch in October 1997. In addition, the Presidents noted with pleasure that the two countries have begun negotiations for an agreement which will facilitate Ukraine's entrance into the commercial space launch services market and enable Ukraine to offer such services to US companies. The two leaders expressed confidence that this would lead to an important new chapter in US-Ukrainian cooperation. They noted certain progress in these negotiations, the first round of which took place in Kiev on April 25-27. The Presidents instructed their delegations to continue work in this direction in order to reach mutual agreement.

Both Presidents expressed confidence in efforts to open new areas of bilateral cooperation, particularly in the field of law enforcement and judicial reform. They announced their intention to begin negotiations this summer for a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty. The Presidents agreed that expeditious completion of the treaty would enhance common efforts at combating crime. The Presidents applauded their countries' initial exchanges aimed at combating the threat of organized crime and corruption and announced their countries' intentions to cooperate in the training of law enforcement professionals and in developing Ukraine's National Bureau of Investigation. They reiterated their support for the rule of law as an essential safeguard of civil and human rights.

Both Presidents agreed on the importance of educational and professional exchanges noting that, through the Freedom Support Act, $8.2 million will be made available in Fiscal Year 1995 for Ukrainian graduate students, undergraduates and secondary school students to study in the United States. This amount also provides for professional exchanges, making a total of 1,000 participants in these exchanges for FY-95.

Security and defense

Presidents Clinton and Kuchma noted that several historic steps have been taken in the area of arms control and security since their last meeting in November 1994. They cited, in particular, Ukraine's accession to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) at the CSCE Budapest Summit, and the provision of security assurances to Ukraine in connection to this accession; and the entry-into-force of the START 1 Treaty. In this regard, the Presidents recognized the continuing importance of fulfilling the goals of the January 1994 Trilateral Statement signed by the Presidents of the United States, Ukraine and Russia. Both Presidents renewed their commitments to work together in both bilateral and multilateral fora to strengthen global peace and stability.

President Clinton recognized the historic contribution Ukraine continues to make to global peace and security in its implementation of strategic nuclear arms elimination commitments. He reiterated that continued US support will

help Ukraine reach its nuclear arms elimination goals in the interest of the world community.

The Presidents noted the substantial progress made in implementing Nunn-Lugar assistance to facilitate dismantlement of strategic offensive arms, to maintain the security of nuclear materials, and to help in the conversion of Ukraine's defense industries. President Clinton was pleased to announce, under the terms of the Nunn-Lugar program, the availability of up to an additional dollars 10 million for defense conversion; up to $10 million in funding for nuclear infrastructure elimination projects; up to an additional $5 million for the Science and Technology Center in Ukraine; and, up to an additional $2 million for defense and military contacts. In addition, the Presidents announced that, subject to the completion of the US internal procedures, including Congressional notification, both countries had agreed on further assistance projects that will include additional funding for strategic offensive arms elimination; the physical protection, control and accounting for nuclear materials; and export controls. The Presidents were pleased to announce that the Science and Technology Center, as of today, will begin accepting project proposals from Ukrainian scientists and engineers for technical evaluation and funding consideration.

The two leaders praised the rapid expansion of bilateral defense cooperation as a positive demonstration of the two countries' cooperation. President Clinton underscored the importance of such programs as the International Military Education and Training (IMET) Program and informed President Kuchma that the United States hoped to allocate dollars 950,000 in 1996 to support the continued expansion of Ukraine's IMET participation. Both Presidents agreed that IMET and other bilateral cooperative programs are important to strengthening civilian leadership of Ukraine's defense establishment. The Presidents also noted a US-Ukraine program of defense and military contacts for 1995 which call for over fifty events, including a combined peacekeeping training exercise – in the spirit of the Partnership for Peace Program – which will be conducted in Lviv later in May.

Presidents Clinton and Kuchma devoted considerable attention to Ukraine's integration into European security structures. The Presidents reaffirmed their shared vision of a stable, undivided democratic Europe and an evolving security structure which promotes further integration. They discussed the prospective enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the further deepening of Ukraine's cooperation with the Alliance in broader terms, including through active participation in the Partnership for Peace, in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), and through other means. President Clinton noted that the process of enlarging NATO will be managed so as to enhance the stability and security of all European nations and expressed understanding for Ukraine's security position. The Presidents agreed that the two countries would continue regular bilateral consultations on questions involving European security architecture. The two Presidents acknowledged that an independent and stable Ukraine, secure in its internationally recognized borders, constitutes a key factor of stability and security in Europe.

President Clinton and President Kuchma welcomed the increasingly important role of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe in the development of an all-inclusive European security structure and, in particular, in transcending divisions among nations. In this context, the two leaders reaffirmed their commitment to the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, including principles addressing the inviolability of frontiers, territorial integrity of states, peaceful settlement of disputes, and fulfillment in good faith of obligations under international law.

President Kuchma informed President Clinton of the latest internal political developments in Ukraine, including Crimea. Both Presidents agreed that internal issues, like Crimea, should be resolved by political means, in accordance with the rule of law, respect for human rights and OSCE principles, and within the context of respect for territorial integrity of states.

The Presidents underscored the importance of establishing a new multilateral regime to enhance transparency and responsibility in trade in arms and dual-use technologies. The two leaders recognized the importance that the new regime's membership include states that produce arms and high technology goods, such as Ukraine, and committed to work toward the shared goal of Ukraine's participation in the new regime, consistent with the agreed criteria for membership.

President Clinton welcomed Ukrainian acceptance of the Guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group as an important factor in strengthening the international control regime on transfers of nuclear materials and technologies.

The Presidents affirmed Ukraine's active participation in the Partnership for Peace (PFP) Program. President Clinton announced that the United States would make available in US FY 95 more than dollars 1 million to assist Ukraine in its participation in PFP exercises. He also informed President Kuchma that, of the dollars 100 million requested in the FY 96 budget for PFP partners under the Warsaw Initiative, the United States intends to provide approximately dollars 10 million in support to Ukraine.

The Presidents renewed their commitment to maintain regular, high-level contacts to ensure full and timely implementation of their initiatives.

President of the United States of America
William J. Clinton

President of Ukraine
Leonid D. Kuchma

President Bill Clinton's Speech to the People of Ukraine

Kyiv State University of Taras Shevchenko
Friday, 12 May 1995

I first would thank Aleksiy Melashuk for that fine introduction. I thank Halyna Shevalova for her fine remarks and for representing the University students here. I thank the Rector, Viktor Skopenko, for his remarks and for the honorary degree, which I will treasure and display in the White House.

I am delighted to be joined here by my wife and by ministers and other important members of our Administration, by the Mayor of Kyiv, and members

of your national government, and by former President Kravchuk. I am glad to see them all here, and I thank them for being here with me today.

I am deeply honored to be the first American President to appear before the people of a free and independent Ukraine.

Today we celebrate the alliance of our peoples, who defeated fascism 50 years ago. We shared victory then, but the cost to your people of that victory was almost unimaginable. More than 5 million Ukrainians died in the conflict. I am pleased that now after all these years we can pay tribute to the extraordinary sacrifice here in the Ukrainian homeland.

It is fitting that we are meeting at this institution, named after Taras Shevchenko. More than 30 years ago, America recognized his passion for freedom by erecting a statue of Shevchenko in the heart of our nation's capital. Now, at last, America also honors this great champion of liberty in the heart of Ukraine's capital.

I am also glad that we are meeting here at this University because so much of your nation's future depends upon this place of learning and others like it throughout your land. Here, the knowledge that Ukraine needs to build itself will be found. Here, the dreams of a new Ukraine will be dreamed.

I would like to say a special word to the students and scholars here. I know the times are difficult now and I commend you for taking the hard road, for putting the needs of your future and your nation above immediate personal concerns. Your efforts will be repaid, for your independent country has a better chance to create freedom and prosperity than it has had in centuries and to do it in a way that is uniquely your own as one of Europe's oldest peoples forging one of its newest democracies.

Ukraine is rising to the historic challenge of its reemergence as a nation on the world's stage. Already your nation can claim responsibility for a major contribution to global peace. Your wise decision to eliminate nuclear weapons on your territory has earned your nation respect and gratitude everywhere in the world.

Your accession to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty has sent an unmistakable message for peace and against weapons of mass destruction. Without those farsighted acts, the historic vote yesterday by the world's nations – to extend the nonproliferation treaty indefinitely and unconditionally – would not have been possible. This will make the people of the world for generations to come safer and more secure.

For 25 years this treaty has been the cornerstone of the world's efforts to reduce the dangers of nuclear weapons. I am proud of the leadership of the United States in securing the extension of the treaty. But I am also proud of the role Ukraine played, and you should be proud as well.

In the short period of your independence, you have helped make the world a safer, more hopeful place and I thank you for that.

A few moments ago Rector Skopenko quoted Taras Shevchenko's question: "When will we receive our Washington with a new and righteous law?" The answer is now because so many Ukrainians are striving to build a nation ruled by law and governed by the will of the people.

Holding free, fair and frequent elections, protecting the rights of minorities, building bridges to other democracies – these mark the way to a "new birth of freedom," in the phrase of our great President, Abraham Lincoln.

Already you have held a landmark election that produced the first transfer of power from one democratic government to another in any of the nations that emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union. You have put tolerance at the heart of your law, and law at the heart of your state. You have claimed your place in the ranks of the world's great democracies as demonstrated by the sight of your flag flying next to the American flag at the White House during President Kuchma's historic visit last November.

You have earned the admiration of the free world by setting on a course of economic reform and staying on that course despite the pain of adjustment. President Kuchma's decision to launch ambitious economic reforms and to press ahead with them was truly bold. We know that after so many decades of command-and-control economy, reform carries real human cost in the short-term – in lost jobs, lower wages, lost personal security.

But your efforts will not be in vain, because the course is right even if the path is difficult. The toil is bitter but the harvest is sweet, as the old proverb says. In time your transformation will deliver better, more prosperous lives and the chance for you and your children to realize your God-given potential. You and your children will reap the harvest of today's sacrifices.

In the pursuit of peace and prosperity, you have been well-served by President Kuchma and his government's bold and farsighted leadership. You should know this. As you build your future, the United States will stand with you.

For America, support for an independent Ukraine, secure in its recognized borders, is not only a matter of sympathy, it is a matter of our national interest as well. We look to the day when a democratic and prosperous Ukraine is America's full political and economic partner in a bulwark of stability in Europe.

Fifty years ago, Americans and Ukrainians engaged in a common struggle against fascism and together we won. When US troops met a Soviet force at the Elbe for the first time and made that legendary handshake across liberated Europe, the unit they met was the 1st Ukrainian Army.

Cruel events made that embrace brief. During the decades of East-West separation, it was left to a million Ukrainian Americans to keep alive the ties between our people. They fought hard to ensure that the hope for freedom for you never died out. Today, their dreams are being fulfilled by you. And on behalf of all Ukrainian Americans, I rejoice in standing here with you.

In the months and years ahead, our partnership will grow stronger. Together we will help design the architecture of security in an undivided Europe so that Ukraine's security is strengthened.

We will increase defense contacts between our nations, consult with one another as NATO prepares to expand, and foster ties between Ukraine and the West. Ukraine has already taken a strong leadership role in forming the Partnership for Peace, which is uniting Europe's democracies in military cooperation and creating a more secure future.

We will work with one another as Ukraine becomes a full partner in the new Europe, and we will deepen the friendship between our peoples in concrete economic ways.

The United States has shown its support for Ukraine in deeds, not just words – in the commitment of more than a billion dollars in assistance over three and a half years for political and economic reform, another $350 million to help eliminate nuclear weapons; in leading the world's financial institutions to commit $2.7 million for Ukraine's future, and urging our partners in the G-7 to do even more. We will continue to work to assist you to build a brighter future.

Our nations have established vigorous trade and investment ties, and a group of American and Ukrainian business people are promoting these ties here in Ukraine this year and next year in their meeting in the United States. Together we will enter into exciting new ventures, such as commercial space launch cooperation.

All these efforts will help to build a Ukraine that is sovereign and democratic, confident and successful – a Ukraine that will fulfill the hopes of your 52 million citizens and provide an essential anchor of stability and freedom in a part of the world still reeling from rapid change, still finding its way toward the 21st century.

Of course, in the end it is you who will make your own future. The people of Ukraine have it in their power to fulfill their oldest wishes and shape a very new destiny. To live up to the promise, to make the most of your role in this global economy in the information age, your ability to learn and learn and learn will be essential.

And so I urge you to take to heart the words of Shevchenko, "Study my brothers, study and read, learn of foreign things, but don't forget that which is yours".

Our two nations are bound together by a common vision of freedom and prosperity. Together we shall make that vision real.

As the great poet of our democracy, Walt Whitman, wrote a century ago, "The strongest and sweetest songs yet remain to be sung". Those strong, sweet songs are of a free people fulfilling their hopes and dreams; they are the songs of Ukraine's tomorrow.

God bless America. Slava Ukrayini.

Remarks by President Bill Clinton Honoring those who Died at Babi Yar

Menorah Memorial
Kiev, Ukraine

The President: Thank you, Rabbi. To the people of Ukraine, and especially to the veterans of World War II and the children who are here.

Here on the edge of this wooded ravine, we bear witness eternally to the consequences of evil. Here at Babi Yar, almost 54 years ago, more than 30,000 men, women and children were slaughtered in the first three days alone. They died for no other reason than the blood that ran through their veins. We remember their sacrifice, and we vow never to forget.

In late September 1941, the Nazi occupying army ordered the Jewish population of Kiev, together with their valuables and belongings. "We thought we were being sent on a journey", one survivor recalled. But instead they were being herded to the ravine, stripped and shot down. By year's end, more than

100,000 Jews, 10,000 Ukrainian Nationalists, Soviet prisoners of war and gypsies had been exterminated here.

The writer, Anatoly Kuznietzov, was a child in Kiev during the war. He remembers the day the deportations began. "My grandfather stood in the middle of the courtyard straining to hear something. He raised his finger – do you know what? – he said with horror in his voice. They're not deporting them – they're shooting them".

Years later, Kuznietzov brought the poet, Yevgeny Yevtuschenko, to Babi Yar. And that night, Yevtuschenko wrote one of his most celebrated poems: "Over Babi Yar there are no memorials. The steep hillside, like a rough inscription. I am frightened. Today I am as old as the Jewish race. I seem to myself a Jew at this moment". These words speak to us across the generations – a reminder of the past, a warning for the future.

In the quiet of this place, the victims of Babi Yar cry out to us still. Never forget, they tell us, that humanity is capable of the worst, just as it is capable of the best.

Never forget that the forces of darkness cannot be defeated with silence or indifference. Never forget that we are all Jews and gypsies and Slavs. Never forget.

May God bless this holy place.

Ukraine on the Eve of Great Changes

Ihor Nabytovych

Ukraine is entering a new era of political and economic reforms. The period which has elapsed since the election in summer 1994 of a new parliament and president and the re-election of all local organs of power, has exposed a major conflict of views between, on the one hand, President Leonid Kuchma, his administration, and certain centre and right-wing fractions in parliament, and, on the other, the chairman of the Supreme Rada (and, simultaneously, the leader of the Socialist Party) Oleksander Moroz and the three large left-wing fractions, the Communists, Socialists and "Agrarians" (collective farm heads).

This conflict was a result of the campaign to eliminate from the economy and politics of today's Ukraine the birth-marks of the Communist past. The Kuchma–Moroz struggle is being waged around three fundamental birth-marks of the former Communist system. The first is political – the power of the Soviets which was brought on the points of bayonets and "bestowed" upon Ukraine by the Russian troops of Lenin and Muravyov. The second is economic (basically social, that is state, ownership). The third – the nucleus of the Soviet state – is the Communist Party.

Oleksander Moroz is a great supporter and sympathiser of these three birth-marks. Together with all the left-wing forces in parliament, he is striving to preserve the "power of the Soviets", and strenuously opposing privatisation and the introduction of private ownership of land. Neither him nor the left-wing fractions in parliament make any secret of their intentions. The third birth-mark, the Communist Party, as a "leading and directing force", was liquidated in August 1991. However, the recent events in parliament, when the "Communists of Ukraine", and the Socialist and Agrarian fractions tried to reactivate the CPSU – the Communist Party of the now-defunct Soviet Union – demonstrated that

the "ghost of Communism" is still holding on firmly in Ukraine and there is still a real threat of a future Communist or pro-Communist victory. One has only to look at recent events in other post-Communist states (Lithuania, Poland, Bulgaria) to see a possible scenario for Ukraine.

At the beginning of 1995, there took place the "Second Congress of the peoples of the USSR". Among the participants was a delegation from the Communist fraction in the Ukrainian parliament. The principal task which this "congress" set itself was the collection of signatures petitioning for the restoration of a "voluntary union of peoples and sovereign republics in a federative multinational state", that is the reanimation of the USSR. This course was confirmed by the March Congress of the Communist Party of Ukraine.

In his campaign against these birth-marks of the Communist system, which to this day continue to torment Ukrainian society, President Kuchma will have to resolve a number of basic issues.

The first (and one of the most important) is to maintain economic stability.

In 1994, production in Ukraine continued to fall: in industry by 28%, and in agriculture by 17%. The national income fell by 26%. Economists predict that in 1995 the drop in production may reach 23-27%, reducing the national income by 24%.

On the other hand, 1994 saw a marked reduction in the rate of inflation: from 10,255% in 1993 to 501% (according to the Ukrainian cabinet) or 840% (according to international experts) in 1994.

The Kuchma administration is doing all in its power to achieve financial stabilisation, which is one of the major factors of the reforms. Monetary reform is being prepared, and the introduction of a new currency – the hryvnya.

Another important factor of economic changes is privatisation. President Kuchma has set rapid "small-scale privatisation" on the Czech model as his target for 1995; this should provide an opportunity for a significant advance towards reform and economic stability.

Ukraine received from the International Monetary Fund credit of the order of US$1.5 billion and almost half a billion Systemic Transformation Facility (STF) credit for systemic transformation.

The second, no less important, requirement at this time is political reform: the adoption of a new Constitution, the reorganisation of the power structure, the creation of strong executive vertical structures, genuine organs of local self-government, and a clear separation of the functions of legislature and executive (which was impossible under Soviet rule). Without these measures the clear and rapid implementation of reforms will be unrealistic.

A third, equally important, condition is also required for the attainment of economic stability and reorganisation of the power structure – the maintenance of civic peace, and the prevention of sharp political conflicts and social upheavals. The painful measures necessary for economic reform are already causing mass unemployment and a further fall in the already miserable standard of living. In this year alone, the unemployment figures are expected to increase to 2.5 million.

Kuchma's reforms, therefore, need a very strong ideological support. It is somewhat bizarre that in spite of all its current economic difficulties, the Ukrainian government continues to relay Russia's "Ostankino" TV channel, although these programmes constitute, in effect, a form of Russian ideological

expansion in Ukraine, and the money concerned could do a great deal to help build up Ukraine's own television services.

One of the most acute internal political problems of Ukraine is Crimea. The roots of the conflict between Kyiv and Simferopol should be sought in the period when the USSR began to come apart at the seams. It would appear that, at this point, the research department of the KGB in Moscow developed a scenario which required the creation, within the republics then striving for independence, of "autonomies" whose task would be to demand the signing of a new union treaty. In the event of these republics quitting the USSR, the "autonomies" would automatically transform themselves into "hot-spots". In some of these "hot-spots", the heat is still on today – Nagorny-Karabakh, Abkhazia, Transnistria. On 20 January 1990, the autonomy of Crimea was established on the basis of a referendum; since then, there has been a continuous drift towards the embrace of "Mother Russia".

The whole time after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the vast majority of the Russian media (and behind them, it is believed, the Russian special services) have laboured to convince the majority of Russian and Russophone inhabitants of the Newly Independent States not to migrate to Russia, but to return to its jurisdiction together with the territory where they live. In January 1994, the Russian press published research into the ethno-political situation of "potential flash-points" including Transnistria, Crimea, the region of Kohtla-Järve and Narva in Estonia, and some regions of eastern Kazakhstan and eastern Ukraine.

These separatist pro-Russian forces regarded the establishment of an "independent" Crimean state as an intermediate step on the road to reunion with Russia.

This "drift" towards Russia was halted by the March 1995 decision of the Ukrainian parliament to abolish the post of President of Crimea, the subordination of the legislature of Crimea to the Constitution and laws of Ukraine, and the holding of new elections to local organs of power.

Ukraine's most serious foreign policy issue is that of relations with Russia. The restoration of the Russian empire began immediately after the collapse of the USSR. The signing of the treaty setting up the CIS a week after the referendum of 1 December 1991 on the independence of Ukraine had driven a nail into the coffin of the USSR, and the Russian leadership set its sights on keeping Ukraine in the Russian sphere of influence by any means whatsoever.

Russia has never made much effort to conceal its imperial ambitions. The new military doctrine of the Russian Federation directly states that the entire political space of the former USSR is a zone of "vitally important interests" to Russia.

A new redistribution of spheres of influence is currently taking place in Europe. Hence Russia is reacting "with pain" to statements on the expansion of NATO to the countries of central and eastern Europe, and is striving by hook or by crook to maintain its influence on this territory. The Russian doctrine of the "near abroad" includes a system of priorities in the borders of two external rings around Russia. The inner ring consists of the states with which Russia has a common border; the outer – of countries formerly under Communist and Socialist regimes. Russia continues to aspire to be a superpower, to dictate conditions to the world around it, and to play an important role in international politics. For this purpose, it continues to support an army more than 2-million-

strong, to maintain a military presence in over a dozen states, including Ukraine, and to modernise its conventional and nuclear arsenals.

Russia's desire to dominate at least the territory of the CIS is attested by the constant demands of the Russians that the UN should grant them "special mandates" in the territory of the former USSR. Russian politicians dream of themselves as the "policeman" of the region. In his address to the UN General Assembly, at the end of September 1994, President Yeltsin once again confirmed that Russia has not abandoned its old imperial longings.

Apart from the most important strategic goal, of what Russia's top political figures call the "rebirth of a great state", there is, according to Yeltsin, another important strategic goal – the protection of the Russian and Russophone population of the countries of the former USSR. In April 1995, Russia's Foreign Minister, Andrey Kozyrev, stated that, if necessary, the whole military might of Russia will be deployed for the protection of "Russophones" in neighbouring states.

Closely associated with this issue is that of the status of the Russian language in Ukraine. President Kuchma's statements during his election campaign and later in his inaugural speech, saying that he intended to grant the Russian language the status of an official language, caused a powerful wave of protests both within and outside Ukraine. Russification, which began in the mid-seventeenth century, after the "unification" of Ukraine with Russia in 1654, is continuing today in what is now an independent state: through the two Russian-language television channels (against one in Ukrainian), and through the leasing of cine-films. Ukrainian books today are swamped by the mass of Russian production. The situation is the same with the Ukrainian press: in the last three years the print-runs of Ukrainian-language newspapers have been reduced by 30%. Today only every fourth newspaper in Ukraine is in Ukrainian.

According to the 1989 census (in what was still the Ukrainian SSR), nearly 20% of the inhabitants of Ukraine were Russians, and 75% – Ukrainians. Nevertheless, even today, according to the Ministry of Education, 48% of pupils are being taught in the Russian language. In Crimea, where there was the biggest outcry about "forcible Ukrainisation", out of a total of 550 schools, there are just three (!) classes which use Ukrainian as the language of instruction.

Some 10 million Ukrainians live in Russia, but within the whole of Russia there is not a single Ukrainian-taught school or class, not one Ukrainian-language theatre, and no Ukrainian newspaper. The only works printed in Ukrainian are a few occasional publications of cultural societies. At the end of 1994, the Ukrainian organisations in Russia were obliged to appeal to the UN about discrimination against the rights of Ukrainians living in the Russian Federation.

Between Ukraine and Russia there lies a sea of unresolved problems: the division of the gold and diamond reserves, the assets of the former USSR, which Russia claims, the on-going conflict over Crimea and the Black Sea Fleet, Ukraine's debts for Russian oil and gas.

Today's Ukrainian state has a good image in the world: in comparison with former President Leonid Kravchuk, the current President, Leonid Kuchma, is seen as a reformer capable of carrying out necessary but unpopular measures. Ukraine, a state which is striving to break with its past, is ready, willing and able to effect the necessary changes. □

Ukraine and Russia Agree on Fleet Division Formula

Hailing the treaty a breakthrough and historical, the presidents of Ukraine and Russia agreed on Friday, 9 June, to divide the post-Soviet Black Sea Fleet between the two countries.

The long-sought division, one of the most troublesome political problems to emerge between Kyiv and Moscow since Ukraine's declaration of independence four years ago, is also Ukraine's first step towards creating its navy.

Following a summit meeting with President Leonid Kuchma at the Russian seaside resort of Sochi, a smiling Boris Yeltsin said the problem of the fleet had been solved. "We've closed the book on the problem of the Black Sea Fleet", the Russian president said of the thorny issue. "I consider this a historic event because it opens the way to further Russian-Ukrainian relations".

Yeltsin said the agreement cleared the way for his long-delayed trip to Kyiv to sign a broad-based treaty with Ukraine – a trip he repeatedly said he would not make until the question of the fleet was solved.

"Our main task is strategic partnership with Ukraine. We have to begin this partnership with a political agreement, which should be signed in Kyiv", Yeltsin said.

The agreement allows Kuchma to claim success in maintaining the territorial integrity of Ukraine, which would have been lost if Russian nationalists who would like Moscow to annex Sevastopol had gotten their wish. "Sevastopol is a Ukrainian city", said Ukrainian First Deputy Prime Minister Borys Tarasyuk, reaffirming Kyiv's resolve to keep Crimea, though that point is missing from the treaty signed by the two countries.

"A huge step forward has been made in the development of relations between Ukraine and Russia", Kuchma said. "The knot in relations between the two countries has been untied".

But significant questions remained unanswered after the summit, despite the positive spin pout on events by politicians and the friendly atmosphere provided by the smiling heads of states, who hugged each other upon meeting and exchanged kisses three times at a news conference. No mention was made of where the Ukrainian navy will be based or whether it will share Sevastopol with Russian ships. Similarly, officials refused to comment on how much Russia will pay to rent the port, if anything at all.

The two sides agreed to divide the fleet into roughly 18% for Ukraine and 82% for Russia. Initially, Kyiv and Moscow had agreed to split the fleet 50–50, but Ukraine decided to sell a larger portion to Russia for cash and energy credits. With precise figures lacking, Western estimates of the number of ships and other vessels in the Black Sea Fleet range from 300 to 900.

The treaty also says that all officers and sailors, regardless of nationality, can decide their service allegiance.

Text of the Ukrainian-Russian Black Sea Fleet Agreement

The Russian Federation and Ukraine, hereafter known as the "Sides", fully resolved to strengthen friendship and cooperation between the Russian Federation and Ukraine, noting the coincidence of the two states' interests in the Black Sea basin and, based on Russian-Ukrainian documents signed previously in this sphere, have agreed on the following:

Article 1. The Russian Federation Black Sea Fleet and the Ukrainian navy will be formed on the basis of the Black Sea Fleet. The Russian Federation Black Sea Fleet and the Ukrainian navy will have separate bases.

Article 2. The main base of the Russian Federation Black Sea Fleet, together with the headquarters of the Russian Federation Black Sea Fleet, will be in the city of Sevastopol.

The Russian Federation Black Sea Fleet will use installations of the Black Sea Fleet in the city of Sevastopol and will also use other basing and deployment locations for ships, aviation, shore-based troops, and operational, combat, technical and support installations in Crimea.

Article 3. The governments of the Sides will settle questions pertaining to the property of the Black Sea Fleet and will sign a separate agreement on that matter, bearing in mind the previous accord on the division of the aforementioned property on a 50–50 basis.

Article 4. The Russian Federation will receive 81.7 per cent of the ships and vessels of the Black Sea Fleet, and Ukraine – 18.3 per cent.

Article 5. In the dividision of the weapons, military hardware and support facilities of the shore-based defence forces, marines, and land-based naval aviation of the Black Sea Fleet, the Sides will work on the basis of the situation as of 3 August 1992.

Article 6. If one Side is interested in using installations which under the terms of this Agreement are designated for the use of the other Side, such issues will be resolved by the conclusion of special agreements in each specific instance.

Article 7. Each officer, warrant officer and petty officer of the Black Sea Fleet has the right freely to determine his future service.

Article 8. The Russian Federation will participate in developing the socio-economic environment of Sevastopol and other population centres where the Russian Federation Black Sea Fleet is to be based.

Article 9. To preserve stability in the Black Sea region and ensure safety at sea, the Sides will pool their efforts in interaction and cooperation in the naval sphere. The organisation of and procedure for cooperation in this sphere will be determined by the Agreement on Cooperation between the Russian Federation Fleet and the Ukrainian navy.

Article 10. The Sides will continue the talks on the Black Sea Fleet and, in particular, the elaboration of the legal status and conditions governing the presence of the Russian Federation Black Sea Fleet on Ukrainian territory, the procedure for mutual settlements connected with the resolution of the problem of the Black Sea Fleet and other questions.

Article 11. A Russian-Ukrainian Joint Commission consisting of the state delegations of the Russian Federation and Ukraine at the talks on the Black Sea Fleet is to be formed to monitor the fulfilment of the accords on the Black Sea Fleet.

The Commission is instructed to draw up specific parameters for the division of Black Sea Fleet installations. □

Conferences & Exhibitions

Trade and Investment Opportunities in the Russian Oil Industry

The fourth international conference convened by the Royal Institute of International Affairs in association with The Centre for Foreign Investment and Privatisation, Moscow, *Petroleum Intelligence Weekly*, and Russian Strategic Services, Ltd, took place in London on 23-24 March 1995.

Russia's near-monopoly position as supplier of oil and gas is one of the basic geo-political *realia* of the post-Soviet space. Over the past four years, the twin series of conferences on the post-Soviet oil and gas industries convened by the RIIA and its associates have gradually changed their emphasis: once their titles spoke of investment opportunities in the CIS, and the energy chiefs of most, if not all, the Newly Independent States attended. Now the conference titles speak of Russia only, and although a few representatives from other post-Soviet states still participate, their role is one of ever-decreasing importance.

It is inevitable that Western oil entrepreneurs, wanting to get into the upstream end of the post-Soviet fossil fuel industry, will negotiate with the primary suppliers, Russia – and, to a lesser extent, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan. But, when the series of conferences began, shortly after the demise of the USSR, there was considerable Western interest in downstream investment – in the refurbishing and modernising of pipelines and refineries, including facilities in the western republics of the post-Soviet space – in particular, Ukraine and Belarus. Now these areas are virtually ignored. Not because, as one might suppose, all the attractive contracts in the area have been snapped up, but rather because it is by no means clear with whom one is supposed to do business. The inability of the "consumer" republics to pay the huge fuel prices which Russia sets for its oil and gas has led to a policy of "debt-for-equity" swaps, by which Russia's fuel giants, LUKoil and Gazprom in particular, are gradually taking over the energy complexes of their debtors. Some major Western oil and gas experts seem not unhappy about the situation in the long term, somewhat naively seeing in the expansion of the Russian companies a factor for stability. Others, more politically astute, are aware of the dangers of such a situation. Opening the latest of these oil conferences, the UK Minister for Industry and Energy, Tim Eggar, gently urged the Russians not to attempt to dominate the energy policy of the other Newly Independent States.

"I would also encourage you to be a good neighbour", he said. "Russia's influence on energy projects in neighbouring former Soviet Republics can have a tremendous positive effect [but] this does not always appear to be the case".

Russia, he said, should

> allow its southern neighbours to decide for themselves how to export their hydrocarbon resources to hard currency markets. With shares in the Karachanagak project [in Kazakhstan] through Gazprom and the Azerbaijan consortium through

> LUKoil, it is surely not in Russia's interest to risk such projects being delayed by pushing host governments towards particular pipeline routes. Such things should be decided on commercial grounds alone.

The Minister's exhortations thus focused on two of the key political issues of the Russian energy industry: the demand that oil from the Caucasus, Caspian Basin and Central Asia should be exported to Europe only via the Novorossiysk terminal on the Russian Black Sea coast, and Russia's claim that the undersea reserves of the Caspian should be held in common by the four post-Soviet littoral states (Russia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan). Both these issues have considerable implications for Ukraine in particular, since, if the Russians get their way, they will keep a stranglehold over supplies to Ukraine from Azerbaijan and Central Asia.

But for Western would-be investors, uncertainty over the Caspian reserves is a major brake on investment in the area. Doing business with Russia is, as a number of Western participants in this conference noted, a minefield of imprecise, equivocal and sometimes self-contradictory legislation – with the Russian side still apt to change the rules retroactively in mid-negotiation. But with the Caspian, it is by no means clear who owns the resources. The problem turns on whether the Caspian is (in international law) a "sea" – in which case the Law of the Sea rules would apply and each littoral state would be entitled to its own economic zone, or whether it is legally only a very large "international lake". But if it is a "lake", as the Russians urge, the existing precedents do not seem entirely applicable to the case of the Caspian. One of the major presentations at the conference dealt with the legal uncertainties surrounding the Caspian, and the not entirely consistent claims advanced by the Russians. As the speaker, B. Sas, of the Energy and Natural Resources Group, Denton Hall, pointed out, "[i]t is absolutely essential for this issue to be discussed and resolved, because it affects title to the oil in off-shore developments, and that brings uncertainty to international investors".

To the Russian participants, however, it was by no means obvious that the issue should be discussed – at least at such a conference. Sas's speech was followed by an outburst of angry Russian comment from the floor, arguing that a conference was no place for such controversy! This Russian contingent appeared to want a conference in the old Soviet style, a place for the presentation of formal, anodyne speeches, with no challenges to the current political line. To the Western participants, who see such conferences as, essentially, a forum for the exchange of views and a mutual learning process, this intervention came as a shock – and, perhaps, a salutary warning of how fragile, still, is the Russian understanding of the norms of world business practice – even among those who see themselves as advocates of market-oriented reform. □

Obituary

Lev Shankovskyi, a professor of military history, and a veteran political and social activist, died on 25 April 1995. He was 91.

Shankovskyi was born on 9 September 1903, in the village of Dubyli, in western Ukraine (then part of the Austro-Hungarian empire). He was the son of the (married) village priest, Fr Petro Shankovskyi, and his wife Mariya (née Sheparovych).

Lev's secondary education was interrupted by World War I. At the age of 15, he entered the Ukrainian Galician Army, and then, after the declaration of Ukrainian independence in 1918, served in the Army of the Ukrainian National Republic. When that Republic ceased to exist, Shankovskyi returned to his studies, and, in 1922, graduated from the Ukrainian high school in Stanislaviv, now under Polish rule. He began his higher education in the unofficial Ukrainian Clandestine University, and then, after completing his compulsory service in the Polish army, entered the faculty of philosophy of the University of Lviv. He then went on to study French and English at the College of Foreign Trade in Warsaw, later working as a teacher of commercial subjects in secondary and tertiary educational institutions.

During World War II, he once again returned to military life, as an officer in the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA). In 1944, he took part in the organisation of the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council, becoming one of its founding members.

After World War II, he settled in the USA, where he played a notable role in the scholarly and community life of the Ukrainian diaspora. He became a much-valued contributor to a number of Ukrainian and English-language journals, using the pseudonym "Oleh Martovych", and published a number of scholarly and popular books, in particular on the history of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army.

He served on the editorial boards of a number of journals of the Ukrainian diaspora, including, from 1966-94, *The Ukrainian Review.*

He is survived by his wife Marta and son Ihor. □

Reviews

Belarus, Lithuania, Poland, Ukraine – the Foundations of Historical and Cultural Traditions in East Central Europe. Edited by Jerzy Kloczowski et al. (Instytut Europy Srodkowo-Wschodniej, Lublin; Foundation John-Paul II, Rome, 1994) 503 pp.

This book presents the proceedings of the conference, held in spring 1990 in Rome, which set in train what has since become known as the "Rome Process" – regular meetings of scholars from Belarus, Lithuania, Poland and Ukraine, to discuss, in an atmosphere of academic reflection and reconciliation, the historical and cultural traditions which in past centuries have so often proved divisive. The area in question lies on the same "fault-line" between the cultural traditions of Rome and Byzantium, which, at the time when Pope John Paul II convened the Conference, was, further to the south, straddled by the gathering crisis of the break-up of the former Yugoslavia.

Although, once the stranglehold of Communist rule had gone, the dissolution of that state was, perhaps, inevitable, the mutual hostilities and recriminations, which eventually resulted in the current armed conflict, were not. A major factor, here, was the psychological atmosphere evoked by the commemorations, in June 1989, of the 600th anniversary of the battle of Kosovo Polje – the traumatic defeat which brought the Serbs under Ottoman rule. At the time of the "Rome-1" conference, Poland had had a mere eight months of its first post-Communist, "semi-democratic" government, while Belarus, Lithuania and Ukraine still formed part of the moribund Soviet Union. Lithuania, indeed, had declared independence a mere month before (and was in the grip of Moscow's retaliatory economic blockade), while Ukraine and Belarus would not declare their "sovereignty" for another three months. In such a delicate political situation, old, historical grievances and cultural clashes could well have engendered new hatreds here, no less than in the Balkans. While it would be a gross exaggeration to suggest that the "Rome Process" was solely responsible for defusing potential tensions in the area, there can be little doubt that it made its own, significant, contribution.

Following a Foreword by Dr Kloczowski, and a scene-setting over-view by a former President of the Polish Academy of Sciences, Professor Aleksander Gieysztor ("Empires, successor states and peoples in East-Central Europe"), the conference materials are presented in three sections: "The Foundations of National Consciousness (Historical and Cultural)", "The Foundations of Religious Life and Culture" and "East Central Europe: Past and Present (Society and Politics)". Of the 37 papers presented, 17 are of obvious Ukrainian interest:

Hryhoriy Hrabovych, "Formation of Ukrainian national consciousness and the question of Polish influences";

Dmytro Stepowyk: "The Vilna Academy and the culture of Belarus and Ukraine in the Seventeenth Century";

Mykola Zhulynskyi: "Ukrainian culture in the system of East-European Spiritual Coordinates of the turn of the XIX-XX centuries",

Oksana Pakhlovska: "The heritage problem in Ukrainian culture and forms of its imperial expropriation";

Yaroslav Isayevych: "Foundations of religious life and culture in Ukraine (up to the end of the XVIII century);

Yaroslav Isayevych: "Confraternities of laymen in Early Modern Ukraine and Belarus";

John-Paul Himka: "Religion and ethnicity in Ukraine. From the mid-XVIII to XX centuries;

Petro P. Tolochko, "The idea of the Roman-Byzantine Christian heritage in the social thought of old Rus'";

Stanislaw Litak: "The Greek-rite Uniate church at the meeting-point of two cultures in the XVI-XVIII century";

Wlodzimierz Mokry: "Ukraine and Ukrainians in Russian culture and literature from the second half of the XVII to the beginning of the XX century";

Fr Isydor Patrylo: "The role of the Basilian Order in the life of the Kyiv Metropolitan See (1617-1839)";

Jan Skarbek: "Changes of the designations Belarus, Lithuania, Poland and Ukraine on maps during the past two centuries";

Andrzej S. Kaminski: "History of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (1453-1795)";

Jaroslav Pelenskii: "Society and state in Ukrainian political thought (past and present)";

Marek J. Karp: "The search for cooperation between the peoples of the former Grand Duchy of Lithuania during World War I";

Adolf Juzwenko: "Unsuccessful attempts by the Poles to reach an accord with the Lithuanians and Ukrainians in 1919";

Fr Ivan Datsko: "The pontificate of Pope John Paul II and the tasks of the Ukrainian Catholic Church".

We have listed these titles in full for the benefit of students of Ucrainica, who might otherwise be unaware of these scholarly and insightful papers. But (except for, let us say, graduate students with a dissertation dead-line approaching), to read this collection simply for matters of Ukrainian (or for that matter, Belarusian, Lithuanian or Polish) interest, would run counter to the whole purpose of the work. For the avowed purpose of the "Rome Process" is the growth of a common understanding of all four communities involved. For this, larger, purpose, the presentations of, for example, Walery Czekmonas on the sociolinguistics of the Vilna area or Zora Kipiel on the literary connections of XVI-century Belarus are of importance to the scholars of Ukrainian affairs no less than those which focus on their own particular field.

But to read the book *in toto* demands a certain linguistic expertise. The papers come in no less than six tongues – the four languages of the "Rome Process" plus German and English. Some of the Ukrainian papers, and (mercifully) the single contribution in Lithuanian, come with a complete translation into Polish. Two of the Belarusian papers come with English summaries. In view of the undoubted importance of this book, one has to regret that the rest

of the papers do not have them. During the four-and-a-half years between "Rome-1" and the appearance of this book (a delay presumably due to the troubled economic situation in Poland), there would surely have been time to produce what, for a modest expenditure of effort, and (in proportion to the over-all size of the book), at a very minor increase in production cost, would have greatly enhanced the value and accessibility of this work. For the underlying purpose of the "Rome Process" – the defusing of old ethnic/religious tensions by means of scholarly cooperation – could be applied in many areas of the world where diverse cultural and historical traditions are in close and often hostile contact. And, with abstracts in a language accessible to those who are not Slavonic specialists, this book could serve as a valuable example.

The Model Occupation – The Channel Islands under German Rule, 1940-45.
By Madeleine Bunting (HarperCollins, London, 1995) 354 pp., illustr., £20.00

The Channel Islands (Jersey, Guernsey, Alderney and Sark), the last fragment of the Duchy of Normandy still in the possession of the British Crown, were the only part of the British Empire to come under German occupation during World War II. Demilitarised after the fall of France by the British government as "undefendable" (against, it must be noted, the wishes of Churchill), the islands were occupied by German troops on 27 June 1940, and were not liberated until 9 May 1945 – the day after VE Day. Madeleine Bunting's book is a chronicle of these 58 months.

The "Model Occupation" of the title refers to Hitler's view of the take-over. He saw it as a try-out for the eventual occupation of the United Kingdom. The islanders (whether indigenous or settlers from the UK) were deemed by Nazi theory to be racially akin to the Germans. Hence, although eventually the UK-born were deported to the continent as a reprisal for the internment of German nationals in Britain, the five-years' occupation, in spite of the psychological trauma and prolonged material hardship involved, was for the most part free of the physical atrocities typical in the occupied countries of continental Europe.

This mildness did not, however, apply to the slave labourers imported to work for the Nazis. Hitler wanted the islands fortified, with huge complexes of underground bunkers and hospital facilities. Since the islanders could not, under the Geneva Convention, be forced to work for the occupation forces against the interests of Britain, forced labourers, mostly from Poland and the Soviet Union, were brought in. "The experiences of the[se] workers on the Channel Islands", Ms Bunting says, "explodes the myth of the Model Occupation". These Slavs (prisoners-of-war, young lads and old men), were, she says, "seldom deliberately killed, but the inadequate food, arbitrary beatings, utter disregard for their safety at worksites and lack of medical care exacted a heavy price in lives".

Earlier histories of the occupation, although they paid glowing tribute to the courage of islanders who risked their own safety to feed these prisoners or to shelter those who managed to escape, could say little of the Soviet contingent except for the fact that they had, indeed, worked, suffered, and all too frequently, died there. Those who returned to the Soviet Union suffered the usual fate of

all who had been in Nazi hands – arrested or harassed as "collaborators". Survivors were unable to contact each other, and the Soviet archives concerning Alderney, where the conditions were the most brutal, remained sealed until May 1993. Sixty-four survivors of the Channel Island camps have been traced in the Former Soviet Union. Bunting cites *in extenso* the accounts of six of them, including two now resident in Zaporizhzhya – Vasyl Marepolskyi, now a professor of Ukrainian literature, and Albert "Podhugine", a Belarusian, who after the war ended up in the Zaporizhzhya metallurgical plants – and also incorporates the evidence of several others into the body of the text. Although Ms Bunting apparently worked through a Russian translator only (which may explain some of the idiosyncratic transcriptions of names), these sections of the work come over with the authentic voice of living history, no less so than in the material gathered by the islanders themselves where there was no language barrier.

(One should note here, perhaps, that although Ms Bunting makes explicit reference to the presence of Ukrainian prisoners on the islands, in recording the memories of the islanders, she is limited by their own words. To the islanders, as to the vast majority of the British of the period, all inhabitants of the Soviet Union were "Russians".)

For those interested primarily in Ucrainica, the chapters dealing with the forced labourers during and after the war will be of the most immediate interest. But merely to skim the index for references to a particular subject would be a mistake. This is a book which should be read in full and in depth. For, although the occupation of the Channel Islands may appear, at first glance, a minor footnote to the overall history of World War II, it raises a number of searching questions that are relevant even today. In the islands, as everywhere in occupied Europe, there were heroes – and collaborators. There were those shot or imprisoned for launching a carrier pigeon or sheltering a German deserter. But there were, too, the island officials who often all too officiously carried out Nazi orders (including the preparation of lists of persons to be deported to the continent) and also the private citizens who, to pay off an old score or gain some privilege for themselves, denounced a neighbour for a clandestine radio set or an unreported store of food. And there were those torn between the promptings of conscience and the demands of family – for example, the Jersey policeman who saw a Soviet forced labourer kicked unconscious by a Nazi official. "The policeman vividly remembers his feelings of powerlessness", Ms Bunting writes. "There was nothing he could have achieved by attempting to intervene, and he remembers being very much aware that, if anything happened to him, his wife and two young children would be left unprovided for on the island. In the event, there was nothing he could do but walk away". Immediately after the liberation, an official enquiry was made into the conduct of the island governments during the occupation. But its findings were hushed up, and, although there was a similar enquiry into allegations of collaboration by individuals, none of these cases ever came to trial. Nor were the German officers accused of war crimes (deportation of islanders to internment camps on the continent and cutting civilian rations during the last hungry year of the occupation) – ever brought to trial, although the accused were

readily available – in POW camps in the United Kingdom. Clement Attlee's government, it now appears, simply wanted to avoid, what Bunting calls, the "political minefield" that such trials would have been.

For such prosecutions would have pinpointed the painful fact that, under enemy occupation, the more-or-less British Channel Islanders behaved no better and no worse than the inhabitants of occupied Europe. Fifty years after the event, such revelations have less power to shock – to those born later, all "history" is one, and past misdeeds, from the St Brice's Day massacre to Bloody Sunday, are matters for the textbook, not the confessional. And the conduct of those who proved, under Nazi occupation, less than perfect heroes could, fifty years after, become a mere matter of academic record – were it not for the recent enactment of retrospective legislation allowing prosecutions to be brought in UK courts for alleged war crimes, committed outside those courts' jurisdiction, more than 50 years ago. The Demjanjuk case, only a few years ago, demonstrated the pitfalls of bringing such a prosecution so long after the event. The fact that no similar prosecutions were brought against officials or private individuals from the Channel Islands where, as Ms Bunting's book makes clear, there was ample *prima facie* evidence and an abundance of witnesses with all-too-fresh memories, must inevitably cast into question the validity of the projected prosecutions under the new retroactive law. Ms Bunting, herself, does not raise this question, but for many readers it will undoubtedly form a significant subtext.

Parliaments in Transition. The New Legislative Politics in the Former USSR and Eastern Europe. Edited by Thomas F. Remington (Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1994) 246 pp. illustr.

This book, which grew out of a conference at Emory University (USA) in April 1993, claims to be the "first cross-national assessment of the development of parliamentary politics" in the former USSR and Eastern Europe. It comprises nine papers, focusing in detail on developments in Ukraine, Russia, Hungary and the then Czechoslovakia, but in the opening and closing chapters by the editor, Thomas F. Remington, taking a wider view of the entire post-Soviet/socialist space.

In his introduction, Remington describes the parliaments elected in the immediate aftermath of the downfall of Communism as "bridges" to the successor regimes, whether democratic or authoritarian. Noting that in Central-Eastern Europe, the elections of 1989-90 have been regarded by some commentators as "founding elections", which "gave the stamp of democratic consent to parliamentary arrangements which were made, typically, through a negotiated agreement between elements of the ruling elite and leaders of the organized opposition", he describes these first elections as having a "plebiscite-like quality", in a situation where a stable party system had yet to develop. Party labels, therefore, were of little use in determining the present and, *a fortiori*, future behaviour of the new politicians, so that a leader who came to power on a programme of anti-Communist democratic reform, might well, once in office, impose authoritarian rule. Furthermore, these transitional societies had to cope, virtually overnight, with working out the balance between parliament and gov-

ernment/president which in longer-established democracies have slowly evolved over the course of centuries. Parliaments may be unicameral or bicameral with, in the latter case, varying patterns of relationship between the two chambers. Indeed, as David M. Olson points out in his paper ("The Sundered State: Federalism and Parliament in Czechoslovakia"), the Federal Assembly of that country appeared, at times, to be virtually a *tri*-cameral parliament! The result (as Remington shows in tabular form) is a patchwork of states whose constitutional type may be presidential, semi-presidential or parliamentary, and whose electoral system may be majoritarian, pure proportional representation or hybrid proportional representation. To this must be added a wide spectrum of ethnicity (with its potential impact on voting patterns), ranging from the almost homogenous Slovenia, to Latvia where the eponymous nationality amount to little more than 50% of the total population. It is clear, therefore, that political developments in these almost 30 post-Communist states present a far from homogeneous picture.

Were they totally heterogeneous, of course, a book of this kind would reduce them to a mere series of case studies, from which only the most banal general conclusions could be drawn. In fact, however, out of all this diversity, some overall trends do emerge. Thus, Remington notes that, "[i]n the immediate post-communist environment, for example, voters are often attracted to candidates for their personal qualities or their reputations as outsiders", whereas in subsequent elections, there is a swing towards "former party bureaucrats or enterprise managers on the grounds that these individuals have proven credentials as competent administrators". Likewise, Gerhard Loewenberg's description of the first post-Communist Hungarian parliament ("The New Political Leadership of Central Europe: The Example of the New Hungarian National Assembly") would ring true in many other countries of the area:

> The members of the new parties include a remarkable number of members of the free professions who are completing or have completed university education in law, the health sciences including medicine, and the humanities including history. By occupation they have disproportionately been university faculty members, physicians, dentists and pharmacists, engineers and architects, and research scientists.
>
> What is remarkable is the extent to which these members are academic intellectuals including an astonishing number of historians, economists, sociologists, philosophers, writers, and actors and a surprisingly small number of individuals who can be regarded in any sense as political professionals...

One may not necessarily share Professor Loewenberg's surprise at this lack of "professionals" – in parties that had only recently come into being. In countries breaking free from a one-party system, it would seem inevitable that the majority of the new democratic leaders would be "non-professionals". Even the relatively small cohort who, under the Communist system, had been driven out of employment and completely marginalised into the position of "full-time dissidents" (Jacek Kuron in Poland, for example) tended to come from the learned professions, and so described themselves in their post-Communist election manifestos. But the "non-professional" nature of so many of the new democra-

tic MPs has had, as Professor Timothy J. Colton shows in his paper "Professional Engagement and Role Definition Among Post-Soviet Legislators") some specific effects. Members of the new parliaments, he says, often had little perception of the day-to-day trivia of parliamentary work. "I had not realized that people in my district would expect me to haul so many little loads for them", he quotes one Ukrainian MP. "I was psychologically prepared for doing my part to write laws that would bring our nation out of its crisis, but not for this small change". Professor Colton does not name this particular MP, nor specify his background, and one cannot but wonder how typical this viewpoint is. Those members who came into politics through the human rights movements of the 1980s, such as the Ukrainian Helsinki Committee, whose activities frequently had to focus on the "small change" of repression, might well have offered a different viewpoint.

Colton's paper is based on research carried out in 1991-92 among members of four legislative assemblies – the moribund Supreme Soviet of the USSR (April-May 1991), and the parliaments of Russia (April-May 1991), Ukraine (November-December 1991) and Kazakhstan (January 1992). Although the survey instruments were broadly identical, the rapid pace of events at that time might well make a purist query whether, indeed, the circumstances of the individual surveys were sufficiently similar to make a comparison meaningful: during his work in Russia, the Soviet Union still existed and President Mikhail Gorbachov was full of plans to revamp it. But the Ukrainian survey came three months after the August coup, and coincided with the run-up to the Presidential election and the independence referendum which dealt the Soviet Union its *coup de grâce* (a fact which Colton does not even mention). By the time he arrived in Kazakhstan, the Soviet Union had been formally wound up, and 15 somewhat bewildered Newly Independent States were trying to cope with that independence.

If, however, one accepts the surveys as validly comparable, it is not easy to draw meaningful conclusions. A major point in Colton's investigation dealt with the relationship between an MP's intention to stand or not for a second term of office and various parameters of his own role in parliament: whether this was a full-time commitment or he/she had another job, membership of a parliamentary floor group or caucus, did he/she hold another post in government at the local level, and so on. The results, as presented, are puzzling. Why, one wonders, was the percentage of MPs in Ukraine intending to stand for re-election (16.5%) so much lower than in Russia and Kazakhstan (29.1% and 24.2% respectively)? Furthermore, Colton observes

> Occupancy of a leading position in the legislative structure, full-time immersion in parliamentary work, and simultaneous service at another level of government are associated with the propensity to run for re-election – but not in any uniform pattern across the three countries. In Russia, legislative non-leaders, part-time deputies, and deputies elected to another soviet were more likely to have the ambition to re-run. In Ukraine, it was exactly the reverse on all three scores. Kazakhstan resembled the Ukrainian lineup for leading position and full-time work, but Russia for dual elective office. Ethnic affiliation, available for only

> Ukraine and Kazakhstan, was barely significant for Ukraine, and, counterintuitively, gave a slight advantage to non-Ukrainians over ethnic Ukrainians. In Kazakhstan, though, ethnic Kazakhs were more than twice as likely as non-Kazakhs to aspire to be returned to office.

The only two variables which appeared to have a positive correlation with the desire to be re-elected was membership of a parliamentary fraction or floor-group (particularly one of a democratic tendency) and a self-perception as personally having an influence on the working out of legislation.

Another major section of Colton's work deals with role perception – with MPs ranking in order of perceived importance the various aspects of their parliamentary work. This leads to the somewhat gloomy conclusion that

> [t]he most damaging contradiction here is that the members of the first cohort of post-Soviet legislative elites most inclined by temperament to conceive of political and parliamentary activity as a lifelong commitment – namely, the Westernizing democrats – are at the same time among the least favourably disposed to the purely representative strand of the elective politician's job.

Re-election, he suggested, (as opposed to the expressed intention to stand for a second term) would be "directly affected by their willingness to take seriously the constituency-defense and personal-service functions that they have tended in the early going to turn up their noses at".

In fact, as recent history has shown, the voting patterns of the post-Soviet electorate seem less conditioned by the performance of their own, outgoing, MPs, as by discontent and disillusion with the on-going economic crisis and a naive tendency to put their faith in glib populists promising an easy fix.

Colton's surveys did not, apparently, find room for the question: "Why did you stand for Parliament?" Unlike the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the parliament of Kazakhstan, the Ukrainian parliament of 1990 was elected on a purely territorial basis: there were no reserved seats for special interest groups. Nevertheless, even in Ukraine, in the absence of developed (non-Communist) political parties, one of the few ways in which persons of a democratic turn of mind could come to prominence was through "public organizations" devoted to special interests – environment, language, etc. Indeed, in the 1990 elections, the nomination of candidates was restricted to such "public organizations" and "workers' collectives". This, undoubtedly, accounts for a significant proportion of the "amateurs" from the intellectual professions in the first post-Soviet parliaments. But anecdotal evidence suggests that a fair number of those who stood for election in 1990 saw themselves not as potential life-long participants in democratic politics, but as precursors or locums, even, one may say, conscripts, filling the gap until new democratic leaders could emerge, and looking forward to a return to full-time work as soon as their country's needs would allow. One would like to know what proportion of those MPs who were unwilling to stand again came from this category, and how many had initially set their sights on a lifetime's career in politics and had since become disillusioned.

As far as Ukraine is concerned, Colton makes no regional distinction between the attitudes of MPs. This, intuitively, would seem a methodological

defect. Western Ukraine, which was annexed by the Soviet Union only in 1939, still had a living memory of a political system other than that of monolithic Communist Party rule. Not surprisingly, as in the Baltic Republics, grass-roots movements for democratic change began there earlier and attracted significantly stronger support than in the "original" Soviet Union. Regional differences are one of the foci, however, of Dr Dominique Arel's paper "Voting Behavior in the Ukrainian Parliament: The Language Factor". Ukraine, in Dr Arel's opinion, is "the only former Soviet republic where severe regional cleavages are aggravated by a serious identity problem for the titular nationality, i.e. the Ukrainians". How the linguistically Russified Ukrainians of the south and east "actually perceive themselves as group members, and how they will behave politically in a post-independence environment in which the Ukrainian state is likely to emphasize its Ukrainian identity vis-à-vis the intimidating Russian neighbor is", Arel says, "perhaps the most crucial question to be addressed not only in contemporary Ukrainian politics, but in post-Soviet ethnic politics".

Arel's paper investigates the linguistic behaviour of Ukrainian MPs in "roll-call" votes. In current parliamentary practice, members may speak in either Ukrainian or Russian, and the stenographic transcripts of proceedings reproduce their speeches and remarks in the language in which they are made. In a study covering virtually all the roll-call votes between May 1990 and January 1992, he works out a "voting index" on which a "conservative" (i.e. pro-Communist) vote scores 1 and a "radical" (i.e. pro-reform) vote scores 3. The overall rating of all the roll-call votes under consideration was 2.09, with, not surprisingly, major regional and generational differences. On the indicator of ethnicity, Ukrainians obtained a more radical score (2.13) than Russians (1.89), though Arel correctly notes that this discrepancy is largely a reflection of the regional differences between the radical west and centre (Kyiv) and the "conservative" south and east.

Particularly interesting was the breakdown by language spoken. Here "the gap between Ukrainian-speaking and Russian-speaking deputies was not only more significant (2.29 vs 1.84), but even outside of the radical West and Kiev, Ukrainian-speaking deputies registered a higher score (2.29) than both Russified Ukrainian deputies (1.81) and Russian deputies (1.89)".

Arel's calculations indicate, however, that language was not a factor significantly influencing the pre-independence votes on sovereignty or the March 1991 referendum on the continuance of the Soviet Union. Nor did it affect how MPs voted on issues of national importance. On a few key issues, however, a correlation between voting behaviour and language become evident. Three cases, Arel says, were particularly striking;

- the vote of 12 June 1990 following objections by nationalist MPs to the use of Russian by the new Deputy Speaker, Volodymyr Hryniov, in the conduct of his official duties. (Only 2% of Russophones supported the nationalists; the Ukrainophones themselves were split on regional lines);
- the vote of 23 October 1990 on outlawing parties and movements advocating violence in order to change the territorial integrity of Ukraine. This de-

volved in debate into whether the unitary nature of the Ukrainian state could be challenged. The Russophones voted en bloc for a resolution which merely referred in general terms to the territorial integrity of the republic. Ukrainophones were split on regional lines between this resolution and one which effectively banned any separatist movement.

• the vote of 6 November 1991 on the Treaty of Economic Union proposed by Mikhail Gorbachov. Russophones voted en bloc for the treaty (only 6.3% objected), Ukrainophones, again, were divided. In Arel's opinion, although "[t]he Treaty itself became history within a few weeks, but the vote, we believe, remains significant as an indicator of *future* trends".

These words may well sum up not only Arel's research presented in this paper, and the extremely useful methodology he has worked out – but also the contents of the entire book. Dealing with a period which (so fast is the pace of events in the post-Soviet world) already seems oddly remote, this fascinating and scholarly work provides a range of valuable insights into the first faltering steps of the former Soviet empire and satellites towards their perceived visions of democracy.

The Russian Natural Gas "Bubble" – Consequences for European Gas Markets.
By Jonathan P. Stern (Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1995) 91 pp.

This is the latest publication to appear under the auspices of the RIIA Energy and Environment Programme. In it, Jonathan P. Stern, an acknowledged expert in the energy resources of the former Soviet Union (FSU), argues that, since Russia's gas monopoly, Gazprom, has flourished while Russian industry, as a whole, has declined, in the near future, Europe will be faced with a glut of cheap Russian natural gas. This surplus, he maintains, will not depend on the opening up of gas fields. Declining consumption within Russia will, he says, provide a surplus of gas from existing fields for years.

Stern's figures and forecasts, therefore, do not take into account projections of future supplies from the high-cost fields of the Barents Sea and the Yamal peninsula. He shows, in fact, that the name "Yamal corridor", bestowed on the new transit pipeline via Belarus and Poland to western Europe, is something of a misnomer. The line will be built in three stages, at a total cost of $18.7, to pick up gas exports from existing Russian fields. Only in a fourth, final, stage is the line to be taken up to the Yamal fields – at the cost of an additional $20-22 billion. The immediate purpose of the new pipeline is not, Stern makes clear, to bring gas from the Russian Arctic to western Europe, but to provide an alternative route for Russian gas that bypasses Ukraine. At present, some 90% of Russia's gas exports cross Ukraine. This means that, if Ukraine cannot meet its own bills for Russian gas, Gazprom cannot simply cut off supplies. For, in that case, Ukraine can (and on occasion does) simply divert to its own needs some of the gas intended for central and west European customers. There are other arguments, too, in favour of the Belarus-Poland corridor (the route to northern Europe is shorter; the current lay-out of pipelines means that, in the case of a major explosion, the whole capacity of Ukraine could be affected), but the net result will be a strengthening of Gazprom's hand in all negotiations with Uk-

raine, as well as with the West, since the Ukrainian "diversions" of gas, although, to date, neither many nor long-lasting, have inevitably damaged Russia's credibility as a secure supplier.

Stern's scenario for the next fifteen years is, therefore, as follows:

1995–2000. The continuing stand-still of Russian industrial production has created a "gas bubble" of production which remains shut due to lack of demand. Efforts are made to increase sales to the West. The Belarus-Poland pipeline is hurried forward to bypass Ukraine and its potential and actual problems. Financing the new pipeline may cause difficulties, and the participation of Western investors could prove crucial. And it seems likely that some, and possibly a major part, of the capacity of this pipeline, will not be covered by long-term supply contracts by the time it is completed.

2000–2010. Assuming that the Belarus-Poland pipeline is built on schedule, Russia will be able to offer more than 30 billion cubic metres of gas to European markets. In order to maximise use of the new pipeline capacity, Gazprom will seek to sell parcels of gas on flexible contractual terms. But sales outside long-term contracts may raise problems of access to west European pipeline networks. In spite of the perceived necessity to sell its gas quickly, Gazprom (in Stern's view) is unlikely to attempt to dump gas on the European market; nevertheless, it will probably begin to price its gas competitively, in comparison with other sources of gas and other fuels. This will, almost certainly, mean at least a temporary cut-back in the development of gas projects elsewhere aimed at the European market. The net result will probably be a speeding up of the liberalisation of west European gas markets. By the year 2010, Gazprom estimates that Europe will have a "yet to be contracted" gas "deficit" of some 200 billion cubic metres a year, of which it hopes to supply 100 billion cubic metres. (Western estimates of this "deficit", however, lie in the 86-130 billion cubic metres range.)

All these developments could, Stern stresses, be undermined by political events: a military conflict within Russia, increasing tension between Russia and Ukraine, a "blatantly anti-Western and anti-capitalist" government in Moscow, tensions between Russia and other transit countries (Slovakia, the Czech Republic and – once the new pipeline is built – Poland), or the development of a new "cold peace" between Russia and western Europe.

2010–onwards. By this time, the surplus gas "bubble" should be exhausted. Russian internal demand will have picked up, and (with moderate economic growth, but assuming that energy-inefficient industries are still tolerated and household prices are held down) should regain its 1990 level of 400 billion cubic metres a year by 2010.

If the Russian economy has by then been restructured with the elimination of energy-inefficient industries and an end to subsidies for household supplies, the demand should be significantly lower – say 320 billion cubic metres by 2010. It is at this stage that supplies from new fields, the Yamal and the Barents Sea, could be brought in, although, Stern stresses, Russia does have the alternative option of buying in gas from the Central Asian republics at little more than the refurbishment costs of the existing infrastructure.

Stern's analysis, of which the above is only a brief outline, is detailed, well-argued, and well substantiated with maps, tables, and inset panels. It is also – as both he and the head of the Energy and Environmental Programme, Michael Grubb (who contributed a preface), make clear – out of step with much of the conventional thinking of the fossil fuel industry. Because of the importance of secure fuel supplies to geopolitical stability and the prosperity of individual countries, and in view of the specifics of Ukraine's relationship with Gazprom, Stern's work must be considered required reading not only for specialists in the gas industry, but for all those concerned with the political and economic future of Ukraine.

Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 30, No. 2, 1995 (SAGE publications, London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi)

In the current issue of this scholarly journal, whose themes range from Mensheviks in New York to Blueshirts in Ireland, Andrew Wilson, a senior fellow at Sidney Sussex College, Cambridge, presents a paper on "The Donbas between Ukraine and Russia: The Use of History in Political Disputes". Pointing out (correctly) that "[h]istorical myths play a particularly important role in the mobilization of ethno-national movements... provid[ing] an ethnic group with a sense of its own past,... and, by relating to the individual's own sense of identity, time and space, helping to make sense of the present". Wilson avers that although such myths are created by "academics, politicians and poets", they "have resonance" and "somehow connect with popular consciousness". This linkage, according to Wilson, is most easily achieved and understood on a popular level by "the claim to be 'indigenous' – to have been historically the first group, or significant group, to occupy that particular land".

Whether this is, indeed, the "easiest" linkage is disputable; the alternative myth of the land-taking can be equally potent in, for example, Iceland, Hungary, and even the United States of America (where Thanksgiving Day celebrates the first harvest of the founding Pilgrim Fathers). In such cases, a specific date of settlement and a self-identification as being descended (at least metaphorically) from the first settlers, can be equally emotive. Nevertheless, in the current controversy over the identity of the Donbas, it is indigenicity which is all-important.

The Donbas, the most easterly area of today's Ukraine, constitutes 9% of the territory of the country, but accounts for 17% of its population and 21% of industrial output; 3.6 million (44%) of the total population identify themselves as Russian, while, in the 1989 census, 66% gave Russian as their mother tongue. But these figures only reflect demographic processes during the Soviet era. What is in dispute here is the ancient and mediaeval history of the area.

Since the late 1980s, when Ukrainian independence once more became a matter of open discussion, both Ukrainian and Russian historians have addressed themselves to the history of the area, reaching conclusions which are, for the most part, diametrically opposed. Wilson surveys the main postulates of this recent burst of historiography without attempting to appraise the arguments on either side, nor analyse which version of history has the greater "pop-

ular resonance" in the Donbas itself. What he does do is to show that the Ukrainian and "Russophile" historiographers of the Donbas are "mutually contradictory at almost every point", and that the "potential for conflict" between the Donbas and the Kyiv government is "obvious".

The Ukrainian standpoint argues that the Donbas lay within the boundaries, or at any rate sphere of influence, of the Kyiv-Rus' state in the tenth-eleventh centuries, before Muscovy even existed. Following the collapse of Kyiv-Rus' in the thirteenth century, the Donbas came under the control of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. The Ukrainian Zaporozhian Cossacks of the sixteenth-eighteenth centuries were ethnically distinct from the Russian, Don Cossacks – and the Donbas was under Zaporozhian, not Don Cossack, control. Only in 1746 was the Zaporozhian sphere of influence pushed back by a decree of the Tsarina Elizabeth which gave part of what is now Donetsk oblast to the Don Cossacks. The Russian ethnic presence in the area became significant only with industrialisation in the latter part of the nineteenth century. The rapid success of the Ukrainianisation policies of the 1920s demonstrates the superficial nature of the Russian influence, and by 1929, 70% of the working class in the region considered themselves to be Ukrainian. Russianisation was, essentially, the result of post-World War II demographic and language policies.

The "Russophile" view starts off by simply denying the early part of this scenario altogether. It reduces contact of Kyiv-Rus' with the Don basin to a few forays into what was then called the "wild field". The Grand Duchy of Lithuania never controlled the Donbas, and colonisation of this hitherto-uninhabited region came from Russia, beginning in the sixteenth century and formalised with the founding of the town of Tsareborisov in 1599-1600. The entire area was controlled by the Don Cossacks, and documents and decrees that appear to indicate otherwise have no validity. Elizabeth's decree of 1746 did not transfer territory; it was a mere device to separate and settle disputes between two Cossack groups. An alternative "Russophile" scenario claims that the Don basin was from the beginning a multi-ethnic area, and that in the course of time, the population "began to Russify *itself*... long before 1917". The two Russophile scenarios then converge, and say that the Donbas became part of the territory of modern Ukraine only as a "gift from Lenin" in 1921, and the fact that a policy of "Ukrainianization" was needed at all demonstrated the tenuous connections of the region with Ukraine. Post World War II "Russification" simply restored the status quo of 1917! The state symbols (blue-yellow flag and trident) are not traditional to Ukraine, but were imported into the Donbas "on the bayonets of the German-Haidamack [Ukrainian nationalist] army" in 1918, etc., etc. – ending up, in some cases, with the denial of the very existence of the Ukrainian language.

For the most part, however, the modern "Russophile" arguments, as summarised by Wilson, stop short of the old denials of the very existence of a separate Ukrainian ethnos or language. Their aim has rather been to push the boundaries of historical Ukrainian interest as far west as possible, creating, in effect, "the ideological basis for a movement for regional autonomy or even separatism in the Donbas". The issues and arguments are emotive, and poten-

tially politically explosive. Sober historical research is unlikely to refute them among those whose own, personal agenda, favours a break with Kyiv, since, as Wilson notes, "[t]he power of a historical myth... has little to do with actual historical truth". Sober academic research is, indeed, vitally necessary – but the immediate, political issues will be conditioned by perceived "myth". And for any observer of this "struggle for hearts and minds" in the Donbas, Wilson's survey and extensive bibliography is an invaluable guide.

The Catholic World Report, June 1995, Vol. 5, No. 6 (Ignatius Press, Harrison, NY)

This high-quality (if somewhat pricy – $4.75 a copy) Catholic journal devotes some 20% of its contents to "World Watch", a round-up of world news which has a religious or church-related dimension. The current "World Watch" contains a lengthy note on the visit of President Leonid Kuchma to the Vatican in May, during which he told the Pope that for him to visit Ukraine next year would "split" rather than "unite" the nation. Ukrainian Catholics had hoped for a Papal visit as the high-point of celebrations marking the 400th anniversary of the Union of Brest which established the Ukrainian Catholic Church. According to "World Watch", "Ukrainian Catholics are naturally disappointed, but at least can understand the president's motives. Far more distressing for them is the attitude of certain Vatican officials who also oppose the visit – saying that it would have an adverse effect on relations between the Holy See and the Russian Orthodox Church". □

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Current Events

Ukrainian-Americans and the 1990 Census: Some Demographic Considerations

Duane Gory

In the book *The Ukrainian Americans*, Myron Kuropas writes of three major Ukrainian migrations to the United States.[1] The first immigration began in the 1870s and was composed mostly of individuals from the Austro-Hungarian empire – the Carpatho-Ukraine region, as well as the provinces of Galicia and Bukovina. Many of these immigrants came seeking opportunities to earn money, and then return to the homeland.[2] Nevertheless, America often became their permanent residence. It has been estimated that 284,400 Ukrainians emmigrated to the United States between the years 1899 and 1909.[3]

The second immigration occurred between the two World Wars, and consisted, in the main, of immigrants from western Ukraine, then under Polish rule. The number of Ukrainians entering the United States during this period was much less than in the first immigration, due to the discriminatory entry policies of the United States, which applied strict entry quotas towards eastern and southern Europeans. These quotas were established in proportion to the national origins of the entire US population in 1890. This methodology of setting quotas severely affected Ukrainians, since they did not form a separate category in 1890 and quotas were awarded to countries (not nationalities) in existence following World War I.[4]

The third immigration occurred in the aftermath of World War II and consisted mainly of displaced persons resisting forced repatriation to Ukraine which was now completely under Soviet domination. The vehicle of entry for these Ukrainian refugees was the Displaced Persons Act of 1948, which opened America's borders to a fixed number of displaced persons from Europe. Approximately 70,000 Ukrainians gained admission to the United States through the Displaced Persons Act.[5] This final wave of Ukrainian immigration to the US was completed in the early 1950s, when the refugee resettlement programmes were wound up.

Thus, in a little over a century, there have been three principal waves of Ukrainian immigration to America. The tables which follow represent an attempt to quantify how many Americans today are of Ukrainian ancestry, on the basis of the data collected in the 1990 Census of the United States Population. It will be seen that the Ukrainian-American population is relatively concentrated in a few states, and that within some states, the Ukrainian-American population is centred around certain metropolitan areas.

[1] Myron B. Kuropas, *The Ukrainian Americans*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991.
[2] Ibid, p. 14.
[3] Ibid, p. 25.
[4] Ibid, p. 132.
[5] Ibid, p. 404.

1990 Census of the United States Population

The 1990 Census of the United States Population was conducted by the United States Census Bureau in April, 1990. Each housing unit in the United States received one of two versions of the Census questionnaire: a short-form questionnaire containing population and housing questions; or a long-form questionnaire which included additional questions, for example, the respondent's income. Long-form questionnaires were only sent to a sample of all US housing units.

The long-form questionnaire contained a question on ancestry. Specifically, respondents were requested to state their ancestry or ethnic origin. Results from the long-form questionnaire (a sample of US housing units) were projected to the population as a whole and published in the *1990 Census of the Population, Supplementary Reports, Detailed Ancestry Groups for States* (hereafter the 1990 Census).[6] This publication was the source of data for this article, unless otherwise noted.

The Number of Ukrainian-Americans

Being a nation of immigrants, large numbers of Americans are of mixed ethnic heritage. Recognising that many Americans do not identify with a single ancestry group, the US Census Bureau allowed respondents to identify a maximum of two ancestries as their ethnic origin. For example, an individual might classify himself as Ukrainian-Polish. In this case, the individual is counted in the 1990 Census ancestry data as both Ukrainian and Polish. Census Bureau terminology labels Ukrainian as the first ancestry reported, while Polish is labelled as the second. Census respondents listing a single ancestry were solely classified in the identified ethnic group.

Table 1 shows the number of Ukrainian-Americans reported by the 1990 Census. These figures represent a conflation of the data on first and second reported ancestry. One should note here that not all Americans with ancestry from the Ukrainian ethno-national area classified themselves as Ukrainian. Instead, many individuals reported themselves as Carpath (Carpatho) Rusyn or Ruthenian, reflecting the separate self-identification maintained by these two groups. Additionally, the classification of Ukrainian in Table 1 is an aggregation of individuals who identified their ancestry as Ukrainian, Little Russian, Lemkian, Boiko, and Husel (Hutsul).[7]

Furthermore, the number of Ukrainian-Americans given in Table 1 may include various sources of error. First of all, ancestry data was obtained from a sample of all US housing units, and hence there is, inevitably, a certain sampling error.[8] Another potential source of inaccuracies is the loss of awareness of ethnic identity. The first major wave of Ukrainian immigration to America began in the 1870s, over one hundred years ago. Since that time, Ukrainian immigrants and subsequent offspring have assimilated into mainstream American culture. This assimila-

[6] United States Bureau of the Census, *Detailed Ancestry Groups for States (1990 CP-S-1-2)*, Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1992.

[7] Ibid, p. G-6.

[8] A description of the errors in the 1990 Census data can be found in: US Bureau of the Census, *Ancestry of the Population in the United States*, Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, p. C-2.

Ethnic Classification	Number of persons in 1990*
Carpath Rusyn	7,602
Ruthenian	3,776
Ukrainian	740,803
Total	752,181

*First and second ancestry reported.

Table 1. Number of Americans with ancestry from the Ukrainian ethno-national area.

tion has been enhanced by inter-group marriages with individuals of different ancestral backgrounds. It is likely that, through the generations, many assimilated Ukrainian-Americans have lost their awareness or interest in their Ukrainian heritage. Thus, many Americans of Ukrainian ancestry probably failed to identify themselves as Ukrainian in the 1990 Census.

Finally, misclassification of ancestry could have caused inaccuracies in the Ukrainian-American data. Depending on an individual's ethnic awareness and time of immigration, a Ukrainian might well have classified himself as something other than Ukrainian. For example, many Ukrainian immigrants at the turn of the century characterised themselves as Russians.[9] This factor of ethnic miscalculation is particularly relevant for Ukrainians, since the Ukrainian lands were ruled for hundreds of years by other ethnic groups. Thus, a Ukrainian may have easily considered himself to be a Russian, Austrian, or a Pole.

Concentration of the Ukrainian-American Population

Examination of the 1990 Census data reveals that the Ukrainian-American population was highly concentrated in several states. Table 2 gives the ten states with the largest number of Ukrainian-Americans, listed in descending order. It should be noted that Table 2 includes only individuals who identified their ethnic identity as Ukrainian, Little Russian, Lemkian, Boiko, or Husel. Table 2 also gives the number of Ukrainian-Americans in each state as a percentage of all Ukrainian-Americans. The ten states listed in Table 2 accounted for 78.6 per cent of the total 1990 Ukrainian-American population. The Table shows that over 50 per cent of the 1990 Ukrainian-American population resided in four states: Pennsylvania, New York, New Jersey, and California.

Pennsylvania had the largest Ukrainian-American population for a single state in 1990, accounting for 17.5 per cent of all Ukrainian-Americans. The number of Ukrainian-Americans in New York State (16.3%) was only slightly lower than Pennsylvania. Together, these two states account for over one-third of all Ukrainian-Americans.

Table 2 also shows a high concentration of Ukrainian-Americans in three northeastern states. The States of New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut contained 29.5

[9] Kuropas, op. cit., pp. 13-14.

State	Number of Ukrainian-Americans in 1990*	As a percentage of all 1990 Ukrainian-Americans
Pennsylvania	129,753	17.5
New York	121,113	16.3
New Jersey	73,935	10
California	56,211	7.6
Michigan	43,914	5.9
Ohio	43,569	5.9
Illinois	38,414	5.2
Florida	33,792	4.6
Connecticut	23,711	3.2
Massachusetts	17,500	2.4

*First and second ancestry reported.

Table 2. Ten states with largest number of Ukrainian-Americans.

per cent of all Ukrainian-Americans. A large portion of this Ukrainian-American population is located in the New York City metropolitan area, as will be shown below.

Table 3 lists the ten metropolitan areas containing the largest number of Ukrainian-Americans in 1990.[10] Once again, Table 3 lists only persons who identified their ethnic ancestry as Ukrainian, Little Russian, Lemkian, Boiko, or Husel. Except for the Scranton and Allentown Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSA), all other urban areas in Table 3 are Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Areas (CMSA). A MSA is an area that contains a city with at least 50,000 inhabitants, or an urbanised area of at least 50,000 residents that includes outlying areas with a total population of at least 100,000.[11] A CMSA is a metropolitan complex that contains at least 1 million people.[12]

Table 3 indicates that the New York-Northern New Jersey-Long Island CMSA had the greatest number of Ukrainian-Americans of any CMSA. The 123,623 Ukrainian-Americans in the New York CMSA exceeded the total number of Ukrainian-Americans located in the whole of New York State. This apparent

[10] Data comes via internet from the US Bureau of the Census. Extracts taken through a utility called *1990 Census Lookup*.

[11] US Department of Commerce, *Statistical Abstract of the United States 1991*, Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1991, p. 904.

[12] Ibid, p. 904.

paradox was due to the fact that Northern New Jersey is included in the New York CMSA. The number of Ukrainian-Americans in the New York CMSA was 63 per cent of the total number of Ukrainian-Americans in the states of New Jersey and New York combined. The number of Ukrainian-Americans in the New York CMSA was more than twice that of the next largest CMSA (Philadelphia-Wilmington-Trenton).

Some of the states in Table 2 had Ukrainian-American populations that were very concentrated, which can be readily seen in Table 3. In Michigan, 77 per cent of the state's Ukrainian-Americans were located in the Detroit-Ann Arbor CMSA. The Cleveland CMSA was home to 56 per cent of Ohio's Ukrainian-

Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Area	Number of Ukrainian-Americans in 1990*
New York-Northern New Jersey-Long Island	123,623
Philadelphia-Wilmington-Trenton	58,767
Chicago-Gary-Lake County (IL)	37,720
Detroit-Ann Arbor	33,693
Pittsburgh-Beaver Valley	29,437
Los Angeles-Anaheim-Riverside	28,422
Cleveland-Akron-Lorain	24,580
Scranton-Wilkes Barre+	14,471
San Francisco-Oakland-San Jose	14,330
Allentown-Bethlehem-Easton+	13,668

* Includes individuals classified as Ukrainian, Little Russian, Lemkian, Boiko, or Husel
+ Denotes Metropolitan Statistical Area.
Source: US Bureau of the Census (see footnote 10).

Table 3. Ten Metropolitan Areas with largest number of Ukrainian-Americans.

Americans, while half of California's Ukrainian-Americans resided in the Los Angeles CMSA. A high percentage of the Ukrainian-Americans in Illinois were located in the Chicago CMSA, but the exact percentage cannot be determined due to the inclusion of Gary (Indiana) in the Chicago CMSA data.

This heavy concentration of the Ukrainian-American population follows a settlement pattern established during the first immigration. At the turn of the century, the United States experienced a period of rapid industrial growth. Much of this industrial expansion occurred in America's north-eastern cities. In order to

find employment in the booming factories, Ukrainian immigrants flocked to the US north-east. Since the first immigration, Ukrainian-Americans have proved to be not particularly mobile. In 1930, 61 per cent of all Ukrainian-Americans lived in the States of New York, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey.[13] By 1990, the percentage of Ukrainian-Americans residing in these same three states declined modestly to 43.8 per cent.

As shown in Tables 2 and 3, Ukrainian-Americans are also highly concentrated in several mid-western states. Similar to the American north-east, this concentration is a legacy of Ukrainian migration to the industrialised cities of this region in search of jobs. Ukrainians often found employment in the steel mills and factories of cities such as Detroit, Cleveland, and Chicago. It is interesting to observe in Table 2 the large concentration of Ukrainian-Americans in California and Florida. These concentrations have been attributed to individuals choosing these two states as locations for retirement.[14]

Overall, the settlement pattern of Ukrainian immigrants to the United States differed greatly from Ukrainian migration to Canada and South America. In the US, Ukrainians gravitated to the job-producing urban areas. This resulted in a Ukrainian-American population that is highly urbanised. In contrast, Ukrainian settlement in Canada and South America centred on rural areas – apparently due to the great availability of cheap land in those countries.[15] □

[13] *Harvard Encyclopedia of American Ethnic Groups*, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1980, p. 999.

[14] Ibid, p. 999.

[15] Ibid.

Ukraine and NATO

Serhiy Pyrozhkov
Volodymyr Chumak

A prominent characteristic of the present geopolitical situation in Europe is the increase in the attention to Ukraine as a state, on which the stability or instability of the central and eastern regions of the continent depends, and will continue to depend, ever more and more. This statement is no exaggeration. Its validity is underscored by relevant changes in the official policy of virtually every country involved in European affairs, and is corroborated by expert analysts.

In contrast to the first two years of Ukraine's independence, members of NATO today unanimously agree that the survival of Ukraine in the long-term concurs with their interests. Prominent political scientist Zbigniew Brzezinski, who carefully monitors the course of events in the post-Soviet space, recently named Ukraine among the active participants in the process of the creation of a system of European security.

Convincing evidence of Ukraine's growing importance in European affairs is provided by, for example, the "Partnership and Cooperation Agreement" currently awaiting ratification, as well as the recent decision by NATO on the particular importance of its relations with Ukraine, the visit to Ukraine by the head of NATO's Military Committee, Field Marshal Sir Richard Vincent, and the subsequent visits of two Ukrainian delegations to NATO headquarters.

The increased attention to the role of Ukraine in the region is completely objective. The main factors here are well known and remain unchanged. They include: its geographical position (the centre of Europe), the size of its population (nearly 52 million people), its neutrality (Ukraine, for the time being, does not participate in any military-political structures).

Ukraine is separated from the West by the states of central Europe, which form a "buffer zone", although more commonly this concept is associated with Ukraine itself, which separates the "old" Europe from the Russian Federation. In the south, across the Black Sea, Ukraine opens up a door to the Middle East and the Mediterranean.

Although this is common knowledge, it has taken on a new meaning in the light of recent events. In striving to achieve their final goal of complete integration into European economic, political and military structures as quickly as possible, the central European countries regard Ukraine as a natural shield against their main perceived threat – an unstable Russian Federation with imperialist ambitions. In this respect, the central European states, naturally, make unambiguous proposals for a more active support for their pro-Western course, since they understand that in the transitional period, apart from a fairly large and well-armed Ukraine, they will have no other protector from the threat from the East.

Similarly, the political élites of the West gradually are losing their over-rosy illusions about the democratic changes and reforms they wanted to see in the

Russian Federation. Together with these illusions, their hopes that the Russian Federation would guarantee stability on the territory of the former Soviet Union are also fading. The Western media and research institutions are becoming critical of the "Russian way", as exemplified by the military conflict with its own parliament, the dubious "peacekeeping" operations in Nagorny Karabakh, Georgia, Moldova, and Tajikistan, the artificial aggravation of the situation in Crimea and the Baltic states, the growing popularity and influence on political decision-making of the national-chauvinists (e.g. Vladimir Zhirinovskiy) and the appearance on the political scene of "no-nonsense" military figures (General Aleksandr Lebed), and instances of opposition to the UN peacekeeping efforts in former Yugoslavia. The most alarming facts include the incident at the December, 1994 OSCE summit in Budapest, where President Yeltsin warned, for the first time, of the possibility of the return of Europe to the "Cold War", and the events in Chechnya, where the Russian Federation demonstrated its lack of any arguments except force.

These changes in the policy of the Russian nuclear superstate have led to a substantial reappraisal by the West of Ukraine's position in the European security system.

Firstly, in view of the size and military potential of Ukraine and the Russian Federation, maintaining and developing peaceful, mutually advantageous relations between them is considered by the West to be one of the main conditions for stability in Europe.

Secondly, the West considers that changes for the better in Ukraine will have a positive effect on its north-eastern neighbour. Furthermore, the strengthening of Ukraine as an independent state will be not only a counterbalance to the re-establishment of Russian hegemony, but will also relieve the West of some of its "worries" about the threat to the countries of central Europe.

Thirdly, the absence of social unrest in Ukraine and the steps towards reform taken by its new leadership, as compared to the growing instability and uncertainties in the Russian Federation, should spur the business and banking circles of leading Western states (particularly Germany) to make appropriate changes in defining their priorities, and in the granting of concessions and privileges. This is a powerful catalyst for positive political steps on their part towards Ukraine.

An analysis of the current foreign political relations of the Russian Federation (and particularly the trends of its most recent political actions), enables us to draw two important conclusions.

Firstly, in spite of all the efforts of the Russian Federation to be considered as the "USSR Mark-2", the West no longer accepts this view. The military débâcle in Chechnya froze consideration of the Russian Federation's application for membership in the Council of Europe, promoted a further growth in scepticism regarding Russia's military power, and, at the same time, increased disquiet about nuclear security and the prospect of general chaos. Indirect evidence of this is the long-awaited credit from the International Monetary Fund, which the Russian Federation finally received (albeit in a fairly humiliating form). This credit, experts consider, was the result of Western fears of cataclysms in Russia in the event of aid being refused; it was unable, however, to produce any substantial improvement in the economic situation.

Secondly, the Russian Federation, which wished to establish its position and realised that it was impossible to achieve the level of recognition it wanted in the "far abroad", launched a brutal struggle for leadership in the "near abroad". (In passing, we may note that this essentially humiliating terminology, which was introduced by Russian politicians and the Russian media, and thoughtlessly picked up in the newly independent states, has been used significantly less in recent months). At the same time, attempts are being made to spread disinformation world-wide to distort the image of other post-Soviet states. This, in the first instance, concerns Ukraine. We may cite here some significant recent examples: the attempts by Russia to halt the extremely important process of Ukraine's accession to GATT and the World Trade Organization and the proposal to recognise Ukraine as a debtor country, for instance.

In response to the increasingly apparent centrifugal tendencies within the Russian Federation, the Russian leadership adopted a policy of the active "gathering in of the lands". This, in the first place, concerns the three Slav republics of the former USSR, which, according to this theory, have to be gathered in to the orbit of Moscow, and will serve as the future nucleus of the reborn superstate. To persuade Ukraine to accept this view is one of the current principal goals of Russia's politicians.

The methods to be used include the tried and tested intervention in Crimea, the delays in the division of the Black Sea Fleet, manipulation of Ukraine's dependence on Russian oil and gas, and, in particular, the persistent attempts to draw Ukraine into a military-political alliance, to construct a common "external" border and to make the "internal" borders "transparent", to change the customs system in favour of the Russian Federation, and to re-establish economic cooperation (including arms production).

Despite the wide range of the above measures, they have a common and essentially political goal. Moreover, the situation is especially dangerous since its long-term aims are covert. Here one may note the statement of Brzezinski to the effect that there is a consensus among the Russian political élite that in the end Ukraine will be subordinated to the Kremlin.

In Russia today, a wide-spread and vocal campaign has been launched to unite around the idea of "Great Russia" "patriotic" forces of every hue, particularly those who have any relation to the power structures and the military-industrial complex. For example, on 21 February, 1995, a new movement – the "Russian Military Brotherhood" – emerged. This is an alliance of over twenty "founders", including the Russian Association of Reserve Officers, the Club of Generals and Admirals, the Foreign Intelligence Veterans' Association, the State Security Club, the Cossack Brotherhood, and the Moscow Patriarchate. Significantly, the Russian Union of Industrialists and Businessmen have pledged their material support. Its aims include lobbying the government and parliament of the Russian Federation, and participating in the elections. It is not difficult to guess the type of candidates this bloc will nominate and the goals they will aim for.

All this demands from Ukraine a well thought-out position. The problem is that Ukraine, which lies at the cross-roads of the conflicting interests of major

political forces, needs not only to work out its own policy, but above all to use and stay ahead of events. Only then can it avoid the unacceptable role of a pawn in the "East–West" or "North–South" geopolitical games, and can gradually build up its position in Europe as an influential player. This must be the principal strategic goal of Ukraine's foreign policy.

All this shows that the situation in Europe is far from stable, and hence detrimental both to Ukraine and to all other European states. Hence Ukraine should not only vocally support the creation of an effective European security system, but should also play an active part in the development of the appropriate mechanisms. Ukraine's official position on this issue coincides with that of the west European states, as is indicated by numerous declarations by their representatives. Today, Western interests lie not so much in achieving the security of an individual state, as in the creation of a universal security system. Such a system, in particular, must ensure the internal stability of every country, and provide for the establishment of bilateral partnerships between neighbouring states, reinforced by appropriate treaties, cooperation in the sphere of economics, politics, ecology, culture, etc., a change of direction and emphasis in the activities of existing European structures and, where necessary, the creation of new ones.

Of the structures already in existence, one must consider, first and foremost, NATO – the most powerful military-political organisation, which Europeans undoubtedly regard as the prime base of a future security system.

In view of the pressing need to establish the political image of Ukraine as a state whose strategic priorities include a return to European values, its relations with NATO need to be clearly defined. For this purpose, it is important to analyse the principal current problems and strategic plans of NATO in the present state of European security.

In his address at the opening of the NATO seminar on questions of public opinion in January, 1995, Secretary-General Willy Claes described the three major problems facing NATO today – peacekeeping in Bosnia, relations with the Russian Federation, and expansion to the east.

The somewhat inconclusive use of NATO military forces in the former Yugoslavia has led many Western analysts to the view that it would be undesirable for NATO to attempt to intervene in armed conflicts in countries of the former Soviet Union. Hereto, we may note a certain de-emphasis of European affairs by the USA, since, in its opinion, Europe has ceased to be an "arena of world conflict". European affairs, the USA considers, should be resolved by the Europeans themselves.

Although in 1991-93 both NATO and the United States considered the continuous existence of the Russian Federation as a sovereign state in its present composition to be a *sine qua non*, today its disintegration is accepted as a possibility. Both scenarios are considered to be dangerous, but no final decision has been reached on which is the more likely.

Present Western policy towards the Russian Federation may be described as one of "moderate pressure". Russia continues to be recognised by NATO as one of the significant components of the "landscape of security" in Europe. In

relations between NATO and Russia, the aspiration to develop closer contacts predominates. Thus, on 1 December, 1994, during the meeting between the Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation, Andrei Kozyrev, and members of the North-Atlantic Council, held under the scheme "16 + 1", in addition to discussions of the individual programme of cooperation between NATO and the Russian Federation within the "Partnership for Peace" initiative, a document was reviewed which envisaged the accelerated development of relations between them outside the programme of the "Partnership". In the meantime, NATO excludes the possibility of building relationships with Russia based on the "spheres of influence" principle. It is taking a fairly stern line to rebuff attempts by the Russian Federation to influence any NATO decisions (e.g., at last year's Budapest Summit of the OSCE).

Regarding the expansion of NATO, according to Secretary-General Willy Claes, no fundamental agreements for this have yet been formed. However, during the January, 1994 Brussels NATO summit, it was stressed that "it [expansion] has to become a part of the process of evolution and will be realised, taking into account political realities and the situation regarding the security of Europe as a whole". At the meeting of the North-Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) on 1 December, 1994, foreign ministers of the NATO member-states directly connected the question of its expansion with an overall system of European security. It is expected that the next meeting (1995) of the North Atlantic Council* will review possible strategies of expanding NATO and the fundamental principles to be adhered to in this regard. The possible consequences of the acceptance into NATO of new members will also be reviewed.

The strategic plans of NATO are directed towards the adaptation of the organisation to new conditions of building a security system. Experience of peacekeeping in the last few years, particularly in Bosnia, has spurred NATO to initiate the concepts of a Rapid Reaction Force. Its major goal is to have at its disposal well-trained and highly-mobile forces capable of rapid reaction to any unforeseen situations. New in principle is the concept that NATO foresees the possibility of placing these forces at the disposal of the Western European Union (WEU), if under certain conditions it sees it as expedient to keep out of direct action. It considers that giving the WEU armed formations, which "can be assigned, but are not separated from NATO", will provide an effective response to new challenges to European security.

The military concept of the establishment of the Rapid Reaction Force is linked to the political initiative of NATO, aimed at improving the structure of relations of NATO with the WEU. It is considered that this will have a considerable significance for the NATO of the future, since it will enable the European part of the organisation to be strengthened and give it the ability to take on a greater responsibility for the resolution of security problems in Europe.

* The North Atlantic Cooperation Council consists of the representatives of the 16 NATO countries plus the 22 ex-Soviet and ex-Warsaw Pact states. The North Atlantic Council is the political body of NATO, consisting of the foreign ministers of the 16 NATO countries.

One of NATO's most important strategic goals is to find ways of preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Hence the fact that Ukraine voluntarily renounced its nuclear weapons is a serious argument in its search for privileges and special status in its relations with NATO.

The new tendency in NATO policy – to devote greater attention to "non-traditional" regions – the Mediterranean, the South and the East – appears greatly attractive for Ukraine. Willy Claes has indicated that NATO today is prepared to establish contacts with the countries of regions which continue to cause it concern. Ukraine is "bounded" to the south by the Black Sea, which is joined to the Mediterranean by a strait, which brings it closer to the potential danger zone. In view of this situation, and also its intrinsic significance, Ukraine has the potential to be an important political partner of NATO in this respect.

Ukraine couples the strategic perspective of its national security with membership in the European security system, and for this reason it will have actively to develop relations with NATO as the most effective component of this system. Thus it is already understood that the NACC will form the fundamental base of the structure of this nascent security system. As an inseparable part of Europe, Ukraine must move gradually towards the development of dialogue with NATO. The staging-points along this path are participation in the "Partnership for Peace" programme and membership in the political structures of NATO. In this way, the process of NATO's eastward expansion will not contradict Ukraine's strategic goals.

However, Ukraine's readiness for closer cooperation with NATO demands, in view of external conditions, a consensus with the position of the Alliance regarding new members. This was clearly spelt out recently by the NATO Secretary-General, who said, "...We do not need consumers of security. We need countries which can share the risks, responsibilities and all the financial obligations of a full member".

Ukraine, which has voluntarily renounced its nuclear weapons and consciously agrees with the expansion of NATO's zone of responsibility to its own borders (despite the extremely negative reaction of the Russian Federation), has reason to expect from NATO a special attitude towards itself. Thus, in the event of unforeseen developments in the disintegrative processes in the Russian Federation, Ukraine might well be left as the only state on the territory of the former Soviet Union with sufficient influence to carry out the functions of a stabilising power.

In our opinion, Ukraine also has the right to expect greater support for its policy from the states of central Europe, which have an interest in the growth of Ukraine's political weight.

Ukraine has not only declared its sympathy towards the ideas of Atlantism, but has also demonstrated its readiness for cooperation. It was the first of the CIS countries officially to declare its wish to participate in the NATO "Partnership for Peace" programme. This step by the Ukrainian state was immediately noticed and applauded throughout Europe. Today, when NATO's interest in Ukraine is growing, Ukraine should persistently nurture its efforts within the

"Partnership for Peace" programme, and also extend cooperation with such Atlantic structures as the NACC, the NATO Scientific Committee, the newly-formed Committee for Standardization, etc.

One must note, however, that the process of cooperation between Ukraine and NATO will not be easy, in view of the very rigid position of the Russian Federation. Already the Russian Foreign Minister, Andrei Kozyrev, during his visits abroad has started making energetic attempts to condition the leaders of west European states to thinking of the eastward expansion of NATO as undesirable. Simultaneously, in one form or other, pressure is also being applied to countries of the former Socialist bloc and the CIS to renounce their intention of joining NATO and other European structures. As regards Ukraine, this pressure takes the form of delays in the division of the Black Sea Fleet, the fostering of separatist sentiments in Crimea, blackmail in the supply of energy carriers, etc.

There are no grounds to expect any substantial changes in imperialist sentiments in Moscow, let alone their complete renunciation. There is a growing threat that chauvinist leaders will come to power in Moscow, who see Ukraine only as a component of the Russian Federation. Hence, for Ukraine to maintain its independence, it needs to establish closer links with NATO, particularly since there are now signs of a certain relaxation of the latter's position concerning the acceptance of new members. The fact that, in the economic and military spheres, Ukraine is not yet ready for large-scale cooperation with NATO nor capable of shouldering the whole burden of appropriate responsibilities, is another matter.

Hence conducting a flexible, dynamic policy with regard to NATO, based on a precise knowledge of the processes and tendencies of their course, is an important factor in the strengthening of Ukraine's national security, and a reliable guarantee that threats to its independence will be impossible. □

UKRAINE AND WWII

The High Price of Liberation: The Return of Soviet Occupation to Western Ukraine

Zynoviya Sluzhynska

Although World War II ended in 1945, hostilities continued in western Ukraine until 1952. The NKVD made war on the civilian population, and carried out a policy of genocide. The Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) made war on the NKVD; it defended the Ukrainian people and territory against the Soviet occupation forces.

The conflict began long before the end of the war – in March, 1944. The Central State Archives of the October Revolution of the USSR contain valuable documentary evidence about the repression of families of members of the UPA. From the painstaking work on the archives carried out by M.F. Buhay,[1] we learn that in March, 1944, by order of the NKVD of the USSR, the families of UPA members and of convicted members of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) were all registered, and liable to deportation. In the course of 20 days in March, 1944, the "Aeneas", "Black Raven" and "Oleh" insurgent groups were crushed. There were 65 NKVD operations; 9,624 insurgents were captured, and 734 UPA officers were killed. At the beginning of April, 1944, 2,000 families of members of the OUN were exiled. All this was carried out under the direction of Lavrentiy Beria. General I.A. Syerov reported to V.V. Chernyshov at the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs that the group was ready for deportation. By the end of 1945, some 16,200 family members had been moved to special (penal) settlements.

In the first years after the war, the NKVD campaign of terror against the indigenous population of western Ukraine did not stop. It took on a different character, and its thrust was in three directions: the abolition of the Greek-Catholic Church and its Christian-national influence, deportation of the civilian population, and the fragmentation and disorientation of the local population by setting up NKVD infiltration-provocation groups which operated in the guise of the UPA, sowing mistrust and hatred. A system of informers and agents was set up; these were given wide powers and guarantees of immunity.

The Abolition of the Greek-Catholic Church

On 11 April, 1945, the NKVD arrested the head of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church, Metropolitan Yosyf Slipyi, and all the Ukrainian Catholic bishops then in Galicia. They were taken to Kyiv and kept there in strict isolation. Eleven months later, in March, 1946, they were put on trial behind closed doors before

[1] M.F. Buhay, "Deportatsiya naselennya z Ukrayiny (30-50-ti roky)" (Deportation of the population from Ukraine, 1930s-50s), *Ukrayinskyi Istorychnyi Zhurnal*, 1990, No. 10.

a military tribunal and charged with "high treason" and "crimes against the state" for which they were sentenced to long terms of imprisonment.

The arrest of the hierarchy triggered a wave of arrests of priests and other religious. More than 2,000 monks and nuns were arrested and sent to strict-regime labour camps. Hundreds of priests were killed or sent to concentration camps. The remaining clergy were terrorised into abrogating the Union of Brest, renouncing their allegiance to the Pope and submitting to the jurisdiction of the Patriarch of Moscow. For this purpose, an "Initiative Committee", headed by Fr Havryil Kostelnyk, was set up. This convoked a spurious Church Council in Lviv (8-10 March, 1946), which was attended by only 216 out of about 2,500 priests and some members of the laity, without any of the bishops being present. Purporting to speak on behalf of the entire Church, this Council declared the Union of Brest invalid and announced the submission of the Church to the jurisdiction of the Patriarch of Moscow. This gave the Soviet authorities the pretext they needed to declare the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church illegal and to arrest those priests and faithful who refused to recognise the decisions of the Council.

Deportation

According to our calculations, the sum total of persons deported during the period 1944-52 amounts to 233,763. The sum total, but not an exact one, since the documents often give the number of families deported, not the number of persons.

Furthermore, there is no information for individual years, while the figures found in the archives do not coincide with the data of the Committee for State Security (KGB). Wolodymyr Kosyk[2] indicates two mass deportations after the war: October, 1947 (300,000 persons) and March-April, 1949 (200,000 persons). Some evacuations from the areas in which the UPA and the underground were operating, went on even later, but on a lesser scale. In all, during the post-war period, some 600-800,000 persons were deported.

Over the entire period of the UPA's campaign against the Nazi occupation and the Stalinist terror (1943-53), thousands of people sympathised with and supported the activities of the UPA, but themselves never took part in insurgent groups. The fight against the occupation forces encompassed the entire nation. Without the support of the local population, the existence of military detachments would have been impossible; the latter needed food, clothing, medicines. For ten years, the UPA groups received all necessary support from the local population. The NKVD classified those who supported the UPA as "accessories of the enemies of the people". Thus, among the 233,763 deportees, there were members of the OUN who took part directly in UPA groups, sympathisers who provided help to the OUN, and their family members, and family members of the insurgents. These categories figure in the reports of the leaders of the NKVD and people's commissariats of internal affairs who received the deportees at their final points of exile. According to the archives, over the entire period, 205,561 persons

[2] W. Kosyk, *Ukrayina i Nimechchyna u Druhiy svitoviy viyni* (Ukraine and Germany in the Second World War), Paris-New York-Lviv, 1993.

were sent into exile, and 198,883 arrived at their destination.[3] Simple arithmetic gives a difference of 6,678 – did these perish on the way? Most probably, they could not endure the harsh conditions of hunger, cold and disease – they perished in the goods' wagons or at transfer points. The archives have still not been studied in full and the fate of these unfortunates remains unknown.

By the middle of the 1950s, out of the 198,883 in the special settlements only 133,659 remained.[4] Conditions in the special settlements were very harsh: punitive physical labour in exhausting and unaccustomed climatic conditions (the sites of the special settlements were Norilsk, Tyumen, Khabarovsk, Karaganda, Chita, Arkhangelsk), and poor nutrition led to exhaustion. The death rate was very high (16 per cent). Between 1946 and the middle of the 1950s, the population of the special settlements fell by 65,224; almost one third of them perished.

In 1957, during Khrushchev's "Thaw", there returned to Ukraine, according to the archives, 65,534 persons, of whom 20,043 had been participants in the OUN movement, 22,497 were OUN-UPA "accessories", and 911 were family members of the "accessories".[5] Out of the total number of those exiled for participation in or sympathising with the UPA, two thirds did not return. The fate of 140,027 persons is unknown. How many of them perished, and how many of them remained outside Ukraine is likewise unknown. If we further take into account the 28,202 persons exiled for a "parasitic way of life" in the countryside[6] (205,561 + 28,202 = 233,763), then the fate of 168,229 persons (233,763 - 65,534 = 168,229) remains unknown. The number of deportees remaining outside Ukraine is considerably higher, since many of those repressed after the 1939 "liberation" never returned.

Geography of the Resettlement of Ukrainians from Western Ukraine

Tagan, the deputy chief of the NKVD in the Irkutsk oblast, in December, 1944, stated that 3,695 members of the OUN and their families had been resettled in the region. As the military-NKVD operations expanded, the contingent of exiles constantly grew. By the end of 1945, 16,200 Ukrainians (including 12,700 from the families of OUN members) had been sent to the special settlements: 3,608 to the Komi ASSR, 2,060 to the Krasnoyarsk territory, 4,773 to the Arkhangelsk oblast, 1,259 to the Kirov oblast, 5,464 to the Molotov oblast, and 2,900 to the Tyumen oblast.[7] In 1945, the greatest concentration of OUN members was in the neighbourhood of Norilsk.

The next resettlements were in 1946, according to the data of the Department of Special Settlements of the NKVD USSR: 2,407 families of OUN members (6,274 persons), of whom 2,261 were fit for work, were sent to the Molotov oblast.[8]

In 1947, 10,316 families of OUN members (30,179 persons) were sent to the Kemerovo oblast; 2,433 families (7,180 persons) to the Chelyabinsk oblast; 3,055 families (7,122 persons) to the Karaganda oblast; 5,264 families (15,202 persons)

[3] M.F. Buhay, op. cit.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Ibid.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Ibid.

to the Omsk oblast; 65 families (1,691 persons) to the Krasnoyarsk territory. The overall number of deported families was 25,877, in all 74,799 persons.[9]

In 1949, 16 families (86 persons) were deported from the Yavoriv district of the Lviv oblast to the Tomsk oblast. On 4 August, 97 families (448 persons) were exiled to the Amur oblast (Tynda). In September, a further 1,236 persons were sent. During the same period, 1,007 OUN members and 164 "decree-breakers" were sent to Chita.[10] They were assigned to gold-mining work. In the middle of November, the first contingent of 235 exiles arrived.

On 11 February, 1952, there arrived in Tyumen 293 families of OUN members, totalling 1,057 persons, and in April a further group of 931 OUN members were sent there.[11]

In the middle of the 1950s, the total number of family members of OUN activists and their associates in the special settlements came to 133,659, and of kulaks and their families – 1,911 persons. These were distributed as follows: Kemerovo oblast – 22,624 persons; Khabarovsk territory – 19,703; Irkutsk oblast – 15,260; Krasnoyarsk territory – 13,613 persons; Omsk oblast – 10,152; Tomsk oblast – 7,881; Molotov oblast – 8,778; the Kazakh SSR – 7,721; Chelyabinsk oblast – 5,168; Amur oblast – 4,392; Tyumen oblast – 5,218; Chita oblast – 3,724; Arkhangelsk oblast – 3,257; Komi ASSR – 2,762; Yakutsk ASSR – 1,528; Udmurtia – 759; Maritime Territory – 757; elsewhere – 452.[12]

The Special Infiltration-Provocation Groups of the NKVD-MGB

Throughout 1944-53, attached to every district branch of the NKVD-MGB there were special groups which operated under the guise of the UPA or the UPA security service (SB UPA).

In March, 1945, the 60-man *provocateur* group "Bystryi" was set up which, for more than half a year, functioned in the guise of the SB UPA, as attested by the reports of State Security Major Sokolov, who commanded this group.

In the Rivne oblast, in May, 1944, the 35-man group "Orel" was set up. Under the command of B. Kornyakov, between May, 1944 and April, 1945, it killed 526 insurgents and detained 140 persons.[13]

In 1945, the head of the Yabluniv district branch of the MGB, Stanislaviv (now Ivano-Frankivsk) oblast arrested 89 young people (dates of birth 1928-31) and "created" a reserve youth squadron of the UPA. He wanted to fabricate a case, but 28 of them were set free; in January, 1946, 22 more were freed, and in April, 1946, a further 34 were released due to lack of evidence against them. In 1946, in the Stanislaviv oblast, a large number of people were detained in remand cells. Out of 3,092 persons, 2,023 were sent to prison without legal justification.[14]

[9] Ibid.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Ibid.

[13] I. Bilas, "Protystoyannya" (Resistance), *Literaturna Ukrayina*, No. 42-43, 29 October, 1992.

[14] Yu. Shapoval, "Skazaty vsyu pravdu" (To tell the whole truth), *Literaturna Ukrayina*, No. 39, 1 October, 1992.

The actions of the infiltration-provocation groups continued after the end of the war. In 1948, a group of the Khust branch of the MGB carried out 13 armed robberies in the guise of the OUN, without pity for those they robbed. In 1949, agents of the Turka MGB attacked the villager S. Lylo in the guise of the OUN and robbed his house (from report No. 582, 9 June, 1949, of the Minister of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR, Strokach, to Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR, Kruglov).

These are not isolated facts; they had an identical character and tactics in all oblasts of western Ukraine. The ferocity of the various bosses, under whose command these illegal actions were carried out, lead one to think that the NKVD-*nomenklatura* cadres were well aware of the inhuman tortures and criminal methods of the apparatus of repression. The strategy was worked out in advance, and the tactical "twists" had no effect on the assigned target. The victims of the "Sokolovs" and "Kornyakovs" were civilians, mainly the rural population – women and children. They perished as a result of the policy of provocation of the special detachments of the NKVD, which operated in the guise of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army.

In 1949, a report was sent to Khrushchev from Kosharskyi, the Military Procurator of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian district, "On the facts of the gross breaches of Soviet legality in the activity of the so-called special groups of the MGB". This throws new light on the confrontation of the UPA and the NKVD and cites instances of attacks on the peasants by special groups in the guise of the UPA: they beat them, robbed them, took their livestock, forced them to confess to various uncommitted crimes, to declare themselves helpers of the UPA, and then, on the denunciation of these same special troops, the local inhabitants were arrested. Once again the latter were beaten, tortured, threatened and forced to identify and denounce others. The plan for the destruction of the population was fulfilled. A number of named persons from various villages are cited as examples. The methods of provocation were the same everywhere. Here are some examples from Kosharskyi's report: in 1947, Stepan Stotskyi and Kateryna Dmytruk were arrested illegally. In order to find them guilty, they were "processed" by the MGB troops. The detainees "confessed" to crimes, that is, they were unable to stand up to physical torture and gave evidence against themselves. Following interrogation, Stotskyi was in the prison infirmary and the Lopatyn hospital from 22 September, 1947 to January, 1948. He was released in 1948, since there was no proof that he had committed any crimes, having, nevertheless, spent almost a year in prison.

M. Zatserkovna, "processed" by the special troops, under fear of being hanged and the effect of physical torture, confessed to being a member of the OUN. She was released after prolonged imprisonment. In September, 1948, an armed group came to F. Dembytskyi in the guise of the UPA. They forced him to collect 30 centners of grain. The peasants did not bring the grain. A few days later, the special troops came back and gave him an hour to collect the grain and to bring it to the appointed place. Dembytskyi loaded up three sacks of his own grain and delivered them. He was duly arrested in possession of grain allegedly intended for the UPA.

The report described robberies carried out against the local population by members of the NKVD-MGB. The robberies, coercion and forbidden procedures –

even killings – carried out by the special troops went unpunished. Even the Minister of the MGB, Savchenko, considered the robberies to be disgraceful: "The special troops must not be sent into the forest with preserved food. Their cover will be blown at once".[15]

Punitive Military Sub-Divisions of the NKVD-MGB against the Civilian Population

These subdivisions carried out police functions. In the spring of 1944, the total personnel in these NKVD-MGB sub-divisions in the western oblasts numbered 26,304; they were fully equipped with arms, ammunition and military hardware. In the Volhynia oblast, they numbered 5,285, in the Rivne oblast – 8,754, in the Lviv oblast – 6,525, in the Stanislaviv oblast – 1,328, in the Chernivtsi oblast – 1,355.[16] In addition, there were the 19th and 21st rifle brigades (2,278 and 2,953 persons respectively), the tank battalion of the 2nd motor-rifle division (163 persons), and five armoured trains (7,700 persons). The military strength was increased every post-war year, up to 1953, in order to the fight the OUN-UPA.

In the archives of Party history of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine (Central State Archive of Citizens' Organisations of Ukraine) there is information that, on 21 October, 1944, from the village of Kryvenky (Ternopil oblast) a group of 15 NKVD personnel evicted the families of OUN-UPA members. The local inhabitants defended themselves, and three of the NKVD were killed. The next day, 22 October, 60 NKVD entered the village. On the orders of one Major Polyanskyi and Second Lieutenant Moldovanov, the NKVD shot 10 villagers, aged between 60 and 80, and burned 45 houses with their possessions and the threshed grain. Among those who were shot were five family members of Red Army men who had not yet returned from the front, and who had been notified that their families had perished "at the hands of the Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists". Twenty of the burned homesteads belonged to Red Army men.[17]

On 25 October, 1944, in the village of Lyakhove (Volhynia oblast), an NKVD-man, Vorotnikov, together with four soldiers, surrounded the house of one Parfenyuk, informing the family that the householder had, allegedly, deserted from the Red Army. In the house was Parfenyuk's wife, and their two sons and three daughters, the youngest of whom was only three months old. At 20.00 hours, Vorotnikov forced his way into the house. When Mrs Parfenyuk replied that her husband was at the front, Vorotnikov shot her, one of the sons, and the three daughters, not sparing even the baby. Only the younger son escaped and later described what had happened. After that, Vorotnikov burned the house and barn. He reported to the regional centre that during the operation, "bandits" had fired at him from Parfenyuk's house. Later enquiries revealed that, at this time, Parfenyuk "was in the Red Army and had never deserted from it".

In the village of Smordove (Ternopil oblast), an NKVD group led by Shvab and Klymenko came to the house of the priest, Fr Prybytovskyi, and opened fire, setting the barn alight. They took the priest's wife, 11-year-old son, daugh-

[15] Shapoval, op. cit.
[16] Bilas, op. cit.
[17] Ibid.

ter and 70-year-old father into the yard, and made them kneel down in front of the burning barn. They then looted their property and valuables. After this, Klymenko took Fr Prybytovskyi aside and shot him.

In Mykytyntsi village (Stanislaviv oblast), a certain Lieutenant Lahoda deployed ambushes in three directions in order to discover and liquidate the insurgents. According to instructions, they were to go to houses which were showing a light, and to detain suspicious persons. One of the groups, led by M. Sotnikov, during this assignment, went to one such house, sat down at the table, drank a bottle of horilka (Vodka), and ordered the housewife to go out of the house, whereupon NKVD-man Butov tried to rape her 14-year-old daughter. The mother managed to protect the girl. Afterwards, the same group broke into the house of one Mykytyuk, identifying themselves as UPA. They smashed the windows, and threatened the householder with their guns. Butov took Mykytyuk's daughter into the lobby, where he beat her up and then raped her. The father, who tired to defend his daughter, was savagely beaten.

After that, once again identifying themselves as UPA troops (the entire group was without insignia), they went to the chairman of the Land Board, V. Orynyak, and together with him to the secretary of the village council. They threatened to hang the two of them. The secretary was not at home, although his wife was. Orynyak was ordered to discover how many Red Army men there were in Mykytyntsi, and if he did not come up with an answer by the next day, he would be hanged. For encouragement, they beat him with their rifle-butts. The wife of the secretary of the village council, A. Kornyat, was raped, first by Butov, then by Sotnikov, then by Stepanov.

These were not isolated incidents, but were of a general nature. In the course of 11 months, repressive measures were carried out in respect of 443,960 persons, of whom 103,313 were killed and 15,058 arrested.[18]

In all the oblasts of western Ukraine, the NKVD used identical tactics against the civilian population: women, children, old men. The male population (of military age) at that time had been mobilised into the Red Army.

In 1946, the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of Ukraine gave permission for the number of troops in the liquidation battalions to be increased to 35,000. In the Volhynia oblast – 4,000; in the Lviv oblast – 6,000; in the Drohobych oblast – 5,000; in the Stanislaviv oblast – 7,000; in the Rivne oblast – 4,000; in the Ternopil oblast – 7,000; and in the Chernivtsi oblast – 2,000.[19]

The UPA archives on the activity of the NKVD punitive sub-divisions augment the picture of the destruction of the population of western Ukraine.

The punitive detachments of the NKVD carried out the instructions of the leadership on the destruction and neutralisation of the UPA, but in reality this was a strategy of destruction of the local population. From February, 1944 to January, 1945, in western Ukraine, 103,313 people were killed, 8,371 participants in the OUN and 15,058 active insurgents were arrested, and 266,261 deserters were detained. The total number of victims of repression was 443,960,[20] while the

[18] Act of transfer of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR from V. Ryasnyi to T. Strokach, 16 Janaury 1946.

[19] Shapoval, op. cit.

[20] Act of transfer of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR from V. Ryasnyi to T. Strokach, 16 Janaury 1946.

numerical strength of the UPA, over the whole period of the fight against the Nazis and the Soviet "liberators" from 1942 to 1952, did not exceed 200-300,000. According to Soviet data, in 1944, there were not more than 90,000 members of the UPA. Up to 1 January, 1945, the NKVD killed 103,313 persons. The question arises: whom did they kill? The NKVD went on with its battles and liquidations for a further six years. Obviously, they were destroying the civilian population.

From 22 July, 1944 to 20 July, 1947, in 12 districts of the Lviv oblast, 7,945 people were arrested, 2,319 were liquidated, and 3,618 sent to Siberia and the Donbas.[21]

In 1944-45, in the six months after the "liberation" of the western oblasts from the Nazis, the NKVD "neutralised" 124,336 persons, of whom 57,405 were killed and 95,931 were arrested.[22] During this period, 30,359 persons (12,117 families) were deported, and 55,000 OUN members were captured by the Soviet authorities.[23]

Reports on 84 villages in the Lviv and Drohobych oblasts record 25,245 repression operations in the course of 1,095 days.[24] This means that, on an average, every village suffered some incident initiated by the NKVD once a week. Apart from killings, torture, the burning of farms and beatings-up, the plundering of libraries and churches was carried out systematically over the three years from 22 July, 1944 to 20 July, 1947. Such was the psychological climate after the "liberation". One has to remember that 1946-47 were drought years. The rural population was obliged to supply work contingents beyond its capacity. Field work was unmechanised. Getting in the harvest was exhausting work, and moreover, the peasants shared their food with the thousands of starving people from the southern oblasts of Ukraine. The nights were frightening, with visitations from the infiltration-provocation groups of the NKVD.

Individual facts illustrate the activity of the punitive military groups. Information about the actions of the NKVD is taken from the de-classified Soviet archives[25] and also from the documents and archives of the UPA,[26] which contain a fair amount of numerical data. Nevertheless, neither set of figures gives a complete picture of the punitive operations of the NKVD-MGB and the deliberate state policy concerning the population of western Ukraine. To calculate the exact number of victims of these actions is impossible, and yet this is the duty of researchers in order to restore historical justice.

What is clear, however, is that the population of western Ukraine suffered a tragedy of unprecedented dimensions: in the course of 13 years, 48 per cent of its population, predominantly of reproductive age, was eliminated. □

[21] T. Chuprynka, "Do genezy Ukrayinskoyi Holovnoyi Vyzvolnoyi Rady" (On the genesis of the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council), *Litopys Ukrayinskoyi Povstanskoyi Armiyi*, Book 2, Vol. 9, Lviv, 1992.

[22] Kosyk, op. cit.

[23] Bilas, op. cit.

[24] Chuprynka, op. cit.

[25] Ibid.

[26] Ibid.

"No Ripe Plums": British Diplomatic Perceptions of Ukrainian Independence Movements, 1938-40

Vera Rich

In late 1938, after the Munich agreement, which transferred the Sudetenland from Czechoslovakia to the German Third Reich, and the subsequent Vienna Award, which transferred more Czechoslovak territory, including part of Carpatho-Ukraine, to Hungary, a number of west European and North American newspapers began to speculate that Hitler was planning to establish a "Greater Ukraine" as a client state of the Reich.[1] Some of these reports, although necessarily speculative, were fairly well informed, giving reasonably accurate accounts of the Ukrainian independence movements, and the economic benefits which Germany stood to gain from such a client state. Various more or less reasonable scenarios for Germany's future moves were proposed. The Diplomatic Correspondent of *The Manchester Guardian*,[2] for example, suggested that

> [t]he Germans are now seriously planning to treat Poland as they treated Czecho-Slovakia[3] and to promote the independence of the Polish Ukrainians. This would mean the dismemberment of Poland just as the annexation of the Sudetenland meant the dismemberment of Czecho-Slovakia... The establishment of an independent Ukraine within the present frontiers of Poland would be the prelude to carrying out the familiar plans which Hitler has for the dismemberment and colonisation of Russia. It would therefore seem that a German-Polish conflict could not occur without involving Russia. But the Germans, having observed the impotence of Russia during the recent crisis are convinced that Russia is incapable of going to war against a Great Power.

Although, as subsequent history was to show, Hitler's *Drang nach Osten* was to take a very different form, this scenario has considerably more geographical logic than that of the speculations of certain diplomats, who, as we shall see, envisaged that the Germans would attempt to detach the Ukrainian SSR from the Soviet Union, without first disposing of Poland.

Many of the articles in the more serious dailies and Sunday papers were well-supplied with statistics and maps, giving their contents an air of well-informed

[1] In fact, almost exactly a year earlier, on 5 November, 1937, Hitler had revealed to his leading political and military subordinates his plans for an eastern expansion, for *Lebensraum*, and to seize, in particular, the rich argricultural and mineral resources of Ukraine. But this was not to become known in the West until after the war. See Document 386-PS presented by the prosecution at the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg.

[2] *The Manchester Guardian*, 24 November, 1938.

[3] The correct new spelling. Until a week previously, it had been a punishable offence in Czechoslovakia to write the name of the country with a hyphen. But on 17 November, 1938, when the Bill for the Autonomy of Slovakia was presented to the National Assembly, the hyphen was introduced.

authority.[4] However, in mid-December, many of the same papers succumbed to fantasy: a visit from the Romanov pretender, the Grand Duke Vladimir, to Germany evoked suggestions that the Nazis were planning to install him as "Tsar" of Ukraine.[5] Vladimir, in fact, was simply paying a private visit to his cousin, Princess Maria of Leiningen, for Christmas, and denied any intention of conferring with the Nazi leadership.[6] However, the fact that serious journalists could give any kind of credence to such a scenario throws considerable doubt on how much they really understood of the Ukrainians' aspirations for independence or their feelings towards the Romanov dynasty.

One remarkable aspect of this speculation is that, although all the rumours and reports were attributed to sources in Germany, the German national press itself was silent on this issue. This led A.J. Drexel Biddle, Jr., a US diplomat based in Warsaw, to conclude that they were the result of deliberate leaks or manipulation by the Nazi propagandists.

"It is obvious", he commented in a "strictly confidential" report to President Roosevelt, dated 15 December, 1938,

> ... that the foreign correspondents in Berlin are eagerly grabbing for the bait handed them by the various Nazi press bureaus and have succeeded in focusing public interest to an important degree on the subject. Accordingly, in my opinion, the Nazi propagandists have put the foreign correspondents to work for them, and I look for the German press to stand aloof until such time as (a) the Nazi Propaganda Bureau will have had time to appraise world reaction to current publicity and (b) operations in Ruthenia [i.e. Carpatho-Ukraine] might have shown signs of definite progress. My belief on this score is borne out by disclosures of an informed Nazi, who recently visited Warsaw, in reply to my discreet inquiries.
>
> Further examination, moreover, points to the "Greater Ukraine play-up's" having been deliberately inspired by Berlin as a tactical maneuver aimed: (1) as a diversion activity to cover up other contemplated intermediate moves; and (2) as a simultaneous campaign to propagandize and "start the ball rolling" and stimulate interest in Berlin's envisaged eventual Ukrainian project...[7]

In fact, the German press was not standing entirely "aloof". The November issue of the journal *Geopolitik* carried an article by General Haushofer, a col-

[4] See, in particular, *The New York Times*, 24 November, 1938, "Wealth of Ukraine Lures Germans"; also *The Manchester Guardian*, 30 November, 1938, "The Russian Ukraine, A Sad History, Land not Race the Problem", and 1 December, 1938, "The Polish Ukraine, East Galicia, Separate Aims and History, German Influence"; also *The Sunday Times*, 11 December, 1938, "Germany's Grip on Ruthenia and Slovakia, Stepping Stones to Ukrainian Wheatfields". In France, *Le Temps* carried, on 10 December, 1938, a major article: "La Marche vers L'Est et La Grande Ukraine", and on 15 December, 1938, a feature "Courier Géographique, Ukraine", which included not only a map but also a not entirely successful translation into French of the "Testament" (Zapovit) of the Ukrainian national poet, Taras Shevchenko.

[5] See, for example, *The New York Times*, 15 December, 1938, "'Czar' to Consult Hitler on Ukraine".

[6] The report was denied on 16 December, 1938, in *The Daily Telegraph* and the following day in *The New York Times*.

[7] Quoted in Lubomyr Y. Luciuk and Bohdan S. Kordan, *Anglo-American Perspectives on the Ukrainian Question 1938-1951. A Documentary Collection* (The Limestone Press, Kingston, Ontario, 1987), p. 25 (hereafter *Perspectives*).

league of Rudolf Hess, on "The future of Subcarpathian Ukraine", which described Carpatho-Ukraine as a "new Piedmont" which would act as the embryo of a "great unitary state" of which Germany would be simultaneously the protector and the beneficiary. "National sentiment", Haushofer wrote, "is developing in Subcarpathian Ukraine: the population aspires towards a union of all Ukrainians, those of Poland, of Romania and of Russia... In the USSR, the Ukrainian people are likewise waging an obstinate and determined struggle for Ukraine, a great nation, to become a national unitary State".[8]

At the end of December, the January issue of the *Europäische Revue* carried an article by Baron von Freytag-Loringhofen,[9] castigating Ukrainian and Russian émigrés in Paris for looking to France for help in achieving the independence of their homelands and accusing Germany of sinister intentions towards Ukraine, rather than turning to Germany as their "natural ally".

The most significant article in the German press of this time, however, appeared in the Breslau[10] newspaper, *Die Schlesische Zeitung*.[11] This article, entitled "Die ukrainische Frage", which seems to have served as source-material for much of the better-informed British and American speculation, was described by *The Manchester Guardian*,[12] as "striking" and "extraordinarily frank". It envisaged, in effect, the establishment of an independent Ukrainian state of 45,000,000 inhabitants, formed by the Ukrainian SSR, Polish-occupied Ukraine and Carpatho-Ukraine. *The Manchester Guardian* translated three key passages for its readers:

> "The first Governmental declaration of the new Czecho-Slovak-Carpatho-Ukrainian State was undoubtedly of importance to the Czechs and the Slovaks, but for the Carpatho-Ukrainians it meant more, far more. For them this development brings the consciousness that for the first time in centuries – with the exception of a short sanguinary chaotic episode twenty years ago – the Ukrainians have become a nation bearing part of the burden of a State. They own a small but nevertheless real territory where they are their own masters. Thus Carpatho-Ukraine [Ruthenia] no matter how the chances for the future are judged, has within the last few weeks become the spiritual heart of a nation of 45,000,000 people.
>
> It might be too early to see in the Carpatho-Ukraine the "Piedmont of Ukrainianism", but it would be guilty of failing to recognise the facts if it were overlooked that among certain people, including those of the Ukrainians settled on the soil of the Moldavian Republic, these thoughts are allowed...".

[8] Quoted in *L'Oeuvre*, 5 December, 1938.

[9] *The Manchester Guardian*, which in its issue of 29 December, 1938, gave a brief account of this article, referred to the Baron as "a well-known German politician".

[10] Central European geographical names for this period pose some problems. Complete consistency is impossible; however, as far as possible, this article will use the following procedure: a) In all direct quotations, the original spellings will be used, otherwise, b) towns, provinces etc. not in Ukraine nor occupied by a predominantly Ukrainian population will be referred to by the name in common use during the period under discussion, c) places in Ukraine or with a predominantly Ukrainian population will be given in the standard Ukrainian form.

[11] *Schlesische Zeitung*, 14 December, 1938.

[12] *The Manchester Guardian*, 16 December, 1938.

The Manchester Guardian's "own Correspondent" then continues:

> The "Schlesische Zeitung" quotes the Prague "Ukrainian Topics", which, it is stated, is at least not distant from official quarters and which attempts to follow up these ideas. The periodical is reported as having stated:
>
> "The time has now come when the problem of the Ukrainian nation, more than any time during the last twenty years, is moving to the centre of European interest. This problem must be solved now. There are two possibilities – either to form an autonomous Ukrainian State with the will of the Ukrainian nation, or to dismember it for the time being against the will of the people. From the interests of European peace and civilisation arises the necessity for the former solution – the establishment of an independent Ukrainian State".

Paraphrasing the German source, *The Manchester Guardian* outlines the situation of the Ukrainians in Poland, and refers to the demands of the UNDO[13] (described as "the chief Ukrainian organisation") for cultural and territorial autonomy, noting that, according to the *Schlesische Zeitung*,

> It can be stated as certain... that the demands for autonomy represent only a minimum programme of the Moderates. The Ukrainians are a 100 per cent peasant people – religious, economically more prosperous than many sections of the Polish peasantry; in fact, everything other than intellectual revolutionaries. But these same characteristics enable the Ukrainians to remain true to their nationality in spite of all attempts to denationalise them. A time which actually forced affairs in the East into the great movement would doubtless also find them ready to defend their nationality – yes, even to fight for the Ukrainian State.

Noting that the German paper alleges "friction between the Ukrainians of Soviet Russia and the Moscow Government", necessitating the "constant change in commissars, for which the same reason is always given – Ukrainian nationalism", *The Manchester Guardian* concludes with another direct quote:

> "We do not wish to prophesy. We only point out that Ukrainianism today is more conscious of its nationalism than ever. For the memory of the short, sanguinary and heroic battle in 1919-20 is still living. In any case it would be wise for Europe to watch the movement between river, steppe, sea, and Carpathians very carefully if it wishes to avoid being surprised some way by developments the extent of which cannot be fully visualised to-day. It is certain that Ukrainianism will live".

The German press of that time was, of course, subordinated to Nazi Party control. Furthermore, *Die Schlesische Zeitung* was something more than merely a local daily. It was clearly obtainable in Berlin – from which city *The Manchester Guardian's* story is datelined – and it was apparently subscribed to by The Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House), since the press-cuttings files of the Chatham House library (now on microfilm) include the original of the article under discussion. It would be naive, therefore, to suppose that this was the case of a local paper publishing material which a paper in the capital would have been forbidden to print. Nevertheless, the silence of the Berlin press is, as Biddle rightly noted, significant.

[13] The Ukrainian National Democratic Organisation. *The Manchester Guardian* does not explain this acronym.

Biddle's assessment of German intentions was a specific response to what he termed the press "play-up" of November-December, 1938. In British diplomatic circles, speculation about German intentions towards Ukraine had begun some months earlier – significantly, with a suggestion that concern about this issue was premature. On 1 April, 1938, Sir Nevile Henderson, the British Ambassador in Berlin, wrote to the Foreign Secretary, Viscount Halifax:

> My Lord,
>
> However great has been the shock to the world caused by the incorporation of Austria into Great Germany, and however profound in consequence thereof has been the change in the political, military and economic position of Central and Eastern Europe, it would seem to serve no useful purpose to indulge at this stage in speculation as to the ultimate and sinister intentions of Germany. Her immediate and certain aims afford quite enough material for anxious consideration without allowing one's imagination to run riot about the Ukraine, about Roumania's oil-fields or outlets on the Mediterranean via Trieste or the Balkans.
>
> 2. Just as it has always been obvious that Hitler's first objective was Austria, so it is to-day not one whit less clear that his next main objective is a settlement of the question of the Sudetendeutschen; on the basis – if possible – of the right of self-determination, but by force if that right is permanently withheld. A solution of the [Polish] Corridor, together with a possible rectification of the Silesian frontier, constitutes his third main objective. Danzig and Memel must be regarded as subordinate questions, and, in fact, the Free City is already Nazi and will declare itself reattached to the German Empire at any moment which may seem most opportune. Everything else is purely hypothetical.[14]

The Czechoslovak local elections of May-June, 1938, brought to a head the demands of the Sudeten Germans for autonomy. At one point, a German invasion of Czechoslovakia seemed imminent, but was averted (at least for the time being) by diplomatic pressure from the United Kingdom, France and the Soviet Union.[15] On 3 June, the United Kingdom's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary in Prague, Basil Newton, reported on an audience he had had that day with President Edvard Benes. The Sudeten Germans' demand for a regional parliament, Benes had said, was unacceptable. "In reply to my enquiry", Newton continued,

> whether it could not at any rate be discussed he said it could certainly be discussed but it would not be honest if he suggested that it could be accepted. Such a parliament would be incompatible with the constitution, endanger the unity of the country, complicate administration to an extent which would be impracticable and immediately raise most dangerous and delicate question of union of Czechs and Slovaks. In regard to this particular argument I alluded to example of Ruthenia. Dr. Benes said that inhabitants of that comparatively small area were quite different people and, if an independent Ukrainia ever came into existence, would probably be incorporated in the Ukraine but union of Czechs and Slovaks was vital for the

[14] *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-39*, Third Series, (HMSO, London, 1950), Vol. I, p. 108 (hereafter *Documents*).

[15] See, for example, John W. Wheeler-Bennett, *Munich. Prologue to Tragedy* (Macmillan, London, 1948), pp. 54-59.

existence of a republic which had neighbouring countries with populations of 75 million in the case of Germany and 30 million in the case of Poland...[16]

In October, the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia begun. The Sudetenland was incorporated into the Reich. The Teschen-Frysztat area was ceded to Poland. And when the Prague government promised that "Ruthenia" (Carpatho-Ukraine) would become autonomous, British diplomats began to see an autonomous Carpatho-Ukraine as a possible springboard for further German expansion eastwards. The expression "Great Ukraine" now began to appear in British diplomatic correspondence. On 14 October, Sir Howard Kennard, the British Ambassador in Warsaw, wrote to Halifax on the Polish reaction to recent developments:

What was more important, if we are to regard M. Beck[17] as a statesman rather than a politician, was the future of Slovakia and Ruthenia. The fate of these two provinces is still in the balance, but Poland's attitude is by now clear. It is that, if possible, these provinces should be separated from Prague and fall under the influence of Poland or Hungary, and that Ruthenia at least, by its incorporation with Hungary, should provide a common frontier between Hungary and Poland. As I suggested in my telegram No. 106 of the 6th October, it is being considered, more especially in French quarters, whether such a solution would not ultimately be in the interests of Europe generally. It is true that Marshal Smigly-Rydz[18] has said that such a common frontier would form a barrier against Soviet Russia. It may also be argued that Hungary itself is liable to fall under German influence, but, except on the theory that M. Beck is completely Germanophile, I conceive it to be possible that his reasoning has been somewhat different. He may well have thought, at any rate after the Munich Agreement, that if Czechoslovakia is to become in the very near future a German pawn, it would be as well to prevent German influence from penetrating as far as the Ukraine, and that an independent Slovakia and a Hungarian Ruthenia would at least provide some obstacle to the fulfilment of Herr Rosenberg's[19] ideas.

8. For quite apart from the obvious danger of having Germany on half of her frontiers, Poland has her Ukrainian problem to consider. There are over 4 million Ukrainians in Poland who dream of the union of all Ukrainians and who are believed to be encouraged, if not subsidised, by German sympathisers, and the Polish Government cannot be expected to favour the existence of an autonomous Ruthenia, which would form on the borders of Poland a nucleus of an independent Great Ukraine.

9. In any case Poles who do not normally admire M. Beck seem to be coming round to the idea that of the two weak countries, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, close connexion with the latter by the elimination of Ruthenia holds most advantage for Poland, as constituting:–

(a) A possible barrier against Germany.
(b) A certain barrier against Communist agitation.
(c) The removal of a centre for Ukrainian nationalism.[20]

[16] *Documents*, Vol. I, p. 443.
[17] Colonel Jozef Beck, the Polish Foreign Minister.
[18] Marshal Edward Smigly-Rydz, Inspector General and Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Armed Forces.
[19] Alfred Rosenberg, the originator of the Nazi theory of "Aryan" racial supremacy.
[20] *Documents*, Vol. III, p. 181.

Carpatho-Ukraine had now become a serious diplomatic issue. On 26 October, Sir George Ogilvie-Forbes, the British Chargé d'Affaires in Berlin, telegraphed to Lord Halifax that "I shall be seeing, in the course of today, both the Minister for Foreign Affairs and State Secretary when I hope to furnish the latest information on German attitude which up to the present appears to favour retention of non-Hungarian part of Slovakia in Czechoslovak State but is undecided regarding the fate of Ruthenia".[21]

Lord Halifax replied the same day:

> 2. According to Prague telegrams Nos. 948 and 955, the Ruthenians have decided to remain within the Czechoslovak State. I am not sure, however, to what extent the present Ruthenian Government represents the wishes of the people and I feel that the solution to the question depends to a considerable extent on Germany's policy. I see from Berlin telegram No. 621 that the official view of the German Government is that this question should be settled on the basis of self-determination. It seems doubtful, however, whether this is the whole story. As we see it here, Germany wishes, now that Czechoslovakia is likely to become her vassal, to preserve the integrity of all that remains of the State and to use Czechoslovakia to spread her influence along the frontiers of Poland and Hungary as far as that of Roumania. It may also be in the minds of the Germans that Ruthenia would, if necessary, furnish a spring-board to the Ukraine or a starting place for fomenting a Ukrainian movement.
>
> 3. On the other hand, Germany is probably averse to opposing directly the wishes of Poland and Hungary which Italy is believed to support.[22]

The Foreign Secretary's reasoning here appears somewhat confused. If the "integrity" of Czechoslovakia (minus the Sudetenland) was to be preserved, then it is difficult to see how "Ruthenia", as a part of that "integral" state, could serve as a "spring-board" to Ukraine. Furthermore, since Hungary and Poland wanted to divide "Ruthenia" between them, with, it was believed, the support of Germany's Axis ally, Italy, neither option – "integral" Czechoslovakia or "spring-board" Ruthenia – would seem feasible without "opposing directly the wishes of Poland and Hungary". One may suppose that some Foreign Office analyst, trying to make sense of events in what Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain had called, only a few weeks before, "a far-away country of which we know nothing" had put forward three possible (albeit mutually exclusive) scenarios. Halifax, however, seems to suggest that at least two, and possibly all of them, may be "in the minds of the Germans" simultaneously.[23]

The Foreign Secretary's confusion must have been exacerbated by the visit to London in mid-November of King Carol of Romania. Until now, the British diplomatic consensus was that the Polish government was opposed to any

[21] Ibid, p. 200.

[22] Ibid, p. 201.

[23] Halifax, as even his most sympathetic biographer, Lord Birkenhead, had to admit, "was not qualified either by knowledge or inclination" for the demanding role of Foreign Secretary. "He was... in no sense a specialist in foreign affairs like [Sir Anthony] Eden, and his aloofness prevented him picking up diplomatic gossip". While Foreign Secretary, he admitted that "he had never read *Mein Kampf*". See, the Earl of Birkenhead, *Halifax. The Life of Lord Halifax* (Hamish Hamilton, London, 1965), p. 418.

form of autonomy, much less independence, for Ukraine. However, on 16 November, after a meeting with the Romanian monarch, Halifax wrote to Sir Charles Michael Palairet, the British Ambassador in Bucharest:

> 4. His Majesty proceeded to say that he had reason to believe that both Germany and Poland had ideas on the establishment of an independent Ukrainian State. This would raise new problems for Roumania, but he did not express himself as unduly anxious on this score, saying that, if they had managed to live on good terms with the vast State of Russia, they would have no particular reason to be anxious at finding for their neighbour a new and much smaller State.[24]

The "union of all Ukrainians" referred to by Kennard would, of course, entail the detachment of the Ukrainian SSR from the Soviet Union. The British diplomatic community put little credence in the idea of any viable manifestation of Ukrainian national aspirations within the Soviet Union. Thus on 17 October, 1938, Lord Chilston, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, reported from the British Embassy in Moscow on the slow rate of recruitment to the Communist Party in Soviet Ukraine, concluding that

> 4. It seems likely that, so long as the intensive drive to increase membership of the Party is accompanied by warnings with regard to the admission of suspect and hostile elements, the growth of membership will be slow, and that the marked reluctance of Ukrainians, owing to their nationalist proclivities, to join an organization which is wholly under the control of Moscow, will only be deepened.[25]

He did not, however, suggest any active form these "nationalist proclivities" might take.

At this point, two events of major significance for Ukrainians occurred. On 8 December, the National Ukrainian Rada (Council) convened at Uzhhorod.[26] The following day, in Poland, a Bill on Ukrainian Autonomy was placed before the *Sejm*.

Neither of these events was unexpected. The Ukrainian Council in what had been Czechoslovakia had existed for some time. On 8 October, 1938, its representatives had passed a resolution in favour of autonomy within a federal state, and had been informed by the newly appointed Minister for Ruthenian Affairs that Ruthenia – now to be officially renamed Carpatho-Ukraine – would be granted the same degree of autonomy as that given to Slovakia.[27] In Poland, too, for several years the UNDO (perceiving independence as impossible) had been pressing for autonomy – and, in any case, so complicated a document as a parliamentary Bill[28] normally takes months to prepare.

[24] *Documents*, Vol. III, p. 232.

[25] *Perspectives*, p. 18.

[26] By now transferred to Hungary under the Vienna Award of 2 November, 1938, imposed on Czechoslovakia by Germany and Italy.

[27] *The Bulletin of International News* (Royal Institute of International Affairs, London), Vol. XVI, No. 1, 1939, p. 16.

[28] The text of this Bill was not published at the time. However, according to *The Bulletin of International News*, Vol. XVI, No. 1, 1939, p. 14, issued by the Information Department of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, it was believed at the time to include the creation of an autonomous Ukrainian state, including "the... voyvodates of Stanislawow, Tarnopol, and Volhynia,

But when the Speaker of the *Sejm* rejected the autonomy Bill, and, a few days later, Poland made representations to the Prague government protesting against "the toleration by the Czechoslovak government of certain organisations in its territory" fomenting anti-Polish and pro-Ukrainian propaganda, the British press, across the political and intellectual spectrum, interpreted the real addressee of the message as Germany. "Poland Warns Germany 'Hands Off Ukraine'" thundered the (socialist) *Daily Herald*, alleging that "Ukrainian Nationalist storm troops, armed and uniformed by Germany, are drilling under German instructors in Chust, the tiny Ruthenian capital".[29]

"Military Schools Organised. Warsaw Astonished", said the establishment *Sunday Times*, linking the protest to Czecho-Slovakia with reports that a special "Ukrainian Bureau" had been established in Berlin to register the "Stateless Ukrainians" resident in Germany, and that special military training schools had been established for Ukrainians in Germany.[30] To the British press it seemed clear that any aspirations towards Ukrainian independence must be German-inspired or at any rate German-manipulated.

From Warsaw, the British view was at once fuller and more confused. On 14 December, 1938, Kennard, reporting on "the international aspects of the Ukrainian problem"[31] noted that "[n]ecessarily any remarks on this subject must be very tentative indeed", since "no one so far as I know has any concrete knowledge of what exactly is in the mind of Monsieur Beck". It was, however, he said, "certain" that the Polish government was giving the Ukrainian problem "serious consideration".

Kennard summarised the "Ukrainian problem" as follows:

– The whole "Ukrainian question" is "intimately bound up" with Poland's security against Russia. If the "open rolling land south of the Prypet marshes" could be "neutralized politically", Poland would have a better chance of containing the Russians "among the forests and marshes to the north of them", [i.e. in Belarus].

– "Russian Ukraine" has close affinities with Poland, dating back to the times of the "Polish-Lithuanian Empire of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries". Ethnographically, "Ukrainians and Poles have suffered together from the denationalizing policy of Imperial Russia". "Great numbers" of Poles come from near Kyiv, and it is estimated that at the end of World War I there were four million Poles in "Russian Ukraine", and there are still said to be "a great many" there. It is less than 20 years since a Polish army captured Kyiv.

– Pilsudski[32] favoured the setting up of an autonomous Ukrainian state as a buffer against Russia, which, in the conditions of the early 1920s, would have

three-quarters of the voyvodate of Lwow, the greater part of Polesia, over a quarter of the Lublin voyvodate, and parts of those of Bialystok and Cracow – totalling over 100,000 of Poland's 380,000 square kilometres". The autonomous state would have a separate parliament, cabinet and civil service, and control over local military forces, justice, education, and tax collection. The Ukrainian and Polish languages were to be on an equal official footing.

[29] *Daily Herald*, 19 December, 1938.

[30] *The Sunday Times*, 18 December, 1938.

[31] *Perspectives*, pp. 19-22.

[32] Jozef Klemens Pilsudski, Polish Head of State, 1918-22. His views on the establishment of an autonomous Ukrainian state are dealt with in great detail in Michael Palij, *The Ukrainian-Polish*

been dependent on Poland for political and military support. But "[t]he times were not propitious" for this, and Poland failed, in 1919, "to free the Ukraine by force". Instead, Poland adopted a policy of "good neighbourly relations" with Russia.

– The idea of an autonomous and pro-Polish Ukraine has never been entirely forgotten. A senior member of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs "touched on it playfully in conversation" in 1937, and in October, 1938, "[a]n article in a periodical called *Polityka*, which used to have some relations with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, caused a minor sensation... by adumbrating the so-called 'Promethian [sic] policy'[33] of creating buffer states under Polish protection in White Russia and the Ukraine". The Polish Military Attaché in Berlin is "preoccupied by the danger to Poland of German expansion" and has "show[n] an interest in the possible emergence of an autonomous Ukraine under Polish patronage.

– Beck is not "contemplating any adventures" in Ukraine at present. "He is an opportunist and the opportunity is not there". Furthermore, "Polish Ukraine" is being "unsettled" by the existence of the new "autonomous Ukrainian province" of Carpatho-Ukraine. "How much more would it be unsettled were it the only part of the Ukraine not to enjoy autonomy". Since "the Poles do not intend to grant autonomy to their Ukrainian population", there is "a fundamental difficulty in Poland's championing a Ukrainian autonomist movement in Russia" (i.e. the USSR).

– As far as Germany was concerned, dispatches from Sir George Ogilvie-Forbes in Berlin suggest that "no decision as to German policy has yet been reached in Berlin", but "Germany's attitude cannot be of indifference to Poland. I cannot conceive of any greater danger to Poland, short of direct partition, than the emergence of an autonomous Russian Ukraine encouraged by Germany to look for the union of all Ukrainians in Russia, Poland, Roumania and Ruthenia, more especially as about one-third of Poland is claimed to be Ukrainian. The Polish Military Attaché in Berlin suggested that an autonomous Russian Ukraine might be anti-German... I cannot believe that the Polish Government will allow themselves to be misled by any such delusion, at any rate so long as they have any hope at all that the Western Powers have not abandoned them utterly to their fate". The recent reaffirmation of the non-aggression pact between Poland and Russia and Beck's "continued insistence on the idea of Hungary's absorption of Ruthenia [Carpatho- Ukraine]" tend to confirm this.

Two Foreign Office Minutes are appended to Kennard's analysis. The first, signed by Richard Speaight, a former Chargé d'Affaires in Warsaw, observes that

> [t]he only definite conclusion reached in this despatch is that the Poles are most unlikely to co-operate in any German designs on the Soviet Ukraine. If this attitude is maintained, it is difficult to see how an armed conflict between Germany and Poland can be avoided; for even if the former were concentrating primarily on the Soviet

Defensive Alliance 1919-1921. An Aspect of the Ukrainian Revolution (Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, Edmonton, Alberta, 1995). See, in particular, pp. 70-75 for the text of the Treaty of Warsaw, 1920.

[33] The International Promethean League was established in 1925 in Warsaw and later moved to Paris as a common front for the liberation of the subjugated nations of the Soviet Union. In Poland, the Promethean movement was supported by governmental and semi-governmental institutions, and especially by military circles. See, Palij, op. cit, p. 186.

Ukraine for the present (and our information from other sources points rather to the contrary), she could not establish any effective contact with the province except across Polish territory. The whole situation, however, is still very confused [34]

The second Minute, which bears an illegible signature, shows a greater familiarity with the history of Polish-Ukrainian relations:

Poland under Pilsudski was anxious to set up an autonomous Ukrainian state which would have formed a barrier against Soviet Russia. Pilsudski was apparently even ready to cede a certain amount of present Polish territory [i.e. Western Ukraine!] to form part of the Ukrainian state. The essence of the idea was, however, that the Ukraine should be friendly towards Poland and under her influence. The Poles today – at any rate the Polish General Staff – are under no illusions and realize that an autonomous Ukraine would be under German control. Nor would they today be prepared to cede any appreciable amount of Polish territory even to form a pro-Polish Ukraine. Sir H. Kennard therefore concluded that Poland will be unable to lend herself to any German plans in the Russian Ukraine unless, perhaps, Mr. Beck were to become convinced that the western Powers had washed their hands of eastern Europe. In that event the Poles might feel obliged to run the risk of an alliance with the Germans, which might involve the loss of the western provinces and the Corridor, in the hope of getting compensation elsewhere. Against this would be many Poles who would [wonder] whether compensation would be forthcoming and many who would fight rather than abandon the present framework of the Polish state (with Posen and access to the sea) which expresses the recovery of Poland from the partitions. In either event the outlook for Poland is a dark one though the Poles themselves argue that Germany is unlikely to risk a war, with a country in which the roads are so bad and the targets for effective bombing so scanty, which would cost her half a million men and still leave her face to face with Russia. Many Poles conclude, therefore, that if the Germans advance anywhere they will advance through Rumania.[35]

Not only the Poles, however, were alarmed by the noises from Berlin. On 24 December, Sir Gordon Vereker, Counsellor at the British Embassy in Moscow, reported:

At the conclusion of my talk the other day with Litvinov[36] about the Grover case,[37] about which I am reporting separately, I asked him whether he had anything of interest to tell me. To this he replied in effect that the Soviet Government, conscious of their strength, were not going to allow themselves to be unduly alarmed by the latest German bogey – an independent Ukraine. He asked me if I seriously believed that the frontiers of the Soviet Union were likely to crumble at the horn blowings of a handful of Ukrainian emigrés. To this I said that I had always understood that it was something more than a mere blowing of horns, and that, in fact, it was nothing less than an earthquake that had caused the collapse of the walls of Jericho.

[34] *Perspectives*, p. 22.
[35] Ibid, pp. 22-23.
[36] Maksim Litvinov, Foreign Minister of the USSR.
[37] Mr B. Grover, a London engineer, had flown from London to Moscow without permission, in order to visit his Russian wife. He was detained for a few weeks after which both he and his wife were allowed to leave the USSR.

Nevertheless, Vereker opined,

> [h]owever much Litvinov may profess calm over the Ukrainian question there is, I think, little doubt that the Soviet Government are, naturally enough, seriously perturbed as to possible developments in this connexion. For the present... there is no reason to believe that there is any exceptional trouble in the Soviet Ukraine or that the population there has any inkling that the Ukrainian question has been raised elsewhere. But if there were to be any kind of armed intervention or threat of armed intervention with the intention of bringing about the inclusion of the Soviet Ukraine in a Greater Ukraine State, the Soviet Government would be faced with a war, as they would undoubtedly, I think, fight to oppose any cession of territory. A war anywhere on their own frontiers, of course, is, as we have always said, the one development which might endanger the régime and which it cannot envisage with equanimity, especially in the still disorganized condition of the Soviet higher command and of the officer cadres.[38]

An appended Minute, signed L.C.[39] and dated January 5th, 1939, reads:

> I agree with Mr. Vereker that the Soviet gov't must be perturbed. They cannot renounce the Ukraine – yet the prospect of fighting Germany for it in present circumstances is pretty grim! Possibly they hope that Hitler will get involved in war difficulties when he deals with Poland (as he must do before he can deal with them); but there seems no reason why he should if he plays his cards only reasonably well and if Poland remains isolated.[40]

By the end of the year, the immediate flurry over German intentions towards Ukraine was beginning to abate. The official Soviet propaganda line presented it as a disinformation campaign. On 10 January, 1939, Vereker reported:[41]

> ...the first direct reference in the Soviet press to the Ukrainian question was made on December 27th in a leading article which bore the stamp of an official pronouncement since it appeared in the *Journal de Moscou* which is generally supposed to reflect closely the views of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. This article took the line that the recent agitation by the German and German-inspired press in other countries on the subject of the Ukrainian question, could not be taken seriously as a threat to the Soviet Ukraine but was probably intended to distract the attention of the Western European Powers from the real aims of German policy. The article declared that the Soviet Ukraine was indissolubly attached to the rest of the Soviet Union and that any attempt to interfere with it would mean war.
>
> 2. I must confess that there seems to be considerable force in the arguments set out in this article... As I see it, the so-called "Ukrainian question" resolves itself into whether there is going to be an attempt by Germany with or without the support of Poland or Rumania to bring about the incorporation of the Soviet Ukraine in some Greater Ukrainian State. Such incorporation, it seems to me, could only come about as a result of:
>
> a) An internal independence movement in the Soviet Ukraine to which the Soviet Government would not be able to oppose effective resistance;
>
> b) An external attack on the Soviet Ukraine or a combination of both (a) and (b).

[38] *Perspectives*, pp. 32-33.
[39] Presumably Laurence Collier.
[40] *Perspectives*, p. 33.
[41] Ibid, pp. 34-39.

The first of these alternatives, in my opinion, is most unlikely. Although the Ukrainians are historically an independence-loving people, and, although the idea of an independent Ukrainian State incorporating the Ukrainian minorities of Poland, Rumania and Czechoslovakia might, in theory, have much attraction for the Ukrainian population of the Soviet Union, there seems to be no likelihood of an independence movement gaining any ground under the present Soviet régime with its widespread and active police system and its close control over all activities within the State. It also seems impossible to believe that any propaganda from abroad in favour of an independence movement could make any headway at the present time in the Soviet Ukraine, in view of the Soviet Government's complete control of all printed and wireless matter, the possibility which it has of blocking the transmission of foreign wireless emissions and of preventing the entry into the Soviet Union of all foreign nationals. Moreover, it must also be taken into consideration that the younger generation, brought up under the Soviet system, is not likely to be as susceptible to the attraction of an independence movement as the older generation might be. As I pointed out in my telegram No. 198 of December 15th last, the vast majority of the population in the Soviet Ukraine has probably no inkling at all that the idea of an independent Ukrainian State has been raised outside this country. Were, however, the Soviet Ukraine to be invaded, it is possible that some enthusiasm might be engendered for an independence movement though this would be likely to take some time owing to the fact that the Ukrainian population has, in company with the population of the rest of the Soviet Union, lived in a vacuum for so long a period and has been without any contact with either the rest of the world or with the Ukrainian minorities elsewhere.

Vereker concludes therefore that

the only possible way in which the Soviet Ukraine could be detached from the Soviet Union and incorporated in some Greater Ukrainian State would be by way of conquest. Such an operation seems to me to present the greatest difficulties but I assume that if it is seriously contemplated in Germany it is because the German Government feel that an attack on the Soviet Ukraine might bring about in a comparatively short space of time the downfall of the present Soviet régime and that in such circumstances no strong régime capable of taking its place and continuing the war could be set up.

Geography, he continues, makes it clear that "any invasion of the Soviet Ukraine can only take place either with Polish or Rumanian approval or in opposition to Polish and Rumanian wishes". Poland, for reasons given by Kennard in his dispatch of 14 December, was unlikely to support an independence movement within Soviet Ukraine, and "[f]urthermore, strategically, it would seem that Poland could not tolerate a Soviet Ukraine under German influence since Poland would then be open to German pressure on three fronts" (i.e. from the main body of Germany to the west, East Prussia to the north-east, and Ukraine to the south-east).

But if Germany were to outflank Poland, and attack through Romania, says Vereker,

it would seem that Poland would be forced into active support of the Soviet Union in resisting such an invasion. In this connection the recent reaffirmation by the Polish and Soviet Governments of the Polish-Soviet Non-Aggression Pacts seems definitely to show which way the wind is blowing. Furthermore, if the invasion

were to take place through Polish territory and led to Germany being involved in a war with Poland and the Soviet Union, it seems not unlikely that France, despite the hesitation which she now feels with regard to the fulfilment of her commitments towards Poland and the Soviet Union, might come to the assistance of both those countries in accordance with her treaty obligations.

But even if in the event of Germany attacking through Romania, and Poland and the Western Powers remaining neutral,

it can... definitely be assumed that the Soviet Government would resist with all the forces at their disposal, any attack on the Soviet Ukraine from whatever quarter, since they could not possibly contemplate the cession of that territory without resistance. The Soviet Ukraine is, from the point of view of population, with the exception of the RSFSR, the largest republic of the Soviet Union and is of immense importance on account of its agricultural and mineral wealth, not to speak of its strategical value at the head of the Black Sea... It is not, I think, an exaggeration to state that the Soviet Ukraine is the life-blood of European Russia.

A German invasion, Vereker considers, would encounter stiff resistance:

7. The Soviet army would be fighting a war on its own territory with internal lines of communication and even though it may have been seriously weakened as an offensive force by the recent purges in the ranks of the officers it would, I feel convinced, by sheer weight of numbers present a serious obstacle to any aggressor. Russia has, moreover, in her past history displayed remarkable resilience to purges from which she seems to recover with greater rapidity than other countries would and although this Embassy would be the last to underestimate the effects of the purges on the morale and military value of the Red Army, I would certainly not agree with the view expressed on December 6th to the Military Attaché in Paris by the head of the Deuxième Bureau of the French Army... that the Soviet Union was

> militarily entirely impotent and that she would find it very difficult to offer any effective resistance to a movement for independence in the Soviet Ukraine if such a movement were actually supported by Germany.

This Embassy has always confined itself to expressing the view that the Soviet Union would be very reluctant to take part in any war outside its frontiers and that if by any chance it became involved in one the Red Army would be unlikely to distinguish itself greatly. On the other hand, it has always been the view of this Embassy that any Power which tried to invade the Soviet Union would not have at all an easy task...

8. It would thus seem that unless an invasion led within a very short space of time to the collapse of the Soviet régime, Germany would have to contemplate, in order to ensure the realization of the limited objective of separating the Ukraine from the rest of the Soviet Union, the defeat of the whole Soviet army, not to mention the possible allies of the Soviet Union operating from the region of the Black Sea...

Therefore, he concludes "... I cannot believe that any action can be contemplated by Germany, at least until there are far clearer signs of a collapse of the existing Soviet régime than are evident at present".

This dispatch was clearly considered by the Foreign Office to be of prime importance. A minuted copy was sent to the War Office, and a further five minutes appended in the Foreign Office files.

The first Minute, by Richard Speaight,[42] endorsed Vereker's views on the fighting capacity of the Red Army following the purges, but found it "difficult to envisage any circumstances in which the Poles would be prepared to fight side by side with the Red Army". He also stressed that

> one must bear in mind that everything that is written about the Soviet Ukraine is based almost entirely on speculation. Neither we nor, I imagine, the Moscow Embassy, have any concrete evidence whatsoever about what is happening there or about the present temper of the large majority of the Ukrainian population living East of the Soviet frontier.

The writer of the second Minute, Laurence Collier, Counsellor at the Foreign Office, disagreed with Speaight about the lack of information. "We have", he wrote,[43]

> a certain amount of evidence about what is happening in the Soviet Ukraine and the state of feeling there; but it is not from very reliable sources. Such as it is, however, it confirms Mr. Vereker's view that there is no general feeling of Ukrainian nationalism and that the whole country is so well controlled by the Soviet Government and so "atomized" by the precautions taken to prevent anything like a concerted political movement or the propagation of any political views other than their own, that there is no chance of any anti-Soviet movement developing there unless and until the country is first conquered by a foreign army. There is undoubtedly widespread discontent among the peasantry, who have been forced into the collective farms with even greater ruthlessness than elsewhere in the Soviet Union; but it is the unorganized discontent of individuals and is economic rather than political; and though there is some evidence that Ukrainian nationalism has affected the upper ranks of the town population, and even Soviet officials of Ukrainian race, this, too, does not seem to have produced any organized nationalist movement, the accusations of "bourgeois nationalism" levelled against the victims of the recent "purges" being usually the excuse rather than the true reason for the proceedings against them. If an independent Ukrainian State could be established in the Polish Ukraine and determined attempts made to smuggle a large number of propagandists and subversive literature from that State over the Soviet border, it is perhaps just conceivable that a Ukrainian nationalist movement of serious dimensions might be started by this means in the Soviet Ukraine; but even then it would have no chance of creating an armed rising without military assistance from abroad, and, as Sir H. Kennard has pointed out, it is difficult to imagine the Poles voluntarily committing suicide by agreeing to the establishment of such a State.

Consequently, concludes Collier, (1) Soviet Ukraine can be detached from the Soviet Union only by armed invasion; (2) the Poles will fight the Germans rather than allow the latter to launch such an invasion from their country, but (3) "if subjected to sufficient pressure", Poland might be forced to remain neutral in the case of a German attack on Ukraine through Romania, and "even perhaps, if sufficient inducements were combined with the pressure, to join in the attack themselves in the hope of securing some of the spoils", though (4) the "ultimate consequences to Poland are so obvious" that only the "very strongest

[42] Ibid, pp. 39-40.
[43] Ibid, pp. 40-41.

pressure, coupled with the conviction that they could get no support from France" would "make them amenable to any scheme of this sort".

The remaining four minutes simply endorse the above:

"I agree with Mr. Collier's analysis", writes W. Strang.[44]

"This seems to me to make sense. And that might point to the conclusion that Hitler, if he feels he must explode, will explode towards the West first", concludes Sir Alexander Cadogan, the Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office.[45]

"Yes", says the fifth Minute[46] (the signature to which is illegible), "if there is any inference to be drawn from all this, it is the one drawn by Sir A. Cadogan. Such an amazing amount of facile nonsense has been talked about the Ukrainian project, that it is well to have the almost insuperable difficulties plainly put".

Or, in the single sentence of the sixth Minute[47] (which also bears an illegible signature), "There are no ripe plums in the Ukraine".

One can only speculate where the "evidence" referred to in Collier's Minute came from. Not, it would seem, via the USA, as the following exchange and attached Minute shows. On 6 January, 1939, Victor Mallet, Counsellor at the British Embassy in Washington, telegraphed to the Foreign Office in London:

> Acting Secretary of State told me today that the Polish Ambassador had recently informed him that reports from Russia indicated serious weakening of the central authority and that a break up involving independence of the Ukraine might be expected in the next nine months. Reports received by State Department were scanty but there were certain indications confirming the above.
>
> Acting Secretary of State asked whether you had any recent information on this subject.
>
> I should be grateful if you could furnish me with material for reply.[48]

To which the Foreign Office replied,

> Your telegram No. 11 [of January 6th: Situation in Soviet Ukraine].
>
> I have no confirmation of these reports, though "purges" which are still continuing throughout the Soviet Union must have reduced efficiency of the administration in Ukraine as elsewhere, and Ukrainian nationalist sentiment is undoubtedly a *potential* source of trouble.[49]

The Minute, signed by Hubert Jebb, Private Secretary to the Permanent Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign Office, after referring to Vereker's letter of 15 December, continues:

> It must be remembered that the Moscow Embassy is not well placed to gain early information of troubles in the Ukraine; but our own information from "other sources" on this subject tends to confirm what he says. Violent purges continue, there as elsewhere in the Soviet Union, and steps are apparently being taken to

[44] Ibid, p. 41.
[45] Ibid, p. 42.
[46] Ibid.
[47] Ibid.
[48] Ibid, p. 43.
[49] Ibid, pp. 43-44.

evacuate more and more Ukrainians not only from the frontier zone, but also from many districts West of the Dniepr. But all this is probably prophylactic in the main, and we have nothing more positive to indicate a "serious weakening of the central authority". The Germans, from whom the rumours to this effect probably emanate, are undoubtedly working to convert their hopes into reality, but so far as we know they have not yet achieved anything positive.[50]

The sudden glimpse, provided by these "other sources", of what is actually happening in Ukraine cuts like a flash of lightning through the considered and repetitious opinions of the Foreign Office experts.

Throughout January, the diplomats and Foreign Office experts continued to take the attitude that Germany had no immediate designs on Ukraine. Hitler and his ministers gave several assurances to that effect, many of which, in hindsight, strike a mordantly ironic note.

Thus, on 30 January, describing the official visit of the new Hungarian Foreign Minister, Count Istvan Csaky, to Berlin, Sir Geoffrey George Knox, the Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary in Budapest, informed Halifax:

As to the Ukraine, Hitler informed [Csaky] that there were to be no adventures in that direction. He recognized that these could not take place without arousing the hostility of Poland, the agreement with whom had been the foundation of Germany's present greatness.

Minister for Foreign Affairs' own view is that most of the noise made about the Ukraine is due to the Vienna Nazis who for self-importance's sake have resuscitated the old pre-war Ukrainian Committee which had been created in Imperial days as a bogey for Russia.[51]

Likewise, on 26 January, Sir George Ogilvie-Forbes wrote to the Foreign Secretary from Berlin:[52]

2. It will be observed from the Military Attaché's despatch, with which I am in general agreement, that the recent trend of events, especially the present rather more conciliatory attitude towards Poland, would seem to make active German intervention in the Ukraine unlikely in the near future...

The Chargé d'Affaires, in fact, was somewhat more sanguine than his Military Attaché. The latter, Colonel Frank Mason-MacFarlane, had, in fact, stressed the short-term nature of Germany's rapprochement towards Poland:[53]

a) There is a general impression that active German intervention in the Ukraine is now unlikely in the *near* future. It would appear that Germany is coming to some temporary understanding with Poland with the obviously possible object of leaving herself a freer hand elsewhere. The attitude of my Polish colleague is not inconsistent with this.

And again, at the end of his despatch:

There is nothing yet either to confirm or to contradict the rumours of mobilisation at an early date. On the other hand, there is sufficient evidence to indicate that a start

[50] Ibid, p. 44.
[51] *Documents*, Vol. IV, pp. 55-56.
[52] Ibid, p. 22.
[53] Ibid, p. 23.

is possibly being made with effecting a gradual military concentration in Bavaria and Austria, and that the possibility of a policy *vis-à-vis* the Ukraine, involving military action against Poland, has at any rate been averted for the moment.

The same day, Britain's new Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Sir William Seeds, wrote from Moscow, describing an interview with Foreign Minister Litvinov, conducted in what he called "comparative informality". After an exchange of diplomatic courtesies, he continued:[54]

4. The conversation then turning on the European situation, M. Litvinov professed his usual optimism on the score of any Ukrainian adventure by Herr Hitler, who, he added, always advanced in whatever direction promised the easiest success and would therefore hesitate to add another to the well-known historical failures by attempting to invade Russian territory. (These words of M. Litvinov were, I may perhaps point out, but a politer version of the sneers of the 'Journal de Moscou' at the weakness of the Western Powers, for which please see Mr. Vereker's telegram No. 1, Saving, of the 12th January.) In the Russian Ukraine there was, he said, no separatist Government for Herr Hitler to use as a tool, but Germany was undoubtedly making preparations and he thought Poland was in for a bad time.

How far the British Foreign Office actually believed these Soviet assurances is a moot point. The Poles, whose unenviable position between Germany and the Soviet Union gave them the most to fear, and who were bound by alliances to France and the United Kingdom, seem to have contented themselves with passing on fragmentary and ambiguous warnings. Thus on 27 January, Sir Reginald Hoare, Minister at Bucharest, telegraphed[55]

Polish Ambassador here told me that Herr Hitler had given Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs an 'official assurance' that Ukraine was not a live issue and could only become one for Germany if Russia showed signs of disintegrating.

Taken on its own, this appears reassuring. Taken, however, in conjunction with the Polish message forwarded in Mallet's telegram of 6 January, the two together form the premises of an ominous syllogism!

Equally ominous was the assurance passed on by Kennard in Warsaw, following Beck's meeting with the German Foreign Minister, Count Joachim von Ribbentrop:

M. Beck said that... Herr von Ribbentrop had repeated that Germany had no intentions of displaying undue activity as regards the Ukraine though she would of course safeguard her economic interests in that direction.[56]

The same day, Sir Alexander Cadogan, minuting a visit by the French Ambassador, M. Charles Corbin, gave an ominous suggestion of the form these "economic interests" might (and eventually did, for a time) take:

I think that these three points [made by Corbin] taken together, namely, the new form which it is proposed to give the anti-Comintern Pact, the projected German-Soviet conversations and the cessation of attacks on the Soviet may be rather omi-

[54] Ibid, pp. 25.
[55] Ibid, p. 35.
[56] Ibid, pp. 68-69.

nous. If we may believe that the Germans have found that their project for acquiring a dominating position in the Ukraine was not so realisable as they had thought, it may well be that they have turned their minds to obtaining a form of economic cooperation with, if not domination of, the Soviet with a view to benefiting from the almost unlimited sources of raw materials which that might put at their disposal. The transformation of the anti-Comintern Pact into a simple pact of mutual assistance against unprovoked aggression by any third party might be designed by the Germans to convince the Soviet Government that they are no longer their chief enemy and that German policy is not directed entirely against the Soviet and all its works. It seems to me that we shall have to watch very carefully the development of any tendency towards a *rapprochement* between Germany and the Soviet.[57]

Halifax, by now, had concluded that Hitler was looking westwards. On 27 January, he wrote to the British Ambassadors in Paris and Brussels,[58] instructing them to make an "extremely secret and confidential" communication to the governments to which they were accredited, stating that

[a]s early as November [1938] there were indications which gradually became more definite that Hitler was planning a further foreign adventure for the spring of 1939. At first it appeared – and this was confirmed by persons in Hitler's entourage – that he was thinking of expansion in the East and in December the prospect of establishing an independent Ukraine under German vassalage was freely spoken of in Germany.

4. Since then reports indicate that Hitler, encouraged by Ribbentrop, Himmler and others, is considering an attack on the Western Powers as a preliminary to subsequent action in the East. Some of these reports emanate from highly placed Germans of undoubted sincerity who are anxious to prevent this crime; others come from foreigners, hitherto Germanophil, who are in close touch with leading German personalities. They have received some confirmation in the reassurance which Hitler appears to have given to M. Beck concerning his plans in the East, as well as in the support which Germany has recently given to Italy's claims against France.

Halifax then continued by outlining four possible scenarios which Hitler might use to precipitate a war in the West, and warning that "[a]ll the reports are agreed in forecasting that the danger period will begin towards the end of February". "His Majesty's Government", he said, "have carefully considered the situation... and have decided to accelerate as far as possible the preparations of their defensive and counter-offensive measures".[59]

The assurances about the East continued to flow in. On 6 February, Kennard reported from Warsaw that Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, Miroslaw Arciszewski, confirmed that Poland "still hoped to secure a common frontier" with Hungary (i.e. by the absorption of Carpatho-Ukraine by one or both of them), and had then reminded him that

Herr Hitler and Herr von Ribbentrop had given Poland assurances that they had no intention of displaying undue activity in that region and the Polish Government had recently received a concrete confirmation of the truth of this statement. German ac-

[57] Ibid, p. 71.
[58] Respectively Sir Eric Phipps and Sir Robert Clive.
[59] *Documents*, Vol. IV, pp. 38-39.

tivity in Carpatho-Ukraine had to a great extent ceased, and whereas in December some nervousness was felt here as to German intentions, it was now felt that there was no danger of a German drive in that direction in the near future. It was true that Ukrainian propaganda was still being organised in Vienna, but he felt this was directed chiefly against the Russian Ukraine and not against Eastern Galicia, where there were fewer signs of attempts at subversive activities from across the Ruthenian frontier, which in any case was now closed. It was further satisfactory that the Czech authorities were now taking serious measures to pacify the Ruthenian districts.[60]

While from Belgrade, the outgoing Military Attaché, Lieutenant-Colonel Humphrey Stronge, reported an "informal" conversation with the Chief of the Yugoslav General Staff, General Simonovic, who, he said:

was of opinion that in the last few weeks an improvement had taken place, and especially since Colonel Beck's visit to Berchtesgaden. Prior to that event, he had believed that a danger existed of a German drive eastwards, either with the object of establishing an independent Ukraine or with a view to penetrating into Roumania, but that, as a result of the visit, Herr Hitler had come to realise that such schemes were not at present practicable. Colonel Beck, he thought, may have succeeded in convincing the Führer that the Ukraine venture, and possibly the Roumanian, would inevitably bring Russia in against him. For that reason they had, temporarily at least, been abandoned.[61]

"Temporary" of course is an elastic word, but, by the beginning of March, the Poles were once again warning that German intentions towards Ukraine had simply been put on hold. In Berlin, on 6 March, Mason-MacFarlane minuted a conversation with the Polish Military Attaché, Colonel Szymanski, noting that the latter

considers however that Germany has only shelved her plans for the Ukraine for the moment – largely as a result of the many obvious difficulties which only became apparent to the Germans after their first wave of 'Greater Germany exaltation'. The Poles have definite information of at least 500 German agitators who are busily at work in the Russian Ukraine; the various German-Ukrainian organisations in Berlin have not relaxed their activities; and various Government Departments continue to maintain sections which deal exclusively with the Ukraine question and are apparently working at high pressure.[62]

The Romanians, too, tried to keep sounding the alarm about Hitler's intentions in the East. Minuting a conversation on 2 March with Alexis Léger, Secretary General at the French Foreign Ministry, Ronald I. Campbell, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary in Paris, noted:[63]

Turning to Germany, M. Léger said that he was convinced that Herr Hitler was not thinking of the Ukraine. He had told this to the King of Roumania on his journey through Paris, though the latter had been convinced that this was Germany's immediate aim. M. Léger had said that the Germans were now thinking of the intermediate countries in which they might hope to secure the position they wanted without a war. The Ukraine would only come at a second or third stage.

[60] Ibid, pp. 80-81.
[61] Ibid, p. 103.
[62] Ibid, pp. 184-185.
[63] Ibid, p. 336.

And even on 9 March in a document entitled "On German violation of the Munich agreement and destruction of Czech independence", Henderson in Berlin wrote:[64]

> Nevertheless, I feel constrained to observe here that most of the talk about German advances into Holland and Switzerland, the Ukraine and Roumania must be regarded as, to say the least, very premature. It must not be forgotten that a principle of Nazism in its present form is purity of race. Austria and the Sudeten lands, where all were pure Germans, and where, even in the former case, the majority of the inhabitants were, in principle, in favour of Greater Germany, is one thing, and countries in which such a majority is non-existent quite another... As regards the Ukraine, while I regard the idea of conquest as inconceivable, it seems to me inevitable that Germany should wish to endeavour to detach that rich country from the vast Russian State, which she regards as her ultimate enemy. She would in her own interests naturally prefer the Ukraine to be independent and to constitute a buffer State between her and that enemy, and it is obvious that she would like to exercise a predominating economic and political influence therein. I cannot see the U.S.S.R. meekly submitting to German intrigues to such an end, and it seems to me that the less we take sides in such a conflict the better.

While the fears of German plans to create a "Greater Ukraine" within the German sphere of influence were at their height, the Foreign Office had commissioned the Department of Overseas Trade to compile a report on the economic assets of Ukraine and the probable effects of such a Ukrainian state on the economies of both Germany and the USSR. This report – as is frequently the case with such documents – was completed only after the fear of an imminent German adventure in Ukraine had abated; it is dated 2 February, 1939. The anonymous author or authors of this report took a somewhat narrow view of their subject: after noting the impossibility of drawing any frontier of Ukraine that would not "inevitably exclude Ukrainians from the new State and include a number of persons of other nationalities", the report states that:

> It is assumed for the purpose of this paper, however, that the underlying drive of the present Ukrainian independence movement is less concerned with satisfying national aspirations than with cutting off from the USSR valuable economic assets and making them available to Germany. From this point of view, territory inhabited by Ukrainians but now lying outside the USSR is relatively unimportant, the real economic assets being found within Soviet Ukraine. This is not to suggest that potential Ukrainian territory outside the USSR is without importance, but that the effect of its inclusion in an independent *Ukrainia* would lie rather in the political and strategic than in the economic field.
>
> Insofar as Soviet Ukraine is concerned – if the underlying purpose of the independence movement be as described – there is little doubt that the plan must imply the inclusion in *Ukrainia* of the independent Soviet republic of Moldavia on the borders of Bessarabia and of the autonomous Soviet republic of the Crimea, neither of which could, for geographical and economic reasons, exist as separate entities, were Soviet Ukraine independent.[65]

[64] Ibid, p. 214.
[65] *Perspectives*, pp. 45-46.

The report then analysed the main effects of a transfer of the resources of the Ukrainian SSR from Soviet to German control, concluding that

> [t]he loss to the USSR resulting from an independent Ukraine, re-oriented as far as possible in a German direction, would be far greater than would the economic gain to Germany. It might greatly improve Germany's position in peace or war but would not solve all her economic problems. On the other hand, since the existence of the Soviet Union depends primarily on the maintenance of an interlocked Union-wide economic balance, the destruction of this balance would presumably entail the collapse of the Soviet régime and therefore a general disintegration of the USSR. It seems more likely, however, that, in view of the vital importance of these areas to the latter, the loss of the Ukraine and the greater part of the Black Sea coast could only result from a decisive military defeat. Hence, the surrender of the Ukraine to exploitation by Germany should follow and not precede the collapse of the Soviet Union.
>
> These conclusions, however, depend primarily on the correctness of the assumption in paragraph 1, namely that the real object to be achieved through an independent Ukraine would be cutting-off supplies from the USSR and making them available to Germany. Were a *Ukrainia* to be created truly independent not only of Moscow but also of Berlin without entailing the collapse and disruption of the Soviet Union (though it is hard to imagine how this could be brought about) so that she could trade freely in any market, the Soviet Union having the means of rendering acceptable counter-value to the Ukraine for her exports would presumably make great efforts to satisfy Ukrainian needs and is at present in some respects better placed to do so than is Germany.[66]

Minuting the report for the Foreign Office, Speaight described it as "useful", but noted, regarding its comment on Ukrainian independence, that "the Ukrainians themselves certainly regard the independence movement as being concerned solely with the satisfaction of their nationalist aspirations". Nevertheless, he continued, "the motive of the Germans, without whose aid the movement has little chance of ever coming to anything, is, of course, largely economic".[67]

In spite of Halifax's assurances, Foreign Office intelligence-gatherers still deemed it useful to keep a close watch on the Ukrainian situation. In June and July, John Hugh Watson, a Foreign Office Intelligence Officer, made a tour of "non-Soviet Ukraine", i.e. the Ukrainian lands in Poland, Romania, Hungary and Slovakia.[68] His report,[69] delivered to the Foreign Office on his return, seems a curious mixture of insight and misinformation. Insofar as it is based on personal interviews and contacts, in particular, (in Poland) with Vasyl Mudryi, the leader of the Ukrainian National Democratic Organisation (UNDO)[70] and with Metropolitan

[66] Ibid, p. 49.

[67] Ibid, p. 50.

[68] Carpatho-Ukraine had declared itself independent on 14 March, 1939, but was almost immediately overwhelmed by the Hungarians with the connivance of Hitler. According to Watson, the problems of this region "seem... separate from those of the Polish and Roumanian Ukraine". *Perspectives*, p. 61.

[69] *Perspectives*, pp. 51-63.

[70] According to Watson, the "UNDO ha[d] inherited from prewar days the tradition of preparedness to co-operate on the whole with the State, while attempting to secure such privileges as may be possible". Mudryi, for example, was a Vice-Marshal of the Polish *Sejm* (Parliament).

Andrey Sheptytskyi, the head of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, it is extremely enlightening. However, many of its comments are clearly based on biased hearsay evidence, as when he describes the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) as "a terrorist organization about which information is not easy to obtain... generally asserted to be in German pay". Furthermore, Watson does not always make it clear whether his information is from first-hand contacts or hearsay: in particular, it is impossible to ascertain from his report whether or not he actually met Dmytro Paliyiv, the leader of the Front of National Unity.[71]

Nevertheless, Watson does seem to have grasped the essential problem of the relationship between the Ukrainian communities of Poland and Romania with their respective *Staatsvolken.*

> One cannot help being impressed by the absolute hopelessness which fills most Ukrainians above the level of peasants on account of the apparent impossibility of becoming loyal citizens of the country in question unless they sacrifice every distinctive trace of nationality, and in all probability not even then. The *intelligenz*, see every avenue virtually closed to them in the civil and military services; they are reminded on every hand that they come from a subject people governed by and in the interests of the *Staatsvolk*, whose ultimate idea is to stamp out all that they hold so pathologically dear, (and which the *Staatsvolk* in the time of its own subjection held just as dear), and so it is inevitable that they should gradually abandon all hope of leading a self-respecting existence in a uniate [sic] state, and find themselves driven to see their salvation if not in detachment, at least in some sort of autonomy, where they would have their own civil, military and religious services, and where their national culture and traditions would be preserved. From this, of course, it is a short step to the demand for absolute independence and fusion in a Greater Ukraine, a hope which was so nearly realized at the end of the Great War and which recent events have seemed to bring almost within their grasp again...[72]
>
> The essential tragedy of so many minority groups in the east of Europe is that young states, desirous of making all the area which fortune has given them an integral part of their own *Volksraum*, can conceive of only one sort of minority, namely the alien unassimilated group which must be attenuated as far as possible as its ambitions are directed at least to autonomy if not to secession. And indeed, in cases where this really represents the facts, such as that of the virtually irreconcilable Hungarian minority in Roumania, it is hard to recommend seriously any other attitude but that at present adopted. On the other hand, I am not convinced that even now the Ukrainians in Poland and Roumania belong to this category. The surest way of counteracting the propaganda of Germany and her conscious and unconscious helpers, is to treat the Ukrainians as far as possible without discrimination against them on the score of their nationality.[73]

But having pinpointed the "tragedy", Watson can see no other way out than the pragmatic one of absorption, coupled with guarantees to the peasantry of

[71] The Front of National Unity was a radical group which split off from the UNDO in 1933. It did not take part in the political life of Poland because, "according to the Polish electoral law the appointment of candidates depend[ed] ultimately on the Government". At this time it claimed a membership of around 10,000. *Perspectives*, p. 53.

[72] *Perspectives*, p. 57.

[73] Ibid, p. 59.

the security of "themselves, their lands and their economic organizations", and to the "Ukrainian *intelligenz*" of their "spiritual integrity". But states pursuing this policy, he said, should move slowly and should firmly refuse

> to discuss any projects of autonomy with the Ukrainians as such. For such concessions can never hope to satisfy Ukrainian aspirations, which will only become more vocal as each new concession is made, and make the recipients more hopelessly conscious of their own nationality.[74]

As for "the 'Promethean policy' of setting up a Ukrainian State under Polish protection, this

> would have much more chance of successful realization if Poland could count on the loyalty of her own Ukrainian minority and if the talent which is now wasting itself in hopeless opposition could be trained into an efficient civil service and military *cadre*, loyal to Poland and capable of filling key posts in the Russian Ukraine.
>
> However, most Poles and Roumanians are convinced that these things are only possible in an atmosphere of confidence and territorial integrity which no longer exists,

while,

> almost every Ukrainian will assure a foreigner, that even if the able-bodied men were not left in the Ukraine to rebel in time of war and even if they can be put to work where sabotage is hardly possible, nevertheless the countryside in the present circumstances will certainly welcome a German army on the whole, while it will do what it can to damage the war efficiency of its oppressors.[75]

Summarising, therefore, it appears that, on the eve of World War II, the British Foreign Office and diplomatic service perceived the Ukrainians outside of the USSR as basically hostile to the *Staatsvolk* of the countries in which they resided, but with no prospects of achieving independence or even autonomy without outside help. They were thus a fertile seedbed for German machinations. The situation in the Ukrainian SSR was (owing to Stalin's repressions) even less promising. The Poles, who in other situations might have found it worthwhile to encourage independence movements in Soviet Ukraine, could not do so for fear of their own Ukrainian minority making like demands – and loss of the Ukrainian lands would be "suicide" for Poland. Only outside intervention could detach Soviet Ukraine from the USSR, and/or establish a united Ukrainian state. Germany was perceived as having intentions in this direction – though clearly understanding that this would mean war. (Why, in the case of war, the Germans would bother to set up such a client state, rather than annexing Ukraine outright as *Lebensraum*, is never explained).[76] At all events, neither within nor outside the Soviet Union, was there any well-prepared indepen-

[74] Ibid.

[75] Ibid, p. 60.

[76] During the mid-1930s, the Nazi chiefs had repeatedly assured Poland that "Germany had not the slightest design upon the Ukraine, not even upon a part of it, and looked upon this fertile land as the perquisite of Poland, to whose Western Ukrainian Provinces, taken from Russia in 1921 by the Treaty of Riga, it should be united" (Wheeler-Bennett, op. cit, p. 223). But why the West should continue to believe such assurances, after Hitler's evident bad faith over Czechoslovakia, is inexplicable.

dence movement capable of making a viable bid for independence. There were no "ripe plums" in Ukraine.

On 25 August, 1939, the Nazis concluded the Molotov-Ribbentrop non-aggression pact with the USSR. Thereafter, events moved too swiftly for any detailed written assessment by the Foreign Office experts, and within little more than a week, Europe was at war.

The opening scenario of World War II did not, however, involve a German attack on Ukraine. Hitler's armies struck first at Poland, and on 17 September, Germany's new ally, the Soviet Union, occupied the Ukrainian and Belarusian lands which had formed part of the pre-war Polish republic. With the Soviet Union, if not a formal enemy of the United Kingdom, at least the enemy's friend (and a major potential supplier of food and military matériel to that enemy), British Foreign Office thinking made a remarkable U-turn. If the newly enlarged Ukrainian SSR could be pried loose from the Soviet Union, it would cause considerable "embarrassment" to the Soviet government, and hence to their German ally. Whether or not this would have been militarily feasible is open to discussion and doubt. As far as the Foreign Office was concerned, however, there were two main problems: a lack of knowledge about the situation in Ukraine, and the uncertainties of the Polish reaction.

The "Ukrainian file" was accordingly passed on to Reginald Leeper of the Foreign Office Political Intelligence Department (who in the 1920s had been Chargé d'Affaires at the British Embassy in Warsaw, and hence had at least some background knowledge of Ukrainian matters). In a note[77] to Mr Roger Makins of the Foreign Office, dated 20 October, 1939, he explained:

> I dealt with this Ukrainian question from the outbreak of the Russian Revolution in 1917 and through the whole of the Petliura period. After the Treaty of Riga between Poland and Russia in 1921 the Russians suppressed the Ukrainian movement within their own territory, but the Ukrainian question remained a very live issue in Poland, especially in Eastern Galicia. When I was in Poland in 1923-4 and again from 1927-9 I visited the whole Ukrainian area in Poland including Volhynia as well as Eastern Galicia, and again and again I discussed it with Poles from Pilsudski downwards and with Ukrainians. I have, therefore, a certain amount of background, though I admit that I am not up to date in the sense of knowing the names and the value of the different Ukrainian politicians who may now appear on the scene.

In spite of this lack of up-to-date information, Leeper asserts:

> I do not imply that there is nothing in Ukrainian national sentiment, but there is no organization and nothing to build on. From that point of view the movement is still in a very backward stage and I do not believe that various Ukrainian politicians who address us on the subject of an independent Ukraine count for anything at all outside a small area. The only area where the movement is actively organized is in Eastern Galicia where it came into being through direct encouragement given by the Austrian Government before the war[78] with the object of keeping the Poles in check.

[77] *Perspectives*, pp. 64-65.
[78] i.e. before World War I.

Leeper does not even mention the possibility of an independent Ukrainian state. What he envisages is the erection of a new, federal, Polish state. The Poles, he opined, missed their opportunity of forming such a state after 1918, largely due to the "intransigence of the Poles of Lwow who in many ways resembled the Ulsterman of Belfast".

Failure to reach a federal agreement with the Ukrainian minority, was, he considered, "one of the real weaknesses of Polish policy". However, he continues

> [r]ecent events may have taught the Poles a lesson. I gather that the new Polish Government realize that the only way of recovering their territories now occupied by Russia is to come to a federal arrangement with the Ukrainians. They are already contemplating this new State as a federal Polish-Ukrainian State. We should, I submit, encourage this mood in every way we can. Just as the new Czecho-Slovak State should be federal and not the old Benes State, so too should the new Polish State be federal. Could some such indication be given to Sir Howard Kennard? Mr. Savery [Frank Savery, the Consul-General in Warsaw] knows this question well.

Accordingly, although Leeper claims to be "all in favour of embarrassing the Russians over this Ukrainian question", the British should act

> only indirectly through the Poles. They will know how to play their cards in this part of the world much better than we can, but we should make them do so. If Poles and Ukrainians come together they should be able together not only to embarrass Russia, but create as much trouble as possible between Russia and Germany where the two frontiers meet.

He concludes by "suggest[ing]... that we should not treat direct [sic] with the Ukrainians or give any publicity to their pronouncements, but should handle this question entirely through the Poles".

Leeper's proposals did not, it would seem, received the unqualified approval of the Foreign Office. A Minute from the "Northern Department" (the signature is illegible)[79] notes that "[a]s to the future it is agreed that the Ukrainian movement is one to be encouraged. It is merely a question of the best method by which to encourage it – directly or through the Poles?"

The writer observes, however, that (contrary to Leeper's assertion) "[t]he Poles have not as yet taken any open steps to make clear that the future state which they have in mind is a Polish-Ukrainian federation", and clearly does not agree with Leeper that all contacts with Ukrainian leaders should be through the Poles

> We have told Dr. Kissilevski[80] who represents the UNDO in this country that he can occasionally bring to the Foreign Office any Polish Ukrainian leaders who may come to England. We have, moreover, asked Paris to acknowledge the letter of M. Prokopovitch, President of the Paris organization.[81] This... does not commit us to very much...

[79] *Perspectives*, p. 66.

[80] Dr Volodymyr Kysilevskyi, head of the Ukrainian Bureau in London.

[81] At the outbreak of war, Vyacheslav Prokopovych, who was a resident of France, took over the office of President of the Ukrainian National Republic in exile by prior arrangement with the then President, Andriy Livytskyi, who found himself in German-occupied territory.

A second minute,[82] by Frank Roberts, admits that he himself is "not competent to express any opinion about the actual merits of the Ukrainian question" but agrees with Leeper that

> we should not ourselves enter into negotiations with the Ukrainians or give them any publicity. I do not, however, see any objection, to our continuing to receive quite informally individual Ukrainians, as we did in the case of Doctors Kissilevski and Solowij.[83] I assume that the last paragraph of Mr. Leeper's minute is not intended to rule out such private conversations.

A third minute, by Collier,[84] however, is less hopeful about Polish intentions towards Ukraine.

> I see no objection to trying to work through the Poles in the first instance; but if – as I fear is quite likely – the Poles will not play properly, and if the attitude of the Soviet Government makes it desirable for us to raise up Ukrainian trouble for them, I trust that we shall not be deterred by undue regard for Polish susceptibilities from dealing directly with any Ukrainian leaders one can get hold of.
>
> I would also venture to suggest that, while Mr. Savery has an unrivalled knowledge of the facts of the Ukrainian question, he may not be a good adviser on policy. My experience of him has been that he thinks, in these matters, more as a Pole than as an Englishman...

The "Poles" in question were the Government-in-Exile,[85] which at this time was in the process of establishing itself at Angers, in France, and to which Kennard was now accredited as Ambassador. On 6 November, the latter commented on Leeper's "memorandum":[86]

> So far neither I nor Savery have worried the Poles about the Ukrainian question, or indeed about any of the larger political issues which they will have to face sooner or later. By the middle of the month we and, I hope, the Polish Government as well, ought to be settled in at Angers. Then, I think, Savery might begin to sound his friends in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and also in other official Polish quarters as to their attitude towards both the Ukrainian and the Lithuanian questions, especially from the standpoint of a federalistic solution.
>
> On the whole Leeper's suggestion that we should act through the Poles in the Ukrainian question seems to me sound. If we want the Polish-Ukrainian question to be settled on federalistic lines, we must do our best to make it appear to the Poles that this idea was originally theirs and not ours. The good old socratic method in fact – we are to be midwives of the political wisdom which is in them.

[82] *Perspectives*, p. 66.

[83] Dr Dmytro Soloviy, Vice-Chairman of the Ukrainian Committee in Paris.

[84] *Perspectives*, pp. 66-67.

[85] After the fall of Warsaw in September, 1939, the Polish government fled to Romania, where it was interned. A Government-in-Exile was established in France, with Wladyslaw Raczkiewicz as President and General Wladyslaw Sikorski as Prime Minister and Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Army in France.

[86] *Perspectives*, pp. 68-69. This, in fact, is a letter signed by Savery on behalf of the Ambassador. But its wording, which refers to Savery in the third person, indicates that it was, at least, dictated by Kennard himself.

Leeper's view of the Ukrainian national movement, the Ambassador says, coincides with that of Savery, i.e. that it has "taken root, that no efforts, not even those of Moscow, can extirpate it for good, but that it will probably not be sufficiently developed for a real settlement to be reached for another two or three generations".

On the matter of contact with individual Ukrainians, the Ambassador opines that

> I do not think it desirable that we should absolutely refuse to have anything to do with Ukrainians who present themselves to us. By adopting such a negative attitude we might only drive waverers into one or other of the enemy camps. But we must be very careful. In the first place we must not take too seriously or show too great cordiality towards persons who may be of no importance whatsoever. For instance, Savery tells me that he has never heard of Dr. Solowij and does not think that he can have held any *official* position of importance in the Ukrainian national movement or political organization in Poland.
>
> Is Solowij a member of the UNDO? And, incidentally, who and exactly what is Dr. Kissilevski?

The Ambassador, moreover, has no high opinion of the Ukrainian leaders with whom the British may have to deal. Most of them, he suggests "(a) are only just emerging from the state of 'semi-intellectual' and (b) have a decidedly oriental kink in their brains".

Presumably he gained this impression from the Poles and/or Savery, since he himself is clearly not *au courant* with Ukrainian matters. What precisely he means by an "oriental kink" is not clear, though as an example of it he suggests that the Ukrainians are more likely to take note of hints and suggestions rather than direct statements. But his patronising attitude seems hardly conducive to good relations.

The next significant document from the Angers Embassy is dated 22 January, 1940, and describes a conversation between J.H. Watson, who by now had been transferred to this Embassy's staff, and E.S. Carlton of the Political Intelligence Department,[87] who was currently attempting to persuade the Polish and Ukrainian leaders in France to work together, in order to facilitate Polish-Ukrainian cooperation in the lands now under Soviet occupation.

Watson assumes that, either during or immediately after the "war with Nazism", it will be necessary to wrest from the Soviet Union the territories it acquired under the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. But

> it will be much easier and cheaper for us to enable the Poles and Ukrainians to throw the Russians out of Eastern "Poland" than for us to have to do it by force ourselves. If the Poles and the Ukrainians will only cooperate, it should be possible to cut the few lines of communication between Russia and her newly won territories, and thus paralyze the mechanized forces on which she relies, but which cannot function without adequate supplies. The Poles seem satisfied that given Ukrainian co-operation the very few roads and railways could be cut and kept cut by perpetual sabotage. We would, when the time was ripe, supply small arms and other

[87] The *Foreign Office List and Diplomatic and Consular Year Book* for 1940 lists only one E. Carlton – Edith Carlton, who at this time was attached to the British Embassy in Paris – but both Watson here and Hankey refer to E.C. Carlton in the masculine.

means of guerrilla warfare. And whether or not we do anything ourselves against Russia, the effect would be sufficient to enable the territories to be recovered.[88]

In spite of the old grievances of the Ukrainians, he says,

I gather that the Ukrainian leaders are willing to co-operate with the Poles in order to gain freedom from Russia on the basis of the five south-eastern *Voivodships*, and of course, carte blanche east of the former "Polish" territories. This I heard in London before I left. Mr. Carlton has now discussed matters with leading Poles and Ukrainians, and he thinks that the Ukrainians would perhaps agree to co-operate with the Poles, provided H.M. Government gave a guarantee of a Polish promise. The promise would be that there should be complete internal autonomy (cf. no doubt Croatia, Slovakia) for a certain area, consisting of Volhynia, Tarnopol, Stanislawów, and part of the Lwów *Voivodship*, but leaving Lwów, the historic capital of Galicia, as a Polish town. The way would then be open for joint action when the moment comes.[89]

In the light of his travels during the summer, Watson confesses himself "somewhat surpris[ed]" that the Ukrainians are prepared to accept this, since, he says, the Ukrainian national movement aims at "an expansion of the Polish-Ukraine into a Great Ukraine based on Kiev". But, he says,

there are many Poles who realize that a Great Ukraine is the only ultimate guarantee against the permanent and natural tendency of Germany and Russia to partition Poland. To exorcise this bogey it would be worth risking the loss of the South-Eastern territories to a greater Ukraine, which may never arise. That all is, unless Poland can be liquidated as a Power, and the Ukrainians can count on German support.[90]

In Watson's opinion, therefore (and Watson was, we must remember, one of the few members of the British foreign service who had recent personal knowledge of the area), any Polish-Ukrainian "joint action" would be an uneasy alliance between Ukrainians who saw it as a springboard to establishing a free and united Ukraine, and the Poles who were prepared to risk the loss (if necessary) of their Ukrainian territories for the sake of a Ukrainian buffer state between themselves and Russia, but who at the same time hoped that their Ukrainian partners might be prepared to settle for the reincorporation of these western lands into the Polish state – this time on a federated basis.

On the other hand, if the Germans move eastwards into "'Polish' Ukraine" (and Watson, at this time, seems to have been one of the few "experts" considering such an eventual scenario), the Western allies cannot rely on the Germans treating the Ukrainians so badly that

they prefer co-operation with the Poles, and the promise of an autonomy under a Polish state after the war, to complete independence of Poland and the promise (which the Germans will, of course, continue to hold out to them) of a Great Ukraine.[91]

On the other hand, so long as Ukraine "remains a purely Russian question" (i.e. is under Soviet, not German, occupation), Watson considers that a deal

[88] *Perspectives*, p. 70.
[89] Ibid, p. 71.
[90] Ibid.
[91] Ibid.

along the lines envisaged by Carlton should be possible – provided, that is, that the British Government is willing to give the Ukrainians the guarantees of Polish good faith they require. However, he continues perceptively,

> [t]he difficulty seems to be the role of the French, who have never been able to grasp a state as any other than a centralized government with one great capital and unitary administration. According to Mr. Carlton the Polish Government in Angers do not seem to have thought very seriously about getting into touch with Ukrainians, and people coming out here from Angers have given him the impression that the French Government has been definitely cold-shouldering any such approaches.[92]

Nevertheless negotiations appear to be going forward. Carlton, Watson writes,

> wants me to write semi-officially to someone in the Foreign Office and see whether they think there is any possibility of H.M. Government counter-signing a guarantee given by the Polish Government to the Ukrainian Bureau. If there is, Mr. Carlton thinks it will have to be announced more or less as a *fait accompli* to the French. And anyway most of the Poles with whom Mr. Carlton has come into contact here have been so anti-French in their attitude that a French guarantee would not be acceptable to either party. On Friday delegates will leave for Paris and Angers, however, to put the final plan... before the Polish Government and the Ukrainian Bureau in Paris.

But if any such agreement is to be reached, Watson repeats, it should be concluded before "the Germans are in Galicia". After that, he warns "agreement may not be possible at all".[93]

Minuting Watson's report, Robert M.A. Hankey, Chargé d'Affaires at the British Embassy in Bucharest,[94] calls it "interesting", but advises against

> our putting up to Foreign Office as a ready-made idea at this stage the plan of a guarantee from H.M. Government, especially as it may get us in queer with the French. The Polish Government and the Ukrainians in Paris are in touch and have actually sent their delegates out here in order to size up the position and sound the Romanian Government, as the Polish Ambassador has done. The next stage is for them to talk it all over in Paris.[95]

Unlike Watson, Hankey perceives no pressure of time:

> If the Ukraine goes off at half cock, before we are ready, the whole thing may fizzle out, or if it succeeds the Germans will just take over the whole Ukraine. Unless I am wrong, we don't want a Ukrainian revolt before 1941 summer; then we will use it to down the Russians and Germans together. Meanwhile we can help the Poles and Ukrainians on tactfully towards an agreement, as we are doing.[96]

[92] Ibid, p. 72.

[93] Ibid.

[94] Romania, at this stage in the war, was still, officially, neutral – it joined the Tri-partite Pact (the "Axis") only on 23 November, 1940. During the early months of the war, the British Embassy in Bucharest seems to have been used as a forward listening post for matters relating to the Soviet Union.

[95] *Perspectives*, p. 73.

[96] Ibid.

And Britain, he says, should not give the Ukrainians the guarantee of Polish good faith they are asking. "We tried it in 1920-1924 and could not enforce it. East Galicia is outside our beat and always will be.[97]

On 5 March, Carlton himself reported[98] on the progress of negotiations claiming that "[t]oday Poles and Ukrainians in the occupied area are getting closer and closer together as a result of the state of adversity in which they find themselves under Soviet rule".

But in practical terms there are difficulties. "The only official representatives available" to negotiate are, he says, the Polish Government in Angers, and the "Ukrainian Government in France", but since these are both "essentially provisional and temporary institutions... any agreement arrived at between them should be in such a form as will be acceptable to the masses who will eventually decide". However, since both the Ukrainian government and the Ukrainian Committee in Paris[99] which has "advisory functions to the Government" consist of émigrés from Eastern Ukraine who left in the 1920s, it is unlikely that they will have much influence in Galicia, where the hoped-for joint Polish-Ukrainian action is to take place.

Of the members of the government and the Committee, Carlton describes Oleksander Shulhyn, the Chairman of the Committee, as a "strong character", "an active worker and a good diplomat". Solowiy is noted to be the only member of the Committee currently in Romania, but is said to have joined the UNDO only in 1935. None of these leaders, in Carlton's opinion, are likely to have much influence over the contemporary "masses".

However, he continues,

> they are no doubt respected by those who remember them and provided their activities are not contrary to the ideas of the UNDO and OUN leaders there is no reason to assume that any commitments which they enter into and which are of a conservative and moderate character would be repudiated by the Ukrainian public at any rate in Poland.

The reference to the OUN is significant. Not only does Carlton imply that any agreement reached by the Ukrainian Committee which ran counter to OUN ideas would be rejected by the Ukrainian public; he tacitly rejects the allegations passed on in Watson's report, that the OUN was "in German pay". For, since the whole purpose of the negotiations is to make trouble for the German war effort, if those allegations were true, there would surely be no way that the negotiations would meet with OUN approval!

In Carlton's opinion, "the real leaders of the Polish Ukrainians are mostly in exile"; of them "Colonel Melnik[100] is the strong character and his presence in Italy[101] may be significant of Italian interest in this question...". Of the UNDO group

[97] Ibid.

[98] Ibid, pp. 74-79.

[99] According to Carlton, this Committee consists of "Szulgin, Udowicenko, Solowij, Kowenko, Rudicew and Col. Kowalskyj". *Perspectives*, p. 75.

[100] Colonel Andriy Melnyk, leader of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists.

[101] Italy, although allied to Germany through the Tri-partite Pact, did not enter the war until 10 June, 1940.

> Mudryj is the strong character... with perhaps a runner up in the person of the writer "Kedren".[102] In so far as religious influence is concerned, Archbishop Szeptycki, who is paralyzed, remains in Lwów where it appears he is isolated by the Russians. If Colonel Melnik and Mudryj could be drawn to Paris their presence would constitute a real representation of the interests of Polish Ukrainians.[103]

Carlton then proceeds to discuss in some detail the "method of liquidating the Polish Ukrainian difference", and concludes that this would be impossible either on the basis of a small independent West Ukrainian state, or on that of autonomy for West Ukraine within Poland. Accordingly, he suggests "...All Ukrainians in Poland to enjoy the full rights and privileges of Polish citizens"; and "the Poles to give the Ukrainians all assistance in reopening Russian Ukraine. Poles living in the Russian Ukraine to be ultimately treated as of equal rights to Ukrainian citizens".

Eventually, perhaps, some scheme could be devised whereby Poles in Russian Ukraine could be transferred to Poland in exchange for Ukrainians in Poland who would go to the Greater Ukraine.[104]

"Information recently received", he says,

> seems to indicate that the Russian Ukraine would not be averse to overthrow of the Soviet regime, and, if this is possible the organization of a Ukrainian State in that region would have a greater chance of successful being if entrusted to the Polish Ukrainian *intelligenz* who have visions of a great future in that field and would probably not be unwilling to emigrate. There is no reason why the Ukrainian *intelligenz* in Roumania could not also take part in the work under a similar arrangement with the Roumanian Government in regard to their own minority.[105]

But the "important facts to bear in mind" are:

1. The establishment of a Greater Ukrainian state will need help from outside;
2. This help will not be forthcoming from either Poles or Romanians if they have to cede territory to the Ukrainians;
3. "if the Ukrainians will agree to settle along the lines proposed, then Poland's 35,000,000 people and the Russian Ukrainians' 34,000,000 would form one block the importance of which could not be denied, but which could never threaten the interests of the British Empire".[106]

Assuming that the Ukrainians would accept such a scheme (under the "British patronage" necessary to overcome Ukrainian distrust of the Polish and Romanian governments), Carlton concluded with a few practical suggestions: the establishment of "a Polish-Ukrainian Committee in Lwów which would propagate the decisions and direct propaganda for the furtherance of good relations between the two races"; the formation of a Ukrainian legion in France, which would secure the goodwill of the Ukrainians and "have a great propa-

[102] Ivan Kedryn-Rudnytskyi, formerly one of the editors of the UNDO journal *Dilo*.
[103] *Perspectives*, p. 76.
[104] Ibid, p. 77.
[105] Ibid, pp. 77-78.
[106] Ibid, p. 78.

ganda value in Polish, Russian and Roumanian Ukraine and also in America"; and (most interestingly) "the establishment of a radio broadcast station in, say, Greece or on a ship designed solely to transmit to the Ukrainians [in the USSR], would be a useful method of contacting 34,000,000 people who have little liaison with the outside world".[107]

Savery, who, it will be recalled, was considered to think "more as a Pole than an Englishman", was, not surprisingly, unenthusiastic about any option which envisaged depriving Poland of its Ukrainian possessions. In a letter to Hankey, dated 8 April, 1940,[108] after damning Carlton's "hard work" with the faintest of praise, he admitted to some confusion about what, precisely, Carlton was advocating, but made it clear that he himself was

> very sceptical as to the possibility of so far smashing up Russia, Soviet or Czarist, and keeping her permanently in a condition of such impotence as to permit the creation of an independent Greater Ukraine which would last more than a few years.

He admitted that "the Russians will not be able, however hard they try, to annihilate Ukrainian separatism", but he saw no long-term political success for their aspirations:

> The Ukrainian people will continue to produce writers and even scientists who refuse to throw in their lot whole-heartedly with Russia, or to write their books in Russian. I am also quite prepared to believe that the Ukrainian peasants will continue to despise the Russian peasants... but I am not prepared to believe that Russia will ever acquiesce for long in the loss of the black earth belt or the Donietz Basin.

If, however, in the course of the war, "Russia disintegrates, at any rate temporarily", the only viable option, according to Savery, is the granting of local autonomy to "those parts of Poland in which the Ukrainians form the majority of the population". But this, he hints, would only be acceptable to the Poles if "we can be quite certain that a Great Ukraine to the east of the Zbrucz will never arise.[109]

For otherwise "however satisfactory their condition might be with autonomy inside Poland, the majority of the Polish Ukrainians would certainly want to join the independent Ukrainian State if such were to arise".[110]

Nevertheless,

> [a]ll the reports which reach me through Polish channels suggest that, thanks to Soviet tyranny and incompetence, there has been a remarkable "rapprochement" between the two races in Eastern Galicia since September, 1939. If that is really the case, there might be some hope of devising a scheme of "autonomy" for that part of Poland which would safeguard the rights of the Polish minority.[111]

He is unwilling to comment on Carlton's suggestion of "possible exchanges of population, etc.", since "the ethnographical statistics which are being prepared for me in Paris have not yet been completed".

[107] Ibid, pp. 78-79.
[108] Ibid, pp. 80-83.
[109] Ibid, p. 81.
[110] Ibid.
[111] Ibid, p. 82.

He endorses Carlton's view that the Ukrainian government in Paris counts for very little in Western Ukraine, and, indeed, has been so long in exile that it has very little connection with East Ukraine either.

But he is "very much interested to read that Melnik is now in Italy", since

> in the spring of last year the Italians established a career consular post at Lwów and the first incumbent of it, Caracciolo, who had previously been Vice-Consul at Los Angeles, told Holiday[112] that he was being sent to Eastern Galicia to watch the German policy in the Ukrainian question.[113] Holiday said that Caracciolo, though 100 per cent fascist, was very strongly anti-German and made no disguise of his conviction that the Germans wanted watching in this question. The fact that Melnik is now in Italy suggests that the Italians are still maintaining this point of view.[114]

Reading these various exchanges, one cannot but be struck by the remarkably limited knowledge available to those who were, presumably, the Foreign Office and diplomatic experts of the time. Judging from the relevant issues of the *Foreign Office List and Diplomatic and Consular Year Book* (which, *inter alia*, noted which diplomats received bonuses for the knowledge of "rare" languages) none of them appears to have known Russian, and only two (Watson and Savery) were qualified in Polish. Naturally, there is no mention of Ukrainian. Furthermore, although, following the alarm about German intentions in Ukraine of November-December, 1938, the Royal Institute of International Affairs produced an excellent "special article"[115] designed to "place the Ukrainian problem in its historical context", there are no indications that any of those concerned in these exchanges and discussions had paid any heed to it whatsoever. However, the Foreign Office report on the probable effects of an independent Ukrainian state on the economies of the USSR and Germany produced in February, 1939 does appear to have been distributed to the relevant embassies.[116]

Under these circumstances, even if the British diplomats had managed to bring about the hoped-for rapprochement between the Polish Government-in-Exile and the Ukrainian Committee, it seems unlikely that their intention of then "enabl[ing] preparations to be made for a joint rising of Poles and Ukrainians at the opportune moment"[117] could have been brought to fruition. What precisely the British could have done to "enable" it is unclear – apart from the radio-broadcasts which Carlton suggested. Ukraine was far beyond the range of air-transport from Britain, and any attempt to infiltrate agents or drop matériel to potential insurgents would have required the cooperation of some neigh-

[112] Leonard Gibson Holliday, Acting British Consul in Los Angeles.

[113] However, some three months before this posting, Mussolini had told a visiting British delegation, led by Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, that "[h]e did not believe that Hitler had any intention of setting up an independent Ukraine... although he, Mussolini, would not feel that it would be a bad thing if an independent Ukraine were created". *Documents*, Vol. IV, p. 525.

[114] *Perspectives*, p. 83.

[115] "The Ukrainian Problem", *The Bulletin of International News* (Royal Institute of International Affairs, London), Vol. XVI, No. 1, 1939, p. 3.

[116] *Documents*, Vol. IV, p. 536.

[117] *Perspectives*, p. 79.

bouring power. Romania, in the early days of the war, would – theoretically – have been at one such possible base, but within a few months it was itself to fall under German influence.

In the event, however, the tentative British attempt to gather the "plums" of Ukrainian independence, whether ripe or unripe, was abandoned. Within a few weeks of Carlton's proposals, France would fall, the Polish Government-in-Exile would relocate in Britain, and any practical possibility for negotiating with the Ukrainian Committee would be at an end. Britain would have enough to do to defend itself against the onslaughts of the Luftwaffe. And in June, 1941, precisely at the time which Hankey had considered optimum for a Ukrainian rising, Hitler attacked the Soviet Union. The pragmatism of war demanded a British-Soviet alliance. Hitler, in Churchill's memorable phrase, had "invaded Hell" and, for the moment at least, Britain was obliged to be "polite to the Devil". The "plums" of Ukrainian independence were forgotten, and, as far as the British Foreign Office and Diplomatic Service were concerned, would remain so for another half-century. □

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The Arts

Zenoviy Krasivskyi – A Tribute

On 15 August, 1995, in Vytvytsya, western Ukraine, a statue will be unveiled of Zenoviy Krasivskyi, one of the most innovative Ukrainian poets of the second half of the twentieth century, and, for more than four decades, a victim of Soviet repression.

Krasivskyi was born on 12 November, 1929, in the village of Vytvytsya, the fourth son of a peasant family, who were possessed of what he, in later life, called, "very moderate means". Western Ukraine was, at that time, under Polish rule, and Krasivskyi's childhood memories were, he said later, of "pasturing, the hungry days before harvest, the Polish 'pacification', an infinity of folk-tales, retellings of the tales of heroic outlaws, and legends... religious solemnities, clerics and church processions" together with "the reading room of the Enlightenment Society, a smallish library, amateur dramatic performances" and the "blazing patriotism" of the older village lads.



In 1942, during the German occupation, at close on 13 years of age, Zenoviy was taken by his eldest brother, Evstakhiy, to Lviv, where he was enrolled in the gymnasium. But Zenoviy, it would seem, was less interested in study than in the growing Ukrainian national movement, in which (in his words) "as never before, the Ukrainian nation felt and understood the necessity of national independence". And, in 1944, his studies were cut short by the approach of the Soviet Red Army. The Nazis, on the defensive, began drafting young Ukrainians into SS-youth detachments. Zenoviy and his third brother, Myroslav, fled back to the country.

The Soviet advance only intensified the struggle for independence. In February, 1945, Evstakhiy was killed, and in March, the second brother, Yaroslav, was arrested and sentenced to 20 years' forced labour. In May, Myroslav was arrested, and Zenoviy, his parents and five-year-old sister, Maria, had to go into hiding to avoid being sent into Siberian exile. The family property was confiscat-

ed. At one point, Zenoviy was captured and detained for several months, before being released for lack of evidence against him. He returned to his studies, matriculating in 1946. He enrolled in the Lviv Polytechnic, but was unable to commence his studies immediately; he was held in prison for several months, before being once again released for lack of evidence.

In 1947, a second order of exile was issued against the Krasivskyi family. This time, only Zenoviy managed to escape, but, a month later, he was caught in a round-up in his native village, and severely beaten. He managed, somehow, to escape, and continued to live illegally in Lviv, until March, 1950, when he was arrested. By this time, he had already been sentenced *in absentia* to five years' imprisonment and lifelong exile from Ukraine. In 1953, he was released under the terms of an amnesty, and later sent to the mines in Karaganda. In 1957, from Karaganda, he enrolled as an external student in the department of Ukrainian philology of Lviv University. The following year, as a result of damage to his health suffered in the mines, he was classified disabled, and the legal constraints on him were lifted. He was issued with an internal passport (allowing him to travel within the Soviet Union), but soon afterwards found himself accused of promoting national activity among the Ukrainians living in Karaganda. He escaped from house arrest, and returned to Ukraine, where he found himself a job in the Lviv Scientific Library as a bibliographer. Several of his friends were arrested and put on trial, and he himself was expelled from the University. He was reinstated in 1962, largely on the merits of two bibliographical publications.

From now on, Krasivskyi became increasingly involved in the struggle for Ukrainian independence, joining the illegal "Ukrainian National Front" in 1964. The programme of this organisation, and a complete set (16 issues) of the underground journal, *Volya i Batkivshchyna*, were found by the KGB in his possession in 1967 and, together with some of his own manuscripts – a narrative poem and a novel – became the basis of a prosecution for anti-Soviet activities, which brought him a sentence of – in all – 17 years: five years' prison, 7 years' strict-regime labour camp and 5 years' exile. While in the Vladimir Prison, he produced a collection of poems, *Weepings of Captivity*, and a narrative poem, "The Triumph of Satan", which began to circulate first within the prison system and then outside it. For this "offence", in 1972, he was given a further sentence – this time in a prison psychiatric hospital in Smolensk.

The use of mental institutions as a convenient oubliette in which to dispose of sane but politically embarrassing persons was not peculiar to the Soviet Union. In the nineteenth century, the Russian authorities had had the philosopher Chadayev declared insane (he had flouted the Tsarist doctrine of "One tsar, one faith, one people", by deciding to become a Roman Catholic). After World War II, the American poet Ezra Pound was confined in a psychiatric hospital – thus sparing the US government of having to try and execute him for treason. One early example of the practice dates back as far as Cromwellian times in Britain. Two features were new, however, in Soviet practice: firstly, the development of new narcoleptic drugs which were administered in punitively large doses to these political "patients", and, secondly, the development of a new psychiatric theory to justify such treatment, based on the "discovery" of a

new, and specifically Soviet disease, "sluggish schizophrenia", in which the only symptom of abnormality was – political dissent!

These remarkable developments in forensic psychiatry did not go unmarked abroad. Western psychiatrists and human rights' activists organised working groups and launched protests and appeals. One such organisation, CAPA (Campaign Against Psychiatric Abuse), was founded in 1975 by Viktor Fainberg, who himself had spent more than five years in a Soviet prison hospital for protesting against the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Fainberg (who had been born in Ukraine) was particularly vocal about Krasivskyi's case. Another new foundation of the early 1970s, the journal *Index on Censorship*, on a number of occasions listed Krasivskyi in its chronicle of repression of writers: "Index Index".

In 1977, Krasivskyi's situation improved somewhat; he was released from the psychiatric hospital and placed under the supervision of the district psychiatrist in Morshyn, Lviv oblast, where he settled. In 1979, he joined the Ukrainian Helsinki Group. In 1980, Krasivskyi was again arrested and made to complete his sentence of 1967. He was released in 1985.

Krasivskyi's life was, in effect, little more than a few windows of freedom between long periods of captivity. He lived, however, just long enough to witness Ukraine's declaration of independence on 24 August, 1991, which was to prove the death-blow of the Soviet Union. But within a month, he himself was dead of a cerebral embolism.

Ukraine's Threnody

Dedicated to Mykhaylo Horyn

Introduction
(After Walt Whitman)

Who looms here like a statue
    and day and night irks the beholder's eye?
The shoulders hunched and, and the head in its grief
    is drooping low upon the breast.
Over the furrowed grey visage
    like pebbles fall the tears.
Tears of despair, of misery, sorrow
    and hopelessness as heavy as night.
From the breast groaning strives to escape
    like volcano from the abyss.
Work-weary arms, emaciated legs
    are racked from their joints by exhaustion.
The whole body is but deep, terrible wounds.
None will ask what it is pains her,
    nor for what sins she is dying.
    O sorrow!

Like a napalm rain
misfortunes descend upon her.
Time with monotonic tread moves onwards
carrying axes in its numbed hands.

Who is it, then, say, who has spread a cloak
over the shoulders of anguish and suffering?
False, cheap meretricious cloak of tinfoil.
Who has touched up the eyes with colour,
Who has placed in the suffering hands a bouquet
of waxwork flowers?
Who drowned out the terrible groaning with hymns?
The dissonance triggers an earthquake.
In boulders, crags, mountains, – to the skies
burst volcanoes of sorrows and weeping.
God almighty!

* * *

It is I! Hear me, I – Ukrayina.
O sorrow, O my sorrow!
The wild Mongolian horses reared up
towering over me in the terror
of God's chastisement.
In their hatred-glazed eyes
gleam conflagrations,
from their nostrils come whirlwinds,
from the girning muzzle, foam and terror.
Down descending ironshod hooves fall on me,
breaking body, spirit and heart.
O sorrow, O my sorrow!

Groaning the bells fell their mortal anguish,
falling now are the war-notched broadswords,
tarnishing helms strew the field of battle,
thronging the gravemounds spread through the land.
And over the gravemounds,
over that wound, deep, filled with anguish,
like a widow in black weeds, stands grief.
O sorrow, O my sorrow!
The lasso cracks like snake filled with thunder,
in a dead circlet falls on the neck
and leads off my fate, clapped into harness,
to a foreign saddle, in distant unfreedom.
With weeping and wailing the heavens re-echo like brass,
resounding with thousand-fold hearts, with thousand-fold woes.

The earth grows empty, the night grows foolish,
And only a lost, roaming wind rakes over
the ashes of conflagrations, fans up
the heat, and warms its frost-bitten hands.
O turn Thine eyes to me, O Lord!
O sorrow, O my sorrow!

Unfriends, harsh neighbours, fiercest enemies.
From all sides, enemies.
They steal up on paths of deceit and battles,
through Carpathian passes,
from the Wild Steppe,
from Lithuanian thickets,
from the insolent West,
from the deceitful East,
from every side,
from every end of the earth.
O sorrow, O my sorrow!
They compass me round about with black storm-clouds,
with ravening predators.
O sorrow, O my sorrow!
They beset me with spears,
with broadswords,
with iron,
with measureless rapacity,
with black spite.
They war me down, tear me apart and enslave me.
The dance of death never rests through the centuries,
And the trumpets of hell resound:
Blood!
Plunder!
Power!
O sorrow, O my sorrow!
While over my breast fierce serpents crawl –
envy, faithlessness, betrayal.
O turn Thine eyes to me, O Lord!

O sorrow, O my sorrow!
The earth is blazing.
The tongues of flame are licking at my wounds
and an intolerable anguish burns
with a bitter brand throughout my body,
through my very heart.
Smoke bellows forth, it eats at the eyes
and hangs there in the heavens
in heavy joyless clouds.

O sorrow, O my sorrow!
Groans now the nation.
Groans through centuries of alien unfreedom,
Groans enforced to unfree labour,
Groans from dishonour, degradation,
Groans and curses the Lord God.
In a black destiny is laid before it
an unfree path to the slavemarket;
tears trickle down the bazaars of Crimea,
the galleys of Turkey,
Siberian permafrost,
in all the prisons and strongholds
of the whole world.
Tears trickle down,
blood flows,
torments rage in unreason.
O sorrow, O my sorrow!

My children-heroes die on impalers' stakes,
sent untimely from this world,
Cossack bones clot into scabs, submerged
in the swamp of Peter's city,
Into a terrible gigantic shadow melt
many million souls murdered by hunger,
And at the gate to the other world the throngs
wait, cannot force their way in with their skulls
pierced through by bullets.
Cells, prisons, camps suffer long agonies
of mortal anguish.
The stars have fallen, fallen,
till no stars remain.
Save me, O Lord,
O sorrow, O my sorrow!

Seeking fresh blood, the hungry eagle swooped
in insane fury.
Rapacious hatred-glazed eyes,
A serpent's tongue,
An ice-bound heart.
The gloom-laden wings hover over the country
blanketing out the sun,
and a black greedy shadow with its bandit's
dirk flowed out over
the earth.
O sorrow, O my sorrow!

The storerooms crack open,
Violated women are shrieking,
The burned and desecrated shrines lie silent,
The master's field puts forth ripe ears,
The bright-painted back of the peasant
    glows with scars.
Lawlessness romps unrestrained, grown foolish from
    decay and sweat and blood.
Mockery runs rife with inhuman laughter.
    O sorrow, O my sorrow!

And how long shall these torments burst forth in groaning?
How long shall this outrage suck at my heart?
How long am I to be bathed in blood?
    Their power is broken,
With a clash, the fetters are sundered,
Bowed figures stand upright
And become giants.

Reforged scythes flash in the moonlight,
Knives sworn in upon holy water,
Sabres mirror back a fiery glow,
The sea has burst its banks and revels wildly,
The red waves are let loose over the earth
    and ... are choked dead in their own blood.
        Where is Thy truth now, O Lord!
            O sorrow, O my sorrow!

My fate chimes in chain-gang fetters on the roads
    of unfreedom and death.
A hateful stepmother for it is its native land,
There is no rest for it by its native hearth,
There is no sun for it in its native sky.
    Nothing!
        Nothing for it, nothing, nowhere!
    Lord have mercy upon us!
        O sorrow, O my sorrow!
Drop after drop infuses into my blood
    a serpent's venom brewed from poison-apple.
My muses grow recalcitrant and foreign.
With foreign mud my thoughts are infiltrated,
Loud-speakers bellow with a hundred voices,
Someone is laughing,
Someone is trampling on my head
    stamping out a hopak with
    hobnailed heels,

Someone lifts up my hand
and yells "I vote – For!"
And "I" am "I" no longer!
Help!
Serpent!
Constrictor!
Laocoon!
Save me, O Lord!

O sorrow, O my sorrow!
I stand now at the crossroads of the worlds,
plundered, ruined, mutilated,
Like a criminal nailed to a stake
of shame. For dishonour and degradation.
But why?
For whose offences?
Good people!
Nations!
Turn your eyes and behold
on my misfortune,
on my unfreedom,
on my pains,
on my chains,
on the rivers of spilled blood.
Can your hearts truly bear this without trembling!
For at these torments, yea the very stones
would tremble and cry out
to the whole world!

□

The Unknown Archipelago

Les Herasymchuk

In *The Vladimir Central* (Prison), a work that is still little known in Ukraine, Zenoviy Krasivskyi wrote: "I look around me. I know all who are on the leading edge, and I constantly wander the earth with, as it were, a lighted lantern, and although I cannot point my finger, yet I feel in my subconscious the awakening of man in our society. And someone once again will appear on the horizon, and this time he is real...".[1] It is not surprising that this search for righteousness, self-dedicated and winged by an uncompromising love for Ukraine, found few echoes in his contemporary "truth-loving" era – truth, which touches the heart of few, but for the majority is a worthless rag. For out of the whole distorted picture of Ukrainian history, it is hard to find such a hue as the period of the Soviet occupation and the clouding of the mind of the community, when authenticity is so distorted and destroyed. For cultural roots were exterminated, the essence of faith was dishonoured, the masses grew indifferent and the leaders, the "masters of thought", simply tried to stay alive, and what history would babble about meant nothing to them.

Krasivskyi's stance as the man with the "lighted lantern" recalls the philosophical poem of Walt Whitman "On the Beach at Night" (1871):

> The ravening clouds shall not long be victorious,
> They shall not long possess the sky, they devour the stars
> only in apparition,
> Jupiter shall emerge, be patient, watch again another night,
> the Pleiades shall emerge.
> They are immortal, all those stars both silvery and golden
> shall shine out again,
> The great stars and the little ones shall shine out again, they endure,
> The vast immortal suns and the long-enduring moons shall again shine.

Usually, that is how everything should happen. And every one of us hopes for this. Only often one has to wait a long time for it, sometimes more than a lifetime.

But it happens in our world "contrariwise" – heroic people are either simply forced out from life by the perfidious, or simply by noisy neighbours. They are loved *pro forma*, but as if they were dead. If their works are published it is, as it were, by chance and in a form plucked of their plumage. For, at the forefront, there must remain all these bawlers from the gang of Party hacks, young Communist nightingales, and the drunkenness of Bolshevik propaganda, the trash of comradely taverns and bordellos, and those laureates and medal-winners gorged on the people's grief.

They wash themselves in burning tears on the grave of Shevchenko, and proclaim sermons at jubilee banquets, but they will not raise a finger to get Shevchenko's works published just once, decently, in full, without the KGB Shevchenkologists. That is for the national poet, Shevchenko. And as for the

[1] Zenoviy Krasivskyi, "Vladimirskyi Tsentral", in *Ukrayinski problemy*, No. 2, 1991, p. 26.

poets of the second half of the twentieth century, tortured or persecuted by these inhuman Communists – Symonenko, Stus, Svitlychnyi, Krasivskyi... it is pointless to speak of them.

If occasional publications in this field do appear, it is only because successive literary and quasi-literary virtuosi and their ideological brethren with campaigners from the ideological front want to get themselves a stake in these names, or to fool the people yet again. Thus, for example, in the collection *Boyan. Poetry "93"*[2] selected poems of Krasivskyi appear (with the poet's name spelt wrongly), and in a preliminary note some anonymous scribbler writes: "Zenoviy Krasivskyi was fated to live until the long-desired days of the nation-wide movement for the establishment of the state independence of Ukraine" (p. 100). And do we now have these "long-desired days of the nation-wide movement?" Or is this really the independence for which Zenoviy Krasivskyi fought?

The poetry of those who fought for the freedom of Ukraine is not simply a fact of the protest and the aspirations of society, but is a specific feature of Ukrainian ethnoculture which has its explicit ethos. Nowhere is this so clearly expressed as in Krasivskyi's "Threnody of Ukraine", where, in the introduction, there is the subtitle: "After Walt Whitman".

The "Threnody" as a literary *genre* in Ukrainian is a legacy of proto-Ukrainian mourning songs, and the Book of Lamentations in the Bible (the Septuagint Greek calls this the *Threnoi*), and also from literary contacts with Poland.[3] Krasivskyi himself paid special attention to the first two Chapters of Lamentations "How doth the city sit solitary" and "How hath the Lord covered the daughter of Zion with a cloud", which in their turn are connected with Psalms 74 and 79.

In truth, Krasivskyi goes beyond the bounds of the *genre* of threnody or lamentation, and maybe this is why. As we know, Lamentations, although attributed to the prophet Jeremiah, is not in reality by him – the true author is still not identified. But we find the same stance in the Book of Jeremiah, especially in Chapter VIII, which now in Ukrainian translations has the page-heading: "New Roads and Threats, vain Hope in the Law". It is verse 23 of this chapter which was quoted by Shevchenko, and not Chapter IX verse I as all our editions say: "Who will give water to my head, and a fountain of tears to my eyes, that I may weep day and night for the slain of the Daughter of my people".[4] Or in Krasivskyi:

...and the head in its grief
    is drooping low upon the breast.
Over the furrowed grey visage
    like pebbles fall the tears.
Tears of despair, of misery, sorrow
    and hopelessness heavy as night.

[2] *Boyan. Poeziya "93"*, Kyiv, Ukrayinskyi pysmennyk, 1993. (Boyan is the name of a legendary Ukrainian bard of ancient times – Translator's note).

[3] In particular, the *Threnodies* of the seventeenth century poet Jan Kochanowski, one of the founding fathers of Polish literature. (Translator's note.)

[4] In the (English) Authorised Version: "O that my head were waters, and mine eyes a fountain of tears, that I might weep day and night for the slain of the daughter of my people".

"Threnody of Ukraine" is connected with Shevchenko's "Caucasus" both ideologically and by a number of motifs. Thus in Shevchenko:

From the dawn of time, Prometheus
Hangs, the eagle's victim;
All God's days, it pecks his ribs,
Tears the heart within him.

In Krasivskyi:

Seeking fresh blood, the hungry eagle swooped
in insane fury.
Rapacious hatred-glazed eyes,
A serpent's tongue,
An ice-bound heart.

In addition to "The Caucasus", there are echoes in Krasivskyi of Shevchenko's "Friendly Epistle". Thus in Shevchenko:

Only I, like one accursed,
Night and day stand weeping
At the many-peopled crossroads,
And yet no one sees me.
No one sees me.
No one sees me, no one knows,
Deaf, they do not hearken,
They are trading with their fetters,
Using truth to bargain,
And they all neglect the Lord, –
In heavy yokes they harness
People...

In Krasivskyi, there is the astounding passage: "Groans now the nation", and also

My fate chimes in chain-gang fetters on the roads
of unfreedom and death.
A hateful stepmother for it is my native land,
There is no rest for it by its native hearth,
There is no sun for it under native sky.
Nothing!
Nothing for it, nothing, nowhere!
Lord have mercy upon us!

The use of formulae of prayers and also formulae from the Psalms and liturgical chants also brings Krasivskyi close to the methods of Shevchenko.

We also encounter prayer formulae, lamentations and biblical echoes in Whitman's "A Song of Myself", a cycle from the time of the American Civil War and the Paris Commune. The themes of misfortune and the fiery rain, wailing and torment, ruins, rocks, frenzied music – all these unite the messianic and prophetic motifs of the American poet with the Old Testament, and the corresponding passages in the Gospels of Matthew and Luke, and the Apocalypse. Krasivskyi, who built up his poems with such allusions, thus created for the "Threnody" a global space-time background. □

Conferences & Exhibitions

Round Table on Belarusian-Ukrainian Historical-Cultural Contacts

Miensk, 18 May, 1995

This Round Table took place during the Second International Congress of Belarusicists, the general theme of which was the "geocultural" position of Belarus at the cross-roads of European cultures. "Belarus between west and east" has become, over the past five years, something of a cliché, but the "north-south" axis has been somewhat less explored.

The contacts discussed at the Round Table were of two kinds. Some papers focused on the borderlands between Belarus and Ukraine, in particular, the linguistic and culturological features of Polessya. Others dealt with specific instances of cultural transfer between the two traditions as a whole. Thus Dr Lidiya Korney (Kyiv State Conservatoire) described the Belarusian church music books and manuscripts now in Ukrainian libraries, and the effect of Belarusian contacts on the development of Ukrainian church music in the sixteenth-eighteenth centuries. Likewise, Professor Kuzma Chromčanka, from the Belarusian State University, Miensk, spoke of Belarusian-Ukrainian literary contacts in the 1920s, contacts which included not only the considerable influence of the various Ukrainian schools and literary movements on their Belarusian *confrères*, but also the repression of the Belarusian writers by Stalin's security police, which followed the procedures applied in Ukraine so mechanically that the (fictitious) anti-Soviet organisation to which the Belarusian writers allegedly belonged was called the "League for the Liberation of Belarus" – a name which simply parroted the "League for the Liberation of Ukraine", which had been cited in the Ukrainian literary repressions.

Of particular interest was the paper of Professor Pavlo Okhrymenko, of the Sumy State Pedagogic Institute, on the folklore material held in common by the two countries. He showed, in particular, that a number of folk-melodies and folk-songs have crossed the border and struck down new roots in the other culture, so that it is not always possible to say on which side of the border they originated. But folk-dances do not travel so well. One strolling minstrel or a singing pedlar is sufficient to carry and pass on a song, but a dance needs a group of performers!

Although the Belarusian and Ukrainian languages are so close as to be mutually intelligible, and although the Ukrainian poet Pavlo Tychyna referred to Belarus as the "blue-eyed sister" of Ukraine, at the academic level Belarusian-Ukrainian cultural contacts have, until very recently, been relatively little explored. Partly for this reason, the Belarusian-Ukrainian Round Table was one of the smaller of the various Round Tables held under the aegis of the Congress of Belarusicists. Furthermore, the timetable of the Congress was such that all five of the inter-cultural Round Tables (Belarusian-Latvian, Belarusian-Lithuanian, Bela-

rusian-Polish, Belarusian-Russian and Belarusian-Ukrainian) took place simultaneously, so that a number of scholars who have an overall special interest in inter-cultural contacts and who otherwise would have participated, found themselves scheduled to take part in another, simultaneous, meeting.

Such timetable clashes are inevitable in all large-scale conferences. But a number of absences could not be attributed to the need to take part in a parallel session. Many Ukrainian scholars failed to arrive at all, or, in at least one case, having got to Miensk, went straight home again! For, in the conditions of today's Ukraine, many academics find it virtually impossible to attend learned meetings, even in a neighbouring CIS state, at their own expense. The Congress of Belarusicists had been promised adequate funding – but at the last moment, certain sponsors from the new Belarusian business community withdrew their support. For, by the blackest of ironies, the long-planned Congress opened immediately after the notoriously undemocratic general election and referendum, masterminded by President Lukašenka as part of his long-term plans to take Belarus into a revamped Soviet Union. Whether the businessmen simply saw the way the political wind was, for the moment, blowing and withdrew their support voluntarily, or whether, as some rumours at the Congress had it, Lukašenka had actually exerted pressure to make them do so, the result was that the money to pay for the promised free accommodation for delegates simply was not there. A number of (to judge from their titles) extremely interesting papers thus went unheard. It is profoundly to be hoped that, at some later date, and free from the vicissitudes of politics, another, similar, meeting may be held at which these can be presented.

New Horizons in Teaching Translation and Interpreting

Alexandr Krouglov

Translation and interpreting are part of a fascinating process of transforming messages from one language into another, while balancing the cultural and social differences of the participants in a communicative event. More and more people are becoming involved in both translation and interpreting and more and more institutions are beginning to teach translation and interpreting as a result of developments in international cooperation in various fields of human life. The problem of training translators and interpreters is one of the central issues on both national and international levels.

What are the newest theories, tendencies, models and approaches in teaching translation/interpreting? How can the translator be taught to overcome social and cultural differences? What is the impact of technology? How can we reproduce the style of literary works in translation? These questions and many others were discussed at the Third Language International Conference on Teaching Translation and Interpreting "New Horizons", which was held in Elsinore, Denmark, in June this year.

Denmark was probably the right place for a conference of this kind, since the University of Copenhagen has a long tradition of teaching translation and inter-

preting at the Center of Translation Studies and Lexicography. The conference attracted more than one hundred academics, translators and interpreters from all over the world. Ukraine was well represented by two scholars: Antonina Badan from Kharkiv University and Victoria Lipina from Dnipropetrovsk University.

The papers and discussion were focused on the traditional notions of translation and pedagogy, and on what knowledge translation students should acquire in order to do their job adequately. Many contributors represented a post-modern perspective on various problems discussed at the conference. Several original theories and concepts were proposed – one of them was the concept of the meme, which comes from genetics and means the cultural equivalent of a gene or a "unit of cultural transmission". Andrew Chesterman (University of Helsinki) demonstrated the significance of "translation memes" in the teaching of translation theory, which helps to build professional self-awareness and an ethnic attitude to translation. This paper and some others showed that translation theory is becoming a truly independent linguistic discipline and deserves much attention within the curriculum of universities.

Another important issue of translation studies is the history of translation. History is on the curriculum in many disciplines: there is a history of medicine, science and music, and a knowledge of history is a requirement for obtaining a degree in most fields. In recent years, translation history has attracted the attention of an increasing number of scholars. Unfortunately, few translation schools offer fully fledged courses in translation history.

The direct relevance of translation to the political, intellectual and economic development of national culture was traced by Michael Cronin (Dublin City University). Linking translation to the historical movements that have shaped the development of different civilisations is not only intellectually stimulating, but also strengthens the case for courses in translation history to be taught right across the university. This discipline can gain a wider academic audience outside the confines of the discipline and the teaching of translation history is one possible agent of change in this respect.

A number of papers presented at the conference were devoted to various aspects of literary translation. Most of them concentrated on the problems of style reproduction in translation and the search for equivalents in connotation, contextual meaning and association. They tackled the eternal problem of whether translation should have its own identity or rather be a copy of the source-language text, in other words, the ideal translation should be a high-fidelity reproduction of the original. This gave rise to discussion of such terms as "equivalency", "adequacy" and "interpretation", the vague usage of which creates confusion that complicates the procedure of training.

However, whatever problem in teaching translation was discussed at the conference, it led to the central issue of cultural differences, since they probably constitute the most difficult part of translation, as one can learn grammar and plenty of lexical items, but one needs years and years to be able to recognise various cultural elements in both source and target languages. It was proposed to introduce translation techniques at earlier stages of language learning, where those differences will be highlighted and the students will be provided

with relevant approaches for resolving difficulties in translation. A better understanding of cultural and social background will inevitably lead to better interpretation of inter-cultural contacts.

In this respect, the attention of the conference was drawn to changes in eastern Europe, which resulted in a considerable shift in usage, function and meaning of various lexical items and cultural notions, to the transformation of style and creation of new means of expressions to mark those changes in society. The radical replacement of one socio-political system by another and the evolution of national languages in the former Eastern bloc countries, brought about by national movements, gave rise to new tasks in training translators and interpreters in Slavonic languages. Pre-Communist, Communist and contemporary periods of development should be included in a course of translation history.

In such a context, those who are involved in training translators and interpreters have to be constantly aware of the changes in societies which can have a great impact on language as a medium of interaction. The main problems arise because of the instability of various language items, inadequate psychological adaptation in the new socio-political systems and increasing social and cultural differences within society.

One can identify the following trends in the present development in the language systems in post-Communist societies:

- the creation of new lexical items to mark emerging notions and features;
- the replacement of the existing lexical items by those which existed in pre-Communist societies;
- changes in style (e.g., mass media);
- considerably more significant influence of other languages and cultures (especially English) through the media, business, etc.

All these changes have to be closely monitored and reflected in teaching translation.

The conference expressed the urgent need to teach translation of mass media. Special attention was drawn to subtitling, advertisements and idioms in translation. It was argued, for example, that subtitles, as a special type of spoken-to-written translation, deserved greater autonomy from written translation norms, and that instructors of subtitling should contribute to its autonomy. Henrik Gottlieb (University of Copenhagen), by presenting taxonomies of text and translation types, came to a conclusion that students of translation should use corpus-based concordances exemplifying the range of real-world renderings.

Some specific problems were discussed in the section on genres and discourse patterns. One of the main problems that face translators in general and translation students in particular, is the models and approaches employed in coping with various texts and their various contexts of situation. Many papers in this section were aimed at launching an attempt to re-evaluate the strategies and the linguistic momentum in the teaching of translation. Both scholars and translators are working hard on the elaboration of methods and recommendations to accelerate progress in teaching translators of technical texts.

Some papers dealt with the problem of the authenticity of material in training translators and interpreters especially when the students are trained to

translate into a foreign language. Marcel Lemmens and Tony Parr (Hogeschool Maastricht) presented the following suggestions, which were based on their experience of teaching Dutch-English translation in the Netherlands:

a) students should learn solutions to typical translation problems. This should allow them to build sentence structures around reliable frameworks and produce natural sentences;

b) students should be offered both structured translation assignments, which can be performed in a random order, and separate reference sections, which can be consulted at any time;

c) students should be enabled to focus on particular structural problems rather than on terminological problems;

d) students should translate authentic material from a variety of sources.

Various methods of teaching consecutive and simultaneous interpreters were proposed at the conference. In teaching consecutive interpreters, dialogue-interpreting in different modes was analysed, as the most sophisticated one, since it involves not only linguistic knowledge, but also the paralinguistic technique of communication. In simultaneous interpretation the strategy of anticipation was considered, which relies on intratextual linguistic elements. Ghelly Chernov (Moscow Linguistic University) demonstrated several methods of training simultaneous interpreters and the results obtained, based on the experience of teaching at the UN Language Training Course in Moscow and the Simultaneous Interpreters' Refresher Course at the Moscow International School of Translation and Interpreting.

As the title of the conference was "New Horizons", participants looked at where translation may be heading, since the average student on a university translation course today can expect to spend seven-eighths of his or her career in the twenty-first century. Translation and interpretation courses have to be more structured to the likely translation of the twenty-first century if university teaching of translation is not to be marginalised. Geoffrey Kingscott (Bradford University) spoke of the danger of such marginalisation in Europe. The Directorate-General XIII of the European Commission, which is responsible for information and communication, has this year been holding a series of meetings, aimed at the creation of a more structured industry in Europe. Strong criticism of university training was expressed at these meetings, and the suggestion was put forward that translator employers come together to establish their own training courses. Ways to change the existing practice of translation teaching were reflected in many papers.

There was a practical, methodological and theoretical overview of newly available technologies designed for professional translation management. These enable users to consult source texts and their translations stored in memory. Such software can be used to improve student performance, since it can provide users with immediate access to a correct model translation. Several papers dealt with the activities of the Technology Enhanced Language Learning (TELL) Consortium of 32 British universities. Professor Thompson heads this section of the Consortium, most of whose computer applications are concerned with different aspects of translation (including specialised dictionaries, a translator's workstation, customised grammars, and advanced-level translation courses in five differ-

ent languages). Technological development provides new openings for both the employee and the company. The traditional work process for language and translation professionals is about to change significantly compared to the translation process as we know it today, mainly due to implementation of new tools. Although translation is to remain in the hands of the translator, it is essential that study programmes are changed according to the latest developments in computer technologies dealing with translation.

Training translators and interpreters is a multifaceted process aimed at developing their professional competence and enhancing their educational status by providing skills that will put them in a position to deal confidently with any text at any time.

The papers presented at the conference and well-focused discussions enabled the participating scholars, translators and interpreters to look into the future of their profession in the twenty-first century, to determine ways of better training, which will lead to a higher quality of translation and interpreting, and better understanding between different peoples of our planet.

Financing Projects and Reducing Risks in Central-East Europe, the NIS

More than 175 senior corporate executives attended this conference in Washington, D.C., on July 11-12, to explore the investment possibilities in Ukraine and other central and east European countries. The conference, sponsored by The Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), was intended to offer US companies an insight into the opportunities in this region, and illustrate ways in which OPIC could assist in financing and insuring projects. Many of those in attendance were interested in telecommunications and investment opportunities.

Ruth Harkin, President and Chief Executive Officer of OPIC, opened the conference by stating that the Clinton administration has made the economic stability of the region the "most important part of our foreign policy". Harkin indicated that OPIC's mission is to assist in the economic growth of developing countries and improve American competitiveness. OPIC accomplishes this through its 24 years of experience, the strength of the US government, the financial strength of over $1.7 billion in financing guarantees last year, and $6.1 billion in issued insurance. In addition, OPIC is now engaged in over 20 equity investment funds, 3 of which, with a capitalised amount exceeding $1.4 billion, are specifically targeted at the NIS. These equity funds will serve as "catalysts" for companies interested in investing in Ukraine, and will be privately owned, closed-ended investments which will yield long-term capital appreciation on a risk adjusted basis. In addition to funds, OPIC provides project finances, political risk insurance and investment development services.

After Harkin's opening comments, Robert Draggon, Vice President for Finance, detailed the ways in which OPIC can finance projects. OPIC typically finances projects from $5 million to a ceiling of $200 million. These projects must be for a long period of time and must not have a negative impact on the US econ-

omy. The principal criteria for obtaining OPIC financing include: the company investing must be US owned; it must retain 25% ownership; and OPIC will only cover 60% of the cost of new projects and 75% of expansion cost, with the remainder being financed by the US investor. OPIC, however, will not finance projects that are involved in military activities or hard alcohol, smoking, etc.

Regarding OPIC's insurance policy, they generally cover inconvertibility, expropriation, and political violence. In the case of inconvertibility, OPIC will step in if the company is not allowed to transfer funds for 60 days. Expropriation claims will be paid if projects are nationalised or confiscated. However, OPIC recognises a country's right to change laws in regulating commerce, thus they will not issue claims unless these changes are targeted at a specific company or group of companies. Political violence covers only politically motivated violence, war, revolution, insurrection, civil strife, terrorism and sabotage. OPIC will not cover damage incurred by other organisations.

Alliance Tech Systems told the audience that the key to a successful operation in Ukraine is to become involved in a joint venture. Joint ventures show commitment to the project, illustrate the concept that both parties can win (an unheard of concept in the Soviet Union), and stresses the concept of partnership. Furthermore, the relationship is more important than any legal document.

OPIC then held simultaneous sessions which focused on Ukraine and Poland. More than half of the conference participants attended the session on Ukraine, which illustrates that US investors are finally taking an interest in this emerging European nation. This year alone, OPIC has received applications for over $800 million to finance projects in Ukraine. Among these, 25 are in the service field, 12 are for manufacturing projects, 9 for minerals, and 5 for agribusiness. Mr. Yakusha, the Economic Attaché at the Embassy of Ukraine in the US, stressed that the situation in Ukraine is far different than that in Russia. Ukraine is experiencing political stability based on the nation building process which took place in 1991-94.

The question and answer period that followed produced a lively discussion about, among other themes, the extent of the underground economy in Ukraine, the reforms, and the lowering of the tax structure. Mr. Yakusha indicated that Ukraine has received $350 million in investment in the first quarter of 1995, which is a 280% increase over the same period last year. However, the privatisation process is moving slowly and to date only 780 large-scale enterprises have been privatised, far behind the 8,000 stipulated in the IMF agreement. Yakusha explained that the slow pace of privatisation is due to the lack of infrastructure and training by government officials.

The conference concluded with a detailed discussion about the application processes, manufacturing, telecommunication opportunities and equity investment. Overall, all of the OPIC staff seemed upbeat. They stated that investment in Ukraine should now increase. □

"Post-Soviet States in Transition" Project, Sidney Sussex College, Cambridge

Andrew Wilson

In 1993, Sidney Sussex College decided to set up an interdisciplinary college-based research project on the theme of the "Post-Soviet States in Transition". The project's *raison d'être* was to expand study of the non-Russian successor states to the USSR, both because of the new geopolitical realities created by the collapse of the USSR and in order to help redress the Moscow-centric bias from which "Soviet studies" had too often suffered in the past. Moreover, our intention was to concentrate on salient topics of national identity, "nation-building" and nationalism.

The project was the initiative of two existing college fellows, Dr Graham Smith, a geographer who has written extensively on Russian and Baltic politics, and Dr Vivien Law, a linguist who specialises in Georgian affairs. In 1993, the College provided start-up funds and Dr Andrew Wilson, formerly of the LSE, was appointed as a Senior Research Fellow attached to the project to undertake research on Ukrainian topics and to organise fund-raising. Ms Annette Bohr, formerly a specialist at Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, was appointed to research Central Asian affairs in 1994. In the same year, a grant of just over £100,000 was obtained from the Leverhulme Trust to finance a sub-project starting in summer, 1995 on "Regional Politics in the Former USSR", beginning (mainly through the employment of two Research Associates) a comparative study of the potential for separatist politics in north-eastern Estonia, eastern Ukraine, Georgia and northern Kazakhstan. Sidney Sussex is keen to organise links with academic institutions in the non-Russian states, and operates a Visiting Fellows Scheme to allow leading scholars in the field from both the former USSR and the West to visit Cambridge to work on the project.

As far as Ukraine is concerned, Dr Wilson has been working in several major areas. One is a monograph to be published by Cambridge University Press in 1996 entitled *Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1990s: A Minority Faith*. He has also been analysing the rewriting and reinterpretation of Ukrainian national history in the wake of independence, and its role in remaking national identity for a forthcoming edited collection entitled *Remaking National Identities in the Post-Soviet Borderlands*; and for the Leverhulme project has begun a long-term study of regional politics in eastern and southern Ukraine. Dr Wilson has a long-standing interest in Crimea, where he has published a series of works on the Crimean Tatars (including contributing to a second edition of Edward Allworth's 1988 survey *Tatars of the Crimea*). In collaboration with Drs Dominique Arel of Columbia University and Valeri Khmelko of the Kyiv Mohyla Academy, he helped to organise a sociological survey in Ukraine in the sum-

mer of 1994, the results of which are to be published in a series of upcoming articles. Other forthcoming publications include a study of the mechanics of economic reform under the new President, Leonid Kuchma, to be published by the Royal Institute of International Affairs in 1996.

Ukrainian Studies in the School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University of London

Jim Dingley

With my appointment as Senior Lecturer in Ukrainian Studies within the Department of East European Languages and Literatures, effective from 1 August this year, Ukrainian studies in SSEES can begin to grow on the foundations laid by Victor Swoboda. During the academic year 1995-96, I shall be fully occupied with the Soros-funded Ukrainian legal dictionary; teaching in Ukrainian language will be provided by the British Council teacher/fellow, Milada Burmistenko. The next year will be used to draft courses and submit them for approval to the relevant School committees. There are already courses which train students to read Ukrainian. New courses are needed which include a wider range of language skills, and provide the students with the necessary background to Ukrainian history and culture. I cannot yet say whether it will be possible to revive the Ukrainian history course taught by Marko Bojcun when he worked at the School, but the main aim must be to provide a solid Ukrainian core within two existing BA degrees at the School: East European Languages, Literature and Regional Studies, and Contemporary East European Studies, and to ensure availability of courses covering various aspects of Ukraine within the structure of the MA degree.

The development of new courses requires the development of teaching materials. The primary task here is to collect reading material in Ukrainian on modern Ukraine from a variety of sources (mainly newspapers and magazines) for language teaching purposes, in particular to retrain MA students who already have a knowledge of another Slavonic language. I shall also be working on the production in-house of anthologies of Ukrainian literature. Any advice and suggestions as to what should be included (or excluded!) will be gratefully received.

The best guarantee of ensuring that Ukrainian studies flourish in the School will be the provision of high-quality language teaching. Over the past few years, this has been provided by teacher/fellows paid for by the British Council. We must hope that this arrangement continues and that it will eventually become possible to employ teacher/fellows whose area of expertise is actually the teaching of Ukrainian to foreigners. Another important consideration is the establishment of good links with university institutions in Ukraine, especially with those that can provide tailor-made courses for our students. Preliminary talks have already been held, and I am confident that this is an area which we shall be able to develop strongly.

Universities flourish also by virtue of their research programmes. The School possesses a rich collection of *Ucrainica*, largely thanks to the efforts of Mr Bartkiw when he worked in the Library, and we must ensure that its holdings receive wide publicity in order to attract research students. There are excellent opportunities now for the development of joint research projects with Ukrainian university institutions. The well-established seminar series must continue as a regular event. Now is also the time to revive the fortunes of the British Association for Ukrainian Studies (provided I do not have to do everything myself!).

We are faced with a challenge and an opportunity. Let us hope that regular reports on the progress of Ukrainian Studies at SSEES will appear on the pages of *The Ukrainian Review*. □

Obituaries

Patriarch Volodymyr (Romanyuk) of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Kyiv Patriarchate), died suddenly on 14 July, 1995, while walking in the Kyiv Botanical Gardens. He was 69 years old.

He was born on 9 December, 1925, in Khymchyna, western Ukraine, then under Polish rule, into an Eastern-rite Catholic family, and given the baptismal name of Vasyl. During World War II, he studied theology for a brief period in Stanislaviv (Ivano-Frankivsk), before joining the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), which fought first the Nazis, and then, after they retreated, the incoming Soviet Red Army. Late in 1944, Romanyuk was arrested by the NKVD, and sentenced by a military tribunal in Stanislaviv to a term in a labour camp. His parents were also arrested and exiled to Siberia, where his father died of overwork, and his 13-year-old brother, Atanasiy, who tried to flee when the rest of the family were arrested, was shot.

Vasyl Romanyuk's term of imprisonment lasted 10 years. During this time, he met and married a fellow prisoner, Mariya Antonyuk. Soon after his release in 1954, he decided to continue his theological studies. But the Eastern-rite Catholic Church had been abolished in the Soviet Union on Stalin's orders – "voluntarily reunited with the Orthodox" was the politically correct term. His only option, therefore, was to study theology within the Russian Orthodox framework. It proved impossible for him to enter one of the few seminaries which remained open in the Soviet Union (admissions were severely scrutinised by the security authorities); he was, however, able to take short diocesan courses, and, in 1959, he was ordained as a deacon. Although in this year he was rehabilitated in respect of his prison sentence (as part of the general wave of de-Stalinisation), he was unable to get permission for religious work and had to take a job as a cinema technician. Eventually, in 1964, after the death of an obstructive local official, he was ordained priest. He and his family (by now there was a son, Taras) moved to the village of Kosmach in the Carpathians.

During the next few years, Fr Vasyl became more and more involved with the resurgent Ukrainian national and human rights movements. A key factor in

his involvement was the removal of the iconostasis of his church, for use in the film "Shadows of Forgotten Ancestors", which won a prize at the Cannes Film Festival in 1967-68. His unsuccessful campaign to get the iconostasis returned brought him into contact with the dissident historian Valentyn Moroz. Following the latter's arrest in Kosmach at Easter, 1970, Fr Vasyl wrote a number of appeals to the authorities on his behalf – until he himself was arrested for "anti-state agitation" in 1972. He was sentenced to two years in prison, three in a labour camp in Mordovia, and then five years in Siberian exile. While in the camp, he several times went on hunger strike in a vain attempt to be allowed a Bible, and wrote a number of appeals to world religious leaders. In 1976, he wrote from the labour camp renouncing his Soviet citizenship, and appealing to the USA to grant him an American passport. The only response of the Soviet authorities was to expel his son, Taras, from Lviv University. The Russian Orthodox Church likewise expelled him from the priesthood.

When his sentence at last expired, he returned to Ukraine, where he worked for a time in a hospital. Eventually, after he had been forced to write a letter retracting his wish to emigrate, he was readmitted to the priesthood. But in 1987, with Gorbachev's *perestroika* under way, he renewed his campaign to emigrate, and in 1988 he and his son were allowed to leave for Canada. (His wife, Mariya, had died in 1985).

In Canada, Fr Vasyl made contact with the independent Ukrainian Autocephalic Orthodox Church, which (like the Ukrainian Catholic Church) had been outlawed by the Soviet authorities. But by 1990, as Soviet power began to crumble, this Church was once more active in Ukraine, and it was as a member of it that he returned to Ukraine. As a widower, he was able to take monastic orders (taking "Volodymyr" as his new name in religion) and became eligible for a bishopric. His rise in the hierarchy was rapid: in April, 1990, he became Bishop of Uzhhorod and Khust, in 1991, Archbishop of Bila Tserkva, and in March, 1993, Archbishop of Lviv.

By now, the Ukrainian state had been independent for more than a year, and the head of the (Moscow-dominated) Ukrainian Orthodox Church, Metropolitan Filaret, attempted to achieve a similar independence for his Church. The Moscow Holy Synod refused to countenance this request, and when Filaret attempted a unilateral break with Moscow, declared him expelled from the priesthood. But President Leonid Kravchuk of Ukraine supported Filaret, and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church split – part remaining loyal to Moscow and the Metropolitan (Vladimir) whom it appointed in place of Filaret, and part supporting Filaret and his desire for an independent church under a Patriarch of Kyiv. Filaret's supporters called a joint Synod with the Autocephalic Orthodox Church and decided on a merger, with Patriarch Mstyslav (of the Autocephalic Orthodox Church) to head the new united church. Filaret was to be his deputy with the right of succession. But Patriarch Mstyslav repudiated this deal; the Synod, he said, had been uncanonical, and, however unjustly, Filaret had been laicised according to the canons of the Orthodox Church. In the acrimonious debates which followed, Archbishop Volodymyr transferred his allegiance from the Autocephalic Orthodox to the new Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Kyiv Patriarchate), and, shortly afterwards, was himself elected Patriarch.

The three Ukrainian Orthodox Churches continue to be at loggerheads – as the disturbances which marred the funeral of Patriarch Volodymyr showed. These very clash-

es, however, have focused the attention of believers on the need for unity – or at least amity – between them, and the Acting Minister of Justice, Vasyl Onopenko, who tendered his resignation in protest at the official mishandling of the funeral, announced that he would try to bring together the leaders of all three Orthodox Churches, and also the Ukrainian Catholic Church, in order to work out a *modus vivendi.*

Oles Honchar, one of the leading Ukrainian writers of our time, died on 17 July, 1995, in Kyiv, at the age of 77.

Honchar was born on 3 April, 1918, in Sukha, Poltava province, in independent Ukraine. He grew up in the countryside, and as a teenager witnessed the horrors of the collectivisation campaign and the artificial famine of 1933. At the age of 17, he went to Kharkiv, where he enrolled in the School of Journalism, from which he graduated in 1937. In 1938, he became a student at Dnipropetrovsk University. His education, however, was interrupted by the Second World War: he joined the Red Army as soon as the Nazis invaded the USSR. Eventually he graduated in 1946, and set about making himself a career as a writer.

At that time, in the Soviet Union, only those writers who cooperated with the Soviet authorities could expect to see their works published. Honchar, who had joined the Communist Party in 1946, found no difficulty in getting his books into print. Works such as *The Standard-bearers* (1948), *Tauria* (1952), *Perekop* (1958), *The Man and Arms* (1960) and *Tronka* (1963) won wide acclaim from the literary establishment. The second volume of the trilogy *The Standard-bearers* (*The Blue Danube*) won a Stalin prize, and *Tronka* gained one of the Lenin prizes for literature in 1964. Honchar's works became compulsory reading in Ukrainian schools and universities.

Nevertheless, even at this stage, Honchar was not simply a party hack. During these early years (with the notable exception of *Tronka*), he tended to avoid contemporary themes, dealing rather with pre-revolutionary life, and the horrors of World War I and the Civil War which followed. But in 1968, there came a watershed. His latest novel, *The Cathedral*, was published in one of the "thick" literary journals and caused a furore. For not only did it hold up an all-

too-accurate mirror to the miseries and injustices of rural life in contemporary Ukraine, the reconstruction of the half-ruined Cathedral of the title was a self-evident metaphor for the hoped-for rebirth of the Ukrainian nation. The Soviet censorship clamped down; the publication of the novel in book form was forbidden, and when, eventually, it was allowed to appear, significant cuts and amendments had been made to the text.

The controversy over *The Cathedral* rehabilitated Honchar in the eyes of Ukrainian patriots. It did not, however, permanently damage his status in the eyes of the Soviet establishment: early in 1971, for example, he acted as the official host for an international literary conference to celebrate the centenary of the birth of the poet and dramatist Lesya Ukrayinka. He turned, too, to politics, serving as a deputy both in the Ukrainian SSR and All-Union "Supreme Soviets" – those rubber-stamp "parliaments" which met for a few days each year to give formal approval in the name of the "people" to the decisions of the real rulers, the Communist *nomenklatura.*

Honchar tried to use even these largely ceremonial gatherings to defend, as far as possible, the formal status of Ukraine as a separate constituent of the USSR. He became more and more known as, in the words of the Ukrainian publicist and environmentalist, Yuriy Shcherbak, "a defender of the moral, cultural and historical *sacralia*, without which the Ukrainian nation would have been transformed into a statistical-mean 'population of Ukraine'". During the later 1980s, it has been said, there was probably not a single forum of significance in Ukraine at which Honchar did not speak with full ideological conviction in defence of Ukrainian culture, language, and – as time went on – state independence. But, for a long time, he refrained from taking the final step of quitting the Communist Party. He still hoped that, under *perestroika*, the Party could somehow reform itself, express its repentance for the millions of victims of the terror (often themselves sincere Communists), and renounce its "imperialist great-power course".

The breaking point came on 9 October, 1990, during the protest fast of students in Kyiv, demanding the dismissal of Prime Minister Masol, new, multi-party, parliamentary elections, and the secession of Ukraine from the USSR. The hard-line Communist majority in the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet refused to take cognizance of the students' demands. Honchar was watching the protest closely (his own grand-daughter was among those students who had announced their intention of fasting, if necessary, until death). When, on the 10th day of the fast, with several students already taken to intensive care units, the hard-liners still met their demands with roars of laughter, Honchar had had enough. He wrote an open letter to the Party Committee of the Union of Writers, stating categorically and unambiguously:

> I am with those who are capable of sympathy and mercy, who, together with the students, together with the whole body of conscious citizens, are speaking out for the true sovereignty of Ukraine; I am not with those who ferociously resist radical changes in our life, revealing their apparatchik-dogmatic conservatism, and their essential anti-people nature. As for those who with measureless harshness and derisive laughter geet the tragedy of their own people and the sufferings of the children of Ukraine, I want absolutely nothing to do with them. □

Reviews

The Soviet Empire Reconsidered. Essays in Honor of Adam B. Ulam. Edited by Sanford R. Lieberman, David E. Powell, Carol R. Saivetz and Sarah M. Terry (Westview Press, Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford) 263 pp, £44.50

Professor Adam B. Ulam, Gurney Professor Emeritus of History and Government at Harvard University, was for many years director of that university's Russian Research Center. Born in Lviv (then under Polish rule) in 1922, he emigrated to the USA on the eve of World War II, and for almost all of his academic career, both as PhD student and then as lecturer and professor, he has been associated with Harvard. His first interest was in British political history. The first courses he taught were on the history and politics of the British Empire, and his first book was *The Philosophical Foundations of English Socialism* (1951). But he soon switched his attention to the Soviet Union and the empire which it was then creating in eastern Europe. The remainder of what the editors of this work rightly call his "prodigious career" was devoted to the analysis of the rise and fall of the Soviet empire and its Socialist satellites.

The Soviet Empire Reconsidered is described by the editors as *Festschrift*, though it is never spelt out just which *Fest* is being celebrated – Ulam's 70th birthday, in 1992, or the end of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991. It contains 11 essays (the planned twelfth contributor, Aleksandr M. Nekrich, who was to have contributed an analysis of the XIX Conference of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, in June, 1988, died before he could complete this work). According to the dust-jacket blurb, which for some reason is repeated as a note on the final page,

> [i]n this volume, eminent scholars reflect on the unique and central features of the Soviet empire during its period of consolidation in Europe and speculate on the long-term effects of its collapse. They reconsider subjects that have absorbed Adam Ulam's attention in his own work – the ideologies of central planning, of totalitarianism and state terror at home, and of intervention abroad – and explore their impact on the people who lived under Soviet power at its apogee. They also analyze the unraveling of the system on the domestic scene, in elite and grassroots politics, and in the international arena. Concluding chapters focus on the configuration of new domestic and foreign policies and on prospects for security and cooperation in the region.

In fact, and in spite of the high scholarly standard of the individual essays, the work as a whole fails, to some extent, to match this claim. The blurb gives an impression of an integrated work; in reality, like most *Festschriften*, its contents are somewhat patchy. The essays range from ideological theory (Abbott Gleason: "The Truman Doctrine and the Rhetoric of Totalitarianism"; Mark R. Beissinger: "The Ideology of Imperative Planning: Marxism and the Ideological Consequences of Market Reform" to the detailed and local (David E. Powell: "Environmental Problems in Moscow"). Except for Sanford R. Lieberman's study "The Re-Sovietization of Formerly Occupied Areas of the USSR During World War II", the Soviet Union is treated as an entirety, although, in a book addressing the theme of the

Soviet *empire*, one might well expect a paper devoted to the theoretical and actual status of the constituent republics and/or the non-Russian nationalities, or to case histories of specimen Union or Autonomous republics. The satellite states of eastern Europe are represented by the two most repressive regimes (Mary Ellen Fischer: "Stalinism in Romania: A Preliminary Discussion of Stalin, Ceausescu, and Totalitarianism", and Norman M. Naimark: "The Soviet Gulag in Eastern Germany, 1945-50"). True, every one of the six east European Comecon states had its own peculiarities, so it would be impossible to select a "typical" satellite. Nevertheless, a paper devoted to Poland or Hungary, where, for a large part of the period, the regimes were less repressive than elsewhere, might have provided a better balance. (Indeed, in view of Ulam's background, it is somewhat surprising that there is no paper devoted to Poland or to Ukraine). Finally, and perhaps most important, in spite of the claims of the blurb, there is no real focus on the problems of how and why the Soviet empire fell apart; such material as there is is scattered over the last four pages, which deal with Soviet and Russian foreign policy in the Gorbachev and post-Gorbachev years.

These criticisms, it must be stressed, are directed not at the individual contributions, but at the contents of the book as a whole – or, perhaps, at the writer of the blurb, for inadvertently promising what the book cannot deliver. The individual essays themselves come well up to expectations of interest and scholarly merit. And although there is no paper on a specifically Ukrainian theme, several contributions do contain material of considerable Ukrainian interest. Sanford R. Lieberman, on the re-Sovietisation of the formerly occupied areas of the USSR gives many interesting details of how this process was carried out in Ukraine: the reconstruction of the local *apparats*, the role of the NKVD, the deployment of discharged soldiers to build up Party cadres. Interestingly, although Lieberman says that this process "has been one of the least studied aspects of the Soviet Union's involvement in the war", much of the material relating to the re-Sovietisation of Ukraine comes not, as one might expect, from materials which emerged from secret archives over the past few years, but from official Communist Party histories published in the 1960s. (Lieberman, indeed, seems to use no "new" material whatsoever – he cites no archival sources, and the latest published work mentioned in the references is dated 1968. Once again, this hardly meets the editorial claim that this is a "fresh examination" of the Soviet empire following its demise). And, by an injudicious choice of the lead-in to one of his key quotations, the author (or possibly his editor) manages to give the impression that "Rovno" (i.e. Rivne) is in Belarus, instead of in Ukraine. Ukrainian matters (albeit from a Russo-centric viewpoint) also feature in Mikhail Tsypkin's "Military Power in Russian National Security Policy" and Carol R. Saivetz's "The Emergence of Russian Foreign Policy: Political Debates and Russia's National Interest" ("Russian", in this context, referring to the post-Soviet Russian Federation), while Sarah Meiklejohn Terry's "Beyond the Cold War: Prospects for Central European Security and Cooperation in a Post-Communist World" brings out to the full the importance of Ukraine's role as one of the "heavyweights" in any new central-eastern or pan-European security systems.

Defense Conversion, Economic Reform, and the Outlook for the Russian and Ukrainian Economies. Edited by Henry S. Rowen, Charles Wolf, Jr., and Jeanne Zlotnick (St Martin's Press, New York, 1994) 262 pp.

This is a collection of the papers presented at a symposium conducted in November, 1992 by Rand and the Hoover Institution. The third in a series of biennial conferences on what had, formerly, been designated Soviet defence economics, it differed from its forerunners in two significant respects: it focused, not on the entire Soviet (by now ex-Soviet) space, but on two of the successor republics, Russia and Ukraine; furthermore, whereas the two previous symposia had consisted largely of papers and discussions by US experts, the contributors to the 1992 symposium came mainly from specialists in the republics concerned – nine from Russia and four from Ukraine, with only two being provided by the Americans.

The book exhibits both the strength and the weakness of such symposium proceedings. On the one hand, it brings together a formidable array of expert talent. In particular, the Ukrainian contributors were Victor I. Antonov (the then Minister of Engineering, Military Complex and Conversion), Oleg Bodruk (Defence Minister Adviser), Alexander N. Honcharenko (Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Academy of Sciences of Ukraine), and Major General Yuri Prokofiev (Head of the Military Education Department of the Ministry of Defence), while Volodymyr Lanovoy (former Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of the Economy), was among the discussants. On the other hand, as the editors' Introduction states that the purpose of the symposium was to "analyz[e] the special role of the defense sectors in these two economies, how that role is changing, and how it will affect and be affected by economic and political reform, as well as some of the issues raised for US and Western policymakers by these changes", then, alas, it would appear that only those "US and Western policymakers" fortunate enough to take part in the symposium itself will have benefited from its deliberations. For the rapid rate of change in the former Soviet space inevitably means that, due to the long delay between the symposium and the book, much of its content was already obsolete by the time it appeared. During the gestation time of the book, such vital issues as the disposal of the nuclear weapons based in Ukraine were (at least in theory) resolved. The time-lag does not seem to have been due simply to the physical production-time of the book, but by the editorial process; although the introduction bears no date, it clearly received its final updating after the Russian parliamentary elections and referendum of December, 1993. Presumably some of this time went on the translation of the Russian and Ukrainian contributions, and what the editors describe as the "at least light" editing of the texts. (On occasion, this editing seems to have been somewhat too light, leaving one with such peculiarities of phraseology as "long-service goods" for "durables" and "subject to international law", where, presumably, "a subject *of* international law" was meant). Doubtless, too, the Introduction was updated at the last moment, when the remainder of the text was ready to go to press. Even so, a hiatus of (at least) 13 months between the symposium and the printing of its

proceedings for a work with a limited topicality shelf-life, suggests, to say the least, the lack of an efficient progress-chaser.

Nevertheless, the book as a whole has worn well. Although the economic situations in both Ukraine and Russia, though still in a state of transition and confusion, have changed considerably, the role of "conversion" in the development of both countries still remains relevant – indeed, this summer President Yeltsin of Russia launched yet another drive to use the redundant scientific expertise of the military-industrial complex to kick-start the Russian economy. The idea of "conversion" has, indeed, been around for some years – it was one of the slogans of Gorbachev's *perestroika* campaign of the latter 1980s – and one may validly ask why, so far, relatively little has been achieved in this field. The answer lies partly in the nature of the Soviet military system. The army had its own network of factories for producing consumer durables for service personnel and their families – and much of the success claimed for conversion in its initial stages was simply effected by making the products of these plants available to the general public. Other much-publicised examples were simply quirky – a tank factory switching to chocolate production, for example! Other "successes", too, were little more than statements of intention, particularly in the case of "dual purpose" goods: it is easy to proclaim, say, that a military helicopter can be used for fire-fighting or air-sea rescue work – but that does not mean that the fire-fighting and rescue services will be able to absorb the whole output of the factories built to supply the military at the height of the Cold War. In both Ukraine and Russia, a proper economic strategy for conversion has yet to be implemented.

Hand in hand with a rational strategy must go a clear conception of the future requirements of the country's defence capacity. As Alexander N. Honcharenko points out, this must include an analysis of the "vital national interests and priorities of Ukraine as a sovereign European state for the decades ahead", the "basic internal and external security factors", the "minimal level of deterrence (political, military, economic [and] legal", necessary to defend Ukraine's national interests and appropriate "guarantors for independence and the further development of Ukraine". From the standpoint of 1992, Honcharenko is sharply critical both of the efforts of the West to impose its own requirements on Ukraine (requirements that, *de facto*, favoured Russia) and of the compliance of the then President of Ukraine, Leonid Kravchuk, on such vital issues as the hand-over of nuclear weapons, and the division of the Black Sea Fleet. The Yalta Agreement (on the Fleet), he warns, "le[ft] everything open, postpon[ed] all crucial decisions for the future, and consider[ed] independent Ukraine as a historical aberration". During the past three years, Western attitudes have, in general, shifted in favour of the non-Russian successor states (Western expectations of Russia took a rude shock over the Chechnya war). At the same time, one issue pinpointed by him – (nuclear warheads and nuclear fuel) which would have appeared to have been resolved during the course of production of the book – has recently flared up again: the USA reduced the amount it is prepared to pay for "ex-Soviet" plutonium (from warheads), and, as a result, Russia now says it cannot afford to supply Ukraine with the fuel for its nuclear power-stations.

Interestingly, Honcharenko concludes his list of "vital national interests" of Ukraine with "The development and maintenance of sociocultural and spiritual revival as the foundations of a nation-state system for the Ukrainian people". For him, as his paper makes evident, this is bound up with such "defense" issues as the presence of Russian troops in Ukraine, the reluctance of Ukraine to become involved in CIS defence structures, the "Russophone" population of Ukraine, and so on. For Major General Yuri Prokofiev, it is seemingly bound up with the continuance of the Soviet approach to military education. The main thrust of his paper is practical – an analysis of the deficiencies of the extended "irrational and ineffective" system of military education inherited from the Soviet Union – in comparison with the system of the United States. While criticising individual features of the Soviet legacy, Prokofiev accepts without question one of its main features – a system of "preliminary" education for young men, prior to compulsory military service. Universal compulsory military service is still demanded by a majority of countries world-wide, but "preliminary" training as a compulsory part of general education was something specific to the USSR and its satellites. And the main purpose of this pre-military training was *not* (according to the Soviet theorists) to save time in basic training when the recruits actually entered the army, but to inculcate into them the correct political and patriotic attitudes. Prokofiev's proposal for the reform of military education in Ukraine envisages as, it would seem, a matter of course the "[o]rganization of a subsystem for preenlistment, prerecruitment, and predraft military training of youth". Certainly, the educative value of military and quasi-military training is something which military personnel (active and retired) in all countries are liable to advocate. Clearly, too, Prokofiev has an interest in maintaining his country's military-educational establishment – to the extent that he actually advocates increasing scientific research at military establishments, although "conversion" is normally considered to include the transfer of military-sponsored research to the civilian sphere. Nevertheless, his unquestioning acceptance of this "preliminary" education, is, to say the least, significant.

The other two "Ukrainian" papers are economically oriented. Victor I. Antonov considers the two strategies for conversion: "broad conversion" to civilian production (which would require considerable investment and credits for retooling, but which would eventually yield "enormous profits", the "Russian variant" (maintaining military output, exporting military hardware, and using the income therefrom for conversion and social security for redundant munitions workers), and, at least in theory, "shock conversion" – the reorientation of defence industries to civilian production with minimum budgetary support from the state, an option which he considers "fraught with unreimbursable losses in intellectual and technical-industrial potential, as well as social constraints". The first option, he urges, is "more civilized and corresponds to the nonviolent policy of our state", and the bulk of his paper is devoted to working out the economic basis of such a policy. Oleg Bodruk notes that the defence-related economic problems of independent Ukraine pose a new problem for Ukrainian analysts accustomed to think only in terms of the defence capacity of the Soviet Union as a whole, and inculcated with

the "class" interpretation of military issues. He pinpoints some significant features of Ukrainian defence production – in particular, the absence of many important sectors such as small-arms manufacture, and Ukraine's dependence on supplies of strategically important raw materials and energy from abroad. He underlines the problems caused by Ukraine's indebtedness to the West and the other countries of the former Soviet Union, and an attitude of foreign investors which "practically deprives Ukraine of all hope of international financial assistance" – a situation which, happily, has now significantly changed. He argues that conversion can be economically beneficial only within a broad frame of economic reconstruction and that "an unreasonable conversion program or an attempt to accomplish conversion in the near future by curtailing funds and orders could lead to an even greater economic crisis and the further aggravation of social tensions".

All four Ukrainian contributions are excellently presented, filled with valuable facts and figures and, whether or not one agrees with all their conclusions, extremely thought-provoking. Equally stimulating and informative is much of the Russian material, however much, from a Ukrainian point of view, one disagrees both with its content and its underlying philosophy. Valuable, too, are the two American contributions – on the inadequacy of Soviet statistics as a base-line for present and future economic assessments by Vladimir G. Treml (Department of Economics, Duke University) and the concluding paper of Fred Charles Iklé on the general strategic background.

Being a compilation of individual papers, the book, not surprisingly, contains a number of conflicting views – all the more so, given the conflicting interests and attitudes of the Ukrainian and Russian participants. Ukraine's legacy of nuclear weapons, the Black Sea Fleet, and whether or not Russia poses a security threat to Ukraine were obvious points of disagreement. Other disputed issues – which to some extent cut across the Russian/Ukrainian divide – included the effectiveness and desirability of foreign aid (such as debt for equity swaps) and the extent to which Russia and Ukraine should rely on arms exports as a means of rescuing their economies. The eminent names listed among the seminar discussants and participants suggest that the debates and discussions which followed each presentation must have been both lively and fruitful. The inclusion of transcripts – or at least brief summaries of these discussions – would have added substantially to the interest and worth of this already very valuable book.

Russian Nationalism and Ukraine. The Nationality Policy of the Volunteer Army during the Civil War. By Anna Procyk (Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, Edmonton-Toronto, 1995) 202 pp, $39.95

This is, undoubtedly, an extremely interesting and challenging book. The author sets out to reassess a number of generally accepted views of the conflicts which followed the Russian revolutions of 1917; and, in particular, the political aims of the Russian "White" movement and its Volunteer Army (VA). In doing so, she deals in considerable detail with the relations between the "White" politicians and the successive leaders of the newly independent Ukrainian

state. Indeed, she argues, that the reason that the VA failed to defeat the Bolsheviks was because its political leaders were unable to come to terms with the idea of an independent or even autonomous Ukraine.

To Dr Procyk, however, this does not mean that the VA was distracted from its prime objective (defeating the Bolsheviks) by a side issue (Ukraine). For Dr Procyk, the main purpose and aims of the Russian "liberals" who dominated "White" politics was not to defeat the Bolsheviks, restore the monarchy, or even to establish the kind of constitutionality envisaged by the Russian Provisional Government after the February Revolution of 1917. It was, she maintains, simply to ensure the continuance of a "One and Indivisible" Russian empire. Finland and Poland could be allowed to go their own ways, but the rest of the empire must be preserved in its entirety. The "Whites" did not fight the Bolsheviks because of their Communist ideology, she asserts, but because they threatened the integrity of the Russian imperium. The "White" ideology, she argues, antedated the Bolshevik October Revolution of 1917. "It first came into being", she writes,

> at the end of 1916 in the atmosphere of heightened nationalism, when corruption, ineptitude, or what was interpreted as betrayal of the tsarist regime seems to have been driving the country to destruction. It emerged again during the revolution, when from the vantage point of General Headquarters it appeared that treason stamped the activities of the extreme left. It crystallized into a fighting force when the Bolsheviks brought their pacifist activities to their logical conclusion by initiating negotiations for peace immediately after their seizure of power in November 1917. Thus the White movement centered in the VA was first and foremost a Russian national movement led by the liberal, strongly pro-Entente intelligentsia and by generals, many of whom differed socially and politically little from their civilian counterparts.

To the "Whites" (whether military leaders or civilians), she says, "a separate peace and treason appeared synonymous" and their movement which had originally "emerged in response to the corruption, ineptitude, and irresponsibility of the extreme right became anti-Bolshevik in 1917 because at this time the Bolsheviks were considered the principal architects of the destruction and disintegration of the vast, multinational empire".

This is an intriguing and stimulating point of view, which, if correct, would make it logical for the "Whites" to see the Ukrainian independence movement as a prime target for their activities, taking priority, perhaps, even over the campaign against the Bolsheviks. As such, it would explain a number of developments, such as the VA's campaign against the forces of the Ukrainian Directory in 1919, which entailed a determined attempt to extirpate all signs of Ukrainian culture in the areas it occupied. To what extent the "White" leaders themselves perceived a choice of priorities is an open question. Dr Procyk suggests that they were taken by surprise by the eruption of national movements in 1917, that moved rapidly from demands for autonomy to full independence. Certainly, there seems to have been some fuzzy thinking on the part of certain Russian politicians, the "Kadets", for example, whose 1906 party programme advocated "free cultural self-determination", including "full freedom to use different languages and dialects in public life", and to "use the native tongue in

local elementary schools; autonomy for Poland; and reestablishment of the Finnish constitution", and who, in 1914, defended the right of Ukrainians to celebrate the birth of their national poet, Taras Shevchenko, nevertheless, were opposed, in 1917, to what amounted to a decision by the Russian Provisional Government to recognise Ukrainian autonomy. (Four Kadet ministers quit the Provisional Government as a result of what seems to have been little more than a grudging acceptance by the Provisional Government of the *de facto* situation). And in March, 1919, a former extreme-right member of Russia's State Duma proclaimed that "for the sake of Russia's salvation I am ready to reconcile myself with the yellow-and-blue [UNR] flag because I prefer to see the salvation of my country under the yellow-and-blue flag rather than a cemetery under the [Russian] tricolor" – although one cannot but wonder what precisely he meant by "Russia" in this context.

Dr Procyk goes into considerable detail about the ideological nuances involved. She brings out well the inherent irony of the Russian "liberals", who supposedly advocated personal freedom, and at the same time were opposed to the aspirations of the national liberation movements. This was, as she correctly points out, partly a legacy of "the rationalistic thought of the Enlightenment, which emphasized the general rather than the particular and imparted no special value or utility to the peculiarities of each nation's language and culture", but which "focused on the rational human being, whose scientific progress and domination of nature would lead to a more perfect society". A "just and more perfect order could be reached most speedily and efficiently under the influence of the most advanced cultures" and "Russian culture, with its undisputed preeminence within the empire, had the right to leadership and dominance not because the Russians were the ruling nation, but because Russian advanced cultural achievements would benefit all of the empire's inhabitants in the march of history toward progress". Such imperial thinking was not, of course, peculiar to Russia – but while it is equally galling to any subject people to be told that the suppression of its native culture is in the long run for its own good – in the case of the Russian empire, these "liberals" seem to have made remarkably little effort, in practice, to ensure that the material benefits of the "march... toward progress" reached the empire's subject peoples. (In passing, one may note that Dr Procyk's explanations of Russian "liberal" thinking go some way towards explaining how today's notorious Vladimir Zhirinovskiy can describe his party as "Liberal Democrats" with, apparently, no general feeling in Russia that this is a gross misnomer).

Dr Procyk's own explanation of why, at times, in the pre-revolutionary era, the liberals were prepared to give some apparent support to the cultural aspirations of the non-Russian peoples of the empire is that of pragmatism – the nationalities' question "provided them with a convenient pretext to criticize the hated autocratic regime". But "[w]hen the catastrophes of the war and the revolution made them aware of their submerged feelings, their newly awakened national fervor transformed them into the most ardent defenders of Russia's indivisibility" and made the liberal civilians "willing partners of the Russian generals, who believed they were bound by their military oaths to defend Russia's territorial integrity".

Yet, in their own perception, the Russian liberals still saw their outlook, in spite of its new patriotic fervour, as "founded on respectable scientific principles of universal human progress". The nationalism of the non-Russians, on the other hand, "had its roots in the ideology of the Romantic era, which stressed the particular rather than the general and the intuitive and the emotional rather than the rational", an outlook based on the views of such writers as Johann G. Herder and Giuseppe Mazzini, in which "each nation is a unique entity with its very own, peculiar nature, which is expressed primarily through its language and culture", and "[h]uman progress is viewed in cultural and spiritual rather than material or scientific terms", with the "extinction of a national language or culture... considered an irreplaceable loss and detriment to all humankind".

Granted the inherent dichotomy between these two world-views, and the dependence of the Russian centre on the rich agricultural and mineral resources of Ukraine, the conflict between the "Whites" and nascent independent Ukraine seems a foregone conclusion. The real surprise is that anyone, on either side, was prepared to consider negotiation. In fact, as Dr Procyk herself shows, ideological lines (and personal interests) continued to waver. In Ukraine, Russian land-owners, industrialists and financiers, and even some "ultraconservative monarchists" were prepared to cooperate with the regime of Hetman Skoropadskyi since

> [a]lthough that regime stood for Ukraine's independence, at the same time it was restoring the principles upon which the old order was based – a step no other larger political center on the territory of the former empire was willing to undertake... Their principal enemies were the Bolsheviks, and if the spread of Bolshevism could be arrested with the aid of Germany or through the efforts of an independent Ukrainian state, they were willing to take advantage of such aid even at the expense of the territorial unity of Russia.

Hetman Skoropadskyi himself, indeed, had a considerable number of Russians in his government, and continued to explore the possibilities of federation with Russia. With the collapse of the Central Powers in autumn, 1918, the Entente effectively made federation a condition of assistance against the Bolsheviks. But an attempt by the French envoy Emile Henno to bring about even a temporary Russian recognition of the Hetman's government proved fruitless. Denikin, an uncompromising advocate of a "One and Indivisible" Russia, was by now Commander-in-Chief of the VA, while the VA's Political Centre had become increasingly Ukrainophobe, and shortly afterwards the Hetman's government was replaced by that of the Directory. Armed conflict became inevitable. Yet, in the last resort, even Denikin was prepared to compromise; in November, 1919, he reached an alliance with the Ukrainian Galician Army (UHA) which did not demand the acceptance of an "indivisible" Russia or the UHA's complete incorporation into his own forces. (He was even, at the very end, willing to recognise the Transcaucasian states as a means of saving his forces from the advancing Bolsheviks). And his successor as Commander-in-Chief of the VA, General Wrangel, and his political supporters showed themselves ready to accept the principle of "a federal structure based on the nationality principle", albeit only under "a strong monarch, the symbol of the empire's unity".

Dr Procyk's research appears to have been confined to sources available in the West; although her bibliography contains many published Soviet works, she does not seem to have consulted the newly de-classified archive collections of the former Soviet Union – the four manuscript collections she refers to are all in the USA. Nevertheless, she brings to her subject a wealth of fascinating material. Who would have thought, for example, that Winston Churchill, the then British Minister for War, would appeal to Denikin in September, 1919, to "meet, as far as possible, the Ukrainian separatist strivings half way"?

Whether the "half-way house" of federalism would have worked, even temporarily, is one of the unanswered questions of history. But there do seem to have been moments in these crucial years when a Russian willingness to accept the principle of federation could have cemented a military alliance with the former non-Russian subjects of the empire sufficient to defeat the Bolsheviks.

Whether or not one accepts Dr Procyk's contention that, to the "Whites" generally, the various separatist movements were perceived as no less a danger than the Bolsheviks, whether or not one continues to cast the VA generals as primarily responsible for the "White" failure, or, like Dr Procyk, puts the blame on the refusal of the VA's Political Centre to come to terms with the leaders of independent Ukraine, one will surely find in this book a thought-provoking source for a reassessment of these crucial years.

Voices of Conscience – Poetry from Oppression. Edited by Hume Cronyn, Richard McKane and Stephen Watts (Iron Press, North Shields, Northumberland, 1995) 445 pp, £12.99

This book is, undoubtedly, a collection of major significance. Thirty-five years ago, when the Ukrainian community in Great Britain announced a poetry competition in honour of the forthcoming centenary of the death of Ukraine's national poet, Taras Shevchenko, the Centenary Committee received a number of letters from the poetry establishment of that time, suggesting that the set theme: "Liberty and Human Rights" was inappropriate. "Poetry for poetry's sake", they thundered.

Today, the literary pendulum has swung so far that one can hardly imagine a poet of significance *not* taking up his/her pen in defence of humanitarian values. For many, thank God, their concern is second-hand. This collection, for the most part, is work from the torture-face; the writings of those who themselves have suffered incarceration in prison or "special" mental institution for their outspokenness.

With the exception of Oscar Wilde (represented by an extract from *The Ballad of Reading Jail*), these are all twentieth-century works. The great oppressions – the Armenian Genocide, Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union and its satellites, are, naturally, well represented. But so, too, are the less-known victims – from Iran, Bangladesh, Nepal, Ireland. Kurds, Australian Aborigines, and Welsh-language campaigners, too, have their place – though Bretons and Basques are absent. It is a grim and world-wide picture of humankind's inhumanity...

Reading such a work, one inevitably feels a need to pay tribute to the initiative of the editors and publishers in bringing out such a work. Literary criticism, it might be argued, must take second place. Yet, since it is the *poet's* words

which encapsulate the personal experience (else one might as well read an Amnesty International report), the conscientious critic must pay due heed to the translator's responsibility to convey into the target language the content and form of the poet's distillation of that experience.

And, here, alas, one must voice one's doubts. Since this is not a parallel-text edition, it would be a considerable task to verify the accuracy of even those contributions in the more accessible languages. But the informed reader of literature in translation can spot the danger-signs: those versions by "A.B. and X.Y." – suggesting that the "translator" poet has no knowledge of the original, and has worked with a native-speaker amanuensis – a procedure which, unless that amanuensis is a practising poet or an ultra-sensitive *litterateur*, inevitably results in the loss of virtually all subliminal overtones. While at least one of the translators included is notorious for the view that it is not necessary to convey the form nor even the content accurately – simply to write one's own (superior) poem on the same theme...

Ukraine is represented here by one poet, Vasyl Stus – five extracts from his cycle, "Elegies", translated by Marco Carynnyk. This is not a name which, hitherto, has come to our attention as a translator of Ukrainian poetry, and the best one can say, in all charity, is that at least he aims for accuracy – the accuracy, alas, of a students' crib! Little comes through of the subtleties of Stus's language – virtually nothing of his poetic technique. One can forgive, perhaps, the linguistic inadequacy of his rendering of *"Yariy, dushe. Yariy, a ne ryday"*, as "Flame fire, soul, flame fire instead of wails", since here Stus plays with the triple meaning of *Yarity:* "rage/flame/burst into spring". But to render *kalyna* – "guelder rose" by the colloquial "snowball tree", so that *"A ty shukay – chervonu tin kalyny"* becomes "Seek the snowball's scarlet shadow", is far from felicitous.

While congratulating the editors on their initiative in producing a work of such humanitarian importance, one must express a hope that, should they be contemplating a second volume (and oppression, like the poor, is, alas, always with us), they will pay greater heed to the quality of the translations. For so very often these poets were persecuted, not simply for their ideas, but for the emotive language and memorable form in which they expressed them – language and form which transformed their message from dull political argument to a stirring tocsin. And that language and form, therefore, no less than the content, deserves an adequate rendering!

Regional Patterns of Foreign Investment in Russia. By Michael Bradshaw (Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1995) 50 pp;

The Euro-Asian Corridor. Freight and Energy Transport for Central Asia and the Caspian Region. By Gavan McDonell (RIIA, London, 1995) 50 pp;

Iran and the Former Soviet South. By Edmund Herzig (RIIA, London, 1995) 60pp.

These latest three publications from the Royal Institute of International Affairs (the first two under the aegis of its Post-Soviet Business Forum, and the third from its new Former Soviet South project), are of the excellent standard one has come to expect from RIIA publications. All are well researched, lucidly presented, and (which is of

considerable importance in view of the rapid pace of events) published within a few weeks of completion of the work. None of them, as one may judge from the titles, deals directly with Ukraine. Nevertheless, both the geography and the economic ties which Ukraine has inherited from Soviet times mean that what goes on anywhere in the former Soviet space may have considerable impact on Ukraine's economy and security. The serious student of current affairs in today's Ukraine needs to be *au courant* with major developments in the whole of the Former Soviet Union (FSU), no less than in Ukraine's European and Black Sea neighbours.

Of particular importance to Ukraine's energy supplies are the oil- and gas-producing republics of Central Asia and the Caucasus, and plans for new "southern" pipeline routes bypassing Russia, a subject which is dealt with in some depth by both McDonell and Herzig. Bradshaw's work on investment in Russia, while less immediately relevant, nevertheless, is not without interest from the Ukrainian point of view. In particular, he shows the continuing unreliability of statistics relating to the FSU, showing in particular that, according to the UN/ECE data presented in *East-West Investment News* (1994), the total number of registered foreign investments in the entire CIS in 1992 was less than the sum of those registered in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus! Furthermore, by identifying the emergence of "gateway" regions based on major ports and their hinterlands (St Petersburg, Vladivostok, Novorossiysk), he tacitly repudiates the postulate, heard routinely at foreign investment conferences in the early months after the break-up of the USSR, that the European ex-Soviet republics, including Ukraine, would act as a "bridge" between Western investors and Russia, deriving considerable financial benefit in the process. Transport of goods and hydrocarbon fuels across those republics is, of course, flourishing. But the idea that Western investors with their eye on the Russian market would begin by opening an office in Kyiv or Riga was, it would seem, erroneous.

The Economist, Vol. 336, No. 7924, July 22, 1995

The issue under review contains what the table of contents terms a "Special" article – an update, or rather a U-turn, of the report on the Ukrainian economy published by *The Economist* in April of last year. That report gave a picture of almost unrelieved gloom. But in the past year, says the anonymous author of the "Special", "[i]n one of the most unexpected turnarounds of recent times, Ukraine has liberalised prices, trade and exchange rates, stabilised its currency and been given large loans by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank".

The "unlikely" hero of this (relative) success story is, the author says, President Leonid Kuchma. Elected on a programme of "gradual" economic reform and rapprochement with Russia, Kuchma "changed his tune" as soon as he took office, forged ahead with reforms, and "turned Ukraine pointedly westwards". His confrontation with parliament over his demand for extra powers is presented as a necessary step in the reform process, "bring[ing] the communist-dominated parliament to heel". US President Bill Clinton's eulogy of last May, hailing Kuchma's "bold, far-sighted" leadership is quoted with clear overtones of editorial approval.

Once past the euphoria of the opening paragraphs, however, the "Special" lives up to the old definition of economics as the "dismal science". European Union sup-

port for Ukraine's reforms, we are told, is "grudging". No senior European leader has yet visited Kyiv, while the "Eurocrats say Ukraine's negotiating tactics are crude". Kuchma's mass privatisation scheme, launched in the spring of this year, is "not going well", would-be foreign investors are frustrated by laws that "change monthly, weekly, daily", and bribery is all too often the only way to get things done...

On non-economic matters, our author believes that Ukraine's "blurry sense of national identity" [sic!] may be a good thing, "leav[ing] the country mercifully free from the ethnic tension that divides more self-aware places like Latvia, Estonia and Kazakhstan". Like many Western observers, he falls into the trap of seeing apparent similarities as necessarily conducive to concord. "In its culture and its history, Ukraine is closer to Russia than is any other part of the ex-Soviet Union except Belarus", he writes. "The two countries share the Orthodox version of Christianity. Their languages, though not as close as Russians like to make out, are more or less mutually comprehensible; most educated Ukrainians speak both". The author did not, presumably, intend any irony: the reader has only to turn, however, to page 4 of this journal: "The world this week: Politics and Current Affairs" to see a note on the violent clashes at the funeral of Patriarch Volodymyr of Kyiv; disturbances which had their origin precisely in the fact that Ukrainians and Russians "share the Orthodox version of Christianity"!

This seeming naiveté concerning perceptions of national identity throw some doubt on the author's prognostications concerning relations with Russia and the vexed issue of Crimea. Furthermore, some sensitive issues of Ukrainian-Russian relations are glossed over. "Last year", he writes "[the Russians] agreed, with American help, on a plan to dismantle Ukraine's arsenal of ex-Soviet nuclear warheads". His tone suggests that this is at least one knotty issue which has been satisfactorily resolved. In fact, the scheme has been for some time at a standstill; the USA has cut its funding, and Russia has failed to carry out its obligation, under the terms of this agreement, to supply Ukraine with nuclear fuel. To judge from recent remarks by Ukrainian officials, the missile deal is now a source of friction with Russia, not harmony!

Nevertheless, in spite of its several shortcomings, this article is well-worth a careful reading. *The Economist* is a journal of influence, and the ideas which it promulgates can play a significant role in shaping the perceptions of politicians and international decision-makers. In this context, the generally optimistic outlook of the article (so different from the gloom and doom expressed by the same journal only 15 months previously) may well prove more significant than the individual economic and political facts and forecasts which it contains. □

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Current Events

Ukraine at the Economic Crossroads: Hopes and Opportunities

Serhiy Tolstov

The celebrations of the fourth anniversary of Ukraine's independence were significantly different from previous occasions both in tone and content. It was abundantly clear that the country has "grown up", in as much as the government, perhaps for the first time, began to speak in the language of businessmen. In his celebratory speech during the 24 August, 1995 celebrations, President Leonid Kuchma spoke of great hopes unfulfilled, and opportunities lost in the first half of the 1990s.

On October 11 this year, when the new Prime Minister, Yevhen Marchuk, presented the government programme to parliament, he stressed the necessity of reducing government expenditure, so that consumption does not exceed national income. The highest executive power has at last recognised the economic problems which are decisive for the existence and well-being of Ukraine, on which former President Leonid Kravchuk could not decide. Thus now it is clear to almost everyone that the future of Ukraine, its continued model of development, and also its prospects for survival and overcoming the current crisis, will be resolved in the sphere of economic relations and the economic policy of the state.

Economic Crisis – Ukrainian Version

The communist bureaucracy, which managed to preserve its power in Ukraine in 1991 by forming a bloc with the national-democratic movement, has in general continued and, to a significant degree, assisted the deterioration of the economy, which had consistently been going downhill since the era of Leonid Brezhnev and the Soviet *perestroika* of Mikhail Gorbachev. The attitude of the government apparatus towards economic processes in 1991-94 may be described as an attempt to apply the monopolistic levers of its uncontrolled rule (which has taken on the form of a post-communist oligarchy) in order to accumulate property. This process was effected by the redistribution of state property and preferential credit-emission in support of privileged enterprises of the state sector. In various places, top personnel from the presidential administration, members of previous governments, and leading provincial, municipal and district officials have established whole strings of commercial enterprises, mainly in commerce, services and the most profitable branches of production. In many cases, they collaborated with the mafia of the shadow economy, which in addition to business activities also operated "protection" and other rackets, illegal currency operations, and controlled the gambling business, prostitution, etc. This led to the creation of what have become known as "economic clans", which operate outside the es-

tablished legal rules, and make use of the support of a "patron" – a person in the power structures at the central or regional level. Other private enterprises, founded by the savings and entrepreneurial initiative of citizens, have been unable to compete with these nascent monopolies and were subjected to severe pressure by the taxation department of the Finance Ministry, extortion by bureaucrats, and the watchful eye of the racketeers, etc.

As a result of various factors, including the lack of entrepreneurial skills among the managers of the state economic sector, the brakes imposed on privatisation, the rupture of direct economic ties with the former republics of the USSR, hyperinflation, and the catastrophic rise in the price of energy carriers, in the period 1991-94 the Ukrainian industry dropped production by approximately 48-50%. During 1990-95, the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) decreased almost threefold to approximately 35% of the 1990 indices.[1]

The fall in production initially affected the military-industrial complex and the oil-refining, machine-building, and ship-building industries, followed a little later by coal-mining, light industry, and power generation. The decline of oil-refining was due to Russia's imposition of tariff barriers on the export of crude oil to Ukraine, as well as the insolvency of the state structures in charge of the supply of oil. The enterprises of the military-industrial complex were in decline as a result of the disintegration of the USSR, the drying up of orders for military technology, and the reduction of cooperative links with military plants in Russia.

The trigger of the decline of production in the coal industry was the miners' strike of 1993. At least half of the coal-mines in Ukraine are extracting coal from uneconomical and virtually exhausted coal-fields and cannot compete with cheaper, imported, coal. The crisis in the light industry was caused by the drying-up of the supply of raw materials, in conjunction with external competition.

At the same time, the drop in production in the food and processing industries was on a significantly smaller scale. As the crisis in the state sector deepened, a parallel increase in activity was observable in small private businesses, predominantly in the service sector, commerce, the manufacture of consumer goods, and the processing of agricultural produce.

These processes were accompanied by a certain redistribution of activity, which was accelerated in 1994-95 as a result of the privatisation of a significant tranche of state enterprises.

Simultaneously with the fall of the GDP, there was a significant increase in the fiscal tax pressure imposed by the state on enterprises of all forms of ownership. This policy was due to the lack of income into the state budget and its chronic deficit. Under the terms of agreements between the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the government undertook to maintain the budget deficit in 1995 at around 7.3%. The negative external bal-

[1] Volodymyr Lanovyi, 'Derzhavna polityka v obiymakh ekonomichnoyi kryzy' (State policy in the grip of economic crisis), *Demos* (Kyiv), No. 4 (13), 1995, p. 3; Yuriy Nechaev, 'Preodolenie investitsionnogo krizisa v Ukraine' (Overcoming the investment crisis in Ukraine), *Vremya rynka. Sbornik dokladov tsentra rynochnykh reform* (Kyiv), No. 1, 1995, p. 14.

ance of trade makes the government hold on to the IMF credits and loans. In the absence of a properly thought out plan for fostering industrial growth, in 1994-95 the government resorted to increasing tax pressure, raising the total tax liability of enterprises to 70-98% of their income. Hence, from the very beginning, a significant fraction of industry was perceived to be unprofitable, which undermined interest in the industrial sector.

In the opinion of Oleh Taranov, the head of the Permanent Commission on Economic Policy of the Ukrainian parliament, the "total rate of taxation [on enterprises] should not exceed 40%, since in the whole world it amounts to approximately 36%. In our country, if we count up how much an enterprise pays overall, this figure reaches 90%. The question arises: who will want to work, if all he can keep is 5-6%?". According to Taranov's statement, if today wages in many branches amount to 1.5-2% of the net cost of production, then it appears that the present procedure of setting tax at 30% of profit is worse than last year's procedure, which set tax at 22% of the income of enterprises.[2]

A ruinous tax policy, which, apart from the tax on citizens' incomes, consists of no less than 38 types of taxes and dues, as well as import duty and excise, has promoted the growth of the shadow economy. Economists now estimate that the shadow economy controls from 30-50% of the GDP. According to the National Bank of Ukraine, in September, 1995, some 200 trillion karbovantsi notes (US$1.15 billion) were circulating outside the banking system, that is, 35-40% of the overall amount of cash in circulation. In addition, a significant proportion of deals in the shadow economy are settled for cash in foreign currency, in spite of the official ban on its circulation in Ukraine as a means of payment in the internal market. In order to avoid tax, a significant number of small-scale commercial operations are settled for "black" cash and not included in tax returns.

The state taxation services and the relevant departments of the Ministry of Internal Affairs carry out regular checks and apply stern measures against those who violate the customs laws. However, they cannot stop the regular day-to-day breaches of the law, since industry simply could not show a profit if it conscientiously paid all its taxes. In this regard, the state for most of the time behaves as if it has no concern with the private affairs of its citizens, while the citizens, for their part, try to "ignore" the state, except when contact with the state and its institutions is unavoidably forced on them. This situation may be seen as a peculiar form of social contract which has developed in the conditions of the complete collapse of the state system of social security.

A relative social stability has been preserved so far in Ukraine due to the exceptional individualism, assiduity and enforced adaptation of the people to extremely complex economic realities and the extraordinary difficulties of everyday life. The paradox lies in the fact that, to force its citizens to play by the official rules of the game, the government would have to introduce martial law and an identity card system. In the state sector of the economy, there are around 3.5-4 million per-

[2] Oleg Taranov, 'Kto budet rabotat za 5-6%?' (Who do you think will work for 5-6%?), *Telenedelya* (Kyiv) No. 1, 12-21 May, 1995, p. 21.

sons who are on short time or indefinite "leave". In institutions paid by the state budget and enterprises run by state ministries, the practice of holding back wages has developed and is being used deliberately to stretch the pay curve. For example, wages for June-July are paid in October-November. People who thus have no opportunity to get their income at the usual, primary place of employment, are forced to take whatever opportunity they can of earning enough to survive. Usually they find this opportunity in the shadow economy.

Economic Prospects

The further deepening of the crisis in 1995 has produced a general need to define explicitly the priorities for the survival and development of Ukraine. This is not a matter of formal slogans of the type "socially-orientated market economy", "capitalism", or "accumulation of wealth", but rather of a system of effective measures at government level. For a long period of time it was totally unclear as to what the government gave pride of place. Helping Ukrainian industry or winding down industry in order to close down technologically obsolescent branches? Encouraging the formation of national capital or the complete opening of the economy to penetration by foreign companies and the creation of import-substituting industries? Halting privatisation to reduce unemployment or encouraging changes in the form of ownership in order to hasten the process of placing unprofitable enterprises on a healthy footing?

A clear answer to these questions would mean that the institutions of power have finally reached an agreement on the directions the future development of the state should take and are capable of foreseeing the long-term results of their decisions.

Some answers to these questions are contained in the Programme of the Cabinet of Ministers, approved by parliament on 11 October, 1995. In the short-term plan, the programme envisages the slowing-down of the rate of decline in the GDP in 1996 to 1%, an increase in industrial production of 0.6%, and the reduction of the inflation index to 1.5% (according to other documents, to an annual 36%).

The section of the programme on structural and industrial policy is conceptually the most interesting. A detailed knowledge of its contents allows one to form some idea of the government's economic strategy.

Regarding long-term structural policy, the government is proposing a three-stage programme: stabilisation of the economy (2-3 years), activisation of economic development (8-10 years) and establishment of a rational economic structure (10-12 years).[3]

It envisages the regulation of structural economic policy with the aid of such measures as the realisation of macroeconomic regulation; the stimulation and selective support for priority and promising industries; temporary protectionist measures favouring certain specific branches; ensuring a minimal scale of investment to maintain the operation of basic services; the realisation of regional and branch programmes of liquidating unpromising industries or their conversion to new types of production; putting state-owned enterprises on a healthy footing;

[3] *Programme of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine* (Kyiv), September, 1995, p. 20.

aid for the development of import-substituting industries with the preservation and development at the same time of useful forms of inter-state cooperation.

The principal aim of industrial policy was defined by the government as "halting the trend towards the further decline in industrial production, while maintaining the operation of basic services, the technological restructuring (on the principle of conserving resources) first and foremost of those branches which can manufacture high-technology products and will have a rapid return on invested capital".[4]

The government has had four years in which to grasp the fact that it is impossible to preserve the economic structures which Ukraine inherited from the Soviet era and to recognise the advisability of radically reducing certain branches of industry or even closing them down altogether. At the same time, the Programme of the Cabinet of Ministers underlines the need to preserve the industrial potential of the state so as to prevent the further run-down of viable branches. "The field of fundamental tasks of industrial policy", the programme says, "does not include the support of the physical scale of production of all forms of industry. The reduction of the output of goods, for which currently and in the foreseeable future there is no demand, will permit the release of resources to satisfy more important needs".[5]

The driving element in the government's current economic concept is its intention to prevent spontaneous processes which could ruin the economic structure. The targeted intervention of the authorities in structural changes in the economy envisages acting within the limits of four fundamental directions:

1. The first direction envisages the predominant development of branches with a fast turnover of capital (food, light industry, as well as those industries which provide them with raw materials, and the corresponding infrastructure).
2. The second direction includes the development of science-based industry, and, in particular, the modernisation of machine-building, metallurgy and the chemical industry. Joint production with the industries of other CIS countries is being planned, to increase competitiveness; this could have a significant effect on exports.
3. The third direction of industrial policy envisages the restructuring of non-viable industries and branches.
4. The fourth direction includes measures for the conversion of sections of the defence industry which are no longer relevant, and also the establishment and development of appropriate military technologies, using closed cycle processes.

The government's plans pay particular attention to the creation and introduction of modern energy-saving equipment and resource-saving technologies.

The structural plan takes into account the need to establish cooperation between enterprises in individual branches of industry in order to produce competitive goods; and envisages the establishment of what will be known as industrial-financial groups. The government programme foresees the creation of such industrial-financial groups in the chemical industry with the participation of enterprises producing mineral fertilisers, magnetic data-storage materials,

[4] Ibid., p. 21.
[5] Ibid.

photosensitive materials, vitreous plastics and glass-fibres, rubber goods for industry products, chemical reagents, etc. The bill on industrial-financial groups had its first reading in parliament in September, 1995.

Important indicators for review and course-correction may be observed in the branch of foreign-economic planning.

This concerns first and foremost the creation of the said industrial-financial groups, in which industrial enterprises and bank structures from the contiguous regions of Russia will also participate. At the end of August, the Ukrainian government approached the Russian government proposing the creation of 32 such unions. However, these groups will not have the status of juridical persons, will not have a single controlling body, and will only have a slight resemblance to transnational corporations. The principal purpose of these groups is to reestablish broken channels of cooperation between Ukrainian industry and the enterprises of the former republics of the USSR, and to help Ukrainian products penetrate the markets of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, which in 1995 set up a separate customs union.

Another significant change in foreign trade priorities is the development of Ukraine's relations with the countries of the Near and Middle East, the Asian-Pacific region, and Latin America. Having had several failures in its search for markets in Europe, the Ukrainian government is seeking more and more actively for a niche in Third World markets.

However, by no means all aspects of the new economic course appear well-grounded. First of all, there is some doubt as to the ability of the state to ensure the finance needed to implement it – except by the emission of more money. Already the government is feeling a chronic lack of finance to cover the budgetary expenditures in spite of the fact that (according to 1994 indices) the state budget accounts for the redistribution of more than 55% of the GDP.

The strengthening of state regulation of the economy envisaged by the government also poses a direct threat to the foundations of monetary policy, which is implemented through the rigid control of the central bank over the amount of money in circulation. During the economic meeting of 14-15 September, 1995, President Kuchma criticised the monetarist measures which, in his opinion, mean the dismantling of direct state influence on economic processes. "I do not support the thesis 'the less state, the better'", he stated. "There have never been any examples in the world of the transition from an authoritarian economy being effected without the use of a strong, decisive state authority".[6]

The course aimed at the completion of privatisation in the main by the middle of 1996 has also been somewhat modified as concerns certain enterprises in leading export branches and a group of high-tech industries, which need major capital investment. Some of the most important enterprises of the state sector will be included in two groups under government control but with autonomous

[6] Tamara Mayboroda, 'Bolshoye viditsya na rasstoyanii: Kakoy byt modeli dalneyshego ekonomicheskogo razvitiya Ukrainy' (Great things are seen from afar: What should be the model for Ukraine's further economic development?), *Novosti* (Kyiv), No. 82, 18-25 September, 1995, p. 5.

managements. The first group will consist of state enterprises which are not to be privatised at all. The second will consist of corporatised joint-stock companies in which the controlling holding, amounting to not less than 50% of the total amount of shares of the enterprise, will belong to the state.

The "correction" of the course of reform is also envisaged by the introduction by Anatoliy Halchynskyi (a presidential "adviser" with a socialist outlook) of "controlled inflation", based on monetary emission on the scale of 4-5% every month. At the same time, the government plans for 1996 predict that the budget deficit will not exceed 6% of the GDP. The inflation indices in December, 1996 are being planned to remain in the region of 34% in comparison to December, 1995. However, these figures appear artificial and absolutely unrealistic. The government predicts that the level of inflation in December, 1995 in comparison to December of last year will be 134%.[7] Independent experts, however, say that the index of the increase of price levels over the course of this year is now approaching 300%.

According to Volodymyr Lanovyi, one of the leaders of the Liberal Party, the artificial freezing of the exchange rate of the karbovanets against the dollar has produced an extraordinarily complex situation on the money market of Ukraine. "At the same time, internal inflation of the karbovanets continues, prices on goods and services in the karbovanets equivalent are constantly increasing. In certain branches at the beginning of the year expenditure increased 5-6 times due to rising prices...".[8]

Criticism of the new government policy comes in the main from the liberal economists – supporters of a rapid implementation of reforms, as well as the head of the World Bank team in Ukraine, Daniel Kaufman.

However, while Mr Kaufman's arguments are mainly concerned with proving that it is impossible to maintain economic growth without overcoming inflation, the radical supporters of a market transformation see the problem deeper. Their criticism concerns the content of the state-capitalist model of development, which will be a direct consequence of the implementation of the government programme.

In the opinion of Oleh Soskin, Director of the Institute of Transformation of Society, "the spontaneous development of the state-monopolist model of capitalism has already led to the situation that a bitter struggle is in progress in Ukraine for the reanimation of the Bolshevik model, in as much as the main elements of the previous economic and political system have not changed".[9] According to Soskin, the model of state-monopolist capitalism is orientated towards an extraordinarily slow and, as far as the people are concerned, severe formation of a capitalist society, which rejects any form of decentralisation of ownership and economic administration.

According to a reader of the principal Ukrainian business newspaper, *Business*, a certain Dmytro Dzhanhirov, the aspiration of government to help the new in-

[7] 'Proekt programmy sotsialno-ekonomicheskogo razvitiya na 1996 god' (Draft programme of socio-economic development for 1996), *Zerkalo nedeli* (Kyiv), No. 42, 21-27 October, 1995, p. 9.

[8] Volodymyr Lanovyi, 'Hirka pravda krashche, nizh solodki obitsyanky' (The bitter truth is better than sweet promises), *Ukrayina. Evropa. Svit* (Kyiv), No. 20, 18-25 October, 1995, p. 3.

[9] Oleg Soskin, 'My poydem kakim putem?' (Which path are we to follow?), *Biznes-eksklyuziv* (Kyiv), No. 1, 1995, p. 11.

dustrial-financial groups is a direct sign of its orientation towards the state-capitalist model of development. "There exist all the grounds for considering that the creation of the financial-industrial groups is, from the point of view of the present state leadership, an alternative to the previous course of 'rigid monetarism'".[10]

Thus, the sensitive attitude of the government towards the demands of financial stabilisation, measures for the strengthening of tax pressure, control and regulation of bank transactions, against the backdrop of attempts to effect a conceptual development of methods of state regulation of the economy, is a clear indication of the inability of executive power to halt stagflation and create conditions for a gradual upswing of the economy. First and foremost, this is corroborated by the total failure of the government's anti-inflation measures. The index of inflation for 1995 is expected to exceed that of 1994. Even before October, 1995, when the new government programme was ratified, this was happening even though monetarist regulation of the circulation of money had not been officially abandoned.

In the conditions of a post-communist economy, calculated on a high level of consumption of resources, all attempts to cope with de-industrialisation and achieve financial stability have proved to be ineffective in the absence of a preliminary, realistic privatisation of state property, the creation of a significant private sector, the implementation of land reform, and the achievement of a true de-monopolisation of the economy.

However, the programme is evidence that the Ukrainian government has taken a decision to halt the de-industrialisation of the economy by means of administrational regulation.

The overwhelming majority of subjects of economic activity in Ukraine, with the possible exception of privileged companies which enjoy the formal and/or informal support of the government, express an ever more vocal dissatisfaction with government policy and the state of the business environment. This is also true of enterprises of the processing industries, machine-building and the military-industrial complex, the management of which unwaveringly supported the candidacy of the present president during the presidential election campaign of summer, 1994.

It seems highly likely that, having taken on board the views of the bosses of large industrial enterprises, the presidential administration and the apparatus of the Cabinet of Ministers decided, in the autumn of 1995, to review their priorities for achieving financial stability, in order to prevent the industrialists from going into open opposition and the prospect of pre-term presidential and parliamentary elections.

One symptom of the hardening opposition among the bosses of the state sector of industry was the October, 1995 announcement by former deputy-premier Valentyn Landyk's Party of Labour, which represents the interests of this sector, that it was setting up a shadow cabinet.

[10] *Business* (Kyiv), No. 39, 10 October, 1995, p. 3.

Apathetic Stagnation as a Permanent Condition of the Political System

During the transition from totalitarianism and arbitrary rule to democracy, civil society and a law-governed state, an exceptionally important role is played by the party-political system. First of all, it provides a structural framework for social interests and harmonises the political activity of competing citizens' associations. Secondly, it normalises and formalises the struggle for power, giving it a competitive and peaceful character. Thirdly, the establishment of a developed and stable political system means the strengthening of the generally-recognised rules of the game, which removes the aura of secrecy from the pyramid of power.

From this point of view, the deliberate efforts of the government to block the formation of powerful nation-wide movements and coalitions, capable, in the case of a general election victory, of forming a government without recourse to coalition partners, seem perfectly logical.

The greatest "merit" in preventing the formation of normal and viable political parties in Ukraine undoubtedly belongs to the administration of former President Leonid Kravchuk, as well as the previous parliament, half of which was drawn from the former *nomenklatura.* However, the present presidential administration, too, supports the political forces in those cases when it cannot get vitally important decisions of internal policy adopted without them. Moreover, given the current lack of influential nation-wide political movements, the central authorities are not, as it were, threatened by obvious rivals and competitors, with the possible exception, that is, of the *nomenklatura* oligarchy opposition, and also that of the leftists, who continually try to incite social discontent and are waiting for the right moment to bring to power a new neo-populist *nomenklatura* and impose a stricter state control over all sectors of the economy.

The parliamentary conflict between leftists and reformers does not encompass the whole content of the fundamental contradictions of Ukrainian politics. There is also the profound and serious conflict between the political-economic groupings orientated towards the administration of President Kuchma and the nucleus of the *nomenklatura* oligarchy, which formed the so-called "party of power" of 1990-94. The essence of this conflict lies in the contraction of the economic and legal space in which it is possible to use state power and influence as uncontrolled measures of economic and political activity.

In the political sphere, the clearly necessary and unavoidable course of the Kuchma administration's reforms consists of an attempt to effect a gradual transition from the parasite rule of the post-communist bureaucratic oligarchy to a certain separation of spheres of influence and the introduction of a model of a mixed economy by transforming the system of depersonalised state ownership into one based on state-capitalism and share-holding.

In this sense, the declaration that the privatisation of state property is a priority, the attempts to achieve the separation of powers, the timid measures to encourage private not-monopolised business, in spite of being indecisive and going only half way, are perceived as a real "revolution" in a country exhausted by economic decline and moral depression.

Nevertheless, the situation of the presidential structures in these conditions remains crippled and shaky. In a developed political system, a simple and understandable decision could be reached on the basis of a coalition of reformist parties – from the social-democrats to the neo-conservatives – who have a declared commitment to the transition from communist totalitarianism to European socialism, liberal or constitutional democracy. Thus the primary goals of their programmes for the transitional period do not differ greatly. They all support a programme of de-statisation of the economy, the separation of powers, and the establishment of a civil society.

Such a course is blockaded by three factors. Firstly, most of the active political organisations lack clear ideological guidelines. The leaders of many political parties are more interested in supporting this or other *nomenklatura* leader than in a concrete positive programme for transformation. Political in-fighting and splits provide clear proof of this.

Secondly, Kuchma's "revolution" cannot bridge the chasm of alienation between the authorities and the people. As the economic crisis drags on, the majority of ordinary citizens feel no improvement whatsoever in their material situation and put no real hopes in the reforms. The share-based mechanism of privatisation, which is difficult for the average citizen to understand, in 90% of cases does not lead to a real transfer of ownership to citizens, but simply prepares the way for its future transfer into the hands of large capital.

The liberal variant, which envisages priority support for small and medium-size business, together with attracting high-tech foreign investment to Ukraine, or the neo-conservative variant of scaling down large enterprises and the privilege transfer of assets earmarked for "small" privatisation to small companies and family firms have proved so far unachievable in a country which has not experienced a phase of in-depth political reform.

Thirdly, the effect of the national-ethnic factor produced a distorted political system which preserves a significant degree of local specificity in individual regions of the country.

In addition to the traditional division between right-wingers, centrists and left-wingers, a predominant role is still played in Ukraine by the great divide between, on the one hand, national-democratic and nationalist tendencies, and, on the other, parties and movements which reject the primacy of ethnic problems, and confine themselves to guidelines relevant to the state as a whole. A separate group is formed by the organisations which advocate the greater participation of Ukraine in the pro-integration processes of the CIS.

Out of the 27 political organisations which, according to the requirements of Ukrainian law, are permitted by the Ministry of Justice to undertake full-scale political activity and participate in elections to the organs of power at all levels, only a few have a developed network of local and district branches. These include, in particular, the Popular Movement of Ukraine, the Liberal Party and the Communist Party.

There also exist at least 15-20 organisations, which are not officially registered, and which operate in direct violation of the legislation currently in force.

The new Bill on the election of members of parliament, which has been drawn up by representatives of those political parties currently in parliament,

envisages a new electoral system with 50% seats being filled on a constituency majority basis and 50% by proportional representation. This undoubtedly would speed up the amalgamation and reorganisation of political parties, and would also facilitate a clearer-cut political structuring of the future parliament. However, the emergence of a normal political system will be hampered by the continuing lumpenisation of society in the conditions of economic decline, as well as the deliberate compromising of the principles of party politics on the part of the government. So long as only small political groupings continue to act in Ukraine, and the electorate as a whole fails to take an active part in political life, the government structures can continue to act as "suprapolitical" institutions and use simply lobbying techniques to push through parliament whatever measures suit their own purposes.

This feebleness of the Ukrainian political system can explain the events surrounding the drawing-up and signing, on 8 June, 1995, of the Constitutional agreement between the president and the majority of members of parliament. This agreement suspended for the duration of one year certain norms of the existing Constitution (which did not define a clear division of power), replacing them by a temporary regulation of the separation of executive, legislative and judicial power.

The lack of development of the political system has enabled the structures of executive power to assume a self-sufficient nature and to duplicate, to a significant extent, the functions of political representation. At the same time, and in equal measure, the executive power is deprived of the opportunity of taking into account the manifold political, economic, business, cultural, and regional interests of grass-roots pressure groups. The presidential structures, however, have quite deliberately adopted the tactics of political Bonapartism. The growing influence of the Left and the threat of civil disturbances has also made a significant contribution to hampering the development of a non-monopolised private sector of the economy to the benefit of the state-monopoly trend.

In addition, there is ever growing anxiety over the continued concentration of power in the hands of the presidential and government structures, since they will undoubtedly make a deliberate effort to block the development of a modern political system in Ukraine. There can be no doubt that, in the present situation, the presidential administration will have the opportunity to bring into force its own draft Constitution. It can in no way be ruled out that this document may assume an authoritarian content, particularly if, let us say, just before it is due to be enacted some demonstration or political meeting ends in an affray between communists and national-patriots, or there are clashes between the adherents of various churches, or a miners' strike breaks out in the Donbas.

Conclusion

The paradox of the current situation lies in the fact that, without economic decentralisation in the state, the establishment of a stable democratic order is impossible. Likewise, only the creation of a strong private non-monopolised sector will enable the government to implement macroeconomic regulation methods effectively. However, the stimulation of the liberal or neo-conservative econom-

ic model will be possible only if a general election brings to power a party or bloc of parties which considers this to be a primary political objective.

Any other principle of forming government structures will result in the dominance of the interests of economic circles, who have no interest in the division of state property and the liberalisation of the economic structure. However, practice indicates the primary necessity of implementing political reform in Ukraine, and of consolidating centrist forces on the basis of ensuring the economic survival of society. In the end, the model of development which Ukraine will follow will depend on the Constitution, which may be introduced in 1996. Will it be European, or Eurasian? Time alone will tell. □

Problems of Ukrainian Terminology and the Compilation of Dictionaries of Computer Science and Telecommunications

Orest Kossak

Ukrainian Terminology – Historical Background

It is widely accepted that a national language should perform all the social and cultural functions within the state, and, *inter alia*, should be the language of science and technology. This statement, which is completely self-evident for most countries, remains unfortunately, in the case of Ukraine and the other countries of the former USSR, only an aim to be achieved.

The creation of the Ukrainian National Republic upon the fragments of the Russian and Austro-Hungarian Empires in 1918 favoured the consolidation of the Ukrainian language in all spheres of human activities. A considerable number of scientists and scholars took an active part in the process of developing Ukrainian terminology. During the 1920s, this process continued actively under the Bolshevik regime, in what was termed "Ukrainisation". A number of dictionaries were compiled and published during this period. The Ukrainian Linguistic Institute was established to coordinate this work and to elaborate the principles of Ukrainian terminology.

However, at the end of the 1920s and the beginning of the 1930s, the repressions began, directed against Ukrainian intellectuals, scholars and the technological élite. This campaign was sanctioned and supervised by Moscow. The development of Ukrainian terminological science was cut short early in the 1930s after the abolition of the Ukrainian Linguistic Institute. Within the following years, more than 40,000 Ukrainian scientific and technological terms were "repressed". The above-mentioned dictionaries were confiscated and destroyed. As a result, Ukrainian terminology was polluted by loan translations from Russian and by linguistic distortions.

The ridiculous melting-pot theory of the "alloying" of nations into a unique Soviet people, which was reborn in the Kremlin in the time of Brezhnev, promoted a new wave of Russification, which finally ejected the Ukrainian language from the scientific and technical spheres. Practically all scientific journals were arbitrarily Russified. For instance, the unique system of standard documentation in the USSR effectively excluded the Ukrainian language from the sphere of scientific and technological activities. For all 600 of the standards of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic were defined in Russian. In the long run, this resulted in the stagnation of Ukrainian terminology.

When, in 1991, Ukraine declared independence, the nationally conscious scientific and technical community launched an active drive to establish and consolidate the Ukrainian language in all spheres of activity and, in particular, in science and technology.

The Ukrainian State Standard Organisation is now implementing a broad programme of defining Ukrainian linguistic standards. For example, in the years 1992-94 alone, about 600 standards for terminology were developed, taking into account the experience and recommendations of the International Standard Organization (ISO) and the International Electrotechnic Committee (IEC). In order to improve the terminological provision, a Technical Committee for Standardisation of Scientific and Technological Terminology was established. Regular conferences are held on these questions. The last conference was in 1994, the next will be held in Lviv in 1996. A number of dictionaries have been published, first and foremost, Russian-Ukrainian and English-Ukrainian vocabularies for various specialist fields: chemistry, mathematics, informatics, mechanics, radio engineering, electrical engineering. The formation of Ukrainian terminology is fostered by the publication of Ukrainian manuals and monographs and the keeping of documentation in the state language. This process is especially complex in rapidly developing spheres such as computer sciences, microelectronics, telecommunications, space sciences, and the like.

Formation of Ukrainian Computer and Telecommunications Terminology – Difficulties and Problems

The rapid development of computer and telecommunications technologies, and their wide application in various spheres of human activity has led to the development of new terms, mainly in English. Ukrainian terminology in these fields was left virtually undeveloped in consequence of the imperialistic policy of the former USSR. Practically all publications in these fields were in Russian. A unique exception was the publication, in Ukrainian, of the two-volume *Encyclopaedia of Cybernetics*, published in 1973 in Kyiv, which was edited by Viktor Hlushkov, Director of the Institute of Cybernetics. It fixed the state of Ukrainian terminology in these fields for the middle of the 1960s. It should be mentioned that the internationally known journals *Kibernetyka* and *Avtomatyka* were published in the 1960s in Ukrainian.

It must be stressed that all instruction in the technical universities, with a very few exceptions, took place in the Russian language. As a result, the majority of Ukrainian engineers and scientists were unable to express their professional knowledge in their own, Ukrainian, language.

Specialists in computer science and telecommunications use mainly Russian and now also English professional publications, manuals and technical documentation. Most of the software is in English, all the operational systems display their messages in English. Computer users encounter many difficulties and problems with English display information. Likewise the new digital exchanges, mobile repeater exchanges and other telecommunication stations which are manufactured abroad (AT&T, Siemens, etc.) come supplied with English manuals and technical documentation. All this creates additional complications for the operating and technical personnel.

For these reasons, the formation of Ukrainian terminology in these fields is a very important and necessary task at the present time. A number of dictionaries have been complied and some have already been published. In particular, I should like to mention:

– *The Russian-Ukrainian Dictionary of Computer Science* by Valeriy Karachun et al;
– *The English-Ukrainian Dictionary of Mathematics* by Myroslav Kratko et al;
– *The Russian-Ukrainian Dictionary of Radioelectronics* by Bohdan Rytsar et al;
– *The Russian-Ukrainian Dictionary of Radiotechnics* by Volodymyr Perkhach et al;
– *The English-Ukrainian-Russian Dictionary of Computer Science* by Sviatoslav Mankovskyi and Orest Kossak;
– *The English-Ukrainian Dictionary of Telecommunications* (not published in hard copy, but existing in a computer version) by the Academy of Telecommunications in Odessa;
– *The English-Ukrainian Dictionary of Computer Science* by Orest Kossak.

In addition, I should like to mention the dictionaries, currently in the process of compilation:
– *The English-Ukrainian Polytechnical Dictionary* by Myroslav Kratko et al;
– *The English-Ukrainian Dictionary of Abbreviations in Computer Science, Telecommunications, Radioelectronics* by Valeriy Karachun et al.
– *The English-Ukrainian and Ukrainian-English Dictionary of Telecommunications* by Roman Krawec and Orest Kossak.

It must be stressed that the list is incomplete, being based on private information from the authors concerned.

The formation of Ukrainian computer and telecommunications terms may be accomplished in three ways:
– translation from English;
– translation from Russian;
– original formation.

In the past, for the reasons mentioned above, it was the second way which was predominant. This approach, however, has the following drawbacks: modern Russian terms mostly were created as translations from English and do not always adequately express the meaning of the English term. Subsequent translation into Ukrainian preserves these deficiencies or even increases them. For example:

> source information > исходная информация > вихідна інформація which should rather be початкова інформація

– many Russicisms appear as a result of transliteration. For example:

> control code > управляющий код > управляючий код > which should rather be керівний код
>
> recorder > записывающее устройство > записуючий пристрій > which should rather be записувальний пристрій
>
> hard disk > жесткий диск > жорсткий диск > which should rather be твердий диск
>
> storage unit > запоминающее устройство > запам'ятовуючий пристрій > which should rather be запам'ятовувальний пристрій

– calques of Russian terms into Ukrainian. For example:

> network > сеть > сітка> which should rather be мережа

control > управление > управління > which should rather be керування
current > бегущий > біжучий > which should rather be поточний
switch on > включить > включити > which should rather be увімкнути
switch off > выключить > виключити > which should rather be вимкнути
label > метка > мітка > better позначка
cellular > сотовый > сотовий > which should rather be стільниковий

Progress in computer and telecommunications science and technologies has for a long time been associated with an English-speaking environment. Thus, naturally, the first approach should be the main one in forming new Ukrainian terms. However, here we face a whole series of problems:

1. Context-dependent meaning of terms. One English term may have a variety of translations requiring special comments and explanations. For example, from the dictionary of telecommunications:

unit – пристрій > елемент > одиниця (виміру) > блок > модуль
volume – том, об'єм > обсяг > гучність > рівень гучності

The problem of which term to choose is the main one in computer-assisted translation systems and became a particular problem when an inverse dictionary based on the English-Ukrainian dictionary had to be compiled. In this case, computer-assisted inversion produces Ukrainian-English translations which are strange and not the forms in normal use. Hence we need to analyse all the translations and to delete these "freaks". But, on the other hand, we can easily find appropriate translations and standardise them.

2. Words from professional slang which have now *de facto* become standard terminology. For example:

boot sector, back up, etc.

Translation of these terms involves considerable difficulty.

3. The existence of English terms which have been transliterated into the Ukrainian language. In many cases, these need no translation, but sometimes they sound unusual. For example:

utility – утиліта > also службова програма > сервісна програма
printer – принтер > also друкарський пристрій

How, then, should one proceed? Should we seek pure Ukrainian words or sentences to replace them, or accept these Anglicisms as *de facto* Ukrainian terms. In my opinion, we have to include them in the dictionary, but should also try to find good and concise Ukrainian translations.

4. New English terms, especially those associated with new achievements in science and technology. Translation of these terms often results in a whole long sentence, which is a definition rather than a term. To find a good and concise translation which can be used as a term is a major problem particularly in cases when the English term is formed by the mechanical juxtaposition of two or more words. For example:

transmit-to-receive crosstalk, on-hook dialling, downlink, footprint, loop-disconnect signalling, etc.

5. Synonymity of terms and different explanations of terms. For example:

channel, line, circuit, link

There is no formal difference of these terms. Different dictionaries define them in different ways. We may note, too, that there is no clear difference between Ukrainian

лінія > канал > тракт

Hence chaos can lead to chaos squared. To avoid this we had to apply the procedures of systems analysis of the situation and to normalise the situation according to agreed criteria. This is mainly a problem of standardisation.

The conservatism of linguistic tradition and the fear of using words which have a traditional meaning as new terms within a new context should be added to the aforesaid problems.

It is important, too, to take into account the achievements of Ukrainian terminology of the 1920s and 1930s, and also the experience of the Ukrainian diaspora.

All these problems have been, at least in part, solved in the *English-Ukrainian Dictionary of Computer Science* and *English-Ukrainian and Ukrainian-English Dictionary of Telecommunications.*

But I should also like to mention the main problem – the zero-level problem: how to create dictionary databases. Where are we to find the sources? The main dictionary entries were, in our case, collected from the English explanatory dictionaries, the ISO, IEC and Comité Consultative International Telegraphique et Telephonique (CCITT) standards and recommendations, Ukrainian standards, Laws on Communication and Automated Systems, scientific and technical journals, manuals and technical documentation. These were analysed, thematically sorted, then the secondary terms were picked out and analysed a second time to decide whether or not they needed to be included in the dictionary.

Computer-assisted Dictionary Compilation

All these processes are effectively impossible without the broad application of computers. The Ukrainian alphabetical coding standard was developed only in 1991. It then became possible to localise software in the native language. Digital Equipment Ukraine localised the Linkworks system. Apple localised its operating system, ClarisWorkls, Aldus PageMaker. Various systems for compiling dictionaries have been developed, as well as computer dictionaries, computer-assisted translation systems, speech-processing systems and terminological databanks. A number of conferences have been held. The most recent (5th) International Conference "UkrSoft-95" was held in Lviv in October, 1995. The next will be in May, 1997.

A computer multilingual dictionary compiling system "SLOVO", which was developed in Lviv Polytechnic University, enables users to form two-, three- and four-language translating and explanatory dictionaries and to invert them. The

"SLOVO" system makes it possible to create a dictionary database for ordinary and nested structures. A hierarchical menu enables one to manipulate input, output, edit, sort, print, and other commands. This project was partly supported by Ukraine's State Committee on Science and Technology. This system has already been used to produce a number of dictionaries, several of which have appeared in print. In particular, one should mention:

– *The English-Ukrainian Dictionary of Mechanics* by Yuriy Sulym et al, to be published;
– *The Russian-Ukrainian Dictionary of Welding* by Bohdan Berezyuk et al, to be published;
– *The English-Ukrainian-Russian Dictionary of Computer Science* by Sviatoslav Mankovskyi, Orest Kossak, 1991, 9,000 entries;
– *The English-Ukrainian Dictionary of Computer Science* by Orest Kossak, 1995, 15,000 entries. Sponsor – Digital Equipment Ukraine;
– *The English-Ukrainian Dictionary of Telecommunications* by Orest Kossak and Roman Krawec, to be published in 1996, 4,000 entries. Was partly supported by The British Council Ukraine.

Conclusions

Solving the aforesaid problems entails a number of organisational, methodological, linguistic and financial difficulties, due, in particular, to insufficient analysis of terminological systems, the lack of a systematic approach, an absence of spelling standards, and, to date, no proper coordination of the terminology.

Much, therefore, remains to be done, and the difficulties which face us are considerable. But we are optimists, we are looking forward and we are going forward. □

Quatercentenary of the Union of Brest

The Union of Brest, 1596

Next year, 1996, marks the four hundredth anniversary of one of the most significant and far-reaching events in Ukrainian history: the Union of Brest, which led to the establishment of the (Greek-rite) Ukrainian Catholic Church.

This event was of more than religious significance. The Union, which brought a portion of the Orthodox Church into communion with Rome, while still retaining its traditional, Byzantine, form of worship, was by no means universally accepted in Ukraine. In particular, the Cossacks who saw themselves as the defenders of Orthodoxy against the forces of Islam, viewed the Union as a betrayal of Orthodoxy to the Catholic Poles. The bitter conflicts which ensued undoubtedly contributed to the eventual downfall of the Cossack-Ukrainian state.

Yet, by one of the ironies of history, the same Ukrainian Catholic Church became, in the nineteenth century, one of the chief transmitters and protectors of the Ukrainian national idea. The major part of Ukraine was absorbed into the Russian Empire which aimed at the total Russification of all its subjects – a process in which the Moscow-ruled Orthodox Church willingly cooperated. But Western Ukraine, Galicia, the heartland of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, became part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, whose rulers were only too happy to allow that church to continue to flourish, seeing it as a useful counter-balance to Russia's policy of using the Orthodox Church as a means of, and pretext for, interfering in the politics of neighbouring states. Hence one has the ironic situation that while Ukraine's greatest poet, Taras Shevchenko, in his rousing narratives of Cossack times, sees the "Uniates" (Ukrainian Catholics) as the enemies of things Ukrainian, his *secundus inter pares*, the West Ukrainian Ivan Franko, in his great narrative *The Lord's Jests*, presents a sympathetic portrait of a priest of that same church patiently teaching the village children to read.

The Union of Brest, proclaimed in October, 1596, and the preliminary accords signed in December, 1595 in Rome were, in fact, only the culminating point in a long process of attempted union between the Catholic and Orthodox Churches. Ukraine-Rus' accepted Christianity from Constantinople in 988 – several decades before the final split between the two great centres of Christendom. The Kyivan church, in fact, never formally broke with Rome; it maintained relations with the Holy See right up to the fall of Kyiv to the Tatars in 1240. In this it differed sharply with the church of Muscovy, which had never been in good relations with Rome. During the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, a number of attempts were made to bring the religious domains of Rome and Byzantium into alliance against the advances of Islam, culminating in the Council of Florence (1439), which worked out a formula acceptable to both sides, regarding one of the major, if abstruse, theological differences which had developed between the two

churches, concerning the Holy Ghost. The fall of Constantinople to the Turks only four years later, however, meant that the decisions of Florence remained a dead letter – until a new initiative was made a century and a half later, culminating in the Union of Brest.

To the Russian Orthodox Church – and official Russian historians – these facts are anathema. The Russian leaders of both church and state claim to be the direct lineal heirs of the church and state of Kyiv-Rus'. They deny, therefore, any connection of the Church of Kyiv-Rus' with Rome, and interpret the Union of Brest as the subversion of the Orthodox of Ukraine and Belarus by Roman Catholic Poland. When, in 1839, Tsar Nicholas I ordered the Union revoked and its followers to be forcibly incorporated into the Russian Orthodox Church, this was officially proclaimed as the "voluntary reunion" of these lost sheep with the true "Mother-Church". Precisely the same terminology was used a century later when Stalin ordered the suppression of the Ukrainian Catholic Church in the West Ukrainian lands, which he had acquired under the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939, and the subsequent post-war border changes. And, in 1989, when the reinstatement of the Ukrainian Catholic Church became one of the key issues of the growing movement for human rights and civil and political freedoms in the Ukrainian SSR, Soviet officialdom made a determined stand to exclude the Ukrainian Catholic Church from the liberalisation programme proclaimed by Mikhail Gorbachev, alleging that Ukrainian Catholicism was a subversive political force, aimed at breaking up the Soviet Union.

Although today's independent Ukraine embodies in its Constitution the separation of church and state, the legacy of seven decades of atheistic communism is all too apparent. Secular and religious leaders alike speak of the nation's "moral bankruptcy", of the need to rebuild spiritual and ethical values. Free of the imposed communist ideology, the Ukrainian people are seeking a new system of values on which to build their lives. Some are turning to the traditional faiths of Ukraine – Orthodoxy and Eastern-rite Catholicism. Others, particularly the young, are drawn to faiths new to Ukraine – from US-style revivalist Christianity to Krishna Consciousness and the "Moonies". There are even a few neo-pagan movements, based on the little that is known of the pre-Christian cults of Ukraine-Rus'.

To mark the quatercentenary of the Union of Brest, therefore, *The Ukrainian Review* will publish, in the course of the next year, not only articles directly relevant to the events of 1595-96, but also the whole spectrum of religious life in Ukraine, past and present, including its expression in art and literature. The current selection concentrates on a theme of particular topical interest – the role of religion in state-building. □

Saints and State-Building in Kyivan Rus', 988-1240

Debra Coulter

Ye are protectors of the land of Rus', shining forever like beacons
and praying to the Lord on behalf of your countrymen.

Tale of Bygone Years, 12th century[1]

Immediately after his baptism, the *Tale of Bygone Years* tells us, Prince Volodymyr I returned to Kyiv in 988 with the relics and icons of saints to begin the Christianisation of Rus'.[2] During the centuries that followed, an ever-increasing pantheon of deceased holy men and women were honoured and invoked by the people of Rus', according to the testimony of contemporary chronicles, *vitae*, icons, church calendars and dedications. Why were these saints so fundamental to the Orthodox faith?

When the Kyivan people accepted Eastern Christianity from Byzantium, they inherited the ancient tradition of venerating the saints, a practice which stemmed from the earliest centuries of the Christian era. Martyrs, ascetics, and evangelists were honoured as heroes of the faith, who were believed to have gained special access to God.[3] The saint's intimacy with the Almighty empowered him to mediate between the Divine Judge and sinful mankind. Through his relics, the saint became a channel of divine grace and healing to the faithful, a heavenly intercessor whose awesome power transcended the grave.

Mary, the Mother of God, and St Nicholas of Myra ranked as all-time favourites in the devotion of the East Slavs, but indigenous saints were also needed as ambassadors in the courts of Heaven on behalf of their countrymen. How did the Church find new saints? The monasteries were the chief producers of saints in the Middle Ages, but they were not alone in propagating cults. What other interest groups promoted their saintly candidates and what did early Kyivan society expect of its holy men? These are the questions considered here.

Canonisation

There are three things which testify to true holiness in men: first blameless orthodoxy, second attainment of all virtues... and finally the manifestation on God's part of supernatural signs and miracles.

Nektarios of Jerusalem (1602-1676)[4]

Within a generation of the Christianisation of Kyivan Rus', the new Kyivan Church was including indigenous holy men in the official Church calendars for venera-

[1] S.H. Cross (trans.), *Russian Primary Chronicle* (Harvard, 1930), pp. 217-8.

[2] Ibid, p. 204. Although the precise details of Volodymyr's baptism have been subject to scholarly debate, the pertinent fact here is the value Volodymyr saw in the cult of saints.

[3] E. Kemp, *Canonization and Authority in the Western Church* (Oxford, 1948), p. 20.

[4] Patriarch Photius of Constantinople, 'The Canonization of Saints in the Orthodox Church' in *The Christian East* (1931), p. 86.

tion alongside the traditional saints of Byzantium. Few literary sources exist to tell us exactly how native saints were "canonised"[5] in the Kyivan era, but it would appear that the process loosely emulated the Byzantine model. Like the piecing together of a jigsaw, a general idea of the development of canonisation can be deduced from early documents, references in Chronicles and *vitae*, and by comparison with the practices of the mother-Church in Byzantium.

The first indigenous saints of Old Rus', Borys and Hlib, were canonised in the eleventh century, and in their cults we can detect three distinct levels of sanctity that were recognised by the Kyivan Church throughout its history. These three levels are represented by local, regional and national cults, and only the latter were approved by the Church for veneration throughout the land of Rus'.[6] The local level was the first stage in glorifying a saint, at which a holy man was venerated after death by his community. In some cases, veneration was a spontaneous act of the people, particularly if the deceased person had suffered. Ascetics and innocent victims of violent death were often the object of spontaneous lay veneration. More often, though, saints' cults flourished as a result of promotion by interested parties who had something to gain.[7]

Posthumous miracles were a vital ingredient in the creation of a cult. To the lay populace, miracles alone were sufficient proof of the deceased's sanctity, but the Church required evidence of a virtuous life and orthodox faith as well before sanctioning a new saint. Even so, the Eastern Church has always taken more heed of the "common consciousness" of the people in recognising saints than has the Western Church, and the veneration of local holy men was most often approved (or at least tolerated) by bishops, who had responsibility for investigating cults in their diocese. Following Byzantine tradition, the name of a new Kyivan saint was recorded in the Church Calendar at the church or monastery with which he was associated. The day of the saint's death was then commemorated as a feast day, an account of the saint's life was written, and an icon of the saint was painted.[8]

Cults approved for local veneration could eventually gain regional or national recognition if the saint was considered important enough. Such a progression was usually acknowledged by a translation of the relics into a church dedicated to the saint, and required the involvement of higher ecclesiastical and secular authorities. The cult of the princes Borys and Hlib clearly illustrates this process: from local beginnings, the cult rapidly gained widespread popularity when miracles were reported. After ecclesiastical investigations, the princes were proclaimed saints by Metropolitan Ioan and Prince Yaroslav, and in 1072 and 1115 were progressively elevated to national sainthood by Yaroslav's sons and grandsons.[9] Another early Kyivan saint, Feodosiy Pecherskyi (i.e. "of the caves"), was

[5] NB the term "canonisation" is used here to describe official glorification of saints by the Church of Kyivan Rus'.

[6] G. Lenhoff, *The Martyred Princes Boris and Gleb* (Ohio, 1989), p. 47.

[7] B. Ward, *Miracles and the Medieval Mind* (London, 1982), pp. 128-9.

[8] Patriarch Photius, op. cit., pp. 86, 88-9; C. Galatariotou, *The Making of a Saint* (Cambridge, 1991), pp. 113-5.

[9] 'Tale of the Miracles of Roman and David' in P. Hollingsworth, *The Hagiography of Kievan Rus'* (Harvard, 1992), pp. 114, 120-1, 132-3.

promoted from local to national status when Grand Prince Svyatopolk advised the Metropolitan to register the saint's name in the *Sinodik* for public reading in 1108, at the request of the saint's monastic community.[10]

Compared with papal bureaucracy evolving in Western Europe, the canonisation of saints in Kyivan Rus' appears to have been a relatively lax affair, and consequently there remains much uncertainty over who was and who was not a saint among the many names listed for commemoration in Church calendars. However, it is apparent that princes, as defenders of the faith, played a leading role in the recognition of national saints. This was a duty which could be, and was, exploited for political purposes. Without detracting from the sanctity of the process, the involvement of secular powers made canonisation a significant step in state-building.

Hagiography and Icons

He [Prince Yaroslav] ordered that the saints be painted on an icon, so that the faithful, entering the church and seeing their image depicted, as if seeing the saints themselves, would with faith and love bow down to them and kiss their image.

Lesson on the Life of Boris and Gleb, 11th century[11]

The Kyivan Church, as we have seen, followed Byzantine tradition in commemorating new saints with an icon and a *Life* which strictly adhered to Orthodox convention. As a result of this conformity, the historical value of saints' *Lives* has been considered doubtful, yet recent scholarship has shown that these early literary works are of great use to the social historian.[12] Amid the topoi of *vitae* we catch a glimpse of the occupations and perceptions of medieval society. The production of *vitae* and images were highly esteemed tasks, undertaken only by trained churchmen, such as the monk Alimpiy of Kyiv, who was himself later canonised.[13] To the monastic writer and his patrons, hagiography and iconography were not only a means to honour a saint, but were more subtly a vehicle for publicising a message.

Hagiography had two main functions. Firstly, *vitae* were written to promote veneration of a saint by showing that he was worthy of the honour. Hagiographers reinterpreted their subjects' actions through the filter of Eastern Orthodox convention in order to identify the saint as a saint. Furthermore, if East Slavic saints could be shown to be like the holy men of old, then the whole land of Rus' could be a full partaker in sacred history, alongside more ancient Christian lands. For this reason, the lives of the holy monks of Rus' emulated their Byzantine predecessors in describing the saint's withdrawal from the world and fight against the devil, culminating in his acquisition of superhuman power.[14] Secondly, saints' *Lives* were written to encourage other monks in their vocation and to present an

[10] M. Heppell (trans.), *The Paterik of the Kievan Caves* (Harvard, 1989), p. 93.
[11] Nestor, 'Lesson on the Life of Boris and Gleb' in Hollingsworth, op. cit., p. 22.
[12] For example, S. Harvey, E. Patlagean and P. Hollingsworth.
[13] Heppell, op. cit., p. 192.
[14] Galatariotou, op. cit., p. 94; E. Patlagean, 'Ancient Byzantine Hagiography' in D. Wilson (ed.), *Saints and Their Cults* (Cambridge, 1983), p. 108.

ideal example for the brethren to follow, as we see in the prologues to the *vitae* of Feodosiy of the Kyivan Caves and Avraamiy of Smolensk.[15]

In Orthodox tradition, an icon as well as a *Life* was required as a declaration of sainthood.[16] The early Kyivan saints – Borys, Hlib, Antoniy, Feodosiy and their successors – were venerated through icons soon after their deaths, and it is likely that those doubtful cases which exist only as names in Church calendars probably denote either cults that died out or simply deceased persons listed for requiem prayer.[17] Why were icons so essential a component of Orthodox sainthood? The answer lies in the fact that icons were considered not merely as pictures, but as windows on Heaven which revealed the saint in his heavenly glory. "The person who venerates an icon venerates the person represented on it", the hierarchs of the seventh ecumenical council in Nicaea had declared, and this confident post-iconoclastic theology was inherited by Rus'. Just as the saint was the mediator between man and God, the icon was the intermediary between the praying faithful and the saint, and this link was preserved by conformity to Byzantine iconographic conventions.[18] Theology apart, medieval churchmen well knew the value of visual stimuli for transmitting ideology. The sensory impact of life-size icons of saints interceding for the faithful before the mighty Pantocrator must have had a powerful effect on worshippers.

By publicising the saint, iconographers and hagiographers honoured the holy man and kept his memory alive, but other causes could also be promoted through this medium. The status and prosperity of the monastery or church which housed the saint's relics could be enhanced by advertising the powers of the saint, thereby drawing patrons and pilgrims and warning off predators. The *Patericon of the Kyivan Caves Monastery*, compiled between the eleventh and late thirteenth centuries, warns of divine retribution meted out to enemies of the monks.[19] *Vitae* could be commissioned by princely families to glorify saintly relatives and enhance the prestige of their house, as we shall see later. Ideological viewpoints were frequently expressed through *vitae* and icons: Metropolitan Ilarion, writing in the mid-eleventh century, piously described newly-Christian Kyiv as "sanctified by the icons of saints", but it is equally likely that, as Likhachev has suggested, the adornment of the city with icons and the promotion of native saints were part of a wider political programme to present Kyiv as the equal of Constantinople.[20]

Iconography and hagiography were the chief means by which a saint's cult could be promoted and publicised. The *Life* was the written testimony of a the saint's holiness, the icon was the medium through which he was venerated. So fundamental were they to the success of a cult that vigilant monastic promoters

[15] 'Life of Feodosii' in Heppell, op. cit., p. 24; 'Life of Avraamii of Smolensk' in Hollingsworth, op. cit., p. 136.

[16] Bishop Kallistos Ware, interviewed by D.A. Coulter.

[17] 'Life of Boris and Glëb' in Hollingsworth, op. cit., p. 22; Heppell, op. cit., p. 11.

[18] L. Ouspensky, *Theology of the Icon* (1992), Vol. I, pp. 8, 135, 167; Vol. II. p. 268.

[19] Heppell, op. cit., pp. 59, 155-7.

[20] Metropolitan Ilarion, *Slovo o Zakone i Blahodati* (c.1037-51); D. Likhachev, *A History of Russian Literature* (Moscow, 1989), p. 110.

would frequently paint the icon of a living monk who had a reputation for holiness, in readiness for distribution after his death, and then watch at his tomb for miracles to record.[21] Yet although the monasteries monopolised iconography and hagiography, they could not ignore outside pressures. The images that adorn ancient Ukrainian churches reveal not only the theology of churchmen, but also the aspirations of princes and beliefs of the people.

Monastic Saints

Who, having called upon his holy name with faith, has not found deliverance and healing for the wounds of his soul and the sickness of his body? He is our apostle and preacher, our shepherd and teacher, our ruler and guide, our strong wall and defence, our great glory and our intercessor before God.

Encomium to St Feodosii, 11th century[22]

The monastic saint was the holy man of Kyivan Rus', the principal figure in Orthodox spirituality until the end of the fifteenth century. In seeking spiritual perfection, the monks of Rus' followed the example of the great monastic saints of Palestine and Syria by renouncing the world and withdrawing to the cenobitic life of a monastery or to the eremitic life of a hermit. Likewise, the holy women of Rus' had as their example St Mary of Egypt. Yet asceticism was not escapism, for it drew the attention of a needy society. By living a life apart dedicated to God, the ascetic was perceived by society as the intimate of the Almighty, and was venerated as a man of power, who consequently became the focus of society's hopes. A study of the *Lives* of St Feodosiy Pecherskyi, St Avraamiy of Smolensk and the *Patericon of the Kyivan Caves Monastery* reveals that the monastic holy man of Kyivan Rus' was – like his Byzantine counterpart – the prophet and wonder-worker of his community.

The most outstanding monastic saints of the Kyivan era were St Antoniy and St Feodosiy of the Kyivan Caves, often considered the founding fathers of East Slavic monasticism. Through their "angelic life and passion-suffering asceticism", Antoniy (d.1073), Feodosiy (d.1074), and the holy monks who followed them were reputed to have become agents of divine miracle-working energy.[23] Although the miracle-stories in the *vitae* of monastic saints are often dismissed as fables by modern scholars, these tales reveal the role expected of a saint by his community. Miracles were both the result of and the proof of his holiness. St Feodosiy's provision of oil and mead for his monastery are typical of the miracles a saint was expected to perform. Having achieved victory over demons, the monastic saint was also believed to be able to avert the work of demons in nature: disease, plague and famine, hence St Ahapyt of the Kyivan Caves Monastery could cure Prince Volodymyr Monomakh of illness, and St Avraamiy of Smolensk (c.1200) could bring rain on drought-strick-

[21] Ouspensky, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 170; Lenhoff, op. cit., p. 45.

[22] Heppell, op. cit., p. 103.

[23] Examples are taken from Heppell, pp. 75, 103, 106, 120, 149, 156-7, 175, 189-90, 195-6; and from the 'Life of Avraamii of Smolensk' in Hollingsworth, op. cit., pp. 143, 147.

en Smolensk. In an age when Christianity still had to compete with paganism, miracles such as the healing of a rich man by the venerable Alimpiy demonstrated the new religion's superiority over the skill of magicians.

Holy monks were revered as prophets who could foretell the future and see across time and space. The *Patericon of the Kyivan Caves* records how the venerable Hryhoriy predicted the death of Prince Rostyslav Vsevolodovych, while the revered Onisifor was able to see into men's hearts. A prophet carried moral responsibility for defending the oppressed, and thus the *vita* of St Feodosiy tells us that the saint "intervened with the judges and princes" on behalf of the lowly and fearlessly rebuked unjust princes. Few men would dare speak to rulers in this manner, but the ascetic holy man was in a unique position. Having renounced all, he had nothing to lose except his life, and even death held no fear.

Nonetheless, the prophet faced real dangers for his courage, and only his reputation could save him from the wrath of powerful enemies. Few princes dared touch a holy man of the stature of Feodosiy Pecherskyi, whose link with the supernatural was well known, but lesser saints fared worse. St Hryhoriy, the *Patericon* tells us, was brutally drowned by Prince Rostyslav; St Fedir and St Vasyl were tortured to death by Mstyslav Svyatopolkych. St Avraamiy's preaching almost resulted in his death at the hands of an angry mob. Even so, martyrdom made the saint even more formidable to his foes: Hryhoriy's murderer was drowned, Fedir's torturer died by the very arrow with which he had shot the saint, and Avraamiy's clerical accusers fell ill or died. The misfortunes that befell a saint's persecutor were intended by the hagiographer to serve as a warning to secular powers: "Mark well, those of you that give offence – a dangerous thing. The Lord will speedily avenge His servants".[24]

Despite a monk's own wish for solitude, a reputation for holiness inevitably cast him in the role of counsellor and confessor for his community. The people of Smolensk came to St Avraamiy in the late twelfth century to hear his teaching, for "nothing from the divine writings was concealed from him".[25] Princes regularly sought the counsel and prayers of a holy monk, for his intercession was regarded as the best guarantee of success in this life and salvation in the life beyond. Thus the Kyivan élite came to the living holy fathers of the Caves to confess their sins, and Princes Izyaslav, Svyatoslav, Svyatopolk and Volodymyr Monomakh prayed at the tombs of the deceased saints Antoniy and Feodosiy.

The saint's holiness depended on his withdrawal from the world, and yet the world needed him. Consequently, an inherent conflict arose which eventually threatened to undermine the role of the monastic saint. Drawn by his reputation, disciples would settle around the holy man; a monastic community would be formed; and gifts would be given by princes and nobles. Eventually, the monastery would become a rich landlord with governmental powers over peasants and worldly concerns. Only by fleeing the decadence of worldly monasteries had the holy men of ancient Rus' assumed the charisma of moral authority – as St Feodosiy recognised when he exhorted his followers: "It is wrong for us who are

[24] Heppell, op. cit., p. 157.
[25] 'Life of Avraamii' in Hollingsworth, op. cit., p. 143.

monks, who have renounced the world, to collect property... For where thy treasure is, there is thy heart also".[26]

The rise of the holy monk had been due to the role he fulfilled in society as "locus of spiritual power", as the well-known historian Peter Brown has written of Byzantium.[27] During the Kyivan period, the monastic saint had been a spiritual guide for the populace amid crisis and transition. His authority, which could only be achieved through an ascetic and virtuous life, had represented the mighty resources of heaven and brought hope to his world. The Kyivan chronicler Nestor summed up this hope in the poignant words of a humble supplicant of St Feodosiy: "He has rescued many people from sorrow and misery. Therefore I too have come to look for him, so that he may help me".[28]

Royal Saints

You two bring honor to our princes! You are defenders of the land of Rus'!... Having received the gift of healing from our Lord Jesus Christ, you inexhaustibly grant [healing] to the ill who come in faith...

Translation of the Relics of Boris and Glëb, 12th century[29]

In contrast to monastic saints, the holy princes of Rus' were canonised for their role as patrons and protectors of the Orthodox faith, rather than for ascetic virtues. By nature of their regal authority in life, sainted princes could be expected to become especially powerful protectors in their heavenly role. However, royal cults had an overtly political nature, and for this reason they have been subject to considerably more research by modern scholars than any other category of Slavic saint. Even so, many questions remain unclear. To what degree were sainted princes venerated by the ordinary people, or were they merely the creation of the ruling élite? Were the royal cults of Kyivan Rus' the product of piety, politics or pagan traditions?

Early records indicate that the common people of Rus' readily venerated princely saints who had a reputation for miracles or martyrdom. Borys and Hlib were regarded as both miracle-workers and martyrs, hence their cult received early acceptance and enduring devotion by the people. In the *Tale of the Miracles of Roman and David* (i.e. an early *Life* of Borys and Hlib dating from the eleventh century) we are told that "both rich and poor" came to the translation ceremonies of Borys and Hlib, and it was humble folk who received healing at the brothers' tombs.[30] Reports of miracles could always guarantee initial popularity for a cult. However, when a deceased prince was the innocent victim of violence, as in the case of the murdered sons of Volodymyr I, the death tended to be equated with martyrdom. The royal victim was revered as a *strastoterpets*

[26] 'Life of Feodosii' in G. Fedotov, *A Treasury of Russian Spirituality* (1950), p. 40.

[27] P. Brown, 'The Rise and Function of the Holy Man in Late Antiquity' in *Journal of Roman Studies* 61 (1971), p. 151.

[28] 'Life of St. Feodosii' in Fedotov, op. cit., p. 45.

[29] 'The Hypatian Chronicle' (extract) in Hollingsworth, op. cit., p. 205.

[30] 'Tale of the Miracles of Roman and David' in Hollingsworth, op. cit., p. 133.

("passion-sufferer").[31] Royal martyr cults were a feature of Western Christendom as well, but the people of Rus' displayed particular devotion for such saints. *Strastoterptsy* needed no virtues in life to become the object of posthumous veneration by the people, and therefore even the unpopular twelfth-century rulers Ihor Olhovych and Andriy Boholyubskiy were credited as saints by local people on account of their violent deaths.

Although royal saints were widely venerated by the public, only rarely were these cults initiated by the populace. Royal cults almost always had influential promoters, among whom was the Church. The young Church of Kyivan Rus' needed the protection of Christian princes against enemies within Rus', where the hold of the old Slavic gods was not broken easily. Moreover, between the tenth and fourteenth centuries, Kyivan Rus' faced a relentless tide of pagan invaders from the east – Pechenegs, Torki, Polovtsians, and Tatars. The situation was compounded by the violence and greed of the feuding princes of Rus' itself, hence the Church attempted to promote the ideal of the holy Christian ruler, characterised by godliness, charity and non-violence. The lack of a centralised canonisation process and the paucity of records from the period have sparked considerable debate over which princes were canonised prior to 1240, but according to one Orthodox authority, only the princes who had suffered in the course of discharging their princely duty were actually recognised as saints by the Church during this period.[32] Borys and Hlib met the criteria for Orthodox canonisation, and their example of humility was used by churchmen as sermon material to upbraid the violent princes of Rus'.[33]

Volodymyr I, unlike his youngest sons, was apparently not venerated as a saint until after 1240, despite the efforts of both Metropolitan Ilarion and the monk Yakov to publicise his piety and good deeds. Although Volodymyr was honoured as the Baptiser of Rus', he had neither suffered in life nor worked miracles after death, as was generally required of a saint. In contrast, Volodymyr's grandmother Olha was venerated as a saint during the Kyivan era. Both the *Primary Chronicle* and the *Encomium* for Princess Olha, which are thought to date from the twelfth century, record that Olha's relics displayed the miracle of incorruption, thereby proving that God had glorified her.[34] Volodymyr's eventual national canonisation apparently came only after the trauma of the Mongol destruction, at a time when the "Second Constantine in the land of Rus'" symbolised the former greatness and cohesion of Kyivan Rus'.[35]

While churchmen played a significant role in princely canonisations, the chief promoters of these cults were royal relatives, motivated by political interest and family prestige. Indeed, it was Prince Yaroslav of Kyiv who set in motion the early cult of his brothers, Borys and Hlib, and his motives have been subject to much specu-

[31] G. Fedotov, *The Russian Religious Mind* Vol. I (Harvard, 1946), pp. 104-5.

[32] P. Kovalevsky, *St. Sergius and Russian Spirituality* (New York, 1976), p. 37.

[33] For example, see the 12th c. 'Encomium and Martyrdom of the Holy Martyrs Boris and Gleb' in Hollingsworth, op. cit., p. 222.

[34] The monk Iakov, 'Memorial and Encomium for Volodymyr' and 'Encomium for Princess Ol'ha' in Hollingsworth, op. cit., pp. 170, 181.

[35] V. Vodoff, 'Pourquoi le prince Volodimir Svjatoslavic n'a-t-il pas été canonisé?' in *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* (1988-89), pp. 457, 448.

lation by historians. Did he promote the cult to justify his seizure of Kyiv from his brother Svyatopolk, whom he branded as the murderer of saints? Or did he propagate the cult of the martyred princes in order to claim autonomy from Constantinople for the young Kyivan Church?[36] We do not know, but motives of state-building appear to be uppermost in the ruler's mind. It is significant that, due to the political nature of the cult, Borys and Hlib were only recognised as saints by Constantinople after considerable delay. Subsequent generations of Ryurikid scions claimed the special patronage of the martyred princes in battle and sought reflected glory as blood relatives of the "saviours of the land of Rus'". There was bitter princely rivalry surrounding the translation ceremonies in 1072 and 1115, with each royal faction wanting to take preeminence in the affair – a fact which illuminates the immense value of a dynastic saint as status symbol and protecting patron.[37]

It was undoubtedly in the interests of a royal house to publicise the cults of its dynastic heroes, thereby enhancing its own prestige and bolstering support. Such motives appear to have been the driving force behind the cult of Prince Mykhailo of Chernihiv, whose daughters played a major role in establishing the saintly reputation of their father in the second half of the thirteenth century.[38] However, it has been suggested that pre-Christian traditions provided further impetus for the veneration of royal saints by their relatives. Scholars have consistently pointed to similarities between the rise of princely cults in Christian Rus' and ancestor worship in pagan Slavic and Varangian cultures.[39] According to Cherniavsky, almost all deceased Ryurikid princes of Kyivan Rus' were revered as saints by the lay populace, due to pagan notions of sacral rulership which had fused with Christianity.[40] Indeed, vestiges of pantheism may have tainted the devotion of the laity, but in the eyes of the Church royal saints represented the pure heritage of ancient Christian piety. Christian veneration of holy rulers was, in theory at least, a reversal of normal values, replacing pride with humility, and exalting service to the people above self-interest.

The Royal saints of Kyivan Rus' were, as we have seen, promoted by the Church as ideals of kingly conduct, and by their relatives as validators of princely power. To the reigning house, princely saints were potent symbols of statehood who sanctified the dynasty, but to the common folk, they were holy miracle-workers. For although princely cults seldom arose *spontaneously* from among the people, the long-term success of these cults was ultimately in the hands of the ordinary men and women of Kyivan Rus'. As one historian has aptly observed, without popular acceptance and public utility, even a royal saint could fade into obscurity.[41]

[36] J. Fennell and A. Stokes, *Early Russian Literature* (London, 1974), p. 13; Lenhoff, op. cit., pp. 35, 37; Likhachev, op. cit., pp. 117-8, 120.

[37] F. Sciacca, 'In imitation of Christ: Boris and Gleb and the ritual conversion of the Russian land' in *Slavic Review* 49 (1990), p. 260; M. Dimnik, 'Oleg Sviatoslavich and his patronage of the cult of SS. Boris and Gleb' in *Medieval Studies* 50 (1988), pp. 364, 370.

[38] M. Dimnik, *Mikhail, Prince of Chernigov* (Toronto, 1981), p. 141.

[39] E. Reisman, 'The cult of Boris and Gleb: Remnant of a Varangian tradition' in *Russian Review* (1978), p. 156; S. Maczko, 'Boris and Gleb: Saintly princes or princely saints?' in *Russian History* II (1975), p. 73.

[40] M. Cherniavsky, *Tsar and People* (Yale, 1962), pp. 30, 32.

[41] J. Nelson, 'Royal saints and early medieval kingship' in *Studies in Church History* 10 (1973), p. 43.

Conclusion

Indigenous saints' cults arose and endured in Kyivan Rus' because these saints met a need in society. The monastic saint was the spiritual guide for the recently-Christianised people of Kyivan Rus'; he was the prophet and oracle of his community. Through ascetic suffering and detachment from the world, he embodied the true essence of spirituality.

In contrast, canonised princes were political figures, emblems of power and instruments of ideology. In life they were powerful leaders and protectors of their people, and after death they became patron saints of their principalities. In the rise of holy princes we can see the raw motives of their promoters: pride, fear and rivalry.

Whether ascetic or prince, the great saints of Kyivan Rus' were symbols of national dignity. As such, their cults merged state-building with sanctity. This holds true even in modern society, hence the "rediscovery" of St Euphrosia of Polacak by democrats in post-1991 Belarus, and the bringing home to Lviv of the body of Cardinal Slipyi in 1992, an event which formally concerned only the Ukrainian Catholic Church, but turned into a quasi-state occasion upon the arrival of President Leonid Kravchuk. Above all, however, saints provided a link with the resources of Heaven and a focus of hope for suffering humanity. Hope for the individual, for the community, and for the state.

We believe that they still live after death and that they can help and save and protect those who have recourse to them.

Paterik of the Kievan Caves Monastery, 11th century[42] □

[42] Heppell, op. cit., p. 11.

Church and State in Ukraine Past and Present

Anatoly Kolodny

The relationship of religion, in its capacity as a social phenomenon, and politics, and in particular the material manifestation of politics, the state, has in different eras and places, taken various forms, depending on historical circumstances and national tradition. In some cases, the state has acknowledged the absolute authority of religion and the church, and acted as its obedient instrument. Elsewhere, conversely, the state has felt that there is no need for religious sanctions, and has excluded the church from the sphere of political life, separating religious organisations from the state sector. But what one observes most frequently throughout history is the desire of politicians to transform religion and church organisations into tools of its own policies, subordinating the work of church institutions to secular interests. The relations between politics and religion in such cases is effected through the church apparatus and the day-to-day activities of church organisations which thrust on the faithful the ideology demanded by the organs of state.

In Ukraine, politics has virtually always dominated over religion. Throughout Ukrainian history, regardless of which power currently held sway in Ukraine, the religious leadership provided its basic support. The political overlords, as a rule, required not a church which, in every possible way, mirrored the national traits of the Ukrainian ethnos, but one conformable to its political aspirations which would not contradict the secular power.

In the ninth and tenth centuries, the development of social relations in Rus' raised the issue of creating a strong state power and securing appropriate ideological foundations for it. It became necessary to define the place of religion in the new, feudal state. Pagan cults were inappropriate to the new needs of society, and it would have taken far too long for a new religious system, suitable for the changed social and political structure, to develop naturally. The search for a religion, which would act as a stabilising factor for on-going social development and appropriate to the *realia* of Ukraine, led the Kyivan princes to Christianity, which was already functioning successfully in the social system of European countries.

Thus it was the weakness of paganism from the point of view of the state structure which impelled Prince Volodymyr (ruled 980-1015) to introduce into Kyivan Rus' the Christian religion in its Byzantine form. This brought with it the concept of Caesaropapism and thus enabled the prince to avoid the sort of conflicts with the ecclesiastical authorities which the contemporary Polish rulers were having with their bishops. Moreover, Christianity (as Volodymyr well understood), by its spiritual and organisational unity (as opposed to paganism), strengthened the state both politically and nationally. Therefore, the "Christianisation of Rus'" was essentially a political act, which, on the one hand aimed at introducing a religion which would remain under the full control and in the service of the secular power

and simultaneously validate the latter's existence, and on the other – facilitate the entry of Rus' into the arena of international relations.

A special feature of Ukrainian history is that, from the first appearance of Christianity in Ukraine, on its territory there was no confessional unity between the population at large and its leaders. The use of force by the secular power to impose its will in religious affairs, characteristic of the "conversion", became a tradition which endured for centuries in Ukrainian history.

If religion does not develop as an organic part of indigenous national tradition, but is imposed from above by rulers or conquerors, it will require some considerable time before (in modified form) it becomes a part of the spiritual life of this ethnos and begins to play its historical ethno-integrating and ethno-mobilising role. Hence in ancient Rus' Christianity did nothing to reduce or prevent the endemic disputes between rival princes. Nor did it bring about the spiritual unity of Rus' – as the defeat of Rus' by the invading Tatars (Mongols) shows. Christianity had not become a shrine which it is a sacred obligation to defend. Furthermore, since it lacked deep roots in the conscience and history of the people, it had no more significance in the national consciousness than the new state organisation mechanically imposed on Rus' by the Tatars.

History makes it abundantly clear that (like Christianity in general) none of the Christian confessions with their whole spectrum of doctrine and ritual appeared in Ukraine as a product of the organic self-development of society as a whole. Every one of them – whether Orthodoxy, or Greek-Catholicism – first established its domain in the conscience of the leading strata, both secular and ecclesiastical, and played rather the role of an ideological foundation of political power. This led to divisions in society, inter-confessional conflicts, and tragedies in the existence of the nation.

However, the paradox of Ukrainian history lies in the fact that in the course of time, during periods of the political degradation and decline of Ukrainian society, and the enslavement of Ukraine by foreigners, this confession became a force which saved the Ukrainian ethnos from destruction, and developed into the principal leader of all national forces, and a means of individualisation of the national culture.

These paradoxical changes became possible, in our opinion, on account of the fact that in periods of national tragedy in Ukraine, religion became independent of the secular power. One confession or another became able to abandon the role of founder and saviour of the state institutions and to grow closer to the population at large. The political emphasis of its religious doctrine disappeared. It appeared before the faithful in the entire wealth of its universal human principles, and its moral authority grew in the eyes of the people. It assumed the role of leader of the tastes and aspirations of the life of the people, breathing spiritual life into the formation of society and nation.

Thus the decline of state power in Rus' during the Tatar invasion facilitated the transformation of the state religion into a symbol of national unity and salvation. The church then appeared in the role of an organised national institution, capable of uniting all strata of the people who perceived it to be not so much a religious, as a political force, a means of national integration, and a voice for the interests of the Ukrainian national ethnos.

Thus, up to the seventeenth century, the Ukrainian Orthodox, and later the Greek-Catholic, Churches were the sole organised force opposing the political occupation of Ukraine. All changes in Canon Law and church organisation, which took place under the conditions of colonial dependence, were conditioned by the need to preserve this particular function of the church in national life.

A number of facts in the history of Ukrainian church life bear witness to this. In the fourteenth century, the Grand Dukes of Lithuania, who had extended their sphere of influence into Ukraine, were compelled by the influence of the Orthodox Church, which had the support of the entire people, and by the whole culture of the Ukrainian people, to adopt Orthodoxy themselves. They broke with the Moscow Metropolitanate and elected a separate Kyivan metropolitan, whose see was in Vilna. The Union of Brest (1596) was also intended to protect Ukraine against the initiative of the Moscow Patriarchate and the political hegemony of Moscow, as well as Polish attempts to subjugate it.

When, in 1686, the Metropolitanate of Kyiv fell under the jurisdiction of the Moscow Patriarchate, it ceased to have any real influence on the Ukrainian ethno-process. In 1721, Tsar Peter I liquidated the Moscow Patriarchate and established a Holy Synod as, in effect, a "Ministry of Religious Affairs". Orthodoxy in Russia thus became a part of the state apparatus, and the leading agent of Russification of the other Slav churches. Under these conditions, the development in a Ukrainian of a feeling of belonging to the Orthodox Church was not conducive to the consolidation of an awareness of ethnicity, since the ethnic-confessional features of the culture propagated by the Moscow church had a purely Russian colouring. The Russian Orthodox Patriarchate played an active and vigorous part in the planned de-Ukrainisation and destruction of Ukrainian Orthodoxy. One of the manifestations of the policy of the "Third Rome" towards Ukraine was carried out in 1775-1875 and 1946 with the support of the secular authorities, that is, the forced liquidation (under the slogan of the "Return to the faith of our fathers") of the Greek-Catholic Church which had done much for the development of the Ukrainian ethnic identity.

The destruction by Russian Orthodoxy of the Ukrainian church, both Orthodox and Greek-Catholic, was based on the concept of the Great Russian state: Ukraine does not exist, these religious processes are an internal matter of a single country and no one should meddle with them. Thus for centuries the Russian Orthodox Church managed to keep the question of religion in Ukraine outside the focus of international opinion, leaving Ukrainian Christianity face to face with a perfidious opponent which was now simply an arm of the state.

Since, from the twelfth century onwards, the Ukrainian nation was without statehood, which is the fundamental attribute of national consolidation, while its ethnic territory was constantly being carved up between colonist neighbours, the result was that none of the confessions developed into a single national religion. Claims by Orthodoxy or Greek-Catholicism to be the sole religious voice of the interests of the nation, and the desire of these churches to subordinate to themselves and their jurisdiction all Ukrainian believers, led only to inter-confessional conflicts. These were endemic to Ukraine and mirrored not only the complexity of international and intra-national relations, but also religious intole-

rance, the aspiration of individual foreign religious bodies (the Vatican, the Polish episcopate, the Moscow Patriarchate) to subordinate the Ukrainian believers to their jurisdiction. By dividing the Ukrainian ethnos, these inter-confessional disputes halted the process of national integration and self-determination, and made Ukraine an easy prey for various states and churches.

As may be seen from the history of the first national renaissance (sixteenth-seventeenth centuries), these processes drowned the Ukrainian national idea. Having turned to union with Rome, the Ukrainian episcopate split the nation by confessional allegiance, sowed unfamiliar intra-national disputes, which weakened and split the Ukrainian social movements, and which, by failing to defend the national territory, provided neighbouring states with the opportunity of, in the end, cutting Ukraine in two.

In tsarist Russia, the Orthodox Church held the dominant place in organised religious life. Orthodoxy was considered the state religion, and the Holy Synod of the Orthodox Church established by Peter I had, in effect, the status of a Ministry of Religious Affairs. Due to this "symphony" of its relations with the secular authorities, and often due to the efforts of the latter, Orthodoxy eventually became an integrating force in society. In the sphere of spiritual life, an absolutist order prevailed *de jure* up to 1905, and even up to 1917 it remained *de facto* monopolist. Orthodoxy retained this monopoly of religious life also under the communist regime. In tsarist Russia, religious and ethnic oppression went together. The Soviet era then halted the process of transformation of Ukrainian Orthodoxy into a national religion, with the result that a significant proportion of Ukrainians accepted this foreign, Russian, church as part of their own ethnic identity. National self-awareness was replaced by feelings of some abstract confessional allegiance. When Ukrainians were asked who they were, they replied: "We are Orthodox!"

Comparison of the functioning of the Orthodox Church under the authoritarian tsarist regime and that of the communist regime which followed reveals a marked similarity, particularly in the desire of both to bring the sphere of human consciousness under total control. But totalitarianism as a fully-formed phenomenon is far from identical with church authoritarianism. Totalitarianism is based on the erosion or complete elimination of national-historical traditions and the consolidation of the social, cultural and religious uniformity of society, through the destruction of all social institutions and spiritual factors, which might in some way oppose this drive for unity. Under socialism, particularly taking into account the fact that totalitarianism was based on the sacralisation of social utopias and their transformation into a religious doctrine, traditional religiousness, particularly its institutionalised forms (church structures), were subjected to atomisation and gradual destruction. The confrontation which emerged in the first years of Soviet rule between the church and the young political regime was quickly liquidated to the benefit of the latter. Religious relations and the church as a form of their external expression could exist only insofar as the all-powerful secular authorities permitted. The Communist Party, which in reality embodied the core of power and which acted as a part of the state apparatus, gave its struggle against religion a legitimate sound, basing it on the need to overcome any factors which might obstruct the building of a society of universal bliss.

After the almost total destruction of the church in the first decades of the Soviet regime, its alliance with the state could be renewed only in conditions of its direct subordination to communist rule. This came to pass in the 1940s; the governing bodies of certain confessions declared their loyalty to the new state power, and later also their support for it. Those which were unwilling to subordinate themselves to the new order, did not register themselves under the new laws, and were persecuted in various ways. The greatest zeal in praising the totalitarian authorities as appointed by God was exhibited by the hierarchs of the Russian Orthodox Church, and was rewarded by the tacit support of the government organs for this church. The government bureaucracy even set up a special Committee on the Affairs of the Orthodox Church. To some extent, this was regarded as a desirable religious institution. The activities of certain Protestant and Old Believer groups at this time was, if not actually proscribed, restricted in various ways. In 1931, to please the Russian Orthodox Church, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church was dissolved. In 1946, a pseudo-Synod of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church, which was convened under pressure by the authorities, adopted a resolution to return to the bosom of the "mother-church" – the Russian Orthodox Church. In time, the Soviet regime took complete control of all the levers for subjugating religious organisations. Under pressure from the secular authorities, these organisations lost the role of subject of state-church relations, and were transformed into the object of various crude machinations by the authorities. They were viewed as the kind of influential social institutions which obstructed the consolidation of the communist ideology's monopoly over the spiritual life of the people.

During the totalitarian period, the Ukrainian exarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church exhibited a patently pro-Moscow orientation, rooting out every tendency towards separatism in the organisational life of the church and all attempts to revive the special features of Ukrainian Orthodox tradition in liturgical practice. The Russification policy of the Moscow Patriarchate was thus in complete agreement with the policy of the Soviet state and the Communist Party, orientated on the "melding of nations".

The period of *perestroika*, which began in 1985, prepared the ground for a substantially new approach to church matters in the independent states which were established after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. On 23 April, 1993, the Ukrainian Parliament adopted a Law "On the freedom of conscience and religious organisations". This defined the obligations of the state towards religious organisations and the latters' obligations towards the state and society. In Ukraine, the church is separated from the state. The state education system is separated from the church (religious organisations), and has a secular character. Every citizen is guaranteed the right to freedom of conscience, which includes, in the first place, pluralism of outlooks and religious confessions, free practice of his or her religion and the right to propagate religious or atheist beliefs. According to the law, parents are able to bring up their children in conformity with their convictions and attitude to religion. Ukrainian citizens have equal rights in all branches of economic, religious, social and cultural life regardless of religious affiliation. All religious confessions and organisations are equal before the law.

Freedom of conscience is subject to only those restrictions necessary for the protection of public safety and order, life, health and morality, and of the other rights and freedoms of citizens.

The new legal regulations governing the activities of religious organisations in Ukraine, the state's assurance of the necessary material and social conditions for their functioning, and the democratisation of the sphere of church-state relations has made possible significant changes in the attitude of religious organisations towards the authorities. In particular, these changes have been demonstrated by those religious organisations which have a specifically Ukrainian nature – the Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Kyiv Patriarchate and the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church. These have become a means of support for the process of the building of Ukraine as an independent, democratic state, and have assumed a responsibility for the fate of the Ukrainian nation. Thus the participants in the All-Ukrainian inter-religious forum, which was held in the autumn of 1991, put out an appeal to the faithful of the various confessions to vote "Yes" in the national referendum on Ukrainian independence.

The national renaissance in democratic Ukraine has not only stimulated the revitalisation of the religious activities of the various churches, but also put on the agenda the question of the place of religion in the national life of Ukrainians, and in the state-building process. Today the predominant sociological view is that religion is a major factor in the renaissance of spiritual culture, an important foundation for spiritual values and full-blooded national life. The number of people who believe that religion occupies an important place in their life has also increased. Evidence of the widespread nature of religious belief is the growing importance of religion in the outlook of young people and intellectuals. But today's increase in the level of religious commitment among the population of Ukraine is not simply the result of the propaganda activities of the churches or some missionary influences (although these processes do, in fact, increase in strength every year). It is due, first and foremost, to the spontaneous searchings of the people, who have become aware of the crisis in the Marxist ideology which was for so long predominant.

Ukraine is a multi-confessional country in which today there are up to seventy various religious denominations and cults. In addition to the traditional and widespread Orthodox Church, there are also other Christian denominations – Greek- and Roman-Catholicism, the Church of the Old-Believers and other sects which developed out of Orthodoxy, a whole range of Protestant churches, as well as Judaism and Islam, which also have a long tradition in Ukraine.

Since independence, churches banned in the past have renewed their activities, in particular the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic and Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Churches, the Union of Christians of Evangelical Faith (Pentecostalists), the Society of Jehovah's Witnesses, and the All-Ukrainian Alliance of Evangelical-Christian Baptist Associations. In today's independent Ukraine, the denominations enjoy the right to free canonical, catechetical and preaching activities, and links with their centres abroad. Confiscated buildings used during the communist era for secular purposes are now being returned to them. The state allows officially registered churches reliefs on

taxation and the charges for communal services, etc. During the period 1991-93, the network of religious organisations in Ukraine grew to more than 3,000 communities, while in 1994 there were more than 16,000 of them. A number of denominations new to Ukraine have appeared, in particular the Lutheran and Evangelical-Reformed Churches, the New "Svedenborg" Church, the Church of the Union, the Faith of the Light, the Svyatoslav Church, the Presbyterian Church, and the Church of the Transfigurating Mother of God. The Ukrainian Orthodox Churches of the Kyiv and Moscow Patriarchates have established some 500 new parishes each. There has been a particularly rapid increase in the number of parishes in the Greek- and Roman-Catholic Churches, the Church of the Evangelical Christians-Baptists, the Seventh-day Adventists. The network of communities of Buddhists and Muslims has virtually tripled. Whereas ten years ago there was only one ecclesiastical teaching institution in Ukraine – the Odessa Orthodox seminary – now there are almost thirty. Nearly all the major denominations have their own teaching institutions. In addition to seminaries, the Orthodox and Greek-Catholic Churches also have religious academies. The Greek-Catholics have opened their own academic institutions – the Institute of Philosophy and the Institute of the History of the Church. In 1994, some fifty various religious periodicals were published in Ukraine. Seven years ago, there was only the journal *Pravoslavnyi Visnyk* (Orthodox Herald).

Ecclesiastical and religious processes in present day Ukraine are marked with great complexity, uncertainty and even a certain unexpectedness. This is due not only to factors arising from historical tradition, but also the sharp contradictions of contemporary social and political life, and the special features of the socio-economic crisis of post-communist society.

The Law on Freedom of Conscience passed back in the socialist era has proved ineffective, since, according to this law, church-religious life was run, in effect, under the direct eye of the state. The Committee on Religious Affairs, which until recently existed within the structure of the government of Ukraine, acted basically as a peculiar court of arbitration in inter-confessional and intra-confessional disputes, often doing so in an ignorant manner, due to the subjective thinking of those in charge of it. The state did not have a rational policy towards the church. Former President Leonid Kravchuk's slogan "A free church in a free state" ran counter to the interests of the state. Local government officials not only failed to monitor ecclesiastical and religious processes from the point of view of the national interest; they did not even take note of the general course of events. Hence, as a result of the spiritual vacuum which followed the collapse of the Marxist-Leninist ideological monopoly, together with the loss of authority by the traditional confessions due to their past collaboration with the state authorities, and their weakened position due to inter-confessional conflicts and the financial crisis, Ukraine has become an arena of ideological expansion, with missionary activities launched and generously financed by various foreign religious organisations. Often this takes place in violation of Ukrainian law and disregarding Ukraine's national interests. These foreign missionaries buy the local authorities and media, and hire for next to nothing cultural and educational institutions, and stadiums, and, ignoring the very presence in Ukraine of church

organisations of the same denomination, they target their teaching at young people, especially school-children and students. And, since, in the years of totalitarian rule, Ukraine was robbed of its national and religious traditions, the missionaries find a fertile ground for the uncritical acceptance of their non-traditional religious teaching, which they present as a higher expression of universal religious tradition, and the one possible means of expressing religious spirituality. And, as a result of their preaching, the younger generation is becoming socially and politically indifferent, and (in the worst sense of the word) cosmopolitan, losing the characteristics of national mentality.

As a result, the Ukrainian Parliament was obliged to pass amendments to the Law, henceforth confining the missionary activities of foreign churches to the framework of inter-confessional contacts.

But it is clear that these amendments were adopted all too late. Already in Ukraine there are active communities of the Baha'i faith, Buddhists, the Church of Christ, Mormons, the Unification Church ("Moonies"), the Salvation Army, the Evangelical Society, and various missionary societies. Some of them were allowed to register by local authorities, without the knowledge of the Council on Religious Affairs, or even the provincial authorities.

Orthodoxy occupies a particular place in the history of Ukraine. The attempts of its hierarchs to win autocephalic status have always coincided with periods of national renaissance or attempts to build a Ukrainian state. But the current crisis in the Orthodox Church is unprecedented in the history of Ukraine. This, too, is a result, first and foremost, of the processes of national renaissance. But it has been reinforced by political factors, in particular the attempts by Russian chauvinists to use the Russian Orthodox Church as a means of building a new state uniting all the East Slavs. This crisis has resulted in the splitting of Ukrainian Orthodoxy into three independent and competing churches, each of which claims to be the only genuine representative of Orthodoxy. The Synods of two of these Churches – the Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Kyiv Patriarchate and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church – have declared their separate status and are seeking confirmation of this autocephaly in the family of Orthodox churches. The Ukrainian Orthodox Church subordinated to the Moscow Patriarchate likewise hopes to be granted full independence from its mother-church, although this ignores the way that history has shuffled the cards. For the Russian church considers that the Kyiv Metropolitanate is its historic mother-church, and hence the Ukrainian church should, properly speaking, seek to be granted autocephalic status by the church which is truly the "mother" of Ukrainian Orthodoxy – the Patriarchate of Constantinople.

Thus the problem of autocephalic status for Ukrainian Orthodoxy has a clearly defined geopolitical aspect, so that it is not simply a purely ecclesiastical problem, but one of the aspects of Russian-Ukrainian relations in general and of possible changes in the world Orthodoxy environment. The opposition of the Russian Orthodox Church to granting autocephalic status to the Orthodox of Ukraine has deep historical roots and a political colouring. The Orthodox Church both in the Russian Empire and in the Soviet Union served to help inte-

grate the political order, propounding the messianic idea of Moscow as the "Third Rome". The Russian Orthodox Church, which thus identified itself with the unitary state, is now making significant efforts to preserve its "canonical territory" and history, since if Ukrainian Orthodoxy breaks away, Russia will lose its claim to apostolic origins, and its well-established ranking in fifth place among the Orthodox churches. It is therefore pursing a policy of direct interference in the internal affairs of the Orthodox Churches in Ukraine, and attempting to discredit the idea of Ukrainian Orthodox autocephaly, putting forward "proofs" that the existing Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Kyiv Patriarchate is illegal and uncanonical. This Church (as of September, 1995) has around 2,000 of its own parishes, 20 dioceses, its own monasteries and ecclesiastical teaching establishments, press and publishing house. Moreover, it enjoys the backing of political groups, parties and civic organisations which support the ideas of national renaissance and independence.

It is not the concern of the Ukrainian state how – canonically or otherwise – this or that Orthodox Church achieves autocephalic status; the state must treat them all impartially. But, since the split in Ukrainian Orthodoxy is leading to a certain regionalisation of Ukraine, and even the strengthening of separatist tendencies, and a negative influence on international relations, the state cannot regard the proliferation of Patriarchates as a purely internal church matter. The Ukrainian authorities need to adopt a policy aimed at healing the splits in the Orthodox community and consolidating a single Orthodox Church in Ukraine, taking into account both the historical experience of other Orthodox peoples in winning autocephalic status for their churches as an expression of their sovereignty, and also the existence of many churches within the state borders, which is itself a factor conducive to the consolidation of the national interest.

Such a policy will help preserve civil peace in Ukraine, strengthen international relations, reduce trends of regionalism and separatism, and strengthen Ukrainian unity. Russophone Orthodox believers, and also those in whom the tradition of Russian Orthodoxy lives on, could fulfil their religious needs through parishes of a Ukrainian exarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church, although this formally runs counter to the ruling of Canon Law – "in every state one particular church". To help resolve the crisis and problems of Orthodoxy in Ukraine, it would be useful and timely for the state to take the initiative in setting up a permanent Conference of bishops of all its Orthodox churches.

The relations between the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church and the Greek-Catholic Church are likewise complex, although they all express, each in its own way, the Ukrainian religious mentality. Inter-confessional conflict between them has been exacerbated by disputes over church buildings and the desire of each of them to have a monopoly of catechetical work in the cultural and educational spheres in what they claim to be their own "canonical territory". Thus the Eastern-rite Catholics aspire to establish a monopoly in Galicia, while the Orthodox are determined not to let them into eastern Ukraine and Volynia.

The search for concord between these truly Ukrainian churches is based on the Eastern rite, to which they have preserved their faithfulness, as well as the

Ukrainian idea, which in various ways they support and consolidate. But in the present situation this can go no further than rapprochement. The idea of creating in Ukraine a single "national Christian Church", advocated by certain political forces, aimed at uniting all Christian denominations on the basis of national values, is unrealistic. For the unity of the faithful regarding the national idea in no way implies that their denominational sympathies are identical.

Moreover, we have to recognise that a rapprochement of Greek-Catholics and Orthodox to the point of possible unity would not be permitted by the Apostolic See, to whose jurisdiction the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church is subordinate. The latter has already been cut up by the Vatican, which has subordinated the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic eparchy in Poland directly to itself, and the Transcarpathian one to its nuncio in Kyiv. Ukraine today is viewed by certain elements in the Vatican as their own "mission territory". Thus the number of Roman-Catholic parishes here in the last five years has grown tenfold. All this goes to show that the sovereign Ukrainian state cannot be indifferent to the subordination of the churches and religious denominations existing in Ukraine to foreign religious centres. The practice of international relations recognises the legal regulation of such relations, with appropriate obligations, embodied in the statutes of religious organisations and even in inter-state agreements. The question of the subordination of religious organisations to foreign centres (and in Ukraine this means virtually all of them with the exception of the Kyiv Patriarchate) needs to be regulated by appropriate legislation.

The ideological situation in present Ukraine is in some ways reminiscent of that in the Soviet era. But, whereas then it was the religious outlook and its institutional forms which were under pressure, now it is the free-thinkers who find themselves in that position. The media are taking on (without the sanction of the state) an increasingly religious slant, religion is becoming incorporated in the educational process and in various ritual and festival events, and the predominance of religious content in book-publishing is clearly at odds with the ideological and confessional reality of today's Ukraine. Contemporary Ukrainian society is too diverse in the religious/free-thought sphere. This is partly due (and one should take due note of it) to the demographic, historical and socio-political processes of Ukraine's history. Freedom of conscience, therefore, cannot be understood in Ukraine in the same sense as in countries of the democratic world. If the state defends the idea of public concord and a true pluralism of views, then its laws on freedom of conscience should represent this idea, preventing head-on conflicts between believers and unbelievers. It is therefore important that the new Constitution of Ukraine should codify a proper understanding of freedom of conscience as one of the principles of a law-based state. Such a definition will have a profound influence on the nature of social relations. Equally important, the Constitution must recognise the right of the church to its place in the life of society, and its role, in conjunction with the state, in tackling a whole range of social, civic, political and ethical/educational problems.

Freedom of conscience in a state depends also on there being genuine and enforceable guarantees of the equal rights of the various confessions. And here we

cannot agree with the view that the absence of an established state religion will not hamper social and cultural spheres. Here one may point out the traditional role of Christianity in Ukraine and the Christian ethnic bases of Ukrainian society as a dominant factor. Though if one speaks of indigenous religious tradition, then for Ukraine this should surely be Ukrainian paganism, which today has reappeared in such forms as the "Native-Faith" (followers of Volodymyr Shayan), the Native Ukrainian National Faith (RUNvira, followers of Lev Sylenko), the "Great Fire", the "Faith of Lada", etc. Moreover, the recent success of certain non-traditional religions in picking up adherents among young people and some sections of the intelligentsia does not represent simply a mechanical transfer to Ukraine of religious forms traditional in other countries, or some modification of religious movements already existing in Ukraine. It is also (and one should bear this in mind) an expression of the complex anthropological revolution, currently taking place in the context of the religious achievement of reality, which is characterised by a shift from an authentic rationalism of the theology of the institutionalised Christian churches to the standpoint of personal incorporation of everyone into the transcendental world through the rediscovery within himself of elements of the latter, the aspiration of man to find in religion understanding and resolution of nature and the essence of all spheres of his life – physical health, psychological state, spiritual and moral orientations. The creatively thinking religious believer is no longer satisfied by religions which are founded on splendid rituals and emphasis on the sinful nature of man. "I do not want to feel myself a sinner all my life and bear the guilt of some Original Sin", a Ukrainian Buddhist woman from Lviv told the author of this article. "I aspire to do good in my life, but in church you are taught: you are a sinner. For this reason, I left that religion".

Therefore the Ukrainian state cannot, by recognising the traditional position of this or that confession in its history, make this a basis for legislation which imposes disadvantageous conditions on other confessions, which are now appearing in Ukraine. There is one God and everyone is free in his or her choice of his or her way to Him. Therefore the registration of the statutes of religious organisations by the state should not be made conditional on their renouncing certain dogmatic principles of their doctrine or forms of ritual practice. Yet this is currently happening in Ukraine, since such matters have been placed in the competence of local authorities, who are often over-sympathetic to one particular confession and either delay the registration of other confessions, or refuse point blank to register them. Thus the Greek-Catholic community in Sevastopol has not been registered, while in the Lviv province many church buildings have been taken away from the Orthodox without any justification and handed over to the Greek-Catholics. In Kyiv, the All-Ukrainian centre of the International Society for Krishna Consciousness has been trying to get registered for more than a year.

The Ukrainian state should have a direct interest in the formation of such relations between believers of various confessions, and between people of various outlooks, so as to draw them together in a united effort to tackle matters of national renaissance, and the establishment of democratic laws and freedoms, and good-neighbourly relations with other countries. These aims can only be

achieved if the life of the community is free from any form of religious discrimination, if inter-denominational and inter-church conflicts are brought to an end, and the concept of "sovereignty of the citizen" in matters of belief and outlook has a genuine meaning. However, the resolution of the problems cannot rest solely on the state. Following the experience of other countries, an important role could be played by a Council of Churches of Ukraine, with its local branches, in which all religions and denominations registered on an all-Ukrainian level would have a voice. □

The Kaniv Monastery

Oleksander Ryhin
Serhiy Maksymov

For more than eight centuries, the Kaniv basilica has stood on a hill overlooking the Dnipro. At one time, too, there was also a monastery in Kaniv, dating back to the princely era of Kyivan Rus'. Later, in the sixteenth–eighteenth centuries, many elderly Cossacks retired into this monastery to spend the closing years of their life in devotion.

Until now, it was thought that no physical traces of the Kaniv monastery remained. However, during restoration work on a former school, situated near the church, the authors of this article were able to examine the crypt of the building which in the past housed the Uniate school, established by the Basilian Order. Beneath the seventeenth-century walls of the school there are remains of the foundations of an earlier structure, which can be definitely dated to the Kyivan Rus' period. These earlier foundations were built of stone blocks and plinths, which are similar in dimensions to the twelfth-century plinths in the walls of the Kaniv basilica.

We shall return to its history later. For the moment, we may note that it was built on top of the remains of some older foundations. The walls are built of rough red brick, characteristic of the seventeenth century, and built into them near the entrance one can see ancient inscribed stone crosses (one of them inverted), which evidently were originally tombstones. Clearly, when the Uniates were building the school, they used the crosses from the Orthodox churchyard as building material. There are also many stone blocks, which show signs of previous use, which had been taken from some older structure, and incorporated in the school walls. It may be noted that these stone blocks could not come from the ruins of the St George's basilica, which was destroyed by the Mongols in 1239, since stone was not used for the walls of that church. This leads inevitably to the conclusion that the ruins of another, earlier, building lay close to the basilica, since it is known that in the architecture of old Rus' stone was used in conjunction with brick in the construction of walls only from the first half of the eleventh century.

According to the local inhabitants, the foundations, laid from stone blocks, occupy an area significantly larger than that of the present school, and stretch further to the east, just below the surface of the ground. It is possible that the castle, which the *starosta* (sheriff) of Kaniv, Yevstaphiy Dashkevych,[1] built in 1535, and which was described in the middle of the sixteenth century by Mykhalon Lytvyn, who was commissioned by the Polish King, Sigismund I, to inspect the fortifications of all Ukrainian towns, stood somewhere on this site. The said castle, which was destroyed during the Haydamaky uprising in 1768, was surrounded by a high palisade of oak logs. On two sides it was protected by a natural precipice,

[1] *Lyustratsiya Kanivskoho zamku*, Arkhiv Yugo-Zapadskoy Rossii (Archive of South-West Russia, hereafer AYuZR), vol. 7, part 11, document no. 18.

and on the others by a deep ditch. The gate took the form of a high stone tower, the deep vaulted undercroft of which contained the dungeon.[2]

Unfortunately, the present authors do not know the location of the "Royal castle" in Kaniv, and the remains of the foundations in the crypt of the old Basilian school building seem evocative rather of the laconic references of chroniclers to the Kaniv eparchy in the era of Kyivan Rus'.

The first mention of Kaniv was in the *Patericon of the Kyivan Caves Monastery*, relating to the 1080s.[3]

Pokhylevych[4] believes that the name "Kaniv" is of Turkic origin and means "the place, where blood has been shed". Earlier references in the chronicles to the fortress of Roden, which Ribakov[5] associates with the ancient cult of the god Rod, are only partially relevant to Kaniv itself, since Roden is known to have been situated on the "Princely Hill" adjacent to the present-day village of Pekari.

Legend has it that, during the founding of the Kyivan Monastery of the Caves, two icons of the Madonna were brought to Rus' from Byzantium by ship. The first of these was installed in the Church of the Dormition in the Monastery of the Caves, and was later called the "Madonna of the Caves"; the second icon was brought to Kaniv. There must, therefore, have been a church or monastery in Kaniv to which this icon could be entrusted.

Pokhylevych mentions accounts from the mid-nineteenth century, which preserve the memory of a stone church of St Irene and the "Greek town" on Moskovka Hill, earlier known as "Greek Hill",[6] where there had been a fortified town from the Kyivan Rus' period. There is even a legend that the town on Moskovka Hill had been founded by the Greeks.[7]

According to Pokhylevych, in the middle of the nineteenth century, fragments of an old Rus' plinth, which had formed part of the church of St Irene, could still be seen on this hill.

By the twelfth century, Kaniv was already a well-fortified town, which formed part of the southern frontier defence of Kyivan Rus'.

Prince Heorhiy of Suzdal, who occupied the Kyivan throne after the death of Grand Prince Izyaslav II Mstyslavovych (in 1154), handed over Kaniv as an appanage to his son Hlib.

In 1155, negotiations between the Rus' princes and Polovtsian (Cuman) envoys took place in Kaniv, while, in 1166, Grand Prince Rostyslav I mustered the forces of the allied princes there, in preparation for a campaign against the Polovtsians.[8]

Kaniv was an important transit point on the trade route "from the Varangians to the Greeks", and here the princes and their household troops met the trade cara-

[2] L. Pokhylevych, *Skazaniya o naselennykh iestnostyakh Kievskoy gubernii* (Kyiv, 1864), p. 540.

[3] 'Kievo-Pecherskiy Paterik', *Pamyatniki literatury Drevney Rusi XII v.* (Moscow, 1989), p. 427.

[4] Op.cit., p. 537.

[5] B.A. Ribakov, *Yazychestvo drevnikh slavyan* (Moscow: Nauka, 1984).

[6] Pokhylevych, op.cit., p. 540.

[7] V.G. Lyaskoronskiy, *Gilom Levasser de-Boplan i ego istoriko-geograficheskie trudy otnositelno yuzhnoy Rossii* (Kyiv, 1901), p. 9.

[8] *Polnoe Sobranie Russkikh Letopisey* (hereafter *PSRL*), vol. 1, columns 345-46, 399; vol. 2, columns 480-81, 490, 673, 675.

vans from the south, giving them protection against the nomads: "... remained in Kaniv for a long time, until Hrechnik and Zaloznik arrived".[9]

The Chronicles record frequent rivalries and hostility between the princes, which often affected Kaniv.[10] In 1190, Grand Prince Ryuryk II of Kyiv handed over Kaniv as a fief to his vassal, Prince Vsevolod Yuriyovych of Vladimir, but the following year he once again took it under his own, personal rule.

"Prince Svyatoslav of Kaniv" was among the princes killed at the Kalka in 1223.[11]

On 9 June, 1144, Grand Prince Vsevolod II Olhovych of Kyiv founded a stone church of St George[12] in Kaniv, which survives, albeit after considerable rebuilding, to the present day. The Chronicles note that in 1154, when the princely throne of Kyiv was vacant, the Kyivans sent Bishop Demyan of Kaniv to invite Prince Izyaslav Davydovych to be their ruler.[13] Kaniv, clearly, was the seat of the Kaniv eparchy, and the Bishop's residence, it would seem, was the Kaniv monastery.

Maksimovich[14] assumes that this Bishop Demyan of Kaniv was the same Demyan who, in 1147, occupied the See of Yuryiv and who participated in the Synod of Bishops of Rus' in Kyiv that year, which elected Klym Smolyatych as Metropolitan. Maksimovich also believes that Kaniv and the basilica of St George served as the seat of the Yuryiv eparchy.[15] This may have been due to the fact that the town of Yuryiv, situated on the river Ros', was often under attack from the Polovtsians. The latter are known to have laid siege to Yuryiv throughout the entire summer of 1095, following which the inhabitants abandoned it and moved to a new town, which Grand Prince Svyatopolk founded for them near present-day Vytachev, on the banks of the Dnipro between Trypillya and Rzhyshchev, where they, including their bishop, Maryn, settled. Yuryiv, which was burned to the ground by the Polovtsians, was rebuilt only in 1103.[16]

In 1239, Kaniv was captured by Khan Baty, and henceforth was the seat of Tatar vassals, the viceroys of the Great Khan, who collected tribute and controlled the surrounding territories.[17]

The Kaniv eparchy ceased to exist, and its monasteries and churches were transferred to the jurisdiction of the Bishop of Pereyaslav.

With the incorporation of Rus' into the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in the mid-thirteenth century, Kaniv became a "suburb of Kyiv", a "castle",[18] and its former role as a fortified frontier-town was restored.

With the rise of the Cossacks, Kaniv became one of their most important towns. By the turn of the fifteenth-sixteenth centuries, it was the administrative centre of

[9] Ibid, vol. 2, columns 528, 541; vol. 7, pp. 79, 83; vol. 25, columns 74, 78.
[10] Ibid, vol. 2, columns 521, 683-85; vol. 7, pp. 77, 103; vol. 25, columns 72, 96.
[11] Ibid, vol. 15, column 342; vol. 25, column 121.
[12] Ibid, vol. 1, column 312; vol. 2, column 317.
[13] Ibid, vol. 1, column 344; vol. 5, p. 161; vol. 9, columns 201-202.
[14] M.A. Maksimovich, 'Vospominanie o starodavnem monastre Kanevskom', *Sobranie sochineniy*, vol. 2 (Kyiv, 1877), pp. 312-19.
[15] Ibid, p. 312.
[16] Ibid, p. 313.
[17] V.N. Tatishchev, *Izbrannye proizvedeniya* (Leningrad, 1979), p. 284.
[18] *PSRL*, vol. 32, pp. 38, 43, 71, 137, 147; vol. 35, pp. 96, 153, 200, 221.

the Kaniv *starostwo* and the residence of the *starosta* of Kaniv (a post normally held in conjunction with that of *starosta* of Cherkasy).

At the beginning of the sixteenth century, King Sigismund I handed over Kaniv to Yevstaphiy Dashkevych, the leader of the Cossack units defending the frontiers of the Grand Duchy against Tatar raids.

We have already noted that Dashkevych built Kaniv castle. There is reason to believe that Dashkevych, who, at about this time, revived the Trakhtemyriv monastery, also rebuilt the Kaniv monastery and its church. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the monastery was known as the Monastery of the Dormition.[19]

In 1556, Kaniv and Cherkasy were occupied by the Cossack leader Prince Dmytro Vyshnevetskyi, while in 1576 King Stefan Bathory of Poland issued a decree, placing the Kaniv lands under his personal jurisdiction and forbade *voivodes* (military governors) and *starostas* to appropriate them for themselves.[20]

Further references to the Kaniv monastery from the Cossack period are also found,[21] at which time it was already referred to as an "ancient monastery".[22]

The Cossack leader Ivan Pidkova,[23] who was executed in Lviv on 16 June, 1578 on the orders of Stefan Bathory, was buried in the Kaniv Dormition Monastery.

In 1582, Hetman Yakiv Shakh, a friend of Pidkova, became a monk in the Kaniv monastery, where he died and is buried.

In 1602, Hetman Samiylo Kishka, the hero of a well-known *duma* (folk-lay), was buried there. According to popular tradition, Kishka, who was a Cossack hetman from 1599-1602 and had previously spent twenty-five years in Turkish captivity, came from Kaniv.

The burial of Cossack leaders in the Kaniv monastery is evidence of the significance which this monastery held for the Cossacks, since they also had another monastery of their own, close to Kaniv, at Trakhtemyriv.

The Basilians, who founded the Uniate school, stated in the records of their "canonical visits" that in 1630[24] the Tatars destroyed the Kaniv monastery during one of their devastating raids on Ukraine, and killed most of the monks.

[19] Of the *starostas* of Cherkasy and Kaniv of that time, Dashkevych was, undoubtedly, one of the most interesting. See A. Yakovlev, *Namisnyky, derzhavtsi, starosty hospodarskoho zamku Cherkaskoho v kintsi 15–16 st.* (Kyiv, 1907).

[20] Pokhylevych, op.cit., p. 537.

[21] Information about Kaniv of that time can be found, in particular, in descriptions of Kaniv castle, dating from 1552, 1570, 1616, 1622, 1765, and the inventory for 1789. See AYuZR, no. 7, vol. 1, pp. 91-105, 307-12; no. 7, vol. 3, pp. 13, 15, 42-57, 275-300. Kaniv attracted the attention of many visitors to Ukraine:

– *Puteshestvie v vostochnye strany Plano Karpini i Rubruka* (Moscow, 1957), pp. 67-68.
– S. Gerbershteyn, *Zapiski o Moskovii*, (Moscow, 1988), pp. 59, 78, 185.
– *Memuary, otnosyashchiesya k istorii Yuzhnoy Rusi* (Kyiv, 1890), part 1, pp. 51, 162.
– *Sbornik materialov dlya istoricheskoy topografii Kieva i ego okrestnostey* (Kyiv, 1874), section 2, p. 13.
– Zvliya Chelebi, *Kniga puteshestviya* (Moscow, 1961) part 1, p. 81.

[22] Maksimovich, op.cit., p. 313. In the annal for 1678, the *Velychko Chronicle* refers to the Kaniv monastery as an "ancient monastery".

[23] O. L(evitskiy), 'K istorii Kanevskoy sobornoy tserkvi', *Kyivska starovina*, 1903, 10: Dokumenty, izvestiya, zametki, p. 13.

[24] Maksimovich believes that these events could not have taken place in 1630, and that this report refers, in actual fact, to the events of 1678.

In 1638, according to a legend quoted in the *Istoriya Rusiv*, Hetman Yakiv Ostryanyn (Ostryanytsya) arrived in Kaniv with 30 Cossack officers to attend a service commemorating his "victory" over the Poles at the battle of the river Starets. However, while in the monastery, the Cossacks and their hetman were captured by the Poles and sent to Warsaw, where they were executed. (Other sources record this engagement as a defeat for the Cossacks and say that Ostryanyn, together with his regiment of 900 Cossacks, had, by this time, already moved to the Muscovite frontier and settled near Chuhuyiv).

In 1646, Prince Jeremi Wisniowiecki issued a decree, confirming the rights of the Kaniv monastery and its estates.[25]

In 1652, its rights to these estates were again confirmed by a charter of King Jan Casimir, and in 1670, by a charter of King Michal Korybut (b.1640–d.1673), son of Jeremi Wisniowiecki. In answer to a petition of the then abbots of the Kaniv monastery, Tsar Aleksey Mikhailovich of Muscovy likewise issued two charters, in 1660 and 1666.[26]

Hetmans Bohdan Khmelnytskyi, Ivan Vyhovskyi, Yuriy Khmelnytskyi and Pavlo Teterya granted various estates to the Kaniv monastery.[27]

In 1664, after the Poles destroyed the Trakhtemyriv monastery, its monks found refuge in the Kaniv monastery.[28] Because of this, in May, 1665, Hetman Ivan Bryukhovetskyi, gave the monastery a mill, and Hetman Petro Doroshenko confirmed most of the Kaniv monastery's holdings in his decree of 1670.[29]

These documents mention the abbots of the Kaniv monastery Iov Zayonchkovskyi and Sylvester (surname unknown). The former was abbot in the time of Hetmans Vyhovskyi and Yuriy Khmelnytskyi, while Sylvester was mentioned in 1665 and 1666.

And it was in the Kaniv monastery that on 25 March, 1669, the Metropolitan of Kyiv, Yosyp Nelyubovych-Tukalskyi ordained as deacon the future prelate Dymitriy Tuptalo.[30]

According to the Chronicle of Samovydets, on 4 September, 1678, after the destruction of Chyhyryn, the Turkish-Tatar army burnt down Kaniv and its monastery, where many people were killed near the stone church.

The few monks who survived were unable to rebuild the monastery. They built themselves a small wooden church of the Patronage of the Virgin Mary, and founded a new monastery in a valley opposite Monks' Hill – the hill where Ukraine's national poet, Taras Shevchenko, was later to be buried. (According to a local tradition, mentioned by Pokhylevych, where the Shevchenko museum now stands, there was in olden days a wide clearing where the monks made hay, from which the hill derived its name).

[25] The text is cited in Maksimovich, op.cit., p. 314.

[26] Ibid., p. 314. Copies of charters granting privileges to the Kaniv monastery by Kings Jan Casimir and Michal Korybut, Hetman Petro Doroshenko, Central State Historical Archive of Ukraine, holding 2099, file 1, document 1; document 3, lines 1-2.

[27] Ibid, p. 315.

[28] Ibid, p. 314.

[29] Ibid.

[30] L(evitskiy), op.cit., p. 13.

This monastery, however, was soon closed down by the Uniates, who built a new church in the town itself, beside the ruins of the basilica. This became the church of the Uniate school, founded by the Basilian monks. In the seventeenth century, the Basilian Order founded a number of these schools in various towns in Ukraine, in order to promulgate the Uniate (Catholic) faith.[31]

After some time, the monastery near Monks' Hill was once again re-established. However, at the end of the eighteenth century, it finally ceased to exist. At this time, many ancient but small monasteries in Ukraine were dissolved or merged with larger monasteries on the directive of the church administration.

Today a convent of nuns runs a farm on the site of the Kaniv monastery, while above the valley stands the high Monks' Hill with Shevchenko's grave. But of the Kaniv monastery itself no physical trace remains. □

[31] In 1810, the Basilians also rebuilt the ruined Dormition monastery, and turned it into a Uniate church. In 1833, this church was handed over to the Orthodox, becoming a basilica again in 1844.

Alla Horska, 1929-70 – A Tribute

November 28, 1995 marks the 25th anniversary of the mysterious death of the artist Alla Horska, one of the leading activists of the Ukrainian national revival of the 1960s.

Alla Horska was born on 18 September, 1929, in Kyiv, and was educated at the Kyiv Institute of Fine Arts. Her family was Russian-speaking; however, in the early 1960s, when the movement for national revival began among a new generation of Ukrainian writers and artists, she began to use the Ukrainian language. In 1962, she became one of the founder-members of the Kyiv "Club of Creative Youth", playing an active role in organising literary and artistic events, the distribution of *samvydav* and banned publications, the collection of mutual assistance funds, and similar activities. She married a fellow-artist, Viktor Zaretskyi, and, in spite of repeated harassment from the authorities, she produced, during her decade of creative activity, some fine contributions to Ukrainian art. At the end of November, 1970 (apparently on the 28th), she was mysteriously murdered in the house of her father-in-law, in the town of Vasylkiv, near Kyiv. Her funeral, on 7 December, became a patriotic manifesto, in which a number of outspoken young artists and writers paid their last tributes to her, and rededicated themselves to the ideals of Ukraine's political and cultural rights.

The Shevchenko Window Affair

In 1964, Alla Horska was one of the team of young artists responsible for a new stained-glass window, set up in the main entrance-hall of Kyiv University, to mark the sesquicentenary of the birth of Ukraine's national poet, Taras Shevchenko. They portrayed the poet behind prison-bars, supporting with one arm an abused female figure, personifying Ukraine, and with the other hand holding high a book. The window also bore a quotation from Shevchenko's "Paraphrase of the Eleventh Psalm":

I shall glorify
These small dumb slaves! And as a guard
Protecting, I shall set my word
About them...

This design caused a furore in Communist Party circles. The Communist Party organisation of the University and the Department of Higher Education had the window destroyed, and three of the artists responsible, Alla Horska, Halyna Sevruk and Lyudmyla Semykina, expelled from the Union of Artists of Ukraine. (The actual decision to destroy the window was taken, it would seem, by Professor Ivan Shvets, an expert in thermal technology!). The Artistic Council of the University was not even given time to see the window before it was smashed, although subsequently, the "Decorative and Monumental Art" section of the Union of Artists of Ukraine arranged a special ideological "discussion" about the window at the university. This, however, was a "closed" meeting, to which members of the university in general were not admitted. A transcript of part of this "discussion" was eventually published in the *samvydav* journal *Ukrayinskyi Visnyk* (The Ukrainian Herald). This reveals that the Party case against the design was two-fold. Partly, there was the usual bureaucratic inability to comprehend the new and progressive in art – what one of the official "discussants" called "contemporary abstract generalisation". The main complaint, however, was the ideological "principle" of the design, which did not, it was claimed, portray "our" [i.e. the Party's] attitude towards Shevchenko. Shevchenko's great appeals for liberty and the rights of the oppressed, it appeared, must not be publicly quoted, lest "the enemy" "over there" make use of them "as a weapon". Had the artists approached the matter "practically", said one discussant, "they would have shown that Shevchenko's dream had already been brought to fruition".

Alla Horska as Activist

The destruction of the Shevchenko window became one of the key events in the fight for Ukrainian cultural identity in the 1960s. For Alla Horska, expulsion from the Union of Artists made it impossible to work in Kyiv. For a time, she worked in the Donbas – the mining and industrial region of eastern Ukraine – producing a number of items of civic art. She was eventually reinstated in the Union – the tacit assumption being that she had learned her lesson, and would conform to the artistic and personal norms of Soviet life in the future. Instead, she was even more determined to speak out against oppression. In the years that followed, as cases of censorship and the persecution of writers and artists proliferated, Alla Horska became an indefatigable campaigner, petitioning the authorities on behalf of her friends and colleagues, and attending their "trials" – if these travesties of normal legal process can be dignified with such a name. She became particularly adept at confronting the Soviet bureaucrats on their own ideological grounds. "Is it possible", she wrote in a formal "Complaint" to the Public Prosecutor of the Ukrainian SSR, "that in our Soviet country, a country whose basic law – the Constitution – guarantees citizens freedom of conscience, speech, publication, assembly, etc., people can be thrown behind bars simply for reading

some little book, even if its ideology is foreign to us?... Lenin rightly considered that the truth does not need to shelter behind censorship".

As a result of these activities, she was once again expelled from the Union of Artists, and could find work only in a remote village in the Cherkasy region.

Alla Horska as Artist

Even apart from her work for human rights and the cause of Ukraine, Alla Horska's artistic work would undoubtedly have brought her into conflict with the Soviet "establishment" which required its art to be based on the principles of "Socialist Realism". The Shevchenko window affair shows how little that "establishment" could appreciate her artistic vision. An alternative, and more perceptive, appreciation can be found in the words of her friend and fellow-activist, the writer Yevhen Sverstyuk

> In silent alarm, and with a certain air of maturity, the children in her pictures, as if meditatively, grow and ripen in the wind and sun. A portrait of a mother who with the eyes of the soul gazes alarmedly into space. A sketch for a portrait of Dovzhenko with a gloomy, cloven brow, clutched in anguish by a white and black hand. How much suffering and dignity there is in these afflicted female faces...
>
> ... A tragic talent, she moved towards a tragic truth, through the terror of which, like distant stars, there shines a snowy-white ideal, somewhere in the form of a mother who strives to shelter her child with her strong arms and, as if with a swan's wing, thrusts aside the branches of a guelder-rose...

The Murder

On (apparently) 28 November, 1970, Alla Horska was murdered in the house of her father-in-law, in the town of Vasylkiv, near Kyiv. The following day, the father-in-law himself was found dead – his decapitated body was lying on the railway lines near the town of Fastiv. The circumstances of the two deaths have never been fully explained. However, according to *Ukrayinskyi Visnyk*, there were soon three theories in circulation – none of them satisfactory.

The first was that Zaretskyi senior, who had been suffering occasional psychological disturbances since the death of his wife the previous year, killed his daughter-in-law during one such attack, and then, when he realised what he had done, committed suicide. Against this it may be argued that Ms Horska was a strong young woman, likely to be able to hold her own against a weakly old man, who was approaching his seventieth birthday. Furthermore, the scene of the murder had been carefully cleaned up, the traces of blood washed away and covered with matting, and the body concealed in the cellar – not the behaviour one would expect from a psychologically disturbed person about to commit suicide. Moreover, the behaviour of the militia (civil police) was, to say the least, odd. For a full week, Zaretskyi's body remained "unidentified", although, apparently, he had his identity papers in his pocket. And, when, after several days, Ms Horska's friends became alarmed about her absence and asked the militia to investigate, the latter, reluctantly, forced an entry into Zaretskyi's house, had a

superficial glance round, and then reported that they had seen nothing suspicious. Only later, when a fellow activist, the writer Nadiya Svitlychna, insisted, did they open up the cellar, and find the body. Furthermore, the militia official in charge of the investigation seems to have been taking instructions from the KGB; he used the murder investigation to taunt and interrogate her friends about their own political activities.

His evident familiarity with the KGB files helped fuel the second theory, namely Alla Horska was killed by the KGB in order to intimidate the growing dissident and independence movement. While a third explanation attempted to combine the two: the KGB, it was suggested, did not send one of its own agents to kill her, but played on old Zaretskyi's known mental instability, egging him on to kill her (and, presumably, to kill himself afterwards). And finally, there was a fourth scenario; someone (presumably the KGB) attempted to spread the rumour in Kyiv that Alla Horska had been killed by her own colleagues in the national revival and human rights movement, because allegedly she "knew too much". But this, however, attracted few believers.

The Funeral

Even after her death, the Soviet authorities did not leave Alla Horska alone. Her coffin was sealed, and her friends and relatives were not allowed to remove it to her home nor her atelier for the traditional pre-funeral rites. The burial, scheduled for 4 December, was at the last minute postponed to the 7th, ostensibly in the interests of the investigation, but in reality to reduce the numbers likely to attend. Furthermore, the authorities insisted that the interment take place in a new cemetery outside Kyiv. Nevertheless, between 150 and 200 people arrived for the obsequies.

Once they knew that Alla Horska was dead, the Union of Artists of Ukraine hastily reinstated her membership – apparently in order to get some control over the funeral events. Accordingly, the Union sent an official representative to the funeral, who delivered a few general platitudes and then tried to draw the proceedings to a close. But the murdered artist's friends refused to allow this, and offered their own eulogies – for which, they themselves, were later duly punished by the authorities.

Their tributes included the following:

> She knew how to love people. But only if the person had a root – love for the nation and a willingness to serve it faithfully.
>
> Her own nature being one of exceptional strength and integrity, she forgave other people their weaknesses and faults, giving to each his due. It was good to be with her.
>
> Independent and proud, Alla respected people, and was loved by all her friends and acquaintances. But, like everyone who loves, she could also hate. She was openly derisive of well-fed civil servants and bureaucrats from the art department. They could not endure the hard, derisive look of her grey eyes and repaid her with their black hatred. They hated her for the things for which we love her...
>
> (Oleksander Serhiyenko, teacher)

... She knew well how to follow her path in dignity and independence, and to feel to the full the joy of her efforts, her work and the hard struggle for self-realisation. Her voice, her smile, her form cover the event of the blind tragedy which cut short her life. Alla Horska will radiate light, and will by her very name establish the presence of her soul. She was a rare person, who will for ever be present with us, like our own soul. In the view of the whole decade, she stands high as a white vision of the Good Spirit, in which conscience, dignity, the aspiration of youth and the brilliance of the free human countenance, illuminated by talent and human devotion, become incarnate...

(Yevhen Sverstyuk, writer and activist)

Alla remains for us a model of a Person and Artist, who does not know how to bow to the pressures of political crisis, nor to pay heed to "good" or "bad" times, but who unswervingly seeks for that one path unique to every one of us, by which we can to our best serve Ukraine.

The conditions of her life, and, most of all, social conditions, meant that Alla did not discover Ukraine, and herself in Ukraine, at once. Perhaps it is for this very reason that her life over the past decade was so active and uncompromising...

(Ivan Hel, historian and activist, from Lviv)

In Memory of Alla Horska

Rage with spring fire, soul. Rage, and do not wail.
A white frost on Ukraine's sun spreads its pall now.
Go, seek the guelder-rose's shadow fallen
on the black waters – seek the red shadow's trail,

where there are few of us. A group so small.
Only enough for prayers and hopes' poor sighing.
We all are destined to untimely dying.
For crimson blood is sharp as any gall,

it stings as if within our veins are gathered
in a grey whirlwind that laments and weeps
great clusters of our pain which falling deep
as an undying grief take root forever.

Vasyl Stus

□

Vasyl Stus. On the Tenth Anniversary of His Death

Vasyl Stus was one of the most brilliant and innovative of the Ukrainian "poets of the sixties", a group of young Kyiv-based writers who took advantage of the post-Stalin "Thaw" to explore and reinterpret the potentialities of the Ukrainian language and the abiding symbols and values of Ukrainian culture. He was, however, a somewhat late arrival on the literary scene; by the time he arrived in Kyiv, in 1963, to do post-graduate studies at the Institute of Literature of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR, the other "poets of the sixties" were already well-known.



Vasyl Stus was born on 6 January, 1938, in the village of Rakhvinka, in the Vinnytsya region. However, soon afterwards, the family moved to the Donbas, where Vasyl grew up and which he considered as his native land. Significantly, although the Donbas is today routinely quoted as one of the predominantly Russophone areas of Ukraine, several of the most prominent Ukrainian writers of the 1960s – including Ivan Dzyuba and Ivan Svitlychnyi, as well as Stus – came from there.

Stus began his professional career by training as a teacher at the Stalino (now Donetsk) Pedagogic Institute, afterwards working as a teacher of Ukrainian language, literature and history. He also worked for a time in the Donbas mines, and as literary editor of the newspaper *Sotsialistychnyi Donbas*. After his move to Kyiv, in 1963, he began to become known as a poet; his work was published in literary papers and journals, and attracted the favourable attention of the critic Andriy Malyshko. But his literary career was interrupted by politics; the "Thaw" came to an end, and, in 1965, when widespread arrests of the Ukrainian intelligentsia began, Stus made a public appeal for protests against injustice and tyranny. He was immediately expelled from the Institute of Literature – for conduct unbecoming to a research student and scholar.

This only hardened Stus's determination to fight injustice. He began to contribute to the new, underground Ukrainian press, and was a prominent figure at such dissident gatherings as the funeral of Alla Horska (see pp. 54-55) When, in 1972, he was eventually put on trial, the indictment against him cited 14 poems,

critical of the Soviet state and social order, 10 anti-Soviet protest documents, a "hostile" letter to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine and the Committee of State Security of the Ukrainian SSR. For these writings he was sentenced to five years in strict regime labour camps in Mordovia, followed by three years' exile in Kolyma.

After serving his sentence, Stus returned to Ukraine. However, within a few months, in October, 1980, he was rearrested, tried, and sentenced, this time to ten years' strict regime camp, followed by five years' exile. Stus was not a submissive prisoner. For a whole year (1982-83) he was in a solitary-confinement punishment cell. But his sufferings told on his health, and, during the night of 3-4 September, 1985, he died.

Since the establishment of Ukrainian independence in 1991, Vasyl Stus has been given due honour in Ukraine, both as a patriot and for his undoubted poetic talent. Indeed, even before independence, in November, 1989, his mortal remains were returned to Ukraine and their reinterment in Kyiv's Baykovyi cemetery became a major pro-independence and pro-democracy demonstration. Now Stus's literary and political writings can be read and publicly honoured in Ukraine, and, in spite of the undoubted complexity and profundity of his poems, have even been produced in school editions for senior classes.

From the cycle *Palimpsests*

2

Never could I descry,
and I still do not know,
if the world passed me by,
or if I passed it so.
Of old all would be
a sleepy enchantment
and someone imparted
the great dates to me.
The world seemed filled at first,
with hopes, like pond unrippled.
That realm will pass from people,
uncensured and uncursed.

21

In room chill and dreary,
white as the wall, grown
from long waiting weary,
a woman sleeps, lone.
Strength to weakness turning,
every day, every night,
from her spouse not a murmur,
be it ever so slight.
The dread shadows grow longer,
icon haloes all chime,
and lamenting grows stronger,
beyond screen of the pines.
My pinioned falcon,
to this place where I stay,
you can come not, nor, baulked so,
will not learn the way.
My beloved, for you
my eyes grew blind with tears,
and like horse in lasso,
the world plunges and rears.

32

to my son

You are somewhere past memory now. In murk
of loss, to which the heart has grown accustomed.
But, like a star, you'll shine, from an abyss
far higher than the heavens. You are a
mere five years old. And in those years, you're bedded
like grain within the husk. O my pain
upon the burned-out ashes, how past bearing
it would be for you to be born a second
time, and once more be but a speechless babe.

74

I need an avenging angel. My defence,
my shield, which will not let me fall in ruin,
nor let me rot in the hell of reproaches
of the world's great ones. Where are you, appear!
For all things draw towards their end. All rivers
flow to their estuaries. The restless ocean
grumbles and complains, and very soon –
in despite of all griefs – will start to roar.
Do not delay! Make haste, avenging angel,
while my wrathful rage still rears its head,
while before my eyes still a red mirage
senselessly crawls on its way before me.

83

And east, and east and east once more,
and east, pace after pace!
The painworn heart, like meteor
in the nights leaves its trace.
Now phantoms loom in distant haze:
Ukraine lies yonder – look!
And all with gangrene fires blaze,
as warning and rebuke.
Towards her, from her you go
to hunchbacked otherlife.
Horizons, like a black rim shows
where bitter gall runs rife.
Towards Her, from Her you go,
a path in torment palled,
and on that path, you'll be brought low,
and others, too, shall fall.

□

Literary Centenaries, 1995

This year marks the centenary of the birth of four Ukrainian poets of considerable talent. Although differing in style and approach, they all, in early manhood, faced the same challenge to their talents: the revolutions of 1917, the emergence of Ukraine as an independent state, and – for three of them – the tragic, Soviet aftermath. Their responses were very different. Volodymyr Kobylyanskyi, who briefly occupied an official post in the literary establishment of independent Ukraine, died in 1919. The other three, Maksym Rylskyi, Mayk Yohansen, and Todos Osmachka, took part in the vigorous Ukrainian literary life of the 1920s, but, in the 1930s, fell foul of the increasingly repressive Soviet authorities. Yohansen perished in the great purges of 1937-38. Osmachka, although arrested several times during the 1930s, survived the terror, and, after World War II, ended up as an émigré in North America. Rylskyi, the most talented of them, suffered what his fellow-poet, Yuriy Klen, described as the most tragic fate of all: under pressure, he made his peace with the regime, forced to turn out official hymns of praise to Stalin and his rule, becoming one of what Klen termed the

> ... bards, who for their bread and tea will sell
> Paeans, where they write "Paradise" for "Hell!".

Below, we present a selection of the works of these four poets, and in the case of Rylskyi, a brief appreciation of his work and international significance by the eminent Belarusian scholar, Viacaslau Rahojsa.

* * *

Volodymyr Kobylyanskyi

Volodymyr Kobylyanskyi was born on 27 August, 1895, in Iasi, Romania. He attended the *gymnasium* in Chortkiv, and, immediately on leaving school, himself began working as a teacher. In 1914, he moved to Kyiv, where he held various jobs, including work as a clerk, and in a hospital. In 1918, he took a post at the National Secretariat of Education, becoming, the following year, head of the chancery of the Kyiv "Palace of Books". Within a few weeks, however, he died, the actual date of his death, 10 March, being the same as that of Ukraine's national poet, Taras Shevchenko, 58 years previously.

Kobylyanskyi's first published work appeared in 1913, in the Chernivtsi newspaper, *Nova Bukovyna.* He continued to publish in various periodicals and literary almanacs, but his poems appeared in book form (*Miy Dar* – My Gift), only posthumously, in 1920. In addition to his original work, Kobylyanskyi was also a talented translator, rendering into Ukrainian the works of Schiller and Heine.

* * *

How mournfully lovely the autumn days shine,
When with a whisper the yellowed leaves tumble,
Quietly that whisper is mourning for summer,
That sleeps in the tomb of the pines –
How mournfully lovely the autumn days shine...

Beauty of change is the beauty most dear.
Lovely those leaves fallen under our feet now.
Like withered corpses they cover the streets now,
Brighter the heavens appear...
Beauty of change is the beauty most dear.

In My Soul...

In my soul is a deep pool of tears,
So deep it is, like the grief of the nation
With which I lived, with which I mourned, was reared,
With which a thorn crown of crowns bore for years,
Generation to generation.

My weary dream is now in sorry plight,
Walks through the sands, falls, crushed by tempest's hammer,
Long since it would have perished in deep night,
But that through the dark mysteries gleamed bright
A fair Fata Morgana.

This is the mirror of my future days,
Like phantom through the desert sands I stumble,
I walk a path without light's joyful rays,
Relentless anger burns me in its blaze
At the door of the temple.

Maksym Rylskyi

Maksym Rylskyi was born on 19 March, 1895, in Kyiv, the son of a noted Ukrainian ethnographer. After completing his education at Kyiv University, he worked, from 1919 to 1929, as a school-teacher, at first in village schools, and later in Kyiv.

He began writing poetry while still a schoolboy. His first book, *Na bilykh ostrovakh* (On the White Islands) appeared in 1910, when he was aged only 15. (The *Song* for M.V. Lysenko, translated below, comes from this early work).This was followed, in 1918, by the collection *Pid osinnimy zoramy* (Under autumn stars) and the narrative poem *Na Uzlissi* (On the edge of the forest). Another eight books followed during his great creative period of the 1920s and 1930s, when, together with Mykola Zerov, Pavlo Fylypovych, Mykhaylo Dray-Khmara and Yuriy Klen, he formed one of the group of "neo-classical" poets. Another 24 books appeared in the years that followed, including a last, posthumous, collection, *Iskry vohnyu velykoho* (Sparks of the great fire) in 1965. He also published a large number of translations from the classics of world poetry, including Pushkin and Mickiewicz. Rylskyi died on 24 July, 1964.

* * *

Knight of the Lofty Purpose

Viacaslau Rahojsa

Maksym Rylskyi was a poet and bard in the highest meaning of the word. During his far from short life (19 March, 1895–24 July, 1964), he published 80 books of original works, and left, not only to his fellow Ukrainians, but to all humankind, hundreds of poetic works: a novel in verse *(Maryna)*, narrative poems ("Wandering in spring", "Thirst", "Love"), a lyrical-epic composition ("Taras Shevchenko and Ivan Holota"), cycles of poems ("Kyiv octaves", "Fisherman's sonnets", "Mystery of the autumn leaf", almost all of which are creations of universal prosody in a wide variety of genres and forms (lyrical, civic, philosophical, landscape; songs, odes, ballads, invective, medications; sonnets, octaves, sestinas etc.). And, what is especially important, the greater majority of these words fulfil in a talented manner the poet's aim of being *pulchra et apta* – beautiful and useful.

Both the ordinary quatrains and the most recherché verse-forms (the sonnets alone, for example, occupy a complete volume of his collected works) throb with thoughts charged with emotion and poetic experience, in which one may perceive the legacy of feeling, the dreams, the moods of a man of our century. Not, that is, an abstract man, not a Universal Man, nor Superman, but a representative of a certain society, namely, a Ukrainian, who lived through three revolutions, four wars (including two world wars), and the manifold "social experiments" of the Bolsheviks (abolition of private property, collectivisation, industrialisation, etc.), manifestations of genocide (the artificial famine of 1932-33, the GULAG, Stalin's physical destruction of the Ukrainian intelligentsia, and the policy of "melding the nations" of the

1960s)... However, in the specificity and profoundly Ukrainian nature of Rylskyi's poetry lies concealed one of its most important and fundamental qualities. For the more truly "national" art is, the more it reveals the features common to all humankind, and the more it is interesting, comprehensible and important to all. National cultures are like mighty trees in a wood: each individually penetrating deep into its native soil, but with their roots and their branches intertwining.

While creating new, original artistic values of an explicitly Ukrainian form, Rylskyi did not, however, forget the need to transplant into his native culture the best, which other nations – including Russians, Poles, French, Belgians, Germans, Spanish – had created over the course of many centuries. It is sufficient to say that in the most recent, twenty-volume edition of Rylskyi's "Collected Works", seven volumes are taken up by translations into Ukrainian of poetic works (including verse dramas) of European literature, including Pushkin's *Yevgenii Onegin*, Mickiewicz's *Pan Tadeusz*, Voltaire's *Maid of Orleans*, and the *Lay of Ihor's Host*, and separate volumes of the classical works of French and Polish poetry. For the Ukrainian musical theatre, he translated the libretti of a number of operas: *Yevgenii Onegin*, *Ivan Susanin*, *Madam Butterfly*, *Prince Igor*, *Carmen*, and *Rigoletto*. All these translations are of a high artistic level, and preserve the specific national features of the originals, yet fitting naturally into their new cultural environment. Apart from anything else, Rylskyi's translations reinforced and continue to reinforce the prestige of Ukrainian culture, showing the great potentialities of the Ukrainian language in imagery and sensuousness. This is of particular importance in the struggle against both foreign enemies of Ukrainian identity and against the ethnic nihilism implanted in the soul of the nation during several centuries of subjugation.

Rylskyi was not only a member of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR, but also of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR. And these honours were well-deserved. In spite of the fact that circumstances did not give him the chance of a higher education (he graduated from a private *gymnasium*, but completed only the first two years of university studies), Rylskyi educated himself up to a truly academic level, and became a scholar of repute in a number of branches of the humanities: literary criticism, linguistics, the fine arts, folklore and ethnography. In the field of Shevchenko studies alone, he published more than seventy works. His monograph on Adam Mickiewicz appeared as a separate book. His translations likewise came out as a separate work ("The art of translation"). Furthermore, he was a talented organiser of scholarship (from 1942 until the end of his life he was head of the Institute of Art, Folklore and Ethnography of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR), and the editor of multi-volume editions of the classics of Ukrainian literature in Russian, Russian-Ukrainian dictionaries, etc. It may be stated that, in his creative and civic activity, Rylskyi fully realised the intellectual and physical potential handed down in his genes from his father – Tadey Rylskyi, a Kyiv nobleman and, in his time, a well-known ethnographer – and his mother, Malanna, a simple peasant woman from the village of Romanivka. The gentle and the simple blended organically in the blood of the writer, making him (as he himself wrote of his contemporary, the Belarusian national poet, Janka Kupala), a "knight of the lofty purpose", a noble campaigner for the good of his nation.

Song
to M.V. Lysenko

Soar, O skylark, high above
Grainfields winging,
Comforting our human sorrow
With your singing.
In the clear transparent heavens
Sunlight glances,
As upon the sea, a wave
On gold rye dances.
Look and see: the reapers stooping,
They are weary.
And the sweat is streaming from their
Labours dreary.
Comfort them with your sweet music,
Chiming, pouring,
Soar, O skylark, high above,
Ever o'er us.

To Mykola Zerov

Like a tulip that in Haarlem
bows to greet the passing traveller
through a snowy window-pane –
through the mists of man's existence
so creative thought is flowering
scarlet in the poet's soul.

Low the yellow sun is moving,
eyes by the fierce winds are blinded,
all the poor street-lanterns weep.
And in solitude unfolding
all the crimson of its petals,
the long cherished tulip blooms.

Mayk Yohansen

Mayk Yohansen (1895-1937), as his name would suggest, was the son of a Swedish-descended family. His father was a teacher of German, and he himself began his poetic career by writing in Russian. After the revolutions of 1917, he began writing in Ukrainian, and soon became one of the most prominent of the "proletarian" writers of that era.

In 1919, he signed the *Universal* (proclamation) of the Kharkiv "proletarian" writers, and during the 1920s, was a member of successive (and short-lived) literary groups which proclaimed their allegiance to Marxism as the basis of their literary activity: the Association of Proletarian Writers ("*Hart*" – 1923-25), the Free Academy of Proletarian Literature (VAPLITE – 1925-28), and the Technical-Artistic Group A (1929-31). These self-proclaimed "proletarian" writers, however, in 1932 fell foul of Stalin, who suppressed all literary movements in Ukraine, on the grounds that there was insufficient contact between the writers and the masses. By 1936, Yohansen was in trouble with the censorship, and his autobiographical novel *Yuhurta*, which portrayed pre-revolutionary Kharkiv, was banned. Together with many other former members of VAPLITE, he perished in 1937, in the first wave of Stalin's terror against the Ukrainian intelligentsia.

Yohansen's literary output, in both prose and verse, shows considerable innovation and experiment, attempting in his poetry to combine romanticism and symbolism with expressionism, and in his prose to embody romanticism in a clearly defined plot. His major works include the novels *The Journey of Dr Leonardo* (1928) and *The Journey of a Man in a Cape* (1932), and the collections of poetry *Upwards* (1921), *Circle of Steps* (1923), *Output* (1924), and *Ash-tree* (1930).

* * *

The oats grow close to heaven in the sand,
Like grandsire grey above them a cloud drowses,
    A gloomy dream: centuries stand
Upon their heads, in thoughtless visions browsing,
    – The oats grow, there they nod and hold their peace.

Far out upon the sea, boats rock, a flight
Of lateen sails in eventide migrating.
– The oats grow, they grow tall to forest height,
    Awesome the tree-trunks, moribund and greying,
Rot, and fall on the road at fear's command...

– The oats grow close to heaven in the sand.

* * *

When she and I out in the fields would meet,
The fields put forth flowers our path to greet,
Then there was no earth beneath our feet,
– Not floating, standing, walking – trance complete.

Between its banks of old the Donets drowsed,
Like reaper supine lay to sleep his fill.
When she glanced – a gentle breeze was roused,
When she stopped – the gentle breeze grew still.

The white sounds of heaven, too, slept then
And forgot to glide across the sea,
Like this quill with which these lines I pen,
Drowned in a dreaming immobility.

How the foresters' sharp iron blazed bright
And the camomile's rust died away,
How they passed then, night and day and night,
How they passed then, day and night and day.

* * *

"Return, then!"
So the voice rang forth out of the mist.
Like bird then
My heart leapt up, my hands trailed in the distant past,
The tramcar rent the quiet, and off it flew.
I heard how the day moved, how the grass grew,
Ah, higher than the woods, higher than rooks fly, yes,
So that the birds pecked it, fiercely tore it asunder...
Once more, sighing:
"Return, then!"
Softer
Almost unheard, under the city's distant rumble,

On the innumerable pavements those words fell, dying.

Todos Osmachka

Todos Osmachka was born on 3 May, 1895, in the village of Kutsivka, Cherkasy region, of peasant stock.

He was an active figure in Ukrainian literary life of the 1920s, when he published the collections *Krucha* (Precipice, 1922), *Skytski vohni* (Scythian fires, 1925), and *Kleket* (Birdcall, 1929). However, when, at the end of the 1920s, the Soviet clampdown in Ukraine began, Osmachka spoke up vigorously against the Sovietisation of Ukrainian rural life and the suppression of Ukrainian culture and freedom of expression. In 1932, he became one of the first writers to be arrested. During the 1930s, he was arrested several more times; nevertheless, he managed to survive, and, during World War II, made his way westward. In 1943, his book *Suchasnykam* (To Contemporaries) was brought out by the Ukrainian Publishing House *"Ukrayinske Vydavnytstvo"* in German-occupied Lviv. After the war, he settled in the West, living mostly in Canada and the USA, where his last book, *Iz-pid Svitu* (From Beneath the World) appeared in 1954. In July, 1961, while on a visit to Munich, he suffered a paralytic stroke, and in March, 1962, he died in hospital in the USA.

As an émigré, Osmachka was considered a non-person in the post-war Ukrainian SSR, and it was not until 1991 that a collection of his poems could be published, once again, in Ukraine.

Elegy

Hospital,
Commotion and the screams of a crazed old woman.
Here there is no deep heaven,
nor field ravine-riven.
Yet love lingers, in a wreath where
periwinkle is twinkling...
I am alone in the world,
Like Judas in the wood, on his halter!...
The storms have grown quiet,
the winds do not fly;
no yellowed leaf falls from the willow bough
on the blanket
that wraps my body round, –
does not recall the village birthplace,
orchards and meadows.

Hey,
You on high there!
Do you hear a shrill sound above Ukraine's meadows?
To the sea the bird-flocks re-echo loudly,
along the rivers and the quiet ponds...

So free-will sounds alarm-bells to the drowsing!
Spring has flown into the valleys,
From her sides sunlight poured over the tillage...
She shed her robe in the fields of Podillya,
and free-will put it on,
like sheet-lightning stuck fire over evening waters...
snatched the cap from the forests of Bukovyna,
through centuries sang in the clouds;
caught a horse among the Black Mountains...
Whisht!
And it flies over Ukrayina,
flies with my heart!
Its mane floats wide
like golden rye burgeoning in the grainfields,
a horse that is bright as the sun.
For thousands of miles the robes of the fields stretch on!
The stars sparkle high in the heavens...
In starry showers my free-will flies on;
till the star-dust is lost in the earth.
It flies over rivers,
and steppeland,
and woodland,
to the far north.
High above a plumbless fjord
I shall set down my heart...
and there its storms will beat at the mountains,
will sprinkle the snows,
will cover the forests.
In moonlit nights on the mountains' high scree,
the scalds will sing forth lays of the sea,
and the love of bold Vikings
in Norse forests primaeval.
And then you, my heart, under snows of the northland,
will flower forth, like moss,
at the songs of that love!

□

Documents

Congress of the Ukrainian Intelligentsia

On 11 November, 1995, the Congress of the Ukrainian Intelligentsia held its inaugural meeting in the International Centre of Culture and Arts, in Kyiv. Around 2,500 delegates and guests, took part: representing creative unions, civic organisations, political parties, Parliament, the presidential administration and the Cabinet of Ministers. The Speaker of the Ukrainian Parliament, Oleksander Moroz, likewise attended and addressed the Congress. President Leonid Kuchma sent a message of greetings. Other notable participants included the former President of Ukraine, Leonid Kravchuk, and the head of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Kyiv Patriarchate), Patriarch Filaret.

The discussions of the Congress touched upon many of the most urgent problems of Ukrainian political, intellectual and cultural life today.

A profound anxiety was expressed over the present state of the economic and cultural life of society, which, it was felt, poses a threat to the very existence of Ukraine as an independent state. A considerable number of constructive proposals were made on dealing with the social crisis, revitalising national priorities, strengthening state support for Ukrainian culture, education, and book-publishing, and ensuring the widespread use of the Ukrainian language in all spheres of official and social life of the country.

The Resolution of the Congress of the Ukrainian Intelligentsia (printed below) put forward a series of practical measures to reduce the effects of the social crisis and raise the cultural and intellectual life of Ukraine. The Congress likewise ratified its Statutory by-laws, an appeal to the Russophone citizens of Ukraine, and an appeal to voters concerning the forthcoming elections to the Parliament.

The Congress elected Ivan Drach as its chairman, and worked out the principles and foundations for its future activity which will be coordinated by a National Council.

Resolution of the Congress of the Ukrainian Intelligentsia

The Congress of the Ukrainian Intelligentsia, which has been debating the burning questions of the development of Ukrainian society in its present stage, wishes to make known the following:

1. The alarm sounded in the Manifesto of the Ukrainian Intelligentsia about the future of our statehood, nation, language, culture, psyche, and scholarship is well founded. It was no accident that the organising committee received thousands of letters in support of the views expressed in it.

2. National self-defence is becoming more and more necessary. We must oppose the savage pressure of anti-Ukrainian forces from both without and within the state with national accord and unity, aimed at building a materially and spiri-

tually wealthy Ukraine, a free, democratic society, and guarantees of all the rights and freedoms of the individual.

3. The Ukrainian intelligentsia is cognisant of its historical role as a consolidating factor in society, and a constructive cultural force. Hence, taking as our foundation the interests of the Ukrainian state, and the Ukrainian people, we ask the President of Ukraine, and the legislative and executive power of the state:

– to ensure the unconditional implementation of the will of the Ukrainian people, expressed in the Referendum of 1991, to build an independent Ukrainian state;

– to work out and consistently implement an ideology of state-building, the conceptual nucleus of which must be the Ukrainian national idea. The following priorities, which constitute a system of valuable guidelines for Ukrainian society, should form the basis of that ideology:

the development of an independent, legal, democratic national state on the basis of the revival of historic, cultural, spiritual, and moral-ethical values of the Ukrainian people, together with universal humanistic values;

the fostering of a Ukrainian statehood patriotism through a system of school education, military training, mass media and cultural initiatives, and other forms and means of forming social awareness;

ethnic self-realisation, and the ensuring of the rights (including cultural and educational rights) of all ethnic minorities in Ukraine;

ensuring the functioning of the Ukrainian language as the state language, as a means of communication and provision of information at all levels of state and social life;

the reform of the system of school education, higher education, science and learning, health protection, and social security with a clear delineation of national guidelines and tasks;

– in the field of economics and social security to implement a policy of national protectionism, to bring in reforms aimed at the protection of indigenous industrial and agricultural production, and the raising of the standard of living of the Ukrainian people;

– the privatisation of national assets must be carried out in the interests of the Ukrainian people, the creation of an undivided and effective national economy, the achievement and securing of the economic independence of Ukraine, support for Ukrainian business and private agriculture, opposition to the expansion of Russian imperialist capital and the criminalisation of the economy; and the use of decisive measures to suppress the operation of indigenous and foreign mafia structures in Ukraine and to put an end to the rampant shadow economy;

– compensation from state property (land, real estate, etc.) for the losses suffered by citizens, whose savings were, from 1 January, 1991, devalued with the connivance of state power; ensuring help for low-income groups (through the differentiated raising of pensions, subsidies and rent rebates, etc.);

– treating the social security of the intelligentsia as the security of the most valuable capital of our state, the future of which is under the highest degree of threat as a result of the current hidden robbery; legislative and executive power to take all possible measures to halt the drain abroad of high-class experts, aca-

demics, artists, sportsmen and trainers, and create all possible facilities for the self-realisation of creative artists in Ukraine;

the state must find the funds so that people who bring renown to Ukraine, and allow its culture to compete on equal terms among other cultures – from film producer to opera singer, from writer to sculptor, from theoretical mathematician to winners of international contests and top sports awards – do not feel themselves to be superfluous to our society, and do not have to live, as presently so many of them, particularly young writers and artists, live, in the low-income and unemployed groups. In addition to targeted state subsidies, sponsorship should be encouraged in every way, including the exemption of charitable donations from the taxation which currently renders them nugatory.

– to determine and strictly adhere to the scale of budgetary financing of culture and education, after first raising them to international standards;

– to pay off promptly the current outstanding backlog in academic salaries, and give academics appropriate guarantees regarding the state's use of their intellectual property. To take urgent action to halt the destruction of the scientific-technical base and to create conditions for the development and financing of long-term scientific-technical programmes, giving priority to those lines of development likely to contribute to the progress of Ukrainian society;

– to develop a state programme of all kinds of support (and, in particular, economic support) to Ukrainian culture, art, science, and education, encourage Ukrainian-language book- and periodical-publishing and the Ukrainian cinema; to maintain the number of Ukrainian-taught schools in proportion to the number of Ukrainians in each region of the state, and to introduce Ukrainian-language higher and professional-technical education throughout the whole of Ukraine;

– to secure the unconditional implementation of the Law on Languages, introduce Ukrainian in all state institutions, from the Supreme Council, Cabinet of Ministers, and the presidential administration, downwards, having brought to the attention of every official the requirement that the state language must be used in the work-place;

– government structures should renounce the concept of "linguistic regionalisation", which, in actual fact, is leading to the division of Ukraine, and should conduct themselves in accordance with the concept of Ukrainian as the state language, as laid down in the law;

– a state organ should be founded to promulgate linguistic policy and monitor adherence to the language law and the implementation of state programmes in the language field;

– to bring in legislation giving tax privileges up to the year 2001 to the production and dissemination of Ukrainian-language printed and video publications, in particular for works intended for children and adolescents, and to increase the taxes on advertising in Russian and other foreign languages;

– to complete, as a matter of urgency, the removal of all symbols and toponyms relating to the former totalitarian society, and to remove, first and foremost, the crests on the principal buildings of the state – the presidential administration, the Supreme Council, and the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine;

– to ensure the sovereignty of the Ukrainian information space, and to forbid the sale of television and radio air-time to foreign companies;

– to halt the plundering of Ukraine by senior officials; employ radical measures to repatriate to Ukraine hard currency which was intended for the Ukrainian economy, but which has been subverted to secret foreign bank accounts;

– make major cuts in the excessively overgrown administrative-power apparatus, and in the number of ministries and departments and their subordinate structures, and to use the money so saved to improve the well-being of the people, and to develop culture, art, science;

– to abolish *nomenklatura* privileges; senior officials should share with the people the difficulties of the transitional period – then, and only then, will it be in their interests to make this period as short as possible;

– to dismiss from all levels of the bureaucratic apparatus persons who have done damage to the statehood of Ukraine, shown themselves to be tainted by Ukrainophobia, or who have used their official position for their own personal benefit; the fundamental criteria for appointments in the state service must be Ukrainian patriotism, professional competence and human decency; the Ukrainian state should have a Ukrainian power-structure;

– make illegal the subversive activity of anti-Ukrainian parties and movements, and also of individuals who take as their goal the liquidation of the independent Ukrainian state, act against the will of the Ukrainian people, as expressed in the Referendum of 1991, and foment ethnic and social hostility;

– prosecute those responsible for the inhuman treatment of those who took part in the funeral procession of Patriarch Volodymyr on 18 July, 1995, outside St Sophia's Cathedral in Kyiv, treating this as a particularly serious crime against the Ukrainian people; Patriarch Volodymyr must be reinterred in the precincts of that Cathedral, which, throughout the centuries, generations of our forebears, faithful and clergy, have built and maintained, and to whom it belongs as of right;

– to support on the state level the process of the union of the Ukrainian Orthodox into a single national particular church;

– to prevent the unlawful and uncontrolled migration of foreign citizens into Ukraine; stop the issue of new passports, since the absence in the present documents of the entry giving the nationality (ethnic origin) of the bearer, and also the fact that the printed headings are bilingual (Ukrainian and Russian), insult the national dignity of many citizens of the state; and to take a census of the population of Ukraine as soon as possible;

– implement a state policy of national reconciliation, recognise the rights of all participants in the national-liberation struggle of 1941-45, cease the repression of Ukrainian national-patriotic organisations;

– develop and implement a programme of economic, cultural and educational support for Ukrainians abroad, particularly in Russia;

– achieve the return of historical and cultural treasures, removed from Ukraine and appropriated by Russia over several centuries, and also the return of Ukraine's property retained by Russia after the collapse of the Soviet empire, and of Ukraine's share in the gold and diamond reserves, foreign securities and real estate of the former USSR;

– to demand the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territory of Ukraine, in as much as their deployment is contrary to the neutrality of our state, proclaimed by the Supreme Council, and does economic, ecological and moral damage to the state.

These our demands are not an expression of excessive political or national radicalism, nor dictated by an essentially emotional approach to reality – they simply recreate the civilised economic and cultural models and civilised standards of existence of any state, people, nation, and constitute indispensable conditions of their survival and development in the world community.

Without a successful resolution of these most essential tasks, without the enactment of laws, without clauses important for the national-spiritual development in a new Constitution, which will pronounce that the Ukrainian state is built on the basis of the sovereign self-determination of the Ukrainian nation, it will be impossible to overcome the serious threat to Ukrainian culture and spiritual identity, and thus to Ukrainian statehood as a whole.

We urge the President of Ukraine to set up, within a month, a plenipotentiary government commission with equal participation of delegates of the National Council of the Ukrainian Intelligentsia, to elaborate a concrete national programme for satisfying the above demands, earmarking timetables, means, and funds for its implementation.

The Congress appeals to representatives of the national minorities, all citizens of Ukraine, to support the natural demands of its most-numerous native ethnos, which, although it has won its own state, has nevertheless ended up in the position of a step-son.

Recently, government circles, and in particular the President, in order to placate the Ukrainian citizens, have begun assuring us, more and more frequently, that, supposedly, no threats to our nation, language, culture exist. However, countless facts testify to the exact opposite.

Despite this, the Congress declares with all responsibility that the Ukrainian intelligentsia is prepared to cooperate with the legislative and executive powers in order to save our national statehood, and the Ukrainian language, culture, spiritual identity, science, and economy.

A necessary condition of our support for the President and government is that the executive power should actually implement the fundamental propositions and demands, expressed in this appeal. If, however, they are not implemented, we shall be impelled to oppose the present powers-that-be, as acting in disregard of the national interests of Ukraine.

The Congress of Ukrainian Intelligentsia considers that the only way to overcome the situation which has arisen in the state, in national unity, and in the consolidation of all national-patriotic forces, is an unremitting concern for the spiritual bases of society, and in its profound reform on the basis of the interests of the Ukrainian people. In unity – lies the strength of Ukraine, its independence, its welfare. □

Conferences & Exhibitions

"Many Religions, One God": An International Exhibition of Religious Bookplates

Petro Nesterenko

Life yields bountiful crops in the bookplate field. Bookplate artists gather several harvests a year. And 1994 was no exception. Ukrainian masters of this small-scale graphic art took part in a prestigious exhibition in Milan, held in conjunction with the Twenty-Fifth Congress of Bookplate Artists, in the "Tadeusz Czeslawski Junior" International Competition of Bookplate Artists commemorating the Warsaw Uprising, and in the Lithuanian "Music, Song and Dance". This list could be prolonged, however the principal event of the year was the International Bookplate Contest "Many Religions, One God", the principal sponsor of which was the International Charitable Foundation "Thanksgiving". This was the second international bookplate exhibition held in Kyiv by the Ukrainian Bookplate Club. One hundred and thirty-six brilliant personalities from 27 countries exhibited their concepts of this interesting theme.



Second prize. Borys Romanov, Ukraine

Every such contest is a particular striving for the right to be recognised, so that among hundreds of works your own will be recognised. And how many cases can one cite, when the jury, in recognising its prize-winners, is guided by some incomprehensible logic and its tastes do not coincide with the artist's ideas. It is quite possible to understand this. Every master chooses his own style, personal to him alone, and his own technique of execution, and quite possibly considers everything else uninteresting. Even going through a prepared

Diploma. Volodymyr Lomaka, Ukraine

catalogue to pick out the best works is no light task; every artist is an individual. Someone who later consults the catalogue, may not find his name among those nominated by the adjudicators, and maybe will not even find his bookplate among those printed. Perhaps the Lithuanians are right when they insist that everyone taking part in their exhibitions is represented by one work only. The winners of the international competition "Many Religions, One God" were nominated by a prestigious jury, headed by Oleksander Bazhan, President of the International Charitable Foundation "Thanksgiving". It also included such outstanding personalities as Patriarch Dymytriy of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, the Director of the International Institute of Cosmosophy, Yuriy Shvaydak, the Editor-in-Chief of the "Soborna Ukrayina" publishing house, Serhiy Kobets, two bookplate artists, Hennadiy Puhachevskyi and Ruslan Ahirba, who, although young, are already well-known, and the author of this article. Here it is appropriate to note that Puhachevskyi and Ahirba did a great deal of work on the concept and shape of the exhibition, and the design of the tasteful catalogue, which met the highest world standards. In addition, Hennadiy Puhachevskyi was responsible for the poster, diplomas and invitations, which, together with the catalogue, formed a single stylistic entity. By taking part in the panel of adjudicators, these artists obviously gave up the chance of entering the contest, although they could have had a good chance of winning.

In one of the three exhibition halls there were displayed 62 works of 11 world-famous bookplate artists from Ukraine, Russia, Moldova, Lithuania, Estonia, the Netherlands and Slovakia, from the collection of Petro Nesterenko (this collection totals, in all, more than 17,000 bookplates).

Within the framework of this event, there was also presented the "GALEX" gallery of graphic and sculptured miniatures. In a separate hall were displayed graphic works of the artists Valeriy Syurkha, Andriy Kalchenko, Ruslan Vyhovskyi from Kyiv, Orest Kryvoruchko from Chernivtsi, and reliefs in plastic by Viktor

Modzhar and Viktor Ruban. Small-scale sculptures in bronze, stone and wood were exhibited by Oleksiy Vladimirov from Kyiv. The works on display in the gallery were distinguished by their high technical quality and spirituality; they were a natural extension and adornment of the thematic exhibition.

Vasyl Leonenko, Ukraine

I should like to say yet again that all this was possible due to the dedication and selfless work of the organisers of the exhibition who gave their time ungrudgingly (the preparation and work on the exhibition and catalogue required half a year of intensive work), and who made a brilliant success of the task they had undertaken.

The exhibition had a successful run from 20 to 28 August, 1994, in the halls of the Shevchenko State Museum in Kyiv. Visitors became acquainted with excellent works which were a testimony of truth, love and mercy, morality and harmony, given physical shape as small graphic art by artists of different religious faiths.

For every nation on our planet, the foundation of faith is God. Faith gives man spirituality.

The subjects of many of the European bookplate artists are based on one of the oldest and most widespread religious symbols of humanity – the Cross. This is revered all over the world. Examples of crosses are to be found in remote antiquity. They are found on the breasts of statues of the Buddha, whom Chinese believers consider as the founder of their religion, and the chief law-giver of Assyria, King Shamshi-Adad. Cross-like symbols hang on stone figures of ancient and once highly honoured gods – the Egyptian Osiris and the Greek Eros, as well as the Buddhist Patriarch Ta-mo. There are crosses, too, on the walls of ancient temples in Mexico and Tibet, and on Jewish and Egyptian coins. Large crosses are painted on the walls of Egyptian tombs.

All this testifies to the fact that the Cross is one of the oldest and most widespread religious symbols of mankind. It symbolises fire, the sun and eternal life, power and fertility. This sign acquired a new significance in Christianity. Hence in many bookplates the Cross appears, first and foremost, as the implement of the Saviour's passion, the symbol of a martyr's death.

These works which proclaim the architecture and symbols of all religions of the world are distinguished by their technical mastery, originality of composition and freshness of concept.

We may note at the outset that the images of Jesus Christ and the saints, reproductions of well-known works of painting and sculpture, and likewise mythological motifs, even when carried out at a high artistic and technical level, did not evoke any special interest from the adjudicators. Among the diversity of tenets and forms of belief, the best expression of the spiritual truths which unite all people on the path to the Light came, in the opinion of the adjudicators, from Peter Kočak from Slovakia. His series of profound compositions executed in intaglio, rich in thought and associations, and a profundity of imagery, philosophy and awareness of the world, received the highest number of marks. The first prize, which went to Kočak, was undivided. Six other prizes were also given in the following order: Borys Romanov (Severodonetsk), Orest Kryvoruchko (Chernivtsi), Vasyl Fenchak (a student at the Ivan Fedorov Lviv Polygraphic Institute), Frederic Kuhlmann (France), Nina Kazimova (St Petersburg), and Volodymyr Budko (Slantsi, Leningrad oblast). Nine artists from Ukraine, Hungary, Russia, Belgium, and China were awarded diplomas. A special prize – a big cuddly elephant – went to a seven-year-old exhibitor, Vasilisa Shtapakova, from St Petersburg.



Mykola Opanachuk, Ukraine

Seven beautifully designed bookplates by Oleksander Savich from Kyiv, made up a special septet of related plates. These bookplates were made for well-known European collectors and connoisseurs of small graphic art: Francesco Orenes (Spain), Jan Rhebergen (Netherlands), Luc van den Briele (Belgium), A.M. Da Mota Miranda (Portugal), Giuseppe Mirabella (Italy), Gernot Blum (Germany) and William Butler (England). Together these bookplates form a symbolic dome, whose pure height symbolises the one God to whom humanity turns by means of numerous teachings. In addition to a diploma, his work also received a special prize from the Ukrainian Bookplate Club.

Orest Kryvoruchko, as always, produced high-level work. His bookplates are redolent of the ecological woes of Ukraine, which are themselves a legacy of the loss of spirituality in contemporary society.

The search for conscience, the study of human nature, the desire to penetrate to the core of various cultures, and the wish to bring together the customs and traditions of different peoples were characteristic of the students of the Ukrainian Academy of Fine Arts and the Ivan Fedorov Lviv Polygraphic Institute. They demon-

strated a broad spectrum of individual methods of the intaglio technique. The works of the world-famous American writer and philosopher, Carlos Castaneda, inspired Vasyl Fenchak to create profoundly meaningful complex associated images which reveal that author's world of phantoms, and which express the wisdom of the eyes, the realia of modern sciences, and spiritual and ethical enquiry.

Likewise filled with spirituality, profound in content and elegant in composition were the philosophical works of Borys Romanov, Borys Drobotyuk, Volo-



Roy Cooney, "The whole world in His hands"

dymyr Lomaka, Volodymyr Taran, Kostyantyn Antyukhin, and Oleksander and Serhiy Kharuk.

The bookplate of Roy Cooney (England) was also profoundly philosophical: "The whole world in His hands". This was dedicated to Rosemary Redcliffe, to celebrate her ordination as one of the first women priests in the Church of England.

The religious architecture and symbols of all times and nations in the personal bookplates of the Finnish artist Simo Hannula are directed to the heights of Heaven and the Almighty, and strike a note of response from the works of Frederic Kuhlmann (France) and Oleksander Savich (Ukraine). Faces of people shining with an unearthly, cosmic light in a composition which focuses on the

Cross, in the bookplate of Marie Claude Saillant (France), executed in a colour wood-cut technique, and dedicated to Oleksander Bazhan, warned, as it were, in the manner of the silent cinema: "Where is humanity going?"

Profoundly symbolic, too, were the bookplates of Claudio Lara (Argentina), Istvan Molnar (Hungary), Vincze Laszlo (Romania), and Vasyl Leonenko, Mykola Opanachuk and Viktor Rubanskyi (Ukraine).

The Islamic school of bookplates was represented by miniatures executed in lithograph by the Kazakh artists Anuar Utegenov and Marziya Zhaksygarinaya. The characteristic oriental script played a significant role in their compositions.

The works of the Chinese bookplate artists focused on the harmony between Heaven, Earth and humanity, which together form the unity of the world. The Taoist teachings assert that there exists a profound connection between Heaven and humanity, and he who knows the deepest causes of this connection is truly wise. The philosophical and ethical norms of a number of artists were attested by the image of one of the most popular Chinese divinities, Kwang-yen, the goddess of mercy. Rescuing people from every misfortune, Kwang-yen may also appear as a terrible and implacable force.

The exhibition and competition represented the search of the artists for a higher reality representing the unity of all existence, uniting all the best created by the artists of different countries of the world on sacred themes, and has enriched contemporary bookplate art by new achievements. It proclaimed the fact: God is one, but the roads to Him are many. □

Ukrainian Studies in the UK

"Be Our Voice": Twenty-Five Years of the Keston Institute

Vera Rich

The Keston Institute, formerly Keston College specialising in the study of religion in communist lands, is currently celebrating its silver jubilee. The organisation of this unique research centre began with an initiative meeting in 1969, and it was formally registered as a Charity the following year. But its true inception dated back to 1964, when two intrepid women from west Ukraine travelled to Moscow, with an appeal against the threatened destruction of the famous Pochayiv monastery.

They managed to deliver this petition to a French visitor, and, in due course, it came into the hands of Michael Bourdeaux, an Anglican priest who, some years previously, had been one of the first exchange students with the Soviet Union. Later, he made contact with the women themselves, and they made to him the famous appeal which, in effect, became the motto of Keston: "Be our voice!"

The "College" – a small research group, with a rapidly expanding library documenting the oppression of religion in the entire Communist bloc – established itself in a disused school-house in Keston, a small village in Kent on the very rim of the London transport network. Its remoteness caused considerable problems for the KGB disinformation network, which launched a massive smear campaign against it in the Soviet media: Keston was described as a "leafy suburb on the banks of the Thames" – presumably by confusion with Kingston! The KGB – as defector Oleg Gordievskii told the annual Keston "Open Day" this year – considered Keston a major target, to be infiltrated and/or discredited. In this, it had some success: one "mole" attempted to find a post there but was rapidly despatched, and – which in the long run was more serious – the editors of several influential newspapers and journals became convinced that Keston, which had set up its own news agency, was not a reliable source. Although stories first publicised by Keston did, eventually, prove to be substantiated by other sources, not only was their topicality often lost, in some cases, had the media been prepared to take them up earlier, certain major cases of oppression might have been averted. During these years, the Soviet authorities were growing increasingly sensitive to Western criticism; hence the importance they placed on discrediting Keston.

During its twenty-five years of work, Keston's interest in matters Ukrainian have flourished. One of its earliest visitors was Cardinal (later Patriarch) Yosyp Slipyi of the Ukrainian Catholic Church. Keston publications include a biography of the Ukrainian Baptist Georgi Vins, and collections of writings by the dissident Yosyp Terelya and Fr Vasyl Romanyuk (later Patriarch Volodymyr of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Kyiv Patriarchate), as well as many articles in its journals. In the early 1980s, with the assistance of the Harvard Ukrainian Institute, a full-

time Ukrainian research post was established at Keston. This became of particular importance in the late 1980s, when, as the current incumbent of the post, Fr Serge Keleher, put it, "it became clear that the Ukrainian Catholic Church would be the litmus paper of the new Soviet policy on freedom of religion – it looked as if the relaxations would apply to everyone except Ukrainian Catholics!"



Fr Serge Keleher
Ukrainian researcher at Keston.
Photo courtesy of the Keston Institute

The sudden collapse of Communism meant a major upheaval for Keston. Many sources of income dried up virtually overnight: funding organisations seemed to assume, naively, that Keston's role was over. In fact, Keston found a new and even more demanding role. It relocated itself to Oxford, changed its name (the term "college" in the Oxford context would have been misleading) and undertook a new task, to help the churches of the former Communist lands re-establish themselves. Its activities now range from scholarships for theology students and clerics (many of the latter were ordained with only a minimal knowledge of theology), to arranging the "repatriation" of icons which have ended up in the West, in the hands of those who wish to see them returned to the churches from which they came, and from supplying material help (including medical supplies) to those in need, to organising pilgrimages. (The first Keston pilgrimage to Kyiv is scheduled for next summer). Current publications include the scholarly journal *Religion, State and Society*, and the more "popular" bi-monthly *Frontier*, and plans are now under way to relaunch the Keston News Service – possibly via the Internet.

Repairing and healing the spiritual and material damage done to religion by seven decades of Communism is proving a long and arduous task. There will clearly be work for Keston for many years to come.

A service of thanksgiving for its first 25 years will take place early next year. *The Ukrainian Review* wishes the Keston Institute every success in its future efforts, so long as they may be needed. □

Reviews

The Politics of Religion in Russia and the New States of Eurasia. Edited by Michael Bourdeaux (M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, New York and London, 1995), 321 pp. Hardback: 1-56324-356-3, £53.95, paperback: 1-56324-357-1, £19.95. Distributed by the Eurospan Group

This collection is the third in a planned series of ten studies to be produced by the "Russian Littoral Project", sponsored jointly by the University of Maryland and the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies of Johns Hopkins University. The project title is misleading: it does not deal (as one might expect, with the coastal lands of Russia, but with the entire post-Soviet space – here termed the almost equally misleading "Eurasia". We have not seen the first two volumes: possibly (for such are the vagaries of academic publishing) they have not yet appeared.

This collection of fourteen essays addresses the specifically political aspects (both internal and international) of the revival and reinstatement of religion in the former Soviet Union. Ten of the fifteen Newly Independent States (NIS) are discussed in detail. One must regret that the coverage was not comprehensive. The two European omissions – Moldova and Belarus – are not without their own peculiar features. Back in 1989, the former was the first of the then Soviet republics to refuse to accept an Orthodox Metropolitan nominated by Moscow – and his name, for a time, became enshrined in the nonce-word to "spiridonise". Now, the Moldovans are trying to extricate their Orthodox Church from its subordination to Moscow – with the help of their linguistic and ethnic kin in Romania. (It is by no means clear whether their aim is an Autocephalous Moldovan Orthodox Church, or subordination to the Romanian Orthodox as a means of protection against Moscow!) And in Belarus, the current President, Aleksandr Lukašenka, seems determined to use religion, not, as in other post-Soviet states, as a means of nation- and state-building, but rather to achieve his proclaimed goal of a close union with Russia. Three Central Asian NIS, likewise, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan, while not given separate coverage, are to some extent subsumed in the paper on "Islam and the Political Culture of 'Scientific Atheism' in Post-Soviet Central Asia: Future Predicaments". But this cites most of its examples from Uzbekistan (already given a chapter of its own), and makes no attempt to address the multi-faith nature of Kazakhstan, the political consequences of which range from Russia's self-assumed role of "protector" of the Orthodox, to the current drive in Poland to provide churches and priests for the Poles of Kazakhstan (whose presence there is the result of Stalin's deportations during World War II) – and the fervent desire of those same Poles for repatriation to Poland, for fear of a future outbreak of Islamic "fundamentalism".

Let us turn, however, to what the book contains, rather than its omissions. Following a general introductory chapter by an acknowledged expert on religion in the former Soviet lands, Canon Michael Bourdeaux of the Keston Institute, it is divided on a regional basis into three sections: Russia (five papers), the western

NIS (three papers on Ukraine and one on the Baltic states), and the "southern" NIS (one paper on the Caucasus, one on Tajikistan, one on Uzbekistan, and the general survey already mentioned).

The three papers on Ukraine (which will be the primary interest of our readers), are all excellent – but to some extent cover the same ground. Bohdan Bociurkiw ("Politics and Religion in Ukraine: The Orthodox and the Greek Catholics"), Vasyl Markus ("Politics and Religion in Ukraine: In Search of a New Pluralistic Dimension"), and Serhiy Bilokin ("The Kiev Patriarchate and the State") all deal at some length with the problems which have, currently, split the Ukrainian Orthodox three ways. Their views have a broad consensus of opinion, in particular, agreeing on the key role of President Kravchuk's support in the attempt by Metropolitan Filaret of Kyiv to get the Moscow Patriarchate to grant his church autonomy. They also broadly agree on the failed merger between the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC) and Filaret's new Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Kyiv Patriarchate (UOC-KP) in summer, 1992. Patriarch Mstyslav of the UAOC, they say, was persuaded by his advisers in the USA to reject the deal, contrary to the wishes of the majority of the UAOC clerics in Ukraine. Both Bociurkiw and Bilokin stress that even after Mstyslav's disavowal of the merger (on the grounds that the "Synod" which proclaimed it was convened uncanonically), the UOC-KP continued to regard him as its head, and elected its own Patriarch, Volodymyr (Romanyuk) only after Mstyslav's death in 1993.

Even as regards the Ukrainian Orthodox churches, however, these three papers are not simply reworkings of the same material. Bilokin concentrates on the relations of the Orthodox churches with the state, from the beginning of the Soviet period, presenting some fascinating material from the formerly secret archives of the Communist Party and the Cheka/OGPU/NKVD/KGB. These include not only plans for the infiltration of the church in the 1920s by Communist agents briefed to sow dissension – but even a budgetary estimate for their pay! Likewise, he sees the hand of the present day Ukrainian Security Service (which, he implies, is at least to some extent penetrated by the KGB) and of the KGB itself in the conflicts within Ukrainian Orthodoxy over the past four years. He cites, in particular, the media coverage (especially in journals with communist leanings) of the June, 1992 visit of Patriarch Mstyslav to Kyiv, and its aftermath, in which a "wave of correspondence" suggested that "the Kiev Patriarchate [had] failed to take proper care of their superior", by failing to provide him with a proper apartment in Kyiv. But, Bilokin notes, not only was Mstyslav offered a choice of apartments which he rejected (doubtless, at his advance age, he felt more comfortable in hotels), this very argument was a re-run of an accusation brought "justly" against the authorities of the then Ukrainian SSR during a previous visit of Mstyslav to Ukraine, "[s]everal months before the attempted coup of August 1991". "This creates an impression", Bilokin observes, "that this accusation appeared after yet another careful study of the patriarch's dossier" (presumably by the disinformation department of the KGB).

Bilokin then goes on to cite a circular issued by "a previously unknown Russian Union for the Defense of the Motherland (UDM)" and reprinted in October, 1992 by *Samostiyna Ukrayina*, the newspaper of the Ukrainian Republican Party. This

document, addressed to "Representatives of the UDM in legal organizations and organs of power", contained plans for the "neutralization of the nationalist faction in the UOC", and, in particular, the 37 members of the "forecasting and analysis group" which allegedly "exert[ed] influence on Kravchuk" and other top officials in favour of an independent Ukrainian Orthodox Church. In addition to neutralising this group and "fostering division and discord among political and social organizations of separatist orientation", the UDM members were instructed to:

> focus your attention on the following:
>
> 1. prevention of unity of separatists within one organization.
>
> 2. maximum use of Mstyslav in the "celebrations" for the purpose of recovering lost positions in the UOC leadership
>
> – use of the old name "Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church"
>
> – recommending [pro-Moscow] Metropolitan Volodymyr [of Kyiv] to propose a joint liturgy in St Sofia Cathedral to be conducted by Mstyslav
>
> – insisting that this liturgy be broadcast over television and radio in the hope that the age of Mstyslav and his frail health, which it will be impossible to conceal in a live broadcast, will operate in Volodymyr's favor, and the very fact of a liturgy jointly conducted by Mstyslav and the hierarch of the Moscow Patriarchate... will cause a quarrel between Mstyslav and the bishops of the so-called Kiev Patriarchate and Filaret.

"It is interesting", Bilokin continues,

> that almost until the end of 1992, events developed more or less according to this scenario. Contacts were established between seemingly uncompromising and irreconcilable adversaries: Patriarch Mstyslav and Metropolitan Volodymyr (Sabodan) of the Moscow Patriarchate. There were press reports about their meeting in room 201 of the Zhovtnevyi Hotel on 6 July 1992. Further, a wedge was driven between the patriarch and Metropolitan Filaret. Actually, the patriarch grew cool toward all the bishops of the Kiev Patriarchate and refused to attend their Council on 15 December. Finally, the appeal of the popular name of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, which had been destroyed in the thirties, was also exploited: it was misappropriated by a small fraction of the Kiev Patriarchate headed by Archbishop Petro (Petrus') (a local Council of this church, held in Kiev on 7 September 1993, elected Father Volodymyr Iarema patriarch under the name of Dmytro).

These examples, he concludes, "illustrate the importance of influences exerted by secret services. There can be no true history of the church without due consideration of these factors".

Bociurkiw, for his part, begins his paper by defining the "chief problem that came to confront the Ukrainian government", post independence, as "the continuing allegiance of the majority of the Orthodox in Ukraine to the Moscow Patriarchate, which remained opposed to the separation of Ukraine from Russia and intent on pursuing their eventual political reunion through ecclesiastical unity of the two". This fairly states his agenda: it is the overt response of the government which interests him, not the covert actions of secret services. After a brief but masterly "historical perspective", which in little more than three pages sums up the history of both Orthodoxy and Eastern-rite Catholicism in Ukraine (with due emphasis on the latter's role as guardian of "Ukrainian ethnic identity and culture"), he analyses the effect of the Gorbachev reforms on religion in Ukraine,

during which Moscow's strategy was aimed at disqualifying the Ukrainian Catholic Church (UCC) from benefiting from the new law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organisations. The resurgence of the UCC and the UAOC are played clearly in their context of the national-political revival in western Ukraine. Filaret's bid for autocephaly, and the opposition of the Moscow Patriarchate are placed firmly in their political context, and Bociurkiw cites a number of interesting details. During the Council of Russian Orthodox Bishops which discussed Filaret's petition, he notes,

> [a]ll but six of the participants attacked the very prospect of Ukrainian autocephaly as a step towards "schism" and Uniatism, a blow to the "unity" of the three East Slavic peoples, and an invitation to Russian Orthodox in Ukraine to secede from the UOC and for Belarusians and the ROC [Russian Orthodox Church] in the Baltic states to follow the Ukrainians in separating themselves from Moscow.

Likewise, he draws attention to the remarkable fact that the Ukrainian "component" of the ROC at this time was larger than the remainder of that church in the whole former Soviet Union.

Bociurkiw's account of Filaret's break with Moscow, and the subsequent history of the UOC-KP likewise contains considerably more "internal" church detail, in particular, concerning the opposition to Filaret within that church which "crystallized around Metropolitan Antonii (Masendych) of Pereiaslav and Sicheslav (Dnipropetrovs'k)". Looking to what, at the time of writing, was the future, he suggests that

> [u]nless the government withdraws its backing from Filaret and brings about his "retirement" now that a new patriarch (Romaniuk) has been elected, there is strong likelihood of further defections from the UOC-KP.

In fact, since the election of President Leonid Kuchma, overt government support was largely withdrawn. But the death of Patriarch Volodymyr (Romanyuk) in July, and the election of Filaret as Patriarch has, indeed, resulted in the mass defections from the UOC-KP, which Bociurkiw predicted.

Arriving eventually at the point when Ukraine "has *two* patriarchs of Kiev and *three* Orthodox churches", Bociurkiw concludes that

> in aiming for the autocephaly of the Orthodox Church in Ukraine, both Metropolitan Filaret and the Ukrainian government made a strategic mistake in rushing, in the face of expected hostility from the Moscow Patriarchate, without first educating the UOC clergy and faithful in the advantages and inevitability of an independent Orthodox Church in an independent state.

The Ukrainian government, he argues,

> had other options than unconditionally supporting Filaret in 1992-93. It could have built its policy in favor of autocephaly around the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, whose patriarch Mstyslav (Skrypnyk), could not have been defrocked by the ROC and who may have found a better reception in the patriarchate of Constantinople. Alternatively, the Kiev government could have followed the precedent set by the Directorate government in January 1919, when it declared the autocephaly of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church by state law, applying administrative sanctions against bishops who refused to embrace Ukrainian autocephaly.

Finally, he warns that

> [t]he quality of the politicians trying to "run" church affairs also complicates Ukraine's church policy. Many, if not all, of them may be paying lip service to the importance of religion, but their view of it tends to be instrumental as a convenient means of advancing political objectives. As in the other areas of contemporary Ukrainian politics, the long shadow cast by decades of Bolshevik rule extends to the realm of church-state relations as well.

Although Bociurkiw's main interest is the Ukrainian Catholic and Orthodox Churches, he does give some brief details about the other 56 registered religious organisations in Ukraine, both Protestant and non-conformist Christians and the new more exotic "cults", such as the International Society for Krishna Consciousness and the notorious "White Brotherhood". These other religions, all of which, Bociurkiw stresses, have only "minuscule" followings, feature prominently in the article of Vasyl Markus. His paper is largely descriptive, and statistical, citing numbers of parishes, publications and the like. Few of them pose any major problems or controversies – the possible exception being the Roman-rite Catholic Church, whose members are mainly foreign-descended (Poles, Hungarians and Germans), even if now many of them are linguistically, and even ethnically, assimilated. According to Markus, the Vatican now "tries to slightly deemphasize the Polish ethnic character of Latin-rite Catholics in Ukraine". On the other hand, the new "Catholic Bishops' Conference of Ukraine" (made up of Bishops of both Roman and Eastern rites, together with Ukraine's one Armenian bishop), is, he says, claimed by some to pursue "the objectives of proselytization in Orthodox-dominated Ukraine, and thus jeopardizes ecumenical dialogue with the Orthodox, especially with the Moscow Patriarchate, which still claims Ukraine as being within its sphere of influence".

In fact, as Markus himself has to admit, a "true modern post-Vatican II ecumenism does not exist in Ukraine". Not only are there on-going disputes over the ownership of confiscated church buildings, the various

> churches and other denominations are now busy in establishing their own identity, status and image. They are working hard to recover from their miserable state of affairs prior to the 1990s. They have not reached as yet the stage when they would be in a position to realize their potentiality. They have not achieved any degree of understanding, compassion, and sense of community of Christian faith that would be needed in order to initiate ecumenical dialogue... No previous ecumenical experience and basic education in ecumenism, which Western churches have been experiencing for at least three decades and now take for granted, are available.

On the other hand, in spite of the "aggressive" stance of some of the newly arrived missionaries, whose "activism" is conducted at the expense of the established traditional churches, "Ukraine does not provide us with the kind of legislation and religious policies vis-à-vis certain minority sects that have been attempted in the Russian Federation, such as introducing legislative measures to restrain foreign-inspired missionary activities...".

Taken together, these three papers give a comprehensive view of the major religious issues in today's Ukraine, and their influence, potential or actual, on the process of national renewal and state-building. But Ukraine-oriented readers

should not confine themselves to these three chapters. Apart from the undoubted interest (and useful comparative experience) to be found in the other papers, two of them have a major relevance to Ukraine: John B. Dunlop's "The Russian Orthodox Church as an 'Empire-Saving' Institution, and Dimitry V. Pospielovsky's "The Russian Orthodox Church in the Postcommunist CIS". For, although their attitude to some extent differs (in particular, Dunlop is far more condemnatory of the Moscow Patriarchate past and present), they both make it abundantly clear that the leadership of the Russian Orthodox Church still sees the entire post-Soviet space, and in particular the alleged 25 million Russians resident in the non-Russian NIS, as their natural "territory". And this is a claim which no one concerned for the future of Ukraine can afford to ignore.

In spite of its multiple authorship, this book, taken as a whole, exhibits a remarkable degree of cohesiveness. In spite of the extremely complex issues with which it has to deal, it is written in an eminently readable style, the fruit, one assumes, of Canon Bourdeaux's editorial skills. He appears, however, to have overlooked an unfortunate ambiguity on p. 237, which, as it stands, implies that Academician Andrei Sakharov referred to post-independence Georgia, under the government of Zviad Gamsakhurdia, as a "little empire". Sakharov, in fact, died on 14 December, 1989. Although, by that time, Gamsakhurdia, as a prominent dissident, was able to exert a certain moral pressure on the leadership of the Georgian SSR, the situation which prompted Sakharov's remark must be attributed not to Gamsakhurdia, but to the Communist leadership of the late 1980s.

Meletij Smotryc'kyj. By David A. Frick (Harvard University Press for the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1995), 395 pp, illustr., $29.00

This is an important and, in the light of the approaching anniversary, a timely work – the first major biography in English of one of the most significant participants in the complex religious disputes which followed the signing of the Union of Brest in 1596. Smotrytskyi, a noted polemicist for Orthodoxy while still a layman, entered religion at the age of (or about) 40, taking the name in religion of Meletiy. He rose rapidly in the Orthodox hierarchy, and in 1620 became Archbishop of Polacak, the second highest Orthodox appointment within the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. But, in late 1628 or early 1629, he revealed himself as a hitherto-covert adherent of the Union of Brest. In 1631, the Pope appointed him Archbishop of Hierapolis *in partibus infidelium.* He died in 1633.

But, in spite of his abundant writings, both on behalf of the Orthodox, and later in support of the Union, Smotrytskyi's life, as recorded in the sources, was an abundance of unknowns and riddles. There is no certainty about either the date (probably between 1575-80) or place of his birth, his baptismal name (the sources waver between Maksym and Maksentiy), nor the social status of his family. He is known to have studied in Vilnia and Germany – but how long he spent in either, and to what level he took his studies is open to debate. Likewise, on his deathbed, he asked his attendants to place in his hand the letter appointing him archbishop. But which letter and which archbishopric? The breve from

the Pope conferring the empty Hierapolis title, or that from the Patriarch of Jerusalem installing him in the real archiepiscopal see of Polacak?

It is perhaps only to be expected that so enigmatic a person published many of his books pseudonymously. Luckily, their attribution is in most cases not in question, since their true authorship was an open secret at the time and his contemporaries, in their rejoinders, make his identity clear. Furthermore, he himself deliberately left coded clues in mottoes on the title pages.

In the case of one key work, the *Apology for My Peregrination to the Eastern Lands*, published in 1628, there is, however, a major problem about the content: when precisely did Smotrytskyi undertake the journey described? Here Frick makes a major departure from the traditional chronology of previous scholars. Advancing the date of departure by several months, he suggests that Smotrytskyi set out for Constantinople around the middle of the summer of 1623. This would mean that Smotrytskyi was out of the Commonwealth on 12 November of that year, when the "martyr of the Union", St Josaphat Kuncevyč, was killed at Vicebsk. This, however, runs counter to Catholic hagiography: a petition of Uniate bishops to the Polish king (dated 6 November, 1626) described Smotrytskyi as having been the "primary cause" of Josaphat's death, alleging that Smotrytskyi then fled to Turkey to avoid the consequences. Frick, however, advances reasons why this document should be discounted. Similarly, after Smotrytskyi publicly acknowledged his adherence to the Union, Catholic writers openly linked this conversion to the heavenly intercession of the martyred Josaphat, casting him in the role of Stephen to Smotrytskyi's Paul. But this is seen by Frick as a hagiographic and polemic trope.

Frick, it must be noted, is no newcomer to the field of Smotrytskyi studies – the bibliography lists seven major articles, while an advertisement in the end-papers indicates that he has provided introductions to two collections of Smotrytskyi's works in the Harvard Library of Early Ukrainian Literature series. His suggested emendations to the "traditional" biographical and chronological schemes are therefore soundly argued, and must undoubtedly be taken seriously. They may well become a subject of scholarly debate – but cannot simply be ignored.

Equally thought-provoking are Frick's views on Smotrytskyi's Polish linguistics. For, in spite of the epigram of his contemporary Jan Kazimir Paskievič that "Poland blooms with Latin genius, Lithuania with Ruthenian", Smotrytskyi published polemics not only in Latin and the literary East Slavonic language of the day, but also in Polish. But his Polish, both in vocabulary and syntax, contains a number of idiosyncrasies. Frick suggests that these represent a deliberate attempt (during his "Orthodox" period) to create a new "Orthodox" Polish rhetoric based on Greek and Church Slavonic models rather than the existing (Catholic) Polish rhetoric based on Latin norms. Hence such features of Smotrytskyi's Polish as the "genitive of remorse" in interjections, the use of chcę (normal meaning "I wish") to form the compound future tense, and of *tuszyć*, which in standard Polish means "expect", "anticipate" or "hope", as a near synonym for *gasyć* – "to extinguish" (cf. modern Ukrainian *tushyty*).

Finally, after tackling all the "outer" puzzles of Smotrytskyi's life – biographical, bibliographical and linguistics – Frick, in a final chapter, addresses the far

more problematic issues of his inner life, in particular, his conversion. Having dismissed, early on in the book, the Orthodox polemicists' allegations that he accepted the Union in the hope of worldly advantage, Frick suggests that in an era of growing religious controversy and the hardening of inter-confessional lines, Smotrytskyi was a "pre-ecumenist", whose

> career, from the mid-1610s to the end of his life, with all its contradictions and about-faces, was a series of frustrated attempts to define and defend a Ruthenian Church, nation, and culture that was "inclusive" and still "included", tolerant but yet tolerated. He was thwarted by the society he wished to defend, which could not always recognize itself in his definition of it, and by the powers to which he wished to defend it, who would not accept the level of autonomy he accorded his local Church, nation, and culture.

"I do not find", Frick concludes,

> convincing evidence that Smotryc'kyj's conversion brought with it any fundamental change in his attempts to shape a Ruthenian Orthodox response to the cultural, doctrinal, and political challenge of the local Reformation and Counter-Reformation. Nor do I find that he was ever quite Orthodox or quite Uniate in the way many of his contemporaries and most of his students have expected him to be... Let us picture – in conscious opposition to the two reigning iconographies – a man who, holding his letter of consecration from the patriarch of Jerusalem in his left hand and that from the bishop of Rome in his right, had attempted with mixed success to find a way for an Orthodox Slav to maintain his identity in the early modern West.

Flight from Novaa Salow. Autobiography of a Ukrainian Who Escaped Starvation in the 1930s Under the Russians and Then Suffered Nazi Enslavement. By Julia Alexandrow with Tommy French (MacFarland and Co., Inc., Jefferson, North Carolina, and London, 1995) 202 pp, illustr., £29.25

This book appears at first glance to be an excellent example of "living history" – the memoirs of an elderly Ukrainian woman as told to her American son-in-law. It is written in a lively style, and abounds in the inconsequential trivia which, for the non-specialist, do so much to flesh out the dry bones of history. Although, as she explains in a prefatory note, the author still fears that "the Communist attitude in Eastern Europe may not have changed" and that therefore, all names, including her own, have been changed in order to protect her surviving relatives, this necessary precaution should not, of itself, detract from the authenticity of the picture it presents – a fascinating and horrific child's-eye view of the artificial Famine and purges of the 1930s, a teenager's experiences of forced labour in Nazi Germany, and then (after a fairly routine account of life in a Displaced Persons' Camp and emigration to the USA), re-establishment of contact with her family, a visit to Ukraine in 1976, and her brother's trip to the USA in 1978.

At a second reading, however, a few flaws and difficulties begin to emerge. Tommy French has done an excellent job in catching the spontaneity of oral reminiscence, particularly if he really is an engineer, and that his professional identity has not also been changed to conceal further Mrs Alexandrow's identity. (Presu-

mably a tape-recorder was used – but, even so, French has admirably resisted the temptation to "improve" on the narrator's style; a temptation particularly hard to resist for those who are not professional writers!). At the same time, however, one cannot but wish that this work had been read before publication by an expert in modern Ukrainian history. For it contains some peculiar errors, one of which could prove seriously misleading to an interested but previously uninformed reader. The book seriously underestimates the death-toll of the artificial Famine of 1933. French, in his preface, writes that "Julia thought a million Ukrainians perished during 'the Starvation'. Her husband, Michael, thought two million. The encyclopedia estimates three million". And, accordingly, "over three million" is the figure quoted in the body of the text. Which encyclopaedia, one wonders? Most experts would now put the death-toll at above 7 million.

Equally, what is one to make of this piece of dialogue between Mrs Alexandrow and her brother, when she visits him in Ukraine in 1976:

"I thought everyone here had to join the Communist Party".

"No, there are other parties, you just don't live as well if you don't join [the Communist Party]".

Were this a work of fiction, one might suppose the author had somehow confused the USSR with Poland, where two vestigial non-communist parties did survive throughout the Communist period, and eventually played a key role in the overthrow of Communism there. But since this is an autobiographical work, one can only suppose that Mrs Alexandrow misremembered her brother's words.

Similarly, in recalling Germany in the first weeks after the end of the war, the narrator speaks, anachronistically, as if partition were already a *fait accompli* – or at least a foregone conclusion.

"I'm going west, maybe West Germany or France, any place that isn't Communist", one Ukrainian is quoted as saying.

"The Americans are moving west; they're leaving East Germany to the Russians", says the narrator's husband ("[a]bout six weeks after the war ended"). But, at this time, Germany was simply divided into four occupation zones – US, British, French and Soviet. The transformation of this seemingly temporary arrangement into two German states, requiring capital letters for "West" and "East" began, effectively, with the Berlin blockade of 1947-48 and was formalised only in 1949. For 1945, such capitalisation is anachronistic.

For the better informed reader such seemingly minor points can, subliminally, undermine the sense of authenticity, which is the principal value of such a work. Conversely, such slips make one somewhat reluctant to recommend it to the less-informed reader who wishes to know something of modern Ukrainian history. In particular, Ukrainians in the diaspora, who might consider this book as a suitable present for, say, a grandchild, need to be alert to these shortcomings.

The use of a Ukrainian-English dictionary, too, would have avoided some linguistic difficulties. What is obviously "hemp" is described at first mention as "a weed that grew wild in the Ukraine. I described it to someone later in life, they thought it might have been marijuana", and later is referred to as the "marijuana-like plant". Ukrainian words appear in odd forms, *"kielbasa"* (though this may simply reflect

American usage), *"kastern"* for *"kashtan"*, *"hupok"* instead of *"Hopak"*. Ukrainian names are, for the most part, Anglicised: Julia, Helen, Michael, Joseph, while "Olga" for "Olha" is probably also perceived as an Anglicisation rather than a Russicism. Some of these versions seem oddly out of place in a Ukrainian village, Francine and Brenda, in particular! And, although, presumably, the name of the village from which the narrator made her "flight" has also been changed, one wonders at her choice of pseudonym. Presumably, she opted for the non-committal "New Village" – but her version of this, *"Novaa Salow"* looks more like an attempt to transcribe by ear the Russian *"Novoye Selo"* than Ukrainian *"Nove Selo"*. (Incidentally, "flight" in the title is likewise something of a misnomer, implying a hasty and/or secret departure at one's own volition. Yet, according to her own account, Mrs Alexandrow was taken to Germany as a forced labourer. Her later decision to hide from the post-war Soviet repatriation squads might, perhaps, be termed "flight" – but not flight from her native village!)

In addition to these errors, the book has some fundamental inconsistencies. In the first sentence of the book, the author asserts that "I, Julia Alexandrow, am a Ukrainian", maintaining a few lines further on, that her parents "taught me about Ukrainian heritage and religion behind closed doors". Yet we hear nothing about that heritage, only that Ukraine is "a pretty and fertile country near the Black Sea that grows food enough to feed all of Russia". Indeed, she writes as if Ukraine lost its independence only in 1932-33: "In December of 1991", she writes in her preface,

> the Soviet Union fell apart. The Ukraine, that beautiful country where I was brought up, would finally get its independence back. I was there when Russia had taken that independence. I remember 1933, there were no army tanks or shooting, just men with guns who came to your home and took everything. If you objected, they would take you too.

Mrs Alexandrow has good reason to remember 1933. Although, she says, "[a]ll parents in the Ukraine... taught their children to keep their mouths shut in public", in 1932, she herself, at the age of seven, "for one jelly-filled candy", revealed to a Communist "Brigadier" where her father had hidden the family store of food. Seven of her eleven siblings died in the Famine. Many of her memory lapses must be attributable to guilt-trauma. "[M]y mind can't easily remember the good things", she says – not even the names of all her dead brothers and sisters. And even over the name of one of her surviving brothers, she is confused. She gives it as "Seheesman", and supposes that her mother had called the boy after one of her Jewish friends. The name is, certainly, very unusual for a Ukrainian, but (if this is not yet another name-change) one may perhaps suggest some form of "Sigismund" as a more likely variant!

With a sensitive and informed editor, skilled in dealing with "living history" material and the associated psychological difficulties of the informants, many of these shortcomings could have been avoided. But Mr French does not have that experience, and, moreover, many of the slips and discrepancies may well be due to his admitted unfamiliarity with the Communist world. Throughout the book, there is a tendency to use "Russia" to mean the entire Soviet Union. Possibly Mrs Alexandrow considered the entire Soviet Union to be a Russian imperium – but it seems inconceivable that her parents instructed their children "never to admit

to being anything but Russians". Nationality, after all, in the Soviet Union was a matter of bureaucratic record! It is far more likely, in the climate of the 1930s, that they were told always to state only that they were "Soviet citizens".

And, ultimately, one has to consider Mr French's perception of the book. When he married in 1966, he did not, he admits in his preface, at first particularly like his mother-in-law, considering her uneducated, on account of her "Polish sounding accent". He became interested in her experiences only because, shortly after his marriage, he had done a two-year stint of military service in what was then West Germany, and ever since had "never been able to fathom genocide". When, more than two decades later, his mother-in-law was at last willing to go public with her experiences, Mr French was, he said, "eager to get to Nazi Germany", but nevertheless he "let her talk". Having worked through her story with her, he concludes: "[s]he was not able to tell me anything that helped me understand genocide, but I learned a lot about Communism".

But not enough, it would seem, to realise that the artificial Famine in Ukraine in 1933 was itself genocide!

Modern Ukrainian Short Stories. Revised First Edition. Edited by George S.N. Luckyj (Ukrainian Academic Press, Englewood, Colorado, 1995), 230 pp., $27.50

This is a reprinting of a parallel-text (Ukrainian/English) collection which, Professor Luckyj says in his preface, has "[f]or over 20 years... often served as a text in courses on Ukrainian language and literature on [the North American] continent". In spite of the profound changes in both the political and literary scene in Ukraine since the first edition appeared in 1973, "[t]he usefulness of this volume", he says, "has not been superseded".

Although to those reared in an older tradition of scholarship the idea of a university professor openly advocating the use of what is, in effect, simply a glorified "crib" will come as something of a shock, one may assume that many of the courses in question are not intended for students whose main subject is Ukrainian language and literature, but rather as part of general background courses in Slavonic literature or comparative linguistics. For such students, these 15 short stories representing 11 authors will, indeed, provide a good introduction to Ukrainian prose *belles-lettres* of the chosen period (1898-1968).

The general standard of the translations is high, and in the main faithful to the style of the original – although one must regret the diminution of the verse "Horilytse, pohorilytse" into a prose paraphrase, while in the title of Mykhaylo Yatskiv's story in which this verse appears, "Kedryna" should surely be rendered "Cedar *Tree*", not "Cedar Wood". Likewise, although one can hardly blame the translator of Yuriy Yanovsky's *"Shalanda v mori"* for rendering *"Shalanda"* simply as "Boat", but "v mori" here should be "on" the sea, and, in the antepenultimate paragraph of the story, "at sea" – not, as the translator has it, on both occasions, "*in* the sea". These are, admittedly, only small quibbles, but, since this is a *revised* edition, and since, as the editor claims, the book has been in use in academic departments for more than 20 years, it seems strange that in that time no one has picked

up these slips, or that, if, indeed, some punctilious academic did so, the necessary corrections were not introduced.

A further quibble regards the editorial style. One may reasonably assume that, when this collection first appeared, the vast majority of students enrolling for courses in Ukrainian language and/or literature would have been either of Ukrainian origin, or having some close personal connection with Ukraine. This, however, is no longer true. Over the past four years, members of the diplomatic and business community have found it necessary, often at extremely short notice, to brief themselves not only about the basic hand-book facts and statistics about Ukraine, but also, insofar as possible, about the culture and collective psyche of the Ukrainian people. To such people, a book of this kind could prove extremely valuable. But, such readers, ex hypothesi, will have no background knowledge of Ukraine, and the editorial decision of 1973, to "keep footnotes to a minimum" should, perhaps, have been reconsidered in this light.

These are, however, only minor blemishes on a collection whose worth has been tried and tested for more than two decades. One hopes that in the not too distant future a companion volume will appear, representative of the post-1968 era.

Occasional Papers in Belarusian Studies, No. 1, 1995 (School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University of London), 68 pp, £6.50

This collection inaugurates a new series, intended to replace the *Journal of Byelorussian Studies*, which last appeared in 1988. The change of publisher, from the Anglo-Byelorussian Society to the School of Slavonic and East European Studies, has meant the disappearance of those features of the old *JBS* which were not strictly scholarly: the Chairman's Reports and notes on meetings of the society – a change which few, if any, readers will regret.

This inaugural issue of the *Occasional Papers* contains four articles and two lengthy book reviews. Two of the articles contain matter of Ukrainian interest. Aleh Latyšonak's "Students from the Grand Duchy of Lithuania before the Rectorial Court of Cracow University in the Years 1459-1536", while naturally concentrating on students from the Belarusian lands of the Grand Duchy, contains also some references to Ukrainian members of the University. In particular, Latyšonak notes that the use of the terms "Russus" and "de Russia", used in the *Acta Rectoralia* to refer persons from either Red Rus' or – more generally – the Ukrainian lands of the Grand Duchy, does not necessarily imply membership of the Orthodox Church – some members of the university so designated were clearly Catholics. In "Nikolai Petrovich Rumiantsev and the Russian Discovery of Belarus", David Saunders makes some interesting observations of the changing perceptions of Muscovites/Russians of the cultural differences of their Ukrainian and Belarusian neighbours over the period from the seventeenth to the mid-nineteenth centuries, and the fundamental change made by Tsar Peter I's establishment of direct contacts between Russia and the West, which put an end to the role of the Ukrainian and Belarusian lands as the "middlemen" by which Western culture reached Muscovy.

The World Today, Vol. 51, No. 10, October, 1995, 24 pp. £2.50 ($4.50)

The World Today is the current affairs monthly of The Royal Institute of International Affairs ("Chatham House"). This issue includes an article by Anatol Lieven, the Moscow correspondent of *The Times*, "Russian opposition to NATO expansion".

Lieven states his aim: "as faithfully as possible to describe Russian establishment thinking on NATO expansion, without imposing [his] own views". He argues that "[w]ith the sole exception of Vladimir Zhirinovsky, all Russian politicians... know that the former countries of the Warsaw Pact are lost for good", and that, from Russia's point of view, the Baltic States "have long since been surrendered to Europe", but that "[t]he really major question for Russia is Ukraine, and there can be no doubt that unless in the meantime international relations, Russian-Ukrainian relations, and NATO itself have been utterly transformed, moves towards NATO membership for Ukraine would trigger a really ferocious Russian response". Even "NATO expansion as far as Poland", Lieven suggests, "will cause preemptive Russian moves to force Ukraine to accept a full military alliance with Russia, and Ukrainians are acutely aware of this danger".

Russians, both "Soviet loyalists" and "Westernisers", are, he says, "determined that Ukraine should not fall into anyone else's formal sphere of influence". Their attitudes, he suggests, are underpinned by different, but equally powerful, psychological motives:

> [f]or Russian nationalists, NATO membership for Ukraine would mean the final loss of Russia's claim to the inheritance of Kievan Rus and to the inherited leadership of the eastern Slavs, and the loss of all the territory conquered by Russia in the past 350 years. For the Soviet loyalists, it would mean the end of any hopes of reconstituting some form of union on the territory of the old Soviet Union.
>
> But for the Westernising liberals, it would also be a catastrophe. The driving back of Russian influence past the borders established by Peter the Great would also signify the defeat of Peter's Westernising programme: the West's conclusive rejection of Russia as part of Europe and Russia's expulsion from Europe into Asia.

A Moscow-centric, and pessimistic analysis, but one which (given Mr Lieven's journalistic affiliation) is liable to carry weight in political and diplomatic circles.

New Blackfriars. A Monthly Review, Vol. 76, No. 897, October, 1995, £1.50

This intellectual Catholic journal, edited by the English Dominicans, contains, in the issue under review, an article by Peter Knowles OP, entitled "The Dominican Experience in Russia". This deals with what the author calls the "spasmodic sallies" of the Dominican Order into the Russian empire over the past five hundred years, and also the current situation in both Russia and Ukraine, where the Dominican Order has recently been formally and canonically established. He stresses that, in both these countries, Latin-rite Catholics are mainly "Polish, Lithuanian, or German by blood and domestic tradition". The mission of the Latin clergy to these believers, he stresses, must not interfere with the native, Byzantine Christian tradition. The Dominicans are present there "precisely as members of a Latin Rite Order

with its own long history of traditions, customs and cast of mind. Their field of mission is the pastoral and educational care of the multitude of Latin Rite citizens of those countries and not (unless in the most exceptional of circumstances) the Catholics of Eastern Rite".

Urging his fellow Dominicans to exhibit, in their "encounters with Oriental Catholics a generous minded respect, born of a maturity of faith", he warns them of two ways in which they could hinder the progress of the local church and "harm the delicate relationship and balance of encounters between Eastern and Western Catholics". The first is "misplaced missionary zeal" – converting local people to the Latin rite, irrespective of their potential or actual traditional ecclesiastical origins. This he condemns as "an example of Latin Rite imperialism", stressing that "[t]he 'follow-on' of entry into the Church is vital, and must be experienced in the ecclesiastical ambience that by mentality and culture have been long present in the region".

The second, and potentially equally damaging, attitude, he says, is "a sort of 'miscegenation'... the setting apart of a section of the Latin Religious Order as an Eastern Rite branch, or province". Several Religious Orders adopted this practice in the last century, thinking, says Fr Knowles, that it offered "the best of both worlds: the religious training, theological education and discipline of the Latin Order, and the opportunity to administer the sacraments and have the services and Divine Liturgy in an Oriental Rite". However, in Fr Knowles opinion, this simply

> results in a frustrating serving of two masters... the "internal" spirituality is of necessity Latin: the external display of liturgical worship is all that is Oriental and its influence finishes at the church door. This is a hollow simulation of one form of church practice, since the engine that directs it comes from another tradition. In such a situation there can be no inner harmony, but only a constant shifting from one plane to another. A Rite cannot be reduced merely to one among many ways of performing external liturgical actions. A Rite is born of a theological, cultural and artistic historical interplay: Rite is the face or person of a Church and cannot be taken away from its own history to mask the history of another Church.

Fr Knowles' attitude may seem unduly harsh on the record of those orders, such as the Redemptorists, whose Eastern-rite "branches" have, over the years, given devoted service to the Ukrainian Catholic Church. However, as he points out, the history of his own Dominican Order indicates how easily such an approach can go wrong. The Dominicans, he recalls

> were the first ones to institute such a missionary device, the "Friars of Unity", to work among the Armenians. By erosion, all that the Armenian Friars had of their own was their language. The Armenian Rite, at first so respected and honoured by the Order, was laid aside for the Dominican Missal and Breviary, translated into Armenian.

Noting therefore that, "[r]umours of some such plan of hybrid life for Dominicans in Ukraine and Russia have been heard in the past years", Fr Knowles warns that any such "attempt to create a formal structure to preserve such an aberration will in the short term prove damaging and in the long term futile".

Whether or not one agrees with his conclusions, this is undoubtedly an extremely important and challenging article, revealing a sensitivity to the problems of Eastern-rite Catholicism which is still, unfortunately, all too rare among Western Catholics. One hopes that Fr Knowles' superiors will take due note of it.

The Ukrainian Media Bulletin Quarterly Digest, No. 2, June, 1995

This publication, launched earlier this year, is a 16-page newsletter produced by the Dusseldorf-based European Institute for the Media (EIM), and funded by the Westminster Foundation for Democracy. The main topic in the present issue is advertising in Ukraine, including analyses of services offered (Ukraine has no less than 486 advertising agencies, 220 of them in Kyiv), prices, statistical data (which, an editorial note stresses, should be "treated with caution" in view of the "confused state of the market and the lack of comprehensive information" and the findings of relevant public opinion polls). The next issue, No. 3, will focus on legislation and presidential decrees concerning the media.

The current issue, for some reason, also includes excerpts from a study, carried out by the EIM and funded by the TACIS Democracy Programme of the European Union, on the parliamentary elections and national referendum in May in Ukraine's northern neighbour, Belarus. The EIM team concluded that "coverage of the referendum was marked by a campaign of disinformation", while "coverage of the elections – and especially in the second round – is better described as a campaign of no information".

The Catholic World Report, No. 11, 1995, £3.30

This US-edited glossy Catholic monthly regularly gives extensive coverage in its "World Watch" section to news of religion in eastern Europe. The current issue, in addition, contains a special report "The Bumpy Road to Unity", in preparation for the 400th anniversary of the Union of Brest. This gives a concise outline of the relations of the East Slav Churches with Rome since the Baptism of Kyiv in 988 until the present day, stressing, in particular, the role of the Eastern-rite Catholic Church in preserving Ukrainian culture and ethnic awareness in Western Ukraine under Austro-Hungarian rule.

The last third of the article addresses the position of the Eastern-rite Catholic Church and the possibilities of closer rapprochement with the Orthodox in today's post-communist world, including the continuing hostility of the Russian Orthodox establishment, the well-meaning (but misguided) missionary efforts of Roman-rite missionaries in the East Slav lands, the continuing reluctance of the Vatican to recognise the desire of Ukrainian Catholics for a patriarch of their own – and even the possibility that the Union of Brest might serve as a model for other, future, acts of unity, which would allow other Christian communities – say the "high" wing of the Anglican church – to come *en masse* into communion with Rome. □