

THE UKRAINIAN REVIEW

A quarterly journal devoted to the study of Ukraine

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Current Affairs**INTERNATIONAL FACTORS OF NUCLEAR
DISARMAMENT OF UKRAINE**

Serhiy Tolstov

The issue of the status, subordination and decision of the ultimate fate of nuclear arms installed on Ukrainian territory in the times of the former Soviet Union has acquired an exceptional significance in the shaping of the foreign policy of Ukraine following independence. Nuclear arms have become, beyond any doubt, the most complicated problem of the foreign policy and security of the state.

Ukraine acquired its nuclear weapons in a unique manner. For the first time in history a new legal subject with a claim to wield nuclear weapons appeared as the result of the disintegration and disappearance from the international political map of an active participant of international affairs, the Soviet Union, which was one of the founders and nuclear parties of the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

According to experts' estimates, based on the data in the protocols to the START-1 Treaty, at the end of 1991 the nuclear potential of the former USSR amounted to 32,000 nuclear warheads, of which more than 10,000 were of strategic type and 17,000 were tactical, while nearly 5,000 consisted of decommissioned and dismantled time-expired devices.¹ After the destruction of medium- and short-range missiles in accordance with the Soviet-American Treaty of 1987, roughly half of the tactical weapons of the former USSR were in the hands of the armed forces stationed in Ukraine: 1,240 warheads in silo-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and 416 warheads in gravity bombs and long-range cruise missiles in the arsenal of the strategic air force, concentrated around the towns of Uzyn (Kyiv region), Pryluky (Chernihiv region), and Stryi (Lviv region).

Two types of ICBM were stationed on the territory of Ukraine: 130 SS-19s (Russian designation RS-22) and 46 SS-24 missiles (Russian designation RS-18). Silo-based SS-19 multiple warhead missiles of the 1979 type, with a range of up to 10,000 km, were each armed with 6 550-kilotonne warheads

¹ William Walker, "Break up of the Soviet nuclear arsenal", *International Affairs*, vol. 68, no. 2, April 1992, p. 259.

(a total of 780 warheads). The other 46 missiles, dating from 1987, with a range of up to 10,000 km are of the latest type. They are each armed with 10 550-kilotonne warheads (a total of 460 warheads). The solid fuel SS-24 missiles, of which only 86 were built in Ukraine by "Pivdenmash" (Southern Machine-Building Plant), could be refitted as mobile-launcher types with computer-controlled variable range.

The total number of ICBMs and strategic bombers in Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan came to 431. These strategic deterrent weapons were equipped with 3,147 nuclear warheads, of which 1,656 were deployed in Ukraine.² In relation to the number of warheads, the strategic nuclear weapons were divided between the four new independent states as follows: 69.45% in Russia, 16.08% in Ukraine, 13.69% in Kazakhstan, and 0.79% in Belarus.

During the course of 1993, a gradual increase in the role played by the nuclear arms problem in the civic-political life of Ukraine could be observed. Although the idea of the unilateral nuclear disarmament of the state had been proclaimed long before the declaration of independence, the political aspects of this strategic intention were not properly grounded and thought through, in particular, as regards the cost of disarmament and conversion. The politicians and legislators who introduced and approved the first documents of the Supreme Council on the renunciation of the future use of nuclear weapons were inspired by ideological motives. They could not even imagine most of the legal, financial and technical nuances of the process of disarmament, conversion and inspection. The conceptual principles of the future non-nuclear status of the state were set out and formulated in circumstances of severe external pressure, against the background of the dynamic state-building events of 1991-93, and in the course of complex interactions between the Ukrainian government and other nuclear states, first and foremost Russia and the USA.

The paradox lay in that the parliament and government of Ukraine, which had proclaimed their intention of achieving a non-nuclear status, ended up unable to realise this goal by their own efforts due to a lack of the funds required to finance the disarmament process. In addition, failures in foreign policy led to the emergence of opposition within Ukraine to the non-nuclear policy. Influential circles of the political élite, including members of parliament and some representatives of the military, began to envisage the nuclear weapons as perhaps the most effective guarantee of independence and territorial integrity of Ukraine.

Decision-making on the future of Ukraine's nuclear weapons was slowed down by various complications arising out of internal and foreign policy issues, the main ones being property rights in the fissile materials of the missile warheads, financing the conversion and ensuring effective military and political guarantees of Ukraine's national security after the removal of the nuclear weapons.

² "Cooperative Denuclearization. From Pledges to Deeds", Ed. by G. Allison, A.B. Carter, S.E. Miller and P. Zelikow. CSIA Studies in *International Security* no. 2, Cambridge, Mass., Center for Science and International Affairs, 1993, p. 31; Aleksandr Sychev, "Kyiv and Minsk: a personal point of view", *Izvestia*, 5 January, 1993, p. 1.

The delay in deciding the future of the nuclear inheritance of the former USSR led to complications in relations between Ukraine on the one hand and the USA and the countries of Western Europe on the other, and to the creation of a negative image of Ukraine in the eyes of public opinion abroad. At the same time, talks on political concessions, including Ukraine's possible renunciation of control over these nuclear devices or the handing-over of warheads to Russia without the proper resolution of issues related to the value of the nuclear materials, the financial arrangements for the destruction of the missiles, silos and launch sites, and so on, led to the consolidation of pro-nuclear sentiments among the majority of the factions in the Ukrainian Parliament and a part of the military leadership. This came out strongly during the negotiations and ratification of the START-1 Treaty in the Supreme Council on 18 November 1993. The Ukrainian Parliament ratified START-1 on the scale of reduction of strategic offensive weapons which had formerly been envisaged for the entire former USSR (42% of the warheads and 36% of the missiles).

When we look at the history of Ukraine's proclamation of its goal of nuclear disarmament, we should recall the events of 1968, concerning the signing of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This document, which laid the foundations of legal relations between states of the international community as regards the use of nuclear weapons, was drawn up by the Committee on Disarmament and ratified by the United Nations General Assembly on 12 June 1968. The governments of Ukraine (then the Ukrainian SSR) and Belarus (then the Byelorussian SSR) did not participate in the signing of the treaty although these states were formally members of the UN. Had they taken part, they would have had to declare their status regarding the use of nuclear weapons and in actual fact would have acquired the status of nuclear states. Naturally, all the permanent members of the UN Security Council rejected this; the Western states inasmuch as this would have increased the membership of the "nuclear club"; and the USSR, since it did not wish to strengthen the foreign policy potential of the republics and preferred to avoid the many complicated and undesirable implications of the military subordination of the weapons on the territory of Ukraine and Belarus, which did not even have their own defence ministries or their own armed forces. As a result, the declaration of independence by Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan raised a number of complex questions of politics and international law.

The initiator of the nuclear disarmament of Ukraine was the national parliament. The Chornobyl disaster of 1986 had resulted in the spread of anti-nuclear feelings in Ukraine including a general negative attitude towards nuclear energy. The election of new republican parliaments in 1990 was followed by some degree of political liberalisation; this allowed the growing conflicts between the central organs of the Soviet Union and the political élite of the republics to gain strength. In the course of inconclusive debates on the form of future relations between the centre and the peripheries of the Soviet empire and the preparation of a new Union treaty, on 16 July 1990 the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR issued its Declaration of the State Sovereignty of Ukraine. This laid down, for the first time, principles of for-

eign policy aimed at a gradual progress towards a non-nuclear status: "The Ukrainian SSR solemnly declares its intention to become in the future a permanently neutral state, which will not participate in any military blocs and which will adhere to the three non-nuclear principles: not to accept, not to produce and not to acquire nuclear weapons".³

Since then the question of unilateral nuclear disarmament has acquired increasing weight in the foreign policy process. The brutal behaviour of the generals and Communist Party leadership during the putsch of 19-21 August 1991 served to radicalise the stance of the leadership of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR and stimulated parliament to elaborate further principles of an independent foreign policy. The concept of nuclear disarmament in the most general form was expounded in the statement of Parliament on the non-nuclear status of Ukraine of 24 October 1991 and the 9 April 1992 declaration "On additional measures regarding Ukraine's acquisition of non-nuclear status". These documents contained legal bases and mechanisms for the liquidation of the various types of nuclear weapons deployed on the territory of Ukraine. However, they avoided any specific formulation of Ukraine's demands regarding the numerous aspects of the disarmament process relating to property and technical matters. Later these omissions would lead to major complications regarding the basis of Ukraine's stance and interests in the negotiating process.

Up to the 1 December 1991 referendum Ukraine possessed only essentially formal and limited legal existence as a state. It did not have its own military policy (this came under the competence of the organs of power of the USSR). The referendum on the independence of Ukraine, which triggered the break-up of the Soviet Union, radically increased the foreign policy capacities of the state, and this necessitated the development of a foreign policy and a military doctrine as rapidly as possible. On the nuclear weapons issue this meant thinking through the mechanisms of transition from a *de facto* nuclear status (as a component part of a nuclear superpower) to a future non-nuclear status, as well defining the conditions, status and time-span for the temporary retention in Ukraine of various types of nuclear weapons.

Ukraine's declaration of independence in 1991 took place among international circumstances conducive to the peaceful establishment of a national state on the territory of the former Ukrainian SSR. This was helped by such factors as the defeat and temporary demoralisation of Communist and pro-Soviet imperialist forces as a result of the defeat of the 19-21 August 1991 putsch;

— the existence of a system of supreme organs of state power in Ukraine, including a government and parliament, which had formal legal validity under Soviet law;

— the loss of authority of the central structures headed by Mikhail Gorbachev;

— the simultaneous predomination of centripetal tendencies in a marked number of the republics of the former USSR, including the Baltic states, Transcaucasia, and Moldova;

³ *Pravda Ukrayiny*, 17 July 1990.

— the fact that the attention of Western states was focussed on the post-war crisis in the Persian Gulf.

Taking advantage of these factors, in the second half of 1991, it became possible to implement the most urgent state-building reforms, as well as to carry out, in the first half of 1992, successive steps towards subordinating to the Ukrainian state the military units of the former Soviet Army which were stationed on its territory. To a certain degree the Ukrainian leadership even managed to outstrip the process of putting Russian independence on a constitutional basis, indicators of which were the inheritance of former Soviet central structures by the regime of Boris Yeltsin, the rebirth and reappraisal of the Russian national idea and the renewal of the traditions of Russian foreign policy.

At the same time it should be pointed out that, in practical terms, independent Ukraine's diplomatic debut in the international arena took place in the far-from-simple circumstances of qualitative and quantitative changes in international relations: the end of the Cold war and the gradual transition from a bipolar confrontational model to polycentric relations, accompanied by the threat of possible anarchy and the clash of national interests of the various old and new states.

For the political leaders of Western countries, including the USA and its NATO allies, the turbulent changes in eastern Europe which followed from the fall of the former Soviet empire brought forth fears of possible fragmentation of power and a loss of control over the development of events. For the USA the possible formation of a new geopolitical situation in Europe was also of significance due to trends towards the strengthening of the European Community as a new political and (in the near future) military alliance, the increase of the role of Germany as the most influential European state, as well as the presence of huge arsenals of weapons of mass destruction in Russia and the newly independent states (NIS) on the territory of the former USSR.

Certain delays by the West in recognising the legal subjectivity of Ukraine and the other NIS regarding the assets, rights and obligations of the former USSR may be explained to a marked degree by the issue of the inheritance of the nuclear weapons and the political will to prevent the emergence of new candidates for membership of the "nuclear club".

One cannot disagree with the arguments of political scientists that the emergence of new nuclear states within the borders of the former USSR would automatically lead to a more complex international geopolitical situation and would encourage the nuclear ambitions of various Third World countries. Hence, after the end of the Cold war, Western states quite consciously and in their own interests supported the idea of slowing down the process of the transformation of international relations towards a polycentrist model. Their position was in total accord with Russia whose leaders envisaged a strategic partnership with the USA as a means of preserving great power status and a sphere of influence in the "near abroad".

The strategic position of the Bush administration regarding the new realities within the borders of the former USSR was characterised by the following elements:

1) Supporting socio-economic market reforms in Russia as a guarantee of the rebirth of capitalism, political democracy and the establishment of stability within the former Soviet empire.

2) Recognising Russia as the successor of the USSR *de jure* and *de facto*, and continuing cooperation with Russia in the reduction of nuclear weapons.

3) Encouraging Russia to support Western political and military initiatives, including in the Third World, the Middle and Far East, the Balkans, and halting Russian military cooperation with pro-Communist dictatorships in Cuba, North Korea, etc.

4) Recognising the leading role and vital interests of Russia within the CIS. However, as regards the Baltic states, Western states implemented a programme of emergency aid regardless even of alleged violations of the civil rights of minorities in Latvia and Estonia.

The Clinton administration likewise took as its priority support for reforms in Russia and the recognition of its special role in maintaining international stability during the transition from confrontational bipolarity to a new world order. This was shown by the readiness of the USA and other developed states and Western financial centres to mobilise funds for the aid programmes for Russia, as per the declaration issued after the meeting of Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin in Vancouver on 4 April 1993.

The Clinton administration's stake in support for the pragmatic political leadership headed by Boris Yeltsin was to a large extent conditioned by a certain dependence of the USA on Russia's stance in questions of global policy regarding the containment of international conflicts, particularly in the Middle East, Bosnia, and the Persian Gulf, including the implementation of sanctions against Iraq and Serbia.⁴

However, long-term political forecasts of developments in Russia, regardless of the fact that Boris Yeltsin's supporters are currently in a majority, allow one to predict that the president and government will continue to pay ever-increasing heed to the position of the generals, as well as the radical-nationalist forces in elaborating their foreign policy. Moreover, the most consistent Yeltsin supporters — the radical reformers from the "Russia's Choice" party, in no way create the impression of being too compliant vis-a-vis the former Soviet republics.

It is quite obvious that in such a scenario Ukraine will be reduced to the role of a militarily weak state, dependent on Russia and playing only a peripheral role in international politics, in spite of the fact that the election of Bill Clinton as President of the USA gave one cause to expect a less prejudiced attitude towards Ukraine.

As the well-known American specialist on international security, Prof. Robert J. Art, has shown, a major desideratum of US foreign policy in the 1990s (subordinated always to the ensuring of the vitally important interests of the country), is "preventing, retarding or even reversing the spread of

⁴ G.F. Seib, C.A. Robbins, "Russia's Tumult Draws Clinton to the Fore in Foreign Policy and Clouds U.S. Arms Cuts", *Wall Street Journal Europe*, 25 March 1993.

weapons of mass destruction, including ballistic missiles and chemical and nuclear weapons". This goal is pragmatic. Art points out that it instrumentally serves to guarantee the security of the US, although many people will not agree that the non-proliferation of weapons belongs to the vitally important interests of America.⁵

Examining the possible undesirable scenarios for developments in the former USSR, American experts from the Center for Science and International Relations of Harvard University suggest that the likelihood of the following turn of events should be borne in mind: "WHAT IF? Russia and Ukraine are unable to agree on a plan for withdrawal of strategic nuclear weapons from Ukraine. Over time pro-nuclear factions take hold within the Ukrainian government and determine to retain nuclear weapons on their territory indefinitely. A large, and perhaps fatal, blow is dealt to the global non-proliferation regime. Other nations are emboldened to go nuclear — North Korea, Iran, Syria, Libya, etc. India, Pakistan, and Israel, seeing Ukraine become the third largest nuclear nation, openly acknowledge their own nuclear programs. Japan, Germany, and other advanced nations see their own non-nuclear stances in doubt. ...

America leads the international community in isolating Ukraine as a pariah nation. Aid, assistance, trade, and political support with Ukraine cease. Tensions increase between Russian commanders and custodians of the nuclear missiles and weapon storage bunkers on Ukrainian soil, leading eventually to armed conflict..."⁶

Although in theory the possibility of chaos, devolution of political power and even the disintegration of the Russian Federation is not discounted,⁷ the practical policy of the Clinton administration shows that the level of threat to the USA in the event of the keeping by Ukraine of nuclear munitions was regarded as maximal.

A challenge of another nature, in the opinion of the US administration, is the activity of the Russian national-patriotic, centrist and Communist factions, which threatens to put an end to the "pro-American" foreign policy of President Yeltsin and to review the plans for the reduction of strategic offensive weapons within START. In its turn, the political crisis in Russia in March-April 1993 cast doubt on the Clinton administration's planned reduction of the military budget, raising considerable internal political difficulties for the US government. Barry Posen, a national security expert from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, wrote: "A lot of people who are already fighting the cuts will use the argument that the Soviet threat is coming back".⁸

Against this political background the possible emergence of new nuclear states on the territory of the former USSR is certainly perceived by Western countries as a direct threat to international stability and security. However,

⁵ Robert J. Art, "A US military strategy for the 1990s: reassurance without dominance", *Survival*, vol. 34, no. 4, Winter 1992-93, p. 5.

⁶ "Cooperative Denuclearization. From Pledges to Deeds", p. 10.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

⁸ G.F. Seib, C.A. Robbins, *op. cit.*

the transition of Ukraine to non-nuclear status turned out to be more complicated than it initially appeared. This process ran into considerable political and economic obstacles, in which the most significant factor was the complicated situation in Ukrainian-Russian relations.

The issue of the ownership, subordination and the determination of control over the nuclear weapons in Ukraine was gradually defined in the course of 1992-93. According to the presidential decree of 5 April 1992 the military personnel who service nuclear weapons were administratively subordinated to the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine. In particular they have to take the oath of allegiance to Ukraine, are subject to Ukrainian laws and must carry out the direct orders of the military command of Ukraine.⁹ Hence, this decree introduced the administrative subordination of the 43rd Rocket Army to the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, counterbalancing the operational control, which up to the beginning of 1993 was formally exercised by the Supreme Command of the Strategic Forces of the joint CIS armed forces (Marshal Yevgeny Shaposhnikov), and subsequently by the Ministry of Defence of Russia (General Pavel Grachev). Since Ukraine did not possess the technical capability for the direct use of strategic nuclear weapons, this administrative control was regarded as a means of ensuring the non-use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances (the principle of a permanent block on the nuclear button), via a direct telephone link between the President of Ukraine and the command of the nuclear devices deployed on the territory of Ukraine.

At the end of 1992 and the beginning of 1993 the Russian government attempted unilaterally to subordinate the rocket forces and units of the strategic air force in Ukraine to itself. This led to a bitter conflict on the eve of the CIS summit in Minsk on 22 January 1993.

On 21 January 1993 there was a meeting of the committee on nuclear policy of the Council of Ministers of Defence of the CIS states, composed of the Ministers of Defence of Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus, at which General Grachev insisted that all strategic nuclear forces should belong only to Russia. Repudiating Russian demands, the Deputy Defence Minister of Ukraine, General Ivan Bizhan, spoke out firmly against any change in the status of the nuclear weapons of the former USSR and assured the participants of the meeting that "we [Ukrainians] will insist on the division of levels of command of strategic nuclear forces. The administrative control should remain in Ukraine's hands... Everything remaining on the territory of Ukraine and under its jurisdiction is undoubtedly the property of Ukraine".¹⁰

Originally the plans of the Russian government envisaged the formal transformation of the former Soviet Army into the joint armed forces of the CIS, the command of which would be given control over the nuclear offensive weapons until the latter were completely transferred to Russia. However, when Ukraine and Belarus did not join the collective security

⁹ Presidential Decree "On urgent measures for the building of the Armed Forces of Ukraine", *Holos Ukrayiny*, 8 April 1992, p. 2.

¹⁰ "Participants in the Minsk meeting intend to prolong the existence of the CIS", *Izvestia*, 22 January 1993, p. 1.

treaty signed in Tashkent on 15 May 1992, the Russian leadership demanded that the strategic nuclear weapons in other ex-Soviet republics should be subordinated to the Strategic Rocket Forces of the Russian Federation. From a purely formal point of view this was reneging on the decisions adopted by the CIS meeting in December 1991. However, one should bear in mind that the basic agreements of the CIS heads of state on strategic nuclear weapons had built-in contradictions, contained palliative measures, and were bound eventually to be violated in many particulars by the signatories. We should remember, first of all, that the CIS meeting in Alma-Ata in 1991 ratified the status of subordination of strategic nuclear forces as temporary. Before the resolution of the question on the reform of the armed forces command over them was given to Marshal Shaposhnikov,¹¹ who up to June 1993 formally held the post of Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Armed Forces of the CIS.

Likewise the formula of the Alma-Ata Declaration on 21 December 1991 regarding joint control by the CIS states over the nuclear weapons did not accord with the generally accepted interpretation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. In particular, this treaty stressed that each of the participating states possessing nuclear weapons is bound not to hand over to any third party any nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosives, or the direct or indirect control over such weapons or explosives. Thus the nominal transfer of the control over nuclear weapons to CIS structures could play only the role of a temporary, palliative decision, inasmuch as the CIS did not acquire the status of a subject of international relations and international law. Secondly, Art. 5 and 6 of the agreement on joint measures with regard to nuclear weapons (Alma-Ata, 21 December 1991) envisaged a non-nuclear status for Ukraine and Belarus and their accession to the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty and made provision for the transfer of nuclear weapons to Russia for dismantling under joint control.¹²

The Minsk agreement between member-states of the CIS with regard to strategic forces of 30 December 1991 specified that the CIS would maintain "control of the joint command of strategic forces" regarding the nuclear weapons deployed in Ukraine until their complete liquidation by the end of April 1994. But this deadline was remarkable for its lack of realism, due to the limited available capacity of the relevant plants.¹³ The sharp differences in approach between the governments of Russia and Ukraine regarding issues of subordination of and property rights in nuclear weapons in actual fact negated the aforesaid treaties and agreements at the level of heads of states of the CIS.

During 1993 both parties pursued a policy of *fait accompli* regarding the future of these nuclear weapons, since the working groups established by both governments proved incapable of reaching compromise decisions acceptable to both sides.

¹¹ "Protocol of the meeting of heads of independent states", *Holos Ukrayiny*, 24 December 1991, p. 3.

¹² "Agreement on joint measures regarding nuclear weapons", *Holos Ukrayiny*, 24 December 1991, p. 3.

¹³ "Agreement on strategic forces between the member-states of the CIS", *Diplomaticheskii vestnik*, Moscow, 1992, no. 2-3, 31 January-15 February, p. 10-11.

From the point of view of the Deputy Foreign Minister of Ukraine, Borys Tarasyuk, the difficulty lay in the fact that Russia was now demanding a "change in the status of the strategic offensive weapons, located on our territory, and secondly, Russia wants to deprive Ukraine of its well-grounded right to the components of the nuclear weapons — both strategic, and tactical, which were transferred to Russia last [1992] year".¹⁴

On the other hand, all measures taken by Ukraine regarding these nuclear weapons ultimately have to be agreed with the government of the Russian Federation. The fact is that, in all events, the nuclear warheads deployed in Ukraine need to be returned in the near future to the plants in Russia which produced them for dismantling, since they have a limited shelf-life and are constructed in such a manner that they can only be dismantled safely with the aid of the designers' diagrams and blue-prints.

Thus, the attempts of a significant proportion of Ukrainian politicians to use the nuclear weapons in Ukraine as a means of applying political pressure to Russia, the USA and Western countries could have only a temporary effect. The technical and financial situation made it impossible for Ukraine to establish its own independent nuclear deterrent using these warheads since Ukraine does not have a complete nuclear production cycle and the necessary space monitoring and early warning systems. This situation shows the error in the assumption of certain Western analysts, for example Dr. Steven Miller (Harvard) regarding the likelihood of the Ukrainian government trying to take steps to acquire a "temporary" nuclear status by declaring these nuclear weapons to be the property of Ukraine.¹⁵

During the discussion of an important conceptual document "Bases of foreign policy of Ukraine", on 2 July 1993 the Supreme Council ratified the proposal, put forward by the head of the commission on foreign relations, Dmytro Pavlychko, that all nuclear weapons situated on the territory of the state after the declaration of independence, are the property of Ukraine.

Shortly after, during the Russian-Ukrainian negotiations in Massandra on 3 September 1993, the prime ministers of the two states signed the protocol "On the withdrawal of all nuclear warheads of the Strategic Nuclear Forces deployed in Ukraine to the Russian Federation". A handwritten correction to the text made this only a partial transfer of the weapons. This related to those arms "which came under" the terms of the START-1 Treaty,¹⁶ and this opened up possibilities for a free interpretation of the document.

One may note four principal points of view regarding the problem of nuclear weapons in Ukraine, which are expressed by institutions of state power, political factions and scholarly institutions.

1) Handing over all nuclear weapons to Russia without any substantial preconditions and provisos, as the first step towards establishing a military

¹⁴ *Uryadovyi Kurier*, 24 April 1993, no. 59, p. 5.

¹⁵ Steven E. Miller, "The Case Against a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent", *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 72, no. 3, Summer 1993, p. 71-74.

¹⁶ "Protocol on the removal of all nuclear warheads of the strategic nuclear forces deployed in Ukraine to the Russian Federation", Massandra, 3 September 1993.

alliance with Russia. This idea is supported mainly by the leaders of left-wing movements and factions.

2) Ratification of the START-1 Treaty in its full form and joining the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty under conditions of Ukraine's being granted international security guarantees, as well as financial and economic help. This view may be regarded as the official position, i.e. that which reflects the stance of President Kravchuk and the Foreign Ministry of Ukraine. In the political arena, this idea is supported mainly by the liberal-democratic centre.

3) Declaration of Ukraine's right of ownership of the nuclear weapons situated on its territory, and the submission of claims for full reparations in the event of the Parliament of Ukraine ratifying the START-1 Treaty. Postponing joining the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty for a transition period of 5-7 years, until all aspects of the nuclear disarmament of Ukraine are fully dealt with. This idea was first put forward during the winter of 1992-93 by experts from the International Institute of Global and Regional Security in Kyiv. It was later taken up by representatives of the parties of the national-democratic trend which are dominant in the Permanent commission on foreign relations of the Supreme Council of Ukraine.

4) Formal declaration of Ukraine to be a nuclear power. Taking real control of the nuclear arsenal deployed on its territory and in consequence establishing an independent nuclear deterrent. These aims and demands are put forward by representatives of various right-wing radical and nationalist organisations, first and foremost the Ukrainian National Assembly and the Ukrainian Conservative Republican Party.

During the summer and autumn of 1993 there was a stepping up of internal pressure against the official line of the president and foreign ministry due to the fact that Ukraine's leaders were unable to obtain from the governments of Western countries and Russia clear-cut assurances regarding external guarantees of security and the granting of financial assistance, including the financing of a full programme of nuclear disarmament. This situation was reflected, in particular, in a number of meetings between former Defence Minister Kostyantyn Morozov and former Prime Minister Leonid Kuchma. Prior to his dismissal in September 1993, Morozov stated: "Ukraine is in a situation such that it will be forced to undertake the organisation of the dismantling of nuclear warheads, which will exceed the boundaries of those calendar deadlines assigned to them. In this connection various plans and calculations are being made".¹⁷ As for the Non-Proliferation Treaty, in political circles the predominant thought was that it is hopelessly out of date and does not reflect the norms of security and the political-legal situation which has developed on the territory of the former USSR. Hence, Ukraine will be in no hurry to sign it, but will wait until this treaty runs out and is reviewed in 1995.

Inter alia, the handwritten amendment made by Anton Buteyko, adviser on international affairs to the President of Ukraine, to the text of the Massandra Protocol of 3 September 1993 "On the withdrawal of all nuclear warheads of the

¹⁷ Olga Anisimova, "Ukraine needs not rockets but money, Russia needs both", *Respublika*, no. 15 [30], 4-10 September 1993, p. 3.

Strategic Nuclear Forces deployed in Ukraine to the Russian Federation", drew attention for the first time to the intentions of the political leadership to extend to Ukraine the general levels and parameters of the START-1 Treaty without recognising Article V of the Lisbon Protocol. This binds Ukraine to accede to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as soon as possible. Former Prime Minister Leonid Kuchma also spoke about possible ratification of START-1 on the basis of a reduction of 36% of missiles and 42% of warheads in his last press conference on 22 September 1993. However, he said, he personally would prefer the transfer of all 130 liquid fuel SS-19 missiles, the shelf-life of which had practically expired, to Russia as well as the removal of their nuclear warheads prior to their transfer.¹⁸

On 18 November 1993 the Ukrainian Parliament ratified the START-1 Treaty by 254 votes to 9, committing Ukraine to the overall scale for the reduction of missiles (36%) and warheads (42%), envisaged by this treaty for the former USSR, and also lifting the obligation of the signatories of that agreement to observe Article V of the Lisbon Protocol. Parliament also ratified a 13-point resolution which included extremely broad demands for Ukraine to be granted guarantees of national security by the nuclear states, including commitments

- never to use nuclear weapons against Ukraine;
- not to use conventional armed forces nor the threat of force against it;
- to respect the territorial integrity and inviolability of Ukraine's borders.
- to refrain from economic pressure as a means of resolving any conflicts.¹⁹

The resolution also contained a request for funding for the disarmament process and compensation for the value of the fissile materials contained in the warheads deployed in Ukraine.

However, this resolution of the Ukrainian parliament did not improve the external political situation of Ukraine. On account of the overtly negative attitude of government circles in the USA, the countries of western Europe and Russia to the Ukrainian parliament's decision, President Kravchuk instructed the Ukrainian government to take part in the trilateral negotiations between Ukraine, Russia and the USA in Kyiv, Moscow and Washington in December 1993 and January 1994.

The attitude of influential political circles in Western countries to the complex of problems in eastern Europe, as earlier, is exemplified by a commitment in principle to the forces of bourgeois reform in Russia as a guarantee of stability and security in the region; an approach which permits fairly intensive cooperation with the Yeltsin regime but caution towards the geopolitical interests of Russia in eastern and central Europe, the Black and Baltic Sea basins, Kazakhstan and Central Asia.

Against this background of a lack of market reforms, a reactionary electoral law and an ever-deepening economic crisis, the *nomenklatura* power structure in Ukraine is conducive to military and foreign policies prejudicial

¹⁸ "Russia has annulled the document signed by the Presidents of Ukraine and Russia in Massandra", *Nezavisimost*, no. 114, 24 September 1993, p. 1.

¹⁹ "The difficult path to denuclearisation". From the speech of the first deputy Speaker of the Parliament of Ukraine, Vasyl Durdynets, at the plenary session on 18 November 1993, *Holos Ukrainy*, 24 December 1993, p. 2.

to the interests of Ukraine, which pay no heed to such factors as the success of the ultra-nationalists of the Liberal-Democratic Party of Vladimir Zhirinovskiy at the recent elections to the Federal Congress and the centrifugal tendencies of the regions of Russia.

The elections to the Parliament of Ukraine, scheduled for 27 March 1994, are unlikely to lead to marked changes in the balance of political forces or a radical alteration of the power structures.

The continuing lack of effective reforms in the Ukrainian economy, due largely to internal factors, will pose the principal threat both to the national security of the state and the needs of its proper development. Economic stagnation can result only in a critical decline in the impact and effectiveness of foreign policy. Under these conditions, questions of the safety of nuclear installations on Ukrainian territory will lead to a constant escalation of external political pressure and the loss of national dignity.

A real breakthrough towards the regulation of the problem of nuclear arms in Ukraine came only in January 1994, as the result of prolonged consultations between representatives of Ukraine, Russia and the USA which had lasted for almost two months. Probably Ukraine's clearer and more consistent stance regarding the nuclear question, coupled with a general change in emphasis of the approach of US officialdom made it possible to reach the compromise terms which were set out in the Moscow Trilateral Declaration of the Presidents of Ukraine, Russia and the USA of 14 January 1994, during the visit of President Bill Clinton to Russia.²⁰

This document was entirely devoted to setting out the details of the dismantling and removal of nuclear arms from the territory of Ukraine.

An analysis of the text of the declaration allows one to distinguish the following basic points in the compromise.

1. The Trilateral Declaration confirms the organic unity of the START-1 Treaty with the Lisbon Protocol and the documents annexed to it (letters of the Presidents of Ukraine and Russia and the Head of State of Belarus and the special representative on disarmament of Kazakhstan on measures to implement the Treaty over a seven-year period) thus annulling the basic points of the decision of the Ukrainian parliament of 18 November 1993, in particular as regards proportional arms reduction and the reservations of Article V of the Lisbon Protocol. President Kravchuk of Ukraine also confirmed his commitment to Ukraine's future accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear state, "in the shortest possible time".

2. The Declaration for the first time officially defined the principle of compensating Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus for the value of the highly enriched uranium "located in the nuclear warheads deployed on the territory of these countries". It proclaimed the synchronicity of the payment of compensation with the withdrawal of the warheads to Russia for future disman-

²⁰ "Trilateral Declaration of the Presidents of Ukraine, the USA and Russia", *Holos Ukrainy*, 19 January 1994, p. 2.

ting. It also stressed the importance of ensuring the safety and reliable maintenance of the warheads until they are dismantled.

3. As regards external international guarantees of the national security of Ukraine, the document contained explicit formal declarative indications on the readiness of the USA and Russia, and also the United Kingdom, to confirm the obligations arising from the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), but only after START-1 comes into operation and Ukraine has joined the NPT as a non-nuclear power.

These formal guarantees, which were included in a deliberately non-specific form include:

- a confirmation of the obligation to respect independence, sovereignty and the existing frontiers;

- a commitment to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of “any” state, and to use armed force only for the purpose of self-defence or in any other action in accordance with the statutes of the UN;

- the confirmation by Ukraine of the principles of the CSCE Final Act to refrain from economic pressure, aimed at subordinating to its own interests the rights of another member-state of the CSCE, inherent in its sovereignty, and thus to obtain some advantage;

- confirmation of the action of positive guarantees of the security of Ukraine, that is, the provision of help in the case of a nuclear attack on the territory of Ukraine after it has acceded to the NPT as a non-nuclear state, under Resolution 255 of the UN Security Council;

- emphasising the negative guarantees — the non-use of nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear member-state of the NPT, except in the case of attack on them, their territory or armed forces or their allies by such a state alone or in alliance with a state possessing nuclear arms.

4. Considerable significance is given to the point of the Trilateral Declaration on the granting to Ukraine by the USA of technical and financial help for the reliable and safe dismantling of the nuclear arms and the maintenance of the fissile materials. However, in this case the administration of the USA will not exceed the sum already allotted by the US Congress under the Nunn-Lugar program.

The survey-style and declarative nature of the Trilateral Declaration undoubtedly requires to be made more definite and concrete; a first attempt at this was made in the supplement to the main document. In particular, the supplement sets out the scale of compensation in the form of fuel units for Ukrainian nuclear power stations amounting to 100-tonnes of low-enriched uranium in return for “at least 200 nuclear warheads from RS-18 [SS-19] and RS-22 [SS-24] rockets, which will be transported to Russia for dismantling in the course of the next 10 months.

Here one should note the contradictions between the propositions of the supplementary document regarding the time-scale and dates of Ukraine’s implementation of START-1, which are manifest in the discrepancies between many aspects and details of the disarmament process. Thus, the

assertion that all nuclear warheads will be transported from Ukraine to Russia for future dismantling "in the shortest possible time" which repeats the formula of the Lisbon Protocol of 1992, obviously contradicts the proposition that "Ukraine will ensure the destruction of all nuclear arms, including strategic strike weapons, deployed on its territory in accordance with the corresponding agreement over a seven-year period", as is envisaged by START-1 and in the context of the declaration of the Ukrainian parliament "On the non-nuclear status of Ukraine".

At the same time, a short-term (10 month) period is envisaged for the standing-down of all RS-22 (SS-24) rockets, which in the context of other agreements may denote only the dismantling of the warheads and their storage for a prolonged period in Ukraine under the designer's supervision and the technical servicing of the depots by Russian specialists.

In our opinion, the practical implementation of the compromise terms defined in the Trilateral Declaration will demand the additional conclusion of technical accords and protocols at the bilateral (Ukraine and Russia), trilateral (Ukraine, Russia, the USA), and quadrilateral (Ukraine, Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus) levels. The positive significance of the Moscow terms for Ukraine lay, first of all, in the fact that it put an end to the international isolation of the Ukrainian state, removing barriers to relations with the United States and other Western countries, and opening up a road to participation in international economic and political cooperation including joining the "Partnership for Peace" programme. The framework documents for participation in this programme were signed by Ukraine's Minister of Foreign Affairs Anatoliy Zlenko in Brussels on 8 February 1994.

Thus it put an end to the dangerous tendencies which were evident towards the end of 1993, after the partial ratification of START-1 by the Ukrainian parliament, as a result of which the question of the nuclear arms on the territory of Ukraine was viewed as being virtually the chief problem in the context of national security, while in fact it had the character of a routine question of bilateral Ukrainian-Russian relations together with debts for oil and gas, the dispute over the division of the Black Sea Fleet, the Crimean question, etc.

In spite of its intrinsic defects, contradictions and imperfections, the signing of the Trilateral Declaration was an undoubted success of Ukrainian foreign policy, since, without reaching such a compromise, it would have been totally impossible to ensure any positive changes in the attitude of Western states towards Ukraine. While previously the political leaders of the Western democracies had considered Ukraine rather as a state with far from hopeful prospects, lying in a zone of predominantly Russian interests, after the second reading of the START-1 Treaty by the Ukrainian parliament on 3 February 1994, and the successful visit of President Leonid Kravchuk to the USA at the beginning of March 1994, their attitude towards Ukraine took on a noticeably more helpful tone, including assurances of significant economic assistance and the acceptance of the Ukrainian state not as a temporary historical phenomenon but as a permanent subject of international relations and on occasion a possible counterbalance to Russia in the east of Europe.

The Ukrainian parliament's adoption of the resolution on 3 February 1994 evoked a series of protests from representatives of parties with a "national-democratic" orientation. The resolution, in particular, removed the reservation on the article in the Lisbon Protocol on Ukraine's accession to the NPT as a non-nuclear state, and contained an injunction to the Ukrainian government to "effect an exchange of documents on the ratification" of START-1 and to put in train actions leading to the conclusion of concrete international accords following from the reservations of the Resolution of the Ukrainian parliament on the ratification of START-1.²¹

But it must be taken into consideration that the exchange of ratification documents is by no means the same thing as the accession of Ukraine to the NPT under reservations imposed by the Senate of the USA and the Parliament of the Russian Federation. Secondly, the diplomatic aspects of nuclear disarmament of Ukraine have been kept so far under a veil of secrecy due to the existence of a significant number of unpublished accords and protocols. Thirdly, the questions of the financial arrangements and the sharing of the obligations of destroying the rockets and their silos in Ukraine still have to be worked out in detail.

The fact that, to date, the political leaders of Ukraine have still not reached a clear concept of the solution of these problems is attested, in particular, by the address of President Kravchuk to Parliament on 3 February 1994 that "It is not a matter of the accord concerning the liquidation of the rockets including the SS-24... It is a matter of the liquidation of the combat status of the rockets, but not the liquidation of the SS-24",²² although this question is unequivocally formulated in the START-1 agreement as the liquidation of the means of delivery — the rockets. On this point, during Kravchuk's visit to the USA, the Clinton administration promised to give Ukraine additional help in liquidating the SS-19 and SS-24 rockets and their silos.²³

The process of the nuclear disarmament of Ukraine has already acquired an irreversible character.

More than 100 strategic warheads have already been removed to Russia for dismantling. The rest will be warehoused and maintained on the territory of Ukraine until the compensation mechanism is decided.

Although far from all the demands of Ukrainian politicians have been met, the dismantling of the nuclear weapons deployed in Ukraine will enhance the international authority and national security of the state; it will put an end to the dangerous political attempts of nationalist-patriots to get legal control of the nuclear arsenal, will lead to long-term prospects of cuts in military expenditure, will deprive Russia of a substantial source of interference and pressure through the formal control over the 43rd Rocket Army, whose weapons come under the operational control of the Ministry of Defence of Russia, and are not at the disposal of Ukraine. ■

²¹ "Resolution of the Supreme Council of Ukraine", *Holos Ukrayiny*, 5 February 1994, p. 2.

²² Svitlana Pysarenko, "Reservations on the START-1 Treaty lifted", *Holos Ukrayiny*, 5 February 1994, p. 2.

²³ "Joint Declaration on the development of friendship and partnership between Ukraine and the United States of America", *Holos Ukrayiny*, 11 March 1994, p. 3.

UKRAINE: FORMATION OF A MACROECONOMIC POLICY IN A HYPERINFLATIONARY ENVIRONMENT

Valentyn Yegorov

The present stage of the transitional period of the Ukrainian economy is characterised by a number of negative phenomena, such as the sharp decline in overall production, disorder in the financial sphere and money circulation, fuelled by increasing inflation (and since late summer 1993 — hyperinflation) and in the deteriorating standard of living of the population. According to the available data, in the first half of 1993 national income as well as net material product (NMP) fell by 9%, productivity fell by 5.7%, while the total output of food and consumer goods fell by between 12% and 20%. By the end of October 1993, more than 50% of industrial enterprises had reduced their volume of output. This resulted in a drop in production of 130 of the 146 most important industrial products. The wages/prices spiral has hit the economically most fragile groups in Ukraine very hard. The minimum state wages and pensions (at different periods of 1993) represented as little as 20 to 40% of the value of the minimum consumer budget. The rate of population growth has fallen dangerously low — the mortality rate in Ukraine now exceeds the birth rate.*

The current economic crisis in Ukraine must be considered in the closest connection with the heritage of the former centrally planned economic system. This observation should be of even greater significance if the focus of attention is concentrated on those special macroeconomic policies which could be properly applied to overcome the crisis and, naturally, which must differ from those previously in existence. The correct economic policy should create “a bridge over the troubled waters” of the transitional period, linking the “old shore” with a new one (which is supposed to be “a socially-oriented market economy”).

Basic precondition of economic transformation

Many of those constructive elements which will in the future play a crucial role in the market economy until lately either existed only in embryonic form or else were totally absent.

Commodity markets. In centrally-planned closed economies commodity markets have been treated mostly as internally-oriented ones with weak external links outside the borders of the national economy or the CMEA. Being

* For detailed outlook see: *Ukraine. EIU Country Report* 3rd quarter 1993. The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 1993, pp. 4-21.

managed by the state, Soviet-type economies developed on the basis of state-wide targets which were often political rather than economic in nature. This resulted in an artificial inter-branch structure of the national economy overweighed with heavy industrial and military production. Only a comparatively small section of consumer goods within such an economy was the subject of relatively free market relations. Prices for many goods and services were set administratively and had not changed for decades, irrespective of world prices.

Capital markets. Capital markets officially did not exist, since there were no different owners of capital factors and it was the state, which played the role of the sole distributor of the means of production (according to the Plan), plots of land, and labour power (in semi-hidden form). The state budget was considered as the main channel of money accumulation and investment. Small-scale investment programmes were provided by cooperative enterprises and, in recent times, by new-born private enterprises. Preconditions for the activity of the latter were created from the late 1980s onwards by the establishment of numerous commodity exchanges. A stock-exchange has just started operating in Ukraine and, until very recently, had only dealt with a limited number of transactions owing to the absence of serious privatisation and corporatisation of state enterprises.

The money and credit market. This is not a single, homogeneous entity as in developed economies; it is fragmented into organised, semi-organised and non-organised parts. This can be partly explained by the weak legislative framework available, partly by an unsophisticated macroeconomic policy, which has not managed to attract the essential flow of money capital (including hard currency) through legally established financial channels, and partly by a lack of institutional organisations and experience.

Transitional (fragile) institutional structure of the market economy. This is extremely obvious in the financial sphere, where newly-emerged commercial banks and other financial intermediaries are not sufficiently diversified and suffer from a lack of self-management experience. The single-bank state system is only now being transformed into a two-tier banking system with an adequate (in theory) assignment of executive functions to each participant. In fact the nascent monetary policy has very little working space in which to operate unless and until a new institutional framework is completed. The absence of broad privatisation, and primary and secondary security markets makes it problematic to use monetary regulation to its full capacity.

There is a *lack of experienced skilled professionals* prepared to take risks in an uncertain market environment in which the available information is incomplete and state monopolies prevail in many spheres. After decades of implanting a command-type management it seems problematic to encourage people to shed a purely executive attitude which implies no particular responsibility for the final result. Psychologically many of these people are still unprepared to shift from a guaranteed state salary to a possibly far higher-paid but risky business of their own.

Hence, the most striking characteristic of the majority of transitional economies is their macroeconomic instability, which, generally speaking, is caused by the mere fact of transition from one economic system to one that is different in principle. For many east European countries economic instability is being intensified even further both by political changes and state restructuring or the creation of new independent states, as in the case of Ukraine. Obviously, countries with a well-established state system such as Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria and, to a large extent, the Czech Republic and Estonia tend to overcome the economic instability of the transitional period quicker than those whose statehood is new and relatively less developed.

Under these transitional circumstances and general economic instability, the overall economic reform in Ukraine has to be focussed simultaneously on several basic objectives, including: a) institutional restructuring, b) the formation of a new legislative environment and a new system of macroeconomic policy, and c) preventing a sharp decline in production and maintaining the macroeconomic indicators at some satisfactory level.

As the present experience of the former Soviet republics shows, this common, but very contradictory and complicated set of targets cannot be attained without splitting up the complex task into a chain of consequent short-term and long-term ones. In any event there must be a special stabilisation programme designed and run as an initial short-term task.

Stabilisation programmes are typically introduced to reduce the pressure of a) a high domestic rate of inflation and b) a balance of payments deficit. In addition it should focus on c) stabilising some positive rate of output growth.

The crucial factor in designing a successful programme is how to derive the appropriate macroeconomic policy to achieve specific stabilisation objectives in a permanently changing environment. Since most of the macroeconomic tools available are of a financial nature (or are in some way linked to finance), appropriate stabilisation programmes are firmly based upon a combination of fiscal and monetary policies. Preferences in applying them arise from basic theoretical "dogmas", in whose mighty power the politicians have been persuaded to believe. (There still exist contradictions between neo-classical, monetarist and Keynesian theoretical approaches and their practical application). Nevertheless, different approaches cannot change the core purpose of any stabilisation programme. In the widest sense it is designed as a set of economic policies applied to achieve equilibrium between aggregate demand and supply in the economy by eliminating balance of payments deficits and minimising the inflation rate (price rises).

The nature of inflation and its factors

Unfortunately for Ukraine, as well as for other ex-Soviet republics, the designing and application of macroeconomic policy was, from the very beginning of the economic reform, inadequate for the economic situation and so, to some extent, it discredited itself. There existed a quite primitive, old-fashioned, classical approach to monetary regulation. Unsuccessful

attempts to balance aggregate supply and aggregate demand on commodity markets simply by liberating prices (freeing them from administrative control) in January 1992 without adequate rise in production and changes in forms of ownership rapidly aggravated the economic situation. Those measures were taken before the monetary system was divided among the independent states and created totally unfavourable preconditions for the introduction of those states' own macroeconomic policies. Besides, they resulted in widespread scepticism among economic policymakers on the efficacy of any monetary policy, since the inflation had started to gather momentum.

Price liberalisation had a huge impact on inflation, which in the case of Ukraine was soon fuelled into hyperinflation by further mistakes, incompetence, and a disequilibrium of the economic environment. Let us look more closely at the nature of hyperinflation in the Ukrainian economy and its roots.

Change in price level and price structure. Price liberalisation, as has already been stated, was the initial starting point driving the rise in inflation. This "shock therapy" was initiated in order to stimulate a rapid rise of domestic production (aggregate supply) in response to higher market prices and to make shallower the gap between aggregate demand and aggregate supply on the domestic commodity market (partly and temporarily at the expense of a fall in the real incomes of the population and their purchasing power).

But, conversely, the total disbalance of the material structure, which proved to be beyond administrative control, under the free impact of prices had changed the comparative monetary balance. The aggregate demand for money rose many times, manifesting itself in a general crisis of payments and demands from state enterprises for additional budgetary support and credit emission of the National Bank of Ukraine. This was a well-known, and long approved, method of policymaking. But what has been acceptable in the past was no longer applicable under the changed circumstances.

The rise in prices was accompanied by an obvious drop in the level of production — the very opposite of the growth which had been hoped for. To a large extent this was provoked by the obstructive behaviour of the huge monopolistic state producers, who offset the drop in their production by higher prices. According to the Ukrainian Ministry of Statistics, the price increase, calculated on the basis of the monthly index (compared to the beginning of 1991), was dramatic. Wholesale prices of industrial products in Ukraine rose in 1991 by a factor of 2.6, in 1992 by a factor of 111, and in the first 8 months of 1993 by a factor of 2,235 (see Fig. 1).

The highest rate of price increase was observed in fuel and energy production as well as in other extracting industries dealing with raw materials. The explanation is simple if we take into consideration the artificially low domestic prices in these industries before the introduction of market relations. However, the average prices for raw materials grew faster than those for many products if compared with relative world market prices. According to the available data, the parity of the purchasing power of the Ukrainian karbo-




Fig. 1 Monthly growth in wholesale prices
(times as compared to December 1990)

vanets to US dollars calculated over 140 representative commodities were as follows (January 1993): industry as a whole — 254 KRB/1 USD, energy complex — 293 KRB/1 USD, nonferrous metal industry — 410 KRB/1 USD.

As a result of uneven price increase, the structure of industry in terms of value has also changed. In 1993 the share of the fuel industry had increased 3.6 times, ferrous metals 2.1 times; in contrast to them, the share of the light and food industry fell to almost half. Heavy industry by 1993 had grown by 17% of its volume at the end of 1991. This has meant a further growth of intermediary, but not of final, production.

A striking example of inflation in the Ukrainian economy is the dynamic growth of retail prices. Over the period 1992 plus the first eight months of 1993, the total retail price index grew by a factor of 521, as compared to December 1991. The rate of growth of some retail prices for selected con-

sumer goods, if compared with relative basic wholesale prices, is much higher. Retail prices in the food industry, for example, were 40% higher in 1992 than wholesale ones. Their rapid rate of growth reflects two underlying negative causes: the pseudo-market behaviour of transport and trade enterprises during their commercialisation, when they deliberately maximised the share of their profit in the retail price structure, and the excessive tax burden, imposed by the state, which as a final result, suppresses consumers' purchasing power.

NBU policy: emission of cash and primary credit

The successful performance of a macroeconomic policy depends largely upon the skill with which a traditional money market is treated. Transition from direct administrative tools of monetary regulation to economic ones presupposes an active and independent Central Bank. Its functions should not be restricted to cash and credit emission; they include the formulation of strict general rules under which all commercial banks and financial intermediaries have to operate and monitoring the obedience of these rules. On behalf of the state, a Central Bank maintains a dynamic ratio between the aggregate demand for money and its aggregate supply, using a variety of regulatory instruments. Its effective performance is in practice correlated to a stable state budget, an investment-stimulating financial environment and a balance between the basic macroeconomic indicators, such as general price level (wages), the rate of employment, and the rate of economic growth.

The National Bank of Ukraine (NBU), which was initially set up as a formally independent financial centre, is still largely dependent upon the executive state organs, particularly on the Cabinet of Ministers and the Ministry of Finance. Mainly due to this reason, it has had little control over the emission of cash and primary credit. Chaotic measures, undertaken by the NBU in 1993, reflected a lack of experience in providing a rigid policy with respect to commercial banks and state enterprises. Its initial annual limit of 2.3 trillion karbovantsi collapsed in June with the government's promise of subsidies amounting to 13 trillion karbovantsi (\$2 billion) to the striking Donbas miners. No one in the government (nor in the Ukrainian parliament) seems to have thought seriously about how such an unprecedented expenditure was to be covered from the budget. The NBU itself had no choice except to obey and implement the government's decision.

At the beginning of autumn, the NBU promised to keep the third-quarter primary credit emission down to 10.9 trillion karbovantsi. Very soon the government undermined this intention by its decision to credit money into agriculture over the summer and autumn. There were fears that last year's poor sugar beet harvest would be repeated. Simultaneously, in August the government imposed a 150% price hike on Ukrainian coal. This inevitably led to industry demanding additional credits to pay for its ever-higher fuel costs. By that time Russia had raised the cost of its oil and gas exports to approach world market prices.

There was no evidence of successful currency control nor money supply regulation. Basically, the karbovanets (coupon) was introduced as an interim currency on a par with the Russian (former all-Union) currency — the rouble, in early 1992. Since it was supported neither by a saturated market nor by hard currency reserves, the karbovanets began to fall in value when Ukraine withdrew from the rouble zone in December 1992.

At first holding its own, the karbovanets plummeted with the news of a huge NBU cash emission in February 1993. The political crisis and strikes during the summer contributed to the devaluation of the karbovanets from 6,000 to 18,000 to 1 US dollar. By the end of November 1993, it had fallen to below 31,000 KRB to 1 US dollar. During the one and a half years of liberalisation, the money supply rose by a factor of 40, and within 10 months of 1993, by a factor of 12.




Fig. 2 Dynamics in hard currency exchange rates (KRB/USD)

The ever-falling exchange rate prompted the government to “improve” the hard currency balance in the old-fashioned way. A special decree was issued obliging all enterprises to sell 50% of their hard currency incomes to the state at an artificially low exchange rate, fixed by the NBU (5,960 KRB/1 US dollar). This exchange rate was far remote from that which existed in the free market sector, as the result of supply and demand for hard currency (see Fig. 2).

This unpopular fiscal measure was reinforced by the introduction of punitive taxes and customs tariffs. All together these measures created an extremely unfavourable background for "inspiring" growth in either the export or the private sectors of the Ukrainian economy. As so often before, once again the new rules of the game were significantly different for certain state enterprises which had the backing of a parliamentary lobby.

The series of presidential decrees last autumn has not greatly improved the situation, and rather than easing existing contradictions, has made them more acute. Attempts to regulate the exchange rate by fixing its ceiling while suspending operations on the Ukrainian interbank currency exchange could in no way provide a "more accurate" picture of the currency purchasing power without a radical restructuring of the production base. Meanwhile, the privatisation of many inefficient state enterprises, has in effect come to a halt, aggravating the state budget deficit.

Budget deficit and fiscal policy

The rate of enterprise taxation, the highest in Europe, imposed by the Ukrainian government, has not helped to create a stable and broad tax base. Budget incomes could not meet the loose and unpredictable government expenditures which have resulted in huge budget deficit. The estimated budget deficit, in the last months of 1993, was running at some 35-40% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). But the actual figure may well be 50% or above if off-budget credits are included. External debts have noticeably aggravated this sharp disbalance. By the first half of 1993 outstanding debts between Ukrainian enterprises and those in the rest of the former USSR reached 3.5 trillion Karbovantsi.

The largest item in the balance of payment crisis is the outstanding and growing debt to Russia for the oil and gas imports which Ukraine requires for its energy-intensive industrial sector. By mid-November 1993, this debt reached as much as 700 million dollars with clear prospects of further growth since prices are promised to approach world level in 1994. Under the circumstances the Ukrainian oil refining industry has suffered dramatically: petrol production has fallen by 36%, diesel fuel by 28%, and fuel oil by 42%. According to the latest estimates, Ukraine's demand for oil and gas in 1994 will be worth 9 billion dollars (taking average prices to be equal to 70% of the world level). To cover these needs from state budget will be a problem, taking into account that Russia's share in this energy supply is about 90% and that it intends to bring its prices up to world level.

A draft budget for 1994, drawn up by the Ministry of Finance and presented at the Ukrainian parliament at the end of last year, showed unchanged priorities in the main sources of budget income. As before, foreign credits and investments are among the largest items of budget growth. An economy which puts so much faith in foreign capital and neglects its own sources of economic and budget stabilisation, can hardly achieve a real financial

improvement in the near future. The latest development of events seems only to prove this. The IMF hints that it would be eager to participate in up to 6 billion dollars of credit, and the World Bank's promises of 27 plus 400 million dollar credits are still only promises. At the Tokyo G-7 summit in July 1993, Ukrainian appeals for 2 billion dollars received little attention.

Numerous recent examples of macroeconomic regulation in the transitional Ukrainian economy show its pro-inflationary direction, and not the contrary. Once the Ukrainian government brought in its decision to introduce a 250% price increase at the beginning of 1992, inflation, however paradoxical this may be, acquired a status of an official policy, and became the main instrument of fighting economic impoverishment. Attempting at any price to ensure the social security of the population and to counteract the flow of cheaper goods from Ukraine, the government and parliament adopted decisions of a tactical rather than strategic nature, which had little economic foundation. In December 1992, an increase of the minimum wage 2.6 times forced up the overall mean level of wages by 80%, and shortly afterwards, in January 1993, led to a considerable price increase.

In these circumstances, the victim was the national currency, which was devalued in parallel with the introduction of economic stabilisation measures. For many state enterprises and the still very weak non-state economic and banking structures, credit under these conditions of spiralling inflation became almost the only form of financial security. The attraction of credit, for the majority of users, lay in the widespread practice of writing off or cancelling debts.

From this point of view a typical measure of NBU "regulatory policy" was the writing off of unpaid debts in the state sector in March 1993. This cost the state budget 1 trillion karbovantsi, which was easily covered by additional emissions of money. Even such a purely monetary measure as increasing the refinancing charge to 240% of annual interest, which aimed at making it more difficult to obtain credits, was not very effective. This increase was too insignificant in comparison with the actual rates of inflation. Under conditions of the rapid devaluation of the national currency, the credits received were put into hard currency, high-value technical goods, and complex and expensive equipment.

The spring-summer credit emission produced a qualitative change in the situation, driving the rate of inflation into hyperinflation — over 70% a month. The national currency rapidly became devalued not only against the US dollar and other hard currencies, but also against the Russian rouble. It was fully realised that the ever-growing financial chaos had to be restrained: this eventually led to a fairly brisk return to the use of strict and specific monetary measures. At the end of 1993, the acting Prime Minister, Yukhym Zvyahilskyi, and the head of the National Bank of Ukraine, Viktor Yushchenko, ordered all businesses to repay all outstanding credits immediately. In practical terms, this meant realising all the material assets, into which those credits had been converted, "freezing" projects in progress and

breaking signed contracts. The initiators of this single measure seemed to have no idea of the probable results: under existing conditions it would have meant a rapid end to market reforms.

The critical and very discordant economic situation in Ukraine has given great urgency to the question of a targetted widescale stabilising programme, based on the rapid privatisation of ownership, monetary reform, and financial improvement of the economy.

Stabilising macroeconomic policy: theoretical framework and practical application

Until now the macroeconomic policy in Ukraine, especially the monetary and fiscal policies, have had no strong inner logic or a definite order of consequent actions. Mostly, it has been driven by negative internal and external socio-economic influences and simply reflected attempts to contain their effects. The rate of hyperinflation and the fall in the standard of living are so critical that the economic situation could easily lead to serious political disruptions. Hopes for a real and gradual economic reform are vested in the election of a new parliament in March 1994 and a new reform-oriented Cabinet of Ministers, competent enough to bring in immediate emergency measures aimed at initial stabilisation.

The following principles could serve as a basic theoretical framework for considering a stabilisation programme for the Ukrainian transitional economy:

1. The stabilisation programme should carefully adjust main objectives, tools and rules of macroeconomic policy, especially in the monetary-credit sphere.

2. It should rate the main objectives and measures in terms of their importance, time and possible consequences.

3. It should be multivariant with respect to the possible results of each specific step of the programme and hence with respect to adequate interchangeable tools.

4. It should be oriented mostly towards internal sources of economic stabilisation with respect to possible external changes and their reflection in macroeconomic policy.

5. It should have acquired a background which is consolidating rather than restrictive and obstructive as regards "old economic phenomena" and social forces.

6. It should include basic socio-economic priorities and objectives which should remain unchangeable under all circumstances.

7. It should be preferably grounded in the specific and peculiar conditions of Ukraine, while remaining open to the use of world-wide stabilisation experience.

8. It should give a preference to gradual, but firm measures, rather than "revolutionary breakthroughs".

Special attention must be paid to drawing up proper monetary and fiscal policies, since previous attempts have become seriously discredited in the last few years. The following are some of the practical measures which should be applied in the proposed logical order and consequence.

Suppression of inflation as the number one priority of any macroeconomic stabilisation policy cannot be achieved without eliminating the dangerous economic distortions (which engendered it). The principal distortion is the imbalance between the volume of output available and the money flow. This must be treated by the following urgent steps of *institutional reform*:

1. Mass medium- and large-scale privatisation (especially of non-profitable state enterprises) and the creation of a considerable non-state sector of the economy with an approximate share of production equal to 40-50% of the GDP.
2. Privatisation of state housing and plots of land with the widest participation in this process of all legal potential owners, including foreign ones.
3. Completion of the restructuring of the banking system by initiating favourable conditions for the activities of non-banking financial intermediaries. Stimulation of stock exchange operations and the equity market. The latter must be considered as the crucial precondition for large-scale privatisation and its "working mechanism", used for securities' (shares) dissemination.
4. The NBU, as the central financial structure, should be given wideranging autonomy with broad responsibilities in providing monetary and credit policy. No direct orders should be issued from the Cabinet of Ministers to cover the budget deficit. This practice should be replaced by a civilised official way of legalising the internal (national) state debt.

The above institutional measures should be supported simultaneously by rapid changes in *fiscal policy and state budgetary performance*. The following measures should be implemented promptly: total restriction of credit emissions (credits issued must be well-founded and planned in advance), and sharp cuts in budget expenditure on military production and the army. Budget deficit financing should be covered by the emission of state securities and bonds and from external sources. The whole budget must be split up organisationally and separated into two budget levels: state (republican) budget, including expenses on state management, defence, social sphere, the transportation system and so on, and local (municipal) budgets, with responsibility for many aspects of regional development.

The adjustment of taxation should start by lowering the general rate of enterprise income tax from 55% (the highest level for Europe) to 40-45%. It would be very preferable for such tax to be deducted from the profit, rather than the net income of the enterprise. Tax privileges for "selected" state enterprises must be abolished as soon as possible. The tax system in general should be gradually reshaped from direct taxes to, preferably, indirect taxes. Finally, the fiscal system should be completed by a fair system for transfer of payments.

In the sphere of *monetary, credit and price regulation* the exchange rate mechanism must play the crucial role. Indirect exchange rate regulation at the initial stages must be replaced by a freely fluctuating exchange rate during the period of active privatisation. During this period, the exchange rate may be expected to fluctuate until an appropriate exchange rate with the leading hard currencies is established. After three or four months of stable appreciation of the interim national currency, the karbovanets, the new

national currency — the hryvnya — must be introduced in parallel for “cash transactions” only. Its exchange rate against the US dollar, Russian rouble, and the karbovanets must be fixed (on the basis of the attained relative parities of purchasing power of basic products).

The measures of the money supply must be adjusted in line with the level of commodity saturation on the domestic market during privatisation and devaluation of the karbovanets. Objects of privatisation should preferably be valued in the new national currency — the hryvnya — so as to give an impetus to its gradual appreciation. The general emission of the new currency must be brought into line with the withdrawal of old banknotes and coins and the growth of the commodity market. The multiplication of the amount of money through loose credit practice of commercial banks must be limited by compulsory backing demands (reserves requirements), provided by the NBU.

In the initial stages, the *interest rate policy* could use the neo-Keynsian low interest rate approach rather than the neo-classical approach. To stimulate investment and production, the real interest rate could be fixed at a level slightly lower (or equal) to the rate of inflation. This level could then gradually be raised by the NBU.

The NBU, or a special committee of the bank, could cooperate with the state to coordinate the amount of specially issued state equities circulating on the open market. The form of such equities could vary: short-term state bonds (3-4 months) with an interest rate higher than the interest rate on saving deposits, and medium-term state securities with the nominal value fixed in hryvni and, hence, pegged to the US dollar.

Price regulation could be temporarily applied to a fairly wide range of socially important goods and services, especially for groups of people with stable low income. There are two main possible ways to do this: either by offsetting high market prices by direct grants and allowances to consumers, or by state subsidies to producers as compensation for the difference between low price and production costs. The first way is obviously preferable, since it creates favourable conditions for producers and proper treatment of the purchasing power of consumers. ■

History

UKRAINIAN RELIGIOUS AND CULTURAL INFLUENCES ON MUSCOVY IN THE 17TH AND 18TH CENTURIES

Petro Cymbalisty

Introduction

International cultural influences which stimulate the advance and development of human culture are positive factors. It is virtually impossible to find any cultured nation whose development has been totally independent of outside influences. A stronger nation influences a weaker, a centre of greater culture the less cultured. History knows of cases where physically (or materially) weaker, but culturally superior, nations influenced nations that were physically stronger: Greece triumphed culturally over her conqueror, Rome; similarly the Slavs triumphed over the Bulgarians. The Lithuania-Rus' state also falls into this category, and so, of course, does the example of Ukraine, brought low in military terms, and yet having a great spiritual and intellectual influence on Muscovy in the 17th and 18th centuries.

Kyiv's links with Byzantium and Rome, which were continued by the Galician-Volynian state, and the fact that at least the west Ukrainian lands and Church lay in the sphere of influence of Sts Cyril and Methodius, and later of the two-rite Czech lands,¹ led to a synthesis of eastern and western elements, which lies at the foundations of Ukrainian culture and its entire spirituality and Christianity, which Nahayevsky,² with good cause, calls "eastern in form and western in content", and "universal" in thought and tradition.

Muscovy received Christianity through the intermediary of Kyiv, receiving, at the same time, Kyivan tradition. But Muscovy, which developed in different his-

¹ This tradition is attested by prayers in collections from the 13th and 14th centuries of west Ukrainian translations from Czech-Latin originals which recall Czech Western-rite saints (Procopius, Vit, Sviaceslav). For example, the *Prayer against the Devil*, the *Prayer to the Blessed Trinity*, the *Dialogues of Pope Gregory*, the *Gospel of Nicodemus*, etc. Cf. A.I. Sobolevsky, "Materialy i izsledovaniya", *Sbornik ORYaS*, 88, pp. 37-54.

² I. Nahayevsky, "Cyrillo-Methodian Christianity in Rus'-Ukraine", *Zapysky ChSVV*, ser. 2, sect. 1, vol. 5, Rome 1954, p. 134.

torical conditions, isolated from centres of culture and under strong Asiatic influences, developed its own psyche and dressed those traditions in its own garments.

In Ukraine, the Church and the monasteries were traditionally centres and seedbeds of education and learning. But in Muscovy, where the outward forms of religion were considered to be the marks of righteousness, and where the views of Iosyf of Volokolamsk ruled, learning and education were considered a threat to the authorities, and had no soil for development.³ Furthermore, even the higher clergy had little education, and so, in their simplicity, considered any deviations in rite or outward form to be "heretical novelties" incompatible with the one-and-pure Muscovite Orthodoxy.

The far-reaching consequences of the events of the 15th and 16th centuries — the unsuccessful Union of Florence (1439) and the fall of Constantinople (1453) which as a consequence diminished the authority of Constantinople and facilitated the rise of Moscow as an Orthodox centre and the theory of the "Third Rome"⁴ — were the coronation of Ivan the Terrible as Tsar (1547) and the establishment of the Moscow Patriarchate (1589). The Unions of Lublin (1569) and Brest-Litovsk (1596) were, in the eyes of the Orthodox, an assault of Catholicism on Orthodox territory, and constituted a threat for Muscovite plans for an Orthodox protectorate. For Ukraine, the net result of these events was positive, since, by generating religious polemics, they forced the Ukrainian Church to arm itself with knowledge and education so as to match the Catholic learning. The impact of Ukrainians with a western intellect in the religious field was an added stimulus for the opening in the lands of Ukraine of a large network of schools and printing houses, while the foundation and achievements of the Mohyla Academy established Kyiv and Ukraine on the highest cultural, theological and literary level of the Orthodox world at that time.

The situation in Muscovy^{4a} was completely different. At that time, when in Ukraine, in addition to Kyiv and Lviv, there were a large number of centres of culture⁵ and Ukraine already had a number of western-style highly educated spiritual leaders, in Muscovy, in the Moscow Academy in the second half of the 17th century, as Pypin testifies, there reigned "ecclesiastical fanaticism, hostility towards learning, stubborn stagnation, moral wildness and cruelty".⁶ In comparison with the Metropolitans of Kyiv (Petro Mohyla,

³ For the education of Ukrainian bishops see: Sonevsky, "The Ukrainian episcopate of the Peremysl and Kholm dioceses in the 15th and 16th centuries, *Zapysky ChVSS*, ser. 2, sect. 2, vol. 2, Rome, 1954, p. 43.

⁴ Cf. the *Epistles of Filofei, Elder of the Pskov Monastery of St Eleazar, to Vasiliy III, to the deacon Mysyuryi Munezhin, and to Ivan IV [the Terrible]*.

^{4a} "Muscovy" here is used in the sense of the Moscow state (and was the official term at the time). The term "*Rossiia*" — a Greek variant of the word "*Rus*" — which was also popularised by Ukrainians — is relatively new in that sense. In Ukrainian, the terms "Russian" and "Muscovite" are still equivalents.

⁵ Before 1646, there were 20 centres with printing houses.

⁶ I. Ohienko, *Ukrayinska Kultura* (Ukrainian Culture), Katerynoslav, 1923, p. 66. (Hereafter Ohienko).

Sylvester Kosov), the Patriarchs of Moscow (Ioakim, or even Adriyan in 1690, who according to Konstantin Kharlampovich “studied very little scripture and read very few church books — so that they could barely say the mid-day service,”⁷) were poorly educated. It was not without reason that Kyiv looked upon Moscow as “stupid Muscovite Rus’”.⁸

From these assertions, it becomes clear why the Ukrainian Church, in the face of great resistance from the Muscovite clergy, was called on to correct the Muscovite church books, to reform the rite and the theology, and from the time of Peter I — to civilise Muscovy — to establish schools, theological seminaries, and to lead the Muscovite Church. Ukrainians, among whom we meet many famous names (Epiphaniy Slavinetsky, Stefan Yavorsky, Dimitriy Tuptalo of Rostov, Theophan Prokopovich), took into their hands the Moscow Academy, the Holy Synod and all the top posts in the Church hierarchy. For example, out of the 127 bishops who occupied Russian sees in the period 1700–62, there were 70 Ukrainians, 47 Russians, 3 Greeks, 3 Romanians, 2 Serbs and 2 Georgians.⁹ During this time there were 5 Ukrainian metropolitans: while Dimitriy of Rostov, Ioasaf of Bilhorod and Inokentiy of Irkutsk were canonised as saints.¹⁰ In 1758 alone 9 Ukrainians and 1 Russian were appointed to 10 vacant sees.¹¹ Imperial and court chaplains were mainly (or exclusively) Ukrainians. Religious scholarship and education were safe in Ukrainian hands.

All this could not pass unnoticed. Already Brueckner observed that for Muscovy Ukraine had the significance of a school: it Europeanised Moscow by its influence.¹² Following Beznosov, Konstantin Kharlampovich wrote on the extent of the Ukrainian influences.¹³ These influences were minimised by Golosov¹⁴ and Sergievsky,¹⁵ while Kapterev¹⁶ was inclined to attribute Ukrainian church and religious activity in Moscow to the Greeks.

⁷ K.V. Kharlampovich, *Malorossiyskoye vliyaniye na velikorossiyskuyu tserkovnuyu zhizn* (Little-Russian influence on Great-Russian Church life), Kazan, 1914, p. 256. (Hereafter Kharlampovich).

⁸ V.O. Eyngorn, “O snosheniyakh malorossiyskago dukhovenstva s Moskovskim pravitel'stvom v tsarstvovaniye Aleksey Mikhaylovicha, I-IV” (On the relations of the Little-Russian clergy with the Muscovite government in the reign of Aleksey Mikhaylovich), *Chteniya OIDR*, 1893, vol. 2; 1894, vol. 3; 1898, vol. 4, I, p. 25. (Hereafter Eyngorn).

⁹ Kharlampovich, p. 459 (according to “information not entirely correct”).

¹⁰ Kharlampovich, pp. 505–6.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 486.

¹² A. Brueckner, *Europäisierung Russlands. Land u. Volk* (The Europeanisation of Russia. Land and People), Gotha, 1888. “Little Russia [Kleinrussland] had for Great Russia the significance of a school...”, “exerted a Europeanising influence on the Moscow state”, pp. 15, 18.

¹³ Kharlampovich, (II).

¹⁴ A. Golosov, *Tserkovnaya zhizn na Rusi v pol. 17 v.* (Church life in Rus' in the mid-17th century), Zhytomyr, 1916.

¹⁵ N. Sergievsky, *Svyateysbiy Patriarkh Nikon* (The Holy Patriarch Nikon), Moscow, 1894. (Hereafter Sergievsky).

¹⁶ N.T. Kapterev, *Patriarkh Nikon i ego protivniki v dyelye ispravleniya tserkovnikh obryadov* (Patriarch Nikon and his opponents in the amendment of church rituals), Sergiev Posad, 1913. (Hereafter Kapterev, *Opp.*).

The reasons for Ukrainian influences in Muscovy may be explained as follows: 1) the Ukrainian intention to influence Moscow which had emerged as a centre of Orthodoxy, where there was an Orthodox Tsar and Patriarch; 2) material help from this centre to Ukrainian churches and monasteries; 3) a lack of Russian scholars and good security for Ukrainian scholars in Moscow; 4) Kyiv — a centre of Orthodoxy, a carrier of western culture — having a tradition of education among the East Slavs, prevailed over other influences on Moscow.

I. Spiritual (Non-Material) religious influences

1. The Sermon

Preaching, as the *Word on the Law and Grace* of Ilarion and the *Words...* of St Cyril of Turov bear witness, were already known in Kyivan Rus'-Ukraine. But this preaching was not the generally widespread extempore preaching as the Ukrainian Church knew at least from the 16th century. Ukrainian oratorical homiletic prose, which in the baroque style reached its peak in the 17th century, flourished, as may be seen, as early as the theory of preaching of Ioanikiy Galyatovsky (*The Teaching or the Manner of Composing a Sermon*, Kyiv 1663, 1665¹⁷), with some of its elements of logic influenced by the West and, in part, Poland.¹⁸

In old Muscovy, there were no extempore church sermons; there were "appointed readings" which could be supplemented by individual commentaries of the cleric¹⁹ up to the middle of the 17th century, when the rhetorical preaching of Ukrainian preachers began to become famous. This preaching was brought to Moscow by numerous Ukrainians, representatives of the highly educated clergy like Ioanikiy Galyatovsky, Lazar Baranovych, and Antoniyy Radyvylovsky, who, brought to Moscow by various church affairs, by chance or intention, delivered sermons in Muscovite churches, often dedicating them to the Tsar, the Patriarch or other great personages, while the Ukrainians who had settled in Moscow finally established this style of preaching there. Lazar Baranovych, Archbishop of Chernihiv, preached especially frequently at the Tsar's court. In 1664, a priest from Hlukhiv, I. Shmatkovsky, delivered a sermon in the presence of the Tsar.²⁰ On 25 August 1670 Ioanikiy Galyatovsky

¹⁷ O.I. Biletsky, *Khrestomatiya davnoyi ukrayinskoyi literatury* (Anthology of old Ukrainian literature), Kyiv, 1952, p. 260. (Halyatovsky divided preaching into "exordium, narration, conclusion").

¹⁸ There was preaching in Poland as early as the 14th century, cf. *Kazania Swietokrzyskie* (Swietokrzyskie Sermons), 14th century, *Kazania Gnieznienskie* (Gniezno Sermons), 15th century. W. Taszycki, *Najdawniejsze zabytki języka polskiego* (Oldest relics of the Polish language), Cracow, 1927, pp. 39-53; 120-126.

¹⁹ S. Smirnov, *Drevnorusskiy dukhovnik* (The old Russian Cleric), Moscow, 1914, p. 135. (Hereafter Smirnov, *Dukhovnik*). (This was normally the life of some saint which the deacon chanted).

²⁰ Eyngom, I, p. 267.

preached, dedicating his sermon to the Tsar; this sermon was afterwards circulated in manuscript throughout Muscovy.²¹ A great deal was done in this regard by Simeon of Polotsk, a Belarusian educated in Kyiv. The tradition of fine oratory was continued in the 18th century in Muscovy with great success and brilliance by such masters of the word as Dimitriy Tuptalo of Rostov, Stefan Yavorsky, Theophan Prokopovich, Theophilakt Lopatynsky, and Havryil Buzhynsky, while collections of sermons contributed to the flowering of fine oratory: Antony Radvylovsky's *The Crown of Christ* and *Orchard of Mary, Mother of God*, which in their time enjoyed exceptional popularity.²² Some preachers (Ioanikiy Galyatovsky, Epiphaniy Slavinetsky, Simeon of Polotsk), at the request of the Russian bishops, wrote sermons for them too.²³

After 1701, Ukrainians officially established the post of instructor of preaching in the Moscow Academy. For example and prestige, this post was usually filled from Kyiv, and in seniority and salary ranked immediately after the Prefect. Among the famous names listed by Kharlampovich for the period 1711-62, we can identify 30 Ukrainians and 6 Russians who held this post.²⁴

By tradition the Tsar's court was sympathetic to and valued Ukrainian preaching, both as the word of God and as a work of art, for it was at the Tsar's court that noted Kyiv orators most often began their panegyric sermons, and so attracted the attention of the Tsars (Stefan Yavorsky, Theophan Prokopovich). A preacher of the Kyiv school raised the prestige of the court, where with time there grew up, as it were, the institution of court preachers. For example, from as early as 1687, Fr. Poborsky preached constantly at the Tsar's court until 1701. At great events during the time of Peter I, the greatest Ukrainian masters of the word, Stefan Yavorsky, Theophan Prokopovich, Havryil Buzhynsky, Theophilakt Krolyk, Theophilakt Lopatynsky, would preach. Elizabeth was an even greater devotee of Ukrainian church preaching and officially established the function of imperial preachers in 1742. Among these preachers, we find the names of Fathers Savitsky (1742-48) and Evstakhiy and Arseniy Mohylyansky. Up to 1753, almost all the imperial preachers were Ukrainians.²⁵

Like all novelties in Muscovy, Ukrainian preaching also encountered considerable resistance from the poorly educated clergy of the capital, for whom the very fact of declaiming (and not reading from a sacred book in the church) was "unsanctioned by Holy Writ" and evoked suspicions of heresy, an accusation which was also made against the Ukrainians.²⁶ Nevertheless, both the Ukrainian

²² *Istoriya Russkoy Literatury* (History of Russian Literature), Academy of Sciences of the USSR, Moscow, 1946, II/2, p. 364. (Hereafter *IRL*).

²³ Eyngorn, III, pp. 789, 630, 754. (Lazar Baranovych on important occasions published his sermons in the form of booklets, e.g. *Utesheniye* (Consolation), 1669, dedicated to the Tsar, expressing sympathy on the death of his wife; *Knizhitsa na noviy brak* [Booklet on a new marriage], 1671, for the Tsar on the occasion of his marriage to Nataliya Kirilovna).

²⁴ Kharlampovich, pp. 742-743.

²⁵ Kharlampovich, pp. 313, 759, 760-762. (In 1742, Elizabeth attended 30 sermons by Ukrainians).

²⁶ S.M. Solovyev, *Istoriya Rossii* (History of Russia), Moscow, 1857, III, p. 202. (You have the Devil within you). See also Smimov, *Dukhovnik*, p. 136.

learned clergy and its preaching had their adherents not only among the upper strata of Muscovy, but also, to a certain extent, among the ordinary people too. This is evident from the fact that as early as 1669 the parishioners of the Church of St John the Divine (at Bronnaya Sloboda) in Moscow wanted to have (and obtained a Patriarchal decree to the effect) a "learned priest" who would "know the Kyiv singing and be able to preach and teach the rhetorical art". Fr. Shmatkovsky from Hlukhiv was assigned to this post.²⁷

The spread of Ukrainian preaching in Moscow and its growth of popularity was aided by Patriarch Nikon who admired the brilliance of Ukrainian learning as a whole and himself pursued it.²⁸ In the second half of the 17th century, preaching spread throughout all Muscovy, so that in the *Spiritual Regulations* of 1771, that alpha and omega of the Holy Synod, Prokopovich codified it officially.²⁹ In the 18th century, preaching became a normal phenomenon in Russian churches, but as the imperial edict "On the need of students from the Kyiv diocese..., to teach catechesis and the delivery of sermons at the Sts Peter and Paul, Holy Trinity and St Isaiah Cathedrals in St Petersburg"³⁰ bears witness, for a long time it relied on Ukrainians, right up to the time of G. Krinovsky, that is, up to the second half of the 18th century.

2. Church Singing, Choir, Music

One of the notable features of Ukrainian spirituality which Ukrainians grafted into Russian church-religious life is church music, singing and chant, which greatly changed the character of the Muscovite Church and influenced the development of Muscovite art.

In Ukraine, under the stimulus of the West, a specific variant of singing and music had been created, which the Ukrainian Church transmitted to the Muscovite Church. Even while it was still using neumatic notation, the Ukrainian Church, from the 16th century onwards,³¹ had a three-part style of singing, which in the second half of the century developed into what is called the "*partesnoe pienie*" (part choral singing), and in the course of the 17th century, during the flourishing of the Mohyla Academy, this reached the peak of its development. Then finally the Ukrainian system of notation, the "Kyiv notation", developed, and in 1700 the first Lviv *Irmologion* was

²⁷ Eyngorn, I, pp. 543-544. (He took up his parish duties on 27 May 1669).

²⁸ N.T. Kaptelev, *Patriarkh Nikon i isar Aleksey Mikhailovich* (Patriarch Nikon and Tsar Aleksey Mikhailovich), Moscow, 1909, I, pp. 152-153. See his sermons against new icons in the Cathedral of the Dormition in 1665.

²⁹ T. Prokopovich, *Dukhovnyi Reglament* (Spiritual Regulations), Moscow, 1721 (10th edition, Moscow, 1794), parag. 23 "On the preaching of the Word of God, the following rules...", p. 62. Cf. the "Statutes of the Clerical Consistories" (P. Zabelin, *Prava i obovyazki presviterov* [Rights and obligations of presbyters], Kyiv, 1888, p. 110).

³⁰ Ohiyenko, p. 83.

³¹ Rev. Dr. I. Muzychka says from 1500. See "Persnyi ukraïnyskyi irmoloi" (The First Ukrainian *Irmologion*), *Zapysky ChSVV*, ser. 2, sec. 2, vol. II, Rome, 1954, p. 257.

printed.³² This “part singing” the Ukrainians took to Moscow, where until the 17th century the old primitive form of singing had been used in the churches — recitative, using neumatic notation (which the Russian Old Believers still keep) and the *Chomoniya* chant, which is characterised by being immeasurably long-drawn out.³³

Those responsible for the spread and strengthening of Ukrainian singing in Moscow were first and foremost those groups of monks, singers and choir-masters who for various reasons sang in the Moscow churches, sometimes by invitation.³⁴ The main factor in the success of the “Kyiv part choral singing” in Muscovy (against which, too, as against the novelty of “Latin fabulation” not handed down from the saints,³⁵ there was an opposition among the Muscovite clergy) was the fact that it enjoyed the support of the cultural sphere of the nation, it had the support of Patriarch Nikon, and was connected with the brilliance of Ukrainian culture, while its aesthetic excellence was attractive in comparison with the old Muscovite singing. A comparison of the Ukrainian singing with the Muscovite singing of the time may be made on the basis of the valuable observations of foreign travellers in the 16th and 17th centuries. Johannes Herbinus, a German pastor, who attended Divine Service in Kyiv in 1635, was so overcome by the harmony of the Ukrainian singing and by the fact that the whole congregation sang, that he cried aloud from emotion “Heaven and earth are full of the majesty of Thy glory”, being especially struck by the music of “Glory to Thee, Our God”.³⁶ We know about the beauty of Ukrainian church singing from Paul of Aleppo, who was in Kyiv in 1654. He and his Syrians were also greatly impressed by the fact that both the choir and all the people in the churches sang, and they were especially struck by the sweet, pure voices of the Cossack children. The wonderful melodies of the singing of the Kyivans moved the Syrians to tears (Paul says), for they had never heard anything like it before. Commenting on the singing of the Russians, Paul changes his tone: they sang coarsely, without melody.³⁷

³² Ibid, p. 258; in Fr. Muzychka's opinion, the appearance of this *Irmologion* was the reason for the fact that in 1700 the *Irmologion* which had been prepared for publication in Moscow in neumatic notation was never actually printed.

³³ V.M. Undolsky, “Zamyechaniye dlya istorii tserkovnago pyeniya v Rossii” (Observations on the history of church singing in Russia), *Chleniya OIDA*, Moscow, 1846. (Hereafter Undolsky, “Zamyechaniye”). (This prolongation was partly due to errors in the Muscovite texts; additional syllables and words had crept in.

³⁴ Eyngorn, I, p. 300. (In 1656, the Metropolitan of Kyiv, Sylvester Kosov, refused to send a singer).

³⁵ Ohiyenko, p. 7.

³⁶ J. Herbinus, *Religiosae Kijovenses Cryptae...*, Jena, 1675, p. 154. (“*Pleni sunt coeli et terra majestatis gloriae tuae*”).

³⁷ I.P. Rushchinsky, *Religiozniy byt Russkikh po svyedeniyakh inostrannykh pisateley 15-17 v.* (Religious life of the Russians according to the accounts of foreign writers of the 15-17th centuries), Moscow, 1871, p. 44. (Hereafter Rushchinsky). Ibid, p. 42 (“The Russians unlike the Ukrainians did not know music; they sang on the in-breath, they preferred their prayers in a low coarse tone, which was unpleasant on the ear.

Modern Moscow church singing — “Kyiv singing” (choral part singing) began in Moscow also in the time of Nikon (1652-66) — and after Fedor Alekseyevich, according to the *Chronicle of Samovidets*, was already fairly widespread.³⁸ Beginning from 12 January 1652, when I. Kurbatov, a priest from Putivl, was sent to Kyiv in order to invite to Moscow singers and choirmasters, documents bear witness to a whole series of ensembles, choirs, and individual Ukrainian singers, directors and choirmasters who were invited to Moscow. Thus, for example, in 1652, a “singing capella” of 11 singers including the “creator of linear-notation singing, the great singer Theodor Ternopilsky, with the Archimandrite Mikhail from the Kyiv Bratsky monastery, went to Moscow at the invitation of the Tsar.³⁹ In 1656, together with many others, the “elder” Iosyf Zahvoysky, “a person deeply versed in church singing” went to Moscow “to teach part singing”.⁴⁰ On 12 October 1666, Lazar Baranovych, Archbishop of Chernihiv, who went to Moscow for a Synod, took with him a whole choir and choirmaster, which sang in the Moscow churches.⁴¹

The Ukrainian style of singing was also brought to Moscow together with other cultural habits and tastes by Russians themselves, such as, for example, the Boyar P.V. Bolshoi-Sheremetev, who returned to Moscow from Kyiv after a four-year visit, bringing with him a “singing capella” made up of Ukrainians.⁴² The most highly educated Muscovite strata, the Tsars Aleksey Mikhailovich and Ioann Alekseyevich, and the Regent Sofiya loved and employed Ukrainian singers (“supreme” or “court singers”) and the Patriarchs Nikon and Ioakim had Ukrainian choirs and strove to introduce Ukrainian singing into Muscovy⁴³ so that by 1675, there was a great demand for Ukrainian “descants and basses” in Moscow.⁴⁴

In addition to introducing choral singing, Ukrainians, such as Mykola Diletsky and Dmytro Bortniansky, laid the foundations of Russian theory and composition of church music, and the Ukrainian *irmologia*, became models for the study of church music and the *irmologia* of Russia for a long time.⁴⁵

³⁸ Biletsky, *Khrestomatiya*, p. 288. (“...he ordered the services in Moscow to be sung by our singing in the churches and in the monasteries”, *Chronicle of Samovidets*, 1682). Kapterev, I, p. 61; Undolsky, “Zamyechaniye”, p. 16; Kharlampovich, pp. 325-326.

³⁹ *Akty ot nos. k. istor. Yuzhnoy i Zapad. Rossii* (Acts relating to the history of Southern and Western Russia), Archaeographic Commission, St Petersburg, 1861, III, no. 330, p. 480. (Hereafter *AkYuZR*; Undolsky, “Zamyechaniye”, pp. 15, 17, 23-24.

⁴⁰ Eyngorn, I, pp. 95, 299. (In 1665 the lower descant singer Ryabsky was in Moscow); *AkYuZR*, III (350), p. 518. (On 27.7.1656 the Kyiv singers A. Leskivsky and K. Kononsky passed through Putivl on their way to Moscow), Undolsky, “Zamyechaniye”, p. 25.

⁴¹ Eyngorn, I, p. 379.

⁴² Ibid, pp. 237-8; *Primyechniye*, p. 598.

⁴³ Kharlampovich, pp. 318; 325-327.

⁴⁴ *Chleniya O IDR*, 1889, book 2, p. 1009; Eyngorn, *Primyechniye*, p. 598.

⁴⁵ S.O. Smolensky, *O Sobranii Russkikh drevnepyevesheskikh rukopisey v Moskovskom Sinodalnom uchilishe tserkovnago pyeniya* (On the collection of Russian ancient chant manuscripts in the Moscow Synodal Schools of Church Singing), Moscow, 1889, p. 45. (Hereafter Smolensky).

A decisive factor in the establishment of the Ukrainian style of singing was the presence of Ukrainian hierarchs in Russian cathedrals, who, in their dioceses and monasteries, introduced Ukrainian choirs and way of singing, and the school of music in Hlukhiv, with its special task of training singers, soloists, musicians and choirmasters for the imperial court in the first place, set the tone of choral art for the whole of Muscovy. As a result, the old Muscovite style of singing became unfashionable and was suppressed.⁴⁶

II. Scholarship

1. Correction of Liturgical and Religious Books

A major influence of Ukrainian scholarship on Muscovy is connected with the activity of those Ukrainian scholars who, at the invitation of the Tsar, took part in the correction of church books, as a result of which they left in them not only a Ukrainian semantic colouration, but also a definite Ukrainian character. The solidity of their work underlined the authority of Kyivan scholarship and the Kyivan Church, which, to a significant extent, eliminated the influence of the Greeks, who, as late as the beginning of the 17th century, still maintained a permanent presence in Moscow, especially around Patriarch Filaret.⁴⁷

The frequent recopying of church manuscript books in old Muscovy carried out by poorly educated copyists had led to the introduction of many serious errors. Maxim the Greek, who revised and attempted to correct the Muscovite books (in the first half of the 16th century), had found in them so many errors and distortions that they appeared to him to be rather books of the Arian heresy than Orthodox.⁴⁸ The Stoglav Council (1551) confirmed this state of affairs.⁴⁹ The situation did not greatly improve with the appearance of Muscovite printed books, as is evident, for example, from the 1577 *Psalter*, the *Lenten* and *Festal Triodion* of 1590-92, the *Oktoechos* of 1592-94, and the *Service Book* of 1602 from the Moscow printing-house of Andronik Nevyezha. There was no chance of a better result, since there were no model exemplars, while the printers were ill-prepared. The corrector of the printing house, Nasyedka, said, "they performed their prayers according to whatever came into

⁴⁶ For example, Metropolitan T. Lishchynsky, in 1702, in Tobolsk, *Chteniya O IDR*, 1904, book 1, *Smyes.*, pp. 15-16; Kharlampovich, p. 481.

⁴⁷ Kapterev, II, pp. 38-39. In our opinion, Kapterev exaggerated the activity of the Greeks, since, if only due to linguistic difficulties, it could not equal that of the Ukrainians. Cf. Maxim the Greek could not distinguish "siv" from "sydiv". ("Trial of Maxim the Greek...", *Chteniya O IDR*, 1847, book 7, p. 9.

⁴⁸ He corrected the *Book of Hours* and the *Psalter*; he was imprisoned in 1525 and died in prison in the 1530s.

⁴⁹ P. Kazansky, *Ispravleniye Tserkovno-Bogoslužebnykh knig pri Pat. Filaretye* (Correction of the Church-Liturgical Books under Patriarch Filaret), Moscow, p. 2. (Hereafter Kazansky). "They write the Divine Books with incorrect translations, and having written, they do not correct them; they churn out copies... and then books... and study and write from them".

their heads".⁵⁰ It is well-known that neither the attempts of Maxim the Greek, who had linguistic difficulties, nor the attempts of Archimandrite Dionisiy, the elder Arseniy, and the priest I. Nasyedka (who had on the instructions of the Tsar in 1615 to correct the church books "in accordance with the testimony of Holy Writ as the Holy Ghost makes known"⁵¹) improved matters very much. Maxim, accused of heresy, died in prison; Dionisiy, also accused of heresy, was condemned by the Moscow Council of 1618, tortured and, together with Arseniy, put into prison in fetters.⁵² But these attempts, although successful, had nevertheless underlined the problem of errors in the books and had led to a realisation that, as well as overcoming the stubborn resistance of the Muscovite clergy, to carry out this assignment successfully required more knowledge, and in particular knowledge of languages: Greek, Latin, Church Slavonic and Old Slavonic, which neither Maxim the Greek, nor the group of Dionisiy possessed. So Moscow began to turn for help to Kyiv as may be seen from the letter of the Metropolitan of Kyiv, Iov Boretsky, to the Tsar, and from the journey of the learned philologist Pamva Berynda from Kyiv to Moscow in 1624.⁵³ But, apart from discussions, the matter proceeded no further.

The first impact of Ukrainian scholarship on the reality of simple Muscovite church thought which had definite consequences was the dispute between Zyzany and Patriarch Filaret in Moscow in 1627 over the theme of the text and interpretation of Zyzany's *Catechesis*, which the Russians had corrected in accordance with their understanding.⁵⁴

One result of the conviction that for this purpose it was necessary to have Ukrainian theologian-philologists was their formal invitation to Moscow in the "Autocrat's name" by an imperial charter of 1649. This invitation was delivered to the Metropolitan of Kyiv, Sylvester Kosov, who was to "seek out also teachers, who are authors of theological writings and familiar with the Hellene tongue of the ordained-monk Arseniy [Satanovsky] and Damaskin Ptitsky, and send them to him, the great autocrat in Moscow, for a time, to correct the Greek Bible into Slavonic speech" on which Kosov noted that he had sent "To Aleksey Mikhailovich... with the Kyiv elder Theodosiy, the teachers, also Kyiv elders, Arseniy [Satanovsky] and Epiphaniy [Slavinetsky]".⁵⁵

Twenty learned Kyivan monks came after Epiphaniy Slavinetsky⁵⁶ and so began the activity of Ukrainian scholars in Muscovy, which spread far

⁵⁰ IRL, II/2, p. 16.

⁵¹ Kazansky, p. 4.

⁵² Ibid (see *Acts of the Council*), pp. 13, 16.

⁵³ Arkhiv Yugo-Zapadnoy Rossii (Archives of South-West Russia), Archaeographical Commission, Kyiv, 1859), part 1, vol. 6, p. 543. (Hereafter AYuZR).

⁵⁴ *Zasyedanie v knizhnoy palatye v 1627 g. po povodu ispravleniya katikhizisa L. Zizaniya* (Session in the Palace of Books in 1627 in connection with the correction of the Catechesis of Zyzany), Moscow, 1878, p. 10. (Hereafter Zyzany, *Preniye*).

⁵⁵ *AkYuZR*, III (267), pp. 332, 333, 480. (Ptytsky came a year later).

⁵⁶ P. Pekarsky, *Nauka i Literatura v Rossii pri Petre Vel.* (Scholarship and literature in Russia under Peter the Great), St Petersburg, 1862, I, p. 189.

beyond the correction of the text of the Bible even before the time of Patriarch Nikon who in his reforms relied on Ukrainian scholars.

What actually were the errors in the Moscow church books and how were they corrected before the arrival of Epiphaniy Slavinetsky. From the unsuccessful attempts of Dionisiy's group it is known that a) there were errors: 1) in the *Ritual* (1602) there was the surplus phrase "and fire" in "bless this water by Thy Holy Spirit *and fire*"; in other places there were different variants of the same phrase "and grant Thee" and "... We";⁵⁷ 2) The conclusion of the doxology in prayers did not accord with sense, for example, the *Theotokos* was called the mother of "God the Father", and "God in four persons";⁵⁸ 3) in the *Festal Triodion* there was "By the flesh" instead of "with the flesh" and also a confusion in the order of Sundays, the second instead of the third, etc.; 4) there were also errors in the *Oktoechos*, the *Proper of Feasts* and the *Psalter*;⁵⁹ and b) that the Muscovites used the manuscript books of Metropolitan Cyprian⁶⁰ and other Slavonic *Rituals* (they also had four Greek ones) and also the (Ostroh?) Bible of the "Lithuanian printing" and the translations and corrected texts of Maxim the Greek.⁶¹

The eighteen-months work of the Dionisiy group in effect was able to do hardly more than to compare principally the Slavonic texts, of which the Ukrainian ones served as exemplars, since it was cut short by the opposition of the Muscovite clergy and charges of heresy which said "Dionisiy ordered the name of the Holy Trinity in the books to be defaced, and does not acknowledge the Holy Ghost, that He is fire"⁶² so that Patriarch Filaret, although he was sympathetic to their intention, did not dare to introduce the changes (apart from deleting "and fire") until 1625.⁶³ This means that the majority of the errors remained until Slavinetsky, and right up to the time of Nikon, who entrusted the matter to the Ukrainians.⁶⁴

The Kyiv scholars who, led by Slavinetsky and with the blessing of Nikon, corrected the church books, adopted the method of comparing the texts not

⁵⁷ For example, in the prayer for the blessing of water "And do Thou now O Lord bless this water by Thy Holy Spirit and fire"; at the trial it was substantiated that this was a superfluous "addition" in the "Moscow printing" of the *Gospel of St Matthew*, which was absent from the "Lithuanian printing" and "all other good things grant Thee" and "all other good things grant us", Kazansky, pp. 5, 6.

⁵⁸ For example, speaking about one person, in the doxology there was "For Thou art the resurrection and the life, Christ Our God, and to Thee we proclaim Glory to the Father and the Son and the Holy Ghost), *Trebnik* (Ritual) 1602, (chapter 10, 13, 14, 15). Kazansky, pp. 5, 6; Kapterev, II, appendix, no. 9.

⁵⁹ Kazansky, pp. 7, 9. *Plotski* ("fleshly") in "*vo grobye plotski, vo ade zhe s dushoyu*" ("in the grave fleshly, but in hell with the spirit"), Zyzany (*Catechesis*, 1627) had "*s plovuyu*" ("with the flesh"). See *Preniye*, pp. 6, 12. Also, the years were "159" and "150" instead of 149 and 181. See P. Kapterev, *Prilozh.*, ch. 9. There were also numerous less serious mistakes, e.g. "*obshchniki*" instead of "*obyeshchniki*".

⁶⁰ Kazansky, p. 4. Cyprian's *Service Book* of 14 pages. (He was Metropolitan of Kyiv 1376-1406. A Bulgarian by birth, he corrected and put in order the Kyiv church books; he was also in Moscow).

⁶¹ *Ibid*, p. 11.

⁶² *Ibid*, (*Acts of the Council*), p. 13.

⁶³ *Ibid*, p. 18.

⁶⁴ Sergievsky, p. 69; Kharlampovich, pp. 63, 64, 124.

only with old Slavonic ones, as had been done previously, but also with the Greek originals and with Ukrainian redactions,⁶⁵ and, after long toil, in 1663, published in Moscow a corrected version of the entire Bible. Careful analysis of this 1663 Bible, the result of the work of the Slavintsky group, shows that it is for the most part a copy of the Ostroh Bible (1581) including certain Ukrainian linguistic elements.⁶⁶

The majority of the Muscovite church books were corrected in accordance with Kyivan exemplars, and with the presence in Moscow of Slavintsky, there began an important epoch in the history of Ukrainian influences, in which Ukrainian scholarship, becoming dominant in the Muscovite state, imposed its European-Ukrainian imprint on the life of the Muscovite Church and on life as a whole. During the reign of Elizabeth, at the time of the strongest Ukrainian influence on Russia, yet another Bible was published in Moscow in 1751, also the result of the work of Ukrainian scholars, led by Theophilakt Lopatynsky and Stefan Yavorsky, with the participation, during the final review of the manuscripts, of Yakiv Blonnitsky and Ilarion Hryhorovych, and with the final approval in 1747 of the Ukrainian professors of theology Varlaam Lyashevsky and Hedeon Slonimsky, who were brought from Kyiv especially for this purpose.⁶⁷ The text and the language of this Bible, which does not greatly deviate from the text of 1663, with its Ukrainian stress and grammatical forms, have remained as exemplars in Russia to the present time.⁶⁸ The Ukrainian theologians who were called to Moscow to revise the church books corrected them and put them in order in Ukrainian style, following the example of Petro Mohyla.

2. Ukrainian Religious Books in Muscovy

A constant and important source of Ukrainian religious-cultural influence in Muscovy were Ukrainian books, which, multiplying significantly with the spread of printing, penetrated into even the remotest corners of the Muscovite lands, so that, as Prof. Shlyapkin says, "almost every church had some Ukrainian book".⁶⁹ Ukrainian religious books prevailed over Russian ones in the 17th and 18th centuries, not only as regards numbers, but also in authority;

⁶⁵ Kapterev, I, p. 58. ("in Greek and South-Russian editions"). Makary, *Istoriya Rossiyskoy Tserkvi* (History of the Russian Church), St Petersburg, 1857-83, vol. XI, p. 221.

⁶⁶ For example, the replacement of the form of the present participle active masculine singular with the nominative case "-yi" by "-ushchiy" ("syi" — "suchchiy"; "bydyi" — "budushchiy"). See Gennadian Bible (1499). *Sinod*, Job xv, and Bible, 1663, Job xv. 14. See T. Buslayev, *Istoriya Iserkovno-slavyanskago i drevne-russkago yazykov* (History of the Church Slavonic and Old Russian languages), Moscow, 1861, pp. 170, 221.

⁶⁷ S. Smirnov, *Istoriya Moskovskoy Slavyano-Greko-Latinskoy Akademii* (History of the Moscow Slavonic-Greek-Latin Academy), Moscow, 1855, pp. 128, 129. (Hereafter Smirnov, *Acad.*).

⁶⁸ Ohiyenko, p. 104.

⁶⁹ I.A. Shlyapkin, *Sv. Dimitriy Rostovskiy i yego vremya (1651-1709)* (St Dimitriy of Rostov and his time 1651-1709), St Petersburg, 1891, p. 131. (Hereafter Shlyapkin.).

they brought with them the brilliance of Ukrainian preachers, learned scholars, the fame of the Kyiv Mohyla Academy and the prestige of European scholarship, and also the sanctity of the Kyiv Monastery of the Caves which in Moscow was viewed equally with suspicion and envious respect.

Ukrainian books were brought to Muscovy by Ukrainian merchants, monks, and often by the authors themselves; they were also brought by Muscovite merchants.⁷⁰ In addition to a number of manuscript books such as *Esther* (with the *Pentateuch of Moses*) in the Gennadian Bible of 1499, the *Six-Winged Seraphim*, the *Logic*, the *Psalter* of the 15-16th centuries of the sect of "Judaizers", which (as linguistic features show) came from the Ukrainian lands,⁷¹ also the first Ukrainian printed books the *Oktoechos* and *Book of Hours* (Cracow, 1491) of Shvaipolt Fiol and the Ostroh Bible (1581) were known in Moscow, and, as the Archimandrite Leonid asserts, until 1629, since they had no printed service books of their own, in Moscow they made use of the Lviv, Ostroh and Vilna editions.⁷²

The popularity of Ukrainian religious-polemic works in Moscow in the 17th century is attested by Russian copies of the works of Ivan Vyshensky and numerous *Collections*. For example, the book *History of the Council of Lystra of 1598* (of Klirik of Ostroh) was used by I.A. Khvorostinin in the *Tale of Weeping* and the *Address against the Heretics*⁷³ of 1625-26, the works of Vyshensky, Zyzany (*Sermons of St. Cyril*, Vilna, 1596), Zakhariy Kopystensky (*On the one Faith*) and Vasyl of Ostroh (*The Didactyl Blessing*) came out in the widely known *Book of St. Cyril* (Moscow, 1644),⁷⁴ while ten chapters of Zakhariy Kopystensky's *Palinodia* (1618-21) and his Kyiv *Book on the Faith* were included in the Moscow edition of the *Book on the Faith* (Moscow, 1648),⁷⁵ while the *Book on Icons and the Cross* (Vilna, 1607) appeared in the Moscow *Collections*.⁷⁶

Zyzany's uncensored *Catechesis* was widely used in the 17th century by the Old Believers, and in the 18th century it was reprinted three times. Officially the Muscovite Church used the *Small Catechesis* of 1648, an abridged reprinting of the Mohyla *Catechesis* (1645).⁷⁷ From Mohyla's *Large Ritual* (*Euchologion*, 1646), the chapter "On the sacrament of matrimony", which Mohyla had taken

⁷⁰ IRL, II/2, p. 12; AkYuZR, III, part 2, p. 6. (In 1638 the priest Pafnutiy brought to Putivl 24 Ukrainian books and the *Teaching Gospel* of Kyrylo Trankvilion Stavrovetsky from the Hustynsky monastery in Pryluky).

⁷¹ A.I. Sobolevsky, *Perevodnaya literatura Mosk. r. 14-17 v.* (Translated literature of 14-17th century Muscovy), St Petersburg, 1903, pp. 401-409, 410-412, 413-419, 424-428; Buslayev, p. 943; IRL, II/1, p. 380; II/2, p. 425.

⁷² *Sluzhebniki Vilenskoj Pechati* (Service Books of the Vilna press), Pam.DPI, St Petersburg, 1882, p. 12.

⁷³ IRL, II/2, pp. 14, 17.

⁷⁴ Kapterev. *Opp.*, pp. 81, 93.

⁷⁵ Russkaya Istoricheskaya Biblioteka (Russian Historical Library), IV, pp. 22-23. (Hereafter RIB); Kapterev, *Opp.* p. 16.

⁷⁶ Ibid, p. 11, IRL, II/2, p. 14.

⁷⁷ Kapterev, *Opp.*, p. 18.

from Catholic *Rituals* was reprinted in the Moscow *Rule Book* of 1649-50.⁷⁸ Ukrainian books of Canon Law were known and widely used in Moscow: those of Pamva Berynda (Kyiv Monastery of the Caves, 1629). It may be seen from this that the Moscow books of Canon Law of 1639 and 1651 were little more than copies of the Kyiv editions of 1624, including the preface, where the name of Kopystensky is replaced by that of Patriarch Iosif, while the *Canon Law of Nikon* (1658) is based on the second and third Kyiv editions.⁷⁹

Very widely known in Moscow were the controversial *Teaching Gospel* of Kyrylo Trankvilion Stavrovetsky (Pochayiv, 1618) and *The Mirror of Theology* (Rakhmaniv, 1619). Of these, *The Mirror of Theology* was translated into Russian on 16 June 1674,⁸⁰ while the *Gospel* circulated in manuscript form as the *Holy Book*. In 1674, in the Cathedral of the Assumption, Patriarch Ioakim himself read the homily from it, and as late as 1730 it was in use in Russian churches.⁸¹

Ukrainian authors visiting Moscow often presented their works with a dedication to the Tsar, the Patriarch and other persons. Thus Kopystensky in 1623 sent his *Conversations of St John Chrysostom* to the Tsar, the Patriarch, State Secretary Olabev and the governor of Putivl; Berynda in 1624 brought his *Conversations... on the Acts of the Apostles*. Zyzany in 1626-27 sent the Tsar and the Patriarch the *Conversations... on the Epistles of St Paul* (which he himself had translated from Greek; Kyiv, 1623) and the *Catechism*; Lazar Baranovych in 1666 sent *The Sword of the Spirit*, which was officially distributed by the Muscovite Church;⁸² Inokentiy Gizel in 1669 sent *The World with God-made-Man*; his *Synopsis* (Kyiv Monastery of the Caves, 1676), was reissued five times. *The Trumpets of the Word* (1674) of Lazar Baranovych, the *Paterikon* of the Kyiv Monastery of the Caves (1661) and especially Ioanikiy Galyatovsky's *Righteous Messiah, New Heaven* (Lviv, 1668), and *The Key of Understanding* (1659, 1665), the latter two of which were translated into Russian, were very popular in Moscow.⁸³ There were also numerous translations, such as Theodosiy Safonovych's *Discourse on the Holy Church* (Kyiv, 1668) and the great Moscow translation from Polish, made by Ukrainians, of *The Great Mirror* (1677), in which Catholic elements are transformed into Orthodox, e.g. "the Pope" was replaced by "the Patriarch".⁸⁴

After Slavynetsky's *Acts of the Council* (1660), religious books from Ukrainian printing-houses or authors who had settled in Moscow and were running the

⁷⁸ Shlyapkin, pp. 127-128. (As late as 1692, Afanasiy Lyubimov, Archbishop of Kholmogory, used this *Ritual*).

⁷⁹ A.S. Pavlov, *Nomokanon pri bolsbom Trebnike* (The Nomocanon in the large Ritual), Moscow, 1897, p. 63; Kharlampovich, p. 113.

⁸⁰ Buslayev, *Khrist*. pp. 1030-31.

⁸¹ *IRL*, II/2, p. 149; Kharlampovich, p. 112; Shlyapkin, p. 124. (The priest of Orlov knew it by heart).

⁸² Kharlampovich, pp. 102, 103, 108; *IRL*, II, p. 146.

⁸³ Shlyapkin, p. 129; *IRL*, II, pp. 141, 146; Kharlampovich, p. 426; Brueckner, p. 216.

⁸⁴ *RI*B, V, pp. 749-50; Eyngorn, III, p. 788; *IRL*, II/2, pp. 408, 409, 410. (Work of the Jesuits *Speculum Magnum Exemplorum*, 1605).

Church, held a dominant position in Muscovy for a long time. Among the numerous works of Dimitriy, Metropolitan of Rostov, such as the *Christmas Comedy* (1702), the *Investigation of the Schismatic Faith of Bryn* (1708-9), his *Refreshing Dew* (1683) was reprinted eight times; his *Proper with Saints' Lives* (Kyiv Monastery of the Caves, 1684-1705) became a basic work of reference of the Moscow scholars; Poshoshkov called *The Stone of Faith* (1722-28) of Stefan Yavorsky (the deputy Patriarch) a "Holy book", and recommended it to his son.⁸⁵ The *Spiritual Regulations*, the *Codex of the Russian Church*, and other works of Theophan Prokopovich, Slavinetsky (*The Dinner of the Soul*, 1681, *The Supper of the Soul*, 1683) and Simeon of Polotsk (*Metrical Psalter*, 1680) and numerous *Collections* of Ukrainian homilies were read throughout the whole Muscovite state.

The demand for books is attested by the trade in them in Moscow. For example, in 1655 in the Ukrainian bookshop in Moscow the Patriarch bought 98 *Layman's Prayerbooks*, 100 *Psalters*, a *Ritual*, a *Book of Hours*, published by the Kyiv Monastery of the Caves. In 1673, the Kyiv Monastery of the Caves sent 800 books, some 31 religious titles from printing houses in Kyiv, Lviv, Kremenets and other cities, to Moscow.⁸⁶ Further evidence of this demand is the reprinting of books in Moscow, starting in 1637 with the Lviv *Trefolion* (Kyiv, 1618) and other Ukrainian books, like the *Small Catechism of Mohyla* (Kyiv, 1645), reprinted in 1648; the Lviv edition (1614) of St. John Chrysostom's *On the Priesthood*, reprinted in 1664; Mohyla's *Service Book Ritual* (1646), reprinted in 1680; the *Book of Hours* (Chernihiv, 1679), reprinted in 1682; Mohyla's *Orthodox Confession of the Faith* (1640), reprinted in 1696; the *Collection of Homilies* of Kyrylo Trankvilion Stavrovetsky, reprinted in 1696; and *St John Chrysostom's Pearl* (Ostroh, 1595), reprinted in 1697.⁸⁷

3. Numerical Strength of Ukrainian Books in Muscovy

Analysing the registers of printing houses, bibliographical materials, and catalogues of libraries, we have an approximate picture of the numerical strength of Ukrainian books in Muscovy:

a) According to Karatayev,⁸⁸ before 1600, 13 editions of books were printed in Moscow; from Ukrainian printing houses and by Ukrainian authors, there were 50; Ukrainian-Belarusian — 9; Belarusian — 12; almost all the Ukrainian and Belarusian books were of a religious character and well-known in Moscow.

⁸⁵ IRL, II/2, p. 89.

⁸⁶ Eyngorn, III, pp. 605-7; IV, p. 870; Kharlampovich, pp. 441, 442-3.

⁸⁷ This analysis is partly based on the *Kratkoye opisaniye Ross. uchenoy istorii* (Brief description of Russian scholarly history) see Damaskin, Pam.DRI, St Petersburg, 1881. (Hereafter Damaskin). Moscow reprints of Ukrainian books were characterised by the fact that in the "prefatory compliments" the only change was that the name of the Patriarch of Moscow replaced that of the author.

⁸⁸ I. Karatayev, *Opisanie Slavyano-Russkikh Knig, napechatanykh kirilovskimi bukvami, 1491-1660* (Description of Slavonic-Russian Books printed in Cyrillic letters, 1491-1660), St Petersburg, 1878. (Hereafter Karatayev).

b) In the bibliography of Slavinetsky, compiled before 1676,⁸⁹ out of a total of 204 books, 24 were from Ukrainian printing houses or by Ukrainian authors; however if we include the almost 100 works by Slavinetsky himself, then over 50 per cent of the books were by Ukrainian authors.

c) According to the aforesaid work of Bishop Damaskin, between 1590 and 1698, in Muscovy there were 286 Moscow editions of various books in circulation, 250 Ukrainian books, and 31 Belarusian ones.

d) According to Rodosky's account, Ukrainian books accounted for 48 per cent of the Slavonic books (printed up to 1784) of the library of the St Petersburg Theological Academy.⁹⁰

e) In the "Moscow Synodal School of Church Singing" Simeon of Smolensk found 68 Ukrainian *Great Irmologia*, published by the Pochayiv Basilians and spread "in the north of Russia by Ukrainian bishops".⁹¹

The power of the Ukrainian books, which overthrew the obsolescent Muscovite religious views, is also attested by the persecution of these books in Moscow; Moscow endeavoured unsuccessfully to fight off the cultural offensive of Ukraine, regarded as a threat, by condemnations issued by Councils and the public burning of Ukrainian religious books. In addition to the Decrees of 1627 and 1672, the Council of Moscow of 1690, under the leadership of Patriarch Ioakim, condemned and forbade the works of: Simeon of Polotsk, Petro Mohyla, Lazar Baranovych, Kyrylo Trankvilion Stavrovetsky, Ioanikiy Galyatovsky, Antony Radyvyl'sky, and even Epiphaniy Slavinetsky, in the name of "defending" Orthodoxy "from the Latin errors which the new Kyivan books assert".⁹²

In spite of all impediments, in the 16-18th centuries Ukrainian religious books survived and occupied a very important position in Muscovy. They accounted for almost two thirds of all Slavonic books in the then state of Muscovy-Russia: they were officially prescribed for use in Russian dioceses by Ukrainian bishops⁹³ and decrees of the Holy Synod.⁹⁴ They led to the spread and consolidation of Ukrainian theological learning and the authority and competence of Ukrainian ideas, and were a permanent seedbed of Ukrainian culture in Moscow.

⁸⁹ V. Undolsky, *Oglavleniye knig, kto ikh slozbil* (Tables of contents of books, who compiled them), Moscow, 1846.

⁹⁰ A. Rodosky, *Polnoye opisaniye staropechatnykh tserkovno-slavyanskikh knig v bibliotekye SPB Dukhovnoy Akademii* (Complete description of old printed Old Slavonic Books in the Library of the St Petersburg Theological Library), St Petersburg, 1884, appendix no. 24.

⁹¹ S. Smolensky, *O sobranii russkikh drevnepycheskiikh rukopisey* (On the collection of Russian ancient chant manuscripts), Moscow, 1899. (Hereafter Smolensky).

⁹² Ohiyenko, p. 141.

⁹³ *Dariush gryeshnogo ieromonakha Dimitriya [Rostovskogo]* (Diary of the sinful ordained monk Dimitriy of Rostov), *Drevnyaya Rossiiskaya Vivliofika*, XVII, Moscow, 1791, p. 90. ("...for the opinion of all as to how the Sacred Mysteries of Christ are to be performed, let every priest look in the *Great Kyiv Ritual*" [Manual for the clergy]).

⁹⁴ Decree of the Holy Synod of 15.2.1832 (Zabelin, *Catalogue of books ... for the guidance of priests*, Kyiv, 1888, pp. 112-113, 118), prescribes the *Cheti Miney* (Proper of Feasts), the *Book of Lessons*, the *Collected Works* of St Dimitriy of Rostov, Petro Mohyla's *Profession of the Orthodox Faith*, Prokopovich's *Spiritual Regulations*.

4. Education, Schooling, Libraries

While in the lay aspect of the development of learning and scholarly activity there were and remained traces of Western (Polish, German, etc.) influence, in the church-religious sphere, after the removal of Greek influences, the Ukrainian line was utterly dominant: the Ukrainian system of education and schooling was transplanted in Muscovy, and the principal role in it was played by scholar monks who were called from Ukraine for this purpose in their hundreds.

In the old Muscovite state of the 15-17th centuries, education, as is known from the Stoglav Council (1551) and from the testimonies of foreign visitors, was a rare phenomenon, and the education of priests, in the best instances, went no further than learning (by heart) the alphabet, prayers and some portions of the New Testament; at the same time in Ukraine, from the 16th century onward, almost every village had its brotherhood school, and the priests, as Paul of Aleppo said (in the 17th century), knew logic, and philosophy; there were also libraries.⁹⁵

The initiative to organise schools in Muscovy came, albeit at first unsuccessfully, from Ukraine (Petro Mohyla in 1640), and the way was then paved by the teaching activity of Epiphaniy Slavinetsky and Simeon of Polotsk.⁹⁶

Ukrainian education was a synthesis of Western and partially Byzantine elements with a Slavonic colouring — it was more acceptable to the Muscovites than other systems, and perhaps for that reason, after the unsuccessful attempts of the Lykhudy brothers, in 1699-1700 Peter I appointed Stefan Yavorsky Protector of the Moscow schools, as a consequence of which the Moscow Academy was shortly afterwards reorganised on the lines of the Kyiv Mohyla Academy⁹⁷ and a further part of schooling and education came into Ukrainian hands.

The consequences were so far-reaching that for more than half a century the top posts of the Moscow Academy were almost exclusively in Ukrainian hands. For example, in the period 1700-62, out of 21 rectors, 18 were Ukrainians, out of 25 prefects, 21 were Ukrainians, one a Serb from Kyiv, and three were Russians; up to 1757 the rectors, and up to 1753, the prefects were exclusively Ukrainians.⁹⁸ In 1711 (according to the writings of the Dutch ambassador to Moscow, Julius Joost, which listed the names), all the professors were Ukrainians;⁹⁹ for a long time, the professors of theology, and

⁹⁵ Rushchinsky, pp. 176, 177.

⁹⁶ *AkYuZR*, II, p. 39, ("Journey of abbot Starushych to Moscow"), Smirnov. *Akad.* p. 5.

⁹⁷ Smirnov, *Akad.* pp. 80-81. The Kyiv Mohyla College (on the model of the Zamojski [1594] and the Jagiellonian [1400] on the Oxford system) received the title of Academy from Peter I in 1701. It was established as a result of Petro Mohyla's reform of the higher school in 1631; the latter having developed in 1615 out of the Fraternal School, which had existed in Kyiv since 1589. See: Askochensky, *Kyivska Akademiya* (The Kyiv Academy), I. pp. 58, 60. *Moskovska Akademiya vid 1687 r.* (The Moscow Academy since 1687).

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 205-11; Kharlampovich, pp. 651-652, 666, 649.

⁹⁹ V.N. Perets, *Istor. Liter. Izsled. i Mater.* (Histor. Liter. Res. i Mater.), I, St Petersburg, 1900, p. 208. During the period 1700-62, there were about 95 Ukrainian professors and about 20-25 Russians. (Kharlampovich, pp. 665-6).

even the students, due to a shortage of Russians, were Ukrainian, so that the Moscow Academy became not only a copy of the Kyiv Academy in the structural system, but the Ukrainian spirit, programme, customs and terminology (such as "rector", "prefect", "exercises", "conclusions", "disputes" etc.) became rooted in it. With the spread of the Ukrainian system of schooling, Ukrainians, who had a position of near monopoly in religious scholarship, brought into use their own catechisms and textbooks.¹⁰⁰

By 1721 Ukrainians had taken over the leadership of the Holy Synod. This is attested by the composition of its members (for example, in 1721, out of a total of 11 members, five were Ukrainians, including the president and vice presidents, 4 were Russians, one a Serb and one a Greek; in 1746, out of 8 members, six were Ukrainians; in 1751, out of 10 members, 9 were Ukrainians; and in 1761, out of 7 members, 4 were Ukrainians.¹⁰¹ As a result, the Ukrainians introduced into Muscovy, in accordance with the Ukrainian level, the demand of high qualifications for candidates for the priesthood and episcopate, establishing, as early as the time of Stefan Yavorsky, the post of Examiner of Candidates, which, right up to 1760, was exclusively filled by Ukrainians.¹⁰² These conditions meant that, up to the time of Catherine II, successful candidates to higher church posts were almost all Ukrainian.¹⁰³

The schools which the Ukrainian bishops began to found in their sees, as, for instance, Dimitriy of Rostov in Rostov from 1702 onwards, and Metropolitan Lishchynsky in Tobolsk from 1702 onwards (likewise on the Ukrainian model), established a system of clerical schools, so that in the Synodal period (1721-50)¹⁰⁴ there was already an entire network of clerical schools (26 religious seminaries) with a Ukrainian teaching staff.¹⁰⁵

Regarding the influence of the scholarly activity of Ukrainian scholar-bishops, one must also mention that by their personal examples they inaugurated a system of church and lay libraries in Muscovy: the great private libraries of, for example, Dimitriy of Rostov, Iosyf Turoboysky (Rector of the Moscow Academy), Havryil Buzhynsky, Stefan Yavorsky (547 volumes), Theophilakt Lopatynsky (1,416 volumes), Theophan Prokopovich (about 30,000 volumes) formed the basis of the Synodal Moscow and St Petersburg libraries.¹⁰⁶

For a long time, as priors, archimandrites and abbots, Ukrainians made it possible to raise the level of monastic life and monasteries in Muscovy.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁰ Smirnov, *Akad.*, pp. 116-18.

¹⁰¹ Kharlampovich, pp. 471, 487.

¹⁰² *Izvestiya Oryas*, 1907, book 3, pp. 297, 299; Kharlampovich, pp. 633-4.

¹⁰³ Kharlampovich, pp. 486, 489; Decrees of Elizabeth, 1754, and Catherine II, 1765, on equal rights of Ukrainians and Russians to become bishops and succession of monasteries.

¹⁰⁴ Prokopovich's *Dukhovnyi Reglament* (Spiritual Regulations), pp. 31, 36, 39, already speaks officially of schools, "houses of learning" and libraries.

¹⁰⁵ Kharlampovich, pp. 633-4, 636.

¹⁰⁶ Brueckner, p. 198.

¹⁰⁷ Kharlampovich, p. 561. There were two hundred Ukrainian priors in the period 1721-50; of the 21 priors of the Zaikonospasky Monastery in Moscow mentioned by Kharlampovich (pp. 570-71), 19 were Ukrainians.

III. Language

A strong Ukrainian influence became apparent also in the Russian ecclesiastical and literary languages, which were to a great extent shaped by Ukrainians. Leaving aside morphological and other Ukrainian features in Russian ecclesiastical language (even in the *Grammar* of Lomonosov, 1755, derived from the *Grammar* of Meletiy Smotrytsky, Vilna, 1619, reprinted in Moscow in 1648), we will deal only with Ukrainian phonetic characteristics.

The long, direct and exemplary contact of a great number of Ukrainian priests, bishops, monks, singers, and preachers with Russians in Muscovite churches, schools, seminaries and monasteries introduced and established in Russian speech a number of Ukrainian phonetic features: the pronunciation of "r" as "h" in words such as, for example, "*Hospod'*, *blabosloviti*,"¹⁰⁸ the pronunciation of the stressed "é" as "e" instead of the Russian "yo" (ё) and even Ъ as "i", and also Ukrainian stress. That these characteristic Ukrainian phonetic features, preserved even now by the older Russian upper strata, must have been widespread in Russian is attested by the 18th century proposal (by Trediyakovsky and Adodurov) to codify the situation by the use of separate letters for "g" and "h" as in Ukrainian.¹⁰⁹

According to certain authoritative 18th century Russian sources, we have *inter alia* some very interesting remarks about the Ukrainian role in the spread of these words in the Russian language. Although neither Lomonosov nor Trediyakovsky, in speaking about these sounds, drew any connection between their appearance or origin in the Russian language and the Ukrainian language influence, nevertheless, it is interesting that Lomonosov and Sumarokov considered correct the customary appearance of such pronunciations in church usage. The theory that the origin of this sound lies in South-Russian dialects is put into doubt by the very fact that it was connected for the most part only with a certain group of words, in church rather than popular use, as is evident from the list given by Lomonosov in 1755: in the oblique cases of the word "*Bob*" (God), "*Boha*", "*Bohu*", "*Bobom*", "*Bohy*", "*Bobovi*", etc., in the words "*Hospod'*" (Lord), "*blas*" (voice), "*blabo*" (good), and their derivatives "*hosudar*" (ruler), "*hosudarstvo*" (state), "*hospodin*" (master), "*hospodstvuyu*" (I rule), "*rozhlashayu*" (I disseminate), "*blabodat'*", (to thank), "*blaboslovlyayu*" (I praise), "*blabodaryu*" (I thank).¹¹⁰ To these one may also add "*hrad*" (city), "*hrob*" (grave), "*holub*" (dove), and the genitive singular masculine of the following adjectives: "*svyataho*" (of the holy), "*dobrado*" (of the good), "*slepaho*" (of the blind), "*tobo*" (of this), "*moyeho*" (my). These are

¹⁰⁸ M. Lomonosov, *Rossiyskaya Grammatika* (Russian Grammar), St Petersburg, 1755, parag. 99, p. 48. (Hereafter Lomonosov).

¹⁰⁹ V. Trediyakovsky, *Razgovor... ob ortografii starinnoy i novoy* (Rules... on orthography old and new), St Petersburg, 1748. ("...in our alphabet, one of the consonants is lacking, namely... one corresponding to the Latin 'g' before a, o, u; moreover, it is quite beyond doubt that all we Russians pronounce our g like Latin 'h'..."), pp. 380-81, 382-83. Adodourow, e.g. E. Weissmann, *Teutsch-Lat. u. Russ. Lexicon samt denen Anfangs-Gruenden der Russ. Sprache*, St Petersburg, 1731.

¹¹⁰ Lomonosov, p. 48.

not the kind of words to be carried over from dialects. Moreover, the pronunciation of the Moscow dialect and literary language adopted the phonetic system of the North-Russian dialects in which the sound "h" does not exist.

This could not be a relic of the old Church-Slavonic language, as Lomonosov explained it,¹¹¹ for in this the pronunciation of "r" as "h" did not occur, but only a partial relic of the old Kyiv church pronunciation, which did have "r" = "h", and which, according to Shakhmatov and Gens'orsky,¹¹² in the 17th and 18th centuries exerted a strong Ukrainian influence on the Moscow Church and renewed and propagated this sound in Russian speech in the widest sense. One must be permitted to believe Trediakovsky, that in the pronunciation of the upper strata of Moscow in the 18th century "r" = "h" prevailed over "r" = "g", and that this was extended even to foreign words, cf. frequently in the prepositional case of "Peterburg", one had "Peterburkhe" with the ending "-khe" instead of "-ke" or "-ge".

To a certain extent, the connection of Ukrainian with these phonetic features in Russian was noticed by Sumarokov, when he said that "r" in Slavonic speech is pronounced like the Latin "h", but in the speech of the common people like the Latin "g", explaining, first and foremost, that the significance of these sounds "you will soon know when you listen to a church service and the speech of the common people".¹¹³ The language of the "church service" was connected with Ukrainian. Discussing the phonetic significance of the pronunciation of "ѣ" as "i" for example, "*vo viky*" ("for ages"), which he himself was inclined to accept rather than "*vo veki*", Sumarokov clearly sees the Ukrainians as the cause of this phenomenon in Russian speech, because, as he says, "to our shame, our most learned clerics were all Little Russians [*Malorossiyantsy*]", almost up to the present time, ruling over us like autocrats" and accordingly, "all the clergy, blindly followed their incorrect and provincial pronunciation", and furthermore, that "all the schools were full of them: such provincialisms took root as *vsibdy*, *tebe*, *mya*, and other Little Russian pronunciations". The same Sumarokov further asserts that from Ukrainian pronunciations such as "*lita*" (years) instead of "*lyeta*", "*tilko*" (only) instead of "*tolko*", and because "the Little Russians [*Malorossiyantsy*]" often sing '*Tebi Hospódy*' [To Thee, O Lord] and '*Hospódy pomylúy*' [Lord, have mercy], instead of '*Tebe Góspodi*' and '*Góspody pomiluy*'... much has already been accepted".¹¹⁴

¹¹¹ Ibid., p. 48. "The letter g is pronounced in different ways: l. like foreign h, this originates from the Slavonic language".

¹¹² A.A. Shakhmatov, *Ocherki sovremennoy russkoy literaturnoy yazyky* (Outlines of modern literary Russian), Moscow, 1941, p. 91. A.I. Hensyorsky, "Traditsyi pivdenorus'koyi (kyivskoyi) fonetyky v literaturniy vymovi Pivnichnoyi Rus'i do kintsya 18 stol." (Traditions of Southern-Rus' [Kyivan] phonetics in the literary pronunciation of Northern Rus' up to the end of the 18th century), *Pytannya Slovyanskoho Movoznavstva*, book 5, Lviv, 1958, p. 202.

¹¹³ A.P. Sumarokov, "Nastavlenie uchenikam" (Instructions for Pupils), *Sochineniya*, X, p. 49.

¹¹⁴ A.P. Sumarokov, "O pravopisanii" (On orthography), 1748, *Sochineniya*, X, pp. 24, 26. Ohiyenko (p. 107) asserts, following Tymkovsky, that in the court churches of the 18th century, Ukrainian pronunciation was "even official".

From this, one may conclude that by the middle of the 18th century Russian scholars were aware, and quite rightly so, of the great and various changes in the Russian church and lay languages due to Ukrainian influence. This state of affairs could hardly have been different, when one considers that this language was launched into the world by such great Ukrainian theologians as Epiphaniy Slavynetsky, Dimitriy Tuptalo of Rostov, Stefan Yavorsky, Simeon of Polotsk, Theophilakt Lishchynsky, Theophilakt Lopatynsky, Theophan Prokopovich, and hundreds of others.

Conclusions

With the broad and long-lasting cultural activity by Ukrainians in the Muscovite-Russian state which we have described above, and also the personal impact of Ukrainian theologians on Muscovite spirituality during the theological disputes;¹¹⁵ with the reforms of rituals and customs (prostrations, the tridactylic blessing) introduced during the time of Nikon on the example of the Ukrainian Church (confession, consecration of priests); with old Ukrainian traditions practised in Muscovy (writing of Chronicles, pilgrimages to the Holy Land and various *Pilgrimage Books* in literature); with the Ukrainian traces in material culture (the vestments of cathedral singers,¹¹⁶ Ukrainian customs regarding episcopal mitres with crosses,¹¹⁷ including icons and grave-monuments¹¹⁸), Ukrainian religious-cultural influences and their traces in the life of the Moscow Church in the spiritual and material aspects were profound, clear-cut and significant, more than most scholars are prepared to recognise.

This review of the above aspects, which constitute only a small part of the entirety of Ukrainian religious-cultural influences on Moscow, allows us to conclude that Ukraine played a great role in the creation of the culture of Russia, and made a great contribution to its enlightenment. It brought order to Russian church life and brought the Russian Church significantly closer to the Ukrainian.

Moscow, stronger in the military sense, was, for a certain time, subordinated to culturally stronger Ukraine: in the religious and cultural facets there remain permanent traces. ■

¹¹⁵ Zyzany, *Preniye* (Dispute on Purgatory), p. 10.

¹¹⁶ K. S-sky, *Ukrainskoye proiskhozhdeniye pyevcheskikh kostyumov v katedralnykh kbramakh Rossii* (Ukrainian origin of singers' costumes in the cathedral churches of Russia), *Ukrainskaya Zhizn*, Moscow, 1913, no. 7-8, pp. 116-117.

¹¹⁷ Eyngorn, II, p. 390. (At the Council in Moscow in 1666 the Ukrainian bishops, Baranovych and Methodius, were pressed to take off the crosses from their mitres, since in the Muscovite Church only the Patriarch was allowed one).

¹¹⁸ Shlyapkin, p. 63.

Literature**FIVE POLITICAL POEMS***Taras Shevchenko*

Taras Shevchenko (1814-1861), the 180th anniversary of whose birth is being celebrated in March this year, is revered as the national poet of Ukraine, not only for the profound love of Ukraine, its people, traditions, landscape and folklore which pervades his lyric works, but also for the seminal role which his poetry played in forming and forging the national consciousness of the modern Ukrainian nation.

At the peak of his poetic career, in the mid-1840s, he produced several major works, which commented bitterly, sometimes in symbolic form, sometimes in overt political criticism, on the plight of Ukraine, incorporated into the Russian empire over half a century previously, and now suffering ever-increasing attacks on and erosion of its native traditions, under the policy of monoculturalism favoured by Tsar Nicholas I. These works, which could not, of course, be published, nevertheless circulated in manuscript form, and their content told heavily against the poet, when, in 1847, he was arrested together with fellow-members of the clandestine pan-Slavist "Brotherhood of Sts Cyril and Methodius". To the court sentence condemning the poet to 25 years penal service in the army, the Tsar added, in his own handwriting, "with a prohibition on writing or painting". Although this ban was not always strictly enforced, so that he not only managed from time to time to write clandestinely, but was also, for a time, employed making sketches for a military survey of the Aral Sea area, nevertheless, the harsh conditions of life as a penal soldier told heavily on the poet. He was reprieved in 1857 (although forbidden to reside in Ukraine) but died less than four years later, worn out by suffering, one day after his 47th birthday.

The selection of poems published here commences with his most overt political message to his fellow Ukrainians, the "Friendly Epistle", of 1845. This is followed by an untitled work from 1850 — perhaps the "blackest" of all his prison and exile poems, and finally, three works from his final years in St Petersburg.

V.R.

To My Fellow-Countrymen, in Ukraine and Not in Ukraine,
Living, Dead and as yet Unborn

MY FRIENDLY EPISTLE

*If a man say, I love God, and hateth his brother,
he is a liar.*

I John iv, 20.

Dusk is falling, dawn is breaking,
And God's day is ending,
Once again a weary people
And all things are resting.
Only I, like one accursed,
Night and day stand weeping
At the many-peopled cross-roads,
And yet no one sees me.
No one sees me, no one knows,
Deaf, they do not hearken,
They are trading with their fetters,
Using truth to bargain,
And they all neglect the Lord, —
In heavy yokes they harness
People; thus they plough disaster,
And they sow disaster...
But what shoots spring up? You'll see
What the harvest yields them!
Shake your wits awake, you brutes,
You demented children!
Look upon your native country,
On this peaceful eden;
Love with overflowing heart
This expanse of ruin!
Break your chains, and live as brothers!
Do not try to seek,
Do not ask in foreign lands
For what can never be
Even in heaven, let alone
In a foreign region...
In one's own house, — one's own truth,
One's own might and freedom.

There is no other Ukraina,
No second Dnipro in the world,
Yet you strike out for foreign regions,
To seek, indeed, the blessed good,
The holy good, and freedom, freedom,
Fraternal brotherhood. ... You found
And carried from that foreign region,
And to Ukraine brought, homeward-bound,
The mighty power of mighty words,
And nothing more than that. ... You scream, too,
That God, creating you, did not mean you
To worship untruth, then, once more,
You bow down as you bowed before,
And once again they very skin you
Tear from your sightless, peasant brothers,
Then, to regard the sun of truth
In places not unknown, you shove off
To German lands. If only you'd
Take all your miserable possessions,
The goods your ancestors have stolen,
Then with its holy heights, the Dnipro
Would remain bereft, an orphan.

Ah, if it could be that you would not return,
That you'd give up the ghost in the place you were reared,
The children would weep not, nor mother's tears burn,
And God would not hear your blaspheming and sneers,
The sun pour no warmth out upon the foul dunghill,
Over a land that is free, broad and true,
Then folk would not realise what kind of eagles
You are, and would not shake their heads over you.

Find your wits! Be human beings,
For evil is impending,
Very soon the shackled people
Will their chains be rending;
Judgment will come, and then shall speak
The mountains and the Dnipro,
And in a hundred rivers, blood
Will flow to the blue ocean,
Your children's blood ... and there will be
No one to help you ... Brother
Will by his brother be renounced,
The child by its own mother.
And like a cloud, dark smoke will cover
The bright sun before you,

For endless ages your own sons
Will curse you and abhor you.
Wash your faces! God's fair image
Do not foul with filth!
Do not deceive your children that
They live upon this earth
Simply that they should rule as lords —
For an unlearned eye
Will deeply search their very souls,
Deeply, thoroughly...
For whose skin you're wearing, helpless
Mites will realise,
They will judge you, — and the unlearned
Will deceive the wise.

* * *

Had you but learned they way you ought,
Then wisdom also would be yours;
But thus to heaven you would climb:
"We are not we, I am not I!
I have seen all, all things I know:
There is no hell, there is no heaven,
Not even God, but only I and
The stocky German, clever-clever,
And no one else beside... ." "Good, brother!
But who, then, are you?"

"We don't know —

Let the German speak!"

That's they way you learn in your
Foreign land, indeed!
The German would say: "You are Mongols".
"Mongols, that is plain!"
Yes, the naked grandchildren
Of golden Tamburlaine!
The German would say: "You are Slavs".
"Slavs, yes, Slavs indeed!"
Of great and glorious ancestors
The unworthy seed!
And so you read Kollar, too,
With all your might and main,
Safarik as well, and Hanka,
Full-tilt you push away
Into the Slavophils, all tongues

Of the Slavonic race
You know full well, but of your own
Nothing! "There'll come a day
When we can parley in our own
When the German teaches,
And, what is more, our history
Explains to us and preaches,
Then we will set about it all!"

You've made a good beginning,
Following the German precepts
You have started speaking
So that the German cannot grasp
The sense, the mighty teacher,
Not to mention simple people.
And uproar! And the screeching:
"Harmony and power too,
Nothing less than music!
As for history! Of a free
Nation 'tis the epic...
Can't compare with those poor Romans!
Their Bruti — good-for-nothings!
But oh *our* Coclezes and Bruti —
Glorious, unforgotten!
Freedom herself grew up with us,
And in the Dnipro bathed,
She had mountains for her pillow,
And for her quilt — the plains!"
It was in blood she bathed herself,
She took her sleep on piles
Of the corpses of free Cossacks,
Corpses all despoiled.

Only look well, only read
That glory through once more,
From the first word to the last,
Read; do not ignore
Even the least apostrophe,
Not one comma even,
Search out the meaning of it all,
Then ask yourself the question:
"Who are we? Whose sons? Of what sires?
By whom and why enchained?"
And then, indeed, you'll see for what
Are your Bruti famed:

Toadies, slaves, the filth of Moscow,
Warsaw's garbage — are your lords,
Illustrious hetmans! Why so proud
And swaggering, then do you boast, you
Sons of Ukraine and her misfortune?
That well you know to wear the yoke,
More than your fathers did of yore?
They are flaying you, — cease your boasts —
From *them*, at times, the fat they'd thaw.

You boast, perhaps, the Brotherhood
Defended the faith of old?
Because they boiled their dumplings in
Sinope, Trezibond?
It is true, they ate their fill,
But now your stomach's dainty,
And in the Sich, the clever German
Plants his beds of 'taties;
And you buy, and with good relish
Eat what he has grown,
And you praise the Zaporizhya.
But whose blood was it flowed
Into that soil and soaked it through
So that potatoes flourish?
While it's good for kitchen-gardens
You're the last to worry!
And you boast because we once
Brought Poland to destruction...
It is true, yes, Poland fell,
But in her fall she crushed you.
Thus, then, your fathers spilled their blood
For Moscow and for Warsaw,
And to you, their sons, they have
Bequeathed their chains, their glory.

* * *

Ukraina struggled on,
Fighting to the limit:
She is crucified by those
Worse-than-Poles, her children.
In place of beer, they draw the righteous
Blood from out her sides,

Wishing, so they say, to enlighten
The maternal eyes
With contemporary lights,
To lead her as the times
Demand it, in the Germans' wake
(She crippled, speechless, blind).
Good, so be it! Lead, explain!
Let the poor old mother
Learn how children such as these
New ones she must care for.
Show her, then, and do not haggle
Your instruction's price.
A mother's good reward will come:
From your greedy eyes
The scales will fall away, and you
Will then behold the glory,
The living glory of your grandsires,
And fathers skilled in knavery.
Do not fool yourselves, my brothers,
Study, read and learn
Thoroughly the foreign things —
But do not shun your own:
For he who forgets his mother,
He by God is smitten,
His children shun him, in their homes
They will not permit him.
Strangers drive him from their doors;
For this evil one
Nowhere in the boundless earth
Is a joyful home.
I weep salt tears when I recall
Those unforgotten actions
Of our forefathers, those grave deeds!
If I could but forget them,
Half my course of joyful years
I'd surrender gladly...
Such indeed, then, is our glory,
Ukraine's glory! ...
Thus too, you should read it through
That you'd do more than dream,
While slumbering, of injustices,
So that you would see
High gravemounds open up before
Your eyes, that then you might
Ask the martyrs when and why

And who was crucified.
Come, my brothers, and embrace
Each your humblest brother,
Make our mother smile again,
Our poor, tear-stained mother!
With hands that are firm and strong
She will bless her children,
Embrace her helpless little ones,
And with free lips, she'll kiss them.
And those bygone times will be
Forgotten with their shame,
And that glory will revive,
The glory of Ukraine,
And a clear light, not a twilight,
Will shine forth anew...
Brothers, then, embrace each other,
I entreat and pray you!

14.xii.1845
Vyunyshcha.

UNFREE I COUNT THE DAYS AND NIGHTS

Unfree I count the days and nights —
And then forget how many,
O Lord! How wearily they drag
Those days that pass so heavy!
And years flow away with them.
Quietly flowing ever,
And they bear away with them
Evil and good together
Bear away, and bring back nothing,
Nevermore returning,
Do not then complain that prayer
From God no help can earn you!

Lost among the murky marshes,
Among wild weeds, there have passed now
Three years, sadly, day by day;
And so much they bore away
From my granary's dark hollow.
And in the sea cast it for ay;
And all quietly the sea swallowed

My wealth, not silver nor of gold,
But my years and my good,
And my suffering my anguish,—
Those forever-unseen tablets
Writ with pen unseen it took.

And now the fourth year is passing,
Quietly, unspeeding,
And now the fourth notebook I
Begin in this unfreedom
To embroider. I'll embroider
With my blood and weeping
All my grief in foreign lands.
For grief in words will speak not,
Will say naught to anyone,
Never will speak, never,
Nowhere on earth. No words there are
In far unfreedom ever.
No words are here, no weeping tears,
Nothingness abounds here,
There is not even God Almighty
In this void around you.
There is naught to look upon
No one to speak with, even.
Life is utter weariness,
But you must go on living!

I must, I must, but to what end?
So that soul 'scape damnation?
It is not worth so much anguish!
For what consumation
Must I live on earth, and drag
My fetters in unfreedom:
Maybe yet once more I shall
Behold my Ukraina...
Maybe once again I'll share
All this my words' weeping
With the oakgroves, verdant green,
With meadows, darkly gleaming,
For no kin of mine remain
In all Ukraina,
But people there at least are not
As in this foreign region
I would walk on Dnipro's banks,
Through carefree hamlets faring.

I would sing there all my thoughts,
Quietly and careworn.
Let me live and gaze once more,
O God of mercy, grant me
To look once more on fields of green
And on those gravemounds lofty.
But if Thou grantst it not, then bear
To my dear country cherished
All my tears, for I, dear God,
Here am doomed to perish!
Maybe I shall lie more easy
In this foreign country,
If they in Ukraine remember
And recall me someday!
Carry them there, God of mercy,
So that hope may come yet
Into my poor soul! For naught now,
Naught can I accomplish,
With this poor, poor head of mine.
And my heart feels terror
For I think that in this foreign
Land, maybe they'll bury
Me, and all these thoughts of mine
Bury with me together,
So that no one in Ukraine
Will recall me ever.

But maybe, quietly, with years flowing
These lines embroidered with tears, going
From me will fly far away,
In Ukraine to land one day,
As upon the earth the dew falls,
In a heart so young and true fall,
Quietly in tears that day.
And a young head will bow surely
And will weep and sorrow for me.
And, dear Lord, in prayer maybe,
Someone will remember me.

Well let it be as it must be
To swim, or struggle through the tide!
Even though I be crucified,
Yet I'll embroider quietly,
Quietly, these pages white.

PARAPHRASE OF THE ELEVENTH PSALM

O God of mercy! How they wane,
Thy saints, how few on earth remain!
One forgeth now against another
Chains in his heart and in his speech,
With lips exuding honey sweet
They kiss, the hour awaiting whether
Soon from feast to grave they might
In his coffin bear a brother...
Thou, only Lord of truth and right,
Wilt lock those lips deceiving, seal
That wagging tongue that utters forth,
Proclaims: "We are not vanity!
And we shall wondrously exalt
Both our reason and our tongue...
And where's the Lord to bid us "nay"
That thus our thought, our speech should run?"
— "I will arise!" that Lord will say,
"This day I will arise again,
For these my people, bound in chains,
Poor wretches. I shall glorify
These small dumb slaves! And as a guard
Protecting, I shall set my word
About them..."

Then shall wither, die,
Like grass men trample underfoot,
Both your speaking and your thought.
And like to silver, forged and beaten,
By fire in the furnace heated,
Molten sevenfold, o Lord,
So are these mighty words divine,
Throughout the earth! In all the world
Thy marvels through the length of days
Thy poor small babes shall know and praise.

15.ii.1859
St Petersburg.

I AM NOT ILL...

I am not ill, touch wood, not I —
But something strikes my inward eye,
And the heart hopes for something... Weeps,
Aching, aching, never sleeps,
Like a child that cries for food.
A time where grim disasters brood,
Perhaps, you hope for? Give no heeding
To hopes of long-expected freedom —
She slumbers on: Tsar Nicholas
Put her to sleep, and now to call
The weakly freedom to awake,
We must together, one and all,
Harden the axe-shaft, whet the blade,
And start to rouse her, start to call.
Else the poor dear will sleep away
The years, sleep on till Judgment Day.
The noblemen will lull her still,
Shrines and palaces they'll build,
Love their drunken tsar, adore
Byzantism with all their will,
And nothing, it seems, nothing more!

22.xi.1858
St Petersburg.

DAY COMES AND GOES

Day comes and goes, night comes and goes...
Bowing your head on hands clasped tight,
You wonder why there still comes no
Apostle of wisdom, truth and right!

5.xi.1860
St Petersburg.

Translated by Vera Rich



FOREST SONG

Lesya Ukrayinka

Lesya Ukrayinka (1871-1913), the undisputed *doyennne* of Ukrainian poetic drama, paradoxically devoted most of her dramatic works to Biblical, classical, or "universal" literary themes (such as the Don Juan legend). These subjects she adapted and reinterpreted to encapsulate the major issues of her time, in particular the conflicting claims of personal integrity and the conventions of society, and the morality of strategic compromise with the oppressor in the hope of alleviating the lot of the oppressed.

Two of her poetic dramas, however, do deal with specifically Ukrainian themes. *Boyarynya* (published as "Her Excellency" in *The Ukrainian Review*, Nos.1-3, 1992) is a historical work, set in the 17th century, shortly after the disastrous Treaty of Pereyaslav had provided the growing power of Muscovy with a pretext for the eventual annexation of Ukraine. The other, *Lisova Pisnya* (Forest Song), is set in the folklore fantasy world of the Volynian forests. This drama, in a prologue and three acts, spanning the seasonal cycle of a year, with its interplay of the various forest- and water-spirits on the one hand and humdrum human life on the other, forms yet another vehicle for the exploration of the poet's *leitmotif* of personal freedom versus conformity. Western readers earlier this century, who came upon this play in the somewhat less-than-adequate translation of Percival Cundy, tended to stress its "fairy" nature, and overlook its deeper message. To a generation raised on *The Lord of the Rings* and *The Silmarillion*, however, the use of a world of "secondary creation" to discuss major issues of philosophy and ethics should not prove unfamiliar.

Prologue

An age-old, dense, primeval forest in Volyn. Amid the forest lie a wide clearing with a weeping birch and a great, ancient oak. At the edge, the clearing turns into clumps and reeds, and in one place into brilliant green swamp; this is the bank of a forest lake, formed by a forest stream. This stream flows out from the depths of the forest, falls into the lake, and then, on the other side of the lake, again flows out and is lost in the bushes. The lake itself is dead water, covered with duckweed and waterlilies, but with a clear surface in the middle.

The place is all wild and mysterious, but not gloomy — filled with the delicate, pensive beauty of Polisia.

It is the dawn of spring. On the brushwood and in the clearing the first shoots show green, and scillas and anemones boom. The trees are still leafless, but are covered with buds which are on the pit of opening. A mist lies over the lake in a sheet, now stirred by the wind, now opening and revealing the pale-blue water.

In the forest, something begins to re-echo; the stream murmurs and chatters, and suddenly from out of the forest darts the DAM-BREAKER, young, very pale, blue-

eyed, with vigorous but flowing movements. His clothing shimmers with changing colours, from muddy-yellow to clear blue, and glitters with sharp golden sparks. Rushing from the stream into the lake, he begins to circle round on the open surface, stirring its sleepy water; the mist disappears, the water becomes a deeper blue.

DAM-BREAKER: From hills to the valley
I run, I leap, I sally!
All the bridges smashing,
All the dams send crashing,
All dykes and weirs I shiver,
With which men dam the rivers,
For the spring floods must be
Like the will, young and free.

(He stirs the water still more, submerging and surfacing, as if seeking something in the water.)

The LOST BABIES, two small pale children in white shirts, surface among the water-lilies)

FIRST BABY: Wherefore do you blunder?

SECOND BABY: Wherefore break our slumber?

FIRST: Mama came and made our bed here,
Softly, softly for us spread here,
On the gravel, on the pebbles,
Lay the pondweed, deep and level,
Spread a lily-cover o'er us,
Quietly, quietly singing for us:
'Lulla-lullabye, now,
Babies close your eyes now!'

SECOND: Wherefore do you bluster?

FIRST: Seeking in such fluster?

DAM-BREAKER: Rusalka charming,
From childhood my darling,
That water-princess rarest,
In all the world the fairest!
I have run from the mountains,
Dales, clefts and gullies scouting,
None can match the radiance
Of my beloved maiden,
Your waters I'll set creaming
To find the lass I dream of.

(He stirs the water vigorously)

(RUSALKA draws close to him, but he turns away from her sharply, stirring the water into eddies)

For Rusalka 'tis more fitting
By her fisher to stay sitting,
To watch the poor creature
Lest crayfish or sheat-fish
Should gnaw off his kiss-curls.
Oh, what a fine trysting.

(RUSALKA swims closer, catches him by the hand, and looks up into his eyes)

Are you still angry?

(wickedly)

But I know something, darling,
You heartbreaker so charming!

(she laughs quietly, and he grows embarrassed)

Where did you tarry?
A princess of the waters
Scorned — for a miller's daughter!
The nights are long in winter,
A maiden's dark eyes glitter.
And gallants, it is plain,
Bring her coins not in vain!

(she wags her finger at him and gives a little laugh)

I can see, dearest,
Your nature, clearly, nearly,
But I'll forgive, sincerely,
Because I love you so!

(with jesting pathos)

To you I shall be faithful for a whole long instant,
For a moment's space, tender and submissive,
I'll drown your folly though!
No tracks on water linger,
From morning until dinner.
Just so is your love,
And so my grief will prove!

DAM-BREAKER *(impetuously stretching out his arms to her)*

Well, let's be friendly!
Let's swim above the eddies!

RUSALKA (*grasping him by the hand and whirling round*)

On the eddies swirling,
On the gold sands curling,
In my garland pearly,
In the dance I whirl me
Oooh! Oooh!

(They whoop, splash, and throw up spray. The water beats against the banks, so that the sedges rustle and flocks of birds fly up out of the reeds.)

WATER-ELF rises up in the middle of the lake. He is an ancient grey grand-sire, his long hair and long white beard, intertwined with pondweed, flow down to his girdle. His robes are the colour of mud, and he wears on his head a crown of shells. His voice is without resonance, but powerful)

WATER-ELF:

Who has come here to trouble our quiet waters?

(RUSALKA and her partner stop short, then hurry apart)

Shame on you, daughter! Shall a water-princess
Go dancing with a stranger? Fie, for shame!

RUSALKA:

Father, he's not a stranger! Don't you know him?
It's the Dam-Breaker!

WATER-ELF:

Yes, I know, I know!
But he's not kin, although he's water-kind.
His nature is all wicked and deceitful.
In springtime he will scour and play and tear,
He rips away the lake's luxurious garland
That the rusalky tended all year long,
He startles the wise bird, our sentinel,
He digs between the willow-widow's roots
And quenches with his waters the frail torches
Of those poor little orphans, the Lost Babies,
He spoils the pleasant levels of my banks,
And ruins all the peace of my old age.
But where is he in summer? Where does he
Skip when the thirsty sun drinks up the water
Out of my cup, like an insatiate gryphon,
When all the rushes waste away with thirst,
Left high and dry upon my arid bank,
And when the dying lilies have to bow
Their wilting heads down into tepid water?
Where is he then?

(During this speech, DAM-BREAKER furtively nods to RUSALKA, inviting her to escape with him along the forest stream)

DAM-BREAKER: I'm in the sea, then, grand-pa,
For ocean calls to me to bring him aid,
Lest the sun should drink all his chalice dry.
And when the Sea-King calls, one has to heed!
It is a duty, as you know full well!

WATER-ELF: Oh, very well, you're in the sea!... But I,
If I'd no help from my eternal friend,
From my true ally, the autumnal rain,
I'd simply pass away in mist!

(RUSALKA, unobserved, hides in the water)

RUSALKA: Oh, father,
You couldn't pass away in mist, for mist
Turns back to water.

WATER-ELF: What a clever lass!
That's enough chattering here! Get down below!

RUSALKA: Just going, father. Look, he's gone already!
I just want to comb out the tangled sedges.

(She takes a shell comb from her girdle, and combs the plants along the edge of the bank)

WATER-ELF: Well, comb them then, I like things in good order.
Comb them out nicely; I'll wait for you here,
Until you're done. And put the water-lilies
In order, so they spread out nice and flat,
And darn the duckweed carpet neatly, where
That footloose rascal tore it.

RUSALKA: All right, father!

(WATER-ELF settles himself comfortably in the reeds, following RUSALKA's work with his eyes; gradually his eyes close in sleep)

DAM-BREAKER *(surfacing, quietly to RUSALKA)*

Hide behind the willow!

(RUSALKA glances at WATER-ELF and hides)

We'll swim through the billows,
In the spillway,
'Neath the mill-race,
Break the dam, free the water,
And drown the miller's daughter!

(He seizes RUSALKA by the hand and speeds with her over the lake. Not far from the further bank, RUSALKA stops and cries out)

RUSALKA: Oy! I've got tangled up in last year's branches!

(WATER-ELF wakes, cuts across to overtake RUSALKA and seizes hold of her)

What's going on here? You accursed deceiver!
You'll learn not to entice rusalky so!
I'll make complaint about you to your mother,
The Mountain Snowstorm, so you just watch out!

DAM-BREAKER *(rocking with laughter)*

Until that happens, I'll just have my fun!
Goodbye, Rusalka darling, fill your goblet!

(He rushes into the forest stream and disappears)

WATER-ELF *(to RUSALKA)*

Get down below! And don't you dare come up
Above the water for three moonlit nights!

RUSALKA: *(rebelliously)*

And since when have all we rusalky been
Prisoners in the lake here? I am free!
Free as the water!

WATER-ELF:

But in my domain
The waters have to know and keep their bounds.
Get down below!

RUSALKA:

No! I don't want to!

WATER-ELF:

Then give me your pearl garland!

No!?

RUSALKA:

No, I won't!
It was a present from the Sea-King's son.

WATER-ELF: It is not proper you should wear a garland,
When for your disobedience, the Rock-Dweller
Will carry you away.

RUSALKA: (*terrified*) No, dearest father,
I will obey you!

WATER-ELF: Then get down below!

RUSALKA: I'm going! I am going... . May I play
With the fisher-lad?

WATER-ELF: Yes, play your fill!

(*RUSALKA sinks down in the water, up to her shoulders, and mournfully smiling, looks up at her father*)

WATER-ELF: Daughter, how strange you are! It's for your good,
For he would simply be the ruin of you,
He would have dragged you through the thorny bed
Of the forest stream, torn your white body
To shreds, and then abandoned you somewhere
In a parched desert.

RUSALKA: But he is so handsome!

WATER-ELF: At it again?

RUSALKA: No! No! No! I'm just going!
(*she submerges*)

WATER-ELF (*looking up*) Already the spring sun begins to scorch...
How close the air is! I'll go where it's cool!

(*he also submerges*)

CURTAIN

Translated by Vera Rich



News From Ukraine

Nuclear Weapons

Specialists Say Ukraine is Disarming Safely

PERVOMAYSK, January 6 — Military specialists in Ukraine say safety is being fully observed in the dismantling of former Soviet missiles in the country but they need help from abroad. The specialists, escorting journalists on a rare tour of the Pervomaysk base, 300 km south of Kyiv, said suggestions that SS-19 and SS-24 missiles were being kept in unsafe conditions were unfounded. They added that the dismantling work now underway proved Ukraine was serious about disarmament despite international criticism of conditions imposed by the Ukrainian parliament on ridding the country of weapons. "The base strictly observes all safety demands", Colonel Viktor Shvets, the base's deputy commander said. "Staff are trained and all missiles are kept in perfectly safe conditions. Nuclear and ecological safety are observed to the very highest degree. These initial steps are being carried out by Ukraine using its own resources. But Ukraine is in no condition to deal with the scale of work for disarmament on its own". Specialists have so far removed warheads from 20 of the 130 aging SS-19s remaining in Ukraine.

Pact Reached to Dismantle Weapons

BRUSSELS, January 10 — President Clinton announced that the United States, Russia and Ukraine will sign an agreement aimed at eliminating Ukraine's nuclear arms in exchange for a broad range of political and economic benefits. The agreement, to be signed by the three leaders in Moscow, puts in place a process under which the warheads left in Ukraine after the collapse of the Soviet Union would be dismantled and the highly enriched uranium within them processed into nuclear fuel for civilian use. Some details of the agreement are to remain secret. The agreement would leave Russia the only nuclear state among the republics. Clinton called the accord a "giant step" for world peace and stability. In exchange for giving up nuclear arms, Russia will waive the massive debt for energy imports owed by Ukraine and the country will receive nuclear fuel, economic and technical aid from the United States and security guarantees that it was said to regard as "critical".

Opposition Quick to Object to New Pact on Arms

KYIV, January 11 — An agreement that calls for Ukraine to give up nuclear weapons began drawing crit-

icism in Kyiv. "The President cannot decide this question on his own", declared Vyacheslav Chornovil, leader of Ukraine's largest opposition party Rukh. "He can sign the agreement, but it must be ratified by Parliament". Ukrainian lawmakers who recently ratified the strategic arms reduction treaty with numerous conditions are furious about their president's attempt to circumvent their own controversial decision. "This is in particularly poor taste because he is going directly against decisions already made by his own Parliament", said Chornovil.

Ukraine Welcomes NATO Plan

KYIV, January 11 — Ukraine welcomed NATO's "Partnership for Peace" plan to broaden contacts with former Communist states. A statement issued by the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry described the plans as a "step in the right direction which will enable all interested countries to begin practical work on concrete political and military cooperation with NATO". It said Ukraine would take part "to the full extent" in the programme, approved at the NATO summit in Brussels.

Kravchuk Claims Success in Moscow Agreement

MOSCOW, January 14 — Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk claimed success in today's three-way agreement with Russia and the United States in which he signed away his country's nuclear arsenal. Together with Russian President Boris Yeltsin and US President Bill Clinton, Kravchuk signed a tripartite accord in Moscow under which Ukraine will

transfer its nuclear weapons to Russia for dismantling. "This is a historic moment for resolving the problem of nuclear weapons", Kravchuk told a news conference he held alone in the Ukrainian Embassy several hours after the Kremlin signing ceremony. "Ukraine is embarking on the path of disarmament. This opens up wide prospects for economic cooperation with the US and international monetary organisations", he said. Kravchuk refuted lawmakers who slammed the accord as "surrendering to Russian and US pressure". "I am satisfied that Ukraine was understood, and not simply coerced into signing this agreement", he said.

Nuclear Powers to Give Ukraine Guarantees

KYIV, January 26 — The United States, Russia and Britain have agreed to sign a document providing security guarantees for Ukraine once it joins the Non-Proliferation Treaty, said Ukraine's top arms negotiator. Deputy Foreign Minister Borys Tarasyuk said the three-sided agreement was based on the accord signed in Moscow by the Presidents of Ukraine, Russia and the United States to rid Ukraine of its nuclear weapons. Parliament in Kyiv is considering that accord, aimed at satisfying Ukraine's demands for compensation and security guarantees in exchange for implementing the START-1 disarmament pact.

Disarmament Conditions Removed

KYIV, February 3 — Ukraine's parliament moved closer to nuclear disarmament by removing condition on ratification of the START-1 arms agreement,

but postponed the key step of adhering to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Deputies implicitly approved an agreement signed in Moscow last month by the Presidents of Ukraine, Russia and the United States offering Kyiv \$1 billion in compensation and security guarantees for giving up its weapons. Kravchuk had urged parliament to drop 13 conditions attached to the START-1 treaty in November and join NPT, saying Ukraine otherwise faced isolation and ruin. Deputies approved by a wide margin two points of a resolution acknowledging that the Moscow accord satisfied the conditions and authorising the government to proceed with the provisions of START-1. It also accepted the Lisbon protocol appended to START-1 saying Ukraine had to join NPT as soon as possible. But a clause on Ukraine joining the pact did not receive enough votes to be included in the resolution.

New Row Over Missiles

KYIV, February 22 — Ukraine and Russia quarrelled over nuclear disarmament — the first dispute between the two former Soviet republics since they signed a deal with the United States for Kyiv to give up its nuclear arsenal. Russia accused Ukraine of undermining its control over the weapons by forcing officers to swear an oath of loyalty to Ukraine. Ukrainian officials denied the allegations and said they had no intention of interfering in the disarmament process. The Moscow daily *Izvestia* wrote that 900 of 2,300 officers of Russia's 43rd rocket army had refused to take the Ukrainian oath. Two of the three top commanders took the oath while one who refused was sent to Russia.

Defence Issues

Ukraine to Join NATO Partnership Programme

KYIV, February 7 — Ukraine will join the new NATO partnership programme that offers limited military cooperation to former Soviet bloc states. The step is part of a warming in relations between Kyiv and the Western alliance following President Leonid Kravchuk's renewed commitment to eliminate Ukraine's nuclear weapons. Two other former Soviet republics, Lithuania and Estonia, have already joined, but Ukraine will be the first member of the Commonwealth of Independent States to join. Russia has praised the initiative, but has not said publicly whether it will join. The Clinton administration designed Partnership for Peace as a compromise between the former Soviet bloc states, which want quick NATO membership, and Russia which objects to NATO's rapid expansion.

Ukraine Signs Partnership Deal with NATO

BRUSSELS, February 8 — Ukraine and Hungary signed military partnership deals with NATO, joining a queue of Eastern European nations which see the agreement as a prelude to full membership in the 16-nation Western alliance. The partnership deal, offered by a summit of NATO leaders last month, will include joint training, exercises and defence planning but makes no promises of membership or security guarantees that Eastern European states want. Foreign Minister Zlenko said he was pleased that NATO had decided

for now not to take in new members on a selective basis. This would "by no means strengthen security in Europe but, on the contrary, might throw the situation off balance".

Army Fights for Cash to Survive

KYIV, February 16 — Ukraine's army is barely scraping by financially, according to the military daily *Narodna Armia*. The army, with 650,000 troops, has received less than 10 per cent of funds due so far this year, General Ivan Shtopenko, Defence Ministry finance chief, told the newspaper. "Military units and their families appear to be on the survival level", Shtopenko said. The monthly salary for top Ukrainian officers is about 1.5 million karbovantsi (\$45). The article also cited a letter from Defence Minister Vitaliy Radetskyi to President Leonid Kravchuk which said current budget restrictions would hinder Ukraine's military programme. The ministry had proposed a draft budget of 63.7 trillion karbovantsi (\$1.8 billion), but the national budget for 1994 limited expenditures for Ukraine's armed forces to a fraction of that figure.

Seven Generals Quit Over Commander Appointment

KYIV, February 23 — Seven top Ukrainian air force generals have handed in their resignations to protest against President Leonid Kravchuk's appointment of a new air force commander. Military officials said top officers had expressed deep reservations about the ability of General Volodymyr Antonets. The dissenting generals oppose Antonets' idea of unifying the air force and Ukraine's anti-aircraft defence.

The Economy

Ukraine to Keep Controls on Electricity Prices

KYIV, January 4 — Ukraine's Energy Minister has failed to persuade his ministerial colleagues to liberalise electricity prices to encourage consumers to save energy. Ukrainian authorities, meanwhile, announced that they had raised wholesale prices for coal to industry. But they halved prices paid by companies supplying individual consumers. "There is no place in the world where consumer prices for electricity are less than those paid by industry", said Energy Minister Vilen Semenyuk. "This is why nobody wants to save energy. It is so cheap".

Ukraine to Close Mines in Next Decade

KYIV, January 5 — Ukraine plans to close 47 loss-making coal mines in the next 10 years, nearly a fifth of the total of more than 250 mines, because of depleted deposits. Studies are being conducted on other non-economic mines. But Hryhoriy Surhay, head of Ukraine's State coal committee, said Ukraine would keep supplying coal to Bulgaria despite domestic fuel shortages.

Inflation Rose to 80 Per Cent in December

KYIV, January 12 — Ukrainian monthly inflation rose to 80 per cent in December, from 70 per cent in November, said central bank head Viktor Yushchenko. Earlier forecasts had been for December monthly

inflation of 100 per cent. "In the last year the government's practice of continually issuing new loans led to a price explosion and brought the country to the brink of bankruptcy".

Russia Maintains Oil and Gas Supplies

MOSCOW, January 12 — Russia has maintained shipments of oil and gas to Ukraine this year despite payment problems, said senior Russian officials. "Moscow is sticking strictly to the agreed timetable of oil shipments to Ukrainian consumers", Vladimir Trofimov, chief dispatcher at the Fuel and Energy Ministry central supply department, told Interfax news agency. He estimated deliveries in the first 10 days of this year at up to 600,000 tonnes of crude oil, mostly with a high sulphur content that can only be refined at the Kremenchug refinery in southern Ukraine.

Ukraine Seeks Loans From IMF

KYIV, January 13 — Ukraine hopes to receive a \$1.5 billion loan from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and around \$700 million from the World Bank after it signs a nuclear disarmament deal, officials in Kyiv said. Ukrainian Finance Minister Hryhoriy Pyatachenko told a news conference that Kyiv expected the aid to help stabilise the country's depressed economy. Last year, Ukraine received a \$27 million loan from the World Bank at a time when other former Soviet republics were given larger loans to help push through their market reforms.

Ukraine Agrees to Repay Gas Debt

ASHGABAT, January 17 — Ukraine has agreed to repay a \$693.2 million debt to Turkmenistan for natural gas supplies in eight instalments over a two-year period, a top Turkmen official said. Deputy Prime Minister Valery Otchertsov said in an interview that the debt was negotiated down from the \$727 million Turkmenistan had been seeking for gas deliveries to Ukraine in 1993. The repayments should begin immediately.

Odesa Sees Urals Crude Loading

ODESA, January 17 — The first cargo of Urals crude in over a month started loading from the Black Sea port of Odesa, shipping sources said. The Bulgarian-flagged 75,275 dwt Osam started loading around noon and was due to carry 51,000 tonnes. Loading of crude and oil products from the Ukrainian port of Odesa has been very limited recently due to political tension with Russia and money owed by Ukraine to Russia for oil deliveries. Total planned crude and oil products loading volumes were expected at a very reduced 143,000 tonnes per day in January.

Ukraine Carries Out First Land Auction

KHARKIV, January 21 — Ukraine carried out its first land auction in the eastern industrial city of Kharkiv. Two plots of 1,500 square metres and one of 2,500 square metres in the city centre were leased for 50 years for the total sum of 1.53 billion karbovantsi

(\$41,350). Some Western companies took part in the auction, which was held with the help of the US International Development Agency.

US to Give More to Republics

WASHINGTON, January 25 — The United States said its aid to former Soviet republics would drop substantially in the next fiscal year and less of it would go to Russia while more went to the other 11 republics. Special ambassador Strobe Talbott, President Clinton's coordinator on policy to the former Soviet Union, told the House Foreign Affairs Committee that whereas two-thirds of US aid to the former Soviet Union went to Russia and one-third to the other republics in fiscal 1994, the administration would aim for a 50-50 split in fiscal 1995.

Parliament Adopts Privatisation Programme

KYIV, January 27 — The Ukrainian parliament voted to speed up the snail's-pace privatisation in the country, adopting for the first time a national programme for the sale of state firms. "This is an extraordinarily important step. This means privatisation in Ukraine has truly begun", State Property Fund Chairman Volodymyr Pryadko said after the vote. Ukraine plans to privatise 20,000 small firms and 800 large and medium-sized companies this year, up sharply from a total of 2,000 firms in the whole of 1993, privatisation officials told parliament. Pryadko told deputies Ukraine hopes to receive 21 trillion karbovantsi (about \$580 million at street rates) from domestic investors and \$230 million from foreigners from the 1994 sell-off.

Ukraine Sets Bank Emission Targets

KYIV, January 27 — Ukraine's central bank expects to issue 29.4 trillion karbovantsi of cash and credits in the first quarter of 1994, the bank's deputy chairman said. In 1993 emissions totalled 25.5 trillion, mostly in the form of credits to industry and agriculture, Oleksander Vasylovskiy told parliament. But inflation rates of up to 80 per cent a month and a steeply falling currency mean it is difficult to make meaningful comparisons between the two figures. The karbovanets was worth 2,000 per dollar at the start of the year but it is currently worth about 30,000.

800,000 Jobless by End of Year

KYIV, February 1 — Ukrainian unemployment could reach between 300,000 and 800,000 by the end of the year, from 80,000 at present, because of layoffs and cuts in subsidies to industry, said Labour Minister Mykola Kaskevych. But Kaskevych told a news conference that he recognised that the forecast would still be low considering Ukraine's work force of about 25 million. "In other countries, 3 per cent unemployment is nothing. But to us, it is a huge jump", he said. He said the government planned to launch retraining programmes and start public works programmes to help the unemployed.

Ukraine's Industrial Output Fell

KYIV, February 1 — Ukraine's industrial output fell by 7.4 per cent last year, compared to a 6.4 per cent decline in 1992, said a government report. Production of metals, one of Ukraine's chief exports, fell by 30 per

cent. Oil refining declined 34 per cent, largely because of shortages of oil imports from Russia, the report said. Agricultural output fell by 1.7 per cent, despite huge state subsidies and a record grain harvest. However, production of machinery and electronics increased by 4.3 per cent.

Ukraine Passes Balanced Budget

KYIV, February 1 — Ukraine's parliament approved a balanced budget for this year but reformers said it had little basis in current economic reality. The budget envisages an income and expenditure of about 335 trillion karbovantsi each, worth about \$20.9 billion at the 16,000 karbovantsi per dollar exchange rate selected by the finance ministry. The black market rate is 38,000 karbovantsi per dollar, but the official rate, used for some compulsory exchange is 12,610. The budget also predicts inflation of 440 per cent this year, well down from last year's annual inflation of 1,200 per cent.

Ukraine to Negotiate USDA Sales Pact

WASHINGTON, February 1 — United States and Ukrainian officials will begin negotiating a proposed \$20 million PL 480 sales pact this month, a US Agriculture Department official said in an interview. "One thing we explored with them was the prospect for a PL 480 title 1 programme and in fact we offered to them and I believe we'll begin right away negotiating a \$20 million title 1 programme", said General Sales Manager Chris Goldthwait. In talks held earlier, Ukrainian officials told USDA that harsh weather damaged winter crops causing a severe shortfall in production.

Chornobyl May Shutdown

KYIV, February 2 — Shortages of nuclear fuel could shut down part of the Chornobyl nuclear power station within a week and Ukraine's four other plants within months, according to industry officials. Alexander Skripov, acting chief engineer at Chornobyl, site of the world's worst nuclear accident, said the Chornobyl plant's third reactor faced imminent shutdown — a month ahead of a routine stoppage for maintenance. Ukraine's parliament, coping with severe shortages of power and heating, adopted a long-term energy programme calling for an increase from 30 to 40 per cent of the nuclear industry's share of electricity production. But Anatoliy Chernov, deputy head of Ukraine's State Nuclear Committee, said the nuclear industry was getting no help from the government.

Relaunch of Currency Exchange Fails

KYIV, February 9 — Ukraine's tiny currency exchange, shut down for three months by President Leonid Kravchuk, failed for the second time in a week to resume business. The central bank has limited trading of Ukraine's weak karbovanets to the "soft" currencies of other former Soviet republics. Trading in Kazakh tenge fell when the sole interested bank withdrew a bid for 2.6 million units. Earlier in the week, trading was cancelled for the Belarusian rouble because banks did not have enough of the currency.

IMF Delegation in Kyiv for Talks

KYIV, February 14 — An International Monetary Fund delegation arrived in Kyiv to begin negotiations on releasing a loan to help Ukraine make the painful transition from a state-controlled econo-

my to the free market. Government officials said Kyiv was expecting \$750 million under the terms of the so-called systemic transformation loan, the IMF's first credit to Ukraine. Economics official Oleksander Kulakov said Ukraine is also hopeful that talks with the World Bank for a \$400 million rehabilitation loan will begin during the course of the three-week IMF negotiations. With the exception of a \$27 million institution-building loan from the World Bank, these are the first large-scale credits Ukraine will have received from international finance organisations.

Inflation Down to 20 Per Cent

KYIV, February 17 — Ukraine's monthly inflation rate dipped sharply to an annualised 20 per cent last month from 80 per cent in December, said Alexander Kulakov, head of the cabinet's international relations department, quoting estimates by the statistics ministry. He did not say how Ukraine achieved the dramatic drop, but National Bank chairman Viktor Yushchenko said earlier that Kyiv had not issued money for three months.

Domestic Credit Crisis Worsens

KYIV, February 18 — A top government official warned that Ukraine needed hundreds of millions of dollars worth of fresh credits to escape a severe payments crisis threatening to cripple its industries and deepen energy shortages. Deputy Minister Valentyn Landyk said the government should issue 10 trillion karbovantsi (\$793 million) in credits to ease mutual debts between state enterprises. Landyk also told Interfax-Ukraine news agency that loss-making enterprises must be allowed to go bankrupt, although he said this could result in a 20 per cent jump in unemployment.

Ukraine Pledges Funds to Avoid Industry Collapse

KYIV, February 21 — The Ukrainian government will issue credits of \$1.3 billion to head off a payments crisis and the collapse of industry. Senior ministers agreed at a meeting to issue credits of 9.5 trillion karbovantsi to industry and agriculture to boost output and pay workers who have not been paid for months. Credits for a further seven trillion karbovantsi were agreed last week.

Banks With Foreign Capital Restricted

KYIV, February 24 — Ukraine's central bank has restricted new banks with more than 50 per cent foreign capital to operations with non-resident clients and investments only. The new regulations also limited the amount of foreign capital to 15 per cent of the total capital in the country's banking system. Banks with less than 50 per cent foreign capital must have a start-up capital of at least five million ECU (\$5.5 million). Banks with more than 50 per cent must have a start-up capital of no less than 10 million ECU (\$11 million).

Religious Affairs

Synod of Ukrainian Greek Catholic Bishops Concludes

LVIV, February 28 — The second Synod of Bishops of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church on the territory of an independent Ukraine finished its week-long, intensive working sessions yesterday with Divine Liturgy in the

Cathedral of St. George. The head and father of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, Myroslav Ivan Cardinal Lubachivsky, led the 29 bishops of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church in prayer for the Ukrainian church and nation. They were joined by the Apostolic Nuncio to Ukraine, Archbishop Antonio Franco, as well as representatives of some of the many confessions of Ukraine, including the Roman Catholic Church and the three Orthodox Churches, who joined the bishops for lunch following Divine Liturgy.

Present were Archbishop Metropolitan Marian Jaworski and Assistant Bishop Markian Trofumiak of the Roman Catholic Church; Bishop Andriy Horak of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church-Kyivan Patriarchate; Bishop Petro Petrus of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church; Avgustyn Markevych of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate and Archimandrite Nathan of the Armenian Church.

United together by common love for their Church and faithful, the bishops of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church listened to His Beatitude Myroslav Ivan as he read the "Address of the Synod of Bishops of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church to the Ukrainian People".

"This Synod was predominantly of a pastoral nature", explained Bishop Ivan Martyniak, bishop of Ukrainian Greek Catholics in Poland and General Secretary of the Synod. "It is impossible for us to publicise many of the decisions of the Synod before they are presented to the Holy See for review, but I can say that the issues were predominantly of a pastoral nature — how to better meet

the needs of our faithful".

The hoped-for visit of the Holy Father, Pope John Paul II, to Ukraine was among the first proposals discussed. Recognising the great desire of Catholics in Ukraine to have the Holy Father visit their country, the bishops of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church resolved to do all within their power to bring this wish to reality.

Other issues raised and discussed during the week-long session included: meeting the needs of Ukrainian Greek Catholic faithful in the entire independent Ukraine and in the countries of the former Soviet Union; the need for new eparchies and exarchates in these areas; potential candidates for these eparchies and exarchates; the statutes of the Synod of Bishops of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church and revision and standardisation of liturgical practices.

The projects of the Patriarchal Sobor (Cathedral) in Kyiv and the establishment of the Lviv Theological Academy won great support from the Synod Fathers with a resolution that these two projects would receive widespread support from the Ukrainian Greek Catholic hierarchy, clergy and faithful.

The Synod also approved initial proposals for the celebrations in 1996 of the Union of Brest and the Union of Uzhhorod and the commemoration in 1994 of the 50th anniversary of the death of the Servant of God Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytskyi.

"Regrading the celebrations of the Union of Brest and the Union of Uzhhorod, the Synod would like these celebrations to have an ecumenical character", explained Bishop Martyniak. "The Synod plans to have many educational conferences which will present the true histories of

these moments in our history. Unfortunately, this period of our history has been manipulated negatively and it should be presented in a positive way".

In its address to the Ukrainian people the Synod of Bishops of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church decided to convene a Patriarchal Sobor (Council) in which bishops, clergymen, monks, sisters and lay people of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church will take part. The Sobor will focus on the pastoral situation in the regions of Ukraine at the dawn of the third millennium of Christianity.

The Synod Fathers paid special attention to the situation of Ukrainian Greek Catholic faithful in

Bosnia and in Romania. Greek Catholic faithful are suffering physically as a result of the war in Bosnia and pastorally in Romania.

Finally, the Synod made preparations for the commemoration of 1994 as "The Year of the Family". Special emphasis will be placed in this year on programmes which will address the situation of the family in Ukraine. "Many families are broken and there is a lack of respect for the lives of children, especially of the unborn child. This situation will be of primary importance to our Church in this year", Bishop Martyniak concluded.

Press Office of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church ■

Art

“ART OF THE UKRAINE”; NEW UKRAINIAN PAINTINGS; UKRAINIAN VISUAL POETRY

Vera Rich

What is Ukrainian art? Is it art produced by Ukrainians, or art incorporating Ukrainian national symbols and/or folk motifs, or simply art which happens to have been produced in Ukraine? And, if the latter, how far, after decades of *sotsrealizm*, does “Ukrainian” art differ from that coming from other parts of the former USSR?

To Tamara Bassi-Demidenko, impressaria of “Danusha Services Ltd.”, who presented the exhibition “Art of the Ukraine” shown in June 1993 in Lincoln’s Inn Great Hall, subsequently in the hall of the Ukrainian Cathedral in London, and most recently, in February-March 1994, at the Hyde Park Galleries, London, “the works of the Ukrainian artists... bespeak the artistic genius of a people who, though immersed in the ideological maelstrom of “Soviet” Communism, nevertheless saw the world within it, from a distinctly folksy Ukrainian perspective”. What Ms Bassi-Demidenko means, precisely, by the normally somewhat patronising adjective “folksy” is unclear; it is not, after all, a word normally found in serious art catalogues. “Folk” motifs, in the sense of national costume or peasant artefacts, are not conspicuous in this collection. One painter, indeed, Alexandr Klimenchuk, does use motifs from the Ukrainian past. But his interpretations are personal and idiosyncratic, as in “Old Things”, in which an icon of (apparently), St Nicholas, and a bunch of red flowers appear in bright contrast against a dimly lit background of old-fashioned household implements. In some of the most exciting paintings in this collection, Klimenchuk turns to the remote past of paganism (“Wizard”) or its later, folk-lore survival (“Ivan Kupala Night”). But the vein of fantasy which they reveal is equally apparent in many of his works with no overt “Ukrainian” content — in the explosion of colour and motion in the birds of “Golden Cage”, or the surrealism of the work somewhat obscurely listed in the catalogue as “Aquarius’s Bouque” — a vase of flowers which, mysteriously, penetrates a pane of glass, with living blossoms on the near side, but only sere, dead, flower-heads on the further side.

Other artists in this collection also make use of what may be fairly termed “Ukrainian” motifs. How far, however, they can retain their evocative and numinous aura for a non-Ukrainian audience is unclear. Svjatoslav Blednov’s

"Holy Svjatoslav" incorporates various objects of, presumably symbolic significance — candles, a piece of timber, five nuts (or are they nails, or onions?). Michail Kokin's "Kobzars" must be even more obscure to the non-Ukrainian. There is no explanation of what a *kobzar* is, nor what is the connection between the seated folk-musician in the foreground, and the elderly



Alexandr Klimenchuk, "Wizard", canvas, oil, 85 x 85, 1993

bearded man in the city clothes of the mid-19th century standing behind him. The other painting featuring Shevchenko — Gregory Shishko's "After the Return", is less enigmatic; to a viewer who knows nothing of Ukraine's national poet and his tragic life-story, this painting at least works, superficially, as a street-scene of the past century. But if "historical" paintings of this type are to be exhibited to an international audience, it would perhaps be advisable for the catalogue to include a few basic explanatory notes!

Large "historical" canvases on politically significant themes were a staple of Soviet art. In its first version at Lincoln's Inn, this exhibition contained several such works: Eugene Logninenko's "Meeting on Brjanka in 1905" and Gregory Shishko's



Valeria Trubina, "Gate", canvas, oil, 200 x 175, 1992

was one of contrast — with what it calls the "agitated stirrings going on beneath the placid surface of official conformity". These "stirrings", we are told, found their expression in the "magical world of almost lyrical Still Lifes", "hauntingly beautiful landscapes" and the "enduring and ineffable beauty of the 'oasis of beauty'... found amidst the industrial ruins". Translating this catalogue blurb into more measured language, one may note that the exhibition does, indeed, include a number of fine landscapes — both those of conventional beauty, such as Shishko's "matched pair" "Sedniv in Summer" and "Sedniv in Winter", and the stark devastation of the open-cast mine in the same artist's "Carrier". Likewise, there indeed are a number of excellent examples of still life: Yuri Bondarenko's "Still-life with pears", in particular. And several canvasses combine the two genres — a landscape viewed through a window, with the window-sill, in the foreground, bearing flower-vases, fruit, etc., presenting the artist with a challenging contrast of scale and perspective (Vladimir Kudrja's "Summer day", Svjatoslav Blednov's "Old Town", and Alexandr Klimenchuk's "Winter window").

By the time it reached the Hyde Park Gallery, the Danusha collection had lost most of its monumental canvasses. However, in February 1994, when part of the exhibition "Angels over Ukraine", shown at Edinburgh's "369 Gallery" during the 1993 Edinburgh Festival, was brought to the Economist building in London, the canvasses which came were large. ("Ukrainians do paint large", observed Andrew Brown, Director of the 369 Gallery!) Only two

"Liberation of Lozovatka". By the time the collection reached the Hyde Park Gallery, most of these works had disappeared — they were, one was informed, too large for this somewhat cramped venue! Assessment of the artistic merit of such works, painted two decades and more ago, according to the political correctness of that time, is, to say the least, somewhat difficult, and should, perhaps, be left to the critics of the future, for whom the Soviet era will be no more than an old tale. Although, in fact, some of the "sotsrealist" works originally included do show considerable technical skill, their main purpose, to judge from the catalogue,

of the original seven artists, however, were represented in London; Oleg Holosii, who died tragically last year at the age of 27, and his long-time partner Valeria Trubina. The paintings of these two artists are very different from the Danusha collection — spare, dramatic, landscapes evocative of backdrops for as yet-unwritten ballets. A river-wharf, painted pale-grey on white, in Trubina's "Morning Mist", the anguish of a lonely life evoked by a deserted study in Holosii's "Armchair", the tragedy of a species under threat of extinction in his "Whales", the gates and doors — closed or open — which clearly fascinated both of them — these anguished paintings, all painted after the collapse of Soviet power, seem far removed from the late-Soviet world of the Danusha collection.

And, from the large to the very small, and from brush and palette-knife to the art of the type-setter, the London campus of the Ukrainian Catholic University hosted a three-day exhibition of Ukrainian visual poetry. Such *jeux de lettres* have a long history in Ukraine; the earliest example dates from the late 16th century, and, according to the exhibition's organiser, Mykola Soroka, has already enjoyed two major flowerings, in the 17th century and in the 1920s. But in the 1930s, Soviet literary theory condemned the genre as "formalist" and its new popularity among poets and graphic artists in Ukraine is thus part of the general liberation of literature and art from former constraints. Some of the works displayed are clearly inspired by the remote and recent history of Ukraine: Mykola Luhovyk's "Cossack Grave", or Soroka's own "Shche ne vmerla Ukrayina ("Ukraine is still not dead" — the first line of the Ukrainian national anthem), which is a fantasy on the Russian and Ukrainian spellings of the word "Ukraine". But not all the works in the exhibition came from Ukraine. In compiling the collection, Soroka took as his criterion that the poems should use the Ukrainian language. The exhibition thus included, for example, "The history of my life", by Yaroslav Balan from Edmonton (Canada), and "The Eiffel Tower" by Lyubomyr Hoseyko, who works in Paris. ■

Books & Periodicals**Michael Ignatieff, BLOOD AND BELONGING, Journeys into the New Nationalism, BBC Books/Chatto and Windus, London, 1993, 201 pp., illustrated, £16.99**

This book falls into a category which, forty years ago, would have been deemed impossible. Then the self-appointed custodians of culture confidently bewailed the advent of television as the death-knell of serious reading. Time, however, has shown that one of the surest routes to bestsellerdom is for a book to be linked in some ways to a television series. A TV version of a novel by Dickens or Trollope routinely signals the reprinting in paperback not only of the work in question but of other major *oeuvres* of chosen authors. "How to" programmes, from gardening and cooking to keeping fit and yoga have their back-up books. Wild-life and art programmes generate lavishly illustrated spin-off books. And, from time to time, a major current affairs programme will also have an "accompanying" book.

Such a book is *Blood and Belonging* — the back-up of a six-episode investigation of "nationalism" in the new post-cold war world. And as such, its format and content are inevitably shaped by the constraints of TV journalism. For the purpose of a TV programme, or at least one made for general, prime-time viewing (educational programmes for the Open University have a different set of priorities), is to entertain as well as instruct. It is not the medium for a learned dissertation on the philosophy of nationalism. What the programme editors require from their investigative journalists is controversy and excitement. Not surprisingly, therefore, the six countries chosen for the series were those giving the greatest scope for the clash of opinions and/or at least the potential of physical conflict.

The destinations chosen for the six countries were therefore Croatia and Serbia, Germany, Ukraine, Quebec, Kurdistan and Northern Ireland. The reporter/author, Michael Ignatieff, it so happened, had personal ties with no less than four of these. His grand-parents had been Russian land-owners in pre-revolutionary Ukraine, he himself grew up in Ottawa, "just across the river from Quebec", as an adolescent, he lived in Tito's Yugoslavia, where his father was stationed as a diplomat, and, finally, he himself settled in the United Kingdom, where, although he claims that "like most outsiders, I'd dismissed the Troubles as a throwback to the tribal past", that very "dis-

missal" must surely be interpreted as his personal assessment of events that, one way and another, impinge ever more and more closely on the inhabitants of mainland Great Britain no less than those of Ulster.

Such personal links, it may be argued, provide a programme and a book with a heightened immediacy. They also — from the point of view of production schedules, mean that less time is wasted in preliminary research; the reporter already has a fair idea of where to go and the range of opinion he may expect to encounter. But such links also mean that the reporter inevitably brings to the subject his own perceptions which are unlikely to be completely impartial. Even in a work which aims at a scholarly detachment this may leave its traces: in *The Baltic Revolutions*, for example, Anatol Lieven, a descendant of Baltic Germans, almost falls over backwards in his efforts to demonstrate that the history of a country is not merely the history of its eponymous ethnic majority, and devotes so much time and energy to the histories of the present and past minority populations of the present Baltic States — Poles, Jews, Germans and Russians (though not the Belarusians about whom he is more than a little derisive) — that the Lithuanians, Latvians and Estonians whose fight for independence actually made the said revolutions at times seem to be pushed into the background. And in a reportage work like *Blood and Belonging*, where the writer's personal reactions are all important, such partiality is virtually inevitable.

To give him his due, Ignatieff is aware of this danger. "My difficulty in taking Ukraine seriously", he writes, "goes deeper than just my cosmopolitan suspicion of nationalists everywhere. Somewhere inside, I'm also what Ukrainians would call a Great Russian, and there is just a trace of old Russian disdain for these 'little Russians'". In that case, one wonders, was he really the right person to make such a programme for the BBC which has a long and honoured tradition of and reputation for impartial reporting?

Ignatieff's account of Ukraine is made up of a sequence of personal encounters and experiences — not all of which made it into the TV programme. A British "wide boy" on the flight to Kyiv, with seven suitcases of Soccer kit, a Canadian-Ukrainian journalist who proclaims that "Independence requires a new human type but... it will be a long time coming", the "dollar zone" of the Khreshchatyk, the "gentle nationalist" Mykola Horbal, an interview with President Leonid Kravchuk, the Monastery of the Caves, a pop-group in Lviv that specialises in political satire, a flying visit to the Crimean Tatars, another to the Donetsk miners... with one fifth of the entire Ukrainian section devoted to a pilgrimage to his ancestral home, where ancient villagers bring out their memories of his grandfather, his great-aunt, his great-grandmother, and where a requiem is sung for the Ignatieff family dead. Here, at least, Ignatieff, at a personal level, becomes aware of what nationalism, in its best sense, can mean.

...."another feeling began to steal over me, a feeling that, like it or not, this was where my family story began, this was where my graves were. Like a tunneller, I had gone through suffocation, and I had tunnelled myself back to at

least one of my belongings. I could say to myself: the half-seen track of my past does have its start and I can return to it. The choir sings, the priest names my father, mother, grandfather, grandmother, the names, some of them Anglo-Saxon, peeking through the seams of his prayers, the choir and their voices singing, the sound filling this church my great-grandfather built.

Afterwards the priest... leads me out of the church into the crypt, a low damp flag-stoned space, with icons ranged along the back wall. In the gloom, against the far wall, I can see piles of lumber. One by one the icon lamps are lit, and in their glow, I can make out three granite graves. In the centre, my great-grandfather's, with his military rank, and the name of the treaties he had negotiated in the Tzar's name embossed on the side. On either side, the grave of his daughter, my grandfather's sister, who died in a hospital train of typhus tending the wounded in 1915; and beside her, my great-grandmother. The priest points out on the white marble of my great-grandfather's grave the cuts in the stone from the butcher's knife. This was a slaughterhouse in the 1930s. I run my hands across these black slices in the marble. We stand and sing the *viechnaya pamyat*, the hymn of memory, the priest blesses the graves, and then they leave me alone, with a candle.

Nations and graves. Graves and nations. Land is sacred because it is where your ancestors lie. Ancestors must be remembered because human life is a small and trivial thing without the anchoring of the past. Land is worth dying for, because strangers will profane the graves. The graves were profaned. The bulls slaughtered on top of the marble. A person would fight to stop this if he could.

Looking back, I see that time in the crypt as the moment when I began to change, when some element of respect for the national project began to creep into my feelings, when I understood why land and graves matter and why the nations matter which protect both".

Unfortunately for both book and TV series, Ignatieff obviously did not have time to assimilate fully this change of attitude. Had he been able to, both book and programmes would have benefited. For, unless one accepts that the nation matters, one can neither appreciate the heroism which led people like Horbal to defy Soviet pressure, nor the breadth of spirit with which he will welcome ethnic Russians who wish to become Ukrainian citizens. Nor can one feel the pain of the individual tragedies and confusion which seem inevitable when empires and supra-national states break up — whether that of a Russian miner in Donetsk, stranded in what has suddenly become a foreign country and/or villages in Bosnia, where Serbs, Croats and Muslims have lived for centuries as neighbours, now torn apart by "ethnic cleansing". Nor, indeed, unless one accepts the datum of Ukrainian national identity can one fully understand the true depth of the hospitality with which the Ukrainian villagers welcomed Ignatieff himself — the grandson of the Russian who had once owned the place.

But Ignatieff's moment of revelation did not persist — or else his editors and producers did not let it persist. So, at times, the book (and the programmes too) acquired a note of somewhat cheap rhetoric, with material, valuable in itself, presented out of context for a cheap effect. The Gadukin Brothers of Lviv, with their song about the Old Red Cart, which Lenin used to drive, and which is now painted blue and yellow, but no one knows where it is going, belong to a tradition of political-satirical bards, that has long flour-

ished (albeit generally underground) in that part of Europe. But such songs have to be appreciated and judged in context — and that context, including the precise ratio of truth and exaggeration which the average listener finds in them, is almost impossible to judge for someone not well-rooted in the tradition. Otherwise, it is all too easy to draw the wrong conclusion, just as, say, a first-time visitor from Ukraine, knowing no English, might easily be misled by a *Private Eye* cartoon. On occasion too, Ignatieff's love for the broad sweeping effect and flows of rhetoric lead him into inaccuracies, the statement that "Bandera and Melnyk, Ukrainian nationalists in exile, returned with the advancing Wehrmacht" being perhaps the most blatant.

One should note, however, that such inaccuracies are not unique to the Ukrainian material. Even allowing for the peculiarities of Comecon planning, it seems unlikely that (as Ignatieff says) East German cotton mills exported cotton fabrics to Poland, itself a cotton exporter. Nor would "Ethnic German" immigrants from Russia being taught to cope with west European traffic be instructed to look "right, then left, then right again" (in the British manner), but "left, right and left".

Closer to home, Northern Ireland, although part of the United Kingdom, is *not* (as Ignatieff seems to think) a part of Great Britain, which is the geographical name for the island comprising England, Wales and the Scottish mainland. The "cross of St Patrick" is the popular name for the flag more correctly termed the "Geraldine saltire" — the diagonal red cross on the white ground incorporated into the Union Flag in 1801 — indeed, on p. 172, one of Ignatieff's interviewees uses it in this sense. ("I'll tell you one thing... If they took the cross of Saint Patrick out of the Union Jack, there wouldn't be much of a flag left, now would there?") Yet on the previous page, Ignatieff refers to "the Ulster Flag, with its bloody Red Hand in the midst of the St Patrick's Cross". But the red cross on the Ulster "loyalist" flag is an upright cross, (similar, to the chagrin of many of the English, to the cross of St. George), and the Red Hand of the O'Neills appears not in the middle (if that is what Ignatieff means by "midst") but in the leading quadrant! A minor point? Not to those for whom a flag, as the symbol of the nation (however defined), is something to die for!

**David Humphries, MINING AND METALS IN THE CIS —
Between Autarky and Integration, Royal Institute of
International Affairs, London, 1994, 41 pp., £9.50**

This is yet another useful contribution to the complex field of post-Soviet studies from the Royal Institute of International Affairs. The author, David Humphries, is a geologist with a background in both government service and the mining industry — he is currently Deputy Chief Economist with the RTZ Corporation and is Vice-President of the Brussels-based federation Euromines. He is therefore well-qualified to approach the subject from both the geological and the economic points of view.

Details on CIS mineral resources are hard to come by: the old Soviet figures were, for the most part, calculated on a Union-wide basis, and were

moreover bedevilled by secrecy. Furthermore, Soviet statisticians were interested simply in the gross total of the reserves, and in bolstering the often-repeated claim that the Russian Empire/Soviet Union was uniquely "blessed with all necessary minerals and metals" (Peter D, "a country with uncounted riches and inexhaustible opportunities" (Leonid Brezhnev). No attention was paid to accessibility or the cost of working these deposits. Furthermore, the structure of the Soviet mining and metallurgical industry was developed deliberately to try to knit the Union together, so that ore mined in one area would be shipped perhaps half way across the Union to be smelted, and the ingots taken several thousand miles more to be turned into finished goods. None of this mattered since transport costs were not imputed to production, and what mattered was the fulfilment of plans, not economic viability. To add to the problems of the sector, the ex-Soviet metallurgical industry is so obsolete that much of its processing removes, rather than adds, value, so that, in economic terms, it would make more sense to export the raw ore rather than "process" it. (Political and social considerations, of course, make such a strategy impossible).

These legacies of the past put considerable problems in the way of Western companies seeking to do business with even the most Western-minded CIS states. Tough licensing restrictions have been imposed on would-be exporters of metals and minerals, in a number of CIS countries, including — as Mr. Humphries notes — Ukraine. And, as Western oil and gas companies have learned to their cost, CIS governments, virtually across the board, are all too apt to change the rules for foreign investment in mid-negotiation.

Yet it is clearly in the interests of the international metals and minerals producers for the CIS to be integrated into the world trading community. (The alternative would be a constant threat of dumping and destabilisation, as in January 1994, when Russia started to unload its diamond stocks in the search for ready cash), Mr. Humphries discusses a number of possible Western, and in particular, European approaches to the problem, including the possible designation of the CIS mining and metals sector as a priority area within the EU's technical assistance scheme TACIS, special support for transport and infrastructure development, or mitigation of the environmental impact of current production methods. He notes that the most direct means of assisting in the integration process — investment finance and political risk insurance — is already under way, citing the European Bank for Restructuring and Development (EBRD) in CIS gold-mining.

Mr. Humphries' own preference is for finance — particularly the "soft" finance for pre-feasibility studies, should this be made available — to be concentrated on a few "show-case" projects which can demonstrate state-of-the art technology and work-practice, rather than spreading the aid negligibly thin among all who seek it. In somewhat the same spirit, when not writing about the common post-Soviet legacy of the CIS, he concentrates on a few republics — Russia (inevitably, in view of its size, resources, and proven capacity to dictate its own terms to the rest of the CIS) and also the Central

Asian Republics. Ukraine, although mentioned as a major producer of iron and manganese ore, does not attract his special attention. This, for readers of *The Ukrainian Review*, will alas deprive of special interest what is, undoubtedly, a well-researched and informative general study.

Vera Rich

STUDIA DIPLOMATICA, Vol.XLVI, 1993, Nos.3-4-5

This triple number of one of the world's most prestigious journals of international affairs, (the organ of the Belgian Institut Royal des Relations Internationales/Koninklijk Instituut voor Internationale Betrekkingen), is entirely devoted to a single work, *L'indépendance de l'Ukraine*, by Professor Romain Yakemtchouk. Double, and *a fortiori* triple issues of journals always involve a certain risk of criticism from readers, who may feel themselves, "short-changed". In this case, however, the editorial decision was more than justified. This is a really superb study, well-documented and insightful, of Ukraine's long struggle for independence, over the past 753 years, since the fall of Kyiv to the Tatar hordes of Batu.

The earlier centuries, naturally, are dealt with rapidly, in an opening chapter, which presents an outline of Ukraine's history in the context of what the author calls her *contraintes géographiques*, in particular, her lack of national frontiers. The three following chapters, *L'Ukraine au cours de la première guerre mondiale*, *L'Ukraine soviétique entre les deux guerres mondiales*, and *Visées de l'Allemagne National-Socialiste sur l'Ukraine*, while still fairly concise, begin to display the wealth of documentation at the author's disposal. But from Chapter V, *Retombées politiques de la deuxième guerre mondiale*, the text becomes a densely argued commentary on diplomatic events and negotiations that could, in the hands of a lesser author, all too easily become turgid and confusing. Professor Yakemtchouk's masterly handling of the French language (all the more remarkable in one for whom it is not his mother-tongue) makes it, however, an exciting and fascinating tale.

For the reader who is not a diplomatic specialist, and who is inclined, therefore, to view Ukraine's history as a series of gallant, if doomed, challenges by heroes against the might of the oppressor, it is a tale not often told. To the general reader, the empty forms of "sovereignty" allegedly enjoyed by Soviet Ukraine, including membership of the United Nations, have, for decades, seemed a mockery of reality. What did it matter to the average Ukrainian, living under Stalin's tyranny, that in April 1945 the Kyiv "government" announced that

"the Ukrainian S.S.R, on the basis of its Constitution of January 30, 1937, and the constitutional revisions and amendments adopted by the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R on March 4, 1944, has recovered the right which it formerly had, and which it voluntarily ceded to the U.S.S.R in 1922, to establish direct relations with foreign states, to conclude agreements with them and to have independent representation at international conferences and bodies set up by the latter..."

Yet this assertion provided the framework for Ukraine's admission to the United Nations — and to the various agencies and organisations under the UN aegis, and although for more than 45 years this membership (like that of Belarus) did little more than provide a back-up vote for the All-Union delegation, it was eventually to smooth the path of the reintegration of independent Ukraine into the world political scene.

The treatment of the post-World War II period is "weighted" according to significance for the future, and, in particular, the diplomatic implications of various events. Thus the whole of *"L'Ukraine sous Staline"* occupies less than a quarter of the space allotted to *"Le rattachement de la Crimée à l'Ukraine"*. The era of Brezhnev and his gerontocrat successors, and the early Gorbachev years are presented solely in terms of *"Le combat pour le respect des droits de l'homme"*. But from the elections of March 1990 onwards, up to the independence referendum of 1 December 1991, and the Minsk and Alma-Ata accords which established the CIS, the narrative becomes virtually a diplomatic diary, with every issue, event, document and international response set out in detail. Finally, for the first year of independence, the author gives a masterly analysis of the main diplomatic issues facing the reborn Ukrainian state — strategic options and the problems of conventional and nuclear arms control, the disputes with Russia over Crimea and the Black Sea Fleet, and the problems of "inheritance" of the assets of the former Soviet Union, the problems of oil and gas supplies, Ukraine's departure from the rouble zone, and its demand for international guarantees of security.

The final chapters give details of the bilateral treaties concluded by Ukraine during 1992 and the first part of 1993; Ukraine's multilateral diplomacy and participation in international organisations (including the participation of Ukrainian troops in UNPROFOR), and a (somewhat gloomy) forecast of Ukraine's security and economic future. In conclusion, the book contains the full text of no less than 43 key documents — from the "Fourth Universal" which proclaimed the independence of Ukraine in January 1918, up to the February 1993 memorandum of the Foreign Ministers of Ukraine, Romania and Bulgaria on the maintenance on the Danube of the UN Security Council's embargo on trade with rump Yugoslavia.

Jean Martin

**Olesj P. Benyukh and Raisa I. Galushko, UKRAINIAN
PHRASEBOOK AND DICTIONARY, Hippocrene Language
Series, New York, 1994, 214 pp., \$9.95**

With the opening up of Ukraine to Western business and tourism, a good Ukrainian phrasebook is undoubtedly needed. Unfortunately, this offering from the Hippocrene Language Series fails dismally to fill the gap. True, it covers, albeit superficially, the basic needs of the visitor: "Essential expressions", "At the Airport", "At the hotel", ... "Transportation", ... "Shopping", "Accidents and Emergencies"... . There are even a few hints for the intrepid traveller, which taken *en bloc* form an off-putting litany:

"Try not to change more than you need because the reexchange rate is less than the exchange rate and you will lose money";

"Car rental in Ukraine is only for the very brave at heart";

"You should be aware that hot water is routinely shut off for several weeks at a time...";

"Restaurants are inexpensive... but the food is mediocre at best", (though elsewhere we are told that "Most Ukrainian national dishes are very delicious);

"Packages to be sent out of Ukraine must be brought to a post office unwrapped"... .

The Ukrainian-English and English-Ukrainian vocabularies cover most basic needs — and a few less common ones. (Does the casual visitor, one wonders, really need to know *bozbevilnyi* — "insane"?) There are, inevitably, a sprinkling of errors. "Thus in the section on "Stones and metals", *sribnyi* is rendered not as "silver (*adj*)", but as "silver-plated, for which the correct Ukrainian term is *sriblennyi*.

Apart from a bald list of national holidays, however, (New Year, Women's Day, May Day, VE Day, Independence Day), there is no attempt to work into the conversational phrases anything relating to Ukrainian culture or history. No "Shall we visit the Shevchenko memorial?" or "Please give me two tickets for 'Natalka Poltavka'". The overall picture is, alas, of a grim, grey country, fraught with rules and regulations, which no one save a confirmed masochist would visit except out of dire necessity.

But all this pales into insignificance before a glaring basic error — the pronunciation of the fourth letter of the Ukrainian alphabet. This should, of course, be pronounced "H". True, the identical symbol is pronounced "G" in Russian. True, the Soviets banned the separate symbol for "G" from the Ukrainian alphabet, so that Ukrainians who have grown up under Soviet rule have considerable difficulty with foreign names, which they have usually heard only in their Russian forms, speaking of Gamburg, Gitler, and the Gabsburg empire. Why a work printed in the West, however, should wish to perpetrate Soviet errors is a mystery. And yet this book maintains that the letter in question, the fourth letter of the Ukrainian alphabet, the Ukrainian "H" is pronounced "like the g in goat"! Under such circumstances, one can really do nothing but give it an emphatic thumbs-down!

SCIENCE AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS, The Royal Society, London, Spring 1994

This issue includes a survey of the cases for and against plans to build the UK's first permanent disposal site for nuclear waste and a report on the legacy of the Chornobyl nuclear accident in April 1986. The juxtaposition of the two articles is hardly coincidental. The debate surrounding the proposed Sellafield "underground repository" will undoubtedly continue until — and even beyond — its planned opening in 2010; the report on the Chornobyl legacy shows only too well how, eight years after the world's worst reactor disaster, scientists are still having constantly to reassess upwards their estimates of its health and environmental effects.

The author of the report, Roland Pease, is an experienced science writer — formerly a journalist with *Nature*, and now a writer and producer with the BBC's science unit.

Much of the new material presented here derives from a meeting last December, organised by the British group of Pugwash (an international organisation of scientists concerned with the impact of science on world affairs). Unfortunately, there was no expert from Ukraine present at that meeting, and although Dr. Alexander Lutzko, Rector of the International Sakharov College of Radioecology in Minsk, happened to be in London on a flying visit from Belarus, his contribution was restricted to a few remarks from the floor during the general discussion. Pease's material on the situation in Ukraine and Belarus presented here tends, therefore, to be slightly dated, and to derive from secondary sources — in particular, alas, Piers Paul Read's *ABLAZE* (see *The Ukrainian Review*, No. 2, 1993).

Pease's main message, however, comes over clearly and unequivocally — the huge and still increasing cost of the accident in human health and environmental damage, the lack of a safe and permanent solution of how to dismantle the damaged reactor, the continuing efforts of some members of the pronuclear lobby to down-play the problems — and the complacency of others, such as Alexander Sich of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, who — after 18 months work with the post-accident research team at Chernobyl — concluded that the Chernobyl accident represents “an upper bound for severe nuclear power plant accidents” and that, since this accident involved neither a nuclear-bomb-type explosion nor a “China syndrome” meltdown, such scenarios are unlikely to take place anywhere! (One envies his optimism — or is it complacency?)

One important issue which Pease brings to the fore, and which to date has not been adequately aired in the Western press, is the major legal issues confronting plans by the Western nuclear industry to close down and phase out the 25 oldest and most dangerous nuclear reactors in the former Soviet Union. The Westerners are keen to do this if only because — as John Gittus, a spokesman for the British Nuclear Industry told Roland Pease “nuclear power *couldn't* continue anywhere if we had another Chernobyl”. But it is hard to see how the necessary funding (an estimated \$24 billion) could be raised, and although a little Western money is available for safety, Pease tells us, the current state of commercial law in the former Soviet Union and eastern Europe could leave Western contractors liable for the damages of any accidents at these reactors, even if their own work were not involved. Not surprisingly, under the circumstances, Western nuclear manufacturers are unwilling to take the risk.

In February 1994, Pease reports, Foratom, the umbrella organisation of the nuclear industry of the European Union asked the EU's Commissioner for external economic affairs to find a temporary way of indemnifying them so that this urgently needed safety work can be commenced. One can only hope for an early and positive solution. ■

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Current Affairs**THE CURRENT STATE OF THE UKRAINIAN ECONOMY. STRATEGY AND REFORM**

Halyna Pukhtayevych

Studies of the on-going processes taking place in the Ukrainian economy in 1992-93 have yielded new results. The principal one is the worsening of the socio-economic crisis under the influence of hyperinflation.

The economic policy of "shock therapy", introduced at the beginning of 1992, had a result which was diametrically opposed to what had been intended. During this period the gross national product and national income fell by one-third, and the structural crisis increased, as the accelerated rate of decline of the production of consumer goods (the light, food, medical industries, and basic services) bore witness. The monetary system collapsed, the balance of payments deficit and the state budget deficit became deeper, and the situation in the investment sphere became more acute, the standard of living of the people continued to decline, and the stratification of the population by income level and its polarisation intensified. Thus this anti-inflation policy has led to the decline of the country's economy.

This critical situation makes the proper determination of its causes and effects a matter of considerable importance. Without this, it is impossible to work out a strategy for economic reform. The defining economic causes are:

- a marked structural disproportion in the economy;
- no guarantee that domestic producers can be ensured the necessary material and technical resources;
- the extremely low level of organisation of the national economic life on the part of the state, and the lack of effective measures to improve the situation.

This resulted in the collapse of the financial sphere, and hyperstagflation with all its consequences.

Ukraine has huge potentialities for economic development. These include the unique black-earth zones, intellectual, scientific and production potential, various types of commercially viable mines with large reserves, an extraordinarily convenient geographical location with major transnational communications and access to the sea. Why then, if Ukraine has such major assets, do its citizens have such a low standard of living? The first reason is economic: the

existing production capability of Ukraine was formed, exploited and developed not on its own resource, natural, geo-economic and human bases, but as part of the potential of the huge territory of the former Soviet Union. But this potential operated not to the benefit of Ukraine, but for the whole economic complex of the USSR. As a result, today Ukraine does not have an integrated economy, and even the key sectors of production in practice do not work to the benefit of Ukraine.

Significant structural disproportions in the Ukrainian economy facilitated the accumulation of inflationary potential. A policy which gave priority first and foremost to ensuring the needs of production led to the predominant development of the means of production (69.5% in industry in 1990) in comparison with production of consumer goods (30.5% in industry in 1990). This interrelation between the two sectors of public production paid no attention to the needs of the population. As a result, insufficient attention was paid to balancing the purchasing power of the population with the supply of goods and services necessary to cover it. The goods-money imbalance gave rise to a significant inflationary potential which initially became manifest in the form of deficits and the growing unsatisfied purchasing power of the population.

These deficits and the accumulation of unsatisfied purchasing power of the people may serve as evidence of the excess of aggregate demand over aggregate supply, since consumption is one of the most significant components of aggregate demand. Hence, the sector structure of Ukraine's economy became distorted and contained a built-in inflationary potential.

In Ukraine it was always the heavy industry sectors, subordinated to the All-Union government and actively favoured by the state, which were most highly developed. In 1992 at current prices the greatest specific weight in overall industrial output was that of ferrous metallurgy (23.1%), machine-building and metalworking (18.5%), fuel industry (15.2%). The output of light industry accounted for 6.7%, and the food industry 12.8%. One should point out that the "price liberalisation" introduced at the beginning of 1992 led to further distortions of the economy in comparison with 1990. Thus, for example, in 1990 the light and food industries made up 19.4% of the total. And in the first six months of 1993 it fell from this already unsatisfactory state to 18.6%.

As a result of the present price, budgetary and monetary-credit policies the economic structure of Ukraine continues to deteriorate at a significant rate, and has a marked tendency towards sharp oscillations after every new round of reviews of prices, wages, budgetary expenditure and the emission of money.

The inflationary spiral is not developing at the same rate in the various sectors. Prices increase at a slower rate at the moment when they are increased administratively on consumer goods and services, which are created for the most part, in the machine-building and the light and food industries. The proportion of costs due to inputs from the coal and metallurgical industries increases at an above-average rate. Rises in prices and wages are especially sharp, as are those production costs of industries using oil and gas imported from Russia.

Significant fractions of social production, the processes of the formation of prices and profit are currently being distorted to a markedly greater degree than in previous decades.

It is likewise significant that the heavy industry plants, which hold the dominant position in the scale of industrial output, were built decades ago and use obsolete equipment. This makes Ukraine's industry extremely energy-greedy, and, since today Ukraine is not self-sufficient in energy, makes it extremely dependent on external suppliers – in particular Russia. This dependence represents a great inflationary danger since a significant rise in the price of energy carriers imposed by the suppliers or a reduction of the scale of supplies can lead to a drop in production and hence to a rise in inflation.

The contribution to the inflationary potential of the sector structure of the Ukrainian economy is not limited to the situation we have described. The sector structure also affects other processes and linkages in the economy. Thus, for example, the dominance of state ownership and monopoly production structures, and the centralised distribution of resources at fixed prices has destroyed the price elasticity of aggregate demand. With the lack of stimuli for capital flow enterprises found an opportunity to transfer their losses to the consumer or the budget. One effect of this policy was the existence of large numbers of loss-making enterprises, which reduced the efficiency of social production. The mining industry and agriculture of Ukraine showed an excessively high loss-level. Thus in 1991 the profitability of the coal industry amounted to -75%, while 10% of created national income went on subsidies to agriculture. It must be pointed out that, at the present time, the mining industry and agriculture in highly developed countries also require government support, subsidies and investment. But what is actually happening at present in Ukraine is unique. As a result of the circulation of money devalued by hyperinflation, the profitability of the coal industry fell in the first quarter of 1993 to 51.5%, that of ferrous metallurgy to 55.2%, that of the chemical and petrochemical industries to -61.4%, and of the forestry, timber-processing and cellulose-paper industries to -55.2%. No economy can endure such relationships for long. Structural reform has been brought to a standstill through the artificial relocation of financial resources from the profit-making sectors to low-profitability or loss-making sectors. These latter sectors should reduce their part of the overall volume of production and have a lower volume of financial accumulation. The distortion of the economic structure in Ukraine is, in actual fact, due to all its spheres, and counteracts both the process of structural reform and the establishment of a market economy.

The goods-money imbalance of the economy has been intensified by an elevated level of employment in comparison with its normal, effective level. This lowered the productivity of labour, and expenditure on wages was not fully covered by goods. In addition, under pressure of strikes in the period 1991-93 the government, by raising the wages of various categories of workers, intensified the distortion in the levels and interrelation of wages between individual branches of the state economic sector. The coal industry ended up in an espe-

cially privileged position; here wages rose in 1992-93 from the 1991 level of 1.5 times the mean level of industry to 2.2-2.7 times. At the same time, wages in the light and food industries do not exceed 75-80% of the average industry level. Traditionally the gap between the wage levels of the coal industry and the mean industrial level of Ukraine did not exceed 1.5-1.6 times. Similar gaps also exist in other countries, but in some of them, particularly during the implementation of a stabilisation policy, it does not exceed 1.2-1.3 times. In Ukraine the government has used the state budget to maintain artificially an elevated level of earnings and profitability in the coal industry, which distorted the financial resources of accumulation and had a negative effect on structural changes and also led to a new cost inflationary spiral. Internal economic policy under pressure from miners, transport workers and others, has ended in hyperinflation. The whole burden of these effects has fallen on the shoulders of the consumers, that is the population, which in reality has had to pay for price and wage levels which are unjustified and have been artificially raised as a result of an acutely deficit budget. All this has caused a further intensification of financial problems in other sectors, and continues to distort the economic structure.

Thus the structure of the Ukrainian economy is inefficient and ecologically dangerous. It leads to overexpenditure of natural resources, and, at the same time, fails to satisfy the needs of the economy in investment goods, or those of the population in goods and services. Today more than half of the inventory of output of the most diverse goods production have breaks in production, that is those production cycles which depend on imports. Ukraine's import dependence coefficient is 41%, whereas even for a country as dependent on the import of raw materials and integrated in the world market as Japan, it is only 14%, for the USA 9.5%, and for France 20.5%. Since there is no flow of capital and investment into highly profitable and socially oriented sectors, over the whole structure of the economy there are no improvements.

The fall in production taking place in the economy is to a large extent also characterised by the lack of a steady and adequate supply of material and technical resources to the producers of goods. A large number of experts also point to the breakdown of economic links with the countries of the former Soviet Union as the principal cause of this fall in production. But this is not a cause but an effect. With the collapse of the USSR, raw materials, resources and products were no longer distributed. Now they are sold, not given. Many producers have ceased operations. The circulation of goods has decreased not because the ties with traditional partners have been broken, but because the economy lacks the foreign currency, and first and foremost, roubles, to ensure the necessary resources.

According to the data of the balance of payments with Russia drawn up in 1993, Ukrainian exports to Russia are valued at 20.4 trillion karbovantsi, and our imports from Russia at 32.2 trillion karbovantsi. This is associated with special features of the export potential of Ukraine and Russia. For Russia, this is mainly energy-carriers, and for Ukraine – primary and finished goods. It should be observed that the balance of payments gap – the deficit – will go on increasing

until Russia has brought up her energy prices to world level. From the situation which has arisen, one may draw the following conclusions: all economic barriers to export must be removed, and exports encouraged; imports of nonessential goods must be limited; it must be realised that taking the route of increasing exports means consciously limiting the domestic consumption of exportable output, but without this we shall be unable even to speak about acquiring the additional reserves for industry from export and at the same time further expand internal consumption. It would be desirable to increase exports mainly through industrial-technical goods. Covering the balance of payments deficit, together with international credits, encouraging exports and restricting imports, will demand major structural changes in the economy, as we have already stated.

The said balance of payments deficit intensifies high rates of inflation. In its turn, high inflation intensifies the balance of payments deficit since it causes foreign currency to be kept abroad (for example, Ukraine's debt to Russia in 1992 of some US \$2.5 billion, was almost entirely due to the "leakage" of roubles to Russia as a result of the collapse of the monetary-credit policy in 1992). The balance of payments deficit considerably intensified the fall in the standard of living of the population. This was caused by the special features of Ukraine's imports from Russia, as mentioned above. Almost all its income from exports to Russia goes to covering the energy supplies to Ukraine's exceptionally energy-greedy heavy industry. This also aggravates the situation since it blocks exports to Russia as it means that there are no roubles available for the acquisition of the components required for the manufacture of export goods. There are virtually no roubles left for the needs of the light, food and medical industries. This is the main reason why, during the first seven months of 1993, while industrial production fell by 6.6%, production of textiles fell by 32.9%, footwear by 20%, fish products by 32%, etc.

All these facts demand structural changes in the economy as an absolute priority. As a rule, structural changes cannot be carried out immediately. They require a considerable amount of time and expense. But the change which can and must be carried out immediately is an absolute priority structured policy of energy conservation. Thus, for example, simply halting the export of ammonia, carbamide and methanol (taking only the cost of gas, thermal and electric power into account), would free US \$85 million, and this, without other costs, would reduce Ukraine's demand for gas by 1.5 million cubic metres, and would contribute an additional income of US \$81 million from gas transit (calculated at world prices).

Finally, the third reason for the economic crisis is the low level of state regulation of economic processes, the absence of a favourable economic environment, the absence of diverse forms of property, the necessary conditions for the operation of the market, and a legal basis for interaction between the subjects of the market. This demands the immediate solution of the question of establishing market structures, privatisation, support for business, small firms, competition, the passing of anti-monopoly legislation and the working out of methods of state regulation of the economy. World experience shows that in a market econ-

omy the state not only creates the necessary conditions for the functioning of the market, but also actively assists the development of science, education, the saturation of the market, and ensures the stability of the currency.

The factors we have described to a significant measure trigger disruptions in the financial and monetary-credit spheres and generate a high rate of hyperinflation.

Taking into account that inflationary processes in Ukraine have simultaneously a structural, monetary and institutional character, an anti-inflationary policy will have to be a complex one, that is, it will have to operate on the basis of a combination of monetary and nonmonetary methods. Non-standard and non-traditional methods will be necessary: a structural reconstruction of the economy, changes in budgetary, taxation and social policy, external economic activity, and reform of the banking system. Thus the complex nature of the transitional period lies in the fact that it is necessary to carry out stabilisation, structural and reform measures.

First of all, it is necessary to solve the problem of saturating the market with goods. Increasing the output of consumer goods is the most reliable anti-inflationary measure. Such an element of anti-inflation policy as the stimulation of purchasing power will not operate in present conditions. This mechanism will work reliably only when there is a real market, a buyers' market, and not a producers' one. Prices in Ukraine are not free, but set high by monopolies; there is no competition between producers, and prices do not come down even in response to low demand. Thus the main problem is one of production, and this means the problem of creating effective stimuli for work and investment.

Structural changes in the economy will ensure a change in the ratio between sectors, in favour of the population: an increase of consumer goods necessary for the stabilisation of the currency, and a decrease in the dependence of Ukraine on external economic links, first and foremost on energy suppliers. The advantage of such changes is that they will introduce not only anti-inflationary measures but also stimulating ones.

Structural changes can be real only if the conditions of privatisation are realised. The shaping of a competitive environment will be associated with the demonopolisation of production, and the establishment of small enterprises.

Demonopolisation is one of the most important strategic aims of economic reform in Ukraine. According to the data of the Ministry of Statistics, the majority of branches of industry have a monopolistic or oligoistic structure. The level of monopolisation of production is 76-99% for 152 types of output, 51-75% for 154 types of output, and 35-50% for 136 types. The highest amount of monopolists is concentrated in ferrous metallurgy, the chemical industry, heavy and agricultural machine-building, and machine-tool construction. The monopolists are responsible for 40% of the total volume of industrial production, 45% of the labour force, and only 2.9% of the overall number of enterprises.

During 1992-93, the worsening of the crisis was accompanied by the strengthening of monopolistic tendencies in the economy. The market which is just beginning to be formed, has a monopolistic character. Hence it is necessary

to overcome the monopolisation of the economy. Government demonopolisation programmes envisaged: the removal of the unjustifiable role of the state in a number of spheres of economic activity by means of privatisation, the anti-monopoly direction of investment and structural policy, guaranteeing a real growth in the number of competing subjects of the market, the expediency of maintaining high-efficiency competitive monopolised structures, eliminating their negative effect on the consumer sphere.

With this aim, the programme of action of the Ukrainian government for 1994 envisages the mass implementation, and, in the main, completion in 1994, of small-scale privatisation, in the first instance in the sphere of trade, basic services, mass catering, via auctions or competitive tender, with the obligatory inclusion in this process of wholesale trade links and mass catering; to impose a 30% cut in the payroll of concerns scheduled for privatisation; to demonopolise road transport, and to sell off its enterprises by auctions or competitive tender; in the privatisation of large enterprises to use the gradual introduction of the corporatisation of state enterprises as a necessary preliminary step towards privatisation. In the sphere of privatisation in the agrarian sector the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine proposes: first of all to privatise enterprises which process agricultural produce, applying the mechanisms of mortgages and bankruptcy to farms within the agro-industrial complex, and establishing a normative-legal basis for the privatisation of land.

The classic regulator of inflationary processes in a market economy is the emission and credit-monetary policy. But, taking into account the special nature of the inflationary processes in Ukraine, it becomes once again necessary to pay particular attention to credit-monetary policy. It will be necessary in 1994 to avoid major price hikes for energy associated with transition to world prices and thus to get free of the effect of this external factor of inflation. Due to the transition to world prices, the economy of Ukraine is approaching a qualitatively new situation – a crisis of the export product market due to the non-competitiveness of the prices of large enterprises. This will demand a whole system of measures to support the export potential of Ukrainian goods.

To make the effect on the economy of the measures of credit-monetary policy more substantial, it is necessary to reform the banking system, and to create a securities' market.

The only centre able to lay down the fundamental directions of credit-monetary policy can be the National Bank of Ukraine. It is necessary to separate the functions of the National Bank of Ukraine and the Cabinet of Ministers: the Cabinet of Ministers is to be responsible for realising economic policy, and the National Bank for money supply, its stabilisation and the support of the national currency. Emission activity of the National Bank, linked to regulation of the mutual indebtedness of enterprises, is forbidden.

An important condition for the efficient functioning of the market economy is a fully competent financial market. The formation of credit-finance and commercial-intermediary organisations in Ukraine is taking place fairly intensively.

About 150 commercial banks have been established: 85 goods, raw materials and stock exchanges and over 5,000 brokerage businesses have been established; the Ukrainian Stock Exchange has also been established.

But passivity in the sphere of privatisation means that the securities' market has failed to develop. As a result, the Ukrainian Stock Exchange does not possess the basic necessity for its operation – shares in privatised enterprises. Hence the creation of a fully competent securities market is bound up with the process of privatisation.

Another factor holding back the formation of the market financial infrastructure is the absence of legislation on investment stocks, companies, holdings, and also the absence of practice in licensing dealings in privatised securities.

Hence it is envisaged that the formation of a financial market will begin with the establishment of a securities' market.

In emission policy, the government programme for 1994 envisages prohibiting the emission activity of the Cabinet of Ministers via the state budget, and the withdrawal of the commercial banks' emission licences. In order to bring the economy out of inflation smoothly, a ratio has been established between price rises and emission of money (80% of money emission per 100% of price rises).

The fundamental measures of credit policy must, in the first place, assist the direction of credit resources towards investment which is connected with the restructuring of the economy. The National Bank will effect the sale of credit resources to the commercial banks only through auction. It is necessary to introduce a supervisory mechanism for the targetted use of credit resources in implementing priority programmes. It will be necessary to refuse support to inefficient enterprises, since the tightening of inflation is connected with the involvement of the financial and credit systems in the process of maintaining the artificial solvency of loss-making enterprises. Credit and financing support will be possible only for enterprises capable of competitive output.

Measures to get out of hyperinflation also included a budgetary policy. One of the principal problems of this is the budget deficit. The following basic measures are envisaged for restructuring the financial-budgetary system: dividing expenditure financed by the budget into current budget and development budget. The current budget will ensure financial resources for the social security of the population. All budgetary calculations for 1994 have been carried out on the basis of world prices for energy and other resources. Moreover, a Treasury office is being established, whose computer system, interacting from the start, will ensure a complete and prompt income from taxation.

A review of the taxation system is also necessary. Its use to stimulate investment by enterprises, organisations, enterprise structures, and foreign partners to increase production will be strengthened. To this end, taxes will be reduced to a given level, taxable bodies will be reassessed, and a system of differentiated tax-scales introduced. A policy for tax breaks for Ukrainian exporters will be introduced.

Escaping from the crisis situation and the construction of a market economy will also require the reappraisal of the functions of the state. Today, there is not

a single country which does not make active use of a system of state control and regulation of market relations. The states themselves are in charge of the regulation mechanism of macroeconomic processes. Administrative methods of control must not be completely ruled out, since the adoption and implementation of economic measures require administrative actions to carry them out.

Firstly, the function of the state consists of creating normal conditions for the functioning of the economy: drawing up and adopting a Constitution, and a package of legal acts regulating the whole system of market relations; effecting goods-money and budgetary equilibrium; and antimonopoly measures. In other words, the state, with the aid of legal methods, regulates the social-economic processes of the functioning of society.

Secondly, the state functions as a property owner, for which it is necessary to go over to new forms of interaction between the state, as owner, and state enterprises on the basis of a contract system.

Thirdly, an important mechanism of state economic control is the system of formation and use of the state and local budgets to finance government programmes at the national and regional level, and to solve the social problems of the life of the population.

Fourthly, the state's economic strategy in crisis conditions is based on the recognition of a necessary system of graduated priorities which require the support of state resources. Macroeconomic regulation processes require the recognition of a single banking and currency-finance policy for the entire sphere of economic activity.

Fifthly, the system of state control facilitates the working out of targetted complex programmes and the forecasting of economic development.

Thus the state creates the necessary economic preconditions for the formation of the relevant market space and the activation of modern business. State economic policy will be successful insofar as it is consistent and target-oriented.

Thus, on Ukraine's road to economic stabilisation as a principal strategic aim, the first steps will consist of curbing the sources of hyperinflation. For it is this which, by depreciating the value of money, has engendered all the negative phenomena which exist today. To overcome hyperinflation it will be necessary to use a whole complex of anti-inflationary measures: restructuring, antimonopoly policy, stabilisation of the currency-finance and credit-money systems. All these measures are envisaged in the Programme of Action of the Ukrainian government for 1994, and with their implementation one may hope for a positive economic effect. ■

History**THE MYSTERY OF THE FIRST KYIV TREASURE**

Ludmyla Pekars'ka

Kyiv, one of the ancient cities of Europe, for three centuries was the capital of the powerful East Slavonic state – Kyivan Rus' (10-13th centuries). It occupied a vast territory: from Lake Ladoga in the north to the Black Sea in the south, and from the Carpathian Mountains in the west to the Upper Volga in the east. Kyivan Rus' defended its borders, maintained political, economic and kinship ties with Bulgaria, France, Hungary, Poland, Sweden, England, and countries of the Arab East and Byzantium, and was renowned in the world of the Middle Ages. In its wealthy and influential capital, Kyiv, was concentrated the considerable wealth of the princely families, monasteries and churches. A significant number of relics of that time have survived until the present day: material treasures of various kinds, first and foremost precious metals. Over the past 150 years, some 70 such treasures were discovered on the territory of Kyiv, all of them by chance. Numerous treasures, large and small, were found in the central, fortified part of the ancient capital, close to the Tithe Church, the Monastery of St Michael, and the Cathedral of St Sophia. During times of emergency, Ukraine's forebears were driven to preserve their valuables by burying them in the ground. These treasures included jewellery of high artistic workmanship, articles of princely apparel and religious artefacts, and so on. These treasures were decorated with polychrome enamel, niello work, filigree, pearls and precious stones.

Unfortunately, not all the treasures so unearthed ended up in scholarly custody. Many of them "went missing"; some were simply melted down for bullion, and the fate of others remains a mystery. The latter category includes the treasure, found in Kyiv in 1824. It is to this find that this article is devoted, for several reasons. First of all, the fate of this treasure typifies the fate of the majority of archaeological relics of ancient Kyiv treasures. After a short-lived period of fame, in the summer of 1825 it mysteriously and completely disappeared. For almost 170 years we have known absolutely nothing about its whereabouts or even if it still exists. Secondly, it was the first well-known find of valuable material treasures from Kyiv of the princely era, and thereby deserves every effort to search for and elucidate the circumstances of its mysterious disappearance. All this has given an impetus to attempts at systematising and analysing all the known data about this treasure, bringing together even what may seem, at first glance,



Fig. 1

Pectorals from princely ceremonial dress. Gold, enamel, rubies, turquoises. Late 11th-early 12th centuries. (Medallions depicting: a – Christ, b – St George – known from drawings; c – St Demetrius – still extant).

insignificant details and to make generally known all the existing material on it, both known, and previously unpublished.

Let us begin with the circumstances of its discovery. On 25 May 1824 the Kyiv *petit bourgeois* Vasyl Khoshchevskiy was walking up a path in the Podil district leading to the Golden-Domed Monastery of St Michael. When he had almost reached the monastery wall, he accidentally stepped on a red brick which broke. Under it he saw, buried in the ground, a pot with something silver shining inside. He took out all the things from the pot and wrapped them up in a kerchief.¹

The local police chief informed the Governor of the find, and conveyed them under escort to M.F. Berlynskiy, the senior lecturer of history and geography of the First Kyiv *gymnasium*. The latter prepared a description of the treasure, which has the value of a primary source.² The description is evidence that the treasure included items of great artistic value: a silver chalice depicting the Saviour, the Mother of God, St John the Baptist, and St John Chrysostom; a silver paten depicting the Mother of God; two golden medallions with enamel representations of Christ and an unidentified martyr, adorned with rubies and turquoise; a small cross made from white marble with golden ends and enamel ornamentation; 25 golden pendants with pearls; 20 silver gilt plates; 8 golden semirings with precious stones and pearls; a pair of silver filigree ear-rings of the Kyivan type; and a pair of gilt, enamel ear-ring pendants.

Berlynskiy's description was corrected and expanded by Metropolitan Yevheniy Bolkhovytinov,³ and was later published.⁴ Another study of this treasure was made by P.O. Mukhanov⁵ and came into the hands of the Society of Russian History and Antiquities and of the publisher O.O. Kornilyovych. However, it was never published, and in time it disappeared altogether. Investigators could not find Mukhanov's study either in the archive or in the Society's library. It should be pointed out that the Society did not have direct instructions about where actual artefacts from the find were to go. Some scholars have held the opinion that the treasure is preserved in the Hermitage Museum,⁶ but the catalogue of the Hermitage Museum's Mediaeval and Renaissance Department makes no mention of them.⁷

¹ N.P. Kondakov, *Russkie klady. Izsledovaniya drevnostey velikokniazheskogo perioda*, St Petersburg, 1896, pp. 96-105.

² Manuscript Archive of the Institute of the History of Material Culture of the Russian Academy of Sciences (hereafter RA IIMK RAN), fund 1, file 59/1885, pp. 225-227.

³ Yevheniy (Yevphymiy Bolkhovytinov, 1767-1837), Metropolitan of Kyiv from 1822, was a notable scholar and collector of historical materials. The archaeological excavations in Kyiv commissioned by him led to the discovery of the foundations of the Tithe Church, the Golden Gates, and other valuable finds. Yevheniy is the author of many historical works.

⁴ RA IIMK RAN, fund 1, file 59/1885, p. 188; *Otechestvennye zapiski*, 1824, book 19, pp. 272-85; Evheniy, mitropolit Kievskiy, "O Drevnostyakh nedavno naydennykh v Kieve", *Trudy obshchestva istorii i drevnostey rossiyskikh*, Moscow, 1826, book 1, part 3, pp. 152-63.

⁵ *Severnyi Arkhiv*, 1824, part X, no. 11, May, pp. 277-78 (Mukhanov's Letter to Kornilyovych).

⁶ N.V. Zakrevskiy, *Opisanie Kieva*, Moscow, 1868, pp. 554-55; N. Belyashevskiy, "Klady velikokniazheskoy epokhi, naydennye v Kieve", *Kievskaya starina*, vol. XXII, 1888, pp. 136-143.

⁷ N.P. Kondakov, *Ukazatel otdeleniya srednikh vekov i epokhy Vozrozhdeniya*, St Petersburg, 1891.

Thus the treasure had unexpectedly and mysteriously vanished. It was only at the end of the 19th century that the Russian Imperial Archaeological Commission began searching for it. The archival materials include documents which allow us to trace the measures employed.⁸ Three times the Commission asked the Governor of Kyiv (in August and December 1895 and January 1896) to lend it the relevant official correspondence, in order to clarify certain circumstances of the disappearance of the find.⁹ The governor eventually replied (February 1896) that the archives of the Chancery and the *gubernia* administration contained no correspondence on this treasure.¹⁰ The Commission continued its search. It made similar requests to the Society of Russian History and Antiquity at Moscow University and the archive and library of that Society,¹¹ the Kyivan Clerical Consistory,¹² the archives of the Monastery of St Michael in Kyiv¹³ and the Imperial Public Library.¹⁴ However, in every case the answer was the same: there was no information whatsoever about these artefacts. There was no correspondence and their whereabouts were unknown.

Finally on 17 May 1896 the Commission approached the Ministry of Internal Affairs in order to establish whether or not the archive of that Ministry held anything relevant to the discovery of the Kyiv treasure of 1824.¹⁵ This produced the first positive reply – file no. 74 of the Ministry of Internal Affairs concerning the treasure trove.¹⁶ From the materials of the case it was understood that the State Chancellor, Count Rumyantsev,¹⁷ had in mind to acquire the treasure for himself – a fact which was, until recently, unknown. In order to discover why he was unsuccessful, we must back-track a little, to the time of the discovery of the treasure.

Count Rumyantsev first learned about this unique find from M.F. Berlynskyi who drew up the first description of the artefacts.¹⁸ Somewhat later, Metropolitan Yevheniy of Kyiv suggested to Rumyantsev that the latter should acquire the treasure for his historical collection, and proposed that he, Yevheniy, should act as intermediary with the Governor of Kyiv.¹⁹ On Yevheniy's application, the Governor approached the Ministry of Internal Affairs for permission to sell these

⁸ RA IIMK RAN, fund 1, file no. 59/1885, "Perepiska o veshchakh klada 1824 g."

⁹ Ibid, pp. 185-187.

¹⁰ Ibid, p. 197.

¹¹ Ibid, p. 189.

¹² Ibid, p. 214.

¹³ Ibid, p. 214.

¹⁴ Ibid, p. 240.

¹⁵ Ibid, p. 219.

¹⁶ Ibid, pp. 223-234.

¹⁷ Nikolay Petrovych Rumyantsev (1754-1826), served the Russian Imperial Court in the capacity of senator, minister of commerce, and minister of foreign affairs. In 1809 he was appointed state chancellor. Rumyantsev made a great contribution towards the study of history: at his own cost he printed a number of academic publications, organised a scientific-maritime expedition aboard the *Ryurik*, and set up a society to search for, study and publish historical documents, archaeological artefacts and ancient relics. Many scholars benefited from his patronage.

¹⁸ *Perepiska Mitropolita Kievskogo Evgeniya s gosudarstvennym kantslerom grafom N.P. Rumyantsevym i s nekotorymi drugimi sovremennikami (s 1813 po 1825 g.)*, third edition, Voronezh, 1872, p. 107 (letter of 24 June 1824).

¹⁹ Ibid, pp. 112-13 (letter of 21 October 1824); p. 114 (letter of 2 November 1824).



Fig. 2

Artefacts from the Kyiv treasure, discovered in 1824,
which mysteriously disappeared in 1825.

artefacts, but received no reply.²⁰ After this, Count Rumyantsev in person applied to the Minister of Internal Affairs, V.S. Lanskyi.²¹ Rumyantsev proposed that Lanskyi should give the owner of these artefacts the right to sell them since the State Treasury had no intention of acquiring them.²² Rumyantsev still hoped to be the purchaser of these unique artefacts.

Lanskyi also received a written notification from Vasyl Khoshchevskiy that Count Rumyantsev had the intention of acquiring this treasure (the finder was worried that he would not receive his remuneration).²³ Although Rumyantsev received no answer, ten days later it was made known to him that the Kyiv valuables would be taken into the State Treasury.²⁴ Emperor Alexander I of Russia, who had commissioned the description of the treasure ("in a good hand for easy reading"),²⁵ instructed Lanskyi to confer with the President of the Academy of Fine Arts, O.M. Olenin, where would be the best place to keep it. Olenin considered that it would be expedient to keep the treasure in the Imperial Public Library, of which he himself was a director. The archive documents bear witness that on 9 June 1825 Lanskyi actually received the treasure, which was brought from Kyiv to St Petersburg, and made preparations to transfer the artefacts to the Public Library.²⁶ And, indeed, they were sent there. But that was not the end of the story.

In August 1896, that is 71 years after the treasure was found, the Imperial Archaeological Commission approached the Imperial Public Library with an enquiry about the treasure, hoping at last to receive the materials. But the Library administration stated that it had no knowledge of these artefacts. Moreover, it said, all antiquities and coins had been transferred in 1825-26 to the Hermitage and the Emperor's personal library. In November 1896, the Hermitage – to which the Commission had then applied – replied that it had no information about this treasure. The idea expressed in the literature, that the treasure had been "re-presented to the Court, but had vanished without trace",²⁷ seems very improbable. It is more likely that it never reached the Court, for otherwise there would be some information about it in the archives of the Ministry of the Imperial Court. But there is no mention there of the Kyiv treasure of 1824.²⁸ The search undertaken by the Russian Imperial Archaeological

²⁰ Ibid, p. 116.

²¹ V.S. Lanskyi, a former Hussar colonel of the Sumy regiment, was appointed Governor of Saratov by Catherine II. In the reign of Alexander I he was posted to Grodno, where he remained until 1812. After the occupation of Warsaw by Russian troops he was a member of the provisional government of the Warsaw dukedom. In August 1823 Lanskyi became minister of internal affairs. (*Istoriya tsarstvovaniya imperatora Aleksandra I i Rossiya v ego vremya*, vol. VI, St Petersburg, 1871, p. 389; Russian Archive, Moscow, 1863, pp. 830-32).

²² Ibid, p. 117 (letter of 19 December).

²³ RA IIMK RAN, fund 1, file no. 59/1885, p. 231.

²⁴ *Perepiska Mitropolita Kievskogo Eugeniya s gosudarstvennym kantslerom grafom N.P. Rumyantsevym i s nekotorymi drugimi sovremennikami (s 1813 po 1825 g.)*, third edition, p. 119 (letter of 29 December 1824).

²⁵ RA IIMK RAN fund 1, file no. 59/1885, p. 288.

²⁶ Ibid, file no. 70/1887, p. 234.

²⁷ H.F. Korzukhina, *Russkie klady IX-XIII vv.*, Moscow-Leningrad, 1954, p. 123.

²⁸ RA IIMK RAN fund 1, file no. 70/1887, pp. 5-6.

Commission yielded no results. In the first work on the treasures of old Rus', prepared by this Commission over ten years, this treasure appears only thanks to some sketches made of it shortly after it was discovered.²⁹

Let us now turn to the composition of the treasure. We know about this, first and foremost, from the works of Metropolitan Yevheniy of Kyiv, N.P. Kondakov, and also H.F. Korzukhina.³⁰ The treasure was composed of about 70 items. These artefacts added up to about a pound of pure gold. One metal piece with stones was estimated at that time at 1,500 roubles and two oriental orbs and high-quality pearls at 80 roubles.³¹ Unfortunately, history has left us not the wonderful originals, but only drawings of the artefacts. Although these were carefully made, they can give only a rough idea of these artefacts, ornaments of personal attire, decorated with enamel, pearls and precious stones, liturgical objects, and valuable vessels.

Among the most fascinating items in the treasure were two gold medallions, the larger with an image of Christ, and the other with a martyr, identified by some as St Borys,³² and by others as St Demetrius.³³ It should be noted that Kondakov, who first drew attention to the fact that there were only two, was of the opinion that for a complete set there should have been a third medallion, also with the image of a martyr.³⁴ And he was quite right. It was discovered later that certain items, namely, a gold medallion, a silver ear-ring, a cross and a ring were abstracted immediately after the treasure was found.³⁵ Towards the end of the 19th century, the silver ear-ring was in the museum of the University of St Volodymyr in Kyiv.³⁶ The gold medallion ended up abroad, in the collection of Prince Karl of Prussia. We know about this only because in 1880 it was on view at an exhibition in Dusseldorf, while at the end of the 19th century it was deposited in the Royal Museum of Art and Industry in Berlin.³⁷ Recently we learned that this medallion has been preserved³⁸ and an account of it published.³⁹ The three medallions were found at the same site, and formed a single

²⁹ N.P. Kondakov, *Russkie klady. Izsledovaniya drevnostey velikokniazheskogo perioda*, pp. 96-105.

³⁰ H.F. Korzukhina, op. cit., p. 123, no. 107.

³¹ *Perepiska Mitropolita Kievskogo Eugeniya s gosudarstvennym kantslerom grafom N.P. Rumyantsevym i s nekotorymi drugimi sovremennikami (s 1813 po 1825 g.)*, third edition, 1872, pp. 112-113.

³² I. Tolstoy, N. Kondakov, *Russkie drevnosti v pamyatnikakh iskusstva*, fifth edition, St Petersburg, 1897, p. 127.

³³ N.P. Kondakov, *Russkie klady. Izsledovaniya drevnostey velikokniazheskogo perioda*, p. 101; H.F. Korzukhina, op. cit., p. 123; T.I. Makarova, *Peregorodchatye emali Drevney Rusi*, Moscow, 1975, pp. 57, 111, no. 84.

³⁴ N.P. Kondakov, *Russkie klady. Izsledovaniya drevnostey velikokniazheskogo perioda*, p. 100.

³⁵ *Perepiska Mitropolita Kievskogo Eugeniya s gosudarstvennym kantslerom grafom N.P. Rumyantsevym i s nekotorymi drugimi sovremennikami (s 1813 po 1825 g.)*, third edition, 1872, p. 119; H.F. Korzukhina, op. cit., p. 123, no. 107.

³⁶ I.A. Khoynovskiy, *Raskopki Velikoknyazheskogo dvora drevnogo grada Kievskogo proizveden-nye v esnoy 1892 g.*, Kyiv, 1893, p. 12.

³⁷ H.F. Korzukhina, op. cit., p. 123, no. 107.

³⁸ The Kunstgewerbemuseum Collection in Berlin. I would like to express my thanks to Prof. Dr. Dietrich Kotsche for this information.

³⁹ K. Wessel, *Die Byzantinische Emailkunst 5-13. Jah.*, Verlag, 1967, p. 128, no. 44.



Fig. 3

Artefacts from the Kyiv treasure, discovered in 1824,
which mysteriously disappeared in 1825.

composition – a ceremonial pectoral known as *barmy*. As the drawings reveal, the largest of the medallions bore a half-length figure of Christ in *himation* and *chiton*. The right hand was raised in the attitude of the didactic blessing, and the left was hidden under the *himation*. The book of the gospels is indicated only by an ornamental square. At the side of the cruciferous halo is the monogram of Christ – IC XC. On both sides of this medallion, which formed the centrepiece of the composition, would have hung the two medallions with images of warrior martyrs. These were presented frontally and did not form a *deesis* composition. Their faces were elongated, with long noses, small lips, thick black eyebrows, black eyes, and black hair. These saints wore Kyivan dress – a *kavtan* (long tunic with waist-girdle) and cloak. Both martyrs held a cross in the right hand. The sleeve of the *kavtan* was narrow. As in the case of Christ, their left arms were hidden.

Kondakov considered it possible that the medallions, which formed part of this treasure, were imported from Constantinople, but were decorated by a local craftsman.⁴⁰ The craftsman was directly influenced by Greek art, and the iconographic type of these saints is close to Byzantine tradition, but a number of features indicate local work. Thus, for example, the Kyiv artists always showed Christ with wavy hair and a centre parting, with a lock of hair on his brow and a forked beard,⁴¹ as in the present example. The treatment of the clothing on all the medallions takes the form of wavy, smoothly flowing lines which does not correspond to the natural direction of fall. The drawing of the warrior-saints' clothing follows a single model and is differentiated only by the ornamentation. It is characterised by uniformity and schematism. The princely dress of the martyrs is similar to that of the princes, Sts Borys and Hlib, on the medallions of the pectoral from Kamyanyi Brid,⁴² and on the ear-ring pendants with images of the same princes from the Stara Ryazan find of 1822.⁴³ There is, however, an interesting difference: whereas the cloaks of Sts Borys and Hlib have woven heart-shaped and circular ornamentation, on the Kyiv medallions the artist has in one case made a mistake and instead of "weaving" patterns on the cloak, he did it on the *kavtan*. Furthermore, the clasps on the cloaks which ought to be on the right shoulder are almost central. One must also note a further detail, the hands, in which the Kyiv goldsmiths did not master the high technical skill of their teachers. The imperfect rendering of Christ's didactic blessing indicates the work of a Kyivan.

The mutual relation and placing on the Kyiv medallions of the saints honoured by the church could not have been accidental. Normally such medallions

⁴⁰ N.P. Kondakov, *Russkie klady. Issledovaniya drevnostey velikokniazheskogo perioda*, p. 104.

⁴¹ N.P. Kondakov, *Istoriya i pamyatniki vizantiyskoy emali. Sobranie A.V. Zvenigorodskogo*, St Petersburg, 1892, p. 265.

⁴² *Otchet Imperatorskoy arkheologicheskoy komissii* for 1903, pp. 192-97, 208, plate VI; A.S. Gushchin, *Pamyatniki khudozhestvennogo remesla Drevney Rusi X-XIII vv.*, Leningrad, 1936, pp. 59-62; plate IX.

⁴³ T.I. Makarova, *Peregorodchatye emali Drevney Rusi*, Moscow, 1975, plate 16, fig. 1, 2, (cat. no. 97, 98).

showed either the portraits of historical figures who had contributed to the Christianisation of Rus', or else the patron saints of the owner of the object. The fact that the figures are not wearing head-dress indicates that they are not Sts Borys and Hlib, but rather Sts George and Demetrius. Although these martyrs are portrayed with few individual features, it is possible to distinguish between them. St George has short curly hair and a younger face. St Demetrius has straight hair with two locks at the sides and looks older.

A number of factors makes it possible to date the medallions to the period between the end of the 11th and beginning of the 12th centuries. This *barmy* possibly belonged to the dynasty of the Yaroslavychi, which ruled the Kyiv state after the death of Yaroslav the Wise (1054). In this case, the pair of medallions would honour Yaroslav the Wise (who took St George the Victory-Bringer as his patron in baptism) and his son Prince Izyaslav (baptised after St Demetrius). Izyaslav also built a Monastery of St Demetrius⁴⁴ on the site which later acquired the name of the Golden-Domed Monastery of St Michael, near the wall of which the treasure was found.

Our search for this mysterious treasure has yielded a number of previously unknown conclusions. Firstly, we may take it as fact that the treasure of gold and silver artefacts found in Kyiv in May 1824 was brought to St Petersburg by the Governor of Kyiv on 9 June 1825. It was received by the Minister of Internal Affairs, Vasilii Sergeyevich Lanskyi. What the latter did with the treasure is still unknown. Secondly, it proved possible to locate one gold medallion – the one object known to have been preserved from the first Kyiv treasure of the princely era. This is of unique value as a work of high artistic quality and probably formed part of a ceremonial pectoral of a patronal nature, which undoubtedly formed part of the princely dress.

The treasure disappeared in Russia during the turbulent historical events of the second half of 1825 – the unexpected death of Tsar Alexander I, the Decembrist Rising, Constantine's abdication from the succession, and the transfer of allegiance to the new emperor Nicholas I etc. – all of which makes any search for it far more difficult. But it may not perhaps have been lost to scholarship. Part of it may have been preserved in private collections. Whether any of it will come to light in present-day collections, time will tell.

The Kyiv treasures of the 10-13th centuries form part of the material culture of the past, and constitute important memorials of the princely era of Rus'-Ukraine. Quite a number of them have the value of state relics and demand detailed study to enrich the treasury of Ukrainian culture. ■

⁴⁴ *Polnoe sobranie russkikh letopisey*, vol. I, "Lavrentevskaya letopis", first edition, "Povest vremennykh let", Leningrad, 1926, p. 159.

THE EAST SLAVS IN THE TIME OF JULIUS CAESAR

Yevhen Maksymiv

The course of Slavonic history stretches back at least to the second millennium BC. Even at that time, from the mass of tribes of South-East Europe which made up the Indo-European linguistic-cultural unity, together with other groups – Germanic, Celto-Illyrian, Indo-Iranian, etc. – the Slavonic group of tribes also emerged as a distinct entity, with its own specific linguistic, ethnographic and cultural traits. On the long road of their evolution, the Slavs passed through several stages of development, as the evidence of linguistic and archaeological sources confirms. One of these stages was the era represented by numerous archaeological finds from the Zarubyntsi culture from the end of the third century BC to the second century AD, extending over the forest-steppe and Polissian zones of the Dnipro.


Soon after the discovery of the first site of this culture – the Zarubyntsi cemetery near the Dnipro, south of Kyiv, the Ukrainian archaeologist V.V. Khvoyka proposed the theory that the Zarubyntsi culture was one of the stages of the prehistory of the Slavonic settlement of the Dnipro Basin.¹ Almost simultaneously, the German scholar Paul Reinecke asserted that the Zarubyntsi finds were of Germanic origin, having been left behind, it would seem, by one of the East-Germanic tribes which migrated thither from Central Europe at the beginning of the Christian era.²

These two theories of the nature of the Zarubyntsi culture triggered a sharp discussion, which still flares up from time to time, thus bearing witness to the subjectivity of scholars in the interpretation of their material.

However, in the past decade a great amount of new archaeological material has come to light, excavated by scholars from Kyiv, St Petersburg, Moscow, Minsk, and other centres of learning. Now more than 500 Zarubyntsi sites are known, the majority of which have been thoroughly excavated. We now have data on over 1,000 burials and 200 dwellings, and a great number of vessels, tools, ornaments, and objects of daily life have been collected. On the basis of these new materials quite a few general monographs and separate articles have been published, throwing light on the origin of the Zarubyntsi culture, its chronology, ethnoses, and the his-

¹ Khvoyka, V.V. "Polya pohrebeniy v Srednem Pridneprove" (Burial fields in the Middle Dnipro Basin), *Zapiski Russkogo arheologicheskogo obshchestva*, vol. 1, parts 1-2, St Petersburg, 1901, pp. 172 ff.

² Reinecke, P. "Aus der russischen archäologischen Literatur" (On Russian archaeological literature), *Mainzer Zeitschrift*, 1906, pp. 42-50.



SCHEMATIC MAP OF THE ARCHAEOLOGICAL CULTURES OF THE ERA
OF JULIUS CAESAR IN UKRAINE

torical fate of the bearers of this culture, and also the territorial features of these sites. These include the works of P.M. Tretyakov, Yu.V. Kukharenko, K.V. Kasparova, Ye.V. Maksymiv, L.D. Pobal and many more.³

Of great importance, too, are the works on the history of the proto-Slavonic language by F.P. Filin, T. Ler-Splavinskiy, O.M. Trubachov, and others, which throw light on the place of the Zarubyntsi people in the European glottogenesis of that time.

However, a number of questions associated with the Zarubyntsi culture remain open, including such important issues as the establishment of the place of residence of the Zarubyntsi people, the dating of their sites, the origins of the Zarubyntsi culture and the role of the Zarubyntsi people in Slavonic ethnogenesis. This article presents the views of Ukrainian scholars on these questions.⁴

The territorial range of the Zarubyntsi sites does not constitute a continuous zone in the oecumene of the Dnipro Basin. It consists of five regions, relatively small in size and separated from each other, namely: the Polissia-Prypiat and Upper Dnipro regions in southern Belarus, the Middle Dnipro and Southern Buh regions in Ukraine, and the Upper Desna region on the borders of the Bryansk *oblast* of Russia. Each of these regions has its own special features as regards burial customs, construction of dwellings and ceramics, and, moreover, of chronology, which allow us to consider them to be local regions of the culture or even separate though related archaeological cultures, so that as late as the 1950s there were two hypotheses which attempted to interpret the totality of these archaeological sites.

Thus the Kyiv scholar, M.Yu. Braychevskyi, on the basis of the marked differences between the newly-discovered sites in Belarus and Polissia on the one hand, and the standard Middle Dnipro sites on the other, proposed a new name: the Zarubyntsi-Korchuvatv culture, referring to the materials of the Zarubyntsi and Korchuvatv cemeteries near Kyiv. At the same time, the Moscow archaeologist Yu.V. Kukharenko took a fundamentally different point of view; he saw in the Zarubyntsi culture predominantly the features of Central European cultures and assigned to it only the Prypiat region. However, this version did not find support. On the contrary, taking into account the extent of the single funeral custom – cremation, black-glaze vessels and fibulae of Celtic-La Tene-type, and also the identical nature of the processes of formation of the culture in all its regions, and the indisputable absence of any linguistic evidence to the contrary, the idea became established that all the various Zarubyntsi regions belong to a single Zarubyntsi cultural entity.

The chronology of the Zarubyntsi culture was established by the dating of the fibulae and ancient imports – amphorae, vessels, beads, and ear-rings, dis-

³ For a list of works by the authors mentioned here, see Shovkoplyas I.H. and Petrenko N.H. *Archeolohiya Ukrayinskoyi RSR*, (Archaeology of the Ukrainian SSR), Kyiv, Naukova Dumka, 1989.

⁴ Maksimov, Ye. V., *Srednee Podneprove na rubezhe nashey ery* (The Middle Dnipro Basin at the beginning of our era), Kyiv, Naukova Dumka, 1972. Zarubinetskaya kultura na territorii USSR (The Zarubyntsi Culture on the territory of the Ukrainian SSR), Kyiv, Naukova Dumka, 1982.

covered during the excavation of Zarubyntsi sites. The time of these objects which have wide-spread and reliable analogues in well-dated ancient materials are sometimes defined to within a few decades (amphorae with stamp-marks, certain types of vessels).

The earliest finds in Zarubyntsi sites of objects of this kind – fragments of amphorae with stamp-marks on the handles of 230-220 BC – were found in the hill-settlement at Pylypenkova Hora in the town of Kaniv, on the Dnipro.⁵ And the latest datable objects come from the Middle Dnipro Basin – fibulae, silver Roman coins, and certain types of black-glaze ceramics, and from the Southern Buh Basin and Upper Desna Basin. All these are assigned to 170-180 AD; hence we may state that the Zarubyntsi culture existed for more than 400 years, from the last third of the third century BC to the end of the second century AD. Generally speaking, no individual Zarubyntsi culture site existed for the whole of this period; as a rule they existed for a shorter time, hence the given Zarubyntsi chronology indicates only the boundary limits of this culture.

In general, throughout the long course of its existence, the Zarubyntsi culture underwent perceptible changes in the topography of its settlements and necropolises, in the typology of its vessels, which is correctly considered to be an indicator of every primary culture, in the forms of fibulae, tools, common outlook and other components of this culture. The periodisation of the Zarubyntsi culture has been worked out on the basis of these changes. It is notable, too, that a considerable influence on the lives of the Zarubyntsi people was exerted by the actions of neighbouring peoples, especially the penetration into the Zarubyntsi territory from Central Europe of Germanic tribes: Goths, Gepids, Vandals, and others, and also the migration through the Zarubyntsi lands of eastern warrior nomads – the Sarmatians.

Taking all these circumstances into consideration, the time-span of the Zarubyntsi culture is divided into three periods – early (from the last third of the third century BC, to the end of the first century BC), middle (end of the first century BC to the end of the first century AD), and late (end of the first century AD to the end of the second century AD).

Within this general periodisation of the Zarubyntsi culture, we have also the periodisation of its separate regions, each of which has its own specific features. Thus in the early period, only three (of the five) regions of the Zarubyntsi culture existed – Middle Dnipro, Upper Dnipro, and Prypiat. The middle period is represented by sites in all five regions. This was the high point of the Zarubyntsi culture. For the late period, when the Zarubyntsi culture was in gradual decline, sites are known on the Southern Buh, the Upper Desna, and – though in lesser numbers – on the Middle and Upper Dnipro.

The most important, albeit the most complex, problem of the prehistory of Ukraine is that of the origin of the Zarubyntsi culture and the ethnic attribution

⁵ Maksymov, Ye.V. "Zarubynetske horodyshche Pylypenkova Hora" (The Zarubyntsi settlement at Pylypenkova Hora), *Arkheolohiya*, 1971, part 4, Kyiv, Naukova Dumka, pp. 41-56.

of the Zarubyntsi people. The complex nature of such problems is related to the fact that no proper model has been constructed for the process of establishment of an archaeological culture as a datum reflecting a certain ethno-historical process, for which there are no reliable written sources. Added to this there are significant lacunae in the archaeological materials, which until recently were very sparse and which even now remain largely unpublished, – a situation which also leads to subjectivity in their interpretation.

This state of affairs has led to the promulgation of three hypotheses concerning the origin of the Zarubyntsi culture. Firstly, there is the hypothesis of autochthonous origin. The adherents and authors of this view are V.V. Khvoyka, V.M. Danylenko, L.D. Pobol, and some others, who established the existence of typological (that is “genetic”) links as regards vessels, the construction of dwellings, and burial customs between the archaeological cultures of the forest-steppe tribes of the Dnipro Basin – the Scythians of Herodotus – and the Zarubyntsi culture.

Such similarities between preceding cultures and the Zarubyntsi culture do indisputably exist. On the other hand, there are a significant number of discrepancies, one of the most important of which is the Zarubyntsi black-glaze ware, which has no analogues in the preceding cultures of the Scythian era. Furthermore, as regards the burial customs of the earlier cultures, although cremation was known, the prevalent custom was inhumation. As for the La Tene-type fibulae characteristic of the Zarubyntsi culture, these do not occur in finds from the Scythian era.

Thus in spite of the presence of observable hereditary links with the previous cultures of the area, the Zarubyntsi culture cannot be considered simply as a continuation of what went before.

The migration theory of origin of the Zarubyntsi culture was propounded by the German archaeologist Paul Reinecke back in 1906. It has been supported by a number of German and Polish archaeologists, including K. Tackenberg, G. Schwanres, and J. Kostrzewski, who in different variants recreated Reinecke’s postulate of the migration to the Dnipro Basin of various tribes from Central Europe, who appeared in their new place of settlement as the carriers of the Zarubyntsi culture. A number of Russian scholars also concurred with this view – O.P. Smirnov, M.O. Tikhanova, M.B. Shchukin, D.O. Machinskiy, and also Yu.V. Kukharenko and K.V. Kasparova. They drew their inspiration from the similarity of Zarubyntsi black-glaze ceramics and the black-glaze ware of Central Europe, the presence of fibulae and the practice of cremation, characteristic of the Zarubyntsi culture and absent in the finds of the Scythian era, which was explained by the migration of tribes from Central Europe. These migrants – according to Kukharenko and Machinskiy – were western Baltic tribes – bearers of the Pomeranian and the related bell-beaker cultures, or the Germanic tribes of the Bastarnae (according to Kasparova) or Cimbri (according to V.Ye. Yeremenko).

The migration of European tribes during the era of formation of the Zarubyntsi culture is established not only by archaeological material but also by

the evidence of classical historians. Hence Kukharensko's assertion⁶ that in the formation of the Zarubyntsi culture of the Prypiat, a decisive role was played by the Baltic tribes of the Pomeranian culture may be considered correct; it is confirmed by explicit archaeological materials which show up clearly in such early sites as the Otverzhychi cemetery and similar sites. However, the Zarubyntsi culture does not appear to be a direct continuation of the Pomeranian culture of Poland, as Kukharensko asserted, it differs in too many elements of funeral customs and typology of ceramics, in particular dishes.

In the Zarubyntsi regions of the Middle and Upper Dnipro Basin, there are few signs of the Pomeranian culture, while, on the other hand, features of other cultures make their appearance.

In contrast to Kukharensko, Kasparova⁷ derives the Zarubyntsi culture not from Poland (the Vistula Basin) but from the Balkan-Danube region, where in the second century BC there lived tribes of Celts and Bastarnae who migrated there during the seventies of that century from the headwaters of the Oder, from the region of the Germanic Jastorf culture. In due course, according to Kasparova, these Bastarnae moved to the south-east, to Moldova, where, as a result of their presence, a new archaeological culture – the Poienesti-Lukashivka culture – came into being. A further breakthrough of the Bastarnae, into the Middle Dnipro Basin and on further to the Prypiat, led, according to Kasparova, to the formation of the Middle Dnipro and Prypiat regions of the Zarubyntsi culture. Kasparova's view emerges as one of the best-substantiated versions of the migration theory of origin of the Zarubyntsi culture, but it is not entirely consonant with the historical and archaeological data. Thus the Roman writer Livy mentions the war of the Bastarnae against the Illyrian tribes of the Adriatic, as a result of which the Bastarnae settled in that territory. But neither Livy nor any other author of classical antiquity gives any indication that the Bastarnae departed from Illyria in the direction of the Dnister or the Dnipro, and this fact, taking into account the constant attention paid by the ancient historians to the Bastarnae and other hostile neighbours of Rome cannot be explained except on the assumption that the Bastarnae did not, in fact, go east. To this we may add that throughout this period, the Germanic and other barbarian tribes were thrusting towards the rich lands of the Mediterranean, while the thrust towards the poor remote regions of the Dnister-Dnipro Basin postulated by Kasparova lies outside the bounds of historical logic.

Furthermore, in the opinion of R. Vulpe and G.B. Fedorov, who studied the Poienesti-Lukashivka culture, this culture arose not when the Bastarnae came to Moldova from Illyria, but significantly earlier, when they left their primeval Germanic homeland on the Upper Oder. This postulate is supported by the pres-

⁶ Kukharensko, Yu.V. "Zarubinetskaya kultura" (The Zarubyntsi culture), *Svod arkheologicheskikh istochnikov*, DI-19, Moscow, 1964, pp. 5-57.

⁷ Kasparova, K.V. "Rol yugo-zapadnykh svyazey v protsesse formirovaniya zarubinetskoy kultury" (The role of south-west links in the process of formation of the Zarubyntsi culture), *Sovetskaya Arkheologiya*, 1981, no. 2, pp. 57-59.

ence in the Moldovan Bastarnae sites of Jastorf-type vessels, similar to those found in the Oder region itself: pots with triangular profile, cruciform handles and horseshoe-shaped appendages on the vessels. However, these typological features, which are peculiar to the Jastorf culture of the Upper Oder, are not characteristic of the Zarubyntsi culture of the Middle Dnipro, thus contradicting Kasparova's hypothesis.

Finally, the presence in the Zarubyntsi culture of fibulae with a triangular spine, resembling to a certain extent the La Tene-type scroll fibulae, is to be explained not by the movements of the Bastarnae, but by increasing contacts with the Celts themselves, since by the turn of the third and second centuries BC, the latter had penetrated to the east, to the Southern Buh, as is testified by the marble stele from Olvia in honour of Protogenus.

Taking into account all the above arguments, we have good grounds for considering that in the middle of the second century BC there were no Bastarnae in the Middle Dnipro Basin, and that therefore they played no part in the establishment of the Zarubyntsi culture in that territory,

We may also note yet another migration theory.⁸ According to this view, the founders of the Zarubyntsi culture were, once again, Germanic – namely the tribe of the Cimbri, from Jutland, who, towards the end of the second century BC moved towards Rome, but who, as they approached, were cut to pieces by the army of Marius. The theory that they spent some time in the Dnipro Basin is not, however, substantiated by sound historical facts, and should be considered as no more than an original hypothesis.

The third view of the origin of the Zarubyntsi culture – integration – regards the problem in the light of the totality of known facts. According to this view, both indigenous and incoming tribes played a part in the formation of the Zarubyntsi culture, while the role and place of each of these components was determined by concrete historical processes, which are reflected in the archaeological materials.

The view that such integrative processes played a significant role in the formation of the Zarubyntsi culture was propounded by P.M. Tretyakov,⁹ D.O. Machinskiy,¹⁰ V.V. Sedov,¹¹ Ye V. Maksymiv and certain other scholars. Tretyakov and Machinskiy considered that the Zarubyntsi culture arose as a result of the interaction of indigenous tribes with incoming Pomeranian and bell-beaker tribes, and the indigenous inhabitants – Balts to the north and Scythians to the south, represented respectively by sites of the Milahrad and Scythian cultures.

We, however, taking into account all known facts, including new materials and excavations, consider that the Zarubyntsi culture in the Middle Dnipro Basin

⁸ Yeremenko, V.E., Shchukin, M.B., "Cimbri, Teutons, Celto-Scythians...", *Problemy khronologii epokhi latena i Rimskogo vremeni* (Problems of the chronology of the La Tene era and Roman times), St Petersburg, 1992, p. 80.

⁹ Tretyakov, P.N., *Ugro-finny, balty i slavyane na Dnepre i Volge* (Ugro-Finns, Balts and Slavs on the Dnipro and Volga), Moscow-Leningrad, 1966, p. 217 ff.

¹⁰ Machinskiy D.A., "O proiskhozhdenii zarubinskoy kultury" (On the origin of the Zarubyntsi culture), *Kratkiye soobshcheniya Instituta Arkheologii*, 1966, part 107, pp. 3-8

¹¹ Sedov, V.V. *Proiskhozhdeniye i ranneya istoriya slavyan* (Origin and early history of the Slavs), Moscow, Nauka, 1979, p. 76 ff.

arose in the last third of the third century BC as a result of the integration of the local forest-steppe proto-Slavonic population of the late Scythian era, known from the Khotiv and Padhore sites, and the incoming Balto-Slavonic tribes of the Pomeranian and cloche-burial cultures of the territory of north-east Poland, which showed a certain influence of the Germanic Jastorf culture. In the Upper Dnipro Basin, the Zarubyntsi culture had a different substratum – the Balto-Slavonic tribes of the Milahrad culture, while in the Prypiat Polissian region there was a mixed Late Lusatian/Pomeranian population. One characteristic feature of the Zarubyntsi culture – the presence of La Tene-type fibulae – was the result of lively trade relations with areas of La Tene culture – the Balkan-Danube region, the northern Black Sea Basin and the Dnister Basin. The Zarubyntsi Dnipro Basin had stable and fairly strong links with the “classical” world of the northern Black Sea littoral, and obtained from it wine in amphorae, fibulae, necklaces and pottery, in exchange for agricultural products. A certain Zarubyntsi emigration from this region into the Olvia periphery has also been established.

With such argumentation of the origin of the Zarubyntsi culture, a convincing explanation may be given both of the characteristic features of Zarubyntsi burial customs and also of features of the construction of dwellings and the typology of vessels specific to each of the Zarubyntsi regions, and also of the presence in this culture of elements of the Pomeranian, bell-beaker, Jastorf or Khotiv forest-steppe, Milahrad or La Tene and classical cultures, which as a rule appear in modified form.

This view gives one every reason to assert that the Zarubyntsi culture cannot be regarded simply as an evolutionary combination of one of the indigenous cultures of the Dnipro Basin – Milahrad, Khotiv or Padhore, or of one of the incoming cultures – Pomeranian, bell-beaker or Jastorf. The Zarubyntsi culture was a new phenomenon, which arose in the Dnipro Basin in the course of the integration of various indigenous and incoming tribes with different cultural and ethnic features.

It is important to recognise that during this era, analogous processes were taking place in Central and South-Eastern Europe, as is attested by the formation of the Przeworska culture between the Oder and the Vistula, and the Poienesti-Lukashivka culture between the Prut and the Dnister. The development of the Zarubyntsi culture is thus not a unique ethno-cultural phenomenon.

The most complicated aspect is the identification of the carriers of the Zarubyntsi culture. The historical, linguistic and archaeological materials relating to this do not in themselves give exhaustive information, while even when they are all taken together, they allow only an approximate answer to be found.

The earliest written materials on the population of South-East Europe at that time are found in the works of the classical authors of the first and second centuries AD – Pliny the Elder, Tacitus and Ptolemy. However, these are too brief and contradictory to allow the territories occupied by these peoples to be identified with certainty, especially in the case of the Slavs, nor for this or that tribe to be located with certainty. Thus Pliny places the Venedi – who are considered to

be the ancient Slavs – to the east of the Vistula. But Ptolemy puts these same Venedi on the south-eastern shore of the Baltic, while Tacitus has them together with the Fenni and Bastarnae – that is, in the space between the sources of the Volga and the Carpathians, although he calls them all Germanic peoples.

To connect these Venedi with the ancient Slavs is simply impossible, since the territories designated by the ancient authors possess no Slavonic antiquities, neither ancient hydronyms nor Slavonic archaeological cultures. Slavonic hydronyms, however, extend over the Zarubyntsi Dnipro Basin – Prypiat, Teteriv, Zbruch, Irpin, Stuhna, Desna, – and are a powerful argument in favour of the Zarubyntsi culture being Slavonic.¹²

Archaeological evidence of the Slavonic nature of the Zarubyntsi culture is substantiated by the retrospective method of analysing materials, according to which elements of a culture whose ethnicity is established are compared with an earlier, ethnically unknown, culture. In our case, the starting point is the Penkivka culture – an early Slavonic culture of the V-VII centuries. Its substratum is found to be the Kyiv culture of the III-V centuries, in the formation of which the Zarubyntsi culture of the Dnipro Basin played the leading role. Both these cultures coincide in typological (genetic) features as regards the construction of dwellings, ceramics, burial rites, and social structure, which indicates their ethnographic and hence their ethnic identity.

Similarly, the Zarubyntsi culture of the Dnipro Basin can be linked to the earlier, Khotiv culture of the Scythian era of the VII-III centuries BC, while in the Upper Dnipro Basin, the indigenous Zarubyntsi culture recedes into the depths of the synchronous Milahrad culture. In their turn these two cultures arise from the indigenous intermediate cultures of the end of the second millennium BC, the Bilohruda and Sosnytsya cultures, which grew up as a result of the existence of the East Trzcinec culture of the first half of the second millennium BC, – so going back to the most ancient Slavonic cultures from the point of view of archaeology. ■

¹² Filin, F.P. *Proiskhozhdeniye russkogo, belorusskogo i ukrainskogo yazykov* (Origin of the Russian, Belarusian and Ukrainian languages), Leningrad, 1972, p. 24 ff.

Literature

FOREST SONG

Lesya Ukrayinka

Act 1

The same place, but a little later in the spring. The fringes of the forest seem to be covered with a fragile green veil, and the tops of the trees are splashed with green. The lake is full to over-flowing, and its green banks are like a bride's garland of rue.

Out of the forest, into the clearing, come UNCLE LEV and his nephew, LUKASH. LEV is an old man, grave and kind in appearance. In the mode of Polisyia, his long hair falls in white waves on to his shoulders from under a square grey felt cap. LEV is dressed in clothes of pale grey, almost white, linen; he has bast shoes on his feet. In his hands he is carrying fishing-tackle (a small trammel-net), at his girdle he has a knife on a thong, and over his shoulder he carries a bast bag, on a broad strap.

LUKASH is a very young man, handsome, with dark eyebrows, slender, with a still childlike look in his eyes. He too is dressed in linen clothes, but the linen is finer. His shirt, which hangs outside his trousers, is decorated with drawn-thread work, with a flat collar, and tied with a red girdle; at the collar and cuffs it is fastened with red tassels. He has no jacket; on his head he wears a straw hat. At his girdle there is a knife and a bast scoop on a string,

Arriving at the bank of the lake, LUKASH stops.

LEV: What are you stopping for? This is no place
 To try for fish. There's too much mud and mire.

LUKASH: But I just want to cut myself a pipe.
 The reeds right here are really good for that.

LEV: But you've a mighty lot of them already!

LUKASH: How many, really? Willow, guelder-rose
 And linden, that is all. I really need
 To make a reed pipe for myself as well —
 For that plays best!

LEV: Well, then, have fun, have fun!
 That's why God gave us feast-days. But tomorrow
 We'll come and build a cabin. It is time
 To drive the cattle to the forest. See,
 Between the primroses, how green the grass is!

LUKASH: But how are we going to live out here?
 For people say it's an unchancy spot...

LEV: For some, maybe! But, nephew, I know well
 How to deal with such things, how to avoid them,
 Where you must place a cross, drive aspen stakes,
 And where to spit thrice will be all that's needed.
 We'll sow wild poppy flowers around our cabin,
 We shall plant gentian round a bout the threshold,
 And then no power can come and trouble us...
 Well, then, I'm off; you can do what you like.

(They separate. LUKASH goes to the lake and vanishes in the reeds. LEV walks along the bank, and disappears behind the willows).

RUSALKA *(swimming up to the bank and shouting)*
 Grandfather! Forest-Elf! Help! Quick! There's trouble!

FOREST-ELF *(a small, bearded grandsire, brisk in his movements but grave of face, in brown garments the colour of bark, with a shaggy cap of marten-fur)*
 What's wrong? Why all this shouting?

RUSALKA: There's a boy
 Cutting reeds for a pipe, there!

FOREST-ELF: Really, now!
 What a to-do for nothing! What a miser!
 They're going to come and build a cabin here,
 And I shall not forbid it, if they don't
 Cut wood from living trees.

RUSALKA: Oh no! A cabin!
 That means there will be humans here. Those humans
 Who live beneath straw roofs! I cannot bear them!

I cannot bear the odour of that straw!
I'll drown them all, and wash off with my water
That horrid odour! If intruders come,
I'll tickle them to death!

FOREST-ELF:

Stop! Not so fast!
It's Uncle Lev who will live in this cabin,
And he's our friend! Sometimes, just for a joke,
He'll use aspen or gentian-plant to scare us.
But I love that old man. And, but for him,
That oak-tree there would long-since have been gone,
Which has so often seen our moots and dances,
And all the mighty mysteries of the forest.
Once Germans came to measure it, they stood,
All three around it with their arms extended,
And hardly could they touch. They offered money,
Coined thalars that are very dear to humans,
But Uncle Lev swore by his very life
That never would he let the oak be felled.
And then I also swore, upon my beard,
That Uncle Lev and all his kith and kin
Should be safe forever in this forest!

RUSALKA: Really! my father, though, will drown them all!

FOREST-ELF: He better not! For if he does, I'll choke
His whole lake up with last year's rotten leaves!

RUSALKA: Oh dear, that would be awful! Ha-ha-ha!

(She disappears into the lake. FOREST-ELF, muttering to himself, sits down on a fallen tree and begins to smoke his pipe. From the reeds comes the sound of music played on a reed-pipe, a delicate, curling music, and as it unfolds, so does everything else in the forest. First the catkins on the willows and alders begin to gleam, then the birch begins to rustle its leaves. On the lake, white lilies and golden king-cups unfold. The wild-rose puts forth tender buds.

From behind the trunk of an old, split, half-dried-up willow, emerges MAVKA, in light green garments, and with unbound black tresses which have green glints in them. She stretches her arms and rubs her eyes).

MAVKA: What a long sleep I've had!

FOREST-ELF: Long, indeed, daughter!

Drowsy anemones are almost over;
She will put her fine red slippers on,
And measure out the years for humankind.
Our guests have come flying back from the south,
And on the lake, on the clear water now,
All in their yellow down, wild ducklings swim.

MAVKA: But who awakened me?

FOREST-ELF: Probably, Spring.

MAVKA: But Spring has never sung like that before,
Not like today! Or was I only dreaming?

(LUKASH, offstage, plays again)

No... stop!... D'you hear? Is that the song of Spring?

FOREST-ELF: No, it's a lad there, playing a reed-pipe!

MAVKA: Who is it? Surely not the Dam-Breaker?
I'd never have expected that of him!

FOREST-ELF: No, its a human lad, Uncle Lev's nephew,
Lukash by name.

MAVKA: I don't know him at all!

FOREST-ELF: For it's his first time here. He's from far off.
Not from these forests, but from pine-tree country,
Where our Old Lady loves to spend the winter;
He is an orphan, with a widowed mother,
So Uncle Lev has given them a home...

MAVKA: I'd really like to catch a glimpse of him!

FOREST-ELF: But what is he to you?

MAVKA: He's surely handsome!

FOREST-ELF: Now, don't go looking upon human lads.
It's very dangerous for forest maidens.

MAVKA: Why, grandfather, how stern you have become.
Surely you won't restrict me, in the way
Water-Elf does Rusalka?

FOREST-ELF: No, dear child,
I'll not restrict you. He, from times primaeval,
Down in the clinging quagmire is accustomed
To suck in every living thing. But I
Respect your freedom. So, play with the wind,
Or, if you wish, go sport with Brushwood-Elf,
Woo every power of forest or of water,
Mountain or air, allure them to your side...
But, dearest child, beware of human pathways,
For freedom does not walk there — only grief
Carries its burden there. Remember, daughter:
Take but one step there — freedom's gone forever!

MAVKA: What, just like that — freedom is gone forever?
Why, that's like saying the wind's gone forever!

(FOREST-ELF is about to say something more, but LUKASH comes out with his reed-pipe. FOREST-ELF and MAVKA hide.)

LUKASH makes as if to cut the birch with his knife, to tap the sap. MAVKA rushes out and seizes his hand).

MAVKA: Don't move! Don't move! Don't cut her! Do not kill her!

LUKASH: Why, lass, what's up? D'you think I am a robber?
I simply want to try and tap the sap
Out of this birch.

MAVKA: Don't tap it! It's her blood!
O please don't drink my dearest sister's blood!

LUKASH: You say this birch-tree is your sister, then?
So what are you?

MAVKA: A Mavka of the forest!

LUKASH (*not entirely surprised, but looking at her carefully*)
Are you, indeed, I've often heard old people
Talk about mavky, but I've never seen one
Myself before.

MAVKA: And did you want to see one?

LUKASH: Why not?... But anyway, you look just like
A girl... or rather, like a fine young lady,
For you've such white hands and you are so slim

But then, of course, your dress is rather strange...
And, surely, shouldn't you have eyes of green?

(he looks at her closely)

Why, they *are* green now... But just now they were
Blue as the sky... Oh, now they have gone grey
Just like a cloud... no, it seems that they're black,
Or, maybe, hazel... Oh, you are a marvel!

MAVKA *(smiling)*

But am I beautiful?

LUKASH *(embarrassed)*

How can I tell?

MAVKA *(laughing)*

Then who *can* tell?

LUKASH *(covered with embarrassment)*

Eh, what a thing to ask?

MAVKA *(really puzzled)*

But why should such a question be forbidden?
Look over there, see the wild-rose, the fairest,
Asks: 'Am I rarest?'
And the tall ash-tree nods, this message bearing:
'Beyond comparing!'

LUKASH:

I never knew there was such talk in them.
I thought that trees were dumb and that is all!

MAVKA:

But there is nothing dumb here in our forest.

LUKASH:

And do you always live here in the forest?

MAVKA:

I've never been outside in all my life!

LUKASH:

And how long has your life been?

MAVKA:

Well, in truth,

(pondering)

I've never thought about it before now...
It seems to me as if I've lived forever...

LUKASH:

And have you always been as you are now?

MAVKA:

I think so, yes...

LUKASH: What about family?
Or do you have no kin at all?

MAVKA: I do!
There's Forest-Elf, I call him 'Grandfather',
And he calls me 'Dear Child' or sometimes 'Daughter'.

LUKASH: Well, is he Dad or Grandpa?

MAVKA: I don't know!
Isn't it all the same?

LUKASH (*laughing*) Well, you are strange,
You forest-folk! But do you have a mother,
Or grandma, or whatever you may call her?

MAVKA: It sometimes seems to me that the old willow,
Half-dried-up, over there, that she's my mother.
Because in winter-time she takes me in
And makes a fine soft bed of dust for me
To rest upon.

LUKASH: You spent the winter there?
What did you find to do there all the winter?

MAVKA:
Nothing! Slept! Who does anything in winter?
The lake sleeps, and the forest and the reeds.
The willow creaked on: 'Slumber, slumber deep...
And ever there came to me dreams of white,
Bright sparkling jewels, mounted upon silver,
And unknown herbs and blossoms spreading wide,
Gleaming and white... Delicate, quiet stars
Fell down from heaven — thick and white — and formed
Pavilions... All white and pure it was
Under those pavilions... A bright necklace
Of crystal played and glittered everywhere...
I slept. My breast could breathe so easily,
And in the white dreams, rosy fancies came
And formed into a white embroidery,
And visions wove themselves in gold and azure,
Peaceful and quiet, not like those of summer....

LUKASH (*drinking in her words*)
The way you talk...

MAVKA:

But do you find it pleasant?

(LUKASH nods in agreement)

That pipe of yours speaks better than you do.
So play to me and I will have a swing.

(MAVKA twists the long branches of the birch together, sits on them, and rocks back and forward gently, as if in a swing. Lukash plays, leaning against the oak, never taking his eyes off MAVKA. He begins a spring-carol, and MAVKA, hearing him, involuntarily begins singing the melody after him. LUKASH plays the spring-carol again, and she sings it with him).

Music, sweet with wonder,
Ah it rends asunder,
Piercing the white breast so deeply,
Steals the heart as plunder.

A cuckoo answers the music of the spring-carol, then a nightingale, The wild rose blooms more abundantly, the blossoms of the guelder-rose grow whiter, the hawthorn blushes rosily, even the black, leafless thorn-bush puts forth delicate flowers.

MAVKA, enchanted, swings quietly, smiling, but in her eyes there is a yearning, almost to the point of tears; LUKASH, observing this, ceases playing.

LUKASH: Lass, are you crying?

MAVKA:

Was I really weeping?

(she passes her hand over her eyes)

Indeed, though... No, it is the evening dew.
The sun is setting... Look, the mist is rising
Over the lake...

LUKASH:

O no. it's still quite early!

MAVKA:

You wouldn't like day to be over yet?

(LUKASH shakes his head for "No")

MAVKA:

Why not?

LUKASH:

Uncle would call me to go home.

MAVKA:

And you would rather be with me?

(LUKASH nods silently)

You see,
You've started talking as the ash-tree did.

LUKASH: I'll have to start to learn the local customs,
Since I'm to spend the summer here.

MAVKA (*delightedly*) Indeed?

LUKASH: Tomorrow we must make a start at building.

MAVKA: You'll build a bothy?

LUKASH: No, a cabin, maybe,
Or, maybe, a whole cottage.

MAVKA: Just like birds!
You go to all that trouble, build a nest,
And then abandon it.

LUKASH: O no, we build
Forever.

MAVKA: How "forever"? You just said
You will be out here only for the summer.

LUKASH (*embarrassed*)
Well, I don't know... But Uncle Lev did say
That he'd give me a cottage and some land here,
Because in autumn he wants me to marry.

MAVKA (*alarmed*)
With whom?

LUKASH: I don't know. Uncle did not tell me,
Maybe he's not even found the bride.

MAVKA: But can't you simply find a mate yourself?

LUKASH: Well, I suppose I could, but...

MAVKA: What?

LUKASH: Oh, nothing...

(He starts playing something very melancholy, and then takes his hand from the pipe and sinks into thought)

MAVKA (*after a short pause*)
When humans choose a mate, is it for long?

LUKASH: Why, it's for ever!

MAVKA: That is like the doves...
Sometimes I envy them, they love each other
So tenderly... But I have never known
Tenderness like that, except from the Birch,
And that is why I call her my dear sister;
But she, alas, is always filled with gloom,
So pale, so drooping and so sorrowful,—
I often weep simply from looking at her.
I do not love the Alder, she's cross-natured.
The Aspen always scares me for some reason;
And she herself is frightened, always trembling.
The Oaks are much too serious. Wild Rose
Is quarrelsome, so are the May and Blackthorn,
Ash, Plane and Maple are all high-and-mighty.
The Guelder-rose so flaunts her loveliness
It seems she cares for nothing else at all.
I think that, last year, I was rather like her,
But now I find the thought of it unpleasant...
Thinking it over, though, I'm all alone
Here in the forest ...

(she mournfully sinks into thought)

LUKASH: What about the willow?
I thought you said that you called her your mother?

MAVKA: The willow... Yes... it's nice to winter in her,
But in the summer... well, she is so dry,
Creaking and always talking about winter...
No, I am all alone here, all alone!

LUKASH: Surely there are not just trees in the forest,
But also lots of different powers as well?
(somewhat tartly)

You needn't pull long faces, for we've heard
About your dances, jests and revelries.

MAVKA: But they are nothing more than sudden whirlwinds,
They swoop down, whirl you round, and disappear.
We've nothing like you humans have — forever!

LUKASH *(drawing closer)*
And you would like it our way?

(suddenly UNCLE LEV is heard, shouting loudly)

LEV (*offstage*) Hey there, Lukash,
Hey there! Where have you got to?

LUKASH (*answering*) Right, I'm coming!

LEV (*offstage*) Well, come on quick!

LUKASH: What an impatient fellow!
(*shouting*) Just coming! (*he starts to go*)

MAVKA: You'll come back, though?

LUKASH: I don't know!

(he goes into the bushes on the bank. Out of the depths of the forest darts BRUSHWOOD-ELF, a handsome youth, in red clothing with reddish hair, wild as the wind, with dark eyebrows and glittering eyes. He tries to embrace MAVKA, but she eludes him).

MAVKA: Don't touch me!

BRUSHWOOD-ELF: And why not?

MAVKA: Be off, and see
If the new shoots are green yet in the fields.

BRUSHWOOD-ELF: What business are new shoots of mine?

MAVKA: Out there
You'll find your field-rusalka in the rye.
Already she's begun to plait for you
A garland of the brightest springtime green.

BRUSHWOOD-ELF: I've long forgotten her!

MAVKA: Forget me too!

BRUSHWOOD-ELF: Now, don't be such a tease. Come on, let's fly!
I'll carry you up into the green mountain, —
You always used to long to see the fir-trees.

MAVKA: But I don't want to, now.

BRUSHWOOD-ELF: Indeed? Why not?

MAVKA: I've lost the fancy for it.

BRUSHWOOD-ELF: What a nonsense!
You've lost the fancy, how?

MAVKA: I don't feel like it!

BRUSHWOOD-ELF (*approaching her, coaxingly*)

Come, fly to the mountains, my sisters dear live high there,
Upland-Rusalky, meteor-spirits fly there,
Up upon the greensward our dances we shall ply there,
Like lightning in the sky there.
Magic blossoms of the bracken we shall find you,
Tear stars down from the sky for spangles gold to bind you,
Bleach upon the mountain snows a veil of wondrous kind, too,
To trail behind you.
So that you may wear the royal crown of the forest,
We the Serpent-Queen from off her throne will banish,
We shall take the mountain crags to be our fortress!
So be my lover!
Morning and evening ever,
I'll bring you jewel-encrusted
Robes to match your lustre,
Garlands I'll prepare you,
In the dance I'll pair you,
On my wings I'll bear you
To the purpling sea, where the sun so wealthy
Hides its gold so safely in the deep depths laid,
Then we shall peep in the dawn's windows, all stealthy,
Borrow from a star-spinner a silver weft then,
With that thread embroider the samite shade!
Then when daylight comes, and all the white clouds gather,
All along the skyline, like white flocks together,
Come to drink cold water from a mere so peaceful,
We shall rest so sweetly on the flowery —

MAVKA (*impatiently*) Cease now!

BRUSHWOOD-ELF: Why did you interrupt so very fiercely!
(*sadly, and at the same time slyly*)
Do last summer's memories no longer pierce you?

MAVKA (*in a tone of indifference*)

Last summer has vanished, long gone, unremembered,
And what was sung then was lost in wintry slumber!
My dreams 'twill not quicken!

BRUSHWOOD-ELF (*urging mysteriously*)
But in the oak-thicket?

MAVKA: Well, what? I sought berries and mushrooms, no more!

BRUSHWOOD-ELF: Was it not my tracks, rather, you were looking for?

MAVKA: In the thicket I gathered the hop-bines all curling...

BRUSHWOOD-ELF: To make a soft bed for me from their soft twirling?

MAVKA: No, but to twine them in my long black tresses!

BRUSHWOOD-ELF: Hoping, perhaps, for a lover's caresses?

MAVKA: No, just the birch-tree rocking me ever?

BRUSHWOOD-ELF: Weren't you in love with someone or other?

MAVKA: Ha-ha-ha! I don't know!
Ask the thicket, go!
I shall seek flowers, in my tresses to twine them...

BRUSHWOOD-ELF: But look! In the cold dew already they're pining!

MAVKA: The soft breeze is blowing,
The warm sun is glowing,
Soon will vanish the dew!

(she runs into the forest)

BRUSHWOOD-ELF: Stay a moment more, do,
My heart is breaking for you!
Where are you? Where... are... you?

(He too runs into the forest. His red garments can be seen flashing among the trees for a moment, and like an echo is heard "Where...are...you?" . The red glow of sunset plays over the forest.

A white mist rises over the lake. UNCLE LEV and FOREST ELF emerge into the clearing.)

LEV (*muttering angrily*)

That cursed Water-Elf! May he go dry!
I'd done my fishing, and just started to
Cross the lake by canoe — I merely wanted
To get across to this bank,— but he grabbed

The bottom of it firmly in his paw,
 I couldn't move! A bit more, he'd have sunk me!
 Well, I'm nobody's fool! I grabbed a handful
 Of his beard, twisted it into a skein,
 Got my knife from my belt, and 'pon my soul,
 I would have cut it off! But that damned pair —
 There was a bump, and my poor boat capsized!
 I hardly got myself ashore alive,
 And all the fish are gone... May the slime take you!

(to LUKASH) And something grabbed you to, back here, no doubt —
 I've called, yelled, shouted — might as well be dead!
 What were you up to?

LUKASH: Listen, I was just
 Cutting a pipe...

LEV: Well, nephew, I must say
 You take a mighty time to cut your pipes!

LUKASH: But Uncle I...

LEV (*smiling and in a better humour*)

Eh, don't you try to lie,
 You're too young for it! You'll just hurt your tongue!
 You'd better hunt some brushwood in the forest,
 And light a fire — I've got to dry myself?
 For how am I to go home in this state?
 Before I got there, *She* would be upon me —
 Don't say her name out here— curses upon her!
 And then she'd try to shake my soul out of me...

(*LUKASH goes into the forest; he is heard breaking up dry branches. UNCLE
 LEV sits down under the oak on the gnarled roots and tries to strike a light in
 order to kindle his pipe*)

LEV: Of course! You strike! But all the tinder's wet,
 And all the touchwood lost... Well, may the ague
 Take the whole lot of 'em. Maybe there's some
 Fresh on the oak?

(*He feels around the oak, searching for fungus to make tinder. From the
 lake, out of the mist rises up a white female figure, more like a swirl of mist
 than a human being. She approaches LEV with her long white outstretched,
 moving her fingers as if to grab him*)

LEV (*terrified*)

What phantom is it?

Aha! I know. Good thing I noticed it!

(Recovering his wits, he takes from his basket some roots and herbs, and holds them out towards the figure, to protect himself against her. She retreats a little. He recites, speaking faster and faster)

Evil creature!

Ague seizure, raging fever!

Betake ye back to the swamp, to the marshes,

Where man doth not wander, where fowl singeth never,

Where voice comes not ever.

Not for thee to come hither,

The white flesh to make wither,

The yellow bones to set a-quiver,

The black blood for to drink and slake ye,

Nor years from my life to take ye!

Here's wormwood — aroint ye, fly!

Perish, wraith, for ay!

(The phantom retreats into the lake and dissolves into the mist. LUKASH returns with his arms full of kindling, he puts it down in front of his uncle, takes out flint and steel from inside his shirt and kindles a fire.)

LUKASH:

You can get nice and warm now, Uncle!

LEV:

Thank you!

You're a good boy to your old uncle, lad!

(He kindles his pipe at the fire)

That's a bit different!

(He lies down on the grass, by the fire, puts his basket under his head and puffs at his pipe, watching the flames with half-closed eyes)

LUKASH:

Maybe, Uncle, you'd

Tell me a fairy-ballad?

LEV:

Goodness me!

You've turned back to a child! Well, what d'you want?

Okha the Wizard? or Son-of-Three-Fathers?

LUKASH:

I know these ones. But you know other ballads

That no one else can tell.

LEV (*pondering a moment*)

Well, listen closely!

I shall recite "The Princess of the Waves".
(He begins in a quiet, measured, sing-song tone)
 When house is warm within,
 With friendly kith and kin,
 'Tis good to tell stories,
 'Tis good to sing ballads,
 Until dawn is breaking!
 Dark pine-woods stretch gloomily,
 Deep seas roll booming,
 Mountains rise looming.
 Beyond is a country where sun never sinketh,
 Where moon never blinketh.
 And the bright stars in that country entrancing
 Are ever dancing.
 The fairest of the stars, she bore a son there, high
 Palyanin the White.
 Of face he was fairest,
 Of beauty the rarest,
 With golden tresses in the breezes streaming,
 And in his hand a silver weapon gleaming!

LUKASH:

Well, where does the princess come in?

LEV:

Just wait!...

Now Palyanin the White to man's estate he groweth,
 Within himself he thinketh of what fortune showeth,
 And how to cheer his life with what fate bestoweth.
 "They tell me that I am out of all youths the fairest,
 But as yet my fortune has not been the rarest.
 O bright star, my mother, speak me
 Where my bride I ought to seek me,
 Among nobles mighty,
 Among warriors knightly,
 Among princes royal,
 Among those who toil?
 There is some princess surely,
 A worthy partner for me..."

(he begins to drowse)

So off he went to the deep blue ocean
 And laid the pearl necklace down on the strand...

LUKASH:

Uncle, I think you've left a bit out there!

LEV: Really? Well, anyway, don't interrupt:
... And over the sea came a mighty wave rolling,
From the wave horses darted,
Fiery and scarlet,
All to a scarlet coach harnessed...
And there in the coach...
(he falls silent, overcome by sleep)

LUKASH: *(lost in dreams)*

Well, what? What princess... Oh, he's gone to sleep!

(He gazes pensively into the fire for a while, then stands up, moves away from the fire, and wanders round the clearing, playing on his pipe, so quietly that one can hardly hear.)

Night falls over the forest, yet the darkness is not dense, but transparent, as it is just before moonrise. The flickering firelight and twisting shadows dance fantastically. The flowers close to the fire now blaze with colour, now fade into darkness.

Along the edge of the forest, the trunks of the aspens and willows gleam white and mysterious. The spring breeze blows in impetuous gusts, running through the foliage and stirring the branches of the weeping birch; hidden in the mist, the reeds whisper together with the aspen.

Out of the depths of the forest runs MAVKA; she runs swiftly as if in flight; her garments are disordered. She stops in the clearing, glances round, pressing her hands to her heart, then runs to the birch, and again stops.)

MAVKA: Dear night, magic night, true thanks I must render you,
That in my misfortune you hid me so splendidly,
And you, paths tracing, like fine lacing,
That led me to my birch embracing...
Sister, dear sister, hide me now tenderly.
(She hides behind the birch, embracing the trunk)

LUKASH: *(approaching the birch, in a low tone)*
Mavka?

MAVKA: *(even more quietly)*
Yes?

LUKASH: Were you running?

MAVKA: Like a squirrel!

LUKASH: Was someone after you?

MAVKA: Yes!
LUKASH: Who?
MAVKA: Someone
Like fire itself!

LUKASH: Where has he got to, then?

MAVKA: Hush? For he's getting close again. *(silence)*

LUKASH: Now you are trembling. I can feel the birch
Shaking, and all the leaves begin to whisper!

MAVKA: *(drawing away from the birch)*
Alas, then I don't dare to lean on it,
And yet I cannot stand!

LUKASH: Then lean on me!
I'm strong. I will support you and protect you!
(MAVKA leans on him. They stand close together. Moonlight begins to stray over the forest, spreading over the clearing and stealing under the birch. In the forest, the song of the nightingale resounds, together with all the noises of a spring night. The wind blows fitfully. Out of the moonlit mist emerges RUSALKA, who watches them in silence.)

LUKASH draws MAVKA to him, bends his face closer and closer to hers, and suddenly kisses her.)

MAVKA *(crying out in a pang of ecstasy)*
Oh! A star fell into my heart.

RUSALKA: Ha-ha!
(with a laugh and a splash she dives into the lake)

LUKASH: What's that?

MAVKA: Don't be afraid. That was Rusalka!
She's a good friend of mine. She will not vex us.
She's headstrong, and she likes to mock and tease,
But I don't care... Now I don't care at all,
Not about anything!

LUKASH: Not me?

- MAVKA: But you
Are the whole world to me, dearer and better
Than that world which I knew before — though that
World, too, is better now that we are one!
- LUKASH: And are we really one?
- MAVKA: Cannot you hear
The nightingales sing out their wedding-songs?
- LUKASH: Yes, I can hear them... And they do not twitter
Nor warble as they always did; they sing
"Go kiss her! Kiss her! Kiss her!"
(He kisses her with a long, tender, trembling kiss)
And I'll go
Kiss you to death!
(A sudden gust scatters white flowers over the clearing, like snow)
- MAVKA: No, no! I cannot die...
A pity!...
- LUKASH: What's that? I don't want you to!
Why did I speak so?
- MAVKA: No, it is so good, —
To die, just like a falling star...
- LUKASH: Now, stop it!...
(speaking caressingly)
I don't want you to talk like that! Don't speak!
Don't say a single word. No, do say something!
For what you say is very strange, and yet
So nice to listen to...
All silent, then?
You're cross with me?
- MAVKA: I'm listening to you,
And to your love...
(She takes his head in her hands, turns his face to the moonlight, and looks closely into his eyes)
- LUKASH: What's this? You're scaring me,
Your eyes are gazing deep into my soul!...
Please, I can't bear it! Speak to me! Make jokes,
ask questions, talk of what you like, or laugh...

- MAVKA: Your voice is pure and limpid as a stream,
But your eyes are all clouded.
- LUKASH: The moon, maybe,
Does not shine brightly.
- MAVKA: Maybe...
(She leans her head against his heart, as if swooning)
- LUKASH: D'you feel faint?
- MAVKA: Hush! Let your heart speak!... for its speech is low
And indistinct, just like the sweet spring night.
- LUKASH: Why try to hear it, then? You have no need to!
- MAVKA: No need to, did you say? Then, love, no need to?
No need to, dearest! Then I won't, my joy,
I shall not listen to it, handsome one!
Instead, I shall caress you, my dear love!
Aren't you used to caresses?
- LUKASH: I've not been
In love before. I didn't even know
That loving was as sweet as this!
(She caresses him passionately and he cries out in ecstasy)
O Mavka,
You're drawing the soul out of me!
- MAVKA: Yes, yes!
I shall draw out your soul that sings so sweetly,
And with my words enchant your heart completely.
Kisses on your handsome lips bestowing,
Set them blushing,
Glowing, flushing,
Like the blossoms on the wild rose blowing!
Your eyes of blue I shall allure,
Set them dancing,
Brightly glancing,
Flashing forth like fiery jewels.
(she suddenly claps her hands)
But how can I attract your darling eyes!
I haven't got my flowers on yet!
- LUKASH: No matter!
You're beautiful without flowers.

MAVKA: No, I want
For your sake to dress splendidly in flowers
As suits a forest princess.
(she runs to the other side of the clearing, away from the lake, where there are flowering bushes)

LUKASH: Wait for me!
I'll put your flowers on for you.
(Runs after her)

MAVKA: *(sadly)* Flowers at night
Aren't beautiful... Their colours are asleep!

LUKASH: But there are glowworms in the grass. I'll get some
For you, and put them in your hair to shine,
And that will make a starry crown for you.
(He puts a few glowworms in her hair)
I must collect some more! I'll dress you up
In jewels, like the daughter of a king!
(He looks for glowworms in the grass under the bushes. RUSALKA again emerges from the mist. She whispers, turning back towards the reeds)

RUSALKA: Come my little Lost Babes nimble!
And your little torches kindle!
(Two little wandering lights glimmer in the reeds. Then the LOST BABIES appear, carrying away completely. RUSALKA gathers the LOST BABIES to herself, and whispers, pointing to the white figure of LUKASH which shows up indistinctly in the dark among the bushes)

RUSALKA: Now just look over there! D'you see him roaming?
He's like your father who abandoned you,
And brought your poor dear mother to her ruin!
He mustn't be let live!

FIRST BABY: You drown him, then!

RUSALKA: I cannot do it! Forest-Elf forbade me!

SECOND BABY: But we're not strong enough! We're only little!

RUSALKA: You are little,
Light and nimble,
In your hands bright torches kindle,
Just like weasels, quiet and kimble,

In the bushes creep, my dears,
 Forest-Elf will never hear!
 The mortal find — then
 Torches shining
 Disappear.
 Run like lightnings, flashing, speeding,
 Where paths lead him,
 O'er the haycock flash and twinkle,
 Lead him into quagmire sink-holes, —
 When he stumbles,
 Make him tumble
 To the bottom of the marshes,
 And the rest — my proper task is!
 Quick now, begone!

LOST BABIES: *(to each other, as they go)*

You go thither, I'll go hither,
 O'er the lake we'll gleam together!

RUSALKA *(joyfully)*: That's well begun!

(She runs to the marsh, and sprinkles water from her fingers over her shoulder. KUTS jumps out from behind the bushes, a youthful mannikin of an imp)

RUSALKA: Kutsie, sweetie,
 Come and greet me!

(With an imperious gesture, she stretches out her hand to him; he kisses it)

KUTS: What is it, my lady?

RUSALKA: I'm making you ready
 A splendid breakfast, so don't lose it in your haste!

(pointing to LUKASH)

You see? Well? Is the dish to your taste?

KUTS: Until the marsh has caught him,
 He won't make my mouth water!

RUSALKA: He's the boy for you!
 And he'll give pleasure to your dam and grand-dam too!

(KUTS leaps into the bushes and vanishes. RUSALKA in the rushes watches the LOST BABIES, whose tracks make arabesques of running fire, flashing, glimmering, weaving and running hither and thither. LUKASH, seeking for glow-worms, catches sight of them)

LUKASH: What splendid glow-worms. No, they must be fireflies!
I've never seen the like before! Such big ones!
I've got to have them.

(He chases first one, then the other; imperceptibly they lead him out to the sink-holes)

MAVKA: No! Don't try to catch them!
Dearest, don't try it! They are the Lost Babies!
They'll lead you into danger!

(LUKASH, absorbed in the chase, fails to her and runs even further from MAVKA)

LUKASH *(crying out suddenly)* Help! I'm lost!
I'm in a quagmire! It's pulling me under!

(Hearing his shout, MAVKA comes running, but fails to reach him as he is too far from the firm bank. She throws him one end of his girdle, holding fast to the other)

MAVKA: Catch!
(The girdle falls short)

LUKASH: It won't reach! What will become of me?

(MAVKA runs to the willow which leans over the quagmire)

MAVKA: O willow dearest, mother dearest, help us!

(Quick as a squirrel, she climbs into the willow, crawling out on to the furthest branch, and again throws her girdle. This time it reaches LUKASH, who grabs the end. MAVKA pulls him towards her, then she gives him her hand and helps him scramble up into the willow. RUSALKA in the reeds gives a dull groan of anguish and vanishes into the mist. The LOST BABIES also vanish)

LEV *(awakened by the shouting)*
Hey! What's all this? Another phantom now?
Begone! Aroint thee!

(looking round) Lukash! Hey, where are you?

LUKASH *(from the willow)*
Here I am, Uncle!

LEV: Well, lass, although you haven't got a soul,
You've a good heart at least. You must forgive me.
I thundered without thinking.

(to LUKASH) But why go
Hunting around for fireflies in the marsh?
Couldn't you find some glow-worms in the bushes?

LUKASH: But the fireflies were so magnificent!

LEV: Aha! I knew it! It was those Lost Babies!
Well, just you wait! I shall come back tomorrow
And bring some hound-pups with me, then we'll see
Who will be whimpering here!

THE VOICES OF THE LOST BABIES (*echoing mournfully, like frogs croaking*)

No, no dear grandpa,
We've not been naughty,
In the swamp-water,
Berrying coldly;
If someone had told us
People would come here,
We'd not come boldly
From our deep home here....
Sad, sad are we!
Weep bitterly!

LEV: D'you see just what a faithless pair they are,
Those spawn of witches! Well, so be it, I
Know very well who's guilty and who's not!

(to LUKASH)

Well, lad, it's surely time for going home?
We'd best be on our way.

(to MAVKA)

Goodbye, then, lass!

MAVKA: But you'll be back tomorrow? I will show you
Where you can find the right wood for your house.

LEV: I see that you have found out all about it.
Bright lass! Well, come then! I'm used to you wild-folk,
And now you'll have to get used to us too!
Well, we must go. Farewell! (*he sets off*)

MAVKA (*more to LUKASH than to LEV*)

I shall be waiting!

(LUKASH lags behind his uncle, and, without speaking, clasps MAVKA's hands, kisses her silently, and then, running after LEV, goes into the forest).

MAVKA (*alone*)

Would that, sweet night, your course were more rapid!
 Forgive me, dear night. For I never knew happy
 Day such as this, a day so delightful,
 Joyous as you are, night fairest and brightest!
 Why are you sorrowing, birchtree, dear sister?
 Do you not see, my dear, that I am blissful!
 Do not shed, willow, your tears in the water,
 Mother, a sweetheart will come to your daughter!...
 And you, my dear father, forest dark-looming,
 How can I live this night, how to endure it?
 Night is short — parting is long till tomorrow..
 What will fate bring to me — fortune or sorrow?

(The moon becomes hidden behind the dark wall of the forest. Darkness spreads over the clearing, black and velvety. Nothing can be seen but a few glowing embers from the fire, and the wreath of glow-worms which shows where MAVKA is going through the trees: the wreath now shines brightly in a full constellation, now in isolated sparks; then darkness covers it, too. There is a deep midnight silence, only, at time, a faint rustle is heard in the forest, like the sigh of a sleeper.

CURTAIN

Translated by Vera Rich



OLEKSANDER OLES – ON THE FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF HIS DEATH

Oleksander Oles (real name Oleksander Kandyba), was born in 1878, on a farm in the Sumy region of eastern Ukraine. He was a graduate of the Kharkiv Veterinary Institute, and worked for some years in the Kharkiv area as a vet, before moving, in 1911, to Kyiv, where he worked on the editorial board of the prestigious journal *Literaturno-Naukovyi Visnyk* (Literary-Scientific Herald) and also for the “Lan” publishing house.

During Ukraine's brief period of statehood in 1918-22, he served for a time as cultural attaché to the countries of Central Europe, living first in Budapest and then Vienna where, in 1920, he became editor of the journal *Na perelomi* (Turning-point) and also head of the Union of Ukrainian Journalists. In 1924, he settled near Prague, where he spent the rest of his life, until his death in July 1944.

Oles began his literary career in 1903. Throughout his working life, his poems, plays and journalism were imbued with the ideas of Ukraine's struggle for national rebirth and independence – whether overtly, as in “Daybreak, day-break...”, written in 1917, at the beginning of the chain of events which led to Ukraine's declaration of independence in January 1918, or symbolically, as in “The Asters”, written after the Revolution of 1905 which, *inter alia*, won for Ukraine and Belarus the right to publish in their own languages. (“The Asters”, incidentally, was translated into Belarusian by the talented young poet, Maksim Bahdanovič, 1891-1918, and published in his only collection of poems *Vianok*).

THE ASTERS

In a garden at midnight the asters unfurled...
They bathed in the dew, donned their garlands' fair whorls,
And they started to wait for the rosy-hued morn,
And with rainbows of colour life to adorn...

In luxuriant reveries the asters dreamed,
Of grasses all silken, of days where sun gleamed, –
And there in these dreams a bright tale they learn,
Where flowers do not fade, where spring is eterne...

Thus dreamed the asters in their autumn ring,
Thus dreamed the asters awaiting the spring...
But morning brought to them a rain cold and chill,
And somewhere a wind in the bushes wept shrill...

To the asters it seemed they in prison were caught...
To the asters it seemed that life was worth naught,
They wilted and died... And like laughter, straightway,
The sun o'er their bodies shone forth in bright day.

* * *

Daybreak, daybreak! Time of dawning...
What a splendid time comes thus!
With joy and with sorrow calling
Ukraina summons us.

And her martyr's voice re-echoes,
Voice of Mother calls her sons,
Calls us to the banner, beckons
To stand where dread breakers run.

Shades of our forefathers wander,
Shades go roaming through the land,
For us they unfurl their standards,
To us they their sabres hand.

Swiftly bells through Ukraina
Echo loudly, boom afar,
Swiftly now the great shades lead us,
Bring us to the flags of war.

Time of kindling... Time of dawning,
What a splendid time comes thus,
With joy and with sorrow calling,
Ukraina summons us. ■

News From Ukraine

The Economy

Road and Rail Expansion Planned

VIENNA, March 2 – Ukraine is planning to improve its east-west road and rail links to improve transport from the Donbas coal basin to western Europe and from Kyiv to Budapest, said Transport Minister Orest Klymush. But the projects would require private and foreign investment, he told an Adam Smith Institute conference. Ukraine would build two additional wide-gauge electrified lines from Donbas to Ukraine's western borders by 2004. It would also electrify other international routes so that 80 per cent of freight can be carried on electric lines.

US Boosts Aid to Ukraine

WASHINGTON, March 4 – President Clinton announced a sizable boost in US aid to Ukraine as the administration looks for assurances that Ukraine will fulfil a pledge to divest itself of 1,800 nuclear warheads. Foreign aid, which is mostly technical assistance, will be increased by \$50 million – from \$300 to \$350 million. In addition, the \$175 million

Ukraine is due to receive in congressionally authorised funds to pay for dismantling missiles will be increased to \$350 million, spread over two years. President Leonid Kravchuk, during his visit to the United States, urged senators to take “decisive measures” to help his country and warned that Ukraine could otherwise face a slide backwards to “old times”. Kravchuk told reporters he had received a sympathetic hearing from two members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee at the outset of his three-day visit, but he warned that the West had to act quickly to prevent a reversal in the advancement of reform. “I tried to explain that the situation in the former Soviet Union, and Ukraine in particular, was extremely complicated. This is no exaggeration”, he said. “The question can be put simply. Either these peoples move towards democracy and reform or else forces could come to power capable of stopping the process”.

Ukraine Looking to Invest in Colombian Coal Mines

BOGOTA, March 9 – Colombian Energy and Mines Minister Guido Nule Amin recently met Ukrainian

company and government officials to discuss a possible joint venture in expanding Colombia's coal mining industry, a Ukrainian company official said. "We're looking at joining Colombian companies to exploit coal in Colombia's mines", said Joel Doglioni, president of Protocol Invest Contacts, a mixed company recently opened in Bogota to promote Ukrainian business in the country. "The idea is that Ukraine would bring the machinery, technology and experts".

Western Atlas to Explore for Oil Off Ukraine

LOS ANGELES, March 14 – Western Atlas said it and the Bulgarian company EasternOil Services signed an exclusive agreement with Ukraine to conduct seismic exploration over 15,000 kilometres of the Ukrainian offshore continental shelf. Western Atlas, recently spun-off from Litton Industries, said the survey will cover the largest area in the Black Sea, a region where oil and gas prospects have been underexplored.

Slovak-Ukrainian Investment Protection Accord Initialled

KYIV, March 17 – An agreement on investment support between Ukraine and Slovakia was initialled during the first session of the inter-governmental Slovak-Ukrainian commission for cooperation in trade, the economy and scientific technology. An agreement abolishing double taxation is also being made ready for signing. The inter-governmental commission will sit twice a year. The

next session, to be held in Bratislava in October, will deal with the support of trade contacts, the development of relations between industrialists' and business people's associations and the organising of joint trade fairs. Five sub-commissions have been created to deal with questions of industry and conversion, agriculture and food, transport, financing and light industry. Cooperation in the energy sphere is also envisaged.

Ukraine Signs Economic Accords

PRAGUE, March 17 – Ukrainian Minister for External Economic Relations Oleh Slepichev and Czech Trade and Industry Minister Vladimir Dlouhy signed an agreement on economic cooperation between their two countries. Slepichev also signed an agreement on the support and mutual protection of investments with Czech Finance Minister Ivan Kocarnik.

Ukraine Wants to Divide Up Assets

KYIV, March 18 – A Ukrainian minister, signalling an apparent retreat from a deal on repaying former Soviet debts, said the debts and assets of the former Soviet Union should be divided up. "We never agreed to the 'zero option' and cannot agree now", said Oleh Slepichev, Minister for Foreign Economic Relations. "We have to divide up both Soviet debts and assets. But we still have no information from Russia on Soviet assets".

Joint Power Plant Project

BUCHAREST, March 21 – Romania and Ukraine will launch a joint project to build a chain of seven power plants on a border river between the two neighbour states, a Romanian official said. “In 1995 we’ll start work at the first two power plants out of a total of seven which we plan to jointly build with Ukraine over the next five years”, said Iosif Kaytar, who runs the project for the Institute for Power Plants and Energy Studies. Romania would build the seven plants in the northern county of Baia Mare on the river Tisa.

Ukraine, Poland Sign Pact

WARSAW – Poland and Ukraine signed on March 21 a document pledging to develop close political and economic ties, in a move some expect to generate concern in Russia.

“We have talked like friends and neighbours”, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Anatoliy Zlenko said. “It will play a major role in the region and Europe”.

His Polish counterpart, Andrzej Olechowski, said that Poland and Ukraine can play a more significant role in Europe by developing closer bilateral contacts. “These two countries have strategic significance to each other”, Olechowski said. “I would specify our relations as a close partnership”.

The document avoided reference to the two countries’ greatest concern – the growing regional interests of Russia. It only referred to a “revival of hegemonistic tendencies

and zones of influence in the region”. “The active cooperation of Poland and Ukraine will prevent the creation of new divisions and hegemonistic tendencies”, the document said. “Poland and Ukraine can and should play a significant role in the solution of complicated problems in central and eastern Europe”.

The two ministers also signed an agreement on mutual protection and restoration of burial places and monuments to victims of World War II and repressions.

Zlenko indicated that his country was interested in joining an informal French-German-Polish axis to help strengthen ties between East and West. Zlenko said during the visit to Warsaw that he had raised the idea with Polish Foreign Minister Andrzej Olechowski but did not make clear how the Polish side had reacted.

Polish, German and French leaders have held several trilateral summits since Warsaw ended Communist rule in 1989 to ensure that common links keep improving.

“Ukrainian participation... could be essential for this to continue and for integration between East and West”, Zlenko said. “In our sub-region, Ukraine and Poland are two large partners and the deepening of their mutual relations can have great significance for the whole region”, he said.

Ukraine Sets Up Fund to Issue Bonds

Kyiv, April 5 – President Leonid Kravchuk has set up a Ukrainian Credit Fund which will have the right to issue state bonds. Ukrainian

authorities said the fund could stimulate and guarantee foreign investment here because state bonds would be guaranteed by Ukrainian property.

Protection for Domestic Firms

KYIV, April 6 – Ukraine introduced new import taxes this month to protect domestic producers, the state customs committee said. But importers predicted retail prices on all goods could jump fourfold as a result. The new regulations require importers to pay excise duties on average three times higher than before. The duties range from 30 to 300 per cent of the wholesale price of imported alcoholic beverages, tobacco, sugar, electronics and other items.

Ukraine Gives Aid to Cuba

HAVANA, April 14 – Ukraine, grateful for help given by Cuba to victims of the Chernobyl nuclear disaster, has donated fertiliser, powdered milk, canned meat and medicines to the Caribbean island worth some \$1.6 million. Granma, newspaper of the ruling Communist Party, quoted Ukrainian trade attache Alexander Gniedik as saying at a ceremony in Havana that the aid was a “show of solidarity” for Cuba, currently deep in economic crisis. The island treated some 10,000 children affected by the disaster at the Chernobyl nuclear plant in 1986.

Tatarstan to Supply Oil Refinery

MOSCOW, April 15 – The central Russian republic of Tatarstan has been authorised by the Fuel and Energy Ministry to supply 200,000

tonnes of high sulphur crude oil to Ukraine's big Kremenchuk refinery. The deal, which could improve the quality of Russian oil exported to the West, allowed Tatarstan's Tatneft oil company to resume output at wells that had been shut for want of customers. High sulphur crude from Tatarstan and the southern Urals region of Bashkortostan is often blended with better quality supplies from Western Siberia, lowering the overall quality of Urals Blend exports.

Iran and Ukraine Expand Cooperation

NICOSIA, April 18 – Iran and Ukraine agreed to set up a joint committee to expand economic cooperation and Iran said it would mediate to free Ukrainian prisoners of war in Afghanistan. The decision to set up the committee was announced in a meeting in Tehran between Ukrainian Foreign Minister Anatoliy Zlenko and Iran's Oil Minister Gholamreza Aqazadeh. Zlenko said Ukraine was ready to cooperate with Iran in oil, energy, metal production, transport and tourism industries and hoped the joint committee would help pave the way for implementation of previous agreements.

Ukraine Will Not Close Chernobyl

VIENNA, April 21 – Nuclear experts and neighbouring countries began an emergency conference with Ukraine to discuss its Chernobyl nuclear plant, but Kyiv said it could not immediately cut off the power. Delegations from Ukraine and 15 other countries, plus the European Union and the European Bank for Reconstruction

and Development (EBRD) were attending the talks at the Vienna headquarters of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Two low-level safety incidents, which did not involve the release of radioactivity, were reported in the past week. The United States, the European Union and environmental groups say the plant should be closed entirely. The IAEA said the concrete "sarcophagus" built over unit four was visibly weakening. Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister Valeriy Shmarov, however, told the Vienna meeting his country simply could not afford to turn off such a major source of electrical power. He told a news conference urgent safety measures at Chomobyl and other investment needed to boost power capacity would cost up to four billion dollars.

British Firms Get Ukraine Deal

LONDON, April 22 – British Coal, Babcock Energy and privately owned SPD Swan Consultants have been awarded a contract to study means of improving efficiency at Ukraine's coal-fired electricity generating stations. State-owned British Coal said in a statement the study will assess the environmental performance of coal-fired power stations, retrofitting to control emissions, training in circulating fluidised bed combustion and a detailed assessment of Ukrainian coals. The value of the contract was not disclosed.

EU Commission Offers Food Plan

BRUSSELS, April 27 – The European Commission suggested supplying Ukraine with food worth about 100

million Ecus to be sold at local market prices to alleviate growing domestic shortages. The Commission said in a discussion paper for submission to European Union member states that the proceeds of the sales would generate counterpart funds to finance badly needed supplies of seed, fertiliser and other items. A statement by the Commission said experts estimated at 100 million Ecus the cost of meeting Ukraine's immediate needs for such agricultural inputs.

Oil Refinery Opens Polymer Plant

KYIV, April 29 – Ukraine's Lisichansk refinery opened a polypropylene plant with an annual capacity of 100,000 tonnes, a spokesman for the state committee on oil and gas said. The plant at the eastern Ukrainian refinery was built with \$125 million in investment from the Italian firm Technimont, said Stepan Yaloveha. Ukraine will export 2,000 tonnes of the polypropylene and use the rest domestically, to manufacture hypodermic needles, pipes and other goods.

Russian Crude Deliveries Fall Sharply

MOSCOW, April 29 – Russian crude oil deliveries to Ukraine and other former Soviet republics plunged in January-March, increasing the amount available for export to western markets, in theory at least. The State Statistics Committee said crude deliveries to Ukrainian refineries in the first quarter of this year totalled 2.6 million tonnes, less than half of the amount supplied in the same period of 1993.

Ukraine to Sign Deal with Nigeria

KYIV, April 29 – Ukraine is on the verge of signing a deal with Nigeria for 140,000 tonnes of crude per month. The crude is to be processed at Ukraine's Odesa refinery, and 50 per cent of the refined product will remain in Ukraine. The other half will be returned to Nigeria for possible resale in Europe.

First Quarter GDP Down

KYIV, April 27 – Ukraine's first quarter gross domestic product fell 36 per cent against the same period last year, according to a government report. Industrial output fell 38.4 per cent in the first quarter compared to last year, continuing a steep decline since the former Soviet republic gained independence two years ago. Declining output contributed to shortfalls in the national budget. Budget expenditures were 26.6 trillion karbovantsi (\$591 million at commercial rates), with a deficit of 5.4 trillion. Parliament had passed a balanced 1994 budget.

Iran Offers Oil Credit

KYIV, April 27 – Iran is offering Ukraine a \$50 million credit to buy oil and plans to supply 100,000 tonnes of oil by June, a foreign ministry official said. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Anatoliy Zlenko reached the deal to increase oil credits to \$50 million from \$30 million during a visit to Tehran. Iranian officials told Zlenko during the visit they were prepared to fulfil earlier agreements to supply Ukraine with oil but that the Ukrainian side had failed to implement them.

Ukraine Ends Export Restrictions

KYIV, May 6 – Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk issued a decree cancelling export quotas and licences for some metals, metal products, some types of coal, sugar, grain and fish. Deputy Prime Minister Valentyn Landyk said Ukraine was able to ease export restrictions because the government had been more successful in returning hard-currency profits to Ukraine. "Once we found a mechanism for returning export earnings of Ukrainian enterprises, I was the first to insist on cancelling all restrictions", Landyk said.

US, Ukraine Sign Agreement on Missile Exports

WASHINGTON, May 13 – Ukraine has agreed to limit its missile and space related exports to the standards of an international arms control regime, building a foundation for space co-operation between the two countries. In an agreement, signed by Vice President Al Gore and Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister Valeriy Shmarov, Ukraine agreed to abide by the Missile Technology Control Regime keeping Ukraine from trading in missiles or missile technology to countries around the world which are not partners in the regime.

EU Provides Aid to Build New Chernobyl Tomb

KYIV, May 17 – The European Union has provided three million ECU (\$3.5 million) for Ukraine to hold a tender to build a new "sarcophagus" over the fourth reactor at the Chernobyl nuclear plant. "The European

Community and the West want to see Chernobyl closed, but on the other hand we understand that Ukraine has a great need for energy", said Luis Moreno, EU Ambassador in Kyiv. The tender is aimed at finding the best and cheapest project to secure the fourth reactor wrecked by an explosion that unleashed the world's worst nuclear accident in 1986.

Ukraine to Privatise Oil Refinery

KYIV, May 19 – Ukraine will privatise its Lysychansk oil refinery, one of the biggest in the former Soviet Union, within a month, the plant's chief engineer said. Mykola Parfyev said that the government had issued a decree to transform the plant into a share holding company named "Lysychansk Nefteorgsintez".

Gas Supplies Cut to Firms

KYIV, May 20 – Ukraine, which owes Russia more than \$300 million in gas debts, has slashed supplies to some 2,300 domestic companies which have failed to pay for gas, senior Ukrainian officials said. Ukrainian companies owe the state more than 15 billion karbovantsi (\$340 million) in gas debts and Kyiv is unable to pay for gas imports from Russia and Turkmenistan. Russia and Turkmenistan cut off gas to Ukraine in recent months but resumed supplies after Kyiv started paying its debts.

Russia to Boost Oil Exports Through Odesa

MOSCOW, May 24 – The Russian pipeline company Transneft will boost crude supplies to the Ukrainian oil ter-

minal of Odesa to eight million tonnes this year. An official said an agreement was reached last month between the Russian trade house Conex and the Ukrainian pipeline consortium Ukrtransnafta to ship up to eight million tonnes of Russian crude to Odesa on the Black Sea from about 5.5 million in 1993. Under the agreement the company expected to ship about 700,000 tonnes of crude a month to Odesa which is well equipped for high sulphur crude shipments.

Ukraine, Turkey Plan Oil Pipeline

KYIV, May 25 – Ukraine and Turkey plan to build a pipeline across Turkey to transport Iranian oil across the Black Sea to the port of Odesa. Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk and Turkish President Suleyman Demirel will sign the agreement, allowing for shipment of 40 million tonnes of oil annually, said Yevhen Sukhin, deputy head of Ukraine's State Oil and Gas Committee. The project is expected to cost about \$1.4 billion.

Privatisation of Oil and Gas Industries

Kyiv, May 26 – Ukraine plans to privatise half its oil and gas industry, creating a new share holding company known as Ukrnaftahaz, according to government officials. Yevhen Sukhin, deputy head of the state oil and gas committee, said 49 per cent of Ukraine's oil and gas facilities would be turned over to the new private firm. Half of Ukrnaftahaz shares would be offered to the public and the state would continue to control the rest of the industry.

Speaker Condemns Land Privatisation

KYIV, May 30 – The new head of Ukraine's parliament strongly denounced any attempts to privatise the country's land. "I will not allow this in this country", Oleksander Moroz, the Socialist Party leader, told a news conference. "I consider it [land privatisation] a crime before the Ukrainian nation and particularly its future generation". Moroz countered claims that this will further isolate Ukraine from Western business investment and economic aid from international finance organisations. "Investment should not be tied to the issue of selling land", said the parliament speaker.

Funds for Farm Sector

KYIV, June 3 – Ukraine is offering its hard-pressed agricultural sector extra cash to enable the country to complete this year's harvest, government officials said. A presidential decree this week ordered the government to issue within 10 days 1.7 trillion karbovantsi (about \$35 million) of new credits to firms owing money to the agriculture sector. It ordered commercial banks to use 10 per cent of their credit resources to provide loans to the Agro-industrial complex from June 15.

Ukraine, Russia Agree on Debt

KYIV, June 6 – Ukraine and Russia have agreed to create a joint stock company to develop transit pipelines carrying Russian natural gas to Europe through Ukrainian territory. The weekend agreement signed in Kyiv by Russia's Gazprom and Ukraine's Ukrhazprom firms, also set

a debt repayment schedule for Kyiv to pay off over \$800 million it owes Russia for gas. The two sides also agreed to pave the way for Ukrainian firms to make direct agreements with Gazprom for gas supplies.

Rocket Technology Sold to France

KYIV, June 6 – A Ukrainian rocket plant has agreed to sell technology used to build powerful Soviet-era nuclear missiles to France's Aerospatiale 1/8AERP.CN3/8. Aerospatiale, which is building the Ariane-5 space rocket, signed three contracts worth \$109,000 with the Yuzhmash plant in Dnipropetrovsk, the agency quoted top national space agency official Andriy Zhalko-Tytarenko as saying. The contracts envisage the sale of rocket technology, including an oxygen tank and other components used in building the Soviet SS-24 missile. Aerospatiale plans to use the technology to build a new small rocket for putting satellites into low orbits.

Radioactive Leak at Chornobyl

MOSCOW, June 11 – Workers at the Chornobyl nuclear power plant have discovered a leak in a part of one of the working reactors that holds containers of spent nuclear fuel. A shift supervisor at the plant said escaping waste has not increased radiation levels at the plant and that the accident is no cause for alarm. Leaks like this are "a chronic disease of this type of atomic power station", said shift supervisor Aleksander Yelshishchev, referring to RMBK

reactors, fifteen of which still operate in Russia, Ukraine and Lithuania. Yelshishchev did not say when the leak began, but he said it "will not be localised soon", indicating that Chernobyl workers do not know the exact location of the fissure.

Rise in Energy Output Predicted

KYIV, June 23 – Ukraine plans to increase annual energy output to 7.5 million tonnes of crude oil and 35.5 billion cubic metres of natural gas by the year 2010. Ukraine produced 4.2 million tonnes of crude oil and 19.2 billion cubic metres of natural gas in 1993, according to Mykhailo Kovalko, head of the state committee for oil and gas. He said an increase in foreign investment, the transformation of state enterprises into joint stock companies and a significant reduction in energy consumption would help Ukraine realise plans for higher energy production. Kovalko said Ukraine had held oil and gas production stable in the first three months of 1994.

Ukraine to Proceed With Nuclear Expansion

LONDON, June 23 – Ukraine aims to push ahead with expansion of new nuclear power capacity and some reactors may come on stream without safety features standard in the west, according to a confidential report commissioned by the G7. But a shortage of cash may oblige Kyiv to keep the ill-fated Chernobyl plant open for as long as is technically possible, despite pressure from the west to close it. "The majority of officials are of the opinion that nuclear capacity should be maintained or increased", says the report.

"They were clear in their view that closure of Chernobyl is contingent upon completion of at least replacement nuclear capacity". A joint fact-finding mission from the World Bank's International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) prepared the report ahead of July's Group of Seven meeting in Naples.

Drought Damages 80,000 Hectares

KYIV, June 24 – Drought has severely damaged 80,000 hectares of the grain crop in Ukraine's Crimean peninsula, officials said. Half of the drought-damaged areas were ruined and the remainder will likely produce only a fraction of normal output, Crimean parliament chairman Sergei Tsekov told local journalists. President Leonid Kravchuk, visiting the region with senior government officials before Sunday's presidential election, pledged help from the central government. "We have come here with specific proposals. We came here to see the situation and decide how we can help Crimea as a whole and the regions hurt by drought. Ukraine sowed 4.6 million hectares of grain this spring, and officials said they expected a harvest of about 40 million tonnes of grain this year. A cold winter forced resowing of a third of winter grain crops this year – about 2.35 million ha.

Voters Reject New Nuclear Reactor

KYIV, June 27 – Voters in eastern Ukraine rejected government plans to complete construction of a sixth reactor at Europe's largest nuclear power station, Zaporizhzhya, accord-

ing to the results of a plebiscite. The same day a group of Ukrainian parliamentarians meeting at the Chornobyl power station, agreed to keep the facility operating until the year 2000. Two districts near the Zaporizhzhya power station rejected by 61 per cent to 31 per cent the completion of a sixth reactor. 63 per cent of voters rejected a second proposal to build a storage site at the station for spent nuclear fuel. The sixth reactor was all but built when parliament froze construction of nuclear sites after public fury over Chornobyl.

Ukraine Agrees to Nuclear Safeguards Accord

VIENNA, June 29 – Ukraine has agreed in principle to submit its nuclear facilities to the United Nations' nuclear safeguards regime, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) said. The draft agreement commits Ukraine to use nuclear power solely for peaceful purposes and to open its facilities to regular IAEA inspection, but it was not immediately clear if this would mean inspection of nuclear missiles the country still controls from the Soviet era.

Canada to Press G7 Summit to Help Ukraine

OTTAWA, June 30 – Canada will press the G7 leading industrial nations to do more to help Ukraine reform its economy, achieve political stability and clean up its nuclear industry. "PM Jean Chretien will push for action on Ukraine at Naples", said a senior Canadian official. It is in the interest of all of us to see the phase-out of Chornobyl-type reactors", he said.

The Crimean Crisis

Crimea Approves Russian Premier

SIMFEROPOL, March 11 – Ukraine's Crimean peninsula confirmed a Russian citizen as head of the autonomous region's government, in conflict with Ukrainian law. But Yevgeny Saburov, who becomes deputy prime minister and effective head of the Crimean peninsula's administration, publicly signed an official request addressed to Ukraine's President Leonid Kravchuk to take Ukrainian citizenship. Saburov's appointment by Crimea's pro-Russian president, Yuri Meshkov, drew criticism from Kyiv officials who said Ukrainian law forbids non-citizens from holding state posts. The Crimean-born Saburov, an economist who was a deputy prime minister in the Russian government at the end of the Soviet era, said during a news conference that he wanted to improve Crimea's economy, not engineer its union with Russia.

Crimea Schedules Poll on Power

KYIV, March 11 – The president of Crimea has scheduled an opinion poll designed to give him a popular mandate for demanding greater powers to run the peninsula without interference from Ukraine, but Ukraine's president said the vote would not be legally binding. Meshkov signed two decrees, one disbanding the current Crimean government, and the other setting up a

peninsula-wide vote to coincide with the March 27 Ukrainian parliamentary elections. The poll will ask Crimeans whether they want greater autonomy from Kyiv, with relations between the government in the Black Sea peninsula and Ukraine built on bilateral treaties, rather than dictates from Kyiv. Voters will also be asked whether Meshkov should be allowed to issue legally binding decrees, and whether they back dual citizenship for the peninsula's 2.7 million inhabitants, two-thirds of whom are ethnic Russians.

Kravchuk Annuls Crimean Plebiscite

KYIV, March 15 – Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk annulled a plebiscite this month in Crimea on broadening the region's autonomy, saying it violated the former Soviet republic's laws and constitution. Kravchuk issued a decree saying Crimean President Yuri Meshkov had exceeded his authority in ordering the vote for March 27 to coincide with Ukraine's parliamentary election. Although it was not clear what steps, if any, the Ukrainian president would take to stop the vote going ahead, Kravchuk hinted that Kyiv could cut off electricity and water to the Black Sea peninsula.

Crimean Leader Seeks Oil and Advice

MOSCOW, March 19 – The leader of Ukraine's Crimean peninsula was in Russia's most independent province seeking oil from Tatarstan as well as advice on breaking free from the

central government. Yuri Meshkov, the pro-Russian politician who recently became Crimea's first elected president, went to oil-rich Tatarstan seeking another source of energy in case Ukraine makes good on a threat to cut off his province. He also went seeking tips on how the Russian province managed to achieve political and economic autonomy from Moscow. Meshkov secured an agreement that calls for Tatarstan to supply Crimea with much-needed oil and gas.

Crimea President Wants Military Service at Home

SIMFEROPIL, March 24 – The president of Crimea ordered local recruits to perform their military service in the region, boosting tension with Ukrainian leaders ahead of weekend parliamentary elections. But Ukrainian military authorities immediately dismissed Crimean President Yuri Meshkov's decree as illegal and said they would continue to administer Ukraine's army as before. "I do not obey Crimean President Meshkov and will work on the basis of the orders of Ukrainian President Kravchuk".

Crimean Vote Rebuffs Ukraine

SIMFEROPIL, March 28 – Crimeans have voted overwhelmingly to assert more power for their rebellious Ukrainian peninsula in a move that serves as a rebuff to the federal government in Kyiv. More than 80 per cent of Crimeans backed ballot measures that called for Crimea to have

great independence in its dealings with Kyiv, that would give more power to the Crimean president, and which envisions dual citizenship for Crimea's predominantly ethnic Russian population. Sunday's voter turnout in Crimea was 58 per cent, lower than the overall turnout in Ukraine.

Kravchuk Names Representative in Crimea

KYIV – President Leonid Kravchuk on Friday, April 1, named people's deputy Valeriy Horbatov as his personal representative in Crimea.

In the parliamentary elections on March 27, Horbatov was the sole Crimean deputy directly elected to the Ukrainian Parliament in Kyiv. Reportedly, his status is unclear. Under arrangements with Crimea, presidential representatives usually take charge of the local administration. This function is being fulfilled by an ethnic Russian economist, Yevgeni Saburov.

Saburov announced in Simferopol the first economic change of course under Meshkov's leadership. Interfax said that included in a package of changes to taxation and foreign-currency policies is a rise in the price of bread by 100 per cent from Friday.

Crimean Leader Blasts Kravchuk

SIMFEROPIL, April 6 – The pro-Russian leader of Ukraine's Crimean peninsula denounced Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk, increasing tension in the area four days before run-off local and national elections. Yuri Meshkov, in a dramatic

statement read on television, condemned Kravchuk's decision this week to appoint a prefect in the region, dominated by ethnic Russians. He said Kravchuk was unfit to lead the country and expressed the hope that new leaders would emerge to redirect policy. President Kravchuk said that he is considering granting Crimea and other restless regions greater powers over their economic affairs, but not political autonomy as some are demanding. Kravchuk rejected calls for Ukraine to become a federal state, a solution that has been proposed as a way of satisfying the growing aspirations of many regions for greater say in running their own affairs.

Crimea Elects Pro-Russians

SIMFEROPIL, April 11 – Ukraine's Crimean peninsula elected a local parliament dominated by pro-Russian and communist candidates, but unity among them appeared in doubt two weeks after residents voted to move closer to Moscow. Candidates of the "Russia bloc", the power base for Crimea's pro-Russian president Yuri Meshkov, took 54 of the 94 declared seats. Communists won 15 seats in the semi-autonomous region. Crimean Tatars, deported to Central Asia in the Stalin era, took 14 seats set aside for them. Smaller quotas were allocated for ethnic Armenians, Greeks, Bulgarians and Germans. Meshkov had urged voters to boycott concurrent elections for 23 seats in the Ukrainian parliament. Low turnout invalidated 12 contests and eight of the 11 seats filled were won by communists.

Crimea Votes to Loosen Ties

SIMFEROPIL, May 20 – The parliament in Ukraine's autonomous Crimean peninsula voted to restore a 1992 constitution, loosening its links with Ukraine and placing itself on a collision course with Kyiv authorities. Deputies voted by 69 votes to two, with two abstentions, to reintroduce the constitution, which calls for a new accord on dividing powers with Kyiv, separate Crimean citizenship and the formation of a local militia. Deputies stood and applauded after the vote was taken.

US Rebuffs Crimean Separatists

WASHINGTON, May 23 – Secretary of State Warren Christopher told Ukraine that the Clinton administration does not support a separatist drive in Crimea. The Secretary of State also praised Kyiv for its "restraint" in dealing with the potential crisis. "The territorial integrity of Ukraine within its present borders is something the United States consistently affirms", he said.

Crimea Rejects Presidential Powers

SIMFEROPIL, June 2 – The Crimean parliament rejected an appeal from the republic's leader for the power to rule by decree. Yuri Meshkov, who became president of the rebel Black Sea peninsula in January, told lawmakers he needed special, emergency powers to push through economic reforms. "Legislation like this can only be found in an authoritari-

an state", said Nadir Bekirov, a lawmaker representing the minority Tatar community. Meshkov stormed out of the session after his appeal was rejected.

Canada Supports Claim to Crimea

OTTAWA, June 7 – Canada backs Ukraine in its dispute with Crimea over who controls the territory of the independent-minded peninsula, said Canadian Foreign Minister Andre Ouellet. "Canada strongly supports Ukraine's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity... A stable and secure Ukraine is essential to European stability and a key factor in global security".

Defence Issues

Ukraine Rejects Special NATO Status

PRAGUE, March 17 — The foreign ministers of Ukraine and the Czech Republic rejected suggestions that Russia should be given any special status in joining NATO's Partnership for Peace programme. "When we are talking about special status for someone... it is important such status be granted to every state within the framework of Partnership for Peace", Ukrainian Foreign Minister Anatoliy Zlenko told a news conference during a visit to Prague. "Within the United Nations, all countries have equal rights and for 48 years no one has been demanding a special status".

Romania and Ukraine Sign Defence Agreement

BUCHAREST, March 18 — Romania and Ukraine signed a military cooperation agreement. The accord was sealed in Bucharest by Romanian Defence Minister Gheorghe Tinca and visiting Ukrainian Defence Minister Vitaliy Radetskyi. Tinca described the event as a new stage in cooperation between the two former communist states. The agreement provides mutual security guarantees.

No Security Guarantees for Ukraine

KYIV, March 22 — US Defence Secretary William Perry gave a definite no to Ukraine's hopes for American security guarantees. "We have not offered Ukraine or any other country security guarantees in the last 20 years, and we are not even discussing or negotiating the issue", Perry said at a joint press conference with Ukrainian Defence Minister Vitaliy Radetskyi in Kyiv. Ukraine has been seeking security guarantees as a condition for giving up the nuclear weapons it inherited upon the breakup of the Soviet Union. The US Defense Secretary, who arrived in Kyiv after stops in Russia and Kazakhstan, spent the day visiting two Ukrainian nuclear sites, the 46th missile base at Pervomaysk and the Yuzhmash missile factory in Dnipropetrovsk.

Russia Negotiating with Kyiv on Strategic Bombers

MOSCOW, April 6 — Russia is negotiating with Ukraine to buy 42 strategic bombers left over from the for-

mer Soviet Union. A Russian air force official said Moscow had offered to remove the bombers on several occasions but had run into problems over strict conditions laid down by Kyiv. A Ukrainian defence ministry spokesman confirmed that talks had been taking place and said the sticking point was the price. Ukraine does not have the aviation fuel or spare parts to operate the planes, designed for delivering nuclear bombs.

Agreement on Fleet Share-Out

SEVASTOPIIL, April 22 — Ukraine and Russia agreed to a share-out of the warships making up the Black Sea Fleet, but were still engaged in tough negotiations over where to base their respective navies. A spokesman for Ukraine's defence ministry said his country was to keep 164 of 833 vessels making up the fleet — just under 20 per cent. Under an agreement worked out after an all-night negotiating session, it would sell the remainder of its 50 per cent share to Russia. Major difference remained on where to base the two fleets.

Ukraine, US Sign Missile Control Treaty

WASHINGTON, DC — Deputy Prime Minister Valeriy Shmarov and Vice President Al Gore signed on May 13 a Memorandum of Understanding on Missile-Related Exports, in which Ukraine agreed to conduct its missile and space-related exports according to the criteria and stan-

dards of the multilateral Missile Technology Control Regime.

According to the White House, this formal commitment on the part of Ukraine meets a major non-proliferation objective of the United States and the 24 other members of the MTCR.

"The memorandum is a welcome expression of the strong partnership that the United States and Ukraine have established to address issues of non-proliferation and arms control. Ukraine's commitment to abide by the criteria and standards of the MTCR is an important step that shows its readiness to be a responsible national actor in the sale of high-technology goods and services, including in the aerospace sector", the Shit House said.

"We see an important capability there, and we want to ensure they are in this regime so they are mindful of these proliferation issues", a senior US official said after the signing ceremony in the Old Executive Office Building.

The 1987 MTCR is meant to restrict international sales of missiles, missile components or related technologies that would enable a country to hurl nuclear, chemical or biological warheads more than 185 miles. Twenty-five nations are officially members of the regime, while others, such as Russia, have pledged to adhere to its guidelines.

US officials said the new agreement covers one of the most advanced industrial sectors in the former Soviet Union. Ukraine is estimated to possess roughly 40 per cent of the former Soviet aerospace industry, including some of the top manufacturing plants for advanced

missile guidance and control equipment. A factory at Dnipropetrovsk formerly manufactures SS-18 and SS-24 nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles, and the country still makes Zenit and Cyclone missiles capable of placing satellites in low-earth orbit.

Ukraine also has factories capable of making advanced electronics for missile-related equipment. US officials said Ukraine does not appear to have exported any of its equipment or technology. But Chinese officials have discussed potential purchases of Ukrainian missile guidance technology, and other countries reportedly have expressed interest in Ukraine's stockpile of equipment.

In a joint statement, issued after the signing, said the United States and Ukraine "reaffirm their commitment to building a relationship based on partnership and mutual trust and respect between their two countries, and to continuing to build a new relationship in security and defense matters that reflects the end of the Cold War".

The statement also emphasised both sides' recognition of the importance of fulfilling their obligation under the START treaty, the Trilateral Statement and the Lisbon treaty.

For Ukraine, America's retargeting of its nuclear missiles away from Ukrainian territory is a significant development, a Ukrainian Embassy spokesman said.

"Ukraine welcomes U.S. progress in reducing strategic offensive arms. As the first step toward meeting the reductions required by the START Treaty, the United States has already removed over 3,500 nuclear warheads from over 780 intercontinental and submarine-launched ballistic

missiles. Within the next few months, all warheads have been taken off U.S. ballistic missiles whose launchers will be eliminated under this treaty. Ukraine also notes with satisfaction that, as a reflection of the improved international security environment, by 30 May, U.S. strategic ballistic missiles will no longer be targeted on Ukraine or any other country", the joint statement said.

America "strongly" supports the Supreme Rada's and President Kravchuk's commitment that Ukraine sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear state. America also pledged to help Ukraine eliminate strategic offensive arms located on its territory.

The United States welcomes the progress in deactivating nuclear weapons based in Ukraine and the process of delivering from Russia of fuel assemblies for nuclear power plants in Ukraine.

A day earlier, defense Secretary William Perry announced plans for the first defense conversion project in Ukraine, a joint venture that will help a former missile equipment maker enter the nuclear power industry.

Perry said the agreement between Westinghouse Electric Corp. and a Ukrainian company was a "significant step forward" in the effort to help Ukraine create productive civilian enterprises from its defence industry.

The Defense Department will make a \$5 million cost-sharing grant to Westinghouse, funded under a \$40 million programme signed with Ukraine in March. The money is part of a programme initiated by

Sens. Sam Nunn (D-Ga.) and Richard Lugar (R-Ind.) to help Russia and the other former Soviet states dismantle their nuclear arsenals and shift from military to civilian production.

The Ukrainian firm, Khartron Production Association, produced and installed control systems for missiles and space systems. Under the grant, the new joint venture company will manufacture control systems to upgrade Ukraine's aging nuclear power plants and to sell on the world market.

Shmarov said the agreement was important both in converting the nation's weapons industry and in solving "major problems" in its nuclear power industry.

"This is indeed a moving day", Shmarov said. "Finally our political decisions have been transformed into practical implementation".

Politics

Big Turnout in Ukrainian Election

KYIV, March 28 – Ukraine's first multi-party election lured more than three out of every four Ukrainian voters to the polls, but few candidates received the necessary majority to win seats. The surprisingly high 75 per cent nationwide turnout managed to fill a mere 10 per cent of the new 450-seat parliament. So many candidates were competing for each seat that they split votes and only 48 garnered the necessary majority to claim victory outright. Preliminary

results indicate that communists and socialists picked up one-third of the seats, reformers won another third, and independents claimed the rest. In districts where there was no clear winner, a runoff election in two weeks will pit the top two vote-getters against each other.

Communists, Nationalists Win in Vote

KYIV, April 10 – More than two thirds of the electorate voted in Ukraine's run-off elections, but dozens of seats were left unfilled by complex electoral rules requiring a 50 per cent turnout. The new parliament will reflect a broad mix of political currents. Communists and their allies, who won more than 20 seats in the first round, got at least 60 more in eastern and southern Ukraine in early returns from run-offs, election officials said. Moderate nationalists, lead by the Rukh party, won nearly 20 seats in the first round in their strongholds of western and central Ukraine and took at least 25 more in the run-offs. Three members of the extreme nationalist Ukrainian National Assembly, whose members staged an aggressive campaign in military uniforms, also entered parliament. At least three key allies of President Kravchuk won. Acting Prime Minister Yefim Zvyahilskyi and Deputy Prime Minister Valentyn Landyk defeated prominent communist opponents in the eastern industrial city of Donetsk which also elected seven communists. Deputy Prime Minister Mykola Zhulynskyi won in a western constituency, while Environment

Minister Yuriy Kostenko defeated a heavily favoured wealthy businessman in central Kyiv.

Parliament Elects Chairman

KYIV, May 18 – The leader of Ukraine's Socialist Party, who opposed radical measures to restructure the economy, was elected chairman of the country's parliament. Oleksander Moroz received 171 of 322 ballots cast, to 103 for Vasyl Durdynets, the former deputy chairman of parliament and an ally of President Leonid Kravchuk. That was three votes more than the required majority of the 335-seat assembly. The 50-year-old Moroz campaigned on a ticket of strengthening parliament's powers at the expense of the president.

Parliament Approves New Prime Minister

KYIV, June 16 – Ukraine's parliament overwhelmingly approved President Leonid Kravchuk's conservative nominee for Prime Minister. Vitaliy Masol, a former prime minister in the Soviet era, received 199 votes in the parliament 10 days before the presidential poll. Only 24 voted against. Communists and their allies, whose support Kravchuk needs to win the election, gave enthusiastic support to Masol, forced from office in October 1990 by mass student demonstrations. Masol pledged to head a government committed to a market economy with heavy state regulation. He said Ukraine's timid economic reforms had to be speeded up but not at the expense of people's well-being. ■

Books & Periodicals

William R. Veder (translator), THE EDIFICATORY PROSE OF KIEVAN RUS', Harvard Library of Early Ukrainian Literature, English Translations, Vol. 6, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Massachusetts), 1994, 202 pp. (\$29.00 hardback; \$17.00 paperback)

This work, the latest volume in the Harvard Library of Early Ukrainian Literature is part of a project commemorating the Millennium of Christianity of Rus'-Ukraine. It comprises translations of two eleventh-century texts, the *Izbornik* of 1076, and the *Homilies* of Grigorij the Philosopher. Although – according to the latest scholarly opinion – these two works were written within fourteen years of each other, probably in Kyiv, they have very different origins and history. The *Izbornik* which survives in the original manuscript, is the third-oldest dated Slavonic book, and consists of a (probably unique) compilation of diverse text from the Greek Fathers of the Church: theological exposition, homiletics, and paraphrases of the Old Testament Wisdom literature – in particular, Sirach (Ecclesiasticus). Nevertheless, (Veder tells us in his preface), the *Izbornik* is considered to be not a Rus' compilation but to derive from a Bulgarian original. The *Homilies*, on the other hand, which survive only in late manuscripts, were long considered to be of non-Slavonic, or at most, Bulgarian, origin, but are now considered to be, in Veder's words, "a truly original work written in Rus' for a Rus' audience". The collection consists of seven sermons, on the seven themes traditionally associated in Eastern Christianity with the days of the week: Sunday – the Resurrection, Monday – the Angels, Tuesday – St John the Baptist, Wednesday – the Mother of God, Thursday – the Apostles, Friday – the Holy Cross, and Saturday – the dead. Unlike the *Izbornik*, which, over the past two centuries, has attracted the attention of generations of eminent scholars, the *Homilies* have been relatively little studied, and, as Veder notes, "the full Slav[on]ic text remains, as yet, unpublished".

It is a pity, therefore, that the Harvard programme's resources did not run to a parallel-text edition. Even without the original, this book represents a major contribution to the study of the literature of early Rus'. There are extensive notes and bibliographical references, an analysis of manuscript sources, outlines of previous research, and a special introduction on the homilies contributed (indeed, a sign of the times!) by Dr. Anatolij A. Turilov, of the Institute

of History of the Russian Academy of Sciences in Moscow. As with all the Harvard publications on Ukrainian studies, this book will be essential reading for all serious Ukrainicists, in particular those dealing with the history and culture of the early Kyiv state. It should also prove invaluable to all who study the development of religious thought and teaching in Europe. Indeed, although the general didactic and expository tone of the content of these two texts might appear at first glance to be uncongenial to contemporary religious style, a more careful reading suggests that the spirit of edification which inspired the production of these texts in eleventh century Kyiv, can speak also to the believer of today. For throughout the text, in spite of the nine centuries since it was compiled, one constantly comes upon aphorisms, anecdotes and meditations, which would not seem out of place in a contemporary book of spiritual readings – or, indeed, a “thought for the day” calendar. ■

Vera Rich

Andrzej Sulima Kamiński, REPUBLIC Vs. AUTOCRACY, Poland-Lithuanian and Russia, 1686-1697, Harvard University Press for the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 1993, 312 pp.

The last two decades of the seventeenth century were a key period in the struggle for the possession of Ukraine by its neighbours to east and west – Muscovy/Russia and the Polish-Lithuanian Rzeczpospolita. Historians of Ukraine normally treat this epoch as a series of shifting alliances, treaties, and military clashes, as a result of which ever-increasing areas of Ukraine fell into the sphere of influence of Russia.

Kamiński, however, takes a radically different approach. He sees the eventual fate of Ukraine (and, indeed, the collapse of the Rzeczpospolita a century later), as decided by political structures and forces within Poland-Lithuania and Russia – and, in particular, the diplomatic relations between the two. His primary source material is, therefore, the records of the respective departments and chancelleries responsible for foreign affairs. In particular, he puts considerable stress on how the diplomats and politicians of Warsaw and Moscow perceived each others aims and intentions, and how, and to what extent, they achieved their own objectives in the diplomatic sphere.

These objectives, it would appear, did not focus first and foremost on Ukraine. As far as Moscow was concerned, the prime target of foreign policy was Poland. According to a late-eighteenth-century catalogue cited by Kamiński, during the seventeenth century, the Chancelleries of the Department of Foreign Affairs in Moscow prepared 256 books on Poland-Lithuania, 32 of which were compiled during the twelve years covered by this book. The figures for Ukraine for the same period were 80 and 24, respectively, and those for the Crimean Khanate 90 and 5. (One may note, for comparison, that the figures for France were 15 and 4, Prussia 7 and 2, and England 20 and 1).

Nevertheless, in the clash between Russia and the Rzeczpospolita, the Cossack Ukrainian state played a far more significant role than the passive one dictated by geopolitics. Both "great powers" valued the Cossacks as warrior allies. And the Cossacks, turn and turn about, allied themselves now with Moscow, now with the Rzeczpospolita – and, on occasion, with the traditional enemy of both – Turkey. Kamiński goes into great detail about what he terms the "Ukrainian paradox" – why the freedom-loving Cossacks, whose social and political structure was closer to that of the Rzeczpospolita than to Russian autocracy, would nevertheless choose an alliance with the latter.

In what is, in effect, the focal chapter of the book, Kamiński dismisses the various traditional trite (and politically-slanted) explanations: the "eternal desire of Russians and Ukrainians for reunification", the "diabolical" Russian diplomats deceiving the honest, naive Cossacks, pressure on the (pro-Polish) Cossack military aristocracy from the "masses"...

The paradox can only be resolved, Kamiński says, by a detailed analysis of the diplomatic approaches to the Cossacks by both Warsaw and Moscow – and the reactions to those moves within Ukrainian society.

But of the three players in the game, two were divided within themselves. In Poland, King Jan Sobieski saw the Cossacks as a possible tool in his own struggle with his magnates. The Polish Parliament, which in 1658 had accepted the idea of Ukraine as a third, equal partner in the Commonwealth, soon backtracked and reverted, in Kamiński's words, "to its previous policy of domination" – although it did not possess the large standing army necessary to dominate with. Meanwhile, among the Cossacks, the military aristocracy (*starshyna*), which had been interested in establishing a Polish-style political system in Ukraine, found itself too weak to control the situation during the power struggle between the hetman and the rank and file of the Cossack army. And, paradoxically, as Kamiński notes, Muscovy-Russia, although autocratic at home, seemed, at the time to offer considerable more freedom to the Cossack colonels of East-Bank Ukraine than their counterparts on the West Bank enjoyed under Polish rule. (Here, in passing, one must congratulate Kamiński in using the unequivocal terms West-Bank and East-Bank, rather than the traditional, but ambiguous, Right-Bank and Left-Bank!).

After a detailed analysis of all the factors involved – including, in particular, the role of the church and education on the Cossack outlook – Kamiński, himself, to judge from his name, of Polish origin, puts the responsibility firmly on the Poles' lack of understanding.

"Sobieski, the [Polish] Senate and Parliament", he writes, "apparently oblivious of this situation, formulated a Cossack policy without regard for its repercussions on the East Bank. They had paid little attention to the successive agreements between the Cossacks and Moscow. While contemplating the conquest of the whole of Ukraine, the king failed to give any thought to preparing a program more attractive to the Zaporozhian army than that offered by the tsar. It simply never occurred to Sobieski, the senators or the szlachta that anyone could prefer 'Muscovite tyranny'

to the 'sweet freedom' of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The Polish political program for the East Bank was confined, under Sobieski, to urging Hetman Mazepa to 'throw off the yoke of slavery'. It was an inspiring appeal, but one unlikely to persuade even Mazepa, nicknamed by his enemies 'the Pole' or the land-owning *starshyna* – not while the East-Bank Cossacks enjoyed more privileges under tsarist tyranny than their brothers on the West Bank did within the Commonwealth, so boastful of its 'freedoms'".

No analysis of motives, three hundred years after the event, can be anything more than guess-work, however insightful. Kamiński's explanation does, however, at least make psychological sense, and is in accord with the historical facts. It will therefore provide student and historian alike with at least a broad framework within which to approach this extremely complex period. A major example of the complexities involved is what is known as the "Solomon affair" of 1689-90 – the case of the monk who showed up at Sobieski's court claiming to be an envoy from Hetman Mazepa. The Affair has long been, and still remains, a subject of major controversy between historians; the crux of the matter being the identification of who was really behind Solomon. Kamiński, after a careful analysis of the source material, suggests that the villain of the piece was the Russian boyar, Vasili Golitsyn, who, he suggests, promised Solomon ecclesiastical advancement if he could obtain a compromising letter from Sobieski to the Cossacks – ostensibly to destroy Mazepa, but in reality to compromise Sobieski himself. Kamiński's argument is not water-tight; in particular it can provide only a tentative explanation of why Sobieski did not denounce Golitsyn after the latter's downfall, but continued to take the blame himself. Kamiński merely says that he "evidently found it more advantageous" to do so. But his careful and well-reasoned analysis throws important new light on this episode – one of the major enigmas of the whole enigmatic period. ■

Vera Rich

Hans-Joachim Torke and John-Paul Himka, GERMAN-UKRAINIAN RELATIONS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, Canadian, Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, Edmonton-Toronto, 1994, 238 pp.

Like many works in Central and East European Studies scheduled to appear in the early 1990s, this book has been overtaken by history. But while the end of the Warsaw Pact, Comecon, and the Soviet Union made many books obsolete – or at any rate historical curiosities – before publication, this book has gained in importance as a result of recent events. Essentially the proceedings of a conference on German-Ukrainian relations, held in 1986, at the time these 14 essays were first written, Germany was divided by the Iron Curtain, and Ukraine firmly embedded in the Soviet Union. Direct Ukrainian-German con-

tacts were limited to a few academic exchanges with East German universities – all else was firmly controlled by Moscow.

Now, Germany is united, and the second-largest trading partner (after Russia) of independent Ukraine. This has inevitably meant some updating of the two closing essays, which deal with post-World War II developments. Recent developments, including the declassification of library materials in Russia, have enabled several authors to amend their historical articles (particularly those relating to World War II), or to incorporate additional bibliographical references. While in his general preface to the collection, Torke notes with satisfaction that relatively little updating was needed, the general thrust and forecasts for the future of the two “contemporary” articles had largely stood the test of time and events.

Nevertheless, the book seems oddly dated – or rather, inadequate for the present day. The subject matter shows a lack of balance – inevitable, in the circumstances under which it was written, concentrating on German colonisation in Ukraine during the nineteenth century, and German policy in World Wars I and II. The value of these essays to historians is indisputable – although, as is inevitable with a book put together out of conference papers, the reader has to pick his way through the varying approaches and priorities of the different authors, and some significant topics may be left out altogether. But, in spite of Torke’s claim that, “the volume conveys the impression of multifarious connections between the two nations”, in reality the proportions of the subject matter, (in spite of the sober and academic manner in which it is treated), cannot but give the impression that Germany’s main interests in Ukraine have been, first and foremost, *Lebensraum*, and secondly, as a first line of defence against Russia.

At the time of the Conference, Ukrainian-German relations were a little-known, and mainly scholarly field. (Torke describes as “blissful” the fact that it managed to attract an unexpectedly high number of German Ukrainicists). But now the relations between what are now two of the largest states in Europe are a matter of major interest far beyond the bounds of academe – and, in particular, to politicians and the international business community. Excellent though these individual essays are, a volume like this is not really suitable as an introduction to the subject for those readers for whom, five years ago, “Germany” meant only the Western fragment, and Ukraine barely existed at all. What such readers need is a purpose-written general overview. But, in the absence of such a work, they are all too likely – if they ask a secretary or aide to send out for suitable background reading – to end up with this collection.

One can hardly blame the contributors for their individual choice of subject-matter – nor the editors for putting the book together originally in the form it is. They were not, after all, planning a work for the non-academic reader. Nevertheless, one must regret that, in addition to updating the individual papers, they could not, in view of the changed situation, have added a general introductory overview, for the non-academic reader with an unexpected need to understand German-Ukrainian relations. Or, since the book does, in fact,

contain something approaching such an overview in the penultimate paper, John R. Armstrong's "Ukraine: Colony or Partner", at least to have brought this forward to the front of the book, where the non-academic reader would be bound to light on it. ■

Vera Rich

Neil Melvin, FORGING THE NEW RUSSIAN NATION – Russian Foreign Policy and the Russian Speaking Communities of the Former USSR, Discussion Paper 50 of the Russian and CIS Programme of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1994, 63 pp.

One of the principal problems facing the governments of the 14 non-Russian successor states of the USSR is the claim made by Russia to have a special relation with the (generally large) Russophone minority communities of those republics. These claims include not only the kind of demands for cultural rights that, for coethnics, for example, the Hungarian government makes on behalf of the Magyar communities of Transylvania or the Polish government on behalf of the Poles of Lithuania, but also, on occasion, the "right" of Moscow to dispatch "peace-keeping" troops to any ex-Soviet republic where it considers the local "Russians" to be at risk. Such intervention would be, of course, in clear violation of the peace-keeping principles observed by the United Nations over the past half-century, where countries with a perceived special interest in a region of conflict have routinely been excluded from such peace-keeping operations. Yet, to a significant extent, the international diplomatic community, by adopting the term "the near abroad", introduced by the Russians early in 1992 to denote the non-Russian successor states of the Soviet Union, have tacitly accepted the concept of Russia's special interest in this area, not merely in the economic and military spheres (as is inevitable, at least temporarily, in the winding down of any former empire), but also, *sine die*, as protector of "ethnic Russian" interests.

Neil Melvin's study will therefore be invaluable to anyone wishing to understand – and deal with – Russian claims of such a special right to intervene. Beginning with an analysis of the status of the Russians and the Russian language ("the language of success... the language of the Communist Party, the armed forces, the legal and transport system, large-scale industry, and most of the higher education system") during the years of Soviet power, he proceeds to the rise of feelings of national identity throughout the Soviet Union during the years of perestroika. In this period, he notes, in certain republics, "a large proportion of the [Russian] settler population supported the idea of independence", and in the Baltics, in particular, Russian-speaking intellectuals "played prominent roles in the [pro-independence] Popular Fronts. At the same time, within Russia itself, the confrontation between the Soviet Centre and the Russian Federation – in human terms, between Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin, "fostered a growth of what has been termed the Russian national idea".

The break-up of the Soviet Union into 15 independent states undoubtedly generated often groundless fears among people who suddenly found themselves stranded outside their ethnic-eponymous republic. Throughout the ex-Soviet space, newspapers recorded the problems and distress of such "newly-foreign" individuals. An ethnic Ukrainian journalist, brought up in Russia, who had spent his whole working life in Latvia, wanted to know from which republic he could claim a retirement pension. Old couples, whose children were married and settled in another republic, wailed that now they could never hope to see their grandchildren. Much of the grief was a result of the old Soviet practice which restricted foreign travel to a small, politically-correct, élite, and hence beyond the hopes of a simple factory worker or collective farmer, while matters such as pension rights, acceptance of academic qualifications, and the like have, or are gradually being settled by, reciprocal agreements between the republics concerned. At the same time, new fears have arisen among minority populations of the CIS republics. New laws make a knowledge of the "state language" mandatory for citizenship or, in some cases, employment. Newly installed officials deliver speeches about the need to extirpate all "Soviet" influences, in terms which suggest that they equate "Soviet" with Russian. And, as Mr Melvin's well-documented and argued analysis makes clear, there are politicians and activists in Russia all too eager to exploit these fears and tensions.

But who are these "Russians" whom the Russian politicians wish to defend? There is, Melvin notes, considerable confusion in the terminology. Only rarely is the term *ruskii* (ethnic Russian) used in this context. More often, these newly expatriate "Russians" are referred to as *russkiyazychnye* or *rusofony* (Russian-speaking or Russophone), *sootchestvenniki* (compatriots), or the illogical *etnicheskiye Rossiyan* (ethnically a citizen of Russia!). In the more nationalist Russian press, such terms as *Nashi* (our people) or *rusko-dumayushcheye naseleniye* (the ethnically-Russian-thinking population), while more moderate politicians resort to the ill-defined concept *Rossiisko-orientirovannoye naseleniye* (population orientated to Russia).

According to the data of the 1989 census, there are 25 million "Russians" living in the 14 non-Russian republics. This is the figure routinely quoted by politicians wishing to assume the burden of "protecting" their rights. There is, in fact, anecdotal evidence (for example, from Belarus) that, in some republics at least, the number of ethnic Russians was over-reported, but even if one accepts this figure, it is clear that it is not only these "ethnic Russians" whom the would-be defenders of Russian interests wish to protect. Members of the Polish and German minorities of Kazakhstan, for example, are frequently Russophone monoglots. Are their ethnic and cultural rights, therefore, to be defended by politicians in Moscow – rather than in Warsaw or Bonn?

Some Russian politicians, according to Mr Melvin, would say yes. He distinguishes three main definitions of the Russian diaspora current (at least tacitly) among Russian politicians: 1) ethnic Russians, defined so in their former Soviet passports and possessing at least one ethnic Russian parent; 2) "Slav-

Europeans" – including in addition to ethnic Russians, Ukrainians, Belarusians, Poles, the non-Slav but European Germans, and even on occasion the non-Slav and non-European Jews; 3) "linguistic/cultural Russians" – that is, those whose cultural outlook and identity was shaped by the Russian language and Sovietised "Russian" culture. This third definition, according to Mr Melvin, is probably the most common one and "despite its imprecision, more than any other single term captures the nature of the settler communities" – that is, the military personnel and industrial workers translocated, during the Soviet era, to the non-Russian republics. At the same time, he notes, it is a term which has "significant shortcomings", not the least in that, if taken to mean anyone who has a good knowledge of Russian and was brought up in the Soviet world-view, it would include the major part of the population of the ex-USSR. And even if restricted to those for whom Russian is the first or only language, it would have to include many non-Slav/non-Europeans, including many Kazakhs as well as small Russophone ethnic minorities such as the Koreans.

After negotiating these thorny definitions, Mr Melvin tackles the question of how far the defence of Russian rights is necessary. Why, he asks, if the Russian minority in one of the republics is facing discrimination and violations of human rights is there not a similar outcry about infringements of the rights of the Ukrainian or Belarusian minorities? In fact, he concludes, in most republics the Russian minorities (whether ethnically or linguistically defined) enjoy full legal equality. This is true (as of April 1994), he notes, in Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, "where the bulk of the Russian-speakers are concentrated", and also in Moldova. Russian minorities are "vulnerable" in Central Asia and Transcaucasia, as a result of the "general instability" of the area, but there is little formal discrimination. Only in Latvia and Estonia, he concludes, has the legal status of Russians and Russian-speakers caused real concern, but although the difficulties of the transition period is causing them "significant difficulties" (not the least of which is the need for psychological adaptation to the post-independence situation), nevertheless "numerous international human rights missions to the area have found little evidence of systematic rights abuse".

"Russia's case for involvement with the Russian-speaking communities [of the other republics]", Melvin concludes, "is extremely weak". It is far from clear, he says, what basis Russia has for claiming a special relationship with these communities, nor is the problem of the Russian diaspora in the former USSR unique. Furthermore, there is very little evidence for formal discrimination against Russian speakers. "It therefore becomes clear that... various forces in the Russian Federation have sought to make this a political problem for the purpose of advancing their own interests". Genuine public concern about the fate of the "Russian-speaking communities" has, he says, been "exploit[ed] and cynically manipulate[d]" by Russian nationalists, and Russia's "assertive position" about the "Russian-speakers" is "a reflection of the steady percolation of nationalist ideas into Russian foreign policy.

Melvin distinguishes five stages in the development of Russian foreign policy generally, and the issue of the "Russian-speakers":

1) Autumn 1991–spring 1992. Independence and “political triumph” of democratic forces. Foreign policy aimed at economic integration into the world community. In agreements signed with other republics, the well-being of Russians in those countries is referred to in the context of international human rights agreements.

2) Spring–Autumn 1992. The issue of the Russian-speaking communities becomes increasingly important in foreign policy. Events in Moldova establish it as a justification for external policy action. Ministry of Foreign Affairs continues to support use of diplomatic and international agreements to protect Russian speakers, but in April 1992, Parliament recommends the use of the former 14th army in Moldova, and also backs support for breakaway Dniester republic. Continued pressure by the “red-brown” (Communist-Chauvinist) alliance on democratic politicians and, in particular, on Foreign Minister Kozyrev. Defence Ministry personnel press for greater involvement in foreign policy, in particular on the issue of Russian-speakers. Russian “Federal Migration” service establish with budget of 3 billion roubles to facilitate migration of Russian-speakers to Russia.

3) Autumn 1992–Summer 1993. Commitment to championing the rights of Russian-speakers now a prerequisite for all shades of political opinion in Russia. The main political battle is now about how. A new policy statement by the Foreign Ministry down-plays the role of international organisations and human rights agreements and stresses its aim to conclude bilateral agreements with all ex-Soviet republics to guarantee the rights of “Russian citizens living beyond the borders of the Federation”. It is far from clear how “Russian citizen” was to be defined, and at about this time the term “ethnically Russian citizen” begins to be used. The Foreign Ministry begins to establish embassies in the ex-Soviet republics, and embassy staff are instructed to establish contacts with and report back on the local Russian-speakers. Top-ranking foreign-policy research institutes revamped for research on the “near-abroad” and the Russian-speakers. Foreign Ministry establishes contacts with moderates in Parliament, but a new Presidential Council of Experts (including a number of “hawks”) creates top level “competition of ideas” on foreign policy. In summer 1993, a new Estonian law on foreigners is met with threat of an energy embargo, and Yeltsin hints that Russia would intervene if the Russian-speakers rebel. “Russia cannot remain a disinterested observer”. From summer 1992 attempts are made to codify defence of Russian-speaking communities as an essential part of the new military doctrine. By 1993, defence of these communities is seen as the main justification for peace-keeping/peace-making activities in the former Soviet Union. During this period, especially from early 1993 onwards, a number of politicians who initially kept quiet about the issue of Russian-speakers, or were hostile to Government policy on it, now became involved in (officially) non-Governmental organisations promoting cultural and business contacts with Russian-speakers in the near abroad. In one case, the “International Russian Club” (Mezhdunarodnyi Rossiiskii Klub), Yeltsin issues special order giving the club access to money from the “Reserve State Fund”.

4) Autumn 1993. Yeltsin suspends Russian Supreme Soviet and moves against the "red-brown" extremists. Troop withdrawals from the Baltic states make progress, and Russian foreign policy statements moderate. But as the election campaign takes off, the issue of the Russian-speakers in the Baltic States becomes a key one, for "democrats" as well as extremists. All parties now speak of the need to defend Russian interests in the world, and, in particular, the "Near Abroad".

5) Winter 1993–Spring 1994. Following the elections, nationalism becomes, effectively, the basis of Russian foreign policy. The election campaign breaks the sense of identity between "Soviet" and "Russian communists" – the latter are now left-wingers "heavily infused with Russian nationalism". Russian policy-makers commit themselves to ever more and more external commitments. Foreign Minister Kozyrev and other top politicians speak increasingly of Russia's "special role" in the former Soviet Union. A new committee of the State Duma for CIS relations is set up, called "Committee for CIS Affairs and Relations with Fellow-countrymen" (our italics). Russia presses for Russian-speakers in Central Asian republics to have dual citizenship. An agreement on this is reached with Turkmenistan. A new "Congress of Russian Communities" is established, in opposition to Russian government programme of cultural/economic links with "Russian-speakers"; this Congress aims at "reunification" of the "divided" Russian nation, by incorporating "areas of Russian settlement" into the Russian Federation.

Such is the picture up to the cut-off date April 1, 1994. In the final chapter, Mr Melvin considers the response of the international community to these developments. He draws a distinction between possible closer economic integration of the successor states and a workable and more united CIS, in which Russia, by its very size, would play the leading role, and the Russian claim to have special interests in its "near abroad" on account of the Russian-speakers. The evolution of a fairly integrated and Russian-led CIS, would not, Melvin considers, be necessarily ominous; but the claim to "special interests" must be very carefully examined. Melvin argues that too close an involvement of Russia with its diaspora is against the interests of both Russia and the Russian-speaking communities. He envisages a scenario, therefore, in which ties between these communities and Russia are restricted to economic and cultural links, while the world at large, by supporting the creation of democratic institutions and a law-governed society in the post-Soviet states, will assist the Russian-speakers to develop a sense of cultural/ethnic identity within the context of loyalty to their home states. International organisations (the CSCE, etc.) could provide various forms of assistance, he suggests, including funding for teaching programmes to help the Russian-speakers learn the local language.

These suggestions are naturally tentative – some, indeed, seem utopian, and – as Melvin himself admits – development of a Russian-nation-identity (distinct from that of statehood) among the diaspora Russian-speakers, could well be open to manipulation by one state or another. On the other hand, his sugges-

tion that cultural assistance to the "Russian-speakers" should include Ukrainian and Belarusian organisations to develop the ethnic identity of those minorities shows a rare sensitivity to the true, multi-ethnic nature of this diaspora.

Furthermore, by stressing in the closing pages that "it is important to recognize the belief in a special link between Russia and the Russian speakers is now uncontested in Russia, even if this link is more often based on emotive than on substantive claims" sounds a clear note of warning to the Western diplomats and politicians for whom this study is intended: that here is a fact with which all who have dealings with Russia will have to grapple.

Neil Melvin, in short, has done an excellent job, in analysing in a brief compass one of the major issues – and possible causes of future conflict – in Russia's dealings with the other 14 post-Soviet states. There are, inevitably, in so brief a work, many omissions. One would like, for example, to have heard more of the role of the Orthodox Church as a channel for raising "Russian-consciousness" among the Russian-speakers. Nor can one necessarily agree with Melvin's optimism about the "non-ominous" nature of an integrated, Russian-led CIS. Furthermore, although in his preface he thanks "specialists and researchers in Russia, the Baltic States, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Moldova", states in which he conducted interviews, all the printed sources cited are either Russian or Western. But these are but minor points of criticism – in a work which should be required reading for all whose professional interests involve them in the study of developments in the post-Soviet "successor states". ■

Vera Rich

Roy Allison, MILITARY FORCES IN THE SOVIET SUCCESSOR STATES, Adelphi Paper 280, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1993, 84 pp;

Neil Malcolm, RUSSIA AND EUROPE – an End to Confrontation, Pinter Publishers, London-New York, for The Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 240 pp.

These two works, both by eminent specialists in their fields, and both sponsored by Institutes with a world reputation for sound research in international affairs, address, each in its own way, the problems of political and military security in today's post-Soviet Europe.

Dr Allison's aim is relatively straightforward: "to evaluate the capabilities of the military forces in the Soviet successor states and to assess the viability, given the specific conditions of each state, of military plans which have already been advanced by national leaders". He confines himself to national military planning and armies under government control (leaving out, therefore, irregular forces and unofficial militias). Furthermore, he focuses, in the main, on con-

ventional forces, alluding to the Soviet Union's nuclear legacy only insofar as it has played a part in the development of perceptions of threat in certain of the successor states – in particular, the long reluctance of Ukraine's leaders to relinquish the nuclear weapons which, in their eyes, not only formed an important counter-balance to Russia's nuclear arsenal, but also (they believed), was one of the key factors which, in 1991, had forced the outside world to take Ukraine, and Ukraine's declaration of independence, seriously. *Russia and Europe* has a more complex task, to trace the changing attitudes of Russia towards "Western Europe" – including, in particular, to the European Community", (now the European Union), from the hostility of the mid-1980s, to the current situation, where the Russians wish to join – or at any rate to have the closest possible ties with – these institutions.

Both books concentrate first and foremost on Russia. This is quite logical and rational, not only because of the huge extent, population and military might of that country, and fears that economic chaos and collapse could bring to power some fanatic (whether Zhirinovskiy himself or no) who in the name of bolstering Russian prestige and preserving Russian cultural values against the West, would, at the very least, inaugurate a new era of confrontation, and, all too probably, would launch a campaign to "repossess" the lost Soviet empire.

With such a possibility, clearly, if tacitly, inherent in the military doctrines of the 14 non-Russian successor states, Dr Allison analyses not only the prospects for the CIS Collective Security Treaty fostered by Russia, but also the possibility of other regional alliances which would exclude, and, hopefully, counterbalance, Russian might, in particular, a Central Asian Alliance, a Baltic Alliance (underwritten by security guarantees from the West) or a Baltic-to-Black Sea Alliance of Moldova, Ukraine, Belarus and the Baltic States, with or without the participation of some of the former Warsaw Pact states (in particular, Poland).

Whatever pattern of military alliances eventually becomes consolidated in the ex-Soviet space, Ukraine, with its 50-million population, will clearly have a key role to play. Allison gives full recognition to this fact. To him "[t]he establishment of Ukraine as an independent state is the most significant geostrategic development in Europe since the end of the Second World War. Ukraine occupies a central position between the democracies of Eastern-Central Europe and the militarily fragmented, politically chaotic and potentially authoritarian Russian state. Ukraine is the only one of the successor states with the capacity to challenge and face down serious Russian military threats and its defence-policy orientation will continue to influence the military choices of smaller CIS states as well as the military planning of its other Western neighbours".

With this in mind, he proceeds to give an insightful analysis of perceived threats to Ukraine – including possible future conflicts on the western and southern frontiers (fuelled by Romania's refusal to recognise northern Bukovyna and Bessarabia as Ukrainian territory, and the problems of the Ukrainian minority in Moldova, and the remoter, but – to certain Ukrainians, not entirely incredible – possibility that Turkey might lay claim to Crimea), as

well as what the majority of Ukrainians see as the most grave menace – Russia. This latter threat, Allison notes, is perceived as two-fold; both the possibility of military attack, and (which is far more likely) the deliberate – and covert – stimulation of inter-ethnic tensions into outright conflict.

Having outlined the threat, Allison then treats in some detail Ukraine's measures to counter it – first and foremost, the need to build a national army (and navy), loyal to Ukraine. Here he goes into considerable detail about the economic, manpower and political constraints on Ukraine's future defence policies, including Ukraine's legacy of 27.5% of the ex-Soviet military hardware covered by the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty.

He concludes that, although the CFE Treaty in itself "permits and tempts" Ukraine to maintain fairly large forces, economic constraints mean that Ukraine "cannot afford rapidly to form a national army suited to its needs". Allison concludes his survey of Ukraine by reviewing its Soviet "legacy" in personnel and hardware in the various service branches, and outlines the problems of attaining self-sufficiency in military production, or failing that, of purchasing essential weaponry from a non-Russian source, e.g. the Czech Republic or Slovakia.

Dr Allison is clearly more familiar with the Russian language than with Ukrainian – the notes to his survey of Ukraine refer, for the most part, to Russian-language publications (though this may, to some extent, also be conditioned by the greater availability of the latter). Nevertheless, he approaches the section on Ukraine with considerable sensitivity, and a clear realisation of the strategic importance of Ukraine to the future security of Europe.

This is in marked contrast to the approach of *Russia and Europe*, the editor of which, Neil Malcolm, was Dr Allison's predecessor as Head of the Russian and CIS Programme at the Royal Institute of International Affairs. As the title makes clear, this work focuses on the relations of "Russia" – both in its former incarnation as the Soviet "centre", and in its present form, with "Europe", from the beginning of the Gorbachev era until the cut-off date of July 1993.

In his Preface, Neil Malcolm suggests that the changing views of the Russian leadership during this period towards NATO and the European Community are to a great extent simply the latest phase in Russia's centuries'-old oscillation between isolationism and westernisation. The "arena" for the Cold War conflict of ideas between East and West is – for the contributors to this volume, basically the countries of what is now called Central-Eastern Europe – in other words, the former Warsaw Pact/Comecon bloc. Again, this approach has a certain logic; prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union, the East European "satellites" were able to pursue their own domestic and foreign policies that were, at least partially, independent of the dictates of Moscow. Hence, to a greater or less extent, they had their own specific role to play in the "confrontation" and its relaxation (for example, the specific relations between the Democratic and Federal German Republics, Poland's special (albeit informal) relationship with the Vatican after October 1978, Romania's unique position in maintaining diplomatic ties with Israel after the Six Day War). But the constituent republics

of the Soviet Union had no chance of a foreign policy of their own, and, prior to August 1991, their only contribution to East-West relations was the occasional outcry from human rights campaigners in the West over the repression of some Ukrainian, Baltic, Armenian or Kazakh campaigner for human rights or the environment. (This book, incidentally, gives relatively little consideration to the "dissident factor" although, in the 20 years between Khrushchev and Gorbachev, it had a considerable effect on East-West relations, both governmental – through the "linkage" of trade agreements to human rights – and non-governmental – in particular, scientific and academic exchanges).

Nevertheless, even if those sections of the book dealing with the Gorbachev era largely ignore the non-Russian republics, one would expect them to feature in the post-1991 material. But this they fail to do. Looking in the index under "Ukraine", for example, one finds four references to "CFE allocations", three to "independence and the formation of the CIS", three to "nuclear status" one to "position vis-a-vis Central, E. and S.E. Europe and Russia", one on "relations with Poland" and two on "relations with the Russian Federation". (Admittedly, this is better than some other ex-Soviet states: Lithuania scores only one reference, Latvia and Estonia none at all!). But virtually no attempt is made to analyse how Ukraine (or for that matter any other of the European ex-Soviet republics) view either Western Europe or the new Russia. The contributor who comes closest to so doing is Dr Alex Pravda, who in his chapter "relations with Eastern Europe" observes that "[a]s models or pathfinders, however, the East Europeans are perhaps of greater importance for Belarus, the Baltic and Ukraine than for Russia. Kiev has, for instance, described Hungary as a 'special bridge' to the European Community". But even here, these republics are mentioned, as it were, not in their own right, but to point a contrast with Russia!

To readers of *The Ukrainian Review*, this Russo-centric view will be, alas, all too familiar. For the past two centuries historians and – more recently – Sovietologists, have treated the lands ruled from Moscow as a monolithic whole, with Ukraine and the other non-Russian lands, mentioned, if at all, as outlying areas of marginal importance. The approach of this book is one of bloc-confrontation; "Russia" (in both its incarnations) versus "the West". As a result, individual Western countries often show up poorly in the index: Britain gets only four references, and France six! One cannot but wonder if, for a scholarly work of this kind, it is really appropriate to deal with the wind-down of confrontation solely or mainly, from the Russian standpoint, without considering the potential roles of the other ex-Soviet republics in the developing diplomatic and security patterns of the 1990s. ■

Vera Rich

Andrew Cowley, UNRULY CHILD, – a survey of Ukraine, The Economist, May 7 – 13, 1994. Also as a separate brochure. £2.00 post free UK (£2.50 overseas)

Economics is, traditionally, the “dismal science” and Andrew Cowley’s survey of Ukraine upholds this tradition. From the opening section, “The birth and possible death of a nation”, to the closing words – what he calls the “less than uplifting” first line of the Ukrainian national anthem, this survey propounds the thesis that Ukraine is an economic basket case, doomed – as despair and tensions mount – to be torn apart by ethnic discord.

As far as the economic data are concerned, it would be difficult even for the most optimistic Ukrainophil to argue with Cowley. Statistics – and in particular graphs and histograms – can, it is said, be made to prove anything. But Cowley does not play tricks with figures; the charts he presents make their point all too clearly without resorting to gimmickry or economic sleight of hand. Certainly, Cowley is not averse to the witty phrase or epigram: “Ukraine is a case-study of how not to reform an economy”. “The party of power has achieved something that many might have thought impossible: to invent an economic system that is more inefficient than the command economy of the old Soviet Union”. (This latter judgement is, perhaps, over-harsh; the “party of power” for all its faults, did not “invent” the Russian stranglehold on oil and gas supplies which have driven the Ukrainian economy to the verge of hyperinflation and would have made nonsense of even the most brilliant plans for economic reform). In general, however, Cowley’s political and economic analysis (as of April 1994) is well-reasoned, and it would be difficult, indeed, to fault either his facts or conclusions – as far, that is, as the political and economic realia are concerned. And – within this political/economic framework, his work contains much valuable data and anecdotal material.

Where his survey fails to ring true is in its understanding – or rather lack of understanding – of the Ukrainian history and character. To Cowley, quoting, it would seem, the Professor of Ukrainian History at Harvard University, Roman Szporluk, “Ukraine is an artificial creation... an extremely ambitious project in nation-building, a Yugoslavia in reverse!”

Ukrainians, he maintains, have a feeling of insecurity – unlike “the Poles and Czechs who know exactly who they are”. Ukrainians – according to Cowley – lack such forces for national cohesiveness as a strong church or a single language! He places considerable stress on the differences between West and East Ukraine, attributing the greater political and national self-awareness of the former to their incorporation into the Polish Second Republic of the inter-World-War years – with no mention of the at least equally seminal “Austrian experience”. And he understands *Shche ne vmerla Ukrayina* (which he renders “Ukraine has not died, yet”) to be “less than uplifting!” – rather than the shout of defiance which for more than a century, it has been – and still continues to be. Finally, and

perhaps most damning of all, there is not, in the whole 18 pages, a single quotation, reference, or even the faintest allusion to Shevchenko. Mr Cowley would doubtless ask what a nineteenth century poet has to do with the economic problems of today's Ukraine. But had he really managed, in his research, to come to grips with the Ukrainian psyche, Shevchenko, in some form or other, would have undoubtedly appeared in this survey – and in a manner too integral to the work for some insensitive sub-editor to remove him.

Yet at times Cowley does present a picture that is less than unrelieved black. He quotes the British ambassador to Kyiv, Simon Heemans, on how it is possible for business – and even market-oriented business – to survive in today's Ukraine: "An engineer of aerodynamics will tell you that a bumble-bee cannot fly, but it does!" Cowley recognises, too, that Ukraine now possesses three of the four things necessary for successful economic reform: a good plan, people capable of implementing it, and some external financial help. But, he says, a "big question mark" hangs over the political will? For that, he says, Ukraine needs a strong and charismatic leader – and to date none such has emerged. The only alternative – "a divided parliament and an ineffectual president" is, he says, a recipe for, at the best, "more drift", at the worst, "collapse". The only real hope, he suggests, quoting Professor Szporluk again, lies with the younger generation, "who were never in the Komsomol, have had a chance to travel to normal places, and only dimly remember that Ukraine was once part of something called the Soviet Union. They can build a country, if there's anything left when the parents have finished!"

And that, surely, in today's context, is the true meaning of *Shche ne vmerla Ukrayina!* ■

Vera Rich

Exhibitions**CEETEX-94. Earl's Court,
London, 8-21 May 1994**

CEETEX, the Central and Eastern Europe Technology and Investment Exhibition, was organised by Sterling Exhibition Ltd and the Turret Group Plc in association with the PHARE and TACIS programmes of the European Union. Its purpose – according to Michael Summers, the Managing Director of the Sterling Publishing Group (of which Sterling Exhibitions is a subsidiary) – was “to bring together Central and Eastern European industry and western finance and expertise; to forge links and joint ventures between the regions; and to promote trade between East and West”.

“Eastern Europe” it may be noted, seems to have been interpreted by Sterling to mean the whole of the former Soviet Union; not simply Siberia and the furthest east of the Russian Federation, but also the Transcaucasian and Central Asian Republics! Sterling, it seemed, was still exploiting its old, Soviet era contacts, irrespective of whether they fitted into the frame of reference of the current exhibition.

Five years ago, an enterprise in Tbilisi or Alma-Ata might have had some justification for taking part in an exhibition of East European industry – for then these were outlying cities of the Soviet Union, a state whose capital, Moscow, was European – at least in the geographical sense of being west of the Urals. But now that these cities are capitals of independent states, outside geographical Europe, it is difficult to find a logical justification for these enterprises' presence.

More significantly, in view of the avowed emphasis of the exhibition on the creation of market economies, it is somewhat unfortunate that the Sterling Group's list of contacts still included so many unreconstructed enterprises of the worst Soviet-type.

Names as the “Makeyevka Integrated Iron and Steel Plant named after S.M. Kirov” or the “Eighth State Bearing Plant”, “Eighteenth State Bearing Plant”, or even the “Twenty-Eighth Bearing Plant of Lutsk” – to quote a few examples from Ukraine – seem hardly geared to the new market economy. Nor – though in some cases they referred to privatised or new market-orientated concerns, do such tongue-twisters as “Dnepropetrovskvneshservis”, “Luganskshachto-stroi” or “Ukrpapiirtvortrom Corporation” – to use the catalogue spellings.

(Orthography, it must be said, was highly erratic – the Iron and Steel Plant referred to above occurred at one place in the Catalogue as “Makeevka” and at another as “Makeyevka”. Ukrainian – and Belarusian – names addresses were transliterated as if from Russian, and in some cases were actually given in Russian – “Octyabrskaya Street”, instead of “Zhovtneva”. There are frequent misprints in the addresses “Schenchenko” for “Shevchenko”, “Lyiv” for “Lviv”, and “Sihferpolskaya” for “Simferopolskaya”, being among the most blatant. And, inevitably, “Ukrainian” was, on occasion, written without its first “i”).

Even those firms which tried to attract western partners by translating their names could not always keep clear of howlers and off-beam renderings, like the “Odessa Brandy Plant” (though none of the Ukrainian exhibitors could rival the Belarusian knitwear producer which described itself – on its stand – as the “Bobrynsk Factory of Articles”!).

Nevertheless, in spite of all difficulties, Ukraine was represented, and well-represented, at CEETEX, with over 100 exhibitors, the largest number from any country apart from Russia. This weighty representation made it feasible to assign a separate pavilion to Ukraine, just as Russia was given a whole storey of the main hall to itself (although certain Russian firms overflowed into the main level). But the Russian hall could be reached from the main level by lift, whereas the Ukrainian pavilion meant a walk of 200 metres or so and the descent of a precipitous staircase.

The existence of the Ukrainian pavilion and the access route to it were placarded, and at strategic points in and around the main hall, leaflets were distributed, exhorting one politely to “Please visit the Ukrainian pavilion”. Nevertheless, the prestige of having a national pavilion may, to some extent, have been paid for in a reduction of the total numbers who visited it.

And, alas, for those who actually made the effort to reach the Ukrainian pavilion, found little that could be called a traditional Ukrainian warm welcome. Many of the stands – even those representing Ukraine’s leading edge technologies were not staffed at all.

Thus the “Institute of Computer Science Problems”, which, according to the catalogue “offers the unique microgabarit apparatus used with all types of computer, a series of computer devices of functional diagnostics with universal interface module on the fields of cardiography, spirometry, reography”, in reality “offered” nothing more than an unstaffed stand, whose main attraction was a couple of strategically placed easy chairs!

The staffed stands, alas, were little better. Visitors enquiring for more details about the products and services on offer were often treated with a wariness that sometimes fell little short of hostility. This was undoubtedly a legacy from the old Soviet days, indeed, the whole exhibition had a marked West-to-East gradient of salesmanship – from the Slovenes with their champagne-and-music reception to the Kazakh who stuck his head through the curtains and bawled “What do you want?” whenever a visitor approached. The Ukrainians, as befits their geographical position, came midway in the sequence. But at least, in the

main, they had more linguistic skills than their Belarusian neighbours who tended to greet the would-be investor with a helpless shrug and the plea "I no speak English, and interpreter – he busy!"

Nevertheless, with all its shortcomings, the Ukrainian presence at CEETEX was an impressive one.

In spite of the (Soviet-style) emphasis on ball-bearings and wire-drawing plants, a wide range of goods and services was on offer, from bromine to artificial diamonds, shoes to alcoholic liquors, shipbuilding to banking. Unfortunately – to judge from the CEETEX-94 experience – Ukraine as yet lacks the marketing and PR skills to present these goods and services to their best advantage – at least in the cut-throat competitiveness of an international trade fair.

CEETEX-94 was, of course, a specialised forum, intended to be a learning experience both for the exhibitors and their potential western partners. And Ukraine has, as yet, advanced only a relatively small way along the road to integration into the international market economy. The presence of so large a Ukrainian presence at CEETEX reveals a major commitment to the market. The necessary skills will surely come in due time.

If the observed "welcoming gradient" was, indeed, a function of how far the country in question had progressed towards integration into the international network of market relations, then many of the shortcomings of the Ukrainian exhibitors at CEETEX will doubtless be rectified with time. In the meantime, however, Ukrainian products and services on offer at such a fair have to compete against very similar goods offered by Czechs, Poles, Hungarians and Lithuanians, who have already mastered the public relations skills to present them to their best advantage. ■

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Current Affairs**UKRAINE'S MEDIA: A COG IN THE STATE WHEEL?**

Oksana Hasiuk

Ukraine's press has become a kind of a hybrid of Soviet style journalism and a new way of thinking.

Older journalists, accustomed to working for essentially one boss – the Communist Party – have been slow to claim their new freedom to search for interesting facts and make a critical analysis of them. By contrast, young Turks in the reporting and publishing world have welcomed the openness now permitted their profession, but often find themselves constricted by less enthusiastic editors and owners and by financial realities. But what has really complicated matters is that both groups still walk a tightrope between media freedom and government retribution.

It is no secret – nor was it in the past – that Soviet journalism almost solely functioned as a funnel for agitation and propaganda, rather than a means of access to objective information. As the Soviet Union's mechanisms of control rapidly unravelled in 1991, it is not surprising that many talented young people – not yet entrenched in state bureaucracy – grabbed the opportunity to begin anew. Several small underground newspapers surfaced almost immediately, although many went under just as quickly. Larger newspapers have since come on to the press market and continue to challenge weaker competitors to survive.

While young people have managed to infuse the press with a fresh spirit and style, many state-owned publications have been less than conducive to such creative impulses. In fact, it has been difficult for writers of the Soviet generation to adapt to new political and economic realities, and they freely admit so. "I have been working as a journalist for thirty years", asserts Valeriy Zholdak, editor-in-chief of the weekly *Ukrainska Hazeta* (Ukrainian Newspaper). "I am not going to change my style of writing according to new trends in journalism", he says.

As a result, a kind of generation gap has polarised the contemporary Ukrainian press corps. Some journalists have opted to stay in state-funded publications – the only ones with enough consistent funding – and give up on journalistic ideals. The other prevalent alternative is starting one's own publication and facing the probable failure from lack of adequate funds.

Notwithstanding the vagaries of the market, about 71 relatively new publications have been registered in Ukraine between 1988 and 1993, according to the Ukrainian National Press Club. Small regional newspapers are not included in the total, and most of the local papers remain under the control of local government bodies, as they did in the past. A few, in a nominal bow to press freedom, have changed their names, though their content remains similar to that of the past.

The biggest obstacle to keeping newspapers and journals independent from the state is their own heavy reliance on state subsidies. "It is very difficult to find commercial structures which would want to invest their money into a serious analytical press", laments Oleksandr Kryvenko, editor-in-chief of Lviv's *Post-Postup* weekly.

Post-Postup, established in 1991, is one of the few publications that has managed to publish news in a manner more closely resembling Western newspaper styles and to maintain a steady readership. It is also one of the very few publications that can boast of correspondents abroad. *Post-Postup* is doing so well, in fact, that it has been able to organise a new high-tech project, *Fax-Postup* weekly (now available on electronic mail), an English-language edition that serves the foreign community in Ukraine with political and economic information.

Not all new and popular Ukrainian newspapers have been as fortunate as *Post-Postup*. The weekly *Respublika* (Republic), established in May 1992, shut down its presses in November 1993 – but for reasons that seem more dubious than simple lack of funds. *Respublika*'s journalists are still awaiting the reopening of their publication.

Government annoyance over the contents of *Respublika* appears to be the core of the problem, although Iryna Pohorielova, *Respublika*'s editor-in-chief, admits there is no clear proof for the allegation. *Respublika*, she explains, belongs to the newspaper and magazine concern RIA-press, and in addition to this weekly RIA-press also owns two newspapers, publishes books, and transports various types of goods within Ukraine. "As a participant in major commercial activity", Pohorielova says, "this concern could have been cooperating with the government". "I can call such shadow cooperation corruption, but I don't have any concrete evidence besides my guesses", she admits.

Interestingly enough, *Respublika* twice faced closure before it finally ceased publication – the first time, when former Prime Minister Vitaliy Fokin's Cabinet of Ministers was replaced in September 1992, and a second time, when former Prime Minister Leonid Kuchma's Cabinet was dismissed in October 1993. In November 1993, just before the election campaigns for the Ukrainian parliament got underway, the RIA-press concern simply refused to hand over money and facilities to *Respublika*. Thrown out into the cold, the weekly's journalists played an active role in the work of independent press centres such as Elections-94 and the publication *Vybir-94* (Choice-94).

Even now, one can only postulate that *Respublika* was a victim of politics. The leadership of RIA may have been concerned about *Respublika*'s criticism of

contemporary politicians – a step it took frequently. “At the time, under the auspices of RIA-press, we did not have rights as a juridical entity”, recalls Pohorielova. “Now the press’ leadership allows us to have such rights. So now we can organise our own newspaper – but we don’t have the money”, she says.

Pohorielova says prospects for the future of *Respublika* are grim, even though the newspaper still has not officially disbanded and reporters have been allowed to retain and use their press cards. Pohorielova does not fear persecution from the new governmental and presidential structures but, she says, there is a hidden agenda of the new president in his preferential treatment of certain media. In fact, at an August 9 press briefing, Kuchma spokesman Mykhailo Doroshenko told journalists that the Presidential administration would choose people and publications to spend time with the President. Pohorielova interprets this policy as an international screening of information and audience on the part of Kuchma. “In other words, there will be people, who will have first-hand information and there will be journalists, who will get second-hand facts”, says Pohorielova.

Doroshenko, who prior to his nomination to the post of presidential spokesman was editor-in-chief of the *Ukraina Moloda* (Young Ukraine) newspaper, may smooth things over yet. Problematic access to information has slightly improved recently with the administration’s institution of a weekly press-briefing for Ukrainian and foreign media.

But some Ukrainian journalists have begun to dismiss such official channels as mostly a selective forum for the creation of positive images – an attitude not yet common in Ukraine, even though it is standard practice in the West. As *Post-Postup*’s Kryvenko points out, “We don’t really need information from the President’s office”, citing good reporters as more credible means of finding out the truth.

Still most Ukrainian journalists are not taking a rebel stance and continue to feed on whatever information they obtain. Viktor Kovalenko, Ukrinform’s (official Ukrainian news agency) correspondent openly admits that he works for his agency because of the better opportunity to get good information – and more of it. When, for example, Kuchma met with famous philanthropist George Soros, only official mass media were invited – the parliament newspaper *Holos Ukrainy* (Voice of Ukraine), the government newspaper *Uriadovyi Kurier* (Government Courier), and the Ukrinform news agency. Other mass media got their information about this event from these newspapers, Kovalenko points out.

While this official media claims little objectivity in presenting the facts, it is at least in no danger of becoming the target of the government’s anger or of having to suffer financial trauma. In truth, most of the “democratic” newspapers in Ukraine are facing hard reality. “We have seen better times”, sighs Volodymyr Bodenchuk, editor-in-chief of the *Molod Ukrainy* (Youth of Ukraine) newspaper. Founded in 1919, *Molod Ukrainy* was owned by the Central Committee of the Lenin’s Communist League of Youth of Ukraine

(Ukrainian Komsomol) until 1991. Now a journalists' collective publishes the newspaper. Daily circulation has fallen from 800,000 issues in Soviet times to 67,509 issues at present.

Although *Molod Ukrainy* supported Kravchuk during the presidential campaign and sharply criticised Kuchma for his pro-Russian views, Bodenchuk is not worried about retribution. "We are not afraid of persecution from Kuchma's side, because there is a difference between a presidential candidacy and the presidency", he says. "*Molod Ukrainy* is ready to cooperate with new power structures", he adds. He points to the necessity of government subsidies as the real reason. "It is impossible for our newspaper to get large amounts of money from advertisement because entrepreneurs are not willing to put their money into it. Moreover, the reason we do not get advertisements is that *Molod Ukrainy* is popular generally in small Ukrainian towns and also among the people who are not interested in business".

With government interference playing a major role in the financial problems of publishing, it is something of a miracle that any newspapers have survived at all. Only a very small number of Ukrainian publications like *Post-Postup* can continue to provide themselves with necessary facilities. Other newspaper/publishing houses like *Vsieukrainskiye Vedomosti* (All-Ukrainian News), established in Kyiv in April 1994 and publisher of a Russian-language newspaper, have turned to another Western way in which newspapers keep high readership – by disseminating tabloid news for the masses. The Vedomosti Publishing House now issues the *Vedomosti* daily newspaper which tops the list in providing gossip and spreading rumours about politicians, actors, and other rich and/or famous personalities, as well as sensationalist stories that often turn out to be false.

Vedomosti-style reporting may be a way to circumvent political and financial problems – and while such journalism can be credited with bringing Ukraine further along the road to press freedom – the essential problem of media independence in Ukraine remains. For most independent Ukrainian papers, the crises continue.

Despite offers of accessibility, Ukrainian officials do not appear to have much respect for the press. Cases of media control are said to be a thing of the past, but it is truer to say that the tradition of keeping the screws tight is alive and well. The problem for journalists trying to do battle with the old Soviet ways is that there is no possibility of recourse to the law and indeed often no response at all to complaints – except for more posturing by the accused politicians.

The press itself is partly to blame for its lack of independence, due to the dominant presence of the journalistic old guard, which either does not care for real reporting or is being careful – and rightly so – not to lose valuable state funding of their work. Even if many Ukrainian journalists generally do not understand the important role an independent press can play in society, the fear of retribution for controversial articles acts as a considerable disincentive to would-be rebels. Examples abound: the *Molod Ukrainy* newspa-

per last year sharply criticised the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs for inactivity – only to find its journalists later locked out of a meeting between then-President Leonid Kravchuk and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl. But the reaction of the newspaper's editor-in-chief was perhaps more telling. "It is normal", he said, "when officials like one publication and do not like another one". No protest ensued from the newspaper's correspondents either – which may be another reason officials so easily dismiss media complaints.

An especially telling example of problems the media faces when it does try to exercise its right of freedom can be found in Crimea. Leonid Pilunskiy, a journalist of the radio station *Ostrov Krym* (Crimea Island) has often accused Crimea's presidential administration and parliament of intentionally putting pressure on reporters and press organisations whose points of view do not coincide with the official views of Crimean authorities.

Crimean officials, most of whom are working for the incorporation of the peninsula into Russia, appear to agree that suppression of dissent is in fact a good policy. "If the *Rossiya* bloc has 90 per cent of the seats in Crimea's parliament, there will be only one point of view on the peninsula – the views of this bloc", asserts Mykhailo Bakhariiev, who heads the Publicity and Press Committee in the Parliament of Crimea.

As a result of such prejudice, all pro-Ukrainian correspondents are now subject to severe censorship. Journalists from *Holos Ukrainy* (Voice of Ukraine), *Molod Ukrainy*, the Internews agency, the Crimean Tatars' newspaper *Advyet* (Response) and correspondents of the independent Russian newspaper *Izvestiya* were banned from the July 20 press conference of republic President Yuriy Meshkov, reports *Ostrov Radio's* Pilunskiy. "Only pro-Russian publications like *Krimskaya Pravda* (Crimean Truth), *Krimskie Izvestiya* (Crimean News), *Mistchanskiye Izvestiya* (Burghers' News) and the official Ukrainian news agency Ukrinform received any information from Meshkov's press secretary Vyacheslav Lebediev about that press briefing", affirms *Molod Ukrainy* correspondent Volodymyr Prytula. The inclusion of Ukrinform was apparently not surprising since, according to Pilunskiy, Lev Riabchikov, Ukrinform's Crimean correspondent, "often defends Meshkov's illegal positions and actions and personally supports uniting Republic Crimea with Russia".

Whether or not some personal journalistic competition was involved – and leaving aside the question of whether Ukraine is spending state money on Ukrinform to air views it does not hold – a more interesting occurrence made the event newsworthy. Reports that Meshkov's chief bodyguard, Ihor Voychik, threatened reporters with a pistol to prevent them from attending the briefing further dramatised the incident, which subsequently received even more media attention. Olha Dmitriyeva, a reporter for the Ukrainian newspaper *Nezavisimost* (Independence) in her coverage of the event, pointed out that the exclusion of the press constituted a serious breach of Ukraine's Law on Information of May 1992 and Law on the Press adopted in October 1992. Both laws guarantee journalist access to information deemed public by state officials.

The incidents surrounding Meshkov's press briefing could themselves have been written off as media hype if it were not for the fact that such violations of press freedom have become increasingly common and that nothing is being done to resolve such disputes. Already fifteen Crimean journalists have appealed to the Crimean Procurator General with a request to investigate the Meshkov affair and punish all officials who violated Ukrainian laws. Crimean journalists are still waiting for an official response. "But we do not have great hopes for a positive solution of this problem", says Pilunskiy. "President Meshkov controls all branches of power on the peninsula. We can only count on our own forces to defend journalists' rights", he adds.

A first step in this direction appeared to be the creation of the Free Union of Journalists of Crimea. Lillia Budzhurova, a deputy in the Crimean Parliament and editor-in-chief of the newspaper *Advyet*, was elected to head the union. Members of the union have called for support from the French journalists' organisation Reporteurs sans frontières. The Polish Union of Journalists has promised its Crimean colleagues to help them join the International Journalists' Union.

But factionalism between journalist groups and general disunity on censorship appears to be creating as much havoc as the frequent violations by politicians. Pilunskiy accuses the Free Union of Journalists of being another collaborator. "This organisation has not been created for the defence of journalists' rights, but to impose censorship on the mass media", he affirms. Hryhoriy Taran, who heads the Legal Department of the Union of Journalists of Ukraine, reports that the union has not in fact issued any statements in connection with violations in Crimea. "Our Legal Department has only received appeals from the editors-in-chief of local newspapers asking for our help in defending their rights", Taran reports.

If one can be certain of only one thing, it is that local newspapers are frequently subjected to political games. Local councils and worker collectives together are the usual publishers of such newspapers. This overlap gives regional authorities especially easy opportunities to use the local press for their own purposes. Many instances have occurred when heads of local councils have announced the early retirement of the local editor-in-chief, who just happened to have criticised the actions of local bodies of power inopportunely. Such blatant interference by a co-publisher – even when it takes place at the local micro level – contradicts national legislation: according to Article 23 of Ukraine's press law, one co-publisher of a newspaper, like a regional council head, does not have the right to retire an editor-in-chief without the agreement of another co-publisher – the workers' collective. This clause seems to be universally ignored: only one case charging violations of this article has been brought to court in Ukraine.

If Ukrainian journalists have as little faith in Ukraine's system of justice as they do in their own freedoms, it should not be surprising. Schools of journalism teach nothing about legislation or the legal system. But Anatoliy

Moskalenko, Director of the Institute of Journalism of Kyiv University, says all the trials and problems of Ukraine's press is merely a part of living through a period of transition. "To experience these times and to create a real informational space is a very important thing for Ukraine", he says. The Ukrainian media still has to work to release itself from the cage of official propaganda.

The process will perhaps be complete when the media ceases to feel like a "little cog in the state mechanism", as the founder of the Soviet Union Vladimir Lenin once termed literature and journalism. Until then, Ukrainian reporters will have to do battle with officialdom to force the latter to accept them as the Fourth Estate. ■

SOME SIGNIFICANT MEDIA INCIDENTS OF THE PAST YEAR

December, 1993

- Captain Andriy Lazebnikov, head of the Black Sea Fleet Press Centre, was shot dead at the entrance to his own building. The press centre appealed to all journalists of Crimea to express their protest by suspending publication of journals and transmission of live TV on the day of the funeral.
- The President justified a ban on live coverage of parliamentary sessions, on the grounds that such coverage "could be used for advertising populist ideas".
- The council of editors-in-chief of newspapers and magazines said that the Kravchuk government is ignoring the "constitutional right of the people to printed information" by doing nothing about soaring costs of paper and printing.

February-April, 1994

- The newspaper *Holos Ukrainy* reported that radio and TV editors in Crimea who held a "position of common sense" were being harassed by pro-Russian groups who demanded their dismissal. Shortly afterwards, Crimean "president" Yuriy Meshkov, dismissed the President of the Crimean State TV and Radio Company, Valeriy Astakov (who advocated policies of ethnic tolerance). His dismissal was contrary to the rules laid down by the Crimean Council of Ministers for the management of the station, and also to the law on the delineation of powers between the Kyiv authorities and Crimea. Ukrainian President Kravchuk eventually issued a decree reinstating Astakov.

June, 1994

- Two Russian journalists, Anna Konyukova and her husband Viktor Sosnovskiy, working in Crimea for NTV (Russian independent TV) reported four months of harassment by Russian activists, demanding that they leave Crimea and cease "defaming" Russia. They said that the persecution started in November 1993, after they made a feature about the murder of the leader of the National Movement of Crimean Tatars, Yuriy Osmanov. They said that appeals to the law-enforcement authorities in

Crimea had been fruitless. In mid-June, Konyukova was beaten up by two unidentified person who threatened that "blood will be spilt" if she and her husband continued their activities.

July, 1994

- Oleksander Moroz, the speaker of parliament stated that the media must create an "appropriate image" of parliament, and that it might be necessary to restrict the accreditation of journalists who write "untruthfully, subjectively and in a one-sided manner" about Parliament's activities.
- Crimean "president" Yuriy Meshkov barred representatives of several leading media organs (*Holos Ukrainy*, *Izvestiya*, BBC and Radio Liberty) from a press conference. His press secretary said that "only those who do not criticise the president" would be admitted.

September, 1994

- Ukraine's new president, Leonid Kuchma issued a Directive "On steps to bring order to prices for some periodicals". This abolished VAT on subscriptions to newspapers and magazines owned by the Ukrainian parliament, government and other central and local official bodies, also those owned by trade unions, writers and journalists unions and public organisations, provided that they were registered on or before 1 August 1994. The import duty on newsprint and printing plates was lifted.
- During a confrontation between Crimean "president" Yuriy Meshkov and the Crimean parliament, the Crimean Radio/TV Centre was seized by members of the law-enforcement bodies who had sided with Meshkov. Members of the Crimean parliament three times tried to gain access to the centre. Two eventually got in, switched off the Russian radio channels and spoke on the first channel of the local broadcasting system, appealing to the public to defy Meshkov, who, they said, had been acting unconstitutionally against parliament. Meshkov sent his own personal guard (the possession of which had been ruled unconstitutional by the Crimean parliament), but eventually this was dispersed, either by the intervention of MPs, or else, according to Viktor Minin, Crimean Minister of State, driven away by Cossacks. Parliament then used the Centre to issue its own two-hourly broadcasts, setting out its own views. ■

History**THE MYSTERY OF THE GRAVE OF IVAN MAZEPA**

Volodymyr Rychka

Mazepa is perhaps the greatest figure in Ukrainian history. The fate of this exceptional personality was difficult and tragic. In the course of his long life,¹ he was to know the heady delights of Europe-wide fame, the joys of victory and the mortal pangs of defeat, and the collapse of all his grand designs.

For twenty-two years (1687-1709) Mazepa stood at the head of the Ukrainian state of the era of the Hetmanate. A sober politician and gifted diplomat, Hetman Mazepa was forced up to a time to come to terms with the centralist policy of the Tsar of Muscovy. But, from that point on, he was convinced of the ruinous consequences of this for the fate of Ukraine. Thus life itself faced the Hetman with an inescapable choice: to live out his life peacefully in his tranquil palace in Baturyn among his beloved books and the pleasure of worldly life, or to try to snatch Ukraine away from "Muscovite slavery" and to establish its independence. Ivan Mazepa chose the latter course. It was a conscious choice, and, to use the words of the author of the *Istoriya Rusiv*: "alien to all passions and purposes, harmful to the soul". Turning to his supporters on the eve of his break with Moscow in 1708, Mazepa said that he was seeking nothing for himself, "except the happiness of that people which honoured me with the rank of Hetman and entrusted me with its fate".²

The barbaric destruction of Baturyn by the Russian army and the military disaster at Poltava wiped out Mazepa's plans, but did not compromise the idea of Ukrainian statehood. It was this idea which Tsar Peter I feared most. In the torture chamber he set up in Lebedyn, Peter personally carried out the interroga-

¹ Mazepa's date of birth has still not been unequivocally settled by historians. It is usually given as before 1639 or 1644. In our opinion, the most weight should be given to the view of those scholars who take Mazepa's date of birth as 1639. See, Oleksander Ohloblyn, "Hetman Ivan Mazepa ta yoho doba" (Hetman Ivan Mazepa and his times), *Zapysky NTSb*, New York, Paris, Toronto, 1960, vol. 170, p. 21.

² *Vyvid prav Ukrayiny (Dokumenty i materialy do istoriyi ukrayynskoyi politychnoyi dumky)* (Study of Ukrainian laws [Documents and materials on the history of Ukrainian political thought]), New York, 1964, p. 82.

tion and torture of Ukrainians suspected of sympathy to the idea of Ukrainian autonomy. Terming him "criminal" and "traitor", the ideologues of the autocratic regime strove in every way possible to put Mazepa to shame in the eyes of the world. They presented him as an ambitious egoist and careerist, who pursued allegedly only his own interests. On the orders of the Tsar, the Russian Orthodox Church had already excommunicated Mazepa during his lifetime. But this was not enough for the Tsar. Peter hastily took steps to carry through his pursuit of the rebellious Hetman. When he learned that it had been impossible to intercept Mazepa and his companions in the steppes of the Black Sea littoral, the Tsar burst out in an explosion of enraged fury. In a despatch to the Russian envoy in Constantinople, P.A. Tolstoy, the Russian government required him to demand that the Sublime Porte should send instructions to the Crimean Khan and the Hospodars of Wallachia and Muntenia (Eastern Wallachia), "that their lands should neither admit nor receive [him], but that they should give orders for the turncoat Mazepa to be apprehended and kept under guard".³ To the same end Peter sent epistles to the Sultan of Turkey, the Khan of Crimea and the Pasha of Ochakiv. Meanwhile, pursued by Russian troops, Mazepa and Charles XII with the remnants of their army had managed to avoid capture and to cross the Buh river, setting up their camp near Ochakiv. The Turkish government, ignoring the constant pressure from Russia to hand Mazepa over to the Tsar, granted him asylum in its dominions. There were plans to send Mazepa to Crimea, where the custom was strictly observed not to hand over those who sought the protection of the Khan.

But the vital forces were draining away from the Hetman who had suffered such blows of fate. His last days were passed in Bendery, where Charles XII had established his camp. Feeling that his life was drawing to a close, Mazepa, according to the testimony of his contemporaries, conducted himself heroically, jokingly comparing his fate with that of the poet Ovid, who also died far from his native land. Mazepa died during the night of 21-22 September 1709. As Dmytro Bantysh-Kamenskyi asserted in his time, the Hetman was buried near the village of Varniti not far from Bendery, and later his body was moved to Iasi, and there interred with full solemnities.⁴ As eyewitnesses portrayed it, "... the coffin, draped in red velvet with wide gold braid was drawn on a catafalque by six white horses. On both sides of it marched Cossacks, with drawn sabres. In front of the coffin, the Hetman's standard-bearer carried his mace, which was all glistening with pearls and precious stones. Behind the coffin walked many Ukrainian women who had followed their husbands and kinsmen who had remained with the Hetman: according to national tradition, they were all wailing and lamenting... The Cossacks walked with dipped banners and weapons reversed; the coffin of the Ukrainian Hetman was lowered into a grave made

³ *Pisma i bumagi imperatora Petra Velikogo* (Letters and papers of the Emperor Peter the Great), Moscow-Leningrad, 1964, vol. IX, part 1, pp. 977-88.

⁴ D.N. Bantysh-Kamenskyi, *Istoriya Maloy Rossii* (History of Little Russia), Kiev, 1903, 4th ed., p. 410.

ready in a church outside the town, and the Cossacks, as a sign of honour, at that moment fired a volley with their muskets".⁵ The death and burial of Hetman Ivan Mazepa near Bendery, and also the plans of the Cossacks to reinter the Hetman in Iasi is attested by "The humble majesty of the Zaporozhian host to his Royal Majesty of Sweden", drawn up in autumn 1709. In the fifth, concluding, point of this very interesting document, it is observed, *inter alia*, "We are grieving over the inglorious interment of His Serene Highness, Hetman Mazepa, and the fact that his dear mortal remains, the heroic soul within which filled the whole world with his glorious deeds, was received by the mean earth of this simple village. Hence the Zaporozhian host are turning to his Royal Majesty, requesting that they might inter the remains of their Hetman, with due ceremony, in a more distinguished town, specifically in Iasi, in the monastery known as the Monastery of Holii".⁶ Popular tradition to the present day connects the grave of Hetman Mazepa with a high barrow beside the Dnister river near Bendery. Archaeologists, however, are sceptical about this.

Of unusual interest, however, is a communication from Mykola Usatyi, a resident of the town of Tarashcha in the Kyiv oblast, published in the newspaper, *Kyivska Pravda*, on 14 September 1993, in which he states that just after World War II, he saw with his own eyes a gravestone cross with the name Mazepa. The present author has kept in his files Usatyi's reminiscences about this chance discovery. It happened in 1946 in the vicinity of Bendery. It was a "stone cross on which was engraved the name of Ivan Mazepa. The cross was around half a metre high, maybe a little more". One can only regret that Usatyi did not give this discovery the significance it deserved. Unfortunately, we have not succeeded in locating it today either in topographical material or the holdings of any museums.

Earlier historians, following Bantysh-Kamenskyi, give the place of Mazepa's burial as the town of Iasi. This version of the reburial of the Ukrainian Hetman in the capital of Moldova was taken as an article of faith by such authoritative scholars as M.A. Markevych and M.I. Kostomarov. Certainly, later, after the publication in *Kievskaya starina* in 1883 of the protocol of the interrogation of one of Mazepa's followers, the Poltava "acting colonel" Hryhoriy Hertsyk, Kostomarov, in subsequent editions of his famous work on Mazepa, on the basis of Hertsyk's testimony, gave the place of Mazepa's burial as Galati, on the Danube. Hertsyk was arrested by the Tsar's secret police in Warsaw, in 1721, and under interrogation stated, that, "living in the company of Voynerovskiy, I was sent by him with two of his household and with one Wallachian to the Wallachian land, to the little town of Galicia [i.e. Galati] to the Metropolitan of that place with the body of Mazepa which was interred there by the Metropolitan".⁷ The fact of the reburial of the mortal remains of the Ukrainian Hetman is attested, albeit similarly, by F. Lagust, who in the middle of the nineteenth century made a visual survey of a locality in the region of Bendery and observed

⁵ Quoted from, Vasyl Riznychenko, *Smert Mazepy* (The death of Mazepa), Kyiv, 1919, p. 8.

⁶ Mykhailo Voznyak, "Benderska komisiya po smerti Mazepy" (The Bendery Commission on the Death of Mazepa), in *Mazepa*, Warsaw, 1938, vol. 1, p. 116.

⁷ *Kievskaya starina* (Kyiv antiquity), vol. V, March 1883, p. 600.

traces of the grave of Ivan Mazepa, "to the right of the road" which connects Bendery with Varnita.⁸ This scholar also considered the burial place of the great Hetman to have been Galati. However, the actual location of the grave and the fate of Mazepa's ashes was undetermined in the historiography of that time.

The question attracted V.B. Antonovych, a professor of the St Volodymyr University in Kyiv, to a scholarly investigation. While making a painstaking study of all the available sources, he came upon a work published in Iasi in 1845: a French translation of a collection of the documentary evidence of the Moldovan chroniclers of the first quarter of the eighteenth century (M. Cogălniceanu, *Fragments tirés des chroniques moldaves et valaques pour servir à l'histoire de Pierre le Grand, Charles XII, Stanislas Leszczyński, Demètre Cantemir et Constantin Brancovan*, Iasi, 1845). In the chronicle notes of Nicolae Costin (Logothete of Moldova, 1662-1711) included in this edition, it is stated that Mazepa was buried in 1710 in the Galati church of St George in the monastery of that name. The chronicler also tells us that Mazepa did not find peace even after his death; a few years after the transfer of the Hetman's coffin to Galati, the Turks captured the town and dug up Mazepa's grave. When they found in it nothing of any significant value, they reportedly emptied the remains of the Hetman of Ukraine on the bank of the Danube.⁹ It is worth noting that the Turks' desecration of Mazepa's grave is also reported in other sources.¹⁰ But these give no information about what happened to the Hetman's mortal remains.

The writer Cogălniceanu, who published Costin's Chronicles, became interested in the fate of the Hetman's remains and visited Galati, where he discovered some additional information about Mazepa. He established, in particular, that Mazepa was first buried in the sanctuary of the church, in a brick vault, the surface of which was covered by a marble plate with an engraved inscription and Mazepa's coat-of-arms, and the figure of a one-headed eagle. So Mazepa's grave was preserved after the Turks devastated Galati in 1711. It was Pylyp Orlyk who undertook its renovation and preservation. According to Ilko Borshchak and René Martel, having learnt of the terrible desecration of the tomb of their leader, the followers of Mazepa, "began in haste to search for the

⁸ F. Lagust, "Karl XII v Yuzhnoy Rossii" (Charles XII in Southern Russia), *Zapiski Odesskogo obshchestva istorii i drevnostey* (Proceedings of the Odessa Society of History and Antiquities), 1853, vol. 3, pp. 333-4.

⁹ M. Cogălniceanu, *Fragments tirés des Chroniques...*, pp. 91-2.

¹⁰ *Cronica Ghiculestilor* (Editie îngrijită de Nestor Camariano si Ariadna Camariano-Cioran, Bucuresti, 1965, pp. 46-7.

In 1932 M. Voznyak found and published the travel notes of F. Hostysyetskyi, who, during his journey to Turkey in 1712-14, visited Galati and is a witness to the destruction of Mazepa's grave by the Turks. See M. Voznyak, "Benderska komisiya po smerti Mazepy" (The Bendery Commission on the Death of Mazepa), pp. 106-9; Ks. Franc. Gosciecki, *Posolstwo wielkie jasniewielmoznego Stanisława Chomentowskiego, wojewody mazowieckiego, od najjasniejszego Augusta II, krola polskiego do Achmeta IV, soltana turcekiego, ... proz lata 1712, 1713, 1714* (The Great Embassy of his excellency Stanisław Chomentowski, Wojewoda of Mazowia, from His Majesty Augustus II, King of Poland... to Achmet IV, Sultan of Turkey, in the years 1712-14), Lwov, 1732, pp. 247-50.

body of Mazepa, and when they found it, they placed it once again in the former grave; only they did not repair the broken flooring leaving it in the state it was as a memorial of the crime.¹¹ Later, in June 1722, Orlyk, who was on his way abroad, once more visited Mazepa's grave and had a memorial service held for him. In his will, drawn up in 1716 (a copy is preserved in the Swedish Royal Archives), Andriy Voynarovskiy bequeathed a thousand thalers to the "monastery of Galati in Wallachia, where rests the body of His Excellency, Hetman Mazepa of the Zaporozhian Cossacks, my late maternal uncle".¹²

Furthermore, Cogălniceanu asserts that by 1835, the Greek monks no longer knew the name of the person buried under the marble plate where rest the mortal remains of Ivan Mazepa (by that time the inscription on it had been worn away by people's feet). In that year, when they were preparing a place for the burial of the nobleman Dumitru Derekcha-Pasha, the monks came across the vaulting of Mazepa's tomb. Pushing aside these unknown (to them) remains, they buried the body of the aforesaid nobleman in the same tomb.

A few years later, Cogălniceanu says, the Moldovan government forbade burials within church buildings. The relatives of Dumitru Derekcha-Pasha then opened the tomb, and transferred his remains together with those of Mazepa to a new tomb outside the church, to the right of the entrance. The old slab from Mazepa's tomb ended up in the Museum of Antiquities, collected by Mihai Ghica, brother of the former Hospodar of Moldova Alexandru Ghica (1834-42). Giving all due credit to the painstaking research of Cogălniceanu, V.B. Antonovych wrote in the July edition of *Kievskaya starina* for 1885: "We do not know what fate has befallen the museum of Mihai Ghica and the slab preserved in it over the past 40 years – we do not know either if in the church registers of the monastery of St George there is an authentic entry for the burial of Mazepa. But thanks to the ever-precise evidence collected by Mr Cogălniceanu, we may assert that any traveller interested in Ukrainian antiquities may very easily collect in Iasi and Galati, information which does not reach us".¹³

Alas, however, the optimistic expectations of this famous Ukrainian historian were dissipated in the course of time. In the years that followed, the question of looking for Mazepa's grave not only did not advance, but was even held back, becoming overgrown with the contradictory testimony of "eyewitnesses" and various inventions. It was recounted, for example, that during Peter I's expedition to the Prut river, he struck the slab of Mazepa's tomb with his own hand and shattered it to bits. In periodicals published before the October Revolution one often encounters reports that Mazepa's grave was dug up and desecrated by Russian soldiers in 1877 during the Russo-Turkish War. As an example, we may quote an extract from

¹¹ I. Borshchak, R. Martel, *Ivan Mazepa: Zhyttia i porvyv velykoho hetmana* (Ivan Mazepa: Life and passions of the great Hetman), Kyiv, 1991, p. 102.

¹² Alfred Jensen, *Mazepa*, Kyiv, 1992, p. 115.

¹³ Volodymyr Antonovych, "Moldavskie svedeniya o meste pogrebeniya i mogile Mazepy" (Moldovan observations on the burial place and grave of Mazepa), *Kievskaya starina*, July 1885, vol. XII, p. 505.

the book of Mykola Lazorskyi *Svitla i tini* (Lights and Shadows) which Antin Lyaskovskiy kindly sent to the present author from Canada: "Already on the way back home [from the Russo-Turkish War – author], the Russian general, Skobelev, recalled that the great Hetman I.S. Mazepa was buried here. He ordered resourceful sergeant-majors to seek out this grave, a sacred grave of our nation. The grave was quickly found. The coffin was dragged out from the church of St George and blasphemously broken open, the bones and grave clothes were burned..." A similar story was repeated in 1946, when the Soviet Army was in Galati. This story is told by the Kyiv journalist and bard Mykola Lytvyn, on the pages of the weekly *Nash Chas* of 23 April 1993. He wrote it down from the words of an uncle, now deceased, before whose eyes special detachment troops allegedly, "used pickaxes to force an entrance into the vault, which stood on its own to the right of the entrance to the church, having opened the lid, emptied the skeleton, poured petrol over it and set it alight. When the fire had gone out, they brought up a truck with the sides let down, and used shovels to scoop up the still-smouldering ashes and loaded them on to the truck. A major of the special detachments shouted in a raucous voice: 'So be it with all traitors to our great motherland'. He gave a signal and jolting over the potholes, the truck drove away into the open steppe".

We also have the reminiscences of Stepan Matviyenko, recorded by Oleksandr Semenenko. Here the story goes that Mazepa's grave was found in the vicinity of the village of Volontyry and dug up by a police officer from Bendery, a Bulgarian named Kirilov. The remains had apparently been hidden in the attic of Kirilov's house until 1925, when the Romanian Security police took them to the General Siguranza in Bucharest.¹⁴ On the other hand, the historian V. Trepke, who visited Galati in 1930 on behalf of the Ukrainian Scientific Institute in Warsaw, saw with his own eyes Mazepa's grave on the territory of the St George monastery.¹⁵ At that time, the name of Mazepa was mentioned in the memorial lists of a religious service at which Trepke was present.

Branding Mazepa a "traitor" to the Ukrainian nation, Soviet historiography passed over the question of his grave in silence and did not consider it worthwhile checking out the various versions of the fate of his remains. Quite recently, the All-Ukrainian Society of Political Prisoners and Victims of Repression in conjunction with the Institute of Archaeology and the Institute of the History of Ukraine of the Ukrainian National Academy of Sciences came forward with a proposal to search out and identify the mortal remains of Hetman Ivan Mazepa and bring them back to Ukraine. We may note in passing that back in 1917 the government of the Ukrainian National Republic also had the intention of organising the ceremonial reburial of Ivan Mazepa in Ukraine.

The National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine passed a special resolution, establishing a scientific expedition to search for and identify Mazepa's ashes.

¹⁴ Oleksandr Semenenko, *Kharkiv, Kharkiv...*, Kharkiv-New York, 1992, p. 155.

¹⁵ Vasyl Lutsiv, "Zhyttia i smert hetmana Mazepy na chuzhyni" (The life and death of Hetman Mazepa abroad). In: *Mazepa – lyudyna y istorychnyi diyach* (Mazepa – the man and the historical figure), Kyiv, 1991, p. 32.

The expedition was composed of the archaeologist Hlib Ivakin, the anthropologist Serhiy Sehedra and the present author. After studying the diverse versions regarding the location and fate of Mazepa's ashes, the expedition members last year went to Romania to carry out the necessary search. The materials we collected gave us grounds for confirming what the historical documents state: the fact that the Hetman was buried in the monastery of St George in the Romanian town of Galati. This monastery was destroyed at the end of the 1950s or beginning of the 1960s. The place where it stood is now a small knoll overgrown with grass, standing alone on the bank of the Danube. It guards the secret of Mazepa's grave, for it is difficult to believe that his remains had been dishonoured even before the destruction of the monastery. Certainly it would have been impossible to desecrate the same grave so many times!

One must remember that local popular tales associate Mazepa's name with the church of Our Lady of Protection which still stands in Galati, not far from the place where the church of St George once stood. Until quite recently one of the neighbouring housing blocks and one of its streets bore the name of Mazepa. A traveller walking along this street would willingly turn aside to the church of Our Lady of Protection, taking the opportunity to see the grave of Mazepa. Thus, in one case, reported in 1891 by the newspaper *Yuzhanin* (no. 263), some pilgrims happened to see Mazepa's tomb-slab against the church wall, in the crypt of the church complex. It was stated here that the inscription on the slab was in Greek. According to another source, traces of this slab were sought in the courtyard of the church, in front of the entrance. On 30 April 1978, the Ukrainian weekly, *Shlyakh Peremohy*, published in Munich, carried the reminiscences of Dr M. Halyn, about his visit to Galati in 1929. He writes: "I found the church, for, like Mazepa Street which runs beside it, it is known not only to every cabdriver, but also to every inhabitant of Galati. Looking round the inside of the church I could find no sign of a tomb anywhere, and so I went up to an old woman who was selling candles and asked her where Mazepa's grave was. 'Not here', she replied, 'come with me'. In the courtyard of the church, a few paces in front of the main door, the old woman stopped, facing the door in front of the porch and its threshold: 'Mazepa's grave was here, just here where I am standing, and where these weeds are growing. Long long ago there used to be a marble slab with something written on it, not in Romanian. But thirty years ago, a Russian steamboat came to Galati, and the sailors from that boat came, under the command of their officer and their chaplain, and dug up everything that was under that slab and took it with them to Russia'".

A different picture of Mazepa's grave is given in the memoirs of a famous Ukrainian man of the theatre, Mykola Sadovskyi (1856-1933). During the Russo-Turkish War of 1877, when he was doing his military service in the Russian army, he happened to be in Galati. Here, he recalled later, "wandering around the town out of boredom, I went into the cathedral of Galati. While I was having a good look at its architecture and ornamentation, I came upon somebody's tomb which I had not even noticed when I came in. The tomb was

all on its own, like an orphan, on the right as one came into the church. I went up to it. I had a good look at it. A white, fairly small, tomb about the size of a chest on wheels, with a copper plate on top and around it an inscription in copper letters in the Latin alphabet: 'Ivan Stepanovych Mazepa, Hetman of the glorious Lower Zaporozhian Host and of all Ukraine...'. It was like a blow in the face! I stood stock-still. If there had been a thunderclap in a clear blue sky and a bolt of lightning had fallen at my feet, it would not have startled me as much as what I now beheld. I could not believe my eyes. I read it again. Yes, it was true. It was he! Where could I find the colours to paint, or the words to describe the feeling which came over my entire being! My God! How many weighty thoughts at once began swarming in my head".¹⁶ One cannot doubt the sincerity of Sadovskiy's words and feelings. At the same time, how is one to explain what he saw? The description which he gives here does not agree with the information of the available sources on the outward appearance of the tomb and the fate of Mazepa's remains. Perhaps the far-sighted Hetman, foreseeing the hostile intentions of his enemies, before his death had two coffins prepared, and ordered his followers to hide the real one carefully. Mazepa could have stage-managed his "death" and "burial" in Bendery, and then gone in secret to Galati, and lived out his life there. At the very least we do have one document, albeit an unreliable one, known in a French copy (the original is in the archives of the Sublime Porte, in Turkey), which says that Hetman Mazepa, "settled in Galati, in the castle built by the Genoese, was already of a late age, regretted his past mistakes and lived freely as if resting".¹⁷ In this regard the date of Mazepa's death is very significant; it is given by the Moldovan chronicler Nicolae Costin as 18 March 1710(!). From this the Hetman would have had time enough to make reliable arrangements for his real burial, thus cleverly arranging for his eternal rest to be undisturbed.

Further searches in the archives of different countries in Europe, the possibilities of which are only now opening up to Ukrainian historians, may permit the mystery of Mazepa's grave to be unravelled. We place our hope, too, in future archaeological excavations which, together with an anthropological commission, should finally resolve the question of the burial place of Ivan Mazepa and the identification of his remains. ■

¹⁶ Rostyslav Pylypchuk, "Mykola Sadovskiy nad mohyloyu Ivana Mazepy" (Mykola Sadovskiy at the Grave of Ivan Mazepa). In: *Ivan Mazepa: Khudozh. dok. kn.* (Ivan Mazepa – artistic-documentary book), collected and with a foreword by V.O. Shevchuk, Kyiv, 1992, p. 97.

¹⁷ I. Zastyrets, "Mazepyntsi v Turechchyni. Z paperiv Sadyk-pashi (Chaykovskoho)" (Mazepa's followers in Turkey. From the papers of Sadyk-Pasha [Chaykovskiy]), *Ukrayina*, 1914, book 2, p. 71.

WHO HAS A RIGHT TO CRIMEA?

(Part 1)

Volodymyr Butkevych

Might or right ?

Ukraine had just declared itself an independent state on August 24, 1991 when Gavriil Popov, the Mayor of Moscow, stated, on August 27, on the Central Television Network: "If Ukraine continues to pursue the course of making this act a reality, without doubt the question will be raised regarding the borders separating Russia and Ukraine, and Russia will definitely come to the aid of its people in Ukraine". How can this be explained? An explanation was soon forthcoming from Russian president Boris Yeltsin's press secretary, P. Poshanov. He maintained that Ukraine should still remain within the structure of a single federation and that, "in the case of a cessation of the present Union-based relations, the RSFSR will reserve the right to raise the question of a review of common borders [between Russia and Ukraine]".¹

As Russian Secretary of State Gennadiy Burbulis later stated, "Russia cannot become a republic 'like the others...'. Russia can and must become the sole heir of the USSR and all of its structures".² Furthermore, in order to clarify any confusion on the part of Ukraine, the explanation was offered that, "[p]resent-day Russia is not simply one of fifteen disenfranchised republics in an empire, but the fully legitimate leader of the former empire".³ Should the point still remain unclear in the minds of Ukrainians, it was now reinforced. "Anti-Russian attitudes will not be met with silence on the part of the Russian leadership. We must take the example of the US. Must [Ukraine] be reminded of the American reaction when its citizens were maltreated in Grenada?"⁴ This general tone was also quite evident in the attitude of Russian Information Minister Mikhail Poltoranin, when he exclaimed "no discussion!" All of the above indicates that the prevailing thought in Russia is that the Russian Federation is the sole and rightful heir of the USSR.

Whether the dialogue involves the issue of creating a Ukrainian army or that of refusing to sign any all-encompassing agreement on a political union, Ukrainians are constantly being presented with the threat of an alteration of

¹ *Izvestiya*, August 29, 1991.

² *Megapolis-Express*, October 17, 1991.

³ *New Times*, no. 36, 1991.

⁴ *Rossiya*, no. 38, 1991.

their national borders or the transfer of Crimea to Russia. These threats are echoed in Crimea by the Crimean Parliament's Presidium, which is sympathetic to Moscow's centrist attitude. The Presidium issued a statement which was published in *Izvestiya* on October 17, 1991:

Respecting the right of the people of Ukraine to self-determination, we concurrently hold that an equal level of respect must be accorded to the will of the people of Crimea, to their right to create their own statehood on the basis of a referendum, should this be called for by a change in the political situation.

If the above statement is indeed genuine, one must inevitably conclude that the Chairman of the Crimean Parliament, Nikolai Bagrov, is calling for a necessary review of the legislation regarding the return of Crimea to Ukraine.

One should recall that any such intentions are a violation of international law, and would involve international repercussions. Should any doubt be cast upon this, one need only turn to the UN Charter or the CSCE's Helsinki Final Act of August 1, 1975. Chapter III of the latter act specifically states:

Member-states consider as inviolable all borders of all states in Europe and thus will refrain in the present and the future from any and all encroachments on these borders.

They will also refrain from any actions or demands that are directed towards the seizure or usurpation of parts or of whole territories of any other member-state.

Chapter IV of the Final Act, "Territorial Integrity of States", reinforces the above with an explanation of additional prohibited actions or statements that may be directed towards the alteration of borders or territorial integrity. It should be noted that these chapters deal with the state borders of Europe, the USA and Canada, and not administrative-territorial demarcations that are the internal matters of individual states.

While claiming to be the sole heir of the USSR, Russia must also take into account the international obligations of the past. Among others, the USSR was a signatory of the Bucharest Declaration of 1966 on the inviolability of state borders and territorial integrity, the Paris Charter of 1972, the Treaty on Principles of Cooperation between the USSR and France of 1971, a 1971 treaty with the Federal Republic of Germany, and various joint communiqués with the US, Italy, Austria, Denmark, and other countries. One should also note the treaty signed by the RSFSR and Ukraine on August 18, 1990, which holds both signatories responsible for maintaining the inviolability of their common borders. All these documents categorise any action aimed at violating borders, propagating the idea of such action, or supporting the proponents of such action as a violation of international law. Furthermore, any media used to propagate such ideas are subject to responsibility under the UNESCO Declaration "On the Basic Principles Regarding the Contribution of Mass Media to the Strengthening of Peace and International Understanding, the Development of Human Rights and the Fight Against Racism, Apartheid and the Promotion of War", of November 28, 1978, and the December 16, 1952 Convention on International Law.

Secondly, with all its frequent assertions of its right to Crimea, it would greatly strengthen Russia's case to produce at least one international or even national document where this right is legally justified. If it cannot produce such evidence, then international law relegates the matter to historical right. "Historical right" refers to the justifiable acquisition of previously unclaimed territory – *terra nullius*.

What is Russia's historical right regarding Crimea?

The logical starting point for this discussion would be the eighteenth century, when Russia first expressed a formal desire to annex the Crimean peninsula. Until this time, formal relations with Crimea were conducted by Ukraine. Sharing a common fate with Crimea (Ukraine being a vassal state of Russia, and Crimea of the Turkish Sultanate), Ukraine, as early as the seventeenth century under the Cossack state, had begun to develop friendly relations with the Crimean Khanate. In the majority of their dealings with Russia, the Cossacks strove, at the same time, to maintain a peaceful alliance with Crimea. This was a basic principle of Bohdan Khmelnytskyi's⁵ policy in dealing with Russia. It was also the mainstay of the policy of his successors, including Hetman Ivan Vyhovskyi, who, in a treaty with Poland in 1658, had specifically stipulated (Article 17) that Ukraine's right "to maintain a friendly relationship with the Crimean Khan" is guaranteed by the treaty. Hetman Ivan Samoylovych attempted to persuade Russia to include in the Bakhchisaray Peace Treaty between Russia and Turkey in 1681 a clause on the necessity of maintaining good relations between Ukraine and the Crimean Khanate. However this attempt failed because Moscow was vehemently opposed to any strong ties developing between Ukraine and Crimea.

To put it bluntly, it was simply not in Russia's interests for such relations to exist. In order to sow the seeds of discord between the Zaporozhians⁶ and the Turks, the Russians forced the latter to include certain concessions to the Cossacks in the Bakhchisaray Peace Treaty. Among these was an agreement permitting Cossack use of the southern fishing waters under Turkish jurisdiction. Unfortunately for Russia, this did not spark the intended discord. Both the Zaporozhians and the Turks understood that they were pawns in the hands of the "imperial" powers in Moscow and Constantinople. As a statement from Moscow issued to Hetman Ivan Mazepa illustrates:

⁵ Bohdan Khmelnytskyi was Hetman of the Zaporozhian Cossacks and later of all of Ukraine from 1648-54. He had succeeded in driving the Poles completely from Ukrainian lands, only to be forced into a treaty with Russia in 1654, which Russia used as a pretext for its own occupation of Ukraine.

⁶ The Zaporozhian Cossacks were the basis for Ukrainian socio-political, economic and religious organisation from the sixteenth to the late nineteenth centuries. The Cossacks formed as escapees from Polish serfdom, choosing a martial and religious lifestyle based at their island fortress, the Zaporozhian Sich, on the Dnipro (Dnieper) River. Their military campaigns were famous all over Europe, and their social order was highly democratic and religious.

The Zaporozhians will never have peace with Crimea... and this warning cannot be emphasised enough. Traders from Little Russian cities had better cease travelling to Crimea with their goods and selling horses there as well.

Mazepa was forced to relay this order to the Zaporozhians, which was met with the following riposte: "When the Khan returns from the Hungarian war, the Zaporozhians will conclude a peace treaty with him at that time and then start marching on 'Great' Russian cities".

Faced with such opposition from the Zaporozhians, Tsar Peter I attacked the Sich on May 14, 1709. In response, the Zaporozhians left Moscow's protectorate and proceeded to seek an alliance with Crimea, which was finally concluded by the Peace of Prut (1711). Henceforth, until 1733, for almost a quarter of a century, the Zaporozhians and the Crimean Khanate shared a common state structure. For their part, the Ukrainian Hetmans⁷ (Pylyp Orlyk, Ivan Skoropadskyi, Pavlo Polubotok, Petro Doroshenko) were constantly striving, during their successive leaderships, to gain autonomy for Ukraine, to unite with the Sich for this purpose, and to establish good relations with the Crimean Khanate. However, this only resulted in Russian annexation of the Zaporozhian Sich in 1739.

In the second half of the eighteenth century, Russia went on to develop a plan for the annexation of Crimea. However, St Petersburg had set itself an extremely difficult and complex aim. The annexation of Crimea became possible primarily due to the final victory over Turkey, and this war could not have been won without the support of the Zaporozhian Sich. At that time, the Otaman⁸ of the Zaporozhians categorically refused to fight against the Crimean Khanate. Moreover, he continued to pressure Moscow for the reinstatement of Ukraine's borders, in accordance with the treaty with Russia signed by Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytskyi. It was not until the Otaman was assured that the war would be waged exclusively against Turkey and that the borders of Ukraine would be respected that an agreement was reached. A significant role here was played by an anonymous report forwarded to St Petersburg by a Zaporozhian officer, P. Savytskyi, in 1767, in which he denounced a plan by Otaman Petro Kalnyshevskyi to go to war with Russia while "he prepared to send twenty of his best warriors to the Turkish emperor to ask for his support".

Catherine II put off dealing with Kalnyshevskyi until after the war. In the meantime, she sent emissaries to persuade him to go to war against the Turks. Promising the Zaporozhians large sums of money as remuneration, the emissaries admitted to Kalnyshevskyi that it was only the Zaporozhians who had a force strong enough to destroy the Turkish fortresses on the shores of the Black Sea. The Zaporozhians received a reward for quickly destroying the

⁷ The Hetman was the leader of the Cossacks. He was elected by the Cossack assembly and his decisions had to be approved by what was called a Chorna Rada (Black Council).

⁸ Following the establishment of the Cossack state, its centre moved to Chyhyryn, where the Hetman was based. The Sich then came under the leadership of the Otaman.

Turkish encampments. General Field-Marshal Pyotr Rumiantsev reported on the excellent leadership displayed by "General" Petro Kalnyshevskyi. In addition, Grigoriy Potemkin requested to be admitted into the ranks of the Kushchiv company of the Zaporozhian Cossacks in order to improve his martial skills. However, this praise was short lived, since Russia was preparing for the annexation of Crimea. The main obstacle to this was the Zaporozhian Sich, which continued to support the Crimean Khan. The Cossacks' position was immutable and remained so while Russo-Turkish relations deteriorated. They joined forces to win back some saltwater fisheries in Crimea and forest lands surrounding the Sich. When the Crimean Khan, Girei, attacked Southern Rus' in 1769, the Zaporozhians refused to come to Russia's aid. When Zaporozhians fell prisoner to the Turks in the war and were being transported across Crimean lands, the Khan always freed and returned them to the Sich without demanding a ransom. In their legal proceedings, the Tatars and the Cossacks enjoyed a cooperative atmosphere. The Russian agent Nikoforov informed St Petersburg that the Sich and the Khanate annually exchanged services equivalent to the sum of 60,000 roubles in gold and silver, at a time when this was considered a considerable sum.

Why was the Sich destroyed ?

Henceforth relations between St Petersburg and the Sich quickly deteriorated and Catherine began to give serious consideration to the final destruction of the Sich. This, she felt, would once and for all deal with the "Little Russians" and open an unobstructed corridor to Crimea. The problem was to put this plan into operation. In spite of the fact that Catherine's generals attributed Russia's success over Turkey to their own acumen, Catherine was well aware of the level of their military abilities. She knew that they would not have stood the slightest chance in a war with the Zaporozhians. Her aides constantly reminded her that the Sich had the support of the people of Ukraine. The only solution, therefore, was to deprive the "criminal" Cossacks of this popular support. But to do this, it was necessary to oust the Cossacks from their territories.

Thus, Catherine returned to an earlier plan that had first emerged in the early 1760s. Under her initiative, in 1762, the Imperial Senate issued an *ukaz*⁹ and a Manifesto on the recruitment of foreigners for settlement in Ukraine. In 1763, Catherine issued another Manifesto, outlining a programme for the acceleration of foreign colonisation in Ukraine. These documents promised the following conditions to prospective colonists, all detrimental to the interests of the people of Ukraine: a) resettlement at the cost of the state within two years of departure; b) two years' cost-free food supply, housing and transport (responsibility for which would lie directly with the local villagers in Ukraine);

⁹ An *ukaz* was a form of imperial decree, which could be issued at any time and at the complete discretion of the Tsar or the Tsarina. It had binding legal authority and was enforceable by legal penalty.

c) in accordance with the choice of the settler, an allocation of up to 60 *desiatyny*¹⁰ of the most fertile land per person; d) the granting of long-term loans for construction, supply and sowing purposes; e) a tax holiday for thirty years; f) an exemption from military conscription; g) hereditary privileges for acquiring local serfs; h) a guarantee of political rights, religious freedom and local authority, schools, churches, community organisations and so on.

The settlers were recruited from Serbs, Bulgarians, Moldovans, Greeks, Prussians, Austrians and other Europeans. In this manner, thirty thousand Moldovans alone were resettled in Ukraine along with nineteen thousand Greeks. To ensure that the settlers did not choose to leave their new homes, Catherine established a Chancellery for the Protection of Foreigners and allocated 200,000 roubles to finance the resettlement programme.

The enabling *ukaz* on the allotting of lands to the colonists was issued by the empress in 1765. However, in exchange for the lands to be colonised, the empress demanded the lands of the Zaporozhian Sich. This demand encountered great opposition from Kalnyshevskiy, who was still striving for a rapprochement with the Crimean Khanate. On her part, Catherine II promised Kalnyshevskiy an immediate resolution of the situation, taking his position into consideration, while at the same time sending her governors-general into Ukraine to begin the colonisation of Ukrainian lands. It was on these events that Russian historians base their erroneous contention that Catherine II and Kalnyshevskiy enjoyed good relations. This attitude served to mask the actual details of Russia's colonisation of Ukraine, while at the same time failing to give a satisfactory explanation of Catherine's harsh solution to the "Kalnyshevskiy problem" in 1775.

Ignoring Kalnyshevskiy's protests, Catherine issued an *ukaz* acknowledging the rights of Russian colonists in Ukraine. Later that same year, she initiated the creation of a coordination centre for colonisation attached to the Little Russian Collegium, and allocated 42,000 roubles for this purpose.

At this time Kalnyshevskiy realised that Catherine's policy was slowly leading towards the destruction of both the Sich and the Crimean Khanate. He took his suspicions to the Crimean Khan and proposed to him a joint effort to stop the spread of Tsarism into Ukraine and Crimea. The Crimean Tatars then journeyed to the Zaporozhian Sich and wintered there. This caused St Petersburg to accuse the Sultan of Turkey of complicity during talks in Bucharest in 1772. The empress' emissary, O. Obreskov, stated that, "In two years over 11,000 Tatars have crossed over into Zaporozhian Cossack lands and have wintered there".¹¹

Meanwhile Catherine continued her attempts to undermine the relationship between the Zaporozhian Sich and the Crimean Khanate. The Governor-General of Slobodian Ukraine,¹² Ye. Shcherbinin, was sent tem-

¹⁰ A *desiatyna* is approximately 2.7 acres.

¹¹ *Arkhiv vneshnei politiki Rossii do snosbeniia s Turtsiei [Hereafter AVPR]*, 1744/154-55/122.

¹² The north-eastern part of Ukraine that was the only territory under Russian jurisdiction.

porarily to Crimea to convince the Khan that Russia had no intention of annexing Crimea and that it merely wanted the peninsula to become a state independent of Turkey. Russia also sent P. Veselytskiy, an official Resident, who insisted on having his credentials recognised. A different version of this episode was put forth by Nikita Panin:

According to accepted European tradition and etiquette, there can be nothing more truly, clearly and satisfactorily proven than the recognition by the local court of Tatar independence and the proposition that they are worthy of direct relations and correspondence with respected states.¹³

At the outset the Khan refused to embrace friendly relations. Then Shcherbinin provoked a neighbouring Muslim group, the Nogais, to attack the Tatars. Thus in 1772 the Crimean Khanate was forced to sign a treaty with Russia,¹⁴ and to take upon itself a whole series of responsibilities vis-à-vis the latter. The treaty specifically proclaimed "the union, friendship and trust between Russia and the Crimean Khanate" (Article I).

"Neither the Russian Empire nor the Ottoman Porte [the title of the formal seat of Turkish power] and other allies have the right to interfere in anything [regarding affairs of the other party]; but by resolution of the Khan, it will be permissible for the Russian High Court to do so" (Article II). In return for an undertaking to refrain from demanding military aid from the Khan, Russia persuaded the Khan to sever all ties with the Zaporozhian Sich. Russia also reserved the cities of Kerch and Yenikan for itself in return for granting the Khan the right of passage across Russian territory to the Kuban region (Article VII). In addition, Russia also secured the right to quarter its army and fleet in Crimea as a "guarantee of the security of Tatar independence", while questions of trade, borders and an exchange of diplomatic representatives were dealt with in Articles XVII, LXXIX and XIII respectively.

Who gained from the 'self-determination' of the Crimean Tatars?

The Russian generals managed to convince the Crimean Khan that a treaty without a Declaration on the State Separation of Crimea from Turkey would carry little weight. The salient point here is that Russia was simultaneously conducting talks with Turkey at Kuchuk Kainarji, at which Turkey had taken on an inflexible position. The Turkish diplomat Resiyi Akhmet Effendi, had learned of the talks between Russia and Crimea, and proceeded to accuse the former of interfering in the internal affairs of the Khanate to achieve the same result as with Ukraine. Obreskov reassured Effendi by stating that "according to the Tatars the treaty will proclaim that neither side will interfere in the affairs of the other; the Porte must be satisfied with this kind of outlined responsibility".¹⁵

¹³ *Arkhiv Kniiazia Vorontsova*, vol. 26, p. 87.

¹⁴ See *AVPR*, *op. cit.*, 1723/89/8/67-70.

¹⁵ See V.A. Ulyanytsky, *Dardanelly, Bosfor i Chernoe more v XVIII veke*, 1883, p. 124.

Under pressure from Russia, the Crimean Khan adopted a Declaration on the State Separation of Crimea from Turkey, in which he appealed to Turkey: "We hope for fairness and compassion from the Sublime Porte, that we may not only be left in peace by her, but also that after the end of the war she recognise the Crimean peninsula with its free Nogai Horde as self-determinate and her own jurisdiction on her own land as independent". The Khanate appealed to other states to adopt a position of trust regarding the Tatar document.

Obreskov quickly presented the Tatar document to the Turkish diplomat Abdul-Rezak, stating that it "has already been announced in all European courts".¹⁶ Russia's aim became quite clear: to force Turkey into signing a disadvantageous treaty. However, Russia did not anticipate an unforeseen development. After reading the document, Abdul-Rezak began to grow even less conciliatory. He spoke of the decision taken by the Crimean Khan in the following terms:

The principles of our faith do not tolerate two Muslim rulers being equal, unless they rule at a great distance from one another. Otherwise it is absolutely necessary that one destroy the other. Then the Almighty can acknowledge as the rightful ruler the one to whom, by His Right Hand that is unfathomable to the Fates, He gives victory over the opponent. The assertion by the Khan and the prayers in the name of the Sultan of all Muslims must adhere to the Commandments of the Sultan.¹⁷

Russia was thus forced to accept a compromise, according to which the elected Khan of Crimea and the Judges of the Khanate were obligated to obtain the blessing of the Turkish Sultan before carrying out any duties.

All remaining obstacles were quickly resolved, and on 10 July 1774 a twenty-eight-article treaty was signed in Kuchuk Kainarji, with two secret articles annexed. Article III of the treaty was wholly dedicated to recognising the independence of Crimea. It specifically stressed the fact that "all Tatar peoples, Crimean, Budzhat, Kuban, Yedisán, Zhambuilu and Yedichkul, without exception, have the right to be recognised as free and completely independent from all foreign power, yet remaining under the state jurisdiction of their Khan of the line of Genghis. The whole collective and structured Tatar society, which is ruled by their ancient laws and customs, will be held accountable to no foreign state in any affairs; and neither the Russian Court nor the Ottoman Porte has the right to interfere in the councils or structures of the above-mentioned Khan, in domestic, political, civil and internal affairs in any form, but must recognise and consider the Tatar nation in its political and civil state in the same vein as other states, under self-rule, self-sufficient and independent of everyone except God Himself...".

Having secured the Declaration of Crimean independence, Russia devised a programme for its annexation. Before this could be completed, though, the Zaporozhian Sich had to be destroyed. Conscious of the fact that the

¹⁶ *AVPR, op. cit.*, 1747/9.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 1747/9.

Cossacks had the opportunity to flee to Turkish territory, Russia included in Article II of the treaty the following clause:

If, following the conclusion of this treaty and its ratification, anyone from the said two empires committing any severe violation wishes to seek refuge or escape to one of the two sides, such must not be accepted under any pretext, nor protected, but must be immediately returned or, in an extreme case, be driven back from the territories of that state into which he has fled, so that no judgments or conflicts between the two empires will arise. This excludes only those in the Russian Empire who have accepted Christian Law and those in the Ottoman Empire who have accepted Mohammed's Law. Moreover, should anyone from the two above-mentioned empires, Christian and Muslim, commit any crime or similar act, for whatever reason, and flee from one empire to another, then upon demand he must be immediately returned.

Having established her legal framework, Catherine II could begin her operation to destroy the Sich. While a delegation sent to St Petersburg by Kalnyshevskiyi to resolve the territorial question was being shuffled around from reception room to reception room, Catherine ordered his arrest and the destruction of the Sich. On 5 June 1775, General Pyotr Tekeliy attacked and destroyed the Sich. Kalnyshevskiyi was ambushed and taken to the Solovki monastery. To the dismay of the empress, Kalnyshevskiyi was able to survive torture and mistreatment to the age of 112 years. Held in a stone cell, he was kept from any human contact for twenty-five years. He soon lost his eyesight and his health. However, his faith in his people remained unbroken.

Hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians from the central and southern regions left their homes and were relocated or simply driven away. The south of Ukraine was soon left barren and bereft of any population.

The road to Crimea is opened

Tsarist diplomats and generals, aware of Catherine's aims, soon began to present her with various plans for the taking of Crimea. In 1778 Pyotr Rumiantsev asked Catherine to "accelerate the final decision regarding Crimea, and in the meantime to consider all the options and necessary provisions in the case of war".

One year earlier, in 1777, a well-known diplomat from Catherine's court, Bakunin, had devised and presented the court with such a plan entitled "Considerations of a Russian patriot on past relations and wars with the Tatars, and methods for the Service to cease them for all time". The essence of his plan was straightforward: to set the Tatars fighting amongst each other, and settle the Crimean steppes with loyal Ukrainians, while the areas left empty in Ukraine would be settled by Russians from the central Russian regions. This would weaken Ukraine even further and eventually drive the Tatars out of Crimea.

Rumiantsev's plan proved attractive to Catherine, and on 9 March 1778 she signed a decree "On the resettlement of all Christians to the southern

Russian land". The speed with which the army began to prepare land for resettlement in the southern Ukrainian provinces is evident from the fact that Russia's General Aleksandr Suvorov had thirty-two thousand males (whole families were not resettled) moved per day. However, many Russians could not grow accustomed to their new homes and simply fled. Without proper tilling and farming, the land slowly went to waste. A war with the Tatars was also looming, and the people were not at all prepared for it. On 5 May 1779 Catherine published an *ukaz* permitting Ukrainians from beyond Ukraine's borders to be settled in these lands. They would be granted pardon for any "transgressions": escape from their masters, service with the Zaporozhian Cossacks, and so on. Many Ukrainian serfs, who had earlier escaped to Poland, took advantage of this opportunity.

However, these concessions could not rectify the situation completely. On 20 April 1780 a second *ukaz* was issued, extending the terms of the original one of the previous year.

In the meantime, Turkey had learned of Russia's preparations for war, and became increasingly uneasy. In order to divert Turkish attention from the Crimean problem, Catherine ordered her diplomats at the Porte to begin negotiating a new treaty with Turkey. Among her instructions was an order to re-emphasise the terms of the Treaty of Kuchuk Kainarji, in some cases reiterating points, and in others, taking new positions. It was clear to the Russian negotiators that Catherine had not the least intention of adhering to any of the terms. As an earnest of good intentions, Russian state counsellor O. Stakhiev signed the Ainali-Kavak Convention on 10 March 1779, along with the Turkish representative Abdul-Rezak. Almost half the articles of the convention (four out of nine) dealt with the Crimean question.

This was the final internationally-recognised document that ratified the state independence of the Crimean Khanate. However, the treaty had absolutely no effect on strengthening Crimea's international standing. Russia had no intention of adhering to the treaty and Turkey was in no position to defend it. Moreover, Turkey continued to regard Crimea as a colonial territory that was forcefully detached from it. Within four years the Crimean Khanate would cease to exist altogether as an entity recognised by international law. At the same time, Russia concluded no international treaties either before or after the Ainali-Kavak Convention giving it any legal right to claim the territory of the Crimean peninsula. Its annexation of Crimea was simply a matter of might.

Grigoriy Potemkin, who was responsible for preparing the southern regions of Ukraine for a possible war with Crimea, informed Catherine in 1780 that "the taking of Crimea by Your Highness is justifiable by prestigious reason, that is, a cessation of all wasted efforts and the constantly arising conflicts with the Porte. The Khan, who will in no way be able to remain in power without Your support, will be greatly benefited by Your making him into a Persian Shah".

At the beginning of 1783, Russia seized Crimea and announced the *fait accompli* with the Manifesto of 8 April proclaiming the incorporation of Crimea into the Russian empire. Russia's long-standing policy towards the annexation of territories remained the same as ever. Crimea, like Ukraine earlier, was regarded by Russia as "lebensraum", and no account was taken of the interests of the indigenous population. It is, therefore, not surprising that many of the articles of the 1772 treaty with the Crimean Khan were simply copied from the Russian treaty with Ukrainian Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytskyi of 1654. Nor was the similar manner in which the two treaties were drawn up and then violated by Russia a coincidence. The system of rule in the occupied territories was identical in both cases. Identical, too, was the attitude of the Russian rulers towards the inhabitants of Ukraine and Crimea. The primary concern for Russia was to ensure that the indigenous populations never outnumbered the Russian incomers. At the time of the destruction of the Zaporozhian Sich, in the Novorossiysk *guberniya*¹⁸ alone, there were 65,259 Ukrainians, 38,996 Russians, 2,471 Moldovans, and 704 Serbs, Greeks, Bulgarians, Macedonians, Georgians, Hungarians, Poles, Swedes and Germans. The fact that there were more Ukrainians than Russians did not bode well for Tsarist plans, and for this reason, massive resettlement plans were adopted to move native Ukrainians out of these territories. The artificial vacuum so created was to be filled by Russians, and if there were too few of them, then, as we have already seen, other foreigners were recruited.

"Divide and Rule"

This policy engendered a unique demographic cycle. In spite of the destruction of the Sich and the subsequent mass resettlement programme, the number of Ukrainians began once again to increase – and was met by a legislative counterattack. In 1785 Catherine issued a manifesto on the recruitment of foreign settlers to Ukraine. However, the resettlement policy soon led to a crisis. Within two years of the manifesto, over twenty five thousand Ukrainians had been deported to central Russia, while Russia encountered great difficulties in finding its own people to resettle the abandoned lands. This, quite naturally, was reflected in the economic development of the region; there was a huge shortage of labour. Catherine's response was to issue an order for the recruitment from abroad of previously deported or willingly resettled Ukrainians. All across Europe, Russian recruitment offices began to appear.

Having already developed a deportation strategy for Ukrainians, Russia now began to apply these same principles to the indigenous population of Crimea. Before annexation by Russia, Crimea had had a population of over 400,000. A few months after incorporation into the Russian empire, there were 70,269 males, and a total population of around 140,000. The deporta-

¹⁸ *Guberniyas* were territorial-administrative divisions akin to states or provinces, with a governor as the chief administrative figure.

tion was so rapid that by the spring of 1784 the Khan, Shahin Girei, had also been deported. He was presented with a choice of Kaluga, Orel or Voronezh for his new home. In 1787 Potemkin issued an order to dispose of all remaining Tatar administrators left in Crimea.

The absence of a productive native population left the Russian army in a difficult logistic situation, since it was left with no local source of supplies. It thus could not carry out Catherine's orders for reconstruction in the area. Moreover, after the seizure of Crimea, many European states adopted a hostile attitude towards Russia. Russia was able to trade some Polish territories from Prussia and Bessarabian territories from Austria. But while the Russian court was able to make a few other minor advances in foreign policy, this was insufficient to rescue the situation caused by Russia's poor standing in Europe. It was then that Russia resorted to the announcement that the sole reason for the seizure of Crimea was to civilise the "barbaric" local population.

In response to this explanation, many highly placed European state officials travelled to Crimea to be convinced of the process of "civilisation" that was being carried out in the southern regions of Ukraine and Crimea. Potemkin was then ordered to rebuild the countryside immediately. There was, however, insufficient labour and resources to complete the task. Undaunted, Potemkin decided to construct fake villages along the route to be taken by the European delegates, and placed painted façades of villages further in the distance, giving rise to the term "Potemkin villages".

Tsarist policy was inherently aimed at completely severing all ties between Ukraine and Crimea. For this reason Russia did not favour the option of resettling the depopulated Crimean lands with Ukrainians. No effort was spared to ensure that the lands would be settled primarily with Russians. However, this plan met with failure due to an overwhelming reluctance on the part of most Russians to resettle so far away from their homes. The first attempt at Russian resettlement utilised the army. Russian soldiers were promised demobilisation if they accepted permanent settlement in Crimea. To make the offer more attractive, Catherine issued an *ukaz* on 14 January 1785 authorising the soldiers opting to remain to send for their wives. But the *ukaz* succeeded in recruiting only 4,425 wives. A further attempt was made to find female volunteers to travel to Crimea and wed unmarried soldiers there. In spite of a fairly generous bounty for volunteers (five roubles apiece was the advertised rate), very few Russian women came forward.

Russia then tried to encourage "Little Russian" women to volunteer to marry soldiers in Crimea. This, too, proved unsuccessful; only 1,497 Ukrainian and 2,353 Moldovan women came forward. A majority of Russian soldiers, who wanted to get free of their service obligations, agreed to permanent settlement in Crimea and then, after demobilisation, fled back to their homes in Russia. As a result, between April and November 1784, the Russian army in Crimea was reduced to half its original complement, but there was no significant corresponding increase in new settlers. This was the

main reason that Russia agreed to allow Ukrainians to settle in Crimea. However, it made sure that these would not be Ukrainians with well developed relations in Crimea, opting instead to recruit settlers from Polish-occupied Ukraine. Potemkin wrote to Catherine in 1787 that, "it would be against the interests of the state to forbid the acceptance of Ukrainian settlers from Poland. Poland then would be able to take advantage of them as a resource. It would be desirable to encourage as many representatives of the Ukrainian people in Poland as possible to leave Poland for Crimea". This was in essence an admission of Russia's failure in its Crimean aspirations.

In the ensuing years Ukrainians began to settle Ukrainian territory as defined by its present frontiers, as well as adjacent territories now incorporated into other states. As regards the territory of the former Crimean Khanate, by the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries it was inhabited by a majority of Ukrainians. For example, in the Tauride *guberniya* Ukrainians made up 42.2 per cent of the population, Russians – 27.9 per cent, Tatars – 13.0 per cent, Germans – 5.4 per cent, Jews – 3.8 per cent, Bulgarians – 2.8 per cent, with a mixture of other nationalities comprising the rest. The area settled by Ukrainians in Crimea greatly surpassed that inhabited by Russians. The Tsarist government had by this time realised that its attempt at selective demographic development was a failure. Between 1897-1914, St Petersburg undertook an unprecedented resettlement programme in which 1.69 million Ukrainians were deported from nine Crimean *guberniyas* to Siberia and the Far East. A new influx of Russians and non-Ukrainians into Ukraine began concurrently. Describing Tsarist demographic policy, Stalin quite justifiably wrote that, "Tsarism deliberately settled the prosperous outer regions with colonial elements in order to squeeze out local populations, force them into worse regions and sow national enmity".¹⁹ But following the Bolshevik takeover in 1917, Stalin himself adopted these very same Tsarist principles of "demographic selection".

The end justifies the means

The history of relations between Russia and Crimea up to the twentieth century gives absolutely no grounds for the contention that Russia can claim a right to Crimea. In all the international treaties it concluded, Russia recognised the Crimean Khanate as a sovereign and independent state. The seizure of Crimea in 1783 is not legally justifiable by accepted international law and cannot be considered a basis for the inclusion of Crimea into Russia. However, should one power seize the territory of another country and then return its legal status, such an act takes on legal proportions and must be recognised as such by all subjects of international law. Among the criteria for recognition are state development, effective government on a defined territo-

¹⁹ J.V. Stalin, *Sochineniya*, vol. 4, p. 355.

ry, the condition of the population, and the effectiveness of the economy that is linked to the economy with which the country is united. The main legal basis for the recognition of territorial unification is the principle of the self-determination of peoples and nations. This is clearly upheld in Article II of the United Nations Charter and in other documents of international law.

Furthermore, the principle of self-determination is explained by current international law as not merely a basis for secession from an existing state, but also for the maintenance of an existing state's territorial integrity. Rights connected to secession do not take precedent over the rights of unification. In other words, if a people is united with other peoples in a single state structure and if the state in no way infringes on their rights, then the attempt to use the principle of self-determination as a basis for secession is a misapplication of that principle. This is directly addressed by the 1970 UN Declaration on International Law, which states that the principles of self-determination "cannot be applied in the context of sanctioning or encouraging any acts that would lead to the dismemberment or partial or full violation of the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign, independent states... with governments that represent the whole people of a given territory, without regard for race, religious conviction or skin colour".

It should also be noted that this principle applies only to the people itself, as a social community characterised by a common historical heritage, territorial cohabitation, a common language and economic life, among other criteria. This community must be historically stable. When considering Crimea, it is difficult to apply the idea of historical stability when it is realised that the population of Crimea has grown in the post-war period from 780,000 to 2.5 million, primarily due to forced resettlement. This process of forced resettlement was halted as recently as 1978.

Thirdly, the people of Crimea, comprising a social community, can turn not only to the principle of self-determination, but also to that of a people's right to decide its own fate. This principle is described as "the right to define under the conditions of full freedom, when and how a people desires, its internal and external political status without foreign interference and to realise according to its own judgment its political, economic, social and cultural development".²⁰

Nevertheless, an attempt can be made to consider the issue from the point of view of those who maintain Russia's claim to Crimea. It is an accepted historical conclusion that following the Bolshevik overthrow in 1917 Crimea mistakenly employed Lenin's proclaimed principle of self-determination to unite with Russia.

Prior to 1917 Lenin had on several occasions espoused the right of peoples and nations to self-determination. However, it is a misconception to interpret this as meaning that Lenin was an advocate of national rights. He

²⁰ *In the Name of Peace*, Kyiv, 1975, p. 20.

and his party approached the issue of self-determination simply as a matter of political expediency.

Before the Bolsheviks came to power, Lenin supported self-determination to the point of secession. "National self-determination", he wrote, "is exclusively understood as political self-determination. In other words, it is the right of secession and the creation of an independent national state".²¹

However, once the Bolsheviks were in power, Lenin's views quickly altered. He now supported the principle of self-determination only insofar as it would lead to a federal relationship with Russia. Lenin paid special attention to the processes developing in Ukraine at the time. "The details of the elections at the First Constituent Assembly indicate that as of November 1917 the Ukrainian SRs [Social Revolutionaries] and Socialists still maintained a majority in Ukraine", Lenin wrote in 1919.²² It should be noted that at this time Lenin had designated Crimea as Ukrainian territory. Establishing a Bolshevik government in Ukraine was still out of the question. As Vynnychenko wrote,

In Ukraine Bolshevism had no power at this time. Several attempts by the Bolsheviks to seize power ended in failure.²³

Fearing that Ukraine would soon declare independence, Lenin appealed in his "Letter to the Workers and Peasants of Ukraine":

May the communists of Russia and Ukraine unite in a patient, insistent and determined effort to defeat the nationalist advances of the bourgeoisie or nationalist superstitions of all kinds, and demonstrate to the workers and peasants of the whole world a truly strong union of workers and peasants of various nations in the struggle for Soviet power, for the destruction of capitalist and landowner oppression, for a global Federation, a world-wide Federal Republic.²⁴

This matter was addressed even more directly by Yakov Sverdlov, then the Chairman of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee. In a confidential memorandum to one of the proponents of Soviet power in Ukraine, Fyodor Sergeev (Artem), Sverdlov wrote,

My Dear Artem!

I am writing about this only to you. I am sometimes truly terrified by this wave of independence thinking that is sweeping Ukraine, as well as Latvia, Estonia, Belarus and so forth. Do not allow this silliness to continue. Make sure of this.²⁵

The slogan "self-determination of nations" was often employed as a method of countering anti-Bolshevik organs of power with the aim of annexing certain territories to Russia. With this aim (among others) in mind, numerous representatives of the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Russian Communist Party

²¹ V.I. Lenin, *Sobranie Sochineniya*, vol. 24, p. 248.

²² *Ibid.*, vol. 40, p. 47.

²³ V. Vynnychenko, *Vidrodzhennia Natsiyi*, Kyiv, 1990, pp. 81-2.

²⁴ Lenin, *op. cit.*, vol. 40, p. 47.

²⁵ Y. Sverdlov, *Izbranie Sochineniya*, Kyiv, vol. 3, p. 155.

(RKP[b]) were sent to various territories to organise “congresses” and “conferences” at which independence and unification with Russia were to be simultaneously proclaimed. This method was particularly applied to areas where Ukrainians lived, and thus one saw the emergence of Black Sea, Northern Caucasus and Kuban-Black Sea Socialist Republics; Soviet Stavropol; the Odessa Soviet Republic; the Mykolayiv District Socialist Workers’ Commune; the Donetsk-Kryvyi Rih Republic and so on. All of these had also created their own respective Soviet People’s Committees. However none of these “republics” took into account ethnic distribution when marking their borders. Nor did they uphold the national-territorial principle of border demarcation. Furthermore, the will of the local populations was ignored.

Then, when the Bolsheviks lost the elections to the First Constituent Assembly, they responded by calling plenary sessions of the Donetsk and Kryvyi Rih Soviets, at which the following resolution was adopted:

Widespread agitation for the secession of Donetsk and Kryvyi Rih, along with Kharkiv, and their union with Russia must be increased. This would be accomplished with the understanding that the former would become part of a single, administrative and self-governing province [of Russia].²⁶

However, when the local populations began to oppose the creation of these “states” and their “governments”, the Bolsheviks invariably turned to the use of terror and assassination.

It is evident, therefore, that the term “self-determination” was used purely as a propaganda tool to appease world public opinion. Sverdlov spoke quite candidly of this during the debates on the proposed Ukrainian SSR Constitution on March 4, 1919:

It must be emphasised here with all certainty, that what we are defining as a separate Ukrainian republic in the eyes of the international community today, will tomorrow possibly become the legal part of an All-Russian republic in a changed international situation... It would be generally more rational to adopt – with amendments – the constitution of Soviet Russia than one of a Ukrainian republic. Its deep meaning would then transform it into an international constitution which is even now an example for the whole world proletariat.²⁷

Sverdlov was not speaking on the highest level of government in Ukraine at the Third Congress of the Bolshevik Ukrainian Communist Party (UKP[b]). Nevertheless, he was confident that even the government of the republic would heed his words. That very day, he added a memorandum on the Ukrainian constitution to the list of proposed Congress resolutions, stating that, “the Third Congress of the Ukrainian Communist Party agrees to adopt completely and generally the constitution of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet

²⁶ *Donetskyi Proletariy*, December 2, 1917.

²⁷ Sverdlov, *op. cit.*, vol. 3, p. 173.

Republic, allowing for changes that take into account local conditions".²⁸ Having arrived at an agreement with party leaders outside the Congress hall, Sverdlov was assured that the Congress would not dare oppose him.

When opponents used the principle of self-determination to support their positions, the Bolsheviks invariably deemed such arguments illegal and without justifiable motive. This situation arose in Crimea as well. In the Soviet of Peoples' Commissars' (Sovnarkom) appeal "To All Working Muslims in Russia and the East", of 20 November 1917, the following was included:

Muslims of Russia, Tatars of Crimea! Create for yourselves a free life. You have a right to this... You yourselves should be masters on your own land. You yourselves must create your own life according to your own image and wishes. You have this right because your fate is in your hands.²⁹

The Tatar population in Crimea decided to avail itself of this proclaimed right and thus a congress was called for 26 November 1917 in Bakhchisaray-Kurultay. The congress elected a Tatar National Government and proclaimed its independence from Russia. Proclaiming the slogan "Crimea for the Crimeans", the government furthermore proclaimed its desire to remain united with Ukraine, being unwilling to break the historical national, economic and cultural ties with the Ukrainian mainland.

The Sovnarkom was not disposed to allow this. It did not recognise this act of self-determination as legal or legitimate and proclaimed the Tatar National Government "...counter-revolutionary and clinging to the sole support of the Ukrainian Central Rada and the Ukrainian counter-revolution". Revolutionary Red Guards and sailors from Sevastopol were sent against the Tatar National Government to dispatch the tiny Tatar army, after which they proceeded to arrest the entire government. In a reply sent to the Sevastopol Military-Revolutionary Council (the Bolshevik military organisation first created and headed by Trotsky in Moscow, comprised exclusively of Russian Bolsheviks in Crimea), the Tatar National Government was compared to a military dictatorship set up as a vassal by the Ukrainian Rada. Russia also accused the Rada of

devis[ing] a clever and treacherous plan – with the help of the Sevastopol and Simferopol councils, as well as the Crimean Tatar army – to seize power firstly in the cities of Crimea, and then the fortress at Sevastopol.³⁰

The support of the Crimean Tatar people for separation from Russia and union with Ukraine greatly perturbed the RKP(b) leadership. Representatives of the RKP(b) Central Committee were immediately sent to Crimea. At first reliance was not placed on the use of force, since at the time there were hardly enough dedicated Bolsheviks to implement it. Only seven members

²⁸ *Ibid.*, vol. 3, p. 176.

²⁹ *Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR*, Moscow, 1959, vol. 1, pp. 34-5.

³⁰ *Bor'ba za sovetskuiu vlast' v Krymu: dokumenty i materialy*, Simferopol, 1957, vol. 1, p. 153.

appeared in Simferopol at the first conference of Bolshevik organisations in the Tauride *guberniya* on October 2, 1917 (one each from Sevastopol, Yalta, Yevpatoriya, Feodosiya and three from Simferopol).

Soviet historiography maintained that the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in March 1918 supported the incorporation of Crimea into Russia. However, there is no explicit or implicit reference to support such a contention anywhere in the Brest-Litovsk text. Regarding border demarcations between Russia and Ukraine, Article VI of the treaty stated:

Russia is bound by this treaty to conclude an immediate peace with the Ukrainian National Republic and recognise the Peace Treaty between this state and the states of the Central Powers. The territory of Ukraine must immediately be freed of all Russian armies and Russian Red Guards. Russia will also cease all agitation or propaganda against the government or social institutions of the Ukrainian National Republic.³¹

No mention is made of Crimea.

To be continued



³¹ *Dokumenty vnesbnei politiki SSSR*, vol. 1, p. 122.

Literature

FOREST SONG

Lesya Ukrayinka

Act II

(Late summer. In places the dark dull foliage of the trees is splashed with autumnal yellow. The lake has shrunk, and now has a broad beach. The thin leaves of the reeds and bulrushes rustle dryly.)

A house has been built in the clearing, and a vegetable patch planted. There are two strips of grain – one of rye and of wheat. There are geese swimming on the lake. Laundry is drying on the shore, pots and pans are hanging on bushes near the hose. The grass has been mown, and a haystack piled under the oak. From among the trees can be heard the cackle of chickens and the lowing of cattle. Somewhere near at hand, a pipe is playing a lively dance.)

MOTHER: *(coming out of the house and calling)*
Lukash, hey, where are you?

LUKASH:
(emerging from the forest, carrying his pipe and a carved walking-stick)
Right here, Mother!

MOTHER: Haven't you had your fill of music yet?
Piping, that's all! But, work, *you* don't get done!

LUKASH: What work d' you mean?

MOTHER: What's that you say? What work?
And who's supposed to fence the cattle-yard?

LUKASH: Oh, very well, I'll fence it right away!

MOTHER: But when will that "right away" come to pass?
You're always running off somewhere or other
With that stray wench of yours, that good-for-nothing!

LUKASH: Who's running off? I drive the beasts to pasture
And Mavka helps me.

MOTHER: A fat lot of good
Such help is!

LUKASH: But you said yourself that when
She looks after the cows, that they let down
More milk.

MOTHER: Well, all the same – a witch's spawn!

LUKASH: There clearly isn't any pleasing you!
When we put up the house, didn't she bring
The wood for us? And who was it that planted
The garden with you and helped sow the grain?
Did we ever have such a crop before?
And look how she planted the flowers there
Beneath the window... Doesn't it look pretty?

MOTHER: So much we need these flowers! But I don't have
A girl here in the house to do the work.
And *his* head is all full of flowers and songs!

(LUKASH gives an impatient shrug and starts to leave.)

Where are you off to?

LUKASH: To fence in the yard.

(He goes behind the house and in a few moments there is a sound of wood being chopped.)

MAVKA emerges from the forest, decked in a profusion of flowers and with her hair hanging loose.)

MOTHER: *(in a disagreeable tone)*
What do *you* want?

MAVKA: Say, Aunty, where is Lukash?

MOTHER: What do you want with him? It isn't proper
For a girl to go chasing a young man!

MAVKA: Nobody ever told me that before!

MOTHER: Well, for once you can hear it! It won't hurt you!
Why do you always go about like that?
Why do you always comb your hair out so?
You look just like a witch! It isn't decent!
And what is all that nonsense you have round you?
It's not the least bit suitable for working!

I've got some things left of my poor dear daughter's.
Go, put them on – they're hanging up inside –
Yours, if you want, you can put in the chest.

MAVKA: Well, good. I shall go in and change my clothes.

(Mavka goes into the house. UNCLE LEV comes out of it.)

MOTHER: And not a word of thanks!

LEV: Well, sister, why
Do you keep on and on at the poor lass?
Or what has she done to upset you so?

MOTHER: And, you brother, had better hold your tongue
On things that don't concern you! You'd bring in
All of the witches from the forest here.

LEV: If you had something to say that made sense
I'd listen – but this "witches from the forest"...
Where are there witches in the forest, say?
The witches live in villages...

MOTHER: Well, you
Know all about it! Well, then, attract them in,
Bring in this forest scum, and you will see
What good comes of it!

LEV: What's that? Yes, I'll see!
What's in the forest isn't scum, my sister.
All kind of treasures come from it...

MOTHER: *(ironically)*

For sure!

LEV: From lasses like her, humans come, that's what!

MOTHER: What sort of humans? You've been drinking? Huh?

LEV: What do you know about it? My old grandpa
Used to say: if you only know the word
Then you can bring into a forest nymph
A human soul, the very same as ours.

MOTHER: But then where will the witch-soul it replaces
Go off to?

LEV: You're on your old theme again?
I'd better far get back and do some work,
Why should I stay chattering here!

LUKASH: Leave me be!
I haven't time!

(MAVKA sadly looks him in the eyes.)

Well, find some dry wood for me...

(MAVKA runs swiftly into the forest, and returns carrying a huge bundle of dry wood.)

MAVKA: I found some for you; Will you need a lot?

LUKASH: What? Can I fence the cattle-yard with that?

MAVKA: You seem to have turned angry with me, somehow...

LUKASH: Well, you see... Mother's always on about you...

MAVKA: What does she want? And how is it her business?

LUKASH: How is it? I'm her son...

MAVKA: Her son – then, what?

LUKASH: You see... You're not the kind of daughter-in-law
She wants... She doesn't like the forest folk,
She's be a harsh mother-in-law to you.

MAVKA: We have no mothers-in-law in the forest,
What are all these "in-laws" all about?
I do not understand!

LUKASH: She needs a daughter-
In-law to help her with the work... she's old.
To bring outsiders in to do it all
– It isn't right. A hired-girl's not a daughter...
But truly, though, you cannot understand this...
If you're to fathom all our human troubles,
You'd have to be brought up outside the forest.

MAVKA *(with sincerity)*

If you explain, then I will understand
Because I love you... I grasped straight away
All the songs that you played upon your pipe.

LUKASH: Songs! Well, there's no great knowledge needed there!

MAVKA: Do not despise this flower of your soul,
For out of it was born our very love,

It is more wondrous than the magic bracken
Which reveals treasure, for your song *creates* it.
It was as if a second heart was born
Within me when I heard it. In that moment
A fiery miracle took place...

(breaking off suddenly)

You're laughing?

LUKASH: But truly, though, it does seem rather funny...
A girl in working clothes, making a speech
As if it were a festival oration! *(laughs)*

MAVKA: *(tugging at her clothes)*
I'll burn the lot!

LUKASH: And make mother scold worse?

MAVKA: What does that matter, if this dress has made me
Seem different to you?

LUKASH: I knew it, though!
Now the reproaches and complaining start...

MAVKA: No, dear one, I am not reproaching you,
I am just sad, because you cannot raise
Your life up to the level of yourself.

LUKASH: I somehow cannot grasp just what you're saying.

MAVKA: See, that is what I love you for the most,
That you do not understand what is in you,
Although your soul can sing about it all
Clearly, sincerely, through your pipe's sweet voice...

LUKASH: Well, what is it?

MAVKA: Something more beautiful
Than all your fine, beloved, handsomeness,
But I, too, cannot find the words for it...

(Sadly and lovingly, she gazes at him for a moment in silence.)

Play to me, beloved on your pipe,
And let the music charm away all evil!

LUKASH: Eh, this is no time for me to be playing!

MAVKA: Embrace me then, so that I may forget
This conversation.

LUKASH: (*looking round*)

Hush! Mother will hear you!
Already all the time she speaks of you
As hussy.

MAVKA: (*flaring up*)

You're right! No one who did not
Grow up with you will understand you. What
Does "hussy" mean? Is it because I love you?
Because I was the first to speak? It's shameful,
Is it, to have a generous heart that does not
Keep its treasures hidden, but straightway
Bestows them all upon the one it loves.
Not waiting to be given pledges first?

LUKASH: But there was hope that they'd be repaid later...

MAVKA: Another strange word I can't understand:
"Repaid". You gave me all the gifts you wished
To give, and I gave my gifts so to you.
Unmeasured, and uncounted...

LUKASH: Well, that's fine.
When neither has reason to blame the other.
And you said it yourself – remember it!

MAVKA: But why must I remember what I said?

MOTHER (*coming out from the house*)
So that is how you reap? And fence the yard?

(*LUKASH hastily drags the wood behind the house.*)

Well, look here, lass, if you don't want to reap,
I shall not force you. Somehow I shall manage
To do it all myself. And, comes the autumn,
Please God, I'll get a daughter-in-law to help me.
There's a young widow, a strong, active wench –
She's been making enquiries through her friends,
And I replied, that, unless Lukash happens
To... Well then, dear, you'd better let me have
The sickle – it's the only one we own.

MAVKA: No, I shall reap. You go and do the hemp.

(*The MOTHER crosses the clearing and disappears behind the reeds. MAVKA swings the sickle and stoops to cut the rye. Suddenly, out of the rye, springs up the FIELD RUSALKA. Her green garment is visible here and there through the*

cloak of her golden hair which covers her small figure. On her head she wears a garland of cornflowers, and her hair is interwoven with pink flowers of corncockle, camomile, and convolvulus.)

FIELD RUSALKA (*throwing herself beseechingly towards MAVKA*)

Sister, I beg you, no!
Do not destroy my beauty so!

MAVKA: I must!

FIELD RUSALKA: Already I'm in tatters now,
My flowers destroyed and scattered now
And my flowers' constellations all
Into desolation fall!
Fiery burned my poppies red,
But now they are black and dead,
Flow like drops of blood so rich,
And congeal there in the ditch.

MAVKA: Sister I must. Your beauty will return
Next year in even greater, richer splendour,
But if my happiness today should wither,
It goes for ever!

FIELD RUSALKA:

(wringing her hands, and bowing with grief, like an ear of grain bows in the wind)

Woe is me! My lovely hair!
All my radiant golden tresses!
Alas, Alas! My beauty fair!
All my youthful lovelinesses!...

MAVKA: Your beauty is not fated to live long,
For this it grew up, so that it would fall.
It is in vain you plead to me and cry,
For someone else will reap it, if not I.

FIELD RUSALKA: See sister, see, how the waves are still playing,
From end to end swaying,
Let us partake of this paradise smiling,
While summer's beguiling,
While the rye-ears have not fallen yet,
While dread doom has not befallen yet.
Grant me one moment, one moment my sister dear,
Then my poor beauty will fade and will disappear,
Of itself it will lie down!
Sister, wear not winter's frown
That will not yield to entreaty or prayer.

MAVKA: Willingly, sister, I'd spare you,
I am not free, though, I'm bound to this labour!

FIELD RUSALKA: (*raising herself up, to whisper in MAVKA's ear*)
Does it not come to pass when reaping, maybe,
Hand may be wounded by sharp-bladed sickle,
See my pain, sister, and pity!
One small drop of blood would be sufficient to save me.
Well? Is my beauty not worth some blood!

MAVKA: (*slashing her hand with the sickle, and letting the blood fall on the golden hair of the FIELD RUSALKA*)
Here, sister! May it do good!

(*The FIELD RUSALKA bows before MAVKA in thanks, and disappears down into the rye.*)

From the direction of the lake approaches the MOTHER, and with her KYLYNA, a buxom young woman, wearing a red fringed kerchief, and a beetroot-coloured finely pleated skirt, a similarly pleated green apron with appliquéd white, red and yellow bands; her blouse is densely embroidered in red and blue, and a necklace of gold coins jingles on her plump white neck, her belt hugs her figure closely, making her rounded, well-nourished shape seem even more voluptuous. She strides along so fast that the MOTHER can barely keep up with her.)

MOTHER: (*in a very amiable tone*)
Come, now, Kylyna. There beside the birch
The herbs are still fresh. There's hypericum,
You'd like to brew a pitcher of it, maybe?
It's really brings the milk on, dear, you know.

KYLYNA: But I've more milk now that I well can cope with!
Would that the fair was due, I'd buy a vat!
The cow I've got is Turkish breed – my late
Lamented picked her up somewhere – a milker,
Lord, what a one! But you know how it is,
I've the field work to do, and then I've got
To do the house on top of that. Oy, Auntie,
A widow's got to cut herself in two!

(*she puts on a woeful voice and pulls a long face*)

MOTHER: Well dear, but I'm sure you get through it somehow!
Goes without saying if someone's hard-working
And strong... But we, we've only a small plot.
But God gives us no respite...

KYLYNA: (*looking at the rye-plot, where MAVKA is standing*)
But who's that
You've reaping there?

MOTHER: That's a poor orphan lass,
(*in an undertone*)

But, God forgive me, she's not fit for much...

KYLYNA: (*approaching MAVKA with MOTHER*)
Good-day, lass! Is the reaping going well?

MOTHER: (*clasping her hands*)
O heaven help us, she's not even started.
O how life plagues me! What have you been doing!
You stupid, useless lazy good-for-nothing!

MAVKA: (*in a dull tone*)
I've cut my hand...

MOTHER: Indeed, I might have known it!

KYLYNA: Well, give the sickle here, and let me do it.
(*MAVKA hides the sickle behind her back, and looks at KYLYNA with enmity*)

MOTHER: Give her the sickle, then. It isn't yours!
(*She snatches the sickle out of MAVKA's hands and gives it to KYLYNA, who begins to reap like wildfire, so that the straw whistles under the sickle.*)

MOTHER: (*approvingly*)
Now that's what I call work!

KYLYNA: (*without breaking off her work*)
If someone could
Twist up the bands for me, then I could reap
The whole field in one go.

MOTHER: (*calling*) Lukash, come her!

LUKASH (*entering. To KYLYNA*)
God grant you strength!

KYLYNA: Thank you!

MOTHER: Lukash, you
Can help this fine young woman bind the sheaves.
Your "helper's" gone and cut herself already.

(LUKASH begins to bind the sheaves)

Well, reap away, my children, and I'll go
And get some fruit-soup boiling for your dinner.

(She goes into the house.

MAVKA goes to the birch-tree, and leaning against it, watches LUKASH and KYLYNA through the long branches.

For some time, KYLYNA continues to reap furiously, then she stops, stands up straight and looks at LUKASH bending over the sheaves, smiling to herself; in three long strides she goes over to him, and slaps him on the back.)

KYLYNA: Well, speed it up, lad! Don't crawl like a snail!
There's masses to do yet!

LUKASH: *(also straightening up)*

How fast you go!
But better not challenge me, for I'll win!

KYLYNA: *(puts down the sickle, and puts her hands on her hips)*
Indeed, indeed! Well, let us see who wins!

(LUKASH runs at her; she catches his arm, and they "try their strength", palm to palm; for a time they are balanced, then KYLYNA draws back a little, laughing hysterically and making eyes at him. LUKASH, heatedly, forces her arms wide apart and tries to kiss her, but just as his lips are about to touch hers, she trips him and he falls.)

KYLYNA: *(standing over him, laughing)*
Well, then? Who won? I beat you, didn't I?

LUKASH: *(getting up, breathing heavily)*
Cheating doesn't count as winning!

KYLYNA: No?

(A door bangs in the house. KYLYNA darts back to the reaping and LUKASH to binding the sheaves. Soon the plot is dark with stubble and covered with sheaves; while many other bundles of rye lie on the spread straw-bindings, like conquered prisoners who have not yet been fettered.)

MOTHER: *(from the lobby)*
Come along in, you reapers! Dinner's ready!

KYLYNA: Well, I've done all my part, but Lukash there
Has nowhere finished his.

LUKASH: I shan't be long.

MOTHER: Well, finish up! And you, come in, Kylyna!
(KYLYNA goes into the house. The door closes. MAVKA emerges from behind the birch.)

LUKASH: (*a little confused at seeing her, then pulling himself together*)
Aha, it's you? Well, come and bind the sheaves,
And I'll go in.

MAVKA: I cannot bind the sheaves.

LUKASH: Well, have you simply come out here to watch,
If you don't want to help?

(*he continues with the binding himself*)

MAVKA: Lukash, you mustn't
Let that woman come here any more, –
I do not like her; she's an evil creature,
She's like an otter!

LUKASH: You know nothing of her.

MAVKA: O yes, I know! I heard her laugh and voice.

LUKASH: That isn't much!

MAVKA: No, it is quite enough.
That woman's like a lynx, rapacious.

LUKASH: Really!

MAVKA: Don't let her come out here into our forest!

LUKASH: (*standing upright*)
Have you become queen of the forest then,
And pass decrees who may come in the forest,
And who may not?

MAVKA: (*sadly, and with menace*)
The forest has its pit-falls,
Well-hidden under bushes, under branches.
No animal, no human ever sees them,
Till they fall in...

LUKASH: Once again, you are talking
Of evil and rapacity. Be quiet!
I see I've never really known your nature!

MAVKA: And, maybe, I myself have never known it...

LUKASH: Well, listen here: If I have got to ask you
Every time who is allowed to come
To see me, and who not, I'd better leave
The forest and go settle in the village.
At least I'd not be lost there among people.
For I can't simply stay and sit with you
Like a fox in a trap!

MAVKA: I never set
A trap for you. You came of your own will.

LUKASH: And I'll go of my own will if I want,
No one has anything to bind me here?

MAVKA: And did I ever speak of binding you?

LUKASH: Oh, what's the point of all this conversation?

(He binds up the last sheaf and, without looking at MAVKA, goes into the house, MAVKA sits in a furrow, among the stubble, bowed in gloomy thoughts.)

UNCLE LEV: *(coming out of the house)*
What is the matter, lass, why are you grieving?

MAVKA: *(quietly and sadly)*
The summer's going, uncle!

LEV: Yes, for you,
That is grief! Indeed, I'm quite surprised
You don't yet need your willow for the winter.

MAVKA: And where am I to go, then?

LEV: As for me
I'd not feel cramped to have you in the house...
If but my sister had a different nature,
But one can't speak with her. I've tried already.
Well, that's the way it is... If only I
Were master here, you would not have to ask,
But I've made over land and house to them,
It's not my will counts here! I'm going back,
To winter in the village, in my home.
If you were able to live in a village,
I'd take you with me.

MAVKA: No, I cannot do it...
But if I could, I'd come. You're so good, uncle!

LEV: Bread is good, my lass, but people never.
But yet, in truth, I've somehow grown so close
To all you forest folk. And when it's time
To die, then beast-like I'll come to the forest,
Under that oak, there let them bury me.
Hey, oak, old friend, will you be standing there,
When this grey head of mine is in the dust?...
Well, once there were still greater oaks than this
But they've all been cut down. But you stay green,
My curly friend, right up until the frost,
And then... will God grant me to last till spring?

(He stands there, sadly leaning on a flail.

MAVKA slowly picks out the wilting flowers from the mown rye and gathers them into a posy.)

The MOTHER, KYLYNA and LUKASH emerge from the house)

MOTHER (to KYLYNA)

Why are you hurrying? Sit here awhile?

KYLYNA: No, Aunt, it's time I was on my way.
See, it is getting late, and I'm afraid.

MOTHER: Lukash, you could see her home...

LUKASH: Of course.

KYLYNA (looking at him)

But maybe there's some work to do...

MOTHER: What work

Is there to do at evening? Go, go son,
And see Kylyna home, right to her door.
It's gloomy in the evening in this forest.
And she is still a young and handsome woman, –
Suppose someone should pounce on her!

KYLYNA: Oh, Aunt,

Now you've got me completely terrified!
Lukash, let us be off before it's dark,
Or else we'll both of us be scared!

LUKASH: What, I?

Scared in the forest? Not a bit of it!

MOTHER: He is a fine bold lad, this son of mine,
Careful, Kylyna, don't offend his honour!

KYLYNA: No, I was only joking...
(*catching sight of UNCLE LEV*)

Uncle Lev?

Are you off home, then?

LEV (*pretending to mishear her*)

Huh? Well, then, goodbye.

(*he goes into the forest*)

KALYNA: Goodbye, and all the best to you, dear Auntie!

(*She attempts to kiss the MOTHER's hand, but the MOTHER will not let her, and, wiping her mouth on her apron, she kisses Kylyna three times, "ceremonially".*)

KYLYNA (*already on her way*)

Farewell I say, remember us, I pray.

MOTHER Goodbye, good cheer – and come back soon, my dear!

(*She goes into the house and fastens the door behind her*
MAVKA raises herself up and quietly, as if wearily, goes to the lake, sits down on the leaning willow, bows her head on to her hands, and quietly weeps.
A fine drizzle begins, covering clearing, house and forest with a dense net.)

RUSALKA (*Swimming up to the bank, and looking at MAVKA with surprise and interest*)

Are you weeping, Mavka?

MAVKA: And have you
Never wept, then, Rusalka dear?

RUSALKA: What, I?
If I weep only for one little minute,
Someone will have to laugh himself to death!

MAVKA: Rusalka, you have never been in love...

RUSALKA: I've never been in love? You have forgotten
Just what proper loving ought to be.
Loving is like the water, flowing, swift.
It rushes, plays, fondles, allures and drowns.
Where there is heat, it boils, where cold, it freezes,
Becomes as hard as stone. That is my loving!
But yours is but a frail will-o-the-wisp
A sickly infant. It sways in the wind,

Is trampled underfoot. It strikes a spark
But does not strive to burn, and from it there
Remains only black charcoal and grey ash..
And if it is rejected, tossed aside,
Then it lies down and rots away, like straw
In the cold water of a fruitless grief,
Under the late cold rainshowers of repentance.

MAVKA (*raising her head*)

You say repentance? Go and ask the birch
Whether she feels repentance for that night
When the springtime breeze unbraided all
Her flowing tresses?

RUSALKA: So, why does she grieve?

MAVKA: Because she cannot embrace her beloved,
Clasp him in her long boughs for evermore.

RUSALKA: Why so?

MAVKA: Because her love's the springtime breeze!

RUSALKA: Why did she fall in love with such as him?

MAVKA: Because he was gentle, that springtime zephyr,
Singing he tousled all her tender leaves,
Caressingly, he plucked apart her garland,
And, fondling, scattered dew upon her tresses...
Yes, yes, he truly was the springtime breeze,
And with no other could she fall in love.

RUSALKA: Well then, let her now droop her mournful grief
Down to the ground, for she cannot embrace
That breeze forever – he's flown off already.

(Quietly, without splashing, she swims away from the bank and disappears in the lake.)

MAVKA once again bows over, her long black hair falls to the ground. A wind springs up and heaps together grey clouds, and together with them black skeins of migrating birds. Then a stronger gust of wind blows away the rainclouds, and the forest becomes visible, already in bright autumn colours against the dense blue twilight sky.)

MAVKA (*quietly, with deep sorrow*)

Yes... he's flown off already...

FOREST ELF: Now I no longer am afraid for you.

(Nodding his head solemnly, he walks with measured step into the thicket, and disappears. BRUSHWOOD-ELF comes running out of the forest.)

MAVKA: You again?
(she starts to run away)

BRUSHWOOD ELF *(scornfully)*

Don't run, I don't want you.
I'd come to find Rusalka in the rye,
But I see she's asleep already. Pity!
But you have wilted somewhat.

MAVKA *(proudly)* So you think!

BRUSHWOOD ELF:
So I think, you say? Well, let me see!

(He moves towards her. MAVKA retreats.)

But why are you so terrified, I know
That you're betrothed.- I'm not going to attack you.

MAVKA: Be off! Don't mock me!

BRUSHWOOD ELF:
Don't be touchy! So
I was mistaken... Listen, Mavka, let us
At least be brother and sister.

MAVKA: You and I?

RUSHWOOD ELF: And why should we not be? Now we're in autumn?
For, look, even the sun has now grown cold.
And all our blood turns chilly. You and I
Once were good comrades, whether we but played
Or loved, after it's hard to say. But now
It's time for brotherhood. Give me your hand!

(MAVKA somewhat irresolutely gives him her hand.)

And let me place one small brotherly kiss
Upon your poor pale face.

(MAVKA draws away, but nevertheless, he kisses her.)

Oh, now at once
Flowers are blooming on that face once more,
Fair and chaste, unperfumed, autumnal flowers...

(without letting go of her hands, he looks round the clearing)

Look yonder, where the gossamer is flying,
Spiralling and circling in the air,
And so are we...

(He suddenly snatches her into a dance.)

And so are we,
Swirling and whirling.
In circle free,
Stars of the fairest,
Golden sparks rarest
Bright and lovely fires are flaring,
All is a-glitter,
All a-flitter
All in an unceasing skitter!
And so am I,
And so am I
And so, my love, like spark, come fly!

(The dance whirls rapidly. Mavka's silver veil curls upwards, like a glittering snake, her black resses strum out and mingle with the fiery curls of the BRUSHWOOD ELF.)

MAVKA: Enough, Let me go!

BRUSHWOOD ELF:

In sincere concord so
Do not cease, love, the dance ever plying,
Happiness may betray us:
So revel and play now,
Fine is that which forever is flying!

(the dance becomes mad)

Let us whirl,
Let us curl,
In the whirlwind, let us swirl,
Let us live,
Let us thrive,
In fiery heaven flying!

MAVKA: Enough, let me go. I'm fainting... I'm dying.

(her head falls on to his shoulder, her arms hang loose; BRUSHWOOD-ELF whirls her in the dance, fainting. Suddenly, from beneath the earth appears a dark, broad, terrible PHANTOM.)

PHANTOM: Render unto me what is mine. Release her!

BRUSHWOOD ELF (*stops, and unclasps his arms from MAVKA; she falls powerless on to the grass*)

BRUSHWOOD ELF: Who are you?

PHANTOM: Do you really not know me?
 I am the Rock-Dweller!

(BRUSHWOOD ELF shudders, and with a swift moment, runs and disappears into the wood. MAVKA recovers consciousness, stirs a little, opens her eyes wide, and looks with terror on the PHANTOM, which stretches out its arms to grasp her.)

MAVKA: No, I don't want to!
 I don't want to come to you! I'm alive.

ROCK-DWELLER: I will lead you to a distant land,
 An unknown land, where dark and tranquil waters
 Peacefully spread like dead and misty eyes,
 Above those waters there rise silent crags,
 Dumb witnesses of actions dead and gone.
 There it is peaceful, never tree nor bough
 Will whisper there, thither no daydream comes,
 No traitor daydream to keep one from sleep,
 No wind will ever carry thither songs
 Of unfulfilled desire, no greedy flame
 Will ever blaze there; the sharp lightnings shatter
 Themselves upon those crags, and have no power
 To penetrate in the dense dark and peace.
 There I shall take you. There you shall lie down,
 You are pale from the fire, you faint from movement,
 Your happiness is shade, you live no more.

MAVKA (*rising*) No, I am living! I shall live for ever.
 My heart holds something which will never die.

PHANTOM: How do you know this?

MAVKA: I know it because
 I love my torment and I give it life.
 If I could only wish I could forget,
 Indeed I'd be able to come with you.
 But there is no force in the whole wide world
 Which could make me wish for forgetfulness.

(In the forest there is heard the noise of some human being approaching.)

See, here he comes, he who gives me this torment!
Begone, you phantom. Here he comes, my hope!

(LUKASH emerges from the forest. MAVKA goes to meet LUKASH. Her face is deathly pale against her brilliant clothing, her great dark eyes are filled with an agonized hope her movements are abrupt and jerky, as if something is breaking inside her.)

LUKASH: How grim you look! What do you want with me?

(He hurries to the house, raps on the door, the MOTHER opens it, without coming out)

LUKASH *(on the threshold, to MOTHER)*

Mother, please bake the loaf for the match-makers,-
I'm sending them tomorrow to Kylyna!

(He goes into the house. The door is closed. The ROCK-DWELLER approaches MAVKA and seizes hold of her)


MAVKA *(tearing off the purple robe)*

Take me away! I want forgetfulness!

(The ROCK-DWELLER touches MAVKA; with a cry, she falls into his arms; he covers her with his black robe. Together, they sink into the earth.)

CURTAIN

Translated by Vera Rich



OLEH OLZHYCH (1907–44)

Oleh Olzhych (1907–44) was the son of the Ukrainian poet and dramatist, Oleksander Oles (see *The Ukrainian Review*, no. 2, 1994, pp. 59–60). He was born on 8 July 1907 in Zhytomyr, and, from 1923, lived in Prague – at that time a major centre of Ukrainian émigré life. Here he studied Archaeology at the Charles University, eventually becoming, in 1930, an assistant lecturer in the Department of Archaeology of the Ukrainian Free University, which was located at Podebrady, near Prague, and (under his real name – Oleh Kandyba) publishing scholarly works on the ceramics of the Trypillya (Tripole) culture.

As a political activist, he devoted his life to Ukraine's national liberation struggle, working on raising the consciousness of the Ukrainians of Transcarpathia, a region with a majority population of ethnic Ukrainians, which nevertheless, after World War I, had been incorporated into the new Czechoslovak republic.

His output as a poet was fairly modest in size. During his lifetime, he published only two collections: *Rin* (Gravel), in 1935, and *Vezhi* (Towers), 1940. A third collection, *Pidzamchya* (In the shadow of the castle) was brought out posthumously, in 1946, and a number of individual poems, published in the journals of the time, still remain uncollected. His significance in the development of Ukrainian literature is, however, considerable. In particular, his various experiments in the use of language and verse-forms considerably extended the scope of the Ukrainian literary language. As one small example of his subtle understating and uses of language, we may note, for example, in the selection given here, the untitled *rhyme riche* obtain beginning “Evening, I look on the blue rock-faces”, with its grammatical “pun” – the identity of spelling (exact in Ukrainian, but differenced by an apostrophe in English) between the vocative plural and genitive singular.

In addition to his original writing, Olzhych became, in 1934, one of the editors of the Prague-based journal *Proboyem* (Breakthrough), one of the most influential publications in the Ukrainian language of the inter-war years.

During World War II, Olzhych was arrested by the Nazis, and sent to Sachsenhausen concentration camp, where he died on 9 April 1944.

MORNING PRAYER

Not the bright peace of depths well loved and known
Of a transparent and unsullied learning,
Not orchid's golden inspiration, mounting
Out of its tenderness beyond all counting, –
Send to me, I pray, this gift alone:
In her name boldly to bear torments burning,
And in that dread, iron day, to pay, requiting,
In a grey jacket from grenade-burst dying.

* * *

Evening, I look on the blue rock-faces,
Golden, the sky rests on the rock-faces.
In the rear the fires splutter merry,
Round the hearths are comrades, also merry.

Ah, you strange unconquerable valleys!
The smoke pulses, flows out to the valley's
Side, and we, tomorrow too shall flow there,
Like a river unrestrained, shall flow there.

THE PROPHET

No dream this of years of childhood,
No musing of days of youthhood,
It is long since from green uplands
The girls came down to go dancing.

Long time past since figs were gathered,
No more breathe the vine-boughs heavy,
The streams flow no more with water –
But with stone, all black and arid.

O my eyes ablaze with fire,
And my lips grown grey and thirsty,
That behold the bright sun only,
So the one word, "Truth", be shouted!

So that women's faces yellow,
So that their attire grows heavy,
So that their wombs, moist and fruitful,
May become like empty vine-boughs.

So that shield and armour vanish,
Vestments be torn from the shoulders,
And with unrelenting knife-edge,
Men should fall upon their horses.

Clasp your hands upon your breast, then,
And defend the soul within you –
But let no one look for mercy –
I a stone am from God's labour.



YURIY LYPA

On the 50th anniversary of his tragic death

Petro Kindratovych

Yuriy Lypa, poet, publicist, political activist and doctor, one of the most influential figures in Ukrainian national thought in the inter-war years, died at the hands of the communists in August, 1944.

He was born in 1900, in Odessa, the son of Ivan Lypa, himself a writer and activist, who later, in 1918, was to become a minister in the government of the short-lived independent Ukrainian National Republic. Yuriy Lypa spent the inter-war years in Poland where he studied medicine at the University of Poznan, and later worked as a doctor. During World War II, until his death, he served in the medical department of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army.

His published works include poetry: the collections *Svitlist* (Brightness, 1925), *Suvorist* (Severity, 1929), *Viruyu* (I believe, 1938), and an "almost complete" edition of his poems, produced in Canada, in 1967, under the auspices of the (Canadian-based) Ukrainian Medical Society, a novel *Kozaky v Moskoviyi* (Cossacks in Muscovy, 1931), a collection of essays *Bitv za ukrayynsku literaturu* (The Battle for Ukrainian Literature, 1935), and also two works on herbal medicine: *Fitoterapiya* (Phytotherapy, 1933) and *Liky pid nohamy* (Medicines Underfoot, 1943).

The memorial tribute published below is by a member of the Lviv region memorial committee set up to organise the ceremonial commemoration of his death – Ed.

August 20, 1944 marks the 50th anniversary of the heroic death at the hands of the communists of Yuriy Lypa, a great patriot and son of Ukraine, writer, publicist, historiosophist, social and political activist, theoretician of Ukrainian nationalism, participant in the struggle for national liberation, by profession a physician and a teacher of medical personnel for the medical service of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army.

Yuriy Lypa was born on May 5, 1900, in Odessa, the son of Ivan Lypa, a well-known writer, social and political activist, who later [in 1918] would serve as a Minister in the Government of the Ukrainian National Republic.

The whole of Yuriy Lypa's literary output, at first poetry and later, especially, publicistics, was aimed at overcoming the feeling, held by many Ukrainians, of being "little Russians", their "national minority complex", and of creating a completely new pan-Ukrainian national and political "I", based on the joining together of all Ukrainians in the name of a common goal – the building of a great, independent Ukrainian state.

All of Lypa's patriotic, social and political activity, beginning with his induction as a Volunteer-Cossack into the Marines of the Ukrainian National Republic, and later, his illegal organisational and political work at the University of Poznan (where he was a student of medicine), the establishment in Warsaw of illegal research and publishing institutes dealing with questions of Ukrainian culture and identity, his direct active contacts with the Ukrainian insurgent movement in Volyn [Volhynia], Polissya and in Galicia from their first beginnings until the establishment of the pan-Ukrainian Ukrainian Insurgent Army, define the essence of his special national and political "I".

In his publicistic works, and especially in those which together constitute the *Trilogy of Pan-Ukrainian National and Political Thought* ("The Definition of Ukraine", "The Black Sea Doctrine", and "The Division of Russia"), Yuriy Lypa augmented the theory of Ukrainian nationalism of his predecessors and developed it to the level of contemporary needs and future prospects.

The appearance of Yuriy Lypa in Ukrainian society signified the manifestation by the Ukrainian nation of self-defence against foreign occupation, while he, Yuriy Lypa himself, has come down in history as a saviour of the Ukrainian nation.

In 1943, Yuriy Lypa left Warsaw for Ukraine, for Yavoriv. His arrival in Yavoriv fired the revolutionary spirit and insurgent movement in the area, while his tragic death invoked in the Ukrainian insurgents an upswelling of resolution, patriotism and sacrifice, and only reinforced their desire for vengeance.

From his arrival in Yavoriv in the spring of 1943, Lypa closely associated his life and activity with the Ukrainian insurgent movement: he was constantly involved in the training of nurses and paramedics for the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) and he himself treated members of that army in the villages and forests of the Yavoriv region, carried out specialist medical consultations, and prepared leaflets and appeals for the insurgents. At the beginning of July, 1944, when the Lviv region was under bombardment [by the Soviet Red Army] he categorically refused to go to the West; he and his family moved to the village of Buniv, near Yavoriv, from where he went to the village of Ivanyky, three kilometres from Buniv, which was the base of the UPA unit of Petrenko and a branch of the Ukrainian Red Cross and the insurgents' regional hospital.

Prior to the arrival of the NKVD, the UPA group made a tactical withdrawal into the Yavoriv forest. Lypa refused to go with them, hoping that by masquerading as a villager he could survive this critical moment. This was a fatal mistake, which cost him his life, and robbed Ukraine of a patriot, philosopher and great human being.

On August 19, 1944, at around mid-day, the NKVD ambushed him at a farm in Ivanyky, where his wife and two children were living. He was taken for interrogation to the neighbouring village of Shutova where he was killed the next day.

The villagers found his body under some builders' rubble, and buried it clandestinely in the Buniv cemetery. For a short time, there was a birch cross on his

grave, but the communists tore it down. The patriotic villagers of Buniv quietly kept watch over the grave, trying to keep the communists from finding out who was buried there, for fear they would desecrate it. The grave was preserved, and since 1989, it has been marked by two crosses, a birch one erected by the people of Buniv, and an oaken one from his daughter, Marta.

SAINT GEORGE

Nation, that was born of fire indeed,
Nation, mighty nation, watch and pray;
Radiant-armoured George, as in old days,
Once more sits upon his mighty steed;
A white avalanche, it seems, now speeds,
The crags' echoes make small hearts afraid,
Mist of poison scatters and recedes
From the radiance of that wondrous face;
Nation that was born of fire indeed,
Thy George comes now, resurrected bright,
See how he reins in his mighty steed,
Stretches out his arm to heaven's height.

CURSE

To homeless dogs that lick the bone of drought,
Do Thou grant shelter, Lord, in a warm refuge;
Show to the muddy toads a bunch of leaves,
And to the skylarks show their thorny nests.

But to those who sow rottenness of evils,
The murderers of souls, appear in wrath,
Pointing a road that has no further end –
Let them, with faces lunatic from fear,
Depart from out their own true native Land,
And find no other through eternity.



TWO LITTLE-KNOWN BELARUSIAN-UKRAINIAN CULTURAL CONTACTS

Usievalad Rahojsa

Until very recently, the name of the poet Hryts Chuprynka would have meant virtually nothing to the Belarusian reader. Even in Ukraine, this talented poet could only be mentioned, during the Soviet era, in a negative sense. But the history of Chuprynka's connections with Belarusian literature goes back a long way. Thus, even at the very beginning of the twentieth century, the Belarusian writer and *litterateur* Siarhiej Palujan became a friend of the Ukrainian poet. They were by no means of equal age – Palujan was younger than his Ukrainian brother-writer by eleven years. What was it that united them? Evidently, the unity of their views on national and political issues, the closeness of their literary and aesthetic tastes, and their work together for the Kyiv newspaper *Ukrayinska Khata*, from its very foundation in 1909.

Palujan was a lonely figure. The son of a poor Paleussian landowner, he had been thrown out of the family home by his father, on account of his commitment to the Belarusian revival and the dream of a future national, democratic and free Belarus. He made his way to Kyiv, the nearest centre of intellectual life, where he eked out a precarious living as a journalist. His friendship with Chuprynka seems to have been the one bright spot in his existence – indeed the strength of the bond between these two impoverished writers is witnessed by the fact that at one point they made a kind of undated suicide pact: if at some time one of them decided to kill himself, so would the other. And, indeed, in 1910, losing hope in a better future, and having no reliable material support, Siarhiej Palujan did, indeed, commit suicide. But, just at that time, Chuprynka had found the support he needed – first and foremost in the person of an unexpected benefactor, Oleksa Kovalenko, who collected and published at his own expense all the poet's works. It was probably this fact which kept Chuprynka from keeping his pledge to Palujan and committing suicide, and allowed him to live another eleven difficult, but fruitful, years.

Nevertheless, Chuprynka clearly was not easy in his conscience about surviving his friend, as the following poem reveals – a poem dedicated to Palujan, and entitled "At a comrade's grave"

Speak to me from the grave, friend, tell me rightly,
Is it worth so to abide
In that faith so holy, so glowing, so mighty,
In which you lived and you died?

Speak truly from your long home, tell the reason, –
Is it worth so this life to lose –
Or should one, despairing, turn towards treason,
And betraying so, other gods choose?

For, without will or power, long we were roaming,
With shards of the faith of warriors long-past,
Like living corpses without death nor tombing,
Seeking with the dead to be at last.

I know that faith is no more needful, even,
For him who like sleepwalker, in the mist roams,
But is it now surging and surging to heaven
Or with the worthless corpse hid in the tomb?

*

In the Lviv Museum of Ukrainian Art there is preserved a painting by Taras Shevchenko – a portrait of his father. On a fairly small piece of paper, mounted on white card, is a pen-and-wash ink full-length picture of the poet's father – a typical Ukrainian peasant of that time in a shirt, with a wide girdle, and wide "Zaporozhian" trousers, tucked into boots. Under the painting is written in Ukrainian: "This is my father".

Today even the museum staff do not know how one of the earliest paintings of the Ukrainian poet and artist came into their collection. We can learn about this, however, from a short item published in 1921 in the Belarusian newspaper *Kryvica*.

The portrait of Shevchenko's father was presented to the Lviv Museum of Ukrainian Art by the famous Belarusian scholar, archaeologist and activist, and founder of the Belarusian Museum in Vilnius, Ivan Luckievic. Shevchenko had painted the portrait of his father in 1829, in Vilnius, when he came there, as a fifteen-year-old serf-boy, in the entourage of his master, Engelhardt. The latter, who had noticed the boy's talent and who felt it would be an asset to have a trained artist among his serfs, sent Shevchenko to study painting with Professor Jan Rustem of Vilnius University. During his stay in Vilnius, Shevchenko kept the picture of his father, mounted in a frame, hanging in his room. But when he left with Engelhardt for St Petersburg, it was left behind, and sold off together with the furniture and other effects. For some years, the portrait of Shevchenko senior adorned a Jewish shop, where it eventually caught the eye of Luckievic, who acquired it and returned it to Ukraine. ■

KINGIR, 1954

This year, in addition to the anniversaries of such major figures in Ukrainian history and culture as the bicentenary of the death of the philosopher Hryhoriy Skovoroda, the fiftieth anniversary of the death of the head of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, Metropolitan Andrey Sheptytskyi, and of writers Oleksander Oles, Oleh Olzhych and Yuriy Lypa, Ukrainians throughout the world have been paying tribute to the memory of some 500 Ukrainian women, who in 1954 were crushed to death by Soviet tanks, during a protest strike in the concentration camp, at Kingir, Kazakhstan.

MEDITATION

*On the death of 500 Ukrainian women, crushed to death
by Soviet tanks, during a strike in the concentration
camp of Kingir, Kazakhstan, 1954.*

So always she has fought,
Woman against the dark, the cold, the hunger
That draw a steely ring round the lighted hearth,
Fighting for child, for husband, sweetheart, brother,
And from the dawn of chaos, building life
Out of the shreds and nothings of the void.
She has fought hunger in the miles of bread-queues,
Has wrestled death back from a midnight cradle,
She lives, her tenderness to sheathe the sword
Of tempered spirit burnished into fight.

So always she has fought,
And when the dark, the cold, the hunger threaten
Ranged in the massing ranks of tyranny,
She fights, no more for life, but a dearer freedom,
Nurse, messenger or soldier, takes her stand
Fighting beside her brothers; some in secret,
Some in the glory of a heroic scaffold,
Starvation, or the dawn-lit firing party,
Her soul alive and free, she laughs at death.

So always she has fought,
And these five hundred, ranked in a hopeless chain,
Clasped hands against the grinding wheels of death.
A last calm stand, the hopeless for the hopeless,
Vain sacrifice, the doomed to save the doomed,
What of their glory? Not the emblazoned name,
The portrait shrined by future generations,
The medals voted tear-proud relatives –
Joined in the anonymity of death
They have no names but “sister”, “wife” and “mother”,
No dying dreams of family or home,
But a sure smile that clasps a martyred nation,
Gathers the last soul orphaned of its freedom
And, in defiance of sharp-gear'd destruction
Cries: “You that shall triumph – are our eternal children !”

Vera Rich

Reprinted from *Portents and Images*,
London, 1963.

News From Ukraine

Politics

Ukrainian TV-Radio Boss Fired

KYIV, August 30 — President Kuchma sacked the president of the state broadcasting company — “Derzhtele-radio” — in an attempt to give Ukraine’s dull, Soviet-style television and radio a facelift, his spokesman said.

“It’s been necessary for a long time to start transforming state television into something contemporary and competitive”, Mykhailo Doroshenko, press secretary, said.

Kuchma appointed Kyiv newspaper editor Oleksander Savenko, 39, to replace veteran Mykola Okhmayevych, who headed the state radio and television company for 15 years. He has come under sharp attacks by many Ukrainian broadcast journalists for hampering the development of the credible Ukrainian television and radio company. Okhmayevych reportedly remained in the position so long because of his close relations with former president Leonid Kravchuk.

The broadcasting company’s vice president, Zynoviy Kulyk, said that only more money, not new leadership, would bring real changes.

“Trying to reform Ukrainian television is absolutely hopeless. The system is stronger than any new leadership. It needs to be rebuilt from the bottom up”, Kulyk told Reuters.

Kuchma blasted state television during the presidential campaign last spring, accusing it of devoting most of its air time to his opponent, incumbent Leonid Kravchuk.

Ukrainian television has changed little since Soviet times, when it was an arm of the Communist Party’s propaganda machine. Nightly news broadcasts include long features on farming and culture, with minimal political analysis or talk shows.

Most viewers get their news from the Russian Ostankino station which is broadcast throughout the former USSR.

Udoenko Appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs

KYIV — Hennadiy Udoenko, former long-time permanent representative of Ukraine at the United Nations, has been appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs by President Kuchma as he continues to replace members of the Cabinet of Ministers with his own appointees.

The appointment of Udoenko, who, until recently, was Ukraine’s ambassador to Poland, must be con-

firmed by the Parliament when it returns from its summer break in mid-September.

Udovenko, who was born in 1931 in Kryvyi Rih, is a career foreign service officer and diplomat. He has held the diplomatic rank of extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador since 1985 and was deputy foreign minister in 1980-85.

He graduated from the Department of International Relations at the Taras Shevchenko Kyiv State University in 1954. His first assignment was with the Ukrainian Scholarly-Research Institute of Economics and Agriculture.

Udovenko's first major diplomatic post came in 1965, when he was assigned to the United Nations office in Geneva. In 1977 he began working with the UN Secretariat in New York.

From 1985 to 1992 Udovenko was the permanent representative of Ukraine at the United Nations, eventually becoming one of the senior diplomats at the international body. After the declaration of Ukrainian independence on 24 August 1991, Udovenko, the dean of the Ukrainian diplomatic corps, became the *de facto* chief representative of Ukraine in the United States. During the early months of Ukraine's independence he divided his time between working at the United Nations and travelling to Washington to present Ukrainian views on key issues of the day.

In September 1992 Udovenko was named Ukrainian ambassador to Poland.

In the course of his diplomatic career, Udovenko represented Ukraine at many international organi-

sations and at various sessions of the United Nations. He chaired meetings of the UN General Assembly, the Security Council, and the Economic and Social Council. He also served as chairman of various special economic and political committees of the General Assembly.

On the eve of the third anniversary of Ukrainian independence, editors of the Ukrainian newspaper *Homin* in Poland asked him about Ukrainian-Russian relations. He replied, "I want to emphasise that our cooperation with Russia will only be built on the basis of the sovereignty and independence of our state. At the same time we will develop our relations with other European countries".

The official announcement of Udovenko's appointment stated that the previous foreign minister, Anatoliy Zlenko, was replaced in view of a new assignment, which official sources said will be an ambassadorial post.

Civilian Named Defence Minister

KYIV — For the first time in the recent history of Ukraine, a civilian has been named the country's Minister of Defence. President Leonid Kuchma appointed Valeriy Shmarov, a native of the Vinnytsia region, to the post on Friday, August 26, pending parliamentary ratification on September 15, when the legislature convenes.

Shmarov, 49, who until recently was deputy minister in charge of the military-industrial complex and defence conversion, was born in 1945.

An engineer by profession, Shmarov graduated from Kyiv State University in 1972. He spent most of his career in the defence industry. He worked as a director of a Kyiv defence plant from 1987-92. From 1992-93 he was the first deputy chairman of the National Space Agency of Ukraine.

Shmarov's predecessor, General Vitaliy Radetskyi, who succeeded independent Ukraine's first defence minister General Kostyantyn Morozov in October 1993, was relieved pending reassignment.

Pynzenyk Named Kuchma's Adviser

KYIV – President Leonid Kuchma, due to present an economic reform package to parliament, created on September 16 a council of economic advisers to help elaborate policies.

Kuchma issued a series of decrees setting up the nine-member council dominated by reform-minded economists.

Its most prominent member is Viktor Pynzenyk, a member of parliament and a former deputy prime minister who last year quit the government of Kuchma's predecessor, Leonid Kravchuk, saying he was being hindered in proceeding with reforms.

Other members include the head of one of Ukraine's largest banks and top academics.

Kravchuk Wins Seat in Parliament

KYIV – Leonid Kravchuk, the former first president of Ukraine to be popularly elected after independence, won a seat from western Ukraine in the country's parliament on September 25.

Kravchuk said the following day he wanted to help the current administration to develop Ukrainian statehood.

Kravchuk, who was beaten in the July presidential elections by Leonid Kuchma, won the seat in a single run-off election with 87 per cent of the vote in Terebovlya.

Kravchuk's challenger for a seat in the 450-seat parliament, Mykola Novosilskyi, a candidate of the Ukrainian Conservative-Republican Party, headed by Stepan Khmara, got only 10 per cent of the votes, said Valentyn Kirnenko, deputy chairman of the Central Electoral Commission. Unlike many recent elections in Ukraine, turnout in the western Ternopil region was high, with 85 per cent of the eligible voters casting ballots.

Kravchuk, 60, said he intends to establish his own political party and rebuild his power base.

"I plan to create a union of patriotic, democratic and centrist forces, which unite a wide political spectrum... I don't plan on joining the right or the left – the centrists appeal to me most", Kravchuk said. "I don't think I would like to be in opposition. To the contrary – in parliament I want to help the government and the president to develop Ukrainian statehood".

Kravchuk declined to pass judgement on Kuchma's tenure in office, saying "one does not criticise the president's first 100 days". But he said the same problems he faced as president remain, and gave that as his reason for running for a parliamentary seat. "Ukraine needs to be

protected and my goal is to continue working for the good of Ukraine – no matter in what position”.

“Victory is always pleasant. The main thing is that I have found proof that people still value my work of the past three years. And it also proves that people still value independence”.

Kravchuk is the 393rd member of Ukraine's first democratically elected parliament. The remaining 57 seats in parliament will be filled with elections in November.

Foreign Affairs

Baltic-Black Seas Alliance Seen as Hope Against Russian Expansion

KYIV — Feeling threatened by Russia's newest imperial device, encapsulated in the concept called the “Eurasian Region”, seven Ukrainian political parties, among them the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists (KUN), and political institutions from eastern Europe have formed a Baltic-Black Seas Alliance to thwart a possible rejuvenated expansion by Moscow from eastern Europe to Vladivostok.

Called in translation “League of Parties Between the Seas”, its founders expressed hope that it will be transformed into a bulwark against Moscow's imperialistic drives. The Eurasian Region, an arrangement which has its supporters in the new Kyiv government, with a political centre in Moscow, they fear,

would return Russia to its previous dominant position in the region.

Mykhailo Horyn, chairman of the Ukrainian Republican Party and a former people's deputy, said the signing ceremony on July 30 in the former premises of the Central Rada of 1917-20, was an historic event. Horyn, one of the promoters of the alliance, explained that one of the goals of this parliamentary-based alliance is to institute closer contacts and cooperation between political parties in the Baltic-Black Seas region.

“After many years this is an attempt to create a commonwealth and an expression of mutual interests and desires to remain independent states and to prohibit neoimperialism”, Horyn said.

“Actually this is a counterbalance to Russian imperialism. This is an association to disassociate ourselves from Russia”, observed Bohdan Pavliv, second vice-president of the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists.

Pavliv further noted that it would be inappropriate to overlook organisations such as the Antibolshevik Bloc of Nations, which should exist as long as there are Ukrainian colonies inside the Russian Federation. “Everything that is directed against the empire should be welcomed”, he said.

Instead of submitting themselves to a process of integration with Russia, the representatives of the political parties have set their sights on integration in central and eastern Europe, which would consolidate as reality the statehood of its members.

Among the Ukrainian political parties present at the signing were KUN, the

Ukrainian Republican Party, the Democratic Party of Ukraine, Rukh, the Party of Greens, the Party of the Democratic Rebirth of Ukraine, and the Social-Democratic Party of Ukraine.

The non-Ukrainian parties which joined the League included: the National Front of Belarus, the United Democratic Party of Belarus, "Fatherland" (Estonia), For the Fatherland and Freedom, the National Conservative Party (Latvia), the Conservative Party of Lithuania, the Lithuanian National Association, the Confederation for an Independent Poland, the Republican Party of Poland (Third Force), and the Third Movement of the Republic (of Poland).

Also present were representatives of political parties in Bulgaria and Romania, who, along with counterparts from other central and east European political institutions, are expected to join the League in the near future.

The alliance's founding document states:

"In order to coordinate the efforts to strengthen peace, security and multilateral cooperation in central and eastern Europe, acknowledging the importance of political guarantees of these processes, we, representatives of political parties in the countries between the Baltic, Black and Adriatic Seas, declare the establishment of the League of Parties of Countries in the Baltic-Black-Adriatic Region (Between the Seas).

The League is a voluntary association of political parties that have representatives in the parliaments of their respective countries.

The political parties, which acceded to this document agree to:

Conduct regular inter-partisan consultations about the most important questions of international bilateral and multilateral relations.

Establish a permanent representative, consultative organ from among the representatives of the parties, which acceded to this document.

Through partisan factions in the parliaments of their countries:

To encourage the development of bilateral and multilateral relations among the countries Between the Seas.

To encourage the expansion of cooperation between the countries Between the Seas and the countries of the European Union".

As regards the League's premise as a counterbalance to the Eurasian Region, the section dealing with the goals and purposes states:

"Encourage military cooperation of the states Between the Seas.

Conduct a wide-scale information campaign regarding the baseless attempts by official diplomatic circles of Russia to endow the CIS, which is not a state, with the status of a subject of international rights.

Oppose attempts by Russia, as an imperial recidivist, to have its armed forced declared United Nations peacekeeping forces.

Support the demands by political parties in Estonia, Latvia, Belarus and Ukraine for the withdrawal of Russian military units from the territories of these independent states.

Support the idea of a demilitarised Kaliningrad Oblast".

During the press conference at the conclusion of the signing ceremony, Dmytro Pavlychko, chairman of the Democratic Association "Ukraine",

stated: "Many forces have joined the efforts to save the empire. However, without Ukraine, the empire cannot exist. Consequently, those forces want to include Ukraine in the Eurasian Region. We have united in order to include ourselves in Europe because the geographical centre of Europe is in Ukraine".

Among the League's immediate goals are to publish the proceedings of the inaugural conference, establish the groundwork for the upcoming conference, which will be held in Poland, expand its membership throughout central and eastern Europe as well as Scandinavia. The League is also planning to form an interparliamentary commission on ethnic minority rights. Between conferences the League will be rotationally administered by each national representation.

Based on its strong desire to become a full-fledged member of the European Community, when asked about Russia's possible membership, the political leaders unanimously stated that, because of Moscow's Asiatic slant, it cannot attempt to join the League.

Regarding Kuchma's views on Ukraine's regional role, the President of Ukraine expressed his views at a July 22 meeting with the foreign diplomatic corps based in Kyiv. He said, "Let's not fool ourselves with the question where is Ukraine heading, west or east. Ukraine does not need to head anywhere. It is there, where history and geography, and, allow me, God, placed it — at the edge between Europe and that, which today is called the Eurasian continent. Ukraine should not be a buffer, but a useful bridge, a useful liaison".

Chinese President Meets with Kuchma; Two Leaders Pledge Tight Relations

KYIV — Chinese President Jiang Zemin spent almost an hour in private talks with President Leonid Kuchma shortly after arriving here on Tuesday afternoon, September 6, for a three-day visit to Ukraine.

The two leaders confirmed their intent to strengthen an already solid relationship between China and Ukraine, a Chinese official said. "Our goal is to work together with Kuchma in mutually convenient relations that will bring us into the 21st century", Wu Jianmin, head of the Chinese delegation's information service, told journalists after the meeting.

The two countries are already major trading partners, with yearly trade equalling almost \$600 million, up 77 per cent from last year. It was confirmed that Ukraine would not recognise Taiwan or post representatives there, Wu said.

The two countries signed five documents on Tuesday. These included a cooperation agreement between the two presidents, an agreement on naval trade and shipping, on postal and electronic communication, and on cooperation between the interior and foreign ministries.

Jiang is still scheduled to meet with parliamentary speaker Oleksander Moroz and with Prime Minister Vitaliy Masol. Also scheduled is a visit to an electronic welding plant.

China is one of Ukraine's largest trading partners, according to the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry, which hopes the Chinese summit will solidify relations and boost trade.

"We put enormous hope on the results of this visit, that they will be successful and that we will be able to deepen our relations with China", Oleksander Nikonenko, deputy head of the Far East Administration at the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry, told a press briefing earlier on Tuesday.

This means increasing the current trade turnover to bring it up to \$3.5 billion by the end of this century. "Today China is our main trading partner in all of Asia as far as volume is concerned", he said.

Nikonenko declined to give any concrete details on Ukrainian-Chinese trade in the area of military hardware or to confirm whether any military deals will be signed while the Chinese delegation is in Ukraine.

"The question of military technology will be raised", said Nikonenko. "One could say both sides would be interested in an agreement, but none has been planned for this visit".

Jiang flew to Kyiv from four days in Russia, which began with a Kremlin summit with President Boris Yeltsin and ended with a trip to the Ural Mountain city of Yekaterinburg. The Chinese-Russian summit produced a new declaration of cooperation, a border accord, and an agreement on missile detargeting. The two countries also discussed increasing their trade, which is down 40 per cent from last year's \$7.7 billion peak.

Ukraine Keeps CIS at Arms' Length

MOSCOW — Despite President Leonid Kuchma's campaign pledges to bring Ukraine closer to Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent

States, the Ukrainian delegation here for a CIS head of governments meeting shocked the participants by refusing to sign two of three documents.

Ukraine made it clear on Friday, September 9, that it would seek to maintain its detached stance within the CIS. At the first meeting of CIS premiers since July's election of Kuchma, Ukraine shied away from aspects of plans for developing ties within the Moscow-dominated bloc.

"Russia has to understand that there is no alternative to an independent, integral Ukraine. There is no return to the past. There can be no return to supranational structures in their old form", Ukraine's acting Foreign Minister Hennadiy Udovenko told reporters.

Journalists covering the meeting highlighted in their stories the conflicts between Ukraine and Russia. Reuters, for one, wrote, "Disagreements have focused on the Black Sea fleet, Ukrainian payments for energy supplies and other strategic issues. Kuchma, elected in July, predicated his campaign on building an economic union with Russia to reestablish broken Soviet era economic ties. Some Russian leaders said Kuchma would be more "realistic" in economic policy and in his approach to the CIS. However, once elected, he also made clear Ukraine would pursue independent policies".

Ukraine declined to sign a draft agreement on the creation of a payments union between the 12 members of the CIS, saying it would be premature. "Each country will participate in this union taking account of its own national interests", Ukrainian Prime Minister Vitaliy Masol told reporters.

Ukraine also declined to embrace the provisions of a draft memorandum on the development of CIS integration, which sought, among other things, to foster military political cooperation.

"The direction of our cooperation is exclusively in the area of military technology. That is, there is no question of joint military action or of a military union", said Ukrainian First Deputy Defence Minister Ivan Bizhan.

Kyiv also disagreed with a provision envisaging joint control of CIS borders, insisting this was an internal matter for each state, and on proposals for joint peacekeeping within the Commonwealth.

However, Ukraine did agree to sign an agreement to create a CIS inter-state economic committee, the first body within the CIS to have supranational powers. Each country's power within the committee, which will be able to enforce decisions on signatories, will depend on its "economic weight". Officials said Russia would have 50 per cent of the votes out of 80 per cent needed to pass decisions, compared with a 14 per cent share for Ukraine.

Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan did not sign the agreement. "Our parliament has not given me powers to sign this document", Azerbaijan's Prime Minister Suren Huseinov told reporters. "The idea of this committee as a controlling and executive organ does not correspond to Azerbaijan's interests". Turkmenistan's delegation members said they would decide whether to join in the CIS premiers' summit due in October.

Masol explained that Ukraine needed to sign this document

because it gave Ukraine's producers access to Russian markets.

The Interstate Economic Committee will coordinate energy, transport and communications ties and control common property of the CIS countries. But it will also be authorised to enforce some decisions in those CIS members which had delegated powers to it.

"For the first time, leaders of the states will have to pluck up courage and responsibility and abandon a part of their national functions... and determine the limits of the powers which they agree to pass over to the committee", CIS Executive Secretary Ivan Korotchenya said in a statement.

"Russia will always be able to find another state, a companion, to ensure a decision is passed", Russian CIS Minister Vladimir Mashchits told reporters.

Explaining the reason for the payments union, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Aleksander Shokhin told reporters, "The creation of a payments union on the basis of bilateral and multilateral agreements will create a monetary system not worse than in the European Union".

Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, pushing the concept of deeper integration, told the meeting that improving ties between the republics was an urgent task. "It took 35 years to create the European Union; we do not have that time", he said in an opening address.

Udoenko Outlines Independent Ukrainian Foreign Policy

UNITED NATIONS – Setting Ukraine's foreign policy goals and priorities at the 49th Session of the General Assembly

of the United Nations, Foreign Minister Hennadiy Udovenko emphasised that Kyiv rejects external pressure and polarisation and will conduct its own, independent foreign platform.

Udovenko, speaking on Wednesday, September 28, in the General Assembly, where he had served for many years as Permanent Representative of Ukraine, listed many factors which contributed to drastic, yet positive, transformations around the world. However, he underscored that one recent development will not change: Ukraine will not lose its independence.

"The state policy of Ukraine will be consistently based on that authority which was established by the Ukrainian people when it almost unanimously confirmed its choice of independent development during the national referendum held in December 1991. This reality is predominant and rumours that Ukraine will eventually lose its sovereignty are absolutely unfounded. We will continue to follow the path of building an independent state and a return to the situation that prevailed in the former USSR is impossible", Udovenko said in the opening minutes of his speech.

Udovenko outlined for the international diplomatic corps a foreign policy, which will accentuate bi- and multilateral relations with individual countries and regions rather than a merely strong association with Russia. Answering a rhetorical question which is on the minds of many statesmen, namely, where is independent Ukraine heading, Udovenko said:

"Today, the world is becoming more integrated, and political marks

of geographical affiliation of countries disappear step-by-step. Ukraine, like any other state, cannot just simply 'go' East or West. It is there, where it has been for ages and where it will stay forever. Its many tasks as an historically old but politically young state consists of integrating gradually in the European and world political, economic, humanitarian and other processes as a reliable link in a new global system of international relations".

Ukraine intends to develop "mutually beneficial and equitable cooperation" with Russia and the other countries of the CIS, but among equally important target countries and regions that Udovenko listed are: the United States, Germany, Canada, countries of Central and Eastern Europe, countries of Asia, China and Japan, as well as other countries of the Pacific Rim, Africa and Latin America.

"That is to say that the sphere of our interests is very large. I would like to emphasise that on the international level, Ukraine will protect its national interests, including economic ones, with increasing dynamism and pragmatism", he added.

At the same time, Udovenko continued, Ukraine reserves the right to make "corrections", in its foreign policy which despite domestic changes "remains as President Leonid Kuchma stated predictable, consistent and weighted".

Though Ukraine is committed to carrying out its foreign obligations, Udovenko said that the country is facing many domestic problems

which affect the pace of implementing its promises. "The wave of political romanticism gave way to severe hardships in the political, social and economic lives of the newly-independent states, which emerged out of the former Soviet Union", he observed.

Borrowing from two popular novels, Udovenko characterised the mood in those countries as "great expectations, gone with the wind".

Udovenko noted that neither those problems nor that mood bypassed Ukraine and, while the country is struggling to fulfil its pledges, it only recently experienced foreign understanding of its fate. Despite these good intentions, Ukraine is encountering reluctance on the part of its foreign partners to appreciate the essence of its difficulties.

"The reality of the current situation of Ukraine consists of the fact that so far we still are under pressure and suspicion from the outside, and sometimes we encounter open reluctance to understand the essence of problems we face", Udovenko said.

Ukraine's goal is to overcome the "economic crisis, normalise the social and economic situation, create favourable domestic and international conditions for gradually raising living standards of the population", he indicated. To accomplish this task, he urged, Ukraine needs foreign investments, which should be attractive to the international community "because, owing to its geopolitical situation, the establishment of Ukraine as a sovereign and economically powerful state is one of the important factors of securing

peace and stability on the European continent".

Udovenko called economic support for Ukraine an "investment into the strengthening of international security".

The collapse of the Soviet Russian empire led to the establishment of many countries that are in transition to market economies, among them Ukraine, the Minister said. However, rather than helping these countries in transition, the economic powers restrict their aid to polite diplomatic declarations, he charged. "It seems that donor-states, while declaring their support for the implementation of reforms in countries in transition, nevertheless are too cautious in providing adequate support to specific projects in Eastern Europe and CIS countries. Such an attitude is becoming a serious problem", Udovenko explained.

Ukraine expects that international organisations, such as the World Trade Organization and GATT, will create a favourable trade climate for boosting exports from countries of that region, "particularly Ukraine", he urged.

As part of its international obligations, Ukraine is contributing its troops to the UN Peacekeeping Forces in the former Yugoslavia, where nine of its soldiers have been killed and 30 wounded. While Ukraine does not intend to renege on this or other world-wide commitments, Udovenko requested UN understanding that the sanctions imposed on the Balkans have cost Ukraine \$4 billion in lost business. "Collective actions aimed at imple-

menting coercive measures cannot be carried out on such an unfair basis. This increases the danger of losing confidence in the institute of sanctions", he warned.

Due to the changing nature of international peacekeeping operations, Udovenko said, Ukraine is proposing the establishment of rapid deployment forces, "which would recruit volunteers and have an ex-territorial nature. Ukraine has already declared its readiness to take part in this process".

Turning to security matters, Udovenko said that Ukraine, as a European country, is deeply concerned with this issue. At a time when the Partnership for Peace, NATO, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and even the United Nations are becoming incapable of guaranteeing peace and security, Udovenko stated that Ukraine "strongly supports initiatives aimed at all-European cooperation in different fields, including security".

"Ukraine advocates exactly such an approach, i.e., strengthening partnership and cooperation in an all-European dimension, instead of searching for new geometrical figures, which, in fact, would secure division of the small as it is, in respect of global scale, European continent", he said.

One step in this direction is "confidence building" in the Black Sea region, Udovenko noted. "This region is extremely important for us as a crossroads between Europe and Asia, North and South. Elaboration and implementation of specific confidence-building measures in military and political fields in the Black Sea

would promote good neighbourly relations, political and economic cooperation of Black Sea countries".

As for Ukraine's nuclear arsenal, which Udovenko said has been consistently on the minds of the international community, the Minister attempted to calm global anxieties about Kyiv's plans. "It should be emphasised that Ukraine is the first state in the world which voluntarily and unilaterally assumed the obligation to eliminate nuclear weapons located on its territory", he said.

Pointing out that Ukraine means to become a non-nuclear state, Udovenko said that before parliament ratifies this decision, Kyiv requires an agreement from the nuclear states guaranteeing the national security of Ukraine.

"Ukraine stands for corresponding guarantees which are to be multilateral and addressed directly to Ukraine as the state, which for the first time in history, on its own, is getting rid of nuclear weapons; these guarantees should provide a mechanism of consultations which could come into play should the security of Ukraine be threatened. In this process, we attach great importance to the United Nations as the most authoritative international organisation", Udovenko remarked.

Kuchma's Chief of Staff Discusses Bilateral Relations

WASHINGTON, DC – Dmytro Tabachnyk, President Kuchma's Chief of Staff, at 31, is one of the youngest people in Ukrainian politics.

Visiting the United States to discuss with the White House staff and the

State Department the upcoming visit of Ukraine's president, Tabachnyk took time to speak at a press conference at the National Press Club on Thursday, September 29. He was escorted by the chargé d'affaires of the Ukrainian Embassy, Valeriy Kuchynskyi, and press attaché, Dmytro Markov, who acted as interpreter.

Tabachnyk discussed the politics of Ukraine's current administration. "Ukraine celebrated its third anniversary of independence and for the first time in its history there was a democratic change in all the branches of government. This has proved that democratic reforms in Ukraine are very viable", Tabachnyk said.

However, because of the changes he is often asked what changes there will be in the country's foreign policy. Will it lean more to the East or to the West?

To answer this question, Tabachnyk used an excerpt from President Kuchma's campaign statement, saying "Ukraine will not lean this way, or that. Ukraine will stay where it is, according to its destiny, its history and geography".

Tabachnyk went on to say that the world is changing and policies must change in order to accommodate those changes but one thing will always remain the same and this is the devotion and loyalty to the idea of the independence and sovereignty of Ukraine.

The Kuchma administration is introducing certain changes in its policy towards the Russian Federation and other countries of the CIS, which will be orientated towards mutual equality and interest. However, he noted, "no matter how our relations

continue to develop, it will in no way affect our attitude towards our relationship with the West".

In principle, he said, Kuchma is very interested in continuing to develop relations with the West, in particular the United States, Germany and Canada.

"If I were asked what was the main difference between the new leadership and the one before it, I would say that the period of romanticism is over. The new government will be approaching solutions to all problems from a pragmatic position of common sense and the economic value of the decision which is made".

Responding to a question about Ukraine's reaction to the possible influence of Russia on Ukraine, Tabachnyk answered that "Ukraine will be choosing its own partners and will develop its own world outlook".

When asked about Russian President Boris Yeltsin's postponement of his trip to Ukraine, Tabachnyk explained that both presidents felt that they could attain a higher level of summitry if they were to delay it for a few more weeks.

Discussing whether President Kuchma will be accorded the same diplomatic courtesies as was his Russian counterpart, including a state dinner, Tabachnyk said that Vice-President Gore indicated during his visit to Kyiv that Ukraine was a high priority for Washington. Tabachnyk expected that similar protocols will be observed and the visit would be on as high a level as Yeltsin's visit. ■

Books & Periodicals

Trevor Taylor, EUROPEAN SECURITY AND THE FORMER SOVIET UNION – Dangers, Opportunities, Gambles, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1994, 176 pp, £9.95

This is an unashamedly Western-orientated book. Its aim is to determine and analyse the new security issues which the West must address, as a result of the demise of the Soviet Union. At the same time it focuses on the potential impact of three factors “carried forward” from the Cold War – “the role of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) as a sort of successor entity to the Soviet Union, the importance of the Russian government, and the centrality of NATO to Western policies”.

Taylor is concerned, therefore, with identifying military threats and security risks as seen from a Western perspective. At the outset, he rejects the possibility of a frontal attack by an ex-Soviet state on the heartland of the West as “remote”. Only Russia has the conventional forces which could attempt such a penetration, and the disruption in both the Russian defence industry and its conscription arrangements make – for the moment – such an attack seem remote, particularly as – from the end of 1994 onwards –, to reach the west of heartland Europe, this putative invasion force would have to cross Belarus, Ukraine and Poland. But Taylor is not blind to the possibility of a flanking attack. He rejects the triumphalism of “one Ukrainian author”, who claimed that “The Soviet threat to the West which existed for over seven decades, was removed at one stroke by the December 1991 vote by Ukraine for independence”. Two NATO states, Norway and Turkey, he points out, still share a common border with the states of the Former Soviet Union (FSU) – one of them, Norway, with Russia itself. The Norwegians are still very concerned, Taylor says, about the concentration of Russian forces in the Kola peninsula.

But even ruling out as remote the likelihood of a head-on clash of arms with the West, Russia inevitably poses the greatest threat to European security. Not only on account of its sheer territorial size and its inheritance of the lion's share of the former Soviet war machine – but also because of what it insists on terming the “near abroad”, both to “maintain stability” in contiguous states and also to defend the interests of persons “ethnically and culturally” identified with Russia. There remains, too, the threat of Russia's nuclear arsenal. Even when the START-2 agreement is implemented (and implementation could well be delayed), Russia will

have more than three thousand strategic nuclear warheads. Even if the possibility of a direct nuclear attack by Russia on the West seems, at the moment, in Taylor's words, not "a realistic option", there is, he argues, the danger of a launch unsanctioned by the political or military leadership. Either a small, desperate, even insane element in the CIS armed forces (military supporters of Zhirinovskiy, maybe?) might "try to cause chaos" by launching a strategic nuclear weapon (Taylor is clearly sceptical of Russian assurances that the presidential "nuclear button" is sufficient to prevent such an occurrence) – or else such a weapon could be launched by accident. He cites an incident in March 1994 when "a Russian soldier, apparently a mentally deranged recruit from Dagestan, went on the rampage at a nuclear missile installation, and killed several people... [T]here were real fears that a bullet hitting a missile could have ignited the fuel". (Even more alarming, as we close for press, reports are coming in of a Russian nuclear base having its electricity supply cut off, for failure to pay the bill – and control over the missiles being, apparently, lost!) Taylor, following Bruce Blair (*The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War*, Brookings Institute, Washington D.C., 1993) considers that, at the time of writing (June 1994) the possibility of a loss of Russian central control over these weapons must be a "concern for the West", but is not, at present, an "alarming one".

A greater threat, Taylor says, is the physical deterioration of the existing weapons – leading to an explosion and the radioactive contamination of East, Central and possibly Western Europe. This was, of course, one of the main arguments used both by the Russians and by Western "experts" to urge the early removal of nuclear warheads from Ukraine. The tacit assumption in such arguments was that the Russians had the know-how to keep their warheads safe until they were eventually dismantled, and it was only the Ukrainians, who had never been trusted by the Soviets with such sensitive information, who were unable to deal with the safety of the missiles they had inherited. He cites a leading Russian nuclear weapons designer, Boris Gorbachov, to the effect that "gas will build up to dangerous levels within warheads, that older warheads have problematic detonators, that there will be insufficient experts to dismantle the weapons, and that explosions involving nuclear materials will occur". It is not clear from the context whether the weapons under discussion were those based in Ukraine or in Russia also. But even if it refers primarily to those in Ukraine, it is clear that if there are insufficient experts in Russia to dismantle the warheads returned to Russia from Ukraine, then there certainly cannot be enough to dismantle the warheads within Russia, scheduled for destruction under the START agreements. And "problematic detonators" must be a feature of all the older-type weapons, not merely those which happened to be sent to Ukraine.

Leaving aside such accidental detonations, Taylor concludes that, at the present time, the "direct military threat" (capability + intention) posed by Russia to the West is, for the moment, "minimal". He does not, of course, rule out a change of policy leading to a military attempt to regain control of East-Central Europe and the Baltic States, or that, within a couple of decades, the Russian Federation might become, once again, "a great military power which tries to take over its neighbours". But

this, he says, would demand "considerable economic and military strength, the prospects for which do not seem good. At least for the moment!"

Having disposed (at least to his own satisfaction) of the direct threat from Russia, Taylor moves on to the second nuclear threat – "proliferation". After reviewing – with unusual perceptiveness – the various ways in which Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus have approached the problem of their unexpected nuclear legacy, Taylor discusses the possibility that Russia's stockpiled weapons of mass destruction – chemical and biological as well as nuclear, could be sold off – or, which in the long run is an even greater threat, that scientists working in these fields might seek employment abroad. He notes, correctly, that states wishing to develop their own weapons programmes might find it worthwhile to recruit not only the relatively small élite with extensive knowledge of these weapons, but members of the far more numerous scientific community with partial – but vital – expertise in some ancillary technology. He calls into question the assurances received by the West that "the sense of responsibility of these people will keep them at home" – particularly in the face of "sustained economic deprivation" in Russia's isolated former secret defence cities, and alludes to various reports in the Russian media that China and North Korea have been recruiting Russian nuclear scientists.

Taylor then proceeds to the more general threat posed by "military sector resources" – in other words by the fact that, under the Soviet system, the military sector was not accountable or subordinate to the civilian administration. Now that the political control over the armed forces exercised by the Communist Party has disappeared, the military is effectively autonomous, and, in the smaller successor states as much as in Russia, still largely dominates defence policy making. Even where, as in Ukraine, there is a civilian minister of defence, there is only a limited amount of available civilian expertise on military matters. And even if it is true, as Taylor claims, that the post-Soviet military would "rather do anything, including pick potatoes, than try to rule their turbulent country" and that a coup would only be feasible with a completely professional army, nevertheless, from the viewpoint of Western thinking on defence, the sooner civil-service staffed Ministries of Defence are operating and there is "effective democratic and civilian supervision of defence" in the successor states of the Soviet Union, the better. But this, as Taylor stresses, will take a long time to establish.

Taylor next addresses the problems of restructuring the former Soviet armed forces, including the breakdown of the conscription system, and the fact that a large proportion of both conscripts and officers in the Soviet army were based outside their native republics. The example of Ukraine is used to pinpoint a number of key issues – the refusal of 25 per cent of army officers to take the oath of allegiance to Ukraine, and the long dispute over the Black Sea Fleet. On other republics, Taylor seems somewhat less well-informed; he observes, for example, the problems Belarus faces in building a "native" army – but fails to mention its even greater problem, the sheer density of military personnel (41 per 1000 of the population), the highest in the post-Soviet space, which the

state budget simply cannot afford to maintain. Reorganisation of armies goes hand-in-hand with the reorganisation of the arms industry. The old slogan of "conversion" of military production has proved, in many cases, unworkable, but armaments factories cannot simply be closed. At the end of 1991, when the Soviet Union ceased to exist, the Military-Industrial Complex employed some 6.5 million people in Russia and 1.2 million in Ukraine – that is, 4.4 and 2.9 per cent of the population respectively. (For comparison, Britain's defence industry, which was often criticised as "excessively large" never exceeded 1.1 per cent, even at the height of the Cold War). Furthermore, the Soviet defence industry was often effectively the only employer in a given area, and closure would mean major social disruption. Yet, with arms cuts due under the CFE agreement, and no money to pay the wages of an idle workforce, there is, Taylor stresses, the possibility of arms firms being drawn into "irresponsible" sales of their technology and wares abroad.

Following a brief review of political "hotspots" which could possibly trigger a major military confrontation, Moldova, the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the problems associated with Russian withdrawal from the Baltic states, Taylor proceeds to discuss Western goals and priorities in the area. These he identifies as:

- 1) the prevention of nuclear and other non-conventional weapons proliferation in the former Soviet Union and beyond, in conjunction with continuing arms control and disarmament on the regional and global levels;

- 2) the building and maintaining of relationships of cooperation among the successor states of the Soviet Union and with the West – which must be based on genuine Russian recognition of the other successor states as sovereign entities;

- 3) the maintenance of a cooperative relationship with Russia at the United Nations on matters of internal order;

- 4) the establishment of sustained economic growth in the successor states, especially in Russia and those with a significant Russian population;

- 5) the further building of democratic political systems (including the subordination of the military to civilian authority) in the successor states; and

- 6) the maintenance of a Western alliance to generate Western solidarity and coherence on the range of problems arising in the former Soviet Union, and to respond should Russia once more turn to a foreign policy of intimidation and expansion.

Of these goals, Taylor says, the first three relate to the cooperative nature of international relations which would best serve the West, the fourth and fifth to the conditions within the former Soviet Union most likely to promote such relations, and the sixth is an acknowledgement of the need to prepare for the worst while working for the best! The discussion of these aims which follows ranges over a wide spectrum of topics, including the possible disintegration of Russia – which, he fears, would lead to significant violence, disorder, nuclear proliferation, and a huge refugee problem, but in which (should it happen), the West's role would have to be limited to damage containment as far as the world at large is concerned. He returns, once again, to Ukraine's nuclear missiles, and the "harsh precedent" set by the West in being unwilling to provide significant economic

help to a government threatening to "go nuclear". Ukraine's "size, location, history, economic potential and needs", he says, justify a significant aid programme, but since "preventing proliferation is the supreme western concern", the West "must be prepared to risk political and social instability in Ukraine, following from economic problems, if Kiev withdraws its readiness to cooperate on nuclear matters". Yet in the very next paragraph he gives what could well be construed as a reason for Ukraine not to comply with the West: Western interest in preventing proliferation, he says, also means directing economic and other aid to Russia, in order that "effective government "as opposed to civil war" is maintained, "so that control is not compromised over the 30,000 nuclear weapons involved". "This suggests... *that almost any effective government in Russia is better than no government*" (our emphasis). But what if the only government capable of holding Russia together were one with nationalist and expansionist policies, with Ukraine in the first line of attack?... This is a problem which Taylor, like virtually all Western defence experts who place non-proliferation at the head of their agenda, implicitly fail to address. He does, however, stress the need for Ukraine to have strong and well-equipped conventional forces (within the constraints of the CFE agreement, arguing that the better Ukraine's conventional defence capability, "the less interest it should have in the nuclear dimension". (But this ignores the psychological deterrent force of nuclear, as opposed to conventional ones, which almost fifty years of Cold War propaganda did much to instil).

One way of containing Russian expansionism would be to impose constraints on its "peace-keeping" activities in the Former Soviet Union. The Russian argument to date is that it has been obliged to act in the conflicts contiguous to its borders because no one else was willing to. Taylor argues, correctly, that the West should show itself willing to take part, via the United Nations, in such peace-keeping and peace-making activities, "The UN should not be allowed to evolve as a body which takes little interest in the FSU", says Taylor. One may add that, as Taylor points out, there are certain elements in Russia, particularly in the military, who see the stimulation of such conflicts as a way of re-establishing Russian control in the area. A perceived Western readiness to become involved should, to some extent, call their bluff.

Taylor's final chapter, "The Institutional Dimensions of Western Policy", deals with the role of such organisations as the CSCE and NATO in the post-Soviet world. He notes that, with the winding up of CoCom, the West, in its larger sense, has no agency for taking unified action, even in the economic sphere, towards the countries of the former (political) East. He notes that the West has, in principle, three limited assets, "brainpower, solidarity and wealth", which it must "use well", not only – in the worst case, to defend itself against a possible revanchist Russia, but also to strengthen its relations with the successor states. But these assets, Taylor says, currently look "more than a little flawed" – and their weaknesses should be targeted by governments as "urgent areas for repair".

Arguing from the perspective of 1994, Taylor maintains that "the west must seek to move closer to Russia... while keeping NATO as a non-provocative insur-

ance policy in case things go wrong". This, he says, will "undoubtedly involve the prudent granting to Russia of great power status, and of Western recognition that Russia is the most important variable in the future security of Eastern Europe". (In other words, of accepting what would appear to be the only sound pragmatic basis for negotiations which could draw Russia into compliance with internationally recognised norms of behaviour). But, he warns, "handling this will not be easy". The alternative, pessimistic view, is to write off the attempt to integrate Russia into the wider Europe, and for the West to be content in defending itself as far east as possible, whether on the border of Germany, Poland, or Ukraine. But such thinking, says Taylor, should be rejected as "premature".

Taylor's analysis and arguments – of which only a brief outline is given here – do not make easy reading. His status, however, as an Associate Fellow in the International Security programme at the Royal Institute of International Affairs and Professor of International Relations at Staffordshire University, makes him a voice of some authority, and although the opinions expressed in this book, as the note on the flyleaf stresses, are his own responsibility and not that of any organisation, a high official of NATO has publicly stated his general concurrence with the views expressed here. For all those concerned with the future and democracy of the countries of the former Soviet Union, this book, as an expression of the thinking of Western defence and security theorists, should be required reading.

Vera Rich



Jonathan Sutton, "Religious Education in Contemporary Ukraine", in RELIGION, STATE AND SOCIETY, vol. 22, no. 2, 1994, pp. 209-35

Religion, State and Society is the only scholarly journal in the English language specifically devoted to issues of church, state and society in the former communist countries. The current issue is devoted entirely to the subject of religious education in the former Soviet Union. Jonathan Sutton's contribution, "Religious Education in Contemporary Ukraine", forms part of a research project at the University of Leeds, and gives a detailed analysis of religious studies courses at a variety of educational institutions, both state and confessional, for the academic year 1993-4.

Dr. Sutton argues that, although Article 6 of Ukraine's Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organisations (23 April 1991) perpetuates the old Soviet principle of the separation of religion from education, nevertheless, there is, to a considerable extent, *de facto* religious education in secular educational establishments at the primary, secondary and tertiary level – first and foremost in the "cultural studies" courses which replace the old, mandatory "foundations of scientific atheism".

The following courses and syllabi are discussed in detail:

Lviv oblast syllabus for state school courses on Christian ethics for years 5-9 (10-14-year olds);

Ethics and Religious Studies Courses at the Ivan Franko University, Lviv;
History of World Religions Course at Kharkiv State University;

Foundation Course in Religious Studies at the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy; and, in less detail, the work of the Religious Studies department of Donetsk State University.

From his material, Dr Sutton notes a number of interesting developments. On the one hand, a number of higher education institutions have made it obligatory for all undergraduates to take courses in either religious studies or the history of religion (thus replacing the old obligatory courses in Marxist philosophy and scientific atheism), although, as of February 1994, the Ministry of Education has not yet made this a requirement nationwide. At the same time, while the former "Theme 10, Free thought and religion" disappeared from the Kharkiv Institute of Culture religious studies course in 1993-4, several university-level courses include a lecture (usually the final one of the course) on freedom of conscience and free thought. Since many lecturers in religious studies formerly worked in departments of atheism, this provision, Dr Sutton suggests, may provide scope for "special pleading" from the atheist side. Nevertheless, he concludes, "[t]he benefits of discussing the topic, for students and lecturers themselves and for the promotion of a truly pluralistic society, are plain to understand, and these far outweigh any possible misuse of the topic by those seeking to steer academic discourse back towards the false 'certainties' with which they themselves feel most comfortable". Special pleading is also apparent from the "religious" side in certain cases; the first "theme" of the Institute of Culture course is devoted to justifying the concept of religious studies as an academic subject – in a manner, as Dr Sutton notes – that would be thought unnecessary in a comparable course in the West.

Dr Sutton continues his survey with a review of study courses in denominational institutions for the training of future clerics: the Russian Orthodox Seminary in Odessa, the (Kyiv-Patriarchate) Orthodox Seminary in Lviv, the Greek Catholic Theological Institute in Ivano-Frankivsk and the Seminary of the Holy Spirit at Rudno, near Lviv, and the Baptist Theological Seminary in Odessa and the Bible College in Donetsk. He also outlines the plans for a new Greek Catholic Theological Academy in Lviv (modelled partly on the Catholic University of Lublin in Poland). The syllabi of these specialist institutions are much what one would expect – Bible study, patristics, homiletics, church music, etc. – though in the Orthodox institutions which existed (precariously) under Communism, courses in Ukrainian History and the History of Ukrainian Literature have replaced the former obligatory "History of the USSR" and "Constitution of the USSR". The Baptist Bible College, moreover, seems to be unique in offering a specialised course in radio-communication skills, including studio equipment, cross-cultural communication, script-writing and – interestingly – English language.

Finally, Dr Sutton draws a number of insightful conclusions, noting, in particular, the prominence in all courses of Ukrainian religious thought and cultural identity, "as might be expected" he observes, "in a country that is engaged in the processes of growing independence and self-affirmation". He notes, too,

the prominence given to the educational and ethical aspects of family life, which is brought out strongly, for example, in the Lviv oblast school syllabus, and the courses of the Baptist Bible College and the Greek Catholic Seminary in Rudno. It is particularly significant, he considers, "that one of the five planned institutes which will be affiliated to the Greek-Catholics' Theological Academy in Lviv is to be an 'Institute of the Family and Christian Marriage'".

Jonathan Sutton's name is a new one in the field of Ukrainian Studies. He approaches his subject, however, with considerable academic insight and a sympathy for Ukrainian views, taking care in his notes to correct assertions of the Soviet period (such as the alleged "atheism" of Ukraine's greatest poets, Taras Shevchenko and Ivan Franko) the falsity of which might not be immediately obvious to a reader whose prime interest in this study was from the religious or pedagogic, rather than the Ukrainian aspect. One looks forward to seeing more of his work in this field.

Vera Rich



PHYSICS WORLD, vol. 7, no. 8, 1994

This is the monthly of the London-based Institute of Physics, and, as such, is targeted principally at a readership of scientists. Vol. 7, no. 8 contains in its news section an article on a new initiative to preserve research links among scientists in the former Soviet Union, without involving the old cooperation structures which were, inevitably, Moscow-centric and Moscow dominated. Accordingly, 27 democratically-minded scientists and scholars from Belarus, Ukraine and Russia have set up a new organisation, the International Eurasian Academy of Sciences. This will have its capital in Minsk (Belarus), and membership will gradually be extended, first to scientists and scholars from other post-Soviet republics, then to the former socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe, and then to Western Europe and – eventually, to scientists and scholars world-wide. Membership will be by election, and the main purpose of the Academy will be to organise specialist and interdisciplinary conferences, allowing for the exchange of ideas and the establishment of personal contacts, as a basis for cooperation.

The article ends with a quotation from the new Academy's secretary-designate, the Belarusian mathematician Uladzimir Sivcyk: "Science was banalized by the Soviets, and we want to restore it to its old position of honour, so that, in looking to the future, we may build upon all that is best in the long traditions of Europe's science and culture".

Vera Rich



EAST EUROPEAN JEWISH AFFAIRS, vol. 24, no. 1, 1994

The latest issue of this scholarly journal contains three items of specifically Ukrainian interest. In "The Scattering of Amalek: A Model for Understanding the Ukrainian-Jewish Conflict", Henry Abramson, Visiting Scholar at the Center for the Documentation of East European Jewry of the Hebrew University, Jerusalem, analyses the roots of traditional enmity between Jews and Ukrainians, and demonstrates that traditional Ukrainian antipathy to Jews is not, strictly speaking antisemitism, but rather a reaction to specific historic circumstances, as a result of which Ukrainians perceived individual Jews as the agents of the (Polish or Russian) "occupiers" of Ukraine. He rejects the "erroneous assumption" of traditional Jewish historiography that "Jews must be viewed solely as victims and never as victimisers", noting that, during the Polish occupation of Ukraine in the early seventeenth century, "Dubnow's characterization of Jews as caught between 'hammer and anvil' – that is, between the demands of the Polish lords and the anger of the Ukrainian peasants – is simply misleading. The Jews were very much part of the 'hammer', part of the economic machinery that executed Polish control over Ukraine". Likewise, Abramson points out that present day Ukrainian hostilities to Jews arise not from religious nor ethnic theories, but rather because the Ukrainian popular consciousness (with some substantial historical basis) equates "Jews", with "communists". Looking at the brief history of newly independent Ukraine, Abramson considers that there are grounds for "cautious optimism for the future" of Ukrainian-Jewish relations, and observes that "with few exceptions, the relationship between Ukrainians and Jews during and following the collapse of the Soviet Union has been exemplary – something which cannot be said for Jewish-Russian relations".

Abramson also contributes to this issue a review of Yakiv Suslenskyi's book, *Spravzhni heroyi: pro uchast bromadian Ukrayiny u Ryatuwannyyu yevreyiv vid fashytskoho henotsydu* (True heroes: the Part played by Ukrainian Citizens in Rescuing Jews from the Fascist Genocide) – a work which appeared at the end of last year with a preface by the then President of Ukraine, Leonid Kravchuk, and the imprimatur of such prestigious Ukrainian institutions as the Ministry of Education, the Institute of Nationality Relations and Political Science of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, the International Ukraine-Israel Association and the Ukrainian Association for Jewish Culture. While noting that this book (which is implicitly recommended for use in secondary schools) is only the first in a series of biographical studies of Ukrainians who saved Jews during World War II, Abramson suggests that its overall tone is unbalanced, both by failing to emphasise the "enormity of Jewish losses during the Second World War", and also by its lack of the scholarly apparatus of foot notes and bibliography", and by the over-brief discussion of – for example – the exclusion of the Ukrainian Catholic leader, Metropolitan Andrey Sheptytskyi (who was responsible for saving at least 150 Jews), from the Avenue of the Righteous among the Nations at the Yad Vashem memorial complex in Jerusalem. "Hopefully, future volumes will be more substantive", Abramson concludes.

A second review, by Ephraim Tabory, deals with *Between East and West: the Jews of Moscow, Kiev, and Minsk: Identity, Antisemitism, Emigration* (ed. Howard Spier, Macmillan/New York University Press, for the Institute of Jewish Affairs, London. A detailed review of this work will be published in a subsequent issue of this journal. For the present, one may perhaps point out that the reviewer, Ephraim Tabory, falls into the traditional trap of treating the Jewish communities of these cities, so different in their historical and social ambience, as if they were identical.

Vera Rich



**THE HUNGARIAN QUARTERLY,
vol. 35, no. 134, Summer, 1994**

The latest issue of this ever-interesting journal includes an article: "Resistance, Collaboration and Retribution during World War II and its Aftermath", by Istvan Deak, who holds the Seth Law Chair of European History at Columbia University. This article, a translation of a paper read by Professor Deak on the occasion of his induction into the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, addresses the problem of anti-Nazi resistance and collaboration, and the efforts by governments, throughout post-occupation Europe, in the immediate post-war period, to sanitise the record of collaboration. Deak argues that in all occupied countries, the number of collaborators exceeded the number of resistance-fighters – although he admits that score-keeping is confused by the fact that many apparent collaborators were, secretly, members or helpers of the resistance. At the same time, he says, "[e]ven in countries that ring loud with the praise of resistance heroes and where, according to historians, German propaganda proved unsuccessful, more men volunteered for service in the Waffen SS than took an active part in the resistance... in Norway, Denmark, Belgium, the Baltic countries and... Western Ukraine, more men proved willing to sacrifice their lives in the War against Bolshevism, than to risk their lives fighting the Germans and their hirelings". Undoubtedly, many scholars will challenge this – particularly since, in most cases, Deak cites no numbers to substantiate this claim – and when the occasional number does appear (e.g. that in "the Netherlands, 22,000-25,000 men served the Germans as armed volunteers"), no source is given. Nor is his suggestion that all those who served the Nazis did so specifically to wage "War against Bolshevism" – their motives, particularly in Western Europe, were undoubtedly more complex.

Nevertheless, this is an interesting attempt to tackle, at a scholarly level, one of the most emotionally loaded issues in the history of the Second World War. And for once, a scholar with no apparent Ukrainian connections (Deak is a Hungarian-born US citizen), discusses, albeit briefly, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army and the Ukrainian anti-Nazi resistance in the over-all context of this era.

Vera Rich



Conferences**POST-SOVIET GAS – RECENT DEVELOPMENTS**

Vera Rich

"The thing that attracts me about Sakhalin", remarked one American gas technologist, "is that *Gazprom* is not there!"

"Well, at least not so far!", replied a British colleague/competitor gloomily.

This exchange over lunch, during the latest in a series of conferences on the Post-Soviet Gas Industry, co-organised by the Royal Institute of International Affairs (London) and the Centre for Foreign Investment and Privatization (Moscow), was symptomatic of a growing feeling in the international gas community that *Gazprom*, the Russian gas extraction and transport monopoly, is growing dangerously large and aggressive. The gas business, like any other commercial activity that can command a multi-billion international market – is no place for weaklings. Nevertheless, business, as conducted in the traditions of market capitalism, does have its rules of play, in which the optimum strategy is to reach an agreement satisfactory to all parties. *Gazprom*, however, uses a style of adversarial tactics which is beginning to prove off-putting to at least some of its potential Western partners.

This constitutes a marked difference in Western attitude from the previous conference, just a year before. Then, one of the Western keynote speakers publicly counselled the gas transport enterprises of Ukraine and Belarus that they would be better advised, instead of charging transit fees for conveying Russian gas across their territory, to establish joint ventures with *Gazprom*. This, the financial pundit explained, would yield a more reliable income. Similar advice, indeed, is still forthcoming in certain circles, although aimed now at *Gazprom* itself. Thus, the leading article in the issue of the newsletter *World Gas Intelligence* which appeared during the Conference urged that the acquisition of assets in the downstream pipeline and distribution sectors is essential if *Gazprom* is to ensure payment for the gas it supplies. *Gazprom*'s problem with cashflow from the non-Russian countries of the Former Soviet Union are now becoming critical. Media coverage of the debt-collection problem usually concentrates on the difficulties of the debtor countries. The editor of *World Gas Intelligence*, however, saw it as a problem for *Gazprom*'s own survival, which, he opined, can only be ensured by "aggressively moving downstream".

"The more pipeline and distribution companies that *Gazprom* can invest in, the more stable its cash flow is liable to become. As for others not indebted to *Gazprom*, the firm could use equity-for-equity swaps to build an asset base throughout Europe and Asia as an option".

Such advice, however, presupposes a level of business sophistication which, to date, *Gazprom* has shown little sign of having acquired. Its attempts to acquire the distribution system of the FSU is beginning to appear, even to the Western gas community, as crude "empire building", rather than a well-planned business strategy in the style of a Western multinational. And *Gazprom's* business style is now becoming of considerable significance to Western gas firms. Hitherto, their dealings with *Gazprom* have been at the level of cooperation agreements and joint ventures, supplying the Russians with technology and/or know-how in return for gas supplies. But the present conference marked a potentially major change. *Gazprom* has completed its first two tranches of privatisation – share sales firstly to its own work-force and then to the local inhabitants of areas in which it is the major employer. Now it is open to outside, including foreign, investment.

To attract foreign capital, *Gazprom* will have to put its financial house in order. It is currently the world's largest gas producer, by volume (465 billion cu.m. annually) and has estimated reserves of 35 trillion cu.m. But the assessment methods used in setting up Russia's voucher privatisation scheme scaled down the value of *Gazprom's* assets to a mere \$150 million, whereas the real value, according to various Western estimates, is thought to lie between \$200-\$900 billion. Equally importantly, however, it has to convince potential Western investors that it is a good business risk. Post-Soviet Russia has shown a distressing tendency to change the rules of the investment game in mid-stream. (The "Rosshelf" affair, in particular, still rankles. Western firms were invited to tender for exploitation rights in this rich off-shore hydrocarbon field in the Russian Arctic. Several consortia were formed, and devoted considerable financial and intellectual capital to preliminary studies – only to be told, at the last moment, that only a 100% Russian consortium could be permitted to work it.) Potential Western investors will require sound guarantees that, if they acquire equity in *Gazprom*, they will not suddenly find themselves forced to sell it back to the Russians at a price which is little more than confiscation! At the same time, since investors will expect a return for their money, *Gazprom* will have to do something about its payment problems. Unpaid bills from all consumers (including defaulting Russian concerns), stood, at the time of the Conference, at around US \$3 billion, with only 30% of FSU bills for 1994 settled to date. And debt-for-equity swaps, even at the most pragmatic level, cannot be more than a temporary solution. Even if the governments of the countries concerned allow *Gazprom*, under the guise of creating joint ventures, to gobble up 100% of *Ukrhazprom*, *Bieltranshaz*, *Gruztransgaz*, *Moldovagaz* and the rest, what happens if consumers in Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia and Moldova still cannot meet their bills? Cutting

off defaulters' supplies is possible only on a limited scale; too large a cut-off would cause problems at the upstream, extraction, end...

So the Western gas experts, while maintaining their usual business cordiality towards their opposite numbers from *Gazprom*, at the same time showed a markedly greater interest, in comparison to previous conferences, in what the teams from other FSU countries had to say. And here there emerged a clear subtext: Russia's western neighbours are not prepared to surrender their gas-industry assets without a fight. For Ukraine, Viktor Rozhonyuk, Deputy Chairman of *Ukrhazprom*, described the new National Hydrocarbon Programme, with extraction targets of 7.5 million tonnes of oil and 35.5 billion cu.m of gas by the year 2100. He also gave further details of Ukraine's major commitment to refurbishing transit pipelines and extending its system of underground gas storage facilities in the worked-out oil-fields of Galicia. He noted, too, that although *Ukrhazprom* has an agreement with *Gazprom* to create a "joint stock company" (*Gazprom*'s preferred euphemism for a take-over), Ukraine's parliament has frozen this. (Interestingly, from Belarus, Mikalaj Mocarniuk reported a similar reluctance of the Belarusian parliament to ratify the agreement authorising a *Gazprom-Bieltransgaz* joint venture, signed between the Prime Ministers of Russia and Belarus back in September 1993, this deal is vital to *Gazprom*'s plans to deliver gas from the Yamal fields of the Russian Arctic to Western Europe, via a new pipeline across Belarus and Poland, bypassing the current pipeline network through Ukraine). Rozhonyuk also stressed that, even if the *Gazprom-Ukrhazprom* "joint stock company" does materialise, it will not take in the whole of Ukraine's gas-related activities – the refurbishment programme, in particular, will not be included. He indicated, too, some significant technical breakthroughs in the production of high-efficiency pumping equipment, in particular, the new turbines produced by the Mykolayiv shipyards.

Reports from the other non-Russian FSU states struck a similar note. From Georgia, I. Zazashvili, General Director of *Gruztransgaz*, reported efforts to return to its *ante bellum* extraction figure of 3.5 million tonnes of oil (60% of national requirements) a year, "now that we have the victory over the mafias", and noted that letters of intent had been signed with US and Australian firms on the production of oil and oil-field associated gas. He spoke, too, of geological survey work to find possible underground storage sites for gas – so far, without great success. But efforts would continue to locate such sites, he said, since "Georgia cannot be left without them!"

Gazprom's FSU customers, whether consumers or pipeline owners, clearly do not want to quarrel with their source of supply. *Ukrhazprom*, in particular, wants to increase its transit trade to Central Europe and the Balkans to a target of 140 billion cu.m by the year 2000. Properly managed, and in a non-adversarial business atmosphere, the former Soviet gas industry could be a major source of income for all concerned – not the least, for future Western investors. (*Gazprom*, incidentally, seems willing also to let Western investors

buy into the "joint stock companies" established with its western FSU neighbours, on, it would appear, a case-by-case basis).

But there is still considerable room for confidence-building measures on the part of *Gazprom*, both towards its FSU partners and towards potential Western investors who have a growing wariness of the Russian company's perceived propensity for empire-building. And in the meantime, for Westerners seeking a stake somewhere in the FSU gas industry, the rich gas fields off Sakhalin island, from which the gas can be exported, liquefied, by sea, to Japan and the Asia-Pacific region, without (to date, the involvement of *Gazprom*), look increasingly attractive ■

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**50th Anniversary of the Death of
Metropolitan Andrey Sheptytskyi****ANDREY SHEPTYTSKYI:
MAN OF GOD AND THE PEOPLE**

Vera Rich

November 1, 1994 marks the fiftieth anniversary of the death of one of the leading Ukrainian religious and cultural figures of the twentieth century, Metropolitan Andrey Sheptytskyi, head of the Ukrainian Catholic Church.

The future Metropolitan was born on 29 July 1865, at Prylbychi, western Ukraine, at that time under Habsburg rule. He was the third of a family of seven sons. His father, Count Jan Kanty Szeptycki, came of an old Ukrainian family, which could trace its history back to the twelfth century. But like many such old aristocratic families, they had become completely Polonised, and adopted the Roman rite of the Catholic Church. The Szeptycki family was, however, well aware of its Ukrainian past and its former allegiance to the Eastern Rite Catholic Church, to which it had given, during the course of the eighteenth century, no less than four bishops. Count Jan Kanty's wife, Zofia, was a daughter of the famous Polish playwright Count Aleksander Fredro.

The future Metropolitan was baptised under the name of Roman Aleksander Maria. According to Countess Zofia's own memoirs, shortly before the boy's birth, her husband had said that if he had more sons, he would like one of them to become an Eastern rite Catholic priest, and then rise to be a bishop, who could introduce much needed reforms in the Ukrainian Church. But when, at 16 years of age, Roman first mentioned his desire to become a priest in that rite, his parents were shocked. In the eyes of Polonised aristocrats, Ukrainians were a peasant people, and their priests were often ill-educated, and – in the case of parochial clergy – married. It was only after several years of parental opposition, several bouts of serious illness, and a family audience with Pope Leo XIII, that Roman was eventually able, in 1888, to enter the novitiate of the Basilian Order at Dobromyl, taking the name in religion of Andrey.

In 1892, after yet another serious illness and a period of studies in Cracow, Brother Andrey made his final vows, and a few days later was ordained priest. His career within the Church was meteoric. In 1896, he became hegumen (superior) of the Monastery of St Onuphrius in Lviv. In 1898, he was made a Professor



Metropolitan Andrey Sheptytskyi. Rome, circa 1921

of Philosophy, in 1899, Bishop of Stanyslaviv, and in 1900, at the age of 35, Archbishop of Lviv, Metropolitan of Halych and Bishop of Kamyanets-Podilskyi, head of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, a post he would hold for almost 44 years.

The Ukrainian Catholic Church was at that time in considerable disarray. The decree of Tsar Nicholas I, abolishing that Church within the Russian empire, had left only a small remnant surviving in the Austro-Hungarian empire – a mere two dioceses (increased, in 1885, to three). There were virtually no facilities for training new priests. Often a married priest simply taught one of his sons as best he could, and then presented him to the bishop for ordination. Contemporary thinking in the Vatican assumed that the Roman rite would eventually absorb all others, and Jesuits active in western Ukraine seemed intent on bringing this about as soon as possible. Moreover, in the course of the past three centuries, since its establishment in 1596, the Ukrainian Catholic Church had gradually picked up all kinds of accretions from the Latin rite, devotional practices good in themselves, but alien to the traditions of Eastern Christianity and liable to prove a major stumbling block to any future attempts at reunion with the Orthodox.

The new Metropolitan immediately addressed himself to bringing order into confusion. Education for the parochial clergy was established on a sound basis, and monastic life reorganised. Religious books and periodicals were published, and the rite gradually pruned of accretions – often in spite of considerable opposition from the faithful. These years, too, were a period of intense national revival in western Ukraine. Here, too, the Metropolitan made his mark, founding a Ukrainian National Museum in Lviv, and petitioning (unsuccessfully) the Vienna government for a Ukrainian-taught university.

As head of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, moreover, the Metropolitan had to address the problems of the new Ukrainian diaspora – economic migrants to the United States, Canada, Argentina and Brazil. In 1894, Pope Leo XIII had issued the encyclical *Orientalium dignitas ecclesiarum*, which formally repudiated the “second class” status which Rome had for so long accorded the Eastern Rite Churches. Now the emphasis was on the preservation – not the absorption – of rites. But if the Ukrainian settlers in the New World were to remain in their ancestral rite, they needed churches, and priests. And – Rome decided – these priests would have to be celibate, so as not to scandalise the Protestants of North America. Sheptytskyi was faced with having to find a new generation of celibate clergy for America. And even when the priests were, eventually, found, and the churches built, all kinds of knotty problems arose over jurisdiction, relations with the Roman rite hierarchy, guidelines for inter-rite marriages and the like. It soon became clear that the Metropolitan would have to travel to the New World himself to resolve some of these difficulties. Eventually he did so, combining his pastoral visit with participation in the Montreal Eucharistic Conference of 1910.

In 1914, on the outbreak of World War I, Russian troops entered Austrian-ruled western Ukraine, and, within a few days, Metropolitan Sheptytskyi was interned. He was released only in 1917, under an amnesty proclaimed by the Provisional government established in Russia after the February Revolution. After Ukraine's brief window of independence, western Ukraine was incorporated into the reborn Republic of Poland, whose government, intent on state-

building after more than 125 years in the limbo of the Partitions, paid little heed to the needs and aspirations of the ethnic minorities within its borders. Nor did it help the Metropolitan that – in the eyes of many Poles – he was something of a renegade, who had abandoned his noble Polish heritage to become a Ukrainian. Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, he suffered constant harassment from the Polish authorities – who even interned him for a brief period – and was attacked and ridiculed in the Polish press. (Meanwhile, ironically, his younger brother Stanislaw, rose to the rank of General in the Polish Army.)

In 1939, under the terms of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, the Red Army annexed western Ukraine. Within a few months, the clampdown began – monastery property and church lands were seized and – like the lands of the Ukrainian peasants themselves, incorporated into collective farms. Atheist teachers were installed in the schools, and Ukrainian cultural institutions “Sovietised”. The Metropolitan’s brother, Count Lev, and his wife, who were still living on the Sheptytskyi family estates, were shot as “exploiters” – after having been forced to dig their own graves. Metropolitan Andrey, who for more than a decade had been crippled with arthritis and could no longer walk unaided, began to prepare for his own end. While keeping up a constant stream of protests to the new Soviet authorities in defence of his flock, he secretly consecrated Iosyf Slipyi as his coadjutor bishop and eventual successor, and convened a synod to prepare for an underground mission of evangelisation within the Soviet Union.

Then, on 22 June 1941, Hitler broke his non-aggression pact with Stalin, and the Nazis moved east. In western Ukraine, where the older generation could remember the relatively liberal days of Austrian rule, and where after two years of Sovietisation, anything seemed an improvement, the Germans were at first greeted as liberators. Soon, however, the new Nazi rulers began to apply their racial theories, rounding up Ukrainians for forced labour, and introducing a new clamp-down on Ukrainian culture and education. Nevertheless, at least in the first months of Nazi occupation, it was possible to do something to restore the religious life destroyed by the Communists. This – and protests against Nazi atrocities – became what proved to be the final task of Metropolitan Andrey’s life. He died on 1 November 1944, a few months after the Red Army had, once again, in its own phraseology “liberated” Lviv. His body was buried in the crypt of St George’s Cathedral in Lviv, a Cathedral which was part of his family history, having been started in 1744 by his remote uncle, Metropolitan Afanasiy, and completed by another Bishop Sheptytskyi – Lev.

Some two years after Metropolitan Andrey’s death, the Eastern Rite Catholic Church was abolished in Ukraine (“reunited with the Orthodox”, said the Soviet propagandists, adopting the phraseology of Tsar Nicholas, more than 100 years previously). His successor, Metropolitan Slipyi, was arrested and sent to the Gulag.

For 35 years, the Ukrainian Catholic Church was – at least officially – a Church of the diaspora only. But, in the late 1980s, it emerged from the catacombs, alive and vigorous. And the celebrations to mark the fiftieth anniversary of Metropolitan Andrey’s death, have proved a focus of renewal, not only for Ukrainian Catholics, nor, indeed, for Ukrainian believers of all confessions, but also for cultural and scholarly life throughout Ukraine. ■

ANDREY SHEPTYTSKYI AND THE SOCIAL ROLE OF THE CHURCH UNDER THE OCCUPATIONAL REGIMES

Oksana Hayova

Throughout history, occupation regimes have always striven to destroy the integrity of the occupied territory, to render any surviving indigenous national administration incapable of functioning, to deprive the indigenous population of their social rights by means of social discrimination and the granting of privileges to certain favoured strata of the population.

Ukraine, under successive regimes of foreign occupation, was no exception to this rule. The long years of foreign domination took their toll: they stunted Ukraine's cultural development and robbed the Ukrainian people of their leaders among the laity. Yet the Ukrainians were not left entirely defenceless. From the end of the nineteenth century onwards, Ukrainian Church leaders took upon themselves the task of nurturing and sustaining the national culture and aspirations of the Ukrainians, no less than their spiritual welfare.

How such clerics viewed this two-fold role may be seen from a letter to Metropolitan Andrey Sheptytskyi, Primate of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, in September 1941, when western Ukraine was under Nazi German occupation. The writer, Dr Markian Dzerovych, was President of the Institute of Catholic Action in Vienna, hence his reference to his being "abroad".

"The devices of our enemies", Dzerovych wrote,

whatever their hue, have always been geared towards depriving us of leaders and turning the Ukrainians into an ethnic mass, capable only of ploughing, sowing and performing the most arduous work, with no opportunities or the slightest advantage to themselves or their development, since a People without leaders is hardly in a position to demand its rights. To fight against this is our first and foremost battle-cry. Young people must be educated, trained here, abroad, so that they come to understand the mentality of those who like to call themselves our friends, but who are, in reality, coldly calculating egoists. That is the best remedy for the tragic split, prevailing among our People!

In this sea of egoism and moral, psychological meandering, the Church is steadily gaining respect and is beginning to play a major role in shaping the soul of the individual citizen. More and more, individuals appear among us who understand the need and importance of channelling all our strength towards the eternal truths of the Christian Faith.¹

¹ Central State Historical Archive of Ukraine, Lviv, fund no. 358.

The laity, viewed the Church as their natural defender. Back in the days before World War I, when western Ukraine was under Austrian rule, the Ukrainian Physicist, Professor Ivan Pulyuy wrote to Yaroslav Okunevskyi, a Deputy of the State Council in Vienna: "Ukrainians will certainly not achieve anything by bowing and scraping... In my opinion, the Metropolitan [Sheptytskyi] should be the first to stand up for the rights of our people and protest against the planned annexation of Galicia to Poland. Metropolitan Sheptytskyi considers himself to be a Ukrainian. He is famous even among foreigners as a builder of Ukraine". In *Ukrainska Korespondentsiya* (Ukrainian Correspondence, no. 40 and 41, p. 10) counsellor Dr Karl Schämpfluß in Vienna wrote about the "powerful Ukraine in the lofty plans of the Ukrainian Metropolitan Count Sheptytskyi". If the Metropolitan "had remained silent on all these issues", Schämpfluß continued, "then diplomats, our enemies, and the whole world would have the right to think that not only the Metropolitan, but also our whole hierarchy and the Ukrainian clergy agree to a common roof with Poland".²

Although the Church was not always able to have a voice in politics and was not always tolerated by the occupation government, nevertheless, it did not remain silent.

Thus, in the inter-war years, in an address to the upper chamber of the Polish parliament, Metropolitan Andrey Sheptytskyi said,

The view that a bishop has no right to engage in purely political matters is fundamentally false and insulting to us. Like every citizen, we have the right and often duty to deal with purely political matters... We are certain that we will ultimately be given the opportunity to develop our national strength. We need this. We cannot continue to live without our own schools, without our own regional administration. Through the blood, enough of which our people have spilt on the battlefield, through unjust slander and defamation and the indescribable suffering which they have patiently endured and which I do not wish to dwell on today, we will surely achieve this right and, indeed, we are demanding this right.³

Although Ukrainian political life was frequently reduced by the occupying power to a minimum level, the Church always preserved its firm position and took over the role of the leader of the Ukrainian people, which it maintained for many centuries. No social temptation could separate the Ukrainian Church from the masses, force a wedge between the clergy and the people.

In addition to the numerous materials, documents, and letters to Metropolitan Andrey Sheptytskyi on socio-political, economic, and personal matters preserved in the Central State Historical Archive of Ukraine in Lviv, there are also letters, which reflect the close relationship between the clergy and the people and their aspirations towards liberation. The following examples may serve to illustrate this relationship.

² Central State Historical Archive of Ukraine, Lviv, fund no. 408

³ O. Kravchenyuk, *Veleten zo Svyatoyurskoyi Hory* (The Giant of St George's Hill), Canada, 1963, p. 133.

3 August 1933

Your Excellency!

... I have a brother who was a theology student in Stanyslaviv [now Ivano-Frankivsk] until Whitsun of this year. At Whitsun, together with 16 of his friends, he left the Seminary. The reason for this was the following. The Most Reverend Father H[r]yhor[iy] Khomyshyn forbade the theology students to take part in a Whitsun procession to the graves of the Sich Riflemen,* although all Ukrainian educational establishments, all Ukrainian Associations and surrounding villages were taking part under the direction of priests. Because a large number of the theology students, who are themselves former Sich Riflemen, disobeyed orders and took part in the procession and prayed for their dead Comrades, the Most Reverend [Father] expelled the organisers [of the event] from the Seminary. Now they have all reached a cross-roads because they now belong to the Polish army [i.e. having lost their exemption as students, they were liable for conscription]. Part of their youth they lost as Sich Riflemen, in the Ukrainian-Polish and Bolshevik war, and the second [part] they will lose in the Polish army. I am best acquainted with the lot of such people from the experience of my brother, whom I have been looking after since he began his studies at the gymnasium. This young man – like all the others – has already gone through hell in this world, in the campaign against the enemies, fighting with a rifle in his hand but no ammunition, and, what is more, suffering from typhoid.⁴

Of equal interest is the following letter to the Metropolitan from Father Dr Roman Yatsenkiv, a leading Lviv theologian. It dates from July 7, 1944, in the closing days of the Nazi occupation, when the Soviet Red Army was advancing towards Lviv.

... I. Concerning pastoral care for the UPA-West [Western Military District of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army]. I think it is vital to provide pastoral care for the UPA in the form of field clerics. I humbly request you to select clerics, laymen and monks, who are prepared for death, discomfort, lice and scabies, and to assign these persons to the Staff of the UPA Western Military District.⁵

All the successive occupation regimes were fully aware of the power and importance of the Church in the life of the Ukrainian people, and none of them ever let the activities of the Church and its leaders out of their sight or control.

Going back to World War I, when the Imperial Russian army occupied Galicia, among the records of the Tsar's police, we find the following report.

Moscow. Department of the Police. Regarding the Sheptytskyi archive.

The Metropolitan did not, however, confine himself to activity in the field of the Church, but tried to place himself at the head of a distinctive political movement

* The Ukrainian Sich Riflemen was a military formation of World War I, when Galicia – western Ukraine – was under Austrian rule. It consisted of youths of 14 to 17 years old only; at 18, its members were mobilised into the regular Austrian army. By 1933, the date of this letter, any seminarists who had been Sich Riflemen would be at least 29 years old). Following this appeal to the Metropolitan, the excluded seminarists were in due course reinstated and returned to their studies.

⁴ Central State Historical Archive of Ukraine, Lviv, fund no. 358

⁵ Ibid, fund no. 201.

known as the "Ukrainophilia" which was specially created for the struggle against Russia... When, in August [1914] the Galician people, worn out by their centuries-long struggle, met with the glorious Russian army on their own land, the head of that people's Church, Metropolitan Andrey Sheptytskyi, "called... for the most resolute struggle against the Muscovite Tsar, who [he said] was ready to impose the fetters of slavery upon the Galician-Rus' people, their faith and their material culture". With his blessing, a "Ukrainian Military Headquarters" and combat detachments of "Ukrainian Sich Riflemen" were organised in Galicia...

In addition to this, the Uniate Basilian monks were fanatical supporters and propagators of the ideas put forward by the heads of the Mazepa movement [Ukrainian nationalist movement], particularly among the peasants of Galicia. These priests constantly carried out criminal propaganda among the population and did not shrink even from open attacks on the Russian government.⁶

During a search of the Metropolitan's palace the police found a document, which was of particular interest to the Department of the Police.

This document, which is a memorandum written in Count Sheptytskyi's own hand and confirmed by his original signature, "on the proposed military, legal and church structure of Rus'-Ukraine...", in a copy of the original German and a Russian translation, I consider it my humble duty to submit for your Imperial Majesty's gracious consideration.

In this memorandum, Metropolitan Sheptytskyi envisages the future structure of Rus'-Ukraine, based on the resurrection of the spirit of ancient Ukraine and the restoration of the military traditions of the Zaporozhian Sich, under conditions of the complete separation of the Ukrainian Church from the Russian Synod.

The ideas expressed by Metropolitan Sheptytskyi can only serve to open the eyes of anyone who is still in doubt about the true intentions of the Metropolitan, and once and for all put an end to any idea of the possibility of the premature release of a hostage of such importance to us.

Extract from the legal section of the document of Metropolitan Sheptytskyi:

One should pay attention also to this organisation in order to demonstrate firmly and clearly to the population just how in various ways the Russian legislative system was unjust and burdensome to them. One should first of all take into account those aspects of social and legal life in which the Ukrainian population feels itself most oppressed.

Loyal Address of the Minister of Internal Affairs (on which His Imperial Majesty wrote with his own hand the sign of acknowledgement, and the words: "What a scoundrel!")⁷

The government of Russia remained true to its hatred towards the Ukrainian Church likewise in Soviet times, as we see from the following document, dating from some two years after Metropolitan Sheptytskyi's death.

⁶ TsGAZhR, Moscow, fund no. 102 (DP-00).

⁷ Ibid

*19 September 1946. Protocol No. 10 of the Meeting of the Soviet
on religious cults of the Soviet of Ministers of the USSR*

From the speech of Comrade Vilkhovyi:

... If one speaks of difficulties, then I must say that a whole range of difficulties are present. There are the old counties, where, of course, things are easier, and there are also the new counties, incorporated in 1939, that is, Western Ukraine, or the Western provinces. In the Western provinces of the UkrSSR, there remain 274 Uniate parishes throughout the whole of Galicia. Without delay, we put forward our proposals, namely: 1. To carry out the nationalisation of all church lands and to register them, so as to take out of the hands of this reactionary Church the economic lever of its activity.

The position of the Catholics is clearly escalating into something abnormal: they are becoming uppish. They consider themselves to be independent and not subject to Soviet laws. To bring them within the framework of Soviet laws – that is the principal problem at the present time. It is impossible to overlook the fact that the Catholic Church in the form which it presents to us now has an international base for attacking us. Its agents, who are sent out not only by the Vatican but from all sides, carry out undoubtedly great and serious tasks. We shall speak with Comrade Karpov and serious measures will be adopted in this direction.⁸

There is no such thing as a good occupation regime. Metropolitan Sheptytskyi was well aware of this, and constantly, whether the occupation was Russian or Polish, he spoke out in defence of the rights of the Ukrainian people.

28 July 1938. To Father Edward Kosibowycz in Warsaw.

... I am waiting, and believe that the Fathers are with me in this, for Catholic opinion to realise the might of the present evil, which has spread to such an extent throughout Polish society. The Polish press always justifies such persecution, always approves it and praises it. [The Ukrainians] are being persecuted under the pretext that they are enemies of the Polish state. They are being persecuted because the whole of Polish society, with very rare exceptions, is doing almost everything possible to destroy the Ukrainians in every walk of life – social or national. The entire state administration is helping society in this evil action, and in instances when the actions of Polish society violate the criminal code, the state administration, unable to openly approve and assist, turns a blind eye to the crimes and, leaving the criminals unpunished, tacitly condones and encourages further crimes. You, gentlemen in Warsaw, do not see any of this. You do not read the Ukrainian press, and nowhere in the Polish press can you find the least hint of what is going on. I can omit the proof because I do not aim to convince anyone with a different opinion, and I do not have even the slightest hope of convincing even the best Polish Catholics who do not study this issue in depth and lack the extremely rare trait of being able to give their opponent an unbiased hearing. For the whole of Polish society treats Ukrainians as opponents, as enemies, and deals with them accordingly. I will simply add that there are no Ukrainians – for all are dependent on the Poles or afraid of the state apparatus – who will express their opinion on the situation, or, when speaking with a Pole, will say what they really think.⁹

⁸ Ibid, fund no. 6991.

⁹ Central State Historical Archive of Ukraine, Lviv, fund no. 201.

On another occasion, when a new occupation force was approaching, the Metropolitan urged Ukrainians, particularly the youth, to rally together, to unite in defence of their faith and their people.

"These are difficult times and the darker clouds that are approaching are forcing us to rally together more closely than we have done so far, placing our trust in the Truth of God, and our own strong unity to defend that which is dearest and most holy to us", writes the Metropolitan in his appeal to Ukrainians to organise a Catholic Union.

... We will demand and defend social justice, the development of social security for the peasantry, the labour force, and all working people in general, and in particular victims of social injustice. In unity, order and the discipline of organised action, basing our stance on legality as regards the state, whose citizens we are, we will dedicate all our efforts to achieving by legal means for our people, in all walks of national and political life, ever greater education, culture, welfare and rights. The welfare of the Ukrainian People in every respect and in the Christian sense of the word is the goal to which we are striving in political life.¹⁰

The Metropolitan realised the crucial importance of Ukrainian schools in rearing a nationally and religiously conscious society and in the struggle against an enemy superior in every respect. He observed how a large percentage of the Ukrainian youth educated in Polish schools was becoming cut off from its national roots. In order to prevent this process, the Metropolitan approached the Ukrainian community, giving it moral and material support to help it to organise its own schools, and issued authorisations and directives to various institutions to found their own schools: ordinary schools, art schools and professional schools.

*8 August 1942, Lviv – Letter of Metropolitan Sheptytskyi
to Prof. Kubyiovych concerning a project for an art school
for training drawing teachers*

Dear Professor!

... I think that the issue raised in this letter is of great importance for the Ukrainian youth. Without doubt, an important factor in upbringing is the awakening of aesthetic thought and cultural guidance, which helps train this thought. But, as Ukrainians, these teachers of drawing, have also a second very important significance: they should give patriotism a noble and elevated direction... Our youth, which for a long time has had to go to Polish secondary schools, often has no conception of the most important historical figures of the Ukrainian people. We do not as yet have an illustrated history of Ukraine, although we have distinguished and great artists, about whom generally speaking, even Ukrainian gymnasium pupils have heard nothing. We have Murashko, Narbut, Novakivskyi, even Repin, and from back in the 19th century, Levytskyi. Only a teacher of drawing can make Ukrainian young people familiar with them, and only wise and well educated drawing teachers can awaken among young Ukrainian talents and artists, who will

¹⁰ Ibid.

be able to show us what a person like Khmelnytskyi or Mazepa was like. Or perhaps, one should rather say, not only what such a person was like, but what he should be like in our thoughts, hearts, and understanding.¹¹

In a conversation with one of the staff of the Polish illustrated weekly, *Tygodnik Ilustrowany*, assessing the general situation of Polish society and the place in it of the Ukrainians, the Metropolitan said:

Polish society, which, with a few exceptions, lives completely segregated from us, does not realise how deeply the present crisis affects the Ukrainian masses. The economic crisis, together with the crisis of ideas, affects mainly our young people, who have a long journey before them. Young Ukrainians cannot become civil servants, teachers, or even, minor civil servants or workers in the work-places, which they themselves founded. This is a generation without a future. Hunger and unemployment are the greatest tools of agitators from the Communist and extremist camps. The economic question has a great effect on everyone. The student youth, as the newest generation of the intelligentsia, is living in very difficult circumstances.¹²

Young people and their Christian upbringing, and future, were always in the centre of attention of Metropolitan Sheptytskyi.

28 March 1940, Lviv – Letter of Metropolitan Sheptytskyi to Comrade Zharchenko (Provincial Department of People's Education)

... As the Metropolitan of Western Ukraine, I am the guardian of the Ukrainian youth and it is my duty and right, in their name, and in the name of their parents, to call to mind their rights as guaranteed by the Constitution, as well as the rights of their parents.

I am convinced that there are just and wise men in the Provincial Department of People's Education, who are concerned with the good of the school and the youth, so that I can with confidence openly express my opinion. The good and authority of the Provincial Department of People's Education, as well as the authority of the higher education authorities in Kyiv or Moscow, should incline you to submit to the appropriate persons the necessity, in the school system of Western Ukraine, at least, of stopping all endeavours by the teaching staff aimed at turning the school into a tool of atheist propaganda...

I hope that the Provincial Department of People's Education in Lviv will take a favourable view of this letter, and make it unnecessary for me to repeat this appeal before a higher Council.¹³

But the Provincial Department or Comrade Zharchenko did not make it unnecessary for the Metropolitan to repeat his appeal before a higher authority. In the archives, there is preserved a fragment of a letter of the Metropolitan to Joseph Stalin.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Kravchenyuk, op. cit., p. 91.

¹³ Central State Historical Archive of Ukraine, Lviv, f. 201.

1940, Lviv

To Comrade Stalin

Serious errors, permitted by the Soviet authorities in Western Ukraine and the consequent difficult situation of the people entrusted to my pastoral care, compel me to appeal to your supreme authority with this submission and appeal.

On (28.III.1940) I sent the Provincial Department of People's Education a letter, a copy of which is enclosed herewith. Since I have neither received any reply, nor observed any change in the course of events to date, I am appealing to a higher authority, or rather, leaving out the intermediate stages, I appeal directly to you. It seems to me, after all, that the matter is so important, as important for the Ukrainian people, as for the authorities of the USSR. Atheist propaganda in general, and especially in schools and regarding young people, is a great error of the Soviet authorities in our territory. Before all else it infects and frightens away the people, which is tied to its faith as the most important part of national tradition...¹⁴

What was needed was a truly strong and courageous individual who would stand forth, and protest to Stalin and to the "liberators", who brought a bloody "liberation", which involved the deportation of thousands of people to Siberia, the destruction of national acquisitions, acquired over hundreds of years, with mountains of corpses of those killed in prison without trial or sentence.

The anti-Ukrainian and anti-church policy of the new authorities was clear, but this did not keep the people from their Church, or force the Church itself to change its views.

Letter of Metropolitan Sheptytskyi to the Chairman of the Central Committee of the CP(b)U Nikita Khrushchev, delivered by a deputy of the Lviv province, Academician Kyrilo Studynskyi

... I appeal to you, Chairman of the Central Committee of the CP(b)U, also in defence of the rural population on whose wages such great taxes have been imposed that they are unable to pay them. Later, priests and villagers will suffer the imprisonment with which they are already now being threatened. We believe that the Soviet authorities will follow the path of justice and will not permit the lower organs to destroy their citizens materially and morally and we implore you, Chairman, who are known for your feelings of justice, to issue an order to stop all taxes, which do not match the financial capabilities of the citizens. I ask you, Chairman of Ukraine, to issue your directive without delay for the instalments are having an effect.

Lviv, 3 September 1940.¹⁵

But the Soviet authorities did not meet the expectations of Metropolitan Sheptytskyi as regards the path of justice.

17 May 1940 – Appeal of the County Executive Committee to the village Council in the village of Lakhovychi Zarichni

On the basis of a decree of the people's convention of Western Ukraine all landowners', monastery, and church lands should be nationalised. However, not all Village Councils have carried out the nationalisation of church lands. When car-

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Ibid.

rying out the nationalisation they leave priests up to 10-15 morgen* of land. The County executive committee has explained that all church and parish charter lands are subject to nationalisation and that no one has the right to leave the priests even a single morgen...

Chairman of the Zhuravne County Executive Committee Miroshnyk.¹⁶

*14 December 1940 – Letter of the parish priest of the
village of Voynyliv Father Ludomyr*

Your Grace!

... When the Red Army arrived I endured everything that the lay people did, submitting to everything, which I was unable and could not avoid!

They took all my landed property away, leaving not a single clod, and even before that I had had to suffer a catastrophic fire, which destroyed all the agricultural buildings on 2 August 1939 – and also burned all the crops from the field.

... The financial department has placed an agricultural tax on me, but I have nothing to pay it with. I am sending an appeal to the Province and Kyiv, perhaps there they will want to understand that a burnt-out farmstead was unable to bring in any income.¹⁷

The Lviv Arch-diocesan Council of 1940 adopted a number of decisions, resolutions and decrees, which forbade priests to abandon their parishes without permission from the Church. M[etropolitan] O[r]dinarium No. 14. "Severe canonical censure on all priests, who have abandoned their parishes without leave".

And "all priests are still in their places", writes the Dean of Olesko Father Vasyl Pryshlyak. "They are all giving instruction. In Ozhydiv the authorities found out about a meeting of children in the church and banned it. ... External pressure to collective agricultural life is everywhere apparent. I was approached by political instructors who asked me not to obstruct the new movement. In my personal opinion this business is for the time being a voluntary effort by village layabouts who want an easy living. One should expect that once the new regime is consolidated, everyone will simply be compelled to collectivise, and then what is left of the land will fall to the collectives. Kulaks have already been put on the black list everywhere (probably for ultimate resettlement). We are faced with the unresolved question, what position should the local clergy adopt?... There are already cases which speak for themselves. On 27 March of this year there occurred an event, whose reverberations deeply affected the religious sensibilities of the entire neighbourhood. Halfway through the service, two Red Army soldiers broke into the church and with terrible shouting, or rather roaring, began to obstruct the Mass. The congregation huddled even more closely together, and the service continued even more fervently. Then one of them, Serhiy Zotin (junior commander) leapt up the sanctuary steps, shouting 'I will kill the priest', and throwing himself from the steps towards the altar, pushed aside the congregation and ended up directly at the door of the sacristy, where I was standing in the sanctuary. At the crucial moment I looked round and saw him at my back. I instinctively grabbed him by the collar and threw him into the church. Turmoil broke loose. The faithful stood around me

* A morgen is equal to five-sevenths of an acre.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Ibid.

– others ran out of the church and raised a shout. Both these ruffians hid in the unfinished second sacristy, from where they threw builders' tools at the people. I returned to the sanctuary to finish the service. In the meantime the two intruders knocked out the temporary door and ran outside. There the congregation gave them a good going over. Luckily, apart from a few bruises, bloodshed was avoided. The Lord protected us from what could have been worse, and the icon of Our Lady of Pidhirya (which had been secretly concealed in the village) spread over us her motherly protection".¹⁸

Local peasants have been recruited into the rural Soviet authorities – but these were mainly elements of fairly low spiritual and moral worth. But they also included persons of decent character and conscience who by persuasion and example often stood in defence of the faith, the Church, the clergy and the people. They also included respectable farmers, who had in no way succumbed to the drug of Bolshevism, who were dragged into the "authorities" by terror, and joined them out of fear and dread – and these were basically not harmful. No one voluntarily ran away with the Bolsheviks. On the contrary, when the Bolsheviks were on the run, some days before, they carried off 33 people by force from Kiydantsi, men aged between 27-35, and took them to the county town of Zbarazh. The ballot papers were already prepared. Each elector was obliged to vote. In the polling station an electoral commission put the papers into a ballot-box. Just before they were put into the ballot-box, they were given out to the voters to look at. The polling station was decorated with portraits of Bolshevik dignitaries and with red bunting and paper. It really looked like a diabolical hellish cavern. In the room adjacent to the polling station, music was playing and here the voters – indeed, only a very few of them – were dancing. The Bolsheviks forced them to dance, because it was Advent at the time. The candidate himself spoke little. This was by order. He just introduced himself and gave the people a brief autobiography: all his life he had suffered from the bourgeois, landowners, priests and kulaks, he was a "poor landless peasant". Then the Bolshevik agitators spoke. Not a single voter ever spoke at these meetings, no one ever criticised anything, everyone was afraid, for one could disappear without trace. The voters "had the right" and had to applaud the agitators and shout "Long live...!". They were, however, not allowed to shout [the customary Ukrainian slogans] "*Mnobyha lita*" [We wish you many years] or "*Slava*" [Glory to you] because these were regarded as nationalist and Fascist slogans.

After these electoral meetings and the elections, after all the requisitions of grain and cattle, after the levying of 'compulsory-voluntary' internal loans, after the deportation of people to Siberia, after the summoning of many villagers to the NKVD for interrogation, where they were held without a break for days at a time – nevertheless no less than 9,570 people still remained unimpressed by and utterly hostile to the Bolsheviks and their calls for atheism, Communism and internationalism. For a whole year 1940-41 they have been secretly waiting for liberation and believing that it will come.

And 1941 came. The Bolshevik dictatorship was exchanged for the dictatorship of Nazi Germany, replaced with a regime which at first brought dreams of liberation both to the newly-created Ukrainian state, established on 30 June 1941, and also to the Ukrainian Church.

The Metropolitan wrote appeals, letters, and declarations to the new government in Lviv, dealing with the release of Ukrainians from imprisonment, the

¹⁸ Central State Historical Archive of Ukraine, Lviv, f. 358.

transport of food parcels for prisoners, the problems of Ukrainians doing seasonal work in Germany, and on matters of education and health.

15 August 1941, Lviv

To the Administration of the City of Lviv Health Department

Re: the letter of the Administration of the City of Lviv of 15 August 1941, the Metropolitan Ordinarium states that during the years of Polish rule, there were not a great number of Ukrainian patients in hospitals in Lviv, for the Polish authorities made great difficulties about the admission of patients for treatment. And those who were admitted were forced to accept the service of Polish pastors, to the point of transfer to the Latin rite. Every hospital had a Latin rite pastor; some of them had several. And now the number of Ukrainian patients has increased and is continuing to increase, so it is necessary to provide proper pastoral care for them. We are asking for what is already a matter of vital necessity.

From h-k M.O. in Lviv †Andrey

17 November 1941, Lviv

Dear Colonel,

I am writing to you with the following plea. During the Bolshevik period there was a writer in Lviv from Central Ukraine, OSYPO POZYCHANYUK, a nationally-conscious Ukrainian, who had nothing to do with the Bolsheviks. Now he has gone to Ukraine where on 28 August 1941 he was arrested by the German authorities in the town of Zhytomyr. Presently he is in the Montelupich prison in Cracow. I am aware that on 19 September of this year the Lviv Gestapo issued a decision on the release of Osypp Pozychanyuk. This decision was not implemented as at that time the Gestapo did not know the place of being of Pozychanyuk. I appeal to you to take up the case of this young man and get him out of prison.

Metropolitan and President of the UNR †Andrey (Dr A. Sheptytskyi)

1942, Lviv – Letter of Metropolitan Sheptytskyi to the Administration of the City of Lviv “Re: delivery of food parcels to prisoners”

At the conference of the U.K.K. in Lviv on 17 January of this year the Directors of three economic institutions, namely: the Tsentrosoyuz (Dr Sheparovych Yulian), Maslosoyuz (Andriy Paliy) and Narodna Torhivlya (Dr Kuziv) indicated their agreement to deliver food parcels to prisoners from individual localities to Lviv in the motor vehicles belonging to their institutions.

In view of the fact that large numbers of food parcels (around 30,000) are now ready in the country and the weary Ukrainian prisoners are waiting for them, delivery of these parcels to Lviv should be effected within the next few days. On this depends the success of the action to help the imprisoned Ukrainians. In this regard, special instructions should be issued for the rank-and-file cells of the above-mentioned economic institutions, so that all cars at the disposal of individual district economic institutions, should be used to their maximum capacity for the transport of food parcels.

†Andrey¹⁹

Nor did the Metropolitan ignore the needs of those who ended up in Galicia through force of military circumstances.

¹⁹ Central State Historical Archive of Ukraine, Lviv, fund no. 201.

1943, November – Letter of Orthodox Ukrainians to Metropolitan Sheptytskyi

We turn to you, Reverend Father, seeking help. And only he can help us who has enough for himself, who knows the needs of the faithful and is concerned about their fate, for Christian souls. In your booklet for migrant workers going to earn money abroad, you gave them some quite useful instructions, which they needed. Now, at this dread hour other wayfarers require your help, those who, fleeing for their lives from Bolshevism, have ended up here, in Galicia and other of our territories. These are Ukrainians from the Left-Bank, Central Ukraine – that Ukrainian Galilee, blessed by God, but temporarily perverted by Muscovite Jewish-Bolshevism. In such conditions, far from our native regions, needy, weak, alone, weary in soul and body, these people have found here a certain refuge, a good human heart, material help. Once again we have hope, sighed and our eyes have, as it were, lit up, although it is inexpressibly difficult to forget the evil we have suffered and to free ourselves from it. On holy days and Sundays these unfortunates hasten to the church of God, to the House of Him who eternally calls: "Come unto Me all ye that labour and are heavy laden". To Him, who knew how to love these little ones and who sent His World for the whole world, teaching both to believe and pray, and recognise the way to the Kingdom of God on Earth. For in the Church of God the soul of the Christian finds rest and great joy, for the love of God and the Father and the sacrament of the Holy Spirit.

*4 October 1943, Lviv – Letter of Metropolitan Sheptytskyi
to the Mother Superior of the Basilian Order Monica*

Dear Reverend Mother!

... If you are planning to come to Lviv, you should postpone your intention for some time. At present, Lviv, and in particular my home, is overflowing with refugees from Ukraine.²⁰

The Metropolitan's uncompromising attitude towards the German authorities won him great prestige both among Catholic and Orthodox Ukrainians alike. This turned the occupation authorities against him: the secret police began to visit his palace and there were various incidents when only the intervention of the Governor-General of Galicia saved the Metropolitan from arrest by the Gestapo. Nothing could prevent Metropolitan Sheptytskyi from good work and trying to save the people. In 1942 he issued his famous pastoral letter condemning Nazi atrocities against the Jews. In another he protested vehemently against the recruitment of Ukrainians into the Nazi *Einsatzgruppen*, protested against the mass recruitment of Ukrainians for slave labour in Germany, and appealed to the people with the pastoral letter: "Thou shalt not kill!". At the risk of his own life, he hid Jewish children and Rabbi David Kahane in his palace. On the Metropolitan's instruction, 150 Jews were hidden in the Studite monasteries. According to Isaac Levin, around 500 monks knew about the Jews, but there were no cases of betrayal and not one of these Jew fell into the hands of the Nazis.²¹

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Kravchenyuk, op. cit., p. 103.

In his half a century as Metropolitan, Sheptytskyi had trained true pastors of the Ukrainian people, pastors who followed the example of their teacher and did not desert their people in the difficult times of trial, but risked their lives to save others.

*7 May 1942, Lviv – Anonymous Letter to Metropolitan Sheptytskyi
warning pastors not to issue baptism certificates to Jews*

... Yesterday a Ukrainian, who works in the German government, visited Dr Sanotskyi, the head of the Department of Social Services, and informed him discreetly that some of our parish priests in Lviv are facing arrest for issuing baptism certificates to Jews.

In particular, he mentioned Father Dudkevych and another [priest], probably Father Kashtanyuk, but Dr Sanotskyi does not remember the surname of the other [priest].

He asked me to tell Your Excellency to be so good as to warn all our parish priests that they face the worst consequences regarding this matter. 7.V.1942.²²

Hopes and expectations that with the departure of the Soviet dictatorship the Ukrainian people would be able to build their state were short-lived.

In his letter to Pope Pius XII of August 29-31, 1942, Andrey Sheptytskyi wrote: "When we were liberated from the Bolshevik yoke by the German army, we felt a certain relief, but this did not last more than a month or two... Today the whole country is convinced that the German regime is just as evil, if not worse than the Bolshevik regime, almost diabolical".²³

*7 July 1944, Borynichi – Letter of Dr Roman Yatsenkiv
to Metropolitan Sheptytskyi*

... Stilsko and Iliv were destroyed by fire one hundred per cent. Only the church, which was three times plundered by the German troops, has survived. They desecrated the pyx containing the Blessed Sacrament, and stole the [altar vessels], the whole set – some of the costly vestments, and also money. The third time, on Wednesday, after breaking the lock to the sacristy with a grenade, they left the sanctuary lamp alight in order to burn down the church. Everything that I mentioned has been completely destroyed. Most of all I grieve for my doctoral diplomas and my library, which I cherished like the apple of my eye.²⁴

In 1944 came the next (Soviet) "liberation" and the next letter of the Church appealing to the clergy and faithful not to fight the enemy against impossible odds.

... Horror fills us to the depths of our souls and unspeakable pain seizes our hearts when we behold, Dear Brothers and Sisters, the present state of our eparchies, and the most difficult conditions in which you, priests and faithful, have to live, with no certainty of what will become of your property or your lives...

The storm of war has continued to rage, and fire and blood have marked out their tortuous paths towards the further fettering of our country. A truly difficult fate befell our people. ... This impels us now to draw your attention to new dangers, so that you may with even greater effort and care try to prevent bloodshed and avoid any pretext for the destruction of our people. Try to do nothing to pro-

²² Central State Historical Archive of Ukraine, Lviv, fund no. 201.

²³ *Za viltu Ukrainu* (For a free Ukraine), 28 July 1990.

²⁴ Central State Historical Archive of Ukraine, Lviv, fund no. 201.

voke persecution, do not yield to incitement nor let yourselves be carried away by the provocations of those who would like to entice you into an impasse through various loud, often unchristian nationalist slogans. For, today, more than before you face the threat of the destruction not only of all your livelihood and possessions, but also the loss of your life and that of your entire family.

We appeal to you to prevent further bloodshed. Do this in the name of obedience to the Soviet authorities, but even more in the name of the good of all our people. Obstructiveness would be the result either of an overweening opinion of your strength and might – or else of taking the enemy too lightly...

... Dear Children of Ukraine. While there is still time, take a sober look at reality and heed our voice, the voice of the Church. We are not trying to dissuade you from loving your people and sacrificing your life, but it would be a hopeless impulse to set yourselves up against the mightiest powers of the world at the moment when the Red Army is bringing down the German occupation of Ukraine. Nationalist Germany has been trying to destroy us and the whole of Slavdom together. We must not follow in its footsteps. We should evaluate the position soberly, but, for the achievement of the greater good, should renounce lesser goods. This is justifiable and reasonable. And surely the Lord will bless our good, peace-loving intentions and good will and will guide towards good the affairs of our homeland, for God is not a God of discord, but of peace.²⁵

For the Blessing of the Resurrection of their Church from ruins, Ukrainian Catholics would have to suffer, first of all, the outlawing of that Church in 1946, and then the long years of its underground existence... But then, back in the 1940s, there was still hope.

Dr Markian Dzerovych writes:

Our People have already shown so much strength, shown so close an allegiance to the Christian Faith, that the handful of Foreigners, who acknowledge only their own principles, and who can try and are trying to instil in us their teachings and beliefs will not break it! We need only at this time to create among ourselves an atmosphere of wishing to lead the Hope so dear to our heart along a new, bright, clean path. We need the dedication to organise all the moral forces from among our People, who have taken upon themselves the burden of rebuilding all aspects of national-state life. I have been thinking over those matters several times, and my thoughts fly to St George's Hill, to you, Your Grace, for this unattainable Authority, which Your Excellency enjoys, that Individuality, which today is the sole factor capable of achieving unity, strength and rebirth! I am convinced that every honest-thinking Ukrainian, after so much disillusionment, and so many broken and unfulfilled hopes of outside help, will take up his task inspired by the moral strength contained in Your spirit.²⁶

The Cathedral, the See of the Galician Metropolitans, is a place where the thoughts of the Ukrainian people resound at all important moments of history, in moments of happiness, sadness, moments of national disaster. There the Ukrainian people have searched for and found tranquillity and consolation, there they have gained strength for further effort. God grant that, at the time of this new national resurrection, He will not be disappointed in them. ■

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Ibid., fund no. 358.

Current Affairs**WALKING THE RAZOR'S EDGE**

Oksana Hasiuk

Ukraine became an independent state three years ago. Although the first Ukrainian President, Leonid Kravchuk, understood the need for economic changes, he supported a gradual reform of the economy. But the citizens of Ukraine, especially the Russians, who supported Ukrainian independence in the referendum of December 1991, wanted to live in a rich, developed state immediately, not in some remote future. For three years Kravchuk had been marking time – and the Ukrainian economy had been collapsing. “There was no political will for implementing reforms among Kravchuk’s staff and the former Ukrainian parliament”, said Volodymyr Lanovyi, a young Ukrainian economist, at a press conference on October 15, 1994.

Dependence on Russian gas and oil has created unfavourable conditions for the development of Ukrainian industry. Moreover, it gave Russia the possibility of blackmailing Ukraine by turning off the oil tap. Kravchuk’s promises to move Ukraine towards economic growth remained only words.

At the same time, Ukrainians, especially the elderly, grew tired of all political declarations and wanted to change the parliament and the president. They recalled the “good old” Soviet days, when sausages cost a few roubles and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union “concerned itself” with the people’s welfare. A deep nostalgia for socialism drove them to vote in favour of the communists in the parliamentary elections. Young Ukrainians, on the other hand, were too busy making money and building careers to have time to go to the polling stations. Consequently, only 20 per cent of Ukrainian youth turned out to vote. The majority of students, for example, forgot the date of the election, having lost any hopes for improvement in the economic and political situation in the country. But their grandmothers and grandfathers voted for representatives of the Communist and Socialist Parties.

People did not believe the national-democrats. As a result, the latter lost the parliamentary elections in March 1994.

And now “we have the situation we deserved”, as Kravchuk used to say. The second Ukrainian parliament is as red as the Soviet flag: communists and socialists have won more than 150 seats in the legislature and hold leading positions in key parliamentary commissions. Oleksandr Moroz, the head of

Socialist Party of Ukraine, became Speaker of parliament. The head of the Parliamentary Commission on foreign affairs and relations with CIS countries is Borys Oliynyk, a member of the Communist Party of Ukraine.

Having taken their seats in parliament, these socialists and communists have put the privatisation process on hold. Likewise, they do not want to let the Ukrainian farmers acquire private ownership of the land. The agriculture faction of the Ukrainian parliament supports the communists on these issues. This faction is largely composed of leaders of collective farms who are afraid that a land privatisation law and the consequent creation of a strong class of farmers in Ukrainian society would mean the end of their own position and privilege.

At the same time, the young economists, lawyers and businessmen in the Ukrainian parliament have organised a "Reform" group. "We are self-made persons and we know how to implement economic reforms in our state", said Serhiy Holovaty, a member of this group at the press conference for foreign journalists in September 1994.

Other parliamentary factions – Rukh, statehood and centre – hold a centrist position. Representatives of the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists in the parliament want to preserve Ukrainian independence at all costs. In pursuit of this aim, they cooperate with the other national-democrats. They would also prefer to see Ukraine a powerful and indivisible European nation. Hence members of the Congress take a firm line on the Crimean Autonomous Republic, saying, that Crimea is Ukrainian territory, not Russian. The radical nationalist groups – the Ukrainian National Assembly and Ukrainian National Self-Defence Organisation (UNA-UNSO) and the Ukrainian Conservative Republican Party – are also represented in parliament.

Such is the make-up of the present Ukrainian parliament. And what about the president? Leonid Kravchuk, who has been called the guarantor of Ukrainian independence, lost the July 1994 presidential election. As a result, Leonid Kuchma, director of the Dnipropetrovsk-based Pivdenmash, the biggest space technology corporation in the world, became the second President of Ukraine. Kuchma's support base was mainly centred in the industrial heartland of eastern Ukraine, whose residents trusted his promises of close cooperation with Russia and granting official status to the Russian language in Ukraine. At the same time, Kuchma is known as a reform-minded politician.

Having come to the Presidency, Leonid Kuchma announced his reform programme. "There is no alternative to reforms and I am committed to implementing them", he said, announcing his economic programme in parliament on October 11, 1994. He publicly repeated this phrase at least 10 times.

To ensure his commitment to reforms, Kuchma has appointed a 38-year-old economist, Viktor Pynzenyk, who has been called the Yegor Gaidar of Ukrainian economic reform, as first deputy prime minister. In 1992-93, when Kuchma, then prime minister, was trying to reform the economy, Pynzenyk, then a deputy prime minister, had a chance to gain experience of the upper echelons of government. Now Kuchma is once again attempting to tackle the difficult issue of economic reform with the help of Pynzenyk.

The president and the first deputy prime minister have already taken some steps towards economic reform: unification of foreign currency exchange rates and improvement in the Ukrainian Interbank Currency Exchange's operations, which have been made much more transparent, export liberalisation and liberalisation of prices. It was necessary for the Ukrainian leadership to take these steps in order to receive financial assistance from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the G7 countries, earmarked for implementing reforms in Ukraine. But Western assistance for the Ukrainian economy is conditional on real economic reform. This is manifested in the agreement signed between Ukraine and the IMF on October 3, 1994. Under this agreement, the Ukrainian leadership promised to control the budget deficit, accelerate privatisation, liberalise the price structure and to restructure Ukraine's export regime. All these requirements are now being implemented by the president and his staff.

As a result, the G7 countries promised to give Ukraine US\$5 billion long-term low-interest credit. The first part of this sum – US\$1 billion – is due to flow in the beginning of 1995. An IMF loan of US\$371 billion was recently received by the National Bank of Ukraine. All this money will be used to close the balance of payment deficit, for which purpose, according to Pynzenyuk, it will be sold on the Ukrainian Interbank Currency Exchange.

"Moreover, international financial organisations are confident about Kuchma's commitment to radical economic reforms, especially now that he has gathered young clever economists in his staff and in his Cabinet", Jan Brzezinski, Director of International Security Programmes attached to the Council of Advisors to the Parliament of Ukraine said on October 15, 1994. Kuchma has also secured the support of such nations as Canada and the United States of America in his efforts to reform the Ukrainian economy. During his visit to the US from November 19 to November 23, 1994, for instance, the Ukrainian president won an agreement with President Bill Clinton under which Ukraine will receive a loan of US\$500 million from the United States to pay off Ukrainian debts for Russian oil and Turkmenian gas.

The fact that Ukraine has acceded to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a non-nuclear state, helped the creation of favourable conditions for Kuchma's recent visit to the US. The decision to accede to this treaty was taken by the Ukrainian parliament on November 16, 1994. The American Ambassador to Ukraine, William Miller, rated highly Ukraine's intention to eliminate its nuclear arsenal. "The United States has recognized more than ever before that Ukraine is a particularly significant nation in post-cold war Europe and that it is very much in American interest to consolidate Ukraine as an independent state and as a member of the European Community of Nations", he said at the press conference before Kuchma's visit to the US on November 19, 1994. The United States also promised to allocate US\$200 million additional financial assistance in 1995 and US\$22 million special credit for implementing Ukraine's denuclearisation programme.

The world community supports the Ukrainian president in his intentions to move his country towards economic growth. The question is now whether Kuchma has the clout to implement reforms. The Ukrainian parliament, which, as we have noted above, is very reactionary, is doing everything it can to prevent Kuchma from carrying out radical reforms in the economy of Ukraine. The

communists and socialists wanted to veto the president's Decree on the Acceleration of land privatisation at the recent session of parliament on November 18, 1994. They are also trying to pass an extremely reactionary Law on local self-government bodies, which in effect revives the old Soviet system of state government. The president and parliament, it seems, speak different languages. The communist and socialist majority in the Ukrainian parliament does not want to see Ukraine a state with strong presidential power. Many Ukrainians understand this and they support the president.

At the same time, the rift between parliament and the president is becoming deeper. Kuchma is ready to enter into dialogue with parliament. He has presented to the legislature a draft Law on power in Ukraine on November 20, 1994, which delineates the responsibilities between the president and the legislature. "If Parliament does not pass this Law, a general referendum will be held in Ukraine and people will choose whether our nation will be a presidential state or a parliamentary republic", Kuchma told parliament on November 15, 1994.

Ukrainians are tired of instability in their power structures. They have already been subjected to shocks several times (massive "one-off" price rises in January, September and December 1993), and these were merely shocks without any therapy. The previous price liberalisation measures were followed by new monetary injections into the economy, which sucked Ukraine into the whirlpool of hyperinflation. The former Soviet manufacturing enterprises had grown used to receiving subsidies from the state budget. From now on, however, the tax revenues collected from businesses will be lower, but, in return, these businesses should not expect to receive a portion of these funds back as subsidies. At the same time, Ukrainians will have the possibility to take part in privatisation by receiving vouchers entitling them to a share in the former state property. These plans are what the new Ukrainian government has to offer. And President Kuchma is doing everything to defend his progressive Cabinet from parliamentary attacks.

The communists and socialists in parliament claim that they are defending the rights of common Ukrainians. But they only are defending their own interests, fearing for their positions and socialist principles. And the people of Ukraine are beginning to understand this. The government is trying to cope with strikes, organised by Ukrainian teachers, doctors and other workers whose salary comes from the state budget. Compensation for price rises has been allocated to them and also to pensioners, students, the disabled and other low-income groups. These people are now beginning to understand that only a market economy and a tight monetary policy can guarantee normal living conditions.

Reformers in all countries have been adopting such classic economic reform measures, but under different circumstances. In Poland, for instance, reforms moved fast, unlike Ukraine, where nothing has yet been done. Now Ukraine has a chance. There is political will in the government and in the presidential staff to move Ukraine towards a market economy. But in the words of Viktor Pynzenyk (October 27, 1994), "Today we are walking on the razor's edge, and God forbid that we should step aside. I am deeply concerned that parliament will not understand properly the steps that have already been taken". ■

History

WHO HAS A RIGHT TO CRIMEA?

(Part 2)

Volodymyr Butkevych

How did the present Crimean question arise?

At the end of the summer of 1917, the Ukrainian Rada sent a delegation to Petrograd to discuss questions of autonomy with the Provisional Government. The latter appointed a commission of scholars to take part in the discussions. The Ukrainian delegation enunciated a position supporting the inclusion of the Crimean Peninsula into Ukraine. As a member of the delegation, Volodymyr Vynnychenko* described the reaction of the Russian scholars to this suggestion:

Caught up in the heat of the debates, the Kader** scholars unconsciously allowed their true, full, miserly bourgeois class face to surface. Measuring out the territory of the future autonomous Ukraine, they touched on the questions of the Black Sea, Odessa, the Donetsk region, Katerynoslav, Kherson and Kharkiv. Here, with the sole thought in mind that Donetsk and Kherson coal, Katerynoslav steel, Kharkiv industry will remain theirs, they became so agitated that they forgot their professional behaviour, their knowledge, and the Constituent Assembly, and began frantically waving their arms, showing the real essence of their slick, miserly Russian nationalism. Oh no, under these conditions they could not accept [Ukrainian] autonomy. Kyiv, Poltava, Podillya, even Volyn [Volhynia] and maybe even Chernihiv. But Odessa and the Black Sea, with its port and a route to the Dardanelles and Europe? And Kharkiv, Tauria, Katerynoslav and Kherson? The population in these parts is not Ukrainian; they are Russian territories, they say. The poor professors even spat in the face of their knowledge and, like an unweaned piglet, they kicked their legs out when approached with their own statistics and evidence from the Russian Academy of Sciences.³²

So as not to increase tensions, the Rada proclaimed its jurisdiction only over undisputed territories. It decided to defer the issue of other territories such as Crimea,

* Volodymyr Vynnychenko, a writer and political activist, was the leader of the Ukrainian Socialist Democratic Labour Party, the deputy chairman of the Central Rada (Parliament), and the first head of the General Secretariat – the autonomous government of Ukraine.

** The Kadets were members of the Constitutional Democratic Party. This party advocated a radical change in the Russian government towards a constitutional monarchy.

³² V. Vynnychenko, *Vidrodzheniya Natsiyi*, Kyiv, 1990, pp. 167-68.

which had become bones of contention, to later, separate talks. With these considerations in mind, the authors of the Third Universal³³ proclaimed in that document:

Belonging to the territory of the Ukrainian National Republic are the lands, populated mainly by Ukrainians, including: Kyiv, Podillya, Volyn, Chernihiv, Poltava, Kharkiv, Katerynoslav, Kherson, Tauria (without Crimea). The final demarcation of the national borders of the Ukrainian National Republic regarding the inclusion of Kursk, Kholm, Voronezh, and the *guberniyas* between these lands, where the population is mainly Ukrainian, must be established under the agreement of the organised will of the people.

Having forgotten the latter condition (perhaps due to the fact that the Rada was preparing to discuss the question directly with Crimea and not with Russia), the Russian Sovnarkom (Soviet of People's Commissars) insisted in its discussions with the Germans* that the territories under consideration in their talks should include only those named in the Third Universal. On March 29, 1918, the German Foreign Ministry replied to a memorandum received from the Russian People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs on March 26:

The final establishment of borders between Russia and Ukraine must receive attention in a Russo-Ukrainian peace treaty, which the Russian Government is obligated to conclude immediately according to the peace treaty it concluded with us and our allies. The German Imperial Government, in accordance with the proclamation of the Ukrainian Central Rada, maintains that the following nine *guberniyas* belong to Ukraine: Volyn, Podillya, Kherson, Tauria (without Crimea), Kyiv, Poltava, Chernihiv, Katerynoslav and Kharkiv. It would also be worth adding sections of the Kholm *guberniya*, that have been attributed to Ukraine in accordance with treaties concluded by our allies with it.³⁴

The note, while not part of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, touches on a definitive settling of the territorial question between Russia and Ukraine. The Rada continued to insist on a final regulation of the territorial problem. Russia, on the other hand, had at this time sent its own emissaries to attempt to convince Crimea to separate from Ukraine.

Having no cadres to support them (and being financially supported by Petrograd to the sum of 49 million roubles), the emissaries formed a Central Committee of local Soviets in Tauria, and, on 19 March 1918, proclaimed a Soviet Socialist Tauride Republic. The new leadership claimed jurisdiction over Ukrainian territory as well. The Russian Sovnarkom quickly announced the establishment of official relations with the new "republic". Three days later the Tauride government corrected its earlier mistake by renouncing its claims to

³³ The *Universals* were a series of decrees promulgated by the Ukrainian Central Rada, which ushered in the short lived period of Ukrainian independence between 1918-21. The Fourth Universal, for example, announced an independent Ukrainian state.

* According to the agreement between Ukraine and the Central Powers of 9 February 1918, at Brest-Litovsk, Ukraine accepted the military assistance of Germany and Austro-Hungary to fight the Bolsheviks, who at that time already controlled a large portion of the country, including the capital – Kyiv.

³⁴ *Dokumenty vneshey politiki SSSR*, vol. 1, p. 217.

the Dnipro, Melitopol and Berdyansk regions of Ukraine. According to the 1897 census, the population of the Dnipro region was 73% Ukrainian, while that of the Melitopol and Berdyansk regions was 59% and 54% respectively.

The Tauride Republic lasted for one month and was then disbanded by the Crimean Tatars on 30 April 1918. The Russian Sovnarkom realised by then that it had erred in pursuing the separation of Tauria from Ukraine. The Tauride government had no support from the local population and was, therefore, doomed from the start. The logical course would have been to allow the people to decide for themselves; but the Sovnarkom knew that the people would not decide in Russia's favour. Thus, it decided to convince the local population that it was being represented by its own people and changed the identities of the emissaries to make them appear Ukrainian. Sergo Ordzhonikidze wrote to Lenin on 14 March 1918 that it was necessary to

create immediately a unified defensive front from Crimea to Great Russia, engage our villagers and decisively and unconditionally change our face in Ukraine. This is our immediate task. Antonov* must be prohibited from using the name Antonov-Ovsienko, and must only use Ovsienko. The same can be said of Muravyov (if he remains in his position) and others.

Please tell Comrades Vasylichenko, Zhakov and others that no matter how they plot to separate their region from Ukraine, it will, judging from Vynnychenko's geography, be included into Ukraine and the Germans will fight for it.³⁵

The chief of the General Staff of the Austrian Foreign Ministry wrote:

The road to the East is through Kyiv, Katerynoslav and Sevastopol, since this is where the links to Batumi and Trebizond begin. In my opinion Germany intends to leave Crimea behind as its colony in one form or another. They will never let the rich Crimean Peninsula slip out of their hands.³⁶

The Germans indeed did capture Crimea in the spring of 1918. The note of a German diplomatic representative to the RSFSR, Wilhelm Graf von Mirbach-Harff, indicates that on 3 May 1918 the Russian Commissariat for Foreign Affairs was informed that "the Imperial Government will give the full force of law to the self-determination proclaimed by the Russian government, and foresees that the question of Crimea, which until now has belonged to the Tauride *guberniya*, will become the subject of a Russo-Ukrainian treaty".³⁷

At a meeting of representatives from the Imperial Russian Government and Kaiser Wilhelm II's Supreme Command it was also stated that "Great Russia and Ukraine are presently each laying claims to Crimea. Agreement between the two on this question is as impossible as on the question of borders. Order, in the most extreme case, must be imposed. Bolshevik criminals are still roaming free there.

* Volodymyr Oleksandrovych Antonov-Ovsienko was a professional revolutionary and Bolshevik activist. During the Civil War of 1917-21, he led the Ukrainian Front.

³⁵ V.I. Lenin, *Sobranie Sochineniya*, vol. 50, p. 50.

³⁶ *Razrushenie germanskikh zakhvatnikov v 1919 godu*, Moscow, 1943, p. 289.

³⁷ *Sovetsko-germanskije otnosheniya: sbornik dokumentov*, Moscow, 1968, vol. 1, p. 519.

We cannot do justice indirectly. The population is not able to form a government. General Sulkevich is ready to rule the country in conjunction with us".³⁸

General Sulkevich formed a Crimean government on 17 June 1918. Like his predecessors, he was unfamiliar with the conditions in the peninsula and, regardless of his ethnic ties to the local population (he was a Lithuanian Tatar), Sulkevich found little support from the people of Crimea. He was able to install himself in power only with the help of a handful of Tatars when he appealed to the German government for help in transforming Crimea into an independent Tatar Khanate. This appeal was received by Germany on 21 July 1918. However, the population of Crimea openly supported and pursued a renewal of political, economic and socio-cultural ties with Ukraine.

Rail workers in Ukraine and Crimea organised a strike in July 1918. The Russian press began more and more to write of the people of Crimea as peasants of southern Ukraine. A plenary meeting of the Communist Party (of Bolsheviks) of Ukraine (KP[b]U) Central Committee on 8 September 1918 issued an order to the Odessa provincial party committee to, "Tour Crimea, help organise a Crimean Conference, and give every encouragement to our Crimean comrades, including financial aid".³⁹ According to an order of the RKP(b) Central Committee from October 1918, the Crimean party organisation was made a part of the Ukrainian party structure as a provincial party. Thus delegates from Crimea were present at the KP(b)U Second Congress which took place from 17-22 October 1918.

There were also links to organs of Soviet power in Ukraine. For example, the Ukrainian Sovnarkom invited Crimean representatives to a meeting of Ukrainian provincial government leaders in March 1918. These contacts continued even during the period of German occupation. Furthermore, the inability of the pro-German Sulkevich government to foil attempts at renewing Crimean-Ukrainian ties became greater and greater.

Following the liberation of Crimea from German occupation, on 14-15 November, a Russian Kadet/SR/Menshevik government was formed. However, this government lasted only a very short time.

The consolidation of Soviet power

Soviet power was established in Crimea in the Spring of 1919 (with the exception of the Kerch Peninsula). In order to forestall any Ukrainian claims to Crimea, the RKP(b) Politburo decided, on 23 March 1919, to create a Crimean Soviet Republic within the RSFSR. However, this act was not supported by the general population in Crimea and could not be considered a legal document upon which to substantiate a Russian claim to Crimea.

The RKP(b) Politburo had reconvened the Constituent Congress of Soviets of revolutionary and Peasants' Committees in Tauria from 7-10 March 1918. The delegates to this congress adopted an appeal to the government of the RSFSR, in which they stated:

³⁸ Ibid., p. 571.

³⁹ See *Partarkhiv Instytutu Istorii pry TsK Kompartii Ukrainy*, (Party archive of the Institute of History of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine).

Soviet authority should be established in all Ukrainian territories as an expression of the will of the working people; and we will support such authority along with our Ukrainian proletarian comrades by all means available to us. We do not recognise any other authority.⁴⁰

On 28 April, the RKP(b) Politburo reviewed the membership of the Crimean republican government, and the following day it called a Crimean provincial party conference at which several dozen Communists, under orders from the Russian Politburo, formally proclaimed a Crimean Soviet Socialist Republic as a part of the RSFSR. The conference prepared a declaration for the provisional government which announced that, "With the will of the revolutionary workers and peasants of Crimea and the glorious advances of the Red Army, the bourgeois-collaborationist Crimean government is dissolved and Crimea proclaims itself a Socialist Soviet Republic". This declaration was promulgated on 6 May 1919.

However, although the declaration claimed to represent the will of the Crimean workers, there were no "workers" in Crimea. The text of the declaration was copied directly from similar Russian documents, without taking into account the conditions in Crimea. A Provisional Workers' and Peasants' Government was set up in such haste and with such a fundamental distrust of the local population that it had to co-opt people who were wholly unfamiliar with Crimea – Lenin's brother, Dmitriy Ulyanov, for example. The government was modelled on the Russian Sovnarkom, and so even included a foreign minister. This alarmed the Russian Sovnarkom. Hence, on 28 May 1919, the Central Committee of the RKP(b) passed a resolution which dotted the "i's" of the status of the Crimean government:

It is to be taken as a directive that the government acts as a provincial executive committee and is subordinated to the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the relevant People's Commissariats, while the provincial party committee is now directly subordinated to the Central Committee of the RKP(b).⁴¹

In general terms, the history of the Crimean provincial party organisation provides grounds for assessing the Bolshevik attitude to the independence of Crimea. Having disagreed with the policies of the Provisional Government and wanting to acquire the support of Ukraine in the future, in October 1917 the Russian Socialist Democratic Workers' Party (Bolsheviks) [RSDWP(b)] recognised that Crimea logically belonged to Ukrainian territory. Moreover, it decided that Bolshevik party organisations in Crimea should be subordinated to Kyiv and not Russia. In a letter from the RSDWP(b) Central Committee to the Mykolayiv provincial party organisation dated 18 September 1917, Yakov Sverdlov (chairman of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee [VTsVK]) offered the following explanation:

The issue of this province is of great significance. We believe it would suit you much better to subordinate yourselves to Kyiv for the time being. This province

⁴⁰ See *Krymskyi oblparkhiv*, (the archives of the Crimean provincial party organisation).

⁴¹ See *TsPA IMA pri TsK KPSS*.

will include, as can be surmised, in addition to Kyiv city and region, Odessa, Mykolayiv, Kherson, Crimea with Sevastopol, Yelysavetgrad, and others. This territory may possibly be divided into two regions: 1) Kyiv, Poltava, Chernihiv, Mahileu and so on; 2) Odessa, Mykolayiv, Crimea and so on.⁴²

Following the Bolshevik seizure of power in 1917 the leaders of the RSDWP(b) stopped considering Ukraine's Communists when deciding on issues associated with Crimea. As stated above, they subordinated the Crimean Communists, i.e. the Communist activists who had been sent to Crimea, directly to the Russian Central Committee. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine set up a special committee (consisting of Stanislav Vikentiyovych Kosior, Hryhoriy Ivanovych Petrovskiy and Dmytro Zakharovych Manuyil'skiy*) to direct the activity of the underground Communist organisation in Crimea. It also allocated 500,000 roubles to reactivate the work of the Crimean provincial party organisation and 250,000 roubles for a printing press. However, fearing Denikin's advance,⁴³ the Russian Central Committee once again took over the Crimean party organisation. On 20 December 1919 it resolved that, "Considering the possible liberation and re-establishment of the Crimean republic, it is necessary to order the committee consisting of Dmitriy Ulyanov, Yuriy Haven** and Maksymovskiy to select political workers for Crimea and to prepare a thesis on the tasks of the party and Soviet authority in Crimea".

The interference of Poland in Russia's affairs coupled with General Wrangel's activities delayed the Central Committee's plans. The date for the "liberation" of Crimea was postponed. Control of the Crimean party organisation was once again handed over to the Communists in Ukraine. On 3 July 1920, the Central Committee of the KP(b)U once again (briefly) took into its embrace the homeless Bolsheviks of Crimea. A Crimean subsection, under the leadership of Haven, was formed within the KP(b)U Central Committee. In order to strengthen its position within the Crimean organisation, the Central Committee sent nine thousand political workers and allocated appropriate funds for this purpose. However, after the liberation of Crimea from the Germans, the Crimean Party organisation once again fell under Russian control.

⁴² Y. Sverdlov, *Izbranie Sochineniya*, Kyiv, vol. 2, p. 40.

* Stanislav Vikentiyovych Kosior was a Bolshevik Party activist. He was engaged in illegal Party activity in Kharkiv, Kyiv and Moscow. From 1918-19, he was secretary of the Kyiv underground Provincial Committee of the KP(b)U, and from 1919-20, secretary of the Central Committee of the KP(b)U.

Hryhoriy Ivanovych Petrovskiy was a Bolshevik Party activist. After the 1917 Revolution, he coordinated Party work in Petrograd. From 1920-38, he was a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the KP(b)U.

Dmytro Zakharovych Manuyil'skiy was a Bolshevik Party activist. In December 1921, he became first secretary of the Central Committee of the KP(b)U.

⁴³ Denikin, a White Russian general, led the western Russian forces fighting Bolshevik power during the Russian Civil War of 1918-22.

** Yuriy Haven was a Bolshevik Party activist. From 1917-20, he headed the Sevastopol All-Ukrainian Revolutionary Committee of the Crimean Provincial Committee of the RKP(b) and the Defence Soviet, and from 1921-24, the Central Executive Committee of the Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic.

No annexations or appropriations...

This is how questions of self-determination were dealt with by the Bolsheviks. Such were the possibilities of "self-determination" for the population of Crimea. In fact the RSFSR Sovnarkom had a wonderful grasp of the procedures of self-determination for ethnic groups and peoples and had to give the international community the undertaking to abide by these procedures. Thus, it outlined its programme for the self-determination of the peoples living on the territory of the former Russian empire in a draft peace treaty:

1) Political and economic negotiations; 2) The main subject of the political negotiations and the main principle of "no annexations or appropriations".

3) the concept of "annexations": a) lands incorporated after the declaration of war shall not be considered as annexed; b) all territories whose population, over the last decades (from the second half of the nineteenth century) expressed its dissatisfaction with being incorporated into some other state or with its status within another state – regardless of whether this dissatisfaction was expressed in literature, in local government decisions, in state or diplomatic documents, proclamations of a national movement in the territory in question, national conflicts, disputes, or other upheavals, shall be declared "annexations".

i) An official recognition for every stateless nation that is part of a belligerent state of the right freely to seek self-determination to the point of secession and the creation of an independent state; ii) The right of self-determination is to be realised by a referendum, with the participation of the whole people of the province in question; iii) The geographical borders of the province are to be established by the democratically-elected representatives of the said province and those contiguous to it; iv) Prerequisite conditions guaranteeing the implementation of the right of free self-determination are:

a) the removal of all foreign troops from the territories of the self-said province;

b) a return to that province of all refugees and also those deported from the province at the beginning of the war;

c) the creation of a provisional government in the said province with democratically elected representatives of those seeking self-determination, these representatives to be responsible *inter alia* for implementing point b);

d) the establishment within the provisional government of commissions of the negotiating parties, with the right of mutual monitoring;

e) to implement points b) and c) it will be necessary to obtain financing from a special fund at the expense of the occupying power".⁴⁴

Unfortunately, these very constructive provisions were not observed in the territory of the former Russian empire. When the aforesaid Crimean Socialist Republic was set up, statehood was based not on ethnic but on territorial considerations. This was officially explained by the fact that Crimea was populated by a myriad of ethnic groups, and it was difficult to determine their will. However, Moscow knew the wishes of the Crimean population without the

⁴⁴ *Dokumenty vnesbney politiki SSSR*, vol. 1, pp. 44-45.

need for a referendum. For here in Crimea, ethnic Russians made up a far smaller proportion of the population than did other ethnic groups. The fact of the matter was that Crimea had a significantly smaller Russian population than that represented by other nationalities. Taking into account the 1897 census statistics, which as we have said were unfavourable to Russian designs on Crimea, the outcome of a referendum was not difficult to foresee.

For this reason, Russia began to use highly suspect demographic interpretations in support of its aims. The indices for individual nationalities and ethnic groups disappear in the official statistics. Instead, a new index appears for "the number of Russians and Ukrainians". Naturally, this figure was greater than that for any other group in Crimea. To confuse the matter further, another index was then introduced: "Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians". Although the Belarusians formed less than one per cent of the Crimean population, this ploy was introduced in order to place the three "fraternal peoples" on a seemingly even footing. In fact, the figures were employed to hide the predominance of the Ukrainian population. However, as soon as the mass immigration and resettlement of Russians produced a predominance of Russians over Ukrainians in the population, the statistics began to show precisely the place of each people and its aspirations.

Furthermore, the official language of Crimea was declared to be Russian only (and Tatar for the Crimean Tatars). It is clear that when the Ukrainians had no possibility to study their own language, they had to change to Russian, not Tatar. From 1918 onwards, the population was constantly asked: "In which language do you, as parents, want your children to be taught?" Normally the number of those opting for Russian was considerably greater than those who wanted their children taught in Tatar. An index of "Russophone population" then appeared in the statistical data, which was significantly greater than other indices.

In April 1921 it was decided to carry out a census of the Crimean population. The first data were known as early as the following month. But the picture it painted was not very comforting. Before the publication of the results, in May 1921, a plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the RKP(b) had been convened to adopt a resolution establishing a Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic as a part of the RSFSR. Once again the opinion of the Crimean population was not taken into account. Crimean autonomy was justified on the grounds of territorial and not ethnic considerations. However, no legal act proclaiming the establishment of the republic was adopted at the plenum. The Central Committee cherished hopes that the final results would be more or less favourable.

For the sake of justice, one has to say that initially Moscow's instructions on how to carry out the census could not be distinguished from orders of the Cheka. For example, on 24 March 1921 there arrived in Crimea "An order from the Chairman of the Sovnarkom V.I. Lenin and the Central Statistical Administration to the Crimean Revolutionary Committee for the acceleration of a professional demographic-agricultural census and registration of Crimean industrial enterprises". The order stated:

It is recommended that all means be used to accelerate the completion of a demographic-agricultural census and registration of Crimean industrial enterprises. This

census is necessary for the Workers' and Peasants' government. The data of the census will be included as a basis for Soviet construction. Remove all obstacles you may meet in a revolutionary manner. There is to be no neglecting this matter of great state importance for even one day. Crimea must be covered and included according to the deadline in the established plan of action. You are reminded that the Workers' and Peasants' government demands the highest concentration of your efforts in this matter. You must severely punish all those who stand in the way of the census, and remember, that the Workers' and Peasants' government will hold you responsible first of all for any lack of energy in carrying out the census or for its poor performance. Inform the Central Statistical Administration on a daily basis, beginning on April 1, so that they can keep me apprised of the progress of the work.⁴⁵

The order was sent to, among others, the Crimean Revolutionary Committee, the Crimean Cheka, and various branches of the census administration.

However, these draconian orders did not achieve their purpose. The number of Russians in Crimea remained at the previous level. So once again it was necessary to turn to the approved method. The official results indicated that the Crimean population had the following consistency: "Russians and Ukrainians" – 51.5% (elsewhere this figure appeared as the figure for Russians, Ukrainians *and* Belarusians); Tatars – 25.9%; Jews – 6.86%; Germans – 5.88%; Greeks – 3.31%; Armenians – 1.67%; Bulgarians – 1.57%; Poles, Karamai*, Estonians and representatives of other ethnic groups – 3.31%.

Taking these data into account, Lenin and the Chairman of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, Mikhail Ivanovich Kalinin, signed a resolution on 18 October 1921 on the creation of a Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic within the RSFSR. This, in effect, completed the pre-WWII process of "self-determination" for Crimea. From the day of its inception the Crimean republic had a status little different from that of a province. And on 30 June 1945, this provincial status became official: the Crimean Autonomous SSR formally ceased to exist and became the province of Crimea within the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic.

Khrushchev's "Gift": Fact and Fiction

On 22 November 1991 some of the deputies of the Crimean ASSR Supreme Soviet put forth a proposal to appeal to the president of the USSR. They wanted to ask the Soviet president to repeal the 1954 USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium's decree on "The transfer of the province of Crimea from the RSFSR to the UkrSSR".

From 1954 until the proclamations of Ukrainian sovereignty and then independence, all assessments of that transfer were unanimous: the decision of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium in 1954 was a triumph of historical justice, evidence of the fraternal relations between Ukraine and Russia; a victory for common sense; a recognition of objective necessity.

⁴⁵ *Ukazы sovetskikh vlastey*, Moscow, 1989, vol. 13, pp. 480-81.

* Karamai (China), a city in the northern Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Republic.

However, these views quickly changed following the Ukrainian declaration of sovereignty in July 1990. The leaders of the USSR, the CPSU and the province of Crimea once again adopted the principle: Divide and Rule. One began to hear voices which said that the 1954 decree was merely a "gift" to Ukraine in honour of the three-hundredth anniversary of Bohdan Khmelnytskyi's treaty with Russia.

The territory of the Crimean Peninsula was transferred to Ukraine in accordance with the USSR Constitution of 1936. Article 49 of that document set out the powers of the USSR Supreme Soviet, but these did not make any mention of the transfer of territory. However, Article 14, subsection (d) stated that "ratification of any border changes between Union republics" is the prerogative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Furthermore, Article 31 included the following clause:

The Supreme Soviet of the USSR realises the implementation of all rights granted to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in accordance with Article 14 of the Constitution, insofar as they are not explicitly included in the powers granted by the Constitution, to the responsibility of the subordinate organs of the USSR Supreme Soviet, the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, the USSR Council of Ministers and all USSR ministries.

Therefore, such an act could only have been legally carried out by the USSR Supreme Soviet.

It must also be noted that the USSR Supreme Soviet was not given plenipotentiary powers in these questions; Article 18 of the Constitution included a clause stating that the "territories of Union republics may not be changed without their consent".

It may be asked why such attention was paid in the Constitution to the issue of state territory. The reason is that the transfer of legal and public authority on a given territory of a given state carries international legal implications. When such a transfer occurs in violation of international legal norms or national legislation, it must be considered legally invalid. It is therefore naive to claim a judicial basis for the transfer of the Crimean peninsula on the basis of a single decree.

Why, then, and how, was Crimea "given" to Ukraine? Answering the question "why" will help in clarifying the economic foundations of the 1954 act, while "how" will explain the legal and procedural features of the transfer. Only by considering the two factors together can one arrive at any conclusion as to whether or not the 1954 act was a crude breach of the norms of international law.

In order to proclaim state jurisdiction on any territory, it is not legally sufficient to do so in a legislative act. The questions of effective government, the concerns of the people living on this territory, and economic responsibilities must be resolved. Of course, it is more convenient to assert authority over a territory through the use of repression, the enforcement of a police state or through terror. However, tackling the problem by undemocratic methods invariably leads to economic collapse; and from economic collapse to a crisis of government.

Repression was the path chosen by Tsarist Russia in Crimea, and Soviet Russia, in essence, repeated the same mistakes. Their common and perhaps greatest mistake was to sever the historic ties between Crimea and Ukraine. The proclamation of Soviet Russian statehood in Crimea led to this rupture. Now such ties could only be effected by the route Simferopol-Moscow-Kyiv. The inefficiency of this relationship

soon became apparent in the Crimean economy and, in particular, in the severe decline in the standard of living of the Crimean population. For example, in 1919, when the population of Crimea faced the threat of famine, Ukraine sent 420,000 poods of flour and 109 truckloads of sugar directly to Crimea, and the situation was alleviated. However, under the new conditions, when Crimea became part of the territory of the RSFSR, sending such aid would have been far more complicated.

Ukraine thus delivered material aid and encouraged the development of a strong infrastructure in Crimea, not simply as an act of benevolence – these contacts were mutually beneficial. Ukraine also knew that sanctions from Moscow would soon be forthcoming. Yet, the Soviet Russian government was unable to liquidate the laws of economics. Thus, many of the decisions made by Russia turned out to be mutually contradictory. For example, Lenin and the RKP(b) Central Committee adopted a resolution recognising the complete subordination of Crimea exclusively to the Russian Sovnarkom and the All-Russian Central Executive Committee. Meanwhile, on 20 May 1919, the Deputy Postal Commissar, Lyubovich, the Ukrainian Postal Commissar, Khalepskyi and a Crimean representative, Izvekov, announced the following:

Considering the limited number of postal-telegraph offices in the Soviet territories of Bessarabia and Crimea and their direct subordination to Soviet Ukraine, the postal administrations of these republics are uniting with the People's Postal Commissariat of Ukraine which will have jurisdiction in these territories.⁴⁶

Gradually, ties between Ukraine and Crimea began to be renewed and develop. Yet the greatest obstacle, Moscow, had other ideas.

The May 1921 plenary session of the RKP(b) Central Committee reported that the revolutionary committees had carried out their assignments and Crimea was now a part of the RSFSR. The price exacted for this success was enormous. As a result of the civil war and miscalculations of the Soviet administration towards the Crimean population, the peninsula was in the grip of a famine. Gross output fell by 4.6 times, while a number of industrial enterprises virtually closed down altogether. However, the civil war was not the only cause. There was a severe labour shortage. The Tatar population did not go into industry, while the Tatars' subsistence-level economic activity was of no interest to the state. Moreover, there was a campaign against the workshops and small private enterprises which were renowned throughout the world for the excellence of their metal, leather and textile products, which were considered to be "bourgeois elements". The Ukrainian population, fleeing the Russification of the peninsula, began to move to the southern provinces of Ukraine. This left a large economic gap in Crimea, since these Ukrainians represented the main agricultural force in the peninsula.

For those who remained behind in Crimea, there was a lack of farming equipment, horses and land holdings. Furthermore, deliveries of grain, meat and dairy products from Ukraine were suddenly reduced. Between 1921-22 more than 150,000 Crimeans died as a result of the famine. Despite this, Lenin stated at a meeting of the Moscow RKP(b) organisation in December 1920:

⁴⁶ *Kommunisticheskaya partiya – vdokhnovitel' i organizator obedinitel'nogo dvizheniya ukrainskogo naroda za obrazovanie SSSR: sbornik dokumentov i materialov*, Kyiv, 1972, p. 179.

Although after three years of war we still cannot catch all those loose pigs, it must still be said that these people have no place in the governing of a state. We are tackling immeasurably more difficult tasks. For example, there is a 300,000-strong bourgeoisie in Crimea. This is a source of future speculation, espionage and all kinds of aid for the capitalists.⁴⁷

Of course, no one wanted to conclude that it was impossible to govern the state. The “porkers” were all “caught”, decreasing the Crimean population by 300,000. To replace such great losses in the labour force (in 1922 there were only eleven tractors in working order in the whole of Crimea), even the most developed countries would require decades. However, in Crimea the fight against “banditry” still went on. Furthermore, it moved more and more towards an inter-ethnic conflict. The campaign publicly proclaimed that the Tatars were “barbarians” whose consciousness must be raised to the level of the world revolution. The Ukrainians were similarly depicted as racial hybrids, in whose veins flowed half-Polish half-Tatar blood. Russian workers and peasants in Crimea were described as “freeloaders and drunkards”. (It became difficult for the political activists to understand who it was who for so long had been growing rye and potatoes, and working in the tobacco plantations and vineyards.) Anyone who dared offer any opposition to the imposition of the new Soviet regime was immediately labelled a “White Guardist” and condemned to be eliminated. Everything which went wrong was blamed on the “White Guardists”.

In response to these developments, representatives of various peoples and ethnic groups (which numbered nearly seventy at the time in Crimea) formed a united front to fight the Bolsheviks: Ukrainians rallied around the supporters of the Rada; Tatars rallied around the “Milli-firk”; Jews rallied around the Bund, while Russians rallied around the Kadets, Labourites, Octobrists* and other groups. This, in turn, elicited counter-measures from the Bolshevik authorities.

Peasants were refused the land they were promised by the Bolsheviks. The area of land under cultivation decreased by thirty per cent, while peasants were allowed only two *desiatyny* for their own use – 6.3 *desiatyny* in the steppe regions. The plan to reconstruct Crimean industry proposed by the Crimean provincial party committee fell through and still had not been implemented by the end of the 1920s.

All in all, this created the impression that the emissaries sent by Moscow and the local population lived in completely different worlds. For instance, at the height of the famine, the Crimean provincial party committee went on devoting all its energies to preparing and distributing pre-election campaign literature. They distributed 120,000 copies, that is, only 31,000 less than the number of people who had died. The 1926 level of industrial output was a mere 58.6% of the 1913 level, but the provincial party committee was fully occupied training propagandists to publicise its policies.

⁴⁷ Lenin, vol. 42, p. 74.

* The Octobrists (Union of October 17) were members of a conservative-liberal Russian political party whose programme of moderate constitutionalism called for the implementation of Emperor Nicholas II's October Manifesto.

Economic crimes and the demographic and cultural policies of the Bolsheviks destroyed the local cultural traditions, lifestyle and structure of the indigenous population. The trend towards the eradication of ethnic minorities continued until the beginning of World War II. In 1926 ethnic minorities comprised 10.1% of Crimea's population, while by 1939, the figure had fallen to 5.2%.

The "mobilisation of forces" designed to collectivise the peasants resulted in 104 anti-Soviet manifestations in 1930. Mass arrests of kulaks began. Ukrainians, Tatars, Germans, and Jews began to flee back to Crimea. This resulted in a repression of "elements with resettlement aims". Regardless of the fact that by 1931 the stratum of proficient peasantry was all but eliminated, 1.5% of all farmers were still considered to be kulaks and were subsequently arrested or deported to labour camps. On 2 September 1931 the RKP(b) Central Committee adopted a resolution which stated:

2) We are now able to consider collectivisation basically a completed process...

In Crimea, 83% of peasant land-holdings have already been collectivised, encompassing 93% of all arable peasant land.⁴⁸

In order to give primacy to the collectivised farms, all grain was confiscated from the peasants. A new wave of famine began. The agricultural work force was utterly destroyed. Those who survived carried out their duties as if in serfdom in the eyes of the Soviet state.

The working class did not fare much better. In 1931 a wave of repression swept through the Crimean working class, after the alleged discovery of "saboteurs" at the Kerch State Metal Works and the Simferopol Marine Works. In 1932 "saboteurs" were again discovered at the Kerch State Metal Works, the Saky Chemical Works and various other factories throughout Crimea. Thus by the beginning of the Second World War the nascent Crimean working class had also been practically liquidated.

Whole echelons of new recruits were sent into Crimea, resulting in a rise in the Crimean population from 714,100 in 1926 to 1.13 million by 1939. Over this period the Russian population rose from 301,400 to 558,500. This meant that for the first time the Russian population of Crimea outnumbered all other groups from amongst the indigenous population, and now figured in the statistical tables separately from the Ukrainians and Belarusians.

But in the conditions of an administrative-command system, people alone, without the necessary resources, could not save Crimea's economy. The greater portion of the necessary resources was brought to Crimea from Ukraine. This entailed certain changes in Moscow's policy. The old links between Crimea and Ukraine were re-established and new ones created. The Kerch iron ore basin was thus subordinated to the Donetsk-Kryvyi Rih coal and metallurgical administrative structure. The Simferopol rail network including the huge Dzhankoi junction was given over to the Stalin Railway, administered from Dnipropetrovsk. The road transport system was

⁴⁸ KPSS v *resoliutsiakh, i resheniyakh sezdov, konferentsiy i plenumov TsK*, Moscow, 1970, vol. 4. pp. 559-60.

put under the joint control of Ukraine and Crimea. Thus a large part of Crimea's infrastructure gradually came under Ukrainian jurisdiction. Foodstuffs, light industry products, water and electricity were all exported to Crimea from Ukraine.

However, the campaign to eradicate the Ukrainian element in Crimean life was not halted. Ukrainians in Crimea were gradually eliminated from positions of authority (by 1927, the ethnic composition of the Crimean Central Executive Committee was Russians and Tatars each 34.7%, Jews 8%, and Ukrainians only 6.7%). Ukrainians were also ignored during the redrawing of Crimea's national/regional borders. (In 1930, sixteen regions were created in Crimea; of these, five were Tatar, one was Jewish, nine were Russian and only one Ukrainian. In 1935, new regions were created, two Tatar, six Russian, one German and no Ukrainian ones.) The external relations of Ukraine and Crimea continued to grow in spite of the administrative barriers imposed by Moscow.

It would be erroneous to assert that only Ukrainians suffered from Moscow's Crimean policies. The process of Russification and the imposition of the Russian state structure into Crimea also had a negative effect on the development of other ethnic groups. In 1939 Moscow introduced the Russian alphabet for the Tatar language; while some ethnic groups were deprived of the right to their own schools, cultural institutions or press.

World War II dealt a serious blow to the Crimean economy. Almost everything was destroyed. The whole peninsula was left with only 99 secondary schools and 342 economic enterprises still working. The population fell to 780,000, that is, to the 1926-27 level. Furthermore, on 11 May 1944 the State Defence Committee headed by Stalin adopted a resolution to deport Crimea's Tatars, Armenians, Bulgarians and Greeks. As a result of demographic selection, 228,543 people were deported from Crimea to Siberia and Central Asia, among them 191,088 Crimean Tatars. Bled white by the war, Crimea was deprived of almost a third of its labour force.

Crimea, therefore, was effectively left with neither the material nor the human resources to reconstruct its economy. In order to cover up the artificial demographic vacuum in Crimea, the Soviet government hastily recruited settlers for Crimea from the RSFSR and Ukraine. Families, work-units and even whole collective farms were forcibly uprooted and transported to Crimea. At the beginning of 1945, 17,040 families were resettled in Crimea, and from 1950-54, an additional 57,000 people were moved there.

The resettled collective farms were unable to adapt to their new conditions of existence. The feudal labour, coupled with a drought in 1946, forced many of those resettled simply to flee. The Crimean provincial party committee adopted a resolution at its plenary session in July 1946 to prevent any further flight from Crimea. Nevertheless, in 1947 the stream of fugitives leaving Crimea continued to grow. In October 1948 the provincial party committee adopted harsher measures against the fugitives. These proved ineffective and by the beginning of the 1950s a "conveyor belt" was working at full power with some people fleeing and others being brought in. Under the circumstances, it was hardly possible even to dream of any effective post-war economic recovery.

At this difficult moment, Ukraine offered Crimea a helping hand. In spite of its own difficulties, it made every effort to help rebuild the Crimean economy. Ukrainian engineers designed and built special quarrying equipment for Crimea for the Inkerman quarries; "Ukrvodbud" began construction of the Simferopol and Stryi-Krym reservoirs and the North Crimean Canal. Several metallurgical plants in Ukraine took agglomerate from Kerch and flux from the Balaklava mines; manufactured goods and food were sent to Crimea from Ukraine.

In effect, in the post-war years the economies of Crimea and Ukraine gradually merged into a single indivisible organism. However, this merging of the economies had no legal basis, and it was important for Crimea to switch over to solving its own problems, since its economy was beginning to run wild. The situation and, in particular, the low standard of living produced disaffection in the local population. The heads of a number of local councils including Simferopol (N.N. Katkov) and Sevastopol (S.V. Sosnytskyi) ever more frequently informed the Crimean Provincial Executive Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers that the population was demanding the unification of Crimea and Ukraine and an end to administrative incompetence. The authorities could no longer afford to ignore this information.

Those who assert that "Crimea was given to Ukraine as a present by Khrushchev", simply do not know that Khrushchev, in fact, played little or no part in the transfer. Khrushchev, in fact, kept well out of the affair. At that very time, he was engaged in a bitter and ominous power struggle. The September 1953 plenary session of the CPSU Central Committee strengthened his power amongst the Soviet people, but the international political community continued to view Georgy Malenkov as the more influential of the two figures. By dabbling in this dangerous issue, Khrushchev would have put at risk all that he had worked for decades to achieve. He had become first secretary of the Party at a time when the Central Committee was full of individuals whom Khrushchev could not trust. Moreover, he had been collecting evidence on the pro-Stalinist clique, and Stalin's deportation of the Crimean Tatars was his trump card. As far as Khrushchev was concerned, this was not the moment to heighten tensions in Crimea. As a result, he distanced himself from the whole Crimean problem, hoping probably, that one of his opponents would get embroiled in it.

But Khrushchev's opponents were equally cunning. So, the Crimean question, for perhaps the first time in Soviet history, was resolved in strict accordance with existing legislation (regarding the nationalities question) and by a more-or-less democratic procedure. Firstly (the Republic level) the question was discussed in the RSFSR Council of Ministers, which, after due consideration, concluded that it would be expedient "to transfer the Crimean province to the Ukrainian SSR". The Council of Ministers of the RSFSR presented its proposal to the Presidium of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, which firstly consulted the governing organs of the Ukrainian republic regarding the Council of Ministers' proposition. Having received the agreement in principle from Ukraine, the Presidium adopted the following resolution:

The Presidium of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, with the participation of representatives of the Crimean provincial and Sevastopol city Councils of workers' deputies,

has studied the proposition of the RSFSR Council of Ministers regarding the transfer of the Crimean province to the Ukrainian SSR.

Considering the commonality of the economic systems, the territorial proximity and the close economic and cultural ties between the Crimean province and the Ukrainian SSR, and also taking into account the agreement of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian Republic, the Presidium of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet finds it expedient to transfer the Crimean province to the territory of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.⁴⁹

The RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium then forwarded a copy of its resolution to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR.

In reply, on 13 February 1954, the Presidium of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet began deliberations on the question of the RSFSR resolution. After due discussion, the following resolution was adopted:

Discussion of the resolution of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium on the question of the transfer of the Crimean province from the RSFSR to the Ukrainian SSR was put on the agenda of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. The Presidium of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet would like to express its sincere gratitude to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic for this generous, noble act on the part of the fraternal Russian people.

With a deep sense of satisfaction and fervent gratitude, the people of Ukraine will greet the decision to transfer Crimea to the Ukrainian SSR as the latest shining example of the boundless trust and sincere love of the Russian people towards the people of Ukraine, and new evidence of the inviolable fraternal friendship between the Russian and Ukrainian people.

The government of Ukraine will undertake the further development and prosperity of the Crimean economy.

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR in its reply to the resolution of the Presidium of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet resolves to:

Request the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR officially to transfer the Crimean province from the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR also sent its resolution to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. It should be noted that the fact that the Presidia of the Supreme Soviets of the two republics had adopted these resolutions established a legal relationship between them in the form of a "gentleman's agreement". A "gentleman's agreement", from the point of view of international law, constitutes a source for a juridical document valid in international law, concluded by the competent organs of state.

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR had acted in strict accordance with Article 15(b) of the 1937 Constitution of the Ukrainian SSR, while the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR acted in accordance with Article

⁴⁹ *Radyanska Ukrayina*, 27 February 1954.

16(a) of the RSFSR Constitution, which gave them the right to conclude such agreements. In the practice of the Soviet Union, quite a few international agreements were concluded in this manner (in 1934 with the Mongolian People's Republic on mutual support against the threat of armed attack, in 1953 with Austria, Albania and the German Democratic Republic on transforming missions into consulates, in 1946 with the permanent members of the UN Security Council, etc.). Abrogation of this "gentleman's agreement", like that of a written treaty, would require a new agreement between these states. However, this "gentleman's agreement" also involved a change in the state boundaries of the two republics. Since these questions were reserved for the All-Union organs of power, the final ratification of the agreement lay with the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

A meeting of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium was called for 19 February 1954. Representing the Russian people: the head of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR, M.P. Tarasov, deputy head of the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR, V.O. Maslov, secretary of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR, I.M. Zimin.

Representing the Ukrainian people: the head of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR, Demyan Serhiyovych Korotchenko, the first deputy head of the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR, Mykhailo Serhiyovych Hrechukha, and the secretary of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR, V.Ye. Nyzhnyk.

Representing the province of Crimea: the first deputy head of the executive committee of the Crimean provincial Soviet of Workers' Deputies, N.N. Lyalin, head of the executive committee of the Simferopol City Soviet, N.N. Katkov, head of the executive committee of the Sevastopol City Soviet, S.F. Sosnytskyi.

In case matters relating to the Crimean Tatars deported to Central Asia came up, Sh. Radishov from Central Asia was invited to assist. But his assistance was not required, although he did make a speech. Khrushchev did not attend the meeting and could have had no influence on the discussions. The first to speak was the chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR, M.P. Tarasov, who stated:

The Crimean province, as is well known, occupies the whole Crimean Peninsula and is territorially a part of the Ukrainian republic, being as it were a natural continuation of the southern Ukrainian steppes. The economy of the Crimean province is closely tied to the economy of the Ukrainian republic. Thus out of geographical and economic considerations, the transfer of the Crimean province to the fraternal Ukrainian republic is expedient and in accordance with the interests of the Soviet state.

... The victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution further strengthened the centuries-old friendship of the Ukrainian and Russian people and has now further strengthened the economic and cultural ties between Crimea and Ukraine.⁵⁰

At the conclusion of his speech, Tarasov read the Resolution of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR and asked the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR to ratify the transfer.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

In response, the chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR, Demyan Serhiyovych Korotchenko, announced that the resolution of the Russian Presidium "was hailed by all the people of Ukraine with gratitude and approval". He also assured the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR that, for its part, the Ukrainian government was ready to devote further attention to developing Crimea's economy and raising the material and cultural well-being of the workers in the Crimean province.⁵¹ Finally Korotchenko read out the resolution of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR of 13 February 1954. Among those who spoke in the discussion were the deputy head of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Sh. Radishov, and Presidium members Otto Vilhelm Kuusinen and Nikolay Mikhailovich Shvernik, who supported the decision of the RSFSR to transfer the province of Crimea to Ukraine.

Shvernik, in particular, stressed that, "Without a doubt, this historical act will serve the cause of the further continuous economic development of the Crimean province within the Ukrainian SSR. The Crimean province will develop to an even greater extent, will increase the output of its valuable vineyards, tobacco and wheat fields, and increase the productivity of its livestock".⁵²

The chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Kliment Yefremovich Voroshilov, wound up the discussion. The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR then unanimously ratified the decree transferring the Crimean province from the RSFSR to the Ukrainian SSR in the following form:

"On the transfer of the Crimean Province from the RSFSR to the UkrSSR. Decree of 19 February 1954".

Considering the commonality of the economies, the territorial proximity and the close economic and cultural ties between the Crimean province and the Ukrainian SSR, the Presidium of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Supreme Soviet resolves:

To ratify the joint representation made by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the UkrSSR regarding the transfer of the Crimean province from the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.⁵³

However, this was not yet the final word. In the *Collection of Laws of the Ukrainian SSR and Decrees of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR, 1938-1973* (vol. 1, Kyiv, Politytydav Ukrainy, 1974), the editors have unfortunately added, on their own initiative, an explanation which is legally invalid: "[t]he Crimean province was transferred from the RSFSR to the Ukrainian SSR by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of 19 February 1954" (p. 33). However, as we have noted above, under the 1936 Constitution of the USSR, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR did not possess the authority to do this. Only the Supreme Soviet of the USSR itself possessed the necessary authority. But just at this time, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of the Third Convocation had ceased its work and an election campaign was in progress. The

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ *Sbornik zakonov i ukazov Presidiuma Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR, 1938-1975*, Moscow, 1975, vol. 1, pp. 104-105.

transfer of Crimea to Ukraine became a subject of debate at candidates' rallies in Russia, Ukraine, the republics of Central Asia and the Caucasus. Thus the deputies to the new Convocation of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR were well acquainted with the opinions of those who had elected them. The first session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of the Fourth Convocation took place on 20 April 1954.

On 26 April 1954, following a discussion of the transfer, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR unanimously ratified the law in the following form:

"On the transfer of the Crimean Province from the RSFSR to the Ukrainian SSR. Law of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR".

The Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics resolves:

1. To ratify the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of 19 February 1954 on the transfer of the Crimean province from the RSFSR to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.

2. To introduce appropriate amendments in articles 23 and 24 of the Constitution of the USSR.⁵⁴

This, therefore, was the final ratification. As we can see, Khrushchev had very little to do with it. As for the assertions that "Russia gave Ukraine the Crimean province as a gift in commemoration of the three-hundredth anniversary of the 'union' of Ukraine and Russia", one has only to look at the dates when the Resolution of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR on the transfer of the Crimean province and the Resolution on celebrating the three-hundredth anniversary were adopted. In the latter resolution there is not even a hint about transferring the Crimean province as a "gift".

Attempts to find some violation of international legal norms in the Act of transfer have little hope of success. Contemporary international law recognises the legality of a voluntary transfer of sovereignty over a given territory from one state to another, under an agreement between the two. This institution of international law is called *cession*. The only condition laid down by international law is that the state receiving the territory must provide the inhabitants of that territory with an option to choose between their former or their new citizenship. In the case of the Crimean transfer, however, there was no need for this option since Article 21 of the 1936 USSR Constitution stated that, "a single Union citizenship is established for all citizens of the USSR".

There is, nevertheless, one further aspect of the Crimean problem. At present, many of those who go on about returning Crimea to Russia put their hopes in a referendum. Yet, according to the norms of international law, territorial questions involve the holding of a *plebiscite*. In fact many people often confuse the terms "plebiscite" and "referendum". The two legal institutions do have much in common, but have equally many differences.

Juridical science and legal practice define *referendum* as concerning national questions, while *plebiscite* refers to international questions of law. The aim of a referendum is to resolve questions of a constitutional and legislative nature.

⁵⁴ Meeting of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of the Fourth Convocation, First Session, 20-27 April 1954, Moscow, 1954.

The only territorial questions which can be legally decided by a referendum are those of an internal, territorial-administrative character. Questions regarding the transfer of territories from one state to another may only be decided by a referendum when the transfer is based on a voluntary agreement between the state ceding the territory and the state receiving it, and only if the nation, people or ethnic group resident on it do not protest against such a decision.

Those, who are now urging the transfer of Crimea to Russia are attempting to force it into a framework of a territorial-administrative question. However, from the time when all interested parties expressed their views on Crimea, and especially following the proclamation of Ukraine's independence by the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR, the possibility of resolving the question of the transfer of this territory by referendum was ruled out. Under these new conditions, the question can be resolved only on the basis of the norms of international law, that is on the basis of a plebiscite. The mechanism for holding a *plebiscite* is substantially different from that for holding a *referendum*. The plebiscite must be carried out according to the norms of international, and not national, law; otherwise the results can be declared invalid and not juridically binding.

What are the necessary conditions for carrying out a plebiscite? International law in practice knows both valid plebiscites (Savoy, 14 October 1792; Nice, 15 December 1793; Venice, 22 October 1866; Norway, 1905; Chandernagore, 1949; West Iran, 1949; Guinea, 1958; Algeria, 1962; Uganda, 1964; etc.) and also plebiscites which were ruled invalid due to the breach of international conditions for carrying them out (e.g. Savoy and Nice, 1860). In the first place, international law considers states, nations and ethnic groups as legal subjects under a plebiscite. The nation, peoples and ethnic groups in question must compactly occupy a common territory, must be united by a common historical fate, language, culture and the common aim of self-determination. Even this first condition is not applicable in the Crimean case.

One can cite further factors which make it impossible to carry out a plebiscite in Crimea. The principal one is that no distinct nation, people or ethnic group has ever emerged in Crimea, so that there is no legal subject to carry out the plebiscite. The more than one million people resettled in Crimea in the forty-five years since World War II, cannot be considered a nation or people. This does not mean that the population of Crimea is without any legal defence. All the international pacts and conventions on human rights to which Ukraine has acceded hold good in Crimea.

If one postulates, theoretically, that the population of Crimea, or at least the Russian, Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar population as the most numerous groups in Crimea, might *unanimously* decide to create in Crimea their own independent sovereign state, how could they accomplish this in the light of international law. International law demands that maximally democratic conditions be created for conducting a plebiscite. This would necessitate the complete neutralisation of the territory – the withdrawal of all troops from the Crimean peninsula. This is not only to avoid servicemen sent to Crimea from other regions influencing with their votes the result of the expression of the will of the local population, but also to avoid the possibility of military coercion on the carrying out of the plebiscite.

The organs of power and administration currently functioning in Crimea would have to suspend their activity and dissolve themselves, since they were elected for a different purpose, not for carrying out a plebiscite.

Caretaker organs of power would have to be formed from representatives democratically elected exclusively by the local population, on a basis of parity among all peoples and ethnic groups. The principal purpose of these organs would be to carry out the plebiscite in a democratic manner. As soon as the plebiscite was over, these organs would also have to dissolve themselves. After new democratic elections, new organs of power and administration would be formed, competent to deal with the social, economic and other issues of the region.

Any external interference in the preparation or conducting of a plebiscite is categorically prohibited. We may say that the results of the plebiscite would be considered invalid if the mass media of Ukraine or Russia were to carry out propaganda activity to influence Crimea. As for the local media, these would have to be (all, without exception) open to all nations and ethnic groups living in Crimea.

The frontiers of the territory under plebiscite would have to be precisely defined by legislation. The plebiscite could not be held if these frontiers were not agreed with the contiguous states or if those states are not informed about its territorial aims.

The legal rights and duties of the voters would have to be clearly defined by legislation, and the plebiscite question would have to be formulated in such a way as to assist the voters in making an unequivocal choice, without raising doubts. The voter would have to decide only on the territorial question. It is not possible to put any other questions on the ballot paper, in order to decide other problems. Nor is it permitted to issue other questions on separate ballot papers. There must be only one ballot paper per voter.

All citizens who had been domiciled in the territory in question have the right to vote in such a plebiscite. Hence a plebiscite would be impossible until such time as all Tatars, Ukrainians, Russians and members of other ethnic groups who were forcibly resettled elsewhere or who were forced to flee as a result of prevailing conditions (persecution, anti-ethnic policy), are given the right to return to Crimea.

Organs must be established to organise and carry out the plebiscite, and also a police force to maintain order throughout the plebiscite period. These must be drawn exclusively from the local population. Another essential condition for carrying out the plebiscite is the establishment of a working monitoring system. It is imperative that the accepted international legal norms are adhered to throughout the entire process. If the local authorities are unable to satisfy this condition, then they have the right to appeal to the United Nations for help. Furthermore, the United Nations will assess the degree of legitimacy of the plebiscite and its results. To ensure objective reporting of how the plebiscite is carried out, representatives of the media – including the international media – must be invited.

There are also other, less important, conditions for carrying out a plebiscite democratically. However, it is impossible even to discuss the holding of a plebiscite in Crimea, since, as we have said, the local population is not, in the eyes of international law, a legal subject for the transfer of public legal authority within the territory, or of the territory itself, from one state to another. The only legal subject of cession would be not Crimea, but Ukraine. ■

Literature

FOREST SONG

Lesya Ukrayinka

Act III

(A cloudy, windy autumn night. A last yellow sliver of moon is lost in a chaos of naked treetops. Screech-owls are screeching, white owls and barn owls are hooting, insistently. Suddenly all other sounds are drowned by the prolonged sad howl of a wolf, which resounds louder and louder and then suddenly breaks off. Silence falls.

There begins the sick dawn of late autumn. The leafless forest looms faintly against the ashen sky like black bristles, while below, along the edge of the forest, ragged patches of darkness still lie. The walls of LUKASH's house begin to gleam white; beside one wall, there is a black figure, leaning weakly against the door-post, whom it is just possible to recognise as MAVKA; she is wearing a black robe, with a thick grey veil. The only colour is a small bunch of guelder-rose berries on her breast.

As it grows lighter, a huge stump becomes visible in the clearing, where the ancient oak formerly stood, and beside it a recent grave, still not covered with moss.

FOREST-ELF emerges from the wood, wearing a grey great-coat and a wolf-skin cap)

FOREST-ELF *(catching sight of the figure beside the house)*

Is it you, daughter?

MAVKA *(moving a little towards him)*

It is I!

FOREST-ELF:

And has

The Rock-Dweller really allowed you back?

MAVKA:

You have set me free by your evil deeds.

KUTS:

There lies his grave.
Under the oak they buried him, but now
The old man has to rest beside the stump.

MAVKA: They both are gone together... He foresaw
That he would never see this winter through...

(she goes to the grave)

Oh, if my heart could only weep for you,
My one true friend. If only I had living
Tears, then I would bedew the earth with them,
And periwinkle would spring up immortal
Upon this grave. But now I am so poor,
My sorrow falls to earth like a dead leaf.

KUTS:

Sorrow cannot touch me, yet still I must
Say it's a pity the old man is gone,
For he know how to keep a pact with us.
Time was, he used to tie a black goat up
With the nags, so I'd have something to ride.
I'd dash around like lightning on that goat,
The horses then could stay at home in peace.
These women do not know the way to live
With us as it should be – they sold the goat,
They had the oak cut down. They broke the truce.
Well I have paid them back! Ridden their best
Horses to death: buy more, I'll ride them too!
I've asked the witch, midwife to the she-devil,
Wheedled her nicely to make all their cows
Dry up completely. If they only knew!
Already Water-Elf has soaked their ricks,
And the Lost Babes have rotted all their grain,
The Ague-spirit has struck them because
They made the lake obnoxious with their hemp.
There'll be no good for them now in the forest!
Already round the house the Starvelings wander!

(The STARVELINGS appear around the corner of the house, small, emaciated beings, dressed in rags, with their faces marked by an eternal, gnawing hunger)

STARVELINGS: We are here! Who called us?

MAVKA (running forward to keep them from the door)

Go! Begone!

No one has called you!

Else the old woman will curse you so hard
That you'll sink in the earth. She knows the way!

(The STARVELINGS huddle together on the threshold in a dark crowd. From the house, through the broken window comes the sound of the MOTHER getting up, then her voice, and then KYLYNA's voice)

MOTHER: Daylight already, and she's still asleep.
Kylyna! Hey, Kylyna! Still she sleeps,
Would that she slept forever! Wake! Wake up!
Would that she never woke!

KYLYNA *(sleepily)* What's going on?

MOTHER *(nagging)* It's time for you to go and milk the cow,
That wondrous milker of the Turkish breed
The one your late lamented left to you.

KYLYNA *(now fully awake)* I'll go and milk the ones that I found here,
And if I can strain out three drops of milk –
There'll be a pound of butter...

MOTHER: Hold your tongue!
Whose fault is it we've nothing in the dairy?
With such a housekeeper as this... Oy, sorrow!
Such a fine daughter-in-law! From whence
Did she fall on our heads?

KYLYNA: And who was it
Sent matchmakers to me? You used to have
Some slattern hanging round the place – you should have
Asked her in and dressed her up in style,
Then you'd have had a daughter-in-law to suit you!

MOTHER: D'you think she'd not have been, then? Ah, if only!
That stupid Lukash, to change her for you:
That one was so humble and quiet and good,
Like balm upon a wound... And you may call
Her "slattern", but I see that you've made over
That green dress of hers to wear yourself,
Well, push it all you want – there is no shame!

KYLYNA: Can't you find something new to rail about!
My husband's vanished somewhere on the wind.
And you go bleating mother-in-law curses –
I'm neither wife nor widow – just deserted!

MAVKA (*wearily, drawing back from the door*)

I stand and marvel that you are so happy!

KYLYNA: May you stand there and marvel evermore!

(*MAVKA is suddenly transformed into a willow with dry leaves and weeping branches*)

KYLYNA (*taken aback, and in a hostile tone*)

Bah! Surely I spoke at a lucky moment!

Well, well, you won't be standing there for long!...

BOY (*running out from the house. To KYLYNA*)

Mamma, where are you? We all want to eat,

But Granny won't feed us!

KYLYNA:

Well, wait a moment!

(*leaning towards him, in a low voice*)

I've hidden a pie there behind the stove, –

When she goes to the other room – you eat it!

BOY:

Was it you stuck that dried-up willow there?

What good is it?

KYLYNA:

You want to know it all!

BOY:

I'll cut a pipe from it!

KYLYNA:

Just as you please!

(*The BOY cuts a twig from the willow, and goes back into the house. LUKASH emerges from the forest, emaciated, with long hair, and without coat or hat*)

KYLYNA (*sees him, and gives a shriek of joy, but then at once vexation stops her joy*)

Well, look who's here! Whatever was it kept you

So long?

LUKASH:

Don't ask?

KYLYNA:

Again he says: Don't ask!

He wandered off, went roving, devil knows

Where in the world – and now he says "don't ask!"

Well, sweetheart, there's no need for me to ask...

Somewhere upon this earth there is an inn,

Where your cap and jacket revel still!

LUKASH:

I wasn't in the inn!

KYLYNA: Fools might believe you!
(*lamenting*) And I have drowned my head forever more
With such a drunkard.

LUKASH: Hold your tongue! Don't snivel!

(*KYLYNA stops, looking at him with fear*)

LUKASH: And now I have a question to ask *you*!
Where's uncle's oak, now there is but a stump?

KYLYNA (*taken aback at first, but quickly recovering herself*)
And what were we to do here – die of hunger?
The merchants came, they bought it – and that's all.
A good chance, such an oak!

LUKASH: But Uncle Lev
Swore it should not be felled.

KYLYNA: And Uncle Lev
Is dead, so what good is his oath for now?
Or was it you swore such an oath, or I?
I would be glad to sell off the whole forest
And root it out entirely. There'd be land.
Then fit for people, not this devil's wildwood,
Here, it's like evening, fearful to go out!
And what good is there for us in this forest?
We huddle in it here as werewolves do,
And soon, indeed, we'll start to howl like werewolves.

LUKASH (*with an insane terror in his voice*)
Hush! Hush. Don't say it! Quiet! You say: sell
The forest, cut it down, and then there'd be
No more of... you know, what you said?

KYLYNA: What's that?
That werewol...

LUKASH (*stopping her mouth*)
No, don't say it!

KYLYNA (*getting herself free*)
Then fear God!
Are you drunk or gone daft or been bewitched?
Come on indoors.

LUKASH: I'm coming... right away!
Only I just... just... want a drink of water!

(He kneels down and drinks from the bucket. Then he stands up and looks around him as if lost, without moving from the spot)

KYLYNA: Well? Now what are you thinking?

LUKASH: I... don't know...
(hesitantly)

Did someone come while I was gone?

KYLYNA *(fiercely)* And who
Should have come, then?

LUKASH *(lowering his eyes)*
I don't know...

KYLYNA *(with an evil laugh)*
You don't know,
Well, maybe though, I know!

LUKASH *(in alarm)*
You know?

KYLYNA: So what!
I know quite well whom you are waiting for,
Nevertheless, your waiting is in vain!
If something *was* here, it has long since gone...

LUKASH: What are you saying?

KYLYNA: What you hear!

MOTHER *(running out of the house, and throwing herself with open arms at LUKASH, who receives this welcome coldly)*

My son!
Oh, my dear son! Oh how much I have suffered
From that awful witch!

LUKASH *(shuddering)*
From whom?

MOTHER *(pointing at KYLYNA)*
From her!

LUKASH *(with a scornful laugh)*
So she's a witch now? Well, it was your fate
It seems to be a witch's mother-in-law.
But whom can you blame now? You wanted her!

MOTHER: If only I had known that she was such
A sloven and a slut!

KYLYNA (*breaking into speech*)

O sorrow, sorrow!
Who'd say such things! When such a witch as you
And such a slut the world has never seen!
Well, Lukash, that's your darling mother for you –
Like iron – and corroded too!

LUKASH:

And you
I see, are somewhat stronger still than iron.

KYLYNA:

I thought I could count on you to defend me!
From such a mother such a son, for sure!
What evil has befallen me? That here
I'm to be made a show off!

MOTHER:

Can't you even
Tell her to keep her mouth shut? Or am I
Supposed to be some kind of drudge for her?

LUKASH:

Then let me have one single hour of quiet!
Or d'you want me to leave not just this house.
But leave this world, as well? Well, fine, I'm leaving!

KYLYNA (*to MOTHER*)

Well? You've got what you wanted?

MOTHER:

May you get
The same from *your* son!

(He goes angrily to the house. On the threshold, she meets KYLYNA's son who comes running out with a pipe in his hands)

Let me pass, you Starveling!
(She cuffs the BOY aside, and goes into the house slamming the door)

BOY:

Have you come back, Dad?

LUKASH:

I'm back, my son.
(He puts an ironical emphasis on the word "son")

KYLYNA (*annoyed*)

Well, tell him then what he's supposed to call you –
It's a bit late for "uncle"?

LUKASH (*somewhat ashamed*)

Well, what matter?
Come here, come here, then, lad, don't be afraid!
(He strokes the BOY's blond head)
You made that pipe yourself?

BOY: All by myself.
I don't know how to play it, though. You play!

(He holds out the pipe to LUKASH)

LUKASH: Eh, lad, my playing days are past and done!...
(He stands there sadly, lost in thought)

BOY: Oh, don't you want to, then! Tell me, Mamma
Why doesn't Dad want to play me a tune?

KYLYNA: What's all this fuss for? Playing's so important!

LUKASH: Well, then, give me the pipe.

(he takes the pipe) Why, that's a fine one.
Did you make it from willow?

BOY: That one there!
(He points to the willow into which MAVKA was turned)

LUKASH: I don't seem to have seen one there before.
(to KYLYNA) Did you plant it?

KYLYNA: Who'd plant a thing like that?
Stick in a willow twig and it takes root.
If there is water near, or rain, it grows!

BOY *(petulantly)* But why don't you play something, then?

LUKASH *(pensively)* To play?

(He begins to play, at first very softly, then louder. The melody changes to the spring song which he once played to MAVKA. As he repeats the melody, the voice of the pipe begins to utter words)

"Music sweet with wonder,
Ah, it rends asunder,
Piercing the white breast so deeply,
Steals the heart as plunder..."

LUKASH *(letting the pipe fall from his hand)*
What sort of pipe is that? It's magic! Magic!

(The BOY utters a shriek and flees into the house)

Tell me, you sorceress, where that willow came from?

(He grabs KYLYNA by the shoulder)

KYLYNA: Let go of me! And how am I to know?
 I have no dealings with the forest spawn
 As your kin do! Cut it down, if you like,
 Or am I stopping you? Well, here's the axe!

(She pulls out an axe from the storage lobby. LUKASH takes the axe and goes to the willow. He strikes one blow on the trunk. The willow sways and its dry leaves rustle. LUKASH suddenly trembles and lets his arms fall)

LUKASH: No, I can't raise my arms. I cannot do it...
 Something is pressing on my heart...

KYLYNA: I'll do it!...

(She grabs the axe from LUKASH and takes a wide swing at the willow. At that instant the BRUSHWOOD-ELF flies down like a fiery meteor and embraces the willow)

BRUSHWOOD-ELF:
 I have come to save you, my beloved!

(The willow suddenly bursts into flame. The fire, reaching to the top of the willow, leaps to the house. The thatch takes fire, and the whole house is quickly burnt. The MOTHER and KYLYNA's CHILDREN run out of the house, shouting "Fire! Fire!" and "Help! Help!" The MOTHER and KYLYNA rush around, trying to save what they can from the fire. The STARVELINGS pounce on these bundles and bags, and hide in them. The CHILDREN run with buckets for water, and pour it on the fire, but the fire burns still more fiercely)

MOTHER (to LUKASH)
 Well, don't just stand there! Come and save our goods!

LUKASH *(with his eyes fixed on the rafters, which are covered with curling flames like flowers)*

Our goods? Maybe, our evil's burning there?...

(The rafters fall with a crash, and a column of sparks rises up, the ceiling falls in, and the whole house collapses in ruin. A heavy white cloud appears, and snow begins to fall. Soon nothing can be seen under the cover of snow, only a flickering purplish flame shows where the fire was. Then even the purple flame is quenched, and when the snow slackens only the remains of the fire can be seen, smoking and hissing from the wet. The MOTHER, KYLYNA's CHILDREN and the bundles of goods are gone. Through the snow there loom a half-burned thatched shelter, a waggon, and some farming implements)

KYLYNA (*with the last bundle in her arms*)

Lukash! You still don't move! Have you been struck dumb?
You might at least help carry out these bundles!

LUKASH: I see that you have brought out all the Starvelings!

KYLYNA: Oh, shut your mouth! Whatever are you saying?

LUKASH (*smiling a quiet, strange smile*)

Wife, I can see now what you cannot see.
I have grown wise at last...

KYLYNA (*terrified*)

What is it, husband?

When you talk that way, I am afraid.

LUKASH: Why be afraid? You didn't fear the fool,
And yet you fear him now he's wise?

KYLYNA: Come, Lukash,
Let us go to the village.

LUKASH: I'll not leave.
Not leave the forest. I'll stay in the forest.

KYLYNA: Whatever will you do out here?

LUKASH: Must one
Do anything?

KYLYNA: But how are we to live?

LUKASH: And must one live?

KYLYNA: For God's sake husband, tell me
Have you gone and lost your wits or what?
It must have happened to you from a fright.
Come to the village, I'll call the old woman,
We'll have to wash the fear away!

(*Pulls him by the arm*)

LUKASH (*looking at her with a scornful smile*)

And who

Will keep watch out here over the burned remnants?

(*He points to the waggon and implements*)

KYLYNA (*in a housewifely voice*)

Yes, yes indeed, they're all just lying here.
As soon as they find out there's been a fire,

Then people will come running from the village!
 So better that you stay on guard, dear Lukash,
 I'll run and borrow us a horse somewhere, –
 For our horses were all burned with the stable!
 Then we'll load up the waggon and be off
 Somewhere to your kin, maybe they'll house us!
 Oh what misfortune. Something must be saved...

(Speaking these last words, she runs into the forest. LUKASH sees her off with a quiet smile. Soon she can no longer be seen.)

From out of the forest there approaches a tall, feminine shape, in a full-length white skirt, and a white head-dress, wound in the ancient manner. She sways as she walks, as if blown by the wind; from time to time she stops and looks down, as if searching for something. As she approaches and stops near some bramble bushes which are growing near the burned ruins of the house, she stands up straight, and her face becomes visible; it resembles the face of LUKASH)

LUKASH: Who are you? What are you doing here?

FIGURE: I am lost Destiny,
 Led into thickets by
 Strange impetuosity,
 Now I go roaming
 The woodland like gloaming,
 Bending low, combing, for paths that lead home, to
 Lost paradise coming.
 Now on that pathway
 White snow lies as cover,
 And I in the thicket
 Am fallen forever!...

LUKASH: Then break off, my Destiny,
 A bramble-branch only,
 Make for your needing a small pathway leading
 At least, through the snow, there.

DESTINY: Ah, once in the springtime
 Through this wood I wandered,
 And planted as markers
 The flowers of wonder.
 You trampled those wonder-flowers
 Careless, unheeding.
 Through gullies thorn-grown there, no markers to show where
 The path may be leading.

LUKASH: Dig then, my Destiny,
 With your hands under
 The snow, seek a stalk,
 Of the flower of wonder.

DESTINY: My fingers, long frozen,
 Cannot seek what is buried.
 Ah, my tears flow now, I see and I know now
 That I must perish.

(She moans and moves away)

LUKASH: Tell me how I may live,
 Without destiny, worthless.

DESTINY *(pointing to the ground beneath his feet)*

 Like that severed twig
 That lies on the earth there.

(She moves away, stooping, and disappears in the snow.)

LUKASH stoops to look at the spot which DESTINY has pointed out, and finds the birch pipe, which he let fall there. He picks it up and goes across the white clearing to the birch. He sits down under the long branches, which are bowed down with snow, twisting the pipe in his hands, from time to time smiling like a child. A light, white, transparent figure, whose face is reminiscent of MAVKA, appears from behind the birch and bends over LUKASH)

FIGURE OF MAVKA:

 Play then, play, and give voice to my heart!
 For that is all that still remains of me.

LUKASH: Is it you? Have you come as a vampire
 To drink my blood away? Well, drink it, drink!

(baring his breast)

 Live on my blood, then! It is only right,
 Since I destroyed you!...

MAVKA: Not so, my beloved,
 You gave a soul to me, as the sharp knife
 Gives a voice to the quiet willow twig.

LUKASH: Gave you a soul? But I destroyed your body!
 For what have you become? A shade! A phantom!

(He gazes at her with unspeakable yearning)

MAVKA:

For the body let there be no sighing,
 In the fire's brilliance it came to shine,
 Ardent and pure it grew, like vintage wine,
 Borne on the free sparks, it soared, upward flying.
 A light fluffy ash will descend,
 Returning, will lie, in its native soil pillowed,
 And with the water will breed a fair willow, –
 My beginning will be in the place of my end.
 People to me will come, seeking,
 Wealthy and poor, the joyful, the sad,
 Bring me their feelings, mournful or glad,
 And my soul to them will speak, then.
 I will respond to their call
 With a soft whisper of willow-boughs swaying,
 With the low music of a thin pipe playing,
 With the sad dewdrops that from my leaves fall.
 And I shall sing then to greet them,
 All that you sang to me once in past days,
 Here like spring's dawning will once more played,
 In the grove gathering dreams sweetly,
 Play then, my love, I entreat you!

(LUKASH begins to play, first of all sad melodies, like the winter wind, like grief for something lost and unforgotten, but a triumphant song of love quickly covers the yearning. As the music changes, so does the winter all around; the birch rustles with opening leaves, the calls of spring are heard in the forest, which has burst into flower, the overcast winter day turns into a bright, moonlit spring night. MAVKA suddenly shines out in all her former beauty, wearing a starry crown. LUKASH runs to her with a cry of happiness.

The wind blows down the white blossoms from the trees. The blossoms float down, covering the pair of lovers, and then turn into a dense snowstorm. When it slackens a little, the winter landscape is once more visible, with a heavy blanket of snow on the branches of the trees. LUKASH sits alone, leaning against the birch, with the pipe in his hands, his eyes are closed, on his lips there is frozen a happy smile. He sits there unmoving. The snow forms a cap on his head, his whole form is powdered over with snow, which goes on falling, endlessly falling...)

CURTAIN

Translated by Vera Rich



HRYPORIY SKOVORODA: PHILOSOPHER AND POET

November 1994 marks the bicentenary of the death one of the most outstanding figures in the history of Ukrainian literature and scholarship, the philosopher, Hryhoriy Skovoroda.

Skovoroda was born in 1722, in the village of Chornukhy, in Ukraine, the son of a Cossack, Sava Skovoroda, and his wife Pelahiya. He received his primary education in the village church school, and then, at the age of 12, was enrolled as a student of the famous Academy of Petro Mohyla, in Kyiv, where he was to study, with some breaks, until 1753. During one of these breaks (1741-44), he served as a singer in the imperial court chapel in St Petersburg; during another (1745) he took part in a Russian diplomatic mission to Hungary and Austria. (He is also said, during this time, to have visited Italy, Germany and Poland, but there is no documentary evidence to support this.)

In 1751 Skovoroda, himself a talented poet in the formalised Ukrainian language of the time, became lecturer in poetics at the Pereyaslav Collegium. In 1754 and 1755-59 he worked as a private tutor, and in 1760 and 1763 he lectured in poetry at the Kharkiv Collegium, where, in 1768-69, he also lectured in ethics. However, in 1769, as a result of the hostility of certain leading churchmen, he was forced to give up teaching, and he spent the remaining 25 years of his life as a wandering philosopher, moving from town to town in Ukraine, and exchanging his views, by letter and pamphlet, with philosophically-minded friends.

Skovoroda's life-span coincides with the gradual imposition of Russian rule in Ukraine and its incorporation into the Russian empire. (The last vestiges of independence were destroyed in the year of his death, 1794.) In comparison with the traditional picture of nineteenth century Ukraine under Russian rule as a land of largely illiterate serfs (until 1861) and peasants, Skovoroda's biography reveals a far different picture of the previous century, with a flourishing intellectual life.

Skovoroda published his ideas in a number of works, which took the traditional form of tractates, dialogues, and parables. His philosophy was based on the concept of two natures and three worlds. Everything that exists, he believed, has two natures, an outer, visible nature and an inner invisible nature, of which the outer nature is a mere shadow. The only real world is the invisible, inner world, whose constant and eternal basis, active and motive force is God. God (invisible nature) is without beginning, and the origin of the world, in Whom everything has its beginning. The concept of the two natures and the proposition that "God is in all things" gives Skovoroda's philosophy a pantheistic and somewhat mystical character.

The other basic concept is the division of all that exists into three worlds: the macrocosm, the microcosm, and the symbolic world (the Bible). Skovoroda gives



Hryhorii Skovoroda
1722-94

the name macrocosm to the whole infinite and boundless world of things in which we live, the universe, the basis of whose structure is invisible nature (God), on which depends all visible nature. The microcosm, in Skovoroda's concept, is man, who is also made up of a visible and an invisible nature, body and soul, mortal and immortal, and who is identical with infinity, with God and Christ. The third world, the world of symbols, was, for Skovoroda, Holy Writ, the Bible, which in his understanding was a book about God, the source of all that exists. In the Bible,

Skovoroda also distinguished the visible and invisible, the literal and the symbolic, and stressed the importance of understanding it in a symbolic, not a literal manner.

Central to Skovoroda's concept of the "three worlds" is his teaching about the second world – man. The principal content of his moral philosophy (ethics) is the problem of human happiness. He found the key to this in self-knowledge, knowledge of the world, and especially in work which man does in accordance with his inclinations and talents, that is the work for which he is fitted by nature – only such work, Skovoroda considered, can give man happiness and satisfy his needs. At the same time, Skovoroda censured man's craving for excess, for unnecessary wealth and fame, and castigated the parasitism, hypocrisy and moral decay prevalent at that time in the upper strata of society, including the church. Skovoroda's ethics also put considerable stress on freedom, which he demanded for all people, irrespective of their origin and social status.


* * *

The following translation of an untitled poem by Skovoroda attempts to reproduce in English the linguistic style of the original, which contains numerous archaicisms derived from the Old Slavonic language of the scriptures and Church liturgy.

Little bird, whose flanks shine goldly,
Build thy nest not high and boldly!
Build it on the grasses verdant,
On the greensward young, abundant...
Ah, above thy head now soaring,
Falcon hovers, seeks your blood,
Longs to feed on it, outpouring,
Swift will rend thee and thy brood!

Sycamore on hilltop groweth,
Ever its head bendeth, boweth,
Gustily the wind assaileth,
And its branches breaketh, flailleth.
But the willow softly hummeth,
Lulling me into a dream,
There close by a clear stream runneth,
Limpid so its bed is seen.

What good all this thinking for me,
Since in village mother bore me?
Let him rend his brains, enquiring,
Who to station high aspireth.
But I, in life tranquil, level,
Shall my years spend pleasantly.
Thus will pass from me all evil,
And a happy man I'll be.



News From Ukraine

Economics

Kuchma Outlines Economic Policy

On Tuesday, October 11, President Leonid Kuchma delivered a one-hour speech, outlining his economic recovery plan. A 100-page document was submitted for the consideration of parliament. This plan received a favourable appraisal from Western economists as well as President Bill Clinton, who telephoned Kuchma soon after.

In response to the speech, parliament, spearheaded by the left-wing coalition of communists, socialists and farmers, overturned a bid to renew Ukraine's privatisation programme that was suspended in mid-summer.

The following are salient excerpts from Kuchma's speech:

We must admit that Ukraine has yet to gain real independence. It only gained the attributes of a sovereign nation in 1991 but in the three years that have passed since then, it has failed to become independent in the real sense of the word...

Ukraine's budget deficit is the biggest in the world. In 1992, Ukraine's budget expenditure amounted to 61.7 per cent of its national income. Last year, it amounted to 73.2 per cent, and finance

ministry officials now predict that this year the budget expenditure will surpass 84.5 per cent of the national income...

In 1994, inflation fell considerably. But this was an artificial stabilisation due to mass stoppages in production, deferment of budget payments and an increase in the nation's indebtedness. The nation's indebtedness in the socio-cultural sphere alone amounted to 30-70 per cent of budget payments...

Obsolescent factories and a significant drop in output, have brought Ukraine to the brink of ecological and economic catastrophe.

There is a risk that Ukraine will become the first nation in the world incapable of coping with its own production and military and technical potentials and thus creating an ecological danger for its neighbours, which will be a moral disgrace for the nation.

Ukraine runs the risk of being pushed to the sidelines of the world economy, becoming economically and technologically dependent on other nations, a raw-material supplying appendage and a dumping ground for wastes. This would force a neo-colonial status on Ukraine, with little economic self-reliance and little say in the solution of international, as well as its own internal problems...

Decisive measures must be taken to realise new economic and political strategies and thus prevent national catastrophe.

In order to realise these strategies, the following socio-economic and political policies will be consistently and insistently carried out by the president.

The basis for the new strategy is the need to speed up the transition to a market economy...

- The first tranche of problems relate to the stabilisation of the nation's monetary system. It is necessary to create a serious production stimulus, overcome the economic crisis and restructure the economy.

The financial crisis, which is so destructive to the Ukrainian economy must be overcome. To this end, the president, together with parliament, must accept that financial stabilisation is impossible under the present financial model. Experiences of the past three years point to the fact that cosmetic changes in this sphere will not bring a change for the better. The only way out of the financial crisis is a deep structural reform of the country's financial system...

- The second tranche of problems involves radical institutional transformations. I will concentrate on only some of its aspects.

The main thing is radically to reform property relations. The president's policy in this domain will be directed towards comprehensive establishment, in parallel to the state sector, of up-to-date, civilised, economically efficient forms of private property. This is the basic principle for the radical restructuring of the Ukrainian economy and raising it to the contemporary level of developed countries, the liberation of the individual and the democratisation of society.

At the same time the president is aware of the formidable complexity and

controversial nature of establishing genuinely civilised forms of private property, and hopes for understanding and cooperation of parliament on this issue...

- The third tranche of problems involves structural policies. To date, Ukraine has no economically grounded basis for structural policies. This is the weakest spot in the national economy. All the previous programmes specified around a dozen priority branches. Such an approach is obviously unrealistic.

The suggested course for Ukraine's economic policy will be based on attaching priority to science-based and high-tech branches of the economy, which will give Ukraine access to the high-tech global economic space...

It will be necessary to ensure accelerated rates of development in branches characterised by a rapid turn-over by means of economic levers, such as the production of consumer goods, top priority branches of the agro-industrial complex, public utilities and trade.

- The fourth tranche involves the development of the agrarian sector and the president's agrarian policy.

It must be constantly remembered that every slow-down in the transfer of the agricultural sector to a system of genuine market relations, or blocking of the process of agrarian reforms has been a major brake on the progress of the national economy towards overcoming the ongoing crisis. Currently, Ukraine's agriculture is in a situation of stalemate.

The written report contains a huge array of issues of agricultural transformation. The president's speech dealt with only one: the key problem of a radical land reform for Ukraine.

Its policy, he said, would consist of support for all forms of ownership, that is, state, collective and private ownership, with their relevant forms of management.

At the same time, he made it clear that his actions would be primarily concerned with establishing private land ownership.

A rapid but well thought-out introduction of private ownership in the agricultural production sphere, subject to appropriate state regulation, is, he said, not a road to waste, but, rather, to the genuine establishment of land as the country's national wealth. Such an approach is consistent with every farmer's interests and constitutes a tool to solve the nation's food problems and effect the revival of the countryside.

- The fifth tranche of problems involves foreign economic policies. Our goal is the gradual establishment of an open economy and Ukraine's entry into the global economic space...

The president drew the attention both of parliament and the public at large to the fact that Ukraine is in no position to cope with this problem alone.

There are two ways out of this situation: either to repay Ukraine's debts with capital assets and national wealth, or to resort to foreign credits. The latter way is less economically destructive, and does not pose an immediate threat to Ukraine's economic sovereignty. Hence, the president has initiated intensive negotiations with international financial institutions involving credits intended primarily for these aims. Only one of the former Soviet republics has not been granted an IMF credit for systemic transformations. And this nation is Ukraine. It is hoped that this situation will soon be rectified.

- The sixth, and most important, tranche of problems involves social policies.

The president noted, "with all due responsibility", that Ukraine possesses no real resources to improve the people's living standards.

The slump in production persists. Agricultural production has fallen drastically. The treasury is empty and burdened with intolerable debts, a huge inflation potential, which threatens a new, deeper abyss of hyperinflation. This is the grim legacy of the past...

The essence of social policies may be reduced to creating the necessary conditions for every worker to raise his or her standard of living primarily through his or her personal contribution and economic activity...

As regards a social safety net, primary attention should focus on a fundamental reform of the pension system on the basis of the individual's specific labour contribution and the principle of efficient targeted aid...

A salient point of social policy will be decentralisation. The greater portion of social expenditures will increasingly shift to local and regional levels...

The president suggests that all parties and public movements conclude an act of national reconciliation with the state, by which they would renounce all mass acts of civil disobedience, strikes and violent actions for the duration of the period of economic stabilisation.

The president will initiate the adoption of a law on the opposition, containing clear-cut definitions and attributes of the political opposition, its rights and duties...

All political parties and movements, if they really care for their people and Ukraine's statehood, should agree with the idea that economic

necessity must take precedence over political expediency and thus go beyond ideological and narrow partisan interests.

This means accepting the following major guidelines of the state's foreign and domestic policies.

Firstly development of strategic partnership relations with Russia and other CIS nations, though not to the detriment of relations with Western nations.

Whoever happened to be Ukraine's president, Kuchma, Plyushch, Chornovil or Lukyanenko, would, after a proper appraisal of the situation, have to take this course, sooner or later. Though, Chornovil and Lukyanenko would have an easier job since they could hardly be accused of supporting the revival of the empire...

However, the issue of Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity is not subject to revision or even debate.

The president will consistently stand for the consolidation and development of intra-CIS cooperation and Ukraine's full-fledged CIS membership. Concurrently, the president will insist on the Commonwealth's conditions of genuine parity and mutual benefit...

At the same time, radical leftist forces should abandon hopes for the revival of the Soviet Union. Stripping Ukraine of its sovereignty would be tantamount to unleashing a civil war. Such sacrifices cannot be justified by any political goals...

The state is on the threshold of serious trials. Its future, the lives and welfare of the citizens of Ukraine, and of the country's civic accord and peace today and tomorrow, are largely dependent on the current political leadership, president and parliament. The president called on the members

of parliament to show statesmanlike wisdom and competence, the ability to rise above personal and corporate interests, and courage in making decisions which, though they are unlikely to bring glory and praise, but rather criticism and accusations, are the correct ones in the current situation, and will mark an early step along the thorny road towards overcoming the crisis, and rescuing future generations from a life of increasing poverty in a country doomed by history.

"Let honesty and determination unite us, as well as the need for concrete acts for the people's benefit and joint work, not loud words and a search for personal comfort", the president concluded.

"If we are together, the Ukrainian people will win!"

IMF Offers Ukraine \$371 Million

WASHINGTON, DC – The International Monetary Fund approved, on Wednesday, October 26, a \$371 million loan for Ukraine to help the nation stabilise its shaky economy and transform it from Communism to capitalism, the IMF announced.

The loan, the International Monetary Fund's first to Ukraine, will support what one source described as a "very bold" plan to reform Ukraine's economy.

"This is a sort of big bang approach", an IMF spokesman said. "There is no doubt the programme will be approved".

Prices will be freed from government control, trade will be liberalised and radical steps taken to bring the government budget deficit down.

Ukraine faces a financing gap of about \$600 million in the current quarter. About \$350 million of that is in the

form of loans owed to Russia and Turkmenistan. Sources said that both those countries were expected to agree to allow Ukraine to defer payments on the credits, even though they are financially hard pressed themselves.

The United States has pledged \$70 million for Ukraine and has signalled that it is willing to raise that to \$100 million if other countries join the effort. Washington is looking to the European Union to contribute a similar amount. Canada, which has also promised to contribute, hosted a meeting of donor nations in Winnipeg on Thursday, October 27, to try to marshal further support for Kyiv.

Kuchma Promotes Pynzenyk, Defends Economic Reforms

KYIV — President Leonid Kuchma appointed two allies to top government posts on Monday, October 31, and fiercely defended his proposal for radical free-market reform.

Kuchma, one hundred days in power, told a news conference that he was not ready to compromise with the largely reactionary parliament over his bold plan for painful change. He said financial stabilisation was his top priority in the next two months. The post-Soviet Ukrainian economy is in tatters, production and living standards have nose-dived and prices are surging.

Earlier, the government freed some prices in a liberalised move in line with Kuchma's programme, blessed by the West. It also scrapped an artificial official exchange rate for the karbovanets currency. Prices for bread and other basic foods are expected to surge and Ukraine has been swept by panic-buying. Long queues formed in Kyiv.

"It's time to stop deceiving our own people. We must face the truth", Kuchma said. "It is absurd to expect production to stabilise. What we need is financial stabilisation". He added, "Where is the alternative to the market? Who is going to buy our production? Most Ukrainian production is not needed by anyone. We ourselves do not want to buy what we produce".

Ukraine's economic reforms for long lagged behind those in Russia, but Kuchma promised to change this after his election victory. He has already won promises of financial support from the International Monetary Fund and from a number of donor states.

Speaking at a recent press conference, Kuchma said that this time parliament would not stop him, stating that recent loud complaints from the large contingent of communist and socialist lawmakers lack strength and substance. "I don't see them offering me any alternative", Kuchma said of anti-reform legislators. "If they're going to criticise, they should at least come up with an alternative to this radical economic reform plan". Kuchma said he would not budge from the reform course and would continue appointing reformers to his government. "I can compromise with the parliament on any issue, but not on radical reform and not on my position on the executive branch of power", Kuchma told journalists. Kuchma said he had appointed liberal Viktor Pynzenyk as first deputy prime minister in charge of economic reforms.

Another ally, Petro Sabluk, became a deputy premier in charge of agriculture while deputy premier Yevhen Marchuk was promoted to the post of first deputy prime minister in charge of the fight against organised crime.

Pynzenyk was a deputy prime minister in a 1993 government then headed by Kuchma, but he resigned in August 1993, accusing conservatives of stalling reforms. Kuchma followed suit a month later. The new appointments seemed designed to quash resistance to reforms from Prime Minister Vitaliy Masol, chosen by previous president Leonid Kravchuk and approved by parliament.

"The president made these new appointments to speed up reforms and to boost their support by the government", Kuchma's top adviser, Oleksander Razumkov, told reporters from Reuters.

Kuchma also implicitly warned parliament against trying to stall painful reforms and hinted that he could resort to a referendum to strengthen his position through constitutional changes.

"I am ready for any compromise with parliament with the exception of two questions. The first is radical economic reforms... The second is building up strong executive power", he said. "Probably we need a referendum on a new constitution. I'm ready to take responsibility for reforms. I am not afraid".

Privatisation Begins

KYIV – Ukraine was ready on Thursday, December 1, for its first big nationwide privatisation campaign, which will give every citizen a voucher to invest in a stake of state enterprises being transferred into private hands.

The move represents Ukraine's stepped-up approach to economic reform by setting the stage for a nationwide property transfer designed to involve ordinary citizens in privatisation by giving them tradeable shares.

Kuchma meets G7

Kuchma Warns West Against Chornobyl Pressure

TORONTO – President Leonid Kuchma said on Tuesday, October 25, that he wanted to see the Chornobyl nuclear power station closed, but warned the West against applying political pressure to Ukraine.

"I have a two and half year-old grandson and I live near Chornobyl. And as a grandfather I want Chornobyl to be closed down", Kuchma told a news conference during a five-day visit to Canada. "But as president, I have to ask – why is there pressure on Ukraine to close Chornobyl when in Russia there are many same-type reactors, and nobody says a word?"

Kuchma said closing the Chornobyl station involved immense technical and economic resources. He compared mounting international lobbying to close the station to Western pressure for Ukraine to join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a condition for receiving aid.

"This is similar to NPT, where they tell us we won't get help until we ratify it. Tomorrow, closing Chornobyl may be a condition for aid. And what about the day after?", he said.

Ukrainian officials say closing the Chornobyl station – site of the world's worst nuclear accident, in 1986 – and revamping the country's outdated nuclear industry will cost Ukraine between \$4 billion and \$6 billion. Some European countries have made closing the station a "soft" condition for future financial assistance. Kuchma toured a Canadian atomic

power station outside Toronto, where a C\$2.9 million (\$2.18 million US) government project was announced to help Ukraine build storage containers for spent nuclear fuel at two of its five stations – including Chornobyl.

"We have a real problem. All our spent fuel used to be shipped to Siberia before the Soviet Union broke up, but no longer. So now we need some new technology", Kuchma said after touring the storage facility at the Pickering nuclear power station.

Kuchma also called for nuclear energy experts around the world to help resolve the issue of shutting down the station and finding a permanent solution to the leaking "sarcophagus" covering the ruined fourth reactor.

"We are aware that such nuclear reactors as found in Chornobyl should be shut down in the future. But when? Let's decide together", he said.

In a related matter, Ontario Hydro, Canada's largest utility, said it will provide Ukraine with technology to manufacture storage containers for nuclear waste from the Chornobyl and Rivne reactors.

The provincial utility said it will earn about \$4.9 million through the 38-month project. "The project allows Hydro to assist Ukraine in establishing a higher level of protection for the public and environment by improving its methods and equipment used in handling highly radioactive used fuel", said Ian London, president and chief executive of Ontario Hydro International Inc. – the utility's international marketing subsidiary.

Ukraine will build as many as 550 containers using a high density concrete technology developed by Hydro.

Kuchma in Canada: Asks for \$7 Billion in Help

WINNIPEG – President Leonid Kuchma, with backing from the International Monetary Fund, asked the world's rich nations at an aid conference on Thursday, October 27, for \$7 billion to support economic reforms. "Ukraine is counting on extensive financial assistance from the international community in the nearest future... By the end of 1995 we need a sum close to \$7 billion", Kuchma told the Conference on Partnership for Economic Transformation in Ukraine sponsored by the Group of Seven leading industrialised countries (G7).

Russia, Ukraine's biggest creditor, immediately offered its support. As a goodwill gesture, Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev announced that Moscow would allow Ukraine to put off a \$635-million debt payment until next year.

The aid conference was initiated by Canada, Ukraine's closest ally in the West, and was meant to encourage Ukraine's nascent reform efforts, officials said. It also gave a high-level Ukrainian delegation a forum for presenting its case to potential donors.

Michel Camdessus, the Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), lauded reforms spearheaded by Kuchma to pull the country out of economic collapse as comprehensive and bold. But he warned G7 participants that delays in providing Ukraine with help to cover its huge financing gap – including \$1 billion by the end of this year – would seriously hinder the government's reform efforts. Ukraine's economy has steadily deteriorated since independence nearly three years ago after the

collapse of the Soviet Union. A plunge in industrial output and high inflation have cast most of the 52-million-strong population into poverty.

"Ukraine's domestic policy efforts will produce the desired results only if they are supported by strong international partnership and cooperation", Camdessus said in a speech. "I cannot overemphasise the importance of supporting Ukraine when it has made such courageous decisions".

Kuchma, facing serious opposition from a reactionary parliament since his July election, desperately needs an international stamp of approval for his reform programme. The plan includes extensive privatisation and liberalising trade and prices in the still-centralised economy.

Kuchma said Ukraine needed \$1.5 billion to stabilise its weak national currency and introduce a new currency, the hryvnya. Ukraine also needs help to cover payments for critical imports, oil and gas in particular.

The G7 – Canada, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and the United States – already pledged Ukraine \$4 billion in financial assistance at their July summit in Naples. Those funds would be mainly from international financial institutions and contingent on Ukraine carrying out serious reforms. Ukrainian officials said they hoped to obtain the additional \$2 billion through bilateral financing and debt restructuring from G7 countries and creditors.

Russia's Kozyrev said Moscow was prepared to wait until February for the \$635 million debt payment from Ukraine. Ukraine needs to cover payments for energy arrears of over \$3 billion to Russia

and Turkmenistan, which also sent a delegation to the conference. The United States has pledged between \$70 million and \$100 million in financial aid, and Canada announced help of \$50 million. Ukrainian officials said they would also lobby Japan and the European Union to kick in financing.

A senior US official praised the Ukrainian president for initiating badly-needed economic reforms, but said the country faces difficult trials ahead.

"We are celebrating the second Ukrainian liberation – the first was the political liberation several years ago, the second is economic liberation which is under way now", US Treasury Undersecretary Lawrence Summers told the G7 conference on Ukraine.

Summers repeated the US pledge of up to \$100 million in grants to Ukraine. Washington has said it is up to the European Union to contribute a similar amount. The US promised the money to help fill the "urgent need" of bridging Ukraine's balance of payment gap to the end of the year, he said. International assistance to Ukraine will help bridge a gap until a market economy can take hold in the impoverished country, he said. "We are seeing a very significant break from the policies that have greatly reduced the performance of Ukraine's economy", he said. "A great deal can be accomplished now with some support". Summers said the international community has begun to make pledges of assistance to Ukraine because of the strong economic medicine. This includes deep cuts in the country's budget deficit, freeing prices on necessary goods and unifying the exchange rate.

Returning to Kyiv Kuchma faced a sceptical population and a slightly more confident market on Friday, October 28, when he came home with promises of Western financial support for his bold market reform plans.

"Ukraine has taken a resolute step towards reforms and the West took a step towards Ukraine", Kuchma told reporters at Boryspil airport on arrival from Canada. He added, however, that credits granted to Ukraine by the International Monetary Fund were not enough for a painful transition from socialism to a market democracy which would take years and urged the people to tighten their belts.

"To my great regret, ordinary people will not be affected by the arrival of this small amount of money... that is why I appeal to our people to have more patience".

In Canada, Kuchma attended an international conference sponsored by the world's seven leading industrial nations which aimed to marshal financial support for Ukraine. Kuchma returned with money and promises of more. He told reporters it was "very important because without this financial help Ukraine will not overcome its crisis".

The IMF approved Ukraine's first loan of \$371 million, and its managing director said it could be eligible for an additional stand-by loan of \$1.5 billion in 1995.

But no new G7 financial assistance was pledged at the conference, though Kuchma told participants that nearly \$7 billion was needed by the end of next year. The post-Soviet Ukrainian economy is in tatters, production and living standards have nose-dived and prices are surging. In

October Kuchma presented a programme of radical reforms, saying it was the only way to ensure Ukraine's survival after three years of inaction by his predecessor Leonid Kravchuk.

While Kuchma was in Canada, the government moved to free some prices, liberalise exports and cut inflation, in line with this programme, blessed by the West. It also scrapped an artificial official exchange rate for the karbovanets currency.

Later Kuchma described his visit to Canada as a milestone in relations between Ukraine and Canada. "We have seen a prospect of real rather than declared large-scale economic and political support", Kuchma said at a press conference in Kyiv on October 31.

Kuchma said the restructuring of Ukraine's economy would be facilitated by the agreement on friendship and cooperation and a set of other accords envisaging broader economic, political, military and other relations between the two states.

Kuchma told reporters about his meetings with Canadian business quarters, where new joint ventures and direct investment in the Ukrainian economy were discussed. Kuchma said Canada would financially support Ukraine in its transition to a market economy. In particular, Canada has earmarked \$23.8 million for technical support of Ukraine's reforms and \$13.5 million for settlement of its debt to the International Monetary Fund.

State visit to US

Kuchma's State Visit – Applause, Fanfare, 21-Gun Salute and “Assurances” of Security

NEW YORK – The first, historic state visit to America by a President of Ukraine, a whirlwind four-day tour from New York to Washington, DC, was framed by boisterous ovations by admiring Ukrainian Americans, mutual accolades by the heads of both states, fanfare, military honours and a 21-gun salute.

As the cheers faded and the presidential party departed from Andrews Air Force Base, Ukraine was left with \$200 million more than previously promised for coming closer to signing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and only “assurances” of security rather than guarantees, which was expected by the people and parliament of Ukraine.

Word of the security relationship between Ukraine and the United States came at the joint presidential press conference in Washington, DC, on Tuesday afternoon, November 22. Amid expressions of gratitude and praise by both presidents, President Clinton, congratulating his Ukrainian counterpart for courage, leadership and determination in convincing Ukrainian legislators to vote for the NPT, said, “Ukraine’s move is a major step toward ensuring that nuclear missiles never again will be targeted at the children of our nations. I told President Kuchma that the United States will continue to work with Ukraine to dismantle completely its nuclear arsenal. Three hundred and

fifty million dollars of our total \$900 million, two-year aid package is targeted toward that goal, and there could be no better use of the funds”.

In addition, Ukraine’s decision will permit the United States, Russia and the United Kingdom to extend formal security assurances to Ukraine.

The full aid package breaks down as follows:

- \$350 million for economic and humanitarian programmes;
- \$350 million in Nunn-Lugar assistance.
- \$100 million in balance of payments assistance to help Ukraine cover its external financing requirements over the next several months as it implements IMF and World Bank reforms.
- \$25 million in PL-480 concessional loans for food imports to be delivered early in 1995.
- \$3 million in commodities.

Clinton pointed out that the sum constitutes the fourth largest foreign aid package that the United States is providing. The first three are earmarked for Israel, Egypt and Russia.

President Kuchma, in turn, said, “The current Ukrainian-American summit, the talks we had today, which can be characterised with a spirit of a constructive, businesslike and mutual interest in reaching practical results. And I’m very thankful to the President of the United States, Bill Clinton, and Vice-President Al Gore. Thus, we are the participants and witnesses of a process where our relations are being formed step by step and cooperation is being enriched”.

Kuchma continued, “Ahead of us lies practical work which has to be

realised. Without such implementation, we will not be able to transform the reached, signed accords, to a stronger bilateral cooperation. I would like to assure you, Mr. President, that Ukraine will fulfil its pledges and is ready for further active cooperation".

Responding to the few questions at the first delayed and then abbreviated press conference, Clinton said he "would not say or do anything that would exclude the possibility of Ukrainian membership" in NATO. "That would be up to Ukraine and it will be up to all of us, working together, to try to determine what is the best way to promote the security of what I hope and believe can be a unified Europe".

Addressing the same topic, Kuchma downplayed Ukraine's eagerness to join NATO, confirming his agreement with Clinton and adding that "the security of the European continent is a very important issue, and it shouldn't be solved by a revolutionary way, but rather by an evolutionary method. It is not important who enters where, but it is very important that we do not have a new Berlin Wall in Europe".

Kuchma, his wife Lyudmyla, and the Ukrainian delegation were officially welcomed to America during an impressive ceremony on the South Lawn of the White House that included full military honours consisting of the four branches of the armed forces and the Coast Guard and a 21-gun salute to the strains of the Ukrainian national anthem.

In his welcoming remarks, Clinton said, "We honor you, Mr. President, in our nation's capital as the man who is leading a Ukrainian renaissance".

Clinton said Kuchma "blazed a path ahead on the two most critical issues for

the future: economic reform and nuclear weapons". Kuchma's programmes, the American president said, "will ensure the prosperity Ukrainians deserve".

Addressing the reestablishment of Ukrainian independence, Clinton noted that "The rebirth of Ukraine as an independent state after centuries of rule by others is one of the most inspiring developments of our time. For ages Ukraine was divided by competing empires, then subjugated to tsars and commissars.

Despite efforts to create an independent Ukraine, dictators, terrible famines and relentless oppression all combined to deny your people the right to shape their fate. Despite these ordeals, the Ukrainian people have endured, preserving hope and their identity and contributing greatly to the glories of European civilization. Now, finally, Ukraine has reclaimed its independence and its place as a pivotal state in new Europe".

Clinton also did not overlook Ukrainian Americans, declaring that "the flame of that commitment to freedom was kept burning during the Cold War by nearly a million Ukrainian Americans, some of whom are with us here today, who never forgot Ukraine and who are today contributing to its reawakening".

President Kuchma, paying tribute to American liberties and emphasising the victory over totalitarianism, replied, "It is a special pleasure for me to say this in the United States of America, the great country where a human being has conquered his place not only from nature, but from politics, and with set hopes to become good and reliable partners for the United States in its efforts to transform the old era into the era of victory

of democratic values, civilisation and high responsibility of states for the destiny and well-being of their peoples".

Posing an issue he repeated throughout his visit, Kuchma reminded the guests, who included American and Ukrainian government officials, Ukrainian American civic leaders, and guests that, "Today, they say that Ukraine is a poor country. We are not a poor country, we are a young country and an inexperienced one. That is why we are ready to learn in the sphere of economics, politics, humanism, the best examples of other countries".

The underpinning of the state visit was the foundation of strong relations between the two countries, best characterised by Kuchma's comment, "During his time, your great President Abraham Lincoln was told that he should pray so that God is on the side of his people. Mr. Lincoln replied that he would not pray for that, for it sometimes happens that people can make mistakes, and only God is always right – adding that he would pray so that his people would be with God.

I am confident that both the American and Ukrainian peoples, moving along that avenue which I have mentioned, will be together and with God".

Presidents Kuchma and Clinton and other government officials signed the Charter of Ukrainian American Partnership, Friendship and Cooperation, the Agreement on Cooperation on Space Research for Peaceful Purposes and other documents.

Kuchma and his entourage arrived on Saturday, November 19, a few hours before the Ukrainian American community, under the aegis of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of

American and the Ukrainian American Coordinating Council, hosted a banquet in his honour at the Marriott Marquis Hotel in midtown Manhattan.

More than 900 people filled to capacity the banquet hall and cheered and applauded the second president of independent Ukraine to visit the United States. Though they frequently interrupted his speech, the audience saved its loudest ovation for Kuchma's pledge to revive the spiritual heritage of Ukraine, without which, he admitted, an independent, democratic Ukraine would be unable to exist.

"I want to reemphasise that the President will earnestly and continuously do everything possible to revive the traditions of Ukrainian spirituality", he declared. "Let there be no doubts in anyone, the Ukrainian language and culture will be reliably defended by the state".

The economic crisis in Ukraine was another topic that frequently surfaced in President Kuchma's speeches and meetings, as it was during his banquet address, when he said the crisis is destabilising the country and causing undue suffering among the people. Kuchma pledged that he would not retreat from his radical reform plan, noting that he realises that reforms cause suffering today, but within a few months, without reforms, the situation could lead to death.

He thanked the Ukrainian American community for preserving the Ukrainian culture and supporting independent Ukraine, and asked it for "understanding" as it attempts to help the new country.

With the help of the international community, foreign investments and all Ukrainians, Kuchma said, Ukraine can and will be economically strong, blossoming, united, indivisible.

Kuchma Addresses Overseas Private Investment Corp.

WASHINGTON, DC (UNIS) – President Kuchma's first official meeting and speech in the United States occurred at the Overseas Private Investment Corp. on Monday, November 21.

After a brief meeting with several members of OPIC, Kuchma addressed an audience of more than 60 US executives, which included representatives from Westinghouse Electronic, Digital Equipment, Cargill International and others.

Kuchma stated that while "Ukraine still needs foreign aid, the real potential of Ukraine's economy will be realised after foreign investment revitalises the Ukrainian economy".

In addition, he stated that "Ukraine is not a poor country, just a new nation with the need to break free from the aftereffects of a centralised economy".

Kuchma then signed two agreements with OPIC for projects to be undertaken in Ukraine, including a project for agricultural equipment and one for the construction of a hotel in Kyiv.

In addition to Kuchma's address, remarks were offered by Thomas Dine, assistant administrator for Europe and the NIS, USAID; James Collins, office of the Ambassador at Large for the NIS, and Ruth Harkin, chief executive officer and president of OPIC. Harkin explained OPIC's role in doing business in Ukraine and stated that OPIC insures most types of business except for currency convertibility.

Two separate panels followed the opening remarks and signing ceremony. The first panel included Roman

Shpek, Ukraine's Minister of the Economy; Serhiy Osyka, Minister for Foreign Economic Affairs, and Glenn Hutchins, chairman, Western NIS Enterprise Fund.

Shpek's comments drew applause, when he stated that "the pace of foreign investment is determined by the rate of privatisation, which to this day is too slow". In addition, he mentioned that Ukraine expects to receive IMF standby funds at the end of the first quarter of next year and \$5.5 billion in total aid next year.

Shpek also explained why large US corporations are unwilling to enter the Ukrainian marketplace. He indicated that an executive from Citibank said "Ukraine does not yet possess a history in independent finance, political affairs and world relations, which is needed to attract large capital investments". Consequently, he continued, "Ukraine will, in the short term, need to focus on small and medium investment".

Hutchins spoke next on the fact that there are plans to open an enterprise office in Kyiv and plans are on the way to begin small-scale loans and equity investment.

Osyka concentrated on the progress Ukraine has made in the sphere of tax reductions on foreign investment.

The second panel consisted of several members of US agencies involved with business in Ukraine. Overall, many of the executives stated that this was a successful meeting and that they are expanding their involvement in Ukraine or exploring initial investment possibilities.

Other news

Ukraine Joins Suprastate Economic Committee

MOSCOW – Leaders of the Commonwealth of Independent States reportedly took a step towards closer economic integration on Friday, October 21, when they gave a unanimous go-ahead to a new supranational trade and financial organisation.

At a one-day meeting here, all 12 heads of state agreed, after months of debate, to create a Moscow-based CIS body to oversee restoration and development of economic links forged during seven decades of Soviet Russian rule. The creation of the Interstate Economic Committee, Russian President Boris Yeltsin said, "opens up a real ability to go into 1995 and beyond, having freed our cooperation from unnaturally created obstacles".

President Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan got only a cool welcome for his proposal for a Eurasian Union of states, which would involve much tighter integration. Russian President Boris Yeltsin turned back efforts to create a new union. "The people of our states are not ready to enter into some kind of union", he said.

In Kyiv, President Leonid Kuchma pointed out that the meeting did not create any supranational, watchdog structures but foreign correspondents at the Moscow meeting observed that the economic committee fits the bill.

Yeltsin praised Kuchma for his contribution to the summit. "It was a completely different atmosphere than with the previous president", he said, referring to frequent clashes with Kuchma's

predecessor Leonid Kravchuk. "There were no problems. There was complete agreement between us and Leonid Danylovych Kuchma made some very informed remarks. He supported all the documents", Yeltsin said.

Furthermore, Yeltsin dropped a key Russian demand in talks with Ukraine, telling Kuchma that Moscow would not insist on a treaty provision guaranteeing the right to dual citizenship.

Kuchma told journalists at Moscow airport after "difficult and long" talks with the Kremlin leader that Yeltsin agreed to leave the citizenship question out of a new friendship treaty under negotiation between Moscow and Kyiv. "We have removed from the pact the question of dual nationality", Ukrinform quoted him as saying.

Kuchma said progress had been made on other outstanding issues – recognition of Ukraine's existing borders and repayment of its vast energy debts. "What President Yeltsin confirmed on territorial integrity is a key question for us", Kuchma said. "I am thankful to Russia because all speculation will now end on this matter". Kuchma said Yeltsin offered security guarantees to Ukraine if it acceded to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, a key demand of both Moscow and the United States. The two presidents also agreed to speed up work on a new treaty between Moscow and Kyiv, negotiations on the disputed Black Sea Fleet, on which the two countries have been at odds since 1991.

Speaking after Friday's summit of the Commonwealth of Independent States in Moscow, Yeltsin compared Kuchma favourably with Kravchuk, with whom he frequently clashed, saying there was a "completely different atmosphere".

Ukraine's Parliament Approves NPT

KYIV – The Ukrainian parliament approved on Wednesday, November 16, acceding to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, thereby satisfying one of the West's principal demands before financial assistance begins flowing to Ukraine, according to Ukrainian and other news agencies.

The vote, which carried 301-8 with 20 abstentions, followed months of intense lobbying by the international community, particularly the United States. It is considered a significant step in strengthening ties between the West and Ukraine, the world's third-largest nuclear power.

"By this action, we have proved our intention to proceed towards complete nuclear disarmament", said Vyacheslav Chornovil, leader of the nationalist party Rukh.

However, legislators expressed reservations about signing the treaty, attaching a number of conditions to their vote of approval. One condition stipulates that Ukraine must be recognised as the owner of the nuclear arsenal on its territory, a provision designed to allow Kyiv to claim compensation for the nuclear components in the weapons being shipped to Russia for dismantling. Ukraine wants the reprocessed nuclear fuel for its power plants. But the principal condition – security guarantees – may pose a stumbling block to implementation.

The conditional NPT ratified by parliament states that the security guarantees must take the form of an international legally binding document, and that the promises in the proposed memorandum appeared to

fall short of Kyiv's demands. The security issues may be settled next month at a meeting in Budapest of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

Ukraine inherited an arsenal of 176 nuclear missiles and about 1,800 nuclear warheads when the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. Although Ukraine began dismantling its intercontinental missiles as part of an agreement with Washington and Moscow, it had hesitated to ratify the Non-Proliferation Treaty, demanding security guarantees from Russia and other states.

Foreign Minister Hennadiy Udovenko said guarantees were received hours before the vote in a memorandum signed by the United States, Russia and Britain. A similar guarantee will be issued by France, he told legislators.

Udovenko heralded the security pledges as a "triumph for Ukrainian diplomacy and Ukrainian independence". He said they included assurances against Ukraine being attacked by either nuclear or conventional weapons, as well as promises of substantial financial support from the West.

President Leonid Kuchma has staked his political credibility on steering the treaty through an often recalcitrant parliament. Kuchma, a former missile plant director, portrayed possession of the weapons, which Ukraine has no capability to launch, as a major liability.

"Ukraine today has no choice between being nuclear or non-nuclear. The choice is made. The process of world disarmament depends on our decision today", he said in a resolute address to the chamber. "If on one side of the scale you place Ukraine's reputa-

tion, I simply do not know what to place on the other side to outweigh it. Joining NPT will give Ukraine back its long-forgotten high reputation”.

Kuchma, former director of the world's largest missile plant, said Ukraine had no technical possibility of using its weaponry and could not afford to build a complete nuclear cycle.

“Let anyone who can persuade another country to give us a nuclear testing site please stand”, he said to laughter from deputies. Deputies appeared to be leaning towards approving the treaty, but many suggested attaching conditions.

“Experts estimate it will cost \$10 billion to \$30 billion a year to keep nuclear weapons”, Kuchma told legislators. “It means we have to sell all our possessions to keep them”.

Ukraine's accession further commits this country of 52 million people to nuclear-free status by about the turn of the century.

Washington has strongly backed Kuchma's economic reforms as a way of encouraging Kyiv to go ahead with denuclearisation. About half the \$700 million in US aid for Ukraine in 1994 was targeted at dismantling the nuclear stockpile.

US Ambassador William Miller described the decision as “a major step in the post-Cold War order”. Ukraine's participation in the global treaty will allow the lifting of US export restrictions on high-technology, space and aeronautical equipment and remove a Russian condition for implementing the START-1 nuclear reduction treaty. Ukraine's formal signing of the non-proliferation treaty will take place on December 5 or 6 at a meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in Budapest, Kuchma said.

At CSCE Meeting, Ukraine Accedes to NPT

BUDAPEST – With President Kuchma's long-awaited signature, Ukraine joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and formally renounced nuclear weapons.

The move by Ukraine, which was sought after by the United States, Russia and other countries since Ukraine proclaimed its independence in August 1991, opens the way for deep nuclear disarmament called for under the START-1 and 2 treaties.

Kuchma signed the treaty here on Monday, December 5, on behalf of the world's third-largest nuclear power during a European security summit of the 53-member Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. In a separate document initialed by President Bill Clinton, Prime Minister John Major and Russia's President Boris Yeltsin, the three major powers offered to extend security assurances to Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus.

Kuchma described the signing of the document as the outstanding event of the year, opening new dimensions in international relations. Major called the development an indication of the continuous efforts to disarm nuclear weapons.

After the signing ceremony, Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus, as the nuclear successor states to the Soviet Union, enacted, along with the United States, the long-delayed Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty.

“We have witnessed many signatures”, Clinton said after the signing of the denuclearisation agreements. “Together, they amount to one great stride to reduce the nuclear threat to ourselves and to our children”.

Clinton said START-1 will eliminate 9,000 warheads on strategic bombers and missile launchers, while START-2 would mean the dismantling of another 5,000 warheads. Together, they will eliminate more than 60 per cent of the strategic nuclear arsenals of the United States and Russia.

The START-1 nuclear weapons reduction treaty, which has been on the books for several years, could not come into force until all the former Soviet parties had exchanged instruments of ratification with the United States. With START-1 in force, the United States and Russia are free to proceed with the ratification of START-2, which involves formally achieving substantial reductions in the strategic arsenals of the two countries. Without those treaties on the books, there were no agreements limiting the offensive strategic forces of either the United States or Russia. It is expected that START-2 could be on the books by next year, after which the United States and Russia committed themselves, during President Boris Yeltsin's recent visit to Washington, to initiate talks on further reductions in a START-3 agreement.

After months of debates and procrastination, on November 16 the Ukrainian parliament passed a law on accession to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. It did so after being assured by Kuchma and other state leaders that Ukraine will receive security guarantees from the United States and other members of the nuclear club.

In his remarks to the plenary session of the CSCE, Clinton said: "The forces that tore Europe apart have been defeated. But neither peace nor

democracy's triumph is assured. The end of the Cold War presents us with the opportunity to fulfill the promise of democracy and freedom. And it is our responsibility working together to seize it, to build a new security framework for the era ahead. We must not allow the Iron Curtain to be replaced by a veil of indifference. We must not consign new democracies to a gray zone.

Instead we seek to increase the security of all; to erase the old lines without drawing arbitrary new ones; to bolster emerging democracies; and to integrate the nations of Europe into a continent where democracy and free markets know no borders, but where every nation's borders are secure. We are making progress on the issues that matter for the future. Today, here, five of this organization's member states – Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, Ukraine and the United States – will bring the START I treaty into force and reduce the nuclear threat that has hung over our heads for nearly a half century.

The world will be a safer place as a result".

At the signing ceremony, Clinton observed, "Skeptics once claimed that the nuclear threat would actually grow after the Soviet Union dissolved. But because of the wisdom and statesmanship of the leaders who join me here, the skeptics have been proven wrong. Ukraine's accession to the Non-proliferation Treaty completes a bold move away from the nuclear precipice. Ukraine has joined Belarus and Kazakhstan in ridding itself of the terrible weapons each inherited when the Soviet Union dissolved. Presidents Lukashenko, Nazarbayev and Kuchma have done a very great service for their

own people, their neighbors, and indeed all the peoples of the world".

He also said, "On this historic afternoon, we have shown that today's community of free nations can and will create a safer globe than did the divided world of yesterday. Together we have helped to beat back the threat of nuclear war and lighted the way to a more peaceful day when the shadow of that destruction is finally vanquished from the Earth".

Clinton and Major also called for an indefinite extension of the NPT which formally expires in 1995.

"All this is one of the most significant steps towards the complete elimination of nuclear weapons all over the world", said Kuchma. "It initiates a new stage not only in the process of nuclear disarmament but in the realm of international relations generally".

The assurances from the United States, Russia and Britain – three of the world's five declared nuclear states – are largely those that any state gets when it joins the NPT. The three powers promised to respect the existing borders of Ukraine. This is important to Kyiv because of claims by the Russian parliament for the return of Crimea, which the Soviet leadership transferred from Russia to Ukraine in 1954 and is still largely populated by ethnic Russians.

They also agreed not to use economic coercion against Ukraine, an assurance apparently aimed at soothing fears that Russia might use its economic power against Kyiv. The three powers also guaranteed that they would not attack Ukraine except in self-defence or in accordance with the United Nations charter.

Diplomats have ruled out giving Ukraine the kind of blanket security guar-

antees which NATO states enjoy, as the West has refused to offer such assurances to any country outside the alliance, notably former Eastern Bloc nations such as Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary. Special treatment for Kyiv would have opened the Western powers to accusations of yielding to nuclear blackmail, diplomats say.

Ukrainian Foreign Minister Hennadiy Udoenko told journalists before the signing ceremony that Kyiv sees the security assurances as a benchmark for ties with Russia. "Our main goal is to get these guarantees. Russia will sign a document saying our borders are inviolable, and when we draft other agreements with them, we can always point to this one", he said.

Udoenko said Ukraine was treated with respect as a nuclear power and needed the security of solid agreements with the "nuclear club" to risk sacrificing weapons of mass destruction. "We do not fear anyone but we cannot forget about extremist forces in other countries which could have territorial pretensions. We are protecting our national sovereignty", he stated.

But diplomats say the document offers nothing more than the NPT gives any country which signs the treaty and that the memorandum is merely for domestic consumption in Kyiv.

At a press conference on Monday, November 28, assessing his state visit to the United States, Kuchma demonstrated unfamiliarity with the accurate Ukrainian translation of security assurances or else did not deem the difference between guarantees and assurances as being important.

In Kyiv, members of parliament expressed criticism of the assurances the West offered Ukraine. Former president and now deputy Leonid

Kravchuk noted that at least Ukraine has assurances but they will never satisfy Ukraine's security needs. Kravchuk said that if Russia were to seize Crimea now, no one would display any concern.

Other deputies said that the West must be forced by a separate treaty to fulfil its financial and political obligations to Ukraine as it fulfils its nuclear commitments.

Parliamentarian Stepan Khmara, denouncing the accession as a national day of shame for Ukraine, said he expected nothing more than assurances from the West.

In other matters related to the CSCE meeting, the United States and Russia found themselves on opposite sides of the issue of extending NATO membership to the former subjugated nations. Yeltsin vehemently protested against any expansion beyond NATO's current borders, saying, "Russia is against the North Atlantic alliance expanding the sphere of its influence to the east, since then NATO's frontiers will approach the border of the Russian Federation".

"As you know we are against such huge multinational global organisations. We have only just stopped existing as two blocs and we're on the point of going back into it. Of course this is inadmissible and won't be effective in security questions.

Russia and the US share a determination to try to achieve an integration of Europe and to avoid drawing any more lines or the creation of any blocs", he told reporters here.

"Europe is in danger of plunging into a cold peace", Yeltsin told the opening session of the two-day summit. He suggested that NATO was planning to admit Moscow's former satellites as a precaution against the possible collapse of democratic reforms in Russia.

"It is too soon to bury democracy in Russia", he said. "Why sow the seeds of mistrust? After all, we are no longer enemies... Our best intentions to build a single democratic Europe will sink instantly if they are not transformed into real action". ■

Books & Periodicals

Paul Robert Magocsi (Ed) , MORALITY AND REALITY – THE LIFE AND TIMES OF ANDREI SHEPTYTS'KYI, Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, University of Alberta, Edmonton, Canada, 1989, xxiii + 485 pp, illustr.

This work, like many publications of the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, over the past decade or so, is the outcome of a conference – in this case, a conference held in 1984 to mark the fortieth anniversary of Metropolitan Sheptytskyi's death. To make a coherent book out of a series of conference papers is not easy. It is not always possible to ensure coverage of all essential aspects of the subject in question – if only for the fact that there is a natural tendency, particularly among younger and less self-assertive scholars, to avoid such topics, assuming that some older and more established academic will tackle such important themes, while the same older academics, in fact, propose papers on some new and esoteric slant on the subject, leaving what they see as the more routine aspects to be dealt with, as they suppose, by their younger colleagues. The fact that, in this case, such a comprehensive and well-integrated work has emerged is a matter therefore of sincere congratulations to all those responsible, not only for the production of the book, but also for the drawing up of the original conference programme.

This book does not set out to be a biography. Nor does it include any straightforward biographical essay. This defect, however, is largely remedied by the presence, at the very beginning of the book, of a detailed chronology of Sheptytskyi's life in the context of key events in secular and religious history. This is followed by an equally important piece of context-setting material – an essay by Jaroslav Pelikan, on "The Church between East and West: The Context of Sheptyts'kyi's Thought". For Sheptytskyi's life and work coincided with – and to a considerable extent was responsible for – a major shift in the attitude of the Vatican towards Churches of the oriental rites. The encyclical *Orientalium dignitas ecclesiarum*, issued by Pope Leo XIII on St Andrew's Day, 30 November 1894, marked the turning point, repudiating once and for all the implicit assumption that the oriental rites would, eventually, be absorbed into the Roman rite. The encyclical categorically rejected Latinisation and hybridisation of the Eastern Churches, established educational and canonical provisions for the preservation of the rites of those who had undertaken or would in the future undertake, union with Rome, and threatened with suspension any

Western “missionary” who tried to Latinise any member of one of these Churches. *Orientalium dignitas ecclesiarum* became, for Sheptytskyi, in Pelikan’s words, “a program for the intellectual reunification of East and West that would not merely not require, but would prohibit, ‘hybridism’ and the sacrifice of Eastern identity for the sake of unity”. (The Vatican’s adherence to this principle would, in practice, be less than perfect – in particular, it was decided that Ukrainian Catholic priests serving the Ukrainian diaspora in predominantly Protestant countries should be celibate – lest the traditional married clerics of the Ukrainian Catholic Church should “scandalize the Protestants”! In fact, as an older generation of Catholics will remember all too vividly, at least up to World War II, one of the chief criticisms levelled by Anglicans against the Roman Church was the compulsory celibacy imposed on its clergy!) In addition to setting Sheptytskyi’s life against Rome’s thought and policy towards the Eastern Churches, Pelikan also puts it in the context of the writings of the Russian philosopher, Vladimir Solovyov, and his proposals for the intellectual reunification of the Christian East and West through “a universalizing concord”. “Concord”, at least as interpreted by Pelikan, has to come about “through the use of a method that would sound the differences to their depths in a common tradition, in which apparently antithetical teachings had existed side by side, not because previous generations of believers and theologians had lacked our acuity in recognizing the antithesis but because, while recognizing it, they had possessed, or been possessed by, what the New Testament called ‘the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace’” (Eph. iv. 3). Solovyov is, to say the least, not an easy philosopher. He was, however, one of the few Russian religious thinkers who has ever proposed a philosophical framework for the possible union of the Catholic and Orthodox Churches on terms psychologically and culturally acceptable to both. As such, his views are, indeed, vital to the philosophical background of Sheptytskyi’s life and work – and Pelikan does well to present them here – even though one may feel that his statement that his representation of Sheptytskyi as “str[iving] to carry out the program of Solov’ev’s *La Russie et l’église universelle*, at least as it pertained to Ukrainian Christianity” gives insufficient value to the Metropolitan’s own original thinking.

This book, however, deals not only with Sheptytskyi the Church leader. It is divided into six parts: Sheptyts’kyi and Politics, Sheptyts’kyi during World War II, Sheptyts’kyi and Religion, Sheptyts’kyi and Society, Sheptyts’kyi and Eastern-Rite Catholics Abroad, and Sheptyts’kyi Studies – three or four papers in each section – a total of 21 presentations in all. A high scholarly standard is maintained throughout – as one would expect from the provenance of this collection, and all the papers contain a fascinating wealth of hitherto little known detail. It comes as somewhat of a surprise, for example, to learn from John-Paul Himka’s study “Sheptyts’kyi and the Ukrainian National Movement before 1914”, that Sheptytskyi, who in retrospect is viewed as one of the outstanding figures in the Ukrainian revival in Galicia in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, was viewed by many Ukrainian activists at the time – including the poet Ivan Franko and the newspaper *Dilo* – as a potential Polish fifth columnist, and that it was only his arrest by the invading Russian forces in 1914 that finally established

his *bona fides* in their eyes. Again, though Sheptytskyi's key role in establishing the Ukrainian National Museum in Lviv, and his abiding interest in the traditional folk and religious art of Ukraine is well-known, it is somewhat more surprising to find him, in Myroslava M. Mudrak's "Sheptyts'kyi as Patron of the Arts", in the role of connoisseur and patron of modern art – in particular, of Mykhailo Boychuk and his colleagues in the association of Independent Ukrainian Artists.

The papers in this collection may be divided into several groups. Firstly, there is material mainly of academic and historical interest: Wolfdieter Bihl's study of "Sheptyts'kyi and the Austrian Government", Ann Slusarczuk Sirka's "Sheptyts'kyi in Education and Philanthropy", or the three papers dealing with the Metropolitan's relations with Ukrainians in the New World, "Sheptyts'kyi and Ukrainians in Canada" (Bohdan Kazymyrya), "Sheptyts'kyi and Ukrainians in the United States" (Bohdan P. Procko), and "Sheptyts'kyi and the Carpatho-Ruthenians in the United States" (Athanasius B. Pekar). Fascinating as these contributions are to the historian, the politics and controversies with which they deal – from the campaign for a Ukrainian University in Austrian-ruled Lviv to the controversy over who should be the registered owner of Ukrainian Catholic churches in Canada – have long been settled and forgotten.

Other "historical" material, however, continues to cast a present-day shadow. One subject which is touched on only in passing is the still incomplete process for Sheptytskyi's beatification. Michael Hrynchyshyn deals with this in general terms in the closing paper of the collection "Western Historiography and Future Research", but largely from the point of view that "procedures for beatification are important to scholarship about the Metropolitan". In outlining the course of the process, Hrynchyshyn notes that "almost immediately [after the opening of the process in 1958] the Polish hierarchy took steps to suspend the beatification process" and that "[w]ithin a year, Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński, Primate of Poland, succeeded in obtaining a suspension of the process from the Vatican's Congregation of Rites". Furthermore, after Cardinal Eugène Tisserant had used his influence with Pope John XXIII to have the suspension lifted "Cardinal Wyszyński continued his efforts to shackle the cause, and in May 1962, he obtained a second suspension. Moreover, this time the suspension was issued by the Holy Office itself". This second suspension was eventually lifted, Hrynchyshyn says, "[t]hrough the efforts of Archbishop Iosyf Slipyi, the successor to Sheptyts'kyi who after eighteen years in Soviet prisons was released and sent to Rome in 1963". But Hrynchyshyn never explains why Wyszyński tried to stop the process.

Perhaps the most significant chapters for today's Ukraine, however, are those dealing with the Metropolitan's religious and social teaching. In the three years since the restoration of Ukrainian independence, religious and political leaders alike have stressed the moral bankruptcy of post-Communist Ukrainian society, and the need for spiritual renewal, no less than for economic and political restructuring of the country. Fascinating as this group of papers are for the Western reader, they are even more vital for Ukraine, and one must fervently hope that at least some of them will be translated into Ukrainian, and published

in Ukraine, if, indeed, they have not already been so published. Of particular relevance in this respect is Petro B.T. Bilaniuk's "Sheptyts'kyi's Theological Thought", which reveals the Metropolitan as one of the major theological thinkers of modern times, whose approach, on the one hand, embodies the intellectual rigour of Western scholasticism in which he was trained, and, on the other, draws considerably on the mystical tradition of the great Ukrainian philosopher of the eighteenth century, Hryhoriy Skovoroda. Important, too, in this regard is Andrii Krawchuk's "Sheptyts'kyi and the Ethics of Christian Social Action", particularly in view of the controversy engendered by his 1904 pastoral letter "On the social question", and the polemics against it from the pen of Ivan Franko. The crux of the conflict – the relationship between civil and divine law – Krawchuk suggests, was partly a matter of the historical context of the turn-of-the-century Austrian empire, when the "church was beginning to learn ... that it would no longer be able to exert unquestioned moral influence over the direction of civil legislation", and partly a matter of misunderstanding on Franko's part. But once again, this is not simply a matter of purely historical interest: for decades, the Soviet propagandists made great play with Franko's polemics as evidence of the Metropolitan's "reactionary" stance on matters of social progress. The historical record, on this as on so many matters of contemporary and near-contemporary history, needs to be put right for the widest possible audience.

In spite of the ten years which have elapsed since the Toronto conference, and the enormous political changes which have taken place in them, these papers stand up well to the test of time. Certainly, the new material now available in the Lviv historical archives and elsewhere in the former Soviet Union will provide a valuable source for contemporary and future scholars, as the article published in this journal ("Andrey Sheptytskyi and the Social Role of the Church under the Occupational Regimes", pp. 9-22) reveals. In the West, too, there are a number of fascinating details to be resolved: just who, for example, were the "political circles in England" on whom the Metropolitan concentrated during his visit in 1921, and which, so Ryszard Torzecki ("Sheptyts'kyi and Polish Society") tells us, attracted the attention of the Polish authorities, who reported that "that is where a very important matter is to be resolved"? (And why, if the Metropolitan's political dealings in England were so important, is there no mention of his visit in *The Times*?) Nevertheless, as a foundation for the study of all major aspects of the Metropolitan's life and works, this book cannot be faulted. And the excellent, and comprehensive, bibliographies appended to each paper give fruitful sources for further investigations.

**Cyril Korolevsky, METROPOLITAN ANDREW (1865-1944),
translated and revised by Serge Keleher, Lviv, 1993,
515 pp., illustr.**

Books in Western languages about Metropolitan Sheptytskyi are rare. There is Gregor Prokoptschuk's *Der Metropolitan* (Munich, 1955). There is Ursula Maria Shuver's *De Reus op de Sint-Jorisberg* (Rotterdam, 1959). There is Fr Cyril Korolevsky's work – originally in French, and now translated by Fr Keleher.

From the historiographical point of view, Fr Korolevsky's work is undoubtedly the most important. A Frenchman who transferred to the Byzantine rite (his original name was Jean François Joseph Charon), and who worked for almost forty years as an assistant to the Metropolitan, Korolevsky had access to unique sources of written and verbal historical material, and his work is a primary source on Sheptytskyi's life and work. It covers all aspects of his life and activities, family background, health problems, his parents' opposition to his vocation, the pettifogging liturgical restrictions which made it impossible for his parents to receive Holy Communion at his hands during his first celebration of the Holy Liturgy, his work to improve the education of Ukrainian priests, and to free the Ukrainian Eastern rite services from liturgical Westernisms, his services to education, to culture, to social reform, his difficulties under successive occupation regimes, his foreign travels, his attempts to establish a Catholic mission in Tsarist, and then Soviet, Russia... all these and more are dealt with in loving and meticulous exactitude.

But it is not an easy book to read. It cannot be read either as straight biography, nor for spiritual edification. It goes into long digressions on the theological, political and social problems of the Metropolitan's time – all of great importance, certainly, – but dealt with in such detail as to confuse the lay reader and at such length that often the Metropolitan himself is not mentioned for pages at a time. In fairness, one must say that the original manuscript was not published in Fr Korolevsky's lifetime: had he, himself, at that stage submitted it to a commercial publisher, some judicious editing might have been suggested. As it was, the manuscript lay unpublished in the safe-keeping of Cardinal Tisserant until the release of Archbishop (later Cardinal) Slipyi from the Gulag and his arrival in Rome. Under Slipyi's patronage, the manuscript was published as Fr Cyril had left it – plus the addition of a biographical "note" on Korolevsky (20 pages in the English edition) by Cardinal Tisserant, a 50-page appendix of documents (some – such as that dealing with the situation of the "Ruthenians" [i.e. Ukrainians] in Canada in 1911 – are now of interest only to the specialist historian), plus Fr Cyril's own paper of 1927 "What is uniatism?". The result is – to say the least – a somewhat unwieldy work.

The translation clearly posed many difficulties. In his preface, Fr Keleher stresses his "attempt" to convey Korolevsky's "unique writing style". He has, he says, corrected a number of "obvious typographical errors" in the original – those remaining will doubtless be picked up in a later edition. But the translator has retained a few gallicisms which could prove confusing to those with no knowledge of French ("Anvers" rather than "Antwerp", for example). As for what Fr Keleher calls the "cloyingly hagiographic style" in which the account of the future Metropolitan's childhood is written, it would be easy, here, to blame the Countess Szeptycka, whose memoirs provide the source material for these chapters – save that touches of the same style reappear later in the book. Did the Metropolitan really find nothing more in Rostand's *Cyrano de Bergerac* than "the theory of substitution, by which one person can substitute himself for another and suffer in the other's place"? Korolevsky, here, seems somewhat embarrassed by the fact that the Metropolitan, in his last days, should be read-

ing a secular work dealing with what he calls "a not very admirable eighteenth century character". Indeed, at times his account shows odd traces of primness. He refers, for example, to the Metropolitan's mother as "a very close relative of the famous Polish comic poet Alexander Fredro". In fact, she was his daughter. So why this periphrasis, which tends to suggest some irregularity in the relationship? Certainly, Countess Zofia was the daughter of a second union, following a divorce, which may well have been a source of embarrassment to Korolevsky as a priest. But his phraseology simply provokes the reader to question the relationship – and so adds to the embarrassment.

In short, invaluable as this work is as a source material on the Metropolitan and his times, it is not a biography for the general reader. That, as far as the English language is concerned, still remains to be written. (Until such appears, perhaps the publishers of this work might consider putting out an abridged "popular" edition.) In the meantime, one can only praise Fr Keleher's achievement in translating and editing so complex and monumental a text.

Anne Applebaum, BETWEEN EAST AND WEST. ACROSS THE BORDERLANDS OF EUROPE, Pantheon Books, New York, 1994, 314 pp, illustr., US\$24.00

This is an intensely personal book – an account of the author's journeys through the borderlands between Central and Eastern Europe, the lands where, for more than a thousand years, the cultural traditions of Rome and Byzantium have met, sometimes merging, more often in conflict. Ms Applebaum, an American, descendant of a Jewish family from Belarus, who studied in what was then Leningrad, worked for a time in Warsaw, and is now married to a Pole, might be expected to bring to her subject the kind of psychological baggage which burdens so many works dealing with this and neighbouring areas in the late Soviet/early post-Soviet period. Books such as Anatol Lieven's *The Baltic Revolutions* or Michael Ignatieff's *Blood and Belonging* tacitly – and sometimes declaredly – take it as axiomatic that "nationalism" is intrinsically evil, while at the same time interpreting the past and present of the lands in question in accordance with the traditions and prejudices of their own ancestry.

This is not Ms Applebaum's approach. Rejecting the pronouncements of Western politicians and publicists of the late 1980s about the dangers of national revival in the non-Russian lands of the Soviet Union, she declares firmly that:

what some called nationalism others called patriotism, and still others called freedom: the stability so beloved of international statesmen had also been a prison. In the nineteenth century, nationalism had been considered a part of liberalism, intimately and inextricably connected to democracy. Nationalists were considered democratic heroes, the embodiment of all that was progressive and just. In the former Soviet Union in the years following 1989, nationalism was still popularly believed to be progressive; nationalist leaders were still believed, at least in the beginning, to speak for the many people whose voices had been suppressed in the past. ... Nationalism in the era following the Soviet collapse also included cultural revival: freedom to speak native languages, to read native literature, to discover the truth about national history.

But whose nationalism, whose native language, literature and history in these "Borderlands", where there have been so many changes of frontiers, so much mixing and movement of peoples? Ms Applebaum set out on her travels not to judge but to record: speaking with representatives of the old and the new: with Lithuanians, Belarusians and Ukrainians rejoicing in their new national freedoms, and with Poles in these same lands wistful for the past, with Russians in Kaliningrad knowing nothing of the German past of the land they now inhabit, and with a Belarusian gentile trying to reconstruct the lost Jewish history of his native Minsk. Much of her time is spent in Ukraine – in Lviv still showing the influence of its Habsburg past, Drohobych, in the "island city" of Kamenets Podilskyi, among the "Ruthenians" of the Carpathians, and finally, in Odessa, from whence she finally sailed for the West. Everywhere, her reporting is insightful and filled with fascinating detail. Her conversations, even with people holding the most idiosyncratic views, are recorded with tact and understanding – so that, to take a small but significant example, names of cities are invariably quoted in the form used by the interlocutor – thus, for example, the Lithuanian capital is Vilnius in the mouth of a Lithuanian, Wilno to a Pole, and Vilnia to a Belarusian.

And, with an insight rare indeed in a Western commentator, Ms Applebaum realises how profound a role poetry has, and continues to play, in the national consciousness of the peoples of that region. With – for some reason – the exception of Belarus, her travels are everywhere illustrated by reference to the national poets of the lands in question – in the case of Ukraine, of course, Shevchenko.

THE CATHOLIC WORLD REPORT, vol. 4, no. 11 December 1994

This glossy, informative, but alas somewhat expensive (\$4.74/£3.50 a single issue) Catholic news magazine, completes with this issue its fourth year of publication, appearing monthly save for a combined August/September issue (hence the numbering of the issue under review as no. 11). The current issue contains a four-page feature on the life of Metropolitan Andrey Sheptytskyi, including not only biographical material, but also an account of the recent commemorations, in Ukraine and in the diaspora, of the fiftieth anniversary of his death. This article focuses on the importance of the example of major religious leaders of the past – whether Catholic or Orthodox – in the building of an independent Ukrainian nation and state. "As Church leaders and politicians alike reiterate, after years of communist indoctrination the whole nation is in need of moral regeneration. Hence the 'secular' as well as 'religious' celebrations of Metropolitan Andrew's anniversary". This emphasis on the present and future is underscored by the choice of illustrations – not scenes from the Metropolitan's life, or even a portrait, but the rebuilding of a monastery church which had been used as a warehouse under the Soviet regime, and a recent "youth for Christ" rally in Lviv.

STUDIA DIPLOMATICA, vol. XLVII, 1994, no. 4
The Future of the C.S.C.E., Brussels 3-4 June 1994,
Budapest 2-3 September 1994

The latest issue of this authoritative journal from the Belgian Royal Institute of International Relations contains papers from a colloquium organised jointly by that Institute and its opposite number, the Hungarian Institute of International Affairs, in preparation for the December 1994 Summit and Review Conference of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).

It comprises sixteen papers, in French and (unusually for this journal) English by leading diplomats and academic specialists in foreign affairs, dealing with the possible role of the CSCE in crisis management and the promotion of peace in post-Cold War Europe. This "new" CSCE, as its Secretary-General, Dr Wilhelm Höynck, points out ("Role of the C.S.C.E. and other organizations in managing crisis and maintaining peace") is "marked by growing operational involvement by a modest but increasing ability to undertake concrete and effective action... rang[ing] in principle from early warning to post-conflict activities". Clearly, its most desirable role is one of early warning, and, under the rubric of the "intensive use of regular, in-depth political consultations, within the structures and institutions of the CSCE", the participating states, Höynck notes, have "recently discussed such problems as the situation in the Baltic States, the withdrawal of Russian troops stationed outside Russia, Greek-Albanian relations and the developments in Ukraine". (Höynck does not specify which developments.)

One major new development in the CSCE itself has been the appointment of a High Commissioner on National Minorities. Indeed, issues relating to the collective rights of minorities now virtually form a fourth "basket" in addition to the three original Helsinki Accords. A paper by the High Commissioner, Max van der Stoep, himself ("The Role of the C.S.C.E. High Commissioner on National Minorities in C.S.C.E. conflict prevention"), while "wholeheartedly" endorsing the basic assumption that "conflict, including ethnic conflict, is not unavoidable but can indeed be prevented", notes that "preventive diplomacy by CSCE instruments can only be as effective as the political response of the participating states". As to what that response should be, he quotes the Czech President Václav Havel: "I do not think at all that the main role of the democratic West is to solve all the problems of the 'postcommunist world'. Our countries... must deal with their own immense problems themselves. The 'non-postcommunist West', however, should not look on as though it were a mere visitor at a zoo or the audience at a horror movie, on edge to know how it will turn out. It should perceive these processes as the very least as something that intrinsically concerns it, and that somehow decides its own fate, that demands its own active involvement and challenges it to make sacrifices in the interests of a bearable future for us all".

The government of post-Communist Russia, of course, does not accept this view. It would like the West to mandate it as "peace-keeper" in what it insists

on terming the “near-abroad” – the territory of the former Soviet Union. This in spite of the fact that the avowed role of the same government as protector of the claimed 25 million “Russians” – or, at any rate, “Russian speakers” in the non-Russian republics – makes it hardly an impartial arbiter of any future conflict between the said “Russian” minorities and their host-nations. In his contribution to this volume Yuri V. Ushakov, chief of the Directorate for European Cooperation of the Russian Foreign Ministry, modestly, but firmly, reiterates this “protecting” role: “we do not claim to be some Messiah with respect to Russian-speaking population living abroad but we have to act as their protector – acting, of course, within the limits of international law – from the political and moral standpoint”. Consistently, he uses the term “Russian-speaking”. But the designated use of Russian as the language of inter-ethnic communication in the former USSR, plus decades of a policy which de-emphasised the national languages in favour of Russian, mean that there are far more “Russian-speakers” than ethnic Russians. Taking Ushakov’s paper at its face value, he would appear to be claiming the right to protect the Poles, deported to Kazakhstan by Stalin, or Azerbaijani oil-workers at the Novapolack refinery in Belarus or, for that matter, the tens of thousands of Ukrainians and Belarusians who were deprived of the possibility of learning what should be their mother tongue! Admittedly, in this forum, Ushakov did *not* press for a special role for Russia as peace-keeper in this area. What he did urge was that “the document on the CSCE potential development for prevention of conflicts and settlement of crises being prepared in Vienna should be very detailed”. His reason for this is that “[c]onflicts settlement, peace-keeping operations and international participation in these activities, quite understandably, are main priorities for us. The experience of conducting such activities in the territory of the former USSR is still being accumulated”. Yet, at the same time, he argued that, with regard to Nagorno-Karabakh “[t]he capabilities of Russia in this conflict are unique, indeed. And it is a sin not to use them for the common good”.

In this regard, the contribution of the Ukrainian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Borys Tarasyuk, is particularly interesting. His paper “The transformation of the C.S.C.E. into an international organization” never once mentions Russia. But it is clear to whom he refers when he says of crisis management that “our mutual work in this direction is not supposed to lead by any means to the creation of ‘special responsibility’ zones or to giving to any State the authority of ‘main peace-keeper’ in CSCE region [sic]”. He similarly opposed the idea of establishing a CSCE Security Council or Executive Committee with a limited number of members, since this could “undermine the very nature of the CSCE, which is a unique forum, where all participating States bear equal responsibility for the maintaining of stability in their region”. Praising the efforts of the High Commissioner for National Minorities regarding “emerged problems connected with the Republic of Crimea within Ukraine”, Tarasyuk made the interesting proposal that there should be a similar post of High Commissioner on Security and Stability, whose mandate would be aimed at the early prevention of incipient

instability not directly connected with national minority problems. At the same time, he urged that the institution of the High Commissioner for National Minorities should be strengthened in various ways: the High Commissioner should, he suggested, have the right to send a CSCE group of experts to appraise the situation in a participating state if the government of that state requests it, without waiting for a special decision of the Committee of Senior Officials, and the obligation of participating states to report back on the implementation of the High Commissioner's recommendation.

The CSCE is not, of course, the only supranational body operating in the region. A number of papers dealt with future CSCE relations with the Western European Union, and with NATO and its associated "Partnership for Peace" programmes. But smaller institutions were not overlooked, and perhaps one of the most interesting suggestions made by István Szonyi of the Hungarian Institute of International Affairs in his concluding paper "Institutionalization of the C.S.C.E.: a view from Hungary" is that the CSCE should establish and operate a research institute to "keep track of and monitor not only conflicts and crises in the CSCE area but also the course and problems of transition". Such an institute, he points out, need not be built up from scratch; the CSCE could take over the "well experienced research institute of the Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty", which is "available and accessible", has "wide competencies" in the area – and which, in the aftermath of the Cold War, is scheduled, otherwise, to be wound down.

PUBLIC NETWORK, EUROPE, vol. 4, no. 10, 1994

This specialist journal of the telecommunications business includes, in the current number, a feature article "Ukraine: ringing up risks". Noting that telecommunications is one of the few sectors of the Ukrainian economy to have attracted a significant level of Western investment, the article analyses the record of the joint ventures "Utel" and "Ukraine Mobile Communications" (UMC) in modernising Ukraine's telecommunications sector, while negotiating the various hazards of rampant inflation, changing legislation on foreign investment and the lack, to date, of a Law on Telecommunications, and hence of a proper legal basis for the state telecommunications holding company "Ukrelektrosvyaz". Telecommunications Minister Oleh Prozhyvskyi is quoted as predicting that by 1996, Ukraine will have completed the construction of a modern digital "backbone" network, with fibre optic lines and radio relay links, and that "it is very unlikely that any other former Soviet republic will have achieved this by that time, except possibly some of the much smaller Baltic states". But the article concludes with a warning that "there are powerful interest groups – living ghosts of the Soviet era" with "substantial representation in the Ukrainian parliament", who oppose Prozhyvskyi's plans for reform and growth in the telecommunications market and who "may yet be able to scupper the reform programme". ■