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C O N T E N T S

EDITORIAL 2

Current Affairs

THE BANKRUPTCY OF LEGISLATIVE POWER Viktor Fedorchuk 3

UKRAINE'S CUSTOMS SERVICE: CONTROLLING THE "TRANSPARENT BORDERS" Olena Zvarych 5

CAN KUCHMA PULL UKRAINE OUT OF THE CRISIS? Viktor Marchenko 7

PRIVATISATION — YET ANOTHER DECEPTION Roman Radyletskyi 10

PATRIOTIC PESSIMISTS Ihor Dlaboha 13

History

AN ENGLISHMAN IN UKRAINE, 1918 17

PROBLEMS OF THE HISTORY OF THE OUN AND UPA Wolodymyr Kosyk 24

THE MATRON WHO WOULD NOT BE A MAID Ralph G. Bennett M.D. 33

Literature

TO OSNOVYANENKO Taras Shevchenko 36

SPRING SONGS Ivan Franko 39

News From Ukraine 44

Documents & Reports 82

Books 91

EDITORIAL

With this issue, "The Ukrainian Review" enters its fortieth calendar year of publication. Forty years, of course, is a figure with evocative overtones, being — according to the book of Exodus, the period which the Israelites were obliged to spend in the desert, so that no one who had ever been a slave in Egypt should enter the Promised Land. Indeed, it is with the words *Sorok lit* — forty years — that Ivan Franko opens his great narrative poem "Moses", in which he uses the Exodus story to symbolise and elucidate the long struggle of Ukraine for independence. It is a pleasing coincidence, therefore, that in the opening issue of this fortieth year, we record an event which, to readers in the United Kingdom, must have fully brought home Ukraine's changed status in the world — the visit to Britain of President Leonid Kravchuk of Ukraine.

Informed observers of the East European scene had, of course, taken on board Ukraine's steps towards independence culminating in the independence referendum of 1 December 1991, which dealt the *coup-de-grace* to the moribund Soviet Union. But for those not familiar with that scene, the collapse of the world's largest state into fifteen independent republics — with the strong possibility that at least one of them would disintegrate further, was too much to grasp. There were no historical precedents: the dismemberment of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires following World War I was accomplished by international treaty; the colonies of the British Empire moved towards *svaraj* and *uhuru* in an orderly queue. But here, the political order of one sixth of the world's land surface fell apart overnight. Even to the most dedicated opponents of the ills of Soviet power the shock was enormous.

1992, therefore, was a year in which the international community had to come to terms with a new and still highly confused, map of Eastern Europe, when businessmen wishing to establish relations with the new, independent republics, were bereft of the normal structures of trade attaches to brief them and consulates to issue them visas. Foreign ministries throughout the world hastily rescheduled their budgets to fund new embassies — and set their staff to learning hitherto-obscure languages; university departments revamped their courses and restructured their "Soviet studies" departments, and cartographers, philatelists, and vexillologists revelled in a surfeit of new maps, stamps, and flags. As the months passed, the confusion gradually grew less. Ukraine now has an Embassy in London, and the United Kingdom an Embassy in Kiev. In 1992, the Royal Institute of International Affairs had four major meetings on Ukraine-related topics, while London University now has not only a regular seminar series on Ukrainian affairs at its School of Slavonic and East European Studies, but also has held several conferences on security issues (sponsored by King's College) in which Ukrainian issues were prominently featured.

With this new emphasis on Ukraine and Ukrainian affairs as matters of general, rather than specialised, importance, the Editors of The Ukrainian Review feel that this journal has a major role to play in making Ukrainian history, literature and culture known to the new, wider public who, for the first time perhaps, find Ukraine and things Ukrainian on their personal or business agendas. We hope, over the next few issues, to tailor our contents to the needs of this new audience, while, we hope, still continuing to interest and satisfy our loyal readers of the past four decades. We should therefore like to invite all readers, old and new, to let us know what they would like to see in our pages, and how, in their opinion, this journal can best, in the world situation of 1992, serve the better mutual understanding of Ukraine and the Anglophone world. ■

Current Affairs**THE BANKRUPTCY OF LEGISLATIVE POWER**

Viktor Fedorchuk

By taking the unprecedented step, on November 18, of temporarily entrusting legislative power to government ministers, the Ukrainian parliament has created a new socio-political situation in the country. With the concentration of legislative and executive power in its hands, the Cabinet of Ministers, formerly accountable to the president and the Supreme Council, has for the time being replaced these two government institutions.

Executive power is being reinforced with the intention of achieving an efficient implementation of market reforms and their legal reinforcement by a single government institution. This step is, however, unconstitutional. Article 97 of the Constitution of Ukraine directly rules out similar experiments: "The single organ of legislative power of Ukraine is the Supreme Council of Ukraine". According to this constitutional principle, the country's executive power cannot perform a legislative function.

The Supreme Council has the right to review and adopt decisions on all matters, with the exception of restricting its own legislative powers, ceding them to the executive or judicial branches of government. Such a step is a symptom of political bankruptcy, political impotence, and a renouncement of power. If nothing more, then it is at least a sign of disrespect towards the electorate.

The present Supreme Council of Ukraine still has a long way to go to achieve the professionalism of Western parliaments. To some of the deputies, for instance, the Supreme Council is no more than a second job, their primary concern being the local posts of importance they occupy in their own constituencies: directors of collective and state farms, factory directors, bank managers and heads of commercial enterprises. These deputies are thus completely unprepared for carrying out a legislative function. They do not participate in the formulation of legislation and leave their constituencies merely to pose in front of television cameras in parliament. On the one hand, they want to create the impression of serious political activity, and, on the other, not to lose out on the pay and benefits of their primary employment. Such a parliament is incapable of implementing economic reform and backing it up with appropriate legislation, and of resolving the problems of building an independent state.

The first and foremost course of action in today's complicated socio-economic situation in Ukraine is to develop legislative power, transforming it into a professional permanent body, and not to reinforce executive power at the expense of the legislature. Do the present Supreme Council and government actually want to implement economic and political reforms? All their measures so far have fell short of implementing actual reforms. The Fokin government drew up four economic programmes, which were ratified by parliament but never implemented. The Supreme Council passed a series of laws, including one on the nationalisation and privatisation of state enterprises and the housing fund, but no progress has been made. So far no one has begun to tackle land reform or has any intention of doing so.

Political power and economic structures are in the hands of communist partocrats and the mafia. Hiding behind Ukrainian national colours, they are trying to give the impression of building an independent Ukraine. These people cannot be expected to build an independent Ukrainian state. To them the very idea is incomprehensible and foreign. The individual thus has no protection against the highhandedness of the communist *nomenklatura*, and, as in the past, the people remain the servants of the *nomenklatura*.

The communist *nomenklatura*, which is thriving on the political impotence of the state and the economic chaos, and which is plundering Ukraine and preventing it from rising out of colonial servitude, has an interest in the deterioration of the socio-economic situation in Ukraine. The CPSU, today numerically the strongest and best organised party, which is slowly legalising itself through various parties of the socialist orientation, is also interested in the deterioration of the situation in Ukraine. The communists are doing everything they can to destroy the Ukrainian economy and drive the people to complete impoverishment. They want to use the general mood of despondency to provoke a social explosion. Their goal is to induce the people to quash their own independence and drive Ukraine into a new Union. They are acting with impunity because political power is in their hands.

Without removing the communist *nomenklatura* from power, the building of an independent Ukrainian state is impossible. There is only one feasible solution: extraordinary elections, which will deliver a blow to the communist *nomenklatura* and boost the political and economic processes in Ukraine. ■

UKRAINE'S CUSTOMS SERVICE: CONTROLLING THE "TRANSPARENT BORDERS"

Olena Zvarych

After the USSR broke up into separate national states, Ukraine became like a homestead ravaged by storm: no fences, only an ardently guarded gate. This tragicomic situation has quite aptly become known as "transparent borders". Ukraine is facing a similar situation on more than three-quarters of its state borders, until recently administrative boundaries with Russia, Belarus and Moldova.

In the spring of 1992, during the conflict in Trans-Dnistria, Ukraine replaced its militia posts on the border with Moldova with twenty-two customs posts, assigning a sizable contingent of border troops for their protection. Considering the relative stability in Russia and Belarus, Ukraine was in no hurry to establish customs control on its border with these two countries. President Kravchuk's directive of October 12, 1992, was somewhat belated in comparison with a similar decree by Boris Yeltsin, as a result of which customs posts on the border with Russia and Belarus will be operational only from January 1, 1993. Until then, this section of the border will be guarded by the militia.

In view of its geographical position, Ukraine should have taken this step much sooner. The transit routes of nearly one hundred states cross its territory. Ukraine spent vast sums of money in establishing a new customs service. It was late in imposing customs duty (including tolls) and, up to November 1992, charged duty according to old Soviet tariffs. Ukraine spent half a million *karbovantsi* to fill the gap on the Moldovan border, which went to set up the customs posts. These inadequate sums ensure that this border remains "transparent" and that the customs posts are incapable of checking the flow of industrial and consumer contraband, money, and even arms.

According to General Bodnar of the border troops, the demarcation line between Ukraine and Moldova, as well as Russia and Belarus will be established only in the second half of 1993. For every customs post along the Moldovan border there are around thirty roads which go around it, which the smugglers readily use. Smugglers pay drivers around five thousand *karbovantsi* for every car that drives their merchandise past a customs post undetected, and around ten thousand for every bus. There is thus no shortage of local volunteers for the job. The present customs posts therefore amount to no more than a statement of sovereignty.

With no demarcation line, this "transparent" border is the most convenient for the movement of non-ferrous metals, which are being smuggled to the West. Moreover, many petty businessmen use this border to transport consumer

technology, commodities, and so on. Jewels and narcotics generally leave Ukraine through its western borders. They are smuggled in diplomatic bags after bribing customs officers, or other means. In the summer of 1992, large quantities of arms were frequently moved between Moldova, Trans-Dnistria and Ukraine. Following the official withdrawal of the Russian Cossacks from the Trans-Dnister region, however, the flow of arms was markedly reduced.

Ukrainian armoured vehicles no longer deter the villagers, who use their free days to visit markets across the border. In the evening hours shots can still be heard from Trans-Dnistria, despite the presence there of Russia's peacekeeping force. People living in the border area therefore have no illusions about peace along the Trans-Dnistrian border. The Trans-Dnistrrians are still prepared to fight for their independence in spite of the cost.

For the time being, however, antagonism on the border concerns Moldova's unsuccessful attempts to impose its customs service on Trans-Dnistria, which has established its own militia posts. The reaction of the Trans-Dnistrrians is unanimous: why should another country establish its customs posts in their region?

Ukraine can be glad of one thing. Its control points on this section of the border are superior to Moldovan and Trans-Dnistrian customs posts. Ukraine has a separate border and customs control, and new customs declarations are being produced. However, the control posts are practically without water and heat. They lack all facilities and are manned by officials unfamiliar with customs regulations. Unemployed volunteers from the local population, primarily former soldiers, settle for these close to extreme conditions for a pay of around four to five thousand *karbovanst*.

These volunteers are compelled to take on this difficult and thankless job not only because of unemployment, but also by a craving for an easy income in the form of bribes and confiscated goods. For the time being, however, the customs officers are without hot meals or any confidence in the day to come. They freeze along the roads, surrounded by wind-swept fields, going inside their booths from time to time to warm their hands beside an old-fashioned heater.

Today the majority of customs posts still lack telephone or radio communications. Five or six customs posts are scattered along an area hundreds of kilometres across without any good roads. They have no cross-country vehicles only one small car between all of them, unsuitable for existing driving conditions.

In contrast to their Polish, Hungarian and Czech colleagues, Ukrainian customs officers do not carry arms, even those who serve on the dangerous Moldovan border. One night at the end of October, for instance, unknown persons shot up a customs post at Krasnooknynsk. Three days after the incident, persons driving a stolen car to Moldova fired several bursts of automatic fire at the Maiaky customs post, in the Odessa oblast, killing four customs officers.

The situation on the Moldovan-Ukrainian border cannot be attributed to Ukraine's poverty or remaining traces of Soviet negligence alone. Certain business circles in Ukraine have a particular interest in "transparent borders". ■

CAN KUCHMA PULL UKRAINE OUT OF THE CRISIS?

Viktor Marchenko

At the end of last year and the beginning of this year the Cabinet of Ministers issued a series of decrees, which constituted the government's first practical steps towards overcoming the present crisis. The changes introduced by these decrees affect various aspects of social life but contain very few surprises. Only the measures sanctioning the unrestricted circulation of hard currency contradicted the plans of deputy prime minister Ihor Yukhnovskyi. Yukhnovskyi maintained that the exchange rate between the coupon (Ukrainian rouble: *karbovanets*) and the dollar is being deliberately inflated and should be fixed by the state. In practice, these measures have endorsed a virtually unrestricted circulation of hard currency in Ukraine at a fluctuating exchange rate.

The remainder of the laws are fully consistent with previous declarations by members of the government. Taxes on business have undergone a partial reduction. Value added tax, for instance, has been reduced from 28 to 20 per cent, and taxes on profit have replaced taxes on turnover. The lucrative income of state and private companies is being restricted. The government has declared its intention to put an end to bureaucratic corruption and the misappropriation of state property. State firms have been barred from setting up private companies. Several high-ranking government officials have been dismissed, some of them arrested on charges of corruption. However, it is the people who will have to pay for the implementation of new reforms in Ukraine.

Wage indexing has been abolished and there is a restriction on wage increases at state firms, which employ the majority of the labour force. Simultaneously, the government delivered a powerful blow to private trade. The duty imposed on privately exported consumer goods will inevitably lead to a marked increase in prices on the commodities markets, where prices are relatively lower and most people buy their consumer goods.

The inspiration behind the reforms, Economics Minister Viktor Pynzenyk, is optimistic about overcoming the economic crisis and achieving stabilisation this year. He plans to reduce the rate of inflation to 2-3 per cent per annum from the present 3000 per cent. However, the government's capacity to implement its own programme is extremely doubtful. The tax reductions are not sufficient enough to make Ukraine a businessman's paradise. A reduction in taxes does not automatically create better

conditions. Taxes are still high enough to impede economic development in Ukraine. This primarily concerns value added tax, which is, in practical terms, a sales tax that enables the same goods to be taxed several times. Moreover, profit will be taxed twice: as the firm's profit and as the proprietor's profit. Thus an influx of capital into Ukraine is not to be expected. Naturally, changes in tax policy will create better conditions for economic development. They will not, however, ensure sufficient growth to avert the further collapse of the economy and the growing impoverishment of the population.

The second weak point in Kuchma's policy is his determination to lay the entire burden of the transition period on the people. Ukrainians are distinguished for their exceptional patience, but there is a limit to this patience. Last year there was a sharp decrease in living standards, which are rapidly becoming too low to satisfy even elementary physiological needs. Those earning an average income can no longer feed or clothe themselves on their wages, let alone support their family or manage their household.

A legal restriction on lucrative income can initially win popular support as hopes for a drop in prices begin to rise. But the initial euphoria will soon pass as market prices are determined not by net prices, but by the interrelation between supply and demand. The disproportion resulting from such artificial restrictions will play into the hands of the mafia speculators, which is already the case with railway tickets. Speculators are buying up train tickets in bulk, reselling them at 3-4 times their nominal price. This new development will only strengthen the position of the powerful local mafias.

The Cabinet of Ministers can make whatever plans it likes. The point is, however, whether the people will go on tolerating the government's whims. The people feel cheated. All promises concerning social rights and interests have been broken. The wave of public rallies following the last price increases demonstrated the level of social tension in the country, which is leading to a new mass, uncontrolled explosion of indignation, which will put an end to all reforms. The situation can only be alleviated by an improvement in the material position of the people, but there are presently no serious grounds for such hopes in the near future.

It is also difficult to ascribe any success to the government's plan to establish order in the state economic sector. All hopes of setting up efficient state firms appear naive. This was even beyond the capacity of Stalin, compared to whom today's government leaders look like apprentices. Another factor, which predetermines the failure of these plans is the close ties of Ukraine's economy to the Commonwealth of Independent States, primarily Russia. Stabilisation *à la* Kuchma is thus impossible without contacts with Russian leaders, who are neither inclined nor able to help Ukraine.

The reduction in centralised planning in government businesses does not bring them greater freedom. The new government measures do not offer any incentives. In practice this will mean that state businesses, which have no

interest in their own productivity, will make no attempt to win the market and supply it with their own goods. This has happened on numerous occasions. The liberalisation of prices on industrial goods and food left shops empty. However, instead of creating an interest in productivity, the Kuchma government has resorted to tough measures to achieve positive results.

Ukraine's economy remains greatly dependent on Russia. For instance, although fuel prices in Kyiv have already reached international standards, making the import of oil from countries other than Russia a lucrative prospect, there are no private firms capable of undertaking anything on this scale. The state, on the other hand, does not seem interested in making a profit. The latest government decrees do nothing to improve this situation.

The Cabinet of Ministers has failed to take realistic and decisive steps towards alleviating and simplifying Ukraine's painful transition to the market. The government has missed the opportunity to carry out privatisation more effectively, to reduce the bureaucratic *apparat*, which is impairing private initiative and is the source of corruption, and to create an efficient mechanism to protect citizens' rights and property. Such measures, which do not require a large capital investment, can have an immense economic effect in a relatively short period of time.

Is the Polish scenario feasible in Ukraine? The question remains open. However, Ukraine has already lost the opportunity for a slow, evolutionary transformation of the economy and society, the leitmotif of government speeches. From Poland's shock therapy Ukraine borrowed only shock, and from the evolutionary model — the absence of swift results. Only one course remains open for Ukraine: to force through reforms as quickly as possible in order to achieve positive results. But the new prime minister, in whatever ways he may differ from Vitold Fokin, is implementing a programme that would have been effective last year and is repeating the fundamental mistakes of his predecessor: the slow pace of reform, hopeless attempts to resolve new problems by old methods, and reservations concerning decisive steps towards the market. Thus the government's capacity to successfully implement constructive policies in the present situation remains doubtful. ■

PRIVATISATION — YET ANOTHER DECEPTION

Roman Radyletskyi

The Cabinet of Ministers has finally turned to privatisation. Privatisation vouchers worth thirty thousand *karbovanetsi* (*karbovanets*: Ukrainian rouble) will be distributed free to the entire population. This, however, is a purely symbolic gesture as the vouchers can only be used for buying shares in privatised state firms and cannot be sold or exchanged between private individuals.

In February and March of last year, the Ukrainian parliament passed a series of laws, one on the Privatisation of Small Enterprises and one on the Privatisation of Large Enterprises, and a Law on Privatisation Vouchers. Together with the Law on Foreign Investment, this legislation established the mechanism of privatisation.

Despite these measures, no progress was made with privatisation last year. Like virtually all economic reforms in Ukraine, the plans to transform ineffective state businesses into effective private enterprises met with failure. However, the principal flaw of the privatisation programme lies not in the failure to meet deadlines, but in the inherent flaws in its mechanism.

The privatised state firms are to be sold at open auctions and every citizen will receive special vouchers to buy shares in privatised businesses. Certain firms, primarily the larger enterprises, however, will be privatised not through sale at open auction, but on a so-called competitive basis, that is through direct deals.

Privatisation, which will be carried out in two stages, will take a minimum of four years to complete. Initially, small businesses — shops, various services and a number of small industrial firms — are to be privatised, to be followed by the large and medium-sized enterprises in 1994-1995.

The free hand-over of part of state property to the public is intended to demonstrate the state's concern for its people, to create an equal opportunity for every citizen, and to symbolise the social justice of the new Ukraine. The principles of social justice and concern for the welfare of the general public, however, are pure fiction. As bids for state enterprises can also be made using cash, this will cause the value of the vouchers to drop. Inflation has already reduced the real value of the vouchers by at least 150 per cent. Although inflation will continue to rise, the vouchers will no longer be indexed. Thus, when privatisation is actually introduced, the ordinary citizen's shares in state property will be worth next to nothing. In the eyes of some politicians this may constitute social justice. In practice, however, it is those with money — the mafia, the *nouveaux riches* who made their fortune through speculation

and the large-scale misappropriation of state property, who will benefit from privatisation.

It is, however, procedural matters that will deliver the *coup de grace* to the general public. The average citizen cannot keep track of all the countless privatisation auctions, or assess the condition and real value of businesses or their prospects. The average citizen will thus have to turn to third parties to organise and manage his investment, who will, naturally, charge a commission for their services. The fixed assets of small businesses are relatively low, which will increase competition on the market between the vouchers and cash, devaluing the vouchers even further. At the second stage, the remaining vouchers will have to compete with an even greater abundance of cash, which will eventually reduce them to an abstract symbol of the well-meaning intentions of parliament. In Ukraine the vouchers will be worth much less than in Russia and, in view of the meagre benefits, a significant section of the population will simply not find it worth their while to go through all the bureaucratic red tape unnecessarily.

The private citizen will thus receive hardly anything. But the state will gain nothing either. Huge profit losses will ensure another few years of inefficient production by the state sector. The potential losses incurred by the people will be markedly higher than the value of the vouchers they receive from the state. The privatisation of services and shops will not improve the overall economic situation and welfare of the people since they do not create sufficient material resources. State businesses, whose employees have always shown little concern for communal property and whose fixed assets have dropped by an average of 50-80 per cent, will continue to use their outdated, uneconomical machinery. As a result, completely drained small firms with antiquated equipment will be privatised during the first stage of the plan. If we add the huge expenses required to maintain the bureaucratic apparatus which runs the State Property Fund, responsible for establishing the guidelines for privatisation and for the sale of state property, and the various local privatisation commissions, then the complete ineptness of the privatisation plan becomes clear.

The old *nomenklatura*, those who drew up the plans for privatisation, will benefit. They have already acquired the best positions in the State Property Fund and on the local privatisation commissions. Prospective buyers will have to pay huge bribes for confidential information and for the privilege of acquiring a business. The other beneficiaries will be the various third parties, which will claim their own lion's share of commissions from clients.

An intelligent approach to privatisation could give a powerful boost to economic development in Ukraine and solve the social and economic problems. If the most energetic and ambitious citizens are offered a genuine opportunity to increase their wealth and raise their social status by free shares in state firms, they will eventually become an important factor in the economic development of the country. Moreover, this would greatly reduce social tension.

The sale of other state enterprises for cash would cover the state's enormous budget deficit without increasing the tax burden on businesses and the general public. The rate of privatisation is no less important: the sooner factories acquire new owners, the sooner they will begin to operate normally as each day of delays entails huge losses.

Economics Minister Viktor Pynzenyk recently stated that one of the stumbling blocks of privatisation is the lack of sufficient capital to buy shares in businesses. The Cabinet of Ministers is thus clearly demonstrating its failure to grasp the essence of market reforms. Privatisation should not be carried out purely for the sake of turning people into capitalists, but in order to change the producer's attitude towards production and thereby to use the powerful lever of personal interest and initiative in building the country's economy. Those with capacity and energy will turn to business, while those without will simply sell their shares. This will not affect the interests of the wealthy. It makes no difference to them from whom they buy up shares, from the state, or from small proprietors.

However, the utilisation of the powerful economic potential of the state to accelerate economic development remains purely theoretical. In the short period of independence many opportunities have been lost and many illusions have been shattered. The free hand-over of state enterprises to the general public is merely another myth. ■

The Third Reich and the Ukrainian Question. Documents 1934-1944

Wolodymyr Kosyk

In this 175-page collection Wolodymyr Kosyk subjects the Third Reich's attitude towards the Ukrainian question to a painstaking analysis by compiling and commenting on the crucial documents covering a decade (1934-1944) which encompasses both peace and war.

This period of German-Ukrainian relations has heretofore been largely overlooked by Ukrainian and other scholars. Thus, Kosyk's attempt is a pioneering one. He draws the materials for his work from such sources as: the German Federal Archives (civil and military), the German Foreign Ministry, and the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg.

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PATRIOTIC PESSIMISTS

(Results of a public survey in Ukraine, November 1992)

Ihor Diaboha

It is safe to say that everyone is interested in the development of democracy in Ukraine and the nation's reaction to that process. After 350 years of Russian subjugation and more than 70 years of Communist Russian domination, the question that is on the minds of many people is what do the man and woman on the street today actually think about their new-found freedom and independence, the December 1, 1991, referendum, notwithstanding.

A recent poll of Ukrainians has shown that despite the current economic and political uncertainties, and a pessimistic outlook on future personal well-being, most respondents in Ukraine offer a positive, though critical, assessment of the events of the past year and only an insignificant minority longs for a return to the socialist days. In general, the survey reveals that Ukrainians support the democratic and economic reforms in their country, however, many favour a quicker pace in their development. Furthermore, patriotism and religion, or belief in God, have also increased in Ukraine.

The results of the Times Mirror Centre for the People and the Press survey, conducted in Ukraine in November 1992, have been recently reported, though the article's spin focused disproportionately on one misinterpreted negative, albeit dramatic, response — that 52 per cent of the people said they disagree with events in Ukraine in the past 12 months — without adding an analysis of other questions and their responses.

"As their standard of living goes from bad to worse and uncertainty about the future increases, the Russian people have soured on democracy", the Centre wrote. "Democracy also eroded in Ukraine and Lithuania, but not nearly so severely as in Russia".

The Ukrainian survey, conducted under the direction of Dr. Elena Bashkirova, managing director of Romir Ltd. of Moscow, is based on 1,400 personal interviews held on November 1-15, 1992, with a representative sample of persons over the age of 15. The Centre said the Ukrainian poll was carried out in 160 primary sampling units that were drawn from a sampling frame that was stratified by region and city size. The current survey was a follow-up to one conducted in May 1991.

In response to the question: "Overall, do you strongly approve, approve, disapprove or strongly disapprove of the political and economic changes that have taken place in our country over the past few years", 52 per cent did, in fact, respond that they do not. Thirty-three per cent said they approved, while 15 per cent didn't know.

The survey, which was simultaneously conducted in Russia and Lithuania, showed that in Russia the same number disapproved, while 31 per cent and

17 per cent, respectively, approved or didn't know. Meanwhile, in Lithuania, 64 per cent approved, 27 disapproved and 9 didn't know.

On the surface, the responses in Ukraine could lead a reader to interpret the numbers as indicating the population does not favour the country's situation. However, answers to questions about the kind of political order they would like to see in Ukraine or the pace of political and economic reforms demonstrate that Ukrainians support the changes, though they feel they are proceeding too slowly.

For example, as for which political order should develop in Ukraine, 8 per cent favoured the old socialist system, down 2 per cent from May 1991; 20 per cent favoured democratic socialism, down 7 per cent from the previous poll; 15 per cent sided with a modified form of Scandinavian capitalism, down 11 per cent; 19 per cent favoured Western capitalism, down 4 per cent, and 38 per cent offered no opinion on the matter, an increase of 24 per cent in 18 months.

At worst, this question reveals that the people are confused about which political-economic order they favour, and at best, only a few people want a return to command socialism.

As for the pace of democratic reforms, 45 per cent of Ukrainians feel it is progressing too slowly, 6 per cent say it is too fast and 14 per cent think it is about right. The latter two figures show insignificant changes from May 1991, while the "too quickly" group dropped 9 percentage points. In contrast, 31 per cent of Russians felt it was proceeding too slowly, down from 40 per cent in the previous poll.

In its analysis of the results, the Centre wrote: "Ukraine lags Russia in economic reform, however, and greater disaffection with both democracy and free markets may appear in the future if the speedier movement toward free markets, as promised by the new prime minister, Leonid Kuchma, brings greater hardship".

The responses to the question about free-market reforms reveal a jump to 48 per cent among those who say it is too slow and a decrease to 12 per cent in the too-quickly category.

Responses to queries about patriotism among Ukrainians also offered positive information. The data showed that in the past 18 months it has remained well above 50 per cent, though the two categories — completely and mostly agree — show striking differences. In May 1991, 22 per cent of Ukrainians said they completely agreed with the statement "I am very patriotic". A year and a half later, the figure jumped to 41 per cent. Conversely, reacting to the same statement then, 40 per cent replied then they mostly agreed, while today 27 per cent mostly agreed. As for the cumulative results for the disagree category, previously 27 per cent sided with those choices and in November 1992, only 18 per cent chose those characteristics.

In analysing patriotism or nationalism in Ukraine, the Centre wrote: "some rise in patriotic sentiment occurred, especially in western and central Ukraine, where nationalists are determined to create greater 'national consciousness' by emphasizing their new-found distinctiveness from Russians and recalling historic injustices allegedly done them by 'the Moscow colonizers'".

Also, the Centre found, "East-west differences [in Ukraine] go beyond the socialist sentiment and language preference. The heavily-Russianized eastern

portion is much more pro-authoritarian than the west, 45 percent to 11 percent, and much less inclined to democracy (38 percent to 60 percent). Easterners were also less approving of the political and economic changes of recent years, more disillusioned with the Ukrainian parliament, less religious, less patriotic, and less inclined to say parts of neighboring territories belong to Ukraine. Not surprisingly, 99 percent of easterners have favorable views of Russians, compared with 84 percent of those in western Ukraine".

Some of the questions in the survey also asked respondents to judge other nationalities, territorial claims and military intervention.

Though a question about Ukrainians' favouring Russians or not in Ukraine was not posed, Russians, when asked whether they favoured Ukrainians in Russia, responded positively by 82 per cent. In contrast, Jews garnered only 65 per cent favourable responses. While this answer may not actually reveal what Russians really feel towards Ukrainians, a question about the use of Russian troops to defend Russians in neighbouring countries elicited a 46 per cent positive response, with the greatest number of those in favour coming from persons under 25, with a higher education and income living in the Moscow *oblast*. This question was also not asked in Ukraine. The Centre did find that the unfavourability rating of Jews in Ukraine dropped from 22 per cent to 13 per cent.

Ukrainians were included in a question about "parts of neighboring countries that really belong to us". Twenty-eight per cent agreed with the statement, while 43 per cent did not. The responses did not reflect any radical difference between the two polls. Also, a growing number of Ukrainians responded that they have less in common with other nationalities and races in their country.

Russians, on the other hand, replied by 37 per cent that parts of neighbouring countries are Russian, up 15 per cent from May 1991, with 27 per cent in disagreement today, down 21 per cent.

The responses to these questions reveal that among Russians there may be latent feelings of superiority, chauvinism, even aggression towards non-Russian countries.

While 50 per cent of Ukrainians favour a democratic form of government (down 7 per cent) and 29 per cent support a strong leader, Leonid Kravchuk continues to hold the favour of 60 per cent of the people. In judging Kravchuk, 24 per cent view him mostly unfavourably, and 9 per cent very unfavourably. When asked about Boris Yeltsin, 38 per cent of Ukrainians said they favoured him, 15 points fewer than in May 1991.

Leonid Kuchma, has the favour of 29 per cent of the population, with 9 per cent falling in the negative category and 43 per cent saying they don't know. Vyacheslav Chornovil, transliterated in the tabulations as "Vladislav Tchernovil", has the support of 29 per cent and the disfavour of 53 per cent. Supreme Council Chairman Ivan Plyushch's tallies are 41 per cent v. 28 per cent, and Rukh's, 27 per cent v. 52 per cent.

The Supreme Council of Ukraine also showed signs of falling into disfavour. When asked if the parliament has a good influence on the way events are proceeding in the country, 23 per cent said yes, compared with 45 per cent earlier. The unfavourable rating edged up from 24 per cent to 29 per cent.

Thirty-two per cent of Ukrainians believe there is more democracy today than in the past (only 22 per cent in Russia), while 37 per cent say there is less, and 31 per cent offered no opinion.

When asked where on the ladder of life the respondents find themselves today, compared with five years ago and five years from now, Ukrainians said average to low in all cases, though differences between the two appeared. Less than 10 per cent felt they are, were or will be on the higher rungs.

As for today, 28 per cent replied average and 70 per cent low; 46 per cent replied average five years ago and 44 per cent low, and 31 per cent average five years from now and 54 per cent low.

Admitting that the country is suffering a malaise, Ukrainians placed most of the blame for it on the Communists and today's leaders, though the current government edged out the Communists 67 per cent to 49 per cent.

Private property is supported in Ukraine by an overwhelming majority of Ukrainians — 68 per cent to 23 per cent. However, they also feel that capitalism will not make them rich. Sixty-four per cent said that hard work offers little guarantee of success; 51 per cent believe people get ahead at the expense of others (29 per cent say it is based on ability and ambition).

As for radio and television, 51 per cent believe they have a good influence on the country's events, up 10 per cent from the last poll, but 31 per cent agree with placing greater constraints and controls on what newspapers print and television and radio broadcast. In the last survey, 70 per cent disapproved of controls, while today 51 per cent disapprove. When asked about political parties, 35 per cent said they would allow all of them, compared with 40 per cent earlier, and 44 per cent would ban some today, compared with 47 per cent them. On the one hand, Ukrainians respect their media and democracy, but on the other hand, there is a trend to control it. If it continues, this tendency could pose problems for press freedom and civil liberties in the country.

Another contradictory trend was revealed in questions pertaining to political activism. Fifty-six per cent of the people feel that voting gives them a chance to have a say about how the government runs things, but 66 per cent feel they are losing interest in politics.

Cynicism was also displayed towards the judicial system, with 24 per cent of the people saying it has a good influence and 25 per cent saying it has a bad influence (up 9 points); and only 28 per cent, compared with 37 per cent earlier, said the police has good influence.

Belief in God is on the rise in Ukraine, but, again, in a somewhat unusual manner because regard for the Church's influence is down. In the latest tally, 74 per cent of Ukrainians said they never doubt the existence of God, up 31 per cent in 18 months, while 62 per cent said the Church's influence is good today compared with 77 per cent earlier.

The survey, in general, did reveal positive sides to the people's thoughts about their society and government's actions, and the contradictory observations may be more a function of pessimism over personal fortunes rather than national ones. Kravchuk and Kuchma will have to do better in order to stem the tide of pessimism and lift the spirit of the nation. ■

History

AN ENGLISHMAN IN UKRAINE, 1918

Seventy five years ago, in January 1918, the Ukrainian Central Rada issued its "Fourth Universal", which proclaimed the independence of Ukraine. In the confusion of the First World War, this declaration had little impact in Britain. But to one British air-force officer, Alan Bott, the new status of Ukraine had important personal implications.

In his memoirs, "Eastern Nights — and Flights", published by Blackwood, Edinburgh and London, 1920, Bott, relates how he was taken prisoner in Palestine, and then, after several failed attempts, managed to escape from a transport of sick prisoners in Constantinople, and made his way to the harbour, where, he had been told, he would be able to stow away on board a tramp steamer bound for Odessa. When, disguised as a German, he set out to locate the ship, however, he encountered some difficulties.

"I returned cautiously, through a combination of side-streets, to the bridge-head, and was relieved to find that Mahmoud had disappeared. From the quay I chartered a rowing-boat, and ordered the Turkish *kaitche* to row me up the Bosphorus.

"Are you Russian, *effendim*?"

"No, German". At that his advances ended.

The train of thought started by the word Russian led me to decide that I had better spend the night aboard the Russian tramp steamer on which White and I were to travel as stowaways. Vladimir Wilkowsky, in fact, had told me to make for it if I failed to reach the hiding-place on shore, and to ask for M. Titoff, the chief engineer. Its name was the *Batoum*, and most of its officers were in the conspiracy to help us, in return for substantial payment. I had been told that the ship was moored in the Bosphorus, but of its appearance or exact position I knew nothing.

"*Rusky dampschiff Batoum*", I ordered the *kaitche*, using the polyglot mixture which he was most likely to understand. But his voluble jabbering and his expressive shrug showed that he also was ignorant of where it lay.

"*Bosphor!*" I commanded, pointing higher up the Bosphorus, and thinking that I would find the name *Batoum* painted on one of the five or six ships that I could see in the distance, moored in mid-stream.

Having rowed up the Bosphorus, and already past Dolma Bagtche Palace, I found no ship labelled *Batoum*. Most of the craft seemed to use only numbers as distinguishing marks. What was worse, the majority flew the

German flag, although two of the masts sported a yellow and blue standard which I failed to recognise. Certainly none flew the Russian eagle.

Our only chance of finding the *Batoum* was to ask directions. We visited several lighters near the quay, but the *kaikiche's* questions to Turks and Greeks were unproductive. As a last chance, I told him to row close to a large steamer, on the deck of which I could see some German sailors.

"Please tell me where I can find the Russian boat *Batoum*", I shouted in German, standing up while the *kaikiche* kept the little craft steady with his oars.

"Don't know the *Batoum*", said a sailor. "There are no Russian ships now. They've become German or Austrian".

"And those two over there?" I asked, pointing towards the vessels with the yellow and blue ensigns.

"Ukrainian".

"Thanks very much", I called as we sheered off. My mistake, I realised, had been in forgetting for the moment the existence of that newly-made-in-Germany [sic] republic* the Ukraine. Any vessel from Odessa not flying the German or Austrian flag would now be Ukrainian, and the yellow and blue standard must be that of the Ukrainian Republic. One of the pair flying this flag proclaimed itself to be the *Nikolateff*. It followed that the other, which was marked only by a number, must be the *Batoum*.

After numerous alarms and delays, Bott, and his companion White, escape on the Batoum, a ship of doubtful reputation, with a multinational crew, most of whom are prepared to smuggle anything, from medicines to stowaways, provided that the money is right. There appears to have been nothing Ukrainian about the Batoum but her flag and port of registration, while the political awareness of the crew may best be exemplified by one crewman, dubbed by Bott and White "Bolshevik Bill the greaser", whose "limited and crude" concept of Communism was "plenty of wealth, plenty of happiness, plenty of vodka for all". Eventually the two escapees arrived at Odessa. His account of that city, though necessarily a personal and sometimes prejudiced view, nevertheless provides an invaluable picture of life in Odessa in early autumn 1918 through contemporary, foreign, eyes.

Odessa, like the rest of the Ukraine, had exchanged Bolshevism for Austro-German domination. Already, when we passed through the docks, it was easy to see who were the masters. Austrian customs officers controlled the quays; Austrian and German soldiers guarded the storehouses; Austrian sentries stood at the dock gates and sometimes demanded to see civilians' passports. Had we

* Bott, whose acquaintance with current affairs as a prisoner and then fugitive was, naturally, somewhat patchy, interpreted Ukraine's signing of the treaty of Brest-Litovsk shortly after declaring independence as indicating that the Germans were in some way involved in the establishment of the Ukrainian republic itself. His later experiences of Ukraine under German/Austrian occupation tended to reinforce this mistaken view.

not been vouched for by the uniforms of the *Batoum's* third engineer and third mate, the sentries might well have stopped White and me.

Once outside the [dock] gates, we hired a cab and drove to an address given us by Mr. S. — that of the sister and mother of a M. Constantinoff, a Russian professor at Robert College, Constantinople. Arrived there, we left Josef and Kulman, with very sincere expressions of goodwill.

Mlle. Constantinoff received us cordially but calmly, as if it were an everyday event for two down-at-heel British officers to drop from the skies, with a letter of introduction, but without the least warning.

"Why, only three days ago", she related, two officers of the Russian Imperial Army arrived here under like circumstances. They made their way from Petrograd through Soviet territory. They now occupy the room below ours".

Once again Providence seemed to have played into our hands, for when these ex-officers were asked how best we could live in the German-occupied city, they produced the two false passports by means of which they had travelled across Bolshevik Russia. They now lived in the Ukraine under their own names and with their own identity papers. The faked passports, no longer necessary to them, they handed to us.

Without the passports, we could scarcely have found lodgings or rations, for every non-Ukrainian in Odessa had to register with the Austrian authorities. Tom White, therefore, became Serge Feodorovitch Davidoff, originally from Turkestan, and I claimed to be Evgeni Nestorovitch von Genko, a Lett from Riga. This origin suited me very well, for the Letts, although former subjects of Imperial Russia, can mostly speak the German patois of the Baltic provinces. My passport admitted my claim to be a young bachelor, but White's allotted him a missing wife named Anastasia, aged nineteen.

In Odessa there were still a few British subjects who had remained through the dreadful days of the first Bolshevik occupation, and the rather more peaceful Austro-German regime. It happened that Mlle. Constantinoff knew one of them, a leather manufacturer named Hatton. In his house we found refuge until other arrangements could be made.

Like most people in Odessa, he showed us every kindness in his power, as did his Russian wife and her relation. It was, however, unwise to remain for long with an Englishman, as he himself would have been imprisoned if the Austrians discovered that he was harbouring two British officers.

The professor's sister played providence yet again, and produced another invaluable friend — one Vladimir Franzovitch B., a lieutenant of the Ukrainian Artillery.

Vladimir Franzovitch, who had lost his all in the revolution, lived in two small rooms. The larger one he shared with us, there being just room enough for three camp-beds, placed side by side and touching each other. The second apartment was occupied by his mistress.

Obviously the situation had its drawbacks. It also had its advantages. The rooms were in one of the city's poorest quarters. The neighbours, therefore,

included no enemy soldiers; for the Germans and Austrians had settled in the more comfortable districts.

The *dvornik* was an old sergeant of the Imperial Guard, with a bitter hatred of Bolshevism and all its works. The tale which Vladimir Franzovitch told of us — that we were English civilians escaped from Moscow — was in itself that he would befriend. He took our false passports to the food commissioners, and thus obtained bread and sugar rations for Serge Feodorovitch Davidoff and Evgeni Nestorovitch von Genko.

Our principal interest was now in the news from Bulgaria, for on it hinged our future movements. We visited Hatton each day, to obtain translations from the local press. These I supplemented from the two-day-old newspapers of Lemberg [Lviv] and Vienna, bought at the kiosks.

The Bulgarian Armistice was an accomplished fact, but all the German troops had not yet left Bulgaria. Our problem was whether to make for Bulgaria or Siberia.

Wilkowsky all but tipped the scales in favour of Siberia. He arrived suddenly from Constantinople, having hidden on a steamer that weighed anchor a few days after the *Batoum's* departure. From being a penniless prisoner, without even the means of corresponding with his family, he was now prosperous and comfortable; for his father was a wealthy lawyer living in Odessa, and his uncle the Minister of Justice in Hetman Skoropadsky's Ukrainian government.

Bott and White's plan to reach "some allied detachment in Siberia" come to nothing when Bott goes down with a severe attack of jaundice. No sooner is he recovered from this than both he and White succumb to

the plague of influenza sweeping across Europe, which in one week killed forty thousand inhabitants of Odessa. For three days we lay in Vladimir Franzovitch's little room — weak, feverish, miserable, and at times light-headed — while his mistress fed us with milk, and heaped every kind of clothing over us for warmth.

Recovery was hastened by the best possible tonic — news that the way to Varna, on the Bulgarian coast, was open to us. Thanks were due to several friends for this means to freedom. Hatton had introduced us to a cosmopolitan Britisher named Waite, who adopted us whole-heartedly and swore to get us out of the Ukraine. He enlisted the help of Louis Demy, a Russian sea-captain. Demy spoke of us to Commodore Wolkenau, the Ukrainian officer who, under the Austrians, controlled the shipping at Odessa.

Wolkenau, having been an officer of the Imperial Navy, was a good friend of the British. Moreover, the daily bulletins made it apparent that the Allies were winning the war, so that he was glad of an opportunity to prove his sympathies by helping British officers. He arranged for our passage on a Red Cross ship that was to repatriate Russian prisoners from Austria, now waiting at Varna.

There was an interval of ten days' waiting before the boat sailed. These we passed in moving about the city, in consorting with Ukrainian officers and officials introduced by Wilkowsky, and in collecting information likely to be of use to the British Intelligence Department...

... In those days, the Bolsheviks of Odessa, after months of suppression by the German Military Command, were beginning to raise their heads again. There was much talk of a withdrawal of German and Austrian troops from the Ukraine, to reinforce the French and Italian fronts. The Bolsheviks were ready, if this happened, to rise up and capture the city.

The possession of arms by civilians was strictly forbidden, and any man found in the streets with a revolver was liable to be shot offhand by Austrian soldiers or Ukrainian gendarmes. But the Bolsheviks laughed at the many proclamations calling for the handing over of firearms. They hid rifles, revolvers and ammunition in cellars and attics, or buried them in the ground.

Many of our neighbours in the working-class quarter were Bolsheviks. Often they scowled at Vladimir Franzovitch as he passed them in his uniform of a lieutenant of the Ukrainian artillery; and it was evident that when the Austrians withdrew, our room would be rather more dangerous as a home than a powder factory threatened by fire.

The consul of Soviet Russia was preparing lists of men willing to serve in the corps of Red Guards that had been planned, and spent hundreds of thousands of roubles in propaganda. An immediate rising was threatened; whereupon Austrian and Ukrainian military police surrounded the consulate, captured the lists, and arrested and imprisoned the consul, with two hundred Bolsheviks who had given their names as prospective Red Guards. Sixty of them were shot.

Even that lesson failed to frighten the half-starved men who lurked in the poorer quarters. Often, in the evening, they haunted the streets in small gangs that held up passers-by and stripped them of their pocket-books and watches, and sometimes of their clothes.

The ugliest aspect of an ugly situation was that many soldiers of the Austrian forces, particularly the Magyars, sympathised with the Bolsheviks, and were ready to join them if the troops were withdrawn. The sudden realisation that Austria was beaten, coupled with hatred of Austrian Imperialism, went to their heads like new wine. They foresaw an era in which the working man and the private soldier would grab whatever they wanted. Bands of Hungarian privates proved their belief in the millennium by sacking the warehouses in the docks, under cover of night.

Odessa was overfull of members of the *bourgeoisie*, who had flocked to what they regarded as the last refuge against Bolshevism in European Russia. Refugees had swelled the population from six hundred thousand to a million and a half. The middle classes — professional men, merchants, traders and speculators — knew they were living on the edge of a volcano and tried to drown the knowledge in revelry. Each evening, parties costing thousands of

roubles were given in the restaurants. Wine and vodka, as aids to forgetfulness of the fear that hovered over every feast, were well worth their hundred roubles a bottle.

Their orgy of speculation in inflated prices and their mock merriment left the *bourgeoisie* neither time nor energy to take action against the horrors that threatened them. In general they adopted a pose of fatalistic apathy, and tried hard to soothe themselves into the belief that the Allies would save them, since they would not save themselves. For the rest, they laughed hysterically, speculated unceasingly, and talked charmingly and interminably.

The only serious preparation against a renewal of the Red Terror in Odessa was made by ex-officers, who banded themselves into a semi-official corps. But they possessed few arms and less ammunition. Even the official forces of the Ukraine could place only a dozen small-calibre guns around Odessa, and were obliged to be content with one rifle between two or three soldiers. In any case, the loyalty of the private soldier in the small Ukrainian army was a doubtful quantity, and unlikely to be proof against the temptations of rich loot and licensed rapine.

Small arms were worth their weight in silver. Vladimir Franzovitch, discovering that White and I possessed German revolvers, implored us to sell them to him before we left. He offered us twenty pounds apiece for them. In Constantinople we had bought them for five pounds each, and in England they would have cost less than forty shillings...

... We were present at several gatherings of officers in Vladimir Franzovitch's rooms. Over bread and salted fish, washed down by tea, they discussed the black past and the blacker future. From them we heard awful tales of massacres and looting during the Bolshevik domination over the Black Sea regions.

Of these the most dreadful was that of the cruiser *Almaz*. There have been published many imaginative reports of Bolshevik massacres in 1918; but for horror these are equalled by many true stories that have never been fully told, and never will be until the veil of isolation is lifted and the seeker after truth is free to gather his information at first-hand.

I have every reason to believe the story of the *Almaz*. It was vouched for not only by Vladimir Franzovitch and other Russians [*sic*] whom we met in Odessa, but by Englishmen who were living in the city at the time and are now back in England. Moreover, it is perpetuated in a local song similar to those of the French Revolution.

The Bolsheviks who captured Odessa in the early spring of 1918 made their headquarters on the cruiser *Almaz*. Their first batch of arrests comprised about two hundred officers, with a few officials and other civilians. These were taken to the *Almaz* and lined up on the deck. Each man in turn was asked: "Would you prefer a hot bath or a cold?" Those that chose a cold bath were thrown into the Black Sea with weights tied to their feet. Those that said "hot" were stoked into the furnaces — alive...

... Money and life were the only cheap commodities in Odessa. Paper roubles of every denomination — Imperial notes, Kerensky notes, Ukrainian notes, and Municipal notes — there were in scores and hundreds of thousands; and each issue was trailed by several kinds of forgery, so that only an expert could tell the true from the false...

Everything else was rare and wildly expensive. Meat was ten, weak tea a hundred and ten roubles a pound. New suits of clothes were unobtainable at any price, for there was no cloth. Second hand clothes could be bought in the Jewish market, where the dealers demanded from eight hundred roubles for a shoddy suit, and from five hundred for an overcoat. A collar cost eight roubles, a handkerchief four. Other prices were proportionate...

While waiting for the Red Cross ship to sail, Bott and White were daily "heartened" by the official bulletins posted outside the Austrian headquarters which almost daily bore the news of some Allied victory.

With Hatton, Waite and other Britishers we rejoiced greatly in private, while the German soldiers became glummer and glummer, and the Austrian officers lost a portion of their corsetted poise as they strutted, peacock-wise, along the boulevards. The Russian *bourgeoisie* remained apathetic as ever. Their main interest in the prospect of a general armistice seemed to be the probable effect on prices, and on the rouble's value, of the expected arrival of the British.

As for our Bolshevik neighbours, they continued to unearth and clean their rifles and revolvers, while the corps of ex-officers drilled and planned defence works outside Odessa...

With Hatton, Waite and other Britishers we rejoiced greatly in private, while the German soldiers became glummer and glummer, and the Austrian officers lost a portion of their corsetted poise as they strutted, peacock-wise, along the boulevards. The Russian *bourgeoisie* remained apathetic as ever. Their main interest in the prospect of a general armistice seemed to be the probable effect on prices, and on the rouble's value, of the expected arrival of the British. ■

PROBLEMS OF THE HISTORY OF THE OUN AND UPA

Wolodymyr Kosyk

Since its foundation in 1929 until the mid 1950s, the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and its later military adjunct, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), played a focal role in the Ukrainian struggle against Soviet Russian domination. Yet a full and balanced history of these organisations still remains to be written. Until now, they have been rather a matter of legend — heroic to their supporters, villainous to their foes — rather than sober and scholarly appraisal. This article outlines some of the principal problems facing the serious historian of these organisations.

After Ukraine had declared sovereignty (16 July 1990) and independence (24 August 1991), publicists, historians, lecturers on military affairs and other authors in Ukraine began to take an interest in the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA). These organisations have become the subject of numerous articles, books and academic conferences, and extensive research into their history is going forward. The subject will continue to evoke interest until every aspect of the problem has been thoroughly researched. There are, however, certain aspects of the history of the OUN-UPA, which require an objective analysis. Below is a brief explanation of some of the most important of these problems.

In the first place, there is the question of sources. The fundamental and definitive sources for the research of any history are original documents, that is, authentic documents from the period. Secondly, there are contemporary articles and other materials, which complement the information contained in the documents. Moreover, thorough research into the events and sentiments of the time requires an analysis not only of Ukrainian documents and other

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materials, but also of foreign sources. The most objective and valuable, in my opinion, are German documents from the secret archives of the Third Reich.

Documents and materials, particularly reports on various personalities, sentiments and events, are the most reliable and objective sources. Eyewitness accounts and memoirs, on the other hand, belong to supplementary and not primary sources. They can provide only a subjective personal or political assessment of events and personalities. The historian should thus approach eyewitness accounts and memoirs with a fair degree of caution.

Today various materials from the liberation struggle of 1939-1956 are accessible to historians. These are, primarily, four volumes of documents published outside Ukraine by the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists-Bandera (one volume on the OUN; two volumes on the UPA; and one volume on the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council [UHVR]).¹ Various documents, articles and other materials also appeared in the "Litopys UPA" (Chronicle of the UPA) collection, published by the UPA veterans' organisations in the USA and Canada, more than twenty volumes of which have already appeared. Documents from secret German archives are also available,² as are the documents contained in the archives of Ukraine. It is impossible to write a history of the UPA without examining all these sources.

However, despite unrestricted access to all these documents, an objective historian researching the history of the OUN is still confronted by a number of problems. In the first place, from 1929 to 1939 there was one Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists. From February 10, 1940, however, there were two separate OUNs (named after their respective leaders): the OUN Bandera and the OUN Melnyk. After the retreat of the German army from Ukraine in September-October 1944, the OUN Bandera remained the sole effective political force in Ukraine.

In 1954, in the last stages of the armed struggle for liberation, a third OUN was formed outside Ukraine. So, when Ukraine declared independence in August 1991, there were three OUNs in the diaspora: OUN Bandera, OUN Melnyk and OUN Abroad. This political split in the nationalist forces outside Ukraine has often been the cause of a different interpretation of various events which occurred during the liberation struggle of 1939-1956.

One such event is the proclamation of the restoration of the Ukrainian state by the Act of June 30, 1941, on the initiative of the OUN Bandera. The OUN Melnyk

¹ "OUN in the Light of Resolutions of General Assemblies, Conferences and Other Documents Concerning the Struggle 1929-1955", Munich, 1955; "UPA in Light of Documents Concerning the Struggle for a Ukrainian Independent United State 1942-1950", Vol. 1, Munich, 1957, and Vol. 2, Munich, 1960; "The UHVR in the Light of Resolutions of the General Assembly and Other Documents Concerning its Activities 1944-1951", Munich, 1956. These materials were part of a series entitled "Library of the Ukrainian Conspirator", published by the OUN Bandera.

² Many German documents were published in their original form in a collection compiled by W. Kosyk, "Das Dritte Reich und die ukrainische Frage. Dokumente 1934-1944", Ukrainisches Institut, Munich, 1985 (the work was also published in English: "The Third Reich and the Ukrainian Question, Documents 1934-1944", Ukrainian Central Information Service, London, 1991) and three volumes (Vols. 6, 7, 21) of the "Litopys UPA" (UPA Chronicle).

was extremely hostile towards this proclamation. Its position on the issue has remained unchanged to this day. The Melnyk OUN regarded the actions of the OUN Bandera as a "policy of bluff, beginning with the notorious proclamation [of the restoration of Ukrainian statehood] outside the Lviv radio" and a "criminal gamble with the fate of the nation".³ Today some circles still claim that the proclamation of the restoration of the Ukrainian state was ill-advised and an act of collaboration with the Germans.

These claims are made despite the fact that the German documents clearly corroborate that the proclamation took place without the knowledge or approval of the Germans. The OUN Bandera presented the Germans with a *fait accompli* and was determined to act in the interest of the Ukrainian people and their right to their own independent state. This is confirmed in a report by a special German commission, which questioned Stepan Bandera in Cracow and the German officers who were in Lviv at that time, as well as reports of the German police and security service.⁴ The Germans, who were not prepared to tolerate an independent Ukrainian state, regarded the nationalists as "usurpers".⁵ Stepan Bandera, the head of the OUN, and Yaroslav Stetsko, the prime minister of the Ukrainian government, were arrested, on July 5, 1941, and July 9, 1941, respectively, and deported to Berlin, where they were interrogated and attempts were made to force them, without success, to rescind the proclamation of independence.

The OUN Melnyk claims that the text of the Act of June 30, 1941, is evidence of the OUN Bandera's collaboration with the Germans. These allegations are made not on the basis of the original declaration, but on a report published in the newspaper "Zhovkivski Visti" on July 10, 1941. This newspaper, however, did not print the original text, only its own report, probably based on a subsequent radio broadcast, inserting the words "Glory to the heroic German army and its Führer Adolf Hitler!"⁶ This phrase did not appear in the original declaration. According to Yaroslav Stetsko,⁷ three copies of the declaration were produced. One of these, which contains Stetsko's handwritten notes and signature, is preserved in an archive in Kyiv. This document only points out

³ "Surma", organ of the OUN Melnyk, No. 4, September 30, 1941, p. 6.

⁴ German Archives, BA NS 26/1198 Niederschrift über die Rücksprache mit Mitgliedern des ukrainischen Nationalkomitees und Stepan Bandera vom 3.7.1941, S. 7-11, 14 (Minutes of a Conversation with Members of the Ukrainian National Committee and Stepan Bandera from 3.7.1941, S. 7-11, 14); BA R 6/150 f. 2-10; BA R 58/214 f. 53-54, 58, 59.

⁵ BA R 58/214 f. 69, 75.

⁶ The text in "Zhovkivski Visti" appeared in the memoirs of K. Pankivskiyi "Vid Derzhavy do Komitetu" (From State to Committee), New York-Toronto, 1957, p. 111-112. This text was published in the collection "Ukrainska suspilno-politychna dumka v 20 stolitti dokumenty i materiyala" (Ukrainian Socio-Political Thought in the 20th Century Documents and Materials), Vol. III, edited by Taras Hunchak and Roman Solchanyk, Suchasnist, New York, 1983, p. 23-24. (Hunchak and Solchanyk published part of the original text below the version, which appeared in "Zhovkivski Visti").

⁷ Yaroslav Stetsko, "June 30 1941", Toronto, 1967, p. 205.

that the Ukrainian state would cooperate with Germany, which "is helping the Ukrainian people to liberate themselves from Russian occupation", and that the future Ukrainian army would fight alongside the German army "against Russian occupation for a Sovereign United Ukrainian State and a new order throughout the whole world".⁸

In this and other documents the OUN Bandera expressed its willingness to cooperate with Germany and the German army in the struggle against a common enemy, Soviet Russia, but solely on the condition that the Germans recognise the independence and complete sovereignty of the Ukrainian state. The OUN Bandera's memorandum, delivered to the German government on June 23, 1941, contains a detailed account of the organisation's position.⁹ When the Germans refused to recognise the independence of Ukraine, any cooperation with them became out of the question.

Andriy Melnyk, who was in Cracow at the same time as Bandera, adopted a different position. On July 6, 1941, after the arrest of Stepan Bandera, avoiding the issue of Ukraine's independence or the existence of a Ukrainian state altogether, Melnyk appealed to Hitler through the German army general staff (OKW) to allow the Ukrainians to take part in the crusade against "Bolshevik barbarism" together with the "legions of Europe", "shoulder to shoulder with the German Wehrmacht".¹⁰ Besides Melnyk, six former Ukrainian officers (two leading members of the OUN Melnyk: General Mykola Kapustianskyi and Colonel Roman Sushko, as well as General Mykhailo Omelianovych-Pavlenko, Colonel Hnat Stefaniv, Colonel P. Diachenko and M. Khronoviat) also signed this appeal. On the part of the Germans it had the support of Colonel Alfred Bisantz, the head of the office of Ukrainian affairs in the Generalgouvernement (the political administrative entity comprising the central part of Poland, into which the western regions of Ukraine were incorporated) and a supporter of the OUN Melnyk.

It is not my intention to establish that there was any collaboration with the Germans. Anyone familiar with the circumstances of German occupation (at that time legions were being formed in Europe to fight against Bolshevism) and the diplomatic measures that were necessary under those conditions will understand Andriy Melnyk's proposal.

However, another German document sheds more light on the political situation in Ukraine and on the position of the OUN Bandera. It states: "on 11 and 12.7.1941, all the Ukrainian groups in Lviv, including the Melnyk group of the OUN, with the exception of the Bandera group", assured Prof. Hans Koch, the liaison officer of the Wehrmacht high command, of "their loyalty towards

⁸ Photocopy of the original document in the author's personal archive.

⁹ BA R 43 11/1500 f. 61-71. The memorandum and accompanying letter were delivered by Volodymyr Stakhiv. Stakhiv did not write it. The memorandum was written a week before the outbreak of the war by Stepan Bandera and several leading members of the OUN.

¹⁰ BA R 58/214 f. 91.

the German authorities and informed them of their wish to participate in the positive reconstruction" of the country. The OUN Bandera refused to participate because it wanted an explanation of the German position vis-à-vis the future of Ukraine — on independence and the release of Bandera.¹¹

Another instance of subjective political interpretation is the conflict between the two OUNs. This conflict became more acute in August 1941 when the OUN Bandera intensified its activities and began to form strong bases in the Volhynia region and Central Ukraine. The Germans, who were carefully monitoring the course of events, reported "conflicts" between members of both organisations in Lutsk and Rivne, pointing out that the OUN Bandera, with its "determined stance", was having greater success everywhere.¹² The OUN Bandera also operated in the regions of Vinnytsia, Uman, Mohyliv-Podil'skyi, whereas the OUN Melnyk generally operated in the Zhytomyr region.¹³

On August 30, two leading members of the OUN Melnyk, Omelan Senyk and Mykola Stsiborskyi, were shot in Zhytomyr by an unknown assassin. The OUN Melnyk leadership immediately threw the blame for the killing on the OUN Bandera. The leadership of the OUN Bandera, on the other hand, issued a communique (No. 7) in connection with the incident: "The OUN adopts a negative stance towards the late Senyk and Stsiborskyi, as well as to the whole political group to which they belonged, considering its activities detrimental to the Ukrainian People. We resolutely declare, however, that the OUN had nothing to do with the killing of the late Senyk and Stsiborskyi. As a political organisation, the OUN does not resort to individual terror in its struggle. We consider the attribution of the killing of the late Senyk and Stsiborskyi to the OUN a provocation. Glory to Ukraine".

The OUN Melnyk published this communique in its official organ "Surma" on September 20, 1941, adding its own comment asserting that the crime "was committed by a member of the Bandera diversionaries, who are punishably and criminally assuming the name OUN" and, resorting to individual terror, had already killed "tens" of members of the OUN Melnyk and that the OUN Bandera had "passed its latest death sentence on forty Ukrainian citizens".¹⁴

During the memorial service, held in Zhytomyr on September 7, 1941, the OUN Bandera handed out leaflets, denying its complicity in the killing and condemning it as a provocation.¹⁵

The German security service (*Sicherheitspolizei* and SD) investigated the killing, but noted only that: "The killing of Stsiborskyi and Senyk, as well as another Melnyk supporter in Galicia, created serious indignation among the

¹¹ BA R 58/214 f. 173.

¹² BA R 58/216 f. 51, 52.

¹³ Ibid, f. 71.

¹⁴ "Surma", No. 2, September 20, 1941, p. 4.

¹⁵ BA R 58/217 Ereignismeldung UdSSR, Nr. 86 f. 102. (Report on Events in the USSR No. 86).

Ukrainian intelligentsia. There are fears that relations between the Germans and the Ukrainians will suffer on account of this matter. Rumours that the Bandera group is negotiating with the Polish resistance movement are increasing these fears. According to general expectation, police measures will be implemented". This statement is followed by a report on the intensified activities of the "Bandera group" in Galicia and Volhynia, the spread of leaflets about the "Stetsko government and about the gatherings in support of independence", the refusal to rescind the proclamation of independence, the collection of "war funds", and the issue of postage stamps with the date of the proclamation. Further on the document mentions "rumours about further killings of Melnyk supporters" and that the "Ukrainian intelligentsia and the Melnyk group" were demanding "police [sicherheitspolizeiliche] measures against the leadership of the Bandera group".¹⁶

Such measures could only be implemented by the German police, the Einsatzkommandos of the Sicherheitspolizei and SD, to whose reports I refer in this article. The members of the OUN Bandera's *Pokhidni Hrupy* (expeditionary groups), which operated in Volhynia and Central and Eastern Ukraine, caused great trouble for the German police. In the opinion of the German security service, these "OUN agents are distinguished by their decisiveness, modesty and diligence, which can only emanate from true idealism. Personally, they create a very good impression", although their activities, the report continues, were dangerous in every respect and when the situation became more stable, they would have to be returned to Galicia.¹⁷

According to a report by the chief of the security police and the SD in Galicia, the "Bandera group" continued to kill members of the "Melnyk group" and was particularly looking for Colonel Sushko and Prof. Kubyovych. For this reason, the report claimed, the "Melnyk group and the older Ukrainian intelligentsia" were constantly demanding "the arrest of the entire leadership of the Bandera group and the liquidation of the main perpetrators".¹⁸

Arrests were indeed carried out. These were the first mass arrests of Ukrainians, members of the OUN Bandera. They took place on September 15, 1941, throughout the whole of Ukraine, Germany and the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia. Hundreds of OUN Bandera members ended up in prisons and concentration camps, where many of them died. A week later, the chief of the *Sicherheitspolizei* and SD in Galicia reported that "when the reason for the arrests became known", there was "satisfaction that the actions of the Bandera group had been brought to a halt" among the population, particularly among the "older intelligentsia". But then "rumours that Senyk and Stsiborskyi were killed by the Germans in order to justify their action against the Bandera group" and that the "Melnyk group had helped the Germans in the [security

¹⁶ Ibid, Nr. 79, f. 9, 10.

¹⁷ Ibid, Nr. 81 f. 51-52.

¹⁸ Ibid, Nr. 86 f. 101.

police and SD] operations" began to circulate.¹⁹ In the opinion of the OUN Bandera, the Zhytomyr killing was carried out by a Soviet agent.

It is striking that the information of the German security service on the killings of OUN Melnyk members was based not on the results of investigations or German eyewitness accounts, but on information provided by Ukrainians. One thing is certain, however, that the leadership of the OUN Bandera had nothing to do with these killings, the reasons and circumstances of which could have been various. However, numerous German documents disclose that certain Ukrainian circles were demanding repressive measures against their fellow countrymen.

Another problem of the history of the OUN and UPA is the origins of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. At an academic conference held in Kyiv on August 25-26, 1992, various assertions were made that the UPA was formed in the summer of 1941 by Taras Bulba-Borovets, a civic, political, and military leader from the Volhynia region of Ukraine. Similar claims can be found in school textbooks and books on the history of Ukraine.²⁰ Even the "Encyclopaedia of Ukraine" writes that the "first groups under the name Ukrainian Insurgent Army 'Polissian Sich' were formed at the outbreak of the German-Soviet war by Otaman T. Bulba-Borovets in the region of Olevske in Polissia to fight against the Bolsheviks".²¹

Was this military unit an insurgent army? Was Bulba-Borovets leading an insurrection against German or Soviet occupation? In his memoirs Taras Bulba-Borovets writes that the Polissian Sich "did not stage an uprising against anyone at the beginning of the German-Soviet war. There was no one to stage an uprising against". Further on Bulba-Borovets writes that his unit was reorganised into a "militia", which was treated "with greater tolerance" by the Germans. This gave it the "opportunity to operate completely officially for some time", and to fight remnants of the Red Army and Soviet partisans in the Polissia region of Ukraine and Belarus. When negotiations with the Germans on the future of the "Polissian Sich" ended in failure, "this formation was disbanded on 15 November 1941".²²

The Germans, who noted everything that was happening in Ukraine, also provide information about the Polissian Sich. German reports state that Taras Bulba-Borovets formed the Polissian Sich "with the knowledge of the German authorities to fight against the [Soviet] partisans" and that "it was disbanded in November 1941".²³ Another German document, in addition to providing

¹⁹ Ibid, Nr. 96 f. 357.

²⁰ See Arkadiy Zhukovskiy, Orest Subtelnyi, "Narys Istoriyi Ukrayiny" (Outline of Ukrainian History), NTSh, Lviv, 1991, p. 123; Orest Subtelnyi, "Istoriya Ukrayiny" (History of Ukraine), Lybid, Kyiv, 1991, p. 410.

²¹ "Encyclopaedia Ukrayinoznavstva" (Encyclopaedia of Ukraine), Paris-New York, 1980, p. 3377.

²² Otaman Taras Bulba-Borovets, "Armiya bez derzhavy" (Army without a State), memoirs, Winnipeg, 1981, p. 121-122, 123, 125, 170.

²³ BA R 58/697. Meldungen aus den besetzten Ostgebieten, Nr. 4, f. 65. (Report from the Occupied Eastern Regions, No. 4).

interesting biographical data, states that "after the arrival of the German forces he [Borovets] was assigned the task, on his own suggestion, of forming a special police unit to clear the forests of Northern Volhynia of Bolsheviks". Borovets named his unit the Polissian Sich. After initial successful operations against Soviet military units, Borovets contacted the Wehrmacht and received orders for further military operations, "received arms and equipment. At one time his unit numbered 2-3,000 men". After clearing the forests in Podillia and Northern Volhynia, Borovets began negotiations on further military operations in the forests of the Chernihiv region. Further on the same report states that "due to difficulties concerning equipment and arms, the plan met with failure and the 'Polissian Sich' was disbanded".²⁴

German documents on Taras Bulba-Borovets and his unit confirm and provide additional information on what he wrote in his memoirs. There is, however, no mention in any German source that the Polissian Sich was ever called the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. Although in November 1941, when his unit was being disbanded, Bulba-Borovets stamped "High Command Ukrainian Insurgent Army Polissian Sich" on discharge papers issued by the High Command of the Polissian Sich (not the UPA),²⁵ any objective historian will agree that a legal police unit, regardless of its name, armed and equipped by the Germans, cannot be considered the origins of the UPA that fought against the German occupying forces and continued the struggle for freedom after the Second World War.

Bulba-Borovets claims that he organised the Polissian Sich and later conducted partisan operations according to directives of the government of the Ukrainian National Republic (UNR) in Exile on the basis of a plan authorised by its president, Andriy Livytskyi, on June 20, 1940.²⁶ This has, however, not been confirmed either by Livytskyi himself, or by any document. According to archival material, after the German occupation of Warsaw, the UNR centre moved to Paris, where it was headed by Vyacheslav Prokopovych. In Warsaw Andriy Livytskyi ran into financial difficulties and, to make him dependent on Germany, the Germans offered to pay him a monthly pension (*Gnadenpension*). There are documents which confirm that Livytskyi was receiving a German pension from October 1941.²⁷ It is, therefore, unlikely that he would have either the courage or possibility to become involved in dangerous revolutionary activities.

The last problem I wish to draw attention to is the question of whether, from 1940 onwards, the OUN can be regarded as a single organisation? There is a tendency to regard the OUN as a single organisation, which split into two (later three) parts, that there are simply three factions²⁸ of one

²⁴ Ibid, Nr. 55; BA R 58/224 f. 191-192.

²⁵ Otaman Taras Bulba-Borovets, op. cit., p. 175.

²⁶ Ibid, p. 75-76.

²⁷ BA NS 43/42 f. 54; R 6/151 f. 1-12.

²⁸ The term "OUN Bandera faction" appears in "Encyclopaedia Ukrayinoznavstva", Vol. 5, p. 1865.

OUN. This tendency is expressed in the "Encyclopaedia of Ukraine" (volume 5), which writes about three factions of one OUN, although there are three different organisations with the same name, which have a separate leadership, different platforms and different tactics, and which on occasion even squabbled amongst themselves.

After February 10, 1940, however, that is after the formation of the Revolutionary Leadership of the OUN headed by Stepan Bandera, which brought into being two leaderships and two OUNs, the German authorities continued to refer to one OUN, using terminology like "OUN Bandera group", "Bandera group", "Bandera people", "Illegal OUN — Bandera movement", "OUN Melnyk group", "Melnyk movement"²⁹ and so on. This applies to terminology alone and not to the attitude of the Germans to one or the other OUN. Moscow, too, did not distinguish between the two OUNs.

Scholars of Ukrainian affairs, however, should take care to distinguish the three OUNs. One OUN should not be held responsible for the actions or be credited with the achievements of another.

These are some of the problems that have to be taken into consideration by anyone researching the history of the OUN and UPA. In this article I have mentioned only a few of these problems. There are many more. Not only historians and lecturers, but also former members of the OUN-UPA should be aware of them. During the struggle they knew only of one OUN — the OUN Bandera. They knew about it from practical experience, from the struggle, and even from national songs. It is, therefore, not always easy for them to understand that in the new political situation the interests of various political forces hostile towards the OUN Bandera can come into play. However, I am convinced that historical facts are the most effective means of reconciling political relations in society. ■

²⁹ BA R 58/214 f. 53, 202; R 58/215 f. 225-226; R 58/218 f. 363; R 58/219 f. 87; R 58/698 f. 141.

THE MATRON WHO WOULD NOT BE A MAID

Ralph G. Bennett M.D.

The first time I can remember my grandfather Maier telling me stories about my ancestors' lives in Ukraine was when I was a little boy of about six or seven. It was at one of those marvellous dinners that grandma and grandpa used to host on special Sundays where the whole family would gather around. It was totally unlike the traditions of today, where we have small families and they are scattered all over the country. After the meal, grandpa would join in the singing.

On that particular Sunday I must have done something naughty. I can't really remember what it was, but my father had chastised me and made me go and sit by myself in the corner. My grandfather, who was a wonderful old gentleman with a white handlebar moustache, came over to comfort me by telling me one of his secrets: when he was just about my age he had done something naughty, much naughtier than the little affront that I had committed! What was it? He had gone out to the barn to see the new calf and had started playing with a lantern. Inadvertently, he had set the whole farm on fire! Maier had been born on that farm outside the city of Mykolayiv in Ukraine in 1876, and now, suddenly, his family had become homeless. His parents were forced to divide up their family among various relatives and Maier was sent to live with a cousin in the city. Later on the cousin arranged for Maier to become an apprentice to a millinery manufacturer, where he grew up working in the haberdashery trade as a maker of hats and later on as a salesman.

The years passed until 1904. Then one day, when Maier was twenty-eight years old, the woman who was to become my grandmother, walked into the shop. Her name was Jenny Lapidos. Jenny was only eighteen years old at the time, but had already been in business for herself for three years. She and her sister Ida travelled throughout the whole of Ukraine selling women's fine haberdashery items which were manufactured in a workshop run by Jenny herself. Quite a remarkable achievement for an eighteen year old! She was

Ralph G. Bennett M.D. first became interested in the history of his family when he discovered that his roots spanned at least five countries. From genealogy his interests over the years have broadened to involve scholarly study in a number of other areas as well. Dr. Bennett has written numerous articles concerning medical subjects, history, genealogy, art history and economics. His work has been accepted for publication in the United States and six other countries and has been translated into four languages. Dr. Bennett is a physician whose practice encompasses Dermatology and Allergy in Hayward, California, (a suburb of San Francisco) — but only when he is not collecting dead relatives!

beautiful, petite, and bright as a penny. Her family also had a very interesting history. Her grandfather's last name on her mother's side was Lavrutin. The grandfather was very rich and he had two daughters. The older one was named Ita Oksana and the younger was called Mimi Ruta. Mimi was pretty and charming and was married early, but Ita was more austere and bookish. Therefore, although her father was quite wealthy, suitors for Ita were hard to come by. One day Ita spotted a very handsome, new young man in town who had just started working in her father's paper box factory. The man's name was Milos Lapidos. Milos had flashing dark eyes and a winning smile. Although a very adorable looking young man, he was penniless. Ita's heart was set on him and her father's money won the day. She essentially bought him as a husband, and she used to joke later that he was the handsomest catch that money could buy. Milos, unfortunately, proved to have no head at all for business, and he went through one venture after another making a mess of them all. It was only because of his wife's family's wealth that he was able to survive.

Milos and Ita went on to have five children of whom my grandmother Jenny was one and had inherited her father's good looks and her mother's brains and determination for a winning combination. Like her mother before her, she took one look at the man of her dreams (in this case Maier) and decided he was for her. They were married in 1905 and they decided to emigrate to the New World that year. Maier's original family name was of Slavic origin. I found out much later that the name was Polish and meant "from the city of birch trees". The name referred to his family's ancestral origin from the city of Brest-Litovsk. But after my grandparents' arrival in North America in 1905, Maier found that his Polish name was not only unpronounceable, but also totally unspellable in English. He very quickly "Americanised" it and shortened it to Bennett. Not only did the couple leave Ukraine to come to a new country, but they also discovered that they had arrived in a whole new technological world as well. There were all kinds of inventions here including the telephone, phonograph, automobile, and even the bicycle which were entirely new to their eyes. They were also shocked to find that they had arrived in their new homeland in the midst of a financial crisis which became known as "the panic of 1907". So their early years here were economically very rough. They had gone from being quite wealthy in Ukraine, to being suddenly quite poor while struggling to adjust to a new language, culture, and locale.

Later on, after they became better established, like many immigrants, they tried to bring over their relatives from the old country. They worked very hard for years to save money in order to do this, and eventually they established a chain of millinery stores. By this time, however, the immigration laws had changed and there were now restrictions being applied to immigrants coming from Eastern Europe. The only way they could get their kinfolk over was if they came in ostensibly as servants. Maier and Jenny were not yet really prosperous enough in those days to afford a live-in house maid

of their own, but for the sake of getting Jenny's parents into the country, they wrote on the official documents that Ita and Milos were "being sponsored" to come in as the butler and the maid. Milos, always agreeable to any adventurous scheme was willing, but Ita, having been rich and proud all of her life, adamantly refused. Although she very much wanted to get out of communist Ukraine to come to the golden land of opportunity, there was no way she was ever going to have any official paper say she had entered the country as a maid servant! Her sister Mimi, who by this time was a widow, had no scruples about saying anything that needed to be said in order to leave Ukraine. So she came instead as "the Bennett's new maid".

Subsequently, the immigration restrictions were lifted. At quite an advanced age Ita and Milos came into the United States, as a lady and gentleman. Grandpa Maier showed me a wonderful photograph carefully preserved in a drawer which had been taken in 1932 when Ita and Milos celebrated their golden wedding anniversary in America. By that time, of course, they were in their seventies. Milos was still as handsome as ever with snow white hair and a stylish, clipped white beard and moustache which set off his dark twinkling eyes. Great-grandma Ita, who died before I was born and whose likeness I had never seen before, was wearing an elaborate beaded and jewelled gown. She had beautiful coiffed white hair and the sternest expression of any woman I had ever seen! Surrounding this couple in the photo were their five children and many grandchildren, all of whom my grandparents Jenny and Maier had "sponsored" to come to America. But one look at great-grandma Ita's face and one knew she could never have fooled anyone into thinking she was a maid servant. And so there she posed, the matron who would never be a maid. ■

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Literature

TO OSNOVYANENKO

Taras Shevchenko

Hryts'ko Kvitka (1778-1843), under the name of Osnovyanenko, was one of the major writers in Ukrainian of the first half of the 19th Century. He was the author of a large number of prose works, dealing almost entirely with the life of Ukrainian peasants — long before the peasant "motif" became popular elsewhere in European literature.

The above poem was written by Ukraine's greatest poet, Taras Shevchenko, in 1839, at the start of his poetic career, and was printed in 1840 in "Kobzar", the only volume of Shevchenko's poetry to appear in his lifetime. Although an early work, it contains many motifs to which the poet would return later, in meditations on his poetic mission, including the preface to his epic, "The Haydamaky". This translation was specially commissioned as part of the literary celebrations this year of the 150th anniversary of Osnovyanenko's death.

The rapids pound, the moon is setting,
As it has set for ever.
The Sich gone, and he who ruled
Is lost, and will come never,
The Sich is no more! The rushes
Ask the Dnipro, saying:
"Where, now, have our children gone?
Where, now, are they playing?"
Flying round, the lapwing wails
As if for her babes weeping,
Sunlight glows, a wild wind blows,
O'er Cossack steppe-land sweeping.

In that steppe, all round, the gravemounds,
Stand there, mourning, asking
The wild wind: "Where are our lads,
Where now are they masters?
Where now do they hold their banquets,
Where do you still linger?"

Come back home to us! For see,
 Now drooping rye-ears mingle,
 Where your steeds you used to pasture,
 Where rustles the esparto,
 Where in crimson ocean flowed
 The blood of Pole and Tatar.
 Come ye home to us!"


"They'll come not"

The blue sea spoke, roaring,
 They will come not home again,
 For ever they have fallen!
 True it is, sea, true, blue water,
 Such the fortune deemed them,
 Never shall come back those hoped for,
 Never come back freedom,
 Never come back Cossackdom,
 Nor Hetmans rise up ever,
 Nevermore shall our Ukraine
 With crimson coats be covered.
 All in tatters, as an orphan,
 On Dniro's banks now grieving,
 Weary, dreary lives the orphan,
 None there is to see her,
 Save the foeman, and he smiles.
 Smile then, evil foeman,
 But not long, for all will perish,
 Yet glory knows no waning,
 Knows no waning, still proclaiming
 How the world once wended,
 Whose was right, and whose injustice,
 From whom are we descended.
 This our thought and this our song
 Shall never die nor perish...
 This, good people, is our glory,
 Ukraine's glory cherished!
 Without gold, nor precious stones,
 Nor in shrewd words expressed,
 But resounding, glory true,
 Like God's own gospel blessed.

Well then, father-otaman,
 Am I singing rightly
 Well, if not... But that's enough!
 I've no talent mighty.
 What's more this is Muscovy,
 Foreigners all round us.

"What's the matter?", you might say,
"Why should that confound us?"
Here they laugh to hear the psalm
Which with tears flows over,
Here they laugh! 'Tis hard, dear father,
To live among foemen!
I too would have fought, maybe,
Had strength been granted to me,
Would have sung, had some small voice,
But loans ate it up truly.

Indeed, my father, my dear friend,
This is an evil burden,
Lost in the snows, I to myself
Sing "Meadow, do not murmur!"
And that is all. But you, dear father,
As you know full truly,
You have a good voice, and people
Pay you honour duly.
So sing to them, my dear friend,
Of Sich and gravemounds serried,
When it was they piled each high,
And whom within they buried;
Sing of olden days, that wonder,
All that was, long ended,
To it, then, that, willy-nilly,
The whole world will attend then,
And learn what passed in Ukraina,
And what for she perished,
And what for the Cossack glory
Through the whole world once flourished.
To it, then, grey eagle, father!
Let me weep and mourn then,
And my own dear Ukraina
Let me see once more then;
Let me hear once more the sea,
Playing in its billows,
Hear how a young girl sings "Hryts",
Underneath the willow.
Let my poor heart smile once more,
Though from my own land severed.
E'er in strange earth, in a strange coffin,
I lay me down for ever.



SPRING SONGS

Ivan Franko

These — mainly untitled — poems, written over the period 1880-1883, when Franko was aged between 24 and 27, were published by the poet as a cycle in his collection "Z Vershyn i Nyzyn" (From Heights and Depths, Lviv 1887). Written in a deceptively simple style, and often using the metres, motifs and language of folk poetry, they prove, on a closer reading, to contain a mordant substratum of political comment, contrasting the beauties of the season, conventionally hymned by poets, with the political and social realities of the time.

I

Winter was all amazed,
Why snow started to thaw,
Why the ice was all cracked
The wide river o'er?

Winter was all amazed
Why this weakness she knew,
From whence came this breeze
That with warmth pierced one through?

Winter was all amazed
How the earth grew in might,
Flooded over with warmth.
Each day stirring to life?

Winter was all amazed
How the flowers dared, so
Sweet-scented and small,
To pierce through the snow?

And she breathed on them with
Wind from her icy lips,
And she started to throw
Snow on them in great heaps.

The flowers all drooped,
 Closed up, sad, one and all,
 Then the grey storm passed by,
 And they stood straight and tall.

And exceedingly that
 Against this small flower
 Winter was all amazed
 That she could have no power.

27.iii.1881

II

Thunder roars! And a blest season now is arriving!
 All nature is pierced by strange trembling and striving,
 The thirsty earth longs for the rains fructifying,
 Above the wind dances, unbridled and flying,
 And from the west sailing, the dark stormclouds pour —
 Thunder roars!

Thunder roars! And mysterious tremblings and strivings
 Pierce the people — maybe the blest hour is arriving...
 Millions await a chance happy and wondrous,
 The clouds are but shadows of future abundance,
 That, like fair springtime, mankind will restore...
 Thunder roars.

15. v.1881

IV

And now the bright sun at its toil
 Of spring over meadows is glowing,
 And now on fields' wide-spreading soil,
 Man's sweat in its rivers is flowing.

Purely and gently once more
 Flows the river with silver fish gleaming,
 Again on the bare common, poor
 Cattle graze, wandering leanly.

The woodland resounds with birds' song,
 Near the graveyard — the cuckoo's inflection;
 And in his coach, bowling along,
 The taxman goes round on collection.

1.v.1881

VI

Swiftly spread your branches, willow,
Oak-grove, greenly thriving!
Nature that has long been dead
Once more is reviving;
Is reviving, sundering
The bonds and chains of winter,
With fresh vigour is renewed,
And with fresh hope unstinted.

Grow once more green, native field,
Grow, Ukrainian tillage,
Rise up, shoot with ears, and ripen
Happy to fulfilment!
Every good seed may you rear,
Safe forever keep it,
May good service from your fruit
Benefit the people.

1880

IX

In the orchard now, the nightingale still sings,
A beloved ditty to the fair young spring,
Still it twitters as of old it twittered long,
And it greets the lovely spring with welcome song.

But the orchard is not now as in past days,
When the village rang with song one eve in May,
Young girls came along the road like swarming bees,
Nightingale was fluting in the cherry trees,

Now it is not as it was. Now in the gloom
Groups of girls no longer through the village roam,
Maidens' song no longer floats through all the street,
With the songster in the cherry to compete.

Now, worn out from work, they hasten on their way,
And their limbs ache sorely as if hacked away.
It would not mock the poor lasses, this sweet song,
If they could rest after toiling all day long.

Hard it is now for the nightingale to sing,
 Hard to greet now, though 'tis lovely, the sweet spring,
 To proclaim the joy of nature to the world,
 As it were to human woe an insult hurled.

And it grieves its former rivals, now grown mute,
 Whose sweet song of old once mingled with its flute.
 What awaits them? Loveless marriage, babes untold,
 A bad husband, and his mother who's a scold.

25.iv.1881

X

Spring, ah how long waiting for the we linger,
 Why dost thou not come, Spring, dearest and best?
 Why in thy place, in a poor house to mingle,
 Dost thou send ruin and loss, cold and hunger,
 To be our guests?

It is already May! May, well-beloved,
 Why dost thou come into the world as if dead?
 It is empty and dead in the field, in the grove now,
 Only the dull leaden storm-clouds lie over
 The whole sky-spread.

Through the poor homesteads go groans and complaining,
 Children are dying, throats swollen and sore,
 No wisp of hay in the ricks still remaining,
 Cattle die, and, through the broad valleys straining,
 The waters roar.

"It is the end!", people whisper, "for rarely
 Troubles come singly. This either must bring
 Plague, or the Poles will take over (God spare us!)
 Such are the greetings the villagers bear thee,
 This year, O spring.

6 v.1883

XV

Vivere Memento

Spring, what is this wonder you
In my breast are making?
Do you call the heart to new
Life from death to waken?
Yesterday, like Lazarus, I,
In woe's coffin pining,
Rotted, what new star on high
Is this for me shining?
A strange voice calls, beckoning
Me — here, there, now, then, to
"Rise, rouse up, awakening,
Vivere memento!"

Warm wind, brother truly mine,
Is it your voice speaking?
Or upon the hill's bright shine
Is the oak-tree creaking?
Is it, grass, your whispered breath,
Gently thus expressed now,
You that through the ice of death
To the light have pressed now?
Was it your soft murmur, say,
River, silver blent so,
Washed my weariness away?
Vivere memento!

All round I hear that dear call,
Life's strong clarion shouting...
Breezes, spring, I love you all,
Rivers, stormclouds, mountains!
People, people, I am your
Brother, for you gladly
I would live, my blood I'd pour
To wash away your sadness.
What blood cannot wash out, we'll give
To the fire, present so!
But we battle while we live...
Vivere memento!

14.x.1883



News From Ukraine

Russian Oil Supplies Still Low

KYIV, December 12 — Russia has supplied Ukraine with only a third of the agreed amount of oil over the last three months of 1992. Mykola Popovych, spokesman for the oil concern Ukrneftegas, said Ukraine's largest refinery at Lisichansk was only working at 25 per cent of its capacity. ■

Chornobyl

KYIV, December 13 — Workers restarted a second reactor at the damaged Chornobyl nuclear plant calculating that Ukraine's need for energy outweighs the danger of this action. ■

Zlenko to Kozyrev: Threats Are Not Funny

STOCKHOLM — The government of Ukraine did not find Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev's threatening, Cold War jokes to be funny.

According to a statement released by the Embassy of Ukraine in Washington, D.C., Ukrainian Foreign Minister Anatoliy Zlenko, responding to Kozyrev on December 14, said that rhetoric and jokes are highly dangerous in politics.

"We have felt an echo of the old imperial thinking, which is not compatible with the civilised norms of international coexistence", Zlenko said.

Earlier, Kozyrev delivered a speech at the latest round of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, in which he implied that Russia is reverting to its old ways.

Kozyrev said Russia regards the entire geopolitical space of the former USSR as a domain of its vital national interests and will attempt to restore the federal structure of the former Soviet Union by all possible means.

His statement caused confusion among the delegations and prompted Zlenko to call Kyiv and ask whether a coup had taken place in Moscow.

After thirty minutes, Kozyrev went to the podium and said he was joking only to show what could happen if Boris Yeltsin were overthrown. He said he included his remarks to demonstrate the rhetoric of the Russian opposition forces so that conference participants could sense the danger which threatens peace and calm in the world.

Zlenko said Ukraine does not accept the policy of strength or threat of force and together with

other CSCE partners will stand for the goals and principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the Paris Charter for a new Europe.

"The people of Ukraine have made their final choice and will decide their destiny by themselves", Zlenko said.

Other foreign ministers also stated their displeasure with Kozyrev's theatrics.

Also that day, Zlenko met Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs Barbara McDougall to discuss a wide range of issues covering bilateral cooperation as well as with delegation heads of Finland, Greece, Turkey, Denmark, Croatia, Czechoslovakia and Japan.

On the following day, Zlenko spoke about START-1 and the Non-Proliferation Treaty with Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleberger. ■

Kravchuk Asks For Time to Ratify START

KYIV (Ukrinform) — President Leonid Kravchuk said on Tuesday, December 15, the Supreme Council needs more time to examine the START treaty before ratification.

However, Kravchuk said time is needed to safeguard Ukraine's economic and strategic interests but added that he expects quick ratification.

"Serious people understand that before agreeing to anything, all matters must be studied thoroughly", he said.

"An example of such an approach is the line of the United States. The Senate needed more than a year to

study the START treaty and all the consequences of its implementation for the country's security and economy before ratification".

Kravchuk has said Ukraine required security guarantees and compensation for giving up expensive nuclear components.

A growing number of Ukrainian lawmakers, composed of nationalists and former communists, have called for a reexamination of the country's decision to give up its remaining share of the original 176 strategic missiles.

In the interview, Kravchuk rejected suggestions by some American commentators and officials that Ukraine was unduly delaying ratifying START and the Non-Proliferation Treaty, emphasizing the country's non-nuclear status.

Ukrainian Foreign Minister Anatoliy Zlenko told the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe that the Supreme Council would not ratify the treaties by the year's end as had been expected.

Zlenko said ratification would come in January if four conditions were met: international guarantees of Ukraine's security; financial support for dismantling and storage of nuclear weapons and missiles now on Ukrainian soil; compensation for highly enriched uranium and plutonium to be removed from the disassembled weapons; and an accord with Russia on shares of such compensation.

US Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleberger, who met Zlenko, said that quick ratification of the treaties is critical. In the wake of Sens. Sam

Nunn and Richard Lugar's return from Ukraine, the US government offered Ukraine \$175 million in aid if it ratifies the treaties.

President Bush had written a letter to Kravchuk, stating the funds would be available if Ukraine ratifies the Non-Proliferation Treaty and agrees to be a non-nuclear state under a protocol to the START-1 treaty, which was originally negotiated by the United States and the former USSR. Lugar had quoted Bush as saying that security assurances for Ukraine, which have been among the principal concerns of Ukrainian parliamentarians, are under discussion by Washington and Moscow.

Meanwhile, some Ukrainian officials have said Washington and other Western capitals should offer Ukraine more financial help.

Eagleberger indicated that this topic would be further discussed with Ukrainian officials. Nevertheless, he added, "We have to respect Ukraine's parliamentary processes".

Kravchuk explained that Ukraine was suffering huge material losses by giving up nuclear materials. He said the money was needed to help the government pay for their dismantling and shipment.

"Given Ukraine's limited economic possibilities and the technological difficulties involved, financial assistance is vital from interested parties to implement a multi-faceted programme of destroying nuclear weapons", Kravchuk said. ■

Deadline for Chornobyl Shelter Extended

KYIV, December 15 — Ukraine has extended the deadline for proposals for dealing with the shelter built around one of the four nuclear reactors at Chornobyl until to April 26.

In July a competition was launched to make the shelter safe. About 180 proposals had been received by the start of December. France's Bouygues SA <BOUY.PA> and Societe Generale pour les Techniques Nouvelles (SGN), plus Russian and Ukraine institutes, are studying how a new structure could encase the remains of the reactor and the existing shelter.

The French government is financing the study. Bouygues will be responsible for studying civil engineering aspects, while SGN will deal with safety analysis and investigate the eventual dismantling of the reactor and the shelter.

The shelter has an uncertain service life, the fuel-containing structure is disintegrating and radioactive water is accumulating. ■

Tanker Fleet to End Oil Dependence

KYIV, December 17 — President Leonid Kravchuk called for the creation of a tanker fleet to end Ukraine's dependence on imported Russian oil. Kravchuk issued a decree ordering the setting up of a commission to report within two months on how to build and operate such a fleet. Ukraine's leadership views the creation of a tanker fleet

as a way of overcoming fuel shortages that have grounded most commercial air traffic in the past three weeks and hobbled vast sections of industry. Erratic shipments of oil from Russia, Ukraine's chief supplier, have reduced operations sharply at the country's large network of refineries. Building a tanker fleet would involve other difficulties, like upgrading refineries and pipelines and finishing construction of a planned terminal in the port of Ilyichovsk, all estimated to cost some \$7 billion.

Ukraine has considerable capacity at its three major shipyards and is currently building three tankers for Norway. It has orders from six more foreign buyers. But Ukraine's merchant marine, one of the three largest in the world, is currently undergoing a crisis amid allegations of corruption, tax evasion and misuse of funds. ■

Ukraine's Reputation Rises, Fuel Problems Remain

KYIV, December 19 — Ukraine's prime minister said his reformist government had earned the country a favourable reputation abroad for the first time in a year of independence from the Soviet Union. "Ukraine for the first time has a reputation throughout the world of a state carrying out market reforms. Western capital has begun to flow in", Leonid Kuchma said.

During Saturday's debate parliament gave the government an effective vote of confidence by

agreeing to extend until May extraordinary powers to introduce market reforms by decree.

Kuchma has pledged to work out a concrete reform programme by the end of the year. Since he was appointed prime minister two months ago, Kuchma's cautious approach to reform and bitter attacks on corruption have won widespread support. Reports from his top ministers to parliament were applauded by virtually all political factions, including both conservatives and nationalists generally disinclined to back President Leonid Kravchuk.

In the Kyiv parliament, further reports by Kuchma's ministers showed the dire state of the economy, hit by 30 per cent monthly inflation, a budget deficit of 44 per cent of GNP and chronic fuel shortages. Energy Minister Vitaliy Sklyarov said reserves of heating fuel were sufficient to supply consumers and industry until mid-February, but were uncertain beyond then. A senior Ukrainian railway official said the network was receiving less than one-fifth of the diesel fuel needed to keep locomotives running. Freight traffic was down 50 per cent. ■

Kravchuk in Egypt

KYIV, December 21 — Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk arrived in Cairo on a three-day official visit within the framework of efforts to boost relations between his newly independent country and various world states. Egyptian President Hosny Mubarak and leading officials were on hand to receive the

Ukrainian leader whose talks are expected to centre on the situation in central Asia and bilateral relations.

In an interview with the Cairo daily "Al-Ahram" coinciding with his arrival, Kravchuk served notice that his country would oppose any moves within the Russian Federation towards reviving the former Soviet Union. ■

Government Introduces New Customs Rules

KYIV, December 23 — An order from the Ukrainian government has instructed that all goods taken out from Ukraine to CIS countries or brought to Ukraine from CIS countries, are subject to obligatory declaration.

During a news conference held with the Ukrainian customs committee, it was pointed out that the declaration of goods will provide authentic information about the volume of Ukrainian exports and imports and transit transportations via the Ukrainian territory.

Goods will be registered at the so-called internal customs offices, which have been established practically in all Ukrainian regional centres. Goods will be taken abroad on the basis of documents issued at the same place as is done in international practice. ■

Kravchuk Says Ukraine Will Keep Some Nuclear Missiles

KYIV — President Leonid Kravchuk said Ukraine will keep 46 of the 176 strategic nuclear missiles it earlier promised to transfer to Russia for destruction.

Kravchuk said Ukraine will send Russia 130 of its liquid-fuel missiles for dismantling, but will retain 46 Ukrainian-manufactured solid-fuel missiles and dismantle them itself.

Interfax reported that US Ambassador Roman Popadiuk had promised Kyiv \$175 million in US aid to help dismantle its nuclear weapons. In addition, Kravchuk told a Russian newspaper that he has the power to block the launch of any nuclear missile from Ukrainian territory.

In the interview with "Rossiiskiy Vesti" Kravchuk said Russian President Boris Yeltsin remains in overall control of the nuclear forces command and control system, but Ukraine retains a veto over the launch of any Ukraine-deployed missiles if their use has not been sanctioned by Kyiv. Ukraine has for months insisted on "administrative control" over its nuclear forces, while the leadership of the Commonwealth of Independent States' Combined Forces insists on centralised CIS control of all nuclear weapons.

Furthermore Ukraine is requesting more than \$1.5 billion from the West for dismantling former Soviet nuclear weapons, and one Ukrainian official said on Tuesday, December 29, the world should pay to eliminate the temptation for Kyiv to "spread the infection".

Kostiantyn Hryshchenko, head of the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry's disarmament department, told a news conference that the \$175 million offered by the United States was insufficient, and he said other countries should also pay a share. Hryshchenko said Ukraine would

need \$1.5 billion plus about 500 billion Ukrainian coupons — \$588 million at the current exchange rate — to dismantle the weapons, but added those were “preliminary figures” that “tend to be revised upward”.

He said the costs include “social programmes” to retrain and employ soldiers now employed in strategic missile facilities, paying for technologies to safely handle and dispose of toxic rocket fuels and radioactive warhead components and destroying silos. Volodymyr Kryzhanivskyi, Ukraine’s ambassador to Russia, was even blunter in demanding that the West pay for the elimination of former Soviet weapons on Ukrainian territory. “Ukraine is in a state of illness which it developed during the Cold War”, Kryzhanivskyi said. “It is like the plague. And this plague is nuclear weapons. And we tell the world community, ‘If you do not want us to spread the infection, then you must help us recover’”.

Dmytro Pavlychko, head of the Supreme Council’s foreign affairs commission said on Tuesday, December 29, parliament could ratify a key disarmament pact no earlier than February despite pressure from the West to speed up the process.

Pavlychko added that deputies debating the START accord intended to voice concern over security guarantees and the high cost to Ukraine of giving up nuclear materials. “We must ratify the accord and I am certain common sense will prevail”, he told a news conference.

“But ratification will not take place under the Bush administration. It can take place no earlier than February or March because economic questions are parliament’s top priority in January”.

Pavlychko said the United States, which has accused Ukraine of dragging its feet on ratification, would achieve nothing by putting pressure on the Kyiv parliament. “The greater the pressure, the tougher it will be to get START through parliament”, he said.

“If we are told to ratify the accord by a certain date, I can guarantee you parliament will not do so. We have at least seen from some European countries a measure of understanding of Ukraine’s refusal to rush matters”.

Earlier, Ukraine’s foreign minister accused Western countries of using threats to push his country into ratifying a crucial nuclear arms reduction treaty. Anatoliy Zlenko, speaking to reporters in parliament, did not single out any specific country in his criticism. But his comments followed a warning from the United States that relations with Kyiv would deteriorate if there was any further delay in ratifying the START treaty on reducing strategic nuclear weapons.

“No-one rejects the principles of the START treaty, but to ratify this treaty we have to have full information”, he said. “There is distortion of the Ukrainian position in the West. Some Western states are exerting pressure on Ukraine, up to and including threats”. ■

Ukraine Draws Up Economic Reform Plan

KYIV, December 24 — Ukrainian economic advisers finished work on a plan to reform the ailing economy, aiming to rein in inflation and reduce the yawning budget deficit. The reform plan was drawn up with the help of experts from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

Ukraine plans to tighten monetary and financial policies, make its quasi-currency, the coupon, internally convertible, and begin to sell off small state-owned firms. The privatisation of larger firms would follow later. Investment and insurance companies would be set up to help reform the financial system.

The budget deficit was 44 per cent of gross national product in the 11 months to November. Inflation is running at about 30 per cent a month and the coupon currency has fallen against the rouble. Volodymyr Ryzhov, an advisor to Prime Minister Leonid Kuchma, said the government aimed to stabilise the economy by the end of 1993. Plans to bring in Ukraine's own currency would have to be postponed until inflation had fallen sharply. He said the government hoped to encourage investment from foreign and private companies to modernise the military sector. ■

Protests Over Price Hikes

KYIV, December 28 — Thousands of workers rallied on the weekend to protest against a sharp rise in prices for basic goods and services under a

government free-market programme to cut subsidies.

In the capital, the price of bread jumped almost six times to 35 karbovantsi — about five cents at the official exchange rate. A ticket on the city's subway system increased tenfold to five roubles. Other increases were announced for meat, milk and rent and utilities at state-owned apartments.

In a televised speech, Prime Minister Leonid Kuchma said the government had no choice. Four of Ukraine's 24 administrative regions have refused to endorse the price increases. In Kyiv, about 5,000 industrial workers blocked traffic on a main street and gathered near the parliament building to demand that price increases be cancelled and salaries increased. ■

Kuchma Discusses Role of Cabinet, Economy

KYIV (Ukrinform) — Prime Minister Leonid Kuchma, in an interview with Ukrinform, described the Cabinet of Ministers' function as that of a brain trust rather than a decor for a political scene. However, lack of time has made the government fall short of this goal, he said.

Forced to act as firefighters, the Cabinet is experiencing drastic shortages of time to work on economic strategies, Kuchma complained. The situation demands a package of decisions to be implemented in unison, not step-by-step decrees, he said. The main obstacle to resolving the issues before it is the fuel and energy crisis,

which is difficult to overcome because Russia is Ukraine's sole supplier of gas and oil, he explained.

Though Ukraine is looking for other energy sources, including American petroleum companies, Kuchma said the problem with Russian oil and gas supplies is Ukraine's shortage of roubles to pay for them.

Commenting on the recent price hikes, Kuchma said he had been very reluctant to apply the shock therapy, but he added that there was no other way out.

He said the Cabinet was resolved to raise minimum wages and pensions to provide a social protection umbrella for the society's destitute, while those capable of earning their sustenance should work better.

Touching on the decree providing for wage freezes, Kuchma said the wage race versus price hikes was extremely dangerous for the nation accustomed to getting unearned money and had already caused society's stratification with some 15 million people below the poverty level.

These and other well-coordinated steps should cut down the inflation rate from its present monthly 50 per cent level to a reasonable minimum of 2 or 3 per cent, he predicted.

Turning to economic cooperation with other former Soviet republics, including Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, Kuchma said it was essential and urgent to display goodwill and mutual understanding to normalise interstate relations with them at all levels. He added he was in constant touch with Russian prime

minister Chernomyrdin, who is also intent on expanding economic cooperation.

Kuchma expressed hope that the people of Ukraine would assess the country's situation as one which sets the nation's very survival at stake. ■

Ukraine Continues to Snub CIS, Yeltsin

KYIV — After first snubbing Boris Yeltsin's CIS summit last month, Ukraine further stayed away from the CIS Parliamentary Assembly.

According to published reports, the scheduled summit of CIS heads of state and a separate meeting between the Russian and Ukrainian presidents were postponed, with the delay blamed in part on a minor illness of Russian President Boris Yeltsin.

Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Sergei Yastrzhembsky said Yeltsin was slightly ill, with the independent Interfax news agency saying he was nursing a cold. Yastrzhembsky said Kazakhstan's President Nursultan Nazarbayev was also "indisposed".

Yeltsin and Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk had been scheduled to meet on Thursday, December 24, a day before the full summit of former Soviet republics in the Commonwealth of Independent States. There was no new date announced for the Yeltsin-Kravchuk meeting. The CIS summit was rescheduled for January 22.

Yeltsin spokesman Vitaly Menshikov gave no reason for the postponement of the meeting between the Russian and Ukrainian leaders, which was reportedly delayed at Yeltsin's request.

"I can only tell you it was postponed", he said.

Yeltsin and Kravchuk had hoped to sign agreements on economic ties between the ex-Soviet Union's two most populous nations, which have had a rocky relationship this year because of disagreements over the Black Sea Fleet, monetary policy and reduced deliveries of Russian oil to Ukraine.

Kravchuk said leaders of the CIS were not prepared for a summit and cast doubt on whether the group would ever function effectively. A Kazakh presidential spokesman denied that Nazarbayev was ill and was to blame for the summit postponement.

Kravchuk said the 10-member CIS had accomplished little since it was created in December 1991 on the ruins of the former Soviet Union. "I always ask this question. What have we decided in the framework of the CIS? And I can find no answer. We have not resolved a single question", he told reporters as he returned from a visit to Egypt.

"If anything has been settled, it is only in the framework of bilateral relations".

"The CIS has shown that it is not capable of settling practical questions. If anyone thinks that after adopting the CIS charter, an organisation, which has demonstrated its lack of vitality will change, then he is mistaken".

The Ukrainian president said he regretted that he was unable to meet Yeltsin in Moscow on December 24. "But as for the Minsk meeting, I have no regrets. Very much serious work has to be done there". The Minsk summit had been due to discuss

several cooperation agreements including the Commonwealth's founding charter.

The Ukrainian President suggested that public opinion be taken into account in resolving contentious issues. "Look at the entry of European countries into a tight-knit community. The question is being settled in some places by a referendum. This shows respect for the people, for the state", he said. "We want to decide and adopt everything in an unprepared way, without taking into account public opinion... Is it possible to revive the CIS, which has shown itself to be completely bankrupt and incapable of settling complex issues?", he asked. Ukraine, the second most powerful CIS member, is suspicious of entering accords that might undermine its sovereignty and lead to domination by Moscow.

Meanwhile, delegates from the parliaments of seven countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States met on Monday, December 28, in St. Petersburg amid complaints over the demise of the Soviet Union, which the CIS was created to supersede. "The collapse of the USSR was not inevitable, but the consequence of gross errors of policy", said Ruslan Khasbulatov, Russian parliament chairman and head of the recently-formed CIS Interparliamentary Assembly. Opening the Assembly's second session in Russia's former imperial capital, Khasbulatov said delegates needed "to establish the exact cause of the USSR's collapse". The Russian speaker said the Assembly should take over from the regular

summits of CIS presidents as the main initiator of closer cooperation between commonwealth states.

Delegates arrived in St. Petersburg from Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, Tadzhikistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan — the core commonwealth states most committed to closer integration. Observers from Azerbaijan also attended the two-day meeting, but there were no representatives from Moldova, whose parliament refused to ratify membership of the Commonwealth, or Georgia, which never joined the CIS. No one turned up from Ukraine and Turkmenistan, the two full CIS members most opposed to structures which might violate their sovereignty. ■

Kyiv Cabinet Tackles Economic Problems

KYIV (Ukrinform) — The Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers met on December 29 to discuss furthering economic reforms in the country.

The Cabinet approved a series of decrees, among which were documents on wages, small business and cooperatives' activity, public services and trade establishments leasing of premises, privatisation in the agricultural industry, state regulation of tobacco, alcohol and alcoholic beverage production and export.

New minimal wages and pensions were also expected to be considered and adopted. As Prime Minister Leonid Kuchma stated earlier, the government intends to regularly revise wages and pensions in accordance with inflation and the coupon's decreasing purchasing power.

Another decree that is expected to arouse concern among the blue-collar

workers provides for differential wage freezes at state-run industries. Permission to raise wages would be issued only to those businesses which achieve production increases or demonstrate cost efficiency.

A few of the decrees are primarily aimed at curbing illegal enrichment and incomes through making more orderly enterprises' commercial activities and forcing them to abandon vicious practices of setting up cooperatives, small businesses and joint ventures using state resources but making surplus money by illegitimate means. ■

Ukraine Holds Key to Start-2 Treaty

KYIV, December 30 — The START-2 treaty, which US President George Bush and Russian President Boris Yeltsin will sign in a few days at the Black Sea resort of Sochi, will reduce the two countries' total strategic nuclear warheads to between 3,000 and 3,500 each by the year 2003 from current levels of about 10,000 warheads each.

START-2 is strictly an accord between the US and Russia, but before it can be implemented, another treaty, START-1, in which Ukraine is a co-partner, must also be implemented and ratified.

So far, Ukraine has delayed doing so. Russia has said it will not implement START-1 unless Ukraine ratifies the pact. START-1, which slashes US and ex-Soviet arsenals by less than 30 per cent, has been ratified by Russia, the United States and Kazakhstan but not by Belarus, which is not seen as a problem, and Ukraine, which is.

Ukraine has been using the nuclear weapons as leverage to obtain aid and security guarantees from the West, but some officials have increasingly argued for keeping at least some arms indefinitely to guard against attack by Russia and to ensure Ukraine appropriate stature in the world community. ■

Ukraine Supports Treaty Cutting Strategic Arms

MOSCOW, January 1 — On the eve of a US-Russian summit to sign a treaty dramatically reducing the world's two largest nuclear arsenals, third-ranked Ukraine signalled its support and reaffirmed its goal of eventually becoming a nuclear-free state. After a meeting on New Year's Eve with Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Anatoliy Zlenko said that he had declared his full support for the START-2 Treaty and that he and Kozyrev had promised to "expedite talks on technical aspects of liquidating the nuclear weapons on the territory of Ukraine". ■

President and Party Leaders Discuss CIS Charter

Kyiv, January 4 — A consultative meeting between Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk and representatives of political parties and socio-political associations focused on proposals related to putting the issue of signing the charter of the Commonwealth of Independent States on the agenda of the forthcoming CIS summit. ■

Ukraine Wants to Pay Share of Former Soviet Debt

KYIV, January 5 — Ukraine said it wanted to pay its own share of the huge debt run up by the former Soviet Union and it rejected a deal reached with Russia in November in a move certain to dismay Western creditors. First Deputy Prime Minister Ihor Yukhnovskiy said Ukraine could no longer abide by the deal, under which it authorised Russia to pay its 16.37 per cent share of Soviet debt estimated at around \$80 billion. In exchange Russia would provide Ukraine with an inventory of property abroad to be divided between Moscow and Kyiv. ■

Turkey Launches New Probe Into Chornobyl Aftereffects

ANKARA, January 5 — Turkey has launched a new probe to determine the extent to which people along its Black Sea coast were affected by fallout from the 1986 Chornobyl nuclear disaster. The move followed reports in several leading newspapers of a sharp rise since 1986 in the number of cancer victims seeking treatment in state-owned hospitals along Turkey's Black Sea coast. ■

Ukraine Sticks to Its Policies on Nuclear Disarmament

KYIV — Ukraine's position on nuclear disarmament continues to baffle and irritate the United States and other countries.

While Ukraine has been labelled by some as being intransigent, an obstacle to international nuclear disarmament and stability and a potential pariah, Kyiv is holding fast to its demand for financial assistance in converting the nuclear components of its missiles, a part of the profits to be made by Russia for selling them and US guarantees of its security, sovereignty and independence.

The recent meeting in Washington between US officials and Deputy Foreign Minister Borys Tarasiuk apparently took a turn in favour of Ukraine, however Washington's recalcitrance in fully satisfying Ukraine's demands pose stumbling blocks to the Supreme Council's quick ratification of START-1.

In the aftermath of the signing of START-2 by Russia and the United States, President Leonid Kravchuk reiterated Ukraine's intention to become a nuclear-free country in the future. He pointed out that Ukraine was the first nuclear power to do so while Moscow and Washington talked only of reductions.

Kravchuk pledged that Ukraine would act on its intentions, but noted that START does not yet pertain to Ukraine.

Tarasiuk, Ukraine's top arms negotiator, who met President George Bush on Friday January 8, said US failure to give his country security assurances now will make it more difficult to win parliamentary approval of two nuclear treaties.

"For us, the government, it will be easier to convince the parliament, it will add more arguments in favour of a positive decision if this [security]

declaration will appear before" a ratification vote, Tarasiuk told Reuter. "Now the task is much more difficult. We have no additional arguments. This is the problem", he said in an interview late on Thursday.

But the negotiator, who planned to deliver a letter from Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk to Bush at the White House on Friday, said that overall he was pleased with three days of talks in Washington with senior US officials.

"We are satisfied with the overall atmosphere of conversations and consultations. But the matter is whether our parliament will be satisfied with this situation", said Tarasiuk, who would not predict how the legislature might act.

He spoke after the State Department announced that the United States was prepared to give Ukraine disarmament aid and security assurances only after it ratifies the START-1 and Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaties that codify Kyiv's commitment to become a non-nuclear state.

As Tarasiuk left for Ukraine on January 8, the White House revealed that it sent him home with a letter on security assurances that all sides hope will persuade Kyiv's parliament to ratify the key START-1 nuclear weapons treaty, US officials said.

However, the letter is said to fall short of the kind of formal, high-level declaration Ukrainian Deputy Foreign Minister Borys Tarasiuk was seeking on a visit to Washington that ended on Friday with a White House meeting with President George Bush. But it and the session with Bush —

unusual because the president normally meets only with higher-ranked delegations — seemed to have improved the Ukrainian outlook on the visit.

"We were very satisfied with the atmosphere of real partnership and... readiness to help Ukraine in this very delicate situation", Ukrainian Ambassador Oleh Bilorus said.

Bilorus, who attended Tarasiuk's meeting with Bush, declined to confirm that US officials gave the deputy foreign minister a letter concerning the security assurances Ukraine had been demanding before START-1 was ratified. But a senior US official told Reuter: "My understanding is that they were given a letter... that describes the kind of things that we were talking about, the kind of assurances we could make once they ratify the treaty and pledge to become non-nuclear state. Yes, we put something in writing that they would take back and show their folks".

In Kyiv, Tarasiuk announced on Sunday, January 10, that leading nuclear nations would offer Kyiv security guarantees in writing if it backed the START-1 accord, but a conservative parliamentarian expressed doubt about the treaty. Tarasiuk told a news conference the guarantees were promised in three days of talks in Washington. "Today we are working on how the text will appear. It is likely to be a declaration by heads of state, if not all nuclear states, then the most important ones", Tarasiuk said. "We are particularly interested in guarantees from nuclear states. If this is subsequently confirmed by the UN

Security Council, we have no objections".

Tarasiuk repeated the statement he made on arrival from Washington that guarantees essentially meant a commitment not to use force or threaten to do so. He also said Ukraine was still lobbying to secure the guarantees before parliament ratified the pact.

However, Oleksander Tarasenko, a senior member of parliament's defence commission, said he had little confidence in Tarasiuk's assurances. "Tarasiuk appears rather optimistic after his trip. More attention should be paid to the interests of Ukraine rather than to what one person or another is saying", he said. "We have discussed this question informally in the commission and came to the conclusion that no one will in fact provide us with security guarantees".

Tarasenko is one of about 70 members representing farming interests and embodies some of the more conservative viewpoints in Ukraine's parliament. He said parliament had put ratification of START-1 and the Non-Proliferation Treaty at the top of its legislative agenda and would debate both documents soon after deputies resumed work in mid-January. Other deputies have said a heavy parliamentary agenda dominated by economic reform a year after independence from Moscow would push the ratification debate back until February or March.

US officials maintain that American assistance hinges on Ukraine's ratification of START-1.

The Ukrainian parliament will discuss ratifying the original Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty when it reconvenes in mid-January. Also, the defence ministers of the four former Soviet states with nuclear weapons — Russia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Belarus — will meet on January 21 to discuss control over the Commonwealth of Independent States' nuclear arsenal, Interfax. Presidents Kravchuk and Yeltsin were to meet separately on January 15.

The meeting on the eve of the January 22 summit of CIS heads of state in the Belarus capital Minsk was largely prompted by Ukraine's delay in ratifying the START-1 accord, a spokesman for the CIS Combined Forces Command told Interfax. The ratification of START-1 by the United States and all four nuclear-armed CIS states is necessary for the implementation of the START-2 accord recently negotiated by President Bush and President Borys Yeltsin. START-2, which will slash US and Russian nuclear arsenals by two-thirds, is inextricably linked to START-1.

Only Ukraine and Belarus have not yet ratified START-1, although Belarus was expected to endorse it soon. Ukraine originally agreed to transfer all its nuclear weapons to Russia for destruction, ratify the START-1 accord and become a non-nuclear state. But, in recent months, Kyiv has hesitated repeatedly over giving up its 176 strategic multi-warhead missiles, and caused anxiety in Washington and Moscow by attaching conditions to ratifying START-1. Several Ukrainian legislators even suggested Ukraine

should keep its missiles to boost the newly independent republic's international clout. Currently all strategic nuclear missiles in the former Soviet Union are under CIS central control. ■

Russia's Oil Cuts to Ukraine Pose Threat to Economy

KYIV — Russia will only guarantee to supply Ukraine with one-sixth of the 45 million tons of oil it needs for 1993, threatening the Ukrainian economy, Prime Minister Leonid Kuchma said on Monday, January 11.

He told Ukrinform news agency that Russian representatives at weekend intergovernmental talks had said they could guarantee delivery of only 7.5 million tons. At the most they could supply only 15 million tons.

"This means the collapse of our economy", Ukrinform quoted him as telling local government representatives.

First Deputy Prime Minister Ihor Yukhnovskiy told a news conference this week that Ukraine, heavily dependent on Russia for energy supplies, needed a bare minimum of 36 million tons of oil in 1993, down from about 40 million tons in 1992.

Kuchma was due to arrive in Moscow on January 14 for talks with his Russian counterpart Viktor Chernomyrdin, a day ahead of a planned meeting between Presidents Boris Yeltsin and Leonid Kravchuk.

Meanwhile, Ukraine's second largest oil refinery has resumed work after being virtually idle for several

weeks, Ukrainian radio reported on Saturday.

The radio said the refinery at Kremenchuk in central Ukraine was receiving between 25,000 and 29,000 tons of oil daily. In accordance with orders from local authorities, 75 per cent of the refined oil was being distributed to the farming sector with the remainder for schools, kindergartens and emergency services frequently short of supplies. Breakdowns in shipments from Russia have disrupted work at Ukraine's five refineries in recent weeks.

The country's largest refinery at Lisichansk, with an annual capacity of 22 million tons, was shut briefly in December. Ensuring supplies of oil will be at the centre of talks in Moscow between Presidents Leonid Kravchuk and Boris Yeltsin.

Ukraine needs some 40 million tons annually and Russia can ship only about 15 million. Ukraine's oil sector has been in turmoil over allegations that senior officials diverted large amounts abroad for personal gain. Ukrainian radio said Kravchuk's representatives have been conducting rigorous checks at refineries to prevent further illegal sales.

Also, in Moscow, provisional data shows that Russia exported 66.2 million tons (1.32 million barrels a day) of oil in 1992, up from 54.1 million (1.08 million) in 1991, an official at the fuel and energy ministry said. Former Soviet republics complain that Russia is not supplying them with sufficient fuel and many republics, including Ukraine, Armenia and Lithuania, suffered severe fuel shortages during 1992. ■

Kravchuk's Visit Builds Bridges to Israel

JERUSALEM — Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk arrived in Israel on Monday, January 11.

Kravchuk, accompanied by the Ukrainian foreign minister and six other Cabinet members, was greeted in an official state reception, kicking off his two-day visit designed to strengthen ties between the new republic and Israel.

The purpose of the trip is "to establish new relations between an independent Ukraine and modern Israel", Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres said after lunch with Kravchuk. "We consider it a very important visit because he is president of a very important country".

Welcoming Kravchuk at Tel Aviv airport, Foreign Minister Shimon Peres said the visit "is particularly important because we are mutually interested in strengthening our cultural and economic relations".

Kravchuk also met Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. Israel and Ukraine launched diplomatic ties in December 1991. Kravchuk is the first leader of a member of the CIS to visit Israel.

Peres also downplayed the buildup of nuclear arms in Ukraine, saying that Kravchuk's government has indicated a desire to sign the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, which has already been endorsed by 19 countries.

On the second day of his visit, Kravchuk toured the Yad Vashem Holocaust Museum with a group of

Ukrainians honoured as "Righteous of the Nations" — non-Jews who saved Jewish lives during the Holocaust. Kravchuk was also to attend the dedication of the Ukrainian embassy in Tel Aviv on Tuesday. An Israeli ambassador to Ukraine, replacing the temporary charge d'affaires, is expected to be announced soon.

Reuter said Kravchuk's trip was intended to balance Middle East policy and secure good ties with a country, which is home to 600,000 former Soviet Jews, a third of them from Ukraine.

"We are doing everything to put an end to the myth that Ukrainians are anti-Semites", said Viktor Nahaichuk, head of the foreign ministry's Middle East section. "We believe there is more to unite us than divide us".

Relations between Ukrainians and Jews, who now number about 500,000 in the former Soviet republic, are on the whole good, Reuter said. ■

Ukrainian PM Convinced By Polish Reform Path

KYIV, January 12 — Ukrainian Prime Minister Leonid Kuchma said talks with his Polish counterpart have persuaded him that Warsaw's shock therapy approach to reform was correct. Since coming to power in October, Kuchma has repeatedly backed what he says are gradual reforms to reorient Ukraine's economy on market principles after seven decades of Communist command economics. These have

included steep price increases last month for staple goods, like milk and bread, public transport, rents and public services. ■

Ukraine May Seek Higher Oil Wages

KYIV, January 12 — Ukraine may ask Russia to pay world salary levels to 200,000 Ukrainian workers in Russian oil fields if Moscow insists on payment for its oil at world prices. Ukraine and Russia have been locked in a protracted row over oil prices and supplies following large increases in the price paid for Russian oil. The issue is likely to figure prominently in talks this week between the two countries' prime ministers and their presidents Leonid Kravchuk and Boris Yeltsin. ■

New Chernobyl Fire Underscores Problems

KYIV, January 13 — Fire broke out overnight at the Chernobyl nuclear power station, site of the world's worst nuclear accident, but it was quickly extinguished and there was no radiation danger. The fire was the latest of dozens of incidents plaguing Ukraine's atomic industry. ■

Ukraine to Retaliate if Russia Raises Fuel Prices

KYIV, January 13 — Ukraine will retaliate against Russian moves to charge world prices for oil and gas by raising fees to transport the commodities across its territory.

"Now that Russia has raised its prices for oil, we will also start to raise charges for rail, sea and other transport", Prime Minister Leonid Kuchma said. "Everything here is mutually interdependent". ■

Industrialists Want End to Impasse

MOSCOW, January 14 — The powerful industrialist blocs of Russia and Ukraine urged their political leaders to stop their economic standoff turning into an open trade war. In a joint appeal, industrial leaders of the two states called on their presidents to take decisive steps to end a confrontation that has frozen financial transactions between them and plunged Ukraine into an energy crisis. ■

Russian, Ukrainian Premiers Fail to Resolve Disputes

MOSCOW, January 14 — The Prime Ministers of Russia and Ukraine met to deal with some of the disputes souring relations between the two states, but failed to break a deadlock over the Soviet debt and energy prices. New Russian Premier Viktor Chernomyrdin met with his Ukrainian counterpart Leonid Kuchma for talks which ended in the signing of only five of the ten economic agreements before them. Ukraine is still refusing to let Russia take over its share of the former Soviet Union's \$80 billion foreign debt in exchange for Ukraine's share of the USSR's financial assets. ■

Presidents Start Summit Talks

MOSCOW, January 15 — The presidents of Russia and Ukraine met in Moscow to shore up relations that have been strained by a range of disputes. Boris Yeltsin and Leonid Kravchuk were due to discuss differences over oil and gas supplies and prices, repayment of the former Soviet Union's foreign debt. Ukrainian ratification of the START-1 nuclear arms reduction agreement may also be on the summit's agenda. ■

Ukraine Gains Border Guarantee From Russia

MOSCOW, January 15 — Ukraine won a guarantee from Russia of the inviolability of its borders, one of Kyiv's conditions for the ratification of nuclear cutback agreements with the United States. At a summit in Moscow, President Yeltsin also met another demand holding up the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START), giving Kyiv counterpart Leonid Kravchuk a guarantee that Russia would come to Ukraine's defence against any nuclear attack. ■

New Black Sea Fleet Chief Named

MOSCOW, January 15 — Ukraine and Russia appointed Vice-Admiral Eduard Baltin as commander of the disputed Black Sea Fleet. Baltin, 56, head of the naval faculty at the Russian General Staff Academy, takes over from Admiral Igor Kasatonov. Ukraine had accused Kasatonov, who quit in December, of adopting a pro-Moscow line. ■

Creditors Snub Ukraine Debt Deal Hopes

MOSCOW, January 16 — Foreign creditors backed Russia over an argument with Ukraine on how to repay about \$80 billion of foreign debts of the former Soviet Union. Russia wants to repay the debts on behalf of all other former Soviet republics, but Ukraine insists on handling its own share separately. Negotiators from the Paris Club of creditor nations and the London Club of commercial creditor banks had found the Ukrainian position unacceptable at talks in Moscow. ■

Russians Demand Return of Crimea

MOSCOW — After a pro-Russian demonstration in Crimea, Russian legislators here discussing the disputed Crimean Peninsula in Parliament said on January 18 that Russia had a right to use the Ukrainian-controlled Crimean port of Sevastopol as the base for the Black Sea Fleet.

"We must examine the options for defining Sevastopol's status as the base of the Russian Black Sea Fleet", conservative lawmaker Yevgeny Pudovkin said.

Pudovkin spoke to reporters after closed parliamentary hearings on Crimea.

Russian chauvinists point to a document from 1948 turning Sevastopol into a distinct administrative and economic unit directly controlled by Moscow and stress that the port was financed out of the Russian

budget from 1948 until 1968. They say existing legislation gives Russia a claim to the port, which they want as a base for their Black Sea naval contingent.

Ukrainian Actions

They also say the Ukrainian Defence Ministry is gradually taking over the fleet's on-shore facilities in violation of agreements forbidding unilateral actions by either side until the fleet's final status is determined.

The chauvinists at the hearings on Crimea insisted Russia call on Kyiv to lift a referendum ban in order to allow the peninsula to decide whether it wants to stay in Ukraine, secede, or merge with Russia.

"Russia would like to have confederative relations with Ukraine and the Crimean Republic", Pudovkin said. "We also want Kyiv to lift its ban on a Crimean referendum, which is a violation of human rights".

The Congress of People's Deputies, Russia's conservative-dominated supreme legislature, last month voted to examine all legislation on the status of Sevastopol and hold a special session on the issue.

Angry Reaction

Ukrainian lawmakers reacted angrily to the decision, and in a strongly-worded statement called it "undisguised interference in Ukraine's internal affairs" and an encroachment on Ukraine's territorial integrity and sovereignty. About 5,000 demonstrators, many of them pensioners, on January 17 shouted pro-Russian slogans in the Crimean

Black Sea Fleet port of Sevastopol on Sunday and called for the secession from independent Ukraine. Local journalists, some of whom said the demonstration numbered 10,000 participants, said the demonstration was the largest of a series. ■

Russian Lawmakers Raise Claim to Naval Port

MOSCOW, January 18 — Russian legislators discussing the disputed Crimean Peninsula in Parliament said Russia had a right to use the Ukrainian-controlled Crimean port of Sevastopol as the base for the Black Sea Fleet. The appeal for dual control of the naval base threatens to sour relations between Russia and Ukraine, already strained by conflicts over the division of the Black Sea Fleet. ■

Ukraine to Pay Its Share of Foreign Debt

KYIV — Despite opposition from the Paris Club, Ukraine has reached agreement with Russia on January 18 to repay its share of the former Soviet foreign debt separately, senior government officials said.

The officials said the two former Soviet republics signed a protocol during talks in Moscow on Saturday under which Ukraine undertook to repay a 16.37 per cent share of debts estimated at about \$80 billion.

"But Western creditors have already expressed reservations at the agreement as they are uncertain about Ukraine's ability to pay", said one official.

Russian officials and Western creditors could not confirm whether any agreement had been reached. Russian officials said creditors, Russia and Ukraine planned to issue a joint statement on the issue on Tuesday. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Boris Fyodorov said at a news conference that questions on dividing up debt would be answered by Russia's chief debt negotiator Alexander Shokhin at a news conference of his own after the release of the statement. Fyodorov declined to comment on the outcome of the weekend talks, which also involved senior officials from the Paris Club of creditor states and the London Club of commercial banks.

The Kyiv officials said the agreement with Russia also provided for Ukraine to receive a share of the assets of the former Soviet Union. The assets include embassy premises abroad and reserves of gold and diamonds, while Ukraine has also said it has a claim on a share of factories built abroad with Soviet help. Officials provided no details on whether the two sides had agreed on how to divide the assets.

Russia has agreed a so-called zero-option deal with other former Soviet republics excluding Ukraine whereby the other states relinquished their claim on Soviet assets and Russia agreed to pay all debts on their behalf. But a similar deal with Ukraine has stalled amid bickering about the value of the assets, which Ukraine says could be worth more than the debts. Russia says it will take time to value the assets properly.

Oleksander Sharov, deputy chairman of Ukraine's national bank, estimated Ukraine's share of the debt at \$11.4 billion. Russia is anxious to reschedule as soon as a deal can be reached with creditors.

But Kyiv officials have not said how they plan to divide up the debts or how payments are to be made. Some acknowledge that Western creditors are not happy about the arrangement. Ukrainian estimates show that half the debt is payable to official creditors and half to commercial banks.

Creditors have so far been wary of dividing up debts built up by the old Soviet Union, arguing it is hard to divide up debts denominated in different currencies and paying different interest rates. The maturity of debts also varies greatly. Kyiv ministers have said Ukraine paid Western creditors about \$10 million in 1992, a small part of its obligations.

Kyiv officials believe Ukraine can probably claim about \$2 billion in property. They say the new deal would allow them to take control of the former Soviet republic's financial affairs. ■

Kravchuk Balks Signing CIS Charter; Warns Against Further Integration

KYIV — Though he faces opposition from communist hardliners, President Leonid Kravchuk said on January 18 that he would not tolerate any further integration of the CIS and warned members of the community not to press for further political integration.

Kravchuk told a news conference ahead of this week's CIS summit in Minsk that he would not sign the current draft of the grouping's statutes currently under discussion. "The president and government... will not allow the CIS to be turned into a supra-national body subject to international law", he said. "The statutes do not in their essence or from a legal standpoint meet the needs of the Ukrainian people. We have to confirm that the CIS is working within its existing framework. Let no one take it upon himself to change this status".

Kravchuk earlier had refused to sign the charter, which now Russian-speaking hardliners in Ukraine are demanding that he does.

Kravchuk, who has criticised the functioning of the Commonwealth but says Ukraine wants to remain within it, told reporters he faced a split in public opinion on continued membership.

More than 150 members of parliament, most from Russian-speaking areas of eastern Ukraine and Crimea, converged on parliament on Monday to present a petition demanding that Ukraine sign the statutes. The deputies denounced the government's market reforms and called for immediate resumption of parliament to discuss economic policy.

They also seek the lifting of a ban imposed on Ukraine's Communist Party after it supported the failed August 1991 coup in Moscow. Scuffles broke out briefly between the deputies and several hundred members of the nationalist Rukh

movement seeking Ukraine's withdrawal from the CIS.

"If there is no economic agreement within the CIS, then no statutes will help us", Kravchuk told journalists. "There are specific questions to be addressed — foreign debts and strategic forces for instance. It is not necessary for all republics to stand at attention to do so".

After Kravchuk met Russian President Boris Yeltsin in Moscow on Friday, January 15, Ukrainian officials said they believed Moscow had agreed to drop the idea of the statutes in favour of an economic pact. Senior cabinet ministers were meeting on Monday to work out final details of the government's economic reforms intended to reorient the economy on market principles.

Ambassador Confirms Statement

In Warsaw, Ukraine's ambassador to Poland, Henadiy Udovenko, confirmed the thought that Ukraine may not sign the CIS charter.

"I think that Kravchuk will not sign it", Udovenko said at a news conference on January 18. "I would like him not to sign it", observed Udovenko, former Ukrainian deputy foreign minister and longtime ambassador to the United Nations. Udovenko, considered a close friend of Kravchuk, stressed that Ukraine, which is experiencing a deep economic crisis, does not want to quit the Commonwealth at present. "President Kravchuk never said Ukraine wants to leave the CIS", he said. "But we are against the

formation of a new superpower on the principles of confederation or federation... This structure would lead us to the restoration of the former Soviet Union".

He said that following the latest guarantee on security given by Russian President Boris Yeltsin to Kravchuk in Moscow, his country may modify its stance on the new agreement. Udovenko would not discuss Ukraine's specific objections to the new agreement, saying only, "It is limiting the sovereign rights of Ukraine". Political experts said that the new agreement, if not signed by Ukraine, will deal the final blow to Russia's plan to consolidate its power.

Udovenko said Kravchuk will offer a new plan in Minsk, which will stress the necessity of economic cooperation among the CIS members. Udovenko charged Russia with using economic blackmail against Ukraine. "We are for economic cooperation, and they want to bring us to our knees", he said.

In Moscow, Yeltsin offered Ukraine security guarantees including protection from nuclear attack to encourage it to ratify the START-1 arms treaty. "Russia gives a guarantee to preserve and safeguard the integrity of Ukraine and its borders and defend it from nuclear attack. Russia gives such a guarantee", Yeltsin said. Kravchuk said Yeltsin's guarantee would make it easier for him to persuade the Ukrainian parliament to ratify START-1.

The two presidents said they reached accord on the disposal of

Ukraine's Soviet nuclear inheritance and arms reduction treaties — reiterating past assurances that never materialised but sounding more serious about making their promises stick.

Both leaders pronounced themselves satisfied with their work. "The main political result of the meeting is that we remained friends although today we could have parted company", Yeltsin told a news conference. "The most important thing is that two major states, Ukraine and Russia, have lived, are living and will live together in peace, tranquillity, not threatening each other", he said.

Ukraine Begins to Impose Export Duties

KYIV, January 19 — A decree of Ukraine's Cabinet of Ministers on the imposition of export duties on items that are taken out or mailed by citizens to beyond Ukraine's customs border takes effect on January 20. Export duty rates are reckoned in US dollars but shall be paid in coupons, according to Alexander Petrov, chief of the Ukrainian State Customs Committee's Department for Customs Control Arrangements. The list of goods subject to such export duties includes 50 items ranging from television sets and tape recorders to soap. ■

Ukraine and Russia Agree on New Debt Deal

KYIV, January 19 — Ukraine and Russia have agreed to service the debts of the former Soviet Union separately and divide up assets of the defunct superpower by the end

of March. The protocol says both sides "will be responsible for their corresponding shares. Should either side violate the repayment schedule, the other side will not be responsible for carrying out the obligations". The protocol reverses a previous deal signed by former Soviet republics in 1990 whereby the republics agreed to joint and several responsibility for all debts. Ukraine has accepted responsibility for 16.4 per cent of former Soviet debt of about \$80 million. ■

Chornobyl Plant is Fire Hazard

HAMBURG, January 20 — Ukraine's Chornobyl nuclear power plant is in urgent need of repairs costing millions of dollars to reduce the danger of fire, according to German safety inspectors. A team of experts commissioned by the European Community to study the plant said the former Soviet reactors were unfit to operate by Western safety standards. ■

Premier Defends Reforms Against Hardliners

KYIV, January 20 — Prime Minister Leonid Kuchma stood his ground against hardliners in parliament telling them his reform programme for pulling Ukraine out of a deep crisis was not negotiable. Kuchma told conservatives who denounced steep price increases that the crisis in the former Soviet republic was so dire that there was no alternative to his pro-market policies. Inflation, he

said, was running at 50 per cent per month, industrial production was down nine per cent over the past year and food production had fallen 15 per cent in the same period. The country's interim currency, the karbovanets, has halved in value over the last year. ■

CIS Naval Forces "Mistakenly" Attacked Ukrainian Base

KYIV, January 21 — Ukrainian military officials accused forces of the Black Sea Fleet of attacking one of their bases and accused the fleet's commanders of provocation.

But officials of the fleet, run jointly by Russia and Ukraine, said the assault on the anti-aircraft base was a misunderstanding during night exercises in the Crimean peninsula. No one was hurt.

A spokesman for the Ukrainian navy said fleet forces attacked the base, firing blank shots and "explosive devices". "This was a provocation", the spokesman said by telephone. "A tragedy was avoided only thanks to the restraint shown by Ukrainian forces".

A fleet spokesman said the incident involved eight servicemen on Fiolent Cape "who were to have made a mock attack on a communications centre during exercises and attacked the base instead".

"This was not a deliberate act, but rather a regrettable mistake", the Itar-Tass news agency quoted another fleet spokesman as saying. "Black Sea Fleet and Ukrainian military sites in

Crimea are often located side by side and servicemen sometimes have difficulty getting their bearings with bases changing hands".

Meanwhile, the chairman of the Ukrainian Supreme Council accused Russia of attempting to provoke a conflict by questioning the status of the port of Sevastopol, headquarters of the disputed Black Sea Fleet.

Ivan Plyushch, in an appeal to his Russian opposite number Ruslan Khasbulatov, said the decision of Russia's supreme legislature to re-examine Sevastopol's status constituted interference and "seizure of land".

"We can only view the provocations surrounding the 'problem' of Sevastopol as a throwback to earlier times, an attempt to tie Ukraine's hands and precipitate a clash between our two nations and spill blood", he said.

Russia's top legislature, the Congress of People's Deputies, empowered the country's standing parliament last month to examine the issue, one of several dividing the two leading members of the Commonwealth of Independent States. Russian nationalists in Crimea, their ranks swelled by people upset by price increases ordered by the Kyiv government, have resumed demonstrations calling for secession from Ukraine.

Five thousand demonstrators gathered in the city in mid-January and a fresh protest was to be held on Sunday, January 24, to coincide with the arrival of the new commander of the Black Sea Fleet. Ukrainian authorities gave the region sweeping autonomy last year,

temporarily lowering tensions caused by calls for a referendum on separating from Ukraine. President Leonid Kravchuk said the issue of Sevastopol was not negotiable without conducting a referendum throughout Ukraine. ■

Russia Wants Control Over Arms

MINSK, January 21 — Russia wants to take over control of the former Soviet Union's strategic nuclear weapons from the Commonwealth of Independent States according to Lt. Gen. Vladimir Zhurbenko. The deputy head of the general staff of the Russian armed forces said nuclear weapons based in Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan should become Russian armed forces since all the others have declared they will be nuclear-free. ■

Ukraine Fulfils Promise, Says "No" to CIS Charter

MINSK — Fulfilling President Kravchuk's pledge not to sign the charter of the Commonwealth of Independent States, the Ukrainian delegation at the CIS meeting here on January 22 refused to endorse the document at what was called a stormy meeting of the presidents.

Observers said that Ukraine's rejection of the charter calls into question the future role if not existence of the Commonwealth.

Snubbing again the 10 other members, Ukrainian officials said they would not sign a charter designed to solidify political, commercial and

defence links among the countries of the old Soviet orbit.

"Ukraine cannot accept the transition of the CIS into a new supranational structure", said Anton Buteyko, chief foreign policy adviser to Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk. "It would be little more than a revival of the Soviet Union".

Since the inception of the CIS, Kravchuk has publicly stated his opposition to any deeper integration of the alignment and has refused to approve the creation of a supra-state organisation. At a press conference in Kyiv on the eve of the meeting, Kravchuk said that attempts to politically formalise the CIS smack of imperial centralism. Ukraine cannot accept that kind of arrangement, he said.

While refusing to sign the 27-page charter, Kravchuk reiterated that Ukraine is not quitting the CIS, it is only looking for other avenues of cooperation.

"The links that existed cannot be preserved", Kravchuk said. "The CIS is working and we are all members of the CIS actively contributing to its improvement", Kravchuk said, calling economic ties more important than the political accord represented by the charter.

The head of the Ukrainian delegation, People's Deputy Dmytro Pavlychko, told the German Press Agency, "You could say that the Commonwealth has fallen apart". Pavlychko, chairman of the Ukrainian parliament's Commission for Foreign Policy, added, "A new relationship will emerge from among those states which have signed the document. They will quickly form a

confederation". Pavlychko, emerging briefly from Friday's deliberations, stressed, "The CIS, as we knew it, no longer exists".

The Ukrainian delegation here focused its attention solely on economic cooperation.

Ukraine was joined in its rebuff by Moldova and Turkmenistan.

On the eve of the meeting, Ukraine scorned efforts to strengthen the post-Soviet alliance by adamantly refusing to give up legal claims to nuclear weapons remaining on its soil. Ukrainian Deputy Defence Minister Ivan Bizhan said that although Soviet strategic nuclear weapons left in Ukraine remain under Commonwealth operative control, "they should remain under the administrative jurisdiction of Ukraine".

That position has drawn expressions of concern from Commonwealth military commanders that confusion over ownership of the 176 nuclear missiles in Ukraine could lead to dangerous instability. Russian Air Marshal Yevgeny Shaposhnikov, the Commonwealth's top commander, complained this week that the nuclear weapons in Ukraine are essentially without an owner.

"At present, there are weapons, they are functioning, but there is no jurisdiction of any state over them", he told reporters, saying the missiles' legal limbo has created problems for the Russian experts who must service them. But Shaposhnikov made it clear that Russia has full operational control over any nuclear launch. Ukraine has the theoretical right to veto a launch from its territory, he said, but "that is only an organisational veto, not a technical

one". Spokesmen for the three republics that refused to sign the draft statute said they feared it could lead to an attempt to re-create new federal structures on the ruins of the old Soviet Union. But they denied they were pulling out of the Commonwealth altogether, leaving open the possibility that they could reconsider their decision or seek observer status.

"By our common efforts we have succeeded in resolving the most basic question in a way that suits everybody and takes into account the interests of all members of the CIS", Russian President Boris Yeltsin said at a news conference at the conclusion of a one-day summit of the 10-member Commonwealth in the Belarus capital.

The decisions taken at Minsk are likely to lead to the de facto creation of a two-tier Commonwealth, observers said. Russia, Belarus and most of the undeveloped Central Asian republics have now come out in favour of faster integration, while Ukraine, Moldova and Turkmenistan are deeply suspicious of Russian domination.

Ukraine's suspicions were underlined by remarks by the chairman of the Ukrainian Supreme Council, Ivan Pliushch, who accused politicians in Russia of seeking to "reanimate the old empire and the old imperial policy". He also denounced a recent resolution of the Russian parliament that effectively challenges Ukrainian control over the Crimean port of Sevastopol, the headquarters of the Black Sea Fleet of the former Soviet navy.

Seven republics backed the charter: Russia, Belarus, Armenia, and four Central Asian republics, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tadjikistan and Uzbekistan. The 11th original member, Azerbaijan, has drifted away from the organisation and only sent observers to the summit.

However, in an effort to avoid the impression that the alliance is coming apart, the 10 republic leaders at the summit agreed to keep the charter open for future signing for one year so they could go home, consider it further and present it to their parliaments.

Western reporters said when Friday's summit came to end, it looked a lot like a "peaceful divorce" was unfolding, in the words of Kazakhstan President Nursultsan Nazarbayev, who has favoured integration.

Despite the failure of all CIS members to line up behind a binding, unifying charter, Yeltsin declared, "We realise we can't live without each other". The charter calls for CIS coordinating bodies — one of the principles that scared Kravchuk away out of fear that it might lead to a new central government — such as a council of defence ministers to coordinate military policies.

Also, eight of the 11 leaders of the CIS agreed to set up a joint interstate bank to improve the cash flow between enterprises and state institutions. Ukraine, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan opposed the plan. Russia will have 50 per cent of the voting rights in the new bank, which will use the rouble as a transfer unit. Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin

proposed that Moscow and its CIS partners jointly develop and exploit oil fields in western Siberia. He called on other CIS nations to send exploration experts to the oil-rich regions of Tyumen and Noyabrsk. His proposal, which came to the backdrop of a planned cut in Russian oil exports to CIS countries, was reportedly accepted by a majority of delegations. Russia plans to slash oil exports to other CIS countries to 51 million tons this year from 74 million tons in 1992. ■

Conservative Parliament Challenges Reforms

KYIV, January 25 — Ukraine's conservative-dominated parliament challenged the government's market-oriented reforms calling for a tightening of state control over the former Soviet republic's economy. Deputies discussing the state of the economy for the third day approved by 267 votes to six a resolution on first reading describing Prime Minister Leonid Kuchma's reforms as "ill-considered and hasty". One senior official suggested key ministers in Kuchma's team would resign if parliament blocked the key decrees with which the government has been introducing market measures. ■

Not All Officers Loyal

KYIV, January 25 — Ukraine's Defence Minister said some officers had joined Ukraine's fledgling army for personal gain and suggested anyone not fully supporting the country's independence should quit. "A large part of the officer corps took the oath of loyalty with selfish

motives. Many hoped to solve their own problems, particularly housing", Konstantyn Morozov said in a statement on Ukrainian television. He said any officers still harbouring the idea that the joint command of the Commonwealth of Independent States could remain in place "must leave our army". ■

Ukraine to Exert Tighter Control Over Foreign Trade

KYIV, January 26 — Ukraine will tighten control of its foreign trade in the face of rising import and sharply declining export, the local newspaper "Holos Ukrainy" reported. The paper quoted Boris Sobolev, Deputy Minister of Foreign Economic Relations, as saying that Ukraine would introduce a new export license and quota system, open customs offices along all its borders, and take other measures to deal with the foreign trade deficit. ■

Cabinet Sets Tough Reforms

KYIV, January 26 — Ukraine's Cabinet approved a tough economic programme that seeks to push Ukraine down the path of market reform over the next year. Kuchma's government plans to slash the budget deficit from its current level, 36 per cent of gross domestic product, to 6 per cent by the end of the year. By doing that, Kuchma hopes to rein inflation from this month's peak of 50 per cent to between 3 and 4 per cent a month by the end of 1993. The Ukrainian

government's power to rule the economy by decree, which lasts until May, means the programme already has legal force. ■

Premier Says Ukraine Could Have Violated Sanctions

KYIV, January 27 — Ukraine's Prime Minister said he could not rule out the possibility that his country was violating UN sanctions by shipping oil to Serbia. But Kuchma told a Kyiv news conference he knew nothing about allegations that a Yugoslav barge carrying Ukrainian oil had entered Serbian Danube ports, ignoring orders to halt from Bulgarian and Romanian authorities. Ukraine has previously been suspected of violating the UN regulations but has always protested its innocence, saying its ships were bound for Hungary. ■

Former Soviet Republics Cannot Join European Community

BRUSSELS, January 28 — The European Community may take on Eastern European nations as members in the future but has no intention of admitting former Soviet republics. External Affairs Commissioner Hans van den Broek said association agreements between the 12-nation EC and Eastern European nations included the perspective that they would eventually become members. "That will not be the case with the partnership agreement with the Russian Federation or with other

former Soviet republics", he told a committee of the European parliament. A partnership agreement between the EC and Russia, covering trade and aid, is expected soon and the Community will then negotiate similar deals with Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. ■

West Threatens to Halt Credits to Russia, Ukraine

KYIV, January 29 — Western creditors are unhappy about a scheme for Russia and Ukraine to repay former Soviet debt separately and have threatened to halt credits to both countries. First Deputy Prime Minister Ihor Yukhnovskiy said the head of the Paris Club of creditor nations had informed Ukraine that both state and commercial banks disagreed with a protocol concluded by Moscow and Kyiv earlier this month. ■

Kravchuk Urges West to Offer Help Without Conditions

KYIV — Facing mounting pressure from the West to ratify START-1, especially after Belarus did so in early February, President Leonid Kravchuk nonetheless urged the West on Monday, February 8, to provide Ukraine with immediate financial assistance but said Ukraine would not tolerate pressure or conditions.

Kravchuk, speaking on the eve of a visit to London, also said he was confident the Kyiv parliament would ratify the START-1 disarmament

accord under which Ukraine is to give up former Soviet nuclear missiles to Russia for destruction.

Kravchuk told British journalists that Ukraine, like all former Soviet republics, needed considerable financial assistance to ease its transition to a market economy. He said it was premature to cite a specific figure because "our needs and the capabilities of the West do not always coincide".

"If the West wishes to provide help it must be done now and not, as is often said, after essential things have been done or specific reforms carried out. I believe no assistance of this sort is needed", Kravchuk said. "Help is important today because it will determine the path our state will take, and not just Ukraine but also other former Soviet republics, in resolving their problems and developing democracy. Therefore, the West must make clear what it wants".

Kravchuk's visit to Britain will be the first to a nuclear power since the country's parliament failed to abide by a pledge to ratify START-1 by the end of last year.

He repeated his position that it was up to deputies to decide the matter, taking into account Ukraine's calls for security guarantees from the West and compensation for the expensive nuclear materials it was giving up.

"We have asked for guarantees from those countries directly involved in START, the United States and Russia", he said. "If Britain also offers guarantees then of course we would only be too pleased".

But the emphasis of the president's trip is on economic matters and

includes lengthy talks with business leaders. A series of documents are expected to be signed, including a treaty on bilateral links, an accord on investment protection and agreements on scientific, educational and cultural cooperation. Trade between the two countries amounted to a mere \$15 million during the first nine months of 1992.

Britain is said to occupy one of the lowest places among Western countries investing in Ukraine, well behind Germany, Italy, Canada and the United States. Ukrainian officials accuse British investors of being excessively cautious. Political links are also limited. Officials recall with resentment how former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher played down Ukraine's campaign for sovereignty in 1990 by comparing it to Quebec or California.

In London, the Foreign Office said it hoped last week's vote by the Belarus Supreme Council on ratifying START-1 and acceding to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear weapons state would encourage Ukraine to quickly follow suit.

"This will be specifically discussed", a spokesman said when asked whether it would be a part of Britain's agenda for Kravchuk's visit, particularly in his meeting with Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd. A Foreign Office statement said: "We hope this [the Belarusian decision] will encourage Ukraine to ratify the START treaty, and that both Ukraine and Kazakhstan will act on their commitments to accede to the NPT as non-nuclear weapons states".

In a related matter, in Davos, on Saturday, January 30, Germany backed Ukraine's proposal for a fund to help countries which possess, but do not want, nuclear weapons to get rid of them. But German Defence Minister Volker Ruehe said the fund should be financed by nuclear states, and Germany would not contribute in the first instance. Kravchuk made the proposal earlier at a discussion in the World Economic Forum at this Swiss resort, also attended by Belarus Foreign Minister Pyotr Kravchenko and US arms expert Richard Perle, Ruehe said. ■

Kravchuk in Britain: London Offers Security Guarantees

LONDON — President Leonid Kravchuk's first state visit to Great Britain resulted in offers of British security guarantees for Ukraine after it gets rid of its nuclear arsenal, said the Ukrainian president.

Kravchuk predicted confidently on February 11 that the offer would lead to the Supreme Council's ratification of the START-1 disarmament treaty in spite of misgivings by some of its members and its failure to fulfil a promise to do so by the end of last year. Meeting members of the British parliament, Kravchuk said Britain gave the security assurances in a cooperation treaty signed during his four-day visit.

"It was stated that Britain and Ukraine attach great importance to adherence to the Non-Proliferation

Treaty and ratification of START-1 and that Britain is providing Ukraine with appropriate guarantees", he said. "I believe this will help prove to our deputies that all states are interested not only in Ukraine ratifying START but also are willing to lend appropriate assistance".

The cooperation treaty, one of several documents signed by the two sides, would provide security assurances once Ukraine approves the 1968 nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. A British official, quoted by Reuter, said these were standard assurances given by a nuclear power to any state joining the Non-Proliferation Treaty, effectively declaring its non-nuclear status. He said Britain pledged not to use nuclear weapons against Ukraine if none were used against Britain and committed itself to defending Ukraine at the United Nations if it were attacked by another state.

The United States and Russia have also offered Ukraine guarantees if it ratifies START-1.

Kravchuk later said at a news conference that guarantees sought by Ukraine included no claims on its territory, no use of weapons against it and no pressure of any sort, including economic.

"In other words, a package to enable Ukraine to go on consolidating its statehood", he said.

He said opposition to ratification would be limited. "I wouldn't say there are very many deputies opposed. I believe they are not really opponents with fixed views, but rather deputies who have insufficient information", he said.

Approval of the two treaties is the third item on the agenda when deputies resume debate next week. But parliamentary leaders appear to be in no hurry to proceed with it. About 20 of the 450 members are known to oppose the treaty outright, a mix of former communists and nationalists. But a further 70 or so may try to extract certain conditions.

Kravchuk arrived in London on Tuesday, February 9, seeking security guarantees and aid for Ukraine. He met Queen Elizabeth II, Prime Minister John Major, Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd, opposition lawmakers and business leaders during his four-day visit.

After a lunch with Queen Elizabeth, Kravchuk told leading British industrialists that Ukraine has the raw materials and human potential to justify Western investment. But he warned that the transition to market economics would require time. In practice this is a slow process that will not be completed in a matter of months or a year", he told officials at the Confederation of British Industry. "We are proceeding with privatisation and land reform. Laws and documents have been approved. Our government is doing everything possible to implement these".

Prime Minister John Major told Kravchuk Ukraine would best guarantee its security by approving the pact. Kravchuk, speaking to reporters after talks and lunch with Major, said calls by Western experts for Ukraine to prove its commitment to the market put his country in a "vicious circle".

"We are told 'once you produce some results, we can provide you

with assistance'. And we say, 'once the results are visible, the assistance will no longer be needed'", he said. "For this reason we have to make clear which results we have in mind. If we are talking about the transition to the market and changing infrastructures, then we need help now and I mean now. Otherwise it simply will not happen".

Addressing economic topics, Kravchuk flanked by Jacques Attali, head of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, said failure to act could imperil reforms in both Ukraine and neighbouring Russia 14 months after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

"There is some danger here for both Ukraine and Russia", he said. "If you have to wait for a long time, you might as well wait forever".

Prior to his departure from Kyiv, President Kravchuk urged the West to provide Ukraine with immediate financial assistance but said Ukraine would not tolerate pressure or conditions. Kravchuk predicted that the parliament would ratify the START-1 disarmament accord under which Ukraine is to give up former Soviet nuclear missiles to Russia for destruction.

"If the West wishes to provide help it must be done now and not, as is often said, after essential things have been done or specific reforms carried out. I believe no assistance of this sort is needed", Kravchuk said as quoted as saying. "Help is important today because it will determine the path our state will take, and not just Ukraine but also other former Soviet republics in

resolving their problems and developing democracy. Therefore, the West must make clear what it wants".

A series of bilateral documents were signed, including a treaty on bilateral links, an accord on investment protection and agreements on scientific, educational and cultural cooperation.

On the day of his arrival, Kravchuk met with representatives of Ukrainian British organisations and highly praised the role of the Ukrainian diaspora here in helping Ukraine cement its independence. He urged further assistance and cooperation.

Responding to questions concerning the gold of Hetman Pavlo Polubotok, which was to have been deposited in the Bank of England for safekeeping three centuries ago, Kravchuk suggested that Ukrainians abandon all hope of finding it.

Kravchuk said that Ukrainians were better off working hard than dreaming of several barrels of gold said to have been sent to London in 1724 to protect it from Tsar Peter the Great.

"It is very good that we have at least a legend, although I'm not sure anyone will find this gold", he said with a grin. "I would be grateful to anyone willing to search the vaults of the Bank of England. But we should not count on finding Polubotok's gold. We should work hard to earn money".

Members of the Supreme Council had formed a group to study the possibility of reclaiming the gold from the Bank of England. Bank officials said three years ago that they had no

record of it but would dig further in archives. Some estimates put interest accruing on the gold at as much as \$300,000 for each of Ukraine's 52 million residents.

Rounding up his visit, Kravchuk donned a blue sterile smock and plastic cap on Friday, February 12, to visit a Scottish pharmaceutical plant at the end of a four-day trip to Britain. Kravchuk was taken to the Ethicon plant on the edge of Edinburgh, where he was greeted by a lone Scottish piper.

Kravchuk appeared particularly impressed by an array of dissolving sutures being mounted on spindles for immediate use on the operating table.

"Just look at those. Compared to the wire we use", remarked one medical specialist accompanying the president. "Think how we could use it in gynaecology. Think how our women are suffering", he said. Kravchuk asked how much the largely female work-force earned (about £10,000), about social benefits, and about the plant's sterilising techniques.

Kravchuk's brief visit to Edinburgh, twin city of Kyiv, included brief talks on cultural and business links and he was treated to dinner at Edinburgh Castle by the British government. ■

Ukraine, Russia: No Resolution on Debt, Assets

LONDON — Russia and Ukraine have so far failed to agree on how to repay the former Soviet Union's \$80 billion of foreign debt, Russian

Deputy Prime Minister Boris Fyodorov told reporters on Friday, February 12.

"We have proposed [to Ukraine] a dozen different options and they have accepted none", Fyodorov told Reuter at an oil and gas conference in London. "We want more support from Western creditors to break the impasse".

In Kyiv, the Foreign Ministry sharply rebuked Russian attempts to unilaterally assume ownership of all foreign wealth of the former USSR.

The disagreement between Russia and Ukraine is blocking a debt rescheduling deal with the Paris Club of creditor nations. Russia has agreed to service debts on behalf of all former Soviet republics, except Ukraine, in a series of "zero-option" deals under which other states give up claims on Soviet assets which include gold reserves and embassies. Ukraine, arguing the assets are worth more than the debts, insists on repaying its 16.37 per cent share of the debt separately — a deal which creditors see as unworkable since the debts are denominated in several currencies and repayable under different conditions.

Moscow wants full authority to manage the debt but says a deal whereby Ukrainian payments are channelled through Russia might be acceptable to creditors. Russia says debt rescheduling is a must to prevent the country from having to service \$38 billion on existing and overdue debt in 1993. Economy Minister Andrei Nechayev said Russia last year serviced about \$1.5 billion of debt.

"This year we have suggested to creditor states to repay \$2.5 billion...

without great trouble to our imports and domestic industry", he told reporters in London. Fyodorov told a news conference that negotiations were continuing with creditors, and a compromise was likely on this year's repayment requirements. "The biggest problem is with Ukraine. You cannot negotiate the amount before you know who is responsible for what... It is absolutely clear that only Russia will be paying anything this year", he said.

In Bonn, German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel said he would press Ukraine to reach agreement with Russia on how the debts of the former Soviet Union should be repaid. He visits Kyiv on Monday and Tuesday. Kinkel said that Ukraine was blocking agreement with the Paris Club and he would press for movement on this. "We cannot influence this directly but we can try to press politically for them to agree among themselves", he said.

On the eve of President Kravchuk's visit to Britain, a senior banker at the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development said he expected no quick breakthrough in the dispute between Russia and Ukraine over repayments on ex-Soviet debts and expressed doubt that Kyiv would be able to service its share.

Klaus Hoffarth, the ERDB's senior country manager for Ukraine, offered little hope on prospects for Ukraine making separate repayments on its 16.37 per cent share of the \$80 billion debt. "It is difficult to say at the moment whether or not Ukraine will be able to service any of its debt", he said.

"Recent contacts in Moscow between Ukraine and Russia have not found a solution to the problem", Hoffarth said. "... [T]he difficulties arising from the decision to service debt separately from Russia won't be overcome quickly".

Ukraine said a Russian decision to assume rights over former Soviet property abroad could damage an emerging deal on sharing the foreign debt of \$80 billion. "This decision is not in line with efforts between Ukraine and Russia to negotiate on the important question of the debts and assets of the former Soviet Union", the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry statement said.

In Washington, Agriculture Secretary Mike Espy said the issue of releasing US agricultural loan guarantees to Ukraine is linked with efforts to resolve Russia's debt repayment problems.

"They're all linked", Espy told reporters following a speech to the National Feed Grains Council. But he said he wanted to discuss the Ukraine-Russia debt issue with the State Department before making further comment. Espy also said USDA policy makers are working on a long-term plan to continue grain trade with Russia and hope to have it ready to submit to President Clinton "very soon".

Ukrainian officials had expected to get \$65 million in GSM-102 credits in February, but the release appears to have been held up by Ukraine-Russia differences on the responsibilities in paying off the former Soviet Union's debt. ■

Oil Deal Signed With Iran

KYIV, February 12 — Iran signed a deal with Ukraine to supply four million tonnes of oil a year and jointly build a gas pipeline between the two countries. Under the terms of the agreement Ukraine will pay for the oil supplies, due to start in March, with grain and sugar. Last year Iran agreed to export five million tonnes of oil to Ukraine but Kyiv has not received a single barrel. Kyiv is placing high hopes on the Iranian oil but the absence of tankers and large oil terminals in Ukraine rules out the import of much more than four million tonnes a year. The two sides also agreed to build a gas pipeline from Iran to Ukraine through Azerbaijan and Russia and on to Western Europe. It was said that the pipeline, to be owned 45 per cent each by Iran and Ukraine and 10 per cent by Azerbaijan, would be completed by 1996. ■

Russia Ups Pressure on Ukraine; Kyiv-Moscow Tensions Flare

KYIV— Tension between Ukraine and Russia has increased in the wake of Moscow's refusal to supply Ukraine with gas and oil and to resolve the issue of foreign assets, as well as its blatant interference in Crimea.

In several recent statements, the government of Ukraine has sought to rebuff Moscow's efforts to brow beat it.

Kyiv accused Russia on Friday, February 19, of making territorial claims against Ukraine. A statement issued by the Foreign Ministry said a Russian parliamentary commission had sent a questionnaire to the Crimean parliament asking deputies to express their views on the future status of the peninsula and the city of Sevastopol.

"This action by the Russian side cannot be classified in any other way than as a violation of international law and the principle of territorial integrity", the statement said. It said a note had been sent to Russia protesting against this action "aimed effectively at making territorial claims against Ukraine".

A day earlier, Prime Minister Leonid Kuchma accused Russia of pressuring Kyiv in a conflict over foreign debt and gas prices and hinted that any bullying tactics would be resisted.

"I cannot understand Russia's position. I would call it pressure. From a purely economic viewpoint, there is no explanation for it", he said in an interview with Reuters and the "Financial Times". "There can be no returning to the former Soviet Union, even technically", he said.

Kuchma was responding to a Russian decision this week to raise to world market levels the price of its gas supplies to Ukraine, which depends on Russia for 70 per cent of gas requirements.

"I don't want to give a final judgment before my meeting with Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin", he said, adding that

talks were scheduled for next week. "World [gas] prices now would mean collapse for the Ukrainian economy", Kuchma said.

But he said Ukraine was ready to pay world prices after a transition period. "We now have a conflict between our two countries, but there will be no winner", he said. He described the situation as unhealthy and accused Russia of distorting Ukraine's position in negotiations on foreign debt repayment.

Moscow has linked the gas price issue to a dispute over who should repay the former Soviet Union's \$80 billion debt. The dispute could torpedo a possible restructuring deal with Western creditors that would cut Russia's repayments this year to \$2.5 billion from \$6.4 billion.

Ukraine is resisting Russian demands that it give up its claim to former Soviet assets and allow Russia to repay its share of the debt — the so-called "zero option" proposal accepted by all other former republics. Kyiv has offered to repay its 16.37 per cent share of the debt separately and take its share of the assets, which it believes may be worth more than the debt.

On Monday, February 15, Russia accused Ukraine of jeopardising a possible deal with Western creditors on rescheduling the former Soviet Union's \$80 billion foreign debt. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Aleksander Shokhin and Ukrainian First Deputy Prime Minister Ihor Yukhnovskiy failed to resolve a dispute over how the debt should be repaid at talks in Moscow last week,

a government statement said.

"As a result of the unconstructive position of Ukraine on this question, a real threat has appeared of a break-off in negotiations with foreign creditors", it said.

The Russian government statement said that during talks the previous Friday and Saturday Ukraine had proposed that Russia take on the Ukrainian share of the debt but still give Kyiv a share of the assets. "Such an approach, from the Russian government point of view, contradicts common sense", it said.

As for the gas conflict, a Russian senior official announced on Saturday, February 20, that Russia will cut off natural gas supplies to Ukraine in five days.

Gas customers in Western Europe will also be affected by the move, because they receive Russian gas through pipelines that run through Ukraine.

Rem Vyakhirev, the acting head of the Russian natural gas monopoly Gazprom, told reporters that supplies would be curtailed because Ukraine had not paid for gas it has received from Russia since the New Year. He also accused Ukraine of disrupting Russia's gas exports to Europe, which go through the same pipeline.

Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister Viktor Pynzenyk said on Tuesday, February 16, Ukraine received a telegram from the Russian government increasing gas prices to the world market level of \$85 per 1,000 cubic metres. Under a previous accord between Ukraine and Russia, Moscow

set a price of 15,600 roubles (\$27) per 1,000 cubic metres.

"We have no choice but to raise to world levels the price for transporting Russian gas through Ukrainian territory", Pynzenyk said, without giving details. "The Russian position has become more and more tough, not only on the question of gas and oil prices but also on the problem of foreign debts and economic relations between our two countries", Pynzenyk said.

Pynzenyk, who is responsible for economic reform, said he did not want confrontation with Russia. He said the government had received the first encouraging results in January of its strict monetary policies. But the reform course could be endangered by industrial unrest. Transport workers went on strike on Tuesday in Kyiv and miners are ready to follow suit if salaries are not raised. Pynzenyk took a hard line on the salary demands. "We will never do this", he said. ■

Thousands Attend First Privatisation Auction in Lviv

LVIIV — More than two dozen small state-owned businesses here were auctioned off on Saturday, February 20, as part of Ukraine's privatisation programme.

With much pomp and circumstance and several thousand people in attendance, the first property, a general store, was sold to its staff for 48 million *karbovanist* (*karbovanets*: Ukrainian rouble) — about \$21,000 — in an event that officials promoted as

the end of Ukraine's long hesitation over economic reform. The store, in central Lviv, was valued at 150,000 *karbovanist*.

"This is the start of a new era, the beginning of mass privatisation", said Volodymyr Pylypchuk, chairman of the Ukrainian parliamentary commission on economic reform. "The blow of the auctioneer's hammer marks a new era for ownership in Ukraine".

The first person to become a new private owner wasn't quite as optimistic, though, as she took to the podium to confirm the purchase while speculators uncorked bottles of champagne and applause filled the auction hall.

"I'm a little worried, because now we're bosses. We're going to have to work to pay off the money", said 30 year-old Iryna Yasinska, who represented the seven-person staff in the bidding for the shop. But she added: "It will be better. It's privatised, it will be easier to work, I think".

The auction included shops, cafes, bakeries and beauty shops, for prices that ranged from about \$1,070 to about \$49,000. Almost half the companies were bought by their own staffs, who received a 30 per cent discount under privatisation rules and generous payment terms.

"Our grandfathers and fathers still remember the idea of ownership. Communism is not so deeply ingrained here", said Roman Chaplyk, the head of the enterprise department of the city administration.

The Lviv city government intends to privatise 70 per cent of small,

municipally-owned businesses, mainly shops and services.

Prime Minister Leonid Kuchma is said to be very enthusiastic about the Lviv auction and hopes to repeat the example across the country. Lviv residents also approve of the auctions. In a poll conducted by the finance corporation recently, 67 per cent of those surveyed said privatisation should be completed as soon as possible. ■

Anti-Imperialist Anti-Communist Front Holds National Forum

KYIV, February 21-22 — The Anti-Imperial Anti-Communist Front held an all-Ukrainian Forum in the capital's "Ukraina" palace of culture. The Forum demonstrated that there are serious political forces in Ukraine, willing to defend Ukrainian statehood against the anti-national forces.

The participating organisations' primary concern is the growing threat to the sovereignty of Ukraine on the part of Russia, the economic blockade of Ukraine and the deepening crisis in the country, and the total impoverishment of the people. The seriousness of the threat was described by A. Vashchenko, representing the independent trade union VOST, who described the explosive situation in eastern Ukraine, where the workers' collectives are planning a wave of strikes, an action coordinated, not surprisingly, by Russia.

The AAF Forum, a coalition of Ukraine's national-democratic forces, is opposed to the unilateral

disarmament of Ukraine and is calling for an international tribunal to indict the CPSU for its crimes committed on the territory of Ukraine. These include: the civil war of 1917; the aggression against the democratically elected Central Rada in 1918; the establishment of a totalitarian regime; the famines of 1918-1922 and 1932-1933; the mass executions and deportations in Western Ukraine during 1939-1941; the forced liquidation of the Greek-Catholic Church in 1946; the falsification of Ukrainian history; Russification and discrimination against ethnic minorities; the withholding of information about the Chornobyl nuclear disaster; and the complete disintegration of Ukraine's economy.

The delegates also demanded Ukraine's immediate withdrawal from the Commonwealth of Independent States and a national Congress to adopt a new Constitution.

The AAF, which came into being on February 1, 1993, comprises: the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists, the Congress of National Democratic Forces, the independent trade union VOST, the Association of Former Political Prisoners, Memorial, Rukh, the Ukrainian Republican, Democratic and Christian-Democratic Parties and several youth organisations.

Former political prisoner M. Rudenko described the Forum as the beginning of a "tradition of unity in the face of danger". It, indeed, comes at a very critical time for Ukraine, when the worsening economic crisis, fuelled with outside help from Russia, and the defiant rise of the Communist Party are

threatening the very root of Ukraine's independence, sovereignty and statehood.

A determined, concerted effort by the political, civic and youth organisations which have rallied round the idea of Ukrainian independence and democracy can save the country from impending economic and political collapse and a return to colonial dependence on Moscow. Individually they are powerless to offer meaningful resistance to the rising reactionary forces whose Communist *nomenklatura* continues to maintain a firm grip on power. As a political front that covers the social spectrum from trade unions, to political parties, to cultural and youth organisations, however, the democratic opposition can offer Ukraine a meaningful way out of the crisis and place the country firmly on the road to recovery. But there is no time to lose. Without decisive action now, the future will look very dim indeed. ■

Ukraine Determined to Shut Down Chernobyl

KYIV, February 22 — The Ukrainian leadership has stressed in talks with visiting German Environment Minister Klaus Toepfer that it is determined to shut down the controversial atomic power reactor at Chernobyl before the end of this year. Ukraine turned on blocks one and two of the reactor at the beginning of winter in an attempt to deal with the country's energy crisis. Discussions also dealt with the matter of replacing energy production which will be lost when Chernobyl is shut down. ■

Ukraine Wants World Court to Decide Soviet Debt Dispute

MOSCOW, February 23 — Ukraine is preparing to take its long-running dispute with Russia over dividing up the former Soviet Union's \$80 billion foreign debt to the International Court of Justice in The Hague, according to a Ukrainian Foreign Ministry official. Oleksander Kupchyshyn, head of the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry's legal department, told a news conference that Kyiv was preparing a formal application to the court to resolve the issue. He said Moscow's latest proposals, put forward in talks earlier this month, "go beyond common sense" and were "absolutely unacceptable for the Ukrainian side". ■

Ukraine Missile Silos Leaking Radioactivity

MOSCOW, February 24 — Poorly maintained nuclear missile silos in Ukraine are emitting increased levels of radioactivity. Marshal Yevgeny Shaposhnikov, supreme commander of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) forces, attributed the lack of maintenance to ongoing tensions between Russia and Ukraine over strategic arms. Both countries claim jurisdiction over the 176 long-range nuclear missiles based in Ukraine. ■

Documents & Reports**KRAVCHUK: START-2 "MOMENTOUS"
BUT DOES NOT PERTAIN TO UKRAINE**

Below is the statement issued on January 3, 1993, by President Leonid Kravchuk on the signing of START-2 by the United States and Russia.

The reduction of the nuclear weapons arsenal as the result of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty is a momentous event of this decade, aimed at reducing levels of nuclear brinkmanship and strengthening strategic stability in the world.

The signing of START-2 by Russia and the United States is an important political act, testifying to the consistency of steps on the road of nuclear disarmament. Together with the large-scale defence industry conversion programme, and the reorientation of the military-industrial potential for economic and social development needs, the Treaty will serve the interests of the whole of mankind.

The Russian-American START-2 Treaty does not commit Ukraine in any way and its provisions do not extend to the Ukrainian territory. Ukraine is, nevertheless, consistently moving towards the goal established by its Supreme Council to become a non-nuclear weapons state in the future. I believe that the supreme legislature of Ukraine will give START-1 and the Lisbon Protocol positive consideration. Ukraine will thus become one of the first states to take an historic step towards ridding the world of nuclear arms.

We call upon all nuclear weapons states to follow this example and cooperate with a view to establishing an atmosphere of confidence and security among peoples. We hope that the previous agreements will be realised in the next few days and that negotiations between Ukraine and the Russian Federation on the wide range of technical and financial questions related to the future implementation of the START-1 Treaty and the Lisbon Protocol will commence.

We supported the initiative of the governments of the Russian Federation, the United States and France on the moratorium on nuclear tests and call for the conversion of this moratorium into a permanent embargo on all nuclear explosions by all nuclear powers.

Welcoming the new initiatives of the Russian Federation and the United States on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms, Ukraine

considers that the entire world has to move closer towards complete nuclear disarmament as soon as possible and that the peoples will appreciate not only the steps that have been taken towards the limitation of these arsenals, but also the policies of the states, which are proceeding towards achieving a non-nuclear status of their own free will. ■

JOINT COMMUNIQUE

On the Meeting Between Presidents Yeltsin and Kravchuk

On January 16, 1993, state delegations of the Russian Federation and Ukraine, headed respectively by the President of the Russian Federation B.M. Yeltsin and the President of Ukraine L.M. Kravchuk, met in Moscow.

The meeting included a forthright discussion on numerous matters concerning their mutual interests.

1. The presidents briefed one another on the political, economic and social processes in their respective states, confirmed their determination to proceed with the implementation of wide-scale economic reform, the transition to a market economy, democratisation of all spheres of political and social life, and expressed the need for close cooperation between Russia and Ukraine in these areas.

2. It was accentuated at the meeting that both states place particular priority on Russian-Ukrainian relations. The improvement of relations on the basis of the November 18, 1990, agreement between Russia and Ukraine and the agreement between Russia and Ukraine on the further development of interstate relations signed in Dagomys by both heads of state not only serve the interests of the peoples of Ukraine and Russia, but also have an important international significance.

3. It was acknowledged that the historical division of labour is causing the economic complexes of Russia and Ukraine to remain tied closely together and interdependent.

Both parties expressed their apprehension about the fact that the unwarranted ruin of the economic links between businesses, the untimely measures to settle mutual payments, and several other factors have a negative effect on the state of the Ukrainian and Russian economy.

Both parties agreed to intensify efforts to establish international and commercial relations on the principles of equality and mutual benefit, which would conform with the new situation.

Both parties agreed on the need to form a Russian-Ukrainian coordinating council.

4. The presidents agreed to issue directives for the final settlement of all matters concerning the servicing of the debts and assets of the former USSR.

5. The presidents confirmed the intentions of Russia and Ukraine to proceed with the reduction and destruction of nuclear arms, which will become an important contribution towards the establishment of peace, free from the threat of nuclear self-destruction.

The President of Ukraine acknowledged the ratification of the START-1 Treaty by the Supreme Council of the Russian Federation and accentuated Ukraine's determination to ratify this treaty.

The President of Ukraine acknowledged the signature of the START-2 Treaty by the Russian Federation and the USA.

6. The President of the Russian Federation declared that Russia is prepared to guarantee Ukraine's security if it ratifies the START-1 Treaty and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which would come into effect after the ratification of the treaties by Ukraine. The text of the guarantee is to be drafted shortly.

7. To ensure the nuclear and economic security of the strategic nuclear forces in Russia and Ukraine both parties agreed to establish a system for material and technical support and control over the missile bases of the strategic nuclear forces by Russia. The governments of the Russian Federation and Ukraine received a one-month deadline to draft concrete provisions to ensure the implementation of this agreement.

8. The Presidents of the Russian Federation and Ukraine instructed their governments to begin immediate negotiations to regulate all matters concerning the implementation of the START Treaty, including the conditions of dismantling, shipping and destruction of the nuclear warheads and delivery systems at missile bases of the strategic nuclear forces situated in Ukraine including the conversion of the nuclear components into fuel for Ukrainian nuclear power plants.

9. Both sides reviewed the process to implement the August 3, 1992, Yalta agreement between the Russian Federation and Ukraine on the principles of building the Russian and Ukrainian Navies on the basis of the Black Sea Fleet of the former USSR. It was established that the work of the state delegations of the Russian Federation and Ukraine led to the signature of the agreement on the naval insignia of the Black Sea Fleet for the transition period.

The Presidents of the Russian Federation and Ukraine reached a joint decision to appoint Vice-Admiral E.L. Baltin commander-in-chief of the Black Sea Fleet.

In this regard, the heads of state acknowledged that negotiations concerning the Black Sea Fleet have recently become less intense, as a result of which the documents stipulated in the Yalta agreement were not drafted by the appointed deadline.

The President of the Russian Federation and the President of Ukraine agreed to instruct the necessary state commissions to draft as quickly as possible documents concerning the implementation of the Yalta agreement.

10. The presidents agreed that in order to protect the rights and interests of Russian citizens on the territory of Ukraine and Ukrainian citizens on the territory of Russia their respective consulates should be opened immediately, primarily in centres with the largest concentration of their respective citizens on the territory of the other party.

The Foreign Ministries of both states were instructed to intensify the process of establishing the legal basis of interstate relations through various agreements, concentrating their efforts primarily on financial, economic and humanitarian issues.

Both parties discussed their position on dual citizenship.

11. Both parties called for a peaceful resolution of conflicts in the member-states of the CIS, and for measures to expedite the political resolution of the Trans-Dnistrrian conflict through negotiations between Kishinev and Tiraspol on the establishment of the legal status of the left-bank regions of the Republic of Moldova with the help of the CSCE and other mechanisms.

12. The heads of government of the Russian Federation V.S. Chernomyrdin and Ukraine L.D. Kuchma signed an accord on scientific, technical and economic cooperation in the field of nuclear energy, on the principles of cooperation and mutual relations in the field of transport, a protocol for the gradual introduction of free trade, on remunerations, and on the employment and social security of Russian and Ukrainian citizens who are working outside their own state.

Foreign Ministers A.D. Kozyrev and A.M. Zlenko signed a Consular Convention between the Russian Federation and Ukraine. ■

PRESIDENT KRAVCHUK'S SPEECH AT THE GUILDHALL, LONDON,

February 10, 1993

My Lord Mayor
My Lords
Ladies and Gentlemen

It is a great honour to be in this ancient hall which symbolises London — the city where tradition glorified by ages and fogs go hand-in-hand with contemporaneity, where one of Europe's oldest democracies was founded, where the world's financial and economic experience has been gathered.

We Ukrainians highly respect our own traditions and the traditions of other nations. Since a tradition is a cement that consolidates the nation and

imparts to it its explicit individual identity. It is here, in London, that one becomes aware of how important traditions are in the life of such a historical nation as yours.

The Ukrainian people have also very old and respected traditions while Ukrainian history has ancient and proud roots. As early as the 17th century a professor of Cambridge University and writer Bernard Connor wrote: "Ukrainians mostly are healthy and strong people famous for their generosity; they have great disregard for greed; these are really free people who tolerate no slavery. They are tireless, masterful and courageous".

Many of these features of our people gained through the world-renowned Cossacks — magnificent protectors and guardsmen of their nation's customs.

There is a legend that one of the Cossacks, Hetman Pavlo Polubotok, in the times of Peter the Great, transmitted several barrels of Ukrainian gold to be kept safe here in the City of London on condition that it would be returned to Ukraine when it became independent. Perhaps My Lord Mayor after dinner we might search the cellars to check — perhaps they contain the traces of our ancient investments.

My Lord Mayor, at present our Ukrainian traditions, and particularly the traditions of friendship, sincerity and respect for other nations, have been revived. Ukraine's independence gave them new life and bestowed new significance upon them. My visit here I hope has shown you Ukraine's desire for real friendship with Britain.

However, before our delegation could step onto the land of Shakespeare, Walter Scott and Dickens, the land of great statesmen, economists, industrialists, artists, bankers and talented workers Ukraine had to tread a long and thorny road.

I regard our visit to Great Britain as a sign of a growing desire to expand relations between our countries, as an important step in the process of building relations of friendship and partnership between Ukraine and Great Britain.

More than a year ago, on 1 December 1991, our people confirmed the historic Act of the Declaration of National Independence through a democratic referendum.

Over 90 per cent of the electorate voted for this. Accordingly, our 50 million people once again showed their centuries old aspiration for sovereignty and the preservation of their national existence and development.

The people voted for a free, independent, democratic and law-governed Ukrainian state where the individual is to be the greatest value; they voted for a state where all ethnic and national groups would have equal rights and opportunity to develop their languages, cultures and religious traditions.

And despite numerous difficulties, despite the economic crisis that extended over the whole former Soviet empire we are building just such a state.

Great Britain, and the same happened in 1918, was one of the first to recognise the independence of Ukraine and as early as 10 January 1992 our countries established diplomatic relations. We highly appreciate this step.

From the very first days of its independent existence Ukraine has demonstrated to the world its sincere desire to live according to civilised standards of cooperation, it has demonstrated the will to build international relations ruling out inequality and dominance.

For us the course of peace, friendship and harmony with all nations is the Alpha and Omega of our foreign and internal policies, the best criterion of human morals and responsibilities.

I want the international community to know: an industrious and freedom-loving nation which has suffered long in the course of freedom and a better life has joined their ranks.

The nation that was subject to the lethal consequences of the Chernobyl disaster will not live under the Sword of Damocles of a nuclear threat. From the very first day of its independence Ukraine has been consistent in its policy of becoming not only a state which does not possess nuclear weapons but even does not have them on its territory.

I am sure that very soon after due consideration the Supreme Rada (Parliament) will ratify the START-1 Treaty and take the decision to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. I would like to emphasise that this is an urgent task for us.

However, Ukraine, as any sovereign state, has an indisputable right to its own armed forces, to defence, and to seek international assurances for its security and assistance in eliminating nuclear weapons. The depth of the consideration which the Ukrainian Parliament is giving this issue derives not from any aggressive intentions but, first of all, from our grave and tragic historical experience.

Everything has to be taken into account for as Shakespeare wrote, undue haste just as sluggishness lead to the sad end.

It is not easy for us to build a new state. The Ukrainian people, our Parliament and our Government have to resolve a wide range of complicated issues of building statehood as well as to overcome negative phenomena in the economy.

In fact, altering the mode of production and the mentality of the people we must overcome the economic crisis, introduce the necessary political and economic reforms in a democratic and legal way, and change over to a free market economy. For as they say here in Britain there is no good house without a strong foundation.

Our first priority is privatisation, demonopolisation, the reform of the banking system, building a financial market and the completion of agricultural reform.

It is true that the state of our economy complicates the achievement of this goal, but we cannot delay this process and therefore we shall take decisive action.

The first laws laying down conditions for foreign capital investments in the development of the Ukrainian economy and the introduction of new technologies have already been elaborated and have come into effect. We do not ask for charity — we call upon our foreign partners for mutually beneficial cooperation. We suggest joint exploitation of our economic,

scientific and technological and labour potential, the rich natural wealth of Ukraine, and its advantageous geopolitical situation.

The participation of British partners in the process of privatisation and reconstruction of a number of coal-mining, metal, machine-building, oil and gas, light and food industrial enterprises could be a promising area of cooperation. This may include the setting up of joint Ukrainian and British ventures.

At the same time, striving to establish close contacts with foreign countries our people as well as our Parliament and Government do not wish to destroy the relations with our neighbours from the former Soviet Union.

On the contrary, we are doing everything to keep and develop these links on a qualitatively new, truly equitable, and mutually beneficial basis and not to restore the former imperial structures. We shall continue our membership in the CIS, concentrating the attention of this forum primarily on cooperation with the aim of overcoming economic difficulties, and establishing normal economic relations.

One of the most important achievements of the new Ukrainian state during the first year of its existence is the development of democracy and the principles of the free market economy under conditions of maintaining domestic stability and inter-ethnic peace. It is very important to us.

As you know, to date the Ukrainian people and leadership have managed to avoid bloody fratricidal conflicts which, unfortunately, continuously break out in different regions of the former Soviet Union.

To our mind the time has come to pay special attention to the formation of such worldwide and European systems of security as would render effective support to new emerging states, and protect their new independence and sovereignty.

The ideas of a new Europe, with its democratic values, its principles of mutual confidence and respect appeal to us because they make us feel a part of Europe, whose geographical centre, as our geographers tell us, is in Ukraine.

These are not just principles and ideals for us. We perceive them as an integral part of our national revival. And without an independent and stable Ukraine there cannot be a stable Europe.

This is not just our idea. It is shared by political leaders I've met from many countries. Since we all depend on one another we must build our relations with mutual respect and independence.

I would like to stress once again that the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland will find in Ukraine a working partner and the development of our cooperation will serve a common European cause and humanity's common values.

My Lord Mayor, My Lords, Ladies and Gentlemen, I should like to propose a toast to the Honourable Lord Mayor and Corporation of London. ■

DECLARATION Of the Anti-Communist Anti-Imperialist Front

February 21, 1993

"Ukraina" Palace of Culture, Kyiv

Ukraine is undergoing its greatest trials in the process of establishing an independent state. These are determined by the intensification of the offensive, inside Ukraine and outside its borders, of the pro-imperialist political forces aspiring to restore the Communist regime, destroy Ukraine's independent statehood, and return our people to colonial dependence on Moscow.

These forces are acting overtly against Ukrainian independence, threatening the territorial integrity of the state, provoking ethnic conflicts, blatantly violating the state symbols of Ukraine, and agitating the workers' collectives to strike.

These anti-state actions are inspired and organised by chauvinists and those members of the former Communist Party *nomenklatura* threatened with losing their positions of power.

They hold the real power in all local and central state structures and are deliberately disrupting production, misappropriating national property, and blocking economic reform.

The principal hotbed of social instability today is the reactionary Supreme Council and all the local Councils, formed under the absolute rule of the CPSU-CPU and the colonial status of Ukraine.

The most reactionary members of the former Communist Party *nomenklatura*, which include officials of all levels, have grouped together in the Councils, protected by a parliamentary mandate. Today they form a large and well-organised anti-Ukrainian political force — the ruling party, which dreams of restoring the old order and is actively striving towards this goal. A vivid example of this is the attempt by the Communist majority in the Supreme Council to form their own Constitutional Court, and their preparations for a general meeting (in essence congress) of deputies of all Councils. These are, effectively, preparations for an anti-state coup to restore the totalitarian Communist regime under the slogan "All power to the Councils!"

In view of this situation we, the representatives of the democratic political parties and civic organisations who have gathered in Kyiv on February 21,

1993, for the Forum of anti-communist anti-imperialist forces, declare the purpose of our joint efforts to be the following:

1. The immediate dissolution of the Supreme Council of Ukraine and all local Councils. The convening of a Founding Congress to adopt a new Constitution of Ukraine and a new electoral law.

2. To prevent a review of the decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of Ukraine banning the activities of the CPU. To hold a public tribunal to expose the crimes of the CPSU-CPU against the Ukrainian people.

3. To provide active assistance in the establishment of state power structures, the implementation of economic reform, and the fight against corruption, crime and the misappropriation of state property.

4. To counteract all attempts to involve Ukraine in any supranational structures. Withdrawal from the CIS.

5. To counteract the "privatisation" of state property by the *nomenklatura*.

6. To halt the unilateral disarmament of Ukraine.

7. To consolidate the Ukrainian people and rally the national forces in the struggle against separatism, federalisation, to preserve the territorial integrity of Ukraine.

We declare the AAF coalition open to all political parties, civic organisations, national-cultural societies, creative societies, as well as active citizens. Each member of the coalition can participate in all or individual aspects of our work, in the process of developing an appropriate plan of action and suitable measures.

We urge as many members of the public as possible to support our initiative, which is directed towards the future of Ukraine. ■

Books**Bohdan Nahaylo, THE NEW UKRAINE, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1992, 47pp, £6.50.**

The publication of this short monograph marks something of a watershed in the British establishment's perception of Ukraine. As the author himself observes, "[f]or centuries Ukraine existed not only as a geographically distant 'borderland' (that is what the name actually means) of Europe, but also on the fringes of Western historical and political consciousness... today the emergence of the new Ukraine from the Soviet 'disunion' took many by surprise and the initial reception accorded to the new state was ambivalent".

The appearance, however, of this study of Ukraine, under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs (RIIA), is indicative that this prestigious body was quick to adapt its activities to the new map of Europe. Nahaylo's study is one of a series sponsored by the RIIA working group which early in 1992 renamed itself the "Post-Soviet Business Forum". As Nahaylo states in his opening paragraph, "[t]he emergence of Ukraine as an independent state was a historic event which changed the map of Europe and altered international relations in general", not only precipitating the final collapse of the Soviet Union, but ensuring that the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) which succeeded it would not immediately coalesce into another Moscow-centric superstate.

The purpose of this series is to provide concise but well-researched briefings for businessmen and business-oriented diplomats dealing with the republics of the former Soviet space. In the case of Ukraine, this means starting with the historical background. With a really masterly brevity, Nahaylo manages to outline Ukraine's troubled history, from the beginning until 1985, in a mere five pages, before tackling, in another six, the "loosening of controls" of the Gorbachev era and the recovery of Ukraine's national identity and the campaign for first "sovereignty" and then independence. He then outlines the current political situation (as of June 1992), including thumbnail sketches of the main political groupings, the general lack of Western-style political skills even among senior figures in government and parliament, the lack of definition of the roles and capacities of the president, cabinet, and parliament, the "rather backward" condition of the mass media, religious affairs (including the on-going inter-church and intra-church disputes that are an unfortunate legacy of the Soviet attempt to

"unify" Ukrainian believers into the Moscow-controlled Russian Orthodox Church), the problems of Crimea, and of Ukraine's Russian and Russophone minorities, and — a theme which has attracted little attention among Western observers — the 75 year old dispute between Ukraine and Romania over border-territory in south-west Ukraine.

Having thus set the scene, Nahaylo proceeds to the topics most relevant to the sponsoring Business Forum — economic prospects and foreign relations. In October 1990, shortly after Ukraine and other Soviet Republics were beginning to assert their "sovereignty", the Deutsche Bank published a special report examining the economic strengths and weaknesses of the 15 constituent republics of the Soviet Union. The assessment criteria included the current degree of industrialisation, the hard-currency earning capacity, the scope of agricultural production, the degree of self-sufficiency, mineral resources, the "business-mindedness" of the population, geographical proximity to the European Community, the level of education, the homogeneity of the population and the condition of the infrastructure. On this rating, Ukraine came out top, scoring 83 points out of 100, ahead of the Baltic States (77), the Russian Federation (72), Georgia (61) and Belarus (55). The disintegration of the Soviet Union, and the transition from the old, centrally planned economy to the market, has left Ukraine with a whole range of economic and social problems which must be tackled if the country is to capitalise on this economic potential and attract the Western business interests it so urgently needs. Nahaylo identifies Ukraine's economic strengths: size, fertile soil, mineral wealth — and also current weaknesses — notably the legacy of the old Central Planning system, under which capital investment was assigned in accordance with Moscow's perceptions rather than genuine Ukrainian needs, a preponderance of energy-guzzling and environmentally unsound metallurgical and heavy industry, an energy sector dependent on a declining and increasingly dangerous coal industry and massive imports of oil and gas from the Russian republic — and the aftermath of the Chornobyl disaster. On the management side, Ukraine currently suffers not only from a shortage of personnel trained in Western-style accounting and economics, but also from the absence of basic statistics about its own past economic performance. Set against this background, Nahaylo outlines Ukraine's attempts, from 1990 onwards, to take charge of its own economic destiny, explains its stance over the share-out of the debt obligations and assets of the former repayment of the Soviet Union and deals with the introduction of the quasi-currency "coupons" and the eventual transition to the hryvnia. This leads on naturally to Ukraine's international status, the reluctance of certain Western leaders to accept the breakup of the Soviet Union, the declaration of independence of 24 August 1991, and the subsequent referendum on independence (1 December 1991) which dealt the coup de grace to Soviet power. Nahaylo then proceeds to discuss Ukraine's nuclear arsenal — an unintended legacy from the Kremlin's "cold

war" threat to the West, concentrating on the Ukrainian commitment to the removal and destruction of these weapons as soon as possible. (Unlike some observers of the post-Soviet Ukrainian scene, Nahaylo does not overtly suggest that, without Ukraine's unintended emergence as an — at any rate, temporary — nuclear power, international recognition might well have been significantly delayed!) The final paragraphs of this chapter outline a number of important diplomatic exchanges — "fence-mending" with Romania, the disputes with Russia over the Black Sea Fleet and the status of Crimea, Ukraine's relations with its "eastern diaspora" (ethnic Ukrainians scattered throughout the former USSR, including, *nota bene*, 600,000 in Moldova (giving Ukraine an intimate interest in the conflict there), and Ukraine's search for new suppliers of oil and gas to reduce its dependence on Russia.

Finally, in a brief chapter entitled "Conclusion", Nahaylo makes the point that, in spite of the major problems facing independent Ukraine, independence has "remarkably" been achieved, peacefully, without serious conflict either at home or abroad. Ukraine is now one of the most stable states of Eastern Europe, Nahaylo says, but "it is ultimately the Ukrainian-Russian relationship that will not only make or break the CIS but also determine whether there is stability in Eastern Europe". Without some kind of genuine Ukrainian-Russian rapprochement and a real acceptance by Russia of the concept of an independent Ukraine, Nahaylo concludes — "the new Ukraine will constantly keep looking over its shoulder".

Nahaylo's monograph, as this brief outline indicates, thus focuses on the essentials of Ukraine's geopolitical and economic situation, past present and future. Although tightly packed with information, the fluent style makes for easy reading, even among those to whom Ukraine was, until very recently, *terra incognita*. The format is clear — also an important consideration for the busy diplomat or businessman hastily briefing himself en route to a conference. A first version of this work was presented as the keynote paper at an RIIA Round Table on Ukraine early in 1992, and its publication coincided with a lecture at the RIIA by Professor Volodymyr Vasylenko, legal adviser to the parliament of Ukraine. The shelf-life of all publications dealing with contemporary history is necessarily brief — and Nahaylo's account is already out of date in certain respects (at the time of his cut-off date, Vitold Fokin was still Prime Minister of Ukraine). Nevertheless, the main thrust of its information and argument remains valid and highly valuable background information to anyone wishing to do business with today's Ukraine. ■

Jonathan Aves, POST-SOVIET TRANSCAUCASIA, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1993, 54pp, £6.50.

The Caucasus is an area of considerable significance to independent Ukraine. Symbolically, since Shamil's freedom-fighters of the 1840s provide the theme of one of the greatest of Taras Shevchenko's poetic condemnations of oppression (an extract from which is engraved on the Shevchenko monument in Washington), and also, more mundanely, since Ukraine is seeking to break its dependence on Russian oil by securing alternate supplies via a projected pipeline from Iran.

The Caucasus is, however, a particularly complex area — and at the present time, the political, ethnic and economic situation in the three newly independent trans-Caucasian republics is especially sensitive and fluid. Dr. Aves's survey, produced under the auspices of the RIIA's Post Soviet-Business Forum, provides a conveniently lucid and brief exposition of the major issues, conflicts and personalities involved, which should prove invaluable both for specialists in Caucasian affairs and also for those for whom they impinge peripherally, but no less significantly, on their main field of study. ■

I.S. Koropecyj (Editor), UKRAINIAN ECONOMIC HISTORY — INTERPRETIVE ESSAYS, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1991; UKRAINIAN ECONOMIC HISTORY — ACHIEVEMENTS, PROBLEMS, CHALLENGES, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1993, 434 pp.

These two volumes contain papers presented at, respectively, the Third (1985) and Fourth (1990) Quinquennial Conference on Ukrainian Economics held at the Ukrainian Research Institute of Harvard University. The earlier volume is described by the publisher as dealing with "one thousand years of Ukrainian economic history prior to the outbreak of the First World War". The latter deals with Ukrainian economic history of the 1980s.

Both volumes contain — as one would expect from the Harvard Institute — well-researched and excellently presented works. They are, however, very different in tone, not only as a result of their subject matter, but also of the political climate in which their constituent essays were first presented. For the papers of the 1985 conference were given entirely by scholars working outside Ukraine, whereas by 1990, it had become possible for academics from the then Ukrainian SSR to participate.

The approach of the earlier volume is, for the most part, descriptive, and at times, inevitably, verges towards the social history of trade and commerce,

rather than economics *stricto sensu*. The essays concentrate on three key periods in Ukrainian history — “Kyivan-Rus”, the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and the nineteenth century. Only for the final period are there available economic data in the modern sense of statistics of population, trade, agricultural production, urban growth. For the Kyivan-Rus period, and, to some extent, the seventeenth and eighteenth century, the authors have to have recourse to various types of anecdotal (and, in the case of Kyivan-Rus) archaeological material, to supplement the contemporary chroniclers and historians, who for the most part, paid little attention to economic matters except insofar as, for example, a dispute over trading rights might trigger a war. Some fascinating details emerge. Kyiv-Rus, it appears, was not totally dependent on the Baltic for its amber supplies, but had buried amber deposits of its own. 12th century Kyiv was, it appears, a major exporter of glass to the other principalities of the East Slav lands. The Pechenegs were not simply the dreaded marauders of the steppes recorded in the Chronicles, but on occasion entered into contracts of mercenary service for the Byzantines of the Chersonese, taking their pay “in the form of pieces of purple cloth, ribbons, loosely woven cloths, gold brocade, pepper, scarlet or ‘Parthian’ leather and other commodities which they require...”

The second part of the book, dealing with the Cossack state and the Russian annexation of Ukraine, is particularly valuable in providing the economic background for events which are more often considered from the purely strategic and political point of view. The chapters on the mercantile policy of Peter I towards Ukraine and the two chapters on the grain trade between Ukraine and Russia are particularly valuable in this respect. There is also an attempt to analyse the almost unstudied field of Ukrainian-Baltic trade in the period of the Cossack state — a field which the Soviet historians wrote off as regressive and leading to exploitation, but which, it is here suggested, is a subject demanding scholarly and politically unbiased appraisal. Some possible archive sources in Poland and Germany are suggested which could throw light on this subject.

In Part III, the Nineteenth Century, the book enters the conventional domain of economics, making use of the fairly abundant statistics available in the Tsarist (and for Galicia, Austrian) imperial surveys. The authors of these six essays address, in particular, the place of Ukraine within the economies of the Russian and Austrian empires, and how the development of Ukraine was affected by its incorporation into those empires. A wealth of statistical and anecdotal material is presented — yet the authors make it clear that, from the material available, it is impossible to draw definitive conclusions. They present, rather, themes for future investigation and discussion if and when (the subject of their argument implies) the Soviet Union is prepared to make available materials currently lost in “special” holdings and allow its scholars to take part in free debate.

By 1990, when the Fourth Conference took place, *glasnost* and *perestroika* were officially the order of the day, and six out of the 19 essays presented

were from scholars from Ukrainian learned institutions. Moreover, the statistical material published in Soviet year-books during the late 1980s began to be not only more plentiful, but more realistic in fields previously considered state secrets (a classification which included not only matters of, say, military expenditure, but anything which could be considered detrimental to the Soviet image, such as the soaring infant mortality rates). Although, as the past 18 months have revealed, *glasnost* still maintained a veil of secrecy over such issues as how far both industry and science in Ukraine were integrated into the Soviet military-industrial complex, the figures presented in these essays, both by (Soviet-) Ukrainian and western scholars can be accepted as broadly reliable — or at any rate, the best possible — within the terms of 1990, at any rate until independent Ukraine begins to publish her own statistical handbooks. The range of subjects is comprehensive, covering both macro- and microeconomic developments, and including a special section on welfare issues: living standards and environmental issues. The standard of the individual essays is excellent, and the tables, maps, and charts well-presented. The book, however, as a whole, seems inevitably dated. Unfortunately, the contributors seem to have been asked not only to present a picture of economic trends in their particular speciality during the 1980s, but to analyse Ukraine's potential for future development. The Conference took place in September 1990. The constraints of academic life and research meant, therefore, that these essays would have been completed well before Ukraine's Declaration of Sovereignty of July 16, 1990. This Declaration, it may be noted, happened to coincide with the Fourth World Congress of Slavists in Harrogate. The Ukrainicists attending the Harrogate gathering at once held a special session to draft a telegram of congratulations to Kyiv — but none of them seriously envisaged that, within 18 months, Ukraine would be independent and the Soviet Union no more. Similarly, the forecasts included in the Harvard volume do not seem to have been revised or amended in the light of the "Sovereignty" declaration; the authors tacitly assume that Ukraine's future development will take place within the Soviet context. A preface added by the editor in January 1992 does allude to the economic changes expected as Ukraine breaks out of the economic nexus of the "unified" Soviet state, but, less than a month after the final rites for the USSR, it was impossible to do more than broadly speculate which way these developments would go, or — indeed, if Moscow would really permit Ukraine to go her own way. As a historical picture of the Ukrainian economy in the Gorbachev era, this volume, however, must be highly commended. One looks forward to the proceedings of the 1995 Conference for the first analyses of the post-Soviet Ukrainian economy. ■

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C O N T E N T S

EDITORIAL 2

Current Affairs

UKRAINIAN INDEPENDENCE: FIRST RESULTS
AND LESSONS Viktor Stepanenko 3

ASPECTS OF NATION-BUILDING IN THE NEWLY-INDEPENDENT
COUNTRIES OF THE FORMER USSR Yarema Gregory Kelebay 8

THE FORMATION OF LEGAL TIES BETWEEN THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND UKRAINE Victor Muravyev 18

DIMENSIONS OF INTER-ETHNIC RELATIONS
IN UKRAINE Serhiy Tolstov 28

History

THE UKRAINIAN NAVY IN 1917-1920 Bohdan Yakymovych 47

Literature

POEMS FROM KHARKIV Stepan Dupliy 54

News From Ukraine 59

Documents & Reports 66

Books & Periodicals 80

Obituaries 84

EDITORIAL

For the past four decades, the aim of *The Ukrainian Review* has been to provide its readers with interesting and informative materials about all aspects of Ukraine and Ukrainian life, past and present. Unhappily, until very recently, the Editors were obliged to carry out this task largely in isolation, without the possibility of calling on the resources of Ukrainian scholarship in the homeland. Now, happily, this situation has changed. In this issue, therefore, we present three items by young scholars from Ukraine: two articles on current political developments and a collection of poems. This latter contribution represents a particularly intriguing development.

Not only do these poems express the inner conflicts and anxieties of life in today's Ukraine, perceived by one whose profession — nuclear physics — must, in the shadow of Chernobyl, promote much soul-searching, they were written, not in Ukrainian but in English. Why the poet chose to express his thoughts and emotions in a language not his own is a question we have not asked him. But his decision seems to typify a trend currently widespread in Ukraine, especially among the younger generation — a reaching out to the West, not for the material symbols of affluence, but for the chance to communicate and be understood.

Such an outreach, of course, demands a response — of empathy and understanding. And among the books which reached us for review this quarter was one which showed a really remarkable perception of Ukraine, past and present, and what it means to be a patriotic Ukrainian in this, post-Soviet world. *Darkness at Dawn* is, indeed, a work of fiction, but in its knowledge and perception of Ukraine it outshines many works which claim to be factual accounts. Concerning reviews, readers will note in this issue an innovation: brief notes of significant articles on Ukraine which have appeared in journals whose *raison d'être* is not Ukrainian affairs. Since our intention here is to bring to our readers' attention Ucrainica which they might otherwise have missed, we shall not, therefore, be covering journals which deal specifically with Ukrainian matters. Likewise, since we cannot hope to skim every journal in the English language on the off chance that it may contain some article of Ukrainian interest, we invite our readers to send us copies — or at least bibliographic references — of any such articles which come to their notice. Your help in providing such information will not only allow *The Ukrainian Review* to become more informative; many scholars in Ukraine are anxious to know what is being written in the West about their country, and to build up an archive and data base of "Western" Ucrainica. ■

Current Affairs**UKRAINIAN INDEPENDENCE:
FIRST RESULTS AND LESSONS**

Viktor Stepanenko

Ukraine has existed as an independent state since the proclamation of Ukrainian independence on August 24, 1991, and the endorsement of this act by a popular referendum on December 1, 1991, (in which over 85% of the votes cast were in favour of independence). The sixteen months since the Ukrainian people thus gave their legitimation to the newly created Ukrainian state is, of course, too short a period for serious historical investigation and conclusions. It is, however, a sufficient period to enable certain generalisations to be made about the first social lessons and experience of independence.

The first such lesson is that to be independent is not easy and it takes not only political activity and mass meetings but serious and hard work in order to construct and reconstruct a national and state identity. This search for our own Ukrainian face, it has become clear, involves not only national and cultural tasks, but above all the elaboration of a well-founded state economic and social policy. The problem consists of establishing the vitality of the Ukrainian state.

I am now touching upon the first paradox of the present Ukrainian situation. Ukraine already has its own state, but at the same time we feel an acute lack of experience of independence. Despite the relatively easily achievable successes in foreign policy, internal Ukrainian policy follows "Big Brother" closely. This is especially evident in the Ukrainian imitation of doubtful Russian social and economic experiments, though with a built-in time-lag. In other words the present Ukrainian state, to some extent, is only an empty form which has to be filled by a real content. What will be the nature of this context is another question.

The second paradox consists of the fact that the national idea, as public opinion polls have shown, was not the principal one for the creation of the national state. More correctly, there was no single motive for the majority of the people. Based on the results of public opinion polls, in particular the

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poll conducted directly before the referendum by the Radio Liberty Research Institute and the Academic Centre of the Sociological Association of Ukraine, it is possible to distinguish three main reasons and motives for the support of independence in December 1991. These are:

1) Socio-economic motives, i.e. a combination of an awareness of increased difficulties with a hope for new possibilities, focussing on the socio-economic transformation of society within the framework of the Ukrainian state. In other words, the hope of a better life.

2) Civil democratic motives, connected with the rejection of the past, and, in particular, the Russian/Soviet empire.

3) And, last but not least, a strong national orientation, national feelings and sentiments.

In fact, however, and this is a very important aspect, it was impossible to pick any motive from this single complex as the real base of the Ukrainian independence vote. What at first glance appears to be a purely pragmatic desire for a better standard of living acquired a patriotic content because it could be realised only in a sovereign and independent Ukraine. At the same time every voter understood that the future of the Soviet Union as a political entity depended on the results of the Ukrainian referendum. In these historical circumstances, the Ukrainian national idea was equal to the civil democratic idea.

However, one should not idealise the state of Ukrainian public consciousness as regards its readiness to grasp the new. It has become obvious now that the relative civil unity which was apparent during the referendum was based mainly on the principle of hope for the future: "Everyone is hoping for something better. They will know what they do not want, a fraction of them know what they do want but no one knows how to achieve it". One of the clearest examples of this "hope without knowledge" principle is the notion of democracy which successfully combined the national and democratic aspirations of the people. In this sense it is worth mentioning some of the results of the opinion poll conducted by the Institute of Sociology at the beginning of 1991. This poll revealed a wide gap between the ideal notion of democracy based on Western patterns and the actual practice of its embodiment, that is, the policy of so-called "democratisation". In other words, in the opinion of the majority of respondents, "democratisation" was leading society in a direction diametrically opposed to true democracy.

Unfortunately this gap between the ideal and the social practice of its realisation has been preserved during this first short period of Ukrainian independence. Such a state of affairs may lead in the future to mass disillusionment with democracy itself and with the social prospects connected with it. This poses a threat to the very existence of the Ukrainian state. The first alarm signal has been heard already. According to the recent data obtained by "Eurobarometer", the European Commission's pollsters, over half the Ukrainians polled believe that the creation of a free market economy is a step in the wrong direction and that life was better under the old communist system (59% of those polled).

Of course, the existence of a certain gap between the desired ideal and real social practice is a general principle of social development. But, in the Ukrainian case, the problem is also associated with the specific nature of the transition situation. This entails not only a formal change of the socio-economic system but what is much more important and difficult: a change of the psychology, outlook, behaviour and fundamental backgrounds of the way of life of the millions. In this situation, public awareness is ambivalent and divided. So, at present, two mutually exclusive systems of values exist in the mind of the Ukrainian: on the one hand, the old traditional system of values based on communist or more correctly "Soviet values", and on the other the newly created Western democratic pattern. An often invisible struggle between these two trends is taking place in today's Ukraine both in everyday life and in the policy-making process. The people, as many polls have shown, want to live in the conditions of "developed capitalism" and democracy, but at the same time fear their own uncertainty and the personal responsibility now demanded of them.

The main result of this indefinite position is a split of consciousness and the development of a situation in which none of the possible alternatives can get any effective support. In these circumstances, the problem of the mobilisation and organisation of society as a whole becomes deeply problematic. That is why it became very important for such wavering consciousness to justify the choice of 1991 by real concrete results or even a small change in favour of future prospects. It was much easier to do this in 1992 but it requires far greater efforts in 1993.

The Ukrainian referendum of 1991 came at just that lucky point when all these different political and social motives and orientations, human aspirations and hopes coincided. The idea of a Ukrainian state formally united the two main political forces in Ukraine: the conservative communist elite and the national democratic movement. As subsequently became clear, the communist elite, which is the most powerful, the most organised and the most mobilised political force in the country, used the national idea to preserve its dominant political position in society. The *nomenklatura* made successful use of the natural attitude of the masses to the empire together with strong patriotic sentiments. But, paradoxically, this success meant at the same time the end (at least formally) of their communist identity.

The Ukrainian democratic movement, represented mainly by Rukh (Popular Movement of Ukraine), regarded the idea of independence as the single and necessary condition for the Ukrainian democratic revolution. But since almost all political power and the final say in all policy-making remained in the hands of the former *nomenklatura*, the Ukrainian democrats found themselves faced with the dilemma: "democracy or independence". The rise of the phenomenon of "Ukrainian national communism", under whose wing Ukrainian democracy now finds itself, is a very characteristic and natural result of an "unfinished revolution" which reflects the ambivalent nature of present Ukrainian society and its undeveloped social structure.

The young Ukrainian democracy felt defeated mainly as a result of the absence of a real social base for democratic transformation, namely a strong urban and rural middle class. The Ukrainian intelligentsia, the main supporter of independence and reforms, has been in part destroyed as a social stratum. It is no wonder that the lumpenised, robbed, betrayed and disillusioned mass of the population finds itself in a state of disappointment and fear in the face of further reforms. I have used the term "mass of the population" because the social structure and social interests of the majority of people in Ukraine with the exception of the rather small group of newly created national bourgeoisie and the elite of the new state *nomenklatura* are not differentiated and not defined.

One is forced to recognise that, at the beginning of 1993, Ukraine finds itself in a state of deep crisis. The economic collapse pushed industrial output back by 7-10 years as Kuchma admitted at his press conference in February of this year. But this crisis is not only economic. It extends to all spheres of social life including policy, culture, mass psychology and morals. Corruption has become a permanent element of the state organism. But the most dangerous phenomenon at the present time, however, is an absence of trust in society. This not only poses the threat of a serious crisis of legitimacy for the Ukrainian state but menaces the very existence of society. I define the period from 1991 to 1992 not a year of "lost possibilities" (as People's Deputy Vyachelsav Chornovil called it) but as the year of "betrayed hopes".

All this raises two vital questions: 1) What are the main reasons for the present state of affairs? and 2) What is the way out of this situation?

The principal answer to the first question is that the "Ukrainian revolution" (if we recognise the fact) has not solved, or more precisely, has to start solving its three main tasks, that is its: socio-economic, democratic, and national tasks. It is not necessary to be a great politician in order to understand in 1993 that political independence is not independence in the full sense of the word, but only its first and preliminary condition.

The fateful dilemma "democracy or independence" is secondary and even artificial to some extent in the face of the main and principal problem of survival — survival not only in the political sense of the existence of Ukraine, but in its direct meaning too. Unfortunately, for more than a year, Ukrainian politicians, both old and new, have not yet come to understand this. There has been a total absence of any practical policy of transition. The criminal economic course of Vitold Fokin's government voluntarily or involuntarily discredited the idea of independence itself. It was a case of "shock without any therapy" as former Minister of Economics Viktor Pynzenyk has admitted.

And last but not least, there is a reason connected with the specific nature of public psychology. This is what is known as the effect of the "escalation of claims" and a certain euphoria due to the idealisation and simplifications of the transition period. As is all too well-known, there is a simple connection: the higher the claims and idealisation of something the deeper the frustration and disappointment which follows the failure to realise it. It seems

that the emotional make-up of the Ukrainian national character may possibly have been an additional factor in a perception of events.

So, what may be concluded from this and what is the way out of the crisis situation?

I will hardly be original if I repeat that the only way out of a profound crisis is a real stabilisation of the economic situation and hard everyday practical work in this direction on all levels. The Kuchma team, it would appear, understands this. It is necessary to bring about some change — even a small one — for the better in the economy. In order to overcome the current widespread natural distrust for so-called “reforms” it is important to carry out reforms which have a real content which ordinary people can perceive as useful and beneficial. It should start not with the *nomenklatura*’s “*prykhvatyzatsia*” (“my-atisation”) but a broad real democratic privatisation of property.

Equally necessary steps are the creation of an atmosphere of respect for the law among all Ukrainian citizens and the election of a government which enjoys the people’s confidence. For this reason, the election of a new parliament on a multi-party basis is essential.

Of course, these are only some of the preliminary conditions which must be met. But the final success in the further development of the Ukrainian revolution will depend on processes at the “grass roots” level. The sooner the mass of the population stops relying on the hope of help from some benefactor including the government and begins to organise its life itself, the sooner this mass of population will turn into a nation.

It may take a long time — perhaps the lives of two generations — before a free, responsible and self-respecting people appears. But I do not believe in the absurd stereotype of the Ukrainians as a “nation without statehood”. I prefer to believe in the original mind, in the healthy common sense, and the industry and vitality of our people. ■

ASPECTS OF NATION-BUILDING IN THE NEWLY INDEPENDENT COUNTRIES OF THE FORMER USSR

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Introduction

No one is expert at nation- or state-building because that requires a high and rare political ability. Nation- or state-building is the ultimate in political conduct and the architectonic political act *par excellence*.

The challenge is as old as Plato, who, in "The Republic", defined a state as a "man writ large".

State-building is therefore not a matter of engineering or constructing a machine or system. It is not a matter of science. It *is* a matter of political philosophy and a question of upbringing or raising an organism. As Plato said, it is a question of "tending to the soul". Statecraft is soulcraft.

In this article I would like to address selected issues on the topic of "Aspects of Nation-Building in the Newly Independent Countries of the Former USSR". The title of my remarks is the first among several preliminary issues I wish to raise. And, we must start with definition. In order to get things right we must set certain things straight. Permit me to raise some of those issues which those concerned with nation- or state-building might want to address. Let me raise more questions than I can answer.

Nation v. State

Our thinking must be informed by a number of clear distinctions. Are we talking about country, nation, state, or economy? Each of these must be defined and understood, both alone and in concert with the others. Confusion about these concepts can only lead to problems. Therefore, the first question we should ask is are we talking about nation-building in the post-communist era, talking about state-building, or are we talking about both?

Frequently, discussions about eastern Europe are based on the assumption that full-fledged modern nations do not yet exist there. National differences are often caricatured as ethnic or tribal conflicts and therefore the issue of nation-building is considered relevant in eastern Europe. However, nations already exist in eastern Europe, **nations which do not have independent states**. Therefore, the first task in the post-communist era is the task of building states for the newly independent captive nations.

Independence

Newly independent states? What do we mean by independent? How is independence different from sovereignty, separateness, self-determination, freedom, or autonomy? In what sense and to what degree are any of the newly independent states sovereign, separate, self-determined, free, and autonomous from the former Soviet Union (or now Russia)? Are they really independent politically, economically, militarily, intellectually and/or culturally? Is the process complete?

A year before the December 1991 referendum in Ukraine, that country was declared sovereign. Nobody bought that. Only the overwhelming result of the referendum, which declared for independence, was acceptable to the Ukrainian people. This was not the end of the process of emancipation, but rather the beginning.

Structure and Ideology

Questions of independence are related to questions of structure and ideology. The structure of the Soviet Union has imploded and broken down. Also, the ideology of communism has been discredited and delegitimised. But has the mentality of the ex-Soviet citizen changed? Has there been a widespread conversion in the hearts and minds of men? Did the "new Soviet man" ever exist and does he live on?

The "New Soviet Man"

When we discuss mentality or the "new Soviet man" which the former Soviet Union may have left behind, we are talking about the hearts and minds of men. We are talking about the intellectual baggage of people. Communism and imperialism as structures and ideologies may both be dead and discredited. But what about modern materialism, collectivism, patrimonialism and statism? Red communism and red socialism may in fact be dead but we may find that "green" communism and environmental rather than welfare socialism may be more intractable and durable.

Communism and Colonialism

When we discuss structure and ideology we are talking about two different and distinguishable realities. On the one hand there was the structure and ideology of communism, socialism and Sovietism, and on the other the structure and ideology of Russian colonialism, imperialism and expansionism. Communism has collapsed, but has Russian colonialism? The return of communism is improbable but the continuation of Russian imperialism is possible and that prospect must be faced.

Nationality and Citizenship

There is a difference between nations and ethnic minority groups. When eastern Europe is discussed, there is frequent reference to ethnic conflict and to the phenomenon now called "ethnic cleansing". There is talk about majorities and minorities. There is talk about unity and diversity. There is talk about homogeneity and heterogeneity, about uniformity and pluralism.

This leads me to ask. What are the proper claims of the majority and what are the proper claims of any minorities in these newly independent states? What is to be our position on ethnic cleansing?

Will the new states be based on the principle of nationhood or the principle of citizenship? Can a non-national maintain his citizenship in any of the newly independent states?

I would suggest accepting the pluralistic demographic status quo and basing the new states on the principle of voluntary law-abiding citizenship.

Disclaimers

Before I go into the remaining core issues related to state-building in the former Soviet Union, let me make a couple of disclaimers.

When it comes to the former Soviet Union I am a suspicious person. I confess that on a previous occasion I spoke about *glasnost* and *perestroika* with deep reservations based upon Edward Jay Epstein's book, "Deception", in which he describes Gorbachev's *glasnost* as the "sixth *glasnost*" in Soviet history.¹ So I am unreservedly happy with the relief from communism and imperialism that the people of the former Soviet Union have been granted. But I am not so euphoric as to be grateful to Mr. Gorbachev for his gift from above or am I ready to consider him a great leader of the free world.

My second disclaimer is that I am not an expert on Russia or the Soviet Union. In particular I am not a Sovietologist. Nor have I ever been a fan or follower of the establishment Sovietologists and their conventional wisdom. About them Professor Richard Pipes has written:

"They are at sea now, the Soviet experts, confounded by irrefutable realities and abandoned by a regime whose claims to being progressive and democratic they once helped to bolster. They remind one of the 18th-century French adventurer, a contemporary of Dr. Johnson's, George Psalmanazar. Claiming to come from Formosa, he devised a Formosan alphabet and language, an accomplishment that earned him an invitation to Oxford. Psalmanazar also wrote historical and

¹ Edward Jay Epstein, *Deception: The Invisible War Between the KGB and the CIA*, New York, Simon and Schuster, 1989.

geographical descriptions of his alleged homeland. They became international best-sellers even though everything in them was invented. A group of young Oxford missionaries trained on his manuals travelled to Formosa only to discover that nothing they had been taught bore any relationship to reality. A good part of the "Sovietological" literature of the past 30 years has served as a Psalmanazarian Soviet Union: not totally invented, perhaps, but sufficiently deceptive to cause widespread disbelief once the true state of affairs was revealed.

And so, one fine day, the Communist regimes vanished in a puff of smoke. And what remained? A tormented people who the Sovietologists had not even noticed were there".²

The Collapse of Communism

Now to the issues proper in the question of nation- or state-building in the former Soviet Union. Why did Russian communism and imperialism collapse? Who deserves the credit? Whose analysis and appreciation of the communist experiment has been vindicated? Whose advice are we to take? In nation- and state-building, are we to be guided by those who turned out to be wrong, or those who were right? Are we to take the advice of the Sovietologists or of the anti-communists and all the freedom fighters of past generations?

"Really Existing Socialism"

What exactly has collapsed and how irreversibly has it collapsed? What exactly has been discredited? Can this breakdown be reversed? Can there be a reaction and a crackdown?

Is it the end of the Cold War? And is it the end of history as has been argued by Francis Fukuyama? Did the West win, or did the East commit suicide? Is it now the ultimate end of communism and imperialism and will we now have a durable "new world order"?

Did communism and Stalinism collapse? Did centralised socialism die and did the dream of "really existing socialism" die with them also? Or will really existing socialism remain as a continuing quest?

Western opinion remains confused as to the ultimate causes of the collapse of Soviet communism. There has been a deafening silence among the experts. The Soviet collapse will remain a mystery to them, or be explained by nonsense because it demolishes every pillar that supports their view of the world. As John Gray has said: They continue to cling to the Enlightenment with its animating mythology of global betterment, and similar pieties of secular humanism.³

² Richard Pipes, "Russia's Chance", *Commentary*, March 1992, p. 28.

³ John Gray, "How Communism Fell", *National Review*, November 2, 1992, p. 55-56.

They have a pervasive myopia regarding the spiritual dimensions of the Soviet collapse and the indispensable role played by the Catholic and other Christian churches and, above all, by the present Pope and his teachings based on Biblical nationalism.

To paraphrase Whittaker Chambers: When we are confronted by a totalitarian enemy the essence of whose strategy is the denial of transcendence, we will prevail against it only if our resistance is sustained by an affirmation of that very same transcendence. Communism was not defeated by the tepid half-truths of Western liberalism, but by the unflinching transcendental commitment of the captive nations, which, now having been declared independent, they must continue to nurture and sustain.⁴

The Primacy of Politics

Nation- and state-building are the consummate political acts of man — an architectonic political act. From Plato to Eric Voegelin, this is what classical political philosophy and political conduct has been all about. When I say political, I mean political in the Aristotelian sense of *homo politicus* — the man in the public square, that is, political man rather than a partisan or factional man.

The issue here is the “primacy of politics” versus the conventional and dominant thinking based on the “primacy of economics” (or economic determinism) which permeates political analysis and discussion in Ukraine and elsewhere in the West. Questions of prosperity, trade, currency, consumption, resources, and welfare are all of secondary importance. Politics drives and determines economics, not the other way around. Politics and the rule of law create the preconditions for economic conduct.

Poland’s experience is chronologically ahead of Ukraine and we should take Polish Finance Minister Balcerowicz’s advice: a) Sort out your politics first, before you tamper with the economy. You need a few years before the rewards start to outweigh the pain of transition. b) Do not imagine that a post-communist bureaucracy is like a normal bureaucracy. It will respond more sluggishly and more stubbornly. c) Remember that state enterprises minimise effort and maximise wages rather than profits. So privatise them first, even if you make mistakes along the way.⁵

Ideas

Politics and political conduct in Ukraine must be engaged in by trusted leaders who are guided by principle and by ideas. But, because ideas have consequences it is important to get the right ideas and the good ideas. Nation- and state-building must be based on “the best that has been thought and said on the subject”. For that we must turn to political philosophy.

⁴ *Ibid*, p. 56.

⁵ Radek Sikorski, “Poland’s Erhard?”, *National Review*, November 2, 1992, p. 23-24.

Rethinking the Enlightenment

Our nation- and state-building must be informed by the current "rethinking of the Enlightenment" that is going on in political philosophy. Here I have in mind the work of thinkers like Eric Voegelin, Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn, Paul Johnson, Richard Pipes, Simon Schama and many others. I refer particularly to Eric Voegelin's book, "From Enlightenment to Revolution", in which he discusses change and continuity, tradition and modernity, revolution and order, religiosity and secularism.⁶ It is from the modern post-Enlightenment disdain for classical philosophy and trust in rationalism, scientism and Gnosticism that most 20th-century political problems and tragedies emanate. There must be a return to classical realism grounded in Western theology and Christianity. This Christianity must inform and balance the nationalism and patriotism that should be fostered in the new nation-states in order to supply a certain measure of cohesion in a period of uncertainty, disorder and maybe even anarchy. The necessary nationalism must not become a single, lone and stray dogma. It must join or be joined to a family of principles which mutually moderate and temper each other.

Nationalism

Since the demise of socialism, paradoxically, it has been nationalism which has been getting an increasingly bad press in the West. The message is: now that socialism and the Soviet Union are gone, watch for all the eastern European nationalisms which will rear their ugly heads. This is a typical example of liberal inverted thinking.

The preeminent and definitive political question of the 20th century has been the status of socialist totalitarianism. This issue encompasses even the ugly and criminal career of Adolf Hitler.

Hitler was both a nationalist (as well as a racist) and a socialist. Hence, National-Socialist or Nazi. National Socialism — or Nazism — was a Marxist heresy and Hitler was a socialist heretic.⁷

Yet most of the historiography on Hitler has brought most of his crimes and atrocities to the door of his nationalism (or racism) and almost none of these atrocities to the door of his socialism.

Nationalism can be and sometimes has gone to extremes, but this has paled in comparison with the extremes to which 20th-century socialism has taken us.

⁶ Eric Voegelin, *From Enlightenment to Revolution*, Durham, NC, Duke University Press, 1975.

⁷ Jerry Z. Muller, "German Historians at War", *Commentary*, May 1989, p. 33-41.

Mediating Institutions

Nation- and state-building must be informed by the distinction Michael Oakeshott made between state and society.⁸ The Russian communist and imperialist state has disintegrated; the patrimonial system of Russia has imploded for the third time in its history, the first time being during the "Time of Troubles" in the 16th century, the second in 1917, and the third in 1991. On each occasion the implosion left nothing but atomised individuals or, as one historian described it, "a base people" with no society. After each implosion there was no network of lateral and horizontal social bonds and no mediating institutions between the individual and the imploded state. Therefore, parallel to building states the people of eastern Europe must build non-governmental, non-state voluntary community institutions of every variety while simultaneously building a state.

Parties

Competition for the right to govern and for political power must take place among serious political parties. A political party is a unique modern institution. It is not an association, a club, a brotherhood, a congregation, a confession, a faction, a lobby, a special interest group or a single-issue pressure group.

A national political party has to have an outward outlook and reach, members in every constituency, a national programme or platform, and an open membership. The newly independent states must have more than one serious and coherent political party and far less than the embarrassing and self-defeating number of 20 or 30.

Political parties must for the most part be informed by the political and ideological legacy of the West and the real remaining differences between left and right, liberal and conservative.

The Communist party, which in fact was a fanatical *ersatz* religious sect, must remain outlawed on the principle of "the separation between church and state".

The Rule of Law

A state is a constitutional and an architectonic order in which there is a rule of law and a constitution based on viable laws, a constitution of order and liberty.

You build a state from the bottom up like a house, or rather you bring it up like a child. This must be based on a proper conception of the nature of the human being as a creature of God with God-given rights which the state is established to protect. This is contrary to statism and totalitarianism.

⁸ Michael Oakeshott, *On Human Conduct*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1975.

Statism and totalitarianism are based upon the principle that “everything is forbidden unless permitted by government”. A civilised democratic state is based on the opposite principle of “everything is permitted unless expressly forbidden by law”. This is similar to the Ten Commandments, most of which are formulated in the negative: Thou shalt not.... And what is not expressly forbidden is permitted.

Professor Hayek has distinguished states that are based on *nomos* or *telos*, procedure or cause. The state should essentially be like a night watchman. When the people are up and about and working the state should sleep. When the people are sleeping the state should be watching for foreign enemies.

Capitalism

An economy is an aspect of the state. Economic conduct is a part of and an aspect of human conduct in general. As I said earlier, an economy is structured and shaped by the political order and the constitution. There are essentially only two types of political orders and therefore two types of economies. There are planned or command economies and free or liberal economies. In other words, there are either variants of mercantilist, feudalist, socialist or communist economies, or free enterprise so-called capitalist economies.

Capitalism, of course, is a Marxist misnomer for free enterprise and unhindered entrepreneurship. Karl Marx confused the early monopolistic capitalism of 19th-century industrial Britain with the exclusive reign of capital. Hence, the name capitalism for a free-enterprise, liberal, democratic political and economic order. The question since has been, is there “a third way” between capitalism and communism? This quest has driven Catholic social thought from “Rerum Novarum” to “Centessimus Annus” in May 1991, when Pope John Paul II moved away from a redistributionist approach based on liberation theology and renewed the church’s emphasis on free enterprise, the production of wealth, work and fair profit.⁹

Francis Bacon

Francis Bacon was the first to synonymise a state with an economy. For Bacon an economy *was* the state. This was a mistake. An economy is not a state and a state is not an economy. A state or a *polis* has an economy. First one must build a state as a precondition for a thriving and developing economy.

Supply-Side Economics

Free enterprise or capitalist economies have had a tendency or inclination towards either “demand-side” (or Keynesian and Galbraithian) thinking, or “supply-side” thinking as articulated by Adam Smith and George Gilder. In the welfare capitalist state since the New Deal of the 1930s the dominant

⁹ John Paul II, “Centessimus Annus”, *Origins*, vol. 21, no. 1, May 16, 1991, p. 2-24.

orthodoxy has been demand-side thinking in which the emphasis has been on demand as an engine of growth. And, of course, wealthy, developed countries can and perhaps should afford demand-side policies for some time. But not forever. Underdeveloped or developing economies (or ruined ones like in the former USSR), on the other hand, are better served by supply-side economics in which the inventive supply and production of goods creates a demand and fuels the economy.¹⁰

Foreign Aid

Take the issue of foreign aid. Should the West aid the ailing economies of the East? Should the newly independent states ask for foreign aid? Will foreign aid help or hinder? Contemporary supply-side experts on development like Professor Peter Berger go so far as to say that foreign aid has *caused* underdevelopment. In other words, it seems that the newly independent states of eastern Europe will have to virtually pull themselves up by their own bootstraps.

The Primacy of Foreign Policy

Here we come to "the primacy of foreign policy over domestic policy", as taught by Dmytro Dontsov and usually inverted by modern political analysts. The new states need an independent, loyal military for self-defence and protection, and that must be one of the first acts of nation- or state-building in eastern Europe.

In the old pre-communist patrimonial regime and during the communist era in the USSR, Ukraine was a subject of Russia's foreign policy in spite of Russia's propaganda about family, fraternity and "little brotherhood". In the post-communist order of independent states Ukrainian-Russian relations must continue as foreign policy relations. But it must be remembered that unlike domestic policy, foreign policy can change suddenly, radically and forcefully. Therefore, just as politics must drive economics, foreign policy must drive domestic policy and the prospect of sudden foreign policy changes must be faced squarely.

From Under the Rubble

A truly independent, autonomous and sovereign state based on its own rule of law designed to protect the basic God-given human rights and liberty (political and economic) of individuals is the ultimate assurance that all remaining vestiges of communism and imperialism will be removed. But before we can build these newly-independent **states** in what were previously captive **nations** we must first get out from under the rubble.

¹⁰ George Gilder, *Wealth and Poverty*, New York, Basic Books, 1981.

To do that we must remember Professor Murray Rothbard's recent observation about de-nazification and de-communisation and the double standard that still continues to exist in the West. Professor Rothbard said:

“Regarding Europe I have a nagging two-fold question: Why has no one remarked on the incredible double standard in establishment treatment of ex-nazi and communist regimes? Both were despotic, evil and genocidal. After World War II Nazis and collaborators were: (1) slaughtered on the spot by vengeful Communist successor-regimes or by Communist partisans (as in Italy and France); (2) indicted and convicted by the Allies and then successor regimes for ‘war crimes’ against humanity with leaders put to death or sentenced to long jail terms; (3) masses of officials were ‘denazified and jailed or prevented from holding office’; and (4) for the past 47 years alleged ex-nazis were made to stand trial in their Communist-run homelands or Israel.

Consider the contrast in treating Communists since 1989. Not only guards but high officials, even secret police officials, have not only not been executed or tried for their crimes against humanity, but most of them are still there, still in place — either as bureaucrats serving new regimes or as ‘former’ Communists now calling themselves ‘social-democrats’ or whatever. There has been no policy of de-communization and no lustration law”.¹¹

And before a new house or an independent nation-state can be constructed the ruins of the previous structure must be completely cleared. ■

¹¹ Murray Rothbard, “Cultural Revolutions: Regarding Europe”, *Chronicles*, October 1992, p. 7-8.

THE FORMATION OF LEGAL TIES BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND UKRAINE

Victor Muravyev

The history of direct legal relations between the European Community (EC) and Ukraine is rather short and fairly uneventful. There are several reasons for this. To start with one should recall that official relations between the EC and the former USSR (which included Ukraine) were established only in June 1988, when the Joint Declaration on Mutual Recognition between the EC and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) was signed in Luxembourg.¹ This paved the way for the conclusion, at the end of 1989, of a trade, commercial and economic cooperation agreement between the USSR and the EC and also an agreement on trade in textile products.²

The collapse of the USSR, following the landslide vote for independence in the all-Ukrainian referendum of December 1, 1991, aborted a projected new broader agreement between the EC and the Soviet Union. This had been proposed by France and Germany only one year after the first agreement between the two sides was signed. The proposed agreement had had twin aims: political and economic. It was intended to reflect the EC commitments to democratic reform within the Soviet empire, on the one hand, while, on the other, it might have led to the formation in the foreseeable future of a free trade area including the Common Market and the internal market of the USSR.

The overwhelming pro-independence vote of the Ukrainian people prompted the EC to issue on December 2, 1991, a Declaration on Ukraine.³ This welcomed the democratic manner in which the referendum had been conducted and called for Ukraine to pursue an open and constructive dialogue with the other republics of the dying Soviet state in order to ensure that all existing international obligations were maintained. It also included a number of clauses relating to Ukraine's commitments to respect all the international obligations of the USSR in the realm of arms control and nuclear non-proliferation. In the Declaration the EC called on Ukraine to accept joint liability for the Soviet Union's foreign debts.

The response of newly-independent Ukraine to this document and similar acts of a number of other states was very rapid and constructive. On

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¹ See: *Official Journal of the European Community (OJEC)*, 1988, L157/35.

² See: *OJEC*, 1989, L 397/2, *OJEC*, 1990, L 68/2.

³ Source: EC Commission.

December 5, 1991, the Ukrainian Parliament adopted an "Appeal to the Parliaments and People's of the World" expressed its willingness to comply with all the main provisions of the EC Declaration.⁴

Nevertheless, it has taken some time for the EC to accept the new realities which emerged after the breakdown of the USSR. The process of rapprochement between the EC and Ukraine has not always been totally smooth and, on occasion, has been fraught with misunderstandings. Thus, the EC turned out to be among a small group of somewhat confused states and international organisations which precipitated the official recognition of the so called Commonwealth of Independent States — to the great surprise of the parties to the agreement on the CIS who when signing it had no intention of creating a new international legal entity.

On the other hand, the EC and its member states realised fairly rapidly that the collapse of the USSR would demand the reappraisal of their approach towards the newly independent states (NIS). Now they would have to deal with each republic separately, even while at the same time trying to maintain the economic and political stability of the territory of the former Soviet empire by preserving existing ties among the NIS. For this reason, in the first half of 1992 the EC institutions adopted several decisions on the distribution among the NIS of import and export quotas formerly allocated to the Soviet Union.⁵

Parallel to all this, the EC began reallocating its economic and technical assistance to the former USSR. At the beginning of 1992 the technical assistance programme was reshaped and renamed TACIS (Technical Assistance for the Commonwealth of Independent States). This programme aims at helping the recipients to introduce a system of trade regulation compatible with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Such a system will facilitate the subsequent integration of the CIS states into the open international system and, in time, further improvements in access to markets.

The areas covered by TACIS include human resources' development, food production and distribution, networks (energy, transport and telecommunications), enterprise support services, and nuclear safety. Within the framework of TACIS, new indicative programmes have been signed with each of the former republics, including Ukraine, reflecting their particular needs. Thus, of the 300 M ECU allocated in 1992 to indicative programmes, Ukraine received 47 M ECU.⁶ Particular emphasis is placed on the sphere of privatisation in Ukraine.

EC efforts in the field of nuclear safety were extended in June 1992 by the signing of an agreement with Russia, Belarus and Ukraine setting up a pro-

⁴ See: *Holos Ukrainy*, December 7, 1991, p. 2.

⁵ See Commission Regulation N 723/92 of March 23, 1992, OJEC L 79/5; Council Regulation N 848/92 of March 31, 1992, OJEC L 89/1; Council Decision of March 31, 1992, OJEC No. L 89/3; etc.

⁶ Source: EC Commission.

gramme for studying the radioactive contamination resulting from the Chernobyl disaster. This programme is intended to broaden the technical skills needed to contain such accidents, to improve emergency management procedures, and so on. The total cost of the programme is 10 M ECU.⁷

However, the most dramatic step made by the EC in its relations with Ukraine and other NIS was the decision to reach an agreement on cooperation with each of them individually. On April 6, 1992, the EC Commission submitted to the EC Council of Ministers a directive on the negotiation of cooperation agreements with Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. These will replace the 1989 treaty with the USSR on trade, commercial and economic cooperation, the provisions of which the EC has continued to apply up to now. The new agreements constitute a further step forward in the recognition of the drastic changes that have occurred in this region. They will put an end to the sometimes ambiguous stance taken by the EC with regard to the CIS, since their conclusion will mean the establishment of permanent bilateral political and economic relations between the EC and each of the other NIS with which separate agreements will be reached. For Ukraine, this means the start of a process of integration into the larger Europe on the basis of geographical position and the sharing of common political, economic and legal values.

Nevertheless, some time still had to elapse before the EC and Ukraine began their first contacts aimed at the conclusion of such a cooperation agreement. This delay may be explained by several factors. Firstly, it seems that the Western World had been bewildered by the fact that Ukraine established its independence so rapidly and so peacefully. The West needed time, therefore, to formulate its strategy towards this "new" country. The lack of a coherent policy towards Ukraine was concealed by eloquent discussions on the place of Ukraine in the future European structure and the need for Ukraine to maintain her traditional economic ties with the other NIS on account of the high degree of regional specialisation within the former USSR, the heavy degree of interdependence, and the fact that it would be counter-productive to erect new trade barriers between the independent republics, just at the time when the Maastricht Treaty stipulated the elimination of the remaining economic and legal restrictions within the EC.

It seems, however, that the most important fact is that the EC was unwilling to disrupt the established pattern of relationship between its members and what had been the former USSR. In these relations the Soviet Union had served mainly as a supplier of raw materials to Western Europe and constituted a very large potential market for goods from the EC. Hence the EC was rather reluctant at first to assist the NIS to carry out structural economic reforms. Quite obviously the EC is not interested in new competitors in its own market, particularly at a time when some of its member states such as

⁷ Source: EC Commission.

France, Germany and Great Britain are facing serious economic problems while the prospects for consolidation within the EC are not too bright.

This approach can be observed in some publications analysing the relations between the EC and Eastern Europe, the authors of which, while admitting that in terms of economic cooperation, the EC and Ukraine can complement each other, nevertheless assign Ukraine a place in the backyard of the larger Europe.⁸

As for the Ukrainian policy towards the EC, this is based on a strong desire to become an integral part of the enlarged European economic, political and legal space. The arguments are that geographically Ukraine is situated in the heart of Europe, and has various ties, deeply rooted in history, with a large number of European countries. On the other hand, Ukraine is very keen to reshape the whole spectrum of her relations with her neighbours in order to make them more efficient. It is well understood by many Ukrainian politicians that if the country wants to be an integral part of the larger European area, she must live up to common European standards.

Accordingly, the Ukrainian officials in charge of foreign policy have worked out a system of priorities in which cooperation with Western Europe is considered of paramount importance, ranking immediately after ties with the countries contiguous to Ukraine. To some extent this essentially pragmatic system resembles the concept of concentric circles so dear to the heart of the EC Commissioner Jacques Delors.

However, one has to admit that the Ukrainian system needs more precise definition as regards the EC as a whole. It is even more important to have proper financial resources and personnel possessing the expertise to deal with the EC in order to bring this concept to life. Unfortunately, nowadays Ukraine suffers from a lack of both money and qualified personnel.

Despite this unfavourable background, both Ukraine and the EC have managed to reach many points of common interest. The rapprochement between them was reinforced by the talks between Jacques Delors and the Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk in Brussels on September 14, 1992. This was the first meeting of the highest officials from both sides.

In his address to the meeting Leonid Kravchuk praised the launch of TACIS and promised to base Ukraine's cooperation with the EC on the principles of the CSCE Final Act ("Helsinki Accords"). Kravchuk and Delors signed a Joint Statement confirming the need to formalise by an exchange of letters the continuing mutual obligations of Ukraine and the EC under the above-mentioned trade agreements of 1989. They also expressed their intention to reach an agreement on partnership and cooperation. It was agreed to set up a Ukrainian permanent mission to the EC and a delegation of the EC Commission to Ukraine.⁹

⁸ See, for instance, Perdita Fraser, *The Post-Soviet States and the European Community*, London, 1992, p. 25-26.

⁹ Source: EC Commission.

The first contacts between experts of both sides with a view to elaborating an agreement on partnership and cooperation took place in early December 1992. During this meeting the delegations reached an understanding on several very important and rather complicated issues. These included the problem of Ukraine's succession of the treaties concluded between the EC and the former USSR. This particular issue was resolved by an exchange of letters between officials of both sides.

In the course of these talks the EC experts presented the outline of the future agreement on partnership and cooperation. As pointed out by the members of the EC delegation, such agreements are foreseen with each of the remaining twelve NIS. (The Baltic states had already signed separate cooperation agreements with the EC in 1992).

The main concept of the new agreement with Ukraine is that it will represent a transitional stage between the agreements on trade and economic cooperation which were reached by the EC with the former European members of COMECON (Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, etc.) at the end of the 1980s¹⁰ and the association agreements concluded by the EC with Poland, Hungary, and the Czech and Slovak republics at the beginning of the 1990s.¹¹ So, although the agreement on partnership and cooperation with Ukraine does not predicate any special relations based on the proximity of interests and gradual attainment of common aims as do the association agreements with several East European countries, nonetheless it is expected to provide a framework for cooperation which will go beyond the bounds of simple trade agreements. As a rule the latter do not go further than tariffs and quota arrangements in respect of the exchange of goods.

The new agreement will provide for Ukraine a certain preferential regime in trade. However, it will not surpass Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status on the basis of Art. VI of the GATT.

On its part, Ukraine will extend MFN treatment to EC products.

The agreement also includes several other provisions intended to facilitate the expansion of trade between the two partners by undertakings to increase access to their domestic markets. Thus, the EC will undertake to abolish specific quantitative restrictions¹² on its imports from Ukraine (with the exception of some sensitive products concerning which several special agreements will eventually be concluded).

Ukraine will likewise remove equivalent trade barriers.

The EC is also expected to explore parallel autonomous measures for fur-

¹⁰ Often these are called first generation agreements, since they were the first wide-ranging treaties in the history of relations between the EC and the countries of Eastern Europe and the USSR.

¹¹ These are also called Europe agreements.

¹² Specific quantitative restrictions are a type of trade barriers erected by the EC for the products from a single country or several specific countries. See George Bustin and David Webb, "Breaking Down the East-West Trade Wall", *International Financial Law Review*, April 1990, p. 14.

ther trade liberalisation, such as the General System of Preferences (GSP)¹³ and concessions in products where Ukraine is a major exporter to the EC, since the GSP is considered by the EC to be the only available framework for making GATT-compatible preferential improvements. Here the agreement will be asymmetric in that the EC will undertake to grant concessions without initially asking for reciprocity.

The rest of the agreement will cover a vast array of spheres of mutual cooperation in economic and social development: restructuring, privatisation, industry, training, investment, agriculture, energy, environment, transport, telecommunications, drugs, statistics, consumer protection, competition, etc.

Both the EC and Ukraine will undertake to make efforts to ensure non-discriminatory treatment of workers from each party legally employed within the territory of the other party.

The other undertakings will improve conditions for business and investment as well as relations in areas such as services and capital.

The aim of this economic and social cooperation is to pave the way for the extension to Ukraine (at a future date) of the four freedoms: free trade in goods, free trade in services, free movement of labour and free movement of capital.

The implementation of these provisions will gradually establish a framework for the attachment of the Ukrainian transitional economy to the Common Market. However, one may reasonably assume that at the present time many of these provisions are inevitably more of a declaration of intent than a commitment for the immediate future, since Ukraine still has considerable catching up to do as regards its economic system, technological development and legal order. A special clause in the agreement will cover the protection of intellectual property.

The agreement will also cover cultural cooperation, in particular, extensive exchanges in the arts and humanities.

Like the EC association agreements with East European countries, the agreement with Ukraine will provide for political dialogue between the parties. A new relationship in the political sphere will be developed on the basis of common political values: principles laid down in the CSCE documents the rule of law, respect for human rights, etc. Such a dialogue will favour the development of common interests, and the integration of Ukraine into the international community. A special institutional framework will be set up to ensure close collaboration between the EC and Ukraine in this array of political, economic,

¹³ GSP covers a type of unilateral concession in the form of ceilings and tariff quotas granted to developing countries. They cover agricultural products, industrial goods and most textile products. They were introduced by the EC in July 1971. The first country from Eastern Europe to which GSP was extended was Romania. In 1973 the EC decided, at the request of the Romanian government, to include Romania in its GSP scheme. Until 1990 Romania was the only COMECON country to benefit from the EC's GSP.

legal and cultural issues. Joint institutions will be established to supervise and discuss the implementation of the agreement.

The major links of the proposed institutional structures would be: the Cooperation Council, the Cooperation Committee, and the Parliamentary Committee.

The Cooperation Council will include members of the Ukrainian government and the EC Commissioners. The Council will meet once a year to discuss issues of mutual cooperation of a strategic character.

The Council will be assisted by the Cooperation Committee, consisting of experts from both sides, who will deal with any major problems which arise in the course of day-to-day cooperation.

The Parliamentary Cooperation Committee will include members of the European Parliament and the Ukrainian Supreme Council.

The agreement on partnership and cooperation will constitute the core of the whole legal mechanism, governing the cooperation between the EC with Ukraine. It will be supplemented by other bilateral agreements with a more limited scope. Thus, to cover trade in products which are traditionally considered to be sensitive to the Common Market it is agreed that separate accords will be concluded. These will deal mainly with coal, steel, textile and nuclear raw materials, and their corresponding processed goods.

A separate agreement may be also reached in the field of protection of foreign investments.

At present Ukraine is very interested in receiving financial aid from abroad in order to stabilise her economy. However, the agreement on partnership and cooperation does not foresee the setting up of any special funds to provide financial assistance to Ukraine.¹⁴

It is of vital importance for Ukraine, therefore, for the agreement to include a special provision permitting Ukraine to receive additional loans directly from the member states of the EC.¹⁵

The conclusion of the agreement on partnership and cooperation may open up for Ukraine further opportunities in the sphere of her external economic relations. Much, however, will depend on the ability of the Ukrainian delegation to seize these opportunities in the course of the negotiations with the EC representatives. Thus, Ukraine might insist on the inclusion in the

¹⁴ Most of the assistance is being granted to Ukraine outside the framework of the agreement, mainly through TACIS, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, etc., in which the EC share forms a major part.

¹⁵ This provision is called the "Canada Clause", since it was first included in the cooperation agreement between Canada and the EC of 1976. Since then similar clauses have been included in many other agreements reached by the EC with third countries. The inclusion of this provision in cooperation agreements allows the member states of the EC to reach separate accords on financial cooperation with a third country. For instance, under such accords Poland has received 4 billion francs from France, 3 billion marks from Germany, etc. See Françoise de la Serre, "La Communauté Européenne et l'Europe Centrale et Orientale", *Revue du Marché Commun et de l'Union Européenne*, Paris, 1991, No. 349, p. 530.

agreement of provisions imposing definite obligations on EC member states to support the admission of Ukraine into the GATT.

Regarding political cooperation the Ukrainian delegation should try to enlist the support of the EC member states in eliminating the existing restrictions on the transfer of state-of-the-art technology to Ukraine. These were imposed on the former USSR by the Coordination Committee on export control (COCOM) and are still in force. The core of COCOM is formed by the USA, Japan and the member states of the EC.

The conclusion of the agreement with the EC will inevitably cause some drastic changes in the Ukrainian legal order, due to the need to harmonise the Ukrainian legislation with that of the EC. It is worth mentioning here the possible consequences of this process for Ukraine.

The influence of the Community legal order on the Ukrainian may be of various kinds. As experience has shown in the case of cooperation between the EC and other West European countries this influence may be informal and formal. Informal influence is reflected in measures directed towards the adaptation to Community legislation of the national legislation of a country which has a cooperation agreement with the EC, carried out by the authorities of the country concerned and taking place irrespective of the legal mechanism of the agreement, (although bearing in mind that both entities are gradually becoming more and more integrated).

In the case of Ukraine, an example of this process is the ratification at the beginning of 1992 of the law "On the restriction of monopoly and prohibition of unfair competition in the activities of an entrepreneur". The law is based on the main provisions of the anti-monopoly legislation and anti-monopoly practice which are now in force in the EC. Art. 85 and 86 of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community¹⁶ apply primarily to this case.

So, one may reasonably come to the conclusion that the process of informal adaptation of the Ukrainian legal order to that of the EC has already begun, in advance of the agreement on partnership and cooperation being reached.

An even greater influence on the harmonisation of the Ukrainian legal order with Community legislation can be exerted on a formal basis within the legal framework of the new agreement.

Here one may speak about three main channels of indirect formal influence of the EC legal order.

First of all, the agreement on partnership and cooperation will contain clauses in which the term "harmonisation of laws" is directly mentioned. This, however, does not mean that a special enforcement mechanism will be set up within the framework of the agreement. In the case of Ukraine it would be more correct to speak of "*de facto* harmonisation" rather than of direct commitments, since there will be no legal obligation to implement this nor any enforcement mechanism.

¹⁶ The Treaty of Rome establishing the European Economic Community was signed in 1957.

In this respect the agreement on partnership and cooperation with Ukraine will not go as far as the European agreements with Hungary, Poland, and the Czech and Slovak republics, since the latter contain clear obligations on the part of the associated countries to implement several packages of the EC legal acts covering competition, customs law, company accounts, etc.

In any case, if Ukraine is confident that her ties with the EC are irreversible, she may borrow the experience of some North European states, in particular Sweden, which adopted many legal acts of the EC long before applying for full membership. For many years, relations between the EC and Sweden have been governed by an agreement, whose provisions do not contain any strict obligations on the harmonisation of Swedish law to that of the EC.

By borrowing such experience Ukraine may reform her company law, tax law, customs law, banking law, law on intellectual property, financial services, etc. These areas of EC law have rather elaborate sets of rules which Ukraine, in any case, will have to take into account after legal ties with the EC are established.

Another important consideration here is the fact that prompt reforms of Ukrainian law in these fields will undoubtedly facilitate direct foreign investments in the Ukrainian economy, since foreign investors will then encounter in Ukraine a system of rules and regulations with which they are already, basically, familiar.

It would be good for Ukraine to establish, as soon as possible, a group of experts to draft Ukraine's new legislation in these fields, working in close contact with the relevant EC officials, on the basis of EC law.

Another channel of indirect formal influence of EC law on the Ukrainian legal order is what we have already referred to as "institutional". The agreement on partnership and cooperation stipulates the setting up of organisational structures. Besides providing legal expertise for Ukraine, some of these bodies may be invested with decision-making powers. Their decisions might contain recommendations which would serve as quasi-legislative instruments for the adaptation of the Ukrainian legislation to that of the EC.

The third channel of indirect formal influence of EC law on the Ukrainian legal order is the gradual changing of the Ukrainian legislation by means of the cooperation procedures.

As the experience of cooperation between the EC and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe shows, such cooperation normally includes the exchange of experts, the provision of information, training activities on the one hand, and (which is more important in our context), the promotion of European standards, systems of certification, regulatory procedures, the establishment of policies compatible with those applicable in the EC, etc. In any case, the cooperation procedure will result into Ukraine's endorsement of new norms and technical standards compatible with those of the EC.

It is approximately a year and a half since Ukraine became independent. During that time the country has succeeded in laying the foundations of its own legal order. Now she faces the next stage of her legal reforms, which

are intended to consolidate democratic institutions in Ukraine, to introduce a market-oriented economy, and to re-integrate Ukraine into the European and global community. Beyond all doubt, stable legal ties with the EC — the most dynamic economic grouping in the world — should help Ukraine to accelerate her process of legal reforms — even if the agreement on partnership and cooperation does not provide the kind of privileged relationship established by the EC agreements with Europe.

On the other hand, while emphasising that the new agreement is in no way equivalent to the possibility of association for European countries, the EC officials have not rejected outright the idea of some future association between Ukraine and the EC.

Ukraine should, therefore, endeavour to create the necessary conditions for such an association. ■

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DIMENSIONS OF INTER-ETHNIC RELATIONS IN UKRAINE

Serhiy Tolstov

The continuous decline and eventual collapse of the Communist social order in the former USSR in the late 1980s, and especially during the crucial year of 1991, was accompanied by a widespread revival of ethnic feelings and claims for sovereignty on behalf of most of the Soviet republics and even a number of lesser ethnic autonomous territories and regions within those republics.

The emergence of new independent states has transformed the geopolitical landscape of Eastern Europe and has provided radical changes in the structure of international relations as a whole. The governments of the various states which for decades had been inter-connected as semi-autonomous parts of a Soviet empire now had to define and support the national interests of the Newly Independent States (NIS) which often turned out to be contradictory to those of their neighbours. Such factors as the socio-demographic composition of the population and its ethnic structure rapidly became vital to the governmental national security policies of the new states and their programmes of state-building. The long coexistence of the former Soviet republics within the common borders of a virtually unitary centralised federation had resulted in an intermixture of population, while some of the indigenous ethnic groups had become minorities within their historical territories. In many cases this was a result of the policy of the central authorities. Some other negative consequences of Soviet "nationalities' policy" included the arbitrary definition of administrative boundaries and the suppression of any free-lance political expression of ethnicity, as well as a strict limitation of the intellectual cultures of the various peripheral nations.

During 1985-1991 some of these hidden contradictions found expression in the escalation of tensions and in the emergence of disputes founded in ethnic and religious prejudice. In some multi-ethnic areas (particularly in the Caucasus and Transcaucasus, Moldova and Central Asia) political violence spilled over into local armed conflicts, involving the extensive participation of illegal paramilitary units in the form of "ethnic troops" and militias, backed by various political movements. In other areas, ethnic groups of immigrant origin have encountered discriminatory practices and began to fear a possible deprivation of civil rights and/or curtailment of opportunities. But notwithstanding a complex of difficult problems of an ethno-regional and religious character, Ukraine has managed to escape political violence and has remained the most quiet and safe post-Communist republic.

This may be explained in various ways, but one of the most important factors was that the Ukrainian national movement had worked out and adopted a West-European-type concept of democracy. This aimed at creating a new civic Ukrainian nation-state based on territorial, not ethnic grounds. From the very beginning this concept proposed a "zero" citizenship principle for all inhabitants of Ukraine (that is, it offered citizenship automatically to everyone registered as a permanent resident of Ukraine at the time of the 24 August 1991 Declaration of Independence and the 1 December Referendum on Independence) and granted equal rights and responsibilities for all members of society.

Most of the principles and details of this concept of the creation of a multi-cultural society were discussed at the Second Congress of the Popular Movement of Ukraine (generally known as *Rukh* — "Movement"¹) in October 1990. They were subsequently included in the programmes and political statements of a number of democratic parties, which until August 1991 were in opposition to the government of the Ukrainian SSR. The *Rukh* programme on inter-ethnic relations recommended the following nine proposals:

- 1) support of ethnic representation in parliament;
- 2) selection and nomination of a permanent parliamentary committee on ethnic policy and ethnic minorities;
- 3) creation of a Ministry of ethnic minority affairs to be managed by the representatives of those minorities;
- 4) restoration and foundation of educational bodies and institutions for ethnic minorities, as well as newspapers, theatres etc.;
- 5) foundation of an editorial enterprise for literature in minority languages;
- 6) regular broadcasting and television for minorities and ethnic communities;
- 7) support at the state level for ethnic cultural societies;
- 8) restitution of buildings and other property of minorities' religious and other organisations, expropriated during the Soviet period;
- 9) elaboration of a general programme of ethnic cultural revival in cooperation with minority cultural societies.²

The political programme of the democratic movement provided a vital influence on governmental policy and was on a number of points taken over by the state administration after the proclamation of the independence of Ukraine.

¹ Documents of the Second All-Ukrainian Congress of Rukh (25-28 October 1990), in *Sucasnist* (Newark, N.J.), 1991, No. 1.

² On inter-ethnic relations in Ukraine. Resolution of the Second All-Ukrainian Congress of Rukh, 28 October 1990, in *Sucasnist*, 1991, No. 1, p. 172-173. See also Olexandr Burakovs'kyi, "Council of Nations and Inter-ethnic relations in Ukraine". Co-report on the Second Congress of Rukh, *Ibid.*, p. 56-60.

1. Ethnicity in Ukraine

Present-day Ukraine, which has a 52.1 million population consisting of more than 120 ethnic groups, is one of the largest multi-ethnic states in Europe. In addition to the native Ukrainian people itself, the largest ethnic groups are the Russians, Jews, Poles, Belorussians, Moldovans, Bulgarians, Hungarians, Romanians, Greeks, and Crimean Tatars.

During recent decades, changes in the ethnic structure have taken the form of a reduction in the proportion of inhabitants of native ethnic origin and a rise in the proportion of Russians and representatives of some other small immigrant ethnic groups. According to the data of successive censuses, the percentage of Ukrainians declined from 76.8 in 1959 to 72.7% in 1989, while over the same period the percentage of Russians rose from 16.9 to 22.1% (see Table page 31). This rapid increase in the number of ethnic Russian inhabitants (up to 43.4% over the period 1959-89) was a direct result of immigration, which was most intensive in the 1960s.³ The Russian ethnic group increased from 7.1 million in 1959 to 9.1 million in 1970, 10.1 million in 1979 and 11.36 million in 1989. The ethnic Ukrainian population numbered 32.1 million in 1959, 35.2 million in 1970, 36.4 million in 1979 and 37.42 million in 1989 (an increase in absolute numbers amounting to 13.1% over 1959-1989).⁴ In 1989, the remaining ethnic groups comprised together only 5.2% of the population.

The greatest influx of Russian population was directed to Crimea, a territory gravely depopulated during World War II. Other ethnic groups which exhibited a significant change were the Jews (42.13% decrease due to emigration to Israel, USA, Canada, Germany, or assimilation), Poles (39.67% decrease due to assimilation) and Greeks (5.52% decrease due to emigration to Greece). The most recent wave of immigration to Ukraine was that of the Crimean Tatars, who were deported to Central Asia in 1944 by Stalin's order and since then had been petitioning for the right to return. After 1985 they began to arrive in Crimea as individuals, and at the end of 1980s, after the Supreme Soviet of the USSR adopted some new Resolutions on the restoration of the rights of repressed peoples, this influx became more and more intense. By the end of 1992 the number of officially registered Crimean Tatar incomers totalled 187,000 (42,000 families),⁵ while their real number was around 230,000.

On the basis of historical features, economic conditions and ethnic distribution of population, we may postulate a division of Ukraine into eight

³ During the 1980s only about 100,000 immigrants to Ukraine from other republics of the USSR were registered. See *Swoboda* (Jersey City and New York), 19 December 1992, p. 1.

⁴ *Uryadovyi Kur'yer* (Kyiv), No. 60, 9 December 1992, p. 4.

⁵ *Uryadovyi Kur'yer*, No. 63, 18 December 1992, p. 7.

regional zones with different ethno-political conditions and more or less differentiated trends in inter-ethnic relations. These are:

- 1) the Kyiv metropolitan area,
- 2) the Central, Northern and Northern-Eastern territories,
- 3) the East (Kharkiv and Donbas),
- 4) the Southern territories,
- 5) Crimea,
- 6) the Western (Carpathian and Subcarpathian) territories,
- 7) Transcarpathia, and
- 8) Chernivtsi (North Bukovyna).

The most poly-ethnic areas are Crimea, Transcarpathia and the Donbas. The historic roots of the contemporary Crimean question go back to 1945, when the Crimean autonomous republic within the Russian Federation was dissolved, and 1954, when it was transferred, as an ordinary territorial unit,

Ethnicity / ethnic group	Total number		
	1959 census	1989 census	surplus 1989-59
Ukrainians	32,158,493	37,419,053	5,260,560
Russians	7,090,813	11,355,582	4,264,769
others, including	2,619,740	2,677,399	57,659
Jews	840,311	486,326	- 353,985
Poles	363,297	219,179	- 144,118
Belorusians	290,890	440,045	149,155
Moldovans	241,650	324,525	82,875
Bulgarians	219,409	233,800	14,391
Hungarians	149,229	163,111	13,882
Romanians	100,863	134,825	33,962
Greeks	104,359	98,594	- 5,765
Total population	41,869,046	51,452,034	9,584,988
Source: General Censuses of the population of the USSR, 1959 and 1989 Reports. "Natsional'nyi sostav naseleniia SSSR, po dannym vsesoiuznoi perepisi naseleniia 1989 g.", Moscow, Finansy i Statistika, 1991.			

to Ukraine, in accordance with the existing constitutional procedure of the Soviet Union. Previously, in the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries, Crimea was for most of the time included into larger administrative areas which were associated geographically and economically with Ukrainian lands. The demand for the restoration of Crimean autonomy was put forward in 1989 and 1990 during the election campaigns for the Supreme Soviets of the USSR and Ukraine. Crimea was the only region of

Ukraine where serious separatist forces had emerged under the Russian ethnic and political banners and were causing problems for national security and the territorial integrity of the state. It is also the single territorial administrative part of Ukraine where Ukrainians are in the minority, accounting for 25.75% of a total 2.6 million population.

After local elections of 1990, power in Crimea remained in the hands of the former administrative and territorial Communist Party officials who supported the continued existence of the Soviet Union and then demanded the recognition of Crimea as an autonomous republic within Ukraine. The first secretary of the local Communist organisation, Nikolai Bagrov, became chairman of a regional council. After a regional referendum in Crimea on the issue of the devolution of power, the peninsula achieved autonomous status in January 1991. Notwithstanding the results of this referendum an unofficial political movement for the secession of Crimea from Ukraine was launched in September 1991 and continued its separatist activity until August-September 1992.

Although the political situation in Transcarpathia is less tense, there are some political forces there which challenge the government's policy of state-building and claim a special status for the region as a whole. The multiethnic population of Transcarpathia includes Ukrainians, Hungarians, Slovaks, Germans, Russians, Poles, Romanians etc. The native Ukrainian population exhibits significant regional differences in language and folk culture in comparison with the rest of Ukraine. The lowland Ukrainians in the area were historically named *Rusiny* (in German — Ruthenes) and the highland ethnic groups were called *Lemky* and *Hutsuly*. In the former Austro-Hungarian Empire, this area belonged to the Hungarian possessions. In the 1920s and 1930s, when this territory was a part of Czechoslovakia, the local cultural movement found political expression in three ethnic trends — Russian, Ukrainian and Carpatho-Rusin, while the leaders of the *Lemky* demanded to be recognised as a separate ethnic unit. In the late 1980s there was some revival of these ethnic movements in the form of the Society of Carpathian *Rusiny* and the *Lemky* Union. These organisations stood for separate regional identities and protested against the alleged "assimilative" policy of Ukraine since 1945.⁶ A new Subcarpathian Republican Party was founded in Mukachevo in March 1992. This established contacts with the Republican Party of Czechoslovakia and demanded the organisation in this region of a coalition Provisional Government to be made up of representatives of the various ethnic communities. This party appears to be a separatist minority organisation and has not been officially registered. The illegal leaflets signed by the party leader V. Zayats called for the secession of the region and its transformation into an independent republic of Transcarpathian Rus'.⁷ Some local activists (and also some Czech politicians) supported the idea of trans-

⁶ See Olexa Myshanych, "The faith of regional cultures. From Sub-Carpathian Rusins to Transcarpathian Ukrainians", in *Sucasnist*, 1990, No.12, p. 80-98.

⁷ *Ukrainian News* (Detroit), 11 October 1992, p. 6.

ferring this territory to Czechoslovakia, but this lost all credence after the disintegration of that state at the end of 1992. So did the more romantic proposals to reunite the *Rusin* territories of Ukraine, Slovakia and former Yugoslavia and grant the *Rusin* dialect the status of an official language. But the economic influence of the more developed and prosperous post-Communist states of Central Europe was strongly felt in this region, particularly in comparison with the continuous deterioration of the economy, including the drop in real wages and the supply of food and consumer goods experienced in the rest of Ukraine.

During the referendum on Ukrainian independence in 1991 the Transcarpathian and Chernivtsi (North Bukovyna) regions held their own separate polls. These indicated that the majority of inhabitants of these regions wished their territories to obtain greater autonomy from Kyiv and to establish free economic zones with favourable conditions for foreign trade and capital investment.

In the Donbas and the south, the high proportion of Russophone and ethnic Russian population is also a cause for concern to the government especially on account of current political tensions between Russia and Ukraine. The main danger, from the point of view of Kyiv, is that many Russian politicians in Moscow cannot accept the idea of an independent Ukraine, or rather the loss of Ukraine from the Russian state. Attempts to mobilise the Russian and Russophone inhabitants of Ukraine's southern and eastern regions to join pro-Russian "inter-fronts", to establish a Russophone "Novorosiya" republic around Odessa or a "Donetsk-Kryvyi Rih" republic in the East, or to seek re-unification with Russia, may have failed, but Russian politicians from a number of political movements still try to intervene in Ukrainian politics by raising the issue of borders, challenging Ukraine's right to Crimea or expressing concern for the future of the Russian inhabitants of Ukraine.⁸ Many official representatives of the Russian government have frequently declared their intention to "defend the rights of Russian minorities" "everywhere", not simply in the Baltic and Central Asian states where they currently face discriminatory treatment. In response to this situation, on 26 April 1993, a new Ministry of Interethnic Relations and Migration was formed with Oleksander Yemets, a member of the (left-centre) Party of the Democratic Revival of Ukraine, as Minister.

The most dangerous element in the claims of the authorities of the Russian Federation is that they appeal to the whole Russophone population, irrespective of their ethnic origin and national self-awareness. This puts the language issue in Ukraine at the forefront of current politics, giving it a purely political significance. According to the 1989 Census, 66.3% of respondents named Ukrainian as their native language, while 31.3 % named Russian and only 2.4% indicated other languages. A considerable number of those who gave

⁸ Bohdan Nahaylo, *The New Ukraine* (London), Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1992, p. 19.

their native tongue as Ukrainian also indicated fluency in Russian. On the other hand, almost 11% of ethnic Ukrainians were predominantly Russian-speaking. The wide extent of bilingualism in Ukraine (the result of the former Soviet language policy), was reflected in the distribution of language use by sectors, with Russian dominant in industry, administration and education in most of the urbanised areas of the East, South and even in Kyiv. But the overwhelming majority of the population in these areas can understand Ukrainian as well since they studied it at school, constantly watch television programmes, listen to the radio, and use other mass media in Ukrainian. Bilingualism is less widespread in Crimea where almost all the local media, with the exception of some recently founded newspapers, use Russian.

2. The 1991 Independence Referendum: The Ethnic Option

The Ukrainian Declaration of Independence from the Soviet Union was announced on 24 August 1991, after the failure of the die-hard Communist coup d'état, and endorsed in the referendum of 1 December the same year, when 90.32% of voters came out in favour of independence (the share of "No" votes amounted to only 7.5% and spoiled ballots to about 2.2%). Even in the mainly Russophone areas, such as the Donetsk region, the share of "Yes" votes was 83.9%, while in Crimea it was 54.1%. In the Chernivtsi and Odessa regions, the vote in favour of independence was 92.8 % and 85.4 % respectively, and in Kyiv it amounted to 92.8 %.⁹

The result of the referendum came as a surprise not only to Western observers and Russian politicians but even to optimistic activists of the Ukrainian national movement, on account of the voting behaviour of the so called "Russophone" population in the East and South. But it is less astonishing if one recalls the historical process by which these territories were settled during the late 18th and 19th centuries, as well as the later migrations in the 20th century. The largest migrations from ethnic Russian lands occurred before World War II, and even much earlier, during the Russian empire. The majority of the inhabitants of Russian stock in these territories were born in Ukraine, often in the area where they now reside, and have never lived in Russia. Many city- and town-dwellers are of mixed ethnic origin and only the unchangeable designation "nationality" (ethnic origin) in their Soviet internal passports and the regular use of the Russian language at work and in communication conditioned their self-identification as Russians. In effect, we have here examples of mixed or double identities, because the majority of these people share, to differing extents, some forms of Ukrainian and local identities as well as their original ethnic ones.

The ethnic and political orientations of Russian ethnic groups in Ukraine have some special characteristics as a result of the existence of the

⁹ *Holos Ukrainy*, 5 December 1991; *Vechirnyi Kyiv*, 5 December 1991.

Ukrainian SSR as a formally sovereign republic during the Soviet period. The existence, however notional, of this state, helped condition the consciousness of its inhabitants, so that they could accept the new independent Ukraine as their homeland more naturally and with less trauma. The general sense of dissatisfaction with the political and economic stalemate of the Gorbachev regime and a deep feeling of being hard-done-by, due to the Central authorities in Moscow ignoring the republic's demands for self-rule, were shared by Ukraine's inhabitants of Russian origin, and such feelings formed a major factor in the social and electoral behaviour patterns during the independence referendum.

Taking into account the fact that over the past seven decades, the ethnic cultural habits, traditions, folklore, historic memory etc., and even some elements of the national character of the (predominantly urban) Russian population of Ukraine were largely destroyed both by the "internationalist" policies of the Soviet state, and by the very processes of urbanisation, migration and modernisation of society, while, at the same time, its standard of living did not differ from that of other ethnic groups, it becomes quite clear why political factors dominated over ethnic ones in public consciousness in 1991 and early 1992.¹⁰

Although support for Ukrainian independence within the Russian ethnic group was strong, its political self-consciousness seems to be unstable and wavering. From a sociological point of view, we can identify the existence of a number of transitional forms of ethnic and national self-identification which can incline towards the Ukrainian or the Russian side in response to current political and economic events. The possibilities of such a situation were clearly taken into account by President Leonid Kravchuk's administration and by the parliamentary institutions responsible for ethnic minority problems and language policy.

3. Governmental policy and inter-ethnic relations

Before 1991 Ukrainian governmental policy in many aspects ran counter to the programme of Rukh. The first Congress of Rukh in 1989 appointed a "Council of Peoples" as one of its divisions in order to work to prevent discrimination on ethnic grounds. In response to these activities of Rukh, and to offset their effect, the then government sponsored the establishment of an official Council of National (ethnic) Societies. The revival of ethnic awareness among the minority groups, together with the campaigning efforts of certain radical pro-autonomy movements influenced the government to organise a Committee on Nationality Affairs as a department of the Council

¹⁰ Previous samples gave less encouraging figures of ethnic Russians' political behaviour. The 1990 sample data gave 48% of ethnic Russian electors in favour of independent Ukraine and 38% against. See: Resolution "On inter-ethnic relations in Ukraine" of the Second All-Ukrainian Congress of Rukh, 28 October 1990, in *Sucasnist*, 1991, No. 1, p. 172.

of Ministers (later — Cabinet of Ministers) in July 1991. Until summer 1991, the Communist government tried to manipulate the ethnic movements and to provoke splits in the Kyiv Jewish Society, the Republic Turkophone Centre and the German Society. But the establishment in January 1991 of an All-Ukrainian Round Table of Ethnic Minorities' Organisations, which was subsequently transformed into the Democratic League of Minorities forced the government to take the ethnic movements more seriously.

The official task of the Committee on Nationality Affairs was to prepare and implement legal regulations for minorities and to help satisfy the social and cultural needs of ethnic minority groups. In autumn 1991 the Ukrainian Parliament passed a package of legal documents granting minorities equal rights in political, economic, cultural and social life. Under the terms of the Declaration on the Rights of Minorities (November 1991) ethnic communities were ensured the opportunity to use their native language, in areas of concentrated settlement, in administrative and governmental services, as well as the right to territorial ethno-cultural autonomy, including the establishment of ethnic administrative areas. Bulgarian and Hungarian ethnic local areas have already been established in the west and south.

There is serious evidence to suggest that Kravchuk's administration consciously tried to capture the initiative from Rukh and the ethnic movements and to implement certain points of Rukh's programme in order to pacify and harmonise inter-ethnic relations as well as to neutralise the influence of the political opposition led by Vyacheslav Chornovil.

The official concept of the state-building process has been summarised in various documents and statements. In his address to the World Congress of Ukrainians on 21 August 1992, Leonid Kravchuk spoke of the formation of a new nation-state entity which must include all the principal ethnic groups living in Ukraine. The President's address dealt with such concepts as the participation of the whole population of Ukraine in the state-building process; the inclusion of ethnic groups as integral components to the civic nation and civic society on the basis of citizenship and equality in civil rights and responsibilities; the leading role of Ukrainians in the nation-state building activities.¹¹

This new understanding of the "nation" as a form of civil society, rather than an ethnic community is now shared by the majority of intellectual leaders of the Ukrainian national movement. The well known writer and former political prisoner Ivan Dzyuba, who became Minister of Culture in Leonid Kuchma's Cabinet in October 1992, also noticed this change in the concept of the nation and together with corresponding changes in the character of Ukrainian nationalism. Dzyuba wrote that the "Ukrainian nation-state will follow the principle of national interest and national priorities in the meaning of statehood but not ethnicity, as do modern developed democratic states".¹²

¹¹ *Holos Ukrainy*, 22 August 1992, p. 3, 7.

¹² Ivan Dzyuba, "Ukraine on the path of state-building", in *Slavo i chas* (Kyiv), 1992, No.1 1, p. 10.

Since independence, various changes have taken place simultaneously in the character of Ukrainian nationalism, which has almost ceased to exist in an ethnic form and has incorporated the idea of a civil nation-state. During this time, the main challenges to national security in the sphere of inter-ethnic relations have thus been those posed by local ethnic nationalisms and regional separatist movements, together with external territorial claims and foreign illegal activities.

Before December 1991 no phenomena of the "ethnic vote" type were visible in Ukraine. No political parties or movements based on ethnicity emerged except the Republican Movement of Crimea (since September 1992 — the Russophone Movement of Crimea) and some radical Ukrainian nationalist groups in western Ukraine, who are generally known under the collective title of the Ukrainian National Assembly. But although the membership of these organisations was built up predominantly along ethnic lines, their aims were purely political. The first case of the principle of "ethnic voting being applied was during the independence referendum of 1991, when the Romanian minority in the Chernivtsi region abstained en bloc.

During the presidential elections of 1 December 1991 an ethnic Russian, Vladimir Grinev, from Kharkiv received 1.33 million votes (4.17%). Although he did much better in eastern Ukraine, where a greater proportion of Ukraine's Russians reside, he could in no way be regarded as a political representative of ethnic Russian interests. Some regional political parties of eastern Ukraine, such as the Liberal Party of Ukraine (founded in Donetsk in 1991) and, in particular, the Citizens' Congress which emerged in Kharkiv in 1992, demanded official recognition of the equal status of the Russian and Ukrainian languages at the regional level and a Federal-type constitution for Ukraine. But even these groups have no clearly stated ethnic orientation.

Evidence of strong centrifugal trends may be discerned in the political demands of certain regional and local industrial and administrative élites, which have considerable influence in Kharkiv, the Donbas, Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhya and which, potentially, can exploit current trends in the political behaviour of the Russian population. The most dangerous development is an increasing dissatisfaction with the policy of the Ukrainian government which is clearly incapable of managing the economic crisis. The totally incompetent and dangerously ineffective economic policy implemented by the government of Vitold Fokin (in power until October 1992) destroyed the illusions of many of the less politically aware who had voted in favour of an independent Ukraine in December 1991 in the hope that this would mean an immediate economic recovery and a higher standard of living than that of Russia. But during 1992, the continuing hyperinflation of up to 2,500% (double that of Russia) seriously affected the social sphere. Permanent pressure from the Moscow politicians, who expressed a deep desire to intervene in Ukrainian politics, together with a general dissatisfaction with the economic situation intensified the desire for autonomy in such multi-ethnic areas Luhansk, Donetsk, Transcarpathia and Crimea. At the same time,

regional political organisations which emphasise the necessity of regional self-government are gathering strength: the Civic Congress of Ukraine, the Party of Labour of Ukraine, the Movement for a Democratic Donbas, the Movement for the Revival of the Donbas, the Civic Union, and some regional groups in the Socialist and Liberal Parties.

National security problems were complicated by the presence of foreign troops, which were officially subordinate to the General Headquarters of the Commonwealth of Independent States Unified Armed Forces but which in fact remained under the political control of the Russian Federation. Many of the Russian officers of these units, often in association with retired ex-servicemen and veterans of the Afghanistan war, engaged in illegal activities such as the formation and training of Russian-oriented Cossack squadrons in some areas of Ukraine.¹³ The first Cossack units affiliated to the Don Cossack army were formed in 1992 near Luhansk with the tacit permission of the local authorities. These attempts to establish Cossack units in Luhansk (which in the end proved unsuccessful) were influenced by emissaries from the Rostov-on-Don area, just across the Ukrainian-Russian frontier. But the rise of the Cossack movement in the Bolgrad area near Odessa was the direct result of the activities of certain officers of the the Airborne Division of the CIS Strategic Forces. This division, which was based in the Bolgrad *rayon* (county) of Ukraine, and which also operated in Gagausia, in Southern Moldova, was a disciplined, pro-Communist force which was involved in the attempted hardline Moscow coup of August 1991. Under the terms of the Alma-Ata Agreement on Strategic Forces of 21 December 1991, this Division was placed under the administrative and operational control of Moscow, but was financed by the Ukrainian government. Although the the Airborne Division did not take part in the Transdnistrian conflict in Moldova, the emergence of the pro-Russian Black Sea Cossack movement in the Bolgrad area may be considered a side-effect of that conflict. The actions of the aforesaid officers thus established a strategically located Russian beach-head far beyond the borders of Russia. The first Black Sea Cossack Assembly was attended by the Commander-in-Chief of the Cossack Union of Russia, Martynov, and the Don Cossack senior official Naumov.

At the turn of 1992-1993, the officers of the the Division issued a demand that the Bolgrad area should be transformed into a special Cossack "national" administrative unit (*natsionalny okrug*) and that all the armed forces stationed in this territory should be subordinate to them.¹⁴ This situation was similar to what happened in the self-styled "Dnister republic" in Moldova,

¹³ See B. Nahaylo, *The New Ukraine*, p. 34, and J. Gow, "Independent Ukraine: The Politics of Security", in *International Relations*, Vol. XI, No. 3, December 1992, p. 259-263. The number of CIS and other Russian-controlled troops at the end of 1992 was approximately 120-130,000 men including the personnel of the Black Sea Fleet, the status of which is legally defined as a joint Russian-Ukrainian naval force for the three years' term, from 1992 to 1995.

¹⁴ *Ukrayinska Dumka* (London), 4 February 1993.

where the majority of the staff of the 14th Russian army possessed real estate (houses, apartments, allotments, vineyards, etc.) and the officers were directly involved in local politics. The foundation of an autonomous area around Bolgrad was also seen by these "Cossacks" as an opportunity to settle there permanently, keep their arms and establish a pro-Russian political enclave in Ukraine. It should be noted in this context that in February 1993, the Vice-President of Russia, Alexander Rutskoi, promised the Russian Cossack movement that he would seek for it to be given the official status of a reserve of the Russian army.¹⁵ In April 1993, however, an agreement was reached between the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence and the General Headquarters of the Russian army, under the terms of which the the Division will be divided between Russia and Ukraine. Some of its officers will be transferred back to Russia. The Russian part will cease to exist as a separate military unit, and the Ukrainian part will be reorganised.

It is also evident that the present armed forces of Ukraine cannot be regarded as a normally loyal and disciplined army of a nation-state, since they are, as yet, not fully established, while it is difficult to predict the behaviour of a significant part of the officer corps in the case of an armed conflict with Russia. In these circumstances the Ukrainian government and presidential administration has tried to tread cautiously on controversial issues in order to safeguard national peace and is making efforts to strengthen state power and preserve territorial integrity. In particular, as of May 1993, it has still not fully implemented certain measures of the 1989 Language Law, which stipulates the introduction of Ukrainian as the State Language in administration, education, the courts, etc. in all parts of Ukraine.

During 1992, certain reforms were likewise introduced in the sphere of executive power. A Presidential order of 14 April 1992 (with the amendments of 24 July, 1992) established a nation-wide system of local state administration. Under the terms of these Orders, the President nominates heads of the executive power at every level of local government, thus providing a parallel structure to the existing hierarchy of *oblast* (provincial), *rayon* (county), city and town councils.¹⁶

Some new laws enacted by Parliament over the period April-July 1992¹⁷ implemented the concepts of provincial self-government (provincial councils and their executive committees) and local government (councils and their executives in Kyiv, Sevastopol, other cities and towns, rural and borough districts). The former Soviet system was amended and divided into two levels — provincial self-government whose functions include representation of the interests of the local population and clearly defined responsibilities in the economic and social spheres, and local government under the general

¹⁵ *Nezavisimaya Gazeta* (Moscow), 5 February 1993.

¹⁶ "A Regulation on local state administration", in *Holos Ukrainy*, 8 August 1992, p. 4-6.

¹⁷ Law of Ukraine "On a Representative of the President of Ukraine", and the law "On local Councils of people's deputies and regional Self-government".

control of the state administration. This measure seriously limited the capacity of regional councils to express demands for autonomy and evoked the resistance of certain influential provincial circles and some groups in Parliament, including the Speaker, Ivan Plyushch.

After some sharp exchanges in Parliament, it was decided to hold a conference on "Current problems of Territorial Government in Ukraine", in order to resolve the contradictions between the new State Administration Structure controlled by the President, and the old system of local and regional councils. This took place at Kyiv University on 26-27 November 1992, and the two main speeches at this conference were made by Kravchuk and Plyushch.

It is quite clear that Kravchuk's views are more akin to the French model of a unitary state (possessing, however, regional councils with limited responsibility and a special status for Corsica). In his speech, Kravchuk stressed the need to prevent separatist trends at the regional level and to formulate a concept of regional policy which would help to solve the most difficult problems of the regions. He rejected the idea of administrative territorial reform in the immediate future as dangerous. But in the long term, the President did not object to the decentralisation of power even at the regional level — once the requirements of state-building had been met.¹⁸ This promise of devolution of a part of the state powers to the regional councils was designed to satisfy the ambitions of the regional establishments.

Plyushch's speech embodied a different view of the role of regional councils and their executives. It proposed to give the provinces (*oblasti*) the status of "state territories" (*derzhavni terytoriyi*) with limited legislative powers and some kind of administrative autonomy¹⁹ — in West European terms, something between the German *länder* and Italian provincial structures.

These problems of regional self-government and administrative territorial reform were directly connected with the debates on the draft of a new Ukrainian constitution published on 1 July 1992. This draft proposed a bicameral parliament in which the second chamber, to be called the House of Representatives, would be a form of regional territorial representation (Article 128). In addition, Article 228 on regional self-government envisaged territorial units of two levels — provinces (*oblasti*) and smaller units, counties (*rayony*). The responsibilities of these counties would not include legislative functions.²⁰ At the same time the plenary powers of self-government would be increased and there were some provisions in the constitution which envisaged constitutional changes in the future.

¹⁸ The Governing of territories in Ukraine. Theses of a draft report of L. M. Kravchuk, in *Uryadovyi Kuryer*, No. 54-55, 20 November 1992, p. 3.

¹⁹ The Governing of territories in Ukraine. Theses of a draft presentation of I. S. Plyushch, in *Uryadovyi Kuryer*, No. 54-55, 20 November 1992, p. 3, 6.

²⁰ See The Constitution of Ukraine. A draft endorsed by the Supreme Council for a national discussion, 1 July 1992, in *Holos Ukrainy*, 17 July 1992, p. 7,12.

From the point of view of the presidential administration and the government, it also seemed necessary to impose legal restrictions on separatist activities and ban anti-constitutional behaviour by local nationalist ethnic movements and groups.

4. The Question of Crimea

The earliest attempts to extend regional self-government in Crimea were made in 1990 and early 1991. In January 1991, the local Communist Party ruling élite, administrative group led by the Crimean CP First Secretary, Nikolai Bagrov, held a referendum, which secured the peninsula the status of an autonomous republic within the Ukrainian SSR. On 4 September 1991 the Crimean Supreme Soviet (parliament) declared the sovereignty of the Crimean Republic, so triggering the first constitutional crisis in the history of independent Ukraine.

During 1991 two other referenda were held in Crimea, associated with the wider referenda on the reform of the USSR (17 March) and on Ukrainian independence (1 December). During these referenda, the majority population of Crimea voted to be an integral part of an independent Ukrainian state.

The Republican Movement of Crimea (RMC) was founded by a group of opposition Russian nationalists. Its avowed aim was to develop and defend Russian identity and establish an independent pro-Russian republic in Crimea. Under its pressure, in July 1991, Russian was adopted as a "state language", side-by-side with Ukrainian, within Crimea. The separatists in Crimea were organised in two rival groups: Bagrov's ruling élite and those Russian nationalists who wanted to seize power themselves.

Since January 1992 nationalist parties and groups in the parliament of the Russian Federation permanently pressed the Crimean question and put forward territorial claims towards Ukraine. On 23 January 1992 the Russian parliament challenged the constitutional legacy of the 1954 transfer of Crimea from the Russian Federation to Ukraine, and declared this decision totally illegal and invalid on 21 May, soon after the local parliament in Simferopol proclaimed the full independence of Crimea. A new referendum on Crimean independence was scheduled for 2 August 1992, but the direct intervention of President Kravchuk and the Ukrainian government broke up these RMC-initiated plans for the secession of Crimea. The local referendum was postponed and then finally cancelled.

In April 1992, the Ukrainian Parliament passed a law "On the division of powers between the Governmental structures of Crimea and Ukraine".²¹ This was amended in June after a round of negotiations between Kyiv and Simferopol government officials on special provisions for Crimean autonomy. Furthermore, during these talks President Kravchuk threatened to give support to the claims of a number of local authorities in the agricultural areas of the

²¹ *Holos Ukrainy*, 25 July 1992, p. 9.

north and east of the peninsula who wished to secede from Crimea itself and remain a part of Ukraine, should Crimean independence become a reality.

The autumn session of the Crimean Parliament, which opened on 24 September 1992, annulled certain previous Acts, including the laws on separate Crimean citizenship and on the President of Crimea and finally rejected the motion to hold a referendum on Crimean independence.²²

The balance of forces in the (formally 192-member) Crimean Parliament showed that the number of convinced supporters of the Republican Movement of Crimea constituted a minority of some 10 to 20% of members actually present at the session, i.e. from 16 to 32 out of 154 deputies who took part in the voting. The new makeup of political groups in the local parliament comprised several main trends. The "Party of power" led by Bagrov has become more moderate since the negotiations of May and June 1992, as a result of which Crimea achieved the capabilities and rights to establish independent social, economic and cultural ties with other countries.

The Left-Centrist "Democratic Crimea" parliamentary bloc first of all accepted for tactical reasons Crimea's inclusion in Ukraine and then decided to cooperate with Kyiv-based political parties of a similar orientation and to participate in Ukrainian politics as an autonomous regional political movement, like the members of the Christian-Democratic bloc KDU/KSU in Germany.

The one definitely pro-Ukrainian force was an unstable coalition called "Crimea with Ukraine", which included local sections of Ukrainian political parties and some Crimean regional factions and groups of various political orientations.

During spring and summer 1992, another political bloc called the "Congress of People's Deputies: 'For Civil Peace and Concord'" began to be active and gained a certain political influence and moral authority in Crimea.

On 25 September 1992, the Crimean Parliament amended the constitution of the autonomous republic, bringing it into accordance with the Ukrainian law. As a result, the Republican Movement of Crimea found itself in a position of an illegal and anti-constitutional organisation. Its leaders therefore were forced to announce the dissolution of the RMC in order to establish a formally non-political Russophone movement of Crimea.²³

In the context of world constitutional experience, the present position of Crimea inside Ukraine is somewhat akin to the status of Northern Ireland under the Government of Ireland Act 1920, in force in this province of the United Kingdom until 1972.

Although the internal separatist forces in Crimea seem temporarily to have been defeated, the situation cannot be regarded as stable and secure, on account of the offensive tactics of the majority of members of the Parliament

²² Olexandr Pilat, "The Republic of Crimea has its own flag and coat of arms", in *Holos Ukrainy*, 25 September 1992, p. 3.

²³ Olexandr Pilat, "The Republic of Crimea is a legal democratic and civic state inside Ukraine", in *Holos Ukrainy*, 29 September 1992, p. 3.

of the Russian Federation and the direct involvement of many Russian officers of the Black Sea Fleet in the political struggle. According to media reports, in January 1993 the Russian Parliament began debating the political status of Crimea in order to prepare and introduce a confederate union between Russia and Crimea to demand some form of Russian-Ukrainian condominium in this region as a first step towards Crimea's inclusion into Russia. A radical demand for some form of Russian jurisdiction over the town of Sevastopol was also put forward at this time.²⁴

During the first few weeks of this year, the separatist movements in Crimea regrouped themselves into a coalition of Russian nationalist and Communist parties and movements under the name the "People's Unity" (*Narodnoye Yedinstvo*). It includes the remnants of the Republican Movement of Crimea (the Republican Party of Crimea and the Russian Society). The Union of Communists of Crimea, the Communist Party of Employed Persons, the Russian Party (founded under the influence of the ultra-right activist Vladimir Zhirinovskiy; this group is active in Sevastopol), and the Union of Russian Women of Crimea.²⁵

Another problem with political connotations concerns the ethnic movement of the Crimean Tatars. Their leading organisation named the *Mejlis* (parliament) of the Crimean Tatar people can be compared with the Islamic parliament in the UK or with the Board of Deputies of British Jews. The official programme of the *Mejlis* is to bring back the Crimean Tatars from Central Asia, to safeguard their settlement in Crimea, and to implement the Crimean Tatars' right to national self-determination on Crimean territory as their historic *patria*. Officially, the number of Crimean Tatars in the former Soviet Union is about 500,000, but the Tatar leaders quote figures of 600,000 or even 1,000,000 persons.

The *Mejlis* of the Crimean Tatar people has pretensions to achieving international respectability and recognition in the Islamic world. During his visit to Turkey in March 1992 the Speaker of the *Mejlis*, Mustafa Jemilev, was received at the highest diplomatic level.²⁶ While adopting a generally critical line, Jemilev's stance is much more loyal to Kyiv than to Simferopol. In autumn 1992, the first direct clashes between Tatars and the Crimean local authorities took place. There are some militant factions in the *Mejlis*, especially the semi-autonomous organisation "The National Movement of Crimean Tatars", which tried to take possession of lands on the sea coast and in October 1992 organised a violent attack on the Simferopol Parliament House in order to force the members to assign more territories for Tatar resettlement and funds for their social and cultural needs.

²⁴ Elena Nevelskaya, "Crimea: the Russian Parliament discusses the versions", in *Rossiyskiye Vesti* (Moscow), 20 January 1993, p. 1.

²⁵ See: Tatyana Korobova, "The People's Unity" — under this title a new bloc of socio-political organisations emerged in Crimea, in *Kievskiy Vedomosti*, 29 April 1993, p. 3.

²⁶ *Holos Ukrainy*, 18 March 1992, p. 14.

The Crimean Tatar movement seems to be the most contradictory factor of Crimean politics in the immediate future. Such issues as the stance of the Turkish government and ethnic organisations of Crimean Tatar-descended persons in Turkey, Islamic influence within the Tatar community in Crimea and dangerous trends in relations between the Tatars and the local Russian and Ukrainian population could possibly pose acute problems for Ukraine's national security policy in Crimea.

5. A model of security

The analysis of inter-ethnic relations in Ukraine provides an opportunity to elaborate and implement a general security model for the whole complex of ethnicity in transitional societies. The following scheme can be applied to security issues and national security policies in several other countries which have emerged in the geopolitical space of the former Soviet Union and in most of East-European states as well. This model deals predominantly with the whole complex of ethnic and regional politics including the internal and external dimensions of inter-ethnic and international relations on a state level.

General function: ethnicity and nationalism

The main goals of the state structures in this connection are:

- a) to preserve the integrity of the state,
- b) to maintain civil order,
- c) to provide state-building processes.

At the basic level, this presupposes the following internal and external factors and components which challenge the state's security interests so that an effective response by the government is necessary.

I. Internal dimensions

1. Effectiveness of the governmental system

- a. The political and moral state of society; conditions for democracy.
- b. Effectiveness of governmental control over territorial self-government and local government.
- c. National and local level of governmental support.
- d. Programmes and activities of the political on the national level.

In Ukraine, during 1992 and early 1993, when the influence of the state powers was quite effective, these problems were not viewed as a matter of governmental concern.

2. Constitutional order and constitutional proposals on the reform of the administrative territorial structure

The new Ukrainian constitution has not yet been adopted, indeed, the procedures for ratifying and implementing it have not, as yet, been agreed.

Three main variants of an administrative-territorial system have been put forward by various political groups and movements.

- a. A unitary state with some form of weak regional self-government.
- b. A unitary decentralised state with a large degree of standard autonomous powers for regional self-government.
- c. A federal state structure with a single form of self-government for the regions and an exceptional or standard level of autonomy for Crimea.

3. Federalist and regional autonomist movements

The activities of autonomist movements are of considerable significance in Crimea, and the Kharkiv, Donbas and Transcarpathian regions, but on the national level there is only a weak federalist movement which is represented only by a small group of members (representing peripheral regions) in the Ukrainian parliament.

4. Nationalist ethnic political movements and the ethnic vote

Since the Republican Movement of Crimea was dissolved, there is no longer any purely political organisations in Ukraine which take a Russian nationalist line. The two main Russian organisations in Crimea are the (politically oriented) Russophone movement and the (socio-cultural) Russian Society of Crimea. The Crimean Tatar movement is a politically mobilised and potentially separatist force.

The only community to date to vote as an ethnic bloc is the Romanian minority in the Chernivtsi region. In the future, however, the Crimean Tatars may well vote in this manner.

5. Separatist movements

Following the dissolution of the Republican Movement of Crimea in autumn 1992, local Russian nationalist groups tried to create a bloc of nationalist, Communist and pro-Fascist organisations, analogous to the radical-patriotic opposition in Moscow. This Communist-Republican alliance claims to have the support of 40% of the local electorate. Some illegal political groups in the Transcarpathian and Chernivtsi regions, have proclaimed separatist ideas, but these organisations do not enjoy any wide public support.

6. Ethnic violence and terrorist activities

No such phenomena have been observed in Ukraine, except for the Crimean Tatars' attack on the Crimean Parliament and some cases of physical violence perpetrated by RMC supporters against pro-Ukrainian politicians. A violent outcome is, however, possible, in the case of any future clashes in Crimea between the Tatars and the Slavonic population.

II. External dimensions

1. The level of the international recognition of state borders and international security guarantees.
2. Ethnic claims by foreign states and political movements.
3. Territorial claims by foreign states and political movements.
4. Foreign illegal activities.

A number of statements have been issued on the part of Russian and Romanian politicians, making various ethnic and territorial claims against Ukraine. Territorial claims have been constantly discussed in the Russian Parliament where they gained the support of the majority of deputies of different political orientations. In view of Ukraine's officially neutral status and her total lack of political and strategic allies, the threat of permanent pressure and sanctions from Russia must be regarded as very serious and dangerous.

External dimensions are comparatively far more significant in the current Ukrainian model of national security. Internal and external implications of inter-ethnic relations in Ukraine stress the necessity of reinforcing national security by adopting a new constitution which will give clear definition of regional status, the responsibilities of regional self-government and the status of Crimea. It is no less necessary to confirm the recognition of Ukraine's frontiers with her neighbours and to work out mutual agreements with these countries on the protection of the rights of minorities.

Obtaining international security guarantees in the context of Ukraine's long-term commitment to nuclear disarmament is likewise a very desirable but less realistic prospect. ■

History**THE UKRAINIAN NAVY IN 1917-1920***Bohdan Yakymovych***The Navy in the Era of the Central Rada**

Ukrainian traditions in the Black Sea Fleet go back a long time. For 129 years after the Pereyaslav Treaty,¹ from 1654 to 1783, the armed forces of the Hetman state² included a Ukrainian Cossack fleet. A careful study of the works of Russian scholar, Ye. Tarle, on the Russo-Turkish ("Crimean") War of 1854-1855, indicates that the defence of Sevastopol was conducted by sailors of Ukrainian origin, as their surnames corroborate. Moreover, the commander of the city's defence, Admiral Pavlo Nakhimov, came from the old Ukrainian family of the Nakhimovychi. Later, in 1905, the Ukrainian sailors Hryhoriy Vakulenchuk and Opanas Matiushenko led the uprising on the battleship *Potemkin*.

Ukrainian cultural organisations, such as the "Kobzar" society, established in Sevastopol in 1905, had a considerable influence in raising the national awareness of the Ukrainians in the fleet. Following the February Revolution of 1917, therefore, Ukrainian Sailors' and Soldiers Councils were set up on many ships of the Black Sea Fleet towards the end of April. Similar Councils were also set up within the Sevastopol garrison and the naval aviation service.

This spirit of Ukrainian revival could also be seen in other fleets of the Russian empire. In the Baltic Fleet, for instance, a Ukrainian naval revolutionary staff was formed by Senior Lieutenant Mykhailo Bilynskyi and Lieutenant S. Shramchenko. There was also a plan to Ukrainise the com-

¹ The Treaty of Pereyaslav between Ukraine and Muscovy was signed in 1654. Under its provisions, Ukraine accepted the protection of the Muscovite Tsar, but remained a separate body politic, preserving its own socio-political and ecclesiastical order, its own central and local governments, army and financial system, and the right to carry on limited diplomatic relations under the supervision of the tsarist government. However, Ukraine became incorporated more and more into the Muscovite state, gradually becoming a vassal state.

² The Hetman state (1648-1764) was an autonomous Cossack republic. Its head of state was the "Hetman". Hetman derives from the old German "Hoeftmann" or Commander-in-chief, and is approximately equivalent to the title of "Hospodar" of Moldavia or "Doge" of the Republic of Venice.

mands of the cruiser *Svitlana*, the destroyers *Ukraina*, *Haydamak* and others, to raise the blue-and-yellow Ukrainian national flag, and to transfer these vessels to the Black Sea. These plans, however, could not be implemented, owing to the Bolshevik Revolution in October/November, 1917. Ukrainian Councils were also set up in the Caspian, Siberian, Amur, and Northern Fleets. A very interesting proposal was put forward for the Caspian Fleet: Ukraine was to be given access to the Caspian Sea, through a flotilla of ships of the former Caspian Fleet, transferred to Ukrainian command and based at the mouth of the River Terek. Negotiations on this issue were initiated with the government of the Kuban National Republic.³ However, for various reasons, nothing came of this plan.

The Ukrainian Fleet in the Era of the Central Rada

In July 1917 the destroyer *Zavydnyi* became one of the first to raise the Ukrainian national flag. By November 1917 more than half of the ships of the Black Sea Fleet had followed her example. On December 22, 1917, the Central Rada⁴ in Kyiv set up the Ukrainian General Secretariat of Naval Affairs, headed by a well-known socialist activist, Dmytro Antonovych. Being a civilian, however, he proved totally incompetent in naval matters. The first piece of legislation concerning the fleet — the “Provisional law on the fleet of the UNR [Ukrainian National Republic⁵]” — was enacted by the Central Rada on January 14, 1918. This law proclaimed that the Central Rada had assumed control of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian empire. The fleet would carry out coastal defence duties and protect Ukraine’s merchant shipping on the Black and Azov Seas. The UNR undertook all obligations to maintain the fleet and harbour facilities.

The establishment of the Ukrainian Navy was opposed by all pro-Russian organisations and groupings. The Bolsheviks were particularly vocal in attacking it. The situation in Crimea kept changing. The sailors, bewildered by the various propaganda campaigns, changed their “national” views almost daily: raising the blue-and-yellow, the red, or black (anarchist) flags on their ships, according to which propagandist had impressed them most

³ The state which came into being on February 16, 1918, on the territory of the former Kuban oblast of the Russian Empire. When the Bolsheviks seized power in Petrograd, the Kuban organs took over full control and the Legislative *Rada* (Council) proclaimed the Kuban National Republic.

⁴ The Central Rada was set up in Kyiv on March 17, 1917, as an all-Ukrainian representative body. At the end of March, Professor Mykhailo Hrushevskiy, who returned to Kyiv from exile in Russia, became its president. On April 19-21 the Central Rada called an All-Ukrainian National Congress in which delegates from the organisations of the whole of Ukraine took part. The Congress elected the Central Rada as the standing Ukrainian representative assembly. It was overthrown by a coup d'état led by Pavlo Skoropadskiy on April 29, 1918 (see note 6).

⁵ The Ukrainian National Republic was created on November 20, 1917, by the Central Rada (see note 4).

recently. Finally, Kyiv realised its mistake in ignoring the strategic importance to Ukraine of Crimea, the general headquarters of the Black Sea Fleet. The Zaporizhzhya Corps was assigned to clearing Crimea of the Bolsheviks. A detachment led by Colonel Petro Bolbochan was dispatched to occupy Crimea and take over the Sevastopol naval base.

Despite strong resistance from the Bolsheviks, the battle for Melitopol began on April 18, which shortly afterwards fell into Ukrainian hands. Colonel Bolbochan's group rapidly pushed the Bolsheviks beyond the Syvash fortifications. After a successful night manoeuvre, Colonel Zelynskyi's troops caused panic among the enemy and the Second Zaporizhzhya Regiment occupied the enemy trenches. On April 22 Dzhankoy was taken, and on April 25 Simferopol was cleared of the Bolsheviks. The Hordienko Regiment occupied Bakhchesaray. A panic began in Sevastopol.

Following this successful military operation, conditions appeared favourable for realising the demands of the Central Rada law placing the fleet under the control of the Ukrainian state. The commands of the two largest ships, the dreadnoughts *Volya* and the *Empress Catherine the Great*, agreed on the election of a single command of the fleet, and on April 29 to raise the Ukrainian flag on all the ships. Those reluctant to carry out this order were to be forced to do so by the 12-inch guns of the two dreadnoughts.

Promptly at 16 00 hrs on April 29, 1918, the flagship *St. George the Bringer of Victories* gave the order for the fleet to raise the Ukrainian flag.

At that time the Black Sea Fleet consisted of three subdivisions of battleships (8 vessels), one subdivision of cruisers (4 vessels), one subdivision of hydrographical reconnaissance vessels (6 vessels), a division of destroyers (27 vessels), submarines (22 vessels), and support vessels for various tasks (5 gunboats, 6 mine-layers and others). It should be noted that both dreadnoughts — the *Empress Catherine the Great* (built in 1914) and *Volya* (built in 1915) — were modern, powerful ships weighing 23,000 tons, with a speed of 21 knots, and a crew of 42 officers and 1,200 non-commissioned officers and ratings. Their armament consisted of twelve 12-inch guns, twenty 130-millimetre and four 75-millimetre guns, and 4 mine-laying devices. The naval aviation consisted of around 20 amphibious aircraft.

Naval Forces of the Hetmanate

After the raising of the Ukrainian flag on the ships the Commander of the fleet, Rear-Admiral Sablin, sent a telegram to Kyiv and to the command of the German forces in Ukraine asking for the advance on Sevastopol to be halted. At that time the advance of Colonel Bolbochan's detachment was halted: the German command resolutely demanded the return of the Ukrainian troops beyond Perekop. Clearly, the Germans were primarily interested in Sevastopol and the fleet, which was based there. The conflict became so acute that the Germans actually threatened to disband the

Ukrainian units. Bolbochan's detachment left Crimea and went first to Melitopol, and then on to Oleksandrivka.

Meanwhile, the Commander of the German forces in Crimea, General von Kosch, replied that he had no competence to halt the advance, but promised to send Sablin's appeal to the German Commander-in-Chief in Ukraine, Field Marshal Hermann Eichhorn.

Without waiting for a reply, Rear-Admiral Sablin, who had little idea what was going on in Kyiv, decided to transfer some of the ships to Novorosiysk. Those that remained in Sevastopol were placed under the command of Rear-Admiral Mykhailo Ostrohradskyi. At 20.00 hrs on April 30, when the German artillery had already taken up its positions on the outskirts of Sevastopol, the two dreadnoughts, *Volya* and the *Empress Catherine the Great*, together with 15 destroyers, left Sevastopol. The following day, May 1, the Germans entered the city. German guards were posted aboard all the ships which remained under the command of Admiral Ostrohradskyi (primarily older vessels), and German flags were raised. The fleet, albeit temporarily, found itself in German captivity.

Relations between Ostrohradskyi (whom Hetman Skoropadskyi⁶ appointed on May 21 Ukraine's representative in Crimea) and the German command became very tense. Ostrohradskyi asked to be relieved of his command. He was replaced by Rear-Admiral Vyacheslav Klochkovskiy, who succeeded in establishing a dialogue with General Kosch. As a result, the Germans ceased raising their flag on certain vessels.

Rear-Admiral Sablin's squadron, which by now had arrived in Novorosiysk, raised the Russian naval ensign of St. Andrew. The Germans issued an ultimatum for all the ships to return to Sevastopol by June 16 (later extended to June 19). On the night of June 16, the dreadnought *Volya*, the hydrographical reconnaissance vessel *Trojan*, and 7 destroyers sailed from Novorosiysk to Sevastopol. The remaining vessels, including the other dreadnought — the *Empress Catherine the Great* — as a result of the activities of agents of the Entente and the anti-Ukrainian Bolshevik propaganda campaign, were sunk during a raid on Novorosiysk. Two motives were involved: the Bolsheviks did not want the ships to become Ukrainian, and the Entente could not allow the ships to fall into German hands.

When this part of the squadron had returned to Sevastopol, the Germans removed the officers and hoisted their own ensign on the ships and declared them interned. The Ukrainian government in Kyiv took no counter-measures against the German allies, believing that the issue of the ships and

⁶ Hetman Pavlo Skoropadskyi seized power with the support of the Germans in a coup d'état which overthrew the Central Rada (see note 4) on April 29, 1918. The name of the Ukrainian National Republic was changed to the Ukrainian State. On the day of the coup, Skoropadskyi issued a manifesto in which he proclaimed himself the Hetman of all Ukraine. He abdicated on December 14, 1918, following a mass uprising against his regime, handing over his power to his Council of Ministers, which, in turn, yielded it to the Directory (see note 7).

the fleet in general would somehow resolve itself with time. The Ministry of Naval Affairs therefore began drafting state and normative acts regarding the development and functioning of the fleet, its emblems, and so on. Order No. 166/28 of July 15, 1918, which ratified a law on naval uniforms, was followed on July 18 by the law on the naval ensign. On September 17 order No. 372/159 defined the pennant for the naval vessels and the standards of the ambassador and envoys of the Ukrainian State.

Other laws and regulations of that time included: "Regulations on the officer corps of the naval medical service", "Regulations on the naval medical service", "Regulations on naval representatives abroad", "Staff of harbour pilot stations", "Staff of the corps of naval coastal defence", "Regulations on the Council of the Naval Minister", regulations on various enterprises, belonging to the Naval Department, and other documents. In other words, preparations to draft a "Law on the fleet" were in full swing. In November 1918, the Germans handed back almost all the ships to Ukraine. Hetman Skoropadskyi's order of November 11 on the Naval Department ratifying the order of battle introduced a provisional Table of Organisation for naval staffing. An order of November 12, 1918, announced the first call-up of recruits, under the command of Commander L. Shramchenko. The same day Rear-Admiral Klochkovskiy was appointed temporary commander of the Ukrainian Navy, and Admiral Andriy Pokrovskiy Minister of Naval Affairs. At the end of November 1918, the Germans handed over the Mozyr (Pinsk) river flotilla to the Ukrainian state. Captain Illyutovych was appointed its commander.

In December 1918 the Germans left Sevastopol and other state ports, and ships of the Entente appeared in their place. Despite the fact that the Russian naval ensign of St. Andrew had been raised on the orders of Klochkovskiy, the Allies posted guards aboard all the surface vessels and began to divide them among themselves as the spoils of war. Some of these ships, including the dreadnought *Volya*, were taken by the Allies to Constantinople.

Naval Forces Under the Directory

The removal of the Hetman and the establishment of the rule of the Directory⁷ fundamentally changed the political situation.

A person of dubious political views, political commissar Akymov, was appointed to the Naval Ministry in Kyiv. He collected a team of near-incompetents, and set about introducing the "democratic-socialist order" by dismissing highly-qualified naval officers. Rear-Admiral Ostrohradskiy, the deputy minister, could do nothing. He saw in Akymov's actions an attempt to disintegrate the Ministry. These actions very soon cost the Central Rada very dearly.

⁷ The Directory was set up on November 14, 1918, to lead the uprising against Skoropadskiy. It was headed by Volodymyr Vynnychenko. Its members included Symon Petlura, Teodor Shvets, Andriy Makarenko, and Opanas Andriyevskiy. Following Skoropadskiy's abdication (see note 6), the Directory re-established the Ukrainian National Republic. Set up originally as a revolutionary leadership, the Directory was transformed into the official government of the Republic.

Order No. 1/696/50 "On the Naval Department" of December 25, 1918, installed First Lieutenant Mykhailo Bilynskyi as Naval Minister. He immediately removed the commissar from power. Under Bilynskyi's leadership, people with sound knowledge, breadth of outlook, and leadership qualities began to do serious work. In the course of a few weeks laws were adopted on the staff of the Naval Ministry, and a school for midshipmen, to be opened on October 1, 1919. On January 25, 1919, a "Law on the fleet" was adopted as the basis of government policy in building the naval forces, including naval aviation and the Marines. According to this law, the Ukrainian navy was to consist of combat and support vessels of all types.

This law provided for the creation of the necessary system of communications, a department of naval aviation, a system of coastal defence, and the required amount of support vessels for the fleet. The navy was to consist of 800 officers and 12,500 ratings.

The educational establishment was to include a Midshipmen's Academy, to be opened in Mykolayiv, with courses for officers, special officer courses (for navigation officers, electrical engineers, gunnery officers, and others), special schools for fleet petty officers and ratings, recruit training schools, and so on.

Part six of the law provided for the delineation of a theatre of possible operations, the reconstruction of naval ports and fortifications, the establishment of a harbour pilots' service and a hydrographical expedition of the Black Sea.

In accordance with the law on the Naval Department of January 27, 1919, and order of the Directory No. 57/28 of January 25, the ships under construction at the Mykolayiv and Kherson shipyards, which were to become a part of the combat fleet, were given the following names: to be commissioned in 1919 — the light cruisers *Bobdan Khmelnytskyi* and *Taras Shevchenko*, the destroyers *Kyiv*, *Lviv*, *Chybyryn*, *Baturyn*, the submarines *Shchuka*, *Karas*, *A.II. 22*, *A.II. 23*, and the submarine mother-ship *Dnipro*; to be commissioned in 1920 — the battleship *Soborna Ukraina*, the light cruisers *Petro Doroshenko* and *Petro Sahaydachnyi*, the destroyers *Ivan Vyhovskiy*, *Ivan Sirko*, *Pylyp Orlyk*, *Kost Hordienko*, *Ivan Kolliarevskiy*, *Martyn Nebaba*, *Ivan Pidkova*, and *Petro Mohyla*, and the submarines *A.II. 21*, *A.II. 24*, and *A.II. 26*.

At the same time the recruitment of a Regiment of Marines was begun in Vynnytsia, and then extended to Kolomyia. The idea was that the *hutsuls*,⁸ who were skilled in rafting logs down rivers would be good human material for the Marines. With the agreement of the leaders of the ZOUNR (Western Provinces of the Ukrainian National Republic⁹), the Directory issued credits

⁸ Inhabitants of Ukraine's Carpathian Mountain region.

⁹ On November 1, 1918, after the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Western Ukrainian National Republic (ZUNR) was proclaimed in Galicia and Bukovyna. On January 4, 1919, the Ukrainian National Rada, as the representative assembly of Western Ukraine, voted to unite with the Ukrainian National Republic (UNR: see note 5). The act of union was proclaimed on January 22, 1919, in Kyiv and was confirmed by the Ukrainian Parliament — at that time the Labour Congress (convened on January 23, 1919) — on January 28, 1919. The name of the Western Ukrainian National Republic was changed to the Western Province of the Ukrainian National Republic (ZOUNR). The final integration of the two states was to be worked out by the Constituent Assembly of all Ukraine, with full territorial autonomy being extended to Western Ukraine.

to enable West Ukrainians, who had been serving in the Austro-Hungarian armed forces, to return home from the Adriatic. The recruitment was completed in Brody, Lviv oblast. In June 1919 the I Hutsul Regiment of Marines went into battle against the Bolshevik forces at Volochyska. A little later, the II Hutsul Regiment of Marines was formed in Kamyanets-Podilskyi, and recruitment for the III Regiment was started. These three regiments formed the First Division of Marines.

Units of the First Division of Marines, including the I Hutsul Regiment, took part in the First (1920) and Second (1921) Winter Campaigns of the Army of the Ukrainian National Republic against the Bolsheviks. On November 17, 1921, in the village of Mali Mynky near Bazar Lieutenant Commander Mykhailo Bilynskyi fell in battle against the forces of Hryhoriy Kotovskiy and most of the Marines with him met the same fate. The rest were shot by the Bolsheviks.

The ships, which the Entente had taken to Constantinople in 1919, were forced to raise the Russian naval ensign of St. Andrew. Shortly afterwards, they were transferred to Sevastopol and placed under the command of the White General Pyotr Wrangel, who used them in the fight against the Bolsheviks. It was on board these ships that Wrangel's army (around 80,000) was evacuated in November 1920 to Constantinople and surrounding areas, and later to the French North African port of Bizerta. Some of the ships fell into the hands of the Bolsheviks who incorporated them into their fleet.

The ships which were in Bizerta were claimed by both the governments of Bolshevik Russia and the Ukrainian National Republic (the latter was at that time in exile and demanding its rights through the League of Nations). However, France began to sell some of the ships for scrap. Some of these ships were incorporated in the French fleet and were still sailing under the French flag as late as the beginning of the 1950s.

At the end of 1919 the Mozyr (Pinsk) flotilla was seized by the Poles, who included it in the Polish Pinsk flotilla.

In 1922-1939 the Bolsheviks put on trial a number of Ukrainian naval officers and ratings who had taken part in the struggle for liberation, accusing them of "Petlurism" (Ukrainian nationalism). The percentage of Ukrainian sailors in the Black Sea Fleet fell sharply in comparison with the pre-revolutionary times. The Bolshevik ideological machine had learnt its lesson from the Ukrainisation of the fleet during the revolution and began systematically to staff it with personnel from the Russian territories. Thus ended the history of the Ukrainian Navy in 1917-1920. ■

Literature**POEMS FROM KHARKIV***Stepan Dupliy*

Stepan Dupliy is a physicist working in the nuclear physics department of Kharkiv University. Although in his covering letter, the author stated that he agreed to any necessary editorial corrections, the Editors have decided to print them exactly as received.

LIFE

I have not been full of my praying delight
And I have shrunken.
What have I done? — The old man
Is dispersed by hopelessness.
The restlessness —
The mind's evil —
Reigns not there.
The nonhuman delicacy
Is not the Ray.
Please, answer!
Who is there? —
The immenseness
Of the morbid bondage.
Oh! Priestess of dreams! —
You are being poured over
From head to foot
By the nightmare.
You are a lover
Of the inconsolable and meek
Corpses —
LIFE!

The dawn
Has stained my meaning
With napalm.
Oh! No!
Do not betray
The steel of dreams —
Oh! Yeah!
I am alive with Fullmoon.
The distance of essence
Is shining
With the salvation
Of a rush to the Nothingness —
The Morgue
Of the pious
And guiltless
Strivings.
The delight
Of the loneliness's Dream —
The wheezing moan
Of the exhaustedness
Of evil —
To Sorrow,
To the naiveness of Time,
To the imperishableness
And gibberish.
The inviolable
Soul's outcast —
The dawn.

RADIATION

My air —
 Is the blinding flow of radiation.
 I gnaw it —
 And my life is wiped by X-rays.
 No!
 I don't want to decay on atoms!
 Do I go that way? —
 We are blamelessly squeezed.
 The quiet and calmness:
 "What's the matter, don't be afraid..."
 By what do you measure everything?
 You cannot get round
 The childish prattle
 And trembling of essence
 By the faith in the degrees of lie.
 So who is to be responsible?...

The coast of my gibberish is cut up
 By neglectfulness of senses.
 I'll burn my sinfulness to pay my debts to the night,
 I'll burn my sinfulness to pay my debts to the night.
 I'll soften in the colours of lines
 Of the thrown-away idylls —
 I'll forget the Passion cry,
 I'll forget the Passion cry.
 I'll carry out His words
 And take her white-lie kisses —
 I'll beautify my crypt by anguish,
 I'll beautify my crypt by anguish.
 I'm not afraid of the destroying Hope,
 I'll let out my moan to them
 Before I find the final peace,
 Before I find the final peace.
 Skinned by Him, all infinities
 Are ground
 on the table
 of my soul's dream —
 The realms
 of fancy
 are lapped by vileness:
 Weeping is an echo from the unknown Abyss.

The nimbus melted
Extorting a moan.
Stand still
Life-cyclotron!

I dreamt of night —
The garden of graves.
Two steps — away
Go the debts of my soul.

DREAM

I pray: do read
A moment yelling,
Do not dare leave
Concealing your face.

Please flood with Dream
The stagnated Meaning
To burn to ashes
For Fate's encore.
Forgive my wrecking
And failures, soul selling.
Their's is the delirium —
Mine is Work, Home, Morgue.
I've stonily awoken —
A ray is gliding
Off the bottom of madness:
I'll keep the coup inside me.
Naivete gnaws, hurts, revenges.
My Sin is dethroned — the fancy-realm AIDS.

...


Crying. I stand by the window —
Everywhere there is that cruel silence of mine.
Cri de coeur melts into the night,
Extorting my daughter-hope.

Time revenges for my lying role —
I know it in my heart, but how to burn my failures?
The phone has been done to death —
With my dearest I've become a widower.

Do not beat me with the past, I'm kissing the ground.
What on earth shall I do? Get cool for good?
The gibberish glides to the depths of my soul.
How not to waste? — Write to write yourself out...

SUPERMANIFOLD

Doom is covered with the snow of idylls —
Whether to save my Light
Or to clothe up
My latest and inner worries
In the mud of etceteras?
No!
Fylfot of dreams
Unspoken and unuttered,
Caresses —
Poisoned by the mind.
Life's
Supermanifold
Lies
In Gibberish...



News From Ukraine

Ukraine Chides Yeltsin Over Russia's Police Role

KYIV — Responding to Boris Yeltsin's appeal for a United Nations mandate to act as a guarantor of peace in the former USSR, Ukrainian officials attacked the Russian president on Monday, March 1, for trying to become the policeman over other countries.

"This would mean dictatorship, interference in internal affairs and a threat to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine", the Foreign Ministry of Ukraine said.

Yeltsin said on Sunday, February 28, that Russia should be granted special powers on the territory of the former Soviet Union to stop ethnic conflicts. The Ukrainian Foreign Ministry said this would be a crude violation of all existing international laws. "No one in Ukraine made such a request of the Russian president", it said.

Mykola Mykhailychenko, chief political adviser to President Leonid Kravchuk, said earlier Kyiv would never recognise Ukrainian territory as a sphere of Russian special interest. "We will never agree to Russia once again becoming an elder brother or any other kind of brother. We want relations of equality", he added.

Mykhailychenko said he saw the appeal as a Russian attempt to win

international endorsement for its long-standing drive for dominance in the region of the former Soviet Union.

Yeltsin insists he has no ambitions to reassert Kremlin rule over the former Soviet republics, but sees any instability among Russia's neighbours as a great threat to Russia. Borders are largely open and the flow of refugees and guns from numerous conflict areas is difficult to control. The Transcaucasian republic of Georgia last month accused Russian troops on its territory of interfering in civil conflict there and called for their withdrawal. In his speech Yeltsin did not say what powers he sought from the international community. His brief appeal may be viewed more sympathetically in Central Asian states such as Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Russian troops are currently playing a peace-keeping role in Tajikistan, which has been torn by clan and political conflict for a year.

In Budapest, Kravchuk suggested on Friday, February 26, that Eastern Europe needed new security solutions to cope with the vacuum left by the Soviet Union's collapse.

"We need to create a region of security in East Europe... in a broader sense", Kravchuk told a news conference after holding talks with

Hungarian President Arpad Goncz and Prime Minister Jozsef Antall. He said efforts must be made to provide the legal and diplomatic preconditions for security, adding that it was essential for Ukraine to maintain good relations with Russia.

Antall said in reply to a question at the same news conference that there was no question of reviving the Warsaw Pact, the Soviet bloc's military alliance. "It cannot even arise to establish a separate organization, something similar to the Warsaw Pact", he said. "I signed its dissolution. It did not cross anybody's mind to revive it".

He added: "What we talked about was that this region should enjoy security within the framework of European and global security, so that trouble spots should not develop as in the case of Yugoslavia".

Antall said Hungary sought security solutions within the framework of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and was striving to establish close links with NATO. Kravchuk and Antall earlier signed agreements to ease border controls for people living in their border zone, to double the number of border crossing points to four and to provide for the expulsion of illegal migrants. A communique said Hungary would upgrade its consulate in Uzhhorod to a chief consulate while Ukraine would set up a consulate in Nyiregyhaza in eastern Hungary later this year.

Meanwhile, another problem is causing additional impatience in Moscow. Russia hinted on Tuesday, March 2, it was losing patience in a conflict with Ukraine over who con-

trols former Soviet nuclear weapons on Ukrainian soil.

Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev expressed concern at Ukrainian moves to take some form of control of the missiles and said Moscow was worried by Kyiv's failure to ratify a key superpower arms reduction treaty.

Itar news agency quoted Defence Minister Pavel Grachev as saying there would be no point in further talks between Moscow and Kyiv if their latest round of negotiations, beginning on Tuesday, failed to resolve the nuclear problem. "Let me say frankly that there is clearly no point in further talks if the question of control over strategic offensive weapons on Ukrainian territory is not resolved positively at this round [of talks]", he said.

Grachev said he had prepared a "draft statement" which would appear in the media in three or four days' time if the current round of talks was unsuccessful. He gave no clue as to its contents, but his remarks suggested Moscow was stepping up pressure for an end to its long stalemate with Kyiv on the issue.

War of Words Over Nuclear Weapons Intensifies

MOSCOW — The war of words between Ukraine and Russia intensified recently with Russia accusing Ukraine on Friday, March 5, of blocking progress on START-1.

Ukrainian officials dismissed the accusations and blamed Moscow for causing the delay in Ukraine's ratification of the treaty.

Ukraine, the only former captive nation that has not ratified the treaty,

has delayed adopting START-1 because of fears that Russia would take advantage of its diminished security. In addition to international security guarantees, Ukraine wants \$1.5 billion to destroy the missiles.

Two days of nuclear talks between Russian and Ukrainian leaders ended on Wednesday in Moscow. The Russian Foreign Ministry said on Friday that despite previous commitments, the Ukrainian delegation did not provide specific proposals for implementing the START-1 treaty. Russia said Ukraine refused to discuss the issue during the talks. Its statement also said Ukraine was unable to guarantee the safety of long-range nuclear weapons on its territory.

Ukraine's Deputy Foreign Minister, Borys Tarasyuk, said in an interview that his side was not to blame for the lack of progress. "The absence of agreement results from delays by Russia in holding talks on conditions for dismantling and destroying nuclear arms, delays in answering the question of guarantees of Ukraine's national security", he said. Ukrainian Defence Minister Kostiantyn Morozov also downplayed any safety risk from the warheads on its territory. The risk "is not as acute as the Moscow media makes it out to be", Morozov was quoted as saying in a Ukrainian television broadcast. In other developments on Friday, March 5, officials at Ukraine's Chernobyl nuclear plant said a reactor there resumed operation on Thursday evening after a four-day shutdown caused by a leak in the water-cooling system. The accident was not considered serious

because the leak occurred in a pipe in a reserve water pump and no radiation was released. The Chernobyl plant was the site of the world's worst nuclear accident in April 1986, when an explosion and fire spewed a cloud of radiation across much of Europe. Ukraine's parliament has voted to close the plant by the end of the year, although last year shortages of cheap natural gas and oil forced Ukraine to restart two reactors.

Russia's Defence Minister said on Wednesday that talks with Ukraine over strategic nuclear weapons remained deadlocked and he warned that the safety of the missiles could be put in jeopardy. Pavel Grachev told Itar-Tass news agency no progress had been made in two days of negotiations outside Moscow on the 176 former Soviet missile launchers deployed on Ukrainian territory.

"Even worse, some Ukrainian leaders made statements tantamount to saying that nuclear weapons on Ukrainian territory are all but Ukrainian property", he said. Grachev told journalists at the talks that if the question of ownership was not settled, he would issue a statement exposing shortcomings in Ukraine's maintenance of the weapons. "This will shed light on the state of both the weapons and rocket units, up to and including abandoning Russia's responsibility for maintaining nuclear security on Ukraine's territory", Tass quoted him as saying.

Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev also entered the debate by criticising Ukraine on Tuesday for

failing to rid itself of Soviet nuclear weapons and accused Kyiv of taking a "dangerous" position.

Kozyrev's remarks came as the Russian parliament began hearings on ratification of the latest strategic arms reduction treaty signed in Moscow in January by Presidents Boris Yeltsin and George Bush. Kozyrev urged the conservative-dominated legislature to ratify START-2. "It rids the world of the arms race", he said.

Kozyrev's remarks, initiating Russian parliamentary debate on the treaty, were likely to renew debate elsewhere over Kyiv's true intentions. "Having declared non-nuclear status, Ukraine apparently makes no haste to make this status into reality", Kozyrev said in his address to the Russian parliament. "On the contrary, steps are being taken, which are in fact aimed at maintaining control over nuclear weapons and at keeping strategic nuclear weapons inside Ukraine as long as possible. This is a dangerous position which, I repeat, causes growing anxiety", Kozyrev said. "Today, I think it should be said aloud that the Non-Proliferation Treaty, that is, as regards obligations assumed at the top political level, remains dubious", Kozyrev said. The Russian Foreign Minister said Ukraine's stance "causes growing alarm with us and our international community counterparts".

START to be Ratified Only Under Conditions

Kyiv, March 19 — A leading lawmaker said that Ukraine would not sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation

Treaty, a move that would endanger landmark arms control agreements between Russia and the United States. Dmytro Pavlychko, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee in Ukraine's parliament, made the comment after a meeting between top Russian and Ukrainian government officials. Ukraine, the world's third-biggest nuclear power after Russia and the United States, made no mention of signing the Non-Proliferation Treaty in a joint statement signed after the meeting. "We do not intend to accede to the NPT, and we will ratify START only under certain conditions", Pavlychko told reporters. Pavlychko did not give reasons, but a feeling is growing among political leaders in Kyiv that Ukraine should not let itself be rushed into full nuclear disarmament, especially if hard-liners are resurgent in Russia.

Industrialist Appointed Second in Command

KYIV, March 29 — Vasyl Yevtukhov, an influential Ukrainian industrialist, was appointed as the second in command in the government of Prime Minister Leonid Kuchma, the Ukrinform news agency reported. Yevtukhov has in recent weeks led Ukraine's negotiating team in negotiations with Russia over energy supplies and repayment of Soviet foreign debt. As acting First Deputy Prime Minister, he will become Ukraine's main link with Western creditors. He replaces Ihor Yukhnovskiy who resigned earlier this month after being accused of mishandling both key issues.

Pynzenyk Replaced as Economics Minister; Old-time "Red" Boss in Kyiv Fired

KYIV — Ukraine's young, reform-oriented Minister of Economics, Viktor Pynzenyk, was replaced by President Kravchuk, who a day earlier fired the old-time Communist Party boss who headed the municipal administration.

Pynzenyk was replaced by Yuriy Bannikov, according to Ukrinform. The news agency said the new appointment was connected with the "need to concentrate efforts on implementing economic reforms". No details were given.

Bannikov is currently head of Orizont, a factory making military equipment in Cherkasy. Pynzenyk will retain the position of deputy prime minister.

Kravchuk, on Monday, April 12, sacked Ivan Saliy, the head of the Kyiv city administration who has often been compared to Russian leader Boris Yeltsin for his rebellious, populist campaigns against authority. Kravchuk formally dismissed Saliy for his refusal to move the administration out of its imposing headquarters to make way for the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry.

The two men had clashed repeatedly on how the city of 2.5 million was run. Kravchuk had already repealed municipal decisions to speed up privatisation, increase charges for rent and public services and take control of vast sections of city property. "The president's representative systematically and flagrantly violates laws... and has displayed

a lack of discipline in not carrying out the decisions of the president and government", Kravchuk said in his decree.

Bid to Tone Down Ukraine's Nuclear Policy Misses by 37 Votes

KYIV — The Supreme Council narrowly defeated on Tuesday, April 22, a proposal which would have toned down Ukraine's firm pledges to eliminate its nuclear weapons, according to various news agencies.

But in a tense debate, a growing number of people's deputies argued that Ukraine should keep some nuclear arms as a deterrent against its neighbour Russia. Deputies leaving a closed session of parliament told reporters that only 189 of the 450 members approved on first reading a draft military doctrine tantamount to giving Ukraine interim status as a nuclear power. The doctrine, debated as part of preparations for the ratification of key arms treaties, said Ukraine would strive towards non-nuclear status at some unspecified time in the future.

"It was stipulated that Ukraine intends to be a non-nuclear state in the future rather than being obliged to become one", Deputy Taras Stetskiv said. "In two days of discussion, the number supporting nuclear weapons has significantly increased, mainly because they see them as a means of deterrence and security against Russia", he said.

The vote, only 37 votes short of the required majority, is expected to displease the United States. Stetskiv said 162 deputies had signed a peti-

tion calling for parliamentary examination of whether to declare Ukraine a nuclear state pending the eventual removal of all weapons.

Kravchuk Appoints New Representative For Kyiv

KYIV — On April 29 President Leonid Kravchuk appointed Leonid Kosakivskyi his representative in Kyiv, having relieved him of his former post of presidential representative in the capital city's Pecherskyi district.

Kosakivskyi replaced Ivan Saliy, who was sacked by the president on April 12.

Ukraine-Poland: "Strategic Partners"

KYIV — Ukraine and Poland agreed to become strategic partners and vowed that no one, i.e. Russia, would dictate foreign policy to them.

President Leonid Kravchuk and President Lech Walesa met on Monday, May 24, and discussed a Ukrainian proposal for building an "east-central" European security system.

"An open and secure Europe is inconceivable without a democratic Ukraine and a democratic, independent Poland", Walesa said during his first visit to Ukraine.

On his arrival in the Ukrainian capital, Walesa, who seemed preoccupied with his problems at home, expressed reservations about the proposed security system. "It is a big subject and we are only just beginning to discuss it", he said.

However, after the two sides

signed a number of agreements, Walesa said: "We decide how we are to develop, we choose our partners and friends. No outsider can dictate how we are to live and whom we may choose as friends. Freedom means the freedom to act and choose. We are joined by a common fate and are moving in the same direction".

The viewpoints of the two presidents "fully coincided", Kravchuk said, adding, "We have agreed to develop the idea further and to give it a concrete form".

Walesa and Kravchuk are the chief backers of a plan to create a post-Soviet security system linking virtually all the countries of central and eastern Europe — with the exception of Russia. Hungarian Prime Minister Jozsef Antall gave his support to the plan during talks with Kravchuk in April.

Ukrainian officials say other states in the region also back the proposal after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact under which the Soviet Union kept control over its east European allies. The system, dubbed NATO-2 by Walesa, would also provide for participation by the Baltic states, Belarus, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, and Moldova.

"There is no adequate security system in Europe. Ukraine proposes the creation of a zone of security and stability in central and eastern Europe", Deputy Foreign Minister Borys Tarasyuk said before the visit.

"We are not talking about the creation of a military bloc or organ-

isation, but about constant consultation. And we have no intention of creating a cordon sanitaire between us and Russia or preventing Russian integration in Europe”.

The two presidents opened the first session of a Polish-Ukrainian consultative committee, consisting of presidential advisers and government officials, which Kravchuk predicted would be “one of the most important institutions of Polish-Ukrainian relations”. The two sides also agreed to set up an early warning system to be used in the event of nuclear accidents and signed accords on economic cooperation and mutual legal assistance in both civil and criminal cases.

An agreement signed by the two countries on asylum-seekers was “an important part of the total regulation” of the refugee problem, said Polish Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski. Poland hopes to sign similar agreements, which involve the return of refugees to their countries of origin, with each of its neighbouring countries.

During his three-day visit Walesa met Ukrainian Parliamentary Speaker Ivan Plyushch, and Prime Minister Leonid Kuchma.

AIDS Testing in Ukraine

During the past six years, 27 million people in Ukraine (i.e. somewhat more than half the population) has been monitored for the HIV virus which causes AIDS. Out of these, 118 inhabitants of Ukraine and some 200 foreigners proved to be infected with the virus.

These figures were announced by the new National Anti-AIDS Committee at its first meeting, in Kyiv, in May. The Committee, which is attached to the President's Office, is currently considering improved means of offering counselling and information to those infected, while preserving the strict confidentiality needed to protect them from possible prejudice and discrimination. It has also drawn up proposals for providing housing for persons infected with HIV or suffering from full-blown AIDS. ■

Documents & Reports**UKRAINE RESPONDS TO RUSSIA'S VERBAL ASSAULTS CONCERNING NUCLEAR ISSUE**

In connection with the April 5 statement by the Government of the Russian Federation regarding nuclear weapons located on the territory of Ukraine the press service of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine is authorised to state the following.

Unfortunately, the Russian side has again resorted to fabricating Ukraine's position, making unsubstantiated accusations against her, which demand an additional explanation of Ukraine's approach to this issue.

Contrary to the statement by the Russian Government, the Ukrainian leadership, to this date, has not made any statements, which would indicate that Ukraine is abandoning the intention to assume a non-nuclear status in the future, as was announced by the Supreme Council.

It is common knowledge that this matter is currently being debated in the Ukrainian Parliament, which is subjecting it to a thorough analysis.

Ukraine does not want this extremely serious problem to become a subject of political games. It is worth recalling that in order to neutralise speculations concerning the security of nuclear weapons on the territory of Ukraine, the Ukrainian side proposed on March 31 of this year the possible convening of an authoritative, international commission.

As one of the successor states of the former USSR, and in accordance with the Law of Ukraine dealing with All-Union businesses, institutions and organisations located on the territory of Ukraine, which was adopted on September 10, 1991, Ukraine reaffirms its right of ownership to the nuclear components of the weapons, not the nuclear weapons themselves, which are located on its territory, including the tactical arsenal which had already been transferred [to Russia]. It is common knowledge that, in accordance with the Minsk Treaty of December 30, 1991, the nuclear weapons located on the territory of Ukraine are under the operational control of the Unified Command of the Strategic Forces of the CIS. Consequently, there is no reason to alter this status.

This position does not mean that Ukraine intends to acquire control over the nuclear warheads. Ukraine, which administers only the components of the strategic nuclear weapons of the former USSR, does not have the capability for the unilateral use of these weapons, inasmuch as the launching

controls are located outside its territory. Neither does Ukraine intend to acquire this capability.

The realistic deadline for transferring the nuclear weapons from the territory of Ukraine to be dismantled and destroyed will be decided by a number of factors and, not the least of which will be, the conclusion of appropriate Ukrainian-Russian agreements and the signing of treaties, facilitating the liquidation of the nuclear weapons located in Ukraine.

Even though the operational control of the strategic forces on the territory of Ukraine is in the hands of the Unified Command of the Strategic Forces of the CIS, the administrative control was given to the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine. This does not contradict the idea of a single, secure control over the nuclear weapons. Nothing in the concept of administrative control over the strategic nuclear forces located on the territory of Ukraine presumes an intention to acquire direct control over the nuclear weapons.

Ukraine, in principle, cannot agree to the deployment of foreign troops on its territory, which is implicit in the Russian Federation's announced jurisdictional control over the nuclear weapons located in Ukraine.

The dismantling of only a single element of the major components of the rockets located on the territory of Ukraine, without the parallel dismantling of the entire rocket, will not guarantee the physical and ecological security of the launch facilities. All procedures to dispose of nuclear weapons must be carried out in a precise manner, taking into account legal, technical, financial, organisational and other considerations.

Therefore, Ukraine is making a serious and responsible attempt to resolve the complex problems associated with the presence of nuclear weapons on her territory, and is guided by treaties already in force, without violating any one of them.

Ukraine welcomes Russia's readiness to provide her with additional security guarantees. Presently, it is important to determine the appropriate form, timeframe, level and extent of these guarantees. We welcome with pleasure Russia's readiness to resolve the question of compensation for the nuclear material, which is the property of Ukraine. We assume that this readiness also includes the components of the tactical nuclear weapons which had already been transferred [to Russia].

Ukraine regards the matter of guaranteeing the security of nuclear weapons to be extremely important and has always striven to create all essential circumstances for this and is eager to cooperate with the Russian side in this matter.

Ukraine appeals to the Russian side to be more constructive and realistic in its positions during the bilateral negotiations to solve this question. We are interested in having all complex questions of Ukrainian-Russian cooperation in liquidating nuclear weapons located in Ukraine decided without needless polemics and mutual accusations. The language of ultimatums and pressure is unacceptable in relationships between states. ■

THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE'S SECRET CHORNOBYL CHANCERY

Alla Yaroshinska

The author of this article, Alla Yaroshinska, a journalist from Zhytomyr, was one of the first members of her profession to attempt to bring to public attention the truth about the accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station in 1986. At first editors refused to publish her findings and she was forced to distribute them in *samvydav*. Her efforts, however, won her considerable popular support, and in the "partially democratic" elections of 1988, she was elected to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

Serving as a member of the Ecology and *Glasnost* Committees of the Supreme Soviet, she continued to campaign for the publication of the full truth about the accident. But her efforts were consistently blocked by hard-liners and bureaucrats, and even after the failure of the August 1991 coup, she was unable to copy many of the relevant documents.

(During the coup itself, incidentally, she was in London. When she returned home, she discovered that her name was at the top of one of the local "internment lists" drawn up by the plotters!)

The break-up of the Soviet Union meant the end of her Parliamentary mandate. Yaroshinska, however, decided to stay on for the time being in Moscow and to continue her research there into the Chernobyl cover-up.

Her efforts to expose the truth about Chernobyl won her, in 1992, the Right Livelihood Award, the environmentalists' equivalent of the Nobel Prize, which is presented in Stockholm, by the King of Sweden, on 11 December, the day after the Nobel Prize ceremony.

The article which follows was first published, in Russian, in the Moscow newspaper *Izvestiya*, in April of this year, and is translated here at the author's suggestion — Ed.

Even quite recently, it seemed that almost everything was now known about the Chernobyl accident, especially after the declassification of the documents of the executive group of the Politburo of the CC CPSU headed by Nikolay Ryzhkov. More precise measurements were made of the extent of the radioactive contamination not only in the republics of the former Soviet Union, but also in neighbouring countries. There were presentations even in Bulgaria. Those who had been found guilty of causing the explosion — the Director of the Chernobyl NPS, Viktor Bryukhanov, and his deputy, Anatoliy Dyatlov, were released from prison. Stanislau Suskievic made the terrible figures of cancer-type illnesses in Belarus a matter of public knowledge. The criminal recipes of the CC CPSU for the consumption of radioactive meat and milk became known to all the world. Those who had kept silent about the scale and consequences of the explosion had by now won not only the Order of Lenin, but also international prizes. (Like the former Chairman of the USSR State Commission for Hydro-Meteorology, Yuriy Izrael.)

The official data on the participation of the army in the clean-up were reduced by many times. Even in the six months of 1986, around 100,000 officers and men received doses of radiation. Still one more lie has "emerged" here — about the new duty settlement for the Chernobyl power workers — Zelenyi Mys.

In my archives there are the memoranda of the late General Akhromeyev, an advisor of President Gorbachev, addressed to the executive group of the Politburo. The first says that it is possible to build the duty settlement for the power workers in the place proposed. The second, written some time later, states the complete opposite. Nevertheless, they built it. Just like Slavutych — on caesium [contaminated] land.

Thus, it seemed, the whole lie trumpeted by the powers-that-were had been exposed. After all, seven whole years had gone by. But now, new, top-secret documents have emerged - records of meetings of the Politburo of the CC CPSU, with the note "file copy". One of these sets of minutes — from 3 July 1986, throws light on the fact that for decades there was a "taboo subject" not only for journalists and the general public, but even for "uninitiated scholars": the safety of nuclear reactors. And not only the RBMK-1000 (Chornobyl type) of unhappy memory, but all the rest which up to the present day are being operated in Russia and in other states which have arisen from the ashes of the USSR and in its former "brothers".

Clan Interest

After the first Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR a group of parliamentarians, myself included, approached the Procurator General of the USSR, Aleksandr Sukharev, demanding that he initiate a criminal prosecution against those responsible people who had prevented *glasnost* about the consequences of the accident, who deliberately concealed information, and dooming the inhabitants of the radioactive contamination zone to quiet extinction. In December 1989, we received an answer from the Deputy Procurator General of the USSR, V. Andreyev. This was a standard letter in which it was stated that the directors of the Chornobyl NPS had been prosecuted for criminal responsibility. (As if we didn't know!) It was also stated in the letter that the criminal prosecution dealing with the design of the RBMK reactor, which had been referred to a separate process, had been "terminated", since the accident was the result of the numerous breaches of the operational safety rules for reactors... .

At the end of 1990, the Chornobyl commission of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR shook off the radioactive dust (the "case" is still in fact "hot" to this day) and promulgated the curious testimony of the experts. I shall cite only one example.

Did the design of the reactor have any effect on the development of the accident? The answer was: yes it did. This was also indicated in the report of the government commission: "The development of the accident which led to the destruction of the reactor was due to deficiencies in the reactor design... The immediate primary cause of the initial growth of reactivity was the penetration of boiling water into the core... In this initial growth of radioactivity a design fault of the reactor was revealed: the positive void coefficient, produced by the structure of the core".

The original build-up of reactivity was not suppressed at the start by the motion of the CDS (control and damping system — A. Ya.) rods after the accident protection system came into operation. This revealed a second fault in the reactor design — the unsatisfactory design of the CDS rods.

And this whole case on the design of the RBMK-1000 reactor was closed. This meant that the entire guilt of the accident fell exclusively on the [power station] staff. The court ruled that the reactor was, as it were, outside its jurisdiction, and did not take cognizance of important documents relating to its design which, both before and after the accident, were more than enough to be “not noticed”.

Half a year before the accident at the Chornobyl NPS, Aleksandr Yadrikhinski, a specialist from the Kursk nuclear power station, which also uses RBMK-1000 reactors, sent a letter to the State Nuclear Energy Inspectorate of the USSR, warning about the danger of these reactors. He wrote of the necessity of independent expert surveys, and the redesigning of the very CDS (!) which at Chornobyl became one of the causes of the explosion. No one at the “centre” took the warning seriously.

After the accident, on 1 May 1986, V.P. Volkov, head of the Group for Nuclear Power Station reliability and safety, sent the Director of the Kurchatov Nuclear Energy Institute a memorandum which said that the accident “was caused not by the action of the station staff but by the design of the core and an incorrect understanding of the processes of neutron physics taking place in that core”. On 9 May, he sent the same letter to the government of the country.

On 5 May 1986 the Inter-Departmental Commission drew attention to the structural defects of the RBMK-1000 reactor.

At approximately the same time, a group of specialists from the Ministry of Energy of the USSR drew up an addendum to the statement of the investigation into the accident, noting the design faults of the reactor.

On 2 and 17 June 1986, there were meetings of the Inter-Departmental Scientific and Technical Council chaired by Anatoliy Aleksandrov, at which the structural defects of the reactor were also demonstrated.

As they say, where do we go from here?

But none of these arguments produced any result. Practically speaking, all the causes of the accident were attributed exclusively to staff errors. This stance became the official stance of the Soviet government in the international arena. First and foremost at the IAEA.

In the report of the Kurchatov Nuclear Energy Institute, which was afterwards finalised as a paper for the IAEA, it was stated that the “initial cause of the accident was an extremely unlikely combination of breaches of the operating rules permitted by the staff of the power unit, in the presence of which faults in the design of the reactor and the CDS rods became evident”. The words which I have put in quotation marks are missing from the official papers presented by the USSR to the IAEA expert meetings in 1986 and

1987. As they say, there is truth for internal consumption and truth for export.

Well, could it have been otherwise? Could the “expert” on the RBMK reactor, Academician Aleksandrov, have spoken out against the “father” of the RBMK reactor, Academician Aleksandrov?

On 17 May 1989, *Literaturnaya Gazeta* published some material from the political commentator Igor Belyaev, entitled “Is this really the way?”. His interviewee, V. Bobrov, who was employed as head of the Laboratory of State Expert Appraisal of Inventions of the Central Scientific Research Institute of Atomic Information, spoke about why the RBMK-1000 had not been registered as an invention. The authors of the application were the then Director of the Nuclear Energy Institute, Academician Anatoliy Aleksandrov, and other scientists from the institute. “In 1967”, Bobrov said, “I sent back the first version of the application (one and half pages of type-script without the formulae of the invention or sketches) to the authors, for redrafting”. After that, something incredible began. The redrafted application for the RBMK, dated 6.10.67, was still awaiting consideration, when barely a month later, on 10 November 1967, Academician Anatoliy Aleksandrov announced in *Pravda* (in an article entitled “October and Physics”) “that Soviet scientists had succeeded in solving the problem of increasing the cost-effectiveness of nuclear power stations”. One of the reasons that the design was not recognised as an invention was the absence of any industrial applicability of the means of lowering the cost of electric power by using the RBMK reactor with its antediluvian efficiency, in all, around 30 %. It is precisely for this reason that the applicant has disputed the refusal, and demanded that his “invention” (the RBMK-1000 reactor — A. Ya.) be accepted, after its introduction in force into nuclear power engineering in 1973”.

I recall that this “introduction” began with the Leningrad NPS, where accidents periodically occur. No one could stop Aleksandrov and his colleagues on the road to Chornobyl, not even the refusal of the State Patent experts to recognise the “leading technical level” of his reactor as an [officially registered] Soviet invention. The national economy of the country was doomed: for the next Five Year Plan (1971-75) two thirds of the planned nuclear power station capacity would use precisely these reactors.

Such were the first causes of the universal lie about the special reliability of these reactors.

“The Safety of Reactors Must Be Guaranteed By Physics and Not By Organisational/Technical Measures”

This phrase was let drop in the polemics with Academician Aleksandrov by the head of the State Nuclear Power Inspectorate, E. Kulov, who was invited to a session of the Politburo of the CPSU.

Top Secret. Only one copy (Working Record).

Session of the Politburo of the CC CPSU, 3 July 1986.

Chair: Comrade M.S. Gorbachev,

Present: Comrades G.A. Aliev, V.I. Vorotnikov, A.A. Gromyko, L.N. Zaikov, E.K. Ligachev, N.I. Ryzhkov, M.S. Solomentsev, V.V. Shcherbytskyi, P.N. Demichev, V.I. Dolgikh, N.N. Slyunkov, S.L. Sokolov, A.P. Biryukova, A.F. Dobrynin, V.P. Nikonov, I.V. Kapitonov.

I. Report of the government commission on the investigation of the causes of the accident at the Chornobyl NPS, 26 April 1986.

GORBACHEV: (...) Comrade Shcherbina has the floor.

SHCHERBINA, B.E. (Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR) ... The accident occurred as a result of gross infringements of the technical rules by the staff on duty, associated with serious defects in the reactor design. But these causes were not of comparable significance. The actual event of the accident was, in the opinion of the Commission, an error of the staff on duty”.

[As we can see, the same old song. But then, as if to refute what he had just said, the *rapporteur* continued:]

Considering the operational reliability of the RBMK reactor, the group of experts attached to the Commission came to the conclusion that its characteristics did not coincide with contemporary safety requirements. In their summing up, it was stated that if an expert assessment were made using international standards, the reactor would be “ostracised”. RBMK reactors are potentially dangerous.

(...) It appears that the constantly proclaimed alleged high safety level of nuclear power stations had its effect on everyone (...) The difficult decision has to be taken to stop the construction of new nuclear power stations with RBMK reactors.

Since 1983, the Collegium of the Ministry [of power engineering and electrification — A. Ya.] has not once considered any questions connected with nuclear power station safety.

(...) During the Eleventh Five Year Plan there were 1,042 emergency shut-downs of the power blocks at power stations, including 381 at nuclear power stations with RBMK reactors. At the Chornobyl NPS there were 104 such incidents, for 35 of which the staff were to blame”.

After the report of the Chairman of the Commission, there was a "shop-floor analysis" of the reliability of the reactor. This threw light on some surprising and little-known secrets of the Soviet reactor "court".

GORBACHEV. The Commission has found out why a reactor which was not properly ready got put into industrial production. In the USA, they decided against this type of reactor. Isn't that so, Comrade Legasov?

LEGASOV. In the USA, they haven't developed and do not use this type of reactor in power engineering.

GORBACHEV. The reactor was put into industrial production, and the theoretical research was not continued... Isn't it just the case that the voluntarism of certain individuals drags the country into wild adventures? (...) Who introduced the proposal to locate nuclear power stations around cities? Whose recommendation? (...) And, by the way, after their accident in 1979, the Americans did not start building any new nuclear power stations.

SHCHERBINA. It seemed that the safety question had been solved. They said this in a publication of the Kurchatov Institute, which Legasov helped prepare...

GORBACHEV. How many accidents were there?

BRYUKHANOV. [Director of the Chornobyl NPS — A. Ya.] There were one or two accidents a year... We did not know that in 1975 something similar had happened at the Leningrad NPS.

GORBACHEV. There were 104 accidents. Who was responsible?... What can you say about the RBMK reactor?

MESHKOV (first deputy Minister of Medium Machine-building [the cover name for the nuclear equipment industry — Ed.]). The reactor was tested. Only there was no dome. [We remember that, don't we, reader? — A. Ya.]. If the rules were strictly observed, it was safe.

GORBACHEV. Then why did you sign a document which said that production had to be stopped? (...) You amaze me. You all say that this reactor was unreliable, that running it could lead to danger, and here you are all defending the honour of the uniform.

LIGACHEV. There is a world nuclear engineering industry. Why did you go out and build a reactor of a different type?

GORBACHEV. It [the reactor — A. Ya.] was only minimally studied. That's right, isn't it, Comrade Legasov?

LEGASOV. Yes, that's right.

GORBACHEV. V.A. Sidorenko [one of the heads of the State Nuclear Safety Inspectorate of the USSR — A. Ya.] writes that even after the design has been improved, the RBMK will not be up to contemporary international requirements...

SHASHAKIN [deputy Minister of Power Engineering and Electrification of the USSR]. The physics of the reactor determined the scale of the accident. People did not know that the reactor could run away in this situation. There was no

certainty that its preparation had made it completely safe. You could find dozens of situations in which the same thing could happen as did at Chernobyl. This is especially true of the first units of the Leningrad, Kursk, and Chernobyl NPS. They have no emergency cooling systems. One has first of all to shut them down. (...) It is impossible to build any more RBMKs, I'm convinced of that. As for improving them, it is not worth the expense. The philosophy of extending the life of nuclear power stations is far from justified.

GORBACHEV. But could these reactors be brought up to international requirements?

ALEKSANDROV(...) All countries with developed nuclear power engineering use reactors of a different type from what we use.

And as early as 28 December 1984 (!), a decision of the Inter-departmental Scientific Council for Nuclear Energy confirmed the proposals of an expert commission for upgrading the RBMK-1000 in accordance with the normative documents on safety.

(...) MAYORETS [Member of the Government Commission]. As far as the RBMK is concerned, that question can be answered unequivocally. No one [else] in the world set out to produce a reactor of this type. I am convinced, that even when all the work has been done on the RBMK, it will still not satisfy all present-day requirements.

RYZHKOV. We were heading for an accident. If we hadn't had an accident now, then, with things as they are, it could have happened at any time... . As it is now known, there is not a single nuclear power station without incidents, (...) It has also become known about the faults in the design of the RBMK reactor, but neither the Ministries nor the Academy of Sciences of the USSR drew the appropriate conclusions.

(...) The executive group considers that stations where a large amount of preliminary work has been done will have to be completed, but that the construction of [new] stations with these reactors must be stopped.

These were the appraisals of the specialists who took part in the top-secret session of the Politburo of the CC CPSU on the safety of the RBMK reactor. Dozens of commissions and scientists presented proofs of its dangerous nature. And what then?

A year after Chernobyl construction was started on two more generator units using RBMK reactors, the third unit at the Smolensk NPS and the second at Ignalina...

Judging from the shorthand record of the Politburo session, Mikhail Gorbachev, a jurist by training and [at that time] General Secretary of the Central Committee, turned out to be the most assiduous expert on all our reactors, including the "goodies" — the VVER-type. I am quite certain that we should never have known this if it had not been for August 1991. Not even the members of Gromyko's Politburo. Solomentsev spoke at this meeting in a state of agitation, saying that this was the first they had heard of such revelations about our reactor construction.

(...) GORBACHEV. How many times did you people in the State Nuclear Power Inspectorate turn your attention to the problem of this reactor? [the RBMK. A. Ya]

KULOV. During the three years that I have worked in this job — according to the style of the times — I never heard such a question. We concentrated rather on the VVER-1000. Its units were less controllable. Not a year went by without some accident in a VVER.

GORBACHEV. What is your opinion about Sidorenko's statement that nowhere in the world has there been any attempt to use reactors of the RBMK type, that our VVER and RBMK do not meet international standards, and that under international inspection, the VVER comes out better than the RBMK.

KULOV. The VVER has definite advantages but its operation involves a certain danger.

GORBACHEV. Does this mean, in your opinion, that the VVERs should be closed down too. Why don't you announce that we mustn't build VVERs either?

KULOV. The VVER is better than the RBMK, but the VVER-1000 is worse than those based on the original units.

DOLGIKH. Is the VVER up to present-day standards?

KULOV. Yes, but the VVERs being built now are worse than the old ones".

Can you understand that, reader? If the VVERs now being built are "worse than the old ones", then why build them? Who decided this and why?

MAYORETS. The VVER-1000 is new, it corresponds to the latest safety requirements, but it is unreliable in operation because the instruments go out of order.

"What Kind of Reactor Do You Prefer?"

This question from the secret protocol shook me almost more than anything else. It was put by Politburo Member Nikolay Slyunkov to the Deputy Minister of Power Engineering and Electrification of the USSR, Gennadiy Shashakin. To which Shashakin replied: "The VVER". Thank God Slyunkov did not tell the deputy minister what kind of reactors the Politburo of the Communist Party of Byelorussia preferred. [Note: Slyunkov was First Secretary of the Communist Party of Byelorussia. Ed.]

And today, seven years after the Chornobyl catastrophe, almost nothing has changed in the nuclear energy policy of the independent republics of the former USSR. Once again the Ignalina NPS, with the RBMK reactors which were shut down out of hatred for the "centre" at the demand of the Baltic "patriots", is back in operation. President Ter-Petrosyants of Armenia is also speaking about restarting the Armenian NPS in the near future, although it is situated on a seismic fault. [It was shut down under pressure from the Armenian "green" movement, following the earthquake of December 1988. Ed.] The shortage of electrical power has made [him] forget about this. In spite of the fact that the Ukrainian Parliament voted to shut

down the Chornobyl NPS in 1993, at the end of last year the second and first blocks were once again started up. And quite recently, Stanislau Suskiewicz, the Speaker of the Parliament of Belarus, made a pronouncement about the need to build two nuclear power stations in Belarus. [Since Belarus, although independent since 25 August 1991, has no President, Dr. Suskiewicz, as Speaker, is *de facto* head of state. Ed.]

But nuclear power is now making a very vigorous comeback in Russia. On 26 March 1992, Yegor Gaidar, at that time head of the government, signed an order on resuming construction of nuclear power stations in that country. Without any analysis of the state of the nuclear reactors being published. And this, moreover, in spite of the fact that in 1991, on the eve of the visit of President Yeltsin to the USA, the Academy of Sciences recommended the closure of the majority of Russian nuclear power stations, in view of world safety requirements. The "black list" included the Leningrad, Bilibino, Kursk, Beloyarsk and Smolensk power stations, and two blocks of the Kola and two of the Novovoronezh stations. It was recommended that these dangerous reactors should be phased out over the next two years, According to the Russian Academy of Sciences, only two stations out of nine could meet the safety requirements completely.

Gaidar's order was the first step towards the growth of power of the nuclear lobby by an infusion of fresh blood into the sector, which in essence blew up seven years ago together with the Chornobyl reactor. Today the Phoenix has been reborn, shaking the radioactive ash from its wings.

On 28 December of last year, a decision of the Russian government was published on "Questions of the construction of nuclear stations on the territory of the Russian Federation". This envisaged the commissioning of 33 new blocks of nuclear power stations. It is proposed to site 19 of these in the Central, North-Western and Black-Earth zones of Russia. These are densely populated regions with oil and gas pipelines to the countries of the CIS and the Baltic States. And among the nuclear reactors to be commissioned are our old acquaintances, the RBMKs.

In the "Concept of the development of nuclear power engineering in the Russian Federation", approved by the Collegium of the Ministry of Nuclear Power on 14 July 1992, a good deal of space is devoted to the safety of nuclear power stations, which have to be brought "up to a level which rules out the possibility of a serious accident with the discharge of fission products into the environment". This referred both to existing nuclear power stations and to a new generation of them. But is it possible in principle to attain the maximally possible safety-level with this type of reactor?

Many people will certainly remember the tragic death of Academician Valeriy Legasov, who took part in the Chornobyl clean-up operation and who later committed suicide on the day following the second anniver-

sary of the accident. At the top secret session of the Politburo, Legasov told Gorbachev:

"the RBMK reactor in certain respects does not meet international and Soviet requirements. There is no protection system, no dosimetry system, no outer cowl. We, of course, are to blame that we did not keep a proper watch on this reactor. This is my fault too. ...The same is true also of the first VVER blocks. Fourteen of them too do not meet present-day Soviet safety standards either".

Two years later, shortly before Legasov died, while he was recording something for the documentary film "The Star Wormwood", he went further.

"Every approach to ensuring nuclear safety... consists of three elements. The first element is to make the object itself, in this case the nuclear reactor, as safe as is maximally possible. The second element is to make the operation of this object as reliable as is maximally possible, but the word "maximally" must not be understood in the sense of 100 per cent reliability. The philosophy of safety necessarily demands that a third element be introduced, which assumes that nevertheless an accident will take place and that radioactive materials or some chemical materials will escape from the apparatus. So, to meet this case, it is essential to package the dangerous object in what is called a containment vessel... But in Soviet power engineering, this third element was, in my opinion, criminally ignored. If we had had a philosophy associated with the idea that there must necessarily be a containment vessel built around every one of our nuclear reactors, then the RBMK, with its geometry, would never have seen the light of day. The fact that this device did see the light of day was illegal from the point of view of international safety standards, and safety standards generally, but in spite of all this, within the device itself there were three major design miscalculations.

... But the chief cause was a breach of the basic safety principle of such devices — siting such devices inside capsules which limit the possibility of [radio]activity escaping beyond the limits of the station itself, the device itself".

And this is the time and place to recall that, as Legasov, Izrael and other scientists asserted, the Chernobyl accident was not the biggest in the world. The biggest nuclear power station accident in the world had happened long before Chernobyl, in 1979, at Three Mile Island in the USA. But this reactor was inside a cowl. The accident took place inside the cowl which ruptured, but only a very small quantity of radioactivity escaped into the environment. And since then the USA has not built a single nuclear power station. Not even with a reliable cowl.

In the new "Concept of the development of nuclear power engineering" it is noted that on 1 July 1992, in Russia "there are in operation 28 industrial power blocks at 9 nuclear power stations... of which 12 power blocks are of the light-water VVER type, 15 are uranium-graphite channel reactors (11 RBMK blocks and 4 EGP blocks) and one block with a fast neutron reactor". And this is what Legasov had to say about them, five years ago, before his mysterious death: "It is necessary to think seriously about some special measures to localise accidents in these 28 reac-

tors, since **it is economically and technically impossible to build cowls over them**". (My emphasis. A. Ya).

This means that whatever the scientists do, whatever safety measures they employ (and a great deal was actually done to make the RBMKs safe after the Chornobyl accident), the principal danger of the power blocks now in operation in Russia cannot be eliminated. And this constitutes the tragedy of nuclear engineering in our country which has chosen for its development a path that is depraved from the beginning. About this problem "it is necessary to take thought today, necessary first and foremost for Soviet society to take thought, since it is our problem", Legasov said before his death. At the top secret session of the Politburo in summer 1986, he likewise asserted that "the weak spot of the RBMK has been known for 15 years".

But there are other opinions about this issue. At the same session of the Politburo, Academician Aleksandrov let fall that "a cowl would only have made the accident worse!" Other scientists consider that "Nobody knows!". This means that, on the one hand, a cowl over the RBMK is a technical impossibility, but even if one could have been built, it would simply have made the accident worse. However, unremittingly, Five Year Plan after Five Year Plan, these dangerous power blocks were planted in our national economy by physicists close to the powers-that-be.

This is the second year of life without a Politburo and without a Central Committee of the CPSU. There exist the conclusions of dozens of competent commissions and groups of scientists on the reasons for the explosion at the Chornobyl Nuclear Power Station, which put the blame on the reactor itself. These include the authoritative diagnosis carried out back in 1990, by a Commission of the State Nuclear Energy Inspectorate of the USSR, headed by the well-known scientist Nikolay Shteynberg: "Defects in the design of the RBMK-1000 reactor in operation in the fourth block of the Chornobyl NPS predetermined the serious consequences of the accident. But no changes have been observed in the approach to the issue, although here one is dealing, in effect, with Life itself. But where are such changes to come from, when the people who brought us to Chornobyl have barely moved their chairs?"

Their names and their faces are well-known. (And not only in Russia.) First of all they lied to us about the causes and consequences of the Chornobyl accident, they took decisions about building houses for the evacuees in areas that were themselves dangerous, and then, knowing the real causes of the accident, they loaded all the guilt onto the power station staff. And now they are running us just as before. Making use of the fact that the society at large is poorly informed, they have drawn up their irresponsible plans to "nuclearise" poor Russia with realities whose faults are irrevocably built into the design.

Academician Aleksey Yablokov, an adviser to the President of Russia, commented that the new concept of developing nuclear energy was "unac-

ceptable from the juridical, economic, ecological and political points of view”.

On the eve of each anniversary of Chornobyl, the Politburo used to draw up a “Plan to forestall counter-propaganda actions”. (Especially zealous, on the first anniversary, were the services of Mr. Falin, who in 1987 was head of the Novosti press agency, who feared the “possible attempts by the subversive centres of imperialism to make use of the anniversary of the accident at the Chornobyl NPS to launch a wide-scale anti-Soviet campaign.”) (Appendix to Protocol of the Secretariat of the CC CPSU, No. 42, 26.2.1987). The correction of the “plan” was carried out personally by Yegor Kuzmich Ligachev. On 10 April 1987 a vote was taken in the Secretariat of the CC CPSU on the planned lie, and as usual, the voting was unanimous (Top Secret Protocol No. 46). “Voting as follows: Comrades: Gorbachev — “For”, Aliyev — “For”, Vorotnikov — “For”, Gromyko — “For”, Zaikov — on leave, Ligachev — “For”, Ryzhkov — “For”, Solomentsev — “For”, Chebrikov — “For”, Shevardnadze — “For”, Shcherbytskyi — “For”.

It was always 100 % “For”. In spite of the fact that at their top secret sessions they called the consequences of the Chornobyl explosion “the consequences of a small war” (Andrey Gromyko), and comparable with the “use of a weapon of mass destruction (Mikhail Gorbachev, S. Sokolov). But this was only for the initiated. They assured the common masses that “There was no threat to human health”.

Does not this new “Concept of the development of nuclear power” of the Ministry of Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation resemble the “plan to forestall counter-propaganda actions”? And if this is so, then life on Earth with a reactor will be possible only with a “cow!” over every person. If that can be called life! ■

Books & Periodicals**Anders Åslund, SYSTEMIC CHANGE AND STABILIZATION IN RUSSIA, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 24pp, £6.50**

This monograph, the latest in the series of papers produced by the Royal Institute of International Affairs "Post-Soviet Business Forum" addresses the problem of why the economic reforms attempted in Russia in 1992 have failed to stabilise that country's economy. As such it will be of considerable interest to all those concerned with the future of Ukraine, whose economy, for the foreseeable future, will inevitably remain closely tied to the other post-Soviet states, Russia in particular.

During 1992, production in Russia fell drastically, unemployment began to emerge as a serious social phenomenon, and poverty, in general, increased, although certain individuals became conspicuously wealthy. A number of commentators on this situation have argued that the problem goes back to the timing of the Gorbachev reforms of 1986-90, suggesting that it would have been wiser to force through economic reform from above (on the Chinese model) *before* attempting to democratise the system. This view, Dr. Åslund argues, is incorrect factually (Gorbachev began pressing for the introduction of family farms as early as February 1986) and, moreover, fails to grasp the fact that (as he gives ample reasons) the Soviet system was, in fact, unreformable. The true cause of the failure of the Russian reforms of 1992, Dr. Åslund argues, was Russia's "democratic deficit": the new State powers have not been consolidated, the old *nomenklatura* still retains much of its former power and the Central Bank (the prime villain of the piece in Dr. Åslund's view) continued to issue virtually unlimited credits for the benefit of the former élite. The failure to liberalise energy prices — a major mistake from the point of view of economics — likewise served to line the pockets of the old *nomenklatura*.

Unlike many western commentators, who urge that the unity of the old Soviet "economic space" should be maintained for the sake of "stability", Dr. Åslund contends that another prime mistake was Russia's reluctance (for political reasons) to make a clean break with the past. Moscow's attempts to maintain a "rouble zone" has simply meant that attempts to tackle the currency reform which Russia so urgently needs have been, in Dr. Åslund's words "piecemeal and hesitant". Shock therapy, of the type suffered by Poland under the Balcerowicz plan, is frequently dismissed as too dangerous and destabilising for Russia. In Dr. Åslund's view, although shock thera-

py would be difficult to undertake while the old élite remains strong, and popular understanding of the market economy remains poor, "none of the arguments in favour of gradualism remains valid". But what Russia needed in 1992, and still needs (at his cut-off date of 20 April 1993), he concludes, is "radical systemic change". One can only hope that, with the prestige of the RIIA backing this work, some, at least, of Russia's economic chiefs will heed Dr. Åslund's words. If not, the prospects seem bleak, not only for the peoples of the Russian Federation, but also for all the successor-states of the Soviet imperium. ■

**John Hands, DARKNESS AT DAWN,
Harper-Collins, London, 1993, 236pp, £14.99**

The collapse of Communism, first in Eastern Europe and then in the USSR, posed a considerable professional problem for writers of political/espionage fiction. A gripping tale in this genre requires an enemy who poses a credible threat. The "evil empire" of the Kremlin had all the necessary attributes. It was large, nuclear-armed, sufficiently exotic yet (in spite of the constraints of its political system) sufficiently like in life-style to permit the use of alcohol and sexual allurements with which so many of these writers found it appropriate to adorn their tales.

But from the summer of 1989, when the Hungarians began chopping up the barbed wire of the iron curtain into \$25.00-a-time souvenirs, thriller-writers began anxiously to take thought for their future. Either to find a new and credible enemy, or revert to the unsophisticated old days of the International Master Crook — to some latter-day Carl Peterson or Moriarty. One solution, fastened upon by a number of writers, was to keep the old Soviet background, and postulate a group of hard-liners, trying to subvert the drift to democracy. This trend produced a number of excellent tales, set in the latter days of *perestroika*, Stuart M. Kaminsky's *Rostnikov's Vacation* for example. Then, as so often, art proved to have foretold life, the August coup happened — or failed to happen — and the Soviet Union was no more.

Darkness at Dawn is one of the first "post-Soviet" adventure novels. Again, we have a group of die-hard Communists, plotting to restore the good old pre-Gorbachev hard-line days. In particular, these plotters want to regain what they see as Russia's lost territory, the newly independent republics around her periphery, and, first and foremost, Ukraine. Their strategy is to stir up ethnic tensions in Ukraine, and to convince the West that a wave of neo-Fascist terrorism is on the rise there. Thus the West, with its human-rights commitments, will be reluctant to provide the economic aid which Ukraine so desperately needs, while the alleged threat to ethnic Russians in eastern Ukraine will provide a justification for military intervention.

Mr. Hands is not the first author to use Ukrainian national aspirations as a motif in the plot of a thriller. David Grant did it, some 15 years ago, in his *Moscow 5000*, while more recently Evelyn Anthony made this a major thread in *The Relic*. But until now, authors who attempt a Ukrainian-based story-line almost inevitably fall into elementary blunders. They seem to have difficulty in grasping either the gulf between Ukrainian and Russian patriotic aspirations, or the considerable differences in language, culture and lifestyle. Evelyn Anthony, for example, has a Ukrainian émigré speaking Russian with his daughter and a Ukrainian dissident prepared to merge his patriotism for Ukraine in a wider patriotism for "Russia" (i.e. the Soviet Union).

While these blunders do not spoil the tale as a tale, it becomes difficult for anyone who is familiar with Ukrainian *realia* to take such a story seriously. The necessary suspension of disbelief becomes virtually impossible, and if trapped with such a book, say for the duration of a tedious flight or train-journey, one can only achieve even a moderate enjoyment by forgetting the names and mentally substituting Ruritania for Ukraine and Erewhon for Russia. And if the book aspires to be anything more than a simple tale of white hats versus black hats, and expects the reader to make a serious identification with the inner dilemmas and divided loyalties of the protagonists, then the lack of credibility engendered by these mistakes becomes a serious barrier.

Mr. Hands' novel is, undoubtedly, far more than a white hats/black hats romp. His protagonist, Taras, chosen by the plotters as their prime source of disinformation, is a half-Ukrainian half-Russian, who lost his illusions about Communism back in kindergarten, and has nothing to put in their place. When we first meet him he is interested in nothing but success — as defined by a luscious Western life-style. During the course of the tale, and under the influence of his love for Maria, the daughter of a leading Ukrainian activist, his standpoint undergoes a major change. In an interesting twist on the classical Corneillian love-versus-duty conflict, with "duty" demanding the sacrifice of "love" and possibly life, here "love" (of Maria) demands that he sacrifice his "duty" to his "Moscow employers" and hence almost certainly his life. Yet when he makes the "right" decision, and is prepared to risk torture and death to subvert his employers' plans, he is motivated not by patriotism, not by heroism, nor even by love — but by a combination of alcohol, sexual frustration, and a psychological revulsion against being manipulated. Was it by conscious choice, one wonders, that Mr. Hands gives him the code name "Eliot" (ostensibly T.S.). For Taras, in one sense, "does the right thing for the wrong reason" — but (in spite of *Murder in the Cathedral*), it would be difficult to call his sacrifice any kind of treason, let alone "the greatest".

But if such a novel is to work at a serious psychological level, then the reader must be fully engaged and emotionally committed to what is taking place. And since, for the unfolding of the plot, the past and present Ukraine are all-important, the reader's commitment must to a large extent depend on the authenticity of the background. Mr. Hands is not a Ukrainian, nor does

he seem to have any Ukrainian affiliations. Yet, incredibly, his treatment of the Ukrainian background is flawless — better, indeed, than uncertain supposedly non-fiction works about Ukraine. He does not go in for long explanations or footnotes — which would be out of place in a novel. Many eminent Ukrainians are referred to in passing, without explanation, as part of the local colour, particularly in the case of topographical names (Shevchenko Boulevard in Kyiv and Ivan Franko University in Lviv are mentioned on several occasions, for example, but since it is not necessary to explain who Shevchenko and Franko were, no explanation is given). But such explanations as are necessary — Bohdan Khmelnytskyi, Mykhailo Hrushevskyi, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, the Ukrainian Catholic Church — are beautifully handled — clearly, concisely, accurately, and, for the most part, in the course of conversations which do not impede the flow of the action. Mr. Hands is, indeed, so at home with his Ukrainian background that when, at times, we see the action through the eyes of one of his Russian characters, he can allude to Ukraine as being “historically” a “part of Russia” in such a way that it is clear that this is merely that Russian character thinking and not his, the author’s, own view. At the same time, although he has researched his background so thoroughly, Mr. Hands does not fall into the trap of over-egging the pudding, by dragging in every fact he knows at all costs. The Chornobyl disaster is there as a significant part of the background, but Baby Yar, for example, is not even mentioned. (There is an important “Jewish” sequence in the book, but this does not take place in Kyiv, and so allusion to Baby Yar would be irrelevant.)

Research, however, is simply a matter of hard work and application, both traits which Mr. Hands undoubtedly put into this book. But he brings to it something more — a kind of intuitive and artistic insight which raise it far above the normal run of cloak-and-dagger adventures. A diligent researcher should, without too much effort, be able to locate the Ukrainian Catholic prayers for the dead, and, when describing a priest faced with a scene of sudden violent death, have him recite an appropriate prayer. But Mr. Hands does not do this. Instead, his priest, under the stress of the moment, improvises his own petition out of two separate parts of the liturgy for the dead. The result, artistically, is far more moving, and psychologically, far more credible. That Mr. Hands, without background or roots in that liturgy can achieve such an effect is truly remarkable.

In short, both factually and artistically, this book deserves the highest commendation. It will surely do much to help dispel many of the misunderstandings about Ukraine, past and present, which still remain in the mind of the British public, all the more so, because, whether viewed as a tale of adventure or a serious novel, it will reach a readership which would be unlikely to pick up a non-fiction work on Ukrainian history. ■

**Sarah Collinson, EUROPE AND INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION,
Pinter Publishers (London and New York) for The Royal
Institute of International Affairs, 1993, 189pp, £37.50**

This excellent study analyses the attitudes of governments in Europe (western Europe in particular) to immigration and refugee problems, since World War II, covering both official policy (as embodied in legislative acts and administrative regulations) and the less formalised attitudes which manifest themselves in concern about the social and welfare problems inherent in the presence of large communities of refugees and/or migrant labour whose language, customs, and lifestyle differ considerably from those of the host population.

The appearance of this book could scarcely be more timely. It appeared shortly after Germany revoked its automatic right of asylum, and agreed terms with Poland and the Czech Republic for those states to receive back failed asylum seekers who had entered Germany from their territory. Such arrangements will almost certainly produce a knock-on effect. Since the collapse of Communism, Central Europe has become a gateway of entry for "third world" migrants hopefully claiming refugee status even when their real motives are economic. The end of the Soviet Union has not, so far, brought the flood of refugees and migrants which many governments feared. (The Polish government's Plenipotentiary for Refugees, however, had a "trial run" in August 1991, when the Moscow coup coincided with the presence in Poland of large numbers of Lithuanians, Belarusians, Ukrainians, and Russians, to say nothing of ethnic Poles from across the frontier, who had come on pilgrimage to see the Pope, and who, for 48 hours, seemed likely to want to stay on!). Nevertheless, the situation in the former Soviet space is by no means stable. If the ethnic conflicts of the North Caucasus and Moldova should escalate into widespread violence, the countries of eastern and central Europe might well find themselves hosts to large numbers of migrants (both "economic" and refugees in the strict sense of the word) from the east.

For all those concerned with the social and political problems raised by the inflow of refugees and economic migrants, this book will prove invaluable. It covers all principal aspects of worker migration (both official and "irregular) and asylum flows, compares the policies of the principal receiving countries, and (which is less often dealt with) the attitude of the governments of the sending countries. Here, incidentally, an interesting fact emerges. Much has been said by human rights campaigners of recent years about the right of reunification of families, and it is usually tacitly assumed that it is the receiving country alone which outs hindrances in the way of a migrant worker sending for his wife and children. But in some guest-worker programmes, the sending country has been likewise reluctant. A migrant

worker on his own will send a significant part of his earnings back to his dependents, and so indirectly add to the currency reserves of the his home country. But when his dependents join him, he will spend his wages in supporting them in the receiving country). The book concludes with a discussion of the outlook for the 1990s and the possibility of harmonisation of migrant policy among Europe's receiving countries.

As one would expect of a work produced under the auspices of the RIIA, the book is clearly and readably presented, with abundant notes and a lavish bibliography. The only minor flaw lies in the index, which has some odd omissions. In particular, although Ukraine and Ukrainians are mentioned several times in the text, they do not figure in the Index. This is not a unique case: Sweden and the Swedes are likewise absent. Does the indexer, perhaps, suffer from yellow-blue colour-blindness? ■

**Piers Paul Read, *ABLAZE: THE STORY OF CHERNOBYL*,
Secker & Warburg, London, 1993, 478pp, £16.99**

This book, according to the dust-wrapper blurb, is the "first account [of the Chornobyl disaster] to take advantage of the declassification of nuclear information in the former Soviet Union and the loosening of tongues that followed the failure of the coup in 1991". Strictly speaking, this claim is not true. During the seven years since the Chornobyl disaster, a number of "Chornobyl watchers" have emerged world-wide, nuclear and medical experts, environmentalists, and technical journalists, who have monitored and disseminated each successive revelation concerning the catastrophe — and the demise of the Soviet Union following the failure of the August 1991 coup merely intensified their activities. But the constant stream of new information, as part of what used to be called *glasnost* and is now part of the process of "desovietisation" has meant that, after the initial spate of books, these "watchers", quite properly, confined their publications to the specialist and semi-scientific periodical press. What the blurb presumably means is that this is the first post-coup book-length work on the subject.

Mr. Read, it may be noted, is not among the aforesaid band of Chornobyl watchers. He is a novelist-turned-reportage-writer, who hit the headlines in the late 1980s with *ALIVE — the Story of the Andes Survivors*, the film version of which, coincidentally, opened in London shortly before this book appeared. Mr. Read, it must be said, acknowledges in his Introduction his inadequacies for the task. "Ignorant of haematology, immunology and atomic physics, with little knowledge of the peoples and no knowledge of their languages, it seemed at times reckless to pursue my research", he says.

The reader may well agree with him at this point. His justification for continuing, he explains, is that "it is difficult to see how any Russian,

Belorussian *[sic]* or Ukrainian writer could approach the subject with detachment, and even in the West many writers on either the environment or the former Soviet Union are inspired by a partisan zeal. I embarked upon the project with no axe to grind". But this does not explain how he came to embark on the project in the first place. The reason is tucked away at the end of the acknowledgements: his editor at Random House (his US publishers) "suggested" that he should write it. This implies that the unnamed editor wanted a follow-up book to repeat the success of *ALIVE* — that "unthinkable" (as the film publicity says) saga of late-twentieth century survival-through-cannibalism — and cast around for an equally sensational theme. Certainly, the title *ABLAZE* seems to have been selected to evoke the earlier best-seller — even it could only be made apposite by quoting as epigraph one of the least felicitous of the many English translations of Shevchenko's *Meni odnakovo*.

An author's previous lack of knowledge need not, in itself, prove detrimental to the completed work. A competent writer or researcher, given sufficient time and adequate access to sources, should be able to turn out a competent work on a previously unfamiliar subject. But the less familiar the background, the more painstaking the research must be, and the more carefully the details must be checked. And in a work of this kind, which promises new revelations of hitherto-secret material, the very fact that the author has come new to the subject can serve as a touchstone for the whole work. If, in this case, Mr. Read, knowing nothing of the lands affected by Chernobyl, nor the scientific background, nevertheless manages to get this background correct, then the reader may assume, with a considerable degree of certainty, that the new and hence unverifiable material has been equally thoroughly checked. If, however, he slips up on matters which one can verify, then one is surely justified in wondering how reliable he is on the material we cannot check. One may, of course, advance a counter-argument, that an author may well be absolutely accurate on matters relating to the main thrust of his work, while failing to check thoroughly what he considers to be peripheral details. *Falsus in uno*, it may be argued, does not necessarily mean *falsus in omnibus*.

Nevertheless, Mr. Read's errors are, to say the least of it, off-putting. They begin on the very title-pager, where, as has already been noted, he cites an extract from *Meni odnakovo*, a lyric which forms part of the 12-poem cycle of 1847 generally known as *U Tsiadeli* ("In the Fortress"). For some reason, Read attributes this to the epic *The Haydamaky*, which appeared several years earlier, in 1842 (Read says 1841!). So basic an error regarding one of the two best-known poems by Ukraine's national poet is hardly likely to inspire confidence in anyone with even a nodding acquaintance with Ukrainian literature.

Mr. Read then follows up this *faux pas* by inventing (p. 26) a mediaeval prince Strezhiv of Kyiv, the founder of Chernobyl town. The source of this curious error may be found in one of the few sources which Mr. Read

acknowledges by name — Iurii Shcherbak's *CHERNOBYL — a Documentary Story* (Macmillan, London, 1989). On p. 11 of Shcherbak's work, we read

...when the Great Prince of Kiev Mstyslav, son of Monomakh, in 1127 sent his brothers against the Kryvychy along four roads, Vsevolod Olgovych was ordered to proceed through Strezhiv to the town of Borysiv. Strezhiv was considered the most southerly little town in the Polatsk Principality, where Rohvold around 1160 settled Vsevolod Hlibovych. In the time of this prince Strezhiv, later named Chernobyl, was considered an apanage *[sic]* principality.

Now, although a comma after the word "prince" would undoubtedly make the sense clearer, it is difficult to see how the attentive reader can take this word as referring to anyone but Vsevolod Hlibovych.

But Mr. Read's errors are not confined to *Ukrainica*. He goes equally astray on Russian matters. On p. 7, for example, he writes that "although Kurchatov directed the project [to build a Soviet nuclear fission bomb], he was assisted by a team of top physicists like Khariton, Kikoyin, Kapitsa, Tam and Tam's ablest pupil, Sakharov... On 25 December 1946, in his secret laboratory on the outskirts of Moscow, Kurchatov and his team achieved their first chain reaction".

Not only does he misspell Tamm, he contradicts one of the basic facts of Sakharov's career, namely that he did not work on the Soviet uranium/plutonium fission bombs, but only on the later hydrogen bomb. Likewise, Zhores Medvedev was not, as Mr. Read claims (p. 436), a "nuclear scientist"; he was (and is) a geneticist and gerontologist.

The Russian scientific monthly *Priroda*, moreover, is referred to on its first appearance under its Russian name, but on p. 354 it is called *Soviet Nature* and on the next page merely *Nature*. But this, inevitably, leads to confusion with the prestigious English-language scientific weekly of that name, which Mr. Read shows no signs of having consulted, but to which he does refer, as *Nature*, on p. 272. (As a result, the two journals are lumped together in the index under a single entry). And Belarus fares little better in the error-stakes: Professor Stanislau Suskievic (who emerges in Mr. Read's version as Shushkievicz — an orthographic medley of Russian and Polish!) who, for almost three years following the accident fought to have the extent of the contamination made known to the public (including those still living on contaminated land), did not become — alas for all concerned! — the "first president of an independent Belorussia". His position as *de facto* head of state of Belarus derives from his position as Speaker of Parliament, and his power of independent action is accordingly limited.

And even on points of elementary scientific fact — of a level which might occur in the General Knowledge round of a serious TV quiz such as *Mastermind* — Mr. Read is occasionally confused. In particular, he quotes Nikolai Fomin, the Communist Party Secretary at the Chornobyl Power Station as assuring Ukraine's Health Minister Anatoliy Romanenko, that "the chances of an accident there were much like the chances of being hit by a

comet. 'How many comets hit the earth?' ", he had Fomin say. " 'One almost every hour. Yet we know of only two cases where they caused fatalities: one hit a man going for a walk, and the other fell into the washtub where a German woman was doing her laundry. No, Comrade Minister, the chances of a serious accident are about the same as being hit by a comet'."

Now this is sheer nonsense. Comets simply do not impact on the earth at the rate of one an hour. According to one school of thought, the earth may possibly have been hit by a comet once — in 1908 — causing the widespread devastation in Siberia known as the "Tungus event". Either Fomin was talking scientific rubbish (in which case, Mr. Read should surely have drawn attention to the fact) or else the translator has made an error, putting "comet" for "meteorite" — in which case Mr. Read should have spotted that something was amiss.

Even more seriously (on the scientific side) basic information on types of radiation, the health hazards they pose, and the units used to measure radioactivity and exposure, which is essential if the intended, lay, audience is to understand this book, is tucked away, in far too compressed a form, at the end of the general Introduction, where it has something of the air of having been copied, in haste, out of some encyclopaedia of science. Surely some means could have been found to present this material within the text proper?

But enough of individual errors. Let us look rather at the book as a whole. Mr. Read sets out, as he tells us, to "reduce to manageable proportions" a "catastrophe which affected several million people". His "reduction" consists of telling the story of "only a few", including "some of the essential protagonists". This is, of course, nothing new in disaster reporting. More than 40 years ago John Hersey used this technique brilliantly in his *Hiroshima*, and it is an ideal technique for describing the human impact of a disaster. Indeed, this technique had already been applied to Chernobyl by Iurii Shcherbak, to whose excellent book we have already referred. And, indeed, Mr. Read, who is undoubtedly a competent writer, could doubtless have produced a similar work, perhaps not so moving as Dr. Shcherbak's (since Mr. Read prides himself on his "detachment", but nevertheless a readable account of the human impact of the tragedy. Equally, he concentrated on the investigative journalism approach, looking into the causes and methods of the cover-up — though this would have required (given Mr. Read's acknowledged lack of linguistic skills) a researcher fluent in all three East Slav languages, at the very least, and preferably Polish, Bulgarian, Hungarian and Finnish as well! Likewise, he could (with a scientific "ghost") have emphasised the physical cause of the accident, the "built-in" lack of safety of the RBMK reactor, or its "ideological" cause — the ingrained secrecy of the Soviet Union and the philosophy of work which gave completion by or ahead of an arbitrary target date priority over considerations of safety. He could even have taken as his major theme the Chernobyl factor in Soviet and post-Soviet politics.

Any one of these themes could be made the focus of an effective book. Perhaps because of his "detachment", however, Mr. Read does not seem at all

certain of the direction his work should take, nor which of the above themes to develop most fully. As a result, no clear message emerges. We learn that the RBMK reactor was unsafe, and that the major design fault leading to that lack of safety was the "positive void coefficient", yet we never get a proper explanation of what this means. We are presented with the Soviet great — the "establishment" scientists and the politicians responsible for the Soviet nuclear energy programme, and for the secrecy which entailed an official policy line that "socialist reactors cannot explode", the on-site personnel left (if they survived) to carry the legal responsibility for the accident, and the innocent bystanders and victims. What we lack, however, is a framework that will give their actions and sufferings some kind of coherent meaning.

Faced with disasters of his own or of Nature's making, man has for centuries tried to deal with them psychologically by tracing a common pattern. Disaster as divine punishment for sin is an ancient interpretation — albeit one which, in its crudest form, Christ specifically rejected in the case of the victims of the Siloam tower disaster (*Luke xi.4*). The concept of *hubris*, an impious reaching beyond an appointed limit which of itself brings about disaster (the leitmotif of much of Greek tragedy) does, however, play a real part in many man-made disasters: the Tay Bridge falls with a train in the act of crossing, not because the passengers were impiously using wheeled transport on a Sunday, but because of design faults which failed to take into account the lateral stresses produced by a gale—force wind. The "unsinkable" *Titanic* goes down with huge loss of life, not because the epithet has presumptuously challenged the gods of storm and ice — but because the owners and crew are so lulled by that publicity epithet that they act as if it were literally true — so that insufficient lifeboats are carried and iceberg warnings ignored. The parallels to Chornobyl are obvious. Or was it — rather, a "horse-shoe-nail" tragedy, an accumulation of many tiny slip-ups and breaches of the rules, occurring in a fatal coincidence — or a "Pontius Pilate scenario", a consciousness that, for the sake of expediency, one is transgressing a major rule of conduct, but hoping that, just this once, it will not matter? These archetypes, too, have their place in Chornobyl. If a "disaster" book is to cater to something more than a somewhat immature delight in blood and body-counts, then the "human factor" should relate not merely to the faults of commission and/or omission of those involved, but to the fallibility and culpability inherent in the human condition, to the awareness that "there, but for the grace of God, go we". And if the Chornobyl accident is to have a wider meaning than "Soviet nuclear power-stations are unsafe and the Soviet system a bad thing", then we need an interpretation that will help us — all of us who live in democracies where citizens' views count, or can be made to count — to decide our own nuclear future.

And this Mr. Read fails to give us. He preserves his "detachment" to the end — or almost to the end. For in what was clearly designed to be his closing paragraph (since the Epilogue, dealing with the IAEA report of January 1993 must have been added while the book was at press), he does

venture some kind of interpretation, albeit one which he puts into the mouth, or rather the thoughts, of Academician Anatoliy Aleksandrov, the fallen “emperor” of the Soviet nuclear industry. Putting himself inside Aleksandrov’s mind, Mr. Read draws a parallel between the Chornobyl disaster and the “meltdown” of the Soviet Union “the first and only state built on the principles of science, with fuel rods assembled into a critical mass, and control rods to prevent a runaway reaction. They had achieved the critical mass, and if people had behaved as predictably as atoms, it would have worked. But who could have foretold that all the control rods would be removed — and by the operators themselves?”

Fine rhetoric, although the analogy is neither so simple nor so exact as a first reading suggests. But such a comparison, taken at its face value, tends to reinforce the attitude of the international nuclear community — that Chornobyl, both in its technical and human aspects, was an accident specific to the Soviet system, and so could not happen in the west. (A comfortable theory — spokesmen for the Soviet nuclear industry said exactly the same, *mutatis mutandis*, about US reactors and the capitalist system — after Three Mile Island.) But the truth about nuclear power is not as simple as either its outright advocates or its opponents would have it. Already in both Belarus and Ukraine, the two countries most affected by the disaster, responsible people (including Speaker Suskievic) are beginning to reappraise the perils of nuclear power set against the hazard of being dependent for energy supplies on pipelines from Russia — which, should a right-wing nationalist government come to power in Moscow, would all too probably be used as a weapon of political blackmail. But on the larger issues of nuclear power and nuclear safety, Mr. Read, once again, preserves his “detachment”.

Mr. Read’s account of the Chornobyl disaster is — if one disregards the off-putting hype and superlatives of the dust-wrapper blurb — competently written, and — given his name and the publicity surrounding the film of *ALIVE*,— will doubtless do well. In his Introduction, Mr. Read mentions several of the Chornobyl-related charities. I could find no suggestion that these, or any other similar funds, stand to gain directly from the sales of this book (Mr. Read, possibly, prefers doing good by stealth!) But even if no Chornobyl charity can expect a share of the profits, this book may, for its faults and inadequacies, remind public opinion that the victims of Chornobyl will be with us, if not (in contrast to the poor) “always” at least for our lifetimes and the lifetimes of many of our children. ■

**Maurice Friedberg, HOW THINGS WERE DONE IN ODESSA —
CULTURAL AND INTELLECTUAL PURSUITS IN A SOVIET CITY.
Boulder CO/Oxford, Westview Press, 1991,
xii+145 pp, illustr., £21.95**

This brilliant evocation of Odessa life in the Brezhnev era is a spin-off from a broader debriefing project, in which recent arrivals in the USA from the Soviet Union were questioned about the life and background they had left behind. In view of the Soviet restrictions on emigration in those years, the majority of these informants were Jews — or at least Jewish enough to qualify for a visa “to Israel”. Once they had left the country, however, they “dropped out”, and made their way, not to Israel, but to America.

It is not surprising then that considerable attention is given to the problems of Odessa's Jews. As is well known, the Soviet system practised a kind of covert anti-semitism, particularly in employment and higher education. Odessa was no different, in that respect, to any other city in the Soviet Union, except, perhaps, in that its Jewish traditions were stronger than most. What is less well known is this discrimination sometimes carried over into the Gentile world. Some higher education institutions in Odessa seemed to have operated on a principle of better safe than sorry, rejecting all young people with “unusual” (and hence possibly Jewish) surnames.

Apart from the disabilities covertly imposed on them by the system, Odessa's Jews at this period were highly assimilated, and differed little if at all from their Gentile neighbours. And like many of their neighbours, they were Russophone. Statements about the relative popularity of, say, the Russian and Ukrainian press or theatre, may possibly contain an element of subconscious bias towards the papers and theatre which the informants themselves patronised. This era, of course, was the age of *slivanie*, the “alloying” of peoples into a single “Soviet” nation, and of the Khrushchev theses which effectively made the Russian language the sole medium of public life and learning throughout the entire Soviet Union. The status of the few Ukrainian-language schools in Odessa was low, and Ukrainian was generally considered a “peasant language”. Until, that is, the late 1960s, when it was decided from on high to convert three of these despised Ukrainian schools into prestigious “foreign language” schools, so that the children of Odessa's Russophone élite had to go to crambers to learn Ukrainian, so as to be able to get access to the languages of the West.

What is quite clear, however, is that neither Ucrainophone nor Russophone Odessans were happy with the official cultural and educational diet encouraged by the state. To get out the book one wanted to read from the library, therefore, one had to accept half-a-dozen volumes of recommended ideological texts. Theatres would include several approved Soviet dramas in their repertory to offset each work from the West — but the

Western piece would play to full houses for weeks, while the politically correct dramas were shown only once or twice.

This type of ploy and subterfuge is typical of the material presented here. The title of the book comes from one of the tales of Isaac Babel's *Odessa Tales*, featuring one of Babel's most popular creations, the Odessan Jewish crook, Benya Krik. And, as Friedberg shows, things were "done" in Odessa of the Brezhnev era in a way that Krik would have found utterly familiar. The city was run on corruption: from the highest bureaucrat to the humblest janitor, bribes were expected for the performance of what should have been a routine duty. The Odessans learned how to cope, and to judge from this account, the parallel economy based on contacts, *blat* and protection at least functioned reasonably efficiently — which is more than can be said for its official counterpart. Indeed the city authorities and party bosses of this period are revealed as remarkably inept. The outstanding example of their bungling is the Laocoon affair, when they decided that the statue (a copy from the antique) representing the Trojan priest and his sons, being crushed by the serpents, was too revealing. Instead of adding a plaster fig-leaf, in the Victorian manner, they had Laocoon's penis removed. Not surprisingly, as the news spread, hundreds of Odessans who had passed the statue regularly without really noticing it, came to stand and stare. Orders were given to restore the penis — and this was duly done — using stone which did not match the rest of the group, and hence provoked more stares and sniggers! As an example of "how things were done" by the Soviet authorities in Odessa, the Laocoon story is a classic.

The way, however, in which the ordinary citizen had to "do" things, from getting one's son a university place to procuring some minor luxury for a family celebration — however humorous the anecdotes — poses some hard questions for the future. Odessa, like all major sea-ports, has always had its seamier side — its crooks, racketeers, dives and brothels. But the cheerful amorality which Babel embodied in the character of Benya Krik became, under the pressures of the Soviet system, the way of life of a whole city. Artistically speaking, the world would be the poorer were Odessa to become a city of grey saints. But a colourful underworld is one thing. A whole city corrupted is another. And, since the stresses and strains of Soviet existence were not confined to Odessa, one has to postulate hundreds of equally corrupt cities, throughout all the Newly Independent States. One can only hope that the ingenuity which helped the Odessans — and millions of other Soviet citizens — to furnish themselves, "on the left" with the necessities and little luxuries which the system so signally failed to provide through official channels, can now be diverted into the legal channels of market entrepreneurship.

For the sociologist or historian of the Soviet Union, this book will provide a wealth of illustrative and anecdotal material. To those concerned with Ukraine and the other Newly Independent States, it presents a frightening picture of the moral legacy of Communism, a legacy which, in the day-to-day welter of economic and political crises, the new leaders of those states have barely had time to recognise. ■

**EAST EUROPEAN JEWISH AFFAIRS,
Vol. 22, No. 2, 1992**

Includes a detailed study, by Viktoriya Khiterer, from the Central Historical Archive of Ukraine in Kyiv, of the anti-Jewish pogrom in Kyiv in October 1905, following the proclamation of the Russian empire's first constitution. Original archive material and personal memoirs are extensively cited, showing, *inter alia*, that the pogrom took place with the connivance, and to some extent, the orchestration, of the Tsarist authorities, and noting the efforts made by a number of prominent citizens of Kyiv, including the Metropolitan Archbishop and the Rector of the Technical University, to put a stop to the violence.

Also includes a review of Maurice Friedberg's *How Things Were Done in Odessa: Cultural and Intellectual Pursuits in a Soviet City*, (Boulder, Co. 1991). ■

**RUSSIA AND THE SUCCESSOR STATES BRIEFING SERVICE,
Vol. 1, No. 1, February, 1993**

A new journal, edited by Dr. Martin McCauley of the School of Slavonic and East European Studies of the University of London. The first issue is devoted almost entirely to an excellent and detailed survey of Ukraine past and present by Andrew Wilson of the London School of Economics and Political Sciences. ■

**THE WORLD TODAY,
Vol. 49, No. 6, June 1993**

The monthly of The Royal Institute of International Affairs. This issue includes an article by Serhij Tolstov of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations in Kyiv, on "Ukraine's Nuclear Dilemma". ■

**INDEX ON CENSORSHIP
Nos. 3 and 4, 1993**

This excellent journal, which for more than 20 years has campaigned unceasingly for the freedom of the spoken and broadcast word, is currently running a series of features on the literature now emerging from the catacombs of the former USSR. No. 3, which focuses on Ukraine and Belarus, includes translations of works by Mykola Ryabchuk, Yevhen Pashkovsky, Yury Vynnychuk, Oksana Batyuk, Serhiy Lavrenyuk and Oleh Lysheha, and a report on the Crimean Tatars' efforts to return to their homeland, as well as the first-ever translations from Belarusian prose made directly from the original into English, instead of working through an intermediate Russian text.

No. 4 carries some grim reportage from the ethnic conflict in Transdnistria, just across the Ukrainian-Moldovan frontier. ■

Obituaries

Patriarch Mstyslav I

1898-1993

Patriarch Mstyslav of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church died on 11 June 1993. He was 95 years old, and had been a Bishop for 52 years and a Patriarch for almost three.

Mstyslav, in the world Stepan Skrypnyk, was born in Poltava, in Eastern Ukraine, in 1898, the son of Ivan and Mariamna Skrypnyk. (The latter, née Petlura, was the sister of Symon Petlura, who in 1919-20 served as head of the Directory — government — of the independent Ukrainian National Republic).

The young Stepan attended school in Poltava, but in 1916, he was swept up into the turmoil of the First World War, serving first in the Tsarist Army, and then, after Ukraine's declaration of independence in January 1918, in the forces of Ukraine.

During the inter-war years, he lived in Western Ukraine, then under Polish rule, where for almost twenty years he played a major role in establishing and defending the political, community and economic life of the Ukrainians in Poland. He helped found and administer the cooperative unions which during those years formed a major focus of Ukrainian self-help activities, and became a member of the Church Council of the Orthodox Church in Volhynia. In 1930-31 he served as Deputy Mayor of the town of Rivne, in Volhynia, and in 1931 he was elected to the *Sejm* (Polish parliament), where he served as Secretary of the *Sejm* Presidium and as a member of the Foreign Affairs and Budgetary Committees.

In 1921, Stepan had married Ivanna Vitkovska, who bore him a son (Yaroslav) and two daughters (Tamara and Mariamna). But in 1941 she died. In May of the following year, with Ukraine under Nazi occupation, Stepan entered the religious life, taking the name Mstyslav, and — hastily and in secret, since the Nazis had forbidden any further consecrations of Bishops to this Church —, was rushed through the various stages from layman to Bishop of Pereyaslav in the minimum time-span permitted by Church law.

As soon, however, as he tried to make an episcopal visitation to the parishes of his diocese, he was arrested by the Gestapo, and spent the next seven months in its prisons, including the infamous Pryluky, from which he was eventually delivered by what he described as "an act of Divine Providence".

When, in 1944, the Red Army was advancing into Ukraine, Bishop Mstyslav, who by now was Secretary of the Synod of Bishops of the

Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, organised the "exodus" of his clerics and their families to the West. Making his temporary base in Offenbach, in West Germany, he helped organise the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church in France, and established a new diocese for the United Kingdom. By this time, his Church had been suppressed in Ukraine, and its believers forcibly incorporated into the Russian Orthodox Church, whose existence Stalin was (just) prepared to tolerate, provided that it was prepared to render unto Stalin that which (in Stalin's opinion) was Stalin's. But the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (whose very name seemed to predicate the existence of an independent Ukrainian state — or at least a Ukrainian independence movement) was outlawed.

In 1947, Bishop Mstyslav moved to Canada, where he served for three years as Ukrainian Orthodox Bishop of Winnipeg and head of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in Canada. In 1950 he moved to the USA, establishing his headquarters at South Bound Brook, New Jersey, where he founded the Ukrainian Orthodox Centre of St Andrew the Apostle. Following a Synod which brought about the unification of several branches of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, he became President of the Consistory of this Church. In 1969, when Metropolitan Nikanor died, he succeeded him as Metropolitan of the UAOC in exile — an area covering Western Europe and the British Isles, Australasia and Latin America. Two years later, when Metropolitan Ioan died, Mstyslav succeeded him as head of the UAOC in the USA also, so that he was now head of the entire Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church in diaspora.

During this time, Archbishop Mstyslav played a significant role in ecumenical contacts with other churches, including, first and foremost, the Ukrainian Greek-rite Catholic Church. He took part in the work of the Second Vatican Council, and in 1968, in a meeting considered to be of great significance for both churches, welcomed to South Bound Brook Cardinal Josyf Slipyj, the head of the Ukrainian Greek-rite Catholic Church.

Meanwhile, in the homeland, Soviet power was crumbling, and the two proscribed Ukrainian Churches, Catholic and Orthodox, emerged from the catacombs. In June 1990, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church held its first Synod in Kyiv, proclaimed the restoration of the Kyiv Patriarchate (which had vanished in the year 1300, when the Patriarch of the day quit Kyiv, still devastated from the Tatar onslaught 60 years previously, and betook himself to Moscow). The vote for the Patriarch was unanimous — for Mstyslav. For the last three years of his life, the new Patriarch, now over 90 years old, became an international commuter between New Jersey and Kyiv, and in August 1991, visited Lviv for the solemn homecoming and reinterment of the mortal remains of the late Cardinal Slipyj, who had died in Rome in 1984.

Meanwhile, as Ukrainian aspirations for independence became more manifest, in 1989, the Ukrainian exarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church had been renamed the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, though remaining still subject to Moscow. But, once Ukraine had achieved full independence, the head of this Church, Metropolitan Filaret, wanted likewise to renounce his

Church's allegiance to Moscow. All he achieved, though, was a head-on clash with the Moscow Holy Synod, which deposed him as Metropolitan and deprived him of his priestly status, appointing a Russian, Vladimir of Rostov, to the see of Kyiv. Filaret, however, refused to accept this verdict, and declared himself to be still the leader of the Orthodox Church in Ukraine. Some members of the UAOC felt that this would be an appropriate time to effect the union of all Ukrainian Orthodox, and hurriedly convened a Synod to effect a merger of the two churches. Under the proposed deal, Mstyslav would remain Patriarch of the united Church, with Filaret as his deputy with right of succession.

Mstyslav, however, refused to back the deal. On the one hand, he made it clear that Filaret and his Church were tainted by long years of complacency towards the Communist regime, while on the other he said that the Moscow Holy Synod (which many believers would have said was equally, if not more compromised) had acted canonically in deposing Filaret. The only true representative of Orthodoxy in Ukraine, he stated, was the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, which had never compromised. He spent what were to prove the last months of his life preparing for a general council of that Church to determine its way forward in today's changed conditions. ■

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C O N T E N T S

EDITORIAL 2

60th Anniversary of the 1932-33 Famine

WILL RUSSIA REPENT? Ivan Drach 3

1933 — A VIEW FROM LONDON 8

Current Affairs

UKRAINE AND THE PROBLEMS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Lt.-Colonel Anatoliy Hlushchenko 13

IRAN AND UKRAINE: THE VIEW FROM TEHRAN

Dr. Ali Granmayeh 20

THE STATE OF THE UKRAINIAN HEALTH SERVICE

Prof. B.II. Iskiv 23

HIGHER EDUCATION IN UKRAINE — INTERNATIONAL
COLLABORATION IN DEVELOPMENT David Randall 28

CHERNIVTSI — A FAILURE IN GLASNOST Steve Hide 33

History

UKRAINIAN JEWS' LANGUAGE BEHAVIOUR IN THE 1920s:
AN INDEX OF UKRAINIAN STATUS Gennady Estraikh 40

Literature

BABYLONIAN CAPTIVITY Lesya Ukrainka 45

News From Ukraine 61

Documents & Reports 84

Books & Periodicals 87

EDITORIAL

The current issue of *The Ukrainian Review* appears at a time when Ukrainians, at home and in the diaspora, are commemorating the sixtieth anniversary of the man-made famine of 1932-33. This was a disaster, which, at the most cautious estimates, caused the death by starvation and famine-related disease of at least seven million inhabitants of Ukraine — the land so long famed as the bread-basket of Europe. It was a disaster that, at the time, was relatively little understood abroad. The “intellectual Left” of those years, naively endorsing the Soviet propaganda in a manner which cannot but call into doubt either their intellectual honesty or their perspicacity, did its best to deny that the famine was taking place at all. Those journals which were prepared to give credence to the reports from Ukraine (and to campaign, in consequence, for a boycott of trade with the USSR), nevertheless did not fully comprehend the situation. They knew that the famine was no natural disaster; that neither flood, drought, crop-disease nor insect plague was to blame, and that its causes lay with the Soviet planners in Moscow. But the humane and gentlemanly editors and journalists of sixty years ago simply took this to mean that somewhere there had been a gigantic mistake in the Plan, that “someone had blundered” on a scale to make the Charge of the Light Brigade or the safety precautions for the *Titanic* pale into insignificance. The true horror was beyond their comprehension and imaginings. For the famine was no mistake. It was a piece of deliberate social engineering, designed to force Ukrainian farmers into the Collective Farms, and to destroy (by deportation or death) the “kulaks”, that is all those who resisted collectivisation, or in any way expressed their hostility to Soviet rule.

The full story of the famine has yet to be told. As the former Soviet *spetskrany* and secret archives are gradually unlocked, historians will undoubtedly present us with key documents and the day to day administrative minutiae of those years of “genocide by hunger”. In the meantime, Dr. Robert Conquest’s great study, *Harvest of Sorrow* remains, undoubtedly, the most comprehensive English-language work on the subject.

As new material emerges, *The Ukrainian Review*, will undoubtedly return many times to this theme. In the meantime, to mark the anniversary, we present two items:

a moving piece of oratory from one of Ukraine’s leading contemporary poets and writers, Ivan Drach, and, from 1933, a hitherto-unremarked collection of letters from victims of the famine. ■

60th Anniversary of the 1932-33 Famine

WILL RUSSIA REPENT?

Address at the International Academic Conference
 “Famine 1932-1933 in Ukraine”

Ivan Drach

There is nothing more terrifying than looking down an abyss into which you are afraid to fall. They took a people of tillers and singers and tried to turn them into a people of cannibals and thieves. The brand of 1933 burns yet upon the forehead of our being. We are still waiting for the Russia of Yeltsin and Khasbulatov to do penance for the sins of the Russia of Lenin and Stalin. We offer the Russians the model of the guilt of Germany towards the Jews and how Adenauer did penance for the guilt of Hitler. But first let us look into our own hearts.

The Bolshevik *oprichniki*¹ in Ukraine were mobilised from Ukrainians too, and the penitential blood of Khvylovyi and Skrypnyk² cannot wash away the sins committed by millions against millions.

Ten years ago, the three-million-strong Communist Party of Ukraine received an instruction, signed by Kapto and Mukha, “On the fiftieth anniversary of the so-called famine of 1933”. Ten years ago, too, the Ambassador of the USSR to Canada — the man who would later become the architect of Gorbachev’s *perestroika* — was organising a hunt for diplomats and journalists abroad, in order to suppress the truth about 1933, which our fellow countrymen in the USA and Canada were trying to proclaim to the world. And the fact that the Politburo Archives, and now the

Ivan Drach, a poet and people’s deputy, was the founder and first chairman of the Popular Movement of Ukraine (Rukh). Drach is also the first Secretary of the Kyiv branch of the Writers’ Union of Ukraine and the chairman of the “Ukraina” Society.

¹ *Oprichnina* was the private court created by Tsar Ivan IV the Terrible (1565) that administered the Russian lands (also known as oprichnina) that had been separated from the rest of Muscovy and placed under the Tsar’s direct control. The term also refers to the reign of terror, which was conducted by the *oprichniki*, members of the Tsar’s new court.

² Mykola Khvylovyi (1893-1933), a writer and Soviet Ukrainian political and cultural activist. Committed suicide in 1933. Mykola Skrypnyk (1872-1933), political and party activist of the Soviet Ukrainian government. Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine. Head of the Soviet government in Ukraine from 1918. Committed suicide in 1933.

Archives of Yeltsin are classified top secret clearly shows where the heads of the "famine committees" were born and continue to be born.

The famine of 1932-33 was, of its very nature, not accidental. Nor was it a unique episode in the fate of the Ukrainian people. The time has come to grasp the fact, once and for all that this was only a stage — albeit the one closest to us, Ukrainians, who survived and exist today, of the systematic rooting out of the Ukrainian nation. For a deep-seated reluctance to accept the very existence of our nation is prevalent among the heirs of those of the northern tribes, to whom our people gave its faith, culture, civilisation and even name. And therefore, not just since the beginnings of the Muscovite Tsardom, but right back in the time of the Grand Dukes, and the era of Andrei Bogolyubskiy³ there rolled down upon Ukraine-Rus' ceaseless waves of hate, cruelty, the total destruction of everything Ukrainian, which this provincial northern princeling brought to Kyiv, plundering it several decades before Khan Batu. The testament of this barbarian is, as it were, imprinted on the genes of all Muscovite and Petersburg rulers irrespective of their blood. German or Georgian — every one of them proved an implacable enemy of Ukrainiandom even when our leaders kowtowed in submission and obedience before them. It seems that none of the Russian rulers ever forgot to extirpate the Ukrainian language and culture or refrain from spilling rivers of Ukrainian blood, nor from taking and ever taking endless convoys of Ukrainian helots for the "construction" of their boggy North and their Siberia, "too vast to cross".⁴

The wily epigram, that the only thing which history teaches is that it does not teach anything, is not for us, Ukrainians. It is a masterpiece of those who would wish mankind to forget the diabolical marks they have set upon history, to escape from the judgment of God and of men. Oblivion is the testament for the successors of the hangmen. Eternal memory is the sacred lesson for the successors of the innocent slain. These lessons which Ukrainiandom has to learn and is at last beginning to learn.

The first lesson, which is already becoming an inseparable part of the national consciousness of Ukrainians is that Russia never had, has not and so far shows no signs of ever having other intentions towards Ukraine than the total destruction of the Ukrainian nation. We can see that, from the most refined philosopher to the greediest alcoholic, too many Russians have been inculcated with a fatal fixation — Ukrainophobia. This constitutes one of the principal elements of the "Russian idea". It today is boiling over into a fren-

³ Andrei Bogolyubskiy (b. c. 1111—d. June 1174). Prince of the Rostov-Suzdal principality in the northeastern Rus' lands (1157) and grand prince of Vladimir (1169). In a bid to extend his authority over other Rus' principalities, Bogolyubskiy sacked Kyiv in 1169, acquiring the title grand prince.

⁴ Phrase quoted from the poem "The Caucasus" of Ukraine's national poet Taras Shevchenko (1814-1861), where it occurs in a passage setting out the theory and ambitions of Russian imperialism.

zied, truly biological hatred towards Ukrainiandom in the Russian Parliament. Engraved on the walls of the towns of Crimea one may read: "A good Ukrainian is a dead Ukrainian!". This diabolical fixation has already exceeded the chronic (academic and black hundred) anti-Semitism of Russian "passionarias". This mania deadly for Ukrainians and self-destructive for the Russians themselves dictates every step, every word, every gesture towards Ukraine on the part of the present leadership in Moscow too, the political, military, economic, academic and cultural generals in whatever clothing they disguise themselves. We have to state that today we are approaching the culmination of several hundred years of Great Russian racism, Russian Nazism as a world-view and as a spiritual base, it would seem, a campaign for a final solution — the destruction of the Ukrainian nation. If someone still has some doubts and has failed to notice that Yeltsin suffers from an Andrei Bogolyubskiy complex, then he should think over, once more, what lies behind the psychological, economic, political, cultural-informational, and also military, totalitarian terror which has been the sole content of Russian policy towards Ukraine since our declaration of independence. It is not just Sevastopol or Donbas which is at stake. The primary issue is the claim that "Kiyev [Russian spelling] — is the mother of Russian cities". To blot out this idea from the soul of the average Russian is as impossible as to blot out from the soul of the average Ukrainian that Kyiv is the capital of Ukraine.

I am not saying this in order to cultivate a reciprocal hatred for Russians to balance that which the Russians are pumping out at full strength every day against Ukrainians. The honour and dignity of our nation over thousands of years has lain in respect for other peoples, even for enemies. The crux of the matter is that to our tolerance we must add more than hitherto national fortitude, national discretion, national steadfastness and wisdom. Ukrainians do not aspire towards war with Russia, but are forced to prepare for the worst. Ukrainians do not aspire to live and to manage their affairs to the detriment of Russia, but do have to learn not to compromise their national and economic interests. Ukrainians do not reject Russian culture, but are obliged in the last resort to be able to develop an immunity to its not simply cultural, racist aggression and its intolerance towards the spiritual acquisitions of other peoples. Ukrainians will not renounce Orthodoxy, but want their own Church, not the religious fanaticism of Muscovite imperialism thrust upon them in its place. This is the message that comes to us and our descendants from the millions of radiant souls of Ukrainian women and children from the dark times of 1932-33. Let us hear them!

The second lesson of the mass slaughter of the Ukrainians in the killing grounds of our neighbouring Molochs is one of which in all probability we have hardly come to grips with. Even if one of us or some neighbour had come to believe that Ukrainians were doomed to be a victim-nation, nevertheless in 750 years of statelessness we have proved to the whole of mankind that we are an immortal nation. It is possible that in this lies the

cosmic sense of our tragic situation, in the half-dead existence to which foreigners have periodically reduced Ukrainians, and our inevitable resurrections, and powerful upsurging of the will of the nation to life. So it was after the invasion of the Tatar horde, after the millions-strong slavery to the Turks and Tatars, after impaling and quartering by the Polish nobility, after the three-hundred-year-long spiritual and physical holocaust carried out by the Russians.

Viable historical nations reveal an instructive feature: they never forget the victims suffered by their past generations. For the Jews, Armenians, Bulgarians and various nations whom other peoples tried to wipe from the face of the earth, the continuity of national existence was always associated, in particular, with the unfading memory of irreplaceable losses to their ethnos, and the feeling of a genetic blood link with ancestors who were destroyed only because they remained Jews, Armenians, or Bulgarians. There is now documentary evidence that almost one third of our peasants were killed sixty years ago simply because they were and wanted to remain Ukrainians. But, Ukrainians ended up in the most terrible situation: the Ukrainian stock was consistently rooted out in cannibalistic style and at the same time it was diabolically forbidden not only to count those murdered, but even to keep the very memory of them.

The Jewish people and the State of Israel, reborn after 2000 years, have forced the whole world to acknowledge its guilt, especially after the Nazi holocaust of World War II. The Jews have received an international mandate to hunt down, without Statute of Limitations, those who sought to destroy their nation, and go on doing this, unwearingly, and actively, as if the trail of blood were still fresh. We know that the German people has done penance before the Jews and, in spite of their tradition of thrift even in minor matters, has not only acknowledged its moral guilt, but is also paying financial compensation to the next-of-kin of the victims of Nazism, even though it has renounced the Nazi ideology. We do not have to demonstrate that today's Russia is the heir of both of the Russian Tsars and the Russian Bolsheviks; Moscow has itself asserted this and is loudly maintaining that it is the legal successor of both empires — the "White" and the "Red". The prophets of "Russianness" from Berdyayev to Zyuganov, from Brother Filofei in the 15th century to the contemporary prince of the Muscovite Church, Metropolitan Ioann of St. Petersburg, have indignantly rejected the very idea that autocratic despotism or Bolshevik terrorism is not an integral factor of Russian history and deduce that these regimes which are apparently so different are in fact only variant forms, modifications of the continuity of existence of the Great Russians as natural and eternal statist-imperialists. And everything which was done in the name of, and for the good of, Great Russia.

The Russian ideologues, both old and new, assert their juridical and ethical premises according to which Ukraine has the right to submit a bill for the Famine of 1932-33 to the present Russian Federation. The "Russian idea" and its practice still have not reached an estimate of the slaughter in Ukraine

on the style of the Nuremberg trials. But such a trial appears to be a real and inescapable event. The first warning bell was sounded by the Resolution of the Security Council of the UN regarding Russian pretensions to Ukrainian Sevastopol, while the establishment of an influential tribunal on the atrocities of the aggressors in Yugoslavia means that it is already knocking at the door. So far there is no sign that official Russia has heard these historical signals of fate. We have seen no signs of repentance for the reduction by half of the Ukrainian nation over the last 75 years. But we would wish our northern neighbours to pay heed to our warning; the Ukrainian nation retains the right to demand that Moscow bear the responsibility, in particular for the famine of 1933. The time is coming, and 8 or 12 million witnesses, two or three times more than the number of Ukrainians who fell in World War II, will rise up from their graves in every Ukrainian village and demand that there be no Statute of Limitations for their murder, in accordance with international law.

At a conference organised by our Embassy in Moscow in the spring of this year, most of the Russian participants voiced the opinion that the Famine did not select its victims according to genotype; that in the face of the famine and Stalin all were equal. There was only one person, Serhiy Adamovich Kovalyov,⁵ the former dissident and current head of the commission of Human Rights of the ill-famed Russian Parliament, found the courage to state that the Russians must say to the Ukrainians: "Forgive us!". In these words there is a sound of hope. ■

⁵ This is not the first time that Kovalyov has stood up for the rights of the non-Russian peoples of the USSR. In the 1970s, he publicly gave his support to the underground "Chronicle of the Lithuanian Catholic Church" for which he received a 7-year prison sentence.

1933 — A VIEW FROM LONDON

During the early 1930s, the Catholic weekly *The Tablet*, kept up an unremitting battle against the Soviet Union (usually referred to as Russia), advocating a trade boycott, in particular of foodstuffs. *The Tablet's* primary motive for the campaign was religious — Moscow had, at this time, declared a five year plan for the extirpation of religion. But during the course of 1932 and 1933, references to the famine began to make their appearances in its pages. A boycott of "Russian" produce was now advocated, not only in protest against the Soviet Union's blatant disregard of what are now called Human Rights, but also because the food being offered to Britain was taken from the starving.

The editors of *The Tablet* do not seem to have grasped that what was going on in Ukraine was an engineered famine. They assume rather that it was caused by a gigantic planning blunder.

"More men, women and children have lately starved to death in Russia (*sic*) than there are in all Portugal", *The Tablet* wrote on September 16, 1933. The worst of it is that the Famine of 1933 is no inscrutable Act of God, but a hideous and blatant Act of Man. Rather than admit that their policies were wrong, the Moscow despots have calmly allowed millions of their fellow-Russians (*sic*) to die the most ghastly of deaths".

The Tablet was, and indeed, still is a sober journal, not given to colourful writing or horror stories. Indeed, in the note just cited, it states that the latest reports from the "Ukrainian Bureau" are so horrifying that the editors cannot take the responsibility of publishing them without independent verification! But however sober the writing, the sheer horror of the reportage comes through. In early spring, 1933, it evokes a haunting image of the bodies of Ukrainians "whose names are known only to God", shot by border guards as they tried to escape over the river-ice to Romania, and now floating downstream in the spring floods. (The use of the formula employed on World War I war-graves of those too maimed to be identifiable must have been particularly striking in 1933). And on 1 July, *The Tablet* published the words of the some of the victims of the famine themselves.

The Editors of the day appear to have been somewhat apprehensive of their readers' reactions. The leading article is entitled "Russia once more", and is targetted at readers who have expressed their weariness with the theme.

"If the reader who tells us that she has 'got a bit tired of reading about Russia' were the only person to have said so, a plain reply through the post would meet her case", the editorial begins. "We are grieved to say, however, that there are millions of persons in Great Britain to whom the most dread-

ful messages from starving Russia are merely something to read and therefore something which has become stale.

We should indeed be despicable creatures if the many articles and notes on Russia which we have been publishing nearly every week for years were no more than news-mongering or a journalistic exploitation of human wrongs and miseries. If Russia under the Soviets were no more than a 'stunt' for *The Tablet*, we too should have 'got a bit tired' of the topic long before this. There is no lack, week by week, of interesting and fresh and often congenial matter for Catholic Editors to write about; and such writing would be far easier than our Russian articles, in which there would be tiresome repetitions if we did not lavish pains upon them. We have spoken literally hundreds of times against the Muscovites, simply because we regard their tyranny as the most gigantic in history and their militant atheism as the worst affront ever offered by His creatures to the Creator, and we shall go on speaking, whether we bore the public or not, until the tyrants are unhorsed and their blasphemies are ended...

...[W]e re-affirm our oft-made declaration that Muscovite rule is a curse not only to Christianity but to our common civilisation. For proof of this indictment, we need do no more today than point to the present state of the Russian people, after a decade and a half of Soviet administration. Overleaf will be found an account of the heartrending ordeal of the millions who are doomed to live wretchedly and die prematurely under Moscow's misrule. If anyone who has 'got a bit tired of reading about Russia' can read right through our contributor's fully authenticated story without his boredom giving place to indignation, we shall not envy him his heart of stone..."

The article so introduced is from a certain G.M. Godden, and is partly based on material published in what he describes as "a non-political German magazine (*Allg. Ev. Luth. Kirchenzeitung*, No,15, 14.4.33)". It hardly requires a knowledge of German to identify this as a Lutheran publication — and in those pre-ecumenical days, the very fact that *The Tablet* dared to reproduce material of Lutheran provenance, is itself evidence of the importance placed by the editors on authenticating their material. For the *Kirchenzeitung* material — eyewitness accounts from a visitor recently returned from the Soviet Union — are only there to substantiate the principal material — the letters of the starving.

These letters, we are told, have been edited to protect the writers from even greater suffering, so that names and places of origin are omitted. We are assured that "[e]vidence of the *bona fides* of the transmission is in the hands of *The Tablet*", but has almost certainly not survived the past 60 years. Some letters are clearly come from those deported as "Kulaks", others appear to come from people still in their home villages but trapped by the famine. The identification numbers attached to the documents by those who transmitted them suggest something of the size of the original package.

1490

What shall I tell you about our life in the encampment? It is an unbroken round of misery. When we arrived, all our money was taken from us. If we had money we could buy tickets and try to escape. We have, for doing the full output of work, a little over one pound of bread in the morning and some groats; weak soup at midday; and water for tea. Every month we get less than one pound of sugar. [The editors have presumably converted the original units to those familiar to their British readers]. Those who cannot reach the standard of work get less food. All dead horses are eaten. As most of the Kulaks are elderly men it is harder for them. Young criminals, with whom we are placed, cannot help stealing. They have stolen from me all the little I have, except the shoes I stand up in and my *lapti* (bast shoes). We are given old worn clothes. We lie close together on a wooden staging, in our bitterly cold barracks, which are infested with lice and bugs. We get wet through and have nowhere to dry our clothes. A guard always accompanies us when we are put to "general work".

1475. *March 19, 1933.*

We were unloaded from a wagon on the open steppe (Siberia). At first we had no shelter from rain and snow, and fifty people were lodged in a hovel fourteen yards long by six yards wide. Typhus and smallpox soon broke out. Our food is decreased constantly.

1492. *March 26, 1933*

We don't believe we shall ever again have enough to eat; our faces and feet are swelling from hunger. Out of the fifty-one persons sent here (West Siberia) twenty-three have died.

1495. *March 4, 1933*

You cannot imagine how the people hunger. All who do not receive food parcels from abroad die.

1474. *March 15, 1933,*

My husband died from hunger two weeks ago; my two children are already swollen with hunger; we shall soon follow him.

1475. *March 10, 1933.*

My father died on Friday, and the baby is now dead. The little one was only skin and bones. We shall bury them together... We have just come back, mother is so weak that she fell off the wagon in which was the coffin. Mother is left with five children; we are all so swollen with hunger that we can scarcely see out of our eyes. Father and the little one will not suffer from hunger any more.

1476. *March 27, 1933.*

Day by day the distress becomes greater, many of my parishioners will die, before long, from hunger; two hundred families in my parish have no hope of escaping death unless help is sent.

1477. *March 12, 1933.*

Now that the snow is melting, many corpses are appearing which the snow had covered.

1482. *April, 1933.*

Men have become like hungry beasts.

1478. *April 12, 1933.*

Men are eating dead beasts; they are also eating human bodies.

1479. *April 11, 1933.*

The entrails, liver and lungs are removed from bodies of the dead; from those that are not too emaciated the flesh is taken. Dead animals are also eaten.

1571. *April 18, 1933.*

My husband died of hunger on April 4; he cried for food until he was dead. I have eight children, who are already dying.

1572. *April 25, 1933.*

Most of the people, even those working on the collective farms, have no bread; it is all delivered up, we are compelled to give it. Those who refuse to give up corn [in the British sense of all cereal crops and, in particular, wheat] are sentenced to imprisonment. Many men are dying here. Many are all swollen; then they die of hunger.

1520. *April 23, 1933.*

We were all swollen with hunger, and had nothing more to eat. Then my son found some potatoes left in the ground from the autumn, all frost bitten and soft; they saved us.

1559. *April 28-29, 1933.*

My husband is swollen and has lost all hope of living; our strength is at an end... Many men are dying, here, of hunger.

1529. April 26-27, 1933.

We are all so weak and swollen that we can hardly move. We have six ounces of bread per day. Six of our family have died of hunger... This week two died at the Co-op. They were standing in the Bread Queue, and fell down, and were found to be dead.

During the past few decades, stories of the Gulag and other horrors of the Soviet system have become commonplace to Western readers. In 1933, however, this litany of suffering would have had an audience not yet blunted by familiarity.

To validate the above picture, Mr. Godden refers once more to the *Kirchenzeitung*, and then to a recent report from a certain M[onsieur] Sabline. "The people, in what was once the grain-store of Europe, are starving", Godden notes, while "M[onsieur] Litvinov [USSR Commissar for Foreign Affairs] as the effrontery to suggest to the Economic Conference now sitting in London that vast sums can be paid by the Soviet Government to foreign countries in order to secure potential war material, raw products and machinery, nay, worse, large quantities of food are being exported from Russia and sold throughout the world. 'Will no one save us from death?' cry the starving".

In Godden's opinion, "[T]he first immediate response to that appeal should be a boycott of all Russian food-stuffs, on sale, in those happier lands where mass-starvation is unknown. Such a boycott would influence the callous Soviet rulers, to whom human life and human misery are as nothing, and money to carry out their grandiose schemes of a mechanized Russia is everything".

And now, Godden notes, there is a new threat, as the harvest of 1933 ripens, the peasants are making "new efforts... to ward off death from themselves and their children. Ears of grain are being cut from the standing crops; and the hungry men and women, driven to this expedient, are becoming known as 'grain-barbers'. Although the grain is not yet ripe, 'barbering' has already begun in many districts. Against these 'grain barbers' the Soviet Government has proclaimed a new campaign. Patrols of young Communists, with dogs, are sent out to hunt down the starving people. Two years ago (*Tablet*, August 22, 1931), the Christians in the Soviet Union declared: 'We are all like hunted game'. Today, ten thousand 'selected Town Communists' with dogs, have been sent out to keep the starving peasants from the ripening corn which they themselves have planted...". ■

Current Affairs**UKRAINE AND THE PROBLEMS OF
NUCLEAR WEAPONS**

Lt.-Colonel Anatoliy Hlushchenko

Over the last two years the question of the deployment of nuclear missiles in Ukraine has constantly attracted the attention of politicians, economists, the military, and journalists. This is not surprising, since there are two diametrically opposed views on the matter. One side sees these weapons as a guarantee of its security, while the other perceives in these weapons a certain threat. Nevertheless, a solution to the problem will surely be found provided that both sides manage to understand each other's point of view, and are prepared to act in a constructive manner, on the basis of their common interests.

1. Disarmament and independence

The first step should be an objective analysis of the current situation regarding nuclear missiles in Ukraine. Here, the starting point must be Ukraine's declaration of independence. For, paradoxically, a number of foreign politicians see this event as a set-back to the international process of nuclear disarmament.

Those who think this way should be reminded of the following facts. The nuclear arms reduction process can be conventionally divided into three phases. The first is the 1960s, when a number of treaties were signed on non-proliferation and partial test-bans. The second — the 1970s - was marked by strategic arms limitation treaties. (We may note that, today, independent Ukraine is complying with all the terms of these treaties, unlike certain other countries, which to date have not renounced nuclear testing, and which are the source of a leakage of technological information concerning nuclear weapons production).

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Subsequently, he entered the Lenin Military-Political Academy, following which he worked as a political officer at divisional and army level in Ukraine. In 1991 he was transferred to the reserve with the rank of Lt.-Colonel.

The greatest interest in nuclear disarmament, however, came in the third phase — the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s. In 1987 a treaty was signed on the elimination of medium-range and short-range missiles, followed, in July 1991, by a treaty on the reduction and limitation of strategic forces. If we track the course of the strategic forces limitation talks, then we see at once that the stumbling-block was always what were referred to as the “heavy missiles” based in Ukraine. However, in the summer of 1991 the situation changed drastically, since the military plants which produced this class of missiles were situated in what now became the territory of independent Ukraine.

In this situation the former political and military leadership of the USSR was obliged to reach a compromise with the USA and agree to the reduction of nuclear arms. Thus, willy-nilly, one has to recognise that the reduction of these weapons of mass destruction became possible because Ukraine had become an independent state.

Tracking Ukraine's over-all implementation of the treaties of 1987 and 1991 also reveals some interesting facts. According to these treaties, the general reduction of strategic rocket forces should have been around 50 per cent, as senior military officials have stated on a number of occasions. What is the situation today? Firstly, we may note that during this period (in addition to tactical nuclear missiles) 4 out of 6 of the rocket divisions stationed in Ukraine have been cut, and more than 160 strategic missiles targeted on Europe have been decommissioned. Therefore Ukraine today is the only state in the world which has reduced her strategic rocket forces by more than 50 per cent in reality, and not merely in words. A legal point arises here: would it not be more equitable for other states, instead of urging Ukraine to total disarmament, to emulate her by also reducing their rocket forces in the same proportion?

Secondly, since Ukraine has totally eliminated one class of missiles which were targeted against European cities, her leaders should declare this publicly to the peoples of Europe. Certainly this will by no means satisfy the countries of Europe, since one may confidently assume that the targets programmed into the missiles formerly deployed in Ukraine, have now been plotted into the trajectories of the missiles deployed in Russia. But this is a different issue, which, perhaps, the countries of Europe should take up not with Ukraine, but with Russia.

One cannot of course discount the problem of the rest of the missiles in Ukraine. Today there remain 120 SS-19s (with 6 warheads apiece) and 56 SS-24s (with 10 warheads apiece). Naturally, one can and, indeed, should understand the concern of the USA that in Ukraine there are missiles which could be launched against it. Furthermore, anyone who is involved in these matters is well aware that it is by no means Ukraine which would take the decision to launch them. The chain of command from these missile bases does not lead back to some mythical “strategic forces’ unified command”, under the joint control of the Presidents of Ukraine and Russia, but to the command posts and general headquarters of the strategic rocket forces of Russia.

President Boris Yeltsin has, on occasion, stated that there are no rockets based in Russia which are trained on the USA. It is only natural, therefore, that the USA is pressing for the remaining strategic missiles in Ukraine and Kazakhstan to be removed and dismantled.

Russia, of course, is also demanding the reduction of these missiles, but for other reasons. She would like to meet her commitments to the USA under the 1991 treaty (which related to the total number of missiles based in the then Soviet Union, without distinguishing between republics) by getting rid of the missiles in Ukraine and Kazakhstan without, in effect, cutting back her own missiles at all.

But in order to defuse the tension between Ukraine and the USA, (which, to speak plainly, came about not without the touch of Russia's fine military-diplomatic hand), other decisions need to be taken. Why, for example, should the President of Ukraine not state categorically that there are no missiles in Ukraine trained on the USA? Of course, such a declaration would first require the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine to have organisational and technical control over the programming of trajectories and the transmission of orders through the chain of command. But this problem can be dealt with. At one time, the military leadership of Russia declared Ukraine to be incapable of doing this. However, by June-July 1992 a package of documents had been drawn up, which made it clear to the Ukrainian government that Ukraine could acquire a real power of control over the missiles' combat command, by using the command centres of the 43rd rocket army. In particular, the package proposed various options: such as the "dual-key" system, (as used by NATO), or a built-in "veto", which would cancel any command transmitted through the chain without the sanction of the leadership of Ukraine.

In this way, a declaration of peaceful intent by Ukraine would become something of real practical significance, not only as regards the USA, but for all other countries too.

2. Arms and the Economy

One complicated problem facing Ukraine is the technical management of missile bases. It is, however, undoubtedly difficult for a layman to determine where the real problems lie, and what is simply unadulterated and ongoing blackmail.

For example, some alleged "experts" have decided that the missile systems deployed in Ukraine are obsolescent and must therefore be decommissioned with all speed, since later may prove too late. One would like to inform these "specialists" that Ukraine's southern division is equipped with some of the most state-of-the-art weaponry of all the strategic rocket divisions of the former USSR. It is far too early therefore to suggest that they are nearing their expiry date.

It is also suggested that a number of these systems are not produced by Ukraine at all, and so need specialists from Russia to service them. This is a

genuine problem. But one must not forget either that Ukraine also produces a significant amount of the hardware of the missile systems deployed in Russia. And so Russia likewise will be unable to service *her* missiles without specialists from the relevant factories in Ukraine.

The maintenance of nuclear warheads constitutes a particularly important question. But this problem is far wider than appears at first glance. The essential point is that although Ukraine has her own uranium ore, she has the facilities to enrich it only to a concentration of 0.7 per cent. The yellow-cake produced then has to be sent to Russia. Part of it eventually comes back in the form of fuel for Ukraine's nuclear power plants. The rest Russia keeps or sells for hard currency.

Whatever one's views of nuclear power, the fact is that these plants produce some 30-35 per cent of Ukraine's electricity, and that sooner or later the question of Ukraine having her own enrichment facilities is bound to arise. Furthermore, the sale of enriched uranium could bring Ukraine some of the hard currency she so urgently needs. It is also clear that in view of the present energy and currency crisis, which we are living through, the enrichment problem today is becoming ever more relevant.

It is likewise no secret that from the production of enriched uranium to the manufacture of nuclear warheads is only one small step! In today's world, the know-how for producing nuclear warheads is no longer the top secret it was 50 years ago. It is also known that dozens of countries, including many Third-World ones have the potential to produce nuclear weapons. Ukraine, with her own uranium ores, reactors, and a large scientific infrastructure occupies a leading place in the list of countries with nuclear potential.

Naturally, developing such a programme requires considerable initial investment. But one cannot fail to see that the present situation itself suggests a source of funding. Ukraine has a unique opportunity of acquiring the necessary capital through the gradual dismantling of her existing nuclear warheads as they approach their expiry date. According to some US experts, Ukraine could recoup up to \$20 billion from the uranium and plutonium in these weapons.

On the other hand, it must be realised that if today we reject this unique opportunity of acquiring our own enrichment facilities, then tomorrow we will be forced to buy fuel for our nuclear power plants, for an annual expenditure, according to the best calculations, of \$300-350 billion.

It is Ukraine's political leaders who must decide which path to take. We must, however, remember that a truly independent, civilised state always takes important decisions, first and foremost, in the interest of its own people. It does not go dabbling in the policy bailiwick of superstates, which always have their own interests and which not always take into account the interests of others.

3. Future Prospects

First and foremost among the problems surrounding these nuclear weapons is the vital issue: is Ukraine to remain a nuclear power or not?

Throughout the past two years, there have been a whole range of answers — from a categorical “no” to an equally categorical “yes”. Somewhere among them all the right answer will be found, but, almost certainly, it will be far from clear-cut and will demand both from Ukraine and Russia, and also from other countries, a deeper understanding of each other's interests.

For the time being one thing is clear: the presence of nuclear weapons in Ukraine is the result neither of the wishes of her people nor the request of her government. But there they are, and, clearly, some decisions have to be made about their current status and future fate, on the territory of what is now an independent state. Today everyone knows that the missiles sited in Ukraine have the capability to deliver a nuclear strike at any point on the globe. This arsenal, naturally, makes Ukraine in the military sense one of the most powerful states in the world. And, quite understandably, the majority of countries are concerned about the emergence of a new nuclear state, particularly one with a by no means stable economic and political situation.

The unclear status of the nuclear weapons in Ukraine has raised many questions in the world community. But since this problem touches the interests of other countries, a solution must be sought in the sphere of the foreign policy.

The search for ways to reduce the nuclear build-up is now gathering impetus. And since Ukraine has become a new nuclear state, then, understandably, it is time for her too to take an active part in this process.

The world community has already taken a number of steps towards reducing the nuclear threat. Today we are at the threshold of a new stage, the essence of which will lie, in all probability, in the creation of collective defence and early warning systems to detect military aggression. In support of such a concept, one may cite the unanimity with which the world condemned and halted the aggression of Iraq, and the participation in UN peacekeeping forces in former Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Cambodia. More and more often, various governments have been making tentative proposals about the creation of a single space-watch system, a joint anti-ballistic missile defence system (ABM), and so forth. Under these conditions Ukraine, too, could well put forward such an initiative, on, for example, the creation of a common nuclear weapons monitoring system and international deterrent forces under the auspices of the United Nations.

Such a future UN strategic deterrent could comprise:

- rocket forces armed with intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs);
- heavy bombers, armed with cruise missiles;
- a broad deployment anti-ballistic missile defence system;

— Space forces for the use and exploitation of intelligence-gathering satellites and ABM.

Such an initiative would be fully compatible with existing treaties and would continue the ongoing process of arms reduction, which they initiated. The practical implementation of this initiative might comprise the following stages:

Firstly — introduction of a strict monitoring system for strategic nuclear weapons. This would include drawing up a combat rota of all strategic arms at permanent deployment sites, that is mobile rocket launchers would remain permanently at fixed sites, the permanent patrols by heavy nuclear-armed aircraft would be brought to an end, submarines with launching facilities for SLBMs would remain at specified bases.

During the same period, a joint space-watch system would be set up, staffed by representatives of various countries under the command of the UN.

The United Kingdom and France could form an integral part of this process. The governments of these countries have stated that they will join in the nuclear arms reduction process only when their nuclear potential becomes equal to that of the US and USSR. But our first stage does not make arms-reduction a necessary condition. Its main aim would be to make the military use of these weapons ineffective and to ensure that they are constantly monitored. Naturally, this would not conflict with the treaties which have already been signed between the USSR and USA on the reduction of strategic nuclear weapons.

The second stage would consist of setting up a monitoring system for targets. Essentially, this would mean the removal from the missile systems of all trajectory programmes for strikes against economic or political targets with a high-density civilian population. Targeting tactical nuclear weapons on military objectives would still be permissible. This stage of the programme would free hundreds of millions of people from the threat of a direct nuclear strike — for which they should be duly thankful to governments which adopted this humane decision. Contrariwise, governments which refused to sign such a treaty would find it somewhat difficult to explain their stance to the world at large and their own population, which would continue to live under the threat of a nuclear missile attack.

The third stage would be the establishment of an international strategic deterrent force under the command of the UN. Parallel with the establishment of this force, the nuclear arsenals of the countries of the former USSR would be reduced until parity with other countries is reached.

The fourth stage would be the complete elimination of all national strategic offensive nuclear weapons. Individual countries would be allowed to retain any nuclear weapons which had a purely defensive purpose. This would be the sovereign right of every state which today has a nuclear arsenal. But, understandably, if the nuclear arms reduction process continues to move in a positive direction, then sooner or later the question of eliminating these weapons too would also arise.

Proposals for the total elimination of nuclear weapons find a wide response in the world community. There can be no doubt that such proposals are of themselves good. But they will only acquire a practical character when all countries, or at least all those with the potential to construct nuclear weapons, join the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The present situation, indeed, gives one no great cause for optimism. All over the world, one government after another announces its wish to possess nuclear arms. Nevertheless, there is a real hope that the proposed international strategic deterrent forces under the command of the UN would play a positive role in the resolution of many problems. Surely countries that now wish to possess their own national nuclear weapons would renounce such plans if they were assured of the strong support of the proposed UN forces.

On the same grounds, those countries which already possess nuclear weapons could likewise renounce them. Thus in particular Ukraine, having renounced her own offensive nuclear weapons, would acquire a strong nuclear shield, capable of deterring any potential aggressor. Ukraine could make her own contribution to the support of the combat readiness of the UN forces in the form of uranium and titanium mined on her territory, and the manufacture of sophisticated missile and satellite systems. Such a policy would be in full accord with the Declaration of the State Sovereignty of Ukraine.

The task of establishing the armed forces, and particularly the nuclear missile component, has been from the beginning and still remains a complicated one. No one to date has found a smooth and easy path. But today's choice of a proper approach to the key questions of organising our military forces will have a major influence on tomorrow's difficulties and the effort needed to resolve them. All aspects of this question should therefore be thoroughly considered in great detail and from all sides, and properly weighed up from the political, no less than the military, point of view. For otherwise problems may be created for which there is no solution. ■

IRAN AND UKRAINE: THE VIEW FROM TEHRAN

Dr. Ali Granmayeh

Before the dissolution of the Soviet empire, Iranians had shown little interest in the development of the European part of the USSR. However, Tehran had grown increasingly concerned about Moscow's policy in the Central Asian and Caucasian republics.

When the formation of the Commonwealth of Independent States was announced in December 1991, new considerations appeared in Iran's foreign policy. Ukraine, as the second most populous republic of the former Soviet Union, with a coastline on the Black Sea and close to the Caucasus, and possessed of a good industrial and commercial potential, attracted Iran which was justifiably seeking new gateways to Europe.

Tehran's new policy assessment was welcomed in Kyiv, since Iran was capable of satisfying Ukraine's energy demand, and also could provide a sizeable market for Ukrainian products.

The first contact between the two countries was made in January 1992, when an Iranian delegation — the first ever to visit Ukraine — arrived in Kyiv. At a meeting of Iran's Foreign Minister, Dr. Ali Akbar Velayati, and President Leonid Kravchuk, areas of cooperation were discussed, including: Iran's export of oil and natural gas to, and import of industrial materials and machinery from, Ukraine; joint commercial shipping; a possible direct air link between Tehran and Kyiv; and "coordinated stances of the two countries in international forums". Velayati also signed a diplomatic protocol with his Ukrainian counterpart, Anatoliy Zlenko, which led to the opening of their respective embassies in Kyiv and Tehran.¹

A fortnight later, Iran's Oil Minister, Qolam Reza Aqazadeh, arrived in Kyiv to discuss an oil and gas deal with Ukrainian officials. This was the principal item of bilateral economic cooperation between the two countries. Energy negotiations were followed up by the Deputy Prime Minister, Kostiantyn Masyk, in Tehran where the two sides discussed not only the sale by Iran of an annual four million tons of oil and three billion cubic metres of natural gas to Ukraine, but also the joint construction of a gas trunk-line, with the partnership of Azerbaijan, from Iran to the Black Sea. Ukrainian officials described the deals as Kyiv's "largest economic contract ever".²

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¹ *Tehran Times*, January 23 & 25, 1992.

² RFE/RL Daily Report, February 5 & 25; April 27, 1992.

In the circumstances, when Russia reduced its delivery of fuel oil to Ukraine and Turkmenistan enforced a fiftyfold rise on the price and transportation charge of natural gas to Ukraine, Kyiv rushed to consolidate its relations with Iran, for the sake of its energy needs.³

President Kravchuk visited Iran on 25-26 April 1992, and told Iranian leaders that his country was "interested in establishing friendly relations with not only its western neighbours but also with eastern countries". Kravchuk commented that Tehran could play a vital role in the overall affairs of the world, and that "with respect to the upheavals in the former Soviet Union" Iran should use the situation and broaden relations with the successor states.⁴

During their meetings, Kravchuk and President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani signed a letter of understanding on mutual cooperation in the political, cultural, oil trading, and banking sectors.⁵ Meanwhile, they agreed to form a joint political economic committee, consisting of the Foreign Ministers of Iran and Ukraine, the Oil Minister of Iran, and the Deputy Prime Minister of Ukraine. This committee was former later, under the chairmanship of the First Deputy Prime Minister, Ihor Yukhnovskiy.

In 1993, two more Ukrainian delegations led by the Deputy Prime Minister Yuli Yoffe, and the Speaker of Parliament, Ivan Plyushch, arrived in Tehran with further proposals for expanding Kyiv-Tehran cooperation.

Behind the speedy consolidation of Iranian-Ukrainian relations in the past eighteen months, one should observe several motives and objectives:

Ukraine was desperately seeking a reliable source of energy when its former suppliers refused to cooperate. Iran volunteered to fill the gap, on favourable terms, and agreed to supply Ukraine with oil in return for Ukrainian oil derivatives.⁶ Iran did not approve Kyiv's proposal to build an oil terminal at a Ukrainian Black Sea port. However, a joint venture for the construction of a gas trunk-line, transporting Iran's gas to Europe via Ukraine, has been finalised. Through this project, Ukraine will obtain a secure source of energy, a portion of the profit of the joint investment, and a transit charge benefit.⁷

On its part, Ukraine can help Iran's economic development by the transfer of high technology and industrial know-how. In this context, Kyiv's possession of nuclear science was also stressed in Western analyses, despite Ukraine's assertion that it is no longer a nuclear power, and Iran's denial of allegations that it had sought components of nuclear weapons in Ukraine and Kazakhstan.⁸

There are other issues which bring Kyiv and Tehran together. Ukraine is upset with the aid policy of Western powers whose focus and priority in the

³ RFE/RL Daily Report, February 5 & March 4, 1992.

⁴ *Tehran Times*, April 27, 1992.

⁵ *Ibid.*; *Tehran Times*, March 18, 1993.

⁶ *Tehran Times*, May 8, 1993.

⁷ BBC SWB (SU), February 19, 1993.

⁸ *Tehran Times*, January 25, 1992, & May 10, 1993.

former Soviet republics is Russia. Consequently, Ukrainian leaders have sought other sources of assistance and support to improve their country's economic situation. When visiting Iran, the Ukrainian speaker of Parliament stated that "cooperation between Iran and the newly independent Central Asian republics and Ukraine will help consolidate the independence of those states", and that Tehran should help Kyiv "further consolidate its independence".⁹

Such statements confirm the views of the present Iranian leadership who warn the former Soviet republics to avoid falling into the "trap of the West".¹⁰

Tehran is pleased that ideology and oil wealth are acting to extend its influence in the former Soviet territories. However, in the case of the Christian Ukraine, only the second factor applies.

Both Ukraine and Iran are concerned about Russia's ambitions in the newly independent states. Russian military intervention in Tajikistan (a country with a Persian-speaking population), and Russia's dispute with Ukraine over the Black Sea Fleet and the Crimean peninsula, provide a common ground for Kyiv-Tehran consultations.

In appraising Iran's relations with Ukraine, the Turkish factor should also be taken into consideration. Turkey and Iran share an interest in the Central Asian and Caucasian republics, which has been interpreted as a competition. In view of Turkey's lead over Iran in the Black Sea region and the Turkish initiative in setting-up the Black Sea economic zone, Iran's intention to find a foothold in this region, through Ukraine — and Georgia — is understandable.

Finally, Iranian leaders are pleased with Ukraine's humane treatment of the Crimean Muslim Tatars who are willing to return to their homeland in the Ukrainian territory. ■

⁹ *Tehran Times*, May 13, 1993.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

THE STATE OF THE UKRAINIAN HEALTH SERVICE

Prof. B.H. Iskiv

Providing national health care is a complicated and complex issue, which includes economic, ecological, socio-psychological, public health, financial, demographic, educational and strictly medical aspects.

It is widely believed that it is principally medics who are involved with health care. In actual fact, their work caters for only about 10-15% of health care needs.

In the broad sense of the word, health care is an issue which touches the life of the individual, society, and the nation.

The last few years have been fruitful in concepts, doctrines and health care programmes of the Ukrainian people.

I should like, first of all, to expound the following concept as the basis for a contemporary doctrine on health care of the Ukrainian people.

1. The basis of the health care system must be the principle of multilateral improvement of the physical and psychological strength of the Ukrainian people as a whole, as well as every individual citizen regardless of his or her material status.

2. To implement this principle, the state, community and private sectors have to work together in harmony to build and operate the health care system.

3. The health care system in Ukraine must include measures to:

- a) improve the general health of the population;
- b) strengthen the physical and psychological health of the nation;
- c) prevent disease, reduce the morbidity and mortality rates, increase the birth rate, increase life-expectancy, and raise the capacity for work of the population;
- d) organise public health and prophylactic services;
- e) organise health-care and treatment centres;
- f) provide the Ukrainian armed forces with the best possible medical services of all kinds.

4. Measures for the health care of the population, that is health care legislation, public health and prophylactic programmes, general planning of health care, the establishment of a network of public health, prophylactic and treatment services, and monitoring of the whole health system, and in particular medical care, must be, basically, within the competence of state power and guaranteed by the state budget.

5. To avoid the bureaucratisation of medical care in Ukraine, primary, that is non-hospital care, should be based on a network of general practitioners.

6. Medical establishments, the pharmaceutical industry and retail pharmacies can be run by state, community or cooperative institutions and private

individuals. All these institutions and businesses will be monitored by the state health care organs.

What is the current programme of Ukraine's official organs of power regarding the health care of the Ukrainian people? On June 9, 1992, a bill "On health care", drafted by the Ukrainian Health Ministry, was published, debated and enacted as a law by Parliament. This bill evoked justified criticism, and (in the case of certain articles) outright indignation among medics. Under the terms of this bill the Health Ministry would retain a strict centralised control over the health service, allowing no administrative autonomy. The preamble and introductory paragraphs of the bill were ideologically unsound and confused.

A parliamentary commission on health care then drafted a new bill, entitled "The Fundamentals of the health-care legislation of Ukraine". This bill was passed on December 15, 1992, after a one and a half hour debate, without being published beforehand. The preamble and introductory paragraphs of this law have a more democratic character than the first bill, and the priority of health care in the activities of the state is stressed. The President is stated to be the guarantor of the right of citizens to health care.

Unfortunately, many provisions of the "Fundamentals..." take on a tendentious and assertive character. There are many inadequacies and faults in both concepts and wording.

Thus, in article 4, "Fundamental principles of health care" are stated to include a "... humanist approach, the guaranteeing of the priority of common human values over class, national, group, or individual interests...". Are national values not "common human"? Why stress the "humanist" approach, so downgrading to national values, and ignoring the very fact of the existence of the Ukrainian people.

The "Fundamentals..." make no distinction between the two concepts "health care system" and "medical care system", and fail to specify the tasks and responsibilities of the various organs and institutions of the non-medical part of the health care sector. They stipulate a centralised administration of the health service, give legal force to the social inequality of citizens (special medical establishments for the privileged élite), give unlimited power to the bosses of medical care establishments, and cast doubt on the need for public monitoring of the management of medical establishments.

A law should take a long-term view, and it is the task of the state to ensure its citizens not a minimum standard of living, but a decent one. This means that the percentage of the national income represented by the wage fund should gradually increase so that workers will have sufficient funds to renew their physical and psychological forces, and to ensure the normal upbringing and development of their children.

Is a reform of the health service possible without the establishment of an effective watch-dog system to monitor the management of medical establishments? Such a system, working on the principles of independence, impartiality and justice, would do much to resolve all the problems which surround the provision of health care.

The establishment of the young Ukrainian state is fraught with difficulties. The catastrophic economic situation is having a painful effect on all spheres of life, and on the health of the people, perhaps most of all.

One must not forget that Ukraine inherited from her colonial status in the USSR, the degradation of her soil, forests, and aquifers, as well as the plundering of her mineral resources, outmoded agriculture, disproportionately developed industry (catering first and foremost to the needs of the military-industrial complex), and a very poorly-developed medical and pharmaceutical industry, as the total lack of production facilities for vaccines can testify.

The main emphasis in the health service was put on quantitative indices: the increase in medical staff and the number of hospitals, the construction of giant medical centres to order and for the party *nomenklatura*. There was virtually no up-to-date medical technology, and primary health care was utterly neglected, particularly in the rural areas, and the majority of clinics. Despite a huge number of doctors (in 1982 — 195,600, or 38,900 per 10 thousand inhabitants) and medical establishments (3,808 with 652,500 beds), Ukraine did not manage to prevent the process of depopulation. The mortality rate in Ukraine is several times higher than in the developed countries (from accidents and poisoning — 1.5 to 2 times, from cardiovascular disease — 50-80%, and from respiratory disease — 30-40%).

The average life expectancy of the Ukrainian population is 70.9 years (66.4 years for men, and 74.8 for women). In western countries the average life expectancy for men is some 6-9 years greater, and for women — 4-6 years.

In general, the high mortality rate is caused by such factors as the poor state of the health service, bad working and living conditions, the environment, and individual lifestyles. In Ukraine the mortality rate of men of working age has been on the increase for a considerable time. Men of this group are dying more frequently than women from accidental poisoning and other accidents (4.5 times), from diseases to the circulation system (1.4 times), respiratory diseases (2.3 times), and cancer (1.9 times).

The medical-demographic indices of the Ukrainian population are causing considerable alarm. The dynamics of these indices indicate a drastic deterioration of the health of the nation. The overall mortality index has increased over the past few years and now equals 11.6 per 1,000 inhabitants. This figure is significantly higher than for the countries of western Europe.

The birth rate in Ukraine, which in 1913 amounted to 44 per thousand inhabitants, under Soviet rule fell constantly and presently amounts to 12.7 per thousand.

The decline in the reproduction rate is not conducive to socio-economic development.

In Ukraine only 56% of families have children; every second family has only one child. Forty thousand women a year have abortions and out of every 1,000 infants, 14 are still-born.

The decline in population process began in 1979 in the villages, and in the 1990s in the cities. In 1970 the natural increase of the population amounted to

more than 300,000 a year, in 1980 — 174,000, and in 1990 — 28,000. In the villages the number of deaths exceeded the number of births by 58,000. In 1992 the death rate increased three times, exceeding the birth rate by 120,000.

The reasons are generally known. Today it is not only individual doctors, scientists, and journalists who are sounding the alarm, and describing the present tragic situation of the Ukrainian people. There are hundreds of institutes and committees, although no top-level national demographic committees or institutes, which would be able to resolve the demographic crisis.

What practical measures can be taken to improve the health service, and where to begin this process so far remain unclear.

The weakest link in the health service is the polyclinics. Are the people satisfied with the system of district service by therapists and paediatricians? Are doctors and nurses themselves satisfied with this system, and do they receive adequate pay for their hard work? During outbreaks of influenza, district therapists frequently dish out sick notes to patients without so much as feeling their pulse. And if a patient suffers from hearing or sight problems, or problems with the nervous system, they are completely helpless. To improve the health service, judging from the experience of other countries, the polyclinics need to start training family doctors who would be interested in good salaries, and thus will know and be able to do a lot. One should think how to rationally use the huge polyclinics, whose offices can be rented out to individual family doctors.

The cost of hospital care in Ukraine is a huge drain on the state. The experience of developed countries indicates that the huge hospitals we have in Ukraine are not cost-effective. The introduction of proper medical and surgical standards must be deferred. This type of reconstruction will mean abolishing the obsolete preference indices of medical hospitals.

The introduction of the standards accepted in the civilised world will allow the duration of in-patient treatment to be reduced, save money which can be reassigned to the acquisition of medical technology, release space and allow the establishment of ancillary services and departments (remedial exercise, massage, physiotherapy, etc.).

Finally, one should think about payment of doctors, employees of medical departments, and laboratory staff in accordance with international scales, and to improve their working conditions.

One can hardly expect the health of the Ukrainian people to improve unless the medical sector, and not the state administrative leadership, is made legally responsible for health care.

The environment and recreational facilities have been extremely neglected, and the holiday industry barely exists at all.

Workers, and in particular teenagers, do not know what to do with themselves in their free time. Alcoholism, drugs and crime are therefore rampant. The state has virtually given up building gymnastic and sports facilities. New housing developments, as a rule, lack public baths, saunas, not to mention stadiums and health centres.

The anti-alcohol and anti-smoking campaign is a low priority.

The lack of a responsible medical staff is a major misfortune for the Ukrainian nation. The party *nomenklatura* and the *homo Sovieticus* it created in medicine and its administrative system has an overtly anti-Ukrainian and anti-democratic orientation. In words they are for independence, but take independence to mean an all-embracing permissiveness and independence from their own people. How else can one explain the disrespectful attitude to the Ukrainian language, the sabotage of medical supplies, the theft, including humanitarian aid, and the misuse of positions. For them the needs of the people and national problems are completely alien.

The system of medical education in Ukraine needs a thorough reform at all levels, starting with medical schools and institutes.

Some positive trends may be observed — the introduction of three-year internships, the establishment of new Ukrainian programmes of post-diploma studies, and the computerisation of the education process.

However, *homo Sovieticus* is putting up overt and covert resistance to the introduction of the Ukrainian language in the teaching process. Some professors are totally unconcerned about the virtually complete lack of Ukrainian medical literature, and the training of medical staff with a sense of responsibility to the population of Ukraine.

The problems are enormous, and can clearly only be solved by an integrated and multi-disciplinary approach. ■

The Third Reich and the Ukrainian Question. Documents 1934-1944

Wolodymyr Kosyk

ISBN 0-902322-39-7

In this 175-page collection Wolodymyr Kosyk subjects the Third Reich's attitude towards the Ukrainian question to a painstaking analysis by compiling and commenting on the crucial documents covering a decade (1934-1944) which encompasses both peace and war.

This period of German-Ukrainian relations has heretofore been largely overlooked by Ukrainian and other scholars. Thus, Kosyk's attempt is a pioneering one. He draws the materials for his work from such unimpeachable sources as: the German Federal Archives (civil and military), the German Foreign Ministry, and the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg.

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HIGHER EDUCATION IN UKRAINE — INTERNATIONAL COLLABORATION IN DEVELOPMENT

David Randall

Higher education means universities and colleges, courses, training, education, research, scholarship and enlightenment by a variety of different methods in an infinite number of circumstances. Quite what mix of higher education institutions and higher educational provision is appropriate for Ukraine cannot be elaborated yet, and the reasons are many.

In the first place the demand for higher education in Ukraine has not been reliably modelled, nor can there be any reliable economic forecasts upon which to propose a new funding mechanism. In the second place the research has not yet been done into labour market trends, demography, wastage, student demand, etc., in order to map the existing terrain, which in most countries provides the background for higher education policy. In the third place, it is not clear who will carry out the economic modelling, or propose a funding mechanism, or research labour market trends, or ask the students what they want. Moreover, it is not clear that the key questions, like the ones above, are really being asked, or that there is the intention, awareness or motivation to ask them.

The pressure for change in the higher sector is mainly external, in that it is forced by economic circumstances and the absence of ready alternatives to central funding. However, the pressure for change is unplanned and in a very real sense, change itself is out of control. Unfortunately, nobody seems to care much about this in the West.

Foreign news teams were agog when the break-up of the Soviet Union spelled potential civil war between the former republics, at least three of which were in possession of nuclear weapons which they might, it was argued, provoke each other into using. Relations between Russia and Ukraine, given the bitter dispute over the ownership of the Black Sea Fleet, have been at times very tense, but with the stakes being so high the most powerful states of the CIS have successfully resolved their differences by diplomatic and economic means. Ukraine's offer to give up her nuclear weapons was a calculated gesture of peace which Britain and France have yet to venture, although paradoxically, it is the civilian use of nuclear power which causes the greatest damage, and which continues to threaten and pollute.

Nuclear issues do still make the news because the dangers threaten everyone in Europe, but the weariness of ordinary people struggling with

the stress, uncertainty and discomfort of the economic crisis and the day-to-day trials of the new Ukrainian democracy no longer get reported in the general media. Much hot air and film footage is still expended on Kremlinology. The machismo of the leadership battle between Yeltsin and the parliamentary opposition leading up to the April 1993 referendum completely dominated the "quality" press for months, at the exclusion of all other news including the remarkable turn-around in the supply of goods to Russian stores.

The uncomfortable truth is that the struggle for democracy is only really newsworthy when a blood-bath is just around the corner, and if western audiences cannot have their blood, then they can be tempted by tasty morsels which pander to their ghoulishness and desire for self-aggrandisement. All that remains of the 1991 Coup-days fascination with "freedom" in the USSR is quasi-investigative *reportage* about the rise of organised crime, poverty and corruption, the collapse of the health care system or the spread of drug abuse, prostitution and aids.

Somewhat surprisingly, the media seem to have grown tired of churning out low-brow titillation from eastern Europe. Perhaps the public appetite for such material was not limitless after all. Nevertheless, it will be too much to expect the present vacuum of news from Ukraine to be filled with insightful reporting on serious change issues. That never was the case, and it is even less probable now.

The mass media have largely failed to capture either the detail or the essence of the difficult social challenges which Ukrainians face. This failing blunts the educative impact of the modern communications media, and at the same time it diminishes the power of the media to enlist appropriate overseas support for burdensome modernisation processes.

Yet in spite of the lack of information on life in Ukraine in general as well as higher education in particular, there has been expanding cooperation between Britain and Ukraine since the lifting of the Iron Curtain and subsequent Ukrainian independence. The reasons for this lie in the resourcefulness of people and organisations and their ability to get on with life on their own terms. The new initiatives, from business to cultural exchange to education and training may be motivated by self-interest, sometimes by altruism, but they are executed by independent agents in pursuit of concrete objectives; objectives beyond the dictates of fashion.

The role of higher education in these cooperative processes has been to find ways of coping with external pressures for change in Ukrainian education. The responses are largely locally organised, and are specific to particular universities or other higher education institutions.

Inter-governmental initiatives have, of course, been important catalysts in cooperation between partners, particularly in the area of market reforms and inward investment in the private sector economy. However, government money has tended to favour the private sector, to the detriment of inter-university cooperation, and the private sector short courses, MBA programmes

and functional training courses which were so much favoured by western funding programmes and local entrepreneurs, do not provide for the education of civil servants and engineers, town planners, local government officers, public administrators, lawyers, educationalists, voluntary sector organisers, etc.

The need to cater for these labour markets as well as the vital enterprise markets has invigorated the idea of the university throughout eastern Europe, and responsible agencies are now realising that there is no substitute for a university education of international quality and reputation. Only top quality higher education can turn out the necessary champions and custodians of the new civil society, for only in the university setting is time allowed to develop the qualities of character, reflective self-criticism, evaluative skills and knowledge-based reasoning powers which prepare young people for leadership in very challenging positions of responsibility.

The market economy too cannot expect to survive without the regeneration of the skilled human resources which drive it, and which provide the initiative, the innovation and the enterprise to fire the creative spirit. Such innovation is just as likely to occur through university research as it is in the industrial and commercial sector, provided that universities and industry can achieve that symbiotic relationship found in the best managed research collaboration in the west.

State socialism divorced the universities from the research function, distanced young people and their teachers from developments in the real world, and at the same time either misappropriated or suppressed the qualities of leadership and reflective criticism which are now so necessary, and which are sadly, so widely lacking in the working population of the former USSR as a whole. The Soviet higher education system collaborated both actively and passively in this process. Whilst reformers in Ukraine are aware of shortcomings of the old system, the absence of any Czech and Slovak-style velvet revolution has maintained continuity in much of the leadership of higher education and its institutions, leaving sweeping reform out of the question, and the Government powerless to legislate for it simply by decree.

As a result international initiatives have tended to avoid the public sector, considering that money spent on anachronistic, unreformed state universities was in fact money wasted. Attitudes within government circles tended to confirm this view, and money ear-marked for human resourcing was spent instead on "training" in transferable skills, preferably through private, commercial training agents.

Private sector higher education has its place in the provision of training for specialists in many professions which would otherwise be hard for the public sector to cater for, such as the skilled labour in the financial institutions which provide the framework for the business community to function. Skills have been transferred in this area via East-West know-how projects, and the growing presence of foreign companies with their own trained staff contributes to the locally operating skills base, with important local consequences. But nowadays, the limitations of East-West cooperation in skills

training are becoming evident, the most important weakness being that no nation can rely upon the generosity of foreigners to satisfy human resource needs in the future, and there is no evidence that private colleges will survive long enough to develop its sending institutions.

Public sector institutions, despite their flaws, can lay claim to an extensive capital base, and an historical continuity which goes back in some cases to the 17th or 18th century. The Kyiv-Mohyla Collegium, the first Ukrainian higher education institution, dates back to 1632. Kyiv University, founded in 1834, still predates the University of London by two years, and in 1836 the University of London was merely an examining body and hardly a learned collegium in the sense of *universitas*.

There is therefore an educational heritage which deserves to be recaptured and built upon, and the process is under way to some extent. The Kyiv-Mohyla Collegium, re-christened the University of Kyiv Mohyla Academy, after a 175 period in suspended animation, is once more a centre of Ukrainian culture and language. However, to what extent does the modern Academy capture the spirit of 1993, as opposed to the destructive national rivalries of yesteryear. Perhaps, indeed, nationalism is still inherent in the spirit of the age, but in that case, what is the role of the university in the formation of the modern social market economy of Ukraine which the government was recently elected to promote?

The modern university, by which we refer to those institutions which successfully combine the appropriate teaching methods with research excellence to create a world class centre of scholarship and innovation, is a complex community of endeavour. No modern university can pin its badge of quality on its scientific standards alone. Standards are one expression of achievement, but they no longer symbolise the contribution and the significance of the university to society as a whole. And today "society" means so much more than what certain groups specify as being in the "national interest". In the modern academic community, the notions of staff and student mobility, research collaboration, the information age, the global environment and the changing world order suggest new roles and responsibilities for the university. In some senses they are new, and in others they predate the artificial political and knowledge barriers which nation-states have erected since the early 19th century.

Nowadays, the United Kingdom Government's Know How Fund (KHF) for Ukraine contributes programme funding for institutional strengthening projects. The Overseas Development Administration, which has a coordination role on behalf of the KHF, invited potential UK collaborators to bid by 14 July 1993 for a contract to participate in an institutional strengthening project at the Institute of Public Administration and Local Government (IPALG), Kyiv. The aim of such cooperation is to institutionalise expertise in civil service training within the higher education sector, especially in universities with a background in management education. Most management education emphasises the skills required in business and industry, rather than in

the public service, so the introduction of special new courses, such as the MA in Public Sector Administration, might temper the over-specialisation of business schools in competitive business management.

The cost of introducing new courses from scratch by importing expertise, without even a proportion of academic staff on the payroll with relevant subject knowledge, and with the necessity of having the foreign partner validating the course with all the evaluation and monitoring that implies, places severe financial limitations upon the use of the partnership method.

Nevertheless, by a common-sense use of appropriate resources directed towards long term goals such as "training-the-trainers" and establishing sound evaluative mechanisms, inter-university cooperation can provide coping mechanisms along the difficult road to a completely new system of institutional self-management.

The external environment is hostile, and Ukraine has a long way to go to catch up even with the adaptations achieved by higher education in central Europe. However, the cooperation at university level will have a positive bottom-up influence on the Government when the time comes, and let it be soon, when higher education development is driven positively forward by appropriate legislation within a well-researched and comprehensive strategy for the future. When that day comes, universities will know about it because they will have been involved — but it will not make the Nine o'clock News! ■

CHERNIVTSI — A FAILURE IN GLASNOST

Steve Hide

On July 28, 1988, at 3.00 a.m., a Soviet Rocket Forces convoy was winding its way through the historic heart of Chernivtsi, in southwestern Ukraine. Residents heard the huge tractor units growl to a halt outside their houses. The shape of missiles was visible under tarpaulins on trailers. One vehicle in the convoy, an enormous tanker, seemed to be in trouble. It had hit a tree. Some kind of fluid was leaking out onto the road.

Aurel Scripcara, a printer on a local newspaper, had been working late that night. Soldiers stopped his car as he approached the convoy, parked in Holovna Street, the town's main thoroughfare. Some with gas masks had started to spray a white foam where the fluid had leaked. The stricken tanker, meanwhile, turned into cobbled Kobylitsi Street where it stopped again. The fluid was still leaking out.

Two hours later the convoy rumbled off into the night and Scripcara was allowed to continue his journey home. "Do not mention this accident. This is the military", was a soldier's last comment.

By the time he arrived home, only a few streets away, Scripcara was violently ill. His throat was burning — he was thirsty, but he could not drink — and he lay doubled up with pain. He never recovered. Seven days later, still in severe pain, his skin turned yellow and all his hair fell out. His doctor could not help. Scripcara died on November 1, three months after the fateful meeting with the rocket convoy. Doctors first diagnosed leukaemia, then liver disease.

Five years later Scripcara's widow, Sylvia, is convinced the leaked chemical from the rocket convoy killed him. The military authorities have other ideas. They have never admitted — before or after independence — the accident took place.

There is no other explanation, says Sylvia Scripcara. "Aurel was in pain when he came home that night. He was sick and he never recovered. many others have been sick too, many with the same symptoms, but the doctors won't admit it".

The testimony of Scripcara is just one piece of evidence in Chernivtsi's struggle to find the truth behind a mass illness which has gripped the town for five years. Leading the inquiry is Viktor Freylikh, a quite-spoken professor of history at the University of Chernivtsi. Freylikh is an unlikely candidate for eco-agitprop. Dapper with his trim moustache and grey raincoat, he

Steve Hide, a free-lance journalist, has recently returned from western Ukraine, where he spent a month investigating ecological problems, particularly the case of the mass illnesses in the town of Chernivtsi, first reported five years ago.

has been unravelling the mystery with a Poirot-like efficiency, meticulously typing his notes on a battered old typewriter in the cramped confines of his two-room flat. His friends call him "the bureaucrat".

Chernivtsi, like most towns in the former Soviet Union, has lived under the pall of industrial pollution for decades.

Says Freylikh: "The old system believed it was easier to compensate the people for the effects of pollution than regulate the factories themselves. What we have ended up with is a huge mess for which no one will take responsibility".

Freylikh does not pin all the town's health problems on the rocket fuel. There are plenty of examples of civil industries polluting the town, such as the local brick factory that mixed heavy metal waste with its bricks before firing them. But the rocket fuel spillage had an immediate and devastating affect on its victims and, believes Freylikh, proved the catalyst for the chronic illnesses that have plagued the town ever since.

To date, 18 eye-witnesses have come forward to say they saw the convoy. Many more saw the clean-up operation when soldiers came every night for two weeks and sprayed down the streets with foam. They wore full chemical protection suits — rubber boots, gloves, gas masks — but gave no warnings to curious locals (including children) who watched them at work.

Residents of Kobyltsi Street, Mariya Bilak and her two daughters Svitlana and Valentyna, felt burning to their eyes and skin as soon as the leaking tanker parked outside their house. Next day, like Scripcara, they were doubled up with stomach pains. In the weeks that followed doctors diagnosed "enlarged livers" but gave no cause. Two months later the women's hair fell out. Four months later it grew in again but the other symptoms are still there.

Mariya Primak, another witness to the late-night convoy, ended up in a special ward at the local hospital after two months of high fever, sore throat and stomach pains. Then all her hair fell out. There were twelve other adults in the ward with the same symptoms. A week later, the day before a party of journalists from Moscow were due to visit the hospital, the patients were all sent home.

Ludmyla Pavlychyna moved to the town in April 1989, nine months after the tanker crash, and got a job in Kobyltsi Street. A month later all her hair fell out, including eyebrows and eyelashes. Today her hair has partly grown in, but she still has stomach pains, an enlarged liver, and sores on her arms. Doctors have diagnosed liver disease, but do not know what caused it.

The majority of those affected have been children living in the old part of town. Within a week of the convoy passing through, 2000 became ill. Common symptoms were eczema, stomach pains, swollen livers, jaundice, loss of coordination, severe nightmares and bleeding noses. All, it seemed, had severe bronchitis. Then three months later they began to lose their hair, at least 185 becoming completely bald. The worst affected were aged between two and four. Later, like the adults, their hair grew in but most remained ill with other symptoms which still plague them today. Each spring the symptoms get worse and, in some cases, hair falls out again.

The Soviet health authorities sent the totally bald children for tests in Moscow and Kyiv. One child, the daughter of an army captain, was sent to a military hospital in Leningrad. The results of the tests in Kyiv and Moscow were kept secret until angry mothers picketed the hospitals where their children were being treated. Four separate reports gave four different sets of results suggesting the presence of different heavy metals in the children's blood. Eventually, thallium, a heavy metal once used as a depilatory, was identified as the culprit. Unfortunately, health officials could not say where the thallium came from. Local industry got the blame but no one factory was identified as producing the waste. Meanwhile, the girl sent alone to Leningrad came home with a different diagnosis; military doctors told her parents she had been poisoned with rocket fuel.

Soviet missile fuels are not pleasant substances. Inhibited fuming red nitric acid and asymmetric dimethylhydrazine are so corrosive they cannot be stored in the missiles they power. Instead, they are stored in large tankers until two hours before blast-off, when they are pumped into the missile casing. Such was the tactical disadvantage of this delay, plus the manifold problems of handling the chemicals (and their unpopularity with Rocket Force troops) that, in the final years of the Soviet Union, the military was systematically replacing the old rockets with more stable solid-fuelled models.

Water and soil samples taken in Chernivtsi soon after the tanker crash showed up traces of the dimethylhydrazine, says Freylikh. Then Kyiv experts discredited the results, saying samples were not taken correctly. Attempts at further sampling failed when local scientists were told if they cooperated with the testing, they would lose their jobs.

According to the chemical textbooks, dimethylhydrazine is a highly corrosive irritant to skin, eyes, and mucous membranes, and a convulsant poison. In high doses it can cause liver disease, liver cancer, and cancer of the colon. It evaporates in air and is soluble in water. Anecdotal evidence from the former Soviet Rocket Forces states that soldiers who accidentally inhaled the vapour accidentally have died.

Chernivtsi's rocket fuel theory has gained such support in the town that local authorities set up a special committee to investigate it. On one side of the table sits Professor Freylikh with co-campaigner and local politician Volodymyr Zhorin. Opposite them are former members of the KGB (now SBU, Ukrainian Security Service) whose job it is to investigate the military. In a cyclical game of cat and mouse, Freylikh presents an eyewitness report of the convoy — but without a name. The intelligence officers ask for the names of the witnesses so they can make their own inquiries. Not surprisingly, the witnesses refuse to be named.

A minor breakthrough came when a soldier wrote to the local paper. The rocket fuel accident was common knowledge in the army, he said. In fact, the unit's training major had exhorted poor drivers with phrases like "shape up — we don't want another problem like Chernivtsi".

The major in question was hauled before the committee to explain this statement but acquitted himself with the assertion that the "problem" he referred to was not a fuel spillage, but the public's false notion that the army had poisoned them; there was no room for a real accident.

The people of Chernivtsi did not see it that way. They remember the indecent haste with which the soldiers felled the offending tree — the one which the tanker had hit — a day after the crash. Not only did they chop it down and remove every twig, then (with unheard-of efficiency) they cut the stump to street level and asphalted over the remains. Here, they say, is a snapshot of the "old system" in action: the truck can't have hit the tree because the tree never existed. Show us the tree?

"Eco-AIDS" is one of the buzzwords at the Chernivtsi Children's Hospital for Radiological and Ecodependent Diseases. What it means is that pollution is so widespread it has become impossible to match a symptom with a cause.

The doctors work under incredible difficulties. Medical supplies are running out, the wards are full, and the mass poisoning just won't go away.

Doctors at the hospital say the 1988 "burst of chemical intoxication" affected only 185 children — those who went totally bald — and have been reluctant to link their illness with sick adults or the other 2000 children who suffered similar symptoms but only partial hair loss. This has infuriated the families of the victims themselves who detect a political plot to make the problem appear smaller than it is.

Nor will the doctors admit that any deaths occurred. Freylikh has evidence of five young children who died soon after the convoy accident of symptoms which suggested chemical poisoning. In one case a four-year-old girl fell ill. Dark blotches appeared on her skin and she died four days later. The official diagnosis was leukaemia, but a doctor told the family the girl's liver had been poisoned. When the girl's mother went to the local photo studio to collect the memorial photo she was amazed to see pictures of other dead children lying in their coffins with similar marks visible.

Even if they had the political will to do it, the Chernivtsi doctors are now isolated and are unable to continue their research. If for no other reason than that they have no chemical reagents or equipment to make further tests.

"We are in the middle of an environmental disaster", says chief doctor Valeriy Shapovalov.

Still, Shapovalov has had some success treating the symptoms of the poisoning with vitamin E, charcoal-absorbents, antibiotics, and steroids. Extra food rations from special health shops have enabled doctors to ensure their patients are getting a healthy diet.

Unfortunately, the treatment regimes nearly collapsed last year from lack of drugs. Shapovalov is ready to meet foreigners with a list of urgently needed supplies: "analyser for clinical chemistry and reagents ENCORE III; Ultrasonic system AU-630 with transducer to detect enlarged thyroid glands; bronchioscope paediatric set; annual supply of reagents for Hematology Analyser Cell-Dyn-1600".

Shapovalov dodges the rocket fuel theory by explaining he is "not qualified to comment". Rocket fuel is a military problem, outside the realm of children's doctors, and can only be dealt with by specialists; i.e. the military".

"One day, they may say what really happened. Maybe there is too much secrecy in this country", he adds. Then, reflectively: "It is natural for any military organisation to cover up this problem. It would be the same in your country".

Then, with even more surprising candour, Shapovalov suggests a reason why the military will not acknowledge the fuel spillage: if shown to be the cause of the illness, they would be forced to pay compensation. And they cannot afford the money to do so.

In a flat in the poor part of town, a meeting is taking place — a meeting of the Mother's Committee for the social protection of the rights of the children who fell ill with chemical intoxication in 1988. The committee represents the 185 children who went bald and were taken to Kyiv and Moscow for tests.

"They are still sick, nothing has changed", says chairman Halyna Khomenko. "Ukraine is ashamed to tell the truth of these children".

The Mothers Committee followed their sick children to Kyiv and Moscow for three months of tests. They were never informed of the results and are incredulous that now, five years later, they are still no closer to the truth. Even in the case of the children whose condition has recently deteriorated, the doctors refuse to link this to the original illness.

The mothers believe the rocket fuel caused the illness, and that their children were contaminated while playing in the street. They claim that the children would not have become ill if warnings had been issued at the time of the spill.

"Our children were in good health before 1988, but soon after the accident, all their hair fell out. We know that they were poisoned with chemicals. What else could it be?" says one mother.

"On the quiet doctors have told us to get out of Chernivtsi if we want our children to recover. But they won't say it officially", says Khomenko. "But where can we go? We can't afford to leave".

Chernivtsians, like most western Ukrainians, were especially glad to see the end of the Soviet Union. A region that, historically, leaned west to the Austro-Hungarian empire for cultural ties, it only came under the hammer and sickle in 1939. Communism was never widely accepted and most people stuck to their Christian beliefs. They suffered in return. It is rare to meet a Ukrainian who did not have at least one grandfather murdered in Stalin's purges. As recently as four years ago they were still being discriminated against: 40 per cent of the soldiers sent to Afghanistan were from western Ukraine. "Our punishment for being Christian was to have to go and fight Moslems" was how one veteran put it.

With independence in 1991, therefore, the sick children of Chernivtsi thought their problems would be over. Why, hadn't the new world order been ushered in on a wave of "eco-glasnost"?

Maybe then, but not any more. Whereas environment issues were a safe focus for anti-establishment sentiment in the early days, the new republics

have been forced to put "green" issues on the back burner as they slide into financial ruin. Even Chernobyl — where the 1986 accident, in some experts' opinion, was one of the factors leading to the break-up of the Soviet Union — may soon be recommissioned to provide much-needed electricity in the present power crisis.

With the economic collapse has come a breakdown of communication systems. Telephones are increasingly out of order and mail rarely gets through. Western Ukraine, though geographically closer to the rest of Europe, has had a rude awakening to its dependence on Moscow for information from the outside world. And the free world, rather than ride to Ukraine's aid like a knight in shining armour, has chosen to focus its assistance on Russia in the naive notion that such help will filter through to the neighbouring republics.

"In some ways it is harder to cope with our problems now than it was three years ago", says journalist Ludmyla Florivna of the weekly "Young Bukovynian" (Bukovyna: the border area between Ukraine and Romania). "No one will help us from East or West, we are more cut off than ever before. OK, we are no longer influenced by Moscow, but neither can we send out information or receive it. We can hardly get enough paper to go to print".

Florivna rocked Chernivtsi five years ago with a frank exposé of the sick children problem. Until then, people were unaware of the extent of the suffering. For her pains, Florivna lost her job (her editor fought hard with the authorities to keep her on) but was soon reinstated and, after independence, voted Journalist of the Year.

Like Freylikh, she has made meticulous research of the fuel spill theory and believes that the Rocket Forces are the most likely cause of the 1988 illnesses.

"Wherever we have military establishments we have ecological problems. It is a fact of life. We also have secrecy, and an in-built self-protection mechanism".

The former Soviet intelligence service — the KGB — seems to have survived independence to re-emerge mostly intact under its new Ukrainian guise, the SBU. In Chernivtsi, as well as being part of the investigating committee, they seem to be keeping more covert tabs on the rocket fuel controversy ("I say, 'Hello, Major' when I pick up the phone", was how one campaigner put it). It is hard to gauge their goal in the affair. Certainly, in other parts of Ukraine, the former KGB have proved unlikely allies to environmental campaigners. In Rivne they joined forces with Greenpeace to publicise illicit imports of toxic waste from Germany. In Chernivtsi their hands may be tied. A former KGB officer told Florivna that "if the rocket fuel scandal touches the former Soviet Union, not even the KGB will find the truth".

Outside verification of the rocket fuel theory is equally muddled. What we do know is that in late July 1988 a lot of military missiles were being moved around.

This was the year of the INF Treaty, which started with a US-Soviet pact to scrap the bulk of their ground-based medium-range missiles. The Soviets

had begun withdrawing missiles from bases in Czechoslovakia and East Germany in February. However, the destruction of the SS-12 missiles (one version of which was liquid-fuelled) at Sary-Ozek in Kazakhstan did not begin until August 2, 1988.

(The Soviets, quite sensibly, did not act to destroy the rockets until then, since the US government did not fully ratify the treaty until June).

Other missiles to be scrapped under INF were the old SS-4s, also liquid-fuelled and vehicle-transportable, of which there were bases at Kolomyia and Skala Podilska — both within 50 miles of Chernivtsi. It is also known that at the end of July long-range Ukraine-based SS-18 missiles (though not covered by the INF Treaty) were being transported to Russia under the earlier SALT agreements. SS-18s are also fuelled with liquid dimethylhydrazine.

On July 15 this year, the Ukrainian 43rd Rocket Army began stripping down the first of ten SS-19 missiles (another liquid-fuelled rocket) and, as the government admitted a year ago, technicians face a big problem of how to handle the poisonous propellants. The US Congress has earmarked \$300 million-worth of technical aid to Ukraine to help the disarmament process.

If the testimony of Chernivtsi is true, the people of Ukraine have good reason to question the integrity of their military leaders and the government that keeps them in check.

Undoubtedly, Chernivtsi is only a small drop in the ocean of ecological disasters facing the former Soviet Union (take Chornobyl for example). But the town is setting an example others can follow. Local investigators like Viktor Freylikh have the determination to bring the "old system" to book and to show Ukraine's leaders that people come first. ■

History**UKRAINIAN JEWS' LANGUAGE BEHAVIOUR IN THE 1920s: AN INDEX OF UKRAINIAN STATUS***Gennady Estraiikh*

In 1926, the 1,574,000 Jews of the Ukrainian Republic made up more than 60% of the entire Soviet Jewish population. The 20th century, which from its very beginning was fertile in wars, revolutions, pogroms, starvations and migrations, brought tangible changes in the socio-demographic physiognomy of the community. In the vortex of events between the censuses of 1897 and 1926, the Jewish population of Soviet Ukraine (in its interwar boundaries) decreased by 4.7%.¹ Crucial shifts occurred in the territorial and occupational distribution. The vector of Jewish internal migration became directed chiefly from small market towns (*shtetlach*) towards big urban centres, especially outside the former Pale of Jewish Settlement. In 1926, about 62% of Ukraine's Jews lived in cities and towns, 29% — in *shtetlach*, and 9% — in villages. About 28% of them were concentrated in Kyiv, Kharkiv, Odessa, and Dnipropetrovsk. Relative to 1897, in Kharkiv the number of Jewish dwellers increased sevenfold, in Kyiv it quadrupled, in Donbas it trebled.

It is no coincidence that the Jewish population of the industrial regions showed the highest level of language assimilation. Thus, the percentage of Donbas Jews who claimed Yiddish as their mother tongue was 50% in the Artemivsk and Luhansk districts and 38% in the Stalino district. The figure for the Kharkiv district was 41%, and for the Kyiv district — 63%. The position of Yiddish was not very strong in other industrial regions either, e.g. 49% in the Dnipropetrovsk district, 58% in the Odessa district. It is also characteristic that in 1927 less than one third of Jewish Communists from the industrial districts

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¹ The statistical data quoted in this article are gleaned from: *Perepis' Kiev 16 marta 1919 goda*, part I, Kyiv, 1920; *Alfarbandishe baratung fun di yidishe sektsyes fun al. k. p. (b)*, Moscow, 1927; *Pidsumky partperepysu 1927 roku*; Kharkiv, 1928; Y. Veytsblit, "Di mutershpriakh ba di yidishe proletaryer in ukraine", in *Der shtern*, 3 April, Kharkiv, 1930; Y. Veytsblit, *Di dinamik fun der yidisher bafelkerung in ukraine far di yorn 1897-1926*, Kharkiv, 1930; Y. Kantor, *Natsional'noe stroitel'stvo sredi evreev*, Moscow, 1934; Y. Leshchinsky, *Dos sovetishe yidntum*, New York, 1941; G.O. Liber, *Soviet Nationality Policy, Urban Growth and Identity Change in the Ukrainian SSR, 1932-1934*, Cambridge, 1992.

of Ukraine claimed Yiddish as their mother tongue, whereas in the agrarian districts more than a half of them identified Yiddish as their first language.

Yiddish retained its strongholds among the sedentary population of the Kamianets (97%), Shepetivka (96%), Proskuriv (96%), Tulchyn (96%), Berdychiv (95%), Vinnytsia (95%), Uman (95%), Bila Tserkva (92%), and a few other districts which had been the heartland of Ukrainian Jewry for generations. Although now, among these linguistically retentive Jews there began a mass flight from the backwaters to the urban melting-pots, since their *shtetlach* could not recover from the devastation and pogroms of the Civil War period. In addition, the *shtetl*, "an ugly unit of the capitalist system", became, in the 1920s, the target of "the most ruthless blows of the Revolution".²

The following statistics give some notion about the language behaviour of Ukraine's Jews in the 1920s.

Retention of Yiddish among Ukrainian Jews, 1920s		
Year	Census	% of Jews claiming Yiddish as their mother-tongue
1926	General census of the population	75.6
1926	All trade-union members' census	58.5
1927	All Communist Party members' census	39.4
1929	All trade-union members' census	42.5

Rapid language assimilation in big urban centres was not a new phenomenon. However, the post-Revolutionary Jewish urbanite was much more assimilation-prone. First of all, the proportion of Jewish urbanites to the general urban population fell by half during the inter-census period 1897-1926 due to an even more rapid influx of non-Jewish migrants. As a result, in a Soviet city the Russian and Ukrainian languages could easier "drown" Yiddish. Especially as any ethnically organised public activities were officially viewed suspicious. To name but one example: in 1922, a circular of the Ukrainian Komsomol's Central Committee banned all private sport clubs with *exclusively Jewish* membership.³

² A. Bragin, M. Kol'tsov, *Sud'ba evreyskikh mass v Sovetskom Soyuze*, Moscow, 1924, p. 5-6.

³ G. Estraiikh, "Neskol'ko neizvestnykh tsitat", in *Evreyskaya gazeta*, No. 5 (March) Moscow, 1992.

On the other hand, occupational acculturation began to be far more widespread in the post-1917 years. In 1922, Lenin lamented, "We have in Ukraine too many Jews. It is the genuine Ukrainian workers and peasants who should be involved in governing".⁴ However, this pronouncement referred mainly to certain key executive posts. Jews, the most literate and urbanised ethnic group of the Republic, remained prominent among office workers and professionals. Less than 50% of Jewish trade-unionists with such work status retained Yiddish as their mother tongue.

Retention of Yiddish in different age brackets, 1926
(% of the whole Jewish population)

Age	In urban centres above 50,000	with population under 50,000	in villages	Total
0-4	49.23	81.49	93.71	71.89
5-9	43.49	80.13	94.28	69.89
10-14	47.78	81.26	94.30	72.65
15-19	49.87	80.79	94.13	71.63
20-24	49.85	80.90	93.22	69.55
25-29	53.88	82.58	92.99	70.99
30-34	59.02	85.25	93.95	73.51
35-39	64.32	87.50	95.29	81.94
40-44	63.81	89.75	90.55	81.94
45-49	74.07	91.34	96.52	85.32
50-54	77.56	92.96	97.03	87.76

In contrast to them, Yiddish retention was very high (about 80%) among, say, Jewish tailors and sempstresses who constituted the vast majority (about 70%) of the clothing industry workers. In this industry, some of the trade-union organisation conducted their activity only in Yiddish. A characteristic example was the Tinyakov clothing factory (in Kharkiv) where there was a special Yiddish newspaper "Shtolene nodl" (Steel Needle) with a readership of some 1,500.

Even at the height of the indigenisation drive (which was generally beneficial to Yiddish activity⁵), the linguistic assimilation of Ukrainian Jews meant for the most part Russification rather than Ukrainisation. In 1926, fewer than one per cent Jews claimed Ukrainian as their first language. Even the inci-

⁴ Ibid. See also G. Estraikh, "Letters to the Editor", in *East European Jewish Affairs*, Vol. 23, No. 1, 1993, p. 123.

⁵ M. Altshuler, "Ukrainian-Jewish Relations in the Soviet Milieu in the Interwar Period", in H. Aster and P.J. Potichnyj (eds.), *Ukrainian-Jewish Relations in Historical Perspective*, Edmonton, 1990, p. 296-8.

dence of Ukrainian literacy was not very substantial — 240,000 as opposed to the 935,000 Jews who were literate in Russian. However, these figures might be welcomed as a fundamental change. (In 1919, a census of the population of Kyiv found that among 89,500 literate Jews only 1.4% claimed to be literate in Ukrainian; the majority — 95% of the Jewish respondents of 1919 — answered that they could read and write in Russian, 68% — in the “Jewish language”, and 1.7% — in Polish.⁶) Outside the rural areas the social basis for Ukrainisation was quite thin even among the Ukrainians,⁷ let alone other ethnic groups.

The Yiddish word-stock *per se* furnishes evidence of the roles which Russian and Ukrainian played in the Jewish society. It was Russian officialese and journalese that fed the vocabulary of Soviet Yiddish publications. True, some outdated calques and loan-words from the Soviet Ukrainian Newspeak can be recognised, but their number is very limited; e.g.

- Y. *dorfboyz* <U. *sil'bud(ynok)* [village club-house],
- Y. *komnezam* <U. *komnezam* [committee of impoverished peasants],
- Y. *orempoyer* <U. *nezamozhnik* [poor peasant],
- Y. *spilke* <U. *spilka* [union].

Certainly, this brief list could be expanded. However, the Soviet Ukrainianisms become lost on the fringes of the Soviet Yiddish vocabulary among *thousands* of borrowings from Russian.

It is known that as far back as the second half of the 19th century, words of Russian origin had become predominant in the Slavonic component of literary Yiddish. The impact of Ukrainian was especially weak in the vocabulary of administration and modern city life.⁸ After the Revolution, this impact could increase only very slightly. In spite of official lip-service to the languages of the Soviet Republics, it was Russian that became *de facto* the supra-language of the new regime and its élite. Therefore, both Yiddish and Ukrainian found themselves, in a sense, in the same position — they become targets of Soviet Russian lexical infusions. But that is only half the story.

By denationalising Jewish life, the Soviet milieu deprived Yiddish, to a considerable degree, of its creative capacity. Abraham Koralnik, a Jewish essayist, wrote, “Language, national culture! But... for us, for Jews, it's not enough. That is sufficient for Letts, Poles, Ukrainians. [...] Jews need a chimera”.⁹

⁶ In 1910-1911, Ukrainian practically did not figure in the language repertoire of Jewish students in the Kyiv higher schools (cf. G. Estraikh, “Languages of Yehupets Students”, in *East European Jewish Affairs*, vol. 22, No. 1, London, 1992, p. 63-71).

⁷ G.Y. Shevelov, *The Ukrainian Language in the First Half of the Twentieth Century (1900-1941)*, Cambridge, 1989, p. 122.

⁸ V. Swoboda, “Ukrainianisms in J.M. Lifsic's *Judes-rusyer vertes-bix*”, in P. Wexler (ed.), *Studies in Yiddish Linguistics*, Tübingen, 1990, p. 109.

⁹ A.D. Karal'nik, “Evreyskaya problema vlasti”, in *Novyy put'*, No. 32, Moscow, 1917, p. 10.

But in the Communists' hands Yiddish language and culture became a Soviet indoctrination tool, rather than a "chimera". The Jewish Communists Sections' Central Bureau reported in 1922, during the First All-Ukrainian Congress of Jewish culture activists,

Some of the activists did not have a clear enough notion about the meaning of the Communist activity among the Jews. They have attached a particular value to the language question. The members of the Central Bureau have managed to straighten the line based on principle and to rally the delegates round the resolution which attracted attention exclusively to the intrinsic value of the activity, viz. its Communist content.¹⁰

The introduction of what was called "international" terminology was one of the most favourable "anti-chimerical" devices of Soviet language regulators. In point of fact, both Ukrainian and Yiddish *were obliged* to emulate the shape of Russian coinages with international (Latin, Greek, etc.) roots or affixes.¹¹ At the same time, the aftereffects of this policy were essentially different. For Ukrainian, such an approach spelled an overt swing towards Russian, whereas for Soviet Yiddish language-planners it provided a unique chance to steer a middle course among the co-territorial Slavonic languages — Ukrainian, Belarusian, and Russian. Thus, such calques as "*kolvin*" [collective farm] or "*dorfrat*" [village Soviet] appeared to be a compromise settlement: neither did "*kolhoz*"/"*sel' sovet*" (Russian) nor "*kolhosp*"/"*sil' rada*" (Ukrainian) nor "*kolchaz*"/"*sielsaviet*" (Belarusian). Moreover, the "international" disguise levelled many lexical items, especially different abbreviations, e.g. "*partorg*" (Party organiser), "*revkom*" (revolutionary committee), etc. It is no coincidence that the All-Ukrainian conference on the Yiddish language would later, in 1934, go so far as to make "international" word-formation the principle.¹² Often, however, these "international words" represented (as opposed to "regular" Russian) a distinction without a difference, because the real source of almost all Sovietisms, including coinage with international constituents, was Russian.

In summary, both the language-related statistical data and the vocabulary of Soviet Yiddish are indicative of the real status allotted to Ukrainian even in the heyday of indigenisation. The Ukrainian Jews as well as Yiddish gravitated chiefly to the Soviet supra-language, viz. Russian. ■

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¹⁰ Rossiyskiy Tsentr Khraneniya i Isucheniya Dokumentov Noveyshey Istorii, fond 17, opis 60, delo 974, list 30.

¹¹ Cf. P. Wexler, *Purism and Language: A Study in Modern Ukrainian and Belorussian Nationalism (1840-1967)*, Bloomington, 1974, p. 162.

¹² *Afn shprakhfront*, No. 3-4, Kyiv, 1935, p. 267.

Literature

BABYLONIAN CAPTIVITY

Lesya Ukrainka

Lesya Ukrainka (1871-1913) is universally acknowledged, not only as one of the three greatest Ukrainian poets, but also — like the other two members of this trinity, Taras Shevchenko and Ivan Franko — as a key figure in the nurturing of Ukrainian national consciousness in the nineteenth and early twentieth century. Yet of the poetic dramas and dramatic poems which constitute her *chef d'oeuvre*, only two have a Ukrainian setting, and of these, one has a historical, and the other a fairy-tale setting. Her messages to the Ukrainian nation of fidelity to one's native land, language, culture and tradition, are largely "coded", in Biblical or classical Greek or Roman themes.

The dramatic poem, "Babylonian Captivity", written in 1903, translated here to mark the 80th anniversary of the poet's death, takes its inspiration from Psalm 136 "By the waters of Babylon we sat down and wept, when we remembered thee, O Zion!" But its theme is one which was of contemporary and personal importance to the poet and to all Ukrainian writers of her day — and indeed, for decades to come, and which recurs again and again throughout her work: the role and duty of the artist under a foreign dictatorship, and the conflict, in such circumstances, between commitment to one's art and convictions, and the pressure — if one is to survive — to make some at least minimal compromise with the powers that be.

Such "coding" is, of course, a standard literary device among writers compelled to work under conditions of censorship. Many, indeed, who use a historical, classical, Biblical or mythological setting, introduce conscious anachronisms or modern references to make sure that their readers realise the contemporary "message". (Thus, in "The Neophytes", Shevchenko "accidentally" writes "Siberia" and at once corrects himself to "Scythia", to underline the parallelism between the Rome of Nero and the empire of the Tsars). Lesya Ukrainka, however, does not do this. Her backgrounds are as authentic as the contemporary state of Biblical and Classical scholarship, history and archaeology could make them.

Vera Rich

A spreading plain. The red of sunset turns to blood the confluence of the wide rivers Tigris and Euphrates. The tents of the captives are scattered over the plain. Naked children are searching in the gravel for shells and collecting dry reeds for fuel. Ragged and weary women, mainly old, are preparing supper, each at her own cook fire, for the men who, after their heavy toil have come from the city and are sitting in silence under the willows by the water. A little to the side, also under the willows, stand two groups, Levites and prophets. Above the prophets, there are harps hanging on the willows, they sway in the evening breeze and from time to time vibrate. In the distance can be seen the walls of Babylon and its towers, from time to time, the noise of the city can be heard.

WOMAN: *(calling from her fire)*

Come husband, now and eat, supper is ready!

(Her HUSBAND, still a young man, stands up from his group and silently sits down to supper)

WOMAN: Why don't you eat your bread?

(He remains silent)

Is it so bitter?

Well, my poor dear, you still have got to eat!

HUSBAND: *(mumbling like an old man)*

I cannot eat...

WOMAN: Oh no! Your teeth are gone?

But where did...?

HUSBAND: *(pointing towards Babylon)*

There!

WOMAN: Oh, sorrow, sorrow, sorrow!

(Beside another fire)

(An OLD MAN approaches an OLD WOMAN who is sitting motionless with bowed head, by a dead fire)

OLD MAN: Where is my supper!

(she remains silent, without moving)

Why have you cooked nothing?

(she remains silent)

And why have you put ashes on your head?

(She remains silent and bows her head still further)

Where is our Malka?

OLD WOMAN: *(pointing towards Babylon)*

Yonder!

(she falls to the ground and strews ashes on her head)

OLD MAN: Adonai!

(he rents his garments and falls to the ground).

(Beside a third fire, around which are sitting only men, mainly old)

(A MIDDLE-AGED WOMAN: approaches timidly. Ragged children are clinging to her skirt)

MIDDLE-AGED WOMAN: Forgive me, fathers, for so troubling you,
But have you seen my husband anywhere?

OLD MAN: What is his name?

MIDDLE-AGED WOMAN: Ebenezer, son of Ossi.

OLD MAN 2: That *was* his name, before you were a widow.

MIDDLE-AGED WOMAN: What are you saying?

OLD MAN 3: Do not grieve so deeply!
The enemy cannot torment the dead.

MIDDLE-AGED WOMAN: Oh, what am I to do now, all bereaved,
With little children! *(she wails)*

CHILDREN: Mama! Mama! Mama!...

A MADWOMAN: *(wandering among the fires)*

Blessed the womb which never bore a child,
Blessed the breasts which never did give suck,
Rejoice not, o woman of Babylon!
Be ye not glad, mother of serpent sons!

A GIRL *(whispering to her companion, and pointing to the madwoman)*

She's been so ever since they killed her child
Back in Jerusalem!...

COMPANION: How terrible!

GIRL: I saw the whole thing with my own eyes, how
 A soldier took the poor boy by the feet
 And dashed his head...

COMPANION: Hush dear! Don't speak of it.

GROUP OF LEVITES: (*under the willows*)
 For our sires' sins the Lord took the Temple from us.
 For our forebears' offence, He took His shrine!
 And we now, like the children of a wastrel,
 Though innocent, must pay our father's debts!

GROUP OF PROPHETS: Jerusalem once cast us forth with stones,
 So the Lord cast it to captivity.
 The daughter of Zion once derided us,
 So now the sons of Ba'al pour scorn on her.

LEVITE 1: (*to LEVITE 2*)
 Why did you not come to the prayers today?

LEVITE 2: The overseer called me to the accounting.
 He had to pay the master-craftsmen's wages.
 Those who are working on the royal palace.

LEVITE 1: Could you not find one of the unbelievers
 To take your place?

LEVITE 2: Captivity, my brother!
 The overseer says none can outdo
 The Jews in matters of accounting.

LEVITE 1: True!

LEVITE 2: (*softly*) For my good help, the overseer gave me
 One of his rings.

LEVITE 1: (*loudly*) Praise be the Lord, for He
 With wisdom has endowed His chosen people
 Over all other nations of the earth.

(*softly*) He doesn't need anyone else, maybe?

(*They whisper together*)

SAMARITAN PROPHET: Thus spake the Lord: upon Mount Garizim
 Have I established mine own dwelling-place,
 And on its peak mine altar have established.
 But ye have turned away, recognised not
 My house of glory, as a drunken son,
 Recognises not his father's dwelling
 But wanders, fuddled in the outer darkness,
 Mocked by the children of his enemies.

JEWISH PROPHET: Thus spake the Lord: I in Jerusalem
 My temple have established among men,
 That thither they may swarm, as to a hive
 Bees swarm to their one queen, so ye shall swarm
 To Me in My one temple; but ye flew
 Like a wild swarm, into the wilderness.
 Therefore I have let loose fierce wasps upon ye.

SAMARITAN PROPHET: The Lion of Judah fell upon the flock
 Of Israel, and scattered wide the sheep.

JEWISH PROPHET: The sons of Saul was set to guard the flock,
 But they were not true shepherds of the people.

SAMARITAN PROPHET: The Lord of Israel shall smite you down
 And by my hand!
(He menaces the JEWISH PROPHET with his stick)

JEWISH PROPHET: O Lord, remember now
 Thy servant, David!
(He picks up a stone and takes aim at the SAMARITAN PROPHET)

ELEAZAR: *(a young prophet-singer, who has this moment come from
 Babylon rushes between the quarrelling prophets)*
 Stop! Come to your senses!
 Do not bring down disgrace upon the names
 of Israel and Judah!

SAMARITAN PROPHET: *(to Eleazar)*
 So, it's you
 Prophet of shame? And have you then brought glory
 To Israel and Judah?

JEWISH PROPHET: Unclean creature,
 Why have you come creeping from out your lair?
 There are your god and people! *(pointing to Babylon)*
 Go and praise them!

ELEAZAR: Yes. I do ask it, even though it end
In death for me, by stoning. The Lord liveth!
But you must judge me in accordance with justice.
An unjust judgment will recoil upon you!

OLD MAN: Then let us hear him. Let it not be said
That we abandoned justice in the ruins,
Back in Jerusalem! So, go on, tell us
What it was forced you to sell your words?

ELEAZAR: Because no one wanted to buy my hands.
My father never trained me up to tool.
My mother cossetted me like a weakling,
Though the harp is obedient to my hands,
The hoe and axe, alas, will not obey them.
I tried to bear a load — but straightway fell,
And the overseer drove me away.

OLD MAN: The let your father and your mother feed you.
They failed to teach you how to earn your bread.

ELEAZAR: Back in Jerusalem, with honour I
Could earn it doing what I am trained to do.
But here — the bread burns me far worse than fire.
That bread my father brings from Babylon.
Hard to live off a father's slavery.

LEVITE 1: (*viciously*)
And why is it your father's earnings burn you?

ELEAZAR: Am I on trial here, or is it my father?
Well then, put all the fathers here on trial.
All who risk soul to save their family!

LEVITE 1: Then why did you not turn to your own people.
They would have given you that bread to eat,
Which they give to feed Levites and the cripples.

ELEAZAR: Because I am no Levite, nor a cripple.

A LITTLE BOY: (*to his father*)
Give me some bread, papa!

FATHER: I have none, sonny!

OLD MAN: Well, think of that: He hears us talk of bread
And food and straightway: 'Give me some bread!'

ELEAZAR: The little boy spoke well. He answered for me,
You all could hear that little conversation.
'Give me some bread, papa!' 'I have none, sonny!'
While people in Israel must speak so,
Eleazar will not stoop to share the bread
Of Levites and of cripples. If someone
Still has some bread, then give it to this child,
And from the captives I'll accept a stone.
If someone has a fish, then feed the children,
And he can give to me the poison snake
Of bitter servitude which drains away
All blood from our heart. I'll take that serpent
And carry it into the public squares
And let it shoot its fangs forth in my words,
And those in Babylon shall hear its hiss!

YOUTH: But you will not earn very much from singing
Such songs in Babylon. Far less, for sure,
Than you would get from singing songs of Zion!

ELEAZAR: Lad, you are speaking out of ignorance.
Never have I sung songs of Zion to them.
Before, you spoke the truth. I hung my harp
Here on the willow so that it would never
Accompany songs false and insincere.
For no one ever sings a song of Zion
Without a harp. And I have never sung
A song of love among our enemies.
The song of Zion — fairest of all songs —
Back in Jerusalem was like a bride,
Was like a spouse, there in the Holy City,
But here it has become a concubine —
Who'd take a slave-girl as his wedded wife?

(A groan is heard among the people at these words)

A MAN: Then why not sing songs of captivity,
Pour forth the better tears of slavery?
Cold waterdrops can wear away a stone,
So cannot burning tears wear down a heart,
Though it be evil?

OLD MAN: Tell us, Eleazar,
How did the foreigners take that song of glory?

ELEAZAR: (*speaking slowly, as though forcing the words out*)
One of them looked approvingly, and smiled,
Nodding his head at me. A second said,
"But this cannot be true!" A third invited
Me to become one of the army minstrels,
Then, one by one, they all began to say:
"Is there no world beyond Jerusalem?
Do you not know songs about Mizraim,
Or Edom? Did not Amalek's past greatness
Or Amonite or Amorite not match
In days of yore, the glory that of old
Was Israel?"

PROPHET 1: O Lord, send chastisement
Upon those foemen's lips and strike them dumb!

ELEAZAR: So I began to sing the songs of Edom,
Of Mizraim and all those Gentile strangers,
In a strange tongue. And they all listened how
The bloodstained sword of treacherous Edom broke
Under the onslaught of Assyrian arms,
How Amalek, Amorite, Amonite
From conquerors were brought down into slaves,
How Mizraim, the Lord of half the earth,
The one-time master over Israel's tribes,
Was humbled by the strength of the Eternal,
How horse and rider drowned in the Red Sea,
With all the mighty power of the proud Pharaohs,
How all the House of Bondage was despoiled
And the curst doors of slavery thrown open.

YOUTH: How did they take it? ·

ELEAZAR: Some of them turned pale.

PROPHET 2: May they all soon be pale and cold forever!

YOUTH: But why did you not just tell them straightway.
That such a judgment day awaits them too?

ELEAZAR: No room for such a word in Babylon!...
Today I sang to them a song of Ophir,
Sodom and Tyre, their artistry and wisdom,

Their treasures, such as never could be found,
And never will, in Babylon's treasuries.

LEVITE 1: And did they pay you richly for your song?

ELEAZAR: With Canaanite treasure, you mean, maybe?
I earned just enough to buy my supper!

YOUTH: But surely for those songs which glorified
The might of Babylon they would have paid you
With many bracelets of the finest gold?

ELEAZAR: The viper cannot speak except with venom,
And yet the venom does not reach to all.
Wherever did you hear that I have sung
Songs of the might and glory of Babylon.

(The YOUTH, ashamed, remains silent)

OLD MAN: Maybe, Eleazar, in Babylon,
These songs have found their proper place and setting.
For Mizraim, Edom, and the Gentile tribes
Bring back no memories of Palestine,
Evoke no thoughts about Jerusalem.

ELEAZAR: Do we need songs to quicken memory?

OLD MAN: Not we, but those who among enemies
Now use the language of the foreigner.

ELEAZAR: How will they understand their native song?
Or how can it be sung in foreign speech?

OLD MAN: You too among the foreign speech could soon
Forget to speak the name: "Jerusalem!"

(ELEAZAR stands deep in thought. His hand begins to touch the strings of the harp. Then, in the voice of a somnambulist, he starts half-singing, half complaining:)

ELEAZAR: Powerful was my right arm,
Who could that arm overcome?
But did I ever say to myself:
'Blest am I in my right arm!'
Or did I speak to it so:
'Right arm, know that thou art mine!

The wicked foe smote off mine arm,
 Cut off that right arm of mine.
 Whom can I now smite in conquest,
 Who will not trample me under?
 Now day and night I bethink me:
 'Where, alas, where is mine arm?'
 I gaze on my shoulder, bewailing:
 'Right arm, how can I forget thee?'

(He passes his hand gently over the strings. There is a sound of quiet weeping among the people).

My father had a vineyard so fruitful,
 My mother had a garden so verdant,
 There I would walk and pluck the ripe clusters,
 There trample leaves under my feet.
 A wicket neighbour burned the vineyard fruitful,
 And laid to waste that garden verdant.
 Burned are the vines, destroyed the clusters,
 Beauty abounding is burned to ashes.
 Could I but find one leaf beneath my feet,
 Like a dove, I'd press it to my heart.
 Tell me, my brethren, is there one of you
 That has yet one small leaf from out that vineyard?

(The strings vibrate more sorrowfully; the weeping grows louder).

I have dreamed a dream of terror,
 Who will read my dream for me?
 I dreamed into the power I'd fallen
 Of my fiercest enemies
 What has that enemy done to me,
 How has the foeman afflicted me?
 Mine arms, it seems, are no less mighty,
 My legs, it seems are no less strong,
 Mine eyes, it seems, see no less keenly,
 Only this tongue of mine, this tongue
 Was given to the foe as victim!
 I tried to speak a ringing word,
 I tried to give my thought a voice,
 But the blood poured from my lips:
 And they but mourned in silence.

(A long silence. The harp falls from ELEAZAR's hands. The strings moan, vibrate, and fall silent. The weeping among the people ceases abruptly. It is utterly still).

ELEAZAR: (*heavily, but firmly and distinctly*)

Fathers and brothers, mothers and sisters, tell me!

I'm waiting for your stoning, or your words.

(*silence*)

Could a curse be more fearful than your silence?

OLD MAN: We shall not curse you, no Eleazar!

YOUTH: Forgive me, brother, for my words of venom!

ELEAZAR: You will not curse me? Brother, I forgive you

For every word. And yet I am accursed

With the dread curse of blood. Blood of our fathers

Poured out in vain for freedom that has gone

Weighs on this head of mine, on your head, too,

Pressing our foreheads down upon the earth,

Bown to those very stones which were not raised

Against me in the hands of my own people.

The son of man has wounded his own flesh

By falling on the sharp-edged, cutting stones.

He rent his robe of honour in despair,

And strewed his head with ashes of his shame.

I too have fallen as the Temple fell,

We all lie broken, like Jerusalem.

Now it would be as hard as to rebuild

The Temple, for us to rise up again,

Rise up out of the dust of slavish shame.

This shame has come on us at our own hands,

Since in defeat we did not lift them up

To build our life, but used them toiling for

The enemy. Dishonour's leprosy

Has spread over the flesh of Zion's daughters,

Who would not drown themselves in the Euphrates,

But went to please the sons of profligacy,

Feeding upon the fruit of their dishonour,

Dishonour, too, poisoned these lips of mine,

Because from hunger they did not keep silence,

But spoke forth in the language of the foeman

On those broad squares, accursed by God, where every

Manner of songs is heard, except the song

Which flows forth from the heart — and that must die.

Shame weighs on us more heavily than fetters,

And gnaws at us more sharply than iron chains.

To suffer fetters is a deep disgrace,

But it is far worse to forget one wears them.

There are two roads for us now, death or shame,
Till we find the road to Jerusalem.
Let us seek, brothers, the road to the Temple,
As the gazelle seeks water in the desert,
So that the enemy can never say:
"I have slain Israel. Here he lies dead!"
Until we find that road, let us fight on
Like wounded badger battling with the hunters,
So that the people never make a proverb:
"The God of Israel sleeps in the high heaven!"
It is too soon, Babylon, to rejoice!
Our harps, hung on the willows, still vibrate,
Tears flow into the waters of Babylon,
And still the daughter of Zion burns with shame.
The Lion of Judah roars yet in his anger.
The Lord liveth! This soul of mine yet lives,
Israel lives — even in Babylon!

WATCHMAN'S VOICE FROM THE CAMP:

Israel, to your tents. The night is coming!

The crowd disperses, each to his own tent. On a distant tower, Babylonian magi can be seen, prognosticating from the stars. The camp grows quiet. From Babylon comes a faint sound of nocturnal orgy. A solemn night trembles over the camp of the captives and over Babylon. Here and there, watchfires are kindled. Silence.

15/II. 1903.
San Remo.

News From Ukraine

The Political Crisis

**Ukrainian Prime Minister
Tenders Resignation**

KYIV, May 20 — Prime Minister Leonid Kuchma resigned after Parliament refused to extend his decree-making powers and Ukraine's President requested near total control of the government. Kuchma has defended his reform programme in three days of debate against deputies denouncing large prices and calling for restoration of heavy state subsidies to industry. "We have to be responsible", he said. "If I was sitting in your seats, perhaps I too would call for no price increases or for more state credits. But I cannot do this with a clear conscience". Kuchma has promoted swift privatisation and moved to reduce a huge budget deficit since taking office last October. But he has run into difficulties with the conservative parliament and the national bank over issuing state credits.

**Parliament Boosts
Presidential Powers;
Rejects PM's Resignation**

KYIV, May 21 — Ukraine's Parliament gave President Leonid Kravchuk sweeping powers to direct the economy, but the former Soviet

republic remained in deep constitutional crisis, formally without a government. Deputies voted 354 votes to eight to empower Kravchuk to issue unlimited decrees on economic reform pending the passage of corresponding laws by Parliament. Parliament, however, rejected the resignation of Prime Minister Leonid Kuchma.

**Miners Strike Over Price
Rises**

KYIV, June 8 — Thousands of miners in Ukraine's Donbas coalfield went on strike in spontaneous protest against sharp price increases, trade union officials said. Workers in other parts of Ukraine and Belarus have also denounced the price rises at isolated rallies at large factories over the past two days. The miners, apparently furious at sharp rises in the price of their meals, walked out at about half the country's more than 200 pits.

**Miners Insist on Political
Demands**

DONETSK, June 11 — Ukrainian miners stepped up a five-day-old strike saying they would not give up until their political demands for a national vote of confidence in the President and Parliament were met. Strike leaders in the city of Donetsk

said that despite President Leonid Kravchuk's promise to meet strikers' demands for better wages and more economic autonomy, another 30 pits had stopped work in the country's industrial east. Up to 5,000 people, many of them pensioners, crowded Donetsk's central square in the latest big demonstration there to hear speaker after speaker attack Kravchuk.

Energy Minister Resigns as Strikes Spread

KYIV, June 14 — Ukraine's Deputy Prime Minister responsible for energy quit his post as coal-miners stepped up strike action. A statement from President Leonid Kravchuk said: "Yuli Yoffe has been relieved of his responsibilities". According to Yoffe he had asked to be relieved of his post because nobody listened to his suggestions about how to overcome problems that were being raised by the miners' strike.

Kravchuk Agrees to Confidence Referendum

KYIV — Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk, under pressure from striking miners, called on Tuesday, June 15, for a referendum of confidence in his leadership and new parliamentary elections.

Prime Minister Leonid Kuchma demanded special powers to save the economy from collapse and end a constitutional conflict pitting him against Kravchuk. The premier warned that otherwise Ukraine would slide into dictatorship within a month. Kravchuk, apparently try-

ing to seize the initiative after a week of labour unrest, proposed to Parliament that the polls be held next December and January.

"People who strike and hold meetings are waiting for our decision", Kravchuk told deputies. "This [his suggestion] can satisfy all of them".

Deputies failed to agree on how to stage the ballots and called for further study. They also asked government ministers to outline what powers were needed to avert economic disaster.

More than 200 coal-mines and dozens of factories in conservative eastern Ukraine have joined a two-week strike protesting against up to fivefold increases in basic food prices. Trade unionists staged rallies in Kyiv and other major cities on June 15 to denounce a fall in living standards.

In Donetsk, the country's economic powerhouse and focal point of the strikes, local authorities passed a resolution denouncing Kravchuk and demanding greater autonomy. Deputy Prime Minister Yuli Yoffe, responsible for energy, has already resigned over the handling of the strike.

Kravchuk, clearly hoping to secure the public endorsement Boris Yeltsin achieved in a Russian referendum in April, proposed that the ballot let people pass judgment on him and also decide on the political structures they wanted. He said the referendum should have several questions and should ask voters whether they wanted to preserve the post of president.

Kuchma supported the referendum but said it should ask

Ukrainians whether they wanted to press on with reforms or stand by Communist economics. The prime minister said the Ukrainian economy was faring even worse than other former Soviet republics and time was running out to rescue it from total collapse.

"This government needs extraordinary powers. There is still time. Otherwise we will have to do it within a dictatorship within a month", he said.

He said these powers included the right to amend laws, hire or sack public officials, overturn any decision taken by a state body, and complete control over the Central Bank. Kuchma said the strike by the miners, who earn well in excess of average wages, was overtly political. He warned that unless they resumed work, the country's major industries faced imminent shutdown.

"I ask you to go back to work, I am prepared to go down on my knees if necessary", Kuchma said. "Our steel and chemical industries could well be stopped completely within two days".

Communists and democrats supported both the referendum proposal and an extension of the government's powers — though largely out of fears of growing economic chaos. The Communists say attempts to switch to a market society have caused economic catastrophe. Liberals accuse parliament of burying economic reform.

Some Ukrainian political parties have decried these political demands, some suggesting that anti-Ukrainian pro-Communist forces have co-opted the strike for their

own political ends in the conservative region that borders Russia. The demands for regional autonomy "can have very negative consequences and threaten Ukraine's territorial integrity", said Yuriy Berdnyk, a member of the Independent Trade Union of Miners, whose economic demands are much less strident than the combined political and economic demands of the Donetsk miners.

Ukrainian President Decrees Emergency Powers

KYIV, June 16 — Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk, facing spreading industrial unrest that threatens the economy with collapse, decreed himself extraordinary powers and took direct control of the government. Kravchuk also created a special Cabinet committee to take charge of the day-to-day running of the economy and undertake measures to reduce inflation and stabilise industrial production. The new body is to be headed by Prime Minister Leonid Kuchma and includes the head of the Ukrainian National Bank and ministers of finance and economy.

Kravchuk Rescinds Executive Power Decree

KYIV — In a roller-coaster exchange of information, ranging from threats of resignations, subsequent denials, to high-level duels, President Kravchuk finally rescinded his decree establishing a special economic commission and setting himself up as head of government.

The hectic events in the capital were precipitated by the labour

unrest in Donbas, which by Monday, June 21, for all intents and purposes had come to a halt. Only 26 of the 250 pits in eastern Ukraine had resumed work after government negotiators offered pay rises and other benefits.

Prime Minister Leonid Kuchma negotiated with the striking miners while in the Supreme Council Kravchuk convinced the lawmakers to agree to a confidence referendum on September 26.

Kuchma, after making significant headway with the strikers, accused Kravchuk on Saturday, June 19, of stripping him of his powers and said he would press ahead with plans to resign, the official Ukrinform news agency reported. The agency said Kuchma told industrialists in central Ukraine that he had no room to pursue his policies after Kravchuk's decree this week placing himself at the head of the government.

"In Ukraine, the prime minister's base has been eliminated. The government is now headed by the president", Ukrinform quoted Kuchma as saying in the city of Dnipropetrovsk. "Therefore at the next session of Parliament, I intend to make a fully grounded statement about my resignation".

Kuchma has already tendered his resignation twice to Parliament in a month-long constitutional battle with Kravchuk. But deputies who have blocked his reform policies for months rushed to his defence and persuaded him to stay on.

Later on June 21 Kravchuk appeared to give in to the prime minister, rescinding the decree which had placed him at the head of Ukraine's government.

The new presidential decree said the order was being withdrawn "with the aim of determining in full the appropriate nature of relations between the president of Ukraine and the cabinet pending passage of a law on the cabinet". Presidential spokesman Volodymyr Shlyaposhnikov denied Kravchuk's move represented a climbdown. "We have to deal with the relationship between the president and the government", he said. "No law has yet been adopted on the government. It is not certain who will assume responsibility at this difficult time. This decree returns matters to the position of status quo ante".

But it was clear that Kravchuk was anticipating stiff opposition to the decree from the country's volatile Parliament when it resumed its sittings on Tuesday. The Parliament's influential chairman spoke out against the decree, saying the prime minister should be given additional powers to proceed with market reforms. Parliament is also likely to raise objections to a deal signed by Kravchuk and Yeltsin on dividing the Black Sea Fleet in half.

Parliament last week gave in to the miners' principal demand by agreeing to stage twin referendums of confidence in the president and Parliament. Parliamentary chairman Ivan Plyushch said it was up to Parliament to work out what he said was a "crack" in the state's structures. But he clearly came down on the side of the prime minister. "If Parliament really wants to stabilise the political situation, it must transfer powers to the government as requested by the prime minister", he

said. "A popularly elected president always has a politically stabilising effect. But when you have a sapling with two main trunks, one has to be cut down".

Nonetheless, while Ukraine's two top leaders have declared a truce in their month-long constitutional struggle over how the country should be governed, they face immense economic problems. Parliament was due to reconvene on Tuesday, June 22, with debate expected to focus on how Kuchma will pursue market reforms despite calls from conservative deputies — and some senior ministers — for salary increases and more state subsidies.

"I haven't got any billions and nor does the prime minister", the Ukrinform news agency quoted Kravchuk as telling the cabinet meeting. "Anyone who tries to demand them from the government is pushing the leadership into a corner".

First Deputy Prime Minister Yukhym Zvyahilskyi, a reputed conservative appointed with a mandate to end the miners' strike, called on ministers virtually to double the minimum monthly salary to 40,000 *karbovantsi*.

"I oppose such populist measures", Ukrinform quoted Kuchma as saying in reply. "They will only cast the people even deeper into poverty".

Labour Minister Mykola Kashevych said fulfilling agreements on increasing subsidies to mines, indexing salaries, and cutting income tax would cost the government vast sums. It would send inflation and the budget deficit soaring and send the country's currency into freefall.

"Increased outlays to this extent in the near future can only mean the complete collapse of the Ukrainian economy", he told reporters afterwards. Ukraine's Deputy Prime Minister last week said price and salary rises had sent the budget deficit climbing sevenfold to seven trillion *karbovantsi* in a month.

Kuchma has had limited success in launching small-scale privatisation and curbing inflation, but is viewed both inside parliament and in the West as the only technocrat capable of overseeing reform.

New Vice-Premier For Ukraine

KYIV — On June 24 President Leonid Kravchuk appointed Valentyn Landyk Vice-Premier of Ukraine responsible for foreign economic affairs and investment.

Prior to his appointment, Valentyn Landyk was the director of the Donetsk-based association "Nord", which produces refrigerators. He remains honorary president of "Nord", but tendered his resignation as leader of the Labour Party.

Premier Plans Emergency Economic Measures

KYIV, June 24 — Prime Minister Leonid Kuchma, newly emerged from a month-long power struggle, has proposed emergency measures to save Ukraine's economy from collapse. Kuchma, in an address to Parliament, proposed tougher restrictions on money supply, faster privatisation, tax advantages for industry and incentives to attract foreign investors. He also proposed strict

controls on issuing money, closure of loss-making factories, a negotiated moratorium with Russia on fuel prices and a campaign to secure foreign credits for energy purchases.

Kyivans: No Confidence in Authorities

KYIV, July 7 — Public opinion in Kyiv is becoming increasingly critical of the authorities at all levels, according to an opinion poll conducted by the “Democratic Initiatives” research centre. A significant proportion of the population expressed serious dissatisfaction with the socio-economic situation in Ukraine and the fall in the standard of living, and people are more prone to participate in strikes.

Of those polled, 74.2% said that they had no confidence in the country's Parliament, and 57.9% — in the President. In the opinion of 64.2% of Kyivans, Members of Parliament are primarily concerned with their own sordid interests, 47.1% thought their primary motive was to stay in power, and 30.3% said that MP's prime concern was the interests of the “mafia”. Only 8.5% of the capital's residents believe that MPs are concerned with carrying out their campaign promises, and 3.8% — with representing the interests of their constituents.

Support for political parties has grown (44% of those polled now support one or other political group). However, no party can claim the support of a majority of the electorate. The Popular Movement of Ukraine (Rukh) has the greatest number of supporters — 9.3%.

The majority of people consider that the economic situation in Ukraine is critical. In their opinion, the situation can only be improved by closer economic integration with other CIS countries (84.3%), with western countries (75.1%), and stepping up the pace of reform and privatisation of business enterprises and land (66.1%).

At the same time, in spite of the catastrophic economic situation, the majority of people supported economic reform and the introduction of private ownership.

Referendum Will Be Postponed

Kyiv, August 9 — A referendum on confidence in Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk and the Parliament due to be held on September 26 would have to be postponed. Oleksander Lavrynovych, acting head of the central referendum commission, told reporters that Parliament had not yet prepared documents on the content and format of vote bulletins and had not decided who should finance the poll. A decision to stage a referendum was critical in persuading coalminers to end a 12-day strike in June which brought much of Ukraine's industry to a halt.

Lawmakers Accused of Trying to Avoid Vote

KYIV, August 13 — Leaders of Ukraine's main opposition parties joined ranks with several of the country's most powerful unions to threaten a wave of mass protests and strikes unless lawmakers decide to

hold early elections when Parliament reconvenes later this month. "We're talking about a swarm of people holding protests in front of the Supreme Rada", Mykola Zarytskyi of the opposition party New Ukraine told a news conference.

Parliament Plots Ukraine's Future Course

KYIV — Parliament is debating Ukraine's political future as its members discuss calls for new elections and attempts to bring order to chaotic economic reforms.

Deputies became mired on Thursday, August 26, in proceedings over calls for new elections instead of next month's scheduled referendums of confidence in Parliament and President Leonid Kravchuk. Kravchuk and other leaders have backed new elections for weeks and cancellation of the twin referendums had appeared inevitable. But they all appeared to backtrack in the debate, leaving the fate and timing of the plebiscites uncertain.

"I am not opposed to a referendum, although this amounts to an opinion poll more than a referendum", Kravchuk told Interfax Ukraine news agency after the debate. "Nothing will happen at once. Factories won't go down and credits won't stream in". He suggested adding questions on whether Ukrainians favoured a parliamentary or presidential state, or even whether they wanted to build a market-based or socialist society.

Parliament's Chairman Ivan Plyushch also said he had no objections to the referendums. He had

described them as a mistake during celebrations this week marking the second anniversary of Ukraine's independence.

"The president is lacking in political will", said Vyacheslav Chornovil, leader of Rukh, the largest opposition party. "I won't be at all surprised if he says something entirely different tomorrow".

"Making changes to the referendum or not scheduling new elections is playing with fire", said Chornovil. He described the country's political situation as a "full-blown crisis in the leadership of Ukraine". "We were guilty from the very beginning by not changing the leadership structure and by not conducting new reforms", Chornovil said. "We must correct this today".

Most parties had sought new elections. But many deputies, especially former Communists, insisted on the referendums. "If we fail to take a clear decision on this, we could well lose our Ukraine", said deputy Serhiy Holovatyi. "Already, people do not trust any institution of power".

Opinion surveys show the fractious Parliament enjoys the support of only 5 per cent to 20 per cent of voters. Grave doubts remain over erratic economic reforms, proceeding much more slowly than in neighbouring Russia.

Deputies on Friday were to receive the latest of several reform plans prepared by members of Prime Minister Leonid Kuchma's government. Plans also called for the introduction of new steep price increases for food and services next month. Parliament's conservative majority, which includes

many collective farm and factory bosses, is accused by liberals of torpedoing reforms by approving huge state subsidies.

Kravchuk and Kuchma, at odds earlier this year in a fight over constitutional power, resumed their skirmishes in Parliament over the speed and direction of reform. Kravchuk expressed deep reservations about a proposed economic union with Russia and Belarus — of which Kuchma is an ardent advocate.

Kravchuk said Kuchma overstepped his authority when he signed a July 10 accord to bring Ukraine into an economic and customs union with Russia and Belarus. The three countries are currently drafting a full treaty to implement the declaration to provide for free movement of goods, capital and labour across each other's borders. Kravchuk said the declaration, if implemented, would jeopardise what he called the "economic independence" of Ukraine.

Reformer Pynzenyk Resigns; Kuchma Predicts Government Downfall

KYIV — Ukraine's Deputy Prime Minister Viktor Pynzenyk, the man responsible for piloting the country's economic reforms, announced his resignation on Friday, August 27, and accused conservatives of thwarting attempts to engineer change.

Pynzenyk told a television interviewer he was stepping down because economic decisions were being taken without his consent, including regulations widely blamed for the plunge in the value of

Ukraine's interim currency. "I am obliged to resign given the current conditions", Pynzenyk said in the live interview. "I apologise to the prime minister for doing it in this way".

Pynzenyk said, "Some members of the government are shockingly conservative. Many decisions were taken behind my back. I can neither justify them nor assume responsibility for them".

He said Prime Minister Leonid Kuchma had lost control of the situation. Ukraine, he said, needed to introduce "emergency administration" of the economy or face "complete collapse within months". He blasted new currency regulations, saying they prompted a steep fall in the value of Ukraine's interim currency — the *karbovanets*. The rules, which require exporters to change half their currency earnings at a fixed National Bank rate, caused currency speculation and destroyed trade with Russia, he said.

Ukrainian television and other official media made no mention of Pynzenyk's resignation. Senior ministers of Kuchma's government were due to debate policy options on Saturday. Pynzenyk was one of the government's most committed advocates of market reform and enjoyed the backing of Western financial experts otherwise wary of Ukraine's sputtering drive to overhaul a moribund economy. An economic professor, he lambasted conservative deputies who he said were undermining change by approving huge subsidies for loss-making industry and agriculture. He also toured factories to persuade workers to accept belt-tightening measures.

In the wake of Pynzenyk's resignation, Kuchma predicted the imminent collapse of his government.

Kuchma said on Saturday, August 28, that a fall would be inevitable after the departure of Deputy Prime Minister Viktor Pynzenyk, and the inevitable rejection by parliament next week of a market reform plan.

"The government which I head is living through its final days", Kuchma told reporters as he attended an air-show near Kyiv. "Yesterday's statement [by Pynzenyk] is ample proof of that", he said, "and even if we brought in the best specialists in the world they could never create a programme acceptable to this Parliament".

In his remarks during the air-show, Kuchma said the key to progress was to replace Parliament. The current parliament is viewed by most Ukrainians with disdain and enjoys less than 20 per cent support in opinion polls.

"We have to open the way to other deputies if we want to get the job done", Kuchma said. "Let Parliament look after a new election law, leave legislative initiative to the president and implementation of laws to the government".

The prime minister hinted that he had been unable to resolve differences which pitted him against Kravchuk in a constitutional power struggle earlier this year. But he pledged to forge ahead with plans for an economic union with Russia, the main issue to be discussed next month at a summit of members of the Commonwealth of Independent States.

"If no political accommodation is found with Russia, the Ukrainian

economy will not survive", Kuchma said. "Perhaps someone in the West will provide us with funds. But I personally cannot see any such creditor coming forward".

Two years after independence, Ukraine is mired deep in crisis, with monthly inflation of about 40 per cent reducing vast sections of the population to poverty, wrote Reuter. It said no formal reform plan has been approved. Neither parliament nor top executive leaders appear able to make decisions on the country's future, it noted.

Democratic deputies said the impasse could fuel discontent. "This parliament must be changed", Volodymyr Pylypchuk, head of a commission on economic reform, said. "Otherwise, we could slide towards a social explosion. The way will be open to civil war".

Kuchma Demands Emergency Powers to Save Economy

KYIV, August 31 — Prime Minister Leonid Kuchma presented a programme to save Ukraine's economy from collapse and called for sweeping powers to end political paralysis and introduce vital reforms. "Parliament is incapable of taking decisions. No action has been taken on 75 laws presented urgently to deputies", Kuchma said. "A state of emergency will not help, but emergency measures are absolutely vital". He presented tough anti-inflation measures to be discussed over the next 10 days, including an abrupt halt to profligate state credits for loss-making industry and agriculture.

Kuchma said only a single structure for decision-making would allow Ukraine to find a way to introduce market mechanisms, curb inflation and bring down a vast deficit budget.

Foreign Relations

Russians Hoist Own Flag Over Black Sea Ships

KYIV — The dispute between Russia and Ukraine over the Black Sea Fleet heated up again on Monday, May 24, with sailors raising the Russian naval flag on board dozens of ships in a move that threatened to bury the temporary joint control agreement for the fleet.

Some 115 ships were flying Russian flags, making political waves in Moscow and Kyiv. A few ships raised the St. Andrew Russian naval flag on Friday, May 21, and dozens more hoisted it on Monday. On May 25 a further twelve ships joined the protest against Ukrainian authorities, raising Russia's marine flag, bringing the total to 127 vessels — well over one-third of the fleet. By May 28 203 vessels had raised the Russian naval flag.

Ukraine Calls For Urgent Talks on Fleet

KYIV, May 30 — Ukraine protested officially to Russia at the weekend in the latest flare-up of a row over the former Soviet Black Sea Fleet. The Ukrainian Foreign Ministry said moves by auxiliary support ships, including tugs and tankers but not warships, to raise the Russian St. Andrew flag violated an agreement under which the fleet would fly the

old Soviet ensign until a dispute over its ownership was settled. Ukraine called for urgent negotiations between Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Ukrainian leader Leonid Kravchuk.

Talks Held Over Disputed Fleet

KYIV, June 4 — Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev held talks with Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk in an effort to mend the two countries' deteriorating relations. Kozyrev was dispatched to Kyiv by President Boris Yeltsin to deal with the festering quarrel between the two neighbours that in recent weeks has developed into a full-blown crisis over the fleet. Kozyrev said preparations were underway for a summit between Kravchuk and Yeltsin to discuss a "final resolution" of the dispute, as well as a host of other nagging issues that have soured the relationship between the two most powerful ex-Soviet republics.

Russia, Ukraine Sign Economic Cooperation Pact

KHARKIV, June 29 — Ukrainian and Russian border areas facing adversity clinched a sweeping economic cooperation agreement, but Ukraine's leadership warned against restoring Soviet-style ties. The two countries' Prime Ministers, Leonid Kuchma and Viktor Chernomyrdin, met for the second time in five days to seal the accord. Both men, technocrats rooted in industry, hoped it would mend economic ties broken by the collapse of the Soviet Union.

The accord provided for a free customs zone, liberalised banking regulations and free movement of labour in five regions on each side of the border.

Yeltsin Urges Fleet to Abide By Agreement

MOSCOW, July 1 — President Boris Yeltsin reaffirmed an agreement reached with Ukraine to split the Black Sea Fleet, and accused politicians in Russia of deliberately whipping up passions around the contested naval force. Yeltsin was responding to an attempt by Black Sea naval officers to block a Russian-Ukrainian agreement on splitting the fleet and their demand that the Russian St. Andrew's ensign be hoisted on all the fleet's 350 vessels. The Russian President said in a statement such appeals were an attempt to "speculate on emotions" surrounding the fleet, and were in direct contravention of the accord reached on June 17 with Kyiv to divide the Black Sea force 50-50. "Without having the right to speak in the name of Russia or navy personnel, they are clearly pursuing selfish, personal goals which have nothing in common with the interests of the fleet and the fatherland", the statement said. Yeltsin called on all sailors in the Crimea-based force to show "military discipline and loyalty", and "not to give in to provocations".

Ukraine Asks Not to be Overlooked By G7

KYIV, July 4 — President Leonid Kravchuk appealed to G7 leaders not to overlook Ukraine when they

discuss aid to the former Soviet Union with Russian President Boris Yeltsin in Tokyo. In a letter to leaders of the seven top industrial states, Kravchuk repeated a long-standing request to provide Ukraine with a \$1.5 billion stabilisation fund for a new currency. He also suggested that a fund to help Ukraine cover the costs of doing away with former Soviet nuclear weapons would speed the difficult ratification by the Kyiv Parliament of the START-1 and Non-Proliferation treaties.

Russia Claims City of Sevastopol

MOSCOW, July 9 — Russia's Parliament voted overwhelmingly to proclaim the Ukrainian city of Sevastopol Russian property. "This is similar to a declaration of war", said Dmytro Pavlychko, head of Ukraine's Parliament's foreign affairs commission. A resolution approved in principle by Russia's conservative Parliament confirmed "the Russian status of the city of Sevastopol — the main base of the Russian Black Sea Fleet". "We are talking not about territorial claims on Ukraine, but about rights to territory which belonged to Russia during the Soviet period", said Y. Pudovkin, head of the parliamentary commission that drafted the resolution.

Three Republics Agree on Economic Integration

MOSCOW, July 10 — Russia, Ukraine and Belarus agreed on measures to promote economic integration as the first step towards a treaty

that would join the three Slavic countries into an economic union. The agreement was reached at a meeting in Moscow between the countries' prime ministers. In a statement, they said their historic links, common borders and intertwined economies justified a "joint economic space". The measures include steps to coordinate economic reforms and legislation, to permit the free movement of goods, services and capital, and to coordinate monetary, credit and budget policies. The statement said the goal was to allow residents "to own property, move, reside and work freely on the territory of any of the three countries". The prime ministers asked their deputies to prepare a draft treaty on economic integration by September 1.

Nuclear Arms

START Vote Postponed Until Autumn

KYIV, June 1 — A vote on ratifying the START-1 treaty signed between the old Soviet Union and the United States will affect the fate of nuclear missiles on Ukrainian soil. "The decision of such a difficult problem can only take place over time. In the United States it took eight or nine months. It will take a long time here too", Dmytro Pavlychko told reporters during a break in parliamentary debate. "There is a long time before the vote can take place. I believe the final vote will be postponed until the autumn. The summer recess will allow deputies to study the matter more carefully".

Opposition leader Vyacheslav Chornovil also predicted ratification would not take place until autumn.

US, Ukraine Discuss Storage of Nuclear Weapons

KYIV, June 7 — The United States and Ukraine agreed to discuss a proposal to dismantle and store at least temporarily former Soviet nuclear weapons on Ukrainian territory despite Russian objections. Visiting US Defence Secretary Les Aspin also said he had a better understanding of the concerns of Ukrainian deputies after trying to persuade them for more than an hour to ratify two key disarmament treaties. President Leonid Kravchuk predicted to Aspin parliament would back the START-1 and Non-Proliferation treaties within a month and rid itself of nuclear weapons. Aspin and Ukrainian Defence Minister Kostyantyn Morozov told a news conference the two sides had examined the proposal to keep the weapons in Ukraine rather than transferring them to Russia as Ukraine had earlier agreed informally.

Germany Urges Ukraine to Dismantle Weapons

KYIV, June 10 — German Chancellor Helmut Kohl urged Ukraine to dismantle the 176 nuclear missiles based on its territory soon and with much-needed Western assistance. Kohl, ending his first visit to independent Ukraine, welcomed Kyiv's pledges to ratify the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START-1) and adhere to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. "The clearer Ukraine's posi-

tion, the better the chances of someone like myself being able to mobilise international aid", he said after meeting Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk. Kohl said he would put Ukraine's case for aid and access to Western markets at forthcoming summits of the European Community and the Group of Seven industrial nations.

Nuclear Weapons Ukrainian Property

KYIV, July 2 — Ukraine's Parliament proclaimed ownership rights over former Soviet nuclear weapons deployed on its territory. Deputies approved by 226 votes to 15 a foreign policy doctrine which declared Ukraine "owns nuclear weapons on its territory". But the document said Ukraine had no intention of using or threatening to use the weapons.

Russia Warns Ukraine Against Nuclear Status As Kyiv Orders Dismantling of 10 Missiles

KYIV — As Russia's Foreign Ministry warned Ukraine on Friday against proclaiming herself a nuclear state, Kyiv has begun the dismantling of 10 strategic nuclear missiles located in the country, according to Western and Ukrainian sources.

Moscow's warning said that nuclear status for Ukraine would threaten worldwide disarmament and could cause accidents like the 1986 Chernobyl disaster.

"Is it now clear that making Ukraine a nuclear state is tantamount to opening a Pandora's box, giving a green light to the appear-

ance of other nuclear states, putting an end to the non-proliferation of nuclear arms and saying 'no' to nuclear disarmament?" the Russian ministry said in a statement. "How many Chernobyls could this bring", the statement added.

The Ukrainian parliament is still debating the approval of the START-I and Non-Proliferation treaties under which she is to give up for good her share of the former Soviet nuclear arsenal. Parliament this month ruled that former Soviet nuclear weapons were national property — a move short of proclaiming nuclear status. But the majority of deputies are opposed to a quick ratification of the treaties and say Ukraine must first receive security guarantees and compensation well in excess of the \$175 million currently offered by the United States.

Independent observers in Ukraine, quoted by the Ukrinform news agency, have denied that the strategic missiles in Ukraine are in any danger.

Meanwhile, technicians have begun dismantling 10 of the 176 strategic nuclear missiles in Ukraine to prepare them for transfer to Russia, the daily "Izvestia" reported on Friday, July 16.

But, it said, the rockets would be held in Ukraine pending the outcome of an impassioned debate on disarmament in the country. In Kyiv, the Ukrainian Defence Ministry confirmed that the process of taking the missiles apart had begun.

"Izvestia" said the complex process of dismantling the oldest of the missiles had started on Thursday.

Computer programmes were being removed and highly toxic liquid fuel was being made safe.

"Although one swallow does not make a summer, it cannot be denied that the ice has been broken", it said. "Despite the difficulties in relations, two states, Russia and Ukraine, and their political leaders have at last understood the threat to nuclear security represented by strategic rockets aging beyond their scheduled lifespan".

The 1,800 nuclear warheads still on Ukrainian territory are the focus of a debate in the Kyiv parliament over whether to approve the START-1 and Non-Proliferation treaties and permanently reject nuclear weapons. Opposition to rapid ratification, once confined to a handful of deputies, has swelled in recent weeks to include Prime Minister Leonid Kuchma. A clear majority of deputies are seeking security guarantees and additional compensation.

Even President Leonid Kravchuk, who for months urged a quick approval of the two pacts, now favours declaring the weapons national property pending their destruction — a small step short of proclaiming Ukraine a temporary nuclear state.

He rejects as derisory an initial US offer of \$175 million to cover the costs of disarmament. The United States has urged Ukraine to uphold the obligations she undertook when she became a party to START-1 last year, though Defense Secretary Les Aspin said he understood Ukrainian concerns after talks in Kyiv last month.

Parliament currently has no plans to resume debate on the treaties —

probably a deliberate move following the Russian parliament's claim last week to Ukraine's port of Sevastopol. Given the current mood, deputies would almost certainly vote to keep the more modern 46 SS-24 missiles deployed in Ukraine temporarily. The Supreme Council on Thursday published the official text of a foreign policy doctrine passed this month which said Ukraine owned the weapons but pledged never to use them.

"Ukraine links the removal of nuclear weapons from her territory to the provision by the nuclear powers and the world community of security guarantees", the doctrine said.

Russia objects to any suggestion that Ukraine can lay claim to weapons left over from the Soviet era, or their component parts. She has also rejected a US suggestion that the weapons could be dismantled in Ukraine under international supervision and the parts then transferred to Russia. "Izvestia" said the removal of the 10 missiles would be completed by mid-September. They reportedly would then be sent to a special centre in Udmurtia, near the Urals, for final destruction, a process described as "complex and by no means rapid".

"It is extremely expensive, but there will be no explosions as was the case with tactical weapons and nothing will enter the air or soil", it said.

Ukrainian Premier Rejects Russian Arms Warning

KYIV, July 16 — Senior Ukrainian officials have rejected Russian accusations that Kyiv's moves to take

control of nuclear weapons on its territory endanger world disarmament and could cause a Chernobyl-like disaster. They also called into question reports that some former Soviet missiles were being dismantled for shipment out of the country before Parliament takes a final decision on whether to get rid of nuclear weapons for good. Prime Minister Leonid Kuchma said Kyiv was protecting its own economic and security interests. "When we sent tactical weapons from Ukraine to Russia last year", he said, "Moscow quickly concluded a deal with the United States to sell nuclear materials for vast sums of dollars. We are entitled to a return for our contribution". Earlier in the day Russia's Foreign Ministry denounced the Ukrainian Parliament's decision this month to proclaim the 1,800 warheads on its territory Ukrainian property.

Security Council Sides With Ukraine on Sevastopol

NEW YORK — Ruling for the first time in its history on a question of Russian aggression against Ukraine, the UN Security Council said the Russian Parliament's Sevastopol resolution violated Ukraine's territorial integrity.

"The Security Council shares the deep concern and welcomes the position, expressed by the President and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine concerning the decree of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation", the statement adopted by the Council on July 20 said. "The Security Council reaffirms in this connection its commitment to the

territorial integrity of Ukraine, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations".

The Security Council said the Russian Supreme Soviet's decree on July 9, proclaiming Sevastopol to be Russian territory "is incompatible" with previous accords between Ukraine and Russia "as well as with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and without effect".

It went on to say that the Council welcomes the efforts of the presidents and governments of Ukraine and Russia to settle conflicts between them peacefully.

At a press conference at the United Nations on Wednesday, July 21, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Borys Tarasyuk, who headed the Ukrainian delegation at the special session of the Security Council, said the statement and support of the Security Council's president and members were satisfactory.

Tarasyuk also said that Russian UN Ambassador Yuli Vorontsov's position was reassuring and constructive. However, he noted, while the Security Council's statement included Russia's indirect agreement with Sevastopol's position within the borders of Ukraine, Tarasyuk said Ukraine would rather want to hear Moscow state this position explicitly.

At the press conference and in his testimony the previous day, Tarasyuk denounced the decision of the Russian Parliament as irresponsible, illegal and dangerous.

"In fact, for the first time, the highest legislative body in Russia has overtly and unambiguously put forward territorial claims to Ukraine and has wrapped in legal form that

which on numerous occasions throughout the last two years has manifested itself in the statements of certain irresponsible politicians of the Russian Federation. This is the particular danger in the decision now under consideration", Tarasyuk said.

He said the decision encroached on Ukraine's territorial inviolability, sought to revise existing boundaries, interfered in Ukraine's internal affairs and "in spirit and letter" was incompatible with the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

Pointing out that the Supreme Rada (Council) of Ukraine described the Russian decision as an "aggressive political act", Tarasyuk said, "Ukraine considers the decision of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation to be void of legal validity or any legal consequences for Ukraine, inasmuch as, in accordance with the 1978 Constitution of Ukraine and the 1978 Constitution of the Russian Federative Socialist Republic — adopted, incidentally, before the Ukrainian one — Sevastopol is indisputably recognised as an integral part of Ukraine. Hence, the question of the status of the city of Sevastopol fall exclusively within the competence of Ukraine".

Tarasyuk views the Russian move as "highly dangerous" which could have unforeseeable consequences and seriously threaten the maintenance of international peace and security.

Answering a question about the extent to which Ukraine is willing and prepared to defend her territorial integrity, including Sevastopol, Tarasyuk replied, "to the extent ade-

quate to the situation", adding that the Ukrainian Parliament has already authorised the executive branch of government to do everything possible to implement the Constitution in Crimea.

In his testimony he emphasised: "I should like, in particular, to draw the Council's attention to the fact that in this case we are dealing with a decision of the highest legislative organ of a neighbouring nuclear power whose international commitments extend equally to the legislative and executive branches. It is quite clear that this decision by the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation is in essence an overt territorial claim by one state against another".

Noting that the significance of the decision "cannot possibly be understated", Tarasyuk said, "This is a time bomb, and the one who wields it cannot imagine its full destructive force". He accused Russian lawmakers of displaying an open and cynical lack of concern for the lives that could be lost because of their decision.

Tarasyuk said that immediately after adopting the resolution, Russian legislators travelled to Sevastopol to set up Russian government structures and otherwise agitate for Russia and against Ukraine. "Agitators are threatening to turn Sevastopol and Crimea into a new Dnister region, a Karabakh or an Abkhazia", he warned.

When asked at the press conference who, specifically, is roiling the situation in Crimea, he named the Front of National Salvation in Russia with its branches in Crimea.

"Certain influential political forces in Russia, ignoring civilised norms of behaviour, do not wish to give up these throwbacks to imperial thinking in policy towards Ukraine and the other states that are former republics of the USSR. They are trying to sow enmity between peoples to provoke conflict in the region in order to destroy peace and stability on the continent", Tarasyuk charged.

One of the immediate consequences of the Russian decision, Tarasyuk said, was heightened debate in the Ukrainian Parliament against ratifying START-1 and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. "Certain Ukrainian Members of Parliament have begun to come out firmly against ratification of the treaty, quite rightly seeing in the action of their Russian colleagues a threat not only to national but also to international peace and security. It is not difficult to guess where such a pattern of action and reaction could lead".

"The development of this situation, in our view, is capable of leading to friction between Ukraine and Russia, and the continuation of such friction could threaten the maintenance of international peace and security", he said.

In his statement, Russia's envoy Vorontsov said Russia values the "normal development of good-neighbourly, friendly relations with Ukraine, an independent state, a member of the United Nations, and a country with whose peace the fate of the Russian people is bound by thousands of historical threads".

Noting that President Yeltsin expressed indignation with this decision, Vorontsov added that it "by no

means points the way to prospects for real solutions but merely complicates the search for them".

"Russia intends strictly to abide by the fundamental norms of civilised behaviour for states in the international arena, based on the firm ground of international law, respect for the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe".

Present at the Security Council session were David Hannay, president, of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and representatives of Brazil, Cape Verde, China, Djibouti, France, Hungary, Japan, Morocco, New Zealand, Pakistan, Russia, Spain, the United States, and Venezuela.

At the press conference, Tarasyuk, responding to a question about the appropriateness of signing an economic union treaty in the wake of the Sevastopol decision, said there is no decision to create another union. What was signed in Moscow by the prime ministers of Ukraine, Russia and Belarus was a communiqué on the protocol of intentions. "Much will depend on further developments", he said.

Meanwhile, in Moscow, the Supreme Soviet refused to review its decision on Sevastopol, arrogantly ignoring the statement by the Security Council.

Ukraine, US Sign Defence Cooperation Agreement

WASHINGTON, July 27 — The United States and Ukraine signed the first US defence cooperation pact with a former Soviet republic, but it

fell short of the security guarantees sought by Ukraine's Parliament as a precondition to giving up its 1,800 nuclear warheads. The modest agreement for exchanges of military officials and the provision of US defence expertise was signed by Ukrainian Defence Minister Kostyantyn Morozov and US Defence Secretary Les Aspin at the Pentagon. The agreement provides no US funds. It calls for an annual exchange of visits between top defence officials as well as a bilateral working group on military matters ranging from command and control to medical services. The United States and Russia are preparing to sign a much broader agreement, including plans for military peacekeeping manoeuvres, when Defence Minister Pavel Grachev visits Washington for talks with Aspin in September.

Morozov: \$175 Million Insufficient to Make Ukraine a Non-Nuclear State

WASHINGTON, D.C. (UNIS) — Although the Ukrainian Parliament has declared ownership of all nuclear weapons on its territory, Ukrainian Defence Minister Colonel-General Kostyantyn Morozov continued to assert that Ukraine will work to become a non-nuclear state.

"The government of Ukraine and the Minister of Defence of Ukraine hold the official line of identifying Ukraine in the future as a non-nuclear state, as had been declared by President Kravchuk", Morozov said through an interpreter at a press conference at the Atlantic Council here on July 28.

Morozov said the \$175 million pledged for the dismantlement of the nuclear weapons, under the Nunn-Lugar Amendment, will not be sufficient to dismantle the 176 missiles and nearly 1,800 warheads on Ukrainian territory. "Unfortunately, this amount does not cover all expected expenditure for nuclear disarmament. According to estimates, they would be more than \$3 billion", he said.

Morozov also repeated the guarantees that Ukraine is seeking before total disarmament can occur. He said Ukraine needs financial assistance and national security guarantees from the nuclear powers and "sufficient time for accomplishment of this complicated, dangerous and very expensive work".

The financial aid, including the \$175 million and \$10 million for a scientific centre in Kyiv, which was to be granted only after Ukraine ratified the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, has been promised by the Clinton administration because of recent steps Ukraine has taken in terms of disarmament.

Morozov confirmed that Ukraine began on July 15 to dismantle a regiment of outdated SS-19 nuclear missiles, which are aimed at the United States. "Ukraine has taken measures to reduce her nuclear threat before ratification of the START-1 Treaty by the Parliament of Ukraine", he said.

Morozov, who was invited by Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, also discussed the memorandum of understanding, which they both signed on July 27 at the Pentagon. Morozov told the crowd of 120 people at the press conference that the

memorandum is a strong indication of the cooperation planned between the United States and Ukrainian armed forces. Aspin, in his statement before the signature, said, "Now that the Cold War is over, we must find new opportunities to build a peaceful and stable security partnership with Ukraine".

In responding to questions about the dismantlement of a regiment of SS-19 missiles, which includes 10 missiles and 60 warheads, Morozov said, "We plan to finish deactivation of the regiment by the end of September and at that time we plan to start deactivation of the second regiment".

Morozov added that Ukraine is dismantling nuclear weapons without legislation from Parliament or assistance from the nuclear powers. On the issue of the more modern SS-24 missiles, Morozov said they will be dismantled only after START-1 is ratified.

US and Ukraine Disagree on Commitment

WASHINGTON, July 30 — In a sign of continuing tension over the fate of atomic weapons in Ukraine, the United States insisted that SS-24 missiles are covered by a key nuclear reduction treaty, despite Kyiv's claim that they are not. "Under the [1992] Lisbon Protocol and its associated documents which make Ukraine a party to the START treaty, Ukraine is obligated to eliminate all strategic offensive weapons from her territory", State Department spokesman Mike McCurry said. "These obligations under START cover all strategic

offensive arms of the former Soviet Union including SS-24s". President Leonid Kravchuk told reporters in Kyiv that Ukraine will keep the SS-24 nuclear missiles once she signs the START-1 arms treaty, which is still awaiting ratification by Parliament. He said Kyiv will keep its promise to become a non-nuclear state, but the dismantling of 46 SS-24 missiles must be accomplished in another treaty with Russia and the United States. Kravchuk said Russian President Boris Yeltsin and US President Bill Clinton had already taken the initiative towards such an agreement.

Minister Says Ten Rockets to Go By End of September

KYIV, August 2 — Ukraine's Defence Minister said he expected ten of the country's SS-19 strategic nuclear rockets to be dismantled by the end of September. Kostyantyn Morozov told a Kyiv news conference that the 43rd Rocket Army, based in Ukraine, had begun work on dismantling the rockets on July 15. A Ukrainian official said last week that two missiles had already been dismantled by Ukrainian units as a unilateral token gesture. Ukraine insists her SS-24 rockets, the second, more modern element of the nuclear force on Ukrainian soil, are not covered by any existing treaty. She says they must be subject to a further treaty with the United States. Short-range nuclear missiles, which like the strategic rockets are part of the former Soviet arsenal, have all been removed from Ukrainian soil.

Russia Rejects Plan to Keep Missiles

MOSCOW, August 4 — Russia criticised Ukraine's decision not to give up 46 SS-24 nuclear missiles left on her territory after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and said the weapons belonged to Moscow. A Foreign Ministry spokesman said since Russia considered herself the sole nuclear state in the ex-Soviet Union with sole rights to the arsenals of the former superpower she believed she owned the SS-24s claimed by Ukraine. Under the START-1 nuclear cuts treaty between the Soviet Union and the United States, which Ukraine has not yet ratified, Kyiv had been expected to give up all 176 strategic nuclear missiles left on its territory to be dismantled. Ukrainian officials have since specified that the SS-24s are not included in any existing treaty.

Ukraine Denies Nuclear Deal Near

KYIV — Ukraine firmly denied on Monday, August 16, the previous day's suggestions by Russia's Foreign Ministry that a deal was about to be signed between the two countries on destroying nuclear weapons, according to published reports.

"This is the first I have heard of this", Defence Minister Kostyantyn Morozov told reporters after talks with German Defence Minister Volker Ruehe. "There is a proposal on this, but there have so far been no talks with Russia on it".

Foreign Minister Anatoliy Zlenko also said it was "premature to talk about any sort of accord, let alone

one that would be concluded in the near future.

"The talks are to continue and I hope we will come up with some sort of agreement, particularly on dismantling the missiles", he said.

Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, speaking in Sweden on Sunday, August 15, said an agreement would be signed within a few days and described it as "an important step forward" to achieving stability in Europe. The weapons are to be destroyed under protocols to the START-1 treaty and both sides initially agreed they would be dismantled in Russia.

"It is likely that an agreement can be signed today or within a few days. This agreement is an important step forward and will contribute to security and stability in Europe", the Swedish news agency TT quoted Kozyrev as saying. He gave no details. As recently as Friday, Russia accused Ukraine of breaking her promises to rid herself of all nuclear weapons. The Foreign Ministry said Ukraine denied the 46 SS-24 missiles on her soil were covered by the START-1 accord on cutting nuclear arsenals. It said Kyiv was using this interpretation of the accord as justification to hold on to a portion of former Soviet nuclear weapons stationed on its territory. Senior Ukrainian officials stand by that assertion and the country's Parliament has claimed all former Soviet weapons on Ukrainian territory national property.

US Defense Secretary Les Aspin suggested in talks with Russian and Ukrainian officials in June that the missiles could be dismantled in

Ukraine under international supervision but Russia rejected the proposal. Ten SS-19 missiles are currently being dismantled in Ukraine. Ukraine's Parliament has yet to ratify the treaty and a growing number of politicians think Ukraine should keep them at least temporarily.

Ukrainian nuclear weapons have been on everyone's mind lately. In London, a British television programme asserted on Tuesday, August 10, that Ukraine could take over effective control of nuclear missiles on her territory from Russia within a few months.

Ukraine can already block any order from Moscow to launch nuclear weapons and could take the final step to full operational control in as little as eight months, the BBC programme "Newsnight" said. This raised doubts about the safety of the 176 intercontinental ballistic missiles and 1,800 nuclear warheads on Ukrainian soil, it added. Col-Gen. Ivan Bizhan, Deputy Defence Minister of Ukraine, told "Newsnight" that President Kravchuk had said under no condition should nuclear missiles be launched from his country without the government's permission.

"I must say that certain events have taken place — organisational and other events that give such capability to our government", Bizhan said. Asked if Ukraine had developed the ability to override missile launch codes, Bizhan said, "We do have this ability, but more than that I cannot say".

Earlier on Tuesday, August 10, Ukraine's Foreign Ministry condemned Russia for assuming full

operational control of nuclear weapons on Ukrainian soil. Konstantyn Hryshchenko, head of the ministry's arms and disarmament department, said Moscow had violated agreements by dissolving the Commonwealth joint command that had controlled all nuclear weapons and transferring the "red button" to Russian Defence Minister Pavel Grachev in July.

Despite pressure from Russia and the West, the Ukrainian Parliament has delayed ratification of the START and Nuclear Non-Proliferation treaties. Ukrainian lawmakers want better security guarantees, more financial help for disposing of the weapons, and recognition by Russia that the weapons are Ukrainian property.

Hryshchenko said, "These actions were not legal. We recognise the previous state of affairs. Nuclear weapons on Ukrainian soil are under the operational control of Commonwealth strategic forces", he told a briefing.

Prime Minister Leonid Kuchma appeared less alarmed by the Russian move. "We all knew well enough that it [the red button] had long been under his [Grachev's] control", he told the Ukrainian Interfax news agency.

Hryshchenko denied Russian accusations that Ukraine wanted to wrest control of nuclear missiles. He said Kyiv insisted only on administrative supervision and not direct access to arming and firing systems.

Meanwhile, Moscow had accused Ukraine of nuclear inexperience, which can lead to another Chernobyl-type accident. It also

claimed that the nuclear weapons in Ukraine are in desperate need of repair. However, a recent report suggests that Moscow, too, can't handle its nuclear weapons.

Discipline is weak among staff at Russia's nuclear power plants and human error is a major cause of accidents, Interfax news agency quoted the state atomic inspection body Gosatomnadzor as saying on Tuesday, August 10.

Gosatomnadzor officials said two of the 66 incidents recorded in the first half of this year were serious. The agency did not say how they measured on the seven-point international scale for judging nuclear accidents. In the first half of 1992, 79 safety violations were registered, none of them serious.

Safety violations are increasingly linked to human error, but Russia's nuclear power plants are still working within safety norms, the official said. Nuclear accidents have continued despite tighter safety measures ordered by President Boris Yeltsin after human error caused an explosion at a reprocessing plant in Tomsk-7 in April.

Last Monday, radioactive waste leaked from a pipe in a plant in the Siberian town of Chelyabinsk-40, among a chain of 10 secret nuclear cities. In July, radioactive plutonium leaked from a factory in Chelyabinsk-65. Neither leak caused harm.

Germany Offers Ukraine Funds After Kyiv Ratifies Two Treaties

KYIV — German Defence Minister Volker Ruehe on Tuesday, August 17, reportedly promised Ukraine

money to help her divest herself of nuclear weapons if she approved two key disarmament pacts.

Ukraine's Defence Minister Col.-Gen. Kostyantyn Morozov asked the West for funds and assistance in destroying the 1,760 strategic warheads still deployed on Ukrainian territory.

Ruehe told a news conference it was in Germany's interests to minimise nuclear proliferation and secure Ukraine's ratification of the START-1 treaty and adherence to the non-proliferation agreement. "We have already signed an accord on disarmament under which Germany is to help in destroying liquid fuel SS-19 missiles", he said. "But this help naturally depends on the ratification of START-1".

Ruehe's comments, after two days of talks with Ukrainian leaders, were similar to those made in June by German Chancellor Helmut Kohl.

The influential speaker of Ukraine's Parliament accused Kohl then of "blackmailing" Ukraine by making aid contingent on ratification. Ukraine last year became a party to the START-1 treaty under protocols signed in Lisbon and agreed to join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear state.

But Ukraine's Supreme Rada (Parliament) has yet to approve the two pacts and virtually all leaders, including the country's prime minister, appear to favour keeping some of the weapons at least temporarily. Parliament has declared former Soviet weapons on Ukrainian territory national property. President Leonid Kravchuk and other leaders

say the 46 SS-24 missiles are not covered by the START-1 pact. Morozov said Ukraine stood for ratifying the two pacts but called for more funds to cover the costs of ridding the country of nuclear weapons. Morozov reiterated Kyiv's position that Ukraine will disarm once she receives technical and economic aid from the West. Ukraine cannot afford to do it alone.

"Warheads are reaching the end of their life. The government is looking into this and plans are being drawn up to dismantle them", he told reporters.

Senior Ukrainian leaders say at least \$2 billion are required to clean up unused missile silos and compensate Ukraine for the loss of costly nuclear components. The United States has offered an initial sum of \$175 million.

Morozov also said Ukraine is negotiating with Russia on an agreement over the disposal of old nuclear warheads that are approaching their expiry dates. No final accord has been worked out yet.

Ruehe said he supported Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk's proposal for setting up

an international fund for nuclear disarmament.

"The United States is taking steps to create this [fund], but they should be stronger and more active", he said. During his visit Ruehe also met Kravchuk and Ukrainian Foreign Minister Anatoliy Zlenko. Accords on military cooperation and working visits were also signed by the two sides. Ruehe praised Ukrainian soldiers for their participation in the United Nations peacekeeping forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

He flew to Kazakhstan for talks with President Nursultan Nazarbayev in Alma Ata the next day, following a visit to Ukraine. Ruehe intends to discuss the political situation in northern Asia and atomic weapons left by the former Soviet Union, he told the German Press Agency DPA.

Germany would also examine the possibility of bringing together factions in Kazakhstan's civil war, sources close to Ruehe said. There was no question, however, of a cooperation pact similar to those agreed between Germany and the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Russia, and Ukraine, the sources added. ■

Documents & Reports

Conference Notes

THE SECOND ANNUAL INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITIES IN THE RUSSIAN AND CIS GAS INDUSTRY

The Second Annual International Symposium on Investment Opportunities in the Russian and CIS Gas Industry was held at the Metropole Hotel, London, on October 11-12, 1993. It was sponsored by the Royal Institute of International Affairs (London), the Centre for Investment and Privatization (Moscow), the US monthly "Petroleum Intelligence Weekly", the consultancy firm "Russian Strategic Services Ltd.", British Gas, Ruhrgas and the Italian gas firms Snam and Nuovo Pignone.

As previous similar symposia on the post-Soviet oil and gas industries have revealed, there is enormous Western interest in the fossil-fuel resources of the former Soviet Union, both from prospective customers, and from those who wish to sell equipment and know-how. The richest fields lie in northern Russia and Siberia; but as far as the West is concerned, the westernmost republics of the former Soviet Union play an important strategic role in any such negotiations, since the pipelines which carry the oil and gas westwards have to cross their territory.

One of the major presentations at the symposium was given, therefore, by Bohdan Babyi, the Chief Dispatcher at "Ukrhazprom". Five major international pipelines cross Ukraine, he noted, the Soyuz, Urengoi-Uzhhorod, Progress, Yelets-Kremenchug-Izmail, and Ivancevici-Dolyna-Uzhhorod — in addition to the network for Ukraine's domestic needs. In all, the country possesses over 33,000 km. of pipeline of diameters from 100 to 1420 mm., and working pressures of 5.5 and 7.5 MPa. In addition, there are 81 compressor stations, with a total of 797 pumping units, 1355 gas-distributor stations, 73 compressor stations to supply gas-powered automobiles, and 4 transmission stations for the export of gas. Much of this network, however, requires to be modernised and re-equipped.

In particular, if "Ukrhazprom" is to expand its transit capacity to the West from the existing 107-110 billion cubic metres a year to the planned 124 billion, the West-bound pipelines (Urengoi-Uzhhorod, Soyuz, Progress and Ivancevici-Dolyna-Uzhhorod) will require a major overhaul to bring them up

to state-of-the-art technology. The refit programme, moreover, Babyi said, will also include the completion of new pumping stations at Hrebinky, Stavyshe and Husyatyn on the Progress pipeline, the bringing on-stream of the 1315-km. Torzhok-Dolyna section of wide-diameter (1420 mm.) pipeline, construction and of a 627 km. section of pipeline on the Tula-Shostka-Kyiv line, with compressor stations at Bakhmach and Bobrovysia, and also the construction of a 193-km. doubling loop on the Ananiv-Tyraspil-Izmail pipeline to Romania. Plans are now under discussion with the World Bank and the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development, for the implementation of this programme with the financial participation of these banks, Babyi said.

Transport facilities, however, are only part of the problem. Western customers want a guaranteed supply. But even if the output of the Siberian fields remains constant, demand itself is not uniform. More gas is required in the winter; less in the summer. Here, Ukraine has the ability to "even out" the flow of gas, storing surplus gas in the summer, and feeding it into the system in the winter. For certain geological formations can be used as natural underground reservoirs for gas — in particular, old aquifers and exhausted gas and oil fields. And the latter Ukraine has in plenty, in Galicia, conveniently close to the western border. Already 12 such underground reservoirs are in use, and others could be constructed as and when necessary.

The financial benefit to Ukraine of this transit trade could, potentially, be considerable. But for Western firms to be interested in CIS gas, they want assurances both of guaranteed supplies and predictable future prices. Here the attitude of the Russian gas producers is all-important. As a number of speakers at the symposium made clear, the lack, as yet, of proper legal guarantees to protect investment in Russia is a major factor in discouraging certain prospective investors. The Russians show a distressing tendency to change the rules in mid-game; to invite foreign consortia to tender — and then to freeze them out! Russia's "Gazprom", moreover, keeps declaring its intention of charging "world prices" as soon as possible. But as one of the leading British experts on the international energy trade, Dr. Jonathan Stern, pointed out, there is no such thing as a "world" price. In the international energy market, prices are determined by a whole number of factors, including the initial exploration and development costs of the field, the cost of getting the fuel out, the distance from well-head to consumer and the convenience of transport — and the amount the consumer wishes to purchase. Continuing the same theme, Richard Hildahl, an adviser to the World Bank on energy and transport, said that — according to world market principles — Russia should not charge nearby Ukraine as much for oil as she would charge to some distant country which had to be supplied by sea, via tanker from Novorosiysk.

But equally, Mr. Hildahl advised, Ukraine should think carefully before setting up a structure of transit fees as the basis for charging for the oil and gas pumped across her territory. Transit fees may seem the obvious method, but

customers, he said, are always apprehensive, fearing that at some time in the future, they could be raised so high as to eat up all the profits. As an alternate strategy, he quoted the arrangements between Canada and the USA. Canada does not charge transit fees for Alaskan oil: instead, she charges a ground rent for the pipeline, and income-tax on the earnings of the companies concerned. (The point being, of course, that income-tax works on a percentage basis, and so can never swallow up the entire profit). This, of course, raises the question of how Ukraine is to find out what the Russian supplier and, say, the German customer, actually make from the deal. The answer, according to Mr. Hildahl, would be the "integration" (his word), of "Ukrhazprom" and the Russian "Gazprom" into some supranational company. This, however, might well run counter to Ukrainian sensibilities!

It was this issue, he suggested, which underlay the perceptible tension between the representatives of "Ukrhazprom" and their opposite numbers from Belarus. For the proposed new pipeline from the Yamal fields to western Europe will run not through Ukraine, but via Belarus and Poland. And the Belarusians, Mr. Hildahl said, seem likely to agree to the kind of close cooperation with Russia which would make income-tax, rather than transit charges, a feasible method of payment. Certainly, according to a report in the current California-based monthly "Russian Petroleum Intelligence", "Gazprom" seems set on trying to take over the Belarusian transit company "Beltransgaz" -- indeed, some participants in the symposium stated that it had already done so. But so far, the Belarusians, too, envisage their oil and gas earnings only in terms of "transit fees". ■

Books & Periodicals**Perdita Fraser, THE POST-SOVIET STATES AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1992, 56 pp, £6.50**

Unexpectedly for scholars and political forecasters, the European continent has become one of the most restless in the contemporary world. It is now involved in two impetuous but quite opposite processes: the formation of an ever closer union of states in its western part and the dissolution of the former USSR and the growing disintegration between its republics in the East. This results in the transformation of the existing pattern of ties between these parts of Europe. Perdita Fraser's work is an attempt to analyse the prospects for the future development of relations between the EC and the newly independent states (NIS) which sprang up on the territory of the defunct Soviet Union.

The monograph is one in the series of the publications issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. In the tradition of the Institute it provides good resource material on the tendencies and problems connected with the formation of new Europe in the post-Communist era. As such it will undoubtedly prove of considerable value both to academics and to persons with a practical interest in the area.

Ms Fraser begins by outlining the historical background of the economic and political relationship between the EC and the USSR, tracing developments from the early years of the European Community, which were marked by Soviet hostility and non-recognition, until the full normalisation of relations at the end of the 1980s. The author emphasises two major reasons for the long delay in establishing a comprehensive legal mechanism of trade and cooperation between the EC and the USSR, stressing, in particular, the long-enduring political confrontation and economic rivalry between the EC and the Soviet-led CMEA. One important factor was that both parties always had complementary trade in which the bulk of products exchanged were not covered by trade barriers. So, the EC and the USSR never had any compelling "reason to push trade concessions" by entering into agreements.

Fraser then proceeds to present several factors which have prompted the EC's new approach towards the USSR culminating in the conclusion of the trade and cooperation agreement of 1989. These were a desire to encourage reforms in the Soviet Union coupled with a fear that increased instability and economic distress in the USSR would lead to mass emigration and, even

more alarming, nuclear weapons falling into unsafe hands; an understanding of the key importance of relations with the USSR for the stability in Eastern Europe; the attractive prospect of opening vast markets in the East.

However, the collapse of the USSR in 1991 forced the EC to adapt its policy to new realities. This process is still going on. Fraser outlines some major problems which the EC is now facing in building its relations with the NIS. One of them is alienation between the republics which is quite understandable since "after decades of forced union the first demand is independence". She suggests that the EC with its forty years of experience in integration will be able to assist them not only to coexist, but also to be reintegrated into the European and global economies. The author then elaborates on the prospects for trade between the EC and each of the NIS. She comes to the rather gloomy conclusion that in the near future only Russia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Ukraine have a real chance of surmounting the EC protectionist measures and quality barriers. She then goes on to discuss the implications for the European Community of possible close ties with the NIS. She believes that major arguments against full incorporation of the NIS into the EC in the foreseeable future "revolve around instability, incompatibility, size and boundary-drawing problems". The EC is afraid of the current instability in many of the NIS which, if they were incorporated into the Community too rapidly, might well prove destructive. The differences in the level of economic development coupled with political and cultural distinctions constitute another impediment to full integration. The sheer size of the NIS may also prove a negative factor, since the EC might find it impossible to "digest" such huge countries. Finally, there is the problem of the borderline separating the European NIS from the countries which geographically, historically and culturally lie outside Europe. According to the EEC Treaty only the European NIS can potentially be candidates to become EC members. Fraser argues that this problem is complicated by the EC's fear of provoking a negative reaction from Moscow if some preferences are given to Belarus and/or Ukraine rather than Russia. One of the ways to alleviate this problem would be to treat the CIS as "a continent in itself".

To some extent this approach is reflected in the Commission's policy of treating all NIS in more or less the same way when drawing up cooperation agreements with them. Fraser outlines the possible major provisions of these agreements and the problems which may arise in this respect.

The most interesting and important issue raised in the book is EC aid to the NIS. This is analysed in a special chapter, and it emerges that the lion's share of all such assistance goes to Russia. Ms Fraser has to admit that the NIS cannot make full use of the assistance provided due to delays in the distribution of monies by the West and the unfavourable conditions under which they are allotted.

Specialists in the field will find this book very useful and informative. Ms Fraser's diagnosis is based on the presentation of relevant statistical data, and the book catches the relations between the EC and the NIS in the bud.

The fact that it raises more problems than it solves is simply a mere reflection of the current situation. The book provides an insight into these problems and into possible trends in the developing pattern of relations between the EC and the NIS.

Victor Muravyev, Kyiv

**Anne-Marie Mykyta, THE FORCE OF GRAVITY, Braised
Books, Salisbury, Southern Australia, 1993**

This play which, according to the Title-page, "was the final performance of the Graduating class of the Ass. Dip. in Performing (Acting) students at the Centre for the Performing Arts, Adelaide", in 1991, is a kind of surrealised statement not only on the Chernobyl disaster of 1986, but on all mishandling and careless uses of nuclear energy. To universalise her theme, the author uses not only such props as a diggerido, but fragments of American pop-songs (*Smoke gets in your eyes, Blowing in the Wind*) and English poetry (Wilfred Owen's *Strange Meeting*, Tennyson's *The Lady of Shallot*, and *Macbeth* — which are duly acknowledged in the prelims and de la Mare's "Who has seen the wind?" which is *no*). The names of the characters suggest diverse ethnic origins — Eddie, Liesl, Carmen, Renee, Jurgen, while the only "committed" Ukrainian among them has a name that is hardly typical — Eva.

Unfortunately, however well the play may have "worked" on the stage, reading the cold text raises a number of unanswered, and perhaps unanswerable questions. How does this mixed ethnic group come to be in what is apparently an explosion-proof bunker under the Chernobyl reactor? Are they alive or dead? And if dead, and in some kind of limbo or purgatory, why are they all together? (Literary traditions of depicting the afterlife, from Homer and Virgil, through Dante and down to, say, *Outward Bound*, normally make it clear why the souls they describe are where they are). Symbolism, to be effective, ought at least to have some kind of logical substratum. Nor do the stage directions (somewhat irritatingly given in block capitals instead of the normal italics), help. What is one to make, for example, of the *mise-en-scene* for the "picnic sequence". "The set is overlaid with areas of artificial grass. The light is warm and sunny but artificial. The air is filled with the sounds of nature, birds, rippling water, in the distance, children at play. The sound comes from a machine". Since, *pace* the "willing suspension of disbelief", an audience is subconsciously aware that "grass", "sunlight" and the sound of "running water" forming part of a stage-set are "artificial", does this mean that here we have "artificiality within artificiality" (and if so, how is the audience supposed to recognise it? Likewise, when Charlotte brings out "a formal dinner or cocktail-party set-up, all of which is fake", it is unclear whether this is simply an instruction to the stage-manager to use "property" dishes, rather than actual edibles (since no one touches

them) or whether to the characters themselves they are "fakes". And if the latter, how is the audience supposed to know?

A further query: what does the title mean? "The force of gravity" does, indeed, have a certain role in nuclear accident scenarios. There is the "China syndrome" — the threat that the damaged core of a reactor may, under its own weight, fall through the floor of the reactor building and bury itself ever deeper in the earth. At Chernobyl, moreover, gravity had a specific role: the control rods, which should have automatically shut off the reactor and averted the accident, were designed to fall into place under their own weight. But neither of these technical issues are addressed in the course of the play. The only physical "force" explicitly discussed is the Coriolis force, to which the patterns of air-circulation (and hence spread of the radiation cloud) after the explosion are here (with a considerable simplification of the physics and meteorology involved) attributed.

In a Foreword, a certain H.J.Willett (the publisher, perhaps?), observes that "One of the most important lessons that a writer learns if he or she is going to be successful is that you must tailor your work to suit your market". Anne-Marie Mykyta, he says, has mastered this fact and the "recipe for writing good plays". The result, he concludes, is "a play for students that will stretch them, teach them, entertain you the audience, and at the end send you out of the theatre with something to think about. Just like a play should do. And that's as it should be. Right? Right". One can, alas, agree with his view only at the most superficial level. Mrs. Mykyta has, in one sense, indeed, "tailored" her work to her market: she has a large cast of characters, suitable for a students' passing-out performance — although the payroll required would prove off-putting to any professional manager. Indeed, one suspects that she was writing with specific students in mind — the role of Eva was played by a certain Halyna Mykyta — presumably a relative! And doubtless it did "stretch" the students — and make the audience "think". One suspects, however, that much of the "stretching" and "thinking" was not so much a grappling with profound moral and philosophical concepts, but simply a struggle to try and find out what, at the most basic level, it was all about!

In spite of Mr. Willett's enthusiasm, one cannot easily envisage other drama schools — still less, "experimental" or "fringe" theatre groups — rushing to perform this play. But as part of the literary "fallout" of Chernobyl, it may prove of interest to some critic or PhD candidate of the future.

Vera Rich, London

Julian Cooper, THE CONVERSION OF THE FORMER SOVIET DEFENCE INDUSTRY, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1993, 41pp, £6.50

For more than two decades, Dr. Cooper has enjoyed a well-deserved reputation as one of the leading Western experts on the military industry of the former Soviet Union. He is therefore well-qualified to address the twin problems currently facing that industry: the winding-down of the huge defence capacity generated by the "Cold War", and the break-up of the Soviet Union itself, which has left many of the successor states with defence-related industry and armed forces in excess of, or inappropriate to, their needs.

The wind-down was the earlier development. It began five years ago, at the end of 1988, when Mikhail Gorbachev cut the budget of the armed forces and ordered a partial conversion of military to civilian production. The projected cuts in military procurement (19.5%) and in military-related research and development (15%) turned out to be larger than envisaged (29% and 22% respectively) and a large number of plans and programmes for "conversion" to civilian production were put forward. Some initial successes were reported (partly due to the release on to the general market of consumer goods produced by factories which formerly had catered exclusively to the needs of military personnel and their families). But already the old Central Planning system had started to fall apart, and in the latter half of 1991, the Soviet Union itself disintegrated. Dr. Cooper's study deals with the aftermath.

Secrecy concerning anything which could remotely have a military connection was one of the fundamentals of Soviet life. Not only military bases, but even "closed" towns which housed vital military industries, never appeared on maps available to the public. Research institutes which had even a small military-related department were supposed to have their own, special KGB-staffed fire-brigade, and, according to an ex-Soviet scientist now in Israel, at least one laboratory was allowed to burn down rather than let the "civilian" fire-service into "secret" territory. The figures given for defence expenditure in the Soviet budget were, to Western eyes, ridiculously low, and seem to have been achieved by extremely creative accounting, which, for example, included all army medical expenditure in the health service budget, all classroom instruction of military personnel in the education budget, all military-related research in the general science budget, ignored depreciation and amortisation costs on standing installations, and so on to the n-th degree. Part of the work of scholars such as Dr. Cooper was, for many years, to try and unravel what lay behind the official figures. *Glasnost* and the further revelations of the post-Soviet period, have made the task much easier, although, as Dr. Cooper stresses, it is still difficult to obtain reliable statistical data.

Dr. Cooper's study concentrates primarily on the Russian Federation — partly, he says, "for informational reasons", but primarily because it inherited most of the former Soviet defence industry. Indeed, he notes, of the 14 non-Russian successor states, "only Ukraine possesses major facilities for the manufacture of end-product weapons, including strategic missiles, tanks and naval surface vessels". Nevertheless, he contends, Ukraine cannot properly be said to have a defence industry, but rather only "a random set of enterprises and R & D establishments which had an economic rationale only within the former Union division of labour". Ukraine's legacy, in terms of size, is impressive: "at the time of independence", Dr. Cooper says, "total employment in the defence complex of Ukraine amounted to approximately 1.2 million with 344 enterprises". But these enterprises depend to a considerable degree, on supplies of basic systems and components from Russia and the other successor states.

The post-Soviet situation in Ukraine and the other non-Russian republics, Dr. Cooper rightly notes, differs from that of Russia. Although the former All-Union defence-related ministries ceased to exist in late 1991, their administrative structures remained, and have been remodelled either into ministries of the Russian Federation, or else into semi-commercial corporations. Ukraine and the other, smaller, republics, however, inherited no such defence infrastructure, and has had to create everything from scratch. Theoretically, Dr. Cooper points out, this could have provided an opportunity to break with traditional Soviet structures and procedures. But in practice, "familiar models were chosen". Thus in Ukraine, Dr. Cooper says, "oversight of defence sector facilities is exercised by the Ministry for Machine-Building, the Military-Industrial Complex and Conversion headed by Victor Antonov. However, the facilities formerly subordinate to particular Union Ministries as a rule have formed associations and concerns reproducing the former branch segmentation, missing an opportunity to recast the defence industry inheritance in a more radical manner".

Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that, since independence, Ukraine's arms output has continued to fall. This decrease is not simply a result of the breakdown of the old Soviet supply lines; it is at least in part due to a continuation of the policy of "conversion". (In 1992, for example, the civil production of the military sector is said to have trebled, in comparison to 1991, while its overall output fell by 65%). But the extent of the planned wind-down of this kind entails major policy decisions. Already, Dr. Cooper notes, there is a difference of opinion in Ukraine between Defence Minister Kostyantyn Morozov and the Minister responsible for conversion, Viktor Antonov. "The former wants a strong defence industry able to meet the needs of the Ukrainian armed forces, while the latter envisages a radical downsizing of the military sector so that defence production will amount to no more than four per cent of total industrial output". Conversion, moreover, costs money: factories have to be retooled, redundant workers must be provided with new jobs. The Ukrainian government's 10-year programme

for conversion (which includes 520 sub-programmes for the production of civilian goods). envisages an outlay of \$2 billion plus 650 *karbovantsi*. And, as Dr. Cooper points out, "it is difficult to see", how the Ukrainian government will be able to contribute much to the funding.

Western financial assistance is an issue that has attracted much press coverage — particularly in regard to the vexed question of nuclear warheads. Dr. Cooper outlines the usual arguments for international involvement: the dangers of mass unemployment creating internal instability, and possibly leading to the emigration of weapons experts to "potentially troublesome regimes" and also the "general acceptance that a successful downsizing of the vast military inheritance of the Soviet regime would enhance international security". But, as Dr. Cooper goes on to point out, Western involvement in defence conversion offers "genuine opportunities for profitable business, at the same time furthering the integration of the newly independent states into the global economy".

Dr. Cooper's study, which was sponsored by the RIIA "Post-Soviet business forum" will provide useful background information for anyone wishing to take up such business opportunities in Ukraine. The only examples of existing cooperation in this field which he cites are all drawn from other republics (predominantly Russia), suggesting that there is still a virgin field in Ukraine for the entrepreneur who has an eye for untapped potential. The greatest "wealth" of the former Soviet Defence industry, Dr. Cooper stresses, is not the physical plant but the "human resources". Of those, Ukraine can undoubtedly offer plenty.

Vera Rich, London

Gabriel Partos, THE WORLD THAT CAME IN FROM THE COLD, Royal Institute of International Affairs, BBC World Service, 1993, 303 pp. illustr. hardback £22.50, paperback £10.00

This book, a spin-off of a series of twelve radio programmes of the same name, attempts to present, as its sub-title indicates some "Perspectives from East and West on the Cold War". In doing so, it exhibits both the virtues and vices of its parent medium. On the one hand, it includes an enormous number of telling quotations, from members of the former *nomenklatura*, from new democratic leaders, and from many "bit-part" players in the 46-year-long drama "from Yalta to Malta". On the other hand, the constraints of radio broadcasting compelled the author to use what he terms "a broad-brush approach", to restrict the information content to what can be easily assimilated by the unaided ear, and to break up the material into twelve individually coherent programmes.

Taking as his basic premise the confrontation between the two super-power blocs, the author focuses in on a number of key aspects: divided Berlin

as a microcosm of a divided world, the nuclear arms race and the Cuban missile crisis, the "propaganda" war and foreign-language broadcasting, Soviet East European relations, the espionage war, and so on. Some important topics are omitted entirely — as Mr. Partos himself admits, citing as examples the Soviet role in the Middle East, and Sino-Soviet relations. An even more serious omission — which the author does not mention — is that of the subjugated peoples of the Soviet Union. For almost all the book, the story-line is one of a two-power, Washington-Moscow confrontation, and only on p. 267 do newly independent Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan suddenly appear on the scene, and then only by virtue of their "inherited" nuclear arms.

Other "supporting players" are equally hard—done by. The Hungarian Revolution of 1956 becomes the paradigm of Soviet intervention in its satellites, so that the crushing of the "Prague Spring" of 1968 gets less than its due of attention. The human rights activists and "Helsinki groups" get little attention until the final chapter, where an attempt is made to identify a common psychological underlay in the Soviet fear of dissent and Macarthyism in the USA. Such "parallelism" appears to fascinate Mr. Partos. One whole chapter (i.e. programme) is devoted to a comparison between the US involvement in Vietnam and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, not only in the obvious sense that both were long campaigns in territory eminently unsuitable for conventional military action, against relentless guerrilla attacks for which the terrain was eminently suitable, which cost immeasurably more than the estimated number of lives but also because the propaganda basis was the same: taking on the ideological enemy far from home, rather than fighting him in the streets of New York/Moscow. Indeed, in his preface, Mr. Partos suggests that perhaps more parallelism might have been included: a discussion of America's relations with its NATO allies to contrast with the discussion of the Soviet Union's relations with the countries of Eastern Europe.

In spite, however, of its selectivity, this book is an important work, which should find a place on the shelves of all those interested in the former Soviet and Comecon space. It covers in some depth certain issues usually relegated to the side-lines (in particular, the case of Angola as a war "by proxy" between the superpowers), and its wealth of eyewitness quotations will undoubtedly be mined (and one hopes, duly acknowledged) by mainstream historians for years to come.

For Mr. Partos, it must be remembered, is not an academic historian. He is a writer and broadcaster, whose mandate is to tell a story of interest to the general listening public. This task he has carried out brilliantly, both in the original programme series and in this volume. The listener/reader is fascinated, enlightened, and remains anxious for more. May we suggest to the powers-that-be in the World Service a follow-up series, dealing with the internal tensions of the Soviet empire, and the birth-pangs of the Newly Independent States?

Vera Rich, London

**Bulletin of the Study Group on EDUCATION IN RUSSIA, THE
INDEPENDENT STATES AND EASTERN EUROPE,
Vol.11, No. 1, 1993**

This bulletin is the organ of what was formerly known as the UK Study Group on Soviet Education. Its new title is, perhaps inevitably, somewhat clumsy, but the reports and reviews continue the excellent tradition which the Group, and its bulletin, have established over the past ten years. Vol.11, No.1, includes an interview with the Chief Education Officer of Zaporizhzhya, dated March 1992, which covers such issues as the switch to Ukrainian as the language of tuition, the de-ideologisation of textbooks, and devolution to local authorities of considerable decision-making powers in both school management and syllabus content.

The book review section covers three German works on the educationalist Anton Makarenko, including a translation of his "Ocherk raboty Poltavskoi kolonii im Gor'kogo", a new, enlarged edition of Siegfried C. Weitz's study of juvenile vagrancy in the USSR, "Geschichte der Jugendverwahrlosung in der Sovjetunion" (transdata publication, Fronhausen), Larry E. Holmes's "The Kremlin and the Schoolhouse", (the first major study in English of Soviet educational policy in the 1920s — Indiana University Press, 1991)), and a substantial source-book: "Russian and Soviet Education. 1731-1989, A Multilingual Annotated Bibliography", compiled by William W. Brickman and John T. Zepper (Garland Publishing, 1992).

**The World Today, Nos. 8-9, August-September, 1993. Published
by the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London**

The latest issue of this prestigious monthly contains three items of Ukrainian interest. In "Nuclear proliferation I: the politics of fear", Admiral Sir James Eberle, a former Director of the RIIA, manages to discuss the nuclear arms "legacy" of the Soviet Union without tacitly assuming that the temporary division of these weapons between four successor states (and Ukraine's reluctance to surrender her share without proper guarantees and compensation) *ipso facto* implies an increased threat to world security. Sir James does indeed say (in connection with the possible break-up of the Russian Federation) that "Wider possession [of nuclear weapons] does lead to wider risk — for one cannot rule out their illogical use". But, he continues, "it is easy to exaggerate the risks and dangers. Simple 'bilateral' deterrence can still work, and usually will".

In the following article "Nuclear proliferation II: assessing the risks", Christopher Bluth of Essex University's Department of Politics, takes Sir

James' arguments further, suggesting that "given the political conflict between Russia and Ukraine, nuclear weapons may, in theory, enhance stability by inducing caution on both sides". On the technical side, however, he points out, there is cause for concern. For, in taking over the "administrative command" of the nuclear weapons on her soil, Ukraine also assumed the financial responsibility of servicing these missiles and keeping them safe. Unfortunately, the necessary funds (200 million roubles a year at 1992 prices) are not available, and the list which Bluth gives of possible technical failures and breakdowns is, to say the least, thought-provoking.

"The murky politics of the Danube" — a survey of current disputes and confrontations among that river's riparian states — includes an outline of Ukraine's current dispute with Moldova, over the ownership of 937 metres of north-bank frontage where the latter wishes to construct a major river port, and also Ukraine's contention that Russia's claim to have inherited the Soviet Union's seat on the Danube Commission (the international body which regulates navigation on the river) is unjustified, since the Danube neither flows through nor borders Russian territory.

IAEA BULLETIN, Vol 35, No.2, 1993.

The quarterly journal of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The current issue includes an article by three IAEA staffers (one of whom has now left the Agency) "Environmental pollution of the Black Sea: a search for answers". The paper addresses the main problems of the Black Sea — shallow mixed waters, heavily contaminated by agricultural and industrial wastes, overlying deep waters, which, unlike any other sea or ocean, permanently lack oxygen below a depth of 150-200 metres. The discharge of radionuclides into the surface waters of the sea following the Chornobyl accident in 1986 is described, with appropriate graphs and a map, and it is indicated how this contamination (the arrival date of which is known) can be used to trace the mixing of the surface (oxygen-bearing) and deep (anoxic) waters. The need for an international research programme to address the environmental crisis now afflicting the Black Sea is stressed, and some current efforts and projects outlined. ■

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C O N T E N T S

EDITORIAL 2

Current Affairs

UKRAINE BEFORE THE ELECTIONS Heorhii Kasianov 3

ON FOREIGN INVESTMENTS IN UKRAINE Viktor Mouraviou 11

SOCIAL DOCTRINE, RELIGION AND STATE-BUILDING

Bishop Ihor (Isichenko) 22

History

ANTON OMELCHENKO — A UKRAINIAN IN THE ANTARCTIC

Vera Rich 27

Literature

LEONID HLIBOV — SELECTED WORKS 56

Okhrim's Greatcoat 56

Sorrow 57

Across the field he Walks... 59

It sees — unseeing... 59

POEMS FROM KHARKIV Steven Duplij 60

Drawing 60

Reflections 61

Please do steal me... 61

Moon 62

Downpour 62

January 63

Passenger 63

News From Ukraine 64

Documents & Reports 77

Books & Periodicals 84

EDITORIAL

As we go to press, Ukraine is preparing for her first parliamentary elections since independence. For any newly independent country, such a moment would be a critical one. For Ukraine, with a ruined economy, galloping inflation, and all the social, psychological and moral damage resulting from decades of communism, the situation is even more delicate. If the content of this issue takes on a Cassandra-like note of warning, it is not surprising.

For, the picture which Kyiv historian Dr. Heorhii Kasianov shows us in his survey of pre-election Ukraine is not encouraging. Ukraine, he argues, is still basically in the hands of an ex-Communist Party *nomenklatura*. As yet there have been, he says, no real reforms, no move towards either democracy or a normal Western style market economy — only “pseudo-reforms” and political decisions taken without regard for economic realities. This situation, and its likely effect on the outcome of the elections, makes gloomy — but essential — reading for anyone concerned about the future of Ukraine. And although, more optimistically, Professor Viktor Mouraviov presents the current legal framework for foreign investment in Ukraine — documents and agreements which, he says, are “to a considerable extent... linked to the process of legal reforms” in Ukraine and “the consolidation of her international status” — one feels that without some real commitment of will to kickstart the necessary reforms, Ukraine is unlikely to attract the major investments she so urgently needs.

It is appropriate, therefore, that in this issue we also commemorate the centenary of the death of Leonid Hlibov, a poet who specialised in didactic works. For his fable, “Okhrim’s Greatcoat” which heads our selection of his work, seems to symbolise and foretell precisely the kind of “patching up” which — Kasianov says — successive Ukrainian governments over the past four years have offered in place of genuine reform. ■

Current Affairs**UKRAINE BEFORE THE ELECTIONS**

Heorhii Kasianov

Next year elections will be held in Ukraine for the Supreme Council (regarded by some as a "parliament") and for the office of President. These events will probably evoke profound expectations of progressive changes in the political and economic life of Ukraine, in her advance towards a civilised society. This provokes the question: to what extent are these expectations justified? Will Ukraine proceed after the elections along the path of progress, on the basis of universal human values, realised in a national state, or again will return to the levelled-down Communist "Eden" and into the bosom of the resuscitated empire? It is worth analysing here the broadest political, socio-economic and socio-psychological realities with which Ukraine is approaching the next decisive moment in her history.

Power: "All the king's men"

In the consciousness of the masses there lives a fairly primitive (and hence extremely viable) stereotype, which has grown up in the conditions of post-totalitarian reality: that "democracy" equals disorder, economic chaos and political impotence. This implies, of course, that for the past 2-3 years Ukraine has been living in conditions of democracy and a new, democratic order. This stereotype is nourished by another, the special "*no pasaran!*" of real democrats who constantly issue warnings about the possibility of the Communists returning to power. But in reality, this stereotype has little in common with the facts of the situation. The Communists never lost real power, so there is no sense in talking about the existence of democracy.

It is obvious that in the past 4-5 years a second echelon of the party *nomenklatura* came to power in Ukraine, replacing the Communist top brass discredited by the failed Moscow coup of August 1991. There has been no qualitative change in the powers-that-be, they have simply adapted to new circumstances. The most obvious example of this is the figure of President Leonid Kravchuk himself. In the past he was the ideological secre-

Dr. Heorhii Kasianov is a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of Ukrainian History of the Academy of Sciences of Ukraine. He is the author of four monographs.

tary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine. Under the conditions of Gorbachev's "democratisation" drive, his post necessitated communication with the opposition, which gave him invaluable information and the chance of switching sides at the right moment. He took on board the ideas which the opposition propounded, including their principal tenet — the idea of an independent Ukrainian state. Kravchuk was supported by that section of the party *nomenklatura* in place, which also saw their chance and believed that Kravchuk as president of an independent state would do more for them than as First Secretary of the Central Committee.

Leonid Kravchuk and his "king's men" came to power by making use of the fall of their superiors, the ideas of the national-democrats and nationalists and the growth of decentralising tendencies in the USSR.

This new edition of "national-Communism", which is without any moral content, is explained by essentially rational motives and reasons, the striving of a certain section of the *nomenklatura* to preserve and expand the only extremely valuable possession it had — power. The paradox lies not in the lightning evolution of the Communists into nationalists (in the best sense of the latter term). The paradox lies in that the national-neophytes from the party offices were of their very nature simply incapable of making use of power even to strengthen their position. The structure of power and its component parts and carriers remained as of old, but the tasks which faced and continue to face this power-system are new. Moreover, one must not forget that the selection of the *nomenklatura* in Ukraine was based on training cadres, essentially to carry out orders and directives from the centre. As a result the present-day power structures consist essentially of "bureaucratic robots" who are simply incapable of producing and implementing qualitatively new ideas (as already stated, even to preserve their power alien slogans had to be used, against which in their time this bureaucracy had waged an implacable war).

The result was a singular stupor of the authorities, their progressive degeneration and growing imbalance of their structures. On the surface this has become apparent in what is termed the conflict between the "branches of power", the decentralisation of power structures, and an unprecedented scale of corruption. Vertical structures of power used to work on the principle: Central Committee — provincial committee — district committee — local committee. After the collapse of this system the place of the party committees was taken by councils of people's deputies, which were simultaneously (essentially formally) horizontal power structures. In the conditions of single-party centralism the councils had always played a secondary role — basically carrying out orders. Thus, in the new conditions they likewise appeared capable only of maintaining the status quo. Attempts by the President to repair the activities of the vertical power structures through the institution of representatives and administrations had only the slightest effect, and moreover met with opposition from the councils. The result was that the power structures were paralysed, and the decisions of the centre sabotaged and ignored at the local level. The powers that be are incapable of reforming themselves even in the interests of self-preservation.

In these conditions the power vacuum is filled by provincial and district structures. This is where the real power is concentrated. At the level of the provinces and districts function strange mutual interest groups (which the people for a long time now have been calling the mafia), which include key figures from the local councils, the militia, procurator's offices, the corps of directors, trade middlemen, people from the cooperatives, collective farm heads, and so on. These mutual interest groups operate at present on the principle of self-preservation and all possess the means of manipulating material values, which in today's conditions means manipulating power. They all play a major, if not decisive, behind-the-scenes role in the elections. They have long since now established an organised lobby in Parliament and they have real opportunities to preserve and even strengthen their own positions. With them holding such positions any president and any government with the most progressive programmes will have unbelievable difficulties in bringing about reform. To deprive such groups of the opportunity of really influencing socio-political life requires a substantial reform of the authorities, a new electoral law, and a new Constitution. As events in Russia have shown, there are those in that country who are incapable of handing over power by peaceful, constitutional means. Will Ukraine find her own Yeltsin?

The problem of individuals in light of the elections

The two-year tenure of Leonid Kravchuk as President has demonstrated, it seems, three fundamental characteristics of this politician: his fantastic abilities to manoeuvre, a no less remarkable adherence to an undetermined position and a lack of political will on decisive moments in the development of events. Kravchuk had several favourable moments for starting the process of reform: after the independence referendum of December 1991, using the raising of public consciousness and the results of the presidential election, he could have exploited the situation and taken the initiative in introducing a package of radical economic and political changes; second — during the crisis of the Fokin government (summer-autumn 1992); third — after the discrediting of the Pynzenyk reforms (autumn 1993). In the first instance Kravchuk simply was not ready morally and organisationally, in the others — he had insufficient political will and was let down by the tactics of balancing between the "party in power" and the "opposition". One has the impression that the era of Kravchuk-type politicians is over.

The problem here is not simply of Kravchuk's personality. To a far greater extent it is bound up in the lack of real choices. The circle of individuals, who hypothetically could compete against the current President, is very narrow, which is a programme for confusing the electorate and a corresponding passivity of the voters, and which increases the danger of someone getting elected by accident. Possible contenders in the presidential elections may be Vyacheslav Chornovil (Rukh), Leonid Kuchma (backed by the industrial sector of southern and eastern Ukraine), Ivan Plyushch (collective farm-directors' lobby),

Volodymyr Hryniiov ("new wave" businessmen and New Ukraine), and Ihor Yukhnovskiy (backed by a certain section of businessmen and technocrats). Of course, other candidates may well emerge, but their range of variation will once again be limited to circles close to the existing power structures.

Moreover, choice is limited by the fact that the majority of presidential candidates will undoubtedly have very similar platforms. Hence the choice will lie not so much between what the candidates offer, as their personalities. In such a situation the candidate who can rely on an existing power structure has the better chance and far wider opportunities for publicity which once again raises the rating of the "party in power".

It is worth noting another characteristic of the Ukrainian electorate which became manifest during the last elections in 1990. It may be easily observed that among a significant proportion of the voters political figures are especially popular where personal characteristics can be summed up in the term "substantial". Thus, during the last presidential elections 1991, Chornovil, thin, quick-moving, lively, sarcastic, and sometimes with a note of hysteria was destined for defeat in comparison with the well-fed, unhurrying, ever placid, well-dressed Kravchuk. Apart from this, greater success will go to the candidate who bases his campaign on populist slogans, and not in the last resort — on the mood of levelling-down which has grown considerably due to the impoverishment of a significant section of the population and the rapid polarisation of standards of living.

Hence these presidential elections are merely the second act of the political tragicomedy which the "parliament" of Ukraine, in deciding on new elections, is presenting to the world audience. The first act will be the elections to the Supreme Council, where the main rivalry will be between political parties. There is no doubt that the outcome of the presidential elections will be largely determined at this stage.

Political parties

The number of political parties which are officially registered by the state organs of Ukraine now totals about thirty. At least two-thirds of these parties have no perceptible influence in political life. The majority of them function only at a regional level. Their material resources are meagre, membership sometimes does not exceed one hundred, and they have no printed organs.

Thus the real struggle will lie among some ten parties and political groups. The course of the contest will depend to a large degree on the type of electoral system which will determine whether these parties form electoral blocs or whether, on the contrary, their rivalry becomes sharper.

The political spectrum, exhibited by the current parties and citizens' associations of Ukraine is fairly broad — from orthodox Communists (Communist Party of Ukraine) and "moderate" Communists (Socialist Party) to nationalists (moderate — the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists, and ultra — the Ukrainian National Assembly and the micro-formations of the type of

the Social-National Party). Between these poles lie the parties of a national-democratic orientation (Democratic Party of Ukraine, Rukh, Ukrainian Republican Party, etc.), and the ecological movement (the "Green" Party).

In the fight for a place in the new Supreme Council the main problem for the parties will be to develop a clear-cut platform with the emphases on socio-economic questions. Parties which adopt as their basic line the strengthening of state sovereignty will have little chance of success. It should be observed that here the problem is not one of defining the range of socio-economic questions and offering solutions for them, but of having in their platforms salient features which differ from the platforms of other parties, and making them comprehensible to the voters. In a situation when a considerable number of electoral platforms will be similar, the advantages will all be on the side of those parties which offer simple and speedy solutions to difficult problems. Support is also likely to increase for parties which advocate state-protectionist social principles, first and foremost the Socialist Party, which is making the greatest play with the ideas of social security for the population, and demonstrating notable examples of political demagoguery.

No less difficult for the various parties is the problem of putting their programmes over to the public in the face of a growing indifference to politics among the majority of the population of Ukraine. As numerous public opinion polls have shown, a considerable number of voters base their views not on the platform of the party, but on its name and its leader. The following semi-anecdotal incident is revealing here: in June 1993 in a public opinion poll, carried out by the "Democratic initiatives" centre, the "Party of Order and Justice" picked up a fairly large percentage of popular support, beating the Ukrainian Republican Party, the Socialist Party, the Party for the Democratic Rebirth of Ukraine, and several others. Yet the "Party of Order and Justice" did not exist at all — but had simply been invented for the occasion by the pollsters.

Assessing the party orientation of the population in general, it becomes noticeable that at present it is the national-democratic groups which enjoy the greatest popularity, first and foremost due to the merger of national-state and democratic postulates in their platforms. However, one cannot rely on this "credit of confidence" being infinite. It is simply a symptom of the inertia of processes connected with the downfall of the Communist Party and the emergence of Ukraine into the ranks of independent states. Without a constructive socio-economic platform it will be difficult to hold this position. Unfortunately, the national-democrats and their allies have shown little sign of being able to develop such a platform — and their opponents from the camp of the left exploit this fact. The electoral campaign frequently becomes simply an attempt to blacken the image of the Communists (demands for the Communist Party to be put on trial, commemoration of the 60th anniversary of the famine, etc.) at the time when in any case this image — in public opinion generally — is extremely repugnant.

At the present moment, according to the sociological observations of the Institute of Strategic Studies (in Ukraine), the most popular parties are the

economics and politics: political decisions are often taken without regard for economic realities and which accordingly deteriorate even further.

Quite naturally parasitic economic structures flourish in these conditions of economic crisis. Middleman firms, the bureaucracy of the economic-administrative structures, and racketeers get rich at fantastic speeds. The production sector of the economy is declining and the fiscal policy of successive governments has hastened this decline. This has its own social consequences, particularly in the sphere of the division of labour: the cream of the work-force and intellectuals are drifting into the non-productive spheres. A whole social class of "get-rich-quickies" is growing up, set on putting its fairly large capital not into increasing productivity or even the middleman network (for which there simply are no conditions in today's Ukraine), but into luxury goods, real estate, or simply converts it into stable currency in Western banks. This leads to a necrosis of the capital which should be employed to establish market relations in Ukraine. The private sector, which would be narrow and deformed even without this trend, is thus acquiring even more deformities and lives for today, with no thought for the future. This creates built-in difficulties of implementing market reforms and accordingly poses a threat to the democratic order in Ukraine for the future.

In general the social consequences of this lack of reform activity on the part of the authorities are ruinous. In September 1993, for example, 70% of those polled in Kyiv stated that they live below the officially established "average" level of consumption, and this can be extrapolated to the whole population of Ukraine. It is pensioners, employees of state enterprises, and the intelligentsia who suffer the most from the collapse of the economy. A lumpenisation of entire social strata is taking place with the simultaneous appearance of a small stratum of people quite wealthy even by Western standards. What we may conveniently term the "middle class" (which would in any case be microscopic) is being catastrophically reduced even further. The structure of society is being destabilised. One cannot avoid noting also the demographic consequences: for the third year the death rate in Ukraine exceeds the birth rate, and there is a sharp rise in the number of divorces, which means the destruction of the fundamental unit of society — the family.

Looking at these problems through the prism of the elections, it becomes utterly obvious that the majority of voters will be drawn towards those politicians and parties which promise first and foremost socio-economic stability. Understandably, people of all political views will do that, but it is the politicians of the socialist-Communist camp, who traditionally base their support on the socially depressed classes, who stand to gain the most. And the weighting of the said classes in Ukraine is steadily growing.

Ukraine in the run-up to the elections faces a difficult package of socio-economic, political, cultural and moral problems. The choice will favour whoever can offer the best solution. And this is a matter for the political far-sightedness of politicians, their ability to adjust to a rapidly changing situation, and finally their organisational skills. The future depends on us? ■

ON FOREIGN INVESTMENTS IN UKRAINE

Viktor Mouraviov

The legal framework for economic activities of foreign nationals and legal persons in Ukraine including those in the field of foreign investments is provided by a number of legal instruments. These include laws and resolutions of the Supreme Council of Ukraine, decrees adopted both by the President of Ukraine and the Council of Ministers of Ukraine; the rules established by the National Bank of Ukraine and international agreements to which Ukraine is a party, which are in force on the territory of Ukraine. The most important of these documents (more than 50 in all) came into force at the beginning of the 1990s and to a considerable extent are linked to the process of legal reforms in the country and the consolidation of her international status.

Foreign investments

The fundamental act regarding foreign investments which is currently in force in Ukraine is the Decree of the Cabinet of Ministers "On the Rules for Foreign Investments", which was drafted in close cooperation with Western experts.

This decree took effect from 20 May 1993.¹ It reorganised the whole mechanism of legal regulation in the field, reducing the volume of the relevant legislation. For once it came into force any legal instrument issued prior to it remained valid only if it did not contradict the provisions of the new decree and only insofar as it referred to matters not dealt with by the latter.

The enactment of the decree abrogated the Law on Foreign Investments passed by the Supreme Council of Ukraine only one year earlier.² At the time, this law had been considered by many scholars and businessmen as a new step forward towards modernising and liberalising the then-existing rules on foreign investments, since it tried to meet the demands of foreign investors as much as possible. So its abrogation was not universally welcome, particularly since the decree repealed, *inter alia*, Art. 9 of the previous Law which stated that "the legislation in effect at the time of registration of the foreign investment shall continue to apply to the investment for a

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¹ Decree on the Regime of Foreign Investments, 20 May 1993, in *Holos Ukrayiny*, 12 June 1993.

² Law on Foreign Investments, 11 March 1992, in *Russia and Commonwealth Business Law Report*, vol. 3, no. 3 [1992].

period of 10 years". Thus, the decree has encroached on the principle of legal security which is one of the fundamental conditions for a favourable climate for foreign economic activity in Ukraine.

However, the adoption of the decree was not simply a symptom of an itch for lawmaking on the part of the Ukrainian government. Rather it reflects a trend towards a more balanced and sober approach to the regulation of foreign economic activity in the country.

On the one hand, the decree preserved in the main all the major privileges for foreign investors. On the other, it reflects an attempt to separate the majority of foreign investors (legal and natural persons) who are keen on long-term and mutually beneficial cooperation with the Ukrainian authorities, from those who have invested practically nothing (from 7 to several hundred dollars) in Ukraine but who nevertheless enjoy the existing privileges and guarantees for foreign investors as a whole and who try to evade the Ukrainian tax legislation.³

This differentiation has been achieved by introducing the concept of "qualified investment". This encompasses foreign intellectual property, know-how, high-tech, sophisticated equipment, etc., and creates preferential conditions for transferring them to Ukraine in comparison with the other kinds of foreign investments discussed below.

Effective implementation of the decree is ensured by the appropriate provisions of the Civil Code, the Law on Free Economic Zones, the Law on Entrepreneurship, the Law on Investment Activity, the Labour Code, the Law on Land, the tax laws, the legal acts on currency regulations, etc.

The decree includes a fairly broad list of groups of potential foreign investors who can benefit from the privileges it accords. These comprise legal persons established in accordance with laws other than those of Ukraine, physical persons who do not reside permanently on the territory of Ukraine; foreign states; international governmental and non-governmental organisations; other foreign entities engaged in business activity and defined as such by Ukrainian legislation (Art. 1.1). It follows from the meaning given to these terms that even those citizens of Ukraine who do not reside permanently in the country can be considered as foreign investors.

The decree defines foreign investments as all forms of value directly invested by foreign investors in enterprises or other forms of commercial activity in accordance with Ukrainian legislation (Art. 1.2).

Enterprises with foreign investments are defined by the decree as any legal form of enterprise established in compliance with Ukrainian law in which during a given calendar year a foreign investor has a qualified foreign investment as a share in the declared authorised capital.

The term "qualified foreign investment" encompasses several major concepts. First of all any such investment should amount to no less than 20 per

³ See *Uryadovyi Kur'yer* (Kyiv), no. 87, 12 June 1993, p. 5.

cent of the declared authorised capital of the enterprise. At the same time such investment should be no less than US \$100,000 for banks and other financial institutions and US \$50,000 for other enterprises if it takes the form of movable or immovable property (excluding goods intended for sale) and any property rights assigned thereto; any form of intellectual property the hard currency value of which is established in accordance with laws of the country of the investor or international commercial usages; and the right to carry out commercial activities.

If a qualified foreign investment is in one of the other forms, mentioned in the decree, such as foreign currency, Ukrainian currency in the case of reinvestment stocks, bonds and other commercial instruments, monetary claims or the right to claim against the fulfilment of contractual obligations confirmed by an established bank and having a value in hard currency etc., it should be at least US \$1,000,000 for banks and US \$500,000 for enterprises (Art 1.3).

It should be noted with respect to certain provisions of the decree that the inclusion in the forms of foreign investments of know-how, patents, trademarks, company names, author's rights etc. may cause some problems regarding repatriation of capital, due to possible complications in the assessment of their value within the total volume of investment.

All the above forms of investment, irrespective of whether or not they are "qualified", may be realised by foreign investors by means of ownership shares in joint ventures with Ukrainian legal and physical persons; the establishment of enterprises wholly owned by foreign investors; the acquisition of property; the acquisition of land-use rights or concessions for the exploitation of national resources, etc. The only restriction is that these forms and methods of foreign investment should not be directly prohibited by the law of Ukraine currently in force (Art. 4).

The same applies to foreign investment in Ukraine. The decree itself does not contain any special provision for this. It may be interpreted to mean that such activities may also include non-commercial ones such as, e.g., health protection. At the same time there are certain areas and objects in which the freedom of investments is restricted by other legislative acts of Ukraine. Thus, one cannot invest in projects which contravene environmental protection standards (Art. 51 of the Law on the Protection of the Natural Environment),⁴ or in the production of goods for which special licenses have to be obtained in advance, such as drugs, arms, etc. unless and until such a license is granted (Art. 4 of the Law on Entrepreneurship).⁵

One of the most important sections of the decree is that dealing with the various privileges and guarantees for foreign investors. Here too the decree draws a distinction between qualified foreign investments and others.

⁴ Law on the Protection of Natural Environment, 25 June 1991, in *United Nations Economic Commission for Europe*.

⁵ Law on Entrepreneurship, 7 February 1991, in *Russia and Commonwealth Business Law Report*, vol. 2, no. 13 [1991].

According to Art. 31.4 of the decree an enterprise with qualified foreign investment shall be exempt from income tax for 5 years. However, income gained from organising lotteries; renting premises and leasing certain kinds of property; auctioning certain kinds of property, gambling houses; video salons; concerts in stadiums, sport palaces, etc. enjoy no such tax exemptions.

The other condition governing the aforesaid tax privileges states that qualified foreign investment shall not be withdrawn from a joint venture during its amortisation period nor before the end of the grace period for taxation (Art. 31.3).

One important practical issue which has not yet been decided is the point from which the grace period for exemption from income tax for an enterprise with qualified foreign investment should be reckoned. According to the decree it should start from the moment when qualified foreign investment is put in (Art. 31.4). On the other hand Art. 1.3 defines an enterprise with qualified foreign investment as that which has qualified foreign investment as a share in its declared authorised capital during a calendar year. The question arises whether the starting point for a grace year includes that part of a calendar year before the qualified foreign investment is put in or only the part of it thereafter. This clearly affects the fixing of the end of the grace period.

Unfortunately, the competent Ukrainian authorities have not yet given a clear-cut answer to this question.

In order to encourage small business activity in Ukraine some special privileges are granted for small enterprises if the share of the foreign investor in the declared authorised capital lies between US \$10,000 and US \$50,000 (Art. 32). They enjoy the same tax privileges as enterprises with qualified foreign investment. However the grace period lasts only one year in this case.

As far as other privileges and guarantees envisaged in the decree are concerned, they are granted to all enterprises with foreign investments irrespective of the share held by the foreign investor. Some exceptions are envisaged in the decree itself, others follow from other Ukrainian legislation or from international agreements. In the latter case, if an international agreement in force in Ukraine embodies rights other than those set forth in the legislative acts of Ukraine then the provisions of the said international agreement take precedence.

Additional privileges may be extended to all foreign investors in key sectors of the economic and social spheres of Ukraine under government programmes set up to attract foreign investors (Art. 6, 7). At the present time these include agriculture, metallurgy, electronics, mechanical engineering, chemical industry, etc. The Ukrainian government has expressed its perfect willingness to support by its own guarantees separate pilot-projects within each of these sectors.

In the event of the participation of foreign investors in large projects (for instance, such as the reconstruction of Boryspil airport, the construction of a protective housing over the damaged nuclear reactor at Chornobyl, etc.) the Ukrainian authorities are ready to enact separate legal instruments granting additional privileges to the said investors.

All foreign investors are given guarantees against subsequent changes in the Ukrainian legislation governing the foreign investments if such changes have an adverse effect on foreign investment activities in Ukraine (Art. 8). According to Art. 31.2 of the decree, if the Ukrainian legislation imposes new taxes which did not exist at the time of the adoption of this decree, existing enterprises with foreign investments shall be exempt from these taxes for a 5 year period.

How much this guarantee is really worth may be called into question. The Law on Foreign Investments included similar provisions; nevertheless VAT was subsequently imposed on foreign investors by the previous Ukrainian government.

The decree stipulates the protection of foreign investments against nationalisation and expropriation. There is a complete ban on the nationalisation and confiscation of foreign invested assets. The authorities are not entitled to requisition foreign investments, except as emergency measures. Decisions regarding emergency requisition and compensation conditions may be appealed in the courts under Art. 50 of the decree (Art. 9).

The decree likewise stipulates compensation and damages for losses (including moral hazards) incurred by foreign investors as a result of unlawful actions by Ukrainian state bodies and government officials. All expenses and losses shall be indemnified at current market rates and/or established values certified by independent auditors. Compensation is to be paid in the currency in which the investment was made or in any other currency acceptable to the investor (Art. 10).

The inclusion of the concept of moral losses reflects a new trend in Ukrainian legislation. This concept has appeared in the Civil Code of Ukraine only recently. However, Ukrainian court practice is not familiar with it and has not yet developed criteria for determining moral losses. At the present time Ukrainian judges are uncertain what the concept of moral losses means within the context of the decree. Under these circumstances it might be helpful for the Ukrainian judiciary to apply the practice of countries which have already accumulated the relevant legal experience in the form of judicial precedents.

In the event of the suspension or termination of investment activities the investors are guaranteed compensation for their investments together with proceeds therefrom in the form of money or commodities within the period of 6 months from the date of termination as soon as all outstanding obligations are met (Art. 11).

Remittance or repatriation of profits is permitted under defined conditions. Thus, an enterprise with foreign investment is liable to 15 per cent of the sum remitted or repatriated (Art. 12, 31).

Revenues obtained as a result of investment activity may be reinvested in Ukraine. The proper procedure is set forth in the Law on Investment Activity and in this decree (Art. 13).

Additional guarantees for foreign investors may derive from international agreements concluded by Ukraine. Hence, the decree stipulates that Ukraine

will adhere to her international obligations even if they establish certain privileges to foreign investors which are absent in the Ukrainian legislation (Art. 6).

It is envisaged by the Ukrainian legislation (Art. 1 of the Law on Entrepreneurship, Art. 22 of the decree) that any entrepreneurship activity on the territory of Ukraine requires government registration. In the case of foreign investments registration is carried out by the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Crimea, or the regional state administrations of Kyiv and Sevastopol after the foreign investor has submitted the necessary information in the standard format established by the Ministry of Finance of Ukraine. Unregistered foreign investments do not entitle the investor to the privileges envisaged by the decree (Art. 14).

A notable feature of the decree is the very short period of time within which the responsible bodies are obliged to complete the registration: 3 working days only. The Ministry of Finance of Ukraine must issue the investment certificate within 60 days after receiving the necessary information from the foreign investor (Art. 15). However, the decree does not specify what will happen if these bodies violate this provision.

As far as organisational and juridical forms of enterprises with foreign investment are concerned, the latter are to be established within the organisational and legal forms envisaged by the Ukrainian legislation (Art. 19).

Some problems may arise for foreign investors with regard to labour relations between a foreign employer and his employees. According to the decree all pertinent labour relations are to be governed by collective contracts and individual labour agreements (Art. 36). The terms of collective contracts are additionally specified in Art. 10-20 of the Labour Code of Ukraine.⁶ The important provision is that neither a collective contract nor an individual agreement should render the status of the employees worse than that stipulated by the labour legislation of Ukraine currently in force. The same applies to the citizens of foreign states working within the territory of Ukraine. It should be noted that foreign law does not apply to issues governed by the imperative norms of the labour law of Ukraine.

It has to be admitted that certain provisions of this decree contradict the existing laws of Ukraine. Thus, Art. 3.3 refers to land as one of the types of foreign investments and Art. 4.3 stipulates directly the possibility for foreign investors to buy plots if there is no such prohibition in the Ukrainian law. However, the Land Code of Ukraine (Art. 6) does not envisage any rights for foreigners to buy land for individual or collective use.⁷ While according to Art. 42 of the decree the provisions of the Land Code of Ukraine are obligatory to everyone.

It seems that the most likely resolution of this discrepancy will be to introduce amendments into the Land Code in order to stimulate foreign investments in Ukraine.

⁶ Labour Code of Ukraine, 10 December 1971.

⁷ Land Code of Ukraine, 13 March 1992.

At the same time it must be borne in mind that even in some Western countries land and objects of industrial property or other objects cannot be bought for private ownership. In this situation the possibility of long-term leasing of land (provided for under existing Ukrainian legislation) cannot reasonably be considered an insurmountable barrier to foreign investment activity in Ukraine.

As regards the settlement of disputes involving foreign investors, the decree makes a distinction between disputes in which one party is the Ukrainian government and other types of dispute.

In the former case, that is, disputes between foreign investors and the government on issues of state regulation of foreign investment and the activities of enterprises with foreign investment, they are to be examined by the courts of Ukraine if not otherwise specified by international agreements to which Ukraine is a party.

All other disputes shall be examined by the courts and/or arbitration tribunals of Ukraine or, if agreed by the parties, by conciliation courts, including those abroad. In this way, the decree permits the involvement of foreign courts in the settlement of disputes regarding foreign investment, thus taking a further step forward in securing the interests of foreign physical and legal persons in Ukraine.

Free economic zones

To provide more incentives for foreign investors to expand their activities in the country in October 1992 the Supreme Council of Ukraine passed a Law on Free Economic Zones.⁸ This supplements the Law on Foreign Investments by making provision for the creation of zones where foreign capital may be granted additional benefits as regards taxation, customs, simplified entry procedures into the zone, etc. in exchange for an increase in the introduction of high quality goods and services, introduction of new technologies, improvement of managerial skills, acceleration of socio-economic development, etc.

The law lays down basic rules for the creation, functioning and liquidation of free economic zones. Regarding the status, terms and territory of a given special economic zone, these are to be determined by separate laws to be enacted by the Supreme Council of Ukraine whenever the question of establishing such a zone is raised (Art. 2). This flexible approach makes possible the establishment of various types of such zones having different functional characteristics, and hence requiring certain variations in their legal set-ups in accordance with the purposes for which they are established and the specific conditions in the area concerned.

The procedure for setting up a free economic zone consists of several stages. The initiative in this respect may stem from the President, the Cabinet of Ministers, local councils of people's deputies, local state administration. The project must first be considered by the Cabinet of Ministers

⁸ Law on Free Economic Zones, 13 October 1992, in *Russia and Commonwealth Business Law Report*, 8 February 1993.

within the specified time-span (60 days from the time it receives the proposal). It is submitted to the Supreme Council (Parliament) for a final decision. The same applies to any subsequent proposals for changing the status of the zone (Art. 5). The package of documents governing the setting up of a free economic zone includes the decision (the written consent in the case when the initiative comes from the President of Ukraine or the Cabinet of Ministers) of the local council of people's deputies and local state administration, the draft regulations governing the status and the system of administration of the zone, a description of its boundaries, a feasibility study of the expediency of setting up the zone and its future operation, and a draft of the law setting it up (Art. 6).

Particular attention is paid by the law to the feasibility study the main part of which is listed in Art. 7.

The legal regime of each zone is assumed to be based on two components which supplement each other: the legal rules determining the status of the zone and the organisational mechanism for administering its operation. As far as the latter is concerned the law enumerates several organs of administration of the free economic zone as well as defining their basic functions and sphere of interaction.

The core of the organisational mechanism of a free economic zone is the local councils of people's deputies and local state administration on the one hand, and the organ of economic development and administration of the free economic zone on the other. The latter is to be established with the participation of the subjects of economic activity of Ukraine and foreign subjects of such activity.

The functions and authority of the local councils of people's deputies and the local state administration include the presentation of proposals for possible changes in the status of the zone, participation in resolving the legal, financial, and social problems of Ukrainian citizens living within the zone, concluding with the administration of the zone master agreements on the transfer of plots of land, facilities located within the zone and also natural resources. The other powers of the local councils of people's deputies and local state administration are to be defined by the legal instrument when the free economic zone is established.

The local councils of people's deputies and the local state administration have the right to have their representatives in the decision-making levels of the administrative body of the zone.

Apart from the functions and authority specified in the law creating the zone, the organ of economic development and administration of a free economic zone possesses mainly operational powers. It alone is competent to define the future directions of development of the zone; to run and develop a common infrastructure; organise international tenders to bring in new industries; allocate plots of land, facilities and the use of natural resources; issue licenses for the construction of new facilities, and register the subjects of economic activities and the investments made in the zone.

The law also allows a citizen of another country working on a fixed-term contract to be the executive director of the zone's administrative body.

The local councils of people's deputies and local state administration and also the organ of economic development of the zone carry out their various activities independently of other bodies of the state administration of Ukraine.

The involvement of other organs in the process of regulating the functioning of the zone is described in the basic law in somewhat general terms. Thus, the organs of the state executive power in Ukraine exercising state regulation of the activities of the zone are to supervise the compliance of the zone's legal regime with the requirements of the legislature in Ukraine. The judicial, arbitral and other law enforcement authorities and also the state agencies monitoring compliance with environmental, public health and other regulations are to be guided by the Ukrainian legislation currently in force with such exceptions as are specified in the law for the economic zone in question (Art. 9).

The law gives a general outline of the specific conditions to be created for subjects of economic activities in the zone and stipulates their basic guarantees. Among the former it mentions the creation of regulations covering a preferential mode and level of taxation, specific financial conditions relating to hard currency, a banking and credit system, a system of credit allocation and insurance, conditions of individual types of payment, a system of state investment (Art. 12).

Businessmen have the right of independent choice of the types, forms and methods of their activities within the zone providing these do not contradict the Ukrainian legislation currently in force and the law establishing the zone (Art. 15).

The state guarantees to foreign investors the repatriation of their profits and capital invested within the zone as well as the remittance abroad of the income earned by foreign employees from their work in the free economic zone (Art. 13, 19).

Banking law

One of the major impediments to the activities of foreign investors in Ukraine derives from the fact that the development of the banking system in the country is, for all practical purposes, still in the bud even though the Law on Banks and Banking Activity has come into force. The latter was endorsed by the Supreme Council of Ukraine in March 1991.⁹

The main particularity of the law is that it envisages the possibility of setting up banks of different kinds and forms of property. Special attention should be drawn to the fact that it allows the functioning of commercial banks.

These may be set up by natural and legal persons. One restriction is that the share of any shareholder of such a bank should not exceed 35 per cent of its statutory capital.

Every commercial bank must be registered. For this purpose, a portfolio of documents has to be submitted to the National Bank of Ukraine. The latter must carry out the registration within a month from the time when the necessary documents have been submitted.

⁹ Law on Banks and Banking Activity, 20 March 1991, in *United Nations Economic Commission for Europe*.

A simplified procedure of entry into the zone for foreigners may be envisaged by the law for that particular economic zone (Art. 22).

The preservation in full of all property and non-property rights of the subjects of economic activity of the zone in the case of its liquidation is also guaranteed by the state. Disputes arising in connection with the liquidation of the free economic zone and involving foreign subjects operating in the zone can be taken to litigation before judicial or arbitral bodies chosen by the parties concerned including those located abroad (Art. 25).

One important feature is that the law allows foreign banks, their subsidiaries and banks with foreign participation to operate in Ukraine. The procedure for registering these is somewhat different. Thus, in addition to the decision of the foreign establishing party (participant) to set up a bank or a subsidiary on the territory of Ukraine, a foreign legal person also has to submit the written consent of the controlling body of the country in which the foreign bank is located if the legislation of that country so requires. As far as foreign citizens are concerned, they have to submit a guarantee of solvency from a reputable bank; and two recommendations from foreign legal persons or substantial citizens (Art. 22).

The structure of a commercial bank must correspond to the general provisions of the Law on Entrepreneurship governing the relevant issues (Art. 23).

In the case when a bank is established with the participation of foreign natural or legal persons, a license has to be obtained from the National Bank of Ukraine (Art. 49).

If a commercial bank is going to carry out its operations in foreign currency both within Ukraine and overseas, it should apply for an additional license from the National Bank of Ukraine (Art. 50).

Currency regulations

Some of the issues relating to the sphere of foreign investment and foreign trade are regulated by the Decree on the System of Currency Regulation and Currency Control adopted by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine in March 1993.¹⁰

The decree is designed to improve the currency control mechanism by imposing restriction on the use of foreign currency and establishing licensing requirements for transaction of foreign currency.

Some of its regulations touch directly on foreign investors involved in trade.

According to the decree, residents (i.e. foreign citizens with permanent residence in Ukraine and branches of foreign firms or representative offices located in Ukraine and conducting their activities under Ukrainian law [Art. 1.5]) that receive revenues in foreign currency shall convert it into Ukrainian coupons on the inter-bank currency exchange.

However, foreign currency earnings received by enterprises with foreign investments from the export of goods and services which are considered by the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations as internal production are exempt.

¹⁰ Decree on the System of Currency Regulation and Currency Control in *Russian and Commonwealth Business Law Report*, 17 May 1993.

Services provided by a resident entity with foreign investment to an entity non-resident on the territory of Ukraine are treated as exports and consequently their hard currency revenues that they receive for their services are exempt too from the mandatory conversion rule.

The exemptions also encompass foreign currency transferred to Ukraine for use in the charter funds of enterprises with foreign investment.

Some provisions of the decree govern the activities of foreign firms that are non-residents (this category includes subjects of entrepreneurial activity such as branches and representative offices of the entities located outside Ukraine [Art. 1.6]). Thus, foreign "non-resident" employers are required to pay Ukrainian citizens' wages in foreign currency (Art. 7. 2).

The decree sets up licensing procedures for currency, which means that the National Bank of Ukraine will issue licenses for most uses of foreign currency or for exporting Ukrainian currency.

Foreign investors likewise enjoy certain benefits in this sphere. Thus, there are cases when they do not require licenses. These include making payments in foreign currency abroad to pay for interest on loans or to transfer dividends from a foreign investment, repatriating funds from a foreign investment if the investment is terminated.

Export regulations

Several provisions of another governmental legal instrument — the Decree on Quotas and Licenses for the Export of Goods of 12 January 1993 — also touch upon some important issues concerning the sphere of foreign trade and foreign investments.¹¹

The aim of the decree is to protect the internal market of Ukraine by introducing a system of export quotas and licenses on goods (the list of them includes mostly readily marketable raw materials), works or services taken out of Ukraine in the course of foreign trade.

The decree suspends the sections of Art. 9 of the Law on Foreign Investments which provides guarantees against unfavourable changes in Ukrainian legislation regarding the export of goods purchased by foreign investors in the Ukrainian market, as well as the section of Art. 14 of the same law dealing with the permitted license-free export of goods which foreign investors purchase in Ukraine.

On the other hand, according to the same decree, business or individuals do not have to register with the state in order to engage in foreign trade operations. ■

¹¹ Decree No. 6-93 on Quotas and Licenses for the Export of Goods (Work, Services) in *Russia and Commonwealth Business Law Report*, 8 March 1993.

SOCIAL DOCTRINE, RELIGION AND STATE-BUILDING

Bishop Ihor (Isichenko)

The evangelic mission of the Church in the world, determined by the plan of divine redemption incomprehensible in its majesty, is embodied in diverse and manifold social activities, which are called to illuminate with the light of truth the one true path of mankind in history — the path to eternal life. “No one after lighting a lamp covers it with a vessel, or puts it under a bed, but puts it on a stand, that those who enter may see the light”. (Luke, viii. 16) It is for us to be such a lamp-stand which our prayers and good work spread afar, to our native land and the diaspora the kindly light of the good tidings of redemption.

The forces hostile to the Christian Church, which failed to defeat it during the modern-day persecution of our faith, have changed their strategy. They have, alas, been able to divide Ukrainian Christians, to instigate inter-confessional rivalry, to install among the clergy individuals discredited in the past and still unrepentant, lacking in spiritual and moral qualities, and to seduce a section of the clergy and faithful with the pursuit of wealth, glory, and the support of the authorities. And so the authority of the Orthodox Church, first and foremost, our independent Orthodox Church, has declined in the eyes of the people, and suspicion and a lack of confidence in the clergy has spread among the laity.

In spite of the state’s apparent tolerance of the Ukrainian Church the treatment of the faith and faithful by parliamentary and government officials has in general not changed since Soviet times. Tax concessions and the encouragement of charitable activities remains an empty dream; there has been no compensation for parishes and religious associations which were deprived of their churches and property; many church buildings are still used as museums, concert halls, and cinemas; no denomination has been allocated air-time for television and radio evangelisation (except for foreign missionaries with fat bank-rolls); religious education is not allowed in the majority of schools; long negotiations about establishing an institute for chaplains have so far been fruitless — apart from illegal attempts to get priests to take army jobs in the Socio-Psychological Service of the Ministry of Defence. Archaic and contradictory laws on religion provide all kinds of opportunities for abuses, including the many months-long outrages against the civil dignity of the faithful of the UAOC, still proscribed, persecuted in

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the mass media and deprived of legal rights, just as it used to be under Peter I and Joseph Stalin. The Council for Religious Affairs remains, as ever, an instrument for discrimination and incitement of religious hostility; and its Stalinist-Communist character has remained impervious to any changes of personnel.

We are proud that we have managed to repeat the achievement of the catacomb Church of apostolic times, laying ourselves open to persecution, suffering from threats and coercion, forced to hold religious services in private apartments or in the open air. "Blessed are you when men revile you and persecute you and utter all kinds of evil against you falsely on my account". (Matthew v.11) But is it not tragic, that we, who pray in every service for Ukraine, the government and the army, have to realise that the first leadership of our reestablished state, by its anti-religious policies is calling down the wrath of God upon the country. We have to be the voice of conscience, calling to repentance and conversion. We still have to turn to the authorities with a word of love and reconciliation. But at the same time we have to reject, firmly and consistently, the temptation to submit to the will of the state, even to our own Ukrainian state, and to a lay leadership, even the most democratic in the world. For a state Church is no longer a Church. It is a government Department of Religious Affairs; if we acknowledge the supremacy of lay laws over the dogmas and canons of the Church, then we begin to serve Satan, who once offered to Christ all the kingdoms of the world and all the glory of them, saying "All these I will give you if you will fall down and worship me". (Matthew, iv.10)

In acknowledging the principle of the separation of Church and State, we see in the realisation of this principle a vast field for the use of the spiritual potential of the Church for the higher good of the Ukrainian nation, which today faces the possibility of forfeiting not only the life of the world to come, but also its existence on Earth. The spectre of degeneration and ruin is growing ever more visible. Society has rejected the Christian idea of eternal life, and is falling prey to the influence of the new inhumane culture of death. The death penalty, suicide, crime, mutual hatred and cruelty, the mass killing of unborn babies, the cult of gross physical force come together into a complete satanic system, which is assailing the consciousness of the masses. And the unprecedented scale of forms of slow suicide such as alcoholism and drug abuse, place a direct choice before us, not somewhere in the future, but this very day: with Christ to life, or else into the abyss of non-being through anti-God fossilisation of atheist thinking. By transferring, with the help of other Churches and individual state officials, the ideas of Christian ethics and anthropology into the field of realistic social programmes, we can effectively counteract this wave of destruction.

The individual freedom, which is so attractive to post-totalitarian society, can easily turn into anarchy and permissiveness, under conditions of spiritual vacuum, which aspire to implement teachings and ideologies which are incompatible with Christianity. It is amoral to be a passive observer of the

advance of occult and esoteric doctrines, communities of sexual minorities and neo-Communist groupings. We must firmly and consistently defend society against the cult of personal gain and sexual depravity, the misanthropic ideology of class struggle and racial discrimination. We stand in defence of marriage and the family, the right of the individual to ownership, in defence of dignity and social security for children, invalids, the sick and the old. And in order to carry out our social obligations we demand from the state the following:

- the legal recognition of the UAOC, legal guarantees of its development and compensation for past wrongs committed against it;
- air-time, free of charge, on Ukrainian television and radio to be given to the broadcasting of Sunday and Feast-day services and daily religious instruction;
- encouragement of charitable activities through the introduction of tax-concessions for donors;
- support for the publishing activities of the Church;
- strict limits on the propaganda of amorality, the class struggle, trade in alcohol and cigarettes, prostitution;
- a clear juridical definition of the murder of an unborn child as a most serious crime;
- the abolition of the death penalty;
- legal and economic guarantees allowing pastoral care to be provided for the army, prisoners, the sick, invalids, schoolchildren and students, residents of orphanages and pensioners' homes for war and work veterans;
- the creation of opportunities for extending the network of religious schools, kindergartens, clinics, hospitals, including the cost of handing over state property to Church ownership.

The main precondition for an understanding to be reached between the State and the Church is the abolition of that shameful relic of atheist totalitarianism — the Council for Religious Affairs and its departments in the provinces. Experience shows that this institution is incapable of anything except a voluntarist interference in religious life in pursuit of certain political and material ends. Its corrupt structures are trying to woo the Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Kyiv Patriarchate in Kyiv, the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church in Lviv, and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Moscow Patriarchate in Kharkiv, but have nowhere got any useful results. The job of ensuring the liaison of church institutions with the government and local authorities could perfectly well be carried out by a highly qualified lawyer, whose job can be attached to the Cabinet of Ministers, the provincial and the Kyiv municipal administrations.

People sometimes attempt to gauge the level of our patriotism by our readiness to carry out blindly the plans of the state apparatus, political parties and movements. This is a rather strange, if not absurd position. A Christian looks at relations between the Church, the State and the political parties differently. Our state and political parties are Ukrainian insofar as

they are capable of assessing and respecting religious-church traditions of the Ukrainian nation, the bearer of which is the UAOC. We are ready for dedicated and self-sacrificing work, but not in the political interests of a particular government, party or group, but on behalf of the whole nation and all the people of God. We do not demand concessions and privileges — only normal relations and legal protection.

The first attempts at the direct participation of the clergy in elections and parliamentary activities resulted in tragicomedy, personified first and foremost by Metropolitan Ahatanhel Savyn. This is a warning to us all. A priest, and even more so a bishop, must not neglect his pastoral duties in order to perform certain obligations towards an extra-ecclesiastical group of persons who elected or supported him. Life brings us to the necessity of strengthening the Church's traditional ban on the clergy holding state positions or being members of political parties. We must strengthen the social doctrine of the Church from the pulpit, testifying to it and teaching the laity, from among whom must be raised up qualified politicians, better fitted than the clergy to defend Christian ideals at party meetings, rallies or in Parliament.

This demands a wide and branched network of public organisations of Orthodox laymen. The All-Ukrainian Brotherhood of St. Andrew the Apostle is a good example of such an organisation, although its own status within the Church is still uncertain and not defined by statute. But nothing is being done in the field of sororities (for the attempts of politicised women in Kyiv to declare themselves a sorority proved unsuccessful), artistic societies, clubs, associations, etc. These should all occupy an honourable place in drawing up the church statute, and in the everyday practice of pastoral activities of our parishes.

Society longs to see in the Church not a banal public association, but a higher model, an immutable moral force, a firm defender of spiritual traditions. And if today we declare that we are ready to hurry into new inter-church alliances, this not only deals a destructive blow to the authority of the national Church, but may even be seen as that Church's blessing on the whole country's entering a similar political alliance — the Economic union, the CIS political union, and then there we are back in our old role of "younger brother" in a restored USSR. Let us consider this well before talking about any union. Let us consult our partners: the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church as the second national Church of Ukraine, and the two successors of the Kyiv Exarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church — the Ukrainian Orthodox Churches of the Kyiv and Moscow Patriarchates. Let us forget petty grievances and our own ambitions; let us instead study diligently and carefully our church dogmas, canons and regulations. Let us read history lest we go into a council intended to promote unity and come out dismembered into even more splinters.

I see a slow, sure, honest and uncompromising way to a single Ukrainian Particular Christian Church. This is the path towards spiritual freedom, not a protectorate of Moscow, Rome, Constantinople or a secular government.

Undue haste and disregard for church norms and traditions will result in new schisms. Therefore we have to begin by calling a halt to mutual discreditation, and establishing an all-Ukrainian inter-confessional pre-synodial commission with permanent working-groups in every Church of the Eastern rite, painstaking checking of the canonicity of ordinations and church decisions, repentance for the violation of canons (clerical appointments decided by the interference of the authorities, back-handers for ordination, dedication, reordinations, clerics continuing to conduct services while under suspension, etc.), coordination of ritual niceties, the drawing up of a joint statute and joint translation of service books and Eucharistical unity around a single see. After that there will be no difficulty in convening a truly all-Ukrainian synod and electing a single head of the national Particular Apostolic Church.

The problem to reach inter-confessional agreement is, undoubtedly, extremely vital. But this does not give the right to let everything else go by the board and just go on holding endless discussions about unity, perceiving this as a panacea for all evils. Our Church was never so much one, as after 1946, but never was it so spiritually weak. Let us not repeat past mistakes! Let us grow into a Church that is creative, building and advancing. And when we thrust aside these artificially-created barriers, and spread and the cloak of our holy mother's protection over all strata of the people of Ukraine, then we shall have taken the decisive step in the transition from hostile enmity to unity in love before the throne of God. ■

History

ANTON OMELCHENKO — A UKRAINIAN IN THE ANTARCTIC

Vera Rich

The story of "Scott's last expedition", more formally, the British Antarctic Expedition of 1910-1912, is one of those pieces of history which has acquired a mythic significance. Objectively speaking, it is a story of failure; Scott and his companions were forestalled at the South Pole by the Norwegian Amundsen,¹ and all five of the Polar party perished on the return journey — the last three dying of cold and starvation only 11 miles from food and fuel. Psychologically and artistically, however, it speaks to a strain in heroic tradition which can find a heroic and glorious defeat against insuperable odds as more dramatic, more inspiring, than an "objective" victory.

Furthermore, since the perceived "enemy" is not, primarily, Amundsen, but the forces of nature, it is a story which can appeal to people of any nations. It evokes, at the same time, ancient mythic echoes of heroes battling against implacable Nature-gods, the archetype of devotion, in Captain Oates, sacrificing his life, to give his companions a chance of survival — and for those for whom the objectivity of science has replaced poetry, heroism and myth, Scott's death can equally be viewed as a sacrifice to science — since he and his last two companions might well have reached the depot

Vera Rich, the author of this study, is best known to the readers of *The Ukrainian Review* for her translations of Ukrainian literature. She happened, however, to have grown up in a household where tales of adventures at sea and in high latitudes took the place of the more usual fairy stories and nursery rhymes. When she learned that the Ukrainian Geographical Society was having difficulty in assembling materials on Anton, she felt it appropriate to make, at least, this preliminary survey.

¹ Scott's Last Expedition was not simply a race for the South Pole. It had a broad scientific programme. When Scott learned that Amundsen (who had originally announced that he was attempting the North Pole), had changed his destination, Scott decided to make no alterations in his plans, since an earlier departure for the Pole, even if possible (and the use of pony transport made that extremely problematic) would have meant abandoning some of the most vital science — in particular, obtaining eggs of the emperor penguin which lays in mid-winter. Furthermore, Scott observed characteristically, such a race "doesn't appear the sort of thing one is out for". See *Scott's Last Expedition*, London 1913, (hereinafter *SLE*) Vol. 1, pp. 187-188, 432. See also the letter of Herbert G. Ponting to *The Times*, quoted in H. G. Ponting, *The Great White South* (hereinafter *GWS*), London, 1921, pp. 202-203.

before the fatal blizzard overtook them, if they had lightened their sledges by abandoning the geological specimens they had collected.²

The expedition was, of course, a British one. But not entirely so. A number of participants came from countries of what was then the British Empire.³ The ski instructor, Tryggve Gran,⁴ was a Norwegian. And, at the very end of the list of the expedition, we find the names of two citizens of the Russian Empire, entered as Anton Omelchenko and Demetri Gerof.⁵ The presence of these two subjects of the Tsar on the expedition requires some explanation. Although Scott's plans called for the Polar party to make their way to their objective on foot, manhauling their sledges in the final stages, he intended to use various forms of support and back-up transport. Motor sledges (using the caterpillar treads which would later find a military application in the tank), were to go ahead, as far as terrain and mechanical problems would permit, carrying food and fuel to be cached in depots for the return journey. Dog-sledges likewise would carry additional supplies, and then return to assist the work of the scientists back at base. And, for the first stages of the journey — if possible as far as the Beardmore Glacier — the south-bound party would carry their food and gear on pony sledges. These ponies would not return; they would be slaughtered as fodder ran out or the terrain proved too difficult. But the British Isles do not produce either sledge-dogs or ponies which can stand up to Antarctic temperatures. And so Scott sent a member of his team, Cecil Meares, to the Russian Far East to buy sledge-dogs and Manchurian ponies. Here Meares acquired not only the necessary animals, but the services of two assistants, to help care for the animals on the voyage. Whether Scott originally intended to take these

² See H. G. Ponting, *GWS*, pp. 283. "To the lasting glory of his name, notwithstanding the plight of the party, Dr. Wilson kept a steady look-out for geological specimens and fossils in the morainic matter passed, and collected many. In all, 35 lbs. of specimens were gathered, and these they carried to the last. *The devotion to science may well have meant the difference between life and death to them*" [my italics — V.R.].

³ "It seemed that the corners of the Empire had been searched to find the right man for each department of the enterprise. Thus Dr. G. C. Simpson, of the Indian Weather Bureau, Simla, would have charge of the meteorological and magnetic work; Mr. C. S. Wright, a young Canadian physicist, had come from Toronto; Mr. Griffith Taylor, an Australian, was to be our chief geologist, and he and two other young geologists, Mr. F. Debenham, and Mr. Raymond Priestley — the latter had been South before with Sir Ernest Shackleton — were to join us later in New Zealand". Ponting, *GWS*, p. 8.

⁴ Once the members of the expedition learned, on reaching New Zealand, that the Norwegian, Amundsen, was also leading an expedition to the South Pole, Gran's position with Scott's expedition could easily have become anomalous. Yet no one seems to have remarked on this fact. But a conflict of loyalties (typically between one's kin and one's chosen leader) is a major theme running through all Nordic literature and history, and Gran, although as his own writings reveal (see below) his pride in being a citizen of a country which had only just regained her independence, nevertheless, maintained his loyalty to Scott (and through Scott, to Britain), in the best saga manner, even after Scott's death, sacrificing his commission in the Norwegian Flying Corps by serving in the RAF during World War I.

⁵ *SLE*, Vol. 1, p.xxii.

"Russians" with him to the Antarctic is unclear.⁶ In any event, it was decided to sign them on for the expedition, and their names were duly signed on (for a salary of £60 per annum.⁷)

Although the surname Omelchenko suggests a Ukrainian origin, for decades nothing was known about the background of either man, save for the home addresses in the expedition register — in Omelchenko's case, the Vladivostok race-course! As was and is the custom of explorers, most of the participants on the expedition kept diaries, and several of these were later published or used as the basis for narrative accounts. But although these accounts contain scattered references to both Anton and (in a variety of spellings) Dmitrii, the diaries deal, not surprisingly, with the day to day life of the expedition, rather than giving the past history of expedition members. Furthermore, anything that got into the diaries about the background of the two "Russians" would come from their own accounts, and — due to their far from perfect English — misunderstandings might well creep in.

The best known of all the diaries is, of course, that of Captain Scott himself, which ("arranged by" Leonard Huxley), was published as Volume 1 of the official account of the expedition, and subsequently as a separate, "popular" work.⁸ Fragments of Scott's diary were translated into Russian, but it was not until 1955 that a complete translation appeared.⁹ One of the editors of this Russian version, a certain N. Bolotnikov, became interested in discovering more about the two "Russians". For ten years he was unable to track them down, then in 1965, he received a letter from a certain Zabegaylo, who claimed to have known Anton in 1925, in the village of Batky in the Poltava district of Ukraine, and had seen the Polar Medal awarded to all members of the expedition by King George V. In 1968, Bolotnikov also managed to identify the dog-handler Dmitrii (whose surname turned out to have been, in reality, Girev), and in 1969 he published an account of his discoveries in the popular-scientific journal *Nauka i Zhizn*.¹⁰

We shall consider Bolotnikov's material in detail in a moment. But first, let us bring the story of the search up to date. The identification of one of the participants in this epic expedition as a Ukrainian not surprisingly aroused considerable interest in Ukraine. For various reasons, which the discerning reader can doubtless supply for him- or herself, no attempt was made by the Ukrainian side to take the matter further, until 1989, when the

⁶ Cherry-Garrard, *The Worst Journey in the World*, (hereafter *WJW*) Vol. 1, pp. 224, implies that the decision to sign them on for the expedition was made only after they reached New Zealand. But Cherry-Garrard, as we shall see later, is by no means reliable about Anton.

⁷ See Register in Scott Polar Museum.

⁸ The "popular" version, published in 1923, included a biographical sketch of Scott by Sir James M. Barrie, author of *Peter Pan*. It has continued to be reprinted over the years; the latest version (1983) has a preface by Captain Scott's son, Peter.

⁹ *Dnevnik Kapitana Skotta*, Leningrad, 1934, *Poslednaya ekspeditsiya R. Skotta*, Moscow, 1955.

¹⁰ *Nauka i Zhizn*, No. 10, 1969.

President of the Ukrainian Geographical Society wrote to the Scott Polar Institute in Cambridge, asking if they could provide any further details on Omelchenko and if they had any unpublished material about him. The Scott Polar Institute, like all British academic establishments in these days of financial cut-backs, is understaffed, and doubtless did not understand fully how important even so minor a request can be to a nation striving to re-establish its statehood. The reply was brief, and not encouraging: there was no "unpublished" material, and all that was known of Anton Omelchenko was that he had been born in Vladivostok! Such a reply could only have been written in considerable haste: had the writer checked with the Institute's own journal, *The Polar Record*, he would have found a translation of the relevant Bolotnikov material,¹¹ which states that Omelchenko was born in Batky in the province of Poltava.

Furthermore, even if it is true that the Institute possesses no "unpublished" material about Omelchenko, the writer failed to point out that he is mentioned in the writings of several members of the expedition apart from those of the leader. Scott's account is, it must be said, of its nature not the best source for biographical material. It consists, essentially, of his personal journals, into which Huxley, as editor, has interspersed some passages from his letters home. Had he survived, Scott would undoubtedly have written up these materials into a coherent account, as he did after the *Discovery* expedition.¹² For a day-to-day account, written in the final stages, under appalling conditions of cold, hunger and exhaustion, the literary quality of the journal is astonishingly high.¹³ But it does, alas, omit the explanations and elaborations which Scott would undoubtedly have inserted had he lived to do so. As it is, members of the expedition, its "back-up" personnel in London and New Zealand, and crew members of the *Terra Nova* are apt to appear in the text, with no introduction — so that the first-time reader is obliged to identify them from the list of the expedition personnel at the front of the book.

Thus, in the entry for December 1, 1910, five days into the voyage, with a "stiff wind" and "confused sea", Scott describes the conditions on board.

Below one knows all space is packed as tight as human skill can devise — and on deck under the fore-castle fifteen ponies close side by side, seven one side, eight the other, heads together and groom between — swaying, swaying continually to the plunging, irregular motion.

One takes a look through the hole in the bulkhead and sees a row of heads with sad, patient eyes come swinging up together from the starboard side, while those on the port side swing back; then up come the port heads, while the starboard recede... Some 4 or 5 tons of fodder and the ever watchful Anton take up the rest of the space. Anton is suffer-

¹¹ Moira Dunbar, "Anton and Dmitriy: two Russian members of Scott's last expedition", *The Polar Record*, Vol. 15, No. 97, pp. 499-502.

¹² Published as *The Voyage of the Discovery*, London 1905.

¹³ So high, indeed, that the author of this article studied it as a "Set book" in English Literature class, during her second year at grammar school.

ing badly from sea-sickness, but last night he smoked a cigar. He smoked a little, then he had an interval of evacuation, and back to his cigar, whilst he rubbed his stomach and remarked to Oates¹⁴ 'No good' — gallant little Anton!¹⁵

Scott's other references are likewise tantalisingly brief. In order, they are:

January 4, 1911. I have just come back from the shore. The site for the hut is levelled and the erecting party is living on shore in our large green tent with a supply of food for eight days. Nearly all the timber, &c., of the hut is on shore; the remainder half-way there. The ponies are picketed in a line on a convenient snow slope so that they cannot eat sand. Oates and Anton are sleeping ashore to watch over them.¹⁶

January 10, 1911. We have been six days in McMurdo Sound, and tonight I can say we are landed. ...Some of the ponies are very troublesome, but all except two have been running today, and until this evening there were no excitements. After tea Oates suggested leading out the two intractable animals behind other sledges; at the same time he brought out the strong, nervous pony. I led one of the supposedly safe ponies and all went well whilst we made our journey; three loads were safely brought in. But whilst one of the sledges was being unpacked the pony tied to it suddenly got scared. Away he dashed with sledge attached; he made straight for the other ponies, but finding the incubus still fast to him he went in wider circles, galloped over the hills and boulders, narrowly missing Ponting¹⁷ and his camera, and finally dashed down hill to camp again pretty exhausted — oddly enough, neither sledge nor pony was much damaged. Then we departed again in the same order. Half-way over the floe my rear pony got his foreleg foul of the halter, then got frightened, tugged at the halter, and lifted the unladen sledge to which he was tied — then the halter broke and away he went. But by this time the damage was done. My pony snorted wildly and sprang forward as the sledge banged to the ground. I just managed to hold him till Oates came up, then we started again; but he was thoroughly frightened — all my blandishments failed when he reared and plunged a second time, and I was obliged to let go. He galloped back and the party dejectedly returned. At the camp P. O. Evans¹⁸ got hold of the pony, but in a moment it was off again, knocking Evans off his legs. Finally he was captured and led forth once more between Oates and Anton. He remained fairly well on the outward journey, but on the homeward journey grew restive again; Evans, who was now leading him, called for Anton, and both tried to hold him, but to no purpose — he dashed off, upset his load, and came back to camp with the sledge...¹⁹

January 28, 1911 ...Anton and Demetri are both most anxious to help on all occasions; they are excellent boys.²⁰

April 13, 1911 [after returning from a sledging expedition]

...[I]t took but a minute to learn the most important events of the quiet station life which had been led since our departure. These under the circumstances might well be considered the deaths of one pony and one dog. The pony was that which had been

¹⁴ Captain Lawrence E. G. Oates of the Sixth Inniskilling Dragoons, in charge of the pony transport, and, later, one of Scott's companions at the South Pole.

¹⁵ *SLE*, Vol. 1, p. 8.

¹⁶ *SLE*, Vol. 1, p. 94.

¹⁷ Herbert G. Ponting, "camera artist" to the expedition.

¹⁸ Edgar Evans, Petty Officer in the Royal Navy, and, later, one of Scott's companions at the Pole. Since Scott's second-in-command on the expedition was Lieutenant Edward Evans, (so that they could not be distinguished by their first-name initials) Scott, and other diarists, normally distinguish between them by rank.

¹⁹ *SLE*, Vol.1, pp. 112-113

²⁰ *Ibid*, p. 128

nicknamed Hackenschmidt from his vicious habit of using both fore and hind legs in attacking those who came near him. He had been obviously of different breed from the other ponies, being of lighter and handsomer shape, suggestive of a strain of Arab blood. From no cause which could be discovered either from the symptoms of his illness or the post-mortem held by Nelson²¹ could a reason be found for his death. In spite of the best feeding and every care he had gradually sickened until he was too weak to stand, and in this condition there had been no option but to put him out of his misery. Anton considers the death of Hackenschmidt to have been an act of "cussedness" — the result of a determination to do no work for the Expedition!...²²

My first impressions include matters to which I was naturally eager to give an early half-hour, namely the housing of our animals. I found herein that praise was as justly due to our Russian boys as to my fellow Englishmen.

Anton with Lashly's²³ help had completed the furnishing of the stables. Neat stalls occupied the whole length of the 'lean-to', the sides so boarded that sprawling legs could not be entangled beneath and the front well covered with tin sheet to defeat the 'cribbers'...²⁴

...the ponies look fairly fit considering the low diet on which they have been kept; their coats were surprisingly long and woolly in contrast with those of the animals I had left at the Hut Point.²⁵ At this time they were being exercised by Anton, Demetri, Hooper²⁶ and Clissold,²⁷ and as a rule were ridden, the sea having only recently frozen. The exercise ground has lain on the boulder-strewn sand of the home beach and extending towards the Skua lake; and across these stretches I soon saw barebacked figures dashing at speed, and not a few amusing incidents in which horse and rider parted with abrupt lack of ceremony. I didn't think this quite the most desirable form of exercise for the beasts, but decided to leave matters as they were till our pony manager [Oates] returned.²⁸

April 24 [the first day without the sun]

"Today I allotted the ponies for exercise. Bowers,²⁹ Cherry-Garrard,³⁰ Hooper, Clissold, P. O. Evans and Crean³¹ take animals, besides Anton and Oates. I have had to warn people that they will not necessarily lead the ponies which they now tend".³²

May 5, ...Oates' whole heart is in the ponies. He is really devoted to their care, and I believe will produce them in the best possible form for the sledging season. Opening out the stores, installing a blubber stove, etc., has kept *him* busy, whilst his satellite, Anton, is ever at work in the stables — an excellent little man.³³

June 19 ...Our daily routine has possessed a settled regularity for a long time. ...Between 8 and 8.30 the men are out and about, fetching ice for melting, etc. Anton is off to feed the ponies, Demetri to see to the dogs...³⁴

²¹ Edward W. Nelson, the expedition biologist.

²² *SLE*, Vol. 1, pp. 230-231.

²³ W. Lashly, Chief Stoker on the *Terra Nova*, in charge of the motor sledges.

²⁴ *SLE*, Vol. 1, pp. 237-238.

²⁵ The base of Scott's previous, Discovery, expedition, used as an auxiliary base on the *Terra Nova* expedition.

²⁶ F. J. Hooper, the expedition Steward.

²⁷ Thomas Clissold, the expedition Cook.

²⁸ *SLE*, Vol. 1, pp. 238.

²⁹ Henry R. Bowers, Lieutenant, Royal Indian Marines. One of Scott's companions at the South Pole.

³⁰ Apsley Cherry-Garrard, Assistant zoologist.

³¹ Petty Officer Thomas Crean, R.N.

³² *SLE*, Vol. 1, p. 248.

³³ *Ibid*, p. 263.

³⁴ *Ibid*, p. 319.

June 22, MIDWINTER "observed with all the festivity customary at Xmas at home.

...after this show [of slides made by Ponting] the table was restored for snapdragon and a brew of milk punch was prepared in which we drank the health of Campbell's Party³⁵ and of our good friends in the *Terra Nova*. Then the table was again removed and a set of lancers³⁶ formed.

By this time the effect of stimulating liquid refreshment on men so long accustomed to a simple life became apparent. Our biologist had retired to bed, the silent Soldier [Oates] bubbled with humour and insisted on dancing with Anton...³⁷

July 14. At noon yesterday, one of the best ponies, 'Bones', suddenly went off his feed — soon after it was evident that he was suffering from colic. Oates called my attention to it, but we were neither much alarmed... Later the pony was sent out for exercise with Crean... when he returned to the stable, he was evidently worse, and Oates and Anton patiently dragged a sack to and fro under his stomach...³⁸

August 15 ...It is very pleasant to note the excellent relations which our young Russians have established with other folk; they both work very hard, Anton having most to do... Both are on the best terms with their messmate, and it was amusing last night to see little Anton jamming a felt hat over P. O. Evans' head in high good humour.³⁹

October 13 ...The ponies have been behaving well, with exceptions... The most troublesome animal is Christopher. He is only a source of amusement so long as there is no accident, but I am always a little anxious that he will kick or bite someone. The curious thing is that he is quiet enough to handle for walking or riding exercise or in the stable, but as soon as a sledge comes into the programme he is seized with a very demon of viciousness, and bites and kicks with every intent to do injury. It seems to be getting harder rather than easier to get him into the trances; the last two turns, he has had to be thrown, as he is unmanageable even on three legs. Oates, Bowers and Anton gather round the beast and lash up one foreleg, then with his head held on both sides Oates gathers back the traces; quick as lightning the little beast flashes round with legs flying aloft. This goes on until some degree of exhaustion gives the men a better chance. But as I have mentioned, during the last two days the period has been so prolonged that Oates has had to hasten matters by tying a short line to the other foreleg and throwing the beast when he lashes out...⁴⁰

November 1. [The departure for the Pole] ...This morning we got away in detachments ...Bones [pony] ambled off gently with Crean and I led Snippets in his wake...

The wind blew very strong at the Razor Back [island] and the sky was threatening — the ponies hate the wind. A mile south of this island Bowers and Victor [his pony] passed me, leaving me where I best wished to be — at the tail of the line.

About this place I saw one of the animals ahead had stopped and was obstinately refusing to go forward again. I had a great fear it was Chinaman, the unknown quantity, but to my relief found it was my old friend 'Nobby'. As he is very strong and fit the matter was soon adjusted with a little persuasion from Anton behind. Poor little Anton found it difficult to keep the pace with short legs.⁴¹

³⁵ Lieutenant Victor L. A. Campbell, R.N. Leader of an exploring party which wintered in Victoria Land.

³⁶ The most famous of what are now termed "Old Time" dances, the "Lancers" was an indispensable part of family celebrations in the Victorian and Edwardian eras in all levels of society.

³⁷ *SLE*, Vol. 1, p. 327.

³⁸ *Ibid*, p. 351-352.

³⁹ *Ibid*, p. 381-382.

⁴⁰ *Ibid*, p. 426-427

⁴¹ *Ibid*, p. 447-448

And with that last glimpse, we lose sight of Anton. Scott does not even tell us how far he accompanied the Polar party on its way, nor how he returned to base. His case is not unique. We know from the diary entries from October 28 and 31 that Ponting the photographer and Edward Atkinson the surgeon set out for Hut Point — the first halt on the route to the Pole.⁴² But the diary does not mention when they turned back either. This should not be put down to indifference or negligence on Scott's part. His account is, after all, only a diary — and from November 1 onwards, a diary written in a chilly tent, after a hard day's sledging. Later departures, as the Polar party was gradually whittled down to the occupants of a single tent, were meticulously noted. But in the bustle of departure, with various groups setting off at different times, it was a somewhat different situation.

Summing up Scott's account, we observe that Anton had the reputation of an extremely hard worker — on an expedition where everyone, from the leader downwards, worked unremittingly! He was skilled in the management of horses, and had a dry humour in his insight into equine psychology — as his comments on the death of Hackenschmidt reveal. He was on good terms with his messmates — the living quarters in the Hut at Cape Evans were divided in naval fashion into "officers'" [including scientists'] and "men's" quarters⁴³ — joining — insofar as limitations of language permitted — in any fun and amusement. He clearly disliked abandoning anything he had started — even continuing to smoke a cigar between bouts of sea-sickness. And he was of small stature.

Such was the information available to Bolotnikov, when, in 1965, he travelled to Batky to meet Anton Omelchenko's surviving family and friends.

His account, in Moira Dunbar's translation, reads as follows:

In Bat'ki I met Nataliya Yefrimovna, Anton Lukich's widow (she had remarried three years after his death), his son Illarion Antonovich and family, and the older villagers who remembered Anton well. From their accounts, and the letters of Zabegaylo and Illarion Omelchenko. I have succeeded in establishing the main facts about Anton's life, without question, an unusual and curious one.

He was born in Bat'ki in 1883 into the family of a hereditary farmer, Luki Omel'chenko, a family not over-favoured by fortune, whose main wealth consisted of the children of two marriages. There was not enough land to feed them, and the older brothers, like many of their fellow-villagers, went away to find work, mostly to the Stavropol'

⁴² *Ibid*, p. 446

⁴³ This arrangement, although in accordance with social practice of the time, was not Scott's original intention. His original plans were for an arrangement of cubicles, but during the erection of the hut, there was found to be insufficient space. Accordingly, a bulkhead of storages was built to partition the hut into "men's" and "officers'" space. Distressing as such an arrangement may be to the late-20th century ideas on equality, one may note that a) the "men" were largely naval or ex-naval personnel — and even today, would find nothing strange in such a division; b) the scientists who lived in the "officers'" quarters spent much of their "free" time in the evenings either working or else lecturing to each other on scientific subjects; c) the cooking stove — the main source of heat for the Hut, was in the men's quarters. See *SLE*, pp. 96-98. Griffith Taylor's material, below.

district. Anton was the seventh and youngest of the family. He set out to earn his living at the age of ten, landing up on the estate of Mikhail Adamovich Pekhovskiy near Mineral'nye Vody. At first Anton worked as a herdboyc with the dairy herd, and then he got a place looking after the horses. Pekhovskiy had a stud farm, with a large herd of pure-bred horses. It was here that the young Omel'chenko found his vocation.

Small, light, quick of movement and clever, it seemed that Anton was born to be a rider. Pekhovskiy, a passionate horseman, immediately saw the boy's potential and turned him over for instruction to an experienced trainer, an Englishman. From this trainer Anton learned not only to handle unbroken racehorses, but to speak fairly fluent English. In general, the landowner had guessed right: in a few years Anton became a first-class jockey, rode in races and won many prizes, bringing excellent publicity to the Pekhovskiy stud.

After Pekhovskiy's death, the estate came into the possession of Colonel Vedernikov. The new owner took a fancy to his jockey, took him everywhere and indulged him in every way. They lived for long periods in St. Petersburg, Moscow, and other large Russian cities, travelled to Central Asia to buy pure-bred racers, twice went abroad to take part in race-meetings in England and in Austria-Hungary. When the Russo-Japanese war broke out, Vedernikov set out for the Far East, taking Omel'chenko with him. According to Zabegaylo, Anton worked in Vladivostok as a jockey at the hippodrome, and it was there, late in 1909, that he met Scott's agent, Lieutenant William Bruce, with whom he went to Harbin to buy the Manchurian ponies...

...I heard many nice things about Omel'chenko from his wife and fellow-villagers, who described him as a sincere and likable man with a cheerful disposition. He played the balalayka well, and even when over forty, danced tirelessly and lightly on festive occasions.⁴⁴

Bolotnikov's material, we may note, tallies with and supplements Scott's diary in a number of important points: Anton's small stature (essential in a jockey), his skill with horses (if he could handle unbroken racehorses, his ability to help deal with the kicking Hackenschmidt and the recalcitrant Christopher falls into place), and his presence in Vladivostok.

As we have already noted, Scott's diary, plus Bolotnikov's account, constituted the entirety of the material available to the Ukrainian Geographical Society, when it approached the Scott Polar Institute seeking for further information. The reply from the Institute referred only to the "ship's book" of the expedition — and even there, as we have noted, misinterpreted Vladivostok, Omelchenko's current place of residence, as his place of birth. Furthermore, it did not pass on to Ukraine one small but significant fact contained in that register. In signing on for the expedition, on 28 October 1910, Anton Omelchenko gave his age as 26. But according to Bolotnikov, he was born in 1883. If Bolotnikov is correct — that is, if Anton's wife and son remembered his year of birth correctly, then we may assume that Anton was born towards the end of 1883, that is, not earlier than 29 October New Style (17 October, O.S.).

Since the publication of Dunbar's translation, Bolotnikov's account seems to have been accepted without question as part of the canon of the Polar biography. The diary of Edward Wilson, Chief of the Expedition's scientific staff, was not published until 1972.⁴⁵ This book is presented with all the

⁴⁴ Dunbar, *op. cit.*, p. 499-500.

⁴⁵ Edward A. Wilson, *Diary of the Terra Nova Expedition to the Antarctic, 1910-1912* (hereinafter *DTNE*), London, 1972. Dr. Wilson was one of Scott's companions at the South Pole.

apparatus of modern scholarship, including a biographical appendix, which, for Omelchenko and Girev, simply reproduce, in precis, Bolotnikov's account. Thus we read of Anton that "while working as a jockey in Vladivostok, he met Scott's agent Wilfred Bruce (q.v.) and travelled with him to Harbin to buy Manchurian ponies".⁴⁶ Yet when we turn to the reference to Bruce, we find that "an entertaining and little-known account of this episode is given by Bruce in an article in the magazine *The Blue Peter*, June 1932".⁴⁷ And when one turns up the relevant issue of that magazine, one finds a somewhat different account of Bruce's role.

Bruce, whose sister, Kathleen, was Scott's wife,⁴⁸ was, in 1909, Chief Officer on a P. and O. mail ship operating the China-Japan route. When Scott began recruiting for the expedition, Bruce volunteered his services. Scott, however, felt obliged to reject him "letting me know that he would gladly have taken me, but he had seven thousand volunteers, and could only take the fittest. As he knew that I had slight varicose veins in my legs, and as I was his brother-in-law, he was sorry he could not see his way to accept me".⁴⁹

Nevertheless "in the spring of 1910, I received in China a letter asking me if I would care to join the ship — more or less as a sailing ship expert — but with no prospect of going with him to the South Pole".⁵⁰

Bruce obtained the necessary leave of absence, and rushed back to London via the Trans-Siberian railway — only to find Scott had tried, unsuccessfully, to intercept him by a telegram sent to Irkutsk:

as Cecil Meares, who had been sent to Siberia to collect ponies and dogs for the Expedition, had asked for another man to assist to transport them from Vladivostok to New Zealand. Captain Lawrence Oates was eventually to take charge of the ponies, and Scott had intended to send him out to Meares. But Oates very much wanted to sail all the way on the *Terra Nova*, so Scott asked me if I would mind taking his place, as the long sea voyage would probably be no attraction for me...

...I spent the next few weeks saying goodbye to relatives in the country and left London for Vladivostok on July 9th.

Meares met me at once to see the twenty ponies and thirty-one dogs which he had collected up country, and with which he was quite pleased...

On July 26th, we shipped out ponies and dogs on the small Japanese steamer *Tategami Muna*. The shipment was a dreadful experience, rain was falling in torrents, the streets and quays many inches deep in mud. The ponies were obstreperous, two of them breaking away twice. We had three Russian grooms, two for the ponies and one for the dogs.

⁴⁶ *DTNE*, p. 253.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 250.

⁴⁸ Scott had married Bruce's sister, Kathleen, a talented sculptress, in 1908. The only child of the marriage was Peter Markham Scott (1909-1989), who, in accordance with his father's last letter ("Make the boy interested in Natural History... they encourage it at some schools") grew up to be Sir Peter Scott, the eminent ornithologist. After Scott's death, Kathleen was given the title of Lady Scott and the rank of a widow of a Knight of the Bath. The Scott memorial in Waterloo Place, London, is by Lady Scott.

⁴⁹ W. M. Bruce, CBE, RD, RNR, "Reminiscences of the *Terra Nova* in the Antarctic", *The Blue Peter*, Vol. XII, No. 123, June, 1932, p. 270

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

Anton, one of the grooms, recaptured the truant ponies on each occasion. When for the second time, he had recaptured them, I had got a long rope led through the horse-box on which they were to be hoisted on board, and manned it at the shipend with three or four heavy men. Whilst trying to fasten the other end to a pony's head, with Anton sitting on its back, the pony reared right up on its hind legs, and before I could dodge clear, came down with one foreleg on each of my shoulders. I was much less hurt than I would have expected, as the ponies were not shod.⁵¹

The journey was — to say the least — not an easy one. The five men, with the 31 dogs and 19 ponies (one had been left behind at Vladivostok with suspected glanders), sailed on the Japanese ship to Kobe, then — since no British steamship company would accept them — on the German ship *Prinz Waldemar*, to Sydney, then on the New Zealand steamer *Moana* to Wellington, and finally on another New Zealand vessel, the *Maori*, to Lyttelton, where they met the *Terra Nova*. Trans-shipping the ponies was traumatic. By the time they reached New Zealand, Bruce writes,

[w]e had become expert at the business by this time, but the ponies appeared to get more and more frightened on each occasion. We had to blindfold them now before they were hoisted out of or into a ship, and as I was covering up the head of one in Wellington, he struggled so much and threw his head about so quickly that I arrived in Lyttelton next day with black eyes and a swollen nose.⁵²

His account not only gives us another vignette of Anton's skill in managing the recalcitrant ponies and some idea of the formidable task it was to ship these animals south; it also reveals, quite definitively, that Bolotnikov's account, for whatever reason, may on occasion be less than completely accurate. This is perhaps not surprising; his meeting with Illarion Omelchenko took place some 35 years after Anton's death in 1932. Bolotnikov does not tell us when Illarion was born. However, as we shall see later, at the time of the *Terra Nova* expedition, Anton was still unmarried, and, indeed, seems likely to have married before around 1920. This would make Illarion, at the most, around 10 or 11 at the time of his father's death. It is hardly strange that — however vivid Illarion's memoirs of his father's tales — some errors may have crept into his recollections. The same is undoubtedly true of Anton's widow — who, we recall, remarried some three years after his death, and the elderly inhabitants of Batky. Indeed, it is remarkable that Illarion and his mother remembered any of the unfamiliar British names at all, since — as we shall see later, they had no written material to refresh their memories. There is, of course, the alternative possibility, that they remembered no names at all, and that the reference to Bruce was interpolated by Bolotnikov. But Scott's Last Expedition makes no reference at all to who bought the ponies and dogs, and Bolotnikov's account of his research undoubtedly gives the impression that he had read no other accounts of the expedition. Indeed, had he read these accounts, he would surely have taken cognizance of the references in them to Anton.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 271.

⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 272.

The most valuable of these accounts, as far as our knowledge of Anton is concerned, is *The Great White South*, written by the expedition's photographer, Herbert G. Ponting.

Ponting did not, it appears, keep a diary: instead he kept careful notes about when and where he took his photographs. At the time of the expedition, he already had established himself as a travel writer.⁵³ Not being a diary, Ponting's account is somewhat vague about dates, but is vividly written and informative. And it is to Ponting, of course, that we owe the four pictures of Anton Omelchenko preserved in the Scott Polar Institute's archives.⁵⁴ Ponting's work contains some significant material about Anton. He confirms, for example, Bolotnikov's mention of his musical ability: "it is unfortunate that there was so little musical talent amongst us, Nelson could play the mandolin by ear; Anton, the Russian, occasionally gave us selections on the balalaika, and I had brought my banjo..."⁵⁵

Ponting also shows us that, in spite of his unremitting toil with the ponies, Anton had other contributions to make to the expedition's work. He took part, for example, in the capture of an Emperor penguin — a matter of considerable importance to the scientific programme of the expedition, since the emperor was believed to be a survival of an extremely primitive form of bird-life and thus of considerable importance for the understanding of evolution.⁵⁶

The first of the three Emperor penguins that we saw at Cape Evans before the winter darkness fell, came when the sea had frozen over as far out as the bergs that had grounded in two hundred fathoms off our cape. While I was testing the new ice — which was six inches thick near the shore — I spied him about a quarter-of-a-mile away, standing perfectly still, either asleep or lost in meditation. He looked a perfect giant; but, on getting my glass to bear, I found that this gigantic appearance was due to his being reflected in the glassy ice on which he stood. Summoning two of the men, Anton and Clissold, who were near at hand, I went out to interview him. As we approached, he came forward and bowed his head in greeting, with 'a grace a courtier might envy'. We clumsily returned this salutation; whereupon his majesty made several more genuflexions. After this ceremonial, he gazed at us; and then advancing to within two yards, delivered a short speech in penguin language, to which we tried to make appropriate replies. It was obvious that the complaisant bird, never having seen our like before, took us for fellow creatures, and was extending to us a friendly greeting; but he appeared to be much puzzled at our speech and hilarious demeanour...

...Thinking he might at any moment take alarm at our stupidity — and strict instructions having been given to every member of the Expedition to capture any Emperors we might meet with — I treacherously took advantage of his trust, and slipped about his

⁵³ His book *In Lotus Land* (London, 1910) an account of a two-year stay in Japan, was actually published on the day the *Terra Nova* sailed from London (1 June 1910). See *GWS*, p. 5.

⁵⁴ The Ponting photofile in the Scott Polar Institute in Cambridge has four photographs of Anton:

No. 278. Anton in the stable cooking mash (a profile, facing right)

No. 278. Anton and the "Church Berg" (Anton in the middle distance)

No. 579 Anton cutting Keohane's hair (again a profile, facing right).

No. AS182 Anton (in a balaclava) and Clissold, with a captured Emperor penguin.

” *GWS*, p. 129.

⁵⁶ See, e.g. Cherry-Garrard, *WJW*, Vol. 1, p. 234.

chest a noose which I had hastily made in the web of my camera shoulder-strap. The moment he felt the strap about him, he lost all confidence, and, becoming thoroughly alarmed, flopped down on to his breast and made off on 'all fours', with a precipitancy that jerked the strap away. But Clissold managed to catch it, and the eighty-pound bird went scrambling off over the glassy ice, carrying the cook spread-eagled behind him. Anton joined in the chase; which now became a rough-and-tumble, with the great bird flapping and kicking, and the two men hanging on and trying to hold it. I have never seen a more absurd sight. With every semblance of dignity thrown to the winds, the now ridiculous creature was making prodigious efforts to reach the water, thirty yards away, and was gradually dragging Clissold and Anton with him. As the ice began to bend beneath their united weight, I shouted to them to let him go, for now I began to fear that the comedy would end in tragedy. Just at that moment, they both got a firm hold on his legs; and the unhappy bird, blown with exertion, was caught securely. Much protesting, he was then led by the web and a ski-stick to our Hut, where, under the influence of an anaesthetic, he joined our zoological collection. We softened the qualms of conscience — for our perfidy in taking advantage of the trusting creature's confidence and friendliness — with the thought that science demanded the despicable act.⁵⁷

Ponting, moreover, answers our questions about Anton's role in the departure for the Pole. Ponting himself, he tell us,

was anxious to accompany the Polar Party as far as possible; but Captain Scott explained that it would be quite impossible to transport my heavy apparatus. Every ounce that could be carried on the sledges, other than camping equipment, would be food. '*Everything must give way to food*', he said.⁵⁸ After the party had reached the Great Ice Barrier, there would be nothing to photograph but the level plain of boundless, featureless ice, with the long caravan stringing out towards the horizon. Besides, too, work of more importance awaited me elsewhere — in recording the seal and bird life, which he regarded as of the highest value to zoology.

I realised the sound reason of this, but at my earnest request it was arranged that I should drive my dog-team to Hut Point to record the start from the Discovery Hut, and thence on to the Great Ice Barrier to secure some final films...⁵⁹

...We reached the Discovery Hut at 6.45 [p.m. on October 31], having made the journey in well under three hours... Three hours later, the vanguard of the Southern Party arrived, Dr. Atkinson⁶⁰ and P. O. Keohane,⁶¹ with the ponies Jehu and Jimmy Pigg. The rest of the party, who started a day later, drifted in during the following afternoon — in order, P. O. Evans with Snatcher; P. O. Crean with Bones; Bowers with Victor; Oates with Christopher; Wright⁶² with Chinaman; Scott and Anton with Snippets; Cherry-Garrard with Michael; Wilson⁶³ with Nobby, and Dimitri with his dog-team.⁶⁴

We are thus indebted to Ponting for this vignette of Scott and Anton briefly together on the march to the South Pole. Anton, however, was to go no further than the Discovery Hut. The next evening, when the expedition set out, travelling by "night" (there was, of

⁵⁷ GWS, pp. 229-231.

⁵⁸ i.e. on the outward journey. The geological specimens collected by Wilson (see Note 2), were picked up on the return journey, when most of the food had been eaten, or cached in depots along the route.

⁵⁹ GWS, pp. 155-156.

⁶⁰ Dr. Edward L. Atkinson, the expedition parasitologist.

⁶¹ Petty Officer Patrick Keohane, R.N.

⁶² Charles S. Wright, Physicist.

⁶³ Dr. Edward Adrian Wilson, Chief of the expedition scientific staff, zoologist, and artist, one of Scott's companions at the South Pole.

⁶⁴ GWS, p. 187.

course, no darkness), so that the animals could rest in the "warmest" hours, Anton and Meares were left behind. Ponting and Dimitrii followed the expedition by dog-sledge to the next stopping place — Safety Camp on the Great Ice Barrier. Then Ponting took his final films, as the expedition set out on the first Barrier march, and he and Dimitrii drove back to Hut Point.

On the third day after the departure of the pony units, Meares and Dimitrii harnessed the excited dogs, mounted their heavily-laden sledges, and started off for the Barrier — expecting to catch up with the main Southern Party two days later.

Soon after seeing them off, Anton and I started at 10.30 a.m. for Cape Evans — man-hauling our sledge. The day was clear and sunny, but heavy drift during the preceding twenty-four hours had made the surface of the sea-ice very bad. Moreover, it was but 10° [Fahrenheit] below freezing [i.e. -2° Celsius], and the weather calm, so that the heat of the sun became quite oppressive and the snow soft and sticky. Before we had gone a quarter of a mile, we found our work cut out in places to so much as move the heavy twelve-foot sledge with its 400 lbs. load of photographic gear and camping equipment — and we hoped to cover over fifteen miles that day! Sometimes we came to welcome runs of clean ice, and sped along at a merry pace — the sledge seemed a mere featherweight. Then we would run into a great sticky snowfield again, and the sledge immediately became like a deadweight mass of lead. Warm weather like this certainly has its disadvantages when sledging in these regions, and we should have been glad if the [temperature] had dropped ten degrees nearer the [Fahrenheit] zero mark.

That was the most strenuous day's work Anton or I ever did in our lives. After struggling on until 10.30 p.m., we had covered eleven miles, but it became obvious that we could not get home that night. When about half-a-mile south of Razorback Island, Anton told me that he could pull no further, I was not sorry to hear it, for I was done myself with the labour of the past twelve hours; I therefore decided to camp. After we had pitched the tent and had some good cocoa and food, Anton gave me to understand, in his broken English, that he did not like the idea of sleeping on the ice, as the weather looked threatening in the south. He asked me if I would permit him to walk on to the Hut, about three miles away.

I tried to laugh away his fears; but, knowing his highly superstitious nature, and seeing that he really dreaded the idea of sleeping on the ice — though the night was light as day, I consented to his making his way home, telling him to come back to help me in the morning. I watched him through my glass until he had reached the land; then, weary with my effort of the day, I crept into my warm reindeer bag and slept.⁶⁵

Anton could not, in fact, return to help Ponting next morning. The weather turned bad, "Blowing a drift", and it was only around mid-day that the biologist Nelson and Tryggve Gran, the Norwegian ski-instructor, arrived to help the photographer get his heavy gear back to base.

With the ponies gone, Anton's main duties had come to an end. Ponting, it appears, took him on as a kind of assistant. Photographing and filming in the Antarctic was a formidable task, particularly with the heavy gear of 80 years ago (Ponting's photographic and film equipment weighed over 220 lbs.).⁶⁶ Moreover, weather conditions were so treacherous, that it was advisable to take camping gear and food for several days, even when visiting a site, only a few miles away — as Ponting and Anton found, on a trip to the penguin colony at Cape Royds. On this occasion, Ponting had decided not to take any food, since there were ample supplies left at Cape Royds in the Hut of Sir Ernest Shackleton's expedition.

As we drew to Cape Royds, the snow was so thick that it became almost impossible to move the sledge. Not having expected anything like this — and knowing that there were ample supplies in Shackleton's hut — we had brought nothing to eat; consequently we both became weak from lack of sustenance and the great muscular effort. Our empty

⁶⁵ GWS, p. 190-191.

⁶⁶ GWS, p. 192.

stomachs finally compelled us to leave the sledge, and go on to the hut for food. We soon had a fire blazing in the stove, and prepared a meal of canned chicken, peas, biscuits and cocoa left by our predecessors of the 1907 Expedition. Never did food taste so delicious. After thus restoring our tissues, and our trembling muscles with rest, our sinews became as wire. Feeling like giants refreshed, we went out to the sledge, and made light work of hauling it up to the hut; then we turned-in in our sleeping-bags.

As meteorologist Simpson⁶⁷ had not notified me of any indication of a possible change of weather, I was surprised to find it dull and stormy when we woke up; later a blizzard broke, which lasted for three days. After the wind abated, the snow continued to fall; not the usual powdery kind to which we were accustomed, but in great flakes. When it ceased, the drifts were five or six feet deep around the hut. During the storm we had been 'hard put to it' to find and excavate supplies from the stores, and we had to search waist deep for broken packing-cases for fuel; so we did not lack for exercise to keep ourselves warm.

When the weather finally cleared, looking towards the penguinry, we could see nothing but snow, where formerly had been many hundreds of birds. Not knowing what had become of them, or whether they had deserted the place — as there was not a single individual to be seen — I determined to investigate. Anton and I arduously made our way for a couple of hundred yards to the breeding-ground, but there was no sign of a penguin anywhere. The snow was more than knee-deep, and, as I was floundering about, wondering whether my penguin investigations had come to an abrupt end, I was almost 'scared out of my life' by a muffled squawk, and felt something wriggling under my foot. I had stepped on the back of a sitting penguin — buried nearly two feet deep in the snow!

As the victim struggled out, loudly protesting its wrath at this outrage, we were convulsed with laughter; then, roused by our noisy mirth, scores of black heads, with 'golly-wog' eyes, suddenly protruded from the snow — to see what all the noise was about. That was how we discovered them! They had *not* deserted the place; but were attending to their domestic duties *under* the snow — patiently waiting for it to blow away. There were penguins everywhere; it was impossible to walk without stepping on them. All had their necks craned upwards, and in most cases their breath had melted an airway in the snow; others, however, were completely snowed in, even the airway being covered by a thin film, but that in no wise discouraged the persistent creatures.

After the snow had ceased to fall, it was remarkable how quickly it flattened down under the ablating influence of the wind and the sun; even an hour made a visible difference. As quickly as possible, we laboriously got the kinematograph and a camera on the spot; but by that time the points of numerous beaks were beginning to appear above the surface...

...After two days of fine weather and comparative peace, another and much fiercer blizzard broke, and the hut creaked and groaned with the force of the wind. When gusts of almost hurricane force struck it, it shook and rattled on its temporary foundations, so that at time we almost feared it would collapse — as it probably would have done, had it not been well stayed on the windward side with wire ropes. It was bitterly cold; but the deep snow prevented us from finding packing-cases to break up for firewood, and we had not collected a sufficient supply to keep the fire alight. We had to conserve carefully the few sticks we had, for cooking purposes. Unable to go outside the hut, and with nothing to do inside it, as Anton's conversational powers were limited to a few sentences in broken English, we spent the greater part of the next three days in silence in our sleeping-bags.

On the evening of the third day the blizzard ceased, and the weather became gloriously bright and sunny. Once more we toiled — waist deep in snow — to the penguinry, and I used some additional hundreds of feet of film recording the manner in which the undaunted creatures were conducting their domestic affairs under truly dismaying difficulties.

Though the fine weather continued, I was unable to take further advantage of it, as there was nothing else to illustrate. It was exasperating to be thus helpless in these sunny days, and I was impatient to get back to winter quarters, and proceed with other work.

⁶⁷ Dr. George C. Simpson, meteorologist and magnetologist.

On the tenth day after our arrival, I plodded through the snow to the sea-ice, to find if the surface were settling down and hardening sufficiently for us to end this enforced inaction, and return to Cape Evans. But the snow was still half-a-yard thick, and much too soft to travel on without ski, which we had not brought with us. Then I struggled to a hill-top, in order to reconnoitre the northward horizon with my glass, to see if open water were yet in sight. But though it was now December 10th, there was nothing but ice to be seen. On looking towards the south, I espied two black spots on the snow off Cape Barne, about three miles distant, which I took to be Emperor penguins. Examination showed that they were not penguins, but two men making for Cape Royds. I could not identify them at that distance; but surmising that they were coming to render assistance, and that, whoever they might be, they would arrive with robust Polar appetites, I made my way back to the hut, and instructed Anton to prepare a hot meal. When they came up, they proved to be meteorologist Simpson and Clissold. Knowing we had come away unprepared for so long a stay, they had come over on ski, as soon as the surface permitted, to help us to return home. We gave them a warm welcome, and they did not manifest any tardiness about accepting our invitation to the feast we had prepared.

Our thoughtful comrades had brought two spare pairs of ski, which they had dragged behind them; so we were now free to return with them. After they had rested for a couple of hours, we all buckled on these footwear, harnessed ourselves to my sledge, and returned to Cape Evans.⁶⁸

Anton and Ponting, incidentally, seemed to have made an excellent team as cooks. The expedition had, in fact, an official cook — as well as a steward — since Scott considered the scientists' time too valuable to be wasted on domestic duties. But the cook, Clissold, was not always on duty in the base hut. Shortly after Scott's departure for the Pole, he left the base, as part of a three-man team taking additional supplies to the One Ton Depot, for the use of successive returning parties.

"In the absence of our chef", Ponting writes,

those who knew anything about cooking now had an opportunity to distinguish (or extinguish) themselves. Simpson, at once, frankly admitted that if we were going to place any reliance on him, we should have to subsist on canned meats and 'hard-tack', as he had never had a wider experience, and on the whole we did not fare so badly. In my California ranching days, I had learned to cook from a man who was a real culinary artist. That was a long time ago, and I had seldom tried it since. I took my turn, however, and soon got my hand in again.

One day, about a month later, we espied the party, five miles away, returning over the frozen sea from Hut Point. As it would take them about three hours to reach home, I decided, with the help of Anton, to have one final fling, and prepared a welcome surprise for the party — to show them that we have not been helpless. Hastening back to the galley and its pots and pans, we broached the stores for a banquet.

In due time the party arrived with true sledging appetites, thinking, as they afterwards admitted, they would have to dine on canned meat and biscuits. Instead, they found the ward-room table laid with a hot roast leg of mutton, an Irish stew, mashed potatoes and sprouts, hot custard with stewed pears, a large cold raspberry-jelly, pastry jam-tartlets and a 'three-decker' jam cake (two specialities of mine), bread, butter, jam, cheese, chocolates and great jugs of hot cocoa.⁶⁹

Just what Anton's role in the production of all these goodies was is not clear — but to lay on such a sumptuous feast at such short notice — it is evident that he and Ponting must have been accustomed to working together as an efficient team.

⁶⁸ *GWS*, pp. 250-254.

⁶⁹ *GWS*, p. 196.

Ponting's evidence thus reveals Anton not only as a diligent worker (as we knew from Scott), but also capable of working quickly and efficiently as part of a two-man team, whether it be assisting Ponting to bring his film equipment quickly to the site required, or lay on a huge and delicious meal at the shortest notice. And this, moreover, with only a minimal knowledge of English. Ponting, we may note, rates Anton's linguistic skills considerably lower than does Bolotnikov (Illarion Omelchenko, maybe, exaggerated a little out of filial pride?). Ponting confirms, however, Anton's musical talent, and gives an interesting character insight — Anton was clearly afraid of sleeping on the sea ice, even to the extent of travelling some three miles alone, in a state of considerable exhaustion.

Such wariness was not entirely unjustified. It was now November 4, early spring in the southern hemisphere. The previous spring, shortly after the expedition had landed, Ponting and an unnamed companion had been out on a photographic expedition, and

[a]s I announced my intention to do some camera work further along the glacier the next day, my companion suggested leaving the sledge and apparatus on the sea-ice, where we were, as we were both very tired. But tired as I was, I decided that the sledge must be pulled home to certain safety and had cause to congratulate myself that I had adopted this prudent course, for, the next morning, to my amazement, I no longer looked out on to vast expanse of ice, but the blue sea! The entire sea-ice north of the cape, instead of gradually breaking up, had gone out during the night *en bloc* — a mass several miles in area⁷⁰

True, this was much later in the season⁷¹ but Ponting himself makes it clear that the sea ice was to be treated with caution. His account suggests, however, that Anton's reluctance to spend the night on the ice, was occasioned by more than common prudence — describing his as “superstitious”.

Now, to an Englishman of that era, “superstition” was a very broad term, including, for example, not only, let us say, a belief in lucky numbers or omens, but also the customs and rituals of religions other than the Church of England and the various Nonconformist denominations. Anton and Dmitrii were presumably members of the Orthodox Church, and, in the context of the time, it would have been sufficient for them, say, to have made the sign of the Cross before setting out on a journey, to have been dubbed “superstitious”. But the term is never applied to Dmitrii. Of course he might simply have been a non-believer! However, so many other sources refer to Anton's “superstitious” nature, that one must conclude that — together with his industriousness, it was one of his most remarkable traits.

Thus Griffith Taylor, the geologist, gives his version of Anton's return alone from Hut Point:

On Monday a blizzard blew up, in which superstitious little Anton had a wild time reaching the hut. He had left Ponting encamped at Little Razorback and much preferred finding his way back than spend a night among the howling demons of the Antarctic.⁷²

⁷⁰ GWS, p. 61.

⁷¹ According to Scott, the sea-ice went out on 23 January 1911. *SLE*, Vol. 1, p. 137.

⁷² T. Griffith Taylor, *With Scott: the Silver Lining* (hereinafter *SSL*), London, 1916, p. 332.

One need not take the howling demons too literally. Griffith Taylor's account deliberately sets out to create a lighter, humorous, note; to prove that not everything about the expedition was stark tragedy — and from time to time he uses deliberately heightened language for humorous effect. Of all the published sources, it is he who goes most fully into that aspect of expedition life which impinges on late-twentieth-century sensitiveness: the division of the base Hut into "officers" and "men's" quarters — the "ward-room" and the "mess-deck" in the naval terminology of the expedition.

Thus describing the hut and its occupants, he writes:

To the left are many wire mattresses supported on iron frames. A queer instrument like a guitar cut in half is the cherished possession of Anton the Russian groom. His comical little bow when you address him — for he speaks no English — reminds me of the action known as 'louting low'.⁷³

The occupants of the mess-deck, Griffith Taylor tells us, had, in fact, certain advantages over the "officers" (and scientists). They did not, for example, have to take turns as night-watchman; a job which included not only stoking the fire, and waking the cook when the next day's bread was risen enough for baking, but taking regular meteorological readings and, if necessary, going out into a howling blizzard to unblock a snowed-up anemometer.⁷⁴

"I am sure that the [occupants of the 'messdeck'] enjoyed the free life" writes Griffith Taylor

it must have been a topsy-turvy experience for them to see the weary watchman — who was always one of the officers during 1911 — nodding or shivering over the stove while they snugly slept through the night.

Occasionally, if the unfortunate officer fell over the fire-irons, or otherwise disturbed the "mess-deck", the sailor men would permit themselves the luxury of caustic remarks behind their curtains — well-knowing that the chance of scoring off a member of the 'afterguard' would not occur in a less socialistic community.⁷⁵

Social contact between "officers" and "men", moreover, occurred in a way which would have been impossible under strict naval discipline.

I remember playing a game of bezique with Taff Evans⁷⁶ who rather prided himself on the game. At first, to my amazement, he was beaten, and the messdeck crowded into our cubicle to jibe at Taff! However, he soon got 'topsides' of a mere geologist. Dr. Atkinson was keen to learn Russian, and we used to hear him chanting vocabularies with the two Russians in the mess-deck.⁷⁷

Furthermore, the "men" could enjoy a fair amount of leisure. "The seamen played six-handed eucré most evenings, while the two Russians looked at illustrated papers⁷⁸ and turned in somewhat early".⁷⁹

⁷³ *SSL*, p. 107.

⁷⁴ *GWS*, pp. 130-133.

⁷⁵ *SSL*, p. 258-259.

⁷⁶ i.e. Petty Officer Edgar Evans (see Note 18, above).

⁷⁷ *SSL*, p. 259.

⁷⁸ A store of these had been discovered in Shackleton's hut at Cape Royds. *GWS*, p. 101.

⁷⁹ *SSL*, p. 302.

The officers and scientists, on the other hand, were more or less expected to attend the lectures which, during the first winter, were held three evenings a week, partly so that the scientists could familiarise each other with their various subjects, and partly as a kind of occupational therapy against the winter night. Attendance was, officially at any rate, voluntary, and — in theory — the inhabitants of the ward-room could have “opted out”, by retiring to their bunks with a book, or, in the case of Oates and Ponting, withdrawing respectively to stables or photographic dark-room. This however, Griffith Taylor suggests, was not considered the “done” thing.

Three lectures a week rather terrified some of the party, and it must be admitted that when a lecture was “on” there was not much room for private reading! Anyhow, none of the officers ever absented themselves. The seamen attended the first two⁸⁰ but most of them “gave it a miss” thereafter, being probably intimidated by the title and probable austerity of the third lecture ‘Physiology’ by Griffith Taylor.⁸¹

The one type of lecture which the men almost certainly did continue to attend were the travel talks given by Ponting, illustrated by his own slides of India, Japan, China and Burma — which proved not only entertaining, but also were of considerable psychological importance.⁸² Although there is no direct evidence one way or the other, one may well suppose that Anton and Dmitrii also attended these shows.

One base activity in which Anton undoubtedly did participate was football. Writes Griffith Taylor:

On the 2nd May, we held our first game of football. The game was “soccer”, and curious was the composition of the teams. There was little five-foot Anton, our Russian groom, who knew no English, and had probably never seen a football. Somewhat of a contrast were Crean and Taff Evans, about six feet high and two of the biggest men in the navy. Moreover, Evans was a noted Welsh player. Wright’s knowledge was based on ice-hockey. I had played rugger in 1905, and now found the rules differed considerably. Atkinson was our star player, though Gran had played football in Norway.

We played on the sea — in North Bay, which was still badly cracked, and not very thick, so that there was still a chance of our game being a moving one in several senses.

I dare not give my opinion of the game. Everyone appeared to be offside; the more so the better. I followed hard on the ball, which later I learned was inadvisable. Anton got one idea into his head, and merrily kicked the ball to the middle of the field, wherever he happened to be. At halftime a blizzard started, and helped our side materially. I had on windproof jersey and singlet, but as there was 40’ of frost [i.e. -8’ F, -17’ C], I did not get particularly hot. In fact, I could feel my arm “going” every time I stopped running, which was unfortunate. I had a collision with Crean, which took the last on my wind. Scott was playing just behind me, and was very urgent that I should follow him up, but grinned cheerfully when I said I was too winded! The blizzard nearly blew the ball off the ice. It rose to forty miles per hour, but there was little drift, and it stopped when it couldn’t help our side any more, so naturally we won by three goals to *nil*.⁸³

⁸⁰ Wilson on “Antarctic Birds” and Simpson on “Halos and Auroras”. *SSL*, p. 229.

⁸¹ *SSL*, p. 230 The “intimidating” lecture was, of course, the writer’s own.

⁸² See Lady Scott’s preface to *GWS*, pp. xi-xiii.

⁸³ *SSL*, p. 236.

The football season, however, was brief, and by the third week in May, as the polar night closed in, the games had to be abandoned until the spring⁸⁴

Griffith Taylor, as the title of his book shows, wanted to emphasise the lighter side of Polar life, even to the extent of poking fun at himself and his own lecture! He manages to get a good deal of fun, therefore, out of Anton's participation in a sledging trip to Granite Harbour, some 25 km west of the Cape Evans. According to plan, he, Debenham, Gran and Forde⁸⁵ were to spend the (southern) summer of 1911-1912 there, and be picked up from there by the *Terra Nova* when she returned in the autumn. Debenham, however, had injured his back, and so was unable to haul a sledge. Nelson and Anton therefore helped the Granite Harbour party ferry out their stores.

"After another council", he writes,

I decided to take advantage of Nelson's kind offer. He would accompany us with the little Russian groom Anton. If all went well they could return; if Debenham were too lame to proceed, they could bring him back, and Gran, Forde and myself would push on to Granite Harbour as a three-man party.

Sunday and Monday passed quietly in the hut, though the weather was bad outside. On Tuesday, it was very unpromising until 3 p.m., when we could just make out the Western mountains. At 3.20 we made our final start with Nelson and Anton as a convoy.⁸⁶

To enliven the journey, Nelson proposed a competition:

Finally the western hills appeared, and we were all on the *qui vive* to be the first to spot the depot flag [where stores had been cached on a previous trip]. Nelson offered his raisins as a reward, and then won them himself.

The sledge was not buried, though a great lea had been built by the blizzards. We had a merry lunch, all six of us sitting in one tent. Anton's plans caused much amusement. We gathered that he was going back to Russia to marry a rich wife, and so long as she were wealthy, he had no objections even to a wooden leg.⁸⁷

Or so Griffith Taylor wrote in *With Scott, the Silver Lining*. But in the official account of the Granite Harbour Party, published in Volume 2 of *Scott's Last Expedition*, he gives a slightly different version:

Nelson offered a reward of his raisins for the man who saw the sledge first, and Anton soon won them. We reached our sledge at 2 p.m. and all six lunched merrily in our tent. Anton enlivened the meal by giving us a Russian groom's opinion of marriage in very broken English.⁸⁸

⁸⁴ *SSL*, p. 247.

⁸⁵ Petty Officer Robert Forde, R.N.

⁸⁶ *SSL*, p. 336.

⁸⁷ *SSL*, p. 337-338.

⁸⁸ *SLE*, Vol. 2, p. 227.

Now these two accounts undoubtedly relate to the same incident — indeed, they both bear the same date (16 November). So who won the raisins? Clearly, the “spot-the-depot flag” competition could have only one winner: there could be no runner-up. Did Griffith Taylor deliberately change the story in his later account, considering that it added to the “silver lining” to have Nelson win his own raisins back? That is hardly the attitude of a scientist, for whom scrupulous adherence to the facts is obligatory, even in a minor matter. Was the original version a slip due to pressure of time in writing up the “official” report, which someone, perhaps Nelson, pointed out to him before he wrote *With Scott, the Silver Lining*? Did his original diary entry become smudged or blurred between 1912 and 1915, so that when he came to write the later work, he could no longer make out exactly who had won? (“Nelson” and “Anton” — hastily written and smudged — could well be confused). One would have thought in that case that he would have checked with the version printed in *Scott's Last Expedition*. Perhaps (it was after all, 1915, with World War 1 at its height), he had no copy available. At all events, it is a minor, but puzzling, discrepancy.

Whether or not he won the raisins, Anton seems to have been in a lively mood on this trip. The next day, when the party reached the camp site, Griffith Taylor notes:

...The two tents now resembled grocers' shops. In one Nelson and Forde were bagging the cocoa, in the other Gran and I opened tins of pemmican⁸⁹ and placed them in weekly bags also. Meanwhile Debenham prepare a fine hoosh,⁹⁰ and Anton conducted a lively class in Russian⁹¹

Once the Granite Harbour party were unpacked, however, Nelson and Anton returned to base. Hence the next time Griffith Taylor saw Anton was three months later, after the *Terra Nova* had picked up the Granite Harbour party and returned to Cape Evans:

We found them all asleep, and by no means ready to come off. Simpson and Day⁹² were soon dressed. I had, luckily, left all my gear packed in November, and I hauled my boxes down to the ice-foot. Simpson, Day, Anton and I returned, and after some bumping against the ice-ridged quarter of the *Terra Nova* we got aboard safely.⁹³

The story of the one-legged wife turns up again in Cherry-Garrard's portrait of Anton. In *The Worst Journey in the World*, he writes:

No account of the ponies would be complete without mention of our Russian pony boy, Anton. He was small in height, but he was exceedingly strong, and had a chest measurement of 40 inches.

I believe that both Anton and Dimitri, the Russian dog driver, were brought originally to look after the ponies and dogs on their way from Siberia to New Zealand. But they

⁸⁹ A kind of corned beef; the basis of sledging rations.

⁹⁰ A stew of pemmican and ship's biscuit.

⁹¹ *SSL*, pp. 338-339.

⁹² Bernard C. Day, Motor Engineer.

⁹³ *SSL*, p. 419.

proved such good fellows and so useful that we were very glad to take them on the strength of the landing party. I fear that Anton, at any rate, did not realize what he was in for. When we arrived at Cape Crozier in the ship on our voyage south, and he saw the two great peaks of Ross Island in front and the Barrier Cliff disappearing in an unbroken wall below the eastern horizon, he imagined that he had reached the South Pole and was suitably elated. When the darkness of the winter closed down upon us, this apparently unnatural order of things so preyed upon his mind that he became seriously alarmed. Where the sea-ice joined the land in front of the hut was of course a working crack, caused by the rise and fall of the tide. Sometimes the sea-water found its way up, and Anton was convinced that the weird phosphorescent lights which danced up out of the sea were devils. In propitiation we found that he had sacrificed to them his most cherished luxury, his scanty allowance of cigarettes,⁹⁴ which he had literally cast upon the waters in the darkness. It was natural that his thoughts should turn to the comforts of his Siberian home, and the one-legged wife whom he was going to marry there, and when it became clear that another year would be spent in the South⁹⁵ his mind was troubled. And so he went to Oates and asked him: "If I go away, will Captain Scott disinherit me?" In order to try and express his idea, for he knew little English, he had some days before been asking 'What we called it when a father died and left his son nothing'. Poor Anton!

He looked long and anxiously for the ship, and with his kitbag on his shoulder was amongst the first to trek across the ice to meet her. Having asked for and obtained a job of work there was no happier man on board: he never left her until she reached New Zealand. Nevertheless, he was always cheerful, always working, and a most useful addition to our small community.⁹⁶

Here, we observe, the "one-legged wife" has evolved from being a doubtless jocular reference to how much a poor young bridegroom would be prepared to tolerate providing the dowry was right to a statement of intent. To judge from Cherry-Garrard alone, one would imagine that Anton had a one-legged fiance waiting for him back in Vladivostok — which is not the impression one gets from Griffith Taylor. We may note, however, that Cherry-Garrard was not present at the tent lunch-party in question; hence, unless Anton repeated the remark on some other occasion, could have known about it only from hearsay! Furthermore, his account suggests some other misunderstandings. Anton had, indeed, been working in Vladivostok for some years, but it was hardly his "home" in the sense which Cherry-Garrard suggests — the place to which he hoped to return and settle and raise a family. Indeed, as we know, he eventually returned and settled in his birth-place, Batky. It is difficult to believe, moreover, that he seriously thought that the South Pole could be reached by ship — for if that were the case, what would have been the point of taking ponies and sledge-dogs?

⁹⁴ Although the expedition was well-supplied with pipe-tobacco, for some reason cigarettes were in extremely short supply. *W/W*, Vol. 1, pp.195-196.

⁹⁵ Scott had hoped originally to reach the Pole and return to base before the *Terra Nova* arrived in February-March 1912. The mid-winter celebrations of June 1911 were therefore toasted by Scott as the half-way mark of the expedition. However, the possibility of an additional year in Antarctica was always considered as a back-up scheme, and became inevitable once it was realised that the use of the ponies would delay the start for the Pole until the beginning of November 1911.

⁹⁶ *W/W*, Vol. 1, pp. 224-225.

But his fear of the phosphorescent “devils” seems, as we shall see later, to have been a fact.

We have to be grateful, however, to Cherry-Garrard, for corroborating Bolotnikov’s statement about Anton’s skill as a dancer. Writing of the famous Midwinter Party, he says: “[Oates] danced the Lancers with Anton, and Anton, whose dancing puts the Russian Ballet into the shade, continually apologized for not being able to do it well enough.⁹⁷ This must surely mean that Anton not only entertained his colleagues with balalaika music, but also danced the occasional *hopak*.⁹⁸

Cherry-Garrard also makes it clear that, when Anton left with the *Terra Nova* in March 1912, the official reason for his departure was that his “work with the ponies was done”, just as Day’s “work with the motors was done” and Ponting’s photographic work was done.⁹⁹ Indeed, one may ask why, since the ponies were gone, there should have been any question of Anton staying on for a second season.

One practical reason would have been that, although the Siberian ponies had gone, the *Terra Nova* was bringing, to replace them, a consignment of Indian Army mules,¹⁰⁰ which also would require looking after — though far less so than the ponies. Another was Anton’s sheer physical strength and industriousness.

Dr. Wilson, the head of the expedition’s scientific staff, who also fulfilled, unofficially, the role which today would be assigned to a professional psychologist or counsellor, observes:

Anton, the little Russian stableman, is also to return in the ship. He is a delightful little study, but hasn’t been very happy down here as he is terribly superstitious and the winter has got on his nerves. He works like two men, but we think it best for him to return.¹⁰¹

That significant “but” suggests that in spite of Anton’s fears and superstitions, the expedition were reluctant to dispense with his services.

The last word, as far as the English-language sources are concerned, may be fairly left to Lieutenant Evans, Scott’s second-in-command. His *South With Scott*¹⁰² has only a few passing references to Anton:

The ponies selected [for the depot-laying journey in January/February 1911] were either those in the best condition or the weaker beasts which from Oates’ viewpoint would hardly survive the rigours of the winter. Apart from the animals picked for this journey,

⁹⁷ *WJW*, Vol. 1, p. 232.

⁹⁸ As “Dmitrii” does in the 1951 film *Scott of the Antarctic*. This film, produced for the Festival of Britain, concentrates on the five heroes of the Polar party, and a number of minor characters (including Anton) are unnamed or telescoped. The film “Dmitrii” has therefore taken over Anton’s talent as a dancer.

⁹⁹ *WJW*, Vol. 2, p. 429.

¹⁰⁰ Since — in spite of all his and Anton’s care — the ponies early on proved to be unsuitable for the expedition’s work, Oates had suggested that, for the second season, mules should be obtained from India. *SLE*, Vol. 2, pp. 317-318.

¹⁰¹ *DTNE*, p. 183.

¹⁰² Evans, *South With Scott*, (hereinafter *SWS*).

we had nine beasts left to be taken care of by the little Russian, Anton, and the trusty Lashly, whose mechanical knowledge and practical ability were needed to help get the Base Station going.¹⁰³

Any spare gear [Oates] kept in the saddle-room, a specially cleared space in the stables, where he was assisted by little Russian groom, Anton, who soon became devoted to his hard-working and capable master. The two men, so unlike in appearance and character, etc., and such miles apart in social standing and nationality, worked shoulder to shoulder in the stables throughout the long winter night.¹⁰⁴

Oates danced with Anton (at the midwinter party)¹⁰⁵

...the grins on the faces of the Russian grooms (when the sun reappeared on 26 August)¹⁰⁶

It is arranged for Ponting, Hooper and Anton to make a journey¹⁰⁷ to the south-west in December¹⁰⁸

But, as Commander, after Scott's death, of the expedition, Evans cites in full Scott's instructions to the Commanding Officer of the *Terra Nova*, which he had left in his, Evans' care, not so much because Scott thought he might die on the Polar trip (though naturally he did not discount this possibility) but because there was a good chance that he and his party might not get back until after the *Terra Nova* had had to leave.¹⁰⁹ The relevant passage of these instructions reads:

In regard to the constitution of the wintering party for the second winter, much may remain in doubt. The following members will return in any case:

1. Taylor, whose leave of absence transpires [sic]
2. Ponting, who will have completed his work.
3. Anton, who has had enough of it.

Anton took the dark season very badly; it preyed on his superstitions, but he has worked like a Trojan and is an excellent little man. Please recommend him highly if he wants to get work in New Zealand.¹¹⁰

So much for the published English material. But there remains one further, published source, the writings of Trygve Gran, the Norwegian. His diary¹¹¹ contains only a few passing references to Anton, in the context of the Granite Harbour trip and the return of the *Terra Nova*. For completeness, they are:

(en route to Granite Harbour) 15 novbr ...Anton dvergagtig og tyk.¹¹²

(at Granite Harbour) 18 novbr ...Nelson og Anton sa os ved lunchtiden farvel og satte hjemover¹¹³

¹⁰³ *SWS*, p. 66.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid* pp. 101-102.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid* p. 114.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid* p. 127.

¹⁰⁷ This journey did not, in fact, materialise.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid* p. 155.

¹⁰⁹ See above Note 95.

¹¹⁰ *SWS*, p. 153.

¹¹¹ Trygve Gran, *Hvor Sydliset flammer Leir — og Ekspeditionslif paa Antarktis* (hereafter *TG Diary*), Kristiania og København, 1915.

¹¹² "Anton, short and stout", *TG Diary* p. 121.

¹¹³ "At lunchtime, Nelson and Anton said goodbye to us and started home", *TG Diary* p. 122.

25 febr ...Simpson, Day, Clissold og Anton drop ombord med baaten¹¹⁴

9 mars ...I hyllten va altsaa ved nyaarskiften kun Simpson, Ponting og Anton¹¹⁵

But this was not Gran's only work on the subject. In 1961, apparently in connection with the golden jubilee of Amundsen's achievement,¹¹⁶ Gran published a history of Antarctic exploration,¹¹⁷ which draws considerably on his own reminiscences from Scott's expedition. Concerning Oates and Anton he writes:

Kaptein Oates lovpriste dette stedet. Her kunne man finne ham og hans nestkommanderende: den dvergaktige, men sterke russiske hestepasserer Anton, fra tidlig om morgenen til sent på kveld. Russeren, hvis vugge hadde stått et eller annet sted i de kaukasiske fjell, forgudet sin herre. Han hverken snakket eller skjønte engelsk, men lærte seg snart til å si ved hver anledning som bød seg: 'Kaptein Oates meget god mot hestene og Anton'. Alt ukjent og niyt gjorde et voldsomt inntrykk på Russeren. En natt, da det var begynt å morkne igjen, kom han redselslagen løpende opp fra stranden, den han hatt sett morilden lyse i søjen — og han ropte på russisk — 'Helvete svømmer i sjøen!' Den russisk-talende Mearse [sic] måtte berolige ham. Men ned til sjøen gikk Anton aldri mer, i hvert fall ikke så lenge det var mørketid.¹¹⁸

Apart from the vivid picture of Anton rushing up the beach yelling that there are devils swimming in the sea, and the now familiar themes of his short stature, his capacity for work, and his devotion to Oates, Gran's account contains one new significant detail: he associates Anton with the Caucasus — hence substantiating Bolotnikov's reference to his work at the stud-farm near Mineral'nye Vody.

Summing up the reminiscences of expedition members, we have a picture of Anton as an extremely hard-working young man, whose short stature was belied by enormous physical strength and stamina, and who had a considerable natural gift for work with horses. He was psychologically unprepared for the long Antarctic night, with a superstitious fear of natural phenomena which he did not understand. But his doggedness and sense of loyalty made

¹¹⁴ "Simpson, Day, Clissold and Anton got on board from the boat", *TG Diary* p. 141.

¹¹⁵ "At the start of the new year's work, only Simpson, Ponting and Anton were in the hut" *TG Diary*, p. 152.

¹¹⁶ Amundsen reached the Pole on 14 December 1911; Scott on 18 January 1912. Thus although Scott arrived only 35 days after the Norwegian, the history books record his achievement as being in the following year.

¹¹⁷ Trygve Gran, *Kampen om Sydpolen*, Oslo, 1961.

¹¹⁸ "Captain Oates sang the praises of that place [the stable]. Here one could find him and his second in command, the short but strong Russian groom, Anton, from early in the morning to late in the evening. The Russian, whose cradle had been in a very different place in the Caucasus mountains, idolised his boss. He neither spoke nor understood English, but he soon taught himself to say, whenever the occasion arose: 'Captain Oates much good for horses and Anton!' Anything unfamiliar and new made a fierce and intense impression on the Russian. One night, when it was starting to get dark again, he came running up horrorstruck from the beach where he had seen phosphorescent light in the sea, and shouted in Russian 'There are devils swimming in the sea!' Meares who was Russian speaking had to calm him down. But after that, Anton would not go down to the sea ever again, in any case, not so long as it was dark". *Gran Kampen...*, p. 100.

him reluctant to go home early, if this would disgrace him in Scott's eyes. He had a considerable musical talent, both on the balalaika and as a dancer, and, insofar as it could be expressed through the language barrier, a dry sense of humour.

What happened to Anton after the *Terra Nova* returned to New Zealand, we do not know. When Meares and Bruce engaged him, he was presumably guaranteed a passage back to Vladivostok. Dmitrii, who stayed with the expedition to the end, seems to have returned with the rest of the staff to London, before making his way home,¹¹⁹ and so presumably received his expedition medal from King George V together with the others.¹²⁰ But where and when, and from whom did Anton receive his? From a British Consul, perhaps? He certainly seems to have had one; for according to Bolotnikov, Zabegaylo saw it in 1925!

Bolotnikov, however, is of little help about Anton's return. Of his life after leaving the expedition, he writes merely that:

After wintering in Antarctica, Omel'chenko returned to his homeland before the First World War, and soon in the expression of the day 'joined the colours' — became a soldier. Where and in what units he served, we do not know. We only know that in the civil war he served in the Red Army.

The storms of life blow themselves out. Anton Lukich took an active part in the community life of the village, conscientiously attended political and economic courses, presided at newspaper readings and lectures. He worked at the post office as a mailman. When collectivization began, Anton was one of the first to sign up. At first things did not go well in the kolkhoz, and some of the villagers were ready to back out. Omel'chenko did not leave the collective, but called by word and example for improvement in the work of the kolkhoz. Thus he made his contribution, however modest, not only to the history of Antarctic exploration, but also to setting up the now flourishing Karl Marx Kolkhoz at Bat'ki, the largest in the area...¹²¹

This account, we must recall, was published in 1969, and in the fashion of that period may well have been judiciously edited for political correctness.¹²² Did Anton's wife and son really not know in what army units he had served, before ending up in the Red Army — or at least in the Red Army uniform of the photograph which Bolotnikov reproduces? Or would it have been embarrassing to publish the details? Anton's participation in self-improvement lectures and newspaper readings is substantiated by a group photograph from one such class — and suggests, perhaps, that Anton felt that he was, in this way, carrying on in Scott's tradition. But the account of him joining the kolkhoz seems to need more explanation. How had he acquired the land to put into the kolkhoz pool? He had had to leave home precisely because, as the seventh child, there was no future for him on the

¹¹⁹ Dunbar, *op.cit.* p. 501.

¹²⁰ *SLE*, Vol. 2, p. 446.

¹²¹ Dunbar, *op.cit.*, p. 500.

¹²² Dunbar, *op.cit.*, p. 502, suggests that in the case of Dmitrii, Bolotnikov abandoned his researches when they seemed to be taking an undesirable turn politically!

family holding! Were all his brothers dead? Had he managed, somehow, to acquire a reasonable-sized plot? And if so, why was he working as a mailman? As for Bolotnikov's claim that Anton "called by word and example for improvement in the work of the kolkhoz", this would not be inconsistent with what we know of Anton's character — he was reluctant to have Scott consider him a quitter — but it does read very like the standard Soviet 'hagiography' of the 1960s. Bolotnikov's visit to Batky was not unannounced: he had written to Illarion Omelchenko in advance. The managers of the Karl Marx kolkhoz, impressed by the visit of a Moscow journalist, might well have been tempted to "improve" Anton's role in its foundation.

But this is not the only puzzle.

"Before going to Bat'ki", Bolotnikov relates

in a letter to Illarion Antonovich, I asked him whether any documents, photographs, or curiosities connected with his father's participation in the Antarctic expedition remained in the family. The following was his answer.

'Nothing remains in our family from the expedition. Mother tells me that just before his death [in 1932], a man came to see us, apparently from some newspaper. For a whole week, he wrote down my father's life-story from his own words, after which father loaded him with the whole cartload of photographs, books and diaries of the expedition, and drove him to Poltava with his own horse. This man promised to translate the books from English into our language so that we, his children, could read and enjoy the wonderful life of our father. But life punished father for his trustfulness. That man, he just went off, and he may be still translating... Maybe all those notes and photographs are still lying about somewhere.'

Where, indeed, and what sort of a man was it who took the archives of Anton Omel'chenko? Perhaps something happened to him, too. Would it not be wonderful if some response were to come from someone who knew something about the fate of that material?¹²³

And, a month after this mysterious visitor came, Anton himself perished: being, according to Bolotnikov, struck by lightning while standing at the doorway of his cottage, which was burned down.¹²⁴

Now all this seems too pat: the mysterious stranger going off with a cartload of papers, and then Anton's death and the fire which would presumably have destroyed any documents which remained. To anyone with even a moderately suspicious nature, this must surely appear like some kind of cover-up or rewriting of history. And the year, we recall, was 1932, when many strange and terrible things were happening in Ukraine. If the vanished Omelchenko archives have survived at all, they are probably in some forgotten KGB archive or *spetskhran*! For the moment, it seems impossible to ascertain what really happened in Batky in 1932, or the identity of the mysterious stranger. Though it is worth, perhaps, asking, how, if Anton Omelchenko were really the good *kolkhoznik* that Bolotnikov portrays, how, as late as 1932, he still had "his own horse", with which to drive his visitor back to Poltava?

¹²³ Dunbar, *op.cit.*, pp. 500-501.

¹²⁴ Dunbar, *op.cit.*, p. 500.

Apart from this mystery, however, there still remain a number of questions which may prove amenable to diligent work.

Was Anton really a prize-winning jockey, as Bolotnikov said? As far as his two visits to England are concerned, all that is needed is the time and patience to plough through the relevant volumes of *The Racing Calendar*, for the appropriate years, say 1897-1909, assuming that Anton would not have begun his racing career before, say, the age of 16. (The present writer has made a preliminary scan, enough to note that no Omelchenko is listed among the registered jockeys, nor either a Vedernikov nor the Pekhovski stud among those registering racing colours. However, preliminary enquiries to the Jockey Club, the ruling body of British racing, indicate that foreign owners or jockeys would not necessarily be so registered. Hence there is nothing to be done but simply read through the several thousands of pages of records of race meetings — a tedious, but not impossible task!). Whether similar racing archives for the Austro-Hungarian and Russian empires have survived, I have not, as yet been able to ascertain. As far as Russia is concerned, it seems, on the face of it, unlikely! But there could be accounts of racing results in the general press of the period — the local papers of Vladivostok, perhaps?

If Anton was a successful jockey, why did he agree to sail with the ponies? Even if he has simply gone to New Zealand and back, he would have been away for several months? And the trip to the Antarctic meant an absence of more than a year-and-a-half! His salary of £60.00 a year was generous by the standards of the time — particularly as he was provided with food, lodging and clothing and had, moreover, nothing to spend it on. But surely a successful jockey could expect to earn more than that in two racing seasons? Had Vedernikov died, perhaps, or gone bankrupt? Again, the answer may be somewhere in the Vladivostok press?

And, finally, the most important question: how "Ukrainian" was Anton? The fact that all the expedition diaries refer to him and Dmitrii as "Russians" is of little significance. Scott, as we have seen, referred to the Anglophone members of the expedition as "English", in spite of the fact that several of them came from Commonwealth countries, as well as Wales and Ireland.¹²⁵ Significantly, perhaps, it was Gran, whose country had regained her independence only in 1905, who was most sensitive to matters of nationality.¹²⁶ And even he considers Anton as "Russeren".

Now if the members of the expedition, from Scott downwards, tended to think of citizens of the United Kingdom and the British Commonwealth as "English", it is not, perhaps, surprising, that they considered all subjects of

¹²⁵ Indeed, as Scott and Ponting both note, at the midwinter feast, one of the Irishmen, Keohane became, in Scott's words "intensely Irish and desirous of political argument", and had to be calmed down by Oates. *SLE*, p. 256, *GWS*, p. 143.

¹²⁶ Thus in his account of Christmas 1911 at Granite Harbour, he notes that "Taylor er englænder, Debenham australier, Forde irlænder og jeg nordmand". *TG Diary*, p. 132.

the Tsarist empire as "Russians". Except for Meares, who was fluent in Russian, and Atkinson who was trying to learn the language, they were all very vague about what was and was not Russian. They all accepted the words used to control the dog-teams — "Ki Ki" = "go right", "Chui" = go left, etc. — as Russian, whereas they are, apparently, some local, East Siberian, dialect.¹²⁷ Anton, moreover, had at some point in his travels, acquired and learned to play that typical Russian instrument, the balalaika.

And yet, one cannot help but note that, again and again, throughout the various diaries and narratives, the word "Russian", as applied to Anton, is prefixed by the adjective "little". Anton was, of course, extremely small. But no one refers to him as a "short Russian", or a "small Russian" or a "stocky Russian" — only a "little Russian". Or should it rather be "Little?" Scott, at any rate, knew the expression "Little Russian" in the sense of Ukrainian. One of the sledge dogs (which all had Russian names¹²⁸) was called "Hohol", which Scott translates as "Little Russian".¹²⁹

One needs, of course, to consult the original manuscripts of the diaries, to see if, on occasion, the capital "L" is used to describe Anton. That would imply that, not only had Anton used the term of himself, but that the significance of that term had been understood! But even if he did use the term, the significance cannot have been grasped by all concerned: Cherry-Garrard, we recall, thought that his "home" was Siberia.

One possible explanation of the persistent use of the expression "little Russian" may be a half-remembered and not fully understood joke by Anton himself. Could he, in answer to some comment on his small stature, have tried to jest in his very imperfect English "Of course I — little Russian because I — Little Russian!"?

But, leaving all such speculations aside, we can at least assert that Anton Omelchenko, Captain Scott's "horse attendant" was born in Ukraine, chose to return to and settle in Ukraine, and died (at least according to the official account) in Ukraine. Furthermore, his widow and son were still living in Ukraine as late as the 1960s. Even these minimal facts, perhaps, should ensure him a brief mention in the histories of Ukrainian science and exploration. ■

¹²⁷ *SLE*, p. 485.

¹²⁸ Bolotnikov assumes that they were named by Dmitrii. But this seems unlikely in all cases, since there were several instances of identical or very similar names: Thus, (in Scott's spelling), there were two called "Deek" two called "Suhoi", a "Seri" and a "Seri Uki". On the other hand, Dmitrii was almost certainly responsible for dubbing the extremely unsatisfactory "Lassie" acquired in New Zealand, "Suka".

¹²⁹ *SLE*, pp. 479-482.

Literature

LEONID HLIBOV — SELECTED WORKS

(21.ii.1827 — 29. x.1893)

Leonid Hlibov, who died one hundred years ago this autumn, is universally acknowledged as one of the classics of 19th century Ukrainian literature. Although best remembered for his Aesop-style fables, and for his lyric *Zhurba* (*Sorrow*), which (set to music by Mykola Lysenko) has become — in effect — a folk-song, he also wrote plays, and a number of riddles for children.

OKHRIM'S GREATCOAT

Okhrim had a greatcoat grey,
 Sewn so smart and gay,
 With red wool fringes hanging down behind,
 And upon the collar fancy-work entwined, —
 The finest you could wear!
 But foolish Okhrim for it did not care.
 He took it where 'twere better not to go.
 No sooner put it on, but lo!
 The sleeve of it was tattered and all torn.
 And Okhrim, so that people would not scorn,
 Sat down to sew a patch.
 But where the cloth to match?
 This for Okhrim was no great matter!
 "We shall find it!", to himself he mumbled,
 "I'll cut the sleeve a little shorter,
 And so I'll cure the trouble!"
 'Twas done.
 Once more he put it on.
 'Twas managed, he thought, neatly,
 But to the elbow, he was bare.
 Alas! For everyone who chanced to meet him,
 At once convulsed with belly-laughter there.
 Okhrim was furious to know that they were jeering,

"Just wait", he said, "until —
 "I'll fix it, that I will...!
 Well, let those idiots go on sneering:
 They've all got beetles in their heads, for sure;
 We'll put a new sleeve in once more...
 Nothing could be wiser, never!"
 Okhrim was a lad so very clever!
 And so he set to work apace,
 The greatcoat's skirts cut somewhat short,
 To make the sleeve look as it ought,
 He sliced a strip, sewed it in place;
 The sleeve restored to good condition:
 So off went Okhrim, like an apparition,
 Thinking, "What a fine chap I am, for sure,
 Where could you find another, where?"
 What a fool! See his jacket, there,
 In German style, waist-length, no more!"

Well, that's the way things fare,
 When someone wastes his goods — devil knows where,
 Then rushes wildly round, turning hither and thither,
 Like sparrow in a birdcage caught...
 Then afterwards, poor fellow, shivers,
 In Okhrim's jacket, cut off short.

SORROW

There stands a mountain, lofty, high,
 Beneath it lies a grove,
 A grove so verdant, densely green,
 A paradise 'twill prove.

Beneath the grove, a rivulet...
 Like glass it gleams so fair,
 And flowing through the verdant vale
 It runs away somewhere.

Beside the bank, in sheltered nook,
 Some boats at tether ride,
 Three willows bending over them,
 Grieve at the water-side,

Because summer so sweet must pass,
The chill winds have their day,
Because their lovely leaves must fall,
The flood bear them away.

And I too grieve above the stream...
It runs, resounds amain,
And my poor heart within me faints,
And is all pierced with pain.

O rivulet, dear rivulet!
Like those sweet waves of thine,
So happy days all flowed away,
With every joy of mine...

To thee again, dear rivulet,
Spring will return once more,
But youth will not return again,
Will come back nevermore.

There stands a mountain, lofty, high,
The grove murmurs so green,
The birds are singing with full voice,
The rivulet doth gleam.

How beautiful, how gladsome in
This wide world to remain!...
Why then the heart within me faints
And is all pierced with pain?

'Tis pierced with pain and grieves, because
Spring will return once more,
But youth... will not return again,
Will come back nevermore!...

Across the field he walks, a furrow
With his nose he ploughs; he sows
For one man honour, for one sorrow,
Here a welcome, there harsh woes.

Ploughs far and wide: 'midst strangers dallies,
And in our native land doth dwell,
And once in mine own native valley
Of old for me he did plough well.

But who ploughs with his nose — you wonder?
This is a joke well-hidden then;
I'll tell you straight — no need to ponder:
The answer simply is — a pen!

It sees — unseeing,
It hears — unhearing,
Silently speaking,
Much wisdom bearing,
Oft filled with craving —
Teaches truth rightly;
Other times lying,
All men delighting.
Sweet is its speaking,
Children, together
Let us live with it,
As friends for ever.

What can this thing be,
In this world so blessed,
Wisdom expressing,
Merrily jesting?
If you can't guess it,
Here's a hint for you:
Just one little word —
A *book* it is, surely.

Translated by Vera Rich

■

POEMS FROM KHARKIV*Steven Duplij*

Steven Duplij is a physicist working in the Nuclear Physics Laboratory of Kharkiv State University. He specialises in theoretical physics.

DRAWING

Pastness jeers at the future,
Crosses are melted by smoke,
Meanings confess in the horrors' ward,
Debt stiffs at uttermost line.

Reiterating my prayer in dream,
I stroll along brightness' outskirts again,
Drink trouble to draft the drawing
Of desperation on heart-rending wall.

Generations are cut off by scalpel
Of volte-faces rotted through with guilt,
Haze's drawing above pseudocountry
Is wiped off by calque of time.

Repainting despair into hatred,
I knead moment on evil's palette,
Cut to pieces crossroads of words
By treasons of those who knew
without grasping shoots.

Having changed to imprint nonpersonal
On the infinite's arrow to null,
I set fire from the drawing to stars' contour
And return to my bothering role...

REFLECTIONS

I expel my hatred
 Into basket for Passion —
 Their strange devotion
 Vexes night with pseudohappiness.
 Escaping to sacrificialness
 Of revenge neglected,
 Melting goals' bone
 With honour wasted,
 Grasping lie of flattery,
 Affectedness of meanings,
 Having died with fast dream,
 Taking knife of poverty,
 Yelling, passing through
 To stolen years' peal by thought,
 Reiterating living's moment
 By my childhood crushed,
 Annoying earnest
 With attempts to wash off gibberish,
 Hinting into sincerity
 To forget tender blisses' life,
 Interrupting rally-parade
 Of nonsensical myths,
 I'm closing shatters into town
 Of achievements without reefs.

* * *

Please do steal me from madness to night.
 Oh! My Lord! Be ravaged, lead away
 Me along infinite's shoots into twilight,
 Into rotted through mucus of Time.

Can't survive evil's vow with lying remorse,
 Can not waste that was unknown
 How to conserve from Naiveness, imploring
 Utterlessness not to whisper me end.

Dawn of mine drags along passing line again,
 Predestined by Fate in vain
 On the pilfered dreams and idylls:
 Dawn of mine — is near lonely star.

MOON

Eyes of the Moon — are hazel:
Was so waiting for You evening and night,
Searching the mirage of Pastness,
Endeavouring to surmount the whole of it.

Tear was smelling of alien,
For a moment, filtering to moan,
Deforming the principle to glue
Delight from the sides crying.

Having shivered of strange avenues,
Having wasted the charge to live,
Expelling motif-glumness,
I forgave to wreath Nothingness.

I made from by-gone tenderness
Your Image, having washed off entreaty
Remains of ailing years,
No powers to comprehend them.

Made currentless by Your anew,
I've chosen without trade with Bottom
Profession-pain, the loneliness,
To consume the volume in time.

DOWNPOUR

Downpour — by window,
Snow — inside me.
Selection of mine:
For you — sin.

Fire — from the back,
Sheaf — of betrayals.
Edge — near me,
Stop — Naiveness.

On my table, list
Of mundane affairs,
Splash of ideas,
Sonnet — has been sung.

Downpour — by window,
Snow — inside me...

JANUARY

I am existing with the effort of will power
I am not waiting for the kindness and not giving it
I am not pining for former days,
But I'm not liking the present ones.

I have endured all commotions,
I have become in every of the guises.
I cannot whitewash myself from the dirt's remainders:
Having desired them so much.

I have been so tired to deal out the needless precepts,
To hope for the miracle,
To trust that I will not
Destruct everything again.

But it is not simple to leave myself,
How many times I have tried in vain.
I have hardly lived out the Autumn of Life —
So it is not far from its January.

PASSENGER

I am the only funny passenger
Of the train passing Nowhere,
Halts of cold apartments
And fruitless searches have exhausted me.

Forgotten, amusing, anxious
I don't heat the window with breath.
No end for annoying tiring roadsides —
It's bottom of unavoidableness.

Sleeping Earth — is patient cemetery
Threatening with axe-crosses,
Sharp-clawed evil's lightning-paws
Crush my soul into futile cryings.

Hopes are leaven for the moment's wind,
Already nobody caresses my pain,
In my eyes as behind shutters white,
There's endless anguish of life.

■

News From Ukraine

Nuclear Arms

Ukraine Demands Payment for Nukes Already Returned to Russia

WASHINGTON, October 14 — Ukraine is demanding billions of dollars from Moscow for short-range nuclear missiles she shipped back to Russia months ago before she returns the long-range weapons according to US officials. “There is a very tough issue here which has to do with compensation for highly-enriched uranium in the tactical nuclear weapons that they earlier returned to Russia”, assistant Secretary of Defense Gloria Duffy, the Pentagon’s top disarmament official, told reporters. “That’s the issue at this point around which the Russian-Ukrainian discussions are stuck”.

US to Sign Nuclear Dismantling Deal

KYIV, October 25 — Ukraine, with one-quarter of the former Soviet nuclear arsenal on her territory, will agree to dismantle her missile warheads, according to US Secretary of State Warren Christopher. Signing this agreement would clear the way for Ukraine to receive \$175 million in US funds, part of a \$330 million package that would also include

\$155 million in economic aid. Christopher said he expected to sign the agreement on safe disposal of the weapons before leaving Ukraine. This agreement, the so-called Safe and Secure Dismantlement pact, falls short of what Washington is seeking — Ukraine’s accession to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). Christopher later acknowledged he had received no promises regarding the NPT in discussions with Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk. Foreign Minister Anatoliy Zlenko said he could make no promises about what the Ukrainian parliament might do.

Western Aid Supports Non-Proliferation of Technology

KYIV, November 1 — Officials from the United States, Canada and Sweden announced the creation of a research centre to provide work for Ukrainian nuclear scientists and to avert a dangerous brain-drain from the country. The countries that set up the Science and Technology Center hope it may prompt Ukraine to ratify the START-1 nuclear arms reduction pact and the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The centre aims to provide employment for Ukraine’s highly qualified but impoverished nuclear scientists who might otherwise be tempted to look for higher paid work abroad,

and to act as a clearing house for projects redirecting weapons scientists to peace-time industries.

Ukraine Wants Billions for Her Nuclear Missiles

KYIV, November 2 — Ukraine warned that Moscow and the West cannot expect speedy ratification of nuclear arms reduction treaties until Kyiv gets compensated for giving up the missiles inherited from the Soviets, or at least promises of future payments. Ukrainian experts have estimated that Ukraine should eventually receive up to \$6 billion worth of fuel from the nuclear weapons as well as from profits earned from the sale of the fuel.

Russia's Kozyrev Pressures Ukraine on Nuclear Safety

ODESA, November 6 — Russia has put new pressure on Ukraine at a meeting here of the two countries' foreign ministers, accusing Kyiv of allowing former Soviet nuclear weapons on her soil to become unsafe, reported Ukrainian and Western news agencies.

Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev told Itar-Tass news agency in Moscow: "The technical state of some warheads could lead to a tragedy much worse than Chornobyl".

After the talks began, he said deterioration of some of more than 1,600 long-range warheads inherited by Ukraine from the former Soviet Union "gives rise to great, great alarm".

Ukrainian Foreign Minister Anatoliy Zlenko obliquely accused his guest of exaggerating. "The situation is not so dramatic as someone

wants to present it", he told reporters.

In Kyiv, top arms negotiator, Deputy Foreign Minister Borys Tarasyuk, denied Kozyrev's allegations, saying Russian and Ukrainian experts agreed there was no cause for concern. "There is no danger of any kind at a single site housing nuclear warheads. Russian experts are well aware of this", he said. "There have been similar allegations since the beginning of the year".

Russian pressure has also focused on Ukraine's Achilles' heel — energy dependence. A recent front page story in the Moscow newspaper "Izvestia" quoted a Russian diplomat as saying that Ukraine "will stop receiving cheap oil and gas if she does not part with her nuclear weapons". The diplomat declared: "It would be naive to think that Russia will continue to provide free equipment for her [Ukraine's] nuclear power stations and virtually free oil and gas unless she fulfils her international obligations".

In the course of the talks, Kozyrev told Zlenko that Ukraine need not fear Russia's new military doctrine. Kozyrev also said Moscow had no intention of rushing into NATO membership. He suggested other east European countries should do the same. Kozyrev said the new doctrine's provisions reserving the right to use nuclear weapons in certain circumstances could affect Ukraine only if the Kyiv parliament were looking for a pretext not to make good on pledges to disarm.

On NATO, Kozyrev said membership of the Atlantic alliance was "not a pressing issue". He supported US proposals to involve east European

states in NATO activities, saying Moscow had initiated such an idea. "Once NATO is reformed, there can be various approaches. Perhaps we will join NATO, perhaps others will too", he said. "There is no need to rush forward into NATO membership for Russia or for other countries".

On a lighter side, reporters said that while Zlenko may be under strong diplomatic pressure from Kozyrev over nuclear weapons, Zlenko made short work of the Russian on the tennis court. Zlenko defeated Kozyrev 6-1 6-2 in a fast-moving 90-minute match at a seaside court before the two men started the second day of talks on disarmament and the Black Sea Fleet.

"Zlenko's style is like Ukraine's foreign policy — simple and direct", grinned one Ukrainian diplomat. "Kozyrev is much more deceptive. He tries to trick his opponent".

Ukraine's Parliament Ratifies START-1 With Prerequisites for America, Others

KYIV, November 18— The Supreme Council of Ukraine ratified the START-1 treaty, while simultaneously declaring that it will gradually fulfil its requirements and issuing a series of prerequisites for America and other earlier signatories.

By a vote of 254 to 9, the people's deputies also designated Ukraine neither a nuclear nor a non-nuclear state by declining to approve Article 5 of the Lisbon Protocol on limiting strategic nuclear weapons, which refers to their non-proliferation. The legislators reaffirmed Ukraine's right to

ownership of all nuclear weapons on her territory after the demise of the Soviet Union.

The parliament's separate resolution stipulated that the implementation of the treaty is also contingent on the West's guaranteeing Ukraine's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity as well as financial assistance for dismantling her nuclear arsenal and compensation for the nuclear components that will be transported from the country.

In the first stage of the disarmament, Ukraine will dismantle and destroy 36 per cent of the nuclear weapons — or 63 rockets — and 42 per cent of the strategic nuclear warheads — or 520 of the total nuclear arsenal deployed on her territory. The Supreme Council's decision emphasised that "these limitations do not preclude the possibility of destroying additional carriers and warheads in accordance with procedures which may be determined by Ukraine herself".

"Ukraine as a state which owns nuclear weapons shall move towards a non-nuclear status and gradually dismantle the nuclear weapons deployed on her territory on the condition that she will be given guarantees of her national security under which nuclear powers shall assume obligations never to use nuclear weapons against Ukraine, never to use conventional forces against her, to refrain from the threat of force, to respect the territorial integrity and inviolability of the borders of Ukraine, and to refrain from economic pressures as a means of resolving any disputes", the parliament declared, according

to an unofficial translation provided by the Embassy of Ukraine in Washington, D.C.

"We will liquidate all our weapons", said one lawmaker after the vote which followed a two-hour debate. "However, only step by step. We can't do everything at once".

The parliament vetoed a proposal by President Leonid Kravchuk to guarantee the liquidation of all the weapons.

"Ukraine has a specific status", said lawmaker Serhiy Holovatyi. "We are neither non-nuclear nor are we nuclear. We have become the owners of weapons inherited from the Soviet Union. We are a state which has temporary weapons".

Holovatyi said the conditions approved by the parliament reflect Ukraine's "national interests".

"Implementation of the accord depends on the West. There are doubts whether the United States or Russia will give these guarantees", he said.

Foreign Minister Anatoliy Zlenko said after the vote that further negotiations are needed to resolve the question of security guarantees and financial compensation. "This help is essential for us now, so everyone should treat with understanding Ukraine's terms for the START-1 ratification", he said.

Kravchuk expressed his displeasure with the resolution, saying a day after the vote that he still wanted Ukraine to rid herself completely of former Soviet nuclear weapons and would ask a new parliament to reconsider key disarmament treaties. Kravchuk was speaking to reporters a day after parliament ratified the

START-1 treaty subject to stiff conditions. He said Ukraine did not fully control strategic nuclear weapons still on her territory and had no choice but to give them up.

"I want us to be realists", Kravchuk said. "These weapons are part of a legacy. We did not produce them and we have no full nuclear cycle. If we cannot use or fully control these weapons and cannot replace or service them, I said and repeat here that we must get rid of them. This is my viewpoint from which I have not and will not deviate". Kravchuk pledged that he would present START-1 and a proposal to join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to a new parliament to be elected next March. He said Ukraine could now begin talks with Russia and the United States on how to destroy warheads, missiles and silos on her territory.

The parliamentary resolution also stated that if the dismantlement of the nuclear warheads is carried out in a foreign country, "Ukraine would directly control this process in order to ensure the non-use of the nuclear components of these warheads for the production of nuclear weapons".

It also stipulated that Ukraine would sign agreements requiring the nuclear components to be returned to Ukraine for use in peaceful purposes, such as a nuclear fuel, or compensation for their value. This also pertains to the components of the tactical arsenal, which was transferred to Russia last year, the legislators said.

Stating that Ukraine was not involved in negotiating the START-1 treaty, the Supreme Council recommended that the Ukrainian govern-

ment conduct separate negotiations with foreign countries and international organisations regarding:

- international guarantees for the national security of Ukraine;
- conditions of economic, financial and scientific and technical assistance in the implementation of the commitments under the treaty;
- warranty and supervision of nuclear warheads and missile complexes;
- revision of conditions for financing inspections under the treaty;
- possibilities of a reliable controlled use of silos for peaceful purposes;
- conditions for the use of weapons-grade fissionable materials removed from the nuclear warheads in the course of their elimination; and
- guarantees of fair compensation for the nuclear weapons components.

Looking to a future non-nuclear world, the lawmakers said, "The Supreme Council of Ukraine expresses hope that the nuclear powers which are not parties to the treaty will join the efforts of Ukraine, other USSR successor states and the United States and will begin the reduction of their nuclear arsenals".

Russia raised objections to Ukraine's intention to keep some of the Soviet nuclear weapons she inherited, calling the move a violation of international accords. Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev said that Ukraine's reluctance to give up all of her nuclear weapons makes her the world's sixth nuclear power and undermines the nuclear non-proliferation treaty to which the other nuclear powers had agreed.

Kozyrev said that Ukraine's action

undermines the non-proliferation accord signed by the world's nuclear powers, and which Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan had approved earlier.

Although acknowledging that Kravchuk and his government have called for stricter adherence to the nuclear reduction treaties than parliament seemed willing to embrace, the Russian Foreign Minister pointed out that these nuances may be lost on other states, like North Korea, seeking a way to circumvent the nuclear non-proliferation accords.

The United States said a day after the vote that Ukraine should fully live up to the terms of the treaty calling for her to give up former Soviet nuclear weapons on her territory. A State Department spokesman said "we continue to expect that the Ukraine will live up" to the terms of the treaty.

On Saturday, after the vote, leading Ukrainian politicians accused Western countries of ignoring Ukraine's security concerns and asked them to do more to help her disarm after parliament ratified the START-1 strategic arms pact this week. "We want to persuade the world community, especially nuclear states, that they have to meet us half way", said Vasyl Durdynets, parliament's first deputy chairman. "Our hopes were in vain. We got no guarantees. Promises of help fell far short of what we needed. Ukraine will exchange letters of ratification only when all conditions are met".

NATO Critical of Nuclear Decision

BRUSSELS, November 25 — NATO criticised Ukraine for refusing to give up former Soviet nuclear weapons on her soil and said Kyiv's failure to hon-

our commitments on this would not help it secure much needed economic assistance. Kyiv, which wants security guarantees in exchange for giving up the missiles, has not yet joined the international Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear state.

START Aftermath: US, Russia, Others Increase Arm Twisting Against Ukraine

International pressure on Ukraine has been consistently increasing since the country's Supreme Council ratified on November 18 a watered-down version of START-1 along with prerequisites for the West.

The United States, Russia and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and other countries are urging Ukraine to live up to President Kravchuk's promises to become a non-nuclear state despite the Ukrainian parliament's decision.

President Clinton voiced his "unhappiness" on Monday, November 29, about conditions put on the nuclear pact by Ukraine's parliament, and was assured the accord would be resubmitted next year.

"The president expressed his concern to Pr sident Kravchuk", White House Press Secretary Dee Dee Myers told reporters in describing a 30-minute telephone conversation.

She said Clinton "expressed his... unhappiness with the Ukraine parliament's action" during a conversation she characterised as "frank and open discussion", terms usually reserved for blunt exchanges. "We continue to expect Ukraine to live up to its nuclear obligations", Myers said.

Kravchuk "told President Clinton he planned to resubmit START-1... to the new parliament that will be elected in March, a decision that the president welcomed", according to Myers.

Myers said Kravchuk "also stated his continued willingness to work with the United States and Russia to make progress on deactivating nuclear weapons in Ukraine".

In an interview published that day by the French daily "Le Figaro", Kravchuk said the parliament's vote on the START-1 treaty had not deadlocked the nuclear weapons issue but left him room to manoeuvre. "Rather than speculating on the consequences of the vote, the West would do better to help me technically and financially to destroy nuclear warheads", he said.

Myers declined to say whether Kravchuk had asked for direct financial assistance from Clinton, other than to tell reporters the two leaders "discussed moving quickly to work on further steps toward economic cooperation". Washington observers said that in the wake of the vote an invitation to Kravchuk to visit the United States is unlikely.

Russia declared on Friday, November 26, that she does not recognise Ukraine's ratification last week of the START-1 nuclear disarmament treaty, according to a government statement. Russia also said she would no longer maintain and service the 176 strategic missiles based on Ukrainian territory, as she has been doing so far as part of her obligations to the Commonwealth of Independent States.

Russia said continuing to service the missiles would violate the Non-

Proliferation Treaty, which Ukraine has refused to join as a non-nuclear state despite earlier promises that she would do so.

The Russian government said the conditions Ukraine attached to the treaty, including a claim to ownership of her share of the ex-Soviet nuclear arsenal, make the Supreme Council's ratification of the accord "fictitious". The statement, circulated by the Interfax news agency, said Ukraine's ratification cannot be recognised because "the conditions it contains distort the goals of this treaty". The statement said Ukraine's actions affect the interests of the world community, and that the UN Security Council might have to get involved.

At the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which convened in Rome on Tuesday, November 30, Russia attacked Ukraine over her decision to hold on to some nuclear weapons and demanded that the European security conference should censure Kyiv. In a speech to the conference Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev said the Ukrainian move could start a "chain reaction" across Europe and plunge the continent back into the cold war.

Kozyrev, who referred only to "one of the CSCE member states" without naming Ukraine, said the move had created an "absolutely new situation" in Europe that reversed the process started by the 1968 nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

"Now once again there appears the nuclear problem, which threatens to overturn the whole Treaty system on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and start a chain reaction across the CSCE and right on its borders", he said.

"In fact we risk being plunged back into the worst times of confrontation in Europe", he said, adding that even at that time non-nuclear states renounced possession of atomic arms.

Kozyrev said the "minimum level of security" in the region was threatened by the Ukrainian move. "It would be entirely inexplicable if the CSCE was powerless to note this obvious fact and to speak out with all decisiveness for the inviolability of the Non-Proliferation Treaty", he said.

At the conference, Great Britain, France and Germany also stepped up pressure on Ukraine to give up all the strategic nuclear weapons she inherited from the Soviet Union, and fulfil the START-1 treaty without conditions. The foreign ministers of the three powers urged Kyiv to reconsider its attempt to hold on to over 900 atomic warheads and to delay signing a non-nuclear pledge.

French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe, describing Paris as very worried by the Ukrainian stance, added France's voice to "those who expressed the wish this morning that the nuclear menace does not resurge over Europe".

"Commitments were undertaken by Ukraine, and the conditions it has just imposed on ratification of the START-1 treaty and its hesitations about ratifying the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty are not acceptable", Juppe said.

German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel said he had strongly urged his Ukrainian counterpart, Anatolii Zlenko, over lunch to carry out Kyiv's treaty obligations. German sources said the conference was expected to adopt a firm resolution on nuclear proliferation which, with-

out naming Ukraine, would be clearly aimed at that country.

Canada, which has a large Ukrainian minority, offered to mediate in the dispute and said she understood Kyiv's reluctance to transfer its nuclear arms to Russia for dismantling without guarantees they would not simply be taken over by Moscow.

Britain criticised Ukraine for setting her own terms for shedding her nuclear arsenal, and offered to help dismantle the bombs. In a statement, the British Foreign Office expressed regret that the Ukrainian parliament "has applied conditions to its ratification of the START-1 Treaty which fall short of acceptance of the full terms of the Treaty.

These conditions are likely to remain an obstacle both to the full implementation of START-1 and the entry into force of START-2". It urged Ukraine to speedily deactivate and dismantle the nuclear missiles left over from the Soviet arsenal. "We are prepared to offer practical help with the dismantling of the systems which the Treaty requires should be eliminated", it added.

Defence Issues

Ukrainian Defence Minister Resigns

KYIV, October 4 — Defence Minister Kostyantyn Morozov resigned after it became clear his appointment to Ukraine's new government might spark a battle in parliament. "Parliament is polarised, with some deputies for Morozov and some

against him", said Ministry spokesman Kostyantyn Khivrenko. "To preclude conflict Morozov decided to resign". President Leonid Kravchuk's press office said the President had accepted Morozov's resignation. Kravchuk named General Ivan Bizhan acting Defence Minister.

Radetskyi Named Defence Minister

KYIV, October 8 — The Supreme Council approved by 245 votes to 15 the appointment of Colonel-General Vitaliy Radetskyi as the new Defence Minister of Ukraine.

Radetskyi replaces Kostyantyn Morozov who resigned on October 4.

The parliamentary newspaper "Holos Ukrayiny" (October 9) observed that, Radetskyi, a career infantry officer and former commander of the Odesa military district, is a fitting choice for the post, as he was among the first former Soviet generals to support the creation of an independent Ukrainian army, even before the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Radetskyi, who is 49, was born in the town of Khrystynivka, Cherkasy province. He is a graduate of the Frunze Academy and the General Staff Academy of the former Soviet armed forces. He has served in the Odesa, Kyiv, Baltic and Far-Eastern military districts, as well as in the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany.

New Commander of the Ukrainian Fleet

KYIV, October 11 — President Kravchuk appointed Vice-Admiral Volodymyr Bezkorovaynyi, 49, the new commander of the Ukrainian Black Sea

Fleet. He replaces Borys Kozhyn as Ukraine's naval commander.

Bezkorovaynyi, was born in 1944 in the town of Uman. He is a graduate of the (Soviet) Naval Academy and General Staff Academy and a former commander of the elite nuclear submarine division of the (Soviet) Northern Fleet. In 1988 he was appointed chief of staff of the flotilla of nuclear submarines. His most recent post was the representative of the Minister of Defence at the Ukrainian Admiralty.

According to government sources, Bezkorovaynyi, who was gazetted Vice-Admiral in 1992, has greater professional experience than his predecessor and will accelerate the process of building the country's new fleet. This is to consist of 100 ships, to be constructed at Ukrainian shipyards.

Ukraine Calls for Re-Examination of CFE Pact

KYIV, October 26 — The Ukrainian Foreign Ministry said it was seeking a review of the Conventional Forces in Europe pact to do away with provisions it said were illogical and too costly for Ukraine. The ministry, in a separate statement, also said an accord concluded the previous day with the United States on nuclear weapons failed to provide for immediate disarmament tasks. On the 1990 CFE pact, the ministry said Ukraine's fledgling armed forces were being forced to move tanks and armoured vehicles away from the Black Sea region opposite Turkey to districts closer to central European states.

Slovakia and Ukraine Sign Military Agreement

KYIV, October 29 — Slovakia and Ukraine signed a broad agreement on military cooperation. Defence Minister Imrich Andrejcek said he led "encouraging" discussions with leading Ukrainian politicians. The two countries agreed to supply spare parts to each other's armed forces and to open border crossings. The defence minister said he would also consider a Ukrainian proposal to create a group of countries in the region to discuss security concerns.

NATO Hails Europe Arms Cuts; Russia and Ukraine Complain

BRUSSELS, November 17 — NATO hailed major cuts in conventional arms in Europe but acknowledged there were problems with a landmark treaty providing for the reductions because Russia and Ukraine were pressing for changes. More than 15,000 tanks, artillery pieces, armoured vehicles, helicopters and aircraft had been withdrawn from service on both sides of the old East-West divide after the first year of reductions under the agreement. This represented about one-quarter of the total reductions in the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty which must be completed by November 1995. But Ukraine and Russia had renewed calls for changes to the agreement. Ukraine is upset because the treaty splits its territory, part of the Soviet Union when the pact was signed, in two and would limit the movement of equipment within the country.

Russia wants to station more military equipment than the treaty allows in the Caucasus region, arguing that it must put up a barrier to the conflicts raging in Azerbaijan and Georgia.

The Economy

Privatisation in Ukraine

According to the State Property Fund, to date 1041 state and communal properties with a total value of 70 billion *karbovantsi* have been privatised. More than 300,000 citizens of Ukraine are now owners of businesses. From these privatisations, the Fund received, as of 1 August, 21 billion *karbovantsi*, of which 12 billion were transferred to the state budget. The majority of the privatised businesses are held under leasing arrangements. At present, privatisation in Ukraine is aimed towards shareholding forms of ownership: 59 shareholders' societies have been established and their shares offered for sale.

Ukraine's privatisation programme provides for participation by foreign investors. The Cabinet of Ministers issued a decree listing businesses open to foreign investment.

Kravchuk Orders Privatisation of Incomplete Sites

KYIV — President Leonid Kravchuk on Thursday, October 14, ordered the privatisation of hundreds of unfinished building sites to try to attract investment to Ukraine's sagging economy.

A presidential decree provided for a compulsory transfer to the private

sector of sites at least 50 per cent complete as well as others, provided the relevant state institution agrees. The decree, published by Ukrinform, also called for the privatisation of the land on which the building sites were located. Foreign investors, it said, were welcome to take part in privatisation auctions.

"This is a very, very important decision, previously torpedoed by conservatives in parliament", Deputy Economics Minister Lada Pavlykivska said by telephone. She estimated the total value of sites to be sold off at 100 trillion *karbovantsi*. Parliament still has to approve the measure. Privatisation in Ukraine has proceeded much more slowly than in Russia, although about 1,500 small and several dozen large enterprises have been transferred to private hands.

Other observers have determined that Ukraine appears to have put the brakes on plans for a radical move to a market economy, resorting to centralised tactics reminiscent of Soviet times. The bloody battle between Russian President Boris Yeltsin and the neo-imperialist Moscow parliament rang alarm bells in Kyiv, strengthening calls for a slowdown of economic reform. Economics Minister Roman Shpek said Kyiv, which has been vacillating for months over its reform course, needed a gradual approach to shake off the legacy of seven decades of Communism.

EC Grants Funds for Training

KYIV, October 15 — The EC's TACIS programme which provides technical assistance to the newly

independent states of the former Soviet Union is financing training programmes in the fields of accounting and auditing in Moscow, St. Petersburg, Kyiv and Donetsk. The projects aim to contribute to the urgent need for training for professors, practitioners and students, and complement the assistance currently provided to Russia and Ukraine in the drafting of new accounting and auditing legislation. In a first stage, the beneficiary institutions will be offered a re-training programme for their academic staff while simultaneously developing, together with EC experts from both academic and professional backgrounds, new curricula according to the recently adopted new national legislation.

Ukraine Cancels Chernobyl Shutdown

KYIV, October 21 — Ukrainian lawmakers voted to keep the Chernobyl nuclear power station open and to lift a moratorium on the construction of new nuclear plants. The 221-38 vote in Parliament came in response to a chronic energy shortage that has plagued Ukraine and contributed to the worsening of her economy. The decision keeps the Chernobyl plant in operation "until its resources are exhausted". Experts say this means until 2003.

Western Aid Supports Non-Proliferation of Technology

KYIV, November 1 — Officials from the United States, Canada and Sweden announced the creation of a research centre to provide work for Ukrainian nuclear scientists and to

avert a dangerous brain-drain from the country. The countries that set up the Science and Technology Center hope it may prompt Ukraine to ratify the START-1 nuclear arms reduction pact and the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The centre aims to provide employment for Ukraine's highly qualified but impoverished nuclear scientists who might otherwise be tempted to look for higher paid work abroad, and to act as a clearing house for projects redirecting weapons scientists to peace-time industries.

Kravchuk Revives Communist-Style Economic Levers

KYIV, November 1 — President Leonid Kravchuk tightened central control over Ukraine's economy ordering firms to organise production around the state order, the traditional pillar of the Soviet economy. Two presidential decrees published by the Ukrinform news agency, indicated tighter state control in the future over production and distribution of goods. The orders were in line with a policy statement by Kravchuk last month urging caution in introducing reforms aimed at ending falls in production.

Kravchuk Presses \$10 Billion Bond Scheme

KYIV, November 3 — President Leonid Kravchuk pledged to press ahead with a scheme to issue a series of 400 bonds worth \$25 million each despite growing parliamentary opposition. "Ukraine should attract loans and finance to give our

economy a push", he told journalists. "This is a normal way to attract credits". Kravchuk issued a decree last month providing for the \$10 billion bond issue, backed by Ukraine's natural resources, but the idea was denounced by financial experts and commentators as unrealistic and unprofitable.

Value of Privatisation Accounts Increased

KYIV, November 3 — The nominal value of Ukrainian privatisation certificates was increased 35 times to 1.05 million karbovantsi (about \$30) as of November 1. The certificates were issued late last year in the form of special bank accounts to give Ukrainians funds to invest in firms of their choice. They were initially issued with a nominal value of 30,000, but high inflation has rapidly eroded the value of Ukraine's currency. As of September 189,517 of the certificates had been used, totalling 2.68 billion karbovantsi.

EC Ready for Deals with Ukraine

BRUSSELS, November 9 — The European Community is ready to negotiate partnership agreements with Ukraine and other former republics of the former Soviet Union in addition to Russia, said Belgian Foreign Minister Willy Claes. "The EC does not intend to limit itself to Russia, but the same possibilities are open to other republics... to Ukraine in the first place". But Ukraine must ratify the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and give other nuclear guarantees, he added.

Ukrainians Get 100,000 Note

KYIV, November 17 — Ukrainian consumers got their first chance to spend banknotes of 100,000 karbovantsi. But they did not get much for their money — the note is only worth about \$4. The karbovanets, Ukraine's interim currency, has plummeted in value since it was introduced at par to the Russian rouble in January 1992. A rouble fetches about 25 karbovantsi on the black market and a dollar 25,000. Plans to introduce a full-fledged currency, the hryvnya, have been shelved indefinitely. "As the new note is green, independent observers believe it will soon be suitable — and probably worth one's while — to use it as an equivalent to the dollar," said the daily "Kievskiy Vedomosti".

Ukraine Faces Severe Energy Crisis

KYIV, November 18 — Top officials told Ukraine's Parliament it had to find money and close down large sections of industry to head off a severe energy crisis and keep Ukrainians warm and key factories operating. Leaders of the oil, gas, nuclear and coal industries warned deputies that if Ukrainians continued consuming fuel at current rates supplies would not last through what has started out as the coldest winter in 50 years.

Coal Sector Facing Mass Pit Closures

KYIV, November 25 — Senior managers of eastern Ukraine's coal and steel industry have warned that they are on the brink of ordering mass pit closures because of financial difficulties. "Coal excavation under the con-

trol of the Donetskuvhillya consortium has virtually stopped", according to the firm's director Valentyn Ilyushenko. The consortium groups 21 mines in and around the city of Donetsk. Industry Minister Anatoliy Holubchenko was told "all the consortium's mines will have to close" unless coal prices are brought into line with costs.

Ukraine Tightens Hard Currency Controls

KYIV, November 25 — Ukraine's parliament approved measures to tighten government control over hard currency, forbidding transactions between enterprises and cancelling tax exemptions on earnings. Acting Prime Minister Yefim Zvyahilskyi told the chamber the new measures were to bring more hard currency into state coffers to pay for critical imports such as oil and gas. "This country has a trade

deficit of \$4 billion this year. It's unrealistic to allow free hard currency trading", Zvyahilskyi said.

EC Launches Project to Convert CIS Arms Factories

BRUSSELS, November 29 — The European Community launched a \$5.1 million project to help countries from the former Soviet Union convert weapons factories to ones that produce civilian goods. The 30-month project, which will be implemented by British Aerospace and the French consulting company Softrade Intergroupe, will cover the areas of St. Petersburg and Samar in Russia, Kharkiv in Ukraine and Minsk in Belarus. Although military companies immediately started to produce civilian goods four years ago when arms orders dropped, there had been no coherent plan and many produce the same goods. ■

Documents & Reports

MILITARY DOCTRINE OF UKRAINE

The strategic goal of Ukraine in defence is the protection of her state sovereignty and political independence, the maintenance of territorial integrity and inviolability of her borders.

Ukraine can and should become an influential state, capable of exercising a significant role in maintaining political, economic and military stability in Europe and in the world generally.

Declaring her defensive Military Doctrine, Ukraine takes the stance that she is not a potential enemy of any state.

Ukraine sees her military security as a state of military protection of national interests in the conditions of potential and actual military threat.

The Military Doctrine of Ukraine is an integral part of the concept of national security. It sums up the founding aims and principles ratified by the Supreme Council of Ukraine on the ensuring of the security of the individual, the people and the state through political, diplomatic, economic and military measures.

1. Military-Political Aspects

1.1. Military-political aims of Ukraine and international priorities in providing national security

The principal aim of the military policy of Ukraine is to ensure the national security of Ukraine from external military threat, prevent war, and help maintain international peace and security.

Ukraine is building her relations with other states on a basis of equality, mutual respect, mutual advantage, non-interference in internal affairs and other universally recognised principles and norms of international law, embodied in particular in the Statute of the United Nations Organisation (UNO), the Helsinki Final Act and [other] documents of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

In implementing her foreign political and military-political course in accordance with her national interests, Ukraine:

On October 19, 1993, the Supreme Council of Ukraine ratified the Military Doctrine of Ukraine, submitted by the President and drawn up taking into account the proposals and points of parliamentary commissions and people's deputies.

- does not put forward territorial claims against other states and does not recognise any territorial claims against herself;
- adheres strictly to the principle of the inviolability of existing state borders;
- respects the state sovereignty and political independence of other states and recognises their right to resolve all matters of their national security without damaging the security of other states;
- cooperates in the parity-based balanced reduction of all forms of armed forces and arms in the region and globally, based on the principle of every state's maintaining defence sufficiency;
- supports the resolution of all inter-state conflicts solely through political means and other measures compatible with international law, and the acceptance by all states of mutual non-aggression obligations;
- is building her relations with other states independently of their socio-political order and military-political orientation on a basis of mutually taking into account all matters of national security of the sides;
- forbids the use of her own Armed Forces in the resolution of political issues within her own territory;
- stands against the deployment of foreign troops on her territory and on the territory of other states without their consent;
- excludes her own unilateral total disarmament.

Ukraine stands for the establishment of all-encompassing systems of universal and pan-European security and regards participation in these as an important component of her national security.

While maintaining a non-aligned status, Ukraine is helping to establish reliable international mechanisms and a pan-European security structure at the bilateral, regional and global levels with the aim of strengthening trust and partnership based on mutual understanding and openness in military-political activities.

1.2. Causes of military threat.

Ukraine's position on war

Wars and military conflicts may be caused by economic, political, territorial, national-ethnic, religious or other conflicts, which states cannot always resolve peacefully.

Ukraine regards as her potential enemy any state, whose consistent policy poses a military threat to Ukraine, leads to interference in the internal affairs of Ukraine, or encroaches on her territorial integrity and national interests.

Ukraine condemns war as a means of national policy, adheres to the principle of the non-use of force and/or threat of force and aspires to resolve all international disputes and conflicts solely by political means.

Ukraine participates in troop reductions and conventional arms reduction based on the relevant international agreements, taking into account the need to maintain her own defence capability at an appropriate level.

In respecting the right of every state to freedom of socio-political choice, Ukraine renounces all military interference in their internal affairs.

The principal aim of Ukraine in any possible war would be to repel military aggression, protect her state sovereignty, political independence, and territorial integrity and to end hostilities as quickly as possible by political and diplomatic means.

Ukraine will use her Armed Forces solely in cases of armed aggression against her and encroachments on her territorial integrity, the inviolability of her state borders or in exercising her international obligations.

In the event of the outbreak of war the State and its Armed Forces will adhere strictly to their obligations regarding the protection of victims of armed conflict, as laid down by the relevant international agreements.

1.3. Ukraine's position on nuclear arms and other forms of weapons of mass destruction

Being aware of the catastrophic consequences for the whole of mankind of nuclear war, Ukraine considers the use of nuclear arms unacceptable.

In her foreign political activities Ukraine actively supports universal nuclear disarmament. As a result of historical circumstances Ukraine has become the owner of nuclear arms, inherited by her from the former USSR. Ukraine will never sanction the use of these weapons and excludes from her foreign policy options the threat of the use of nuclear arms.

Ukraine intends to become in the future a non-nuclear state.

Ukraine links the reduction and destruction of the nuclear arms, stationed on her territory, with appropriate actions on the part of other nuclear states and the giving by them and the international community of reliable guarantees of her security.

Ukraine opposes the proliferation of the technology to produce nuclear, chemical and biological (bacteriological) weapons.

2. Military-Technical Aspects

2.1. Basic principles of maintaining military security

The basic tasks in maintaining military security are:

in peacetime — forecasting the aim and character of possible wars in order to prevent them, building up her own Armed Forces within the framework of the international obligations she has assumed, creating and maintaining a military capability at a level sufficient to halt armed aggression, maintaining the non-inviolability of state borders in the air, on land and on the sea, stopping possible provocations and encroachments on the sovereignty of the country, maintaining the constant readiness of the Armed Forces to repel possible aggression on the part of any state (or coalition of states) in the air, space, and on land or sea;

in wartime — mobilising all material and human resources of the country to repel armed aggression, to defeat the aggressor, deprive him of the possibility of continuing the war and ending hostilities in conditions favourable to Ukraine.

The military security of Ukraine is provided by:

- single political-diplomatic efforts, aimed at reducing military resistance;
- the creation of zones free of weapons of mass destruction and of regional security systems;
 - active collective action to resolve conflicts as they emerge;
 - the presence of troops in a constant state of readiness and of reserves whose numerical strength, equipment, military coordination and level of deployment render them capable of repelling aggression;
 - the mobilisation and strategic deployment of all arms of the Armed Forces and organised entry of the state into a condition of war;
 - capability of conducting military actions on land, at sea, in near-earth space, and in the air;
 - the ensuring of a high level of moral-psychological and professional preparedness of personnel for the exercising of the duties of armed combat under any conditions of hostilities;
 - the equipping of the Armed Forces with up-to-date means of armed combat;
 - readiness to allocate appropriate military contingents to the composition of forces of the UNO for the conduct in accordance with decisions of the Security Council of military actions aimed at stopping aggression by individual states or groups of states, as well as the maintenance of peace and security in various regions.

2.2. The tasks of the Armed Forces and the principles on which they are built

The fundamental task of the Armed Forces is the protection of the independence, territorial integrity, and inviolability of Ukraine. They are built in accordance with national legislation and international treaties and agreements on military matters ratified by Ukraine.

The fundamental principles of the building of the Armed Forces are:

- the conduct of operational-tactical, mobilisational, combat and moral-psychological preparation of personnel taking into account the rules of warfare and the principles of the art of war;
- recruitment on the basis of universal military conscription and [voluntary] contracts with the gradual transition to a [fully] professional army;
- military-patriotic education of young men of pre-conscription and conscription age and of serving personnel, based on national-historical traditions;
- the resolution of social security questions relating to military servicemen;

- full de-partisation (a ban on military servicemen taking part in the activities of political parties and movements).

The Armed Forces of Ukraine include in their composition such arms and types of troops and other military formations and installations as are necessary for the maintenance of the defensive capability of the state and envisaged by the legislation in force.

The qualities required in the formation of the Armed Forces are: combat capability, military effectiveness, military steadfastness, mobility, intelligence, leadership qualities, vitality, and preparedness for mobilisation and the carrying out of their military assignments.

2.3. Preparation of the Armed Forces for defence against aggression

Military capability and the location of the Armed Forces on the territory of Ukraine are determined by the need to organise an effective defence of the land and sea borders in all directions and to provide air/space defence of important administrative centres, industrial and potentially sensitive installations.

In the balanced formation of the various arms of the armed forces, types of troops and special troops, priority in development is given to high-accuracy high-power weapons, forces and means of intelligence, air/space defence, radio-electronic warfare, rocket forces, aviation and airborne units, modern surface ships and submarines.

The Armed Forces of Ukraine are equipped with unified automatic control systems, communications, electronic-firepower and metrological backup. A single intelligence space is to be established in the interest of all arms of the Armed Forces and types of troops on the territory of Ukraine.

In the process of operational-tactical, mobilisational and combat training the Armed Forces of Ukraine learn defence, counter-attack and attack manoeuvres. They are thus being trained to choose effective forms and means of military action appropriate to the occasion, enabling the initiative to be snatched from the enemy and maintained.

The system of teaching and upbringing of the cadres in the Armed Forces of Ukraine is a part of the state education system and provides the training of military specialists in peacetime and in wartime.

In wartime the Border Troops, the National Guard, the Security Service, internal and convoy security troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Civil Defence service of Ukraine act together with the Armed Forces.

3. Military-Economic Aspects

3.1. Aims and principles of military-economic policy

The aim of the military-economic policy of Ukraine is to maintain a suitable defence capability for the state with a rational scale of military expenditure. Its own scientific-technical and production potential is directed towards

the provision and development of modern high-efficiency technologies and the establishment on their basis of systems of armaments which within the framework of existing political, economic, international law and other constraints enable the Armed Forces to carry out their assignments effectively.

The fundamental principles of the military-economic policy of Ukraine are:

- ensuring maximum efficiency of military production under conditions of restricted financial and material resources;
- establishing a competitive approach to the development and production of new weapons systems and military technology;
- using a contract approach in filling orders placed by the Ministry of Defence;
- reaching a high technological level in weapons systems and the necessary level of integration;
- ecologically safe and economically beneficial utilisation of weapons systems and military technology, earmarked for decommissioning;
- rational conversion of military production.

The scientific-technical priorities are dual-purpose (military and civil) technologies and new (competitive) technologies, in which Ukraine has reached or can achieve world level.

The military-technical priorities are arms and military technology which increase the firepower and mobility of the troops (forces), as well as weapons systems which can compete on the world market.

Equipping the Armed Forces with modern weapons systems and military technology can be carried out by:

- our own production;
- development and production jointly with other states;
- purchases abroad;

Programmes for the material and social security of Armed Forces personnel has priority financing.

3.2. Preparation of the state and the population for defence

Preparedness of the state for defence is ensured in peacetime by building a robust system of state and military administration, the establishment of production capacity, mobilisable reserves of material resources, as well as timely preparation of the national economy to satisfy the needs of the population, the Armed Forces and other military formations.

The system of preparing the national economy for mobilisation is coordinated with the deployment of troops (forces) and civil defence in order to make the economy more robust and develop mass-scale military production.

Preparation of the national economy for provisioning the troops (forces) is effected by:

- establishing mobilisable reserves of arms, military equipment and other matériel, including those in areas of troop (forces) concentration (designated military zones);

- the establishment (and improvement) of a state infrastructure to facilitate the troops (forces) in carrying out their assignments effectively;
- timely preparation of transport for the transfer of troops (forces) into areas of armed aggression;
- improvement of the system of provisioning the troops (forces).

An appropriate level of military preparedness of those liable for military service is reached by mastering the means of combat available to the Armed Forces.

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The Military Doctrine of Ukraine — the basis on which she is building her army, is based on an analysis of the global geopolitical situation and long-term scholarly forecasts of its development. Such doctrinal foundations are essential for state organs, organisations, organs of self-administration and citizens of Ukraine and are the basis of the coordination of their efforts in the strengthening of the national security of Ukraine.

On the basis of this Military Doctrine, concepts of building up the various types of armed forces, types of troops, and other military formations of Ukraine are now being worked out, together with programmes for their practical implementation. ■

Books & Periodicals**Paul Hollingsworth (translator), THE HAGIOGRAPHY OF KIEVAN RUS', Harvard Library of Early Ukrainian Literature, English Translations: Volume II, Harvard University Press, xcv + 267 pp.**

This collection includes some of the most important hagiographic texts of the early centuries of East Slavonic Christianity: three texts on the martyrs Boris and Gleb, the life of Feodosij, the "Memorial and encomium for Prince Volodimer of Rus'" and the "Life of Avraamij of Smolensk", expertly rendered into an English style, which, while eminently readable, evokes the formalised and Byzantine-modelled idiom of the original. The texts are furnished with copious footnotes, including matters of textual criticism — variant readings, borrowings from other hagiographic texts and the like — and also cultural/historical matters, such as the curious belief in "aerial toll-gates" — check-points on the route between earth and a (physical) heaven, at which the soul would be repeatedly examined, and, if found wanting, thrust down to hell! An extensive scholarly introduction (amounting to over one quarter of the book) deals in depth both with the hagiographic tradition in general, and the sources, background and stylistic features of the individual texts. There is a lengthy bibliography, and useful appendices of Biblical references and of obscure and/or technical Greek and Slavonic terms.

Dr. Hollingsworth's work — both the translation and the notes and introduction — represent a major contribution both to the study of early East Slavonic literature, and to the history of religion in general. The dust-wrapper bears no price, but the volume, which like all publications from the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute is beautifully produced, is unlikely to come cheap. Nevertheless, one hopes that, even in these grim days of cut-backs in university funding, it will be considered a must by faculty and departmental librarians.

There is, however, one minor point with which certain scholars could take exception — the title. The general philosophy of the Early Ukrainian Literature Series, as explained in an "Editorial Statement" at the very beginning of this volume, is that ... "[f]or much of the period covered by the *Library* Ukrainian and Belarussian (sic) cultural figures were active in a shared social, intellectual, and religious milieu". This, however, does not imply that they inhabited the same "political" space — and the term "Kievan

Rus” is normally used to signify those domains under the hegemony of the Grand Princes of Kyiv. There was (and still is) a major controversy between Ukrainian historians who see in that realm the ancestor of today’s Ukrainian state, and their Russian counterparts who claim it as part of a “common Russian” history. But, until very recently, both contenders assumed that the lands which form modern Belarus were part of “Kyiv-Rus”. The new, post-independence, Belarusian school of historiography, effectively denies this. While not all would go as far as Ihnatouski, who in the 1920s put forward the concept of a counter-balancing “Polacak-Rus” to the north and west of the Kyiv-centred state, they all concur in the view that the principalities of the Belarusian lands were, for the most part, independent of, if not actually at enmity with, the Grand Princes of Kyiv. One of the texts in this collection is the “Life of Avraamij of Smolensk”, written by Avraamij’s disciple Efrem, probably (Hollingsworth convincingly argues), in the Monastery of the Deposition of the Veil and the Girdle of the Holy Mother of God outside Smolensk. Smolensk is currently in Russia, but, as the original homeland of the tribe of *Kryvycy*, the *ur*-Belarusians *par excellence*, it is viewed by Belarusians as part of their historical ambit. The inclusion of the “Life of Avraamij” in a book of “Kievan-Rus” texts would seem, therefore, in the post-1991 context to require some justification on textual, linguistic or historical grounds. Dr. Hollingsworth does, indeed, provide such a justification, noting that the “Life” mentions “M’sislav Romanovic, who ruled as prince first in Smolensk (1197-1214) and then in Kiev (1214-1223), and during whose reign Avraamij became a priest”. This would appear to indicate that, in Avraamij’s lifetime, Smolensk was, indeed, in the political ambit of Kyiv. But M’sislav is mentioned simply as an aid to dating the text, not to justify its very presence in the book — and its political, as opposed to chronological, implications could easily pass unnoticed.

The point may seem a small one — and the discussion of it here unnecessarily laboured. But those Belarusians whose consciousness of ethnic and cultural identity survived (albeit by a whisker) decades of *sliyaniye* (“alloying” — Moscow-speak for cultural genocide) are, not surprisingly, ultra-sensitive. It would be a pity if this, or future works from Harvard, added to their sense of historic grievance, by, however unintentionally, appearing to annex unequivocally to Ukraine what they perceive as their own historical tradition, rather than representing — as the editors intend — a shared cultural past.

Vera Rich

Guillaume Le Vasseur, Sieur de Beauplan, DESCRIPTION D'UKRANIE, QUI SONT PLUSIEURS PROVINCES DU ROYAUME DE POLOGNE. CONTENUES DEPUIS LES CONFINS DE LA MOSCOVIE JUSQUES AUX LIMITES DE LA TRANSYLVANIE. ENSEMBLE LEURS MOEURS, FAÇONS DE VIVRES, ET DE FAIRE LA GUERRE, Rouen, 1660, 112 pp, illustr. Facsimile edition, Kyiv-Cambridge (Massachusetts), 1990

OPIS UKRAYINY... (a Ukrainian translation of the above, annotated), Kyiv-Cambridge (Massachusetts), 1990, 254 pp. illustr.

A DESCRIPTION OF UKRAINE, Introduction, Translation and Notes by Andrew B. Pernal and Dennis F. Essar, Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, Cambridge, Mass., 1993, 242 pp. illustr., with accompanying set of 29 maps, presented in separate box

De Beauplan's *Description de l'Ukraine* is one of the primary sources for seventeenth century Ukrainian history. As such, it has been used for over 300 years by a succession of writers, including, among others, the great Edward Gibbon, who, in one of his characteristic footnotes to the *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, complains that he had searched de Beauplan's book through but could not find the great map to which the author referred. (To which many a latter-day reader has mentally added: "Neither could I!"). Yet in spite of this constant use, and the appearance of translations into numerous languages of both western and eastern Europe (the earliest English version appeared in 1704. Although much of de Beauplan's material was incorporated into Volume I of *The English Atlas*, of 1680) the current edition appears to be the first to bring to de Beauplan's text the full apparatus of scholarly criticism.

Guillaume Le Vasseur the younger, better known as the Sieur de Beauplan, was, like his father, a skilled cartographer (according to a contemporary source, his father, Guillaume Le Vasseur the elder, introduced the use of Mercator's projection into French cartography). Born in Rouen, in Normandy (a town he cites on occasion as a datum-line for latitude) in 1600, the younger Guillaume became, by the age of 20, a military engineer, in which capacity, in the year 1630 he took service in the army of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. During the next sixteen and a half years, he took part in campaigns against the Swedes, Muscovites, Turks, Tatars and Cossacks, finally quitting the Commonwealth's service at the end of March 1647. His *Description* and maps of Ukraine, (including the "Great Map" which proved so elusive to Gibbon) summarise his observations made during this period.

The present set of books was produced by the Harvard University's Ukrainian Research Institute (with the facsimile and the Ukrainian translation

forming part of a collaborative project with four learned bodies in Ukraine: the Academy of Sciences, the Archeographic Commission, the Institute of History and the Institute of Social Sciences). The English translation, which will be the principal object of interest to the majority of our readers, is a lavishly produced volume, with a full critical apparatus of notes, indexes and commentaries, which will make it of considerable value, even to scholars working with the original French text. Nevertheless, although, in these days of cost-cutting and economy editions, it is a joy to handle such a treasure of the printers' and book-binders' art, one would like to see, at some future date, a less-scholarly, less-annotated, cheaper, paperback edition.

For, as this excellent version rendering by Andrew B. Pernel and Dennis F. Essar brings out to the full, de Beauplan was very much a man of his time, with the seventeenth-century gentleman's curiosity about all aspects of nature and society, recording his diverse notes and observations in a lively and witty style, with telling vignettes and flashes of insight reminiscent of his English contemporary Samuel Pepys. History, geography, folklore, the arts and techniques of war; the difficulty of abducting a girl unless one has "good legs" and "the girl's promise and consent", locusts "so abundant that they reminded me of the plagues of Egypt", the inheritance laws of the Polish nobility, and how to construct a Cossack bivouac (with diagrams) — all add up to one of the classics of travel literature, but a classic which is, alas, too little known. For three hundred years, scholars have revelled in de Beauplan's material. But he surely deserves a wider and more popular audience. Think about it, Harvard!

Jean Martin

Jonathan P. Stern, OIL AND GAS IN THE FORMER SOVIET UNION — THE CHANGING FOREIGN INVESTMENT AGENDA, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1993, 61 pp. £8.00

The territories of the former Soviet Union, Russia in particular, offer enormous possibilities to Western oil and gas firms. But should they risk their, and their share-holders', money in regions of perceived political instability, where, moreover, the gas or oil produced, may have to be exported across one or more other newly independent states? Dr. Stern's monograph sets out to answer this question for the benefit of potential investors. And his answer is not enthusiastic. Although he sets out both pros and cons in a calm, academic and non-judgmental manner, the arguments against a major commitment to Russia tend to outweigh the advantages. Basically, it is not the current economic problems of that country which seem most off-putting, but the Russians' evident propensity for changing the rules of the game in mid-stream. In the case of the Shtokmanskoye gas field, for example, they gave a Western consortium to understand that it would get the concession, and then, after it had expended considerable resources on feasibility studies, they gave the

contract to a Russian concern. As Dr. Stern points out, all the top figures in the Russian oil and gas industries were raised on Marxist ideology, and accordingly view the Western oil and gas firms as potential exploiters. They do not wish to perceive possible Western partners as making a profit — but without sound prospects of a profit, Western firms will not invest.

All this is bad news, economically, for Ukraine. For the westbound pipelines cross Ukrainian territory, and the Ukrainian energy industry has high hopes of offsetting its own fuel bills to Russia by charging for the passage of oil and gas to the West. Dr. Stern brings out Ukraine's geographical advantages strongly. Thus, analysing the Ukraine-Turkmenistan and Ukraine-Russia gas disputes of 1992, he draws the conclusion that

"[t]he community of interest between the three countries is clear; Turkmenistan needs markets for its gas and transit routes through both Russia and Ukraine to Europe; Russia finds the import of Turkmen gas useful (though possibly not essential) in the future and badly needs an uninterrupted flow through Ukraine to safeguard an important source of hard-currency. Thus everybody can threaten to cut off everybody else's gas, but nobody will benefit from such action".

But this argument assumes that the gas and oil trade are controlled exclusively by commercial interests, and that there will be no political embargoes. One would be naive, however, to assume that this is so. Dr. Stern himself points out, negotiations between the ex-Soviet republics over unpaid bills are routinely resolved not by the supposedly independent firms, nor by the Ministers of Trade or Energy, but by the Prime Ministers of the countries concerned. In other words, gas and oil supplies are treated as a political, not a purely commercial, matter. Less than four years ago, the then Soviet government cut off oil supplies to Lithuania, in reprisal for that country's declaration of independence. And although the Soviet Union is no more, Moscow still perceives energy embargo as a valid political weapon. In July, in their self-assumed role of "peacekeepers" within the CIS, the Russians brokered a peace deal between Abkhazia and Georgia. A month later, the Abkhaz broke the peace and attacked Sukhumi. Russia immediately cut off electricity supplies to Abkhazia. In that particular instance, doubtless a moral case could be made out for economic sanctions against Abkhazia, but the fact that Russia was prepared to do so unilaterally, without consultation with or backing from the international community must have caused a certain alarm to the governments of other countries equally dependent on energy supplies from Russia.

Dr. Stern, certainly, makes it clear in his preface that the "problems of political stability, central/regional/local political relationships, economic reform (including price reform) and industrial restructuring" have now become so enormous as to dwarf the problems of individual industrial sectors "even one so important as energy". He has chosen, he says, simply to sketch these systemic problems in as a background to the oil and gas industries. (His remit was, after all, to advise potential investors of the opportunities offered in the

former Soviet Union, not to warn them off altogether!). Nevertheless, when he finalised his survey in May, it was already apparent that a number of Western firms were looking for partners not in Russia, but in the other oil and gas producing and/or transporting states, including Ukraine. At that time, only one Western firm had a definite stake in the Ukrainian oil and gas industries: *Gaz de France*, which is a partner in the *Oukfragaz* gas transmission and distribution joint venture. Since then, a Ukrainian-British deal has been reached for deep-level offshore exploration off Crimea. Others will doubtless follow.

Vera Rich

**Wolodymyr Kosyk, L'UKRAINE ET LES UKRAINIENS,
Publications de L'Est Européen, Paris, 1993, 174 pp.**

This is a truly excellent little book. Within a brief compass, it provides an outline of Ukrainian history (from the thirteenth century B.C. to the independence referendum of 1 December 1991), language, religion, literature, culture, natural and industrial resources and geopolitical situation, past and present, with a useful time-chart and bibliography. It explains and refutes, in clear and non-tendentious language, such long-standing misapprehensions as "*Kiev, mere des villes Russes*", and the confusion between the Ukrainian Cossack state of the 17th century and the later "Cossack" units of the imperial Russian army. It includes a useful section on the Ukrainian emigration, and also the often neglected subject of the "near" diaspora — the Ukrainians scattered throughout the former Soviet Union — though, perhaps for lack of space, ignoring the considerable Ukrainian communities resident in Ukraine's western and southern neighbours — Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania and Moldova. With this minor exception, the book contains everything that the Western business-person, politician, academic or journalist whose professional horizon has suddenly expanded to comprise Ukraine, will need to know before that first trip to what was, until recently, *terra incognita*. Providing, of course, that he or she is at least moderately Francophone!

Jean Martin

**Bohdan Krawchenko (Ed), UKRAINIAN PAST, UKRAINIAN
PRESENT, Selected Papers from the Fourth World Congress
for Soviet and East European Studies, Harrogate, 1990,
Macmillan, London, 1993, 133 pp. £35.00**

The Fourth Congress for Soviet and East European Studies was — as Dr. Stephen White writes in his Preface — "unusual". Not because — as he would have it — its participants included "for the first time" scholars from the USSR and eastern Europe. For, in fact, a few had managed to attend the Third Congress in Washington in 1985, combining and concealing their pres-

ence at what in the communist world was generally considered to be a CIA-funded event with some more politically acceptable reason for being in the USA. Harrogate was, however, the first of these Congresses which scholars from the political "East" could attend openly, with, if not the blessing, at least the acquiescence, of their governments.

As far as Ukrainian affairs are concerned, the psychological ambience of the two conferences could scarcely have been more different. In November 1985, Ukrainicists anxiously watched the fate of an unfortunate Ukrainian sailor, Myroslav Medvid, who twice jumped ship in the hope of political asylum in the USA, and who was nevertheless repatriated owing to bureaucratic bungling on the part of immigration officials. In July 1990, in Harrogate, the self-same scholars put their signatures to a telegram of congratulations to the Ukrainian government and Supreme Rada on the occasion of their Declaration of Sovereignty.

The formal sessions of the Congress — in 14 panels over six full days — comprised almost 1000 papers, covering a wide range of subjects. Early on, the co-sponsoring bodies — the International Council for Soviet and East European Studies and the British Association for Soviet, Slavonic and East European Studies, realised that it would be impractical to produce a conventional "conference proceedings". Instead, it was decided to produce some 40 individual thematic volumes, or, in some cases, special issues of learned journals, with Dr. Stephen White of the University of Glasgow as General Editor. The present volume, *Ukrainian Past, Ukrainian Present* contains 9 papers, covering the period from 1831 to March 1990.

The first three papers deal with aspects of Ukrainian national awareness and identity in the 19th century. All three are of a high standard of scholarship, well-documented and insightful. Yet all three may prove something of a shock to proponents of the conventional view of the Ukrainian national awakening. For Orest Pelech, ("The State and the Ukrainian Triumvirate in the Russian Empire, 1831-47"), Catherine B. Clay ("From Savage Ukrainian Steppe to Quiet Russian Field: Ukrainian Ethnographers and Imperial Russia in the Reform Era") and Alexis E. Pogorelskin ("A. N. Pypin's Defence of Ukraine: Sources and Motivation") place the Ukrainian awakening in the overall context of intellectual and social developments in the Russian empire generally. This approach yields some interesting cross-bearings. Pelech, for example, locates his "triumvirate" (Kulish, Kostomarov, Shevchenko) within the context of a "cultural revolution that was started by the Russian Imperial State". He argues that, from the time of Peter I until the 1820s, an "imperial model" of citizenship had prevailed in the Russian empire: "a subject needed to be loyal and efficient in the fulfilment of state service, but there was no need for him to convert to the religion of the national identity of the dominant ethnic... It was only in the last years of the reign of Alexander I that the nationalist model of Imperial citizenship began to emerge", while his successor Nicholas I "began the lengthy, systematic and often traumatic process of changing the imperial model of citizenship to the national model". And it was against this background of a Russian cultural revolution

from above, Pelech says, that "the Ukrainian triumvirate found an alternative Eastern Slavic identity and history". While one may not always agree with Pelech's approach or conclusions, his emphasis on a dynamic rather than a static imperial ideology undoubtedly sharpens one's perceptions of — for example — Shevchenko's great political protest poems of the early 1840s — *Rozryta Mohyla*, *Chyhyryn*, *Velykyi Lyokh*, *Son*, *Kavkaz*, and *Poslaniye*.

Clay's work — a review of the ethnographic surveys of the Ukrainian-born Afanasev-Chuzhbinskii and Danilevskii of 1855- includes some fascinating details about the *chumaky* traders, whom Danilevskii viewed as the spiritual heirs of the Cossacks (though the description of "Shapka, the first otaman trailblazer" travelling with "caravans of salt for the Crimea, fish for the Don" reads somewhat strangely — surely it should be "from?") and of the old Ukrainian customary law and its replacement by the often arbitrary and corrupt decisions of the imperial Russian administration.

Pogorelskin's paper deals with a 19th-century viewpoint that is anathema to today's Ukrainian patriots — the argument that Ukrainian culture was valuable and should be encouraged because of its input into the general culture of the Russian empire. Pypin, argues Pogorelskin, accepted the "admonition" of Drahomanov that

"if one does not value the contrast that exists in the soul of Taras Bulba, the Cossack songs, etc., and [the image of] St Petersburg, then one will not... comprehend the appearance of *The Inspector General* and other works... it seems that you... did not perceive in Gogol the 'Ukrainian', a type of Shevchenko, up to his very death".

So convinced, Pogorelskin asserts, it was the contrast between the "grandiose images" of Ukrainian songs and history and the "pettiness and mediocrity" which "entangled" Russian life in the capital, which gave Gogol the insight to depict Russian society so incisively. So arguing "for Ukrainian cultural autonomy... from a purely Russian perspective", Pypin stood out against the wave of attacks current in the Russian press of the 1880s, arguing that what was generally condemned as *ukrainofil'stvo* was simply "a natural human feeling" a "simple attachment to one's homeland". Self-confessed Russian patriots who "made the famous discovery that *ukrainofil'stvo*... was a weapon of 'Polish Intrigues'" had, he said, failed to observe that "the heroes of Ukrainian poetry and history are the enemies of Poland". According to Pypin, Pogorelskin tells us, "[t]he suppression of the Ukrainian language... was the most harmful policy of all because of the profound debt that Russian culture owed that language in one form or another". Yet at the same time, in his prolonged "defence" of Ukrainian culture, Pypin took the stand that "the southern Russian people [i.e. the Ukrainians] are... a Russian people". Nevertheless, argues Pogorelskin, however "simplified or exaggerated" his arguments, he did at least take a stand against Great Russian "destructive cultural chauvinism" in a series of essays which, Pogorelskin concludes, "mark a sad commentary on decades of Tsarist policy in Ukraine".

Papers 4 and 6 in this collection are demographic. In "Ukrainian Migration to Siberia before 1917: The Process and Problems of Losses and Survival Rates", Ihor Stebelsky investigates discrepancies in figures of the census returns of the Russian empire in 1897 and the Soviet censuses of 1917 and 1926 regarding Ukrainian (voluntary) migration to Siberia between 1897 and 1914. Computer simulation of the growth of the Ukrainian population of Asiatic Russia between 1897 and 1917 exceeds the figures of the 1917 census by almost 45%. Stebelsky advances well-substantiated demographic arguments which indicate that, not only did migrants from Ukraine have a higher than average death rate (2.8% as opposed to 2.3% overall), but also that there was significant under-reporting of Ukrainians in the 1917 and 1926 censuses, due either to linguistic assimilation or a bias in the census process itself.

Serhii Pirozhkov, the only scholar from Ukraine to contribute to this volume, tackles an even more complex and sensitive statistical problem: "Population Loss in Ukraine in the 1930s and 1940s" a period that, of course, includes the man-made famine of 1932-33. Using a data base only recently released from the "closed" archives — that is, the census figures for 1926 and 1939, and basing his calculations on the age structure of the population, rather than a crude count of births and deaths, he concludes that during the 1930s, Ukraine suffered a total population loss of some 5.8 million people. This is higher than some other sources (Kulchytskyi gives 3.5 million; Conquest 5 million) — though one must remember that Pirozhkov's figure covers not only actual deaths but also the "indirect loss" of those who, as a result of the famine and the death of their potential parents, were never born at all.

It is significantly lower, however, than the 8 million estimated by the Ukrainian Peasant-Democratic Party in 1990, or the 7 million which, Pirozhkov says, is a "widespread" estimate in the West. Seven million, indeed, seems to be the figure now accepted by Ukrainian officials — witness the speech of Ambassador Serhiy Komisarenko at the Famine Memorial Meeting in London, in September 1993. It may never be possible to reach an unequivocal total for the losses; Pirozhkov's paper, however, is a well-argued piece of statistical modelling and a useful basis for further research.

The fifth paper in the book, Rex A. Wade's "Ukrainian Nationalism and 'Soviet Power', Kharkiv, 1917", is a blow-by-blow account of the six-week struggle between Bolsheviks and Ukrainian nationalists, which culminated in the Bolshevik seizure of power on 9/22 December and the declaration, four days later, of a Ukrainian Soviet Republic. The majority of the population of Kharkiv city, as Wade points out, was not Ukrainian, and — as in other major cities — Russians were predominant in both the officialdom of the city and the factories. Ukrainian nationalism, on the other hand, was relatively weak, at least until the autumn. Nevertheless, as Wade shows, the Bolshevik seizure of power was far from straightforward, and only eventually accomplished with the aid of a Bolshevik expeditionary force, which included Red Guards from Petrograd and sailors from the Baltic Fleet. Furthermore, there remains a major unsolved problem. The resolution of the

Kharkiv Soviet of 10 November, which some authorities cite as "signalling the establishment of Bolshevik soviet power in the city", in reality, Wade says, "demonstrates the prevailing confusion".

The resolution exists in two versions. One reads "We recognise that in Ukraine, as in all the rest of Russia, all authority both locally and centrally must belong to the Congress of Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies *of the Ukrainian republic*" and to the *Central Rada and General Secretariat* chosen by it, and we will do our utmost to convene in the shortest possible time a Ukrainian Constituent Assembly". In the other, the words here italicised are omitted. The presence or absence of these words is clearly critical not only regarding the recognition (or otherwise) of the Rada as a sovereign body, but also the degree of recognition of the Bolshevik government in Petrograd. If these key phrases were indeed present in the original version, they seem to support, at the very least, the idea of a very decentralised federal state expressed in the Third Universal of the Central Rada.

The seventh paper, Taras Hunczak's "Between Two Leviathans: Ukraine during the Second World War" attempts to answer the question: "What options... were really open to Ukrainians during the Second World War? His answer is, in effect, none: the Ukrainians, he concludes, were "powerless, hapless victims". En route to this conclusion, Hunczak gives a concise account of the key events and developments of those years. Nevertheless, the emergence, during the past three years, of so much hitherto-classified material relating to this period makes one look forward to an update — perhaps at the Fifth Congress, in Warsaw, in 1995.

The last two papers were, at the time of the Harrogate Congress, virtually contemporary. In "Restructuring from Below: Informal Groups in Ukraine under Gorbachev, 1985-89", Taras Kuzio outlines the principal "informal" and opposition movements of those years. As the bibliography reveals, much of the material presented here was already available in the Western press or in the research reports of Radio Liberty. Kuzio's paper, however, presents them in a compact and integrated form which, with the accompanying bibliography will undoubtedly prove useful source material to future historians of the period.

Finally, with "The March 1990 Elections in Ukraine", Peter J. Potichnyj brings the story virtually up to date — only four months before the Congress itself. The run-up to the multi-candidate quasi-democratic elections was, in Ukraine as elsewhere in the Soviet Union, an obstacle course through a maze of regulations, in which the ruling *nomenklatura* constantly kept changing the rules to the detriment of would-be candidates from the democratic opposition. The Supreme Soviet eventually elected is the one which, four months later, was to declare Ukraine's sovereignty and a further 13 months later — independence. In view of the somewhat chequered history of that same Supreme Soviet during the past 27 months since independence, Potichnyj's account of its genesis may serve as a useful corrective, by calling to mind how far Ukraine has, in fact, come in that time.

Taken together, the nine studies in this book not only provide much valuable information on a number of aspects of the history and sociology of Ukraine. They also reveal Ukrainian studies as a vigorous and expanding discipline, which, one feels confident, will produce even more fascinating and insightful papers at the next, Warsaw, Congress.

Vera Rich

**Alexander J. Motyl, DILEMMAS OF INDEPENDENCE —
Ukraine after Totalitarianism, Council on Foreign Relations
Press, New York, 1993, 236 pp., \$17.95**

This, as the author himself warns in the preface, is a pessimistic book. "The legacies of empire and totalitarianism in Ukraine and the post-Soviet republics", he says, "incline one to despair". "The future for everyone concerned — for Ukraine, for Russia and the West is likely to be bleak". The West's current policies towards the USSR's successor states are "the worst one can imagine". Economic shock therapy "*cannot* work under the unique post-totalitarian and post-imperial conditions characteristic of all the successor states". Personalities of even the most charismatic leaders are of relatively minor importance (although Motyl clearly thinks highly of President Leonid Kravchuk), human rights are a side-issue. "*Nomenklatura* privatisation" — the effective expropriation of state industries (free or at give-away prices) by their existing managers, creating, in effect, economic fiefdoms for the former communist élite is cautiously praised as beneficial to grass-roots economic reform! But before the dispirited reader of these lines reaches (according to inclination) for the tranquilliser pack or the *horilka* bottle, one must point out that, in spite of the prestigious name of the sponsoring institution, these ideas represent the views of no one but the author, and, in particular, are not shared by those Western individuals and bodies whose opinions are most immediately relevant for Ukraine's economic future — the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

Nevertheless, the book, like the fabled Curate's Egg, is not without its merits. Motyl recognises, for example, the importance of letting "innovative local authorities", in particular, in west Ukraine, push ahead with economic reforms, without being held back either by the slower pace of other parts of the country or by overly restrictive central controls. He places due importance on the importance of "nation building" both at the practical and symbolic level — although his insistence that this must take place in advance of, rather than parallel to, radical economic reforms needs, perhaps, a more detailed justification than he in fact offers. And his concept of "nationality" as a dynamic phenomenon, in which the consciousness of the individual has a role to play perhaps no less than the ethnicity of his/her parents, is of considerable relevance to Ukraine's current reality. Motyl suggests, in effect, that the Soviet "internal passport", with its notorious "Point 5" which fixed

"nationality" once and for all as that of one's parents (or, in the case of the off-spring of an ethnically mixed marriage, by an irrevocable choice of the nationality of one of the parents, made at the age of 16), has produced a mind-set which will complicate Ukraine's problems in dealing with her ethnic Russian minority. Certainly, at the present time, there seems little awareness in Ukraine that nationality might be defined by something other than genetic ethnicity. (The present writer once met a young scientist in Kyiv, who spoke perfect Ukrainian, sang in a Ukrainophone choir, knew the works of Shevchenko virtually by heart, and whose ancestors in both the maternal and paternal lines had lived in Ukraine for five generations — and yet who was quite convinced that — like it or not — he was a Russian, since his parents' passports recorded them as Russians!)

Motyl correctly points out that a country in the twin throes of post-imperial and post-totalitarian chaos cannot become a Western-style democracy overnight. And, as far as economic reform is concerned, his approach is unequivocally Fabian and gradualistic. He is correct, too, in urging the importance of establishing an "inclusive" Ukrainian identity, in which Russian, Jew or Tatar can feel themselves "*bona fide* citizens of Ukraine, no less than the ethnic Ukrainians". But such an "inclusive" identity, which depends on the inner psychological reorientation of the population at large is far harder to create than an economic reform which can be initiated and to some extent implemented by government fiat. As far as the economy is concerned, Motyl is prepared to tolerate *nomenklatura* fiefdoms or a long interim period of state support for unprofitable industries. But the "inclusive identity" he wants at once.

Certainly, the last thing one wants in Ukraine is ethnic tension and (God forbid) violence. But Motyl's concern about the "inclusive identity" issue seems to go far deeper than a proper concern lest Ukraine turn into another and bloodier Bosnia or Karabakh. Although this book is written, in the main, in a calm, academic style, whenever it touches on matters of Ukrainian nationalism — and in particular with the Bandera wing of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists, a shriller note creeps in and the language takes on the tones of the very demagoguery of which Motyl accuses the nationalists.

Writing from the USA (which, incidentally, after more than 200 years has still by no means solved its own problem of "inclusive identity" — ask any Chicago Afro-American or New York Hispanic!), Motyl sees "nationalism" only in the most negative sense of the word, so that he is intolerant, therefore, of political slogans such as "Ukraine above everything!" — not for their possible naivete, but because he sees them as echoes of other, grimmer slogans! Yet in this particular case, "Ukraine above everything" could well be interpreted as advocating precisely that kind of inclusiveness which Motyl himself urges — a loyalty to Ukraine uniting all citizens irrespective of their ethnicity.

Vera Rich

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This is the quarterly of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, a "thick" journal permitting analysis at greater depth than its sister-journal, the monthly *The World Today*. The current number concludes a lengthy article by John Morrison of Reuters entitled "Pereyaslav and after: the Russian-Ukrainian relationship".

In this study, Morrison attempts to place current Ukrainian-Russian tensions (the Black Sea Fleet, nuclear warheads, etc.) in the historical context of the past 350 years and the consequent Ukrainian mistrust of Russia, which he terms the "Pereyaslav complex". Although somewhat outdated by events in both Kyiv and Moscow before it appeared in print, the article remains a significant contribution to the study of Ukraine's role in the current international scene.

In the lengthy book reviews section, which is a regular feature of this journal, two items will be of particular interest to our readers: T. J. Colton and Robert Legvold (Eds.) *After the Soviet Union: from empire to nation* (in which the section on the national question is contributed by the eminent Ukrainian-American scholar Roman Szporluk), and Alexander J. Motyl's *Dilemmas of Independence: Ukraine after totalitarianism*.

SURVIVAL, The IISS Quarterly, Vol. 35, No. 3, Autumn, 1993

This latest issue of the quarterly of the International Institute for Strategic Studies includes an article on "Polish-Ukrainian Relations: Europe's Neglected Strategic Axis". The author, Ian Brzezinski, whose affiliation is given as "National Forum Foundation Fellow at the Institute on Global and Regional Security in Kiev", takes as his starting-point the suggestion of Ukraine's Deputy Foreign Minister, Boris Tarasyuk, who, he said "envisioned European stability as being based on a pyramid consisting of two principal axes: the German Russian relationship and the Ukrainian-Polish relationship". In spite of the somewhat peculiar geometry of this metaphor, there are some instructive points of comparison between the two relationships: in both cases a new "strategic partnership" after a history of "acrimony, confrontation and conflict".

Brzezinski analyses a number of potential threats to the Polish-Ukrainian partnership, including Russian pressure, potential trade rivalry, and the fear of many Poles that a close relationship with Ukraine could provoke a nationalist backlash in Moscow, and indicates the role the West could play in furthering the Polish-Ukrainian "strategic partnership". The article makes a number of interesting points. However, Mr. Brzezinski's expertise falls short somewhat in matters of religion. While observing correctly the role of inter-church relations in "sharpen[ing] Polish-Ukrainian tensions", he goes on to discuss the religious issue as a straight 2-party rivalry between the Polish (Roman) Catholic Church and the Orthodox. The existence of the Greek-rite Ukrainian Catholic Church is not mentioned, and the "Catholic population in Ukraine" is stated to be "too small to constitute an internal threat to [the] host nation". ■