

THE UKRAINIAN REVIEW



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1989

A Quarterly Journal devoted to the study of Ukraine

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TARAS SHEVCHENKO

Self portrait

Pencil drawing. (August 1845)

*On the 175th Anniversary of the birth of
Taras Shevchenko*

TARAS SHEVCHENKO AS AN ARTIST

This year we are commemorating the 175th anniversary of the birth of Ukraine's greatest poet, Taras Shevchenko. While many articles on the life and literary works of Shevchenko will appear, I think it worthwhile to focus the reader's attention on a relatively unknown side to his creative life and talents — namely Shevchenko the artist.

Although the great significance of Shevchenko's multi-faceted contribution towards the cultural, social and political life of the Ukrainian people in the field of literature is well-known, few people are aware that Ukraine's 19th century poet and bard was also the creator of high quality works of art and that his legacy had a marked impact on the development of Ukrainian culture in the field of art. As part of this legacy, Shevchenko not only left the world many valuable literary works, but also 835 known and 278 as yet lost artistic treasures.

In the first place, it is important to point out that Shevchenko's creativity was based on his ideas and beliefs as a philosopher-enlightener and fighter for the national freedom of Ukraine. He believed that the duty of an artist is to serve the interests of the people and his native land. Although this service could take many forms, it entailed, essentially, the formation, through art, of the national self-awareness of the people towards the struggle for a free and independent Ukraine — a decisive struggle against serfdom as a form of slavery thrust upon Ukraine by the Russians. These ideas are reflected in Shevchenko's artistic works.

Taras Shevchenko's career as an artist can be divided into four major periods: the pre-academic period (1830-1838); the academic period (1838-1845); the post-academic period (1845-1847); and the period of exile (1847-1857).

From Shevchenko's autobiography and the memoirs of his brother-in-law Bartholomew we learn that Shevchenko began to paint at a very early age. Later, while a servant of Engelhardt (1829-1832), he began to reproduce prints. One of Shevchenko's reproductions from this time, "Bust of a woman" (Wilno 1830), has survived. In 1831 Shevchenko moved to Petersburg with his master, where, from 1832, he worked in the studio of V.H. Shyriayev, was acquainted with the painter I.M. Soshenko and attended classes of the Society for the Encouragement of Painters (1835).

This set Shevchenko on the course of further painting — professional training for admission to the Academy of Arts.

His first group of paintings comprised subjects from ancient history: "Death of Lucretia", "Alexander of Macedonia expresses trust in his doctor Philippo", "Death of Virginia", "Death of Socrates", as well as two paintings from Ukrainian history — "Death of Oleh, Prince of the Derevlianians" and "Death of Bohdan Khmelnytskyi".

In the last years of the pre-academic period Shevchenko painted a series of portraits in water-colour, among them the portrait of the Ukrainian poet Ye. P. Hrebinka (1837).

Shevchenko entered the Academy of Arts in April 1838. There he had the opportunity to study under the direction of K.P. Bryullov. During his years at the Academy, Shevchenko mastered the technique of oil painting, Italian pencil drawing, chalk drawing, as well as etching. This period in his career can be divided into the following cycles: reproduction of oils and water-colours by Bryullov, like "Head of a Mother", "Disrupted Encounter" and "Dream of a Grandmother and Granddaughter"; model studies; illustrations for various publications; paintings on various themes from literature; genre compositions and landscapes.

He also continued to devote his attention to themes from the history and social life of the Ukrainian people, portraying their great dignity.

At the beginning of the 1840s, Shevchenko became renowned for his illustrations to Shakespeare's "King Lear" and M. Plevy's "History of Suvorov". From 1834-1844 Shevchenko travelled around Ukraine painting landscapes, historic monuments and social life in the villages. However, his etchings to the collection *Malovnycha Ukraina* (Picturesque Ukraine) remained central in his focus of attention. Anxious to expose the oppressive policies of Tsarist Russia and to portray the glorious past of his people and thereby to raise the level of consciousness of the peasantry, Shevchenko decided to recreate the beautiful landscapes and historic monuments of Ukraine.

From his studies of the Ukrainian landscape Shevchenko published six etchings in 1844-1845, which included "In Kyiv", "The Vydubytskyi Monastery in Kyiv", "Gifts in Chyhyryn 1649", "The Council", "Village Matchmakers" and "Fable", which formed the first edition of *Malovnycha Ukraina*.

Shevchenko also had plans to publish etchings of other historic towns — Chyhyryn, Subotiv and Baturyn — and the Pokrovska Church in the Zaporizhian Sich, as well as various other etchings on social and historical themes.

Shevchenko's etchings, according to Prof. Yuriy Turchenko, "signified the beginning and consolidation of a new direction in Ukrainian art, the characteristic feature of which was an interest in national life, native culture, and criticism of the existing order".

Taras Shevchenko was one of the first people to realise and point out the huge social and educational significance of the etching as a means of mass

producing works of art. While working in this field, Shevchenko attained such a high standard that the Council of the Petersburg Academy of Arts accorded him the title of Academic of the Etching.

Shevchenko completed his studies at the Academy in April 1845 and returned to Ukraine. In this, the post-academic period, he devoted far more attention to the portrait than in previous years. After finishing the Academy, Shevchenko became a true master of the portrait and was already renowned throughout the whole of Ukraine and far beyond her borders as a notable national poet.

In this period, the landscape received particular attention from Shevchenko, especially architectural landscape. After his return to Ukraine, he worked as an artist with the Kyiv Archaeographical Commission travelling around the Poltava, Kyiv and Volyn regions in order to paint the relics of Ukraine's past.

Here it is worth noting that the 1830s and 1840s were exceptionally productive years in the creative life of Taras Shevchenko. Having started off with mere reproductions he progressed to complicated works in all genres of art.

On April 5, 1847, Shevchenko was arrested and arrived at the Orenburg fortress on June 9 a simple soldier forbidden to write or paint. Nevertheless, despite the ban, Shevchenko managed to produce several hundred works of art which are now well known to everyone, proving that even in the most difficult years of exile he did not cease his work as a painter and, in fact, reached such a high standard in his better genre compositions that was not yet known to Russian and Ukrainian art.

In exile Shevchenko also painted many Kazakh landscapes during an expedition, as well as producing many pencil sketches.

After his release in 1858, Shevchenko continued to work as an artist until his death in 1861, painting portraits, among them that of the famous Russian actor M.S. Shchepkin (1858) and the notable actor Ira Aldridge (1858), and genre compositions such as "Me in my own home" (1858), "Mermaids" (1859) and "Old Man at the Cemetery" (1859).

Having briefly examined the creative life of Taras Shevchenko, we can see that it was a life of a renowned and gifted artist who was equally talented be it in portrait painting, or the social genre, or the landscape, who was a master not only of oil painting and water-colour, but also of the drawing and etching.

Stephen OLESKIW

GLASNOST AND THE UKRAINIAN CATHOLIC CHURCH

In 1946, the Ukrainian Catholic Church was officially outlawed and incorporated into the Russian Orthodox Church. Forty-two years later, in the age of glasnost, despite the attempts of the hierarchy, clergy and thousands of faithful to secure its legalisation, the Church still remains outside the law. Although glasnost and perestroika are in the air, Ukrainian Catholics continue to suffer harassment and persecution. Yuriy Rudenko, for instance, the son of recently released Ukrainian writer, founding member of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group and former political prisoner, Mykola Rudenko, who arrived in the West in 1987, was arrested on August 8, in the village of Kulashi, western Ukraine, for "violation of the law on religious activities". According to Mykola Muratov, head of the Moscow branch of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union and legal consultant to the Committee for the Defence of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, Yuriy Rudenko had taken part in religious services, but was not directly involved in their organisation. Rev. Havryliv was arrested in Lviv, on August 11, as he stepped off a train which had just arrived from Kyiv, where he had met a priest from abroad and accepted religious literature and articles from him. He was sentenced to 15 days of imprisonment.

Rev. Havryliv was originally an Orthodox priest. He was accepted into the Ukrainian Catholic Church in December 1979. From then on, like many others, he has suffered constant harassment and has experienced great difficulty in finding work. Unable to fulfil his religious duties openly, Havryliv worked as a disinfectant, electrician and welder. In 1986, he was fined 50 roubles (approximately £50) for conducting a Catholic funeral. A year later, while visiting his friend, Volodymyr Shchur, he was again fined 50 roubles for an alleged attempt to organise a meeting of Ukrainian Catholics.

The Yavoriv district authorities continue to harass Ukrainian Catholic priest, Rev. Petro Zeleniukh. Rev. Zeleniukh, who comes from the village of Kalynivka, is one of many Ukrainian Catholics who are suffering for their religious beliefs.

Since the time the authorities handed the Catholic church in the village over to the Russian Orthodox Church, hundreds of faithful have been gathering in front of Rev. Zeleniukh's house to hear Mass. The priest is being constantly fined for celebrating Mass even on occasions when he was not in the village. In a protest letter to Mikhail Gorbachev he wrote: "They fine me

for every Sunday, every religious holiday, even when I do not celebrate Mass, when I'm not at home".

Rev. Zeleniukh and his wife Iryna, who are living off her monthly pension, find these fines particularly insufferable. In an appeal to Catholics in the free world, Iryna Zeleniukh wrote the following:

"Lately, despite the changes in our country — democratisation, glasnost and new thinking — the local authorities have turned on Rev. Petro, and with numerous fines have, in fact, led our family to a state of complete bankruptcy. In the last few months alone, my husband has been fined 40 times! Many faithful in Kalynivka help us as much as they can, but even they are no longer able to pay the priest's fines. I receive a monthly pension of 57 roubles, with which I have to pay my husband's fines and maintain the family. God is our hope, and He gives us strength. So I am appealing to you, my Catholic brothers and sisters, with the plea to help my husband materially, even if with 1 cent, as well as for spiritual and material support. . ."

According to Ukrainian religious activist, Ivan Hel, head of the Committee for the Defence of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, administrative fines for "illegal" religious activities have been increased following the recent gatherings in Ukraine, attended by thousands of Catholic believers.

But it is not only Catholics that are suffering. Baptists are also being harassed for their religious practices. Although the number of cases when fines have been levied against registered Baptist communities dropped in July 1988, this practice is, nevertheless, continuing against unregistered Baptist groups. Chernivtsi remains a bastion of the old order. On June 14, the administrative commission of the Lenin district executive committee, headed by V. M. Petryk, fined the presbyter of an unregistered community of Evangelical Christians-Baptists, Ivan Hryhorovych Danyliuk, 50 roubles for holding a religious meeting. The meeting was held in a private residence in Chernivtsi. When Danyliuk appealed to higher judicial authorities, he was informed that he had no right to complain about this or any other future fines. Similar cases are numerous.

Although glasnost has led to greater state tolerance towards religion in the USSR, with the granting of various privileges to the Moscow Patriarchate, which was allowed to celebrate the millennium, and the return of Kyiv's ancient Monastery of the Caves to the Russian Orthodox Church, it does not, however, include Ukraine's two largest denominations — the Ukrainian Catholic and Autocephalous Orthodox Churches. They are still not officially recognised. The Monastery, for instance, was returned to the Russian Orthodox Church and not its rightful owner — the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orth-

odox Church — and the militia has recently stepped up the persecution of the outlawed Ukrainian Catholic Church: services are disrupted, religious believers continue to be harassed and repressed, priests are prevented from celebrating Mass, and appeals to the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet for the legalisation of the Ukrainian Catholic Church are ignored.

Although the crude draconian measures of Stalin's days have gone out of vogue, the state policy of persecution of the Ukrainian Church remains, in principle, unchanged. The only difference being that the authorities are employing new methods in the struggle against the Church. Activists for the legalisation of the Catholic Church are threatened, imprisoned or subjected to administrative fines, religious attributes are destroyed and churches desecrated. In areas where the campaign for the legalisation of the Church is particularly strong, as in Hrushiv, which became famous last year for pilgrimages to the apparition of the Virgin Mary on the anniversary of the Chernobyl disaster, Zarvanytsia, a centre of pilgrimages for many years, Tuchne, and Kuchycha Volya, the authorities are opening Catholic churches, closed for over forty years, and handing them over to the Russian Orthodox Church. With the help of blackmail and coercion, the KGB, the militia and the Russian hierarchy are trying to force the most backward and frightened believers into the Russian Orthodox Church. In this way, by turning the Russian Church into a tool for the repression of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, the authorities hope to provoke open hostility between the two Churches. Not only that, by creating the impression of state tolerance towards religion and Moscow's guarantee of the constitutional right of religious beliefs, Mr. Gorbachev is hoping to gain a huge propaganda coup.

On the other hand, as far as the Moscow Patriarchate is concerned, the official recognition of the banned Ukrainian Churches would entail an immense potential loss for the Russian Orthodox Church. According to figures quoted by the Soviet news agency Tass on May 3 (also *Radyanska Ukraina*, March 27, 1988), there are 4,000 functioning Russian Orthodox churches in Ukraine. The total number of functioning Russian churches throughout the Soviet Union, according to Konstantin Kharchev, chairman of the Council for religious affairs, is 6,800. Therefore, almost 60 per cent of all functioning Russian Orthodox churches in the USSR are located in Ukraine. In addition, 1,006 of the Russian churches in the republic are situated in the Lviv-Ternopil eparchy, which, incidentally, is the largest eparchy of the Russian Orthodox Church. It follows, then, that almost 15 per cent of all functioning Russian Orthodox churches are situated in the centre of Ukrainian Catholicism (*Sotsiologicheskie Issledovania*, №4, 1987, and *Liudyna i Svit*, №5, 1988). With the help of the militia and the security organs, the Russian Church hopes to extend its control over western Ukraine and Transcarpathia, an area inhabited by 5 million Ukrainian Catholics.

And yet, inspite of what is going on, Soviet publicist, Klym Dmytruk,

writes ironically that "In Ukraine, nobody is persecuted for their religious beliefs. This is just a figment of bourgeois-nationalist and church propaganda in an attempt to discredit the situation of believers and the Church" (*Liudyna i Svit*, №5, 1988).

The Soviet Authorities claim there are no restrictions on religion in the USSR and that people can worship God freely. It is true that there are open churches in Ukraine, where people can come and pray, but they are registered with the Moscow Patriarchate and under full control of the Soviet authorities. People go to these churches because there are no others. But even then they are running a great risk. Regular church-goers, particularly suspected Catholics, are often deprived of work, higher education and a place to live.

When Stalin and his henchmen decided to liquidate the Ukrainian Catholic Church, they thought that the priests would die in Siberia, there would be no bishops and the masses would forget in time. What occurred was the complete opposite. The Church survived the Stalinist terror and forty-three years in the catacombs. Thousands of priests returned from the gulag only to resume their previous activities with even more zeal than before, although many, like Bishop Pavlo Vasylyk, had been imprisoned two or three times. As a result, the Ukrainian Catholic Church is alive today, and is living through a period of great revival. The millennium celebrations throughout Ukraine, attended by many thousands of believers, testify to this. There are presently around 1,000 Catholic priests and more than 10 bishops in Ukraine, who are performing their religious duties in the underground. Monastic life is also flourishing, particularly the Basilian and Studite orders. Nuns are the right hand of the priests, preparing children for holy communion, helping the sick and the poor, making rosaries and so on. They are usually qualified teachers or nurses, and work in hospitals, laboratories and kindergartens, spreading the Word of God wherever possible.

In recent years, there has been a marked upsurge of religious feeling throughout the Soviet Union. In a speech at the Higher Party School, Konstantin Kharchev stated that the number of believers in the USSR is 115 million. In *Ogonek*, an official Soviet publication, however, he claimed that the figure was 70 million. On the basis of official Soviet data, then, one can assume that the number of believers in the USSR is between 41 per cent and 25 per cent of the population.

In Ukraine, the Chornobyl catastrophe two years ago and the millennium of Christianity have played a major role in reawakening religious and national consciousness. Despite continued persecution, fear of the authorities has disappeared. Recently, the hierarchy, clergy and many faithful of the Ukrainian Catholic Church have come out into the open and are leading an active campaign for the legalisation of their Church. Petitions to the USSR Supreme Soviet, in some cases signed by thousands of Ukrainian Catholic believers,

are becoming more numerous. On June 23, the Committee for the Defence of the Ukrainian Catholic Church organised a requiem service for the "victims of Stalinism" in Lviv's main Lychakivskyi cemetery. The service, attended by 3,000 people, was celebrated by two priests, one of whom was the well-known Rev. Petro Zeleniukh. Prayers were said for the 7 million victims of the forced famine in Ukraine in 1933, the cultural activists murdered in the 1930s, the thousands of Ukrainian political prisoners murdered by the NKVD in 1941, the Ukrainian prisoners of conscience who suffered imprisonment during Brezhnev's days, as well as for those who are imprisoned today, and those who died in labour camps after Mikhail Gorbachev took over as Soviet leader.

The huge machine has been set in motion not only in Ukraine, but throughout the Soviet Union and is gathering momentum. Without an outright crack-down along the lines of the purges of the 1930s, a reversal of this process is impossible. Pope John Paul's recognition of the existence of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, in spite of continuous Soviet statements to the contrary, has been invaluable in bringing the suffering of Ukrainian Catholics to the attention of the free world. This has deprived the Soviet leader of the necessary leeway to launch a full-scale attack against the Church. Freedom of conscience is one of the fundamental human rights without which the process of democratisation is impossible. If Mr. Gorbachev wishes to maintain his image and lend credibility to glasnost and perestroika, he must seriously consider granting the Ukrainian Catholic Church legal status. Western solidarity with Ukrainian Catholics and pressure on the Soviet leadership for the legalisation of this Church may bring Mikhail Gorbachev a step closer to making this decision, however reluctantly. At least, if the Ukrainian Catholic Church remains in the forefront of public attention, with the help of the Holy See and the Christian community throughout the world, Mikhail Gorbachev will not have a free hand to finish what Stalin had started.

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CRACKING DOWN ON DISSENT: BUREAUCRATIC SATISFICING IN THE USSR (Part 1)

Introduction

Analysts of social affairs, past and present, have noted that social systems often swing, pendulum-like, between action and inaction. Political philosopher Henri Saint-Simon postulated a social pendulum varying between (*alternance*) "critical" and "organic" periods. Friedrich Hegel and later Karl Marx proposed that established systems ("theses") will ultimately generate their opposites ("antithesis"), thereby destabilising the status quo. More recently, empirical studies have noted that certain systems alternate between periods of "drift" and periods of "action" (Sundquist, 1968). Students of electoral behaviour have found stability in voting patterns periodically giving way to "critical elections" (see Burnham, 1970).

Protest and crackdown

Specifically, protest movements have experienced similar diachronic vasculations in the response of established regimes toward political dissenters (Kowalewski, 1980). Rarely if ever do political regimes maintain an even pressure on dissidents across time. Rather, regimes most often alternate between periods of "drift" and "crackdown". Sound theoretical reasons can be adduced to shed light on this pendulum-like behaviour. Drift periods can be explained by the secrecy, fear, and/or weakness of dissident groups. Consequently, the activities of dissident groups present little immediate threat to the power of the regime. The minimal threat, in turn, strengthens moderate factions in the regime over hard-line elements. Hence the regime treats dissidents with a relatively mild hand. Repression, when it occurs, is usually directed only against the most serious manifestations of public dissatisfaction.

This regime drift, however, frequently enables dissident groups to mobilise with a certain degree of success. In addition, dissidents perceive the regime as relatively weak, thereby encouraging more extensive and open behaviour. This activity, in turn, facilitates recruitment of new members and thus the growth of the movement. Yet this enhanced mobilisation soon comes to the attention of an increasingly threatened regime. The case of moderates in the

regime is weakened and more hard-line officials tend to dominate. At this point, the regime "cracks down" on dissidents, rounding up many movement members for arrest and incarceration.

Comparison dimensions

These considerations lead naturally to an important theoretical question. Do dissidents, arrested in crackdown or "tight" periods, differ substantially from those in drift or "slack" periods? Or is the difference between the two time slices only one of numbers? At least two dimensions seem worthy of analysis: dissident traits and repression characteristics. First, the social and political traits of dissenters arrested in times of crackdown may vary substantially from those taken in during times of drift. The regime may single out, laser-like, particular categories of dissident-citizens for arrest when cracking down on threatening movements. Thus crackdown arrestees may differ from noncrackdown ones on certain social and political dimensions. On the other hand, little variation in dissident traits may be found between crackdown and noncrackdown periods.

Second, the regime may repress arrestees to a different degree than drift arrestees. Dissidents taken in during crackdown periods may experience repression from the regime to a degree different from that meted out to drift arrestees. Again, regimes cracking down on dissident movements may act with a high level of discrimination in their repression policies. Thus the repression characteristics of dissidents arrested in crackdown times may differ substantially from those arrested in times of drift. On the other hand, regimes may treat both groups with an equal degree of repression severity. In short, the difference between the two periods may be only one of numbers of arrestees.

Contending theories

A number of theoretical perspectives may be used to explain and predict the differences, or lack thereof, between the two periods along the two sets of variables. Regimes, cracking down on dissident movements, may follow one of four "operational codes" (Leites, 1951) to deal with the growing threat from below. These contending codes include a set of political assumptions and perspectives and, consequently, a set of criteria and rules to be followed in the choices to be made while cracking down. These choices, as noted above, involve (1) which dissidents to arrest (dissident traits) and (2) how severely to punish (repression characteristics). Each operational code specifies a unique set of choices along these two dimensions.

Ideological Vindictiveness. The ideological vindictiveness model postulates that members of political regimes derive their power from, and maintain it with, a set of ideological tenets in which they have a highly emotional stake. Their "might" is generated from "right". In the eyes of the regime, the good citizens are those who not only follow the rules but do so with enthusiasm.

They must not only behave correctly but believe correctly as well. Hence, according to this "totalitarian" or "monistic" model (Friedrich, 1954), political dissenters are not merely intellectually wrong but morally evil and should be punished accordingly. Dissent is tantamount to betrayal. Indeed, given the highly moral self-perception of regime officials, dissidents by definition are questioning the moral integrity of the regime itself. Consequently dissent is perceived by the regime more as a moral attack than a mere policy disagreement. Thus regimes will defend their moral integrity with great ideological hostility when cracking down on the evil dissenter.

Cybernetic Roundup. A second model proposes that political regimes respond in knee-jerk fashion when faced with growing dissent. The dissenter represents an annoyance in the smooth functioning of the system. The greater the dissent, the more "bugs" to be rooted out. Hence periodic crackdowns become necessary to prevent systematic breakdown. These "purges" against disequilibrating elements thereby enable the system's controllers to maintain their power which they perceive as based on the smooth integration of subsystem parts. Thus the controllers send out the police to round up the political destabilisers simply to restore systematic harmony. In this cybernetic model (Deutsch, 1963), the questions of who are arrested and how severely they are repressed are irrelevant. Only numbers are important.

Machiavellian Decapitation. A third model accords political regimes a greater sophistication. The decapitation perspective postulates that political regimes will operate with great calculation when cracking down on growing dissent. Regimes will recognise that most citizens are apathetic and become mobilised into political dissent only when aroused by "demagogic leaders". Thus, when cracking down, regimes will discriminate clearly between movement leaders and followers. Hence the most rational crackdown focuses specifically on dissident leaders. When the leaders are removed it is thought, the followers will cease to follow. Thus the regime will, laser-like, crack down only on leaders. This policy combination of carrot (toward followers) and stick (toward leaders) serves not only to discourage future leaders, but also to ensure the gratitude of the followers for non-arrest. The movement is divided and thus ruled. The dissident leaders on whom the crackdown falls, in turn, will be treated with great severity as an object lesson to their followers.

Bureaucratic Satisficing. A final model suggests that political regimes will respond to growing dissidence in bureaucratic fashion. As highly political entities, the bureaucracies will attempt to generate external support and minimise dissent which represents an environmental threat to their survival (Wamsley, 1969). Cracking down on dissent thereby solidifies the control of high-ranking officials and also allows the bureaus to make demands for a greater allocation of resources. Yet because of political constraints and organisational rigidity and pressures, an "optimising" strategy is unfeasible. Rather the "satisficing" behaviour characteristic of bureaucracy (Simon, 1958; March and Simon, 1955) becomes the crackdown strategy.

When faced with growing dissent, the bureaucratic regime will take the easiest or least disruptive road when rounding up dissidents. It will crack

down on the dissidents most accessible and most visible. It will gear up its administrative machinery to take in a great number of dissidents for processing through the repression apparatus. Yet, to reduce the problem of overload in this apparatus, it will be even more lenient in its repression policy than in non-crackdown periods. Thus, the bureaucracy reduces the potential for a destabilising immediate environment by mass arrests, yet at the same time maintains its routine functioning by lenient treatment of arrestees. Bureaucracies will crack down to protect their territory from dissent, yet only to a satisfying degree.

The Study

To test the value of these models, the authors have gathered data on a sample of 178 dissidents arrested specifically for Ukrainian (Nationalist, Ukrainian Orthodox, and Uniate Catholic) causes in 1953-80 in the Soviet Union's demographically and economically most important non-Russian republic, Ukraine, from a wide variety of *samvydav* (underground) and other sources (see Appendix). Historically, Ukraine has not only been a major political thorn in Moscow's side but has also been at the forefront of the modern dissident or "Human Rights Movement" in the USSR. Indeed, over 50 per cent of all political prisoners in the USSR are Ukrainians. (Verba and Yasen, 1980: 11). Ukrainian nationalists press for greater autonomy — and at times secession — for their republic from the Soviet regime. Ukrainian Uniate Catholics and Orthodox demand greater freedom of religion from regime interference. Although data on dissidents in the Soviet Union is often obtained only with great difficulty (Verba and Yasen, 1980: 12), underground sources display a relatively high degree of completeness, as well as accuracy and objectivity (Boiter, 1972; Telesin, 1973).

Data on the dissidents at the time of arrest was collected on a wide range of dissident traits and regime repression characteristics: sex, age, urbanisation, oblast capital residence, class, party affiliation, demand, seriousness of charge, sentence severity, and sentence duration (Figure 1). These variables were then related to a dummy crackdown variable composed of tight (1965-66, 1972-74 and 1979-80 = 1) and slack (all other = 0) years. That the Soviet regime alternates between drift and crackdown in its treatment of dissidents there is little doubt, (Lithuanian Information Centre, 1981). In contrast to slack periods, the crackdown syndrome of intensified apartment searches and seizures, street surveillance and harassment, telephone tappings, beatings, prophylactic conversations with coercive organs, media attacks, firings from jobs and expulsions from schools, and official public meetings condemning the dissenters, often manifests itself (Radio Liberty, 1981).

In the Soviet Union, three such crackdown periods have occurred since Stalin's death in 1953. (For a summary of the three waves, see Shornik, 1977: 80.) The first wave of 1965-66, set off with the burning of the Kyiv national library holdings of 600,000 volumes in 1964 (Conquest, 1970: 206), saw the round-up of several writers — the "Sixties" or *shestydesyatyky* — and other

dissidents (Kupchinsky, 1975: 44; Verba and Yasen, 1980: 40; Pazuniak, 1976: 256).

The second wave of 1972-74 pitted the regime against dissidents in Ukraine and throughout the Soviet Union and has rightly been called a "crisis" (Gorbanevskaya, 1977: 224) leading to "stagnation" (Yesenin-Volpin, 1973: 7) in the Human Rights movement (*Samizdat Bulletin*, 1976; *Trials*, 1973; Smith, 1977: 29, Bloch and Reddaway, 1977: 287-288). Official russification of Ukraine was intensified and the Committee for State Security (KGB or secret police) was given enhanced powers in the republic (*Ukrainian Herald*, 1976: 26-27, 125-127.) Several writers and critics were repressed severely (Dushnyck, 1975: 474) such that Ukrainian *samvydav* literature had apparently been crushed by the end of 1972 (Farmer, 1977: 279).

FIGURE 1 VARIABLES AND MEASUREMENT

AGE

Number of years of age at time of arrest. In cases of conflicting reports, greatest age.

SEX

- 1) Female, 2) Male

URBANISATION

Population of locality in which dissident resided at time of arrest. Census of 1970;

Webster's New Geographical Dictionary
(Springfield: Merriam, 1972)

- 1) Village or Collective Farm
- 2) Small Town (under 40,000 population)
- 3) Small City (40,000-99,999)
- 4) Medium City (100,000-499,999)
- 5) Large City (500,000-999,999)
- 6) Metropolis (1,000,000 or more)

OCCUPATIONAL PRESTIGE

Degree to which occupation is accorded deference in Soviet society. For multiple jobs, first or earliest mentioned.

- 1) Peasant or Unskilled Blue Collar Worker
- 2) Skilled Blue Collar Worker. Manual labour demanding some period of prior or on-the-job training
- 3) White Collar Worker. Light non-manual labour not demanding formal or substantial professional training.
- 4) Student or Professional. University or higher technical level. Light non-manual labour demanding formal specialised training

PARTY AFFILIATION

- 1) None
- 2) Prior or current affiliation in CPSU as Candidate or Full Member

DEMAND

Cause for which dissident was arrested

- 1) Nationalist
- 2) Religious (Ukrainian Orthodox or Eastern-Rite Catholic)

CHARGE SERIOUSNESS

1) Light. Violation of racial or national equality, violation of separation of church and state, dissemination of anti-Soviet ideas, encroachment on citizen rights under the guise of religious practice.

2) Moderate. Anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda, participation in an anti-Soviet organisation, refusal of military service, refusal to testify, hooliganism

SENTENCE SEVERITY

Harshness of confinement conditions. In cases of multiple types, e.g. 3 years general regime camp and 3 years exile, dissident was coded according to most intense category. The scale was divided in accordance with the observation of dissidents and foreign commentators. See Commission, 1978: 137-138; Deyneka and Deyneka, 1977: 76-77; Bloch and Reddaway, 1977: 97-219; Mee, n.d.: 1; Puddington, 1980: 1-6.

1) Temporary Confinement. Short incarceration, usually 15 days, in jail or drunk tank or under house arrest

2) Exile

3) General Regime Camp. Obshchii

4) Intensified Regime Camp. Usilennyi; assumed if only "camp" sentence listed

5) Strict Regime Camp. Strogii

6) Special Regime Camp. Osobyi

7) Camp and Prison

8) Prison

9) Normal Psychiatric Hospital. Assumed for psychiatric detention unless "special" hospital specifically designated

10) Special Psychiatric Hospital. For the criminally insane

11) Death. Execution or unnatural death in confinement

SENTENCE DURATION

Total number of years of sentence. Sentences of less than one year coded as zero. In cases of conflicting reports, longest sentence recorded.

The crackdown even reached the top of the Ukrainian Party hierarchy when First secretary Petro Shelest was ousted from his post in mid-1972 for "nationalist deviations" (*Ukrainian Herald*, 1976). Thus, Ukrainian dissident Vyacheslav Chornovil's comment in his "Letter to President Ford" of August 1, 1975 (Subcommittee, 1976: 80) that this crackdown period "was particularly massive and brutal" seems well taken (Verba and Yasen, 1980: 9, 40).

Finally, the combination of a number of pressures induced the Soviet regime to initiate a third wave of serious repression in Ukraine in 1979-80. First, the 35th anniversary of the russification of Ukraine in 1979 led to numerous prophylactic detentions of dissidents to preclude displays of anti-Russian nationalism in the republic. Second, the Soviet invasion of Afghanis-

tan induced the regime to increase the pressure on dissidents in the name of "national security" while the country was at war. Further, the strongly negative response of the Carter administration in the United States to the invasion and the breakdown of "detente" meant that the Soviet regime had little need to treat dissidents lightly in order to please the West (Radio Liberty, 1980a). Third, the holding of the Olympic Games in the USSR in 1980 stimulated a crackdown on dissidents both to reduce a serious control problem brought about by thousands of foreign visitors and to prevent dissidents from using the influx of Western media to publicise their case and embarrass the regime (*East-West Digest*, 1980; Radio Liberty, 1980a).

Thus arrests began to intensify throughout the USSR in early 1979. One Ukrainian dissenter, Mykola Plakhotynuk, was told by authorities eighteen months before the Games that, although the doctors had approved his release from psychiatric internment, his refusal to recant delayed his freedom "until after the Olympics". Other dissenters were told the same (Reddaway, 1980).

Fourth, the Public Groups to Promote the Implementation of the Helsinki accords (hereafter Helsinki Groups) in Ukraine and elsewhere, who had systematically provided the West with information on the Soviet regime violations of the international agreements (*Sbornik*, 1977-80), were particularly hard hit. The convening of the Madrid Conference of the Helsinki Signatories soon after the Olympic Games spurred a crackdown on the five Groups (in Moscow, Ukraine, Lithuania, Armenia and Georgia) in order to prevent recent information from reaching the West which could be used as a propaganda club against the regime (Verba and Yasen, 1980: 10; Reddaway, 1980; Radio Liberty, 1980a). By early 1981, with the arrest of Ivan Kandyba, the Ukrainian Helsinki Group was virtually demolished.

Finally, the fear of public embarrassment just before the Twenty-Sixth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in Moscow in February 1981 also induced the repression of dissidents in 1980. In short, the sharp crackdown in 1979-80 represented a "tornado of total repression". "It seems that the authorities have as their goal", wrote the Ukrainian Helsinki Group, "the complete suppression of national. . . freethinking in Ukraine" (Ukrainian Helsinki Group in *Sbornik*, vol. 7, 1980: 41).

This study's yearly data on the number of Ukrainian dissidents arrested in these periods lend credence to these impressions. Whereas the number of dissidents arrested in non crackdown periods averaged less than 4 per year, the figure for crackdown periods averages over 14. Since the information reaching the West on dissident arrests is often delayed a number of years, the yearly crackdown average, which includes the recent 1979-80 period, certainly represents to some extent an underestimate of the true extent of crackdown repression.

(To be continued)

Ustina MARKUS

US NUCLEAR TARGETING AND UKRAINE

(Part 1)

It is a foregone conclusion that in the event of an all out nuclear war the world would "cease to exist as we know it". For this reason it may seem redundant to study nuclear targeting and its effects. It is precisely because the effects would be so devastating, however, that the subject of nuclear targeting needs to be looked at with questions such as what are targets, what are the effects of a nuclear explosion, etc. in mind. Furthermore, it is because we do rely on nuclear weapons for defence that we should be aware of nuclear strategy. There exist equally lethal weapons in the biological and chemical arsenal, yet neither NATO nor Soviet troops are armed with biological weapons, and thus they are not a cause for immediate concern. Although nuclear weapons are employed as a first line of defence at the tactical level, their use is a debatable issue.

Ukraine is perceived to be a highly targeted area in the event of a nuclear conflict between the Eastern bloc and the West. This article will examine which parts of Ukraine would be targets in a nuclear exchange, why these areas would be targeted, and what Ukraine's position would be in relation to the rest of the Soviet Union in a nuclear war.

There are several factors which limit this study from being a complete analysis of Ukraine's position in the nuclear scenario. In the first place, it is limited to US nuclear doctrine without regard to NATO or to the independent policies of Britain and France. China's targeting against the Soviet Union is also not a part of this study. Secondly, there is no precedent as to how the US or the Soviet Union would behave should the two find themselves in nuclear conflict. Thirdly, there are no known studies available which deal exclusively with Ukraine's position in nuclear targeting. Fourthly, tactical nukes are excluded from this study since they are largely under the discretionary use of the battlefield commander. For this reason how they would be used would depend on the personality of the commander, and not on the guiding national policy of the country involved. Lastly, given the nature of US targeting, which is based on a notion of "flexible response", it is impossible to predict what the US would hit in a nuclear exchange. This article, therefore, is a general examination of Ukraine's position, rather than a precise analysis of Ukrainian targets.

American doctrine on nuclear war is determined largely by technology and

its own precedent. Following WW2 and through the 1950s, American nuclear strategy was not so much a tactical strategy as a threat against cities. This was due to limited and inaccurate delivery systems which made the bombs effective only against big sprawling targets such as cities. A small but important target such as a C³ centre (command, control and communications) was relatively immune to the early nukes since these targets are small and fortified against a nuclear strike, so that they cannot be damaged except by a direct hit¹. As the Soviets built up a sophisticated arsenal themselves, the US adopted MAD (mutually assured destruction) as a policy. Again, this was not so much a strategy as a threat. The idea here was that should the Soviet Union get into a war with the US and employ nuclear weapons against it, the US had enough nuclear power in its arsenal to inflict unacceptable damage on the Soviets. This idea was the basis of deterrence and directed US nuclear policy until the late 1970s.

In 1980 President Carter signed PD 59 (presidential directive). This directive was reaffirmed by President Reagan in NSDD13 (national security decision directive). These two documents called for an increased emphasis on military and political targets instead of the traditional economic and industrial ones². Part of the reason for the change of targeting emphasis has been the technological advances in nuclear warheads themselves and in their delivery systems. Current nuclear weapons are accurate enough to hit a programmed target within a CEP (circular error probability) of a couple of hundred metres. This gives them the capability of hitting and disrupting a C³ centre rather than being effective only as a city busting, therefore deterrent, weapon.

A further reason for the shift in US nuclear targeting policy is the realisation that hitting the industrial and economic targets is not as effective as it appears. Throughout WW2 the US and England continually bombed German cities because these were the industrial centres. Despite the destruction of property and the human losses (which were counted as an industrial asset and were therefore intentionally targeted) German industrial output peaked in the summer of 1944³. The US was confronted with the same problem in Vietnam. Despite massive bombing they were unable to disrupt North Vietnam's industrial output or even to destroy the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

Yet another factor in the change in US nuclear policy is its reassessment of Soviet nuclear policy. While American thinking viewed the horrors of a nuclear exchange as so terrible that the very idea of a retaliatory strike should deter any sort of exchange, the Soviets have always treated it as a weapon. As such, the Soviets tended to aim their nuclear weapons at military targets and C³ centres and adapt them into their general strategic planning as any

1. Martel, W. and Savage, P.: *Strategic Nuclear Targeting*, p. 26.

2. Ball, D.: *Strategic Nuclear Targeting*, p. 17.

3. Murray, D.: *The Defense Policies of Nations*, p. 143.

other weapon, rather than reserving them as a deterrent by the threat they impose upon cities. While this has been viewed as primitive treatment of nuclear weapons by the US, while the US was undisputably superior in its arsenal, since the Soviets have reached parity and even superiority, the US has begun to regard its policy more seriously and adapt its nuclear strategy to respond to Soviet strategy⁴.

American nuclear strategy, like Soviet strategy, is based on a triad of delivery systems: ICBMs, SLBMs and bombers (ground and sea launched cruise missiles add another dimension to the triad, but will not be treated separately in this article). The idea behind having three delivery systems is that even if two are knocked out, the remaining third could still inflict an unacceptable degree of damage on the attacker making the attack not worthwhile unless the entire triad could be knocked out in a first strike, a capability which neither side possessed when the system was adopted, and neither side possesses still. Should there be a nuclear attack from one superpower against the other, then, the second would still have a nuclear arsenal remaining after the first strike to strike back with if it wanted.

The US developed a SIOP (single integrated operational plan) which is continually updated and from which targets are selected. Over the years the lists of potential targets have expanded so that there are more targets than warheads in the nuclear arsenal. Currently there are 50,000 targets in the SIOP. Although the current SIOP is classified so that each target cannot be identified it is known that approximately half the targets in the SIOP are military targets. It is also known that all 200 of the largest Soviet cities are targeted, as well as 80% of the 886 cities with a population over 25,000. These cities are targeted because they are associated with military and industrial targets⁵.

As the US has begun to treat nuclear arms more as weapons than just instruments of deterrence there have been changes in its attitude towards their use. While both superpowers traditionally disavowed a policy of first use, both now plan on the basis of early use and first use of nuclear weapons⁶. This is partly so because of a belief among some planners that a limited nuclear war is possible, and partly because tactical nuclear arms are part of the usual complement of weapons in larger military units under the discretion of the commander making their use a strong possibility in the early stages of conflict. The tactical nuclear arms were made a standard weapon amongst NATO forces in Europe because of NATO's numerical inferiority in troops and tanks compared to the Soviets. The weapons were introduced to enable the NATO armies to withstand an invasion by the Soviet or Warsaw Pact forces, since it was widely perceived that without these weapons, in the

4. Lambeth, B.: "Economic Targeting in Nuclear War", *Orbis*, p. 148.

5. Ball, p. 23, 27-28.

6. Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, *Common Security* p. xvi.

event of an invasion, Western Europe would quickly be overwhelmed. These nuclear weapons, then, have been created with the intention of being used in a conventional attack.

The US has some 10,000 nuclear warheads planted on its strategic delivery systems⁷. Given the percentage of detonation and launch failures of the warheads, as well as the vulnerability of the different delivery systems, in the case of an all out nuclear attack there would be many less explosions than there are warheads. This means that the US would have to be selective in the targets it chooses from its SIOP. It should also be taken into account that some of the most vital targets would have more than one warhead launched against them to ensure their destruction. With these factors in their mind it is apparent that the US could only hit a limited number of its 50,000 targets and would have to go for those which would be most valuable in allowing the US to come out victorious in an exchange. Although it would seem sensible to hit the strategically and militarily important targets, it must be remembered that the US has traditionally targeted population centres as a deterrence and could be expected to target these despite the accuracy of the current weapons simply out of old habit and thinking.

Currently the targets are increasingly becoming military. While moving armies are difficult to target accurately, bases and Soviet ICBMs are a high target priority. War supporting industry still ranks high on the priority list as well. This means that industries that can easily be geared towards the war effort would also be targeted. Since industrial centres are built around population centres for practical reasons (availability of labour), cities would continue to be targeted even though city busting is no longer US policy. These military-industrial targets are located all over the Soviet Union.

Because of the nature of the Soviet Union — a multi-national empire with ethnic dissent within it — the US has taken the ethnic factor into its targeting consideration since the 1950s. At that time there was the idea of not hitting the countries with dissident tendencies so as not to alienate them, but keep them on the American side and use them against the Soviets in the course of the war. The Muslim and Baltic republics were mentioned as such areas of Soviet opposition, as well as Ukraine⁸. The arguments against this type of targeting, however, were many. In the first place, there is no guarantee that the dissident republics would not rally to the Soviet side even if they had not been attacked themselves. They could not be sure that they would not be attacked and, having more ties with the Russians, may stand by them. Secondly, since the real strategic targets are dispersed throughout the Soviet Union, they could not be hit, only the Russian targets could. As the Russians are well entrenched in all the republics, the resources there would remain under their control. Thirdly, even if the dissenting republics were to go

7. Ball, p. 22.

8. Ibid, p. 280.

against the Soviets, unless they were to have an already working structure to provide leadership and take control, they would quickly be overwhelmed by the Russians. Yet another consideration is that there are elements in the dissenting republics which are pro-Soviet. In these instances the result of the dissenters trying to take control may lead to a civil war making that republic unable to give any meaningful assistance to the US in its effort, simply because it would be too busy with its own problems.

The notion of physically decoupling any of the dissident republics from the main body by strategic bombing of C³ centres, roads and railway lines, and disrupting Moscow's control of the area had also been tabled as unrealistic and impossibly difficult because of the extent to which the Soviets have permeated almost every facet of life throughout the Union. If there are any more ideas or plans in which dissenting republics are differentiated from Soviet Russia and spared, they have not recently come to the fore. This does not mean, however, that such ideas no longer exist, since anything giving a hint of such strategies is most likely classified and would remain so for some time.

From the general reading available certain US targeting priorities can be deduced. C³ centres rank high on the list. The C³ centres (which are the leadership) are difficult to target, however, because they are scattered and reinforced against the possibility of nuclear attack. The Soviet leadership is estimated to number some 110,000 people and is dispersed throughout the Soviet Union. Most of the leadership has had shelters constructed for them and the exact coordinates or even the general locations of many of these shelters is unknown. Furthermore defining the leadership is difficult since it consists not only of the higher ranking political and military personnel, but also factory managers, economic planners and farm managers. The leadership is basically all those needed to get the Soviet Union back on its feet after a war⁹.

There are several arguments against targeting the leadership in the case of war. The primary arguments state that if the leadership is nuked there will be no one with whom to negotiate the end of the war. The US does not know the exact chain of command or how power would be distributed in the case of a breakdown of command. With these unknowns, there are arguments that the leadership should be left so that it can direct negotiations to the end of the war.

Along with the leadership, the threat that the Soviet ICBMs pose to the US make them a top priority target. There are no arguments against targeting ICBM fields.

Along with the ICBMs some war supporting industries are held to be equally important. As mentioned earlier, it is difficult to disrupt industry as a

9. Ibid, p. 22.

whole, but creating a bottleneck effect is deemed to be realistic. Some of the industries which are so crucial to the rest are the petroleum refineries, steel production, water cooling and purification plants, etc. Since without these basics other industries cannot function it is expected that these and similar industries would be targeted to prevent the Soviets from being able to manufacture what is necessary to rearm in any reasonable amount of time.

The military targets of a US counterforce attack would tend to be those that are fixed, not mobile. Military C³ centres would come high on this list, as well as airfields and submarine bases. The submarine bases would be a particularly crucial target since there are always a certain number of subs at base undergoing repairs and being restocked and fuelled. Since subs carry powerful nuclear weapons and are difficult to follow once they are at sea, it is in the attacker's interest to destroy as many of them in port as possible. Their slow speeds (not exceeding 60 mph) make it difficult to escape an incoming missile. Therefore, because of the number of nuclear weapons which would be put out of commission by a hit on one submarine base, this would actually be one of the most lucrative targets¹⁰.

Airfields are similarly lucrative targets. Escaping targets would have had to be off the ground for some distance before they would be safe from a nuclear explosion. Although the Soviets have less than 200 nuclear weapons which use aircraft delivery (they rely mainly on the ICBM leg of their triad and only use bombers marginally), an unanticipated hit on an airfield would disable any aircraft in the area making this an important target in knocking out enemy countercapability.

(To be continued)

10. Martel, p. 75-77.

Wolodymyr SLEZ

LES KURBAS AND THE MODERN UKRAINIAN THEATRE

Towards the end of the 19th century the nature of Ukrainian literature changed. The literary scene was dominated by L. Ukrainka, M. Kotsiubynskyi and V. Vynnychenko. They performed a kind of sociological function and were able to cater for the needs of modern Ukrainian society with its growing social complexity and psychological diversity, unlike the populist writers. Indeed, there was ever growing dissatisfaction with the limited ethnographism of the latter. The populist approach to literature led to utilitarianism. Works were evaluated not according to aesthetic criteria but by their accessibility to the masses and whether they had a specific political and didactic content. Ethnographic-realist literature tended to restrict itself to folk themes and the life of the peasants set in a village milieu.

At the turn of the 20th century Modernism was taking root. The progressive Ukrainian intelligentsia turned to aesthetic matters. If the people were to be served, so too were the muses. The poet Marko Voronyi expresses this notion as follows:

Do mene, iak hromadianyna,
Stavliai vymohy, iak liudyna;
A iak poet; bez perepony
Ia stezhu tvorchosty zakony.

(Address me as a citizen
And ask of me what such demands;
Yet as a poet: unconfined
I heed the laws of creativity).

The same applied to the theatre. It was necessary to create a modern theatre with a modern repertoire and modern dramatic techniques. The ethnographic theatre, backward and provincialised as it was generally regarded, could not achieve this as would have been evident to Les Kurbas when he joined M. Sadovskyi's theatre in 1916.

Sadovskyi's lack of sophistication and antiquated ethnographic methods were inadequate for staging modern Ukrainian drama or the new realist and symbolist plays from Western Europe with their subtle psychological nuances.

The Ukrainian Theatre of Ethnographic Realism hails from the beginning of the 1860s when O. Markovych, former member of the Brotherhood of St. Cyril & Methodius, and his wife Maria (Marko Vovchok) staged amateur performances in Nemyriv and subsequently formed the Chernihiv Musical-Dramatic Society. From about this time amateur groups sprang up in Bobryntsi, Elyzavethrad, Kharkiv, Odessa, Sumy, Kamianets-Podilskyi and Zhytomyr. In 1859 an amateur theatrical group was formed at Kyiv University. In the 1870s M. Starytskyi translated "Hamlet" into Ukrainian.

It was not until the beginning of the 1880s that interest grew in establishing a professional theatre. Finally, in the spring of 1882, M. Kropyvnytskyi, former member of H. Ashkarenko's Russian troupe founded the first Ukrainian professional theatre in Elyzavethrad. Here he gathered a group of leading Ukrainian actors and actresses: M. Zankovetska, M. Sadovskyi, O. Viryna, O. Markova, N. Zharkova, K. Stoian-Maksymovych, I. Zahorskyi and others. Ivan Franko considered their acting the fruit of conscientious study, not dilettante improvisation.

Nevertheless, all was not plain sailing. In 1876 the Ems Decree dealt a blow to Ukrainian language and Ukrainian culture, stunting their development. It reflected the absurd brutality of the tsarist government towards Ukrainian culture and its typical ukrainophobia. On 5 June 1876 the Ministry of Internal Affairs' Chief Administration for Publishing issued decree № 3158 with the tsar's approval. Points 1 and 3 read as follows:

1. It is forbidden to import into the empire, without the special permission of the Chief Administration for Publishing, any books or brochures published in the Little Russian language.

3. Little Russian plays and recitations as well as librettos are banned.

The severity of the decree was molified by several amendments formulated at a special session and officially approved on 8 October 1881. Points 1, 2 & 3 read as follows:

1. The printing of Little Russian dictionaries is permitted provided that the general Russian orthography or any orthography prior to the 18th century are adhered to.

2. It is permitted to stage Little Russian plays and perform in public Little Russian songs and comic songs passed by the censor according to the judgement of the higher local authorities in each individual case. Permission to publish Little Russian librettos, provided they follow the general Russian orthography, is the prerogative of the Chief Administration for Publishing.

3. The formation of a Little Russian Theatre is forbidden and likewise troupes for the exclusive performance of Little Russian plays.

By comparison the French theatre in the 19th century could perform French plays and French playwrights could write them. The only "obstacles"

were entrenched tastes and conservative critics. In Germany during the period of anti-socialist laws of 1878-1890, it was forbidden to perform or print political dramas, however, this did not include a ban on the German language.

As if the Ems Decree were not damaging enough, in 1883 in Kyiv the tsarist governor Drenteln banned the performance of all Ukrainian theatres on his territory (Kyivshchyna, Poltavshchyna, Chernihivshchyna, Volyn and Podilia) for ten years.

The basic repertoire of the Ukrainian theatre from 1870 to the 1890s comprised plays on peasant life. The ban on staging historical plays on the life of the intelligentsia lasted until the 1890s. It is hardly surprising that stunted as it was the Ukrainian ethnographic theatre could not do justice to modern plays or handle psychological complexity. Of course, other factors were involved.

The ethnographic theatre regardless of the restriction imposed on it was to contribute to the development of the modern Ukrainian theatre. It introduced a deeper element of realism and helped to overcome operatic, vaudeville stamps, sentimentality and melodrama, problems shared by the French theatre of the time.

The Ukrainian theatre audience was largely illiterate. Interestingly enough, the actors of Hnat Khotkevych's Hutsul Theatre Group, which Les Kurbas joined for a time, were also illiterate. Their parts had to be recited to them during rehearsals.

During the last years of the 19th century and at the beginning of the 20th century, it became easier to discuss broader dramatic themes and ideas.

Despite the oppressive atmosphere Ukrainian playwrights took to the pen with varying degrees of success. In 1883 Vasyl Mova (Vasyl Lymanskyi) wrote the play *Stare Hnizdo i Molodi Ptakhy* which treated the life of Ukrainian cossack officers in the Kuban region in the mid-19th century. Tetiana Sulyma's play *Diachykha* dealt with the petit village clergy. O. Konyskyi's dramas *Porvalas Nytko* (1883) and *I Na Pronozu Iest Zanoza* (1884) examine corruption among the educated classes and civil servants. In the 1890s the issue of agricultural unions on Khersonshchyna was broached in *Ponad Dniptom* (1897) by I. Karpenko-Karyi and *Konon Blyskavychenko* (1902) by M. Kropyvnytskyi. In 1905 B. Hrinchenko tried his hand unsuccessfully at psychological drama. His play *Na Novyi Shliakh* examines a husband and wife relationship but without any real psychological depth.

In Western Ukraine the theatre had similar problems to its eastern counterpart. It suffered from lack of funds and audience. It was an itinerant theatre. Nevertheless, writers did try their hand at drama. Fedkovych wrote romantic plays, in the 1890s Ohoniovskyi produced historical plays and in 1880-1890 Tshelynskyi wrote comedies. The theatre was plagued by russophile critics

who strove constantly to divert the attention of the public to second rate drama.

In the second half of the 19th century Lesia Ukrainka drew attention to a fresh phenomenon, the new social drama. It would no longer examine types but actual institutions, attempting to fathom the reasons for social antagonisms. This would require more depth and subtlety from the theatre.

1890 saw another milestone in the development of the Ukrainian theatre, the formation of the Ukrainian Dramatic Society (1897-1898). The motive force was I. Karpenko-Karyi (Tobilevych) and Opanas Saksahanskyi who assembled a group of young actors. Drenteln's ban was lifted and from 1895 onwards the society enjoyed better times. The affairs of the society were run by general assembly (zbory). It adopted the realist traditions of its predecessors M. Shchepkin and K. Solenyk. The main creative-artistic principle was that of trueness to life: "To be true in art, knowing the truth about life". Art in the populist tradition should serve the people, reflect the social and political state of society and advocate national ideals and cultural interests.

Karpenko-Karyi's method was based on the interaction of mime and the art of the word. Life should be represented artistically, not in an ordinary, mundane, everyday manner. Characters were to be represented in relief, especially their dominant features. He disliked the artificial and contrived, preferring his plays to portray a normal, naturally-motivated and regular course of events. He distinguished himself in defence of the Ukrainian theatre.

The breath of revolution was sensed in the Russian Empire in the last decade of the 19th century and this awakened social-political awareness. In March 1897 in Moscow the Russian Theatrical Society held the first All-Russian Congress of Theatrical Workers. The Ukrainian delegation comprised, M. Starytskyi, M. Zankovetska, M. Sadovskyi and Panas Saksahanskyi.

Although Karpenko-Karyi was not himself present, his note to the Congress (Zapyska) was read out before the assembly. In it he complained of the horrible state of the Ukrainian theatre which suffered from lack of a worthy repertoire and decent accomodation, not to mention merciless censorship. Writers were forced to base their works on stereotypes and stock situations. They were trapped "like squirrels in a treadmill". The theatre should reflect life in all its variety and portray realistic images of the society of a given epoch. He protested the policy of the Russian government of suppressing the Ukrainian word on the stage, in literature, and in the schools. At times such oppression bordered on the absurd. The authorities would allow the texts of Ukrainian songs to be performed provided, however, they were first translated into French¹. Illia Shrag summarising the lectures delivered at the Congress issued four postulates concerning the Ukrainian theatre:

1. Koryfei ukrainskoi stseny, Kyiv, 1901, p. 13.

1. That Ukrainian plays be submitted for censorship on the same conditions as plays written in other languages.
2. That the ban be lifted on publishing and performing plays in the Ukrainian language, translated plays, historical plays and those concerning the life of the intelligentsia.
3. That Ukrainian plays be included in the list of plays approved for performance by the popular theatre.
4. That permission be given for the performance of Ukrainian plays subject to general decisions, and that previous restrictions on the granting of such permission be removed.

By the beginning of the 20th century the Theatre of Ethnographic Realism in Ukraine was in decline and the Young Theatre and Berezhil were just around the corner. It would be unfair to describe the period of the ethnographic theatre as one of total backwardness and provincialism. Progress was made and there were many valuable and heroic initiatives despite oppression. In some ways it was a miracle that the Ukrainian theatre even survived.

At the beginning of the 20th century the European theatre rejecting historical naturalism embraced the tenets of theatricality, a heightened sense of the formal aspects of theatre which was no longer merely a pulpit or place of entertainment but a temple where the ideals of art were to be worshipped.

The Ukrainian theatre was now to be dominated by the towering figure of Les Stepanovych Kurbas, who dragged and coaxed it into the modern era.

On 13 September 1912 a group of graduates from the Drama Section of the Lysenko Music Institute met to discuss the formation of a modern theatre. They lacked an experienced director. Kurbas joined them in spring 1916. Well versed in modern theatrical trends and with a certain amount of valuable acting experience, he became director. In September 1917 the Young Theatre (Molodyi Teatr) was established.

Kurbas gained his first practical experience of acting in 1909 with the Sokil Theatre Group. He then spent some time with Khotkevych's Hutsul Theatre Group before moving to Ruska Besida the leading Western Ukrainian Theatre Evenings troupe (Ternopilski Teatralni Vechory) where he lectured, stressing the importance of the theatre as a means for educating the masses. Like Bertolt Brecht, Kurbas inherited a theatrical tradition with a strong didactic-political undercurrent. Both strove to create a theatre of intellectual inquiry although Kurbas did not concentrate exclusively on conveying the political message. He regarded the theatre as an art form in its own right, the only place where an actor could express himself adequately. Whereas Brecht preferred a slow pace for his dramas to allow the audience to reflect and compare, Kurbas opted for collective dynamic action. In 1916 for a time he joined

Sadovskiy's ethnographic theatre and was by now gradually developing and formulating his ideas.

On 23 September 1917 the Young Theatre published its "Manifesto" in *Robitnycha Hazeta* emphasising its genetic link with the thoughts and ideas of the progressive Ukrainian intelligentsia and supporting it in its cultural orientation to Europe. It was opposed to the provincialism of the ethnographic theatre. The theatre existed in its own right as a place where the actor could express his own individuality. The Russian theatre could not serve as an example since it was experiencing its own crisis. The Young Theatre would foster the theatrical form which best answered its inquiries at a given time. This did not, however, signify that it would become static or stagnate. Unity and purity of style were the essential criteria. Significantly, the Young Theatre was not hampered by state censorship.

Kurbas read widely on the theory and practice of drama. The influences on him were manifold: Adolphe Appia, who advocated that one person alone, the director, should be in charge of the stage action; Georg Fuchs, who advocated rhythmic movement on stage and the reduction of scenery to a minimum; Gordon Craig, who opposed the realist method of acting by exposure and imitation, and proposed an acting style based on the symbolic gesture, representation and interpretation, thus going beyond appearances to the essence of the drama; Max Reinhardt, who rejected the monopoly of any one form of theatre and François Delsarte and Emile Jacques Dalcroze who demonstrated how parts of the body can communicate ideas and emotions and underlined the importance of rhythm and physical response to music in training actors. Kurbas adapted these ideas to his own.

His main acting method was based on the "transformed gesture" (*peretvorennia*), which Iosyf Hirniak defines as follows:

"Peretvorennia is an artistic-theatrical method whereby the director and actor strive as deeply as possible to reveal a certain reality. This was the name given by the Berezhil system to the artistic sign, the theatrical 'symbol' which reveals the essence of a phenomenon and helps us to perceive its existential content. This method is familiar to painters and writers. There are vivid examples of peretvorennia in political and ethnographic caricatures. An economical artistic means, it is used to expose and decipher the most varied psychological and social phenomena. In the play 'Gaz' it was hyperbolised by the author, director, artist and composer and by the entire ensemble of actors"².

Kurbas saw the future actor not as an imitator but as a person in whom intellect and a highly developed acting technique was combined. The role

2. Spomyny, Iosyf Hirniak, Suchasnist, New York 1982, p. 154.

should be the product of deep study and sensitive interpretation of the character. It should be a fixed role which the actor could repeat exactly when called upon. Impulse and emotionalism were rejected. Actors were to construct their roles and as it were demonstrate them to the audience. The substance of the theatre was not literature but gesture and sound. The style of the times lay somewhere between symbolism and classicism.

Russian teachers were invited to develop general skills, not to tie the Young Theatre to Russian or Ukrainophile traditions. Movement was taught by Lange (Kyiv Opera) and Mikhail Mordkin (choreographer from Moscow's Bolshoi Theatre), aesthetics by Kuzmin, fencing by Mikhaylov and voice by Lund. Kurbas taught acting.

On 15 October 1917 the Young Theatre staged Max Halbe's naturalistic play "Youth". However, unlike the original, Kurbas stressed beauty of rhythm and musicality. Next came the staging of O. Oles's "Etudes". Again rhythm, musicality and harmony of gesture and movement were used to good effect. One critic perceived in the performance the beginnings of artistic understanding and subtle delivery. In May 1918 Jerzy Zulkewski's "Ijola" was staged. Another critic was impressed by the fluent and unmechanical movements of the actors while the general spectacle aroused feelings of "pure artistic joy". The performance of "Oedipus Rex" was the first clear experiment in the direction of aesthetic theatre. Kurbas continued this experiment right up to "Jimmy Higgins" in the Berezhil period.

In spring 1919 by a decree of Narkomos Teatrkom (Theatre Committee of the Peoples' Commissariat for Education) the Young Theatre was amalgamated with the Shevchenko State Theatre.

In 1920 Kurbas assembled a group of actors at Bila Tserkva where it performed under the name Kyidramte. In August of the same year the group performed "Macbeth" (the first staging of the play in Ukrainian). In March 1922 Kurbas drew up a statute for a new theatrical organisation. The Artistic Union of Berezhil (1922-1933) was born.

The period of the Young Theatre (1916-1919) had been shortlived. Nevertheless, it gave Kurbas and his colleagues an opportunity to experiment with modern dramatic techniques and theories and to stage modern plays. It was an important phase in the modernisation of the Ukrainian theatre.

In his "Memoirs" Iosyf Hirniak recalls the following comment made to him by Kurbas: ". . . The Ukrainian revolution has spread our wings and now we need space in which to fly, not from Kopychyntsi to Patsykyiv, but from the Zbruch to the Caucasus"³.

Implicit in this statement there is an appeal for the broadening of intellectual horizons. It pointed the theatre to broader national and universal vistas,

3. Ibid., p. 140.

far removed from the rustic cul-de-sac of the ethnographic theatre. Ukraine had experienced a world war, two revolutions, the declaration of an independent state and the struggle to establish it. There were social crises and disruptions throughout Europe. Spengler's philosophy had cast a pall of pessimism on life. The theatre best capable of responding to, assimilating and demonstrating such events would not be one of "cherry orchards" or philistine glutony (cherevouhodnytstvo) but a theatre of the restless, inquiring mind, the Faustian spirit as interpreted by Khvylovyi. Such was the general outlook of Berezil.

The Young Theatre, a theatre of experiment, eclecticism and stylisation had arisen from the combined influence of classicism, modernism, neo-romanticism, symbolism, Wedekind's grotesque and Altenberg's impressionism. Through its acquisitions Berezil moved the theatre even further from the naturalism of the ethnographic period towards expressionism, though by the time Sinclair's "Jimmy Higgins" was staged Kurbas had broken with expressionist convention and abstract form, turning to a more concrete approach and conception.

During the 1924-1925 season Berezil restaged the 1920 performance of "Haydamaky". This had been the last word of the Young Theatre. In "Kharkivskiy Proletarii" of 12 March 1930 Kurbas described the play as the final one to contain remnants of national romanticism and declared it the first example of revolutionary romanticism.

Kurbas rejected the kind of psychological realism in the theatre which reduced it merely to crude portrayals of reality. He reinterpreted it and during the Berezil period it evolved towards expressive realism and monumental realism.

On 9 April 1923 in the supplement to the Kharkiv newspaper *Visti* Kurbas summarised the basic method of Berezil:

"An inclination towards mass movement, a desire for highly developed means, the manifestation of an emotional and psycho-physical theme in visible concrete form, a break with the introverted passiveness of the psychological theatre and its replacement by clear precision and theatricality. Hence the desire to smash the square frame of the stage and set the created concrete form before the footlights"⁴.

On 24 February 1923 Berezil staged the play "Ruhr" composed by Kurbas himself. The action was portrayed by a combination of gesture, word and movement, though limited use was made of word. In the expressionist tradition the amount of scenery was kept to a minimum with just hints at the

4. Ibid., p. 169.

location. Musical dissonance was used in conjunction with and to enhance the transformed gesture.

On 27 April 1923 Georg Kaiser's "Gaz" was performed. Kurbas presented the conflict between the workers and factory owners not according to the Marxist-Leninist dialectic, but by mass image, mass rhythm and mass movements resembling ballet mime. The music and movements of the actors blended harmoniously. There was nothing forced or contrived about the action. Quite simply, it was art created spontaneously by free spirit, not political dogma.

On 6 January 1924 "Jimmy Higgins" was staged. Kurbas broke with the expressionist tradition of mass movement. The individual actor, in this case Jimmy, became the focus of attention while the masses gathered round him merely reflected his thoughts and emotions. For the first time in the history of the Ukrainian theatre the cinema screen was used on stage. Piscator and Brecht were pioneering it in Germany. Kurbas moved the action from stage to screen and back again.

Repeatedly, Kurbas stressed the importance of music. Since the days of the Young Theatre he had regarded every play whether accompanied by music or not as a symphony.

The transformed gesture continued to be the nucleus of the acting method. Adopting B. Coquelin's school of simulation, Kurbas broke with the technique of the old Russian and Ukrainian theatres based on deep reflex and inner experience of the role. Emotion was not rejected but had become a means rather than end. Employing the transformed gesture and achieving an organic union of emotion, word, gesture and rhythmic movement the actor was required at the same time to achieve a structural rapport with objects on the stage. He must act in the rhythm and plan laid down by the director. We see reflected here Craig's concept of the actor as one capable of understanding and organically incarnating himself in the director's vision of the spectacle and the image of the character.

At the beginning of the 1920s Kurbas saw the director's role as interpreter and organiser. He may interpret life and the author. Where he was at odds with the author he could shorten, rewrite, reemphasise, refashion characters and add his own interludes, prologues and epilogues. The text to "Jimmy Higgins" was composed during actual rehearsals! In the 1925-1926 season Kurbas modified his position on the role of director. He now saw the director as an engineer rather than inventor. This was partly in response to protests from actors who objected to being dictated to all the time by the director. They too wished to contribute to the conception of performances. Berezil was in principle not dogmatic. It was a movement, a process, both continuum and evolution. To Kurbas artistic forms were mobile.

In March 1926 Berezil became a state theatre. Kurbas called for a bigger

repertoire. He announced that the artistic experiment was over. The accent was now on the actor and playwright and on achieving higher levels of artistic skill and accomplishment.

In the spring of 1926 the Kyiv municipal authorities handed over the premises of the Russian "Solovtsev Theatre" to Berezil. This completed the ukrainianisation of the theatre in Kyiv. In the same year Berezil transferred to Kharkiv as the Central Capital Theatre of the Republic.

Berezil's success and progress did not go unnoticed. Hirniak remarks indignantly: "The ill-boding russophile mentality refused completely to accept such a sudden leap in the Ukrainian theatre. (What impudence! The khakhly* are turning to the world classics, Shakespeare even)"⁵.

During the theatrical discussion of 1927 Kurbas expressed his annoyance with the reaction Berezil had received from various sections of society. It was time to break with cultural philistinism and provincialism. Ukrainians should have more faith in their own capabilities and potential.

Berezil staged "Narodnyi Malakhii" by Mykola Kulish. The play dealt with the national question and tsarist oppression. It was treading on dangerous ideological ground. Furthermore, Berezil maintained close links with Vaplite meeting regularly at the Literary Club in Blakytyn (Budynok Blakytynoho). Both organisations were bulwarks of free creativity. Sooner or later Berezil would fall foul of the party and Marxist-Leninist doctrine.

Lenin had the following advice for Soviet writers: "Literary activity must become part of the general proletarian cause, a cog in the one great unified social-democratic mechanism set in motion by the whole politically conscious avant-garde of the entire working class"⁶. Newspapers were to become party organs; writers must belong to such organisations; all publishing concerns, bookshops, reading rooms and libraries must be subordinated to the party and answerable to it. Literary and artistic freedom was permissible but the party too was free to expel anyone it disapproved of. The party had another trump card, it held the purse strings. Writers were dependent on the establishment for their material welfare. In Ukraine the party ran two residential buildings for writers, "Slovo" in Kharkiv and "Rolit" in Kyiv. I. Kulyk in his article "Na shliakhakh do proletarskoho mystetstva" (Towards Proletarian Art) published in "Shliakhy mystetstva" № 2 (4) 1922 notes how quickly the Soviet intelligentsia buckled before party pressure that it accepted the doctrine of the "class nature of art". Disobedience might result in destitution. In 1934 the wife of Mykola Kulish returned to Kharkiv from Kyiv where she had visited her husband who was under arrest, only to find that she and her family had been evicted from their lodgings at "Slovo". They spent several

* Russian pejorative term used to describe Ukrainians.

5. Hirniak. . . p. 198.

6. Lenin in Raddatz, vol. I. p. 231.

days wandering the streets ostracised by friends who were afraid of being incriminated.

Presently, the party octopus stirred, extended its tentacles and began to apply its murderous grip on the theatre. By a series of official decrees, resolutions and measures it infiltrated its representatives into the body of the theatre and eventually took control, destroying Berezhil on the way.

On 29 December 1927 the "Theses on Theatrical Criticism" were issued. Henceforth criticism was to encourage support for party policy and promote a better understanding of it. Any critical thought based on personal ties and relations (this would include the association between Berezhil and Vaplite) was to be condemned.

Local party organs issued directives on the foundation of so-called artistic councils (*khudozhni rady*) at every theatre. They would participate in the creative and administrative work of the theatres. They comprised party and union representatives. Kurbas did not allow them into Berezhil. He had already been summoned before Postyshev who showed him a black book containing the testimonies of criminals in GPU cells which implicated certain Berezhil actors.

In November 1927 Berezhil was to have staged A. Berg's "Wozzeck" in Odessa. The performance was banned by the Narkomos Repertory Committee.

The fruitful union between Berezhil and M. Kulish continued despite the fact that his plays, "97", "Komuna v stepakh", "Tak zahynuv Huska", "Khu-lii Khuryna" and "Zona" (Zakut) were attacked by party critics and the Narkomos Repertory Committee. They accused him of lack of optimism in the future of the Soviet system. It was recommended and they should be banned from performance and publication.

1928 was Berezhil's last year of relative freedom from party interference. In the same year VUTsVK and Radnarkom URSR issued resolutions on the "State Theatres and their Unification". Points 1, 2, 6 & 15 read as follows:

1. State theatres are those theatres which come under the direct jurisdiction of the Narkomos.

2. Narkomos has jurisdiction over those state theatres which on account of their outstanding artistic and ideological merit are of general republican significance.

6. State theatres and their associations which come under the direct jurisdiction of Narkomos will conduct their ideological, artistic and political work under the direct tutelage of Narkomos.

15. A theatre council is to be set up at every state theatre. A theatre council is a civic body. Its aim is to facilitate the development of the ideologi-

cal and organisational link between the theatre and the worker audience at large⁷.

Berezil received veiled but qualified support from M. Skrypnyk. However, while he protested against the theatre becoming a mere tool of the party and its political propaganda, he insisted that it should endeavour to raise the consciousness of the proletariat. Kurbas, meanwhile, was concerned with the whole of Ukrainian society.

On 18 April 1929 Berezil staged "Myna Mazailo" in which Kulish depicts the struggle between the modern Ukrainian movement and Muscovite great power chauvinism. He objects to the general view that Ukrainian culture was a "peasant" culture. The orthodox critics sharpened their knives and Kulish was accused of fomenting nationalist counter-revolution.

Meanwhile, the Moscow Artistic Theatre under Stanislavskyi and Nemyrovich-Danchenko could stage Bulgakov's anti-Ukrainian play "Dni Turbinykh".

The party tightened its grip. At the beginning of 1930 the GPU arrested the Berezil actors O. Podorozhnyi and L. Seridiuk. The writing was on the wall for Kurbas.

In August 1930 VUTsVK and Narkomos URSS issued the "Statute on State Theatres and their Unification". Points 1, 4 and 5 read as follows:

1. State theatres are to come under the direct jurisdiction of regional (oblast) committees and city soviets and will act according to plan tasks as confirmed by regional executive committees and city soviets. Individual state theatres and associations of theatres situated in a region or city may come under the jurisdiction of regional executive committees and city soviets.

4. State theatres and their associations will conduct their ideological, artistic and political work under the general direction of Narkomos URSS through its local organs.

5. State theatres and their associations which are of particular artistic importance come under the direct supervision and control of Narkomos URSS which with regard to the former also has the right to confirm and dismiss the head of the Council for theatres (or their associations), confirm the repertory plan, supervise directly the artistic-ideological direction of the activity of the theatres and their associations and likewise issue instructions on the main body of performers⁸.

In September 1931 Kurbas returned to Kharkiv to find "Patetychna Sonata" (Kulish) under fire. Meanwhile in Moscow at the Kamernyi Teatr A. Tayirov staged the very same play with no problem or interference on 20 December 1931. Insensed at this Kulish protested in Russian to the Narko-

7. Hirniak. . . p. 305.

8. Ibid., p. 341.

mos Repertory Committee. When asked why he was speaking in Russian, he replied, in Russian: "Because I am a Russian writer! My plays are performed in Moscow, Leningrad and other Russian cities and even in Siberia. . . but in Ukraine they are forbidden. . ."⁹.

A press campaign was launched against Berezil. The CC CP(b)U attacked Kulish for wasting his talent on the national question. It was a secondary matter compared with Leninism and the proletarian revolution.

Kurbas had been summoned before Postyshev several days before the performance of "Maklena Grasa". He was called upon to deny his part and condemn Vaplite, Khvylovyi and Skrypnyk. This he refused to do. As for his so-called lack of enthusiasm for Soviet society, he pointed out that on his way to see Postyshev he had stumbled upon the corpse of a woman lying unattended in the street, a victim of famine. Kurbas was implacable.

On 5 October 1937 Radnarkomos and NKO approved a decision to relieve Kurbas of the directorship of Berezil. He was replaced by M. Krushelnytskyi, while O. Lazoryshak was appointed administrative director. On 26 December 1933 Kurbas was arrested. Subsequently, Berezil was renamed the Shevchenko Theatre.

Berezil became yet another victim of Soviet political thuggery. Kurbas perished in Stalin's mincing machine.

Although there were three other major theatres in Ukraine at the time also staging modern plays, the Franko Theatre in Kyiv, the Zankovetskyi Theatre and the Revolution Theatre in Odessa, none of them attained the high standards of Berezil or established a definite style.

In the 1930s artistic freedom and experiment, art for arts sake, were outlawed. Indeed, as Dovzhenko bemoaned, for the first time in human civilisation style was defined at a meeting.

On page 507, volume 7 of the Ukrainian Soviet Encyclopaedia (URE) published in Kyiv in 1963 we read in the short entry on Kurbas that amongst other things he betrayed elements of nationalist revolt in the choice of repertoire for Berezil and on some theatrical and creative questions.

Despite the difficulties the Ukrainian theatre had survived and grown though never to fulfil its true potential. Ievhen Sverstiuk points out: "There is no logical explanation for our rebirth after disaster or for the actual fact of our national existence: we live in the spontaneously irrational, in the depths, as just a root which sprouts eternally but rarely achieves normal fruition"¹⁰.

Nevertheless Kurbas succeeded in both modernising and revolutionising the Ukrainian theatre. Despite his untimely end he had fulfilled his mission. In

9. Ibid., p. 348.

10. "Ivan Kotliarevskyi smietsia". Panorama Nainovishoi Literatury URSR, Suchasnist, Munich 1974, p. 550.

the words of I. Marianenko, Berezil's oldest actor: "Prior to Kurbas there was no Ukrainian theatre in the European sense of the word. It was he who created such a theatre for us"¹¹.

* * *

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11. Hirniak. . . p. 62.

News from Ukraine

AUTHORITIES COVER UP ALL TRACES OF VIOLENT DISPERSAL OF DEMONSTRATIONS

(UPA) A letter dated 12 August from Yaroslav Kynshor addressed to the Soviet Procurator's office describes how his brother-in-law, Yaroslav Stupak who lives in Moscow, was framed by the authorities after he was arrested filming the August 4 demonstration in Lviv. When Stupak returned to where he was staying he was arrested, and the videos, he had recorded of the way the riot police had broken up the demonstration, were confiscated. Yaroslav Kynshor believes that this was so the authorities could cover up their abuse of glasnost and perestroika. Soviet television daily shows, he comments, riot police breaking up demonstrations in South Korea, the West Bank of Jordan and South Africa — but not in the USSR. The Lviv “democrats (authorities) could not sleep soundly if they knew that videos were freely circulating”, believes Yaroslav Kyshnor.

But, worse than this, the entire criminal case brought against Yaroslav Stupak “was fabricated from beginning to end. This was done to all intents and purposes without remorse, in the best traditions of the GPU, NKVD and their followers in recent years. Everybody felt that the dark clouds of the 1930s had ascended above Lviv”. Stupak's 15 day sentence was therefore based upon false evidence and was illegal. Consequently, Yaroslav Kynshor asks the Procurator to study the following points:

- 1) Why did the militia falsify the time of the arrest?
- 2) The militia initially stated that they had arrested him for filming the demonstration, which in court was changed to “inciting disorder and trouble”.
- 3) The “witnesses” called in to prove he had “incited disorder and trouble” had never seen Stupak.
- 4) The “witnesses” never saw any court documents.
- 5) Why did the leading militia official threaten him by stating he had fallen into bad hands?

Yaroslav Stupak made a cassette recording of his discussion with the militia after he was arrested which, the author of this statement claims, could be used by the Procurator if he wished to act.

REPRESSION OF UKRAINIAN CATHOLIC CHURCH INCREASES

(UPA) Mykola Muratov, the representative of the Committee in Defence of the Ukrainian Catholic Church in Moscow, reported that a Ukrainian Catholic underground priest and passengers on a private bus returning from a church service were severely beaten by the militia.

The incident happened after Father Mykhailo Havryliv had celebrated mass in the village of Broshniv and was returning home. The bus driver was told to make an unauthorised stop and the passengers were then told to leave the bus. There were cries of "Fascists, who gave you the right to do this?" Meanwhile, Father Havryliv was dragged off the bus with Yuriy Rudenko, the son of Mykola Rudenko. Both suffered severe beatings in front of the passengers and Yuriy was arrested.

According to Muratov, both men suffered harassment at the hands of the militia one day before the incident. He reports that the car they were travelling in was stopped by the militia who insisted on travelling with them. The reason for this was to intimidate Father Havryliv so that he would not celebrate mass.

The authorities in Ukraine have adopted new methods of repression, Muratov reported. Their main weapon is to restrict the movement of known activists and former political prisoners. The latter will often be detained on the streets and taken to militia headquarters for questioning, then released after several hours. Muratov cites the case of Bishop Vasylyk, who was thrown off the train while travelling to Moscow to meet President Reagan. He adds that such denentions are strictly against the law.

Muratov concludes by stating that if one were to take the latest incidents in Ukraine into account then one would have to say that perestroika had come to an end. Rumours about the possible legalisation of the Ukrainian Catholic Church have not materialised.

DEMONSTRATIONS AT A PEACE MARCH IN UKRAINE BROKEN UP

(UPA) The press service of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union has released information sheet number 12 which details how the authorities broke up demonstrations at a peace march on August 20. The meeting, which was the start of the peace march, had been organised with official approval by official organisations and in the presence of foreign representatives. Suddenly, during

the speeches, a banner appeared with the inscription in English: "We are also in support of peace, but without barbed wire".

The Ukrainian Helsinki Union reports that the banner was being held by 2 activists: Oleh Nesterov and Alexander Vernykovskyi, who are trying to emigrate. They were also reportedly wearing teeshirts with the inscription: "I do not want to live in a communist country" and "I want to live in a free country".

The protest elicited no reaction from the authorities until the two young men displayed the reverse side of the banner, where the same slogan was written in Russian. Several members of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) troops, including their chief, Kotliarov, kicked and assaulted the 2 protesters. To add to the confusion, another group of protesters appeared. This time they were Jewish refuseniks with inscriptions on their chests: "Allow us to leave for the West, we don't want to live in slavery".

At this point the Ukrainian poet, Vasyl Piven, appeared and shouted: "Why are you beating the people. . . allow them to leave the USSR. Perhaps they could evacuate their flats for a homeless person like me". He was then pushed into a van, despite protests from American guests and members of the Odessa branch of the Democratic Union in Support of Perestroika.

The Ukrainian Helsinki Union reports that Piven was severely beaten in the militia van accompanied by such insults as: "We'll show you, Jew, what perestroika is!", and "We'll teach you, Jew, to demonstrate!" Piven, however, is not a Jew and does not wish to emigrate.

MYKOLA HORBAL AND VASYL OVSIENKO RELEASED FROM SOVIET LABOUR CAMP No. 35

(UCIS) We have received information that prominent Ukrainian political prisoners, Mykola Horbal and Vasyl Ovsienko, were released from labour camp № 35 in Vsesvyatskoe on August 25.

Up to 1971, Mykola Horbal, composer and poet by profession, worked as a teacher of aesthetics at the Borshchiv technical institute of the mechanisation of agriculture. In 1971, he was arrested and sentenced to 5 years of imprisonment and 2 years of exile on the basis of Article 62-1 of the Ukrainian SSR criminal code. After his release in 1978, Horbal lived in Kyiv and worked as a lift operator. He was also involved with the work of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group for which he was arrested in October 1979 and sentenced to 5 years of strict regime imprisonment in January 1980. In 1984, while in camp, he was sentenced to a further 8 years of strict regime imprisonment and 3 years of

exile. After his release, Horbal went to his mother in the Ternopil region of Ukraine.

Vasyl Ovsienko is a philologist by profession. After completing his studies, he worked as a teacher. He was arrested in 1972, charged with the publication of the samvydav *Ukrainian Herald*, and sentenced to 5 years of imprisonment. On completion of his sentence, Ovsienko returned to his native village, Lenine, where he worked as a painter on a collective farm. In February 1979, he was sentenced to 3 years of strict regime imprisonment on the basis of fabricated criminal charges. In August 1981, Ovsienko was arrested in the labour camp and sentenced to 10 years of strict regime imprisonment and 5 years of exile. After his release in August 1988, he returned to Lenine.

SEPTEMBER 1st MEETING DISRUPTED BY MILITIA

(UCIS) The meeting held in the University district of Lviv, Western Ukraine, on Thursday September 1, was again broken up by the militia. The meeting, organised by the Ridna Mova (Native Language) Society, is one of the regular gatherings scheduled for every first Thursday of each month.

Around 7 pm, 3-4,000 people gathered by the statue of the 19th century Ukrainian poet and writer, Ivan Franko. Although the militia, which included the Deputy Chief, warned the people that the meeting was "illegal" and urged them to go home, the demonstrators refused to disperse. This situation went on until 8 pm.

At 9 pm, Bohdan Skotiv called for the meeting to begin, after which he was arrested. The people then began to shout "Freedom for Makar¹" and "Shame". Shortly after, the 6th special detachment of the militia appeared on the scene in full kit. According to eyewitnesses, it was an awesome sight. They began to pick out certain people from the crowd (the more active ones) and lead them away. Undercover members of the security organs, posing as demonstrators, also arrested various people and dragged them off to police cars.

When the crowds were pushed back, they split into several groups and proceeded down September 17th Street, which leads to the city centre, to the opera theatre. Around the statue of Lenin, where the demonstrators were hoping to meet, they were again dispersed and further arrests were made. The meeting ended at 10 pm.

According to *Vilna Ukraina* (6.9.1988), 25 people were arrested. Eight

1. Ivan Makar played an active part in organising previous meetings. He was arrested on August 3, the evening before the last demonstration.

were imprisoned for 15 days, one sentenced to 2 months of corrective labour, 6 people were fined and one received a court warning. On this occasion, fines were much higher than previously. Bohdan Chopko, arrested during the last meeting and held for 4 days, was again arrested. He was fined 250 karbovantsi (roubles), approximately £250. For someone whose monthly earnings amount to between 130 and 150 karbovantsi this is a serious fine. Another demonstrator was fined 100 karbovantsi.

Eyewitnesses reported that 2 schoolboys aged 14, Yuriy Hnatyshyn and Khoma, were also arrested. They were taken down to the Lviv district department of the militia, where they were slapped around the face and forced to sign a statement to the effect that they had thrown stones at the militia. Although shocked and terrified, the boys refused to sign the document as they were innocent of the charges. All the meetings had been peaceful on the part of the demonstrators. Late that night, the boys' mothers were called and told to collect their sons. Although Yuriy Hnatyshyn's mother later protested at her son's treatment, her efforts have not yet brought any results.

"SPIRITUALITY AND THE CURRENT LITERARY PROCESS"

(A meeting in Kharkiv held at the beginning of September)

(*UCIS*) On September 2, the unofficial club, Friends of the Ukrainian Language of Slobozhanshchyna in the name of Vasyl Stus, held a meeting in the east Ukrainian city of Kharkiv. The meeting, whose theme was: "Spirituality and the current literary process", was organised by the founding members of the club and its various branches throughout Slobozhanshchyna, an area on the north-eastern frontier of Ukraine, as part of the celebrations marking the millennium of Christianity in Ukraine.

The meeting was opened by the Kharkiv poet Stepan Sapeliak. He pointed out that spirituality was a divine creation and illustrated his arguments with examples from the present literary process in Ukraine and the proscribed writers: Vasyl Stus, Ihor Kalynets, Mykhaiko Osadchyi and Ivan Svitlychnyi.

Next to speak was the artist Valeriy Bondar, a founding member of the club. He dedicated his talk to the life and works of the Kviv artist Stefania Shabatura. The meeting was attended by several hundred people, who became acquainted with the works of Ukrainian artists Valeriy Hnatenko and Valeriy Bondar. Those present at the meeting carried placards calling for "Free meetings!", and stating that "The state language is Ukrainian!", and "Let us rally round the club of Friends of the Ukrainian Language!".

Yevhen Zakharov, a founding member of the club, urged the people to

sign a petition to the Ministry of Culture demanding the transfer of the body of the poet Vasyl Stus, who died in a Soviet Russian labour camp in September 1985, from the camp cemetery to Ukraine.

The meeting was closed by Stepan Sapeliak who expressed his thanks to the participants and said the following words: "Let us stand up like giant sunflowers with our faces to national culture and history. Let the bitterness of our life once again return us to the sources, to the beginnings, to the nation. Having completely lost our past, we are left like a spider's web which envelops the mind and heart in inactivity. We are turning into sisters of indifference to good and truth, to injustice and evil. . . Let us look today at the shadow of the fatherland which is becoming blacker in the scaffolding of Brezhnevite stagnation, let us touch it with our lips in a kiss showing that we shall repent and love it, that in the holy millennium of Christianity in the secret of annointment, we shall see again and raise it to new heights in a clean age with culture and with prayer light a candle for our faith and freedom".

When the meeting ended, the militia and people in civilian dress dispersed the participants by violent means.

PEOPLE'S UNION IN SUPPORT OF PERESTROIKA FORMED IN KYIV

(UPA) The People's Union in Support of Perestroika held its first large gathering in Kyiv in late September. But *Robitnycha Hazeta* has pointed out that, "the authorities are not rushing to register the People's Union". All of the talks concerned glasnost in Ukraine. This included the problems surrounding the impact of the current campaign to raise subscriptions to official publications, opposition to the destruction of historical regions of Kyiv and ecological problems, which were dealt with by a number of speakers.

Many of the speakers went to the stage with newspapers and magazines to quote from them, pointing out that the central press covered much more than the local press in line with glasnost. Two appeals were sent from the meeting to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. One concerned the law passed in late July outlawing demonstrations and meetings which, the People's Union believes, should be open to all-Union public discussion and referendum, as well as further work. The Society Lev, a semi-official culture and ecology group from Lviv was in attendance, and it outlined a number of important projects it had undertaken together with the local Komsomol, giving suggestions for similarly minded people in Kyiv. Other suggestions coming from the

meeting talked about ways to "increase the political activism of the people" in the period of "democratisation".

Thus far, 3 cities have seen the rise of Democratic or People's Fronts in Support of Perestroika in Ukraine — Lviv, Odessa and now Kyiv. The Lviv Democratic Front, formed in early July, was quickly repressed by the authorities who feared that events had got out of their control. In Odessa the Democratic Front has come under pressure from the authorities who have organised Afghan veterans to attack their meetings. It too has not been registered.

The Kyiv People's Union is the latest attempt at pushing the frontiers of glasnost in Ukraine, and at the end of September it published the first 36 page issue of its still unofficial organ — *Narodna Volya* (People's Will). On October 7 it organised a demonstration in Kyiv attended by 400 people who shouted such slogans as: "All power belongs to the people!", "Democracy and glasnost — guarantors of Perestroika!" and "Respect for the individual. Defend rights and freedoms — this is the duty of the State organs!". Other placards with inscriptions such as: "The Ukrainian language — the State language!" and "Freedom for Ivan Makar!" were ripped from them by people in "civilian clothes" (i.e. the KGB). Another placard called for "Eternal memory to the political victims of Brezhnevism!" The authorities are undoubtedly watching the members of this new group in Kyiv. The Komsomol newspapers *Molod Ukrainy* (30 September) reported that at the Congress the participants consisted of 2 groups: "Those who came to listen, to support or reject new ideas, and those who came on active service. . . to control the level (of the discussion) and to keep order".

15,000 PEOPLE ATTEND REQUIEM TO FALLEN UKRAINIAN NATIONAL SOLDIERS IN LVIV CEMETERY

UKRAINIAN WRITERS AND DISSIDENTS HONOUR NATIONAL HEROES

(UPA) The Ukrainian Helsinki Union has reported that between fifteen and twenty thousand people attended a requiem mass (panakhyda) on the 1st of November in a cemetery in the western Ukrainian city of Lviv. The first day in November is traditionally a day when Ukrainians honour their dead, in particular those who have died in the struggles for an independent Ukraine.

The service was held in the Yaniv cemetery and it is the first time that such a ceremony has been permitted, or at least has not been broken up by the authorities. Wreaths were placed at the graves of the "Sichovi Striltsi", who

fought for Ukrainian independence after World War One². The leading member of the Writers' Union, Rostyslav Bratun, who has been outspoken in his campaign to look at the "blank spots" of Ukrainian history, gave a speech and was reported as saying that: "we have gathered here today in order to place flowers at the graves of those who fought for the freedom of Ukraine. These graves were desecrated after the war by the Stalinist regime". He said: "they were also desecrated after Stalin but now, during the period of glasnost, it was possible to honour the memory of those who had given their lives in order that others could live".

The service was celebrated by priests of the outlawed Ukrainian Catholic Church who later led a candle lit procession to the graves of Generals Tar-navskyi and Levitskyi — the only graves that have not been damaged. There the Ukrainian activist and head of the Committee in Defence of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, Ivan Hel, gave a short speech followed by a recital of the poem by Vasyl Stus³ written in 1972 about the "Sichovi Striltsi". It was read out by Ihor Kalynets, editor of the unofficial literary journal *Yevshan Zillia*. Shortly afterwards the people joined together and sang patriotic songs about the "Sichovi Striltsi".

RELEASE OF THREE UKRAINIAN PRISONERS

News has reached Keston College that three prominent Ukrainian prisoners of conscience have been released from internal exile in the Soviet Union. They are Lev Lukianenko, Yuriy Badzio and Mykola Matusevych. All three are members of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group, founded in Kyiv in 1976 to monitor Soviet compliance with the final act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

Lukianenko, a lawyer by profession, served two separate terms in prison and exile: the first from 1961 to 1976 for his role in the formation of the Ukrainian Workers and Peasants Union, an organisation committed to organising a referendum in the Ukrainian Republic on the issue of secession from the USSR; the second from 1973 for membership in the Ukrainian Helsinki Group. Lukianenko was originally a Marxist, but renounced this philosophy in favour of traditional Christian Orthodoxy and considers himself an adherent of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church tradition.

2 The "Sichovi Striltsi" were formed as a Ukrainian unit within the Austro-Hungarian army in 1914 from the Ukrainian population of Galicia, then a part of the Austro-Hungarian empire. They were actively involved in the Ukrainian liberation struggle between 1918-1921.

3 Vasyl Stus was a dissident poet who died in the gulag in September 1985 after the authorities had refused him medical care.

Yuriy Badzio, a historian, was originally arrested and charged for preparing a thousand-page manuscript entitled "The Right to Live", an analysis of the Ukrainian national question from a democratic socialist standpoint. This manuscript was apparently destroyed by the KGB, as was a second version that Badzio attempted to write.

Mykola Matysevych, also a historian, was a founding member of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group for which he was sentenced by the Soviet Ukrainian court in 1978 to seven years of imprisonment and five years of exile.

The releases give some encouragement to the hope that all prisoners of conscience in the Soviet Union will be released by the end of the year, as the authorities indicated recently to West German Chancellor Kohl.

(Keston College)

KHMARA ARRESTED IN UKRAINE; FEAR MORE TO FOLLOW

(UCIS) Stepan Khmara, one of the leaders of the current national renaissance in Ukraine, was arrested by the militia in his hometown of Chervonohrad, Ukraine, on December 3, according to the Ukrainian Central Information Service.

Khmara and his wife were abducted from their home and driven by the officers to a police station, where his wife lost contact with him. He was charged with interfering with the work of the militia and sentenced to 15 days' detention. According to sources in Lviv, the centre of the year's national revival in Ukraine, Khmara was arrested because of his participation in organising a manifestation in Lviv on Saturday, December 10. The rally commemorated the 40th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

In protest against the arrest, Khmara declared a hunger strike. Family and friends fear for his health, which they described as poor. In addition, they anticipate that other national activists could be detained in a new wave of arrests in Ukraine.

It is reported that 200 residents of Chervonohrad signed a petition protesting Khmara's arrest. They sent it to local and all-union party and procuracy officials. They are demanding his release and punishment for those responsible for Khmara's arrest.

KHMARA'S DAUGHTER ASKS REAGAN TO HELP FATHER

Solomea Khmara, daughter of the imprisoned Ukrainian patriot, Stepan Khmara, has appealed to President Ronald Reagan on behalf of her father.

The full text of her letter, which was written by her in English, follows:

“On December 3, 1988, my father, Stepan Khmara, was punished by administrative punishment for 15 days because of his political activity. This act was unlawful. To protest this, my father proclaimed hunger, which continues already six days. So his life is in danger. His health is very bad. I love my father very much and want him to be free. Help the political prisoner, please.

His daughter, Khmara Solomea”.

Hanna Mykhailenko threatened

(UCIS) Odessa, November 15: An unknown KGB man threatened former Ukrainian political prisoner Hanna Mykhailenko. He informed her that she would be dealt with for going to Moscow and telling foreign journalists about the abuse of psychiatry by the Soviet authorities as a means of punishment. Hanna Mykhailenko spent 8 years in Kazan special psychiatric hospital.

CHRISTIAN-DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT FORMED IN UKRAINE

(UCIS) According to prominent Ukrainian Catholic activist and former political prisoner Vasyl Sichko, a new Christian-Democratic Movement has been formed in Ukraine. It is a federation of Christian organisations and has the support of the outlawed Ukrainian Catholic Church as well as wide sections of the population. Rev. Mykhailo Simkailo and Vasyl Sichko went to Moscow to register the new organisation with the authorities.

DMYTRO MAZUR CRITICALLY ILL

Vasyl Ovsienko appeals on his behalf

(UCIS) Well-known Ukrainian national rights activist and former political prisoner Vasyl Ovsienko has appealed to Mikhail Gorbachev demanding the immediate release of Dmytro Mazur. Due to his critical state of health, Mazur has been in a camp hospital since March of this year.

Dmytro Mazur, a philologist and teacher, was arrested on 30.7.1980 and sentenced to 6 years of strict regime imprisonment and 5 years of exile. He was re-arrested at the end of 1986 or the beginning of 1987 and sentenced to a further year of imprisonment and the remaining part of his exile. He is not due for release until 1992.

In exile, his living conditions were made deliberately insufferable. He was subjected to constant attacks and blackmail as a result of which he escaped twice from exile. During his new term of imprisonment, Mazur contracted tuberculosis. Since March, he has also been suffering from jaundice. He is critically ill.

In his statement in defence of Dmytro Mazur Ovsienko writes: "I did not ask you to show clemency as far as I was concerned, inasmuch as I do not regard myself as guilty and besides I was released on August 21. My friend Mazur is also innocent and as such does not ask for clemency. But I am pleading for clemency on his behalf: release him in any way, have consideration for his state of health, invalidate his sentence, reduce his term of imprisonment, and if you wish — pardon him. If Mazur is not released immediately, he will become yet another victim of the inertia of stagnation which would be very bad for your reputation".

In light of this, the camp doctor's statement concerning Mazur's health appears completely cynical. The doctor stated that Mazur is under full medical care and his state of health does not give any grounds for concern.

LVIV UNDER SIEGE

on the 40th anniversary of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights

(UCIS) December 10 marked the 40th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The Ukrainian Helsinki Union called a public meeting in the western Ukrainian city of Lviv to mark this day. The authorities, however, banned this demonstration and were standing by to disrupt the proceedings.

The week prior to December 10:

- a) Militia from around Ukraine including the 13 districts of Lviv region was brought into the city.
- b) Troops, as well as military students, were also brought into Lviv.
- c) Hotel rooms in Lviv were emptied to prevent them being occupied by people from out of town during the demonstration.
- d) Check-points were set up outside the city and people who did not have specific business in Lviv were turned back.
- e) The monthly "voluntary" work day was transferred from Saturday December 24 to Saturday December 10 and Lviv was to be the only city in Ukraine which would be working that day.
- f) The militia was conducting exercises in the streets to intimidate the residents.
- g) The militia and KGB went around work places warning people not to attend the Saturday meeting.
- h) Television and radio denounced the unauthorised meeting.
- i) Bohdan Horyn, prominent Ukrainian activist, and others were threatened with arrest upon arrival at the venue of the meeting.
- j) Bohdan Horyn had his telephone disconnected for 3 days.
- k) Leading Ukrainian Catholic activist, Stepan Khmara, was arrested on December 3 and held for 15 days to prevent him from organising and attending the demonstration.

The demonstration:

Ihor Derkach was arrested on his way to the meeting and held from 1.30 p.m. to 11.15 p.m. Ivan Makar and some of his friends were also arrested and held from 1 p.m. to 10.30 p.m. Ivan Zhulechuk and Yaroslav Borshchan were both held from 1 p.m. to 6 p.m. In addition, 30 young people were arrested during the meeting. Despite the terror tactics of the authorities, around 7,000 people attended the meeting.

* * *

**THE UKRAINIAN HELSINKI UNION ISSUES A STATEMENT
CALLING FOR A DEMONSTRATION TO MARK THE 40TH
ANNIVERSARY OF THE DECLARATION ON HUMAN RIGHTS**

Dear compatriots

On 10 December of this year the whole world will mark the 40th anniversary since the signing of the Declaration on Human Rights. The states which participated in the signing of this Declaration and which later formulated the Helsinki Agreement, among them the USSR, accepted the moral obligation

of guaranteeing their citizens basic human rights, among them: the right to free thought, conscience and religion; the right to freedom of conviction and the right to express it; the freedom to organise peaceful meetings and associations; the right of individual freedom and the protection of honour and dignity of the individual.

The despotic Stalinist regime and the neo-Stalinist Brezhnev clique have completely ignored the international acts on human rights which they signed. Despite the positive changes in recent years the USSR has not yet become a state based on legal principles. However, today the voice of the people can already be heard.

The executive committee of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union and the council of the Lviv branch of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union call upon residents of Lviv as well as inhabitants of other Ukrainian regions to take part in the mass meeting dedicated to the fortieth anniversary of the universal declaration on Human Rights, which will begin on the 10 December at 14.00 in the square by the Lviv opera theatre.

We beg participants to exercise self discipline and control in order to avoid possible provocations.

It is intended to start the meeting with the recital of the Ukrainian text of the General Declaration on Human Rights, which is still unknown to the majority of citizens.

We hope that the local authorities will not become the laughing stock of the whole world, having in the past incited the militia and special troops armed with dogs against those campaigning for human rights. We also ask the International Helsinki Federation, the governments and the parliaments of countries, which signed the Helsinki Agreement to take into account the marking of this anniversary in Ukraine and to judge by it the level of perestroika, democracy and glasnost in the USSR and particularly in Ukraine.

We call upon those who are concerned about democracy and national revival in Ukraine to attend the meeting!

The executive committee of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union
The UHU Lviv regional council

(UPA)

PLANTS PRODUCING FOR THE MILITARY RESPONSIBLE FOR MYSTERIOUS DISEASE IN CHERNIVTSI (UKRAINE)

(UPA) Yosyf Ziselts, a resident of Chernivtsi, has written a samvydav article for the unofficial weekly *Express-Chronicle* detailing the causes of the mysterious disease that has engulfed the Ukrainian town of Chernivtsi. After

surveying the official press on the causes of the illness the correspondent comes to different conclusions.

On 9 November, according to *Izvestiya*, there was a meeting between journalists and the minister of health about the situation which has developed in the Ukrainian city of Chernivtsi. The minister was reported as saying that the reason for the disease, which has caused childrens' hair to fall out, is acid rain and high quantities of thallium in the air. The minister's explanation was that these deposits (chemical and other products) had come from other areas, "Possibly even from abroad". Chernivtsi is, indeed, not far from the borders of several other countries and "so the acid rain has started to threaten not only forests abroad, but also children in our own republic", continued the minister.

Although *Izvestiya* a day later reported that "as a rule those falling ill are children between the ages of 2-4", another correspondent writing for *Moscow News* spoke about the age limit of those affected as between 8 months and 14 years. According to this correspondents' account, a special commission has been set up in Chernivtsi, which has reported that "the reasons for the illness were not due to the water or to the air, but they had to rest with the city's waste site, where all major industries deposit their industrial waste. It is interesting how the waste has managed to get into the childrens' organisms and why has the commission decided to blame the communal services rather than the individual plants, which are responsible for the deposits".

The explanation for this is to be found in a report in the unofficial journal *Express-Chronicle* which blames the illness on the metal thallium. However, most of the production of thallium in the area is destined for military uses. And so it is inconvenient for the commission to confirm that thallium is the main culprit. If some blame can be apportioned to the metal then "it came from abroad anyway", as previously explained by the minister. *Express-Chronicle* also reported that it had been officially announced that certain plants will be closed for repairs and for cleansing, however the announcement did not specify which plants.

Documents and Reports**STATEMENT BY STEPAN KHMARA**

**To all Christians and citizens of countries participating in the
Vienna Conference for the Review of the Implementation of the
Helsinki Final Act**

Dear Brothers and Sisters,

At the end of the second millennium since the birth of Christ and after a thousand years since our baptism, only two European nations — the Byelorussian and Ukrainian — are deprived of the right to freely confess the Christian faith, and their Churches are destroyed or outlawed. For a thousand years, the Ukrainian Church has preached evangelical virtues of Christian love and charity in Eastern Europe. It united our nation with the Christian nations of Europe. Having set as its goal the destruction of the Byelorussian and Ukrainian nations through brutal and total russification, Russian tsarism in the first place mercilessly destroyed our Churches as the most important spiritual institution of our two nations.

Stalin and his successors continued the same policy towards Ukraine. In the 1930s, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church in Ukraine was liquidated and its clergy physically destroyed. In the 1940s, the Ukrainian Catholic Church in the USSR was outlawed and its faithful pronounced united with the Russian Orthodox Church. The destruction of the Ukrainian Catholic Church was being realised by the Stalinist regime. Organs of the NKVD arrested the entire hierarchy of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, together with Metropolitan Josyf Slipyj, priors, and thousands of priests and monks — all those who refused to renounce the Catholic Church. Most of them died during imprisonment; hundreds of thousands of faithful of the Ukrainian Catholic Church were repressed.

The Ukrainian Catholic Church went over to an illegal status, into the catacombs. In this form, on the whole, it is continuing to act even at the present time, as the policy of persecution of the Ukrainian Catholic Church remains, in principle, unchanged. The broad campaign of the denunciation of Stalin's crimes, currently underway in the Soviet media, has not touched at all on the question of the destruction of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox and the Ukrainian Catholic Churches, and the terror against Ukrainian Christians — Orthodox, Catholics and Protestants. Moreover, the campaign of disinformation and defamation, particularly of the Ukrainian Catholic Church

and its faithful, in the period of the so-called restructuring, is being waged with fresh force by state officials, official propaganda, and the hierarchy of the Russian Orthodox Church. It does not differ in any way from similar attacks of the Stalin-Brezhnev period.

State policy towards the Ukrainian Church remains extremely hostile. The authorities are striving, without fail, to politicise the religious question. The reaction of the authorities to the numerous appeals and petitions with thousands of signatures for the legalisation of the Ukrainian Catholic Church was this. All appeals to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR have been ignored. Instead, the authorities are employing new methods of combating the Ukrainian Catholic Church, and the persecution of Ukrainian Catholic believers is, it seems, in the spirit of the time. Everywhere, where the movement for the legalisation of the Ukrainian Catholic Church is particularly strong, the authorities are trying to create parishes of the Russian Church, handing over Ukrainian Catholic churches, which have remained closed until now, to the Russian Orthodox Church. With the help of blackmail and threats, the organs of the KGB, the militia and state and party officials are trying to force the most backward and frightened believers into the Russian Church. With the aim of a propaganda coup, the authorities are employing energetic means in order to create the impression of state tolerance towards religious believers and guarantee of the right to freedom of conscience laid down in the Constitution of the USSR. At the same time, the persecution of the faithful of the Ukrainian Catholic Church is becoming more intense. The KGB and the militia are disrupting religious services, dispersing the faithful, and preventing priests from celebrating Mass. Activists for the legalisation of the Ukrainian Catholic Church are being threatened. A legalised form of robbery in the form of levying fines against believers for participation in religious services is being practiced. Acts of vandalism are being committed, religious attributes destroyed, churches desecrated.

The authorities are trying to extend the decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR regarding organisation and the holding of gatherings, meetings, street marches and demonstrations, which is already in force, to religious services of the Ukrainian Catholics, classifying them as unsanctioned meetings and gatherings. And, thus, the high-handedness of the authorities towards Ukrainian Catholics is becoming unlimited, but the question of religious believers is becoming even more profound. As we can see, the policy of restructuring has not improved the situation of the Ukrainian Church and its faithful at all. Without the guarantee of the freedom of conscience, one of the most fundamental human rights, neither the process of democratisation nor the guarantee of other human rights is possible. Furthermore, the problem of the Church is an important part of the main unresolved problem in the USSR — the national problem. Without respect for the religious freedom of one of Europe's largest nations, the Ukrainian nation, progress in the field of European security and cooperation is impossible.

Freedom is indivisible. The absence of freedom in our country will always pose a threat to its existence in democratic countries. A sure guarantee of the freedom and security of nations is not the number of international documents with corresponding declarations that have been signed, but the unwavering implementation of the principles laid down in these documents.

To us, Ukrainian Christians, the principle of freedom of conscience, laid down in the Helsinki Final Act and other international documents, and even in Article 52 of the Constitution of the USSR, is a mockery as the authorities stubbornly refuse to recognise this right for Ukrainians. Our Ukrainian Church and its faithful presently find themselves in a particularly difficult and dramatic situation. We call upon all our brothers in Christ, all the citizens of countries taking part in the Helsinki process, to express their solidarity with our struggle for the better future of our Church. We hope that you, Dear Brothers and Sisters, will not abandon us in this predicament. We call upon you to do everything possible to convince the governments of your countries that it is pointless signing the final document of the Vienna Conference until the government of the USSR allows the Ukrainian Catholic Church to function legally and recognises the right to revive the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church in Ukraine. The signing of the next document, when obligations made at previous international fora are not being met, will only encourage certain parties to go on violating basic human rights in the future.

We are all Europeans, brought up on cultural and spiritual traditions based on the principles of Christian love, charity and solidarity. And hence it is our duty to resist the destructive forces, which are striving to shake or destroy these principles, wherever this threat exists.

Today Ukraine is a victim of the intensified activity of the forces of destruction. She is calling for help to all people of good will.

On behalf of the faithful of
the Ukrainian Catholic Church

S. Khmara

Chervonohrad-Lviv
15.8.1988

GLASNOST IN MOSCOW, RUSSIFICATION IN UKRAINE

(UPA) The growing campaign in support of the use of the Ukrainian language is still encountering official obstacles, according to a report in the journal *Dnipro* (no. 7/1988). The article is critical of a recent government decree, which ordered that all maps, museum catalogues, scientific and research material and inventories should be written in Russian. This, claims the aut-

hor, contravenes the Soviet constitution and is not in the interests of developing the languages of non-Russian nations.

The lengthy article analyses the situation of the Ukrainian language in Ukraine today. The author's findings indicate that, apart from official obstacles, there are still many people who refuse to speak their native language either out of habit or open hostility to it.

According to another article in the organ of the Writers' Union, *Literaturna Ukraina* (no. 35) the Ukrainian language enjoys a worse status in Ukrainian schools than any foreign language. Such neglect, warns the author, could lead to another Nagorno-Karabakh situation. He adds that the practice of exempting pupils from the study of their own language has increased so much in the republic that it is even considered prestigious to do so now.

The author also asks why the Minister of Culture of the Russian republic is responsible for organising school programmes in Ukraine? "Doesn't this smack of the Stalinist idea of 'autonomisation', which was criticised by Lenin before the USSR was formed", he asks? The article advocates decentralisation in education so that the Ukrainian language will once again become the language of tuition in higher education in order that exams be taken in Ukrainian — and not Russian — as is the case today.

The newspaper *Molod Ukrainy* (August 24) also joined in the protest by publicising a selection of letters, the gist of which was that the Ukrainian language had been neglected to a secondary position in its own republic. Some of the problems that exist are that Ukrainian schools are so scarce that parents prefer to send their children to Russian schools which are closer to home. Even in Ukrainian schools all is not perfect, according to one letter — more and more classes are introducing Russian as the language of tuition.

According to the literary journal *Vitchyzna* (no.7/1988) there has been no progress in the language sphere; announcements are still in Russian, road signs are now in Russian, village meetings are conducted in Russian and administrative forms are also in Russian. It also published a selection of letters on this subject. One such letter dwelt on nursery schools in the city of Kirovohrad. The author conducted a survey among parents with young children asking them which nursery they preferred their children to attend. The reasons for this are mainly that higher educational institutions use Russian as the language of tuition and parents believe their children would be disadvantaged by going to a Ukrainian school. Almost all letters are unanimous in advocating government intervention, which would make Ukrainian the official language of the republic.

PRESS RELEASE № 14
of the Press Service of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union

August 30, 1988

(UCIS) The material prepared by Anatoliy Shcherbatiuk, member of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union and the Ukrainian Culturological Club which we propose to our readers and press organs, will not take much time and needs no commentaries. However we want to note the diligence with which the Kyivan party apparatus and the KGB, even today, in the time of restructuring, demonstrate their solidarity with their predecessors and spiritual brothers from the years of the "the glorious Stalinist five-year plans" covering the traces of their horrible crimes.

* * *

KILLED TWICE

(The KGB covers its traces. . .)

Two days after the occupation of Kyiv by the German forces, two women from the Kyivan village of Bykovnia took their cows to pasture, as they usually did. The solid green fence separating a large section of the pine forest from the pasture was no longer guarded by anyone, and the women dared to enter what until now, had been a "forbidden zone". They were compelled by an old curiosity, from 1937, the times of the first Stalinist "selections", when every week, usually at night, undercover automobiles would arrive here, and the silence of the forest would be shattered by gunfire. A day before the arrival of the Nazis the inhabitants of Bykovnia saw an entire colonnade of weary, emaciated people herded into the forest behind the green fence — and the forest again resounded with gunfire.

Behind the fence the women saw a huge ravine, completely filled with partially decomposed corpses. The bodies on top had not yet begun to decompose, they were covered with some type of crystals, similar to salt, according to the women. Later, on the request of the village elder, a priest conducted a memorial service in the forest for those killed. The German commandant of the town of Brovari summoned witnesses from the village, and in their presence, the grave was covered with sand.

The war ended, years passed, the sand settled and was washed away by

rain, and the living were once again reminded of those who were killed. Among the living a particular category of person appeared, the gold seekers who stalked the forest at night and secretly opened graves, looking for gold crowns. The gold fever reached its apogee in 1970. The authorities were forced to take measures, the location of former executions was surrounded by internal troops. For more than a month no one was allowed in the forest. When the troops finally left, the local inhabitants saw numerous traces of excavation and a mound covered with sand and pine branches, surrounded by a fence. On May 20, 1970, an article appeared in "Radyanska Ukraina" informing that yet another mass grave of Soviet citizens brutally murdered by fascists had been discovered near the village of Bykovnia.

However, it turned out that the number of victims was much larger, tens, if not hundreds of thousands. After decades, the living were once again reminded of those who were killed. Human tibias, skulls and backbones once again began to emerge from the sand mound. In 1987, Mykola Hryhorovych Lysenko, a local villager, took several photographs of the mounds of bullet-pierced skulls, mixed with the remains of clothing and footwear. He wrote an accompanying letter and delivered it and the photographs to the writer Ivan Drach. Drach, together with S. Plachynda and B. Oliynyk, came to the forest. According to Lysenko, the writers, upon seeing the thousands of skulls protruding from under the sand like eggs, gasped in horror. The writers passed the materials collected by Lysenko on to the Department of Culture of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. Their reaction was the same as the reaction of the authorities in the 1970s.

In the autumn of 1987, internal troop divisions once again surrounded the place of execution. All through November, December, January, February and all of March, the troops redug the sand, searched for bones and collected them in one common pit. This time the sand mound and the surrounding area were covered with black earth and sown with grass. The mound was surrounded with slabs of granite and a huge granite cube was erected, with "Eternal Memory" carved in the centre in large letters. Beneath, in much smaller letters the following was added: "Six thousand and twenty-nine Soviet soldiers, partisans, members of the underground and peaceful citizens, murdered by the fascist occupants in 1941-1943 are buried here".

On June 6, 1988, the opening of the monument took place. Functionaries from Kyiv brought wreaths which were laid on the common graves, the ribbons bearing dedications: "To the Soviet patriots from the City Party Committee", "To the Soviet Patriots from the Provincial Party Committee". Only lacking perhaps, was a wreath from "veteran Chekists". . . The war veteran and writer Avtomonov delivered a speech, and already on May 12, "Literaturna Ukraina" announced the untimely death of the well-known writer and former hero-intelligence man, Paul Avtomonov. Perhaps his conscience suddenly killed him?

On July 16, 1988, members of the Ukrainian Culturological Club gathered beside the grave of the victims of the Stalinist terror. Valentyn Matsiash, a Ukrainian Culturological Club activist, born in 1949, grew up in the vicinity. His parents and grandparents were all from here. He told those present about his mother's recollections, who lived some two kilometres from there. In the course of the four pre-war years, his mother heard gunfire resounding from the forest dozens of times. The place of execution was constantly and unchangingly watched by the same guards — Russians and Uzbeks. His mother recounted to Valentyn that among the last prisoners herded behind the green fence, there were many women and children. As for partisans, they were never here. The elderly villagers associate the executions with the year 1937, however, they speak about the "green fence" reluctantly. Last year, KGB co-workers who were in the village showed interest in those who were too talkative. KGB agents were also present at the gathering of the Ukrainian Culturological Club. They sat beside the grave and listened with all their might. The UCC gathering picked an initiative group of six persons whose purpose is to gather new evidence about the covered-up Stalinist crime from among the local inhabitants and to appeal to the government of the Ukrainian SSR, who knowingly erred in the date and the naming of the responsible party for the tragedy which occurred near Bykovnia.

The members of the Ukrainian Culturological Club honoured the memory of those killed with a moment of silence, and slowly began to walk out of the forest. The KGB men also got into their cars and began to leave. Today, they did not shoot in Bykovnia. A skull, unburied for some reason, lay on the side of the road.

In the words of Valentyn's mother, the people who were brought here last in 1941, were somehow, special. Their exhausted faces bore the seal of spirituality. Perhaps there is a higher sense, insubordinate to bullets and time — the élite of a nation, its intelligentsia and intellectuals who were led to death along this dirty sand, communicated a part of their vision to this simple village woman, and she in turn, shared it with her children and grandchildren.

Kyiv

Ukrainian Helsinki Union
Press Service

UKRAINIAN HERALD-EXPRESS № 5 NOW IN THE WEST

(UCIS) The latest issue of the unofficial literary journal *Ukrainian Herald-Express* has now arrived in the West. The aim of the *Herald-Express* is to highlight the most important events in Ukraine. The fifth issue contains materials concerning the life, activity and struggle of religious believers in Ukraine. Much of the material has been reprinted from previous issues of the *Ukrainian Herald*, organ of the recently reformed Ukrainian Helsinki Union. The *Express* is a special publication and appears more frequently.

Dated June 28, 1988, this issue of the *Ukrainian Herald-Express* contains the following materials:

- 1) Appeal to Metropolitan Filaret of Kyiv and Halych by Rev. Vasyl Romaniuk (*Ukrainian Herald* № 9-10).
- 2) The Church under siege. A report by Vasyl Sichko, *Ukrainian Herald* correspondent for the Ivano-Frankivsk region. This material has been reprinted from the first issue of the unofficial journal *Khrystyianskyi Holos* (The Christian Voice), published in Lviv by the Committee for the Defence of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, edited by Ivan Hel, head of the Committee.
- 3) Facts concerning the attempts to close the churches in the villages of Perehinske and Ilemnia, and the complaint of the Khalusty family (*Ukrainian Herald* № 9-10).
- 4) The Ukrainian Catholic Church in the struggle for legalisation (*Ukrainian Herald* № 7).
- 5) The truth has frightened them. By Vyacheslav Chornovil (*Ukrainian Herald* № 9-10).
- 6) Attacks against attempts to legalise the Ukrainian Catholic Church. By Ivan Hel (*Ukrainian Herald* № 9-10).
- 7) Partorh (Party organiser) — in the service of the Russian Patriarch. By Vyacheslav Chornovil.
- 8) Which God is more progressive? A tape recording of a meeting between the editorial board of the *Ukrainian Herald* and members of the Lviv press and radio, held on December 1, 1987.
- 9) Brotherhood of the Evangelical Christian-Baptists. Activities and Problems. An interview (*Ukrainian Herald* № 9-10).
- 10) Appeal to the International Committee for the Defence of Human

Rights from a community of Evangelical Christian-Baptists of the Lviv region concerning their demands for permission to emigrate. 8 signatures.

Although the majority of the material has been reprinted from the *Ukrainian Herald*, this points to the fact that the editors regard it particularly important to inform the Ukrainian public about all matters concerning the life and activity of the Churches and religious groups in Ukraine.

STATEMENT BY LEV LUKYANENKO TO THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR OF THE CITY OF LVIV

To the Public Prosecutor
of the City of Lviv

Statement

I have been carefully following the manner in which the decrees of the Central Committee of the CPSU on the development of democracy and glasnost are being implemented in the various republics (RSFSR, Ukraine, Lithuania, Latvia and others) and comparing the process of perestroika in each of them. The differences are extremely great. In some of the republics one notes a reconciliation between the authorities and the patriotic forces in a common effort towards reconstruction and glasnost, the revival of national life. In others, however, such a reconciliation has not been noted. In Azerbaijan and Armenia, for instance, conflicting resolutions concerning Karabakh were taken. Leaving aside the question of whether these decisions are right or wrong, I wish to underline a symptomatic fact: the leading activists of Azerbaijan and Armenia feel that they are united with their people and make decisions which appear right to their respective nations.

Thus the State and Party activists of these nations have not broken the spiritual ties with their people, but have become reconciled with their nations. Whatever the relations between the "top" and the "bottom" may be, the authorities in Azerbaijan have, at the critical moment, felt themselves to be Azerbaijanis and those in Armenia — Armenians. They are not foreigners, but a part of their nations and do not regard their positions in the state and party apparatus as a temporary posting away from Moscow after which they will (like Rakochiy and Novotnyi) take up permanent residence in Moscow's dachas. The leaders of Lithuania and Estonia perceive reconstruction as the repeal of unjust decrees of the Brezhnev era, as well as practices which are harmful to their nations and the security of their further development.

What about Ukraine? We did not expect any positive developments from Shcherbytskyi, a pupil of Khrushchev and Brezhnev. And what about our still relatively young Head of the Council of Ministers Masol? At the 19th Party Conference, he delivered a speech in which he managed to avoid all the most pressing problems of our nation, as though he were not concerned at all about the tragic state in which Ukraine now finds herself as a result of Stalinist despotism and successive decades of impetuous russification and merciless plunder of the culture, customs, traditions and all the spiritual substance of our nation. The poet Boris Oliynyk said a few words about this at the conference. Thus people in the state and party apparatus in Ukraine regard themselves as foreigners in our country and are not concerned about the fate of our nation. Mr. Masol does not care about Ukraine. He cares for the so-called all-union interests. Boris Oliynyk is a poet and not a politician and his address, which was relatively good, appears dissident in comparison to that of the Head of the Council of Ministers.

In Azerbaijan, Armenia and the Baltic republics, the state activists and the patriotic forces are heading down more or less the same path. In our republic, however, there are two tendencies: one — the Ukrainians in the state and party organs; the other — poets, writers, in other words, the patriotic creative intelligentsia.

The first tendency, regrettably, is acting in the traditional manner of Ukrainian hired officials: just as at the beginning of the 19th century, in the times of Uvarov, Aleksander III and Nicholas II, and in the times of Stalin, Khrushchev and Brezhnev, and so even today they regard themselves as officials of the great state which rules over the Ukrainian nation and are persistently suppressing the Ukrainian language and helping to deride our literature and national customs for the sake of their salary and position in the great (foreign) state. For a long time already they have not considered themselves as a part of the Ukrainian nation. They see themselves as activists of the Petersburg and Muscovite state. And, although they are born and die in Ukraine, spiritually they are in the northern capitals at the foot of the powerful throne. The feeling that they are part of the bureaucratic machine of the great state raises the prestige of these officials in their own eyes to the same level as the state which looms over our nation. This creates the illusion of imperiousness. This illusion brings joy to the selfish and when an official does not love his people then a wrong against him serves as a means of self-strengthening and upward mobility on the bureaucratic ladder. It is unfortunate that Ukraine has had many such janissaries and lackeys.

The second tendency is the patriotic intelligentsia. Beginning with Shevchenko it has suffered in prisons, languished in Siberia, and, cold and starving, built the White Sea Canal and perished in the Ural concentration camps. It showed remarkable perseverance in the struggle for the preservation of the nation. Unfortunately, it did not achieve much: its efforts were reduced to nothing by our very own lackeys and turncoats.

Today we are witnessing the latest example of this drawn out self-devouring of the Ukrainians. In Kyiv the initiators of the meetings are being picked up and driven away to far-off forests and fields. In Lviv meetings are being dispersed, and in Chernihiv KGB Colonel Herasymenko has this to say: "I will permit no such street democracy here!"

Who is doing all this? Our own people, our own Ukrainians!

Why do they, related to us in blood, hate freedom so much? Why won't they permit their fellow countrymen to gather for meetings and talk about common issues? Why do they despise the political traditions and primordial tendency of Ukrainians towards the public council to discuss public matters? Where do they get such hate for everything that is Ukrainian and such blind persistence in destroying all that is ours? Their own fathers, grandfathers and great grandfathers were Ukrainians!

Historical circumstances present the opportunity to overcome spiritual intoxication and moral decline and begin the rebirth of our national entity. Instead of taking this opportunity, the Lviv KGB is harassing M. Horyn, V. Chornovil, Z. Krasivskyi and other active citizens and public activity, and even resorts to Brezhnevite methods — the arrest of Ivan Makar for taking part in the organisation of meetings and for his critical words concerning the present Ukrainian reality.

What kind of freedom is it if we can not organise meetings? What kind of glasnost is it if we cannot criticise the real state of affairs in our native land?

The members of the Kyiv viche (council) drove the Prince from this throne and the members of the Cossack rada (council) dismissed the Hetman from his position, and yet Ivan Makar was arrested and threatened with a law suit for merely taking part in the organisation of public meetings of Lviv citizens during which he said things which the authorities did not like.

If the society is to attain a new qualitative state, that is true glasnost, then what does it matter what Mr. Makar said? He relied not on stones or pistols, but on words. Freedom of speech means the right of the individual to express any political, religious or other views.

Therefore, for the sake of reconstruction and a true transition to democracy and glasnost, I demand the immediate release of the active citizen Makar and that the physical force of the state not be placed in the way of his words.

6 September, 1988

Lukyanenko Levko Hryhorovych,
political deportee,
Berezivka village,
Parabel district,
Tomsk region (*UCIS*)

LANGUAGE PROBLEMS AND RUSSIFICATION CONTINUE TO BE A MAJOR CONCERN

(UPA) In September Soviet Ukrainian party and state newspapers announced the preparation for the celebration of the Ukrainian language. Many used the occasion to reassess the position and progress of the Ukrainian language in the republic, which, after years of neglect and russification, has been downgraded in many parts of Ukraine to a second-class language.

Dmytro Pavlychko, a leading member of the Writers' Union, renewed his attack on those forces in the country which have pushed the native language out of schools, colleges and government institutions. Attempting to discover the reasons for the neglect of the Ukrainian language, Pavlychko says it can not be solely attributed to government circulars. Only ignorant people would willingly forget their native language, he exclaims, but in "Ukraine such people, it seems, do not exist. We are educated, well read, all in possession of television sets and radios. . ." He concludes that the nihilistic attitude towards the Ukrainian language stems from fear instilled in people's souls by Stalin's "Internationalism", by people's desire for career advancement and because of fashion, which dictates that parents should send their children to Russian schools. Such people, despite their education, have remained ignorant, lazy and degenerate.

According to Pavlychko, it is a disease which needs to be cured and in order to do so one must transform society as a whole — not just the educational system. "Our language needs the fire of love and spiritual strength! He who speaks "Syurzhyk" (a mish-mash of Ukrainian and Russian) cannot possess spiritual health. . .", argues Pavlychko.

Radyanska Ukraina (September 18), the communist party daily, reported on the recently held "Festival of the Ukrainian language", by the secretary of the Kirovohrad branch of the Writers' Union. He claimed in his critical assessment of the state of the language that although 86.9% of the population of the Kirovohrad region was Ukrainian, only 4 out of a total of 30 schools were Ukrainian. There were few Ukrainian-language nurseries and those that did exist were often only Ukrainian by name. He had made approaches to the local party organisation about organising a special conference on the subject of "The functioning of the Ukrainian language in the city and region", and that teachers, writers, komsomol members and lecturers had been invited to attend. He concludes by advocating the establishment of "Taras Shevchenko Societies for the Respect of the Ukrainian Language" in colleges and komsomol organisations. He would also like to see courses set up for those who wish to study the Ukrainian language.

The same newspaper carried another report on October 9 which featured

an interview with the director of the Institute of Language of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, V. M. Rusanivskyi who expressed grave doubts as to whether the prestige of the Ukrainian language could be raised by government decrees. He admitted that such large cities as Kharkiv, Donetsk, Voroshilovgrad and Odessa did not practically possess any language schools.

Rusanivskyi also attempts to analyse the decline in the use of the Ukrainian language. In practice, however, "it's no secret that in our republic higher educational establishments have almost completely adopted Russian as the language of instruction". He criticises the fact that state, party and other official meetings are conducted in Russian, that TV and radio use more Russian than Ukrainian and that ministers speak publicly in Russian. This, he says, influences parents in their choice of schools.

Rusanivskyi reports that in the Western Ukrainian city of Uzhhorod, the programme for Ukrainian literature has been cut down, and that this is not a unique case. In many instances school meetings are conducted in Russian. He added that school textbooks also need overhauling. In a question and answer session he provided brief details of some of the language problems in Ukraine: Ukrainian literature is poorly circulated because there is a lack of specialists in Ukrainian culture; there is a lack of Ukrainian television programmes because of a shortage of Ukrainian directors; the technical intelligentsia does not speak in Ukrainian because technical courses at Universities and colleges are conducted in Russian. Whereas specialist technical literature in Ukrainian has all but disappeared.

FOURTH MEETING OF THE NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENTS OF THE NATIONS IN THE USSR

(*UCIS*) The representatives of the national democratic movements of the nations in the USSR held a meeting in Riga, Latvia, on September 24-25, 1988. The participants reviewed the situation in their various republics and adopted a series of resolutions and statements, a report on the actual meeting, a concluding statement and other documents.

Report on the meeting

of representatives of national democratic movements of nations
in the USSR, Riga, September 24-25, 1988

The following representatives attended the meeting: from **Latvia** — Ints Zalitis (Informal People's Front), Yuris Ziyemelis (Helsinki Group '88), Eynars Repshe (Movement of National Independence of Latvia), Hirts Ozolpsh (Environmental Protection Club — Latvia), Lidia Doronina (correspon-

dent from the journal *Auseklis*); from **Lithuania** — Yonis Dunaite (Lithuanian Catholic Church), Vitautas Bogushis, Antanas Terleckas, Andrus Tuchkus (League for the Liberation of Lithuania); from **Ukraine** — Stepan Khmara, Vyacheslav Chornovil, Oles Shevchenko (Ukrainian Helsinki Union); from **Estonia** — Lagle Parek (Estonian National Independence Party). A member of the **Rumanian National Movement of Moldavia**, Hryhoriy Himpu, and members of the **Crimean Tartar Movement**, Niasi Selimov, Server Tavarchi, Abdureshid Cheparov, Sadyk Berberov, all participated in the meeting as observers as they did not have time to obtain mandates. The representative of the **Georgian National Democratic Party**, Merab Kostava, could not attend due to the events in Georgia, but was kept informed about the meeting by telephone. The tense situation in **Armenia** prevented representatives from this republic from attending.

During the first day of the meeting, representatives from Latvia, Lithuania, Ukraine and Moldavia addressed the participants.

Crimean Tartar and Estonian representatives spoke on the second day (a short report on all the addresses was published in the meeting's bulletin). At the end of the second day, the following documents were adopted:

- Concluding statement of the meeting;
- Appeal to governments of member-countries of the Helsinki Agreements and to the International Helsinki Federation on political prisoners in the USSR;
- Appeal to the Vienna Conference reviewing the implementation of the Helsinki Final Agreements on matters of nuclear energy in the USSR;
- Resolution on the state of the Churches and the rights of the believers.

The meeting appointed the following members to the new Coordinating Committee of Patriotic Movements: Nijole Sadunaite and Vitautas Bogushis from Lithuania; Sadyk Berberov and Niasi Selimov from the Crimean Tatars; Oles Shevchenko and Hryhoriy Prykhodko from the Ukrainian Helsinki Union; Mati Tirend from Estonia; Ints Zalitis and Yuris Ziyemelis from Latvia. Representatives from Georgia and Armenia were appointed on consent.

The next meeting of the representatives of the National Democratic Movements of Nations in the USSR was scheduled for January 1989 in Lithuania.

Concluding Statement of the Riga Meeting of Representatives of the National Democratic Movements of the Nations in the USSR

We, the representatives of the meeting of the National Democratic Movements of the Nations in the USSR, gathered in Riga on September 24-25, 1988, having listened to reports on the situation in Latvia, Lithuania, Ukraine, Moldavia, Estonia, in the Crimean Tartar Movement and in Georgia, have come to the conclusion about the instability of the political situation in the USSR during the whole period since our June meeting.

On the one hand, having taken advantage of some liberalisation in internal political life, the National Democratic Movements of our nations have taken significant steps forward: the Constituent Congress of the Estonian National Liberation Party has taken place; the League for the Liberation of Lithuania has emerged from the underground; mass organisations similar to the People's Front (general or informal) have been formed in the Baltic republics.

In Ukraine a wave of mass meetings have taken place in Lviv and the Ukrainian Helsinki Union has been formed. The upsurge of the growing national movement in Georgia has seen the emergence of the Georgian National Democratic Party, just one day before our meeting. On the other hand, we apparently have the inconsistency of the "new policy" of the CPSU and attempts by the bureaucratic party apparatus to defend their positions. This has been reflected, in particular, on the decision of the 19th ruling party conference, which adopted half-way or blatantly reactionary, anti-democratic decisions (for example the decision to even formally subject Soviet Power to the Party). We consider the decision by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR concerning Nagorno-Karabakh a disgrace, which has disregarded the will of the whole Armenian nation, and the behaviour of the General Secretary of the CC of the CPSU M. Gorbachev during the meeting of the Presidium was such that it discredits him as a leader of the "new policy". We place all responsibility for the tragic events in Armenia and Azerbaijan on the central apparatus of the power alone. We also believe that it is only Moscow that stands as an impediment to the just solution to the Crimean Tartar problem, which can be confirmed by the work of "Gromyko's Commission", which was conducted in a complete un-glasnost-like atmosphere. The transition of the "new class" of party bureaucracy and the forces of chauvinism to a counter-offensive is also evidenced by the adoption of the anti-democratic decree on August 3, 1988, by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on the order of conducting meetings and demonstrations, analogical decrees on the spot and the ensuing harsh reprisal on the participants of the peaceful meetings in Ukraine in July-September 1988; "bloody Sunday" of the Crimean Tatars in Tashkent on July 26 and their reprisal on September 11 in the Lenin region of the Crimea, numerous administrative arrests and trials. The continuing release of only individual political prisoners, who have only been pardoned instead of completely rehabilitated, has coin-

cided with the first political arrests in this period of so-called democratisation, in particular with the criminal persecution of the Latvian patriot Modris Luyans and Ukrainian Ivan Makar for participating in peaceful meetings. We ascertain that out of all the republics represented at the meeting, the situation has particularly worsened in Moldavia and Ukraine, where the positions of Brezhnev's apparatus have remained completely secured.

In these diverse conditions of multi-power centres in the USSR, we, the participants of the Riga Meeting, reaffirm the demands of the Soviet government presented in the appeals of the meetings in Yerevan (January 1988), Tbilisi (March 1988) and Lviv (June 1988), which are as follows:

The settling and clear definition of citizenship in each republic; a restriction on entry to the republics for permanent residence of population of other republics, and in individual cases which threaten the indigenous nation (Estonia, Latvia and others), a complete stop to such entry and even the re-emigration of part of the population;

The security of complete republican economic dependency instead of the decreed and centralised economy;

Granting official status to the national languages of the republics, their compulsory learning by the whole population of the republic and the introduction of the national languages into all spheres of public life in the republic;

Culture, national autonomy for national minorities (including Russian);

The return to their homeland of resettled peoples and the specification of borders between the national republics and provinces according to an ethnic principle;

The right for representatives of nations to become reunited with their nations, if they are currently citizens of another country outside the USSR;

The prevention of ecological genocide (ecocide) of our nations;

The cessation of the policy of deliberate intermixing of population with the aid of the centralised planning of the economy;

Securing complete sovereignty of the republics in religious matters, including the renovation of ruined national churches in some of the republics;

An investigation of the reformatory legislation of the whole penitentiary system, the prohibition of exploiting forced labour of prisoners beyond the borders of their republics;

The release of all prisoners of conscience with complete rehabilitation (starting from the Stalin repressions), the exclusion from the criminal legislation of articles, which provide the possibility of persecuting for political motives;

The establishment of national military formations within the Soviet army with military service in peace time on the territory of their republic.

We believe that the realisation of these demands is impossible without complete political and economic decentralisation of the USSR and the **guarantee**

of the true rights of every **indigenous nation** (and not the population of the region) to political self-government. We oppose the use of the imperialist term "Soviet people" instead of "peoples of the USSR". The Baltic nations are demanding the recognition as effectual of the peace talks of 1920 between Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Soviet Russia.

We intend to continue to employ only non-violent and legal democratic means of struggle for achieving our aim.

We consider one of the main tasks of our movements to be the creation of democratic structures, called to consolidate and unite on a common national platform all the strong forces of each of our nations.

Since we consider it of utmost importance to change the totalitarian political system in the USSR, we will promote this aim by all possible means, among which we consider as important a possible struggle for a democratic electoral system and the participation of our movements in elections to the supreme and local organs of authority with the proposal of our own candidates. In addition, we warn that until the passing of a just law on citizenship of our republics, we will continue to regard even democratic elections as a school of the political education of masses and not as an instrument of the true expression of the will of our nations.

We will strive to achieve the introduction into the USSR of real freedom of expression instead of decreed ownership. In order to attain the freedom recognised by the whole world for each citizen to express his own views and spread his ideas disregarding borders, we will continue to develop the network of uncensored publications, demand the safeguard of an independent press with material means for multiplying and disseminating, and proportional access to means of mass information of the state. In case of a refusal to comply with these demands, we will continue to use the means of mass information of democratic countries in the world to propagate our ideas, seeing this as a norm for a democratic society, and not as some crime.

We demand a halt to the jamming of foreign radio broadcasts, as well as the barbaric method of ideological struggle.

Since we consider the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of August 3, 1988, on meetings and demonstrations as anti-democratic and such that it not only contradicts international legal norms, but even the Constitution of the USSR, we demand its immediate abolition, we do not consider it compulsory to comply by, and we regard the application of force for suppressing the democratic rights of our nations to express a collective thought as a crime against humanity.

We oppose attempts of ideological dogmatists to disunite each of our nations according to a class, ideological or territorial principle. Every Latvian, Ukrainian, Armenian and others is a representative of his very own nation, united by unique national aspirations no matter what part of the world he may end up in.

We also oppose attempts to disunite our movements and deal with each of us individually. Only in a united front of all oppressed nations will we be able to attain our aim. We appeal to the participants of national democratic movements of other nations in the USSR to join us, and gather under the motto which has always united the nations of the world, which had suffered internal and external violence: **FOR YOUR AND OUR FREEDOM!**

September 25, 1988, Riga.

Signatures: From the Informal People's Front in Latvia — Ints Zālītis; from the Helsinki Group '88 — Yuris Zīyemelis; from the Environmental Protection Club (Latvia) — Hirts Ozolpsh; from the unofficial journal *Auseklis* (Latvia) — Lidia Doronina; from the Movement of National Independence for Latvia — Dans Titaus, Herta Līlīa Astra; from the Lithuanian Catholic Church — Yonis Dunaite; from the League for the Liberation of Lithuania — Vitautas Bogušis, Antanas Terleckas, Andrus Tuchkus; from the Ukrainian Helsinki Union — Stepan Khmara, Vyachslav Chornovil, Oles Shevchenko; from the Estonian National Independence Party — Lagle Parek; from the Georgian National Democratic Party — Merab Kostava. Members of the Crimean Tartar National Movement, personally — Niasi Selimov, Server Tavarchi, Abdureshid Cheparov, Sadyk Berberov. Member of the Rumanian National Movement of the Moldavian SSR, also personally — Hryhoriy Himpū.

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Note to the concluding statement of the Riga Meeting of representatives of the national democratic movements of nations in the USSR. The delegations of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia point out that the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact — criminal in its secret clauses — created favourable conditions for the occupation of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia and their forcible incorporation into the USSR, as a result of which the above mentioned republics should be considered as occupied territories, where the occupational power is camouflaged by apparently electoral forms of state government.

The delegations of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia point out that the first and utmost task of the democratic forces of these republics is the liquidation of the effects of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact.

September 25, 1988, Riga.

Signatures: Ints Zālītis, Yuris Zīyemelis, Hirts Ozolpsh, Lidia Doronina, Dans Titaus, Herta Līlīa Astra, Yonis Dunaite, Vitautas Bogušis, Andrus Tuchkus, Antanas Terleckas, Lagle Parek.

THE IVAN MAKAR CASE

THE ARREST OF IVAN MAKAR

(UCIS) Leading Ukrainian activist, Ivan Makar, who played a prominent role in the organisation of public meetings in Lviv in the last few months, was arrested on August 4, at 9.00 in the morning. That evening, a mass demonstration was held in the city and was dispersed by the 6th special detachment of the militia with particular ferocity. Since then, that day has been known as "Bloody Thursday". Upon his arrest, Makar immediately declared a hunger strike in protest against his unlawful arrest. He regards himself as the first political prisoner to be incarcerated in the age of perestroika.

Twelve days later, Ivan Makar refused a food parcel from his brother Ihor, as he maintained that he would continue the hunger strike. Democratic circles in Ukraine hope that they can secure the release of "such a courageous fighter for true perestroika and glasnost", through their concerted efforts.

The Lviv branch of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union and the recently formed Public Committee for the Defence of Ivan Makar have published the first issue of a special publication, an "Information Bulletin" which deals with Makar's arrest. The "Bulletin" was compiled by Bohdan Horyn.

The first edition of the "Information Bulletin" contains the following materials and documents:

1. Official announcement regarding the arrest of Ivan Makar.
2. Announcement concerning the formation of the Public Committee for the Defence of Ivan Makar.
3. Appeal by the PCDIM to General Secretary M. Gorbachev.
4. Freedom for Ivan Makar — Statement by the Ukrainian Association of Independent Creative Intelligentsia.
5. Biographical extracts — Ivan Makar recounts his meeting with the all-union and republican press.
6. Address by Ivan Makar at a meeting on June 13, 1988.
7. Telegram by Ivan Makar to M. Gorbachev.

8. Ivan Makar's letter to the editorial board of "Leninska Molod", June 26, 1988.
9. To the editorial board of "Leninska Molod" — "Mr. Makar's reply to 'Comrade' Andrushkiv".
10. How the protective press prepared the arrest of Ivan Makar (by Vyacheslav Chornovil).
11. Protocol of the search conducted at Ivan Makar's place of work on 8.7.1988.
12. To the Procurator of the Lviv region — statement by Ivan Makar, 1.8.1988.
13. To the Procurator's Office of the Lviv region — statement by Vyacheslav Chornovil, 17.8.1988.
14. To the Procurator of the Lviv region — statement by Mykhailo Horyn, 17.8.1988.

The last two documents were refusals to participate in the proceedings against Ivan Makar.

Below we give a summary of some of the documents from the "Information Bulletin".

Document No. 4 "Freedom for Ivan Makar" — Statement by the Ukrainian Association of Independent Creative Intelligentsia.

UANTI perceives the arrest of Ivan Makar as a sign of impending political repression in the so-called period of perestroika and glasnost. According to the statement, Makar's only crime was his ability to take command of the meeting and "guide them in the direction of the fight for true perestroika, democratisation and glasnost, in the community's public life, and towards a rebirth of national awareness" in contrast to the authorities' failure to take control of the meetings "into their own hands".

The statement also makes reference to the political arrests and trials of the Brezhnev era and draws parallels to the arrest of Ivan Makar in the new era of glasnost: "If the political arrests of the times of Brezhnev and trials of dissidents made use of false witnesses or even no witnesses at all behind closed doors, then the witnesses of the so-called political crime of Ivan Makar

are the tens of thousands of Lviv residents and visitors who heard his passionate addresses at the numerous meetings in Lviv during June-August 1988. . . and whichever clause of the criminal code will be used to incriminate Ivan Makar, one thing is clear: **Makar is the first victim of political oppression in the age of glasnost**".

The statement concludes with a warning against the return to the oppression of Stalin and Brezhnev, and a demand for the freedom of Ivan Makar. It was released on behalf of UANTI, the authors and editorial board of *Kaphedra* and is signed: Vasyl Barladianu — Odessa, Bohdan Horyn — Lviv, Stepan Sapeliak — Kharkiv, Nadia Svitlychna — New York and Volodymyr Yavorskyi — Lviv, and dated August 1988.

Document No. 9. To the editorial board of "Leninska Molod" — "Mr." Makar's reply to "Comrade" Andrushkiv.

"In contrast to Andrushkiv, I am writing to 'Leninska Molod' a second time. The editors are not in a hurry to publish my first letter written at the end of June. Thus Andrushkiv did not err in calling me 'Mr.', as I have not yet reached the level of 'comrade'. I live in a workers' hostel (12 square metres by two), do not benefit from a government car, do not receive treatment in special regional committee hospitals, do not have food delivered to my home, and my pay, the only thing I live for, this is the entire "trough" I earn (according to your abusive remark). . .

My statement that the crimes of the 1944-49 years in the western Ukrainian lands were encouraged and sometimes directly organised by criminals from the NKVD and KGB has obviously annoyed you. So, let us open up the archives of the KGB from that period, which do not reveal any military secrets, and you will see my lies. . .

Together we would discover that many criminals against humanity with ribbons on their chests stroll down the streets of our city, including your Soviet district. They are the ones who fought not on the battlefield, but against the peaceful civilian population, murdering, shooting and deporting them to Siberia. Today, they will not openly tell us the whole truth about their "heroic deeds" on our land. They belong to the "fighters of Stalin's cohorts" who are always ready to offer uninvited "assistance", to "liberate" (sometimes from the last piece of bread, or even life), to "raise" a culture, or even carry out "limited contingency" on foreign lands.

Now, a few words regarding your claims to my "self-styled leadership". I think that the people will be able to tell whose beliefs and ideas are worth more. Your ideas and those of your "comrades" are mechanical, manifested in the filth of privileged picnics and drunken orgies in restaurants and dachas, developed not around wages, or those, whose ideas and beliefs are formed in

the starvation, cold and cruelty of the Mordovian and Perm camps, face to face with death.

You are much disturbed by the fact that the common people support us and not you. But there is nothing surprising about this — janissaries have always been disliked (to put it mildly) throughout all ages and by all nations.

Lviv, 18 July 1988

Document No. 11 Protocol of the search conducted at Ivan Makar's place of work.

A search of Ivan Makar's workplace at 19, Krylov St., Lviv, was conducted by the Investigations Branch of the Lviv region Procurator's Office on July 27, 1988. The search, conducted by Shemchuk and Dombrovskiy, with the assistance of the following witnesses: Iryna Volodymyrivna Shemuratov, Ihor Romanovych Burdyn, militia captain I. Ya. Matsiuk, and militia lieutenant Shmotolokha, lasted from 9.15 to 9.45 in the morning.

The following items were found and confiscated:

1. A declaration of the Principles of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union (two copies);
2. Statute of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union;
3. A typed letter to the Supreme Soviet;
4. A letter addressed to Iryna Kalynets;
5. A notebook;
6. A draft of the declaration of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union;
7. A handwritten article;
8. Two letters with telephone numbers;
9. Two photographs.

Document No. 12 To the Procurator of the Lviv region — statement by Ivan Makar, 1.8.1988.

In this document, Ivan Makar outlines his treatment by the authorities following his arrest on August 4. Although detained three times on July 28, Makar was not given a reason for his arrest. He was treated "roughly and offensively" and "hands were laid upon him" in the Procurator's office. On these grounds, he wished to "protest against the unlawful activities of his custodians, demand the punishment of those responsible for violating his civil rights and the return of his confiscated items".

STALINIST TRIAL PREPARED FOR IVAN MAKAR

Ivan Makar, a leading Ukrainian activist who played a prominent role in the organisation of public meetings in Lviv in June and July, was arrested on August 4 at 9.00 in the morning. That evening, a mass demonstration was held in the city and was dispersed by the militia. Makar immediately declared a hunger strike in protest against his unlawful arrest. He was held in prison without trial for three months. His case was officially submitted to court on October 12. Makar has now been released.

The prosecution brought criminal charges against Makar based on two articles of the Brezhnev era, introduced into the Ukrainian SSR criminal code in 1966 — Art. 187-1 (“the spread of knowingly false concoctions against Soviet state and social order”) and Art. 187-3 (“organisation or active participation in group actions which violate the social order”).

He was accused of “declaring himself the head of the ‘non-existent’ initiative committee for the organisation of meetings, and the “side-tracking of the July 7 meeting (permitted by the authorities) whose participants supposedly “violated the free flow of traffic” and “shouted slanderous slogans against Soviet party and government officials”. The Ukrainian Helsinki Union’s “Declaration of Principles”, confiscated from Makar, was also being used as evidence against him.

Makar’s parents set about organising his defence. First of all, they authorised prominent Ukrainian lawyer, Ivan Kandyba, recently released from a Soviet Russian labour camp where he was serving a second 15-year term of imprisonment, to find a lawyer for their son. They also appealed to US lawyer Gregory Stanton to act on their son’s behalf. Stanton gave his consent and was ready to fly to Lviv as soon as he received his Soviet visa.

However, Makar’s parents encountered several difficulties. Firstly, the authorities were determined to prevent the Makar family from appointing a lawyer of their choice and to compel them to agree to a lawyer appointed by the public prosecutor. On the one hand, they argued that Makar’s parents had no right to appoint a lawyer for their son as he is an adult and has to make his own choice, and on the other, they were preventing him from authorising a lawyer to act on his behalf.

Ivan Kandyba reached an agreement with lawyer Sluka. Although he initially agreed to act on Makar’s behalf, he later informed Makar’s parents that he did not receive the necessary authorisation from the notary to take up the case. The notary, however, explained that Skuka did not require his authorisation.

On September 27, Makar’s parents were permitted to visit their son in prison. The visit lasted half an hour and was conducted behind a glass screen. Makar had by then called off the hunger strike and, although pale and under-

nourished, appeared to be in high spirits. He gave his consent that Stanton should act on his behalf, but the prison authorities did not allow him to sign the authorisation.

The family was forced to appoint a new lawyer — Mykhailo Zholutiak: Tel.: Lviv 720543. He met his client for the first time on Friday, September 30. Although Zholutiak agreed to act on Makar's behalf the prison authorities did not permit him to see Makar and have the contract authorised. Contact with Makar was extremely difficult. He was held in solitary confinement since his arrest in August.

On Wednesday, October 5, the day after his father's last visit, Ivan Makar was beaten up. Although he called out for medical assistance, the prison doctor was not permitted to see him and treat his injuries. According to the prison governor, Makar was beaten up for refusing to comply with humiliating search procedures in his cell. He was taken out by force and beaten up. During the ordeal, he suffered a hand injury.

Despite meaningless talk of glasnost, democratisation and perestroika, Ivan Makar's trial was being prepared in the spirit of the Stalin-Brezhnev era. His friends feared that the KGB and the public prosecutor had already reached their verdict and were preparing to get the trial, a mere formality, over as soon as possible. They were greatly concerned that the trial might be held in a very small room filled with "their people".

In comparison, a similar trial of a Latvian activist, Luyans, was held on September 27. Shortly after his arrest, Luyans was released and was able to prepare his defence. The court found him innocent and declared the case unlawful. He was released.

Ivan Makar was not worried about the outcome of the trial. His only concern was to expose the true state of glasnost and perestroika in Ukraine during the trial. He was prepared to suffer the consequences of standing up for his legal rights.

The movement in defence of Makar was growing both in the USSR and in the free world. The Executive Committee of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union collected hundreds of signatures from various regions of Ukraine, Moscow, Estonia, Latvia, Uzbekistan and other parts of the Soviet Union. On the occasion of Mikhail Gorbachev's appointment as President of the USSR Supreme Soviet, the UHU Executive Committee sent him a telegram calling for democratisation and urging him to repeal the decree of the Supreme Soviet of July 28 on public meetings and release Ivan Makar.

Makar's case was also widely publicised among legal and government circles in the US where an American Committee in Defence of Ivan Makar was set up. Efforts in defence of Makar received support from numerous congressmen who sent a letter on his behalf to Gorbachev, as well as the American Bar Association. A number of US lawyers also expressed the wish to

attend the trial as impartial observers. Amnesty International and the Association of Canadian Engineers both sent a telegram to the public prosecutor for Makar's release.

The Makar family and activists in Ukraine appealed to Western journalists in Moscow to attend Ivan Makar's trial in Lviv. Western journalists were present at Luyans' trial in Latvia which ended positively.

* * *

STATEMENT CONCERNING THE ARREST OF I. MAKAR

To the Lviv Regional Procurator's Office
From HORYN Bohdan Mykolayevych,
Lviv 54, Kulchytskoyi 15, kv. 94
Place of work: Lviv picture-gallery,
senior research worker.

During the last 2-3 years a democratic-patriotic movement for restructuring has been emerging and successfully developing (to a greater or lesser extent, depending on specific conditions) in many republics in the USSR, including Ukraine. "Restructuring and glasnost", writes *Pravda* on August 30, 1988, "has increased the people's activity, raised their hopes and released their social energy". These words do not only concern Estonia, where "a reinterpretation and analysis of the historic past, an intensive search of new forms of workers' participation in the governing of the republic" are actively taking place, but also Ukraine and its leading towns.

During June and July 1988 a series of meetings took place in Lviv, at which the citizens discussed important matters pertaining to social, national and cultural construction. These meetings became a place of a collective search for a means of solving many burning issues.

During these mass meetings the people began to stop fearing the nightmare of political accusations, which had been used to scare them during the Stalin and Brezhnev eras. Such activity of a re-awakened nation, enraged the bureaucrats. They began to feel their own unlawful privileges threatened by this increasing democratic movement for restructuring and by the numerous displays of civil courage. Having coordinated their actions, the bureaucracy turned the militia, the sixth special task force, dogs trained in attacking people, the KGB, lawcourts and procuracy against the participants of the meetings, not neglecting to use heavy physical force, just as at the harsh reprisal on August 4, 1988".

In the morning of this day, the Lviv engineer Ivan Makar was arrested. Since he had been held in the procurator's office, he had also been unable to

attend the meeting on July 28. The other June-July meetings, at which he had participated, had not been banned by the authorities. On the contrary, the authorities had stood next to the head of the initiative committee (of meetings), one of the meeting's leaders, Ivan Makar, yet for some reason no one from the authorities was able to discuss the problems raised. Is this not the reason why the regional procuracy — a reliable defender of the Lviv intellectually infirm bureaucracy — introduced a criminal case against the activists of these meetings, while having previously dispatched their representatives as far away as Kharkiv to defend the criminal activities of the former head of the Regional Professional Council, Bizhyk, the case of which had appeared in the all-union press?

It is evident that the procuracy, which had stood in defence of lawlessness and which did not start criminal proceedings in the case of the harsh reprisal against the peaceful population on August 4, 1988 — cannot at the same time defend lawfulness. The best evidence of this is the arrest of Ivan Makar. It suffices to become acquainted with Article 187-3 of the Criminal Code of the Ukr. SSR (under which Makar is charged), to be convinced that Ivan Makar did not violate a single point in this Article, just as he did not break any other laws of the existing legislation. The unfounded arrest, due to absence of the corpus delicti, can only be explained by one motive — an attempt to divert public attention from crimes committed by the privileged caste, the newly created class of bureaucrats, which in the person of the regional procuracy has a reliable defender.

Since Ivan Makar's arrest is an arbitrary act and since I am not aware of any fact which could witness Ivan Makar's violation of the existing legislation, I refuse to answer any questions put to me by the employees of the Lviv procuracy.

September 1, 1988

Bohdan HORYN

FOURTH ISSUE OF THE UNOFFICIAL LITERARY JOURNAL "KAPHEDRA" (THE CATHEDRAL) APPEARS IN UKRAINE

(UCIS) We have received information that the fourth issue of the unofficial literary quarterly *Kaphedra* (The Cathedral) has appeared in Ukraine. It contains the following material:

The section "Problems and discussions" contains articles on current themes by Vasyl Barladianu, Lev Lukyanenko, Yaroslav Yumil and Taras Romaniuk. The next section deals with poetry and features works by Ihor Kalynets, Volodymyr Yavorskyi, Viktor Khomenko, Volodymyr Surmach and Vasyl Sosiurchenko, a teacher from the town of Romny, Sumy region, as well as two collections of sonnets entitled "Zhuravlynyi klych" (the call of the crane). This section also contains an anti-Stalinist poem written by Osyp Mendelsh-tam in November 1933, published for the first time in the history of Soviet literature.

By far the largest section of the journal is on prose. Vasyl Barladianu's review of Mykhailo Osadchyi's novel "All sides of the human soul", an excerpt from a novel by Mykola Shcherbatiuk from the Vynnytsia region, Dmytro Hrynkiv from the Ivano-Frankivsk region, and Vasyl Rozlutskyi from the Lviv region, form this section.

The conclusion of Bohdan Horyn's reminiscences about the writer Mykhailo Yatsiv appears in the section "On the crossroads".

Yevhen Hrytsiak's notes on the circumstances in which Maksym Rylskyi's* poem "Song about Stalin" was written, entitled "The secret of the condemned", and Vitaliy Kalynychenko's "The last candle of Vasyl Stus", appear under the heading "The Procrustes' bed of literature".

Literary studies: Hanna Holumbiyevska's "Notes on M. Bulgakov's novel 'The Master and Margarita'" and Volodymyr Leoniuk's "The question of the Ukrainian origins of Fedor Dostoyevsky" are also published in this issue of *Kaphedra*.

For the first time, the journal offers its readers a new section entitled "Sounds and words", which features two discussional articles by Horodenskyi and Halyna Voloshchak on the contemporary state of Ukrainian music, as well as Vasyl Barladianu's study "The bard with a guitar" of the composer Mykola Bilynskyi from Odessa, who composed the music to the words of Vasyl Stus' "According to the chronicle of an eyewitness — A stolen sun squints the frightened eye".

* The most outstanding representative of the Ukrainian poets known as the "Neoclassicists".

"Art" contains an essay by Bohdan Horyn, "Two forces", in which he reviews the early work of artist Yaroslav Matseliukh, and a material entitled "When will the KGB return artist Stefania Shabatura's artistic works?".

In "From the archives" the reader finds a study by Vasyl Barladianu entitled "The Far East — the Ukrainian press 1917-1918".

The section "UANTI in the context of world literature" contains a review by Danylo Huzar Struk of Ihor Kalynets' poetry, reprinted from the English-language press, entitled "Summing up silence".

The "Chronicle" informs the reader of recent cultural, artistic and other events in Ukraine, particularly in Kyiv, Poltava, Lviv and Ivano-Frankivsk.

"Literary apocrypha" features poems by Svyatoslav Hordynskyi, published in the 1930s-1940s and publishes a selection of his works.

The fourth issue of *Kaphedra* is illustrated with photocopies of paintings from the early works of Yaroslav Matseliukh and "St. Volodymyr", a graphical work by Valeriy Bondar from Kharkiv.

Kaphedra is published by the Ukrainian Association of Independent Creative Intelligentsia (UANTI).

THE ECOLOGICAL SITUATION IN UKRAINE

Appeal by the Executive Committee of The Ukrainian Helsinki Union
issued in November, 1988

Citizens of Ukraine!

Our land is threatened with destruction, our people are threatened by the spectre of extermination. As a result of the centralised criminal policy of the Stalin-Brezhnev leadership, which disregarded the interests of the republics — sovereign only on paper, and as a result of the irresponsibility of the local authorities, which sold out Ukraine to the ruling mafia, today Ukraine is oversaturated with power, extractive, metallurgical and chemical industry, which releases the greatest amount of harmful refuse.

50% of the nuclear power capacity of the Soviet Union is concentrated in Ukraine, which comprises only 2.7% of the whole territory of the USSR. Moreover, not far from the territory of Ukraine, the Voronezh and Smolensk nuclear power plants are situated in our river basins.

The ruling bureaucratic leadership has learnt nothing from the tragedy of Chernobyl, which shook the whole world: new nuclear reactors are being constructed or planned at the Rivne, Novoukrainska, Khmelnytskyi and

Zaporizhia nuclear power plants. Ignoring public protests, the construction of the Crimean nuclear power plant is being completed, and even in Ukraine's historical centre, Chyhyryn, the construction of a nuclear power plant is secretly and furtively taking place. This is happening in spite of the fact that even today Ukraine is exporting electrical energy to other countries, and even with economical management and a reduction in the industrial power capacity to international norms, the whole electrical energy of Ukrainian nuclear power plants would be superfluous. This is happening despite the fact that in many countries around the world nuclear energy is prohibited or being reduced. This is happening at a time when even such an over-industrialised state as the USA has decided to halt further construction of nuclear power plants and reduce the existing ones.

The time has come to put an end to the rapacious economical management of our country. At first, we were forced to take pride in being the all-Russian granary, then the all-Union smithy or blast-furnace. Today, Ukraine is becoming an all-Union reactor, and in a future perspective, an all-Union, or even a universal cemetery. Today, we are compelled to remind the rulers that this country has a master — its people, for whom this country is not only a means of fulfilling production plans, but was also a historical cradle in the past and a homestead for a happy life for present and future generations.

Glasnost has brought the belated truth about the terrible 1930s onto the pages of our press. However, the years awaiting us will be even more terrible if we only rejoice over the truth about the past. Just as the blood freezes in our veins when we hear about those 8 million lives taken by the artificial famine in 1933. But where is today's truth, why is it being stifled? The truth about those seven and a half million people who are among us today, but in the next ten years, according to competent scholars, will be buried prematurely? And this, as a result of only one reactor in Chornobyl? Yet, fifty such reactors are in store for us!

Ukrainian scholars, writers and public activists have appealed to the relevant authorities, then later even to the 19th conference of the ruling party demanding a halt to the further expansion of nuclear energy in Ukraine. A national referendum was suggested. However, the reaction to this appeal, or rather the lack of any kind of reaction, has shown that nobody is even thinking of asking the people. Meanwhile, the Ministry of Atomic Energy is speeding up the work of putting new reactors and new nuclear power stations into operation.

People, let us stop these madmen! Let us stop them before it is too late! May this petition become a national referendum, by which the Ukrainian people and all other peoples, living on the territory of Ukraine, can express their will to live. Our country has experienced many hostile invasions. Our ancestors defended it for us. Today, the historical responsibility for Ukraine's fate lies heavily on us. So, let us free our country from the ruthless claws of

centralism and from our own irresponsibility and indifference towards our fate, the fate of our children and grandchildren and the fate of our wounded land.

The Executive Committee of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union

* * *

Petition

In support of the appeal of the Executive Committee of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union, we, the undersigned, demand the following from the governments of the USSR and the Ukr.SSR:

- An immediate halt in the construction of the Crimean and Chyhyryn nuclear power plants;
- The suspension of the operation of the Chornobyl nuclear power plant and its transformation into a reserve and warning zone of international significance;
- The prevention of putting into operation any new reactors on already existing nuclear power plants;
- The preparation and publication of a perspective plan for a gradual liquidation (within the course of clearly fixed dates) of all existing nuclear power plants in Ukraine, which should be replaced by alternative means of electrical power production, and the closing down of ecologically harmful power production in zones of industrial oversaturation and dense population.
- Stop nuclear evil in Ukraine!

Petition presented with numbered signatures, surnames, names, patronymic names, and addresses.

(UCIS)

“WHO IS APPLYING THE BRAKES ON PERESTROIKA, OR WILL THE SOCIALIST REVOLUTION DEFEAT THE COMMUNIST PARTY?” — NEW SAMVYDAV DOCUMENT BY YURIY BADZIO

(UPA) “Soviet society is going through a transitionary period. The sword of Damocles hangs above it — above the heads of every one of us”. Such is the conclusion drawn by the Ukrainian writer Yuriy Badzio, about perestroika in a newly released samvydav document. Badzio’s vision of the future is one that hangs on a very thin thread, as witnessed by the fear caused by

the appearance in March of Andreeva's article in the newspaper *Sovietskaya Rossiya*. This affair, claims the author, proved that Stalinists and anti-reformists are still a politically powerful and organised group. He identifies the "braking mechanism" as something more than just an unwillingness to live in a different way: "It is a firm habit and desire to live and work in the old way". Although he welcomes the change of tone in the official press, he worries about the instability of it.

The future, says Badzio, is unclear: "Some people are being pushed forward along with the inertia of change, others have not yet had time to become accustomed to the new ideas and realities, while others do not have the intelligence to comprehend the volume of new facts or to rethink the past". Therefore, he says, people should be allowed to "jostle with history" and to argue and discuss points among themselves.

Badzio draws on parallels between criticism today, which dominates the official press, and the same criticism several years ago, which invariably led to imprisonment and deprivation of freedom. Such things, as holding meetings, the appearance of unofficial publications, calling for the rehabilitation of former political prisoners are today regarded as revolutionary novelties by many people, but for the conservatives such behaviour is counter-revolutionary.

The idea of reforms solving the country's social-economic, political and spiritual crisis is, in the author's view, not enough. This begs the question, can the reforms succeed without a revolution? He goes further and asks: "democratisation or lexicon"? The decision depends on whether the Soviet people are prepared to renounce the system or do they just want to improve the individual mechanisms of its existence? Badzio recognises that the present system can hardly be called a socialist one, instead preferring the term "state capitalism". The Kolkhoz (collective farm), in his view, never existed in the USSR. Similarly the attempt to create a new society based on democratic principles was a failure. The only victor was the party, which became the main force in society. The inevitable conclusion of this, according to Badzio, was that the working class was deprived of all control over the means of production. Meanwhile the peasantry, forced into collective farms, became the new hired class in the hands of the party-state apparatus. The intelligentsia lost the little autonomy it possessed and became the hired servant of the party. Society was divided into two antagonistic classes: "the party" and "the people".

As expected, the bureaucracy comes under strong criticism from Badzio. He cites Lenin's warnings of the dangers of too much bureaucracy enveloping the system. The worst culprit, however, is the party itself, which is described by Badzio as the source and base of bureaucracy which acts as the braking mechanism on the further democratisation of society. To the question, "who is trying to halt perestroika?", Badzio replies: "those who are most threatened by perestroika are the ones that are trying to halt it". Free meetings and a free press threaten the party by limiting its power and by withdrawing

its privileges. Similarly, he says that it will be impossible to democratise Soviet society unless an alternative party is allowed to be formed. The policy of perestroika will only proceed, says Badzio, if it is accompanied by the formation of new political parties.

A rhetorical question is then posed; will the party support such moves or will it oppose them? Badzio provides the answer by asking whether the ruling class has ever relinquished power without being forced to? According to Badzio, the revolution that he talks about, has already started and it is a socialist revolution. It is one that will enable society to become the owner of the means of spiritual and material production. There is no doubt left in the readers' minds that the aim of this revolution "is to free the people from the party dictatorship, to guarantee it freedom and to make the constitutional slogan of 'all power in the USSR belongs to the people' a reality".

THE KGB AND "GLASNOST" — A LETTER FROM STEPAN SAPELAK TO THE EDITOR OF THE JOURNAL "UKRAINA"

"Dear Editor,

I have taken out a subscription to your journal, a decision which I do not regret: I welcome the interesting and informative pages on art, the material on historical themes and other material that interests the reader. However, what has compelled me to write is something which is very worrying and that sees no signs of disappearing in Soviet society, even during this period of perestroika and glasnost.

The Voroshilovgrad affair**, which involved the KGB and, in particular its major general, serves as a typical example. This affair was written about in the pages of the Soviet press and concerned a vendetta by the KGB inflicted on a Soviet journalist, who had uncovered corruption and speculation in the region. . .

If, during the period of Stalinism, the MVD (Ministry of Internal Affairs), KGB and GPU were conditional then today that is not the case. The leadership of the KGB, notwithstanding their rank, is in a more privileged position than a position in the politburo or membership of the local party committee. During the period of glasnost this is clearly evident in the way the militia works. However, the way the KGB works is always kept a secret. When the word "state security" is mentioned one's hair stands on end. It is important to

** The Voroshilovgrad affair relates to the death of Viktor Berkhin at the hands of the KGB, after he was arrested on false charges of "hooliganism", after writing reports in the magazine *Soviet miner* criticising official corruption in Voroshilovgrad.

realise that this is the organisation which focuses its activity inside and outside the country, which requires local and regional KGB directorates in every corner of the country, and which has investigative departments connected with the procurator and the militia. Why does the KGB decide ideological issues such as censorship, admissions and judicial verdicts?

My main point is to query the absence of basic legal principles regarding the activity of this organisation, as secret instructions and orders only serve to increase the belief that there are violations of law. These very instructions protect the KGB from the public eye. The Voroshilovgrad affair is not the tip of an iceberg. A member of the KGB is allowed, upon presentation of a red card, access to all kinds of information, from the manufacture of weapons to the intimate lives of Soviet citizens. Practically all telephone conversations are tapped as several lines at local telephone exchanges are routed through to the local KGB. Under the instructions of these organs the procurator and the militia openly violate the law. Today, more than ever, it is important to raise the question of the KGB's status.

We do not need a secret police force. Where there is a secret [service], there are also cases of lawlessness, arrests and harassment. There is also fear. After all, article 62 still exists and my compatriots are still in prison or in exile. I consider it necessary, during the period of glasnost, to inform your periodical that the new rubric, which would prevent the lawlessness of the KGB and MVD, would only strengthen the resolve of citizens to play an active position regarding perestroika" (*UPA*).

Stepan Sapelak

member of the Helsinki Union, poet

Kharkiv

TELEGRAM TO PARTY CONFERENCE FROM LVIV INTELLIGENTSIA RAISES DEMANDS FOR UKRAINIAN TO BECOME STATE LANGUAGE

(*UPA*) The Ukrainian Press Agency has received the text of a telegram signed by 10 Lviv-based intellectuals addressed to the nineteenth party conference. A full translation is given below:

"We, citizens of Lviv and its environs, including workers and intellectuals, welcome the delegates and turn to the presidium of the nineteenth party conference with a suggestion to listen to the delegates from Ukraine — the writers Oles Honchar, Borys Oliynyk, Yuriy Mushketyk and the academician I. Yukhovskiy — to adopt measures and suggestions raised in the letter to the

nineteenth party conference entitled 'Concerning the Review of the Development of Atomic Energy in Ukraine', to introduce into the Ukrainian constitution a clause making the Ukrainian language the state language of the Ukrainian republic according to the following points —

- 1) To grant the Ukrainian language the status of state language. To recognise Ukrainian as the state language throughout the territory of the Ukrainian SSR.
- 2) To guarantee the obligatory teaching of the Ukrainian language as the state language, and the teaching of Russian as the language of inter-union intercourse on the territory of the Ukrainian SSR.
- 3) To introduce corresponding points in the constitution of other fraternal republics and to facilitate the process of further democratisation of our society to develop a free economy.

From all our hearts we wish the party all the success in its work at the conference”.

*Prots I. E., Sheredeha A. V., Kobeliuh M. I,
Zarytska Z. I., Sydorovych Z. I., Svinchuk I., Kobeliuh M. I.,
Romanyshyn B. I., Zarytskyi B. V., Zayko K. E.*

OPEN LETTER BY “HROMADA” SOCIETY TO THE UKRAINIAN PARTY PLENUM

(UPA) The Ukrainian Press Agency has received 2 texts from the third issue of the samvydav journal *Dzvin* published by the “Hromada” Society, composed of students at the Taras Shevchenko Kyiv University. The first text is an open letter addressed to the recent Ukrainian communist party plenum whilst the second is a speech given by “Hromada” Society members recently in Yerevan in support of Armenian demands for the inclusion of the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh within their republic:

“The ‘Hromada’ Society considers that the present leadership of the Communist Party of Ukraine is responsible for the stagnation in Ukraine — the decline in the number of Ukrainian schools, the reduction in the use of the Ukrainian language, the neglect of Ukrainian culture and the repressions in the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s.

The policies pursued by the Communist Party of Ukraine have remained virtually unchanged since 1972. The present policies of the party effect every inhabitant of Ukraine. We demand a change in these policies and the removal from their posts of Shcherbytskyi, and other executors of these policies

such as Yelchenko, Matyk and Posibniak. We do not compare the entire Communist Party with these persons and hope that it will find the strength to build new policies along the following lines:

- 1) Recognition of the system of republican cost accounting.
- 2) The gradual introduction of Ukrainisation into all spheres of life, in particular to make Ukrainian the official state language, (the Ukrainian language must be strengthened and used in all government establishments), the introduction of Ukrainian citizenship, the renewal of Ukrainian military formations.
- 3) The removal of all privileges of the party state apparatus, special shops, clinics and health resorts.
- 4) Refuse permission to build new atomic power stations and limit the expansion of existing ones in Ukraine”.

“Hromada” Society, Kyiv, 6 October, 1988

* * *

STATEMENT BY MEMBER OF “HROMADA” SOCIETY TO THE ARMENIAN NATION

“Armenians!

I have come from Ukraine and will soon return home. However, I cannot do so until I have told you something which I find is very pleasant. I bring to the Armenian people in the name of all honest Ukrainians, who sympathise with our struggle, an apology for Shcherbytskyi’s speech at the presidium of the Supreme Soviet. This is not the voice of Ukraine nor is the Soviet Ukrainian press the voice of Ukraine. We hope that we will reawaken Ukraine and then you will hear the voice of a people which has liberated itself from the corrupt and bureaucratic clique.

I cannot promise you support from the Ukrainian people because of the situation in Ukraine today, but you can count on our sympathy. Nobody understands you better than we do. For centuries the Ukrainian people have wanted to unite. Parts of our country belonged to Russia and Poland, then Russia and Austria-Hungary, then again Poland and Romania. The Ukrainian people have become united. There is true unity. So the Armenian people will also be united”.

The “Hromada” Society, Yerevan, 24 September, 1988.

THIRD ISSUE OF UNOFFICIAL KYIV STUDENT JOURNAL "DZVIN" APPEARS

(UPA) The Ukrainian Press Agency has learned that the third issue of the unofficial student journal *Dzvin*, published by the Hromada Society, which is composed of students at Kyiv University, has appeared. The editors believe that their publication is needed in Ukraine because: "In conditions of the low level of democratisation and glasnost in Ukraine, the majority of journals and newspapers remain as the mouthpiece of the republican and state leadership, which in essence, have remained unchanged since the years of stagnation (i.e. the Brezhnev era). Practically all materials in these publications give the point of view of the authorities. We consider it imperative to establish in Kyiv an uncensored publication in order to highlight a wide circle of ideas, including those which do not coincide with the established view; in order to widen democracy and glasnost. The Hromada Society has taken upon itself to organise such a journal".

The third issue of the journal *Dzvin* contains a poem by the well known writer Volodymyr Sosiura called "Mazepa"; an interview with the leading dissident Vyacheslav Chornovil; "Some thoughts on Ukrainian Perestroika" by K. Severyn; "Poets are dying in Spirit" by Mykola Kholodnyi; an article on the mass demonstrations in Lviv in the summer entitled "Ten days that shook Lviv" by Vyacheslav Chornovil; "26 of April" by Volodymyr Kulyk; a long samvydav text "Who is applying the brakes on Perestroika or will the Socialist Revolution defeat the Communist Party?" by Yuriy Badzio; "The Prophecy of 1917" by Vasyl Symonenko; "Text of the speech read out at the meeting in Yerevan on 24 September by the representative of the Hromada Society, Vadym Damyn"; "To the Brother from Kursk" by Vasyl Symonenko; "God, how intolerable is the Foreign Land" by Vasyl Stus and other works by Mykola Kholodnyi. The journal also contains an appeal from the Hromada Society to the next plenum of the Communist Party, as well as an Historical Calendar.

Olha HORYN

IN THE TRADITIONAL MODE OF RUSSIFICATION

(Part 1)

On 27 March 1988, the newspaper *Radyanska Ukraina* published a statement of protest by the deputies of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR, in which they voice their indignation at the attempt of the US Congress to support the struggle of the Ukrainian Catacomb Churches and Catholics for legalisation. The article is called "In Answer to the Transatlantic Aggrieved" and is written in the traditional spirit of Soviet journalism, which sees its mission as the justification and propagation of government policies, frequently irrespective of who occupies the position of State leader. Even now, when the central press has begun its reappraisal of such mass actions as collectivisation, the famine in Ukraine in 1933, there remain specific areas of Stalin-Brezhnev criminal atrocities, reviews of which are forbidden and which, contrary to sound reason and reality of facts, are treated in the same manner as 30-40 years ago.

In the first instance, this touches upon the evaluation of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church. The Stalinist government, which was not acquainted with other methods of solving current and fabricated problems, other than the use of repressive measures, used these against the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church. And today, 40 years later, the truth concerning the use of Stalinist methods on the reality of Ukrainian Catholic foundations can be told. But this did not occur. Having condemned Stalinism, the Ukrainian official press is in no hurry to justify its victims. It even slanders some of them, and straightforward logic, in this instance, is feeble because the omnipotent inertia of fright paralyses the will, blunts the intellect and shows the press in an unattractive light.

However, such a stance has its "theorists". Even today, we hear the whisperings of prudent connivers from all directions: "This is all true, but the time has not yet come to reveal it". According to them, the proclamation of the truth demands corresponding conjectures, approval, agreement, and not the right of the nation to information, reinforced by law. So, until that time comes, the nation can be fed an ideological diet from the Stalinist kitchens.

This is the type of philosophy which the aforementioned group of deputies of the Supreme Soviet of the UkSSR adhere to in polemics with the US Congress. (B. Oliynyk, S. Danchenko, H. Korniychuk, M. Manoylo, Y. Pidstryhach, E. Stankevych and others). Having characterised the Ukrainian Catholic Church (UCC) as a criminal organisation, and not a Christian community, they put forward the following putrid points:

1. All citizens of the USSR, including Ukrainian Greek-Catholics, have the benefit of the freedom of conscience.
2. The battle to legalise the Ukrainian Catacomb Churches, which is supported by the US Congress, is a provocation, inasmuch as the Ukrainian Churches have lost their faithful and their credibility in the face of the nation. The government has nothing whatever to do with their liquidation. The Lviv Synod of 1946 liquidated the Union [of Brest].
3. The Ukrainian Catholic Church divides the nation and is an enemy of the friendship between nations.

* * *

Numerous examples taken from everyday life show what "freedom of conscience" means in the understanding of the organs for the defence of rights. Until fairly recently, Rev. Vynnytskyi, activists of the Ukrainian Catholic movement Vasyl Kobryn and Yosyf Terelya and others were imprisoned. Even today there are attempts at the old practice of the fabrication of criminal cases against active members of the Greek-Catholic movement. Rev. Petro Zeleniukh, who disclosed himself as a priest and began to conduct services in the church of Kalynivka in the Yavoriv district of the Lviv region, having received recognition from beyond the region, was having a criminal's pea-jacket prepared for him for "stealing Church property". The same accusation was levelled against Vasyl Kobryn through the Peremyshyl district press. Here the organs for the defence of rights appear as ardent defenders of the property of the parish communities. Together with this, we became witnesses of an unbridled campaign of destruction of the inactive churches of Western Ukraine under the leadership of those authorised in matters of religion, of rural Soviet Party activists under the protection of several dozen militiamen. During organised pogroms, irreplaceable works of art were destroyed — intricately carved iconostases, icons, church banners and other cherished ecclesiastical items. Such accounts have frequently appeared in independent journals, like the *Ukrainian Herald* and *Khrystyianskyi Holos* (Christian Voice).

Can the mass fining of Greek-Catholic priests and faithful for "carrying out religious rites: confessions, the conduct of funeral services for the dead" (I quote the decrees of the Yavoriv District Council of the Lviv region) be illustrations of "freedom of conscience"? It seems that they portray the exact opposite. I have in front of me 18 decisions of the Rozhnyativ Executive Committee to impose fines of 50 krb. on every adult, usually pensioners. This is not only a cynical disrespect for the law, but a soulless attitude towards people who spent the whole of their lives working on the collective farms for a pitiful wage. One fine of 50 krb. amounts to the monthly or six-weekly wage of a labourer. If you want to pray according to your conscience, expect to go hungry. This is the method of grafting atheistic views onto believing Catholics. Such actions are applauded by the deputies of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, who refer to them as legal actions which do not contradict the

freedom of conscience, "which in practice becomes steadfastly embodied in daily life". The deputies who do not feel any responsibility towards their electors allow themselves to write such articles. They received their mandate from the hands of the all-powerful, whom they humbly serve. The nation can only note its injustice, quietly disposing of its bulletins in the urn.

As long as such practices exist, the deputies can, with no risk involved, speak of harmony and the press can print any kind of fiction. But there is no reason to believe in the perpetuity of such law and order. It is quite probable that the nation will very soon be demanding the whole truth about the retribution of the Stalin-Brezhnev oprichnina against the Ukrainian Churches, and that the deputies explain the use of this bloody anti-religious practice. Even the most educated sophist cannot defend his unprincipled position, particularly now, when the official press is losing its monopoly on information, and independent publications begin to reveal documents which correct the stereotypes that have been used for half a lifetime.

Today it is sufficient to publish a "Chronicle" of the repressions by those in power against the Pochayiv monastery, in order to be convinced how the mafia, which is not constrained by any law, repressed the monks and drove the monastery to the verge of extinction. It is only thanks to the surprising dignified staunchness of monks that some of the "ideologues" are able to refer to its existence as proof of "freedom of conscience" in the USSR. The chronicle will soon be published. The surnames of the most active persecutors of the monastic brotherhood in the 1960s will be revealed: Major Bochkaryov, Major Korsakov, Major Danylov, the chief of the passport section Belink, Lieutenants Koren and Yurchak who forcibly confiscated the monks' passports, discharged them from Pochayiv and subsequently arrested them for violating the passport regulations.

"In this way they sentenced the following monks: Abbot Vyacheslav (Psa-may), who lived in the monastery for 40 years, that is almost his entire life, and in his old age, was made out to be a 'violin of passport regulations', priest Ambroziy (Dovhan), monk-priest Apeliy (Stankevych), monk-priest Volodymyr (Soldatov) and others were re-arrested and jailed for 'violating passport regulations'".

And when the advocates of the anti-religious policies of the party justify their actions by asserting that the government is only persecuting the Churches which are deemed illegal by the authorities, then the evidence given by the Pochayiv monks refute even this cunning argumentation. The Soviet authorities were waging war against every Church, every priest who earnestly served God and the Church community.

Privileged positions were held only by those representatives of the Russian Orthodox clergy who were pressurised by fear and carried out their duties or cooperated with the organs of law and order, particularly with the KGB.

In the struggle against the Church, the organs of law and order joined forces with other Soviet institutions, creating whole criminal syndicates. In the "Chronicle" we read:

“They did not have the courage to arrest all of us, one after the other (because we have the freedom to practice our faith). The organs of the health department were given the task of attempting to ‘find’ any kind of disease state in the monk and forcibly send him for treatment. A Medical Commission was set up by the Pochayiv District Executive Committee who concluded that monks Holovaniv, Marchuk, Shvyruk and others were mentally ill and kept them in hospital for lengthy periods. Holovaniv died in his 85th year”.

Later, “investigations” into infectious illnesses were carried out (monks Volynets, Vybrowskyi, Lysetskyi, Korniychuk, Tsynevych, Hasevych were deported). They were all perfectly healthy people.

On 13 March, chest examinations were carried out and again a group of monks were taken away. At the same time, the local authorities took over the monastery buildings, confiscated vehicles and other machinery. The monastery appeared to be on the verge of liquidation.

Our deputies attempt to conceal this hideous practice with their mandates. Have they not earned themselves the right for a place in the ranks of the Maksymovs and Danylovcs?

* * *

The Ukrainian parliamentarians consider the appeal of Congress for the “legalisation of the Churches in Ukraine” a provocation, saying that the “Churches discredited themselves before the nation, and having lost their faithful, ceased to exist”.

The question of whether our Churches have lost their flock is substantiated by the mass of signatures of Ukrainian Greek-Catholics for the renewal of the Ukrainian Catholic Church. The Church lives within the confines of its underground activity, and, for the celebration of the Millennium, attracts tens of thousands of pilgrims to the holy shrines of Hoshiv, Hrushiv, Zarvanytsia. No, the Congressmen are not falsifying the policies of the Party regarding the Church and the faithful. There is no need for this to be done. Even the most bitter enemy could not possibly falsify things in such a way, having for the past 60 years practiced anti-national, repressive policies.

The newspaper is of the opinion that the State had not outlawed the Churches — the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic and Autocephalous Orthodox. But even here, where the opinion of political events is concentrated in one pair of hands, there is scope for various explanations and “unpleasant” contradictions. We read the following in the *Soviet Encyclopaedia of the History of Ukraine*: “The Uniate Church in Western Ukraine was liquidated by the Lviv Ecclesiastical Synod of 1946” (Vol. 1, p. 252).

Today, every objective reader knows that during Stalin’s reign of terror, no organisation or Church could make its own independent decisions. Nobody

took part in decision-making, everyone carried out the decisions made in the kitchen of "the chief of nations".

That is why the Lviv Synod was not the organ which had the power to liquidate the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church. There are also the following reasons:

1. It was illegal.

The Soviet People's Commissariat of Ukraine tried to give it a formal, legal style, by ratifying three renegades of the Greek-Catholic Church (H. Kostelnyk, M. Melnyk, H. Pelvetskyi) who had converted to Orthodoxy before the Synod, as "The Initiative Group" which was given the task of organising the Synod. But the aforementioned "initiators" at the time the Synod was convened were already Orthodox, and therefore their confirmation as the "sole temporary administrative organ of the Greek-Catholic Church" was senseless and judicially illegal.

2. The Synod was organised by force.

All twelve bishops who had handed statements to the government pointing out their refusal to take part in the Synod, were arrested. Seven of them paid with their lives: five in jails (Mykyta Budka, Hryhoriy Lakota, Semen Lukach, Hryhoriy Khomyshyn, Klymentiy Sheptytskyi [brother of the Metropolitan], two in labour camps (Hryhoriy Balahurak, Yosafat Kotsolovskyi), others endured long terms of imprisonment: Josyf Slipyj — 18 years, Avksentiy Boychuk — 10 years, Mykola Charnetskyi — 10 years, Ivan Slyzniuk — 10 years, Vasyl Velychkovskyi — 18 years (ref. Y. Lesiv "*Khrystyianskyi Holos*", No. 2, 1988).

3. The Synod was unrepresentative.

Only 200 priests out of 3,200 (taken from official data from 1939) were brought to the Synod. There were no lay people. The auditorium was filled mainly with representatives of the republics and regional institutions and organisations.

The Lviv Synod of 1946, convened by the State, was conducted in such a manner by people who were neither mandated nor authorised to do so either by the Greek-Catholic clergy or the faithful. Lately, official literature has carried insidious terms such as "self-dissolution", "self-liquidation", in order to mask the anti-democratic, illegal nature of the Lviv Synod of 1946. Cynicism on such a scale was not even encountered in Catherine II's time. When Ukrainians in Western Ukraine read ominous words like "self-liquidation", "self-dissolution", "halted activity", it makes their blood boil. It is synonymous with a Ukrainian football team beating the team of the German occupying forces (the entire fascist team was shot) and after winning the match, "halting its activity" or "self-liquidating" it. The truth is bitter, the truth hurts,

but the truth remains the truth. Our nation cannot forget the horrific ten years after the end of the war which were marked with blood, corpses, torture, mass deportations of innocent people to Siberia.

Today, 350 years on, when feelings and sharp polemical attacks have subsided, it can be established, inasmuch as it can be related to reality, that the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic and Autocephalous Orthodox Churches "discredited themselves before the nation", stood "for the spiritual subjugation of the nation" and planted the seeds of religious hostility. Before polemicising, let us define the concept of the "Church".

The Church is comprised of the faithful, the nation and the clergy. All reproaches of the Church are reproaches of the nation. From this point of view it is worthwhile making an objective study of the Union of Brest. I will not quote adherents of the Union. In the aforementioned *Soviet Encyclopaedia of the History of Ukraine* we read:

"According to the Union of Brest, the Greek-Catholic Church recognises the supremacy of the Roman Pope and the fundamental dogmas of Catholicism, but maintains Orthodox festivals, rites, appearance and organisation of the churches, Church Slavonic language" (Vol. 1, p. 456).

So the Union did not touch upon the national specificity of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, leaving the organisation of the churches and the language which was understood by the nation untouched. Could the Union which retained the essence of the Ukrainian Church be the instrument of its subjugation? Perhaps the Greek-Catholic Church opened wide the doors for the polonisation of the Ukrainian nation? The answer to this is given by the political conditions under which the Union was signed. Thirty-three paragraphs of these conditions can be drawn together to form four basic points:

1. The retention of the Orthodox liturgy and sacraments.
2. The admission of Ukrainian Uniate bishops to the Senate with rights equal to those of Catholic bishops.
3. The preservation of the rights and privileges of the Ukrainian hierarchy.
4. Protection from political pressure by the Patriarch of Constantinople.

It is worthwhile mentioning that even our prominent national statesman, Bohdan Khmelnytskyi, did not negotiate such a convenient and stable treaty. Twenty-three points of the Cossack delegation's "pleading articles" and eleven points of "mercy and kindness" of Tsar Alexei Mykhailovych formed a one-sided act "by the expression of the will of the monarchy, the attempt of the ruling class to obtain an oath, in the name of the Tsar, from the envoys on the inviolability of the freedoms and privileges of the nobility and the protection of Ukraine from Poland was refused by Buturlin. . ." (*Diplomaticheskiy slovar*, M. 1950, vol. 2, p. 351).

(To be continued)

Book Reviews**THE MILLENNIUM OF UKRAINIAN CHRISTIANITY**

edited by N. L. Fr.-Chirovsky, Philosophical Library, New York, 1988, 628pp.

The volume consists of thirty chapters written by 26 authors on various topics closely connected with the millennium of Christianity in Rus'-Ukraine, particularly dealing with the impact of Christianity on different aspects of the national life of the Ukrainian people in the course of the past ten centuries since the official introduction of Christianity by Grand Prince Saint Volodymyr the Great in 988.

The text is divided into four parts assessing historical, religious, organisational and cultural perspectives. The first part discusses the historical fortunes of Christianity in Ukraine in the course of the millennium, 988-1988. Naturally the chapters point out that Ukrainian Christianity is actually much older than one thousand years, and that in fact Grand Prince Volodymyr acted in a similar way to Emperor Constantine the Great of the Roman Empire: that in 988 Christianity became the official religion of the Ukrainian Rus' Empire. In lieu of an introduction, Rev. G. Udod summarised Christianity's influence on developments in Ukraine. A brief survey of the history of Christianity follows, authored by Chirovsky. R. Mason, referring particularly to Grand Princess Olha, follows the gradual introduction of Christianity into Ukraine before 988. Patriarch M. Lubachivskyi asserted in his essay that it is historically wrong to talk about the "Christianisation of Russia" in 988, while B. Korchmaryk proves in his article beyond any doubt that the northern borderland of the Kyivan Rus' Empire, presently known as Russia proper, received Christianity at a much later date. Three subsequent chapters written by I. Vlasovskyi, V. Mykula and W. Stojko, discuss the tragic fate of Ukrainian Christianity under Tsarist and Soviet Russian domination; the deceitful domination of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church by the Moscow Patriarchate, the liquidation of the Ukrainian Catholic Church in the 19th century, and the ruthless persecution and suppression of the catacomb Ukrainian Catholic Church in the USSR today. The second, religious, section includes the most mystical concept of the calling of the city of Kyiv to bring Christianity to Eastern Europe and to defeat the un-Christian attitude of the so-called Russian Orthodox Church, which never really served God, but the imperialist plans of the Russian tsars and the Kremlin leaders of the present, as studied by D. Dontsov, an outstanding Ukrainian thinker. Chapters authored by Metropolitans Lypkivskyi and Ohienko depict the essentials of the Ukrainian

Autocephalous Church, while Rev. V. Kovalyk discusses the question of the Ukrainian church ritual. Rev. A. Chirovsky examines the state of affairs in the Ukrainian Churches on the threshold of the second millennium. The adherence to Christian principles by Ukrainian youth is covered in a short chapter by a young priest, R. Mirchuk. A. Dombrovskyi describes the Ukrainian Protestant Movement.

The Third part of the book discusses early Church organisation in Ukraine (Rev. I. Choma), a survey of Ukrainian monasticism (Rev. M. Wojnar), and a rather broad approach to the question of the Ukrainian Patriarchate (W. Lencyk and Y. Stetsko).

The final part, dealing with cultural aspects, rather thoroughly examines the impact of Christianity upon the development and growth of various aspects of Ukrainian culture: world perception (M. Kushnir), psychology (I. Holowinsky), culture (B. Stelbelskyi), education (W. Luciw), early literature (N. Chirovsky), old Ukrainian book printing (O. Sokolyszyn), the art of the Ukrainian icon (M. Kushnir), early Ukrainian Church music (M. Fedoriv), dramatic arts (H. Luzhnytsky), painting (I. Keyvan), and architecture (W. and Y. Luciw).

Four appendices have been included featuring the Spiritual Testament of the late Patriarch and Cardinal Josyf Slipyi, the spiritual head of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, and two petitions sent by the late Y. Stetsko, Ukrainian Prime Minister in 1941, to the Vatican in defence of the Ukrainian Church.

In sum, this is a very impressive publication commemorating the Millennium of Ukrainian Christianity. It is a very serious, scholarly and objective evaluation of this momentous jubilee, which is so very important for the Ukrainian Church and the Ukrainian people. After reading the volume, one no longer doubts the enormous influence of Christianity upon the one thousand year long development of the Ukrainian people.

However, there is another positive aspect to the volume, namely, its political importance. It is a well known fact that the Russian people have tried to usurp the Millennium for themselves; to make it a Russian Millennium of Christianity to prove an ancient Russian origin and culture. The Ukrainian people were supposed to be pushed aside as unimportant; a later minor branch of the Russian nationality. As a matter of fact, Tsarist Russia attempted to steal from Ukraine its original name Ruś, its ancient origin, culture and national identity. The Russians for a long time called the Ukrainians *Little Russians*, and the naive Western world, both politicians and scholars, followed Moscow's designs.

Luckily, things have changed today. The Ukrainian people and their culture are presently known to the world. *The Millennium of Ukrainian Christianity* certainly proves beyond any doubt that the Russian insinuations about the supposed Christianisation of Russia in 988 are historically wrong and have no

scholarly substance at all. The present efforts of the atheistic Soviet Russian regime and the so-called Russian Orthodox Church and its Patriarchate to adopt the Millennium for themselves have been recognised as political trickery and propaganda, even more so, because it is quite difficult to explain how an atheistic regime which is harshly suppressing and persecuting not only Christian denominations, but the Moscaic and Islamic faiths as well, suddenly became so interested in the Millennium of Christianity. Clearly, the Soviet Russian regime has had alternative motives all along, which have nothing in common with Christianity or religion. The "magnificent" celebrations in Moscow are only a smoke screen.

This publication exposes Russian falsifications concerning the Millennium. Even some concerned Russians recognise the mendacity of the Soviet Russian regime and the Moscow Patriarchate, and point out that in 988 it was Ukraine that was baptised and that at that time there was no Russia.

The Millennium of Ukrainian Christianity is a very worthwhile publication. Are there any shortcomings? Of course. Nothing is perfect, after all. First of all, at least a dozen chapters should be added to the publication to make it more complete. There are some topics which the book did not cover, such as "The Church and the Defence of the Ukrainian National Identity"; "Ukraine in the Defence of Western Christianity and Western Civilisation". The growth of Christianity in Ukraine before 988 was rather sparsely covered, as was the process of Church organisation and development.

Of course, some chapters in the book are stronger than others, which may also be considered a weakness.

The book is illustrated with the leading personalities of the Ukrainian Churches, outstanding examples of Church architecture, icons and iconostases, church plans and examples of early Ukrainian book printing. At the back of the book the reader will find a comprehensive index of personal names, which will orientate those interested in identifying persons dealt with in the book. The Very Rev. Werenfried van Straaten, for many years the chairman of "Aid to the Church in Need", wrote an inspiring foreword to the publication.

Although the book may not be perfect, it certainly is an invaluable scholarly acquisition to commemorate the great anniversary of the Millennium of Ukrainian Christianity, contributing to the impartial and objective analysis of the role of Christianity in the life of the Ukrainian people over the course of more than one thousand years, taking into consideration that Christianity was growing in Ukraine, perhaps even a couple of centuries before 988.

Anthony FEDENYSHYN

THE UKRAINIAN REVIEW



2

1989

A Quarterly Journal devoted to the study of Ukraine

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
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LEVKO LUKYANENKO
Head of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union

THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF LEVKO LUKYANENKO

An autobiography of the long-term political prisoner of Soviet Russian prisons and concentration camps, Ukrainian lawyer Levko Lukyanenko, recently reached the West. The autobiography, written by Lukyanenko in May of last year, according to his own words is not complete, since it is not about past history, but about the present. In addition, circumstances force him to keep quiet about several early facts, names, and moments from the lives of political prisoners.

Levko Lukyanenko was born on August 24, 1928, and has spent over 25 years in Soviet Russian prisons and concentration camps. He was first arrested and sentenced to death in May 1961 for membership in the Ukrainian Workers' and Peasants' Union, whose goal was Ukraine's secession from the USSR by means of peaceful struggle. His death sentence was commuted to 15 years of imprisonment. In January 1976, he was released after serving 15 years in the Vladimir prison and in strict regime concentration camps, but was denied the right to practice his profession as a lawyer. He was re-arrested on December 12, 1977, and sentenced to 10 years' strict regime camps and 5 years' exile for participation in the work of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group, writing samvydav articles and human rights activities in general. He was charged with "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda" (Article 62 of the Criminal Code of the Ukrainian SSR). Lukyanenko has recently been released from exile in the Tomsk region of Siberia. He is suffering from gastritis, zero acidity, ischaemia of the heart, illnesses of the kidney and liver, and a stomach ulcer.

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I was born on August 24, 1928, to Hryhoriy and Natalia Lukyanenko in the village of Khrypivka, Horodnianskyi district, Chernihiv province. I was the oldest of four children: three sons (I, Victor, Oleksander) and one daughter (Zinayida).

My father had elementary education and was exceptionally hard-working. As a result of being gifted in all kinds of trade, he was able to do literally everything which needed to be done in rural life: he could build a house, thatch a roof, make frames, a loom, barrels, boots, sleighs, a cart etc., not to mention all the labour in the fields, garden and orchard. He was not at all talkative and set to work immediately. He was not afraid of water, forests, heights, night and evil spirits, but he did fear the authorities and preferred to avoid them, rather than enter into discussions with them. He liked speed and recollecting about the Kozak times. He had great respect for knowledge and frequently, instead of an extra bottle of spirits, he would buy a book.

My mother was completely different from my father: she could work while at the same time discussing serious problems and she often considered con-

versation more important than any kind of work. Being naturally clever, she had a wonderful memory, and logical thoughts. She held high principles and did not defend just anybody, but truth (it is not surprising that everyone in the village called her a "lawyer"). In comparison to my father my mother was an educated person — she attended a secondary school, she loved literature and although she had not read much, whatever she had read she remembered for the rest of her life. She tried to turn our, her children's, attention away from poetry and literature by saying: "You will not earn your bread with poems. Learn arithmetics." She loved to sing and knew many songs. I first heard our national anthem "Ukraine has not died yet. . ." as a child from my mother. My mother sung the following Russian songs:

"A cart is driving along a dusty road,
Two gendarmes are sitting on both sides of it,
Cast off the chains, give me freedom. . .
I will teach you to love freedom. . ."

From another song she often repeated the same two lines:

"The bullet fears a courageous man,
The bayonet does not touch a courageous man".

At a pre-school age I already knew a couple of dozen songs and loved to sing.

Forty days before the war, several people from our village were drafted into the army (from the Komsomol personnel). This increased rumours about the impending war. The people waited for the war with trepidation and great hopes — the villagers expected the Germans to free the people from the Bolsheviks, and perhaps even Ukraine from the Russians. So, when war broke out the Germans were greeted with bread and salt. The Germans did, in fact, give the people more breathing space. At first the people ate their fill and revived, they became more cheerful, remembered that they had relatives and began to visit them.

In 1942 my father returned from captivity, my mother having brought him back from the Homelsk concentration camp. The life of our family continued to improve.

Autumn, 1943. Our family is lying in a ditch in the garden because the front is approaching. The Red Army is approaching from the neighbouring village. Our father stood in the garden and watched the grey mass approaching along the road. . . "Hunger and suffering again . . . God's punishment", he said shedding a few large tears and slowly, as if going into exile, he went from the garden into the house. The gate to our yard was opened without permission by the new owners of our father's home, his actual home, and that of the whole of our country. Our father did not even dare to say a word.

Soon, our father, and many other men from our village, were mobilised into the Red Army, taken to the Homelsk province and there, having been handed one rifle between three men, were driven in their civilian clothes, untrained and unprepared to be fired at by the Germans. Each day, ten, twenty, and one day even twenty-three, notices of deaths at the front reached our village. They were all being destroyed so quickly in the swamps, so that no one would be able to praise life under the Germans, and also to stop soldiers in Western Ukraine from joining the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. However, my father was lucky. He managed to return home after the war alive.

At the end of 1944, I was mobilised into the Red Army along with other youths born in 1927. For several years I repeatedly said that my year of birth was 1928, and later I wrote 1927.

In October 1945, I was transferred to serve in Austria. For the whole of 1948 I studied at the annual school of automechanics in the town of Medling, near Vienna. Since I was well acquainted with technics I spent the whole year reading classical literary works. I started to write a novel, but very quickly saw that I was producing something that could not be published. A problem arose whether I should adapt or not write at all. I solved the problem decisively: better not to write at all than write untruths against my conscience.

Austria impressed me with its level of civilisation and the ability to cultivate a wonderful bread harvest, berries, fruit and vegetables on bad soil, but I felt a foreigner there. My nostalgia for Ukraine intensified in 1949. I succeeded in returning to the Soviet Union, unfortunately however not to Ukraine, but to the Nakhichevan ASSR, first of all to Dzulfá, and later to Nakhichevan.

In Dzulfá I managed to obtain a Brockhaus encyclopedia and Yefron (?). I read several articles, among others, about Pushkin, which presented the subject in a completely different way to Soviet literature of that time. What did this mean? There could not be two truths. From then on, I began to suspect the veracity of Soviet authors. This suspicion increased my critical attitude towards absolutely everything, and in addition, finally confirmed a thought I had long since begun to turn into a principle. Namely, not to read Soviet literature about Soviet reality. One should read about the past, but the present day should be studied with one's own observations. The author is a human being. Why should I believe the eyes of another person more than my own eyes? I cannot see the past with my own eyes, so I have no other choice than to base my evidence on that of other people (the authors of books). However, I am a witness concerning the present. This principle saved me a lot of time and decreased the amount of literary stupefaction, which is incessantly poured into the heads of Soviet readers turning their brains inside out on a mass scale.

The second book which I obtained in Dzulfá was *Vom Kriege* ("On War") by Clausewitz. This book opened up a realm of practical psychology for me

based on examples of differentiation of abilities. The conclusion was: the scale and direction of abilities depend on the psychic capabilities of a human being, thus having an innate character.

Before the winter of 1949, I was transferred from Dzulfa to Nakhichevan, where I served as a commander of the motorcycle formation of the administrative company of the 75th infantry division. In Nakhichevan I read a two-volume history of diplomacy, from which I became convinced that there are no greater interests than national ones.

In 1950, after a vacation during which I saw the terrible poverty throughout Ukraine, including my native Khrypivka, I decided on the following imperatives: we must fight for the independence of Ukraine. This is my lifelong ambition to which I will dedicate my whole life. Then, I would be able to do as much as possible if I were to take on a high position (according to the scope of my abilities). And finally, I would not be able to attain such an aim without higher education and membership in the communist party.

Between 1951 and 1953 I joined the Komsomol and later the communist party. I finished seventh grade without assistance, translated all my school lessons from Ukrainian into Russian, I received my secondary school education during evening classes in the secondary school in the officers' building of the Nakhichevan garrison and entered the faculty of law at the Lomonosov Moscow State University.

During my studies, alongside the works of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin, which we were forced to study and summarise, I read Galwitz, Montesquieu, Spenser. In 1956 I changed the strategic concept of my struggle.

First of all it was difficult for me to wear the mask of an active communist. Furthermore, I became more involved in the idea of an independent Ukraine and even more severely I felt a stranger in official society (there was no unofficial society at this time). I found a solution to my moral burden: I ceased all public activity and went over to a position of criticising Soviet reality.

Secondly, the way to a high-ranking position is tied to the necessity of exploiting oneself, namely to such an individual zeal to act in a way that I considered wrong. While contemplating on Bohdan Khmelnytskyi (Ukrainian Hetman) and the evaluation of his deeds by Taras Shevchenko (Ukrainian poet), I realised that I could not agree with Khmelnytskyi. Namely, that I am now harming the people, but with the aid of this wrong I will rise to a high-ranking position and then I will be able to render the people great good.

A person does not know when he is going to die. And what if he dies in the process of creating evil? No matter what a person thought about, there does exist an objective criterion for evaluating his role in history — his actual actions. When these actions are harmful, then that person is a traitor to the interests of his people. Shevchenko did not appraise Khmelnytskyi for his intentions, but for his deeds. And inasmuch as his alliance with Alexander

Mykhailovich turned into three centuries of slavery for Ukrainians, then Shevchenko is completely justified in his appraisal of Khmelnytskyi.

An arithmetical deliberation: the amount of evil I will cause will equal the amount of good, and having reached a positive balance, I will demonstrate the righteousness of the way. This is an absolutely wrong mode of thinking. One cannot cause evil, neither more nor less, to the object of one's love — in fact, no evil at all. One should act in such a way so as not to regret one's actions. May every coming day be assigned for adding to a deed, and not for changing or altering this deed.

Thirdly, the way to a high-ranking position is long and it is not built on emptiness, but in a microsphere, the influence of which cannot in any way be removed from the records. Thus, at the end of such a way, I myself could radically change and no longer be capable of resorting to decisive actions on behalf of the independence of my nation.

That is also why I ceased public activity and from 1957 began to orientate myself on underground activity. After the 20th Congress of the CPSU a large amount of formerly banned literature began to appear in the reading rooms of Moscow libraries.

On becoming acquainted with this literature one's horizons widened and faith in university education as the only correct system was undermined. As the end of my university course approached, I arranged for the Lviv provincial party to send a letter of appeal to the state commission on the division of young professionals. This appeal asked that I be directed to the disposal of the regional party.

The Lviv provincial party directed me to the town of Radykhiv, where I received a position as a member of the propaganda staff of the regional party. This work involved constant travel to villages in the region. I enjoyed travelling and would question people about their conditions of life and work in those times, as well as in the times before collectivisation and during the German, Polish and Austrian occupation. I inquired about the national liberation movement, which had recently quietened down, and about the mood of the population. This mood exceeded all of my expectations: all the people, except for an insignificant group of yes-men and lackeys, regarded the insurgents and revolutionaries as knights of the national liberation movement. They spoke incessantly and in any conditions whatsoever about their heroic deeds; the suffering of the peasants, and about the brutality and barbarity of the "Muscovites". In Radykhiv itself, the last armed conflict had taken place in 1954 and the graves of the occupants were still fresh. I was shown places where farms had once stood, which had been completely destroyed by the invaders. I was told about the execution by firing squad of the whole village on the orders of the secretary of the regional communist party, Pavlovskyi, and about the annihilation of whole villages.

Russian newspapers would shed tears over Oradea and Lidice, Kortylis and

Klius, which had been destroyed by the Nazis during the war. However, nobody could even breathe a word about the number of Ukrainian settlements that they (the Russians) themselves had destroyed even after the war, since this was "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda", which could result in ten years of imprisonment in far-off Siberian concentration camps.

The recent past was filled with blood, and the present — with tears. The people were being sent by force to the kolkhozes. The kolkhozes were assigned with a rigidly set amount of cows for every 100 hectares of land, there was nothing to feed them with and then before spring, the cows were harnessed across their stomachs so that they would not fall, but would die standing up (to be more exact, they were hung on their harnesses). The women wept over the bare ribs of the cows, over their own fate, and the men would grit their teeth and wait impatiently for the time when the Americans would finally crush Red Russia.

Meanwhile, the meagre handful of lackeys, depending on the victorious military force, were going crazy in the following way, for example: There is a long queue of people waiting to be admitted by the head of the kolkhoz. He heats up the door handle in his office with a blowlamp until it turns blue, the heat spreads to the handle on the outer side of the door, and then he calls "Come in". A woman grasps the door handle, burns her palm, cries out in pain and surprise, and the head of the kolkhoz bursts out in joyful laughter, which can be heard across the whole of the kolkhoz offices. "Who's next?" — he cries out to the people in the corridor. "What, nobody? Well, that's fine! You should be working in the kolkhoz field and not wheedling out a horse for your own garden!" (The scene of action — the village of Skvaryava, Hlynynany region, Lviv province. The main hero — the head of the kolkhoz, Laska).

This is what I thought: if you, as a person, see this reality and do not understand its injustice, then you are a fool. If you see this reality and understand all of its injustice, and no ardent desire arises in you to stop it, then you are a coward. To see, to understand and not act against such gross injustice means that you are not a human being, but a worthless worm. So, what indeed are you — a worm or a human being?

My mother and father are of Kozak heritage. My ancestors were human beings, and not worms. Am I, then, to be a worthless branch on my family tree?

Within half a year, I, together with Stepan Virun and Vasyl Lutskiv, agreed to create an underground party called "The Ukrainian Workers' and Peasants' Union". In order to spread the Union geographically, I moved to the Hlynynany region in the middle of 1959. I drafted a programme. I transferred myself from the regional communist party to the legal profession and found much in common with the lawyer Ivan Kandyba and the Lviv engineer and land surveyor Oleksander Liubovych. In order to further spread the geogra-

phical territory of the Workers' and Peasants' Union, Kandyba moved to practice law in the town of Peremyshlyany.

On November 7, 1960, Ivan Kandyba, Stepan Virun, Vasyl Lutskiv, Mykola Vashchuk and myself convened our inaugural meeting in Lviv. (Due to the length of the drafted programme, we decided to abolish it). I was commissioned to draw up a more moderate project for the next meeting, which was planned for January 22, 1961.

I drafted a project for the new programme which was called "Notes". On January 20 and 21, Kandyba, Virun, Lutskiv, Liubovych and myself were arrested in connection with the Ukrainian Workers' and Peasants' Union, and soon afterwards this was followed by the arrest of Ivan Kipysh and Yosyp Borovnytskyi.

In May 1961, the Lviv provincial court sentenced me to death by execution, Kandyba was sentenced to 15 years of imprisonment, Virun to 12 years, Lutskiv, Liubovych, Kipysh and Borovnytskyi each to 10 years of imprisonment.

The Supreme Court of the Ukrainian SSR commuted my death sentence to 15 years of imprisonment, while Kipysh's and Borovnytskyi's sentences were reduced to 7 years of imprisonment. Inasmuch as we had not destroyed the first draft of the programme, all charges were based on this. The austerity of this draft lay in its criticism of the existing state of affairs which dealt with the rights of workers, employees, peasants, and also in the fact that it raised the issue of Ukrainian national rights.

At the same time, this programme signalled the beginning of a new era in the national liberation movement of the Ukrainian people. In other words, in place of the former armed struggle, peaceful means were being proclaimed as the basic method of achieving this aim, namely, the secession of Ukraine from the Soviet Union. The programme stated: "The methods to be used in achieving our aim are peaceful and constitutional". Agitation and propaganda — these are the means of activity of the Ukrainian Workers' and Peasants' Union. The transition to agitation did not emerge from a hatred of weapons, but from a clear realisation of the impossibility of using them. We know from history that after the defeat of our people in the war of liberation (1917-1921) or in the widespread mass movement, a long period of disillusionment followed, as well as disbelief in a whole generation. Thus, the glorious generation of the *Banderivtsi* (followers of Stepan Bandera) accomplished its historical mission and nothing more should be expected of them. The task of activists during the intervening stages, when the previous mass movement had suffered defeat and expired, and a new mass movement is still far-off, lies in the struggle against apathy, lack of faith in one's national abilities, against disillusionment and the interpretation of defeat as a judgement of fatal fate. The task also lies in the preparation of the people for a new mass movement, the aim of which is national freedom. Such a task does not require a machine

gun or a bayonet, but word inspired by faith in the victory of good over evil, freedom over slavery, enslaved colonial nations over imperialism.

On October 20, 1961, I was transported to the village of Sosnovka in the Mordovian ASSR to the 7th concentration camp. The camp regulations were hung on the barrack walls, and they immediately struck my attention by their unlawfulness: they bore no mention by whom they had been approved or sanctioned. Thus, this document specifying the legal status of prisoners was not a legal document.

There were approximately 1,800 prisoners in the concentration camp. More than one third were Ukrainians, mostly insurgents. They served as a living source of information on the national liberation movement in the post-war decade. I felt very lucky to find myself among them.

The prisoners (Ukrainians and those from the Baltic States) told me about the struggle, and I strove to raise their theoretical level and lift them from the level of soldiers to the level of commanders. After almost three years of such efforts, the early stages of their effectiveness could be seen, as well as the fact that Clausewitz was right. After discussing the problem with Trokhym Shynkaruk, I began to single out people to purely specific positions within the structure.

After many years, I realised that the life of society, in particular the life of a human being, is too dynamic and changeable a phenomenon to create a viable and unalterable structure which is estimated for several decades ahead. The fact of the matter is not only that the members of this structure — ordinary people — live (each one of them) in their own microsphere and test its influence on themselves, but also the fact that a person cannot live in the past alone. A person lives in the present as if on a river-bed. The present is forever placing new tasks on a person, engulfing him in its present current, drawing him further and further away from the past and from the task he (the person) had then taken upon himself.

Exceptional people are not influenced by a wide social sphere and play a part themselves in influencing the microsphere. However, the structure cannot be calculated upon exceptional individuals alone (Therefore, even the decision of the Leadership of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists in 1943 on the formation of a reserve network in eastern Ukraine was almost practically of no help at all, just like my own measures).

The very same flow of life also renders the policy of the economy of forces futile. A person (once again I am thinking of non-exceptional individuals) is a false figurehead. Today, he is a courageous, self-disciplined soldier (insurgent), who bravely attacks the enemy and, in the event of a hopeless situation, does not hesitate to put a bullet in his head. Five years pass, and his courage fades, and in ten years a person can become completely indifferent to a high ideal. Thus, people, whom the leadership wanted to save for the future, ceased being the same people they once were, and revealed them-

selves as worthless. They had withered without bearing fruit. If they had died in battle, their blood would have sprinkled over the earth, which would have inevitably borne new fighters for freedom. Struggle is important, but even more important is the factor of the struggle: as long as a nation struggles, its blood pulses and it continues to live. And if not today, then tomorrow, it will certainly achieve independence.

In 1966, a new generation of Ukrainian political prisoners arrived in the Mordovian camps. Until this time, all streams of political prisoners concentrated on underground methods of activity. The generation of 1966 brought with it an orientation on legal activity. They had no contacts abroad and were afraid to make any. The new generation brought contacts with the democratic West and did not conceal this fact at all. Before 1966, only a few prisoners defended and justified the idea of publicising their "anti-Soviet" platform, while the new generation publicly and courageously demonstrated their right.

From the moment the new generation arrived in the concentration camp a struggle between the prisoners and the camp administration began. There was no such struggle previously. The political prisoners began to collect facts of gross violations of laws and prisoners' rights, and strove to inform the international democratic community about these violations, while the administration strove to stop this information from leaking out. This gradually resulted in a reinforcement of the regime.

The highly educated and intelligent new generation created an exceedingly unfavourable atmosphere for the camp administration. The spirit of the prisoners revived and even those more advanced in years raised their heads. In the summer of 1967, in order to suppress this revival, the Committee of State Security imprisoned the most active of the new generation (Mykhailo Horyn, Valentyn Moroz and Mykhailo Masiutka), as well as several of the older prisoners (Svyatoslav Karavanskyi, Mykhailo Lutsyk and myself).

In September 1970, we were transported from the Vladimir prison to the village of Barshevo, in the Mordovian ASSR to the 3rd camp. On December 10, we went on a hunger strike protesting the violation of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and for the first time we organised ourselves and demanded from the Supreme Soviet of the USSR the granting to political prisoners of a separate legal status. At the same time, we began to demand that Ukrainian prisoners be allowed to serve out the rest of their sentences on the territory of Ukraine. The administration of the Mordovian concentration camps appeared incapable of cutting-off the outward channels of information. Therefore, in July 1971, the KGB transported 500 of the most active political prisoners to the Kuchino, Central and Polovynky settlements. The struggle continued.

In 1973, I was fortunate enough to become acquainted with the Russian Yegor Davydov, a true democrat, and the first Russian to recognise Ukraine's right to secession from Russia. In 1974, the regional people's court in Chusovsk, Perm province, sentenced me — a Ukrainian, Symas Kidyryka — a

Lithuanian, David Chornohlaz — a Jew, to imprisonment for organising a strike in the 36th zone in protest of the beating up of the Ukrainian political prisoner, Stepan Sapelak, by an officer of the administration.

While I was in the Vladimir prison, I got to know two wonderful Russians: Vladimir Bukovskiy and Vladimir Balakonov. I met Mykola Buduliak-Sharygin for the second time, who kept up his good humour even when his blood pressure rose to 220, making his face turn completely blue. I also met Anatoliy Zdorovyyk, Oleksa Serhiyenko and the Jew Yakiv Suslynskyi. Life among such people is interesting and full of meaning under any conditions.

We drafted quite a detailed legal project for a separate everyday contingent of regulating conditions for holding political prisoners. Seventy-two people signed this project. We sent it off on October 3, 1974 — the Day of the Soviet political prisoner — to the Commission on Legislative Proposals of the Supreme Soviet, as a proposal for discussion.

Repressions continued in the Vladimir prison and I was sent to the Rybysk psychiatric hospital for tests. During the registration of new arrivals, I asked why I, as a mentally sane person, had been brought to their hospital and what they intended to do with me. I was told: "We will cure you of your views". Within a month I was discharged after having been diagnosed with "hypocondriachal syndrome". Just before my release, I was transferred from Vladimir to Chernihiv, and finally released on January 21, 1976.

Conditions in Chernihiv left much to be desired: there were no products, industrial goods were of bad quality and expensive, the people had no rights and kept quiet, only two Ukrainian schools were left, and the others had been turned into Russian-language schools, television programmes and movies made at Ukrainian film studios were all in Russian. In fact, we were being suppressed from all sides.

We had to oppose such an unhealthy atmosphere in order to prevent a person from turning into some sort of homunculus. At first, I acted alone, then together with a few people, we formed the Ukrainian Helsinki Group, which provided more possibilities of realising the potential abilities of its members. The following ten people became members of the Group (in alphabetical order): Oleksander Berdnyk, Petro Hryhorenko, Ivan Kandyba, myself, Mykola Matushevych, Myroslav Marynovych, Oksana Meshko, Mykola Rudenko, Nina Strokata, Oleksa Tykhyi.

Rudenko and Tykhyi were arrested on February 5, 1977; Matushevych and Marynovych in April of that year. I was arrested on December 12, 1977. On December 10, I finished writing an appeal to the Belgrade Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, attended by delegates from 35 states, on the discrimination of Ukrainians with regard to the right of emigration. I passed this appeal onto my wife, who managed to get it to Kyiv.

During my inquest, I was already well aware of the term and conditions of imprisonment awaiting me. I started a hunger strike in protest of my unjust arrest and refused to testify. I also renounced my Soviet citizenship and for

the first time, I began to accept the thought of death as probably not the worst turn of fate. In ten years (from 1950 to 1960), I would have been able to write something of interest, but in this case. . . these were ten years of intellectual degradation, after which, even if I were left with the minimal physical strength to put pen to paper, I would in any case not have been able to remember enough to write complete analytical works. Must one suffer for ten years just to come out at the end of them a completely worthless invalid? The only thought which kept me alive was that I was in command of my own life. Neither the state, nor anyone else, would be able to stop me from taking my own life should I so wish. I am the supreme judge in this case, and I would be able to do this whenever I decided. Therefore, there is no point in rushing anywhere. Only when I lose my patience, I will go. But in the meantime I must suffer.

The Chernihiv provincial court in the town of Horodna (where my brother Viktor lived, and it is almost 2 kms. from my native Khrypivka to Horodna) declared me as an extremely dangerous recidivist and sentenced me to 10 years of imprisonment in a harsh regime colony and 5 years' exile.

On October 20, 1978, I was taken to the very same village of Sosnovka in the Mordovian ASSR, where I first began my life as a political prisoner 17 years ago, except that at that time this was a large zone, and now there was only a small prison across the road from it.

I was met by Oleksa Tkyhyi, Ivan Hel and others, some known and unknown to me, striped "zebras", or, as Vitaliy Kalynychenko wittily said, "knights in tiger skins".

We managed to send out information from prison to the free world and thus, disclose the unlawfulness of Soviet citizens and the despotic nature of the Brezhnev regime.

Before long, agents began to spread rumours that no one would come out from the zone alive unless he recanted all of his activities. Gradually the harsh conditions intensified and an authorised KGB agent even told us, "How can we release you before you have been disarmed? You will continue to fight us. No, we cannot release such people alive."

Eventually we became reconciled with the thought that an honourable death in Kuchino camp would be our last service for Ukraine. In 1981, Andriy Turyk was transferred to the Perm prison hospital almost in good health, but within a month, he had joined his forefathers. (Thus he paid for being a signatory of the "Document of 19").

(By this "Document of 19", Levko Lykyanenko probably means the joint petition of Ukrainian political prisoners to the United Nations presented in the summer of 1979. The signatories of this document appealed for the inclusion of the Ukrainian issue onto the daily agenda of the UN General Assembly sessions and to do everything possible to speed up Ukraine's liberation from any kind of imperialism and occupation. Besides Andriy Turyk and Levko Lukyanenko, the joint petition was signed by such known former

political prisoners as: Serhiy Babych, Ivan Hel, Vitaliy Kalynychenko, Mykola Matusevych, Myroslav Marynovych, Vasyl Ovsienko, Zoryan Popadiuk, Petro Ruban, Yuriy Shukhevych, and others — ed's. note).

In 1982, Mykhailo Kurka, from the generation of the *Banderivtsi*, died. On May 5, Oleksa Tykhyi died. 1983 was a particularly harsh year. Between my own oscillation between life and death and the loss of my great friend (Tykhyi), I also lost my father in October of that year, and ten days later, my brother Viktor.

On September 5, 1984, the Day of Remembrance of the victims of the Red Terror, my other close friend, Yuriy Lytvyn, committed suicide. That same year, Valeriy Marchenko died, having paid for his life by disseminating the secret document on the intensified Russification of Ukrainian schools.

In 1985, on the eve of the commemoration of the Day of Red Terror, Vasyl Stus passed away.

After Stus' death, there was a slight appeasement. However, in 1986, the KGB was still resorting to old methods of dealing with their ideological opponents and hitting below the belt.

On December 8, 1987, I was transferred from the special regime camp to the severe regime camp. Within 24 hours, I was no longer wearing striped, but black clothes, and I was directed to the Perm prison.

Before I was sent into exile, the following was stated in the accompanying document written in Kuchino: "Five years' exile. Severe regime". In accordance with these instructions from Kuchino, I was put in solitary confinement at all deportation prisons, and made to freeze or tortured with hunger. When the time came for me to be sent to my place of exile in the village of Berezovka, the Parabelsk regional militia put me under administrative supervision. I arrived in Berezovka on January 30, 1988. I was put in a hostel, where I had no peace day or night.

My wife arrived on February 27. For two days we lived in the red corner of the hostel, and then we found a temporary room. In May, I rented an old and inadequate apartment, which I renovated with the help of local acquaintances, and thus I arranged for us to have a "corner of our own", which was made up of a small room and a kitchen. I complained about the supervision, and it was abolished.

My dear friends from the Ukrainian Helsinki Group elected me as the head of the Group. From the very beginning, I regarded the activities of the Group as beneficial to the cause of the democratisation of Soviet society and the defence of Ukrainian national rights. Now, when the possibility arose of renewing the activities of the Group, I was more than willing to make it more active in all possible ways.

That is probably why on April 23, 1988, it was suggested that I write a statement asking for an exit visa from the Soviet Union. I think that, due to the fact that I had spent 25 years in imprisonment, there is no need for me to

leave the Soviet Union. Moreover, if I am not forced to leave for health reasons, then I will stay. Of course, Berezovka is not Ukraine, but although it is far from Ukraine it still seems to me that here I can feel the pulse of life in Ukraine better, as well as the general course of restructuring, than from somewhere in New York. It is true that New York is incomparably a more advantageous place for me to fulfil my potential in the theoretical field than Berezovka. However, I believe that at present Ukraine does not need yet another theoretical dissertation on the right to an independent place under the sun. On the other hand, Ukraine does need practical action in returning its national nature to its ethnographic territories.

After finishing the first course in the faculty of law at Moscow State University in 1954, I got married. Anticipating the possibility of being arrested, I did not take a woman from Moscow, marriage with whom would have been almost exclusively built on love. Love alone is not enough for a lasting marriage. For this one needs the same tastes and idea about many matters and issues. One must have the same idea on moral values. Moreover, my actual political aim — the reason for my possible arrest and my wife's resulting compulsory solitude — should not be hostile to her.

I could expect to find the latter in Ukrainian women who were studying with me at Moscow State University, but not necessarily the former two conditions. I met such a woman in my native village during my vacations. She was Nadia Nykonivna Buhayevska, a student of the Kyiv Agricultural Academy who, like me, spent her vacations in Khrypivka. I was not mistaken in my choice. I did not give her a happy family life (sometimes I even thought that it would have been better if I had not married her at all), inasmuch as I only brought her immense suffering. Out of love, as well as from her own human decency, she made my fate part of her own. From then on, albeit from afar, she has firmly stuck by me. Without her, just as without my mother's constant letters, the barbed wire would have torn at my soul much more painfully and would have dried up the source of my love of mankind considerably more.

A biography of a member of the national liberation movement is of social interest, no doubt with regard to two aspects. On the one hand, the way in which the ideology of national liberation developed and took shape as one's own personal conviction, and on the other, how one's practical activity developed.

At first, I compared the age-group of the revolutionaries of the 1870s with the age of Soviet political prisoners of the 1970s. It seems that one hundred years ago revolutionaries were considerably younger.

Secondly, according to observations made by communist atheist propagandists, people (usually women) who went to church for the first time in Ukraine in the 1970s were around 40 years old. Thus, we have a fact of late development in an examination of the official ideology. The reason for this?

The reason lies in the totality of communist propaganda. From a pre-school

age to the time they reach retirement the people are brought up with the aid of newspapers, radio, cinema, political activities, meetings, etc. The system of deception is built in such a way, so as to keep each person under its influence and leave room for no possibility of slipping out from under this influence.

Therefore, even if the thought arises early on in a youth about the absolute necessity of national liberation, he is constantly tossed about in a web of official ideology until, finally, he is able to accumulate enough lies and theoretically unfounded facts of official ideology, in other words, as a consequence, the theoretical accuracy of the theory of national liberation.

One should not underestimate the fact that Marx's theory about the superiority of great states (this is an antithesis of the theory on separate nations) has been introduced into the course of sciences, which jointly argue for a great state ideology starting from the highest philosophical and theoretical concept of the world through historical materialism down to the lowest level of political explanation of practical decisions. Therefore, the Marxist theory on the superiority of great states aims to satisfy the needs of people in a wide diapason of their theoretically and intellectually recognisable abilities. Although the basic theory is no more than fiction, the actual theory has been worked out in detail and in depth.

I have not stopped to ponder over the long and difficult path of the definition of the numerous postulates of official ideology. In conditions of restructuring and democratisation, when many such postulates have already been defined or questioned by the active community, such a discourse would entail boredom. I only mentioned the emotional moments which have engraved my memory. In moments of theoretical doubts they attracted my attention and beside all sorts of theoretical insidiousness, they forced me to give way to good sense — the best judge in matters of social truth and justice.

The practical activity of an activist of the intermediate stages in the development of an enslaved nation (when one mass movement has already ended its activities, and a new one has not yet come into full being) — is enlightenment, agitation and propaganda.

The organisational part of the preparation for such activity takes place in conspiracy, but inasmuch as the aim — the spreading of ideas — is, according to its nature, public, then the initiators already disseminate their subversive ideas at the organisational stage. In a year or two, they attract the attention of agents, as a result of which the initiators themselves end up behind bars.

It is possible to sharpen the bayonet in one's own house, keeping this secret from the authorities for at least a hundred years. Yet, disseminating ideas and keeping this secret from the authorities for long is not possible. According to my calculations, based on a great number of cases, the average duration from the beginning of practical activity to the time of one's arrest is approximately three years.

These three years are followed by a long period of imprisonment, where a person once again resorts to theorising. Experience in organisational activity,

which can be gained in imprisonment, is restricted by at least the limits of the social structure of the contingent of prisoners. The drive to compensate the restrictions with the aid of abstract projections onto a wide social sphere somewhat helps, but of course it cannot completely compensate for the imperfection of the social structure.

This short biography could not be complete, since it is not something of the past, but the present. KGB agents are now stressing that they are officers and doing only what they are told. Yesterday they did one thing, today another, and tomorrow, so to speak, everything could change. . . Yet, they will continue to do what they did before: arrest, suppress, destroy. They are dreaming of the return of a so-called "normal" Brezhnev-like order. They are preparing for this return by intercepting (not only) telephone conversations, letters, articles and by accumulating them in our dossiers.

What we are hoping is that the old order will not return. And it will not. Yet the zigzag, by which the agents' dossiers will become the basis for charges, cannot be excluded. I can deal with my own affairs as I wish, but I do not have the right to make trouble for others. Therefore, I had to remain silent about several earlier facts in my biography and not mention particular names, as well as certain incidents in our lives as prisoners.

By doing so, I am failing to satisfy my Ukrainian friends and Russian colleagues (on whose request I have written this biography). However, I hope that they will understand the reasons for these particular omissions.

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May 1988
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GLASNOST: IS IT ENOUGH?

Gorbachev's reforms from a nationalist perspective

(Part 1)

A new wind is blowing from Moscow. Many hope that it is a harbinger of positive change towards greater freedom in the USSR. Others, hard-line cold warriors, who have grown quite leery of even a slight breeze from the Kremlin, have consistently warned that the much publicised reform programme of Mikhail Gorbachev is simply a smoke-screen designed to lull the free world into a sense of complacency as a prelude to an all-out assault against the West. While those in the West who have come to embrace Gorbachev as "the Man of the Year" conveniently forget that he presides over what still is the largest imperialist system of subjugation and oppression in the modern historical era, the "cold warriors", on the other hand, neglect to recognise that unprecedented, sweeping changes have already been effectuated in the Soviet Russian empire.

Whatever the case may be, the policy of reform, popularly known as *glasnost*, has serious implications for the revolutionary, national-liberation movements of the subjugated nations in the USSR and the "satellite" countries. To dismiss the Kremlin leader's utterances about his vision for the Soviet Union as propaganda, or as some sophisticated KGB-inspired chicanery, without providing some critical assessment of present Soviet policy and of the rationale behind it would be very dangerous for a liberation movement which embraces a revolutionary ideology.

It is becoming increasingly clear, particularly as Gorbachev's programme begins to gain momentum in the Soviet Union, that many people from the subjugated nations welcome this new wind of change, some with a realistic sense of caution and scepticism, others with a euphoric and hopeful release of fear. It would seem that at the very least Gorbachev's reform programme may, indeed, pull the rug from under the feet of those who claim that only a revolutionary overhaul of the USSR, its dismantling into national independent and sovereign states, can lead to genuine substantive change. This article will attempt to provide a new perspective on the reform initiative from a nationalist vantage point, while also considering probable directions this reform will take, reasons why such unprecedented reform is even being considered, and, finally, the reform programme's implications for the national-liberation struggle of the subjugated nations at this critical juncture.

The thesis

In order to place Gorbachev's reform initiative into a perspective that would be most meaningful for the various peoples subjugated in the USSR, it would be appropriate to remind ourselves of one, historically-proven axiom: **genuine liberty for a nation requires, as a precondition, the establishment of a sovereign and independent nation-state, which — in the case of the USSR — further requires a *revolutionary* overhaul, a complete dissolution of the Soviet Russian system of subjugation. Any future restructuring that falls short of national independence and statehood leaves the presently subjugated nations in a vulnerable position.** The question, therefore, becomes the following: are Gorbachev's policy proposals, concrete reforms, and long-range vision, although heralding unprecedented changes in the Soviet system, commensurate with the general agenda of national-liberation of the non-Russian nations in the USSR? Can the programme of economic restructuring (*perestroika*) and liberalisation/democratisation (*glasnost*) eventually lead to the establishment of sovereign and democratic nation-states of the non-Russian peoples subjugated in the USSR?

The thesis, which this article will attempt to substantiate, is that *glasnost* is not only incompatible with the programme of liberation nationalism, but that it poses the greatest threat to the national-liberation movements of the subjugated nations since the inception of the Soviet Union. Essentially, the argument is that the programme itself is designed to create the political and socio-economic conditions for a new, albeit democratic(ised) empire, in which the non-Russian peoples would still be denied their inalienable right of national independence while being allowed to enjoy minimal democratic liberties (human rights) which do not threaten the integrity of the empire.

Reasons to reform

Often a political system's longevity is predicated by its capacity for change, by its adaptability to evolving global (social, economic, and political) conditions. Although some scholars have argued that a repressive, totalitarian system cannot afford to even appear pliable out of fear that such adaptability would be interpreted as a sign of weakness¹, at times a regime² may reach a critical juncture in its history when change becomes imperative.

Totalitarianism purposefully breeds fear, which is in itself an instrument of

1. Arendt, Hannah, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1973).

2. The term "regime" is being used here purposefully as an accurate depiction of the "Soviet government". Despite the term's obvious connotations, and in spite of the apparent incongruity of the term in an article discussing liberal reform in the USSR, the term is, nonetheless, appropriate, since if the Soviet government were not a regime, then the very question of reform would be moot.

control wielded by the regime. Fear, however, is a prohibitive, or at best, a static political force, designed to mobilise shell-shocked masses in a semi-militarised state, while in effect discouraging genuine political participation and activity, sanctioned or otherwise. Mass mobilisation cannot be equated with genuine political participation. The dilemma which arises for a totalitarian regime committed to industrial modernity is how to maintain vitality, necessary to keep pace with the development of objective global forces, while maintaining absolute control in what must remain a static socio-political system.

It seems that the key to maintaining continuity of dominance to a repressive regime is its capacity to institute reforms which are designed to restructure the system, without altering the existing power quotient in any of its essential aspects. A proven method for taking the wind out of an escalating revolutionary situation is to begin implementing a reform programme which even incorporates some of the demands of the less militant centres of dissent. Moreover, the pace and substance of a government-sponsored reform programme is completely controlled and determined by the regime, which means that a regime, after having loosened the noose, may at any time easily tighten it again if the reforms should backfire.

Several considerations may affect the regime's decision to embark on a reform programme. First, the indigenous revolutionary forces may be ominous enough to cause the regime to re-think its priorities with a view towards salvaging the system through an overhaul of its structure. A revolution's success ultimately depends on its ability to challenge the established normative value system, which infuses the socio-political order with meaningful purpose and projects a vision for the future. This value system not only can be changed, but it can be changed in such a way so as to seemingly accomodate the dissenters, i.e. the non-revolutionary intelligentsia, while continuing to buttress the traditional power infrastructure, providing the regime with a claim to legitimacy. In a revolutionary situation, reforms are effectuated as a palliative device, designed to diffuse the intensity of the revolutionary processes by bifurcating the leadership of the underground movement, with its maximalist agenda for change, from the people. A reform programme, effectuated in piecemeal fashion, can buy the time a regime needs to reconsolidate its power base.

Another consideration may be the regime's acknowledgement of the need to infuse a stagnant economy with much needed vitality by allowing for greater mass participation in new political structures which can be integrated into the established system without undermining its integrity. The regime's hope is that this increased volume and frequency of mass political participation will cascade down to the lethargic socio-economic system, giving the latter a much needed shot in the arm. The people would be encouraged to participate with promises of more liberty, coupled with a projected future of progressive material gain, usually accompanied by veiled criticism of past policies. The regime's success in this regard is predicated on its ability to establish

in no uncertain terms a clear break with the past, not only in style, but also in substance.

These two sets of concerns need not be mutually exclusive. Indeed, a revolutionary situation will not necessarily arise solely because the established political order is experiencing severe ossification of its lines of communication and disequilibrium between its projected value system and existing realities³. Economics plays a critical role. A simple axiom that Karl Marx understood only too well was that people with full stomachs will not be inclined to rebel. According to the theory of relative deprivation (also known as the "J-curve" theory)⁴, poverty alone will rarely generate a revolutionary situation. The potential for revolution is considerable, however, in a society which has experienced steady economic growth followed by a sudden, unexpected, sharp reversal. Up to the time of the reversal, people's expectations are that the economy will continue rising, so that they are completely unprepared for the hardships that the regime asks them to endure in the successive period of austerity. Hypothetically, that same sense of relative deprivation may arise in a totalitarian, repressive society, which has been telling its people to endure hardships for several decades, while promising a rosy future just around the corner. A legacy of dashed hopes and empty promises is fertile ground for revolution.

The decision to effectuate change in the form of liberal reforms may be the result of conclusions drawn from both sets of concerns: a.) the regime's cognizance of a revolutionary threat, and b.) a stagnating economy⁵.

The Soviet model: uneven modernisation

The status of the USSR as a global superpower has always been somewhat tainted by its inability to effectively compete with Western industrialised societies, like Great Britain or France, which in military terms are minuscule in comparison to the Soviet Russian military behemoth, but in terms of sheer economic and technological potential for growth completely outclass the Soviet model. Traditionally, industrial development in the Soviet Union was viewed as a correlate of military growth. The accepted criteria of a healthy

3. Johnson, Chalmers, *Revolutionary Change* (Boston & Toronto: Little, Brown & Company, 1966).

4. Davies, James Chowning, (ed.), *When Men Revolt and Why* (New York, The Free Press, 1971) & Gurr, Ted Robert, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1970).

5. Some may argue that international pressures, the pressure of an outraged world public, or of the diplomatic community may have a significant impact on a regime's decision to institute reforms. History, however, would seem to indicate otherwise. As long as such pressures have no real bearing on the way a regime conducts its business, and as long as it will not severely jeopardise a regime's long-term projects, in the field of foreign policy in particular, a repressive regime has little interest in embarking on a course which would take it through uncharted political waters. In fact, as a matter of principle, the Soviet Union has consistently insisted on strict adherence to the diplomatically accepted axiom of non-interference in the internal affairs of another state.

industrial Western economy simply did not apply in the Soviet Union. Not only was heavy industry subsumed within the vast military complex, with its insatiable appetite for capital outlays, but the entire light consumer industry was viewed as an unfortunate appendage of the military industrial complex; a nagging appendage which, unfortunately in the eyes of the Kremlin, could not be severed, since it kept the people fed, clothed, housed and, most importantly, running the factories which would propel the USSR to a position of global ascendancy.

Recent studies indicate that previous estimates of the Soviet Union's GNP growth rate over the last decade were too low. Researchers and economists now place the figure at around 2-3%, which is still a modest, but respectable, percentage. Nonetheless, it ought to be pointed out that the researchers had to rearrange the accepted criteria when gauging the performance of the Soviet economy, since it simply could not measure up to the multi-faceted economies of the free world's industrialised societies. Upon closer examination of the total output of goods and services in the Soviet Union, what emerges is a markedly disproportionate hierarchy of capital allocation decidedly favouring the heavy industrial sector to the detriment of the lighter industrial sector.

The result is that although the USSR's leadership was quite capable of projecting military power on an unprecedented scale and of continuing to compete with the USA (e.g., in space exploration), despite its technological inferiority, it cannot avoid importing grain from the West in order to feed its population and to fulfil its obligations to its Third World client-states. Thus, although the Soviet Union possesses many of the high-profile characteristics of a modernised society, it is beset by a vast array of social problems stemming from inherent weaknesses in its socio-economic infra-structure. Modernisation in the USSR over the course of the last two decades has proceeded at a staggered, uneven pace. Since its development as an industrialised society has been so disproportionate for such an extended period of time, the once manageable gaps between the light and heavy industrial sectors have now become structural fissures which are beginning to jeopardise critical long-standing projects.

The "nationalities problem"

Further exacerbating the socio-economic problem is what many Sovietologists somewhat euphemistically label the "nationalities problem"⁶. At no time since the inception of the USSR have the various non-Russian peoples, who have been denied their inalienable national and human rights and liberties,

6. The label, in fact, belittles the struggle of the subjugated nations for national independence, while appearing to be academically objective. Problems are manageable. They can be dealt with in rational, pragmatic terms. A war of liberation, however, is more on the order of a crisis. For example, no reputable historian would refer to the American War of Independence of 1776 as a "problem", for the British. By labelling the liberation struggle of the subjugated nations in the USSR a "problem", scholars are discounting the viability of pressing for national independence for the non-Russian peoples.

been sufficiently quiescent to allow the Kremlin's power-brokers the luxury of dismantling the huge and draining apparatus of terror and repression. In fact, even though the view that the USSR is the historical heir of the Russian tsarist empire has fallen out of vogue in academic circles, the one constant in both tsarist and Soviet policy has been the treatment of the nations formerly colonised by the tsars and again subjugated by Lenin's disciples.

The post-Stalin power élites, unwilling and/or unable to implement their predecessor's genocidal policies towards the subjugated nations, have adopted what is basically a "carrot-and-stick" approach: promises of more fruitful material benefits as a reward for loyalty and for willingness to "Sovietise" (i.e., Russianise), coupled with harsh repression as punishment for any manifestation of divergent, potentially disintegrative national identity. Because of its prolonged economic difficulties, however, the carrot had to become leaner while the stick's shadow loomed larger. Ultimately, the Kremlin's "nationality experts" periodically had to resort to blatant terror tactics, sentencing the more prominent cultural activists to inhumane terms of incarceration. Such tactics were, indeed, effective in the short run, as they shocked the subjugated peoples into submission for some time; but they also exposed Soviet Russian "nationality policy" for what it was: a surreptitious campaign to stamp out all vestiges of national consciousness in the non-Russian peoples of the USSR. The policy itself was proven to be an abysmal failure, which only further accentuated the potentially revolutionary contradictions within the Soviet Russian system of subjugation.

Glasnost & Perestroika: an attempt at modernisation

The Stalinist period left a legacy in the Soviet Union that was not easily expunged. Stalinism left an indelible scar even on those who professed to be dismantling it, e.g. Khrushchev. Having learned how political priorities are dictated and effectuated under Stalin, the post-Stalin leadership did not possess the wherewithal to devise constructive means of change, which could have strengthened the system. Instead, under Brezhnev's reliable, consistent, but unimaginative stewardship, the system was allowed to languish in static stability, as the established élites, particularly with the able assistance of the KGB, who had enough fire-power at their disposal to effectively deal with any outward signs of dissent or opposition.

As the Soviet economy grew, albeit at a sluggish pace, the USSR was able to fulfil its ever-expanding foreign policy commitments and to keep pace with the USA in a financially attenuating arms race. Yet, the Soviet Union was still far from becoming a truly modern industrialised society. Moreover, the subjugated peoples of the USSR were becoming immune to pain quicker than the KGB was able to inflict it. Clearly, a more sophisticated type of campaign needed to be directed at the non-Russian peoples to bring them closer to "Sovietisation", i.e., de-nationalisation, Russification.

As the post-Stalin establishment was plodding along, a new technocratic class was being reared in the ways of Soviet politics. This new breed was rather proud of its predecessors' achievements, but eager to take the USSR onto a higher echelon. Yet, it was asked to wait as the aging gerontocrats refused to yield their entrenched positions. The first signal that something was about to give came not when Gorbachev ascended to the throne, but when Yuri Andropov, the former KGB chief, the architect of Hungary's "goulash communism", and Gorbachev's mentor, took over the ideological portfolio following Mikhail Suslov's death. The position itself was critical not solely because the USSR, as a totalitarian state, must pay homage to its ideological base, but primarily because historically the holder of the portfolio was the clandestine king-maker in the Kremlin. Andropov used this position and his subsequent brief tenure as party chief to smooth the ruffled feathers of the old guard while forcefully paving the way for Gorbachev and the coming of a new, technocratic, essentially managerial, Soviet élite.

Now that this new élite, personified by Gorbachev, has a firm grip on the reigns of power in the USSR, its task is to begin modernising Soviet society. According to the classical Western model, the process of industrialisation, or modernisation, proceeds in three separate phases, or "waves". The first wave requires vast capital accumulation followed by rapid development of heavy industry. The second wave, sometimes referred to as the mass consumer revolution, is ushered in with a burgeoning of the industrial sector in all aspects, which nearly over-saturates the economy, and the subsequent creation of various branches of light and service industries to absorb the excess capital. Finally, the third wave, in which the major industrial societies presently find themselves, is preceded by a technological revolution in the means of mass communication and exchange of information, which allows for an increase in productivity and industrial efficiency.

Soviet economic planning until now has clearly ignored this Western model, opting instead to rely solely on heavy industrial development as the one single-piston locomotive which was to drag Soviet society into modernity. This one factor alone explains the lop-sided gaps in Soviet industrial and overall economic development over the last few decades. Apparently, the Gorbachevite technocrats are cognizant of the detrimental implications that such uneven, staggered modernisation has for any industrial society in the twentieth century. It would seem that Gorbachev has made a conscious decision to revive the drive towards modernity by proceeding with all three "waves" *simultaneously*. This venture may prove to be risky, if only because, in strict accordance with the model, each phase should logically lead into the next in a systematic, almost dialectic, fashion. The alternative, however, is even more ominous, since continuing with the *status quo* will almost certainly lead to total systematic breakdown, and perhaps revolution. Dialectics had to take a back-seat to good, old-fashion, capitalist common sense in the state which at one time idolised Karl Marx.

(To be continued)

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CRACKING DOWN ON DISSENT: BUREAUCRATIC SATISFICING IN THE USSR

(Conclusion)

Findings

Table 1 shows the predictions made by each of the crackdown theories. The ideological vindictiveness perspective suggests that those dissidents who display an especially ideological disloyalty (former political élites) or capability for generating competing ideologies (intelligentsia) will be singled out for arrests during crackdowns. Moreover, repression will be especially serious, severe, and long for these ideological "traitors" to the regime.

The cybernetic roundup theory implies complete indiscrimination, that is, no difference between crackdown and noncrackdown periods. All that matters is numbers of arrestees representing "bugs" in the system.

The Machiavellian decapitation theory implies that dissidents with leadership characteristics or potential — males, the older, urbanites and residents in political control centres, intellectuals, and former members of the political élite — will be disproportionately arrested in crackdown periods. Further, repression will be especially serious in order to teach both leaders and followers a lesson regarding the adverse consequences of dissent.

The bureaucratic satisficing model suggests that only dissidents most accessible (residents in political control centres where the bureaucracy itself is concentrated) will be most likely candidates for regime arrest. Yet, since the bureaucracy wishes to minimise the possibility of an overload on the repression apparatus which may disrupt organisational routine, repression will actually be less serious and long due to the increase in numbers of dissidents to be processed.

In Table 1, those predictions which proved true for each model have been mapped out in blocks. Ten correct predictions are possible. The Machiavellian decapitation model proves least useful with only 3; ideological vindictiveness, the next most powerful, with 5; and cybernetic roundup, the third most useful, with 6. Seemingly, the Soviet regime is far less ideologically vindictive and sophistically Machiavellian than usually supposed. Further, it is far less

TABLE 1
PREDICTORS FOR CRACKDOWN MODELS

	<i>Sex</i>	<i>Urbanisation</i>	<i>Oblast Capital</i>	<i>Class</i>	<i>Age</i>	<i>Party</i>	<i>Demand</i>	<i>Article Seriousness</i>	<i>Sentence Severity</i>	<i>Sentence Duration</i>
Ideological Vindictiveness	ND	ND	ND	High	ND	Party	ND	High	High	High
Cybernetic Roundup	ND	ND	ND	ND	ND	ND	ND	ND	ND	ND
Machiavellian Decapitation	Male	City	Capital	High	Older	Party	ND	High	High	High
Bureaucratic Satisficing	ND	ND	Capital	High	ND	ND	ND	Low	Low	Low

TABLE 2
CRACKDOWN AND NONCRACKDOWN DIFFERENCES

<i>Crackdown</i>	<i>Oblast Capital</i>		<i>Article Seriousness</i>			<i>Sentence Duration</i>	<i>Unskilled</i>	<i>Skilled</i>	<i>Class</i>	
	<i>No</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>Low</i>	<i>Medium</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>Mean</i>			<i>White Collar</i>	<i>Student/Intellectual</i>
No	52.6%	47.4%	26.1%	33.9%	40.0%	12.7%	13.5%	8.5%	3.4%	74.6%
Yes	31.6	68.4	34.9	57.6	7.5	7.3	0.0	10.3	5.1	84.6
N	55	81	40	60	31	153	8	13	6	110

than totally indiscriminant as predicted by the cybernetic roundup model. In short, the regime both discriminates and does not discriminate between crackdown and noncrackdown periods with respect to dissident traits and repression characteristics. But why?

Seemingly, the bureaucratic satisficing argument provides the theoretically most useful answer. Nine of its 10 predictions are borne out. Crackdown arrests differ from noncrackdown ones only with respect to oblast capital residence, class, article seriousness, and sentence duration (Table 2). Differences for sex, age, urbanisation, party affiliation, demand, and sentence severity are nominal. On the other hand, whereas only 47.4 per cent of arrestees in noncrackdown periods resided in oblast capitals, some 68.4 per cent of crackdown ones did so. The bureaucratic satisficing thesis suggests that the huge political organisation of intermeshed party and state bureaucrats in the USSR will sense the greatest threat to their power from the immediate environment, that is, in the very political control centres (oblast capitals) in which they are concentrated. Rather than an optimising response to the threat, bureaucratic inertia and fear of disrupting routine limit this crackdown primacy to the immediate environment. The satisficing character of bureaucracy limits the re-stabilisation in crackdown periods to the most imminent threat.

Further, the "rigidity cycle" of bureaucracy (Downs, 1967: 242) resists change and instead opts for a high level of ossification and inertia, especially in non-democratic politics (*Ibid.*). Thus, only the immediate, rather than the all-embracing, environment is targeted for stabilisation. Further, if the entire wide environment of the bureaucracy were targeted for a crackdown, the very high numbers of arrestees would de-stabilise the bureaucracy itself. Thus the numbers of arrestees to be processed are kept manageable by limiting the geographical scope of the crackdown.

Moreover, those dissidents in political control centres are also the most easily accessible for arrest. Because of high information costs, bureaucrats often avoid further search whenever the expected marginal payoff means are smaller than the expected marginal cost (Downs, 1967: 168). In contrast, the concentration of coercive organs in oblast capitals probably means that greater information on dissidents in those localities is more readily available in the form of dossiers and the like than for dissidents residing outside these areas. Thus processing the dissident through the repressive apparatus is facilitated. While bureaucracy acts efficiently within the framework of limited capabilities and the cost of information, whenever the cost of attaining any given goal rises in terms of effort, time or money, it seeks to attain less of that goal (*Ibid.*, 2). Seemingly, a bureaucratic "geographical imperative" is characteristic of crackdown periods in comparison with times of slack.

Further, intellectuals seem somewhat more vulnerable for repression in crackdown periods. Some 74.6 per cent of those arrested in lax times were students or professional intellectuals compared to 84.6 per cent in tight per-

iods. Again, bureaucratic satisficing helps to explain this differential. Students and professional intellectuals are generally more active in terms of organisational activity and publications and hence the most visible and eligible for arrest. Their more visible and open public stance provides a great deal of ready-made "evidence" for "anti-Soviet activity" useable in the potentially disrupted courts.

Further, as articulate spokesmen of dissident movements, intellectuals are useful targets for satisficing bureaucratic intent on reducing future environmental destabilisation. With the articulate and vocal removed, dissident movements are deemed less "moveable" and the bureaucracy can return to normalcy with less environmental "noise" in the form of strident demands on structure, at least until new movement spokesmen arise and another crack-down period becomes imperative.

In addition, the increase in numbers of dissidents incarcerated could seriously disrupt bureaucratic processes. Bureaucratic capabilities are limited in terms of the amount of time which can be spent making decisions, the number of issues which can be considered simultaneously, and the amount of data which can be absorbed regarding any problem. Further, bureaucracies are subject to the "law of decreasing coordination": the larger the organisation, the poorer is the coordination among its actions (Downs, 1967: 143). Hence the large satisficing Soviet bureaucracy compensates for quantitative growth in dissidents by qualitative diminution in repression. For these reasons, dissidents in crackdown periods actually receive less serious criminal charges and shorter sentences than those arrested in lax times. Whereas 40.0 per cent of noncrackdown dissidents receive serious criminal articles, such is the case for only 7.5 per cent of those arrested during crackdowns. Likewise, the mean number of years of sentence for noncrackdown arrestees reaches 12.7 years compared to only 7.3 years for crackdown dissidents.

To reduce the possibility of overload on bureaucratic routine in pre-trial detention, courts and places of incarceration, satisficing bureaucracies actually "run the dissidents through" the repression system quickly in order to return as quickly as possible to bureaucratic routine. And, whereas an increase in numbers of dissidents may serve to increase the power of the bureaucracy, an increase in repressiveness lends little increment in political clout. Thus, ironically, to be "cracked down upon" in tight periods is actually to the dissident's advantage in comparison with his or her counterpart arrested in slack periods.

Yet the crackdown dissidents may receive shorter sentences simply because they were charged with less serious criminal articles. However, multiple regression analysis reveals that, regardless of article seriousness, the crackdown variable remains strongly related to sentence duration (unstandardised regression coefficient = 2 times the standard error). Thus, the crackdown variable has an effect on sentence duration independent of article seriousness.

Thus, all the sub-bureaucracies responsible for particular regimes (exile,

camp, psychiatric hospitals), are equilibrated despite a somewhat increased quantity of human material to be processed. Thus, little difference appears between crackdown and noncrackdown periods with respect to sentence severity. Perhaps these considerations help explain the only unpredicted anomaly in the bureaucratic satisficing model. A conclusive statement, however, must await future revelations concerning the particular workings of the Soviet repressive apparatus.

Yet, do these findings hold true for each crackdown period in Soviet Ukraine? The relatively small N's in each crackdown period render the analysis somewhat problematic. Nevertheless, breaking the crackdown category down into the three specific periods suggests a high level of symmetry across crackdowns. During all three waves, residents of oblast capitals were more likely to be arrested (70.0, 84.9, and 83.3 per cent) than in down periods (47.4 per cent). Similarly, students and professional intellectuals were more vulnerable (78.6, 85.2, and 90.0 per cent vs. 74.6 per cent) during crackdowns. The proportion of dissidents receiving highly serious criminal charge (7.1, 9.3, and 0.0 per cent) and the mean number of years of sentence (6.7, 8.0, and 5.3) are also far less in crackdown than in noncrackdown (40 per cent and 12.7) periods. Thus, the confidence in the soundness of the findings is enhanced.

Further, the theory is bolstered by numerous theoretical perspectives of bureaucratic behaviour, case studies of Soviet politics, and dissident observations alike. First, although the Soviet regime began as a highly ideological enterprise fuelled by Lenin's charisma, quickly the new "movement" became a "structure." In Max Weber's (1947: 363) words, Lenin's charisma became "routinised," such that the group of revolutionaries brought together by personal devotion to the charismatic leader became transformed into a non-charismatic bureaucracy.

Second, observers of Soviet politics have noted its profoundly bureaucratic nature. Lenin's successors accomplished little towards the de-bureaucratisation of the system. Indeed, although Khrushchev engaged in several administrative "reforms," the structure remained intact. Interestingly, his de-Stalinisation programme further bureaucratised the KGB and the courts by means of several constraints in favour of greater "socialist legality." Thus the repressive apparatus was further subject to highly formalised rule systems demanding long delays. Perhaps for good reason one observer (Laird, 1970) terms the USSR a huge bureaucracy "completely carried through".

Finally, a reading of *samvydav* literature suggests that the real ideologues in the Soviet Union are the dissidents themselves. As the Manifesto of the Ukrainian Human Rights Movement of November 9, 1977, declared: (Verba and Yasen, 1980: 122)

In . . . the reign of . . . Stalin . . . the law was bureaucratised and alienated from the individual, from the people. This alienation has not been overcome to this day.

According to the dissidents, Soviet officials are bureaucratic careerists having lost their ideological elan and interested only in self-preservation. The Ukrainian Helsinki Group in its Memorandum No. 7 of March 15, 1977, however, announced as its mission the "defense of rights directed at correcting bureaucratic distortions and abuses" (*Ibid.*, 86, 126). It also announced: (*Ibid.*, 70)

All declarations . . . concerning human rights should not be viewed as the right of the bureaucrat to allow this or that, but as the right of man to turn the sword of law on the bureaucrats when one or another of them does not allow the legal assertion of the will of the subject.

The frustrations of dealing with an immovable bureaucracy have generated a significant counter-movement.

These considerations also shed light on the failure of the other models to explain crackdown on dissent adequately. The ideological vindictiveness perspective poorly serves the "end of ideology" (Bell, 1982) nature of the contemporary USSR. Rather, the "organisational man" (Whyte, 1957) of the Soviet Union stresses methods and short-term objectives rather than long-term utopian goals. His concern is more the immediate job at hand than the long-range fulfilment of ideological imperatives. The cybernetic roundup model likewise ignores the political nature of bureaucratic behaviour, failing to account for administrative inertia and heavy constraints. Bureaucracies cannot crack down completely and indiscriminantly on dissidents because of high administrative costs and small incremental payoffs. Finally, the Machiavellian decapitation model, which predicts a highly selective crackdown on dissent, fails to account for the heavy-handed and satisficing character of bureaucratic behaviour.

The authors should emphasise that certainly some — or perhaps even most — of Soviet regime decision-makers may be ideological, cybernetic, or Machiavellian in part or in full. Their argument, however, is that, when actual regime behaviour is considered, the bureaucratic imperative predominates in crackdowns.

Conclusion

Political regimes rarely sustain uniform pressures on dissidents. Rather, an ebb and flow of suppression characterises the regime-dissident dialectic. This study has shown that the demographic traits and repression characteristics of dissidents arrested in crackdown and noncrackdown periods in the Soviet Union are partly the same and partly different. The sex, urbanisation, age, class, charge severity, and sentence duration are different in the two periods. Three perspectives on regime crackdown against dissent fail to explain the pattern adequately.

Bureaucratic satisficing, however, almost perfectly accounts for the similarities and differences. By cracking down on the most visible and accessible

dissidents, bureaucratic normalcy is only minimally destabilised. Likewise the lower degree of repression helps maintain bureaucratic routines. While cracking down stabilises the immediate bureaucratic environment, the shape of the crackdown repression keeps the bureaucracy itself stable. Hence a satisfying policy is pursued which prevents serious organisational overload. Subsequently, in slack periods, less visible and accessible non-intellectuals outside the immediate environment of political control centres, can be ferreted out and repressed more strictly when organisational capabilities also have more slack.

Do all regimes cracking down on dissent behave like that of the USSR? Or perhaps do regimes with different structural characteristics follow the ideological, cybernetic, or Machiavellian models? Likewise, do the findings hold for violent revolutionary movements as well as the relatively peaceful movement known as the Human Rights campaign in the Soviet Union? These questions may hopefully be answered by future research in other contexts.

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APPENDIX

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Ustina MARKUS

US NUCLEAR TARGETING AND UKRAINE

(Part 2)

Armies themselves are harder to hit, especially if they are mobile and dispersed. For this reason it is probable that these will be left to US and NATO forces to deal with. If nuclear weapons were to be used on them it would be the small yield tactical nukes rather than the large intermediate range or strategic weapons which would take out a sizeable chunk of the landscape along with the enemy force. Armies would, however, be top targets since they rank in the "immediate crisis" category. One could expect armies, navies, and anti-satellite facilities to be the first to be hit, followed by the war supporting industries and other targets.

While populations themselves are no longer considered a target, they are still regarded as an industrial asset and may be targeted as such. In any case, should a vital industry be targeted, the chances that it is located within or very close to a population centre are so great that in that particular situation a population centre would undoubtedly be hit.

Lower on the current target list are factors which would affect the civilian population, such as agriculture. If, however, a target consisted of a combination of a certain amount of industry, agriculture, population, and was in a position through which armies would be passing, such an area would still be hit because of the combined benefits of hitting it.

The last targets are those which have no value whatsoever, but are simply space which is located in a position through which an invading force would have to pass in order to reach its objective. This target would simply be hit to prevent it from being used as an avenue of invasion.

Despite the disavowal of strikes against population centres, there are still certain factors that can make these a target even if no war supporting industry is located in the area and the area is not an avenue for invasion. One of these is the presence of nuclear reactors and storage sites in the vicinity because of the effects of hitting a nuclear reactor. Once a nuclear meltdown begins, the area it contaminates is uninhabitable and useless for decades. The area which is uninhabitable also expands with time. If a prolonged war seems imminent, such targets become increasingly desirable since they strip the enemy of the area's resources. As both the Soviets and the Americans are gearing their strategies more towards a prolonged conflict with the use of nuclear weapons such areas are increasingly likely to be targeted.

It is something of a contradiction that some long-term effects are desirable in the case of a prolonged conflict since most strategy is directed by immediate gains, with casualties counted in the immediate dead and wounded,

rather that the numbers that will succumb to the effects of nuclear fallout and radiation in the years to come. Reactors are, however, a target which is considered for its long-term gains, although they may also be hit for the immediate gains if their location gives them immediate importance. On the other hand, because of the long-term effects that accompany meltdowns, it is also possible that reactors would be avoided as targets unless the area absolutely had to be destroyed. The nuking of a reactor would create obstacles in negotiating a peace since the territory which had been hit would have to deal with the consequences for a century if a waste storage facility had been damaged.

The Soviet attitude towards the use of nuclear weapons differs in several ways from the American. In the first place, their different experiences in WW2 have left them with different views. Americans, with few losses, cannot abide the thought of any and have traditionally felt secure that a war with unacceptably high casualties would be avoided by both sides, so deterrence was an adequate policy for them¹¹. The Soviets, with extremely high losses during the course of the European wars, have taken human loss as a part of war which cannot be avoided and therefore must be accepted. A winning strategy is important for them and human loss an accepted fact. Their main concern is the damage inflicted upon their own forces and their future resources, since this is what will win the war for them. There appears to be little concern for civilians, either allied or enemy. Their strategy even calls for their soldiers to mingle with the suburban populations during manoeuvres for reason of protection.

The Soviet emphasis on the protection of their conventional forces is evidenced by their air defence and concealment capabilities. They put more effort into the concealment of their troops than does the US, and do so at the expense of the local populations. For this reason, should the US bomb a military unit, it would most likely also be bombing a town¹².

Soviet strategy is based on a two echelon system of armed forces. The task of the first echelon is to break through the conventional defences and barriers, while the second echelon follows backing up the first and consolidating its gains. If the US wanted to knock out the second echelon, it could only do so by using its Minutemen ICBMs. These warheads have accurate delivery systems (CEP of 220 metres for the MMIIIA, and a CEP of 315 metres for the MMIIIB) making them capable of hitting a limited area, and are of a relatively low yield (335KT and 170KT respectively)¹³. While these are still high yields (the bomb dropped on Hiroshima was 20KT), they are on the low scale of the tonnage carried by most nuclear weapons in the US arsenal. The other low tonnage bombs are 200KT and are carried by bombers, which means they would take a longer time in reaching their targets and, in the case of a lightning invasion, by the time they arrived on target the second echelon would have overwhelmed the area and bombing it would mean bombing Western Europe. They are also vulnerable to anti-aircraft fire and, therefore,

11. Lambeth, p. 138.

12. Collins, J.: *US — Soviet Military Balance, 1980-85*, p. 67.

13. *Encyclopedia of World Military Power*, p. 8-11.

cannot be regarded as being as reliable a delivery system as a missile. The only other small tonnage nuclear weapon is the 100KT bomb carried by the Trident submarine. Although this bomb has a CEP of 250 metres it has a higher rate of detonation failure, and would also take more time in reaching a target unless it were in close vicinity so it would not be used against a moving target.

The use of tactical nuclear weapons against the second echelon is precluded because of the short range of the weapons (most under 2,000 metres). Tactical nukes could be used on the first echelon, but then the problem is reversed. If the first echelon had advanced too close to one's forces, using a tactical nuclear weapon would endanger one's own troops, if by nothing else, then by the blinding of soldiers and the disruption of electronic equipment through the EMP (electro-magnetic pulse).

With these factors in mind as the principles which direct general American targeting strategy, Ukraine's position in such a conflict may be examined and some idea of what can be expected to happen to Ukraine, and why, may be deduced.

Because of the high rating of military targets it is likely that Ukraine would be bombed in an attempt to eradicate the armed forces stationed there. The armies in Ukraine would be hit sooner than those in the Asian part of the USSR simply because these could reach Western Europe in a shorter period of time and serve as reinforcements for the front echelons. With three MDs (military districts) in Ukraine there is a high concentration of armed forces in the area. These MDs also serve as C3 centres and are attractive targets for that reason as well.

The Kyiv MD, headquartered in Kyiv, has 15 divisions under its control (Soviet divisions are smaller than US, having only some 11,000 personnel per division as opposed to 15,000). There is also a tactical air army under Kyiv's control, and several ICBM (inter-continental ballistic missile) fields in the western, eastern and southern part of the MD. Bomber bases known to accommodate nuclear capable bombers are located in Donetsk, Kharkiv, Novopokrovka and Kyiv¹⁴.

The Kyiv MD is the most important military headquarters in Ukraine. It is the headquarters of the entire Western Strategic Theatre and is therefore the C3 of all the European USSR MDs. This theatre is subdivided into three continental theatres (TVDs), and two oceanic theatres (OTVDs). These are the Northwestern, Western, and Southwestern. The oceanic theatres are the Baltic and Black Sea. The only forces in the Soviet European area not under Kyiv's control are the Central Reserve forces under Moscow.

The Carpathian MD has its headquarters in Lviv. It has 14 divisions and a tactical air army. While there are no ICBM fields located in this district, it is adjacent to the Derzhyna fields of Kyiv, and its neighbour Byelorussia is covered in the IRBM (intermediate range ballistic missile) and MRBM (medium range ballistic missile) fields. The bomber base at Vynnytsia is located within the MD and known to hold 10 Bear B bombers each armed

14. *Military Balance*, p. 4. 42.

with a single one megaton bomb. Vynnytsia also serves as a headquarters for the tactical air and ground forces of the Southwestern TVD¹⁵.

The Odessa MD, headquartered in Odessa, has 10 divisions under its control and a tactical air army. The Pervomaysk ICBM fields spill over onto it from the Kyiv MD. These fields are located by the city of Kirovohrad. The district bomber base is at Kirov and houses 10 Backfires. These planes carry one bomb each with a one megaton yield¹⁶.

The fourth military base in Ukraine is the naval base of the Black Sea fleet. The fleet's headquarters are in Sevastopol with other naval bases at Odessa and Balaklava. This fleet includes the Caspian Flotilla and the Mediterranean Squadron. It commands 20 submarines, 80 major surface ships and some 200 minor ones. None of the submarines are armed with SLBMs (submarine launched ballistic missile)¹⁷.

The headquarters of any of these MDs are legitimate military targets, as are any bomber and naval bases. Although there do not appear to be any IRBM or MRBM fields in Ukraine two major ICBM fields, the Derzhyna and Pervomaysk fields, are situated there. The Derzhyna field holds 55 SS11M3s. These are single warhead missiles with a yield of 950KT. The Pervomaysk fields hold 140 SS19M1s. This is approximately half of the Soviet arsenal of this weapon. The SS19M1s hold 6 MIRVs (multiple independent re-entry vehicles) each and have a yield of 550KT per bomb. This field, then, holds some 840 warheads¹⁸. There aren't any SSBN (strategic submarine) bases with the Black Sea fleet, only bases for conventional naval forces.

The targeting of C3 centres poses a particular problem since the chain of command within the Soviet Union has always been somewhat cloudy. In the case of a war this chain would be even more difficult to discern since it is not known who, or which organisation, would be the one to wield authority. It is possible that the military may be given power over the civilian authorities. At the same time it is equally possible that, in the beginning at least, each administrative organ would retain its jurisdiction over its present responsibilities. Then again, there may be a rejuggling of responsibilities so that the different administrative organs end up having somewhat altered functions and therefore be a more, or less, important C3 centre. However administrative responsibility is delineated, the entities which end up controlling Ukraine and serving as the C3 to Moscow, are likely to be located in the same area as the previous leadership had been. This is because the administrative organs tend to be grouped together in their oblasts and rayons. As an example, the political and military leadership of the Kyiv oblast are both located in Kyiv. Whatever area constituted a C3 centre prior to hostilities, would probably still contain the leadership even if the leadership itself had changed.

In Ukraine the C3 centres would include all the cities with military headquarters. C3 targeting would also include all the other major cities simply because large urban areas have large political administrations making them

15. Ibid, p. 42-43.

16. Ibid, p. 43.

17. Ibid, p. 44.

18. Martel, p. 63.

C3 centres even if they are of no military value. Urban areas also hold industrial administrators, since cities are industrial producers, and, therefore, even small cities would be targeted if they were important producers, since this would mean their industrial C3 centre was important.

For political reasons, then, the capitals of each oblast would be a potential target. For economic reasons, any area which has an industrial output of any significance would be targeted as a C3 centre for its industrial leadership. Military centres are targeted for obvious reasons, and areas which are agriculturally vital, while not targeted per se, may be targeted because they would have an established administration.

Ukraine is subdivided into three economic regions which roughly correspond to the MDs. These are the south, southwest, and Donets-Dnieper. It is further subdivided into 25 oblasts.

As far as being an economic target, the area within Ukraine which is most significant is the Donbas (Donets Basin). This area has coal fields and lignite fields. There are also some coal fields located around Lviv. The Donbas, however, holds the most important coal fields in the Soviet Union¹⁹.

As an oil producer, Ukraine puts out just over 2% of the Soviet Union's oil, or around 11.6 million metric tons annually. It is much more significant as a producer of natural gas, coming second only after Russia with a production level of some 24% of Soviet gas (Russia produces 40%). There are several oil refineries located in Ukraine. These are in Lviv, Kyiv, Kremenchug, Odessa and Kherson. Ukraine is also the most important generator of electricity in the Soviet Union, producing 208 million kilowatt-hours (kWh) annually (the central economic district, Moscow, is the next largest producer of electricity with an annual output of about 115 kWh²⁰).

As far as mineral resources are concerned, Ukraine possesses deposits of salt, potash, phosphorite, graphite, iron, and manganese. A little under half of the Soviet pig iron and 37% of the Soviet Union's steel comes from Ukraine. Most of the iron and steel works are located in the Donbas, particularly around Donetsk and Makiyivka. This is due to the coal deposits there²¹.

Because of the mineral deposits in the Donbas, and the resultant industrialisation of the area, it is one of the areas in which heavy engineering is best developed. Agricultural engineering is also highly developed here because of Ukraine's role as a major agricultural producing country²².

Other industries which exist in Ukraine are sawmills in Dnipropetrovsk and textiles. Consumer goods industries are not, however, well represented. Ukraine, especially the eastern part, is predominantly an area of heavy industry, being particularly important in mining, metallurgy, heavy engineering, and to a lesser extent in chemicals²³.

When considering strategic targeting transportation networks are key elements. Although rails emanate from Moscow, Ukraine has the closest network.

19. Dewdney, J.: *A Geography of the Soviet Union*, p. 92.

20. Ibid, p. 98-99, 104.

21. Ibid, p. 106.

22. Ibid, p. 68.

23. Ibid, p. 110-12.

The Donbas in particular is criss-crossed because of its industrial importance. Canals and rivers still play a significant role in transport in the USSR, although to a lesser degree since many freeze up during the winter. The Don and the Dnieper are the main waterways in Ukraine. These are linked to other rivers by canals²⁴.

Agriculturally, Ukraine is the most sown country in the Soviet Union. In the whole Union only 9.8% of the land is sown. About 56% of Ukraine is sown, the largest area for any single Soviet republic. Half of the sown land grows fodder and sown grasses. The next largest crop is cereals. These take up a little over a quarter of the area sown. Technical crops follow, being sown in over an eighth of the fields, and a little less than an eighth grow vegetables²⁵.

Another factor which will be considered in assessing Ukraine's position in nuclear targeting is the population density. Approximately 260 million people live in the USSR. The average density is 11.6 persons per square kilometre. The average population density in Ukraine is 83.6 persons per sq km. The Donetsk oblast has a particularly high density with 193 persons per sq km. The only area in the Soviet Union with a higher density is the Moscow region with 292 per sq km. The Tashkent-Fergana Basin is the only other area with a density over 160 per sq km. The area of Moldavia and Ukraine is, as a whole, the largest high-density zone²⁶.

There are five cities in Ukraine with populations over one million. These are, in order of population: Kyiv, Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Odessa, and Donetsk. A further 43 have populations over 100,000²⁷. Under the current US SIOF all these are potential targets.

Ukraine's proximity to the borders of the NATO countries and her extensive railway routes and roads, all make it an avenue through which Soviet troops could pass with ease and speed. There are few natural obstacles to obstruct a quick advance since the country is largely steppe. The only areas which are more difficult for an army to pass through because of natural obstructions would be the Carpathians and the Crimean mountains. The Crimean ones do not lie on a route that would be crossed in the course of transporting troops to the border. Roads and rails have been built through the Carpathians, so in reality there are no obstacles which would hinder any large unit from getting through the country speedily.

(To be continued)

24. Ibid, p. 128-31.

25. Ibid, p. 69.

26. Ibid, p. 149-53.

27. *Ukrainian Encyclopedia Atlas*, p. 6.

Volodymyr SLEZ

PRINCE VOLODYMYR MONOMAKH AND HIS “POUCHENNIA DITIAM”

Volodymyr Monomakh's "Pouchennia ditiām" (1100-25), a landmark in Medieval Ukrainian literature, was written according to the popular Byzantine genre of precepts for children. His grandfather Yaroslav the Wise had himself written a perceptive work for this children.

The "Pouchennia" combines religious and secular themes. Monomakh was not a theologian although he quotes from the Psalms and the Book of Isaiah. The work contains a certain amount of religious moralising.

The advice which he gives his children is practical in essence and stems from Christian charity. At the same time it reflects wisdom and foresight.

Monomakh considers three aspects of God. God the just ruler of heaven and earth who punishes the evil and protects the righteous. Monomakh warns his sons to avoid evil and concentrate on doing good. In return they will receive God's blessing and eternal life: "uklonysia ot zla, stvory dobro, vzyshchy myra i pozheny i zhyvy v viky vika" (these words are taken from Psalm 36). God the merciful father who forgives the repentant sinner. Monomakh uses his own words to describe this notion. God has given man three ways of saving his soul: repentance, tears and good deeds. These are preferable to asceticism although some of the advice given leans in that direction. He stresses the need for prayer. Monomakh praises God the good the wise creator of the universe. Here the language is poetic.

The secular advice to his sons is Christian in spirit. He bids them help the poor and warns them against pride which can cause violence and bloodshed. He advocated respect for elders and the clergy, moderation in eating and drinking and stresses the importance of spiritual strength as opposed to over-indulgence in earthly pleasures.

As princes his sons should lead frugal lives, work hard and concentrate on self-discipline. Sloth was to be avoided during peacetime and especially in war. They should look after the poor and protect their subjects from despotism. Monomakh was opposed to capital punishment.

He warns his sons not to swear oaths unless they are sure they can keep their pledge. He stresses the need for learning. Monomakh's father Vsevolod could speak five languages.

An autobiography of Volodymyr Monomakh which may or may not be part of the "Pouchennia" is incorporated in the work. It tells of his military

campaigns, eighty in all, which took him as far as Glogau in Czechoslovakia. Hunting exploits are used to illustrate the teachings on self-discipline. Monomakh was gored by a bison and attacked by many other beasts. He once caught two wild horses with his bare hands. This is probably an exaggeration.

Monomakh does not boast. It is thanks to God that he was able to accomplish his labours.

It emerges from the "Pouchennia" that Monomakh was a religious man and a wise ruler, aware of the problems of government and the qualities needed for it. This appears to have been borne out by history.

He must have been a popular monarch in his time for his sons Mstyslav to have assumed the Kyivan throne unopposed.

According to the evidence of the Chronicle, notwithstanding its tendency to idealise and inaccuracies, Volodymyr Monomakh was a good soldier and capable ruler who could show humanity.

His father ruled in Kyiv after the death of Iziaslav and sent Monomakh as viceroy to Chernihiv. This caused Oleh, son of Sviatoslav and Monomakh's uncle, to march against Chernihiv to claim the city which was his by right of seniority. Monomakh showing restraint and respect in this crisis moved to Pereyaslav. When urged by his fellow princes to march against Oleh and the Rostyslavychi and capture their land, he refused. This would have meant breaking his princely oath of allegiance.

Once again he was to show restraint as well as constructive statesmanship.

On hearing that his son Davyd had been killed by Oleh of Chernihiv, he wrote to Oleh beseeching him to end hostilities and reach some sort of mutual understanding. Monomakh's goal appears to have been peace not revenge. The country had enough troubles.

In 1097 he took part in the inter-princely conference at Lubech which aimed to strengthen the unity of Rus'-Ukraine. Although the conference did not abrogate the principle of seniority, the special patrimony rights of each princely branch were now recognised. Thus Sviatopolk, son of Iziaslav, ruled in Kyiv, Monomakh ruled in Pereyaslav, Oleh, Davyd and Yaroslav in Chernihiv.

The new found unity was soon in jeopardy and Monomakh's moral fibre was once more put to the test.

Davyd of Volyn, suspecting that Vasylko of Galicia was planning to take over his domain, visited Sviatopolk in Kyiv. He informed him that Vasylko and Monomakh were plotting against Sviatopolk himself. Believing this Sviatopolk taking the law into his own hands, invited Vasylko to Kyiv and treacherously had him blinded.

After being informed of this, Monomakh and the Sviatoslavychi met to deliberate. By acting without first consulting his fellow princes Sviatopolk had contravened the Lubech Agreement. When reminded of this he tried to shift the blame to Davyd of Volyn. Monomakh decided to march against Kyiv to

punish Svia polk. Dismayed the Kyivans sent the Metropolitan and Monomakh's mother-in-law to dissuade him. He was left with a dilemma: should he allow the breach of the Lubech Agreement and the blinding of Vasylko to go unpunished or start a war that Ukraine could do without. He and the Sviatoslavychi were persuaded to withdraw but they ordered Sviatopolk to punish Davyd.

Sviatopolk, Monomakh and Davyd joined forces against the Polovtsi to halt their constant incursions on Ukrainian land. Penetrating deep into Polovtsian territory they won a resounding victory at the Salnytsia river in 1111. This removed the Polovtsian threat for some years. At the same time Monomakh's popularity increased. It was to bring him the throne of Kyiv.

The Polovtsian raids had ravaged the country's economy. There had been a drastic fall in population. Most of the survivors in the areas affected faced ruin as a result of the constant pillaging of their property. They were forced to borrow money from the wealthy Kyivans at high rates of interest. Those unable to repay their debts in money did so by working for their creditor on the creditor's terms. It became a source of cheap labour and many such workers even became slaves.

The Polovtsian raids cut the trade routes on the Dnieper. Economic problems were compounded by Sviatopolk's speculation in the salt market and the resulting high prices. After his death in 1113 the lower classes of Kyiv rioted against his administrators and financial advisers. They intended to confiscate the wealth from the rich.

Though full of misgivings Monomakh was persuaded eventually to come to Kyiv as ruler. Corruption amongst officials was probably rife. On his arrival he replaced the chiliarch of Kyiv by a man whom he could trust. He then summoned a conference of the highest officials to revise legislation on loans and indentured labour. The poor and unfortunate were to be protected from exploitation. The conference resolved to prevent short-term loan abuse. Limits were set on interest from long-term loans. Where a 50% per annum rate of interest had been negotiated, it would now be paid for a maximum of two years only. New legislation was introduced to limit the lord's power over indentured labourers who could no longer be forced to do work for which they were not suited. Enslavement was forbidden. Self-selling into slavery was subject to certain formalities to ensure against fraud.

Monomakh had shown concern for the poor before. At a princely conference in 1103 the Ukrainian princes were considering a campaign against the Polovtsi in the spring of that year. If they set out then the smerdy, the backbone of the lower classes in the rural estates who were required by law to provide horses for the city militias in time of war, might be ruined since their animals could not then be used for ploughing. Consequently, the country's economy would suffer. Monomakh reminded all that the smerd was a human being as well as an economic link:

"I am surprised comrades that you concern yourselves for horses with which the smerd ploughs. Why do you not bear in mind that as soon as the smerd begins his ploughing, the Polovtsi will come, shoot him down with their bolts, seize his horse, ride on into his farm and carry off his wife, his children and his property? Are you concerned for the horse and not for the smerd himself?"

Nevertheless, humane and wise though he could be, Monomakh could still say with relish of the storming of Minsk in which he took part, that when the city was taken it was burnt to the ground and the people and cattle slaughtered: "izikhakhom horod i ne ostavykhom u neho ni chelyadyna, ni skotyn". Perhaps where military campaigns were concerned different rules applied?

Monomakh's concern for the poorer classes was tempered by a healthy and practical respect for the wealthy and in particular the powerful boyars. After all, military campaigns had to be financed somehow. The country's security and well being rested largely on a healthy economy.

On the evidence of the "Pouchennia" Volodymyr emerges a religious man. As a prince and statesman he contended with flesh and blood reality. The practical teachings of the scriptures were an inspiration to him. They were enriched by experience. The distilled wisdom resulting from this is presented in the work by an effective combination of religious and secular themes.

"Pouchennia ditiam" is a fitting epitaph to a wise, human and practical ruler.

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Dr. John P. PAULS

RELIGIOUS BELIEFS OF POLISSIAN PEASANTS

For the thousandth anniversary of Ukrainian Christianity

(Part 1)

The year 1988 was celebrated throughout the world by the Eastern Slavs (Byelorussians, Russians and Ukrainians) as the thousandth anniversary of their acceptance of the Christian faith from the culturally flourishing Eastern Roman Empire — Byzantium. The Grand Prince of Kyivan Rus' (the name of Ukraine at that time) Volodymyr the Great (980-1015), ordered the inhabitants of his capital, Kyiv, to be christianised in the Dnieper River on August 1 (old style), 988. From Kyiv, Christianity later spread in all directions of his extensive state. However, this did not occur at once, although this was the wish and order of the mighty Grand Prince¹.

The late Ukrainian Metropolitan Ilarion stated in his book: "Under Grand Prince Volodymyr, mainly the élite (the ruling class) were christianized: his military guards, boyars (nobility), tax collectors, and possibly merchants. The common people did not easily abandon their ancient beliefs and had long regarded the new faith as the nobility faith"². Even later, after they had embraced Christianity, the peasants often kept their pagan customs and rites, especially those pertaining to farming and husbandry, the two most important sources of their livelihood. In conservative Polissia, my native region, some illiterate villagers practiced religious dualism, "a very strange blend of Christian and heathen ideas"³, until the outbreak of World War II, in 1939, when I left my parents' home and could no longer observe local events, especially after the imposition of Marxist atheism by Stalin.

The ancient Slavs, like all other pagan people (Latin *paganus* 'rural, a villager' from *pagus* 'village'), lived in close connection with nature, struggling with difficulty to exist despite many adversities. The primitive work conditions were extremely harsh and dangerous. Survival in the severe climate and rough terrain of the Prypiat, Dnieper and Desna region was difficult. In the dense forests, flooded marshes and sandy dunes, there were many wild beasts, hostile tribes and often intruding hordes of Gothic and Asiatic nomads. A mood of insecurity penetrated the souls of the natives with the

1. M. Hrushevsky, *A History of Ukraine*, (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1941), pp. 65-71; V. Mykula, "The Christianisation of Rus'-Ukraine, *Ukr. Review*, No. 4 (London: 1988), pp. 9, 10; G. Vernadsky, *Kievan Russia*, (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1948), pp. 60-70.

2. Metropolitan Ilarion (Ohiyenko), *Pre-Christian Beliefs of Ukrainian People*, Volyniana XIV, 2nd print., (Winnipeg: R.I.V. Publ., 1981), p. 314.

3. B. Pares, *A History of Russia*, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949), p. 30.

imagination of evil spirits and adverse natural forces which perhaps could be averted by some act of magic. Although the daily existence of the ancient Polissians was not as harsh as that of the arctic Eskimos, their fear of unknown forces in Tokarev's description was comparable. An Eskimo elder said: "We are afraid. . . We are afraid of bad weather with which we have to struggle, securing food from the earth and the sea. We are afraid of want and starving in a cold, snowy igloo. We are afraid of sickness which we see around us every day. We are not afraid of death but of suffering. We are afraid of dead people and the souls of animals, killed by us during the hunt. We are afraid of ghosts on earth and in the air. We do not know exactly why. . . but we follow our customs and taboos — so we can survive" ⁴.

It seems that fear of the known and unknown was the basic reason for the existence of most ancient beliefs, cults, acts of magic, and fortune telling. With the practice of magic, man tried to secure a peaceful existence⁵. However, fear was not always of a negative nature nor did it always have pagan meaning. For instance, the educational philosophy of my Polissian mother was "*vshchypýty strákh bózhyy v dúshu dytýny* ('to plant the fear of God in the child's soul') — so the child would not commit evil deeds either in childhood or later on as an adult, and so he would be afraid of hell, the police and Stalin." My long life has confirmed the validity of her simple philosophy, but ironically she and the rest of my family became victims of the local communists and Stalin's terror⁶.

It is worth mentioning here the view of Metropolitan Ilarion on dualism in the beliefs of our ancestors. They observed in this world the constant struggle between good and evil, as in changes in nature, day to night, summer to winter, warm to cold, and the worst change of all — life to death⁷. He thinks, however, it was not an original Slavic belief, but that some Christian sects had spread it. The coexistence of pagan and Christian ideas supported it, including, for instance, the substitution of the idol of Perun (the god of thunder) with the angry Hebrew prophet Elias whose celebration in the Orthodox Church is on July 20, the most stormy, thunderous time in Polissia. There St. Elias was commonly known as "the igniter of rye stacks" and was greatly feared by the Slavic people.

Interesting also are the Metropolitan's observations about our glorious liter-

4. S. A. Tokarev, *Religiia v istorii narodov mira*, 2nd ed., (Moscow: Izd. polit. lit., 1965), p. 132.

5. K. Moszyński, *Kultura ludowa Słowian*, Vol II, Part 1, 2nd ed. (Warsaw: Wiedza, 1967), pp. 233, 244, 430-450.

6. When Hitler and Stalin divided Poland in 1939, my parents were taken to Siberia by the Soviets and died there. The village council member, Darka Korenko, had confiscated my parents' large, new house and used it for a school. In total, twelve members of my family were sent to Siberia. Ironically, three of the young men later volunteered for the Polish army of General W. Anders and two of them (Basil and Eugene) were killed storming the German fortification at Monte Casino (Italy). Other than that, no one member of my family was ever arrested. The reason, I assume, is because my mother had instilled the "fear of God" in all of us.

7. Ilarion, *op. cit.*, p. 90.

ary monument, the *Tale of the Host of Ihor*, written about 1187 by an anonymous Christian warrior, (Kychak thinks it was a participant of Ihor's campaign, the young Prince of Rylsk, Sviatoslav Olehovych)⁸, describing in a remarkable style, the catastrophic raid of 1185 against the pagan Turkish tribe, the Polovtsi (Cumans) by the Prince of Novhorod-Siverskyi, Ihor Sviatoslavych. The epic tells us how a personified nature weeps for the unfortunate crusaders: "the grass bends with pity and the tree bows to the earth for grief. . . and the heathens from all sides come victorious into the land of Rus'"⁹. It is interesting that for a Christian author, the pre-Christian gods, such as Dazhboh, Veles, etc., are not demons or idols, but are our ancestors, and they were not derided by him even once¹⁰. Whether this is merely a stylistic device or a lingering loyalty to his old culture, is difficult to say. It appears that two hundred years after the acceptance of Christianity, the so-called "élite" still respected their old pagan gods.

Originally, the Slavic pagan religion was merely a cult of nature, without liturgy, clergy or temples. The head of a clan or family simply made pronouncements or offered sacrifices under a tree or in the forest. Their most well-known gods were *Svaroh* (Sanskrit *swar* 'shine, heaven, sun') — god of heaven and his son *Svarozhych* — god of sun and fire. The god of sun and happiness was, in different localities, also known as *Dazhboh* (Old Slav. *dazhd* 'give' and *bog* from Ind. *bhagas* 'happiness, prosperity'). Among the Eastern Slavs, the sun was extensively worshipped as the promoter and source of life and happiness and our people took their oaths primarily on the sun. Much feared was the god of thunder and lightning, *Perun*, (Lith. *Perkūnas*, parallel to Nordic *Tora* from Gr. *peraunós* 'thunderbolt'). In Kyivan Rus' *Perun* was later substituted by St. Elias. *Stryboh* (possibly from Ukr. *strybaty* 'to jump') — god of wind and *Veles* or *Volos*, called "*skotiy bog*" — 'god of cattle, livestock' later also — 'god of riches' in old Slavic, was also known. The etymology is uncertain and the explanation from Lith. *veles* 'souls of the deceased' is doubtful¹¹.

The lesser pagan god is also mentioned by the sagacious author of the *Tale of the Host of Ihor*, in reference to the legendary bard, Boyan, by calling him "prophetic Boyan, the grandson of Veles." However, most important for our theme are the poetical laments of Ihor's wife, Yaroslavna, reproaching her gods, the sun and wind for helping the Polovtsi to destroy her husband's regiment:

*Svietloie i tresvietloie solnce!
Vsem teplo i krasno iesi:*

8. I. Kychak, "Who is the author of the 'Tale of Ihor's Host'?" *Ukr. Review* No. 2 (London: Ukr. Assoc., 1988), pp. 36-39.

9. Pares, *op. cit.*, p. 41, 51.

10. Ilarion, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

11. Z. Stieber, "*Religia pogańska Słowian*", *Słownik star. słowiańskich*, Vol. IV, (Warsaw: PAN, 1972), pp. 486-489.

*chemu hospodyne prostre horiachuiu
svoiu luchi na ladie voi? . . .*¹².

In Yaroslavna's perception, nature was conspiring against her husband's warriors. It was the strong wind, supporting his enemies' arrows, the unusual heat of the sun which exhausted their bodies in the waterless steppes. . . Then she beseeches the mighty Dnieper-Slavutych River to bring her Prince to her, so she would not have to pour her bitter tears into the sea early in the morning. . .¹³. To this day, some women in Polissia similarly bemoan the death of their children, parents or husband by begging the Mother of God and the bright, warm sun to embrace the soul of the deceased in the cold realm beyond the grave¹⁴.

Now, let us look closer at the beliefs and rites of the peasants of Polissia, who have always been emotionally bound to their land. From time immemorial, all of their magic spells and ritual songs were intended to protect the health of their people and livestock, as well as to insure a good harvest in the field. A rich supper is prepared for Christmas and a small portion of it was originally left for good spirits to gain their support for the next year¹⁵. Christianity today is somewhat similar in Polissia in its use of the cross, prayer, candle and blessed water. Now, of course, there are no pagan holidays but only Christian holidays, which are skilfully adjusted and blended to meet the needs of the farmer's life and to reflect his historic past. As Tokarev correctly writes: " 'Pre-Christian' elements are still distinctly apparent in almost all customs, rituals and beliefs connected with church holidays: this includes various omens and forecasts of the weather and the harvest, as well as of changes in family life: marriage, birth of children, death, etc.; also ritual meals, various prohibitions; games; dances; entertainment; the visiting of neighbours with songs and good wishes; mummary, masked festivals, ritual fire; the custom of gift exchange; connection with the cult of the dead; beliefs about evil spirits, witches, etc. These diverse customs turn out to be exceedingly similar among various European peoples. But they are differently distributed among the days of the church calendar and are timed to coincide with a particular saint's day, Christmas or, alternatively, the New Year" ¹⁶.

Pre-Christian Yuletide began everywhere with the winter solstice, as the Romans called it, "*Dies natalis solis*," which followed their joyful holidays, the so-called *Saturnalia* (from December 17 to December 23), during which the god Saturn, the patron of bountiful harvests in field and garden, is worshipped. Metropolitan Ilarion says this was first accepted by the Danube Slavs

12. D. S. Likhachev, "*Slovo o polku Igoreve*": *Istoriko — lit. ocherk*, (Moscow: Prosv., 1982), pp. 127-140.

13. *Ibid.*, pp. 110-112.

14. I. Sydoruk, "*Poliski pisni*", in *Festschrift for R. Smal-Stocki, ShSS Memoirs*, Vol. 177, (New York: NTSh, 1963), pp. 217-227.

15. A. Belov, *Rozhdestvo Khristovo*, (Moscow: 1975), p. 36.

16. S. E. Tokarev, *Kalendarnye obychai i obriady v stranakh zarub. Evropy, XIX-XX v.* (Moscow: "Nauka", 1973, p. 342.

from the Romans and spread to the Eastern Slavs along the Dnieper River¹⁷. Our ancestors, before the beginning of the new agricultural year, tried to influence good spirits by offering gifts and performing magical rites to assure a successful year for the people, the cattle and the harvest. In Polissia, the first day of the winter holidays (December 24) is called *koliada* (from Latin *calendae* 'first day of the month') and is celebrated with agricultural ritual activities, which is described in Metropolitan Ilarion's book.

Here my descriptions will be limited to the most important events, as distinguished from everyday happenings in Ukraine and our attention will be focused on greetings, carols and proverbs, which combine pre-Christian and Christian elements.

Originally, the pagan *Koliada* 'Yuletide' lasted two weeks. Now the Christmas holidays similarly last from Christmas Eve (December 24) to Epiphany, January 6 (the baptism of Jesus Christ in the Jordan River by John the Baptist). During that time, the Ukrainian Orthodox clergy performs one of the most solemn acts for Polissians, "blessing the water," which is treasured by the faithful as a protection against everything evil: the devil, sickness, lightning, etc.

On Christmas Eve, when the first star appears, the father of the family (he had the status of a priest in pagan society) comes into the house holding a sheaf of rye (called *koliada* there, but *didukh* 'grandfather' in Volhyn)¹⁸ and some hay under his arm and solemnly pronounces: "I greet you with *koliada* and with the holy Nativity. God grant us that we may spend these holidays in good health and prosperity and meet the next ones with all of us alive and happy. God bless our family, our livestock, our house"¹⁹.

The mother who was waiting for him with bread, would answer, "*Oi dai Bozhe!*" 'Oh God, give us!'

In some villages of Polissia, for instance Zapрудy (18 km. northeast of Kobryn), I heard the answer "*Oi dazh Bozhe!*" which is now understood as 'Oh God, give us!' But in pre-Christian times *Dazhboh* or the older form *Dazhd'boh* was the pagan 'god of prosperity'. This example from neighbouring Volyn is even clearer:

*Oi Dazhd'bozhe u poli vrozhaينو,
Na toku buino, v pasitsi — riino! . . .*²⁰.

which means 'Oh God, give us good crops in the field, on the threshold floor, plenty, in the bee hives — buzzing'. . . The same author also quotes a

17. Ilarion, *op. cit.*, p. 271.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 273.

19. I. Sydoruk, *Zur Laut-und Formenlehre der ukrainischen Mundart von Novosilky bei Kobryn*. . . , mit Texten, (Wien: 1945). Original texts from Polissia are taken from this dissertation (written under Prof. Ferd. Liewehr) and will be further quoted without footnotes.

20. S. Kylymnyk, *Calendar Year in Ukrainian Folklore*, Vol. I, Volyn No. 3, (Winnipeg: Trident Press, 1955), pp. 48, 49.

beautiful Volynian response to the Christmas greetings of grandchildren from their grandparents:

*Khai zvelychyt vas sviate Sontse,
Osiaiut iasni zori.
Bud'te bahati, iak zemlia,
Zdorovi, iak voda.
Myli, iak misiats. . . Slavite Khrysta!*²¹

This is a clear example of religious dualism: the old faith and the new faith. The grandparents implore the old gods to repay their grandchildren's kindness: "May the holy Sun glorify you, the bright stars shine on you. Be rich as the earth, healthy as the water, kind as the moon. Glorify Christ!"

But let us return to Polissia. . . Father puts his *koliada* in the eastern corner (Christianity came from the East) under the holy icons, decorated with pine branches, and hay is laid on the table (in memory of Christ, born on a bed of hay). Mother puts garlic in the hay (to repel evil spirits), covers it with a white tablecloth and puts a candle on top of it. The whole family kneels and solemnly recites the "Lord's Prayer" in unison three times. When they say "*Khlib nash nasushchnyi dazhd' nam dnes*" ('Give us this day our daily bread'), all the family members bow at the same time, touching the floor with their foreheads. After that mother brings two bowls of *kuttia* (Old Church Slav. *kuciia*, Byeloruss. *kucia*, Russ. *ku't'ia*, Ukr. *kutia* from Gr.* *koukkia* 'beans'), a ceremonial barley porridge with honey and poppy seeds. She puts the larger bowl on the table and the smaller one in the corner before the *koliada* for the good spirits and the souls of deceased relatives. The children take their places behind the table and then the mother and the oldest child bring in twelve lenten dishes. Now the father takes the smaller bowl of *kuttia*, goes into the hall and asks: "Holy Sun, bright stars, sad moon, rich rains, come to us to eat *kuttia*." Then he asks deceased relatives to eat *kuttia*. . . After that the family begins to eat the "holy supper" solemnly, silently and slowly because these are "God's gifts" and all must be as silent as during mass.

In some villages of Northern Polissia, the mistress of the house also calls upon the frost, storm and wolves to eat *kuttia*. But, obviously, there is no answer. Then followed the curse: "If you do not come now, do not come to us all year. *Shchob my vas vydom ne vydaly!*" ('So that we will never have to face you!'). This is the magic curse which is supposed to protect a household for a whole year.

After the ritual supper, the father takes some *kuttia* mixed with bran and some holy water and goes to the cattle shed to bless the livestock with ceremonial *kuttia* sprinkled with holy water. This is supposed to protect them from wolves and witches. When a cow gives little milk, there exists the super-

21. *Ibid.*, p. 42.

* Spelled with double "t" in Polissia.

stition that a witch has stolen her milk. The small bird, *lelyk* (Lat. 'Caprimulgus europaeus', Russ. 'kozodoi' Eng. 'nightjar, goatsucker'), which catches flies on the cattle in summer, is suspected by the peasants of being a witch in disguise, sucking milk, and therefore was mercilessly killed. Perhaps the Marxists enlightened the people and put a stop to such senseless cruelty.

Another superstition is the belief that cattle talk in human voices on Christmas Eve. (A gift from God given for warming the baby Jesus in the crib at Bethlehem). There was a persistent rumour that in a neighbouring village, Zavirye, a cruel midget peasant Arkadko Honcharuk went to listen to his mistreated cattle to see what they thought of him. Two neighbourhood urchins hid behind a shed and told him that for his cruelty, he would die soon. Poor Arkadko indeed died on the first day of Christmas (probably from a heart attack) and his neighbours were sure he had heard his "cattle's verdict" because he was so cruel and so inquisitive.

On Christmas Eve, there was much fortune-telling by drawing stems of grass from under the tablecloth (the longest, signifying a long life), and imitating of animal noises (the children loved that). God or fate would richly multiply those good animals. The Orthodox Church forbade the ancient "idol worshipping rituals", especially in puritan Russia proper. In 1674 Kyivan Archimandrite, Inokentiy Gizel, wrote: "*Toho bisa Koliady i doseli ne perestaiut obnovliaty, nachenshe ot samoho Rozhdestva Khristova, po vsia Sviatyya dni. . .*" which means: 'Until the present, people have not forgotten the demon Koliada, at Christmas and throughout all the holy days!²² But Ukrainian villagers persistently continue to worship the newly born Christ. For the youth, it is romantic to hear the bells at night and to listen to the harmonious Orthodox chorus singing beautiful religious hymns and at the end — melodious Ukrainian carols, such as: "*Na nebi zirka iasno zasiala. . . Khrystos rodyvsia, slavite! . . .*" ('In heaven a bright star has begun to shine. . . Christ is born, glorify Him! . . .') The religious carols are hauntingly beautiful in their worship of Jesus Christ and holy Mary. There is no dualism in them. . . The secular carols are simpler, almost always mentioning the bright, dear Sun" — thus they do contain dualism:

*Ochyshehaite khatu, zastylaite mosty,
Bo vzhe idut' do nas try vylyky hosty:
Oi, pershyi hüst' — iasne Sonychko,
Iasne Sonychko — Sam Isus Khrystos.
A druhyi hüst — iasna züron'ka,**
Iasna züron'ka — Bohorodytsi.
A tretii hüst — to krasnyi misiats,
Toi krasnyi misiats — to sviatyi Yuriy.*

Christian dualism is again apparent here and the pagan gods: the sun, moon,

22. Ilarion, *op. cit.*, p. 277.

** In the Polissian dialect *i* (from Old Slav. *e, o*) is pronounced as Germ. *ü*.

stars, only added more glory and enhancement to the Christian saints: Jesus Christ, the Mother of God and St. Yuriy (St. George) — the patron of agriculture and husbandry and the most worshipped saint in spring. Carolling begins on Christmas Eve and lasts until Epiphany. This is mostly the glorification of the newly born baby Jesus but also includes good wishes to the master of the household: happiness, health, good harvests and prosperity (if gifts are given to the carollers).

*Oi v stiïi khaty ie shoho daty
Sam Būh khodyt', zhyto rodyt'.
Rodyt' zhyto i pshynytsiu,
Shchei usiakuiu pashnytsiu. . .*

A specialist of Volynian folklore, Kylymnyk, recorded an ancient and unique carol in which Jesus Christ helps farmers cultivate their soil. He thinks it contains the idea of the pagan god of harvest which later became Christ:

*Oi u poli pluzhok ore,
(Refrain:) Slaven Ty ye, slaven yesy,
Slavne Sonechko na nebesy!
Za tym pluzhkom Hospod' khodyt'. . . (Refrain)
Sviatyi Petro pohaniaie. . . (Refrain)
Bozha maty isty nosyt', (Refrain)
Isty nosyt', Boha prosyt'. . . (Refrain)
"Ory, Synku, tsiuuu nyvku
Ta i posiyemo pshenychku. . ." (Refrain)²³*

I first heard this carol in Polissia, in the village of Lushchyky, north of Kobryn. The Ukrainian Orthodox Church celebrates Christmas for three days; the time is spent visiting relatives, participating in festivities and eating rich food (ham, *pyrohy* and sausage are the main dishes). The children take part in carolling, cheerfully carrying a large star and spreading good wishes until Epiphany.

As the Romans finished their *Saturnalia* festivities with prayers for a happy New Year, so did their neighbours, the Danube Slavs²⁴. The evening before the New Year is called *shchedryi vechir* ('generous, rich eve') because of the rich meal where the finest ham and sausage are served. The villagers give generously to the carolling boys, who wish the people prosperity. In Polissia, the evening is called *shchodrukha*, in the rest of Ukraine, "*Malanka*", because of the celebration of the Roman St. Melaniya, the patron saint of that evening. This is one of the most cheerful holidays. At midnight people wash their hands with golden or silver coins (for good luck) and drink to success. The more religious go to church to listen to a "thanksgiving" service for the past year and also solemnly pray for a successful future, to give them

23. Kylymnyk, *op. cit.*, p. 44.

24. Ilarion, *op. cit.*, p. 278.

"*mnohaia lita*" ('many prosperous years'). The old people believed that whatever you do on the New Year, you would be doing the whole next year. They were restrained and especially did not argue.

In the morning, the father would take a little seed of rye in his pocket and sow it in the field, while saying: "I beseech you, oh Lord, to grow a lavish crop next year and give us health and happiness." If it was said at a lucky moment, things were supposed to happen 'according to your words'.

The carolling boys would sing on New Year, not the *koliada* songs but the so-called *shchedrivky* ('joyful carols') which are predominantly expressions of good wishes and compliments. The melody of one *shchedrivka* is very popular in America, as the beautiful "Carol of the Bells." The text of it in Ukrainian is about a "*lastivka*" 'swallow' — a herald of the sun, spring and a dynamic life. The song says the bird flies up to the window and tells the master he will have a prosperous year — many calves, lambs, etc.

The carolling boys know well that only the mistress of the house can give them generous gifts. They sing (according to Kylymnyk):

*Oi Dazhd'bozhe. . .
Na posteli riadna, hospodynia ladna.
Bud'te zdorovi na Novyi Rik,
Shchob vodylos' vam krashche, yak toy rik. . .*²⁵

In English it means: 'May God give you a good life. . . The beds are covered, this mistress is pretty. Be healthy in the New Year, may you be happier than last year'. Another New Year carol describes the mistress in even more romantic words:

*Po dvoru khodyt' — yak sontse skhodyt',
A v khatu vviyde — yak zoria ziyde. . .*²⁶

The lady of the house 'When she walks in the yard looks like the rising sun and when she enters the house, she looks like a rising star. . .'. The carollers remember Ukraine in their songs too:

*Hlan' okom mylym, o Bozhyi Synu,
Na nashu zemliu, na Ukrainu. . .
Zoshly ii z neba dar pryvelykyi,
Narodu voliu vo vichni viky. . .*²⁷

The carollers sing: 'Oh, Son of God, look upon our land Ukraine with kind eyes. . . Send her from heaven the greatest of all gifts, freedom for the people for eternity.'

On the eve of Epiphany (January 5) also called Jordan festivity, but in

25. Kylymnyk, *op. cit.*, p. 83.

26. *Ibid.*, p. 84.

27. *Ibid.*, p. 111.

Polissia known as *Vodokhryshcha* 'blessing of the water' (to commemorate the baptism of Jesus Christ in the Jordan River) people celebrate a lenten supper called "meager *koliada*", because it is not very elaborate. The young girls attempt to read their fortunes by pouring hot wax into the water, etc. In some villages, a few believe that at midnight the water in the rivers change into wine for a short time. On the day of Epiphany (January 6) water is blessed in the well next to the church (or in the river, if there is one). People eagerly take water home in containers and bless the door of every building to protect the entrance from devils. They preserve that water, as a healing source, until the next Jordan festivity the following year. The sheaf of *koliada* is given to the cattle to protect it from witches and wolves. A little corn from the sheaf is saved to start the spring sowing.

The boys then have their last chance to sing carols. Here is one of them:

Oi na richtsi, na Ordani. . .
 (Refrain) *Shchedryi vechir, sviatyi vechir!*
Tam Mariia bil' bilyla,
*Bil' bilyla, khustku shyla. . .etc.*²⁸

This is a rather jovial *shchedrivka*, telling us how the holy Mother washed her laundry in the Jordan River. The conception of the holy family here is very human and they are depicted rather like next door neighbours.

The last holiday connected with our Saviour's birth is on February 2, so-called *Stritennia* or *Hromnytsi*. *Stritennia* means the 'meeting' of Jesus with the righteous Simon, who recognised Him as the Saviour. The popular "hromnytsi" is derived from candles which are blessed in church and they protect farmers from *hrom* 'thunder' and fear. At home, the father makes the sign of the cross three times on the ceiling with the smoke of a candle. He then forms a cross on the head of each family member by singeing off a few strands of hair with the candle flame, as a protection from everything evil. *Hromnytsi* is regarded as the beginning of warmer days (something like the American ground hog which does not see its shadow at the beginning of February). The popular belief is "*Na Hromnytsi napyetsia piven' vodytsi.*" 'On *Hromnytsi*, the rooster will already drink water (from the melted snow).'

The winter holidays abound in ancient tradition and are the most joyous. Dualism is prevalent here, especially in Ukraine, where people see a romantic heritage in their folklore. Ukrainian villagers are not religious zealots and, as the saying goes, "They do not mind to have a shot of vodka at the inn with the devil himself." This was expressed very well in 1905 by the Russian literary historian, Prince Peter A. Krapotkin, when he discussed Gogol's novels about Ukraine (he used the term "Little Russia" for Ukraine): ". . . life in Little Russian (Ukrainian) villages is more poetical than in the villages of Great Russia (Russia proper). There is more freedom in the relations between the young men and the young girls, who freely meet before marriage;

28. *Ibid.*, p. 100.

the stamp of seclusion of the women which has been impressed by Byzantine habits upon Moscow, does not exist in Little Russia, where the influence of Poland was prevalent. Little Russians have also maintained numerous traditions and epic poems and songs from the times when they were free Kozaks and used to fight against the Poles in the north and the Turks in the south. Having had to defend the Greek Orthodox religion against these two nations, they now strictly adhere to the Greek Orthodox Church and one does not find in their villages the same passion for scholastic discussions about the letter of the Holy Books which is often met in Great Russia among the Nonconformists. Their religion has altogether a more poetical aspect"²⁹.

Next, Krapotkin evaluates Gogol's book, *Nights on a Farm Near Dikanka* by saying:

"Gogol always remains scrupulously true to reality. Every peasant, every chanter, is taken from real life, and Gogol's trueness to reality is almost ethnographical, without ever ceasing to be poetical. All the superstitions of village life on a Christmas Eve or during a midsummer night, when the mischievous spirits and goblins are set free till the cock crows, are brought before the reader and at the same time we have all the wittiness which is inborn in the Little Russian"³⁰.

Unfortunately, Polissia is not as rich and poetical as central Ukraine, especially the Poltava region. Jerzy Artur Kostecki, a Polish teacher, wrote a romantic and melodious tango before World War II: "*Polesia czar — to dzikie knieje, moczary. . .*" which in English means, "The charm of Polissia is the wild forests and marshes. . ." The Polissians, of course, wholeheartedly agree with the author and composer of this beautiful song.

The Spring cycle begins with *Blahovishchennia* (the Annunciation, March 25). This is such an important holiday that people believe "a bird would not make his nest on this day." To see the migrant birds after a severe winter is a real thrill and blessing. Flying in formation, the cranes and wild geese send out their mournful cry, which seems to be saying, "God, we survived this winter!" Birds, in the pre-Christian beliefs of our Slavic ancestors, have an anthropomorphic quality. They participate in human destiny by bringing messages and warnings from the gods and other people, understanding human language and sometimes even speaking. In the *Tale of the Host of Ihor*, it is nature and animals but especially the birds that warn Prince Ihor about his coming disaster, e.g., "the eagles by their screeching call the beasts to a feast of bones" long before the tragic battle. In ballads, a cuckoo bird tells a mother that her daughter is unhappy. When the rooster crows all evil forces disappear. The stork in Polissia has a special status because in a folktale, God punished the Polissian fisherman, Vasyl, and changed him into a stork for disobeying His will. Furthermore, the stork is monogamous and each year the pair returns to their nest "to protect the house from lightning and fire."

29. P. A. Krapotkin, *Russian Literature: Ideas and Realities*, (London: 1916), p. 70.

30. *Ibid.*, p. 71.

When the storks return, it is already spring. They announce their arrival with a happy, staccato call. The villagers often run out of their houses and throw their caps in the air in exuberance and happiness. This usually occurs on the day of the Annunciation and a small loaf of bread, "hal'opa", awaits the storks. Children throw the bread high in the air, saying:

*Busniu, busniu, na tobi hal'opu,
Dai nam zhyta kopu!*

'O stork, stork! Here is a loaf of bread for you, give us a shock of rye'.

If it is a sunny day the farmer sprinkles his cattle with blessed water and takes it to the meadow to see the spring sun. The youths begin to sing spring songs, called *vesnianky*, such as:

*Vzhe vesna voskresla,
Shchozh ty nam prynesla?
Prynysla ia rosu — divots'kuiiu krasu. . .*

This means: 'Spring has already resurrected, what did you bring for us? — I brought you dew, a girl's beauty. . .'. Springs has already resurrected. . .'. How wonderful are those first warm days, after the cold, cruel winter. . . Now the grass is already getting green, the first flowers appear, the birds sing³¹.

Actually, the Easter holidays begin on Palm Sunday, *Verbna Nedilia* or *Verbnytsia* 'willow Sunday', when the willow is blessed in church to commemorate the triumphant entry of Jesus Christ into Jerusalem before His crucifixion. Hrushevskyi insists that ritual use of the budding willow branches is much older than Christianity in Ukraine³². Perhaps because the pussy willows appear early in spring on Slavic soil, they are very much admired and are associated with the pagan idea of the resurrection of nature. The pussy willow is also used as medicine against sore throats^{***}. People believe it has magic power to diminish the strength of a storm and lightening if thrown against the wind. It was also believed that they could prevent fire in the house³³. After blessing in church, the pussy willow acquired even more protective powers. Therefore, people gently tapped friends and children on the shoulders, while saying:

*Ny ia byu, vyrba bye:
Velykden' za tyzhen'!
Bud' vylykyi, iak vyrba,*

31. A. B. Chertkov, *Paskha*, 2nd ed., (Moscow: 1975), p. 3.

32. M. Hrushevskyi, *Istoriia ukrains'koi literatury*, Vol. I, (New York: Knyhospilka, 1959), pp. 174, 246.

*** The willow tree and willow bush are equally respected there.

33. S. Kylymnyk, *Calendar Year in Ukrainian Folklore*, Vol. III, Volyniana III, (Winnipeg: 1962), p. 44.

*A zdorovyi iak voda
I bohatyi, iak zymlia. . .*

This means: 'It is not I who hits you, but the willow: Easter is in a week! Be tall as a willow tree, healthy as water and rich as Mother Earth. . .'. On Palm Sunday or on St. George's day (April 23), whichever comes earlier, the cattle is taken for the first time to the meadow and every animal is tapped with a pussy willow branch for protection. However, it is forbidden to hit a pregnant cow on the nose, because in the spring, it is pregnant. Ivan Boytik from Khabovychy near Kobryn told me (1939) that in his village, people even put the blessed willow in coffins.

The week before Easter, which is observed in a Christian way, is a very sad time and is usually cold ("*velykodnyi — zavzhdy kholodnyi*"). After the Thursday evening service, people return home with burning candles. If saved, they have protective power. After supper, the old people do not eat until Sunday morning. Good Friday, called *velyka pyatnytsia*, the crucifixion of Jesus Christ, is the most respected day, when "even a bird does not make its nest." People go to the divine "burial service," praying with deepest reverence and tears. Until Resurrection, they abstain from mundane speech and speak only in hushed tones.

For Eastern Slavs, the greatest and most important of all holidays is *Velyk-den'*, from *velykyi den'* — 'great day' or *Voskresennie* 'Resurrection'. The popular belief is that on the day Christ rose from the dead, the sun was so happy, it skipped one sunset — thus, 'great day'; Western Slavs such as the Poles and Czechs call it *Wielkanoc* 'great night'. This is indeed "praznykiv praznyk" — the 'feast of feasts' in the Polissian mind, because as the Apostle Paul said, if there were no resurrection of our Saviour — there would be no Christianity. Some folklorists think there was no idol of spring to celebrate (although it could have been *Yarilo*, from *iara* 'spring', e.g., in Polissia *iara pshynytsia* 'spring wheat', etc.), except the Sun's victory over the Frost, the life of spring over the death of winter.

(To be continued)

News from Ukraine

AN END TO GLASNOST

(UCIS) The official organs of the Government of the USSR and the CPSU, "Izvestia" and "Pravda", published on April 11, 1989, a "Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on the introduction of amendments and addendums to the USSR Law 'On Criminal Liability for State Crimes' and certain other USSR legislative acts", signed by Mikhail Gorbachev, the President of the Supreme Soviet, and — Menteshashvili, the Secretary. The Decree is dated April 8, 1989, the day following Gorbachev's return to Moscow from Great Britain. The legal changes called for in the Decree came into effect with its publication, despite the fact that it was not ratified by the Supreme Soviet, although normal procedure requires such ratification.

These new legal statutes clearly establish that the much-publicised *glasnost*-liberalisation reform initiative has come to an abrupt end, as is illustrated by sections 7 and 11 from this Decree:

"Article 7 Calls for the overthrow or change of the Soviet state and social system.

"Public calls for the overthrow of the Soviet state and social system or for its change by methods contrary to the USSR Constitution, or for obstructing the execution of Soviet laws for the purpose of undermining the USSR political and economic system, and equally the preparation for purposes of dissemination or the actual dissemination of material containing such calls —

"are punishable by deprivation of freedom for a period of up to three years or a fine of up to R 2,000.

"The same actions, committed repeatedly either by an organised group of persons or involving the use of technical means designed or adapted for large print runs —

"are punishable by deprivation of freedom for a period of up to seven years on a fine of up to R 5,000.

"Actions falling within Parts 1 or 2 of this article, committed on instructions from organisations abroad or their representatives or involving the use of material assets or technical means received from the aforementioned organisations —

"are punishable by deprivation of freedom for a period of between three and 10 years."

“Article 11 (1) Insulting or defaming state bodies and public organisations.

“The public insulting or defamation of the USSR Supreme bodies of state power and government, other state bodies constituted or elected by the Congress of People’s Deputies of the USSR or the USSR Supreme Soviet, or officials appointed, elected or approved in office by the Congress of People’s Deputies of the USSR or the USSR Supreme Soviet, or public organisations and their all-union bodies constituted according to law and acting in conformity with the USSR Constitution —

“is punishable by deprivation of freedom for a period of up to three years or a fine of up to R 2,000.”

* * *

A CRY OF ANGER AND DESPAIR

Bohdan Horyn, a leading member of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union, issued the following statement upon the publication of this decree:

“The publication of this Decree on April 11, 1989, signifies a total reversal to anti-democratic methods in our political and social life. The reception, which the General Secretary received in London, encouraged him to sign this Decree. If the West would have been more critical and careful in noting the violations of legality and international legal statutes, which were effectuated during the period of so-called democratisation, *glasnost* and *perestroika*, and would have underscored its concern with such violations, then perhaps this Decree would not have appeared. The West closed its eyes to this unlawful highhandedness, which repeated itself in the various republics, thereby creating the conditions for the publication of this Decree, on the basis of which the authorities will again imprison and sentence to concentration camps the representatives of various unofficial groups, organisations, and public activists. The West’s lack of foresight and its capacity to be deceived by generalised phrases and empty promises gives the opportunity to institute completely reactionary practices and to implement such reactionary laws, which were not even instituted during the reactionary period of Brezhnev and his predecessor. This Decree is not the first such law; the West has already swallowed the anti-democratic law on elections, it calmly ignored the Decree on meetings and demonstrations, resulting in the implementation of these measures and the arrests of many people (including myself and my brother Mykhailo). If the West continues to give its tacit approval to such anti-democratic measures, then these crimes, which will continue to take place, will never be brought to light.

These are our first cries of anger and despair, cries which are in fact powerless, insofar as we are no longer able to do anything to prevent the implementation of this Decree. It has already been implemented once it was released

in the press. In the 1930s, during the years of artificial famine in Ukraine, officials in the West knew of this genocidal catastrophe, but chose to remain silent and are tainted by guilt for their silence. Should the West choose to remain silent about this Decree, it will share the responsibility and guilt for the repressions that will follow.”

MYKHAILO HORYN SENTENCED TO 15 DAYS OF IMPRISONMENT

(UCIS) On the invitation of students from Chernivtsi University, Mykhailo Horyn, a prominent member of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union (UHU), arrived in the town of Chernivtsi on Thursday, April 6, to give a lecture about informal societies and organisations in Ukraine. Although the lecture had been advertised around the University, the local authorities voiced no objections.

Mykhailo Horyn arrived at the University together with Valeriy Kuzmin, a local UHU member. When they entered the lecture hall, they found that very few students had arrived. As soon as the lecture began, one of the students left the hall, returning shortly thereafter to inform Horyn and Kuzmin that the rector of the University wished to speak to them on the telephone. As soon as they stepped into the corridor, they were arrested by the militia, who were waiting outside the hall. That same day, Horyn was sentenced to 15 days of imprisonment and Kuzmin to 10 for “organising an illegal meeting”. They are serving their term of imprisonment in Chernivtsi.

Mykhailo Horyn suffers from heart trouble and his family is afraid for his health. According to his brother Bohdan, who recently completed a term of 15 days of imprisonment in Lviv, conditions in solitary confinement are particularly harsh.

CAROLLING UKRAINIAN-STYLE

Press Release No. 51 of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union

(UCIS) Renewing the national tradition of Christmas carolling, a group of youths from Kyiv’s “Hromada” society joined up with religious faithful who were worshipping Christ in the Volodymyr Cathedral on Christmas Eve (January 6).

As usual, the dress of the carollers and the sweet-sounding singing attracted increasingly more people to the group. An improvised national choir of some 500 people was soon formed. In the middle of the crowd the carol singers raised an eight-pointed blue and yellow (colours of the Ukrainian national flag) star with a steel tryzub (Ukrainian national symbol). People from all around asked them to carry on singing and gave the collector pyrohy (pies), sweets and money.

This festive occasion of spiritual unity, which lasted for a long time, did not appeal to the guardians of the order of stagnation. So-called "people in civilian dress" began to move in closer to the group of carollers and demanded in a rough manner that they take down the tryzub. At this point the people showed extraordinary solidarity: they surrounded the singers in a tight circle and did not let the aggressive agents through. "Leave them alone", the people shouted, "this is our culture! And the tryzub is the symbol of St. Volodymyr". But the agents and uniformed militia did not stop. Then the group of carollers, together with the 500-strong spontaneous choir, walked from the Volodymyr Cathedral to the Khreshchatyk. The singing sounded wonderful, symbolic: "Grant freedom, return good fortune to our glorious Ukraine. . .".

On the corner of Leontovych Street the procession of people was halted by a cordon of militia. The chief of Kyiv's Lenin district militia, Kondratiuk, began to threaten a young participant of this festive occasion, Yaroslava Danylenko, that if the people did not stop singing in the streets he would punish her for the organisation of this unsanctioned demonstration. The people answered militia chief Kondratiuk with resolute and justified shouts of "Hooligans! Clear the road!" Several militiamen set themselves upon the carollers and a certain major, who would not give his name, broke the tryzub. To avoid a clash with the hooligans in epaulettes, the carollers, together with the faithful, returned to the Volodymyr Cathedral. Yaroslava Danylenko and Vadym Dyvnych thanked the people for the protection they had given them from the attackers and for their wholehearted support for national traditions.

Everywhere shouts of "Down with Shcherbytskyi! Enough stagnation! Their time is over!" could be heard and the festive singing continued in even greater harmony. Then the carollers with their blue and yellow star, which had survived the attack, went off to extend Christmas greetings to notable Ukrainian cultural activists. Elderly women and children, young girls and grey-haired men — the whole street — escorted them to the bus. The carol singers promised to return on January 13 (Ukrainian New Year's Eve).

And the officials who are without a conscience and without kith and kin, learnt a lesson from history: the people did not follow them, but those who worship God, who practice the customs of their fathers. (UCIS)

DISRUPTION OF UKRAINIAN DEMOCRATIC UNION MEETING IN KYIV

(UCIS) According to information received by the Ukrainian Central Information Service, the Ukrainian Democratic Union had planned to hold a meeting at 10 a.m. on January 21. A regional conference of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union was also scheduled for that day.

Delegates of the UDU began to arrive in Kyiv on the evening of January 20. But that same evening, organs of state security began to deport delegates to the meeting outside the city, among them a delegate from Moscow and Sumy. Some of the delegates were arrested at the station as they stepped off the train. Fourteen of those detained were released later that evening.

The deportation continued the next day. In all between 40 and 60 people were removed from the Ukrainian capital. The militia and KGB blocked off Ostomelska Street, where the meeting was due to take place in a private residence, from both sides. All doorways were also blocked off. In this way the authorities disrupted the meeting of the Ukrainian Democratic Union.

The regional conference of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union, on the other hand, went ahead as planned. Only Serhiy Naboka, who is also a member of the Ukrainian Democratic Union, was unable to attend. Naboka is head of the Ukrainian Culturological Club, which resolved on December 25, 1988, to become a corporate member of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union.

Mass Commemoration of Act of Reunification of Ukrainian Territories

(UCIS) A litany, dedicated to the 70th anniversary of the proclamation of the Act of the Reunification of the Western Ukrainian National Republic with the territories of central Ukraine into a single sovereign Ukrainian National Republic, was held on Sunday, January 22, in Lviv in the square outside the city's Cathedral of St. George. The litany was attended by between 10 and 15,000 people. Although the militia attempted to disrupt the service using loudspeakers, their efforts were unsuccessful.

UKRAINIAN CHRISTIAN-DEMOCRATIC FRONT HOLDS INAUGURAL MEETING

Lviv, January 13, 1989

(UCIS) The Ukrainian Christian-Democratic Front (UCDF), formed last November, held its inaugural meeting on January 13 in Lviv, western Ukraine. The meeting was held in a private residence in Lviv. The room was decorated with a large tryzub (Ukrainian national symbol) and the inscription: "God hear out our pleas. Misfortune is destroying our land. The strength of the nation lies in unity, God grant us unity. God remove the shackles from us, do not let us die in captivity. Send Ukraine freedom, grant her happiness and good fortune" (religious hymn). All the delegates wore blue and yellow badges (colours of the Ukrainian national flag) and a tryzub.

The Lviv branch of the Front is the most active. It has organised 10 patriotic concerts, during which partisan (Ukrainian Insurgent Army) songs and poems were sung and recited, in private residences in Lviv. Other concerts were held in the villages. They were attended by several thousand people.

Before the start of the inaugural meeting, four members of the militia led by the deputy head of criminal investigations of the Lenin district of Lviv, Smyk Zenoviy Petrovych, forced their way into the meeting room. They searched the residence for almost one hour, looking through all the papers and writing down the names, addresses and work place of the delegates. Those delegates who had arrived in the meantime witnessed the fact that, on leaving the residence, the militiamen were joined by members of the KGB who were waiting for them outside and did not wish to be involved in the search.

The militia raid prevented a religious service, which was to be held prior to the meeting. The meeting opened with prayers for the Ukrainian nation, for Ukraine and for the task at hand.

First on the agenda was a discussion of the name, which the organisation was to adopt. The delegates resolved to maintain the present name Ukrainian Christian-Democratic Front rather than Union. They also discussed the programme and statute of the UCDF and ratified both.

The meeting elected the Central Council which consists of the following 13 UCDF members: Vasyl Sichko (chairman), Lidia Chekalska (secretary), Taras Karpyn, Stepan Yedynoroz, Mykola Torko, Ivan Shturmat, Volodymyr Sichko, Roman Chekalskyi and Mykola Kindrachuk.

In the course of the meeting, the delegates acknowledged the pressing need for a national upbringing of the youth and resolved to renew the youth organisation "Plast", which had been liquidated during the Stalinist terror in Ukraine. All the delegates and members are to take practical steps to renew "Plast". Taras Karpyn, who was elected as head of "Plast", Stepan Yedy-

noroz, Mykola Torko and Ivan Shturmat will take charge of measures to renew the organisation.

As well as "Plast", the delegates also discussed the question of renewing the "Prosvita Society", which played an important role in maintaining the high level of literacy and separate national identity of the Ukrainian people, noting the work which had already been done in this field by the Lviv branch of the UCDF. Both "Plast" and "Prosvita" will be affiliated to the Front. Yaroslav Kormeliuk was elected as the head of the "Prosvita Society". With the help of Volodymyr Senkovskyi and Volodymyr Kasian he is to set about organising "Prosvita".

Roman Chekalskyi and Mykola Kindratiuk are responsible for the religious and national rebirth of the population and Zenoviy Konyk has been placed in charge of organising economic activity.

The meeting also ratified the official address of the UCDF head office and the "Plast" secretariat.

The delegates expressed their thanks to those branches which were the first to hold a collection of funds for the Front, which enabled the organisation to donate 1,000 karbovantsi (£1,000) to help Ukrainian political prisoners. They also acknowledged the efforts of UCDF members to collect financial assistance for Armenia and the necessity to allocate additional capital to the Ukrainian Catholic Church's fund to help the Armenian earthquake victims.

Several delegates, particularly one from the Ivano-Frankivsk region, spoke about the situation of the repressed Ukrainian Catholic Church. Ivan Boychuk, from Ivano-Frankivsk, reported on incidents from the village of Hrabivka when the militia threatened the population with arrest if they did not sign a petition to open an Orthodox church in the village. On Christmas Eve (January 6), after dark, 100 militiamen and KGB descended upon the village in order to open a Russian Orthodox church by force. The whole village was compelled to defend its church all night. The KGB and militia had to call in reinforcements which arrived at 12.30 at night. Young people were arrested and many people were beaten with wooden clubs. Boychuk showed one of the clubs, which the people managed to seize from the militia, to the delegates. It will become an exhibit in a museum of the persecution of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, which the UCDF is planning to set up.

The meeting condemned the persecution of Ukrainian Christians by the authorities and passed a motion in defence of the Ukrainian Catholic Church. The delegates resolved to demand the erection of a monument to Metropolitan Andrey Sheptytskyi. The Central Council is to write an appeal for a petition for the erection of the monument.

The meeting resolved that January 22, the anniversary of the Ukrainian declaration of independence (1918), will be the principal national holiday and that the UCDF will urge the people to commemorate this anniversary.

The meeting condemned the campaign of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine and the KGB to halt the activities of the Front

and the libellous articles concerning the UCDF and its activities in the Soviet Ukrainian press. It also declared as unlawful the fact that the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the UkSSR had dispatched the UCDF's petition for registration to the Central Committee of the CPU for scrutiny. The Central Council of the UCDF was authorised to write a letter of protest to the Presidium of the UkSSR Supreme Soviet regarding this issue.

Because of the circumstances in which the meeting was convened — the campaign to suppress the activities of the Front — the delegates deemed it an extraordinary meeting and resolved to hold another meeting sometime in the future under more favourable conditions and one with a wider representative basis.

The meeting adjourned the same evening with prayers for the Ukrainian nation.

Two Ukrainian Human Rights Activists Arrested in Kyiv

(UCIS) Two members of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union, a human rights groups set up to monitor the Soviet Union's observance of the 1975 Helsinki Accords, were arrested on Saturday, February 4.

Mykola Muratov, a spokesman for the Ukrainian Helsinki Union, said that Vyacheslav Chornovil and Levko Lukyanenko were arrested in the Ukrainian capital, Kyiv.

According to Valeriy Senerov, a Moscow member of the West German based International Organisation for the Defence of Human Rights, Mr. Lukyanenko was driven to the town of Chernihiv, 135 kilometres (85 miles) north of Kyiv, and set free. He had no news of Mr. Chornovil.

Levko Lukyanenko, born in 1928, was recently released before completing a second 15-year term of imprisonment in hard labour camps and exile.

BITTER CONFRONTATION AT KYIV WRITERS' PLENUM

(UCIS) The January 31 plenum of the Kyiv branch of the Ukrainian Writers' Union (UWU) resulted in a bitter confrontation between the writers and the party's head of ideology, Leonid Kravchuk.

Despite the fact that the plenum had initially been convened to examine ecological issues and the problems concerning the establishment of the Ukrai-

nian language as the state language of the republic, the discussions centred on matters connected with the Popular Front for the Promotion of Restructuring in Ukraine.

According to information from Kyiv, in his address to the writers, Leonid Kravchuk remarked that those UWU members who disagreed with the party's present nationalities policy may leave the party. In reply to this Ivan Drach pointed out that the authorities had already tried three times to oust him from the party and that should he leave the party now he would not be alone. He would be joined by all the party members not only from the Kyiv branch of the UWU, but from the whole Writer's Union.

The participants of the plenum greeted Drach and other writers who shared his views with loud applause.

At the end of the plenum, the writers demanded that the resolutions accepted by the plenum be published in the newspaper *Literaturna Ukraina* by the end of February at the latest, otherwise they would take their own measures to do so.

UKRAINIAN YOUTH BEATEN FOR RAISING NATIONAL FLAG DURING MEETING IN KYIV

(UCIS) On Wednesday, February 22, Soviet authorities attacked a young man in Kyiv, who raised the Ukrainian national blue and yellow flag during a meeting in conjunction with Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to Ukraine.

Yevhen Chernyshiv, who is in his mid-20s, raised the flag, which has not been seen at a public gathering in the Ukrainian capital since the mid-1940s, in response to a party representative who claimed that Ukraine already has democracy.

"If we have democracy, what do you say to our national flag", Chernyshiv shouted while holding it above his head.

The authorities attacked him and attempted to wrest the flag from his hands. Chernyshiv was rescued by passers-by, who returned the flag to him and supported him while he once again raised it. The 3,000 demonstrators began chanting "Glory to Ukraine".

During the struggle, one of the organisers of the meeting was approached by a member of the militia, who quietly but hesitantly told him to warn Chernyshiv not to repeat this action. The Ukrainian rights activist was further informed that the militia is under strict instructions from the highest party authorities not to allow the national colours to be displayed. However, because of the determination of the crowd, the authorities refrained from attacking Chernyshiv again, and he was permitted to hold the blue and yellow flag during the remainder of the meeting.

The February 22 meeting was the third demonstration in three days to take place in the Ukrainian capital in connection with Gorbachev's tour of Ukraine. The demonstrations were organised by the activists from the "Hromada Society", the Ukrainian Helsinki Union and the Ukrainian "People's Democratic League", a member organisation of the "Democratic Union". Each of the meetings was attended by several thousand people who demanded the establishment of a national front, protested against conditions in Ukraine and denounced widespread fraud related to the upcoming election of people's deputies in March. Demonstrators held hand-lettered signs with slogans such as "Down with Shcherbytskyi", "Political Pluralism is the Foundation of Democracy", "Ukrainian must be the state language" and "All Ukrainian Party Leaders are Mafia".

Prior to similar demonstrations in Lviv, western Ukraine, seven Ukrainian activists were detained. They were Ivan Hel, Mykhailo and Bohdan Horyn, Pavlo Skochok, Hryhoriy Prykhodko, Ivan Kandyba and Ivan Makar. Makar, who was arrested last year and held, without trial, for three months, received a 15-day jail sentence for collecting signatures for a petition in support of poet Rostyslav Bratun, who is a candidate for the March elections.

UKRAINIAN LANGUAGE SOCIETY OF SHEVCHENKO HOLDS INAUGURAL MEETING IN KYIV

(UCIS) The two-day inaugural meeting of the Ukrainian Language Society of Shevchenko ended in Kyiv on Sunday, February 12, 1989, with the adoption of a resolution demanding that Ukrainian be declared the state language in the republic.

Approximately 500 delegates, representing the majority of provinces in Ukraine, participated in the inaugural meeting in the Republic Cinema along with 200 observers. In addition, about 4,000 people stood in the square in front of the building, listening to the debates which were broadcast through loudspeakers.

The resolution, demanding that the Ukrainian language be granted the status of a state language, emphasises that every citizen of the Ukrainian SSR should have command of the Ukrainian language as behoves a state language. At the same time it was pointed out that the Ukrainian language should be the language of international relations in Ukraine, thereby discarding the bilingual principle. Furthermore, the resolution demands that an official "native Ukrainian language" holiday be placed on the calendar.

In response to the demand of some of the delegates and in opposition to Party members, in particular Yelchenko, the ideological secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the resolution

states that the Ukrainian Language Society supports the idea of the creation of a Popular Front for Restructuring. When a vote was called on this point, Yelchenko left the meeting room.

One of the delegates who strongly criticised the nationality policy of Volodymyr Shcherbytskyi received wide support from his colleagues. After his address, those present stood up and chanted "Shame on Shcherbytskyi" and "Retire Shcherbytskyi".

In the aftermath of an address about the fate of the late Ukrainian poet Vasyl Stus, the participants, with a moment's silence, paid tribute to the memory of those defenders of the Ukrainian language and culture who perished in Soviet concentration camps. The delegates also voiced support for the comment by one of the speakers, who demanded that Soviet citizenship be returned to Mykola Rudenko, founding head of the defunct Ukrainian Helsinki Group, who is currently residing in the United States.

The inaugural meeting accepted the "Appeal to the Citizens of the Ukrainian SSR, to All Ukrainians in Ukraine and Beyond Ukraine" and elected an executive board of the society. The poet Dmytro Pavlychko was elected as chairman. Among the members of the executive council of the society are representatives of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union (UHU), including Bohdan Horyn, chairman of the Lviv branch of the UHU. Also in the executive council are representatives of the Moscow branch of the UHU, and representatives of Ukrainian communities in the Baltic countries. Christina Friehtland from Harvard University in Cambridge, Mass., is also a member of the council.

During the meeting, 3,000 karbovantsi were raised for the erection of a monument to Taras Shevchenko in Leningrad.

MASS MEETING IN DEFENCE OF KYIV'S HISTORICAL MONUMENTS

(UCIS) On Sunday, February 26, a mass meeting in defence of Kyiv's historical monuments was held in the public square outside the Lenin stadium. More than 5,000 people attended the meeting.

Some of the participants held slogans which said: "Turn the baba (old woman) and the yoke into scrap metal", with the term "baba" referring to the huge victory monument which overlooks the Dnieper, and "yoke" — the monument to the "reunification" of Ukraine and Russia. Other slogans said "No to a spiritual Chornobyl!", "Ukrainian roads should lead to Ukrainian churches!" etc.

The numerous addresses, assisted by loudspeakers, included much new information. The participants learnt that the funds allocated for the protection

of Ukraine's monuments are many times lower than similar funds for the city of Leningrad alone. This gave rise to criticism of the present leadership and its policy regarding the protection of monuments.

The fact that a military school is situated on the premises of the city's historic Kyiv-Mohyla Academy was also raised during the meeting. The residents of Kyiv are demanding that this national monument be reclaimed from the Defence Ministry, which, in turn, is demanding the sum of 30 million karbovantsi (£30 million) from the city of Kyiv in order to build new premises for the school.

The meeting officially ended at 7 p.m. After the microphones were switched off, discussions continued for a long time and the participants did not disperse. The wife of Serhiy Naboka, the head of the Ukrainian Culturological Club, came onto the improvised stage and informed those present of the arrest of her husband and another activist, Yevhen Chernyshov. At that point the militia rushed on the scene and began to push back the crowds of people. In response the people began to shout "Shame!" and "You are representatives of the people. Mothers fed you too, but not so that you could attack the people!" Some of the participants said that three boys had been arrested and driven away by the militia.

Before departing the participants expressed their discontent with the party bureaucracy in Ukraine and urged all those present to gather in the square at 6 p.m. the next day (February 27) to continue the meeting.

Several writers, as well as the secretary of the Podil district party committee in Kyiv, addressed the February 26 meeting. This was the first time that an official representative of the authorities addressed a public meeting.

RECONCILIATION OF UKRAINIAN CATHOLICS AND ORTHODOX IN UKRAINE

An unsanctioned requiem service on the occasion of the 128 anniversary of the death of Taras Shevchenko, Ukraine's national poet, drew between 25,000 and 30,000 people to the city centre of Lviv in Western Ukraine on Sunday, 26 February, according to observers present. The service, led by Fr. Mykhailo Neiskohuz of the Orthodox Church and Fr. Mykhailo Voloshyn of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, was held to show solidarity between Ukrainian Orthodox and Catholics in the face of persistent government attempts to incite one against the other. The Ukrainian Catholic Church is banned, while the hierarchy of the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine is being encouraged by the Soviet government to occupy churches once held by the Catholics and then closed in the 1940s, after their banning. Both priests delivered sermons on making peace and co-operation between the Ukrainian churches,

and symbolically kissed and embraced one another before the huge crowds gathered around the Church of the Assumption in the centre of the city. Two other speeches were delivered — by Ivan Hel, head of the Committee in Defence of the Ukrainian Catholic Church and by an engineer named Ivan Hrechko.

The police did not intervene to disperse the gathering and observers present reported considerable satisfaction on the part of the participants. However, a select number of political and religious activists were prevented from attending; they were arrested the moment they stepped outside their homes and were held at local police stations until nine o'clock in the evening.

Keston College

LVIV RESIDENTS ATTACKED BY “BLACK HUNDREDS”

(UCIS) As many as 500 residents of Lviv were brutally attacked on Friday, March 10, by Company 6 of the Special Detachment of the militia, when they expressed their outrage at the sentencing of national and religious rights activist, Iryna Kalynets.

Kalynets was sentenced to 10 days' imprisonment for “organising an illegal meeting” on January 22, commemorating Ukrainian Independence Day in Lviv. Supporters of Kalynets gathered outside the court to await the judge's decision in what was widely regarded as a case without merit. Kalynets and Ukrainian rights activist Mykhailo Horyn have been accused by representatives of the Orthodox Church of instigating religious conflict because of their participation in a prayer service in observance of the 70th anniversary of the reunification of the Ukrainian lands under a single, independent Ukrainian government.

When the decision against Kalynets was announced, the crowd began shouting “Shame”. The militia attempted to force her supporters away from the court and arrested two young men. The ranks of the militia were then joined by Company 6 of the Special Detachment. The company has come to be known as the “Chorna Sotnia” (Black Hundred), in reference to the most reactionary Russian elements during the tsarist era. The Black Hundreds were notorious for perpetrating pogroms, just as Company 6 of the Special Detachment is known for its brutality against Ukrainians.

The crowd then moved towards the Sobor (Cathedral) of St. George, where the January 22 prayer service was held. There they were met by the “Black Hundreds”, who blocked the road and locked the Cathedral gates. The crowd began directing chants of “Judas” against Metropolitan Nikodim of the Russian Orthodox Church. They were forced away from the Cathedral by the “Black Hundreds” and headed towards the university. There they were

once again attacked by the Special Detachment, which finally dispersed the crowd with typical violence.

The primary witnesses against Kalynets, an activist from the 1960s, were the Rev. Kochkodan and Shtum of the Russian Orthodox Church, who were not present at the trial. They sent written depositions, outlining the charges against her. Their allegations were disproved and the judge dismissed their written testimonies. Nonetheless, Kalynets, who was ill and running a high fever at the time, was found guilty and immediately removed from the court. Ihor Kalynets, her husband, was unable to discover the location of her incarceration. Every militia station in Lviv denied knowledge of her whereabouts and all attempts to deliver warm clothing to her met with failure.

“BLACK HUNDREDS” BRUTALLY SUBDUE 100,000 IN LVIV

(UCIS) For the second time in three days, on Sunday, March 12, Company 6 of the Special Detachment of the militia attacked 100,000 demonstrators in Lviv, who gathered to protest against the undemocratic preparations for the upcoming elections.

The assault on the protesters was reported to be the bloodiest strike against the democratic opposition in Ukraine during the Gorbachev regime.

More than 300 protesters were arrested. Among them were Taras Chornovil, son of activist Vyacheslav Chornovil, Taras Horyn, son of rights activist Mykhailo Horyn, and Ihor Drach, son of literary critic Ivan Drach. Thousands sustained severe injuries as a result of this “police riot”.

At 2 p.m., 30,000 demonstrators gathered at the monument to Ivan Fedorov, who established the first permanent printing shop in Ukraine in 1573. There the protesters were attacked by the police and the infamous “Black Hundreds”. The demonstrators then separated into groups which moved to other protest sites throughout the city. Thousands marched to the market-place, to the Town Hall, to the Cathedral of St. George. At each location they were set upon by the Special Detachment.

At the Cathedral of St. George, the crowd demanded the release of national and religious rights activist Iryna Kalynets, who was sentenced on March 10 for “organising an illegal meeting” on January 22, Ukrainian Independence Day. The protesters prevented the arrest of Ivan Makar, who led the meeting at St. George’s.

By 4 p.m., on the Lenin Prospect, the crowd swelled to more than 100,000. A suggestion to march to the statue of Lenin was rejected by the demonstrators and denounced as a “shameful” proposal. Instead, they remained and discussed the critical situation in Ukraine, particularly deploring the circumstances of the upcoming elections, and calling for a boycott. At this point, the

Special Detachment once again launched an attack and began charging into the crowd, randomly beating the people. The intense assault finally dispersed the demonstrators.

The meeting was organised by the Faction for Election Rights of the Temporary Coordinating Committee of the Popular Movement of Ukraine in the Lviv oblast. The committee is comprised of former members of the Popular Front (now movement) of Lviv, which was reorganised at the beginning of March as a chapter of the Popular Movement of Ukraine.

In compliance with the laws on organising meetings, on March 6, the committee informed the authorities of their intention to hold a pre-election meeting on March 12. The authorities suggested that the committee postpone their event until March 18, when an official programme has to be held. Anticipating a staged event by the authorities, they decided to hold an independent meeting. Despite the fury of the assault against the March 12 meeting, the protesters vowed to continue to hold demonstrations without official sanction.

Ilchenko Freed From Insane Asylum

(UCIS) On Monday, March 13, 34 year old Ukrainian rights activist Anatoliy Ilchenko was released from a psychiatric asylum after being held for nearly three months in a Mykolayiv hospital.

Ilchenko was recently transferred to the Kalshenko Psychiatric facility in Moscow, where he was examined by representatives of the American Psychiatric Association (APA). The APA delegation travelled to the Soviet Union to investigate charges of Soviet psychiatric abuse, including the detention of political prisoners in psychiatric wards.

The APA was particularly interested in the Ilchenko case because of the threats he received from Soviet officials when he requested an examination by the American delegation. On March 8, the APA finally met with Ilchenko and found no indication of mental illness.

Ilchenko's case has attracted attention in the West because he endured psychiatric abuse exclusively during the Gorbachev era.

On March 28, 1986, he was taken into custody and placed in a special regime facility in the Dnipropetrovsk Institute of Forensic Psychiatry where he was "treated" for Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism because of his opposition to the Soviet policies of russification in Ukraine and the disenfranchisement of Ukrainians in their own homeland.

At the psychiatric hospital his "treatment" included torture by psychotropic drugs and insulin injections. He was held in that institution until July 15,

1988. Ilchenko's most recent incarceration stems from his activities on behalf of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union. On December 23, 1988, he was apprehended and imprisoned in the Mykolayiv psychiatric ward, under the supervision of Ivan Fedorovych Tryhub.

Ilchenko's detention prompted several prominent Ukrainian rights activists to organise an ad hoc committee for his defence. The committee is chaired by former Ukrainian political prisoner, Hryhoriy Prykhodko, and includes noted activists Mykhaiko Horyn and Ivan Makar, among others. The committee has expressed its profound gratitude and heartfelt thanks to the APA, the United States government and the Ukrainian Central Information Service for their intervention on behalf of Ilchenko. Upon his release, they announced their intention to hold their final meeting and disband the ad hoc committee.

COMMUNISTS SUFFER RESOUNDING ELECTION LOSSES ACROSS UKRAINE

(UCIS) The Communist Party suffered resounding election losses in Ukraine as Ukrainians heeded the appeal of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union and the Initiative Committee of the Ukrainian Popular Movement "Rukh", to boycott the elections or to vote against party candidates, according to sources in Ukraine.

Vyacheslav Chornovil, a member of the executive board of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union, described the movement's campaign as "completely successful."

Among the biggest losers in what was promoted as the first quasi-democratic elections in the history of the Soviet Union was Yakiv Pohrebniak, first secretary of the Lviv provincial party committee, who ran unopposed in the Drohobych-Boryslav electoral district and lost, capturing only 12% of the votes.

Chornovil said that his defeat caused a major panic among party officials in Lviv, who called an immediate meeting during which they decided to give Pohrebniak additional votes in order to disguise the true extent of his defeat, raising his tally to 42%.

Suffering similar humiliations were party secretary Konstantyn Masik in Kyiv and its Mayor Valentyn Zhurskyi, as well as other Ukrainian party officials. Volodymyr Shcherbytskyi, campaigning unopposed, was returned to office but sources in Ukraine believe his results were fabricated.

Among the non-party losers in Ukraine was Ivan Drach, a poet and organiser of the Popular Front, who was placed second in a field of seven candi-

dates, but Ukrainian national leaders console themselves that the winner, a Kyiv surgeon, had strongly endorsed the Popular Front.

In Lviv, of the other six candidates in the city's three districts, only Prof. Vakarchuk from the Lviv State University won 56% of the votes. To be assured a seat in the Congress of People's Deputies, candidates had to win at least 50% of the votes. Otherwise, a runoff will be held between the top two vote getters.

The remaining candidates in Lviv, Bilohrud and Zatushenko, both women, and Vashcheniuk, Maslak and Pavlovskiy were defeated in the polls.

Lev Lukyanenko, head of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union, reported that party-sponsored candidates also lost in the Chernihiv oblast.

In Chervonohrad, all party candidates also lost, and Stepan Khmara, whose candidacy was disallowed by officials, was proclaimed the "people's candidate."

Sources in Ukraine indicated that popular candidates Khmara, Roman Ivanychuk and Rosyslav Bratun would enter the new runoff elections. Originally they were blocked from the March 26 elections.

Documents and Reports

“MOUNTAIN SILHOUETTE” — INDEPENDENT JOURNAL FROM IVANO-FRANKIVSK

(UCIS) The third issue of the independent literary journal *Karby Hir* (Mountain Silhouette) has appeared in Ukraine. The journal, edited by Dmytro Hrynkiv, is published in the Ivano-Frankivsk region of western Ukraine. This issue appeared in the spring of 1988. According to information received by the Ukrainian Central Information Service, the fourth issue of *Karby Hir* has already appeared in December of last year.

Two previous issues of the journal appeared at the beginning of the 1980s. However, KGB repression caused further publication of *Karby Hir* to cease. Last spring, the journal began publication once again.

Dmytro Hrynkiv, poet and prose writer born in 1949, is a former political prisoner. He was repressed in 1973 for his participation in the Ukrainian Youth Association of Halychyna, an independent youth organisation which was active in defence of the rights of the Ukrainian nation, its language and culture. Dmytro Hrynkiv was the head of this organisation. He is the chief editor of *Karby Hir*.

The editorial board consists of other former political prisoners — poet Taras Melnychuk, historian Ihor Kichak, publicist Bohdan Rebyrk and philologist Ostap Kachur. Taras Romaniuk, who now resides in Winnipeg, Canada, also contributed to the third issue of *Karby Hir*.

Karby Hir is the only independent literary journal in Sub-Carpathian Ukraine and the Pokuttia area. It appears four times a year. Apart from literary contributions, the journal also aims to publish articles and notes of a strictly national character dealing with such questions as the refinement of the Ukrainian language, the restoration of forgotten traditions and ecological issues.

This issue opens with a foreword by the editor, which talks about the circumstances surrounding the previous publication of the journal, giving a fundamental explanation why *Karby Hir* has not appeared for so many years. As its motto the journal has adopted the following words from Ivan Franko's poem "Velyki Rokovyny" (The Great Anniversary): "All of you, think that the situation of millions depends on you. . .".

The journal consists of five sections: "Chervona Kalyna" (Red Guelder-rose), which deals with literature; "Zoloti Vorota" (The Golden Gates), which features literary criticism; "Our Heritage" — works of forgotten liter-

ary figures and national activists; "Letters and Responses" of readers; and a "Chronicle" of local information and events.

"Chervona Kalyna" features the poetry and prose of writers from all regions of Ukraine. It consists of a poem by Kovalenko under the same name ("Chervona Kalyna") on love for Ukraine, selected poems by Taras Melnychuk, Yaroslav Hasiuk and Taras Romaniuk. A series of poems by Taras Melnychuk, dedicated to the 75th anniversary of the death of the poetess Lesia Ukrainka, are also reprinted from the journal *Ukraina* for 1971. The first section of *Karby Hir* concludes with a piece of prose by Dmytro Hrynkyv — two novels "Demolish the house. . ." and "Oh, Hnat!"

The next section, "Zoloti vorota", begins with Ostap Kachur's reflections on the poem "Seven" by Borys Oliynyk entitled "Several informal thoughts on the poem 'Seven' ". This is followed by Ihor Kichak's historical article "Critical notes on the problem of Troyan" relating to "The Lay of Ihor's Host" (Medieval epic poem from Ukraine), a religious-philosophical article by Taras Romaniuk entitled "Chornobyl", which discusses whether loss of faith in God is leading to mankind's destruction with Chornobyl as a warning, and Yevhen Hrytsiak's "Homo sapiens", an article on the development of stoicism and deep faith in God.

The section "Our Heritage" contains poems by Hryhoriy Chuprynka ("Native Land"), T. Osmakha ("The Letter"), D. Falkivskyi's "Somewhere behind the wall", and also a story by H. Hordienko "The grave-digger is innocent" about the terrible effects of the forced famine in the Kyiv region in the 1930s.

One letter, that of former long-term political prisoner Lev Lukyanenko to Ihor Kichak, appears in the section "Letters and Responses". In the letter, Lukyanenko reflects on restructuring from his place of exile.

The last section, "Chronicle", features four notices on cultural life in Sub-Carpathian Ukraine:

- 1) the unveiling of a monument to Oleksa Dovbush on the premises of M. Didyshyn, a resident of the village of Kosmach, put up on his own expense;
- 2) the unveiling of a memorial plaque in the village of Pechenizhyn commemorating the 250th anniversary of the beginning of the "opryshky" movement under the leadership of Dovbush;
- 3) the opening of a museum of decorated easter eggs from Kolomyia (the only one of its kind in Ukraine);
- 4) the premiere of a play by Kozhenovskyyi entitled "Verkhovyntsi" (The Mountain Men) in Kolomyia.

The article about the easter egg museum in Kolomyia is illustrated with a photograph of the Church of the Feast of the Annunciation in which the museum is housed.

APPEAL OF THE UKRAINIAN HELSINKI UNION

(UCIS) In connection with the formation of the Ukrainian Popular Movement for Perestroika and the vigorous party campaign against this form of self-organisation of the national forces in Ukraine, the Executive Committee of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union (UHU) has issued an appeal to all citizens of Ukraine, the text of which is given below.

“APPEAL TO ALL CITIZENS OF UKRAINE”

Dear Fellow Countrymen!

Restructuring is democratisation, a transfer of real state authority from the party to the hands of the people, and a universal control of the activity of the party-state apparatus by the citizens. Democracy is independent activity and independent organisation of the people.

This is what the apparatus of power is afraid of. This is what the party officials and their subordinates in science, education, the press, economic administration and official public organisations fear. The attempts at a democratic expression of will and independent patriotic activity arouse particular fear and a particular rage among the bureaucrats. It is only in Ukraine that the party has preserved in full, with complete inviolability, the Stalinist terroristic method of propaganda — the persecution of its opponents and the slandering of democratic initiatives and views. The party press greeted the creation of the Ukrainian Culturological Club and the activity of the UHU with ideological howling and the agitational slanderous propaganda.

Next in line is the emergence of the Ukrainian Popular Movement for Perestroika (henceforth Movement). The fact that the draft programme of the Movement was published only by the literary newspaper *Literaturna Ukraina* is a proclamation of the old anti-democratic principle of the subordination of national initiative to the monopoly of the party. But even this does not placate the leading party officials. They answered the democratic initiative of the Ukrainian patriotic intelligentsia with a furious propaganda campaign against the Movement. Without acquainting the people with the Movement's draft programme, the party's means of mass information are sowing distrust of the initiative itself, of the very idea of organised expression of popular will. This is an old Stalinist method of demoralising society and reducing to nothing the constitutional right to freedom of thought, speech and independent activity.

Citizens! The attempts of the bureaucracy to prevent the emergence of the Ukrainian Popular Movement for Perestroika are a serious threat not only in the Ukrainian republic, but in the whole Union as well.

Ukrainians! The propaganda campaign against the Movement is the voice

of Russian great power chauvinism, of its fear of the national revival of the Ukrainian nation, of the historic inevitability of our national freedom and independence.

Russians, Jew, Poles, Hungarians, Tartars, Greeks, Bulgarians, Armenians, and representatives of all other peoples in Ukraine! The Ukrainian Popular Movement for Perestroika is an organisation whose platform is democracy for all the peoples of our republic; it is also a movement for your spiritual and material interests — for the revival of the language, schools, churches, and cultural centres of all the nationalities on Ukrainian territory. The Ukrainisation of the 1920s went hand in hand with economic strengthening of the republic and the safeguarding of the national and cultural needs of the national minorities of Ukraine. Restructuring in our republic can become reality only on the basis of Ukrainian statehood and your benevolent attitude towards the national revival of the Ukrainian nation.

The initiators and supporters of the Movement are accused of nationalism. Coming from the mouths of ordinary citizens, such accusations show a lack of information regarding the programme of the Movement or a preconceived attitude towards the legal rights and interests of Ukrainians. Coming from the mouths of party officials, they are an attempt to split the population of the republic along national lines, to set certain social and national groups against others and thereby nip in the bud the very idea of the self-organisation of the nation, to preserve the old order in Ukraine, the order which is destroying the national culture of all the peoples of the republic, which is destroying the environment, and under which corruption is thriving.

Fellow Countrymen! Give your support to the Ukrainian Popular Movement for Perestroika, rebuff the slanderous propaganda, organise centres of the Movement in all labour collectives, and unite yourselves on an all-Ukrainian scale around the initiators of the Movement. By supporting the Movement, you are supporting the democratisation of Ukraine. Without the democratisation of Ukraine, the transition to a civilised society, to freedom, to democracy, is impossible!

Executive Committee of the UHU

“WHAT IS TO BE DONE”

**New political treatise by Levko Lukyanenko
Head of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union**

The Ukrainian Central Information Service has recently obtained a new grammatical document written by the Head of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union (UHU), Levko Lukyanenko. The document (52 typewritten pages) is entitled “What is to be done”. It reached the West through unofficial samvydav channels.

The author, Levko Lukyanenko, was born on 24.8.1927. He is a lawyer by profession. In 1961, he was sentenced to death in Lviv for his part in the organisation of the Ukrainian Workers' and Peasants' Union. The sentence was commuted to 10 years of strict regime imprisonment and 5 years exile. In 1976, Lukyanenko became a founding member of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group. Not long after, on December 12, 1977, he was arrested and sentenced to a further 15 years for his human and national rights activities. Last year, the Ukrainian Helsinki Group was re-established as a mass movement under a new name — Ukrainian Helsinki Union — and Levko Lukyanenko, then still in exile, agreed to become its head. In January of this year, Lukyanenko was released from exile and settled in the town of Sendiv, in the Chernihiv region of Ukraine.

According to *Informator* (Informant) No. 11, February 13, 1989, a weekly bulletin of the Lviv regional branch of the UHU, leading members of the Union familiarised themselves with "What is to be done", in which the author outlines his thoughts on the perspectives of perestroika and the tasks which lie before the Ukrainian national-democratic movement, at a meeting of the All-Ukrainian Coordinating Council of the UHU in Kyiv on February 2-4. The participants of the meeting agreed on the future strategy and tactics of the UHU.

"WHAT IS TO BE DONE"

"What is to be done" is not merely an important programmatical document of the national-liberation movement in Ukraine. It is also a significant theoretical contribution to the general discussion about Ukrainian political thought in the period of perestroika and glasnost.

It was written between December 1988 and January 1989, while Lukyanenko was in exile in the Tomsk region. "What is to be done" is comprised of seven chapters. In the first, by far the longest and most detailed chapter (34 pages), Lukyanenko gives a "more or less systematic account of his understanding of the prerequisites, present conditions and perspectives of perestroika in general, and for [the Ukrainian] patriotic movement in particular". At the end of this chapter the author reaches the following general conclusion:

In the Soviet Union, "the communist imperial order has reached a crisis point as a result of the logical development of its external policy of conquest, and the artificial, non-viable internal economic policy. Brezhnev merely added a few features to its most recent period. Presently, we are not seeing the bankruptcy of Brezhnev as a corrupt and amoral leader. We are seeing the bankruptcy of the Marxist idea of the international dictatorship of the proletariat, the bankruptcy of the 600 year old Russian imperial idea, the bankruptcy of the economic competition between the authoritarian USSR and the democratic West. And because the opposition has involved almost half of mankind, its denouement will lead mankind into a new world, which will begin a new turn in history on a new spiritual basis".

In the second chapter, "The short-term perspectives", Lukyanenko emphasises that, in his analysis of the hopeless situation into which Moscow has led the Soviet Union, restructuring is a social upheaval, which has acquired its own dynamics, having torn itself away from under the influence of the centre. At the same time, Lukyanenko states that: "restructuring, with its economic decentralisation as one of the two most important prerequisites of recovery from the economic crisis, will continue; democratisation, as the sole possible means of overcoming the industrial passivity of the workers, will continue; and because the two previous processes are impossible without general democratisation, so it, too, will continue".

The next three chapters, "Where are our forces?", "We are among friends", and "Will they jail us? They won't jail us!", consist of an analysis of the dislocation of social and political forces, which have fought one another over the last decades for the existence of Ukraine on the one hand, and the Soviet Union, on the other. "Ukraine has shown the world", writes the author, "and has herself realised that the spirit of the Kozaks has not yet died within her, and that she has the right to sing with pride, even today, 'Ukraine has not yet died, neither has her glory nor freedom', not only as a national anthem and the memory of our strong, freedom-loving forefathers, who did not renounce their faith even when they were impaled on sharp stakes, but as a testament to the living Kozak blood within the present-day national core". In these chapters, Lukyanenko praises the merits of the members of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group, six of whom died in the Ural concentration camp in Kuchino. He calls for even greater activity geared towards the realisation of the national and human rights of Ukrainians. "We have the right to open public activity", Lukyanenko writes, "We have the right to the social struggle with a right to victory. We have the right to participate in the play of social forces, and we have to build up the forces on our side, and not wait until the opposing force will leave the arena of its own accord".

In this struggle Lukyanenko is counting on the forces which will strive towards Ukrainian liberation:

- the historical tendency of development;
- the moral support of the democratic world, particularly the Ukrainian diaspora;
- the current policy of restructuring;
- the democratic movement in Russia;
- the national-liberation movements of the peoples of the USSR; and
- the democratic processes in the so-called social-democratic countries.

The spontaneous forces are the UHU and its branches outside Ukraine; the potential force is the people, which, with the consolidation of the democratic principles of social life, will give their increasing support to the liberation process.

The sixth chapter is entitled "Our Goal". In this chapter, Lukyanenko describes Ukraine as "a country of sorrow and grief, a country, where the

people love freedom most, and yet know it the least". She is a country from whose people Russia has tried to "rip out the soul" and "hurl [them] into non-existence". "They used to call us Little Russians", writes the author, "They almost buried us in the ground together with our name, and began to call us 'Soviet people'. But, no", he goes on, "we are not yet in our coffin! And our goal is not to end up in a coffin". Further on, Lukyanenko also stresses Ukraine's need to secede from the Soviet Union, a right laid down in the USSR Constitution, and to lead a free and independent existence. The creation of an independent Ukrainian republic is the primary goal of the Ukrainian people.

"One should not speak quietly" is the final chapter of this document. It is summed up by its concluding paragraph:

"The nation is alive so long as its perception of its individuality and aspiration towards independence is alive within it. Thus, for the sake of preserving our nation, let us not obscure our authentic independent substance with ambiguous words. Let us be honest and bold".

CALL TO BOYCOTT SOVIET ELECTIONS

The Ukrainian Central Information Service received an appeal from the Lviv regional branch of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union urging the people of Lviv and its oblast to boycott the elections to the Congress of People's Deputies in March. There was no guarantee that any of the popular candidates, like Rostyslav Bratun and Roman Ivanychuk, would be elected and the UHU members feared that all candidates who did not meet with the approval of the party bureaucracy would be weeded out in the process.

APPEAL TO THE PEOPLE OF LVIV AND ITS OBLAST

Citizens,

The course of the electoral campaign has dissipated any illusions about the possibility of nominating and registering people who would genuinely defend national interests as candidates for the election to the Congress of People's Deputies. The anti-democratic law on elections has been put into practice and has formed a wall to protect the party bureaucrats. The machinations of the party administration during the nomination and registration of candidates in Stryi and Boryslav, in Chervonohrad and Lviv, particularly as regards the popular candidates, Rostyslav Bratun and Roman Ivanychuk, have become widely known.

The time when every citizen must face the issue of how to cast his vote is drawing near.

In past decades, the candid falsification of the true election results in the UkSSR has shown mass participation in the elections and a unanimity in voting on a scale that has not even been seen in the democratic world. In a one-party regime where all important administrative posts and control rests in the hands of the bureaucratic apparatus, there is no guarantee that such a disgraceful practice will not be repeated. It would also be naive to hope that the election to the so-called Congress of People's Deputies of several more liberal deputies can in some way influence the composition of the UkSSR Supreme Soviet, the composition and politics of the future government. In addition to that, our participation in these elections, which are neither direct, nor equal, nor general, would justify the reactionary legislation and help the party bureaucracy to demagogically state once again that it received the mandate to govern the state from the people.

Therefore, we urge all of you to boycott the anti-democratic elections, which are in actual fact "elections without election!"

We recommend that you boycott the elections in one of the following ways:

- 1) by taking your ballot card away with you and giving it to activists of the UHU;
- 2) by non-participation in the elections having previously delivered a statement about your desire not to take part in un-democratic elections to the district electoral authorities;
- 3) by writing the word "boycott" across your ballot card.

We believe that it is not the result of these "elections", which is known in advance, that will be important, but a demonstration of public courage, the political maturity of the people.

Only a conscious mass boycott of the anti-democratic elections will help to abolish the un-democratic legislation and establish a just electoral system, and also speed up the establishment of an all-national democratic movement for restructuring. Boycott the undemocratic elections.

LVIV REGIONAL COUNCIL OF THE UKRAINIAN HELSINKI UNION

FOR A UKRAINIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH

Press Release No. 68 of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union Press Service

(UCIS) In the summer of 1988, certain Western radio stations broadcast a premature report about the creation of an Initiative Group for the Revival of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church in Ukraine. In actual fact, this group did not yet exist. Measures for the creation of the Initiative Committee for the Revival of the UAOC began only with the efforts of the Executive Committee of the UHU. This committee is presently in existence and has

began its work. In the appeal given below, we have used extracts from a draft written by Orthodox priest, Fr. Romaniuk, who emigrated [to the West] last summer.

* * *

To the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR
To the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the UkSSR
To the international Christian community

APPEAL OF THE INITIATIVE COMMITTEE FOR THE REVIVAL OF THE UKRAINIAN AUTOCEPHALOUS ORTHODOX CHURCH IN UKRAINE

Important changes in the spiritual life of our country are taking place and, although this process is inconsistent and contradictory, today light has already been shed on many pressing problems that need to be resolved. One of these is the religious question in the UkSSR. For decades Ukrainian believers have been subjected to the *yarlyk* [yoke] of enemies and foreign nationalists. The ethnic population of the republic was deprived of the opportunity to pray, preach or study in theological schools in its own language. We are deprived of that which is most essential of all, that which the Holy Ghost gave to the Christian Church on the Day of the Pentecost when he descended on the Apostles (Acts 2, 3-8; 11). On this occasion, let us also mention the words of the Apostle Paul from a letter to the Corinthians: "I would rather speak five comprehensible words in church, so that I may teach others too, than ten thousand words in a foreign language!" (Cor. 14, 19).

The hierarchy of the Russian Orthodox Church unlawfully usurped control over the Ukrainian Orthodox Church as long ago as 1685, not long after the so-called "reunification" of Ukraine and Russia, and, until this day, does not recognise the existence of a particular Ukrainian national religious tradition as such, together with its culture, language, ritualism, that is it continues with the chauvinistic treatment of the national question. Orthodox Ukraine can not reconcile herself with such anti-evangelical, anti-canonical practices. Like every other civilised nation, we have the inalienable right to our own independent autocephalous Church.

The tradition of Ukrainian Orthodoxy originates from the baptism of Kyivan Rus', from Grand Prince of Kyiv St. Volodymyr, whose missionary work was conducted with the assistance of both Byzantine and Roman centres of Christianity. The universal schism of the Churches occurred much later, in 1054, but the Christianity which we officially accepted from Byzantium had a clearly Orthodox character from the very beginning. In time, this tradition was consolidated by Kyivan Metropolitan Ilarion, who supported the idea of the Eastern Orthodoxy of Christianity in a number of ways, and all the later Ukrainian religious leaders up to the time of the Kozaks, when the Ukrainian Orthodox Church experienced the greatest development. The religious and social activity of Metropolitans Yov Boretskyi, Petro Mohyla, Sylvester Kosiv, the great cultural, educational and missionary work of the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, and the Orthodox church brotherhoods throughout the whole of Ukraine.

After losing its independence in 1685, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church was revived in October 1921 (the first All-Ukrainian Orthodox Church Sobor). The main driving force behind the revival of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church and its autocephaly was Metropolitan Vasyl Lypkivskyi. In the nine years of the existence of the Church, over 5,000 parishes were created which were attended by 4,000 priests and presided over by a Metropolitan.

By its activity, the UAOC embodied the words of the gospel which were incorporated into the decree of the 1921 Church Sobor: "In the same way the Son of Man came not to be served, but to serve others, and to give His Soul for the salvation of many!" (Mt. 20, 28).

Nearly all the leading activists of the Church, like the members of the All-Union Council of Laymen and all the bishops, together with Metropolitan Vasyl Lypkivskyi, died a martyr's death in camps, prisons and exile. In this brutal manner the UAOC was destroyed in the 1930s, in the time of Stalinist repression. Ukrainian churches suffered mass destruction, and the remaining congregation was again incorporated into Russian Orthodoxy, which, although it suffered persecution, was granted the right to a miserable existence in the Stalinist system of national priorities. But the Russian Orthodox Church does not recognise the very fact of the existence of the UAOC and is incapable of satisfying the religious needs of the Ukrainian believers. For this reason, we, Ukrainian orthodox believers, have decided to create an Initiative Committee for the Revival of the UAOC in Ukraine. We will put the question of the revival of the UAOC before the legislative bodies of the UkSSR and the USSR, we will strive for the registration of the religious communities and, if necessary, collect signatures for the revival of the UAOC among the Ukrainian community. But we expect that the issue will not get to such a stage when mass measures will be necessary and our Church will revive unimpeded on the basis of the constitutional guarantee of the freedom of conscience, which will become real proof of the democratic restructuring of our society.

At the same time, we appeal to His Beatitude the Universal Patriarch of the Orthodox Church, Dimitrius, to the UAOC abroad, to the autocephalous Orthodox Churches of the world, to the international Christian circles, and to all people of good will for support. We aspire, like all civilised people, towards unity with God within our own framework, in our own language.

15 February 1989

Signatories:

Fr. Bohdan Mykhailenko, priest of the Holy Ascension Church of the Latvian SSR, Jelgava, Neon Paegles Street 11, apt. 15.

Taras Antoniuk, Kyiv, Chkalov Street 79, apt. 39.

Anatoliy Bytchenko, Kyiv 73, Kopelovska Street 2a, apt. 36.

Mykola Budnyk, Zhytomyr region, Volodar-Volyn district, village of Skolobiv.

Larysa Lohvytska, Kyiv, Yerevan Street 4, apt. 72.

Press Service of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union

MEETING OF THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE NATIONAL-DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENTS OF THE NATIONS OF THE USSR

Vilnius, January 29

(*UCIS*) According to the Moscow representative of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union, the meeting of representatives of the national-democratic movements of the nations of the USSR was held in Vilnius, capital of Lithuania, on January 29.

The conference was attended by representatives of various independent groups from Ukraine, the Baltic republics, Georgia, Armenia and the Crimean Tartar movement. Mykola Horbal, Oles Shevchenko and Bohdan Hryzan represented the Ukrainian Helsinki Union.

The participants of the conference, during which the problems of national development of the non-Russian republics and the democratisation of the Soviet regime were discussed, signed an appeal to the Russian intelligentsia. The full text of the appeal follows below.

APPEAL TO THE RUSSIAN INTELLIGENTSIA

Gentlemen!

A dramatic moment has come in the history of the state which united our nations by force — a moment, when the unequal coexistence of nations has placed them before the danger of total extinction.

It is difficult for us to find another example of a ruling regime which had brought about the culture of many nations to a state of ruin in such a short period of history. Today the Soviet Union remains the only empire in the world, where great power centralism and means of assimilation are systematically enforced, where nations are deprived of every opportunity to resolve their political, cultural and national problems independently.

The Soviet state inherited the principle of suppressing oppressed nations from Tsarist Russia, which even Lenin described as a "prison of nations", and has, for decades, realised (. . .) the idea of the so-called merging of nations. In practice, this idea has served as a cover for brutal, forced Russification. In the most recent decades, the artificial settlement of the territories of the non-Russian Soviet republics by Russian families from the RSFSR and the reverse in the form of the organised recruitment of a labour force for the so-called socialist enterprises like the ill-fated BAM (Baikal-Amur Railway line) and others, were used as an effective means of consolidating the imperial struc-

ture. An article in the independent Lithuanian newspaper *Rebirth* (No. 1) for January of this year can serve as a compromising example. According to this publication, a secret government decree which stipulates that the indigenous population is to form no more than 40 per cent of the total population of the republican capitals and 60 per cent of the population of the republic as a whole is in force. In the Russian Federation itself, the policy of the assimilation of the national minorities has brought the Evenky, Nanaytsi, Chukshi, Mordva, Odmurty, Komi and many other peoples to the verge of extinction.

In the years of the implementation of this chauvinistic policy, the ruling regime destroyed tens of millions of innocent citizens in peacetime. Fear and force became the principal means of preserving the empire. Not only the oppressed nations, but also the Russian nation itself, which is a tool of oppression, a tool of assimilation, in the hands of the regime, suffered great losses.

Attempts on the part of the imperial rulers of the USSR to retain the system of control over the nations for the ruling Russian nation will lead only to the worsening of relations between the nations and the rise of hostility and hate.

In connection with this, we, the representatives of the national-democratic movements of the nations which live on the territory of the Soviet Union, believe that the time has come when promises have to be fulfilled. The right of the nation to self-determination, which the ruling Communist Party has declared since the very beginning of its existence, must become reality. We are surprised that, with certain exceptions, the representatives of the democratic movement of Russia, and the Russian intelligentsia in general, have not found sufficient courage in themselves to express clear views on the national question, to condemn the dictatorship of spiritual oppression, presided over by the Soviet Russian government, as a crime against humanity. But the time has come; the system has rocked. A new structure should be built on new foundations. We propose to build it on the basis of democratic non-oppressive principles. We urge all true Russian patriots — together with those who are today living outside the borders of Russia — who feel the need to return there, actively, resolutely and with dedication, to set about the building of their democratic national state. In the realisation of this aspiration you can always rely on our very positive attitude.

The final document of the Vienna conference of representatives of the 35 countries participating in the discussions concerning security and cooperation in Europe, as well as the US and Canada, states that, on the basis of the principle of the right of the nation to manage its own affairs, and according to related articles of the Final Act of the Helsinki Accords, the oppressed nations have the right, in conditions of full freedom, to determine, when and how they wish, their internal and external political status without outside interference, and also to determine, according to their beliefs, their political, economic, social and cultural development. We regard the situation whereby

the international documents signed by the Soviet government are in actual fact ignored as intolerable. At the same time we consider these documents a guarantee of a just solution to the national problem. We express the hope that the Russian intelligentsia, the democratic movement of Russia, all Russian patriots, support the idea of national independence recognised by the whole international community.

Vilnius, January 29, 1989

The document was signed by the following:

Oles Shevchenko, Mykola Horbal, Ivan Makar, Bohdan Hryzan —
Ukrainian Helsinki Union;
Representatives of the
Party of Democrats of Lithuania;
Lithuanian Helsinki Group;
League of Freedom of Lithuania;
National Union of Lithuanian Youth;
Lithuanian Committee for the Defence of Political Prisoners;
Club for the Defence of the Environment (Latvia);
Movement of the National Independence of Latvia;
Party of the National Independence of Estonia;
Byelorussian Club "Pahonya";
Independent newspaper *Biloruska Trybuna* (Byelorussian Tribune);
Society of St. Illia the Righteous (Georgia);
Georgian Helsinki Group;
Society of Illia Chauchavadze (Georgia);
National-Democratic Party of Georgia;
National Movement of Crimean Tartars;
Union of the National Self-Determination of Armenia;
Union for the Struggle for Survival of Armenia.

HISTORIC ACT OF REUNIFICATION

Appeal of the Executive Committee of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union

(UCIS) *On the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the Act of the Reunification of Ukrainian Territory of January 22, 1919, the Executive Committee of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union has issued an appeal which appears in Press Release No. 54 of the UHU Press Service. We give the full text below.*

Throughout the ages, our nation, whose territory was divided between

powerful neighbours, aspired towards freedom and strived towards the reunification of its homeland into a single sovereign organ.

The eternal dream of the people became reality only at the beginning of the 20th century. The initiator of the reunification was the Western Ukrainian National Republic (ZUNR). The people of Lviv commemorated the 70th anniversary of this act on 1 November 1988 by laying flowers and holding a memorial service by the graveside of the soldiers of the Ukrainian Army of Halychyna at the Yaniv cemetery.

On 3 January 1919, in the name of the Ukrainians of Austria-Hungary, the supreme legislative organ (National Council) of the Western Ukrainian National Republic solemnly declared the reunification of the Western Ukrainian National Republic with the Ukrainians of central Ukraine into a single national republic. The Directorate of the Ukrainian National Republic [Kyiv — ed.] welcomed this historic step and resolved to put it into practice.

On 22 January 1919, this act of national will was declared by the government of the Ukrainian National Republic in the square outside the Cathedral of St. Sophia in Kyiv in the presence of the Ukrainian armed forces and thousands of Kyivans. The Universal [Decree — ed.], declared on this occasion, stated the following:

“In the name of the Ukrainian National Republic, the Directorate declares to the whole Ukrainian nation a great event in the history of Ukraine. On 3 January 1919, in the town of Stanyslaviv, the Ukrainian National Council of the Western Ukrainian National Republic, as the representative of the will of all the Ukrainians of Austria-Hungary and as their supreme legislative organ, solemnly declared the reunification of the Western Ukrainian National Republic with the central National Republic into a single sovereign National Republic. Welcoming with great joy this historic step of our western brothers, the Directorate of the Ukrainian National Republic has resolved to acknowledge this reunification and to put it into practice in accordance with the conditions stipulated by the decree of the Ukrainian National Council of January 3, 1919”.

The Universal concludes with the following words:

“From this day on, the territories of one Ukraine — the Western Ukrainian National Republic (Halychyna, Bukovyna and Hungarian Rus’) and central Great Ukraine, separated from one another for centuries, are united. The eternal dreams for which the best sons of Ukraine lived and died have come true. From this day on, there is one independent Ukrainian National Republic”.

But the act of reunification, declared by force of historic circumstances, was not validated. However, throughout two decades, it directed the eyes of the people of Halychyna towards their neighbouring brothers, added strength to the struggle for freedom, did not allow the people to dissolve in the multi-lingual sea, resisted the efforts of the occupants to assert as their own since time immemorial the Ukrainian lands of Western Ukraine.

At the same time, the central Ukrainians looked with hope towards their western brothers while succumbing to the bloody terror of Stalin's oprichniki, who murdered a third of the Ukrainian population, dealt the current blow to Ukrainian culture, decimated the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church and placed central Ukraine under the threat of total annihilation.

Observing the intense restructuring of national institutes in Halychyna, the central Ukrainians did not lose faith in the rebirth of the native culture, the consolidation of the Ukrainian sovereign republic.

And so the act of union declared 70 years ago must become our national holiday, and the federative base it laid down must become the basis of our democracy and sovereignty. In connection with this, the Ukrainian Helsinki Union is urging everyone to commemorate this great Act of the Reunification of Ukrainian lands in any way they can throughout the whole of Ukraine. In particular, it gives its support to the "Initiative Group of the Marian Society of Mercy", which is organising a moleben [dedicational service] on January 22 of this year in the square of the Cathedral of St. George in Lviv at 1 p.m. after Mass. If the priests of the official Church refuse to conduct these prayers for the people then we will pray ourselves in the same way the people of Lviv prayed on December 18, 1988, for the salvation of the children of Ukraine and Armenia beside the Church of St. Nicholas.

Press Service of the UHU

January 12, 1989

FREEDOM CHARTER OF THE SUBJUGATED NATIONS IN THE USSR

To the governments and nations of the Free World

(UCIS) Having met in the city of Vilnius on January 28-29, 1989, we, the representatives of the national liberation movements of Armenia, Byelorussia, Georgia, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Ukraine, announce the formation of a joint committee uniting our efforts for the establishment of national independent and free states.

History has shown that the existence of a multinational empire is an anachronism which creates insufferable conditions for all the nations living in the empire. We feel that pluralism is as fundamental a principle in international relations as it is in the sphere of human rights.

While consolidating the right of every nation to individual development, we represent national movements which have been fighting for decades for independence. While we do not impose our conceptions of state organisation and sovereignty, we feel that neither common existence within the framework of

the empire, nor a federative or confederative state organisation are acceptable to the nations which we represent.

We need political and moral support for our movement from all governments and social organisations. We hope that our understanding of the contemporary world will prevail, in accordance with which only the free and independent existence of nations which are striving towards this end will ensure the stable and peaceful development of world community.

We call upon our fellow countrymen who are living beyond the borders of the empire to establish a similar committee and to closely cooperate with us towards the realisation of our common goal. We ask Paruir Ayrikian to be our representative abroad and to assist in the formation of this committee.

We are convinced that our nations will achieve freedom and we hope that we will attain it in the near future and without violent means.

Signatories

1. Union for the National Self-Determination of Armenia — Mekhak Gabrielian
 2. Struggle for the Survival of Armenia — Vaan Ishkhanian
 3. Society of St. Illia the Righteous — Merab Kostava
 4. Society of Illia Chauchavadze — Taniel Hviniasvili
 5. National Union of Lithuanian Youth — Sakris Bushkiavicius, Paulus Vaitekunas
 6. National Independence Party of Estonia — Lahle Parek, Ants Zyndas
 7. Lithuanian Freedom League — Algimantas Valtrusis, Antanas Terleckas
 8. Pre-Founding Faction of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union — Bohdan Hrytsai, Ivan Makar
 9. Latvian National Independence Movement — Anta Rudzite
 10. Informal Latvian National Front — Ints Zalis
 11. Byelorussian Club "Pahonya" and the newspaper *Byelorussian Tribune* — Serzhuk Makhay
 12. National Democratic Party of Georgia — Georgiy Akhelya
 13. Lithuanian Committee for the Defence of Political Prisoners — Petras Tidzikas
-

Olha HORYN

IN THE TRADITIONAL MODE OF RUSSIFICATION

(Conclusion)

So there was no assurance that the agreement would be adhered to and this is no coincidence. Several years after the death of B. Khmelnytskyi, the Tsarist government showed that it had no intention of adhering to the Treaty of Pereyaslav. It used every conceivable opportunity to restrict the rights of the Hetman State and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. And after about 100 years, the Pereyaslav Treaty was consigned to the scrap heap, and Tsarist bureaucracy became the master in Ukraine. The Ukrainian Orthodox Church lost its independence earlier still. This is the reason why Taras Shevchenko called B. Khmelnytskyi "foolish son", to whom mother-Ukraine would have done the following:

"If only I had known,
I would have smothered him in his cradle,
Lulling him to sleep under my heart".

Apart from this, no one annulled the thirty-three paragraphs of the Union of Brest, and the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church became a mighty force of the spiritual evolution of our nation and a secure bastion against the attempts of the oppressors to assimilate it. Today, every schoolchild knows that during the most difficult periods in the life of our nation, it had the support of its priests, our "apostles of the peasantry" as Olha Kobylanska called them, the enlighteners and awakeners of the nation. It is due to their incredibly hard work that the nation survived in such complicated circumstances, became enlightened, retained the language and traditions of its forefathers. The work of one Greek-Catholic priest, Markian Shashkevych, for his nation far outweighs the gains of those who defame the Uniates.

Shashkevych is not an exception. With him were priests Vahylevych, Holovetskyi, Ustianovych, Vorobkevych, Puzyna; academics, composers, actors from priestly families: Omelyan Ohonovskyi, Solomia Krushelnytska, Ostap Terletskyi, Hulak-Artemosvkiy, Petro Nishchynskyi, Mykola Chernyavskyi and many others. Many nameless ploughmen toiled in the furrows of national enlightenment, teaching children in schools, churches, monasteries, and adults in the prosvita reading rooms and the like. The widespread publishing activity of our Church facilitated the availability of our spiritual heritage to the national masses not only of our own nation.

The close ties with the nation, the faith in the nation, were demonstrated by the Ukrainian Catholic Church right up to the last days of its legal existence. Even when the Stalinist mafia held an axe over the heads of the faithful Greek-Catholics, deporting them en masse to Siberia, throwing them into jails and concentration camps, killing them in the villages and towns, the Catholic priests did not betray their nation, even during these tragic years. They found themselves in those same places as the most active of our citizens who were cast out by Stalin's criminals.

Only those people who have neglected their civil responsibility before the nation can repeat the fables of the Stalinist bandits in the period of glasnost, yet knowing full well the thorny path of the Ukrainian Catholic Church.

No, the Ukrainian Catholic Church was not for the spiritual subjugation of the nation. This function was performed by other institutions on which the Ukrainian population of Naddnipryanshchyna depended — Russian despotism and its loyal Church.

At first, the Ukrainian Orthodox clergy acted as a vociferous opponent to the advance of Tsarism and to the Russian Patriarchate. Kyivan Metropolitan Sylvester Kosov was against the annexation of Ukraine to Russia and openly stated that he, the Metropolitan, together with the whole of the Synod "did not direct anyone to bow down before the Tsar, and lives with other clerics on his own accord, under no one's authority".

Apart from Kosov in Chyhyryn, the arch-priest of Cherkasy, Fedir Hurskyi, also opposed B. Khmelnytskyi's decision.

Aware of the mood of the Ukrainian clergy, the Russian Tsar and the Patriarch, for a time, refrained from decisive action against the disobedient clergy, although such attempts were continuous.

In 1666, the intention was to send a Metropolitan from Moscow to Ukraine. But this met with such unanimous resistance that on April 22 even Moscow's most obedient "protector of the Kyivan Metropolitanate", Mefodiy Fylymonovych, together with the Abbots of the Kyivan monasteries, went to Voyevoda Sheremetyev, the provincial administrator, and made an emotional statement:

"If it is the will of the great ruler to take away our liberty and give us a Metropolitan from Moscow and not one elected by us, then let the great ruler give the order to execute us, but we will not agree to this. . . it is better for us to accept death than a Metropolitan from Moscow".

It was only after 30 years of administrative pressure, persecution, intimidation and bribery that the Moscow Patriarchate succeeded in appointing Hedeon as Metropolitan who brought the Ukrainian Metropolitanate under the supremacy of that of Moscow. Even so, the Church had abundant properties and could continue to carry out its charitable duties (shelter for orphans, hospitals) and educational responsibilities and financing cultural and folklore activities with which it defended the nation from spiritual decline. For a long time, Kyiv was publicly acclaimed as the largest educational, scientific and cultural

centre in Eastern Europe and the graduates of the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy beamed the light of education to almost all the Slavonic countries.

In 1764, while liquidating the Hetman State, Catherine II carried out the secularisation (confiscation) of Church land, impairing the activity of those institutions which were materially supported by the Church. So here we have two examples of different Unions:

1. The Union of Brest, which transformed the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church into a mighty force of the spiritual renaissance of a section of the Ukrainian nation.
2. The Russian-Ukrainian treaty, which in the course of several decades completely russified the Ukrainian Church and transformed it into a massive instrument of russification of our nation.

Today, from a historian's retrospective viewpoint, there is sufficient documentation which convincingly proves that it was Russian sovereignty and its Church which became the forces that sowed enmity between nations and were the main instigators of the spiritual subjugation of our nation.

Under the stately hand of the Moscow Tsars, Ukraine with its widespread network of schools was transformed into one of the most backward provinces of the Russian empire. The memoirs of the son of Antioch Patriarch Paul Alepskyi, as an impartial person, testify to the fact that in 1653 "we have noticed a strange, but lovely, tradition in the land of the Kozaks: they are all, bar a small exception, literate, even most of the women and their daughters can read, they know the order of Church services and religious hymns. . . Priests teach orphans and do not allow them to roam the streets".

The high standard of education was secured by the widespread network of schools. According to the Census of 1740-1748, there were 143 schools in 142 villages, one school for every 756 people, but one hundred years later the number of schools was reduced tenfold to one school for every 6,730 people. In 1740, there were 866 schools in Eastern Ukraine, but 60 years later, there were none.

This was the result of the "noble influence" of the Pereyaslav Treaty on the spiritual rebirth of the Ukrainian nation.

Entire volumes of blame for the destruction of national structures, for the devastation of Ukrainian education, the liquidation of the big educational institutions can be written about Russian sovereignty and its Church.

No, there was nothing noble about the transition of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church to the sceptre of the Russian Patriarchate. It was the source of great misfortune. Tsarism advanced against the Ukrainian nation with the blessing of the Russian Orthodox Church. Decrees concerning the prohibition of the use of the Ukrainian language and national life in general poured forth:

1863 — The Valuyev decree;

1876 — the Emms decree;

1892, 1894, 1895 — ill-fated censorial prohibitions;
1910 — the Stolypin decree.

They all doomed us to "extinction", and the Russian Orthodox Church introduced the Russian language into Church services in Ukraine, and also put its hand to the spiritual subjugation of our nation.

* * *

Every type of coercion leads to a violation of national relationships between people and nations, and is a source of misunderstandings and conflicts. The relationship between the Ukrainian Orthodox Church and the Russian adds great weight in support of this statement. It convincingly proves that relations between the Churches were more or less normal up to the time of the Treaty of Pereyaslav.

It is known that in 1648 thirty graduates of the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy organised the first school in Russia and remained there to teach. Invitations were extended to Kyiv for fruit growers, bakers, watch makers, artists and illustrators and other professionals. The spiritual awakening of Russia occurred under the tangible influence of Ukraine. The Russian literary historian, academician Pypin writes:

"Our own efforts were not enough: they are calling the Kyivans to Moscow for educational work. In the middle of the 17th century, it became apparent that there was a need for real scholars for educational work, whom we lacked, so they had to be invited from Kyiv" (*Istoria russkoy literatury*, Vol. 2, p. 316).

Distinguished Church dignitaries Petro Volynets, Oleksiy Chernihovets (14th century), Stepan Yavorskyi, Dmytro Rostovskyi (Tuptalo), F. Leshchynskyi, Arseniy Matsiyevych (16th-18th century) and others, made their way to Moscow, where, in time, they headed the ranks of the Russian clergy.

Ukrainian clergy and academics earned the highest accolades in Moscow. They were treated as "the best people, the most talented, and the most distinguished were graduates of the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy" (taken from a letter by Petro Zavadvovskyi, who headed the school system for the Kyivan Metropolitan).

This could in time have become a two-way system, enriching the lives of neighbouring nations. But the imperial interests of the Russian élite, which was possessed by the idea of a great empire, obstructed this.

Obviously, in these circumstances, the personal contacts between academics, clergy, cultural activists and businessmen did not figure. Russian imperialist politics exchanged them for the russification of the Ukrainian nation, for policies which were hostile to the indigenous population.

The offensive of the empire increased and reached its heyday during the second half of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century. The Ukrainian nation was refused its own name, its own language by law, and all

manifestations of national consciousness were qualified as "Mazepist" and "separatist".

The defence of the native tongue was interpreted as being detrimental to the "political propaganda" of the empire. The nation was nurtured with the idea that "the Russian language is understood by the little Russians, and better even than the so-called Ukrainian language: most of the little Russians themselves accuse the group, whose members assert the opposite, with separatist ideas hostile to Russia and disastrous for Little Russia. . . The majority of the little Russians themselves convincingly show that there has never been nor can there ever be, any little Russian language".

In this manner, Internal Affairs Minister Valuyev justified his decree theoretically. His successors developed the tactics of the ultimate assimilation of the Ukrainian nation. The memorandum of the governor of Poltava to the Minister of Internal Affairs dated 14.2.1914 is noted for the same tactic. It reads:

Point 7. "Attention must be focussed on village clergymen and their political convictions. Appoint only great Russians as bishops to head the Eparchies, and then only those who are solid and energetic: exert extreme pressure on those priests who are infected with Ukrainophilism, appoint only great Russians as Eparchial inspectors of education".

Point 8. "Pay particular attention to seminaries, and appoint only great Russians as their rectors. . . We must concentrate on the Seminaries". . .

Apart from containing anti-Ukrainian directives, it is pertinent to focus on the memorandum and the tactless manner used by the secular authorities to interfere in the affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church. The Governor managed the affairs of the Church, ignoring the clerical hierarchy, developed the politics of the Church and directed it down the imperialist channel. If this is the indelicate way in which those who are authorised in matters of religion lead the Russian Orthodox Church today, then this practice had, indeed, a very old tradition. This tradition is carried on by the anti-Ukrainian activities of the Russian Orthodox Church, which was an obedient tool of imperial politics. It has remained so in our time. Its hierarchy has not yet introduced the Ukrainian language into the Church services, and in their sermons and epistles on the occasion of the Millennium of Christianity in Rus'-Ukraine has taken care not to utter a single syllable about the Ukrainian nation, siding with bankrupt Moscophilism. Can such a Church be close to and a native church of the Ukrainian people? Can it nurture the love of Christ's truth among the faithful towards their native land and amicable feelings towards other nations? It can do nothing but be the obedient instrument of the politics of secular authority.

Such is the myth of the Russian Orthodox Church's nurturing of cordial relations between nations. Such cordiality encompasses neither the Ukrainian nor the Russian nations, and it is against this background of estrangement of the Russian Orthodox Church from the interests of our nation, that the

Ukrainian Catholic Church appears as a truly national Church, a Church of the people, which reinforces Christian morals and love for God through the love of Ukraine, her nation, sees the moral improvement of the nation through the elevation of patriotism and the nurturing of love for all nations. She speaks to the nation in its own language and reinforces the aforementioned principle through daily prayer.

In the "Prayerbook of the Christian Family", which, as we know, is the Christian Code of Ethics of Greek-Catholics, its guide to life, we read:

"Almighty Creator and Lord of the Universe, Jesus Christ! You love the **whole of humanity** with all your heart. . . We, children of the Ukrainian nation, obedient servants of your Will, **love all nations** [emphasis is my own — O.H.] that you redeemed on the Cross with your blood, and our own Ukrainian nation first of all".

In another "Prayer" we read:

"Father of all nations! Lord!

Fortify our nation for battle against our enemies who want to forcibly or cunningly take away our right to the existence which You have mercifully given us. . . I do not ask for punishment for the enemies of our nation. . . But I beseech you, **righteous Father of all nations**, decrease the audacity and impudence of our enemies" [emphasis is my own — O.H.].

In this way the quoted "Prayers", on which the Greek-Catholic youth is educated from the age of six, show a love for all nations, as brothers, and at the same time, a noble feeling of patriotism to one's own nation. Perhaps it is the unity of Church and nation which is its strength, which has helped the Church endure the last decades, full of brutal persecutions, and on the threshold of the Millennial Jubilee of Christianity in Rus'-Ukraine become kindled with a new renaissance, summoning the wonder of the whole Christian world.

No, our Ukrainian Catholic Church does not cultivate hostility between nations, it does not kindle national enmity, which she herself has suffered throughout the centuries, but builds a solid foundation of understanding between them on the basis of mutual respect, dignity and brotherly love.

This is precisely the reason why she is attacked by those who understand friendship between nations to mean assimilation of the weaker by the stronger.

But this view is slowly receding into the past, and our underground Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church discovers new supporters and faithful.

THE **UK**KRAINIAN REVIEW



3

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SHEVCHENKO STONE IN LVIV
Site of future monument to Taras Shevchenko

Nicholas L. CHIROVSKY

THE SOVIET ECONOMY AT THE TIME OF PERESTROIKA

(Part 1)

I. Introduction

Having both studied and taught Soviet economy, comparatively and as a separate entity, the necessity of grand scale reconstruction, the current *perestroika*, was readily apparent to the author. The Soviet economic system is based on a central, comprehensive and purposive planning system, in which the government owns all production resources and controls decision making in all domains. This system has never worked normally, however, and as a 'sick economy', has dragged along inefficiently¹.

The Soviet Russian leadership has likewise known of the inefficient progression of the economy, but has not dared to question the practicality of Marxist-Leninist doctrine. The government has only reformed the system within the limits of the doctrine, allowing their economic condition to continually worsen.

The Soviet leadership under Stalin claimed to have completed the building of a socialist economy, a crucial step before the transition to communism. This was not the case, however, and consequently, in the period following World War II, the Soviet Union became increasingly distant from the communist ideal:

"Hence, the technique of reorganization has become for a number of years a standard device to cure the sick body of the Soviet national economy. In the agricultural sector several times either reduction or enlargement of the small private land plots, farmsteads, was undertaken to overcome the food shortages. At one time, those land plots were increased to enable the peasants to supplement their meager diet, derived from the highly deficient collective farms. Other times, they were reduced because the Soviet leadership suspected that peasants work more industriously on their plots, than on the collective farms. Hence,

1. About the inefficiency of the economic planning and its realisation see: N. L. Chirovsky, "The Official Figures of the Five-Year Plan 1966-1970 and their Evaluation", *The Journal of Business*, Seton Hall University, South Orange, N. J., May 1971, pp. 25-33; Chirovsky, "Another Five-Year Plan was Completed", *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, Autumn, 1971, No. 4, pp. 348-369; Chirovsky, "Sioma Piatyrichka v ostannii staddii zavershennia", *Vyzvolnyi Shlachh*, London, November-December, 1970, pp. 1199-1218; W. Loucks and W. Whitney, *Comparative Economic Systems*, New York, 1973, pp. 289-333; H. Schwartz, *Russia's Soviet Economy*, Englewood Cliffs, 1954, pp. 146-182 and 621-655; Schwartz, *An Introduction to the Soviet Economy*, Columbus, Ohio, 1968, pp. 83-100 and 155-164.

the declining productivity on the collective farms was directly linked with growing efficiency of the farmstead plots, and the plots were blamed for deficiency of collectivism.

Nevertheless, the situation in the Soviet agriculture continued to be desperate. Hence, the collective farms were reorganized. Small farms were liquidated, and a large-scale farm amalgamation followed to enable the introduction of "scientific management" and to raise in this way food production. Then, in a few years, the so-called state-owned and state-operated Machine-Tractor Stations, which served collective farms with agricultural machinery and implements, were abolished, and all machinery and implements were transferred to the farm against certain compulsory payments to the state.

The hoped-for improvement in agriculture did not come, however. Hence, a giant program of amalgamating farms into the so-called agrocities was discussed and introduced in the preparatory stage of realization, but soon abandoned. A new panacea was found in cultivating the half-desert "virgin lands" of the Kazakhstan, where farming was never practiced before. Disappointment followed there, too, after a few years. Several campaigns were forcefully undertaken toward a "giant lift" of the farm productivity without any satisfactory results. The epilogue of all these reorganizational maneuvers followed in 1963, when Russia, once an important grain export country, had to import grain from the United States, Canada, and other capitalistic lands to avert a serious food shortage on her home front.

After Khrushchev's ouster, the new leaders of the USSR came out with neither new nor startling reorganizational measures in agriculture. They enlarged again the size of the peasant land plots, encouraged private cattle raising, offered to limit the production and compulsory sale plans in collective farming, and introduced a gigantic financial help to the collective and state farms of 76 billion rubles to be invested in agriculture gradually over the period of five years in order to enable the farms to acquire better equipment and to apply more progressive production techniques. Collective farm indebtedness toward the State Bank was cancelled. From where the Soviets will get that staggering amount of 76 billion rubles to aid their agriculture and what will be the effect of spending that amount on the stability and purchasing power of ruble, remain to be seen. There is, however, a strong suspicion, that this gigantic investment spending will release a dangerous inflation pressure in the economy of the USSR. Marxism certainly did prove that it was not the theory to benefit farming.

Also in the field of manufacturing, collectivistic approach caused serious drawbacks, in particular low quality and inadequate quantity of production. Since the Marxian doctrines could not be challenged, also in manufacturing the Soviet leaders attempted through numerous reorgani-

zational measures to remedy the sad situation. At first an extreme centralism in planning, management and supervision was practiced. Various ministries were created for various industrial fields to direct the production processes, while the number, structure and competence of those ministerial departments were frequently changed without sometimes even giving those changes ample time to prove their value or expediency from the point of view of the national economic interests. Sometimes real "hurrah" reorganization was introduced without being properly thought through or prepared for. The Soviet "business cycles" may be directly related, among other things and causes, to those *ad hoc* reorganizational measures, which did not warrant by their nature the gigantic costs of money, energy and time.

After Khrushchev established himself as a Soviet dictator, he undertook in 1957 a sweeping reorganizational scheme. He decided to decentralize Soviet manufacturing. Central industrial ministries were abolished in most cases, and the whole country was divided into some 105 Economic Administrative Areas with Regional Economic Councils, each to head the area's manufacturing processes. The main slogan of the decentralization move was to bring "leadership closer to production". But already in the early sixties the whole decentralization scheme was reversed. At first 105 administrative areas were amalgamated and put under only 47 Regional Economic Councils. Then the Regional Councils were grouped into "large economic areas" to coordinate the actions, under the so-called Councils for Coordination and Planning. Finally, in 1963, a Supreme Council of the National Economy was created, and given all powers to direct industrial research, planning and production in the USSR. Centralism in the economic affairs fully returned, but grave shortcomings of collectivism were not eliminated. In his desperation, Khrushchev admitted that the Soviet economy may learn something from capitalism, and appealed to the citizens of the USSR "to act capitalistically, but to remain communist". In early 1965 a few central ministries were reintroduced in the defense industries, having signified a major defeat of Khrushchev's decentralization attempt.

The Seven-Year Plan to replace the Stalinist Five-Year Planning was another Khrushchev innovation towards lifting the falling-off Soviet industrial economy. Its ambitious goals were proven unrealistic by 1961. Hence, the new Soviet leaders have attempted in 1965 to find a middle way between the Stalinist centralism and Khrushchev's decentralization in preparing a new plan for the USSR to come.

The Soviet economists, planners and politicians apparently had exhausted their reorganizational imagination and resourcefulness by 1962 and started to think in terms of revising the Marxian doctrine itself, although they have never dared to admit it openly. That is how "Libermanism" was conceived. Yevsey Liberman from Kharkov Insti-

tute of Engineering and Economics became the chief spokesman for a new trend in economic thinking in the Soviet Union.

"Libermanism", a theoretical attempt to justify liberalization and profit motivation in socialist economics is not something new. The idea was to some extent, and in another version, included in the New Economic Policy (N.E.P.) in the Soviet Union of the middle twenties. Stalin, however, subsequently decided in favor of Marxian radicalism and mercilessly exterminated any compromisory solution between collectivism and individualism in the USSR economy. Then, poor results of strictly socialist economic measures in the "satellite" countries after the Second World War, induced an experimentation with "profit motive" and "liberalization of planning" in Czechoslovakia, Poland, and East Germany. The experiment was quite successful. The troubled situation in the USSR, the echo of the N.E.P. and the example of the satellite economies, naturally turned the attention of the Soviet economists in this direction. And still another development induced the "Libermanist" tendency. In order to fulfill the planning quota, Soviet industrial establishments turned out consumer goods which nobody wanted. Soviet distribution establishments were then stocked with merchandise of poor quality, unattractive workmanship and high price, which formally fitted in the plan but could not be sold. This meant waste of resources and still low living standards in the Soviet Union. The situation required a remedy"².

As a result of Khrushchev's Libermanist policy, central planning was relaxed, the managers of the industrial and commercial establishments were given more freedom in purchasing supplies and selling their products, and the profit element, cursed by Marx, came into use as a means of improving the quality and quantity of goods and services.

Khrushchev was soon ousted, however, and Party conservatives Brezhnev and Kosygin came into power. Libermanism was quietly shelved for being capitalistic and therefore incompatible with Marxism-Leninism. The Soviet Union returned to the Stalinist policy of central planning and management.

Due to enormous economic difficulties, however, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR and the Council of Ministers of the USSR proclaimed a new reorganisational scheme on April 3, 1973. Essentially this plan involved the merging of already large industrial establishments into three main groups: local, republican or Union jurisdiction and supervision, dependant upon the establishment's realm of business. Through this reorganisation Brezhnev and Kosygin hoped to maximise the advantages of large-scale production through minute division of labour and process specialisation, to streamline administrative procedures, and most importantly to increase indus-

2. N. L. Chirovsky, "Liberman v/s Marx", *Studies for a New Central Europe*, 1966, No. 4, pp. 34-48 (quote from p. 34-37).

trial research and development and apply these results to the practical market processes³.

Brezhnev's and Kosygin's reforms did not result in any significant improvements⁴. In 1982 Andropov assumed power in the USSR. Rather than reform he attempted to improve the economy by cracking down on alcoholism, hooliganism, and work inefficiency. His successor, Chernenko, likewise developed no new reforms. It is possible, however, that during the Chernenko regime, plans for what is today Gorbachev's *perestroika* were already in the making. It seems unlikely, given the difficulties of economic reconstruction within the Soviet political and economic system and Gorbachev's limited knowledge of economic development, that Gorbachev would be the sole founder and promoter of such a plan and that it would be so suddenly accepted as policy. This would indicate at least a few years of development. *Perestroika* has certainly followed reforms introduced in Red China by Teng Xioping since 1985, when the Chinese leadership openly declared Marxist-Leninist doctrine obsolete, and not applicable in modern China. Upon analysis it is evident that *perestroika* is also a retreat from Marxist-Leninist precepts.

II. The Nature of *Perestroika*

Years of various reform measures undertaken by the Soviet Russian leadership did not help the ailing economy. Soviet economic development was uneven. Some economic structures, e.g. heavy industry, grew more quickly and effectively, while others, such as consumer and service industries, remained stagnant. Overall the Soviet national economy lagged from 25 to 50 years behind the economic growth of the West and Japan.

For seventy years the Soviet Russian leadership refused to deviate from Marxist-Leninist doctrine beyond Lenin's rule, "two steps ahead with collectivisation and one step back in compromise with capitalist remnants". Lenin's New Economic Policy from 1921-28 and Khrushchev's 'thaw', with its decentralisation scheme and Libermanist liberalisation, were therefore not open breaks from Marxist-Leninist government planning, but were indeed necessary to closer approach the communist ideal.

Gorbachev's *perestroika* has taken reform farther than any previous Soviet plan. It has gradually, although on a small scale, abandoned pure Marxist-Leninist doctrine in all of its perspectives, by allowing private initiative, free marketing, profit motivation, private enterprising, competition, and a free, rather than state, price setting. Peasants have been encouraged to take plots of land for private farming, and people of initiative were induced to organise cooperatives and small businesses for individual gain. Thus, the economy has followed a path considered by Marx to be against the interest of the prolet-

3. N. L. Chirovsky, "Sovietska reforma promyslovosti 1973 r.", *Papers*, Shevchenko Scientific Society, New York, 1976, Vol. 192, pp. 210-221, English summary, p. 329.

4. *Ibid.*, pp. 217-220.

ariat, a crime that for decades resulted in the incarceration, deportation, and killing of Soviet citizens. Statistics show that some one million people were annihilated annually, an estimated 72 million during the Soviet era⁵.

Yet an only partial deviation from theory could not improve the situation, apparent in the dramatic developments in China in May and June 1989. A crucial and illogical error on the part of Soviet and Chinese governments was the simultaneous proclamation of *glasnost*, openness in social and political life, and *perestroika*, economic reconstruction according to free market principles, while retaining a one-party dictatorial system, in which the ruling class remains an élite minority. The contradictions within the system suffer from long-term incompatibility, resulting in an inevitable worsening of the social, political, and economic situation.

After *glasnost* and *perestroika* relaxed the harsh social discipline of the previous eras, particularly that of Brezhnev, work efficiency in state-run establishments declined. The people, no longer fearing repercussions, began to pursue personal interests over those of the state. As a result of lowered work efficiency, the productivity of the Soviet economy continued to decline, a fact about which Gorbachev himself has complained on various occasions. The food situation worsened; the people did not want to work; the management was inefficient; the local Party and government officials were responsible for poor work performance. In 1988 the budgetary deficit of the USSR was \$56 million⁶. James McCarty wrote in May 1989 that the USSR is a backward country in all respects; that credit is virtually unknown, that many people do not know what a cheque is; that the USSR is far behind in the field of computers⁷. The rouble is not recognised by foreign exchanges. The sense of freedom offered by *glasnost* has sparked a greater sense of national awareness among the subjugated Russian nationalities, which comprise nearly half of the USSR. This rise in nationalist tendencies has caused the further decline of the economic process.

Due to difficulties *perestroika* was put on hold in early 1989. Confusion arose between conservative feelings that too many reforms took place too quickly, and liberal feelings that too few reforms took place too slowly. On April 3, 1989, *Pravda* described the economic picture of the Soviet society as bleak and unsatisfactory. *Izvestia* followed suit⁸. The question of what slowed the reforms continued to be asked. In February 1989, *Pravda* pointed out that perhaps the positive effects of *perestroika* were delayed by the following: the growing demand for consumer goods, corresponding to the growth in per-

5. N. N. Ruskin, "Physical Extermination of the Population of the Soviet Union", *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, New York, September, 1956, pp. 239-243; M. Dolot, *Who Killed Them and Why?*, Cambridge, 1984; R. Conquest, *The Harvest of Sorrow*, New York, 1986; The Hearings before the International Commission on Moscow-Forced Famine in Ukraine, Brussels, May 23-27 and New York, October 31-November 5, 1988, records to be published.

6. *US News and World Report*, April 3, 1989, p. 38; according to the latest reports, the deficit in 1989 will be some \$162 billion.

7. *Miami Herald*, May 22, 1989, p. 13a.

8. *Pravda*, April 3, 1988, p. 4.

sonal income; the slow progress in the use of computers; the absence of food price reform; and the lack of relevance of wage rate to productivity⁹. *Komsomolskaya Pravda* asserted that the Soviet economy needs primarily a sense of proprietorship and must make the people's well-being of primary importance to further the economic process¹⁰. In addition to other newspapers, *Izvestia* praised the NEP as the right approach to the solution of economic problems. In the same newspaper R. Simonian asks whether the Soviet economy can learn from the West, suggesting that the Soviet Union should pattern itself after a form of regulated capitalism/market economy, or it would never catch up to the world market¹¹. Meanwhile living conditions of the poorer class, particularly those on pension, continued to worsen, according to letters to newspaper publishers¹².

A May 7, 1987, article by L. Popkova, appearing in *Novoi Mir*, asserts that the combination of a capitalistic market economy with socialist planning must inadvertently fail, because the market economy would ultimately take over¹³. This obvious lack of confidence in the Soviet socialist experiment system resulted in the angry reactions of die-hard Marxists. A June article by V. Lipitskiy retorts that Popkova's article was merely counterproductive, and that she overstepped the bounds of useful discussion, having gone too far in her findings¹⁴. A September 1987 article in *Novoi Mir* entitled "Advance and Debts", further delves into the possibilities of reconstruction. In this article N. Shmeliov calls for the following: the total independence of farming and business, a widespread 'privatisation' of consumer goods and services production, price and financial reforms, an end to any food subsidies, and a 'common market' of the East in which the presently limited Comecon would enjoy broader influence, and the rouble would be convertible¹⁵.

A. Bovin was caught in a controversial search for a new system. He said that the socialist 'model' needs restructuring in order to outperform its capitalist rival, win world-wide adherents, and avert a perilous power balance shift in capitalist favour. He further stated: "Consequently a reform, a departure from the old system and the creation of a new one, is a vital historic necessity whose time has long been ripe, if not overripe. The answer to this need is restructuring, which is destined to play a crucial role in the history of Socialism"¹⁶. Bovin's views could be considered somewhat naive and overly optimistic; previous socialist reforms had been ineffective, and there is no indication likely that present day reforms would enjoy greater success. V. Chikanov, a scholar, relating to the present chaotic situation, stressed the need to wait for long-term results. In the Soviet Union in 1987 managers and executives considered their short-term gains, rather than long-run economic

9. *Pravda*, February 6, 1989, p. 3.

10. *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, February 8, 1989, p. 2.

11. *Izvestia*, March 8, 1989, p. 5; March 10, 1989, p. 3.

12. *Pravda*, March 24, 1989, p. 4.

13. *Novoi Mir*, May 1987, No. 5. pp. 239-241.

14. *Pravda*, June 7, 1987, p. 3.

15. *Novoi Mir*, June 1987, No. 6, pp. 142-158.

16. *Izvestia*, July 11, 1987, p. 6.

goals¹⁷. At the same time *Izvestia* complained that individual enterprises made slow gains¹⁸. Confusion arose over the allowance for personal gain from individual business; what was rightfully earned personal income, and what was punishable speculation¹⁹.

Then, in September 1987, I. Silaiev, Vice-Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, made another confusing suggestion in *Pravda*. During the relaxation of the government grip on the economy, he advised the creation of a multienterprise state production association to control all phases of manufacturing and marketing, while reducing management staffs and the number of central ministries, and introducing competitive order placing. This is, however, merely another form of state-run economy²⁰.

The relaxation of social discipline, once centered in the terrorising actions of the KGB, caused an ethical decline in the USSR, further contributing to overall economic deterioration. In the past two years 2,607 gangs committed over 20,000 crimes, including 218 murders. In 1988, crime was up 9.5% due to the increase in teenage offences, a return to crime among ex-convicts, riots, racketeering, and so on, while the government continuously underpays the police force. The grim statistics were as follows:

Murders increased by 14 per cent
 Serious injuries by 32 per cent
 Assaults and robberies by 43 per cent
 House burglaries by 29 per cent²¹.

The question arises whether this is a result of the existing disparity between *glasnost* and *perestroika*, as observed by *U.S. News and World Report*:

"If *Glasnost* has not produced a thriving *Perestroika*, it has created new opportunities to practice the old arts of crookedness and corruption. Almost everything still can be had for a price in the Soviet Union, from symphony tickets to cars to funerals. The rich are said to spend more than \$22 billion a years on shadow services. The black market thrives. So does the prostitution. Bribery is rife. New mafias have grown up, selling 'protection' to private restaurants, which are literally blown up if they fail to pay"²².

(To be continued)

17. *Izvestia*, September 4, 1987, p. 2.

18. *Pravda*, November 25, 1987, also September 20, 1988, p. 3; *Izvestia*, September 9, 1987.

19. *Pravda*, June 14, 1986, p. 3.

20. *Pravda*, September 21, 1987, p. 2.

21. *Izvestia*, February 8, 1989. According to Gen. A. Smirnov, due to a decline in social discipline, 884,967 crimes were committed in the USSR in the first five months of 1989, a 31.9 per cent increase in the number of crimes committed during the same period of time in 1988. Street crimes increased by 83 per cent, and killings, by 26.5 per cent, *Svoboda*, Jersey City, June 16, 1989, p. 1; *Pravda*, November 15, 1987, p. 3.

22. April 4, 1989, p. 42.

Roman ZWARYCZ

GLASNOST: IS IT ENOUGH?

Gorbachev's reforms from a nationalist perspective

(Conclusion)

The nuts-and-bolts of reform

Gorbachev's reform initiative is basically a two-fold programme: *glasnost*, or liberalisation (a loose translation) of the totalitarian state towards greater civic liberty for the individual, and *perestroika*, or a restructuring of the economic sector and the vast administrative apparatus that oversees it. The connection between the two aspects of the programme is not altogether that apparent. A restructuring of the economy of a country does not necessarily require an introduction of liberal reforms. Yet, it is probably no mere coincidence that the Soviet Russian leader is pressing ahead on both fronts simultaneously. Upon closer scrutiny the interrelationship between *glasnost* and *perestroika* will become clearer.

Essentially, the economic reforms are designed to create the conditions in which elementary "free market" forces may rise and be nurtured. The programme itself calls for the following changes: the introduction of material incentives for workers to increase their productivity; the establishment of a new set of criteria by which a factory's or a firm's performance is to be evaluated and which will emphasise profits rather than plan fulfilment; releasing capital resources and making them available to low level managers at competitive interest rates, giving them greater power to make individual decisions; expanding the private agricultural plots for farmers. In short, although the USSR is not going to undergo an overnight metamorphosis into a capitalist state, the introduction of such free market forces will give the Soviet economy only a faint resemblance to the former, classical communist model.

Several obstacles must first be overcome in order for Gorbachev's programme to take root. The first, most formidable, hurdle which Gorbachev must clear is the far-reaching, well-entrenched Soviet administrative bureaucracy, which is in a position and possesses the capability and interest to sabotage the programme before it gets off the ground. Historically, the Soviet bureaucracy, which includes the official state apparatus, the political party *apparatchiki*, and the vast network of middle and lower level factory managers, has conducted business in what may be termed a "corporate fashion", i.e., in accordance with its own set of interests which did not necessarily coincide with the interests of the Soviet Russian empire. Gorbachev must obliterate

any and all corporate interests deeply embedded within the complex bureaucratic labyrinth, if he is to succeed. Needless to say, such a policy is sure to meet with intense opposition and may wreak havoc throughout the entire administrative network.

The neutralisation of the bureaucracy is to be accomplished primarily by eliminating the middle level administrative organs in the bureaucratic hierarchy, resulting in a greater degree of autonomy for the lower level agencies. Moreover, the unlimited controlling power of the central organs, e.g. GOSPLAN, must be considerably restricted, particularly with regard to their daily operational activities which have a direct bearing on the lower level agencies. Finally, horizontal links between the various bureaucratic bodies on the lowest levels of the hierarchy must be established, so that factory managers, for instance, can communicate directly with each other and place orders on specific supplies and materials. Such direct links will circumvent the power of control historically wielded by the central planning agencies, resulting in a marked improvement in the productive process. There is nothing complicated to these administrative reforms. In fact, an American corporate executive would probably have little difficulty recognising the schema of these reforms in terms of sound, rational management.

Glasnost: an end in itself?

The policy of *glasnost*, which has received most of the notoriety in the West, is not as simple to place within our analytical framework. The question, simply put, is why introduce such potentially cataclysmic changes in the political order, when the primary goal is economic modernity? Although the theoretical base for capitalism was utilitarian liberalism, industrialisation proceeded in Western Europe, the USA, and later in Japan by assembling a centralised, vertically organised, hierarchical system of organisation and technological discipline.

There are several factors which need to be considered in this regard. First, Gorbachev and his cost-conscious technocrats have apparently conceded that one major reason for the Soviet economy's sluggishness over the years has been the complete lack of any individual incentives, material or otherwise, for the workers and farmers. This conclusion is most poignantly brought out in the agricultural sector, where the private plots, which comprise only about 1-2% of the total arable land in the Soviet Union, were producing about 20% of the USSR's total agricultural output. To mobilise disinterested masses behind yet another industrialisation drive, which would undoubtedly require greater labour discipline, more austerity programmes (predicated by shortages of consumer goods), and a higher degree of individual effort on the part of the "Soviet citizen", rhetorical promises of a rosier future would only further reinforce the people's deeply entrenched, and well founded, cynicism towards

the regime. Instead, a show of sincerity and genuine good faith was needed and even critical to the future success of *perestroika* — the ultimate goal.

Glasnost is intended to be showcased as Gorbachev's high-profile show of sincerity. It is a high-powered, highly volatile and risky vehicle for mobilising the masses, primarily the Russian people, behind the economic reform programme. The hope is that by giving the people the opportunity to truly participate in the USSR's political processes, they will acquire a personal stake in the entire system, giving them each an individual incentive, in addition to the material benefits, to become more active in the economic sector. The avenues of political participation will be expanded in incremental stages, perhaps as far as allowing opposition parties to emerge. The emergence of an opposition, however, does not mean the primacy of the Communist Party and its grip on the epicentres of the power structure will be undermined. It should be noted that any officially sanctioned opposition activity will still remain under the watchful eye of the KGB and the CPSU. The very existence of an opposition, in fact, in such a scenario will depend on its ultimate benefactor: the established power élites, which the opposition, theoretically at least, will be called to oppose! He who loosens the noose can at any moment decide to re-tighten it.

If Gorbachev is to convince the masses to participate in the newly created political processes, he must first tear down the wall of cynicism which has grown as the many lies coming from the Kremlin have accumulated. The Soviet leader, however, has chosen the simplest weapon to fight against the destructive nihilist attitude of most every person living in the state which gave Orwell the inspiration he needed to create Big Brother. As incredulous as it may seem, that weapon is the truth!. Amazingly enough, Gorbachev has managed, practically overnight, to make honesty an instrument of his personal power and a vehicle spurring change. By manifesting his desire to speak with unprecedented forthrightness, not only has Gorbachev orchestrated a clear break with the past, he also hopes to generate a moral rebirth which may revive the Soviet Union's socio-political processes of development.

A second, more personal consideration, in Gorbachev's individual interest, is his need to develop a viable base which would allow him to consolidate his own grip on the reigns of power and give him and his technocratic managers the historic opportunity to move the USSR onto a higher plane. It is difficult to establish what precisely constitutes the present Soviet Russian leader's power base. The old criteria seemingly do not apply any longer. Gorbachev was vaulted onto the seat of power by his mentor Andropov. His track record, in fact, as a Party Secretary responsible for agriculture was abysmal. Gorbachev presided over the worst years of agricultural output in the Soviet Union since Stalin's death, and yet he emerged unscathed. Clearly, Gorbachev's ascendancy was prearranged.

Upon assuming the stewardship of the Soviet Russian empire following Chernenko's death, Gorbachev proceeded to alienate many of the power

groups at or near the apex of the Soviet hierarchical pyramid, a policy which in any other circumstances would prove to be suicidal for a new Soviet leader. In the past each new personage who emerged as leader needed to forge a consensus between the various power blocks, each possessing their own vested interests. Such a consensus would later form that leader's power base. Although Gorbachev's ascendancy was undoubtedly orchestrated in a similar fashion, probably by Andropov, the present Soviet leader is seeking to broaden his power base beyond the walls of the Kremlin. His reforms will disrupt the system of privileges so jealously protected by Soviet officials on all levels. One can expect that the vast bureaucratic apparatus, which is Gorbachev's first target, is certainly going to pull out all stops to sabotage the First Secretary's reform programme.

The army, which is one of the major interest groups in the Politburo, has been considerably embarrassed by the debacle in Afghanistan and is certainly not going to be willing to support Gorbachev's reforms after he forced it into an exit that many military officers felt was too premature. Furthermore, Gorbachev's programme calls for the allocation of more capital outlays for the consumer/light industrial sector, meaning that the military/heavy industrial sector will have that much narrower a slice of the budgetary pie.

The KGB's position with regard to the reform initiative is somewhat more difficult to gauge. The KGB has often been a key partner in the formation of the various coalitions behind a new leader's ascendancy to power. Yet, at the special Politburo meeting called in the spring of 1988 prior to the extraordinary Party conference held that same summer, the present KGB chief, Viktor Chebrikov, openly sided with Yegor Ligachev, who was targeted for attack after he allowed (and probably authored) a series of articles to appear in the Soviet press criticising Gorbachev's reform programme. Chebrikov's statements at this Politburo meeting, however, may not necessarily reflect the views of the majority of KGB agents working within and outside the USSR, many of whom are themselves the products of Andropov's more sophisticated training schools.

One would think that the Party as a whole would probably stand behind Gorbachev. A closer analysis, however, indicates otherwise. Historically, the Party has played the role of the mobilising force in Soviet society, usually resorting to terror tactics, instead of persuasive arguments, to move people. Presently, this former mobilising force itself has to be mobilised. The crisis in the Party is a microcosm of the society of which it has been called to be the vanguard. It is beset by stagnation, corruption, a feudal system of loyalty and nepotism, and by political ossification. People join the Party today not out of conviction, but out of personal interest. Although outwardly it appears that the crisis is essentially economic, or perhaps even social in character, the root of the problem is moral. The USSR is an enervated society incapable of generating belief in the value system which it espouses.

Gorbachev has yet to indicate what role he has envisioned for the Party, with

the one exception being the clearly dominant and critical task that the Moscow p.p.o. (primary party organisation) is to fulfil. The Moscow Party apparatus, by far the largest in the Soviet Union, will function in a supervisory role, overseeing every aspect of the reform programme on all its levels and in all its aspects. Although the power of the former central organs, the central planning agencies in particular, is to be severely restricted in the new schema, the special role reserved for the Moscow p.p.o. would seem to indicate that the reform does not call for complete decentralisation, but, instead, it envisions a re-centralised bureaucratic administrative structure, albeit on a broader, more horizontal plane. (The much-publicised Yeltsin affair is a clear sign that Gorbachev has not fully consolidated his power base and is encountering strong opposition from within Party circles).

Moreover, although the Moscow p.p.o.'s function has been clearly defined, Party leaders elsewhere, in the peripheries and the republics, are asking with increasing concern what role they are to play, beyond trying to woo the local intelligentsia to secure its support for the reform initiative. In fact, everything that Gorbachev has asked the Party apparatus to do has been tantamount to asking it to act contrary to its own interests. On the other hand, the handful of truly dedicated, ideologically motivated communists still remaining in the Party, although possessing no personal interests, cannot help but be confused, even repulsed, by the not so veiled capitalist elements in Gorbachev's reform programme. With regard to the economic aspects of Gorbachev's programme the Party is not to be the primary vehicle of reform. That role is reserved for the government apparatus, which at one time was almost completely subservient to the Party. It would seem that the only function the Party, the vanguard of the proletariat, is to fulfil is to stay out of the way!

The Party's dilemma is particularly poignant in the agricultural sphere, where the role of the Party has always been key. Gorbachev's vision calls for a partial, if not total, dismantling of the collective farm system. In its place a system of family brigades is to arise. These brigades are to enter the contractual relationships with the state (not the Party) regarding renting the land, the necessary tools and machines, livestock, or even with regard to gaining financial credits. This economic policy will destroy the power base of the local party cells, and yet the entire Party membership is being called on to support the reform programme to the detriment of its own formerly privileged position.

Gorbachev: the consummate populist

If the traditional power groups are not Gorbachev's base of support, wherein does it lie? The answer is to be found in *glasnost* itself. Gorbachev's base of power is in that group which is to be enfranchised and most empowered by the reforms: the people, or more specifically, the Russian people, whose

sense of national pride had not been aroused to such a high feverish pitch since the "Great Patriotic War". Gorbachev has managed to instil in the Russian people a sense of purpose, perhaps even a sense of mission. Watching the Soviet Russian leader working a crowd of Leningrad workers on television evokes images of some of the most revered American populist leaders.

A reasonably accurate barometer of the Russian people's support is the attitude of the Russian intelligentsia, which has historically, since tsarist times, played the role of an unofficial opposition and from which the Russian people have, in varying degrees, taken their cue. Neutralising the intelligentsia would not have been enough, however; Gorbachev needed to co-opt its support in order to ensure the support of the Russian people. From the outset, that support was forthcoming, at times with unreserved enthusiasm, e.g. Andrey Sakharov. Even a hard-line anti-communist and Russian imperialist like Aleksander Solzhenitsyn, has most recently indicated that he welcomes some of the changes that Gorbachev has instituted.

With the Russian people's support, Gorbachev's position may very well be virtually unassailable. If for any reason the present Soviet Russian leader should be deposed, the remaining leadership could be facing a revolution in the RSFSR, in Moscow itself, which the non-Russian nations are sure to take advantage of. The Russian people's full support for their present leader, however, may not be so extraordinary. For that matter, it is highly unlikely that the Soviet Russian empire could have lasted for as long as it already has without at least the tacit support of the Russian people. The Communist Party itself constitutes only 1% of the total population of the USSR. To argue that the Party alone can subjugate so many millions is quite simply absurd. Simply put, the Russian nation was an agent of imperialist oppression, willingly or unwillingly, but consciously to some degree. Hence, Gorbachev's mobilisation of support of the empire's base national group, the Russian oppressor nation, not only maintains historical continuity, but is also designed to preclude the empire's downfall. Perhaps the "old guard" and the less daring, conservative elements within the established power élites recognise in Gorbachev that same imperialistic quality that is latent in every good Russian.

Implications for the liberation processes

The analysis presented above can now shed more light on the degree to which Gorbachev's reform programme is commensurate with the liberation aims of the subjugated nations. The original thesis, viz., that *glasnost* poses the most threatening prospects for liberation nationalism, can now be put to the final test.

A reform programme, which will establish more liberty in sheer quantitative terms, e.g., freedom of the press, freedom of religion, freedom of assembly, or any other arithmetic calculus of freedoms, can never be equated

with national independence, statehood and sovereignty. Statehood is a value in itself; it cannot be quantified. Otherwise, statehood could be arithmetically expressed as a scientific formula of specific liberties, which is clearly absurd. Moreover, it is very dubious that individual liberty can be genuinely instituted without its prerequisite: national independence, sovereignty, and statehood. How can people enjoy true individual and civic liberty in a colony? Individual liberties are without substance when the nation as a whole is deprived of freedom. At one time John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau and others forcefully argued that individual liberty can only be viewed as an extension of a people's sovereignty.

In terms of national independence, the key issue involves authority, i.e., legitimate, moral right to rule, as opposed to sheer power alone, i.e., the strength to impose rule by force. The nature of a reform programme is to change only some, or perhaps even many aspects of the system and the authority structure, while maintaining the integrity of the established order. Revolutionary processes, on the other hand, are essentially characterised by the elevation of an alternative centre of authority, based on a set of norms and values, diametrically opposed to the established order. In terms of liberation nationalism, the two polar centres of authority are completely incompatible, since one represents the authority of the subjugated nations, while the other represents the imperialist authority. Both are completely incompatible, in fact, mutually exclusive, since they base their claim on legitimacy of opposite value-systems. Revolutions have often been described as crises of dual authority.

As a revolutionary situation develops, the society becomes increasingly polarised between those strata that fully support the underground revolutionary authority, with its maximalist programme of total change, and those who continue to buttress the old order. As this polarisation becomes more severe, the revolution's prospects become brighter. Inevitably, the illegitimate, established regime will recognise this and will seek to confuse issues, so as to render the choice between the two competing value-systems less clearly defined.

The primary, historically proven instrument by which an established regime can seek to attenuate such revolutionary societal polarisation is by introducing piecemeal reforms in order to obscure the diametric polarity that serves the interests of the revolutionary movement. The reform programme can act as a pacifying device, designed to relieve societal tension, or as a palliative instrument with the intention of co-opting key people, particularly the intelligentsia, behind the regime, while confusing the rest with the new policy of apparent benevolence. In the latter case, the reforms become an insidious threat of sorts, i.e., be satisfied with these new changes which will bring additional material benefits, or else risk losing everything. For example, a farmer who has worked on a collective farm all his life and dreamed of owning his own land will certainly harken to a revolutionary programme that promises to

destroy the collective farm system and extend the right of private property. If, however, the regime presents the farmer with the option of leaving the collective farm and working on land that he would initially be renting and which can later be bought outright from the state with credit financing, that farmer's support for the revolutionary movement may wane somewhat.

As uncertainty and confusion set in, the regime buys time to reconsolidate and perhaps reverse the increasingly revolutionary tension. The revolutionary movement, on the other hand, is cornered into a position where the only way it can counter-attack the reform initiative is on an abstract plane, e.g., warning the farmer that only in a national, sovereign and democratic, independent state, which in itself will be an extension of the sovereignty of the people, will the farmer's territory truly be his private property by (moral) right, whereas with the regime's reform programme the land will be the farmer's only on a provisional basis as a gratuity from the regime and in accordance with colonial law. The farmer may hear the theory, but all he knows is that he has land to work on for himself now.

Whether the primary or partial purpose of Gorbachev's reform initiative is to create additional leverage for the established order, which he has been bequeathed, by introducing pacifying and/or palliative measures cannot be fully ascertained. Clearly, however, Gorbachev's intention is to make the Soviet Union, i.e., the Soviet Russian prison of nations, stronger. At the risk of oversimplifying the case, whatever strengthens the enemy consequently weakens the liberation movement. Reforms may, indeed, effectuate wholesale changes in the established system, but, nonetheless, the system itself must continue functioning according to its original design; to subjugate, and certainly not to liberate.

If, however, the reform initiative is designed to undermine the developing revolutionary processes in the USSR, then Gorbachev has, indeed, embarked on a risky course. A reform programme is a double-edged sword. The system may already be irreversibly bankrupt to the point of structural disrepair. A revolutionary situation, in fact, not only develops as a result of the activity of the underground forces; it needs fertile breeding ground, viz, internal systemic contradictions that further fuel the growing revolutionary polarisation. In a bankrupt system, in a society experiencing polar disequilibrium between the projected normative value-system and existing objective realities, the very moral fibre of the society may be completely eroded. People believe nothing, while corruption pervades every sphere of activity. In such a situation, not completely alike the present circumstances in the USSR, the question of reform may be on the order of too little, too late. Reforms would only further accentuate the existing internal contradictions.

Gorbachev clearly is willing to take the gamble in the realisation that the alternative, viz, continuing the policies and practices of his predecessors, will certainly lead to complete dissolution. The gamble, however, becomes less risky if the revolutionary underground hesitates to forcefully attack the pro-

gramme on all possible levels. As a matter of strategic principle, the underground movement cannot afford to even appear to be taking advantage of the reforms to its own purposes; purposes which must be inherently contrary to the reform programme's agenda for change. For example, the temptation to participate in new, more open political processes will undoubtedly be great, and the underground may decide, as a tactical manoeuvre, to attempt to establish an opposition party, espousing a set of non-threatening aims (e.g. freedom of the press). In such a scenario, the underground would fall right into Gorbachev's trap, since by participating in the new political processes it lends an element of legitimacy to the reform programme, which the regime itself was incapable of generating, while the underground itself loses some of its validity in the eyes of the subjugated people. Confusion sets in, while order is reestablished.

The reform initiative must be viewed as a challenge. In effect, Gorbachev is telling the subjugated nations that he does not think that the non-Russian people truly care for national independence, particularly when offered the opportunity to improve one's material standard of living. Presently, it is up to the revolutionary movement of national liberation in the subjugated nations to make one thing eminently clear to their people: Gorbachev's political and economic reforms, although effectuating unprecedented changes in the Soviet Russian system, can never lead to national independence, sovereignty, and statehood.

Simply put, *glasnost is not enough*.

Ustina MARKUS

US NUCLEAR TARGETING AND UKRAINE (Conclusion)

Under PD 59 and the Reagan administration's "Fiscal Year 1984-88 Defense Guide" power plants were included as economic and industrial targets. While these are accepted as a legitimate target, the fact that some power plants are nuclear generated adds another dimension to nuclear targeting. As stated earlier, hitting a nuclear power plant or waste storage facility has consequences which go beyond the immediate destruction of the plant. The area which has been hit is contaminated for a considerably longer period of time due to the extent that a nuclear reactor magnifies the effect of a nuclear weapon. Furthermore, a meltdown contaminates more area than a nuclear weapon could by itself. For a rough idea of the payoff the US can obtain by hitting a nuclear reactor here are some basic figures.

The effects of the explosion of a one megaton bomb leave an area approximately 31,000 sq miles contaminated in the first week. A one megaton weapon exploding over a 1,000 MW reactor leaves an area of 79,000 sq miles contaminated for that same period. The same weapon exploding over a waste storage facility would leave 113,000 sq miles contaminated the first week (the area of Ukraine is 233,000 sq miles). After two years a nuclear strike would leave about 150 sq miles contaminated, and within 20 years the area is free of contamination altogether. The area which suffered a nuclear explosion over a reactor still has 17,000 sq miles contaminated after two years, and 180 sq miles still contaminated after a century. The area which sustained a hit on a storage facility would still have 49,000 sq miles contaminated after two years and 2,400 sq miles after a century²⁸.

Although reactors are small targets, current guidance systems are accurate enough to hit one. The Chernobyl accident, although not as disastrous as originally believed, demonstrated the lack of safety measures taken by the Soviets at their power plants. A weapon exploding even at a distance could cause a meltdown by splitting the reactor core with pressure. It is impossible for Soviet plans of evacuation and shelters against radiation to be of any real help to the population, except possibly as a psychological comfort.

Ukraine has been blessed with being the site of several nuclear reactors. There are three in western Ukraine by the city of Rivne. Two of these are 440 MW and one is 1,000 MW. The land around this area is used for growing

28. Ball, p. 275.

grain and other crops, as well as rearing livestock. There is some woodland in the area.

Chornobyl has four reactors. It is located by Kyiv and the land around it is used in the same way as the land around Rivne. All of Chornobyl's reactors are 1,000 MW. Southern Ukraine has one reactor by the city of Mykolayiv. It too is a 1,000 MW reactor. The land around is used for livestock and agriculture.

The Soviet Union as whole has 51 civilian reactors with another 73 under construction or planned. The number of military reactors which produce nuclear material for its weapons programme is unknown, as are their locations. The reactors are generally located in the European part of the Soviet Union. This part also happens to be the most densely populated part²⁹.

These general factors (military bases, industry, C³ centres, the route through which invading armies would pass, and the bonus effect of hitting a reactor) which would attract an American nuclear missile, should be examined in relation to the same factor in the rest of the Soviet Union to determine their relative ranking as targets in the case of a nuclear attack.

To begin with, the European part of the Soviet Union has the highest concentration of troops. Ukraine's neighbour Byelorussia has 15 divisions and a tactical air army, as well as being littered with IRBMs. The Baltic states have one less division, but otherwise are in a similar position, having a tactical air army and a multitude of IRBM fields³⁰. Since IRBMs do not pose a direct threat to the US these would not be high priority targets, although the armies would be targeted as the second echelon. Ukraine, on the other hand, would have its ICBM fields targeted along with her armies. Russia, having ICBM fields stretching from the Leningrad MD through the Moscow MD to the Volga MD, could expect to see these eradicated along with her armies. This area is slightly less populated than Ukraine (with the exception of Moscow), but still has one of the denser populations in the Soviet Union. The Transcaucasus, having only IRBMs, can expect to be spared as an immediate target although its armies would be hit. The ICBM fields in Central Asia and the Urals would have to go, although those bordering with China would not necessarily pose the most immediate threat, since they would be used to deter the Chinese should this prove necessary. The armies in the Far Eastern MD would not be a high priority target either because they would be required to remain in the area to ward off a possible Chinese threat³¹.

The priority military targets would be the nuclear submarine bases in Petropavlovsk and Polyarny. Other naval bases which would also be immediate targets because of the SLBMs docked there are in Archangelsk and Vladivostok. Air bases holding nuclear bombers would also be targeted. These are dispersed throughout the Soviet Union along the same lines as the armies.

29. Ibid, p. 261-62.

30. *Military Balance*, p. 41-44.

31. Kidran, M. & Smith D.: *The War Atlas* chapt. 19.

There is, therefore, a higher concentration of them in the European section than the interior³².

C³ centres, being an equally high priority target, can expect to go in accordance to their importance. Moscow would rank first in line along with Kyiv for the Western Front. Leningrad, Minsk, Odessa and Riga would probably be targeted as the second most important C³ centres. The exact position each of these cities would hold in the targeting hierarchy cannot be judged, but the reasons why they would be targeted are straightforward. Each is in the category of the 200 largest Soviet cities, all of which are known to be targeted. Each is the headquarters of a MD whose troops form the second echelon. While not all are republican capitals, they are all amongst the most important cities in their republics, and the Soviet Union as a whole.

The cities most likely to constitute the immediate targets in Ukraine are: Kyiv, Kharkiv, Odessa, Donetsk, Sevastopol, and Lviv. These would be targeted as C³ centres either for their military, economic, or political importance.

The Donbas would be targeted for industrial and economic reasons. It is the most important production centre for iron and steel in the Soviet Union. The other areas which are significant in this industry are the Urals and the Kuzbas. These too could expect to be high priority economic targets, although because of Ukraine's population, the location of her military targets, and the number of important railways which cross the Donbas, hitting this area would produce benefits for the US which go beyond its immediate economic destruction. Furthermore, once this area had been destroyed it could not be relocated easily. The reason for the industrial importance of the Donbas is the abundance of natural resources in the area which are necessary for industrial production. The coal deposits as well as the iron ore deposits are what make it a good area for industrial production. If these resources are destroyed then it becomes less practical for the industries to remain there. If the production plants are destroyed along with the resources then they would have to be rebuilt elsewhere, and few areas have the same amount of natural resources in their vicinity.

Agricultural targeting is not accepted as a legitimate practice, but the fact that Ukraine is a major agricultural producer gives nuking her a bonus effect. This would deprive the Soviet Union of yet another resource.

While it is unlikely that Ukraine would be hit solely to make her uncrossable for troops (she is too large of a country with too many railways and roads to make this possible), this is still a bonus effect that should be taken into consideration in planning. Byelorussia and the Baltics, however, provide equally speedy routes for the transportation of large concentrations of troops. With the amount of space that the US would have to deal with in order to contain an invasion by contaminating any area which can be crossed, it is

32. Martel, p. 72.

unlikely that this kind of targeting would hold any high priority, since it is too difficult to accomplish. An area would be hit only if a large unit were known to be passing through a specific sector at a specific time. This would, however, make it a military target because of the presence of troops there at the time, rather than a spatial target.

The last of the possible targets to be considered are the nuclear reactors. There are fourteen main reactor sites throughout the Soviet Union. The European ones produce the most power, generally being 1,000 MW or 1,500 MW plants. The Siberian plants produce 100 MW. It is difficult to assess which plant would be a more desirable target simply on its own merits, since those with a lower output may be converted to produce more MW. It is the area around the reactors which makes their targeting desirable. The Siberian plants, then, would only be attractive targets if they had more to offer than the simple destruction of the power plants. Those located in the Urals have industrial targets as well making them an attractive potential target. The plants around Vilnius, Lithuania, have the highest power output, 1,500 MW. The area around them is highly populated and used for dairy farming. The Leningrad reactors also provide attractive targets. These are located in a major city which is the headquarters of a MD.

If the US decided to get a large payoff for a hit, however, this would be achieved by targeting the Ukrainian reactors. The effects of hitting the Chernobyl reactors would cause considerable damage. The hit would contaminate such a large area that Kyiv would have to be evacuated. This would not necessarily disrupt the Kyiv C³, and it is likely that the troops would have been the most mobile and the first to be evacuated, so this would not have destroyed the military value of Kyiv, only displaced it. Furthermore, the political and military leadership has reinforced shelters to take refuge in. Only a direct hit, or several hits on these shelters could damage them. This is, however, still likely to be the most promising reactor target in Ukraine.

The destruction of the Mykolayiv reactor would contaminate the area around Kherson, but again, would probably not disrupt the Odessa MD. The Rivne reactor would affect Lviv about as much as the Mykolayiv one affected Odessa.

Other than military bases, C³ centres, and war supporting industries, there is little else which is considered a legitimate target under current US doctrine. These targets, however, are usually located in or close to cities. This means that while cities and urban populations are no longer targeted in theory, they remain the de facto primary targets.

Conclusions

It is impossible to predict exactly what would happen to Ukraine in the event of a major nuclear exchange between the United States and the Soviet

Union. Even if the current US SIOP were made public, given America's range of options under its "flexible response" doctrine, it would still be impossible to pinpoint any targets. The best that can be done is a general evaluation of US targeting doctrine, and an even more general analysis of Ukraine's position within that framework.

There has been a definite evolution in American nuclear targeting doctrine over the past decade. This evolution has been a movement away from targeting cities as areas which offer the most destruction per warhead, to targeting areas with real strategic significance. This new concept in targeting has become possible with the technological advances that have occurred over the past decades in the accuracy of the delivery systems. As the accuracy of warheads increased, it has become increasingly possible to hit small areas and avoid unnecessary destruction. This, coupled with the realisation that economic and civilian targeting is not the most effective way of winning a war, has led the US to reassess its targeting priorities. The priorities now consist of military bases, C³ centres, and war supporting industry.

The Soviet Union, having these three types of targets dispersed throughout its territory, offers a vast area against which to launch a nuclear strike. Because the US arsenal is limited, however, and because more than one weapon would have to be launched at a target to insure its destruction, the US would have to be selective in what is deemed most necessary to destroy to further its own war effort.

As all major MD headquarters could be expected to be hit in the first salvo, Ukraine's three headquarters would be placed very high on that target list along with the Byelorussian, Baltic, Leningrad, Moscow, North Caucasus and Transcaucasus MD headquarters. Kyiv, Lviv and Odessa, then, could become casualties in the first barrage. The Kyiv headquarters is particularly important. If the US were to be selective against which headquarters it launched a strike, then the secondary MDs may be spared. Kyiv, however, would be the least likely military headquarters in Ukraine to be spared. In the whole European Soviet Union, only the Moscow headquarters would be a higher targeting priority.

While the Black Sea Fleet does not have any nuclear capable submarines, its fleet headquarters at Sevastopol would still be hit as a C³ centre and to insure that it is not converted to house nuclear-capable submarines. Other naval priority targets would be the submarine bases at Polyarny and Petrapavlovsk, and the naval headquarters at Vladivostok and Severodinsk. None of these are in Ukraine.

ICBM fields would be amongst the first crisis targets because of the threat they pose to the US homeland. Ukraine's fields in Derzhyna and Pervomaysk along with the Russian and Central Asian fields would be hit. Strategic bomber bases would also be hit. Eight of these are in Ukraine³³.

33. Martel, p. 72.

Following the attacks on the military targets, areas which house war supporting industries would be hit. In Ukraine, the most important industrial centre is the Donbas. It is one of the most important industrial centres in the whole Soviet Union, producing steel, iron, coal, and other heavy industry. When considering the industrial/economic targets, it is unlikely that the Donbas and the Urals are the two top targets in the whole USSR.

Looking at Ukraine as a whole, and the limitations of the US arsenal, there are roughly eleven areas in Ukraine which are likely to be hit. These are: Kyiv, Odessa, Sevastopol, Lviv, Vynnytsia, Donetsk, Balaklava, Pervomaysk, Derzhyna, Dnipropetrovsk, and Kharkiv. What the consequences of hitting these eleven areas would be for the population and the country is difficult to determine since there is no precedent by which to measure the destruction. Another difficulty in determining the number of casualties is that people would die of the effects of radiation decades after the fact, and these numbers would be impossible to calculate into the initial casualty counts.

In calculating the casualties, if the entire populations of the cities are counted (since those that do not die outright are likely to die in the ensuing years from the effects of nuclear radiation) roughly 9 million people would be killed. This is excluding the rural populations. Those living outside the cities who would die over the next decade would raise this number considerably. The effects on the land would also take their toll. The eleven cities are dispersed throughout Ukraine so that the entire country would suffer the effects of radioactive fallout in varying degrees. A conservative estimate is that out of Ukraine's population of 50.5 million, some 20% or 10 million would have died within the first six months following such an attack. The number of deaths over the next decade is beyond the scope of this study³⁴.

In a worst case scenario the US could have launched a considerably larger arsenal against the Soviet Union, and it is most probable that in an all-out exchange more sites in Ukraine would have been hit. Under the current doctrine of "flexible response"³⁵ and targeting only the most important strategic centres, however, this limited attack is more realistic. Should a prolonged conflict occur, then the nuclear reactors may prove too tempting a target. In this case, Ukraine would be a wasteland for decades to come.

Ukraine would not be the only area of the Soviet Union which would suffer such devastation. The areas around Moscow and Leningrad would be just as badly off. While the Central Asian republics are more sparsely populated, it is the areas which are populated that hold any strategic significance, so the populations there would suffer as much as anywhere else.

Since civilians are given a lower priority than soldiers in the Soviet Union, it is possible that few soldiers would be casualties. Soldiers would be the most fully mobilised group at the outset of an exchange, and would have access to aircraft so armies could be evacuated if there is some advance warning. In this case, military targets may prove in reality to be civilian targets.

34. Ibid. p. 142-54.

There are factors which could mitigate the amount of damage inflicted upon Ukraine in the case of a nuclear war. As mentioned at the beginning of this article, ethnic targeting had been considered as an option as early as the 1950s. Although it had been considered a largely unrealistic strategy, pressure from ethnic groups in the United States, such as Lithuanians and Ukrainians, could temper the government's actions. While such pressure may not completely keep an area nuclear free, it may make only the targets within a country which pose a direct threat to the US acceptable. In the case of Ukraine, then, only the ICBM fields would sustain a nuclear hit while the other targets would not be considered acceptable. The extent, however, to which ethnic community pressure influences the government is difficult to gauge. It must be remembered that although the Germans have always been a large community within the US, this never stopped the government from bombing German cities during WW2 (of course, the Germans in America never tried to deter the government from its civilian/economic targeting practices).

While the US is following a more enlightend nuclear strategy today than it did in the past, Ukraine's prospects in this strategy remian as bleak as they did under the old city-busting doctrine. The only positive thing about nuclear strategy is that given the consequences of an exchange, neither the Soviets nor the US are likely to allow such a thing to happen.

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Dr. John P. PAULS

RELIGIOUS BELIEFS OF THE POLISSIAN PEASANTS

For the thousandth anniversary of Ukrainian Christianity
(Conclusion)

On Easter day, people say the sun is happy and "*hrye*" 'plays', that is a golden ring circles around the periphery of the sun. Birds such as the nightingale and swallow chirp a hymn to the "living, creative sun" — *zhyyvotvorche sontse*. Perhaps the "Russian Easter Overture" by Rimsky-Korsakov, best expresses the exuberance of the sounds of spring. The church hymn proclaims, "Let the Lord rise, the birds chirp and the joyous Easter bells peal. . . They peal throughout the day. . . The ringing of the bells drives away all evil forces and spells, blessing the land and securing a good crop".

Kylymnyk mentions an older ritual in Volyn, recorded in 1915, of burning a "spring fire" or "Easter fire" near the church, during Resurrection night, to chase away "evil forces" as is done on Christmas night and St. John's night (June 23). He also quotes a "spring song", which originally supported the idea of sun and fire worship:

*Oi ty sonechko pravedne, zasvity, zasvity,
Zemliu — matinku pryhorny, pryhorny. . .
Vesnu-Ladu zapaly, zapaly. . .
Lykhi syly vidzheny, vidzheny. . .*³⁴.

This means: "Shine, shine, oh you righteous Sun, Embrace, embrace our Mother-Earth, Kindle, kindle Spring-Lada (goddess of spring) Drive away, drive away evil forces. . .".

After the midnight service, early in the morning, the villagers place their baskets with food (bread, salt, coloured eggs, ham. . .) around the church and the priest, accompanied by the chorus, blesses the food with holy water, while singing the hymn *Khrystós voskres*. . . At home the father also greets his family with *Khrystos voskres*, with *sviachona paskha* 'blessed bread', kissing everyone three times on the cheeks, wishing that they may "celebrate the next year in good health". After the Lord's Prayer, all break the fast with a blessed egg. . . No doubt, the egg, in pre-Christian times, was a symbol of a dormant life which could be awakened. The red Easter egg was the sign of happiness and the children happily play with the eggs and roll them. This,

34. *Ibid.*, p. 95.

unfortunately was regarded by the Carthage Council of 318 AD as a "pagan habit" and was strictly forbidden, yet in Ukraine, it survived.

The Orthodox Church celebrates the most important holidays for three days (Christmas, Easter, Pentecost) in the name of the Trinity. On the first day of Easter, people stay home after the midnight service. On the second and third days, they go to church and then visit relatives, giving out coloured eggs to the children. The youth like "to hit eggs" (tap cooked eggs together to see which one breaks) and the owner of the unbroken eggs is greatly admired as the winner. The Polish (so-called *smigus*) and Ukrainian habit of pouring water on girls (usually on "one's own" sweetheart!) on Easter Monday, is unknown in Polissia. On Tuesday, the farmers scatter the shells of the blessed eggs in the yard so that the chickens can eat them and lay more eggs.

After the holy mass of St. Thomas Sunday, the priest and cantor go to the village cemetery and there, for a small offering, say a prayer at the graves of the deceased. Relatives bury the blessed eggs at the foot of the grave and say "Christ is risen!", and then talk to their dead relatives. This is "the Easter of the deceased".

Polissians regarded it as God's blessing to die between Easter Sunday and Ascension Thursday, because the gates of Paradise are believed to be open then and the deceased are accepted immediately. Whenever a relative dies, people keep a small saucer of rice for him on the window sill for nine days and water for forty days, to welcome his soul to the house.

In the spring, the second most important holiday is St. George Day, "Yuriy" (April 23), which unites the church saint and some pagan god, a messenger of the sun and spring. A popular proverb says: *Svatyi Yuriy po poliu khodyt', khlib-zhyto rodyt'* 'St. George is walking through the fields bringing bread-rye'. The spring song tells us that Yuriy has the keys to heaven which he opens and lets the warm spring out, also the dew, rain and the "beauty of maidens" (*divots'kuiu krasu*). He protects the spring, crop, cattle, wild animals and even the wolves. The morning dew on St. Yuriy Day has a protective and beautifying power. That is the reason the cattle must be in the meadow early on his day, to catch that dew. . . On that day, the farmer goes to the field with a small loaf of blessed bread (*paskha*), and walks around repeating:

*Sviatyi Yuriy po mezhakh khodyt',
Po mezhakh khodyt' i zhyto rodyt'.
Iz odnogo kolosochka khai bude zhyta bochka! . .
Khrystos voskres! . . Vo istynu voskres!*

This means: "St. George is walking on the boundary-strips, walking on the boundary-strips making the rye grow. From one ear may there be a barrel! . . Christ is risen! . . He is indeed risen!"

The Christian "triumphant St. George" on a high-spirited white steed,

killed a three-headed dragon to free a young princess and was himself tortured and decapitated by the Romans in 303 for being a Christian. This aristocratic Roman officer became a most respected patron of agriculture and animals and was revered in Ukraine almost as a "second Son of God"³⁵.

One of the most important Christian holidays is Pentecost or Trinity — in Polissia, *Triytsia*, 'trinity'. The Ukrainian and Polish term "*Zeleni Sviata*" 'green holidays' are hardly known in Polissia. This time, not much remained of the pagan cult, except worshipping of the popular birch tree, *byroza*. The birch tree and often also the maple tree, *kliin* are used to decorate the house inside and outside as well as the church. The wild iris, locally *plyshnyk*, Rus. *air* (Lat. *Acorus*) which has a very fragrant scent was scattered on the floors. This was at the beginning of summer and was a holiday of forest or vegetation spirits³⁶.

The Christian Church was most successful in defeating this cult and imposed in its stead a holiday for the descent of the Holy Spirit upon the Apostles (the 50th day after Resurrection), calling it "Holy Trinity", accepting from the pagan holiday only the green decorations of the birch tree and wild iris for the floor.

During the summer solstice, there was a popular pagan ceremony, originally devoted to fire, no doubt a symbol of the sun, *Kupala*, or *Kupalo*, sometimes also *Kupailo*. The name first appeared in the 13th century, in the plural form, as *Kupaly* and meant St. John the Baptist's Eve. "On the eve of that day, people's rites took place, such as the first bath of the year, jumping over the fire and in some places drowning or burning a straw effigy"³⁷. In the course of time, this name changed meaning; at one time it meant people's rite, later St. John himself (Ivan Kupalo, whose birthday is celebrated on June 24) and then the effigy of a witch. In the 17th century, *Kupalo* was recorded as "a god" or as "a pagan demon" (Ukr. *bis*).

The night before St. John the Baptist Day, was the night of demons, goblins and witches. The youths danced in a circle around the fire and sang; then the girls wove their wreaths and threw them into the river, while singing:

*Khto vinochka poime, toi divon'du voz'me;
Khto vinka distane, to toi moim stane*³⁸.

This means: 'He who catches the wreath, will have the girl; he who reaches the garland will be mine'. It is evident that during the Kupalo festivities, young people often found a sweetheart. As the folklorist Kaminskyi remarks: "On this holiday, at various moments of its celebration, the main elements of

35. *Ibid.*, pp. 321-325.

36. V. E. Titov, *Troitsa*, 2nd ed., (Moscow: 1974), pp. 59-62; Hrushevskyi, (literat.) *op. cit.*, p. 187.

37. S. Urbańczyk, "Kupała" in *Słownik star. słowiań.*, Vol. II, (Warsaw: PAN, 1964), p. 566.

38. Ilarion, *op. cit.*, p. 295.

pagan ritual, its beliefs, its ideology are reflected"³⁹. A peculiar feature of this holiday is the legend of the blooming of mythical fern (Lat. *Filicinae*) at midnight in a wild forest where, even the crowing of the cock, could not be heard. He who could find and pick this tiny, fiery flower, in spite of its protection by evil forces, would know everything and could have all the treasure he wanted. The remarkable painting, *Hutsuliya*, by Edward Kozak, depicts the Ukrainian version of this unique celebration, including the finding of the mysterious fern flower. Shakespeare's *A Midsummer Night's Dream* has the same theme. The German, *Johannisfeuer* and the French, *le feu de St. Jean*, may have similar festivities.

The Christian Church skilfully connected the more humane activities with St. John, thus, some scholars think that "*Kupala*", at least the name, is of Christian origin. For instance, Brueckner says: "There is nothing mythological in it; since St. John, people bathe themselves (Ukr. *kupalysia*) safely in the waters, because St. John (the Baptist) expelled the devils and nymphs and blessed the waters for Christians, when he stepped into the River Jordan"⁴⁰. Tokarev, however, thinks: "*Kupala* is St. John the Baptist, because Christian baptism was associated with bathing"⁴¹. As always, the Church was hostile to paganism, because people "sacrificed themselves to the demon *Kupala*, jumping over the fire" singing, dancing and indulging in other "impious deeds" (*bohomerzkiya dila*). From the Hustynskyi Annals of the 17th century, Metropolitan Ilarion also quotes: "*Kupalo* was the god of abundance, as was the Greek goddess, Ceres; to him the mad people brought thanks for the abundance at the time when the harvest was beginning"⁴². The constant pressure from the Church eliminated the *Kupalo* rites. Under the Polish occupation, some teachers tried to cultivate a Polish version of *Kupalo*, the so-called, *Sobotki świętojanskie* ('outdoor party before St. John) limited just to the bonfire, dances, Polish songs and the throwing of the wreaths into the river.

In 1927, ethnographers from Cracow University searched Western Polissia, as the most conservative region, for remnants of *Kupalo*, or as the Poles from Pidlashia and Mazowsze say "*Kupałnocka*". Results were somewhat meagre. Predominantly, along the Ukrainian-Byelorussian lingual boundary, north of Bielsk Podlaski, Pruzhany and the River Jaselda (lingual boundary of prominent Slavacist Leszek Ossowski)⁴³ they found a few villages with some knowledge of *Kupalo*, mainly near Pruzhany and Kartuska-Bereza. Even there, however, rituals were somewhat changed. Before, at St. John's fire, animal bones (horse skulls) were burned to prevent plagues afflicting animals; now

39. V. Kaminskyi, "*Sviato Kupala na volyn's'komy Polissi*", *Festschrift for Akad. D. I. Bahalii*, (*Etnogr. Visnyk*, Book 5), (Kyiv: UAN, 1927) pp. 11-23.

40. A. Brueckner, *Słownik etymolog. jęz. polskiego*, (Warszawa: Wiedza, 1970), p. 224 (Note: All my etymologies are taken from this dictionary).

41. S. A. Tokarev, *Religiia*. . . op. cit., p. 229.

42. Ilarion, op. cit., pp. 297-298.

43. I. Sydoruk, *The Problem of the Ukrainian-White Ruthenian Lingual Boundary*, *Slavistica*, No. III, (Augsburg, UVAN, 1948), map No. 2.

— it was an effigy of a witch “who could bring misfortune” to animals or steal milk from cows. If a lone woman was seen lingering around the fire, she would be called a witch and would be beaten by the strong bullies of the village, like that unfortunate bird “goatsucker”. . . (Uhlany; near Kartuska-Bereza)⁴⁴. This is similar to the tragic story in Arthur Miller’s drama, *The Crucible*. The so-called “Puritans” who were themselves fleeing persecution in their new land became executioners of weak women thought to be witches.

In my own research of western Polissian dialects and songs (1936-1939), I found some information on *Kupalo* in the villages Rybna and Bolota. Unfortunately, this research material was burned at Warsaw University during World War II.

In an article published by Cracow University journal, there is an interesting song from Lisnyky near Dorohychyn, in which *Kupala* is identified with a local witch:

*Pryshly dyvky zhyto zhaty, staly Kupalu vyhaniaty;
 “Idy Kupalo v synozhaty, tam tobi bude dobre zhyty!”
 Pryshly khlopsy sino kosyty, staly Kupalu prosyty:
 “Idy Kupalo do Kyieva, vzhe ty nam mnyho nadoila. . .”⁴⁵.*

Here we find girls chasing *Kupala* away from the field of rye, because they came to harvest it. They advised *Kupala* to live in the meadow. Then came the boys to mow the grass. They say *Kupala* should go to Kyiv, because they are tired of her. . . Obviously, this indicates a lack of respect for *Kupalo*, as a holiday and *Kupala* is no longer male but female.

There were more pagan holidays in Ukraine, but in Polissia, people hardly remember them anymore. The beginning of harvest time was usually hot and stormy, especially the middle of July. The most feared was St. Elias Day (July 20), the day of the “Thundering Prophet” (*Hromovyk*). He tried “to hit devils”, who were mischievous enough to hide themselves under the barn roof. The poor frightened peasants remained in their houses, lighting blessed candles “*hromnytsi*” on the table and placing a blessed willow branch at every door. Stacks of hay and shocks of rye were also exposed because St. Elias was also known as *Palykop* ‘shock-burner’. The rain that fell on this day was thought to be healing for people and cattle but also many snakes and vipers crawled out of their holes — a danger for barefoot children. The people’s verdict was: “*Illia narobyt’ hnyllia*” (‘Elias makes waste’).

The most pleasant holiday was *Spas* ‘Saviour’s Day’ (August 6) — church name, *Preobrazhinnie* ‘Transfiguration’. The fruit was ripe then. It was blessed in church and eaten by the people. The mother would bury a blessed apple on her parents’ or children’s grave “to please their souls”. The nights

44. C. Szerszeń, “Zwyczaje świętojańskie na zach. Polesiu”, *Lud słowiański*, Vol. I, (Cracow: 1929-1930), p. B-81.

45. *Ibid.*, p. B-87.

became cooler, the mosquitoes began to disappear and "*Poslia Spasa pryvia-zui rukavytsi do pasa*" ('After Spas Day, tie your gloves to your belt').

The toil of the harvest was at an end. On the final day, tired women reapers made a "bouquet" out of rye or wheat and while singing the mournful song "*Do domu zhenchyky, do domu*". . . (Home, dear reapers, home. . .) brought it to the master of the house and ate a rich supper with vodka. . . At home the same "bouquet" was supplemented with oats and barley, and so on, and decorated with flowers. The "bouquet" was blessed in the church on August 15, on the holiday called "*Splinnie*, the 'Assumption' of Holy Mary, which the Orthodox Church calls "Dormition" from Greek *Koimisis*, in Russian *Uspenie* (from the verb *usnut* 'to fall asleep'; *u. naveki* 'to pass to eternal rest'). This is another happy holiday, because the most important toil is finished, the barn is full and there is good reason to celebrate. As the Polissian proverb says, "*Na Splinnie pos'vi'atymo nasinnie*". ('On Assumption, we shall bless the seeds'). The blessed seeds from that "bouquet" were used at the beginning of the sowing of every new crop, in order to protect it from evil spirits and from violent natural forces, such as storms, frost, and so on. Previously, it had been magic, now it was blessed water which attempted to neutralise all adversities. . .

In autumn, follows the harvesting of potatoes, cabbage and cucumbers, crops not much endangered by rain, thus there were less worries for the farmer. There are less important holidays. One of the more important holidays, however, is *Pokrova* 'Holy Mary of Protection' (October 1), because young girls believe that the Mother of God is very helpful in finding a good husband. This was also a favourite holiday of the Ukrainian Kozaks. . . October 26, *Dmytro* (St. Demetrius), ended the field work and locked the earth, giving the keys to St. Yuriy on April 23. Three saints welcome winter; *Varvara* (St. Barbara, December 4), *Mykola* (St. Nicholas, December 6) and *Hanna* (St. Anna, December 9). People say: "Varvara brings the first snow, Mykola frees the ground and on Hanna Day, sit in your sleigh and dash to your sweetheart". *Mykola* is highly respected in Polissia because he always helps the needy, such as orphans, widows, travellers in distress: "*Sviatyi Mykolai u vs'akyi chas pomahaie*". ('St. Nicholas helps in every trouble').

In 1926, while collecting dialects and folklore from Polissia before World War II, I recorded a remarkable Polissian folk tale "*About a Stork*" in the village of Novosilky, 25km. south of Kobryn, from a farmer named Antin Bezkhlibyk, 40 years of age. The story begins: "*to bulo davno, davno, shche yak Boh svit tvoryv. Boh khotiv tak usio zrobyty, shchob liudiom dobre bulo zhyty*". . .

'It was a long, long time ago, when God was still creating the world. God wanted to create everything so that people would have a good life. . .'. To make the story concise, God created everything good: the land, the sea, forests, animals, birds, bees, so they would collect honey for the people and give God wax for candles. . . "*A chort. . . davai usiaku proiavu liudiom na paküst' chveryty*". . . 'And the devil. . . began all manner of mischief and

baseness out of sheer adversity'. . . In Polissia, the land was level, but the devil began to gnaw into it and repeatedly and violently thrust his horns into it at every side. The places where he bit became bayous and lakes; places where he spat it out, became infertile sand hills. . . When the evil spirit saw the bees, he began to create wasps, flies, mosquitoes, snakes, lizards, ugly toads and all kinds of loathsome things. He thought the vermin would torment man and he would curse God for those evil creatures and then the devil could seize his soul.

But God was merciful. He ordered all the unclean vermin to crawl into a sack, tied it up, and gave it to a Polissian fisherman and told him to take it to the forest and burn it. "But do not look into it!" Vasyl — the fisherman — did as God told him. But at the last moment the devil tempted him: "*Day — dumaye Vasyl — khoch odnym okom zahlianu. . . Mozhe shos' dobre dla mene? . .*" "Let me — thinks Vasyl — peep in at least with one eye. . . Perhaps there is something good for me inside? . . ." As soon as he opened it, the snakes, insects and bugs jumped out like a steel spring. . . Poor Vasyl stood like a stone. . . And God was suddenly visible and was angry. . . He pushed the guilty fisherman away and Vasyl landed sitting in a pool of mud. Then the Lord severely pronounced: "From now on, you will be a stork and you and your progeny will collect all of those reptiles until the end of time! . . . As he was dressed all in white, Vasyl instantly became covered with white feathers, and his muddy seat, with black feathers, his red nose became a red bill. . . "*Shchei typer zvut' tut liude bus'nia Vasylom i kazhut': Yak vyzhyraye busen' vs'o haddie — tohdi bude konets s'vita*". Till this day, people there call the stork "Vasyl" (Basil) and say, "When he finishes collecting all the snakes — it will be the end of the world. . .". And my narrator, Antin, added: "There are still too many snakes in the marshes and among the people."⁴⁶

This is a naive peasant's tale of creation. But then so is Moses' story. As Dr. A. Powell Davis, minister of All Souls Church (Washington, D.C.), in his chapter "Myth, Legend and History" says: "Most of us, including many traditionalists, have long since conceded that the stories of Creation and of the Great Flood are myths, revised from those of the Babylonians"⁴⁷.

Important in this tale, is the peasant's lofty notion that God created only good creatures. Everything evil including people like Stalin and Hitler are the work of Satan. This is, no doubt, an uncomfortable idea to believers that Good and Evil are almost equal forces in history, but it seems like the reality of our day. . . The peasants here did not try to make the devil responsible for the sin of Vasyl as the biblical Adam attempted to blame Eve.

* * *

Let me sum up the beliefs of the peasants of Polissia. . . As I mentioned earlier, it was the fear of living in this endless universe unprotected that

46. Sydoruk, *Zur Laut-*, op. cit., texts, p. 1-2.

47. A. Powell Davies, *The Ten Commandments*, (New York: New Am. Lib., 1956), p. 36.

forced primitive man to seek help and protection from the sun, the moon, the stars, land, water, animals, plants. . . Believing that everything in nature was animate, he thought he could gain favour by offerings, praises, curses, songs, dances and magic. . .

A thousand years ago came the new preachers, who told the simple peasant the "good news" about "the true God", creator of heaven, earth and everything on it". They told him about the "merciful Son of God, Jesus Christ, who forgave his murderers, asking people to love their friends as well as their enemies and also promised His support for the poor and the meek. . .". The simple farmer did not grasp the differences at once. Eventually, however, the beautiful Christian liturgy and songs slowly but surely captivated his sensitive soul. He gave up bloody animal sacrifices, accepted candle offerings, retaining only some of his old ceremonies to support agriculture and husbandry as well as some songs and dances for recreation. The beautiful wedding ceremony, with the exception of oaths in church, remained pagan until World War II⁴⁸. Blessed water, candles, willow branches, Easter bread all became a great protection for the peasant against all evil forces, now represented by the devil — *chort* (probably from Lith. *kereti* 'to bewitch').

Incidentally, some patriots insist that the Ukrainian devil is "less devil" than the Russian devil. It seems, they might be under the influence of world famous *Faust* by Goethe, where the devil, Mephistopheles, is so civil to God, that He permits the devil to tempt Dr. Faust as long as he is on earth. The Polissian perception of the devil is closer to the one in *Demon* by Lermontov, where a very cruel devil is seeking the destruction of mankind. The peasants are always afraid of the devil and they wear small crosses around their necks for protection. They believe that during lightning, the devil tries to stand under the roof and St. Elias, trying to kill him, burns down the barn or house. No cruelty remains from pagan days, except the harsh treatment of imaginary witches.

Finally, the worst tragedy in history for the Eastern Slavs occurred in 1917, the Bolshevik Revolution, when Lenin, Trotsky, and Stalin tried to obliterate Christianity in Russia, according to the teaching of Marx and Engels. Of the approximate forty million victims, Solzhenitsyn thinks, the overwhelming majority were religious people. This was indeed the true Slavic holocaust! Still alive in the souls of the people, religion survived. It seems now that Gorbachev is planning to tolerate it.

As the great Goethe said: "Die Wahrheit sei uns lieb, wo wir finden". The moral decay in the world and the insane build-up of the nuclear arsenal does not prophesise a Christian path and freedom for tormented humanity. "The whole world stands at the insecure crossroads between the bloody Antichrist and the gentle Jesus", said Metropolitan Ilarion⁴⁹. This is true not only for

48. I. Sydoruk, "Polis'ke vesillia", *Festschrift for Z. Kuzela*, ZNTSh, Vol. 159, (Paris, NTSh, 1962), pp. 177-195.

49. Ilarion, *op. cit.*, p. 411.

the East under the dictators, but also for the "free" West. It is painful for us, the religious survivors of Stalin's holocaust, to see in our new, predominantly Christian country a truly Satanic effort underway to morally crucify our Saviour under the false façade of "freedom of expression". Conceived by hired, evil mercenaries and financed by the anti-Christian dollar empire of Hollywood, the so-called "The Last Temptation of Christ" ("a sacreligious, blasphemous and antichristian film")⁵⁰ is a psychological negation of moral leadership for a Man whose last few minutes of life were spent dreaming of engaging in sex (in such pain?) with a prostitute and the dream scene was depicted explicitly on the screen. After seeing that, the viewer will question whether Jesus was really the Son of God. . . And why are their own prophets not depicted in that despicable situation? People of real culture do not insult other religions and prophets, even if it brings a million dollars a week in profits, as the producer proudly proclaims it does. ("Good Christians" pay for their own destruction!). Two notorious movie critics in Chicago cynically stated that even non-Christians love such a Christ. But the non-Christian, Aleksander Yakovlev, has a different view: "I'm an atheist, but I don't like it when Jesus Christ is portrayed in a movie as preoccupied with sex"⁵¹. This is a civilised view of a non-Christian. *Quo vadis*, America?. . . Yet, we believe the gentle moral of Christ will prevail everywhere. There is no other way.

50. P. J. Buchanan, "'The Last Temptation of Christ' is affront to Christians", *Chicago Sun-Times*, p. 36, July 28, 1988.

51. "Quotables", *Chicago Tribune*, p. 23/1, Nov. 2, 1988.

News from Ukraine

THE UKRAINIAN MINERS' STRIKE

The worst workers' strike in recent memory in the Soviet Union, which was centered around the coal mines of Ukraine and Siberia, came to end in the last week of July, signalling a major victory for the miners.

Not until Premier Nikolai Ryzhkov personally signed the workers' demands on Tuesday, July 25, did the miners return to the pits. While the Siberian miners ended their 11-day strike on Friday, July 21, Ukrainian miners in the lucrative Donets Basin in eastern Ukraine remained off the job longer.

Solidarity Strikes

The situation worsened for the Kremlin, when miners in the western Ukrainian town of Chervonohrad joined the strike and added stiff political demands to those issued by the Donbas miners, including the removal of Shcherbytskyi.

The strikes, which rallied the Ukrainian people to a single cause as did the elections earlier this year, developed into a key Ukrainian national issue as the Ukrainian Helsinki Union and the Ukrainian National Democratic League rushed with support for the miners. They attempted to instill a political angle into the workers' economic demands. In a statement to them, the Kyiv-based league urged the strikers to "Transform your strike into a struggle against the exploiters — the party bureaucracy. Demand economic and political sovereignty for the Ukrainian republic, the introduction of a multi-party democratic system of rule. Without political freedom there cannot be economic freedom".

The strikes attracted international attention as the miners pushed forward a wide range of social, economic and even political demands. Industry experts anticipated that the strikes cost \$8 million a day in Ukraine alone, while overall the damages could drain \$150 million in lost production from an already weakened Soviet economy.

International Interest

Newspapers around the world reported and commented on the Ukrainian strikes, indicating that the Ukrainian strikes especially can destroy the Soviet empire. William Safire in the July 20 edition of *The New York Times* said

that the Donbas strike proved to be a political embarrassment to Shcherbytskyi and consequently Gorbachev did not move quickly to squelch it. Asserting that the "restless Ukraine is the testing ground", Safire said, "Then the Kremlin learned that railroad workers were being urged — perhaps by Ukrainian nationalists — to join in what then might mushroom into a general strike. That loss of central authority would be the likely end of the Gorbachev era".

"Sleeping Giant"

Ian Traynor of *The Guardian's* Vienna bureau said that the strikes proved that "the sleeping giant that is Ukraine now shows signs of stirring". He pointed out that "In Ukraine this week the two factors have merged — a nationality potentially hostile to Moscow has downed tools in economic protest". It is clear that Mr. Gorbachev cannot stand by and watch the destabilizing break up of the Union, whether via Baltic independence, Ukrainian nationalism, or Transcaucasian feuding. But with time not on his side, it is difficult to see what he can do to ease a situation that appears increasingly ungovernable without a resort to traditional strongarm Kremlin tactics", Traynor said.

Prior to the government's conceding to the workers' demands, thousands of striking Ukrainian miners had rejected official concessions on Saturday, July 22, and shut down all 121 mines in the coal heartland despite a new appeal from Gorbachev, who said economic losses have reached a "critical point".

At least 93,000 Ukrainian miners stayed out on the sixth day in a strike. Thousands of Ukrainian miners had gathered round the clock, Tass and the Novosti news agencies said, in scores of Donbas mining towns such as Krasnoarmiysk, Yenakiyevo, Gorlova. The biggest crowds were in Donetsk, a city of 1.1 million. The basin is the leading coal-producing area, accounting for one-fourth of all coal mined in the Soviet Union — the world's largest producer.

The Donbas miners said their unique regional conditions have to be taken into account in any settlements. For example, they said some of the mines are 200 years old compared with the relatively newer Kuzbas coalmining region, where mines are only 50 years old.

The strike also extended into the two European Russian cities of Rostov in the south and Vorkuta in the north as well as Ukraine.

"Breakdown"

In the course of the negotiations, Nikolai Slyunkov, the Politburo member who helped settle the Siberian coal strike, suggested on Saturday, July 23, that the miners' demands were justified and officials will work to prevent future strikes. "There was a breakdown here", he told United Press International. "The miners were not given their full rights. Local officials neglected to push ahead with reform". He asserted "we are not afraid" of strikes, but "we will do everything possible to make sure it does not happen again".

Pravda said 200,000 tons a day were being forfeited, and Tass said plants fuelled by coal were running short in the coal-struck Ukrainian city of Pavlohrad, where industries were not receiving 10,000 tons of fuel a day.

Pavlohrad's miners demanded an end to having to support a soccer team in the Soviet First league. Such a concession would strike at the heart of sports financing in a country where plants and enterprises fund Soviet sports clubs.

* * *

APPEAL OF THE UKRAINIAN NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC LEAGUE TO THE STRIKING MINERS

Dear Miners!

The strike which you began in support of the demands of the Kuzbas miners is a sacred and noble venture. You have the support of all honest and conscientious Ukrainians in this endeavour. You are defending not only your own rights, personal comforts and privileges. Your action is an example to everyone of how to trample on the terror of the Stalin-Brezhnev times, and how to defend social justice, which has been brutally violated by the Bolshevik government for over seven decades. Suffice it to say that in the developed countries of the West the worker takes home up to 85% of his earnings, and in the Soviet empire — less than 10%. The party-state leadership — a true mafia of exploiters — is benefiting from our common toil.

Miners! Do not expect the republican party leadership to meet your just and lawful demands. Do not expect our leaders of restructuring Gorbachev and Ryzhkov to meet them either. They have so far not managed to meet the list of demands of the Kuzbas miners. Instead Gorbachev made an earnest gesture in Europe with his proposal to the West to give credit to the developing countries at our own expense. Let Gorbachev give assurances of his understanding and support for your demands at meetings of the Supreme Soviet. Do not believe words. Bolshevik leaders have stated many times that they are ready to break any promise and to commit any crime in order to preserve their power. The events in Novocherkask, Karabakh and Tbilisi are a clear example of this. Only when substantial actions are taken and substantial laws are passed by the Supreme Soviet, or amendments are introduced into the Constitution will we be able to talk about the first step to victory.

Brothers! Put forward not only social and economic demands, but also political demands! Transform your strike into a struggle against the exploiters — the party bureaucracy. Demand economic and political sovereignty for the Ukrainian republic, the introduction of a multi-party democratic system of rule. Without political freedom there cannot be economic freedom! On no account disband the spontaneous strike committees, the real power base of the workers, which the party mafia is compelled to take into account. Form your own trade unions independent of the party! Demand the pre-term ree-

lection of local councils and full change of the executive councils. Nominate your own representatives to the councils and executive committees.

Miners! Do not let the Bolsheviks deceive you again (how many times have they done so already!) with nice promises. Renew the democratic social order and social justice, which have been violated by the Bolsheviks, today and not tomorrow.

"Struggle on — and be triumphant! God Himself will aid you!" (Taras Shevchenko: "The Caucasus", 1845).

Ukrainian National Democratic League

July 21, 1989

* * *

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON UKRAINIAN MINERS' STRIKE

Novovolynsk, Volyn oblast

According to Nestor Drohobyt'skyi, a member of the Chervonohrad branch of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union (UHU), 2 mines went on strike in the town of Novovolynsk.

Chervonohrad, Lviv oblast

All 12 coal-mines went on strike.

On July 22 a delegation of Chervonohrad miners, including Serhiy Loboda from mine no. 4 and Oleh Kul from mine no. 2, went to Moscow to meet with Soviet officials. On the way, the delegation was planning to visit Donetsk.

Donetsk

According to Volodymyr Solovyov, a member of the Donetsk branch of the Ukrainian National Democratic League (UNDL), and Yevhenia Ratnikova, a member of the Donetsk branch of the UHU, after two protests the miners' demands were accepted and signed by the head of the State Labour Committee Shcherbakov and the Minister of Coal Mining Ryabev. The strike committee put forward some very serious demands — several clauses of the miners' statute are to be amended, particularly the clause regarding dismissal, thereby giving miners the right to appeal in court against unjust dismissal. The miners are calling for the economic independence of coal-mines, the right to employ technical engineers, the right to allocate profits, and the right to sell excess coal abroad, to lease mines and to form action groups.

The majority of the strike committee and miners do not agree with signing any variation of the draft proposal as "There are no guarantees that tomorrow they will not deceive us and everything will not return to the way it was", said the miners.

The representative of the "Pivdennodonbaska" coal-mine pointed out that:

"If we disperse today, tomorrow there will be a law governing strikes, on the basis of which we will be repressed. We will not leave until definite decisions have been made". Following his remarks, the miners decided not to send a delegation to Moscow, but to wait for government officials, even Gorbachev himself, to come to Donetsk. the miners shouted: "Gorbachev!" Averyanov, a member of the strike committee, called for a telebridge between Gorbachev and Ryzhkov and the miners, or a session of the Supreme Soviet in Donetsk. In reply to this the miners shouted: "We want a session, we want a session!"

Ryabev then went to the microphone and said: "I will immediately start writing a law based on your demands, but I will need a month".

— "A month's time means never!", replied the miners.

— "If nothing will change in six month's time then I myself will sit down on the steps of the Supreme Soviet with a placard saying 'Looking for work'".

— "Are you for ending the strike?", asked the strike committee representative.

— "No!", replied the miners.

— "Are you for continuing the strike until we get firm guarantees?"

— "Yes!"

— "Are you for a delegation to Moscow?"

— "No!"

— "Are you for a delegation from Moscow?"

— "Yes!"

The decisions were noted down in the minutes of the meeting.

Ryabev then made a last attempt to change the situation, but the miners replied: "We will not change our decision. You might as well go back to Moscow and start sitting on the steps". The commission then continued to formulate its resolution.

"Don't you believe the party?", asked a party official. The miners replied: "We've heard enough about the party, let's get back to the point".

Pavlohrad

July 21 began with the reading of telegrams from miners in Donetsk, Chervonoarmiysk and Pershotravnevs. In the telegram from Chervonoarmiysk the head of the strike committee Oleh Lykhanov stated: "Don't believe the articles in the newspapers *Trud* and *Izvestia* on the possibility of ending the strike". Afterwards the head of the "Pavlohradvuhillia" coal-mine addressed the miners. He pointed out that presently the delivery of coal does not exceed 10 to 15 wagons. He received a telegram from the Zaporizhia hydroelectric power station, which stated that the situation in the town was extremely tense and that everyone was expecting the power station to stop work. That day 40,000 tons of coal were not delivered. The compensation for failure to deliver coal is 20 karbovantsi (20 roubles) per ton of coal. He went on to

say that in the Donetsk oblast people are striking wisely — half the shifts are working. He was shouted down.

A party meeting at the "Blahodatna" coal-mine (the mine which started the strike) passed a resolution of no-confidence in the general manager of the "Pavlohradvuhillia" company Ponomarev. The miners demanded his dismissal from the town council even before the plenum. Two hundred karbovantsi from the party budget (1000 karbovantsi) of the mine are to be allocated for the needs of the strike committee. The recent article in *Trud* was condemned as untruthful and a telegram was sent to the editorial board demanding that a correction be printed. The manager of the "Yuvileyna" coal-mine made attempts to force the surface workers to deliver coal but received a vote of no-confidence. The strikers adhered to the slogan: "Not a ton of coal, not a metre of tunnel" and were determined to strike even though blast-furnaces and the Zaporizhia power station would stop if they had no coal. When asked by accountants from the "Yuvileyna" mine what they should do, the strike committee advised them to "do their accounts according to the conditions laid down in the demands".

In addition, the miners expressed a vote of no-confidence in the mine's union committees and demanded the election of a leadership comprising 80% miners and 20% technical engineers, which would give the miners control, and the subordination of the unions to the workers' collectives. A telegram from the Central Committee of the CPSU, signed by Medvedev, promising to extend government promises to the Kuzbas miners to include all miners of the USSR, was read out but did not receive an enthusiastic welcome. The miners were determined to strike until they received a firm guarantee that their demands would be met. These included several political demands:

- The workers are to be the owners of their company;
- The workers' councils are to control production;
- The workers' council is to deal with the employment and dismissal of workers and the allocation of the work-force; the workers' council and the union are to allocate welfare;
- A resolution on independent trade unions is to be passed;
- All power is to go to the councils;
- Each coal-mine is to have full economic and legal independence;
- The relation between wage increases and productivity is to be abolished;
- The "Pavlohradvuhillia" company is to be disbanded;
- Military training for miners is to be abolished.

The miners pitched their tents in the local park, where the following slogans could be seen: "Stand firm until the end!", "Land to the peasants, factories to the workers!" For a short time the slogan "Farewell, dirty Russia!" (Lermontov) could also be seen, but was taken down after a while.

Through megaphones the strike committee announced the presence of Japanese correspondents in the town, but representative of the district council warned member of the strike committee not to give interviews to the press.

The strikers were discontented with the absence of local party officials. The secretary of the town council Solovyov went abroad. The local authorities were frightened by the strike and refused to help the miners publicise their demands. These were typed out on ordinary typewriters. The strikers said: "The town council has openly moved away from the people". The representative of the Supreme Soviet Commission on Donbas, the deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the UkSSR, was present during the talks between the authorities and the strike committee regarding the miners' demands.

In his address to the miners Vasylov, the head of the Pavlohrad strike committee, said: "Debates about the demands have gone on for the whole day. Opinions are split on whether to continue the strike or not. All this is happening under pressure both from above and below". When he asked: "What do we want?" the striking miners replied: "Results!". Vasylov concluded his address with the following words: "This decision should appear in the official press. We cannot regard a telegram or a document with our demands which has been signed by only one representative of the Supreme Soviet of the UkSSR, who does not represent the whole Supreme Soviet, as a firm decision. We demand that the resolution of the commission is published in the central press. So far this has not been done. We will stand firm till the end". He received the support of all the miners.

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CHERVONOHRAH MINERS MAKE ADDITIONAL DEMAND: "AWAY WITH SHCHERBYTSKYI!"

The Chervonohrad strike began in the afternoon hours of July 20. The first to down tools were mines no. 3, 4 and 6. They were followed by mine no. 9.

On July 21 the strike spread to all 12 of the city's coal-mines and the striking miners added a fourth demand to their initial three political demands — "Away with Shcherbytskyi!"

The previous day, July 20, a meeting was held in the centre of the city from 7.00 p.m. to 11.00 p.m.

Prior to this, Chervonohrad's Ukrainian Language Society held a meeting at the palace of culture, where the strike committee held its meetings. The participants were addressed by a representative of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine (Kravchuk's deputy) who condemned Ukrainian national symbols. This incident was allowed to slip by only because of the strike. The representative of the CPU Central Committee, the first secretary of the city party committee and other officials urged the workers to end the strike, but their addresses were met with whistling.

Donetsk oblast

On July 20 the Soviet television programme "Vremya" reported that nearly 100 of the region's 120 coal-mines had joined the strike and that meetings

attended by thousands of people were being held in a number of mining towns. According to a member of the strike committee in Donetsk the miners were discussing the formation of an independent miners' organisation which would unite all the mines in Ukraine and protect the interests of the mineworkers.

According to Volodymyr Solovyov, a member of the Ukrainian National Democratic League from Dnipropetrovsk, on July 20 the miners' demands were being discussed in the oblast party headquarters, where the Donetsk strike committee met. By 10.00 p.m., the talks had only reached the seventh demand.

Attempts were made to force the miners to go back to work. In the morning the miners came to work, changed into their work clothes and went to the square, where they signed in. The management of the Zasiadko and other mines did not transport the miners to the square. The officials stated that: "You strike there, and we need you to work!" Certain reports stated that the third shift at the Khanshontov mine, Makiyivka district, where force is said to have been used, went back to work.

In Donetsk representatives of the mining industry urged the strikers to go back to work.

Transport workers in Selidov and several other areas made attempts to support the miners, but these were stopped. There were also unconfirmed reports that strikes were being planned in Kharkiv.

Representatives of the unofficial groups in Donetsk held talks with the strike committee urging the miners to demand an amendment to the mining statutes against which the miners were defenceless.

As reported by the strike committee in Makiyivka half of their demands had already been met and the remainder were to be met within a month. If their demands were not fully met, the strike would continue. The strike committees were not disbanded. The authorities were anxious to end the strike as tens of thousands of people would gather on the squares during their off-days.

Pavlohrad

Miners from the local coal-mines as well as representatives from Ternivka gathered in Pavlohrad's central square. They put forward 42 demands. These were principally social and economic, but included some political demands:

1. all power is to be handed over to the councils;
2. independent trade unions are to be set up;
3. party officials are to be deprived of their privileges;
4. self-financing for individual mines.

On the first day of the strike, contact with the "Pavlohradvuhillia" mines was broken. The angry miners demanded the dismissal of those responsible.

When the director of the local group of coal-mines addressed the strikers

his remarks were met with indignant shout of "Lies!". In his address People's Deputy Vychatskyi from Pavlohrad proposed to deliver the miners' demands to Moscow on Monday. The miners were determined to carry on the strike until their demands were met. They were joined by the mine construction workers on July 20.

"Izvestia" reports on Donbas Strike

On July 18 Moscow's central newspaper *Izvestia* published an extensive account of the strike in Makiyivka:

"The whole street and the square by the building of the Soviet district party committee and the district administration are filled with people. Four thousand miners from 7 coal-mines around Makiyivka have begun a strike. The strike committee consists of 50 miners. Organisation is excellent. Order is maintained by the miners. The miners hold meetings and point out that they are afraid of provocations.

Their demands: wage increases, a reduction in the number of officials, the regulation of working hours, a compulsory rest day (for everyone), a rise in coal prices. The first secretary of the Donetsk oblast party committee A. Vynnyk, the head of the Ukrainian republic's Central Committee of Miners' Unions V. Shevtsov, the deputy head of the oblast executive committee Ye. Yevsiukov and others are holding talks with the strikers".

* * *

DEMANDS OF THE DONETSK MINERS

According to a report by Yevhenia Ratnikova, a member of the Donetsk branch of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union, and Volodymyr Solovyov, a member of the Dnipropetrovsk branch of the Ukrainian National Democratic League, the Donetsk miners have put forward the following demands:

1. A 20% wage increase for evening shifts and 40% for night shifts to be paid by the state.
2. Workers are to receive full rates of pay for time taken to travel to work.
3. Face workers are to have 45 days paid annual leave (21 days in winter and the rest in summer).
4. All those who work below ground are to receive additional pay for work with pneumatic drills and other tools and heavy machinery as well as special leave on account of the constant vibration they suffer from their work.
5. Provide all workers and engineers with family holidays.

6. Silicosis, anthrax, tuberculosis and rheumatism are to be recognised as traumas at the place of work.

7. A worker whose health has been damaged or who has become an invalid through his work is to receive compensation amounting to 50% of the average monthly wage for the rest of his life in addition to his wages and pension.

8. Skin cancer, lung cancer, and cancer of the thyroid gland, nose, ear and eye with all their consequences are to be recognized as traumas at the place of work.

9. Retirement after 20 years of continuous work below ground regardless of age.

10. The Council of Ministers is to resolve the question of water, gas and electricity supply to the villages and settlements of Donbas.

11. Workers of the mining industry are to be provided with their own apartment within a period of 10 years.

12. The Ministry and the Central Committee of Trade Unions are to review soap delivery quotas.

13. Donbas is to be placed on the priority list for the supply of food, and the workers are to be provided with good quality food in accordance with medical regulations.

14. A 50% reduction in union staff.

15. Establish a fixed price per ton of coal and per metre of tunnel in the coal face.

16. The Ministry is to increase funds for the provision of spare parts and installations in accordance with needs.

17. The establishment of a single fee of 12 karbovantsi (roubles) and 50 kopeks for kindergartens.

18. A review with a view to increasing the existing norms of coal dampness in order to prevent the paying of unjustified fines.

19. On retirement workers are to receive a lump sum bonus equivalent to their average annual wage.

20. When changing jobs for whatever reason a worker is to receive full payment with no deductions.

21. Profits earned during all-union subotniks (voluntary work for the state on off-days) are to be allocated in accordance with the decisions of workers' meetings.

22. Prohibit the establishment of cooperatives and disband the medical and food cooperatives already in existence as well as cooperatives with an intermediary role.

23. 3-year paid maternity leave for women, maintaining the average wage.

24. Holiday payments or financial aid for medical treatment is to be provided for the workers.

25. Full payment for workers temporarily out of work through the fault of the employer.

26. Families of dead miners are to receive a lump sum equivalent to their annual wages and are to be provided with their own apartment within a period of 3 months.

27. Upper wage levels are to be removed, while maintaining pensions etc.

28. The lunch allowance in kindergartens is to be raised from 60 kopeks to 1 karbovanets to match the rise in food prices.

29. Regional economic self-financing for Donbas.

30. A wage increase of up to 60% for women employed in harmful coal mining concerns. Additional 6 days vacation.

31. The miners' union is to fund the strike.

32. Miners are not to be repressed for the strike.

33. The strike is not to be stopped until our demands are met. This is to be guaranteed in a relevant document which is to be published in the central press.

34. A minimum wage of 350 karbovantsi for the principal trades and 250 for all others.

35. Sunday is to be a general rest day. Reduced working hours on holidays.

36. Income tax should not be paid by workers who have attained retirement status and from every thirteenth monthly wage packet.

37. Ban the transfer of workers to other jobs as a punitive measure.

Chervonohrad, Western Ukraine, Joins Miners' Strike

On July 20, miners from the Chervonohrad basin, Lviv oblast, joined the strike. In addition to social and economic demands similar to those above, the Chervonohrad miners made the following political demands:

1. Pre-term elections to the city councils.

2. The dismissal from office of the first secretary of the city party committee Mariyenko, the secretary of the district electoral commission Mamonova, the head of the city council Harlamov, the chief of police Poliakov, the deputy chief of police Horuk, the head of the KGB Zaderel, the city procurator Olenchyn, the editor of the newspaper *Shakhtar Chervonohrada* (Chervonohrad Miner) Dubyna, and judges Tarnavska, Matsey and Posisen for the violation of the law governing elections in Chervonohrad electoral district No. 492 during the last elections to the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR.

3. The establishment of an independent trade union under the name "Solidarity".

4. Away with Shcherbytskyi.

UKRAINIAN STATEHOOD COMMEMORATED IN KYIV

On June 30, on Kyiv's Khreshchatyk, representatives of the "Diya" (Action) youth group raised the revolutionary red-and-black flag of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists together with the slogan: "Long live Ukrainian Nationalism — the creator of the Act of the Restoration of the Ukrainian State on 30 June 1941".

KHARKIV BRANCH OF THE UHU HOLDS FOUNDING MEETING

On June 20, 1989, the Kharkiv branch of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union held its founding meeting. The agenda was as follows: the acceptance of new members, election of the executive, the bulletin of the Kharkiv UHU, and the election of an editorial board.

At the start of the meeting, Stepan Sapelak informed those present that an Initiative Group for the Revival of the Ukrainian Youth Association in Slobozhanshchyna (north-eastern regions of Ukraine) had been formed in Kharkiv and read out the Group's Appeal. The meeting then dealt with the issue of new members. After that Mykhailo Horyn, a member of the All-Ukrainian Coordinating Council of the UHU, addressed the meeting. He spoke about the history of the UHU, its principles and tactics, and gave a run-down of the events so far this year, as well as recent events in Lviv.

Stepan Sapelak was elected head of the Kharkiv branch of the UHU and Volodymyr Pasichnyk as deputy head. An editorial board, consisting of the following: editor — Volodymyr Pasichnyk; assistant editors — Valeriy Bondar and Ihor Kostiv, was also elected.

UKRAINIAN YOUTH ASSOCIATION REESTABLISHED IN KHARKIV

Taking into consideration that restructuring in our society requires wider activity and affirming the fact of today's cynical disregard for the cultural heritage and traditions of SUM in the Eastern regions of Ukraine, which led to the creation of an abnormal type of young Ukrainian with a national inferiority complex, and in view of the historical memory of the 1930s, when

the Ukrainian Youth Association (SUM) was liquidated as a result of Stalin's repressions, we, conscious representatives of Ukrainian youth, have formed in Kharkiv an Initiative Group for the Revival of SUM in Slobozhanshchyna.

Our purpose is to reawaken a national-spiritual identity in young people. Our means of activity will be: to maintain contact with people in Kharkiv and beyond only in the native language; to conduct debates and discussions with official and unofficial organisations, as well as people of contrasting beliefs, i.e. chauvinists, Komsomol members, etc., to organise meetings with cultural activists on the theme of our native history, literature, art, ecology, and also with repressed prisoners of the Brezhnev-Suslov regime.

Any young person, who is concerned about the fate of our native people and seeks its cultural-spiritual revival, can become a member of SUM.

In turn, we pledge that our platform will be based on the principles and ideals of the SUM of the 1920s.

In connection with this, we appeal to all SUM executives in the free world for support and help in this difficult yet noble task in the form of literature, national symbols (tryzub and blue-and-yellow flags), books on the history of SUM through contacts with SUM members in the free world.

We hope that in the future the central branch of SUM will function in our native land.

With this appeal we would also like to state that this newly-formed SUM branch is in complete solidarity with the Ukrainian Helsinki Union and supports the Popular Movement of Ukraine for restructuring.

The founding members of the Initiative Group for the Revival of SUM are:

Cheremskyi, Andriy
Sheshatskyi, Hennadiy
Herashchenko, Olha
Shkumat, Svitlana
Zhyvolub, Ihor

Anyone wishing to join in our endeavour should contact us at:

Kharkiv,
7 Ostap Vyshnia Street, Apt. 2

PROTEST OF THE KHARKIV BRANCH OF THE UHU AND THE SUM INITIATIVE GROUP

On July 15, the Kharkiv branch of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union (UHU) and the Initiative Group of the Ukrainian Youth Association (SUM) held a 24-hour hunger strike in Kharkiv's Shevchenko Park in protest against the dishonouring of the Ukrainian national symbols — the blue-and-yellow flag and the

Trident — sanctioned by the authorities. In connection with this, they issued a protest letter, the text of which we give below.

To the President of the World Congress of Free Ukrainians, Mr. Shymko
To SUM branches around the world
To the editorial boards of the newspapers “Radyanska Ukraina”,
“Molod Ukrainy”, and “Pravda Ukrainy”
To the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine and
To all those interested

PROTEST

We would like to emphasise the fact that reforms of the political system and other democratic changes are insufficient for the rebirth of the nation unless they are accompanied by legislation on such issues as the granting to the Ukrainian language of the status of state language; Ukrainian citizenship; the national anthem; national symbols; and so on.

This matter cannot be delayed any further because of the recurring acts of vandalism in Ukraine against the blue-and-yellow flag and the Trident, which are descended from the time of Kyivan Rus', and which are a postulate of the historical heritage of the Ukrainian nation.

Not so long ago, basing themselves on a so-called “Commission”, a number of official newspapers informed the people of Ukraine that all use of the above-mentioned symbols irrespective of all political and social circumstances is forbidden.

The Kharkiv branch of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union and the Initiative Group of the Ukrainian Youth Association condemn and protest against the shameful deliberate derision of the historical heritage of our nation by a group of collaborators.

In our opinion, through its collaborationist “edict”, the so-called “Commission” has committed another anonymous act of political and national shame in the long historical heritage and life of our subjugated nation. We regard such shameful acts as a continuation of the “Valuyev” and “Ems” decrees and the decrees of Stalin’s oprichniki, which prohibited Ukrainian orthography — excluded certain letters from our alphabet — and deprived the Ukrainian language of the status of state language of the territory of Ukraine.

We submit this memorandum, based on our convictions and ideological position, because national symbols are closely related to the mentality of the people. The fact that the question of the blue-and-yellow flag and the Trident should be resolved by the people themselves and not by Valuyev-Stalinist Commissions is an axiom. The Kharkiv branch of the UHU and the Initiative Group of SUM also protest against the recent events in Kharkiv, Poltava and Kyiv, where the authorities sanction the dishonouring and derision of the blue-and-yellow flag and the Trident. With anger and indignation we are

resisting these acts of vandalism. In connection with this we are declaring a deliberate 24-hour hunger strike, which is to take place in the Shevchenko Park on July 15, 1989.

People of Kharkiv and Ukraine! Give you active support to our initiative.

Chairman of the Kharkiv branch of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union —
Stepan Sapelak

Members —
Volodymyr Pasichnyk (vice-chairman), *Ihor Kostiv*, *Valeriy Bondar*

Chairman of the Initiative Group of SUM —
Svitlana Shkumat

Members —
Andriy Cheremskyi (vice-chairman),
Olha Herashchenko, *Hennadiy Sheshatskyi*

Kharkiv, July 7, 1989

KHARKIV ACTIVISTS DEFEND UKRAINIAN HETMAN

On Thursday, 6 July, poet Stepan Sapelak, chairman of the Kharkiv branch of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union (UHU), together with other activists from the city, went to Poltava to protest against the official celebrations (July 6-9) marking the 280th anniversary of the Battle of Poltava, and mourn the thousands of Ukrainians slaughtered by Peter the Great after his victory over Hetman Ivan Mazepa. After the battle, Ukraine lost the substantial autonomy she enjoyed under the Treaty of Pereyaslav (1654) between Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytskyi and Tsar Alexis of Russia. The celebrations were staged by the Central Committee of the Communist Youth League and other all-union institutions in Moscow.

According to Sapelak, 12 people from Kharkiv managed to reach Poltava. Activists travelling from Lviv were taken off the train.

In connection with this, the Kharkiv branch of the UHU and the Ukrainian Youth Association (SUM) have issued a joint declaration in defence of Mazepa, in which they disassociate themselves from official interpretations of the Hetman's role in Ukrainian history and call for the return to official historiography of the names of national Ukrainian scholars. The full text of this declaration follows below.

IN DEFENCE OF HETMAN IVAN MAZEPA

To the President of the World Congress of Free Ukrainians
To the editors of newspapers in the free world and in Ukraine
To the administration of the Historical Institute of the Academy of Sciences
of the Ukrainian SSR

Declaration

With this declaration the Kharkiv branch of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union (UHU) and the Initiative Group of the Ukrainian Youth Association (SUM) disassociate themselves from the interpretations of official historiography and individual pseudo-scholars regarding the role of Hetman Ivan Mazepa in the life of Ukraine.

We deem it imperative to declare before the community that for us Hetman Ivan Mazepa is a nationally revered symbol of Ukrainian statehood. Relative to this, and taking into consideration the objective analysis and research into the work of the Hetman by historians who are recognised authorities of national historical scholarship, we demand the return to official historiography of the names of the following scholars: Dmytro Doroshenko, Ivan Ohiyenko, Dmytro Chyzhevskiy, Volodymyr Antonovych, Olha Yakymenko, Mykhailo Hrushevskiy, and the reprinting of [Tykter's] *History of the Ukrainian Armed Forces*.

We also declare that on the day of the battle for national independence at Poltava and the defeat of the Ukrainian nation under the leadership of Ivan Mazepa, we will arrive [in Poltava] in sorrow and mourning. Today, we appeal to the world community and those in Ukraine to support our initiative and join us in grief and mourning.

In the future, we will demand that the Rumanian government return to Ukraine the remains of our glorious Hetman, the defender of national rights and independence.

Stepan Sapelak

Chairman, Kharkiv UHU branch

Svitlana Shkumat

Chairwoman, Ukrainian Youth Association (SUM)

July 5, 1989

KHARKIV COMMEMORATES RESTORATION OF UKRAINIAN STATE

On Saturday, July 1, large numbers of members of the renewed Ukrainian Youth Association (SUM), students, and older residents of Kharkiv went into the streets of the city with blue-and-yellow Ukrainian national flags to mark the anniversary of the restoration of the Ukrainian state in Lviv on June 30, 1941. They laid flowers at the foot of the Taras Shevchenko monument.

As soon as the people unfolded their flags, units of the militia, many of whom were in civilian clothing, charged at the participants and began to brutally beat them. Poet Stepan Sapelak, head of the Kharkiv branch of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union (UHU), was beaten up and arrested. Andriy Cheremskyi, a doctor and member of the Initiative Group for the Revival of SUM, was also arrested. They were charged with violation of Article 185 of the Ukrainian SSR Criminal Code: non-compliance with the militia. They refused to take down the flags. This was the first time that physical force had been used against peaceful residents of Kharkiv: "We meet with flags every Saturday. They attacked us very harshly and dealt with us using very severe physical force", said Sapelak.

In protest against the brutal dispersal of the meeting and the arrest of the two activists, a Committee for the Defence of Sapelak and Cheremskyi was formed and began a hunger strike. The committee distributed leaflets informing the Kharkiv residents that the hunger strike would be held in the Shevchenko Park. However, after a stern warning from militia captain Shevchenko that the hunger strikers would be arrested the action was continued in the university, the court and other buildings.

Sapelak and Cheremskyi were held in prison for 3 days. During their imprisonment, they held a full hunger strike. Judge Losova of the Derzhynsk district court, who intended to hold a closed trial, misinformed the Committee for the Defence of Sapelak and Cheremskyi about the date of the trial. In addition, the head of the Derzhynsk district militia Kyrylchuk failed to inform the friends and relatives of the imprisoned activists where they were being held. The trial began at 2.00 p.m. on July 3 with Judge Losova presiding. Captain Shevchenko of the militia, who is well known for his provocations against the democratic activists of Lviv, testified against the defendants. Losova had to stop the proceedings because Shevchenko's absurd allegations evoked laughter from the packed courtroom. After that Losova ruled that the trial would continue behind closed doors in a different room. Due to pressure from the UHU, SUM and other unofficial organisations Sapelak and Cheremskyi were released after being fined 20 karbovantsi.

KHARKIV ACTIVISTS DEFEND DISTRICT PROSECUTOR

On July 16 a meeting in defence of the prosecutor of the Moscow district of Kharkiv Halsynskyi was held in the city's "Victory" Park. Several thousand people attended the meeting. During the elections to the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR Halsynskyi had given the upper hand to popular candidates Korotych and Yevtushenko for which he was dismissed from his post as district prosecutor.

Members of the Kharkiv branch of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union (UHU) and the Ukrainian Youth Association (SUM) took part in the meeting.

Ukrainian national blue-and-yellow flags and Tridents were displayed at the meeting. Many Ukrainians saw their national flag for the first time and applauded the flag bearers. Many people wept with joy at the sight of the Ukrainian national symbols.

The meeting was addressed by poet Stepan Sapelak, head of the Kharkiv branch of the UHU, representatives of the oblast party committee, the prosecutor's office, and Kharkiv's unofficial groups. The meeting ended peacefully.

10,000 ATTEND ECOLOGICAL MEETING IN KHARKIV

On Sunday, August 6, at 6.00 p.m. the Kharkiv branch of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union (UHU) and the Ukrainian Youth Association (SUM) organised an ecological meeting at the "Dynamo" Stadium in Kharkiv. The Ukrainian national symbols — the blue-and-yellow flag and tryzub (trident) — were displayed at the meeting.

When Andriy Cheremskyi, the head of SUM, carried the Ukrainian flag onto the podium he was immediately surrounded by police and KGB. At that point poet Stepan Sapelak, head of the Kharkiv UHU, was invited to address the meeting. The police switched off the microphones and tried to take Sapelak and Cheremskyi away. The participants began to shout "Glory to Ukraine!", "Release the arrested men!" and "Glory to the flag and coat of arms!". Sapelak was attacked by ten members of the special police who twisted his arms behind his back and injected him with an immobilising agent. He became weak and was carried to a room at the stadium. Cheremskyi and a representative of the strike committee were already there. The participants of the meeting continued to shout: "Release the arrested men!" and "Freedom for Ukraine!". The meeting ended peacefully. The two men were released due to strong public pressure.

Afterwards Sapelak felt ill. His arms were badly bruised and he was suffering from increasing effects of the injection.

OBLAST PARTY SECRETARY ATTACKS KHARKIV ACTIVISTS

The Kharkiv oblast party committee held its plenum on July 21. In his address the first secretary of the oblast party organisation V. P. Mysnychenko attacked the activists of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union and the Ukrainian Youth Association, particularly the head of the Kharkiv UHU Stepan Sapelak. On July 23 *Sotsialistychna Kharkivshchyna* (Socialist Kharkiv oblast)

wrote the following: "Many people probably know that from 1-3 July an extremist group agitated by Sapelak, who is unemployed, went into the streets to propagate national symbols and to declare a hunger strike. The group refused to hold constructive discussions with representatives of the authorities". In actual fact the activists agreed to such discussions but not under the aegis of the party.

AUTHORITIES TELL SAPELAK HIS BOOKS ARE IMPOUNDED

On July 26 airport authorities at Moscow's Sheremetevo airport notified poet Stepan Sapelak that they had confiscated all the materials that he had acquired during his trip to the West.

In their statement Soviet officials and the Institute of Literature said: "Bringing books by authors Stepan Sapelak, Ihor Kalynets, Mykhailo Osadchyi, Yevhen Sverstiuk through USSR customs is forbidden. Reason: anti-Soviet slant and religious propaganda".

The airport authorities also impounded a five-column *History of Ukrainian Literature* by Ukrainian scholar Mykhailo Hrushevskyi.

All of the above-mentioned authors are currently being published in the Soviet Ukrainian press.

KHARKIV RESIDENTS PROTEST HARASSMENT OF PUBLIC PROSECUTOR

On July 26-27 a meeting was held in Kharkiv in protest against the harassment of the prosecutor of the city's Moscow district. To prevent them from raising Ukrainian national flags and tridents UHU activists were forced to leave the square under threat of physical assault by the Moscow district police. They proceeded to stage a demonstration with Ukrainian symbols on Dzerzhinsky square in protest against being banned from the meeting.

In Kharkiv mass public meetings are being held every day. During these meetings activists read poems by Vasyl Stus, Stepan Sapelak and others.

POLICE CONDUCTS SECRET RIOT TRAINING IN RAKOVYTS, LVIV OBLAST

On Saturday, August 5, 40 police vehicles and several fire trucks arrived at a military training area near the village of Rakovyts in the Pustomytiv district of Lviv oblast.

On arrival the contingent split into two groups — “demonstrators” and riot police. The first group proceeded to stage a demonstration shouting various slogans such as “Russians go away!”, “Glory to Ukraine!”, “Independence for Ukraine!” and others. The second group then charged and began to beat and disperse the “protesters”. The training lasted 2 hours.

It is difficult to establish the purpose behind this exercise. Secrecy was clearly being maintained and locals who came up to see what was going on were forced away. One woman who made persistent attempts to get a closer look was pushed into a vehicle and driven away.

According to activists from Lviv the training may have served 3 purposes: Either

a) The local authorities are preparing some type of provocation and the “demonstrators” will be used to create disorder in Lviv to justify a general clampdown on all political and religious meetings.

b) The staged “demonstration” is to serve as “evidence” for a film supposedly portraying events in Lviv in order to justify the brutal police action against demonstrators which will presumably be sent to Moscow.

c) Riot police were training for future deployment against public meetings in Lviv.

UKRAINIAN ORTHODOX BREAK WITH MOSCOW PATRIARCHATE — REVIVE UKRAINIAN AUTOCEPHALY

According to Mykhailo Osadchyi, a member of the Lviv Regional Council of the Popular Movement of Ukraine and editor of the independent journal *Kaphedra* (Rostrum), on Saturday, 19 August, in support of the appeal of the Initiative Committee for the Revival of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC), priests, the church committee and parishioners of the Church of Sts. Peter and Paul in Lviv proclaimed their rejection of the jurisdiction of the Moscow Patriarchate. They sent an appeal to Demetrios I, the Universal Patriarch, asking him to take them temporarily under his jurisdiction until the creation of a Ukrainian Orthodox hierarchy.

During the service archpriest Rev. Volodymyr Yarema, the overseer of the Church of Sts. Peter and Paul, read the appeal of the Initiative Committee,

pointing out the numerous wrongs which the Ukrainian Orthodox Church has suffered at the hands of the Moscow Patriarchate since 1686.

Ukrainian autocephaly was first revived after the Mongol invasion. The next revival occurred in 1918-1920, but was suppressed by Stalin in the years 1927-30. August 19 signified the third revival of Ukrainian autocephaly.

Presently Ukrainian Orthodox communities function in Kyiv, in a number of western Ukrainian oblasts and the Baltic republics without their own churches. The Church of Sts. Peter and Paul in Lviv is the first real functioning community of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church in Ukraine.

A letter to the Chairman of Religious Affairs of the Lviv Oblast Executive Committee Reshetylo was read immediately after Mass and was signed by more than 1,000 faithful.

The declaration of autocephaly by the parish of Sts. Peter and Paul has the support of the Ukrainian Catholic Church. Ivan Hrechko, who represented the Ukrainian Catholic community, greeted the believers of the UAOC.

One of the three Divine Liturgies that day was celebrated by the head of the Initiative Committee for the Revival of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church Rev. Bohdan Mykhailechko, who greeted the priests, church committee and all the faithful with the creation of the first real parish of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church in Ukraine. Mykhailo Osadchyi heads the press service of the UAOC.

* * *

APPEAL TO GODFEARING UKRAINIAN BISHOPS, PRIESTS, DEACONS, CANTORS, MONKS, NUNS AND ALL BELIEVERS IN UKRAINE AND IN THE EMIGRATION

Ukrainian People, sincere, loyal and devout from time immemorial!

You never usurped or enslaved foreign lands and peoples. You did not make peace with the yoke of spiritual oppression. You demonstrated the firmness of your spirits in the most terrible times of your existence.

When it seemed that the Kyivan Metropolitanate had fallen, it revived in the form of the independent Metropolitanate of Halychynna (Galicia). In 1458 the Kyivan Metropolitanate revived once again in the capital of our people — Kyiv. In the 17th century it flourished in the kozak state. Like a mountain the kozaks rose in defence of the Orthodox faith because it filled them with an unbreakable spirit of freedom. The fact that Kyivan Metropolitan Sylvester Kosiv did not accept the Pereyaslav accords, thereby demonstrating his firm stance in defence of the independence of the Ukrainian Church, is widely known.

But events did not occur according to his will. Ukrainian People, you suffered destruction and ruin at the hands of the Tartar-Mongol hordes. You

suffered great oppression from your western neighbours. But still greater ill-treatment befell you from the Muscovites of the same faith. Swallowing the Ukrainian Church into their greedy stomachs by force in 1686, before that deporting all Ukrainian bishops to Muscovy and resettling Ukraine with Muscovite bishops, they brutally deprived the Ukrainian Church of the independent election of bishops and their appointment to eparchies. They banned sermons in our native language and the reading of texts with a southern Slav pronunciation.

It seemed that, having laid in a Russian coffin for over 250 years, our Church would never revive. But, like a phoenix, the Ukrainian Church was reborn from the ashes of non-existence. Our living Church. Her vitality was demonstrated in 1919 when the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, which functions to this day in the emigration, was created.

Godfearing People! Our Church has also been revived in Ukraine. In Kyiv a Committee of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church has been formed. It wants to restore our faith, to tear it away from the Patriarchate of Moscow, although Orthodox, but one that worshipped the tsar and one that is faithfully subservient and alien to the Ukrainian spirit.

Ukrainian People! The time for you to think, each individual for himself, "what contribution can I make towards the sacred issue of the restoration of the independence which was forcefully taken from us, the rebirth of our ancestral faith, the return of our traditions and language — towards the proclamation of our independent Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church" is approaching.

Foreign Patriarchs will not restore order in our home. This we have to do ourselves "for when one is not concerned about his own kind, particularly his own family, he renounces his faith and is worse than an unbeliever" (1 Tim. 5,8).

Let the conscience of the bishops and priests who regard themselves as patriots awake. Surely apathy and spinelessness will not prevail over the service of the Christian needs of our people. Our people can no longer remain "sheep without pastors but only a few wolves". Therefore we propose the following:

1. Regional Committees for the Revival of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, which will in the future be formed into an All-Ukrainian Orthodox Church Council, should be created.
2. Parish meetings, which will adopt resolutions declaring the participants' refusal to obey the Russian Orthodox Church, should be held in all parishes.
3. Believers should inform regional committees about their firm loyalty to their native Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church.
4. The Universal Patriarch Demetrios I should be mentioned during all Divine Liturgies.

Committee for the Revival of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church

Telegram

His Beatitude
The Universal Patriarch Demetrios I,
Fanar, Istanbul, Turkey.

Your Beatitude,

The undersigned group of Ukrainian priests from the Initiative Committee for the Revival of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church appeals to Your Beatitude to take them under your religious and spiritual care.

We have informed His Beatitude Patriarch Pimen of Moscow about our split with the Moscow Patriarchate.

The Moscow Patriarchate's attitude towards us has compelled us to take this action. Immediately after the 1946 Sobor for unification with the Russian Orthodox Church the Patriarchate liquidated the initiative group which organised the Sobor. Its members were killed by the hands of hirelings, the documents were seized and the clauses about unification were not realised. As yet there are no religious schools in Lviv. Bishops appointed to tour eparchies are merely administrators, who humiliate and terrorise priests, exact money and show no concern for spiritual matters and the moral state of the clergy. The majority of eparchies were subjected to forced Russification. Our Ukrainian people feel like slaves of the Russians.

Since our Church, from the beginning of its existence, received the blessings of the See of Constantinople, we ask you now to take us under your spiritual guidance and assign us to one of the Ukrainian hierarchs functioning in the emigration, who has spiritual contact with Your Beatitude.

If Your Beatitude does not refuse us your care we ask you to send your reply to the address of archpriest Rev. Volodymyr Yarema, who had the opportunity to kiss the hand of Your Beatitude during your visit to Lviv.

Lviv
290014,
Yalivets side street 11,
Archpriest Rev. Volodymyr Yarema

Head of the Initiative Committee for the Revival of the UAOC,
226002,
Riga 2,
Mahuniu Street 10,
Rev. Bohdan Mykhailechko
Rev. Ivan Pashulia

Telegram

The Patriarch of Moscow Pimen,
The Exarch of Ukraine Metropolitan Filaret,
The Metropolitan of Lviv Nikodym

The group of priests of the Lviv eparchy would like to inform you of their rejection of the jurisdiction of the Moscow Patriarchate. We can no longer tolerate such medieval forms of serfdom. The Initiative Group for Unification with the Russian Orthodox Church formed in 1946 was physically liquidated, the documents seized, and all efforts towards unification were destroyed.

To this day there are no religious schools in Lviv. Bishops assigned to eparchies do not show spiritual concern for their flock. Instead they subject the clergy to administrative highhandedness and terror. The Patriarchate ignores the existence of the 50 million-strong Ukrainian nation. Religious books with Russian typesets and orthography are forced on us, money for the restoration of northern Russian monasteries is exacted from us when our Ukrainian monasteries stand in ruins. Bibles sent as gifts to our people by communities abroad are sold for 50 or more karbovantsi [roubles]. The Jubilee of the Christianisation of Kyiv was celebrated not in Kyiv, but in Moscow, although Moscow did not yet exist in 988 — the year when Ukraine accepted Christianity.

We have decided to find our own hierarchy and pastors and not wolves. We are temporarily under the jurisdiction of the Universal Patriarch Demetrios I. We have appealed to His Beatitude regarding this matter in a telegram.

Archpriests Revs. Volodymyr Yarema and Ivan Pashulia

* * *

**STATEMENT TO THE CHAIRMAN OF RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS OF THE
LVIV OBLAST EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE RESHETYLO YURIY
YULIANOVYCH FROM THE EXECUTIVE ORGAN OF THE
PARISHIONERS OF THE CHURCH OF STS. PETER AND PAUL IN LVIV**

With this letter we would like to point out that our community rejects the jurisdiction of the Russian Orthodox Church and extends its support to the Initiative Committee for the Revival of the UAOC, which exists in Kyiv.

The hopes we put on the Exarch of Ukraine have led us into a hopeless situation. Therefore we must find our own ways to liberation. We can no longer tolerate such offensive attitudes towards the 50 million-strong Ukrainian nation on the part of those, who should be the spiritual leaders of our people, but in essence are concerned only with exacting money for the erection of their establishments and the restoration of their monasteries, and who

show no interest in our monasteries which stand in ruins and in the fact that to this day there is still no Ukrainian seminary. The eparchies of the Rus', or more precisely Russian, Orthodox Church in Ukraine are nothing other than an organ of the spiritual enslavement of the Godfearing Ukrainian nation. We should segregate ourselves from such wolves not pastors. Therefore, not waiting for any favours, we join the Kyivan Initiative Committee in trying to find true spiritual leaders. Temporarily we will recognise the jurisdiction of His Beatitude the Universal Patriarch Demetrios I until a time when patriotic bishops will be found who will not be afraid of any condemnations on the part of the hierarchy in Moscow, which lost its Christian conscience a long time ago and has become completely subservient to atheist organs.

We understand that there are lay authorities in every state and we recognise the Soviet authorities as legal. But, honouring the decree on the separation of Church from State, we ask the organs of state not to interfere in our essentially spiritual affairs. We will carry out these obligations towards the state conscientiously, but, basing ourselves on the state decree which stipulates that the insult of religious believers is forbidden, we ask that the clauses of this decree are honoured as concerns the most important issue of the faithful — the election of spiritual leaders. The faithful will do this themselves, as was done in Ukraine prior to the enslavement of the Ukrainian Church by the tsarist government.

We have informed Their Beatitudes the Patriarchs by telegram. We will inform you about further developments in due course. We submit the signatures of parishioners who support our parish and our statement, thereby recognising the UAOC. (Over 1,800 signatures).

Lviv
21.8.1989

* * *

STATEMENT OF THE UKRAINIAN ASSOCIATION OF INDEPENDENT CREATIVE INTELLIGENTSIA (UANTI) AND THE EDITORIAL BOARD OF THE JOURNAL "KAPHEDRA"

On August 19, 1989, an historic event occurred in Ukraine. In support of the appeal of the All-Ukrainian Initiative Committee for the Revival of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church in Lviv, priests, the church committee and parishioners of the Church of Sts. Peter and Paul proclaimed the creation of the first functioning community of the UAOC in Ukraine and declared a split with the Moscow Patriarchate. UANTI supports the freedom of the spirit and the freedom of conscience of every individual.

Up to now in Ukraine the UAOC and the Ukrainian Catholic Church have been oppressed and persecuted by both the organs of state and the Russian Orthodox Church. This was a brutal violation of human rights and the rights of the Ukrainian nation, as well as the trampling of the Constitution of the

USSR, and the Ukrainian SSR, which have a separate clause on freedom of conscience of the individual.

The atmosphere of restructuring has provided the opportunity to counteract the usurper's suppression of the freedom of conscience of the individual, as a consequence of which the movements of the UAOC and the Ukrainian Catholic Church have emerged. UANTI, as a creative unofficial organisation, which through its vocation is directly related to the honour, conscience and soul of every individual, every nation, particularly the Ukrainian, insofar as piety has been instilled into the souls of the Ukrainian people from time immemorial, supports the right to the existence and free innate development of both the UAOC and the Ukrainian Catholic Church.

At the same time, in the opinion of UANTI and the editorial board of the journal *Kaphedra*, Ukraine needs her own patriarch on his own native land, who would emerge from the Ukrainian clergy, a national and religious patriot and a faithful son of the Ukrainian nation.

UANTI,
Editorial Board of the journal "Kaphedra"

* * *

REVIVED UKRAINIAN AUTOCEPHALOUS CHURCH HARASSED FOR BREAK WITH PATRIARCHATE

On September 15 Reshetylo summoned the church council and stated that: "With the exception of the Russian Orthodox Church there can be no other Orthodox Churches in the Soviet Union". He also made clear that if within a week the parish does not return under the jurisdiction of the ROC he would be compelled to hand over the church building and property to the authorities.

According to Mykhailo Osadchyi, who heads the press service of the UAOC, it is a well-known fact that a Georgian Orthodox Church, various Protestant denominations like Evangelicals, Lutherans, Pentacostalists and others, as well as other groups exist in the USSR in addition to the ROC. Therefore, says Osadchyi, the action of the Church of Sts. Peter and Paul has previous precedents. The UAOC existed in the Soviet Union until the 1930s when it was liquidated by Stalin.

As part of the assault against the UAOC a court of bishops has been convened to examine the case of the priests of the Church of Sts. Peter and Paul Rev. Volodymyr Yarema, its overseer, and Rev. Ivan Pashulia. They have been excommunicated from the Russian Orthodox Church and are being subjected to psychological pressure to recant and return to the ROC. In addition to this various rumours that Rev. Yarema died in hospital after being seriously beaten up and that Rev. Ivan Pashulia was murdered after an evening service or a religious class for children circulated around Lviv.

These rumours became so vociferous that notification to the effect that Revs. Yarema and Pashulia are alive and well and the Church of Sts. Peter and Paul continues to function had to be posted on a permanent notice board erected by the site of the future statue of Taras Shevchenko.

Metropolitan Mstyslav Skrypnyk, the Head of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, has appointed Rev. Bohdan Mykhailechko, the head of the Initiative Committee for the Revival of the UAOC, as his representative and religious administrator in Ukraine. He is to organise, coordinate and realise the strivings for the revival of the UAOC in Ukraine. Rev. Volodymyr Yarema has been appointed as his deputy.

In defence of the revived Autocephalous Orthodox Church in Ukraine Metropolitan Mstyslav has written a letter to Mikhail Gorbachev, the Chairman of the Committee for Religious Affairs of the USSR Council of Ministers Yuriy Khristoradnov and the Chairman of the Committee for Religious Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers Mykola Kolesnyk appealing to them to take the necessary steps to stop the harassment of the Orthodox Ukrainians, to guarantee freedom of religious worship in Ukraine and to grant the UAOC the right to use the Church of Sts. Peter and Paul.

* * *

To:

The Head of the Supreme Soviet and President of the USSR
Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev,

The Chairman of the Committee for Religious Affairs of the Council of
Ministers of the USSR Yuriy Nikolayevich Khristoradnov, and

The Chairman of the Committee on Religious Affairs of the Council of
Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR Mykola Kolesnyk

Honourable Sirs!

I appeal to you in defence of the parishioners of the Church of Sts. Peter and Paul in Lviv, who are being unjustly persecuted for their religious beliefs. On August 19 the overseer of this parish Archpriest Rev. Volodymyr Yarema and more than 1800 parishioners declared their will to secede from the Russian Orthodox Church and to become members of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church. For their decision the Lviv authorities announced that they would be deprived of the right to use the church and would be ordered to vacate the church premises if they do not return to the Russian Orthodox Church and the Moscow Patriarchate.

I would like to bring your attention to the serious violation of the right of freedom of conscience, guaranteed by the USSR Constitution and legislation on religious affairs.

The clergy and faithful who wish to belong to the Ukrainian Orthodox

Church, which was throughout the ages a Church of the Ukrainian people, should have this opportunity.

As the Primate of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church in the Diaspora and Successor to the See of the Metropolitan of Kyiv, I appeal to you to focus your attention to the situation, which has arisen in connection with the above decision of the parishioners of the Church of Sts. Peter and Paul in Lviv, and to take measures to guarantee their right to a free confession of their faith and to continued use of the Church of Sts. Peter and Paul and the surrounding premises in Lviv.

† *Mstyslav*
Metropolitan

September 19, 1989
South Bound Brook, New Jersey, USA

* * *

Epistle
Of the Primate of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church
Metropolitan Mstyslav
To the Reverend Clergy and Faithful
In Our Native Land and Scattered Throughout the Whole World

To all those residing in Ukraine and abroad to whom this relates

Dearly Beloved!

After the Second World War a large number of Orthodox Ukrainians found themselves outside our Native Land for political, ideological and social reasons. They and the Orthodox Ukrainians who had emigrated earlier to various countries of the West came under the spiritual care of the hierarchy of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, revived during the Second World War in Ukraine. In view of the suppression of the UAOC in Ukraine by Soviet authorities and the subordinate Russian Orthodox Church, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church remained in existence only in the free world. It was the sole successor to the Kyivan Metropolitanate, which throughout the ages from the times of its creation by St. Volodymyr the Great, remained the Mother Church of the Ukrainian people.

On the strength of this fact and in accordance with the decree of the Council of Bishops of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, its Primate Metropolitan Polikarp bore the title of Successor to the See of the Metropolitan of Kyiv. Following his death in 1953 this title was transferred to his successor Metropolitan Nikanor. When Metropolitan Nikanor died in 1969 an Extraordinary Council of the UAOC, attended by its hierarchy, clergy and

lay delegations, took place on 12-14 September 1969 in Ottobrunn. It bestowed upon me the obligations of Primate of the Autocephalous Orthodox Church in the diaspora in addition to my other duties as archbishop and deputy Metropolitan of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church in the USA. Together with this the decree of the Ottobrunn Council also granted me the title of Successor to the See of the Kyiv Metropolitan.

Recent events in the religious life of Ukraine, particularly the continued growing aspiration towards the revival of the UAOC, which is expressed in concrete activities and is developing despite the numerous difficulties and obstacles, summon the diaspora to participate in the movement of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church. Feeling responsible before God, the Ukrainian nation and its native Orthodox Church, I, using the powers bestowed upon me as the Successor to the Kyiv Metropolitan See, appoint Archpriest Rev. Bohdan Mykhailechko as my representative and religious administrator who, under my supervision, is to organise, coordinate and realise the strivings for the revival of the holy Autocephalous Orthodox Church in Ukraine, and as his deputy Archpriest Rev. Volodymyr Yarema, the overseer of the Church of Sts. Peter and Paul in Lviv. At the same time I approve and bestow by blessings upon the appeal to the Universal Patriarch Demetrios I by the priests and faithful of the Church of Sts. Peter and Paul in Lviv to take them under His Beatitude's spiritual care.

May the Blessings of Our Lord Jesus Christ and the Love of the God and Father and the Unity of the Holy Spirit remain with you always!

Devoted in Christ,

† *Mstyslav*
Metropolitan

September 8, 1989
South Bound Brook,
New Jersey, USA

UP TO 200,000 IN LVIV DEMAND FREEDOM FOR CATHOLIC CHURCH

In a rare, populous demonstration of national commitment and fortitude not seen since the war, hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians in Lviv took to the streets on Sunday, September 17, to demand the legalisation of the Ukrainian Catholic Church.

Reports on attendance vary, but western news sources as well as Church and lay activists in Ukraine confirm that up to 200,000 Ukrainian faithful raised their voices in unison in defence of the rights of their Church, banned by Moscow since 1946.

This demonstration was one of two held that day in Lviv. In the evening,

tens of thousands of Ukrainians participated in a "chain of sorrow" to protest against the Soviet Russian occupation of western Ukraine in 1939 as well as the earlier Polish occupation of Ukrainian lands.

Ivan Hel, head of the Committee for the Defence of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, commenting on the numbers, said, "The numbers don't matter very much. This is a moral victory. Look at how powerful our Church is. We've waited a long time for this, and now our time has come".

International press coverage of this event also spoke of the forced liquidation of the Ukrainian Catholic Church and the subsequent arrest, imprisonment and execution of thousands of church and lay leaders. Today, estimates of practicing Ukrainian Catholics in western Ukraine range from 4 to 6 million people.

Declaring, "I can no longer be intimidated", Hel explained that until now believers prayed in their homes or deep in the forests in order to avoid KGB repression.

"Stalin imposed genocide on Ukrainians, and the best way to kill a people is to kill their spiritualism", Hel said. "The time has come for freedom for our church".

Vyacheslav Chornovil, a Ukrainian Helsinki Union activist, observed that a "decisive step has been taken towards the rebirth of the Ukrainian Church".

The demonstration began with a Liturgy and Moleben at the site of the ancient St. George Sobor in Lviv, which was recently converted into a Russian Orthodox house of worship, and later turned into an organised march through the city. Singing religious and national hymns, the faithful proudly displayed a sea of blue-and-yellow flags of an independent Ukraine as well as the red-and-black flag of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists. The police made no attempt to stop the demonstration, however, according to Bohdan Horyn of the UHU, reports in the press accused the organisers of instigating the crowd to violence. Horyn categorically denied any such attempts.

Horyn also believes that the demonstration will greatly contribute to the efforts to recognise the Ukrainian Catholic Church. "In essence, before the eyes of the participants and those who attended the Liturgy and Moleben, as well as the guests, there emerged a picture of a solidified nation, which aspires to have its own national Church, which is prepared to continue to fight for it".

Horyn said that the fact that hundreds of thousands voiced their support for the Church proves that the issue is not an individual one, but a national demand.

"Supporters of the Ukrainian Catholic Church exist throughout western Ukraine in great numbers. I believe that the government must seriously take into account what happened and that the question will be quickly and posi-

vely resolved. Actually, the legalisation has already occurred. What remains to be done is the formal documentation and confirmation". One report said that David Alton, a member of the British Parliament, who went to Ukraine in support of the Ukrainian faithful, said he and two companions were stopped and taken off a train as they crossed into Ukraine at midnight from Poland.

Alton said the three were detained for four hours, searched and had tapes of a British documentary on the Ukrainian Catholic Church and several books confiscated from them. They were eventually put on an empty train that brought them to Lviv. When he went to the apartment of Hel, the police also showed up there.

That evening at 7 p.m., Ukrainians gathered in the centre of Lviv to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the Hitler-Stalin pact, which led to the Soviet Russian occupation of western Ukraine. Chornovil said, "It's been 50 years since Polish occupation was replaced with Soviet occupation. Hundreds of thousands were deported to Siberia. This is what the black September of 1939 brought to the people of western Ukraine". The Lviv regional council of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union proclaimed the day to be one of mourning and appealed to the residents to be part of the "chain of sorrow".

Horyn said that the participants of the silent protest understood that the historical significance of the day could not be overlooked. At 8 p.m. lit candles in memory of the Stalin's victims were placed in the windows of countless homes, he said.

"No one violated the silence with screams or loud conversations. Everyone was in a high state of anxiety and reflection. They understood what they were thinking about. They were thinking about one thing — the numerous martyrs, created by September 1939, about the prisons and concentration camps, about the destruction of the Ukrainian village by the murderous collectivisation, about the destruction of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, and about the decline of culture and morals, all of this appeared before the eyes of the thousands who stood in silence in the 'chain of sorrow'".

Horyn emphasised that the demonstration protested not only against the Soviet Russian occupation of western Ukraine but against the earlier occupation of the same Ukrainian lands by Poland, "otherwise, historically, the demonstration would not have made any sense".

RIOT TROOPS ATTACK CIVILIANS IN LVIV, UKRAINE; MANY INJURED

A peaceful, popular commemoration of the name day of Lviv, on Sunday, October 1, turned into a bloody melee as riot troops attacked unarmed civilians in that western Ukrainian city, leaving dozens wounded in the streets, according to spokesmen for unofficial groups in Ukraine.

(Earlier reports of troops using rubber bullets against the populace are unsubstantiated, according to Bohdan Horyn of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union).

Horyn explained that what was to have been a folklore festival was transformed into a provocative political rally when the government decided to add to it the observance of the 50th anniversary of the so-called reunification of western Ukraine with the Soviet Union in the wake of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact. Ukrainian activists have labelled the events in the aftermath of the treaty as an invasion of western Ukraine by Soviet Russian armies.

To counter the government's intentions, Horyn continued, the recently formed Independent Ukrainian Youth Association (SNUM) came to the celebrations with banners reading: "USSR — The Prison of Nations". The students also choreographed a "street theatre" about the occupation, which they intended to present on the stage in the "Druzhba" stadium.

At the entrance to the stadium, where a concert was in progress, the militia met the crowd, which also held blue-and-yellow flags of an independent Ukraine, and confiscated the national symbols. As the people attempted to protect the national symbols, rumours spread that several youths had been arrested.

Horyn downplayed the incident at the stadium but noted that the next two rallies were more devastating. The crowd then regrouped and marched to the militia headquarters where it demanded an explanation of why they were set upon by the militia and whether anyone was arrested. This time they were brutally assaulted by the militia.

By 10 p.m. news of the provocation and assaults reached a group of demonstrators at the site of the Shevchenko stone in the centre of the city. Horyn said this group, numbering 1,000 people, spontaneously marched to the militia headquarters, where this time they were met by four or five rows of militia, who concealed a detachment of Company 6 of the special riot troops, which in the recent past had attacked demonstrators in Lviv.

"All of a sudden, the rows of militia parted and opened a corridor, allowing the riot troops to charge into the crowds. All street lights on Copernicus Street were turned off, creating total darkness, and the troops indiscriminately beat and kicked men, women and children resulting in a bloody melee".

Several spokesmen for unofficial groups said that countless people were beaten and kicked by the troops, leaving as many as 20 people lying in the streets. Others reported that hospitals were filled with injured people and the streets around the stadium were covered with blood.

CHRISTIAN YOUTH ASSOCIATION FORMED IN WESTERN UKRAINE

A new youth association with an overt platform of independence for Ukraine has been formed in western Ukraine, geared to college-aged students, according to Vasyl Sichko, head of the Ukrainian Christian-Democratic Front (UCDF).

The decision to form an organisation, called the Christian Ukrainian Youth Association (KhSUM), was made at a Plast (Ukrainian scout) assembly in Dolyna on September 30.

"Inasmuch as Plast is an educational organisation and not a political one, we decided to leave Plast for youths between the ages of 7 to 16. For youths between 16 and 30 years of age we formed the Christian Ukrainian Youth Association. We will develop contacts with other Christian democratic youth organisations around the world. We expect that this move will activate the youth", Sichko said.

According to their statement, the KhSUM will serve as the youth branch of the Ukrainian Christian-Democratic Front "designed to mobilise youths into active participation in the processes of national and religious revival".

Leaders of the association are: Ivan Loy (Lviv) — head; Lesia Levkiv (Lviv) — secretary; and Ivan Skorniak (Horodok), Ivan Kurylo (Dolyna), Volodia Bodnar (Ivano-Frankivsk), Myron Kril (Ivano-Frankivsk), Ihor Khoroshylov (Lviv) and Ivan (. . .) from Kolomyia, members.

"The Christian Ukrainian Youth Association and the UCDF appeal to all patriotic organizations to take an active role in an alternative to totalitarian methods of educating the youth and the rebirth of youth Plast traditions and camps, where youngsters could learn their native history, culture, religion and undergo a beneficial, ethical educational course", the group's appeal said.

ACTIVISTS IN UKRAINE DISSATISFIED WITH NEW PARTY FIRST SECRETARY

Leaders of the national revival in Ukraine have expressed dissatisfaction with the appointment of Volodymyr Ivashko as first secretary of the Communist Party in Ukraine.

"Based on the bloody melee in Lviv on October 1, the people's impression of Ivashko is very negative. He is a reactionary. He helped Shcherbytskyi

suffocate everything and now that he has assumed power he wants to introduce iron discipline”.

Vasyl Sichko of the Ukrainian Christian-Democratic Front is convinced that what occurred in Lviv could not have happened without orders from the Central Committee of the party. He said Lviv officials would not have dared to independently order the riot troops to attack unarmed civilians. “Consequently, Ivashko issued the orders”, Sichko said.

Bohdan Horyn of the Lviv Ukrainian Helsinki Union also believes that Ivashko was, at least by his silence, implicitly responsible for what happened in Lviv. Horyn described Ivashko as a member of “Shcherbytskyi’s team”.

“So far Ivashko has not given any impression that he is interested in the processes of democratisation and reconstruction”, Horyn said. “In his maiden speech before the Central Committee Ivashko was noncommittal about his plans and he did not even condemn his predecessor. Everyone stood and applauded Ivashko’s speech at the plenum. The plenum itself was a disgrace. There is no reason to expect that any of the attendees possess any positive traits. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine is probably the most reactionary of all CPs, or, at least, among the most reactionary”, Horyn said.

50,000 DEMAND LEGALISATION OF UKRAINIAN CATHOLIC CHURCH AT RELIGIOUS RALLY IN IVANO-FRANKIVSK, SUNDAY OCTOBER 1

On Sunday, October 1, in the presence of 50,000 faithful, a religious service was held in the west Ukrainian city of Ivano-Frankivsk, some 87 kilometres southeast of Lviv, for the legalisation of the Ukrainian Catholic Church. Bishops Pavlo Vasylyk and Sofron Dmyterko conducted the service attended by Revs. Mykola Simkailo, Hryhoriy Simkailo, Taras Senkiv, Ivan Senkiv and others.

The first to address the gathering was Bishop Dmyterko, who read a letter from Cardinal Lubachivskyi, the Head of the Ukrainian Catholic Church. He was followed by Bishop Vasylyk and Ivan Hel, Head of the Initiative Committee for the Defence of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, who read out an appeal to Pope John Paul calling for the legalisation of the Catholic Church in Ukraine.

After the service the faithful formed a procession with blue-and-yellow Ukrainian flags and marched outside the city to the site of the mass graves of victims of Stalinist terror, where they held a requiem service.

One of the graves, 2 kilometres from Ivano-Frankivsk, contains the remains of 216 men, women and children murdered by Stalin’s secret police.

Five speakers addressed the crowd calling for an independent Ukraine.

NEW LVIV YOUTH GROUP APPEALS FOR UNITY FOR UKRAINIAN INDEPENDENCE

A new Ukrainian youth organisation in Lviv, the Independent Ukrainian Youth Association or SNUM, has appealed to young Ukrainians in Ukraine and the Diaspora to consolidate "all forces in the fight for the national and religious rebirth in Ukraine of SUM (Ukrainian Youth Association) and Plast (Ukrainian Scouts)), said in its appeal dated August 19 that youths should work for "restitution of the historical symbols of the Ukrainian nation, for the granting of state status for the Ukrainian language, for the democratisation of society and the formation of a volunteer Ukrainian army, for economic and political sovereignty of the republic, and, ultimately, for the restoration of our lost statehood".

Below is the full text of the document:

Ukrainian Youth!

We are writing to you, young Ukrainians, as your contemporaries, as your brothers and sisters by blood. We are writing to you because of our great concern and trepidation for the fate of our generation, for the fate of our nation.

We, more than any other segment of the population, are exposed to national and spiritual liquidation. Specifically, with the complicity of the reactionary educational system, we have been targeted to be educated as people without a genealogy, without memory of its own glorious history, or of its national renegades, turncoats, obedient implementors of the dictatorial regime; we first witnessed the grave consequences of the policy of russification and the forced mixing of populations with the intention of altering the ethnic makeup.

They attempted to kill our faith in God, to bastardise the essence of our religious convictions, which is the source of the spiritual rebirth of the nation.

Without any alternatives and under threats of repression if we refused, we were forcibly drafted into the Leninist Communist Youth League. The mere thought of such an alternative is sacrilegious.

We were forced to go to our deaths or endure mutilation in a war against the freedom-loving Afghan people because of the personal ambitions of Moscow's partisan-bureaucratic colonisers.

Since childhood they have been beating into our heads the notion that we are living in the most fortunate, most democratic country in the world. Camouflaging with buzzwords and mottoes the great-state empire, which was formed under the ruse of the Union of sovereign republics, as well as the severe persecution of those, who raised their voices against social, spiritual and national destruction. Particularly ruthlessly repressed were the progressively-inspired youth who aspired to have their own, national, sovereign state.

We turn to our brothers and sisters in Ukraine and beyond Ukraine. We call on all youth to a consolidation of all forces in the fight for the national and religious rebirth of Ukraine, for the restitution of the historical symbols of the Ukrainian nation, for the granting of state status for the Ukrainian language, for the democratisation of society and the formation of a volunteer Ukrainian army, for economic and political sovereignty of the republic, and, ultimately, for the restoration of our lost statehood.

Today, the course of social thought has led us to realise that the establishment of an independent democratic Ukrainian state is not a fictitious idea but a realistic imperative. It is another matter which path we should take to reach this glorious goal. We are for a peaceful, democratic route with a possible transitory step.

Dear young brothers and sisters in foreign countries! You live with us under one God, under one heaven, in the land of our much-suffering mother — Ukraine. For that reason, our fight is also your fight, our aspirations are also you aspirations.

For years and decades a few communist ideologues attempted to sow the seed of hatred between us. You must understand that our desire for a national rebirth is nothing more than a response to the national, social, political and economic oppression of the monopartisan dictatorship. You must understand that the renewal of the rights and freedoms of the Ukrainian nation can only guarantee the rights of all ethnic groups living on the territory of Ukraine. The aspiration to form a single independent democratic Ukrainian state should become the universal unifying factor for the youth of Ukraine, which when realised will help achieve true equality for all peoples and nations.

Therefore, let us unite under our sacred motto: "God and Ukraine!"

August, 19, 1989

Lviv Oblast Council,
Independent Ukrainian Youth Association

POPULAR MOVEMENT OF UKRAINE FORMS COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE OCTOBER 1 MASSACRE

At its first meeting on October 5 the Strike Committee formed in Lviv after the brutal dispersal of peaceful residents of Lviv by special units of riot police on Sunday, October 1, adopted the following appeal to the people of Lviv:

To the Working People of the City and Oblast of Lviv
Dear Fellow Countrymen!

On the evening of October 1, 1989, the punitive organs of Lviv transformed a festive celebration of the traditional Lviv Day into a bloody massacre of completely innocent and defenceless people. After the events of

August 4, 1988, and March 12, 1989, this was the third occasion on which the people were treated as slaves without any rights.

On October 3 numerous businesses, institutions and schools in Lviv held a two hour strike in protest against the events of October 1. The strike action brought home the necessity to form a Lviv Strike Committee to defend the people's rights and coordinate activities. The task of the Committee is to defend the rights and interests of the workers, to fight for social justice, to take an active part in the resolution of political and economic problems, and in the most extreme cases to call a strike.

Representatives of more than 30 factory strike committees, 25 strike committees from various institutions and establishments, 2 regional strike committees from Drohobych and Truskavets, and representatives of all independent public associations and societies have already joined the Lviv Strike Committee.

Form strike committees at all businesses, establishments and institutes of higher education. They are the executive organ for the defence of your rights!

Adopted at the first meeting of the Lviv Strike Committee by representatives of 60 strike committees and initiative groups

October 5, 1989

The Lviv branch of the Popular Movement of Ukraine has formed 3 commissions to investigate the brutal police action on October 1:

1) a commission of people's deputies, which includes Bratun, Vakarchuk and Sorochyk from Lviv, Karasiov from Kramatorsk, and a deputy from Simferopol;

2) a public commission composed of Lviv residents; and

3) a commission of officials from the Lviv Procurator's Office.

The most effective of the three is the public commission. On October 7 a special hearing was held at the Lviv Porokh Tower at which the victims of last Sunday's brutality testified before the commission in the presence of the official and non-official press. Around 40 people took part in the hearing as not everyone could be informed in time.

The hearing, which was chaired by the head of the public commission, N. Hnativ, lawyer and activist of the Popular Movement of Ukraine, revealed the following facts:

1) On the night of October 1-2 21 people were taken to the city hospital.

2) 5 of the most serious casualties, suffering from concussion or broken ribs, were taken to hospital No. 8.

3) At around 2.00 a.m. on October 2 water cannon No. 20-80 LVO was seen washing off the blood at the scene of the massacre on Copernicus Street.

4) The official red-and-blue flags of the Ukrainian SSR were torn down not by extremists, but after the event by unknown people trying to cause a provocation, or rather on special assignment to assist the authorities in justifying the violent police action. After tearing down the flags and ripping them up the group of people jumped into car, registration number S-94-951 (?), and drove off.

5) Stones were thrown, but not by the demonstrators, but by people in civilian clothing who charged in with the special purpose riot troops.

6) 2 policemen were beaten up by an enraged crowd of people, but the incident occurred one-and-a-half to 2 hours after the massacre, some time after midnight on October 1-2, on Lviv's central boulevard and not at the scene of the violence.

7) The Lviv oblast Procurator's Office and Procurator Izosimov took all possible steps to obstruct the public commission, which included printing various libellous reports in the party-controlled media.

8) Borys Kozlovskyi, a Lviv Television official, banned a video recording of the violence on October 1 from being televised.

9) The video recording, taken by Popular Movement activist Yaroslav Kendzior, was shown at the hearing. According to the recording the majority of the casualties received injuries to the spine and the back of the neck, showing that the demonstrators were running away and not resisting the police.

10) According to the video shouts of "Nationalists!", "Banderites!" could be heard from every window of a Russian school, situated near the scene of the massacre. When the principal of the school was asked who instructed his pupils to shout these slogans, he replied that it was the first secretary of the district party committee. The principal in turn told the teachers and they told the children.



Lviv, October 1
Demonstrators facing police cordon on Copernicus Street
prior to attack by riot police



Scene from the religious rally in Lviv on September 17

Documents and Reports

DEMAND FOR CASE AGAINST KREMLIN IN THE HAGUE Appeal of the Tallinn Meeting of National-Democratic Movements of the USSR to Heads of Governments participating in the Helsinki Conference

(UCIS) On April 30 and May 1, 1989, the national-democratic movements of the USSR held a meeting in Estonia. The meeting was attended by around 100 representatives from Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Byelorussia, Ukraine, Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan, as well as Jewish and Crimean Tartar activists. The Ukrainian delegation included members of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union, the Ukrainian Christian-Democratic Front, the editorial board of the unofficial journal *Ukrainskyi Chas* (Ukrainian Time), and Ivan Makar who represented an independent judicial committee from Lviv.

At the start of the meeting, the national flags of all the represented republics were raised in front of the conference building. The meeting was officially sanctioned by the local authorities, who regarded it as a gathering of former political prisoners.

During the meeting, the participants adopted a series of documents. Below we give excerpts of one of these materials.

APPEAL TO THE HEADS OF COUNTRIES PARTICIPATING IN THE HELSINKI CONFERENCE

Having studied materials concerning Georgia, the Tallinn conference on international problems has come to the conclusion that it was not a clash between troops and the people that occurred in the republic, but a premeditated act of genocide and that the victims were not crushed to death, as official Soviet propaganda is attempting to portray. All the materials and videotapes bear witness to this. Moscow's policy towards the national minorities has always been cruel, not only prior to October 1917, but later too. In the last 70 years, relations with all the nations which comprise this empire were built on coercion, the aim of which has been the physical and spiritual destruction of entire nations.

In the 1930s, millions of Ukrainians were destroyed by an artificially created famine, in the 1940s, Soviet tanks trampled on the freedom of the Baltic states and western Ukraine; other nations were deported and met their end in Siberia. The Crimea was left without Tartars and the northern peoples

without homeland or language. In recent years, Moscow organised an international clash in Armenia and Azerbaijan, which left many thousands of people without a home. On 9 April, Soviet tanks crushed peaceful demonstrators in Tbilisi, and dozens of people who were demanding independence were murdered by Soviet troops.

The events in Georgia are an act of barbarism, which only a communist regime could commit. One should mention Pol Pot, Mao, Stalin, and today — Gorbachev. We believe that it is clear to every thinking individual what restructuring really is and who Gorbachev is. Recent events, particularly in Georgia, testify to this.

We, the participants of the Tallinn conference, appeal to the heads of states which took part in the Helsinki Conference, with the demand to open a case in the International Court in the Hague against the Kremlin for its criminal treatment of small nations.

RESOLUTION OF THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE NATIONAL-DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENTS OF THE PEOPLES OF THE USSR

The development of the political situation in the USSR in recent years shows that the unitary Soviet state exists in a constant crisis situation — on the verge of catastrophe. Therefore, with the help of force and deception, the authorities will strive to preserve the decaying foundations of their colonial empire and to avoid making any fundamental democratic decisions. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union, together with its Central Committee and Politburo, are directly responsible for this situation, as well as the local party organisations.

The conference of representatives analysed the current political situation and has reached the following conclusions:

- 1) With great indignation, the Conference declares that the state terror in Georgia on April 9 of this year is an act of genocide, a violation of human rights and the rights of a nation to self-determination, an act of barbarism committed at the end of the 20th century by a government which states that it is beginning the transition to a democratic and legal state. The act of violence against defenceless women and children could not have been committed without a direct order from Moscow. We demand the immediate publication of the names of the persons responsible for these events, as well as an open trial against these people.

- 2) The Conference expresses its support for the Byelorussian nation, which is reviving its national language and culture, and also striving towards the establishment of its right to national self-determination. We express great anxiety over the fact that the Byelorussian authorities are striving to decimate the movement of national revival by force and to legalise this high-handedness. We resolutely condemn the Decree of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of March 30, 1989, which specifies punishment for the dissemination of independent information and for the overt use of national symbols. As a mark of solidarity with the struggle of the "Confederation of Byelorussian Associations" and the "Byelorussian Popular Front for Restructuring" we call for meetings and demonstrations to be held on May 7-9 in support of this struggle.
- 3) The Conference underlines its support for the rightful demands of the Crimean Tartars to be returned to their historic homeland and for the restoration of the Crimean Autonomous Republic. The Conference draws attention to the fact that the government of the Soviet Union has so far not renounced the policy of genocide against the Crimean Tartars and continues to create various obstacles to the return of the Tartars to their Crimean homeland through the local authorities. The Conference turns to the Congress of People's Deputies with the demand to compel the authorities to remove all restrictions preventing the return of the Crimean Tartars to their homeland and to issue a decree on the restoration of the Crimean Autonomous Republic and the full rehabilitation of the Tartar people.
- 4) The nature of the unitary state has not changed. It continues to employ the old authoritarian methods designed to intimidate the peoples struggling for self-determination and national independence, and to create international hostility on the basis of the "divide and rule" principle. We demand, from the government of the USSR, tangible guarantees regarding unconstrained activity towards the realisation of the rights of nations.
- 5) The Conference expresses its decisive protest against the Decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet of April 8 of this year and believes that this Decree is a draconic policy aimed at preserving the power of the party apparatus and a means of suppressing the freedom of thought and the freedom of the spoken and printed word. We demand that the republican governments do not recognise this Decree.
- 6) Although the government of the USSR has not yet released all the previously arrested prisoners, not to mention their rehabilitation, the authorities have begun to repress new representatives of independent movements, including members of the Karabakh Committee, Kurunts, and patriots of Georgia, Azerbaijan and other republics. We

demand the immediate release of those who have been arrested, as well as their full rehabilitation.

- 7) The Conference supports the demands of the peoples of Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, western Ukraine, western Byelorussia, Moldavia and others, which fell victim to the perfidious conspiracy of 1939 between two imperialist states, the so called Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, for the annulment of this Pact. The Conference also demands that the government of the USSR pronounces this Pact ineffectual, with all its consequences: the removal of Soviet forces from the territories occupied in 1939 and 1940 and the restoration of the independent states of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia.
- 8) In accordance with the Geneva Convention of 1949, which forbids the drafting of citizens of occupied countries for military service, the Conference protests against military service by the populations of subjugated countries in the imperial [Soviet] army.
- 9) The Conference has reached the conclusion that the situation in the USSR has today become much more acute. This destabilisation is not convenient for any group of people, particularly the democratic movements of all the nations. This situation is not convenient for the imperialistic state itself either. Therefore, we express support for new forms of public initiative, like, for example, the activity of the independent organisations of Estonia and Latvia, which is directed towards the creation of truly democratic representative meetings and congresses. This form of representation alone by the will of the peoples, can form the basis for a peaceful, but radical, way to resolve the problems between countries and nations, and to pave the way for negotiations to create new unconstrained relations, which would be mutually convenient for both sides. The Conference is certain that if the Soviet government fails to draw any conclusions from the above-mentioned points, then the crisis situation will, in the future, become more acute — a new phenomenon of discontent among the various peoples. The imperial authorities are no longer in a position to prevent this historical development. A retainment of the status quo will not resolve the fundamental problems of the nations. Only the realisation of political rights, the recognition of an equal partnership of all the democratic movements, multi-party system, and the unconstrained expression of the right of nations to self-determination can offer a viable solution to this situation.

Signatures:

National Front of Azerbaijan — Ali Zade Ardusht;
Union for the National Self-determination of Armenia — Bardan Arutunian;
Society of Illia Chauchavadze — Tamar Sheidze;
Confederation of Byelorussian Associations — Serzhuk Mikhanes;
Georgian National Independence Party — Georgiy Dzhimdsharadze;

Society of St. Illia the Righteous — Vaza Adonia;
National-Democratic Party of Georgia — Georgiy Akhalaya;
Georgian Association of National Justice — Irakliy Melashvili;
National Movement of Crimean Tartars — Dzhafarov Abdolorashid;
Latvian National Independence Movement — Eyners Silinskis;
Helsinki 86; Riga — Anta Bergmanie;
Lithuanian National Youth Association "Molodaya Lytva" — Stasis Bushkevichus;
Lithuanian Christian-Democratic Party — Alfredas Matiyauskas;
Lithuanian Freedom League — Antanas Terleckas;
Party of Lithuanian Democrats — Olvas Pechalunas;
Lithuanian Helsinki Group — Viktas Petkus;
Ukrainian Helsinki Union — Levko Lukyanenko;
The journal *Ukrainskyi Chas* [Ukrainian Time] — Ivan Makar;
Ukrainian Christian-Democratic Front — Vasyl Sichko;
National Independence Party of Estonia — Lagle Parek.
Estonia, Loodi, 30 April — 1 May, 1989

KHMARA TO SECRETARY BAKER: "A WAVE OF REPRESSION HAS BEEN UNLEASHED AGAINST UKRAINE"

(UCIS) In a letter to US Secretary of State James Baker, Stepan Khmara, a leading member of current national revival in Ukraine and the Ukrainian Helsinki Union (UHU), said that a wave of repression has been unleashed against Ukraine by the central Moscow leadership. According to Khmara's letter, a text of which was received by the Ukrainian Central Information Service, the Kremlin is unwilling "to allow essential changes in the empire, democratisation and decolonisation". The full text of the letter follows:

Dear Mr. Secretary,

Your visit to the USSR comes at a critical time for us — the unleashing of a new wave of repression. Ukraine has become caught in a peculiar situation. Unwilling to allow essential changes in the empire, democratisation and decolonisation, the central Moscow leadership, maintaining age-old imperial positions, is doing everything possible to strangle the national-democratic movement in Ukraine.

With this in mind, the Gorbachev leadership is protecting Shcherbytskyi's untouchable reactionary party apparatus in Ukraine, which is continually conducting an antinational policy.

In the course of the so-called perestroika years, the situation in Ukraine

has worsened; colonial looting has risen by means of increased quotas to the central fund. Moscow's economic policies in Ukraine are designed to exhaustively exploit our natural and human resources. This kind of policy has resulted in an ecological catastrophe, which threatens the survival of the Ukrainian nation. A danger greater than Stalin's famine of 1933 looms over our land and our people. In order to avoid the final catastrophe, leading representatives of our nation have undertaken active civic work.

On the eve of your visit, the officials began a total offensive against the democratic and rights-advocacy movement in Ukraine. From threats to persecution of separate individuals, the repressive agencies resorted to widespread, coordinated persecutions. The suppressive edict of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, issued on April 8, 1989, which contradicts international laws and the Helsinki process, has already been incorporated into the Criminal Code of the Ukrainian SSR, and, on the basis of which, the ominous Article 62 of the Code has been expanded with the addition of Article 62-1.

A wave of administrative arrests, punishments and summonses of civic activists has passed over Ukraine with the intention of blackmailing and intimidating them with draconic quasi-legalistic decrees. The persecution of Ukrainian Catholics has also intensified.

The authorities have set a new precedent. On May 5, 1989, I was fined 1,000 roubles for participating in an officially-sanctioned meeting in Lviv on April 26, 1989, and placed under administrative supervision of the militia, which prohibits me from travelling beyond Chervonohrad, as well as appearing in certain parts of the city. If I violate this supervision, I can be imprisoned. This shameful and arbitrary act was committed against me in order to exclude me from active participation in civic affairs, particularly in the Ukrainian Helsinki Union, of whose leadership I am a member. These actions should be recognised as attempts to decapitate and progressively choke the most influential rights-advocacy organisation in Ukraine — the UHU.

Honourable Mr. Secretary,

Your great and democratic state remains today as the primary guarantor of freedom and democracy on our planet. To a great extent, the fate of the subjugated nations of the USSR depends on the policies of the US. Consequently, peace and democracy on Earth will depend on whether the USSR develops into a democracy or remains a totalitarian empire.

In the meantime, the rulers of the USSR have not rejected the philosophy of evil, but continue to adhere, in their practices, to the principles of evil. These conditions, as well as the reexamination of US policy towards the Kremlin leadership, particularly in the area of trade (the granting of most-favoured nation status, wide access to scholarly and technological advances of the US, extension of credits, etc.), would have a destructive impact on the democratic movement in the USSR, and would simultaneously result in a death sentence against the current generation of freedom fighters in the USSR.

The negative ramifications of the unreasonable policies of the West European countries are tangibly bearing down on us. Only through the complete and unreserved implementation of the Final Act of the Helsinki Accords, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the decrees on political and civil rights of the executive of the USSR and the agreement of the Soviet legislature with the aforementioned documents can one consolidate one's posture vis-à-vis the leadership of the USSR. It would be premature to remove the label of "evil empire" from the USSR.

Honourable Mr. Secretary, I would like to request that my thoughts be brought to the attention of the government and Congress of the United States of America.

Respectfully,
Stepan Khmara
Chervonohrad, Ukraine
May 11, 1989

APPEAL TO THE PEOPLE'S DEPUTIES OF THE USSR
from the Committee for the Defence of the Ukrainian
Catholic Church and the Faithful of the Ukrainian
Catholic and Ukrainian Orthodox Churches

Honourable Deputies!

In 1946 the Stalinist regime committed a pogrom against the Ukrainian Catholic (Greek-Catholic) Church. Since that time the Church has been outlawed and subject to constant persecution. This Stalinist crime was committed under a cynical cover of NKVD cruelty — the so-called Lviv Church Council. One year later, in a criminal spectacle, the NKVD organs arrested all the bishops of the Ukrainian Catholic Church. Among those arrested was the head of the Church, Metropolitan Josyf Slipyj, who languished for 18 years in Stalinist and later Khrushchev's torture chambers.

Of the 3,000 preselected and frightened priests and some laity, the NKVD troops selected and brought 216 to the so-called council, as well as the hierarchy of the Russian Orthodox Church and forced them to sign a shameful document about the liquidation of the Ukrainian-Greek Catholic Church.

All priests who refused to adopt Russian Orthodoxy were beaten and repressed. The majority of the priests perished in concentration and hard labour camps and in exile. Hundreds of thousands of Catholic laity also suffered repressions. The Greek-Catholics of Transcarpathia met the same fate. Romzha, the Transcarpathian bishop, was brutally murdered by Stalinist killers.

The Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church was destroyed by the same methods in the 1930s and its clergy were almost totally annihilated. However, the Ukrainian Catholic Church could not be destroyed. The Church went into the underground, into the catacombs, and has led a struggle for its survival for 43 years.

The years of perestroika and its accompanying liberalisation in Soviet society have not touched the Ukrainian Catholic Church. With a section of the Ukrainian Catholic clergy coming out of the underground, repressions against the Church have increased, particularly in the last year. For practising religious rites priests and the faithful have suffered repressions from party and state organs — the KGB, militia, courts and party workers. Administrative arrests, fines, beatings, attacks by officials and the hierarchy of the Russian Orthodox Church in the mass media are just a few of many forms of persecution aimed at the faithful and priests of the Ukrainian Catholic Church.

The authorities answered the appeal of tens of thousands of faithful to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR to acknowledge the right of the Ukrainian Catholic Church to legal activity by turning over Ukrainian Catholic churches to the Russian Orthodox Church on a mass scale.

Honourable Deputies! Freedom of religion is one of the fundamental human rights. This right is declared in all principal international humanitarian laws and Article 52 of the USSR Constitution. However, the faithful of the Ukrainian Catholic and Orthodox Churches are deprived of this right.

Honourable Deputies! In the name of the victory of justice, we call upon you to raise the matter of the Ukrainian Catholic Church and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church at the highest form of state authority — The Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR and:

- 1) Rehabilitate the Ukrainian Catholic Church and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church as victims of Stalinist terror.
- 2) Legalise the Ukrainian Catholic Church's right to legal activity and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church's right to an unimpeded revival.
- 3) Adopt a decision regarding the return of churches and church property to the Ukrainian Catholic Church and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church to its lawful owners — the faithful of the respective Churches.
- 4) Declare the persecution of citizens of any religion who practise their religious rites a criminal activity subject to punishment.
- 5) Appoint a commission from the People's Deputies, which should include representatives of the democratic citizenry, to pass legislation guaranteeing religious freedom in accordance with international law.

Committee for the Defence of the Ukrainian Catholic Church and Faithful of the Ukrainian Catholic and Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Churches

DO NOT TRY THE PEOPLE'S PATIENCE

Open Letter from Journalist Vyacheslav Chornovil

To

Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU,
First Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPU,
Volodymyr Shcherbytskyi

Citizen Shcherbytskyi!

I, a long-term political prisoner of the so-called times of stagnation, when you ruled over Ukraine, one of the activists of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union (UHU), slandered by you in Party propaganda, and a Ukrainian patriot, write to you from a prison cell, where I was incarcerated immediately after you issued your instructions at the recent plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine about intensifying the struggle against the extremists of the UHU. I appeal to you: do not try the people's patience any more! Away with you!

The scarce prison paper will not be sufficient to list all your sins against the Ukrainian people. So I will try to name just the most serious ones. Well aware of the fact that a nation without a language, without culture, without history is no longer a nation, but a mere amorphous mass, good only for experiments, you leapt into power and began to destroy everything that was Ukrainian in Ukraine with janissary zeal. You condemned as nationalist the indecisive attempts of your predecessor, Petro Shelest, to halt the process of the russification of Ukraine and her total subordination to the dictate of Moscow. Already at the beginning of your rule you demonstratively went over to Russian as the language of communication with the Ukrainian nation and introduced the complete party-political and economic system throughout the whole of Ukraine, even in Halychyna (Galicia). Much is now being said, both from the podium and in the official press, about the terrible devastation of the Ukrainian school system, higher schools, science, culture, the whole spiritual potential of our great nation, in the years of your viceregency. But those who are speaking out are shaking their fingers at the nameless "forces of stagnation", afraid to point the finger at the Central Committee on which, for some reason, you still sit. They are afraid to name the main inspiration behind the witches' ideological sabbath, which you instituted immediately after receiving the yarlyk of the Kyivan fiefdom from "Leonid Illich [Brezhnev], whom you hold in such great esteem".

Sniffing out and mercilessly hounding everything out of the ordinary, talented and national, you selected a worthy team of collaborators. I need only mention the odious figure of the senior KGB official of the republic, Vitaliy Fedorchuk, the notorious architect of terror and provocations, sent

from Moscow to replace a more liberal predecessor, who today, after all his dishonest deeds, enjoys a personal pension in a magnificent apartment in Moscow. It was you who installed him in the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine and turned him into a Ukrainian Beria of the 1970s, your closest companion.

Together you crippled so many human fates, sent hundreds of Ukrainian patriots to prisons, camps, and into exile, and dozens of activists of the national renaissance to the hell of the closed psychiatric hospitals. You slandered and broke thousands of Ukrainian scientific and cultural activists and forced them to lick the dogmatic dirt from your slave driver's boots with which you trampled on the living body of Ukraine. Those murdered or crippled, those secretly killed in prisons, driven to suicide, the talented activists, with whose contribution even the wealthiest culture in the world could have excelled, driven prematurely to their grave: Vasyl Stus, Ivan Svitlychnyi, Volodymyr Ivasiuk, Volodymyr Ivanyshyn, Hryhoriy Tiutiunyk, Ivan Mykolaichuk, Mykola Lukash — these are only the most well-known names of this tragic list — lie on your conscience which is burdened by irredeemable sins.

The holy Kyivan hills, worthlessly desecrated by pompous monuments; the Dnipro river, transformed into a stagnant puddle; the cities, enveloped in thick smog; the villages, depopulated; the most fertile black earth regions in the world, contaminated and laid barren; the atomic bombs of long-term effect in Polissia and Podillia, in Zaporizhia and Tavria; the empty shelves in shops or kilometre-long queues for the most essential goods; the provincialist culture and militant anti-culturism; the intermixed human throng which has forgotten from which kin and nation it stems: these are the visible fruits of your criminal administration in Ukraine, Volodymyr Shcherbytskyi! I say "criminal" because in a genuine legal state Chornobyl alone, and the mass parades and demonstrations on May 1, 1986, under the Kyivan sky, saturated with radiation, would be sufficient to put you, the organiser of this propagandistic homicide, in the dock and send you to one of those concentration camps, where you dispatched the flower of the Ukrainian nation for dozens of years during the Brezhnev years, which you found so blissful.

What are you waiting for? When will the earth catch fire beneath your feet? I am not so naive as to think that as soon as you are gone a light will immediately shine in Ukraine. You have done everything you could to ensure that you will remain even when you have gone. You selected and recommended a multi-echelon team of Brezhnevites, from the district committees to the Central Committee, and are diligently watching over the purity of its ranks. Thus, it is not difficult to envisage a Shcherbytskyi No. 2 in your place — a Masol or Yelchenko. Millions of people in Ukraine regard every day of your administration in the republic under the current social conditions as spit in all of our faces, as a personal insult. Once they get rid of you, they will breathe a sigh of relief. As a companion of Brezhnev and one of the "architects of stagnation" you remain Enemy No. 1 of any social progress in Ukraine. You halt, as much as possible, even those positive undertakings

which Moscow has dared to allow after reaching a dead end. It is difficult even to imagine in present-day Ukraine administered by you the passing of laws, such as were recently adopted in Latvia: a law on the transfer of land to the peasants for life-time use with permission to hire labour, or the laws, already in force in the Baltic republics, on the status of their ethnic language, each of which is recognised as the sole state language and the language of international communication in each republic. There a precise time limit for learning the language has been set and officials and economists are being retrained, for which considerable funds have been allocated. Is your team of russifiers capable even of thinking about such things?

Under your direction this year's election campaign in Ukraine was transformed into a military review of reactionary forces. You did not even stop at mass-scale preelection machinations and fabrications or physical and "legal" terror (e.g. the pogrom against a peaceful meeting in Lviv on March 12 by special military detachments, dozens of administrative sentences in various cities of Ukraine for preelection agitation, including my own present imprisonment).

Terrified of all organised opposition, even of such a moderate and liberal organisation as the Popular Movement of Ukraine for restructuring, set up by Ukrainian writers, your team organised the systematic hounding of the Movement in the mass media, monopolised by the Party (the Russian mouthpiece of great-power national-communism, stands at the fore of this anti-Ukrainian campaign).

The UHU makes you furious as well, and you label as extremists people who have put forward their programme of national salvation and are propagating it by peaceful constitutional means accepted by the whole civilised world. You encourage genuine extremist methods of combating us — punitive special detachments, defamation in the press, administrative terror based on the principle, popular among market-place thieves, of shouting after others "stop the thief". You accuse us of creating international hostility, as though it were not you who, for decades, vigorously implemented the Brezhnev-Khrushchev imperialist policy of the active intermixing of populations, having, with the aid of economic planning and other voluntaristic measures, resettled millions of Russians in Ukraine (as well as the Baltic states, Moldavia, Central Asia), which devastated and brought about the decline of Russia herself. As though it were not you who forced our language out of the cities, trampled on our culture, protecting and elevating the status of the "great international language and culture" of the immigrant Russian population and thereby creating the preconditions for international conflicts.

Today, when the Ukrainian nation has begun to awaken and to speak out about its rights, without the least impingement upon the rights of the national minorities in Ukraine, you are trying to sow the seeds of hate between us. It is no secret that your party apparatus, which is leading the campaign against the Popular Movement of Ukraine and the UHU, inspires the creation of a chauvinist international front in Ukraine, which your henchmen in the

Donetsk and Odessa oblast party committees, in particular, are trying to do. Keep your dirty hands off the delicate matter of international relations! You have done enough harm! We will, without your "leading role", find a way of coming to terms on how we are going to live in our common Ukrainian home. The whole of Ukraine with her 50 million people, regardless of their social and national status, regards you as a mastodon of stagnation, which sprung out of the Brezhnevite era. The recent elections have shown that even the land on which you once stamped with your bare feet and which you wanted to win over to your side with various bribes at the cost of the state will also reject you. According to surveys, your fellow countrymen voted against you almost to a man. It was only by offering you as the sole candidate on the electoral list and then resorting to falsification that the Dnipropetrovsk apparatchiks managed to complement the reactionary majority in the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR with your person.

Even party officials do not conceal the fact that they, too, would gladly get rid of you — the odious figure which hinders the deception of the people with phrases about restructuring. What are you waiting for? Although you are convulsively holding on to power, you have already missed the moment when you could have painlessly vanished from the political horizon like the Romanovs, the Tikhonovs, the Aliyevs. Do you think that because you were a skilful court chameleon under several previous rulers this will help you maintain your position even under the General Secretary, who, for some reason, does not despise sitting with you at the Politburo table, either out of gratitude for the prudent vote you cast for him in the spring of 1985 or his failure to understand that, in order to succeed, restructuring should have begun in Ukraine, and our republic should not have been transformed into a Brezhnevite preserve. But Mikhail Gorbachev is not an omnipotent emperor like his predecessors. Today, the nation, which is awakening from a lethargic sleep and shaking off its fear, is beginning to speak out. So go away, or else you will be swept away like a feather by the wave of national rage! Grab your next order of Lenin and personal pension while you can, and hurry off to Moscow without delay! And when the time comes to recall you from the imperial capital to answer to your nation, we will each throw in a copper to pay for the journey, as we did not so long ago, at a meeting in Bykivnia, for another hangman of the Ukrainian people, Lazar Kaganovich. Bon voyage!

June 1, 1989

Vyacheslav Chornovil

Member of the UHU Executive Committee
Holding Prison, Zolochiv, Lviv oblast

PS.

If there aren't enough healthy forces at the Congress of People's Deputies to abolish the reactionary decree on the so-called state crimes signed by Gorbachev on 8.4.1989, then it is time to put me in prison for this letter, accusing me of maligning another party and Soviet activist of Khrushchev-Brezhnev-

Gorbachev times, an invariable member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU and leader, for 18 years, of the republican party organisation, active propagandist who implemented the ideas of proletarian internationalism, notorious activist of the international communist movement, twice hero of socialist labour, knight of numerous orders, loyal Leninist, Volodymyr Shcherbytskyi. But in my future trial please also include the circumstances which lighten my guilt. Even if I mobilised all my efforts and all my publicist talents, I would not be able to discredit citizen Shcherbytskyi in the eyes of the Ukrainian people more than he has already discredited himself in the space of several decades of humble service for Russian imperialism. But let the trial, even a symbolic one, take place with crowded squares and thousands of witnesses — the living, the murdered, and those killed prior to birth in the womb of the Chornobyl mothers. And let the judgment of this universal trial be passed not by the loyal servants of the ruling class, who for some reason call themselves people's judges. Let the judgment of this trial be passed by God and the Nation, the two highest judicial institutions in the universe.

V. Chornovil

APPEAL TO THE PRESIDENT OF FRANCE FRANÇOIS MITTERRAND

Dear Mr. President!

The Head of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR M. Gorbachev is beginning his official visit to your country. As well as Franco-Soviet relations he will address the issue of creating a "common European home". We have no doubt that the Soviet leaders will say many fine words about democracy and human rights, but we would like to bring to your attention at the outset the fact that the words of the USSR's leaders do not always correspond to these principles. In particular, as concerns us, Ukrainian Catholics, our right to freedom of worship, guaranteed in Article 52 of the USSR Constitution and fundamental international laws, is being violated in the most brutal manner.

The authorities continue to persecute our Ukrainian Catholic Church, destroyed and forced underground by the Stalin regime in 1946. They have not changed their Stalinist attitude towards our Church.

Against the background of statements by the USSR's present political leadership on restructuring, democratisation and glasnost the persecution of Ukrainian Catholics appears particularly cynical. Contrary to the will of the Ukrainian Catholics, the authorities are handing over our churches, which have remained closed until now, over to the Russian Orthodox Church on a mass scale, and declare our services and other religious rites unsanctioned gatherings and meetings. For participation in these priests and faithful are fined, subjected to administrative arrest and maligned in the press. Priests are conscripted for months of military training. For conducting religious services in May five

priests were sentenced to 15 days in prison. Mykola Simkailo is presently under administrative arrest in inhuman conditions.

It is unfortunate that official propaganda hypocritically attempts to present the situation surrounding religious rights as the triumph of religious freedom in the USSR. In their agitation organs of state and representatives of the hierarchy of the Russian Orthodox Church label as "extremist" our demands for the guarantee of one of the fundamental rights, freedom of worship, and the cessation of the repression against the faithful of the Ukrainian Catholic Church.

Our numerous appeals to various government institutions demanding the legalisation of the Ukrainian Catholic Church did not bring any positive results. They fell on deaf ears. The authorities do not wish to resolve our problem and the persecution continues. This induced the episcopate, priests and faithful of the Ukrainian Catholic Church to begin a continuous hunger strike and protest in Moscow on May 16. Although this hunger strike is now in its second month, the authorities and Soviet media act as though they know nothing about it and remain silent.

Mikhail Gorbachev is also very well aware of the existence of this important unresolved problem.

Dear Mr. President. We appeal to you, the head of a government whose people have made an immense contribution to European civilisation and civilisation as a whole and continue to do so today, to raise your authoritative voice in defence of the Ukrainian Catholic Church and the millions of persecuted Ukrainian Catholics.

We ask you, Mr. President, to remind Mikhail Gorbachev once again that a country where basic human rights are being consciously and systematically violated, and whose statesmen adhere to a totalitarian form of government cannot join a European home based on freedom and democracy.

3 July 1989

With respect and wishes of successful negotiations.

On behalf of the Ukrainian Catholic hunger strikers in Moscow,

Members of the Committee for the Defence of the

Ukrainian Catholic Church:

Stepan Khmara, Orest Karelin, Andriy Kovalov

OPEN LETTER

From Ukrainian People's Deputies of the USSR to the Deputies of the Supreme Soviet of the UkSSR

Dear Comrades!

An important and responsible stage in the life of our republic is approaching — elections of republican and local authorities. A draft law on elections of People's Deputies of the UkSSR has been drawn up and submitted for

debate. The improvements to the draft electoral law are widely known through the results of the election of People's Deputies of the UkSSR and the press. Public opinion is geared towards the further democratisation of the electoral system. Millions of voters are waiting for this, as are the Ukrainian strike committees. Below we list our fundamental demands regarding the future law:

1. One man — one vote without the representation of public organisations.
2. Direct proportional elections to the Supreme Soviet of the UkSSR.
3. The direct election of the president of the republic.
4. Elections on an alternative basis (more candidates than seats).
5. The inadmissibility of the influence of electoral committees on the election of Deputies.

These demands would create the preconditions for the adoption of a truly democratic electoral law. The variations of the draft law and individual articles would assist the democratic process. Your efforts to draw up and adopt the electoral law should be based on positions, which would relate to the hopes and demands of the republic's voters.

In our opinion it is necessary to focus the debates of the next session of the UkSSR Supreme Soviet on a clause-by-clause discussion of the electoral law followed by a secret vote on each clause.

Realising the importance of the moment many of us, People's Deputies of the UkSSR, will take part in the work of this session, but the decisive voice belongs to you, Deputies of the Supreme Soviet of the UkSSR.

Remember the immense historical responsibility which rests on your shoulders, on the shoulders of those who have been elected to the parliament of the republic.

Kultsov
Tykhonienkov
Sushko
Bratun
Fedoriv
Sorochyk
Vakarchuk
Terniuk
Zakharov
Ivanov
Shukhov
Saunin
Zviereiev

Burykh
Zubarov
Cherniak
Karasiov
Honccharov
Boyko
Donchenko
Lisnychyi
Yevtushenko
Kozin
Yavorivskyi
Sanduliak
Hrushchuk

Nazarenko
Koniev
Bezbakh
Yaroshynska
Kozieiev
Chelishyv
Batrachenko
Kutsenko
Tsavro
Smyrnov
Sydorchuk
Ryabchenko

DEPUTIES DISCUSS PLAN OF ACTION FOR UPCOMING ELECTIONS

After consultation with the people of Lviv People's Deputy Yuriy Sorochyk flew to Kyiv for a meeting of members of the inter-regional group of Deputies from Ukraine to discuss the UkSSR draft law on elections of republican and local authorities. The meeting was held at the Kyiv Polytechnic Institute.

"We gathered on August 12", said Sorochyk, "in the conference hall of the library of the Kyiv Polytechnic Institute where we worked for the whole day". Among the deputies present were: Volodymyr Yavorivskyi, Volodymyr Cherniak, Alla Yaroshynska, Serhiy Riabchenko, Serhiy Koniev, Vitaliy Hryshchuk and many others.

Representatives of voters' clubs from around Ukraine and supporters of various deputies also took part in the meeting.

The discussions centered around the question of the UkSSR draft law on elections. During the discussions 3 opinions arose:

1. to retract the draft law as one which in principle does not correspond to the process of restructuring in the republic;
2. to maintain the draft law but introduce amendments and addenda;
3. to draft an alternative law on elections.

During the meeting the following resolution was adopted:

RESOLUTION

On the basis of two alternative draft laws the resolution submitted by Cherniak and amended by Hryshchuk was adopted by a majority of votes. It states:

To set up a commission for the preparation of a draft law on elections of People's Deputies of the UkSSR consisting of Nazarenko, Kriukov, Malyshko, Yavorivskyi, Sorochyk and Cherniak.

The deadline for the preparation of the draft law is to be September 1. It is then to be submitted to a working group of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the UkSSR and published in the republican press.

To insist on a republican referendum, which would accept the law on elections.

To urge all workers' groups to join the struggle for an alternative draft law on elections.

To appeal to all people of Ukraine to take part in a general meeting on September 2 where they should express their position regarding the elections.

In the event that the authorities would reject the alternative draft law to urge a boycott of the elections, including also strikes.

Hryhoriy PRYKHODKO

PROBLEMS FACING THE REESTABLISHMENT OF THE UKRAINIAN STATE

The state regime and international status of Ukraine have caused her to lag behind in the national revival. As a consequence of the agreement between the Western democracies and the terrorist government of Stalin the artificially created Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic became a full member of the United Nations. In 1945-46 the government of the United States and those of the other founder-members of the UN were well aware of the following facts:

1. The Ukrainian SSR is not a Ukrainian state. It was created by a decree of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and its first governments were composed of Russian communists. The UkSSR was to function as the colonial administration of Ukraine under the guise of a Ukrainian national state. In November 1917 the Ukrainians established their own state — the Ukrainian National Republic — and in January 1918 the Central Rada proclaimed the UNR an independent state. The UNR was recognised by many states, including several Entente powers. Bolshevik Russia also recognised the UNR, later only to commit an unprovoked act of aggression against it, destroying the UNR and replacing it with an artificial creation — the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.

2. After the defeat of the UNR by Russia Ukrainians did not cease the struggle for an independent state. In 1941 they staged an armed uprising: first against the German and then the Russian occupants.

3. The acceptance of the UkSSR into the UN gave the Soviet government a legal basis for the suppression of the Ukrainian liberation struggle, including the struggle for national culture.

When the founder-members of the United Nations took the decision to accept the UkSSR into the UN, the Ukrainians were not consulted. The Yalta and Potsdam agreements were concluded without our consent. Like Hitler's government the governments of the leading democratic countries did not see fit to take into consideration the opinions of the nations they had handed over to the terrorists. Nor did they concern themselves with the security of the nations they had betrayed.

The practice of disregarding the interests and fates of the nations enslaved by Russia continued after the creation of the UN. The Final Act of the Helsinki Accords on Security and Cooperation in Europe was a concession to the Soviet empire which allowed it to maintain its colonies. The clauses of this Act which stipulated that each of the participating countries would in turn recognise the inviolability of post-war borders as well as territorial integrity denied the Soviet colonies the right to struggle for their independent states.

Thus the clauses regarding human rights acquired merely a symbolic significance.

In practice human rights can only be implemented within the framework of a particular type of culture — a national one. However, the USSR can only exist through the suppression of national cultures. So how can human rights be implemented in the USSR?

It is difficult for us to understand the motives which prompted the Western governments to sign the Helsinki Accords. I do not believe that Western states are naïve, but all the same cannot help but wonder whether or not they are aware of the impasse they created by their countless concessions to the Soviet government.

This impasse manifested itself most strongly within the ranks of the human rights movement in Ukraine. In the 14 years of the movement's existence none of the human rights were implemented. The Ukrainian remains a subject of the USSR and has not become a citizen of Ukraine. As previously, he does not have freedom of movement or the freedom to choose his place of residence (the internal passport system remains in force). Neither did this movement achieve the implementation of any other rights, and the partial liberalisation of the regime is a temporary concession from the Gorbachev government which can be reversed at any given time.

Two thoughts are prevalent in Ukrainian opposition circles: the first that the Western democracies betrayed the nations subjugated by Russia, including the Ukrainians, and the second that the Helsinki Accords, which formed the moral basis of the human rights movement, are essentially an anti-national agreement between Western governments and the government of Brezhnev.

Having initially overestimated the role of Western democracies in the fate of the Ukrainian nation our people realised that our struggle for an independent Ukrainian state not only could not expect the support of the free nations, but also obstructs the commercial aspirations of the democratic world, which regards the USSR solely as a source of raw materials and has no desire to take note of the threat it poses both to the subjugated nations and to the West. Only the naïve among us can believe that the Gorbachev government is steering the USSR towards democracy. Perhaps Gorbachev himself is aspiring towards this goal, but circumstances exist, which appear more powerful than the General Secretary. One such circumstance is the fundamental impossibility of democracy in the Russian empire. The reason for this is the clash of discordant cultures: despotic and democratic. This clash, which has occurred in the empire, has no room for compromise. Only the suppression of one culture by the other is possible. The despotic culture has reigned for five centuries in the Muscovite state and there are no grounds to expect it to submit peacefully. But a world war which could defeat the despotic culture in the USSR and help the democratic culture would, in the

present conditions, mean the suicide of mankind. At the same time there is still the danger that having modernised its industry Moscow may revert to a repressive form of government and once again redirect production towards the needs of the military. It is impossible to foresee the consequences of such a scenario.

A desirable and secure way to defeat the despotic culture would be the decolonisation of the USSR. A legal basis for this already exists only Western desire to continue the process of decolonisation which began after the Second World War, to help the subjugated nations in their struggle for an independent state, is lacking.

Until recently the principal efforts of the Ukrainian opposition were directed towards the realisation of the Helsinki Accords. This does not point to the naivete of Ukrainian intellectuals, who supposedly convinced themselves of the successful outcome of the Helsinki process. Rather this is an act of desperation, a loss of hope that the free nations will help us become free. Intellectual deliberations caused part of the Ukrainian opposition to accept the hypothesis that if not democracy, then at least enough liberalisation would be possible in the USSR to secure the cultural rebirth of our nation. But judicial law does not function in the non-cultural realm something the Ukrainians have discovered again and again even during the Gorbachev thaw.

The human rights movement never represented the entire spectrum of the national opposition. Christian-Democracy became a very attractive political idea. Religion enabled the moral rebirth of the individual and the evolution of the imperial subject into a citizen of his nation. But the national community perceived the emergence of the Ukrainian Christian-Democratic Front with reservation. All the same, having proclaimed an independent Ukrainian state as its aim, the UCDF consolidated its position and brought the beginning of a new stage in the planned, purposeful Ukrainian movement for national independence.

I do not intend to examine the patriotic forces in Ukraine, therefore I am limiting myself to explaining the fundamental stages of the development. The subsequent step in the development of the radical opposition was the establishment of independence as a political goal. The idea of the reestablishment of our state — the Ukrainian National Republic — evolved in this way. Once we established this goal, we saw how different our struggle will be to that of the Baltic countries.

Presently a political organisation is being formed for the realisation of our goal in Ukraine. The necessary preparations are being made by its initiative group. While drafting the programme of the organisation, we came to the conclusion that all international agreements with the participation of the USSR, which directly or indirectly affected the interests of the Ukrainian nation, were concluded without the participation or consent of the Ukrainian nation. And so far as the numerous agreements of this nature deny the

Ukrainian nation any international judicial protection and make the Ukrainians the property of the USSR, Ukrainian patriots will be compelled to act against such agreements.

There is only one circumstance — membership of the UkSSR in the UN — which embroils the democratic world's perception of our aspirations. But in our country's history there is another great act of judicial deceit — the agreement regarding the creation of the USSR on December 30, 1922. The Baltic countries, fortunately, do not have this Trojan Horse, which has denied us the protection of the free world.

The signatories of this agreement thought up the isidious plan to make the Ukrainian SSR the initiator of the agreement which gave birth to the USSR. Naturally, from the very beginning this agreement was judicially invalid, but, as I have already mentioned, the governments of the member-countries of the UN chose not to take this circumstance into consideration. Having accepted the UkSSR into the UN, they not only recognised the existence of the non-existent, that is they recognised the UkSSR as the Ukrainian state, but also the legality of the illegal — membership of Ukraine in the USSR.

Recognising as invalid the agreement regarding the creation of the USSR we do not recognise the validity of the Constitution of the Ukrainian SSR or the laws which are passed in its name. As the membership of the UkSSR in the UN is also unlawful, we will demand its exclusion from this important organisation and the replacement of its delegation with a delegation from the patriotic opposition.

Our struggle is peaceful, non-violent and democratic. I would like to use this opportunity to appeal to the Western democrats to review their attitude towards the nations subjugated by Russia and to continue the struggle for decolonisation to help these nations achieve a higher moral value — freedom.

THE **UK**KRAINIAN REVIEW



4

1989

A Quarterly Journal devoted to the study of Ukraine

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Ivano-Frankivsk Province
Victims of NKVD terror in 1941

Nicholas L. CHIROVSKY

THE SOVIET ECONOMY AT THE TIME OF PERESTROIKA

(Part 2)

III. ECONOMIC PLANNING

To comprehend the current economic situation in the USSR, it is necessary to address the problem of economic planning. The progress of plan fulfilment is to some extent an indication of economic performance, and the plan during the years of 1985 through 1988 is particularly relevant to understanding exactly what Perestroika has achieved. To better understand the significance of plan fulfilment, however, it is necessary to refer to statistics from previous plans.

The following statistics are the major indicators of Soviet economic performance during the Seventh Five Year Plan from 1966-70:

Table one²⁴

<i>Indicators</i>	<i>1967 in % of 1966</i>	<i>1970 in % of 1969</i>
National Income	106.0	108.5
Personal Income	105.5	105.2
Industrial Production	107.3	108.3
Heavy Industry	107.5	108.2
Light Industry	106.6	108.5
Farming	110.0	108.7

It is necessary to point out the poor condition of Soviet agriculture in 1969. Production only reached 97% of the previous year. Other sectors of the economy (capital construction, domestic trade, electricity, industrial equipment and generators), showed impressive growth of 108.5%.

Conditions however began to grow worse especially during the fulfilment of the Eleventh Five-Year Plan, 1981-5. While the planning targets (refer to following table), were intended for the Tenth Five-Year Plan, the 11th saw a substantial reduction in goals, indicative of the unrealistic ambitions of previous plans. There is a trend towards the abandoning of the planned economy in favour of reform, the inevitable Perestroika. The following chart is a comparison of planning targets for the 10th and 11th Five-Year plans:

Table two²⁵

<i>Planning targets</i>	<i>the 10th Plan</i>	<i>the 11th Plan</i>
National Income	24-28%	18-20%
Personal Income	20-22	18-20
Industrial Production		
Heavy Industry	38-42	26-28
Light Industry	30-32	27-29
Farming	14-17	12-14
Labour Productivity	—	23-25
Capital Investment	24-26	12-15

In 1983-4 it was evident that even the reduced planning targets would not be achieved.

On January 26, 1985, on the eve of Perestroika's inauguration, *Pravda* released the following 1984 plan achievements:

Table three²⁶

<i>Indicators</i>	<i>percentage increase of 1983</i>
National Income	102.6
Personal Income	104.2
Industrial Production	104.1
Heavy Industry	104.3
Light Industry	100.0
Farming	102.0
Labour Productivity	102.5
Retail Trade	104.2
Housing Construction	100.5

The government also disclosed a list of underfulfilled targets:²⁷

Petroleum Industry	99.5
Fuel Industry	100.9
Farming	99.0
Margarine Production	96.0
Vegetable Oil	96.0
Canned Food	99.7
Canned Fruit	99.1
Clocks and Watches	97.0
Radio Receivers	95.0
Fruits and Vegetables	—
Motorcycles and Scooters	98.0
Highway Carrier Transports	97.0

One year later, on January 26, 1986, *Pravda* and *Izvestia* printed the plan fulfilment record for 1985:

Table four²⁸

<i>Indicators</i>	<i>percentage increase over 1984 level</i>
National Income	103.1
Personal Income	102.8
Industrial Production	103.9
Heavy Industry	103.9
Light Industry	103.9
Farming	100.0
Labour Productivity	103.2
Retail Trade	104.2
Housing Construction	100.5

When comparing the results of 1984 and 1985, it becomes evident that the overall growth of the economy had somewhat dropped. The list of industries which under-fulfilled their planning quotas continued to run high. The following industries scarcely reached, or even fell behind the previous year's level:²⁹

Foreign Trade	101.0%
Fuel and Power	101.0
Food	101.0
Petroleum	96.0
Gas	100.6
Ferrous Metallurgy	99.3
Chemicals	99.3
Mineral Fertilizers	98.0
Heavy Transport	101.0
Timber, Pulp and Paper	99.0
Light Industry	99.8
Medical and Microbiological Supplies	100.0

Plan fulfilment actually did not occur in some of the more vital economic sectors. As a consequence of a growing population, greater demands were placed on the economy. Although almost all of the republics suffered in this respect, four were in critical condition:³⁰

Ukrainian SSR	100.1%
Uzbek SSR	99.7
Kazakh SSR	100.1
Georgian SSR	99.5

During the activation of Glasnost and Perestroika, the economic situation in the Soviet Union continued to worsen. Economic performance became less and less favourable, as reported in January 1987 and 1988 by both *Pravda* and *Izvestia*³¹. The published results for 1988 show that there was little change from previous low

achievement levels, but the list of deficient industries had grown excessively long. In addition, not a single Union republic had fulfilled the plan.

Table five³².

<i>Indicators</i>	<i>percentage increase of the 1987 level</i>
National Income	104.4
Personal Income	103.5
Industrial Production	103.0
Farming	100.7
Labour Productivity	105.1
Retail Trade	107.1

Two items in this table seem slightly unrealistic. In 1988 Soviet authorities continuously complained of declining labour discipline, labour inefficiency, worker absenteeism, and wasted time. Plan fulfilment figures for labour productivity, however, are rather high.

Retail trade figures are also high, although produce and merchandise virtually disappeared from store shelves, and many items were made available by coupon only, instead of the regular channels of market distribution. The indication would not be of a growing trade, but rather of a growing trade shortage. The high figure for Soviet retail trade must therefore be explained by growing market distribution by family and cooperative operations, aimed at securing individual gain, a practice that has flourished during the period of reconstruction.

The following industries did not meet the original planning quotas of 1987:³³

<i>Industry</i>	<i>% of plan fulfilment</i>	<i>% of 1987</i>
Cheese	99.8	104.0
Margarine	89.0	97.0
Vegetable Oil	83.0	106.0
Granulated Sugar	91.0	88.0
Bread	100.6	97.0
Canned Goods	99.0	101.0
Fabrics	99.6	103.0
Knittingwear	99.0	103.0
Hosiery	99.9	99.0
Radio Receivers	90.0	98.0
Tape Recorders	92.0	110.0
Washing Machines	94.0	106.0
Vacuum Cleaners	98.0	108.0
Motorcycles	98.0	102.0
Bicycles	97.0	101.0
Passenger Cars	98.0	95.0
Clocks and Watches	100.0	104.0
Elements of Galv. Batteries	91.0	106.0
Footwear	98.0	101.0

A review of the preceeding list of deficiencies shows that the consumer was hit hard with shortages.

A similarly gloomy picture of the Soviet economy is provided by the plan fulfilment records of the following complexes:³⁴

<i>Complex</i>	<i>fulfilment of their contractual commitment</i>	<i>percentage of the share of underfulfilment</i>
Metalurgical	99.0	29.0
Fuel and Power	99.5	31.0
Machine Building	98.1	40.0
Chemical and Timber	98.4	40.0
Agro-industrial	98.8	11.0
Social	99.4	16.0
Construction	99.1	16.0

These statistics show that the economy has indeed been worsening during Perestroika.

Whether Soviet supplied statistics can be considered a reliable source of information is yet another point to question. Soviet authorities have been known to falsify information both within the system, to avoid reprimand by higher officials and provide the citizens with a rosy picture of the economic state of affairs, and outside the system, in order to save face internationally.

This is the case on all official levels. Mikhail Gorbachev, for example, had intended, earlier this year, to reveal to the newly-formed Supreme Soviet of People's Deputies, that in 1984, a year before he came to power and initiated the Perestroika process, the Soviet Gross National Product and National Income had declined at a dramatic rate of 9%. Official statistics, on the other hand, reported a 3.2% increase in the Soviet GNP and National Income levels for the same period of time. Mr. Gorbachev thus resolved to abandon "the idea of dwelling on his predecessors' dramatic record, and rather concentrate on the future"³⁵.

In light of the questionable nature of the official statistics which offer an overall view of the Soviet economy, a truer and more realistic source, other than the government, must be found. Such a source can be partly found in the Soviet press which, rather than attempting to view the economy as a whole, often concentrates on details of specific industries, establishments, etc. These details, once conglomerated, may facilitate the compilation of an overview of the true state of the USSR's economy. It is to the media that we turn to next.

IV. THE ECONOMIC SITUATION AS REFLECTED IN THE SOVIET PRESS

A. The application of technological development in the practical business operations and the resulting ecological problems

The Soviet Research and Development sector has always been far behind that of the West. Specifically, the results gained from the research encountered delays and difficulties when being implemented in practical production processes. This was the case during Khrushchev's period of decentralisation known as "the Thaw", and during Brezhnev's reign also. The reforms of 1973 specifically addressed this problem.

In 1985, special groups were set up in the Georgian SSR, that were intended to speed up the implementation of production innovations. Similar measures were also undertaken in Ukraine and other republics³⁶. In July 1987, *Pravda* commented that technological progress in the area of industrial research, and the modernisation of industrial establishments were occurring too slowly, and that the rate of general progress was unsatisfactory³⁷. Complaints about the sluggish application of computerisation repeatedly appeared in *Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta*, *Pravda*, *Izvestia* and other provincial and local papers³⁸. In September 1987, *Pravda* demanded that research and development, and modernisation of equipment and processing be sped up in all industries, from natural gas to transportation, in order to improve the quality of goods and services³⁹. The Central Committee of the CPSU resolved, in October 1987, that scientific research, technological progress and their application in the industrial process, must be improved, and that new management techniques and systems of better accountability should be progressively employed⁴⁰. That same month, *Pravda* reported on the dire state of agricultural research⁴¹.

Despite all of these shortcomings, the industrial sector of the USSR has been growing over the period of eleven Five-Year Plans, thus producing very serious ecological problems all over the Soviet Union in the 1980s, culminating with the Chornobyl disaster in April 1986. The ecological problems have been repeatedly reported and discussed by the Soviet press, who have painted a rather dismal picture of their ailing land. Instances of air and water pollution have increased throughout the USSR. Land conservation was not receiving adequate attention, and the Taiga was in danger. The deteriorating state of affairs was a direct cause of poor environmental planning; there was too much bureaucracy involved, and the fractional approach resulted in the overall picture being ignored. Fish reserves were dwindling, and reindeer were disappearing. Game moved away as technology encroached their feeding grounds. Flooding also became a problem in many parts of the USSR⁴².

The Chornobyl disaster was yet another issue frequently addressed by the press. Although the real extent of the disaster was never completely revealed by the authorities, the catastrophe evidently plagued the minds of the citizens. The causes, extent, fears, rumours, dangers of radiation and contamination, long-run consequences, Chornobyl's rehabilitation and the likelihood of another nuclear accident are issues that were all being debated three years after the disaster⁴³.

With ecology as a primary concern, the press continuously reported ecological problems, bringing the public and the government to realise the importance of the ecological question. In February 1988, *Pravda* reported on the misuse of chemicals, and the danger posed to the environment⁴⁴. In July 1987, the press reported the failure, on the part of officials in various ministries, to ensure the implementation of environmentally-conscious measures. Lower level administrators had mismanaged the measures, which were aimed at reducing pollution and making a comprehensive use of waste. *Izvestia*, later that same year, complained that industries were ignoring legislation aimed at reducing pollution. Pollution reduction targets, over the course of the 12th Five-Year Plan, were fulfilled by only 50% of those industries required to do so⁴⁵. While the Aral Sea was dying, environmental agencies, rendered useless by the inadequacies of state environmental programmes, were unable to help prevent the disaster. In the Volga Basin, fish were dying while poor irrigation plans resulted in considerable losses of farmland. The Central Committee of the CPSU discussed the case of the Baikal Lake in the Far East, and identified a slow rate of progress in cleaning the lake up. Many papers carried reports discouraging swimming in the rivers and lakes⁴⁶.

As the public voiced its discontent with the ecological situation in the USSR, construction of new nuclear complexes, including one in the Ukrainian SSR and one on the Lena River in Asia, was discontinued. Suggestions were made to restrict the construction of nuclear plants to mountainous and deserted regions⁴⁷.

B. Industry and Trade

Among other perennial Soviet problems frequently reported by the press, is the inadequate quantity and inferior quality of the goods produced in the Soviet Union. Shortcomings have been identified in virtually all industries: power, coal, petroleum, construction, and in those producing consumer goods. Planned targets were not met, and the goods were not being delivered. Industrial production fell behind the expectations of previous years⁴⁸. Due to management problems, several nuclear plants were closed out of fear of another disaster.

Since state enterprises were traditionally inefficient, the Soviet leadership, after the initiation of Perestroika, sought ways of making the Soviet economy more efficient. Hence, following Gorbachev's declarations, the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers resolved to broaden the independence of those state establishments involved in the production of consumer goods⁴⁹. The Law on State Enterprises, however, remained fairly vague. Confusion prevailed as to what was a legal profit and what constituted illegal speculation. Even the appropriate government officials were not sure of the difference. Hence, in many cases, decisions about the legality of earning depended on the whims of officials.

The restructuring of the economy along a laissez-faire trend also caused mounting difficulties in trade. According to *Trud*, the Soviet trade volume had to increase by 11 million roubles if any shortages were to be avoided during 1985. Yet this target

was not reached, and shortages of goods and services continued to plague the economy during the entire period of the 12th Five-Year Plan. Felt boots, for example, were a scarce commodity, for the respective industry only met 40% of the 1984 planning target⁵⁰. In 1984-5, a shortage of contact lenses forced consumers to rely on the black market. The winter of that same year was especially cold, for fuel was sold by drivers on the black market, and the fuel supply for the transport industry was inadequate. When a system of coupons for gasoline purchases was introduced, the instances of embezzlement increased dramatically⁵¹. Such was the case with a multitude of goods which, due to shortages, were also moved off the regular distribution channels and made available through the coupon system of selling⁵².

The growth of the "shadow" or "underground" economy is best illustrated by the sale of bricks by state plants on the black market. This occurred in Moscow, Voroshilovgrad, Kryvyi Rih, Kaliningrad, Leningrad, Tashkent, Volgograd, Voronizh, Zaporizhia, the Urals, and other provinces⁵³.

People rushed from store to store, but it was all in vain for there was nothing to buy. Dozens upon dozens of letters were sent to editors of various newspapers, complaining about the shortages. The shortage crisis soon spread from the provincial towns into the larger urban centres. Commenting on their plight, the people claimed that "they will go to Mars to buy soap and to Prague, Czechoslovakia, to buy dresses⁵⁴." Since 1987, newspapers like *Literaturnaya gazeta* have warned that growing shortages will only lead to continuous price hikes, and make inflation a very realistic threat⁵⁵. By 1985-6, there existed no car towing or mechanical service station along any of the USSR's many highways. The shortage of meat was also posing a problem⁵⁶. In November 1988, *Pravda* appealed for an increase of the available quantity and improvement of the quality of meat and dairy products in order to alleviate market shortages⁵⁷. The Central Committee of the CPSU, addressing the same issue at its 1986 meeting, stated that the stores and cooperatives are inefficient in supplying consumer demands, and that those goods and services which are supplied are of inadequate quantity and inferior quality. A year later, *Izvestia* reported on the shortage of fruit and vegetable supplies, noting that selection is also limited. At the same time state stores recorded shortages of fruit and vegetables, state depots found their stocks replete with them⁵⁸. There was something desperately wrong with the distribution process. The sale of necessity goods dropped in Moscow and other cities, compared to their 1986 levels. Food shortages underscored the troubles the food industry was facing. Hence, Mr. Gorbachev appealed to all to work better⁵⁹. With increasing Union-wide shortages, and the quality of goods also declining, the Council of Ministers approved the unprecedented establishment of marketing and advertising departments in various educational institutions. Although there was virtually nothing to market or advertise at the time of this decision in March 1989, it is reasonable to assume that this was done in anticipation of the growing private sector, whose growth is a result of the opportunities created by Perestroika⁶⁰.

Soviet foreign trade was also suffering. In October 1987, *Izvestia* reported of a high-level round-table discussion addressing the USSR's foreign trade problems.

Among the problems cited were the USSR's growing dependence on foreign oil imports, the USSR's failure to develop goods that could be competitive on foreign markets, a complete lethargy in developing Soviet capital investments abroad, and the deficient performance of Comecon, officially called the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), an economic community composed of communist countries⁶¹. In fact, during the 12th Five-Year Plan, Soviet producers had very little to offer foreign markets. The goods produced were of a poor quality and short in supply. Selection, style and varieties did not appeal to Western tastes. Distribution channels were underdeveloped, spare parts were in short supply, and services were practically non-existent. Significantly, there was practically no demand for the Soviet rouble in the West. In short, the status of Soviet foreign trade had not improved for decades. It was that way before, and it is the reality today⁶².

NOTES

24. *Pravda*, January 29, 1967; January 25, 1970; and February 4, 1971.

25. *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, December 31, 1980, pp. 1-24; *Pravda* and *Izvestia*, December 2, 1979, p. 1.

26. *Pravda* and *Izvestia*, January 26, 1985, pp. 1-2.

27. *Ibid.*

28. *Ibid.*, January 26, 1986, pp. 1-3.

29. *Ibid.*

30. *Ibid.*

31. *Pravda*, January 24, 1988, p. 1-3; the plan for 1987 was rather ambitious. The following are figures for meeting the 1987 plan in the percentages of 1986:

National income	102.3
Industrial production	103.8
Farming	100.2
Labour productivity	102.4
Personal income	102.0
Retail trade	102.8

The figures also indicated some serious underfulfilments below the 1986 level, while the consumer fared a little better.

32. *Pravda*, January 22, 1989, pp. 3-5; *Izvestia*, January 21, 1989, pp. 1-3.

33. *Ibid.*

34. *Ibid.*

35. *US News and World Report*, June 19, 1989, p. 11; on the Soviet statistics: Schwartz, *Russia's Soviet Economy*, pp. 12-137; A. Bergson, "Reliability and Usability of Soviet Statistics", *The American Statistician*, June-July, 1953, Vol. 7, No. 3, pp. 19-23; V. Trembl and J. Hardt, eds., *Soviet Economic Statistics*, Durham, 1972.

36. *Pravda*, January 28, 1985, p. 2.

37. *Ekonomicheskaya gazeta*, January 1985, p. 14; *Izvestia*, June 11, 1986; *Pravda*, July 26, 1987, p. 1; August 20, 1987, and September 19, 1987, p. 2.

38. *Ibid.*, and numerous other papers refer to the problem by various occasions.

39. *Pravda*, September, 19, 1987, p. 2.

40. *Izvestia*, October 23, 1987, p. 1.

41. *Pravda*, October 29, 1987, p. 2.

42. *Izvestia*, January 11, p. 6; January 12 and 16, p. 3, 1985, August 11, 1986, p. 6 *Pravda*, July 15, 1987, p. 1, September 7, 1987, p. 4; *Izvestia*, November 26, 1987, p. 6; *Sovietskaya Rossia*, November 18, 1987, p. 4; *Izvestia*, June 6, 1988, p. 3; July 17, 1988, p. 6; Oct. 10, 1988, p. 2; February 17, 1989; *Pravda*, July, 15, 1987, p. 1; September 7, 1987 p. 4; August 13, 1988, p. 3, and so on.
43. *Pravda*, June 3, 1986, p. 3; *Literaturnaya gazeta*, June 4, 1986, p. 10; June 11, 1986, p. 11; *Sovietskaya Byelorossia*, July, 8, 1986, p. 4; *Sovietskaya Rossia*, June 10, 1986, p. 4; *Izvestia*, August 11, 1986, p. 6; *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, June 1986, No. 26, pp. 4-5; *Pravda*, August 1, 1987, p. 6; *Novoi Mir*, 1988, No. 9, pp. 164-179.
44. February 10, 1989, p. 8.
45. *Izvestia*, November 26, 1987, p. 6; *Pravda*, July 15, 1987, p. 1.
46. *Pravda*, August 13, 1988, p. 3; *Sovietskaya Rossia*, November 18, 1987, p. 4; *Izvestia*, July 17, 1988, p. 6; *Pravda*, September 7, 1987, p. 4.
47. *Izvestia*, June 6, 1988, p. 3; also, October 10, 1988, p. 2; *Pravda*, November 21, 1988, p. 5.
48. *Pravda*, August 30, 1986, p. 2; a meeting of the CP of the CCSU debated the issues; also August 8, 1986, p. 2; March 20 and 22, 1985, p. 1-2.
49. *Izvestia*, January 14, 1989, p. 1.
50. *Trud*, December 18, 1984, p. 2; *Izvestia*, January 29, 1985, p. 3; *Pravda*, February 11, 1985, p. 7; *Literaturnaya gazeta*, October 31, 1984, *Pravda*, July 27, 1987, p. 3; also November 2, 1988, p. 2; *US News and World Report*, April 3, 1989, p. 36 and 42.
51. *Trud*, January 6, 1985, p. 2.
52. *Pravda*, February 11, 1985, p. 7; *Literaturnaya gazeta*, October 31, 1984; *Izvestia*, February 21, 1985, p. 3; *Literaturnaya gazeta*, September 16, 1987, p. 12; *Izvestia*, February 2, 1989, p. 1, March 29, 1989, p. 1.
53. *Pravda*, October 12, 1988; *Izvestia*, January 12, 1985, p. 3; the same, February 7, 1985: Stores and services go back to the former shorter and inconvenient hours, which make the life of the consumer intolerable; *Izvestia*, February 7, 1985, p. 3.
54. *US News and World Report*, April 3, 1989, p. 42; *Pravda*, July 27, 1987, p. 3.
55. *Literaturnaya gazeta*, September 16, 1987, p. 12; *Pravda*, February 4, 1989, pp. 1-2. The Council of Ministers debated the problem.
56. *Izvestia*, February 21, 1985, p. 6; *Molodyi Komunist*, January 1985, No. 1, pp. 49-55; *Pravda*, November 2, 1988, p. 2.
57. *Ibid.*
58. *Izvestia*, July 23, 1987, p. 1; also, October 19, 1987.
59. *Ibid.*
60. *Izvestia*, March 21, 1989.
61. On the Comecon: N. Chirovsky, "The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance: An Evaluation", *The Journal of Business*, South Orange, N.J., December 1962, pp. 24-30, and the same, "The Comecon in the 1960's", *idem*, May 1970, pp. 19-31; Schwartz, *An Introduction*, . . . pp. 147-154; P. Gregory and R. Stuart, *Soviet Economic Structure and Performance*, New York, 1981, pp. 271-275.
62. *Izvestia*, October 10, 1987, p. 6; *Pravda*, October 14, 1987, pp. 4-5.

(To be continued)

Wasył VERYHA

LOOTING OF CHURCHES IN UKRAINE IN 1922

(Part 1)

The Treaty of Riga in 1921, between the Russian, Byelorussian and Ukrainian Soviet Republics and Poland, brought an end to foreign interventions in Eastern Europe. Vladimir Lenin, the leader of the Bolshevik Party was in November 1917 ready to build a classless society and workers' paradise on the ruins of the tsarist Russian Empire. Yet there were still many impediments along the road to that goal, among them one of his own creation — War Communism. It was an economic policy applied to agriculture whose essential element was the requisition of food reserves from the peasants for the maintenance of a new communist bureaucracy, the Red Army and industrial workers — the bastions of Bolshevik power in Russia. The War Communism policy not only deprived the peasantry of their food reserves and seeds for the next season but, worst of all, it killed incentive to produce as many foodstuffs as possible. The problem was that the government pegged all the food products at very low fixed prices and, in addition, no agricultural implements or other necessities were available to satisfy farmers' needs. In practice, money was worthless and it was the best example that hard work did not pay for the farmers. Subsequently, farmers decreased their acreage of tilled land so as to only fulfil their own families' needs. As a result, shortages of food products were felt everywhere, especially in the large industrial cities. This in turn compelled the labour force to abandon their factories and look for food in the countryside. Finally, when the Kronstadt naval base, which helped the Bolsheviks seize the reins of power, revolted, Lenin decided to replace War Communism with the New Economic Policy (NEP). Although NEP permitted limited private enterprise in most spheres of economic activity, it failed to prevent another disaster.

The years 1920 and 1921 proved to be very dry in the regions which normally produced most of the country's food products, namely in the Volga and Don River Valleys, in the Kuban region and also in southern Ukraine and the Crimea. In some areas the harvests of 1920 and 1921 were so poor that even the seeds sown there were not returned. Since the forceful appropriation of food products from the peasantry left their granaries empty, by the spring of 1921 there was nothing left for rainy days, and starvation was creeping into once prosperous villages. At first the terrible conditions in the Volga and Don Valleys were kept secret by the Bolshevik government, and only in summer 1921, did they receive proper publicity within and outside the USSR. The Russian Orthodox Church along with some leading members of the laity

formed their own relief committees in an attempt to organise relief for the suffering Volga Valley population. Patriarch Tikhon appealed to Western Church leaders for food and medicine to help prevent mass starvation. Maksim Gorky did the same on behalf of the civilian committee. At this time it was only the Volga Valley that received satisfactory publicity, while other regions were not even mentioned. Lenin appealed to the peasants of Ukraine and to the world proletariat for help, but the proletariat itself was in dire need of assistance in the inter-war years.

The world responded favourably although there were still some issues which needed to be settled with Russia, including Lenin's plan for a world revolution to overthrow the governments of the capitalist countries. Among the first to respond were the American Relief Administration (ARA) and the International Red Cross.

At the same time the Soviet government refused to accept any organised assistance from the Russian Orthodox Church and the Church relief committee was ordered to disband. Instead, on December 9, 1921, the government appealed for church collections of valuable articles and money for the benefit of the starving in the Volga Valley. But the results, at least according to the Soviet press, were insufficient. "In the Kuban-Black Sea region there are about 500 churches and as many church councils and yet they contributed hardly 11 million roubles for the starving", wrote *Pravda*, the official press organ of the Russian Communist Party¹. By then foreign relief was pouring into the Volga Valley, which was relieved of the tax-in-kind.

Unfortunately, the critical situation in the five southern gubernias of Ukraine, the Crimea and the Kuban area were not only unpublicised, but they also had to pay the tax levy and were obliged to contribute to the Volga Valley relief fund. In addition to that, in summer 1921 Ukraine was flooded by refugees from the Volga Valley seeking food and shelter. Over half a million of them were allowed to flee from the famine.

The collections made in churches did not satisfy the government and they cast their eyes on church treasures. In the usual fashion, such a "request" would be made not as an official demand but rather as an expression of the will of the masses. With that in view a number of articles were published in the Soviet press in which the subject of church treasures was discussed and suggestions were made that the treasures be removed from the churches for the benefit of the starving population in the Volga Valley. There were also letters to the editor asking for the removal of church treasures which were signed simply "a believer".

The amount of treasures in the monasteries and churches was also exaggerated in order to convince everybody, including believers, that the amount was so high that there would be enough for both the Church and humanitarian causes, such as relief for the starving people. "It has been calculated", wrote *Izvestia*, "that if all the church treasures were loaded onto a train then that

1. *Pravda*, No. 46, 28 February 1922, p. 2.

train would be over seven kilometres long. And if all those treasures were exchanged for food for the starving, the Volga Valley and other starving regions could be fed for two years"². Another news item from Kyiv stated that for one icon in the Pecherska Lavra 100 wagons of food could be bought for the starving³. *Pravda* reported from Kharkiv that for a silver bell in the Kharkiv Cathedral, which weighed 18 poods (close to 300 kilograms of silver) 3,000 children could be saved from famine before the new harvest⁴.

In the meantime all Soviet newspapers launched a campaign against the clergy and the church hierarchy depicting the priests and monks as "murderers in cassocks", "thieves in cassocks", drunkards, social parasites etc. The papers demanded the government confiscate the church treasures and buy food for the starving. This had a definite purpose to discredit the clergy in the eyes of the believers and prepare for the eventual requisition of church treasures.

Patriarch Tikhon agreed that some valuable church property could be donated for the relief purposes. On February 14 he issued a pastoral letter calling upon the hierarchy and clergy of the Russian Orthodox Church to donate to the famine fund valuables and decorative artifacts which were not used in the ritual services. In return he also asked the government for a right to participate in the decision making body and to ensure that the treasures were actually used for relief purposes.

That did not satisfy the Party and the government, and after a prolonged anti-clerical campaign on February 23 the government issued a decree ordering the requisition of some church treasures to the Russian Relief Committee. It was signed by the president of the RSFSR Mikhail Kalinin himself.

Patriarch Tikhon, rather surprised by this arbitrary government action, wrote two letters to Kalinin requesting clarification of the matter. There was no reply. Then, in response to the government decree, Tikhon issued another pastoral letter in which he stated that while valuable decorations could be donated for the relief purposes, sacred articles cannot and should not be removed from the church. And he warned that acts of disobedience would result in lay people being separated from the Church and priests being unfrocked. The government, on the other hand, blamed the Patriarch for the supposed issue of a secret letter to the clergy in which he allegedly stated that "it is not important what to give, but to whom to give" which of course could be interpreted as mistrust of the government.

Although the decree was signed by the Russian government and was seemingly intended for the Russian Soviet Republic, it was instantly implemented in the Ukrainian SSR. The first attempt to remove the treasures from the Church in Kharkiv, however, proved to be a failure. A Polish daily "*Kurjer Warszawski*" reported from Kharkiv that on February 26 disturbances broke

2. *Izvestia*, No. 32, February 10, 1922.

3. *Pravda*, No. 101, 9 May 1922. . .

4. *Pravda*, No. 116, 27 May 1922.

out when an attempt was made to remove the treasures from one of the local churches for the famine relief fund. "People are dissatisfied here, fearing that most of the requisitioned treasures will disappear into the pockets of the officials", concluded the reporter⁵.

On March 8, 1922, the Ukrainian government issued its own decree, seemingly under "the pressure" of the working people, ordering the forced removal of treasures from the churches of Ukraine. In fact, the Ukrainian decree was nothing else but a word for word repetition of the Russian decree, with one significant omission. While the Russian decree mentioned famine in the Volga Valley, the Ukrainian one did not. Meetings were then organised in large and small communities across Ukraine, where the decree was explained and approved by the population.

It is noteworthy that Moscow did not have much confidence in the Ukrainian government. This, in spite of the fact that out of some 20 people's commissars, only four were of Ukrainian origin, with the others being mostly Jews and Russians. To make sure that everything was done "properly", Moscow sent Serafimov who was to act as deputy head of the GPU in Ukraine, in charge of the removal of the church treasures.

Serafimov, complying with the decree, began preparations to remove treasures from the wealthiest churches and monasteries. Thus the Pecherska Lavra in Kyiv, respected throughout all Orthodox Slavdom, became his first target.

To ensure that the requisition would be conducted flawlessly, the higher monastic hierarchy was arrested, and the cooperation of the lower clergy and monks was assured by terror. To avoid any disturbance on the part of the population, the requisition was organised at night and the Lavra was surrounded by the most loyal military units. Since Serafimov was already well acquainted with the monastery's inventory, he requested that one item after another, according to the inventory book, be surrendered to him.

One of the monks, a jurist-consultant, Ivan Nikodimov glanced at the treasures collected in one room and wrote in his memoirs: "When I was permitted to enter that room and to look at that marvellous collection I was lost. It was an unusual sight. Diamonds of various sizes, starting with small ones and ending with those weighing several carats, pearls, gold, platinum, rubies and other precious stones shining in the candle light, glimmering with thousands of colourful resplendents"⁶. In summing up his impressions Nikodimov stated that he was informed that the commission requisitioned no less than 4 poods (64kg) of gold, about four pounds of diamonds and about 700 poods (11,200kg) of silver and a great deal of other valuables⁷.

Following the incident, a report was published in *Pravda* by a correspondent who wrote: "I will limit myself to the most important items that had

5. *Kurjer Warszawski*, No. 58, 27 February 1922.

6. I.N. Nikodimov: *Vospominaniya o Kievo-Pecherskoi Lavre*. (Munich: Institut po izucheniyu SSSR, 1960) (Issledovaniya i materialy. Seriya II, No. 76), p. 114.

7. *Ibid.*

been requisitioned: 1) a golden panagia embellished with diamonds and other precious stones; 2) a precious panagia with diamonds; 3) a golden chalice with engraved ornaments; 4) a golden lamp, a gift to the Lavra from Empress Catherine II, which weighed 6 pounds, embellished with 241 diamonds and 207 pearls; 5) an ornament to the icon of St. Joseph covered with diamonds, rubies, sapphires and emeralds; 6) an ornament to the icon of St. Volodymyr made of beaten gold, decorated with diamonds; 7) a precious golden lamp with a cluster of diamonds at the bottom, a gift to the Lavra from Emperor Alexander II; 8) another very rare panagia which was bought for 10,000 roubles by the Countess Leonova as a gift for the Lavra; 9) a panagia, a gift from Prince Rumiantsev, weighing 90 carats; 10) a Gospel with a golden top cover weighing 9 pounds and decorated with 200 diamonds, and a silver back cover decorated with precious stones; 11) two pearl mitres with diamonds; 12) two mitres made from thin beaten gold decorated with precious stones". At the conclusion of his report the correspondent stated that "the value of the requisitioned treasures from the Kyivo-Pecherska Lavra was tremendous"⁸.

According to the official report made by the Russpress on May 3, 1922, the requisitioned treasures from the Kyivo-Pecherska Lavra totalled "2,417 diamonds of which the smallest weighed one and a half carats, while most of them weighed from 3-5 carats, some precious stones of 9 carats each, 1,106 emeralds, 1,345 rubies, 41 sapphires, 10 strings of pearls, 8 sacerdotal vestments covered with precious stones and many other valuable items. "There was no mention of precious metal, platinum, gold and silver". Other sources indicate that in total the requisitioned treasures from the Pecherska Lavra amounted to 64kg of gold and 112.000kg of silver"⁹.

And so they went from monastery to monastery and from church to church, of which there were about one hundred in Kyiv alone, among them the famous and richly endowed St. Sophia Cathedral.

It was not so easy to remove the treasures from the Lavra. Having learnt about the plundering of their holy shrine — the Pecherska Lavra — the people of Kyiv were extremely indignant and endeavoured to prevent the removal of the treasures. They gathered in front of the main gate of the Lavra, as the armed sentries would not let them in, and lay down on the road leading to the gate. They were forcibly removed, and the heavily loaded trucks with the church treasures left the Pecherska Lavra.

In spite of all the propaganda in favour of the removal of church treasures for the benefit of the starving people and the anti-religious and anti-clerical campaign, riots were very common all over Russia, Byelorussia and Ukraine. In fact one of the first major disturbances took place in the city of Shuya in the Moscow gubernia, which compelled Lenin himself to take a stand. On that occasion he wrote a secret letter to Molotov and through him to the

8. *Pravda*, No. 85, 19 April 1922.

9. M. Miller: *The confiscation and destruction of church property in Ukraine — in: Religion in the USSR* (Munich: Institute for the Study of the USSR, 1960), p. 55.

Presidium of the Politburo, advising them what to do next. In the letter he stated that the famine presented a golden opportunity to show the opponents of the Bolshevik government and, most of all, the clergy, that no opposition would be tolerated. Among other things he wrote: "I come to the conclusion that we should declare decisive and ruthless war on the 'black hundred' clergy and suppress it with such cruelty that they will remember it for the next several decades"¹⁰.

As far as the Shuya disturbances were concerned, Lenin instructed that "no less than several dozen people should be arrested from the representatives of the local clergy, local burghers, and from the local bourgeoisie, under suspicion of direct or indirect participation in resistance to the governmental decree about the requisition of church treasures"¹¹.

Furthermore, Lenin instructed that the "Politburo should issue oral instructions to court judges that their proceedings should be carried out with maximum speed and should end with no other verdict than the death penalty for a large number of the most influential members of the black hundred of the city of Shuya and other spiritual centres including Moscow"¹².

Of special interest in Lenin's letter is a lack of any hint that the church treasures are to be removed for the benefit of the starving, although there is a mention about the importance of those treasures for the economic development of the country.

This letter remains "top secret" to this day and is not published in Lenin's collected works. However, the editors of Lenin's works preferred to make only a passing reference to the letter in vol. 45¹³ without disclosing its full contents. Knowledgeable individuals do, however, state that it is authentic¹⁴.

This instruction was valid not only in Shuya or in the Russian SFSR, but also in Ukraine, as its implementation made quite evident¹⁵. Many sacred items were not only removed from the Church, but were also destroyed either by negligence or intentionally. "The barbarous manner of the government collection of church valuables, according to vast testimony, and this type of destruction, inflicted on the church properties, naturally expressed the official contempt for religion in general¹⁶. This also contributed to the people's indignation and incited disturbances.

10. Lev Regelson: *Tragediya Russkoi Tserkvi, 1917-1945*, Paris, YMCA Press, 1977, p. 281.

11. Ibid, p. 283.

12. Ibid.

13. Vladimir I. Lenin: *Polnoe sobranie sochineniy*, Izd. 5 (Moskva, Izd-vo polit. lit-ry, 1964, tom 45, p. 666-667).

14. L. Regelson: op. cit., p. 284.

15. William B. Stroyen: *Communist Russia and the Russian Orthodox Church, 1943-1962*, Washington, Catholic University of America Press, 1968, p. 18.

16. *The Russian Revolution and Religion*; a collection of documents concerning the suppression of religion by the communists, 1917-1925; with introductory essay, appendices, and selective bibliography by Boleslaw Szczesniak, Notre Dame, Ind., University of Notre Dame Press, 1959, p. 17-18.

When the requisition of treasures was reported to *Pravda* or to *Izvestia*, disturbances were hardly mentioned. However, this information became available at a later date when reports from various courts were sent to the newspapers. Thus we know that disturbances took place in Kyiv, Kharkiv, Poltava, Kamianets Podilskyi, and in a number of other places. Not one church was spared and many people paid with their lives attempting to save their church treasures. Some were successful and the treasures were returned to the church during the German occupation when the churches were reopened.

According to the Soviet scholar V. Samofalov, all valuables taken from the churches in Ukraine amounted to 780 billion roubles (1921 value)¹⁷. According to certain independent scholars such as Prof. Mikhail Miller, Soviet authorities have never produced any statement regarding what was requisitioned from all the churches across the Soviet Union. However, as far as the treasures of Ukraine are concerned, we know that they were not requisitioned to help the starving Ukrainian population. The official organ of the Communist Party of Ukraine, *Komunist*, admitted that in Ukraine relief for the starving was inadequate and subsequently very few of the needy received it. In view of that the Ukrainian government asked the Russian Relief Committee for 15% of the treasures collected in Ukraine to be assigned for famine relief purposes in Ukraine¹⁸.

This was rather a modest request since Ukraine's starving population amounted to about one third of the total population affected by famine. In addition, Ukrainian territory afflicted by starvation did not receive any help from abroad and hardly anything from even the more prosperous gubernias of Ukraine, since all food products were allocated to the Volga Valley.

As we know from the press and from the official report of the central Relief Committee in Moscow, the requisition of the church treasures in Ukraine lasted much longer than one month. According to this official document, by May 16, 1922, requisitioning amounted to 3 poods 3 lbs. 75 zlotniks of gold, 3,105 poods 22 lbs. 54 zlotniks of silver, 15 lbs. 40 zlotniks of other precious metals, 852 pieces of diamonds, 117 pearls, one string of pearls weighing 19 lbs. 55 zlotniks 100 carats, and 2,725 precious stones, as well as 125 gold roubles, 8,615 silver roubles, 24 mitres embellished with diamonds, and 26 other valuable items¹⁹. Yet this was not a final report as to what had been collected in Ukraine.

According to official sources quoted by Julius Hecker, the requisition of church treasures in all of the Soviet Union brought 442 kg. of gold, 336,227 kg. of silver, 1,345 kg. of other precious metals, 33,456 diamonds weighing 1,313 carats, 4,414 pearls and 72,383 pieces of other precious stones. How-

17. V.M. Samofalov: *Komunistychna partiya Ukrainy v borotbi za vidbudovu narodnoho hospodarstva (1921-1925)*. Kyiv, Derzh. vyd-vo polit. lit-ry Ukrainy, 1963, p. 115.

18. *Komunist*, No. 126, 1922, quoted in *Nova Ukraina*, ch. 8-9, 1 August 1922, p. 46.

19. *Itoги borby s golodom v 1921-22 gg.*; sbornik statey i otchetov, Moskva, Ts. K. Pomgol, 1922, p. 261.

ever, there are no two Soviet statements which agree with each other. A recent work by the Soviet author R. Plaksin states that requisition brought only 26 poods 8 lbs. 36 zlotniks of gold, 24,565 poods 9 lbs. 51 zlotniks of silver, golden coins valued at 6,185 roubles, silver coins — 229 poods 29 zlotniks, diamonds and other precious stones — 1 pood 34 lbs. 18 zlotniks²⁰.

The Soviet official press organ *Izvestia*, commenting on the amount of confiscated treasures, stated that it was “ridiculously low”²¹. Why was the result so disappointing?

As usual, there is always an official explanation. Some of the valuable church items were hidden by the clergy, or by the parishioners. This was not easy, in view of the terror practised by the authorities and therefore the quantity of hidden church treasures must have been rather insignificant. A second explanation was that those churches were already looted by various military units during the preceding civil war years. The most important explanation which the Soviet authorities do not mention lies with those who were engaged in the requisitioning and into whose pockets many a valuable article disappeared.

There were several sensational news items in the Soviet press about the smuggling of the church treasures to foreign countries. Perhaps even more sensational was the story about the involvement of Soviet diplomats in smuggling church jewels to Holland, which was reported in *The New York Times* on July 7, 1922.

An interesting report printed by *The Times* of London claimed that “many valuables are being sold clandestinely, presumably on the way to the Kremlin from their places of origin”. And that transaction took place right “on the Moscow market where a brisk trade in what was formerly church property is being carried on”²². Gold and silver items “are being melted at the Moscow smelting factory and most of the gold leaves the factory in blocks with the standard and weight marked on them”²³.

Soviet sources continue to claim that the confiscated church treasures played an important role in saving the starving population. There is, however, no documentary proof of this. Captain McCullagh claimed that the “greater part of money received for the treasures the government used for other purposes than for the famine relief”²⁴.

Ethan Colton, a YMCA officer, who was staying in Russia at that time, says that the Soviet government contributed hardly one and a half million

20. Roman Yu. Plaksin: *Krakh tserkovnoy kontrrevolutsii, 1917-1923*, Moskva, Nauka, 1968, p. 155.

21. *Izvestia*, No. 287, 19 December 1922.

22. *The New York Times*, 14 June 1922, p.9 & 5.

23. *Ibid*.

24. Francis McCullagh: *The Bolshevik persecution of Christianity*, New York, E.P. Dutton, 1924, p. 8.

dollars for the famine relief of the hungry²⁵. M. Miller, professor at Rostov University prior to the German-Soviet war, says that "not a single kopek of all the church treasures was spent for the relief of the starving"²⁶.

The Bolshevik economist Nikolai Bukharin, then editor of *Pravda*, admitted in 1923 that at the time when famine was devastating whole villages in Russia and Ukraine, the Soviet government spent 13.750.000 dollars for propaganda purposes abroad²⁷.

The requisition, or more appropriately outright looting, was also accompanied by heavy human sacrifices. According to Lenin's instructions, everybody who endeavoured to save some treasures for the religious services was accused of unwillingness to help the starving. Numerous court trials were held, which sentenced the accused to death and many persons died defending church property. According to some sources, the requisition of the church treasures resulted in 1,414 cases of bloodshed²⁸ across the Soviet Union. In Ukraine, the Kharkiv diocese witnessed the shooting of 98 priests, the Poltava diocese — 124, Katerynoslav — 92, Chernihiv — 78, and the Odessa-Kherson diocese — 191, a total of 583 clergymen²⁹. Not all of the dioceses are listed, and the list, therefore, is incomplete. No lay victims were taken into account and we know that the "workers' and peasants' government" did not show any mercy to the peasantry when they dared to protest against official actions. According to *The New York Times*, in the spring of 1923, i.e. a year after the requisition of church treasures, when Ukrainian peasants demonstrated their indignation at the murder of their parish priest, the army came to pacify them and killed 340 peasants³⁰.

One of the Russian authors, D. Konstantinov, states that in the process of requisitioning church treasures throughout the Soviet Union to the end of 1924, 2,691 members of the white clergy, and 5,409 monks were either shot or tortured to death³¹. Altogether 8.100 clergy lost their lives. When we divide the amount of treasures acquired during the requisition by the number of lost clergy lives, we come to the conclusion that for each life the Soviet government received 55 grams (2 ounces) of gold, 415 kg. of silver and 166 grams (6 ounces) of other precious metals. The lives of laymen are not taken into account since there is no means of estimating their losses. In any case there

25. Ethan Colton: *Forty years with Russians*, New York, Associated Press, 1940, p. 103.

26. Miller: op. cit., p. 56.

27. R.J. Cooke: *Religion in Russia under Soviets*, New York, Abingdon Press, 1924, p. 149.

28. G.P. Fedotov: *The Russian Church since the revolution*, London, Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1928, p. 57.

29. M.Polski: *Muchenniki rosiyskie*, n. p., Tip. N. Pochaevskago v Sviato-Troitskom monastyre, 1949, tom 1. p. 21-31, 57.

30. *The New York Times*, 6 April 1923, p. 1, 7.

31. D. Konstantinov: *Gonimaya Tserkov: Russkaya Pravoslavnaya Tserkov v SSSR*, New York, Vseslovyanskoyeizd-vo, 1967, p. 12.

could be no doubt that the number of victims among them was not smaller than that of the clergy.

To conclude, let us ask the question: Was it really necessary to rob the churches of their treasures, treasures which had been collected for over 900 years, and which represented the historical and artistic development of a nation over the ages? If the government really wanted to obtain the means to buy bread for the starving population then, of course, it could do so without looting the churches and without bloodshed. Patriarch Tikhon³² and Pope Pius XI³³ offered an amount of money equal to the value of those treasures to buy food for the hungry population with a request to leave the sacred items where they were, but the Kremlin refused. Moreover, the Soviet authorities had at their disposal former imperial jewels, the aggregate value of which was estimated in the summer of 1926, to be no less than "five hundred million roubles"³⁴. But they never touched those jewels. "It would be interesting to know how the retention of these treasures would be justified in the face of the supposed irresistible urgency and necessity for confiscating the church treasures"³⁵.

It is true that the Soviet government wanted those treasures for political and economic reasons. However, the most important objective was to humiliate and destroy the authority of the Church and its hierarchy. While the church treasures did not alleviate the lot of the hungry population, they were used as a means to enhance the dictatorship of the Communist Party. In turn this destroyed the dignity of the Soviet population, who realised that there was no possibility of opposing the government's will.

32. F.H. Potter: "Russian church and famine" in *The New York Times*, 16 July 1922, p. 8, 6.

33. *The New York Times*, 30 July 1922, p. 5, 3.

34. Matthew Spinka: *The Church and the Russian Revolution*, New York, Macmillan, 1927, p. 271.

35. *Ibid.*

Dr. Blanka JERABEK

BOOKS, PRINTING, AND THE FIRST PRINTING HOUSES IN UKRAINE

(Part 1)

1. Christianity and books at the beginning of printing

The book is the single most significant factor in the cultural life of mankind. Although cultures can exist without books, every higher stage of development naturally aspires towards both because what has been fixed in writing to a large degree preserves the place of spiritual tradition in history. A book is defined as a larger written or printed work, which in recent times is composed of sheets of paper which have been bound together. Books are only possible at a higher stage of cultural development because they require the knowledge of writing, appropriate materials and a spiritual heritage.

The book is based on a long tradition with extensive development and perfection. Evidence shows that Babylonian and Assyrian books were made from baked clay slates, and Indian books consisted of bound palm leaves. The frame was protected by titular fascia. In the 3rd century BC, parchment appeared in Asia Minor alongside papyrus, which remained for a long time the only material for writing on in Europe.

The appearance of parchment brought about changes in the book form. In place of the book frame rectangular strips of folded parchment sheets became more common from the first century AD. Due to its high cost parchment was often reused after the original writing had been removed. The costs of publishing were reduced again through the invention of paper by the Arabs in the 8th century, and its introduction in Europe in the 14th century.

In the Middle Ages books were written by hand. Artistically the book achieved a high level, particularly through the book illustrations (miniatures) of the 8th-15th centuries. The influence of books was very extensive, notably in the Middle Ages. Books, especially religious books, were compiled with great taste and estheticism, and very finely decorated, expensively bound in gold and encrusted with precious stones. Printing was regarded as the service of God. Books played a different role in religion. Judaism and the Christian religion, for instance, were based on a wide use of books.

The European peoples did not begin to play a full part in world history until they accepted Christianity and with it a higher form of culture. Thus modern Europe was born with the advent of Christianity. This equally applies to Rus'-Ukraine. For the great Kyivan Prince Volodymyr the acceptance of

Christianity was an act of immense significance. Rus' became part of the culture of the most powerful states of the time. Volodymyr can therefore be regarded as the initiator of the full cultural development of his state.

Apart from her great political significance the Christian Church in Ukraine also had a positive influence on the development of Ukrainian culture. The reign of Prince Volodymyr and his son Yaroslav the Wise saw the extensive development of architecture, art, engraving, music, song, education and books. After the establishment of Christianity as a state religion in Rus'-Ukraine in 988 literature, both religious and lay, experienced extensive development and much wider popularity. It took the form of translations which made their way to Ukraine through Byzantium and Bulgaria, as well as original books in Cyrillic, written by local scholars, accessible to and understood by all Slavonic peoples.

Very few examples of Ukrainian literature from the 11th century have survived. These are books written by hand on parchment, beautifully decorated with ornate headings, illuminations, colophons and illustrations. They include the "Ostromyr Gospel" (1056-57), written in Kyiv by deacon Hryhoriy for Ostromyr the Mayor of Novhorod, and the "Izbornyk Sviatoslava" (1073), a book for the private use of the family of Chernihiv Prince Sviatoslav Yaroslavych, the most educated individual of the time.

The miniature had an important place in ancient art. It was used extensively to decorate and illustrate books in Rus'-Ukraine. The oldest known examples are the miniatures of the "Ostromyr Gospel" and the "Izbornyk Sviatoslava", the miniature illuminations of capital letters and ornate depictions of animals, similar in style to the cupola decorations of the St. Sophia Cathedral in Kyiv.

The family of Kyivan Prince Yaroslav the Wise was fascinated with reading. According to the chronicler Nestor the Prince was very fond of books. Yaroslav the Wise is said to have translated books from Greek into old Ukrainian himself. He also gathered together numerous scholars who copied a large number of books on his instructions. One of the greatest Ukrainian bibliophiles Nestor the Chronicler, a monk from the Kyiv Monastery of the Caves (1055-1114), founded the first public library at the Cathedral of St. Sophia, which, apart from religious literature, contained books by lay authors, including the first Ukrainian chronicles.

The oldest surviving examples of old Ukrainian writing are from the first half of the 11th century, from the time of Prince Yaroslav the Wise (1019-1054). Nearly all the literature from the heyday of Rus'-Ukraine, particularly from the reign of Princes Yaroslav the Wise and Volodymyr Monomakh, was imbued with the idea of the greatness and glory of Ukraine. The Ukrainian chronicles and the renowned literary treasure the "Word on Law and Grace" by Ilarion, written between 1037-50, are prominent examples of this literary style. Metropolitan Ilarion was a scholar, gifted writer, notable orator and publicist. His "Word on Law and Grace" was an eulogy to Prince Volodymyr the Great and a tribute to the baptism of Rus'-Ukraine.

The chronicles also form a large part of Ukrainian literature. Perhaps the most well-known of these is the "Povist Vremennykh Lit" (Tale of Bygone Years), which records events from the oldest times to the beginning of the 12th century. The chronicles represent a particular part of the literary style of the 11th and beginning of the 12th centuries. Although not all original works have survived, the translations of foreign literature, chronicles, the "Kyiv-Pecherskyi Pateryk", the renowned epic "Tale of Ihor's Armament" and many other works of the period eloquently testify about the exceptionally high literary level of Ukraine.

There were many talented linguists in medieval Ukraine. Historians believe that the sons of Prince Volodymyr the Great, Vsevolod and Yaroslav, spoke Greek, Latin, German, Polish and Hungarian. The library of the Kyiv Monastery of the Caves, founded by the monk M. Sviatosha, also contained a large number of foreign books. According to the "Kyiv-Pecherskyi Pateryk" Sviatosha read books in Latin, Greek and ancient Hebrew.

In Ukraine books were treated with great respect. Parchment was the only available material and paper came into use only in the 16th century. In addition to ink Byzantine vermilion was also used; goose quills served as writing implements. The form of writing was the "ustav". Letters were straight and separated from each other. Individual letters written by the same scribe were almost identical. With the passing of time handwritten books were produced more readily and much more professionally.

Copying books was a laborious task. An experienced scribe could copy four and a half pages in a day; the less experienced — up to two. The completion of a work was a great achievement and a festive occasion for the scribe. As recorded in old handwritten books the scribe compares himself to a traveller who has completed his journey, and makes other similar comparisons. In those days books were very expensive. A small prayer book cost 8 hryvni and so only rich people could afford to buy books. And only those who had access to court, church or monastery libraries could borrow books.

The "Psalter" was popular with the Ukrainian ancestors. It was second only to the "Gospel". The chronicles recorded historical knowledge translated into old Ukrainian. Of the lay translations the "Alexandriad" was the most popular, but apocryphal works such as the "Mother of God's Journey through Torture", "The Journey of St. Ahaniy to the Garden of Eden" and others were also extremely popular. The sermons of Metropolitan Ilarion, the most notable orator of the time, St. Theodosius of the Cave Monastery, Kyrylo of Turiv and others formed a large part of original Ukrainian literature. "The Patericon of the Monastery of the Caves", the "Pouchennia" (Instruction) of Volodymyr Momonakh, the "Life and Travels of Danylo, Abbot of the Rus' Land" hold a particularly important place in medieval Ukrainian literature. Ukrainian literary works of the 11th-13th centuries, which have survived to this day, are usually later copies. They have been modernised and often spoiled by transcribers of later centuries.



The Epistles
Lviv, 1574. Published by Ivan Fedorovych



The Bible
 Ostroh, 1581. Published by Ivan Fedorovych

The invention of the method of printing from movable type by Johannes Gutenberg and the introduction of the graphical method of printing illustrations began a new era in the history of mankind. Books became widespread.

Gutenberg's invention consisted of a mould, with punch-stamped matrices (metal prisms used to mould the face of the type) with which type could be cast precisely and in large quantities. This process was used by his wooden printing press. In 1438 he established a printing house in Strassburg (now Strasbourg) and in 1447 in Mainz, where he began to print educational and other books. Gutenberg's most famous publication is the "forty-two-Line Bible" in Latin, known as the "Gutenberg Bible" or "Mazarin Bible", which was completed around 1455. This was the first great work of the new printing art. Set in 42-line columns, the format of the Bible is that of the 1288 folio.

Six compositors are said to have worked on this book for at least two years. The edition of the Bible was 100-200 copies of which around 30 were printed on parchment. More than 40 incomplete copies have survived to this day. The text and outward appearance of the Bible down to the smallest detail was undistinguishable from contemporary manuscripts. The typeface of the Bible comprised 290 different characters in order to recreate the manuscript as precisely as possible. It was the technique of printing that was new and revolutionary. But Gutenberg was unable to keep his invention a secret.

Thus the aim of the first printed books was to copy manuscripts as best and precisely as possible. In the earliest printed texts type had already been perfected, but decorations still had to be added on by hand. Gradual improvements enabled decorations to be printed as well. Typography was combined with the oldest methods of printing pictures, such as engravings in metal and wood, to produce a technique based on uniformity and precision.

At the beginning of the 16th century the appearance of the book changed from that of the earlier handwritten works. It became smaller and more diverse. The titular page increased in popularity around 1520. In the 16th century the centre of book printing was transferred from Germany to Italy, and then to France and Holland. And, naturally, printing soon spread to the rest of Europe. It did not take long for it to reach the Slavonic countries, and hence Ukraine.

2. The first Ukrainian and Byelorussian printers — Sviatopolk Fiol, Heorhiy Skoryna and Ivan Fedorovych

The Slavonic peoples were among the first to adopt Gutenberg's invention — book printing with the help of movable metal letters. The pioneer Slavonic printers Sviatopolk Fiol, Heorhiy Skoryna and Ivan Fedorovych made a marked contribution towards the development of Slavonic, particularly Cyrillic, printing.

Recent studies by Cracow academics showed that the first Slavonic printer of the late 15th century, Sviatopolk Fiol, was of Ukrainian origin. He was born c. 1460 and died some time after 1526. Although a Ukrainian, Fiol may have been born in Neustadt, Franconia. By profession he was a mechanical engineer. The printing house he founded in Cracow on December 15, 1483, was an event of immense significance in the cultural life of the Slavonic peoples.

In eight years (1483-91) Fiol published "Oktoyikh" or "Osmohlasnyk", "Chasoslovets", "Triod posnu" and other books which have not survived. Further study revealed that Fiol printed these books first and foremost for his "Rusyny" (people of "Rus"), who lived in Transcarpathia. At that time large numbers of "Rusyny" also inhabited the Cracow area, where they later fell victim to polonisation. This show of patriotism is yet another argument in favour of his Ukrainian and not German origin, as was earlier believed. Fiol also began to serve Byelorussia, Muscovy, Bulgaria, Serbia and Rumania with his books. And it was not only the Orthodox who were interested in these books, but also the Hussites and Catholics in Czechia, Slovakia, Poland and Lithuania. Academics, theologians and historians not only of eastern, but also western Europe, wrote favourably about Fiol's books. Fiol himself was very talented, versatile and energetic. These qualities were characteristic of the notable humanists of the Renaissance. In 1491 the religious tribunal of Cracow tried Fiol for printing books in Cyrillic for the Greeks and not for Roman Catholics. In consequence his printing house, along with the printing press and most of his publications, were destroyed and Fiol himself barely escaped with his life by fleeing Cracow.

Ivan Franko believed that, after working as a mechanical engineer in the coal mines of various countries, Sviatopolk Fiol began to print Cyrillic books once again with the moral and financial support of the great patron of Ukrainian education, Prince Konstantyn Ostrozkyi.

Although Fiol's books had several inherent flaws — the lines were crooked and there were gaps between words — the typeface he used in his first publications, similar to the southern Slav "semiustav" of the 15th century, was legible, and beautifully decorated with initials and illuminations. Engravings were often used to decorate text. They were printed precisely and clearly.

What is even more significant, however, is that Sviatopolk Fiol, whose parents most probably came from the Pryashiv area, began to print books for Ukrainians in 1483. That same year another Ukrainian Yuriy Kotermaka, known also as Heorhiy or Yuriy Drohobych or Drohobytskyi, a notable pedagogue, writer and academic, professor of Cracow and later professor and rector of Bologna University, published his work "Prohnostychne mirkynavvia" in Latin. In this work, published in Rome, this Ukrainian humanist gives valuable information on medicine, geography and astronomy.

In the history of Ukrainian Renaissance culture the year 1483 is doubly significant. It marks the beginning of Ukrainian book printing by the pioneer

printer Sviatopolk Fiol and the publication of the first Ukrainian academic work by a Ukrainian professor of two universities Yuriy Kotermak-Droho-bytskyi. After Fiol books printed in Byelorussian printing houses, usually shortlived or travelling printing houses, circulated around Ukraine. Hieromonk Makariy, who founded a printing house in Cetinje, the capital of Zeta (old name for Montenegro) in 1493, made a significant contribution towards the development of printing in Slavonic languages, particularly Cyrillic. He greatly improved the Cyrillic typefaces, the technique of setting the text, and the actual print itself. In the books he printed Makariy made wide use of a second colour (vermillion), characteristic of southern Slavonic manuscripts, decorating them with Renaissance plant ornaments. Many ornately decorated and masterfully printed southern Slavonic books were published in Venice, where the centre of southern Slavonic printing was based for a long time.

The activity of Heorhiy Skoryna, an early Byelorussian printer, cultural and civic activist, was significant in the further development of printing. He was born in Polotsk, in the family of a merchant, and studied in Cracow (1504-06) and later Padua University, where in 1512 he attained the degree of Doctor of Medicine. In 1517 he founded a printing house in Prague and published the "Psalter" and the Bible in Byelorussian. In 1525 he opened a printing house in Wilnius, where he printed the "Epistles" and the "Small traveller's book". In 1530 he was invited to Königsberg to work in a printing house. From 1534 he was in Prague again.

Skoryna directed his attention towards the ordinary people. His books were filled with elements of the living language. The technical and artistic format of Skoryna's books, particularly his Viennese publications, is characteristic of his professionalism. His books were set in "semiustav", and his lines were straight. For the first time in Slavonic printing Skoryna introduced the contents, numbered his pages in Cyrillic numerals, used topical engravings, particularly various illustrations from works he published in Prague, and decorated his books with ornamental plant illuminations.

Skoryna regarded artistic decorations, particularly engravings, as a means of making books more comprehensible. "And this is so that my brothers, the people of Rus', ordinary readers, could understand better", wrote Skoryna in the foreword to one of his books. In his forewords Skoryna wrote about the education of the people. His books were noted for their masterful finish and were also widespread in Ukraine, Lithuania and Muscovy. It was no coincidence that in the beauty of their artistic and technical finish Skoryna's books equalled those of the renowned contemporary European publishers — the Elzevir family.

We also know of other Byelorussian printing houses from which books made their way to Ukraine — in Zabludiv (1561), Yevya (1611), Mohyliv, Kuteyina (1630), the travelling printing house of Vasylii Tiapinskyi (Omeliannych) and others. Skoryna's tradition was widely used by fellow Byelorussian printers Symon Budnyi, Vasylii Tiapinskyi, Petro Mstyslavets and the father of Ukrainian and Muscovite printing — Ivan Fedorovych.

As a deacon of the St. Mykola Hostunskyi Church in Moscow, from 1553 Ivan Fedorovych oversaw the building of a printing house commissioned by Tsar Ivan IV. In 1564-65 together with Byelorussian Petro Mstyslavets Fedorovych published several literary works in Church Slavonic. Because this technical innovation created competition for the Muscovite scribes, Fedorovych and Mstyslavets were persecuted and fled to Lithuania, where they were received by Lithuanian Hetman H. Khodkevych at his estate in Zabłudiv (northern Pidlashia, on the Ukrainian-Byelorussian border). There in 1569-70 they published the "Yevanheliye Uchytelnoye" and the "Psalter". In Zabłudiv, Fedorovych changed his name from Fedorov to Fedorovych.

In 1572 Fedorovych moved to Lviv where he established the first printing house in Ukraine. In 1573 he began to print books in the St. Onuphrius Monastery and, according to the inscription on his tombstone in Lviv, "renewed neglected printing". A year later with the help of his son and Hryn Ivanovych from Zabłudiv, Fedorovych published the second edition of the "Epistles" (originally published in Muscovy) with an autobiographical epilogue and a "Bukvar" (Primer). In Lviv Fedorovych was known as "Muscovite printer", a name which identified his place of origin rather than his nationality.

In 1575, while in the service of Prince Konstantyn Ostrozkyi, Fedorovych became the overseer of the Derman Monastery. In 1577-79 he established the Ostrih printing press and published the "Ostrih Bible" (1581) and a number of other books. On leaving Prince Ostrozkyi's service Fedorovych returned to Lviv, but his attempts to reopen his printing house were unsuccessful. It had been taken over the Lviv Dormition Brotherhood (later the Stauropegion Institute), which used Fedorovych's original designs until the beginning of the 19th century.

In Ukraine Ivan Fedorovych printed seven books: two in Lviv and five in Ostrih. Much work and wide-ranging knowledge was required to publish these books, and he had to do virtually everything on his own, from pagination right down to the actual printing.

Ivan Fedorovych's knowledge and professional skills were truly remarkable. He was an expert in the field of printing, a talented writer and editor, a philologist and linguist, and a bookseller. Ivan Fedorovych was a prominent individual of his time and a patriot, whose goal was education of the common people. He was to the end dedicated to book printing. Through his many talents and wide-ranging skills Fedorovych became one of the leading activists of the Renaissance.

(To be continued)

Mykola HLOBENKO

THE LITERATURE OF SOVIET UKRAINE

(Part 1)

Zapysky Naukovoho Tovarystva Imeny Shevchenka, Tom CLXVII, Paris, Munich, New York, 1958. Istoryko-literaturni statti Mykoly Ohloblyna-Hlobenka, p. 120-139.

The destruction of the remnants of Ukrainian statehood carried out by a number of measures implemented by the Russian government (in particular, Peter I and Catherine II) during the 18th century coincided with the efforts of the Petersburg administration not only to subordinate the Ukrainian people politically but also to enslave them spiritually. As a result, at the beginning of the 19th century, the Ukrainian school system and printing were liquidated completely while literature almost went out of print. Only the activity of the Ukrainian Romantics who following their Western European counterparts turned to the history and folklore of their people, animated and elevated politically the Ukrainian literary movement in the 1830s and 1840s. However, the government of Nicholas I arrested and punished administratively (without trial) by exile the Romantic group the Brotherhood of St. Cyril and Methodius in Kyiv. The Brotherhood nurtured dreams of uniting all the Slavic peoples. The greatest Ukrainian poet, Taras Shevchenko, for his poems against Tsarist despotism was exiled to Kazakhstan, recruited into the army and prohibited from writing and painting (he spent 10 years there). The further, unrelenting rise of Ukrainian literature whose creators strove in the absence of a Ukrainian state school and scientific institutes, firstly to standardise the modern literary language based on the vernacular, met with unheard-of persecution. By a circular of 1863 and a decree of 1876 the Russian government of the "liberal" Alexander II banned the printing of periodicals and books in Ukrainian (with the exception of belles lettres though even in this case Ukrainian orthography was prohibited); many cultural figures were expelled from Ukraine. In this way Ukrainian literary work was to all intents and purposes driven beyond the borders of the Russian Empire, for only within Austria-Hungary, in Galicia (Halychyna), was it possible despite the likewise difficult conditions to issue newspapers and books and subsequently at the end of the century to establish an unofficial academy of sciences, the Shevchenko Scientific Society. Temporary liberation from censorship prohibitions during the 1905 revolution could not make much of a mark since although it was to a certain extent possible to issue journals and books within the Russian Empire, further oppression continued while the beginning of the First World War in 1914 brought a total ban on the Ukrainian word. The situation was all the

more tragic since the new wave of cruel repressions was allied to the brutal and systematic destruction of Ukrainian cultural life in the Western Ukrainian Territories (ZUZ) Galicia and Bukovyna which were occupied by the Tsarist Russian Army.

Only the exceptional heroism and persistence in the fight for the ideals of an independent national life were the foundations laid for Ukrainian literature which was enriched by the names of new writers who continued the cause of Taras Shevchenko: Marko Vovchok (Maria Vilinska), Osyp Fedkovych, Ivan Nechuy-Levytskyi, Panas Myrnyi, Mykhailo Kotsiubynskyi, Vasyl Stefanyk, Olha Kobylanska, Marko Cheremshyna, Stepan Vasylchenko, Volodymyr Vynnychenko and others, the dramatists Mykhailo Starytskyi, Marko Kropyvnytskyi, Ivan Tobilevych, the poets Panteleimon Kulish, Yakiv Shchoholiv, Volodymyr Samiilenko, Ahatanhel Krymskyi, Oleksander Oles and many others. A special place by virtue of their great importance at the turn of the century, belongs to the prose writer, poet and multifaceted scholar Ivan Franko and the author of collections of poems and numerous dramatic poems, Lesia Ukrainka (Larysa Kosach).

The national liberation of Ukraine brought by the revolution in the Russian Empire in 1917 as was to be expected led to an unprecedented growth in literature. However, tensions in civil life during the stormy days of the rebirth of Ukrainian statehood, and subsequently the necessity of participating in the defence of the young republic which from the very outset faced a new threat from the Russian neighbour, not to mention the difficult economic conditions which made printing difficult, were all factors which did not facilitate intensive, purely literary work. Nevertheless, we see the renewal of the "Literaturno-Naukovyi Visnyk" (1917-19) established in 1898 as an all-Ukrainian literary-civil organ and closed by the Russian authorities in the first days of the war. Here the widest possible cooperation took place between the older mostly populist-oriented generation and the younger mostly modernist generation. Mykhailo Hrushevskyi, Ol. Hrushevskyi and even Panas Myrnyi are joined by V. Vynnychenko, V. Samiilenko, O. Oles, M. Voronyi, H. Chuprynka, S. Starytska-Cherniakhivska who were followed by complete newcomers to Ukrainian literature. The journal "Shliakh" (1917-18), the left-wing "Mystetstvo" (1919-20), the literary-critical "Knyhar" (1918-19) and also, typical of the economic ruin during the time of the Ukrainian-Soviet war, the almanacs: "Literaturno-Krytychnyi Almanakh" (1918), "Muzahet" (1919), "Grono" (1920), "Vyr Revoliutsiyi" (1921) and others mostly introduced the names of representatives of the younger symbolist group: the poets Pavlo Tychyna, Dmytro Zahul, Volodymyr Doroshenko, Mykola Tereshchenko, Pavlo Fylypovych, Yakiv Savchenko, Volodymyr Kobylanskyi, Oleksa Slisarenko and the critic Yu. Mezhenko. In due course most of this group evolved towards complete acceptance of the revolution under Bolshevik slogans thereby approaching Futurism which was represented by Mykhailo Semenko, Geo Shkuriupiy and others.

The writers most closely linked with the revolutionary events were those

who belonged to the Ukrainian left-wing socialist-revolutionaries (Borotbisty); after forming the "proletarian" literary group "**Borotba**", they published the almanacs "Zshytky borotby" and "Chervonyi vinok" (1919). This group comprised the talented poet-impressionist Vasyl Chumak, author of the collection "Zaspiv" (1920) in which a number of poems go beyond transient political moods (he was shot by Denikin's followers in 1919); the prose writer Andriy Zalvychy (perished during the uprising in Chernihiv in 1918); author of the allegorical "Blakytnyi roman", Hnat Mykhailychenko (shot by Denikin's followers in 1919); best known for his later cooperation with the Bolsheviks as a member of the CC CP(B)U, Vasyl Blakytnyi (Ellan, Ellanskyi), author of the revolutionary collection "Udary molota i sertsia" (1920). Most celebrated in the first years after his death (1925) as the founder of "proletarian" literature in Ukraine, at the beginning of the 1930s he was as all the Borotbisty declared "untrustworthy": his works were removed from all libraries, his monument in Kharkiv and the memorial plaque on the building where he died disappeared overnight; the official name of the group "pershi khorobri" (the first of the valiant) was shortly after banned. The poet Yevhen Hryhoruk was also close to this group.

In the maelstrom of the events of 1918-21 Ukrainian writers found themselves in various camps. Some belonging to the **older group remained abroad** such as O. Oles, S. Cherkasenko, V. Vynnychenko, M. Shapoval; others presently returned to the USSR: M. Voronyi and V. Samiilenko. The poet H. Chuprynka who took an active part in the underground struggle against the Russian occupant was shot during the Bolshevik liquidation of the insurgent centre in 1921. Those who remained at home were forced by circumstances to demonstrate a certain degree of loyalty in their work under the new conditions.

After the experience in the 17th-19th century of difficult conditions under the Tsarist Empire which often threatened its very existence, Ukrainian literature during the Bolshevik occupation again lost its recently won freedom. With the beginning of Soviet occupation it was subject at various times to varying degrees of political pressure. The Soviet system and the politics of the Communist Party placed demands on writers (unprecedented in the world of culture) to subordinate their work to special tasks dictated from above.

The beginning of the 1920s is characterised by chaos in the so-called "cultural" politics of the Bolsheviks. However, though the demands of the new authorities had not yet been formulated definitively and clearly, the political terror inflicted on the Ukrainian national intelligentsia as a whole and the events of the war on the one hand, and the economic ruin with the impossibility of publishing books on the other, put in 1920-1923 a new obstacle in the way of the development of Ukrainian literature.

The Bolshevik occupation under the slogan "freedom from the rule of landowners and capitalists", apart from direct political terror aimed at anything linked with the fight of the Ukrainian people for independence, from the outset was categorically opposed to the Ukrainian National Movement as a

"bourgeois-national" movement and strove forthwith to consolidate the ideological domination of Red Moscow, advocating under the guise of "internationalism", a Russian-Bolshevik programme. Symptomatic from this point of view was the endeavour to seize hold of all cultural life by establishing immediately after the occupation in 1919-1920 throughout the towns and hamlets, a network of studios of "proletarian culture" as prescribed by one of the notorious Bolshevik theoreticians, Bohdanov. This policy of immediate inculcation particularly in occupied Ukraine, of Muscovite "proletcults" tied to the negation of all previous cultural acquisitions as "obsolete" and "bourgeois", was unsuccessful and the CC RCP(B) was forced by special letter to condemn "bohdanovshchyna". (Nevertheless, the "proletcults" duly provided cadres for establishing in Ukraine, Russian "proletarian" writers' organisations).

Meanwhile, the Bolsheviks, once a certain political stability had set in, began to define their official stance on literary matters. The literary discussion prior to 1925 which took place between representatives of various writers' groups in the RSFSR with the participation of such foremost Bolshevik authorities as L. Trotsky, M. Bukharin and A. Lunacharskiy, culminated in a council of the CC RCP(B) which issued the following directives: every step was to be taken to protect non-existent "proletarian" literature reflecting the outlook of communist workers; peasant writers were to be gauged to the "rails of proletarian ideology" and as for the writers of the intelligentsia who were prepared to continue their work in the conditions of the new regime, it was recommended that so-called "fellow travellers" be "gradually" educated into the necessary system of views. It became clear that attempts at free creativity and especially open contradiction or criticism of the Soviet regime in literature, were out of the question; such hostile works simply found neither room nor the technical means for publication. This practice unprecedented in other countries, has always been and continues to be regarded in the USSR as one of the main conditions for the "creation of culture". The "Bolshaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya", volume "SSSR" (1948 edition), p. 1485, states:

"In its development Soviet literature has waged an incessant struggle against bourgeois influences and all sorts of literary schools and groups attempting to resurrect bourgeois-individualist, decadent tendencies, bourgeois ideas about the artist's "freedom" of creativity and notions of the autonomy of art, and which often became the direct leaders of bourgeois ideology".

The decision passed by the CC AUCP(B) "On the journals 'Zvesda' and 'Leningrad'" of 14.8.1946 with extreme clarity formulates the prohibition of freedom of creativity and the transformation of literature in the USSR into a means of propaganda, as follows:

"The strength of Soviet literature, the most progressive literature in the world, lies in the fact that it is a literature which is concerned and cannot be concerned about anything but the interests of the people and the state. The task of Soviet literature is to help the state to educate correctly the

new generation, imbuing it with cheerfulness and faith in its cause and ensuring that it has no fear of obstacles and is prepared to overcome all obstacles. . . ."

The practical realisation of these directives on the transformation of literature into a means of propaganda, depended on the historical situation in the individual republics. The literary process during the period of the new economic policy and relative freedom of cultural work during "Ukrainianisation" in 1923-1933 in Ukraine, although subject to government control, occurred in conditions which to a certain extent left room for the expression of the creative powers of the Ukrainian people, awoken by the 1917-1918 revolution.

After the emigration of a section of writers mostly of the **modernist group**, they and those among the modernists who stayed behind in Bolshevik-occupied Ukraine presently in conditions more conducive to work, were active in various cultural spheres (1923-1933). In part they produced new works, particularly S. Vasylenko and H. Khotkevych, however, they were unable to make a telling contribution to literary life; the demands of "topical themes" were far too remote from the views of the representatives of this generation; however, in the 1920s publishers continually printed omnibus editions of B. Vasylenko, H. Khotkevych, M. Voronyi, V. Samiilenko, P. Kapelhorodskyi as well as certain writers who at that time lived in Western Ukraine or abroad: O. Oles, V. Stefanyk, O. Kobylanskyi, M. Cheremshyna, L. Martovych, K. Hrynevych and especially V. Vynnychenko. Some of the writers of this generation such as L. Starytska-Cherniakhivska and Kh. Alchevska were actually kept from their original mode of creativity.

There was much more contact (which presently one way or another meant falling prey to Bolshevik literary politics) with the younger generation whose attitude to the Bolshevik regime varied considerably and who had to accept the new regime.

The **group of symbolists** during its short existence was closest to the modernists mentioned above. The following belonged to this group: Pavlo Tychyna (collections, "Soniashni kliarnety" 1918, "Pluh" 1919, "Zamist sonetiv i oktav" 1920), the prematurely deceased Volodymyr Kobylanskyi (collection "Miy dar" 1920), Dmytro Zahul (collections "Z zelenykh hir" 1918, "Na hrani" 1919), Yakiv Savchenko (collections "Poeziyi" 1919, "Zemlia" 1921), Volodymyr Yaroshenko (collections "Svitotin" 1918, "Luny" 1919), Mykola Tereshchenko ("Liaboratoria"), Oleksa Slisarenko ("Na berezi Kastalskomu" 1918), Pavlo Savchenko, Yakiv Mamontov, Ya. Savchenko. Before long Zahul and Tereshchenko changed demonstratively to proletarian poetry. Slisarenko after a short honeymoon with Futurism enjoyed much more success with well-constructed prose.

Ukrainian Symbolism which compared with similar trends in other literatures was rather a latecomer, did not retain its independent position for long. Its foremost exponent by general consensus was Pavlo Tychyna author of the collection "Soniashni kliarnety" in which lyrical portraits of nature expressed

originally by deeply national images are combined with a considerable wealth of subtle, modern and at the same time organically folk, rhythmic melodiousness. Permeated by a musical-pantheistic spirit the collection at the same time provides a magnificent image of the resurrection of Ukraine in the poem "Zoloty Homin". The poem expresses unambiguously the author's reception of the current national revolution linked with Ukrainian state traditions of the distant past. His further collections "Pluh" and "Zamist sonetiv i oktav" are attempts to depict the revolution as a victorious cosmic force which destroys and simultaneously transforms the world.

A number of lyrical miniatures recreate the tragedy of war and the premature extinction of awakened forces. Tychyna, author of "Viter z Ukrainy", changed his positions somewhat. Here we find much of the activist-romantic reception of the revolution by the Vaplite group. Direct government pressure aimed primarily at this group had a detrimental effect on this extraordinary subtle and gifted poet who from the collection "Partia vede" (1934) onwards changes into a government poet who has sacrificed unreservedly his pen to the service of the Kremlin dictator. The feebleness of his subsequent collections ("Chuttia yedynoi rodyny", "Stal i nizhnist" and a number of others) demonstrates how the loftiest talent is ruined by the pressure of government dictatorship.

Although organisationally not a member of the above symbolist group, Mykola Filianskyi, poet of the older generation, was an authentic symbolist who had been active since the 1920s ("Liryka" 1906, "Calendarium" 1911, "Tsiluyu zemliu" 1928). Brimming with profound idealism and religiousness he was a minstrel of quiet cornfields and sad reflections.

Also not a member of this group but akin to symbolism we find Volodymyr Svidzinskyi (collections "Veresen" 1927, "Poeziyi" 1940); the "eternal themes" of his extraordinarily fine poetry far from the bustle of the present day laid him open to criticism which of course explains his lack of popularity during his lifetime.

There was initially an undoubted affinity, followed by a withdrawal, between Symbolism and the work of a group known by its literary adversaries as the **Neoclassicists** (the name presently stuck to the group). These poets mostly erudites and literary specialists while each retaining his individuality shared a leaning towards "high art", which in the opinion of the maitre of the group Mykola Zerov actually characterised "Ukrainian Classicism". **Mykola Zerov** the most eminent Ukrainian literary specialist and critic of his age, a masterful translator ("Antolohia rymaskoyi poeziyi" 1920) published a collection of poems "Kamena" (1924); in 1948 abroad a collection of his previously unpublished poems appeared, entitled "Sonnetarium". Pavlo Fylypovych in his collections "Zemlia i viter" (1922) and "Prostir" (1925) displayed a good many symbolist elements. The book of poems "Prorosten" (1926) by Mykhailo Drai-Khmara demonstrates a clear transition from Symbolism to Neo-Classicism. Closely allied to this group, Oswald Burghardt, one of the foremost translators into Ukrainian of Western literature, after emigrating from

Ukraine, as the poet Yuriy Klen earned a name for himself in the "Visnyk" group in the 1930s (the poem "Prokliati roky" 1937, "Karavely" 1943, the partly published epic poem "Popil imperiyi"). His poetic works are also characterised by a combination of "neoclassicist" elements and active, wilful Neo-Romanticism.

At the beginning of the 1930s **Maksym Rylskyi** was the most productive poet. His poetry alongside Tychyna's collections is undoubtedly one of the greatest achievements of new Ukrainian poetry. Whereas his first still youthful collection "Na bilykh ostrovakh" (1910) was marked by searches mostly under symbolist influences, his further collections: "Na uzlissi" 1918, "Pid osinnimy zoriamy" 1918 (second edition 1926), "Synia dalechin" 1922, "Kriz burii i snih" 1925, "Trynadsia vesna" 1926, "De skhodiatsia dorohy" 1927, "Homin i vidhomin" 1929, are the works of a mature master. Breadth of scope (from the impressions of a poet-thinker and his friends enamoured of their native natural scenery-peasants steeped in folk wisdom, to subtle, suggestive experiences — images from the culture of the ancient world, medieval times and the present day), is combined with a wealth and extraordinary plasticity of language. A prolonged struggle for an independent view of the world, particularly rejection of the post-revolutionary present together with an obvious bent for high, pure art subject to incessant harassment by official critics, ended in tragedy. After spending time in prison Rylskyi was forced in 1932 to declare a change in his positions and henceforth to become an official poet of the Kremlin authorities, although Soviet literary criticism again in 1947-1948 chastised him severely for not making a decisive enough break with the ideological atmosphere which nurtured Rylskyi the neoclassicist.

While the symbolists existed as a separate group for only a short period of free creativity in their own state and the neoclassicists held out during the 1920s in dangerous opposition to official demands noted more and more in government circles, other writers of the new generation linked in 1917-1921 mostly with Ukrainian left-wing parties which evolved towards the Communist Party, shared their forlorn hopes of independence for Ukraine as a socialist republic.

There were those, very watchful of political developments in the 1920s who still searched for possibilities of writing in Soviet conditions which up to the beginning of the 1930s were much more conducive to work than later. The new monthly journals "Chervonyi Shliakh" (Kharkiv 1923) and "Zhyttia i Revoliutsia" (Kyiv 1925) and also the organs of various writers' groups opened their pages not only to works of art but also found space for discussions.

With the beginning of the so-called **Ukrainianisation course** literary life in Soviet Ukraine intensified to an extraordinary degree. The complex political situation in Ukraine, where the excitement of the times of the national revolution persisted and in particular it was impossible without considerable concessions to master the village and the Ukrainian intelligentsia, forced the Bolshevik occupiers for a certain time to allow farreaching concessions.

Alongside the new economic policy, the rise of Ukrainian schools, Ukrainisation of state institutions, publishing, art academies and the unfolding of intensive activity by the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences and numerous scientific-research institutes and departments and so forth, encouraged hopes of the possibility of creating a particular, national culture within the realms of the Ukrainian SSR. Hence, in many cases remote from inner ideological subjection to the Muscovite-Bolshevik doctrine, writers declared in the manifestos of literary organisations their desire to create the art of a new epoch. This was followed by the struggle to preserve the particular, national creative identity of individuals and entire groups.

Directly linked with the declarations of the "proletarian group" of Borotbisty we find the writers' organisations in the capital of the Ukrainian SSR, Kharkiv: **Pluh** (1923-1932) — The Union of Revolutionary Peasant Writers and "Hart" (1923-1925) — The Union of Proletarian Writers. The former, following the slogan of a "close bond" between the peasantry and proletariat, adopted the policy of mass acceptance into its numerous branches of all those willing to write (provided they belonged to the "worker strata of the population"). The majority of the more talented writers on the forming of new organisations presently left "Pluh"; the union headed by S. Pylypenko which published the "Pluh" almanacs and the journal "Pluzhany" (later "Pluh") and restricted itself to literary-education work among the peasant youth, did not play a prominent role in literary creativity.

The reason for the quick crisis in "Hart" established by V. Blakytnyi was the fact that it combined mechanically advocates of opposite tendencies in the development of Soviet literature and that immediately around the person of Khvylovyi the group "Urbino" was formed contrary to the official line dictated by the "proletarian ideologues" from Moscow. "Hart" after publishing in 1924 an almanac of the same name dissolved. Its former members began a sharp polemic among themselves.

"Urbino" gave birth in 1926 to **Vaplite** (The Free Academy of Proletarian Literature) which under government pressure was forced to reorganise; this produced the group "Literaturnyi Yarmarok" (1928-1930, monthly journal of the same name) and, finally, Prolitfront (The Federation of Studios of the Proletarian Literary Front, with the journal "Prolitfront" 1930-1931). The membership of Vaplite comprised the following: the prose writers Mykola Khvylovyi, Mykhailo Yalovy (pseudonym — Yulian Shpol), Arkadiy Liubchenko, Oles Dosvitniy, Ivan Senchenko, Yuriy Yanovskyi, Oleksa Slisarenko, Hryhoriy Epik, Hordiy Kotsiuba, Oleksander Kopylenko, Vasyl Vrazhlyvyi, Petro Panch, Yuriy Smolych, Ivan Dniprovskyi, Pavlo Ivaniv, Mykhailo Maiskyi, the dramatist Mykola Kulish and the poets Pavlo Tychyna, Mykhailo (Maik) Yohansen and Mykola Bazhan.

Simultaneously with the appearance of Vaplite there was formed in Kyiv on similar lines the group **MARS** (The Workshop of the Revolutionary Word 1926-1928) which comprised members of the former Aspis (Association of Writers, 1927) later named "Lanka" (1924-1926), Mykhailo Ivchenko, Hry-

horiy Kosynka, Valerian Pidmohylnyi, Borys Antonenko-Davydovych, Yevhen Pluzhnyk, Dmytro Falkivskyi, Maria Halych and others.

Vaplite played a particularly eminent role in the literary life of the 1920s both through its creative acquisitions and general ideological directions. Its articles and publications provoked sharp discussion.

The initiator of the discussion was **Khvylovyi**. At first close to the Ukrainian social revolutionaries, later military commissar in the Red Army, member of the Communist Party and advocate of the socialist revolution, in numerous pamphlets compiled in the books "*Kamo hriadeshy*" (1925), "*Dumky proty techiyi*" (1926), "*Sotsiologichnyi ekvivalent*" (1927) he asks questions about development trends in new Ukrainian literature touching on a number of the most urgent problems in modern Ukrainian ideals and solving them regardless of the leaning of the ruling party. Khvylovyi announced the decided orientation of Ukrainian literature to Europe and not Moscow ("*het vid Moskvu*" — "*Away from Moscow*"). By Europe he understood the centuries-long spiritual acquisitions of Occidental culture. Orienting Ukrainian literature to the West, Khvylovyi underlined the need to fight for genuinely high art and declared war on provincial narrow-mindedness ("*prosvita*") to which Ukrainian cultural activity had been condemned for a long period by virtue of historical circumstances. Hence the struggle with the mass character of writers' organisations ("*pluzhanstvo*") favoured by the Communist Party and the demand that Vaplite should be a group open to the masses, learning from the better Western masters. Sharing Spengler's views on the inevitable decline of Europe, at the head of the "*forthcoming Asiatic renaissance*", the movement of the peoples oppressed by the Russian Empire, Khvylovyi puts Ukraine which is now liberating herself from all traces of "*Little Russia*" with its unequal position *vis-à-vis* Russia and subjection by Russia.

In the broad **discussion** in which Khvylovyi received the support of his political followers in Vaplite (M. Kulish, O. Slisarenko, M. Yalovyi, A. Liubchenko and others) and the neo-classicists, his opponents expressed the official line of the CC CP(B)U, V. Chubar, F. Taran and others. Both the pamphlets and artistic works of Khvylovyi stressed the demand for complete liberation of Ukraine from "*psychological subjugation*" by Moscow and continually treated the theme of disenchantment with the Bolshevik revolution which was degenerating into the victory of the "*centre of global petty bourgeoisie*" — Moscow. The publicistic novel "*Valdshnepi*" expressed these thoughts particularly vividly, presenting the positive image of the strong, wilful heroine Aglaia with overt nationalist statements. These works turned the attention of the Moscow dictators to the author. Stalin in a letter to L. Kaganovich (Secretary of the CC CP(B)U) in April 1926 wrote: "While the Western proletariat looks with rapture at the flag flying in Moscow, the Ukrainian communist Khvylovyi can find nothing to say for the benefit of Moscow other than calling for all Ukrainian public workers to flee from Moscow. Who cares about the Ukrainian intelligentsia of the non-communist camp when communists have begun to speak and not only speak but also write in our Soviet

press in the words of Khvylovyi". Naturally, in various party documents of 1926-1927 Khvylovyi and his followers are continually marked out as being close to "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism", and finally in 1927 at the 10th CP(B)U Congress, L. Kaganovich in the report of the party CC describes Khvylovyi as a "yes-man of the bourgeoisie and kulaks", who rest their hopes on the restoration of bourgeois government in Ukraine with the aid of armed foreign imperialism.

Pressure from the critics of "Komunist", the party central organ, and also the official resolutions of the party Central Committee forced the leaders of Vaplite to publish a letter of "recantation". But, of course, the Bolsheviks needed to adopt wider measures for the struggle against manifestations of national thought, even when it was couched in Soviet phraseology as in the case of Khvylovyi. Consequently, by order of the Communist Party an organisation was formed with the undisguised task of combatting Vaplite, the "neo-classicists" and other writers' groups which in any way retained an individual identity. This was VUSPP, **The All-Ukrainian Union of Proletarian Writers** (1927-1932) with its organs, the monthly "Hart" and "Literaturna Hazeta". This organisation united its members according to the official political line and not mutual creative sympathies. Alongside the former symbolist poets Ya. Savchenko, D. Zahul and M. Tereshchenko, the talented V. Sosiura, who left "Vaplite", the union was joined by many writers known more for literary "reliability" than literary qualifications: the poets P. Usenko, L. Pervomaiskyi, S. Holovanivskyi, N. Zabilia, L. Piontek, the prose writers I. Le (Moisia), V. Kuzmych, M. Ledianko, Ya. Kachura, Yu. Zoria, S. Zhygalko and many others. VUSPP was headed by I. Mykytenko, I. Kulyk, I. Kyrylenko, S. Shchupak and B. Kovalenko who followed the Muscovite models of super-orthodox "proletarian criticism" of the group "Na postu", notorious for their oppression of everything which in some way recalled "bourgeois", that is, literature free of the official line. The planned inclusion in Moscow of VUSPP in VOAPP — The All-Union Alliance of Associations of Proletarian Writers, to which were subordinated similar "proletarian" organisations in other republics, was the first step in the unification realised in 1932 of all writers of the USSR, the aim being to transform literature into an organ of Soviet propaganda. According to the principle of "internationalness", VUSPP had a Russian and Jewish section with the monthly organs "Krasnoye slovo", "Zaboy" (for writers in the Donbas) and "Die Rote Welt". Together with VUSPP, the komsomol union "Molodniak" (1926-1932) with its monthly journal of the same name, was subordinated directly to the Moscow leadership of VOAPP.

(To be continued)

W. S.

IVAN VYSHENSKYI — POLEMICIST & WRITER

After the Schism in the Universal Church in 1054, the Ukrainian Church found itself *volens nolens* in the Orthodox camp. Efforts soon began to reunite the Eastern and Western Churches. Inevitably Ukrainian Christendom would be affected directly or indirectly by any moves towards rapprochement, although since the official introduction of Christianity to Rus'-Ukraine in 988 the Ukrainian Church had maintained good relations both with Byzantium and Rome. The matter of unity became particularly acute at the Council of Florence in 1439 when Izydor Metropolitan of Kyiv moved that the Church in Ukraine unite with Rome recognising the primacy of the Pope.

Church unity in Ukraine was not simply a matter of taking part in the general movement towards unity between Rome and Byzantium (Constantinople). The Ukrainian Church had its own particular interests to serve. There was in fact both a universal and national-domestic context.

The Union of Lublin in 1569 saw the establishment of the Polish-Lithuanian State which incorporated Ukrainian lands. Increasingly thereafter the Ukrainian nobility (*shliakhta*) began to side with Poland. About this time militant Polish Roman Catholicism and the Jesuits set their sights on Ukraine. In 1577 the Jesuit P. Skarga published a book "On the Unity of God's Church" in which he called for the abolition of the Orthodox faith in Ukraine and union between the Ukrainian Church and Rome. There were, he pointed out, distinct cultural and educational advantages to be gained for the Orthodox clergy as well as an enhancement of their prestige. Meanwhile, the Ukrainian nobility would enjoy greater material prosperity.

The Union of Brest signed in 1596 ironically split the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in two, Orthodox and Catholic (Uniate). At the same time it gave birth to a rich polemical literature.

The chief aim of the Union was probably self-preservation: consolidation of the Ukrainian Church and prevention of its assimilation by Roman Catholicism. Furthermore, the Ukrainian clergy were disgruntled with the policy of the Greek patriarchs of suppressing the Ukrainian church brotherhoods and their desire to control the Ukrainian bishops and metropolitans.

At the Council of Brest five Ukrainian bishops approved the Union while two were opposed. The Union guaranteed the Ukrainian Church preservation and respect of its Eastern Byzantine rite although it was now required to recognise papal primacy. There thus arose the Uniate (Greek Catholic) Church comprising Ukrainian and Byelorussian elements. It was supported by the Polish government, a section of the burghers and a large part of the

nobility. The remnants of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church were supported by two bishops, some nobility — including Prince Konstantyn of Ostrih, the Church Brotherhoods, peasants and the kozaks.

It was now that the polemicists sharpened their quills. Those on the Catholic side (Polish government, Roman Catholic, Uniate) maintained that the church hierarchy had the right to decide the outcome of the Council of Brest. Meanwhile, those on the Orthodox side insisted that the Ukrainian bishops according to canon law were obliged to consult with the Patriarch of Constantinople before deciding the fate of the Church, not to mention the clergy and faithful.

The polemics addressed other matters of dogma, tradition and history: papal primacy, the origin of the Holy Ghost, Purgatory, leavened and unleavened bread for the Eucharist, the shape of the Host, fasting, genuflection, icons, the church calendars and other differences in the Byzantine and Roman rites.

The pro-Catholic polemicists insisted that the origins of the Ukrainian Church were to be found in Rome and not Byzantium. Moreover the Florentine Union and the Union of Brest were directly and organically linked with Rome.

Both polemical camps suffered from bias and stubbornness. Writers used satire, concocted miracles, falsified documents while rejecting bona fide ones, neither were they immune to fantasy. Where one wonders were Christian charity and elementary ethics?

It is against this background that we must consider Ivan Vyshenskyi and perceive his role in the Orthodox-Catholic conflict which permeates his writings.

There is a paucity of biographical data on Vyshenskyi. He is thought to have been born either between 1538 and 1550 or 1545 and 1550, into a poor burgher family in the town of Sudova Vyshnia, Lviv province. He went to school in his home town. Thereupon he lived in Luts'k and Ostrih, seat of Prince Konstantyn and Orthodox centre of learning. Sometime between 1570 and 1580 he moved to Mount Athos in Greece ultimately to live the life of a hermit for forty years in a cave overlooking the Aegean Sea until his death. In 1604 he returned to Ukraine for two years. Throughout he championed the Orthodox cause.

Vyshenskyi wrote on religious and secular themes. He was opposed to the oppression inflicted on the masses by the Polish magnates and condemned corruption among officials and clergy whether Catholic or Orthodox.

In his view the real Church was not an authoritarian institution like the Roman Catholic Church but persecuted and suffering like the early Church. He calls the Pope Anti-Christ, a notion he borrowed probably from Protestant writings of the time. All people were equal before God. Christianity after all advocated the brotherhood of man. The way to salvation was an internal, spiritual path through self-enlightenment and purification. Vyshens-

kyi's ideal religious individual was a mystic and ascetic who lived in a world that was "a general monastery for all". Simplicity was the watchword. Christ was the wisest teacher. Aristotle, Plato and other ancient Greek philosophers should not be taught in schools. Books were to be printed in the Slavonic language and therefore comprehensible to all.

There was something of the grim reactionary in Vyshenskyi however. He rejected Christmas carols and Epiphany carols (*koliady* and *shchedrivky*) as devilry. Together with comedies their performance should be banned.

Vyshenskyi shares in the tradition of "social conscience" which has typified Ukrainian literature throughout its history. Ivan Franko wrote of him:

"It needed extraordinary circumstances to enable a man of lowly birth to comprehend life at that time, in all its varied phenomena and then to extricate himself reaching heights from where the significance of those phenomena was clear though not so clear to people who were highly placed in the social ladder of the day. Vyshenskyi had to make a fundamental break with the world and all its attractions, temptations, moral indifference or even corruption, in order to kindle such a powerful spiritual flame that burns in his writings and continues to appeal to us".

Vyshenskyi's works, 16-17 in all, divide roughly into three periods. The first — 1588-1596; the second 1597-1600; the third 1600-1617.

It is generally held that his key work is "Ioanna mnikha izveshchenie kratkoe o latinskikh prelestekh o zabluzhdeniit puti istinnaho i boleznekh smer-tonosnoho mudrovania" (A Short Account by Ivan the Monk of Latin Deceit, Straying from the True Path and the Maladies of Deadly Sophistry). A collection of ten individual works, it was written in 1599-1600. The main themes are self-evident from the title.

The author attacks sections of the clergy and secular authorities of the time for excessive materialism and un-Christian conduct. He recommends that they use their God-given talents for the salvation of souls and the benefit of people.

On the theme of Purgatory Vyshenskyi insists that for the Orthodox it exists on Earth where the soul is purified before going to heaven. It is not a place where according to Catholic doctrine one spends a short time before as it were "leaping" into paradise. He accuses the Catholics of idolatry. Ukraine is referred to as Rus'.

In the treatise "Tobi, v zemli, zovemoi polskoi, meshkaiuchomu vsiakoho vozrasta, stanu i prelozhenstva narodu, ruskomu, litovskomu i liadskomu, v rozdilenykh sektakh i verakh romaitykh sei hlas v slukh da dostizhe" (To Those Living in the Land called Poland, of Whatever Age, Standing or Auth-

* Ivan Franko "Tvory" v 20 tomakh Kyiv 1955 p. 418-419.

ority, Ukrainian, Lithuanian and Polish, in Different Sects and of Various Persuasions, this Word to Harken to and Follow), four general themes are outlined: divine punishment for un-Christian godlessness and pagan, unclean living; the true path to God; evil people in church and secular institutions; and the need to repent and reject Catholicism which is harmful and a work of the Anti-Christ.

Vyshenskyi is at his firebrand best. He prefers a desert to a world full of un-Christian and inhumane conduct. He rejects the educational validity of Plato and Aristotle in preference to the Gospels, Epistles and other traditional religious works.

Vyshenskyi's view of contemporary society is rather harsh, indeed it might be said typical of a religious fanatic or a hermit out of touch with reality. However, the kozak uprisings of Konyskyi (1591), Loboda and Nalyvaiko (1596) and others not to mention Khmelnytskyi against oppression and injustice would tend to corroborate some of his objections.

Vyshenskyi is appalled at the pride, falsehood and deceit that is everywhere apparent to him. He calls for modesty and simplicity. Instead of injustice and wrong, justice and truth should be venerated. Faithlessness, despair and hatred should be replaced by faith, hope and charity. His actual words are worth quoting here. They are typical of the kind of vivid language (sometimes bordering on the vulgar) found throughout his works:

“Vse strup, vse rana, vse pukhlina, vse gnilstvo, vse ohn pekelnii, vse bolizn, vse grikh, vse nepravda, vse lukavstvo, vse khitrost”.
(Everywhere scabs, sores, swellings, decay, hellfire, disease, sin, lies, trickery and deceit)

Vyshenskyi is confident that God supports the Orthodox. He reiterates the teaching on the true path to life eternal, through faith, hope, labour and resisting temptation.

Clergy, bishops and archimandrites are accused of misusing money collected from the poor faithful. Moreover, some bishops and abbots disobey the monastic code and would appear to care more for their dogs. The princes too are guilty of such misdemeanours.

In 1599-1600 Vyshenskyi wrote “Oblichenie dyavola-miroderzhitsa i prelestnykh lov ieha vika seho skoropohybaiushchego, ot sovlakhshashosia s khytroupletnykh sitei ieha holiaka-strannyka, ko druhomu budushchemu viku hriadushchaho uchinenoie” (The Exposure of the Devil and Ruler of the World and His Seductive Capture of this Age Soon to Pass, by a Naked Pilgrim who has Freed Himself from His Cunningly Laid Nets and the Prospect of Another Age to Come).

This work is based on the Temptation of Christ. It comprises a dialogue between a pilgrim and Satan. The pilgrim rejects all the Devil's propositions and temporal gifts preferring baptism and faith in the Holy Trinity.

Vyshenskyi's language is an important stage in the development of modern Ukrainian. He wrote in the western Ukrainian dialect using terms borrowed from it such as "abyste", "friuiarnyk", "voron". He also employs Polonisms — "zholner", "skut", "zhrodlo", "khlop"; Latinisms — "poleum", "oratsia", "purgatorium" and borrowings from Greek — "kaluher", "pyna", "pyrh". In general terms his language is a fabric interwoven from Church Slavonic, Ukrainian and Polish threads. He creates Old Slavonic terms from Ukrainian words. His use of the participle is traditional while the gerund and syntax are close to the Ukrainian vernacular.

I. Franko maintains that Vyshenskyi's language "reflects the chaos of the Ukrainian language as it began to break free of Church Slavonic and set out on its literary career".

Vyshenskyi rejects the Latin-Polish literary models with refined and complex rhetoric preferring the Greek-Slavonic literary tradition.

The style is direct and simple by means of which the author sets out to persuade the reader of the correctness of his views.

Various genres are used — witticisms, fiery satire and biting irony. He describes the clothes of the gentry as "rags". Some of them wear jackets with one shoulder raised higher than the other making the wearer look like a bird about to take off somewhere. No quarter is given to naughty bishops either. Vyshenskyi describes them as "pastyri cherevopasy" (pastors of the stomach). He likens them to wolves devouring sheep. The sinful clergy are accused of tarnishing the image of God "gnoiemy mirolubia" (with the filth of wordliness).

The texts are interspersed with clever neologisms and original lexical creations: "domaturkh" (sit-at-home), "miasosied" (meat eater) and "zviroid" (beast gobbler). They are reserved exclusively for Vyshenskyi's "foes", notably the Jesuits whom he describes in one passage as "chetverorogatiye isusorugateli" (fourhorned blasphemers of Christ), "pysarodrachi" (penpushers) and "bohochrevtsi" (belly worshippers).

Vyshenskyi uses traditional Byzantine literary-rhetorical devices — parallelisms, repetitions, appeals and dialogue.

In a certain fashion one can see in the spirit of the language the ground being prepared for Shevchenko.

But so much for Vyshenskyi the writer. What of Vyshenskyi the man, religious thinker and ascetic?

In many ways he faced the concerns of every cleric and devout layman. How much to render unto God and how much to Caesar? Individual salvation or pastoral service to the community or both? The role of the pastor in times of trouble. Was Vyshenskyi right to "desert" his people and live in seclusion? Could he not have been more politically active?

These themes are addressed by I. Franko in his albeit heavily autobiographical poem "Ivan Vyshenskyi". There are some interesting insights.

As Franko sees it there is no doubt that Vyshenskyi's place was back home with his people fighting injustice and religious persecution.

Franko describes Mount Athos as a "sad dungeon of souls". The idea of salvation through self-enlightenment and perfection bereft of family and worldly ties he regards as the work of the Devil not the way of the cross. It conceals a desire to be equal with God. Franko berates Vyshenskyi for his "proud monastic fancies about salvation".

Ukraine is introduced into the poem by the symbol of the cherry blossom whose scent reminds Vyshenskyi of his homeland. This is followed by an appeal from the Ukrainian Orthodox faithful to him to return home and help them in the struggle against religious persecution. In 1604 Patriarch Theoptimus of Alexandria appealed to Vyshenskyi in a letter to return home where he would be of more use to his people than by living in isolation.

At the end of the poem God grants Vyshenskyi his wish to return to Ukraine. In Franko's words (last stanza) the hermit leaves his cell where there can be seen a "white cross" a "skeleton of fancies and illusions".

Vyshenskyi would not have agreed with this solution particularly the "atheistic" connotations. Though living in seclusion he made a significant contribution through his works to the development of Ukrainian literature and thought. He was always part of Ukrainian society and the cultural process.

Hryhoriy Skovoroda, Vyshenskyi's compatriot and 18th century "equivalent", chose to live and work among the people though without attachment. Although Vyshenskyi chose the solitary life he can justifiably share the same epitaph as Skovoroda: "Pursued by the World but Never Captured".

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News from Ukraine

UKRAINIAN CATHOLIC CHURCH IN YAVORIV OPENED

Ukrainian Catholic Church sources in Ukraine have confirmed that the Ukrainian Catholic Church of the Dormition of the Mother of God in the western Ukrainian town of Yavoriv has been opened as a Ukrainian Catholic parish officially since 8 October.

Church officials in Rome have received news that Ukrainian Soviet authorities turned over the keys of the church to the Ukrainian Catholic parish committee early the week of 2 October. The committee entrusted the keys to Rev. Petro Zeleniukh. Authorities then sought to take the keys back, but failed to do so. Ukrainian Catholic faithful guarded the church day and night for three days and on 8 October thousands gathered for a prayer service.

"We are encouraged that our faithful are standing firm in their commitment to their Church", commented Myroslav Ivan Cardinal Lubachivskyi", head of the Ukrainian Catholic Church. "It is curious that Soviet officials would first give our faithful the keys to the church and then try to retrieve them. Still, we must look at these developments positively," Cardinal Lubachivskyi added.

Press Office of the Ukrainian Catholic Church

10,000-15,000 HOLD PUBLIC SERVICE IN STRYI

An estimated 10,000 Ukrainian Catholics in the western Ukrainian town of Stryi gathered together on the morning of 8 October at the former Ukrainian Catholic cemetery for a service of remembrance. Revs. Petro Dudchak, Yaroslav Lesiv and Mykola Kostiuk officiated. According to Ivan Hel, who was present, the service was dedicated to "the 51st anniversary of the day when Cardinal Myroslav Ivan Lubachivskyi celebrated his first liturgy in his native land in the Church of the Dormition of the Mother of God in Stryi". The town is near the village of Dolyna, the birthplace of Cardinal Lubachivskyi. The Cardinal's mother is buried in the cemetery in Stryi.

After the service, the crowd proceeded to the Church of the Dormition which is now occupied by the Russian Orthodox. The faithful carried crosses, icons and pennants. Authorities did not attempt to block the procession. The crowd walked around the church and the priests and some faithful entered

the courtyard. A prayer service to the Mother of God was held at the entrance to the church for the health of Cardinal Lubachivskyi.

Hel related that the Russian Orthodox parish priest exhibited a deep understanding of the problem of Ukrainian Catholics and did not obstruct the procession. He allowed the faithful to circle the church and hold their service on its steps. Hel noted that by this time the crowd had grown to some 15,000 persons.

Press Office of the Ukrainian Catholic Church

UKRAINIANS DEMONSTRATE IN POLAND; PROTEST AGAINST POLICE BRUTALITY IN LVIV, OCT.1

On October 14 around 150 Ukrainians gathered in Gdansk, in the centre of the old city, to protest against the brutal police attack against peaceful residents of Lviv on October 1. The demonstration was organised by the recently formed Association of Independent Ukrainian Youth (SNUM).

The demonstrators read out a protest against the unlawful act of the Lviv police, addressed the problems facing the Ukrainian minority in Poland, and explained the programme of SNUM.

During the protest banners with slogans stating in Polish: "There can be no free Poland without a free Ukraine!" and "Down with the fascist methods of the Soviet police!", a Ukrainian national flag and the Trident (the Ukrainian national symbol) were raised.

Passers-by showed great interest in the demonstration. The reason for the protest was explained to foreign tourists in English.

The participants of the protest sung several traditional Ukrainian songs, ending the action with the Ukrainian national anthem.

The October 14 protest action in Gdansk was the first street demonstration staged by Ukrainians in Poland.

ADOLESCENT DISEASE PERSISTS IN CHERNIVTSI; GOVERNMENT INACTION LEADS TO STRIKE THREAT

In the wake of the government's refusal to recognise the seriousness of a disease affecting adolescents in Chernivtsi, a city about 120km southeast of Lviv, local civic activists have declared a series of general strikes.

"What other recourse is left for us. We can no longer endanger the lives of the children. (In September, 25 new cases of hair loss were reported). A total

fight, with the recognition of the possible difficulties and losses, is imperative. And the only means available to us is a strike, inasmuch as petitions and meetings have not accomplished anything", declared Ihor Nesteruk, head of the ecological commission of the Chernivtsi branch of the Popular Movement of Ukraine, popularly referred to as "Rukh".

Nesteruk called on all businesses and companies in the Chernivtsi region, except those which were forbidden to strike by an October 3 edict of the Supreme Soviet, to organise strike committees for one-hour work stoppage in November and December.

In a statement issued by Nesteruk on October 17, three demands were put forward:

- An international commission to investigate the causes of the disease and its cure is to be established. Independent experts, who will control the research, should be included in the commission.

- The sickest of the children are to be allowed to travel abroad for medical treatment.

- O.O. Baranov and A.M. Kasianenko are to be dismissed from their jobs in the ministries of health of the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR, respectively, for consciously lying about the cause of the disease.

According to Nesteruk, despite contradictory evidence, Baranov and Kasianenko have claimed that the disease is caused by thallium. Nesteruk said that experts have shown that the sickness, which affects youngsters, is not caused by that chemical. Furthermore, he said, government and medical officials have been downplaying the number of cases of the disease.

For example, in a kindergarten in the village of Berehomet, officials registered one infected girl, omitting the four additional cases. In another instance, a girl, who suffered total hair loss in October 1988, regrew hair by the end of November only to experience alopecia by the end of May of this year, Nesteruk said. The disease is spreading at a rapid pace, he explained. In the first six months of 1988, when the Chernivtsi disease first emerged, seven cases of childhood hair loss were reported. However, in the same period of time in 1989, 201 cases were reported, he said.

Nesteruk believes that until there is a change in the personnel in the Ministry of Health, the cover-up will persist and the infected children will not be allowed to go abroad for medical care. "Only an objective investigation will ultimately refute the lies of the medical authorities and reveal their crimes", he said.

Nesteruk warned that their already "great sin" will become greater if the current medical diagnosis will be perpetuated. These individuals are protected by the party-government apparatus, he said, and "enjoy privileges even in the most sensitive of spheres — that of health". Nesteruk fears another Chornobyl cover-up, because Volodymyr Shcherbytskyi, the person responsible for ordering the May Day parade in 1986, fully cognizant of the high radiation

levels, was retired as first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine with standing ovations and platitudes.

SHUKHEVYCH RETURNS TO LVIV

Yuriy Shukhevych, the 57-year old son of Gen. Taras Chuprynka-Roman Shukhevych, the commander-in-chief of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), returned to Lviv on October 21 after nearly 40 years' imprisonment and exile.

In 1948, when he was 15 years old, Shukhevych was arrested by the NKVD and threatened with incarceration if he did not renounce his father. Shukhevych refused and was imprisoned for 10 years. At the completion of that term he was resented to another 10 years' imprisonment, and then a third time.

After his final release, he was banned from Ukraine and forced to live in exile. In the mid-1970s Shukhevych joined the original Ukrainian Helsinki Group and was arrested and sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment and exile.

This is Shukhevych's first return to his native Lviv since his teenage years.

According to Hryhoriy Prykhodko, editor of "Ukrainian Time", Shukhevych is blind and regarded as an invalid of the second category. Since returning to Lviv, he has appeared several times in public and spoken about his family's legacy, imprisonment and current affairs in Ukraine. He spoke at the Shevchenko monument, with youth, and at a recital of Ihor Kalynets' poems.

Pryhodko said, "He was a patriot and remains one. He will never renounce his father".

UKRAINIAN ORTHODOX FAITHFUL IN KYIV SEEK RECOGNITION, RETURN TO ST. SOPHIA

At a meeting in Kyiv on October 22 more than 2,500 Ukrainian Orthodox faithful signed a petition demanding the official registration of their Church and the return of their principal house of worship, the Cathedral of St. Sophia.

"Our ancient Ukrainian Church, which began in 988, was destroyed by the tsarist empire and subordinated to the Moscow patriarchate. By the will of the faithful and priests in Ukraine, it returned to life at the All-Ukrainian Church Synod in 1921. However, by the 1930s, the annihilation of the Ukrainian intelligentsia and the entire Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church was in full force — 27 bishops, 10,000 priests, and millions of faithful were

killed. The official reason for this was the so-called 'Union for the Liberation of Ukraine Case', which has since been revealed to be a fabrication", they said in their petition to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

Reminding the Kremlin officials that freedom of religion is the principal inalienable human right, which cannot be overlooked by any government, the Ukrainian Orthodox faithful said that the government's refusal to recognise their Church is not founded by law. "The matter of reviving the traditional Church of our nation, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, is championed today by thousands of faithful, tomorrow it will be demanded by millions of faithful and their supporters", they said.

"We refer this matter to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and demand its legal resolution".

The petition is currently being circulated among Ukrainian Orthodox communities. It will eventually be delivered to Ukrainian people's deputies V.K. Cherniak and V.O. Yavorivskyi, who pledged in the newspaper "Our Orthodox Faith" to support the revival of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church.

UKRAINIAN ORTHODOX FAITHFUL MOBILISE IN SOUTHERN UKRAINE

An Initiative Group to reestablish the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church has been formed in Mykolayiv, a town 400km south of Kyiv on the Black Sea.

The establishment of this group is significant because the religious situation in the southern regions of Ukraine is far more critical than it is in the rest of the country. Intense russification, denationalisation and intermixing with other ethnic groups have created an entire chain of problems, which need to be resolved, including the religious issue.

There are reportedly many supporters of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church in the Mykolayiv and Kherson oblasts, however they are scattered over vast territories and the official anti-religion campaigns have kept them from their faith.

One of the goals of the Initiative Group is to create an Autocephalous Orthodox parish and to secure a house of worship.

The Initiative Group in Mykolayiv includes: The Rev. Vasyl Hirniak (Syniushyn); Vasyl Nosa, jurist (Mykolayiv); Oleksiy Havrylyshyn, pediatrician (Mykolayiv); Oleksiy Mot, machine operator (Mykolayiv) and Anatoliy Ivanchuk, senior tradesman, steel-concrete mill (Mykolayiv).

CLUB OF THE REPRESSED FORMED IN LVIV

A Club of the Repressed was formed in Lviv on October 22. Heading the club, which is part of the Lviv branch of the Memorial Society, is Orysia Andriyivna Mateshuk, a victim of Russian persecution during Stalin's reign.

On that day, residents of Lviv met with those poets and writers persecuted during Stalin's regime, who are members of the Club of the Repressed. More than 400 people were present.

Among the speakers were Oleksander Hrynko, an actor with the Maria Zankovetska Lviv Ukrainian Academic Theatre; Iryna Senyk and Mykhailo Osadchyi, former political prisoners, recidivists and honorary members of International PEN; Writers' Union of Ukraine member Ivan Hnatiuk, Zynoviy Krasivskyi and Viktor Rafalskyi, poets and former political prisoners, and Maria Khorosnytska, a member of the Writers' Union of Ukraine.

M. Osadchyi's account of the renewal of the Shevchenko Scientific Society in Lviv, a prewar scholarly institution, was met with a boisterous ovation.

The participants of the meeting posed numerous questions to the speakers, rewarded them with bouquets of flowers and offered them best wishes in their work.

Also that day, the Culture Building of Kuznetsov was the site of a poetry reading by another repressed poet of the Brezhnev era Ihor Kalynets. He read accounts from joining the PEN Centre in Ukraine by the backroom intrigues of the official Ukrainian establishment.

They revealed that the representative of the Writers' Union of Ukraine Mykola Vinhranovskyi refused to represent Ukrainian writers at the 54th Congress of International PEN. Vinhranovskyi had previously denounced one of the most gifted poets of the 1960s-1980s, prisoner of conscience Vasyl Stus, saying: "It is blasphemous that Vasyl Stus calculated his life to die at the same age as Shevchenko".

Evidently, Vinhranovskyi believes that Stus was not murdered by the KGB as a political prisoner, but Stus, himself, hastened his death as a prisoner. This is truly a blasphemy on the part of Vinhranovskyi, not Stus!

SUPREME SOVIET OF UKRAINE ADOPTS OFFICIAL DRAFT OF LAW ON ELECTIONS AND LANGUAGE

The Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR began its session on October 25. Police, special purpose units and officials in civilian clothing surrounded the

Supreme Soviet building to prevent a protest by the Popular Movement of Ukraine.

The session debated proposals for a law on language and elections. The deputies were acquainted with the official draft, from which the following most reactionary articles were deleted due to public pressure: the election of deputies from public organisations, the election of the Congress of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR (which is then to elect the Supreme Soviet), and the right of constituency electoral commissions to remove candidates whose electoral platforms are deemed to contradict the Constitution. Now, only the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR has the right to strike a candidate from the electoral list if his platform calls for the violent overthrow or change of the existing order, or national or other animosity or discrimination, said Leonid Milavskiy, a Kyiv-based activist of the Ukrainian National Democratic League. An alternative proposal for the direct election of heads of councils was rejected. The present procedure for nominating candidates for election remains in force, as does criminal liability for calls to boycott elections. The alternative draft proposed the nomination of candidates in the form of a petition with the necessary number of signatures.

The atmosphere in the hall was extremely conservative. Deputies of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet castigated the alternative proposals and the deputies of the USSR from Ukraine (members of the democratic club of Ukrainian deputies) who were present at the session in an advisory role. The official draft of the law on elections was adopted with a change of wording in the procedure for removing a candidate ("violent overthrow or change of the existing order" became "overthrow or violent changes").

A draft law on language, submitted by Borys Oliynyk, was also discussed. It stipulates the designation of Ukrainian as the state language of Ukraine, and Russian as the language of international communication in the republic. These proposals irritated many deputies from the eastern and southern regions of Ukraine, the military, transport workers and others. Volodymyr Ivashko, the new first secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine, and Valentyna Shevchenko, the chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR, were compelled to speak in defence of the proposed law, adopted today by the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine.

On October 27, the indignant deputies almost unanimously threw USSR deputy from Poltava Mykola Kutsenko, a member of the democratic club of Ukrainian deputies, out of the hall for wearing an emblem resembling the blue-and-yellow Ukrainian national flag on his tie.

Elections to the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR and local authorities have been called for March 4, 1990, the same day as the elections in the Russian Federation.

FOUR COMPANIES JOIN WARNING STRIKE

Four enterprises in Lviv reported 100% worker participation in the 24-hour warning strike on Friday, October 27, called by the city's strike committee, to pressure the government to prosecute those responsible for a police attack against a peaceful demonstration.

According to Hryhoriy Prykhodko, editor of "Ukrainian Time" and a national activist, many businesses reported partial worker participation in the strike.

The four striking businesses were: construction, electronics, conveyors and trade.

In the wake of the government's refusal to hold accountable those responsible for the assault against peaceful demonstrators in Lviv, on October 1, the strike committee in that western Ukrainian city called a 24-hour warning strike. Prykhodko said the strike was also in solidarity with coal miners in Vorkuta and the Donets Basin, who have been protesting against the government's reneging on its promises to them.

Prykhodko said that the goal of the strike was not attained and the committee would determine what actions to undertake next.

On Sunday, October 1, a peaceful, popular commemoration of the name day of Lviv turned into a bloody melee as riot troops attacked unarmed civilians in that city, leaving dozens wounded in the streets, according to spokesmen for unofficial groups in Ukraine.

Several spokesmen for unofficial groups said that countless people were beaten and kicked by the troops, leaving as many as 20 people lying in the streets. Others reported that hospitals were filled with injured people and the streets around the stadium were covered with blood.

UKRAINIAN CATHOLICS REGAIN HISTORIC CHURCH IN LVIV

The Greek-Catholic Church of the Transfiguration in Lviv, the city in Ukraine which is the traditional stronghold of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church, has become a symbol for the resurgence of this religion, banned by the Soviet Government since 1946. In that year the Transfiguration Church along with all the other Ukrainian Greek-Catholic places of worship, was given by the Soviet Government to the Russian Orthodox Church.

For the past several years, bishops, clergy, and faithful of the five-million-strong underground Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church have been petitioning the Soviet Government for the restoration of freedom of religion. Numerous public Greek-Catholic services have been held, and for about the last six

months daily open-air services have been attended by thousands of people in Lviv and other Ukrainian cities.

On Sunday, 29 October of this year, Father Yaroslav Chukhnyi, priest of the Transfiguration Church in Lviv announced that he, his parish council, the choir, and the entire congregation had decided to return with their edifice to the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church. Priest and parish were officially received by the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Archbishop of Lviv, Metropolitan Volodymyr Sterniuk, who formally assigned Father Yaroslav as Pastor of the Church of the Transfiguration, and has sent Ukrainian Redemptorist monks to assist him. Ten thousand parishioners have signed an affirmation that they are of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic faith, and that they wish their parish church to be used for Ukrainian Greek-Catholic worship services.

A video-recording crew from the Canadian Broadcasting Company attended the service at which this was announced, and report that the parishioners received this decision joyfully and thankfully. Parishioners are maintaining a constant vigil in the church building and several services are conducted in the church every day.

The Russian Orthodox authorities took the occasion of a meeting in Moscow with Cardinal Willebrands on 2 November to issue a joint statement with the Cardinal deploring "acts of violence" and directing this observation to the Ukrainian Catholics. Tass and Radio Moscow immediately announced that the Vatican representatives had thus condemned the "seizure" of the Transfiguration Church. Ukrainian Catholics in Lviv reply that the restoration of the Transfiguration Church to Greek-Catholic use has been completely peaceful, with no violence or threat of violence from the Catholic side. Prominent Ukrainian Greek-Catholics in the USSR have asked that Ukrainian Greek-Catholic representatives should in the future always be included in ecumenical dialogues or discussions with the Russian Orthodox Church.

Russian Orthodox Metropolitan Filaret, the Moscow Patriarchate's Exarch in Ukraine, interrupted a visit to the USA and flew to Lviv for the weekend. He attempted to convince the Soviet authorities to confiscate the church building from the Ukrainian Greek-Catholics, but the Soviet police and public officials refused to use force in the matter, offering the opinion that the Ukrainian Greek-Catholics will probably have their legal rights restored in the near future anyway. Nevertheless, Ivan Hel, Stepan Khmara, and two Greek-Catholic priests have been charged with "hooliganism" in connection with the Transfiguration Church (although none of the four were personally involved).

The prosecutor's office, in what may have been an attempt to mediate, arranged a meeting between the charged parties and Russian Orthodox representatives, but when Metropolitan Filaret discovered that the meeting would include the Greek-Catholics, he absolutely refused to take part. A delegation of public officials and intellectual notables of Lviv, including deputies to the Soviet Parliament, sought a meeting with Metropolitan Filaret, who eventually agreed to receive five persons, headed by Rostyslav Bratun,

an official of the Writers' Union and a member of the Soviet Parliament. The delegates politely told Metropolitan Filaret that there is no longer any alternative, but the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church must have its legal rights and ecclesiastical properties restored.

Keston College

LVIV CHURCH OF THE TRANSFIGURATION BECOMES UKRAINIAN CATHOLIC

On November 9, 1989, Myroslav Ivan Cardinal Lubachivskyi, head of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, made the following statement regarding the Soviet news agency TASS's allegations of violence on the part of Ukrainian Catholics in Ukraine.

"Following several conversations with our clergy and faithful in Ukraine, we are convinced that recent TASS reports of violence on the part of our faithful in connection with the establishment of the Church of the Transfiguration in Lviv as Ukrainian Catholic are false. Ukrainian Catholics in Ukraine are committed to obtaining the legalisation of their Church in a peaceful manner and in accordance with Soviet law. They have not wavered from this commitment and we continue to support them. I ask that all Ukrainian Catholics in Ukraine and throughout the world continue this course of peaceful activism for the unity of our Church".

The TASS report appeared recently following the establishment of the Church of the Transfiguration in Lviv as Ukrainian Catholic on 29 October. As related to Ukrainian Catholic Church officials in Rome, the curate (assistant pastor) of the parish, Rev. Yaroslav Chukhniy, in accordance with the wishes of the 10,000 members of the parish, announced during services on 29 October that the church would begin functioning as a Ukrainian Catholic church. Rev. Chukhniy was an underground Ukrainian Catholic priest serving as a Russian Orthodox priest.

A petition asking for this change was signed by all 10,000 members of the parish and presented to local Soviet authorities. The Church of the Transfiguration had been a Ukrainian Catholic church before the liquidation of the institution in 1946. It was later opened as a Russian Orthodox church and is the second largest church in Lviv. Several hundred parishioners are said to be keeping watch over the church each night to prevent its closing.

Hel, Khmara, two priests charged

Ivan Hel, head of the Committee for the Defence of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, Stepan Khmara, a Ukrainian Catholic activist and Revs. Antony Masliuk and Ivan Bilyk, have been charged under Ukrainian SSR Criminal Code articles 35 and 198 for illegally seizing a church. The charges state that

the four were leaders of the change of the Transfiguration Church from Russian Orthodox to Ukrainian Catholic. An arraignment date has not yet been set.

"These charges are false in that the decision to change the Transfiguration Church to a Ukrainian Catholic one was made by one of the priests, the council and the parishioners of the church. It was their decision to become a Ukrainian Catholic parish". Hel commented.

In connection with these events, sources in Ukraine also report that the Russian Orthodox pastor of Transfiguration had notified the Russian Orthodox Metropolitan of Lviv, Iriney, that the parishioners were planning to make the church Ukrainian Catholic. In an effort to avert the action, the pastor had asked the Metropolitan to come to celebrate liturgy on 29 October. The hierarchy declined.

Press Office of the Ukrainian Catholic Church

LITERARY EVENING DEDICATED TO BORYS ANTONENKO-DAVYDOVYCH IN LVIV

A literary evening dedicated to the 90th anniversary of the birth of noted Ukrainian writer and civic activist Borys Antonenko-Davydovych, a former soldier of the Ukrainian Army of Halychyna (UHA), was held on October 29 in the Gagarin Palace of Culture in Lviv.

The programme was prepared by Myroslava Zvarychevska, a teacher of Ukrainian language and literature, and included vignettes from the life and works of Antonenko-Davydovych and songs of the Sich Riflemen, performed by a choir conducted by Maria Pustoviat.

Athena Pashko, Oksana Maranovych and Mykhailo Osadchyi, who were acquainted with Antonenko-Davydovych, or had the opportunity to hear him speak, gave their account of the writer and his works.

Osadchyi spoke about a little known aspect of Ukrainian literature of the 1920s: Stalin's official reception of a group of Ukrainian writers, including Borys Antonenko-Davydovych, Ostap Vyshnia, Valerian Polishchuk, Valerian Pidmohylnyi, Ivan Kulyk, and an official of the propaganda department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine Andriy Khvyliia on 12 February 1929.

Lviv schoolchildren read passages from the works of Antonenko-Davydovych. Sviatoslav Maksymchuk an actor from the Lviv Zankovetska Theatre read excerpts from the autobiographical works of Antonenko-Davydovych.

The choir sang various religious hymns, the march of the Sich Rifle Corps, the Ukrainian national anthem and other songs.

The writer's son-in-law, well known contemporary writer Borys Tymos-

henko from Kyiv, recalled the difficult life of Antonenko-Davydovych, pointing out that the writer spent 18 years in Russian concentration camps during Stalin's reign and was constantly persecuted. Upon his return to Kyiv Antonenko-Davydovych received no support. Under Brezhnev he was subjected to more than a dozen searches.

After he became seriously ill, Antonenko-Davydovych wrote a 260-page account of his service in the UHA. When the KGB learned of this, his home was searched and the work confiscated. In the spirit of glasnost the relatives of the writer appealed to the KGB to return the work. It was to be included in a two-volume collection of the works of Borys Antonenko-Davydovych, which is presently being prepared. The KGB reported that the confiscated work had been burned. Tymoshenko later discovered that it had been burned a month after the writer's death in May (?) 1984.

The evening ended with the singing of Antonenko-Davydovych's favourite song "The Eternal Revolutionary" by Ivan Franko.

UKRAINIANS OBSERVE 71ST ANNIVERSARY OF NOVEMBER 1 REVOLUTION IN LVIV

Tens of thousands of Ukrainians in Lviv commemorated the 71st anniversary of the November 1 Revolution and the 45th anniversary of the death of Metropolitan Andrey Sheptytskyi, according to Hryhoriy Prykhodko, editor of "Ukrainian Time".

A requiem for Metropolitan Sheptytskyi was held on November 1 near the Gunpowder Tower with more than 30,000 people present. From there the multitude went to the ancient, historical Yaniv and Lychakiv cemeteries for requiems at the graves of the Sich Riflemen.

On Sunday, October 29, a commemorative rally was held at the "Druzhba" stadium, also with 30,000 people in attendance. Mykhailo Kosiv of the Ukrainian Language Society read the group's resolution which called for the reestablishment of independent Ukrainian statehood.

ALTERNATIVE DEMONSTRATIONS ON THE ANNIVERSARY OF THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION

Moscow

On November 7 unofficial organisations in Moscow staged an alternative demonstration to counter the official commemoration of the October Revolution. Representatives of Ukrainian independent organisations took part in this event as a separate column. Dozens of members of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union (UHU), the Youth club, the "Slavutych" Society and the Moscow branch of the Popular Movement of Ukraine carried 17 blue-and-yellow Ukrainian national flags and banners with: "Ukraine is a state not a province!", "Moscow branch of the Popular Movement", "Our flag is the yellow wheat field under a blue sky!", and others. Leonid Tysiachnyi addressed the participants on behalf of Ukrainians living in Moscow.

Lviv

According to Hryhoriy Prykhodko, editor of "Ukrainian Time", the official commemoration of the Bolshevik Revolution in Lviv attracted an unusually poor turn-out — a mere 5,000 people. On November 7 it was business as usual in Lviv. The people went to work in support of the unofficial organisations' call to boycott the event.

Chernihiv

During the official commemoration of the Bolshevik Revolution members of the Chernihiv branch of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union intended to march with their own slogans through the centre of the city to the Kuybyshev Square, where the official parade was being staged, but the police halted the column and did not allow the demonstrators to reach the square. Two members of the UHU, Oleksander Kotenko and Mykhailo Kovalenko, managed to reach the square with pennants reading: "Democracy and a one-party system are not compatible!" In another, they demanded the repeal of article No. 6 of the Soviet Constitution, which guarantees the CP the dominant role in society. As they were leaving the square, officials in civilian clothing approached them, demanded that they fold away their pennants, and made them leave the area. Later members of the newly-formed "workers' units to assist the police" stopped Kotenko and Kovalenko. When members of the UHU protested against the unlawful detention, the two men were released.

Rivne

According to the head of the executive committee of the Rivne branch of the Popular Movement of Ukraine Mykola Porovskiy on November 7, during the official commemoration of the Revolution there, a column of around

5,000 activists of the branch marched past the stage with the following slogans: "All power to the councils and not the CPSU!", "We demand the revival of a sovereign Ukrainian state!" and others. The banners also expressed the people's indignation over the delay in implementing the Ukrainian SSR law on language. The demonstrators demanded the release of imprisoned leaders of the Rivne branch of the Popular Movement, as well as the dismissal of the first secretary of the city party committee Opryshko and the head of the city council Markov.

"VOTER OF UKRAINE" ASSOCIATION HOLDS INAUGURAL MEETING

The founding conference of the association "Vyborets Ukrainy" (Voter of Ukraine) was held on November 11 at the Kyiv Polytechnic Institute, according to Ukrainian National Democratic League representative Leonid Milavskiy. The conference was attended by more than 100 delegates from various cities of the republic.

The association's declaration, programme, and charter were ratified, as were resolutions concerning "organs of local self-government" and "elections by industrial electoral districts".

The creation of the "organs of local self-government" is inspired by the authorities who wish to maintain their influence on the development of events by controlling situations locally. As a consequence of the introduction of "elections by industrial electoral districts" the workers-electors find themselves in a situation where democratic expression of their will is impossible, for they become dependent on the administration at their places of employment. Administrations would be able to influence the development of preelection campaigns and the outcome of the elections through direct pressure on the workers, or, as is more likely, through the establishment of an extensive system of material incentives and alleviations.

MASS MEETING IN KYIV, DEC. 3

On December 3 the Popular Movement of Ukraine held a public meeting near Kyiv's central republican stadium, said Kyiv-based Ukrainian National Democratic League (UNDL) activist Leonid Milavskiy. The theme of the meeting, which lasted from 2 p.m. to 5 p.m., was "Through democratic elections to a democratic state". Petro Kahuy, a representative of the Secretariat

of the Popular Movement, pointed out that this meeting signalled the beginning of the Movement's preelection campaign.

The 15,000-25,000 participants, many of whom held Ukrainian national flags, were addressed by Movement representatives Mykhailo Horyn, Veniamin Sikora, Serhiy Holovaty, the head of the Kyiv branch of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union Oles Shevchenko, former political prisoner Yuriy Badzio, poet Dmytro Pavlychko and others.

With the exception of the first secretary of the Moscow district party committee of Kyiv all the speakers called for genuine economic and political sovereignty for Ukraine, for a multi-party system and a multi-faceted economy.

Popular Movement activist Larysa Skovyk demanded an independent Ukrainian state, and the leader of SNUM (Association of Independent Ukrainian Youth) Dmytro Korchynskyi and the head of the UNDL Yevhen Chernyshov called "For councils without communists!" In his appeal to communists in Ukraine, the head of the Movement's publishing commission, Dmytro Poyezd, called for the self-liquidation of the Communist Party (this "criminal organisation").

The participants of the meeting adopted a series of resolutions, including a resolution in support of the erection of a monument to Vasyl Stus in Kyiv's Lviv Square.

At the end of the meeting the Secretary of the Popular Movement of Ukraine Mykhailo Horyn announced the Movement's intention to mark the anniversary, on 22 January 1990, of the union of the Ukrainian National Republic with the Western Ukrainian National Republic (1919) by a "human chain" stretching from Kyiv to Lviv.

The police did not interfere with the proceedings.

Inaugural Meeting of "Free Trade Unions" Association in Donetsk

According to Vasyl Spynenko from Donetsk, the inaugural meeting of the independent public organisation "Free Trade Unions" was held in the city on November 26. The meeting appointed a regional council: miner Volodymyr Stemasov, who heads the strike committee of the "Sotsialistychnyi Donbas" pit, was elected to chair the city committee of the organisation, and Oleksiy Kudryshov as deputy chairman. Representatives of the Popular Movement of Ukraine, "Memorial" and other independent public organisations took an active part in the proceedings.

The aim of "Free Trade Unions" is to provide workers with genuine sup-

port and to replace official bodies with real trade unions, as stated in the information bulletin of the newly-formed organisation. "Free Trade Unions" is affiliated to an all-Union association of the same name, formed in 1978 by Volodymyr Klebanov, Viktor Luchkov and Anatoliy Pozniakov.

Decline of Ukrainian Language Discussed At Nov. 19 Meeting In Kremenchuk

According to Oleh Shpirko, on November 19 in the city several hundred people, including USSR People's Deputy Mykola Kutsenko, took part in a discussion club meeting at which activists of the Ukrainian Language Society spoke about the decline of the Ukrainian language during the years of Soviet rule and analysed the reasons for it. The history of Ukrainian national symbols was also discussed.

With a moment's silence the participants of the meeting paid tribute to the Ukrainian political prisoners who died in Soviet concentration camps in the 1980s — Vasyl Stus, Oleksa Tykhyi and Yuriy Lytvyn. The meeting adopted a resolution to rename one of the streets in Kremenchuk after Vasyl Stus.

Kremenchuk Residents Picket KGB Headquarters

Over 1,000 Kremenchuk residents picketed the city's KGB headquarters on 26 November in remembrance of the victims of the 1933 forced famine in Ukraine and the terror of the Stalin and Brezhnev period.

Priests of the Russian Orthodox Church conducted a service in their memory, during which the participants held lit candles and torches, lowering the official flag of the Ukrainian SSR and the Ukrainian national flag, trimmed with black ribbons.

Supreme Soviet Of Ukraine Discusses Programme And Budget For 1990

A recent session of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR in Kyiv discussed the proposed government social and economic programme and budget for 1990. According to the press service of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union, "Izvestia" reported on December 1 that the government's proposals for the economic and social development of Ukraine for next year gave rise to just

indignation both among individual deputies and the permanent commissions of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet.

During the heated discussions the following facts were disclosed: nearly half of Ukraine's villages have no schools; 60% lack kindergartens; 24% lack clubs; nearly 70% have no bath-houses; and 60% lack social services.

According to "Izvestia" the government's social programme for the coming year does not provide a solution to the supply problem and the substantial shift in the consumer market. In the opinion of many deputies, the proposed government measures for the improvement of the ecological situation in Ukraine do not meet the demands of the day.

Deputy Serhiy Konev from Dnipropetrovsk, who outlined the alternative proposals drawn up by the Popular Movement of Ukraine, was bitterly critical of the proposed government programme.

"Although the deputies did not support the proposal to reject the government plan", wrote "Izvestia" correspondent Tsikora, "those with whom I spoke believe that candidates of other organisations will find it difficult to fight the alternative, active programme of the Popular Movement during the preelection campaign".

10,000 MARK HUMAN RIGHTS DAY IN KYIV, DEC. 10; DEMAND FREEDOM

Kyiv — Leonid Milavskyi of the Ukrainian National Democratic League (UNDL) reports that on December 10 a sanctioned public meeting was held near the Ukrainian capital's Republican stadium to mark International Human Rights Day. The meeting was organised by the All-Ukrainian Society of the Repressed and the UNDL. Many of the 10,000 participants held Ukrainian blue-and-yellow flags and banners with the slogans: "Human rights to the people of Ukraine!", "Rehabilitate the victims of repression during the time of Brezhnev and Shcherbytskyi!", "Freedom for all political prisoners!", "Freedom for Bohdan Klymchak!", "Down with the dictate of the CPSU!", "Councils without communists!", "Freedom for Ukraine!", "Glory to the soldiers of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army — they fought for Ukrainian freedom against Nazi German and Bolshevik occupants!", and others.

Representatives of the Society of the Repressed, the UNDL, the Popular Movement of Ukraine, the Association of Independent Ukrainian Youth (SNUM), the Ukrainian Helsinki Union and other independent public organisations outlined the difficulties facing human rights in the USSR, particularly Ukraine, expressed bitter criticism of the political monopoly of the Communist Party, demanded Ukrainian independence and called for the public rehabilitation of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army.

The participants of the meeting supported the proposal of a group of independent deputies to hold an all-Union 2-hour warning strike on December 11 to demonstrate the people's disapproval of Article 6 of the USSR Constitution. The meeting also approved an appeal of Ukrainian Orthodox faithful to the people of Afghanistan on the 10th anniversary of the Soviet invasion, and proposed the inclusion of the head of the Society of the Repressed Yevhen Proniuk on the list of candidates for election to the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR.

An unpleasant incident occurred during the course of the meeting. A group of four SNUM members who became separated from the main body of people were attacked and beaten up by unknown persons in civilian clothing.

The meeting ended with the reading of a resolution of a meeting of the Society of the Repressed, which was held the previous day, December 9, in the building of culture of the Kyiv "Lenin Forge" factory, attended by more than 200 former political prisoners.

The resolution, which was almost unanimously accepted by the participants of the meeting, included the following demands: The release of political prisoners, particularly Bohdak Klymchak, Viktor Baranov, Eduard Krytskyi, Leonid Lubman, and Serhiy Kuznetsov; the return with compensation, at the expense of the government, of those innocent people who were sent to Siberia and other places; the rehabilitation of all those who resisted Stalinism and Brezhnevism in any form; criminal charges against those guilty of crimes against humanity; the forfeit of the right to practice of doctors guilty of the abuse of psychiatry; the redeployment of the KGB and MVD to fighting real crime; the organised return with compensation of the Crimean Tatars to their homeland.

Moscow

A sanctioned march was held in the capital of the USSR, Moscow, on December 10, International Human Rights Day. The representatives of independent public organisations marched from the Olympic sports complex to the Exhibition of Economic Achievement, where a public meeting was staged.

The 5,000-strong crowd included activists of the Moscow branch of the Popular Movement, the Ukrainian Helsinki Union, and the Ukrainian youth club of Moscow. Around 10 Ukrainian national flags and banners with the Trident (Ukrainian national symbol) and the inscription "Rukh" were displayed during the meeting.

Among the speakers was Deputy Mykola Kutsenko from Poltava, who explained the significance of Ukrainian national symbols and accused the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR of the degradation of Ukrainian national heritage — the blue-and-yellow flag and the Trident.

RECENT EVENTS IN UKRAINE

● Budaniv (Ternopil province)

On November 26 around 8,000 people paid tribute to the soldiers of the Sich Rifle Corps, as well as the people murdered by the NKVD in the Budaniv prison. The local authorities, together with the head of the village council, did all they could to obstruct the proceedings; teachers prevented their pupils from attending.

● Chernihiv

According to Ukrainian Helsinki Union (UHU) member M. Kovalenko, on November 1, the state court of the Prydesnianskyi region, with judge Afanasenko presiding, fined three students of the Pedagogical Institute 30-50 karbovantsi, because they were collecting signatures for Sakharov's decree about the authorities. In 90 minutes they collected 120 signatures.

According to Leonid Milavskiy of the Ukrainian National Democratic League, on November 7, activists of the Chernihiv branch of the UHU, during the official commemoration of the Bolshevik Revolution, attempted to march in the official parade carrying their own placards and signs.

The police did not allow the greater part of the UHU members to make their way to Kuybyshev Square, where the parade was being held. Volodymyr Pavlenko, Viktor Fedorenko and others were detained by security forces for holding a placard which read "The whole truth about Chornobyl!". One of the police officers attempted to search Volodymyr Pavlenko. Members of the independent organisation "Democratic Initiatives" were also prevented from joining the demonstrators.

Two UHU members, Oleksander Kotenko and Mykhailo Kovalenko, did manage to work their way into the square, and walked in the parade with signs which read "Democracy and a one-party system are not compatible!" and "We demand the repeal of the 6th Article of the Soviet Constitution". Eventually people in civilian clothing attacked the activists and destroyed their placards. Members of the so-called "workers' police support team", acting on orders received from the "top", detained Kovalenko and Kotenko, but after 15 minutes of inflamed protest released them.

Milavskiy reports that three unidentified men attacked one of the leaders of the Chernihiv branch of the Ukrainian Language Society, Valeriy Saran, in early November. He was on a train on the Symferopil-Riga line on his way to attend a conference of the Lithuanian branch of the Ukrainian Language Society in Vilnius.

The unidentified assailants, who stormed into the train, attempted to search

Saran's belongings. The protest of passengers who had gathered around, however, caused the attackers to flee.

● Chernivtsi

On October 15 an unsanctioned public meeting was held in Chernivtsi in support of a democratic law on elections. Those participants who were arrested went to court the next day. Chernivtsi University students Kost Bondarenko and Serhiy Soltys were sentenced to 10 and 15 days of administrative arrest respectively. Several people were fined. The local branch of the Popular Movement of Ukraine sent a telegram of protest to the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR, and the students of Chernivtsi University formed a student strike committee stating that if their comrades are not released they would boycott lectures. It was also reported that the Komsomol (Communist Youth League) of Chernivtsi University shared a similar disposition.

On October 20 five members of the Popular Movement of Ukraine and the Ukrainian Helsinki Union began a hunger strike in the centre of the city in protest against the authorities' repressive measures. On October 22 it was announced that the students had been released.

● Demianiv (Ivano-Frankivsk province)

On October 29 at 11.00 o'clock the remains of the victims of Stalinism in Demianiv were reinterred. A Ukrainian Catholic service was held in their memory. The local authorities are pointing out that these were the victims of the terror of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists, but activists of the local branch of the "Memorial" society have conclusive evidence which shows that the authorities' claims are unsubstantiated.

● Dnipropetrovsk

According to Milavskiy, on November 10, the day of the official holiday known as Militia Day, a member of the recently-formed independent popular organisation, the Ukrainian National Party, Volodymyr Solovyov, and activists of the Committee in Defence of Social Welfare, Antonina Dmitriyeva, Volodymyr Nedoshytyi and Oleksiy Tarasov, protested in the centre of the city against the unlawful activity of the security organs. The protesters held aloft a placard which read "The militia has taken on the role of political police!" The police eventually chased the protesters away.

Ivan Sokulskiy reports that the first Ukrainian Orthodox-rite liturgy in Dnipropetrovsk was celebrated on November 12, by a priest of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, Rev. Metodiy Andrushchenko.

● Donetsk

On October 14 a meeting demanding the realisation of the **agreement**

between the miners and the authorities took place at the "Shakhtar" (Miner) stadium in the city. The majority of speakers expressed the miners' discontent with the measures taken by the authorities. The head of the strike committee Bokariiev pointed out that the miners' demands are either not being met or else their implementation is being delayed.

According to UHU representative Volodymyr Mazanov, six Popular Movement activists, students of the Donetsk State University, among them a member of the faculty bureau of the Komsomol, on October 16, withdrew their membership from the organisation and handed in their ID cards.

In their declaration, the student activists condemned the Communist Party's policies towards youth as well as the misleading term "Leninist Youth Association".

The harassment of the activists lasted for three weeks. The withdrawal from the ranks of the Komsomol by a group of students was reported disapprovingly by the university bulletin, the newspaper "Komsomolets Donbasa", and the local radio station.

On November 10, the Komsomol Committee of the Donetsk State University agreed to strike off the roster the names of those members who wished to leave the organisation.

● Ivano-Frankivsk

Roman Shevchuk, a UHU representative, reports that on November 13, activists of "Memorial" began to unearth Memorial Square, where, according to eye-witnesses, 800 victims of Stalinist terror are buried. Due to plans by city officials to build a major motorway over the grave site, the victims' remains must be reinterred.

● Kherson

Milavskiy said that on November 12, a demonstration was held outside the building of the local public prosecutor, where banners read "Stop the use of psychiatry for political purposes!", "Freedom for the prisoners of psychiatric prisons!", and "Two healthy individuals — Vyacheslav Mykhailechko and Volodymyr Savchenko, are being unlawfully kept in the Kherson province psychiatric hospital!".

The demonstration was organised by members of the local UHU branch — Stepan Hura, Vasyl Danyshchuk and Mykola Redkun.

People who had gathered around the demonstrators manifested their moral support for the UHU activists, and signed an appeal in defence of the inmates of psychiatric prisons.

● Kirovohrad

The Lenin district party committee expelled writer Kobzar Volodymyr, an

activist of the Popular Movement, from the ranks of the CPSU for violation of the law on meetings, involvement with independent publication, and duplicity. The officials had in mind his membership both of the party and the Popular Movement of Ukraine.

● Kyiv

On October 18 the police dispersed a demonstration organised by the Society of the Repressed outside the building of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine. That day the Central Committee of the CPU was holding a plenum. The demonstrators demanded a meeting with the new first secretary of the CPU Volodymyr Ivashko. A number of people were detained, some receiving terms of imprisonment.

On October 28 the association "Green World" organised an ecological meeting in Kyiv.

According to M. Kovalenko, a memorial ceremony for the victims of the 1933 famine was held on November 5 at the grave of Mykhailo Hrushevskiy, President of the Ukrainian National Republic, at the Baykiv cemetery.

The people, who had gathered in response to the appeal of the local Popular Movement branch, held lit candles and blue-and-yellow flags trimmed with black ribbons. The head of the Movement's Secretariat, Mykhailo Horyn, addressed the crowd, emphasising that millions of Ukrainian peasants became the victims of conscious genocide, which was organised by a system spawned by an anti-human ideology. "We are convinced that any provocation, be it by nation, or by class, leads to catastrophe", said Horyn. "Our ideology is the ideology of love, our duty is the regeneration of Ukraine". After praying, the people departed.

On November 25, a public meeting was held on Lviv Square, near the site where a monument to Vasyl Stus is to be erected. The chief of the Shevchenko district police department removed a portrait of the poet displayed by the participants of the meeting. On November 19, after the reinterment of three Ukrainian political prisoners, Vasyl Stus, Yuriy Lytvyn and Oleksa Tykhyi, a memorial plaque was unveiled at this site. It was removed by police.

A group of Ukrainian theatre enthusiasts set up a "New Ukrainian Dramatic Theatre", whose artistic director is Volodymyr Opanasenko, a leading art aficionado of the Ukrainian SSR. This did not meet with the support of cultural officials. The theatre does not have its own premises (plays are staged in the Kyiv Institute of Construction Engineering) and lacks funds. People have not been paid for four months.

On November 26, at the Baykiv cemetery, the All-Ukrainian Society of the Repressed paid tribute to Ukrainian activist Yuriy Lytvyn on the day of the poet's birthday. A commemoration also took place in the home of Lytvyn's mother, Nadia Antonivna Parubchenko, who lives in the village of Barakhty in the Kyiv province.

● **Lakshyn** (Berezhany district)

On November 26, a memorial service was held by the grave of victims of the NKVD. The column of 150 people, headed by members of the Ternopil and Berezhany branches of the UHU, marched from Berezhany to Lakshyn with blue-and-yellow flags. Members of the UHU and SNUM (Association of Independent Ukrainian Youth) Yuriy Morhun and Ivan Sirko addressed the 2,000 or so participants, pointing out that the reasons for the present crisis lie in the system itself. The meeting ended with the singing of the Ukrainian national anthem.

● **Lisna Ternovytsia** (Ivano-Frankivsk province)

On October 19 riot police brutally dispersed villagers who were protesting against the conversion of a local quarry into a rubbish dump, indiscriminately beating men, women and children. One of the victims was a handicapped girl. As the quarry is situated on a riverbank the waste would flow into the river and pollute the whole province. The people of Lisna Ternovytsia, Havrylivky, Pereroslia and several other villages declared a strike in protest against the beating of the innocent people. Teaching stopped. The people are demanding the public disclosure and punishment of those responsible for this inhuman act, the dismissal of the first secretary of the provincial party committee Nesterenko, a halt to the authorities' plans to convert the quarry into a rubbish dump, as well as the formation of a commission of people's deputies of the USSR to investigate this tragic incident. If the above demands were not met by November 1 the independent organisations threatened a general strike throughout the province.

● **Lviv**

On October 29 at 3.00 p.m. a meeting dedicated to the 71st anniversary of the establishment of the Western Ukrainian National Republic (ZUNR) was held near the "Druzhba" stadium in Lviv. The meeting was organised by the Lviv branch of the "Memorial" society. The speakers who addressed the 30,000 strong gathering included Yevhen Hryniv, deputy head of the Lviv branch of "Memorial", who explained the historical background of the establishment of the ZUNR, the Director of the Institute of Social Sciences Isayevych, the deputy head of the Lviv Ukrainian Language Society of Shevchenko Mykhailo Kosiv, and UHU members Stepan Khmara and Ihor Derkach. Two former Sich Riflemen were also present and gave their account of events in 1918. A girls' choir sang various religious hymns and songs of the Sich Rifle Corps. During the meeting 36,000 karbovantsi were raised for the erection of a monument to the Sich Riflemen.

● Marhanets (Dnipropetrovsk province)

According to UHU representative Ivan Sokulskyi, Popular Movement activist Oleksander Ishchenko was admitted into hospital in early November, after being diagnosed with heart problems.

Although his health improved greatly, Ishchenko, through some unknown directive, was transferred to a psychiatric hospital. Ishchenko is a psychologically sound person and has never been required to receive attention from a psychiatrist.

At the same time, there appeared in the local press completely unfounded reports, accusing Ishchenko of encouraging hostilities between different national groups.

As a result of this, the executive committee of the Dnipropetrovsk provincial branch of the Popular Movement of Ukraine demanded an explanation from the authorities as to why a healthy person has been confined in a psychiatric hospital.

The Popular Movement is continuing to investigate the matter.

● Moscow

On November 13 and 14, a group of Ukrainian Catholics, who have been on hunger strike in the USSR's capital since May of this year demanding the legalisation of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, staged a protest near the residence of the Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church and in the vicinity of the Moscow eparchy of the ROC. Joining the activists was a group of Lviv students who belong to the independent popular organisation "Studentske Bratstvo" (Student Brotherhood).

The Eastern-rite Catholics carried placards which indicated why the protest was being held and emphasised the nature of the problem facing their Church in the USSR.

On November 14, five women from Starokonstantyniv in the Khmelnytskyi province of Ukraine travelled to Moscow to demand the opening of a Roman Catholic church in their city, which is presently being used as a "cultural building".

● Ternopil

According to UHU member Ivan Dmytruk, several unidentified men brutally attacked 60-year-old UHU activist Myroslav Bilyk on November 13 in the village of Kotiv.

● Vovchanske (Kharkiv province)

UHU representative Yuriy Khmara reports that on November 4, an engineer at the local aggregate factory, Oleksander Devyatyi, in the presence of

police officers Chernenko and Krasnorutskyi, struck an unidentified factory worker. Devyatyi cried out: "I'd like to... beat all you rukhivtsi". The police officers appeared to share the same sentiments.

● Uzhhorod

The provincial branch of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union recently held its founding conference. Former political prisoner Oleksander Oros was elected to head the branch.

● Vynnytsia

According to UHU representative Viktor Ivasiunko, on November 14, members of the local UHU branch approved a declaration to the local authorities which informed the latter about the intent of UHU members to hold a general meeting in the city on November 26.

The following issues were to be discussed at this meeting: human rights violations by security forces, and the campaign to nominate candidates for the upcoming elections.

Spokesmen for the authorities assured UHU activists that they will not receive permission to hold such a meeting and that they should not even expect it.

"The local press continues to print Party members' declarations on the absolute necessity for constructive dialogue with informal groups", report UHU members.

● Zhaliv (Berezhany district)

On November 26, reports Ivan Dmytryk of the Ternopil branch of the UHU, a memorial service was held at the grave of the soldiers of the Sich Rifle Corps. Around 5,000 people attended the service, during which 30 Ukrainian national flags trimmed with black ribbons were displayed. UHU activists Levko Horokhivskyi, Yaroslav Demydas, Roman Sydiala, and Petro Malenkyi addressed the participants. The service ended with the singing of the Ukrainian national anthem.

* * *

UHU representatives Roman Shevchuk, Volodymyr Marmus and Ivan Dmytruk report on liturgies and memorial services Ukrainian Catholics have recently celebrated throughout Western Ukraine.

● Memorial services at the grave sites of Sich Riflemen were held in the villages of Cherche and Vyshniv in the Ivano-Frankivsk province of Ukraine.

The service was performed by Rev. Ivan, a priest of the Ukrainian Catholic Church.

● On November 8, in the village of Stara Mizun in the Ivano-Frankivsk province, Ukrainian Catholic priest Yaroslav Lesiv performed a memorial service at the grave site of 130 local residents. They were killed in 1939 as a result of the official Polish government policy of "pacification", which was geared towards destroying the nationally conscious Ukrainian population.

● A memorial service at the grave sites of Sich Riflemen was held on November 12 in the village of Krylos, Ivano-Frankivsk province.

That same day, a memorial service was held at the grave of Sophia Halechko, a standard-bearer from the ranks of the Sich Rifle Corps, in the village of Pasichne in the Ivano-Frankivsk province.

● A memorial service for the Sich Riflemen and victims of Stalinist terror was concelebrated by Bishop Pavlo Vasylyk of the Ukrainian Catholic Church and five other Eastern-rite priests, on November 12 in the city of Chortkiv, Ternopil province. According to an eyewitness, the service was attended by between 15,000-25,000 people. The first secretary of the provincial communist party Krytskyi also addressed the gathering.

● On November 12, 30 UHU activists, accompanied by local residents, marched from the Potutora train station to the village of Saranchuk in the Ternopil province. The participants of the march carried Ukrainian national flags trimmed with black ribbons, a crown of thorns, and a sign which read "Eternal shame on the executioners of the Ukrainian people". After the march to Saranchuk, a Liturgy, memorial service and meeting were held by the graves of victims of Stalinist terror and the grave of an UPA (Ukrainian Insurgent Army)! soldier.

A HUMAN CHAIN ACROSS UKRAINE

"Rukh" Calls For A Day Of National Solidarity To Commemorate The Proclamation Of Ukrainian Independence And Unity From January 22, 1919

Leading members of the Popular Movement of Ukraine ("Rukh"), the largest unofficial non-governmental organisation in Ukraine, announced plans to organise a "human chain" across Ukraine from Kyiv to Lviv. Both cities were capitals of independent Ukrainian states in 1918, following the downfall of the tsarist Russian regime and the Austro-Hungarian empire. On January 22,

1919, both states were united into one independent and sovereign Ukrainian nation-state.

A separate ad-hoc committee has been formed to make preparations for this all-national commemoration. The committee is headed by Dmytro Pavlychko. Bohdan Horyn, a leading activist in "Rukh" and a member of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union (UHU) is in charge of organising the populace in western Ukraine, while his brother Mykhailo Horyn, the "Rukh's" General Secretary and also a leading UHU member, is in charge of eastern Ukraine.

According to Bohdan Horyn, the chain will begin forming at noon on Sunday, January 21, and should be complete by 1 p.m. A large turnout is expected, as preparations are now being made to organise the people from the towns and villages along the Kyiv-Lviv route to participate in this "human chain". The organisers are expecting that 30,000 to 40,000 blue-and-yellow Ukrainian flags will line the entire route of the "chain". All the participants are being asked to bring flags and blue-and-yellow arm bands signifying the town, village or organisation they represent.

Following the completion of the "chain", separate assemblies will be held in Kyiv, before the Cathedral of St. Sophia, and in Lviv, at the monument to Ivan Franko, a notable Ukrainian poet from the 19th century, and other cities.

Three separate appeals were issued on the occasion of this event. The texts appear below:

JANUARY 22 — UKRAINIAN UNITY DAY

*Ukrainian Nation,
Dear fellow Ukrainians!*

Over 70 years ago two independent Ukrainian states emerged from the ruins of the Russian and Austro-Hungarian empires — the Ukrainian National Republic (UNR) and the Western Ukrainian National Republic (ZUNR). On January 22, 1919, both states were united into one independent nation-state — the Ukrainian National Republic. On that day in the capital of our homeland — Kyiv, before a huge assembly of people gathered on the grounds of the Cathedral of St. Sophia, the Proclamation of Ukrainian Unity resoundingly echoed off the gates of Kyiv — announcing the unity of Ukrainian lands into one independent state. This was an expression of our national will; from the lands of Naddnipryanshchyna, Halychyna and Zakarpatia. The century-long struggle of Ukraine for her national independence reached its logical zenith.

Again, however, fate betrayed us. History again put us to the test, as our nation was thrown into the swirling whirlpool of the 20th century, which wrote into the history of Ukraine many tragic pages.

We were led into a civil war, engineered by external powers. Ukraine was again partitioned between various countries. The drive towards industrialisation and collectivisation sapped our energies. Millions of victims died during the artificial famine of 1932-1933. The patriotic, national-political elements of Ukrainian society were completely liquidated. Halychyna and the Carpathian region were subjected to a policy of brutal colonisation by forces occupying those areas. Our intellectual elites were destroyed. Our lands were particularly victimised by the brutality of World War II. We witnessed the dramatic national and political repressions of the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s; Ukrainians dying in Afghanistan; the intensification of Russification in the era of so-called "stagnation"; and finally — the catastrophe of Chornobyl.

All of this is the tragic result of our national subjugation, of the loss of our statehood and independence.

Today we are witnessing a great revolutionary revival of our country and of Europe. The spirit of freedom is spreading, even amidst our enemies. This spirit has engendered new hopes; it has re-awakened our historical memory, long dormant as a result of our subjugation. This memory reminds us of the great deed of our contemporary history — the Proclamation of Ukrainian Independence and Unity.

Fellow Ukrainians! On the initiative of "Rukh" the Proclamation of Unity of January 22, 1919, will be commemorated this year by the citizenry of our Republic, as a significant historical event, as a national day of commemoration of the Ukrainian people. On January 13 the Supreme Council of "Rukh" will hold a commemorative session, dedicated to this event. On Sunday, January 21, general, all-national commemorations will take place: a "human chain" from Kyiv to Lviv followed by commemorative assemblies and religious services in Kyiv before the Cathedral of St. Sophia and in Lviv by the monument to Ivan Franko. We call on everyone, "who is alive, in whom an idea has arisen" (Lesia Ukrainka), to come out on January 21 on the Kyiv-Lviv route and to inseparably unite these two historical centres of our homeland.

Ukrainians! History is viewing us. On January 21 let us demonstrate our national self-awareness, unity, civic activity and resolve. Particularly at this time we must consolidate our nation on the basis of a platform of democracy and sovereignty, standing above any social differences, our official positions, our party membership or religious affiliations. The "Rukh" trusts that Ukrainians in the Party and governmental apparatus will return to their nation and stand in solidarity with it.

All non-Ukrainians living in Ukraine! Join us! On January 21 demonstrate that you believe in the just cause of Ukraine's national aspirations and that you are citizens of the Ukrainian Republic, whose fate is dear to you. Let Ukraine become for all of us our common home — a home of liberty.

Citizens! On January 21 manifest a high degree of discipline and restraint. Avoid everything that may ruin the solemn, commemorative nature of this day or that may lead to civil maturity.

Brothers and Sisters of the Ukrainian Land! Let us transform this commemoration of Ukrainian unity into a commemoration of human harmony, good will, benevolence and mutual understanding!

"Rukh" Secretariat
Kyiv, January 2, 1990

* * *

***Dear Villagers and Workers, Intellectuals,
Brothers and Sisters***

On the ruins of the Russian and Austro-Hungarian empires, by the will of the Ukrainian nation, two Ukrainian states were established — the Western Ukrainian National Republic (ZUNR) and the Ukrainian National Republic (UNR). In accordance with the Act of Union of January 22, 1919, they united into a single Ukrainian nation-state, embodying the Ukrainian nation's age-old aspirations to unity. However, these righteous aspirations of our nation were decimated by the imperialistic encroachment of Red Russia and White Poland against our national independence.

The Supreme Council of "Rukh", in order to commemorate this significant event in the history of our nation — the Act of Union, is organising on January 21 from noon to 1 p.m. a human chain from Lviv through Ternopil, Rivne and Zhytomyr to Kyiv, and calls on all residents of our country, whose historical memory has not yet perished, and who long for the renewal of our national statehood, the victory of historical justice, to take part in this action. On that day, at 5 p.m., meetings will be organised in cities across Ukraine. On January 22, from 8 p.m. to midnight, Ukrainian national flags should be displayed in all national homes.

With our mass actions we again demonstrate our deep understanding of the political needs and demands of the Ukrainian nation — its unity and the renewal of national statehood. We expect that we will be supported by the national minorities in Ukraine who cannot conceive their freedom without a free Ukraine.

Lviv National Council of "Rukh"
January 3, 1990

* * *

Ukrainian People!

January 22, 1919, is one of the most important days in the history of Ukraine. Two independent Ukrainian states — the Ukrainian National Republic (UNR) and the Western Ukrainian National Republic (ZUNR), which

emerged in the wake of the destruction of two empires (the Russian and the Austro-Hungarian) united into a single independent, sovereign Ukrainian state. The Act of Union, proclaimed on January 22, 1919, in St. Sophia Square in Kyiv, became the fulfilment of the age-old dreams of the Ukrainian nation, a great national holiday. But the jubilation was too short. Enemy invasions from the East and West tore apart the lands of a sovereign Ukraine. For many decades an inimical occupational ideology squeezed from the memory of our people the historic day of Ukrainian sovereignty. It is time to reacquaint ourselves with this faded page of our history.

Let us celebrate this significant date of national unity. Let us gather in links at noon on January 21 along the Lviv-Ternopil-Rivne-Zhytomyr-Kyiv route, in order to unite in a human chain of hands and hearts. The greater the participation between noon and 1 p.m., the tighter the chain, a symbol of our unbreakable unity. It is requested that each participant have the Ukrainian blue-and-yellow flag and a blue-and-yellow arm band with the name of the organisation, society, city or village he/she is representing.

Awake people of Ukraine!

The bells of history are waking you!

**The Council of the Lviv Oblast Branch,
Ukrainian Helsinki Union**

Documents and Reports

NATIONAL PARTY IN UKRAINE ADOPTS STATEHOOD PLATFORM

The Ukrainian National Party, one of the latest political organisations formed in Lviv, Ukraine, on October 21, has adopted a national independence and statehood platform, according to Hryhoriy Prykhodko, editor of "Ukrainian Time".

Among the other demands in its programme, Prykhodko said, are:

- Guaranteed civil liberties, private property, political pluralism.
- Recognition by Western democracies and the USSR of the occupied status of Ukraine.
- Abrogation of the constitution of the Ukrainian SSR and the treaty forming the USSR.
- Withdrawal of the Ukrainian SSR from the United Nations.
- Establishment of a temporary government in Ukraine on the basis of those political groups which support statehood.
- Creation of national military forces.
- Withdrawal of occupational troops from Ukraine.
- Convening of an inaugural congress.

Its programme states:

"The Ukrainian National Party regards the political, economic, cultural and ecological crises in Ukraine as a consequence of the enslavement of the Ukrainian nation. In January 1918 the Ukrainian people established an independent state — the Ukrainian National Republic (UNR) — which was recognised de facto and de jure by many free countries. The UNR was also recognised by the government of the RSFSR. On November 1, 1918, the Western Ukrainian National Republic (ZUNR) was proclaimed. On January 22, 1919, an act of union was signed, uniting the UNR and the ZUNR into a single sovereign state — the Ukrainian National Republic.

At the end of 1918 the RSFSR commenced its aggression against Ukraine, violating the peace treaty. The RSFSR's act of aggression was not provoked by the government of independent Ukraine, and is thus unlawful. Therefore the Ukrainian people continued the struggle for an independent state. On March 14, 1939, Carpathian Ukraine proclaimed independence. Its suppression shortly thereafter did not bury Ukrainian aspirations towards independence. The Act of June 30, 1941, proclaimed the restoration of the Ukrainian independent and sovereign state headed by a Ukrainian government. In defence of the Ukrainian state the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) fought

a two-front war against Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia until the mid-1950s. These are indissoluble and complementing events in the Ukrainian struggle for an independent state in the 20th century. It is also a continuation of the Ukrainian state traditions of the princely and kozak eras”.

According to its by-laws, the aim of the Ukrainian National Party is the revival of the Ukrainian National Republic, which was established on January 22, 1918, and united with the Western Ukrainian National Republic one year later to form a sovereign republic of the Ukrainian people. It further stated that the party will conduct itself in a democratic manner in accordance with international laws, and will abide by all internationally-recognised rights of man and national minorities. The party also disapproves of violence and is not calling for such drastic actions.

The executive board of the Ukrainian National Party consists of Bohdan Kohut, chairman, a 70-year-old prewar intellectual and veteran of the war of liberation; Vadym Smohytel, secretary, composer from Kyiv; members of the council: Volodymyr Solovyov, 30 from Dnipropetrovsk, chairman; Olena Protsiv, student; Vasyl Ivasiuk, 35, writer from Kalush; members of the arbitration council, Roman Duzhynskiy, chairman; Bohdan Pryshliakevych, Hryhoriy Prykhodko and Bohdan Chyk; Volodymyr Maksymovych, auditor.

Petro Ruban of Philadelphia, Pa., has been designated as the temporary representative in the diaspora.

The first branch of the party was formed in Lviv on November 3. It is being run by Ihor Kotsiurba, chairman; Lubomyr Ivakhiv, secretary; and Bohdan Chyk, treasurer.

On October 30, the members of the party met with Yuriy Shukhevych, who recently returned to Lviv from exile. They discussed the diaspora's position vis-à-vis unofficial groups in Ukraine, the government's attitude towards the national renaissance in Ukraine, the role of the Popular Movement of Ukraine in the rebirth and its limitations, and the position of the US government and Congress towards developments in Ukraine.

PROGRAMME

Of The Ukrainian National Party (UNP)

The Ukrainian National Party regards the political, economic, cultural and ecological crises in Ukraine as a consequence of the enslavement of the Ukrainian nation. In January 1918 the Ukrainian people established an independent state — the Ukrainian National Republic (UNR) — which was recognised de facto and de jure by many free countries. The UNR was also recognised by the government of the RSFSR. On November 1, 1918, the Western Ukrainian National Republic (ZUNR) was proclaimed. On January 22, 1919, an act of union was signed, uniting the UNR and the ZUNR into a single sovereign state — the Ukrainian National Republic.

At the end of 1918 the RSFSR commenced its aggression against Ukraine, violating the peace treaty. The RSFSR's act of aggression was not provoked by the government of independent Ukraine, and is thus unlawful. Therefore the Ukrainian people continued the struggle for an independent state. On March 14, 1939, Carpathian Ukraine proclaimed independence. Its suppression shortly thereafter did not bury Ukrainian aspirations towards independence. The Act of June 30, 1941, proclaimed the restoration of the Ukrainian independent and sovereign state headed by a Ukrainian government. In defence of the Ukrainian state the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) fought a two-front war against Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia until the mid-1950s. These are indissoluble and complementing events in the Ukrainian struggle for an independent state in the 20th century. It is also a continuation of the Ukrainian state traditions of the princely and kozak eras.

As a consequence of the RSFSR's aggression against the UNR at the end of 1918 Ukraine was occupied. An artificial structure — the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic — whose government became one of the initiators of the USSR, was established on its territory by a decision of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party. Because the Ukrainian SSR and its government were created by a decision of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party, overthrowing the legal government of the UNR, the laws of the Ukrainian SSR and agreements between the government of the Ukrainian SSR and governments of other nations are legally invalid. Therefore the Ukrainian National Party does not recognise them and regards the Ukrainian SSR not as a republic, but as the colonial administration of Ukraine.

The UNP stands for the right of the Ukrainian people to an independent state and declares as its goal the revival of the Ukrainian National Republic on its ethnic territory.

For the achievement of its goal the UNP has drawn up the following programme relevant to the present situation:

1. To strive towards the establishment of democratic principles in society. This goal requires the following democratic guarantees:

a) Guaranteed private ownership. This requires the transfer of all industry, banks, transport, and media, presently owned by the state, to private, cooperative and shareholder ownership.

b) Legalisation of firearms. The absence of private firearms makes the citizen defenceless against armed criminals and is a fundamental restraint on the democratisation of society. Without private firearms democracy becomes a farce which allows the usurpation of power by a single party. A firearms law regulating the use and calibre of firearms is necessary for the legalisation of private firearms.

c) Guaranteed political pluralism. The party monopoly of power and information is immoral and unlawful.

2. The recognition by governments of Western democracies and the government of the USSR of the occupied status of Ukraine.

3. The abrogation of the Constitution of the Ukrainian SSR and the treaty forming the USSR. The UNP regards aims to renew the treaty of union or to draw up a new treaty as attempts to legalise the enslavement of Ukraine.

4. The withdrawal of the Ukrainian SSR from the United Nations and the replacement of its representation by a representation of national forces of opposition, including those abroad.

5. The establishment of a temporary government in Ukraine based on those Ukrainian political forces which support Ukrainian statehood.

6. The creation of national armed forces.

7. The withdrawal of occupational forces from Ukraine.

8. The convention of an inaugural congress.

Lviv

October 21, 1989

TENS OF THOUSANDS REMEMBER VICTIMS OF STALIN TERROR IN IVANO-FRANKIVSK; SICHKO FAMILY SUFFERS CONSEQUENCES

Tens of thousands of Ukrainians gathered in the village of Pasichne in the Ivano-Frankivsk oblast of western Ukraine, on Sunday, October 29, to honour the victims of Russian terror during Stalin's reign in 1941, according to Vasyl Sichko, head of the Ukrainian Christian-Democratic Front (UCDF).

The memorial service, officially sanctioned by the Soviet authorities, was organised by both official and unofficial Ukrainian organisations, which included the UCDF, the Ukrainian Helsinki Union, the Popular Movement of Ukraine, and others.

On return to Dolyna after the service 50 KGB and police officers attacked Vasyl Sichko and his father, Petro, along with 15 others. The attack took place at the Dolyna train station, where the lights were intentionally turned off and people were severely beaten. Petro Sichko was seized and thrown into a police car. According to his son, Vasyl, who managed to escape, Petro Sichko was hospitalised and was in a serious condition due to severe police brutality.

Vasyl Sichko emphasised that the police attack on the UCDF leaders was unlawful, as the memorial service was officially sanctioned by the authorities. He could only conclude that this repressive government action was not directly linked to the mass gathering in Pasichne. He believes that the authorities are attempting to forcibly liquidate the Christian-Democrats.

Sichko also stated that "from the time Ivashko came to power, a vigorous campaign of repression has been launched against members of various unofficial Ukrainian organisations, especially members of the UCDF".

* * *

APPEAL
To All Christian-Democrats Of The World
From The Ukrainian Christian-Democratic Front

Attention all Christian-Democratic Parties, Organisations, and Governments throughout the world!

Christian-Democracy has been outlawed in Ukraine, USSR!

The ruling communist party will not tolerate the existence of any party or social force which poses a direct threat, through democratic means, to its monopoly on state power.

The communist party has decidedly failed in its quest to win over the hearts and minds of the people. For decades, the communists' monopoly on state power has been rooted in their ability to intimidate and terrorise: through arrests, torture, and murder.

Now, however, the people have realised that the communist system is bankrupt, and, no longer afraid, are voicing their dissatisfaction with the performance of the ruling party. And, in order to regain their monopoly on state power, the communists have reverted to their terrorist tactics.

According to several reliable sources, Ivashko's ascent to the position of General Secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine, also marked the initiation of plans to liquidate certain popular organisations and besmirch others, with the intent of making them subservient to the ruling communist party.

Among those organisations singled out, stands, first and foremost, our own: The Ukrainian Christian-Democratic Front (UCDF); for it was a year ago that the CPSU ruled that Christian-Democracy is ideologically dangerous, and hence its existence in a communist state is impossible. The Christian-Democrats of Ukraine have been suffering the consequences of this decision ever since: arrests, beatings, interrogations, exorbitant fines, and harassment at their places of employment. With Ivashko's ascent to power, however, this has all been taken one step further; we must now contend with an outright manhunt.

On October 29, 1989, upon returning from a memorial service in Ivano-Frankivsk held for the victims of communist terror, the founders of the UCDF felt the effects of this new policy. At the Dolyna train station, Petro and Vasyl Sichko were surrounded by dozens of KGB officers and policemen.

They abducted Petro Sichko, a member of the Central Council of the UCDF, forced him into a car and drove away. With the help of several friends, Vasyly Sichko, the leader of the UCDF, managed to escape. The authorities are presently engaged in hunting him down.

The fact of the matter is that the memorial service for the victims of communist terror was officially sanctioned by the authorities. The authorities had little choice, for the service was attended by between 300,000 and 500,000 people, according to various estimates, and it would have taken place regardless of whether it was officially sanctioned or not.

Thus the question arises: If the peaceful memorial service, attended by up to 500,000 Ukrainian Eastern-rite Catholics, was officially sanctioned by the government, then what right does this same government have to hunt down members of the UCDF who were present at the service?

The matter in question is not the memorial service itself. The incident underscored the fact that we, Christian-Democrats, are subject to forcible liquidation. Furthermore, the authorities want to carry out this liquidation at the same time the Ukrainian Catholic Church gains official status, a goal which we also consider among the highest of our priorities. The communist government hopes that the general euphoria surrounding the recognition of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, will draw attention away from a Ukrainian Christian-Democratic Front faced with liquidation.

This is why we, the Central Council of the UCDF, appeal to all our Christian-Democratic brethren, to all the Christian-Democratic parties of Europe and the world, to all Christian-Democratic organisations; for totalitarianism is once again rearing its ugly head. We must still contend with a wolf in sheep's clothing. That is why the issue of whether Christian-Democracy is allowed to exist in the totalitarian structure of Soviet Ukraine is not only our concern, but is a matter which should be addressed by all of you; it is a matter of solidarity amongst all Christian-Democrats who wish to see the victory of Christian humanism.

*The Central Council of the UCDF
October 30, 1989*

APPEAL

To The International Leadership Of Christian-Democracy In Europe And Elsewhere

In the name of the principles of Christian-Democratic solidarity, I have the honour of appealing to you on behalf of the Christian-Democratic Party of Ukraine, which I head as chairman. My appeal is motivated by the nearly one year of attacks that our party has been subjected to by the official communist authorities with the intention of liquidating it.

On November 14, 1988, we sent a declaration to the Presidium of the

Supreme Soviet of the USSR, concerning the registration and granting of official legal status to our organisation. The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, contrary to all legal norms, sent this declaration for appraisal by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine (CC CPU). The CC CPU concluded that Christian-Democracy is an ideologically harmful phenomenon and on January 4, 1989, proposed self-liquidation to us, asserting at the same time that, in the event of our refusal to do so, they have hundreds of ways to destroy us as an organisation. We refused to disband and the repression against us commenced. Here are a few facts to illustrate this repression.

1. Refusing entry to the inaugural meeting. On January 13, 1989, the police raided the room in Lviv where our inaugural meeting to accept the by-laws and programme was taking place, demanded the identities of those present and checked the documents of the meeting. For this reason, the Moleben, which was to have been celebrated by our priest, could not take place at the end of the meeting.

2. A campaign of lies. The official press constantly labels us "extremists", "terrorists" and other epithets. No one responds to our protests before the courts or procurator. They ignore us, the law and civil rights.

3. Ban on meetings and demonstrations. Our numerous applications for permission to stage meetings or hold demonstrations have always been rejected. When we actually hold them, the authorities, with the help of punitive organs, disperse, arrest and punish us.

4. Intimidation and threats. Our members are often summoned by the organs of state security, the KGB, who threaten us in a variety of ways in order to compel us to relinquish our membership of the UCDF. If this fails, they impose heavy fines. We are constantly under the surveillance of the security organs and the mere participation in a sanctioned meeting can result in up to 15 days' arrest. The fines are usually high and are deducted from wages during one year. For example, Mykola Kindratiuk, a member of the UCDF, was fined 900 karbovantsi (roubles), almost one year's wages — for his participation in a meeting sanctioned by the authorities, which took place in the town of Dolyna on June 25, 1989. In addition, they cynically wrote in the sentence that the accused acknowledged his guilt. There are many such examples.

5. Jurisprudence in the service of terror. The method of intimidation and moral terror, which is employed by the state security organs, is abetted by the judiciary which ignores existing laws and the logic of justice, and very often punishes twice for the same "offence". For example, I was sentenced by a court on June 12, 1989, to 10 days' detention for organising the meeting held on June 16, 1989. Yet on July 7, 1989, for the same reason, I was sentenced to 15 days' detention. For participating in a meeting which was sanctioned by the authorities Mykola Huk, a member of the UCDF, received 15 days' detention because, ignoring the threats made by the KGB, he refused to relinquish his membership of the UCDF. Taras Peltser, a member of the UCDF,

was fined 120 karbovantsi (one month's wages) simply for reading the programme of the UCDF at his place of work. Yet at his trial his sentence was recorded as punishment for attending the meeting on July 30, 1989, even though this meeting was sanctioned by the authorities.

6. Physical terror. Attacks on individual members of the UCDF are becoming frequent. On a number of occasions, I have been beaten by police officers. They severely beat the UCDF chairman of the Yavoriv region, Petro Huk. On July 17, 1989, an attack and beating was organised against the chairman of the newly-formed Christian Ukrainian Youth Association, Ivan Loy.

7. Kidnappings and forced deportations. To impede important gatherings, often of an international character, police and KGB agents attack leading individuals of the UCDF on the street, twisting their arms, without authorisation from the procurator or judge, hurl them into a car and drive them as far as 150km. outside the city, into a wooded area or an uninhabited region, and there leave them to fend for themselves. This happened to me on the day I was to have travelled to the Baltic republics for an international meeting on May 23, 1989. They pulled me off the plane which was to fly to Riga and drove me 150km. to a forest, and there they abandoned me. This psychological terror is reinforced by seeing with one's own eyes that one is being followed step by step by members of the security organs, often numbering several individuals. There have also been instances whereby the defenders of state security have torched automobiles of persons who assist us with transportation. This happened to my brother on August 18, 1989, when gasoline was poured over his car which was then set on fire.

8. Repression at places of work and education. The authorities pressurise students, members of the UCDF, to quit the UCDF, threatening them with expulsion from their institute or other schools. This also happens in factories or industries, where even the most ordinary workers are expelled so as to dissuade the intelligentsia from joining the UCDF.

9. Control over correspondence and phone tapping. Mail from abroad does not reach me. Other mail which does reach me arrives torn and censored. The authorities forbid our members to have telephones installed. When we use other people's telephones, outsiders join in the conversation and we often hear threats made in our direction.

10. The leadership of Ukrainian Christian-Democracy — targets for destruction. We are aware that the KGB has formed a separate dossier on every member of the UCDF, containing full characteristics of that person. These dossiers conform with similar ones prepared by the NKVD at the beginning of World War II, when persons on that list were physically destroyed upon the retreat of the Red Army. Such a devastating situation may develop at any time in the event of internal upheavals within the USSR.

This short enumeration of the anti-democratic methods, which are being implemented by the communist party and its organs in Ukraine, reveals the

deep contradiction between the externally declared slogans of glasnost and perestroika and the true state of affairs of the developing processes in the USSR, particularly in Ukraine, whose status remains that of a colony of the Russian empire under the name of the USSR. Ukrainian Christian-Democracy, as an expression of 1,000 years of the spirituality of the Ukrainian nation, which has its roots in the princely and kozak eras in the history of Ukraine, and is in full accord with the principles and activities of Western Christian-Democracy, seems to be a threat to the communist party which is in power in the Ukrainian SSR. The latter, therefore, has decided to annihilate us. Here, today, writing these lines, I read an interview in a local newspaper with the regional head of the KGB in Ivano-Frankivsk, in which he expressed his concern that the UCDF still exists. It would seem that by their calculations, we should have already been destroyed. We have survived one year in desperate struggle — and the repressions are constantly on the increase. Whether Christian-Democracy will survive in Ukraine depends upon concrete support from Christian-Democratic parties and Christian moral forces in Western Europe and the world. If communist parties are allowed to exist freely in the West, why then cannot the Christian-Democratic Party be allowed to exist in the USSR? This is specifically applicable to the Christian-Democratic Party of Italy, which will shortly have the opportunity to meet with Gorbachev. Our fate will depend on the attitude and strength of Christian-Democratic solidarity, on the will to assist our Christian-Democracy to operate in accordance with accepted principles in the cultured world.

On October 13, 1989, in Kyiv, a meeting of four Christian-Democratic parties from the republics of Estonia, Georgia, Lithuania and Ukraine took place, at which it was mutually agreed to form a coordinating council for the common activity of Christian-Democratic parties under totalitarian conditions. Representatives of the following were included into the coordinating council: the UCDF, the Christian-Democratic Union of Estonia, the Lithuanian Christian-Democratic Union and the National Democratic Union of Georgia, representatives of their youth organisations, namely the Christian Ukrainian Youth Association, and the Estonian and Lithuanian sections of young Christian-Democrats.

Having returned from Kyiv to the place of my residence in Dolyna, my apartment came under siege of the police for the purpose of carrying out searches and arrests. My whole family, including my one-year-old son, are living under psychological terror. I write these lines to the accompaniment of banging and yelling at my door — all of which are without any formal judicial mandate. The appointment of a new first secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine has changed nothing. On the contrary. The bloody events in Lviv on October 1, 1989, during which defenceless, peaceful people were brutalised, indicates the direct opposite.

We, therefore, appeal to you, the leaders of the Christian-Democratic parties of the West, with the following urgent requests:

1. Convince the Soviet government to adhere to the recently-signed agreements in Vienna and to respect human rights.
2. Demand that the USSR permit the official registration of our organisation and grant it the status of a legal body which would give it the right to:
 - rent premises to carry out its normal work,
 - publish its own periodical,
 - conduct mass meetings and other gatherings,
 - carry out normal work and struggle for the realisation of its statutory aims within the framework of the law.
 - open a bank account.
3. Protest against the monopoly of the Communist Party of the USSR in conducting state policy, neglecting the will of nations to have other political parties (in their respective countries), including the Christian-Democratic Party.
4. Protest, with all conviction, to the government of the USSR, against its use of physical and psychological terror, arrests, punishments and trials of members of the UCDF.
5. Accept the UCDF into the membership of the Christian-Democratic International.
6. Demand that the government of the USSR does not hinder free contact between the UCDF, the outside world, and Christian-Democratic parties of other countries.
7. After recognising our legal status, supply us with technical aid so that we may publish our periodical.

Ending my appeal to you, brother Christian-Democrats, I wish to express my most sincere wishes. May the Lord bless your initiatives and deeds to strengthen our mutual efforts, for the victory of our ideals — peace and a better life and liberty for all nations.

Respectfully,
Vasyl Sichko

INAUGURAL CONGRESS OF THE REPUBLICAN ASSOCIATION "GREEN WORLD"

The republican association "Green World" held its Founding Congress in Kyiv on October 28-29. The Congress adopted a programme and by-laws, as well as several resolutions, including a resolution on elections, which called for the formation of a bloc of democratic forces, a resolution on the Chernobyl disaster, which demanded a Nuremberg-type tribunal to judge those re-

sponsible for the catastrophe, a resolution on ecology, and various others. The Congress also set up an initiative group to make preparations for the establishment of a Green Party and adopted the following appeal to Armand Hammer, proposed by USSR Deputy Mykola Kutsenko from the Poltava province:

“Mr. Hammer,

We, the delegates of the first Congress of the ‘Green World’ express our extreme indignation at your long-term conspiracy with the governments of the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR, behind the back of Ukraine and her many nationalities, which is allowing your chemical industries, the basis of technocratic business, so harmful to our country and all its present and future citizens, to expand. ‘Green World’ demands an end to your immoral actions on the territory of Ukraine.

The First Congress of ‘Green World’.

Copy: The Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR”.

After the Congress several thousand people gathered by the republican stadium to participate in a sanctioned public meeting. Prior to the meeting the police detained a youth for carrying a Ukrainian flag. A crowd of people, who surrounded the scene of the incident, prevented a second youth from being arrested. When the arrest was announced during the meeting, a group of participants went to the police station to demand the youth’s release.

The slogans: “There is no peaceful atom!”, “There are enough nuclear power plants in Ukraine!” and others were displayed during the meeting. The residents of the regions contaminated by radioactivity came to the meeting with black arm bands and black placards which read: “We want healthy children!” and “We demand immediate resettlement!” The speakers addressed the issue of the nuclear threat to Ukraine. The meeting lasted 2 and a half hours.

STATEMENT Of the Committee for the Defence of the Ukrainian Catholic Church

The Committee for the Defence of the Ukrainian Catholic Church issued the following statement on December 4, 1989:

“On November 30, on the eve of the visit of the Head of the USSR Supreme Soviet Mikhail Gorbachev to Italy and the Vatican, Yuriy Reshetlyo, Chairman of the Council for Religious Affairs of the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR in the Lviv province, publicly declared on local television that Ukrainian Catholics will be allowed to exercise their right to register their church communities in the western regions of Ukraine.

Thus Soviet officials have recognised the Ukrainian Catholics' right to exist. The declaration should be regarded as the first step towards legalising the Ukrainian Catholic Church.

According to the declaration on religious communities, issued on November 1, 1976, any decisions concerning religious communities in the various republics must be approved by the Council for Religious Affairs of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, i.e. an all-Union rather than a republican institution. The all-Union Council's position regarding the matter remains, to this date, unknown.

The above-mentioned declaration was publicly announced only in western Ukraine, and republican and all-Union media did not report on the document, thus testifying to the fact that this pronouncement of justice affects only those Catholics in western Ukraine.

Taking this into account, the Committee for the Defence of the Ukrainian Catholic Church considers the declaration of the Council for Religious Affairs of the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR to be indecisive. It merely expresses the authorities' desire to renew the legal status of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, a process which involves the above-mentioned declaration as a primary step.

During his visit to the Vatican, Mikhail Gorbachev declared that adherents of all faiths have the right to fulfil their spiritual needs, and that a new law concerning freedom of conscience is currently being drafted.

Can such a promise be expected from those same communist rulers who have, over the course of seventy years, promised to create a paradise on earth, while in practice creating a living hell? The realities of history cannot "fail to influence" the attitude of millions of Ukrainian Catholics towards the declaration of the Council for Religious Affairs of the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR.

The deliberate procrastination on the part of the authorities in addressing the problem of the Ukrainian Catholic Church has resulted in a general change of the religious situation in Ukraine. The movement of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church is gaining strength, and certain forces, which identify themselves with "the struggle for autonomy" and have compromised themselves in Christian and national terms, are seeking to join this movement.

The Ukrainian exarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church, which comprises two-thirds of all Russian Orthodox parishes, has almost ceased to exist. Recent events have resulted in the creation of social and national tensions, which may be exploited by anti-democratic forces.

In the second part of the document, instead of recognising the inherent right of Ukrainian Catholics to register their communities and returning to the Ukrainian Catholics all church property which belonged to the Ukrainian Catholic Church prior to 1946, the government proposes to conduct polls and

referendums in order to discover thereby whether local populations support the Ukrainian Catholic Church. The faithful are not pleased by the possibility of such a "plebiscite", for it is common knowledge that the ruling communists have the uncanny ability to manipulate figures concerning the outcome of votes and elections.

When reading the text of the declaration, one becomes familiar with the logic followed by its authors: Ukrainian Catholics, the rightful owners of the property which was stolen from them, are expected to supplicate before those same people who stole their property. Such an attitude, even at a passing glance, is obviously bereft of any sanity.

The Committee for the Defence of the Ukrainian Catholic Church once again declares that the faithful do not consider legalisation as mere formal registration. Legalisation entails the return to the Ukrainian Catholic Church of the more than 600 churches, including the Cathedral of St. George, all property owned by the Ukrainian Catholic Church prior to 1946. The ruling organs, who were the de facto organisers of the 1946 pseudo-synod in Lviv, must recognise this in the form of a formal statement, thus politically rehabilitating the Ukrainian Catholic Church".

Lviv, December 4, 1989

Head of the Committee for the Defence of the Ukrainian Catholic Church
Ivan Hel

Legal Consultant for the Committee
Mykola Muratov

KGB THREATENS YOUNG UKRAINIAN ACTIVIST

The KGB Administration Is Making The Following Announcement

The KGB administration of Lviv province has received testimonies from residents of the Zolochiv district which express anxiety and alarm concerning the address by Lviv resident Vitovych Oleh Vasylovych, born in 1967, welder of the "50th anniversary of the October Revolution" plant, who represented the so called "Association of Independent Ukrainian Youth" (SNUM) at the inaugural conference of the Zolochiv district branch of the Popular Movement of Ukraine on November 12. The citizens' testimonies state that Vitovych O.V.'s address was of an instigative and provocative nature, and was discordant with the process of democratisation, and grossly misrepresented the aims and tasks of the Popular Movement of Ukraine for restructuring.

On November 24, Vitovych O.V., who had previously been brought to administrative responsibility, was invited to the KGB administration for a talk

to warn and educate him. He was warned that unconstitutional instigation is unlawful and punishable in accordance with criminal law, particularly Article 7 of the USSR law "On criminal liability for state crimes".

It was explained to Vitovych O.V. that there are no moral grounds for the rehabilitation of the national bandit formations of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), and that this does not comply with the decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of January 16, 1989, which states: "Traitors of the fatherland and scourgers of the period of the Great Patriotic War, policemen, participants of the nationalist bandit formations and their accomplices are not subject to rehabilitation...". It was also explained that Vitovych O.V. and other members of SNUM can examine the archives of the KGB administration, which contain materials documenting the terrorist and other hostile activity of the OUN-UPA in the province".

*Press Group of the KGB Administration of the Ukrainian SSR
Lviv Province*

This is a translation from Russian. The report appeared in the newspaper "Lvovskaya pravda" on November 5, 1989.

13th November 1989

Hon. George Bush
President of the
United States of America
The White House
Washington DC 20501
USA

MEMORANDUM TO PRESIDENT GEORGE BUSH

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) which is the historical heir of the Tsarist Russian colonial empire is the last remaining imperialist empire in which Moscow has subjugated numerous nations subjecting them to the most barbarous forms of oppression in order to eradicate all vestiges of a non-Russian national consciousness through a policy of severe Russification and repression.

Nevertheless, as must be apparent from reports of current events, these nations have continued their national liberation struggles and have strengthened their resolve to attain national independence and statehood.

The recent series of "reforms" which have been introduced in the Soviet Union by Mikhail Gorbachev under the catchall phrase "Glasnost and Perestroika" are not an indication of Moscow's desire to democratise but rather an

indication that the Soviet Russian empire is in the midst of a serious economic, political and, most importantly, a moral crisis where no one, perhaps even the First Secretary himself, believes in the false vision of Communism.

Gorbachev's programme of "Perestroika" does not envisage full national independence, sovereignty and statehood for the subjugated nations. It presents a veil of democracy in an attempt to lure the working people of the USSR to become more economically productive — an essential precondition of Moscow is to solidify its military base which it needs to continue enslaving its "satellites" and from which it may launch yet another wave of military expansionism in its aim to establish global hegemony.

The national liberation struggle of the subjugated nations has now become greatly intensified and is taking on mass proportions which will ultimately result in the dissolution of the last remaining empire together with its huge military apparatus.

It is well known that during and after the Second World War the democratic West extended good will assistance to the USSR which proved to be instrumental in the covert enslavement of the peoples inside the Soviet Russian empire.

We ask that the US Government does not provide economic assistance to a failing Russian empire whether in the form of governmental subsidies or private investment to the Soviet Russian regime.

We ask the US Government to recognise the struggle for national independence of the subjugated nations and instead of assisting the Communist regime of Gorbachev in its reconstruction and revitalisation attempts, to help the exploited peoples "build an alternative society with an alternative economy".

In the future, the USA will be faced with the much brighter prospect of dealing with independent nations such as, for example, Ukraine, Latvia, Estonia, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and others who, in the process of vigorous reconstruction following the indiscriminate economic exploitation during the past 72 years by Soviet Russia, will open up huge markets to the Western nations. Such nations as Ukraine, rich in natural resources and driven by a democratic free enterprise system, should prove to be viable trading partners — able to meet their economic obligations, unlike the present Soviet regime which, in the words of Gorbachev in March 1989, is continually economically deteriorating, restructuring its commitment due to significantly deteriorating economic conditions.

We believe that the 50 million Ukrainian nation, because of its demographic resources, economic and geopolitical importance, is the key nation within the Soviet Russian empire to become a catalyst for genuine restructuring of the empire into sovereign democratic independent states of the subjugated nations.

We therefore recommend that:

1. The US Government render all possible assistance to the popular “unofficial” Ukrainian organisations (and their publications) that have sprung up in Ukraine in an effort to regenerate the political, social, cultural, religious and economic infrastructures of the nation which has been weakened or destroyed by the totalitarian infrastructures of the empire. Some of these organisations are the Ukrainian Helsinki Union, the Popular Movement of Ukraine for Restructuring, the Ukrainian Memorial Society, the Ukrainian Language Society, the Ukrainian Youth Association, the Ukrainian Association of Independent Creative Intelligentsia, the Ukrainian Ecological Organisation “Green World”, the Ukrainian Christian-Democratic Front etc.

2. The US Government to render all appropriate support to the Ukrainian Christians — Catholics, Orthodox and Protestants — who are still suffering repression and the denial of religious glasnost. The Ukrainian Catholic Church, with over 5 million believers, is too large a problem to be ignored any longer by Gorbachev and to be forgotten by public opinion in the West. Nor should be forgotten the plight of other religious believers. Half a million Jews have no religious facilities, with only 20 to 30 registered Jewish congregations and only one active Rabbi in Kyiv. The Muslim Crimean Tatars are denied their rights and protestant groups such as Baptists, Pentacostalists, Adventists and Jehovah’s Witnesses remain banned.

3. The US Government take the initiative to seek and wherever possible initiate the process of establishing direct diplomatic, economic and cultural ties with the Ukrainian people and those people of other subjugated nations and satellites.

4. The US Government to send media representatives, radio, press and TV journalists and crews to Ukraine to provide adequate objective and regular coverage of developments taking place and thus end the practical news black-out and isolation of Ukraine.

5. To establish direct links with and organise support for Independent Ukrainian Cooperatives which continue to develop in Ukraine and which as institutions are not linked to government business organisations but are directly under the control of the people i.e. cooperative members. These Independent Cooperatives can and do have the right to export independently produced products although, at present, with extreme difficulty due to the regimes and restrictions.

6. The US Government to send fact finding delegations to the USSR which

include Ukrainian language interpreters and which have the brief to make contact with Ukrainian independent organisations as mentioned and not simply follow the official guided tours which serve to camouflage the true situation.

We are confident that the future developments in Ukraine will only corroborate the reality of our suggestions.

Please accept our assurances of the highest consideration.

Bohdan Fedorak
Chairman,
Ukrainian National Government

Slava Stetsko
Chairman,
Foreign Affairs Department of the
Ukrainian National Government

Books**Anthology of Stetsko's Writings
Published by Philosophical Library**

The writings and speeches by the late Yaroslav Stetsko, Prime Minister of Ukraine and Head of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists, have appeared in a 648-page English-language volume from the Philosophical Library in New York.

Titled "Ukraine and the Subjugated Nations: Their Struggle for National Liberation", the book spans the history of Ukraine's war of liberation since World War II, when during it the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists under the leadership of Stepan Bandera, in the midst of the Nazi-Russian conflagration, proclaimed the renewal of Ukrainian statehood on June 30, 1941, and created a government in Lviv with Stetsko as Prime Minister.

Stetsko's involvement in the Ukrainian revolutionary nationalist movement lasted nearly half a century. Since the assassination of Bandera by a Russian agent in 1959, until his death on July 5, 1986, Stetsko was the leading spokesman in the West for the reestablishment of independent Ukrainian statehood.

The book includes Stetsko's writings on such topics as the Ukrainian Church, including the Ukrainian Catholic Patriarchate, the Hungarian revolution, coexistence between the US and the USSR, the Helsinki process, Russification as a form of national genocide, the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations, which he headed, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, Ukraine's liberation war on two fronts, Ukrainian nationalism and its ideology, a critique of Western policies towards the USSR, and others.

The anthology was edited by John Kolasky, a Ukrainian Canadian who wrote two popular books on Ukraine in the 1960s, titled "Two Years in Soviet Ukraine" and "Education in Soviet Ukraine".

In his note, Kolasky observed, "The articles and speeches reveal the author's deep conviction and dedication, as well as his personal modesty and abiding Christian faith".

The foreword was written by John Wilkinson, member of the British Parliament and Chairman of the European Freedom Council, who said, in part, that Stetsko "always rejected totalitarianism, was a passionate advocate of national self-determination".

"He worked tirelessly until his death, promoting the causes of Ukraine and the other Captive Nations, championing the right for individuals as for

nations that they should both be free. Inspired by a deep, personal Christian faith as well as a profound sense of history, Yaroslav was a symbol for those who wished to see the downfall of bolshevism and the oppression and sorrow which it inflicts", wrote Wilkinson.

In his preface, Bertil Häggman of Helsingborg, Sweden, said, "The ideas of Yaroslav Stetsko will continue to be a guiding light not only to Ukrainians but to all in the West who love liberty. Ever since World War II they have served as an inspiration to those Western leaders who feel that free peoples worldwide have an obligation to aid their subjugated brothers and sisters".

A glossary, index and photographs are also included in the book.

Priced at \$49.50, it is available from the

Organization for the Defense of
Four Freedoms for Ukraine,
136, Second Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10003,
U.S.A.
