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1986

THE UKRAINIAN REVIEW

A Quarterly Magazine devoted to the study of Ukraine.

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- 4 The Youth Panel;
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Stephen OLESKIW

ON THE MILLENNIUM OF CHRISTIANITY IN RUS'-UKRAINE

In 1988 Ukrainians around the world will be celebrating the 1000th anniversary of the official adoption of Christianity in Ukraine. In the same year, the Russian Orthodox Church in the Soviet Union and Russians in other parts of the world are planning to celebrate the "Millennium of Christianity in Russia". The Russian celebration, however, will be founded upon a false claim. The event whose anniversary is being celebrated took place in the medieval Grand Principality of Kyiv, the capital of present-day Ukraine, before the birth of Russia.

According to the earliest surviving Kyivan Chronicle, in 988 the Grand Prince of Kyiv, Volodymyr, had the inhabitants of his capital baptised, an act, which signalled the official acceptance of Christianity as the state religion of Kyivan-Rus'. This has traditionally been taken to represent the beginning of the Kyivan Church, even though the roots of Christianity in Ukraine can be traced back at least as far as the 3rd century A.D. The Ukrainian Church of today, with its several denominations, is a direct descendant of the medieval Church of Kyiv.

Christianity came to Rus'-Ukraine from Byzantium, at that time the most advanced country culturally and the most powerful. It came not because it was imposed on the Ukrainian nation by the armed might of a foreign power, but because it was freely accepted by the Prince and his people, as a result of an extensive investigation into all the religions at that time known to the Ukrainians. This decision has had a tremendous impact on the future historic development of the Ukrainian nation because the beauty of the Divine Liturgy, the unique nature of religious living and the magnificent Christian culture were accompanied into Ukraine by a most intimate cooperation of Church and State. Unlike Byzantium where the government always did its utmost to impose its will upon the Church, and Western Europe where the Church did everything in its power to impose its will upon the State, in Rus'-Ukraine a very close harmony between the work of the Church and that of the State existed from the very beginning of Christianity in Ukraine. For instance, Prince Volodymyr always sought the counsel of the Church on all matters pertaining to Church and State. He never enacted a state law without the sanction of the Church hierarchy and, in so doing, provided the Church with every possible moral and financial assistance in her development and activity. Thus Christianity came to Ukraine in a form, which was most in keeping with the national Character of the Ukrainian nation and most conducive to the nation's religious, cultural and political life.

Through the Church Christianity sowed the seeds of education in Ukraine. The first schools were established in Kyiv by Prince Volodymyr. From these early institutions of learning education surged forward across

the whole of Rus'-Ukraine. At times when the Ukrainian people had lost their own state and were subjugated by foreign powers the Church once again acted as the driving force behind Ukrainian education through its brotherhood schools and colleges. As a result, such renowned institutions as the Ostroh and the Kyiv-Mohyla Academies won worldwide acclaim. The efforts of the Church in the field of education were manifested most prominently during the Khmelnytskyi era, in the 17th century, when illiteracy was completely eradicated in Ukraine.

Christianity spiritually united the many tribes in the Kyivan-Rus' Principality by bringing them together to form one nation and emerge on the world scene in the realm of the most cultured and most powerful nations of the world at that time. As a result, along with education there developed the nation's string awareness of its separate national identity. The Ukrainian national and Christian awareness manifested itself in subsequent years in that the Ukrainian nation totally identified its religion with its nationality. In fact the two became synonymous. Church-State harmony facilitated the rapid and fundamental regeneration of Ukrainian social life in the spirit of Christian ideals. Thus the death penalty along with slavery were abolished and women enjoyed equal rights in all social matters.

Christianity gave Ukraine a magnificent Christian culture in which Ukrainians have prided themselves for a thousand years. This can be seen in the splendid Church architecture in Ukraine, the finest examples of which are the Tithe Church and the Cathedral of St. Sophia in Kyiv. But there are hundreds of beautiful churches spread throughout the whole of Ukraine. These are filled with wonderful paintings, and especially Ukrainian mosaics, of which the finest examples can be found in Kyiv, and include the portrait of the Mother of God at the Altar of St. Sophia.

Christianity also gave rise to the development of the art of sermon in Ukraine. The most famous example is the "Sermon on Law and Grace" by the Most Venerable Ilarion, Metropolitan of Kyiv.

With Christianity Church music and chant also came to Ukraine. After a vigorous development upon a Ukrainian foundation, they became one of the foremost branches of Ukrainian spiritual culture, particularly as a result of the great contribution made by such brilliant Ukrainian composers of later centuries as Bortnianskyi, Vedel, Lysenko, Leontovych, Stetsenko, Koshyts and others.

Christianity gave Ukraine an original literature and laid the foundations for Ukrainian historic tradition. Although the first literary works were translations from Greek, they very rapidly developed into original literary gems, which bore little if no resemblance to Byzantine literature. Perhaps the finest example of original Ukrainian Christian literature can be found in the excellent epic poem *A Tale of Ihor's Host*. The first Ukrainian chronicles were written in the caves of the Pecherskyi Monastery in Kyiv, and were soon followed by similar works in other monasteries and centres of Ukrainian Christian life.

Thus from the very beginning the fate of the Christian Church and the fate of the Ukrainian nation became firmly joined together to form one indivisible entity. In times of oppression and foreign occupation the Church acted as the bearer and custodian of the national state traditions and helped to launch the process of national regeneration, which has continued unceasingly to this very day, giving rise to such great Ukrainian literary figures as Markian Shashkevych and Taras Shevchenko.

For these very reasons, Christianity, as Cardinal Lubachivsky writes, has become "so firmly embedded in the soul of the Ukrainian nation" and has become "an inseparable part of it".

However, the Russian Orthodox Church also lays claim to the Christianity of medieval Kyiv. This is one aspect of the Russian theory that the history of the Kyivan State is the beginning of the history of Russia — a theory originating in 15th century Muscovy and developed by the Russian historian Karamzyn in the 19th century, and one, which is not founded upon any historical facts. So why do the Russians try so vigorously to tie Kyiv to Russia? The reason is that Russia wants to legalise its occupation of Ukraine, which began over 300 years ago in the time of the tsars and has continued to this day in the Soviet era. Therefore, Russia has increasingly forcefully propounded the theory of the alleged "eternal oneness" of the Russian and Ukrainian people based on a fictitious "common old-Russian nationality" of the 11th and 12th century, in order to justify its expansionism in the eyes of the world. To do this, Russia is trying to make people believe that Ukrainians are merely the "younger brothers" of the Russians, whose history and culture are simply a "marginal aspect" of Russian history and culture, by asserting itself as the alleged "heir" of the Kyivan State and its Church. It is not surprising, however, that given the present political power of Russia, the Russian view of the history of Eastern Europe is the one, which predominates in the West. Here the understanding of the issues is complicated by the loose usage of the terms "Russia" and "Russians" in referring to all the lands and nations currently in the USSR, despite the fact that 14 out of the 15 republics that make up the Soviet Union are non-Russian. Even the Soviet Union distinguishes between Russian and the other nationalities (of necessity rather than from choice) and the last census indicated that non-Russians are approaching majority status in the USSR. The issue is further complicated by the use of the term "Rus'" to mean Russia, something deliberately introduced by Moscow to assist the tsars and later the Soviet leadership in asserting their alleged claim to the heritage of the Kyivan-Rus' State.

To see the factually unfounded and historically inaccurate nature of the Russian theory, one needs only to look at the relevant historical facts, which point to the separate origins and development of the Ukrainian and Russian people.

As early as 1113, the great Kyivan chronicler Nestor in his *Povist Vremennykh Lit* (The Tale of Bygone Years) writes that the tribe of Viatychi, who lived in the northern areas of Rus' were the real ancestors

of the Muscovites (later Russians), and that the Poliany, who lived in the south, in the area where the Kyivan State was later formed, were the ancestors of the Rus' (Ukrainians). In the *Povist* Nestor emphasises that the Poliany and the Viatychi existed apart and that there was no sense of unity between the two tribes. He even regards the Viatychi as a Western Slavic tribe, as opposed to the Poliany, who were an East Slavic tribe. They were even different in character and behaviour. The chronicler describes the Poliany as people with civilised customs and laws, who knew marriage, and the Viatychi as uncivilised and uncouth people, who did not practise marriage. Since Volodymyr Monomakh, who reigned in Kyiv from 1055 to 1125, constantly waged war against the Viatychi, and since Christianity came to the northern tribe only in the second half of the 11th or the first half of the 12th century, it is clear that there was no sense of oneness between the two groups, which could later have served as a basis for the emergence of a "common Russian nationality".

In the 12th century, the Kyivan State was going through a period of decline, and by the middle of that century, had disintegrated into a number of separate principalities. The most significant rupturing of the previous political unity was the separation of the northern principalities, which severed their links with Kyiv during the 12th century and disassociated themselves from the heritage of Kyiv. The most powerful of these was the Principality of Rostov-Suzdal (whose capital was originally at Suzdal, but was later moved to Vladimir-on-the-Kliazma), which had ambitions of challenging the primacy of Kyiv. Andriy Boholubskyi, the Prince of the Rostov-Suzdal lands, rejected the ideas and traditions of Kyiv reinforcing his separation with the invasion of Kyiv in 1169 during which the city was sacked and ruined, in order to cause it to lose attraction. In 1177, his successor, Vsevolod (1176-1212), commissioned separate chronicles of the Rostov-Suzdal Principality as another attribute of the sovereignty and independence of his land. In these revised chronicles Kyivan tradition was accepted only up to the time of Volodymyr Monomakh, which became the formative period of the Rostov-Suzdal dynasty. The northern chronicles reflected a declining interest in the affairs of the south and after the Mongol invasion of Kyiv in 1240, the fate of the southern principalities received no mention. Thus, it was not Mongol occupation that separated the north from the south, but a lack of a sense of community and an absence of mutual attraction and interest. The Principality of Moscow originated from these northern territories. In later years it became dominant in the north and gradually expanded by annexing all the other northern principalities and ultimately developed into the present Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic. The claims of Russian historians to the Kyivan tradition are therefore without foundation, since Russia emerged precisely as a result of the rejection of that tradition.

The respective histories of the Ukrainian and Russian Churches follow a similar pattern. For about 50 years, from 988, the Kyivan Church had an autonomous administration, but from 1037 it was headed by a metro-

politan appointed by the Patriarch of Constantinople. Missionaries were sent to the northern parts of the State and bishops were installed in various cities. However, unlike the circumstances in Kyiv, the affairs of the Church in the north were subordinated to the interests of the local rulers. As part of his policy of separation from Kyiv, Boholubskyi attempted to persuade Constantinople to appoint a separate metropolitan for Rostov-Suzdal. Later, in 1448, Moscow finally broke away from Constantinople by appointing its own metropolitan. So, again, it is unjustified for the Russian Orthodox Church now to claim the heritage of Kyiv as its own, having originally rejected it.

The inseparability of religious and national ideals and interests is also reflected in Ukraine's struggle for national liberation, and one of the most significant aspects of the struggle has always been the struggle for religious freedom — the freedom to worship God in the native Ukrainian faith in opposition to the forcible imposition of foreign religions and most recently of all, since 1917, of atheism — a concept completely alien to the Ukrainian people.

It is for these very reasons that Soviet Russia places such great importance on the destruction of religion in Ukraine.

However, despite all the efforts on the part of Soviet Russia to eradicate all forms of religious worship in the Soviet Union, the liberation struggle continues unabated. Today it is spearheaded by the Ukrainian Catholic Church, which has grown up in the catacombs. The leadership of the Church has gone to a younger generation of priests, monks and faithful, to men such as Josyp Terelya and Vasyl Kobryn, who are not cowed by the regime. Clandestine religious services are held in almost every Ukrainian village and city in Western Ukraine, and are attended by large numbers of people regardless of the constant threat of arrest and imprisonment. Ukrainian priests conduct missionary work in Eastern Ukraine and Byelorussia, and at a time when the Catholic Church throughout the world is experiencing a critical dearth of vocational callings to the priesthood, in Ukraine, where religion is suppressed and the faithful persecuted, no such shortage exists. Today 10 Ukrainian Catholic bishops, over 300 priests and more than 1000 nuns look after the religious and spiritual needs of the Ukrainian people.

Thus, on the eve of the great Millennium of Christianity there is a marked upsurge of religious activity. The Ukrainian Church with its many denominations not only exists, but its activity is widespread and the number of faithful is steadily increasing. As a manifestation of religious and national consciousness, in Ukraine today church weddings and baptisms are common practice, even among party officials, and the celebration of religious festivals, especially Christmas — so rich in tradition — are celebrated en masse. The churches, which have not yet been destroyed by the Russians (when open) are always packed with faithful and young people are increasingly seen openly wearing crosses around their necks as an act of defiance of the official repression of religion.

Witness to the growth and vitality of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, as well as the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church and the many other religious communities, is the *Chronicle of the Catholic Church in Ukraine*, published in 1984 by the "Initiative Group to Defend the Rights of Believers and the Church".

The strength of the Ukrainian Church lies in its martyrdom and the trying tests it has to endure. Because the particular brand of Ukrainian Christianity is founded upon a powerful moral, religious and cultural basis, and because religion is so firmly imbedded in the soul of the Ukrainian nation, which has, since the time of Volodymyr the Great, identified its national interests with Christianity, the Christian religion has survived for 1000 years and the Ukrainian nation has not disappeared as a separate national and religious entity. The recent resurgence of religious activity in Ukraine has stimulated the spread of religious and national consciousness among the Ukrainian people and has led to a great religious, cultural and national revival.

The Millennium of Christianity, which we will be celebrating in two years time, will be the turning point in the liberation struggle. It will lead to a great upheaval of the Ukrainian nation on two plains — national and religious — by markedly increasing the present national renaissance along religious and national lines, and by instilling the whole population of Ukraine with a great pride in its 1000-year religious and cultural heritage. The fact that Christianity has survived in Ukraine for 1000 years will show the people that despite many attempts to destroy religion in Ukraine, what has been given by God is eternal and cannot be destroyed by atheism. This will greatly strengthen the will, determination and energy to go on resisting atheism and Soviet Russian oppression and to ultimately establish an independent and sovereign national state, which will guarantee the freedom of religious worship.

The Millennium will have the same effect for the other religions in the Soviet Union, which are also going through a period of revival. Thus, the celebration of this great national and religious event will initiate a spiritual revolution and signal victory over atheism. In the years to come, after necessary preparations, this spiritual revolution will bring about a political and military victory over Soviet Russia and the breakup of Moscow's colonial empire. Therefore, the Millennium of the Christianisation of Ukraine will be a crucial event in the liberation struggle of the nations presently subjugated by Moscow.

Dr. Bohdan STEBELSKY

THE FACES OF CULTURE

Among the great works of literature of Ukrainian resistance, *The Faces of Culture*¹ paints the widest and deepest picture of the colossal struggle with which the enemy, after physically subduing our nation in the armed clashes of the 1940's and 1950's, is attempting to crush the nation's spiritual strength and its cultural uniqueness, a uniqueness that is fundamental to national consciousness and the desire for national independence.

The enemy is no longer satisfied with despoiling the land, but, like wind and water, enters into all the crevices of the thoughts and emotions of the conquered in order to enslave them and enable them to live only in the organism of the conqueror. And at such a moment, at the very time of the enemy's aggression against the mind and soul of a nation, a decisive battle takes place for the existence of a nation, its very life or death.

Every nation is an individual, with its particular biological, mental and perceptual characteristics, which are reflected in a people's culture. Every people has its beginnings in some birth, in some formative event; it has its own paths of development, its own life experience, which is translated into its life's ideals and is reproduced in its spiritual creativity, its customs and beliefs, its arts and its world view. All these elements of the style and content of a people, created by it from the very beginning of its existence, are called a people's culture.

A nation ceases to exist from the moment that it loses its own culture and with it its historical memory and its concrete experience of life and the ideals to which bygone generations have contributed and for which they have lived. That is why we dare to say that the most important and decisive battle that our nation is waging with the aggressor is being waged on the cultural front, on the instinctive and conscious feelings of one's separateness and individuality, around an individuality that the occupant is trying to erase from memory and substitute for it his own cultural content.

This struggle takes place formally under the slogan of national cultures according to the class principle and of the foisting upon enslaved nations the concepts of a "bourgeois-nationalist" as opposed to a "proletarian-internationalist" culture. This division is created with the intent of destroying individual cultures and of creating the possibility for the real goal of the Russian occupants under their theories of the "merging of cultures", the "friendship of peoples", and the "union of nations" for the eventual creation of one "Soviet people", educated in the spirit of "proletarian culture". The model for proletarian culture is Russian culture in which are carefully preserved all the characteristics of Russian "bourgeois" culture. The Russian language is regarded as the language of the future Soviet people, since, because of its influence on the languages of the enslaved nations, these

¹ Stepan Hoverla, *The Faces of Culture*, Ukrainian Publishers Ltd., London, 1984.

people experience a "blossoming" and "perfecting" reaching to the very peak already attained by the "most developed" Russian language.

All the conquests of the tsarist, and the later Russian bolshevik, empire are regarded as a "progressive historical phenomenon" because they influenced the cultural and economical "development" of the conquered peoples. The "most progressive phenomenon" is the drawing together and merging of all cultures into one nation of Russian, Ukrainian, and Byelorussian peoples who, in the time of Kyivan Rus', presumably made up a Rus' people and who, so it is said, later disintegrated into three separate nations under the pressures of the Tatar and Lithuanian occupation. Soviet history, archaeology, anthropology, ethnography, literature and all the branches of the arts have the task of showing not only the "close connections" of these three nations and the "common roots" of their cultures, but also the historical tendencies and desire for "union", the complete cultural merging of these three nations and the eradication of everything that prevents or contradicts this. Thus in the historical disciplines, the "cultural workers" make use of the method of falsification and Leninist "dialectics", while in the sphere of the arts the method is changed to the physical destruction of creative styles and the tradition of the so-called socialist realism.

Does there really exist an original parent country of these three nations — Ukrainians, Byelorussians, and Russians? In particular, there is the question of whether there exists a common culture of these three nations that are called Slavic? Do they have, other than their family of languages, a common character? Do they have common ancestors so that one could speak of an estrangement and the necessity of restoring the unity of three Slavic-speaking peoples?

Nations change their languages during the course of history. True, they do not change these as often as they do their names, but under the influence of historical circumstances nations have changed and continue to change their language; for there have always existed conquering and conquered nations. Most often, the conquerors have forced their language on the conquered. The Romans forced their language on the peoples of the Pyrenean peninsula, and Latinised Gaul; in the Balkans they Latinised the Dacians and Slavs, thus creating the basis for the Rumanian language and people. From as far back as the paleolithic age there have been no large tracts devoid of population centres in Europe. Every ethnic group that changed its territory occupied the territory of another indigenous population. It was not always necessary to destroy the original inhabitants; usually the invader mixed with the natives. This process is explained by the theory of substrata. The Eastern Slavs, whose territories are marked out by archaeologists and linguists, consolidated their homeland between the Carpathians, the Prut and the Danube in the west, the left-bank tributaries of the Dnieper in the east, the Black Sea in the south, and the Prypyat and the Oder. The Greeks designated the Slavs as the Sklaviny and Antes; the Romans called them Vanadians. As has been stated, we are not concerned

with the name and the language of our ancestors, whom history does not remember; but they are clearly noted in archaeology, anthropology, and the remains of their material culture. The latter testifies to the social and spiritual culture of our ancestors, which has sustained itself to the present and which had the name of Antes and Rus' in the past and is now called Ukrainian.

We are concerned here with the permanence of the indigenous population of the geographical area on which, from neolithic age until the time of Kyivan Rus', a unity of territorial, material, and spiritual culture, a continuity of beliefs, customs and folkways has sustained itself from one epoch to the next. The thesis of the indigenous character of the culture of the Ukrainian territories was formulated by the father of Ukrainian archaeology, V. Khvoyka; it was upheld by Ya. Pasternak and the majority of Ukrainian archaeologists.

Beginning with the mesolithic age, from the 6th century B.C., the Buho-Dniester culture showed signs of a continuous agricultural community in Ukraine, which is at the same time one of the oldest agricultural societies of Balkan Europe. At the beginning of the 4th century B.C., it transmitted its agricultural characteristics to the Trypillian culture, which reached as far as the Dnieper and lasted until the 2nd century B.C. Afterwards there appeared the string culture, known in Ukraine as the Middle-Dnieper. In the white-breasted culture, in which elements of the Trypillian reappeared and which ended the bronze age and crossed over into the black forest age, we have the beginnings of the iron age, which entered into the age of the Scythians and Iranians. The majority of professional archaeologists see in this culture the tie to the Eastern Slavs, who gradually developed the Zarubynetsky and, finally, the Chernyakhivsky cultures, and which correspond to the historical Antes. These created the first forms of a Slavic state on the territory of Ukraine from which Kyivan Rus' later emerged.

As we see, the population of Ukraine continued to occupy its geographical territory for over 8,000 years as a stable population concerned with agriculture, and the development of its material and spiritual culture, which resulted in the construction of living quarters, tools, ceramics, and ornamental symbols. The belief in the purifying force of fire, a belief exhibiting itself since the Trypillian age in the custom of cremation and continuing in various forms until the Christianisation of Rus', shows the continuity of culture of the native population. Having an almost uninterrupted contact with South-western Europe, this population created a complex culture whose development was broken by the migrating pastoral tribes of Asia. These nomadic tribes, looking for grazing lands for their flocks, moved across the steppes and, from time to time, drove the farming tribes into the forests, where they found shelter and from which they re-emerged into the steppes in safer times. The nomadic tribes crowded each other in their continuous migrations from the Caspian, Azovian, and Black Sea steppes into the Danube valleys.

North of the Prypyat stretched the lands of the Baltic tribes, the ancestors of the historical Prussians and the present-day Latvians and Lithuanians. They were settled cattle-raising tribes who gradually, under the influence of their southern neighbours, turned to farming. Linguistically the Balts were related to the Slavs, as they were, to a great extent, in their material and spiritual culture as well.

We get a totally different picture north-east of the Desna and the mouth of the Oka to the Volga basin and from the eastern coast of the Baltic to the White Sea and the Urals. In that region lived hunting and fishing tribes of Ugro-Finnish stock from mesolithic times, through the neolithic and bronze ages until the colonisation of those lands by Slavic conquerors in the first five centuries A.D.

According to contemporary chronicles, the Slavs who colonised the Baltic and Ugro-Finnish lands were unable to drive out the local populations, which outnumbered the colonists, and gradually intermingled with them ethnically. The present-day Byelorussian and Russian territories were colonised by northern and western Slavic tribes. The latter include, according to the chronicles, the Viatychi, the Slovens and the Radymychi, and some archaeologists also add the Kryvychi. The Slavs, surrounded by a sea of Finnish tribes, were centred in the large city of Novhorod, and there developed a complex culture, which was, quite likely, imported from the south. Anthropologists see in the physical features of these Slavs traces of Pontic racial characteristics; their language also retained certain Slavic elements.

The Viatychi and the north-eastern Kryvychi took over the culture and beliefs of the indigenous local hunting tribes, although they retained their linguistic dominance. Some archaeologists deny their Slavic origin, regarding the Dryhovychi, Kryvychi, Radymychi, Slovens, and Viatychi as Slavicised tribes rather than true Slavs.

It is hardly surprising that with the disintegration of the Kyiv empire, which was multinational in its ethnic composition, foreign tribes began to build their own states on the basis of their age-old traditions and territories. The Ukrainian people retained its agricultural character within the boundaries of its ancient Slavic culture; the Byelorussian people formed and separated itself within the cultural boundaries and territories of the former Baltic tribes north of the Prypyat. And around the Oka and Volga rivers, on the former territories of the Ugro-Finns, there began to form the embryo of the Russian nation, built on the traditions of a hunting and trapping culture. One can only speak of the unity of the Slavic peoples in a linguistic sense, and here only as concerns the Byelorussian and Ukrainian languages with their Balto-Slavic language heritage. One should be careful about the Russian language, which consists mainly of lexical similarities, but is different from the Ukrainian language phonetically, syntactically, and morphologically. One can translate almost literally Shevchenko into Byelorussian or Kupala into Ukrainian. But it is impossible to translate Pushkin into Ukrainian or Byelorussian in the same way. The languages differ in character.

As in the north of Eastern Europe, a similar process of Slavicisation occurred in the Balkan peninsula where the Antes and Sklavyiny were assimilated by the native tribes of Traky, Macedonians and Illyrians, as well as by the invading Tyrsky Bulgars. Thus new nations were formed from local cultures and with which were connected the Bulgarians, Macedonians, Serbs, Croatians, and Slovenes. They were called Slavs and their culture, similar to that of the Ukrainians, was based on ancestors who spread the Trypillian culture and were neighbours, in the west, of other long-standing agricultural tribes of Europe, the carriers of the so-called Lentochna culture, contemporaneous with the Trypillian.

The theory of substrata is important in the study of the formation of nations; according to it we can explain the appearance of, for example, Mexicans, who are not Spaniards although they speak Spanish. We can prove that Peruvians, Bolivians, and Paraguayans in South America are also not Spaniards. Thus we conclude on the basis of archaeology, anthropology, ethnography, and the history of culture as a whole that the Russian nation arose from different cultural and ethnic origins than the Ukrainian, and that it has its own character, which influences its style of life with its biological, social, and spiritual roots. The character of a Russian is diametrically opposite to that of a Ukrainian.

The Ukrainian, a tiller of the soil with a sense of personal dignity and of private property, is freedom-loving, equable, and hospitable even towards foreigners. Ukrainian society, whether in the times of the Antes, in the Kyivan Rus' era, or in Cossack times, knew of no serfdom or slavery. The system of exploitation and plunder is a characteristic of the subjugator of the Ukrainian people, whether today or in the past.

The Russian phenomenon is a product of a communal social organisation that has no basis in private property. It stresses the discipline of the group and its subordination to its leader. In its form of bolshevism and proletarian internationalism it serves as a classic example of the old hunting cultures. In its character, as in that of every hunter, there are traits of hunting and pillaging. Hunters live according to the rule of might, not of justice. Such traits developed over the course of thousands of years of hunting life of the Finnish tribes, the ancestors of present-day Russians. A strong element of Tatar racial characteristics entered into this stream and with it that of the horde, a faceless mass that acts obediently on the order of the khan's whip.

The Russian has not changed, not with the coming of a system of agriculture, not under the influence of Christianity (imposed by Kyivan Rus'), not with the arrival, from the Kyiv-Mohylansky Academy in Ukraine, of an educated clergy, not with the European reforms of Peter I, and not with the influence of the Polish-Lithuanian, and later the German and Cossack, nobility on the Russian boyars. All this was instinctively rejected by the Russians who, liberated by Lenin, showed once again their hunter's teeth. This Russian character was described by Alexander Blok in his poem *The Scythians*:

Millions of you, but hordes and hordes of us.
Our might is irresistible.
Yes, we are Scythians! Yes, we are Asiatics!
With slanting, greedy eyes.

See! The day has come. Misery is flapping its wings.
The time of destruction is nearing,
And perhaps there where your temples have stood
Now only weeds will be growing.

You antique, sagacious world! Before you
Tumble into the grave from wealth and boredom,
Stand, like Oedipus, before the Sphinx
And try to solve its riddle.

Russia is the Sphinx, sombre and bright
And soaked in dark blood.
It gazes and gazes into your eyes
With love and hate.

It loves, our blood loves.
For long no one of you has loved so!
You have forgotten that there is love in the world
That burns and destroys.

We love flesh, its colour and taste,
And its tainted, mortal smell.
Are we to blame when your skeleton cracks
In our heavy and delicate paws?

Widely, in powerful dress
We will spread out in the wild spaces
Before Europe. We will show you
Our Asiatic faces.

We won't move when the cruel Hun
Greedily searches corpses,
Burns cities, drives cattle into temples,
Roasts the flesh of the white captives.

Even to the author of the Kyivan chronicles the character of the two cultures of the Kyivan Rus' empire was readily apparent. In the south live "wise and thoughtful men"; in the north men live "like animals".

Mykola Chubatyy writes: "Two different minds and two different ideologies can clearly be detected in the relations of Kyiv and the Suzdal-Volodymyr state, the forerunner of Moscow, towards the Tatars when the Tatar wave engulfed Eastern Europe. Kyiv, carrying on the traditions of

its ancestors, decided to resist the barbarians of the steppes; the forerunners of Moscow decided to capitulate and cooperate"². And he writes further: "No one has so definitively described the mentalities of Rus'-Ukraine and Muscovy as the Russian writer Alexey Tolstoy, author of the well-known historical novel *Prince Serebryany*. According to Tolstoy, two attitudes revealed themselves on the part of the two halves of the ancient Rus' lands towards the Tatars: 'One Rus'', he writes, 'has its roots in universal, at least European culture. In this Rus' the ideas of goodness, honour, and freedom are understood as in the West. But there is another Rus', the Rus' of dark forests, the Rus' of the taigas, the animal Rus', the fanatic Rus', the Mongol-Tatar Rus'. This last Rus' made despotism and fanaticism its ideal. Certain historical data make it possible for us to see the first ideal in the Rus' of old Kyiv, and to see all the negative features of the opposite tendency, the eastern and despotic, in Moscow, which rose on the spiritual ruins of Kyiv. Kyivan Rus' was a part of Europe; Moscow long remained the negation of Europe'"³.

A similar opinion was stated by historian Yury Vernadsky about the "something" that separated Kyiv from Moscow: "That 'something' was the spirit of freedom — individual, political, and economic — which prevailed in the Rus' of that day and which the Muscovite principle of the individual's complete obedience to the state was in complete contrast"⁴.

Similar to Tolstoy, Mykola Khvylovy perceived, with great intuition, the contrasts between Ukraine and Muscovy. In his novel *Editor Kark* he describes two opposing forces: "Hryhory Savych Skovoroda — this is how the Russian intelligentsia likes it: Hryhory Savych, Nikolai Romanovych, Vladymyr Ilich, Taras Hryhorovych. And in this there is something of the northern sweetness and stubbornness, of marshy forests and Ivan Kalyta, of Russian strength — a great strength, fatal, and coming from Varangian guests. And there are no cherry orchards here — in June, stars grow on the cherry trees — and there are no pretty girls' songs, far off near the villages... Smoke... There has always been smoke over Ukraine, he thought, and all of it has been enveloped in the smoke of uprisings, in the smoke of suffering... And there was fire and also a great, immense strength, a fatal strength, only it did not come from Varangian guests"⁵.

It is not important whether Khvylovy was correct in naming Russian strength Varangian; the important thing is the opposition of two great, overwhelming, and fatal forces — that of the northern hunters and that of the southern farmers. The former, in order to live, must kill and plunder; the latter earn their bread in the sweat of their brows, by work. They kill only to defend their lives or their possessions. The "truth of Rus'" is a Ukrainian creation, the result of life experience of thousands of ears. Moscow did not act according to this truth because it lived by a truth of its own.

² Mykola Chubaty: *Medieval Rus' and the Emergence of the Three East-Slav Nations*, p. 101.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 101.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 101.

⁵ Mykola Khvylovy: *Works*, Vol. 1, p. 37.

It did not know the freedom of the individual, his dignity, the right of private property, the two-member marriage; it lived by the commune. The "truth of Moscow" takes no consideration of personal freedom or individual privacy; it takes no consideration of the lives of millions of people or of whole nations. It subjugates nations according to the law of the hunter-plunderer. Thus were subjugated the lands of Ryazan, Tver; thus was Novhorod destroyed and its population, or what was left of it, was transferred to Muscovy.

In war Russian imperialism lacks the courtly ideal of Kyivan prince Svyatoslav's "I am setting out against you". In a direct open struggle Moscow would lose; it always uses cunning, like the hunter. It conceals its real aims by fictions that confuse its victims, fictions like Russian orthodoxy, pan-Slavism, or internationalism. Under the guise of Marxism, Russian imperialism forges a communism, first, by the creation of a "Soviet" people in the USSR and then nations of a world proletariat through the "fusion of peoples". Russian imperialism has as its goal the mission of its race — to melt into one all the nations of its empire and, eventually, the whole world in accordance with the Russian character and style of life. At first they desire to instil the language and culture of Lenin into the Ukrainians and Byelorussians, the Baltic peoples, and the Caucasian, Turkic and Central Asian peoples; and when this is done, then the Europeans in the West, the Americans, and the Asians will be next.

Russian imperialism does not use the words "conquer", "subjugate", or "occupy". It has its own terminology for these acts — "unite", "free", "aid", "make friends", "draw near", "bring together", "develop".

A classic example of the essence of Russian "liberation" and "aid" is Lenin's statement that "only through the united efforts of the Great Russian and Ukrainian proletariat is a free Ukraine possible; without such a united effort all such talk is useless"⁶. Any other kind of Ukraine, that is, an independent Ukraine, is impossible! There can be no "talk" of an independent, only about a "free" Ukraine and, constitutionally, a "sovereign" Ukraine, since such a designation is empty when the power is in Russian and in imperial hands. When Ukraine is socialist, when it is Soviet, when it is part of a union, when its capital is in Moscow, when a "republic" provides a "state" with everything it produces, when the whole empire, from the Carpathians to Kamchatka is an indivisible "fatherland" — only then can one speak of a "free", even of a "thriving" Ukraine.

The bolshevik system of total dictatorship cannot transform itself into a democracy, just as the system of a collective economy, which originates in the social and racial characteristics of the Russians, cannot transform itself into a system of private ownership or individual initiative. The bolshevik system gives the Russian nation boundless capacity to control the physical, material, and spiritual life of other peoples as never before. But this does not mean that the character of this nation differed in earlier

⁶ Lenin: *Works*, Vol. XX, p. 14.

times. The Russian historian E. Solovyov in the work *Nicholas, the Gendarmes, and Literature* states: "Everyone was assigned a strictly delimited place, and from everyone it was required that he should talk, think, and feel exactly as he was ordered to do... The system destroyed everything that was in its way".

Behind the screen of the social transformation of the nations conquered by Moscow, the main goal of the occupant has been and is to make these nations totally dependent, to create an economic system that would control the life of every person, direct it, and form it into a helpless brick in the construction of the empire. The physical destruction of nations and the terror against their governing classes have laid the foundation for the mass transfer of native population into other peoples' territories. The centralised rule in Moscow, developing its empire's industry and urbanising individual republics, makes use of the direction of the productive sectors of nations by means of "aid" to and "friendship" among nations. Under the pretext of aiding the "labour force", Russians, Byelorussians, Georgians, and even Uzbeks are brought into the industrial centres of Ukraine. Meanwhile, the Ukrainian peasantry is displaced into the virgin lands of Kazakhstan, and the Ukrainian worker is forced to leave the industrial cities of Ukraine in order to construct trade centres in Siberia such as Tyumen, BAM, and others.

The transfer of population under the façade of economic productivity takes place at the cost of young people of both sexes, usually single, who marry in an environment of mixed nationalities and become pliable material for assimilation. Assimilation is furthered by the heterogenous national composition of the empire's industrial centres, where the only conversational language of these people is Russian and where the schools and the cultural services available to all nationalities use the Russian language exclusively.

As a result of this policy created in Moscow there are fewer and fewer members of the younger generations from the native populations of the "national republics" who start families, the national make-up changes, and the natural increase in the number of the native population becomes smaller. The population growth is the result of immigration from other national republics, most often from the RSFSR. The result of this planned policy is that the Russian minority grows proportionally larger than the majority of Ukrainians in the republic.

The cosmopolitan character of Ukrainian cities, especially of the industrial centres, gives the Russian occupant the chance to stress the thesis of the importance of the Russian language as an intra-national means of communication.

The First Secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine V. Shcherbytskyi, on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the creation of the USSR, said, "The Russian language, consciously and freely chosen by all the peoples of the USSR as an instrument of intra-national communication, plays an extraordinarily large unifying role; it serves the goal of intra-national fraternity of workers, of the exchange of material and cultural

achievements, and of the enrichment of national cultures". The author in whose work this quote is found goes on to state: "The working class, as V. I. Lenin emphasised, supports everything that erases national differences and welcomes assimilation... Life has fully proved the Marx-Leninist thesis that socialism is impossible without defeating all inherited... national exclusivity and national bounds. Socialism... has found the road to the drawing closer of all nations, to their grouping into a single multinational community, to the realisation of their complete unity, to the future merging of nations"⁷.

The same author proceeds to write: "From the specific nationality there is excluded all that is outmoded and reactionary in the sphere of customs, traditions, and culture, all that impedes the course of the drawing near of nations and nationalities. The drawing together of nations is a natural process... and there is no basis for artificially halting it, especially by preserving those "unique" national traits that have already grown old with age and over which anti-communists 'lament' so much"⁸.

One could cite many more passages from various authors, Russians and renegades from the enslaved nations. But this would be pointless: they are all the same. Behind them stands the chauvinist, imperialistic Russian axe that destroys the individuality of other peoples and nations, their cultures and traditions, and their rights to be themselves, to live according to their ways, to cultivate their own cultures, and to surround themselves with the borders of their own national states.

All the means available to the state apparatus are used to further the programme of the merging of nations and the creation of a new Soviet people on a Russian pattern. To this end are mobilised all levels of the school system, youth organisations, the military, the press, and artistic, academic, and professional organisations. All these carry out the programme of the Communist Party of the USSR in all spheres of life of the empire's peoples. These agencies have the goal of turning these peoples into Russians. Their goal is to cultivate the "language of the revolution", "the language of the great Lenin", the Russian language, which is the "means of joining the Soviet people to cultural achievements of all the people of the USSR, to the achievements of world culture".

The goal is to "remove everything that is outmoded and reactionary" in the Ukrainian nation. This includes the destruction of Ukrainian churches, the extirpation of the customs and traditions of the thousand-year-old Ukrainian culture, the extirpation of the styles and works of Ukrainian poets, writers, artists, composers, and even the forcing of Russian folk art into Ukrainian national centres under the pretext of "innovation". Everything native and original in Ukrainian culture is regarded as outmoded and as "obstructive to the drawing near of nations and nationalities". Thus, for

⁷ See L. Nahorna: *Against the Bourgeois Falsification of the National Policy of the CPSU*.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 149.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 170.

example, the geometrical ornaments of Ukrainian art, which have existed on Ukrainian lands from paleolithic times, are suppressed and in their place is substituted the naturalistic motifs of Russian folk art, with its animal, plant, and anthropomorphic ornaments. The deformation of Ukrainian culture, its de-stylisation, and its dislocation are conducted by plan in all the territories of Ukraine. It will suffice to compare pre-Soviet publications on 19th century and earlier folk art with the art of the so-called "Soviet" period in order to see the catastrophic decline of Ukrainian culture, which is produced by Moscow-schooled folk artists in cooperatives and factories.

Moscow keeps a sharp watch out for artists who grow out of the roots of Ukrainian culture and strive to bind the present to the past or those whose talent strays from the programme of destruction of nations and which creates genuine cultural values. Then Moscow destroys with its hunter's hands these talented individuals. Thus the composer Mykola Leontovych, who opened the doors to the treasures of the Ukrainian national folk songs died at its hands, Volodymyr Ivasiuk, who led Ukrainian youth away from the influence of Russian popular songs, also perished in this way. Mykola Khvylovy, whose motto was "Away from Moscow!" met the same fate. Les Kurbas, the creator of the Ukrainian modern theatre; the creators of Ukrainian modern art Mykhailo Boychuk, Vasyl Sedlyar, and Ivan Padalka perished in exile. Poets perished, as did the ablest scholars. But so did archaeologists, historians, linguisticists, literary figures, and art critics. Similarly to Leontovych and Ivasiuk, Alla Horska was also murdered because in her works she exposed, as did Symonenko, the hell of the Russian "heaven".

Today there exist two cultures in Ukraine. The first is the culture that, along with its practitioners, the occupant is destroying, but which continues to be preserved and developed; the second is an anti-culture, which the occupant is attempting to force on the population. This official anti-culture is cultivated, in each enslaved nation, by those with vested interests — the members of the academies of sciences, the professional art unions, theatre, music, and ballet ensembles, journal and book publishers, radio and television, and all other communication and information media. Everything that the latter "create" is assigned by the communist party, which is directed by Moscow. The first culture, the real one, is erased and extirpated along with its undaunted creators. This true culture has found itself in the underground self-publishing organs and its creators — in prisons and concentration camps. The officials have the powers of an occupational force because they have their orders and, out of weakness and greed, have agreed to stupefy and paralyze the consciousness of the nation with Moscow's propaganda to kill in the people the awareness of their uniqueness and individuality. Ukrainian official literature has as its goal the "building of communism", the development of "a feeling of one family", — one fatherland with its capital in Moscow. The propaganda of these officials not only inundates Ukraine, but is sent abroad by Moscow. It is sent in the name of contact and cultural "exchange". Ukrainians abroad who do not know

what anti-culture is or what real Ukrainian culture is become victims of Moscow's lies. They take anti-culture for Ukrainian culture and help Moscow to poison them and their environment.

For a long time we have not had any works that might have thrown light on the struggle in the area of culture, the struggle for the mind and soul of the nation. The author of this book has in some degree filled the void, giving a picture of this struggle, its methods, sacrifices and goals. The reader will profit from the experience of an eyewitness and indomitable participant in the struggle for a true Ukrainian culture; he will feel the pain of the author and his warning that Ukraine is in danger.

If the reader feels and understands this, the author will have achieved his goal.

A NEW PUBLICATION ON THE MILLENNIUM OF
CHRISTIANITY IN UKRAINE

**WAS IT REALLY RUSSIA THAT WAS
CHRISTIANISED IN 988?**

by His Beatitude Myroslav Ivan
Cardinal Lubachivsky

Basing himself on both Ukrainian and Russian historiography, the author points out the distinct origin of the Ukrainian and Russian nations and describes the historic process by which Christianity was officially adopted as the state religion of Kyivan-Rus' in 988. The Cardinal argues very convincingly that the true descendants of Rus' are the Ukrainian people and the Ukrainian Church, with its many denominations, and not the Russians and the Russian Orthodox Church, and that in two years time it is the Ukrainians who will be celebrating a 1000 years of Christianity in Ukraine. He also explains why the Russian Orthodox Church and the Soviet Russian authorities are trying so hard to convince the world that 1988 will see the alleged millennium of Christianity in Russia.

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UNDERSTANDING SOVIET STRATEGY

Much emphasis is placed in training on "the threat", and this is understandably seem primarily in terms of Soviet capabilities and tactical doctrine. However, tactics are subordinate to strategy, just as strategy itself is subordinate to what the Soviets call "military doctrine", which is their equivalent of American "national security policy". In this article I propose to look at some of the distinctive features of Soviet strategic thought.

The Soviets themselves regard their strategy as being both distinct from, and superior to, that of the West. This inherent superiority is due above all to the fact that it is firmly grounded in Marxism-Leninism. Marshal V. D. Sokolovsky, who produced the standard textbook on Soviet strategy, claimed that this "advanced scientific theory... allows the knowing and the correct use of objective laws, which determine victory". In contrast, Western strategy is directed at "preserving and consolidating the obsolescent capitalist system" and at a "struggle with the advanced and progressive system of human society — the socialistic"¹. Marxist thought distinguishes different categories of wars, and in each case the correct communist standpoint is clearly set forth; "good" or "just" wars are those, which further the cause of socialism. A future world war will, by definition, have been started by the West, and since only the imperialist powers resort to aggression, it follows that the USSR can never be the aggressor, irrespective of which side starts the shooting. Lenin (who had studied his Clausewitz) defined war as "the continuation of policy by other [i.e. violent] means". On another occasion he defined war as "a tool of policy". The extent to which this oft-quoted dictum can be taken in a nuclear age is open to question. The role of ideology is by no means static, and one must beware of over-simplifying the Soviet position. Nevertheless the very fact that Soviet decision-makers subscribe to a common philosophical doctrine gives Soviet strategy a cohesion and a consistency, which is lacking in its Western counterpart.

Whereas the tendency in the West since 1945 has been to regard strategy as being "too important to be left to the military", this is emphatically not the case in the USSR. There is no Soviet equivalent to the RAND Corporation. In any case, the distinction between the civilian and the military leadership is far from clear-cut even in peacetime, and would probably disappear altogether in time of war. This imparts a distinctive flavour to Soviet strategy, summarised by Benjamin Lambeth as "highly systematic in formulation, unambiguously martial in tone, and explicitly geared to the belief that should deterrence fail, some recognisable form of victory is theoretically attainable through the skilful exploitation of initiative, surprise and shock"². In other words, strategy is combat-orientated, with the emphasis on war-fighting, war-winning, and the military and political exploitation of

1 V. D. Sokolovsky, *Soviet Military Strategy*, ed. H. F. Scott (N. Y. 1968), p. 1.

2 J. Baylis & G. Segal, *Soviet Strategy* (London 1981), p. 106.

victory. This amounts to a strategy of deterrence, which rests, not on the rationality or good will of the enemy, but on the intrinsic capabilities of the Soviet armed forces; no other deterrent theory is acceptable to them. The Western concept of mutual assured destruction (MAD) was never likely to find favour with Soviet writers. It was seen as a civilian rather than a military concept; it meant publicly admitting that the Soviet Union needed to be deterred; and worst of all it was based on an assumption of mutual vulnerability totally unacceptable given the perceived technological superiority of the USA. The Soviets therefore aim at "deterrence by denial", making sure that no military advance can accrue to anyone attacking the USSR. To this end, deterrence and war-fighting capability are fused together in "dialectical unity". Should deterrence fail, the Soviets believe that a multi-layered strategy would be more likely to leave them in a position of net advantage than would a system of passive deterrence.

Sokolovsky condemns the "bourgeois" notion that nuclear war would mean the end of politics, and it is an article of faith that, should the imperialists unleash a world nuclear war, the outcome would be the destruction of capitalism and its replacement by socialism. Such a war would be a complex and many-sided process, involving economic, diplomatic and ideological means, in addition to the operations of the armed forces. Since Stalin's death the theory of the inevitability of world conflict between the two opposing systems has been modified to allow for "peaceful co-existence", although it should be remembered that "peace" for Marxist-Leninists does not have the morally-loaded connotations it has in the West; it simply means absence of **armed** conflict. However, the awful destructive power of nuclear weapons is not played down by the Soviet leadership. Brezhnev appeared to recognise the reality of MAD without espousing it as a basis for national security, and Andropov said in 1976 that nuclear weapons would make the consequences of war "truly catastrophic". R. L. Arnett³ quotes civilian sources on the non-survivability of nuclear war, and although military theorists like Khalipov and Milovidov argue against this, at least one, General Zhilin, appears to accept the capacity of both sides for mutual destruction. War might still be a tool of policy, but the consensus would appear to be that nuclear war is not a practical instrument, given the correlation of forces. But it cannot be wished away, and the prime task of Soviet strategy must therefore be to plan for the fighting and winning of a nuclear war.

Soviet writing places great emphasis on "strategic planning", which covers a) the achieving of a "military-technical" superiority, b) operation planning for the deployment of forces, c) mobilising the economy, and d) civil defence (CD). In terms of force requirements, mere parity is not sufficient. The Soviets aim at a numerical preponderance, which confers a double advantage. In peacetime it shifts the burden of anxiety onto one's opponent, and in wartime it provides a cushion of reserves. Forces are organised in three strategic echelons (differentiated by degrees of manning and combat readi-

3 Ibid, p. 61.

ness) plus substantial reserves. These echelons and reserves must be accumulated in peacetime, as a nuclear war will jeopardise production. It includes reserves of Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and Professor Erickson has suggested a reload capacity four times greater than the nominal ICBM deployment. There is a marked tendency to over-insure in military affairs, stemming from a history of relative weakness, and obsession with maximising security, and a readiness to base strategic planning on very bad or worst-case options. The great stress placed by the Soviets on civil defence is indicative of their attitude towards nuclear war, and the effectiveness of their CD measures with its implications for the strategic balance was greatly exaggerated in some Western circles during the 1970's. In wartime CD personnel are responsible for important military tasks, for example the repair of damaged installations, the maintenance of lines of communication, transport, and resupply.

The important factors in nuclear war are seen by Soviet strategists to be 1) the correlation of nuclear forces (i.e. the strategic balance), 2) secrecy and surprise, 3) the management of the war effort, and 4) the preparation of country and people. Surprise was not one of Stalin's "permanently operating factors", chiefly because it had to be played down in view of the success of the German surprise attack in 1941. Since his death, however, it has been constantly stressed. There is a fundamental reason for this. It is a basic tenet of Marxism that the side, which is economically stronger will predominate in any prolonged conflict. The Soviet leadership recognises that the economy of the capitalistic bloc taken as a whole is stronger than that of the socialist bloc, and that this superiority can only be offset by fully exploiting the advantages of surprise and shock action. The Soviets have long been sceptical about the feasibility of a limited war with the West, seeing it as an American ploy (i.e. a "theatre" nuclear war would leave the US homeland unscathed yet offset American conventional inferiority in Europe). For this reason they tend to base their own intermediate-range nuclear weapons on Soviet territory rather than in Eastern Europe, thus ensuring that any NATO attack on these systems would provoke immediate retaliation against mainland US targets. American concepts of escalation control, demonstration strikes, limited nuclear options and intra-war deterrence are frowned upon as half measures whose adoption would sacrifice the initiative. Despite slight shifts in this position recently, it remains generally true that the Soviets believe a nuclear war, once started, would rapidly escalate. Conventional forces are seen as a supplement rather than an alternative to nuclear weapons, and although they can envisage operations beginning with a conventional phase, they see this largely in terms of its usefulness for "camouflaging" preparations for a surprise nuclear attack.

The Soviets list a number of "strategic objectives" or "conditions of victory". The first of these is the defeat of the enemy's forces and potential. This will be achieved through surprise, the disruption of political and military control, the destruction of the enemy's ready military forces

(including nuclear ones), the protection of the homeland, and the maintenance of initiative and momentum. For this task the main burden will be carried by the Strategic Rocket Forces. The second objective is the seizure of strategically important areas. Sokolovsky makes this clear: "For final victory in this clearly expressed class war it will be absolutely necessary to bring about the complete defeat of the enemy's armed forces, to deprive him of strategic bridgeheads, to liquidate his military bases, and to seize strategically important regions... [these problems] can be solved only by the ground troops in co-operation with the other services of the armed forces"⁴. Thirdly, Soviet forces must penetrate deep into enemy territory, with the object of occupation and control. This is particularly applicable to Europe, but the importance of the USA itself is not overlooked; given the greater capacity of large states to survive, Soviet strategy must aim at the moral-political disintegration of the main enemy. The fourth objective is sovietisation, or as they put it, "ideological conversation"; the implications of this are obvious from recent history. Finally, war-termination is not seen as an end in itself; the Soviets look beyond the end of the war to consider the politics of the post-war world.

The Soviets see a future war as falling into phases: the period of threat, the initial period of war, and the second and subsequent periods. The period of threat may be long or short, but the Soviets regard a week as being a reasonable assumption for planning purposes. Since surprise is considered of vital importance, for the aggressor as well as for the Soviet Union, it follows that a correct determination of the threat can neutralise surprise. At the same time the mobilisation of the Soviet forces must be as covert as possible, and during the period of "open" mobilisation as brief as possible. During this phase, diplomatic efforts and disinformation are regarded as part of military strategy, as are eve-of-war subversion and the manipulation of leftist groups and "peace movements" in the West. Air defence (PVO) troops would be deployed and submarines and aircraft dispersed. (It should be noted that a smaller proportion of Soviet forces is maintained at a high state of readiness than in the case of NATO.)

The initial period of the war is seen as lasting for anything from days to weeks, and may well be the decisive one. An initial strike (in reality several massed nuclear strikes) would be made on "active" targets (nuclear delivery means, command and control elements, reconnaissance and ground support means) and "passive" targets (relating to the enemy's military potential or deemed important for military-political disintegration purposes). The Soviets do not use the terms "counterforce" and "countervalue" except when discussing US strategy. Their strategy is centred around a "goal" and missions to achieve that goal. Targetting policy is mission-orientated, priority being determined by balancing the danger posed by the target against its vulnerability. Particularly stressed is the importance of initial strikes against Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (C³I) elements. It is likely that a number of Submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs)

⁴ Sokolovsky, p. 198-9.

would be earmarked for use against such time-sensitive targets (e.g. those pertaining to the US Minuteman) because of their shorter flight-time; this must be balanced against the tendency since 1972 of wishing to withhold their ballistic-missile nuclear submarines (SSBNs) for later use. The EMP (electro magnetic pulse) effect resulting from the detonation of high-yield warheads in the upper atmosphere would be used to blind enemy early-warning systems and disrupt C³ and guidance systems. This is in contrast to the American policy of attempting to preserve communications systems because of their usefulness for intra-war negotiations. Attention would be paid to the correct sequencing of nuclear strikes, and to the achievement of flexibility; to the redirection and retargeting of weapons during the conflict; in short to the **management** of nuclear war.

Given the great emphasis placed by the Soviets on surprise, and on the "primacy of the offensive", it is clear that the Soviets would prefer the strategy of pre-emption if they stood on the brink of a nuclear war. In other words, the least miserable option at the brink of a hopelessly unavoidable nuclear catastrophe would be to strike first and decisively so as to ensure a measure of initiative and control, without which even a Pyrrhic victory would be impossible. This would be very much a last-ditch option. The Soviet Union would much rather gain its objectives without war, which in the words of Colonel V. Morozov, "can undermine the very foundations for the existence of human society and inflict tremendous damage to its progressive development"⁵. Although the Soviet leadership would have no scruples about initiating a war if it would achieve their objectives with the least risk, it is hardly likely that the USSR would willingly embark on a world war, the risks of which would be appalling. "Capitalism, as the main obstacle on the way to the progressive development of human society, must and should be eliminated by the revolutionary struggle of the popular masses under conditions of peaceful-coexistence of states with different social systems — world war is not necessary for this"⁶.

⁵ J. Douglass & A. Hoeber, *Soviet Strategy for Nuclear War* (Stanford 1979), p. 98.

⁶ Ibid. See also D. Leebaert (ed.) *Soviet Military Thinking* (1981), and P. H. Vigor, *The Soviet View of War, Peace and Neutrality* (1975).

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Taras KUZIO

BRITISH AND UKRAINIAN MINERS: COMPARISONS

At first glance there would be little or no connection between British miners and their Ukrainian counterparts. Yet, the connections do exist, and have dramatically expanded during the last few years. Donetsk, in the Donbas coalfield of south-east Ukraine, is twinned with Sheffield, the headquarters of the National Union of Mineworkers (N.U.M.). In addition, Arthur Scargill, the current leader of the N.U.M., has refused to support attempts to establish independent trade unions among Ukrainian miners through the efforts of those such as Aleksey Nikitin and Volodymyr Klebanov.

The year-long strike by the N.U.M. led to the strengthening of "international solidarity" between the N.U.M. and the Soviet Union, a process begun prior to the strike by Arthur Scargill. At meetings held for visiting British miners in the summer of 1984, Ukrainian miners promised to "voluntarily" donate 10% of their daily earnings to the N.U.M. strike fund. A few months later the Soviet news agency Tass reported that Ukrainian miners had "voluntarily" donated 859,000 roubles.

The strike by British miners was sparked by the decision, in March, 1984, to close "uneconomic pits" and reduce manpower by 20,000. The National Coal Board (N.C.B.) promised to honour its pledge that "every man, who wants to stay in the business can do so" — the reduction in manpower being accomplished through early retirement and voluntary redundancy schemes. Those working at pits that were scheduled to be closed could, if they so wished, be re-employed at others.

The Donetsk coalfield is also not without its problems. The share of this region's coal production has dropped from 81% (1913), 51% (1950) to 28% (1984). In the Donetsk basin, reserves of coal are rapidly becoming depleted, whilst what remains is contained in such thin seams that its exploitation is becoming less economically viable.

In the Soviet trade union newspaper, *Trud* (January 10, 1984), the declining share of the Donetsk coal output, "cannot help but concern economic managers and scientists". This decline has occurred despite new investment in the 1970's, and the report admitted that, "some people have said that the basin 'has no future', and, 'that its decline is not far off'". Although production levels could be maintained if labour productivity were increased, "this is no easy task". Radio Moscow (October 7, 1984) also stated that, "since the mid-1970's the Soviet coal industry as a whole has been operating at a loss. Of course, some collieries make a profit, but two-thirds of them are operated at a loss". Consequently, it would be true to say that, "the future of coal in both countries is not in doubt, only the location of the industry itself".

Mining in the Donetsk basin is becoming more dangerous and the hazards increasing as the miners have to work longer hours to maintain the production

levels. Klebanov and Nikitin were partly spurred into action by the lack of attention paid by both management and official trade unions to the concerns for the safety of the miners. Radio Moscow (January 5, 1985) even admitted that, "whilst particular attention is given to safety precautions in the coal mines, it is difficult to have 100% safety underground".

Radio Moscow referred to a fire that had swept the Krimenaya mine in Ukraine in the summer of 1984, due to a short circuit in an electrical cable. This was caused because, "people who would see to it that cables are in perfect order had failed to perform their duty". Radio Moscow shifted the blame from the authorities by claiming how this once again showed, "how much the safety of work depends on the miners themselves".

The sensitivity of the Soviet authorities to Western criticism could be seen in the *Trud* (January 16, 1985) rebuttal of an editorial that appeared in *The Times* entitled "The Life of the Soviet Miner". (January 8, 1985). *Trud* stated that claims to the existence of low wages, bad safety records and poor consumer service for Soviet miners are unfounded: "that is the real state of affairs, which the mouthpiece of the London elite, the newspaper, which pompously calls itself the *Thunderer* preferred not to notice. But the attempts to fulminate about Soviet miners, distort the fact and slander miners will merely rouse their indignation". A Ukrainian miner wrote to the newspaper *Trud* (Septemeber 21, 1980) complaining that: "We are constantly being deprived of our day off on Sunday". In 1980, in the Ukrainian coal mines, "every day in March, April, May, June and July was, without exception, a workday". These measures are taken, "without so much as a telegram from the Union ministry or the trade union's central committee, but on the basis of verbal instructions at the local level. No one then asks the permission of the miners trade union committees. Only 73 of Ukraine's 250 mines are meeting the plan during a regular work-week, despite Sunday working. Sunday's output is 50% lower than on a workday.

The reasons for this, according to *Trud* were: "Sundays are designated as increased output days, so that there is not even time for the routine maintenance of equipment and work areas that is normally done on weekdays. A full 12 hours of repair work is lost". Sixty seven mines were in dire need of repair, because preventive maintenance, which was once done on Sundays, is now "a much less frequent occurrence". Although there is no mention of accidents or safety problems here, one can only guess at the results of this Sunday working and negligence.

The institution of a seven-day week in one particular mine, "has resulted in a higher breakdown rate for machinery, the deterioration of labour discipline and a decrease in the workers interest in meeting plan assignments on regular workdays". The mine's trade union, "are not doing a proper job of making sure that normal work schedules are adhered to". In addition, "thousands of miners are recruited for second shifts without the consent of the trade union committee". Another report in *Pravda* (March 23, 1984) described how, starting in 1970, "more and more Sundays became

workdays for Donets Basin miners... Miners worked nine Sundays in 1970, 13 in 1975, 40 in 1980 and 54 — every single Sunday — in 1983". (Obviously the Soviet year has more weeks than the "capitalist year").

Although the number of Sundays worked has increased by 250% since 1975, the monthly average of work appearances has not. What has happened is that, "workers themselves make up for extra workdays by taking compensatory days off or failing to report for work". Those taking time off could not be punished by the manager, "when he himself is breaking the law by declaring Sunday a workday". The above occurs, "in the majority of mines in the Donetsk basin..." Miners' absenteeism has, "increased four-fold since continuous operations were introduced, and the figure is growing every year". Repairs and preventative maintenance, "are either done in a slapdash way or left "for later". Miners are losing 21 million tons of coal a year, "because of production stoppage, absenteeism and equipment breakdowns".

Throughout these official reports there is less concern expressed for the welfare or safety of the miners than for the fulfilment of the plan. One unofficial report described how conditions were "intolerable" in the Ukrainian mines. A Donetsk physician stated that, "at the age of 45 the miners were already old men. They were duped into fulfilling and over-fulfilling the plan. Safety equipment and security precautions existed only on paper. The management was constantly poisoning the Russians against the Ukrainians and vice-versa, without forgetting the Jews. This spectacle made me finally understand that the bright future was not just a long way off; it was totally unrealisable in such a sick society". The physician concluded: "Until I die I will never forget the way the miners lived and worked — not to mention the way they spent their holidays... For those miners there was no way out"².

Bearing this in mind there is little surprise at the attempt in 1977 by Klebanov and Nikitin to establish the Association of Free Trade Unions in the Donbas region of south-east Ukraine — three years prior to Solidarity³. In Ukraine, the increasing emergence of a nationally conscious working class is occurring for the first time in her history.

This coupled with insufficient investment, which has led to a decline in working conditions, and an average income that in 1979 was 12% below the all-union level, has sparked numerous cases of worker discontent. Food shortages and poor social amenities have also contributed to this unrest. It is no wonder, therefore, that Ukrainian workers have been in the forefront of post-Stalinist civil unrest⁴. In March-April, 1984, disturbances took place at a number of factories in Kharkiv among workers protesting against unsatisfactory work conditions. The authorities blamed a visiting group of Polish workers, who were promptly sent home⁵.

An official survey of 12,000 families in Ukraine over a 30-year period, reflecting all population groups, joyfully acclaimed that: "Families with an income of over 100 roubles a month now comprised over 60% of the total". (Radio Moscow, October 29, 1984). If we deduct 10 roubles as a

donation to the British miners strike fund, then 60% of Ukrainian families have monthly incomes of over 100 roubles, whilst 40% have less than 100 roubles per month. Yet the official minimum wage in the Soviet Union was only 70 roubles per month in 1972⁶.

It is not difficult to understand the words of one Ukrainian miner, who stated: "The government has started to deduct 10 roubles from each miner's monthly wages. The money goes into a fund for English miners. Naturally, we were not asked to give prior approval of this measure. The government is doing this for propaganda purposes, to demonstrate the spontaneous solidarity of Soviet miners with their English counterparts..." He continues: "But 10 roubles is a lot for a man with a family to support. You can feed your family for three days with 10 roubles. As far as I'm concerned, the English miners can strike as long as they want to and the hell with them. It's not our problem. I'd just like to see them try to strike like that in the Soviet Union"⁷.

Arthur Scargill, the present leader of the British N.U.M., remains an enigma for many, and an extraordinary phenomenon for others. He is a revolutionary Marxist in a profoundly unrevolutionary society. In March, 1955, he joined the local branch of the Young Communist League and soon became its secretary. The membership of 11 when he joined, rose under his leadership to over 600. Within 18 months of joining the YCL, Scargill had been elected to its National Committee at the 1955 Congress. He also became chairman of the Yorkshire District YCL, and when the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) was formed, became involved in its activities, eventually becoming chairman of Yorkshire CND.

His upward movement in Marxist politics, consequently, was at a time when others were leaving in disgust at the suppression of the Hungarian uprising and Khrushchev's revelations on Stalin. His parents had the largest influence upon him, and his father has remained a Stalinist member of the British Communist Party until this day. Scargill admitted that, "at the age of 15 I decided that the world was wrong and I wanted to put it right virtually overnight if possible". In May, 1960, he stood as a CP Candidate in an election, but lost to his Labour Party opponent. He left the YCL in 1962-63 and committed himself completely to trade union business⁸.

Scargill's militant brand of oratory and contempt for compromise, mirror his intransigence in foreign affairs. He is on record as having denounced the Polish Solidarity movement as "anti-Soviet" and "anti-socialist", whilst praising General Jaruzelski as a "patriot". His favourite country remains Cuba, which he has visited a number of times as the guest of Fidel Castro. At the same time, he is passionately anti-American, and harbours nothing but contempt for the American Labour movement. In 1983 he withdrew the N.U.M. from the Miners International Secretariat, based in Brussels, which brings together non-communist miners unions. Scargill's aim was to establish a new Miners International linking East and West under Soviet control⁹.

Although Scargill called for "international solidarity" to back his strike in Britain he must have been disappointed to have found that Jaruzelski's

Poland turned out to be the main strike-breaker (exporting more than 400% more coal than prior to the strike to Britain). In addition, despite calls of "international solidarity" with the N.U.M. from Moscow, the USSR is still selling coal and oil to Britain under previously signed contracts.

The Soviet position was somewhat confused because the secretary of the central committee of the Soviet union of coal industry workers announced on Soviet television on the October 29, 1984 that: "...it has been decided that our foreign trade and freight organisations, regardless of the great loss of currency incurred, should for the entire period of the strike cease the export of coal to Britain and suspend the operation of contracts under which Soviet vessels were due to supply any kind of fuel to Britain". A few days later, Tass (October 3, 1984) complained that, "the press in a number of Western countries has of late been floating allegations that the Soviet Union is purportedly using its trading and economic links... as a tool of political pressure. The Foreign Trade Ministry of the USSR declares that the Soviet side always has honoured and will honour the signed contracts and agreements. All fabrications on this score are untenable and pursue aims that are hostile to the Soviet Union".

Although Scargill criticised the "hypocritical and anti-socialist" attitude of General Jaruzelski's regime in a letter to the Polish Federation of Trade Unions of Coal Miners in November, 1984, he has still to backtrack on his attitudes towards Solidarity and Free Trade Unions in the USSR. In November, 1980, Nikitin addressed an appeal to the British trade union movement asking for its support for an "action group in the USSR to organise independent trade unions". He called on organised British labour to offer Soviet workers rights campaigners "directions, practical advice and solidarity"¹⁰. Nikitin's appeal fell on deaf ears. When the cases of the forcible psychiatric imprisonment of Klebanov and Nikitin were brought up at the International Miners' Conference in Newcastle, England, the chief Soviet delegate replied that, "Klebanov was getting better" but that Nikitin "had been found in possession of weapons and would have to submit to court proceedings". Needless to say, Arthur Scargill believed the Soviet authorities that both Nikitin and Klebanov were "unstable".

When their cases were brought up by another Yorkshire miner, John Cunningham, Scargill's answer was deliberate and predictable¹¹: "I have nothing to add to the previous public statement made by the N.U.M. apart from saying that I only wish that the people, who constantly inundate this office with letters about the above two people do not appear to show any concern or very little about the tragedy in El Salvador and Nicaragua where more people are dying in a day than have been killed in the Soviet Union in the last ten years. "Could it be... that people have not heard of the American intervention, the terror that they are striking at... the whole of Central and Latin America". "International Solidarity" for repressed miners is only extended for those under Right-wing dictatorships, in Arthur Scargill's view.

In October-November, 1984, already ten months into the strike, Scargill and his vice-president and long-time member of the Communist Party, Mick McGahey, visited the Soviet Embassy in London to request aid and a halt in coal and oil deliveries¹². They were only successful on the former. N.U.M. officials also visited Libya around this time to seek aid from Colonel Gaddafi's regime; a highly provocative and diplomatically suicidal move in view of the expulsion of Libyan diplomats from Britain after the shooting of a police-woman earlier in the year.

The outcome of the miners strike is now history. But even by February, 1985, nearly fifty per cent of British miners were back at work. Many abandoned the strike for economic and financial reasons, whilst others refused to join the strike from the outset because of the refusal to hold a democratic ballot (as laid down in the N.U.M. rules). Arthur Scargill remembered well the negative vote in the previous two ballots. Working miners visited Solidarity leaders in October, 1984, in Poland. Most Polish workers remember Scargill's views on Solidarity and, therefore, express little sympathy for him. Lech Walesa gave his support to the working miners struggling for democracy in their union and against violence¹³. Walesa also admitted to a British journalist: "I admire him for his determination — he is tough — but it would be better if what he fights for is both reasonable and logical"¹⁴.

Since the inception of the strike by British miners, it has been supported wholeheartedly by the USSR. After a British miners news conference held in Moscow, (Radio Moscow, October 24, 1984) claimed that: "International Miners solidarity has played a decisive role in enabling the British miners strike to continue for more than seven months". Derek Reeves, a Yorkshire miner, said that, "This solidarity campaign inspires us in a firm conviction in the ultimate victory of our struggle for our rights". The USSR believed that the strike would show that, "industrial action,... has supplied fresh proof that the Marxist doctrine of class struggle will remain unshakeable as long as the working class in capitalism exists". (Radio Moscow, October 23, 1984). In addition, "whatever the outcome of the current conflict in the coal industry, Britain will never be the same", and the Conservatives have, "given a spur to processes, which may have far-reaching consequences for the political evolution of British society". (Tass, December 28, 1984).

At a time when there are reports of yet another disastrous Soviet harvest, the Soviet Union has sent along to Britain food aid for the striking miners. This "International Solidarity", seems to be lacking for the starving millions of Ethiopia — where the principal Soviet import seems to be of a military nature (and the food aid Western). After some of Moscow's food aid was not admitted to Britain because, "some of their meat products are not acceptable to British standards and can be a health hazard"¹⁵, Moscow complained of the "ridiculous and clearly fabricated pretexts" for this. (Tass, October 21, 1984). The food aid sent to Britain could have been used for the inhabitants of Kryvyi Rih, in Ukraine, who reportedly staged strikes and street demonstrations in protest at the lack of food in the shops¹⁶.

A large group of striking miners spent their 1984 holidays in Soviet resorts. Derek Reeves, leader of the holiday makers, said that British miners attended Soviet miners meetings of solidarity with their colleagues in Britain. They were very impressed and apparently believed that Ukrainian miners had agreed to "voluntarily" donate a share of their earnings to the strikers' fund. Radio Moscow (October 26, 1984) quoted Mr. Reeves as having said he had an enjoyable holiday, praising the Soviet miners moral and financial support, and saying that "in a socialist society such a strike would never occur". Another miner said, "Soviet people were friendly, happy and enjoyed a comfortable life style. Soviet miners enjoyed better working conditions than their British counterparts". Keith Towler told a Tass correspondent: "one lacks words to express gratitude to the Soviet colleagues for the care for us and our families. For us this is the supreme manifestation of the notion of international solidarity about which we heard from fathers... And since that solidarity exists — we feel 10 times stronger. The Tory government shall not break us" (Tass, October 8, 1984).

The acute naivety reflected in these comments speaks for itself, and cannot be dissassociated from the overall Sovietophilism that has permeated the National Union of Mineworkers under Arthur Scargill's leadership. The flagrant disregard for the rights of oppressed workers in Soviet dominated countries, and the disregard for the democratic rights of the members of his union, led the leadership of the N.U.M. to pursue a strike that had absolutely no chance of success.

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THE UKRAINIAN REVOLUTION: THE NATIONAL QUESTION AS THE ORIGIN OF THE DICHOTOMY BETWEEN RUSSIAN AND UKRAINIAN COMMUNISM*

IV. THE STRUGGLE FOR A SEPARATE UKRAINIAN COMMUNIST PARTY

a) The Kyivan Conference and the Tahanrih Preparatory Conference

From the very beginning of its existence, the Bolshevik wing of the RSDWP stood for a single, highly centralised Party, and any demands for a separate existence or even inter-party autonomy put forward by the various national groups were firmly rejected. This position of Party centralism was not altered even when some national parties moved toward the Mensheviks, who, after 1912, underwent a revision of their stand with regard to the national parties, and who accepted the Austrian conception of national cultural autonomy. As late as April, 1917, during the Seventh Conference of the RSDWP(B), the integrity of the Party was emphasised by Stalin — the main speaker at the Conference — who asserted that:

“We have still to settle the question of how to organise the proletariat of the various nations into a single, common party. One plan is that the workers should be organised according to nationality — so many nations, so many parties. [Austrian plan] This plan was rejected by the Social-Democratic Party. Experience has shown that the organisation of the proletariat of a given state according to nationality only leads to the destruction of the idea of class solidarity. **All the proletariat members of all the nations in a given state must be organised in a single, indivisible proletarian collective body**”¹¹¹.

Despite this principle of absolute centralism the Bolsheviks were compelled by the existing political reality in Ukraine to create for Ukraine a separate Bolshevik unit, with the Russian centre, however, providing the general pattern for the revolutionary struggle. The main reason behind this compromise was the growing popularity of the Ukrainian National Council (*Rada*); and only a well organised and well co-ordinated Bolshevik entity could attempt to counter its actions and leadership. Hence, on July 23, 1917, at the Regional Conference of the RSDWP(B) of the South Western Region the first step towards the formation of such a centre was taken. A Regional Committee consisting of nine members was established, with Kyiv as its place of residence. Simultaneously there took place a Regional Conference of the Donets and Kryvyi Rih basin, which also elected a Regional Committee to direct the Party activities. It is interesting that these two camps,

* Continued from *The Ukrainian Review*, No. 4, 1985.

¹¹¹ J. Stalin, *Marxism and the National and Colonial Question* (London, 1947), p. 66.

long antagonistic to each other, were "created in accordance with a directive of the Central Committee of the RSDWP(B)"¹¹². The regional Committees, however, turned out to be ineffective, and the creation of one Party centre for Ukraine became an utmost necessity.

Nevertheless, the Central Committee of the RSDWP(B) continued to reject the requests of the Bolsheviks in Ukraine for the creation of a single Party centre. Only after the formation of the Ukrainian Soviet "government" in Kharkiv did the Central Committee of the RSDWP(B) inform the Poltava Bolshevik Committee that:

"Ukraine as an independent unit may have its independent SD organisation, and for this reason it may call itself the Social Democratic Workers' Party of Ukraine, but since they [the Bolsheviks in Ukraine] do not wish to secede from the common Party, they exist with the same rights as an independent region"¹¹³.

It is clear from the above excerpt that the Bolshevik centre in Ukraine was regarded by Moscow not as a separate and independent Party, but merely as its regional unit, subservient to the CC RSDWP(B) in Moscow.

Despite this resolution by the CC RSDWP(B), the debate between the centralists (who stood for the indivisibility of the Communist Party) continued during the Kyivan Conference, which took place in December, 1917. While the Kyivan group argued that it was necessary to create a separate party since Ukraine was now a federative Republic, the centralists strongly opposed such a "national" party accusing the Kyivans of chauvinism. After long debates, the so-called "Chief Committee" was elected, whose purpose was to decide the status of the Bolsheviks in Ukraine. However, since most of the members of this Committee were "centralists" no conclusive steps were taken towards the creation of a separate party.

The idea of a separate Ukrainian party became accepted only in April, 1918, i.e. after the overthrow of Russian Bolshevik power in Ukraine. Consequently, during the evacuation of the Ukrainian Soviet government, a conference of the CIKU* took place in Tahanrih, where it was decided to form an independent Bolshevik Party of Ukraine. Commenting on this issue, Ravich-Cherkasky wrote¹¹⁴ that only historical necessity and the special conditions in Ukraine (the overthrow of the Bolsheviks by German and Ukrainian forces) were responsible for this decision. It is interesting that even at this critical moment some Russian Bolsheviks** would not reconcile themselves to the idea of a separate Party and proposed, instead, a creation of an autonomous Communist party with its own Central Committee and Congresses, but subordinated to the CC of the Russian Communist Party¹¹⁵. This proposal was rejected by the so-called "Poltavians" (led by Skrypnyk

¹¹² *Voprosy Istorii KPSS*, 1958, No. 3, p. 36.

¹¹³ U. Riadnina, *Pershi Zlyzd KP(b)U*. (Kyiv, 1958), p. 40.

* CIKU — Central Executive Committee of Ukraine.

¹¹⁴ Ravich-Cherkasky, *Istoria Komunisticheskoi Partii (Bolshevikov) Ukrainy*, (Kharkiv, 1923), p. 55.

** Such as Kviring, Bosh and others.

¹¹⁵ S. Mazlakh, *On the Current Situation in the Ukraine* (Ann Arbor, 1970), p. 143.

and Shakhrai), who called for the establishment of an Independent Communist Party with its own Central Committee and Party Congresses, which would be connected with the Russian Communist Party only through the Third International. The motion put by the "Poltavians" was immediately denounced by the Russian Bolsheviks, who accused Skrypnyk of nationalistic deviations and a "manifestation of separatist trends"¹¹⁶, but at the end it was adopted by twenty six votes against twenty one.

It should also be noted that the CC RCP had recognised both the independence of the Communist Party of Ukraine, and its independent membership of the Third International on May 18, 1918¹¹⁷. However, this recognition, which was unprecedented in the whole history of the Bolshevik wing of the RSDWP was very short lived. Already in the summer of 1918, during the First Congress of the CP(B)U¹¹⁸, which took place in Moscow (because Ukraine was under German occupation at that time) the Tahanrih resolution with regard to an independent Communist Party of Ukraine was totally reversed. Accordingly, Skrypnyk's proposition that "the Communist organisations of Ukraine are uniting in a separate Communist Party (Bolshevik) of Ukraine, with its own Central Committee and Congress, formally tied with the Russian Communist Party through the International Commission of the Third International"¹¹⁹ was rejected, and a counter-proposal put forward by Kviring accepted. As a result, the CP(B)U was transformed into a provisional organisation of the RCP(B)¹²⁰, and a resolution was passed, which stated that "Communists of Ukraine in all of their activities must support the realisation of the policy of the Russian Communist Party and they must live up to the general decisions of the Central Committee and of the Congress of the RCP"¹²¹.

It has been observed that the Ukrainian delegates (a minority in any case) acceded to this compromise due to the German reign of terror in Ukraine at the time of the First Congress. Undoubtedly, the foreign occupation, which resulted in the forced exile of the Ukrainian Bolshevik government to Moscow had a psychological effect on the Ukrainian delegates to the Congress. But it should also be mentioned that this period is marked by great chaos and internal strife in the CP(B)U between the so-called "left" and "right" factions*. Thus, during the First Congress of the CP(B)U, it was the "leftist" (Kyivan) faction, which stood for a separate Ukrainian Party, while the "rightists", who represented almost totally russified regions of the Donets Basin and Katerynoslav, fully supported by the RCP(B) including Lenin, demanded

¹¹⁶ Borys, p. 139.

¹¹⁷ Dmytryshyn, p. 39.

¹¹⁸ Communist Party (Bolshevik) of Ukraine was the name adopted at the Tahanrih Conference.

¹¹⁹ Mazlakh, p. 193.

¹²⁰ Lavrynenko, p. xvii.

¹²¹ M. Skrypnyk, *Stati i Promovy*. (Kharkiv, 1931), p. 85.

* These factions should not be confused with the "left" and the "right" opposition in the RCP(B).

“as an ultimatum”¹²² the adoption of their resolution.* Thus the Kyivans were compelled to compromise, at least for the time being.

b) The CP(B)U versus the RCP(B)

Although defeated on the question of the relationship between the Russian and the Ukrainian Communist Parties, the “leftist” faction was able to elect a Party Central Committee, which consisted almost exclusively of “leftist” delegates, and which set out immediately after the Congress to reassert its independence, at least in local matters. Thus, on July 16, 1918, the Committee passed a motion, which stated that “questions of internal affairs are the exclusive concern of the CC of the Communist Party of Ukraine, the decisions of which can be appealed only to Congresses of the Communist Party of Ukraine”¹²³.

The “leftist” faction was also supported as to the organisation of a partisan movement against the German occupation, and a Central Revolutionary Committee was formed to supervise its activities. The CC CP(B)U also urged a general insurrection against the German forces, which actually took place in August, 1918. However, this Bolshevik sponsored upheaval failed to arouse the masses, and the immediate result was the complete routing of the Bolshevik Party cells in Ukraine¹²⁴.

A more important consequence of that unsuccessful uprising was that it undermined the position of the pro-Ukrainian “leftist” faction of the CP(B)U, which was held responsible for the failure, and sharply condemned during the Second Congress of the CP(B)U by the pro-Russian “rightist” faction. In general, the Second Congress of the CP(B)U, which met from 17-22 October, 1918, in Moscow, witnessed almost total victory for the “rightist” faction, as well as further subordination of the CP(B)U to the Russian Communist Party. Not only was the new Central Committee composed of such Russophiles as Kviring and Yakovlev, but a permanent liaison officer for Ukraine was appointed by the CC RCP — in the person of none other than Stalin. It was also resolved that

“the chief task of the CP(B)U is the uniting of Ukraine with Russia, the deepening and broadening of the Party machinery, the transfer of the centre of Party operations onto the territory of Ukraine itself, and the concentration of Party forces primarily in the working class centres. In all its preparatory work the Party must lean upon the force of proletarian Russia, co-ordinate its measures with and subordinate them to the CC RCP, and choose the moment for a general offensive only in agreement with the CC RCP”¹²⁵.

¹²² Borys, p. 141.

* See quote of p. 36, note 121.

¹²³ Sullivan, p. 44.

¹²⁴ Borys, p. 142.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 144

Also, on Lenin's order, the Ukrainian (underground) military units were to be shifted outside Ukraine to struggle against the White anti-Bolshevik forces in the Don region¹²⁶, while the Ukrainian Revolutionary Committee, established during the First Congress to direct the partisan warfare was dissolved. The subordinate status of the CP(B)U was once again stressed by the delegate of the CC RCP, Sverdlov, who said that in essence "we [the Bolsheviks] have been and are a single Russian Communist Party... of whatever parts this Party may be composed, the centre regards these disjointed parts as those of a single organism"¹²⁷.

In view of the fact that shortly after the Second Congress of the CP(B)U the German forces withdrew from Ukraine and Soviet power was re-established in the country, the relationship between the RCP and the CP(B)U was especially significant. Also significant was the defeat of the Kyivan faction of "independists" and the domination of the Russophile group in the new Central Committee. Because of this, the CP(B)U cast aside any separatist and national aspirations¹²⁸ and actively helped to install a Soviet Russian regime in Ukraine. By the spring of 1919 all Eastern Ukraine found itself under Russian Bolshevik rule, and the Soviet Ukrainian government was in the position of ending its exile in Moscow and returning to Ukraine. As a result it was now possible to convene the Third Congress of the CP(B)U on Ukrainian soil, which took place in Kharkiv in March, 1919.

At the Third Congress — just as during the First and the Second — the struggle between the "leftist" (pro-Ukrainian) and the "rightist" (pro-Russian) factions with respect to the status of the CP(B)U continued; and again a Russian Bolshevik, Sverdlov, representing the CC RCP, managed to quell the struggle. The need for subordination of the CP(B)U to the CC RCP was expressed this time by Rakovsky — the Head of the Soviet Government in Ukraine — who stated the already obvious fact that

"The Communist Party of Ukraine regards itself a member of a single Communist International; it maintains close organisational ties with the Communist Party of Russia, whose southern detachment is the CP(B)U"¹²⁹.

With the Third Congress of the CP(B)U the struggle between the "left" and the "right" factions declined, as the "rightists" once again constituted the majority of the CC CP(B)U. Thus, although in theory the Soviet Ukrainian Republic was independent, in reality its leadership was totally dependent on the RCP and the Red Army. As one historian observed: "the Ukrainians [Bolsheviks] were dependent on the Red Army for the territory they governed; they had been selected by Russian leaders and in practice retained their posts only at the sufferance of the Russians"¹³⁰. The subordinate status of the CP(B)U was most clearly reflected in the dissolution of the

¹²⁶ Sullivan.

¹²⁷ *Vtoroy Siezd KP(B)U*, p. 113-4.

¹²⁸ Sullivan, p. 45.

¹²⁹ Ravich-Cherkasky, p. 109.

¹³⁰ Sullivan, p. 109.

CC CP(B)U ordered by Moscow on October 2, 1919, that is, following the fall of the Second Soviet Republic in Ukraine. Thus, as Richard Pipes observed, "a year and a half after its foundation, the Communist Party of Ukraine had become a mere shadow: an organisation without authority, without influence, without even a formal centre"¹³¹. Similarly, the Ukrainian Council of Defence was also disbanded, and the only remaining political body of Soviet Ukraine was the so-called *Zafrontovoe Biuro* with a staff of three functionaries, residing in Moscow.

The liquidation of the Ukrainian political apparatus by Moscow was met with indignation not only among Ukrainian communists, but also among such Russian communists as Manuïlski for instance, who compared the communist regime in Ukraine to a typical colonial administration¹³². Also, in reaction to this massive Russian intervention, fifteen prominent Ukrainian communists organised the so-called Homel Conference, which took place in late November, 1919, despite the directive from the CC RCP, which ordered that the proceedings be stopped. Although all of the participants of the Conference agreed that a Ukrainian Central Committee should be re-established, they failed to agree on other issues. While the Ukrainian "federalists"* asserted that the CP(B)U should pursue an independent course under the leadership of its own Central Committee, the opposition, led by Manuïlsky, criticised this proposal as un-communist in spirit and advocated a close merger of Soviet Ukraine and Russia¹³³. Nevertheless, the federalists sent a memorandum to the CC RCP, which proposed that the CC RCP review its nationality policy in Ukraine. This may have induced Lenin to discuss the Ukrainian question during the Eighth Party Conference¹³⁴ (of the RCP). The immediate result of self-criticism with regard to the Bolshevik policy in Ukraine as expressed by Lenin and other prominent Russian Bolsheviks during the Eighth Conference was the re-establishing of the Soviet Ukrainian government, and the formation (in Moscow) of a new party centre for Ukraine. In both of these bodies, however, there prevailed advocates of Russia-one-and-indivisible, which surfaced during what should have been the Fourth Congress of the CP(B)U, but which was called the Fourth Conference took place in March, 1920, and, according to one observer, proceeded in a very tense atmosphere. One speaker sharply denounced the "cringing and servility"¹³⁵ of the CP(B)U to the RCP and charged that "the CC CP(B)U is merely a fiction since its composition has been changed just as some lady changes her maid"¹³⁶. Another delegate observed that the former CC should not have obeyed Moscow's order to dissolve itself, since it was elected by the Congress (Third) and, therefore, responsible to the Congress only, and not

¹³¹ Pipes, p. 144.

¹³² Pipes, p. 145.

* They advocated the separation of Ukraine from Russia.

¹³³ *Ibid.*, p. 146.

¹³⁴ Dmytryshyn, p. 44.

¹³⁵ Ravich-Cherkasky, p. 151.

¹³⁶ *Idem.*

to the RCP. Some centralists, present at the Conference, asserted that Ukraine is "too weak to be an independent factor in the revolution"¹³⁷, and defended the policies of the RCP. The Bolshevik Kossior concluded that "over Ukraine there hung some curse, which does not permit working in agreement"¹³⁸. It should be pointed out that at this time in Ukraine there was an organised opposition against the "democratic centralism" in the Party as well as in the administration and industry. This opposition reflected itself in the heated debates at the Conference. Furthermore, members of the opposition not only denounced the former CC, but they elected a new CC CP(B)U from its own ranks as well. However, shortly after the Fourth Conference, the RCP announced that it did not recognise the resolutions passed at the Conference, and on April 5, 1920, it was resolved to dissolve the CC CP(B)U, which was elected by the Conference. In its place, the CC RCP had created a temporary CC, which was ordered to carry out a strict purge and to re-register all the Party members in Ukraine¹³⁹. As a result, 22 per cent of all the members of the Party were expelled. Furthermore, Zinoviev, Trotsky and Kamenev were sent to Ukraine to stamp out any remnants of the opposition to centralism.

At the Fifth Conference of the CP(B)U, which took place in November, 1920, Soviet Russian rule was consolidated, mainly because the majority of the delegates attending the Conference consisted of Red Army men¹⁴⁰. But the consolidation of Soviet rule and the "taming" of the Bolshevik Party in Ukraine by the RCP did not eradicate the strife between the two parties. This strife continued and reappeared under different forms for many years to come.

V. SOVIETISATION OF UKRAINE

The idea of the sovietisation of Ukraine was on the Bolshevik agenda already in the summer of 1917, i.e. from the first attempt at a Bolshevik uprising¹⁴¹. Following the Bolshevik coup in October, 1917, in Petersburg, an attempt to seize power was also carried out in Kyiv, Ukraine, but it ended in failure due to the opposition from the Ukrainian *Rada*. Another attempt to install a Soviet Russian regime in Ukraine took place during the Bolshevik sponsored Congress of the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies, which convened in Kyiv, on December 17, 1917. As

¹³⁷ Borys, p. 148.

¹³⁸ *Idem.*

¹³⁹ *Idem.*

¹⁴⁰ Popov, *Narys*, p. 228, Cited by Borys, p. 151. With regard to this, historian Popov remarked that "more than half of the delegates of the Fifth Conference were the representatives of the Red Army, and the greater part of the Red Army consisted of divisions, which came from Soviet Russia, of course not as invaders and conquerors
* as friends and helpers of the working masses of Ukraine".

Borys, p. 171.

mentioned earlier the Bolshevik delegates were greatly outnumbered by the adherents of the *Rada*, and had left the Congress even before it dispersed. Following the Congress, it became clear that the sovietisation of Ukraine was possible only through force. An occasion to use the army against Ukraine arose when the Bolshevik representatives (defeated at the Congress of Soviets) proclaimed a Soviet Ukrainian Republic, which the Council of People's Commissars immediately recognised, and pledged support against the *Rada* — the legal government of Ukraine. Since it soon became clear that the *Rada* would not recognise the self-proclaimed and Russian sponsored "Soviet government" in Kharkiv, the Russian Bolsheviks began military operations to overthrow the *Rada* and impose their regime in Ukraine. With regard to the character of the Ukrainian Soviet "government", which the Russian Bolsheviks offered to support, a participant in the events, Khrystiuk, wrote: "the whole Ukrainian Soviet Government and the whole Ukrainian Soviet Republic served only as a screen. The role of the government was to give its name, its banner, for the covering-up of the occupation policy of Soviet Russia in Ukraine"¹⁴².

One of the first cities occupied by the Russian Red Army under the leadership of Muraviev was Poltava. (January 6, 1918). There, colonel Muraviev declared:

"Citizens! The Civil War has started. The Civil War goes on. From the Baltic to the Black Sea, across the Danube, towards Vienna, Berlin, Paris, and London we shall march with fire and sword, establishing everywhere Soviet power. With fire and sword we shall destroy everything, which will dare to stand in our way"¹⁴³.

Before capturing other cities, the army of Muraviev — which consisted mostly of criminal elements and sailors — went on a "wild orgy"¹⁴⁴ in Poltava, which Muraviev himself described as "drunken bacchanalia"¹⁴⁵. From Poltava, Muraviev's forces moved towards Kyiv, which fell in January, 1918, while other detachments, led by Antonov, occupied Kharkiv and the cities in the Donets Basin. Wherever the Red soldiers came, terror, drunkenness and murder reigned. In each captured city Muraviev, "an unbalanced and sadistic megalomaniac, who delighted in talking about the 'flow of blood'"¹⁴⁶, gave orders to annihilate practically everybody. His orders were carried out only too well by the Russian troops. Naturally, such tactics alienated the population and the Ukrainian communists, who watched these actions with apprehension. Yet, as Richard Pipes observed:

"It is characteristic of the Bolshevik mentality that in objecting to the excesses of the invading Red Army, the Ukrainian communists did not denounce the behaviour of Muraviev and his troops as inhuman, but as a tactical mistake, which had alienated the population whose support was needed for the proper

¹⁴² Khrystiuk, vol. II, p. 147-9.

¹⁴³ Mazlakh, "Oktiabrskaya Revolutsiya na Poltavshchinie" *LR* no. 1, p. 139. Cited by Pipes, p. 124.

¹⁴⁴ *Idem.*

¹⁴⁵ *Idem.*

¹⁴⁶ Pipes, p. 126.

functioning of the government. Lenin too, when he intervened, did so for the sake of the smoother operation of the party and its government, and not out of any concern for the welfare of the inhabitants"¹⁴⁷.

What alienated the Ukrainian communists even more than the excesses of the Red Army towards the civilian population was that the Russian military forces completely ignored the organs of the local Ukrainian Soviet Government, including the People's Secretariat. In regard to this, the Soviet Commissar of War, Antonov, admitted that "Muraviev in Poltava adopted a definitely sharp tone, the tone of a conqueror, and entered into a sharp conflict with the local Soviet"¹⁴⁸. But, although Antonov advised Muraviev not to interfere with the administrative affairs of the Ukrainian Soviets, he himself appointed some commissars* without the knowledge of the People's Secretariat of Ukraine. These commissars, in turn, removed the officials appointed by the Ukrainian Executive Committee replacing them by their own men. When the Ukrainian communists protested to Lenin about these measures of the Russian Bolsheviks, Lenin promptly intervened and wrote to Antonov:

"...For heaven's sake, apply every effort to remove all and every friction with the Central Executive Committee. This is super important for the sake of the state. For heaven's sake, make up with them and grant them any sovereignty. I strongly request you remove the commissars whom you have appointed. I hope very, very much that you will fulfil my request and will attain absolute peace with the Central Executive Committee. Here there is needed national super-tact!..."¹⁴⁹

Simultaneously with these conflicts between the local Bolshevik authorities and the military occupational forces there was also a growing hostility of the local population to the Bolsheviks, which stemmed from their ruthless procurement of grain, indifference to the national feelings of the people and the general policies of terror. This anti-Bolshevik attitude was also reported by Muraviev, who wrote that "the proletariat of Odessa has not given me a single battalion... and I have at my disposal only several hundred Red Guards... Treason is everywhere"¹⁵⁰. Thus, when the Bolshevik regime was overthrown by the German forces (in March, 1918) it left behind the disillusioned Ukrainian masses. This had serious repercussions in the future attempts to install Bolshevik power in Ukraine.

The German intervention in Ukraine, which had driven away the Russian Red Army was a direct result of the separate peace treaty signed between the Ukrainian Central *Rada* and Germany during the negotiations in Brest

¹⁴⁷ Pipes, p. 127.

¹⁴⁸ Antonov, *Zapiski*, vol. I, p. 135. Cited by Borys, p. 182.

* Antonov admitted that due to the shortage of personnel, he used for the posts of commissars "any men who were handy; most of them were newcomers from Petrograd, or valiant seamen, but some were drunkards, and thick headed thugs". Antonov, *Zapiski*, p. 174. Borys, p. 182.

¹⁴⁹ Institut Istorii Partii TS K KP Ukrainy. *V. I. Lenin pro Ukrainu* (Kyiv, 1969), vol. II, p. 82.

¹⁵⁰ *Pravda*, No. 127, June 25, 1918. Borys, p. 186.

Litovsk. Since the German spokesman recognised the delegates from the Central *Rada* as the legitimate representatives of Ukraine* and demanded similar recognition from the Bolshevik delegates as a basic condition for armistice¹⁵¹, the Bolsheviks succumbed and accepted the German demand. There is enough evidence¹⁵², however, to conclude that any treaties signed between the Bolsheviks and the *Rada* were viewed only as a tactical manoeuvre by the RCP and that the German occupation was considered only temporary.

It should be mentioned at this point that the main motive for the German occupation was the hope of the German government to secure food supplies for Germany, and that even before signing the treaty, the German High Command requested the *Rada's* promise to provide one million tons of grain¹⁵³. When the *Rada*, for various reasons, failed to co-operate with the Germans, German troops disbanded the *Rada* and soon replaced it with a government headed by Hetman Skoropadsky (April, 1918). From that time until the annulment of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty on November 11, 1918, and the subsequent evacuation of the German troops, Ukraine was a scene of bloody peasant rebellions against the German food "expeditions" and shootings whenever the peasants resisted to supply the foodstuffs. Despite the hatred for the German occupant, the Bolsheviks' popularity also remained very low, as the Bolshevik-instigated rebellion against the Germans had proved.

With the departure of the German armies in November, 1918, the RCP began planning a second Bolshevik attempt to impose its regime on Ukraine. On November 29, 1918, the Commander in Chief, Vatsetich, received the following telegram from Lenin:

"With the advance of our troops to the West and into Ukraine, regional provisional Soviet Governments are created whose task it is to strengthen the local Soviets. This circumstance has the advantage of taking away from the chauvinists of Ukraine, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia the possibility of regarding the advance of our detachments as occupation and creates a favourable atmosphere for a further advance of our troops. Without this circumstance, our troops would have been put into an impossible position in the occupied regions and the population would not be meeting them as liberators. In view of this we request that the commanding personnel of corresponding military units be issued with instructions that our troops must in every way support the provisional Soviet Governments of Latvia, Estonia, Ukraine and Lithuania, but, of course, only the Soviet Governments"¹⁵⁴.

Accordingly, the Bolsheviks established such a Soviet Government of Ukraine in November, 1918, and without the knowledge of the CP(B)U. For

* There was also present at Brest-Litovsk a delegation representing the "Ukrainian Soviet government".

¹⁵¹ Sullivan, p. 37.

¹⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 39.

¹⁵³ *Die Deutsche Okkupation der Ukraine-Geheimdokumente* (Strassburg, 1937), p. 22-3, cited by Pipes, p. 133.

¹⁵⁴ This telegram was published for the first time in 1942. Lenin, *Sochinenia*, XXII, p. 205.

a while, however, this government was kept secret due to the fact that, following the evacuation of the Germans, the previously deposed Ukrainian *Rada* carried out a successful coup against Hetman Skoropadsky's regime and showed such popularity among the population that the Bolsheviks did not dare to begin their offensive. They even considered the possibility of co-operation with the Directory as the *Rada* was now called. Nevertheless, the antagonism between the nationalistic Directory and the Bolsheviks was inevitable. First of all, the Directory did not recognise Soviet* power in Ukraine, and also insisted on independence. The Bolsheviks initiated a policy of grain requisitioning. Lenin wrote a telegram to Shlichter stating "if you will not deliver the 50 million puds of grain by May or June, [1919] we will all be doomed"¹⁵⁵.

Simultaneously with the grain requisitions, the Bolsheviks began to implement their "land reform", forcing the peasants into communes, which provoked a violent reaction not only from the peasantry, but even from the Ukrainian Socialist left parties, such as the *Borotbisty* and Independents, who had previously supported the Bolsheviks against the Directory. The national question during this time was totally ignored. As Borys observed:

"Lenin, under the influence of the economic emergency, looked at Ukraine almost exclusively from the point of view of grain. At every mention of Ukraine Lenin added how many puds of grain there were, how many could be taken from there, or how many had already been taken"¹⁵⁶.

Although even Antonov pointed out to the CC RCP that it was committing mistakes with regard to national and land policies in Ukraine, his remarks were ignored by Moscow and regarded as heretical.

The Second Soviet government came to an end due to the successful offensive of Denikin's army on the one hand, and the forces of the Ukrainian Directory on the other. As it was mentioned earlier, with the approach of these armies, the "independent" Ukrainian Soviet government was dissolved by the RCP and the so-called *Zafrontovoe Biuro* was created instead. The personnel of the dissolved "Ukrainian government" was absorbed by various Russian Bolshevik organs.

The third and final attempt to gain power in Ukraine came as a result of the Bolshevik victory over the forces of Denikin and the Ukrainian Directory, which took place under greatly changed conditions — both internal and external — for Soviet Russia. One major change was the defeat of all other anti-Bolshevik forces, mainly due to the growing indifference of the Entente, which was their economic base¹⁵⁷. Another important change was the Bolshevik realisation that the world revolution would not take place as had been predicted, and that they (the Bolsheviks) should rather concentrate on their own domestic affairs. With regard to Ukraine, it became clear that

* It viewed the Soviets of workers' deputies as an organisation for the discussion of social problems.

¹⁵⁵ *Lenin pro Ukrainu*, p. 234.

¹⁵⁶ Borys, p. 226.

¹⁵⁷ *Narys*, p. 203, Borys, p. 238.

some concessions were necessary — both to the Ukrainian national movement and to the peasantry if the sovietisation of Ukraine was to enjoy a measure of success.

In view of this, it has even been recognised by the Bolsheviks that during the previous periods of Soviet rule in Ukraine the party has done nothing

“in order to attract the poorer elements to its side, but instead it has gladly admitted to its membership the petty-bourgeois elements from among the Russian and Jewish craftsmen whose attitude is more or less Russophile...”

Ukraine has been regarded merely as an object from which to extract material resources, and moreover the interests of the class struggle in Ukraine have been completely ignored¹⁵⁸.

Perhaps the most fundamental document, which reflected the new nationality policy of the Bolsheviks was the resolution passed by the CC RCP “On Soviet Power in Ukraine” and approved by the Eighth All Russian Party Conference, which also called for:

- a) Recognition of the independence of the Ukrainian SSR.
- b) Consideration with regard to the form of the Union between the Soviet republics, which should be decided by the workers and peasants themselves.
- c) Removal of all obstacles to the free development of the Ukrainian language and culture.
- d) Closer contact of the Soviet institutions with the peasantry¹⁵⁹.

Although two months after this resolution was passed Lenin asserted that any call for a separation of Ukraine from Russia is a crime, this document is important as an admission of their failure to solve the national question during their first two attempts to gain control of Ukraine. This also serves as proof that any Bolshevik concessions were only tactical manoeuvres, as the later developments were to show.

Aside from these temporary concessions, one of the most important events, which took place during the final attempt to establish the Soviet regime was the amalgamation of the Ukrainian National Communists *Borotbisty* with the CP(B)U, which took place in March, 1920. According to one surviving *Borotbist*, Maistrenko, “the story of the *Borotbisty* appears at first as a classic example of fellow travelling, a cautionary tale of the ‘Lady Who Went for a Ride with a Tiger’. It follows the familiar pattern of cajolery, then subjugation, and finally extermination of the weaker partner by the stronger”¹⁶⁰.

The Ukrainian Communist Party (*Borotbisty*) — the UCP(B) — was a continuation of the Ukrainian Party of Socialist Revolutionaries (UPSR), which split in mid-1918 into two wings — left and right. The left wing, the so-called Internationalists, adopted the name *Borotbisty*, after the party newspaper *Borotba*, which they controlled. Shortly after their split with the

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 237.

¹⁵⁹ I. Maistrenko, *Borotbism: A Chapter in the History of Ukrainian Communism*. (New York, 1964), p. 169.

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. vii.

UPSR they moved ideologically towards Bolshevism, and in March, 1919, adopted a new name UPSR (Communists-*Borotbisty*). Also in 1919 the *Borotbisty* merged with the "left" wing of the Ukrainian Social Democratic Workers' Party and at that time took the name Ukrainian Communist Party (*Borotbisty*) under which they are generally known.

From the very beginning of Bolshevik rule in Ukraine the *Borotbisty* were disillusioned with the domineering attitude of the Bolsheviks, although they supported the latter in their struggle against the Ukrainian Directory. Nevertheless, they opposed the Bolshevik government in Ukraine under Piatakov, and organised their own government, which they named "The *Rada* of the Chief Revolutionary Emissaries". The open break between the *Borotbisty* and the Bolsheviks took place due to the centralising policy of the latter, who viewed the *Borotbisty* as a petty-bourgeois party¹⁶¹.

While the Soviet Ukrainian Government and the CP(B)U went into exile (to Moscow) during Denikin's offensive, the *Borotbisty* merged with the Independents — as mentioned above — and toyed with the idea of leading the Ukrainian communist revolution, since they felt that the CP(B)U had committed treason by escaping to Russia. The *Borotbisty* also wrote to the Comintern that they wished to be recognised as the "only real" Communist Party in Ukraine¹⁶², since in their opinion the CP(B)U was a foreign body in Ukraine. But the Comintern ignored these demands.

Although in December, 1919, on the eve of the Soviet Russian offensive on Ukraine, the *Borotbisty* pledged to support the efforts of the Red Army, they simultaneously attempted to organise their own army, which would be totally Ukrainian in character. These efforts, however, were not successful. Further misfortune befell the *Borotbisty* when at the beginning of 1920 they received a negative answer to their plea for recognition in the Comintern. Moreover, they were even told to liquidate their party and join the CP(B)U. The following reasons were given for the refusal to admit the *Borotbisty* into the Comintern:

"The party of the *Borotbisty*, which call itself a Communist Party, in reality departs from the principles of communism in several extremely important points: demanding the immediate formation of a separate national army, and in its open agitation against communists of other nationalities, in particular Russian communists, who work in Ukraine... The Executive Committee of the Communist International considers that the closest brotherly alliance should exist among those republics in which Soviet rule prevails"¹⁶³.

It is interesting that while the *Borotbisty* were finally liquidated because of their insistence that Ukraine should be Soviet but independent, Lenin emphasised to the Executive Committee of the Comintern that "the *Borotbisty* be accused not of nationalism, but of counter-revolutionary and petty-bourgeois mentality"¹⁶⁴. When the *Borotbisty* finally merged with the CP(B)U,

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p. 125.

¹⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 285.

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 186-7.

¹⁶⁴ Lenin, *Stati i Rech i ob Ukraine*, (Kharkiv, 1936), p. 344. Borys, p. 260.

they did so with the hope that "We will join, spread and flood over" (the Bolsheviks)¹⁶⁵. However, according to Borys, only 118 former *Borotbisty* were in the CP(B)U in 1922¹⁶⁶. Yet, their amalgamation with the CP(B)U was significant because of their national feelings, which influenced other members of the CP(B)U, and because they had some ties with the Ukrainian masses. The national leanings of the *Borotbisty* became especially important and prominent during the policy of Ukrainisation, and during the period of the so-called "national deviations" of the 1920's.

VI. THE FORMATION OF THE SOVIET UNION

In many respects the creation of the USSR was a "synthesis of the centralistic trends, which dominated the Party from its very inception"¹⁶⁷. In Ukraine, the trend toward centralisation and the elimination of independent Ukrainian institutions can be observed since 1919, i.e., from the Eighth Congress of the RCP(B). However, even before the Congress, the so-called Ukrainian Front was already subordinated to the Commander in Chief of the RSFSR, Vatsetis, and by June, 1919, it was liquidated. Also, a resolution was passed in June by the All-Russian CIK, which provided guidelines for the merging of the military organisations and command of the RSFSR and other Soviet Republics, the Soviet of People's Economy, railway administration and management, finance, and the Commissariats for labour. Although the defeat of the second Soviet government in Ukraine prevented these measures from being immediately put into effect, on May 20, 1920, however, the Fourth Congress of the Soviets of the Ukrainian SSR ratified the agreement between the CIK of Ukraine and the CIK of the RSFSR with respect to the unification of the following Commissariats: military, finance, railways, national economy, post and telegraph and labour¹⁶⁸. With respect to these first measures of unification between the RSFSR and Ukraine Wolfe observed that "first military decisions, then military-economic decisions, and finally pure economic and political decisions taken for their own sakes gradually determined the future nationalities structure of the Soviet Union"¹⁶⁹.

An important step, which provided a legal framework¹⁷⁰ for the close ties, which developed between the two republics was the signing on December 28, 1920, of a Treaty of Alliance — drafted by Lenin himself — and also signed on behalf of the RSFSR. One of the main features of the treaty was the

¹⁶⁵ S. Pidhainyi, "Ukrainian National Communism", *Ukrainian Review*, No. 7, (Munich, 1959), 49.

¹⁶⁶ Borys, p. 265.

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 297.

¹⁶⁸ *Istoria Sovetskoi Konstitutsii v Dokumentakh 1917-1956* (Moscow, 1957).

¹⁶⁹ B. Wolfe, "The Influence of Early Military Decisions upon the National Structure of the Soviet Union", *ASEER*, 1950, Vol. IX, no. 3, p. 178.

¹⁷⁰ Sullivan, p. 65.

provision, which stated that "all obligations, which the two republics in future would take upon themselves in respect of other states can be conditioned only by the common interests of the workers and peasants concluding the present union treaty of the republics"¹⁷¹. In this treaty the unification of the Commissariats for military affairs, economy, trade, finance, labour, post and telegraph was also mentioned. Those united commissariats were to be controlled by the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of which the Ukrainian representatives would also be members. However, the treaty was "broadly" interpreted and often the decrees passed in the RSFSR were automatically applied to the Ukrainian Republic.

During the Tenth Congress of the RCP (March, 1921) the delegate from the CP(B)U, Zatonsky, asserted that the existing relationship between the two republics was very confusing and that it was "necessary to define more precisely the mutual relations of the parts of federation, not because it is necessary to increase or reduce the rights of these parts, but to do away with this muddle"¹⁷². It is obvious that this "muddle" stemmed from the ambiguous nature of the treaty of December 28, 1920, which on the one hand proclaimed Ukraine as a sovereign and independent republic, and on the other, allowed for interference of the RSFSR into Ukrainian affairs through the joint Commissariats. Zatonsky's remarks about the need for a clearer definition of the existing ties between the republics had proved to be superfluous in view of the fact that the RCP had already prepared a scheme, which would clarify any "misunderstandings". Thus, Stalin informed the Congress that:

"...the old compact relationships — the convention relationships between the RSFSR and the other Soviet republics — have exhausted themselves, have shown themselves to be inadequate... We must inevitably pass from old compact relationships to relationships of closer unification... It is proposed to form as something permanent what has hitherto been decided spasmodically"¹⁷³.

Stalin further asserted that:

"The isolated existence of separate Soviet republics is unstable in view of the threats to their existence presented by the capitalist states...

The national Soviet republics can safeguard their independence and can conquer the united strength of imperialism only when joined together in an intimate state union"¹⁷⁴.

The Tenth Congress of the RCP also witnessed the "burial" of the principle of self-determination for nations, which the Bolsheviks had proclaimed long before they seized power. With respect to the policy of self-determination Stalin stated:

"It has been two years now that we have bidden farewell to this slogan. It is no longer in the text of our programme. Our programme makes no mention of national self-determination — a completely hazy slogan; it refers to a more

¹⁷¹ Borys, p. 286.

¹⁷² Borys, p. 291.

¹⁷³ Sullivan, p. 65.

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 66.

precisely formulated and defined slogan, the right of nations to secede as states... Insofar as Soviet states join in a federation on a voluntary basis, the right to secede is not invoked, because the peoples making up the RSFSR have themselves so willed..."¹⁷⁵.

In regard to the Soviet nationalities policy, the Tenth Congress may be regarded to a certain degree as a turning point in the relationship between the RSFSR and the Soviet Republics. As Borys observed, "until then [the Congress] the relations between the borderland republics and the RSFSR had been marked by rather indefinite forms... After the Tenth Congress the Party took the road of uniting the Soviet Republics into one state as the only solution of the national question"¹⁷⁶.

Stalin's call for an even more intimate union was accepted with mixed emotions in Ukraine. Some Ukrainian Bolsheviks felt that the unification would result in greater equality among the republics, while others argued that such a close union already existed between the RSFSR and Ukraine¹⁷⁷, therefore, the proposed "union" would not alter anything. Another group, however, engaged in a bitter struggle against the proposed unification, which they felt negated both the principles of self-determination and federalism.

The chief spokesman of this opposition group against the growing centralisation and a steady violation of the "Alliance" treaty signed in 1920 was the old Ukrainian Bolshevik, Mykola Skrypnyk*. Although nothing in his background suggested that he would become a champion of Ukraine's rights against the centralising policies of the RSFSR following the treaty of December 28, 1920, Skrypnyk watched with alarm how the rights of the Ukrainian SSR were being violated, and voiced sharp criticism against the RCP's policies in Ukraine. In his opinion, the Communist party apparatus "was infiltrated with adherents of *Smena Vekh*, ready to violate the party's pledge, which proclaimed Ukraine independent"¹⁷⁸. Upon Stalin's proclamation of the resolution regarding the formation of the permanent union, and during the actual creation of the Union, Skrypnyk led the opposition, especially during the draft of the constitution.

The first phase in the creation of the Soviet Union began in October, 1922, when the Politburo of the CC RCP formed the commission, which consisted of representatives from the CC RCP and from the Central Committees of the Republics. To this commission Stalin presented his draft of the theses on unification, entitled *Draft resolution concerning the mutual relations of the RSFSR with the independent Republics*. The principle in the draft was

¹⁷⁵ S. Schwartz, *The Jews in the Soviet Union* (Syracuse, 1951), p. 35.

¹⁷⁶ Borys, p. 334.

¹⁷⁷ Sullivant, p. 67.

* During the period of the "sovietisation" of Ukraine, Skrypnyk actively supported Russian Bolshevik forces in their struggle with the Ukrainian Democratic Republic. He was a member of the Soviet Ukrainian government and the head of the Cheka in Ukraine.

¹⁷⁸ Pipes, p. 265.

based on the "autonomisation", i.e. on the entrance of the Republics into the RSFSR. This principle provoked such bitter opposition among the nationals that Lenin was compelled to intervene against it. Lenin's intervention, however, came only after* Stalin and Dzerhinsky began to apply the "autonomisation" through force. Following Lenin's intervention, the appointed commission changed Stalin's proposals for autonomisation and passed a resolution that a new state formation should be created. It should be pointed out that Lenin attacked Stalin for his "hastiness and passion for administration"¹⁷⁹ and termed the process of "autonomisation" incorrect and inopportune.

Another problem, which arose during the first phase of the formation of the USSR was the question of the name of this new creation. Touched upon already at the Tenth Congress of the RCP, it was proposed that the current RSFSR should be renounced as too narrow, and, therefore, "The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics" was the best for the future federation. The main speakers on the subject were the delegates from Ukraine, Frunze and Zatonsky, who asserted that it was "us", which first proposed this name¹⁸⁰.

However, more important disagreement came to light when the constitutional commission began to prepare the final draft of the constitution for the Union. The commission was appointed on January 10, 1923, by the Central Executive Committee — a temporary government of the Union — which came into being on December 29, 1922. In accordance with the decision adopted on January 10, 1923, the republics were to recommend whatever changes they wished to make and forward their recommendations to the commission. It has been observed that the disputes began as soon as the constitutional commission began its work¹⁸¹. One major issue touched upon was whether the Central Executive Committee should be a unicameral or bicameral organ. Although earlier (November, 1922) Stalin expressed himself against the two-chamber legislature, by February, 1923, he urged that a second chamber — the Council of Nationalities — be created. However, no decision was reached by the commission as to what powers the second chamber would exercise, and in the end it adjourned without arriving at any conclusions¹⁸².

Since the constitutional commission adjourned upon reaching a deadlock, the main issues were discussed within the Party circles during and after the Twelfth Congress of the RCP, where the nationality question came into the open. The opposition, led by Skrypnyk and Rakovsky, urged specifically that two changes be adopted in the construction of the Union. The first recommendation dealt with providing a guarantee in the constitution that the Council of Nationalities would truly represent Union Republics. Under the proposed draft, each republic, autonomous republic and national region would have four representatives in the Council of Nationalities. Thus, the

* This may have been due to the fact that Lenin was ill at that time.

¹⁷⁹ Borys, p. 302.

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 305.

¹⁸¹ Sullivan, p. 71.

¹⁸² *Idem.*

RSFSR, with its many national regions would in fact have 64 representatives, while Ukraine only 4. This, argued Rakovsky, was a negation of the underlying principle, which provided for the Council to guarantee the rights of the separate units against the dominant body¹⁸³.

A compromise was reached on this issue, which made provisions that each independent and autonomous republic was entitled to have five representatives, while the national region had no right to representation. However, for all practical purposes Russia still remained a dominating body in the Council of Nationalities.

The second change, advocated by the Ukrainian delegation, dealt with the increase of authority of the republic governments, against the centre. Although Rakovsky delivered a speech with regard to the relationship between the republics and the RSFSR at the Twelfth Congress, the demands of the Ukrainian opposition were more elaborately expressed in the amendments to the draft constitution, which each republic was supposed to prepare for the constitutional commission. Forwarded in May, 1923, the Ukrainian draft recommended major changes in the relationship between the supreme organs and the republics. Thus, for example, it stated that in matters such as foreign policy, local taxes, local trade, education, health, local economic planning, the republics should be given general guidelines by the Union, but **without interference**. It also recommended that some commissariats, which were exclusively Union bodies under the original proposal should be transformed into joined Union-Republic commissariats; while several joint commissariats should be transferred under the jurisdiction of the republics. It is clear from the proposed changes that Skrypnyk had in mind a confederation, rather than a "centralised federation", which was decided upon during the Twelfth Congress. As expected, the amended draft forwarded by the Ukrainian delegation was rejected, and consequently the official draft adopted in July, 1923, by the Central Executive Committee did not undergo any major changes.

Nevertheless, the Ukrainian opposition to centralism, however, did not end with the adoption of the Constitution, and the disputes over the competencies of the central organs of the Union and the organs of the Republics continued. The leading opponent, again, was Mykola Skrypnyk, who proposed several amendments to the Constitution with regard to the right of amnesty, the right to veto the decisions of the SPC of the Union, and so on. Although all of his amendments were rejected by the CC RCP, the struggle between the centralists and such nationally minded communists as Skrypnyk continued until Stalin's great terror.

A Russian Bolshevik and centralist, Larin, perhaps best expressed the role Skrypnyk and other Ukrainian national communists played in the struggle against the total amalgamation of the Union Republics. During the meeting of the CIK of the Union, in April, 1926, he said that:

"if it had not been for Ukraine, if it had not been for its energetic raising of questions about a complete, precise, hundred per cent implementation of our

¹⁸³ Sullivan, p. 73.

line in the question of nationalities, the life and work also of other, less considerable, national Republics would have been put into a more difficult situation in the national respect. I know that the attitude to Skrypnyk's frequent speeches at the sessions of the CIK is sometimes somewhat skeptical... And yet, comrade Skrypnyk by this activity of his in particular, and the whole of Ukraine in general performs an extremely useful work, because they wage daily a persistent struggle for the full recognition of that equality of rights of all cultures situated on our territory, which [equality of rights] constitutes one of the foundations of our order. But in order to realise such a state structure with equal national rights, it is necessary to overcome the internal and external Great Russian chauvinism, which has come to us from the old [i.e. pre-revolutionary time]. When discussing the question of the activity of the Ukrainian Government, this first feature, this first manifestation of a particular state role of Ukraine must be... recognised and noted by us with gratitude"¹⁸⁴.

VII. CONCLUSION

The quest for the solution of the nationalities question has been one of the major preoccupations of the Soviet Russian regime ever since it came to power in 1917. Yet, although as early as 1921 the Bolsheviks asserted that the only regime capable of solving the nationalities question is the Soviet regime, and despite the more recent optimistic assertions, there is enough evidence, which points to the bankruptcy of these claims by Moscow.

Theoretically, the Russian Bolsheviks led by Lenin had solved the problem of nationalities as early as 1903-1913 when Lenin had expounded his theory of self-determination and equality of all nations. In practice, however, self-determination meant centralism and unity even greater than the Tsarist Russian Empire had ever achieved. Although before the October Revolution the Bolsheviks had exploited the national movements of the non-Russians for the purpose of combatting the tsarist regime, after the revolution the theory of self-determination was abandoned as harmful for the Party and Soviet Russia. Therefore, any national concessions that were granted to the non-Russian peoples were due to political expediency of the moment, and as such were of a temporary nature.

As soon as Soviet Russia emerged victorious from its Civil War it began to pursue the centralistic policies of Russia-one-and-indivisible of the preceding regime. Slowly, under the camouflage of federalism the Union republics were stripped of their rights and national equality that the Bolsheviks advocated in theory. The Russian communists were guided strictly by their national interests, whereas the Ukrainian communists found themselves caught in a dilemma of how to reconcile their ideological positions (in which they believed) with purely Ukrainian national interests. They obviously could not do it, and in the meantime were cornered and finally crushed by the Russian centralist avalanche. They found out only too late

¹⁸⁴ "2 Sessia Centralnogo Ispolnitelnogo Komiteta Soyuza SSR 3-go sozyva", *Buletēn* No. 13, Moscow, 16 April, 1926, p. 12-13. Borys, p. 323.

that Bolshevism was intrinsically adverse to strictly national aspirations and interests. One cannot but agree with Lavrynenko, who observed that

"Ukrainian communism was chronologically the first to demonstrate a general tragic paradox of our time, namely the tendency of national liberation and peasant movements in the colonial areas of the world to group themselves under the banner of communism, which, in the first analysis, is inimical to the goals to which they aspire"¹⁸⁵.

¹⁸⁵ Lavrynenko, p. xxv.

A NEW BOOK ON THE EXPERIENCE AND SUFFERING
OF UKRAINIANS IN AUSCHWITZ!

IN THE GERMAN MILLS OF DEATH 1941-1945

by Petro Mirchuk

(Second Edition)

This timely publication has appeared at the height of the Soviet Russian campaign of defamation against Ukrainians. Based entirely on fact, *IN THE GERMAN MILLS OF DEATH* is a fitting answer to the KGB's anti-Ukrainian propaganda which attempts to portray Ukrainian nationalists, who fought against both the Nazis and the Soviet Russians during and after WWII, aimed at discrediting the Ukrainians in the eyes of the West with a view to cutting short Ukrainian attempts to acquire Western political support and material aid in their struggle for an independent Ukraine.

In this remarkable book, Petro Mirchuk, who was a Ukrainian political activist when he was taken to Auschwitz, explains why thousands of Ukrainian political prisoners were imprisoned and exterminated in German concentration camps. He relates how life and death was from day to day in a place which most prisoners were convinced they would leave only as corpses. Such was the nature of the concentration camp that simple existence was a miracle of no small accomplishment, and those who managed it are well worth listening to.

Published in 1985 by: The Survivors of the Holocaust and the Ukrainian
American Freedom Foundation, Inc., Rochester,
N.Y., USA

Price: U.K. — £5.00, USA — \$12.00, Canada & Australia — \$15.00.

Orders to be sent to: Ukrainian Publishers Ltd.,
200, Liverpool Road, London N1 1LF, U.K.

M. SULATYCH

THE ETERNAL PATH OF HEROES*

In the Fall of 1970, the news of this campaign reached wide circles of the Ukrainian population by means of a "samvydav" publication, entitled *Ukrainskyi visnyk*. Its third issue presented Yuriy Shukhevych as "the son of one of the leaders of the OUN movement, Roman Shukhevych" Yuriy was "kept in slavery for 20 years for being the son of a nationalist activist". He is described as being "self-educated, an erudite and enlightened person". This description was surely intended to present him to the public as a young Ukrainian national leader.

When a son, Roman, was born to the Shukhevyches and Svyatoslav Karavanskyi learned about it in Vladimir prison, he wrote a beautiful poem "dedicated to Yuriy Shukhevych on the day of the birth of his son. Roman", entitled "Kolyskova" (At the Cradle). In a loose prosaic translation its text is as follows: "Sleep, child, as long as you are able, gain strength, let your path appear in your dreams through the graves. Sleep, child, let the dream solve a sheaf of living scenes, it will tell you everything, whose grandson and whose son you are. Sleep, child, rock-a-bye and do not reduce your expectations because bullets are whizzing in the woods, where your grandfather was walking. Do you hear the murmur of creeks? Do you see those paths? Your grandfather is watching all around you, for there are wolves everywhere. Animals are tiptoeing pretending to be sheep, sleep, child, the hunter was unable to rid himself of misfortune. And even now the green leaves are conversing with the wind: — He wished the dragon would not drag out small children from their cradles. Sleep, child, and remember the entire court-path; they threw a lasso on your father when he was still young, they are sharpening the knife and hammering chains, some are even inventing lies. Sleep, child, until the golden sun rises again. Sleep, child, rock-a-bye, and do not reduce your expectations because bullets are still whizzing where your grandfather walked".

A reviewer of S. Karavanskyi's book of poetry entitled *An Encounter with the Typhoon*, which contains the poem "Kolyskova", Dr. Mykola Klymyshyn wrote: "This is an important aspect of the poet, the fact that he was an active fighter in the OUN during the days of battles for Ukraine's freedom. He was close at heart to the Commander of the UPA. Therefore, he suffered for 30 years, but it has borne fruitful thoughts, formed in poetry — poetry in praise of father and son. The son is ready to do everything to remain faithful to his great father. Due to his filial loyalty to his father's fighting glory, Yuriy has added his own glory of a martyr. One would like to tell the little grandson everything about his noble grandfather and great father: 'whose grandson and son you are.'" (M. Klymyshyn, "On the poetic creativity of S. Karavanskyi" in *Vyzvolnyi Shlachh*, February, 1981, p. 212).

* Continued from *The Ukrainian Review*, No. 2, 1985.

At the end of summer 1971, Nina Strokata-Karavanska (wife of S. Karavanskyi) was forced by the Soviet Russians to leave Ukraine and arrived at Nalchyk from Odessa. She obtained a post at the Nalchyk medical school. Soon Yu. Shukhevych's family took a joint apartment with her. However, in December, 1971, the KGB made a thorough search of their residence in preparation for new repressions against Shukhevych.

The Continuation of the Heroic Path and Martyrdom of Yuriy Shukhevych

The period of the late 1960's and early 1970's was characterised by intensified activities by the Ukrainian national liberation movement. Moscow decided to counteract brutally because the movement contradicted the objectives of Russian imperialism. After a thorough preparation, the KGB executed several thousand searches and arrests during the months of January, February and March, 1972 — one thousand in the Lviv oblast alone. The Ukrainian national liberation movement was so widespread at that time that "arrests happened in virtually every oblast centre and in numerous county centres as well". (*Ukrainskyi visnyk*, issue 7-8, Spring 1974). Yuriy Shukhevych was arrested on March 20, 1972. But at the same time, the sixth issue of the *Ukrainskyi visnyk* reached the Free World, containing a detailed description of the infamous mock trials of Yuriy Shukhevych during the 1940's and the 1950's. It was quite clearly underlined that he refused not only to renounce the nationalist movement, but also to write articles against Ukrainian nationalism and to become a renegade subservient to the Russian racist regime in occupied Ukraine.

During an "in camera" court at Nalchyk, Shukhevych was sentenced on September 9, 1972, to a barbaric new term of 10 years imprisonment in a strict regime camp and another 5 years of banishment. He was accused of writing memoirs about his life in slavery. The KGB confiscated these memoirs. He was also accused of attempting to find out the reasons and circumstances of his father's death and of conducting anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda. He was immediately transported to Vladimir prison in Russia, where he was placed in a specially isolated cell. Yuriy was described as "a particularly dangerous repeater". Nina Strokata received a four-year prison sentence in 1973 for "giving assistance to the family of Yuriy Shukhevych". (*Ukrainskyi visnyk*, issue 7-8, Spring 1974). Yuriy's wife, Valentyna, remained with the small children in Nalchyk, Kabardyno-Balkar ASSR.

It seems that Yuriy Shukhevych renewed his efforts, while in prison, to write down the memoirs of his life in slavery. For that reason he was again tried in the Vladimir prison court and accused of attempting to smuggle his memoirs out of the Soviet Union to the West. He was sentenced to an additional year in prison.

The glory of the unbending Yuriy Shukhevych was spreading throughout the world. In 1973, Avraam Shyfrin published his book, *The Fourth*

Dimention, in the West in which the prominent Zionist activist described Yuriy in fine words, full of respect, admiration and recognition for the boundless heroism of this uncompromising fighter for a better future for his people.

In October, 1973, *The Statement on Affairs in Ukraine and the World* was issued by Yaroslav Stetsko, Prime Minister of Free Ukraine, and Mykola Livytskyi, President of the Ukrainian National Republic (UNR) in exile. A prominent place in this statement is given to "the outstanding personality of Yuriy Shukhevych, faithful son of his great Father-Hero". Mr. Ya. Stetsko also delivered an important speech in New York at the Second Conference of the Organisations of the Ukrainian Liberation Front, which support the OUN, on the topic: "For the strengthening of our liberation activities". Mr. Stetsko mentioned Yuriy Shukhevych as the foremost example of contemporary heroic figures in the struggle for Ukraine's national independence. Another speaker at the same conference, the late Hryhoriy Drabat, depicted Yuriy Shukhevych as the representative of "a persecuted and tortured, yet unbending younger generation" of Ukrainian freedom-fighters.

In 1973, Captain Anatole Radygin a long-term political prisoner in the Soviet Union, arrived in the West. In his memoirs entitled *Episodes from the Mordovian Concentration Camps*, Radygin wrote: "I was not honoured to be in the same cell with Yuriy Shukhevych, but I know that while M. Soroka was known as a teacher and patriot, so Yuriy Shukhevych was known as a friend and a companion; a friend — wise and magnanimous, a companion — generous and indefatigable. Such was the opinion of all those who shared a cell or barracks with him. While such people exist among us, the Chekists will never be able to gain either complete subordination, or the complete deprivation of purpose in life among their prisoners. We knew that the son of General Shukhevych was young, intelligent and a fighter, worthy of his name which will never be forgotten in Moscow... Although everyone expected it to happen, all of us were shocked by the new sentence. We knew that the stench of the cells, bad food, lack of any understanding and hatred from both sides of the prison walls awaited him, as well as the helpless misery of his family. But one is forced to repeat: 'There are still knights in Ukraine!'"

The health of the 40-year old Yuriy Shukhevych began to decline and in 1973 he became very ill. A duodenal ulcer appeared, but he did not receive any medical treatment.

In spring, 1975, a declaration was issued, signed by 77 political prisoners, with a request to the state authorities of the USSR to recognise their status as that of political prisoners. Among the signatories is the name of the 42-year old Shukhevych.

The question of worldwide support for these political prisoners in the USSR, among whom Yuriy Shukhevych is one of the most outstanding, was raised by the representatives of the OUN at a Conference of the World Anti-Communist League, held in Rio de Janeiro (Brazil) in April, 1975.

The Conference adopted a resolution to make Yuriy Shukhevych an example to the whole world of a true national freedom-fighter, especially for the young generation. The prestige of Shukhevych was rising steadily.

In the Vanguard of a Two-Front Struggle: against Red and White Russians

At the beginning of the 1970's, Russian opposition groups inside and outside the USSR energetically attempted to form a united movement against the current Soviet regime, but based on the principle of preserving the integrity of the Russian empire. In other words, these groups aspired to reform the system, but not to destroy the colonial state. The initiators of such a movement were also trying to draw to its ranks as many activists from the captive nations as possible, particularly those who had been russified and had lost all national consciousness and dignity.

Soon after the declaration of the 77 political prisoners, news spread about the conclusion in Helsinki (capital of Finland) of an Accord (August, 1975), in which Western nations recognised the existing borders of the Soviet Russian empire. In return, Moscow promised some concessions in the field of "human rights". Such a turn of events quite soon came to be considered harmful to the national liberation movements, but advantageous to those opposition groups which favoured the status quo of the empire, although they allegedly cared about "human rights".

For these reasons, a group of 13 Ukrainian freedom-fighters, prisoners at Vladimir prison, signed an appeal, addressed to Kurt Waldheim, then Secretary-General of the United Nations. They cautioned Western nations not to place so much weight and trust on anti-regime Soviet Russian dissidents for "they do not endanger the existence of the empire itself (which since 1922 has had the name USSR)". The undersigned argued that "one cannot live in the second half of the 20th century with the look of an empire. Therefore, Moscow endeavours by all possible means to cover up the imperialistic nature of its own nationality policy and to hide the wide dissatisfaction with Russian occupation prevailing in Ukraine, in the Baltic and Caucasian countries". This cover-up is carried out to a certain extent by the anti-regime Soviet Russian dissidents, oppositionists and Russian emigres. To the contrary, the group of 13 proposes Yuriy Shukhevych — "the son of the Commander of the UPA, General Taras Chuprynka", as a personification of the Ukrainian anti-imperial liberation struggle. (Taras Chuprynka is the pseudonym of Roman Shukhevych, the Commander-in-Chief of the UPA). It should be pointed out that the Soviet Russian racists sentenced Yu. Shukhevych to a third 10 year term of imprisonment and to 5 more years of banishment "for writing nationalist articles. The reason for such a cruel sentence was the renunciation by Shukhevych of his citizenship of the USSR and his expressed desire to leave the Soviet Union".

The group of Ukrainian freedom-fighters imprisoned at Vladimir prison is referred to in the Memorandum of the Ukrainian Public Group to

Promote the Implementation of the Helsinki Accords, dated November-December, 1976. Among the inmates at this prison was Yuriy Shukhevych.

In 1977, a list of Ukrainian political prisoners in the USSR arrived in the West from Ukraine. There is a remark concerning Yu. Shukhevych to the effect that he is "under continuous pressure to renounce his views".

In January, 1978, Vyacheslav Chornovil, a prominent national freedom-fighter and long-term political prisoner, wrote an announcement, sent to the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR, in which he informed that a resolution was adopted by the Ukrainian political prisoners in January, 1972, to commemorate each year on the 12th of January a "Day of the Ukrainian Political Prisoner". Among the most prominent political prisoners, Chornovil mentions Yuriy Shukhevych.

In the second half of the 1970's, Moscow permitted many of its oppositionist dissidents to leave the empire and go to Western countries. Most of them advocated various anti-regime views since their arrival in the West, but among them, Russian dissidents have not supported the concepts of liquidating the Russian empire and have also not supported national anti-colonial movements within the Russian empire.

As a counterweight to the pro-imperialistic dissidents and the communist Russian imperialists, a statement appeared in April, 1979, produced by a group of political prisoners in the "Soviet Chystopolski Special Prison" in the Tatar ASSR, together with another group from the Mordovian concentration camp at Sosnovka. The statement was entitled: *The Second Decade of Solidarity in the Struggle against Soviet Russian Colonialism*. Both groups clearly express their solidarity with the position of the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations and the captive Nations Week in the USA. The statement was also signed by Yuriy Shukhevych.

A group of political prisoners in the Sosnovka concentration camp opposed the policy of détente between the West and the Russian colonial empire in June, 1979. This group sent a memorandum to the President and the Congress of the USA, as well as to all those Western governments which signed the Helsinki Accords. Among the authors of this memorandum was the name of Yuriy Shukhevych. The group warned the West against making the tragic mistake of believing that by "treaties it is possible to remove Russian hegemonism" and the threat of a world war. The conclusion follows that the proper policy is to support national anti-colonial freedom movements of the people enslaved within the Russian empire.

At the end of 1979, still another document came out of the underground in the USSR — an appeal to the Secretary-General of the United Nations which stressed the primary objective as the need to get support from the Free World for the national liberation movements. Among the 18 signatories was, yet again, Yuriy Shukhevych.

A Fighter to the Last Breath of His Life

The life of Yuriy Shukhevych has passed in a constant struggle to achieve the idea of a sovereign Ukrainian state. However, at the beginning of 1982, news arrived that Yuriy has a serious heart ailment as well as a stomach ulcer.

Amnesty International in London, Great Britain, proclaimed Yuriy Shukhevych as "prisoner of the month", in February, 1982.

In the second half of 1982, news arrived that the KGB had transferred Yuriy to the Haasa Leningrad Central Hospital for Prisoners and performed an operation on him on January 7, 1982, the result of which was that Shukhevych became blind. It is the epitome of barbaric cruelty and savageness to take away the eyesight of such a noble person! Svyatoslav Karavanskyi believes that the Russians had deprived Shukhevych of his sight much sooner, during an operation at the Chystopolski Prison in the Tatar ASSR.

More news arrived about the decay of one of Yuriy's eyes and a cataract on the other eye with a decayed retina. It has been said that Yuriy lost sight in one eye in November, 1981, and he could barely see with the other one. He could not clearly distinguish the faces of relatives. Several possibilities are being mentioned as the cause of this loss of sight: either powerful blows on the head, or the lack of vitamin "A"; either a prolonged stay in darkness or prolonged stay in bright light. In addition, the Russians brought him to a condition of serious dystrophy, a condition produced by bad nutrition which has made Yuriy a living skeleton.

In March, 1983, the Russians transferred Yuriy from prison to a boarding house, "Lesnaya dacha" in the town of Oskano, Shegarsk county, Tomsk oblast, Western Siberia, where he had to serve another 5 years of banishment. There is a photo of him at the age of fifty with a cane in one hand and his mother at his side. In spite of the unbelievable hardships that both of them have endured, we can still see in their faces a shining and inextinguishable optimism, and a strong faith in the coming victory of the idea of a Ukrainian independent and sovereign state, in the service of which Yuriy has given his whole life.

A great honour for him was President Reagan's recognition of him in his Proclamation of Captive Nations Week, on July 16, 1984. The President called him "the imprisoned Ukrainian patriot Yuriy Shukhevych" who is a symbol of "millions of freedom-fighters in the captive nations..." from whom all of us should gain strength.

News From Ukraine

CHRONICLE OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN UKRAINE

Although there was some doubt as to whether the *Chronicle of the Catholic Church in Ukraine* would continue to appear due to the confiscation of materials and printing presses by the authorities, an incident, which was mentioned at the end of issue Number 8 of the *Chronicle* in a handwritten note by Josyp Terelya, we are pleased to say that we have now received issue Number 9. The first part is published in this issue of *The Ukrainian Review*.

*

Number 9

To the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet
of the Ukrainian SSR.

STATEMENT

On the 21st we members of the [timber procurement] team, Firka M. V., Korol Yu. M. Romanets I. M., Dutka D. I. and Firka Yu. M., drew up a contract with the Petrovskiy collective farm, Verkhnodniprovsk district, Homel region. The contract was ratified by the authorities of the collective farm on March 1st, 1984. We completed the job on April 28th, 2 days before the set deadline. The contract was signed by the head of the district agricultural administration, H. V. Velyhiv, by the director of the UKS¹, A. I. Chornomorets, and by the chief economist of the RAPO² and the legal service, V. I. Vasylenko.

Chief construction engineer, Troyan V. F., and the works manager of the collective, Belko, received 497 cubic metres and [an additional] 3 tons of timber from our procurement team³. Both men immediately signed a document authorising the payment of the team's wages. However, to our great regret the money we had earned by the sweat of our brow was not paid out to us. We are ordinary Ukrainian rural workers, who worked 16 to 18 hours a day just to earn some money and bring home a well-earned

¹ Management of Capital Construction.

² District Consumers' Cooperative.

³ This is unclear. The first figure refers to the amount of timber stacked up in an area of 497 cubic metres (presumably on the collective itself), which was procured by the team. The second, a weight measure rather than an area measurement, implies transportation of the procured additional 3 tons of timber to some destination, for whatever reason — to be sold, for use on building projects outside the immediate vicinity of the collective, etc.

piece of bread for our families... We do not know why Soviet law was so blatantly violated and why the management thinks our children do not want to eat. Only fierce enemies of the working class and peasants can act in such a way. It is interesting to note that as soon as the local Uniates got to know of this they immediately came to my house and insisted that we complain to their committee of defence so that the world would know how Ukrainian rural labourers work for nothing on our collective farms. We have nothing in common with the Uniates. We belong to the Russian Orthodox Church and do not tread the same paths as our enemies... we wrote a statement to the district prosecutor's office, but our money has still not been paid. To whom should we write now? Why did the management have the "right" to violate the contract and spit into the soul of a Soviet rural worker?

Surely the guilty persons cannot get away with only a mere reprimand for the obvious theft of our honestly-earned wages? We hope that the higher administrative organs of the Ministry of the Interior will find the time [to deal with this case] and that our children will not end up without a piece of bread.

12. 7. 1984

*

To
The Secretary-General of the UNO,
Mr. Javier Perez de Cuellar

Mr. Cuellar!

Forty years have passed since the end of the world war. It would seem that there would be no return to the past — the people of little planet Earth are heading towards peace and mutual understanding. But mere aspirations are not enough. During the war in the city of Lviv in Ukraine there was a concentration camp, which stood on Shevchenko Street near the Lukachiv cemetery where over 100,000 prisoners of various nationalities were exterminated. After the war Soviet troops occupied Ukraine and set up their own concentration camp in the place where Hitler's "Yaniv concentration camp" once stood. The Soviet camp has survived to this very day. On May 20th [1984] the Ukrainian Catholic priest Fr. Antin Potochniak who was aged 72, was murdered there. The Moscow officials expanded this camp by more than half. We, the members of the Helsinki Initiative Group to Defend the Rights of Believers and the Church in Ukraine, turn to you with the request that a monument to the memory of those, who died at the hands of the Nazis and the Stalinists be erected on the site of the former Nazi and now communist concentration camp. People of good will! Remember and do not forget that in Ukraine an undeclared war is being

waged against our people. Moscow has decided once and for all to finish with Ukraine and its past, depriving us also of the future.

1. 8. 1984

Lviv

Chairman of the Initiative Group — *Vasyl Kobryn*,
Secretary — *Fr. Hryhoriy Budzinskyi*,
Member — *Josyp Terelya*.

*

CHAUVINISM — RUSSIA — COMMUNISM

Throughout the centuries imperial Moscow has strived for peace and at the same time has conducted its own wars of conquest. Throughout the centuries Moscow has hidden behind the shield of the “protection of small nations” before the large ones, while simultaneously destroying and subjugating these very same nations.

This is what *Russkaya Mysl* wrote in December, 1914: “We are fighting for the general liberation of all nations that are being threatened with humiliation and oppression, no matter what their particular race or religious beliefs may be. We are striving for the rights of every nation, for the [protection] in politics of the national principle itself in its full sense...”. This quote has been taken from an article written by Prince E. Trubetskoy, entitled “War and the world mission of Russia”. The article goes on to say that: “...the liberation of other peoples and the struggle to help the weak against the strong does not only concern our political disinterestedness, it is also indispensable for the survival of Russia”.

However, we can see that for the Russian chauvinist [Trubetskoy] the imperialist war was not a case of the “political disinterestedness of Russia”, which [supposedly] thought about the time when the peoples of the world would be free from slavery... “The task, thrown upon us by history, is alien to the differences between East and West. It equally concerns racial and religious antagonism. This task, in essence, is international, universal — the general political renaissance of all subjugated nationalities”. In reality, how very similar Prince Trubetskoy's article is to the doctrine of the Central Committee of the CPSU. For the followers of Andropov and Chernenko speak the same. Neither the communists nor their predecessors, the princes and so on, ever asked the nations, which in the eyes of the chauvinist [Trubetskoy] came under the category of those, which had to be liberated from themselves [whether any of them wished to be liberated]... In January, 1915, *Russkaya Duma* repeated what had earlier been published in *Russkaya Mysl*: “The task of general national liberation can be resolved only through our victory — through such a victory that would bring us

world hegemony... This [the achievement of this victory] is our greatest problem..." As we can see, world hegemony, which is now called the world hegemony of the working class, is equally indispensable to both regimes [tsarist and communist]. Although its nature and slogans may have changed, the essential principle — imperialism — is the same. In the opinion of the author [Trubetskoy] Russia will only succeed in avoiding the triumph of nationalism by a "successful solution to the national question in its world-wide scale and significance"...

This means that Russia should become an international policeman in its future global empire in which the big Russian elder brother will make the peoples happy...

Prince Trubetskoy writes: "Russia should preserve the image of itself as a liberator-state — the defender of all small nations against predator-states". It is interesting to know to which of these nations the chauvinist Trubetskoy felt he belonged? Perhaps he was trying to say that "Russia will become the centre of a union of nations with the aim of common security". Although not a communist one, he did, nevertheless, create in his mind a picture of a "centre of a union of nations". The communists did not have to think up anything new. They made use of everything that the old imperial machine had left behind. They merely added lack of principle, cruelty, and the destruction of faith — in other words complete amorality. It was embarrassing for "Christian Russia" to propagate the idea of Pavlyk Morozov⁴. For the new emperors, not restricted by international laws, this was most unfitting. The aim put forward was unambiguous: the struggle for the complete destruction of capitalism and the triumph of communism — clear and simple. They want to change the label and conquer the world with their dirty hands, according to the old imperial principle, divide and rule, to achieve the complete triumph of Russian chauvinism, today called "communism". However, as we shall see later on, today the well-known "Ukrainian question" stands in the way of the achievement of all these aims, as it did 70 years ago. "Such an annexation is essential — as it became clear in connection with this war [WWI] — also for the internal recovery of Russia, for the life of the Little Russian [Ukrainian] race under Austria has created and nurtured the monstrous so-called 'Ukrainian question' in our midst"... In this way Mr. Struve and Prince Trubetskoy were hoping for a war — a war to achieve the "unity of the great Russian culture..." by means of destroying the little Ukrainian culture, thus realising the religious miracle of the fusion of power and truth.

All of the programmatic documents of today's Kremlin officials hurt the eyes with statements on peace and friendship, on the protection of the interests of the Russian worker, the great Russian culture, and so on. However, the Ukrainian question is not forgotten either, especially today, when

⁴ A boy, who gave his father away to the authorities for hiding grain during the period of collectivisation.

raging Russification and the destruction of everything Ukrainian is on the advance.

I purposely made this selection of quotes of former tsarist government officials in order to convince myself one more time that the communist empire did not spring up from an empty space.

August, 1984.

*

WHAT HAS CHANGED IN THE LAST 70 YEARS?

For us — nothing. Ukraine remains a Russian colony as it was in the past. In December⁵, 1914, Metropolitan A. Sheptytskyi was arrested and exiled to Kursk in January, 1915, where he was placed under the supervision of Archbishop Tykhon.

Ukrainian Catholic bishop, Stepan Yuryk⁶, was arrested and exiled to the gubernia of Tomsk, along with 54 Ukrainian intellectuals from Lviv, Ternopil, and Kolomyia.

On January 9th, the Kyiv police retracted permission for the printing of all publications in the Ukrainian language, which appeared in Kyiv. Nineteen publications were closed down, not including those publications, which were printed in both Russian and Ukrainian. The basis for this action was the instruction issued by the Commander-in-Chief of the military district in Kyiv, which said: "Halt all periodicals in the Little Russian dialect, the old Aryan language and in the Hebrew jargon for the entire period under military conditions". In this way the empire, which was crumbling, began the year 1915.

*

ANNOUNCEMENT

In 1983, the church in the village of Stare Stryiske, Zhydachiv district, Lviv region, was converted into a funeral directory. Presently, it houses a museum.

In the spring of 1984, the church in the village of Veriatsia, Vynohradiv district was destroyed. The communists smashed everything and burnt all the liturgical books. The church itself was turned into a medical centre. It would be interesting to know where the Ukrainian people's money goes if the Kremlin destroys churches and turns them into medical centres, instead of building hospitals. For more than half a year none of the local people wanted to work in the medical centre. The authorities then sent

⁵ This is a mistake. The incident actually took place in September.

⁶ The authors were probably thinking of Dmytro Yaremko.

down a Russian obstetrician, who now works in the village. However, the inhabitants of the village do not turn to her for medical help.

On June 9th, 1984, a meeting of young Catholics from two districts of Transcarpathian Ukraine was held on the site of the Boroniavskyi Monastery, which had been destroyed by the Russians.

*

MYKHAILO HORYN

The Ukrainian sociologist, M. Horyn, is in exile in the village of Kuchino, Perm region, Russia. This is his second term [of imprisonment] for his love of Ukraine and its independence. According to information received from his relatives, Mykhailo Horyn suffered a heart attack in May. The commander of the concentration camp, Major Zhuravliov, agreed to allow Horyn to receive his next visit, but on the 14th he unexpectedly sent a telegram denying permission for the visit. Having arrived in Russia, where the concentration camp is situated, Horyn's wife did not receive permission to visit her husband. Later it became clear that some KGB men from Ukraine had arrived to have a "chat" with M. Horyn. This chat did not take place and the "friends of the people" gave permission for a visit from his relatives.

Horyn moved around his cell with difficulty. The camp doctors did not allow him to move around... But why did the heart attack occur immediately after the KGB visit? It is also strange that of late all those political prisoners who did not compromise with their own conscience have died.

This question is primarily directed, both today and in the future, to Major Zhuravliov, the commander of the concentration camp, who puts into practice the Kremlin's directives on the destruction of Ukrainian political prisoners. A truce with the authorities cannot be made until every single camp commander is put on trial for crimes committed against the nations, which inhabit this huge empire...

Mykhailo Horyn is now imprisoned on the basis of fabricated evidence. The authorities are well aware of his tough stand on the issue of the liberation of Ukraine. For this reason they have resorted to the open destruction of this Ukrainian Catholic.

Presently, Mykhailo Horyn is confined in a cell with Zorian Popadiuk, Levko Lukianenko and Valentyn Kalynychenko.

Ukrainians! Pray for the martyr M. Horyn. Pray for all those innocent people who are suffering for their love of Ukraine and its people, and for the love of our Lord God Jesus Christ.

The Initiative Group to Defend the Rights of Believers and the Church in Ukraine demands the return to Ukraine of all Ukrainian political prisoners, who are imprisoned in Russia. The Russians took upon themselves the

terrible mission to destroy the Ukrainian nation — a genocide of the Ukrainian people. This action was thought up by the Kremlin's God-killers.

The Nuremberg process, which began in Nuremberg against the fascist murderers, will come to a close in Moscow with a tribunal of all the subjugated nations.

*

AFGHANISTAN

Announcement:

Volovets district	— 32 men were drafted for military service
	— 4 killed
	— 1 wounded
Perechyn district	— 10 killed
	— 3 wounded
	— 51 suffering from frost-bite
Velykyi Bereznyi district	— 1 killed
	— 12 wounded
Vynohradiv district	— 31 killed
	— 63 wounded, including those suffering from frost-bite

The authorities have made a compromise. They "allowed" crosses to be placed on the graves [of the dead soldiers] next to the star. However in the town of Svaliava when relatives placed a cross on the grave of a dead soldier the authorities took it down. This continued for half a year.

MURDER INTERNATIONAL, INC.

Murder and Kidnapping as Instruments of Soviet Policy.

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary

U.S. Government Printing Office. Washington 1965.

176 pages, price \$5.00 £2.00

Contains hearings of testimonies by former Soviet secret service agents, Petr S. Deriabin and Bohdan Stashynsky, the murderer of Stepan Bandera and Lev Rebet.

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Ukrainian Publishers LTD.

200 Liverpool Rd., London, N1 1LF.

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Ukrainian Booksellers
49, Linden Gardens,
London, W2 4HG.

OKSANA MESHKO RETURNS TO KYIV

News has just reached us that Oksana Meshko, a long-standing Ukrainian political prisoner and campaigner for national and human rights returned to Kyiv on November 5th, 1985, after completing her term of imprisonment and exile.

She was arrested on 14. 10. 1980 and sentenced to 6 months of imprisonment in strict-regime labour camps and 5 years of exile in the village of Yan, Khabarovskiy kray.

Oksana Meshko was born in 1905 and is a teacher by profession. She is the mother of 1 son. She was first imprisoned in the years 1947-1955 in Stalinist labour camps. Afterwards she was rehabilitated. On 9. 11. 1976 she joined the Ukrainian Helsinki Group, becoming one of its founder members. From that time she has suffered constant persecution and has been under continuous KGB surveillance. On 12. 6. 1980 she was arrested in Kyiv and sent to a psychiatric hospital for a 2-month "examination".

Oksana Meshko, who is 80 years old, suffers from diabetes, hypertension and rheumatism.



RUSSIAN UNLAWFULNESS IN UKRAINE

The Life of a Martyr.

By **Ivan Kandyba**

a long-term inmate of Russian prisons
and concentration camps.

Published by: Ukrainisches Institute für Bildungspoliti,
München, Germany, 1980. Paperback, 40 pp.

Price: £2.00 (\$4.00)

REPRESSED UKRAINIANS IN THE USSR

(Continued from The Ukrainian Review, No. 4, 1985)

578) STEFANIV Volodymyr. Former member of the UPA for which he spent 10 years in labour camps.

579) STEPA Bohdan P. Professional labourer. Sentenced in Lviv in 1973 to an unknown term of imprisonment for spreading the word of God, for teaching children religion and for criticising the Soviet authorities.

580) STEPANIV Ivan S. Sentenced to 40 years of imprisonment in strict regime camps for national and political issues.

581) STEPANIUK Oleksiy S. Born in 1908. Member of the OUN and the UPA. Sentenced to 25 years of imprisonment in 1956. Due to have been released in 1981.

582) STETSENKO. Captain of the Soviet army. In Budapest in 1956 he refused to order his troops to fire upon insurgent Hungarian workers for which he was sentenced to 10 years of hard penal labour.

583) STETSIUK Bohdan Ya. He was deported by the Soviet Russians after the Second World War for political issues. He still lives in exile and is forbidden to return to Ukraine.

584) STETSIUK Petro I. Born in 1955, arrested and sentenced to one and a half years of imprisonment under Art. 187 and 138 of the Criminal Code of the Ukr. USSR.

585) STETSULA Nadia. Student of the Faculty of Ukrainian Philology at Lviv University. In 1973 she was expelled from the University for alleged participation in the publication of the underground journal *Koryto* and for handing out leaflets.

586) STRILTSIV Pavlo S. Arrested on 4. 7. 1972 and sentenced to 18 months of imprisonment under Art. 187-1 of the Criminal Code of the Ukr. SSR. He is constantly persecuted.

587) STRILTSIV Vasyl S. Born on 13. 1. 1929 in the village of Zahvizdia near Ivano-Frankivsk. Taught English. Arrested for the first time in 1944 when he was 15 years old and sentenced to 10 years of imprisonment under Art. 54 of the Criminal Code of the Ukr. SSR. Released in 1954. Member of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group. For participation in a strike he was arrested in 1979 and sentenced to 3 months of imprisonment. On 12. 11. 1979 he was sentenced to 2 years of imprisonment in strict regime camps by the regional court of Dolyna, Ivano-Frankivsk region, under Art. 196 of the Criminal Code of the Ukr. SSR ("violation of passport regulations" — he lived without a passport).

588) STROTSIN Pavlo. Born in 1928, participated in the liberation struggle. Arrested in 1958 and sentenced to 25 years of imprisonment under Art. 56 of the Criminal Code of the Ukr. SSR. Due to have been released in 1983.

589) STRUS Petro. Sentenced in the town of Ternopil to 10 years of imprisonment for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda".

590) STRUTYNSKYI Ivan V. Born in 1937. Sentenced in 1958 to 10 years of imprisonment under Art. 56 of the Criminal Code of the Ukr. SSR for membership of the "United Party for the Liberation of Ukraine".

591) STULKIVSKYI I. H. Jehovah's Witness. Arrested in 1976 and sentenced in Ternopil to 3 years of imprisonment for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda".

592) STUS Vasyl S. Born on 8. 1. 1938 in the village of Rakhnivka in Vinnytsia. Graduated from the Donetsk pedagogical institute and did his post-graduate studies at the Academy of Sciences of the Ukr. SSR. He was a poet and literary critic. Married, the father of a son. Arrested on January 13, 1972, and sentenced on September 7 of the same year by the Kyiv regional court to 5 years of strict regime labour camps and 3 years of exile under Art. 62 of the Criminal Code of the Ukr. SSR. He was accused on the basis of all his literary work and also for exclusively using the Ukrainian language. In 1979 he was released. In May, 1980, Stus was re-arrested in Kyiv. He was sentenced to 10 years of strict regime camps and 5 years of exile. Vasyl Stus was gravely ill, but yet was made to perform strenuous physical labour and was deprived of medical treatment. He died on September 4, 1985, as a result of deliberate mistreatment at the hands of the camp authorities.

593) SUROVTSEVA Nadia. Born in 1897. Ukrainian writer and authority on art. Spent more than 30 years in Soviet Russian labour camps, prisons and in exile. Recently released, but was constantly persecuted. She died in April, 1985.

594) SVARNYK Ivan I. Student of Lviv University. Expelled in 1973 for the alleged participation in the publication of the underground student magazine *Koryto* and also for handing out leaflets in defence of the Ukrainian language and traditions, for commemorating the birth of Shevchenko and so on.

595) SVERSTIUK Yevhen Ol. Born on 13. 12. 1928 in Volyn. Graduated from Lviv University and then did post-graduate studies at Kyiv University. Candidate of pedagogical sciences, publicist and writer. Married, the father of children. Persecuted for many years. Arrested on 14. 1. 1972 and sentenced in Kyiv on 24. 4. 1973 to 7 years of imprisonment and 5 years of exile under Art. 62 of the Criminal Code of the Ukr. SSR. He was accused of writing literary works in the Ukrainian national spirit. Due to have been released in 1984.

596) SVITLYCHNYI Ivan O. Born on 19. 9. 1929 in the Luhansk region. Graduated from Kharkiv University, and then did post-graduate studies in the Institute of Literature of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukr. SSR where he also worked. He is a literary critic, writer, translator and research worker. Married. Between 1965 and 1966 he spent 9 months under investigation by the KGB. He was again arrested on January 14, 1972, and sentenced on 27. 4. 1973 in Kyiv under Art. 62 of the Criminal Code of the Ukr. SSR

to 12 years of imprisonment, accused of Ukrainian national patriotism. Due to have been released in 1984.

597) SYDORENKO Vasyl. Sentenced to a long term of imprisonment. At present he is in a concentration camp. He is seriously ill.

598) SYMCHYCH Mykhailo V. Born in 1921, member of the OUN-UPA. In 1952 he was sentenced to 20 years of imprisonment. He was released in 1972, but is still persecuted.

599) SYMCHYCH Myroslav V. Born in 1923 in the village of Bereziiv, Ivano-Frankivsk region. Former member of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists; a leader of a group of the UPA (Ukrainian Insurgent Army) between 1944-48. Married, father of two sons; arrested and sentenced on 13. 4. 1949 in Ivano-Frankivsk under Art. 54-1a and 54-2 of the Criminal Code of the Ukr. SSR to 25 years of imprisonment and 5 years withdrawal of all rights for his allegiance to the OUN-UPA. In 1953 he was sentenced to a further 10 years of imprisonment for organising the political prisoners against the criminals. Altogether he has been sentenced to 35 years.

600) SYMON I. Sentenced to death in Zhytomyr and the verdict was carried out in 1978. He had been accused of supposed "crimes" committed during the Second World War.

601) SYMONCHUK Mykhailo. Young intellectual, graduate; sentenced in Ternopil in 1969 to 4 years of imprisonment. He was accused of spreading samvydav material in particular an article about the trial of Pohruzhalskyi.

602) SYNHYVSKYI Vitaliy V. Has spent time in concentration camps; was accused of "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda".

603) SYNYSHYN Mykola M. Worked as a poligraphist in a publisher's firm in Lviv. Arrested in 1973 and sentenced in Lviv in 1974 to 4 years of imprisonment. He was accused of clandestinely printing religious literature for the underground Ukrainian Church.

604) TARAKHOVYCH. Sentenced to long term imprisonment for his political activity during the Second World War.

605) TARNOVSKYI Mykola A. Born in 1940. High school teacher by profession. Sentenced to 7 years of labour camps for membership of the "Democratic Association of Socialists"

606) TERELYA Josyp Mykhailovych. Born in 1943. Poet and artist by profession. Married, the father of children. Sentenced in 1968 to 8 years of imprisonment under Art. 64 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR. Released in April, 1976. The authorities demanded that he should recant. He refused and was sent to a psychiatric hospital on 28. 4. 1977. In 1982 Terelya formed the "Initiative Group to Defend the Rights of Believers and the Church" and became its first chairman. At the end of 1982 he was arrested charged with "parasitism". He spent his 1-year sentence in a corrective labour colony in the Lviv region. Terelya was the author of many articles in the *Chronicle of the Catholic Church in Ukraine*, published by the "Initiative Group". He was arrested on February 8, 1985, in the village of Dovhe, Transcarpathian Ukraine, and confined for a period of time in a psychiatric hospital. His trial took place on August 20, 1985, and he was

sentenced to 7 years of imprisonment and 5 years of exile under Art. 62 of the Criminal Code of the Ukr. SSR.

607) TEREKH Vasyi. Comes from Siltse Belske, married, the father of 4 children. Participated in the struggle of the OUN-UPA for which he was arrested. Spent 10 years in a labour camp. Released and was re-arrested and sentenced to 25 years of labour camps.

608) TESLENKO. Sentenced to 6 years of imprisonment under Art. 70 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR.

609) TIAHLIVETS Oleksa. Sentenced in Lviv on 22. 1. 1962 to 12 years of imprisonment for membership of the "Ukrainian National Committee".

610) TKACH Stepan. Born in 1937. He raised the Ukrainian flag in his village. In 1968 he was sentenced to 2½ years of strict regime labour camps. In the camp he constantly complained of head aches, but never received medical treatment. He died suddenly on 28. 7. 1968.

611) TKACHENKO Petro I. Born in 1952. Arrested on 26. 4. 1974 and sentenced under Art. 200-1 and 170-1 of the Criminal Code of the Kazakh SSR to 3 years of labour camps for spreading the faith of the Evangelicals Christians-Baptists.

612) TKACHUK Yarema S. Born in 1933. Worked as a turner in Ivano-Frankivsk. Arrested in December, 1958, and sentenced on 10. 3. 1959 to 10 years of imprisonment for membership of the underground "United Party for the Liberation of Ukraine" under Arts. 54-1 and 54-2 of the Criminal Code of the Ukr.SSR.

613) TOMKIV Ihor. Born in 1957 in the Lviv region. Deeply religious. Every year he organised traditional Ukrainian carol singing performed by the faithful. On Christmas Day in 1975 he was murdered on the way home from carol singing. The militia and the Lviv prosecutor's office refused to investigate this crime.

614) TOVKACH Ivan P. Born in 1920 in the village of Borovychi in Volyn. Participated in the liberation struggle of the OUN-UPA. Arrested in the town of Prokopyivsk, Novosybirsk region, and sentenced in 1972 by the Volyn regional court to 12 years of strict regime labour camps under Art. 56 of the Criminal Code of the Ukr.SSR.

615) TRASIUK. Sentenced in Donetsk in 1963 to an unknown term of imprisonment for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda".

616) TRYSH Vasyi. Born in 1911. Physicist by profession. Sentenced in Ternopil in 1975 to 3 years of imprisonment. He was accused of assisting the publication of samvydav material.

617) TROTSIUK V. H. Born in 1937. Sentenced on 11. 6. 1962 in the town of Zdolbuniv in the Rivne region to 2½ years of imprisonment for political issues.

618) TROTSIUK-KOZLIUK Petro. Born around 1925. Married, the father of one child. Participated in the liberation struggle of the OUN-UPA. Sentenced to 25 years of imprisonment under Art. 56 of the Criminal Code of the Ukr.SSR. In 1971 the KGB opened another case against him on the basis of Art. 102 of the Criminal Code of the Ukr.SSR. In 1972 he was sent

to the Dnipropetrovsk psychiatric hospital for an indefinite period. He was completely sane. In 1977 he was still in the hospital.

619) TROYAN Yakiv. Arrested in 1944 and sentenced to 10 years of labour camps for membership of the UPA.

620) TRUKHAN Hanna. Sentenced in April, 1974, to an unknown term of imprisonment for visiting the shrines of the "Uniates-Pokutnyky". She was accused of "systematic vagrancy" and membership of the group "Uniates-Pokutnyky".

621) TRUKHAN Maria. Member of the sect of "Pokutnyky" (Penitents) of the Greek-Catholic Church. In 1973 she was arrested for her beliefs and sentenced in 1974 to an unknown term of imprisonment.

622) TRUKHAN Stefania. Comes from the village of Vilshanka, Zboriv district, Ternopil region. Arrested in 1973 in the village of Serednie, Kalush district, Ivano-Frankivsk region and sentenced to an unknown term of imprisonment for her religious beliefs and membership of the sect of "Pokutnyky" of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church.

623) TSAP Maria. Comes from the village of Vilshanka, Zboriv district, Ternopil region. Arrested in April, 1974, and sentenced in the town of Kalush to an unknown term of imprisonment for membership of the sect of "Pokutnyky" of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church.

624) TSAPIV Vasyi. Born in 1923 in the Ivano-Frankivsk region. Participated in the liberation struggle of the OUN-UPA for which he spent many years in labour camps. After his release he was constantly persecuted.

(To be continued)

THE AGONY OF A NATION

The Great Man-made Famine in Ukraine

by *Stephen Oleskiw*

with a Foreword by *Malcolm Muggeridge*,

Cover design by *Rostyslav Hluvko*.

A concise analysis of the circumstances which led to this terrible holocaust in recent Ukrainian history and its aftermath, with much illustrative material, eyewitness accounts and bibliography.

Published by the National Committee to Commemorate the 50th Anniversary of the Artificial Famine in Ukraine 1932-33.

72 pp.

Price in the U.K. £1.50

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London W2 4HG, England

Documents and reports

ABN/EFC CONFERENCE

The European Freedom Council (EFC) and the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations (ABN) held a joint Conference on 21-24 November, 1985, in London, Great Britain. The theme of the Conference was: "High and Low Frontier — Strategic Defence and Liberation".

One hundred and fifty eight delegates and over two hundred observers heard several distinguished speakers offer their first hand knowledge in panel discussions and individual addresses. Among them were the Hon. Yaroslav Stetsko, former Prime Minister of Ukraine, Mr. John Wilkinson, M.P. (Great Britain), Rt. Hon. Sir Frederic Bennet, M.P. (Great Britain), Mr. Stefan Terlezki, M.P. (Great Britain), General John K. Singlaub (USA), Dr. James D. Morgan (USA), Mr. Arie Vudka (Israel) and Dr. William P. Murphy (USA).

In this, the international youth year, a youth panel, in which representatives of various subjugated nations took part, underlined the persecution of youth behind the Iron Curtain. The youth in these countries suffer at the hands of a tyrannical and ruthless Soviet Russian empire for their attempts at liberation.

The EFC issued a statement condemning Soviet Russian imperialism, their denial of national and human rights, and the persecution of religious freedom. The ABN resolutions appealed to the Free World to give more political, financial and military support to the liberation struggles of the subjugated nations, thereby allowing them to establish national states and democracies in their respective countries. The ABN resolutions recommend this strategy as the only reliable means of saving mankind from thermo-nuclear destruction.

The EFC and the ABN, in their mandates, will pursue the combatting of communism and its imperialist attacks on innocent victims and nations. The unanimous reelection of Mr. John Wilkinson, M.P. as President of the European Freedom Council and the Hon. Yaroslav Stetsko as President of the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations was greatly applauded. It is certain that under their leadership both organisations shall endeavour to combat the tyrannies of this world with all their might.

The Conference culminated in a demonstration held outside the Soviet Russian embassy on Sunday, November 24. Over 1000 people took part, representing various subjugated nations, from Afghanistan to Nicaragua.

PRESIDENT REAGAN EXPRESSES SOLIDARITY WITH BRAVE PEOPLE OF UKRAINE

Washington, D.C. — On the occasion of a mass demonstration and a great concert of Ukrainian music and song in tribute to the liberation struggle of Ukraine against Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia, during and after World War II, held in New York on October 6, 1985, President Ronald Reagan sent a message to the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America (UCCA), which was read at the concert in Carnegie Hall. The message reads as follows:

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 27, 1985

It is an honour to join with members of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America as you gather to commemorate the 40th anniversary of the end of World War II.

In his farewell address to the cadets of West Point, General Douglas MacArthur reminded us that "The soldier, above all other men, is required to practice the greatest act of religious training — sacrifice... he must suffer and bear the deepest wounds and scars of war".

More than forty years ago, your brothers-in-arms gave flesh-and-blood meaning to General MacArthur's words as they offered their last full measure of devotion in resisting the twin tyrannies of Nazism and communism that ravaged their homeland. In the darkness of untold hardships, their spirit of courage and self-sacrifice shone brightly.

Although the shadow of tyranny continues to darken your ancestral lands, a spirit of hope and the yearning for liberty live on to inspire a new generation. I wish to express my solidarity with the brave people of Ukraine in your resolve to advance the cause of freedom and self-determination for your beloved homeland. God bless you.

Ronald Reagan

**INFORMATION CONCERNING THE TRIAL OF JOSYP TERELYA
sentenced in Uzhhorod on 20. 8. 1985 to 7 years of strict regime camps and
5 years of exile for violating Article 62 of the Ukr.SSR Criminal Code**

Josyp Mykhailovych Terelya was tried in Uzhhorod between August 19-20, 1985, accused of violating Article 62 of the Ukr.SSR Criminal Code (= Article 70 of the RSFSR Criminal Code). (During his arrest on February 8, he was accused of violating Article 190-1, but shortly afterwards, during his transfer from Lviv Prison to Uzhhorod Prison, the case was changed and transferred to the oblast prosecutor).

Among other things Josyp Terelya was accused of: writing a letter to Gance Majer (the chairman of the committee of German catholics), involvement with document K-30 (?), declaring to renounce his citizenship, distributing anti-Soviet literature, oral expressions, compiling and publishing 8 issues of the *Chronicle of the Ukrainian Catholic Church in Ukraine*.

Twelve witnesses gave evidence, almost all of whom were Terelya's neighbours when he lived in the village of Dovhe, others were: several workers from the Insurance Society, and the deputy of the military registration board who gave evidence in the courtroom that Terelya refused to accept the military draft card and sought to prove that by this gesture Terelya refused to serve in the army of Moscow (Russian).

The evidence of Budzinskyi was read out, in which he wrote that the idea of creating a *Chronicle of the Catholic Church in Ukraine* belonged to Terelya, and that he [Budzinskyi] and Kobryn did not play an active part in it. They also read out the evidence of the former district militiaman, who informed the court that when he went to persuade Terelya to vote, he said: "We do not vote for Soviet power".

Out of the twelve witnesses only one attempted to prove that the information given in the *Chronicle* was not slander. Several years ago the witness was arrested and accused of hooliganism, but in actual fact, of taking part in carol singing (pre-Christmas festivities). In court he said: "Not long before Christmas, we were warned by the local militia department, that if we gathered to sing carols, then "we will find a reason to put you into prison. We have had enough of your gatherings".

At the beginning of the trial the judge said that "this is an unusual judicial meeting, we are trying an ardent nationalist-Uniate, a supporter of the so-called Ukrainian Catholic Church". At the end, after the sentence had been passed he said: "And let this sentence be a warning to all those, who do not yet understand".

The procurator said that Terelya was being tried early, that his articles were based on foreign radio stations and that Terelya was slandering Soviet reality.

Josyp Terelya refused to be represented by a lawyer. In his final word he said that he was shown a certain document, which in reality does not exist,

and that is why it is not worth talking about. Furthermore, referring to the article of the constitution, which states that in the USSR there is no ban on religion, he said it is the KGB and not he, who is violating the law. Then he started reciting the psalm book. He was interrupted and told to speak on the subject. Terelya replied that he was talking about the essence of the situation just as he was being sentenced for his beliefs. They replied that he was being sentenced not for his beliefs, but for a violation.

"In that case", said Terelya, "I consider I'm being deprived of the final word".

THE NORILSK UPRISING

by

Yevhen Hryciak

This book records the events of the uprising in the Norilsk concentration camps in 1953. It describes the brutality and unbelievably cruel excess to which prison guards resorted. The author played a leading role in the uprising.

The Norilsk Uprising was published in 1984 by the Ukrainian Institute for Education, Munich, and should be required reading for anyone who believes there are merits in the Soviet Russian system which justify "certain errors". The callous disregard for the most basic human rights is stamped on every page, every paragraph and every sentence of these memoirs.

Price: UK £4.00; USA and Canada \$8.00.

Orders to be sent to:

Ukrainian Central Information Service,
200, Liverpool Road, London N1 1LF
Great Britain

TWO LETTERS FROM JOSYP TERELYA

Keston College has recently received copies of two letters from imprisoned Ukrainian Catholic Josyp Terelya to his family. The first letter was apparently written between February 17th and 21st, 1985, in cell No. 139 of the Lviv prison, Ukrainian SSR. The second was written on February 21st or 22nd in cell No. 132. Both are addressed to Terelya's wife Olena, his daughters Kalyna and Mariana, and his son Pavlo, born last autumn.

Josyp Terelya is a founder of the Initiative Group to Defend the Rights of Believers and the Church in Ukraine, and chairman of the Central Committee of Ukrainian Catholics. He is an advocate of a free and legalised Ukrainian Catholic Church and has also spoken in defence of other religious denominations as well. Terelya, who is 42, has spent over 18 years in Soviet Russian prisons, labour camps, and forced psychiatric confinement.

Terelya was arrested near Lviv on February 8th, 1985. Although ill with a fever of 39.9 degrees C. he was transported to Uzhhorod, Transcarpathian region, for imprisonment and interrogation. On February 15th he was taken to Lviv and confined in the local prison. Later he was subjected to a psychiatric examination. On August 20th he was sentenced to 7 years in a labour camp and 5 years exile for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda".

*

Letter 1

Glory be to Jesus!

My dear Kalynka, Maryanka, Olenka, and little Pavlyk!

The day before yesterday they brought me to the Lviv prison. The prison is still there, the procedures are the same; only the people change. I am in cell No. 139 — if you can call it a cell...

...Why they brought me to Lviv I don't know, but I can guess. They arrested me on February 8; Procurator Feksta signed the warrant for the arrest; the KGB directed the arrest, and the executor of their commands was Ivan Ivanovych Mitsoda. On February 5 I was taken ill with the flu; my temperature was 39.9. During the arrest I declared that I was ill and said that I wasn't going anywhere. The nurse on duty at the sanatorium said that I was well and that they could transport me to prison.

They shoved me into a "Black Maria", opened the window, and we were off. They didn't even give me any medicine for the journey, and they brought me to the Uzhhorod prison at night, totally ill. They put me into

cell No. 5. In reply to my request for medical aid Captain Pavlenko, chief of the medical department, said that this was a prison, not a hospital. They brought me to an unknown person for interrogation. He said he was an investigator of the Lviv regional procuracy by the name of Mykhailo Vasylovych Osmak.

This sadist and provocateur declared that if I did not testify, they would not treat me. He gave me one tablet each of aspirin and calcium, and the investigation began. The interrogation ended late in the evening. When business was finished, another tablet of each. The illness had so broken me that I barely dragged myself to my floor.

My testimony did not satisfy the "loyal Leninists", and then M. V. Osmak stopped giving me medicine; I refused to testify. On the 12th they again called me for interrogation. Lieutenant-Colonel Korsun — deputy chief of the regional administration of the KGB — was sitting in the office.

"If you want to be treated, talk! If you don't — then drop dead".

I asked what there was to talk about for we talked enough.

"We need only one thing. You, Terelya, must repent. You've made your bed, now sleep in it, understand?"

I answered that we weren't on an equal footing. You need [illegible] for a conversation, and I wasn't going to talk with them in a prison.

"Terelya, we'll separate you from the Lviv group and send you away under arts. 62-64, and that's 15 and 5 years. Or else we'll throw you into a psychiatric prison. The doctors will write everything we want, and there — one injection and you won't know what hit you. Look at things realistically. Who helped your kindred spirit?¹ He died, people talked a little, then they stopped. And Tykhyi?² Let's make a deal, and tomorrow you'll see your children; your wife is worried, isn't she? Do you think we're afraid of anyone? We're strong as never before. But for the present we don't want to have you in prison. The Western radio centres, and all kinds of Banderite³ rabble, exploit this. What do you have in common with them? We can do a lot; why sacrifice your life — why, you haven't lived yet. Take pity on your wife, your children. And Kalynka⁴ is always calling her papa, "Papa, tell me a story", but papa isn't there".

Tears rolled from my eyes. He left me alone for about 10 minutes. Then he came in, gave me an aspirin — "Take it here, it's forbidden to take it into the cell, they'll say I brought it". He didn't talk any more about repenting, and asked me how the *Chronicle* gets abroad.

Osmak came the next day, gave me a tablet and began the interrogation. He says that Major Bogdanov of the Lviv KGB told him I'm a fanatic, and that with such people one must speak only from a position of strength,

1 Apparently a reference to Ukrainian Catholic Valeriy Marchenko, who died in a prison hospital due to medical neglect on October 7, 1984.

2 Oleksa Tykhyi died in a labour camp due to medical neglect on May 10, 1984.

3 A reference to the Bandera faction of the anti-Communist Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists, active in Ukraine during and after World War II and presently active in the West as well.

4 Kalyna is Terelya's younger daughter, born on 3 March, 1983.

but that he (that is Osmak) has nothing in common with the KGB — he is a worker of the procuracy and it is not his method to apply pressure upon the person being investigated.

“How then am I to understand this issuing of one tablet of aspirin at a time during interrogation?”

Then he said that the committee was very angry at me and it would be better if I found a common language with them, with Osmak, and if they change the article of the Criminal Code⁵, then this will be my last term.

I answered that they'd already told me about this.

Osmak: “Your chief Korsun said that if you refuse to repent, he'll make every effort to see that you die in a psychiatric prison, and if not, then we have such cells in the prison where the prisoners themselves will kill you. Think about it...”

On 13-14 February Mitsoda conducted the interrogation. He issued a directive for a forensic psychiatric examination. I would not sign it. On the eve of the 16th I was transported to the Lviv prison. Thus ended the first stage, the Uzhhorod stage.

Dear Olenka! If possible, please don't cry. Remember Jesus' words: “And for my name's sake...” (Mark 13:13). Yes! For His name's sake, and also don't think about what you'll say when they take you to court.

Our children will grow up and they will live free from communist prejudices, from hatred for Christ, for their native people. Prison bars are not yet a prison. A man can be free behind prison bars, if he wants. They have lost! With enmity and hatred the KGB is repressing the Ukrainian Catholic movement everywhere in Ukraine.

On Wednesday I will go to the [psychiatric] commission.

God be with you!

*

Letter 2

Glory be to Jesus!

Good evening my dear girls, and Pavlyk!

Yesterday, 21 February, I sent a letter: they were collecting the waste-paper and a notebook was slipped into the cell.

The cell is filthy and we are being eaten alive by lice. After dinner they will take us for delousing. People sleep on the floor, on tables; you can't breathe for the filth and the smoke. They've welded an inner grate onto the windows, and behind it in the window there are screens and blinds.

For a long time they've been portioning out sunlight and fresh air in Soviet prisons by the gramme...

⁵ i.e., substituting a charge carrying a heavier sentence.

You remember, after my flight on 15 November I travelled to Uzhhorod on 14 January for a meeting with the KGB. Conditions were set: on our side, to stop issuing the *Chronicle*; on theirs, to free prisoners from prisons and camps. The meeting took place in the Hotel Zakarpattia in Room 52. Lt-Col. Dzyashko and a captain whose name I don't remember came to the meeting. They brought with them two issues of the *Chronicle of the Catholic Church in Ukraine*, Nos. 1 and 6. The standard questions were asked: who, where, when? To whom and how did you pass it abroad? I answered that I had not come for an interrogation, but to reach an agreement on the conditions for the liberation of Vasyl [Kobryn], Fr. Herman [Budzinskyi] and a list of prisoners — a compromise decision. Dzyashko rejected the first version of the list. I put together a new one, but you were right when you told me that nothing would come of it, they need something else. After dinner (Dzyashko and I dined together and you would have thought we were colleagues) a new list was composed and agreed upon... I typed up the first and last version of the compromise declaration:

"In connection with the given situation we (that is I, Budzinskyi, Stefaniya Sichko) consider the dissolution of the Initiative Group [for the Defence of the Rights of Believers and the Church] to be possible. Further friction and conflicts between the Catholics and the authorities shall be resolved without the interference of any third party. Also the *Chronicle of the Catholic Church in Ukraine* is to cease, though that does not mean that we are breaking with our Church".

They read it. Korsun said that such a declaration was not suitable. Then I took the piece of paper and was about to tear it up. Dzyashko snatched it away: "What are you doing? Let it be". He folded it and placed it in a folder. Korsun, red faced and angry, began to say that he had given his word in Kyiv that everything would be all right, and here I was deceiving them; that Kyiv would not agree to such a declaration, and this means that my friends will remain imprisoned...

On Sunday I went to another meeting with Korsun and Dzyashko in Svalyava. The meeting took place at the home of Marhareta Bohovych. During the talk I announced that I would sign the declaration when everyone on the agreed list had been freed. Korsun boiled with rage, he began to threaten me, and then he said it was necessary to submit the matter to his superiors for the final decision. After this Dzyashko took some sort of papers out of a folder. At the bottom of a clean copy of the protocol, three photographs were pasted.

"Which of these do you know?"

"None".

"How do you know that Chernenko was in Solotvina for a cure, and who sneaked your declaration to him?" demanded Korsun.

"This is not an interrogation".

A pause.

"Josyp Mykhailovych, do you really want to leave the Soviet Union? Why did you write to the Yids in Israel? After all, you have relatives in Spain, Italy, Austria, the USA, why not write to them? You could equally well go to Czechoslovakia — you have a family, children, take pity on your wife. Live peacefully there and write poetry".

I answered that I want to leave not for the reunification of my family, but because the Soviet government does not allow me to live freely, that it violates its own constitution, and persecutes us simply because I do not want to be a Russian, because I demand the right (guaranteed by the constitution!) to profess the faith of my ancestors. And the fact that I wrote to the government of Israel is my private affair — it isn't said anywhere that only Jews ought to go there. That is a democratic government and it accepts all those, who are persecuted in the USSR.

"I wouldn't advise you to do that. Renounce your declaration and within a week you'll be able to go to Austria. Well? What do you think? Having ended up with your protectors you'd rebel there too, and with time there'd be disillusionment and longing for your native land. Think about it! And if you want you can live here too. Why shouldn't you live for your family, draw pictures and write poems? If you want we will give you a place in Uzhhorod — an apartment, a job, there are Roman Catholic churches there, go to them, no one will ever say a word. What do you need this Uniatism for? With whom have you bound up your life? What do you need Budzinskyi for — he's a Vatican spy, he's lucky he's old, otherwise we'd have found a place for him. Believe me, we only want what's good for you".

"One more thing, which concerns you alone", added Lt-Col. Dzyashko, giving me the typed text of a declaration written in my name, in which, as it were, I declare that everything I wrote about Raoul Wallenberg is a fabrication from beginning to end, and that I did so on instructions from abroad. I read it carefully and asked: "Why do you hate Wallenberg so much, who saved hundreds of thousands of people at the cost of his life? The Soviet KGB destroyed far more, as was revealed at the 20th Congress of the CPSU. How can a Ukrainian forget the millions of Ukrainians, who starved to death in 1933-1947? Why hasn't Moscow to this day immortalised the memory of those, who perished innocently at the hands of the Party and the KGB?"

Korsun answered that the government of the USSR would have set up a memorial to the victims of the famine of 1933 long ago, but because of the hullabaloo raised abroad cannot do so now.

Angrily, Korsun said: "Terelya, we can do anything. Look at Raoul Wallenberg for example. Even in the Swedish government there are people, who are tired of the clamour around his name. And who are you? There isn't even any sense in giving you a long sentence. A year's enough, but where is the guarantee that one of the criminals won't cut your throat? And if it's necessary we'll throw you into a cell with Raoul Wallenberg. There you could help each other".

"In other words he's alive?"

"That was just a turn of phrase", he answered, calm again.

Then the talk turned to home, the children, and they took me home. And on the 8th they arrested me, just as you thought they would.

In the prison Korsun warned me that if I do not repent I'll die without trace.

Lviv prison, cell 132

21 February, 1985

Glory be to Jesus!

Glory forever!

P.S. Osmak promised me a newspaper with the confession of Vasyl who is supposedly already at home, but apparently I won't ever see this article. [In fact, Kobryn did not confess. He received a three year sentence on 22 March 1985].

A NEW PUBLICATION

"THE WEST'S STRONGEST ALLIES"

edited by Slava Stetsko, MA.

This is a new publication of the ABN/EFC Press Bureau, published in 1985 in Munich, West Germany.

It contains the collected materials from the ABN/EFC Conference, held in London on September 24-26, 1982, as well as the materials from two EFC Conferences held in Munich in May, 1983 and September, 1984.

This book, in hard back, is available from

ABN Büro, 8000 München 80, Zeppelinstr. 67,
West Germany, price \$12.00 or £6.00.

Fred J. ECKERT

MEDVID CASE: AMERICAN HONOUR LOST

(Excerpt from an article by Fred J. Eckert "The Wall Street Journal",
Thursday, November 21, 1985)*

In the early evening of October 24, on board the Soviet grain freighter Marshal Konev, docked in the Mississippi River just outside New Orleans, a 25-year-old Ukrainian seaman approached the ship's rail and looked down.

He was standing 40 feet above the river. It was dark, stormy and raining.

Myroslav Medvid was ready to jump ship and defect to America. He was wearing short pants, a sweater and tennis shoes. He held a container protecting personal papers valuable to him.

He jumped, from three stories high, into deep, turbulent water. The shore was more than the length of a football field away. He struggled to reach American soil. He struggled to reach freedom.

Myroslav Medvid reached American soil. He did not reach freedom.

Five days later Anatoly Dobrynin, the Soviet ambassador, emerged from a meeting with Secretary of State George Shultz at the State Department to tell reporters: "It's settled. He's coming home".

One persistent reporter asked: "If Seaman Medvid really wanted to return to the Soviet Union, why did he jump ship and why did he do so many other things that so clearly indicated he wanted to defect?"

Mr. Dobrynin said: "I am not a sailor". Then he chuckled. And then he turned his back and walked away.

Return to a nightmare

For the Soviet ambassador, the sad case of the Ukrainian seaman is something to laugh about. But for young Myroslav Medvid, his life has turned into a nightmare, a nightmare inflicted upon him by the incompetence and insensitivity of low-level US officials. A nightmare caused by the feeble fears and limp leadership of high-level US government officials.

Under well-established US government procedure, Mr. Medvid should have been detained for several days until he had time to complete all necessary interviews and applications. But he wasn't.

No Soviet ship sails abroad without KGB agents on board. Now the KGB was free to interrogate and intimidate the young sailor. Free to threaten him with retaliation against family and friends. Free to do whatever they wished.

It was not until Mr. Medvid had been back on the ship for more than 12 hours that the State Department was informed of the matter. One would think that procedures in such a sensitive matter should call for prompt notification to higher-ups. They do — but they weren't followed.

* Mr. Eckert is a Republican representative from New York. He was US ambassador to Fiji from 1982 to 1984.

Four days later the State Department issued a statement that ends by saying, "The United States Government considers this matter closed". The statement opens by assuring us that from the moment the department "was first informed of this case, the Department of State has been attempting to determine the intentions of Soviet Seaman Myroslav Medvid".

One would think that a review of Mr. Medvid's actions would make it clear what his intentions were — but nowhere in the State Department "case closed" statement is there a single reference to Mr. Medvid's actions prior to his return to the ship.

The department assures us that it "immediately" dispatched "a Russian-speaking Foreign Service Officer". But Mr. Medvid is Ukrainian, not Russian! And the State Department does not mention in its report it had rebuffed offers of Ukrainian language translators. The department says it provided "an expert Russian interpreter... to ensure there would be no difficulty in communicating with Seaman Medvid". No difficulty for him to communicate in a language that Ukrainians resent? Maybe. Maybe not.

Yes, a team of US officials and a US doctor did communicate with Mr. Medvid aboard the Marshal Konev and later aboard a US Coast Guard cutter. But, no, they never once spoke with Mr. Medvid without Soviet agents present. And never once in his own language.

"We insisted", the State Department boasts in its statement, "on a non-threatening environment in which to conduct the interview". Baloney! Wouldn't it have been more non-threatening if Mr. Medvid had been permitted to speak to US officials without Soviet agents glaring at him and listening to his every word?

We are assured by the State Department that "Medvid appeared to be in generally good condition". Oh? Did the physical examinations given him include blood and urinalysis tests to detect the presence of drugs? Well, no. This despite the fact that we had intercepted a communication between the Soviet Embassy and the captain of the Marshal Konev in which the embassy instructed the captain to administer certain specified drugs to Mr. Medvid. Despite the fact Mr. Medvid once had to be taken to sick bay for nausea.

"Generally good condition?" But US officials observed that Mr. Medvid's wrist had been slit. No mention of that in the official statement! That came out days later in a congressional hearing. Was Mr. Medvid asked if he had attempted suicide? Did we conclude he had been tortured? Such questions aren't raised in the report.

The State Department does mention that Mr. Medvid was examined by a US psychiatrist who found him competent to decide whether he wanted to defect or not. But the Department does not mention that the psychiatrist believed that Mr. Medvid knew what he was doing when he jumped ship and that he believed he had been threatened and that he believed the threats involved Mr. Medvid's parents, and possibly a threat against their lives.

The State Department report has it that we gave this man every chance to defect and that later we afforded him a nice "non-threatening environment" in which to think things over.

The truth, of course, is that a frightened sailor who had been dragged back to the Soviets has very good reason to be leery of Americans — and even more good reason when later they permit Soviets to stand watch over him while they promise him that this time he really can be free.

Congressmen incensed

But the State Department report was enough to convince the White House to echo that the case was closed. It was also enough to incense this member of Congress and many of my colleagues. Some of us asked the president to order an investigation (which he did do) and to detain the ship and give Mr. Medvid another chance at freedom (which he did not do).

We should have announced the immediate suspension of those government employees responsible for this fiasco — pending dismissal proceedings. Mr. Medvid should have come off that ship and into US custody even if we would have had to physically remove him. We should have detained him until the effects of the drugs inside him had dissipated. And we should have demonstrated to him that most Americans are not as dumb and insensitive as the Border Patrol agents who handed him back the first time and not as feeble and deferential towards the Soviets as the US officials who handed him back the second time. And we should have let him meet with Ukrainian-Americans, including those who say they are related to him. We should have done all this not only to give Myroslav Medvid another chance for freedom, but also to give ourselves a chance to atone for disgrace and dishonour.

We should have. But we didn't.

The Marshal Konev carried Ukrainian Seaman Myroslav Medvid to the hell that awaited him back in the Soviet Union. The ship also carried away a full load of American grain. And pieces of America's reputation, pride and honour.

SAILOR WANTED TO DEFECT

Among the first people to meet Myroslav Medvid, the Ukrainian sailor who jumped the Russian ship he was on in an attempt to defect, were a jeweller, Joseph Wyman and his nephew, Wayne Wyman. Although individuals have claimed that the intention to defect to the United States was not clear, the affidavits of the two Wymans indicate differently. The following affidavits were sworn on November 1, 1985, in the Parish of Plaquemines, town of Belle Chasse, state of Louisiana.

*

I, Joseph Wyman, duly sworn hereby give the following statement of my own free will and accord:

1. My name is Joseph Wyman and I reside in Belle Chasse, Louisiana.

2. Today is November 1, 1985, and I am providing this statement to Orest A. Sejna of Phoenix, Arizona.

3. On October 24, 1985, a Thursday, at 7.30-8.30 p.m. I was closing my jewellery store when I noticed a man running up the parking lot and run to my nephew, Wayne Wyman.

4. My nephew asked me to come there because this man was speaking in a foreign language.

5. I then walked over to them and the man appeared very excited and I noticed that he was soaking wet. It was not raining that night. The man was babbling or trying to speak in a foreign language. The only thing I was able to understand was "Novi Orlean". I understood the language to be some Eastern European dialect.

6. I then asked the man if he was Russian. He responded by beating his chest with his fist, and saying "Ukrainian".

7. The man appeared extremely nervous and kept looking south, the direction from which he came.

8. The man was dressed in the following manner: he had on brown shorts, blue pullover shirt, sneakers and black socks. The man was carrying a brown jar which, I later learned from my nephew, contained the man's papers, watch and a small red object.

9. I then spoke with my nephew and tried to calm the man down.

10. I then asked the man and said: "You, New Orleans". He said: "Yes". I asked him again: "You, defect, New Orleans". The man responded: "Yes".

11. I'm not sure if the man understood what I meant. but, based on the facts before me, I felt this man was trying to defect to the United States.

12. Based on my past experiences as a Jefferson Parish Deputy Sheriff, I felt this man was trying to defect to the United States.

13. I then asked my nephew to take the man to New Orleans where he wanted to go. I then asked the man: "New Orleans?" and gestured "where?" He responded: "Policia".

14. My nephew agreed to take him to New Orleans and they both left in my nephew's car.

15. Approximately 3-5 minutes later, three men approached and only one man spoke. Two of the men were tall and large muscularly, and the other one was of average height and weight.

16. One of the men asked me if I had seen a man walking around. I asked him: "Why?" He said: "One of our 'comrades' fell overboard and may be hurt and wandering around looking for help. At that time, I felt it was in my best interest, that I told them "no". I knew those men were after him and I wanted to protect him. I personally felt they were after the man.

17. The statement I have provided above is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge.

Joseph Wyman

*

I, Wayne Wyman, duly sworn hereby give the following statement of my own free will and accord:

1. My name is Wayne Wyman, and I reside in Terrytown, Louisiana, in the Parish of Jefferson.

2. I have read the statement of my uncle, Joseph Wyman. I would like to reiterate the facts delineated in paragraphs 1-14, as being true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

3. Upon leaving the premises with the man who approached us in the parking lot, I then drove him to New Orleans.

4. After we left my uncle's jewellery shop, I was together with the man for about an hour.

5. During that hour, I tried to figure out where he wanted to go. The man picked up an envelope from my car seat and gestured that he wanted to write. He then wrote the words "Policia" on the centre of the page. Then he wrote "Novi Orlean" below it, and drew a circle around the word "policia" and drew an arrow to the word "Orlean". He then drew a line separating the page. On the upper right hand corner, he wrote "USSR". He pointed to the "USSR" and tried to gesture that's where he was from.

6. I said to him: "I think you are trying to defect". I don't believe he understood what I said, but, I knew that's what he wanted to do.

7. I then drove him to the police station and left him there. The man was pointing at the police station and motioned for me to stop.

8. The man appeared to be of sound mind and body as best as I could tell. He even wrote my license plate number down. He also could understand some road signs.

9. Once we got to the police station, I let him get out of the car.
10. The man tried to thank me by shaking my hand and kissing it.
10. The brown jar the man had with him was left in my car which I gave to the INS. The brown jug contained legal papers, watch and something red.
11. The statement I have provided above is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge.

Wayne E. Wyman

SENATOR DOLE PLACES MEDVID PANEL ON SENATE CALENDAR FOLLOWING INTENSE UKRAINIAN PRESSURE

Washington, DC — The Senate Majority Leader Robert Dole, today ordered Senate Resolution 267, known as the Medvid Panel, to be placed on the Senate's order of business for the day. Senate Resolution 267, sponsored by Senator Gordon Humphrey (R-NH) and Senator Alan Dixon (D-IL), would establish a special Senate panel to investigate the case of Ukrainian seaman Myroslav Medvid and review U.S. policies and actions towards individuals seeking political asylum in the United States.

Senator Dole, who has been unclear about whether he supports or opposes the legislation, has come under considerable pressure from Ukrainian-American groups around the country.

On September 16, 1985, the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America called on the Senator to place the bill on the Senate calendar. "The bill has the support of 60 Senators, including 31 Republicans and 29 Democrats", cited Myron Wasylyk, director of the Ukrainian Congress Committee's Washington Office. "The cosponsors of this bill include Senators from Helms to Harkin", continued Wasylyk, "that's about as broad based as you can get for anything in Congress".

The American East European Ethnic Conference (AEEEC) unanimously decided to cast its support for the legislation by writing to Senator Dole urging his support. In a letter sent on December 16, the AEEEC stated that the Medvid panel is "of keen interest to the 15 million Americans of East European descent". The AEEEC was "disturbed by what is called "half-hearted efforts by some members of the Senate (to) undermine the importance of the issue".

Meanwhile in Detroit, MI, thirty five Ukrainian-American protesters met Senator Dole at a Michigan State Republican fundraiser in the city's Cobo Hall. Several Ukrainian-Americans attending the fundraiser (Messrs. Ihor Petrasczuk, Roman Skypakevich, and Roman Kolodchyn) had confronted the Senator and demanded that he place the resolution on the Senate's order of business before the Christmas recess. As a result, the Senator placed a

call to his office in Washington and demanded the resolution be placed on the calendar.

Ukrainian-Americans and East European ethnic communities have spent considerable time and effort lobbying members of the Senate urging their cosponsorship.

REPORT ON HELSINKI ACCORDS RELEASED

Washington, DC (UNIS) — The State Department recently made public the President's 19th Semiannual Report to the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe on the Implementation of the Helsinki Final Act.

The report, which covers the period beginning with April 1, 1985, through October 1, 1985, gives a general assessment regarding the implementation of the 1975 Helsinki Accords by the Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc signatories.

Describing Russification in Ukraine, the 19th Semiannual states that, "attempts to 'Russify' the Ukraine continue unabated. Recent Western visitors to Kyiv have commented on how little Ukrainian is actually spoken there. Those who inquire why this is so are frequently told that spoken Ukrainian is regarded by local officials as a manifestation of 'bourgeois nationalism' and strongly discouraged. Ukrainian cultural and historical objects have been neglected and Uniate churches burned".

The report also singles out the cases of political prisoners Josyp Terelya, Vasyl Kobryn, Rev. Mykhailo Vynnytskyi, Josyp Zisels, Mykola Horbal, and Iryna Ratushynska.

Repression against cultural activists has remained vehement. At the end of August imprisoned poetess Iryna Ratushynska had her head shaved and was placed in a punishment isolation cell for six months. Also detailed was Moscow's campaign against the long repressed Ukrainian Catholic Church.

The report gives mention to the September 4, 1985, death of Vasyl Stus. Referring to the deaths of Oleksa Tykhyi, Yuriy Lytvyn, Valeriy Marchenko, and Vasyl Stus, the report states "these deaths leave little doubt that Ukrainian political prisoners are singled out for particularly brutal treatment".

Bertil HÄGGMAN

SPECIAL REPORT ON POLITICAL WARFARE IN THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA (ROC)

Since the 1920s the political warfare concept has been part of the tactical and strategical thinking of the Republic of China (ROC). In 1951 the Fu Hsing Kang College (College of Political Warfare) was founded to support the ROC's efforts to regain control over Mainland China. A moving spirit behind the college was then Director of the Defence Ministry's Political Warfare Department, now President, Chiang Ching-kuo. Both men and women are enrolled in this exceptional and unique school.

There are 1,800 students at the college. Graduates move on to the Armed Forces as first lieutenants and serve as morale officers and in other capacities. There are eight departments at the college :

- | | |
|----------------------|-----------------------|
| 1. political science | 5. fine arts |
| 2. law | 6. music |
| 3. journalism | 7. cinema and drama |
| 4. foreign languages | 8. physical education |

All applicants must be high school graduates and there are tough examinations for those, who apply.

Much emphasis in the educational programme is placed on the study of past experience in fighting communism. Six types of warfare receive special attention: ideological warfare, strategical warfare, intelligence warfare, organisational warfare, psychological warfare and mass warfare.

The basic text is *The Theory and Practice of Political Warfare* (Taipei, ROC, Fifth Edition, 1974) — there are probably later editions, but it is the fifth edition that has been available to the editor. It was written by General Wang Sheng, leading ROC theoretician on the subject of political warfare. The general is presently serving as ROC ambassador.

Ideological warfare in ROC doctrine is the struggle of "ism" versus "ism". "The objective is to shatter the enemy's political belief, break his will and seek to win over the masses, who are affected by the enemy's ideology". Ideological differences are the cause of political, but also of military warfare.

Strategical warfare is the employment of planned strategical activities causing the enemy to commit mistakes so as to facilitate the realisation of war aims and to achieve victory. This type of warfare has a very broad spectrum. Its scope ranges from political strategy to tactics and plays the role of policy-maker in the whole field of political warfare.

Organisational warfare is the use of organisational power to crush the enemy's organisation and dissolve it for good. A well-built organisation is important not only in military operations, but in political warfare as well. But it must be guided by strategy, preceded by ideological attack and supported by a mass movement.

Psychological warfare is a means other than military to subdue the enemy psychologically, causing his will to break and his organisation to collapse. But operations in this type of warfare must be guided by well-planned strategy, carried out by ideological weapons and supported by good intelligence.

Intelligence warfare is basically what Sun Tzu (600 B.C.) described in the following way in his work *The Art of War*: "If one knows oneself and the enemy well, one must not fear the result of one hundred battles".

Intelligence warfare aims at collecting military, political, scientific and production facts and secrets of the enemy. This type of warfare entails covert operations in the whole field of political warfare.

Mass movement warfare has as its main function to stir up, to win over, to rally, to organise and lead the people behind enemy lines to fight under one's banner. If successful this hurts the enemy's war efficiency and cripples the enemy himself. The battlefield of political warfare is the hearts of men. It is built on mass movement warfare.

A basic feature of political warfare according to ROC doctrine is to understand the thinking of the enemy. In Russian military science, as expressed by B. M. Shaposhnikov, whilst war is a continuation of politics and the employment of other means, peace is likewise a continuation of war and the employment of other means than military. Thus, to Soviet Russia there is no difference between war and peace.

In his book on political warfare General Wang Sheng draws a number of conclusions that are essential to this type of warfare. In strategy reconciliation is preferable to destruction. In tactics offensive is preferable to defensive. This is applicable on a worldwide scale. The Western democracies have too long accepted the primacy of communist offensive in the war of ideas. It is high time that the democracies went on the offensive in bringing the message of political, cultural and religious freedom to the subjugated nations. Finally in political warfare the contest of wits is preferable to physical strength. While depending on a strong military defence the West should meet the communists also in the contest of wits to advance the liberation of the subjugated peoples on all continents.

Book Reviews

SURVIVAL IS NOT ENOUGH, SOVIET REALITIES AND AMERICA'S FUTURE

Richard Pipes, 1984, Simon and Shuster, New York. Hard cover, \$24.95.

Very few people in the West understand the true nature of the Soviet Union. Fewer still are aware of the threat that the Soviet Union represents to the world. In his book *Survival is Not Enough* Richard Pipes, a professor of history at Harvard University who in 1981-82 served as Director of East European and Soviet Affairs in the National Security Council, explains both the nature of the Soviet Union and the global threat it poses.

Pipes starts off by explaining the communist system beginning briefly with a historical background pointing out the expansionist character of the Russian state which has always enhanced and preserved its might. In the second part of the chapter Pipes explains how a predominantly Russian communist party elite, which he calls the "*nomenklatura*", rules the Soviet Russian empire much the same way as the autocrats did before the 1917 revolution.

After describing the Stalinist economic system he moves on to the predominant theme of the book — the nature of Soviet Russian imperialism. Russian imperialism is unique in that it was never a temporary phase as in other countries, but a constant phenomenon. The second point is that these territorial acquisitions were always military in nature. Thirdly, the conquest of foreign lands was usually followed by the colonisation of Russian settlers. Significantly, the author dismisses claims by other Russian "experts" that this expansion was really due to anxieties aroused by foreign invasions.

Pipes' observation is "...that far from being the victim of recurrent acts of aggression Russia has been engaged for the past three hundred years with single-minded determination in aggressive wars, and if anyone has reason for paranoia it would have to be its neighbours. In the 1890s the Russian General Staff carried out a comprehensive study of the history of Russian warfare since the foundation of the state. In the summary volume, the editor told his readers that they could take pride in their country's military record... between 1700 and 1870. In that time Russia had spent 106 years fighting 38 military campaigns of which 36 had been "offensive" and a mere 2 defensive. This authoritative tabulation should dispose of the facile theory that Russian aggression is a defensive reflex".

The author continues to offer better explanations of Russian expansionism which take into account economic, geographic and political factors. It is the political factor which is central in understanding the essence of the

book. The author contends that "Russian governments have always felt the need to solidify their internal position by impressing on the population the awe which they inspired in other nations... By inspiring respect in foreign governments, by bullying neighbours, by undermining them and distributing their lands and riches among her own subjects, Russian governments have historically enhanced their claims to legitimacy and obedience... The poet Lermontov expressed this sentiment well when he had a Russian tell a Muslim of the Caucasus, whose land the Russians were about to conquer, that he would soon be proud to say, 'Yes, I am a slave, but a slave of the tsar of the universe'. Communist ideology and interests of the "*nomenklatura*" have reinforced these expansionist traditions, making Russian imperialism more aggressive and more persistent than ever before".

The subsequent three chapters of the book which deal with the Soviet Russian threat, the economic and political crises, expand on this central theme of Russian imperialism and contain rather interesting sections on various Soviet Russian strategies, party corruption, intellectual dissent and imperial problems. Of particular interest is a sub-section dealing with the nationalities problem: "...there is strong evidence of persistent nationalism (among Ukrainians and Byelorussians), especially among the Ukrainians. With fifty million people, 86 percent of them (as of 1970) Ukrainian-speaking. Ukraine is potentially a major European state. Its separation would not only deprive Russia of an important source of food and industrial products, but also cut it off from the Black Sea and the Balkans, for which reasons the "*nomenklatura*" persecutes all manifestations of Ukrainian nationalism with especial savagery".

Further on the author states, "unless history is to make a unique exception for the Russian empire, leaving it intact while all other European empires have fallen apart, its future cannot be bright. It is impossible to justify to the Ukrainians that Ireland, with 3 million inhabitants, should be a sovereign country whereas they, with 50 million, have been condemned to remain forever a Soviet Russian dependency..."

Under the sub-section dealing with intellectual dissent the author points out that no kind of opposition is tolerated in the Soviet Union with only one exception — Russian nationalism. Pipes explains that although it might seem that Russian nationalism is opposed to Marxism-Leninism, the relationship is as Pipes explains, "neither new nor casual... already by 1920 Lenin began to make tactical advances towards right-wing, nationalist groups active at home and abroad". Lenin had apparently realised that democratic pro-socialist and pro-Western forces in Russia were too weak to be counted on for any support, this was proved by the fact that the Bolsheviks had easily toppled the Provisional Government in 1917. However, the subsequent civil war with conservative and monarchist elements turned out to be long and costly. As the Bolshevik dream of the revolution spreading to other countries faded, Lenin decided to court his former enemies. Stalin too, realised the potential of appealing to Russian nationalism and quite

deliberately identified himself with it. As a result of this trend Russian nationalist "dissent" has been encouraged by the Soviet Russian regime. The Russian nationalists are given their own publications such as *Pioneer Truth*, *Young Guard* and *Our Contemporary* which stress peasant life, Russia's glorious past and the superiority of the Russian race.

In the final chapter of the book Pipes explains why the past policies of containment and détente were not effective. In their place he offers other alternatives in dealing with the Soviet Russian threat, which would have direct bearing on internal Soviet conditions. This, he argues, would effectively curtail the Soviet Russian threat to world peace without necessitating a major war.

In the end, the author quotes the advice given to the Western powers in the nineteenth century by Karl Marx: "There is only one way to deal with a power like Russia, and that is the fearless way".

Yaroslav Fedenko

THE NATIONAL QUESTION IN MARXIST-LENINIST THEORY AND STRATEGY

In a recent voluminous study, *The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Strategy*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey 08540, price: US \$62.00 (cloth), US \$14.50 (paper), Walter Connor has made a study of the relationship between nationalism and communism since 1848. His study shows that Marx and Engels found it of great importance to use the forces of nationalism to further the world revolutionary process. The later tactical refinement of Lenin led to some communist successes in the field.

Lenin recommended a three-pronged strategy for harnessing nationalism to communist strategy. Firstly, prior to the assumption of power by the communists, all national groups were to be promised the right to self-determination (including the right to secession). Secondly, after taking power the hope of a right of secession was to be kept alive, and thirdly, the party was to be kept free from all nationalist proclivities.

Presently Soviet Russia is trying to pose as a champion of self-determination by advancing the myth that the peoples in the Tsarist empire joined the "Soviet Union" voluntarily. Connor notes that in 1979 forty-five notables from Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania demanded independence from Moscow in an open letter. In this letter they stated that the Russian authorities had ceded independence "for all time" and relinquished "all sovereign rights" in 1920.

Russia's policy to use language as a means of Russification receive extensive coverage in this book. For example, the tendency to favour the Russian language is especially noticeable in the publication of books. In 1970 60,000 books were published in Russian, and only 3,000 in Ukrainian.

Connor quotes a Soviet publication, *The Handbook of World Population*, to the effect that "groups of people who have changed their language in the course of time usually also change their ethnic [national] identity".

As an example of the attempts of the Soviet Russian authorities to distribute the various peoples throughout the USSR in order to further Russification Connor states that after graduation students at institutes of higher education are obliged to spend three years working in a position anywhere in the Soviet Union. Thus 1.2 million Ukrainians would be on an outside assignment at any one time. People sentenced for crimes against the state are sent to prisons and camps outside their native republics. A Ukrainian dissident once stated ironically: "Ukraine, according to its constitution, is also a sovereign state which even has representatives in the United Nations. Her courts sentence thousands of Ukrainians and send them to be detained beyond her borders — a policy unparalleled in history. Perhaps Ukraine, like the principality of Monaco, has no room for camps? Room was found for seven million Russians, but for Ukraine's political prisoners there is no room in their native land".

Connor's work is important for the analysis of how Marxist-Leninist regimes attempt to exploit nationalism for their own ends and ultimately fail in this.

Bertil Häggman

THE GRENADA PAPERS

The intervention in Grenada on October 25, 1983, was an important victory in the political-psychological war, as well as a significant military victory. An established communist regime (New Jewel) was deposed and for the first time in history the archives of a communist state were opened to Western observers and scholars.

In October, 1984, on the first anniversary of the invasion, ICS Press published a selection of the captured documents in a book entitled *The Grenada Papers*, ICS Press, 785 Market Street, Suite 750, San Francisco, CA 94103. Distribution in Europe Clio Distribution Services, 55 St. Thomas Street, Oxford OX1 1JG, England. Price: US \$16.95 (cloth), US \$8.95 (paper).

In the foreword the editors, Professors Seabury and McDougall, state: "What makes these papers from Grenada doubly valuable is that they permit us intimately to witness both the dynamics of a Marxist-Leninist regime in the early stages of the consolidation and its emerging relation to broader configurations of political power in the communist world".

The New Jewel leaders copied the methods of their Soviet Russian fore-runners: plans were made for a crack-down on the Catholic and Protestant

Churches. The Party Propaganda Department set up ideological crash courses to "re-educate" the masses. Requests were made to Andropov and General Ustinov for military aid and cadre training in Russia. Agreements were made between the New Jewel Movement (NJM) of Grenada and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the parties of East Germany, Cuba and North Korea.

To the West, Maurice Bishop and his colleagues tried to show another face and initiated public relations campaigns to find support in the media, in Western governments and among blacks, mainly in the United States.

One of the most interesting documents in the book from the point of view of political warfare is the reprint of a handwritten report of a NJM member studying at the International Leninist School in Moscow. The course began with three weeks of Russian language. Subsequent topics included "The World Revolutionary Process in the Contemporary Epoch", and "Social Psychology and Propaganda".

The Grenadian cell is reported as having developed contacts with colleagues in the Nicaraguan, Angolan, Mozambique, Ethiopian, South African, Syrian, Colombian and Danish collectives and especially close contacts with the Jamaican collective. The report ends with a call for "building a strong Party on Marxist-Leninist principles and for the defence and building of the revolution along the lines that would bring the achievement of socialism". The CPSU's International Leninist School has, since the 1920s, served as a principal training centre for communist agents all over the world.

Another fascinating document is the report of the Grenadian ambassador in Moscow, W. Richard Jason, to Maurice Bishop. In the report Jason points out the two countries in the region ripe for "influence operations": "Of all the regional possibilities, the most likely candidate for special attention is Surinam. If we can be an overwhelming influence on Surinam's international behaviour, our importance in the Soviet scheme of things will be greatly enhanced. To the extent that we can take credit for bringing any other country into the progressive fold, our prestige and influence would be greatly enhanced. Another candidate is Belize. I think that we need to do some work in that country".

The Grenada Papers is a must for every student of political warfare. It shows the importance the Soviet Union attaches to any advance in the Western hemisphere. In the words of Russian Marshal Ogarkov at a meeting with Grenadian military leaders in Moscow on March 10, 1983: "...over two decades ago, there was only Cuba in Latin America, today there are Nicaragua, Grenada and a serious battle is going on in El Salvador".

Bertil Häggman

The
UNIVERSITY
REVIEW



II

1986

THE UKRAINIAN REVIEW

A Quarterly Magazine devoted to the study of Ukraine

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The Church of St. Michael in Kyiv, 1108
Destroyed by the Russians in the 1930s

M. O.

A GENERAL ATTACK

(Moscow's Reaction to the Ukrainian Liberation Movement)

The re-inforced attack by the imperialist powers of Moscow on the Ukrainian national liberation movement is twofold. In Ukraine, an inundation of propaganda attacks has been perceived, aimed at the Ukrainian revolutionary-liberation movement during the Second World War and the post-war period during the Soviet Russian occupation of Ukraine, as well as attacks on the activities of Ukrainian political emigrés in the West, in particular on the revolutionary Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN). These attacks are carried out through mass campaigns in the Soviet press, radio, television and in the production of new anti-nationalistic films. However, it seems that even this does not suffice. Recently, as we found out from *Literaturna Ukraina* (Issue No. 21 of February 21, 1984, in an article entitled "An encyclopedia of failure"), a new group of operative writers and publicists, headed by Vitaliy Korotych, has been created under the auspices of the Party Commissariat of the Kyiv Writers' Organisation. The reason for the creation of this new group, it seems, is that there has arisen an urgent need to strengthen the struggle against the "ideological enemy", who is attacking "territory, which we have not yet conquered". In other words, this article is an admission that the influence of Soviet Russian propaganda employed until now against "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism" has been, according to the article, "deficient".

This influence has been even more "deficient" in the sphere of Soviet Russian propaganda among Ukrainians in the West, which employs the same primitive means of falsification and lies as it does in Ukraine. The publication of a book in Toronto, written in English, by a "Canadian publicist", Terlytsia, (a Ukrainian so-called "progressive") entitled *Here they are — proofs*, reveals, however, that the dialectics of the lies and disinformation are still used as "arguments", which are supposed to weaken the influence of nationalists. This also applies to all other English and Ukrainian language publications distributed among the Ukrainian emigration.

Moscow can boast of somewhat greater success in its organising of a second front struggle against the Ukrainian national liberation movement in the West. We have in mind here, first of all, the organised action by the KGB of "unmasking" so-called "war criminals". This action is by no means directed against former German Nazis, but against the representatives of national liberation movements of nations subjugated by Moscow, in particular against the Ukrainian and Baltic nations. The reasons for this are manifold.

First of all, Moscow endorses these actions by exploiting part of the Jewish population in the West, especially in the USA, and Israel, making use of the Jews' hostile attitude to Ukrainians, due to Ukrainian so-called anti-Semitism. In addition, Moscow discreetly supplies these Jewish circles with their propagandistic lies, beginning with Schwarzbart, moving on to the pogroms, which, having been organised by Moscow and executed by the Bolsheviks, were accredited to Ukraine, and ending with the alleged cooperation of Ukrainians, in particular the OUN, with the Nazis. Although at the same time, so-called anti-Zionist Soviet propaganda proceeds along the same channels, with similar accusations against Jewish Zionists, stating that they collaborated with the Nazis and are at present collaborating with Ukrainian "bourgeois nationalists", the indignant Jews, while lightheartedly repudiating these deceitful, yet harmful, accusations aimed at them, employ the same deceitful accusations themselves, just as the Soviet Russians do, against Ukrainians.

Thus, by taking up these KGB claims, certain Jewish circles in the United States and Canada have started to put pressure on Commissions created to investigate the cases of "war criminals" and have begun to inundate these Commissions with accusations, in the first place against Ukrainians, Byelorussians and representatives of Baltic nations, who reside in the USA and Canada.

These accusations are based on KGB "information", as well as on various "testimonies" and "witnesses" from the USSR, which have been collected and falsified by those same KGB organs. At first, the Commission for investigating the cases of war criminals made ardent use of these "documentations". A delegation of US prosecutors even travelled to the USSR to collect evidence. However, it did not take very long for American circles to become convinced that this "evidence" was mostly a disinformation campaign based on falsifications. As a result, the most ardent supporters of this "struggle" against the Nazis were soon removed from these Commissions, which in practice, did nothing more than fight against the opponents of the USSR.

Recently in Canada, also under the pressure of certain Jewish circles, a Commission for investigating the cases of war criminals was formed and immediately there were Jewish accusations, which were also based on supplied "information" from Moscow, and almost the same as those in the USA. In Canada these accusations were also directed not so much against Nazis as against Ukrainian nationalists, the "Galicia" Division, and so on. The notorious Wiesenthal also joined this Commission and "unmasked" 218 Ukrainian SS officers, although it is not certain whether even half of them live in Canada. In any case, even Wiesenthal and other Jewish activists in Canada, who joined in this anti-Ukrainian campaign, should be well aware that the soldiers of this Division, who were captured by the English, had been investigated by a special Commission in Great Britain and they had

quite legally, without hiding the fact that they had served in the Division, obtained permission to emigrate to the USA and Canada, as the Commission could not find them guilty of any "criminal activity". Besides, the case of the officers who served in the Division was merely an additional factor in the general campaign against Ukrainians in Canada on the part of certain Jewish circles. One of the Jewish leaders even considers that Soviet evidence with regard to the activities of "war criminals" from among Ukrainian and Baltic peoples is "valid" and that the Commission should use this evidence in its further proceedings. It is obvious from this who is the actual motivating force in this current attack on Ukrainians.

In addition to the anti-Ukrainian affair in Canada, anti-Ukrainian articles have appeared in certain sectors of the American press, in which accusations of Ukrainian nationalist collaboration with the Nazis is repeated. It has even been maintained that the "Galicia" Division fought on the same side as the Nazis in France and in another article, that the Division liquidated Jews in Lviv in 1941, even though the Division was not formed until 1943. It is not known whether the American journalists who write these articles have become victims of the KGB disinformation campaign, the "information" having somehow been put at their disposal, or whether they are perhaps individuals, who are obeying instructions or being paid to do so. A significant role in this has also been played also by John Loftus, a former investigator from the American Department of Justice — the Office of Special Investigations into cases of war criminals. Mr. Loftus was removed from his post in 1981, after which he wrote a book containing incredible accusations directed against representatives of national liberation movements active in the USA. It is no wonder that these fantasies of his about Byelorussians became the basis for the TV crime series "Kojak". At the press conference, held in connection with his book, John Loftus provided the following "revelations": after occupying Byelorussia, the Germans created a buffer state whose president was Radoslaw Ostrovskyi, a Byelorussian activist, now dead, who headed the Byelorussian National Council, which is still active in the USA and other Western countries, all of whom collaborated with the Nazis. They have all been, or still are, in the service of the American CIA. Furthermore, these Byelorussians and other such "war criminals", who impunitively reside in America, have on their conscience millions of Soviet citizens. Not Stalin, but they! Soviet experts on "information" could not have thought up anything better! Or perhaps they did think this up and provided Mr. Loftus with the "information".

One may perhaps think that this anti-Ukrainian campaign with the aid of naive or corrupt people, or perhaps with the aid of secret service forces in the West, will continue. This campaign goes on at a time when the current situation in Ukraine is at its most acute, which can be seen from various, including Soviet, documents, as well as at a time when American interest in the nations subjugated by Russia is at its greatest. Therefore, it is our

task to concentrate all of our efforts on obtaining political connections within American circles and on strengthening our own information on current events in Ukraine and on the true nature of the Soviet Russian imperialistic system by exposing these Soviet lies and falsifications. This should also be done by those Jewish circles, which consider it necessary and beneficial for them to normalise Ukrainian-Jewish relations. Such a campaign, as that in Canada, merely serves to create indignation and an ill-disposed attitude towards the Jews.

The most important task at present for Societies of Ukrainian Political Prisoners of Nazi Concentration Camps is to stand up and fight against these KGB attacks and the KGB's widespread disinformation campaign, which the KGB is effectuating through various means by using infiltrated corrupt forces in order to discredit Ukrainian freedom-fighting nationalists before the eyes of the Free World.

**A NEW BOOK ON THE EXPERIENCE AND SUFFERING
OF UKRAINIANS IN AUSCHWITZ!**

IN THE GERMAN MILLS OF DEATH 1941-1945

By Petro Mirchuk

(Second Edition)

This timely publication has appeared at the height of the Soviet Russian campaign of defamation against Ukrainians. Based entirely on fact, *IN THE GERMAN MILLS OF DEATH* is a fitting answer to the KGB's anti-Ukrainian propaganda which attempts to portray Ukrainian nationalists, who fought against both the Nazis and the Soviet Russians during and after WWII, aimed at discrediting the Ukrainians in the eyes of the West with a view to cutting short Ukrainian attempts to acquire Western political support and material aid in their struggle for an independent Ukraine.

In this remarkable book, Petro Mirchuk, who was a Ukrainian political activist when he was taken to Auschwitz, explains why thousands of Ukrainian political prisoners were imprisoned and exterminated in German concentration camps. He relates how life and death was from day to day in a place which most prisoners were convinced they would leave only as corpses. Such was the nature of the concentration camp that simple existence was a miracle of no small accomplishment, and those who managed it are well worth listening to.

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Stephen OLESKIW

CAN ACTS OF TERRORISM EVER BE JUSTIFIED?

1. Introduction

Political terror is neither a new nor an unprecedented phenomenon. It is as old as mankind itself, only the face of terror has changed. For instance, terrorism was widespread in the 19th century and there were probably more assassinations of leading statesmen, both in America and Europe, in the 1890s when terrorism was more popular, than in the latter part of the 20th century. Terrorism emerged in its modern form as part of the struggle by the European resistance movements of the Second World War to overthrow Nazi occupation and in the post-1945 era it was extensively used during the campaigns for independence by Third World countries in Africa and Asia against the remnants of Western colonialism.

As the wars of decolonisation of the 1950s and 1960s came to a close there came about a general decline in guerilla activity and rural terrorism and from the 1970s urban terrorism has superceded guerilla warfare in various parts of the world. The rural guerillas learnt through bitter experience that the "encirclement of the city by the countryside" was now of doubtful value if four-fifths of the population of most Western industrialised countries live in cities. With the transfer of operations from the countryside to the cities the age of urban terrorism dawned.

Most recently terrorism has increasingly assumed a new international dimension and with the financial and material backing of such powerful patrons as Libya, Cuba, the Soviet Union and various East European countries, it now poses a not insignificant threat to world security.

Since the early 1970s political extremists in different parts of the world have seized embassies, kidnapped government officials, diplomats and prominent business executives, hijacked international aircraft and ships and held their passengers hostage; they have attacked passengers in air terminals and stations and planted bombs in government buildings, offices and public places.

In the 1980s Britain has witnessed acts of terrorism on its own soil. For instance, in 1980 anti-Khomeini terrorists seized the Iranian Embassy in London; in 1982 two IRA bombs exploded in Hyde Park; a

year later in 1983 another IRA bomb exploded outside Harrods; and most recently of all in April 1984 there occurred the infamous shooting incident outside the Libyan People's Bureau in St. James's Square, London.

But terrorism is not only limited to groups fighting against states. It is also very often used by states themselves as a policy to achieve their political aims. For instance, the Nazi and the Soviet states were run exclusively on the basis of state terror and in the world after the Second World War many African and Latin-American dictatorships have also widely employed terror and violence as a means of running their countries.

This has come to mean that terrorism now forms a new and by no means unimportant element in international relations between states. And yet there is no single precise or widely-accepted definition of this phenomenon in existence. Thus it would be most useful, for the purpose of this article, to try and lay down at the outset some form of general, comprehensive definition of the concept of "terrorism" on the basis of the various definitions submitted in the numerous writings on the subject. This would form a convenient base from which to examine and explain the concept and to decide whether terrorism can in fact be justified under any conditions.

2. What is terrorism?

As its name suggests, the basic term related to this question is "terror".¹ It describes a psychic state of great fear and dread. "Terrorism" therefore, it follows, is the resort to the application or the threat to apply means (actually acts or a campaign of violence) which induce the state of terror on certain groups of people or individuals, or indeed even on entire populations of particular states, on a sustained basis as a way of achieving specific ends, whatever they happen to be. Terrorism is thus a means to an end and not a self-satisfying end in itself. It is violence for effect, and not only (and sometimes not at all) for effect purely on its victims. "Terrorism is violence aimed at the people watching".² Fear is therefore the intended effect and not the by-product of terrorism, a factor which distinguishes terrorist tactics from common crime, which can terrify but is not, strictly speaking, terrorism.

People usually associate terrorism with groups or factions operating

1. Some writers, most notably Barrie Paskins and Michael Dockrill in their *The Ethics of War*, London, 1979, p. 90, disagree with this interrelation.

2. David Carlton and Carlo Schaerf (eds.): *International Terrorism and World Security*, London, 1977, p. 14.

against state systems or fighting to overthrow colonial rule by Western liberal democracies, but it is most important to stress that acts of terrorism can also be (and have on numerous occasions been) committed by state administrations themselves or else by groups or individuals in the service of, or representing their states. Terrorism can be employed both in peacetime and in war, often in practice making it difficult to distinguish between the two conditions.

Following on from this a "terrorist" is essentially someone who employs terror systematically, in some cases possibly as his only policy, to further his views, to achieve some goal, or else to attain power, consolidate his rule and maintain himself in power.

With this definition in mind we can proceed to examine further the problems of terrorism and the issues surrounding its use.

3. Terrorism against states

Before dealing with the matter any further, certain issues which hinder the objective analysis of terrorism must, first of all, be explained and the problems ironed out.

The basic and at the same time most important here is that terrorism is usually viewed in a subjective perspective and the term itself has so often been misapplied, especially as a convenient label for certain, if not all, acts or groups one may happen to disapprove of and not support.

For instance, taking a simple example as illustration, one can often see that to some a particular action may be terrorism, to others it may embody a fight for freedom, while there are those to whom it may merely represent a guerilla campaign, depending on where one stands in regard to all similar cases of this nature.

Because of this indiscriminate use of the word, "terrorism" has come into general usage as a word describing all acts of violence, all kidnappings, hijackings and other similar actions not necessarily intended to be mainly terror-producing, or else purely criminal acts and thus technically not terrorism as such. As a result terrorism has become a synonym for rebellion, civil strife, insurrection, street battles, guerilla warfare and coups d'état.

The world's media are very much (and more often than not) at fault in this matter and contribute greatly to the confusion which surrounds terrorism. The erroneous use or deliberate misuse of the word "terrorism" in order to heighten a dramatic situation and hence to brighten up drab headlines can help to paste the label "terrorist" on movements

which may not be of such nature at all and thus do not deserve to be called terrorist. The initial use of the term to describe a particular group sets the precedent and from then on all subsequent actions of that particular group of people are described as terrorist acts.

In addition, popular thought about terrorism may very often be pre-conditioned with the post-World War II liberation movements against the West. Thus this image of a strictly anti-western phenomenon helps to condemn terrorism outright without due consideration of the entire problem, in the eyes of some people, and sympathy with the underdog may condition the opinion of others to support all acts of terrorism and condemn all anti-terrorist measures by states.

The term is also very often employed pejoratively and as such it implies a moral judgement. For example, governments may attempt to label all violent acts by political opponents as terrorism and anti-government extremists may say that they are victims of government terror. The successful attachment of the label around the neck of a political opponent would indirectly persuade others to accept and adopt one's moral viewpoint and would thus make political headway in the battle for the hearts and minds of the people.

So, what one usually finds is a sloppy use of the imprecisely defined word, be it in the daily press, on the air or in general public opinion and expression. Such vague, careless or indiscriminate use of the term, however, either in the media or in government announcements or else by students of the subject, only help to inflate statistics and make the understanding of the specific character of terrorism and the issues surrounding its use more difficult.

But in examining such problems as terrorism it is crucial for one to take a completely objective stance and steer well clear of any emotional involvement. It is of vital importance to avoid taking sides, however tempting or difficult to resist this may be, in order to remain entirely impartial if one is to reach an objective conclusion. Thus one should study terrorism, the theory behind it, why it is used and how it is put into practice, in the light of what it really is and what it entails. One must not confuse or deliberately misapply the term to describe something different, such as all guerilla movements we may happen to dislike. For not all cases of guerilla warfare necessarily have to, or do, include a campaign of terror.

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On the operational plain terrorism against states constitutes both a strategy and a particular set of tactics. It is a strategy of the weak and the tactics of indiscriminate guerilla or "evasive" warfare. Those

who indulge in terrorist activity lack the military strength or resources to be able to conduct "conventional" warfare either on land, at sea, or in the air and to fight decisive battles with regular forces. Since military inferiority to the opponent in both firepower and numbers prohibits conventional warfare with the enemy forces, other methods suited to the terrorists' disposition must be employed.

A distinction, however, must be made between terrorism and guerilla warfare and the two cannot be equated outright unless the guerilla campaign in question has employed terrorist tactics. For, in theory, guerilla operations may be conducted without the resort to terrorism, although in practice the majority, if not all, examples of guerilla warfare have employed terrorism in one form or another. It is therefore the indiscrimination of the evasive warfare under consideration which constitutes a terrorist campaign. Thus, in the word of Paskins and Dockrill, "... , terrorism is a species of evasive and counter-evasive war. It is, quite simply, indiscriminate war of evasion and counter-evasion".³ To add to their definition, terrorism is also a means of waging psychological warfare and a method to achieve political gains which terrorists claim cannot be attained by other means.

In theory therefore terrorism is not as "mindless", "senseless" or "irrational" as it is often made out to be. Usually, as mentioned above, it is simply a means to an end — the end being certain specific political objectives. However, those involved in terrorist activity can at times become so carried away by and dedicated to violent means that they will tend to miss the point. Hence the overall ultimate objectives will become obscured by the acts of terror and violence, which in some instances would appear random, and may in fact come to be directed against targets whose death or destruction does not directly benefit the cause. A good illustration of this point is the killing of Israeli athletes by Arab terrorists in Munich during the 1972 Olympic Games. The deaths of these people did not in any way aid the Arab cause or make any positive progress in the political arena at all. As such this act must be condemned as senseless and unjustifiable violence.

It must be remembered however that the objectives of terrorists are not those one may expect from "conventional" combat, but neither do terrorists want to see too many people dead. This would only backfire on the terrorists and defeat their initial object — to win the support of the population. Thus terrorists want a large proportion of people watching and listening to what they have to say and not a large number of casualties.

Terrorists aim to compel individuals and states to adopt a certain

3. Paskins and Dockrill, *op. cit.*, p. 89. They include counter-evasive war in their definition because, as mentioned earlier in this paper, acts of terrorism can also be committed by state authorities.

manner of conduct or else to concede certain demands. They seek their goals by spreading fear and undermining confidence in accepted human values, attempting to create a general feeling of threat and trying to destroy all psychological opposition and belief in the usefulness of resistance in the future, and hope that everyone will comply.

Thus, however we look at terrorism it is clear that, whatever the arguments put forward by the perpetrators to justify their actions, the use of terrorist means is still wrong on each occasion. It is both immoral and illegal to terrorise people by threatening to kill them or by actually doing so in order to coerce them into doing something that a particular group of terrorists may want them to do, or else to achieve a specific goal. Such actions deprive people of the free choice to do or think as they want and entail compulsion through terror or threat of terror of people who have the right to be left in peace under international law.

But there are wrongs and there are greater wrongs, and in some instances terrorism can be more excusable and justifiable than in others, thus making it more acceptable, or should one perhaps say less unacceptable than on other occasions.

This can be illustrated by a simple comparison between the threat to employ terror and actual direct application of violence resulting in death and destruction. Although some writers regard both equally as wrong and unacceptable, this writer tends to differentiate between them. For instance, it seems logical, although both are wrong, that a mere threat of terror is not as wrong as direct terror, provided that no killing or damage occurs in the process. Thus it would seem a lesser evil if a group of armed men were to seize a foreign embassy in one of the world's capitals, taking its staff hostage and eventually allowed them to walk out unharmed, than if they were to kill the hostages one by one or else blow up the building, killing themselves as well as the hostages. Although technically still a criminal act, it would nevertheless be reduced in intensity as excessive and unnecessary steps would have been avoided.

But terrorism, however watered down and justifiable it may at times be, is still a crime and is described as such under the legal rules of all states. Terrorism is also considered as a crime under international law, despite the fact that an effective definition of what constitutes an act of terrorism cannot be established on international fora.⁴ As well as this it is considered as the disobedience of a sovereign and the violation of public order.

However, besides breaking all the lay legal codes, terrorism also contradicts divine and canon laws by breaking the Fifth Commandment.

4. Paul Wilkinson: *Terrorism and the Liberal State*, London, 1977, p. 65.

A policy of systematic cold-blooded murder is repugnant to societies abiding by Judaeo-Christian laws and believing in certain human values and because terrorism follows a systematic policy of terror and violence the acts become analogous with crimes.

As such, the use of terrorism is wrong under all accounts. Therefore, in dealing with this problem, what one has to look at is the degree of wrongfulness and unacceptability of different cases of terrorism, to distinguish between those acts which can be regarded as completely wrong and those that lie in the direction of justifiability, though by no means completely absolving themselves of their criminal nature.

Thus since terrorism is basically wrong on every occasion, to take the problem further one would need to examine the degree and nature of the terror employed in particular cases, how and why it was put into practice, the scale of death and destruction, the question of intent or accident and the overall circumstances surrounding the use of terror on each particular occasion.

As the most useful basis for such an analysis I would suggest the application of the Just War principles of Ss. Augustine and Thomas Aquinas to different examples of terrorism in order to pass a more effective and just judgement on the use of terrorism.

i) The Just War principles as applied to the use of terrorism against the state

The principles of Just War (a just cause or legitimate reason for the resort to terror, a last resort nature of the particular case of terrorism in question, and whether it was applied with discrimination and proportion to the designed goal) form useful and convenient guidelines for the further examination of the problem of terrorism.

To illustrate these points one can suggest as a legitimate reason for the eventual resort to terror the struggle against tyranny, racism and genocide, as was the case in occupied Europe during the Second World War when Nazi rule satisfied all three conditions. However, the assumption must not be made that because terrorist movements may spring up under foreign occupation or colonial rule they are automatically a last resort means and can thus be justified. The rule must be so evil or so dangerous and unacceptable to live under that it must be resisted — a fact which constitutes a moral right to the inhabitants of that particular country. It must also be clear that all other means have been tried first by the terrorists before their ultimate resort to violence and terror, and have completely broken down or proved ineffective. But once initiated, it is desirable that terrorism be used in as

much proportion as possible, and rather as an auxiliary measure than as the main policy employed on a large-scale sustained basis.

What is meant by this is that once put into practice terrorism should be in direct proportion to the intended goal it is designed to achieve. For instance, if a goal can be successfully achieved with the minimum of terror, then terror tactics should be used on an appropriate scale. Thus if the aim is to achieve publicity in the world's media and it can be attained without the killing of innocent bystanders or kidnapped hostages, then killing these people should be avoided. Basically terrorists should not use a sledgehammer to crack a nut.

As well as this, terror should be employed with discrimination. Terrorists should select their physical and material targets to be directly related to their cause or else to be relevant to specific issues. For example, groups should attack selectively, aiming at officials and collaborators rather than at the population as a whole which is completely innocent to all terrorist charges. To qualify this even further the officials and collaborators must have been directly responsible for the specific acts of tyranny or a hated policy. They must have been responsible for the arrest, imprisonment, torture, death or the betrayal of their own people to the authorities, to be regarded as "legitimate" targets. It would not, for example, be sufficient to justify the shooting of a so-called "collaborator" for petty things like allowing enemy soldiers to eat in his restaurant or for working in an administration established by the ruling regime. This may be his sole means of livelihood to support himself and his family and not outright, conscious collaboration with the enemy. Thus under no circumstances could the death of such a "collaborator" be as justifiable as that of genuine traitors and collaborators. The killing of foreign or indigenous officials related to particular grievances can be more easily justified as tyrannicide rather than pure murder, but the perpetrators of such actions can never be completely free from guilt as their acts are still murder, although not as abhorrent as that of innocent people.⁵

Therefore the use of terror must be such that would avoid unnecessary casualties and the subjection of innocent people to unnecessary dangers such as reprisals by the authorities. Terrorists must take all possible precautions to avoid unintended but foreseeable deaths and injuries. It is also vitally important that due care be taken to ensure that casualties do not outweigh the value of the target, as was the case

5. Elizabeth Anscombe in her "War and Murder" article, in Richard A. Wasserstrom: *War and Morality*, California, 1970, p. 45, describes murder as "... the deliberate killing of the innocent whether for its own sake or as a means to some further end". Tyrannicide, although technically still murder, is the killing of a tyrant — one who is guilty of tyranny, violence or state terror and thus not an innocent victim. Tyrannicide is therefore more justifiable under the clauses of the Just War rules.

with the symbolic attack by the Irgun in July 1946 on the British HQ based at the King David Hotel in Jerusalem. During this particular operation 200 people were killed or injured. If this was to have been a symbolic raid then so many victims need not have been killed or maimed. There was absolutely no need to strike a target which housed such a large number of people, many of whom were not even related to the struggle. On this occasion no discrimination or proportion at all were observed and the objective was in no way worth the lives of so many.

It is thus crucial for terrorist activities to meet the several criteria of Just War if they are to be regarded as justifiable to the best degree possible, taking into account the nature of terrorist activity. As it is basically criminal activity, terrorism can never be fully justified and hence it is impossible to regard any case as a perfect model. Obviously the more conditions met the more acceptable the particular case will be, but it is by far insufficient to regard an act of terrorism as acceptable, if it merely meets one or two of the conditions. What therefore one can at best do is to try and find the most perfect example of an imperfect phenomenon. As part of this task I would now like to turn, first of all, to occasions when terrorism was used against an authoritarian and tyrannical state system, and then cases when it was put into practice against liberal-democratic governments.

ii) Terrorism and Authoritarian States

In this section I would like to concentrate on the European resistance movements of the Second World War and their use of terrorism against the Nazi occupational authorities and military personnel in their respective countries.

It is beyond doubt that the cause of the resistance movements was a just one. Europe had, after all, been overrun by a hostile power. But, most important of all, this was no ordinary invasion limited to military occupation alone. Germany was not merely a conquerer and looter who would be satisfied with redrawing the map of Europe. This time Europe was to become part of the "Thousand-Year Reich" and its peoples slaves of the Aryan master race. Thus not only was the occupying power trying to impose its control over European territories, it was also attempting to enforce its own political system and ideology on its newly-conquered people as well. The people of Europe therefore had to face not only the enemy soldiers but also the secret police and all that this entailed — the arrest of activists, fear, and the liquidation of all forms of opposition, which meant primarily communists and Jews as well as nationalists.

In the East the situation was much worse. There the native populations were regarded as "sub-humans", according to Nazi ideology, and were denied all basic human rights. For instance, no native Slav could hold a position of authority, receive more than primary education or make use of most kinds of cultural institutions. In addition, Soviet prisoners of war were treated with the utmost severity in the prison camps, as a result of which millions died unnecessarily through starvation.

As well as this, occupied Europe was subjected to a systematic exploitation by Germany. In Nazi plans Europe was to become an endless source of raw materials, agricultural produce and forced labour. All raw materials such as Rumanian oil, Polish coal and Ukrainian agricultural products and minerals were directed straight to Germany where they were harnessed to the autarchic economic projects of the Four-Year Plan to aid the continuation of the war.

Not only was Europe exploited for inanimate materials, but also millions of Poles, Lithuanians, Ukrainians, Russians, Latvians and others were deported to Germany to provide slave labour for the war industries.

Thus not only was Europe occupied militarily but it was also subjected to an unjustifiable violation of natural law and international and Christian morality by an occupying power that took no account of anything, not even basic human dignity and rights.

Along with an unquestionably legitimate reason for resistance Walzer argues that the European peoples also had the moral right to resist.⁶ He goes on to say that even after everything else has been forfeited — if the war has been lost, the armies beaten in the field and the state has surrendered, if there are still certain values worth defending to be found then there is no one to carry on fighting except the ordinary citizens. In this sense such values grant people the moral right and, one may argue, obligation to carry on fighting with every available means (with terrorism as the weapon of last resort) in the defence of these values. In the conditions that Europe found itself during the Nazi occupation some values worth defending were indeed still to be found. The people may have lost their freedom and were constantly forced to give up their manpower and resources to Germany, but they could not allow their basic rights and dignity to be trampled on in blatant disregard for morality and ethical principles by the occupational authorities.

Besides possessing a just cause for rebelling against German occupation, the turn towards terrorism by the European resistance movements was of a truly last resort nature. All opposition and political dissent

6. Michael Walzer: *Just and Unjust Wars*, London, 1980, p. 178.

was heavily put down without delay by the German security forces and there was no other effective means of putting one's case forward. In addition, in military terms, the resistance movements were a weak force engaged in a life and death struggle for survival against regular forces — an ill-equipped band of irregulars, poorly armed and supplied, facing an opponent far superior in both numbers and material, and employing armour, artillery and aircraft in the battle against the insurgent forces.

Therefore, although this meant overstepping the boundaries of the war conventions on two counts (in the mode of fighting and the fact that a clear distinction between those involved in the fighting and ordinary civilians was not maintained) "unconventional" warfare using terror tactics was the sole means available to the peoples of Europe to stand up for their rights.

This brings us on to the question of whether the resistance movements employed terrorism with discrimination and proportion.

First of all it must be said that all kinds of people joined the resistance for a variety of reasons, including real criminals who killed for the sake of killing. Some people took the opportunity to settle old scores under the pretext of executing traitors. Thus there were individual occurrences of indiscriminate killing and destruction, and the communist groups, especially in France, usually kept to a policy of all-out terror.

On the whole, the movements tried to keep their activities within the bounds of proportion. As already mentioned, excesses were occasionally committed as it was extremely difficult for any central organisation to control the activity of the numerous local groups. There were also cases of internecine strife, but usually terror activities were limited, as indiscriminate and excessive use of violence and terror would have been self-defeating. It would have caused the loss of popular support and hence eventual political defeat (the first step towards military defeat) for the resistance movements. The resistance members would then no longer be able to "swim in the sea" of the population — a vital factor for the successful waging of a campaign of insurgency.

Thus terror was used with discrimination and aimed at the occupying and military personnel and native collaborators and not at the compatriots of the various resistance movements. Despite the fact that the occasional German soldier was gunned down on the street corner (a tempting target) assassinations were limited to prominent Nazi officials and indigenous traitors. For example Colonel Hotz, military commander of Nantes, was killed on October 20, 1941; Heydrich was killed in Prague on May 27, 1942; General Lutze, SD commander in Western Ukraine, was ambushed and killed in May 1943; and General Franz

Kutschera, SS commander of Warsaw, was assassinated on February 1, 1944.⁷

Sabotage was also used in proportionate and discriminate measures. For instance, usually only minor charges were laid in the key parts of machinery producing materials vital to the German war effort, in order to cause partial damage and thus only a temporary halt in production. Any greater amount of damage or delay in production would have caused the deportation of the work force of that particular factory to Germany. Trying to avoid this at all costs, the resistance movements desisted from blowing up entire factories which, in any case, would have resulted in the wasteful and unnecessary deaths of their fellow countrymen, something else the resistance movements were trying to avoid.

If a factory did however have to be destroyed in its entirety, the action would usually be carried out with the compliance of the proprietor, and the charges would be detonated when the building was empty.

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It may be argued that the use of terror by the resistance organisations was immoral and that assassination was not far removed from pure murder. This is quite true in the technical sense but, taking into consideration ethics and morality as well as the principles of Just War, in certain circumstances such actions are more justifiable than in others. As mentioned earlier, citizens of a country have the moral right to resist an evil administrative system. In this case terror was the only possible means of demonstrating the peoples' opposition to the rule of the occupying power and the refusal to accept their criminal activities. Thus the resistance was put in a paradoxical situation of having to employ immoral means to exercise their moral rights.

However, the resistance groups did not launch a continuous campaign of terrorism but practiced occasional and discriminate acts of terror for specific purposes when the need arose. Discriminate use of terror is always more justifiable than pure terrorism which involves completely and deliberately indiscriminate and random acts of terror because, whereas indiscriminate terror spreads fear and alarm among the general population, selective, yet unpredictable, terrorist attacks limit their effects to specific selected groups directly related to the struggle.

The European resistance aimed its terror at the occupying authorities and native collaborators and not at their own people as well. In effect this was a continuation of the war by ordinary citizens, employing the sole effective means available to them and tacitly, or even actively in

7. Henri Michel: *The Shadow War-Resistance in Europe 1939-1945*, London, 1972, p. 222-223. See also Yuriy Tys-Krokhmaluk: *UPA Warfare in Ukraine*, New York, 1972, p. 175.

some cases, supported by the people of their country. The assassinations therefore can be classified as tyrannicide and not pure murder as the resistance was killing perpetrators of crimes and collaborators who were themselves immoral beings. The work of traitors had handed over many lives to the vaults of Gestapo headquarters and the firing squad. Killing such people is still in itself immoral, however, but it is less so than killing innocent people at random to spread the effects of the terror.

In spite of the selective nature of the terrorism, mistakes were occasionally made. Sometimes innocent people would be erroneously assassinated like the magistrate of Aix-en-Provence who was, as it eventually turned out, not a collaborator at all, but was trying to help the French resistance. Occasionally a bomb would claim the lives of people accidentally. But one must look at the original intentions and motives behind acts of this nature which happened to take an unintentional toll in lives. Men and equipment are not infallible and sometimes things go wrong and innocent people die. But accidents happen everywhere. The deaths of these people would have been an unintentional toll of war and I would be prone to say that they can quite easily and legitimately be justified under "double effect", provided that initially measures were taken to avoid unintended casualties or to reduce the number of injuries.⁸

There is, however, one more important moral factor which has to be taken into consideration. It is important to note that whatever the resistance did, its activity constantly endangered the lives of innocent people around them. The Germans could not identify the members of the resistance and so on every occasion each act of terrorism would be followed by reprisals of some sort. Either hostages would be taken or else people would be shot at random from the population at large. Sometimes reprisals would be of a truly brutal and horrendous nature as was the case in Czechoslovakia after the death of Heydrich. In Prague 540 people were arrested at once, which was followed by mass deportations of officials, writers, priests and communists of which 252 were shot at Mauthausen. In addition, the village of Lidice was burnt to the ground and its entire population massacred.

Immediately two questions spring to mind: did the resistance movements have the right to subject their fellow countrymen to unnecessary dangers and were acts of terror which led to such brutal reprisals necessary?

In reply one can, first of all, say that it would have been difficult

8. In Just War terminology "double effect" is essentially a means of reconciling the absolute prohibition against attacking civilians with the legitimate conduct of operations. For a complete definition of the principle please see Michael Walzer, *op. cit.*, p. 151-154.

to foresee the scale of some of the acts of reprisal. Even so, in, and only in, truly exceptional cases where the danger was so great that it had to be resisted people could be subjected to dangers which they normally would not have to face. Without wishing to sound too much like a political realist I would say that the general good and the long term situation had to be considered. Short-term sacrifices, however, painful, had to be made in order to build a better long term, but only on the condition that the numbers of victims of reprisal were not excessively high and that the suffering was actually contributing positively to a better life in the future.

Europe found itself in clearly exceptional circumstances between 1939 and 1945, facing the kind of occupation that it did with all that this entailed. Some of the nations, notably those of Eastern Europe, were literally struggling for survival as a race and as human beings. In such circumstances the use of terror would be justified as would the subjugation of the respective populations to possible dangers. What was at stake was too great to allow to proceed unabated. Thus, although the effects of resistance were, on the whole, mainly moral and the enemy forces were left largely intact, the nations had to be awakened from the shock of defeat, subjugation and demoralisation. The price of compliance and passivity would have been too high. The people had to be shaken out of apathy and sacrifices had to be made so as not to live in perpetual degradation and servitude. In this case the theory of the lesser evil would hold as it was a situation of supreme necessity, especially in Eastern Europe, where resistance and the use of terror were more justified than in Western Europe, because the threat and danger there were much greater and far more serious.

Of all the examples of the use of terrorism against the state I find the campaigns of the European resistance movements deserve the most justification of all. They appear most positively of all when examined in the light of the Just War principles and would thus lie nearest to complete justification. But under conditions other than exceptional circumstances of great danger, the exposure of people to danger and reprisals through terrorist activity would be totally unwarrantable and hence unjustifiable and wrong.

(To be continued)

Nina STROKATA*

THE UKRAINIAN NATIONAL FRONT: A LOOK AT ITS ACTIVITY 1962-1967

Over a decade after its founding, information about the Ukrainian National Front, a group of patriotic Ukrainians active from about 1962 to 1967, has been pieced together from various sources, including the underground press in the Soviet Union, as well as from persons who met UNF members in prisons and camps or after their release and have subsequently described such meetings.

Little was known about the front during the period of its activity, and information about the group was first reported in clandestine journals in the USSR in 1970, and by sources in the West a year earlier, 1969.

The underground *Ukrainian Herald* had reported, in its first issue (January 1970), on the 1967 trial of UNF members Zinoviy Krasivskiy,¹ Dmytro Kvetsko, Mykhailo Diak, Hryhoriy Prokopovych,² Yaroslav Lesiv, Vasyl Kulynyn,³ Ivan Kubka,⁴ and Myron Melyn.⁵ In December 1970 another underground journal, the Russian *Chronicle of Current Events*, added Mykola Kachur to the list of imprisoned UNF members. In March 1972 the *Ukrainian Herald* recorded two more names of those involved with the UNF, Semen Korolchak and Ostap Pastukh, both of whom were tried in 1971. Not until 1974 did the *Chronicle* provide an excerpt from the sentencing.⁶

But the first mention of the UNF was made by sources outside Ukraine. In March 1969 the Munich-based Ukrainian journal *Suchasnist* carried information that differed somewhat from that in the underground press. In May 1969 *Ukrainske Slovo* in Paris published the text of one of the programme

* Nina Strokata is a former Ukrainian political prisoner and a member of the External Representation of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group.

1. Former prisoner of Stalin's camps.

2. Former prisoner of Stalin's camps.

3. Kronid Lubarsky, in a communication about those who were sentenced with Kvetsko, states that the correct spelling is Kulynych. (See *Vesty yz SSSR*. Supplement to "List of Political Prisoners of the USSR." Munich: 6, October 31, 1981, p. 6). Mikhailo Heifetz also writes Kulynych. (See "Ukrainski Syluety," *Suchasnist*, 1984, p. 185). However, Irina Korsunska, an activist in the human-rights movement (Moscow), who came to the United States in 1982, insists that the correct name is Kulynyn. Her statement appears to be conclusive in as much as she often visited this UNF member after his release, as well as corresponded with him.

4. Former prisoner of Stalin's camps.

5. Former prisoner of Stalin's camps.

6. In that publication Korolchak is called Korolchuk.

statements of the UNF, "Charter Principles of the UNF: A Project."⁷ And in February 1970 *Vyzvolnyi Shliakh* in London published the same material. These publications preceded the arrival in the West of the *Ukrainian Herald* and its revelations about the existence of the Ukrainian National Front.

As the underground press increased its circulation, news of the fate of several imprisoned UNF members reached the West along with authentic documents of those who were sentenced. One issue of the group's journal even penetrated the Iron Curtain. Later, former political prisoners like Anatoly Radygin, Yuriy Vudka nad Mikhail Heifetz, who had emigrated from the USSR, published their memoirs, thus adding a personal element to the information already available in the underground press and from Ukrainian sources abroad. Such a personal note can be found in the obituary of Mr. Diak in the *Chronicle of Current Events*. (The author was Ludmilla Alexeyeva,⁸ who had met Mr. Diak several times after he had been released from prison because of a terminal illness.)

Not all sources are always reliable as far as facts about the UNF are concerned. The main reason for this is that underground publications — Ukrainian, as well as Russian — were reporting on events that occurred before these publications had been founded. Published memoirs, on the other hand, like all memoirs, occasionally sin against the truth. Authentic materials of the group and of individual members have helped, however, in an evaluation of the data. Having made a comparative analysis of the available sources of information, we can now sketch the history of the UNF.

Date of founding uncertain

It is difficult to ascertain the exact date of the founding of the organisation. According to a Ukrainian underground journal,⁹ the group was created in 1965, but according to *Suchasnist*,¹⁰ the date was at the end of 1964.

A statement in the 1966 issue of the UNF journal, however, may offer indirect evidence that the organisation was created neither in 1965 nor in 1964: "On Ukrainian territory several years ago the Ukrainian National Front was born and began its struggle."¹¹

Moreover, Mr. Krasivsky's autobiographical directory, which he compiled

7. Hryhoriy Panchuk, a researcher on Soviet Ukraine, after analysing the language and content, concludes that the document is a forgery, written outside the area of activity of the UNF. I believe this conclusion to be mistaken.

8. Activist in the human-rights movement in Moscow, has resided in the United States since 1977.

9. *Ukrainian Herald*, I (January 1970), p. 104.

10. *Suchasnist*, Munich: 3 (99), March 1969, p. 101.

11. *Ukrainske Slovo*, Paris: 2141 (December 5, 1982).

in the fall of 1979, contains statements suggesting that the UNF had already been created in 1962:

"In 1962, as a result of the efforts of the president of Kyiv University, Kost Lazarenko, I am being allowed to finish the university programme and to receive a diploma. At this time I am a member of an illegal organisation, the Ukrainian National Front."¹²

It is also true, however, that in another autobiographical version Mr. Krasivskyi writes that he became a UNF member in 1964.¹³

The force behind the creation of the UNF was Mr. Kvetsko. He first thought of creating the organisation after an unknown person, not far from Mr. Kvetsko's village in the Ivano-Frankivske region, put up the traditional blue and yellow Ukrainian flag, with its trident, on the village council building, and in another village someone scattered leaflets with the slogan "Long live independent Ukraine."

From the account Mr. Kvetsko gave to Mr. Heifetz, it appears that the leaders of the UNF were Messrs. Kvetsko, Krasivskyi and Diak, while the membership was made up mostly of villagers.

The programme of the UNF consisted of agitation with the goal of Ukraine's secession from the USSR: "The struggle is for an independent Ukrainian state."¹⁴

It is not known whether UNF members were aware of the activity and fate of Lev Lukianenko's group, but they — like Mr. Lukianenko's worker-peasant league — placed their hopes in the secession of Ukraine from the USSR. Mr. Diak, after being released from prison because of illness, said the following of the UNF:

"If the statutes of the Criminal Code did not negate constitutional rights in the USSR (freedom of speech, publication and others), we would be able to achieve the goal of Ukraine's secession from the USSR by legal means."¹⁵

UNF members were not armed. Only Mr. Diak, as a militia member, had a service revolver.

The group had as its programme the transformation of Ukrainian society into a democracy; it also had an agrarian programme. (The first we hear of such a programme is in Mr. Heifetz's camp memoirs of his meetings with Mr. Kvetsko.)

The group published a journal, *Volia i Batkivshchyna*, (Freedom and Fatherland), and had a printing press. Mr. Krasivskyi was the editor of and a contributor to the journal; Mr. Kvetsko was its regular writer. The first issue

12. *Shliakh Peremohy*, Munich: June 22, 1980.

13. Zinoviy Krasivskyi, *Nevolnytskyi Plachi* (Brussels, Belgium: Lettres et Art, 1984), p. 124.

14. *Ukrainske Slovo*, Paris: 2141 (December 5, 1982).

15. *Suchasnist*, Munich, 7-8 (799-800), July-August 1977, p. 221.

carried the UNF's demands, while the second was devoted to tactical considerations. Unfortunately, these materials are, at present, not available to researchers. A few issues of the journal contained Mr. Krasivskyi's poems.

Every issue was retyped twice, six copies being made each time by the use of carbon paper. Two copies were kept by the editorial board; the rest were handed out for distribution. At the time of the arrest of the active members, 16 issues had been written. The 14th issue, which appeared in 1966, did not pass through Soviet borders until 1982; two other issues were confiscated in 1973 in an unsuccessful attempt to smuggle them out.

In order to educate its readers, the group also used publications of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), which were found in old hiding places. Mr. Diak was an inventive distributor of printed matter. One of his methods was to wrap copies of the texts in plastic bags and float them downstream. Boys playing near the river would then carry home what they found in the bags.

In addition to distributing the journal, the group sent open letters to government agencies of the Soviet regime. A "Memorandum of the UNF" was sent to the 23rd Congress of the Communist Party in the spring of 1966. The memorandum was also sent to individual party heads and to major newspapers. There were no replies. We can get an idea of the memorandum's content from the only issue of *Freedom and Fatherland* ever to reach the free world:

● "... The memorandum presented to the congress contains minimal demands of a cultural-national character, demands without which any subsequent development of the Ukrainian people as a nation is impossible. . .

● "The memorandum defends the right of one's native language and national culture. . .

● "The memorandum demands the return of the Ukrainian population forcibly taken into Russian captivity by the Stalinist-Bolshevik gang. . .

● "The memorandum advocates the equality of all the peoples of the USSR. . .

● The memorandum stands for the full rehabilitation of the victims of the bloody Stalinist-Bolshevik terror. . ."¹⁶

In the fall of 1966, during a Kyiv press conference by the former OUN member Mr. Dzuhalo, the UNF scattered explanatory leaflets and sent a letter to Petro Shelest. Mr. Kvetsko later told Mr. Heifetz in a forced labour camp that the former "boss" of Ukraine wrote brief instructions on the letter: turn over to the KGB. (The letter with Shelest's instructions was included in the investigation of Mr. Kvetsko and his sympathizers.)

16. *Ukrainske Slovo*, Paris: 2136 (October 31, 1982).

The views of several leading UNF members concerning a referendum are also known. Mr. Kvetsko rejected all forms of such an idea. As Mr. Heifetz remembers it, the referendum was often the subject of disagreement between Mr. Kvetsko and political prisoners of the younger generation:

“We. . . never stopped fighting for our independence. What now? Have we sacrificed hundreds of thousands of people for an independent Ukraine only to begin voting as to whether we need freedom? It seems that those people who died in the struggle have died in vain, while we start everything from the beginning.”¹⁷

The only circumstance in which a referendum was seen as a real option was the one allowed by Mr. Diak:

“Although there were discussions in the pages of *Freedom and Fatherland* as to the kind of government suitable for a free Ukrainian state. . . such a choice should be made by the Ukrainian people — by a referendum or by other means.”¹⁸

Mr. Heifetz mentions another aspect of Mr. Kvetsko’s thoughts concerning an independent Ukraine of the future — the matter of its borders. As Mr. Heifetz recalls, Mr. Kvetsko took the position that Ukraine should renounce any desire for territorial aggrandizement within the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic as presently constituted.

The UNF spread widely beyond Ivano-Frankivske, although, according to KGB estimates, the active membership consisted of no more than between 20 to 30 people. The particular issue of *Freedom and Fatherland* which led to the investigation of the organisation was found by the KGB as far away as the Donetsk region.

The history of repressions against the Ukrainian National Front begins with the arrest on July 8, 1966, of Donetsk miner Mykola Kachur. Dmytro Kvetsko was arrested later, on March 21, 1967, in his native region of Ivano-Frankivske. Yaroslav Lesiv was arrested on March 29, 1967, in the Kirovohrad region, where he was working at the time. Also arrested in March of the same year were Zinovyi Krasivskyy and Mykhailo Diak. Information available about the dates of the arrests of the UNF members is very general, for example, the beginning of spring of 1967 for Hryhoryi Prokopovych, Myron Melyn and Ivan Hubka; the summer of 1967 for Vasyl Kulynyn.

In September 1967 the Lviv regional court tried Messrs. Prokopovych, Hubka and Melyn. In October of the same year in Ivano-Frankivske, the court tried Mr. Kachur, who gave the investigators a great deal of information. In November 1967 in Ivano-Frankivske, the Supreme Court of the Ukrainian SSR tried the five founders of the UNF: Messrs. Kvetsko, Diak, Krasivskyy, Lesiv and Kulynyn. Mr. Kvetsko received the longest sentence,

17. Mikhail Heifetz “Ukrainski Syluety.” *Suchasnist*, 1984, p. 192.

18. *Suchasnist*, Munich: 7-8 (199-200), July-August, p. 220.

but Messrs. Krasivskyi's and Lesiv's fate was not a light one. Mr. Diak became ill in prison and died in 1967.

However, the repressions against the UNF did not stop. In 1967 the investigative organs already knew that one of the arrested, Mr. Hubka, was in contact with Semen Korolchak, a physician. Dr. Korolchak had been arrested in 1967 and detained in prison for three days. Frightened, he revealed from whom he had obtained *Freedom and Fatherland* and the emigré publication *Suchasnist*. He also revealed where the journals were hidden.

At the time of these revelations Dr. Korolchak was not tried, but in 1971 the unfortunate doctor was arrested again, and the Lviv regional court sentenced him to prison for that which it had neglected to sentence him in 1967. The court had no new evidence against Dr. Korolchak. The *Ukrainian Herald* commented that some observers saw in this action an example of how the KGB goes about correcting its former "liberal mistakes."

Even stranger is the case of Ostap Pastukh, who was arrested in January 1971 and tried with Dr. Korolchak in September 1971. Mr. Pastukh's illegal activity consisted of several remarks about the subject of Russification. His previous imprisonment appeared to be totally without basis, but such a thing could not, of course, be officially admitted. The court, therefore, sentenced Mr. Pastukh to six months, a term that he served while under interrogation in prison. To adjust the "numbers," Mr. Pastukh was released before his trial, the KGB telling him beforehand that the court would hand him down a six-month sentence.

Thus, the court trials of the UNF not only revealed the hidden sentiments of the people, but also gave new proof of the supposed independence of the courts in the USSR.

Having accused some UNF members of anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda, and others of betraying the fatherland, the courts handed out the following sentences:

● Dmytro Kvetsko¹⁹ — five years in prison, ten years of severe-regime camps, five years of exile and confiscation of private property.

● Zinovyi Krasivsky²⁰ — five years of prison, seven years of severe-regime camps, five years of exile.

● Mykhailo Diak²¹ — five years of prison, seven years of severe-regime camps, five years of exile.

19. The length of the sentence has been verified on the basis of the materials received from these persons.

20. The length of the sentence has been verified on the basis of the materials received from these persons.

21. The length of the sentence is given in the testimony of Ludmilla Alexeyeva, who met Mr. Diak after his release.

- Vasyl Kulynyn²² — six years of severe-regime camps.
- Yaroslav Lesiv²³ — six years of severe-regime camps.
- Hryhoriy Prokopovych²⁴ — six years of severe-regime camps, five years of exile.
- Ivan Hubka — six years of severe-regime camps, five years of exile.
- Myron Myroslav Melyn — six years of severe-regime camps, five years of exile.
- Mykola Kachur — five years of severe-regime camps.
- Semen Korolchak — four years of severe-regime camps.
- Ostap Pastukh — six months.

Having accused some members of the Ukrainian National Front of treason, the court, as in the case of Lev Lukianenko's Workers-Peasants League, handed down sentences for which the laws of the USSR provide no basis, a fact shown by the following definition of treason taken from the Criminal Codes of two Soviet republics, Russia and Ukraine:

"Treason, that is, an act deliberately committed by a citizen of the USSR to the detriment of the national independence, territorial sovereignty or military strength of the USSR: crossing over to the side of the enemy, spying, transfer of state or military secrets to a foreign country, escape across the border or refusal to return from beyond the border back into the USSR, the giving of aid to a foreign country in conducting hostile actions against the USSR, also a conspiracy with the intent to usurp power."²⁵

But it is not this aspect of his court process that Mr. Kvetsko describes:

"I know from history that the bayonets of every occupational power brought for us Ukrainians not only a new colonial yoke, but also their fatherland, which we were forced to love and serve. My grandfather lived under Austria; Austria was his fatherland. My father lived under Poland; Poland was his fatherland. I found myself under the USSR; the USSR became my fatherland. My grandfather fought for Austria in 1914, my father for Poland in 1939, and I 'betrayed' the USSR."²⁶

Further information about the fate of those sentenced is incomplete. One of them, Mr. Kachur, was released in 1969, before his term expired, for helping investigators prepare their case against the UNF. Dr. Korolchak was released from the Perm camps in 1975 after completing his term.

22. The length of the sentence is given in the testimony of Ms. Korsunsky, who met Mr. Kulynyn after his release from prison.

23. The length of the sentence is given in an autobiographical sketch written by Mr. Lesiv in the fall of 1979.

24. According to Mr. Lukianenko's letter to Mr. Stus, Mr. Prokopovych's sentence ended in 1977. ("Zupynit Krivosudia: Sprawa Levka Lukianenka," *Suchasnist* 1980, p. 92).

25. Statute 56 of the Criminal Code of the UkSSR in "Records of the Supreme Soviet of the UkSSR," 1961, No. 28, p. 342.

26. *Vyzvolnyi Shliakh*, London: 1 (370), January 1979, p. 80.

In 1973, Mr. Kvetsko was brought to the Lviv KGB headquarters where he was urged to write a statement of recantation to be published only in the local newspaper. For such an act he was promised a prison term reduction of 12 years. For Mr. Kvetsko, however, such a recantation was more ruinous than prolonged imprisonment. He served his full sentence for 15 years, after which he was transported to Siberia to serve his exile. While in the Perm camp in 1977 he took part in the struggle for political-prisoner status. He requested political asylum and citizenship in a letter to the ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the Netherlands monarchy.

Mr. Kulynyn was an active participant in camp protest actions during his entire prison term. In 1970, for his part in a general hunger strike, he was transferred to Vladimir prison. From Iryna Korsunsky (see footnote 3), we learn that Mr. Kulynyn was not able to remain very long in Western Ukraine: shortly after his release from prison he settled in the Kherson oblast. He is married and has two children.

Mr. Diak became ill of a blood disorder during his prison term. He was offered a deal whereby he would be given complete medical treatment in exchange for a statement in which he admitted his mistakes. Rejecting this proposition, Mr. Diak found himself without medical care. In January 1975 a court considered releasing Mr. Diak because of the state of his health; it did not release him, however, because Mr. Diak "has not yet entered on the path of correction; he still writes appeals." Eventually he was released and in 1976 died of cancer.

About Mr. Prokopovych nothing was heard for ten years. But in 1977 Mr. Lukianenko wrote in a letter to Vasyl Stus that Mr. Prokopovych was in exile in the Krasnoyarsk region and that his term was nearing its end. The Ukrainian Helsinki Group, in its Memorandum of December 1977, stated that Mr. Prokopovych was demanding the right to emigrate from the USSR. In the following year the underground press reported on Mr. Prokopovych's release, search and interrogation in connection with the Lukianenko case. The last underground mention of Mr. Prokopovych appeared in 1978 to the effect that Mr. Prokopovych, called as a witness against Mr. Lukianenko, did not appear at the trial for reasons unknown.

Mr. Krasivskyi, nearing the end of his prison term, was subjected to new repressions in 1972. Psychiatrists in Moscow pronounced him to be mentally ill, and he was transferred to a psychiatric prison. In 1978 he was released because of poor health. In 1979 he announced his membership of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group, explaining his action as follows: "I consider this social and political movement a correct one and believe that, as a participant in it, I shall be able to realise myself and draw nearer to our ideals. . ."²⁷

In 1980 Mr. Krasivskyi was arrested once again and, without an investi-

27. *Homin Ukrainy*, Toronto: 28 (1623), July 2, 1980.

gation or trial, made to serve a term on the basis of his 1967 sentence. In 1984 the Ukrainian publishing house, Literature and Art, based in Brussels, Belgium, published a collection of Mr. Krasivskyi's poems on the basis of which Moscow psychiatrists had pronounced the author to be mentally ill. The collection was titled *Nevolnytski Plachi* (Captive Laments). From time to time, letters from Mr. Krasivskyi and his wife, Olena Antoniv,²⁸ find their way to the free world.

About Mr. Melyn there is no information until 1978. Only the *Chronicle of Current Events*, in reporting on the release of Mr. Krasivskyi, names Mr. Melyn as the individual appointed to be Mr. Krasivskyi's guardian.²⁹ No other source mentions this fact.

For the prisoners's protest actions Mr. Lesiv was transferred in 1970 from camp to Vladimir prison. He was released in 1973 after serving his sentence. In 1979 he joined the Ukrainian Helsinki Group, writing: "I am joining the ranks of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group. . . I am especially impressed by the idea of democracy, justice, and the goal of human rights and national rights."³⁰

Almost immediately after joining the group, Mr. Lesiv was arrested and, on the basis of trumped-up criminal charges, sentenced to two years of general-regime camp. Before the end of his term he was sentenced to an additional five years of severe regime.

After the trials of the UNF members, neither underground publishing organs nor oral reports ever mentioned this organisation. Not until the 1970s is there any news of the Ukrainian National Front, and the centre of activity is once again the Ivano-Frankivske region. But, except for the name and the place of origin, this organisation is a different one, and an account of this group will appear separately.

28. Olena Antoniv-Krasivskyi was killed in Lviv, February 2, 1986.

29. *Chronicle of Current Events*, 51 (December 1, 1978), p. 103. The Russian language *Chronicle* uses the name Melen.

30. Yaroslav Lesiv, *Myt: Virshi iz Viaznytsi*, New York: External Representation of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group, 1982, Introduction, p. 4.

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THE DEVELOPMENT OF UKRAINIAN HISTORIOGRAPHY

1. Introduction

In general the Soviet Union is regarded in the West as the Russian state, although in fact, according to its official description and basic law, it is a multi-national state. Ukraine is but one of the fifteen national republics of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Moreover, Ukraine is seen as a part of Russia, without attention to historical, linguistic, and cultural differences. Because of this, the Ukrainians have been accused of disturbing East European stability by their national movement for independence. In Soviet basic law, however, (1924, 1936, 1977) the right of any national republic to secede from the USSR, including that of Ukraine, is guaranteed.

In keeping with the above, historical writing on Ukraine by nationally-minded Ukrainian historians, especially by Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi, is branded as "nationalistic". However, the works of Russian historians, such as Sergei Solovyov and Vasilii Kliuchevskiy are not evaluated in the same way. Also the Soviet Russian historian Mikhail Pokrovskiy's criticism of Russian imperialism and the suppression of non-Russian peoples in the Russian empire is totally ignored by people in the West. This is measuring with a double standard. Today works of Russian historians are generally regarded not only in the Soviet Union, but also in the West as "objective," while those of Ukrainian historians are regarded as "nationalistic."

The greatest misunderstanding lies in the fact that in the West the term "Rus'" is translated as "Russia," in spite of the different meanings of these names. The adjectives "ruśkyi", "ruskiy" and "Rossiyskiy" are translated as "Russian," although all three mean different things. For instance "ruśkyi," is derived from Rus' — the old name for the territory of present day Ukraine. "Russkiy" means ethnic Russian, while "rossiyskiy" stands for the Russian imperial state, thus "Rossiyskaya Imperiya" and now "Rossiyskaya Sovyetskaya Federativnaya Sotsialisticheskaya Respublika" (RSFSR), in which non-Russian peoples are also incorporated. The terms "Rus'," "Ruthenia," "Malorossiia," "South Russia" and "Ukraina," as well as their inhabitants, "Rusy," "Rusichi," "Reussen," "Ruthenians," "Ukrainians," had a similar historic meaning

according to particular historical situations in the relations between Poland, Russia and Ukraine, but all of these names refer to the land and people on both sides of the Dnieper with its capital of Kyiv.

Likewise, the term "Ukraine" represents not just a geographic and linguistic, but also a political problem. In the past certain Polish and especially Russian circles rejected the names "Ukraine" and "Ukrainians." Instead, the Poles preferred "Rus'" and "Rusin," and the Russians — "Malorossiia," and "Maloros" (Little Russian). The Ukrainians have refused these names as discriminatory. The sensitive historic consciousness of the Ukrainians defends itself even now in the Soviet Union, where national identity is most repressed. Thus the linguistic definition of the word "Ukraina" as border area ("Okraina") as well as the Tsarist "Malorossiia" (Little Russia) are rejected. The name is explained in the native tongue as "Kray" (country), and has been regarded as the symbol of the origin of the Ukrainian sense of national identity and feeling for the homeland since the 13th century.¹ The name "Ukraina" was mentioned for the first time in the Chronicle of Kyiv for the year 1187.

2. Historical Background for Interpreting Ukrainian History

In the 14th century these territories came under Lithuanian rule (Olgierd, 1341-1377); after the Union of Krevo (1385) they became part of the Polish Lithuanian Commonwealth. They remained under Lithuanian administration until 1569, i.e., until the Union of Lublin.

After the agreement between Lithuania and Poland in Lublin, Ukraine came under Polish administration. In the first half of the 17th century the Polish nobility ("Szlachta") reduced the Ukrainian people to a status without rights. The introduction of serfdom, the national oppression of the Ukrainian masses, and above all the pressure which was exerted on the populace to make it accept Catholicism, all led to a profound discontent and to the numerous uprisings of the Cossacks.

During the great national movement for liberation (1648) Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytskyi² set up a military republic, also known as the Hetman State, under a Polish protectorate (1649). The Hetman State consisted of three provinces: Kyiv, Bratslav, and Chernihiv. In this state Ukrainian administration was introduced, and the Polish army could not be quartered there, (Article 9). The strength of the Ukrainian (Cos-

1. D. I. Myshko, "Zvidky pishla nazva 'Ukraina', " *Ukrainskyi Istorychnyi Zhurnal* (hereafter "UIZ") (Kyiv, 1966), Vol. X, No. 7, p. 42. See also: R. Serbyn, "Rus' in the Soviet Scheme of East Slavic History," *The New Review*, Vol. VIII, No. 4, (1969), pp. 169-182.

2. George Vernadsky, *Bohdan: Hetmen of Ukraine*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1941.

sack) army was set at 40,000 men, (Article 1). The Polish king, Jan Kasimir, had recognised the Hetman State in the Peace Treaty of Zboriv on August 18, 1649.³ Because the Polish Sejm would not ratify this treaty, and since the war with Poland went on, Khmelnytskyi was forced to seek an alliance with Russia. Moscow was eager to establish a protectorate over Ukraine, but hesitated to be involved in the Ukrainian-Polish struggle, because of the defeats she had suffered from Poland in the past. The Russians, however, assumed that if the Poles were to defeat Khmelnytskyi, then they would turn the Cossacks with the Tartars against Moscow. Therefore the Russians sent a delegation to Warsaw to demand the restoration of the terms of the Peace Treaty of Zboriv. Poland refused to comply, and the Russians called the estates general (Zemskiy Sobor) in the autumn of 1653, which decided that the Tsar was entitled "to accept under his high hand Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytskyi and the entire Zaporozhian Host, with its cities and laws" by force from Poland.⁴

When Khmelnytskyi was notified about the Russian decision, he designated the city of Pereyaslav, as the place where he would meet the Russian delegation, which was supposed to administer an oath of loyalty. On January 18, 1654, the public ceremony took place. Khmelnytskyi placed before the Cossack assembly the protection of the Tsar, which was received by acclamation. The head of the Russian delegation, V. Buturlin handed the Hetman the charter from the Tsar and asked that the whole assembly should take the solemn oath of allegiance to the Tsar. When Khmelnytskyi requested Buturlin to take the oath first in the name of the Tsar that Russia would not surrender Ukraine to Poland and that the Tsar would defend the country from its enemies and would respect the privileges and rights of all classes of the Ukrainian people, the Russian envoy refused to do it. He stated that the Tsar was an autocrat, who ruled according to his own will and neither made pledges nor took an oath to his subjects, because his word was sufficient. In order to avoid breaking off negotiations, the assembly took the oath of allegiance to the Tsar while some high ranking officers refused to take the oath altogether.

After Buturlin's departure, the Ukrainian Cossack Government elaborated a draft of the treaty and sent two envoys to Moscow, where after two weeks of negotiations it was accepted by the Tsar. According to the terms of this treaty the Tsar promised to guarantee that:

1. The Ukrainian Army was to consist of 60,000 Cossacks.
2. The rights and liberties of the Ukrainian people ought to be maintained and respected.

3. For details see my article "The English Press of 1649 on the Battle and Peace Treaty of Zboriv," *The New Review*, Vol. XIII, No. 1-2, (1973), pp. 28-49.

4. Hrushevsky, *A History of Ukraine*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948, p. 296.

3. The state offices should be held by Ukrainians.
4. The Hetman was to be elected by the Cossacks and only notify the Tsar of his election.
5. The Hetman was to be permitted to carry on international diplomatic relations, except with Poland and the Ottomans.
6. All the Cossack judges were to be free to perform their duties without interference.⁵

The text of the Treaty of Pereyaslav (it actually should be called the treaty of Moscow) was so vague that the Russians and the Ukrainians interpreted it differently.⁶ The Tsar "taking Ukraine under his high hand" turned the protectorate into an annexation to Russia. Khmelnytskyi and his associates considered the Tsar's protection as a temporary military alliance to win the war with Poland.⁷

As was expected, the Treaty of Pereyaslav caused the Russo-Polish war, which ended with a peace treaty at the village of Andrussovo on January 13, 1667. According to this treaty Ukraine was divided into two parts: the Poles held Ukraine on the Right Bank of the Dnieper River and the Russians the Left Bank. The Zaporozhian Cossacks were to remain doubly dependent on both Poland and Russia.

At that time protectorate status was a common condition even for such countries as Holland under Spain, Prussia under Poland, Livonia and Estonia under Sweden, and the Balkan countries under Turkey. Although the Ukrainian Cossack State or the Hetman State was a protectorate, it had its own territory, people, government, and military forces, namely the Cossacks, so that the creator of this state, Bohdan Khmelnytskyi, who carried on international diplomatic relations, except with Poland and the Ottomans, was *de facto* an independent ruler.⁸

However, it should be pointed out that the designation of the Hetman State refers to the Ukrainian Military and not the Cossack State,

5. Vernadsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 131-7. Hrushevsky, *A History of Ukraine*, pp. 294-6.

6. The Treaty of Pereyaslav receives little attention in the Soviet Ukrainian history, e.g., V. A. Diadychenko, F. E. Loš. V. E. Spitskiy, *Istoria ukrainskoi S.S.R. Uchebnik dla 7-8 Klassov*, Kyiv, 1966, 5th ed., pp. 38-9; *Istoria ukrainskoi S.S.R.*, Kyiv, 1969, Vol. 1, pp. 234-37. In these books it is emphasized that the Ukrainian liberation war against Polish oppression could not have been successful without Russian help, cf., Lowell Tollett, "Ukrainian Nationalism and Fall of Shelest," *Slavic Review*, Vol. 34, No. 4 (1975), pp. 758-762, ff.

7. Most Russian and Ukrainian historians considered this treaty to stipulate a state of vassalage of Ukraine under Russia. Some interpret it that Ukraine was simply incorporated into Russia with certain privileges and rights that did not exist in autocratic Russia. Others consider Ukraine as an autonomous state dependent on Russia. For details see: D. Doroshenko, *A Survey of Ukrainian History*, ed. O. W. Gerus, 1975, pp. 231-257; Hrushevsky, *A History of Ukraine*, pp. 293-7; Orest Subtelny, *The Mazepists*, New York, 1891, pp. 293-7.

8. H. Schumann, *Der Hetmanstaat 1654-1764*, Breslau, 1936, p. 4. (The text of this dissertation is also published in *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas*, (1936), Vol. 1, pp. 499-548.

because the Cossacks were not a nation, but rather the military force of the Ukrainian state which lasted until 1764 when Catherine II forced the last Hetman, Kyrylo Rozumovskyi (1750-1764), to abdicate and ultimately incorporate Ukraine into the Russian Empire. It was already Hetman Ivan Vyhovskyi (1657-1659), who considered the Cossacks as the armed forces of Ukraine and therefore he signed the agreement with Poland at Hadiach ("Pacta Hadiackie") in 1658 as "Hetman of the Armed Forces of the Ukrainian Principality."⁹ Also his Great Seal reads: "Ivan Vyhovskyi — Great Hetman of the Ukrainian Principality, Governor-General of Kyiv. . ."¹⁰ There was a clear distinction between Ukraine and Russia at that time as can be seen on the contemporary maps by Guillaume le Vasseur de Beauplan, P. Gordon, Johann Baptist Homann, and others.¹¹

3. Ukrainian historiography in the 19th century

The Ukrainian national rebirth, which based itself on nationality and the revival of the historical national tradition, began around the turn of the 19th century. The historical tradition was influenced by the new political ideas from the Western Enlightenment, i.e., ideas of national identity, political freedom, republicanism, and universal social justice and equality. These ideas contributed to the Ukrainian national revival, which found, in the historical past, a stimulating source of national consciousness, customs, language, poetry, and folksongs, which are so characteristic of the Romantic period. When the Hetman State was abolished (1764) and serfdom was introduced in Ukraine, many Ukrainians declared their claim to nobility.

Historical material of every description — chronicles, memoirs, charters, and so on — were sought and collected. This not only provoked interest in Ukrainian history, as a whole, but also aroused Ukrainian patriotism. In defending their traditional family rights, Ukrainian nobles felt themselves to be defending the rights of their native country. The abolition of autonomy in Ukraine had brought a certain reaction on the part of the more enlightened and patriotic Ukrainian nobles.

9. Wacław Lipiński, *Z dziejów Ukrainy*, Cracow, 1912, p. 303; (Jan Wyhowski, Hetman Woy (sk) X (ies) tw Ruskich.)

10. Hrushevskiyi, *Illustrovana istoria Ukrainy*, Winnipeg, 1918, p. 332; (2nd ed.); Lipinski, *op. cit.*, p. 617, ("Ioan Vyhovskyi, Velikiy Hetman Kniazhestva Ruskoho, Kievskiy Voyevoda-General. . .").

11. G. de Beauplan, *Description d'Ukraine, que sont plusieurs provinces du Royaume de Pologne*, Rouen, 1650. Also an English translation: *A Description of Ukraine, Containing Several Provinces of the Kingdom of Poland, Lying between the Confines of Muscovy, and the Border of Transylvania, in a Collection of Voyages and Travels*, London, 1774; P. Gordon, *Geography Anatomized. . .*, London, 1693; J. B. Homann, *Neuer Atlas über die gantze Welt*, Nuremberg, 1714.

In 1791 a leading nobleman from Poltava, author of an *Ode on Serfdom*, Vasyl Kapnist (1756-1823), went to Berlin, where on April 24, 1791, he submitted a memorandum in French to the Prussian minister Ewald Friedrich Hertzberg (1725-1795), asking the Prussian king to take Ukraine under his protectorate in order to liberate the Ukrainian people from the Russian tyranny¹² (. . . dans lequel case ils tâcheroient de secouer le joug Russien."¹³ The king, however, turned down this request because England refused to support him in the case of a war against Russia.

In addition to several Cossack chronicles (Roman Rakuska, 1702, Hryhoriy Hrabianka, 1710, Samilo Velychko, 1720), the most popular and most influential work was *Istoria Rusov*, (*History of the Rus' People*) which was written in the 1820's and published by a professor of Moscow University, O. Badianskyi, in 1846. In order to avoid censorship, he named the deceased Archbishop of Mohyliv, Georgiy Konyskyi, as its author. In fact, a leading Ukrainian nobleman from Lubny, Hryhoriy Poletyka (1724-1784), is accepted as the author of *Istoria Rusov*.¹⁴ This work contained an impressive history of Ukrainian national political thought and had a tremendous impact on Ukrainian historiography, as well as on the Ukrainian national revival in the 19th century.

However, it was the Hungarian-German historian Johann Christian von Engel (1770-1814), who wrote the first scholarly work on Ukrainian history entitled *Geschichte der Ukraine und der Ukrainischen Kosaken*. . . (*History of Ukraine and the Ukrainian Cossacks*. . .), [Halle, 1796]. In his work Engel compared the Cossacks to the ancient Spartans and admired the heroic wars of the Cossacks first against the Tartars and then against the Polish magnates.¹⁵ The Ukrainian historians of the 19th century were impressed very much by Engel's history and used it as an historical source of information.¹⁶

12. Polish historian B. Dembinski discovered this document and published it in *Przegląd Polski*, Cracow, 1896, No. 3, pp. 511-523; for details see: W. Edgeton, "Laying a Legend to Rest. The Poet Kapnist and Ukraino-German Intrigue," *Slavic Review*, Vol. 30, No. 3 (1971), pp. 551-560. Soviet historian A. Matsay indignantly rejected "the provocative twaddle spread by bourgeois Ukrainian nationalists in the wake of Mr. Hrushevskyi about V. V. Kapnist's enmity towards Russia and her people, and about his trip to Germany in 1791 to ask for help against Russia, has nothing in common with reality and its false from beginning to end. . .," Kyiv, 1958, p. 78. Hrushevskyi published this document in ZNTS, 1896, Vol. IX, pp. 7-9.

13. German historian, G. Sacke published the text of this document entitled "V. V. Kapnist und seine Ode 'Na radstvo,'" *Zeitschrift für slavische Philologie*, 1941, vol. XVII, pp. 291-301.

14. About the authorship of *Istoria Rusov* see: O. Ohloblyn, *Istoria Rusov*, New York, 1956, pp. V-XXV, his essay "Where was *Istoria Rusov* written," *Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U.S.*, Vol. III, No. 2, pp. 670-695, also A. Jakovliv, "Istoria Rusov and its author," *Annals*, Vol. III, No. 2, pp. 620-669.

15. J. Chr. von Engel, *Die Geschichte der Ukraine*. . . , Halle, 1796, pp. 178, ff.

16. Krupnytskyi, "J. Chr. Engels Geschichte der Ukraine," *Abhandlungen des Ukrainischen Wissenschaftlichen Institutes*, Berlin, 1931, vol. III, pp. 108-9.

In view of the prevailing climate in Ukraine, the works were written in Russian and conformed to the official name for Ukraine — "Little Russia." Thus Dmytro Bantysh-Kamenskyi (1788-1850) wrote the first history of Ukraine entitled *Istoria Maloi Rossyi* (History of Little Russia [Moscow, 1822], 3 Vols.) to be documented and written separately from the Russian history. Following him was Mykola Markovych (1804-1860), who wrote the five volume *Istoria Malorossyi* (History of Little Russia) [1842-3]. The heroic Cossack period, which found a brilliant expression in Ukrainian songs, overwhelmed the Kyivan and Lithuanian periods as well as the growth of other social groups in Ukraine, as is evident in the works of both Bantysh-Kamenskyi and Markovych.

Romanticism, born in Western Europe, found favourable soil in Ukraine. The heroic struggle for freedom of the Ukrainian Cossacks, which had been particularly celebrated in folk songs, occupied the minds of the investigators, and one forgot, as it were, Kyiv Rus', the Lithuanian period, and the historical development of other social classes, such as the middle class and the nobility. The Cossack entity as the embodiment of the ideals of liberty, sung in countless songs and secret tales, lived in the memory of the people and drew the attention of the Ukrainian scholars. Initially it aroused their preference for ethnography and went on to the realm of historical writings.

The most pronounced characteristic of historical research in the period of Romanticism was the study of ethnography. The emphasis on ethnography in Ukrainian research marked a new course in Ukrainian historiography, namely national character — "narodnist". Studies of folklore, customs, and traditions led to deeper consideration of the historical causes of the prevailing social and economic enslavement of the masses and the historians' sympathy for them.

Johann Gottfried von Herder's (1744-1803) *Ideas for a History of the Philosophy of Mankind* (1784-1791) found an echo in Ukraine, along with the ideas of the political enlightenment (Montesquieu, Voltaire, Rousseau), the War of Independence (U.S.A. 1776) and other revolutionary movements (the Great French Revolution, 1789). Ukrainian students, who studied in St. Petersburg, Moscow and also abroad, were acquainted with the philosophy of German Idealism (Schelling, Fichte, Hegel), as well as with the French Utopian Socialists (Proudhon, Fourier), and brought these ideas to Ukraine.

In 1805 and 1834 universities were founded at Kharkiv and Kyiv respectively. At both universities studies were devoted to ethnography and to the causes of the social misery of the people. The people and their struggle for freedom and the betterment of life became the focus of research. The Populist attitudes were first coherently expressed in the works of Mykola Kostomarov (1817-1885), professor at Kyiv and later

at Petersburg University.¹⁷ The Populist interpretation of Ukrainian history was further developed by Kyiv University's professor Volodymyr Antonovych (1834-1908). He saw Ukrainian history as the history of the popular masses, who were forced to live under alien conditions: religious, social, and political, which were brought on them by aristocratic Poland.^{17a}

In 1834 the thirty year old Mykhailo Maksymovych (1804-1873) was appointed professor of ethnography, but he concerned himself with the old Ukrainian literature, which led him to investigate the history of Kyiv Rus'. At this time Mikhail Pogodin (1800-1875) was teaching Russian history at the University of Moscow. Pogodin proposed the hypothesis that the Great Russians were the original inhabitants of Kyiv Rus' and had resettled themselves in the North as a result of the Tartar invasion. Ukraine, he said, was only settled in the 16-17th century by inhabitants of Galicia and Volhynia. In his essays Maksymovych, who based himself on the exact method in botany, doubted Pogodin's view. Thanks to Maksymovych a commission was established to investigate the documents in the possession of the Governor General of the South West Province (Right Bank Ukraine). This work was particularly supported by the Russian government after the Polish uprisings of 1831 and 1863.

Mykola Ivanyshchyn (1811-1874), professor at Kyiv and student of the German jurist, Friedrich Karl von Savigny (1779-1861), was the founder of the famous *Archiv Yugozapadnoi Rossii*. His successor at Kyiv, Volodymyr Antonovych continued the research (35 volumes appeared up to 1914) and founded the first school of Ukrainian historians, the so called Kyiv Documentary Historical School. In the same period M. Kostomarov in Petersburg published ten volumes of *Akty otnosiashchysia k istoriyi Yuzhnoyi i Zapadnoyi Rossii* (1861-1878), which was extremely valuable for research into the Hetman State of the second half of the 17th century.

Antonovych continued his folk studies. According to him Ukrainian history is the history of the Ukrainian masses, who were abandoned by the Ukrainian leadership and delivered into the power of the Polish *Szlachta* as well as the Russian *Dvorianstvo*. This is what produced the freedom struggles of the masses led by the Ukrainian Cossacks. The Cossacks were idealised and became the centre of his historical writing. To be sure, under the influence of Polish historiography (Karol Szajnocha), Panteleimon Kulish (1819-1897) had criticised the Cossacks. He considered the Polish *Szlachta* to be the bearers of culture in

17. For details see: D. Doroshenko, *Mykola Ivanovych Kostomarov*, Leipzig, 1924.

17a For details see: D. Doroshenko, *Volodymyr Antonovych. Yoho zhyttia ta naukova diyalnist*, Prague, 1942, also Yuriy Lavrinenko, "Ukrainska 'polityka vlasnoho gruntu i syly' Volodymyra Antonovycha," *Suchasnist*, 1985, Vol. XXV, No. 6, pp. 76-79.

Ukraine and the union with Moscow (1654) a historical necessity, since the Ukrainians of the time were not capable of creating a state of their own.¹⁸ He sharpened his attacks against the Cossacks and personally against Kostomarov and the Ukrainian poet, Taras Shevchenko, who was already famous at that time, and Kulish was, therefore, completely rejected by Ukrainian society.

Later, Alexander Lazarevskyi (1834-1902) and his school put the blame for the decline of the Ukrainian masses on the Right Bank Ukrainian nobility and on the Left Bank "Starshyna" (officer corps), and thereby denied the native national-state tradition. In other words, Lazarevskyi was opposed to the historic initiatives to establish a Ukrainian commonwealth.^{18a} In this way the "Narodnyky" had not only rejected the idea of the state, but had thereby removed the very basis of their own existence.

Already, Mykhailo Drahomanov (1841-1895), a socialist, republican and advocate of federation with Russia, had accused the Ukrainian historians of having falsified Ukrainian history by damning fighters for the freedom of Ukraine like Vyhovskyi, Polubotok and Mazepa, and concealing the past — that people like Peter I and Catherine II and others had destroyed that freedom.¹⁹

Drahomanov's position was ignored. The Ukrainian historians — "Narodnyky" — who rejected a native state tradition on the one hand, and on the other had no clear national-political programme of their own, could not arrive at any basic judgement concerning historical development. They remained "Ukrainophiles", but from their works one could draw no final synthesis; their motivation was lacking.

Antonovych and his students published documents, wrote monographs and historical outlines of the individual Ukrainian lands, but they did not concern themselves with the theoretical problems of Ukrainian history as such. They could hardly do so, for they were constrained by the system of official Russian historiography, which would not recognise the existence of a Ukrainian history.

Thanks to the Polish-Ukrainian understanding in Galicia (1890) Antonovych's student, Mykhailo Hrushevskyi (1866-1934) was called to the University of Lviv (Lemberg) (1894-1914), where instead of Ukrainian history he taught world history with special attention to Eastern Europe. The contemporary Austrian Minister of Education, Hautsch, maintained that "Ruthenian history is not a concrete science."

At that time, despite the malpractices of the Polish-controlled administration in Galicia, the Ukrainians enjoyed some rights provided by

18. For details see: D. Doroshenko, *Panteleimon Kulish*, Berlin, 1923.

18a For details see: V. Sarbey, *Istorychni pohlady O. M. Lazarevskoho*, Kyiv, 1961.

19. M. Drahomanov, *Lysty do Ivana Franka*, Lviv, 1908, Vol. II, p. 19.

a constitution. They published books, had their own press, (just to mention a few such as: *Pravda* 1867-1896, *Zoria* 1880-1897, *Dilo* 1880-1939, and others), established several societies of which the Shevchenko Scientific Society (1873) evolved into a unofficial Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences, which gained wide recognition in the world of scholarship, published hundreds of volumes of *Zapysky* (Notes), and built up a large library and museum. In addition, the Ukrainians could hold conferences, participate in elections, express their grievances in the parliament both in Lviv and Vienna, and fought for their rights. After the "Ukaz of Ems" (1876), which prohibited Ukrainian cultural activities in Russia, Galicia became a sort of sanctuary for Ukrainian intellectuals from tsarist persecution.^{19a}

A prominent Ukrainian leader from Kyiv, Eugene Chekalenko, remarked in his memoirs (1861-1907): "... At that time, Galicia was for us a model in the struggle for our national rebirth; it strengthened our faith and hope for a better future. Galicia was a true 'Piedmont' of Ukraine because prior to 1906 a Ukrainian press, scholarship and national life could develop only there."²⁰

4. Ukrainian Historiography in the 20th Century

The majority of leading Russian historians such as: N. M. Karamzin (1776-1826), M. P. Pogodin (1880-1875), S. M. Kliuchevskiy (1841-1911), P. N. Miliukow (1859-1943) and others followed the so-called "traditional scheme" of Russian history and regarded all Eastern Slavs as one nation, namely the Russian people. Byelorussians (White Ruthenians) and Ukrainians "belonged to the same Russian nationality." They "developed cultural and linguistic differences because of geographical and political separation from the Russian people." Consequently, many Russian historians maintained that since there was and is only one Russian nationality, there can be only one national history.

This "traditional scheme" was opposed by Hrushevskiy in his well known essay entitled "The traditional scheme of 'Russian history' and the problem of a rational organisation of the history of Eastern Slavs." Thanks to leading Russian liberals, such as Vladimir I. Tamanskiy and Alexander S. Shakhmatov, this essay was published even in Ukrainian by the Russian Imperial Academy of Sciences in 1904.²¹ In this essay,

19a I. Lysiak-Rudnytsky, "The Ukrainians in Galicia under Austrian Rule," *Nation-building and the Politics of Nationalism: Essays on Austrian Galicia*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 1982, p. 51.

20. E. Chekalenko, *Spohady, 1861-1907*, New York, 1955, p. 336.

21. M. Hrushevskiy, "Zvychnaya skhema 'russkoy istoriyi' i sprava ratsionalnoho ukladu istoriyi skhidnoho slavyanstva," *Imperatorskaya Akademiya Nauk*, St. Petersburg, 1904, Vol. I, pp. 294-304; English translation in *Annals*, Vol. II, No. 4, (1952), pp. 355-364.

and above all in his monumental ten volume *Istoria Ukrainy-Rusy* (1894-1932), Hrushevskyi treated the history of Eastern Slavs separately. He pointed out that it is illogical to connect the old history of the Kyiv State with that of the Suzdal-Vladimir and the Moscow Principality of the 13th and 14th centuries. In his "rational scheme" Hrushevskyi emphasised three parallel lines for the history of White Ruthenia, Russia and Ukraine. Concerning the origin of the various nationalities and the earlier stages of their history, Hrushevskyi said that "the Kyiv State, its legal system and its culture, were the creation of one nationality, Ukraine-Rus', while the state of Vladimir-Suzdal-Moscow was developed by another people, namely, the Russian people."²² Furthermore, he marked the continuation of Kyiv Rus' with Galicia-Volhynia until the time of its incorporation into Lithuania (which before 1939 was never under Russian rule), while the Moscow Principality found its continuation in the Tsarist Empire of Moscow and in the Russian Empire.²³

Hrushevskyi's interpretation had limited success. Some Russian historians, such as Alexander J. Presniakov (1870-1929) in *Obrazovanie velikorusskago gosudarstva*, (1918), and Pavel P. Smirnov (1882-1947) in *Volzkiyslakh i starodavni rusy*, (1928), accepted Hrushevskyi's scheme and tried to use it in their works on Russian history. In general, however, it was rejected by Russian historians.

(To be continued)

22. *Annals*, pp. 356-7.

23. Until 1654 the Ukrainians had no real relations with Moscow and developed not only their own language, but also their own culture. For details see: O. Pritsak and J. Reshetar, "The Ukraine and the Dialectics of Nation Building," *Slavic Review*, Vol. XXII, No. 2 (1963), pp. 234-243.

Bohdan KRAWCIW

UKRAINE IN WESTERN CARTOGRAPHY AND SCIENCE IN THE 17TH — 18TH CENTURIES

In 1961 the U.S. State Department, in its research bulletin, entitled *Soviet Affairs Notes* (No. 158), was guilty of a totally false and spurious definition of the name of Ukraine, which was given as follows:

"The term 'Ukraine' is itself a modern political rather than a historical term. It was invented in the 19th century by nationalists seeking to detach the south-western borderlands of Russia from the Tsarist Empire."

The intent of this article is to give the historical origin of the term "Ukraine" and at the same time to demonstrate the unreliability of some of the research produced by U.S. government agencies, as well as other Western academic and political institutions.

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While in London in 1930, the well-known Polish geographer and cartographer, Prof. Eugeniusz Romer, visited the Royal Geographical Society and inspected its rich collection of historical maps and charts. Upon his return to Warsaw, Prof. Romer set down his impressions and views,¹ featuring an attack upon the Dutch cartographers of the 17th century, Guilielmus and Joannes Blaeu, because in their 10-volume *Atlas Maior* they cartographically did not do justice to the then Poland and thereby contributed to the creation of detrimental cartographical influences in the European opinion. Prof. Romer was incensed at the cartographers Blaeu because their atlas "lacks a map which would embrace the entirety of the Polish Republic of that time, while a map entitled *Polen*, which was described as 'Polonia Propria', in the east did not reach the upper and middle Buh and did not even embrace Lviv." Prof. Romer added that such a cartographical picture of Poland was subsequently popularised (through other editions of the Blaeu atlases, as well as through the atlas of Jansson and his successors, including *The English Atlas* of Moses Pitt in 1680) and wondered "whether this accidental result of an attempt to attain a cartographical detail in the 17th century had not become the source of a political and quite incomprehensible concept known as the Curzon Line."

1. *Polski Przegląd Kartograficzny*, Lwów-Warszawa, Vol. V, No. 33-34, April 1931, pp. 1-31.

I do not have the slightest intention of engaging in polemics with Prof. Romer, who is known for his chauvinistic attitude towards the aspirations for freedom and independence of the peoples of Eastern Europe. But as far as the "detrimental cartographical influence" of the Blaeus, the Janssons and of Pitt on European opinion is concerned, I freely admit that Prof. Romer chanced upon a very important point. What is typical of the political maps of Eastern Europe in the 17th century is that all Eastern geographers and cartographers of the time treated the whole Eastern European territory under the domination of the Polish Republic of that time not as a political unity, nor even as a federation, but as a complex of completely separate ethnic and political lands and countries.

Such a cartographical picture of the European East, in which Muscovy did not play an important part, existed in Western mentality not only in the 17th century. As far back as the 16th century, long before the Blaeus, the founders of modern cartography, Gerard Mercator (1512-1594) drew the maps of Lithuania, Taurica and Poland, limited to their ethnic territories. His atlas, known as *Atlas sive cosmographicae meditationes* (between 1585 and 1682 there were 47 editions), contained separate maps of Lithuania, Rus', and Taurica, which embraced the Crimea and the present-day Ukrainian territory on both banks of the Dnieper River. A map of Poland embraced only the Polish lands proper reaching to the Sian and Buh Rivers in the east. There was also a map of "Russia cum confiniis", as Muscovy was referred to at that time. Thus in fact the Blaeus and their successors merely followed in the footsteps of Mercator.

Yet Mercator himself was not the creator of the cartographical picture of the countries of Eastern Europe. Among the first pioneers who blazed the trail in fixing the political frontiers of Eastern Europe were Marco Beneventanus, Martin Waldseueller and Sebastian Muenster. To quote from a work by the writer²:

In their writing and maps they distinguished it (Rus') from Poland proper and from Polish ethnographic territories. For instance, on Marco Beneventanus' first map of Central and Eastern Europe, entitled *Tabula Moderna Poloniae, Ungarie, Boemie, Germanie, Russie, Lithuanie*, which was included in Ptolemy's *Geography*, published in 1507 (Rome, Bernhardus Vinetus de Vitalibus); or on the map of the eminent scholar and geographer of the early 16th century, Martin Waldseueller, which was entitled *Tabula Moderna Sarmatie Eur, sive Hungarie, Poloniae, Russie, Prussie et Valachie* (Johannes Schott, Strassburg) found in Ptolemy's *Geography* published in 1513, Rus' was defined in the titles of

2. Bohdan Krawciw: "Giillaume le Vasseur Sieur de Beauplan's 'Description of Ukraine' and His Military Maps of Ukraine" in *A Description of Ukraine* by Guillaume le Vasseur Sieur de Beauplan, New York, 1959, pp. IX-XIII.

the maps as a separate territory, equal not only to Poland, Lithuania and Wallachia, but also to Germany, Hungary and Bohemia.

Both maps, as was documented by contemporary researchers (Birkenmajer, Kordt, Piekarski, Buczek, Chowaniec), were published on the basis of the maps and information compiled by the Cracow canon and historian, Bernard Wapowski (d. 1535), who at the beginning of the 16th century lived in Rome and enjoyed friendly and academic associations with Marco Beneventanus in Rome and Martin Waldseueller in Saint-Die, author of several maps in the Strasbourg edition of Ptolemy's *Geography*.

Rus' was treated — according to tradition — as a separate political and ethnic territory by the well-known cosmographer, Sebastian Muenster (1489-1552), publisher of several issues of Ptolemy's *Geography* (beginning in 1540 in Basel) and author of the widely-known *Cosmography*, published first in 1542 and reprinted more than a score of times during the 16th and 17th centuries in German, Latin and other languages. In all these publications the description of Rus', also referred to as Ruthenia and Podolia, is differentiated not only from the description of Poland, but also from that of Muscovy (Muscovite Lands). Even Polish cartographers of the second half of the 16th century defined Rus' on their maps as a separate territory within the borders of Poland, with distinct boundaries, as, for instance, Wacław Grodecki in a map published in 1558 and included in 1570 in Abraham Ortelius' atlas, entitled *Poloniae finitimarumque locorum descriptio*. Auctore Veceslao Godrecio Polono.

This differentiation of Lithuania and Rus' and other lands from Poland proper, "Polonia Propria", was based on their separate political and state status which they possessed heretofore. The Galician-Volhynian State, which ended with the death of Yuriy II and the conquest of Polish King Casimir, went under the domination of the Polish kings (in part the Lithuanian princes as well) and continued to be treated as the separate country of Rus', with its own proper boundaries and distinct from Poland. In like measure Lithuania was a separate state organism until 1569, that is, until the Union of Lublin. It is to be recalled that Lithuania embraced the Ukrainian provinces of Volhynia, Kyiv and Podolia, all of which remained nominally "Lithuanian" even after the Union of Lublin. However, Western (including Polish) geographers, cosmographers and chroniclers, considered Rus' and Lithuania with its Ukrainian provinces as separate countries and distinct from Poland from the viewpoint of the political and ethnographical status. Therefore, in the atlases of the 15th and 16th centuries special maps and charts were made for them. To underscore the separateness from Poland the Ukrainian lands under the Polish crown were referred to as Rus', Russia, Ruthenia, Russia Rubra, and Russia Nigra, and these

appellations extended not only to Galicia, the Kholm and Belz provinces and Pokutia, but were also applied on the maps of the 17th century to Volhynia and the provinces of Kyiv, Chernihiv, Poltava and Podolia.

With the growth and development of the Muscovite state with its capital in Moscow — its territory was once part of Kyivan Rus' destroyed by the invasion of the Tartars in 1240 — this Muscovite state, known as Muscovy in the West, accepted as its name that of Rus', whose Latin transcription was Russia. Thus appeared a paradox — the same name was applied to two culturally, ethnographically and politically different countries: Rus'-Galicia, with its capital in Lviv, and Muscovy, with its capital in Moscow. Both were referred to as Russia. This is the source for the confusion of nomenclature regarding Russia and Ukraine which lasts, in various degrees, to this day, inasmuch as both terms, Rus' and the later Russia, translate into Latin and other languages as Russia.

As in the histories of other countries and nations, which at various times had different names, the Ukrainian territory populated by the Ukrainian people, was called Rus' and then gradually came to be known as Ukraine.

Origin of the Name "Ukraine"

Ukraine, as a name designating a part of and subsequently the whole Ukrainian national territory, has already appeared in the 11th and 12th centuries, but it was definitely established only by the 16th century. Today, after many centuries of effort to suppress this name along with the endeavour by the enemies of Ukraine to destroy the Ukrainian people themselves, this name has earned a fully-fledged right of citizenship in the world. It is the official and valid name of the Ukrainian land, populated by the Ukrainian people.

Nevertheless efforts still persist today to deny the Ukrainian people the right of freedom and self-determination, with consequent national statehood and independence. In some political capitals of the West the view still prevails that the separateness and statehood of Ukraine has no legal and political foundation, that it is a problem "invented" recently by Ukrainians and their anti-Russian "allies". This compound of ignorance and propaganda is being stubbornly disseminated by some Russian emigré groups which have managed to inject it to some extent into U.S. political thinking. Their most popular version is that Ukraine was a "German intrigue". In the early 1950's these groups distributed an absurd pamphlet, entitled *Ukraine — Invention of the 20th Century*, which was extensively bruited by *Novoye Russkoye Slovo*, a Russian-

language newspaper in New York. This view probably had some effect on the pro-Russian officials of the U.S. State Department.

It is therefore my salutary purpose here to trace the actual appearance and development of the term "Ukraine" in the maps and cartographical charts beginning with the 17th century, as well as its citation in the works of Western European historians and travellers. A wealth of source materials exist which are preserved in the Library of Congress and in other libraries of the United States, in the British Museum, in the Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris and in many other world libraries. Hence everything presented here is readily verifiable.

Some Ukrainian researchers, such as S. Shelukhyn and V. Sichynskyi, maintain that the term "Ukraine" appeared on the maps of Western European cartographers as early as the 16th century, but in any event "Ukraine" is clearly shown on the great map of Lithuania made by the well-known Dutch cartographer and engraver, Hessel Gerardus or Gerritsz (1581-1632), and published in 1613 by the Amsterdam publisher, Wilhelm Jansson Blaeu. It was sponsored by Lithuanian Prince Nicholas Radziwill-Syritka (1549-1616). The author of the map was Tomasz Makowski (1575-1620?). On this map, entitled *Magni Ducatus Lituaniae et Regionum Adjacentium exacta Descriptio*, for the Right Bank Ukraine [Ukraine West of the Dnieper River] the following description is used: "Volynia Ulterior quae tum Ukraina tum Nis ab aliis vocitatur", which means "Outer Volhynia, which sometimes is called Ukraine, and sometimes the Flatland". The term "Flatland" was used at that time to designate the territory of the Zaporozhian Host, with their headquarters in the Zaporozhska Sich. This territory was also known as the "Liberties of the Zaporozhian Army of the Flatland" and embraced the central part of Southern Steppe Ukraine on both banks of the Dnieper River. This territory, although nominally under the Polish crown, was in fact a quasi independent republic with its own elected leaders. This territory, in addition to being called the "Flatland", was also referred to as Ukraine in the second half of the 16th century. We might add that although the map of Lithuania by Makowski was published in 1613, it had been prepared by Makowski in the last decades of the 16th century.

"Ukraine" was often used in the field of international relations among the peoples of Eastern Europe in the second half of the 16th century. For instance, in a letter of the Turkish Sultan, Suleiman, to Polish King Sigismund August, dated November 3, 1564, reference is made to a castle in Kamianets Podilsky which "lies in Ukraine". That meant that not only "Volynia Ulterior" belonged to Ukraine at that time, but also the province of Kyiv with the "Flatland" and Podolia with its capital Kamianets. In his edict of 1580 Polish King Stefan Batory appealed to "Ukraine: Ruthenian, Kyivan, Volhynian, Podolian

and Bratslavian"; thus Ukraine comprised not only Rus', but also the province of Kyiv, Volhynia, Podolia and Bratslav. In the official records of the Polish Sejm of 1585 appears a reference to "Ukraina Podolska"³.

The term "Ukraine" began to be extensively used in international relations in the 17th century. Polish chronicler Marcin Bielski, in his chronicle, *Kronika Polska Marcina Bielskiego* (The Polish Chronicle of Marcin Bielski), published by his son Joachim Bielski (1540-1629) in 1609, uses Ukraina and writes about "Ludzi ukrainnych" (Ukrainian people). In a letter to the Ukrainian Kozaks King Sigismund III wrote:

"The pagans desolated almost all areas of Ukraine: the once rich Volhynian land, Pokutia"⁴.

This shows that the Polish King associated Pokutia with Ukraine; Pokutia, a province near the Carpathian Mountains, was then a part of Rus'.

But it was only the insurrection of Bohdan Khmelnytskyi against Poland in 1648 which brought about the establishment of the Ukrainian Cossack State and which placed the name of Ukraine firmly in general use. "Ukraine" became widely known and used in Western Europe, especially in Western European maps and in the scientific literature of the time.

De Beauplan's Maps of Ukraine

The major works which clearly show the change in nomenclature of the Ukrainian land are the striking cartographic and descriptive works of the French engineer and architect, Guillaume le Vasseur de Beauplan (1600?-1673). He came to Poland at the end of 1630 upon the invitation of King Sigismund III and was assigned to service in Ukraine, specifically in Podolia and in the province of Kyiv. Remaining in Ukraine for 17 years, he became known not only as a famous builder of fortresses and castles, but also as the mapper of the lands of Ukraine which were known as "wild fields" — *Loca deserta*. In the course of his long stay in Ukraine de Beauplan made a series of cartographical charts and maps and amassed a great quantity of material for the description of the country. Specifically he made a general map of Ukraine on a large folio, another map on 8 folios, a map of the course of the Dnieper River, and several plans of cities and fortresses. His work on the general map of Ukraine was completed in 1638. It was attested to be virtue of a copy made by a Swedish engineer, Frederic Getkant, in 1639 and included under the name of *Tabula Geographica Ukrainiska*

3. *Encyklopedia Ukrainoznavstva*, Munich-New York, 1949, Vol. I, p. 15.

4. *Op. cit.*, p. 15.

in his atlas, preserved in the collection of K. Krigsarkivet in Stockholm⁵.

De Beauplan was released from service in the Polish army in March 1647, a year before the insurrection of Khmelnytskyi, but even prior to his departure for France he took the first steps for the publication of his map of Ukraine with the known engraver of Danzig, Wilhelm Hondt (Guihelmus Hondius). Four years later, in 1651, his efforts culminated in the publication of his map of Ukraine, entitled, *Delineatio Generalis Camporum Desertorum, vulgo Ukraina, Cum adjacentibus Provinciis*. It also contained descriptive notes relating to the wars of Khmelnytskyi against Poland, specifically the battles of Lviv in 1649 and of Berestechko in 1651. The map embraced the Ukrainian lands on both banks of the Dnieper River, the area up to the Black Sea, including the Crimea, and Podolia, Volhynia and the greater part of Rus' with the city of Lviv.

The second special map of Ukraine of de Beauplan on 8 folios was published (in partial editions only) by Wilhelm Hondt in Danzig in 1653. Its exact title was *Delineatio Specialis et accurata Ukrainae cum suis Palatinatibus et Districtibus Provinciisque adjacentibus. . . Gedani Anno MDCL*. Dated 1650 the map contained the provinces of Kyiv, Podolia with the Bratslav area, Pokutia, part of Rus', and Volhynia, but lacked the region of the Black Sea and the Crimea. In the titles of both maps the spelling of Ukraine was correctly given as Ukraina, although in some inscriptions in the general map of Ukraine the name once appeared as Ukrainia, and another time as Ocraina.

Of specific value and importance with regard to events in Ukraine during the wars of Khmelnytskyi is de Beauplan's description of the Ukrainian lands, the materials of which he collected during his stay in Ukraine. The book itself was published upon his return to France. The first edition of the description, published in Rouen in 1651, was entitled, *Description des Contrees du Royaume de Pologne, Contenves depuis les confins de la Moscouie, iusques aux limites de la Transilvanie*.

In the second edition, which appeared in 1660, the name of Ukraine has been added in the title of the book: *Description D'Ukraine, qui sont plusieurs Provinces du Royaume de Pologne. Contenves depuis les confins de la Moscouie, iusques aux limites de la Transilvanie*. This edition also contained a map of de Beauplan entitled, *Carte D'Ukraine contenant plusieurs Prouinces comprises entre les Confins de Moscouie et les limites de Transilvanie*.

In addition to these maps and descriptions of Ukraine, maps of the

5. See Leo Bagrow: *The first Maps of the Dnieper Cataracts*, *Imago Mundi*, X:92 and reproduction of Getkant's map on p. 91.

Ukrainian lands appeared in the 70's and 80's of the 17th century, published in Amsterdam by the Dutch publisher and cartographer Joannes Blaeu and incorporated into some editions of his *Atlas Maior*, which appeared in the Latin, Dutch, French and Spanish languages. These were 1) *Ukrainae pars quae Kiovia vulgo dicitur*; 2) *Ukrainae pars quae Pokutia vulgo dicitur*; 3) *Ukrainae pars quae Podolia vulgo dicitur* and 4) *Ukrainae pars quae Braclavia Palatinatus vulgo dicitur*.

On all these maps the provinces of Kyiv, Podolia (with the area of Bratslav), and Pokutia are marked distinctly as parts of Ukraine. These maps were subsequently reprinted or incorporated in *The English Atlas* of Moses Pitt as well as in the works of Jansson and Waesbergii, I. Ottens, Covens & Mortier, Homann, and others.

The book on the description of Ukraine published by de Beauplan in Rouen in 1660 evoked great interest in the contemporary world, especially in England. It was rapidly translated into English and published in the widely-known 6-volume collection of voyages and travels by the London booksellers, Awnsham Churchill (d. 1728) and John Churchill (fl. 1695). It appeared in print in three editions in 1704, 1732 and 1744, respectively, in London, under the title, *A Collection of Voyages and Travels*.

De Beauplan's description of Ukraine was added to the first volume of all these editions under the English title, *A Description of Ukraine, containing Several Provinces of the Kingdom of Poland, Lying between the Confines of Muscovy, and the Borders of Transylvania. Together with their Customs, Manner of Life, and how they manage their Wars. Written in French by the Sieur de Beauplan*.

De Beauplan's *Description of Ukraine* was published during the 17th and 18th centuries also in other languages. Thus a Latin translation was published under the title of *Descriptio Ucrainae* in a collection published in Warsaw in 1761 called: *Historiarum Poloniae et Lithuaniae scriptorum collectio magna* (Vol. II).

A German translation appeared in Breslau in 1780. It was entitled, *Beschreibung der Ukraine, der Krim und deren Einwohner. Aus dem Franzoesischen des Beauplan uebersetzt mit einen Anhang, der die Ukraine und die Budziakische Tatarey betrifft, herausgegeben von J. W. Moeller, Braslau, 1780*.

Subsequently a Polish translation appeared in a collection by J. U. Niemcewicz: *Zbiór Pamiętników historycznych o dawney Polsce*. Warsaw, 1822, Vol. III.

In the 19th century the work of de Beauplan appeared also in the Russian language. The name of Ukraine was always preserved in the title of the book: *Opysanie Ukrainy. Sochynenie Boplana. Perevod s franzeskago* (F. Ustrialov), St. Petersburg, 1832; *Opysanie Ukrainy Bop-*

lana, 1630-1648, translated by K. Melnyk in the collection of *Memuary odnosiashchiesia k istorii yuzhnoi Rusy*, Vyp. II, Kyiv 1896.

The cartographical works of de Beauplan, especially his general and special maps of Ukraine, had great impact upon the establishment and confirmation of the name "Ukraine", and in the works of Western European cartographers. Beginning in 1650, this name figured not only on maps of Poland and Muscovy, which at that time embraced larger or smaller parts of the Ukrainian lands, but there also appeared special maps of Ukraine as a distinct and separate geographical and political unity with the name of Ukraine at their heading.

The best evidence of this influence is a series of cartographical works executed by such known French cartographers as the Sanson family: Nicholas Sanson (1600-1667), his three sons: Nicholas (d. 1648), Guillaume (d. 1703) and Adrien (d. 1718), and grandson Pierre Moulard Sanson. On the maps of Poland and Muscovy prepared by this family which were published by Nicholas Sanson (Jr.), and which were incorporated after his death in 1648 into the *Atlas of Europe*, the name of Ukraine does not appear. But on the same maps of his father and his brothers that were published after 1660 the Ukrainian lands are designated as *Ukraine Pays de Cosaques*.

Moreover, through the efforts of the Sanson father and sons there appeared in 1665 and 1674 six separate maps of Ukraine and its various provinces:

1) *La Russie Noire ou Polonoise qui Comprend les Provinces de la Russie Noire de Volhynie et de Podolie divisées en leurs Palatinats Vulgairement Connues sous le Nom d'Ukraine ou Pays des Cosaques. Par les Sansons*, 1674;

2) *Russie Noire, divisee en ses Palatinats & c. tire pour la plus grande Partie de la grande Carte de l'Ukraine, du Sr. le Vasseur de Baeuplan. Par le Sr. Sanson d'Abbeville. A Paris*, 1665;

3) *Haute Volhynie, ou Palatinat de Lusac; tire de la Grande Carte d'Ukraine, du Sr. le Vasseur de Beauplan. Par le Sr. Sanson d'Abbeville... A Paris*, 1665;

4) *Basse Volhynie, ou Palatinat de Kiow, tire entierement de la grande Ukraine, de Sieur le Vasseur de Beauplan. Par le Sr. Sanson d'Abbeville... A Paris*, 1665;

5) *Haute Podolie, ou Palatinat de Kamieniec, tire entierem. de la Gr. Vkraine, du Sr. le Vasseur de Beauplan. Par le Sr. Sanson d'Abbeville... A Paris*, 1665, with inset: *Basse Partie de la Basse Podolie*;

6) *Basse podolie, ou Palatinat de Braclaw, tire de la Grande Ukraine. du Sr. le Vasseur de Beauplan. Par le Sr. Sanson d'Abbeville... A Paris*, 1665.

As we can see all these maps were based on the general and special maps of Ukraine by de Beauplan except that the Sanson publishers went farther than de Beauplan by including in the territorial range of Ukraine also Rus' and the whole of Volhynia.

This cartographical picture of Ukraine, firmly established by de Beauplan and the Sanson family, was maintained by subsequent Dutch, French, English, German, Italian, and other cartographers and publishers.

Along with these maps of wide popularity, the general map of Ukraine of de Beauplan was re-published by various Western European publishers under the name of *Typus Generalis Ucrainae sive Palatinatum Podoliae, Kioviensis et Braczlaviensis terras nova delineatione exhibens*. Such a map also was re-published, on the basis of the general map of Ukraine by de Beauplan of 1651, anonymously by Moses Pitt in his *The English Atlas*, in Oxford, in 1680-1682.

In addition, in the 17th and 18th centuries other maps bearing the name of and presenting Ukraine were published:

1) The one of the German cartographers, Johann Baptist Homann (1664-1724) published in two editions in Nürnberg around 1710 and 1720, and entitled, *Ukrainia, quae est Terra Cossacorum*;

2) Pierre van de Aa, a Leyden cartographer, in his 44th volume *Le Galerie Agreeable du Monde*, included a map of *Ukraine, Grand Pays de la Russe Rouge, Avec Une Partie de la Pologne, Moscovie, Bulgarie, Valachie, podolie et Volhynie*;

3) That of the Augsburg publisher of maps and atlases, Matthias Seutter (1678-1756), entitled: *Amplissima Ucrainae Regio, Palatinatus Kioviensem et Braclaviensem complectens, cum adjacentibus Provinciis*;

4) Conrad Tobias Lotter (1717-1777), son-in-law of Matthias Seutter, re-published Seutter's *Amplissima Ucrainae Regio* with the name of Ukraine printed across the top of the map;

5) The one, entitled, *Ukrainia seu Cosacorum Regio*, and prepared by Christoph Weigel (1654-1725) and his brother, Johann Christoph Weigel (d. 1746).

In the middle of the 17th century the Dutch publisher, Danckerus Danckerts, published a map by de Beauplan embracing the whole of the Polish Kingdom, that is the Polish lands proper plus Lithuania and Ukraine. It was printed on a folio and covered the territory from the south-eastern seashores of Sweden and the southern borders of Finland to the southern coast of the Crimea, and from the island of Rugia to Moscow. The full title of the map read: *Nova totius Regni poloniae, Magnique Ducatus Prussiae et Lithuaniae, cum suis Palatinatibus ac confiniis. Exacta delineatio par G. le Vasseur de Beauplan. . . Amster-*

dam apud Danckerum Danckerts. Although the name of Ukraine does not appear in the title of the map, the territory on both sides of the Dnieper River is designated as Ukraine.

Subsequently, the map of de Beauplan which was made in 1651 became the base of many other maps which appeared in a number of atlases or as separate maps. The map of Ukraine also appeared on a general map of the Polish Republic as, for example, the map published in 1679 by the Paris cartographer Nicholas Sanson, Sr. (1600-1667) and entitled, *Estats de la Couronne de pologne*. Its original title in the French language read: *Royaume de Pologne, Duches et Provinces de Prussie, Cuiavie, Mazovie, Russie noire & c. Duches de Lithuanie, Volhynie, Podolie & c., de l'Ukraine & c.*

Maps similar to that of the *Les Etats de la Couronne de Pologne* were published at the end of the 17th century by Frenchman Charles-Hubert-Alexis Jaillot (1640-1712). These also included all the north-central Ukrainian lands on both banks of the Dnieper River and Podolia, underscoring the fact that these provinces of Volhynia and Podolia embraced also Ukraine, or in French, "Les Provinces de Volhynie, et Podolie, ou est compris l'Ukraine ou Pays de Cosaques."

In the title of the map of the whole Polish state — "totius Regni Poloniae", published at the end of the 17th century on the basis of the Sanson family maps and which were printed by Nicholas Visscher (Jr.) [1649-1709], Ukraine is given as one of the principal parts of the Polish state, and is listed in Latin in the following order: Polonia, Ducatus Lithuania, Ukraina. The definition of Ukraine states that it comprised Volhynia and Podolia: "Ukraina & c. in qua Volhunia, et Podolia cum suis Palatinatibus ac Confiniis."

The same component parts of the Polish Crown are also enumerated in the map of Frederic de Wit(t) (1616-1698), son of Frederic de Wit(t) of Amsterdam, which read as follows: *Regni Poloniae et Ducatus Lithuaniae, Volinia, Podolie, Ucrainie, Prussiae, Livoniae et Cvrlandiae descriptio*...

In the 18th century we find that on the numerous maps of Poland published mostly by the French geographer and cartographer Guillaume De L'Isle (1675-1768), the Ukrainian territory is always marked as Ukraine, or in French "Ukraine ou Pays des Cosaques" (Ukraine or Country of the Cossacks).

All these examples attest to the fact that in the second half of the 17th and during the 18th century the concept of Ukraine as a separate ethnic unity had become firmly entrenched in Western European cartography. This treatment of Ukraine as a separate territory was also accepted in Russia-Muscovy during the era of Peter I and after. This can be deduced from the fact that a map of Poland made by Carel

Allardt (b. 1648), a Dutchman from Amsterdam, was reprinted on the order of Tsar Peter I by another Dutch engraver, Peter Picard (1670-1737), and published in Moscow with Russian inscriptions. On this map the name Oukraina embraces the vast Ukrainian territory on both banks of the Dnieper River. The name Russia Rubra, printed twice on this map, pertains only to Galicia (with the area of Belz and Kholm) and Volhynia. The state and lands of Peter I are designated on the map as "chast Moskovskoga Gosudarstva" (part of the Muscovite state). The name, "Ukraine," designating the Ukrainian national territory was marked on all plans of the Poltava battle in 1709 which were made on the order of Peter I and published in Moscow and abroad⁶.

Moreover, the name Ukraine was always properly used by the Petersburg Academy in the 18th century. In all the maps published by the Academy on the Russo-Turkish War of 1736-1738 and which subsequently were re-printed in the West, Left-Bank Ukraine was designated in German as "Ein Theil der Ukraine", or in French "Partie d'Ukraine". These maps of the Petersburg Academy with the name of Ukraine were used in all German, French and English editions of the memoirs of Christoph Hermann Manstein, a general in the service of the Russian army. The memoirs embraced the years 1727-1744. The book appeared in English in London in 1733 under the title of *Memoirs of Russia, Historical, Political and Military*.

At the end of the 18th century the name of Ukraine appeared on a modern map of Eastern Europe whose author was the most outstanding French cartographer of the 18th century, Jean Baptiste Bourguignon d'Anville (1697-1782). His map, published in Paris in 1760 and which later was re-published in London and elsewhere, was entitled, *Troisieme Partie de la Carte d'Europe*. The territory on both sides of the Dnieper River is distinctly designated as Ukraine: Krayn ou Ukraine; Galicia is given with the cities of Lviv, Belz and Kholm as Russie; Volhynia as Russie Polonoise, and Muscovy as Grande Russie.

Such designation of the Ukrainian territory and its delineation from Poland proper and Muscovy-Russia was widely adopted during the 18th century in memoirs, travels and other publications. An extensive bibliography on this subject, compiled by the late Ukrainian researcher, Elias Borschak, is entitled, *L'Ukraine dans la litterature de l'Europe Occidentale*, published in 1935 as a reprint from *Le Monde Slave*.

Among the works cited by Borschak worthy of mention is the book of the English traveller, Joseph Marshall: *Travels through Holland, Flanders. . . Russia, the Ukraine and Poland. In the years 1769 and 1770*

6. Cf. charts and plans in the article by L. A. Goldenberg, *Kartograficheskie Istochnyky XVIII v.* in the collection of Poltava, Moscow, 1959, pp. 363-388, in which there constantly appears the designation, "Poltawa in d'Ukraine," as well the plan of the Fer in 1714, entitled, *La Journee de Poltawa en Ukraine*, and others.

in which is particularly minuted the Present State of those Countries, which was published in London in three editions — 1763, 1764 and 1806, and once in Edinburgh in 1788; in a Dutch translation in Leyden in 1769, in two French editions in Paris (1768 and 1803) and in a German edition in 1787 in Hamburg. Significantly, the title of the *Travels* of Joseph Marshall differentiates the names of Russia, Ukraine and Poland as those designating separate countries.

Among other books at that time is that of a Hamburg doctor, Johann Wilhelm Moeller, who in 1780-1781 published his *Reise von Warschau nach der Ukraine im Jahre 1780 and 1781* (Herzberg am Harz, 1804).

But the most important document on the ethnic, cultural and political separateness of Ukraine was the appearance at the end of the 18th century of the first Western European history of Ukraine. Written by the well-known Vienna historian, Johann Christian von Engel (1770-1814), a German originally from Transylvania, it was entitled: *Geschichte der Ukraine und der Ukrainischen Kosaken* (History of Ukraine and the Ukrainian Kozaks). It was the 48th volume of the *Fortsetzung der Allgemeinen Welthistorie durch eine Gesellschaft von Gelehrten in Deutschland und England ausgefertigt* (General History of the World) — and was published in Halle by Johann Jacob Gebauer in 1706.

Its frontispiece is a portrait of Hetman Ivan Mazepa. A portrait of Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytskyi appears before the preface. This monumental history comprising 709 pages was divided into two parts: a) “Geschichte der Ukraine und der Ukrainischen Kosaken”, — covering the period 1320-1795, and b) “Geschichte von Galizien und Iodomerein” — embracing not only the history of Halych and Volodymyr, but also the history of Kyivan Rus', beginning in 980, that is, from the era of Prince Volodymyr the Great. Engel's history is the history of Ukraine as a separate state and country, populated by a distinct and separate people. A solid and reliable work, it had a powerful influence upon the development of Ukrainian historiography; the data it amassed constituted the basis for the works of Western European historians in the field of history of Eastern Europe and its peoples. All the works based on this history, which were published at the end of the 18th and throughout the 19th century, only confirmed the previous deductions and data on Ukraine in Western cartography.

In the preface of his book, *History of Ukraine and the Ukrainian Cossacks*, published in 1796, Engel wrote:

“Ukraine from the viewpoint of territory is equal to the Kingdom; it is a fertile land, liberally endowed by nature; it is a frontier wall between cultured Europe and uncivilised Asia, a pasture and a gateway to so many Asiatic hordes which have tried to invade Europe, and for this reason alone it merits much attention, especially in connection with new developments. Now Ukraine forms a considerable part of the Great

Russian Empire. But how did it come to be under Russia? How did it happen that these free, Spartan-like and independent Cossacks found themselves under the Muscovite yoke — these Cossacks who, as Boissy d'Anglas said, inflicted heavy defeats upon the Turks, Tartars and Poles?

How did it come about that the Cossacks instead of having their own hetmans as was assured them when they went under Russia, had governors imposed upon them and the Ukrainian lands? The history of the Cossacks also had a great influence upon the history of Poland, Sweden and Transylvania, especially in later times. Without them the splendour and the decline of Poland in our day could not be imagined. Without them one could not practically imagine the quarrels, so pregnant in their consequence, between Russia and Poland, and without taking them into consideration one could not understand the internal relations in Poland, as the attempts of Vladislaus IV to preserve one autocratic monarchistic head on a corpse with many cut-off heads of the aristocratic hydra. The successors of Charles Gustave and Charles XII might have ruled up to this day in Warsaw, Moscow and Petersburg, as was desired by Khmelnytskyi and the Cossacks of Mazepa. And perhaps Georg Rákoczy would have been a second Stefan Batory, had he not been stopped through the desertion of the Cossacks in his campaign of 1657. . . But from the political viewpoint the history of the Cossacks is instructive in itself. Ukraine, a granary and a pasture for hordes of Poles, a bastion against the Tartars and Russians, has been subjected to the yoke of the latter, has increased their power and lately is helping to completely destroy Poland. In presenting these events the history of the Cossacks could be a very interesting lecture. The energy of many peoples and individuals, which enchanted us in the historical events of the Greeks and Latins, has manifested itself on the battlefields of Bilhorod, Korsun and Zbarazh, as well as in the heroic undertakings of Khmelnytskyi and Mazepa. To shine in the way that the actions of the Greeks and Romans did, this history needs only such pens as those which masterfully and instructively described the collapse of the united Netherlands. . . ”

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In conclusion, the name Ukraine has been a part of the history of the Ukrainian people for at least three and a half centuries. To say as the U.S. State Department “experts” contend, that it was invented in the 19th century is to confess one’s lamentable ignorance of the history not only of Ukraine, but of all Europe as well.

News from Ukraine

OLENA ANTONIV-KRASIVSKY KILLED IN LVIV

We have just received information from Ukraine that Olena Antoniv-Krasivsky, wife of Zinoviyy Krasivsky, a Ukrainian political prisoner and poet, was killed in a road accident in Lviv, Western Ukraine, at about 10 p.m. on Sunday February 2, 1986. She was 48.



*Olena Antoniv-Krasivsky with
her son Taras Chornovil, 1980*

That night she was escorting a friend's daughter to a railway station in Lviv. After leaving the station she was going home in a taxi. On the way it was hit by a truck. In the commotion that followed, she was found dead. So far it has not been established whether her death was accidental or pre-arranged.

Olena Antoniv-Krasivsky was born in the village of Bibrka on November 17, 1937, into a nationally-conscious family which suffered constant repression. After graduating from the Lviv medical institute she worked as a doctor.

Shortly after her marriage to Zinoviyy Krasivsky he was arrested (March 12, 1980) and, without a trial, sent to Siberia to complete the term of his sentence from 1967, for his activity in the underground organisation the Ukrainian National Front.

In the autumn of 1982 Olena Antoniv-Krasivsky was compelled to go to Siberia, where her husband was serving a term of exile in the Tyumen region, after the appearance of a provocative article in the Lviv newspaper *Vilna Ukraina*, accusing her of the alleged misappropriation of money designated to help political prisoners in Ukraine. After Zinoviyy Krasivsky completed his term of exile, they both returned to Lviv in the autumn of 1985.

It should be borne in mind, however, that 4 days later Fr. Juozas Zdebskis a Lithuanian Catholic priest was also killed in a road accident. He was one

of the 5 priests who founded the Catholic Committee for the Defence of Believers' Rights in Lithuania, in 1978. He was consistently persecuted by the KGB. In November 1981, Fr. Bronius Laurinavicius, a member of the Lithuanian Helsinki Group, was pushed under a lorry by 4 unknown men in Vilnius, the capital of Lithuania, and died of his injuries.

Olena Antoniv-Krasivsky spent her life actively helping Ukrainian political prisoners and their families, for which she was persecuted for many years. Her work was certainly a thorn in the KGB's side and would have given them a very good motive to dispose of her. If so, then Olena Antoniv-Krasivsky would have been the KGB's fifth victim, after Oleksa Tykhyi, Yuriy Lytvyn, Valeriy Marchenko, and Vasyl Stus. Her funeral took place in Lviv on Thursday February 6, 1986.

CHRONICLE OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN UKRAINE

Number 9 (continued)

Extract from Report No. 12

Meeting of the local committee of the VTK of the LZTV¹

Agenda

1) The case of the controller of the VTK, comrade Kobryn V. A.

Subject: Everyone present listened to the report of the head of the local committee, comrade Zherdev. N. I., on the memorandum he had received from the chairman of the BTsK², comrade Bronnytskyi V.U., concerning the absence from work on 4.5.1975³ of comrade Kobryn, the controller of the VTK without a valid reason.

Discussion: Kobryn V. A., the controller of the VTK, refused to answer why he had been absent from work on 4.5.1975.

Zherdev N. I., head of the local committee, proposed that the factory committee of the LZTV should be asked to dismiss the controller of the VTK, Kobryn V. A., for his unexcused neglect of duty.

Los V. V., controller of the VTK: "It is my opinion that the easiest thing to do is to dismiss a person, but we have to re-educate him, to help him find the correct way in life".

Semko, acting chairman of the BTsK: "I condemn comrade Kobryn's behaviour and support the notion put forward by comrade Zherdev to dismiss

1. VTK — Department of Technical Management. LZTV — Lviv Television Factory.

2. BTsK — Office of Factory Floor Management.

3. 4.5.1975 was Easter Sunday. The Council of Ministers of the USSR had proclaimed this a working day. Kobryn did not turn up to work that day for religious reasons.

comrade Kobryn for his neglect of duty, so that others would not be tempted to act in a similar way”.

Decision: It was decided to ask the factory committee of the LZTV to dismiss the controller of the VTK, comrade Kobryn V. A., from the factory for his neglect of duty.

The decision was unanimously approved.

Head of the local committee: *Zherdev*

3.12.1975⁴

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Extract from Report No. 15

Meeting of the factory committee of the trade union of the LZTV, “Electron”, on May 23, 1975.

Subject: Examination of the case of comrade Kobryn V. A., the controller of the VTK.

The head of the local committee of the VTK, comrade Zherdev N. I., spoke on this issue. He informed the members of the factory committee that comrade Kobryn V. A. deliberately failed to come to work on May 4, 1975. The shift supervisor reported this to the chairman of the BTsK of the factory floor No. 6, comrade Bronnytskyi V. U., who in turn reported the incident to the chairman of the VTK of the factory, comrade Koriakin N. Ya. This issue was examined at the meeting of the local committee of the VTK during which it was decided to ask the factory committee of the trade union to employ certain measures to dismiss comrade Kobryn V. A. for his deliberate neglect of duty.

Discussion: *Comrade Bronnytskyi V. U., chairman of the BTsK of factory floor No. 6:* I know comrade Kobryn V. A., very well and I personally warned him that May 4 was a working day. But he did not come to work dismissing it with a joke.

Comrade Kobryn V. A.: According to the decision of the Council of Ministers in April 1974, May 4 was declared a working day, but that day's working hours were to be counted as part of the vacation. I don't know why Easter had been declared a working day this year. The administration knows that there are many religious believers at the factory, but yet, without consulting any of the workers, it declared May 4 a working day in order to dishearten the souls of the faithful. There were many unhappy Christians. For instance, on April 29 and 30 two shifts were sent home supposedly because there was a lack of necessary parts. As to what concerns me, I knew that all this had been done in order to make me work on Easter. I believe that the management could have revoked the declaration of the Council of Ministers and leave the 4th a free day. I could not act against my conscience and so I did not go to work.

4. This date appeared on the original document.

Comrade Malkin A. I., chairman of the personnel department (question): I would like to know whether you know the legislation on employment?

Comrade Kobryn V. A. (answer): I do know the legislation, but I also know that it is not for religious believers, and that the government is discriminating against Christians. I did not act against my faith, but the government does not do anything to meet the wishes of the faithful.

Comrade Rodych P. I.: I can see that he thoroughly understands everything. His work is clean. This is a political treatment of the issue. Basically he did not wish to contribute his mite to government matters.

Comrade Nerushev, legal adviser of the factory: I listened to your testimony with reserved patience. You are like someone from the Middle Ages, although you have finished technical school. What you are saying is anti-Soviet propaganda. People who violate Soviet laws by their activity are enemies of the people. It is not worth wasting government funds on such people. If you believe in God, then believe in Him, but don't conduct agitation. I propose that comrade Kobryn be dismissed from the factory for his deliberate neglect of duty.

Comrade Malkin A. I.: It is completely unclear to me as to where you became so saturated with anti-Sovietism. You're only 37 years old, and you were born under Soviet rule. We are following the right course and we do not tread the same path as you. You deliberately failed to turn up to work with the intention of disrupting a working day. I propose that comrade Kobryn V. A. be dismissed under Article 40-4 of the Legal Code of Employment (of the UkSSR).⁵

Comrade Poplavskiy A. A.: This is the first time I've heard of such agitation and I fully support the proposition to dismiss comrade Kobryn V. A. for his deliberate neglect of duty.

Comrade Melyk-Pashayeva N. M.: I tell you with an open conscience that the lathe workers of the factory were really unhappy when May 4 was declared a working day, but when the shift supervisor explained to them why this had been done, they understood and all came to work. It has been proposed that you should be dismissed for your neglect of duty, and really, if you will be unable to reconcile your religious beliefs with your work discipline, then you will, undoubtedly, have much unpleasantness in the future as well.

Comrade Smoktiy I. A., acting head of the factory committee: I listen to you and wonder how you came to think this way? I am poorly versed in religion, but I've heard that it doesn't forbid work. How can you explain your behaviour. You deliberately didn't come to work and we have to punish you. Comrades, members of the factory committee, I support the proposition to dismiss comrade Kobryn V. A. for his malicious neglect of duty under Article 40-4.

5. Equivalent to Article 33-4 of the Legal Code of Employment of the RSFSR.

Decision: A decision was made to allow the administration of the factory to dismiss the controller of the VTK, comrade Kobryn V. A., for his deliberate neglect of duty under article 40-4 of the Legal Code of Employment.

Head of the factory committee: *M. Hnus*

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Extract from Report No. 15

*Meeting of the factory committee of the LZTV's trade union
"Elektron" on May 23, 1975.*

Present: 15 members of the factory committee, the legal consultant of the factory, comrade Nerushev P. V., the chairman of the personnel department, comrade Malkin A. I., the head of the local committee of the VTK, comrade Zherdev N. I., the chairman of the BTsK of factory floor No. 6, comrade Bronnitskyi V., the shift supervisor of the VTK of factory floor No. 6, comrade Hataliak Ya.

Subject: The case of the controller of the VTK of factory floor No. 6, comrade Kobryn V. A., (statement by the head of the local committee of the VTK, comrade Zherdev N. I.).

Decision: To agree to the dismissal from the factory of the controller of the VTK, comrade Kobryn Vasyl Antonovych, for a deliberate neglect of duty without a serious reason under Article 40-4 of the Legal Code of Employment.

Head of the factory committee: *M. Hnus*
Conforms with the original document

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Copy

UkSSR, Lviv region,
Public prosecutor of the Zaliznytsia district,
30.6.1975,
No. 984, Lviv.

To citizen Kobryn Vasyl Antonovych,
Peremyshliany district,
village of Bibrka,
Lenin Street 66-1.

In reply to your complaint, I inform you that the office of the prosecutor of the Zaliznytsia district, city of Lviv, does not find any grounds for objecting to the order to dismiss you from work.

May 4, 1975, was declared a working day throughout the (Soviet) Union, and, therefore, it was a working day for you as well. By not coming to

work on 4.5.1975, on the grounds that there was a religious holiday on that day, you are guilty of the neglect of duty. According to Article 40-4 of the Legal Code of Employment the management has the right to dismiss people for individual instances of neglect of duty.

Because of these circumstances you have been dismissed from work legally, and for this reason your complaint has not been settled.

According to Article 231⁶ of the Legal Code of Employment disputes over reinstatement at work are examined by the people's courts.

Assistant Prosecutor
of the Zaliznytsia district
of the City of Lviv

Legal adviser

signed: *Korynevych*

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To The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.
From Kobryn Vasyl Antonovych,
Lviv region, Peremyshliany district,
village of Bibrka, Lenin Street 66-1.

STATEMENT

On May 28, 1975, the director of the Lviv Television Factory dismissed me from work, where I had worked without reserve for 6 years. Regardless of the fact that I often worked overtime, as well as on free days, I was thrown out of work for a single incident of failing to come to work on May 4, 1975. (The Christian festival of Easter fell on this day). Compulsory work for religious believers is a discrimination against one's conscience and also a violation of human rights. This is how I interpret Soviet law. Abusing his position, the director of the LZTV gave orders forbidding anyone to give me a copy of the instruction to dismiss me from work, so that I could not be able to send it to the people's court along with my complaint.

Circumstances of the issue: As soon as it was announced that May 4 and 11, 1975, had been declared working days, and that these days were to be counted as part of the vacation, the management of the factory and the leadership of the trade union, fully aware of the fact that the overwhelming majority of the workers at the factory were religious believers, immediately began a campaign to dispirit the conscience of those workers who adhered to religious beliefs. At the general meeting much was said about the fact that it was compulsory to work on Easter Sunday. The opportunity to frighten the religious workers with the threat of the most severe administrative measures for non-attendance at work was not missed even at the meetings dedicated to May 1. It is obvious from the circumstances that the manage-

6. Equivalent to Article 207 of the RSFSR Code.

ment of the factory, along with the trade union, were not getting ready for just any ordinary working day, but specifically for Easter Sunday, so that on that day — the day of the most important Christian festival — they could dispirit the conscience of the religious workers.

Thus, on April 30, the last two shifts in the part of the factory where products are finished off, a major section of the factory, which secures the required production levels, were sent home. In addition, the previous week another shift purposely did not work for a whole day. In this way an artificial lag in production was created in another part of the factory. As a result of this, on May 4 the whole lag (in production) fell on the shoulders of the workers of this particular factory floor (who had to make up for it). The director from the main factory arrived and that day, which was an important day for them, the employees had no work with an excessive workload. I understand that a hospital cannot function without doctors, that trams cannot run without drivers, that the postal system cannot operate without postmen, and even in such cases where there are variable schedules production cannot be halted. However, in our factory the whole campaign was conducted purely and simply in order to dispirit the conscience of the religious believers.

The way I see it, the management of the factory, as well as the trade union, have violated Soviet law, for a person who believes in God cannot act against his conscience and at the same time not wish to get into conflict with the management. Because I have previously been subjected to discrimination for my beliefs on more than one occasion, I felt that the wisest course of action for me (that day) was not to go to work. At the meetings of the factory committee I was slandered with all kinds of insulting words. Those present called me an "enemy of the Soviet authorities" and a "nationalist." They stated that I should be put on trial for not coming to work on Easter Sunday. All this was said by people who do not even know me, and whom I have never seen either. Making use of such fictitious evidence against me, these people succeeded in provoking others who were present at the meeting of the factory committee, into raising the question of my dismissal from the factory. Regardless of the fact that I had never previously violated work discipline, I was unjustly thrown out of work, where I had been working for 6 years. The director of the factory denied permission for me to receive a copy of the instruction authorising my dismissal in order to deprive me of the opportunity of lodging a complaint about the affair to the people's court. In addition, as can be seen from the reply to my complaint, which I had earlier sent to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, it appears that it is unjustified for me to complain about the matter mentioned below, because the main reason that I have been left without a means of existence is the fact that May 4 had been declared a day of work by the Council of Ministers. Instead of themselves making the appropriate decision, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR directed my statement to the office of the regional prosecutor. And, as I was being rushed

around "from Pilate to Herod", more than three months went by.⁷ I was born into the family of a poor peasant. I was 11 years old when my father joined the collective and we handed over all our possessions along with our land to the state in the hope that we could constantly be certain of secure employment. But my hopes did not come true. As I have no means of existence, I am compelled once again to address my statements to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and ask you to consider it and to help restore me at work.

Signed: *V. Kobryn*

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Bilynskiy Vasyl Ivanovych — Ukrainian Catholic priest. During the forced incorporation of the Greek-Catholic Church into the Russian Orthodox Church⁸, Bilynskiy refused to go over to the Russian Orthodox Church. For this he was accused of treason and sentenced to 10 years. He was released in 1958. Because he was unable to register at his former home, he was compelled to take up residence with his sister in the Mykolayiv region. He found work, most recently of all at the Lviv administration of dispensaries, from where he received a certificate proving that he picked medicine plants for them in the Lviv region. In 1974 he had already reached retirement age, but continued to work. In May of that year his passport expired. The KGB knew about this, as a result of which he was arrested in the village of Novi Strilyshcha, Lviv region, and locked up at the Zhydachiv department of the militia. There the sick 65 year-old priest was held for about 20 days, and was constantly provoked in every possible way. The prosecutor of the Zhydachiv district, Lubarskiy, the investigator, and the chief of the militia department came to his cell and said that he will be tried for a breach of passport regulations. Then they decided to provoke Bilynskiy into offering them a bribe. When Bilynski's friends arrived at the militia to find out why he had been arrested, the militiamen who were explaining the situation demanded a bribe for his release, of course without the knowledge of the chief of the militia department and prosecutor Lubarskiy. When the militia received the money, Bilynskiy was released. They bought him a ticket to the Mykolayiv region and put him on the train with great care under the escort of a militiaman. However, they had arranged in advance with the KGB of the Vesely-nove district of the Mykolayiv region that the latter would also demand a bribe from Bilynskiy, who, they said, would offer one.

I have explained the affair of the priest Bilynskiy in order to make use of a living example to show what kind of methods are practised by the KGB.

7. Refers to the Article of the Legal Code of Employment of the UkSSR which states that a complaint about dismissal from work can be made to the courts for a period of three months after the incident. Equivalent to Article 211 of the Legal Code of Employment of the RSFSR.

8. 1946.

Who could have foreseen the tragic outcome, which ended with 3 years of severe regime imprisonment for the Catholic priest. And secondly because Bilynskyi has no family I have taken it upon myself to be his nephew and to study the whole affair.

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SENTENCE

On behalf of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic

On October 31, 1974, the people's court of the Veselynove district, Mykolayiv region, composed of the following: President — People's judge Pastushenko, People's assessors Zhust and Yusypenko, Secretary Shcherbyn, Prosecutor Shevtsov, Attorney Forostyan, examined during an open session in the village of Veselynove, the case of the accused, Bilynskyi Vasyl Ivanovych, Ukrainian, born on 4.4.1909, native of the village of Rukomysh, Buchach district, Ternopil region, non-party member, secondary religious education, unmarried, without permanent work or residence, who had previously served a prison sentence.

Incriminatory resolution delivered. Under arrest since 9.8.1974.

Charged under Article 170-1 of the UkSSR Criminal Code.

Decision: In 1958 Bilynskyi V. I. was released from imprisonment. He arrived in the village of Pishchanyi Brid, Veselynove district, and registered at a permanent place of residence. However, he did not reside in Pishchanyi Brid, but went to Lviv region and travelled around various villages.

Because his passport expired, he came to Pishchanyi Brid in May 1974 and stopped with his relatives. He applied in writing for a new passport to the District Department of Internal Affairs (RVVS). Because his passport had expired a long time ago, and because Bilynskyi could not state his place of work and residence, on the instructions of the head of the Veselynove RVVS, an inquiry was held in order to establish the actual place of residence and employment of Bilynskyi, with a view to issuing him with a passport. Aware of this and fearing the discovery of incriminating evidence against him, he came to the passport section of the RVVS on 2.8.1974 and placed a bribe of 50 rubles wrapped in paper on the desk of the acting head of the passport section, Mavryshchuk, hoping that he would get a passport. Mavryshchuk ordered him to take back the money and escorted him out of his office. On 9.8.1974 Bilynskyi again came to see the acting head of the passport section and this time placed a bribe of 150 rubles wrapped in paper on his desk in the hope that he would receive a passport. Mavryshchuk asked witnesses, citizens who came for their passports, to come into his office, and also told the head of the RVVS. A report was written on this

incident. This was confirmed by the evidence given by the witness, Mavryshchuk, who stated that on 9.8.1974 Bilynskyi did in actual fact place on his desk 150 rubles wrapped in paper, and that he was compelled to call in witnesses. The witness, Strokyna O. V., had already confirmed during a previous investigation that when she entered the office of the chairman of the passport section, she unwrapped a package and counted the money which came to the total sum of 150 rubles.

The defendant Bilynskyi, did not plead guilty, alleging that Mavryshchuk had demanded the money from him and that he had brought it for him, and afterwards that Mavryshchuk had provoked him into this.

The court considers that the crime committed by Bilynskyi has been correctly classified under Article 170-1 of the UkSSr Criminal Code and proved to its fullest extent. In choosing a suitable sentence for Bilynskyi V. I., the court takes into account his age, as mitigating circumstances and believes it possible to pass a less harsh sentence on him. Basing itself on Articles 323 and 324 of the UkSSR Criminal Procedural Code the court has made the following decision:

Sentence: to find Bilynskyi Vasyl Ivanovych guilty under Article 170-1 of the UkSSR Criminal Code and to sentence him to 3 years of imprisonment in a strict regime corrective labour colony. The term of imprisonment is to be backdated to 9.8.1974. The accused is to remain under arrest. The material evidence — money in the sum of 150 rubles — is to be confiscated. The sentence may be appealed in the regional court for a period of 7 days.

People's judge signed: *Pastushenko*

People's assessors signed: *Zhust, Yusyenko*

Conforms with the original document: Official stamp

People's judge of the Veselynova district

Signed: *Pastushenko*

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To The Head of the Supreme
Court of the Ukrainian SSR.

From Kobryn Vasyl Ivanovych,
resident of Lviv region,
Peremyshliany district,
village of Bibrka,
Lenin Street 66-1.

Concerning my convicted uncle, Bilynskyi Vasyl Ivanovych,
who is serving a term of imprisonment
in the Dnipropetrovsk region, Sofiyivka district,
village of Makorty, Postal Code YaZ-308/45.

COMPLAINT

For Review

By the verdict of the people's court of the Veselynove district, Mykolayiv region, on October 31, 1974, Bilynskyi Vasyl Ivanovych, born in 1909, was found guilty of a crime under Article 170-1 of the UkSSR Criminal Code and sentenced to 3 years of imprisonment in a strict regimen corrective labour colony.

Bilynskyi V. I. was found guilty of placing a bribe of 150 rubles on the desk of the acting head of the passport section of the RVVS, Mavryshchuk, on 8.9.1974, for the renewal of his passport. Throughout the investigation and during the trial Bilynskyi did not plead guilty to offering a bribe to the acting head of the passport section, explaining that the latter had provoked him into this action.

Circumstances of the case: Since 1958, Bilynskyi V. I. lived with his relatives in the village of Pishchanyi Brid, Veselynove district, Mykolayiv region, and was constantly registered there.

Every summer Bilynskyi travelled to the Lviv region where, in accordance with an agreement with the Lviv administration of dispensaries, he picked medicinal plants for them from 1968 until the day of his arrest in 1974. This is confirmed by the certificate issued to Bilynskyi V. I. by the Lviv administration of dispensaries, by a receipt for plants which they had received from him, and by the agreement between Bilynskyi and the Lviv administration of dispensaries made in 1974.

In April 1974 Bilynskyi V. I. asked the Mykolayiv region to renew his passport. For this purpose Bilynskyi turned to the village council asking them to give him a certificate stating that he was registered and lived in the village of Pishchanyi Brid. The village council replied that the Veselynove RVVS had forbidden the issue of any certificates to him.

Acting above the law, the Veselynove RVVS of the Mykolayiv region deliberately delayed the renewal of Bilynskyi's passport compelling the sick old man to come and see them many times in order to put into practice his legal right to the renewal of his passport. The court verdict had stated that Bilynskyi's passport had expired a long time ago and that he was unable to state his place of employment and residence. Thus, on the instructions of the head of the Veselynove RVVS, an inquiry was held to establish the actual place of employment and residence of Bilynskyi, with the aim of issuing him with a passport, . . . "Fearing the discovery of incriminating evidence against him he came to the passport section of the RVVS on 2.8.1974 and placed a bribe of 50 rubles on Mavryshchuk's desk. Mavryshchuk escorted him out of the office."

The court verdict groundlessly stated that Bilynskyi did not have a permanent place of residence, although he was registered and lived in the village of Pishchanyi Brid. When he was arrested and searched a note from the Lviv administration with the agreement that in 1974 Bilynskyi was to pick medicinal plants for the administration was found on his person. However, this document was taken from him and was not produced as evidence during the trial. Also the Lviv administration of dispensaries was not asked to verify this fact. This bears witness to the fact that the Veselynove RVVS conducted the whole affair in such a way as to create a fabricated case against Bilynskyi. For this reason it provoked him into offering a bribe. The inquiry did not produce any incriminating evidence against Bilynskyi because he had not committed any crimes.

In the court verdict it was stated that Bilynskyi did not live in the village of Pishchanyi Brid, but went to the Lviv region and there travelled around various villages. Such conclusions reached by the court are not backed by any objective evidence and contradict the real facts behind the whole affair. As is clear from the enclosed documents: a certificate issued to Bilynskyi by the Lviv administration of dispensaries, and a receipt also issued to Bilynskyi by the Lviv administration of dispensaries for medical plants which they had received from him, he did not go around the various villages, as was stated in the verdict.

The Lviv administration of dispensaries had the legal right to make such an agreement with Bilynskyi, who lived in the village of Pishchanyi Brid in winter, and in summer went away to pick medicinal plants. If the Veselynove RVVS had made inquiries at the Lviv administration of dispensaries this would have been officially confirmed.

The prosecutor of the Zhydachiv district, Lviv region, comrade Lubarskyi, categorically forbade the head of the main dispensary of the Zhydachiv district, comrade Mudryk, and also the head of the dispensary in the village of Novi Strilyshcha, comrade Borysiuk, to issue any certificates to Bilynskyi concerning his agreement with the Lviv administration of dispensaries by which he was to supply them with medicinal plants.

It must also be noted that Mavryshchuk did not make an indictment on 2.8.1974 about the fact that Bilynskyi had offered him a bribe of 50 rubles, but threw him out of his office telling him to come and see him again at the RVVS on 9.8.1974, which gives the impression of a provocation to make Bilynskyi offer a bigger bribe. Witnesses were already waiting by Marashchuk's door for the arrival of Bilynskyi with the bribe which he had been provoked into bringing.

It is common knowledge that someone who offers another person a bribe is aware that in exchange for the material gain he provides he requires certain

services from the person in question that would in turn be advantageous to him. In this particular case what was the acting head of the passport section supposed to do? He was supposed to renew Bilynskiy's passport, something to which the latter had a legal right, and Mavryshchuk, as the person responsible, was obliged to renew the passport according to the law. The crux of the matter lies not with the issue of a new passport, but with the renewal of an already existing one.

On what basis and according to which law was the sick old man Bilynskiy rushed around by the Veselynove RVVS backwards and forwards many times between its own office and the village council, which had been ordered not to give him any certificates? Why did the Veselynove RVVS deliberately fail to make an inquiry at the Lviv administration of dispensaries in order to confirm that Bilynskiy really did pick medicinal plants for them? They acted in this way because these measures were unnecessary for their purposes. Such a certificate had already been taken from Bilynskiy and not produced as evidence during the trial.

All this shows that the Veselynove RVVS had acted above the law during its handling of the case of Bilynskiy, using illegal methods for carrying out the investigation. It was only interested in the negative outcome of the affair and therefore had conducted a one-sided and unfair examination of the case, failing to mention all those circumstances, which were of decisive significance for an objective examination.

Bilynskiy V. I. is 66. He is old and seriously ill. He is suffering from arteriosclerosis of the heart, contraction of the blood-vessels of the main part of the brain and loss of memory. He also has hypertonia and is a grade 2 invalid. Bilynskiy V. I. is of a reduced intellect, he is easily persuaded, and not highly literate. Irrespective of the fact that Bilynskiy did not plead guilty either during the investigation or during the trial itself, the defending attorney did not complain to the Mykolayiv regional court or inquire about the receipt of a certificate from the Lviv administration of dispensaries to confirm whether or not Bilynskiy really picked medical plants for them. For this reason the court did not have the grounds for alleging in the verdict that Bilynskiy lived in the Lviv region and travelled around various villages, as no objective evidence was presented as proof of this.

On the basis of the above-mentioned facts, and in connection with the one-sided examination of this case, I complained to the Mykolayiv regional court and to the Supreme Court of the UkSSR. However, they refused to review the case. I ask you to allocate time for the case of Bilynskiy to be retried and also to protest at the verdict of the Veselynove district court, which sentenced Bilynskiy V. I. on the basis of unverified evidence. The investigative organs conducted the case of Bilynskiy in total breach of Soviet law.

Enclosures: a copy of the verdict, documents which prove that Bilynskyi picked medicinal plants, a letter from the Mykolayiv regional court stating its refusal to review the case, and the refusal of members of the Supreme Court of the UkSSR to re-examine the case.

27 June, 1975

Signed: Kobryn

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In connection with the arrest on the night of November 11-12, 1984, of the chairman of the Initiative Group to Defend the Rights of Believers and the Church in Ukraine, Vasyl Kobryn, on November 14 searches were carried out in the homes of 2 other members of the Group, Josyp Terelya and Stefania Sichko, as well as in the homes of people who are not members of the Group. In the village of Tybara, Svaliava district, the home of the Catholic Mykhailo Smozhenyk was searched, and in the town of Svaliava itself, the home of Josyp Terelya's aunt, Maria Fales, was also searched. Smozhenyk M. was arrested for refusing a Soviet passport. Nothing is known about the trial of the secretary of the Group, Fr. Hryhoriy Budzinskyi. Fr. Hryhoriy was to have arrived in Transcarpathia to see Josyp Terelya, but was arrested on his way there and forcibly sent to the venereal section of the regional hospital for an alleged check-up. After that, when Terelya went around warning people about the mass arrests and repression of Ukrainian Catholics, Fr. Hryhoriy was released from the hospital on December 11. On December 12, his home was searched. The search was personally conducted by the regional prosecutor, Dorosh, and KGB men who did not reveal their names. Five ecclesiastical vestments, 5 oversleeves, 2 chasubles, 2 crosses, a Bible and a catechism from 1905, a missal, a book by V. Soloviov entitled *The Orthodox Church and Catholicism*, *My Saviour*, 2 poems by Josyf Terelya — *The Suffering of Jesus* and *The Return of Jesus* — some little crosses, a rosary, 2 icons painted by Josyp Terelya, who had given them to Fr. Hryhoriy on his birthday, an icon of the Ascension of the Virgin Mary, and a savings book, along with his pension worth 6000 karbovantsi, which he had been saving for 20 years, were all confiscated. This was not the first time that the communists had robbed the Christian faithful and their pastors. For in the Soviet Union the citizens' possessions can be plundered by the militia or the KGB at any time. Fr. Hryhoriy was released from the "hospital" in a critically ill state. He is 82 years old.

REPRESSED UKRAINIANS IN THE USSR

(Continued from *"The Ukrainian Review"*, No. 1, 1986)

625) TSELIUK Semen. Participated in the liberation struggle of the OUN-UPA for which he spent 9 years in prison. Arrested again in 1970 and sentenced to 15 years of imprisonment.

626) TSEMOK Semen. Arrested for nationalist activity and sentenced to 15 years of imprisonment in 1964 under Article 56 of the Criminal Code of the UkSSR.

627) TSYTSYK Ivan. Student of the mechanical engineering faculty of the Lviv Polytechnic. In 1975 he was expelled from the institute for writing nationalist poetry. He is persecuted for this to this day.

628) TSYTSYK R. Born in Chervonohrad in the Kharkiv region. In 1973 he was sentenced to 3 years of imprisonment for political matters.

629) TURAZH Andriy. Born in 1927. Arrested in 1950 and sentenced to 25 years of labour camps for membership of the OUN under Article 58-1 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR (treason).

630) TURYK Andriy M. Born on 14.10.1927 in the village of Birky in Volyn. Participated in the liberation struggle of the OUN-UPA. In 1957 he was sentenced to 25 years of imprisonment under Article 56 of the Criminal Code of the UkSSR. Due to have been released in 1983. Died in 1980.

631) TYKHYI. Sentenced in Kyiv in 1960 to 10 years of imprisonment for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda."

632) TYKHYI Oleksiy I. Born on 31.1.1927. Completed higher education in pedagogy. Worked as a teacher. Arrested for the first time in 1957 and sentenced to 7 years of imprisonment for demanding that the number of Ukrainian schools in the area of Donbas be increased. Arrested again on February 4, 1977, and sentenced by the Donetsk regional court to 10 years of imprisonment and 5 years of exile on July 1, 1977. He was put on trial because he was a member of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group and for writing a book on the problem of Ukrainian national and cultural schooling. Oleksiy Tykhyi died on May 6, 1984, in a Soviet Russian labour camp as a result of deliberate mistreatment by the camp authorities and deprivation of medicines and medical treatment.

633) TYMKIV Bohdan I. Born in 1935 in the Ivano-Frankivsk region. Student of the Lviv Forestry Institute. Sentenced to 10 years of imprisonment for membership of the underground group the "United Party for the Libe-

ration of Ukraine" under Articles 54-1a and 54-2 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR.

634) TYSHCHENKO Vitaliy I. Born in 1941 in the Kharkiv region. Arrested in 1975 and accused of setting up an underground printing press and of preparing and publishing underground literature. The term of his sentence is unknown.

635) TYSHKIVSKYI Stepan. Born in 1914. In 1952 he was sentenced in Ivano-Frankivsk to 25 years of labour camps for participation in the liberation struggle of the OUN-UPA under Article 56 of the Criminal Code of the UkSSR.

636) TYSIACHUK Oleksander. Member of the Evangelicals Christians-Baptists. Arrested and sentenced to two and a half years of imprisonment in 1974. Accused of religious activity.

637) UDOVYCHENKO Volodymyr. Student of the faculty of philology at Lviv University. Expelled from the university in 1973 for membership of a semi-legal group which published the journal *Postup* (Progress) and various leaflets, and acted in defence of the Ukrainian language and culture.

638) UTASIUK. Arrested at the end of 1972 for political reasons and sentenced to an unknown term of imprisonment.

639) VASYLENKO Bohdan. A young man from the town of Bolekhiv. Arrested in 1974 and sentenced in Ivano-Frankivsk to long-term imprisonment for spreading underground literature.

640) VASYLYK Korniylo Maksymovych. Professional labourer. In his spare time he preached the faith of God for which he was sentenced in Lviv in 1973 to a long term of imprisonment.

641) VASYLYK Volodymyr. Born in 1930 in the Ivano-Frankivsk region. Arrested in December 1967 and sentenced to 12 years of imprisonment for organising the religious believers in the village of Tysmenytsi, Ivano-Frankivsk region, to prevent the Russians from destroying the ancient church in their village.

642) VEDUTA Bohdan. Born in 1946. Arrested for political reasons in 1967 and sentenced to 15 years of imprisonment in a labour camp under Article 64 of the UkSSR Criminal Code.

(To be continued)

Documents and reports

A VICTIM'S ACCOUNT OF HIS INTERNMENT IN DNIPROPETROVSK SPH*

Josyp Mykhailovych Terelya (b. 1943) was interned in Dnipropetrovsk SPH from 1977 to 1980, after he had been arrested for human rights activity and the circulation of a number of his works, including some poetry and an account of his experiences during an earlier internment in Sychyovska SPH, in Samvydav. He had first been arrested on a political charge in 1967, when he was serving a term in camp, and was sentenced to an additional 8 years for Ukrainian nationalist activity. From 1969 he was held in Vladimir Prison, where he was charged again with anti-Soviet agitation (Article 70 of the RSFSR Criminal Code), ruled not responsible, and in 1972 sent to Sychovka SPH. Transferred to Chelyabinsk OPH** in 1975, he was released in April 1976, and was ruled fit for army service. He took a job as a joiner, but was briefly interned again in November 1976, as being "socially dangerous", before his arrest in 1977 and internment in Dnipropetrovsk SPH; extracts from his account of this internment, which has recently become available in the West, are given below.

Following his release from Dnipropetrovsk SPH in 1980, Terelya continued to be active in the defence of human rights; in 1985, having been ruled responsible, he was sentenced to 7 years of strict regime camps and 5 years of exile, for forming a Committee for the Legalisation of the Ukrainian Catholic Church.

Josyp Terelya was arrested on April 28, 1977, outside his home in Svalyava, in the Transcarpathian Region. Iryna Teodorovna Romanovych, chief doctor at the Regional OPH wrote a report stating that his condition had deteriorated and that he was aggressive; this report, says Terelya, was written on the instructions of the KGB. Roman Josyfovych Bondar, head of men's ward No. 2, told him: "Josyp Mykhailovych, I have been ordered by the KGB not to let you out for a walk, to watch who you talk to and who visits you. . ."

"I was held for four months in Uzhhorod Regional Prison (AZ 308/180), director I.M. Kovalchuk. During this time, no special prison i.e. Special Psychiatric Hospital would agree to accept me, on the grounds that I had not committed a crime. So the officers of the Transcarpathian KGB concocted an

* Special Psychiatric Hospital.

** Ordinary Psychiatric Hospital.

'investigation case' and on September 2, 1977, I was taken to Dnipropetrovsk Prison. A few hours later I was transferred to the special prison, the director of which is Colonel Babenko. I was stripped naked, given a crude hair cut, thrown a dirty pair of underpants and something resembling a shirt and hurried off to the prison block. I found myself in Ward 3, presided over by Senior Lieutenant and communist Nelya Mykhailovna Butkevych. . .

Through 1978 I was subjected to all sorts of humiliations, drugs and terror by the Operations Section, in the person of its Head and his assistant, Lieutenant Verbitsky. I spent my entire three years at the hospital in solitary confinement, in Cell No. 21. All mention of my name, which did not appear in any of the hospital lists, was prohibited. . .

It is important to remember that the doctors in special prisons carry out investigations and immediately inform the KGB if they succeed in wresting anything from their victims. Having summoned me for routine interrogation, Butkevych cynically announced that I could now complain to Almighty God, to which I replied that I had never complained, but that I would try to remember everything. She then said: 'Do you seriously think you will get out of here? Perhaps you want us to appear before an international tribunal? We constitute our own tribunal. You are a sick man, Terelya; the very fact that you call yourself a Christian is an illness, a serious, incurable illness and we will continue to treat you until you rid yourself of this delusion'. I said that there were many Christians, not only in our country, but abroad — even presidents. She replied that they would get around to the rotten West, too, 'We'll cure them all!'. . .

I have never contravened Soviet law — I have simply demanded that the rights guaranteed by the Constitution be respected: freedom of conscience, the right to self-determination, the right to national self-government.

I was forbidden to write or to draw, or to possess even the stub of a pencil. When one was found during a routine search, Butkevych immediately prescribed drugs, I was subjected to threats and repressions. Nevertheless, I am grateful to those MVD officials who provided me with paper, pencils and information about the situation in the prison and outside".

Terelya recounts the circumstances surrounding the deaths of two patients interned on political charges, Nikolay Sorokin, and Valery Zaks; Sorokin died of kidney failure brought on by massive doses of psychotropic drugs; he was refused any treatment for this, and the other patients were not even allowed to give him water as he lay dying. Zaks, a Jew who tried to hi-jack a plane after repeated requests for permission to emigrate to Israel were refused, fell to his death after being sent to work on a construction site within the SPH, although he was being subjected to intensive drug treatment. He also tells of the death of another patient, named Sereda, who was beaten to death by the orderlies after he had complained to Dr. Butkevych that

the orderlies were robbing the patients, and Butkevych had instructed the head orderly to "teach him a lesson".

Towards the end of his internment (he believes following the protests about his imprisonment in the West), Terelya was treated a little less harshly. He was still kept on his own in cell 21, but he was no longer locked in and was left to go around the hospital. Lieutenant-Colonel Kapustin of the Dnipropetrovsk City KGB and Colonel Babenko, the director of the SPH, told him that he would soon be released unconditionally, but warned him that "If you end up here again, you won't get out. You belong in a special regime camp". His release was delayed until after the Moscow Olympics (many activists and dissenters were detained in psychiatric hospitals during the Olympics).

Terelya gives an account of an interrogation which took place during the latter stages of his internment; he was injected intravenously with 10cc of caffeine and barmil at the start of the interrogation. Terelya deliberately uses the tactic (recommended in 1974 by Vladimir Bukovsky and Dr. Semyon Gluzman in their *Manual on Psychiatry for Dissenters*) of pretending to have been mentally ill, but to have been cured by the ministrations of the doctors. This tactic, as is clear in the following extracts, irritates and confuses the doctors, who are concerned only with finding out if he intends to continue his activities as a dissident on his release.

Those interrogating Terelya were Senior Lieutenant Nela Mykhailovna Butkevych, the doctor in charge of his ward, the SPH director, Colonel Babenko, and Lieutenant-Colonel Kapustin of the City KGB.

Butkevych: Do you realise that your situation is hopeless? the West won't help you.

Terelya: I put my trust in Soviet doctors. When they have cured me, all my problems will be over.

Butkevych: (irritably): Keep to the point.

Terelya: But I don't live in the West.

Babenko: Tell us, if they let you go, what will you do when you get home?

Terelya: Live and work.

Kapustin: What do you mean: live and work?

Terelya: I have a wife and daughter; I will live and work for them.

Babenko: May we understand by this that you do not intend to engage in anti-state activities?

Terelya: How can a sick person engage in any sort of activities?

Butkevych: Answer the question. Are you taking it upon yourself to say that you are ill? That's what doctors are for.

Terelya: But I have been declared mentally ill by leading Soviet psychiatrists, such as D.P. Lunts, Professor M.F. Taltse and. . .

Babenko: We know about that from your case file. We are asking you for your own opinion.

Terelya: I agree with the leading Soviet psychiatrists.

Butkevych: That's no answer. We obviously haven't treated you enough...

Terelya: Then why did you give me caffeine and barbamil — we could have talked just as well without it.

Butkevych: We do it for everybody. You are no exception. However, all the patients say they are well, whereas you say you are ill.

Terelya: I say that I was ill and now, thanks to you, my health has improved.

Kapustin: You're not ill at all, Terelya and you understand everything perfectly; you won't be getting any more parcels or good food: you'll go where your colleague Zinoviy [a political prisoner] went, you're both simulators.

Terelya: You have forgotten my other friend, Yury Belov [held as a political prisoner in SPH, for many years; he emigrated from the USSR in 1979].

Kapustin: Belov is a recidivist. And it would be good for you if you did not reply to his letters or receive parcels from him.

Terelya: They never tell me who the parcels and money are from and I never sign for them. They give them to me and I eat.

Kapustin: There is a parcel for you from Belov, so you can refuse to accept it.

Babenko: I beg your pardon, comrade Lieutenant-Colonel: the parcel is from Grivnina, the books from Belov.

Kapustin: Oh yes! But why the Muscovites sending you parcels and money? Why don't they send me any?

Terelya: I don't know any of the people who send me parcels, but I think they must all be good people. If they knew that you were in need, they would help you, too. . .

Babenko: Josyp Mykhailovych, you said that you are not political, but a Christian — what do you mean by that?

Terelya: I have never been interested in politics, I have always reached out for love, for God.

Babenko: But faith in God is also politics; that's what the capitalists base their aggressive international policies on.

Butkevych: Faith in God is absurd. People who believe in God are ill. It's called mass psychosis in medical literature.

Terelya: But there are over a milliard Christians.

Butkevych: Oh, leave out the statistics. Christianity is a form of schizophrenia.

Terelya: I didn't know that. I haven't read it anywhere.

Butkevych: But you don't read specialist literature.

Terelya: True, I don't read "special" literature. . .

Babenko: What do you think of the entry of our forces into Afghanistan?

Terelya: The same as our doctors.

Butkevych: Don't be sarcastic. You are obliged to answer all the questions put to you; your answers will determine what happens to you.

Terelya: I think that more troops should be sent in.

Kapustin: Why do you think that?

Terelya: It's more difficult to wage war in a mountainous region.

Kapustin: We are not waging war. We are just present.

Terelya: In that case, it will go on for a long time.

Butkevych: What would you say about Sakharov?

Terelya: I don't know him personally.

Butkevych: We know differently. Did you know that Sakharov receives money from the CIA and uses it to undermine our state?

Terelya: I didn't know anything about it.

Butkevych: Do you believe the Soviet press?

Terelya: Of course, I'm not ill.

Butkevych: There's no need to be sarcastic — Sakharov is an enemy. And don't think that we're afraid to send him where we sent you: the authorities are simply waiting for him to change his mind.

Terelya: Andrey Dmitrevich is an academician, he's always thinking. I only completed ten classes at school.

Butkevych: Did you know that the majority of academicians are schizophrenics? Only they don't disturb the peace and quiet of other citizens, so there is no need to put them in psychiatric hospitals.

Terelya: I didn't know that. . .

Kapustin: Now, remember this: this time, we will let you out, but if you start consorting with priests and old men again, you have only yourself to blame!

Terelya: There's no need to frighten me. I understand perfectly, citizen director.

Kapustin: Yes, we're frightening you. Do you think we should make a fuss of you? If Stalin was still alive, you'd sing a different song. Nowadays there is all this weak shilly-shallying. . .

Kapustin: What do you know about the Ukrainian National Front?

Terelya: Absolutely nothing.

Kapustin: But your friend Krasivskyi is a member of it.

Terelya: I am not political.

Kapustin: All right, but you are also in favour of an independent Ukraine?

Terelya: I thought it was independent.

Kapustin: Generally speaking, it is, but you want it to secede from Russia.

Terelya: I beg your pardon, but all the republics are independent within the Soviet Union, so that Russia is Russia and Ukraine is Ukraine.

Kapustin: Well all right, but what do you personally think about the secession of Ukraine from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics?

Terelya: The Ukraine is not ready for it.

Kapustin: Why — but times, or the wrong conditions?

Terelya: Things are all right as they are. At the moment we don't need a visa to travel to Moscow.

Kapustin: You see, so what if you wrote in your own words that you are against secession from the Union?

Terelya: To whom shall I write it?

Kapustin: Just generally, to the public.

Terelya: I'm not a journalist and I write badly.

Kapustin: Someone will help you. So how about it?

Terelya: I'll think about it.

Babenko: Josyp Mykhailovych, how do you maintain contact with the world outside?

Terelya: Through my wife.

Butkevych: We have different information.

Babenko: Do you seriously think they've got enough problems of their own?

Terelya: I put my trust in God.

Butkevych: Empty words. Do you seriously think that God will help you?

Terelya: I'm convinced of it.

Butkevych: I can see that you have not been cured.

Kapustin: Tell us, Terelya, — Sakharov spoke up in your defence in 1978. How did he to know about you?

Terelya: My friends told his friends; I think that is how Sakharov knew of our plight.

Kapustin: Who exactly are your friends?

Terelya: Rudenko, Grigorenko, Berdnyk and all those who are in prisons and camps, but since I've been in prison, I've lost track of who that is.

Babenko: All right, but what do you have in common with these Jew boys; who attracted you to them?

Terelya: All those mentioned are Ukrainians.

Babenko: I did not mean them, although. . . I mean those people who keep in with Sakharov.

Terelya: I have not met Sakharov, so I can't comment.

Kapustin: Did you know that your wife sent a message to the West saying that you, a healthy man, are being detained in a special psychiatric hospital?

Terelya: My wife is also a Soviet doctor and she has her own opinion.

Butkevych: So you will tell her that you are ill.

Terelya: She does not believe me.

Babenko: She's making things difficult for us. If no fuss had been made about you, you would have been at home long ago.

Terelya: Who made a fuss?

Kapustin: The people who pretend to be your friends. We have reliable information that Sakharov and his cronies were using your illness as a means of undermining the Soviet state.

Terelya: How can one person's illness undermine such a powerful state? That's absurd.

Kapustin: It's true. And anyway, you were used by the Zionists for their own ends.

Terelya: I don't know any Zionists.

Kapustin: It's true. But they use hidden agents such as Sakharov, Rudenko, Orlov and the like.

Terelya: I don't understand that.

Kapustin: It's true. It's difficult for an ordinary man to understand. You must, therefore, follow the national press and, most important, have a proper understanding of what real life is like. We don't wish you any harm. Our aim is to help you break away from these pitiful little people.

Butkevych: We must be sure that you won't end up here again. Also, comrade Lieutenant-Colonel is right when he says that special hospitals can't help you — you belong in a special regime camp. You have a wife and daughter and you live for them, so why get involved in various nasty affairs? Remember, we are better friends than all those you call your friends. We really don't wish you any harm. What the Sakharov lot want is a lot of noise and the disruption of peace in our country.

Terelya: Then why am I forbidden to write or draw?

Butkevych: That's irrelevant now. When you start writing poetry, you have a relapse and we cannot allow that to happen. And you don't need to do it in future. Even poems about flowers. . .

Kapustin: So how about it? Will you write for us that you denounce the actions of the Helsinki group? No one will get to know about it. . .

Terelya: Then what is the point of writing it?

Kapustin: We will publish it if you wish.

Terelya: I cannot write anything, since I don't know anything at all about it. Besides, it might be interpreted as part of my illness.

Butkevych: You are completely well, otherwise there would be no question of your discharge. Besides, you are not one of those patients who is not responsible for their actions.

Terelya: I don't want to get involved in politics, it's not one of my hobbies. . .

Babenko: So you have shown your true colours. It's a pity, we've been so open with you.

Kapustin: Sakharov is dearer to him, he'd write for him.

Butkevych: Perhaps he needs a bit more treatment. We obviously need to reinforce the treatment.

Terelya: Something else worries me. How will I get a job once I am free? No one will employ me with a certificate from a psychiatric hospital.

Kapustin: Don't worry about that. We will get in touch with the comrades in Uzhhorod and everything will be all right.

Babenko: Have a rest. There's always time to work. The most important thing for you to do is to acquire a true understanding of Soviet reality.

A NEW PUBLICATION ON THE MILLENNIUM OF
CHRISTIANITY IN UKRAINE

**WAS IT REALLY RUSSIA THAT WAS
CHRISTIANISED IN 988?**

**By His Beatitude Myroslav Ivan
Cardinal Lubachivsky**

Basing himself on both Ukrainian and Russian historiography, the author points out the distinct origins of the Ukrainian and Russian nations and describes the historic process by which Christianity was officially adopted as the state religion of Kyivan-Rus' in 988. The Cardinal argues very convincingly that the true descendants of Rus' are the Ukrainian people and the Ukrainian Church, with its many denominations, and not the Russians and the Russian Orthodox Church, and that in two years time it is the Ukrainians who will be celebrating the 1000 years of Christianity in Ukraine. He also explains why the Russian Orthodox Church and the Soviet Russian authorities are trying so hard to convince the world that 1988 will see the alleged millennium of Christianity in Russia.

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DECLARATIONS OF YURIY BADZIO

Declarations addressed to the presidium of the USSR and the UkSSR Supreme Soviets have reached the West via samizdat channels from the Ukrainian political prisoner Yuriy Badzio, the well-known historian and researcher. The most recent declaration dated January 1983 relates to the honouring of the Ukrainian victims of the 1933 famine. The other declarations from 1982 and 1983 relate to the nationalities issue in the USSR.

A similar declaration about the famine of 1933 was also sent to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet by Vasyl Striltsiv, a member of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group, who is serving his sentence with Yuriy Badzio in a Mordovian concentration camp in the village of Barashevo.

On the May 8, 1983, Y. Badzio and V. Striltsiv went on a one day hunger strike in honour of the victims of the famine of 1933.

With the declarations that reached the West came more detailed information about the member of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group V. Striltsiv. Just before his release in October 1981 he was rearrested in a concentration camp in the Poltava region of Ukraine and in April 1982 accused of "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda" and sentenced to 6 years of imprisonment. Since then there has been no news about V. Striltsiv. It has only recently become known that he is imprisoned in a concentration camp in the village of Barashevo in the Mordovian ASSR.

Y. Badzio, who is the author of the declarations, was arrested on April 23, 1979, and sentenced on 22 December of that year to 7 years of imprisonment and 5 years of exile. He was charged with being the author of the great work *The Right to Live*.

Below are the texts of Yuriy Badzio's declarations relating to: the honouring of the victims of the famine of 1933; to the fact that the USSR is not a unified state; to the suppression of political freedom and human rights in the USSR; and to the inequality of the Ukrainian nation within the USSR.

Taras Kuzio

*

THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES BEAR FULL POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE FAMINE IN UKRAINE

To the Chairman of the Presidium
of the UkSSR Supreme Soviet,
Oleksiy Fedosiievych Vatchenko.

DECLARATION

Taking into account the official attitude that has existed up to this day to the event given below, I consider it my duty as a citizen to remind you and through you the whole of the republic's political leadership that the spring of this year will mark half a century since our people went through

the most dreadful tragedy in their modern history — the famine of 1933. There is a conviction that as a result of the famine 6–8 million Ukrainians perished. I say “there is a conviction”, because there is no information about this in Soviet literature. Moreover, in our social life this important historical event has been surrounded by a stony silence for half a century; there is a political taboo attached to it. To forget those who perished innocently, to destroy the memory of what happened among the people and to extract whole pages from the history of life of the nation is the height of immorality and monstrosity.

Without doubt the famine of 1933 has a distinct political tint attached to it, and this is precisely why the authorities cannot keep silent. If, however they do so, then they must accept full political responsibility for the events. Let us point out that political logic is not formally an obstacle to “de-mystifying” the famine of 1933, because the culprit of the tragedy — Stalinism, has been officially condemned.

I call on the Presidium of the UkSSR Supreme Soviet to undertake at long last the moral duty of honouring for the first time in half a century the memory of millions of innocent people who perished tragically. I propose that a resolution be passed on a state level. In the spring, for example in March, an all-Ukrainian Grievance Evening could be organised in memory of the sacrifices of the famine; one day in the month, for instance the third Sunday of March, could be proclaimed National Grievance Day and it could be marked every year; a memorial could be erected in the village that suffered the most from the famine; to guarantee academic research of the event which would also be worthy of artistic inspiration on a high level. The public honouring of the tragedy of 1933 would not be an expression of moral feeling, it would also be an expression of political intellect. It would mean that the present leadership of the Republic distance itself from the policies of Stalinism and bears responsibility before the Ukrainian nation for its historical memory and is also responsible for the firm stability of the future.

Yuriy Vasylovych Badzio
Mordovia P/camp 22 Jan 1983

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THE USSR IS NOT A UNIFIED STATE

To the Presidium of the USSR
Supreme Soviet from citizen
Y.V. Badzio

I would like to direct the state authority's most vigilant attention to the very coarse political mistake made by the CPSU General Secretary and member of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Y. V. Andropov in a speech during the USSR's 60th year celebrations. I am referring to his phrase in which he says that the USSR is a “unified state”, and by saying this

directly and unambiguously denies the federal nature of the Soviet Union and admits a clear contradiction with the constitution of the USSR and with the constitutions of the republics. The phrase "unified state" is not a literary word which may be used freely, but is a generally understood legal term. It denotes a state, represented by a single unified and indivisible subject of political and legal relations. The term "unified state" is known in science as a "unitary state". It is simply a foreign expression with the same meaning. The Soviet Union, at least formally, is a "unitary state" and is not unified, but is a federal state, composed of union republics which have the status of separate state units of sovereign states. Even present day Russia, cannot be called a "unified state": it is also a federal republic. The formula "unified state" when applied to the USSR is deeply offensive to the nations of the Soviet Union if one is only to talk about the moral side of the issue, primarily because of the generally understandable reasons of the non-Russian nations that accept the term as a concept which deprives them of their own national statehood. The phrase "unified state" cannot mean anything else!

To tell the truth, the construction of the USSR defines the Soviet Union as a "united union republic". This formula has become widely used. However in principle it is incorrect. It is logically and politically disputable. A state cannot be united and a union at the same time, that is indivisible and divisible.

The sciences possess distinct terminology to describe the nature of a state i.e. its structure: a unified (unitary) state, federation and confederation. History is familiar with some other forms of political union of peoples. According to form and intention the USSR is a federal state.

The definition of "union" has only a specific significance. It is deprived of any terminological meaning: a confederation for example can also be called a state union.

In my letter which I sent to one of the central Soviet press organs during the discussion concerning the drafting of the USSR constitution I pointed out the scientific and political unsuitability of the constitutional formula "unified state union". Unfortunately the constitutional commission did not accept my remarks and a very dangerous Trojan Horse of great Russian state chauvinism was released into the political-legal ideology of national relations of the peoples of the USSR.

Of course, at the moment, there has been a desire to throw off this deceptive cover as defined by the form "union" and to enter the world with the true ideological form.

During the celebrations marking the 60th anniversary of the formation of the USSR and in the official greetings on that occasion, representatives of a whole string of communist parties and parties analogous to them, in particular the parties of Poland, NDR, Mongolia, Afghanistan, Madagascar, India, Nicaragua, DDR, Ireland, Guinea, Luxemburg, San Marino and Iraq called

the Soviet Union a "unified state". This fact is both striking and troubling in all cases and especially if it means irresponsibly following a bad example: it reflects the level of knowledge or the national-political awareness of the above mentioned foreign political representatives, in particular of the statesmen. This is more so when it concerns parties of friendly states.

I hope that this declaration of mine will reach the addressee and that it will be treated with due political responsibility.

7 January 1983

Badzio Y. V.

Address: Mordovia, Barashevo

*

CONCERNING POLITICAL FREEDOM AND HUMAN RIGHTS

To the Presidium of the USSR
Supreme Soviet from Y. V. Badzio,
a prisoner of conscience.

DECLARATION

The principle of political freedom, which is also proclaimed by the constitution of the USSR, logically and historically means nothing more than freedom from the state authority, the right and possibility to go against government policy and the social system itself, naturally and in accordance with the democratic forms as defined by the law, which was accepted democratically and which guarantees democratic conditions of existence, i.e. the possibility to assess oneself critically. However, the political ideology of the CPSU, and more consistently party state practice, are in open contradiction with the concept of political freedom. The persecution of people in various ways along with their imprisonment for contrary feelings, convictions and ideas and for criticism of a social-political nature even within the boundaries of socialist doctrine is a tragic norm of our social life. This, in sharp contrast, is the situation with the present notion of democratic interrelations of citizens and the state, and violates international law, in particular the Declaration of Human Rights and the Helsinki Final Act. This situation gives rise to negative historical consequences in the sphere of international relations, primarily in matters relating to preserving peace among peoples.

In marking the Day of the Soviet Political Prisoner by a hunger strike on October 30, I would like to point out to the USSR leadership the growing necessity of basic democracy for Soviet society.

29 October 1982

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To the Presidium of the USSR
Supreme Soviet from Y. V. Badzio,
a prisoner of conscience.

DECLARATION

The Human Rights Declaration and the Final Act of the Helsinki talks justly consider the peaceful coexistence of nations and states a political code of practice, one that defines the basic principles of social existence in conditions of freedom, pointing out the circle of social interests, which unites people of different nations and societies. The short, popular and increasingly topical slogan about human rights contains within itself the concept of political freedom and a democratic social system in which citizens have the right to the widest form of freedom of thought, have a genuine possibility of revealing their political will including their opposition to the official ideology and policies and are able to air their views and defend their interests by means which are normal in democratic societies. It is precisely the right to political opposition which is denied to the citizen of the USSR by the social ideology, theory and practice of the CPSU, which has set up in the USSR a regime of its own dictatorship. In this way the basic concept of democracy has been twisted and denied.

A future in which the norm of social life is the absolute power of the CPSU and which leaves the people with only the right and possibility of singing songs of praise to the party is consistently and actively proposed to the world. Societies that have been educated in democratic traditions do not wish for such a future and are afraid of it. Without doubt the basic reason for the present international tension is concealed within this collision.

Only the relaxation and the eventual removal of this collision is capable of improving relations between countries and between opposing socio-political systems and will preserve and deepen this easing of tension. Thus we are talking about the general historical need for democratising Soviet society.

The sooner the Soviet leadership understands the inevitability of substantial democratic reforms in the Soviet Union, the sooner the arms race will be brought to an end and progressive disarmament will be possible, and the sooner will blissful coexistence for all nations become a living reality.

In marking International Human Right's Day I am declaring a hunger strike on December 10 of this year against violations by the Soviet Union of human rights and of the right of nations to self determination.

9 December 1982

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THE INEQUALITY OF THE UKRAINIAN NATION WITHIN THE USSR

To the Presidium of the USSR
Supreme Soviet from Y. V. Badzio,
a prisoner of conscience.

DECLARATION

I would like to inform you that on December 30 of this year I shall be announcing a hunger strike on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of formation of the USSR in order to point out to the Soviet leadership, to governments of countries, to members of the UN and of the communities, the unequal position of the Ukrainian nation among the nations of the federation of Soviet republics.

For 7 years I worked on a detailed scientifically based argument of this issue, laying out the results of my research in a large work, the manuscripts of which were 1500 pages long, with the title *The Right to Live*, which I addressed to the higher organs of the party-state authorities. The reply was my arrest and deprivation of freedom for 12 years. The sentence alone is sufficient for one to understand the political condition of the national-historical life of the Ukrainian nation in its present form.

I demand that the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet discuss the state of the Ukrainian nation within the federation of the Soviet republics during a session of the USSR Supreme Soviet with the obligatory participation of present-day Ukrainian patriots-political prisoners including those who have been released prematurely and completely rehabilitated.

29 December 1982

AUSTRALIANS UNVEIL MONUMENT TO THE UKRAINIAN FAMINE VICTIMS

Melbourne, Australia — Dr. James E. Mace, research associate at the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, joined Australian Liberal Party Leader John Howard in dedicating a monument to the victims of the Great Ukrainian Famine of 1932-33 in Canberra, Australia, on October 10.

Also while in Australia, Dr. Mace delivered a series of lectures on his research and introduced the film "Harvest of Despair" in major Australian cities.

The famine memorial, erected at the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in Turner, Australian Capital Territory, was officially opened by Mr. Howard, leader of the opposition in the Australian Parliament, who praised the contribution Ukrainian Australians had made to their adopted country and called it fitting to commemorate the 7 million Ukrainians who perished in Stalin's genocide by starvation.

Some 600 persons, most of them travelling by bus from Sydney, Melbourne and Newcastle, attended the dedication ceremonies, and the event was covered by the national news services of three Australian networks.

Among dignitaries in attendance were Sen. Alan Missen and Member of Parliament Philip Ruddock, both Liberals. In addition, a representative of Sen. Don Chipper was present.

Australian National University professors Jerzy Zubrzycki (sociology), Bob Miller (politics) and James Jupp (editor of the ANU *Encyclopedia of the Australian People*), were present as well.

Dr. Michael Lawriwskyi of the Australian Federation of Ukrainian Organisations and George Mentsinskyi, chairman of the Famine Memorial Committee, addressed the gathering.

Ukrainian Orthodox and Catholic priests officiated at the blessing of the monument, and Bishop Volodymyr of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Canada attended.

The memorial was erected thanks to contributions by Ukrainians throughout Australia.

Dr. Mace also lectured on various aspects of his research at the Australian National University, Monash University and Macquarie University. At the ANU in Canberra, his topic was "National Communism in Soviet Ukraine, 1918-1933." At Monash University in Melbourne, he gave a seminar on "Ukraine in Soviet politics and policy in the Interbellum Period." And at

Macquarie University in Sydney, he lectured in that university's Ukrainian studies programme on the topic, "The Great Ukrainian Famine of 1932-33."

On his final night in Australia, October 19, Dr. Mace was asked to speak at an observance honouring the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) in Sydney, which he addressed on the topic, "The Importance of Two Kinds of Memory: Commemoration and History." On this occasion he stressed the importance of scholarship in protecting Ukrainian veterans of the Second World War from defamation.

Dr. Mace also had the opportunity to meet informally with Australian specialists in Slavic studies such as Prof. T. H. Rigby of the Australian National University, Prof. Jiri Marvan of La Trobe University and Prof. Steven Wheatcroft of Melbourne University.

Dr. Mace was interviewed by a number of media personalities on the topic of the Great Famine, including John Tingle, a popular radio talk-show host in Sydney, Darren Hinch in Melbourne and Trevor Ford in Adelaide. Newspaper interviews were arranged with the *Melbourne Age*, *Melbourne Sun* and *Adelaide News*. Among Ukrainian community organs, he was also interviewed by 5BB1-FM in Adelaide and *Ukrainian Issues*, a publication of the Ukrainian Graduates Association in Melbourne.

Dr. Mace also introduced the film "Harvest of Despair" for a special showing to members of the Australian Parliament in Canberra, to the Ukrainian communities in Melbourne and Adelaide, and for a special showing to the Shevchenko Scientific Society in Sydney.

Dr. Mace's trip to Sydney, Canberra, Melbourne and Adelaide was sponsored by the Australian Federation of Ukrainian Organisations and was hosted by Prof. Lawriwskyi, Dr. Lev Hawryliw, Roman Fedevych and Andrew Liszczyński of that organisation.

*

Addresses at the Monument Dedication

Famine Scholar James E. Mace

Text of keynote speech by Dr. James E. Mace, research associate of the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, delivered on October 10 in Canberra, Australia at the dedication of a monument to the victims of the great Famine of 1932-33 in Ukraine.

We have come here to commemorate not a triumph, but a tragedy, not an act of valour and glory, but a crime of ultimate evil. Over half a century ago, Ukrainians were dealt a deathly blow. The government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, led by Joseph Stalin, seized the crop from those

who has sown and reaped it. This was done despite ample warning that mass starvation could be the only conceivable outcome of such a policy. Millions of innocents fell victim to the slow death of starvation. At the same time, Ukraine's priests and poets, its scholars, its historians, its playwrights and novelists were slaughtered en masse.

From many nations came the millions of Stalin's victims, but the Ukrainians were assaulted not as individuals, but as a nation. They were the victims of genocide. A hitherto flourishing Ukrainian culture was interrupted. A process was set in motion whereby the Ukrainian national presence was ultimately largely pushed out of Ukraine's cities back to the land. And on the land the very body of Ukrainian nationhood, its farmers, were decimated twice over.

The difference between homicide and genocide is not merely quantitative. Homicide is the murder of individuals, no matter how numerous the victims. Genocide is the murder — or attempted murder — of a nation as such, the destruction and irretrievable loss of a member of the human family. For this reason, we have come to recognise that genocide is more than a crime against persons, no matter how many. Genocide is a crime against humanity as a whole.

Stalin's genocide against the Ukrainians, like Hitler's genocide against the Jews and the Ottoman massacres of the Armenians, have all been denied by the criminals who committed them. All such crimes and all such denials ultimately failed because Ukrainians, Jews and Armenians have survived to affirm to all the horrors they witnessed.

In the aftermath of the Second World War, tens of thousands of Ukrainians came to these shores. Among them were individuals for whom the Ukrainian famine was indelibly burned in memory. Some of those who will carry to the grave the burden of that trauma and that memory are among us here today.

We have gathered here today to join with them in an act of remembrance, to pledge that even when witnesses of Ukrainian genocide are no longer among us, their trauma shall not be forgotten. We pledge that their children, their children's children, and their descendants to the last generation will bear remembrance. We pledge ourselves to the memory of that crime and that tragedy, not in the spirit of hatred and lust for revenge, but as the trusteeship of a sacred duty. We shall testify that by his crimes Stalin showed himself to be the moral equal of Hitler, and his government the equivalent of the Third Reich. We shall demonstrate by the example of our memory that the crime of genocide — no matter when or where, by whom or to what purpose, despite even the most strenuous of denials — will always and inevitably be exposed. We pledge ourselves before God until the end of days, we shall not forget.

*

Member of Parliament John Howard

Text of speech by John Howard, member of Parliament, at the unveiling of the Australian monument to the victims of the Ukrainian Famine of 1932-33.

Stalin's forced famine in Ukraine just over 50 years ago was one of the most barbaric acts of human history. In terms of lives lost, it ranks with Hitler's war against the Jews on any measure of human evil.

In recent years there has been an increasing awareness of the 6 million who died in the Nazi Holocaust. It is important that their fate is never forgotten and that mankind is constantly reminded of Hitler's racist genocide.

It is a matter of deep regret that so little is known in the West about Stalin's brutal war against Ukraine between 1928 and 1933 that directly led to the deaths of between 5 and 7 million innocent civilians — including about 4 million children.

There were foreign correspondents in Stalin's USSR who knew what was happening, but who failed to report it. Others, however, such as Malcolm Muggeridge and William Henry Chamberlin, reported truthfully and courageously what they had seen. Tragically, they were not widely believed.

Hitler's Nazis and Stalin's communists were the most brutal totalitarian regimes the world has known. It should be remembered that World War II — the worst conflagration in history that took almost 60 million lives — only commenced after the signing of the Nazi-Soviet pact under which, between 1939 and 1941, Hitler and Stalin divided up Eastern Europe between themselves.

It is a great honour to unveil and officially dedicate the first all-Australian monument to the memory of the victims of the forced famine in Ukraine.

Of course, the Ukrainians were not the only victims of Stalin's collectivisation, deportations and forced famine — millions of others also died in the North Caucasus and Central Volga regions, as well as in parts of Soviet Asia. And the Russians themselves were victims of the Marxist-leninist dictatorship of the day.

But the famine was most intense in Ukraine. And the cause for it was to be found in the policies of the leadership of the Soviet Communist Party.

As the British writer Robert Conquest has written:

"The famine can be blamed quite flatly on Stalin. . . It is perhaps the only case in history of a purely man-made famine. It is also the only major famine whose very existence was ignored or denied by the government and even to a large degree successfully concealed from world opinion. There seems little doubt that the main issue was simply crushing the peasantry at any cost."

Or as a Russian poet (who was in time to become a victim of Stalin's purges) wrote:

"Ten paces away and our voices cannot be heard (The only one heard is the Kremlin mountaineer) The destroyer of life and slayer of peasants." (Quote from Adam Ulam's introduction to Miron Dolot's *Execution by Hunger*, New York: Norton, 1985).

Stalin's famine was more than a war on the peasantry. It also involved a typical totalitarian-type liquidation of the cultural, religious and intellectual elite of the Ukrainian leadership. As such it involved an element of cultural genocide.

The survivors and descendants of the victims of the Nazi Holocaust and of Stalin's mass killings have every right to erect monuments to the victims. Such memorials serve as a timely reminder of the fate that invariably befalls those who become the victims of totalitarian oppression.

Those who suggest that peace is a viable option would do well to realise that a conquering aggressor invariably brings about only the peace of the grave or the gulag.

All of us should be sympathetic to the genuine and sincere peacemaker. There can be no nobler cause. But in our quest for peace and multilateral disarmament, we must not take actions that will unintentionally encourage an aggressor or a potential aggressor.

At a ceremony such as this it is appropriate to record that the government in Moscow still denies basic freedoms to its own population — both Russian and non-Russian. Moreover, the USSR has never publicly atoned for Stalin's crimes — including the deliberate Ukrainian famine.

On any analysis, the Soviet Union is an expansionary world power. In the ten years since the fall of Saigon, pro-Soviet forces have come to power in Laos, Cambodia, Mozambique, Angola, South Yemen, Nicaragua, Afghanistan and Ethiopia — parts of which — under Marxist rule, have also had a forced famine.

In Afghanistan, 100,000 Soviet troops are literally putting the local population to the sword by conducting a war of staggering brutality and oppression. According to reports, Afghanistan has lost almost a quarter of its population (through death or refugee outflow) since the Soviet invasion. There has been widespread political and cultural repression. Political prisoners are tortured. War has been waged on civilian settlements. And yet this war of aggression features little in our news or on our TV screens.

The Afghan persecution, like the Ukrainian famine, is very much the product of a closed society. There is little media comment, because there is no free press.

Closer to home, there is little coverage of the oppressive practices of the regimes in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. But we do know that Moscow

has engaged in what can only be described as a substantial military build-up in the Pacific and Indian oceans and the South China Sea.

Under the terms of the Treaty of Friendship between Moscow and Hanoi, the Soviet Union has access to the Vietnamese military bases at Da Nang and Cam Ranh Bay. Cam Ranh Bay is now the largest Soviet naval base outside the Warsaw Pact countries. In other words, the Soviet Union is rapidly becoming the preponderant military power in our region.

It is timely to record these unpleasant facts on a day on which we remember the innocent victims of Stalin's war on Ukraine of 50 years ago.

I congratulate those who initiated, and those who supported, the construction of this all-Australian monument to the victims of the forced famine in Ukraine.

It is my privilege to unveil this monument to the millions of Ukrainians who died just 50 years ago.

THE NORILSK UPRISING

by
Yevhen Hrycyak

This book records the events of the uprising in the Norilsk concentration camps in 1953. It describes the brutality and unbelievably cruel excess to which prison guards resorted. The author played a leading role in the uprising.

The Norilsk Uprising was published in 1984 by the Ukrainian Institute for Education, Munich, and should be required reading for anyone who believes there are merits in the Soviet Russian system which justify "certain errors". The callous disregard for the most basic human rights is stamped on every page, every paragraph and every sentence of these memoirs.

Price: U.K. £4.00; U.S.A and Canada \$8.00

Orders to be sent to:

Ukrainian Central Information Service,
200, Liverpool Road, London N1 1LF
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THE WHITE HOUSE


WASHINGTON

January 22, 1986

I am very happy to extend warm greetings to the members of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America as you gather to commemorate the 68th anniversary of the proclamation of independence in Ukraine.

This day is not entirely a joyful one for Ukrainians in America and abroad. The campaign against defenders of the long persecuted Ukrainian Catholic Church continues unabated. Ukrainians who defend their basic human rights, such as Yosyp Terella, the Reverend Vasyl Kobryn, and others, now face long and severe imprisonment for advocating their belief in freedom and democratic principles. While attempts to russify Ukraine have increased, I remain confident that the strong ties Ukrainians have historically had to their history, their families and to their faith will endure and that their cultural traditions will once again flourish.

Ukrainians throughout the world are sustained by the hope that nothing can extinguish their deep sense of nationhood or forever thwart the yearning of the human spirit for liberty. I wish to join in solidarity with all Ukrainians in your continuing courageous efforts to secure freedom, human rights, and to preserve the national identity of your beloved homeland. Nekaj Bokh bude z'vamy!

A handwritten signature in dark ink, reading "Ronald Reagan". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style with a large, prominent "R" at the beginning and a long, sweeping tail that extends to the right.

UCCA CHAPTERS MARK UKRAINIAN INDEPENDENCE DAY

The 68th anniversary of Ukrainian Independence Day was commemorated by several chapters of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America throughout the United States. The commemoration of a once independent Ukrainian nation, proclaimed in the Ukrainian National Republic's Fourth Universal, has become an annual event for many of the UCCA's sixty-seven chapters.

- The *Boston* UCCA chapter made arrangements to have Boston Mayor Raymond Flynn and Massachusetts Governor Michael Dukakis proclaim January 22, 1986, as Ukrainian Independence Day in the city of Boston and the state of Massachusetts.
- In *Cleveland*, the United Ukrainian Organisations of Greater Cleveland, a UCCA chapter, held a reception in the executive offices of Cleveland Mayor George V. Voinovich. The Mayor also proclaimed January 22, 1986, as Ukrainian Independence Day in the city of Cleveland.
- The *Chicago* UCCA chapter honoured Senator Gordon Humphrey (R-NH) and Senator Alan Dixon (D-IL) for their contribution in trying to secure the release of Myroslav Medvid. The Chicago Independence Day commemoration was attended by more than 600 guests at the Sheraton International Hotel O'Hare. Also in attendance were representatives from various ethnic groups, state and local government officials, and Rep. Henry Hyde (R-IL).
- In *Baltimore*, more than 150 persons gathered at the Ukrainian Independence Day reception which was held on Sunday, January 26, 1986. Guest speaker for the event was Myron Wasylyk, Director of the Ukrainian National Information Service. Under the initiative of the Baltimore Chapter, Mayor William Donald Schaeffer designated January 22, 1986, as Ukrainian Independence Day in the City of Baltimore, MD.
- In *New York City*, the United Ukrainian Organisations of New York hosted a concert and official programme with Mr. Kornel Wasylyk as the main speaker. Participating in the cultural programme were several New York area groups as well as New York Metropolitan Opera Singer Andrew Dobriansky. Also New York City Mayor Ed Koch and New York State Governor Mario Cuomo designated January 22, 1986, as Ukrainian Independence Day in the city and state of New York.
- In *Washington, D.C.*, the local chapter assisted in the preparations for the annual Ukrainian Independence Commemoration on Capitol Hill which was attended by 8 Members of Congress and more than 50 congressional aides.
- In *Phoenix AZ*, the local chapter held its annual commemoration with a proclamation being issued by Arizona Governor Bruce Babbitt.
- In *Buffalo*, a Joint Proclamation was issued by Buffalo Mayor James Griffin and County Executive Ed Rudkowski proclaiming Ukrainian Independence Day on January 22, 1986. On Sunday, January 26, 1986, the local chapter sponsored an official programme in the City Hall Common Council Chambers with Assemblyman Dennis Gorski as the main speaker. The

successful event was carried in the Buffalo Newspaper, *The Buffalo Evening News*.

In addition to local branch events, several Congressmen and Senators made appropriate remarks in *The Congressional Record* regarding Ukrainian Independence Day. Many of the remarks were published in the January 22 and 23 issues of *The Congressional Record*.

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UKRAINIAN INDEPENDENCE DAY MARKED ON CAPITOL HILL

Washington, D.C. — The 68th anniversary of the Fourth Universal, which proclaimed Ukrainian independence from Russian rule in 1918, was commemorated in Washington, D.C. on January 23, 1986, in the Rayburn House Office Building.

Some 150 persons gathered for the annual reception which was sponsored by the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America along with honorary co-hosts including: Senators Bill Bradley (D-NJ), Alan Dixon (D-IL), Robert Dole (R-KS), Richard Lugar (R-IN), Donald Riegle (D-MI), and Arlen Specter (R-PA), along with Representatives Frank Annunzio (D-IL), William Broomfield (R-MI), Phil Crane (R-IL), Brian Donnelly (D-MA), Fred Eckert (R-NY), Edward Feighan (D-OH), Benjamin Gilman (R-NY), Steny Hoyer (D-MD), Henry Hyde (R-IL), Jack Kemp (R-NY), Tom Lantos (D-CA), Sander Levin (D-MI), Thomas Manton (D-NY), Mary Rose Oakar (D-OH), Gerald Solomon (R-NY), and Samuel Stratton (D-NY).

The official programme was led by UNIS Director Myron Wasylyk. Addresses were delivered by several Senators and Congressmen including, Senator Don Riegle (D-MI), Reps. Fred Eckert (R-NY), Ben Gilman (R-NY), and Tom Kindness (R-OH). Mr. Linas Kojelis, Acting Director of the White House Office of Public Liaison, presented the greetings from President Reagan.

In his greetings the President noted "the campaign against defenders of the long persecuted Ukrainian Catholic Church (that) continues unabated." The President also mentioned that "Ukrainians who defend their basic human rights, such as Josyp Terelya, the Reverend Vasyl Kobryn, and others, now face long and severe imprisonment for advocating their belief in freedom and democratic principles."

In addition to the main speakers, the reception was attended by Representatives Jim Saxton (R-NJ), Robert Borski (D-PA), Mark Siljander (R-MI), and Senator Paul Sarbanes (D-MD). In addition to the eight Senators and Congressmen attending the reception, several representatives from the White House, the National Security Council, the State Department, the Defense Department, the Commerce Department, the Justice Department, and the Voice of America were also in attendance, as well as more than 50 congressional aides representing 35 Senate and House Offices.

The reception was officially closed with a benediction by the Rev. Joseph Denischuk, Pastor of the Holy Family Ukrainian Catholic National Shrine.

Book reviews**NATIONBUILDING AND THE POLITICS OF NATIONALISM:
ESSAYS ON AUSTRIAN GALICIA**

Edited by Andrei S. Markovits and Frank E. Sysyn. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 1982, viii, 343 pp. Paper. Distributed by Harvard University Press.

In these scholarly, objective, and informative essays, the authors acquaint the reader with the historical background of Galicia in the Habsburg Empire from 1772 to 1914. The volume consists of eleven essays, of which four (Nos. 6, 7, 9, 10) were presented at the conference on "Austria-Hungary, 1867-1918," sponsored by the Ukrainian Research Institute and the Soviet and East European Language Center at Harvard University. There are four additional essays which were previously published in the *Austrian History Yearbook* (vol. III, p. 2, essays No. 2 and 3), in the *Slavic Review* (vol. XXVIII, essay No. 4) and in the *Canadian Slavonic Papers* (vol. XIV, essay No. 5). In addition, the volume contains two unpublished contributions (essays No. 8 and 11). A. Markovits has provided an introduction and bibliography (chapter 1).

In his "Introduction: Empire and Province," Markovits discusses the political structure and the changing political conditions of the Habsburg Empire. The Habsburgs were able to "accumulate kingdoms, duchies, principedoms and the title of "Holy Roman Empire" (until 1806), but could not unite their diverse domains. Despite successful control of their possessions, for example, the kingdoms of Bohemia and especially Hungary retained state and national traditions quite different from those of hereditary German lands. This led to the formation of the Dual Monarchy. In Bohemia rapid industrialisation caused a rise of national rebirth of Czechs. "In small Bukovyna," writes the author, "Austrian bureaucracy and even more markedly German culture remained vibrant in part by retaining the support of the Jewish population in the midst of a complex social and national situation involving Ukrainians, Rumanians, and Poles" (p. 13).

The annexation of Galicia by the Habsburgs profoundly changed the economic, political, social, religious, and cultural life of Ukrainians, Poles, and Jews. Especially, the reforms of Maria Theresa and Joseph II affected the Ukrainian peasants and the Uniate or Greek-Catholic clergy. "Of all developments under Austrian rule, the formation of mass national movements was

undoubtedly the most lasting. Poles, Jews, and Ukrainians, all advanced in the process of modern nationbuilding," rightly writes Markovits (p. 15). His introduction serves as a basis for a better understanding of the essays that follow in the volume. Unfortunately, the author did not mention the historical roots of Ukrainians and other nationalities in Galicia.

However, in the second chapter, "The Ukrainians in Galicia under Austrian Rule," the late Ukrainian-Canadian historian, Ivan Kysiak-Rudnytsky, delineates a detailed historical survey of Ukrainian political and religious life in Galicia from 1772 to 1914. This would have been an appropriate introduction to this volume. In his essay the author analyses the complex issues of interethnic relations.

Before World War I, there were approximately four million Ukrainians in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, who lived in Galicia, Bukovyna, and Carpathian Rus' (Carpatho-Ukraine) which was under Hungarian rule and therefore requires separate treatment. The author, however, deals with the most numerous and historically most important group, namely the Ukrainians, who till the end of the 19th century called themselves "Rusyny"-Ruthenians (die Ruthenen). In order to avoid a confusion of "Rus'" and "Russia" and to stress national unity with Dnieper Ukraine, the Galician "Rusyny" adopted the terms "Ukrainian" and "Ukraine."

At that time, despite the malpractices of the Polish-controlled administration in Galicia, the Ukrainians enjoyed the rights provided by a constitution. They published books, had their own press, (for example: *Pravda* 1867-1896, *Zoria* 1880-1897, *Dilo* 1880-1939, and others), established several societies of which the Shevchenko Scientific Society (1873) evolved into an unofficial Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences, which gained wide recognition in the world of scholarship, published hundreds of volumes of *Zapysky* (Notes), and built up a large library and museum. In addition, the Ukrainians could hold conferences, participate in elections, express their grievances in the parliament both in Lviv and Vienna, and fought for their rights. After the "Ukaz of Ems" (1876), which prohibited Ukrainian cultural activities in Russia, Galicia became a sort of sanctuary for Ukrainian intellectuals from tsarist persecution.

A prominent Ukrainian leader from Kyiv, Evhen Chekalenko, remarked in his memoirs (1861-1907); "... At that time Galicia was for us a model in the struggle for our national rebirth; it strengthened our faith and hope for a better future. Galicia was a true 'Piedmont' of Ukraine because prior to 1906 a Ukrainian press, scholarship and national life could develop only there," (p. 51).

Peter Brock's "Ivan Vahylevych (1811-1866) and the Ukrainian National Identity" supplements Rudnytsky's essay. Brock discusses the specific development of Ukrainian consciousness. In connection with Vahylevych, the author devotes a great deal of attention to the activities of Markian Shashke-

vych and Yakiv Holovatskyi ("Ruška trytisia"). Unfortunately, Brock did not mention an excellent work by Stefan Shakh, *o. Markian Shashkevych ta halytske vidrozhennia* Rev. Markian Shashkevych and National Renaissance in Galicia, Paris-Munich 1961, where a good deal of material is devoted to Vahylevych.

John-Paul Himka in his essay "Voluntary Artisan associations and the Ukrainian National Movement in Galicia (The 1870s)" examines the role of the voluntary artisan association in the Ukrainian national movement in the 1870s, but fails to explain the reason why the rural associations were more successful than those in the cities.

Martha Bohachevsky-Chomiak's "Natalia Kobrynska: A Formulator of Feminism" is an excellent essay in which she discusses the historical development of the Ukrainian Women's movement in Galicia. In the late 1860s and early 1870s in Galicia a dramatic cultural process was in progress. Kobrynska's organisation of Ukrainian women made it possible for them to participate in the socio-economic and political life in Galicia and cooperate with women organisations of other nationalities.

Leonid Rudnytsky wrote a very good essay about the outstanding Ukrainian scholar and writer, Ivan Franko (1856-1916), who at first was deeply committed to socialism and later to the Ukrainian national movement. He considered the Austrian regime as the oppressor of the Ukrainians, which thwarted their aspirations for self-determination. At the same time, however, as Rudnytsky rightly remarks, "Franko recognised the constitutional rights in the Austro-Hungarian Empire." He was after all, like many members of the Ukrainian intelligentsia of that time, "a product of Austrian education and of Austrian culture." (p. 253).

Paul R. Magosci in his essay "The Language Question as a Factor in the National Movement" emphasises the importance of the language in historical development of every nation ("... the language of a people is itself the people, it is its ego and its essence. . .", p. 221). His "Bibliographical Guide to the History of Ukrainians in Galicia: 1848-1918" is drawn from his book *Galicia: An historical Survey and Bibliographic Guide* (1982).

Ezra Mendelsohn in her essay "Jewish Assimilation in Lviv: The Case of Wilhelm Feldman" describes the position of Jews in Galicia in the 19th and early 20th centuries. The Jews were a large national minority in Galicia. The backward social and economic structure prevented them from assimilating with other nationalities in Galicia. The author quoting M. Aharonpreiz makes an interesting observation: "... the Ukrainian orientation never interested the Jews in Galicia, who regarded Ukrainian as a peasant language. The Ukrainian national movement, however, did have an impact on Jewish intellectuals, some of whom were moved by its example to advocate equal national rights for Jews as well," (p. 97). The Jewish intelligentsia in Galicia, especially in Lviv was primarily interested in German and Polish culture.

Leila P. Everett in her essay "Rise of Jewish National Politics in Galicia, 1905-1907," discusses the rapid development of the Zionist movement in Galicia and the Jewish politics with Poles and Ukrainians in the election of representatives to the legislative bodies in Lviv and Vienna. Both essays are supplements to Ivan Rudnytsky's work from the Jewish point of view. Neither Mendelsohn nor Everett mention any evidence of anti-Semitism in Galicia at that time.

Piotr S. Wandycz in his essay "The Poles in the Habsburg Monarchy" supplements historical development in Galicia under Habsburgs from the Polish point of view. In his opinion the Austrian policy was "playing the Ukrainians against the Poles ("divide et impera") and vice versa, which contributed to the mounting hatred which erupted in bloodshed in 1918," (p. 92). Yet, as the author admits himself, the Poles in Galicia were treated very well by Vienna, namely: in the early 1870s the University in Lviv was Polonised. The decree of 1869 made Polish an official language in Galicia, although some concessions were made to the Ukrainians. "The administration would pass to the Poles. Viceroys of Galicia would thenceforth be Polish. In 1871 the practice was inaugurated of appointing a Minister without Portfolio, who was invariably a Pole, to the Austrian cabinet to handle all matters dealing with Galicia," writes the author, (p. 85). Moreover, writes the author, "the Polish ruling class asserted their way over the Ruthenians and pointed out to Vienna that sponsorship of the Uniate hierarchy had not only produced internal friction, but had failed to prevent the latter from becoming susceptible to Pan-Slavist propaganda from St. Petersburg" (p. 86). Although in his essay Wandycz tries to present the situation of the Polish population in Galicia objectively, it is not clear whether he gives the right to the Ukrainians in Galicia for independent statehood, when he remarks that Galicia in 1918 was "reunited with a reborn Polish state" (p. 89).

In conclusion, it should be added that the volume has been attractively edited and the editors are to be congratulated for a job well done.

Theodore Mackiw
The University of Akron

Note: The wrong prices were shown in *The Ukrainian Review*, No. 1, Spring, 1986. The mistake has been corrected in this issue.

The
Ukrainian
Review



1986

THE UKRAINIAN REVIEW

A Quarterly Magazine devoted to the study of Ukraine

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
A Quarterly Magazine

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***Death of Prime Minister of Ukraine,
Yaroslav Stetsko***

Obituary

**YAROSLAV STETSKO
FORMER PRIME MINISTER OF UKRAINE**

It is with great sorrow and pain that we inform the Ukrainian people in Ukraine and abroad, the cadres of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists, the members of the World Ukrainian Liberation Front, the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations, the European Freedom Council, the World Anti-Communist League and all friends of the Ukrainian nation that, having received the last rights, *Yaroslav Stetsko* — a great Ukrainian patriot — passed away at the age of 74, on Saturday July 5, 1986, at 6:05 p.m. in West Germany.

The Hon. Yaroslav Stetsko was Prime Minister of Ukraine, Chairman of the Leadership of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists, President of the ABN, member of the Honorary Presidium of the EFC and a member of the Executive Board of WACL. From an early age the Hon. Yaroslav Stetsko was a prominent member of Ukrainian liberation organisations for which he spent long terms of imprisonment in Polish and Nazi German prisons and concentration camps. He was an ideologue of Ukrainian nationalism with a Christian viewpoint, a great strategist of the Ukrainian liberation revolution, champion of the idea of a Ukrainian patriarchate, an outstanding publicist who, over the course of more than half a century, formulated Ukrainian political thought. As a prominent diplomat he organised world-wide forces for the fight against communism and for the dissolution of the Russian empire, and strived for the liberation and national independence of all subjugated nations.

Funeral services were held on Saturday July 12, 1986. The period of mourning lasted until July 31, 1986.

May his memory be eternal.

**Leadership of the Organisation
of Ukrainian Nationalists**

Obituary

The Times, London, 10.7.1986

YAROSLAV STETSKO UKRAINIAN LEADER IN EXILE

Yaroslav Stetsko, who declared himself Prime Minister of an independent Ukrainian republic after the Germans invaded the Soviet Union in 1941, died in Munich on July 5. He was 74.

For nearly half a century he symbolised for many the struggle for Ukrainian independence and was regarded by Ukrainian exiles as their last legitimate Prime Minister.

Born in Ternopil, Western Ukraine, in 1912, Stetsko grew up during a time when Ukrainian national consciousness was re-awakening after nearly 200 years of suppression by successive occupiers.

As a student at Lviv and Cracow Universities, he became a member of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists, a clandestine body operating in both Polish and Russian occupied Ukraine. His intellectual brilliance ensured a swift rise within the movement.

When the Germans invaded the Soviet Union in 1941, and the Red Army was in headlong retreat, the Ukrainian nationalists proclaimed an independent Ukraine and Stetsko was named Prime Minister.

Rejecting totalitarian systems, whether Nazi or communist, he refused to become a Ukrainian quisling. Had the Nazis been capable of treating the Ukrainians as equals rather than as *Untermenschen*, they might have won their wholehearted support as allies, with incalculable consequences.

Instead, Stetsko and his cabinet were swiftly arrested by the Gestapo and Stetsko was sent to Sachsenhausen concentration camp where he remained until 1944.

Until 1945, the nationalists fought a guerrilla campaign against the Germans and the Russians; after the war, they fought against the Russians until 1951. Stetsko was now living in Munich helping to direct the fight as well as trying to influence Western powers to support the struggles of East European countries occupied by the Russians.

He devoted his life to keeping alive the hopes of Ukrainians and other East Europeans that their countries would one day be free, becoming active in various international anti-communist organisations, including the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations, whose president he was since 1959.

He is survived by his wife Slava.

Zoreslava KOWAL

**FUNERAL OF FORMER PRIME MINISTER OF UKRAINE,
Chairman of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists
and President of the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations
the late Yaroslav Stetsko.**

Ukraine has lost a father — the Ukrainian nation has become an orphan. For on July 5, 1986, death in a foreign land mercilessly took away the head of the Ukrainian National Government, the President of the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations and Leader of the Revolutionary Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists, who, for half a century, formulated the Ukrainian struggle for liberation — the late Yaroslav Stetsko.

The bells of St. Sophia and all the other Ukrainian churches in Europe, the Americas and far off Australia resounded their mournful laments. During Requiems and memorial services held by both Ukrainian Churches on Sunday July 6, mournful prayers were raised by those who, not so long ago, beseeched the Almighty for the recovery of the deceased from a grave illness.

The painful news about the death of the late Yaroslav Stetsko became known to Ukrainians in every country on the evening of Saturday July 5, breaking the hearts of the numerous cadres of the OUN, the Ukrainian youth and every Ukrainian patriot. The leadership of the OUN informed the mass media about the death. The German press agency DPA reported that: "the former Prime Minister of Ukraine, who was also the Head of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists and President of the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations, died at the age of 74. According to information issued by the ABN, Stetsko led the Ukrainian Liberation Movement and worked very closely with Stepan Bandera who was murdered by a Soviet agent in Munich in 1959 on the orders of the Soviet government. He was the future successor of Bandera". The text of the communique issued by the DPA was printed in the following German newspapers: *Süddeutsche Zeitung* and *Die Welt* on July 7, 1986, and *Münchener Merkur* on July 8, 1986. They also underlined the fact that the deceased had been imprisoned in the Nazi German concentration camp Sachsenhausen for the declaration of an independent and sovereign Ukrainian state by the Act of June 30, 1941. On July 10, 1986, *The Times* (London) printed an obituary entitled "Yaroslav Stetsko, Ukrainian leader in exile", which described very clearly the historic figure of this great Ukrainian statesman and leader.

Mrs. Slava Stetsko, the distinguished widow of the deceased, received over 300 telegrams and letters of condolence which flooded to Munich every day from all parts of the world. Among the first telegrams to be received were messages of condolence from the hierarchy of both Ukrainian Churches — from the Patriarch of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, Archbishop Major Myroslav Ivan Cardinal Lubachivsky; from the Metropolitan of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, His Beatitude Mstyslav Skrypnyk; and from the Secretary of the Congregation for Eastern Churches, Archbishop Myroslav Marusyn. Other telegrams came from President Ronald Reagan; H.R.H. Otto von Habsburg, Member of the European Parliament; John Wilkinson and Stefan Terlezki, Members of the British Parliament; Manuel Fraga Iribarne and Guillermo Kirkpatrick, Members of the Spanish Parliament; Hugo Hegeland and Berger Hagaard, Members of the Swedish Parliament; Yuriy Shymko, member of the Provincial Parliament of Ontario; Gen. John K. Singlaub, President of the United States Council for World Freedom and Chairman of the World Anti-Communist League (WACL); Dr. Ku Cheng-kang, Honorary Chairman of WACL; and many other notable people. Countless telegrams also came from Ukrainians in the free world.

At the Church

On the day of the funeral, July 12, 1986, the Ukrainian Catholic Cathedral in Munich was completely full. At 10 a.m., 33 flag bearers led the grand procession into the church for the Requiem. They were followed by relatives of the deceased, members of the Leadership of the OUN, members of the World Ukrainian Liberation Front and representatives of Ukrainian and international organisations, and finally by the large over 1000-strong congregation of Ukrainians from Germany, Great Britain, France, Belgium, USA, Canada, Australia, Argentina and Scandinavia.

Holy Mass was conducted by Bishop Platon Kornylak, Apostolic Exarch for Ukrainians in Germany, assisted by archimandrite and archpriest Rev. Prof. Dr. I. Hrynioch; Rev. Dr. S. Harvanko; Vicar General and archpriest Rev. V. Turkovydy; archpriests Revs. O. Chaika from Montreal and S. Izyk from Winnipeg; Rev. Rush from Canada, and Revs. M. Molchko and Ye. Harabach from Munich. Archpriest Rev. Palladiy Dubytsky also took part in the Mass on behalf of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church. The male voice choir "Ukraina", conducted by Ye. Zadarko, sang the Mass prayerfully and movingly.

The coffin containing the mortal remains of the deceased was not brought to the church. It remained in the cemetery chapel. On the tetrapod in the church stood a small portrait of the late Yaroslav Stetsko. The first few pews



Requiem Mass for the late Yaroslav Stetsko at the Ukrainian Catholic church in Munich.



Funeral procession at the Waldfriedhof cemetery.



Memorial service at the grave of the late Yaroslav Stetsko.

were reserved for the relatives of the deceased, the Leadership of the OUN, John Wilkinson, M.P., representatives of the Ukrainian political and academic world. The church was full of young people, most of whom were members of the Ukrainian Youth Association dressed in their uniforms.

At the cemetery

As the people walked around the open coffin of the deceased to pay their last respects, hearts began to beat more rapidly and prayers to the Almighty to grant eternal peace to the soul of a great son of Ukraine, who has just recently departed became stronger. Then the huge crowd of mourners entered the chapel, adorned on the outside with dozens of wreaths with dedications written in many languages.

At exactly 1 p.m. the coffin containing the mortal remains of the late Yaroslav Stetsko, draped in the blue and yellow national flag of Ukraine, was brought into the chapel to the sound of "Ave Maria" written by the composer Gounod. The Requiem and the mournful sound of the final "Vichnaya Pamiat" aroused unspeakable sorrow in those present and at the same time many pleasant memories of their numerous meetings with the deceased during his life. This filled their souls with pride and convinced them of the eternity of the ideas of the deceased, and of the inevitability of the ultimate victory of these ideas. These feelings became stronger when the archpriest Rev. V. Turkovyd read out the words of the Gospel according to St. John about the resurrection of the righteous.

Miracles happen in life. It had been drizzling for a whole week until Saturday, bringing with it a cold and damp unusual for this time of year. But on the day of the funeral it suddenly cleared up and rays of sunshine filled the Waldfriedhof cemetery, where the mortal remains of Stepan Bandera and Stepan Lenkavsky came to rest, with the light of a rainbow. And now on this sunny day a crowd of over 1000 mourners escorted an unforgettable leader, statesman, revolutionary and political thinker, who dedicated his entire life to serve God and his nation, to his place of eternal rest. At the head of the procession was a cross. This was followed by dozens of flags which fluttered in the wind. When local bystanders saw the 120 wreaths, they asked in wonder whether it was a General who was being buried that day. The numerous uniformed members of the Ukrainian Youth Association and the grey haired veterans in their military headgear, who formed a guard of honour around the coffin and had other official duties, gave this impression.

A huge wreath made of red carnations, which was carried behind the coffin, was from the grief-stricken wife of the deceased, Mrs. Slava Stetsko.

The procession moved slowly between the grass and the trees, and the

mournful singing struck everyone's heart with pain and anxiety at the unforgettable loss.

Before the open grave, into which the coffin was lowered, stood the bereaved Mrs. Slava Stetsko, the faithful widow of the deceased, who was his inseparable companion along the difficult road he had to follow throughout his life. Beside her stood the sister of the deceased, Oksana, with her husband and her relatives. Around them stood hundreds of close and more distant friends, both Ukrainians and those of other nationalities, and other people who had gathered in Munich to pay a final tribute to the late Yaroslav Stetsko.

After the Requiem and the sealing of the grave, the first speaker was Bishop Platon Kornylak who bade farewell to the late Yaroslav Stetsko on behalf of the Ukrainian Catholic Church and the Ukrainian nation. He reminded those present at the funeral how in 1941 the Servant of God Metropolitan Andrey Sheptytsky recognised the late Yaroslav Stetsko as Head of the Ukrainian National Government urging the people to obey their new governing body and to strive towards the re-establishment of an independent Ukrainian state. He also stressed the piety and deep faith of the deceased. Archpriest, Rev. P. Dubytsky from the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church spoke similar words about the deceased stressing his steadfastness and perseverance in his beliefs and deeds. He also noted the writings of the deceased in which he always brought up the historic significance of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church and its Head, the Martyr Metropolitan Vasyl Lypkivsky.

Dr. M. Klymyshyn, boyhood friend of the late Yaroslav Stetsko, bade a last farewell to the deceased on behalf of the Leadership of the OUN. He described the deceased as the author of the Act of June 30, 1941, which he worthily defended, and the one who put it into practice, thereby, together with Stepan Bandera, making the Nazi German occupant of Ukraine admit moral defeat. Julian Zablocky, the representative of the Ukrainian National Government, spoke about the late Yaroslav Stetsko's attempts to re-establish an independent Ukrainian state.

The Bavarian Government was represented by Dr. Rößner-Kraus from the Ministry of Work and Social Order, who extolled the deceased as a great fighter and leader of the liberation movement of Ukraine and the other subjugated nations. He expressed admiration and praise for his steadfastness in the struggle for justice. The words of Dr. Sarzamin Kaimur from Afghanistan, who represented the Central Committee of the ABN, were filled with deep respect and praise for the deceased. He recalled the words of President Ronald Reagan on the occasion of the visit of the Head of the Ukrainian state to the White House: "Your struggle is our struggle, your hope is our hope". He also stated that he was proud to have had the honour of working

with the late Yaroslav Stetsko — the President of the ABN and Head of the Leadership of the OUN. M. Kovalchyn from the USA paid tribute to the deceased on behalf of the Society of Veterans of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. He expressed regret and sorrow that the Ukrainian veterans could not bury this great Ukrainian leader with full military honours, as would befit the Head of a Government. Mrs. Maria Shkambara from Canada paid tribute to the late Yaroslav Stetsko on behalf of Ukrainian women, expressing her faith that the spirit of the deceased will give the Ukrainian nation greater strength in the struggle for an independent and sovereign Ukrainian state. In paying tribute to the deceased, B. Fedorak, Head of the World Ukrainian Liberation Front, assured everyone present that the members of his organisation were ready and willing more than ever to carry on struggling for the realisation of the great ideals of the late Yaroslav Stetsko.

In his tribute to the deceased, the Head of the National Executive of the Ukrainian Youth Association of Australia, Stefan Romaniw, stated that the deceased had made an ineradicable mark on the hearts and souls of Ukrainian Youth and that his ideals and the struggle for an independent Ukrainian state were an example which young Ukrainians throughout the world should follow.

The following speakers also paid tribute to the late Head of the Ukrainian National Government on behalf of the cadres of the OUN, friends and the various organisations which they head: V. Mazur (USA), who spoke of the late Yaroslav Stetsko's firm belief in the ultimate victory of Christianity over atheism, W. Oleskiw (Great Britain), Prof. M. Andruchiw (Canada), Yu. Wenglowsky (Australia), O. Kowal (Belgium), Dr. W. Kosyk (France), I. Wasyluk (Argentina), P. Holowinsky (Austria), M. Kuts (Scandinavia), S. Mudryk (Germany).

Then, to the sad sound of the farewell song *Vydysh Brate Miy* (Can you see, my brother), Dr. M. Klymyshyn scattered earth from the grave of Taras Shevchenko in Kaniw, from Kyiv, from the Poltava region, from Kharkiw and various parts of Ternopil, into the grave, sprinkling the coffin with water from the Black Sea. He also dropped a cranberry branch from the Ternopil region into the grave. Many tears fell into the grave as a gift from the heart for a dear friend, as the participants of the funeral dropped earth over the coffin.

The funeral repast

After the funeral, the participants were driven to the large hall of the Heide-Volm restaurant in Planegg, not far from Munich, where the repast began at 4.30 p.m. The stage was decorated with two large flags — the blue

and yellow national flag of Ukraine and the red and black revolutionary flag of the OUN. In the middle of the two flags hung a big portrait of the late Yaroslav Stetsko. Places at the head table were reserved for Mrs. Slava Stetsko, relatives, the clergy and representatives of various organisations. The repast began with a prayer recited by the clergy.


The master of ceremonies was W. Lenyk. He asked the President of the Ukrainian National Republic in exile, M. Livytsky, to give the opening address. The President noted that the late Yaroslav Stetsko was a distinguished leader of the national liberation revolution and that his name features prominently on the pages of Ukrainian history, where it has been written down in big letters. He ended his speech with the words "Glory to Ukraine!"

The next speaker was the Rev. S. Harvanko, who represented the Society of St. Sophia, the Ukrainian Catholic University and all other institutions striving towards the establishment of a Ukrainian Patriarchate in Rome. He concentrated on the Testament of Patriarch Josyf, which the late Ukrainian leader saw as a set of guiding principles in life. Rev. Dr. S. Harvanko also underlined the essentiality of a widely educated social stratum in the attempt to make the people more active in the liberation struggle.

Dr. M. Marunchak from Winnipeg, Head of the World League of Political Prisoners in the free world, stated that the late Yaroslav Stetsko had been elected an honorary member of the League as early as 1946 and described the great joy felt by the late Head of the Ukrainian National Government when the whole Ukrainian nation approved the Act of June 30, 1941. He also stressed the historic significance of the ABN.

Dr. Marunchak was followed by the sister of the deceased, Mrs. Oksana Romanyshyn. When she came up to the microphone a great silence descended upon the hall. She spoke with a voice that was so similar to the unforgettable voice of the late Yaroslav Stetsko. Mrs. Oksana Romanyshyn paid tribute and bade farewell to her late brother on behalf of his numerous relatives, from those who suffered in prisons, for the majority of them perished as a result of communist Russian terror. Mrs. Oksana Romanyshyn and her husband remained at her brother's side for more than two months when he was seriously ill.

Further speeches were made by the Head of the Central Executive of the Ukrainian Youth Association, Ye. Hanowsky; the representative of the student tour group from the USA "Along the paths of our parents", Natalka Krislata; the Head of the Coordinating Centre of Ukrainian Central Institutions in Europe, S. Mudryk; the President of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, I. Bilynsky; the Head of the League of the Liberation of Ukraine, T. Buyniak; the Head of the Association of Ukrainians in Great Britain, I. Dmytriw; the Head of the Organisation for the Defence of the Four Freedoms of Ukraine, Prof. M. Chirowsky; The Head of the Associa-



Scenes from the funeral repast at the Heide-Volm restaurant, Planegg.

tion of Former Ukrainian Combatants in Great Britain, Dr. S. M. Fostun; V. Novak from the veterans of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army in Canada; M. Moravsky from the Association of Ukrainians in Australia; Col. D. Kosmowicz from the Byelorussian Liberation Front; Mrs. Roxolana Potter from the delegations and affiliations of the ABN throughout the world; Mrs. Bohdanna Krushelnycky from the Organisation of Ukrainian Women in Great Britain; Dr. Askold Lozynsky, Head of the National Executive of the Ukrainian Youth Association in the USA; D. Moravsky from the Ukrainian Youth Association in Australia; and also Ya. Klymovsky on behalf of the graduates and people from the Ternopil region where the late Yaroslav Stetsko was born.

Finally, Mrs. Slava Stetsko with moving words thanked everyone present for participating in the funeral and paying tribute to her late husband, the Head of the Ukrainian government and of the Leadership of the OUN, and President of the ABN, on behalf of herself and her relatives.

Once all the speeches were over, W. Lenyk thanked the clergy, the representatives of various organisations and all those present for paying their last respects to the memory of the late Yaroslav Stetsko. The repast ended with a prayer and the Ukrainian national anthem.

And so, having said their last farewell to their unforgettable leader, everyone departed for their homes bearing in mind the words of his last appeal issued on the occasion of the 45th anniversary of the Act of June 30, 1941: "Our strength lies in the struggle, in prayer and in fundamentality. Our slogans are: 'Christ is in the Catacombs, Ukraine is in Battle!' 'Fight for the Christian ideal of freedom and an independent state!' 'OUN stands for an independent and sovereign Ukrainian state!'"

YAROSLAV STETSKO

A biographical sketch

Yaroslav Semenovych Stetsko — Prime Minister of the Ukrainian National Government in 1941, Chairman of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and the President of the Central Committee of the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations (ABN), was born in Ukraine on January 19, 1912, in the city of Ternopil. He graduated from the University of Lviv, where he majored in ethics and philosophy.

At an early age, Yaroslav Stetsko became an active participant in the underground Ukrainian liberation movement. In the 1920s, he joined the Ukrainian Military Organisation (UVO) — a para-military, revolutionary organisation, dedicated to the cause of Ukrainian independence and statehood. Subsequently, he became a member of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) — a political, revolutionary organisation, which was formed in 1929 and which, for the past 50 years, has led the Ukrainian nation in its determined struggle for national independence.

Because of the active role Yaroslav Stetsko played in the underground, revolutionary and national movement in Ukraine, he was arrested by the occupying Polish forces in Ukraine on several separate occasions (1930, 1932, 1933 and 1934). In 1934, he was incarcerated for being the editor-in-chief of several underground publications of the OUN and a leader of the OUN in Western Ukraine. Already Yaroslav Stetsko was widely known and highly respected among the general Ukrainian populace, as well as in many non-Ukrainian political circles abroad. It was he who authored the now well known OUN-ABN slogan: "Freedom for every individual! Social Justice for every individual!"

When the war between Germany and Russia began in June 1941, Yaroslav Stetsko organised a convocation of the Ukrainian National Assembly, which proclaimed the independence of Ukraine on June 30, 1941, in Lviv. This Assembly nominated Yaroslav Stetsko as Prime Minister and then formed a provisional Government of the newly independent Ukrainian state. These actions forced Hitler's hand and demonstrated clearly the aspirations of the Ukrainian people for independence. Yaroslav Stetsko exhibited courage, statesmanship and foresight — qualities which were to mark the rest of his noble political, revolutionary activity.

On July 12, 1941, together with other members of the Provisional Government of Ukraine, Yaroslav Stetsko was arrested by the Nazi German auth-

orities and deported to Germany. Two months later, on September 15, 1941, upon categorically refusing Hitler's ultimatum that he resign from his post as the Prime Minister of Ukraine and that he revoke the Proclamation of Ukrainian Independence issued on June 30, 1941, Yaroslav Stetsko was incarcerated in a concentration camp at Sachsenhausen until September 1944. There he was subjected to continuous torture, which was to have a permanent effect on his health. Once released from the concentration camp, Yaroslav Stetsko was placed under continuous Gestapo surveillance for refusing to cooperate with Hitler's regime.

The Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), meanwhile, was formed in Ukraine in 1942, growing rapidly into a powerful military and political force.

In the autumn of 1943, under the auspices of the UPA, a conference of subjugated nations was held in the forests of the Zhytomyr region of Ukraine. This conference was attended by representatives of the liberation movements of thirteen subjugated nations. The immediate and most significant result of this conference was the creation of the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations (ABN), which was to become the essential coordinating aegis of the national liberation struggle of all the nations subjugated by Moscow against Russian Bolshevik tyranny. Mr. Yaroslav Stetsko's activities then branched off into two main categories: those relating to the international campaign against Soviet Russian imperialism, and leading the Ukrainian nationalist liberation movement.

In 1945, Yaroslav Stetsko was elected to the three member Presidium of the OUN. The Presidium was headed by Stepan Bandera, who was assassinated in Munich in 1959 on a direct order from Moscow by the Russian agent B. Stashynsky. The third member of the Presidium was General Roman Shukhevych (nom de guerre — Taras Chuprynka) the Commander-in-Chief of the UPA, who was killed in 1950 near Lviv in Western Ukraine, in battle against the forces of the Soviet Russian secret police — the MVD — a precursor to the present-day KGB. In 1968, at the Fourth Great Congress of the OUN, Yaroslav Stetsko was elected the Chairman of the OUN. As the last remaining member of the Presidium of the OUN, Yaroslav Stetsko's election as the Chairman of the OUN was a manifestation of the legitimate continuity with the OUN movement in Ukraine.

Since 1950, Yaroslav Stetsko had been very active in promoting the idea of national liberation against all forms of imperialism and neo-colonialism, but especially against the chauvinistic aspirations of world domination by Soviet Russia. His major objective had been the consolidation of a world anti-communist movement, which he energetically pursued through his numerous trips to Free China, Free Vietnam, Australia, Thailand, Singapore, Hong Kong, Turkey, Western Europe, Canada, Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Japan, Korea,

the Philippines and the United States of America. In Taipei, he was the guest of President Chiang Kai-shek. There he concluded an agreement of mutual cooperation between the Asian People's Anti-Communist League (APACL) and the ABN, so as to coordinate their common struggle against communism and Russian imperialism. In 1957, a similar agreement of friendship and cooperation with the Inter-American Confederation of the Defense of the Continent was effected.

The Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations under the leadership of Yaroslav Stetsko made considerable progress towards cooperation between all influential anti-communist organisations.

In March 1958, Yaroslav Stetsko took part in the Preparatory Conference for the World Anti-Communist Congress for Freedom and Liberation held in Mexico City, which established the World Anti-Communist League (WACL).

In 1958, Yaroslav Stetsko was invited by the US Congressional Committee for Foreign Affairs to testify on the imminent danger of Russian aggression and the national liberation struggle of the nations subjugated by Moscow. All of his political activity has demonstrated his desire to secure a fundamental and general understanding as to the imperative necessity of restoring political independence and national sovereignty to every nation subjugated in the USSR by Russian communist imperialism and tyranny. Yaroslav Stetsko pledged unequivocal support for all liberation movements and members of the ABN with the nations of the Free World in a common struggle for freedom, peace and justice in the world. He felt that the only real foundation for these ideals is the universal application of the principle of national independence throughout the world.

Yaroslav Stetsko was singled out for a fierce personal attack by Nikita Khrushchev in response to a very effective anti-Khrushchev and anti-Russian campaign he organised in the Scandinavian countries in June 1964, on the occasion of the former Russian Premier's visit there.

In 1967, Yaroslav Stetsko was instrumental in the establishment of the European Freedom Council (EFC), a coordinating body for organisations fighting for freedom and against communism. He was first elected co-Chairman of the EFC and later a member of the Honorary Presidium, a position which he actively maintained until his death.

In 1970, in Tokyo, Mr. Stetsko was elected to the Executive Board of the World Anti-Communist League (WACL). He participated in a number of WACL conferences held in various countries of the world.

Mr. Stetsko travelled throughout the Free World, attending conferences, giving speeches, meeting with foreign statesmen and dignitaries. In 1983, he was received at the White House by President Ronald Reagan, who stated

during the 1984 Captive Nations commemoration ceremonies in Washington D.C.: "Your struggle is our struggle. Your dream is our dream." Mr. Stetsko lobbied parliamentarians and statesmen, met personally and corresponded with them in his ceaseless dedication to the cause of freedom for his country — Ukraine — and all countries subjugated by Soviet Russian communism.

Yaroslav Stetsko was a renowned political and ideological thinker, his ideas are as original as they are revolutionary. He was recognised among all Ukrainians, be it abroad or in Ukraine, as the foremost ideologue and political thinker of Ukrainian revolutionary nationalism. His political analyses of cultural and ideological processes among Ukrainian intellectuals of recent decades have always been characterised by their extraordinarily accurate foresight. He also showed an astute awareness of the trends of international politics.

Yaroslav Stetsko was convinced that the only feasible alternative to a thermo-nuclear war was a global strategy, the integral component and orientation of which are the revolutionary national liberation struggles of the nations presently subjugated by Russian imperialism. "If the Free World is fearful of an atomic and nuclear war and will not start a thermo-nuclear Armageddon against Russia, then it must implement the only remaining alternative: the support of the national independence movements of the nations enslaved by Russia."

Yaroslav STETSKO

**GREETINGS TO THE UKRAINIAN YOUTH
ON THE 45th ANNIVERSARY OF THE RESTORATION
OF THE UKRAINIAN STATE ON JUNE 30, 1941.**

Dear Fellow Compatriots
Dear Ukrainian Youth!

I extend to you my cordial greetings on the occasion of the 45th anniversary of the Ukrainian state in the city of Lviv, as a manifestation of the Ukrainian nation's will during World War II to sovereign life in an independent state comprising all parts of Ukraine. I greet you on the anniversary of this great day in the history of Ukraine, when in the very heat of a most cruel war between two imperialist, totalitarian, aggressive powers it seemed that every independent, national act would be suppressed by the Nazi German or Russian occupants and that none of the attacked nations would be able to rise and demonstrate their desire for freedom.

At the time the Ukrainian nation understood the part it had to play in world history, as the initiator and organiser of a third, separate, independent force comprised of subjugated nations in Europe and Asia, to which the future should belong in the development of a new world based on national, anti-imperialist principles. With the blessing of both our martyred Churches, their highest hierarchy, the Ukrainian nation, on the initiative of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists under the leadership of Stepan Bandera, began to rebuild its state during the ongoing struggle of the two deadly enemies of Ukraine, and thus created the newest epoch of Ukrainian statehood. The Ukrainian state of the 1940's emerged from and was a result of the thousand year-old traditions of the Ukrainian nation: from the state of the Antes, then the Princely state and Kingdom, through the Cossack-Hetman state and the Zaporizhian Sich state, then the Shevchenko era, the state of 1918, the Carpatho-Ukrainian state and on to the last period of Ukrainian statehood which was formed by the Ukrainian National Government, the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army and the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council. Our statehood of the last epoch lasted as long as Ukrainian territory was under Ukrainian rule under the protection of the OUN-UPA. I am proud that I had the honour to initiate according to the will of the OUN, the National Congress, upon the will of the people, with the blessing of both our Churches, this glorious period of our history of statehood. I am proud that the OUN brought up such a generation of fighters, about whom the enemy said that even if the Ukrainian nation did not exist,

then this group of faithful revolutionaries who were prepared for anything, would have been capable of not only resurrecting a nation, but creating one.

June 30, 1941, was an Act of world-political importance, which proved to the freedom-loving world that those who are for freedom, justice, goodness and faith in God have to stand up in a common front against the empire of evil, and not fraternize with the forces of Satan against the devil. This is the memento which now faces the whole world. Ukraine's Truth is gaining victory, but with the price of a great many sacrifices. It is frightful to recall Chornobyl, this tragedy of a nation which the Russian Satan wishes to destroy by means of the most recent type of genocide, being otherwise unable to suppress the nation's spirit longing for freedom. However, it will not be Satan who will decide upon the end of life on earth; the fate of the world is not in Gorbachev's hands, but in the hands of the Almighty Creator, who will decide its fate. And Chornobyl will be the turning point in the growth of the revolutionary situation within the empire. Chornobyl will be an unforgettable torch reminding everyone that the fate of Chornobyl victims is awaiting all nations. All these nations have already awakened to put an end to Russian tyranny and its genocide of nations, whether it means life or death. On the 45th anniversary of June 30 show your esteem of this glorious day in our history with a special all-national mobilisation of all forces within the Ukrainian community against the Russian and communist tyrants. The stronger, the more powerful, the more aggressive our action will be against the organisers of Chornobyl, the better we will fulfil our obligation in honour of the millions who have fallen for the freedom of Ukraine. The time is not far-off now, when we will be celebrating Kyiv's victory over Moscow, the victory of St. Sophia over Zagorsk, the victory of world-wide Ukrainian freedom over Russian bondage.

Honour and Glory to the heroes of Ukrainian history — to Symon Petlura, Yevhen Konovalets, General Roman Shukhevych-Taras Chuprynka, Stepan Bandera, to all those murdered in torture chambers and in Russian prisons, to those known only to God — the fighters and heroes of Ukraine.

Glory to Ukraine — Glory to our Heroes.

Yaroslav Stetsko,
June 1986

Condolences

President Ronald Reagan The White House, Washington

Dear Mrs. Stetsko,

I was deeply saddened to learn of the death of your husband, Yaroslav. His life burnt brightly with the love of liberty in an age darkened by totalitarian tyranny. Throughout his 74 years, he kept faith with his countrymen in his courageous struggle for human rights and national independence for Ukraine against the twin tyrannies of Nazism and communism.

In the ongoing contest with communism for the hearts and minds of men, your husband's courage and dedication to liberty will serve as a continuing source of inspiration and an abiding reminder of the timeless struggle of mankind to break the chains of tyranny.

God bless you.

Sincerely,
Ronald Reagan

July 22, 1986

Myroslav Ivan Cardinal Lubachivsky, Head of the Ukrainian Catholic Church.

Mrs. Stetsko

In your days of mourning and sadness after the passing away into eternity of your husband, the late Yaroslav Stetsko, I send you my sympathy. I will remember the late Mr. Stetsko in my prayers and services.

His Beatitude
Cardinal Archbishop Myroslav
Ivan Lubachivsky,
Rome

Metropolitan Mstyslav, Head of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church

Mrs. Slava Stetsko

Please accept my sympathy upon the untimely passing away in the Lord of Yaroslav, your husband and long-term leader and political activist of the Ukrainian nation. In my prayers for the servant of God Yaroslav, I will beseech the Lord to accept his soul in heaven.

Yours in Christ,
Metropolitan Mstyslav
Ukrainian Orthodox Church
South Bound Brook, New Jersey,
USA

**Major General John K. Singlaub, Chairman of the
World Anti-Communist League and President of the
United States Council for World Freedom (USA)**

Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations

It is with shock that we received the tragic news of the death of Yaroslav Stetsko. His death will mean a great loss to human rights everywhere. We will miss him and his courage should be a banner to wave for future generations. I regret my inability to attend the funeral services. I will be speaking at Captive Nations Week in Taiwan.

My deepest sympathy.

Respectfully,
Major General John K. Singlaub
United States Council for
World Freedom

Dr. William Whitlock, M.P. (U.K.)

July 7, 1986

Dear Mrs. Stetsko

My wife and I received the sad news of your husband's death at the Ukrainian Hall, Nottingham, last night, and we, along with everyone else present at a meeting there, were shocked by the announcement.

We would like to offer you our every sympathy with you at this time of great trial for you. Nothing which anyone can say at this moment can possibly help you to bear your great loss, but we wish you to know that our thoughts are with you.

Yaroslav will be mourned by millions who know of his lifelong fight for the freedom of the Ukraine, and he will be very much missed by all those who knew him and admired his steadfast work for those things in which he believed. I feel sure too that all those who remember him will recall how great has been your own contribution to his efforts in support of human liberties in the Ukraine, and elsewhere.

On the 21st June at the ceremony of conferring upon me an honorary Doctorate of Philosophy by the Ukrainian Free University, Mrs. Cymbalistyj read a wonderful letter from Yaroslav and I now cherish it among a number of documents which I consider to be the most important to me. On the 4th July I wrote to Yaroslav, thanking him for the very kind comments in his letter and pledging myself to do all within my power to stand up for the rights of the Ukraine. I also asked if he had any suggestions for the way in which I might assist the cause now that I am a man of leisure.

Since his letter did not carry an address I sent my letter to Professor Cymbalistyj and asked that it be forwarded to Yaroslav, and I regret therefore that he will have not seen it before he died. I am now relying on the Professor to forward this to you.

Yours sincerely,
William Whitlock

General Robert Close, Senator (Belgium)

Dear Slava,

Upon my return today from a session of the Council of Europe in Istanbul, I learned with profound regret of the passing away of your dear husband and our most admired friend Yaroslav.

He will always be remembered as a fighter in the struggle for freedom, one who has dearly paid the price and who has not shirked any responsibility and the consequences derived from assuming the responsibility of defending our most cherished freedoms as laid down in the Charter of the United Nations.

May his memory be eternal, but he will live on in our minds and be ever present!

I do look forward to seeing you on the occasion of the 19th WACL Conference and enclose a slightly updated programme of the proceedings.

With my deepest sympathy and condolences, I remain

As ever Yours,
Robert Close

Senator Alfonse M. D'Amato (USA)

July 7, 1986

Dear Mrs. Stetsko

It is with much sadness and regret that I learn of the passing away of your husband, Yaroslav. Please allow me to extend my deepest condolences to you upon your great loss.

Yaroslav Stetsko was one of a rare breed of men. He was a brave and stalwart patriot who cherished liberty for his fellow Ukrainians, and for all people, everywhere.

Devoted to the cause of self-determination for the Ukrainian people, Yaroslav Stetsko stands out as a towering figure in the noble struggle against Soviet totalitarianism. His bold and inspiring vision represents a spirit that no system and no government can ever hope to extinguish.

Although we mourn the loss of Yaroslav Stetsko, we are content in the knowledge that he will live forever, in the hearts and minds of all who hold dear the freedoms that are the inherent right of every man and woman.

Mrs. Stetsko, I know that you will continue forward in the gallant path forged by your husband, as we strengthen our commitment against the evils of Bolshevism with renewed vigour and determination.

With deepest sympathy,
Alfonse M. D'Amato
United States Senator

Charles M. Lichenstein, The Heritage Foundation (USA)

July 8, 1986

My dear Mrs. Stetsko,

I received today the wire telling me of the death of your revered husband, the only genuine Prime Minister of Ukraine.

Saddened as of course I am, still my predominant feeling is that of gratitude: personally, that I had the chance to meet him and spend a brief time in his presence; and more generally, gratitude quite simply for his unceasing activity on behalf of freedom and for his courage, which was never diminished. Truly, a great man and a good man.

My thoughts are with you. I know that you will take some comfort, and much courage of your own, from the knowledge that your husband made so indelible a mark on his era, and for all time, as long as the love of liberty endures in every part of the world.

With warmest wishes, always, and deep respect.

Sincerely,
Charles M. Lichenstein
Senior Fellow

Yuri Shymko, M.P.P. High Park-Swansea (Canada)

July 11, 1986

Dear Mrs. Stetsko,

Please accept both my personal expresions of condolences, those of my family and of all my colleagues in the Ontario Legislature on the tragic death of your husband, Yaroslav, a great Ukrainian patriot whose leadership and life has symbolised the determined heroic unwavering struggle of the Ukrainian nation for liberty and justice for all those in our family of nations who cherish and value those goals.

As the head of the free and independent government proclaimed on June 30, 1941, by the Ukrainian people, he has epitomised the courage to stand up to the Nazi onslaught at a time when very few leaders and peoples had the audacity to take such steps at the risk of their own lives and the sacrifice of millions of their compatriots. In waging this heroic struggle throughout his life

from Nazi concentration camps to the position of a leader in the fight of captive nations as President of the A.B.N., the Head of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists, Honorary Chairman of the European Freedom Council and a member of the Executive of the World Anti-Communist League, he died indeed a heroic death.

Yaroslav Stetsko has joined the Altar of the Heroes of the Ukrainian nation such as Petlura, Konovalets, Shukhevych, Bandera and others as a guiding light and motivating example to the new generation of Ukrainians who will carry on the torch of freedom, liberty and justice for their subjugated, persecuted but unvanquished nation. May his memory remain eternal for all of us. Long live a free Ukraine! Long live its heroes!

Sincerely yours,
Yuri Shymko, M.P.P.
High Park — Swansea

**John Wilkinson, M.P., Chairman of the European Freedom
Council (U.K.)**

July 8, 1986

My dear Slava,

I was deeply saddened to hear of Yaroslav's death on Saturday after a long illness bravely sustained. Please accept my sincere and heartfelt condolences on your loss. We shall all miss Yaroslav immensely and his courageous example of dedication and total commitment to the liberation of Ukraine and other proud nations oppressed by communist totalitarian regimes has been an inspiration.

It has been a great personal privilege and honour to have been associated with his work. I have learned so much from Yaroslav — his sense of history, generosity of spirit, warmth of heart, human kindness and above all courage and perseverance were unfailing.

Often he must have felt privately that his struggle for self-determination for the captive nations behind the iron curtain was lonely and that the support from Western European governments and peoples could have been stronger and better sustained. If he ever experienced inner disappointments he never showed them. Instead his strong belief in the ultimate triumph of Good over Evil and that justice and liberty were eventually bound to prevail over inhumanity and oppression sustained his unflagging efforts through ABN, EFC and the other organisations of which he was both an inspiration and an active figurehead. He led from the front regardless of personal danger, fati-

gue, official apathy, or the outright ridicule and hostility of communists, fellow travellers, and their sympathisers.

Luckily Yaroslav always had you at his side to help fight his political battles and to sustain his public campaigns. Your love and devotion had no boundaries and together you carried your message of freedom and hope to far flung countries from the Americas to the Pacific.

We all have our special memories of Yaroslav, and mine will always be when you came to the unveiling of the plaque in his honour at Bradford Cathedral. I am going to the Captive Nations commemoration at Bradford on July 20th and shall, as is fitting, deliver my personal public tribute to Yaroslav's life and work there.

In the meantime, may God's blessing and grace sustain you through your sorrow. You are very real in the thoughts and prayers of all your friends and I hope all being well to attend Yaroslav's Requiem Mass on Saturday to give thanks to God for a fine life of service bravely and devoutly led.

Yours very sincerely,
John

Bertil Häggman (Sweden)

ABN.

Terribly shocked and saddened by the passing away on July 5 of Hon. Yaroslav Stetsko. Blow to ABN, EFC, and to the liberation struggle of the subjugated peoples under Soviet Russian tyranny and oppression.

My deepest sympathy with Mrs. Slava Stetsko for the loss of her husband. All Scandinavian friends of a free and independent Ukraine share her grief. Please let me know if there is anything I can do.

Bertil Häggman

**Manuel Fraga Iribarne, M.P., President of the
Alianza Popular (Spain)**

Madame Stetsko,

I have just learned, with deep grief, of the Honorable Yaroslav Stetsko's passing away. Please accept my most sincere condolences.

Manuel Fraga

Stefan Terlezki, M.P., (U.K.)

With great sorrow and heartfelt grief I pray and mourn the death of my beloved and dear friend Yaroslav Stetsko, the leader of the Ukrainian people who never stopped or flinched from fighting, throughout his life, for freedom, democracy, independence and justice for his people, and to free Ukraine from Russian imperialism.

I am convinced that Ukrainians in his beloved homeland and Ukrainians throughout the free world, as well as countless world leaders, and the many people who have known the former Prime Minister of Ukraine, and greatly admired him for his unceasing and determined fight for freedom, will salute Yaroslav Stetsko just as I do, and pray for his wish and the wishes of 50 million Ukrainians that his country must and will be free.

God give strength to Mrs. Slava Stetsko.

We salute and say goodbye to our beloved son of Ukraine with a song from our hearts "Shche ne vmerla Ukraina".

Stefan Terlezki,
Member of Parliament,
House of Commons,
London

and to own a trained portrait painter, sent him for a short time to study painting in Vilno, and in 1832, a year after their arrival in St. Petersburg, he apprenticed him to a painter and decorator Shiryayev. Another three years passed before Shevchenko's fellow countryman and artist, Soshenko, came across him and became enthusiastic about his artistic abilities; he introduced him to other Ukrainians: the writer Hrebinka and the Secretary of the Academy of Arts, V. I. Hryhorovych, as well as to other artists and men of letters, among whom were Zhukovsky, the famous Russian poet, and the great painter Bryullov, of French Huguenot descent, who had just won world-wide acclaim for his painting *The last day of Pompeii*. (One of his admirers was Sir Walter Scott). Bryullov praised Shevchenko's work; everybody agreed that Shevchenko ought to become free, and when other means failed Bryullov painted a portrait of Zhukovsky which was disposed of in a private lottery, and for the 2,500 roubles thus raised Shevchenko's freedom was bought on April 22, 1838, when he was twenty-four years old.

Shevchenko's happiness was boundless. From a mere serf, a mere chattel of his master, he became a free man, an independent student, now formally enrolled at the Academy, and a favourite pupil and friend of the famous Bryullov.

Now he could plunge into his beloved art; and he also applied himself avidly to many branches of learning, making up for the time lost in the slavery of serfdom.

He was very successful in his studies at the Academy and won a number of medals. Apart from paintings and watercolours, he also produced illustrations for a number of books, and his drawings for one of them* were engraved on steel by a prominent London engraver, J. R. Robinson, who was later to become a member of the Royal Academy.

Shevchenko probably started writing poetry about 1832, but he kept none of his early efforts till 1837. His first published collection of eight poems appeared in the second year of his freedom, 1840, under the title *Kobzar* (The Minstrel), and it earned him immediate renown; a year later, his longest historical poem, *Haydamaky*, was published as a separate book, and a number of other poems were printed both in various other publications and separately until 1844, when the original *Kobzar* and *Haydamaky* had their second edition in one volume.

The extraordinary impact and success of Shevchenko's poetry makes him unique in Ukrainian literature and one of the most remarkable and outstanding personalities in the republic of letters. As to the particular circumstances of Shevchenko's appearance in the literature of his country, it must be remembered that Ukrainian literature was re-born over forty years earlier, with the appearance in 1798 of a humorous adaptation ("travesty") of Virgil's *The Aeneid* by Kotlyarevsky who was followed by several other writers; but none produced such artistic works as those contained in the *Kobzar*, nor did

* N. A. Polevoy, *Russkiye polkovodtsy*, St. Petersburg, 1845.

125th Anniversary of the Death of Taras Shevchenko

Victor SWOBODA

University of London

SHEVCHENKO ANNIVERSARY

This year sees the 125th anniversary of the death of the greatest Ukrainian poet, Taras Hryhorovych Shevchenko. Like every true genius, he cannot be explained, and the following few words are not intended to do more than present a brief sketch of his life and work and indicate his impact on his contemporaries and the following generations.

Shevchenko was born on March 9, 1814, in the village of Moryntsi, less than a hundred miles south of Kyiv, in Central Ukraine. His parents, like nearly all peasants in the Russian Empire of that time, were serfs, so that they were the property of their landlord and had to work almost the whole week for him without any payment either in kind or in money. In order to keep their children and themselves alive, they had to till their small allotment in any remaining time (chiefly at night). Although Shevchenko's parents worked hard, the difficulties of keeping a family of six children were enormous, and poverty was a permanent guest, though not an unusual one in Ukraine of that time. The relatively unclouded childhood of the nine-year-old Taras came to an end when constant hard work brought his mother to an early grave at the age of forty. His father soon re-married, and the step-mother turned out to be very harsh with the boy. Then his life became even more intolerable when his father's death, nineteen months later, left him a complete orphan.

From early childhood, Taras had a passion for reading, which he learnt in the village school, and for art, and would use every scrap of paper he could lay hands on for copying out poetry or sketching. Being impelled towards art, he tried unsuccessfully to become an apprentice to one or other of the local icon painters, but, after various vicissitudes, and having reached the age of fifteen, when a young serf had to start work for his master, he was taken on to the estate of his owner, Engelhardt, as a personal servant. Only a few months later, in the autumn of 1829, he had to leave Ukraine, together with his master's retinue, going via Kyiv to Vilno and then to St. Petersburg. Every free moment the young Shevchenko devoted secretly to sketching and copying any prints that he could get hold of. Often he incurred his master's wrath and punishment; however, Engelhardt, wishing to make the best use of his serf

any of them express the spirit of Ukraine with anything approaching Shevchenko's clarity and intensity.

It is often said that Shevchenko's poetry is based on Ukrainian folk songs. While it is of course true that Shevchenko's inspiration often came from folklore, yet he enriched Ukrainian literary poetry with completely new genres, original metrical schemes, and a great variety of rhyming patterns; his innovations represented not only a great advance on previous poetry, but the excellence of his work remains unsurpassed to this day. A measure of his success is the fact that very many of his poems have been set to music, while some became folk songs very soon after their first appearance in print. The first twelve lines of his earliest poem, *Prychynna*, are now perhaps the best-known Ukrainian song; the only other song which might claim to share this distinction is the one taken from the opening poem of his *Kobzar* ("Dumy moyi").

While it is difficult to give an impression of the poetic qualities of Shevchenko's poetry, so very firmly are they embedded in the fabric of the original language, it is easier to sketch out its chief motifs.

Some of his first poems continue the Romantic ballad tradition, with its Ossianic love of the mysterious and supernatural, the mist and moonlight; but the settings and personages are purely Ukrainian, and his debt to folklore is considerable. A minor key motif, that of the Ukrainian away from his native country and among strangers, occurs frequently; another very prominent theme is the plight of the Ukrainian girl seduced and abandoned by a Russian soldier or master. But from his earliest poems Shevchenko also looks back into the historic past of his native country; he nostalgically recalls the past glory and freedom of the Ukrainian Cossacks whose descendants are now in Russian bondage.

It must be remembered that all the poems published between 1840 and 1844 were written from eight to thirteen years after the poet's departure from Ukraine as a boy of fifteen. He did not re-visit his homeland until 1843 as a man of twenty-nine; then, after completing his studies at the Academy of Arts in 1845, he returned to Ukraine, intending to settle there for good. Confronted with the realities of life in the country, he sounds in his new poems a much sharper note of protest and clearly formulates his view of history. The most important poems of this period are: *Chyhyryn*, *The Plundered Grave*, *Dream* (1844), *The Heretic* (John Hus), *The Great Vault*, *Subotiv*, *The Caucasus*, *Epistle*, and *Testament*. The poet laments the plight of Ukraine, whom he calls the Mother, the luckless widow, who is being robbed of everything by the Russians and by renegades from her own people who help them. In *The Caucasus* he condemns the Russian imperialist expansion: he sees the fate of enslavement which is in store for the hitherto free peoples of the Caucasus; there awaits them, he prophesies, "boundless Siberia" in an empire where "From the Moldavian to the Finn, in all tongues, everyone is silent, for they 'prosper!'". Looking back into Ukraine's history, the poet is quite definite and consistent in his condemnation of the treaty of union between Ukraine

and Russia concluded in 1654, and of Bohdan Khmelnytsky for his part in bringing it about, and considers this union to be the cause of Ukraine's loss of freedom and enslavement. Two Russian monarchs — Peter I and Catherine II — are singled out as being chiefly responsible for the destruction of Ukrainian liberty. In order to regain it, the Ukrainian people must "break their fetters and sprinkle their freedom with the enemy's evil blood".

During these years, Shevchenko travelled about Ukraine, studying antiquities for the Archaeographical Commission, and in 1847 was appointed a lecturer at the University of Kyiv. In 1846, several Ukrainian scholars and intellectuals founded the secret Brotherhood of Cyril and Methodius whose aim was to advocate the spiritual and political union of all the Slavonic peoples based on the principles of the equality and independence of each one of them, while democracy and Christianity were to be their internal mainstays. Several of Shevchenko's friends were among the members, and he himself joined it with great enthusiasm and became its source of inspiration. A year later, however, the Ukrainian brotherhood was denounced to the Russian authorities, and its members were arrested. Thus, after a mere nine years of freedom, Shevchenko was deprived of it again in April 1847, to be released from this second captivity ten years later, only four years before his death.

On the evidence of his clandestine poems, found with him and in copies with his fellow-members, Shevchenko was accused of having incited dissatisfaction with the enslavement of Ukraine and of having suggested that Ukraine's happiness could be achieved only through independence. The extreme popularity and success of his poetry among the Ukrainians was considered in the indictment as an aggravating circumstance. Moreover, his poetry contained insults to the persons of the Reigning House. Shevchenko was sentenced to military service as a private (a severe punitive measure in those days, usually for 25 years) in the Orenburg Special Corps. The Tsar added a rider in his own hand: "Under the strictest supervision and with a ban on writing and sketching". It was of course this ban which caused the greatest sufferings of Shevchenko the artist and the poet.

He spent much of his service in the barren Central Asian deserts, on the Aral and Caspian Seas, often suffering extreme hardships and privations, and almost completely cut off from the world. In spite of the ban, he sometimes managed to write secretly, hiding from everybody during short off-duty periods, or at night, and concealing the tiny book in his boot. For a time, he was even semi-officially permitted to paint as his services were useful to his superiors of a hydrological expedition on the Aral Sea when he produced its pictorial documentation.

After the death of Nicholas I in 1855 Shevchenko's friends renewed their efforts for his pardon. However, he was excluded from the general amnesty, and it was only after two years' perseverance on their part that they succeeded in securing his release, from police surveillance, chicanery, and restrictions on his movements.

Shevchenko's poetry of the exile period is varied, but predominantly lyrical; after his release, broken in health, but unchanged in spirit, he continues with his old themes. With the force and majestic dignity of an Old Testament prophet he inveighs against the evil and corrupt ways of this world and has visions of the overthrow of oppressors and tyrannical monarchs. As before, he sees Russia as the oppressor of Ukraine, and he never changes in his condemnation of Khmelnytsky.

His popularity and fame as a writer spread tremendously far and wide, not only in Ukrainian, but also in Russian circles. In the last year of his life he became an academician in the class of engraving.

Shevchenko's health deteriorated rapidly from the autumn of 1860 until his death on March 10, 1861, at five o'clock in the morning on the day after his forty-seventh birthday.

This was an immeasurable loss to the Ukrainians who had come to regard him as their national lodestar and prophet. But Shevchenko the lodestar and the prophet lives on in his works which continue to be an inspiration and a call to the struggle for national liberation.

The extraordinary degree of devotion with which Ukrainians honour Shevchenko's memory was noted some years before 1905 by the French scholar Eli-seé Reclus who observed that the veneration visitors at Shevchenko's grave outnumbered beyond all comparison those at the grave of the most popular French poet Voltaire, in spite of the fact that France at that time surpassed Ukraine in cultural development.

Yefremov's words of three quarters of a century ago seem to be a fitting conclusion: "The significance of Shevchenko's genius for Ukrainians goes beyond the limits set even for great writers in their native lands: this man was for his country that sun which brings the day with itself, the day of a new birth into this world as a great civilised nation; his poetry became the best expression of national consciousness in Ukraine, while his fate may be regarded as a symbol of the fate of the whole Ukrainian people."

W. K. MATTHEWS

**TARAS SHEVCHENKO:
THE MAN AND THE SYMBOL**

Personality and reputation are not commensurate terms, for although they are obviously connected, the connection between them is not organic. A man may be greater or less than his reputation, find his reputation may grow or diminish in harmony with the fluctuating fashions of thought. Essentially a man's reputation is not a projection of his personality, as the branch is of the tree, but rather a reflection, like his image in a mirror, and this being so, it is determined by the nature of the reflecting surface — here the human environment — which is clearly subject to the influence of place and time. The career of Taras Shevchenko illustrates all these things, except the ebb of a reputation, for in the 125 years since his death his fame has grown unabated with the turbulent growth of Ukrainian self-consciousness. Today he is still the symbol of his country's unslaked passion for freedom from tyranny in all its forms as he once became in the first flush of youthful ardour.

Ukrainian literature in its modern sense begins almost with Shevchenko in the first half of the 19th century, although its recorded beginnings go back to the introduction of the Cyrillic alphabet and of Old Bulgarian literature at Kyiv in the 10th. The modern phase is represented before Shevchenko by Ivan Kotlyarevsky, whose language, unlike that of earlier Ukrainian authors, exclusively reproduces the contemporary vernacular. This was also used by another outstanding precursor of Shevchenko — Hryhoriy Kvitka-Osnovyanenko, as well as by an entire school of Kotlyarevsky's imitators, all of whom focused their attention on depicting Ukrainian life and manners. The careers of Shevchenko's two precursors overlap into the Romantic period, but neither had the temperament to profit by the emancipating effect of the new literary fashion. And so it fell to Shevchenko to express Romanticism, especially its later phase, in Ukrainian literature. The advent of Shevchenko was sudden and startling and carried the more responsive of his compatriots off their feet in a wave of fervent admiration. Such a poet had not been known in Ukraine before. His vivid, singing, emotional verse, both lyrical and narrative, had a familiar ring and movement, for it was the language of Ukrainian folk-song, and simple charm of manner. And yet it was not folk-poetry, for the poet's personality shone through the words with an unmistakable radiance, and it was the personality of a man who loved his country not only in the aureoles and heroisms of its past, but even more in its contemporary state of abject humiliation. This man moreover was acutely aware of

social and national injustice and was not afraid to indict his people's enemies and to make them feel the sting and lash of his tongue. Here apparently was another Burns, yet, all in all, Shevchenko was more influential than Burns, for the latter lived and died in the Age of Enlightenment, when interest in the lot of the downtrodden was only just beginning to win the attention of serious, compassionate men.

The comparison with Burns, whom Shevchenko knew at least by repute, is instructive. Both men belonged to the peasantry and to a nationality other than the dominant one; both, as writers, were to some extent self-made; both wrote partly in the vernacular and partly in an alien literary language; both were highly emotional, impressionable, not markedly strong in character; both endured the indignity of social ostracism; and both died comparatively young. But the differences between the two poets are probably as considerable as the similarities, and perhaps the most glaring difference is that of legal status. This may appear to contradict my statement that both belonged to the peasantry. But in fact it does not. Although a man of the people, Burns was a free man, whereas Shevchenko was born a serf, who obtained his freedom only at twenty-four and only to enjoy it for nine out of the forty-seven years of his life. This is a fundamental fact in Shevchenko's biography and cannot be too often or too strongly emphasised. It set the tone of his poetry; it inclined him to identify himself with the meanest of his compatriots, who till 1861 were the chattels of mainly Polish and Russian Landowners; it gave him his strong feeling for the soil of Ukraine; and it enabled him to see clearly the social and national evils which beset his unhappy country. Shevchenko also differs from Burns in being an artist not only in words, as Burns was, but with brush and pencil. Indeed Shevchenko the artist was as widely known in his own time as Shevchenko the poet. And there is a third point in which the two poets are different: Burns's freedom was never circumscribed and marred by imprisonment, whereas Shevchenko's freedom was merely a brief interval in a life of ignominious duress.

Shevchenko, as a man of letters, was known to his contemporaries by two books of verse — *Kobzar* (The Minstrel) and *Haydamaky* (The Haydamaks). Only a small part of the first, as it is now constituted, appeared in 1840, two years after his emancipation from serfdom by purchase through the kind offices of his Russian friends Zhukovsky and Bryullov. In content it is partly lyrical and partly narrative, while *Haydamaky* (1841) is wholly narrative; in tone both are predominantly lyrical. Both draw on native folk-lore as well as on the Romantic balladry of Western Europe, and there is a great deal in them that comes from the poet's own experience whether direct or vicarious. Thus, for his *Haydamaky*, Shevchenko made use of his grandfather's eyewitness stories of the peasant revolt of 1768 (*koliyivshchyna*), imbuing them with the vitality of passionate memory. An expanded edition of the *Kobzar* came out in 1860, and since Shevchenko's death early in the following year other wrinnings of his have come to light. Today his complete works include prose as well as verse, and the prose is for the most part in Russian.

Although generally inferior as writing to his verse¹, it has the characteristics of his literary temperament and is valuable as an autobiographical record throwing considerable light on certain periods of his life. His *Dnevnik* (Diary), limited to the crucial years 1857-1858, is particularly illuminating on the notable change in his psychology which was the inevitable outcome of ten physically and morally degrading years of exile in the Kazakh steppe². His correspondence, both Ukrainian and Russian, covers a much longer period than the *Diary*, and even substantial parts of his nine Russian stories, e.g. *Khudozhnik — The Artist*, are apparently little-modified transcripts of his own experiences, their verisimilitude being in some cases heightened by the use of actual names (e.g. Bryullov's). On the other hand his only play *Nazar Stodolya*, which remained for decades in the repertory of the Ukrainian theatre, has no autobiographical significance.

The core of Shevchenko's literary art was and remains his Ukrainian verse, and the impact of this on his contemporaries and on succeeding generations is usually explained by reference to its "national" character (*narodnist*). His poetry has been equated with Ukrainian folk-songs (*pisni*) and folk-ballads (*dumy*), because they share a common vocabulary and style. The Russian critic K. Chukovsky avers in one of his pre-revolutionary essays³ that his collation of the verse of the *Kobzar* with the equivalents in Maksymovych's edition (1843) of Ukrainian folk-songs has persuaded him that there is not a line of Shevchenko's poetry which cannot be paralleled from the folk-songs. This seems to be an exaggeration at best, although there can be no doubt that Shevchenko's verse is permeated with elements of folk-speech. Dobrolyubov⁴, the Russian radical, reviewing the second edition of the *Kobzar* (1860), drew a parallel between *Kobzar* and Koltsov and found that the former had closer and firmer ties with the common people. *Prima facie* then it would seem that Shevchenko's verse is folk-poetry. And yet statistics show that hardly more than fifty per cent of the total number of verses in the *Kobzar* are written in the measures of Ukrainian folk-song and that thirty per cent of the verses are iambic, i.e. in a metre directly at variance with the predominantly trochaic movement of the folk-songs⁵. Even the typical folk-song measures are not used in the manner of the folk-songs, but as, for instance, the char-

1. S. T. Aksakov wrote to Shevchenko of the latter's Russian story "A Pleasant Stroll not without a Moral" (*Progulka s udovolstviyem i ne bez morali*): "It is incomparably inferior to your talent as a poet. You are a lyrical poet, an elegist; your humour is not happy, your jokes not always funny. True, where you refer to nature, where you have to do with painting, everything you say is beautiful, but this does not redeem the shortcomings of the story as a whole". See A. Beletsky, "Russkiye povesti T. G. Shevchenka" in M. Rylsky and N. Ushakov (editors), *Taras Shevchenko*, V, Moscow, 1949.

2. In a letter to Ya. H. Kukharenko (22.IV.1857) Shevchenko wrote on the occasion of his release: "Ten years of duress, my only friend, have destroyed, killed off my faith and hope. And both were pure once, unspotted as a child taken from the font — pure and strong as a polished diamond. . . But what cannot the chemical retort do?"

3. See Marietta Shaginyan, *Taras Shevchenko*, Moscow, 1946.

4. *Sovremennik*, LXXX, St. Petersburg, 1860.

5. See M. Shaginyan, *op. cit.*

acteristic ballad *Perebendya* shows, are blended in a very individual fashion. The Soviet Ukrainian poet Maksym Rylsky, summarising, in his Shevchenko commemoration address of 1939, the investigations of philology in the sphere of Shevchenko's prosody, points out that Shevchenko's metrical heritage consists of two main patterns of rhythm — that the *kolomyika* verse (alternating lines of eight and six syllables, with a general trochaic movement and great freedom in stressing) and that of the *kolyadka* verse (lines of eleven and twelve syllables, with a general grouping into amphibrachs and an equally free stress on either side of a fixed caesura)⁶. The *kolomyika* rhythm may be illustrated by —

Ne zhenysya na bahatii,
Bo vyzhene z khaty.
(1845)

(Don't marry a rich bride, for she'll chase you out of the house), and the *kolyadka* rhythm by —

Otak u Skutari kozaky spivaly;
Spivaly serdehy, a slozy lylyś. . .
(*Hamaliya*, 1842.)

(Thus the cossacks sang in Scutari — the wretches sang, and their tears flowed.)

But these two types of rhythm are subtly varied, and the presence of iambic and anapaestic metres adds to the rhythmic richness of Shevchenko's verse.

It must be plain from the foregoing technical details that we have to do here with more than a simple imitator of folk-songs, who, as Milton in his *L'Allegro* said inaccurately of Shakespeare, "warbled his native woodnotes wild". For like Shakespeare, another author with a defective early education, Shevchenko was an uncommonly sensitive and impressionable man, quick to learn, and able to transform acquired knowledge to his own use and to give it the stamp of his unique genius. A sober study of Shevchenko's poetry convinces us of this, even though we can easily pick out its folk-song elements. But as we read his *Diary* we continually marvel at the variety of his interests and information, the maturity of his understanding, his balanced judgement in the fields of literature and aesthetics⁷, and his high moral standard. It is difficult, after reading the *Diary* and the stories, to conceive Shevchenko as the semi-literate peasant of Turgenev's description⁸, and we may well imagine that in his early St. Petersburg days, when he unobtrusively laid the founda-

6. *Byulleten No. 2 stenogrammy VI plenuma SSP*, Kyiv, 1939, p. 95.

7. Cf. for instance his assessment of Eugene Sue and his review of Karl Libelt's *Estetyka czyli umnictwo piekne*.

8. "Shevchenko had read. . . very little (even Gogol was familiar to him superficially), and he knew even less" (see *literaturnyye i zhityeskiye vospominaniya*, Leningrad, 1934, p. 257). We get a similar impression of Shevchenko from the reminiscences of the Ukrainian historian N. I. Kostomarov.

tions of his artistic technique and wrote the mature sequences of the *Kobzar*, he followed literary developments in the intervals of painting. We learn from his story *The Artist* that Bryullov, Shevchenko's teacher and friend, encouraged him to love books and to read poetry aloud, although he objected to Shevchenko's cultivating verse, because it interfered with the latter's studies at the Academy of Art.

We have examined the technique of Shevchenko's verse and can now briefly review its subject-matter. Like the technique which it informs, this is varied, but can be reduced to a number of dominant patterns. There is, first, the recurrent theme of the seduced girl, which obsessed Shevchenko and may have been partly suggested to him by both Russian and Ukrainian authors, but the obsession of the theme was due to the fate of his first love, the village-girl Oksana Kovalenko. Less personal are the historical themes centred in the exploits of the Cossacks and the haydamaks, which may be resolved into the symbols of the Ukrainian people against foreign oppression. Shevchenko's very life is bound up with the theme of the exile's longing for his homeland, which is as intense in the lyrics of his St. Petersburg days as in those which he wrote in the Caspian steppes. Other attitudes which show no slackening of intensity are those of opposition to the Tsarist order and of anti-clericalism, the second of which has led the Soviet critic to diagnose atheism in Shevchenko. Opposition to the Tsar and Church, as the executive organs of Russian tyranny, which supported the minor, if no less galling of the serf-owning Polish and Russian landowners, was innate in our poet, whose childhood knew the hair-raising stories of his grandfather and whose manhood had felt the heavy hand of Nicholas I and his henchmen. Shevchenko's frequent and caustic attacks on the Russian monarchy and the Orthodox Church in league with it have given Soviet criticism cause to regard him as a "revolutionary", and it is characteristic of this view that in 1939 the University of Odessa published a symposium with the title *The Great Poet-Revolutionary*. We cannot deny that there are passages in Shevchenko's verse, and especially in his Russian prose, which lend colour to such a view, but scrutiny of his biography shows that Shevchenko was no activist, for all his radical opinions, and belonged to no revolutionary organisation, although he had friends in the liberal Society of St. Cyril and St. Methodius and appears to have been acquainted with N. G. Chernyshevsky. This Russian radical, incidentally, quoted Shevchenko as his authority on Ukrainian conditions when he attacked the anti-Russian policy of the *Lvivske Slovo* (Lviv Word) as a member of the dominant nationality in the Russian Empire, to whom foreign criticism of his country was as repugnant as it had been to Pushkin.⁹ What drew Shevchenko to the Russian "revolutionaries" in his latter days was an unrelenting hatred of established authority — both that of landowners and that of the Russian government. These had been the twin sources of his miseries from his birth. And how intense those miseries could be we realise, for in-

9. See N. G. Chernyshevsky, "Natsionalnaya bestaktnost" (*Sovremennoye Obozreniye*, July, 1861), reprinted in *Iz literaturnogo nasledstva N. G. Chernyshevskogo*, Saratov, 1937, pp. 101-102.

stance, from the pages of his *Diary*, in which he complained on June 19, 1857: "If I had been a monster, a murderer, even then a more fitting punishment could not have been devised for me than that of sending me off as a private to the Special Orenburg Corps. It is here that you have the cause of my indescribable sufferings. And in addition to all this I am forbidden to sketch". To these words he subsequently adds the scathing remark: "The heathen Augustus, banishing Naso to the savage Getae, did not forbid him to write or sketch. Yet the Christian Nicholas forbade me both". Is it strange then that Shevchenko's highly-strung nature, prone to extremes of feeling, as the superlatives in his letters and *Diary* show, should have resented such treatment and the many humiliations of military discipline, which in his case only stopped short at running the gauntlet? Is it to be wondered at too that after ten years of exile, broken in health (partly indeed through his own unwisdom), he should on occasion have been unable to restrain violent and even obscene outbursts against the powers that had wronged him?

Shevchenko, as we have just hinted, had his moments of weakness as well as considerable strength of character. Such moments of weakness led him into contradictions. The warm defender of feminine virtue confessed in a letter to his physician and friend A. O. Kozachkovsky in 1852¹⁰ that he could not boast even then "of a very chaste mode of life". In spite of this however Shevchenko's unchanging dream was of love, marriage, and domestic felicity in his native Ukraine. This dream continually recurs almost as a *leitmotiv* in his verse and it closes the last poem he wrote before he died.¹¹

Although Shevchenko never married, love played a significant part in his career,¹² and several of the women he was attracted to, including the peasant-girl who jilted him towards the end of his life, were subjects of his pictures, for Shevchenko was a portraitist as well as a painter of landscapes and historical canvasses. To understand him completely, as we must, it is necessary to study his work in that other field of art which he made his own.¹³ Here the influence of Karl Bryullov was of capital importance, even if it did not rise, except in the earliest phase, to the plane of inspiration. Shevchenko's careful and accurate draughtsmanship, his attention to detail, and his ability to seize and reproduce a slightly stylised likeness were all the results of Bryullov's precept and example. But the static quality of Bryullov's Classical art found no reflection in Shevchenko's practice. Between 1838 and 1847 Shevchenko passed through his period of apprenticeship to art, working mainly at the St. Petersburg Academy. By 1840 he was already illustrating books with engravings, and his subsequent visits to Ukraine provided him with practice portraiture and with fresh impressions. A critical year in his life was 1847 when he

10. See M. Shaginyan, *op. cit.* p. 188. The *Kobzar* contains *inter alia* a lengthy epistle to his friend (A. O. Kozachkovskomu).

11. *Chy ne pokynul nam, neboho* "Shall we then give up, my poor dear".

12. See M. Shaginyan, *op. cit.* pp. 129-224.

13. See I. L. Boliashny, "Shevchenko — khudozhnyk" (in *Velykyi poet-revolutsioner*, Odessa, 1939, pp. 215-259).

was exiled to Orenburg. Yet what seemed at first like catastrophe to the artist was not without its blessings in the long run. When Shevchenko was allowed to sketch in 1848 he made admirable use of his keen vision to solve completely the mystery of light and shade, which had fascinated him in the sunlight of Ukraine and now possessed him in the intenser light of the Caspian sands. Bryullov was no longer at hand to demand exclusive adherence to Classical and Biblical themes. Shevchenko's natural curiosity was attracted to landscape and ethnographic detail, although he could still practice portraiture by depicting at least himself. The work he did in exile is chiefly in water-colour and pencil. His choice of theme shows that he had largely outgrown his taste for Romantic and literary subjects and now preferred, as in his *Diary* and stories, to reproduce the seen and the known.¹⁴ Soldiers, the *Kirghiz*, especially Kirghiz children, and the sun-scorched arid landscapes, with their wide expanses, rugged bluffs, and rare vegetation — such things figure in the exiled Shevchenko's sketches and paintings. Yet when he returned to the capital in 1858 we find that he had brought with him a set of illustrations to the parable of the Prodigal Son. These however are not done, as they might have been, in a Bryullov-style Biblical context, but are "modernised" and given realistic touches, like verse-adaptations of the Scriptures which he made in his later years.¹⁵ The transition from Romanticism to Realism, which represents a change in European art and thought in the middle of the 19th century, may therefore be followed as plainly in Shevchenko's painting as in his literary work.

We began this essay with an attempt to detach Shevchenko from his reputation and we have considered him apart from it. Let us now consider him as a symbol, for this is one of the forms which a man's reputation may invest. All Shevchenko's literary work is closely bound up with his love and longing for Ukraine. It is only in the concrete visual detail of painting that his thoughts seem at times to be completely removed from his native landscapes and memories. Now it is the patriotic aspect of Shevchenko's work, especially his poetry, which first endeared him to his compatriots and has since made him the personification of the Ukrainian's thirst for liberty and independence. One might interpose here that the patriot Shevchenko of, say, the celebrated *Zapovit* (Testament) of 1845, in which he calls on his own to bury him and to rise and break their chains, and, echoing a passage of *La Marseillaise*, "to spatter freedom with evil enemy blood", — that this Shevchenko is only a fragment of a much larger whole, that this patriotism is only one aspect of his many-sided personality. It should be further pointed out, as the Soviet critic is only too apt to do, that this emphasis on Shevchenko's patriotism ignores his strong social consciousness, his "atheism", his very real anti-clericalism. To be sure it does; but at the same time there is no denying that his patriotism plays a highly important part in his poetry and has been rightly chosen by nationally-minded Ukrainians for special emphasis, just as the rather less important

14. E. g. the picture "Running the Gauntlet" (U. *Kara shpitsrutenamy*).

15. E. g. the paraphrase of Psalm XL (1859) and the adaptation of Hosea XIV (1859).

social criticism in his work has been emphasised by those intent on proving his revolutionary affiliations.¹⁶ Shevchenko's patriotism is that of the artist who is primarily a man of feeling. With him it is not a shibboleth, but a profound emotional experience. Nevertheless it has binding power and it can serve, as Shevchenko knew well himself, as a call to arms. Study of those lyrics in which he speaks of his country not merely as an object of longing, but as the future home of his liberated compatriots, shows that he tried to project his sense of national equity into the future and to visualise this as an age of personal freedom in the homeland. So we find him, in his *Friendly Epistle to My Compatriots* (1845), urging them not to seek freedom and brotherhood abroad, but in their native Ukraine, in their own homes, where they will find "their own truth, strength, and freedom", and imploring them to create a new age by embracing one another in brotherhood. These words hold good today as they did when they were written over a hundred years ago, although conditions in Ukraine are in some respects very different from what they were then. But the realisation of the ideal expressed in Shevchenko's words is prevented by circumstances for which Ukrainians themselves are not collectively responsible. An intolerant alien power still presides, as it did in Shevchenko's time, over the destinies of their country and has even succeeded in uniting under its control all the Ukrainian-speaking lands. The presence of that power has led to an exodus of Ukrainians from Ukraine in moments of crisis since the emancipation of the serfs after Shevchenko's death made collective movement possible. In consequence of this a notable part of the Ukrainian people now lives outside the national frontiers. The existence of such a body of emigrants¹⁷ is a sure sign of an abnormal state of things at home. But it is by no means the only sign, for the long history of Ukraine has been an abnormal history of repeated annexations since Kyiv fell to the steppe tribes in the early 13th century. This state of nearly unbroken national servitude brings vividly to mind the career of the great and lovable man, the 125th anniversary of whose death we are celebrating this year. Shevchenko's story is that of his native land in microcosm. No wonder then that his inspiring words are especially treasured by all those of his compatriots who have experienced the bitter anguish of exile and who still love and have not lost their faith in a regenerate Ukraine.

16. See Ya. S. Parkhomenko, "Hart polumyano ho revolutsionera" and L. P. Nosenko, "Shevchenko i rosiyska revoliutsiyna demokratiya" (in *Velykyi poet-revolutsioner*, Odessa, 1939)

17. Cf. the Irish emigration to the U.S.A. after the potato famine in the 19th century.

Ariadna STEBELSKA

SHEVCHENKO — APOSTLE OF TRUTH

All around us reign untruth and slavery,
And our martyred people is silent.

With these words Shevchenko begins his tale of the martyrdom of the righteous Czech, Jan Hus, who was not afraid of raising his voice against the "mighty of this world" in defence of truth. In the same year (1845), which saw Shevchenko's most powerful political works, he finished his poem *Nevolnyk* (The Slave) with a description of the times in which he lived:

Everywhere I look there is untruth,
Everywhere people curse the Lord!

In the poem *Kavkaz* (The Caucasus), so full of poetic axiom, one finds the following words, like the words of a prayer addressed to God, which stress the importance of "truth" and "falsehood" in both their positive and negative sense:

Not for us to stand against Thee,
Not for us to judge Thy deed:
For us there is but weeping, weeping,
For us our daily bread to Knead
Well mixed with blood and sweat and tears;
The hangman tortures, mocks and jeers,
Our drunken truth sleeps on — as dead!

At the very beginning of the sermon-like poem *Moye Druzhneye Poslanie* (My Friendly Epistle), written in 1845, Shevchenko describes the problem of truth in these words:

Deaf, they do not hearken,
They are trading with their fetters,
Using truth to bargain,
And they all neglect the Lord, —
In heavy yokes they harness
People; thus they plough disaster,
And they sow disaster. . .

Shevchenko's *Epistle* contains many words filled with sacred passion and indignation, bordering on the invective, often making use of irony, even sarcasm, which comes out very clearly in the following extract:

. . . You scream, too,
That God, creating you, did not mean you

To worship untruth, then, once more,
 You bow down as you bowed before, . . .

In a further passage of the *Epistle* Shevchenko gives out similar instructions. But this time without using sarcasm:

Such indeed, then, is our glory,
 Ukraina's glory! . . .
 Thus too, you should read it through
 That you'd do more than dream,
 While slumbering, of injustices,
 So that you would see
 High gravemounds open up before
 Your eyes, that then you might
 Ask the martyrs when and why
 And who was crucified.

In his works Shevchenko connects the notion of "untruth" with the concept of "coercion", with his descriptions of martyrdom in *Yeretyk* (The Heretic), and *Kavkaz* (1845), and with the unjust social order under which "our martyred people", coerced into a deathly silence, the deathly silence of all those millions who have lost their lives as a result of famine, firing squad or deportation, "is silent". The word "untruth" appears in various forms. Sometimes it is substituted by the word "injustice", and at other times by the word "lies". It also comes in the form of verbs, such as "to lie" (thou liest people-starver)*, and is sometimes connected with the idea of "unjust people" by the use of such terms as "evil ones", and "wicked ones". Having outlined the notion of "untruth" at the outset of this article, I would like to describe the sombre background of one of the most substantial principles of Shevchenko's ideology — his concept of "truth", which is frequently highlighted by descriptions of light and brightness, and with the notions of good and sanctity, and which identifies with the concept of God, as an ideal, and the goal of man's aspirations. The word "istyna" (biblical: truth) is sometimes used in place of the word "pravda" (truth), especially in prayers, and appears in Shevchenko's works connected with the notion of "love". Both concepts ("truth" and "love") bear equal significance as does the concept of "freedom" which balances out the idea of "captivity" just as "truth" balances out "untruth".

In his poetic descriptions Shevchenko often makes use of the word "truth", which, like its opposite "untruth", has its own nuances and variants. The words "righteousness" and the "righteous ones" are connected with "truth". The "righteous ones" are sometimes called the "good ones", just as the "unrighteous" are referred to as the "evil ones".

Despite the wide thematical variety the whole of Shevchenko's work, including his work as an artist, not only as a poet and prose writer, is filled with one ideology, one aspiration towards "truth" (identification with justice),

* *Kholodnyi Yar* (The Cold Ravine), Vyunyshcha, 1845.

with "freedom" in its most noble sense, and "love", as the moving force of human life. Everything else stems from these three notions and is dependent upon them. However, despite these three notions, which often appear as synonyms of or else very closely linked with the concept of God, the dominant moving force in Shevchenko's life and creative work is Ukraine. In certain instances Shevchenko even crosses the borders of purely national interests and ventures into the realm of universal problems of existence. But here too the same ideals apply and are as dominant as those which Shevchenko aspires to attain in the sphere of his own national interests. The words "pravda" or "istyna" and the words which derive from them, as well as their antitheses, such as "untruth" or "injustice", appear for the first time in Shevchenko's works as early as 1839 in the poem *To Osnovyanenko*, and recur in many of the works he wrote during his life, appearing even in one of his last works — the poem *I den ide, i nich ide* (Day comes and goes). However, the actual notion of "truth" and "untruth" laid out in a philosophical manner, but described in many diverse poetical descriptions, appears even more frequently.

Shevchenko's thought pattern distinguishes very clearly between all the phenomena of human life linked with either of the two opposing notions "truth" and "untruth". Coming to the end of his relatively short life, Shevchenko tried to draw several conclusions from all that he had lived through and seen. These appear in the form of his shortest contemplative work, only four lines long, written in St. Petersburg in 1860, *I den ide, i nich ide* (Day comes and goes):

Day comes and goes, night comes and goes.
Sinking your head in hands clasped tight,
You wonder why there still comes no
Apostle of wisdom, truth and right.

At that time, twenty years had already passed since the beginning of Shevchenko's creative life, and he was waiting for an echo to his work, something he had missed so much during his period of exile. At this point he also anxiously awaited a person who would inherit his "Apostleship of Truth". He was full not only of grief, but also of despair, expressing this in the words: "sinking your head in hands clasped tight". However, the sole "Apostle of Truth" remained none other than Shevchenko himself.

Having made a detailed study of Shevchenko's work one can distinguish the following directions in his "Apostleship of Truth": a) Constant acquaintance with his native Ukrainian "truth" and national values; b) constant study to attain the ability to distinguish between everything that was his own and everything that was foreign; c) conscious ability to distinguish between "truth" and "lies"; and "good" and "evil".

In Shevchenko's works one can find poetic descriptions illustrating both "truth" and "righteousness", as well as their opposite notions "untruth" and "evil". In his poems *Nevolnyk* (The Slave), *Naymychka* (The Servant Girl),

Moskaleva Krynytsia (The Muscovite's Well), *Yeretyk* (The Heretic), *Neophity* (The Neophytes), and *Maria*, and many other works in which the key words "truth" and "righteousness" are often used in various forms, Shevchenko sets his reader an example which the latter should follow. It is interesting to note that at the beginning of his tale of the blind orphan Stepan (*Nevolnyk*), Shevchenko notes:

In Ukraine the villages still proudly stood happy and free
When the old Kozak and the two children lived righteously,
Long ago this took place,
In the time of the old Hetmanate.

In the epilogue of the poem this glorious picture of the times of the Cossack Hetmanate, when there was still "truth" and "justice" in Ukraine, is contrasted with Shevchenko's contemporary times, when "untruth" reigns everywhere. In his political works, both didactic and contemplative, Shevchenko deals with the problem of "truth" even more clearly. However, it also appears very discretely in various intimate descriptions like, for example, in the masterpiece *I Nebo Nevmyte, I Zaspani Khvyli* (Drowsy Waves) written in the Kos-Aral in 1848:

. . . It does not speak,
The yellowed grass, but silent, sways
As if alive, across the plain.
To speak the truth is not its task. . .
And there is no one else to ask.

This extract is of great value to us as proof that although Shevchenko was physically distanced from people and human problems, his thoughts about "truth" and his aspirations towards freedom did not leave him.

"Truth" was to manifest itself in speech, in the words of poets, bards and minstrels. For instance, in the poem *Do Osnovyanenka* (To Osnovyanenko) the minstrel asks:

Is it so, father Otaman,
Do I sing the truth?

In the same poem the glory of Ukraine is described as "loud and true, just like the word of the Lord". At the end of the poem *Haydamaky*, addressing Hryhorovych, the secretary of the Academy of Arts, who helped to buy Shevchenko out of serfdom and calling him his "sincere father", the poet has this to say:

He did not shun the words about Ukraine,
Which sings the melancholy blind old man
Beside the fence,
He loves to hear her дума of truth,
Of exploits past and Cossack glory.

Shevchenko uses different words to describe his other "advisers" who only wanted to hear from him songs in Russian about "Parasha, our happiness and

joy". Choosing his metaphors carefully, Shevchenko dismisses this advice describing it as the opposite of truth, as lies:

The sheepskin coat is warm indeed,
But unfortunately it doesn't fit me,
And your profound words are soled with lies.

Shevchenko speaks very modestly about his own poetic words, but links them with "truth". For instance in the poem *Chyhyryne, Chyhyryne* (Chyhyryn) he says:

Do not rend, thoughts, do not burn!
I shall bring back, maybe,
My truth, all fortuneless, my words
Spoken quietly.

His views on creative power do not change even after exile. Thus, in the poem *The Muse* he writes as follows:

. . . At night,
In the daytime, in the evening and in the morning
Come to me and teach me, teach me with unevil lips
To speak the truth!

However, before being able to speak the truth, one must first of all discover it, and in order to know it, one must search for it, and ask it to come to you. From childhood Shevchenko sought "people who would teach [him] good" (*Haydamaky*), and even when he saw that all around him there was so much injustice and evil, and how "the wind scattered [hope] over the plain [and] the waves swept it over the seas", he did not lose hope, but sang:

Then let the wind bear all away
In its untrammelled flight,
And let the heart then weep and pray:
On this earth-holy right!

Chyhyryn
(Moscow, 1844)

In the prayers which Shevchenko wrote as late as 1860, he expresses the same desire for "truth" as the highest value of life. He prays using these words:

Grant it to me, O Lord,
That I may love truth on earth.

In Shevchenko's works, "truth" is often described as "sacred", "God's" or "living", and its identification with metaphorical expressions referring to light and sun is in accordance with the canonical prayers of the Eastern Church, which introduced such modes of addressing Christ as "The Sun of Truth" or "The Lamp of Truth", through the writings of the Great Fathers of the Church. These descriptive expressions appear in Shevchenko's poetry as early as 1844. For instance in the poem *Zavorozhy Meni Volkhve*. . . (Tell me my fortune, o sorcerer) he writes:

Maybe I'll pray one more time,
And weep with the children,
Maybe I will see one more time
The sun of truth,
If only in my dreams. . .

Dedicating the poem *Yeretyk* to Šafarik Shevchenko turns to the Czech patriot with these words:

You saw hidden deeply
With your bold, courageous spirit
And your eye like eagle's.
Seer, you caught the glimpse of freedom,
Freedom, and of truth!

Truth and its sanctity and vitality are linked with the highest being, with God. Thus in the comedy *Son* (The Dream), a poem where Shevchenko expresses painful bitterness and sarcasm, he reminds Ukraine that “. . .with the Lord of Heaven truth yet is living!”. Truth must reign among people. Mankind has to steer a straight course without evil as Shevchenko tells us about his own interrelation with fate (1853):

We were not evil with you,
We steered a straight course,
We have not left seeds of untruth behind us!

The notion of “truth” gains particular significance in the poem *Neophity*, and sublimates into the most spiritual descriptions of the poem. It appears in the beautiful prayer to the Virgin Mary, which has no equal in perhaps the entire Christian literature. The words of the prayer go like this:

Thou who art blessed among women,
O Holy Mother, full of grace,
Mother of that Holy Son
On earth! Let me not dwine a slave,
And waste the fleeting years in vain.
O joy of the afflicted ones,
Send me that holy word, the new
Voice, O send, of holy truth,
And that word with holy wisdom
Do thou revivify, enlighten!

Shevchenko ends this prayer with the word “truth”, changing only its form to the religious form “istyna”:

So that the word, as flame apparent,
Will melt the heart of human-kind,
Throughout Ukraine the word be carried,
There in Ukraine the word be hallowed,
The word, the frankincense divine,
The frankincense of truth. Amen.

The word of truth, metaphorically described here as frankincense,

becomes particularly dynamic, for, just like the incense, it has to spread throughout the world and reach every corner of the earth, especially Ukraine. An even greater sublimation of truth occurs at another point in this poem, when the author becomes indignant at the "sightless slaves" who went to pray to the bronze image of their executioner, Emperor Nero, among them the heroine of the poem, the mother of Alcides. Shevchenko issues a warning saying:

. . . Woe unto you!
 You blind, unseeing slaves! With whom,
 With whom are you entreating, hapless
 Creatures, sightless slaves and captive?
 The executioner save you from doom?
 Pray to God alone, your father,
 Pray to truth and right on earth,
 And bow down before no other
 On earth.

Although one cannot regard Shevchenko's writings as theological works, it would nevertheless be fitting to make a comparison between the deep Christian identification with God and truth, which is so apparent in Shevchenko's works, and the epistle of the Apostle John the Theologian who wrote that God is love. They complement each other perfectly. The notion of "truth" adopts a theological character towards the end of the poem *Neophity*. Having suffered the greatest possible grief known to man — the martyr's death of her son (Alcides) — his mother accepted her son's faith and became a new apostle of the ideas for which he died. Shevchenko ends the poem with these words:

. . . He saved
 You, Mary's Son, the Crucified.
 And you received the living word
 That in your living soul He poured.
 And you to market-place and palace
 The word of right, the word of God,
 The Living Lord and True you bore.

This elated notion of "truth" continues in the poem *Maria*, gaining even greater force and dynamism. Although the author mentions Christ relatively little, he does say that Christ:

Bore the word of truth to the evil,
 But they did not accept the word and crucified Him!

But the Virgin Mary, who urged the Apostles to "go their own way to different places around the world" and to "spread love and truth throughout the whole world", taught her Son, while He was still young, to "stand for truth, [and] die for truth [for] without truth there is but grief!"

"Truth" is a universal concept. But every corner of the earth has its own

particular shade of the universal truth, and just as Christianity teaches that each person is unique, so the various national organisms are equally unique. Upon attaining its self-assertion each nation discovers its own particular truth, and its own truth has to have a place in the world, where:

There'll be no more of enemy, of foe,
But only son and mother earth will know,
And only people shall there be.

*Archimedes and Galileo,
(St. Petersburg, 1860)*

And these people shall live in their "own house". "In one's own house" there is "one's own truth, one's own might and freedom" (*Epistle*).

As an "Apostle of truth" Shevchenko could see the vital importance of "one's own truth", and as an apostle of learning, he saw the absolute necessity of one's own learning, which he mentioned in *The Epistle*:

Had you but learned the way you ought,
Then wisdom also would be yours.

Before a nation can develop its own truth, learning, strength and freedom, it must attain independence, and there must be truth and justice between every nation. Despite the very black reality, which kindled the flame of "sacred passion" in Shevchenko, he believed in the ultimate victory of truth as a normality. He expressed these beliefs in the poem *O Liude, Liude Neboraky!* (O People, Poor People!) St. Petersburg, 1860:

Will there be a trial?
Will retribution fall upon the tsars
And princelings here on Earth?
Will there be truth among the peoples? . . .
But truth there ought to be,
Or sun from slumber will arise
And desecrated land, defiled, shall scorch.

In a poem *I Tut, i Vsiudy — Skriz Pohano* (Both Here and Everywhere — It's Bad Throughout), written only a few days before *O People, Poor People!*, Shevchenko also prophesies the return of light and truth with the words:

Here comes the sun,
Leading day behind it. . .
And truth there will be on this Earth! . . .

(St. Petersburg, 1860)

An even more powerful picture of Heaven on Earth can be found in the *Paraphrase of Isaiah, Verse 35*. (St. Petersburg, 1858). However, the prerequisite of this Heaven on Earth is the existence of truth:

When O Lord the holy truth
Shall on the Earth descend. . .

Only then all kinds of miracles will happen, for "the blind shall see, and

hunchbacks shall run around like antelope among the trees” and “the wilderness shall be filled with happy villages”. However, this ideal society will not come of its own accord. The people will have to fight for it, and the struggle will only be successful if they fight in the name of truth. Thus, in *Kavkaz* Shevchenko turns to the subjugated mountain people and says:

Struggle on — and be triumphant!
God himself will aid you;
At your side fight truth and glory,
Right and holy freedom.

In the end justice must come, according to the word of God:

Truly in Thy might, Thy living
Spirit we believe;
Liberty and right shall triumph,
And, O Lord, to Thee
Every tongue on Earth shall pray
Through the length of days.

This norm of justice also applies to Ukraine, and through the efforts of all her faithful sons and daughters Ukraine will throw off the yoke of “untruth” and bondage. In the poem *Subotiv*, a complement to his great political work the mystery play *Velykyi Liokh* (The Great Vault), Shevchenko speaks these prophetic words:

And Ukraine shall once more arise
And blow the darkness of captivity away,
The light of truth shall come on once again,
And children of captivity in freedom and
In liberty will pray.

(Myrhorod, 1845)

Taras SHEVCHENKO

THE CAUCASUS

To Yakiv de Balmen

Oh that my head were waters, and mine eyes a fountain of tears,
that I might weep day and night for the slain. . .

Jeremiah lx. 1.

Mountains beyond mountains, crags in stormclouds cloaked,
Wild heights sown with sorrow, soil that blood has soaked.

From the dawn of time, Prometheus
Hangs, the eagle's victim;
All God's days, it pecks his ribs,
Tears the heart within him.
Tears, but cannot drink away
The blood that throbs with life,
Still it lives and lives again,
And still once more he smiles.
For our soul shall never perish,
Freedom knows no dying,
And the Glutton cannot harvest
Fields where seas are lying;
Cannot blind the living spirit,
Nor the living word,
Cannot smirch the sacred glory
Of Almighty God.

Not for us to stand against Thee,
Not for us to judge Thy deed:
For us there is but weeping, weeping,
For us our daily bread to knead
Well-mixed with blood and sweat and tears;
The hangman tortures, mocks and jeers,
Our drunken truth sleeps on — as dead!

When will she wake once more from slumber?
When, worn out with strife,
Lord, wilt Thou lie down to rest
And grant us people life?

Truly in Thy might, Thy living
Spirit we believe;
Liberty and right shall triumph,
And, O Lord to Thee
Every tongue on earth shall pray
Through the length of days.
Meanwhile, rivers rise in flood,
Swollen streams of blood.

Mountains beyond mountains, crags in stormclouds cloaked,
Wild heights sown with sorrow, soil that blood has soaked.

“And there, Our Majesty surprised
(Naked and starving though it be),
A poor, but natural liberty.
The hunt is on! . . .” Since then, the ground
Is strewn with conscripts’ scattered bones.
And tears? And blood? Enough to drown
All emperors with all their sons
And grandsons eager for the throne
In widow’s tears. . . And maiden’s tears
Shed secretly the whole night long?
What of the fiery tears of mothers?
The blood-stained tears of aged fathers?
Not rivers now — a sea, full-flood,
A sea of fire. . . Glory! Glory!
Glory to wolf-hounds, trappers, hunters,
And to the tsars, our “little fathers”, Glory!
And Glory to you, dark-blue mountains,
Frost and snow protect you;
And to you, great hearted heroes,
God does not forget you.
Battle on — and win your battle.
God Himself will aid you;
At your side fight truth and glory.
Right and holy freedom.

“Bannock and croft are all your own;
They were not alms, were not a gift, —
No one will seize them for his own,
Clap you in chains and drag you off.
In our domain. . . We’re civilized,

We read the words of the Holy Writ,
And from the dungeon's lowest pit
Up to the glory of the throne
We're all in gold — and naked too.
We'll show you culture! You'll be taught
The price of bread, the price of salt. . .
We're Christians. We have shrines and learning,
And all that's good. God likes us too!
Your croft alone still spoils our view;
Why does it stand upon your land
Without our leave? Why can we not
Throw you your bannocks as to dogs?
Why don't you, when all's said and done,
Pay excise duty on the sun?
That's all we ask! For we're not heathens,
We're genuine, professing Christians.
We're satisfied with little, — so
If only you'd be friendly too,
There'd be so much to show to you,
A good slice of the world is ours;
Siberia, think! — too vast to cross!
Jails? People? Counting takes too long!
From the Moldavian to the Finn
Silence is held in every tongue. . .
All quite content. . . In our domain
The Bible is made plain to us,
The holy monks explain it thus: —
A king, who used to pasture swine,
Murdered a friend, and stole his wife,
— And thus he won eternal life!
Just see who's in *our* Paradise!
You're unenlightened, you don't know
The truths the Holy Cross can show!
So learn our rule! Fleece, fleece and give;
 And when you've given —
 Straight off to heaven,
And take the family if you like!
And as for us! What don't we know?
There's stars to count and corn to sow,
We curse the French! And we can sell
(They make fine stakes at cards as well),
People — not negroes, our own kind,

Just simple Christians, we don't mind,
For we're not Dagoes! God forbid
That we should deal in stolen goods
As Jew-boys do. We live 'by law'! . . ."
By the apostolic law?
Then you love your brethren?
Hypocrites, with vipers' tongues,
Rogues accursed by heaven!
Yes, you love your brother's skin,
Never mind his soul!
Fleece him 'by law' when you need money:
A daughter's fine fur stole,
Or a dowry for your bastard,
Slippers for your wife,
And expenses you don't mention
In your family life!

Why, then wast Thou crucified,
Christ, Thou Son of God?
Was it just for us good people?
For the word of truth?
So that we would mock Thee, maybe?
That's the way it was!

Shrines and chapels, candelabra,
Ikons, clouds of incense,
Deep prostrations, never tiring,
Honouring Thine Image;
— Grant them theft and war and murder,
So that they may kill a brother,
Behold, they offer gifts to Thee!
Loot from a fire, fine tapestry! . . .

"We are the enlightened! Now
We bring the radiant sun,
Reveal the blessed light of truth
To sightless little ones.
Come to us, and all you ought
To know will be made plain:
Prison building will be taught,
How to forge your chains,
How to wear them, how the knout

Is plaited — we'll explain
All our science. Only yield
Your dark-blue mountains, please —
They alone defy us now,
We hold the plains and seas!"

And they drove you there, Yakiv, to die as a stranger,
My friend, my one friend! Not for our Ukraina,
But for her hangman they made you shed blood,
— Not black blood, but good; and you drank your reward
From a Muscovite chalice of Muscovite poison.
My friend, my dear friend, in my thoughts unforgotten!
Come, living soul, come to dwell in Ukraine;
Fly across banks with the Cossacks, stand guard
By the robbed mounds of heroes, and wait in the plain,
Sharing the tears that the Cossacks are weeping,
Until I escape from this slavery and pain.

Meanwhile, I have seeds to scatter,
All my aching grief,
All my thoughts; God grant they blossom
Speaking in the wind.
Peaceful winds from Ukraina,
Bearing dew, will carry
All my thoughts to you, dear brother,
Greeting them with sorrow,
You will read them to the end,
Recalling quietly,
The heroes' graves, the plains, the hills,
The land you loved — and me.

18.xi.1845
Pereyaslav.

THE COLD RAVINE

To every man his own misfortune,
Nor am I without one,
Though it is not mine, but borrowed,
Still it is — misfortune.
Why, one would say, recall events
That happened so long past,
Rouse them from God knows how far back?
Good that they sleep at last! . . .
Take, for example, that Ravine!
Already there remains
Not even a narrow track to it,
As though there never came
Man's foot there — yet, if you but think,
A good road ran between
The sacred Motryn monastery
And that dread Ravine.
Of old the Haydamaky there
In that Ravine pitched camp,
They primed there muskets for the fight
And made their lances sharp.
In that Ravine assembled then
(with suffering worn and tried)
Father with son, brother with brother,
In order, side by side,
To face the evil enemy,
The accursed Pole.
Where art thou, then, path to the deep
Ravine once trodden well?
Hast grown thyself with a dark grove?
Or have new hangmen come
To plant thee over, so that now
People cannot come
For thy advice: what shall they do
With masters just and good,
With wicked, evil cannibals,
With new Poles? no, indeed,
You cannot hide it! Zaliznyak
Above the Ravine still hovers,
Glances over towards Uman',
Looking out for Gonta.
Do not hide it, do not trample

On the Holy Gospel,
Do not hail ferocious Nero:
"Righteous Apostle!"
Do not try to find your glory
In the Tsar's "crusade",
For you yourselves do not know what
These Tsarlings perpetrate,
But shout that "for the Fatherland"
You make this great oblation
Of soul and skin! Forsooth yours is
Indeed a sheeplike nature!
The fool offers his neck, not knowing
What for it is wanted,
And, what is more, the idle loafer
Scorns and sneers at Gonta!
*"The Haydamaky were no warriors,
Thieves they were, and robbers,
A blot upon our history !"*
Thou liest, people-starver:
For freedom and the holy truth
A robber does not rise up,
Nor does he set free a people
Who, dark, unlightened,
Are bound into your chains, does not
Slay with his own hand
An evil son, nor break his living
Heart for his native land!
It is you that are the robbers,
You, the insatiate!
Hungry crows! And by what righteous
Holy law d'you trade
In land, the equal gift to all,
And traffic in misfortuned
Human beings! Then beware,
For evil will befall you,
Grave evil. Fool your children, fool
Your brother blind and sightless,
Fool yourselves, fool strangers, too,
But fool not God Almighty!
For, in the day of jubilation,
Vengeance unforeseen
Will fall on you; new fires will blow
From out the Cold Ravine.

17.XII.1845
Vyunyshcha.

IT DOES NOT TOUCH ME

It does not touch me, not a whit,
If I live in Ukraine or no,
If men recall me, or forget,
Lost as I am, in foreign snow, —
Touches me not the slightest whit.
Captive, to manhood I have grown
In strangers' homes, and by my own
Unmourned, a weeping captive still,
I'll die; all that is mine, I will
Bear off, let not a trace remain
In our own glorious Ukraine,
Our own land — yet a stranger's rather.
And speaking with his son, no father
Will recall, nor bid him: Pray,
Pray, son! Of old, for our Ukraine,
They tortured all his life away.
It does not touch me, not a whit,
Whether that son will pray, or no. . .
But it does touch me deep if knaves,
Evil rogues lull our Ukraine
Asleep, and only in the flames
Let her, all plundered, wake again. . .
That touches me with deepest pain.

(May 1847

St. Petersburg. In the Fortress.)

Translated from Ukrainian by Vera Rich.

Stephen OLESKIW

CAN ACTS OF TERRORISM EVER BE JUSTIFIED?*

iii) Terrorism and Liberal Democracies

In liberal-democratic states the situation is markedly different to that in authoritarian state systems based on tyranny and fear. In liberal democracies terrorists do not face exceptional circumstances of imminent threat or great danger that would demand drastic measures. There is thus no legitimate reason to resort to terroristic means. Political dissidents do not have to fear a secret police and do not have to face repression, arrest, deportation or execution as there is freedom of speech, press and political opposition as well as other basic human rights granted to every citizen of a liberal democratic state. Thus those who ultimately turn towards terrorism are free to oppose, criticise, and campaign against the particular party or faction in power at any time, as long as they do not resort to violent means.

It is clear therefore that terrorism is by far not a last resort method in liberal states. Alternatives more effective than terror are available and have been effectively put into practice before. For instance, a long general strike can be a very effective weapon or means of persuasion. It can paralyse a liberal state and even enforce major concessions or capitulation by the government without the need to resort to illegal means. Such was the case in 1974 when a strike by the Ulster Workers Council caused the collapse of the Northern Ireland Executive. Similarly the mineworkers' strike at the end of 1973, which was staged at the same time as the Arab oil embargo and the huge increase in the price of Middle East oil, was a major factor in the defeat of the Conservative government in the General Election which Prime Minister Edward Heath was forced to call on February 28, 1974, as a result of the effects of the strike on the difficult economic situation in the country. Thus those who choose to oppose the government of the day can work within the bounds of the law through political parties, trade unions and even bring down a government without terror and excessive violence.

Neither are the terrorists in democratically run states people of need whose welfare has been constantly neglected and appeals for aid disregarded, thus warranting drastic measures to receive attention. On examining the background of many of those committing acts of terrorism, one can see that in the 1970's much of the political terrorism in liberal states was committed by "spoilt children of affluence". For example, the Baader-Meinhof in Germany,

* Continued from *The Ukrainian Review*, No. 2, 1986

the Weathermen in the USA, the Japanese United Red Army, and the Angry Brigade in Britain were all mainly composed of young people who had received the benefits of higher education. They were not deprived in any sense, either in absolute or relative terms and were not psychotic either⁹. So why did they, as so many others, resort to violence?

Terrorists in liberal-democratic countries are men and women of urgency. They are impatient people and cannot wait for the slow pace of evolutionary development towards the attainment of their desired aims. They want to realise their aims at once and thus resort to terrorism, which they claim is the only way to get what they want. They are usually desperate people who are violently opposed to the regime in power and alienated from liberal values. They know very well that the liberal state has universal acceptance and legitimacy, a factor which drives the more fanatical dissidents to loose hope of attaining influence and power by peaceful and legitimate means.

Sometimes a particular ideological obsession, be it Marxism or Sartrean idealisation of violence, as well as fanaticism, drives these people to strive for tactical gains, such as publicity, through violence and terror. But in the words of Walter Laqueur "slogans change with intellectual fashions and should not be taken seriously. The real inspiration underlying terrorism is a free-floating activism that can with equal ease turn right and left. It is the action that counts"¹⁰. He quotes as examples the IRA and the Macedonian IMRO which at different times had connections with both fascism and communism, and the Stern gang and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) whose ideologies included elements of the extreme right as well as the extreme left.

In liberal democracies the majority makes decisions. Terrorists are a minority group, but they can accept neither this nor the fact that as a minority group they cannot dictate policy or decide who is to rule the state. In liberal states there is a generally accepted form of political behaviour. The people are politically aware enough to understand the political system and to accept a particular legal means of political transfer of power — electoral endorsement by a majority of votes. The people also accept the rules and regulations laid down by the particular legal codes of their countries and abide by them. Therefore attempts at political transfer of power by means of terror and violence (both illegal) will not work in liberal states and will only result in political defeat for those trying to do so. In liberal countries terrorists trying to gain power or political importance will never be accepted by the people, who will not lend their support to anyone working outside the established law and thus terrorists can never achieve the basic and perhaps most important aim in the battle against the state — the support of the population.

In the theory of the liberal state, however, everyone has the chance to voice his opinions and be heard. Thus the minority can and must be heard.

9. Paul Wilkinson: *Terrorism and the Liberal State*, London, 1977, p. 93.

10. Walter Laqueur: *The Terrorism Reader — A Historical Anthology*, London, 1979, p. 255.

But the minority cannot dictate to the majority. Concessions can and should, within reason, be made to accommodate the minority wishes, but the minority has no right to enforce its views on the majority, least of all by such means as would entail terrorising people into acceptance.

Thus because of the ways of the liberal state terrorists turn to extreme ruthlessness and violence in the hope of attaining their goals. Through their frustration terrorists believe that the more extreme the terror and violence the faster the state will concede or capitulate. Therefore it is common to find acts of terrorism largely of an indiscriminate nature in liberal democracies.

In terrorism there exists "a stronger connotation of guilt and punishment than in other forms of warfare or politics, and a narrower definition of 'innocent' bystanders. To terrorists, there are few innocent bystanders"¹¹. For terrorists often declare that victims of their attack, whether human or material, are somehow guilty or else symbolise something that the terrorists consider to be guilty. For instance, a person may be regarded as guilty because he has committed what in the eyes of the terrorists constitutes a crime. He may have actively opposed, disobeyed, or informed on the terrorist movement, or even cooperated with a guilty party, and hence "deserved" to become a victim of "punishment". However, this "cooperation" is usually interpreted very broadly indeed to mean that the person in question worked for, tacitly supported, accepted a visa from, or travelled on the national transport of an enemy state or government.

A very good example of this is the massacre of Puerto Rican pilgrims at Lod airport in 1972. The PFLP, which was responsible for the attack, said that the innocent victims were "guilty" because they had arrived in Israel on Israeli visas, thereby tacitly recognising a state declared an enemy of Palestine, and also because by coming to Israel the pilgrims had entered a war zone. Such a rationalisation of indiscriminate and random killing is common to all terrorists who usually declare their victims guilty post factum.

Through this type of assignment of guilt and the claim of the administration of justice terrorists rationalise their acts of violence and moral outrage and also seek to establish their moral superiority. Terrorists are imbued with a strong sense of moral outrage and a conviction of the absolute righteousness of their cause and by their acts they attempt to arouse the same sense of moral outrage which may be latent in the minds of the audience, and at the same time to reinforce their own moral convictions.

Such moralistic and romantic euphemisms and claims to be revolutionary heroes do not hold water. Acts of indiscriminate and random killing of innocent and unarmed victims who logically have nothing to do with the struggle lack all heroic qualities such as magnanimity and humanity.

Once we take all these factors into account, it becomes obvious that terror-

11. Carlton and Schaerf (eds): *International Terrorism and World Security*, London, 1977, p. 18.

ist activity in liberal-democratic states is completely unjustifiable and wrong, and must be condemned on all occasions.

*

It would also be prudent to mention in a few words terrorist activity by groups fighting against colonial rule by liberal states. In such cases the resort to terror tactics is more than just that of groups not living under the colonial rule of a democratic state. However, all the other Just War principles must still apply and cannot be disregarded.

As with all other causes of terrorism against the state, theoretically use of terror can be such as to be justifiable. If all or most of the principles are positively covered then the acts of terror can be justified, but only so far, for one must always keep in mind the fact that terrorism is a crime and can never be completely justified.

In practice, however, this is much more difficult to do. For in practice all movements employing terror in struggles for independence have not really justified themselves to the fullest degree possible. As an example one can take the campaigns fought by the Irgun in Palestine, the EOKA in Cyprus, and the FLN in Algiers. All these groups and many like them did not keep their mode of fighting strictly within the bounds of proportion and discrimination when it came to the use of terror and violence. For instance, the FLN practiced an indiscriminate form of terrorism, planting bombs in crowded market places, in shops, in buses and other public places to provoke an ethnic schism between Europeans and Arabs in Algiers, as well as to sow fear and cause disruption in the cities and destroy certain elements of the population, especially Muslim officials sympathetic to the French, and collaborators.

The EOKA, struggling for "Enosis" (unification) with Greece, played with similar rules. Its policy was to kill not only officials, policemen, and British soldiers, but also their families in order to heighten the atmosphere of terror, and indeed every Greek or Turk found to be helping the British authorities. Here again one can recognise a distinct lack of, or even deliberate disregard for, proportion and discrimination. And, as mentioned earlier, it is rather obscure in such cases what accusations of "helping the British" or "working for the British" really mean. One can be sure that some of those killed as traitors were genuine collaborators whose assassination would not be as wrong as that of innocent people, but what of the others?

As with terrorism inside liberal democracies, employed against the political system, those resorting to it are usually a minority who turn to ruthless violence without the support of the whole population in a desperate attempt to achieve their aims, and thus their use of terrorism cannot be justified in any way at all. Such means as indiscriminate terror go only to negate any just cause or legitimate reasons which may have called for the resort to violence. It is, after all, far too insufficient to justify a campaign of terror purely on the merits of a just cause alone.

(To be continued)

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THE DEVELOPMENT OF UKRAINIAN HISTORIOGRAPHY*

V. Hrushevskyi and Lypynskyi

One can say that Hrushevskyi's attempt to introduce Ukrainian history into the structure of European history did not succeed. Ukrainian historiography has remained part of the Soviet-Russian, and was ignored in the West. In Western Europe the ideas of state, people and nation, are by extension the same. In Ukraine the state did not exist for a number of centuries (14th-20th), indeed there were times when historical consciousness itself was very much diminished. Even the name of the nation was changed to Rus'-Ukraina.

Hrushevskyi as successor of the "Narodnyky" continued that tendency. Already in his inauguration speech on September 30, 1894, at the University of Lviv (Lemberg), Hrushevskyi declared:

"... The people are joined into an entity by their various historical periods, and the people are to be the alpha and omega of historical development. The people, with their ideals, endeavours, struggles, successes and failures, are the only hero of history. To understand their economic, cultural and intellectual situation is the goal of our history. The state is not the corresponding vehicle for these ideals. The form of the state, which was almost never created by the Ukrainian people has been foreign to them since olden times".²⁴

Thus Hrushevskyi remained basically a federalist to the end of his life. He said in 1920 that he had been brought up in the traditions of the Cyril-Methodius Brotherhood and believed that, in a conflict between people and state, the guilt is always on the side of the state.

In contrast to Hrushevskyi the Ukrainian historian (of Polish descent), Viacheslav Lypynskyi (1892-1931), who studied history in Cracow and Geneva and was familiar with French-Swiss sociology, put into the centre of his studies not the people, but the state. In his works, *Z dziejów-Ukrainy* (1912) and especially *Ukraina na perelomi 1657-1659*, (Ukraine in Reconstruction), Vienna 1920 (Reprint 1954), Lypynskyi wrote: "...our historiography until now was developed under the influence of three factors, namely, the Russian, the Polish state ideology, as well as the national-cultural, democratic, but stateless Ukrainian ideology, which can give no answer to the questions of our history. . . If we will free ourselves of the idea that we are not capable of

* Continued from *The Ukrainian Review*, No. 2, 1986.

24. M. Hrushevskyi, "Vstupnyi vyklad z davnoi istoriyi", *ZNTS*, 1894, Vol. IV, pp. 140-150.

an independent life, and if we are aware of our historical development as the achievements of our forefathers, then we will be able to understand their aims and ideas better, yes, to evaluate and judge our history according to the rules of truth and scholarship".²⁵

Lypynskyi's conception of the state as the fundamental element in the historical process had a volcanic effect in Ukrainian historiography. The new generation of Ukrainian historians took over Lypynskyi's thesis of the state, as for example, is evident in *Ukrainska istoriografia na perelomi* (1924) by Hrushevskyi's student, Ivan Krevetskyi. Other students of Hrushevskyi, such as Ivan Krypiakievych (1886-1967), later professor of Kyiv, Stefan Tomashivskyi (1875-1930), professor at Cracow, Myron Korduba in Warsaw, Mykola Chubatyi, Borys Krupnytskyi, Dmytro Doroshenko, and Mykola Andrusiak, have all treated Ukrainian history from the viewpoint of the state.

In the 1920s Lypynskyi's words were still obtainable, and Oleksander Ohloblyn, student of Hrushevskyi and professor at Kyiv, and in the 1970s Visiting Professor for Ukrainian history, said that he had read *Ukraina na perelomi*, and the work made a tremendous impression on him. Lypynskyi's work had a great influence on the other historians of Soviet Ukraine for example, on Dmytro Bahaliy, Dmytro Yavornytskyi, and others.

Unfortunately, Ukrainian historiography had not progressed any further. Even if all the Ukrainian historians in Halychyna and abroad represented the thesis of the state, they would still not succeed in getting a foothold within the structure of West European historiography. Certainly, the fact that Ukraine had no state and no schools of higher learning speaks for itself.

The study of Ukrainian historiography is rather new. The late Ukrainian historian, Dmytro Doroshenko (1822-1951) wrote the first work on Ukrainian historical writing.²⁶ His study covers the period from the 11th century to 1920. His work was supplemented and updated by another Ukrainian historian, formerly professor of Ukrainian history at Kyiv University and visiting professor at Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, Oleksander Ohloblyn.²⁷

In the scheme of Ukrainian historiography, Doroshenko represents the moderate state-centred school ("derzhavnist"), as compared to Viacheslav Lypynskyi. To Doroshenko, Ukrainian statehood was not an end in itself, but an instrument of social reforms and general welfare. He understood the Ukrainian nation not as a monolithic peasant class, as the populists ("narod-

25. V. Lypynskyi, *Ukraina na perelomi*, New York, 1954, p. 17.

26. D. Doroshenko, *Ohlad ukrainskoyi istoriografii*, Prague, 1923; 220 pp. An English translation was published in the *Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U.S.*, New York, 1957, Vol. V, No. 4, Vol. VI, No. 1-2, pp. 13-306. It is to be said that Doroshenko as a student published a survey *Ukazatel istochnikov dla oznakomleniya s yuzhnoy Rusyu*, St. Petersburg, 1904; 60 pp. For details, see: L. Wynar, "Dmytro Doroshenko — vydatnyi doslidnyk ukrainskoyi istoriografii i bibliografii, *Ukrainskyi Istoryk*, Vol. XX, No. 3-4, 1, 1982-1983, pp. 40-78.

27. Ohloblyn's continuation was published with the translation of Doroshenko's work in the *Annals*, pp. 307-455.

nyky") envisaged it, but as a variegated national group whose ultimate aim had always been national statehood. In arriving at his interpretation, he carefully examined all the basic components of Ukrainian historical process, i.e., ethnography, economy, culture, literature, education, and religion. Doroshenko saw in Ukrainian history the creative power of the elite and the disruptive influence of the misguided masses, for whom he felt a deep compassion. To him the Cossack leadership epitomised that nationally-conscious and patriotic elite that was involved in the state-building process. It provided leadership and set goals during the 16th and 17th centuries, as well as after the abolition of the Ukrainian Military (Cossack) Republic (Hetmanshchyna) in 1764.

The first Ukrainian historiography in Soviet Ukraine was written by the well-known historian M. I. Marchenko and was published in 1959.²⁸ This historiography and the inauguration of the *Ukrainskyi Istorychnyi Zhurnal* (Ukrainian Historical Journal) in 1957 marks a new era in historical studies of the Ukrainian SSR, which lasted until 1972.

These two historiographies (Doroshenko-Ohloblyn and Marchenko) supplement each other. Doroshenko and Ohloblyn (who were fortunate to work in a free society, as the Ukrainian-American historian, Stephen M. Horak, rightly remarked in his essay)²⁹ pay much attention to the national struggle for freedom and elevate the past of the Ukrainian people. Marchenko, on the other hand, underestimates the importance of nationalism as a historical force, for the class struggle in Ukraine during the 18th and 19th centuries had a national flavour because the upper class was identified with Poland and Russia rather than with the Ukrainian people. Furthermore, his Marxist interpretation of history constantly runs into contradictions and distortions and at times actually suggests ignorance of historical events.

It should be mentioned that two Soviet Russian historians, B. E. Illeretskiy and I. A. Kudriavtsev, devoted a few pages to Ukrainian historiography, in their book, *Historiography of the History of the USSR from the Earliest Times to the Great October Revolution* in which they accused the very well-known Ukrainian historian, Mykhailo Hrushevskyy stating that he "undertook to establish a thoroughly false and politically injurious concept of the complete 'sovereignty' of the Ukrainian people in their past as well as the present".³⁰ To this derogatory remark, the Soviet-Ukrainian historian, V. H. Sarbey responded: "...Just because the Ukrainian nation allegedly never had independence in the past, does not mean that it cannot claim independence now".³¹

28. M. I. Marchenko, *Ukrainska istoriografiya z davnikh chasiv do seredyny XIX st.*, Kyiv, 1959; 255 pp. It should be said that an earlier attempt to write a Ukrainian historiography in Soviet Ukraine by D. I. Bahaliy, *Narys istoriyi Ukrainy*, (Kyiv, 1932), is rather an analysis of historical sources than a historiographical inquiry.

29. S. M. Horak, "Ukrainian Historiography, 1953-1963", *Slavic Review*, Vol. XXIV, No. 2, (1965), p. 258.

30. *Istoriografiya istoriyi SSSR s drevneishikh vremen do Velikoi Oktiabrskoi Revoliutsiyi*, ed. B. E. Illeretskiy and I. A. Kudriavtsev, Moscow, 1961, p. 488.

31. *UIZ*, No. 3, 1963, p. 140; cf. Horak, *op. cit.*, p. 259.

VI. Soviet Ukrainian Historiography before 1934

Soviet Ukrainian historiography is a complex study because it is dependent upon the political situation in the Soviet Union as a whole and in Soviet Ukraine in particular. The problem of national identity in the national histories of Byelorussia, Russia and Ukraine has not yet been solved in Soviet historiography in a satisfactory manner.

Most Soviet Russian historians followed the traditional scheme of Russian history. Ukrainians have adopted Hrushevskyi's "rational scheme". Both schemes survived the October Revolution and in the absence of an obligatory Marxist approach, Soviet Russian as well as Soviet Ukrainian historians enjoyed a relative academic freedom which was at that time especially beneficial to Ukrainian scholarship. In 1924 Hrushevskyi returned from Vienna and as head of the History Institute of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences was the promoter of Ukrainian historical studies. He was editor of the historical magazine *Ukraina* and other scholarly publications and also continued to write his monumental work *Istoria Ukrainy-Rusy*.

In addition to Hrushevskyi's activity, there were other historical centres headed by such Ukrainian historians as D. Bahaliy in Kharkiv, M. Vasylenko in Kyiv, M. Slabchenko in Odessa. Oleksander Ohloblyn, one of the contemporary historians of that period, wrote that all of these historical centres cooperated with each other, with an exception in the case of the Marxist school headed by M. Yavorskyi, and that the "entire Ukrainian historiography of the twenties in the Dnieper Ukraine, in Halychyna and abroad, subscribed to identical ideological Ukrainian national positions, centring its main attention and its research on the problems of Ukrainian statehood in its historical development in all its manifestations: political, cultural and national".³²

Although many Soviet Russian historians followed the traditional scheme even before the 1917 Revolution some scholars wrote Russian history from the Marxist point of view opposing the glorification of Tsarist Russia's past. The most prominent of them was certainly M. N. Pokrovsky. He, as a Marxist historian, interpreted the history of Russia from the point of view of historical materialism, i.e. he divided history into feudal and capital stages. In fact, he not only opposed, but also denounced Russia's imperialism, admitting the historical role of all nationalities in the territory of the former Russian Empire. He rejected the idea of the Kyivan period as a part of Russia.³³

32. O. Ohloblyn, *Ukrainian Historiography, 1917-1956*, p. 300; cf., L. Wynar, "The Present State of Ukrainian Historiography in Soviet Ukraine: A Brief Overview", *Nationalities Papers*, Vol. VII, No. 1 (1979), pp. 2-3.

33. M. N. Pokrovsky, *Russkaya istoria s drevneyshikh vremen*, Moscow, 1920, Vol. I, p. 170, ("... To speak of a united Russian state during the Kyivan era is possible only on the basis of an evident misunderstanding.") There is also an English translation by J. D. Clarkson and M. R. M. Griffiths, New York, 1931, and reprint, Bloomington, Ind., 1966.

However, in the 1930's Pokrovsky and his followers were rejected as "heretics" and anti-Marxists in the Soviet Union.³⁴ The official attack against Pokrovsky came in 1934, when the Central Committee of the Communist Party and the Government of the Soviet Union issued a decree accusing Soviet historians as well as teachers of history of "being anti-Marxist, anti-Leninist. . ." and expressing anti-scientific views on history as a science.³⁵ The campaign against Pokrovsky and his school was continued and, moreover, it was alleged that his school was "the basis for acts of sabotage committed by enemies of the people whom the NKVD subsequently unmasked. . ."³⁶ The official Soviet historical scholarship not only ignored Pokrovsky, at the same time praising old historians such as Solovyev and Kliuchevskiy, but also "blamed" him for the harm he had done to the study of history.³⁷

At the same time there came the purge of the Ukrainian "nationalist historians". The focal point of party criticism was Hrushevskiy's *Istoria Ukrainy-Rusy*. He was criticised for featuring the historical separatism between Russians and Ukrainians and for ignoring class concepts.

In general, Ukrainian historians were accused of being hostile to Ukrainian-Russian friendship and were to eradicate "bourgeois nationalism" and to promote the rewriting of history from a class position which was to feature what Ukrainians and Russians had in common.³⁸ The historical institutions of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences were eliminated and destroyed, and many Ukrainian historians were arrested, deported or physically liquidated.

While Soviet Ukrainian historians contested Hrushevskiy and his school, the general conception of Ukrainian history worked out by Hrushevskiy was recognised by Ukrainian historians living in the West, and the chief task of the Soviet Ukrainians was to combat the ideological struggle against them.³⁹ Hrushevskiy was accused of having represented the exclusiveness ("vykliuchnist") of the Ukrainian people, and of having carried out a complete separation of Ukrainian history from that of Russia. The point at issue here was the heritage of Kyiv Rus', which Hrushevskiy ascribed mainly to the Ukrai-

34. Numerous literature on this subject matter is given by K. F. Shteppa, *Russian Historians and the Soviet State*, New Brunswick, N. J., 1962, and by R. Szporluk in his introduction to *Russia in World History*, (selected essays by M. N. Pokrovsky), Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan, 1970.

35. "V Sovnarkome Soyusa SSR i TSKVK (b)," *Izvestiya*, January 27, 1936; cf. Szporluk, *op. cit.*, pp. 35-36, 222.

36. A. M. Parkratova, "Razvitiye istoricheskikh vzgliadov M. N. Pokrovskogo", *Protiv istoricheskoy kontseptsii M. N. Pokrovskogo*, Moscow-Leningrad, 1939, Vol. I., p. 5; cf., Szporluk, *op. cit.*, pp. 36-37, 223.

37. V. P. Volgin, E. V. Tarle, and A. M. Parkratova, *Dvatsat piat let istoricheskoi nauki v SSSR*, Moscow-Leningrad, 1942, pp. 7-9, 78; cf. Szporluk, *op. cit.*, pp. 37, 223.

38. Lowell Tillet, *The Great Friendship: Soviet Historians on the Non-Russian Nationalities*, Chapel Hill: North Carolina University Press, 1969, pp. 36-7.

39. B. I. Bilyk, J. A. Horbani, N. J. Kostytsia, *Pytannia druzhby narodiv u kursy istoriyi SRSR. Posibnyk dla uchyteliv*, Kyiv, 1976, p. 58. Hrushevskiy was very severely criticized by M. A. Rubach, (Rubanovych) in his article "Hrushevskiy, Mikhail Sergeyevich", *Sovetskaya Istoricheskaya Entsiklopedia*, Moscow, 1963, Vol. IV, pp. 857-859.

nian people, while in the official Soviet version the Kyivan Realm was regarded as the cradle of all three East Slavic peoples. Furthermore, he was accused of putting national distinctions before socio-economical factors in line with the idealist world-view, and thus raising classlessness and the unified stream of folk history into a principle. In particular he was accused of arguing against the rise of the Ukrainian bourgeoisie and its opposite, the proletariat ("bezburzhuznist"), and just like Kostomarov before him, to have neglected the inner, economically conditioned contradictions of Cossack society (class peace — "klasovyi myr").⁴⁰ Finally, they maintained that Hrushevskyi wanted to sever the Ukrainians from the Russians since he wrote his entire history of the Ukrainian people from an anti-Russian point of view. This last accusation is the most important since it is raised against all the bourgeois Ukrainian scholars of the present day who will not recognise the Soviet system. As indicated above, it was maintained in this regard that the splitting off ("vidryv") is supposed to lead to the establishment of a class hegemony over the Ukrainian workers by means of foreign imperialism (i.e., American), making use of the efforts of Ukrainian nationalists.⁴¹

Besides the general philosophical reasons, the continuous violent battle of the Soviet Ukrainian historians with the Ukrainians in exile, and the opposition to the whole direction of the bourgeois Ukrainian historiography of the 19th century, is to be understood in terms of historical peculiarities. The thought of a Ukrainian revival ("vidrodzhenya"), which was represented in the last century and the beginning of this by historians Kostomarov, Kulish, Antonovych, Hrushevskyi, and many Ukrainian personalities of the cultural and intellectual world, was an answer to the results of the long division of the Ukrainian people, cultural suppression or prejudice by neighbouring states on whose soil the Ukrainians formed a minority. The goal was reunification, and the creation of a state or an autonomous Ukraine within a federation.

(To be continued)

40. V. J. Yevdomenko, *Krytyka ideynykh osnov ukrainskoho burzhuznoho natsionalizmu*, Kyiv, 1968, pp. 36, 150, 154.

41. S. H. Sarbey, "Istorychni nauky". *Ukrainska Radyanska Entsyklopedia*, p. 439.

Bertil HÄGGMAN

SOVIET RUSSIAN ACTIVE MEASURES IN SCANDINAVIA

NEW SOVIET ACTIVE MEASURES: TARGET SWEDEN

In 1985 a number of West European newspapers and magazines received a manuscript containing disinformation on Swedish military activities.

According to the manuscript a Swedish officer of the military security and intelligence department (OP 5) helped Israeli agents to steal computer tapes with secret information on the new NATO fighter "Tornado". The manuscript probably originated in Moscow. The picture painted in the article is that of Swedish military intelligence in close cooperation with Israel's Mossad. One of the fields of cooperation is the security control of Palestinian refugees in Sweden according to the manuscript.

A Soviet attempt was made in neutral Austria to spread a fake letter from the US ambassador in Vienna to the Defence Minister. In the letter the American ambassador suggested that NATO and Austrian defence forces should coordinate air defence in case of a Warsaw Pact attack. A copy of the letter was sent anonymously to the Austrian newspaper *Kurier* in the spring of 1984.

The manuscript on Swedish-Israeli cooperation was signed Roy S. Carson, a journalist based in Malmö in southern Sweden. He was first made aware of the attempt to use his name when the manuscript was returned by the West German magazine *Stern* with a statement that the editors did not want to use the material.

NORWEGIAN SUPERSPY IN SOVIET HONEY TRAP

During the trial of Norwegian superspy Arne Treholt the prosecutor asked the court, in his final statement, to sentence Treholt to 20 years of imprisonment. The sentence was passed in June 1985. Treholt was accused of having spied for the Soviets since the 1960s. In 1975 he reportedly fell into a Soviet honey trap as revealed during the trial as early as February.

In the autumn of 1967, Arne Treholt, who was then a journalist, was invited with a number of radical socialists to the home of a Soviet diplomat in Oslo. A few days later Treholt was invited to lunch by Soviet

diplomat Eugeniy A. Belyayev. Later he was offered bottles of brandy for purchasing books for 40-50 persons on a list provided by Belyayev.

In the summer of 1971 the Soviet diplomat telephoned Treholt to tell him that he was leaving Oslo, but he wanted to introduce him to a colleague, Gennady Titov. A mutual friendship developed between Titov and Treholt. In 1975 the Norwegian met his present wife and soon afterwards was invited to Moscow by Titov. One night in Moscow Treholt was invited to a private party. When he returned to Oslo Titov showed him photos taken at the party and asked Treholt for more secret material. After 1975 the Soviet diplomat continuously received secret material. The two met at restaurants for lunch and Treholt slipped a "package" to Titov. During police interrogation Treholt stated that Titov had told him that only he and two top KGB officers in Moscow knew about their contact.

Later Treholt met other KGB officers when he served at the Norwegian UN delegation in New York. Titov was also the contact with another Norwegian Foreign Office employee working for the Soviets, Gunvor Galtung-Haavik. He broke the contact in 1972 saying that he had other duties. . .

Before the Treholt trial began, his wife, Kari Storaekre, published his memoirs, *My Story*. In the book she revealed that Treholt was increasingly anti-American and pro-Soviet. He intensively fought the Common Market and NATO. In 1983 he harshly condemned the American rescue operation in Grenada and openly defended the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

In the book his wife also published excerpts from letters that Treholt made her smuggle out of the prison. In the letters he more or less admitted spying for the Russians.

EX-IRAQI INTELLIGENCE AGENT MURDERED IN SWEDEN

Majid Husain, a former agent of the Al Mukhabarat, the Iraqi intelligence service, was murdered in Stockholm in March 1985. The reasons for the killing were obviously that he had told the press what he knew of the operations of the Iraqi intelligence service.

Al Mukhabarat was established in 1968 and is one of the biggest intelligence services in the world outside the superpowers. It is known worldwide for organising political murders. A special department, Al Hunain, led by Khalil al-Wazi, is responsible for executing political opponents to the Baghdad regime.

Al Mukhabarat cooperates closely with the KGB and the GRU. The leading officers of the service have been trained in the Soviet Union. Iraqi agents in Sweden are for instance responsible for contacts with Soviet "illegals" — agents who live under deep cover for a long time in a Western country to be used as saboteurs and so on in war-time.

SOVIET ATTEMPT TO RECRUIT SWEDISH ARMY OFFICERS FAILED

For two years a Soviet GRU officer based in Stockholm attempted to recruit a 45-year old Swedish army officer. The Soviet agent went so far as to ask the officer to hand over a document on NATO anti-tank weapons. The final goal was obviously to gather information concerning recent developments in anti-tank weapons.

It was in 1982 during a reception at the Soviet embassy that the first contact was made. The GRU officer asked the major to explain in more detail the Swedish system of compulsory military service. He suggested that they should meet later and have lunch. Initially the GRU agent was very careful. They talked about the East-West conflict and also touched upon the major's private life. At this stage the major contacted Swedish military counter-intelligence and it was recommended that he went along a bit further. The Soviet officer invited the major to his private apartment and when he was leaving he was offered a case of liquor. The case was later delivered in person by the GRU officer to the major's apartment. They continued to meet in restaurants and the major was forbidden to call the Soviet embassy.

After a while intense recruiting was began. First the GRU officer asked for a couple of harmless Swedish army brochures and continued to offer a few 100 \$US for a memorandum on NATO weapons. At this stage the major was ordered to break off all contacts. Shortly afterwards the GRU officer left Sweden. The Soviets are probably most interested in the new Bofors BILL anti-tank missile. It is laser guided and is set to explode above the tank under attack.

During the 1982-1985 period Swedish military intelligence has provided help for around 100 officers approached by Warsaw Pact intelligence. Lennart Borg, head of the department, admits that there have been cases of Swedish officers travelling to Poland on holiday and being arrested for drunkenness.

SOVIET VIOLATION OF "SILENT" AGREEMENT ON FISHING RIGHTS IN THE BALTIC SEA

In the middle of April 1985 a Soviet inspection vessel boarded three Swedish fishing boats in the so-called "white zone" in the Baltic Sea: "Santos", "Themis" and "Biscays". There is a silent agreement between Sweden and the Soviet Union not to carry out inspections of fishing trawlers in an area east of the Swedish island of Gotland. Swedish foreign office officials call it a gentlemen's agreement. Swedish inspection vessels have orders not to board Soviet trawlers in the zone. Initially the Soviet vessel is reported to have boarded six

Danish and two West German trawlers. The Soviet officer stated that the trawlers were operating in the Soviet fishing zone. He asked them to leave the area and the commanders of the Swedish ships were forced to sign documents in Russian.

Swedish customs immediately sent the inspection vessel TV 171 to support Swedish fishermen in the area. The dispute on the "white zone" has been going on for 16 years between Stockholm and Moscow and no solution seems to be in sight. Swedish authorities claim the demarcation line in the Baltic is to be drawn between the island of Gotland and the Soviet Baltic republics. The Soviets want it to be drawn between the Swedish and Baltic mainland.

SOVIETS MOVING FORWARD ON SPITSBERGEN

The Norwegian archipelago of Svalbard (of which Spitsbergen is the largest island) is growing more and more important to the Soviets. In 1920 it was decided at an international conference that Norway would be given sovereignty over the islands, but the 40 nations participating in the conference would have the right to exploit the natural resources of the islands. There is plenty of coal, but only Norway and the Soviet Union are mining. There are now 2,100 Russians and 1,400 Norwegians and the two main centres are Barentsburg (Soviet) and Longyearbyen (Norwegian). In 1975 Norway built an airfield outside Longyearbyen. There were Soviet protests. When they could not stop the airfield they built a helicopter landing field near Barentsburg.

It is generally believed that the Soviet coal mines on Spitsbergen are operated only in order to secure military bases on Spitsbergen in case of war. But there are other reasons: oil and gas. The Russians have built a new village at Colesbay half way between Longyearbyen and Barentsburg. Recently a Norwegian oil magazine concluded that the Soviets have found oil and gas at Colesbay. There are now crews of up to 60 people at the village. In Vass Valley, about 15 miles south of Colesbay new Soviet oil rigs have been built and intensive drillings are made all over Nordenskiöld Land in the central area of Spitsbergen. Ten West European and American oil companies are ready to start drilling among them Exxon, Elf, BP, Statoil, the Norwegian state owned company. A Swedish company, Swedish Polar Energy (SVEPO) will start looking for gas at Horn Sound on the southern tip of Spitsbergen. American research has shown that there are 1,000 billion cubic metres of gas on the islands. BP is planning to drill for oil near an old Swedish coal-mine on the islands of Sveagruva.

The importance of the archipelago is underlined by the Norwegian-Soviet conflict over an area 155,000 square kilometres large south-east of Svalbard in the Barents Sea (the so-called "grey zone"). The Russians are already looking for oil there. The zone stands right across the

route of the Soviet submarines into the North Atlantic from the large naval base of Murmansk on the Kola Peninsula. The strategic importance of Svalbard is continuously growing.

AUTHOR DEMANDS RECIPROCITY BETWEEN SWEDEN AND THE SOVIET UNION

In his book *Industrial Espionage*, published in 1984, author Charlie Nordholm exposed 50 of the 80 Soviet intelligence officers in Sweden. In all there are 150 Soviet officials in Sweden, of which 50 have diplomatic status serving at the embassy in Stockholm, the consulate, the general consulate in Gothenburg or the trade delegation in Lidingo outside Stockholm. Meanwhile there are 15 Swedish diplomats in the Soviet Union at the embassy in Mosfilmovskaya Ulitsa 60 in Moscow and the Swedish consulate in Leningrad.

In a newspaper article published in March Nordholm demanded that the Swedish parliament consider the limitation of Soviet representation in Sweden in accordance with the Vienna conventions of 1961 and 1963. Every country, which signed the conventions has the right to limit the personnel strength of the embassies according to what is regarded as reasonable. Great Britain, Portugal and Norway have in the past referred to the conventions and reduced the diplomatic personnel of the Soviet Union. In Great Britain the number of Soviet diplomats is now 47, precisely the number of British diplomats in the Soviet Union. Twenty seven out of the 38 Soviet diplomats in Stockholm are intelligence officers; 5 out of 6 at the consulate general in Gothenburg and 2 out of 3 diplomats at the trade delegation. Three diplomats in Stockholm represent the International Department of the CPSU. The Swedish parliament is presently considering a three party bill on the limitation of the number of Soviet diplomats in Sweden.

LITERATURE ON SOVIET SPETSNAZ OPERATIONS IN THE NORTH

Hansen, Lynn M.: *Soviet Navy Spetsnaz Operations on the Northern Flank: Implications for the Defense of Western Europe*, College Station, Texas: Center for Strategic Technology, The Texas Engineering Experiment Station, The Texas A&M University System.

Spetsnaz brigades are presently assigned to all four Soviet fleets. The Hansen study divulges the extent of the known activities of these brigades within Swedish and Norwegian territorial waters. In October 1982 three Soviet submarines were serving as mother ships for three mini-subs outside Stockholm. This was the first time during the 1980s it was possible to state with certainty that such submarines were developed and used for covert naval operations. Forty such operations

occurred in Swedish waters during 1982 alone and 226 in Norwegian waters between 1969 and 1982.

According to Hansen the Northern Flank might well be the "key to victory in a war with central Europe" since a Soviet victory in that area would neutralize the navies of Sweden and NATO, protect various Soviet missile sites, the headquarters of the Soviet Northern Fleet and one end of the Leningrad-Murmansk railroad. From Scandinavia it is not really far to the coastlines of the United Kingdom — and even Canada and the United States — if Spetsnaz brigades are used.

SOVIET MINISUBS IN SWEDISH WATERS FOR TEN YEARS

Soviet mini-submersibles have probably operated in Swedish territorial waters for ten years. During 1984 there have been less sightings than at the beginning of the 1980s. The Swedish defence minister Anders Thunborg believes the reason is that Swedish anti-submarine defences are more effective and reliable. After the 1982 incidents the Swedish defence staff has gone through reports as far back as 1975. Earlier reports have been discarded because it was thought that submarines could not operate so near the coast. Now it is clear that these reports could have been right. It could have been mini-submersibles operating close to the coast. Present defence staff chief, Bror Stefansson and naval chief, Admiral Per Rudberg, think foreign mini-submersibles have operated near the Swedish Baltic Sea coast for ten years. In 1975 a Soviet naval officer wrote an article entitled: "Midget Submarines Are Coming Back".

COMPUTER ADDRESS REGISTER SOLD TO THE SOVIETS

The Swedish GPO has sold a computerised address register to the Soviets according to Swedish press reports. Later Swedish researchers received a circular letter from the Soviet Union. Investigation showed that the Swedish GPO sold home addresses to the Soviets.

LITERATURE ON "BACK-CHANNEL" DIPLOMACY

Carl O Nordling, "Defence or Imperialism? An Aspect of Stalin's Military and Foreign Policy 1933-1941". Published in *Contributions to Soviet and East European Research*, Vol. 11, Uppsala, 1984.

In a secret letter to the late prime minister Olof Palme of May 25, 1983, Sweden's present UN representative Anders Ferm wrote: "We have discussed how a "back-channel" could possibly be established for discussion of the submarine incidents". In April 1983 Ferm had discussed with ex-GRU general Mikhail Milstein if a Swedish representative could secretly be sent to Moscow with a military expert. Alternatively a Soviet representative could be invited for a discreet visit to

Sweden. The leaders in the Kremlin must have been most satisfied with the Swedish offers. Discreet diplomacy is exactly what the Soviet leaders are looking for to be able to manipulate foreign governments. Mr Nordling's booklet describes how this kind of diplomacy was developed to perfection during the Stalin era.

LIST OF SWEDISH FIRMS REPRESENTING WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES

EME-Norlett AB, P.O. Box 369, S-631 05 Eskilstuna. Holiday equipment. 52 employees. Representing Merkuria, Czechoslovakia.

Fransson Maskin AB, S-150 16 Hölö. Import-export of second-hand machinery. 8 employees. Representing Maskinexport, Rumania.

Fredberg Marketing AB, P.O. Box 3191, S-103 63 Stockholm. Carpets. Representing Artex, Hungary.

Frekvensia Gete AB, Stockholmsv 37, S-194 54 Upplands Väsby. Production and design of electronic components. Video products. 7 employees. Representing Bulgaria Film, Bulgaria, and GAMA, Bulgaria.

Gerber & Hesslow AB, P.O. Box 2152, S-103 14 Stockholm. Industrial products, construction material, process equipment for the chemical industry. 16 employees. Representing Centrozap, Poland, and Tscechoslov Keramik, Czechoslovakia.

Glasdon AB, P.O. Box 3027, S-400 10 Göteborg. Representing Elektronik Export-Import VE AHB, German Democratic Republic, Glas-Keramik VE AHB, German Democratic Republic, Intermed Export-Import VE AHB, German Democratic Republic, MOM, Hungary, Ruhla Glashütte Weimar, German Democratic Republic.

Grünfeld AB, Alexander, Box 7510, S-103 93 Stockholm. Agents for foodstuff. 5 employees. Representing Agrimpex, Hungary, Hungarofruct, Hungary, Medimpex, Hungary, Monipex, Hungary, Terimpex, Hungary.

Elof Hansson, S-413 27 Göteborg. Export and import. 550 employees. Representing Galvanotechnik VEB, German Democratic Republic.

Olle Hartwig AB, S-121 62 Johanneshov. Import and export of foodstuff. 10 employees. Representing Prodexport, Rumania.

Hugo Henning AB, P.O. Box 22023, S-500 02 Borås. Machinery for plastics industry. 15 employees. Representing Investa AG, Czechoslovakia, Unitechna-Textima VEB, German Democratic Republic.

Hofsam AB, S-114 51 Stockholm. Wholesale dealer in photos. 8 employees. Representing PRACTICA, German Democratic Republic.

Nina STROKATA

WOMEN PRISONERS OF CONSCIENCE IN THE SOVIET UNION*

"Now we don't shoot you any more, but we have other methods which will make sure that you won't leave this camp alive."

Major Shorin**

At least 824 Soviet prisoners of conscience spent December 10, Human Rights Day, in prison. Almost one out of every ten Soviet political prisoners is a woman.

Data relating to Soviet prisoners must always be approximate because the Soviet regime thoroughly conceals information about its methods of internal repression. Nevertheless, if one makes use of all available information, it is possible to make meaningful comparisons and to draw certain conclusions.

At the end of 1985, scattered information on 824 Soviet prisoners of conscience included information about 77 women. It is with these women that I will principally be concerned. We have certain biographical information about why they were arrested, how they were punished, where they are confined, the state of their health, and the fate of their families. Not all of these pieces of information are available for each person, but the gathered materials do shed light on women dissidents in the Soviet Union today.

The task of classifying the activities of the majority of the dissident women is not easy because of their many faceted interests and activities. The activities in which the women were engaged and for which they were charged in court are indicated in Table 1.

It should be noted that in numerous cases Soviet courts have concealed the dissidents' true activities and have falsely charged them with common crimes which they did not commit. The data in Table 1 reveals the predominance of religious believers among the women political prisoners. Table 2 gives a breakdown of these women by denominations.

People who are aware of the religious rejuvenation taking place in the USSR will not be surprised by the data cited in Tables 1 and 2. However, the case of the woman who was put in the dock because she was distributing information about the apparition of Our Lady of Fatima deserves special men-

* Reprinted from *Freedom at Issue*, No. 89, March-April 1986.

** Major Shorin is head of labour camp ZhKh 385-3, Barashevo village, Mordovian ASSR, the camp complex that includes the camp for women political prisoners.

tion. This charge was brought against Sofia Belyak, a church organist from the Ukrainian city of Zhytomyr. She was also tried for having had contacts with friends in Poland and for participating in an independent ecumenical movement. For this complex of "evil deeds" Sofia was given a ten year sentence.

The lack of freedom of conscience in the USSR has instigated the struggle for the right of emigration, in which women Pentacostalists and Jewish believers have been particularly active. Those who strive to emigrate have begun to use the same methods as activists of the human rights movement. Experience in the USSR, a state that ignores norms of lawful behaviour, often forces people to conclude that it is hopeless to rely on lawful means. Thus, otherwise lawful people become totally desperate and try to leave the country by hijacking Soviet planes. As a rule, such attempts have not only failed, but have borne tragic consequences.

For example, in 1969, Galina Silivonchik, a resident of Leningrad, hoped to escape with her husband and brother on a hijacked plane. However, her husband was killed during the attempt, her brother was only recently released from prison, and Galina herself is still in internal exile. She was sentenced to thirteen years in a strict regime labour camp and five years of exile.

The youngest prisoner on the list is Tinatin Petviashvili, twenty-one, from Georgia. In 1984 she received a fourteen-year prison sentence for participating, with her husband and several friends, in a desperate attempt to hijack an Aeroflot airplane. Another woman involved in this unsuccessful hijacking attempt, Anna Varsivashvili, was given only a suspended sentence, but a Georgian Orthodox priest, Teimuraz Chikhladze, thirty-eight, was reportedly recently executed for his alleged role in the hijacking plan. Although Reverend Chikhladze was not actually part of the group that hijacked the plane, in fact was not even aware that an attempt was to be made, he was nonetheless portrayed during the trial as the group's "spiritual leader" and as the instigator of the whole idea.

Table 1.

Activities	Number of Women
Religious	42
Mainstream human rights	13
For greater national rights	10
Emigration rights	7
Others	5

The human rights movement in the USSR is based on humanitarian principles that cause it to express concern for the violation of individuals' rights as well as the rights of entire nations. These principles have created a sense of

unity among its participants, and some of the women have become veterans of the movement. Many of them have been forced into exile, some have completed their prison terms, and thirteen who engaged in mainstream human rights activities are still in prison.

Among these thirteen women are two members of Helsinki watch groups: Olha Heyko-Matusevych, who is serving her second sentence for participating in the Ukrainian Helsinki Watch Group; and Tatiana Osipova, who was a member of the Moscow Watch Group. As punishment for using legal methods of defence against the arbitrary behaviour of the camp administration Tatiana received an additional two-year prison term while she was still in labour camp.

Table 2.

Denomination	Number of Women
Baptists	15
Seventh Day Adventists	7
Hare Krishna followers	6
Pentecostalists	4
Ukrainian Catholics	3
Jehovah's Witnesses	2
Muslims	2
"True" Russian Orthodox believers	1
Georgian Orthodox Church members	1
Expressed sympathy for ecumenism and Our Lady of Fatima	1

The term "uncensored literature" has come into existence in totalitarian societies. In the USSR *samizdat* (hand-typed writing distributed underground) supercede the limits that are placed on the flow of information regarding events taking place both inside and outside the country. It frees from the yoke of censorship artistic literature as well as literary criticism, philosophical tracts, and research done in history, culture, archaeology and economics. Raisa Rudenko, the wife of the Ukrainian poet and prisoner of conscience Mykola Rudenko, was sentenced to ten years in 1980 specifically for showing his smuggled prison letters to friends and for reciting the poetry he wrote in confinement. For reading and circulating her poetry in *samizdat*, Irina Ratushinska was sentenced by a Kyiv court to the Gulag for twelve years. There she met Natalia Lazareva, who was already serving her second term for editing a *samizdat* feminist journal.

Approximately half of the women come from regions permeated by non-Russian national dissent. Of the total list of women political prisoners, thirty-

seven were arrested in Ukraine, the three Baltic states and Transcaucasia. There is no contradiction between this and the previously noted preponderance of religious believers among the women prisoners, for the non-Russian Christian peoples of the USSR have an innate dislike of church bodies controlled by an atheistic regime. Official Orthodoxy, whose existence in the USSR depends on its cooperation with the government, has a dissenting counterpart: the underground Russian True Orthodox Church.

Until November 2, 1985, the oldest prisoner of conscience was eighty-one year old Oksana Meshko, a member of the Ukrainian Helsinki Watch Group. During 1947-54 she was a prisoner in Stalin's labour camps and was later exiled until 1956, after which she was rehabilitated. Mrs. Meshko's sister and husband were both victims of Stalin's repressive measures. During a new wave of mass repressions in Ukraine in 1972 her son was taken as a political prisoner. In 1980 Oksana Meshko was forcibly committed to a psychiatric hospital. In 1981, at the age of seventy-six, she received six months of strict regime labour camp and five years of internal exile, which she served in a part of the USSR farthest removed from her native Ukraine.

Among those on the list are numerous women who have served more than one term in prison. Four of these were first incarcerated during Stalin's time, while fifteen others were repeatedly confined during the post-Stalin period.

The numbers assume greater meaning when individual cases are cited. Yadviga Bieliauskiene was imprisoned during Stalin's time from 1946 to 1956. In 1982 she was again sentenced, this time to seven years of strict regime labour camps and exile. Her crime was participating in the peaceful Lithuanian national movement. In 1949 Lagle Parek and her parents were deported without trial from their native Estonia for six years. This was a time when mass repressions were sweeping over the Baltic states and Ukraine. In 1983 Lagle was given a nine-year sentence for taking part in the Estonian national movement.

Table 3

Length of prison term	Number of Women
Up to 3 years	17
Up to 5 years	14
Up to 7 years	6
Up to 10 years	6
More than 10 years	8
Indefinite term (in cases of psychiatric commitment)	6
Information not available	14

Lydia Doronina-Lasmane, from Latvia, has already served two terms in the

post-Stalin period, and Halyna Maksymiv, a Ukrainian, is still in prison, although in 1982 she was given "only" one year for trying to emigrate with her son from the Soviet Union. Since her initial incarceration Halyna has twice been charged with new unfounded offences.

One of the peculiarities of the Soviet punitive system is that the prisoners usually serve their sentences in geographic regions far from the places where they lived prior to their trials. If we remember that in the USSR all prisoners are obliged to work, and that the Soviet constitution tries to portray the USSR as a voluntary union of various national states, we will appreciate the morbid humour of a joke popular among Soviet prisoners: The Soviet republics are nation-states which lend one another their slaves.

The womens' camp for politicals, a strict regime labour camp, is located in Mordovia, but after completing their terms in Mordovia the women usually serve their periods of exile in Siberia, Kazakhstan or various regions of the Far East. Camps for common criminals are strewn all over the USSR and psychiatric prison hospitals are located in Kazan, Kazakhstan, Ukraine and in certain other parts of the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, Anna Mykhailenko, a Ukrainian, was first committed for a short period of time to a psychiatric hospital in Ukraine, but was then transferred to the special psychiatric hospital in the city of Kazan located in the Tatar ASSR, where she remained for more than five years.

Women prisoners are not allowed to wear their own underclothing, but must use prescribed cotton slips, which do not keep them warm in the severe winter. Consequently, during family visits the women sometimes try to change into the underwear of their relatives and smuggle them into the camp. However, new laws have made such exchanges practically impossible. The woman prisoner who is about to receive a visitor is given a special set of clothing that she must return to the warder that issued it to her. The use of standard uniforms is an old and universally accepted tradition used in penitentiary facilities, but in the USSR it has assumed a quality of torture.

Table 3 indicates the length of the most recent prison terms meted out to the seventy-seven women in our list.

The two articles in the criminal code which are most often applied to dissidents are "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda" and the dissemination of "deliberate fabrications discrediting the Soviet political and social system". The first of these articles provides seven years of labour camp and five years of internal exile for first time offenders "against the state". Punishment under the second article is limited to three years, regardless of whether the person is a first-time offender or a recidivist, and the sentence is served in camps for common criminals.

Many religious believers are sentenced under the latter article. Because there is a multitude of camps for common convicts in the Soviet Union, the authorities are able to avoid concentrating political prisoners in one camp,

and find it easy to separate different groups. Religious believers are usually sent to criminal camps under the second article, and the other prisoners of conscience are dispatched to special camps under the first article.

When a person is subjected to forced psychiatric commitment the court logically does not set a sentence, since the length of a person's medical treatment cannot be considered as a juridical procedure. However, this plays into the hands of punitive psychiatry. Innocent and healthy people find themselves unprotected by any kind of law. Anna Mykhailenko can once again be cited. Since 1980 she has been administered neuroleptic drugs that have caused physical debilitations in her body, but her protests against the treatment have been looked upon as further signs of mental illness.

The prevalence of three-year sentences (Table 3) should not create the illusion that Soviet courts prefer giving this relatively short sentence to women political prisoners. The Soviet juridical system is constantly "improving" methods of "legally" extending prisoners' sentences until they have practically no hope of ever getting out. For example, on October 1, 1983, a new law on the "Malicious Disobedience" of the camp administration was added to the criminal code. This law makes it possible for camp officials to extend prisoners' sentences from one to five years for "maliciously disobeying" their orders. This arbitrary adding of terms can continue without end. In such a manner Olha Heyko-Matusevych received a new three-year sentence in 1983 just as her first three-year term was to expire. In 1985 Tatiana Osipova was given two more years of prison when she had already completed serving the initial five years.

Imprisonment is particularly anguishing for those women who are about to become mothers. Tatiana Osipova was arrested in 1980 just as she was receiving medical treatment which was to help her have a child. The investigator promised Tatiana, who was a member of the Moscow Helsinki Watch Group, that she could continue being treated in prison if she admitted her guilt. She refused to give in to this immoral and illegal demand of the K.G.B., and the medical treatment was stopped. Another prisoner, Olga Kiseleva, was arrested when she was pregnant. Her child was born in the prison hospital, but died a month later.

A woman who is removed from her family because of imprisonment faces all kinds of difficulties with her husband, children, and other family members. Strained relationships of different shades are bound to occur, regardless of whether a woman has children or not, or whether the children are under age or are already grown. Edita Abrutiene was arrested soon after her husband returned from prison. Their son, who was just beginning to get used to the idea of having two parents, was once again left with a single parent. His visits with his mother are rare. Edita has often refused to perform forced labour, and has been additionally punished in the labour camp by being deprived of her visitation rights with her son. Valentina Golikova has a grown-up adopted

son who is being threatened with psychiatric incarceration for supporting Valentina, who was a mother to him all his life.

Raisa Rudenko's husband is in exile, and she is serving a five-year labour camp sentence which will end this year. No one knows whether the authorities will allow her to serve exile in the same region as her husband. Tatiana Osipova, whose husband is in prison, is probably concerned with the same problem, because he is also soon scheduled to go into exile. But Tatiana has recently received a new two-year sentence, and her hope of soon seeing her husband in exile has been dashed.

Women are often persecuted together with their husbands, sons and sisters. Twenty-four of the seventy-seven women political prisoners belong to families in which other members were also imprisoned. Similar convictions and a shared world view are among the reasons why entire families are targeted for repression. We can cite Olha Heyko-Matusevych and her husband; Halyna Maksymiv and her son; and Tatiana Osipova and her husband, whose father was also a political prisoner. There are a number of other similar cases. Very often a family suffers persecution simply because it has offered sympathy to a family member who was arrested or imprisoned. Irina Tsurkova was punished because she refused to testify against her husband, and when he wound up in a labour camp, she could not refrain from telling people about the terrible conditions in the camp. Consequently, Irina was herself put in a prison camp.

No brief summary can give a complete picture of what is happening in the women's Gulags in the Soviet Union today. But even a brief glimpse into that secret and harsh world may make the reader more aware of a world whose existence is so little known.

Roman SOLCHANYK

SPECIAL ISSUE OF THE CHRONICLE OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN UKRAINE REACHES THE WEST

A special issue of *The Chronicle of the Catholic Church in Ukraine*, unnumbered and undated, has reached the West through *samizdat* channels. From the contents, it is clear that this special edition (*ekstrennyi vypusk*) was compiled at the end of November 1984. Unlike previous issues, nine of which have become available, this latest issue of the *Chronicle* is shorter in length (three typewritten pages in the original) and concerns itself primarily with one topic — the regime's determined attempt to destroy the Initiative Group to Defend the Rights of Believers and the Church in Ukraine, which circulates the *Chronicle*.¹

In a statement in the issue entitled "Resistance and Submissiveness", Josyp Terelya writes that between November 12 and 14 the Initiative Group "was crushed". He says:

The chairman, Vasyl Kobryn, has been arrested; the secretary, Father Hryhoriy Budzynskyi, has "disappeared", along with his driver, and no one knows where; I have gone underground; other members of the group are under house arrest "until things are cleared up".

Terelya has been a leading activist in the campaign conducted over the past several years for the legalisation and restoration of the Ukrainian Catholic (Uniate) Church in the USSR. Ukrainian Uniates, said to number approximately four million, have led an underground existence since 1946 when the Uniate Church was banned by the Soviet authorities.

In September 1982, Terelya and four others established the Initiative Group, which subsequently (early 1984) began to issue the *Chronicle*. At about the same time, Terelya compiled another *samizdat* journal, *The Ukrainian Catholic Herald*, the first issue of which has also been received in the West.² Terelya served as the first chairman of the Initiative Group and, simultaneously, as head of the Central Committee of Ukrainian Catholics. In the special edition of the *Chronicle*, readers are informed that Terelya's apartment was searched on November 14, that on the following day he was summoned for questioning, and that on that evening he managed to flee from his

1. AS 5515.

2. AS 5415. See RL 101/85, "First Issue of New *Samizdat* Journal Put Out by Ukrainian Catholics (Uniates)", March 26, 1985.

guarded apartment.³ On February 8, 1985, Terelya was arrested on charges of "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda"; and on August 20 he was sentenced by a court in Uzhhorod to a term of seven years in the camps and five years of internal exile.⁴

Kobryn has likewise been convicted. On March 22, 1985, he was sentenced to a three-year term of deprivation of freedom for "dissemination of knowingly false fabrications discrediting the Soviet political and social system" (Article 187-1 of the Criminal Code of the Ukrainian SSR). His trial is described in an article in the oblast newspaper *Lvivska pravda* of April 13, 1985.⁵ The same article reveals that Budzinskyi was summoned by the court as a witness. Budzinskyi's mysterious disappearance in mid-November 1984 had in the meantime been clarified in the ninth issue of the *Chronicle*, which was compiled at the end of December 1984, or at the beginning of January 1985.⁶ He was detained in a hospital and released on December 11.

One of the interesting details revealed in the special edition is that the tenth issue of the *Chronicle* had been completed and that it was confiscated along with other materials when Kobryn was searched and arrested in November 1984. Further information is provided about the search at Terelya's home, including his refusal to sign the protocol of the search because it was written in Russian. The special edition also states that between November 9 and 14 over 300 Ukrainian Catholics were given a final warning by the authorities to accept Soviet passports that they had disowned earlier. "Not one Catholic", writes the *Chronicle*, "carried out the order of the authorities, so that Soviet Prisons and concentration camps are being filled with new victims of tyranny by the communists". There is also a reference to the deaths in 1984 of three Ukrainian human rights activists — Oleksiy Tykhyi, Yuriy Lytvyn, and Valeriy Marchenko — while incarcerated in the Kuchino camp in the Perm Oblast.

The special edition also includes the text of an appeal by Terelya to Catholics in Europe and North and South America dated November 15, 1984, in Lviv. Terelya writes that:

a new pogrom of Ukrainian Catholics has begun, [a pogrom] of all members of the Initiative Group. . . What are the Ukrainian Catholics guilty of? We are guilty of one thing — we want to pray openly and bring up our children, but we are not permitted to do so. We ask of the authorities only one thing — legalisation — but they incarcerate us in prisons and camps.

The final text in the *Chronicle* is Terelya's "Resistance and Submissive-

3. Terelya's flight is also mentioned in the ninth issue of the *Chronicle* (AS 5444, p. 31.).

4. RL 290/85, "Ukrainian Catholic Activist Iosyp Terelya Sentenced", September 3, 1985.

5. See RL 280/85, "*L'vovskaya pravda* on the Trial of the Ukrainian Catholic Activist Vasyl Kobryn", August 29, 1985.

6. See AS 5444, p. 31; and AS 5515, n. 1, p. 1, and n. 3, p. 3.

ness". He writes that prior to his earlier arrest, which took place in December 1982, "our movement had a loyal character vis-à-vis the authorities" but that subsequently opinions became divided. According to Terelya, there is a radical wing among the Ukrainian Catholic activists that favours "a more realistic [form of] resistance to the regime", including the conduct of partisan warfare on the territory of the USSR. The point of departure for these people was the murder of the Polish Catholic activist priest Jerzy Popiełuszko. Terelya himself states that his views are more moderate, "that the regime will after all agree to the recognition and legalisation of our Church". He argues that:

one should not forget that in Russia of the Soviets Stalinism is simply impossible, it cannot return. Indeed, it is not needed by Moscow's rulers; to speak well of Stalin does not yet mean to wish for his return. Even the current pogrom of the Ukrainian Catholic Church is a cul-de-sac and [reveals] the impotence of the authorities, which is a consequence of their rejection of Christ.

To some, this would appear to be an exceedingly optimistic evaluation of the current situation. If the virtually nonstop flow of so-called atheistic and anti-Uniate publications in the Soviet Ukrainian media can be taken as a fairly reliable indication of the regime's position on the Ukrainian Catholic (Uniate) Church,⁷ then there can be little hope that Terelya's vision of the future will become reality.

CHRONICLE OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN UKRAINE

Special issue

On November 12, 1984, in Lviv, the chairman of the Initiative Group to Defend the Rights of Believers and the Church in Ukraine, Vasyl Kobryn, was arrested. During the search of his home, the tenth issue of *The Chronicle of the Catholic Church in Ukraine* was confiscated along with various church literature, a Catholic catechism, a missal, a Bible, several crosses and rosaries, as well as paper and materials for the next issues of the *Chronicle*.

Vasyl Kobryn is presently in Lviv prison.

7. For example, the current issues of the two leading political journals published in Kyiv, *Komunist Ukrainy* and *Pid praporom leninizmu*, both contain articles devoted to this subject. See Klym Dmytruk, "Pryamym shliakhom u nebuttya", *Pid praporom leninizmu*, No. 17 (September), 1985, pp. 76-82 (to be continued); and Yu. I. Tereshchenko, "Patriotyzm": Aktual'nyi aspekt naukovoho ateizmu", *Komunist Ukrainy*, No. 9, 1985, pp. 85-92.

* * *

At about the same time, Father Hryhoriy Budzinskyi, the secretary of the Initiative Group, who was on his way to visit Josyp Terelya in Transcarpathia, was abducted. On the way, Father Budzinskyi disappeared along with his driver — the Soviet KGB did not repeat the mistake of their Polish colleagues. . .

* * *

On November 14, a search, which lasted 7 hours, was carried out in the home of Josyp Terelya, member of the Initiative Group to Defend the Rights of Believers and the Church in Ukraine and head of the Central Committee of Ukrainian Catholics. The search was carried out in connection with the arrest of Vasyl Kobryn.

It was carried out by the investigator of the public prosecutor's office, Mitsada, Ivan Ivanovych, local militiaman Lt. Bazhyv, and a "third person who did not identify himself". Four representatives of the village council were also present during the search. The report of the search stated that it had been carried out in connection with the case of Vasyl Kobryn in order to find "Uniate clerical anti-Soviet literature" as well as "other documents and literature". . .

When the prosecutor and the KGB man entered Terelya's home, he protested against the illegal nature of the search. Terelya needed to search the militia and KGB man in order to make sure that the guardians of communism were not carrying any narcotics or other rubbish. The Soviet law enforcers reacted vigorously, but eventually turned out their pockets after which they began their "work".

The owner of the home himself placed on the table all the "seditious materials" in his possession. These included: a catechism, a Bible, liturgical materials, a missal, a Psalter, a collection of poems by Iryna Ratushynska, various notes, his own poetry, and also various underground church literature, which included the book *My Saviour*.

After completing the search, the officials presented Terelya with the protocol, which he refused to sign because it was written in Russian. From the above-mentioned literature only one poem by Terelya was confiscated, as well as a typewriter and tape-recorder along with a cassette with an Easter broadcast and poems by Tychyna, Rylskyi and other classical figures of Ukrainian literature, including Shevchenko. The KGB man told the investigator not to take Ratushynska's poems or any of the other everyday things that are usually discovered during searches.

Terelya was summoned to appear at the district centre for questioning on

November 15. However, on the night of November 14-15, he managed to flee from his guarded home and warn his friends.

* * *

On November 14, a search was carried out in the home of Stefania Sichko, a member of the Initiative Group, who lives in the town of Dolyna, Panas Myrnyi Street, No. 14. During the search nothing was found. Stefania Sichko was warned not to leave.

* * *

Between November 9 and 14, 310 Ukrainian Catholics were given a final warning by the authorities to accept Soviet passports by November 17, which these faithful members of the Church had disowned earlier. Not one Catholic carried out the order of the authorities, and so Soviet prisons and concentration camps are being filled with new victims of communist tyranny.

* * *

**Appeal by the head of the Central
Committee of Ukrainian Catholics,
Josyp Terelya, to Catholics in Europe
and North and South America**

Glory be to Jesus Christ!
Peace on you, Brothers and Sisters!

In Ukraine a new pogrom of Ukrainian Catholics has begun, [a pogrom] of all members of the Initiative Group. This year. Father Antin Potochnyak, a member of the Initiative Group to Defend the Rights of Believers and the Church in Ukraine, died in a Soviet concentration camp. He was serving a term of imprisonment in concentration camp VL-315/30, where he was killed on May 29 of this year, aged 72. Now there is a new pogrom of all members of the Group and also of the rank and file faithful of the Church.

What are the Ukrainian Catholics guilty of? We are guilty of one thing — we want to pray openly and bring up our children, but we are not permitted to do so. . .

We ask of the authorities only one thing — legalisation — but they incarcerate us in prisons and camps.

Brothers and Sisters! Friends! The time has come for a new trial for our people and our Church — pray for us, guilty ones, let your prayers help us to stand firm. These may be my last words of love to our Lord God Jesus Christ, to you, and to my friends and relatives. . .

Glory be to Jesus!
Glory forever!

J. Terelya

Lviv, November 15, 1984

* * *

Aleksander Oros, a Ukrainian Catholic and professor of Uzhhorod State University, is serving his sentence in difficult conditions in concentration camp YeCh-325/62, which is situated in the town of Cherkassy. According to available information, A. Oros has been forbidden to correspond with his friends and relatives, and also to make use of the camp shop.

* * *

Ukrainian Catholic, Pavlo Kampov, who is almost blind and is serving a sentence in difficult conditions in concentration camp OR-216/3-1 in the RSFSR, Kirov region, Rudychnyi settlement, is dying.

* * *

In the village of Dovhe, Transcarpathian region, the authorities have warned Catholics Maria Trykur, her husband Mykhailo, and also Polanya Batyo, to accept Soviet passports. If they refuse, these faithful will be arrested and punished. This year, the above-mentioned people returned home from Soviet concentration camps, where they were serving a sentence for their faith and for Ukraine.

* * *

According to available information, 2 more political prisoners have died in the Kuchino concentration camp VS-389/36-1, shortly after the tragic death of O. Tykhyi, V. Marchenko and Yu. Lytvyn. Who will be the next victims?

* * *

18.11.1984

J. Terelya

RESISTANCE OR SUBMISSIVENESS

Or thoughts which I sometimes have. . .

Seven days ago, I made a decision which will affect both my own personal life and that of our movement for the legalisation of the Ukrainian Catholic Church.

Between November 12 and 14, the Initiative Group to Defend the Rights

of Believers and the Church in Ukraine was crushed. The secretary, Father Hryhoriy Budzinskyi, has "disappeared", along with his driver, and no one knows where; I have gone underground; the other members of the Group are under house arrest "until things are cleared up".

Three hundred and ten refuseniks, who have disowned Soviet passports and other documents, have been arrested "under the pretext" of the crushing of the Group. . .

Our movement had a loyal character *via-à-vis* the authorities, but after my arrest opinions became divided.

On January 12 of this year, I was re-elected for another term as head of the Central Committee of Ukrainian Catholics and at the same time took on responsibility for the publication of *The Ukrainian Catholic Herald*. Remaining a member of the Initiative Group, I also worked on *The Chronicle of the Catholic Church in Ukraine*.

From here — from the underground — the world and everything we do appear different. Here, we have no room for thoughts of submissiveness. As a Christian and Catholic, I understand that all the work and endeavours to denigrate and hate God, that is to oppose Him, are doomed to failure.

The initial days of confusion have made us more confident that the former conditions of drifting are over. The distress was necessary in order to lead the Church out of its state of uncertainty and confusion. Now everything is clear. They want to physically destroy us — to do what Stalin was unable to achieve. In time, wickedness violated, or rather rose up against, the eternal law. Through sin, which is the offspring of wickedness, Russia became what it is today — the land of practical atheism. Collective egoism and pseudo-chauvinistic slogans, nourished by sin and having gone through a national catastrophe, gave an appearance which is not unique since the beginning of the world.

Some people have a wrong opinion as regards the question of the Church, and in particular the Ukrainian Catholic Church. The very idea of a "Church" is dangerous to the land of practical atheism and militant God-killing, and gives rise to much fear. For a "Church" is a "bond" and any "bond" (that is union) is hateful to the Satanists. But the "Ring of Nibelung" idea creates much anxiety and has already led Russia into a catastrophe in the past. Apparently, history does not teach anything.

Analogies easily come to mind: the Russo-Japanese war and its consequences, and now the Soviet Russian-Afghan war and its consequences which are difficult to foresee.

After the murder of Father Popieluszko and the disappearance of Father Budzinskyi (his body and that of the driver were not found) Ukrainian Catho-

lics realised for certain that it is war! But why war? Why the persecution? The answer is that practical atheism is in a state of crisis.

Some radical Catholics can be heard voicing the opinion that a more realistic [form of] opposition to the regime than the perpetual appeals for recognition and legalisation should be adopted. Certain people, who are more categorical in their opinions, think that the time has come to use force and get involved in the war in Afghanistan, making use of China, in order to conduct partisan warfare not only for the liberation of Afghanistan, but also on the territories of neighbouring republics. Other voices urge that people accept Israeli citizenship and join the Israeli army in order to cut off Moscow's reach in the Middle East. Others still, including me, believe that the regime will after all agree to the recognition and legalisation of our Church.

One should not forget that in Russia of the Soviets Stalinism is simply impossible, it cannot return. Indeed, it is not needed by Moscow's rulers; to speak well of Stalin does not yet mean to wish for his return. Even the current pogrom of the Ukrainian Catholic Church is a cul-de-sac and [reveals] the impotence of the authorities, which is a consequence of their rejection of Christ.

A NEW PUBLICATION ON THE MILLENNIUM OF CHRISTIANITY IN UKRAINE

WAS IT REALLY RUSSIA THAT WAS CHRISTIANISED IN 988?

**By His Beatitude Myroslav Ivan
Cardinal Lubachivsky**

Basing himself on both Ukrainian and Russian historiography, the author points out the distinct origins of the Ukrainian and Russian nations and describes the historic process by which Christianity was officially adopted as the state religion of Kyivan-Rus' in 988. The Cardinal argues very convincingly that the true descendants of Rus' are the Ukrainian people and the Ukrainian Church, with its many denominations, and not the Russians and the Russian Orthodox Church, and that in two years time it is the Ukrainians who will be celebrating the 1000 years of Christianity in Ukraine. He also explains why the Russian Orthodox Church and the Soviet Russian authorities are trying so hard to convince the world that 1988 will see the alleged millennium of Christianity in Russia.

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London N1 1LF, U.K.

REPRESSED UKRAINIANS IN THE USSR

(Continued from "The Ukrainian Review", No. 2, 1986)

642) VASYLYNA Roman Andriyovych. Technician from Lviv. Arrested on 15.7. 1973 and sentenced to 5 years of imprisonment. He was accused of illegal underground publication and distribution of prayer books and Church calendars.

643) VELYCHKA Borys. Lawyer by profession. Former classmate of Stepan Bandera. He is constantly repressed.

644) VENDYSH Mykhailo. Born in 1947. Arrested in 1967 and sentenced in the same year to 15 years of imprisonment in a labour camp on the basis of Article 64 of the RSFSR Criminal Code ("Treason").

645) VERES Serhiy Fedorovych. Born in 1947 in the Rivne region. He is a teacher by profession. Arrested in April 1970 and sentenced in Rivne to 2 years of imprisonment on the basis of Article 62 of the UkSSR Criminal Code, for national cultural activity.

646) VERKHOLIAK Dmytro Kuzmovych. Born in 1928. Student of Medicine. Former member of the UPA. Arrested in 1955 and sentenced to 25 years of imprisonment on the basis of Article 56 of the UkSSR Criminal Code. He served his sentence in a labour camp. His wife, Kateryna, served a sentence of 10 years of labour camps for belonging to the UPA. Both were accused of membership of the OUN and were tried in Ivano-Frankivsk.

647) VERNIYCHUK Anatoliy. In 1971 he was sentenced to 12 years of imprisonment, accused of nationalist views and for illegal attempts to cross the border. He served his sentence in a labour camp.

648) VERNYK Ivan Oleksiyovych. Born in 1942. Arrested on 15.11.1971 and sentenced to 4 years of labour camps for giving talks on socio-political issues to workers in Zaporizhia. Presently he lives in Chernivtsi and is still persecuted.

649) VESELOVSKYI V. P. Priest, repressed since 1945.

650) VILCHYNSKA Halyna Volodymyrivna. Born in 1958. Member of the Evangelicals Christians-Baptists for which she was arrested on 23.8.1979 and spent over half a year under interrogation.

651) VIRUN Stepan Martynovych. Born in 1932 in the Lviv region. Attained higher education. On 20.5.1961 he was sentenced in Lviv to 11 years of imprisonment for membership of the "Ukrainian Workers' and Peasants' Union", which propagated secession from the USSR.

652) VODYNIUK O. V. Arrested and sentenced on 12.4.1961 in Lviv to

15 years of imprisonment on the basis of Article 56-1 of the UkSSR Criminal Code. He was accused of political activity.

653) VODYSHCHAK Oleksa V. Arrested in 1969 and sentenced to 15 years of imprisonment on the basis of Article 62 of the UkSSR Criminal Code, accused of nationalist activity.

654) VOLOSIANKO Mykola Prokopovych. Priest of the Ukrainian Catholic Church. Arrested and sentenced in 1973 in Ivano-Frankivsk to 3 years of imprisonment for conducting Mass in a church that had been closed.

655) VORONOVSKYI Vasyl Ivanovych. Priest of the Ukrainian Catholic Church. Long standing political prisoner. After his release he continued to be persecuted. For conducting Mass and baptising children he receives fines. Presently he lives in the Lviv region.

656) VOROZHKO V. S. Born in 1920 in Volyn. Member of the OUN-UPA. Spent many years in the underground. Arrested in 1974 and sentenced in Lutsk to 20 years of imprisonment on the basis of Article 56 of the UkSSR Criminal Code. He served his term in a labour camp.

657) VOVK Ihor. Born in 1953 in the Lviv region. Student of the Rivne Cultural Institute. In 1974 he was expelled from the Institute for national-patriotic activity. After that, he was conscripted into the army and since then nothing has been heard of him.

658) VOZNIAK Mykhailo Onufriyovych. Born in 1920. Priest of the Ukrainian Catholic Church. Married, father of children. He spent many years in Siberia. He is constantly persecuted and fined for conducting Mass and other religious services.

659) VYCHYKOV. Member of the UPA for which he spent many years in prisons and labour camps. In the 1970's, he died while being transferred to a labour camp in Ukraine.

660) VYNNYCHUK Petro Mykolayovych. Born in 1954 in the Ternopil region. Student, arrested in January 1973 and sentenced in Ternopil to 4 years of labour camps and 2 years of internal exile, on the basis of Article 62 of the UkSSR Criminal Code, for belonging to an underground youth group whose aim was the liberation of Ukraine. He served his sentence in the Tomsk region. He was accused of religious activity.

661) VYTENKO Ivan. Born in 1938 in Zakarpattia. Graduated from Lviv University. His parents were deported to Siberia for which Vytenko was persecuted receiving many threats. In 1975-1976 he was found dead while on his way back to Lviv. The authorities closed the case of his murder. Vytenko worked as a mathematician.

662) YAKUBENKO Mykola Ivanovych. Born in 1944. Worker by profession. Arrested in 1971 and sent to a psychiatric hospital for his national beliefs and "anti-Soviet propaganda". In 1978 he was in a labour camp.

663) YAKUBENKO Vasyl. Participated in the liberation struggle of the UPA. Arrested in 1953 and sentenced to 25 years of labour camps.

664) YANKEVYCH Stepan. Born in 1928. Took part in the liberation struggle of the OUN-UPA. Arrested and sentenced in Ivano-Frankivsk to 25 years of imprisonment on the basis of Article 56 of the UkSSR Criminal Code.

665) YANKOVYCH Oleksander. Born in 1929. Belongs to the Evangelicals Christians-Baptists. Arrested in April 1976 and sentenced to compulsory psychiatric treatment. He was sent to Cherniakhivsk psychiatric hospital.

666) YAREMA Mykola and Yuriy. Brothers from the Transcarpathian region. Members of the UPA. Remained underground until 1972 when they were uncovered and arrested. There are no details about their sentence.

667) YASNYTSKYI Symon. Born in 1922. Took part in the liberation struggle of the UPA. In 1953 he was sentenced to 25 years of imprisonment on the basis of Article 56 of the UkSSR Criminal Code. He served his complete sentence.

668) YATSENIY Karlo. Born in 1928. Arrested in 1975 and sentenced by the Rivne regional court to 10 years of imprisonment for helping the OUN-UPA.

669) YATSENKO Vyacheslav. Born in 1948. Worked as an engineer in Mykolayiv. Arrested in 1973 for political matters. Sent to Dnipropetrovsk psychiatric hospital, where he remained until 1979.

670) YATSYSHYN Mykhailo Konstantynovych. Comes from the Lviv region. Arrested in 1972 and sentenced to 6 years of imprisonment on the basis of Article 62 of the UkSSR Criminal Code. He spent several years in a psychiatric hospital.

671) YATSKIV-VERKHOLIAK Kateryna. Arrested in 1955 and sentenced in Ivano-Frankivsk to 10 years of imprisonment accused of working with the OUN. Her husband Dmytro Verkholiak was sentenced to 25 years of imprisonment in the same year. After her release she was constantly refused permission to see her husband.

672) YOVCHYK Myroslav. Arrested in 1961 in Lviv for membership of the underground organisation "Ukrainian National Committee" and sentenced to 15 years of labour camps on the basis of Article 56 of the UkSSR Criminal Code.

(To be continued)

Documents and Reports

VASYL OVSIENKO: "INSTEAD OF A FINAL STATEMENT"

Vasyl Vasylovych Ovsienko was born on 8.4.1949. In 1972 he graduated from the Philological Faculty of Kyiv University and went to work as a teacher of Ukrainian language and literature in a secondary school in the Kyiv region. He is married.

Ovsienko was first arrested in 1972 and sentenced to 4 years of labour camps on the basis of Article 62 of the UkSSR Criminal Code. He was released after serving his full sentence and was immediately placed under government surveillance. He was forbidden to work as a teacher and was subjected to frequent interrogation.

V. Ovsienko was again arrested in 1978 and sentenced on 7-8.2.1979 to 3 years of strict regimen labour camps according to Article 188-1 of the UkSSR Criminal Code, on the basis of fabricated evidence. The real witnesses were not allowed to attend the trial. During the trial Ovsienko made a final statement (printed below) in which he stated his innocence and denounced the case which had been prepared against him as a fabrication. He also spoke up in defence of the Ukrainian nation condemning Soviet Russian oppression and persecution in Ukraine.

Just before Vasyl Ovsienko was due to be released he was re-arrested and transferred from the camp to Zhytomyr prison, where in August 1981 he was sentenced to 10 years of strict regimen camps and 5 years internal exile on the basis of Article 62 of the UkSSR Criminal Code for the alleged spread of propaganda among inmates. His final statement during the 1979 trial, as well as his 1977 declaration to the State Public Prosecutor of the UkSSR, in which he stated Ukraine's constitutional right of secession from the Soviet Union, were used as evidence against him during his trial in 1981.

Presently Vasyl Ovsienko is serving his sentence in Pern camp 36-1, where he is made to carry out forced labour despite his very poor health conditions.

*

Here, where justice is being administered upon me, there is no one to talk to. Here I am alone amongst hissing snakes like an unburnable bush. You tried to surround me with guards, fences and walls. But instead you have used these to surround yourselves from the people. It is you not I, who is

afraid of publicity. It is you not I, who have hidden yourselves from the people lower than the bottom floor, in the underground, in order to create your black deeds.

You nosed out all my tracks, eavesdropped on all my words, frightened people away from me and slandered me with absurd statements. And when you were unable to find in me any falsity, slyness, trickery, you became convinced that I was in principle incapable of committing any crime. And you became afraid of me. This is precisely why you resorted to the vile fabrication of the "affair", just as you used to do on a vast scale during Stalinism according to the principle: "A case will be fabricated, as long as there is person". In my case there is a precedent of the rebirth of Yezhovshchyna and Beriyivshchyna.

I am not guilty of anything and you are very well aware of it. However, you have sent me to this disgusting court in order to ruin me. What for? For the reason that I am interfering with your intentions of robbing and deceiving the people. Because I know the truth about you and my conscience does not allow me to suppress this truth. Because I am one hundred times more noble than you. Because I do not accept swine-like philosophy, whose biggest blessing on earth is to eat from the trough to which you have been lead by Russian imperialism in the guise of communism. You, "Soviet people of Ukrainian descent", who are being led by this troughlike philosophy, helped Russian imperialism to exterminate by hunger one third of your people in 1933. You helped Hitler and Stalin to trample down millions with war and repressions. It was you, who prepared the wagons for the deportation of the remainder of Ukrainians to Siberia. It was you, who destroyed the prime of our people — the intelligentsia. You are now destroying their beautiful language, spreading in its place your dirty lies. You are tearing apart its soul, forcing everyone to become thieves, liars and cowards. You are exterminating its lucid mind with your vodka. You are the nation killers.

This sentence is a continuation of the genocide of the Ukrainian nation. Yes, I am a condemned man. Sooner or later you will destroy me. I am not your first nor your last sacrifice. But I go to this death conscientiously, because I know that by this deed I am defending the life of my nation. I am guided by a Superior Law of Life — by the Law of Sacrifice. Your snake's hissing is heard only by those stone walls, but my voice will be heard by the whole of Ukraine, and the whole world. You are self-murderers and rulers of your deaths. All your failures in world politics are a result of a scandalous destruction of natural human rights for the freedom of expression and the right to do what we please. Whoever is consciencious will not want to deal with a gang. You usurped the right to talk in the name of truth. But nobody among people has this right. It is God's privilege. The principle of total equality grip even more the minds of people, whom you would like forever to have as submissive cattle. But people no longer want to be somebody's slav-

oppression, communist expansion, and totalitarian brutality. We hope to inspire, but we also seek inspiration. Because the history of liberty is a history of resistance, we learn from those who live where the struggle is most urgent. Purified by resistance, they show us the path to a renewed commitment to preserve our own liberties and to give our support and encouragement to those who struggle for freedom."

To pursue that struggle, and to honour those who are with us in that battle, the Congress, by joint resolution approved on July 17, 1959, (73 stat. 212), has authorised and requested the President to issue a proclamation designating the third week in July of each year as "Captive Nations Week".

Now, therefore, I, Ronald Reagan, President of the United States of America, do hereby proclaim the week beginning July 20, 1986, as Captive Nations Week. I invite the people of the United States to observe this week with appropriate ceremonies and activities to reaffirm their dedication to the international principles of justice, freedom, and national self-determination.

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand this twenty-first day of July, in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and eighty-six, and of the independence of the United States of America the two hundred and eleventh.

*

PRESIDENT RONALD REAGAN'S REMARKS AT THE CAPTIVE NATIONS WEEK SIGNING CEREMONY

A couple of weeks ago, we had a celebration up in New York. You probably heard about it. And throughout the width and breadth of our country we had that celebration. It was quite a party. But there was more to that joyous occasion than dazzling fireworks, spectacular entertainment, and flag-waving pageantry. As we emphasised over the liberty weekend, our country is made up of people who came here from nearly every corner of the earth to better themselves and to be made free. And thus there is a spiritual bond between the citizens of our country and all people everywhere who yearn for freedom.

When we approach our dealings with communist governments and the governments of other countries where freedom is under assault, we do so knowing that we have a special responsibility. We must not only be mindful to our own interests, but we must also keep faith with those millions of souls who live under oppression, and I am proud that during these last five and a half years, we have kept faith with the people of the captive nations. To be true to ourselves, we must remain true to them. So many who live under communism see us as their only hope. This is the case even though there are

governments that portray the United States as a horrible place. There is a story of a dissident who, when he was sentenced to a labour camp in one of those countries, complained to the judge that his sentence was too light. He said, "if the United States is as bad as you say it is send me there". (Laughter.)

Seriously, though, I have received letters from desperate people pleading for us to be firm in our resolve. I had a special guest, Anatoly Shcharansky, who was here, and he had been a prisoner, as you know, of the Gulag. And he told me how word of things that we say here in America spread from prisoner to prisoner. I wish that it would be possible to relate to all our people everything that he told in the line of stories.

I can tell you one little story here. Some time ago, I recieved a letter. It was smuggled out of the Soviet Union. Ten women incarcerated in a labour camp there, managed to get this letter out. And it was delivered to me in a kind of presentation so I could not bring the original letter in here. The size of the entire letter, written and signed by the ten women prisoners is so tiny that, you know, nothing but a strong magnifying glass could allow someone to interpret the Russian writing into English. But it was telling me that we are still the only hope of people like themselves. And then it was accompanied by a little larger piece of paper, about the same width but about that high, which contained the record of the hunger strikes that all ten had been on in that labour camp as measures of protest.

Well, I do not suggest that it is impossible to improve relations with the Soviet Union and the other communist regimes. Progress was made that we can build on when I met General Secretary Gorbachev in Geneva. But, however, wishful thinking is not the way to a better world. Meaningful progress can be realised by facing our differences, not glossing them over. Human rights and humanitarian issues cannot be ignored or trivialised.

We care about those people, those separated families who are now brutally cut off from contact with wives or husbands and relatives. We share their suffering and will not forget them or ignore their plight.

I believe the Soviet Union wants better relations. Well, let us begin then by loosening restrictions on travel and personal contacts between our peoples. And in Geneva we talked about that. It is time to see the follow-through, to see deeds now, not words. Opening up emigration and travel would be demonstrable progress with little cost and little risk. Our goal is not just to live in peace with the Soviet Union, but that all mankind live in freedom. And peace is an outgrowth of freedom.

Until all peoples are free to travel and speak with each other, it behooves us to keep Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, Radio Marti, The Voice of America, broadcasting the truth to those who are denied it.

Until freedom is no longer threatened by a massive military build-up as has

been happening in the Soviet Union since the early 1970s, we must remain vigilant and prepared.

Until the Soviets stop trying, through force of arms, to turn Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Angola and other third world countries into colonies of their empire, we will continue to support freedom fighters who are struggling for their independence.

Until the people of the Baltic States and Eastern Europe are free to choose their own system of government, we will continue to speak up for their rights and champion their cause. That is what Captive Nations Week is all about.

During the last decade, nations like Vietnam and Cambodia were added to the list of Captive Nations, which included Romania, Poland and Ukraine. One of the accomplishments of which I am most proud is that during our term here there have been no new captive nations. (Applause).

Thank you. In fact, we brought one small country, Grenada, back into the family of free people. There aren't any signs down there about "Yankee go home". I've been there and seen.

But in July of 1959, the United States Congress, by joint resolution, authorised the President and future Presidents to declare this, the third week in July, as Captive Nations Week.

CAPTIVE NATIONS WEEK MARKED ON CAPITOL HILL

Washington, D.C. — The 28th observance of Captive Nations Week, the 45th anniversary of the Restoration of the Ukrainian State and a special tribute to the Reopening of the Statue of Liberty were commemorated in Washington, D.C. on July 22, 1986, in the Cannon House Office Building.

Some 150 persons gathered for the annual luncheon which was sponsored by the National Captive Nations Committee along with the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America. The Captive Nations Steering Committee was comprised of the Hon. Edward Derwinski, Counselor, Department of State, Rep. Gerald Solomon (R-NY), Rep. Samuel Stratton (D-NY), Rep. Philip Crane (R-IL), and Rep. Don Ritter (R-PA).

The official programme was led by Rep. Gerald Solomon (R-NY). Addresses were delivered by several Senators and Congressmen including, Sen. Robert Dole (R-KS), Rep. William Broomfield (R-MI), Rep. Dennis Hertel (D-MI), Rep. Don Ritter (R-PA), Rep. Philip Crane (R-IL), Rep. Helen Bentley (R-MD), and Rep. Mario Biaggi (D-NY).

OPENING REMARKS BY REP. GERALD B. SOLOMON
28th CAPTIVE NATIONS WEEK LUNCHEON July 22, 1986

Friends and Distinguished Guests

It is both a privilege and an honour for me to welcome you to this 28th annual Captive Nations Week luncheon. For the past 28 years, a Presidential Proclamation has established the official observance of Captive Nations Week. A time when we remember the people who live in nations that have fallen under the domination of godless, international communism.

About one-third of humanity — more than one and a half billion people — live in countries that are part of the captive nations list. These people live under the tyranny of an ideology that can be imposed upon a nation only by force of arms. It is a dogma that has no respect for human rights, or, indeed, for human life itself.

This year's observance of Captive Nations Week is all the more poignant because Yaroslav Stetsko has passed away. This great Ukrainian patriot restored the independence and liberty of his country for a few exciting days in 1941 before he was arrested and imprisoned by the invading Nazi forces.

However briefly the lamp of freedom may then have glowed in Ukraine, Yaroslav Stetsko and the Ukrainian people never lost faith that the day will come when their country will be liberated — permanently! — from its yoke of bondage to Soviet communism. May we never lose faith with them.

Captive Nations Week is that time during the year when those of us who enjoy the blessings of living in a free society renew our dedication to the struggle that seeks to liberate the captives. It is a time when we resolve to preserve, protect, and defend the free world. And for these past six years, under the leadership of President Ronald Reagan, not one square inch of free territory has fallen under communist control.

Above all, Captive Nations Week is that time when we remember that the war against totalitarianism did not end in 1945 with the defeat of Nazi Germany. No, the war against totalitarianism only entered a new and more dangerous phase after 1945. The war against communist tyranny is a war of ideas, as well as arms. And the stakes are just as high as in the war against Nazism.

Earlier this year, I visited one of the battlegrounds in this war, Vietnam. "Give peace a chance" we were told so many times when American soldiers were bleeding and dying to keep Vietnam free. Well I have seen that so-

called peace — the false peace imposed upon an unwilling people. A trip to Vietnam today calls to mind the solemn warning of Winston Churchill that, yes, “war is horrible, but slavery is worse”.

I am reminded, too, of the plight of the Cambodian people. We were also told so many years ago to “Give peace a chance” in that country. But the Cambodian people are today condemned to live under the same kind of false peace as are the Vietnamese.

Several years ago, Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia visited Washington, and, while here, he went out to Arlington cemetery to visit the graveside of John Foster Dulles. When asked why, he recalled the advice that Secretary of State Dulles had given him many years earlier. Mr. Dulles told the Prince that Cambodia had a bright future and that the Prince, as an ambitious young man, was in the position to do great things for his country.

But, Mr. Dulles warned, you must decide whose camp you are in — you cannot have it both ways indefinitely, playing the East and West off against each other. Prince Sihanouk bitterly regrets that he did not follow that advice. In 1975, the proud and ancient country of Cambodia joined the list of captive nations.

I look forward to the day when Cambodia, Vietnam, Ukraine, and all the others — especially Afghanistan and Poland — are no longer on the captive nations list. Indeed, we all look forward to the day when the list itself is no longer necessary. It is in that spirit — in that confidence — that we meet today. To let the atheistic communist leaders know that we free people do not and will never accept a philosophy of “Better red than dead”, because living one day under communism is the same as being dead.

And we of the National Captive Nations Committee and freedom fighters throughout the world will not rest until all peoples are free of the hated yoke of communism.

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REMARKS BY REP. WILLIAM BROOMFIELD

On this 28th anniversary of Captive Nations Week, freedom remains an elusive dream for the millions who continue to labour under the weight of communist tyranny.

Despite the preparations for summit meetings, changing faces in the Kremlin, and rhetoric about better East-West relations, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, East Germany and the Baltic States remain enslaved societies.

With each new military offensive the Soviet Union seeks to murder or ens-

lave those in Afghanistan who only wish to determine their future for themselves.

A few months ago, I had the opportunity along with Chairman Dante Fascell of the House Foreign Affairs Committee to visit the Soviet Union and meet with Gorbachev.

While he is a younger, better educated leader, he is in my judgement no less a dedicated communist than his predecessors.

As the tragedy of Chornobyl proved, the Soviets may be trying to change their image, but they have not changed their fundamental disregard for human life.

If the Soviets are serious about better relations, let them come clean about what really happened at Chornobyl.

Let them begin by loosening restrictions on travel and personal contacts between peoples.

Let us see less talk and more deeds, now.

But as President Reagan said yesterday in signing this year's Captive Nations proclamation, until that time comes we must remain vigilant and prepared.

He added, and I quote: "Until the Soviets stop trying, through force of arms, to turn Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Angola, and other third world countries into colonies of their empire, we will continue to support freedom fighters who are struggling for their independence. Until the people of the Baltic States and Eastern Europe are free to choose their own system of government, we will continue to speak up for their rights and champion their cause".

As the President said, "That's what Captive Nations Week is all about".

UKRAINIAN RESISTANCE IN W.W.II REMEMBERED IN CONGRESSIONAL RECORD

Washington, DC (UNIS) Several U.S. Congressmen and Senators have recently made special remarks in *The Congressional Record* remembering Ukraine's resistance to Nazi and Soviet tyranny during World War II.

The remarks in *The Congressional Record* appeared in conjunction with the 45th anniversary of the Restoration of the Ukrainian State which occurred on June 30, 1941, in Lviv.

Writing about the Nazi reaction of Ukraine's proclamation of independence, Rep. John Dingell (D-MI) wrote, "The reaction of the Gestapo to the Ukrainian proclamation of June 30, 1941, was swift and merciless. However, the imprisonment and murders of members of the Ukrainian Government and its leaders by the Gestapo did not prove to be the deadly blow to the Ukrainian resistance the Germans had hoped for. These acts were followed by the barbarous policies of ruthless exploitation, oppression, and genocide against the Ukrainian population, which responded with a ferocious national liberation struggle led by a reorganised Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists.

Congressman Dennis Hertel (D-MI) wrote that following the German defeat "the Ukrainians were forced to escalate their struggle in a new war against Soviet Russian imperialism. During this confrontation, which continued into the 1950's, the Ukrainian forces valiantly continued to fight for peace and freedom. Although never militarily defeated, the Ukrainian nationalists were eventually forced to decentralise and form a Ukrainian national underground".

Tying his remarks to the celebration of the reopening of the Statue of Liberty, Senator Carl Levin stated that, "As all of us celebrate in the relighting of Miss Liberty's torch, let us remember the flame of freedom which also still burns in the soul of the Ukrainian people. As we celebrate our freedom, let us remember and honour the millions of Ukrainians who have fought, sacrificed, and struggled for their freedom".

Congressman Paul Henry (R) spoke of the newly proclaimed National Assembly composed of the "most prominent Ukrainian leaders from all walks of life", as well as being composed of "representatives from various political parties".

In his remarks during Captive Nations Week 1986, Congressman William Lipinski remembered the "blood that was shed, and the many lives that were lost, in the battle to free a nation held captive by tyranny's iron grip". He referred to Ukraine by paying "homage to the courage that the Ukrainian Insurgent Army demonstrated when they battled the twin scourges of democracy — Nazi Germany and the Red Army. Though the Ukraine is still held captive, we acknowledge the spirit of freedom that resides in the bosoms of the Ukrainian people, and give whole hearted support for an independent Ukrainian nation".

PUBLIC MEMBERS OF UKRAINIAN FAMINE COMMISSION ANNOUNCED

Washington, DC (UNIS) — Ukrainian Famine Commission Chairman Dan Mica (D-FL) has announced the appointment of six Ukrainian-Americans to serve as public members of the recently formed commission.

The six members include: Bohdan Fedorak of Warren, MI; Ulana Mazurkevych of Philadelphia, PA; Myron Kuropas of DeKalb, IL; Oleh Weres of Oakland, CA; Daniel Marchishin of Bound Brook, NJ; and Lubow Margolin-Hansen of Washington, D.C. Chosen in accordance with established legislation, the public members represent the Ukrainian-American community at large and will be involved in all aspects of commission work.

The Commission on the Ukraine Famine was enacted at the close of the 98th Congress in 1984. The Commission's purpose is to conduct a study of the 1932-33 Ukrainian famine in order to expand the world's knowledge of the famine and provide the American public with a better understanding of the Soviet system by revealing the Soviet Russian role in the Ukrainian famine which claimed more than seven million lives.

In addition to the six public members, the Commission consists of four members of the House of Representatives, two United States Senators, and one member each from the Department of State, Education, and Health and Human Services.

JEWISH ENCYCLOPEDIA ON UKRAINE

The following excerpt is found in *The Universal Jewish Encyclopedia* under the heading "Ukraine". This description of Ukrainian attitudes towards Jews in Ukraine during the Second World War differs drastically from some of the slanderous comments disseminated in the media during the past year. (Emphasis added — ed.)

"In August 1941, the notorious Eichmann, formerly Gestapo head in Vienna, was appointed head of the Gestapo in Ukraine with complete authority to deal with the Jews there as he saw fit. Two months later great massacres of Jews in Ukraine behind the battle lines took place. Thousands of Jews unable to retreat with the Soviet armies into the interior of Russia were

mowed down by Nazi machine-gun fire. In the course of these massacres, which were reported to have begun as early as the month of August 1941, more than 50,000 Jewish men, women and children were murdered in Kyiv alone. Nazi troops and agents spread anti-Jewish reports among the Ukrainian population which, however, remained sympathetic toward the Jews, refusing to participate in the massacres and in many instances giving shelter to refugee Jews from Ukraine, Poland and other parts of Eastern Europe.

"In November 1941, large numbers of Jews from Bukovyna and Rumania were deported to Ukraine, where they were interned in makeshift ghettos. Reports spread by the Nazis in Ukraine that the Jews of the province were responsible for the massacre of many Ukrainian nationalists in Lemberg (Lviv) at the time when the city was occupied by the Soviet troops failed to set the Ukrainian population against the Jews, and Ukrainian leaders in Nazi-occupied Galicia cooperated in relief and administrative problems. "In early January and in April 1942, the Nazi authorities made new attempts to incite the Ukrainian population against the Jews through anti-Semitic propaganda. All these attempts remained unsuccessful. New massacres of Jews in Ukrainian towns, including Novozibkovo, in the district of Kyiv, and Unych, occurred in September and October 1942. In the latter month large numbers of Jews were deported from Limbourg, Liege and Antwerp, Belgium, to Ukraine.

A NEW BOOK ON THE EXPERIENCE AND SUFFERING OF UKRAINIANS IN AUSCHWITZ!

IN THE GERMAN MILLS OF DEATH 1941-1945

By **Petro Mirchuk**

(Second Edition)

This timely publication has appeared at the height of the Soviet Russian campaign of defamation against Ukrainians. Based entirely on fact, *IN THE GERMAN MILLS OF DEATH* is a fitting answer to the KGB's anti-Ukrainian propaganda which attempts to portray Ukrainian nationalists, who fought against both the Nazis and the Soviet Russians during and after WWII, aimed at discrediting the Ukrainians in the eyes of the West with a view to cutting short Ukrainian attempts to acquire Western political support and material aid in their struggle for an independent Ukraine.

In this remarkable book, Petro Mirchuk, who was a Ukrainian political activist when he was taken to Auschwitz, explains why thousands of Ukrainian political prisoners were imprisoned and exterminated in German concentration camps. He relates how life and death was from day to day in a place which most prisoners were convinced they would leave only as corpses. Such was the nature of the concentration camp that simple existence was a miracle of no small accomplishment, and those who managed it are well worth listening to.

Published in 1985 by: The Survivors of the Holocaust and the Ukrainian American Freedom Foundation, Inc., Rochester, N.Y., U.S.A.

Price: U.K. — £5.00,

U.S.A — \$12.00,

Canada & Australia — \$15.00.

Orders to be sent to:

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Book Reviews

ENCYCLOPEDIA OF UKRAINE Volume I (A-F)

*Edited by Volodymyr Kubijovyč, University of Toronto Press,
October 1984, xv, 952 pp. Cloth \$115.00.*

The first volume of *Encyclopedia of Ukraine* has been published by the University of Toronto Press for the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, the Shevchenko Scientific Society and the Canadian Foundation for Ukrainian Studies. It covers the letters A to F and has taken twenty five years of research by more than one hundred scholars to produce. The *Encyclopedia of Ukraine* is an updated and translated version of the *Entsyklopediya ukrainoznavstva* which was initiated over thirty five years ago by the Shevchenko Scientific Society, the oldest Ukrainian learned association.

The *Encyclopedia of Ukraine* is to be published in four volumes, of approximately 1000 pages each. The individual volumes are to be published at two to three year intervals, and the complete Encyclopedia should be available within the decade.

The Encyclopedia will contain about 20,000 entries which are divided into the following five groups:

The first group includes entries on Ukraine's geography and natural environment, archaeology and history, jurisprudence and the Church, language and literature, education, art, theatre, music and the economy.

The second group contains longer entries on the various scholarly disciplines in Ukraine, including technical and scientific subjects such as anthropology, botany, chemistry and economic studies.

The third group consists of long entries, many of them brief surveys, on Ukraine's natural geographical-historical regions. In Volume I there are such entries as the Sea of Azov, Bessarabia, the Black Sea, the Carpathian Mountains, the Chernihiv region, the Crimea, Dobrudja, the Don Region, and the Donets Basin.

The fourth group consists of entries dealing with other countries, contacts between Ukrainians and other peoples in other nations in the past and present, countries to which Ukrainians have emigrated, and national minorities in

Ukraine. Examples in Volume I are Albania, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Byelorussia, Bohemia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, the Far East, France, and cities with Ukrainian communities such as Berlin, Chicago and Edmonton.

The fifth group provides brief accounts of individuals, geographical locations, historical, political, juridical and economic periods, events and institutions, periodicals and publications, associations and organisations.

The *Encyclopedia of Ukraine* is a much awaited publication, for which there has long been a need. It will no doubt become an important source of reference for many. Illustrations, totalling about 450 photographs and over 150 tables and maps, supplement the text. A separately bound chromatic map and gazetteer of Ukraine accompanies the volume, and the system used for transliterating words and names from the Cyrillic alphabet is well explained. In conclusion, the *Encyclopedia of Ukraine* is a most useful, nay invaluable, addition to the library of any institution or household interested in Ukraine and Ukrainian matters.

Irena CIAPRYNA

THE PRIVATE WAR AGAINST SOVIET CENSORSHIP

By D. R. Shannor. St. Martins Press. New York, 1985

The author is concerned to highlight how uncensored information is able to filter to the Soviet citizen, and how modern technology will make this possibility even greater in the future. Control of information is a basic requirement for the Soviet state, although this state monopoly is being broken in many ways — especially within the realm of Soviet citizens' private lives. Ways of rolling back this state monopoly are what the author outlines, — and as he says, "the possibilities are endless; the technology is readily available". But any lessening of party control over information will not take place with its approval. Direct broadcast by satellite onto Soviet television would probably lead to the authorities shooting them down. Other possible branches of the information revolution which will have a dramatic effect in the USSR are personal computers, (as the author points out — "every one is a potential printing press as well as a link to other computers"); videos and satellite communications.

The author points out the dilemma in Soviet policy — how to allow the in-

formation revolution to take hold in the USSR (a requirement for Gorbachev's plans to improve economic performance) and yet how to go on controlling it to prevent a lessening of party control over people's lives? The author believes that if it wants to take advantage of new technology then it has "to designate a rather large area of activities that will be tolerated". Judging by past Soviet performance this seems to be unlikely — the chances are just as great that the regime will absorb the new technology and retain totalitarian control over its subjects.

The average Soviet citizen is better informed than one would expect if he relied solely on news from the state. People look to independent sources of information because they disbelieve what they see, hear or read in the Soviet media. In many cases Soviet citizens first learn about developments in the USSR from Western radio stations and not from the Soviet media. In other cases, the Soviet media has not been able to remain silent about an issue because Soviet citizens have already heard about it from elsewhere.

The "grand illusion" is what the party would like its citizens to believe. This illusion is disseminated through controls exercised on three levels — constant interaction between editors and censors (Glavlit), editors and party propagandists (instruktory) and through self-censorship. As a former *Komsomolskaya Pravda* reporter explained, "the first part of your article must be about what is being done well. The second part can be about what will be done well".

The Soviet system sets great merit upon letter writing, serving the dual purpose of complaint channel and opinion gauge. The Soviet regime does not necessarily base its decisions on public opinion, — it feels it can switch it on and off at will. Public opinion cannot change personnel in the USSR. As Shannor points out, "the advantages of the letters is that they can be acted on or ignored, inspired or discouraged, and selected in such a way as to support any position the party wants". Ninety percent of the letters received are about quality of life issues — housing, work problems, and so on. The other ten percent are about politics — something most Soviet citizens are reluctant to take part in. Many dissidents have been sentenced for writing letters that were never published. Letters sent to newspapers that are classed as "anti-Soviet" are turned over to the KGB. Most political letters are unsigned.

The most important aspect of this, as Shannor points out, is that "the authorities must always maintain control, or at least the appearance of being in control". Public opinion exists only "in organised form, organised by the government, and that means it cannot be genuine". When Soviet commentators talk of "public opinion" — "it is limited to the factory and local issue level, not the national and international". What is clear is that the authorities take the issue of opinion very strongly — hence an estimated 4 million party agitators in the USSR. In Moscow alone, there are 100,000 professional

party lecturers. (Could this be why unemployment does not officially exist in the USSR?)

The "underground telegraph" is the unofficial information system that competes with the state media. This underground telegraph obtains information from overseas telephone calls, foreign radio, as well as videos and cassettes smuggled into the USSR. Some information is circulated as samizdat, others as tamizdat (tape recordings). The "underground telegraph" involves millions of people, "aiming to inform, not to persuade or organise". It is the work of "individuals with no discernible organisational plan". It arose out of "individual dissatisfaction with the failure of the party media to provide honest and relevant information, and it will stay in being as long as those deficiencies remain". Shannor believes that the "underground is growing in size and importance".

Foreign radio broadcasts and overseas mail (in 1982 over 12 million letters were sent between the USA and USSR in both directions) bring in information that is passed by word of mouth and recordings. Even an inconspicuous colour photograph of a recent emigre standing in front of a new car provides the Soviet reader with information that life is not as bad in the West after all. The volume of mail is so great that the KGB just cannot read everything. In addition, letters are shared between friends.

Foreign broadcasts have the advantage of immediacy, and their information enters the underground telegraph system. Friends who have been listening call friends who were not. At times of crises, the listening increases. Broadcasts can be taped, passed on and copied.

Information can be gleaned from the Western press — although only from newspapers of Western communist parties. Oral lectures give out more information than print. Many loyal party journalists release news or gossip to friends or Western correspondents. Foreign travel is a source of good unofficial information. The underground telegraph can often have the effect of making the official media more open when the pressure gets too great. Often Soviet citizens check their local information with a foreign source, more than likely believing the latter.

Most participants in the underground telegraph are not dissidents and there is a lack of a written record of the information exchanged. The dissident information network has a written record, often passed on to the West and then broadcast back — thereby reaching a much wider audience. Dissidents have therefore "created an independent public opinion in the Soviet Union for the first time". Telephoning contacts in the West with dissident information is a way of getting information to the West for the press and radio. Because of radio broadcasts, dissident literature has reached a much wider Soviet audience, leading to many more being involved in the opposition.

The Soviet authorities have retaliated by jamming Western broadcasts. Three thousand jamming transmitters and 15,000 technicians work on this task. The cost of jamming is believed to be greater than that of bringing out Radio Liberty and Voice of America. The authorities have cause to worry — a third of the Soviet population listens to foreign broadcasts on a regular basis. In addition, photocopying facilities are locked up in order to prevent their unofficial use.

Computers linked in networks will have profound effects on the way information is exchanged. Future dissidents could reach a wide audience by being relayed on a video telephone system, televised into Soviet homes from satellites, using a dish antenna made from scrap iron and wireless telephones (meaning less danger of tapping). What will the regime's answer be to this new technology? How will it react to its citizens being better informed?

The existence of a network of word processors, personal computers and electronic mail would pose a near-impossible challenge for police and political control. If computers were allowed at home, then many believe printers would not be provided — discs would have to be printed in the office. But electric typewriters can be used as printers. The dilemma is that computer technology, which Gorbachev feels is so urgent a requirement for the USSR, will only give a real advantage to societies that do not try to control information. Person to person information systems now being built in the West would be difficult to censor and control. If this system was introduced in the USSR they would need to employ many more censors.

Video films are another area of information that the authorities are trying hard to control. Already viewers in many western regions of the USSR watch Polish or Scandinavian television. Estonians regularly watch Finnish television which makes that republic the unofficial video centre of the USSR. The authorities are worried that if they themselves do not begin producing videos the unofficial market will expand out of control. Black market videos cost up to 250 dollars. At the moment video recorders cost as much as new cars. Videos can give over a message to a large number of people on a very basic level. Soviet officials bring in recorders and videos without border controls.

Tape recorders are another means of passing around uncensored information. Western broadcasts are taped, copied and passed on. In 1981, the USSR had 168 million radios (compared to 90 million in 1965). Rewiring of Soviet radios to enable them to pick up Western broadcasts is apparently easy. Western radios are brought in by sailors and officials.

Telephone technology will open up vast new possibilities for uncensored information. Direct dialing between the USSR and abroad only lasted two years (1980-82). The ending of direct dialing was to put a stop to the leak of

information over the phonelines. To control telephones in an era of copper-wire telephone systems is possible. But what will happen when people will have tiny, pocket-sized phones they can take anywhere?

Radio technology is also improving at such a pace that it could become a real threat to political control in the USSR. Work is already being undertaken on jam-proof radio transmitters. A satellite transmission system for FM radio that could reach into every Soviet home has already been perfected. Jamming would be difficult and there would be no need for a special antenna to receive FM radio. The Soviets are already worried about direct television broadcasts from satellites. Many Soviet citizens could assemble a dish for receiving signals from everyday objects.

Shannon believes that the USSR will face up to the information revolution by: "delaying, handing out a concession here and taking another away, retreating, regrouping, and hoping in the end that it can have both control over information and the benefits of open information exchange". The result is likely to be more penetration of the USSR by independent information. A better informed Soviet public "will have great power", believes Shannon, who thinks this will allow the regime to be more open.

Although Shannon does not follow this argument through to its logical conclusion, one could quite reasonably ask whether the end result might be more opposition and unrest in the USSR? A better informed Soviet public is a dangerous outcome for the regime — for without the totalitarian controls imposed on Soviet society, the lies and falsifications encountered in everyday life would be questioned even more than they already are. When that happens the legitimacy and survival of the very regime are at stake.

Taras KUZIO

The
UKRAINIAN
REVIEW



IV

1986

THE UKRAINIAN REVIEW

A Quarterly Magazine devoted to the study of Ukraine

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Soviet TV picture of the damaged Chornobyl reactor.

Chornobyl Nuclear Disaster

Stephen OLESKIW

THE CHORNOBYL DISASTER

Causes and consequences of the world's worst nuclear catastrophe

On Monday April 28, a radioactive cloud blew over Scandinavia from the direction of the Soviet Union. Several hours later, the world learnt about what is being termed as the world's worst nuclear disaster. At 9 a.m. that morning, technicians at the Forsmark Nuclear Power Plant, 60 miles north of Stockholm, picked up abnormally high levels of radiation — a sure sign of serious trouble. Had it not been for this, the rest of the world would still be unaware of the fact that an accident had occurred at the Chornobyl Atomic Energy Station in Ukraine, some 50 miles north of the country's capital, Kyiv.

Ironically, the accident occurred at a time when the Soviet Union was publicly boasting of the high levels of safety maintained at Soviet nuclear power plants and the fact that they are thoroughly up to date. Only two months previously, the February 1986 issue of *Soviet Life*, an English-language publication, published an article on Chornobyl in which Ukrainian Power Minister, Vitaliy Skliarov, declared the chances of a meltdown at the plant to be one in 10,000 years, and claimed that the environment was securely protected.

As Western experts desperately tried to locate the source of the radiation, one of the four operational reactors at the Chornobyl nuclear power plant was burning out of control, blowing a huge cloud of highly radioactive debris across Northern Europe.

All this time Moscow remained silent, putting the whole of Europe at risk. By Monday afternoon, Swedish experts had identified isotopes of krypton, iodine, caesium and cobalt in the fall-out which could only come from an accident at a nuclear reactor. Thus, on the basis of these findings, they came to the conclusion that a meltdown must have occurred at a nuclear power plant somewhere in that part of the world. After checking the direction of the wind that weekend, Western experts backtracked the line through Latvia, Byelorussia down to Kyiv, which made the nuclear plant at Chornobyl the most likely source of the leakage of radiation. But when Swedish officials pressed Moscow for information, they were confronted with consistent denials that an accident had occurred at one of the Soviet Union's nuclear reactor

plants, and silence. It was not until 9 p.m. that Monday that Moscow television broadcast a four-line statement, issued by TASS, which raised more questions than it answered, officially acknowledging that an accident had, in fact, occurred at the Chornobyl nuclear plant. At that time, however, no mention was made of the number of casualties, and no technical information on the scale of the disaster, or how it was being dealt with, was released. When the Swedes demanded additional information, Moscow refused to give any and continued to stonewall. The only indication of the seriousness of the situation was the fact that Soviet diplomats in Stockholm and Bonn were frantically looking for information on how to put out a graphite fire. This was a sure sign that something was terribly wrong inside the Soviet Union, as Moscow was openly seeking advice from the Western powers despite ideological beliefs in Marxist-Leninist infallibility.

The immediate causes of the disaster

In accordance with a report issued by the Soviet government, discussed at a special meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), in August of this year, the accident occurred as a direct result of an unauthorised and improperly conducted experiment of little value, carried out with blatant disregard for safety regulations. The shift manager in charge of the experiment was an electrical engineer, not a nuclear scientist, and had insufficient knowledge to realise the risks which were being taken in an experiment of this nature. The experiment resulted in an explosion which sent radiation streaming across most of Europe.

It began at 1 a.m., on April 25, when staff allowed the operative reserves of radioactivity in the reactor core to drop below permissible levels, thereby weakening the unit's defences. Next, the reactor's capacity was allowed to drop significantly below the 700 mw of heat energy needed for the tests. Then, the main circulation pumps were overloaded. Trying to prevent a reactor shutdown, staff cut the automatic blocking devices which would have come into operation when steam failed to reach the generator. They also switched off the defences controlling the water level and steam pressure. Finally, the emergency cooling system was switched off during tests designed to find out how long stable power could be maintained after switching over to a diesel generator. Thus, the unit was functioning with its cooling system switched off for almost 12 hours. This was strictly against all regulations, and the worst mistake of the whole experiment. Although Soviet Russian authorities try to point the finger at local officials, putting the blame entirely on human error, it is the serious flaws in design and construction of Chornobyl's fourth reactor that lie at the core of the factors which caused the disaster. Drawings and other information, which have become available to US experts, reveal that the No. 4 reactor lacked a secondary containment shell. Although there was a steel and concrete structure surrounding the reactor

itself, it was grossly inadequate. According to Edward Zebroski, chief nuclear scientist at the Electric Power Research Institute in Palo Alto, California, it was not designed to withstand pressures similar to those anticipated in Western reactors¹. The shell was designed to withstand only one particular type of pressure from a specific type of accident and was not intended to contain radioactivity from a serious nuclear disaster. Chornobyl was inferior in equipment and design to modern Western plants and was inherently less safe. Its steel and concrete walls enclosed a smaller volume than most US plants which meant that pressures would build up more rapidly inside the Soviet reactor. In comparison, the containment building at Three-Mile Island withstood the pressures which built up inside it during the accident in 1979. Although some radiation was released into the atmosphere and radioactive water was dumped into the Susquehanna river, most of the radioactivity was contained inside the four-foot thick steel and concrete walls of the reactor's containment building. Had there been adequate secondary containment at Chornobyl, most of the radioactivity would undoubtedly have been retained inside the reactor. But, as described later in this article, the No. 4 reactor was built and put into operation in the fastest possible time in order to meet construction plans, which meant that adequate safety measures to protect the workers and the thousands of people living in the area around the plant from any mishaps which might have occurred, were disregarded. In the words of Artem Kulikov, former Soviet scientist now working as a physicist in Stamford University: "When there are building problems or delays [in the Soviet Union], the first thing that is sacrificed is pollution control and safety" and although "there are good laws against pollution and unsafe operations of industrial plants. . . they are disregarded"².

There are problems in all Soviet industries, but the nuclear industry is the most dangerous. For this reason, particular care should have been taken to ensure that the reactor was not of an archaic and dangerous design, that it was designed to withstand every conceivable problem and that all required safety standards were adequately met. This was not the case with Chornobyl. As a result, the Ukrainian and Byelorussian people will pay the price of Soviet Russian negligence and disregard for human safety for many years to come.

The long-term causes

The Chornobyl disaster happened at a time of rapid expansion of the Soviet Union's nuclear energy programme, designed to expand additional sources of energy to avoid an energy crisis, and to further integrate the economies of Eastern Europe into the Soviet plan, thereby curtailing still further the autonomy of Eastern bloc countries. The expansion began in the late

1. *Time*, June 2, 1986, p. 11.

2. *The Ukrainian Weekly*, June 1, 1986, p. 3.

1970s, at a time when the Kremlin decided to strive for nuclear superiority over the West, rather than satisfy itself with parity. The Ukrainian SSR was to play a major role in this overall expansion, firstly because a third of the coal deposits at Donbas had been exhausted and the rest was of poorer quality and more difficult to extract; secondly, because the uranium deposits near the town of Zhovti Vody, north of Kryvyi Rih, are the best known source of uranium in the Soviet Union, which would greatly facilitate the nuclear energy programme by the advantageous positioning of raw materials (uranium) in close proximity to nuclear power plants; and thirdly, because Ukraine is situated in the far western part of the USSR, bordering on the satellite countries, a factor greatly facilitating the development of energy in the Eastern bloc. Thus, at least 3 of the proposed 9 nuclear power plants already functioning, or presently still under construction, in Ukraine were designed to serve Eastern European countries: the Khmelnytskyi plant — Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary; the South Ukrainian plant — Rumania and Bulgaria; and Chornobyl — Hungary³. For these reasons, Moscow set itself the goal of doubling the amount of nuclear-generated electricity in Ukraine by 1990.


But, as one can imagine, such a dramatic expansion of the Soviet nuclear energy industry could not take place without serious problems. In fact, the nuclear industry was being rapidly expanded before an adequate infrastructure had been established. The Soviet Union itself admitted a shortage of specialists, and that training of qualified technicians specifically for the nuclear energy industry was still in its infancy. The first faculty of nuclear energy in the Soviet Union was only set up in 1975 in the Odessa Polytechnic Institute. The second did not appear until 1985, in Kyiv, along with the foundation of the Institute of Nuclear Energy at the Moscow Physical Engineering Institute⁴. Thus, the necessary cadres of qualified specialists on nuclear energy were only now beginning to emerge. It was also common practice for students to spend their summer vacation working on the construction of nuclear plants⁵. The Soviet press had reported that "bands of students" were working at the Odessa, Rivne, Chornobyl, South Ukrainian and Zaporizhia plants (*Komsomolskoye znamia*, summer 1985).

Thus, the fact that the construction of nuclear power plants in the Soviet Union, particularly Ukraine, failed to keep pace with the scheduled plans was hardly surprising. However, instead of tackling the problem logically, the authorities merely pressed on with meeting the deadlines set by the plan. They made great efforts to raise the tempo of construction by inducing workers to greater output and to compete with other plants. This led to a race to complete the specified number of reactors in the set time, irrespective of all other factors.

3. David Marples: "Chernobyl in Ukraine's Nuclear Energy Programme". *Soviet Nationality Survey*, Vol. III, No. 4-5, April-May 1986, p. 5.

4. *Ibid*, p. 5.

5. *Ibid*, p. 5.



The New York Times/April 30, 1986

The Chornobyl plant, as can be seen from Soviet press, was of particular importance and received special attention in the race to fulfil set plans. Although it was already the largest plant in Ukraine, with four huge RBMK-1000 reactors (total output 4,000 mw)⁶, and one of the four largest in the Soviet Union, two more reactors were scheduled for completion in 1986 and 1988. The first was to be ready in 1986, that is 50% faster than the average time span between the construction of energy blocks advocated by the Soviet authorities. One can assume that this particular place was reserved for Chornobyl due to its additional military significance. It is the only Ukrainian plant with graphite dual purpose reactors capable of producing not only electricity, but also weapons-grade plutonium for the further expansion of the USSR's nuclear arsenal.

A look at Soviet Ukrainian press on the subject of Chornobyl underlines the very gloomy picture of the circumstances which surrounded the construction and operation of the plant. It was built in record time by more or less experimental methods, and has, since the beginning, been plagued by numerous problems, such as chronic shortages of essential materials, poor organisation, and a demoralised workforce. According to an article which appeared in the journal *Nauka i suspilstvo* (No.11) as early as 1971, when the Chornobyl power plant was being built, it was "unique" at the time in the Soviet Union "not only because of its design, but also because of the fast methods of construction". It was being built "at an unprecedented tempo" and "many technological methods" were going to be tried out for the first time. *Radyanska Ukraina* confirms this in an article published on December 29, 1985, which stated that Chornobyl was already "leading the field in the race" to become the largest nuclear plant in the Soviet Union with a total output of 6,000 mw.

A correspondent, who had worked on the Chornobyl plant, published an article in *Znannya ta pratsya* (No. 12, 1977) in which he drew attention, once again, to the "unique nature of construction" that had required "bold decisions and the latest work methods" from the work force. In his opinion, the site became "an extraordinary forum for experimentation".

By 1984, when the 4th reactor had been constructed, the plant had developed serious personnel problems. On July 26, 1985, *Pravda* printed a report

6. Reactor No. 4 at Chornobyl is one of four similar units at the plant. In its design, it is a direct descendant of the world's first nuclear power plant which came into operation at Obninsk, in the Soviet Union, in 1954. The RBMK-1000 reactor generates 1000 mw of electricity and 3200 mw of thermal power. In size it is comparable to the largest of Western power plants, but is of a design which uses graphite as a moderator (a substance used to slow down the neutrons in the fuel), used almost exclusively in the USSR. The only Western reactor of similar design is the graphite-moderated reactor at Hanford, Washington. The No. 4 reactor at Chornobyl houses a uniquely bad combination of moderator and cooling system. It is cooled by water and uses graphite as a moderator. Graphite can burn, which is one reason why US reactors use water as a moderator and not graphite. Although British reactors also use graphite, they are cooled by carbon dioxide. The difference is vital: graphite will not burn in carbon dioxide, but does so extremely well in steam. However, since 1954, the Soviet Union has continued to develop the graphite-moderated, water-cooled reactors despite their inherent dangers.

by the first secretary of the town party committee of Prypiat, A. Hamaniuk, who mentioned the “insufficient regard of the leaders for the task at hand, their not very high level of professionalism [and that the] “low level of labour and population discipline” only led to “more frequent shortages and the resultant unfulfilled plans”.

Taking the matter still further, an article by Lyubov Kovalevska, which appeared in *Literaturna Ukraina* (No. 3), on March 27 of this year, describes how the officials responsible for the running and expansion of the plant ignored constructional defects which came to light during the building of the first reactor at Chornobyl in the early 1970s, in their great haste to meet the tight construction schedule. She goes on to say that “the problems of the first reactor [were] passed on to the second reactor [block], and from the second to the third and so on, and under these conditions the problems [became] more profound, and one [had] an ‘overgrowth’ of an enormous number of unresolved problems. At first, these problems were discussed with great interest, later they were the subject of indignation and finally there came a sense of helplessness. ‘How long can we talk about one and the same thing? What’s the point of all this discussion?’

And now the fifth block. . . The deadlines for its completion were reduced from 3 to 2 years, and construction began in 1985 with a minimum number of supplies. This change in deadlines, and the tightening-up of current time periods, even without flexible plans, caught project coordinators, suppliers and even construction workers unprepared, and their capacities, of course, have their limits. But the organs directing the projects, sometimes for objective reasons, made no attempt to adjust unrealistic expectations, and did not support new programmes of work with adequate resources — all of which led to the disorganisation of the construction project and often to a collapse of plans”.

These problems were accompanied by a breakdown in work discipline and morale which led to delays in the supply of essential materials, many of which were defective on arrival. In short, Kovalevska summarised the situation at Chornobyl on the eve of the accident as the lack of “the strictest adherence to the correct building techniques”, something which is “characteristic of many sites in this country”.

A similar uncomplimentary article appeared in the March 1986 issue of *Vit-chyzna*, the Kyiv literary journal. Serhiy Kyselov, the author, also reveals how construction work on the 5th reactor at Chornobyl was to be completed in 1986, a year earlier than the set date for completion. He goes on to say that “Construction work at the Kursk nuclear power station began a year prior to work at the Chornobyl plant, and at Smolensk — a year later. [By 1984] three reactors had been brought into operation at the Kursk nuclear power station, and one at Smolensk. At Chornobyl, four [had been brought into operation]”. The article further states that although work on the 4th reactor at Chornobyl was speeded up, detailed construction plans were not

available to the work force until the last minute. As a result, a "dead zone" was created inside the condensing system where no equipment could gain access. Assembly workers had to seek new ways of completing the joints.

But what is even more disturbing is that the reactors at Chornobyl are not equipped with secondary safety measures — a reinforced concrete outer containment structure which would prevent radioactive materials from escaping into the atmosphere during an accident or leak. In other nuclear meltdowns many of the radioactive materials would be buried in the ground, but at Chornobyl the graphite fire sucked in oxygen as it burned and blew radioactive isotopes into the air. In her article, Kovalevska reported how safety was abandoned in order to achieve speed in the completion of construction plans.

In summary, therefore, the long-term causes of the accident at Chornobyl can be accredited to the fact that the Soviet nuclear energy industry, particularly in Ukraine, was being rapidly expanded regardless of all other considerations, however serious, and before the necessary infrastructure had even been created. As a result, the work was being carried out in extreme haste to meet production deadlines, and mainly by unskilled personnel and a demoralised workforce with no incentive to do their best. This led to shoddy workmanship and carelessness both on the part of the workers and the management. Because of the lag in construction, the job had to be completed in great haste despite the mounting problems which became most acute during the construction of the 4th reactor where the explosion occurred. Here the management quite blatantly set aside the serious difficulties they had encountered in order to meet the schedules.

However, despite these facts, the construction of nuclear reactors is under central, not local, authority. Although Moscow tried to soften the blame by downplaying the danger, by accusing the foreign media of hyping the story, and trying to set the blame on local officials, these were purely hollow facts. Since the Soviet Ukrainian press had published previous warnings of the shortcomings in construction at Chornobyl, the attempt to blame local officials lacks persuasiveness. Thus, the blame for the disaster ultimately lies with the Politburo in Moscow.

Consequences of the disaster

It is now more than five months since the accident at Chornobyl. Details, however, still remain relatively scant, and the effects of radioactive fall-out on the Ukrainian population can still only be estimated. Although the Soviet media has gradually revealed more and more about the disaster and its aftermath, the information is very much lacking in detail and the reports are highly contradictory. Soviet coverage of the accident is, on the whole, characterised by attempts to balance negative news with reports of a more positive nature in order to reduce the embarrassment to the CPSU and its new

General Secretary and to minimise the scale of the disaster and its consequences.

On this basis, it is very difficult to establish an accurate figure for the resulting number of casualties and also to predict the overall toll of Chernobyl. Winds carried the fall-out over large areas of the Soviet Union, especially Ukraine, Byelorussia and the Baltic States, as well as much of Europe. People in countries such as Poland, who were in the path of the radioactive cloud, received unknown doses of radioactivity for days before any announcement about the accident was made.

Although we do not know exactly how much radiation was released into the atmosphere (the true figures have not, as yet, been revealed) we can assume that, immediately after the explosion, and in the first few days that followed, the radiation levels in the immediate vicinity of the reactor and the surrounding area, including the nearby town of Prypiat and Chernobyl, must have been very high. Unfortunately, because there is a great discrepancy between figures for the levels of radiation which have been released by official Soviet sources, Western experts and analysts can only make speculations as to the possible extent of the damage caused to people and the environment. On May 11, 1986, *Robotnycha Hazeta* (No. 107) stated that, at the peak of the disaster, the level of radiation within the danger zone was 10-15 millirem⁷, which had gone down to 2-3 millirem by May 5, reaching the low level of 0.15 millirem three days later (May 8). Two days after the appearance of the first article, the same publication printed a report from the USSR Council of Ministers which stated that on May 10 the radiation level was 0.33 millirem, 60 km. from Kyiv, and 0.32 millirem in the capital itself. In an interview in West Germany during the week-end of May 10-11, Moscow's Communist Party boss, Boris Yeltsin, stated that the level of radiation around Chernobyl, had at that time dropped to 200 rem an hour, while a few days later, on May 14, after his 18-day silence, Mikhail Gorbachev announced, during his television appearance, that the level of radiation was 10-15 millirem. All these figures are highly contradictory and merely add to the uncertainty and confusion which already surrounds the disaster. So far, Western scientists have managed to establish that the magnitude of the radiation which escaped into the atmosphere during the Windscale accident in Britain, in October 1957, was far smaller than the amount of radiation released at Chernobyl, probably by a factor of 100 or more. This can be inferred from the area of significant fall-out which was far smaller for Windscale. Fifty km. from the Windscale plant, ground deposits of iodine 131 measured a quarter of the fall-out deposited at Konstanz, West Germany, 1,500 km. from Chernobyl. It has been estimated, through environmental measurements and com-

7. One **rad** is the unit absorbed dose of radiation. A **rem** is a unit of dose \times quality factor \times distribution factor \times any other necessary modifying factors. Most people receive 0.2 of a rem in a year, which probably has the same effect on their cancer risk as smoking a cigarette every ten days. At the other extreme, however, 1000 rem received within a short period of time would be fatal.

puter simulation, that Windscale released 300,000 curies of xenon 133, 10,000-20,000 curies of iodine 131 and 1,300 curies of caesium 137 — a total of just under 1 million curies overall⁸.

Taking the figure quoted by Yeltsin (200 rem), which, in the opinion of Petr Beckmann, an electrical engineer, seems to be the most realistic because, in such cases, Soviet statistics are usually greatly deflated in order to minimise the scale of the particular mishap, we can establish that in 5 hours this amount of radiation would be lethal (total of 1,000 rem). What is more, Yeltsin's statement appeared to imply that radiation levels had initially been even higher. Dr. Gale (a bone marrow expert at the University of California, Los Angeles) himself admitted treating some casualties who had been exposed to between 1,200 and 1,500 rads. They were suffering from radiation burns which had peeled off large portions of skin, and also from burns sustained from the fire at the plant which reached a temperature of 5,000° centigrade. Many had inhaled radioactive gases and were suffering from blistering sores and other symptoms of radiation.

According to Henry Wagner, professor of radiation health sciences at the John Hopkins University, local residents of the Chornobyl area risked exposure to extreme doses of radiation leading to cerebral haemorrhage, nausea, vomiting and death within hours. Kerry Dance, president of G.A. Technologies which produce nuclear reactors, confirmed this when he stated that at close range the radiation would have been deadly, and that the immediate danger was greatest to those nearest the disaster — the workforce, firemen, medics, security guards and so on. People on the actual site, and the teams attempting to put out the graphite fire, faced the most serious threat of all to their lives. Unofficial sources reported that prisoners worked on so-called "special jobs", such as cleaning up the Chornobyl nuclear plant. Many of them are said to have died⁹. Some Western sources suggest that after the explosion the immediate death toll was somewhere in the region of between 800-1,000. In the vicinity, the possibility existed of another 2,000-3,000 dead. According to Petr Beckmann, by early July of this year, more than 1,000 people have already died as a result of the disaster. His estimate is based on conclusions drawn from official reports of deaths and hospitalisations from serious radiation illnesses. In his trade newsletter, *Access to Energy*, Beckmann writes that most of the deaths will be "unnecessary" as they will have resulted from the Soviet authorities' failure to inform people and carry out prompt evacuation measures. In accordance with information received from three separate sources, some 100 people appear to have died from the blast and the initial high radiation. In a similar report, Dutch radio ham, Annis

8. C. Hohenemser et al: "Chernobyl: An Early Report", *Environment*, Vol. 28, No. 5, pp. 32-33. 1 curie is a unit of measurement = 3.7×10^{10} nuclear transformations per second.

9. The fact that prisoners are used to clear up nuclear plants and other "dirty jobs" of a similar nature, has been confirmed by a woman who has recently arrived in the West from Lviv, Western Ukraine. Her relative, himself a prisoner, died as a result of a smaller scale accident in 1981 at the Rivne plant where he was working.

Kofman, who picked up a broadcast from a Ukrainian radio enthusiast just 20 miles away from the scene of the disaster, stated that hundreds of people died in the first few days after the accident. One resident of Kyiv, contacted by UPI, said that 80 people died immediately and some 2,000 died on the way to hospital.

The bodies of those who perished as a result of the accident were reportedly either burnt on the spot or buried in mass graves, probably nuclear waste dumping grounds, with the aid of bulldozers and other heavy equipment.

Unofficial sources, and also some Western sources, suggest that only high-ranking party, military and government officials and members of the militia, along with their families, were evacuated to Moscow. The rest of the casualties were taken to hospitals in Kyiv and surrounding areas, where Western reporters and medical staff are forbidden to go.

Many of the children who have been resettled are ill, and many are already dying. There have been cases of pregnant women, affected by radiation, giving birth to dead children. It has also been reported that pregnant women have been advised to seek abortions. Presently, 18,000 people are reported to be suffering from headaches, coughing and respiratory problems — typical symptoms of exposure to high doses of radioactivity¹⁰. On May 15, 1986, the West German newspaper *Bild* reported that in parts of Byelorussia, 130 km. north of Chernobyl, women and children had begun to loose their hair as a result of radiation. On June 3, *Sovetskaya Byelorussiya*, admitted that people in parts of Khoyniki, Bragin and Narovlya regions of Byelorussia, had been evacuated. Earlier reports in the same newspaper, such as that of May 9, had emphasised that life was proceeding normally and agricultural work continued outside the 18-mile danger zone around Chernobyl. The next day, June 4, *Pravda* itself stated that highly contaminated spots had been discovered in certain parts of the Gomel region in Byelorussia, outside the 18-mile zone, as a result of which, additional evacuations had to be undertaken. On June 5, *Pravda* stated that all 60,000 children from the Gomel region, regardless of whether they were in the actual danger zones, had been evacuated to summer camps¹¹.

A nuclear accident of such proportions demands immediate action — the implementation of measures to reduce the chances of the exposure of the local population to radiation, the evacuation of the inhabitants of the affected areas, decontamination measures, and so on. But Moscow acted to the contrary. Instead of warning the people who lived in the danger area and organising an evacuation, the Soviet authorities concealed the fact that a nuclear accident had taken place in Ukraine, both before the people of the Soviet Union, and the West. Because of Chernobyl's military significance, the danger area was sealed off by special military and police units, mostly made up of non-Ukrainians, according to unofficial sources, blocking of all access to

10. *Ukrainian Echo*, June 25, 1986, p. 1.

11. Vera Tolz: *Soviet Media Coverage of the Chernobyl Accident*, RL 222/86, June 6, 1986, p. 2.

the areas immediately affected. At the same time, this made it impossible for neutral observers to assess the situation and estimate the damage. Ukraine was cut off from the rest of the world: all telephone links with the republic were cut off, and no one was allowed either in or out of the danger zone, especially Western correspondents. As a result, the inhabitants of the Chornobyl area carried on as if nothing had happened, exposing themselves to the harmful effects of radiation. According to Dmitri Mikheyev, a Soviet physicist now living in the US, the fact that people had to stand in long queues for food each day outside shops caused people in the affected areas to expose themselves to radiation even more. And while Moscow decided what steps to take, the people of Prypiat, Chornobyl and other settlements in the danger zone unknowingly exposed themselves to radiation until the decision was made to evacuate the population inside the 18-mile danger zone. In the initial 36 hours or so, there was very little movement. Military helicopters hovered over Chornobyl dumping boron, lead and sand onto the damaged fourth reactor, but no evacuations were carried out. What is even worse, not only did Moscow fail to react instantly to what had happened at Chornobyl, the Politburo also refused all practical help offered by the US and other Western countries. President Reagan had offered the Soviet Union a highly sophisticated computer system that uses wind and terrain data to predict the path of radioactivity; a heli-borne system that can measure and map the spread of radioactive contamination; a team of health physicists and others to examine the air, water and soil; medical specialists on radiation exposure, and technical experts on decontamination — invaluable help in saving lives and minimising the casualty rate. Within 24 hours, the offer was turned down. The only US offer that the Kremlin accepted was conveyed by Armand Hammer, chairman of Occidental Petroleum, who volunteered the services of a bone marrow specialist and his associates. In these circumstances, it is highly likely that a very large number of people had been exposed to massive doses of radiation during this period of delay. It is, therefore, also quite likely that many of the people who have reportedly been evacuated from the 18-mile zone, the majority of whom were not evacuated until a week or so after the explosion, are now suffering from some form of radiation sickness. The effects and seriousness of this will depend on the distance of the casualties from the reactor and the degree of contamination they sustained.

In the opinion of Dr. Dixy Lee Ray, former chairman of the American Atomic Energy Commission, 20,000 people are "at real risk" from the radiation and 100,000 should be followed for radiation diseases over many years¹². According to Dr. Robert Gale, thousands of Ukrainians could suffer radiation-induced cancer in the future. Frank Von Hippel of Princeton University states that one estimate places the cancer rate in Ukraine, as a result of the accident, at ten times the normal rate, and predicts 5,100 deaths which normally would not have occurred¹³.

12. *The Ukrainian Weekly*, June 1, 1986, p. 3.

13. *Ibid*, p. 3.

However, all we can say with any degree of certainty is that the people who died immediately or shortly after the accident would have received a dose of over 1,000 rem in several hours or even days. Most of those now critically ill or dying would have received doses of between 600-800 rem leading to severe radiation damage, especially to bone marrow. Death is likely in the next few months. Those people who received a dose of 100-600 rem could face serious medical problems, including thyroid damage, blood cell disruption and damage to their immunity system. The symptoms are not severe in the first month after exposure, but become more severe in the months that follow. These people are probably now suffering in hospitals. Many thousands could have received significant doses of radiation below 100 rem with the possibility of an abnormal cancer rate, particularly from leukemia, over the rest of their lives.

We can deduce the seriousness of the situation from the fact that all the hospitals in Kyiv and the surrounding areas are reportedly full of casualties from Chernobyl. Secondly, also reported by unofficial sources, all medical personnel, doctors and nurses, from all over Ukraine, are called up for an official tour of duty to work in the affected areas for 36 hours. On their return, they are forbidden to say where they had been and what they did there.

Kyiv itself, with a population of $2\frac{1}{2}$ million, was affected by the radiation. But, as the rest of Europe took no chances, for instance France, Finland and Britain recalled their nationals from the Soviet Union, and the Polish authorities distributed iodine tablets, the people of Kyiv were kept in the dark. Many did not even know that a nuclear accident had taken place at Chernobyl, only 50 miles to the north. In Kyiv, foreigners were the first to learn of the seriousness of the disaster when the authorities warned West German technicians, on Tuesday April 29, that the Chernobyl area was being sealed off. Without any announcement from the authorities, the residents of the Chernobyl area were being quietly evacuated in order to conceal the fact that an accident of such a serious nature had occurred in Ukraine, so near to its capital. As it turned out, people in Ukraine and the rest of the USSR received less information than was made available to the outside world. Thus, in Kyiv, life went on as normal. Reports from foreign students and tourists stated that people were going about their daily business as if nothing had happened, and everything seemed normal.

News of the Chernobyl disaster came to Ukraine through Western radio broadcasts and also, apparently, via the satellite countries. It is reported in unofficial sources that tourists from Ukraine and other Soviet republics who visited Yugoslavia saw what had happened on Yugoslav television.

Long-term damage

Apart from the horrendous effects of radioactivity on human life, radiation also poses a great threat to the environment. The main danger to the land

comes from two radioactive elements caesium 137 and strontium 90, both of which were detected in the radiation emitted from the Chornobyl plant. Some radioactive isotopes, such as iodine, have very short half-lives and will not remain a threat for very long. Others, however, such as caesium and strontium remain dangerous for hundreds of years, some contaminants even longer. For instance, plutonium has a half-life of 24,000 years. These isotopes take years to decay and thus pose long-term dangers of turning affected farm land into wasteland for generations to come. The radioactive particles that settled on the land have contaminated grain which is eaten by cattle giving rise to contaminated milk and beef. Much of the cattle has died in consequence of this contamination. Much more will probably die as time goes on. The ground itself will become unsuitable for farming and the affected crops will obviously be unsuitable for consumption. Thus, as a result of the Chornobyl disaster, agriculture in Ukraine has suffered immeasurable damage and certain areas will probably never again be used for farming. The Vice-President of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, Yevgeni Velikhov, has already stated that the 25,000 evacuees from the town of Prypiat will probably never be able to return to their homes¹⁴.

Furthermore, about 10 million people are dependent on water supplied from the river Dnieper. Contamination of Ukraine's main north-south waterway would have devastating effects on the whole of Ukraine's agriculture. Boris Yeltsin revealed that the reservoir near the plant (which flows into the Dnieper) has been contaminated, and that the area remains too radioactive for residents to return. The Prypiat river is also contaminated as a result of the disaster.

Should Ukraine's livestock, soil and water supply become seriously contaminated, the cumulative effect will pose a great threat to Europe's breadbasket and the Soviet Union's main grain producer, which feeds not only the Soviet Union, but the whole of the Eastern bloc as well, and Ukraine may once again become a victim of famine. There are already rumours that Ukraine may suffer another famine in the not too distant future. But, whatever the ultimate effects on Ukrainian agriculture will be, we may be certain that large areas of Ukraine's rich farmland will be destroyed for many years to come.

Conclusion

Despite the lengthy 382-page report submitted by Soviet Russia during the international accident review conference staged by the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna last August, the Soviet Union is still avoiding the key issues which surround the Chornobyl disaster, and has so far failed to answer the most pressing questions posed by Western experts. For instance,

14. *Time*, June 9, 1986, p. 16.

Moscow has not yet disclosed how many people were exposed to radiation. It has not explained why the Soviet Union relies so heavily on outdated and inherently dangerous graphite-moderated reactors or why they do not contain the necessary safety measures. The Soviet government has not given an adequate explanation of what happened to the thousands of women and children who were evacuated from the danger areas, or published a list stating the whereabouts of those who were evacuated. And neither has it made clear what material aid has been given to the victims of the disaster, or explained why telephone links were not established so that relatives residing in the West could contact their families in Ukraine, and why a large number of letters to the West have been withheld.

Secondly, it is important to stress that Chornobyl was not the first nuclear accident in the Soviet Union. In 1957-58, an explosion occurred at a nuclear waste dump near the town of Kyshtym in the Urals, as a result of which large tracts of land were turned into wasteland and dozens of villages simply disappeared from the map. In 1981, there was a minor scale disaster at the Rivne nuclear plant in Western Ukraine. Presently, another Soviet reactor is deemed to be unsafe. In a private report for the Swedish government, experts from the Swedish State Power Board claim that the Ignalina plant in Lithuania, which went into operation in 1983 and is of the same design as Chornobyl, is being run at 150% of its capacity¹⁵. If temperatures are allowed to rise out of control, the seals around the fuel elements would melt causing radioactivity to leak out. In addition to this, well before the Chornobyl disaster, Lithuanian scientists published and signed a study which criticised safety systems and the lack of cooling towers at the huge Ignalina plant¹⁶.

Thus, on the basis of all the above-mentioned faults, the Soviet Russian government should be condemned by the international community for its negligence and disregard for human safety in the construction and operation of its nuclear power plants, especially Chornobyl; for attempting to conceal the fact that a nuclear accident had occurred in the Soviet Union, both inside its own borders and before the peoples of Europe and the rest of the world; for failing to warn people in the affected areas of the accident, and to carry out immediate emergency measures: to issue directives on the safe handling of food-stuffs, and to ban the use of milk and water from the contaminated areas; and also for its long withholding of relevant information regarding the disaster.

Furthermore, the Soviet government must be pressed into allowing the International Red Cross access to the affected areas in order to give the necessary medical treatment to the casualties, and to take in much needed food parcels. In order to prevent further accidents of this nature, the International Atomic Energy Agency must be allowed to inspect all of the Soviet Union's nuclear power plants. To achieve this effectively, the Soviet government must adhere to the resolution passed at the Tokyo Summit earlier this

15. *The Daily Telegraph*, August 29, 1986.

16. *Ibid.*

year: "For each country, the maintenance of safety and security is an international responsibility for the safe design, manufacture, operation and maintenance of its installations. . . Each country, furthermore, is responsible for prompt provision of detailed and complete information on nuclear emergencies and accidents, in particular those with transboundary consequences. Each of our countries accept that responsibility, and we urge the Soviet Union which did not do so in the case of Chornobyl, to provide urgently such information, as our countries have requested".

In concluding this summary of the Chornobyl nuclear disaster, it would be most appropriate to finish with the words of President Ronald Reagan, when speaking of the catastrophe. I quote: "The Russian handling of the disaster manifests a disregard for the legitimate concern of people everywhere". As such, the Ukrainian nation has once again suffered at the hands of the Russians, and will go on suffering, as a result of Chornobyl, for many years to come.

WAS IT REALLY RUSSIA THAT WAS CHRISTIANISED IN 988?

**By His Beatitude Myroslav Ivan
Cardinal Lubachivsky**
Second revised edition

Basing himself on both Ukrainian and Russian historiography, the author points out the distinct origins of the Ukrainian and Russian nations and describes the historic process by which Christianity was officially adopted as the state religion of Kyivan-Rus' in 988. The Cardinal argues very convincingly that the true descendants of Rus' are the Ukrainian people and the Ukrainian Church, with its many denominations, and not the Russians and the Russian Orthodox Church, and that in two years time it is the Ukrainians who will be celebrating the 1000 years of Christianity in Ukraine. He also explains why the Russian Orthodox Church and the Soviet Russian authorities are trying so hard to convince the world that 1988 will see the alleged millennium of Christianity in Russia. The second edition includes several documents.

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CHORNOBYL: SITUATION REPORT

(Based on Information from Ukraine)

Chornobyl: The latest information from Ukraine indicates that **the Chornobyl area is now a deserted wasteland. All the fruit in the area was picked up and taken off to be sold.** Soviet citizens who were in Bulgaria affirm that the Bulgarians did not pick their fruit and are not selling it in view of the fact that it is contaminated.

Presently, **the soil of Chornobyl is being scraped up to a depth of one metre, covered in rubber and then taken somewhere. People say that the soil will be unusable for 100 years.**

The director of garages at Chornobyl is on trial. Having discovered about the catastrophe, he took his family and fled. **Forty party members have already been expelled from the Communist Party and a minister, not named by our source, was put on trial.**

Kyiv: According to one of the sources, who visited Kyiv for a day, **the capital of Ukraine has become a dead city.** The children have gone and the hotels are deserted. Tickets are not available and all transport is at a standstill. In his opinion, **Kyiv will not live up for another 100 years or so.**

In September, there was to be a meeting to decide what further course should be taken as regards schooling, i.e. when teaching will begin again.

Kyiv, apparently, now has no more water. As a result, the authorities are instructing the people, by means of radio broadcasts, to drink only mineral water.

As regards uncontaminated food, we have learnt from a lady in the U.S., who managed to telephone her relative in Kyiv, that **food from outside Ukraine is available, but no one can afford to buy it as it is extremely expensive.** In addition, nobody dares to buy or eat **fresh food** because it **lies uncovered on the shelves** and because **people are aware that fruit from the Chornobyl area was being sold,** despite the authorities' assurances that all food, vegetables and fruit sold by the state are safe to eat. In consequence, **people in Ukraine are trying to find food that has not been contaminated.**

In Kyiv, there is still great panic. Although people wash and clean everything with water several times every day, in general, no one really knows what to do. Many people are ill. Many others do not know where their children are.

While in Kyiv, one source heard various reports of what happened in the

city. In the first few days of May, people's voices became deeper as a result of the radiation. In the affected areas, cattle went insane and plants grew immeasurably. When the daughter of General Mukha* failed to appear at the University on 27.4.1986, everyone knew that she had left the city and that the top rungs of Kyiv society were trying to save themselves. At this time, people are saying that "the whole of Ukraine is under mukha", the meaning of which is ambiguous: 1) that everyone is walking around as if in a drunken stupor (as a result of the radiation); 2) that everyone is under KGB surveillance (i.e. under General Mukha).

The source was very critical of the Soviet system and strongly condemned the negligence and criminal irresponsibility of the Soviet leadership.

He also heard from people who were in Chornobyl that **the first casualties of the disaster were quickly evacuated to Moscow without even having their clothing decontaminated.** When they arrived at the Moscow hospital, and the doctors who were waiting for them realised who their patients were and where they had come from, they fled in panic. Later, the taxi drivers who had brought the casualties to the hospital, were themselves hospitalised.

But the greatest tragedy seems to have befallen the youth aged between 15 and 17, who were attending class 7 and 8 of high school, evacuated from the Chornobyl area. Out of despair, these young people have taken to drinking, saying that their lives are already forfeit and that there is nothing more left for them.

Evacuations: Other reports have stated that many children from the affected areas of Ukraine were sent away to the Baltic States and other areas, where they have been housed in youth camps. These camps have been sealed off. No one is allowed in or out, and no contact with the local population is permitted. The language barrier ensures this. The children, who are already suffering and dying from the radiation, are kept in complete isolation from the locals. The source went on to say that **had Ukrainian parents seen their children dying off in Ukraine, there would have been an uproar or even riots. To prevent this, the children were removed from Ukraine to suffer and die out of sight and knowledge of their parents.** This information would appear to answer the question why the children were evacuated from Ukraine, and for many people where their children have been taken.

* KGB chief in Ukraine. He replaced Vitaliy Fedorchuk on 4.6.1982.

Taras KUZIO

CHORNOBYL AND OPPOSITION IN THE SOVIET BLOC

The nuclear disaster at Chornobyl, Ukraine, has directly led to an outflow of samizdat in both the USSR and Eastern Europe, increased domestic discontent and heightened calls for further cross-border cooperation between various groups. The nuclear accident affected not only Ukraine — the home of the Soviet Union's first free trade union and worker opposition — but also the Baltic republics and Poland — all areas of high discontent.

Two former members of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group, Nadia Svitlychna and Leonid Pliushch, issued a press release soon after the accident where they stated that "the tendency of the Soviet regime to suppress unpleasant events has cost the Ukrainian nation dearly in the past". They went on to say that "The Soviet Union has treated this disaster in the same way as it treats human rights, it considers nuclear power as an internal affair of the state without taking into account that today there are very few exclusively internal affairs left in this world". Undoubtedly, many Ukrainians will sympathise with this statement.

Various sources attest to the level of discontent in Ukraine after the accident. Mounting panic in Kyiv, and the surrounding area, led to tremendous demand for train tickets to leave the city, and of heavily increased security measures in Ukraine. Militiamen were seen carrying rifles, instead of the normal side-arms. All but approved vehicles were barred from leaving Kyiv, and a security cordon was placed 30 miles around Chornobyl.

Kyiv residents described how they heard about the accident at first on Western radio stations, but when they saw it on Soviet television the "effect was explosive". Oleg, a Russian writer living in Kyiv, described the aftermath of the television broadcast:

"I thought, My God, this is the end. I ran to shut my windows. Others were doing the same. Windows were slamming shut, doors were bolted and mothers were pulling their children in off the street". (*The Sunday Times*, 11.5.86)

A Ukrainian emigré, who contacted his parents in Kyiv, was told that "people are still drinking milk and buying fruit" and, "they've only been told to keep their windows closed and to bathe several times a day". According to Leonid Pliushch, "there were reliable reports of public anger and dissension among spectators at the May Day parade. Some Kyiv residents were dismayed at what they considered callous celebrations just as reports of dead and injured in and around Chornobyl were emerging" (*The Christian Science Monitor*, 13.5.86). According to another report in *The Mail on Sunday* (11.5.86), peasants living near Chornobyl painted slogans on the under

ground bunkers where party officials hid during the accident, with words such as: "Murderers of the Fatherland" and "Architects of Death". Cartloads of hay were set alight and pulled up to the bunker doors, and some military vehicles hijacked.

A report in *The Washington Post* (July 2, 1986) asked the question why out of the official death toll of 26, all but three have been buried in a cemetery, 13 miles from the centre of Moscow — 450 miles from Chornobyl. The birth dates are all in the 1950's or 1960's. Did the authorities fear burying them in Ukraine?

In Moscow, the unofficial Trust Group for Peace attempted to organise a demonstration and collect signatures on a petition addressed to the Kremlin. The authorities were determined that the demonstration would not take place and prevented many from leaving their homes, or arrested others en route. The fact that they attempted to organise a demonstration is indicative of the effect that Chornobyl has had on opinion. The Trust Group released a circular letter dated May 6 to *All Friends and Colleagues in Independent Peace Movements of West and East*. The letter stated that from this moment their anti-nuclear platform also includes a complete negation of nuclear power. They explained this as resulting from:

"our careful monitoring of developments on our two ad hoc seminars which we held immediately after the catastrophe; another important aspect is the mutual education gained during contacts we had with the political delegation of the Greens of West Germany".

The Trust Group also demanded the following:

1) "All Soviet nuclear power stations be "stopped, and that they remain shut down until everything has been investigated, and until the implementation of upgraded safety provisions in the stations to levels recognised by all neighbouring countries".

2) "Above all, we insist on complete information being given to the Soviet and foreign publics with equal openness. . ."

On 30 May, several Trust members went to Gorky Park, Moscow, to collect signatures for an appeal asking the Soviet government to review its nuclear energy programme. They collected 50 signatures from interested passers-by, but were then arrested. In mid-June, Yury and Olga Medvedkov, two Trust members, lost their jobs. They began a series of demonstrations against the loss of their work, as well as against the proposed increase in Soviet nuclear power. Yury Medvedkov received a ten-day sentence in early July, and has since gone on hunger strike.

In the three Baltic republics of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, the initial press coverage of the Chornobyl accident was taken directly from the main Soviet Russian newspapers. In an attempt to assuage growing concern over

safety in Soviet nuclear power plants, a special trip was arranged for Western correspondents in June to Vilnius and Ignalina, both sites of Chornobyl-type reactors. A map published in the March 1985 issue of the Soviet Latvian journal *Zinatne un Tehnika* showed that dump sites for storing "particularly dangerous toxic materials" cover 25% of Latvia's territory.

According to Christopher Walker, the decision to go ahead with the reactor has caused concern among the residents of Vilnius: "Anxiety in the city has been higher than in many parts of the Soviet Union because the full scale of the Chornobyl disaster was discovered through Polish radio and television broadcasts" (*The Times*, 27.6.86). Two weeks after the accident, the Lithuanian Manager of Health made a special television broadcast to reassure Lithuanians because of wild rumours from Poland. People have written to the Central Committee of the Lithuanian CP expressing their worries about the siting of the plants in their republic.

In a letter from the Suwalki region of Poland, populated with a Lithuanian minority, the author complains that there is a shortage of vitamins, whilst vegetables are dangerous to eat because the soil "has been most thoroughly polluted". After the accident, only children received drugs. There was nothing for the adults. Women up to three months pregnancy had to abort. The letter stated that "Most people here have sore and dry throats, they cough a lot, and are depressed". The author received letters from Lithuania where "many people are already emotionally affected". The mood of most people is "rotten" (*ELTA Bulletin*, October 1986).

In Estonia, a recent sociological study in *Eesti Loodus* (June 1985) revealed that 80% of the Estonian population questioned were worried about the environment. Many Estonians link their republic's ecological problems to the pollution caused from labour-intensive industries dependent on Russian labour.

Recent information suggests that in Estonia men are being conscripted into thirty days of duty cleaning up Chornobyl after the accident. Evacuees from Ukraine have been provided with apartments, whilst those who have been on the waiting list have been told that they will not be able to move in for the foreseeable future. Estonia also has a shortage of milk and meat, which has been removed to the areas affected by the accident.

Discontent at being drafted for clean-up work was confirmed in *Noorte Haal*, the Estonian Komsomol daily (August 12-16). The articles speak of "greatly exaggerated rumours sweeping Estonia". Some Estonians were sent home before their six-month tour was over because of over-exposure to radiation. The Estonians drafted were bitter at having been taken "often in the night". Their mood was one of "indignation, extreme bitterness and despair". In June, the reservists were informed that their two-month tour of duty had been extended to six months. They gathered angrily en masse to demand an explanation: "in which someone was grabbed by the collar, as well as some

jabbing of knees into buttocks and throwing of sand". This confrontation led to the stoppage which lasted into July:

"The news about the extension ruined the men's willingness to work, creating a psychologically explosive situation. For a while, some men simply stood about idle, having worked like oxen before. The normal work rhythm was restored bit by bit and by the time we were there in mid-July everything was back in order".

The author pointed out that unfortunately the reservist "At Chornobyl had nowhere to go and can only choose to swallow his bitter fate" (*New York Times*, 27.8.86). Although the articles were intended to dampen widespread alarm about the fate of the reservists, they seemed only to have added to further speculation. In Tallinn, arrests have been made after angry protests at the forcible conscription of reservists (*New York Tribune*, 28.8.86). The newspaper *Noorte Haal* also admitted that "at home there are stories of larger fights" But it cautioned: "the uprising or strike or whatever else it was being called at home, based on information in the men's letters to Estonia, was extremely exaggerated".

Indeed, Tass has gone to the usual lengths of denying any strikes by Estonians drafted to Chornobyl took place (*New York Tribune*, 5.9.86). In Latvia, the newspaper *Cina* (24.6.86 and 6.7.86) also described the lives and duties of Latvians conscripted to Chornobyl. Most of those sent were military reservists, and there was never any indication that they had volunteered. Life was monotonous in the camps and the food poor. *Cina* quoted one of the group's leaders as describing the work zone as a "unique place where nobody ever smiles: everyone just works very hard there". Meanwhile, *Sovyetskaya Latvija* (30.8.86 2-4.9.86) had similar articles about Latvians sent to Chornobyl. The aim of these articles was to reassure readers that relatives and friends working at Chornobyl were being well looked after. The tasks the men had to perform were described as though in battle. The soldiers are portrayed as highly motivated, with high moral and civic consciousness. Focus was placed on cases of exemplary and courageous behaviour. Men were supposedly well looked after and the authorities cared about their welfare. The articles did indicate that the period of duty had been extended from the original two months.

The Chornobyl accident has also increased hesitation towards nuclear power in Eastern Europe (see *The Times*, 27.6.86). In Czechoslovakia, where the same nuclear power technology is used, an organisation called Anti-Atom has been formed, which has issued samizdat postcards calling for demonstrations against nuclear power. Charter 77 (no. 15/1986) meanwhile, sent an open letter to the Czechoslovak government critical of the lack of information:

"... we demand that the Czechoslovak government obtains from the

Soviet government all essential information concerning the circumstances of the catastrophe, will make these available to the public, and will also inform the public what practical lessons will be drawn from the Chornobyl accident. . .”

“Given the density of the population, a similar accident in Central Europe could have much worse consequences. In the event of a threat from radioactivity, frontiers are irrelevant and we must take protective measures”.

In the GDR, a group of Christians, attached to the Protestant Church Synod, sent an open letter to the Council of Ministers and the Soviet government demanding that nuclear power stations in East Germany be closed down and a referendum be called on the future use of nuclear energy. Another document was signed by hundreds of independent peace, ecological and ordinary people entitled *Chornobyl affects everybody — We demand the renunciation of Nuclear Energy by 1990*. They demanded more information, blamed both the Soviet and East German authorities for producing misleading news and criticised the headlong dash for industrialisation at any cost to the environment and individual. They demanded a “wide and open discussion about the quality of life under socialism and what we should expect and demand from a socialist society”. They claimed that the Chornobyl accident had brought to their attention the dangers of nuclear energy, and, “raised a question mark about the whole aim of the energy and economic policies based on the principle of the ruthless exploitation of available natural resources and of ourselves” (*Frankfurter Rundschau*, 13 May and 26 June 1986).

In Poland, the existence of a larger opposition has meant that the impact of the Chornobyl disaster has been greater (see *Russkaya Mysl*, 13.6.86 for an extensive survey of the unofficial press in Poland on Chornobyl). On May Day, riot police broke up demonstrations in Warsaw, where there were chants of “Ukraine!” “Ukraine!” in reference to the accident, after priests led prayers for the victims in Ukraine.

The official *Przegląd Tygodniowy* (11.5.86) admitted that:

“Ever since the commission released its first communiqué, people asked questions and expressed their doubts. Each word in the communiqué was scrutinised, each bit of information and semi-information studied closely. The lack of details in the Polish media on Tuesday and Wednesday came at a time when Polish-language radio stations in the West were sounding the alarm. . .” It continued, “Fearing panic, the central authorities stayed extremely reticent”.

Tygodnik Mazowsze (8.5.86) described a demonstration by the peace movement Freedom and Peace in Wrocław where 200 people had placards asking, “Is an atomic death from the East any different?”. Freedom and Peace later issued a statement (May 2) asking for full information on Chornobyl:

"As representatives of a nation in danger of biological destruction we demand from the Soviet government the admission to Chornobyl of equipment and experts capable of mitigating the danger. We are opposed to the further development of a nuclear power station in Zarnowiec and to other proposed constructions of this type".

An exchange of letters took place between Freedom and Peace and the Ljubjana Peace Group, Yugoslavia. The Ljubjana Group declared their sympathy for the imprisoned Freedom and Peace activists and thanked them for supporting their demonstration about the lack of information on Chornobyl and radiation in Slovenia. A demonstration was also held in Ljubjana with 2000 participants, organised by the Union of Socialist Youth, which received positive press coverage.

A longer statement released by Freedom and Peace (May 4) declared that in Eastern Europe individuals had little influence upon preventing or solving a tragedy such as Chornobyl. The concerns of the totalitarian state were linked to military interests, had little connection to safety requirements or the health of the population, denied political participation and hid ecological information from public view. All these elements found their expression in the Chornobyl accident:

"The blockade of information, then the vague and evading declarations, leading to uncertainty and long queues in front of night chemists for iodine pills, together with more carefully than ever directed May Day parades. Even in Kyiv, thousands were brought out on to the streets to prove to themselves and to the world that in reality nothing had happened".

The last TKK statement signed by Bujak before his arrest, dated 13 May, criticised the lack of information:

"In a situation where a Government Press Spokesman will often lie in a blatant manner, the public could have no trust in government information. . ."

"The International aspect of this whole affair, which illustrates the Polish government's lack of independence and Poland's reliance on the USSR, also creates feelings of bitterness".

The TKK statement went on to say that ecological information is regarded as a state secret in Poland, and that most Poles learnt about Chornobyl firstly from Western radio stations.

The Social Committee for Learning and the Social Committee for Health, unofficial organisations linked to Solidarity counting many leading scholars, medical experts and members of the Academy of Sciences, sent an open letter to the International Atomic Energy Agency. They stated that "every user of nuclear energy is responsible to the entire world for the consequences of his activity". They criticised the lateness of information given about the acci-

dent, presented a number of recommendations about the use of nuclear power and criticised the behaviour of the Polish Authorities as "indicative of incompetence and a desire to conceal the true situation and is no guarantee of safety in the future".

On 17 May, a group of women workers from a Warsaw factory issued a statement deploring the lack of information, and extending sympathies to the Ukrainian families who suffered from the accident. Fighting Solidarity in their publication of the same name (4-18 May) sent messages of condolence to Ukrainians for the tragedy bestowed upon them signed by their leader, Kornel Morawiecki. He called the USSR an "empire built upon lies", criticising those Western pacifists who still upheld the slogan "Better Red than Dead". Morawiecki said that the accident "reminds the world of the tragedy of Ukraine, a nation which has experienced the worst under communism, deprived of the right to her own native culture, economic riches and her own state".

The underground Committee for Social Resistance (KOS) issued a special number of their bi-weekly publication of the same title — *KOS* (4.5.86). They explained that the dangers were far greater than the authorities had claimed and that although they still lacked much information, it was better to go ahead and publish what they had learnt from Western radio and publications. What follows are articles critical of industrial safety in the USSR and a brief outline of the Soviet nuclear programme. Iodine was first issued to "officials holding posts covered by the so-called 'nomenklatura' system". KOS is critical of the official response, and expresses doubt that the USSR would reimburse Poland for any economic damage sustained.

The speed with which various groups have reacted to the accident at Chornobyl is indicative of the level of unease it has caused in many quarters. It is highly likely that, with the passage of time, further samizdat documents and information will reach us, critical of the authorities handling of the accident, and of the Soviet nuclear power programme in general.

FIRST SAMVYDAV INFORMATION DISPUTES OFFICIAL SOVIET ACCOUNTS ON NUCLEAR ACCIDENT

The first samvydav information reached the West about the accident at the Chornobyl nuclear power plant in Ukraine in late April. This information disputes a lot of the disinformation disseminated by the Soviet government.

According to these underground sources, it is untrue that the evacuation of the population began two days after the accident. Rather, evacuation began on the third day, and only those who lived up to ten kilometres (6.2 miles) from the plant. Those living between 10 and 18 kilometres from the plant had not been evacuated six days after the accident. Among them were children, young people, and pregnant women.

The first to flee the site of the accident in panic were bureaucrats, engineers, some doctors and nurses, and several hundred highly placed members of the Communist Party and Komsomol.

In the first two weeks after the accident, total disorganisation reigned, especially among the medical personnel. There was a lack of information about what to do and how to protect oneself from radiation.

For unexplained reasons, foreign radio broadcasts were difficult to pick up and understand within a 30 kilometre radius of the Chornobyl plant. Thus many listeners could not take advantage of the news broadcasts from abroad.

Although tens of thousands of school-age children were sent from Kyiv to camps on the Black Sea early, pre-school children — who are most threatened by radiation — were not evacuated. Nursery schools in Kyiv and surrounding areas were full of children.

The biggest problem for Kyiv and surrounding areas has been pregnant women. Thousands of women demanded abortions. Each day the clinics and hospitals in Kyiv were filled to capacity with pregnant women.

In Kyiv and other cities of the north-west of Ukraine, there is a great demand for “green tea”, an Asian import that supposedly helps against radiation contamination. In Kyiv, fresh fruit and vegetables are still limited, roads and buildings are washed off and grass is mowed daily. The population constantly talks about the deadly so-called “fifth x-ray”.

Letters are being received in Kyiv from children who have been evacuated to camps on the Black Sea. Some of these very moving letters are from a camp in the village of Novopetrivsk in the Odessa region, in which the children, who are still unaware of the radiation threat to their life and health, write about the solidarity and amity with which the villagers have taken them in. The villagers bring fresh fruit, vegetables, juice, and milk to the children in the camps. Several letters describe the illnesses of the children. One letter says: “We were playing when all of a sudden Misko fell and became uncon-

cious, and we didn't know what had happened to him". In another letter — "Irochka became unable to talk this morning, and she has difficulty breathing. She could not talk. . ."

SAMVYDAV DOCUMENT ON LIFE AFTER THE CHORNOBYL ACCIDENT

How are we living? It is difficult to answer this question since even we do not know anything about ourselves, that is — how long we have to live, what is actually happening to us and how should we now live our lives? We have no information about what has happened. We feel weak. . .

The main problem is food. I do not buy any vegetables even though the shops are full of them. Since May, we have not drank milk. Very rarely do I buy cheese. We eat vermicelli, old potatoes which are now nearing the end of their season. But what of the future? My gums bleed, constantly causing me pain, and my teeth are loose. There is no dried milk and we dare not even dream about condensed milk. How shall we live? I really do not know.

Between 2-17 June, children from classes 1-7 were evacuated from Kyiv for 45 days — they were due to return, but have been ordered to stay where they are in Ukraine for another 45 days.

Most frightening is the lack of information — no one talks about the subject. Yesterday, I went to a fruitshop and saw some beautiful raspberries. I asked the shop assistant, who was a friend of mine, "where are these berries from?" With a wink, she said, "From Odessa", yet when other customers had left, she told me, "Don't buy them because these raspberries are from near Kyiv". But people buy them. . .

The village of Novoshepelichi is situated 4 kilometres from the river Prypiat. On the 6-7 May, people were evacuated from this village over a period of ten days. I know this for certain. They were taken to the Borodyansk region, and will not be returning. The village will be destroyed — the former inhabitants were allowed to take their clothing and other essential items. Now, the question is where to build a new village?

We are informed by many sources not to panic and to lead a normal life, even to bathe and sunbathe; even to use all the food in our diet which is available in the shops, although it is generally known that it is contaminated with radioactivity. Yet, where should we go? People are already saying that 150,000 have left Kyiv. . .

(This samvydav document is in the form of excerpts from an anonymous letter circulating in Ukraine since the Chornobyl accident.)

CHORNOBYL IN POLISH PUBLICATIONS

THE GEIGER COUNTER WENT MAD

In Mikolajki (North-East Poland), on the terrible Monday, 28 April, the Geiger counter went mad. Scientists at the local Institute of Weather and Water Management decided that it had simply gone wrong. They only changed their minds in the afternoon when a helicopter landed at the Institute, the army took over their equipment, total secrecy was imposed and a guard was posted at the gate. Then they remembered that in the morning the counter had showed 2.5 milliroentgens per hour, i.e. 500 times higher than normal. A few of the scientists immediately moved their children out of the area.

The local authorities took no steps whatsoever, though they probably had nothing to go on — all the information was intercepted by the regional commission in Suwalki.

On Tuesday, many local inhabitants complained of headaches, stomach aches and sickness. Rumours about radiation were quick to spread, so that on Tuesday supplies of powdered milk had been bought up by noon.

Now, there is no panic in the town. People have given up. Children go off to school as usual, "Carpigiani" ice creams are still popular, though fewer vegetables are bought.

The helicopter comes every day. It brings people in field uniform, high boots and gloves who pick grass and stuff it in plastic bags. They also take soil and milk samples from the local cows, and then fly back to Suwalki.

The weather is glorious, the holiday homes renovated, the lakes a deep blue. Mikolajki is waiting for the tourists to arrive.

Tygodnik Mazowsze No. 169, 8 May 1986.

IN BECQUERELS AND REMS

Radioactive contamination is measured in Becquerels; one Becquerel represents one atomic disintegration per second. The normal background radioactivity of our environment does not rise above all Bq/m³. According to the International Atomic Agency, an emergency arises in the event of radioactive contamination of 10,000 Bq/m³. Official information that only 200

Bq/m³ were measured in the areas of Poland with the greatest contamination, appears to be too low. Thus, in Warsaw, which was not greatly affected, independent measurements taken by the Central Laboratory for Radiological Protection and Warsaw Polytechnic, read as follows: 28 April: noon, 150 Bq/m³; 29 April: 1 pm, 100 Bq/m³; 30 April: noon, 280 Bq/m³; 1 May: 10 pm, 8 Bq/m³; (data from KOS materials — Committee for Social Defence).

Much greater contamination was recorded on the soil's surface and in the rainwater, which is less dangerous inasmuch as people's greatest contact is with the air around them.

However, our greatest concern is with doses received by people. Absorbed radiation is given in rems and millirems (one thousandth of a rem). It is significant which part of the body absorbs the radiation and how large the dose is. Thus, since in Poland 80% of the radiation was from radioactive iodine, absorbed by the thyroid, we wanted to find out how much this gland could safely absorb. In fact, it is accepted that the emergency level for those who work with radioactive materials is 30 rems a year, and for an entire population — 3 rems. During the contamination period, our thyroids absorbed 50-500 millirems, which at worst is six times less than the population emergency level, and sixty times less than the level for workers exposed to radiation.

Tygodnik Mazowsze No. 169, 8 May 1986.

THE CLOUD OF FRIENDSHIP

The universal complaint of lack of information concerning Chornobyl goes to show that we have "our heads in the clouds". The citizens of the USSR — including our compatriots in Lithuania, who live in the path of the "cloud of friendship" — read about the accident in newspapers on Wednesday 30 April. The article was headed by the meaningless title "From the Soviet Ministers' Council", and was inserted at the bottom of the second page. It began with the words, ". . . As we have already stated in the press. . ." During the following days successive announcements appeared under the same heading — and, of course, nothing came of them. At the same time, on the back pages — which are given over to international news — a list began to grow of nuclear disasters in the USA and Great Britain. On 4 May, a communiqué appeared from the Council of Ministers, which was largely composed of surnames and the long titles of the officials who had visited the site of the accident. However, the names of the two victims, of course, were not given.

From 5 May, the Soviet press began attacking Washington, which apparently, was focusing the world's attention on the small mishap in Chornobyl to

deflect its scrutiny from the Star Wars programme. *Pravda* maintained that the whole "campaign" concerning Chornobyl was but "the warming-up of an unappetising meal concocted from Washington lies". In a very amusing article it writes of the recall of Western tourists by their governments; "indignant and protesting tourists were literally rounded up into specially sent aeroplanes where they were forced to change into 'protective clothing' and undergo special screening. . ."

This will doubtless make the appropriate impression upon the Soviet reader. The fact that Western countries do not want to buy contaminated foodstuffs was also received in the light of American machination by *Pravda*. The *Literary Gazette* explains it all quite carefully to whit, that the purpose is to hurt the economies of the Socialist countries, for the halt to exports causes a rise in the price of the goods manufactured by Western corporations. This article, bearing the headline, "Anti-Sovietism — how it is created" is the only article in the *Literary Gazette* pertaining to Chornobyl. But in the same issue we find new revelations concerning AIDS. The reader will doubtless remember the Soviet theory that the Americans discovered AIDS for its military uses. This revelation is now repeated with the added complaint that the Americans did not prevent the AIDS virus from spreading all around the world! By way of digression the article reassures its readers, that there is no likelihood of AIDS establishing itself in the USSR because homosexuality is a crime punishable with all the severity of the law. It is true that the treatment is harsh, so-called "queers" are sent to labour camps for 10 years. Now, along with political prisoners and criminals, they will undoubtedly be rebuilding the electricity-generating station in Chornobyl.

Wiadomosci No. 19/193, 11 May 1986.

LETTER FROM KYIV, 2 MAY 1986

On Saturday, 26 April, there was a noticeable absence of busses in Kyiv, but nobody knew why. We only heard the news about Chornobyl on Tuesday from Polish radio. On Wednesday and Thursday, the official communiqués did not contain any warnings or recommendations. Nevertheless, people were worried: fewer children were seen outside, sales of milk dropped. People took these precautions as a result of broadcasts from Western radio stations, to which they now tuned-in less discreetly than usual, and because of Polish radio. The 1 May parade lasted only one hour and ten minutes and was made up exclusively of workplace delegations.

There are many rumours going around. Apparently, fire-fighters and doctors from Kyiv were immediately sent to Chornobyl without being told the

nature of the catastrophe and with no safety equipment. After two days they were withdrawn, given supplies of alcohol, promised medals and sent home. The army and militia immediately sealed off the area within a 50-kilometre radius of Chornobyl. They evacuated children and old people, and pregnant women were assured they would be able to have abortions. Outside this area there was a ban on evacuation — those who fled, including representatives of the local authorities, were turned back. It is rumoured that all available alcohol supplies have been taken to the sealed-off area.

In spite of everything, newspapers and radio keep repeating that workers' output everywhere remains at 100 per cent as planned.

Tygodnik Mazowsze No. 171, 22 May 1986.

WHAT WE HAVEN'T BEEN TOLD ABOUT THE CONTAMINATION

To date, almost four weeks after the Chornobyl disaster, no readings of contamination levels in particular areas have yet been made public. Even official organisations, such as the Polish Horticulturalists' Association, have requested them in vain. At present, the most important readings would be — given the enormous local differences in contamination levels — detailed recommendations for farmers regarding land cultivation and grazing animals.

We have only received information about minimum and maximum local contamination levels (without being told the areas) for the days between 28 April and 6 May from the Central Laboratory for Radiological Protection. Thus, while before the radioactive cloud appeared, readings taken of milk were 42 becquerels (i.e. atomic disintegrations per second) per litre, on 29 April, for example, the highest reading was 2,000 Bq per litre — double the emergency level, which had recently been significantly raised in any case. Tap water, which before the accident showed 0.4 Bq/l, on 6 May reached 86,000! Readings for grass on 30 April ranged from a "normal" 3,200 to a shocking 82,000 Bq/kg (before the accident these were 130). Finally, daily radioactivity in the atmosphere, previously 34 Bq/m³, on 26 April ranged from 26 to 19,514 Bq/m³.

Tygodnik Mazowsze No. 171, 22 May 1986.

CONTAMINATED BABY MILK

On 20 May, Warsaw physicists measured the radioactivity of samples of powdered baby milk produced in Mława (North-East Poland) and sold only in exchange for ration coupons. These levels, which ranged from 500 to 600 Bq/l, were produced by iodine 131, and 50-70 Bq/l by the more dangerous caesium 137. The scientists notified the Central Laboratory for Radiological Protection, which demanded samples of the milk and, after confirming original readings, called for an explanation. It transpired that the powdered milk had been made from cows' milk condemned because it contained high levels of radioactivity, and had reached the shops despite orders that it should remain in the warehouse for some time. A telephone call to the weekly *Polityka* proved fruitless ("This is political matter", explained the Editor, Mr. Pasent).

Tygodnik Mazowsze No. 172, 29 May 1986.

The Central Board of the Polish Ecology Club in Krakow addressed an open letter on 3 May to the President of the Sejm (Parliament) proposing the setting-up of a Public Committee to monitor safety standards at the nuclear power station in Żarnowiec and to organise public debates on the future of Polish nuclear energy. The Club leaders wrote that "it would be useful to have a referendum on this topic".

On May 2 in Lublin, the independent Ecology Commission was formed. Its job is to constantly analyse the threats to the natural environment around Lublin and to provide regular information on this matter to the public (Informer Regionu Środkowo-Wschodniego No. 124).

The Nationwide Polish Committee of Farmers' Solidarnosc Movement appealed to medical students and doctors in Poland and abroad, to the International Red Cross, to the World Health Organisation and to the Food and Agriculture Organisation for an international Committee whose purpose would be to evaluate the pollution affecting food and to control the building of nuclear power plants in Żarnowiec, Gdańsk and Kępno in the Północ region.

Tygodnik Mazowsze No. 174, 12 June 1986.

In Wrocław on 5 May, a new underground magazine entitled *Zagrożenie — Ecological Bulletin* appeared. It is edited by the Working Group delegated to the problems of the Environmental Protection by the Social Commission

on Health and the Social Committee on Science. The first issue dealt exclusively with Chornobyl.

*

The Bodies of two men were brought to Polaniec (Tarnobrzeg Region) in metal (lead) coffins. The men had gone to Ukraine where they had been working at the Chornobyl nuclear power plant. Their funerals were held on 8 May, 1986, at their parish cemetery. One of the dead, Mr. Mazur, a qualified engineer, leaves behind five children. (Own information)

Solidarnosc Walczaca No. 11/180 (1-15 July 1986)

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THE SOVIET RESPONSE TO CHORNOBYL

The following is the text of a speech by William H. Courtney, Consul General Designate to the U.S. Consulate in Kyiv, which he delivered to the Ukrainian-American Bar Association and the Ukrainian Medical Association of North America on May 24, 1986, in Philadelphia.

On April 26, an explosion at the Chornobyl atomic power station signalled the worst nuclear reactor accident in history. Most Soviet citizens did not learn of it until days later, after Sweden and Finland had detected unexplained radiation and queried the Soviet government. After initial obfuscation, the Soviet government tersely admitted the accident, but said nothing about the extent of the danger. Soon it was clear that a disaster had occurred. It has profoundly touched Americans having roots in Ukraine and Byelorussia. Many have relatives and friends living in the regions directly affected by radioactivity. These Americans were stricken with grief about the danger to loved ones, frustrated by difficulties in contacting or sending aid to them, and angered by the early dissembling of authorities. Americans quickly pledged help for the victims. The U.S. government offered humanitarian and technical aid. American voluntary organisations and citizens did as well. Soviet authorities rebuffed most of these gestures, but through Armand Hammer they did invite the assistance of Dr. Robert Gale and his associates. We are all glad and proud that an American medical team was able to help. All Americans sympathise with the victims and their families, and we remain ready to help in any way we can.

What Happened at Chornobyl?

A combination of events — a power surge in the reactor core, an explosion, and a fierce fire that spread to the core — led to the release into the atmosphere of enormous amounts of radioactivity. Some of it was released suddenly. Additional large amounts were released over a period of more than a week. Radioactive particles and gasses were carried through the atmosphere by winds. Beginning at the reactor site itself, most of the particulate fell to the earth in Ukraine and Byelorussia. Smaller amounts drifted to Eastern Europe, the Baltics, the Russian republic, Scandinavia, and elsewhere.

At the station, the powerful explosion and fire caused casualties among emergency personnel. Blast and heat effects harmed those in the immediate vicinity of the reactor. Radioactivity was swept into the sky by the plume of a raging fire. Activity levels may have reached tens and hundreds of Roentgens per hour, with higher levels downwind.

The extent of casualties from radioactive fallout will depend on several factors, including the direction and speed of winds, the concentrations of radioactive particles falling to the earth, and how many people were exposed and for how long. The food chain within miles of the reactor site will be contaminated, and cropland recovery will require significant effort. The Soviets have not yet made public data on the amount of radioactivity released or the extent of contamination. They have indicated, however, that they are sending some data to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

The U.S. government lacks precise knowledge of casualties and deaths. Because of latent effects, such as the risks of cancer for exposed persons, it will be years before the full consequences are manifested. They will become publicly known only if credible medical data are released. In this respect, I would note the American and Soviet medical teams have been consulting to develop a means to monitor, on a long-term basis, persons potentially exposed to radioactivity from Chernobyl. The American team believes an understanding on this has now been reached.

We can, however, draw some tentative conclusions. The early, thickest clouds of radioactive emissions appear not to have descended directly on the most populated areas near the reactor site, such as the cities of Prypiat and Chernobyl. This is fortunate. Nevertheless, even the less urbanised areas of the region contained tens of thousands of people. Soviet statements seem to suggest that evacuations began only thirty-six hours after the explosion of April 26. Soviet statements also indicate that some areas within the 18-mile zone around the reactor were not evacuated until over a week after the explosion. Soviet authorities say over 90,000 people were evacuated from the stricken area.

One can conclude, therefore, that perhaps tens of thousands of people were exposed to varying and in many cases significant amounts of radioactivity. According to press reports, Dr. Gale has said that about 50,000 to 100,000 persons potentially have doses of radiation which may be of long-term concern. Such large numbers do not seem implausible. The continuation of some normal activities a short distance from the Chernobyl station in the first days after the explosion suggests that early warnings to the local populace were at best selective.

Most people in the path of the fallout beyond the 18-mile radius may have had little warning until the terse statement three days after the explosion. Initially, people had to rely on foreign radio broadcasts for news of the accident and of health precautions that could be taken. Thus, the Voice of America, Radio Liberty, and Radio Free Europe played valuable roles.

The record of the Voice of America is illustrative. On April 28, at 8 pm Kyiv time, VOA informed listeners in Ukraine that increased levels of radiation had been found in Sweden, which led to suspicions there of nuclear leak-

age from the USSR. The next VOA broadcast specifically to Ukraine, at 5 am the next morning, opened with a report that there had been a serious accident at Chornobyl, but details were few. All VOA news programmes since then have carried detailed news as it unfolded, information on medical and scientific aspects, round-ups of U.S. press stories on Chornobyl, reports of VOA correspondents in Europe, and statements of concern and offers of help by leaders of the Ukrainian-American community.

An informal "word-of-mouth" system helped spread the news from foreign radios and from the people living near Chornobyl. In contrast to the years of the 1932-33 famine, there is today in the Soviet Union a rebirth of community. People are less scared to talk, and more educated and demanding of their rulers. Soviet leaders no longer face an atomised and submissive society. This may be especially true in Ukraine. Thus, the news of Chornobyl seems to have spread in days to wide segments of Soviet society, causing disquiet. Not surprisingly, several days after the first news from foreign radios, officials began to reveal more details of the accident and announce health precautions.

The decision to change the initial approach may have been controversial. For example, one Politburo member visiting West Germany seemed to get out ahead of spokesmen in Moscow in disclosing new information.

Another KAL-007?

The Soviet response to Chornobyl has similarities with and contrasts to Soviet actions following another recent crisis, the tragic downing of Korean Airlines flight 007.

In both cases, Soviet authorities said nothing until after foreign governments had revealed indications of an event in the USSR. In contrast to the 1932-33 famine, foreign governments and news media quickly deduced the occurrence of the KAL-007 and Chornobyl incidents, and immediately challenged Soviet authorities with the evidence.

In the cases of both KAL-007 and Chornobyl, initial official Soviet statements were terse and less than forthcoming. The first statement on KAL-007 implied that the aircraft had been intercepted, but allowed to continue its flight. Only later did the Soviets admit that it had been shot down. The first Soviet comment on Chornobyl gave no hint of the risks to people living near to the damaged reactor. Not until a week after the explosion did most people living under the path of the fall-out receive official warnings and advice on health precautions.

Evidently, because the downing of KAL-007 took place in a border area near which U.S. military aircraft regularly flew, the Soviets decided to blame it on the U.S. They concocted the absurd fiction that KAL-007 was on a

U.S. spying mission. Soviet spokesmen have stuck with this line despite its lack of credibility with most foreign and some domestic audiences. One reason they have not backed away is that, unlike with Chernobyl, most Soviet citizens had no way to ascertain for themselves the facts of the shutdown.

With Chernobyl, there was no credible way to blame the accident on foreigners. The reactor was constructed and operated by Soviets. The authorities had to accept responsibility. Nonetheless, they have tried to soften the blame. At first they downplayed the danger, accused foreign media of hyping the story, and fingered local officials.

To many Soviet citizens, however, these tactics must have rung hollow. Subsequent, more forthcoming official statements about the accident, left no doubt that foreign radio broadcasts had been on the mark. Since the Ukrainian (Soviet) press had previously warned of shortcomings in construction at Chernobyl, the attempt to blame local officials also lacked persuasiveness. Construction of nuclear reactors is under central, not local, authority.

In contrast to the time of the 1932-33 famine, modern technology did not allow the Soviet leaders to deny outright for more than a few days that the KAL-007 and Chernobyl incidents had occurred. What worries Soviet leaders most is not just that foreigners learned of these recent events. Rather, it is that foreign radios promptly broadcast the facts to large numbers of Soviet citizens. The handling of the KAL-007 and Chernobyl affairs reminded the Soviet peoples once again of how little they can rely on official propaganda for critical information at times of crisis.

Soviet authorities evidently came to recognise that early propaganda on Chernobyl was mishandled. In contrast to the approach taken after the destruction of KAL-007, the propaganda line on Chernobyl changed once it was clear that the initial approach had generated more public cynicism than reassurance. While the Soviets continue to divert attention to arms control and foreign media coverage of Chernobyl, they have made their own story more credible. In this regard, they invited senior officials of the IAEA to tour the accident area on May 8.

In the cases of both KAL-007 and Chernobyl, new international measures were suggested to help deal with future problems. After the KAL shootdown, the United States and Japan pressed the USSR to agree to steps to improve air safety in the North Pacific. Two years later, on the eve of the Geneva summit, agreement was reached.

This time, anticipating strong international pressure for better nuclear safety, the Soviets moved faster. Last week, in a televised address to the Soviet peoples, General Secretary Gorbachev offered new proposals. At first glance, his ideas for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) appear to track closely with what the Summit Seven leaders called for in Tokyo earlier this month.

The United States welcomed and will carefully examine the Soviet proposals, in the context of longstanding U.S. support for a stronger IAEA role on nuclear safety. Actions are already underway. Three days ago, the IAEA Board decided to open negotiations on an international system for early notification of nuclear accidents, and on coordinated assistance when accidents release radioactivity into neighbouring countries. Agreements on these steps would be a positive sign. One should bear in mind, however, that agreements by themselves are less important than a constructive attitude toward protecting innocent bystanders.

THE EXPERIENCES AND SUFFERING
OF UKRAINIANS IN AUSCHWITZ!

IN THE GERMAN MILLS OF DEATH 1941-1945

By Petro Mirchuk
(Second Edition)

This timely publication has appeared at the height of the Soviet Russian campaign of defamation against Ukrainians. Based entirely on fact, *IN THE GERMAN MILLS OF DEATH* is a fitting answer to the KGB's anti-Ukrainian propaganda which attempts to defame Ukrainian nationalists, who fought against both the Nazis and the Soviet Russians during and after WWII, and discredit the Ukrainians in the eyes of the West with a view to cutting short Ukrainian attempts to acquire Western political support and material aid in their struggle for an independent Ukraine.

In this remarkable book, Petro Mirchuk, who was a Ukrainian political activist when he was taken to Auschwitz, explains why thousands of Ukrainian political prisoners were imprisoned and exterminated in German concentration camps. He relates how life and death was from day to day in a place which most prisoners were convinced they would leave only as corpses. Such was the nature of the concentration camp that simple existence was a miracle of no small accomplishment, and those who managed it are well worth listening to.

Published in 1985 by: The Survivors of the Holocaust and the Ukrainian American Freedom Foundation, Inc., Rochester, N.Y., U.S.A.

Price: U.K. — £5.00,

U.S.A — \$12.00,

Canada & Australia — \$15.00.

Orders to be sent to:

Ukrainian Publishers Ltd.,
200, Liverpool Road, London N1 1LF, U.K.

U.S. House of Representatives Resolution on Chornobyl

On May 1, 1986, U.S. Congresswoman from Ohio, Mary Rose Oakar, introduced a resolution expressing the views of the House of Representatives concerning the nuclear accident at the Chornobyl nuclear plant in Ukraine. The text of the resolution, which was co-sponsored by 124 members of Congress, is reprinted below.

H. Res. 440

Whereas on or about April 26, 1986, a catastrophic accident occurred at the nuclear power plant at Chornobyl, sixty miles north of Kyiv in Ukraine;

Whereas Soviet authorities made no effort to inform neighbouring countries of the accident, preventing them from offering warning and a measure of protection for their citizens;

Whereas this accident has resulted in a significant loss of life;

Whereas large numbers of people have sustained serious injuries;

Whereas Americans with relatives in the Kyiv area are anxious over the state of their family members; and

Whereas this accident could result in long-standing technical, medical, and environmental problems: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That the House of Representatives —

(1) conveys the sympathy of the American people to the people of Ukraine, especially to the families of victims;

(2) calls upon the government of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Government of the Soviet Union to facilitate direct channels of communication to allow relatives to receive word about the fate of family members;

(3) supports the offer of the United States Government to provide technical and medical assistance to help authorities in Ukraine cope with the tragedy;

(4) calls upon the Government of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Government of the Soviet Union to facilitate the furnishing of technical and humanitarian assistance by appropriate international organisations in order to address the immediate problems and develop cooperative strategies for the future consideration of this problem that has international ramifications; and

(6) deploras the Soviet Union's failure to provide the world with notification of and information about the nuclear accident at Chornobyl, and calls upon the Government of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic to permit the international press to cover the situation freely so that the world may be assured of complete and accurate information.

Anna BOLUBASH-ROMANYSHYN, B.A., M.A., M.L.S

Ucrainica Research Institute

THE USSR BETWEEN 1945-1975: A BIBLIOGRAPHIC STUDY

PART I

The Subject

The area that has been selected for this article is *The USSR from 1945-1975*. It is obvious from the title that the subject under scrutiny is quite broad and, as such, it should cover at least the major aspects in order to present a comprehensive picture of the USSR in that period. Furthermore, the picture should be presented against the background of contemporary world affairs. In view of this, the subject matter falls into two major categories: (a) internal affairs of the USSR; and (b) international relations. With regard to internal affairs, I propose to concentrate on the following major aspects: the system, society and the nationalities question, dissidence, and future prospects. With regard to international relations, this topic will have a twofold approach — international relations within the Communist bloc, and international relations with non-communist countries.

It is evident that relations of a given state with other countries are inevitably subject to evolution and change, and obviously vary from one country to another. Since it would escape the purpose of this article to deal with the issue of Soviet international relations in such great detail (i.e. country by country), it seems wiser to concentrate on the relations of the USSR vis-à-vis major areas, or so-called world “trouble-spots”. The major areas that are on the Soviet high priority list, as far as foreign affairs are concerned, are: the Western bloc, the Middle East, South-East Asia, and Latin America. Regarding the countries of the Communist bloc, we have two major areas — the so-called “satellite countries” of Central and Eastern Europe, and the worsening relations with China in the Far East. Finally, we can also consider Soviet policies with respect to the so-called “developing countries” of the Third World. International relations here are meant to include politics, economics, and culture. This, in general terms, is what constitutes the mosaic of the USSR from 1945-1975. It should be pointed out at this point that the year 1945 was a turning point in the history of the USSR. World War II plunged the Soviet Union into the international arena, and it provided the basis for its steady growth into the world power that it is today.

Scope and limitations

The post-war years have witnessed a great outpouring of books and other material on all aspects of the USSR. Consequently, the bibliography of works considered for this survey had to be extremely selective and, therefore, far from exhaustive.

The material that I will be dealing with here falls into four categories: a) basic bibliographies and standard works for reference and background purposes; b) primary sources; c) works of a specialised nature dealing with the various aspects of the USSR; and d) scholarly journals on the subject.

Since the late 1950's and early 1960's (under Krushchev) marked a transitional period in which the old trends of the Stalinist era (Stalin died in 1953) overlapped with new currents in Soviet domestic and foreign affairs, it permitted the student of Soviet affairs to draw more comprehensive pictures of the immediate Soviet past, and also to make intelligent projections for the immediate future. It is perhaps for this reason that, in this period and after, there appeared a number of excellent works on the Soviet Union that broke ground, and are still considered today as classics on the subject. Consequently, the publishing period for the material under consideration here is 1960-1974 with only one exception that matters (M. Djilas' *The New Class*, 1957).

Although all the material used for the purpose of this paper is in the English language, this does not mean that we would run the risk of presenting in our bibliography only one point of view on the subject, that of Western scholarship. Fortunately, the most important works written about the Soviet Union in any language become available in English in a relatively short period of time. This obviously includes Soviet publications as well. At this point we shall only mention as an example the *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* — a weekly publication in English which enables the English-speaking scholar to keep up, on a regular basis, with the most important material printed in all major newspapers in the USSR.

In an attempt to present a comprehensive picture of the Soviet Union since 1945, I have tried to strike a workable balance between maintaining the broad scope of the subject matter and the inevitable limitations that had to be imposed in selecting the material in order to carry this project through.

Criteria for selection of material

It was difficult to establish a rigid criteria for the selection of material because more exacting standards had to be applied, for example in areas where the literature is more vast than in those areas where it is comparatively more limited. The criteria for selection was such material that would be of greatest value to scholars and could also be recommended to students, judg-

ing by such qualities as the information those books contain, their comprehensiveness, reliability and objectivity, while also representing a variety of points of view on the subject. When information and actual examination of a book have revealed that it was of lesser value, I have deleted it from my bibliography.

The method used to establish whether a certain book had merit or not was based on its close examination and all the available information about it in reliable bibliographies and other reference works. If a given book was of major importance, then infallibly these bibliographies would list it and also concur in the assessment of its worth.

As mentioned above, priority was given to works in the English language because of the immediate access and their availability. A special effort has been made to include also Soviet titles on the subject in order to maintain a balance between varying points of view. However, due to the inevitable limitations, valuable works had to be omitted which was at times a painful decision to make.

Organisation of the search

There are two standard specialised bibliographies in the field that at least partially cover the period under scrutiny: T. T. Hammond's *Soviet Foreign Relations and World Communism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), and Paul L. Horecky's *Russia and the Soviet Union; a bibliographic guide to Western language publications* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965). *The USSR and Eastern Europe: periodicals in Western Languages* compiled by Paul L. Horecky and Robert G. Carlton (Washington: U.S. Library of Congress, Slavic and Central European Division, 1964), was found to be very useful for selecting the necessary periodicals and journals for this assignment.

Aware of the fact that there exist excellent general bibliographies on the subject of history, international relations, and other similar subjects which would be difficult to locate without concrete leads, I have examined the *Bibliographic Index. A Cumulative Bibliography of Bibliographies* (New York: The H. W. Wilson Co., 1945-). This task proved to be extremely rewarding for it led to other outstanding bibliographic works, such as the *Foreign Affairs 50-year Bibliography* edited by Byron Dexter (Published for the Council on Foreign Relations in New York: R.R. Bowker, 1972); *Foreign Affairs Bibliography* (Published for the Council on Foreign Relations in New York: Harper & Bros, 1933-64, 4 vols.); *A Select Bibliography: Asia, Africa, Eastern Europe, Latin America* (New York: American Universities Field Staff, 1960), in particular its *Cumulative Supplement 1961-1971* (New York: American Universities Field Staff, 1970); Jesse J. Dossick's *Doctoral Research on Russia and the Soviet Union* (New York: New York University Press, 1960); *Books*

on *Communism and the Communist Countries* by P. H. Vigor (London: Ampersand, 1971); and several others.

It should be reiterated at this point that for the purpose of this project, and for the reasons stated above, I have limited myself to English language bibliographies only. Consequently, I shall not list here numerous similar publications in Slavic and other languages found in the process of the search. As noted previously, most of the major works are usually translated into English and then listed in English-language bibliographies.

All of the bibliographies obtained were carefully examined for the necessary material, and for various reasons showed different degrees of usefulness for the subject under discussion in this essay. As already mentioned, the intention was to concentrate on the most recent and the best material available on the subject which limited the usefulness of otherwise excellent bibliographies that appeared prior to the early sixties (Hammond, Horecky, and others). Other bibliographies, like the yearly *American Bibliography of Slavic and East European Studies* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1965-), although extremely valuable in itself for its inclusion of all works (good or bad) of professional interest published in America or by Americans in the entire field of Slavic and East European studies, was difficult to use for the purpose of selecting material for this paper because of its massive character and uncritical listings.

Of all the bibliographies examined, the most useful ones in order of priority are the following: *The Foreign Affairs 50-year Bibliography* which is a selective bibliography of outstanding books on international relations published between 1920 and 1970. Experts in various fields have advised me on the selections. The next is the *Cumulative Supplement 1961-1971* of *A Select Bibliography* which lists mostly useful books and journals available for university study about the civilisations and affairs of the areas concerned. Finally, there is *Books on Communism and the Communist Countries* which, besides all its outdated material, lists works on communism in general and in the USSR, communism in other countries, and official documents and publications on the subject. The aim is to include "the best of the writings on communism and the communist countries" that appeared from 1963 to 1970.

The compilation of the materials for potential inclusion in Part II of this study was done with the aid of the above bibliographies and close examination of every item considered. The final selection of the items from the original list was based on a painstaking process of elimination according to the criteria for selection of material outlined above.

Major authors, organisations, publishers

In closing this section, I would like to briefly mention the major authors, organisations, and publishers in this field that have emerged in the search.

Regarding authors, besides those scholars associated with the preparation of the various bibliographies mentioned above, I have encountered the following outstanding personalities in the Soviet field of studies: Zbigniew Brzezinski, Victor Chkhikvadze (Soviet), Robert Conquest, Isaac Deutscher, Merle Fainsod, John Hazard, Wolfgang Leonhard, Roy Medvedev (Soviet), Peter Reddaway, Leonard Schapiro, Adam Ulam, Donald Zagoria, and others. The names and works of these scholars are considered classics in the Soviet field. To this we should add the names and writings of Karl Marx, Vladimir Lenin, Leon Trotsky and Joseph Stalin — the last three being the “founding fathers” of the Soviet Union. The respective subjects of specialisation of these authors will come into focus in Part II, at which stage I will be commenting on their works.

Among the organisations that play an influential role in the Soviet field of studies, there is the highly professional Council on Foreign Relations (United States), the Institute for the Study of the USSR (West Germany), the International Association for Cultural Freedom (England-France), the Central Asian Research Centre (England), and various academic institutions, such as Columbia University, Harvard, Princeton, London School of Economics, and others.

Regarding publishers, Praeger seem to be in the forefront in this field, as is Macmillan, and of course, the various academic presses, such as Harvard, Oxford, and others.

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PART II

Having briefly presented in Part I the bibliographical works available on the subject, in Part II I will concentrate on the material that has been located for first priority consideration on the USSR since 1945. This includes reference works, standard works, specialised works, primary sources and documents, and periodical publications. As pointed out in Part I, the discussion will encompass the various aspects of the Soviet Union grouped into major categories — its internal affairs and international relations. I will begin by discussing some standard background material, and systematically work my way through the major aspects and problems of the subject. A section on the relevant periodical literature — journals, newspapers, and so on — will appear at the end of this paper.

(A) Soviet internal affairs

A basic knowledge of the ideological foundations and the rationale on which the Soviet Union was built is indispensable for the understanding of any period in Soviet history or political affairs. Thus, the writings of Karl Marx, Vladimir Lenin, Leon Trotsky, and Joseph Stalin should be on hand for reference purposes. The availability of their selected works serve to fill this need: Karl Marx, *Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1959); Vladimir Lenin, *Selected Works* (3 vols.; Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1967); Leon Trotsky, *Basic Writings* (New York: Random House, 1963); Joseph Stalin, *Selected Writings* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1970). The writings compiled in these editions reflect what can be called the “blueprint for a Socialist state”, specifically, the Soviet Union. The authors dwell on theoretical as well as practical aspects of communist state building. Supplementing the above, there is an outstanding biographical history *The Three Who Made the Revolution* by Bertram D. Wolfe (4th rev.

ed.; New York: Dell Publishing, 1964). In this book, through a bibliographical study of the three leading Bolsheviks — Lenin, Trotsky, and Stalin — Wolfe provides a detailed history of Russian Marxism right up to the seizure of power in 1917. The book is subtitled “biographical history” because Wolfe believes that the character of the leaders has a great influence on the course of history. For an overall view and a concise treatment of the subject, Basil Dmytryshyn’s *USSR: A Concise History* (2nd ed.; New York: Scribner, 1971) should be considered. The book gives an updated, brief, but accurate, clearly organised, chronological survey of domestic developments and foreign policy of the USSR since 1917.

It was only after World War II that the world came to full realisation that practically “overnight” a new historical phenomenon came into being — the Soviet Union. It was also close to three decades before any definitive analyses of the USSR could be contemplated. In this respect Merle Fainsod’s *How Russia is Ruled* (rev. ed.; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965), is the single most influential work that has been written in North America. This penetrating and analytical book details the history of Bolshevism, and analyses the institutions of the Communist Party and of the Soviet government from 1917 to the date of its publication. Its only weakness is that now it is somewhat dated. As sequels to this basic study which elaborate on two main institutions of the Soviet system — the roles of the Communist Party and of the Soviet Government — we have Leonard Schapiro’s *The Communist Party of the Soviet Union* (2nd ed., rev. & enl.; London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1970), and John N. Hazard’s *The Soviet System of Government* (4th ed., rev.; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968). Schapiro’s work is useful in that, aside from being a fully documented history of the Communist Party, it emphasises structure and mechanics more than doctrine, and the theme that subjective factors have been as important as objective ones in determining the course of party history. Thus, the stress on the personalities and intrigue in the historical process is made evident. On the other hand, Hazard goes beyond the Soviet scope in his analysis emphasizing comparison between the Soviet Russian and American political systems. Furthermore, while examining the various aspects of the Soviet state apparatus, the author tackles such complicated questions as whether there are any distinguishing characteristics that set the Soviet Russian system apart from other totalitarian systems, and discusses features that preclude its evolution towards something comparable to Western democracies.

For an alternative point of view on these aspects of the Soviet system, one can refer to *The Soviet State and Law* edited by the Director of the Institute of State and Law of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, Victor Chkhikvadze (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1969). Continuity is the dominant theme. The Communist Party is still the “directing and guiding force” of the Soviet system, economic development continues to have the “highest priority”, and the state remains the “primary source of legal norms”.

In the same vein of differing points of view on these issues, there is a use-

ful recent selection of readings *The Soviet Crucible; the Soviet System in Theory and Practice*, edited by Samuel Hendel (4th ed.; North Scituate, Mass.: Duxbury Press, 1973), which dwells on a number of topics, such as, for example, the underlying theory, the Soviet political and economic systems, and their prospects for the future. An interesting theme becomes evident in this anthology — that traditional Russian traits were carried over into the Soviet Russian system. The information and analysis made available in the material discussed above would not be complete without the profiles of the men who governed the Soviet Union through the Communist Party since its conception. Borys Lewytsky's massive work *The Soviet Political Elite* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1970), which consists of brief biographies, indexes and tables of numerous people involved with the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union from 1912 to 1969, completes the picture. The study — based on Soviet sources only — covers twenty Central Committees with an overall total of 2,210 members and candidate members.

The death of Stalin in 1953 had marked a turning point in the Soviet Union. In retrospect, politically, this event, had a greater impact on the Soviet Union than World War II, because it marked the end of an era during which the "Soviet system" was forged. It also laid the bases and set precedents for future "Soviet behaviour". The period under scrutiny here (1945 onwards) is not homogeneous. We have eight years of "Stalinism" (1945-1953), five years of the so-called "collective leadership", actually a transitional period (1953-1958), and the gradual "normalisation" of the system along neo-Stalinist lines thereafter.

Since Stalin and "Stalinism" left a heavy imprint on the Soviet Russian system, probably for good, its knowledge is imperative in order to fathom that system. Two monumental works that have been acclaimed by specialists in the field as milestones in "Sovietology" provide the reader with the best insight available on this particular issue. The first is Robert Conquest's *The Great Terror. Stalin's Purge of the Thirties* (New York: Macmillan, 1973), which presents three main aspects: (a) its colossal scale in which millions died; (b) its methods, particularly the device of the frame-up and the "confession trial"; and (c) the secrecy of the whole operation. The other work is Roy Medvedev's *Let History Judge* (New York: Random House, 1973), which is the first analysis of the origins and consequences of "Stalinism" to come out from the Soviet Union in recent years. The first study was written by a non-communist, the second by a Soviet Marxist, who tried to begin the discussion at home. Since Soviet publishers turned Medvedev's book down, he had it published abroad. Medvedev makes a sharp distinction between "Stalinism" (as a criminal deviation) and the Soviet system and communism which to him are "basically sound". This line of thinking is quite useful to Moscow, and that is why Medvedev has been "tolerated" and even encouraged by the Kremlin to continue in scholarly fashion to whitewash the system and Russian imperialism as such. Medvedev also makes an important contribution to social psychology with his penetrating analysis of the Soviet upper strata,

who submitted to and cooperated with Stalin, until they themselves were decimated. Both works are based strictly on Soviet sources and documentation. In order to gain complete understanding of the politics of mass terror, an insight into the workings of Soviet law and its enforcing agencies is imperative. This is provided in two other studies by Robert Conquest, namely, *Justice and the Legal System in the USSR* (New York: Praeger, 1968), and *Soviet Police System* (New York: Praeger, 1968), which are based — like all of his works in the field — strictly on Soviet material.

Lastly, a document that literally shook the entire political world on either side of the fence was the Special Report to the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (1956) which appeared in the West under the title *The Crimes of the Stalin Era*, delivered by Nikita Khrushchev (New York: The New Leader, 1962). In it, Khrushchev publicly condemned Stalin and his practices before the representatives of the whole communist world. This document is indispensable reading for students of Soviet affairs.

The period after Stalin's death was marked by a power struggle, and revealed certain traits in the post-Stalin Soviet system which were impossible to observe before, much less to analyse them. A leading German scholar (formerly from East Germany) challenged the well-established view that the Soviet system was a totalitarian dictatorship whose real character had not been changed by the death of the dictator. Wolfgang Leonhard in his new ground-breaking book *The Kremlin Since Stalin* (New York: Praeger, 1962), was the first to apply the "interest group" approach to the study of the USSR. He described the system as consisting of five "pillars": the party, the economic administration, the state bureaucracy, the army, and the police. The leaders of these groups made up the "new élite". The conception of the "new élite" was aptly formulated by the former Vice-President of Communist Yugoslavia, Milovan Djilas, in his *The New Class* (New York: Praeger, 1957) — one of the great political and sociological documents of our time. His main contention is that this "new élite", which he calls "political bureaucracy", is just another ruling class, but this time exercising complete power.

At this point, we should invariably mention Nikita Khrushchev's memoirs which appeared in the West under the title *Khrushchev Remembers* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1970). Although far from being a scholarly work, it is, however, extremely valuable. Aside from giving an account of himself from the early days, and "exposing" Stalin, in whose shadow he began his career to the top, Khrushchev discloses to his readers plenty of insights into his mentality and activity as a political figure from the time he came to power in 1956, until he was ousted in 1964. As Strobe Talbott said: "the account is a vivid self portrait by the man who emerged from Stalin's shadow to challenge Stalin's ghost". Apart from valuable information contained in these memoirs, they belong to the same category as Medvedev's work — both were sanctioned by Moscow.

1964 proved to be another turning point in Soviet Russian politics, for it showed that the removal of a Soviet tyrant from power actually does not af-

fect the stability of the totalitarian system itself. The system is independent from the leader and vice-versa. This point was aptly suggested and developed in Michael Tatu's *Power in the Kremlin: From Khrushchev to Kosygin* (New York: Viking Press, 1969). The author, in a detailed fashion, gives a political history of the Soviet Union from 1960 to 1966 — the crucial period in which this important development was noticed.

Aside from the mainly political aspects of the Soviet Russian system discussed above, other problems — closely intertwined with Soviet politics — warrant an equal degree of attention: the economy, the question of nationalities, the "Soviet" society, culture and dissent, and most importantly the struggle for independence from Soviet Russia by the nations under its control.

Turning now to the Soviet economy, there are two works by an outstanding authority in the field: Alec Nove, who wrote *An Economic History of the USSR* (London: Penguin Press, 1969), and *The Soviet Economy: An Introduction* (2nd rev. ed.; New York: Praeger, 1969). Both works supplement each other. The first book deals in chronological order with all the major periods beginning with the period of the revolutionary upheaval, the "New Economic Policy" (NEP) of the 1920's, collectivisation and industrialisation in the 1930's, the "War economy", and the post-war period. It concentrates on economic policies, decisions, events, as well as organisation and conditions. The second book deals with economic institutions, and also examines the issues arising at the enterprise level, as well as problems of investment, supply, output planning, and so on. Another two studies which deal specifically with the two "pillars" of the Soviet economy — the peasants and the workers — are Robert Conquest's *Agricultural Workers in the USSR* (New York: Praeger, 1969); and *Industrial Workers in the USSR* (London: Bodley Head, 1967). Both studies deal with the various aspects concerning the organisation, relationship with the government, and life and working conditions, of these two working forces.

Another first priority issue facing Moscow is the question of the various nations under Russian control within the framework of the Soviet Union. While much of the literature on the subject is polemical, the collection of essays *Ethnic Minorities in the Soviet Union*, edited by Erich Goldhagen (New York: Praeger, 1968) is one of the better earlier scholarly works on this complex subject. The essays deal with general nationalities questions, as well as with the particular nations — Ukrainians, Armenians, Balts, Soviet Jewry, and others. Other essays also deal with the economic relations between the Union Republics; language policy; and so on. Aside from the thematic approach to the subject, a useful historical treatment is provided by Robert Conquest's *Soviet Nationalities Policy in Practice* (New York: Praeger, 1968). His historical analysis goes as far back as the Communist Party's pre-Revolution theory on the nationalities question, ending with the current status of their sovereignty in theory and practice. As usual, Conquest's sources are strictly Soviet.

For an understanding of the policies of the central authorities regarding the

non-Russian Union Republics, and the various national groups, Yaroslav Bilinsky's *The Second Soviet Republic: Ukraine After World War II* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1964), is a useful work which sheds light on recent political events and processes in Ukraine. The book deals with such issues as Soviet policy towards Ukraine in the realm of politics, language and culture; the Communist Party of Ukraine; Ukraine in international affairs, Ukrainian nationalism, and other issues.

The question of nationalities is intimately wedded to the oppositionist movement against Soviet Russian hegemony since its beginnings, as well as to the current resistance of a continuously widening circle of intellectuals. Active opposition has been a steady companion to the Soviet Russian system, and a constant source of worry for the Kremlin. Ronald Gaucher's *Opposition in the USSR 1917-1967* (New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1969) is one of the most comprehensive and authoritative works in English to trace the history of the opposition and its efforts to overthrow Moscow's totalitarian system since its seizure of power in 1917 to the present. The study concentrates mainly on violent opposition, guerillas, revolutionary uprisings, and military activity. A substantial part of the book is devoted to the organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) in their struggle for Ukraine's independence.

For the past fifteen years, Moscow has been faced with the new fact that the intellectual community wants to see implemented in practice what the system subscribes to in theory — human and national rights for everybody. This has produced what can be called an "inflationary" process — the more the authorities use repression to silence the intellectuals (thousands have already been imprisoned), the more the discontent and protest grow. There is already enough material available to draw a comprehensive picture of the situation, which points to two main trends in the current "politics of dissent" — on the one hand, we notice concern strictly for human and democratic rights; on the other, human rights are intimately connected with national grievances. The latter are particularly strong among the non-Russian peoples in the USSR.

These questions have been treated in a satisfactory manner by various scholars in the field. One such attempt to give a comprehensive view of dissidence since Stalin's death is Abraham Rothberg's *The Heirs of Stalin; Dissidence and the Soviet Regime 1953-1970* (Ithaca, N. J.: Cornell University Press, 1972). In this study the author traces the development of the movement, the reaction of and the effect on the Soviet system of this oppositionist upheaval.

The best method, however, to comprehend the nature of contemporary dissent in the USSR is to consider the documentation and the writings of the oppositionist intellectuals themselves. From the large amount of material available in the West I have selected what would be representative of the problems at stake. Thus, *In Quest of Justice; Protest and Dissent in the Soviet Union Today* compiled by Abraham Brumberg (New York: Praeger, 1970), offers a brief section of introductory commentaries on the situation, followed by a mass of documentation comprehensively edited and arranged under

such themes as documents on trials, the nationalities problems, religious dissent, and so on. Another interesting anthology is *Uncensored Russia; the Human Rights Movement in the Soviet Union* edited by Peter Reddaway (London: J. Cape, 1972). This book consists of an annotated text of the first eleven issues of the unofficial journal "A Chronicle of Current Events". In a factual approach the anonymous authors and editors contribute to clarify the scope and harshness of Moscow's attempts to suppress the protest and opposition of the intellectuals. It also illustrates the geographic spread of protest in the USSR, which acquires increasingly greater national overtones as we move away from the centre — Moscow. Thus, human rights coupled with national grievances are quite obvious in *Ferment in the Ukraine*, a compilation of documents and writings by Ukrainian patriots, edited by Michael Browne (London: Macmillan, 1971). The documentation, which comprises transcripts of secret trials, protest letters to the government, petitions, appeals, essays on cultural and political themes, and other material, illustrates the "ferment" in Ukraine in the last decade caused by the increasing attempts to Russify Ukrainian culture, and political repression on the part of Moscow.

However, one of the most outstanding documents that have come out from the Soviet Union is Ivan Dziuba's *Internationalism or Russification?* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1968), which is a devastating critique of the Soviet Russian nationalities policy. In this treatise, this foremost literary critic in Ukraine deals factually with the sensitive issue of Ukrainian-Russian relations, placing the blame for the present discontent in Ukraine squarely on the Russification policies pursued by Moscow.

Since any "isolated" study may sin for lack of perspective, it is always rewarding to compare. In the sphere of politics we have already mentioned Hazard's book in which comparisons were made between the Soviet Russian and American political systems. It is at this point — the closing of the discussion of the material on Soviet "internal affairs" — that I should mention a book in comparative sociology which studies both systems — the Soviet Russian and the American. The readings in *American and Soviet Society: A Comparison*, edited by Paul Hollander (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973), deal with social values and beliefs, the polity, social stratification, the family, crime, national and ethnic discrimination, leisure, alcoholism, mass culture, youth, old age, rural and urban problems, population movement and religion, stressing both similarities and differences. Against this background I would now like to turn to Soviet international relations since the end of WWII.

(To be continued)

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THE DEVELOPMENT OF UKRAINIAN HISTORIOGRAPHY*

(Conclusion)

VII. Soviet Ukrainian historiography since 1934

In the 1930's, the Communist Party decided to extend its control over intellectual life in the USSR and the relative academic freedom came to an end. In 1934, Pokrovsky's school was condemned as anti-Marxist and a new methodological approach, based on the political principle of unity, was introduced. This new approach — the "Soviet scheme" — disproved the traditional scheme recognising the existence of the nation with its own national history, but at the same time rejected the rational scheme by insisting on keeping Ukrainian history closely bound to Russian history. Thus, the Soviet scheme was a compromise in its treatment of the Kyivan period. According to the Soviet scheme, Rus' was neither Ukrainian nor Russian, because at that time there were no Russians and no Ukrainians, but rather a "drevniy russkiy narod" — an ancient Russian people from which there later developed three branches: Russian, Ukrainian and Byelorussian⁴².

Futhermore, according to the Soviet scheme, the national unity of the "drevniy russkiy narod" was disrupted by the Tatar invasion, but was reestablished when the Russian people took the Ukrainians under their protection and "the decision by the Pereyaslav Assembly to reunite Ukraine with Russia was a magnificent display of the will of the whole of the freedom-loving Ukrainian nation, an expression of its eternal longings and expectations"⁴³. However, the problem of the Ukrainian statehood (Hetman State) proved a difficult topic to handle within the framework of the Soviet scheme.

The campaign of de-Stalinisation in Ukraine proceeded on a very limited basis, was delayed for a year or two, and then was only partially carried out. Ironically, it was Anastas Mikoyan who in his speech at the Twentieth Party Congress encouraged Ukrainian historians "to write a better history of the emergence and development of the Ukrainian SSR than the Moscow histor-

* Continued from *The Ukrainian Review*, No. 3, 1986.

42. K. Voblyi, *Narys Istoriyi Ukrainy* (Ufa, 1942), reprint Toronto 1949, p. 39, quoted by R. Serbyn, *op. cit.*, p. 173.

43. O. Kasymenko, *Vozyednannia Ukrainy i yoho istorychnie znachennia* (Kyiv, 1954), p. 81, c.f., Serbyn, "Rus' in the Soviet Scheme of East Slavic History", *The New Review*, Vol. III, No. 4, 1969 p. 175.

ians who undertook the job, but who perhaps would have been better advised to stay away from it"⁴⁴.

O. K. Kasymenko, director of the Institute of the History of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR, complained in his article "New Achievements of Ukrainian Historians" about the sad situation of Ukrainian historical writings during Stalin's period. He wrote: "... Immeasurable harm has been done to the study of history in Ukraine by (the Stalin) cult; as a result of Stalin's tyranny in the handling of important historical events, his biased interpretation of the role of his own person, and the cultivation of subjectivity in works on the history of Ukraine, he is responsible for all sorts of distortions of historical truth"⁴⁵.

The de-Stalinisation period gave non-Russian historians more freedom to rewrite their national histories. Soviet Ukrainian historians were particularly active in rewriting Ukrainian history and bitterly complained about discrimination against Ukrainian historiography by the Russian historians, who revert to the traditional interpretation of history of the Eastern Slavs. As a result of these complaints, the publication of the *Ukrainskyi Istorychnyi Zhurnal* (U.I.Z.) was permitted and several Soviet Ukrainian historians opposed the idea of the reunification of Ukraine with Russia⁴⁶. For example, M. Braichevskyi, a senior research member of the Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR, author of numerous monographs, challenged the official Soviet interpretation of the Pereyaslav Treaty⁴⁷ by writing his essay *Poyednannia chy Vozyednannia* (Annexation or Reunification), which was never published in the USSR, but was published in Ukrainian in Canada (1972) and in English in Munich (1974)⁴⁸.

In 1968, Braichevskyi and other Ukrainian intellectuals signed a protest-memorandum to the Soviet Government because of "the political trials of young people belonging to the creative and scientific intelligence" held in the Soviet Union⁴⁹.

Another Soviet Ukrainian historian, I. Boyko, maintains that the lost statehood of Ukraine after the Tartar invasion was regained in the years 1648-1654 and in spite of the annexation of the Hetman State by Russia, Ukraine maintained an autonomous status until Catherine II abolished and incorporated it

44. *UIZ*, 1963, No. 3, p. 140, cf. Stefan M. Horak, "Ukrainian Historiography, 1953-1963", *Slavic Review*, Vol. XXIV, No. 2, 1965, p. 259.

45. *Pravda*, February 18, 1956, cf., Horak, *op. cit.*, p. 263.

46. For details see: L. Tillett, *The Great Friendship: Soviet Historians on the Non-Russian Nationalities*, pp. 225-228.

47. The book entitled *Tezisy o 300-letiy vossoyedinenia Ukrainy z Rossiei (1654-1954)* was prepared and published by the Central Committee of the Communist Party in Moscow (1954), in Russian, Ukrainian, and other languages.

48. For details see: Wynar, *op. cit.*, pp. 13, 22.

49. For details see: M. Browne, *Ferment in the Ukraine* (New York, 1971), pp. 191-6. cf. Wynar, *op. cit.*, p. 22. Also L. Tillett, "Ukrainian Nationalism and the Fall of Shelest", *Slavic Review*, Vol. 34, No. 4, (1975), pp. 758-765.

into the Russian Empire⁵⁰. Thus Soviet Ukrainian historians, whose subject is the history of their own nation and the investigation of the relations of their people to others, must observe two fundamental requirements. Namely, they must harmonise their thinking with the teachings of Lenin, as far as the national question is concerned, and they must show the closest relationship possible between the history of their homeland and that of the "Great" Russians. The first condition arises from the nature of the matter: the Soviet scholars of society represent the principles of the Marxist-Leninist world view, and this contains the theory of the national question, which, based on the basic maxims of the classicists, was developed by Lenin and adapted by Stalin.

The dependence of the Soviet science of historiography on the guidelines of the party and the close personal inter-relationships involved are well known and do not need to be further explained here. It is enough to point out that, after the general directions to historians, which come from party congresses, planning goals are then set up in the various disciplines, and it is decided which themes in particular are to be worked on. Here the process of the national economy's five-year plan, a process concerned chiefly with material goods, is carried over to this sphere. Culture is, according to the Soviet definition, the totality of the material and intellectual values of a society. Thus historiographical epoch-making in Ukraine, as well as elsewhere in the Soviet Union, conforms to the Party Congresses⁵¹.

The determining role of the party arises from the Marxist principle that science, or knowledge, only fulfils its true calling in the service of society. It is, therefore, the task of the Soviet Russian historians to fight against all idealistic influences outside the socialist camp, as well as against possible internal deviations, and to cooperate in the creation, preservation and advancement of socialist consciousness. This has special application in the field of national relationships which is regarded as the primary area of ideological argumentation⁵². In this regard, it is a matter of strengthening the attitude of "Soviet patriotism" and of "proletarian" or "Socialist Internationalism" among the works. This task is usually carried out in the newspapers by Soviet Ukrainian historians, especially at the time of party congresses, but also on other important occasions, such as memorial days and important events, and the theoretical foundations for conducting the ideological struggle and for recogni-

50. I. D. Boyko, "Do pytannia pro derzhavnist ukrainskoho narodu v period feodalizmu", *UIZ*, 1968, No. 8, pp. 30-38.

51. Sarbey, *op. cit.*, p. 440; F. E. Loš, V. H. Sarbey, "Osnovni etapy radyanskoi istorichnoyi nauky na Ukraini", *UIZ*, 1968, Vol. XI, No. 1, pp. 14-23.

52. M. I. Kulichenko, *Natsionalnye otnosheniya v SSSR i tendentsii yikh razvitya* (Moscow, 1972), p. 10. Concerning the concept of Soviet nationalities policy — "the flourishing" (*rastsvet*), "coming together" (*sblizheniye*), and "merging" (*slivaniye*) — see: M. I. Kulichenko, *Rastsvet i sblizheniye natsiy v SSSR: Problemy teorii i metodologii* (Moscow: Mysl, 1981); S. H. Fingeyev, "Leninska problema partiyi z natsionalnoho pytannia. . .", *Komunist Ukrainy*, April 4, 1983. See also T. Kuziō, "Non-Russian Nationalism in the USSR and Soviet Nationality Policy", *The Ukrainian Review*, Vol. XXXII, No. 1, 1984, pp. 41-52.

tion of the educational function of historiography is demonstrated in the works of the classic writers⁵³.

The second principle enunciated above, the deepening of mutuality and reciprocal relationships between the Ukrainian and Russian peoples, is deduced from Leninist pronouncements on the national question: the friendship of peoples is favoured by the fact that the class interests of the working masses, which go beyond national boundaries, are more important than the peculiar characteristics which set one nation apart from another. Why does this not apply also to the relations of the Ukrainian and Polish masses who lived for so long under the roof of one state? Here it is apparent that the progressiveness and irreversibility of the common life of the two East Slavic peoples (Byelorussians included) is established chiefly by use of historical peculiarities: by common ancestry and by the singularity of their essential make-up. After all — so it is said — they have always wanted to maintain the inheritance of the Kyivan Realm and reverse the division that had occurred between them. In the guidelines for handling this subject, which originated in the Stalinist era and were finalised in 1954, and from which there has never been any deviation (situation in 1983), and which indeed were even strengthened recently (especially in 1979)⁵⁴, we see, on the one hand, the concern of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to unify the historical pictures of the various republics and to further "friendships of peoples" by showing historical mutuality. On the other hand, this avenue to Ukrainian history is bringing, whether intended or not, many of the views of the bourgeois Russian historiography to the fore once again (i.e., Karamzin, Pogodin, Solovyev, Kliuchevskiy). These historians deemed Ukrainian history unworthy of any kind of separate existence and gave it value only as a fringe phenomenon of the Great Russians⁵⁵. Thus reunification became the goal of Soviet Ukrainians as stated by J. J. Kompaniets: "The individuality ("svoyeridnist") of the history of the Ukrainian people consisted of the fact that, having originated with the Russian and Byelorussian from the Old Russian people, it was later divided, and in the course of the centuries added to the master of various states"⁵⁶. Further, the achievement of a national state is repeatedly termed — even after 1972 — the chief problem of Ukrainian history since the time of the Cossack Wars⁵⁷.

One can read this in the large *Istoriya Ukrainskoi R.S.R.* (1977-79), by Yuriy Kondufor (b. 1922) and Arnold Shevelev (b. 1928), published by the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences in 8 volumes (10 books), which is supposed

53. Loš — Sarbey, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

54. V. A. Dyadychenko, "Tezy pro 300-richchiya vozyednannia Ukrainy z Rosieyu", *Radyanska Entsyklopediya Ukrainy* (Kyiv, 1972), Vol. IV, part 1, p. 7.

55. N. Polonska-Vasylenko, *Zwei Konzeptionen der Geschichte der Ukraine und Russlands* (Munich, 1970), p. 30.

56. *Radyanska Entsyklopediya istoriyi Ukrainy* (Kyiv, 1969), p. 337.

57. F. P. Shevchenko, "Uchast predstavnykiv riznykh narodnostey u vyzvolniy viyni 1648-1654 rr. na Ukraini", *Ukrainskyi Istorychnyi Zhurnal*, 1978, No. 11, pp. 10-22. Also in *Istoriya URSR*, 1977, Vol. 1, p. 8.

to replace Hrushevskiy's *Istoria Ukrainy-Rusy*. The difficulty that Soviet Ukrainian historians have in this great history of the Ukrainian SSR is the problem of the rise of the Ukrainian Hetman State (1649). The aim of Soviet Ukrainian historiography is, on the one hand, to fight against any rebirth ("vidrodzhennia") of Ukrainian national consciousness in the last two centuries and, on the other, the reunification with Russia. These tasks are those of the Soviet Ukrainian historians in Soviet Ukrainian history. It is clearly stated in the *Radyanska Entsyklopedia Istorii Ukrainy*:

The particular nature ("Svoyerdnist") of the history of the Ukrainian people consisted in the fact that, while it descended with the Russian and Byelorussian from the Old Russian race, it was later divided, and in the course of the centuries came to be part of the various states⁵⁸.

Ukrainian history is also similarly treated in other Soviet works, such as the seventeenth volume of the Ukrainian Soviet Encyclopedia, of which a Russian translation exists, somewhat condensed, brought up-to-date, and richly illustrated, published under the title *Ukrainskaya Sovetskaya Sotsialisticheskaya Respublika* in Kyiv in 1967. As the editors stated in the introduction, "the materials of this book are presented on the basis of Marxist-Leninist methodology and in the spirit of proletarian internationalism in the struggle against bourgeois ideology"⁵⁹. Besides this ideology, there is a great deal of pro-Russian bias. For example, the rule of the Lithuanian Gedimin dynasty over the Ukrainian lands in the 14th century is labelled as "foreign occupation" and the Austrian regime in Halychyna (1772-1918) as "colonialism". Lithuania and Austria are described in the darkest colours, while in the case of Russia the positive and progressive factors are emphasised and the negative ones simply omitted.

The Ukrainian statesmen are evaluated not on the basis of services rendered to their country, but by their loyalty to Moscow. Therefore, those Hetmans, such as Ivan Vyhovskyi, Petro Doroshenko, Ivan Mazepa, Pavlo Polubotok, and others, who resisted Russian encroachments, are considered as "traitors". Furthermore, Ukrainian history before 1917 is edited in such a subtle manner that the popular movements and peasant revolts are glorified while the attempts of the Ukrainian leaders to obtain political rights for Ukrainian people are diminished or ignored. Thus, Ukrainian history is reduced to a series of popular movements and revolts which can be fitted into Russian history on the same level as the revolts of S. Razin or E. Pugachev. It is well known that Soviet Russian historiography takes a positive view of the rise and consolidation of the traditional Russian state, despite serfdom, autocracy, and other negative features.

The treatment of the Soviet period is even more tendentious than that of pre-revolutionary history. The development of Soviet Ukrainian society is pre-

58. *Radyanska Entsyklopediya istorii Ukrainy*, 1969, Vol. I, p. 357.

59. *Ukrainska Sovetskaya Sotsialisticheskaya Respublika*, Kyiv: Glavnaya redaktsia Ukrainskoi Sovetskoi Entsiklopedii, AN USSR, 1967, p. 2.

sented as straight, ascending line, as a triumphal march leading from one victory to another. Unpleasant facts are omitted, and consequently there is not a single word about the famine of 1932-33, which took several million lives in Ukraine. Stalin is mentioned for the first time under the year 1938 and accused of "deviations from the norms and principles of the Soviet constitution, and abuses of power, of causing serious harm to the Communist Party, the Soviet country, and to our people. However, the noxious results of the cult of personality, though hampering the development of Soviet society, did not stop the advance of our country towards new victories of socialism"⁶⁰. The expressions "our people", and "our country" refer not to the Ukrainian SSR, but to the Soviet Union as a whole. This clearly indicates where, in the official view, the Ukrainian people ought to place their ultimate national identity. This, however, is a political goal of the Soviet Russian regime and does not reflect the actual trend of modern Ukrainian history.

Fortunately, in the USA and Canada, Ukrainian history has been recognised as a discipline at major universities such as Harvard, Edmonton, and Toronto. There, topics on Ukrainian history have been accepted as dissertations and essays, some of which have been published by university presses. In fact, between 1928 and 1978, in Western Europe, Canada, and the United States 235 known dissertations devoted to Ukrainian topics, or at least having significant relevance to Ukrainian matters were written⁶¹. The number of dissertations on Ukrainian topics markedly increased after World War II. The leading institutions in which Ukrainian topics were written are as follows: Columbia — 27; Harvard — 15; Ottawa — 13; Pennsylvania — 12; Washington — 10; Georgetown — 8; Chicago, Illinois, Michigan, and Yale — 7 each; New York and Indiana — 5 each⁶². Further research on Ukrainian history has been done in the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies in Edmonton, Alberta, and in the University of Toronto, Ontario. Researchers in Ukrainian history have the opportunity to publish their work in *The Journal of Ukrainian Studies* in Canada, in the *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*, and *Ukrainskyi Istoryk* in the USA, and *The Ukrainian Review* in Great Britain.

60. *Ibid.*, p. 133.

61. For details see: Bohdan S. Wynar and Susan C. Holte, "Doctoral Dissertations on Ukrainian Topics in English prepared during the Years 1928-1978", *Ukrainskyi Istoryk*, Vol. XVI, No. 61-64, 1979, pp. 108-127.

62. *Ibid.*, p. 111.

Stephen OLESKIW

CAN ACTS OF TERRORISM EVER BE JUSTIFIED?*

(Conclusion)

4. TERRORISM AS STATE POLICY

So far we have been looking at terrorism as a political weapon used against particular states, but there is yet another important angle from which one ought to examine the problem to get a fuller picture of the whole issue — that is terrorism as a state policy. Thus, in such cases, terrorism can also serve the purpose of the strong, not only that of the weak.

i) Terrorism by Authoritarian States.

In general, terrorism is directed against authoritarian state systems for a specific reason, such as tyrannical rule or serious injustices and the abrogation of rights, hence signifying that the rule is of an unjust nature. If the state in question had been ruled justly and properly, in accordance with moral and ethical principles, then there would have been no need for any section of the population to resort to violent means in order to state their grievances or put forward their views and wishes.

Thus, on no account can one accept or justify, even in the slightest, a state system which relies on fear and coercion to function in the manner prescribed by its rulers — one which depends on the widespread activities of a secret police network to implement terror by methods such as the random arrest of suspects, imprisonment without any due and adequate trial, and the mysterious disappearance of political opponents and dissidents.

The 1930's witnessed two very clear examples of what one means by state terror — Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union under Stalin. The rise to power of the NSDAP portrays very well a deliberate use of terror and violence for the specific political purpose of gaining power in Germany in the 1920's and 1930's. Subsequently, after the rise to power of Hitler in January 1933, the entire Nazi system was based on terror and violence which ensured that the "ordnung" from above was carried out at all levels. Besides this, the grim history of the death camps is well known, as are the other methods of terror and coercion. The Germans made it common practice, especially in Eastern Europe, to stage public executions of political activists and nationa-

* Continued from *The Ukrainian Review*, No. 3, 1986.

lists, which the entire populations of towns and villages were herded together to watch, as a means of terrorising the people of the occupied territories into obedience.

A similar picture was also found in the Soviet Union during the 1930's. According to Boris Lewycky, Stalin, by his use of State terrorism, "made fear and uncertainty into 'organisational methods', into instruments for educating people in communism. Terror became a stimulant for increasing economic productivity. This precisely is the essence of the 'historical function' of terrorism under Stalin. After the Yezhovshchina, after the bloody purges, it was not abolished, but expanded to fresh depths. With the help of the security service, a million-strong army of convicts was created so as to form part of the plan for 'building Socialism'"¹².

However, one does not have to look as far back as that to study forms of terrorism practiced by states. One needs only to look at Amin's Uganda, or the activity of death squads and the secret police in the Latin American dictatorships. The Soviet Union also continues to remain a notable example of a state which employs mass coercion and terror, although far more subtly as regards the outside world and foreign opinion, than under Stalin. Today there are still millions of people incarcerated in Soviet labour camps and psychiatric hospitals for expressing dissident views and campaigning for their rights.

For internal purposes and consumption, therefore, terror is still very much in existence and once in a while certain draconic measures are taken if the "normal" methods of terror appear to be too ineffective, in a given situation, as a means of persuasion. For example, in 1979, a young Ukrainian composer, Volodymyr Ivasiuk, was asked several times by the authorities to desist from writing Ukrainian folk and national songs and to concentrate on composing "official" songs. Ivasiuk refused on every occasion, as a result of which he disappeared from his home. Having been tortured by the KGB and brutally murdered, his body was mutilated and left hanging from a tree in a forest as a reminder to others¹³.

Another means of terrorising political opponents and dissidents is long-term imprisonment (up to 25 or 30 years) in the adverse conditions of Siberian labour camps. The families of those convicted are openly persecuted and deprived of certain rights granted to those who conform, as a warning to others who might dare to speak up against the authorities. Upon release, the victims of Soviet state terror are very shortly re-arrested and convicted, once again, for a long period of time.

Such was the life story of Yuriy Shukhevych, a boy of 14 when he was first arrested in 1948 for being the son of Roman Shukhevych, commander-in-chief of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. Until his release in 1983, Yuriy Shukhe-

12. Boris Lewycky: *The Uses of Terror — The Soviet Secret Service 1917-1970*, London, 1971, p. 316.

13. *The Ukrainian Review*, Vol. XXVII, No. 4, 1979, p. 10.

nych had spent 30 years in prison and labour camps, as a result of which he has lost his sight due to vitamin deficiencies and the harsh conditions of incarceration¹⁴.

For a state to resort to such inhumane methods and to base its rule on organised state terrorism is a total breach of morality and international law, as well as a full frontal attack on all human rights. As such, the use of terror by authoritarian systems for their political, and indeed any other, purposes can never be justified and violates the Just War principles on every count. Use of terror by authoritarian administrations is, therefore, wrong on every occasion and can never be justified under any circumstances whatsoever.

ii) Terrorism by Liberal Democracies.

It can also happen that, on occasion, acts of terrorism are committed by a democratic state or by particular groups acting in its name. In fact, few liberal states are completely innocent of the charges pressed by anti-state terrorists — of the use of violence and terror during the colonial wars of the 1950's and 1960's. But, because an act of terror and violence has been authorised by a liberal (or any other) government or state agency, it does not mean that it is, necessarily, legitimate or legal. If certain acts of violence and terrorism have been committed, in breach of moral laws and legality, then they must be recognised as terrorism on the part of that state, and one cannot deny that murder, torture or other acts of violence have taken place simply because they were carried out on the orders of a state, or else by the security forces or agencies of the state in question.

It is important, however, to keep in mind the distinction between outright violence and terror and the use of force by the state as a form of legal coercion. A state is entitled to some, though very restricted, use of force for the purpose of legitimate coercion, as, otherwise, things may eventually evolve into chaos and anarchy and, thus, obstruct the due process of law and order and the smooth running of the state.

In addition, every state is entitled to certain legal reprisals which are permitted under international law. The reprisals, however, must be very strictly controlled and limited, and great care must be taken not to allow the actions to slip out of control into an upwards spiral of death and destruction which would only cause the increase of violence and terrorist activity on both sides.

Reprisals are designed to end a period of terror and violence and, therefore, they must be of a reactive nature, used in response to past cases of violations and crimes. To avoid spiralling, reprisals must not be random attacks. They must be directly proportionate to terrorist attacks against the state and must have a genuine limit. For instance, it is forbidden by international law to use the innocent and helpless, such as hostages, as a target for reprisal raids.

14. *The Ukrainian Review*, Vol. XXX, No. 2, 1982, p. 84-85.

It is, however, permissible to attack and destroy property in return for incurred civilian deaths, but the utmost care must be taken to avoid accidental deaths of innocent civilian victims. During the Israeli raid on Khibye, on October 14, 1953, 40 people were left buried under the rubble of the destroyed houses. Their deaths were not unintentional as due care was not taken to avoid them and, therefore, the killings were unjustified and wrong.

In comparison, let us take another Israeli raid — that on Beirut — which occurred on December 28, 1968. During this raid, 13 aircraft were destroyed and civilian deaths were avoided. It was a response to the attack by the PFLP on Athens airport two days earlier and was of a limited and proportionate character. In this case, efforts had been made to avoid unnecessary deaths and destruction. Therefore, this act of reprisal can be fully justified¹⁵.

Finally, one must say that acts of reprisal, like acts of terrorism, must be of a last resort nature. A formal protest must first of all be made and this must be followed by threats to initiate reprisals before actual steps are taken to carry out an act of reprisal.

But for a liberal state to resort to terrorism is wrong. Firstly, it is wrong because, as mentioned earlier, the use of terror by states for the coercion of its people is unjustifiable. And secondly, it is wrong because of the theory and character of the liberal-democratic state, where such methods are banned by the constitution.

Unfortunately, however, perfection cannot be expected from mankind, and liberal states have at times resorted to some quite drastic measures of violence and terror for the attainment of their political aims. Perhaps the clearest example of this is France during the Algerian struggle for independence (1954-1962).

In 1956, the French Army made the decision to purge the FLN in Algiers which was put into practice by a policy of full-scale terror (or counter-terror). For instance, large-scale murder raids were launched against villages and districts which served as hiding places for the rebels, as punishment and warning to others. The use of torture was common practice on a regular and widespread basis in police stations and military detention centres, and, sometimes, entire populations of villages or districts would be “resettled” (or what in fact amounted to deportation) in order to insulate them from the FLN. As well as this, there were many cases of arbitrary arrests. Detentions were carried out regularly and frequently. It was also not uncommon to find summary executions of prisoners (both civilian and military) ordered by judicial authorities and concealed as “attempted flight”.

Such behaviour on the part of any state, totalitarian, or, particularly, liberal-democratic (which would make the actions even worse), is completely intolerable and, one has to stress, totally unjustifiable and wrong on every occasion.

15. Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars*, London, 1980, p. 217-219.

CONCLUSION

Much has been said about terrorism in the preceding pages and it has become quite clear that it is by no means a simple issue. Terrorism is a problem of great complexity, and one which comes in many different guises, all of which fall together under the single brand name of "terrorism" to serve numerous different purposes for many and varying reasons.

I have also explained that terrorism is not just a mode of combat for groups opposing particular states, but is an equally effective weapon in the hands of a state by which popular behaviour can be regulated, obedience enforced, and by which the people can be terrorised into conformity.

But, because of its basically criminal character, which leads to death, injury or material damage, or, at best, the threats to cause death and destruction, terrorism is unacceptable and, therefore, under normal conditions, unjustifiable. When employed by a state, terrorism is unjustifiable on every occasion, except in the case of legal reprisals, which must be proportionate to specific crimes and discriminate.

But, sometimes, a situation may be such that terrorism against a state may be the only solution to a particular problem. Everything else may have failed and all attempts at peaceful solutions may have proved ineffective, thus leaving terror and violence as the only effective means of carrying on. In such circumstances, terrorism is far more justifiable, according to ethical thought and the principles of Just War. However, those engaged in terrorist activity must not allow themselves to commit excesses and must adhere closely to the Just War rules in order to achieve any justification at all.

For instance, it must be clear that the situation in a given country is genuinely bad enough to warrant the resort to drastic measures and that the danger is truly great, before one can even begin to think of justifying a particular terrorist movement. The situation must be one of exceptional circumstances of great threat or danger, which would make it impossible to live a normal life under such circumstances. Thus, the cause of the terrorists must be a good and just one, such as the fight for survival, or a struggle for national liberation, as every nation is entitled to freedom under the clauses of international law.

It is impossible, however, to justify acts of terror committed on the basis of the ideas of Sartre. Sartre idealises, glorifies and romanticises violence and cruelty. In his eyes, they play a heroic and important role in life, and terror forms a cleansing process by which man recreates himself through violence. Terror appears as the engine of freedom and progress, and violence becomes a goal in itself, in complete and callous disregard for its victims and consequences.

But, although the oppressed may have the right to resist (as Sartre asserts), and terrorism may even be their ultimate last resort means, the struggle for

liberation cannot become debased into an uncontrolled orgy of ever-mounting terror, violence and bloodshed, which may eventually turn into an upwards-moving spiral of terror on the part of both the terrorist group and the state.

If terrorism must be used, it should be a means of last resort and should be kept to the minimum necessary to achieve the intended goals. It must be put into practice selectively and with discrimination, and must be used in proportion to each selected goal. As well as this, a terrorist campaign cannot be part of a war fought by a minority grouping or faction in a country where the rest of the population may not wish it to continue. Such is the situation in Northern Ireland where the Provisional IRA appears oblivious of the fact that its cause lacks legitimacy in the eyes of the people it claims to be "liberating", and that the Protestant community, which forms two-thirds of the population in Ulster, is opposed to a united Ireland.

To be anywhere near justification, terrorism requires the backing of a sizeable part of the population (preferably the majority) of a country, a fact which decides whether that particular nation legitimises the fight. In fact, in these circumstances, the terrorist movement would become part of the overall struggle of the entire population which would support, actively or passively, or else tolerate, the terrorist campaign on its soil, despite the obvious dangers to itself.

Thus, in circumstances of exceptional danger, and when the population does not condemn the terrorist movement in spite of the dangers to itself, one can say that it is justifiable to subject innocent people to dangers of reprisals, injury or other sufferings for the greater good and a better future, but only if their deaths and grief make a definite and positive contribution and are not out of proportion to the overall cause and the specific individual objectives of the terrorist movement.

In theory, therefore, it is perfectly possible to have a terrorist campaign which can receive the maximum justification possible, taking into account the nature of terrorism and what its use would entail.

However, we have seen from past examples that, in practice, it is more difficult to achieve this. Because human nature, with its inherent weaknesses, is the way it is, mistakes are usually made and hot-headed actions may lead to excesses being committed. In practice, therefore, it is very difficult to achieve the best possible degree of justification by observing unfalteringly all the rules all the time, and all examples of terrorism have, usually, had at least some moments of indiscriminate terror and violence.

Finally, then, what one can say in the way of conclusion is that terrorism, whenever it occurs, is always wrong, but it is not necessarily always completely so on every occasion. But, because of what it entails, terrorism can never be completely right either. Therefore, in some cases it is possible to justify some acts of terrorism, but it is never possible to justify them completely.

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News from Ukraine

DEATH OF KATERYNA ZARYTSKA-SOROKA



Kateryna ZARYTSKA-SOROKA

Kateryna Zarytska-Soroka, leading member of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), Head of the Red Cross of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), and long-standing political prisoner, died in Ukraine on August 29, 1986. For her firm nationalist beliefs and devotion to the cause of Ukrainian liberation, she spent more than thirty years in Polish and Soviet Russian concentration camps.

Kateryna Zarytska was born in Lviv, Western Ukraine, in 1914. She finished higher education at the Lviv Polytechnical Institute and the Mykola Lysenko Institute of Music. From an early age, she was already an active member of the OUN, for which she was arrested in 1934. During the so-called "Warsaw Trial" in 1935 (a trial of Ukrainian nationalists, among them Stepan Bandera), she was sentenced to 8 years of imprisonment. During the trial, Zarytska did not plead guilty to any of the charges brought against her.

In 1936, during the "Lviv Trial" (a continuation of the "Warsaw Trial" of the previous year), she was sentenced to 5 years of imprisonment.

After the capitulation of Poland in 1939, Kateryna Zarytska was released from prison. Soon after, she married Mykhailo Soroka, himself a leading member of the OUN. At the end of 1940, Zarytska was arrested again, this time by the Soviet Russians. Her husband Mykhailo, was arrested the same year and sentenced to 8 years of imprisonment for belonging to the Leadership of the OUN. A year later, in 1941, their son, Bohdan, was born in Lviv prison.

Mykhailo Soroka was re-arrested in 1952, charged with "heading the underground organisations active in the concentration camps". He died in a Mordovian camp in 1971. The Russian authorities denied Kateryna Zarytska permission to take her husband's body back to Ukraine.

After the outbreak of the war between the Soviet Union and Germany in June 1941, Zarytska was released and once again began to play an active part in the underground activities of the OUN, directed against the Nazi German occupation of Ukraine. After the Soviet Russian re-occupation of Ukraine, she took command of the UPA's Red Cross.



Mykhailo SOROKA

After her release, Zarytska remained under constant KGB surveillance and suffered much hardship and persecution.

Till the very end, despite the torture and many years of imprisonment and persecution, she remained unbroken in spirit and firm in her beliefs.

Kateryna Zarytska-Soroka was buried in the family tomb at the Lychakivskyi cemetery, alongside her mother, who died on August 1 of this year. She will be remembered as one of Ukraine's greatest freedom fighters.

SPONTANEOUS DEMONSTRATION IN UKRAINE

During a recent concert in Chernivtsi, South-Western Ukraine, at the beginning of September, a great commotion arose after the singer, Sophia Rotaru, performed songs by the late Ukrainian composer, Volodymyr Ivasiuk, reported the German newspaper *Die Welt*, on September 23, 1986.

As Rotaru ended her performance, the audience spontaneously rose from

their seats and began to pray aloud for Ivasiuk — a very popular young Ukrainian composer from Chernivtsi, murdered by the KGB in 1979. The Russian authorities feared and could not accept Ivasiuk's compositions, which were filled with Ukrainian folklore and love for his country. The official cause of Ivasiuk's death was given as suicide. This was not accepted by the Ukrainian people, who knew very well that Ivasiuk had often been summoned by the KGB for interrogation.

According to eye-witness accounts, the militiamen present at the concert were powerless to do anything. They just stood helplessly and watched.

Since his death, Ivasiuk's grave is constantly adorned with flowers brought by the population, especially the youth of Ukraine. People also donate money for special requiem services to be held in memory of Ivasiuk in churches throughout Ukraine. During these services, prayers are said in which **not the late, but the murdered Ivasiuk is remembered.**

The above outburst demonstrates the defiant attitude of the Ukrainian population towards the Russian occupational regime, as well as the strength of the Christian faith, and national feelings and aspirations. This faith in God is also evidenced by the fact that, since the Chernobyl disaster, churches throughout Ukraine have been filled with people praying (in an atheist imposed regime!). People are beginning to be less afraid of the Russian authorities and are giving way to their inner outrage by such demonstrations.

IRYNA RATUSHYNSKA RELEASED FROM PRISON

On the morning of October 10, 1986, Iryna Ratushynska, imprisoned physicist and poet, was unexpectedly released from an investigation prison in Kyiv, where she had been sent from a concentration camp for a period of "re-education". She was due to be released in 1994. She was arrested on 17.9.1982 and sentenced to 7 years of strict regimen imprisonment and 5 years of internal exile for the authorship of a collection of poems. Ratushynska was born on 4.3.1954.

REPRESSED UKRAINIANS IN THE USSR (Conclusion)

(Continued from "The Ukrainian Review", No. 3, 1986)

673) YUKHNOVSKYI Oleksander. Born in 1926 in the Rivne region. Arrested in Moscow in 1976 and sentenced to death. He was accused of anti-Soviet activities during and after the Second World War in the Rivne and Sumy regions.

674) YURCHENKO Mykola. Born in 1933. Labourer. Arrested in 1959 in Ivano-Frankivsk and sentenced to 7 years of concentration camps for belonging to the underground group known as the "United Party for the Liberation of Ukraine".

675) YURIY E. Arrested in Mykolayiv in 1971 and sentenced to 5 years of imprisonment for spreading the Christian faith.

676) YURKEVYCH Ihor Yosyfovych. Born in 1936. Journalist. Sent to work in Kazakhstan where he was arrested in 1968 and sentenced to 4 years of concentration camps for protesting against the invasion of Czechoslovakia.

677) YURKIV M. M. Faithful Subotnik. Arrested on 23.12.1977 in Uzhhorod and sent to a camp in the Dnipropetrovsk region. He was born in 1941 and is married with two children.

678) YURKIV Volodymyr. Born in 1928. Took part in the liberation struggle of the OUN-UPA. Arrested in 1947 and sentenced in Ternopil to 30 years of imprisonment on the basis of Article 56 of the UkSSR Criminal Code. In 1952 he was sentenced to death. The sentence was commuted to 25 years of imprisonment.

679) YUSHKA Petro. District commander of the OUN in the Kyiv region. Arrested after the Second World War and sentenced to long-term imprisonment in concentration camps.

680) YUZKEVYCH Artem Borysovyh. Born in 1931 in Volyn. Engineer by profession. Married with a daughter. Worked in Tallinn. Arrested on 14.12.1974 and sentenced to 5 years of imprisonment on the basis of Article 70 of the RSFSR Criminal Code for his sympathies towards the "Estonian Democratic Movement".

681) ZABOLOTNYI A. Born in 1925. Remained in the underground movement until 1972 in the Kirovohrad area, where he was arrested. Sentenced to death in Kyiv for anti-Soviet activities. The sentence was commuted to long-term imprisonment after which he was sent to the Dnipropetrovsk psychiatric hospital.

682) ZABOROVSKYI Roman. Took part in the liberation struggle of the

OUN-UPA. Arrested in 1954 and sentenced to 25 years of camps on the basis of Article 56 of the UkSSR Criminal Code.

683) ZAHIRNIAK Oleksander F. Born in 1958. Arrested in Leningrad in 1977 while attempting to hi-jack a plane in order to escape to the West. He was sentenced to 8 years of camps.

684) ZAHORODNYI A. Arrested in 1977 and sentenced in Chernivtsi to long-term imprisonment for membership of the OUN.

685) ZAHARODNYI Borys. Member of the Evangelicals Christians-Baptists in Lviv. Repressed continuously since 1972.

686) ZALESKYI Dmytro. Member of the UPA, sentenced to 25 years of concentration camps.

687) ZALEVSKYI Petro Semenovych. Born in 1913. Arrested at the beginning of 1973 and sentenced to 5 years of ordinary regimen camps and 5 years of internal exile. His wife lives in the Zhytomyr region.

688) ZALIZNIAK. Ukrainian Catholic Priest. Imprisoned in Stalin's concentration camps. After his release he settled in the Lviv region. Since then he has been continuously persecuted. After every service he is arrested by the militia, sometimes being punished by several weeks of imprisonment.

689) ZALYVAKHA Opanas Ivanovych. Artist by profession. Born on 26.11.1925 in the Kharkiv region. Arrested on 28.8.1965 and sentenced in Ivano-Frankivsk to 5 years of strict regimen concentration camps. After his release, he was placed under police surveillance and is still persecuted to this day.

690) ZALYVAKO Borys Borysovych. Born in 1940. Orthodox priest. Arrested in 1969 while attempting to cross the border into Czechoslovakia and sentenced to 8 years of imprisonment and 5 years of internal exile in the Tomsk region on the basis of Article 56 of the UkSSR Criminal Code.

691) ZARYTSKA Kateryna Myronivna. Born in Lviv in 1914. Finished higher education. Married to Mykhailo Soroka, a leading member of the OUN, who died in a concentration camp. She has one son. Leading activist engaged in liaison work for the OUN Leadership in Ukraine. She later became the head of the UPA's Red Cross. Zarytska was also imprisoned by the Poles. She was first arrested in 1940, and again in 1947 when she was sentenced to 25 years of imprisonment on the basis of Article 56 of the UkSSR Criminal Code. She served her full sentence. After her release, Zarytska was forbidden to return and live in her native Lviv. In recent years she suffered increasing persecution. Kateryna Zarytska died on 29.8.1986.

692) ZATRAVSKYI Volodymyr. Sentenced to 7 years of imprisonment and several years of internal exile in Kyiv in 1960. In 1979 he was in exile in Inta. He was used as a witness during the trial of Levko Lukianenko.

693) ZDOROVETS Borys. Born in 1930 in the Kharkiv region. Leading member of the Evangelicals Christians-Baptists for which he was sentenced to 10 years of imprisonment in 1961. Re-arrested in 1972 and sentenced in Kharkiv to 3 years of concentration camps and 7 years of internal exile.

694) ZDOROVYI Anatoliy Kuzmovich. Born on 1.1.1938. Married with children. Arrested in 1972 for demanding the establishment of Ukrainian-language high schools. Sentenced in Kharkiv to 7 years of imprisonment on the basis of Article 62 of the UkSSR Criminal Code. Spent a long time in the Vladimir prison.

695) ZELENCHUK Mykhailo. Arrested for Ukrainian nationalism and sentenced in Ivano-Frankivsk on 14.2.1956 to 20 years of concentration camps on the basis of Article 56 of the UkSSR Criminal Code.

696) ZELYMASH Hryhoriy. Born in 1936 in the Lviv region. Arrested there in 1961 and sentenced to 15 years of imprisonment for belonging to the "Ukrainian National Committee" an underground organisation. After his release he continued to be persecuted.

697) ZELYMASH Oleksa. Brother of Hryhoriy. Arrested in Lviv in 1961 and sentenced to 12 years of concentration camps for belonging to the "Ukrainian National Committee" whose aim was the liberation of Ukraine.

698) ZEROV Dmytro Konstantynovich. Born in 1895 in the Poltava region. Academic. Member of the Academy of Sciences of the UkSSR. During a party meeting in 1971 he strongly condemned Moscow's Russification policies in Ukraine. After the meeting he died in mysterious circumstances. The official cause of death was announced as a heart attack.

699) ZHOLDAK Ivan. Born in 1912. Mechanic. Arrested in 1956 and sentenced to long-term imprisonment. Although ill and exhausted he was deprived of medical attention as a result of which he died in Mordovian camp No. 3 on 31.12.1971.

700) ZHOVTOBOLOVSKYI Vasyl. Took part in the liberation struggle of the OUN-UPA. Arrested in 1952 and sentenced to 20 years of concentration camps on the basis of Article 56 of the UkSSR Criminal Code.

701) ZHUK Mykola. Former officer of the Red Army. Comes from the Poltava region. Arrested for his sympathies towards the OUN-UPA and sentenced to long-term imprisonment. After his release from the camp in 1976, he was sent to a psychiatric hospital.

702) ZHURAKIVSKYI Mykhailo Petrovych. Born in 1913 in the Transcarpathian region. Took part in the liberation struggle of the OUN-UPA. Arrested in 1953 and sentenced to 25 years of imprisonment on the basis of Article 56 of the UkSSR Criminal Code. He served his full sentence. Critically ill on his release, he died soon after returning home.

703) ZINCHENKO Anatoliy Mykhailovich. Engineer by profession. Mar-

ried. First arrested in 1972, spending two months under interrogation. Re-arrested on 22.8.1980 in Kharkiv under the pretext of attending a demonstration demanding the right to emigrate from the USSR together with Yu. Dziuba and Antsupov.

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This list extends only as far as 1984. It is by no means complete, as information from Ukraine, and the Soviet Union in general, often takes a long time to filter through to the free world. It is thus not uncommon for news of the arrest of a particular individual, or group of individuals, to become known in the West only 1 or 2 years after the incident.

We will continue to publish updated information regarding the arrest or repression of Ukrainian political and religious prisoners as new details become available. (ed.)

RELATED ARTICLES OF THE UKSSR CRIMINAL CODE.

Article 19: The deliberate commitment of a crime by two or more persons, including those who assisted in the commitment of the crime.

Article 54: Reduction of or exemption from punishment of those convicted of a particular crime.

Article 56: Particularly dangerous crimes against the state, such as "treason", "desertion", "attempts to escape across the border", "attempts to seize power", and so on. Conviction on the basis of this Article carries the death penalty or a 15-year prison sentence.

Article 58: Murder of a member of the authorities. Punishable by up to 15 years of imprisonment and the confiscation of all property.

Article 62: "Anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda". Punishment for conviction on the basis of this article is a 6-month to 7-year prison sentence followed by several years of internal exile.

Article 63: The propagation of war in any form. Punishable by 8 years of imprisonment and 5 years of internal exile.

Article 64: "Organisational activity", e.g. the formation of underground organisations, etc. Punishment is in accordance with the terms laid down under Articles 56 and 63 of the UkSSR Criminal Code.

Article 70: Contraband. Article 70 of the RSFSR Criminal Code is equivalent to Article 62 of the UkSSR Criminal Code.

Article 81: Concealment of a crime against the state. Punishable in accordance with the terms laid down under Articles 56, 57 and others, depending on the nature of the concealed crime.

Article 101: Deliberate grievous bodily harm. Punishable by 3-10 years of imprisonment.

Article 117: Rape. Punishable by 3-8 years of imprisonment.

Article 133: Violation of the laws regarding employment.

Article 138: Violation of the laws regarding the separation of Church and State, and the separation of Education from the Church. Many priests and faithful are convicted on the basis of this Article.

Article 140: Theft. Punishable by up to 5 years of imprisonment.

Article 187-1: "Dissemination of knowingly false concoctions defaming the Soviet state and social system". Punishable by up to 3 years of imprisonment.

Article 188: Resistance to a member of the militia or the national guard. Punishable by up to 5 years of concentration camps.

Article 190: Threatening behaviour towards, or coercion of, a member of the authorities. Punishable by up to 3 years of imprisonment.

Article 190-1: Attempts on the life of a member of the authorities. Punishable by 5-15 years of imprisonment, in some cases death.

Article 196: Violation of the laws of administrative surveillance over persons released from imprisonment. Punishable by a prison sentence of between 6 months and 2 years.

Article 206: Hooliganism. This is understood to mean resistance to the militia, shady enterprises, etc. Punishable by 1-5 years of imprisonment.

Article 209: Encroachments upon a person and the rights of citizens under the pretext of conducting religious rites. Punishable by up to 2 years of concentration camps, or 5 years for recidivists.

Article 223: The theft of firearms or explosive materials. Punishable by up to 7 years of imprisonment.

Article 229: Manufacture or sale of narcotics. Punishable by up to 3 years of imprisonment.

Article 233: Failure to carry out the directives of a superior. Punishable by a term of imprisonment of between 3 months and 3 years.

Article 249: Violation of statutory laws regarding guard duty by soldiers. Punishable by up to 5 years of imprisonment.

Documents and Reports

Roman SOLCHANYK

THE UKRAINIAN WRITERS' CONGRESS: A SPIRITED DEFENCE OF THE NATIVE LANGUAGE*

The Ninth Congress of the Ukrainian Writers' Union, which convened in Kyiv on June 5, opened with an impassioned speech by Oles' Honchar urging his fellow writers to cultivate and protect the Ukrainian language. Honchar is probably the most prominent contemporary literary figure in Ukraine. He is also a member of the Ukrainian Party Central Committee, a candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee, and a deputy to the USSR Supreme Soviet. This high "political visibility" adds a certain amount of authority to Honchar's statements.

Honchar's remarks on the language issue were contained in a highly critical introductory address very much in the style of Gorbachev's campaign for more "openness". He began his presentation with a reminder that "the Twenty-seventh Party Congress has given us a lesson in principledness and truth, a lesson in new thinking. We expect that the discussions at our writers' meeting will take place in precisely this spirit".

Following his own lead, the Ukrainian writer chose to focus on the language issue, which has consistently been in the forefront of the Ukrainian intelligentsia's concerns, but in a manner so forthright and indignant that it must have taken many of his listeners back to the 1960s and early 1970s.

Capitalising on the determination to preserve, something he described as being very much in vogue these days, Honchar posed the language question in a rather unconventional manner — in terms of environment:

"Our linguistic environment [is] the natural milieu within which literature lives and is created. Language is the soul of every national culture, the fount of its strength and the irreplaceable source of its development, and who if not we writers — but surely not we alone — should be concerned about it?"

The concept of a "linguistic environment" that needs to be preserved and protected is a particularly interesting twist in light of the apparently successful effort by Russian intellectuals to halt the river diversion projects —

* Reprinted from *Soviet Nationality Survey*, Vol. III, No. 9, September 1986.

a battle that has often been depicted in terms of Russian national interests — and the campaign that is currently under way to save Russian historical and cultural monuments. The delegates did not need that much imagination to realise that Honchar was using an allegorical mechanism to make a simple point: language, in this case the Ukrainian language, is no less a cultural heritage in danger of destruction than river, forests, and ancient churches.

For those who needed the problem spelled out for them, Honchar explained:

“[The Ukrainian language] like every fully-fledged language, is suited for the school and for the lecture hall, it is suited for the mundane and for the special occasion. But there are those who need to be told that to hold the language of one’s own people in contempt means, above all else, to disclose one’s own narrow-mindedness. For some, our language seems to be ‘without a future’ just like those age-old villages in the Poltava and other regions seemed to be ‘without a future’, and attempts were made to wipe them out; only now, in a climate of reason and filial love, have those villages fully demonstrated that they do have a future and feed us with bread. Our beautiful language, in defiance of all those who do not care, had and will have the same kind of future; after all the Tsarist bans, in the radiance of October it has asserted its right to live”.

The poetics aside, this is one of the strongest statements in support of the native language to have appeared in the Soviet Ukrainian press in many years. References to the banning of the Ukrainian language in Tsarist times — the Valuyev Circular of 1863 and the Ems Ukaz of 1876 — are not an everyday occurrence in the Soviet media. No less pointed was Honchar’s denunciation of the idea that certain languages have no future (*neperspektyvni*). This notion was floated almost twenty-five years ago by the editors of *Voprosy yazykoznaniya* and created a stir among Ukrainian intellectuals precisely because it omitted the Ukrainian language from the list of those languages that did have a future.

From the political standpoint, the most interesting aspect of Honchar’s speech is the clear attempt to draw a parallel between the fears of Ukrainian intellectuals about the role and status of their native language and the concern clearly evident among influential circles of the Russian creative élite about Russia’s cultural and historical heritage. Moves to preserve the latter seemed to have gained the support of politicians in Moscow. Will the Ukrainians be permitted to join the patriotic bandwagon?

UKRAINIAN WRITERS' CONGRESS: EXCERPTS

(Literaturna Ukraina, June 12, 1986)

The Ukrainian Writers' Congress was characterised by a wide-ranging consideration of the state of the Ukrainian language and letters. Although the public statements made by the officially sanctioned writers were within the boundaries sanctioned by the state ideology, and many included well-worn formulas concerning the friendship of peoples, they, nevertheless, reveal an intense concern about the sad state of literary life in the Ukrainian SSR.

Below are several representative excerpts from the statements of leading Ukrainian writers.

*

**Report by Pavlo Zahrebelny, First Secretary
of the Ukrainian Writers' Union:**

"In what things does national dignity manifest itself first of all? From the writer's point of view, it manifests itself in the national character depicted by artistic mastery. Therefore, we cannot remain indifferent to such things as the language in which business correspondence is conducted, the language in which technical, scientific and socio-political literature is published or what language is used in kindergartens, in schools, in higher educational establishments, in Komsomol and Pioneer organisations, or how many theatres have already become bilingual because such an approximate language gives rise to approximate thoughts, approximate feelings, approximate work, and, as a consequence, approximate people. Let us be frank: He, whose speaking ability is poor, also lives and works badly. One is convinced of this by the example of those drones and punks who have ceased to understand us, who instead of living are "sailing high".

We are especially concerned over the fact that the publication of Ukrainian books in Ukraine is fewer than two copies per capita. I am naming the things which do not depend on us. But it is we citizens who should speak frankly about the obvious omissions in cultural construction. . .

We should have made ourselves heard on such issues as harming the river Dnieper by senseless planning, the disorderly way in which our large and small towns are being built, how hundreds of thousands of hectares of fertile Ukrainian black soil is lost under the construction of more new enterprises, or how much land has been flooded by badly selected artificial seas, and what harm is inflicted upon nature by the insufficiently planned operations of chemical combines. But we have said nothing. . ."

Speech by Yuriy Shcherbak:

"... I would like you to understand me correctly. I speak here not as prosecutor with regard to native literature, which I love and which I am trying to serve with heart and soul, but rather as a doctor trying to make a diagnosis in order to find out how to treat the disease. This disease is marked by a light-weight, schematic simplified attitude to contemporary phenomena and unwillingness to touch upon painful problems, in order to avoid having troubles later with the publishing of one's books. Everything I say here applies also to me personally. How often, taking my place at the writing desk, I think of what to leave out, what not to mention, what not to see, knowing beforehand the way the editors think and the logic of their pencils. I have learnt well the rules of the literary salon, where, the whole uneven route is marked by flags which indicate the acute problem of life. It is this which causes the amazing monotony of numerous books, especially those written by young writers, the pettiness of subject matter and pre-planned correctness of presentation. . ."

Speech by Petro Rebro of the Zaporizhia Writers' Organisation:

"It's disturbing that we are losing the young reader. It's becoming so much more difficult to find a young girl or boy who rather than "skimming through" has read in full and, so to speak, lived through "What is to be done?", "How the Steel was tempered", "The Flag-Bearers" and other works which hold our spiritual life together. Last year, *Literaturna Gazeta* reported a serious crime committed by juveniles in the Dubovyi Hay park in Zaporizhia (as everyone knows, the criminals included sportsmen, who were oblast champions). What were these disgusting pagans brought up on? On foreign films about Superman and such like. And two years ago, Georgian television showed the trial of an armed gang which had tried to seize a passenger aircraft. I was impressed by the revelations of the gang-leader; in order to turn these parasitic spongers into real gangsters, he used to take them to the cinema to see American films. Why has no one given serious thought to such instances? Why is the operation of cinemas still gauged in terms of roubles, when it is a matter of one of the most popular and influential art forms? . . ."

Speech by Ivan Drach, poet:

"We speak a great deal about our youth, its weak acquaintance with the native culture and particularly about its disrespectful attitude to

contemporary literature. One of the reasons for this lies in the fact that we have not learned as yet to speak quite frankly about the truth, about how we lived and how we are living now. We should tell the truth aloud.

In the board's report it was noted that close to 215 books by Ukrainian authors have been published in foreign countries and only a few in fraternal republics. This bears witness to the fact that the prestige of modern Ukrainian literature is falling among Soviet multi-national belles-lettres. . .

Or can we be indifferent when a youth, dressed up, as the saying goes, as if for a parade, while greeting from the platform war veterans, utters "correct", eloquent and necessary words, but as soon as he had stepped down, he undoes all those shiny buttons and laughs at his own words as if to say that up there he acted as expected, that up there he was one person, and here is something different".

**Speech by Leonid Novychenko, Ukrainian literary critic
and member of the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Science:**

. . . I share the concern expressed in the speech of Oles' Honchar about Ukrainian literature and the classics, about the Ukrainian language and the cultural ecology in general which has become in our times such a pressing necessity. The print-runs of the greatest masters of the word are falling. Cases occur when books by Dovzhenko, Yanovskyi and Vasylychenko are rotting in warehouses. This should stir our public, apart from well-wishers and our union. Meanwhile, very few books by our classic writers can be found in school libraries. Should not our cultural public come out with effective assistance here by creating, on a voluntary basis, a fund sufficient to replenish school libraries with books by the native classic writers? As the Radyanska Shkola publishing house is now widely engaged in the publication for schools of books by the Ukrainian classic writers in Russian translations, without denying the need for such publications, we should remind it that greater print-runs of classic Ukrainian works in the language of the original are needed. . ."

Dmytro Pavlychko, poet and playwright:

"Unfortunately, the drama companies of our republic very rarely and unwillingly, and at times sceptically, approach the Ukrainian Soviet dramaturgical heritage. They are not using its mighty ideological and artistic potential and its educational force. For a long period now, Ukrainian dramaturgy, both Soviet and pre-October, has not occupied a substantial and determining place in the repertoire of drama companies. . .

There are a score of other important problems which disturb us playw-

September 8, 1986

Letters to the Editor

THE WASHINGTON POST

1150 15th St., N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20071

Dear Editor:

Jack Anderson's September 7, 1986, article "Warm Praises for 'Heroes'", furthers the erroneous notion of Nazi support for Ukraine's right to national self-determination and defames the role of those individuals who dedicated their lives to the pursuit of human and national rights, most notably, the late Yaroslav Stetsko.

While Anderson may rely on historians with "a less (than) sympathetic view" of Ukraine's struggle for independence to increase his collections of political skeletons, a review of World War II documentation with respect to Ukraine is in order to correct the misleading tone of Anderson's exposé.

Under the initiative of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), a declaration of independence was proclaimed in the Western Ukrainian city of Lviv on June 30, 1941, restoring a Ukrainian government free of foreign intervention. The Germans demanded that the proclamation of independence be withdrawn and on July 12, 1941, proceeded to arrest OUN leaders Stepan Bandera and Yaroslav Stetsko, later sentencing the two to prison terms in the Sachsenhausen concentration camp. Subsequently, on November 25, 1941, Hitler's SS issued a directive to "arrest" and "secretly liquidate" all members of the OUN, thus negating the purport of OUN-Nazi collaboration which Anderson implies had existed "without a doubt".

Claiming Stetsko was responsible for the murder of 7,000 Jews in Lviv, Anderson is completely inconsistent with records that show the German *Ein-satzgruppen* SS killing units were not only responsible for the Lviv Jewish massacre, but were also charged with the task of hunting and eventually hanging Stetsko's OUN members and nationalist sympathisers.

As a result of the Nazi savagery in Ukraine, which was indistinguishable from that of Stalin himself, both alternative conquerors became equally unacceptable, thus forcing the creation of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) in 1942, which simultaneously fought both Nazi German and Soviet Russian invaders. The wartime carnage meted out on Ukrainian territory has been figured to be approximately 10 million lives with millions more being deported to Nazi slave labour and concentration camps.

It is unfortunate that the facts of Ukraine's struggle for national independence during World War II and the resumé's of its leaders are being tainted

with unfounded allegations and vast generalisations which ride the brink of revisionism and defamation. It is indeed reassuring to know that those elected officials weaning the "so-called ethnic vote" are aware that broad generalisations and collective guilt are dangerous propositions and need to be discarded in the decision making process. Perhaps the success of such politicians is their sense of smart politics rather than their attention to journalism based on sensation.

Sincerely,

Myron W. Wasyluk

Director, Ukrainian National Information Service
Washington, D.C.

XIXth WACL CONFERENCE

Luxembourg, September 7-10, 1986

JOINT COMMUNIQUÉ

More than 300 freedom-fighters from the various organisations of the World Anti-Communist League in 100 countries and international organisations assembled in Luxembourg on September 7-10, 1986, for the 19th WACL General Conference with the theme of "Working for Peace in Freedom". Effective measures for forceful action were adopted. A great global unity of freedom forces was demonstrated.

The Conference examined the changing world situation and noted three most conspicuous trends of development:

1. Moscow-Peking reconciliation showing their unchanged drive to communise the world;
2. Measures on the Chinese mainland concerning economic reform, modernisation, external opening-up, etc., are aimed at amassing logistic strength for external expansion and seeking aid and assistance from the Free World;
3. Growing awareness of more free nations that no communist will help check other communists.

The Conference reaffirmed that the main current of this age is for national independence, freedom and democracy, for progress and well being.

For further joining of strength for freedom and for an end to communist

expansionism, the 19th WACL Conference resolved to urge all the nations and peoples of the world who love freedom and respect democracy to:

A. Draw and keep a clear line between the freedom camp and the Communist bloc, bearing in mind the Moscow-Peking reconciliation;

B. Be vigilant against Soviet Russian schemes to infiltrate the mass media, political parties and religious and educational institutions. One typical example is the systematic instigation of anti-nuclear and pacifist campaigns all over the world;

C. Strengthen the existing common defence arrangements of free nations, promote free world regional security systems, and work for the adoption and implementation of a global anti-communist strategy. Positive efforts should be made to help developing nations repel communist advances.

D. Render moral and political support to the liberation struggle of Ukraine, Byelorussia, the Baltic countries, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria, Caucasia, and the other subjugated nations in their quest for national independence, statehood, sovereignty and democracy;

E. Help by all means those nations fighting with arms against communist slavery imposed upon them by Moscow, such as Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Angola, Cambodia, Vietnam and other freedom-loving peoples in Asia, Latin America and Africa, and support the Cuban-freedom fighters by helping them to overthrow the Castro regime;

F. While condemning apartheid and urging the South African government to accelerate the ongoing reforms, condemn the insurgency instigated by the ANC, UDF and SACTU, its political allies, which are using the issue of apartheid to gain support. For if this insurgency succeeds, the resistance movements — UNITA in Angola, Renamo in Mozambique, the Seychelles Resistance Movement (MPR) and others will be extinguished and the Soviet Union will proceed to conquer all of Africa, with its strategic minerals and geopolitical assets. Instead of sanctions, the Free World should seek out the support of Black leaders to fashion, by dialogue, a democratic South Africa.

G. Oppose and counter Soviet and North Korean military and naval build-up in the Northern Pacific by the nuclear free zone treaty;

H. Counter the counterpart Soviet military build-up in the region of the Kola Peninsula, the Northern Flank of Europe, which is being linked up with Moscow's expansion in Cuba and Central America.

I. Promote economic development of developing countries by removing tariff barriers. Developed nations ought to invest more in developing countries, promote economic and technical cooperation with them and help their industrialisation and modernisation programmes;

J. Call upon the free nations to stop supplying Soviet Russia and other

communist regimes with subsidised grain and butter helping to stabilise these regimes and turn this aid against the Free World through the developing countries;

K. Strictly enforce embargoes on all forms of transaction — capital, facilities, weapons and technology — that would help communist regimes grow.

L. Express sympathy for Ukraine and Byelorussia as well as other surrounding nations which suffered the radiation from the Chornobyl reactor due to Soviet negligence, lack of information and refusal of foreign help for the suffering population;

M. Reconcile religious and racial conflicts and promote unity and cooperation in the name of anti-communism for the sake of freedom and democracy. Strongly protest the systematic persecution of the Turkish-speaking minority in Bulgaria with respect to the language, names, culture and religion;

N. Actively support the efforts of Hongkong and Macao residents to safeguard their rights, interests and free democratic ways of life. The Free World should not stand by and allow these people to be swallowed into the communist gulag;

O. Positively develop anti-communist activities in all enslaved countries and areas. Stepped-up spiritual and material assistance should be given to those behind the Iron Curtain who are struggling for national independence, freedom, democracy and human rights. All the strength for freedom should be galvanised behind and outside the Iron Curtain for a joint action against all communists — in the Soviet Union, or the Chinese mainland, and elsewhere. A decisive victory for freedom shall thus be won for the assurance of lasting world peace.

WACL will continue its best exertion for the attainment of its goal: Freedom for all Mankind. The 20th WACL Conference will be held at an appropriate date in 1987 in Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China.

All the participants of the 19th Conference are most grateful to the WACL Belgian and Luxembourg Chapters for the excellent arrangement and warm hospitality they have made and offered.

* * *

REMARKS BY GENERAL JOHN K. SINGLAUB
Chairman of the 18th WACL Council
at the Opening Ceremony of the 19th WACL Conference
(Luxembourg, September 7, 1986)

Honorary Chairman Dr. Ku Cheng-kang, Secretary-General Luns, President Gregoire, Minister Desmarets, Senator General Close, Your Excellencies, Distinguished Guests, and Friends of Freedom:

I am honoured by this opportunity to address such a distinguished audience in this city of Luxembourg which has become a symbol of democracy throughout the world.

As I look around me today, I see the familiar faces of old allies from the struggle against the totalitarian forces of the 1940's. Many faces, like my own, are now etched with the lengthening lines of a "hard and bitter peace" as the totalitarian forces of National Socialism were defeated but replaced by the total tyranny of communism.

As the joy of victory was replaced by the deep concern for the peoples and nations who were falling victim to the new Red Imperialism and being incorporated into the Communist empire, a few men of vision sounded the alarm.

One of these men of great vision is with us today — Dr. Ku Cheng-kang. Dr. Ku, with encouragement and support from President Chiang Kai-shek of the Republic of China, and President Syngman Rhee of the Republic of Korea, formed the organisation which eventually led to the establishment of the World Anti-Communist League (WACL) which brings us together today as we continue our efforts of "Working for Peace in Freedom".

Another man of vision is not with us today. Unfortunately, Yaroslav Stetsko was taken by his Maker just eight weeks ago. As President Ronald Reagan said in a personal letter to his widow, "... your husband's courage and dedication to liberty will serve as a continuing source of inspiration to all those striving for freedom and self-determination and an abiding reminder of the timeless struggle of mankind to break the chains of tyranny".

While inspired by these great men of vision, I am most encouraged as I listen with eager ear to the youthful voices of those new to the battle. I hear the voices of those who were born in freedom, but are willing and proud to bear its heavy burdens. I hear youthful voices who not only condemn communism, but are anxious to aid those who bear its brunt. These young men and women recognise that in the dark gulags and dusty camps, in the mountain passes, and torid jungles, their fight is our fight; their only hope is our help; their victory means our survival.

And yet, we still here from some sides the cowardly pleas of those who counsel retreat; who, seeing the enemy, seeks terms. They somehow haven't

learnt that when communists talk of negotiating, they mean to exchange **your** freedom for **their** bonds, because that is all they have to offer.

The apologists for communism in the United States, and especially here in Western Europe, now tell us that the Russian Bear has been defanged, that Mikhail Gorbachev is seeking peace, that he hasn't the heart for making war.

But let them go to Afghanistan. There, the Russian tanks roll over innocent children. There, a nation has been raped, a culture has all but been destroyed. There, a fearfully modern communist army is perfecting its techniques and strategy for future aggressions.

The apologists also tell us that communism helps the poor escape their plight, that it provides them homes, and that it feeds the hungry.

Let them go to Ethiopia. Let them go to Angola or Mozambique. In lock-step allegiance to Lenin's dictates, the communist rulers in those countries use deliberate starvation as a weapon of war. Daily, we see pathetic pictures of dying children — their bellies bloated, their limbs bone-thin. The apologists tell us that the problem is the lack of rain. The problem is really the flood of communist restrictions, regulations, and total incompetence which destroys all incentive to produce and distributes what is produced to the wrong place.

Speaking of the economic advantages of communism, let me repeat a story that is now being told behind the Iron Curtain about communist economic planning. The story goes that if communists seize the Sahara Desert, within five years there will be a shortage of sand.

The apologists also tell us — time and again — that the communist threat is overstated, that there is no so-called "domino effect".

Well let them go to Vietnam, Laos, and what remains of the holocaustic Cambodia. Imagine with me the unholy horror of those who, in the mid-1950's fled south from Communist North Vietnam only to face the same murderous hordes two decades later. And this time, with the fall of their neighbouring lands, there was nowhere left to run. So, they set sail, many knowing they would die at sea. They had accepted the idea that it is better to be dead than remain Red.

In fact, today, there are at least eight nations inside the Communist empire where this view has prevailed and the citizens have taken up arms against their Marxist masters.

Let us, from this day forward, dedicate ourselves to the task of exposing the fallacies of those who apologise for and want to do "business" with the communists.

Let us take heart that the freedom-fighters in Nicaragua, in Afghanistan and Angola, in Ethiopia and Mozambique, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam can, with our help and assistance, turn back the tides of tyranny and let the light of democracy flow in.

This does not mean we are warmongers. In fact, the opposite is true. As a soldier, who for more than forty years answered the call of duty, I can assure you that no one hates war as much as those who have to fight it. But, the apologists' reveries aside, those who love liberty more than life are today already embattled on fields of fire in foreign lands. They fight wars they did not seek in places they did not choose. They fight against a communist enemy unequalled in the annals of mankind for cynicism, cruelty, and ruthless greed.

The freedom-fighters of the world need our physical, financial, moral, and spiritual help. With God's blessing, I hope and pray that we keep on giving it to them.

Thank you.

UKRAINIAN NATIONAL GOVERNMENT
Chairman of the Ukrainian Foreign Affairs Department

September 23, 1986

MEMORANDUM

on

**The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe,
Vienna, November 1986**

We wish to invite the attention of the Western democratic nations to the worsening plight of the nations occupied by Soviet Russian imperialism in the USSR and their satellite states under the leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev. There is a sharp contradiction between the de-colonisation efforts of the civilised Western nations with the concepts of democratic guarantees of human rights and the colonialist policies and practices of the Soviet Russian empire.

In the last three years, Moscow ruthlessly exterminated every Helsinki monitoring group within the nationalities of the Soviet Union. The founders of these groups were courageous enough to stand up in defence of the national and human rights provisions of the Accords, at the risk of being arrested by the KGB, on the assumption that the Western democracies would initiate an international political campaign on their behalf. Unfortunately, the hopes of the organisers of those groups were soon dashed, as the colonial Russian secret police organs liquidated these groups through mass arrests of all their members. The Helsinki Accords of 1976 became a glaring and terrible farce.

Known prominent national and civil rights leaders were exterminated, psychologically maimed, imprisoned or exiled. We would just like to mention a few well-known Ukrainians, such as Dr. Volodymyr Horbovyi, Bishop Oleksander Khiva of the underground Ukrainian Church, talented poet Vasyl Stus, writers and publicists Oleksa Tykhyi, Yuriy Lytvyn, Valeriy Marchenko, Oleksiy Nikitin, all of whom were recently exterminated. Dozens

of other Ukrainian political prisoners after finishing their terms of 20-25 years of incarceration, were suddenly being eliminated in mysterious circumstances. Hundreds of Ukrainian patriots, and patriots of every other nationality, are being thrown into prisons and concentration camps each year.

In spite of the various contradictions inherent in the Helsinki Accords (e.g., recognition of the right of national self determination, i.e., national independence, and recognition of the "integrity and inviolability" of the Russian empire; the human rights provisions of the "Third Basket" and the clause on "non-interference in internal affairs"), we feel that the Western democracies can utilise these Accords more, in order to pressurise the Soviet Union into releasing the political and religious prisoners of Ukraine and other subjugated nations.

At the Vienna Conference, the Western democracies are particularly requested to take up the case of **Yuriy Shukhevych**, a Ukrainian political prisoner, who has been incarcerated in Russian prisons and concentration camps for over 30 years. His only "crime" is that he refuses to denounce his father, Roman Shukhevych (the late Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army — UPA), and to condemn the ideals of national independence and freedom for which his father fought and died. Yuriy Shukhevych, who was first incarcerated at the age of 14, has recently been blinded by the KGB and suffers from a number of severe stomach ailments and other illnesses, that are all the more aggravated in the hard conditions of imprisonment. From a strictly humanitarian position, it should not be difficult for the West to actively seek Yuriy Shukhevych's release, particularly on the forum of the Vienna Conference.

Also, the primary concerns of the Western delegations at the Vienna Conference ought to be the fate of the members of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group. Many of the members of this Group are now serving excessively long terms of imprisonment for no other reason than stating that they were members of this Group, among others: Ivan Kandyba, Levko Lukianenko, Myroslav Marynovych, Mykola Matusevych, Mykola Rudenko, Olha Heyko-Matusevych, Mykola Horbal, Vitaliy Kalynychenko, Yaroslav Lesiv, Vasyl Ovsienko, Bohdan Rebyrk, Vasyl Sichko, Ivan Sokulsky, Vasyl Striltsiv. May we point out that these individuals took that step after the West, by signing the Helsinki Accords, led them to believe that it would stand up in their defence.

In the year 988, the Ukrainian nation officially accepted Christianity under the leadership of our Sovereign, St. Volodymyr the Great. From that year onwards, Christianity has remained an inherent moral and ethical force in the spiritual, cultural and national character of the Ukrainian people.

As we, Ukrainians in the Free World, prepare for this truly momentous event, our joy is tempered by the fact that in Ukraine our brethren will be forcibly denied the right to celebrate this great anniversary in any form.

Many Ukrainian priests are summarily arrested and incarcerated or tortured to death in the Russian gulag concentration camps for having "committed the crime" of performing the holy sacraments. Many others are simply shot outright. The late Ukrainian Catholic Patriarch, Josyf Slipyj, who died in Rome on September 7, 1984, suffered eighteen years in a Russian prison for his staunch defence of the Ukrainian Churches and the Ukrainian Liberation Movement. He was released to the Vatican and became a symbol of Ukrainian devotion to faith. Another example is Metropolitan Vasyl Lypkivsky, leader of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, who perished at the hands of the Russian-Communist persecutors. The list of millions of Ukrainian martyrs continues to grow as Moscow continues its war against God and Ukrainian national ideals. And, yet, the Ukrainian nation remains one with the underground Catacomb Churches and continues to live its faith in God through countless sacrifices, as it is corroborated in the underground *Chronicle of the Ukrainian Catholic Church*.

In accordance with the relevant clauses in the Accords that provide for religious freedom, we suggest that the Western democracies demand the immediate release of all religious prisoners in the USSR and, in particular, that Moscow cease its severe repression of the Ukrainian Catacomb Church.

In accordance with the relevant positions of the international Labour Organisation concerning the abolition of forced labour (1957), we kindly suggest that the representatives of the Western democracies at the Vienna Conference put pressure on the USSR to cease using slave labour, especially of political and religious prisoners, as was seen in the construction of the so-called Siberian pipeline, and to completely abolish all slave labour and concentration camps.

The nuclear disaster at Chornobyl, Ukraine, is the latest example of the ruthless nature of the Soviet Russian system. It is in fact an act of genocide. This disaster is exploited by the Russian colonialist regime to dislocate hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians, Byelorussians, Lithuanians and others from their native lands, to disperse families, by separating several thousands of children from their parents and sending them to far-off places, allegedly for reasons of safety.

The Chornobyl catastrophe is being compared to the artificial famine organised in Ukraine in 1932-1933, which is eloquently and dramatically revealed by the outstanding work of British scholar Robert Conquest in his recently published work *The Harvest of Sorrow*. At that time, the Russians destroyed seven million Ukrainians and many other non-Russians conquered at the beginning of the 1920's. The Western media and officials aptly compare the present Soviet regime and the racial policies of Mikhail Gorbachev to those of Joseph Stalin during the terrible 1930's. (See e.g. George F. Will's article "America Should Spur Itself to Curb Russia's Excesses" in the *International Herald Tribune*, September 8, 1986, or the interview with Robert Conquest by Radio Liberty, September 10, 1986).

The sharpening of genocidal policy in respect to the non-Russian peoples and their speeded up forceful Russification was met by the outcry at the convention of writers in the Ukrainian SSR in June of this year, when speakers protested against the gradual liquidation of the Ukrainian language and Ukrainian cultural life.

Moscow should be condemned for being directly responsible for the nuclear disaster at Chornobyl and its use as an instrument of intimidation and repression on a mass scale in Ukraine. Governments and public opinion should be sensitised to the fact that in Moscow's hands nuclear power has now become a weapon of suppression of the subjugated nations.

Furthermore, Western representatives are kindly requested to compel Moscow to make a full disclosure of the magnitude of this man-made catastrophe and crime against humanity, and let the Western nations bring direct assistance to the population of Ukraine, Byelorussia and the Baltic States.

In view of the fact that only one article of the Helsinki Final Act was realised by both sides, namely in respect to the inviolability of the borders of the Russian empire, its integrity and non interference by the West in the matters of the liberation activities of the subjugated nations, the Western democratic representatives should make it clear at the Vienna Conference that:

The subjugated nations are not and never were the internal matter of the empire, but are the problem of world-wide significance, and that every empire should be dissolved (Articles VII & VIII).

The UN declarations and resolutions on granting independence to the colonial countries and nations (also subjugated in the USSR, namely in the Russian colonial empire), the UN resolutions approved in connection with Namibia on internationally legal obligations to render even military support to nations in the struggle against the colonial yoke, universal declarations on Human Rights and International Covenants on Human Rights should have an internationally binding legal force.

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COLUMNISTS' TV COMMENTS BLASTED AS OFFENSIVE TO UKRAINIAN-AMERICANS

The Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, through a D.C. spokesman, Myron Wasylyk, today voiced concern about "anti-Ukrainian statements" made by two columnists who spoke on national television on September 24. Wasylyk said former *New York Times* correspondent Harrison Salisbury "insulted the heritage of Ukrainian-Americans" during a discussion of the 1932-33 Ukrainian famine when he stated that Ukraine and Russia are really not separate countries". Wasylyk called Salisbury's statements "the standard Russian imperialist approach to dealing with the question of Ukraine's right to sovereignty and national independence". Wasylyk charged Salisbury with "furthering misinformation about Ukrainian national identity" by referring to Ukraine as the "Iowa of Russia". Mr. Wasylyk emphasised that "Ukrainians are geneologically separate and distinct from Russians", adding that the "two nations evolved independently of one another" despite "centuries of Ukraine's subjugation by Russian rulers".

Wasylyk also expressed his organisation's concern about statements made by the British columnist Cristopher Hitchens who stated that a "very large number" of Nazi SS regiments fighting in Ukraine "were Ukrainian". Wasylyk described himself "at a loss to explain the connection in Mr. Hitchens' mind between the genocide of 1932-33 and actions taking place on Ukrainian territory during the German occupation in World War II". Wasylyk denounced Mr. Hitchens' statements "as not having any relevance to the '32-33 famine" and further called Hitchens' statements "lacking in historical accuracy as well as credibility".

Mr. Wasylyk expressed the UCCA's concern that Salisbury and Hitchens' statements may do emotional harm to the viewers who are survivors of the 1932-33 famine, many of whom have waited a lifetime for public acknowledgement of the true facts concerning the famine, "and who are now subjected to an apparent campaign of anti-Ukrainian disinformation brought about by vast generalisations and unjustifiable claims".

Statements by Hitchens and Salisbury were made during a special edition of Wm. F. Buckley's *Firing Line* programme aired on the PBS network which focused on the award winning film *Harvest of Despair*. The 55-minute documentary deals specifically with Stalin's deliberately imposed famine of 1932-33 which resulted in the death by starvation of 7 million Ukrainian farmers. *Harvest of Despair* has been shown on major television networks in other countries. After more than a year of negotiations, it was finally permitted to be aired on the PBS network after PBS network had originally rejected it.

The UCCA is a national organisation representing Americans of Ukrainian descent. It has 67 branches nationwide with its headquarters in New York City and its public affairs office located in Washington, D.C. There are more than one million Ukrainian-Americans living in the U.S.

Book Reviews

KOSTA CAVOSKI. THE ENEMIES OF THE PEOPLE.
LONDON, THE CENTRE FOR RESEARCH
INTO COMMUNIST ECONOMIES, 1986

**RICHARD PIPES. LEGALISED LAWLESSNESS. SOVIET
REVOLUTIONARY JUSTICE.** LONDON, INSTITUTE FOR
EUROPEAN DEFENCE AND STRATEGIC STUDIES, 1986

Both authors concern themselves with the formative years of the Soviet regime after the Russian Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 and point out that terror and persecution are integral components in the Soviet regime. Although this may sound like a truism for most readers, there is a tendency for many students of the Soviet Union to argue that there is a difference between Lenin and Stalin. As Pipes points out, "Contrary to the widespread impression, promoted by his successors, that Stalin violated the norms of Soviet legality when he carried out his appalling massacres, his actions were, in fact, well within the terms of Lenin's Criminal Code".

This disagreement about the nature of the Soviet regime can be seen in the works of Ivan Dziuba and Yuriy Badzio. Both are critiques of Soviet nationality policy. Yet, Dziuba idealised Lenin as an unblemished hero, blaming the regime's current problems on a distortion of Lenin's teachings. Badzio, on the other hand, traces Soviet nationality policy to Lenin himself. Ironically though, even Lenin's works, in the hands of people like Dziuba and Petro Shelest, are dangerous. When Dziuba's house was searched in January 1972, one of the items confiscated was the complete works of Lenin. Shelest's book, *O Ukraine, Our Soviet Land*, was still sharply criticised, despite two-thirds of its footnotes being from Lenin.

Both Cavoski and Pipes agree on the totalitarian origins of the USSR during Lenin's day, arriving at the same conclusion from different perspectives. Cavoski is a Yugoslav writer and senior research officer in the Belgrade Institute of Comparative Law. Pipes is a well-known American authority on Russian and Soviet affairs. Cavoski sets Leninism in the context of age-old traditions of despotic governments. His study is mainly concerned with the use of force against political opponents described as "the enemies of the people".

In its normal everyday use, the word "enemy" refers to external enemies and foreign invaders. But, in the USSR, this word is also used to describe internal enemies. The same reprisals are used against them as against a foreign invader: banishment, imprisonment and death. Cavoski points out that citizens are branded and persecuted as "enemies" only in the corrupt form of government: "in ancient times this corrupt form was a tyranny, and in modern times, totalitarianism".

Pipes believes that Lenin was "first and foremost, a strategist and tactician,

who approached revolution as others might warfare". Totalitarian regimes cannot exist without the confronted other: "the enemy who must be humiliated, trampled upon and overcome so that the public, cowed by the fate of the enemy, may be kept in check and in a state of obedience". Cavoski believes that if there are no "enemies", they have to be invented "because without them the internal cohesion and monolithic structure of such regimes would be threatened".

In Pipes' view, the political exploitation of law in the USSR "has placed every communist regime in a state of permanent war with its own citizenry". Pipes also brings out the need for the "foreign enemy" — a campaign of hostility and mistrust towards the outside world, in the old Russian tradition of the 'siege mentality'. The need for internal and foreign "enemies" to sustain the regime inevitably leads it to undertake violence against its own citizens and those of foreign countries. Robert Tucker has described this as the image of the "Dual Russia" where "the relations between the state and the society is seen as one between conqueror and conquered. The state is in control, but in the manner of the occupying power dealing with a conquered populace" (*The Soviet Political Mind*, New York, W.W. Norton, 1972, pp. 122). Society is constantly exposed to a state of siege.

Totalitarian regimes resort to trickery and violence to free themselves of their immediate rivals. What distinguishes persecution in totalitarian regimes from other historical examples is, above all, its huge scope. Purges and mass terror are a frequent prerequisite for holding on to power. All autonomous groups have to be nipped in the bud. The outcome is the creation of an "atomised" society in which there is no trust between the people themselves and in which it tries to destroy the most elementary forms of solidarity, including the family and friendship" (Cavoski).

In the USSR, the elimination of any kind of opposition began in the first days of the Bolshevik Revolution. In Lenin's opinion, in any given political community only two parties can exist — the people and its "enemies". The Bolsheviks took it upon themselves to decide who were the enemies of the people. Co-operation and power sharing with other (even Socialist) parties, was an obstacle to implementing revolutionary terror and establishing the Bolshevik monopoly of power. In December 1917, the Bolsheviks issued a "decree on courts", which in one swoop did away with nearly the entire legal system. A year later, a ruling forbade judges to make reference to pre-revolutionary laws and having to observe rules of evidence.

The introduction of revolutionary tribunals were brought in by Lenin to deal with opposition to Bolshevik rule, and from their very outset were merely "kangaroo courts", sentencing people to death and imprisonment on the basis of trumped-up evidence or other arbitrary accusations. This arbitrariness, according to Pipes, "became more pronounced in time", speeding up the procedure of establishing "guilt".

Lenin on more than one occasion, admitted that, without such drastic measures of terror, the Bolsheviks would not have remained in power for long. During the period of civil war many believed that these drastic measures were "temporary". This was not to be the case. The introduction of the

New Economic Policy was simultaneous with a policy of eradicating all opposition. As Cavoski maintains, "it was their own weakness which was driving them to eradicate all — even loyal — opposition. . . thus it was their own weakness — fear and suspicion — which had led them towards totalitarianism. In this way, within Lenin's lifetime, all socialist opposition was "liquidated". Having crushed all enemies outside their ranks, the Bolsheviks soon began to seek them within their own", with Stalin completing the task of destroying all factions within the party.

Already in 1918, the people of the former Tsarist empire had courts, but no laws to guide them; people were punished for crimes, but crimes were nowhere to be defined. Lenin believed in the efficacy of executions as a means of ridding himself of opponents and intimidating the rest of the population. Consequently, within two months of taking power, Lenin created a political police, the CHEKA, "subject directly to his personal authority as head of state" (Pipes). The CHEKA had unlimited authority over the lives of Soviet citizens, and could give out the death penalty. Pipes quotes a CHEKA official who wrote in 1918:

"We do not wage war against individuals. We are exterminating the bourgeoisie as a class. Do not look during an investigation for evidence. . ."

Claiming the "right" to exterminate a citizen, not for what he does, but for what he happens to be, is a "short step to genocide, whether of classes or of races" (Pipes).

Pipes rejects the view that Bolshevik violations of justice were reactions to the civil war raging around them; the basic Court Decree of December 1917 appeared before any organised opposition to the Bolshevik dictatorship. The Marxist philosophy that Lenin adhered to rejected the due process of law as a "bourgeois" relic. Lenin wrote that:

"Dictatorship is rule based directly upon force and unrestricted by any laws. The revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat is a rule won and maintained by the use of violence by the proletariat against the bourgeoisie, a rule that is unrestricted by any laws".

The rationale behind the Bolshevik abuse of law, according to Pipes, rests on the Marxist belief that law forms part of the "super-structure" of society, thereby serving the interests of the dominant class. This gave Lenin "a handy criterion for separating friends and followers from enemies" (Pipes). Lenin denied the existence of any "permanent human values". In the USSR, the function of law, in Lenin's view, was an instrument in the waging of "class war". Law in the USSR has the function of strengthening the Soviet state. There could be no objective concepts of right and wrong, of guilt and innocence.

Under Stalin, the wholesale extermination of opponents was perfected: "By his actions he proved that the struggle against the enemies is not only a constant feature of a totalitarian system, but also that it intensifies with the consolidation of the system's stability" (Cavoski). As nearly as 1924, the Supreme

State Prosecutor warned that it is a waste of time to try and correct "hostile class elements" — they had to be "physically liquidated". Later, this view was applied to individuals, as well as entire ethnic groups. It was Lenin who first issued the proclamation against the so-called "kulaks", proclaiming them enemies of the people. Lenin's campaign against the "kulaks" was one of extermination, resembling a man at war. Stalin used this concept more devastatingly against Ukrainian peasants in 1932-33.

Both Pipes and Cavoški argue that the Bolshevik method of determining who was the "enemy" was arbitrary. Arbitrariness in punishing enemies is "a fundamental aspect of totalitarian terror" (Cavoški). Only they could decide who was the "enemy", and the laws were deliberately left vague in order for the Bolsheviks to interpret them as they saw fit and at any given time. Cavoški gives the example of the Borotbists. Lenin ordered their dissolution and wrote that they should not be accused of "nationalism, but of counter-revolutionary and petty-bourgeois tendencies".

In the state Lenin created, all means justified the ends. Law became an instrument in the overall struggle. Political expediency was above the law, whereas struggle against "enemies" should not be constrained by any laws. Lenin permitted punishment by list — without individual guilt being established — using false accusations and "evidence". The next step was to introduce "collective responsibility" and guilt by association. Under Lenin, this was perfected to include the taking of hostages. As Cavoški states: "Lenin did not give a thought to the legitimacy and morality of terror and killing, but was interested only in how efficient and useful they were".

The crime of thought was "resorted to most frequently in their struggle against internal opponents". Intolerance, he believes, was therefore "cemented into the movement's foundations". The Bolsheviks could not reconcile themselves to allowing an alternative viewpoint. It was Lenin personally who advocated that the crime of thought should be legalised and entered in the criminal code. Vague formulations and total arbitrariness in meting out punishment were used to suppress any opposition. All citizens of the state have to be converted to one ideology. This unanimity is an attempt at "extending ad infinitum the established totalitarian system" (Cavoški).

Both Pipes and Cavoški firmly point to the origins of totalitarianism in the USSR in 1917, under Lenin. As Cavoški states, corrupt forms of political systems need enemies, and the "enemy is, therefore, an inherent element of such a system". These internal enemies are not enemies of their country, but of their rulers. If no enemies exist (which is unlikely), then they are invented. Despite the misplaced optimism of many people that Gorbachev will "liberalise" the Soviet regime, Cavoški concludes his study by stating:

"Without a radical change of government the so-called liberalisation of tyrannical, caesarist and totalitarian regimes and their gradual transformation into more tolerable forms of political system is impossible".

Taras KUZIO
