

The UKRAINIAN QUARTERLY



Vol. XIII. — No. 4.

December, 1957.

**FORTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF UKRAINIAN
INDEPENDENCE**

JUST OUT!

JUST OUT!

IN QUEST OF FREEDOM

1918 — 1958

*In Commemoration of the Fortieth Anniversary
of Ukrainian Independence*

By WALTER DUSHNYCK

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Picture on the Cover: Prof. Mykhailo Hrushevsky, President of the Ukrainian Central Rada, addresses Ukrainian soldiers attending the Third Ukrainian Military Congress in Kiev on November 20, 1917.

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 Ukrainian ethnographic territory

 Boundaries of Soviet republics and satellites

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U. S. AND THE 40th ANNIVERSARY OF UKRAINE'S INDEPENDENCE

Editorial

This year is the 40th anniversary of the independence of Ukraine. On January 22, 1918 the people of Ukraine proclaimed their national independence and liberated themselves from the foreign domination of Russia. The historical facts surrounding this momentous event are conclusive and incontrovertible. They cannot be beclouded by the recent celebrations in Moscow and elsewhere of the fortieth anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution. That revolution was exclusively a Russian event. Nor can they be concealed by Nikita Khrushchev's recent address to the puppet Communist government of Kiev. This government was not even in existence forty years ago.

The facts about Ukraine's genuine independence, truly an historic and patriotic event, are firmly established by documentary and other evidences of proof. It is thus patently inexcusable for anyone concerned with Eastern Europe and the immediate background of the Soviet Union not to know them well. The scholarly works of Hrushevsky, Manning, Reshetar and numerous others are readily accessible to all interested American readers. Indeed, in order to understand the present political realities of the USSR, this background on the freedom fight of a major European nation is indispensable.

In many sectors of the Free World this monumental event will be solemnly celebrated. In fact, the genuine independence of Ukraine in 1918 has been celebrated annually by Free World groups, especially since the destruction of the independent Ukrainian National Republic in 1920 by the Red armies of Soviet Russia. What is then the significance of these celebrations from the viewpoint of an American observer? Is it a form of expressed nostalgia which, as some cynics would say, will in time wear off? Well, forty years are a lot of time in a man's life and there are still no signs of wear. On the contrary, the reverse holds true. The celebrations are more vigorous, more justified, more hopeful as each year passes. Possibly, perhaps, their significance can be explained on the basis of common sociologic ties, involving language, customs,

religion, and other forms of get-togetherness which satisfy the natural personal urge for belonging. That these ties are present and are formidable, one cannot deny. They fall into the rich and diversified pattern of America itself. They are part of the spiritual resources of this Nation. Nevertheless, these bonds by themselves are inadequate for an explanation of these anniversary celebrations.

The full significance of these ceremonies, particularly this 40th one, is political in nature. Their significance rests on the historic importance of the event itself. It is primarily founded on the sustained meaning of Ukraine's independence in 1918 for the United States and other parts of the Free World today into the challenging future. This meaning is indelibly imprinted in the hearts and minds of 40 million Ukrainians today. They are not free to express it, but those in the Free World who understand this meaning are. They freely express it in behalf not only of these captive millions but also of the national interests of the United States and other free countries. In these critical times it is a meaning tied up with the predominant fact that Ukraine is the largest non-Russian nation not only in the USSR but also in captive Eastern Europe. If, as President Eisenhower characterizes it, the Russian Communist Empire is "an uneasily sleeping volcano," then on record Ukraine is one of its most eruptive elements.¹

The meaning of Ukraine's genuine independence in 1918 is that it formalized the break-up of the Russian Empire. Ukrainian independence was part of a general non-Russian revolution for independence in the Czarist Russian Empire which also was "an uneasily sleeping volcano." Like other non-Russian states, the newly independent Ukrainian state was recognized by the communist government of Russia as well as by other foreign powers. This state structurally crystallized the full awakening of a major nation in Eastern Europe against Russian imperialism and colonialism. But the long tradition of totalitarian Russian imperialism was soon to make itself felt through Russian Bolshevism. It is vitally important to always remember that the independent Ukrainian state became the first chief target of Russian Communist infiltration and subversion in the period of 1918-20. When these methods failed miserably, Ukraine became the victim of open military aggression by Soviet Russia. Harassed by remnant Czarist Russian forces, unassisted by sister democratic powers in the West, and subjugated to this early onslaught of Russian Communist imperialism, the young democratic Republic succumbed in 1920.

¹ "The State of the Union Message," *Congressional Record*, January 9, 1958, p. 172.

· By no means did the historic importance of Ukraine's independence end in 1920. The physical embodiment was destroyed then, but the fiery spirit of independence has lived to this day. It has for long been clearly evident that the destruction of the independent Ukrainian state laid the foundation for Moscow's subsequent aggressions and imperial aggrandizements. What Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, White Ruthenia, Turkestan and other non-Russian nations suffered at the beginning of the 20's, the Baltic nations, Poland, Hungary, Czecho-Slovakia and others experienced in the 40's. Now, significantly enough, the same threat in this series of conquests confronts the United States, Canada, the countries of Western Europe, and others in the Free World. As we plan to preserve our national independence, the people of Ukraine and other captive non-Russian nations seek to recover theirs. The nexus of natural alliance between U.S. and Ukraine, as well as all other captive non-Russian nations, is obvious.

The record of Ukraine's fight to recover its independence is long and detailed. It is filled with tragedy, but it is also emblazoned with glory and patriotic heroism. The Russian Communists well understood the depth of Ukrainian aspirations and named their empire the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. They made room for a puppet delegate of Ukraine in the United Nations and down to this day have tried to impress upon the restive Ukrainian people that they are "independent." Khrushchev himself appears to be doing what Beria unsuccessfully attempted to do. In his bid for total power he is surrounding himself with some Ukrainians of the stature of Malinovsky, Kirichenko, and Grechko. But despite all such window-dressing concessions Moscow will not be able to stifle the will of the Ukrainian nation to achieve its real independence and national freedom.

No matter what superficial concessions Khrushchev might make to Ukraine, the people will always regard him as the "Hangman of Ukraine." Even the former foreign editor of *The Daily Worker*, Joseph Clark, has been quoted to say: "Khrushchev was the bloodiest of Soviet tyrants. He is elbow-deep in the blood he shed in the Ukraine while he ruled there."² However, for the conservation of its own substance, there is an optimum point to which any people can go in making personal and national sacrifices in blood and treasure without the sympathetic aid of its brothers in freedom. There are other possible ways of striving for this freedom but in the process it might not be of net advantage to the Free World unless we determine to do something imaginatively about the doubtless will of the Ukrainian nation for independence. To-

² *The New York Times*, September 8, 1957.

day, in the United States, this is not a question of knowing; it is one of courageously deciding.

The strategic importance of Ukraine for the United States and the Free World is written in terms of the Ukrainian will for national independence; the geography of Ukraine, its rich resources, its large population, and its unsurpassed record of anti-Communist resistance. All of these determining factors were present at the time of the independent Ukrainian state. They are present today. Thus, Ukrainian independence is not just symbolic in value. It is a living reality in the hearts, minds, and wills of all who understand it and who see in its objective realization one of the most powerful strokes for world freedom. Only the shadows of ignorance can blind us from seeing this opportunity. Fortunately this is not the case. For example, the report of a statement on NATO attributed to Prime Minister John Diefenbaker of Canada indicates this: "To give hope to those people behind the Iron Curtain who have kept glowing 'the flickering flame of freedom' in Ukraine, in Hungary, in Poland and in East Germany and the Balkan states, . . . a paragraph was included in the communique assuring them that the light had been seen by the free world."³

The problem of Ukraine, therefore, is not one of the people determining themselves for freedom and independence. This they did on January 22, 1918 for all the world to see. This they have been doing in multiple ways since the occupation of their country by the Russian Communists. Instead, as in the case of Poland, Lithuania, Hungary and others, the problem is one of recovering independent statehood or, in other words, the elimination of Russian Communist domination over Ukraine. To satisfy the insistence of Secretary of State Dulles and the Department of State, the test of demonstrating aspirations for national freedom and independence was passed by Ukraine forty years ago.

Our concern for missiles and military weapons today should not throw us off balance with regard to the realities within the Russian Communist Empire. The captive nations, including Ukraine, still are the source of Moscow's greatest fear. Moreover, they still are our most formidable allies and one of the greatest deterrents against a hot war. If, as Napoleon once said, "Moral force is three-fourths in military affairs; other forces one-fourth," then how greater is the proportion in political affairs. The moral force of national independence throughout the world is overwhelming. In our struggle for national survival, it is both a goal and weapon available to the United States. This fact in itself more than justifies the significance of each anniversary celebration of Ukraine's independence.

³ *The New York Times*, December 22, 1957.

U. C. C. A. POLICY TODAY

By LEV E. DOBRIANSKY

In 1951 the political policy of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America was formulated in concrete terms. This policy was explicitly stated in an article which appeared in the winter issue of this organ.¹ It embraced ten points: the decisive defeat of Russian Communist imperialism, maintenance of world-wide contacts with friends of Ukraine, political coordination with other American organizations, advancement of the idea of political warfare, aid to the Ukrainian underground, abeyance of territorial problems, rejection of the common guilt of the Russian masses, the necessary dismemberment of the Soviet Empire, national self-determination, and the gradual federation of Europe.

These paramount tenets were born of practical, political action in the three years preceding their formal expression. They have successfully guided us in our tactics and problem solutions to the present date. They were not the products of any arid cogitation undertaken in a swivel chair atmosphere but, instead, these tenets constituted, and do so now, an intellectual response to political realities as they have been experienced here and abroad and to certain norms justified by our own American tradition. Despite changes in verbal designations, they have doubtlessly withstood all sorts of tests to this very day and have gained for our organization a respect that many have looked upon with expressed envy.

It should be observed that through channels of expression the membership of the Congress Committee has repeatedly approved and upheld these major policy points. This is a fundamental and healthy basis. Thus any deviation from these stated guidelines of action would be in reality a broken contract with our membership. I, for one, would not want to be a party to this transgression. Freedom of thought and discussion, a flexibility of mind to constantly assess and reassess, and a firm disposition toward constructive self-criticism are assets which must be preserved in any circumstance. However, though fully observing this, it is my strong feeling that any serious attack made against any of these basic tenets becomes a source of concern and suspicion for us.

¹ Vol. VII, No. 1, pp. 52-64.

In view of the type of propaganda flowing out of Moscow today, particularly with respect to Americans of Slav background, we must be more alert than ever in our combined efforts to prevent the creation of any point of vulnerability in our thinking and in our organization. In my judgment the slightest contravention of the established policy of this committee would produce the environment for vulnerability. Our policy has been a policy of clean hands. It shall continue to be so.

Now, as suggested above, it is of course wholesome and necessary to reappraise a policy from time to time. In actuality we have been doing this continuously as we consider each vexing problem that comes before this committee. The force and peculiarities of different problems compel us to consciously reflect upon the premises and concepts of our thinking as we bring it to bear on the situations at hand. So, in a sense, there is actually no real need for any formal reappraisal of our policy unless, for one reason or another, someone begins to doubt our principles and the general structure of our policy; in effect, calling for a serious deviation from the established course of our activity these past ten years. However, in the present scene of world circumstances, a clear reaffirmation of our policy seems necessary. We can effectively do this by dwelling here on certain basic observations and working theses.

BASIC OBSERVATIONS IN THE CURRENT PERIOD

This need for policy reaffirmation provides a good opportunity for us to synthesize our thoughts again with regard to the nature of this committee, the meaning of policy, the significance of world events these past seven years—particularly events in the Russian Communist Empire—and the fundamental bases of our policy. These matters can be treated succinctly in view of our previous policy statement and the innumerable memoranda and communications which have consistently expressed our stand on different issues. The newness and refreshing applications of our policy are to be found not in any major substitution or modification of its basic tenets but rather in a growing acceptance of some of these policy points in various spheres of our society. Basically our task is one of education and this, needless to say, takes time, patience, sustained effort, and undiminished hope. The marked advances of our educational program concerning Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, and American policy toward the Russian Communist Empire are the evidential proofs of the newness, vitality, and prospective meaning of our policy.

First in the order of our basic observations is the nature of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America. Much has been written about this primary point. But here again it appears necessary to explain

it. For if one misjudges or refuses to accept our mutual understanding of the nature of this organization, then it logically follows that his understanding of our policy will be different. The policy of any entity, regardless of its character, is a verbalized expression of the spiritual substance of that entity. This is a principal point on which a whole policy discussion can either maintain itself or fall. It cannot be too strongly emphasized that our policy is tightly girded to our understanding of the nature of U.C.C.A.

The Congress Committee is a completely American institution, made up of American citizens with a Ukrainian heritage or ancestry. Its policy thoroughly reflects this primary and determining fact. Later we shall appreciate this indispensable point. At this juncture let me just indicate that when someone writes or talks about us being representatives of "the native country of Ukraine," about being ambassadors of Ukraine, and wallows in other forms of hallucination, then it becomes clearly evident that he has no sound conception of our policy. If he does know this policy and in effect casts doubt upon it with such unrealistic assertions, then the condition is even worse since it is no longer a matter of reason but one of will and wishful inclination. In short, if we are at all ambassadors, we are nothing more than ambassadors of truth and ideas about Ukraine and all other captive nations in the Russian Communist Empire. Indeed, in these grave times, this is the finest and one of the most honorable badges we can wear as American citizens.

A second basic observation concerns the gross untruth and fallacy that our policy has been, is, or ever will be predicated on an expectation of a hot war outbreak. When Communist sources spread this untruth, we can readily comprehend their evil motivation. When exponents of a virtual do-nothing policy raise this, we can also understand their lack of vision, foresight, and courage. But when this fallacy is disseminated in the writings of those who profess to know and understand our policy, then one can have only the gravest doubts as to the intentions and inclinations of such writers. The plain fact is that we have always held and, indeed, will maintain even more strongly in the future that the only way to avoid a hot war is to win this cold war; and this clearly means the implementation of the peaceful policy of liberation. For years we have written extensively on this subject, the official papers and communications of this committee have incessantly repeated and reiterated this position, and all of our work has been poised on this conclusive point. Our record is open and clear for any who might be deceived by this fatuous notion of war predication.

Our third major observation relates to the changes that have taken place in the Communist Empire since 1953. The significant question

which arises here is whether the death of Stalin, the abortive Beria affair, the Pereyaslav celebrations, the transfer of Crimea to Ukraine, the 20th Party Congress, the so-called liberalization program of Moscow, the deceptive acrobatics of Khrushchev, and *Sputnik* and the I.C.B.M.—whether any of these events call for any basic change in our policy? A sober examination of these events in detail would reveal that actually no real change has taken place in the political climate of the USSR. No real concessions have been meted out to the Ukrainian people or to any other non-Russian captives, whether in or outside the USSR. While Khrushchev seeks a monopoly of power, the Ukrainian people are not being fooled by the basically innocuous changes engineered by Moscow. They are too aware of what happened in the “liberal” 20’s when similar circumstances of intra-Party rivalry existed, not to mention their intimate knowledge of the character of the “Hangman of Ukraine.” They are necessarily cautious, patient, and only momentarily abiding.

Logically, even if there were real changes in the totalitarian environment of the Russian Communist Empire, these in no way would cause us to make basic changes in our policy. No matter how one views it, our policy is a highly principled one, but it is also a highly flexible one. Lest some forget, during the muddled period of the Geneva spirit we ardently advocated concrete steps in the direction of pressures for freedom within the USSR. These pressures were to be generated from sources provided by Moscow itself. No blind charge that these steps would engender the risk of all-out war, could at all be rationally made. Even before this period we sought the assignment of U.S. ambassadors to Kiev and Minsk, a diplomatic step of great psychological and political importance which is only now being recognized in certain responsible quarters. These are but few examples of the flexibility of our policy.

One cannot rationally counterpose the liberation doctrine with the doctrine of evolution, as espoused by Allen Dulles and all containment spokesmen. Actually, the doctrine of evolution, like “competitive coexistence” preceding it, is just another version of the outmoded policy of containment. It, too, is a fancy title for a policy of drift. The notion that through education and mere cultural exchange the peoples and nations in the Soviet Union will evolve to freedom is vacuous, to say the least. Nazi Germany or Japan is the best recent proof for this. The literacy and technologic attainments of these nations should not be overlooked when we choose to talk about evolution to freedom through education. The doctrine of evolution may prove to be our most dangerous illusion. It is patently not sufficient to merely speak of education in the USSR. One must consider the crucial question of education in what. Recent history has shown with striking impact that the combination of

technology and a totalitarian scheme of barbaric institutions is scarcely conducive to freedom.

Real change for the Ukrainian people and all other captive nations will by definition be revolutionary change. This is an inescapable truth well founded on centuries of man's struggle for freedom. To liken, as some do, the political conditions of Moscow's Empire to those of the former British Empire and then, in the next breath, project a parallel of evolution toward national freedom is not only a defective logical construction but also a misreading of history itself. The totalitarian institutional base of Muscovy could hardly be equated with the democratic base of Great Britain. The British Empire was qualitatively different from the past or present Russian Empire. Regardless of technologic exteriors, evolution toward freedom in the Russian Communist Empire has really no institutional basis other than the non-Russian aspirations for national independence and all that these culturally entail. Thus, our realistic efforts for political warfare on the terrain of the Russian Communist Empire are utterly necessary for the collapse of this empire and for the real changes sought by the captive nations and peoples. Briefly, those who glibly employ the term evolution either do not know the meaning of it (its scientific use in the 19th century was remarkably vague) or, as is likely the case, have simply made an expedient terminological switch from containment.

Looked at more critically, the notion of evolution cannot serve as a basic idea of American policy. To depend on it would mean complete passivity for which no policy is really necessary. Evolution, as used by Allen Dulles and others, means simply let things develop as they do in the Soviet Union and through a mellowing process, freedom in time will be achieved. There is, of course, nothing deterministic in this development to insure this outcome. In fact, for us the outcome may be the confrontation of the most powerful totalitarian enemy in history and the fatal choice of global war or surrender. By such argument the new-styled evolutionist is inevitably thrown back upon containment as his sole support. But this argumentative support is no full support for the survival of our Nation, let alone the expansion of freedom in the world. For containment has its own measure of passivity which encourages the above outcome.

It is necessary to distinguish between a policy and individual problems and situations. If no such distinction is made and observed, then we cannot possibly avoid much confused thinking. A policy by nature is a formal statement of principles, norms, and ends that guides us in the application of our resources to limited or ultimate solutions of particular problems. In our case, whether it is in relation to the United

Nations, the forces of Asia and Africa, or even the notorious and totalitarian Russian N.T.S., our policy is broad and flexible enough for us to draw the proper inferences which guide us in the treatment of problems pertaining to each of these. The application of policy requires prudential judgment, an allowance for the dimension of time, and a careful valuation of situations not only in terms of our policy tenets but also in terms of the relative gravity of these situations and the distribution of our resources. The more philosophically formidable the statement of policy, the clearer its premises and objectives, the easier will the application be with consideration given to each of these requisite elements.

By virtue of its flexible and comprehensive policy the Congress Committee is in the most fortunate position of all concerning the relationship of problems in Eastern Europe and the United States. The appearance of missiles in military hardware does not reduce the importance of this position. On the contrary, it strengthens it since the policy consistently enunciated by us becomes even more significant in a period which will be marked by the relative decline of deterrent physical power on the part of the United States. The power of ideas in a political offensive against the enemy will be on the increase. Many will come to recognize that in this struggle for survival the key to the free world's gravest problem is Eastern Europe. The liberation of Eastern Europe would eliminate the peril to our security. In Eastern Europe the largest and most dangerous opponent to Russian Communist imperialism is Ukraine. The strategic position of Ukraine is paramount whether the war is a cold or hot one. Thus, these inter-related facts and the growing necessity for a political offensive against Moscow explain the good fortune of our position in the thinking of this country about U.S. policy toward the USSR. The center of Free World strength and the hope of world freedom is here, in Washington, not elsewhere.

THE SUBSTANCE OF U.C.C.A. POLICY

From these observations and the mentioned contents of a previous policy statement it is obviously not difficult for one to understand the substance of U.C.C.A. policy. Primarily, our policy is girded to the national security interests of this country. What we strenuously advance in the form of ideas and programs concerning the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, we strongly believe to be in the greatest interest of our Nation. The integral relationship between our ideas and this primary interest cannot be explained on the mere basis of patriotic lip-service. More deeply, it rests on a basis of logic, morality, and real pragmatic value. The cause for a liberated Ukraine, for instance, is intrinsically

related to the prime cause of a free and independent United States. As in the past, the future will be determined by what our Nation does or does not do. The base of determination for the future rests nowhere else. In realistic terms it is utterly nonsensical to seek a significant third force among the neutralists of Asia and Africa. In fact, the luxury of neutralism is in largest measure the by-product of passive containment.

Our policy also furnishes and develops the valuable concept of the non-Russian nations in the USSR. This concept is now a regular usage in many high quarters. Falling under the concept, the liberation and independence of Ukraine and other captive non-Russian nations in the Soviet Union are goals of the greatest importance to the survival of our Nation. Simply described, the realization of these goals means the end of the Russian Communist Empire and thus the end of our greatest peril. Related to this, too, is the emancipation of the Russian nation from centuries of institutional totalitarianism and imperialism. The pursuit of non-Russian liberation and independence provides the best hope for the Russian masses to learn the ways of democracy both in politics and economics. U.C.C.A. policy naturally embraces the principles of anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism with moderate perspective. It views Russian Communism as the only remaining imperialism and colonialism which could be regarded as obnoxious to human values. Publicized transfers of real estate, such as Crimea to the Ukrainian SSR, do not in the least reduce this indictment.

The structure of U.C.C.A. policy is further built on a rational extension of the non-Russian nation concept. After all, Russian Communist imperialism is really an onslaught upon nations rather than social classes. Thus our policy is oriented toward the patriots of all non-Russian nations in Europe and Asia. We vigorously oppose the Communist regimes of China, Poland, Yugoslavia and other communist-dominated countries because they do not represent the people. Instead, in varying degree they represent the will of Moscow. Our position on American aid to Poland is today being praised by many Americans of Polish descent. Also, the forthcoming Slavist Congress being prepared by Moscow cannot but be viewed by us as another exhibitionist spectacle designed by Moscow to impress the world with a non-existent Slavic solidarity.

At the summit of this policy structure is our advocacy of an implemented policy of peaceful liberation. As Pope Pius XII pointed out two years ago, there cannot be any political coexistence with Communist RSFSR. The policy of liberation, with its exclusive stress on national self-determination and independence, provides the only clear alternative for us to penetrate the Russian Iron Curtain in Europe and

Asia. As stated before, it means carrying political warfare on the terrain of the Communist Empire. This alternative is chiefly what the policy of this committee presently seeks. Beyond liberation it seeks independence and the opportunity of free nations to determine their various possible federal ties. We are convinced that our policy is flexibly adaptable to requirements in the cold war, in an always possible hot war, and in a period of reconstruction.

DISINTEGRATION OF THE IMPERIAL RUSSIAN ARMY IN 1917

By LEW SHANKOWSKY

The disintegration of the Imperial Russian Army in 1917 was a protracted and varied process which deserves close study by politicians and military men alike, but not a word is said about it in the history of the Red Army since the collapse of the Russian Empire in 1917. To our regret it says only that by October 1917 the Imperial Russian Army "was in a state of complete disintegration."¹ It is our intention, in this article, to throw some light on the interesting process which led to the "complete disintegration" of the multimillion Russian army of 1917. We must point out the fact that the Revolution of 1917 resulted in the complete breakdown of the Russian Empire and that one of the aspects of this breakdown was the disintegration of the Imperial Army along *national lines*. Long before October 1917 the Imperial Russian Army simply disintegrated into *national armies* of the subjugated peoples, once the February Revolution of 1917 opened the doors to freedom for them.

The quite extensive literature on the disintegration of the Imperial Army² shows that the disintegration of the Imperial Army began im-

¹ Cf. *The Red Army*, Ed. B. H. Liddell Hart. New York, 1956, pp. 24 ff.

² Russian emigré writers tend to minimize the process of disintegration of the Imperial Army along *national lines*. Such writers as Daniloff (*Die Russische Armee im Weltkrieg*, Berlin, 1925), Golovin (*The Russian Army in the World War*, New Haven, 1931), Gourko (*War and Revolution in Russia*, New York, 1919), Loukowsky (*Memoirs of the Russian Revolution*, London, 1922) ignore it despite the fact that some of them (Golovin) participated in the Ukrainization of the Old Army and, later, served on the Ukrainian General Staff. Gen. Denikin gives the process of the Ukrainization of the Old Army an unfavorable treatment in his *Ocherki Russkoi Smuty (Outlines of Russia in Turmoil)*, Paris, 1921, Vol. II, pp. 127 ff and former Kerensky's Political Commissar-in-Chief—V. B. Stankevich—is somewhat more favorable in his *Vospominania (Reminiscences)*, Berlin, 1920, pp. 148 ff. Older Soviet sources can be used: Kakurin, N. E., (Ed.) *Razlozhenie Armii v 1917 Godu (Dissolution of the Army in 1917)*, Materials and Documents, Moscow, 1928; Eideman, R. and V. Melikov, *Armia v 1917 Godu (The Army in 1917)*, Moscow, 1917; Kizrin, I. G., *Raspad staroi armii (The Disintegration of the Old Army)*, Voronezh, 1932; Mints, I. and R. Eidemann, *Rasstanovka boyevykh sil kontr-*

mediately after the news of the February Revolution had reached the military units of the Army at the front and in the rear. In the second half of March and the first half of April, 1917, officers and soldiers of non-Russian nationalities held meetings demanding the formation of separate national units and the creation of separate national armies. The notorious Order No. 1 of the Petrograd Soviet of March 14, 1917, had little or nothing in common with this movement; the organizers found a precedent in the existence of the national units within the Russian Army which had come into being before the Revolution. There existed within the Russian Army a Polish rifle division, several Latvian rifle brigades, two Serbo-Croatian divisions and a Czechoslovak brigade. It is noteworthy that the Serbo-Croatian and Czechoslovak units were formed of officers and soldiers of the Austro-Hungarian army who had passed over to the Russian side in entire regiments with their regimental colors and military bands, and thus proved the unreliability of a multinational army under certain conditions. However, when on March 30, 1917, the Russian Provisional Government under Prince Lvov granted a limited recognition of Poland's independence and sanctioned the formation of a Polish Army out of the Polish officers and soldiers of the Russian Army, the demands for separate national units increased in force and led to some arbitrary formations at the front and in the rear despite urgent remonstrations by the ruling "Russian democracy" and Russian soldiers' committees. The general relaxation of military discipline only facilitated the revolutionary activities of the non-Russian officers and soldiers.

Several factors contributed to this process, which no doubt was an embarrassing chapter in the history of the multimillion Russian Army. One was the growth of national movements for liberation and separation from Russia which swept the non-Russian peoples and especially those which in recognition of their separate historic or national rights at various times in history enjoyed extensive self-rule within the Russian Empire. It was the practice of the Russian Czars to grant considerable

revolutsii nakanune Oktiabria ("Deployment of Fighting Forces of the Counter-revolution on the Eve of October"), *Istoriik-Marxist*, Moscow, Vol. I, 1934, pp. 53-98; Rabinovich, S., *Borba za armiyu v 1917 Godu* (*The Struggle for the Army in 1917*), Moscow, 1930; Chemodanov, G., *Poslednyie dni staroi armii* (*The Last Days of the Old Army*), Moscow, 1926. There are numerous Ukrainian sources which will be quoted in the article, among them the most important: *Istoriya ukrainskoho viyska*, (*History of the Ukrainian Forces*), Second revised edition, published by Ivan Tyktor, 1953, Winnipeg, Canada, 832 pp. Much of related material was published in *Za Derzhavnist* (*For Statedom*), a quarterly publication of the Ukrainian Military Historical Society in Warsaw (10 volumes, Warsaw 1930-1939).

autonomy to newly conquered territories, but this they withdrew later on one pretext or another. In other cases the Russian Czars entered into contractual relations with neighboring nations which sought their protection, as was the case with Ukraine when by the Treaty of Pereyaslav it entered into a military union with Muscovy in 1654. Later the Russian Czars unilaterally abrogated the Treaty and incorporated Ukraine into the regular administration of the Empire in 1783. At any rate such territories as Poland from 1815 to 1831 or Finland from 1809 to 1899 were in practice separate constitutional monarchies within the Russian Empire; and such as Ukraine from 1654 to 1783, or Georgia and its parts (Mingrelia, Immeretia, Svanetia, Guria) at various times, or Turkestan and its parts (Bukhara, Khiva) up to 1917, or Livonia and Estonia from 1710 to 1783 and again from 1795 to the 1880's, enjoyed special autonomous status within the Empire. It is evident that all these nations were conscious of their historic rights which had been abrogated as were, of course, the Lithuanians and White-Ruthenians, whose separate nationality lasted in the Lithuano-White-Ruthenian Commonwealth up to 1793. It is from among all these historic nationalities that the first national units within the Russian Army had been formed and they had been formed not rarely on the basis of living military traditions of the concerned peoples in preceding centuries. Many regiments of the Imperial Russian Army traced their military traditions back to the regiments of the Kozak Army of *Hetman* Bohdan Khmelnytsky in 1648 as e. g. the Starodubsky Regiment of Dragoons, the Hlukhovsky Regiment of Hussars, or the Kievsky Regiment of Hussars, etc.³ As the learning of regimental histories was part of obligatory training, it is no wonder that some of those traditions were revived in a new form in 1917. Thus, the First Regiment of the reborn Ukrainian Army established by the revolutionary action of soldiers in Kiev on May 1, 1917, and authorized by the Commander of the South-Western Front, Gen. A.A. Brusilov, on May 4, 1917, took the name of *Hetman* Bohdan Khmelnytsky.⁴

³ For the history of the regiments of the Imperial Russian Army, see F. von Stein, *Geschichte des Russischen Heeres vom Ursprunge desselben bis zur Thronbesteigung des Kaisers Nikolai I Pavlowitsch*. Leipzig, Zuckschwerdt and Co., 1895. From this book we learn that nearly one half of the Russian cavalry in 1914 was of Ukrainian Kozak origin, as were some of the oldest Grenadier and Musketeer Regiments of infantry.

⁴ Gen. A. Denikin, of course, deploras Gen. Brusilov's action, calling it "arbitrary" and contrary to the Army's interests. Cf. Denikin, *op. cit.*, p. 129. He also deploras the action of the Commander of Northern Front Gen. Ruzsky who consented to the formation of an Estonian unit. *Ibid.* However, his contentions that the formation of Ukrainian units destroyed the traditions of the Old

The Ukrainian example was soon followed by the officers and soldiers of other non-Russian nationalities. The Finns, Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, White Ruthenians, Cossacks,⁵ North Caucasians,⁶ Georgians, Armenians, Crimean Tatars, Volga Tatars and Bashkirs, Azerbaijanians—all formed their national units and subordinated them to their national leadership.⁷ It was evident that the February Revolution had set in motion strong nationalist forces which promoted rapid and, for many Russians, unexpected development. At the very beginning, the national movements centered around the demands for territorial autonomy, but encountering a negative attitude on the part of the Russian Provisional Government and Russian political parties, they proceeded to demands for self-determination and even separation from Russia. The most interesting fact, however, is that the strongest support to these demands was given by the non-Russian officers and soldiers in the Army. Analyzing the process of disintegration of the Russian Empire in 1917, Richard Pipes is right in stressing that “the national movement in 1917” had perhaps “its most rapid development in the army.⁸ How violent was the nationalism which had taken hold of the non-Russians became evident in the course of their military conventions. At the First Polish Military Convention the Polish officers and soldiers enthusiastically responded to the declaration of the formation of an “extraterritorial” Polish Army in Russia and unanimously resolved to greet Joseph Pilsudski, who was Commander of a Polish Legion fighting on the side of the Central Powers. At the First Ukrainian Military Congress (May 18-21, 1917) the 700 delegates representing nearly one million Ukrainian soldiers and sailors violently attacked the Provisional Government in Petrograd for ignoring Ukrainian demands for territorial autonomy and

Army and, therefore, brought it closer to the destruction, can hardly be regarded as justified if we take the content of these traditions under impartial consideration. Cf. Denikin, *Op. cit.*, p. 133.

⁵ Separate Cossack units had always existed within the Russian Army. However, in 1917, they passed under the control of elected *Atamans* of their own. So e. g. on June 12, 1917, the elected members of the Don Cossack *Voiskovii Krug* (Council) extended the Council's control over all Don Cossack units at the front and in the rear. On June 30, 1917, Gen. Kaledin was elected *Ataman* of the Don Cossacks. Cf. Vera Vladimirova, *Revolutsia 1917 Goda* (*Revolution of 1917*), Petrograd, Gosizdat, 1923, Vol. II, p. 236, Vol. III, p. 80.

⁶ A “native” cavalry division composed of North Caucasian Mountaineers (Chechens, Ingushes, Kabardinians, Cherkesses, Ossetinians) existed before the Revolution.

⁷ The best study on the disintegration of the Russian Empire available in English is Richard Pipes' *The Formation of the Soviet Union. Communism and Nationalism, 1917-1923*. Cambridge, Mass. Harvard University Press, 1954.

⁸ Pipes, *op. cit.*, p. 52.

raised their voices in favor of Ukrainian independence and separate representation at the future Peace Conference.⁹ Richard Pipes states in his book that "the general tone of these sessions was so extremely nationalistic that Vynnychenko¹⁰ . . . felt forced to plead with the delegates to remain loyal to the Russian democracy . . ." ¹¹ The delegates to the Convention demanded the creation of a Ukrainian army and navy as a base of support for the (Ukrainian) Central *Rada* in Kiev, but under the influence of its leaders they resolved to continue the war effort against Germany and Austria and voted a resolution opposing the subversive propaganda of the Bolsheviks to leave the front.¹² A still more uncompromising attitude could be observed at the Second Ukrainian Military Congress (June 18-23, 1917) which met against Kerensky's orders forbidding the meeting as "untimely," and where the 2,414 delegates from both the army and the navy, representing 1,732,000 Ukrainian soldiers and sailors, adopted a resolution calling upon the Central Rada to cease negotiating with the Provisional Government and to turn, instead, to the organization of an autonomous Ukraine in agreement with the national minorities of Ukraine.¹³ The strong wording of the resolution bears evidence to the fact that soldiers hardened by three years of war were able to express their opinions to the Russian Provisional Government somewhat more firmly than the civilian members of the Ukrainian Central *Rada*. However, the Central *Rada*, given a dynamic force and the dedication of the Ukrainian Military Congresses, was able to adopt a more resolute policy toward Petrograd.¹⁴

⁹ Pipes, *op. cit.*, p. 56.

¹⁰ Volodymyr Vynnychenko (1880-1952), Ukrainian writer and dramaturgist, was one of the leaders of the Central *Rada* in Kiev. His memoirs: *Vidrodzennia Natsii (The Rebirth of the Nation)*, 3 volumes, Vienna, 1920, are very useful for studying the developments in Ukraine in 1917-1918.

¹¹ Pipes, *op. cit.*, p. 56.

¹² Cf. Nicholas D. Chubaty, "The National Revolution in Ukraine 1917-1919." *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, Vol. I, No. 1, 1944, p. 25. It is interesting to note that in his great novel *Myr khatam, viyna palatsam (Peace to the Huts, War to the Palaces)*, published recently in the Kiev literary magazine *Vitchyzna (Fatherland)*, Nos. 8, 9, 10, 11 from 1957, the Soviet Ukrainian writer Yuriy Smolych gives a wide picture of the Ukrainian Military Congresses in 1917 stressing their negative and uncompromising attitude toward the Russian Provisional Government and Ukrainian nationalist sentiments in general. See, *Vitchyzna (Fatherland)*, Kiev, No. 9, 1957, 73-79, 95-98, 98-102.

¹³ Cf. Chubaty, *op. cit.*, p. 26.

¹⁴ There is a good coverage of the Second Ukrainian Military Congress by A. Brinsky—a reporter of *Kievskaya Myst*—a liberal Russian paper which appeared in Kiev in 1917. This is fully included in Vynnychenko's *Vidrodzennia Natsii*, vol. I, p. 205 ff and partly in Chubaty, *op. cit.*, p. 26 ff.

This also bears evidence to the fact that while in Russia proper the social aspects of the Revolution with the violent class struggle prevailed, in the national borderlands of the Empire the Revolution assumed an equally strong national character. Here even a class struggle assumed a national form: it was directed against Russian colonists. Russian landlords, Russian capitalists, Russian administrators and policemen. In Ukraine, for example, the struggle for acquisition of land assumed a distinctly national character: it was directed against the historic enemies of the Ukrainian people—against Russian or Polish landlords and their Ukrainian, but mostly Russified, counterparts.

Another factor in the disintegration of the Army along national lines was to a large extent the same one which led to the triumph of Bolshevism in Russia proper. It was the war-weariness of the soldiers and their urgent demand for peace and return home. Uncertainty how to achieve this goal led the non-Russians in many instances to the formation of national units and soldiers' councils through which they hoped to end the war and to get repatriated. It must be said that in this regard the Ukrainian soldiers' hopes were mostly futile. The leaders of the Central *Rada* tried at all costs to cooperate with the Provisional Government and to support its war effort at the Eastern front to the very end. They firmly believed in the unity of the "revolutionary forces" and were not willing to follow a course of separate action.¹⁵ It is no wonder, therefore, that this attitude of the Central *Rada*, composed mostly of Ukrainian Socialists, was widely criticized by Ukrainian nationalists as an "appeasement policy" toward the Russian Provisional Government. It is still so criticized. At the time, the nationalists argue, when the Central *Rada* was supreme in Ukraine because the Provisional Government was collapsing and the Russian Army disintegrating, it would have been better for the Ukrainians to declare their independence and to conclude an immediate peace, relying upon Ukrainian troops. According to the nationalists, it is doubtful whether the Provisional Government could have effectively prevented such a development.¹⁶ At any rate, an attempt to carry out such a policy was made in July, 1917, by the Polubotok Infantry Regiment in Kiev. In the night of July 18, 1917, the regiment left its barracks, captured the Pechersk fortress and the Arsenal, and brought all Kiev into its hands, disarming the Russian

¹⁵ For the compromising attitude of the Central *Rada*, see, Pipes, *op. cit.*, p. 53 ff. Also: John S. Reshetar, Jr. *The Ukrainian Revolution, A Study in Nationalism*, Princeton University Press, 1952, pp. 53 ff.

¹⁶ For nationalist criticism, see, O. R. Martovych, *The Ukrainian Liberation Movement in Modern Times*. Edinburgh, Scottish League for European Freedom, 1951, p. 40.

units and police and arresting Leparsky, the commander of the Kiev militia. On the morning of July 18, 1917, Kiev was completely in the hands of 5,000 armed Ukrainian soldiers who occupied all important military objectives, including the bridges over the Dnieper River, the banks, state buildings, etc. The Russian authorities completely lost their heads. However, this well organized attempt at a coup was disavowed by the leaders of the Central *Rada*, to which the delegates of the Polubotok Regiment reported for further instructions, and the regiment itself was ordered back to barracks. Another Ukrainian regiment of the Kiev garrison, the Bohdan Khmelnytsky Regiment, supported, after some hesitation, the action of the Central *Rada*. The Central *Rada* was able to wire to Petrograd that order had been reestablished.¹⁷ The Russian units of the garrison received their arms and together with Bohdan Khmelnytsky Regiment disarmed the Polubotok Regiment, which was subsequently sent to the front where it distinguished itself as a fighting unit.¹⁸

Another important factor which largely contributed to the formation of national units in the Army was the vacillating attitude of the Russian Provisional Government on the problem. This vacillation was due to the fact that Russian opinion was divided on this problem. The movement found its strongest supporters among the commanding officers of the old Army, while its most resolute opponents were among the different groups of the ruling "democracy." Such a division was strange; nevertheless, it was a fact. While Russian commanders at the front recognized the capacity of the national units to withstand the demoralizing effects of Bolshevik propaganda,¹⁹ and sponsored the formation of

¹⁷ Cf. Dmytro Doroshenko, *Istoria Ukrainy 1917-1923 (History of Ukraine 1917-1923)*, New York, Bulava, 1954, 2nd Ed. Vol. I., pp. 364-369. Included is the text of the telegram sent by the Central *Rada* to Petrograd (p. 368) and the excerpts of the letter written by the Commanding Officer of the infantry division in ranks of which the Polubotok Regiment fought at the front (p. 369).

¹⁸ For the Polubotok Regiment's coup, see, M. Padalka, *Vystup Polubotkivtsiv 4-9 lypnia 1917 r. v Kyevi na foni sytuatsii toho chasu* ["Polubotok Regiment's Coup on July 4-9 (17-22), 1917, on the Background of the Situation of those Times"]. *Do Zbroi (To Arms)*, Tarnow, 1921, pp. 64 ff. Also: Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, pp. 364-369. Smolych ascribed the coup to the Bolshevik influence as did also Col. K. Oberuchev. See analysis, by Lew Shankowsky, *Vystup Polubotkivtsiv u Kyevi* ("Polubotok Regiment's Coup in Kiev"). *Ukrainsky Samostiynyk*, Munich, Germany, No. 1, p. 36-38, No. 2, p. 23-26, No. 3, p. 31-36, 1957. From the Russian side: Milyukov, *Istoria Vtoroi Russkoi Revolutsii (History of the Second Russian Revolution)*, Sophia, 1922, Vol. I, part II, pp. 80182. Also: K. Oberuchev, *Vospominania (Reminiscences)*, New York 1930, p. 289. Col. Oberuchev was then Commander of the Kiev Military District.

¹⁹ This statement is corroborated by the Russian historian Michael T. Florinsky. He states that "the formation of national troops—Polish, Ukrainian,

military units of non-Russians, the Russian "democrats," mostly in the rear, obstructed the formation of such units by all possible means and were considerably aided in their efforts by local Soviets and Russian soldiers' committees. The formation of the Ukrainian military units had its most ardent opponent in Col. K. Oberuchev,²⁰ an old Russian Socialist-Revolutionary who returned from exile and occupied on May 12, 1917, the post of Military Commissar of the Kiev Military District. In his capacity Col. Oberuchev published a series of articles in the Kiev Russian paper, *Kievskaya Mysl*, in which he sharply condemned the "Ukrainization of the bayonet" and denounced it as detrimental to the "cause of revolution." In his articles he did not refrain from abusing the Ukrainian soldiers by calling them "deserters" who shirked their duty to fight on the front under the pretext of joining the Ukrainian units in the rear. Of course Col. Oberuchev did not limit himself to writing articles in a newspaper; he was always ready to do whatever he could to hinder the creation of the Ukrainian units. When Gen. A. A. Brusilov authorized the First Ukrainian Regiment in Kiev, Oberuchev tried to delay the publication of his order and relayed it only after three weeks' time during which he attempted to get this order countermanded from Petrograd. At last, on Gen. Brusilov's insistence, he capitulated and recognized the Ukrainian regiment officially by an order of the day. Undoubtedly, he did it with a heavy heart.

It must be said that the ire of Col. Oberuchev was directed chiefly against the officers and soldiers of the First Bohdan Khmelnytsky Regiment, which by mid-May numbered 3,574 officers and men and was organized into 16 companies with cadres of cavalry, artillery and engineers. It was planned to expand the regiment into a division, but Col. Oberuchev obstructed this in every way. When on August 8, 1917, the Regiment was sent to the front, Col. Oberuchev allowed Prince Speransky's Cuirassiers of Guards and the Don Cossacks to attack

Lettish (?—L. Sh.), Latvian (?—L. Sh.), Moslem, Georgian, Armenian—was regarded in *some* quarters as an effective way to counteract demoralization." (Italics and interrogation marks of this writer—there is confusion in "Lettish" and "Latvian" which, actually, mean the same nationality—Latvian. Cf. Michael T. Florinsky, *Russia: A History and Interpretation*. New York, Macmillan, 1953, Vol. II, p. 1408. All Russian Commanders-in-Chief belonged to the "quarters" which supported the formation of the Ukrainian army corps and divisions. However, some Russian commanders as e. g. Gen. A. Denikin were its sturdest opponents. Gen. Denikin in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Western Front forbade the units of the front to enter into any relations with the Ukrainian General Military Committee of the Central *Rada* which, elected at a recognized Military Congress, was an official institution. Cf. Denikin, *op. cit.*, p. 131.

²⁰ For Oberuchev's point of view, see his *Vospominania (Reminiscences)*, New York, 1930.

the Khmelnytsky Regiment, which was departing from the railway station in Post Volynsky for the front. The Ukrainians, assaulted as they were preparing to sleep in the echelons, were helpless; a number of Ukrainians were killed and wounded.²¹

It is evident that both sides tried to influence the Government and to persuade it to accept their point of view. The trouble was that since the opponents had no real force to cope with the mass movement in the Army, they employed chicaneries of all kinds. This only infuriated the soldiers and prompted them to more resolute action. The history of the *Hetman* Petro Doroshenko Regiment in Chernyiv can serve as a classical example of how some Russian authorities aggravated the situation.

In the second half of May several thousand Ukrainian soldiers assembled in Chernyiv and asked their proper rear command the authority to form as a Ukrainian regiment. They were refused by both the Chernyiv command and the Military District in Kiev. The soldiers continued formation by a "revolutionary action," but were refused room in the barracks and were forced to lodge in tents on an athletic field. A Russian attempt failed at disarming the Ukrainian regiment on the occasion of a military parade in Chernyiv (it was the day when the Ukrainian regiment received its colors from the Ukrainian community). Instead of being disarmed, the Ukrainians disarmed the Russians and seized their barracks with arms and ammunition. Then the Chernyiv command refused the Ukrainian regiment food and supplies, but for some time the neighboring Ukrainian villages provided food for their soldiers. Wire after wire was sent to the Command of the Kiev Military District and to the Central *Rada* asking them to disperse 5,000 Ukrainian "deserters" and to send them to the front. Of course, there was no force available to do that. Again the Central *Rada* intervened. It dispatched inspectors to the unit to check on the affair. Negotiations with the Chernyiv command started. Finally the inspectors of the *Rada* reached a workable compromise: the Doroshenko Regiment agreed to leave the area of Chernyiv and to proceed to the front. It agreed to break up into march battalions which successively, one by one, were to depart from Chernyiv, but at the front those march battalions were to remain Ukrainian units. Thus, by the second half of June, 1917,

²¹ Cf. Reshetar, *op. cit.*, pp. 73-74. Chronology of the official recognition of the Bohdan Khmelnytsky Regiment: Brusilov's order on May 4 (17), 1917, order of the day by the Staff of the Kiev Military District on May 25 (June 7), 1917. Cf. Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, p. 362 ff. Also, Denikin, *op. cit.*, p. 129. Denikin confirms that Gen. Brusilov insisted that Petrograd not countermand his Order and thus not injure his prestige and reputation.

the problem of the Doroshenko Regiment in Chernyhiw had been solved, but the question arises, and still is to be answered: could not the force of those Ukrainian "deserters" have been used then for establishing a sovereign Ukrainian nation independent from Petrograd? Every Ukrainian city had a similar problem.²² Lenin answered this question positively only several months later. He manipulated the force of Russian "deserters" to establish his party's power in Russia and . . . succeeded.²³

To all these problems the Russian Provisional Government in Petrograd maintained a negative or ostrich-like attitude and thus only poured oil on the fire. In many cases, no Ukrainian propaganda could achieve better results than this negative attitude of the Provisional Government. How the Ukrainian soldiers reacted can be shown by Kerensky's failure to prevent the Second Ukrainian Military Congress in Kiev. The fact that the Government permitted the Polish Military Congress in Petrograd and, at the same time, forbade the Ukrainian meeting in Kiev irked the Ukrainian soldiers immensely. They held protest meetings at the front and in the rear and in their resolutions urged the *Rada* and the Ukrainian General Military Committee to proceed with the plans of the Congress.²⁴ As a result the forbidden Congress was attended by several thousand delegates from all sectors of the front, from both fleets, and from many military garrisons in the rear, and turned into a tremendous demonstration against the Russian

²² In June 1917, there were Ukrainian regiments in Rostov (5,000 soldiers), in Simferopol (1 regiment), in Kharkiv (1 regiment), in Kremenchuk (1), in Katerinoslav (2 regiments), in Odessa (a Ukrainian brigade), etc. They existed also in Russia proper: in Petrograd, in Moscow, Saratov, Pensa, Simbirsk, etc. At least 17 reserve regiments in the rear were forming as Ukrainian units. Cf. Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, pp. 358-359.

²³ The account of the Chernyhiw incident is based upon the memoirs of a participant. See, Kharakternyk, *Zhadky z mynuloho* ("Reminiscences From the Past"). *Literaturno-Naukovyi Visnyk*, Lviv, 1924, No. 7-9, p. 285; Nos. 2, 10, 11 in 1925; No. 1, 1926. These also deal with Polubotok Regiment coup in Kiev and with the fate of the XXIth Ukrainized army corps on the Northern front and its demobilization in February, 1918, in the area of Chernyhiw.

²⁴ The Ukrainian General Military Committee (UGVK) was the military executive branch of the Central *Rada*. It was elected at the First Ukrainian Military Congress in Kiev. Its presidium consisted of: Volodymyr Vynnychenko, Simon Petlura, Dr. Ivan Lutsenko, Col. Victor Pavlenko, Col. Alexander Pylkevych, Lt. Michael Poloz, Maj. Gen. Michael Ivaniv. The Second Military Congress of June 1917, enlarged the Committee and extended its competences by transforming it into a sort of headquarters for the Ukrainian units. For the composition and organization of the Committee see, *History of the Ukrainian Armed Forces*, *op. cit.*, pp. 367-368. For the characteristics of its members, see, Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, pp. 357-358.

Provisional Government and for Ukrainian independence. "The Russian Government is against us! Down with it!" cried the soldiers on the streets of the Ukrainian capital.

In the sessions the soldiers were quite belligerent and in their speeches advocated "a complete break with Moscow and the immediate proclamation of an independent Ukrainian Republic." Some even called upon the Ukrainian soldiers "to resort to arms to win Ukraine's freedom."²⁵ There can be no doubt that much of the success of this Congress was due to the unfortunate and truly "untimely" order of the Russian War Minister (Kerensky) which was certainly issued under the pressure of the anti-Ukrainian groups within the "Russian democracy," but which no Russian commander at the front and in the rear dared to carry out and thus stop the Ukrainian officers and soldiers from going to their Congress. Therefore, we are inclined to share the opinion of a Ukrainian military historian who attributed the growth of the Ukrainian military movement in 1917 also to "permanent conflicts, misunderstandings, and affronts" on the part of the Russian Provisional Government and some Russian military and civilian authorities. They had the opposite effect of that which was intended: they incited the masses of the Ukrainian soldiers and provoked them to action.²⁶

Every student of the disintegration of the Imperial Russian Army must surely come to the conclusion that of all those movements causing disintegration of the Imperial Army in 1917 along national lines, by all odds the most robust and the most important was that of the Ukrainians.²⁷ It embraced large masses of officers and soldiers of Ukrainian descent, who willingly joined the Ukrainian regiments bearing the names of Ukrainian *Hetmans* or prominent Ukrainian military leaders of the past. Whole army corps and divisions at the front were reorganized as

²⁵ True sentiments of the convening Ukrainian soldiers are best characterized by a Russian reporter, Brinsky, in his report in *Kievskaya Mysl*. Cf. note 14. At the same time the Ukrainian Peasants' Congress convened in Kiev and also displayed nationalist sentiments, even demanding the immediate introduction of autonomy without regard to Petrograd. Cf. Pipes, *op. cit.*, pp. 57 & 59.

²⁶ Zenon Stefaniv, *Viyskovi syly chasiv Centralnoyi Rady* ("Military Forces of the Central Rada"). *History of the Ukrainian Armed Forces*, *op. cit.*, p. 358.

²⁷ This statement is corroborated by the Military Commissar of the Russian Provisional Government at the *Stavka* (Headquarters), V. B. Stankevich. See, V. B. Stankevich, *Vospominania (Reminiscences)*, Berlin, Ladyzhnikov Publisher, 1920, p. 148 ff. He lists War Minister Kerensky among the resolute opponents of the Ukrainization of the Army, but states that, nevertheless, the Ukrainians were doing in the Army "what they were willing to do." Cf. p. 149.

Ukrainian national units with their own national insignia and with Ukrainian as the language of command. All throughout the Russian units the Ukrainians were demanding transfer to their own units in order to serve under their own national banners and under command of their own officers. It is noteworthy that while in the Russian units Bolshevik propaganda succeeded in turning the soldiers against their own officers, conditions within the Ukrainian units showed an ideal fraternization of the Ukrainian soldiers with their own officers.²⁸ The reason for this was simple: it was easy for the Bolsheviks to turn the Russian *muzhiks* against their officers who were mostly of an aristocratic or strictly professional type and who never fraternized with the soldiers, whom they regarded as a sort of "gray cattle" with whom one does not become familiar.²⁹ Conditions in the Ukrainian units were different. The bulk of the officers were reserve officers (in civilian life—teachers, agriculturists, employees of the numerous Ukrainian cooperative societies, sons of priests, students, etc.), often themselves of peasant origin and therefore psychologically very close to the soldiers. They looked after their soldiers well, cared for their comfort, organized lectures, courses for illiterates and debating societies, and led choirs and theatrical circles, etc. They enjoyed prestige and respect among the soldiers, who looked up to them for leadership and were ready to do all their leaders asked of them.³⁰ This was why even the Russified or slightly nationally conscious professional officers of the Russian Army soon discovered the

²⁸ See, memoirs of Lt. Gen. Petro Yeroshevych, Commander of the XIth Army Corps of the Russian Army which was Ukrainized at the South-Western front in the fall of 1917 (11th, 32nd, and 159th infantry divisions): *Z borotby ukrainskoho narodu za derzhavnist* ("From the Fight of the Ukrainian People for Statedom"). *Za Derzhavnist (For Statedom)*, Vol. VIII, Warsaw 1937. Gen. Yeroshevych commanded later an army corps in the Ukrainian War of Independence.

²⁹ Gen. A. F. Rahoza (Ragoza), Commander of the 4th Army and later Ukrainian War Minister in 1918, complained to Sir Alfred W. Knox, British military attache to the Imperial Russian Government, on the behavior of the Russian officers. He said: "Unfortunately the mass of Russian officers seemed to think that their duty began and ended with leading their men in the attack . . . The soldier . . . wanted officers that he could look up to and would then be ready to do all they might ask of him." Cf. Sir Alfred W. Knox, *With the Russian Army 1914-1917*, 2 vols. New York, Dutton, 1921, vol. II, p. 453. Knox's interview with Gen. A. F. Rahoza confirms that even higher officers of Ukrainian descent were perfectly cognizant of peculiar duties of an officer at the front. In another place Rahoza bitterly complained of drinking and card-playing habits of professional officers.

³⁰ See, Col. V. Savchenko, *Spohady pro ukrainskyi rukh v XII Armii* ("Memoirs About the Ukrainian Movement in the XIIth Army"), *Za Derzhavnist*, Vol. I, Warsaw 1930. Corroborated by V. B. Stankevich, *op. cit.*, p. 200.

advantages of their national origin and became anxious to enter the Ukrainian units. There, they knew, they would find protection and due respect.³¹ It was not only officers of Ukrainian origin who realized this: after the Bolshevik *coup d'état* in November and the assassination of the Commander-in-Chief, Gen. N. N. Dukhonin, in the *Stavka* in Mohylev, numerous Russian generals and officers fled to the Ukrainian units for refuge from the Red terror raging in their own Russian units.³²

However, this was the reason, too, why the Ukrainian units at the front managed to preserve their morale and discipline to the end in spite of the Bolshevik propaganda. The Ukrainian units were the only ones which held the front to the very end of hostilities and long after all the others, not excluding the patriotic and disciplined Cossacks, had left the trenches and gone home.³³ The Ukrainians abandoned

³¹ Among many higher officers of Ukrainian descent who through Ukrainian units of the Old Army found their way to Ukrainian nationality and were later active participants in the Ukrainian War of Independence (1917-1921) were: Art. Gen. A. F. Ragoza (Commander-in-Chief of the 4th Army in 1915-1917; Ukrainian War Minister in 1918); Lt. Gen. Mykola Yunakiv (1871-1931), Professor of the Imperial War Academy, Chief of Staff of the 4th Army in 1915-1917, Commander-in-Chief of the IXth Army in 1917, in 1919 Chief of General Staff of the Ukrainian Army; Art. Gen. Alexander Halkin, on the Staff of Western Front in 1917, Chief of the General Staff of the Ukrainian Army in 1920; Art. Gen. A. F. Ragoza (Commander-in-Chief of the 4th Army in 1915-1917; of Artillery of the Ukrainian Army; Lt. Gen. Michael Omelanovych-Pavlenko, Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Galician Army in 1919, Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Army 1919-1920; Lt. Gen. Victor Zelinsky, organizer of Ukrainian divisions in the German prisoners of war camps; Maj. Gen. Alexander Osetsky, Commanding officer of the 4th Infantry Division, corps commander in the Ukrainian Army; Lt. Gen. Petro Yeroshevych; Maj. Gen. V. Dashkevych-Horbatsky; Maj. Gen. Alexander Hrekiv, and others.

³² Not all Russian generals and officers who saved their lives seeking protection with the Ukrainian units showed their gratitude to the Ukrainians, but some did as, for example, Maj. Gen. Borys Bobrovsky who served in the Ukrainian General Staff, and Maj. Gen. K. Prysovsky who commanded a Ukrainian division. A Georgian, General Natiev in 1918 commanded a Ukrainian Army Division. Unfortunately, many others remained "neutral" at the time of the First Ukrainian War (1917-1918) against the Red Russians, and thus dug their own graves. After the Red Guards of the former Tsarist, Colonel Muravyev, seized Kiev in February, 1918, they perpetrated a terrible massacre of thousands of officers of the Old Army who remained in the Ukrainian capital. Some officers of Russian (or Russo-German) descent betrayed the cause of their saviors and fled to the Red or White Russians as e. g. the editor of the materials and documents on the dissolution of the Russian Army in 1917, Col. Kakurin and Gen. Mai-Mayevsky, Gen. Schilling, etc.

³³ Confirmed by many Ukrainian sources quoted in this article and corroborated by Soviet sources: Pokrovsky, Kakurin, Mints-Eidemann, etc. Also, see, a Russian emigre source: *Arkhiv Russkoy Revolyutsii (The Archives of the Rus-*

their positions only on the orders of their leaders,³⁴ and mostly tried to return home as military body. With the exception of the XXIst Ukrainized Army Corps from the Northern front which returned home to the Chernyiv area in February, 1918,³⁵ and some smaller units³⁶ which succeeded in fighting their way through heavy concentrations of the Red forces in Byelorussia, the Ukrainian units either were demobilized at the front after turning the parts of occupied Galicia over to the Austro-Hungarian Army in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk³⁷ or were dispersed en route home by stronger Red concentrations.³⁸ The First Ukrainian Army Corps disobeyed the order

sian Revolution) Vol. XIII, p. 159, which brings evidence that the 33rd Ukrainian Division of the XXIst Army Corps left their trenches in late January, 1918, only after all others had done it.

³⁴ The Central *Rada* resolved to demobilize the Army on January 16, 1918, and, accordingly, its General Secretary of War, Mykola Porsh, issued a Demobilization Order on January 17, 1918. Cf. Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, p. 374 ff. The idea of the leaders of the Central *Rada* was to form a "people's militia" instead of a standing army. Strangely enough, they developed this idea in the middle of the First Ukrainian War against the Bolsheviks.

³⁵ Cf. Kharakternyk, *op. cit.*, No. 1, 1926, p. 33.

³⁶ For example, the Ukrainians of the 7th Turkestanian Div. of the IIIrd Siberian Army Corps on the Western Front formed a Ukrainian cavalry regiment which, under the leadership of Col. Vsevolod Petriv-Werner, Chief of Staff of the Division, fought its way from Mir in Byelorussia to Kiev and took part in the Ukrainian War of Independence up to 1920 as *Koshovyi Otaman Kost Hordienko Zaporozhian Cavalry Regiment*, one of the best units of the Ukrainian Army. Cf. *Zaporozhskiy imeni Kostia Hordienka polk kinnykh haydamakiv* (Zaporozhian Kost Hordienko Cavalry Regiment). *Literaturno-Naukovyi Visnyk (Literary-Scientific Messenger)*, Lviv, No. 4, 1928. See, also, Gen. Vsevolod Petriv, *Spohady (Memoirs)*, 4 vols. Lviv, *Chervona Kalyna*, 1928. Also the *Hetman Ivan Mazepa Cavalry Regiment* fought its way from the Northern Front to Poltava in Ukraine, in January, 1918.

³⁷ An Austro-Hungarian source: *Oesterreichs-Ungarns letzter Krieg*, Wien, 1938, Vol. VI and VII, lists the Ukrainian units at the front and testifies that the Ukrainian units handed over to them parts of Galicia and Bukovina after the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. From Ukrainian sources we know that these were the 2nd Ukrainian Army Corps in Galicia, and the XXVIth Ukrainized Army Corps in Bukovina. See, Alexander Shapoval, *Na porozhni ukrainskoi hetmanskoj derzhavy* ("On the Threshold of the Ukrainian Hetman State"). *Sich*, Chicago, 1929, No. 17, and Severyn Levytsky, *1917 rik v zapysnyku ukrainskoho sichovoho striltsya* ("The Year 1917 in the Notebook of the Ukrainian Sich Rifleman"). *Novy Chas (The New Times)*, Lviv, February 5, 1937, p. 3.

³⁸ This was the fate of the Xth Ukrainized Army Corps on the Rumanian front. Its 9th Infantry Division going home to Poltava met strong Red resistance along the Dnieper River near Kremenchuk. The other Division (the 31st) was demobilized in Balta. Cf. V. Korniyiv, *Spohady pro ukrainskyi 36 pishyi Orlovskiy polk* ("Memoirs About the Ukrainian 36th Orlovsky Infantry Regiment"). *Za Derzhavnist (For Statedom)*, Vol. I. Warsaw, 1930.

of Red Commander-in-Chief Krylenko to proceed to the front and, instead, occupied the railway junctions of Zhmerinka and Kozyatyn, where it disarmed all Red echelons trying to advance against Kiev during the First Red war against the Central *Rada*.³⁹ By this it prevented the Red seizure of the Ukrainian capital in November-December, 1917.

It is no wonder, therefore, that all the Russian Commanders-in-Chief in 1917, along with many Russian front commanders, were among the strongest supporters of the "Ukrainization of the bayonet." It would be ridiculous to suspect these commanders of being "Ukrainophiles" or "sponsors of Ukrainian separatism;" yet as professional military men they had no other choice. They were anxious to preserve the Army as a fighting instrument and so they had to rely on the Ukrainian Army Corps and divisions, which preserved order and discipline at a time when the dissolution of the Russian units was marked by violent outbursts against officers,⁴⁰ when thousands of deserters swarmed the cities in the rear and thousands AWOL's formed bands, making the whole countryside insecure because of their excesses.⁴¹ At the same time, the percentage of the deserters from the Ukrainian units was abnormally small and 70 per cent of the soldiers returned from their leaves.⁴² Having to choose between Bolshevism and Ukrainian separatism the Russian front commanders chose . . . separatism,⁴³

³⁹ See, Col. H. Porokhivsky, *Spohady pro I. ukraïnskyi korpus* ("Memoirs About the 1st Ukrainian Corps"). *Almanac Dnipro*, Lviv, 1934. Also, "The Memoirs" of *Hetman* Paul Skoropadsky, then Commander of the 1st Ukrainian Army Corps in *Khliborobska Ukraina*, Vienna 1922-23, Vol. IV, p. 39-40.

⁴⁰ Corroborated by Jules Legras, *Memoires de Russie* (Paris, Payot, 1921) and Nicolas de Monkevitz, *La decomposition de l'armee russe* (Paris, Payot, 1919). Among quite "innocent" practices of Russian soldiers against their officers we count the practice of throwing bombs and grenades into officers' quarters which, according to Gen. Golovin, became a very popular sport in the Russian Army of 1917. Cf. N. N. Golovin, *The Russian Army in the World War*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1931, p. 237.

⁴¹ Golovin, *op. cit.*, p. 233 ff.

⁴² Cf. Gen. Vsevolod Petriv, *Do istorii formuvannia viyska na Ukrayini pid chas revolutsyi* ("To the History of the Formation of the Army in Ukraine During the Revolution"). *Literaturno-Naukovyi Visnyk (Literary-Scientific Messenger)*, Lviv, 1930, No. 11. Gen. Petriv puts the percentage of the deserters in the Ukrainian units of the 2nd Army on the Western Front at one half per cent of the effectives. Chamberlin estimates the number of the deserters of the Russian Army in 1917 at 900,000. See, William Henry Chamberlin, *The Russian Revolution*, New York, Macmillan, 1935. See, Chapter X: "The Mutiny of the Russian Army."

⁴³ Lt. Gen. Paul Skoropadsky, a collateral descendant of *Hetman* Ivan Skoropadsky (1709-1722), aide-de-camp to Czar Nicholas II and Commanding Officer of the XXXIVth Army Corps of the Old Army, which became the 1st Ukrainian

because they had fully realized the profound importance of their soldiers' Ukrainian nationalism as a means of stopping Bolshevism from spreading in the Army. It was their own experience with the Ukrainian units that told them to support them against the ill will of "Russia firsters." With their own eyes they could observe the Ukrainian units at the front and see how, inspired with the lofty spirit of national aspirations, they were able to oppose the demoralizing effects of the Red propaganda, to preserve their national identity and to maintain lasting military values among the chaos.

During the years of the Revolution three Commanders-in-Chief held their posts in the *Stavka*, and all three were enthusiastic supporters of the "Ukrainization of the bayonet": Gen. A. A. Brusilov, Gen. L. G. Kornilov, and Gen. N. N. Dukhonin. It was Gen. Brusilov who not only authorized the First Ukrainian Regiment in Kiev, but also designated the First Army Corps at the front for Ukrainization. At the Conference of the leaders of the Central *Rada* with War Minister Kerensky at the *Stavka*, on May 27, 1917, Gen. Brusilov insisted on the speedy Ukrainization of the army units at the front and in the rear and largely impressed the reluctant Kerensky with his arguments. The Conference then resolved to Ukrainize three Army Corps at the South-Western Front and 17 reserve regiments in the rear, which would remain the 17 divisions only with Ukrainian contingents.⁴⁴ Drawing upon his experience as former front commander, Gen. Brusilov designated the VIth, XVIIth, and XLIst Army Corps for Ukrainization. Besides, at the Southwestern Front there was also the XXXIVth Army Corps which was largely composed of Ukrainians and was later transformed into the Ist Ukrainian Army Corps. In accordance with the resolutions of this Conference, the Ukrainian General Military Committee in Kiev began to Ukrainize the reserve regiments in Ukraine and was able to

Army Corps, said frankly to Maj. Gen. Peter N. Krasnov, the *Ataman* of the Don Cossacks, at their meeting in August 1918, that the motives for his becoming a Ukrainian general and *Hetman* of Ukraine were those of choosing between Bolshevism and Ukrainian separatism. However, *Hetman* Skoropadsky died in 1944 as a convinced Ukrainian separatist and leader of the Ukrainian monarchists in exile. So did his interlocutor, Gen. Krasnov. He died a Cossack separatist. As commanding officer of the Cossack Corps which fought on the German side against the Soviets, he was extradited after the war and hanged with other Cossack generals in Moscow in 1945. Cf. P. N. Krasnov, *Vsevelikoye Voysko Donskoye* (The Great Army of the Don). *Arkhiv Russkoy Revolutsii* (The Archives of the Russian Revolution), Vol. V: p. 191.

⁴⁴ Cf. H. Yurtyk (Gen. Yurko Tiutiunnyk), *Vseukrainskyi viyskovyi generalnyi komitet i tymchasove pravytelstvo* ("The All-Ukrainian General Military Committee and the Provisional Government"), *Literaturno-Naukovyi Visnyk* (Literary-Scientific Messenger), 1923, No. 5, p. 39.

dispatch 70 Ukrainian combat battalions up to the time of the Kerensky offensive which remanned the Army Corps designated for Ukrainization.⁴⁵ From one Ukrainian city alone, Katerynoslav, seven such battalions were sent to the front.⁴⁶

Every student of the war on the Eastern front knows that the Southwestern Front was one of the most important fronts during World War I. Under the command of Gen. Brusilov, this Front carried on a large-scale offensive in 1916, which brought the Russian Army considerable success. The same front was also designated in 1917 to sustain Kerensky's war effort and to mount the last large offensive of the Russian Army in 1917. However, not every student of the war knows that from the beginning of World War I the Southwestern front was essentially a Ukrainian front. It ran through Ukrainian territory and its front units consisted of large numbers of Ukrainians. Here and on the neighboring Rumanian Front, because of their proximity to Ukraine, the "Ukrainization of the bayonet" embraced the largest military bodies—whole armies and army corps—and here even the waves of the Red dissolution were considerably weaker than at the Northern or Western Front in the immediate vicinity of "revolutionary" Petrograd.⁴⁷

The student of the ill-fated Kerensky offensive of July 1917 may know even its details, but he certainly overlooks one important fact: *the offensive was successful so long as the Ukrainian units were in action, and it abruptly turned to defeat and to complete rout of the Russian Army when the turn came for the Russians to advance.* Whole

⁴⁵ Cf. V. K. Z *druhoho Vseukrainskoho viyskovoho zyzdu* ("From the Second All-Ukrainian Military Congress"). *Literaturno-Naukovyi Visnyk (Literary-Scientific Messenger)*, Lviv, 1923, No. 8, p. 142.

⁴⁶ Cf. Ivan Hnoyovy, *Z ukrainskoho rukhu Sichslavskoi zalohy* ("About the Ukrainian Movement in the Garrison of Katerynoslav"). *Za Derzavnist (For Statedom)*, Vol. V, Warsaw 1936.

⁴⁷ Gen. Golovin characterizes the Southwestern front in this way: "The Southwestern front, in the rear of which was Kiev, was in a more healthy state; and the waves of dissolution reached it only later on . . . As for the armies on the Rumanian front, they made the best showing . . ." Cf. N. N. Golovin, *The Russian Army in the World War*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1931, p. 249-250. The conditions on the Northern front were characterized by Gen. Klembovsky: "The Northern front is in a condition of dissolution. Not a single officer's order is fulfilled without begging and humiliation before soldiers. Fraternalizing (with the enemy—L. Sh.) goes everywhere; if machine guns are turned against the fraternizing mobs of soldiers they throw themselves on the guns and make them useless . . . The 12th Army could not help the 5th with an artillery demonstration because the soldiers refused to permit the opening of the fire." Cf. Golovin, *op. cit.*, p. 233.

Russian, and even Polish⁴⁸ units mutinied and, instead of to the front, they marched to the rear.⁴⁹ "We want to wage war, but we don't want to go to the trenches," was a unanimously accepted resolution of a Russian regiment while several others left the trenches and forced the other units to do the same thing, opening a clear way for the German-Austrian advance. Regiment after regiment refused to obey orders under the influence of the Bolsheviks, and officers who insisted on obedience were brutally murdered by their own men. Meanwhile the Germans and Austrians received considerable reinforcements and passed themselves to the offensive. Along the entire front the Russians, greatly superior in numbers, retreated without a pretence of fighting, while the enemy steadily advanced and reoccupied nearly all of Galicia. The decimated Ukrainian units⁵⁰ could then be of little help. On the 17th of July, at the very time of the debacle on the front, the Bolsheviks mutinied in Petrograd, and as a result of the two days' revolt more than 500 men, women, and children were killed in the city. However, at that time, the Bolsheviks failed to establish their power in Russia.⁵¹

Thus, the Kerensky offensive opened with a startling success and ended in failure. We attribute the success to the Ukrainians and Czechoslovaks, and the failure to the Russians. This can be shown by the facts. The main attack of the offensive was to be launched by the Southwestern front in the direction of Lviv, while the attacks on the Northern and Western fronts were to be of a secondary nature. The offensive on the

⁴⁸ Cf. Wladyslaw Pobog-Malinowski, *Najnowsza Historia Polityczna Polski (Modern Political History of Poland)*, Paris, 1953, Vol. I, p. 320. The Polish cavalry distinguished itself in Kornilov's offensive. *Ibid.*

⁴⁹ The Preobrazhensky Regiment of Guards, ordered to proceed to the front, marched under the leadership of its Bolshevik leader, Capt. Dziewaltowski 25 kilometers to the rear. Dziewaltowski was arrested, tried in Kiev, but found not guilty. Cf. Gen. M. Omelanovych-Pavlenko, *Spohady* ("Memoirs"). *Literaturno-Naukovyi Visnyk (Literary-Scientific Messenger)*, Lviv, 1929, No. 10, p. 888. No. 11, 12, 1930: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6.

⁵⁰ See, V. K. *op. cit.*, (Note 45). The 155th Inf. Div. lost 75 per cent of its effectives. The VIth Corps was praised by the Russian Commanders. The *Stavka* wired to the Ukrainian General Military Committee: "The VIth Corps honestly fulfilled its duty before the Fatherland." See, *ibid.* and Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, p. 369-370.

⁵¹ The Soviet writer Yuriy Smolych and the Russian democrat Col. Oberuchev connect the Polubotok Regiment's coup in Kiev with the Bolshevik coup in Petrograd. Both of them are wrong. The coup in Kiev was directed by the "father" of the Ukrainian Independence Movement, Mykola Mikhnovsky, who tried only to exploit the state of aggravated crisis caused by the failure of the Kerensky's offensive. It is quite possible that the Bolshevik reasoning followed the same line. See, also, note 18.

Southwestern front began on June 29 and the Corps of the XIth and VIIth Armies launched the attack under the cover of an artillery and air bombardment of unprecedented character. The enemy's defenses and batteries were leveled to the ground and his first line swept back in rout. Here is the disposition of the XIth and VIIth Armies for the attack:

SOUTHWESTERN FRONT:

Commander-in-Chief: Gen. Gutor; Chief of Staff: Gen. Dukhonin.

In the first line:

In reserve:

XIth ARMY:

XVIIth Army Corps (Ukrainian)
35th Inf.

Ist Corps of Guards (R)
Transbaikal Cossacks

XLIXth Army Corps (Russian and Czech)
4th Finnish Rifle, 6th Finnish Rifle,
Czechoslovak, 82nd Inf.

VIth Army Corps (Ukrainian)
2nd Finnish Rifle, 4th Inf. (Ukrainian)
16th Inf. (Ukrainian), 151st, 155th
(Ukrainian)

Vth Army Corps (Ukrainized)
7th (Ukrainian), 10th (Ukrainian)

VIIth ARMY:

XL1st Army Corps (Ukrainian & Russian)
3rd Transamur, 5th Transamur,
74th Inf. (Ukrainian), 113th Inf.
(Ukrainian)

IInd Corps of Guards (R)
1st Polish Division
5th Cavalry Corps
11th Cavalry Corps

VIIth Siberian Rifle Corps
Special Siberian, 108th Inf.

XLVth Army Corps (R)
122nd, 126th, 194th Inf.

XXXIVth Army Corps (later Ist Ukrainian)
23rd Inf. (Ukrainian), 104th Inf.
(Ukrainian), 153rd (Ukrainian),
19th Siberian Rifle

XXIIInd Army Corps
1st Finnish Rifle, 3rd Finnish Rifle,
5th Finnish Rifle, 159th Inf]

In the first line of the XIth Army was the VIth Army Corps, parts of the XLIXth Corps (Czechs) and the Vth Army Corps. The VIth Army Corps distinguished itself: it took the enemy's first three lines of

trenches,⁵² and the village of Koniukhy, where it captured nearly the entire Ukrainian Legion of the Austro-Hungarian Army (the Riflemen of the *Sich* Regiment) which offered no resistance. The rout of the enemy infantry on the sector of the VIth Corps was so complete that thousands surrendered without fighting. However, the 82nd Infantry Division of the XLIXth Army Corps refused to attack and exposed the right flank of the VIth to heavy counterattacks. Moreover, as the advance progressed, the Ukrainian units, which had suffered heavy losses, melted away while the Russian units in the rear became so disorganized that instead of proceeding to the front they marched in the opposite direction.⁵³ When the Czechs of the XLIXth Army Corps seized Zboriv where the entire 81st (Czech) Regiment of the Austro-Hungarian Army surrendered to them without fight, the divisions of the XXXIVth Army Corps under Gen. Paul Skoropadsky made a spectacular attack on the city of Berezhany—an enemy key position (Mountain Lysonia)—on the way to Lviv. Because of heavy losses (the 23rd Inf. was reduced to 2,000 bayonets) the attack of the Corps exhausted itself. Gen. Skoropadsky urgently demanded reinforcements, but there were none: because of the demoralization of the Russian units the Russian war machine was no longer efficient. By 6 PM on July 1st, all the units with the exception of the VIth and VIIth Army Corps had retired to their original trenches.

The morale and fighting capacity of the Ukrainian units in the Kerensky offensive was the chief reason for the favorable attitude of the Russians Commanders-in-Chief to the Ukrainization of the Army. After replacing Gen. Brusilov as Commander-in-Chief, Gen. L. G. Kornilov who himself had good experience with the Ukrainian units of his VIIIth Army (which had borne the brunt of the second phase of the Kerensky offensive in Galicia) ordered immediately the Ukrainization of the XXXIVth and the VIth Army Corps which became the Ist and the IInd Ukrainian Corps.⁵⁴ When the XXIst Army Corps distinguished itself in fighting around Riga in September 1917, Gen. Kornilov ordered its transformation into the IIIrd Ukrainian Army Corps. Furthermore, he designated for Ukrainization the IXth, the Xth, the XIth, the XXVIth, the XXXIInd and the XLth Army Corps and several cavalry divisions. Together with the XVIIth Army Corps (the XLIst was divided into a Ukrainian and a Russian part with the Ukrainians transferred to the Ist Ukrainian Corps) there were all together 10 Army Corps and some 5 cavalry divisions which became Ukrainian in mid-September, 1917.

⁵² Cf. Knox, *op. cit.*, Vol II, p. 642.

⁵³ Cf. Pavlenko, *op. cit.*, p. 890; Golovin, *op. cit.*, p. 236.

⁵⁴ Cf. Skoropadsky, *op. cit.*, p. 39; Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, p. 370.

After Gen. Kornilov's unsuccessful attempt at establishing a military dictatorship in Russia, Gen. N. N. Dukhonin became Commander-in-Chief in the *Stavka*. In November 1917 he started negotiations with the Central *Rada* and on November 19, 1917, he signed an agreement to establish a Ukrainian front to include the former Southwestern and Rumanian fronts, to Ukrainize the Kiev and Odessa Military Districts and to transfer all Ukrainian units from the Northern and Western fronts to the Ukrainian front. The Headquarters of the Ukrainian front were to be established at Svyatoshyno near Kiev, and Gen. Shcherbachev—the Commander of the Rumanian front—agreed to take the command of the Ukrainian front.⁵⁵ After the Red coup in the *Stavka* and the murder of Gen. Dukhonin, all military missions of the Allied powers went from Mohylev to Kiev, where they were received with military honors by the Ukrainian troops under the command of Gen. Tsytovych, a member of the Ukrainian General Military Committee.⁵⁶

We conclude this article with a short survey of the Ukrainian military units on the Eastern front which ranged from Pskov to the Black Sea and was divided into four sectors ("fronts"): Northern, Western, Southwestern, and Rumanian. Another sector was the Caucasian front in the Caucasus.

Northern Front: Ist, Vth and XIIth Army.

First Ukrainian Congress of the Front on May 6, 1917. Greeted officially by the Commanders of the Vth (Gen. Dragomirov) and the XIIth Armies (Gen. Radko-Dimitryev). Resolved the Ukrainization of the XXIst Army Corps (33rd Inf. and 44th Inf. Div.). The Ukrainians of the 136th Inf. Div. transferred to the 33rd Inf. Div. Ukrainians of the 3rd Special Division (4,000 soldiers with high percentage of officers) which were refused transfer to the XXIst Corps, joined the XXIst Army Corps by arbitrary action.⁵⁷ Two Ukrainian cavalry regiments composed of the Ukrainians of the 4th and 14th Cavalry Divisions were also formed at the front. A Ukrainian paper, *Ukrainsky Holos (The Ukrainian Voice)* was published from June to December, 1917, by the Ukrainian Council of the Front.

Western Front: IInd, IIIrd and Xth Army.

First Ukrainian Congress of the Front on April 15, 1917. Ukrainian Soldiers' Council elected. Ukrainization of the IXth Army Corps

⁵⁵ Cf. Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, p. 176-177.

⁵⁶ Cf. Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, p. 233.

⁵⁷ See, Savchenko, *op. cit.*, (Note 30). Also, Petro Protsenko, *Ukrainizatsia na Pivnichnomu Fronti Rossiyskoi Armii* ("Ukrainization of the Northern Front of the Russian Army"). *Za Derzavnist*, Vol. VI, Warsaw 1937.

resolved (35 per cent Ukrainians). Ukrainian reserve regiment of the Front established in Synyavka. Ukrainians of the 7th Turkestanian Division formed a cavalry regiment which fought its way to Ukraine. The Ukrainians of the 1st Finnish Rifle Division fought also their way to Kiev under Gen. Pustovit. The Ukrainized 7th Cavalry Division defended Zhytomyr from the Bolsheviks toward the end of 1917.⁵⁸

Southwestern Front: VIIth, VIIIth, XIth and Special Army.

First Ukrainian Army Corps: VIth, XVIIth, XXXIVth, and XL1st. In September, the XXXIVth transformed into 1st Ukrainian Army Corps, the VIth into the 2nd Ukrainian Army Corps. Besides Ukrainized: the Vth (7th, 10th Inf.), XVIth (23rd, 113th), XXXIIInd (101st, 105th)⁵⁹ and several divisions of the other Army Corps.

Rumanian Front: IVth, VIth, and IXth Army.

Ukrainian Congress of the Front on October 8-13, 1917. Ukrainized Army Corps: Xth (9th and 31st), XIth (11th, 32nd, 159th), XXVIth (65th, 78th), and XLth (3rd Rifle, 4th Rifle Div.). The 4th Rifle Division under Col. Udovychenko (later commanding the best division of the Ukrainian Army) in order and discipline returned from the front to Odessa—its garrison city. The Riflemen of the 4th Div. defended Odessa against all onslaughts by the Bolsheviks up to the time of the Austrian occupation of the city.⁶⁰

⁵⁸ See, Petriv's *Memoirs*, Vol. I, and his *Do istorii . . .* (Note 42). For the Ukrainization of the IXth Army Corps, see, Dr. M. Halyna, *Sposterezhenia i vrazhennia viyskovoho likarya za chasiv velykoi viyny i revolutsii* ("Observations and Impressions of a Military Surgeon From the Times of War and Revolution"). *Za Derzhavnist*, Vol. IV, Warsaw, 1935.

⁵⁹ See, Skoropadsky, *op. cit.*; Porokhisky, *op. cit.* (1st Army Corps; B. Sul-kivsky, *Z istorii formuvannya Druhoho Sichovoho Zaporizkoho korpusu: 4 i 16 dyvizii* ("From the History of the Formation of the IInd Zaporozhian Sich Corps: 4th and 16th Divisions"), *Tabor*, Kalisz, Vol. 4, I. Hnoyovy, *Spomyny pro 19-yi pishyi ukrainskyi polk* ("Memoirs of the 19th Ukrainian Infantry Regiment"), *Tabor*, Kalisz, Vol. VI. Also: M. Halahan, *Spomyny (Memoirs)*, Lviv, *Chervona Katyna*, 1930, IV Vols. See, Vol. II. See also, Volodymyr Kedrovsky, *1917 rik* ("The Year 1917")—a series of feuillets in *Svoboda*, Jersey City, 1928, and Shapoval, *op. cit.*, (Note 37). On the Ukrainization of the 7th Cavalry Division, see, A. Marushchenko-Bohdanivsky, *Materialy do istorii Pershoho kinnoho polka* ("Materials to the History of the First Cavalry Regiment"), *Za Derzhavnist*, Vol. IV, Warsaw, 1935. Also, V. Fylonovych, *Sorok lit tomu. Spohad*. ("Forty Years Ago. A Reminiscence."), *Ukrainskyi Prometey*. Detroit, Nos. 40-41, 1957.

⁶⁰ See, Korniyiv, *op. cit.*, (Note 38), Yeroshevych, *op. cit.*, (Note 28); Le-vytsky, *op. cit.*, (Note 37). Also, Col. Savchenko, *Ukrainskyi rukh v rosiyskykh chastynakh* ("The Ukrainian Movement in the Russian Units"), *Za Derzhavnist*, Vol. IV, Warsaw, 1935; V. Savchenko, *Ukrainskyi rukh v IX Armii* ("The

Caucasian Front:

Ukrainian Congress on October 29-November 4, 1917. Own Ukrainian paper of the Ukrainian Council: *Visti Kavkazkoho Frontu (The News of the Caucasian Front)*. 127th Inf. Division and the fortress artillery battalions in Trapezund Ukrainized.⁶¹

On the eve of the October Revolution, the Ukrainians were the third largest group in the Old Army.⁶² This we know from the returns of the elections to the Russian Constituent Assembly which were held on November 12-14, 1917. On this day 3,952,624 officers and soldiers in the Army and 121,403 in the Navy voted for their choice in the elections, excluding the Caucasian Front from which there are no returns available. The largest vote was assembled by the Bolsheviks who collected 1,646,194 votes. The second largest was that of the Russian Socialist-Revolutionary Party. It included 1,551,013 voters. The third was that of the Ukrainian parties supporting the Central *Rada*. It numbered 535,843 votes and was divided thus:

Northern front	88,956
Western front	85,062
Southwestern front	168,354
Rumanian front	180,576
Black Sea fleet	12,895
T o t a l:	535,843

Other votes were insignificant: Social-Democratic (Menshevik)—123,851, Cadets (Constitutional Democrats)—65,599, Moslems—15,135, etc.⁶³

Ukrainian Movement in the IXth Army"), *Za Derzhavnist*, Vol. VIII, Warsaw, 1939.

⁶¹ Kedrovsky, *op. cit.*, (Note 59). Also: Alexander Dumyn, *Ukrainskyi viyskovyi rukh v rosiyskyi armii v 1917 roci* ("The Ukrainian Military Movement in the Russian Army in 1917"), *Ukrainski Visti (The Ukrainian News)*, Lviv, No. 3, 1938, p. 2.

⁶² Among the Ukrainized cavalry units we find the 3rd, 7th, 11th, 12th cavalry divisions. The Ukrainians of the 14th cavalry division formed a Ukrainian cavalry regiment which tried to fight its way from the Northern Front to Ukraine but was dispersed by the Bolsheviks in the battle of Rogachev, in Byelorussia in December 1917. See, Savchenko, "The Ukrainian Movement in the XIIth Army, *op. cit.*, (Note 30). On the Ukrainization of the 12th Cavalry Division, see, Mykola Yanchevsky, *Zi spomyniv* ("From the Memoirs"). *Za Derzhavnist*, Vol. I, Warsaw, 1930. On the Ukrainization of the 3rd Cavalry Division, V. Savchenko, *op. cit.*, (Note 60).

⁶³ Cf. Oliver Henry Radkey, *The Elections to the Russian Constituent Assembly of 1917*. Cambridge: 1950, Harvard University Press. Election returns in Appendix (p. 80.).

In conclusion, we wish to say only that the formation of the regular Ukrainian Army, which carried on regular warfare against the Red and White Russians and the Poles in 1918-1920, would have not been made possible, if in 1917 the process of the disintegration of the Old Army had not eliminated Ukrainian divisions. But this process also brought evidence to the fore that f o r t y years ago the nationality problem was no less an outstanding issue in the Imperial Russian Army than it is in its "heir apparent"—the Soviet Army of today. The problem itself must not be ignored any longer and must receive the recognition and attention it rightly deserves.

A SCIENTIST AND SOCIAL LEADER AS PRESIDENT OF A STATE

Professor Michael Hrushevsky, Leader of the Ukrainian National Revolution and First President of the Ukrainian National Republic

By MATTHEW STACHIW

To be charged with the stewardship of a state in modern times, a state with its complex and varied problems, is one of the most difficult tasks that may confront a man. And this is doubly onerous and far more taxing in a state emerging out of a war and to the accompaniment of one of the world's greatest political, social-economic and national revolutions, shaking the entire continent of Europe and the world at large.

In such circumstances was Ukraine as part of the Russian empire when historical fate imposed upon Professor Michael Hrushevsky the task of championing and leading the national liberation struggle for the restoration of the Ukrainian state and subsequently of heading the Ukrainian revolutionary parliament—the Ukrainian Central *Rada*—and then of becoming the first president of the Ukrainian National Republic.

A head of a state which has existed for centuries has a considerably easier time of it, inasmuch as he enjoys the traditional prestige of the office of head of state, from which also stems smoothness of functioning of the state system. Sometimes even ordinary and quite mediocre individuals immediately acquire a halo of prestige and rec-



Prof. Mykhailo Hrushevsky,
First President of the Ukrainian National
Republic and President of the Ukrainian
Central *Rada* in 1917-1918.

ognition as soon as they achieve the presidency of their states. But in a state which is first being organized, its head must establish his prestige and respect wholly through his own efforts and the sheer force of his personality.

In the case of Hrushevsky we have a unique situation in history. At the beginning of the Ukrainian Revolution, he was formally elected president of the initial Ukrainian revolutionary national representation, the Ukrainian Central *Rada*, on March 17, 1917, even without proposing his candidacy for the post, without his knowledge and in his absence. At the time he was in the interior of Russia, where he had been deported by the Czarist authorities with the commencement of the war. Even before his return to Kiev, he was regarded as a popular national and revolutionary leader of the Ukrainian people. His election *in absentia* was only a formal confirmation of the general recognition and respect in which Hrushevsky was held by the Ukrainians. Thus, it was not the office of the *Rada* presidency that gave Hrushevsky prestige and the respect and obedience of the politically-conscious masses of the citizenry. On the contrary, it was Hrushevsky who elevated the prestige of the *Rada* and its presidency through his own individuality.

This followed naturally enough. For many years Hrushevsky had been widely known to all active Ukrainians as one of the most remarkable personalities of his generation. He was incontestably the greatest Ukrainian historian, whose quantitative and qualitative output placed him alongside the leading historians of other nations. Moreover, he was exceedingly active in every phase of social life, especially in the organization of the political and cultural efforts of the nation and in the field of education of university youth. He was known as an outstanding political and social thinker and publicist by Ukraine as a whole (by that portion under Austria, where he was a professor at the University at Lviv for many years, and by Ukraine under Russia, where he succeeded in organizing the Ukrainian political and cultural resistance in spite of Czarist oppression).

To be taken into consideration is the fact that in both parts of the divided Ukrainian nation (under both Austria and Russia), the Ukrainians suffered the same basic enslavement, political and social-economic. In Western Ukraine under Austria (Galicia, Bukovina and Carpatho-Ukraine), the Ukrainians theoretically had equal rights and constitutional liberties. In practice, however, they had to fight for these rights vigorously and incessantly against the Polish nobility, to whom the Austrian Vienna regime, on the basis of an agreement, had given authority over the Ukrainians in Galicia unconstitutionally. Only in

Bukovina the Ukrainians achieved practically self-government, thanks to the liberal governor, Prince Konrad Hohenlohe-Schillingsfuerst.

In Ukraine under Russia there was overt Russian colonialism and relentless persecution of every manifestation of Ukrainian activity. From 1863 on the Russian government forbade the publication of Ukrainian books and newspapers, and from 1876 on it forbade even the singing of Ukrainian songs in public concerts. The Ukrainian political movement could exist only illegally, underground. Some relaxation did take place after the revolution of 1905, with publication of Ukrainian books being permitted, yet the reaction that soon followed imposed a heavy censorship on the Ukrainian printed word. The Ukrainian language was proscribed from public schools and even from church prayers. Under these conditions of the colonial enslavement of Ukraine by Russia, the problem of social emancipation of the Ukrainian working class assumed special significance, inasmuch as this class suffered from an utter lack of land and employment. The Czars had parcelled out vast tracts of land among their favorites and the nobility, while industrial enterprises were almost totally manned by Russian workers imported from Russia.

As a social philosopher and thinker Hrushevsky propagated in his writings not only a program of political liberation from Russia, but also the reorganization of the social-economic order for the benefit of the Ukrainian working masses, bitterly exploited by the oppressive Czarist regime. As such, he enjoyed the sympathy and support not only of the leading strata of the Ukrainian intelligentsia, but the politically-thinking masses of peasants and workers as well. To all of them he was simply "Father Hrushevsky."

When the All-Ukrainian National Congress, sponsored by the *Rada* (April 18-21, 1917), re-elected the Ukrainian Central *Rada* as a properly commissioned organ of national representation, Hrushevsky was unanimously re-elected its president in a secret ballot—a rather unusual occurrence. The explanation is that at that time it was unthinkable that anyone else could occupy that responsible and august post, equivalent to the leadership of the whole nation .

Hrushevsky not only thought about a free and independent Ukraine but heavily contributed concrete deeds toward the realization of this ideal. His efforts consisted above all of the elaboration of the political thought and program, and later on, of the creation of organized political strength. Inasmuch as political thought and program are concerned, Hrushevsky was one of the founders and co-organizers of three different political organizations. In 1899 he helped organize the Ukrainian National-Democratic Party in Western Ukraine and had incorporated

into its program the existing postulate of Ukrainian Socialists on the restoration of a united, sovereign and independent state of Ukraine as its ultimate goal; in 1906 he was co-organizer in Kiev of an illegal party known as the Society of Ukrainian Progressivists (TUP); and in 1917 he was one of the initiators of the reorganization of the Ukrainian Party of Social-Revolutionaries, and he remained one of its spiritual leaders, 1917-1920.

For Hrushevsky, as a political thinker, it was evident that a modern state is the outcome of the organized political will of the nation, and that such a state cannot survive unless it is sustained by an all-out organization of the nation, especially organization in the political field. Hence his alert political activity in the press and in organizational life. For him party life constituted a healthy political soul of the nation, while petty party squabbles were a kind of degeneration of political party life. He believed that the masses without a political party life would indicate weakness in the nation, inasmuch as a lack of this party life would mean an atomization and dispersal of the strength of the nation.

As statesman, social leader and thinker, Hrushevsky propounded the idea that a modern democratic state cannot be anything else but a synthesis of the compromises of various groups and interests within the nation itself. A society ought to be dominated by an intra-class and intra-group compromise; otherwise there is permanent civil war or a class war, which under normal conditions tends to weaken the nation, and in the circumstances of an international political crisis, leads it to its downfall. In the circumstances of a differentiation and complexity of group interests of the nation, the president is a true leader and statesman only when he is able to consolidate around his policy all the national groupings. This technique was brilliantly implemented by Hrushevsky as no other Ukrainian or foreign statesman has done in subsequent political situations. By virtue of his influence in the Ukrainian Central *Rada* there were no petty party squabbles (which is quite admissible and, in fact, unavoidable in revolutionary times). He even succeeded in achieving an exceptional consolidation of all Ukrainian political groups, ranging from the extreme right to the extreme left. He was able to impress upon their leaders the necessity of concentrating all the efforts of struggle upon the primary goal of the restoration of statehood, initially in the struggle with the "democratic regime" of Russia (the Russian Provisional Government of Prince Lvov and later Alexander Kerensky) and subsequently against the totalitarian and dictatorial regime of Russian commissars in Moscow. Parallel to that, in his social legislation he was able to work out compromises among

the various interest groups, always keeping in mind that the interest of the backbone of the nation—90 per cent of the working people—had to be safeguarded. How far statesman Hrushevsky succeeded in manifesting his political art is indicated by the fact that he was able to win over to his side even the communizing Ukrainian elements, led by Alexander Shumsky and Panas Lubchenko. This group of communizing Ukrainians, then very small and without influence, submitted to Hrushevsky's leadership of a united front against the aggression of Soviet Russia and stood steadfast around Hrushevsky until the aggressors were expelled from Ukraine (April, 1918). Such success was beyond the reach of any other leader.

His brilliant statesmanship is characterized not only by the depth of his political thought, but also by his talent to outline a political *strategy*. Inasmuch as the principal aim was concerned, Hrushevsky never hid it from the Russian political world. As far back as 1907 he expounded his views on the nationality problem in the Russian empire in a dissertation published in Russian. He boldly warned the Russians:

“When you hear from some members of the non-Russian peoples that they are content with their prison in an alien empire, you should not trust them, inasmuch as they are not voicing the sentiments of the peoples.” He added that “the aspirations of each of these peoples are quite different.” He said further:

“A *full independence and sovereignty* is the logical culmination of national development and self-determination of each people.”

How to attain this ultimate objective was to be determined by the political strategy of the statesman. In political strategy Hrushevsky scored really great successes and attainments. As a wise leader he, first of all, mobilized those forces, especially in the political and military fields, which had been dispersed and dissipated through Russian oppression. At the beginning of the Ukrainian Revolution (March, 1917), the political organization of the nation was extremely weak after having been forced to lead an illegal existence under Czardom. The military organization could only begin to operate effectively with recognition, what with the constant bans and interdictions of the Provisional Government of Prince Lvov and Alexander Kerensky. The Provisional Government of Russia was strong enough until June and July, 1917, as indicated by its offensive on the Austro-German front (the “Kerensky offensive”). If Hrushevsky had allowed himself to be influenced by the strategy of the phraseologists and not by his own political wisdom, he would have already proclaimed the independence of Ukraine in March, 1917. It would, of course, have been the first and last proclamation of the Ukrainian Central *Rada*: the regime of the Provisional Govern-

ment was then strong enough to destroy the still weak Ukrainian forces without undue effort.

Instead, Hrushevsky applied a different tactic aiming at the restoration of Ukrainian independent statehood. At the beginning he spoke only and formally about a "territorial autonomy" of Ukraine. But the word "autonomy" at that time was understood by every Ukrainian to mean the statehood of Ukraine, with its own Constitutional Assembly. Furthermore, at that time the term "autonomy" was likely to evoke less opposition from the Russians than the expression "independence." When the autonomy of Ukraine was finally recognized, although without a Ukrainian Constitutional Assembly and limited in scope, then did Hrushevsky (in the fall of 1917) go strategically further ahead by preparing for the convocation of the Ukrainian Constitutional Assembly.

This prompted Kerensky to issue orders for the dispersal of the Ukrainian Central *Rada* and the arrest of its leadership for "high treason." These orders were not carried out because his own Provisional Government was dispersed by the Bolsheviks and ceased to exist. While the struggle between the Russian Bolsheviks and the Provisional Government was going on in Petrograd, ending with the establishment of the communist power in Russia on November 7, 1917, the Ukrainian Central *Rada*, according to Hrushevsky's plans, moved from autonomy to the fulfillment of statehood with the proclamation of the Ukrainian National Republic on November 20, 1917. Thus the real state, the Ukrainian National Republic, was *created*, and not merely proclaimed.

In the undertaking of building an autonomous, and, later on, a genuine state, the Ukrainian National Republic, Hrushevsky demonstrated his genius as a crafty statesman by his neutralizing the non-Ukrainian national minorities in Ukraine—Russian, Polish, Jewish and others. He was able to unite around him all the democratic parties of the national minorities of Ukraine, such as the Russian, Jewish and Polish, to the end that they sent their representatives to the Ukrainian Central *Rada* and gave it their support and cooperation. His skill in influencing and recruiting assistance for the just Ukrainian cause was remarkable, succeeding as he did in having all the Jewish representatives in the *Rada* as well as the Polish Socialists vote for the proclamation of the Ukrainian National Republic on November 20, 1917. Other representatives of minorities, while abstaining from voting in favor of the establishment of the Ukrainian republic, did not, however, vote against it.

The established Ukrainian Republic enjoyed a full sovereignty, inasmuch as it entered into international relations with other states and was recognized, at least *de facto*, by Great Britain and France, and receiving later on *de facto* and *de jure* recognition from the Central

Powers. But the unprovoked and aggressive war waged against Ukraine by Communist Russia compelled Hrushevsky to deviate from his original conception of an Eastern European confederation of free national states, including a national Russia. During the warfare (in December, 1917), the Russian minority revealed itself as disloyal toward its country, Ukraine. Not only the Bolshevik elements of the local Russian minority, but also the non-communist Russian groups in Ukraine, especially the rightist "Ka-Dets" and leftist Social Democrats (Mensheviks), sided openly with Soviet Russia against Ukraine.

Hrushevsky prevailed upon the parliament of Ukraine to defer the plans of a confederation and urged it instead to proclaim the full and unqualified independence of Ukraine, or rather the Ukrainian National Republic. This was done on January 22, 1918. Here again, Hrushevsky was instrumental in getting the Polish Socialists to vote for this constitutional act of the Ukrainian people. The representatives of the Jewish and Russian Social-Revolutionaries abstained from the vote, while the Russian Mensheviks cast negative ballots. But it was Hrushevsky's stability that swayed the Polish Socialists to vote for the independence of Ukraine and which neutralized the Jewish and Russian representatives, who, at least, did not vote against it.

Finally, to be underscored is another characteristic of Hrushevsky as a statesman: his personal and civil courage. He was not afraid to expose himself to the odium of unpopularity in some zealous Ukrainian circles, which pressed him for an immediate proclamation of Ukrainian independence in March 1917. On the other hand, he displayed even greater courage when he refused to yield to the Soviet Russian "ultimatum," sent to the Ukrainian government by Lenin and Trotsky, demanding that Ukraine allow the crossing of Soviet troops to the Don territory and that it stop disarming the communist bands which were forming in Ukraine. The superiority of Soviet Russia in the matter of troops and organizational potential was well known to all the Ukrainian leaders; logic would have seemed to dictate acceptance of the "ultimatum," actually, capitulation, as few saw any chance to sustain a defensive war against Communist Russia. Yet Hrushevsky had the courage to spurn the "ultimatum" and to prevail upon the Ukrainian Central *Rada* and its government to accept the Russian challenge and to prepare to defend the new republic before the onslaught of aggressive Communist Russia.

In the Russian Bolshevik-Ukrainian war Hrushevsky provided many examples of his heroism. It took some six weeks before the massive Russian communist troops approached Kiev, the capital of Ukraine, one not unimportant reason being the heroic resistance of the armies of the Ukrainian National Republic, and began shelling it from three

sides simultaneously. Hrushevsky refused to follow the advice to evacuate his government from the threatened Ukrainian capital, inasmuch as he knew that the evacuation of Kiev by his government would psychologically weaken the nation and its defense effort. He convinced the government and the parliament to remain in Kiev as long as it was reasonably possible, thereby strengthening the morale and fighting spirit of the badly-battered Ukrainian troops. For ten days both the Ukrainian government and the Ukrainian Central *Rada* continued to sit in Kiev while the city was bombarded day and night by Bolshevik artillery. The Central *Rada* voted important laws regarding the social reform of Ukraine as the Ukrainian government continued to hold its sessions in the beleaguered capital.

The Ukrainian Central *Rada* and the government of the Ukrainian National Republic evacuated Kiev only on February 9, 1918, together with the last contingents of Ukrainian troops. The heroic attitude of Hrushevsky had decisively contributed to overcoming the crisis into which the Ukrainian nation was pushed by the unprovoked aggression of Communist Russia. The crisis was terminated not only by the arrest of Russian communist troops, but by an effective counter-offensive of the Army of the Ukrainian National Republic.

FORTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF UKRAINIAN FREEDOM AND RUSSIAN BETRAYAL

By WALTER DUSHNYCK

On December 24, 1957 Nikita S. Khrushchev delivered a major address to the Supreme Ukrainian Soviet in Kiev, which met to commemorate the establishment of the communist power and government in Ukraine forty years ago. In enumerating all the blessings that the Soviet power allegedly brought to the Ukrainian people, Khrushchev spared no compliment and praise as far as the Ukrainians are concerned. In paragraph after paragraph he dwelt upon the "glory" and "happiness" of the Ukrainian people and their political achievements in their "free and independent state."

In reporting his address, *Pravda* in Moscow quoted him as saying:

The Ukrainian people, with the brotherly help of the Russian people and other peoples of the USSR, have successfully realized the socialist transformation and preserved their freedom and independence in the severe trials of the Great Patriotic war. For the first time in history all the Ukrainian lands have become united in one Ukrainian state, which is an historical event in the life of the people . . .¹

In similar vein, but with even more emphatic stress on Ukrainian "independence" spoke Alexander I. Kirichenko, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party in Ukraine, who has since moved up into the inner councils of the Kremlin. Kirichenko, the first Ukrainian to serve as top communist chief in the Ukrainian party apparatus, eulogized not only the Ukrainian people who, he said, had found a solution for their national and social aspirations within the Soviet system, but he praised the Russian "big brother" for assisting the Ukrainians in achieving these blissful goals. He did not fail, of course, to castigate "bourgeois Ukrainian nationalists" and their alleged patrons, the "foreign imperialists," who apparently are determined to take away these great "achievements" of the Ukrainian people. He stated:

¹ *Pravda*, December 25, 1957, Moscow, USSR.

The struggle of the Ukrainian people, like that of all peoples of our country, for their freedom and independence, received an invincible momentum when the working class of Russia appeared on the stage of history.

Their statehood, national independence and freedom the Ukrainian people won in the heat of the Great October socialist revolution, realized by the proletariat of Russia together with the toiling peasantry, under the leadership of the Communist Party . . .

. . . Almost three years after the establishment of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic severe fighting against all enemies was still going on in our land. By the united efforts of all the peoples of our country and under the leadership of the Communist Party were destroyed the Austro-German occupiers, Anglo-French and American interventionists, White Poles, the armies of Denikin, Petlura, Wrangel and all the counter-revolutionary forces which sought to strangle the Soviet power . . .

. . . Born forty years ago in revolution's fire, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic is a national, independent sovereign socialist state of the working people. For the first time in history the Ukrainian people have taken an honorable place among the nations of the world . . .²

In commenting on the struggle against the Ukrainian National Republic in 1917 Comrade Kirichenko had this to say:

In the midst of the heroic and drawn-out struggle of the proletariat, the bourgeois-nationalist Central *Rada*, with the assistance of counterrevolutionary forces, plunged a knife into the back of the revolutionary fighters and cunningly seized power. The Central *Rada* was a determined enemy of the working people. Under the national flag it defended the interests of capitalists, landowners and *kulaks* . . .

In their hatred against the working people the Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists found a common language with the White Guards, the Mensheviks, S-R's and other enemies, and entered into an open alliance with the imperialists of Germany, England, France, and the United States of America, Poland and other states, and sold Ukraine to them. Loyal to the Leninist principles of proletarian internationalism and friendship of nations, the working people of Ukraine, fought always against the bourgeois nationalists as agents of imperialism, and they destroyed the Central *Rada* and its counterrevolutionary forces. The destruction of the Central *Rada* marked the birth of the Soviet power in Ukraine . . .³

One wonders how many Ukrainians were listening to Kirichenko's verbal gymnastics who could give the lie to almost all he was saying; in Ukraine there must be thousands upon thousands of people who were not completely brain-washed and who still remember clearly what happened in Ukraine forty years ago.

From March to November, 1917, Ukraine got well on the road to complete freedom and independence, despite the fanatical opposition of the Provisional Government and Bolshevik agitation. The Ukrainian Central *Rada* succeeded in mustering the overwhelming support of the

² *Pravda*, December 25, 1957, Moscow, USSR.

³ *Ibid.*

Ukrainian people in all its political moves and could perhaps have prevented Bolshevism from spreading in Ukraine had it not been for the obstinacy, political shortsightedness and chauvinism of the men who led the Russian Provisional Government in those days.

From the early days of March, 1917, it was evident to everyone that the empire of the Romanovs and their dynasty was doomed. The anti-Czarist Russian political forces (both Bolshevik and Social-Revolutionaries, as well as the Mensheviks) were powerful, yet it was the non-Russian nationalities that precipitated the final break-up of the despotic empire, a fact that is somehow ignored and underestimated by Russian historians and, regrettably, by Americans as well.

Soon after the abdication of Czar Nicholas the non-Russian countries stirred and rose up with demands for national autonomy and political independence. The Russian imperial army was no longer what it was a few months previously. Various nationalities were stepping up the organization of their national units, thinking in terms of defending their native countries rather than the despicable and oppressive Russian empire.

Already in March the Ukrainians, both in Ukraine and Russia, and especially those in Petrograd and Moscow, intensified their political work, and on March 17, 1917, the Ukrainian Central *Rada* was formed in Kiev under the presidency of Professor Michael Hrushevsky, Ukraine's foremost historian. The *Rada* at once began to function as a free and democratic parliament of Ukraine. Its policies were widely upheld and supported not only by the great majority of Ukrainian parties and organizations, such as the Ukrainian Military Committee, Ukrainian Peasant Congresses and Ukrainian Workers, student, and cooperative organizations, but by the national minorities living in Ukraine as well. At the All-Ukrainian National Congress that gathered in Kiev on April 18-21, 1917, some 1,500 delegates from every part of Ukraine fully endorsed the policies of the *Rada*. A similar endorsement was given the *Rada* by the First Ukrainian Military Congress, held in Kiev May 18-21, 1917, with some 700 delegates, representing over 1,000,000 Ukrainian troops. The congress, in addition, demanded the speedy Ukrainization of the army and national and territorial autonomy for Ukraine.

The reaction of the Provisional Government was wholly negative and hostile. Despite the fact that its power was gradually declining, it refused to recognize the Central *Rada*, although the power in Ukraine was virtually in Ukrainian hands.

The stupidity and recklessness of the Provisional Government was indicated by Alexander Kerensky's ban of the Second Ukrainian Military

Congress, which was scheduled for June 18, 1917. Kerensky, then War Minister in the cabinet of Prince Lvov, was one of the Russian democratic leaders most hostile towards the Ukrainian aspirations for freedom and independence. Despite his ban, the Second Ukrainian Military Congress convened with 2,500 delegates representing 1,600,000 soldiers from all the armed services. The congress severely castigated the Provisional Government and declared that the latter "misunderstands the national aspirations of Ukraine and underestimates the organized and spontaneous revolutionary strength of Ukrainian democracy . . ."

Soon thereafter, on June 23, 1917, the Ukrainian Central *Rada* issued its First *Universal*, by which the *Rada* declared itself to be representative of the Ukrainian nation. A few days later the *Rada* created the Secretariat General, which became the council of ministers of the Ukrainian government.

These forward steps of the Ukrainians dismayed the Russians. Both Russian revolutionaries as well as Russian reactionaries were shocked that the Ukrainians, after long and oppressive Russian rule, should dare to act on their own.

The Russian Bolsheviks in Ukraine denounced the *Rada* as being an "undemocratic and bourgeois nationalist" organization.

The Russian Provisional Government at last became aroused by the First *Universal*, especially because of the overwhelming repercussions and support it had throughout Ukraine; and it decided to act. But its acts were as myopic and timid as were its political perspectives. It issued a vague proclamation to the Ukrainian people promising them what the discontented Ukrainians had already seized for themselves. In the middle of July, 1917, three Russian ministers, Kerensky, Tseretelli and Tereshchenko, came to Kiev to negotiate with the Ukrainians, this mission resulted in a political compromise between the Ukrainian Central *Rada* and the Provisional Government. The latter agreed to a limited autonomy of Ukraine as well as to Ukrainization of armed units. But the agreement did not last long. In August, a crisis developed inside the Provisional Government, caused by the unsuccessful uprising of Lenin's Bolsheviks in Petrograd and the devastating military debacle of the Russian armies in Eastern Galicia and Bessarabia. In the ill-fated Russian offensive against the German-Austrian troops only the Ukrainized units, especially the VIth, XVIIth and XLth Ukrainized Army Corps, remained combat-fit. The rest were considerably demoralized by Bolshevik propaganda.

Assuming the post of Prime Minister, Kerensky took upon himself the responsibility of dealing with the Ukrainian government. When a delegation of the Secretariat General, headed by Volodymyr Vynny-



THE FIRST SECRETARIAT GENERAL OF THE UKRAINIAN CENTRAL RADA. Sitting from left to right: Simon Petlura, Sergiy Yefremov, Volodymyr Vynnychenko, Christopher Baranovsky, I. Steshenko; Standing from left to right: Boris Martos, M. Stasiuk and Pavlo Khrystiuk.

chenko, presented a draft of the Ukrainian constitution, Kerensky rejected it and issued an official ordinance instead, by which he completely disregarded the Central *Rada* and the Secretariat General, and in so doing, tried to retain whatever little power he had in Ukraine in his hands.

The Kerensky government, being itself at deadly grips with the ever-increasing Bolshevik menace, made every attempt to impede the progress of Ukrainian autonomy: and thus played into the hands of the Bolsheviks. On the very eve of the collapse of Kerensky's Provisional Government, Kerensky himself was preparing the arrest of the members of the Secretariat General of the Ukrainian Central *Rada* on the charge of "high treason" against the Russian state. Significantly, the Ukrainians by that time not only had ceased to believe that Ukraine was a part of the Russian empire, but were moving quickly toward the establishment of the Ukrainian National Republic.

The betrayal by Kerensky of the principles of democracy and self-determination with respect to Ukraine not only had prevented an early establishment of a free and independent Ukraine, but eventually precipitated his own downfall as well. Had he agreed to Ukrainian autonomy, he might have succeeded in preserving his government in Petrograd and preventing the Bolsheviks from seizing power. The Ukrainian Central *Rada*, still willing to maintain Ukraine within a Russian federative system, had succeeded in Ukrainizing nine army corps, some of them

still possessing high efficiency and combat fitness. Such Russian generals as Kornilov, Brusilov and Dukhonin supported the formation of Ukrainian units because they saw in them the sole reliance and support they could muster against the Bolsheviks.

But talkative Kerensky was more preoccupied with preserving the Russian empire than with preventing the Bolsheviks from assuming power in Petrograd. Even on the day when Lenin's unscrupulous and fanatical minority took over the All-Russian Congress, Kerensky displayed utter inaction and indecision, which only encouraged Lenin and his partisans. In his series on the Russian Revolution, published in *Life Magazine*, Alan Moorehead had this to say about Kerensky:

. . . Before daybreak the Bolsheviks had seized the railway stations, the State Bank, the power station, the bridges across the river and finally the telephone exchange. There was scant resistance anywhere. Kerensky had held an emergency cabinet meeting during the previous night. The reinforcements he had sent for had not shown up, and in the morning Kerensky himself set off to find them. He borrowed an American military attache's car, complete with its flag, and with this vehicle running ahead of his own car he made his escape—it could hardly be called less than an escape—to Gatchina. He hoped there to rally the Third Cavalry Corps and other troops and bring them into the city. However, nothing more was heard from Kerensky in the course of the day, and during his absence he lost the city . . . The Bolsheviks were by no means secure as yet. No one had any news of what Kerensky was doing. It was rumored that he had mustered a force that was now marching on the city . . .⁴

RUSSIAN AGGRESSIVE WAR AGAINST UKRAINE

The advent of the Bolsheviks to power in Petrograd confronted the Ukrainian National *Rada* with two alternatives: to recognize them or oppose them. By assailing the Petrograd coup the *Rada* chose the second course. On November 20, 1917, the *Rada* proclaimed its Third *Universal*, by which the Ukrainian National Republic was established.

The extent and degree of the extreme political cautiousness of the Central *Rada* is best demonstrated by the fact that the Third *Universal* only separated Ukraine from the newly-established Bolshevik administration of Russia, inasmuch as it declared that Ukraine would remain in the Russian federative state as a free and equal republic. It also announced an election to the Ukrainian Constitutional Assembly, scheduled for December 27, 1917, to determine the further political status of Ukraine. The Ukrainian leaders were thus extremely careful not to provoke Russian persecution, so intimately experienced in the past.

⁴ "The Russian Revolution: Brutal Betrayal by the Bolsheviks." Alan Moorehead. *Life Magazine*, February 3, 1958, p. 60.

The attitude of the Bolsheviks toward the Ukrainian Central *Rada* was strictly negative from the very beginning. (At times the Bolshevik leaders in Ukraine, as a rule ethnic Russians, paid lip service to the principles of self-determination, but in reality they opposed the *Rada* and did all they could to undermine its power and prestige.)

But the power and influence of the Bolsheviks in Ukraine was small, if not insignificant. Upon instructions from Lenin the Bolshevik group in Kiev pressed for the convocation of the All-Ukrainian Council of Peasants', Soldiers' and Workers' Deputies and the new elections of the *Rada*, hoping thereby that they could be able to accomplish what they had done in Petrograd, that is, to seize the power by force. The All-Ukrainian Peasants Congress, which then was holding its convention in Kiev, issued a strong resolution against these Bolshevik maneuvers, saying:

Regarding the agitation of the *Russian Bolsheviks* for new elections for the Ukrainian Central *Rada* as *their maneuver to seize the power in Ukraine*, the All-Ukrainian Council of Peasants' Deputies protests against it most categorically and declares that such an election *at this moment* cannot but be detrimental to the Ukrainian working people, and that the question of a *Rada* election is *not a prerogative of Russian Bolsheviks, but of the toiling Ukrainian people* (all italics in the text—W. D.).

The All-Ukrainian Council of Peasants', Soldiers' and Workers' Deputies did meet on December 17, 1917, and the Bolsheviks experienced one of the worst defeats they have ever suffered as a party.

Despite violent propaganda and agitation among the 2,500 delegates at the congress, they barely mustered 60 votes and only two of these delegates were Ukrainian, that is, they spoke Ukrainian. The congress voted a resolution of confidence to the Rada; only 2 delegates voted against it, while 19 others abstained from voting.

Stunned by this veritable rout, Lenin dispatched an "ultimatum" to the *Rada*, demanding the immediate cessation of the disarming of Bolshevik troops that he had sent to the Don territory (they were being disarmed by the Ukrainian troops, upon orders of the Central *Rada*). The "ultimatum" was immediately followed by the Russian communist invasion of Ukraine, although it stated:

If in forty-eight hours no satisfactory reply is received, the Council of People's Commissars will consider the Ukrainian Central *Rada* to be at war with the Government of the Soviets in Russia and Ukraine . . .

Only then did the Bolshevik delegates, who had failed at the Kiev congress, escape to communist-occupied Kharkiv and proclaim a "Ukrainian Soviet government" in opposition to the Central *Rada*. This fiction was, of course, swiftly "recognized" by Lenin and Trotsky. (Kharkiv was then already occupied by the Russian Communist troops

who entered Ukraine from the North upon Lenin's declaration of war against the Ukrainian Central *Rada*.)

The perfidy of Russian Bolsheviks can be best demonstrated by the same "ultimatum" of Lenin of December 17, 1917, inasmuch as in it the Russian Bolsheviks recognized the Ukrainian National Republic as follows:

Therefore, the Council of People's Commissars *recognizes the Ukrainian National Republic and its right to full separation from Russia*, and that it may enter into negotiations with the Russian Republic in the matter of federative and other relations. The demand of Ukraine regarding her rights and independence of the Ukrainian people the Council of People's Commissars recognizes without limitations and unconditionally . . .

Ukraine spurned the "ultimatum," refusing to yield to Soviet threats and intimidation, and thereby incurred an aggressive war. The Russian Bolsheviks assembled large contingents of communist troops and invaded Ukraine.

On January 22, 1918, the Ukrainian Central *Rada* issued its Fourth *Universal*, by which the full and unqualified independence of Ukraine was proclaimed. The aggressive war, launched by Communist Russia, went on during which Ukraine defended her freedom and independence with all the resources at her disposal. It lasted until November 22, 1920, but anti-Russian and anti-Communist uprisings continued for a long time afterwards.

Hence, the Kiev celebration of the anniversary of the "independence" of Ukraine, at which Khrushchev and Kirichenko so eloquently spoke about the "happiness" and "sovereignty" of the Ukrainian nation, was not the anniversary of Ukraine's genuine freedom and independence, but the anniversary of Russian enslavement and communist oppression.

If perhaps the memory of Khrushchev and Kirichenko does not serve them too well, they might refer to the reports and memoirs of some of their military leaders, who have written on how they established the Soviet power in Ukraine. One of them, Col. Muraviev (the "Butcher of Kiev") in his Order No. 14, wrote:

We bring this government (in Ukraine—W. D.) from the far North on the blades of our bayonets, and where we set up our rule, we support it with all means by the force of these bayonets . . .⁵

Another Russian communist commander, Antonov-Ovsienko, said:

The local Communists (in Ukraine—W. D.) are very irresolute, and are looking for coalition with opportunists, do not want and do not try to give our troops any assistance . . .⁶

⁵ *Ukraine: Her Struggle for Freedom*. Panas Fedenko. Augsburg, Germany, 1951. P. 21.

⁶ *Comments on the Civil War*, Vol. I, p. 55.

Still another Communist, a Ukrainian, Vasyl Shakhray, who became a war commissar in the "Ukrainian Soviet government" in Kharkiv, wrote ten years later:

What kind of a "Ukrainian government" is this that its members should not properly know and do not wish to know Ukrainian? . . . What kind of a Ukrainian war minister am I, that I should have to disarm all Ukrainian troops since they do not want to go with me to defend the Soviet government? We have but one military support in our fight with the Central *Rada*—the army that was brought into Ukraine by Antonov (Antonov-Ovsienko—W. D.), which regards all that is Ukrainian as hostile, counterrevolutionary . . .⁷

These were the forces that brought about the fall of the Ukrainian National Republic and the establishment of the Soviet tyrannical power in Ukraine.

The Ukrainian people, who rose with such ardent fervor and hope to freedom, were betrayed by both, the anti-communist Russians and the Russian Bolsheviks. The former were simply too chauvinistic to see the impending doom and therefore they sacrificed everything, even the freedom that they won after the fall of Czardom, for the dubious value of preserving a "one and indivisible Russia." The latter, although they paid lip service to the slogans of freedom, national emancipation and independence, did not hesitate to throw in communist hordes in an effort to suppress the freedom and independence of Ukraine, which in theory they have preached and approved.

If anything, the fortieth anniversary of Ukrainian independence may teach the world the lesson that no matter who rules the Kremlin, be it Czar Nicholas, "Liberal" Alexander Kerensky, Despot Stalin or "Peace Salesman" Khrushchev—the Kremlin masters all believe and fight for what is ineradicable in them: a Russian empire and domination over foreign lands and nations, even if they are hated and detested for such by the entire world.

⁷ *Annals of the Revolution*, No. 1, p. 162, Kharkiv, 1928.

THE UKRAINIANS AND THE UNITED STATES IN WORLD WAR I

By CLARENCE A. MANNING

World War I broke out with a suddenness that surprised most of the people of the different lands, if not the professional diplomats. The murder of Archduke Franz Ferdinand at Sarajevo on Kossovo Day 1914 by a Serb of Austrian citizenship solved and intensified one of the most pressing problems of Europe, the succession to the Hapsburg throne. In other times it would scarcely have attracted more than passing attention but already vast forces were in motion that did not allow it to pass unnoticed.

For the United States the declaration of war was more than surprising. The people were just making a new approach to their domestic affairs and beginning that surprising readjustment of the relations of capital and labor that has still not been grasped by many of the older nations. In foreign affairs, however, they were still unaware of the forces that were operating in Europe. They were still convinced that Washington's warning against entangling alliances was the vital argument in international relations, although Washington after issuing his Farewell Address, had accepted the post of general in the undeclared war against the French. They were still listening to Fourth of July orators who loved to twist the lion's tail in their speeches and to revert to the glory of John Paul Jones. They still believed in the doctrine of the open door in China and also in the tremendous friendship of Russia for the United States.

On the other hand, once hostilities were begun, the foreign born citizens of the country of all stages of education and prosperity realized that something new and unforeseen had happened. Almost from the very first days they began to plan for the future independence of their lands. They formed committees to agitate for the destruction of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and began to seek friends and supporters among all classes of the population. For their part the Germans worked feverishly to win American public sentiment to their side and in this they were seconded by a large part of the Irish community, which was traditionally anti-British.

The result was a fantastic period and for a while the situation was very unsettled as the American public as a whole tried to determine whether the British interference with the freedom of the seas was more dangerous to the future of humanity than the German invasion of Belgium and the declaration that all treaties were merely scraps of paper. By the time of the sinking of the *Lusitania* the situation began to clear up and American public opinion began to veer more and more strongly to the realization that the future of the United States and the progress of civilization lay in the triumph of the Triple *Entente*. The Russian Revolution of March, 1917 removed the last doubts and prepared the way for the final Declaration of War on Germany and Austria-Hungary in early April, 1917.

Yet during the whole period American opinion looked only to the West. The surprising events on the Eastern Front, when the Russian, German and Austro-Hungarian armies ranged freely over a large expanse of territory, practically the whole of Western Ukraine and Byelorussia, passed unnoticed. Even such broad-minded men as ex-President Theodore Roosevelt thought only of the West and of driving the Germans back within their own boundaries and thus defending international law as it was then conceived. Thus the United States had no program for dealing with Eastern Europe and when the Armistice came on November 11, 1918, the American people believed that peace and justice had finally been won and that a new world was opening for humanity.

It was against this background in the early years of the war that the Ukrainians had to act. They saw before them the example of the Czechoslovaks and the Poles. These were older immigrations and they already each in his own way had secured friends and supporters. Prof. Thomas G. Masaryk was vigorously assisted by a group of admirers who were ready to pour money into the cause of his people. I. J. Paderewski, the outstanding pianist of the day, was able to rally all the lovers of music to the cause of Poland and to rouse again the memories of Pulaski and Kosciuszko, two Poles who had fought with distinction in the American Revolution. Prof. Michael Pupin, an outstanding scientist of Serb birth, poured into the cause of the Southern Slavs his own personal fortune and personally underwrote in the darkest days of Serbia a Serb war loan.

What about the Ukrainians? The majority had arrived in the United States only a few years before. They were the last of the great immigrations of the Slavic peoples and as their predecessors, they had come with little or nothing except their physical strength. They had not yet developed any leaders who could compete with the other Slavs to win American support. They had no recognized spokesman, no

authority except the justice of their cause. They did not have the funds to stage elaborate charity bazaars with high-sounding names as patrons and patronesses. On the other hand they were continually slandered by both the Russians and the Poles, following their traditional policy when Poland, the *Rzeczpospolita*, extended from the Baltic to the Black Sea, called for a restoration of their country to the dimensions of 1772. The Russians who had perpetually denied the existence of a Ukrainian people sought by their occupation of Lviv in the early days of September, 1914, to convince the Americans that those Ukrainians who objected to the occupation of their country by the armies of the Czar or who called for the liberation of Russian Ukraine were but a small group of German sympathizers who were being urged by Berlin to create a diversionary movement. Their policy was the more acceptable, because both the confirmed Czarists and the Russian revolutionists who had sought refuge in the United States after 1905 agreed that the actions of the Ukrainians were highly un-American and could be useful only to the Central Powers.

The Ukrainians in the United States were hardly prepared to face this double attack. They had come to America with the intention of making money and returning to their native land despite all of the difficulties which it was undergoing. Slowly but steadily they were beginning to take root in their new home but like their brothers in the homeland they still bore the marks of their origin and even their main organization, the National Association, was still bearing the name of the Rus National Association. Their Ukrainian Catholic Churches, while flourishing, were not definitely organized and Bishop Ortynsky had failed to rally all his parishioners from Galicia and the Carpathian area to work harmoniously. Worse still, they were subjected to a furious proselyting campaign carried on by the Russian Archbishop of the Aleutian Islands and North America to enter the Orthodox fold and to avoid any solving of administrative difficulties with Catholics of the Latin Rite by joining Mother Russia and its faith.

Thus the weakened community was in difficulties all around but the shock of war and the formation in Vienna of the "Union for the Liberation of Ukraine" did more in a few months than could have been won by years of hard work and strenuous propaganda. The men and women who had been bearing the brunt of what seemed a hopeless fight now came into their own and they found the strength and the bearing to say openly what all the Ukrainians had been saying secretly with an unconscious faith, that the time had come when Ukraine must be free.

The war began on August 1, 1914 and by August 18, *Svoboda* was able to print: "We do not want the domination of the Germans . . . If our people, freed from under the Russian whip had to accept the German or Austrian rule, we would not count it as something good but as the lesser evil and it is undeniable that it would lead to the full liberation of our people, so that they could become their own master on their own land . . . If the result should be that Russia was defeated in the east and Germany in the west, there would be a reconstruction of various multinational states into states of a single people. Actually this result of the war would be the best for a solution of the present unhealthy conditions in Ukraine."

This was a striking statement and the editor dared to put into words something which had hardly appeared in the publications of any other of the peoples divided between the Triple *Entente* and the Triple Alliance. It well shows that the understanding of the European situation by the Ukrainian leaders in the United States was perhaps further advanced than was that of many of the better organized and more influential communities of both the Slavic immigration and American public as a whole.

The influence of events was shown in another connection for almost immediately in September the Rus National Association was renamed the Ukrainian National Association and it began to move forward with a clearly defined policy of expressing the desires of the Ukrainians in the United States for a clear cut recognition of their own position.

There were of course dissenters from this strong policy. There were some who felt that it was tantamount to treason for Ukrainians here in the New World to dare to act against the wishes of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and who allowed themselves to be the willing tools of the Central Powers. They succeeded only in playing into the hands of the enemies of Ukraine and in making more difficult the position of their more far-sighted brothers who realized more and more clearly as time went on that their interests and the interests of their own and adopted countries lay in the victory of the Western powers.

It was a daring venture but on December 4 the Ukrainians opened an Information Bureau in Jersey City to begin their difficult task of winning the ear of the American public which was still unaware of the complications of the nationality problem in Eastern Europe and was only interested in the fate of the Western Front. At the same time there was established a Ukrainian National *Rada* in the United States to act as the coordinating body of all the nationally conscious Ukrainians.

On September 18, 1915, the Ukrainians definitely appeared before the public eye with a protest meeting at Cooper Union, New York City,

against the Czarist treatment of Prof. M. Hrushevsky. There were difficulties in arranging such a meeting for many influential organizations, especially the churches, felt that it was premature to take such a stand at the moment.

The patriotic and conscious Ukrainians disagreed with this attitude and on October 30 and 31, the First Ukrainian *Soym* under Dr. Volodymyr Simenovych met in Cooper Union and in its resolutions it clearly set forth its desires that Ukraine be in its entirety a sovereign and independent state. The resolution recognized facts and added, in case its full goal could not be reached,

That there should be formed in Austria-Hungary from the Ukrainian lands, a Ukrainian province in which the Ukrainian people could have self-government, and without the supremacy of the Poles or any other nobility could solve their own national and economic problems;

And that in Russia, on the basis of the Treaty of Pereyaslav, which is in the corpus of state laws and has never been cancelled, Ukraine should secure autonomy.

This was all that the Ukrainians could hope with their scanty resources to accomplish during those hectic days when American public opinion and the administration were still undecided on which side of the conflict America would enter or whether it would succeed in remaining neutral. The Ukrainian organizations sent money for relief to Galicia and to the Carpathians but they could not hope to equal the sums raised by their well-established neighbors and enemies who had the opportunity to draw liberally for propaganda purposes on the wealth and favor of many of the richest persons in America.

In the meanwhile the constant work of the Ukrainians began to show some result. They succeeded in enlisting the sympathy of some members of Congress and on January 24, 1917, Congress approved a resolution of James J. Hamil for a Ukrainian Tag Day to collect funds for the Ukrainian war sufferers in Europe. President Wilson set this for April 21, 1917, and this was perhaps the first real contact of the Ukrainians with the mass of the American citizens.

Unfortunately after the meeting of the *Soym* in 1915, new difficulties arose. The *Soym* had provided for a continuing body, the Federation of Ukrainians, but this organization soon began to split as to the degree that Ukrainian dislike for Russian tyranny should be stressed, if it involved an apparent sympathy and support for Austria-Hungary. At the same time there was established alongside of this Federation a Rus National *Rada* which was more formally under the protection and influence of the Ukrainian Catholic Church and drew especially on the Ukrainians from the Carpathians, the area that at home was dominated by the Hungarians. Throughout the entire war there

was a marked tendency for the Galicians and those from Carpatho-Ukraine to work in separate organizations. There were various schisms and finally some of the more outspoken supporters of Austria founded their own Ukrainian National Committee. This, however, as the United States prepared to enter the war, adopted a strong anti-Austrian policy and it became the leading organ of the Ukrainians in the war years of 1917-1918 as the older Federation sank into the background.

Yet the separation between the two sections became even more marked in 1918. Thomas G. Masaryk paid a visit to the United States and visited many of the leading Czech and Slovak communities. Under his influence there was signed in Pittsburgh an accord between the Czechs and Slovaks in the United States. He followed this up with working with the Carpathian Ukrainians and at a meeting in Scranton in November after the Armistice, the delegates at a Rus National *Rada* voted overwhelmingly to join Czechoslovakia, in case they could not secure directly a united free Ukrainian state. Thus when Austria-Hungary disintegrated, the way was paved through the influence of the immigrants in America for the Czechoslovak Republic to secure control of the Carpathians or, as they called it, Podkarpatska Rus. It is true that the government promised autonomy to this area but it continually found obstacles in the way of doing it and took no effective steps to introduce it until after the Munich Agreement in 1938 which radically changed the political and administrative set-up in the entire country.

With the outbreak of the Russian Revolution in March, 1917 and the speedy entrance of the United States into the war against Germany and Austria-Hungary, the Ukrainians were able to speak more freely. With Russia falling into chaos, there was no desire or possibility on the part of the Ukrainians from Galicia and the Carpathians to stand for Austrian domination of any part of Ukraine and this cleared the air in more ways than one.

Then the Ukrainian Central *Rada* in Kiev began to function as a Ukrainian government and by the end of 1917, it declared the independence of Ukraine in the Third *Universal* in some sort of federation with Russia and on January 22, 1918, it declared the full independence of the Ukrainian National Republic. This gave new hope and inspiration to the Ukrainians in the United States and encouraged them to work harder to raise money for Ukrainian relief and to assist the new state.

On the other hand, the Ukrainian National Republic met with more difficulties in connection with the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk ending the war of the Ukrainians with the Central Powers and transferring all their energies to the combat against the Russian Bolsheviks. The American public and even the administration still hoped that Russia would re-

enter the war under a republican form of government and once again there came the opportunity to attack the Ukrainians as having German sympathies and once again they were greeted with the most fantastic charges by the anti-Bolshevik Russians of all factions and by the Poles who now saw the opportunity to recover even more of the territory which had once been under the control of the Polish state.

The Ukrainians greeted enthusiastically President Wilson's speech on the Fourteen Points, calling for the self-determination of all peoples. They could not reconcile this with the point dealing with the need of sympathizing and helping the Russian people to secure their own government. They called for the extension of the same right of self-determination to the peoples oppressed by Russia as was extended to the peoples of Austria-Hungary, especially the Czechoslovaks and the Poles, for less attention was paid in the United States to the Croats and Slovenes than to the Serbs who had long stood out for their heroic defense of their country from the early days of the war.

Then on November 1, 1918, the Ukrainians seized control of Galicia and Lviv and set up on its territory the Western Ukrainian National Republic. Since most of the Ukrainians in the United States were from Galicia, this new development aroused their prolonged enthusiasm, even though their joy was soon tempered by the news that the Poles had recaptured Lviv and set themselves stubbornly to win by force of arms the entire province.

It would take too long to list in detail the work of the Ukrainian National Committee in the field of relief and to win American sympathy for the cause of Ukrainian independence. It sent delegations to Washington to plead the cause of Ukraine before the President, the Secretary of State, and Congress. It published books on the Ukrainian situation and it protested publicly against every aggressive act of the Poles and the Bolsheviks, but alas with little tangible result. The romantic interest of the American public in the Poland of Kosciuszko and Pulaski and the prestige which the Poles had won in the United States were obstacles which the Ukrainians with their lack of leaders known to the American public were unable to overcome, the more so as the entire weight of the French was thrown into the cause of Poland, for France had decided to make a restored Poland the bastion of her policy in the east of Europe.

Nothing daunted, the Ukrainian National Committee sent to Paris a delegation of Congressman James J. Hamil and Dr. Kyrylo Bilyk to try to cooperate with the delegates of the Ukrainian National Republic and the Western Ukrainian National Republic at the Peace Conference. They were able to secure interviews with all of the Big Four—Wilson,

Lloyd George, Clemenceau and Orlando, but they were unable to secure any alteration of the policy of the Conference and with heavy hearts saw that the Conference was tending to recognize Eastern Galicia as a part of the Polish state. At the same time the leaders of the Conference were so sure that in the near future Russia would throw off the Bolshevik yoke and resume its place among the free nations of the world that they took no action with regard to the oppressed nationalities trying to liberate themselves from Russia with the exception of the Finns and to some degree of the Poles, but even the Conference did not award any eastern boundary to Poland and contented itself with recommendations that Poland govern temporarily some vague region east of the so-called Curzon Line, pending the emergence of a democratic Russian government.

Back in the United States, the Ukrainians made common cause with the Lithuanians, Latvians and Estonians in a League of Four Nations all struggling against Russian domination. On the other hand they joined the Central European Union of all the new states being erected in Europe with the exception of Poland under the presidency of Thomas G. Masaryk who left the post to become the President of the Czechoslovak Republic. By now the Ukrainian National Committee had become the recognized spokesman for all the Ukrainians, especially those from Galicia and those parts of Ukraine that had not been under Hungarian rule before World War I and it never failed to take advantage of any opportunity to appeal to the American people, the administration or the Peace Conference and later the Council of Ambassadors in Paris and the League of Nations for support of the Ukrainian cause against both the Bolsheviks and the increasing aggressive claims and actions of the Poles who stubbornly insisted that the revived Polish Republic should include all the territory which it held before the First Partition of Poland in 1772.

At the same time the Ukrainians were bothered by the constant suspicion that they still nourished pro-German sympathies. These ideas were carefully fostered in the American mind by both the Poles and the Russians and in some quarters they found ready credence because there were very few Americans with any proper appreciation of the history of Eastern Europe in the past and those who had any inkling, including the scholars, were apt to have obtained their knowledge almost exclusively from sources hostile to the Ukrainian aspirations.

In 1919 the Western Ukrainian National Republic sent an unofficial diplomatic mission to Washington to add its word for the government in exile so as to salvage something out of the wreckage of the high hopes of but a couple of years before. This mission first under

Dr. Lonhyn Cehelsky and then Dr. Luke Myshuha did not succeed in warding off the inevitable triumph of the Poles in Eastern Galicia, for on March 14, 1923, the Council of Ambassadors formally awarded Eastern Galicia to Poland and the few conditions that it imposed were never seriously taken into account by the Polish government. The end of the trail had now been reached and a new period of weariness and disillusionment swept over most of the Ukrainians in the United States.

It was not to be permanent for in 1922 the stalwart leaders of the Ukrainian movement had founded the Union of Ukrainian Organizations. This continued to function until the beginning of World War II. It continued the work of its predecessors and even though it was unable officially to raise the banner of Ukrainian independence, it continued throughout the entire period its work of relief and of publicity and of protest against the abuse of the Ukrainians by both the Poles and the Soviet authorities.

How shall we evaluate all this self-sacrificing work of the Ukrainians in the United States? From the point of view of results, it had little practical success when we compare it with the activity of many other groups but it would be wrong to stop there. It is true that the State Department has advanced little from its position of 1917 and still dreams of a future democratic Russia in which Ukraine may be only a sort of a state on the American model, but Ukraine and the Ukrainians have penetrated to some extent the American consciousness. Steadily widening circles are coming to realize that there is something to the Ukrainian dreams and claims and even the newspapers are beginning to note the difference between Kiev and Moscow.

The effect on the Ukrainians themselves has been astounding. Before 1914, as in their homeland, they represented rather an amorphous group with few or no outstanding spokesmen, more or less content to earn a laborious living in their new homes. Today they and their organizations are an alert and active part of the American scene. They have developed a new sense of racial and national pride and today they are in that same position that Ivan Franko envisioned in *Moses*, when the feeling of desolation and despair at the loss of their rejected leader suddenly turned into a furious power and the young men under Joshua went on to achieve those goals of which even Moses had despaired. So it is now. The Ukrainian people, aware of themselves and their powers, are now in a position to speak for themselves and a new crisis, if one arises, will show that the Ukrainians in America can speak with more authority and prestige than ever before and can play their part in seeing that Ukraine becomes free.

DRAY-KHMARA'S POETICAL CREATIVENESS

By OKSANA ASHER

PART I

The influence of contemporary symbolist poetry in Russia is reflected in most of Dray-Khmara's first attempts at poetic expression. Thus, one of his earliest poems in Russian, published in 1910, in the literary magazine *Lukomorie*, begins:

Girl in the flaming red kerchief,
Rainbow of ribbons and light;
I hear the music of bagpipes
Reeling with youthful delight.

The musical quality of Dray-Khmara's poetry connects him with the Symbolists, especially the poetry of Verlaine, which he translated with great success. However, Dray-Khmara's imagery has not the indefiniteness and the vague spiritual effect of the French poet. Ukrainian symbolism, according to Yury Sherekh, was a peculiar phenomenon in which the vague mystical and spiritual elements played a very small part, for it was not the result of spiritual fatigue or a reaction against materialism, but a form of protest against the narrow ethnographical current that dominated early Ukrainian literature.⁴⁶ However, Dray-Khmara's unusual images do sound like the musical chords of an old Ukrainian song.⁴⁷ They are often drawn from the folklore background. In his poem "The Fields as a Striped Kerchief,"⁴⁸ the slow tempo of country life reminds him of the majestic tread of oxen. In another poem, "She Put Forth Silken Threads,"⁴⁹ the sun is rolling on the soft straw and the poet's heart goes wandering around like a bee. Again in his

⁴⁶ Yuri Sherekh, "Trends in Ukrainian Literature Under the Soviets." *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, IV (Spring, 1948), p. 151.

⁴⁷ Because of the great musicality of the poem "Leavetaking from Podilya," it was set to music as a song by Fomenko.

⁴⁸ *Prorosten'*, Slovo, 1926, p. 23.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 25.

poem "The Rain,"⁵⁰ the sudden darkness of the heavy rain is compared with the clouds of locusts that sometimes appear on the plains.

Another link with Symbolism is his use of the most delicate nuances of light and color.

My eyes embrace the world around me,
For lines and tones enchant my sight —
The strong sun's ploughshares deeply furrow
My fallow land with blades of light.⁵¹

With a philosophical depth to his profoundly perceptive soul, he perceives with his eye, his ear, and his heart his relationship to the world.

I look, I listen, how translucent
Life's singing river flows along.
I, too, it seems, must quickly, quickly
Give forth that same unaging song.

Although Dray-Khmara's musically sounding verse connects him with the Symbolist school, his carefully constructed phraseology and polished words, always in complete harmony with the form of the poem, lead us to see in him also a master of "Ukrainian neoclassicism." However, he is not a classic poet in a strict sense, for he has neither the severity of the classicists nor the detached and scientific observation of the French Parnassians, whom he translated with such consummate art. Moreover, his work has a grace and humanity which is not to be found in these French poets. It reflects, as does the work of any great poet, the influence of many literary movements in combination with the poet's individual reactions to such influences.

A man of great intellectual originality, Dray-Khmara rejected Soviet realism. He chose rather to be carried away by the mysteries of his own mind and to cultivate his joy in aesthetic sensation and to develop a personal philosophy. This philosophical mood is evident as early as 1919 in the poem, "At Dusk,"⁵² which shows the poet both as an admirer of nature and as a keen observer of life who wishes to understand the universe. Thus the moment seems to him an eternity, when in silence without breathing, he is listening to the voice of his soul. Two years later (1921), in the poem "February Raged in Vain,"⁵³ he states his intention of traveling among the Ukrainian folk as the Ukrainian philosopher Skovoroda⁵⁴ did, and pouring out his songs into the heart of the people.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 39.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 15.

⁵² *Prorosten'*, Slovo, 1926, p. 32.

⁵³ *Prorosten'*, p. 6.

⁵⁴ Hryhory Skovoroda (1722-1794), known as the "Ukrainian Socrates," traveled on foot throughout Ukraine, teaching morality, love of knowledge, and good deeds.

Although he had a wide knowledge of Western culture there is little trace of it in his first volume of poems. The Eastern element is predominant and is used, not for exotic color, but rather as something very familiar, to him as a part of Ukrainian culture. For example, when the melted snow of the city reminds the poet of the Tatar drink, *Buza*. In the brilliant second poem of the cycle, "Scheherezade,"⁵⁵ (1923), the language of magic and phantasy which the poet introduces into the world of fairy-tales becomes particularly striking when combined with the colors of Ukrainian folklore. Here in the image of the young winged horse he adds his feelings of the power of a storm at dawn to the passions of the Revolution and the dramatic strength of an Eastern legend. Even the treatment of Biblical themes in this first volume of poems has a characteristically Ukrainian interpretation. Thus, in the first poem of *Prorosten'*, "Under the Blue of Spring,"⁵⁶ which was written in 1922, he presents his belief in the Ukrainian Renaissance in the double symbol of early spring and the emergence of the Earth from the Flood. In another poem of Biblical content (1922), "And Again as the First Man,"⁵⁷ the agony of a prophetic heart is expressly stated. Here the first man calls the stars his sisters, and the moon his brother, names the animals and all living things, yet finds his heart a Gobi Desert. He lived alone with his vision of good and evil days to come. In one of his most beautiful poems, "I Fell in Love with You,"⁵⁸ 1924, he sees the rebellious Ukraine as a young eagle flying into battle. Her wings are bloody, her head bears the stigmata, and in the distance he sees Golgotha and hears the enemy crying "Crucify her!" He drains with her the full measure of this bitter pain and in silence they clasp hands as brother and sister. This note of belief in the Revolution as a national liberation colors the whole volume, except for the last poem in which we may divine his disillusionment with the Revolution and with life. For "To the Village,"⁵⁹ 1925, is written wholly in a minor key.

The snow now gleams, the cold wind races,
The straining wires hum: I know
All roads are hid as one erases,
Against the wind is hard to go.

⁵⁵ *Prorosten'*, p. 18.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 22.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 48.

Here the poet approaches a village devastated during the Revolution, now deserted and buried in the swirling snow. From behind a snowdrift the face of Lenin, with its high forehead, momentarily appears. And then a cry of agony is heard as Dray-Khmara asks his heart to beat only if there is still hope. For if only despair remains, the poet wishes that his heart may break and, like ashes, blow away.

A Ukrainian nationalist of energy and determination, Dray-Khmara was often distressed by the passivity of the Ukrainian intelligentsia, which, as he wrote, did not experience in full measure a feeling of national consciousness during the Revolution and therefore found itself irresolute in the face of the new social order.⁶⁰

In one of his unpublished poems, "And Every Day Somewhere in the Tram,"⁶¹ he contrasts the monotony of life in the Soviet Ukraine with the inspiring greatness of the Ganges and the Himalayas. "But what is inevitable cannot be changed; you will only prick yourself by plucking the roses," exclaims the poet-philosopher, concluding painfully that the time is not ripe in his beloved country for the emergence of great souls, that no Ghandi fights for Ukrainian independence.

Important also as thematic material in this first volume of poems is Dray-Khmara's feeling for nature. Some of the poems in *Prorosten'* are autobiographical in their reflection of his growing up as a country boy and of his joy in the changing season, sun, rain, birds, all Nature. Such are "Ah, the Round Sun Stands So High,"⁶² 1922, and "The Cuckoo Calls Beyond the Water,"⁶³ 1921. He particularly admired the early autumn which induced a feeling of gentle melancholy and glorified its golden beauty as a season of sweet silence and dreams of which he felt himself a part. In one of the poems in *Prorosten'* he echoes the mood of the Podilya,⁶⁴ "I Dream . . ." ⁶⁵ While he is lying on the warm ground with the hum of insects in his ears he feels the sun's rays as cords on which he swings, swings, until he finds himself becoming one with the earth he lies on. Again in the poem "I Do Not Bemoan My Fate,"⁶⁶ the poet calls the sun his sworn brother, the steppe his sworn sister, and the wind his friend. We see an intimate connection between the sun, the stars, the winds and the poet's emotions.

In Rylsky's review of Dray-Khmara's first collected volume of poetry, *Prorosten'* (*Young Shoots*), we read:

⁶⁰ His Diary, August 13, 1924.

⁶¹ Unpublished poem, date unknown.

⁶² *Prorosten'*, Slovo, 1926, p. 36.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 38.

⁶⁴ Podilya is the region of Great Ukraine, which lies southwest of Kiev.

⁶⁵ *Prorosten'*, Slovo, 1926, p. 45.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

The choice of the title *Prorosten'* was particularly appropriate, because the author is very fond of words rarely used, or (I suspect) not used at all.

Rylsky was right in his conjecture that Dray-Khmara invented the word *Prorosten'*, although the word actually has its roots in the vocabulary of Ukrainian folklore. Even in Dray-Khmara's use of symbolism he reverts to archaic and forgotten words, buried in the treasury of folk speech. In the following lines we can see how his unusual arrangement and choice of words give the poetry both freshness and originality while revealing, at the same time, his interest in and knowledge of philology.

I cherish words vast and full sounding,
Like honey scented, flushed with wine;
Old words, that in lost depths abounding
Were sought through ages mute in vain.

Without undertaking the systematic analysis of the formal aspects of Dray-Khmara's poetry, one may point out a few characteristic features, such as his use of unexpected rhymes and sonorous assonances which is another important feature of these poems. Thus he prefers to rhyme the verb with the noun, as for example "liubliu'"* and "rilliu'"; "Tsvitut'" — "put'"; or the verb and the adjective, "roste" — "zolote"; and if he rhymes two verbs, they will be of different tenses, for example, "pase" (present) and "znese" (future). Similarly, when he rhymes nouns, they are usually in different cases, for example a genitive plural "Pisen'" with a nominative singular "den'," or nominative plural "dary" with a genitive singular "nory." He also uses many musical assonances such as "okom" — "hlyboko" or "nadaremne" — "pidyaremnyi."

Dray-Khmara has a highly individual way with epithets, often replacing the commonly-used adjective epithet with an adverb. Thus, instead of saying "I dzveniat' stozharni duhy," (And *Bright* Heavens Are Ringing), he writes, "I dzveniat *stozharno* duhy" (And the Heavens Are *Brightly* Ringing). When he does use an adjective epithet, it is always the exact and individual one. For special emphasis he sometimes puts the epithet, i.e., the adjective, after its noun, for example, "Rala prominni" (Sun rays ploughshares) in the poem, "My Eyes Embrace." In general, however, he tried to avoid an excessive use of epithet. In this same poem he says, "An epithet, like misfortune, occurs where least expected and only iambs and anapests keep order."

Also very common is his use of the metaphor with the instrumental or with the genitive case. For example with the instrumental case:

iablungia roztsvitaie bilym shatrom
(the apple tree is in white cane blossoms)

or with the genitive:

* The italicized vowels are accented in Ukrainian.

huby kamiani dakhiv vysokykh
 (the stony lips of the high roofs)
 I sliozy ne moi — dubiv pomerklykh
 (And the tears not mine — of the darkening oaks)

In his lyrics, Dray-Khmara's technical device of using the first stanza as a refrain at the end of the poem achieves the completeness of the rondeau. For example, in the poem "To the Village" the first four lines are repeated at the conclusion with only a few changes in the second and in the fourth lines:

The snow now gleams, the cold wind races,
 My thoughts are straining wires: I know
 All roads are hid, as one erases,
 But I must go!⁶⁷

Dray-Khmara's poetry in *Prorosten'* is syllabo-tonic with classical meters: iambic, trochee, anapest, and dactyl. Occasionally he makes use of clear-cut caesura.

A master of short poems, Michael Dray-Khmara also wrote some longer poems in free verse that were equally successful. For example, the poem, "Return," written in the years 1922-1927. He considered this poem unpublishable because of its abstract character and the possibility of seeing political implications in it. Indeed, the symbolism of this poem appears in the very first stanza:

No flood of sadness ever
 Did totally surround
 As on this day,
 Nor did I search so far and keenly,
 With anxious
 And impassioned
 vision
 Into the sapphire misty shore
 Of dreaming shadows.

Here Dray-Khmara speaks about his great loneliness and longing for his beloved fatherland while he was abroad. The European countries he visited remain strange and cold to him. Convinced that only at home can he be happy, he must return to his dear steppes. In the second part of this poem he describes his return to Ukraine. But, instead of the beautiful land he was dreaming about, he finds an endless desert:

Like a flaming sea the ungathered grain
 is standing tossing its empty ears. It
 waits for the harvesters, but they do not
 come. It is so lonely here; there is not
 even a small village, not even a tree.
 Only the steppes, the steppes without end.

⁶⁷ Compare with first stanza on p. 357.

Later in the poem Dray-Khmara asks himself who is responsible for this destruction, "Whose fault is it?" and he answers: "It is the people's own fault," and the proverb, "a powerful state cannot be built by lying on the warm stove at home." Yet the poet believes that better days will come, that the horrors of bloody Revolution were not suffered in vain, that at least they will reawaken the national consciousness.

The main motif of a great loneliness in the poet's heart appears against the background of these ancient steppes, whose unchangeable beauty is wonderfully recreated by the poet. The nature of the steppes is reproduced in every detail: we can sense the smell of the dry grass, lightly touched by a gentle wind, the erratic movement of a butterfly through the air, the endless expanses of these steppes where the hot and generous sun caresses like a loving mother without asking, "Who are you?"

The feelings of personal loneliness and admiration of nature introduce a third philosophical theme. The poet, while lying under the shadow of the grave mounds, one of those graves which can be found throughout Ukraine, gazes at the dark evening sky and recognizes eternity in the depths that are hanging over him. The poet's mood is interrupted by his reawakening at the touch of a very small breeze. Thus he creates the artistic tension which makes this poem so beautiful.

The form of the poem *Povorot* is very complex: it consists of two chapters which are divided into smaller parts of different rhythms and lyrical moods with the result that classical meters alternate in sharp contrast with free verse. Especially colorful in rhythms is the second part, which contains a mixture of free verse, a folk-song, and dialogues in which the lines are divided among several voices.

The first issue of *Literaturny Yarmarok*⁶⁸ (1928) contained Dray-Khmara's famous and controversial sonnet, "Swans," which was his last published poem and therefore his real "swan song." This work was greeted by a storm of criticism. In order to understand the nature of this criticism, an English translation follows:

⁶⁸ *Literaturny Yarmarok*, the literary almanac in Kharkiv, had among its collaborators several members of the dissolved *Vaplite*. It was under the direct ideological influence of Khvylovy and therefore contained the most talented contemporary prose and poetry. To give more liveliness to the printed texts of different authors, the editors presented these materials in the old style of *inter-media*, which was used in the Ukrainian drama of the eighteenth century. The original style and high artistic level of this almanac made it stand out from the other colorless magazines that circulated in the Soviet Ukraine at that time.

S W A N S

Upon the lake with winds through willows singing
 They lingered in captivity till fall.
 They stately swam; their curving necks had all
 The grace of reeds the stormy wind is swinging.

But when sonorous crystal frosts came ringing
 And water froze under a dream-white pall,
 They leapt to flight out of that frigid stall
 And feared no threats of winter to their winging.

O Five unconquered, though the cold be long,
 No snow can muffle your triumphant song
 Which breaks the ice of small despairs and fears:

Rise, swans, and higher to bright Lyra homing
 Pierce through the night of servitude to spheres
 Where, all intense, the sea of life is foaming.

The publication of this sonnet in *Literaturny Yarmarok* is significant, for the magazine was dedicated to printing the best Ukrainian literature. But even the editors of *Literaturny Yarmarok* were aware of the audacious symbols in Dray-Khmara's sonnet, and several times they made reference to the poem. For example, in the same issue of this almanac, the attention of the reader was again attracted by such a comment as: "Dray-Khmara's swans went away to the south far behind high mountains and great seas."⁶⁹ And in the second issue of this almanac we read a dialogue about the sonnet, written in the form of an interlude. The dialogue takes place between a young boy pioneer and his father:

- Father, is it true that swans can sing?
- These, my son, can sing.
- And why?
- Because they are singers.
- But is it true that even among swans there are singers?
- Oh, little stupid, leave me alone!
- And why are they unconquered and captured?
- Because the artist wanted to use the dialectic thinking.
- And what is dialectics? And why "through storm and snow?"⁷⁰
- Such was the name given to the monograph.
- And why have I never heard their singing, that "sounds so triumphantly?"
- Because it is poetic exaggeration.
- A lie, my father?
- Poetic image, hyperbole.

⁶⁹ *Literaturny Yarmarok*, Vol. I, p. 201.

⁷⁰ *Kriz buryu i snih (Through Storm and Snow)* was the title of Rylsky's volume of collected poems that was published in 1925.

- And what is this ice of despair and disappointment that they break, Father?
- Enough, son; in this way they encouraged some of their friends . . .
- And why did he write about "slavery" and "non-existence"?
- But enough, I say to you: you see they are captured.
- And who captured them?
- They captured themselves . . .
- Themselves? And who are they? Such funny beings! I want, my father, to listen to the living ones; take me to them!

The father was offended and shrugged his shoulders; and one of the editors of *Literaturny Yarmarok*, who was listening to this dialogue between the father and son, looked to the West in silence.⁷¹

The author of this dialogue was Nicholas Khvylovy. He pointed out that "Swans" has a great deal to say to the reader and that it reveals allegorically the fate of the five Ukrainian "neoclassicists."⁷² Khvylovyi not only shared the poet's ideas, but strongly supported them. But such defenders of the party line as Borys Kovalenko and Mykola Novyts'kyi severely criticized the poem, accusing Dray-Khmara of harboring counter-revolutionary ideas. The publication of "Swans" in December, 1928, was dangerous for Dray-Khmara. The communist literary critic Koriak came especially from Kharkiv to Kiev to unmask the hostile tendencies in current Ukrainian literature. Some of Dray-Khmara's friends, such as Professor Savchenko, advised him to hold off publication, but the poet refused.

Novytskyi, in his critical pamphlet, *At the Fair*, tried to discover in the symbols of "Lebedi" the poet's hostile feelings towards "proletarian dictatorship." "If the poem had appeared twenty-five years ago, when the Ukrainian workers and peasants were oppressed by the Czarist regime," wrote this critic, "we would sympathize with the author in his mood of 'daring,' though we would not advise him to call the attention of the proletarian masses to Lyra's constellation or try to make them believe that the all-conquering poetic song can liberate them from their slavery. The workers have a better way of liberating themselves from their 'non-existence,' by building up a fighting class organization and preparing for the decisive revolutionary contest. But this poem, inspired by Mallarmé according to the poet, appears in the Ukrainian literature not of twenty-five years ago, but of today, when moods of despair, disappointment, pain and grief over wings that are frozen to the ice are very foreign to the proletarian conqueror, who is occupied with very different feelings and with more practical things. But we have, it is true, in our territory (in the Soviet Union) elements 'captured'

⁷¹ *Literaturny Yarmarok*, Vol. 2, pp. 125-126.

⁷² Sherekh, Yu., The convention held at the second congress of M.U.R. (Artistic Ukrainian Movement) in May, 1948, in Zuffenhausen, Germany.

by the proletarian dictatorship and these elements have reason for 'despair and disappointment.' They have their singers and 'groups of five poets' and even some who dare to protest. For them perhaps the mood of *Lebedi* would be in key, but for us this poetic language is too strange and its moods too foreign."⁷³

In answer to this hostile criticism, Dray-Khmara published in the fourth issue of *Literaturny Yarmarok*⁷⁴ his translation of Mallarme's sonnet and a long letter of explanation beginning as follows:

Very respected comrade editor, allow me to publish in your journal a few words which I hope will dispel the misunderstandings which arose in connection with my sonnet *Lebedi*.

This same letter, with a few changes, appeared at the same time in the Ukrainian newspaper, *Proletarska Pravda*.⁷⁵ Dray-Khmara's explanation of the relation of the Mallarme sonnet (which begins: *Le vierge, le vivace et le bel aujourd'hui*) to his "Swans" points out that Mallarme was trying to describe man's vain attempt to free himself from the chains of reality by force of reason. Mallarme's swan can shake the snow from his neck but has not strength enough to free his wings from the ice.

In my two last terza rimas, which greatly disturbed certain critics, arousing in them feelings of doubt and incertitude (continued Dray-Khmara), I had reference to five poets of "Abbeys," who, without egotism and with a closer approach to things as they are, were able to break that ice of despair and disappointment which held prisoner the "dark" genius of Mallarme. Such were the poets who established the "Creteil commune," earning their living by physical work and publishing their books privately. Their names: Jules Romains, Georges Duhamel, Charles Vildrac, Rene Arcos, Alexandre Mercereau."

Dray-Khmara explained further that he was attracted to these poets by the great love they had for their comrade, man, and by the humility implicit in their recognition of man's being the merest dust of the vast universe, and by their philosophy which was to be sane and strong, to work hard, and to look into the future with courage.⁷⁶ In conclusion, he called his critics naive for finding in *Lebedi* a picture of people opposed to the present state of affairs. "I would advise these critics," added Dray-Khmara, "not to search for 'Special meaning,' in literary work, but to pay attention to the visible aims of the author."

⁷³ Novytskyi, M., *Na Yarmarku*, Kharkiv, 1930fi p. 11.

⁷⁴ *Literaturny Yarmarok*, Vol. 4, 1929, p. 174.

⁷⁵ *Proletarska Pravda*, Kiev, 1929, No. 66.

⁷⁶ As a source concerning the Creteil commune, see Margolin, S., "Jules Romains," *Zhyttya i Revolutsiya*, 1926, 10, pp. 59-60. Dray-Khmara translated much of the work of these poets.

These last two Russian expressions Dray-Khmara took from the old Czarist law on censorship, using them ironically.

But Dray-Khmara's ingenious explanation was considered unsatisfactory. The same Bolshevik critic, Kovalenko, published in the literary gazette, *Literaturna Hazeta*, an article entitled "Dray-Khmara Tries to Justify Himself," in which he continued his attack on the poet. The Soviet press was, by nature, predisposed to find in this elegant and optimistic sonnet a directly counterrevolutionary meaning. The poet had meant only to celebrate the five Ukrainian "neoclassicists" whose songs of courage he felt were real weapons against the despair and disappointment of the thoughtful soul. In his use of the constellation (poetry personified as leading man from slavery to the freer seas of life) he was perhaps quite innocently symbolic, as the relationship between "Swans" and the predicament of the "neoclassicists" is very clear.⁷⁷

As a matter of fact, in spite of the similarity between "Swans" and Mallarme's sonnet in poetic expression, the lyrical moods of the two poems differ widely: Dray-Khmara's poem has perhaps more in common with Zerov's "Ovid,"⁷⁸ which was published five years before "Swans," and there is also a connection between "Swans" and another poem of Zerov's about the "ninth winter" (ninth since 1917), published two years before the appearance of "Swans." It is interesting that the similarity in feeling between "Lebedi" and Zerov's "Ovid" did not attract the notice of the Soviet critics. Also, Dray-Khmara used one of the lines in "Swans" the title of poet Rylsky's volume of collected poems, "Through Storm and Snow," a use which proves again that the sonnet "Swans" reflected the spirit of the whole neoclassical group to which his dedication of the sonnet, "To My Comrades," clearly refers. After the storm of criticism aroused by "Swans" the avenue to publication was closed to Dray-Khmara forever. In a like position were Zerov and Fylypovych. Rylsky broke off all connections with the group and Burghardt went abroad to Germany. Thus Dray-Khmara's "Swans" was the true poetic swan song of the Ukrainian "neoclassicists."

⁷⁷ Dray-Khmara's explanations sounded oddly sophisticated and artificial, especially since there were, in fact, more than five poets in the French "Abbey" group.

⁷⁸ For a comparison of these two poems, see Porsky, V., *Kyiv*, No. 1, 1951, p. 36.

BOOK REVIEWS

KHRUSHCHEV OF THE UKRAINE. A Biography. By Victor Alexandrov. Philosophical Library, Inc. New York. Translated from the French by Paul Selver. Pp. 216. 1957. \$4.75.

The opponents of Ukrainian independence, both the Red Russian Communists and the White Russian anti-Communists, are endeavoring to convince the world that Ukraine was not occupied nor enslaved by Russia. Both Red and White imperialists are in total agreement on this point; both ignore the historical facts. They simply do not recognize these objective facts, but instead are trying to create a false history, in the spirit of which they are conducting propaganda on both sides of the Iron Curtain in order to preserve Russia from dismemberment into independent national states.

Of late the anti-Ukrainian propaganda conducted by the White Russians in the West has been gathering momentum. One of their chief arguments—which is supposed to convince the Western world that Ukraine is not occupied by Russia—is that after the advent of Khrushchev to power in Moscow the key positions in both the state and the party administrations of the USSR went into the hands of the Ukrainians, who allegedly have been pressing a new “Ukrainian course” in Soviet politics. Thus, they say, the Soviet army is commanded by Ukrainian Malinovsky, while the Soviet navy is under the command of another Ukrainian, Admiral Kabanenko. Furthermore, Soviet foreign policy is led by still another Ukrainian, Gromyko. To crown the list, the Communist Party of the USSR, they aver, is also in the hands of a “crafty Ukrainian,” Nikita S. Khrushchev. Therefore, they conclude, there could be hardly any talk about Ukraine being occupied by Russia, inasmuch as it is the Ukrainians who “dominate” Russia in the USSR.

This propaganda line is systematically pursued by Russian imperialists in the whole world; it is inadvertently propagated by professors in American universities, and is widely disseminated in the American press, radio and TV.

Regrettably, these “Russia Firsters” are totally oblivious to the fact that the national origin of either Czarist or Soviet chieftains has little bearing on their loyalty and dedication to the “grandeur” of a “one and indivisible Russia.” Was it not a fact that all the members of the Romanov dynasty, despite the fact that they had no Russian blood in their veins, nonetheless conducted Russian imperialistic policy for 300 years? Was it not Georgian Stalin who raised the international prestige and significance of Russia as no Russian Czar ever dreamed of doing?

It is quite understandable why Nikita Khrushchev, dressed in “Ukrainian national garb,” is more acceptable today for both Russian Red and White imperialists than a Khrushchev as a “Russian man.” Such a propaganda “arrangement” is especially convenient to combat Ukrainian nationalism, to confuse world opinion as to the true nature of the USSR, and above all, is opportune for whitewashing the Russian people, who produced Bolshevism, and for the pursuance

of the "theory" that communism is an international phenomenon, and not a product of Russian political thought.

Among the books dedicated to Nikita Khrushchev published lately, that of Victor Alexandrov, *Khrushchev of the Ukraine*, deserves especial attention in that it endeavors to perpetuate the myth of Khrushchev's "Ukrainian origin." In many places the author simply states that Nikita Khrushchev is a direct descendant of a Zaporozhian Kozak by the name of "Khrushch," who was allegedly exiled from Zaporozhe to the village of Kalinovka in Kursk province, where he settled and gave origin to the Russified family of the Khrushchevs.

One does not have to be an official biographer of the first secretary of the Communist Party of the USSR to detect, on the basis of available facts on him, that neither by blood nor by spiritual attachment was Khrushchev in any way ever connected with the Ukrainian people.

Author Alexandrov writes that the village of Kalinovka is situated in the southern part of the Kursk *oblast*, on the River Vorsklo. It takes but a moment to glance at the map of the Kursk *oblast* and to find out that the village of Kalinovka, where Khrushchev was born, lies in the Khomutov *raion*, in the northern (and not the southern, as stated by V. Alexandrov) part of the Kursk *oblast*, about 60 klms. north of the city of Rylsk on the Nemeya River (and not on the River Vorsklo); and this part of the territory is not a part of the Ukrainian ethnographic territory. This *raion* of the Kursk *oblast* is radically different, by virtue of its purely Russian population, from the southern part of the *oblast*, where in 1918 during the existence of the Ukrainian independent state there was a Ukrainian-Russian frontier, and where the names of the villages and the towns, such as Tsybulivka, Hraivoron and others eloquently attest to their Ukrainian origin.

But the veracity of Khrushchev's biography as reported by Alexandrov is seriously to be questioned owing to his other "facts." For instance, he writes that Khrushchev's father was a village blacksmith. But the *Little Soviet Encyclopedia* (1956) reports that Nikita Khrushchev was "born into the family of a worker-miner." Naturally, the calling of blacksmith and miner are both "proletarian"; the Soviet encyclopedia had no reason to falsify this particular fact.

There are other supporting facts which would indicate that Khrushchev was a miner. Up to the Russian revolution some 250,000 people from the Kursk *oblast* every year went to the neighboring areas of Ukraine in search of seasonal employment. In the second half of the XIXth century and with the development of the Donets coal basin, a great majority of these migrant Russian workers were employed in the mines. Ukrainian peasants, it is known, reluctantly accepted work in the mines, even regarding with scorn those Russian workers who came from the north, calling them *dontsi*, which is synonymous with "have-nots" and "beggars."

Nikita Khrushchev, about whom both his official biography and V. Alexandrov's book state that he worked in the Donbas while a young man, belonged to these "have-nots" from Kursk who worked in the Donets mines as migrant workers and who, after earning a few hundred rubles, promptly returned to their villages in the north.

There are many other inconsistencies and simple misstatements regarding Khrushchev, all of which are meant to "prove" that Khrushchev is Ukrainian. For instance, on p. 3 the author states that village youngsters, with whom Nikita Khrushchev played, played on a *sopilka* (a Ukrainian type of flute) and also played

a game called *lapta*. As a matter of fact, *lapta* (a ball game, a kind of cricket) as a game is entirely unknown in Ukraine; it is a purely Russian game, never played in Ukraine.

On page 44 the author writes: "It might seem paradoxical, but it is a fact that the Ukrainian people, especially in the Kursk *oblast*, do not speak Ukrainian." This attests to the author's "knowledge" of Ukraine, its geography and factual conditions.

The terms, "Ukraine" and "Ukrainan," are frequently used by the author, but the reader cannot really discover what these terms imply. There is no mention of the existence of the Ukrainian independent state of 1917-20, nor of its struggle against the Russian Bolsheviks, nor is there any reference to the epic fight of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army against both the Nazis and the Bolsheviks during World War II. All this is conveniently omitted by the author with the obvious purpose of presenting the Ukrainian people as an amorphous mass, capable of no independent political development and creativeness. But this "expert" on Ukraine (p. 15) has the courage and audacity to accuse the Ukrainians of anti-Semitism, stating that the "inhabitants of Ukraine in the majority were anti-Semites."

Finally, Alexandrov's analysis of the so-called "Ukrainian course" of Khrushchev's policies and his alleged packing of the Soviet government and the party apparatus of the USSR with Ukrainians can hardly be borne out in the face of some substantial evidence.

As everybody now knows, Nikita Khrushchev got his training and political experience as a henchman of Stalin in Ukraine. There, during his bloody tenure of power, he succeeded in "educating" a number of trusted and proven friends who had the opportunity to demonstrate their loyalty and subservience to him on many occasions. As party boss, Khrushchev had his "men" not only in the party, but in the Soviet army and in the security apparatus as well. It was only natural that a substantial part of these "friends" should have been of autochthonous, Ukrainian origin. These collaborators and lackeys of Russia, who once served Stalin with the utmost loyalty, have served Khrushchev with the same zeal and loyalty ever since he became Stalin's successor. But that they have little in common with anything that is dear to the Ukrainian heart, is also a plain and known fact to every Ukrainian or non-Ukrainian, who has had the misfortune to live in Ukraine under the occupation of the Russian Bolsheviks.

It is not surprising, though, that this truth is ignored by author Alexandrov. After reading his book, one becomes overwhelmingly convinced that he is little concerned about the truth in any case.

VIACHESLAV DAVYDENKO

GERMAN RULE IN RUSSIA IN 1941-1945. A Study of Occupation Politics, By Alexander Dallin. London, Macmillan & Co. Ltd. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1957. Pp. XX-8, 695.

This carefully prepared volume deals with a most extraordinary subject—the philosophy of Adolph Hitler in his campaign against the USSR in 1941 and the still more surprising reactions of his closest advisers and counselors like Borman, Himmler, Rosenberg and Goering, not to speak of such characters as Erich Koch, the *Reichskommissar* for Ukraine and the few other persons in the Nazi machine who did have some sort of knowledge or interest in victory. The marvel is not that the USSR succeeded in driving back the Nazis but that they were not even more completely overwhelmed.

Certainly no army ever entered a hostile country with such an incongruous collection of directives. Hitler at one and the same time, under the spell of his racial theories and pushed along by his fanatical followers, thought of the conquest of the USSR as a means of wiping out "Russian-Jewish Bolshevism" and also of forcing to the East all those elements of the population which he did not believe worthy of Germanization. At the same time he refused to care for the prisoners of war, for the civilian population, or any one else, but after the first impacts, the army and many of the civilian leaders wanted to use that same abused and starved population as a source for labor battalions in Germany and later for at least subordinate units in the fighting front. At the same time he took care that the compliant officers would not even use due common sense in adapting their movements to those of the Soviet Army and utilizing what advantages the Germans still possessed. Back of Hitler's tirades, we have excellent pictures of the dog-eat-dog attitude that prevailed in Berlin as Hitler's associates indulged in a savage struggle for power in which apparently nothing but murder was looked upon amiss.

It was against this background that Rosenberg as Minister of Occupied Territories in the East, through his haze of paganism and anti-Christianity, conceived the idea of separating the various national groups on the Eastern Front and giving special privileges of a sort to the Ukrainians, the Caucasians and the peoples of the Baltic states. He was led to this through his personal knowledge and through his long friendship with many of the foremost emigrés from these lands who had been in Germany since the ending of World War I. He was warned by Hitler against it but it was Goering who in November, 1941, countermanded both practice and theory and ordered that thereafter Ukrainians would no longer receive any special treatment at the hands of the German armies. Koch admirably seconded this and other efforts to decimate Ukraine as well as the Great Russians and the situation steadily deteriorated, until in 1944 Himmler swung over in the moment of defeat to the support of Vlasov. Then in the final hours, the questions were again raised in a purely academic way as to whether the Germans should try to work through a general Russian organization or through committees of each of the non-Russian nationalities. It was the same problem of the "liberation of the peoples of Russia" with non-predetermination that has bedevilled all American work with the refugees, the emigrés and the propaganda to the Soviet Union.

If the author has been impartial in his consideration of the motives and actions of the Nazi leaders, we cannot say as much of his treatment of those Ukrainians and other separatists whom he has occasion to mention. Thus he believes that the final separation of the Russian Empire into its national constituents was only due to Bolshevik abuses and these led to the fostering of "anti-Russian hues" which had subsided thanks to Bolshevik actions in the 20's (pp. 47 ff). He believes implicitly in the growth under Bolshevism of a "stronger feeling of community that subordinated national tensions to an 'all-Russian' or 'all-Soviet' patriotism." Later on, he writes of Rosenberg: "The thesis represented a symbiosis of Western Ukrainian nationalism aspiring to the creation of a state from the Carpathians to the Volga, and German interests (as Rosenberg saw them) which would set up a Ukraine dependent on the German group" (P. 111). In the same way he passes somewhat depreciatory comments on such men as Dmytro Doroshenko, Prof. Volodymyr Kubyovych and any other Ukrainians who emerged into the limelight even for a brief moment.

His summing up is significant (pp. 674 f): "In 1941 Germany—or any other state—had a rare opportunity to appeal to the population of the Soviet Union . . . After traumatic years of terror and near-starvation the wounds were still open . . . Individual leaders, large strata of intellectuals and white-collar workers, as well as the urban and rural masses, were potentially receptive to a skillful attempt to drive a wedge between the rulers and the people.

"Germany failed utterly to take advantage of this opportunity. This failure was due to a variety of reasons: a conscious determination not to solicit the political support of 'inferiors'—indeed a detailed plan for the destruction of the Russian intelligentsia and bureaucracy; a willful misidentification of those areas of Soviet life which generated the most tension and grievances; and a deliberate attempt to appeal to racial and national, rather than social and economic groups, thereby forfeiting in advance some of the most telling propaganda and some of the most valuable defectors. Only to one major class—the peasantry—was a special appeal made and this only after setbacks drove home Germany's need for large harvests. Significantly this was the only social group among which the *Reich* gained and kept some support." Yet it was the peasants who had suffered under collectivization and who more than any other class carried on the ancestral linguistic and cultural traditions which could flower in separatism.

The author shows clearly that it was the injustice and brutality of the Nazi leaders and their chimerical and unreal policies that destroyed the original sympathies of the Ukrainians and many other peoples for the once welcomed German opponents of Sovietism. It was the folly of Hitler and his aides that won the victory for the Russians, even in those areas where dislike of the Russians was most marked and it does small service to the American reader to entangle this with the dreams of Great Russian supremacy and the unity of the Russian Empire—USSR. Recent history in all parts of the world has shown clearly the impossibility of a deliberate linguistic imperialism and in the cold war it is that opposition which is today an often neglected weapon of the free world. Moscow has no intention about using it but the surviving theories of "Russia" and the fear of displeasing the Muscovites weighs too heavily on the free world. In the chaos of World War II there is much yet to study and to evaluate but the opposition of the national committees to Russian domination was not only a German trick of Rosenberg and his friends but a serious factor of which Hitler did not take proper account but which today scholars and statesmen have still not learned to interpret properly to their own cost. The valuable part of this work is its picture of the German policy-makers, not the author's evaluation of the non-Russian opponents of Communism.

Columbia University

CLARENCE A. MANNING

THEIR BROTHERS' KEEPERS. By Philip Friedman. With a Foreword by Father John A. O'Brien. Crown Publishers, Inc., New York 1957. Pp. 224, \$3.00

This is a vivid and human account of the suffering and martyrdom of Jews in the Nazi-dominated Europe of World War II, and of the selfless sacrifice and dangerous risks taken by countless Christians of all denominations and nationalities who tried and in many instances succeeded in saving the lives of many persecuted and hapless Jews. Alongside the shocking and depressing tale of savagery and brutality, torture and murder, the book also provides a brighter side of these shameful years. It is also a tale of the compassion, sympathy, bravery and heroism of the

thousands of men and women who befriended and shielded the victims at the risk of being imprisoned, tortured and eventually put to death.

Author Friedman has performed an outstanding service to society by compiling and collating these heroic fragments and episodes which heretofore have been little known to the general public. Here and there, of course, we have heard from various nationality groups—which frequently were indiscriminately charged with “anti-Semitism”—about deeds of heroism and self-sacrifice which they performed in sheltering Jews in Nazi-run Europe. But now the American reader, perhaps for the first time, has the opportunity to learn more about these truly Christian deeds from *Their Brothers' Keepers*.

The author has been able to assemble a great array of facts, accounts and material on what the Christian brothers had done in saving Jews in France, the Low Countries, Italy, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Greece, Poland, Ukraine, Byelorussia, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia.

From the viewpoint of *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, author Friedman's report on the treatment of Jews in Nazi-occupied Ukraine quite naturally arouses interest.

Dr. Friedman is a native of Lviv, Western Ukraine, but he succeeded in escaping Nazi torture and possible death by forging his identity papers and hiding in the underground. He says that before the outbreak of World War II there were some 1,500,000 Jews in Soviet Ukraine and about 600,000 more in Eastern Galicia, and Volhynia, all of whom were marked for extinction by the Nazi policy-makers. Toward that end, he writes, the Nazis sought to enlist the support of the population by forming the Latvian, Lithuanian, Byelorussian and Ukrainian auxiliary police (militia), which acted under orders of the German police and Gestapo.

But the overwhelming majority of the population, he writes, particularly the intelligentsia and the clergy, were outraged at the orgy of persecution, and virtually all social, political and ecclesiastical groups either remained aloof or made efforts to counteract the Nazi gospel of death.

He then goes on to present the political picture of the Ukrainians on the eve of World War II, showing that the Ukrainians entertained the hope that the Germans would eventually support their claims for liberation. These illusions were soon dissipated with the arrest of the Ukrainian nationalist leaders who had formed a Ukrainian provisional government on June 30, 1941. Soon Eastern Galicia was incorporated into the Government General as an adjunct of the Nazi empire, while Polisia and Volhynia were joined with Soviet Ukraine under the rule of sadistic Erich Koch. Ruthless economic exploitation and persecution quickly evoked the hatred and indignation of the Ukrainians and the powerful Ukrainian Insurgent Army, numbering 200,000 men, sprang into being.

But Dr. Friedman contends that “the dregs of society” among the Ukrainians were used by the Germans in the latter's abhorrent genocidal excesses. He further states that “these elements also supplied the Germans with active *Waffen SS* and units of a regular army.” Inasmuch as there was only one Ukrainian unit composed entirely of Ukrainians, namely, the Ukrainian “Galicia” Division, we might assume that the author had this unit in mind. The division was organized to fight against the Soviet troops, and its leaders had an ulterior purpose in mind—to make it the nucleus of the Ukrainian armed forces after eventual defeat of both the Nazis and Bolsheviks. *The unit never engaged anywhere in any Nazi “police action,”* a fact that could be attested to by thousands of former soldiers of the Ukrainian division who now live in the United States, Canada, South America and elsewhere.

On the other hand, Dr. Friedman cannot offer enough praise for Metropolitan Andrey Sheptytsky, Archbishop of Lviv and the titular head of the Ukrainian Catholic Church in Western Ukraine. Already an old man in 1941, he was absolutely fearless and did not hesitate to tell the Nazis what he thought of their barbarities. He prohibited the rendering of religious services to individuals who embraced the Nazi gospel of murder, and he wrote an indignant letter to Heinrich Himmler protesting the use of Ukrainian auxiliary police. He also composed two pastoral letters denouncing the persecution of Jews and warning the Ukrainian people not to engage in any of these un-Christian and inhuman actions. He was as intrepid in action as in word. In his Cathedral of St. George in Lviv Metropolitan Sheptytsky hid fifteen Jewish children and several adults, among them Rabbi Dr. David Kahane, who subsequently became chief chaplain in the Polish army and who now is in Israel. On order of Sheptytsky 150 Jews were sheltered in various Ukrainian Catholic convents and monasteries. This was known to some 500 Ukrainian monks and nuns, but not one betrayed the presence of the Jews to the Nazis. Similar acts of risk, sacrifice and humanity demonstrated by the Ukrainians with respect to the Jews took place in every Ukrainian town and city. Little known outside, these deeds are, of course, burned in the memories of the thousands of Ukrainians who exposed themselves to punitive action for helping the hapless Jews. Many, indeed, were executed by the Gestapo, their sole "crime" being that they sheltered the Jews. Considerable documentary evidence of this aid has been brought to this country by Ukrainian displaced persons since the end of the war.

In his chapter, "Notes and References," Dr. Friedman lists a series of publications by Ukrainian authors on the subject of Jewish-Ukrainian relations and German policies in occupied Ukraine with respect to both the Ukrainians and the Jews. He also lists Jewish publications on reports by Jews attesting to the fact that many simple Ukrainian people, peasants, housemaids, workmen, intelligentsia and the clergy saved the Jews from persecution and death. He also cites reports that many Jews actively fought in the Ukrainian underground resistance, some in the leftist (pro-Soviet) and others in the nationalist UPA (Ukrainian Insurgent Army). Among the latter he cites the example of Dr. Stella Krenzbach, now in Israel, who served in the ranks of the UPA as a physician.

Dr. Friedman's book is indeed, a valuable document, proving among other things, that anti-Semitism is as abhorrent to Christians as it is to the Jews. It proves again that the general charge of anti-Semitism leveled against the Eastern and Central European nations by some unknowledgeable Jews is as baseless as it is ridiculous. While here and there the Nazis succeeded in enlisting some mercenaries who were as ruthless to the Jews as they were toward their own compatriots, the overwhelming majority of the people not only detested the Nazis for their crimes of genocide in regard to the Jews, but gave unstinting help, made many sacrifices and even suffered severe punishment in helping the innocent Jewish victims, as Dr. Friedman has so ably described in his book.

WALTER DUSHNYCK

POWER AND DIPLOMACY. By Dean Acheson. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1958, pp. 137.

This work consists of the William L. Clayton lectures delivered by former Secretary of State Dean Acheson at Harvard University in 1957. The author is the first to deliver these annual lectures which are made possible by grants

from the Clayton estate. Mr. Clayton was associated with the Department of State and in the course of an eventful life made his fortune in the cotton industry.

A careful reading of these lectures leads one to the overall conclusion that in connection with basic U.S. policy toward the Russian Communist Empire the author offers nothing new. His fundamental orientation in this work is no different from that shown by him during his official days under the Truman Administration. Cutting through all the elaborate phraseology and some winding comments on the courses of action taken by Mr. Dulles, it becomes quite evident that Mr. Acheson continues to expound the policy of containment. In this respect he does not differ from George F. Kennan. Along with Paul Nitze, whom he makes references to, and several others, he fundamentally remains in the Kennanist camp of thought. Admitting the differences that have recently arisen between Acheson and Kennan over the latter's neutralization scheme for Central Europe, one cannot overlook the present status of Acheson or Nitze in the deliberative foreign policy group of the Democratic Party and the possibility that the open repudiation of Kennan's scheme was a means of separating Kennan's name from the Party in preparation for both the '58 and '60 elections. It will be recalled that both in '52 and '56 the Republicans capitalized on Kennan's intimate association with this group in the Democratic Party. On the basis of this work they should have no trouble in showing the most basic ties that will continue to exist.

There are, of course, many solid and perspectival points developed in these lectures with which one could scarcely disagree. There are others which are hardly excusable for a man possessed of the experience and learning of Mr. Acheson. That the United States is the power center of the Free World, that the West European nations are dependent on the U.S. for their sustained independence and national freedom, and that military and economic strength of the non-Communist world must be steadily built up are points which an exponent of a policy of liberation readily accepts. His analyses of the economic and military bases for such strength are generally sound. The emphasis he places on the economic and military growth of the Soviet Union is well taken. His arguments against the neutralization scheme and the withdrawal of American armed forces from Europe are most convincing. Such a withdrawal would be a manifest sign of retreat. Displaying little appreciation of the potential explosive forces in the USSR, he argues, too, that from Moscow's point of view, a Russian withdrawal from Central Europe "would lead to the immediate overthrow of the Russian-controlled regimes in Eastern Europe and to social changes whose repercussions within the Soviet Union would imperil the regime itself—or would be thought to imperil it" (p. 93). These and other views, including the impracticality of limited nuclear war in Europe, the long-run need for conventional arms, our mishandling of the Suez crisis, and the necessity for strong, top leadership so that the people will "understand what is necessary, and why," are reasonably and coherently presented.

However, Acheson's chief thesis is the creation and maintenance of a non-Communist world system. Significantly, it is not to be an anti-Communist world system. Assembling his essential points in these lectures, it is evident that what, in effect, he is proposing is that we achieve stability in world relations by building this non-Communist world system on firm bases of military and economic power which, in turn, will induce an evolutionary process for the good in the Communist Empire (p. 93). Not if, but "*when* that evolution occurs, Russian

and American troop withdrawal may be possible without destroying the basis of American association in the security of Europe." Actually, in time, Acheson is just one step removed from Kennan.

In argumentation against this line of reasoning an exponent of liberation should have little difficulty pointing out its weaknesses. First, there is no necessary causal relationship between a non-Communist bulwark of strength and an evolutionary process toward freedom in the Communist Empire. Indeed, if this bulwark should prove to be stifling to Russian expansionism and internal pressures ensue to the point of wrecking the totalitarian scheme of control and tyranny, Moscow could well take advantage of the first shot opportunity for which, by then, it would be highly equipped militarily. With accumulated military strength *in time* Moscow might preclude the very possibility of massive retaliation on our part. This is the possibility—nay, probability—that the Acheson containment thesis holds out to us. Second, the economic cost of building the non-Communist world system as envisaged by Acheson is unsatisfactorily considered by his lectures. To meet the requirements of rapid development in the uncommitted nations, to offset the persistent psychological and political encroachments of Moscow in Asia and Africa, to counter the world-wide network of Russian Communist subversion, to compensate for fluctuations and inspired tensions in the non-Communist world, the foreign aid Acheson proposes for us would intensify the inflation problem which will haunt the United States for many years to come. The Communist desire of having the United States bleed itself to death may well be satisfied by pursuing the Acheson course.

The Acheson policy of containment would, in short, have us continually play on our side of the fifty yard line. No team has ever won a match this way. Tensions and challenges would be as usual in the free area of the line. His policy proposals not only guarantee freedom from such tensions for Moscow but also neutralism in the Free World which would be increasingly exerted to maximize economic gain from both centers of power in the present world situation. It is evident that largely determining this narrow outlook are the flagrant misconceptions held by the author with regard to the enemy. First, for him, ". . . the Soviet is a revolutionary society . . ." (p. 9). Actually, there is no such thing as a Soviet society and its revolutionary fervor in Marxist terms evaporated at the beginning of the 20's. Worse still is his conception of the USSR as a "nation" (p. 37). Moreover, for Acheson, the world system between 1815 and 1914 was destroyed "in our century along with the empires which composed it" (p. 69). He doesn't seem to realize that the one empire which escaped this was the Russian Empire which is now called the Soviet Union. These and many other misconceptions found in these lectures well demonstrate the inability of our former Secretary of State to grasp the meaning and practicability of our policy of liberation.

Georgetown University

LEV E. DOBRIANSKY

RUSSIA SINCE 1917. FOUR DECADES OF SOVIET POLITICS. By Prof. Frederick L. Schuman. New York, Alfred A. Knopf. Pp. 508: \$6.50.

The author is Professor of Government at Williams College and the author of several other books on the Soviet Union, many of which have shown a marked pro-Soviet sympathy and orientation. The book is interesting, for it is based mostly on Soviet sources. It covers forty years of Soviet history and shows the author's close acquaintance with his subject. Yet it contains many nonsensical

and misleading statements, as for instance his treatment of the Pilsudski-Petlura alliance.¹ This statement is obviously based on Soviet falsehoods, because he mentions as sources in this connection three books, two by Lenin and Stalin and a panegyric biography of the latter. Yet in other connections he cites the standard works on Ukrainian history, that of Prof. J. Reshetar (pp. 40, 111, 237, 429), the work of R. Magidoff (pp. 219, 405), the books of Prof. C. A. Manning (pp. 370, 281), and the two latest publications of J. Armstrong and I. Kamensky. If author Schuman had looked even superficially at these works he cites, he could hardly have written as he has. Similar misrepresentations through the use of exclusively Soviet sources can be found on several pages (pp. 203, 253, 255, 306). The author relies upon the unfounded belief of the French Ambassador R. Coulondre that Germany in 1939 had the plan of establishing a Ukrainian state. We know now that this was false, for Hitler and the Nazis had only the one plan—that of making Ukraine and the other occupied eastern territories German colonies, German *Lebensraum*. In the chapter "Nomads Out of Asia" (p. 43) the author shows that he has little knowledge of the races, nationalities and languages of the eastern Slavs and their history. In referring to Kievan Rus (the author's "Russia"), he speaks of the "chaos of anarchy made better by occasional despotism . . . and recurrent dynastic rivalries." Then he continues that "Kiev helped mightily, without help from Europe, to save Europe from Asian conquest."

His explanation of the name Ukraine is very superficial, indeed (p. 50). There is some distortion in his treatment of Far Eastern problems also. The Mongolian People's Republic was not established by the will of the people, as the author asserts, but by the Soviet Red Army.

The best chapters are those on the "Socialist State" and its "Guardians." Here Professor Schuman writes with knowledge and understanding and he gives much valuable information. It would have been even better had he given a more realistic appraisal of the present, had he used the works which he has cited, as R. Magidoff's *The Kremlin vs. The Peoples* and the volumes by Reshetar and Manning, to show the influence of the non-Russian peoples on the development of the Soviet Union.

His epilogue "A Time for Peace" contains many original ideas but some of these are impractical, again because he does not realize the importance of the oppressed non-Russian peoples and nations in the USSR.

This volume makes important contributions to our knowledge of the Soviet Union by indicating a valuable literature where true and more exact information on the Soviet Union can be found.

It is a pity that more cannot be said and we can only hope that in a future revision Prof. Schuman will come to a realization that Russia and the USSR are not the same indivisible nation that far too much Western scholarship assumes. Let us hope that he will.

JOHN V. SWEET

¹ "Pilsudski concluded a 'treaty' with the Ukrainian *Hetman* Simon Petlura, then a refugee in Poland, whereby the *Hetman* acknowledged title to extensive Russian lands in return for aid in setting up an anti-Soviet regime in the Ukraine . . . on May 8, Kiev was taken, although it lay beyond the frontiers of 1772, while Petlura's men followed fast behind, killing Jews and carrying banners (still on exhibit in the Kiev Historical Museum) emblazoned with anti-Semitic Hakenkreuz" (p. 122).

KONSPEKTYVNY NARYS ISTORIYI KOMUNISTYCHNOYI PARTIYI BOL-SHEVYKIV UKRAINY. [*Outline of the History of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine*]. By Vsevolod Holubnychy. Institute for the Study of the USSR. Munich, 1957.

The author warns us in the preface that this is a brief, condensed survey of the Communist Party [KP(b)U] based upon its separate congresses and conferences. In accordance with this plan the author reviews in chronological sequence all the congresses of the KP(b)U from the first in Moscow (1918) to the seventeenth (1952). In presenting such a picture, the author shows correctly the role of a whole series of Ukrainian party workers, such as Shakhrai, Lapchynsky, Blakytyn, Shumsky, Skrypnyk, Petrovsky, Chubar and Lubchenko. He correctly interprets their actions and clearly characterizes them, thereby enabling us to dispel the confusion in defining their place in the political events of the 20's and 30's. At the same time he shows the activity of such non-Ukrainian Bolsheviks who strongly influenced the KP(b)U as Pyatakov, Kviring, Stalin, Kaganovich, Molotov and points up, especially, the doubtful glory of Postyshev, Kossior and Melnikov. Their activity needs no commentary, for they worked steadily to injure the Ukrainian people. The sole exception may be Lazar Kaganovich, under whose influence the strengthened policy of Ukrainization took its rise. In general the years when he was Secretary of the KP(b)U (1925-1928) were almost the best years for Ukraine in the entire Soviet period. The role of Kaganovich in 1947 as "controller" of policy in Ukraine was not perhaps what it is common to assume. In the first place, Kaganovich was then in Ukraine only a few months and perhaps, thanks to the "pacifying" instructions given to him by the Kremlin, Moscow did not proceed to the physical annihilation of those workers for Ukrainian culture who had undergone sharp criticism in the second half of 1946, i. e. before the arrival of Kaganovich in Ukraine. Holubnychy rightly notices that Kaganovich was more disturbed by the industry and agriculture in the UkSSR. Besides, the period of the new accelerated Russification and the period of the new limitation of the already miserable rights of the party and state institutions in the UkSSR actually came in 1950-1953, and then Melnikov had his fingers upon the strings and, according to much evidence, so did Khrushchev.

One positive feature of the outline of Holubnychy is that he shows definitely the tremendous influence of economic questions on the policy of the Communist Party in Ukraine and on the mutual relations between Kiev and Moscow. The situation of industry and agriculture was very often the cause of the sharp changes in the KP(b)U. We must sharply underline this, for the emigration is often inclined to think that the changes in the KP(b)U were conditioned only by the various stages of the cultural processes in Ukraine.

The one cultural process which did have a deep effect upon the KP(b)U was Khyvlovysm. Its remains are still active in Ukraine at the present time. On the other hand, a number of Ukrainian party workers, as at least Chubar, Petrovsky and Yerynko, were primarily interested in the development of the people's economy in Ukraine, and for Moscow the production of grain, coal and iron was the basic motivation of its policy. These dictated the trends also in the field of cultural national policy. Also among the outstanding party workers were those who were especially dangerous for Moscow both for their economic "deviations," as Shlikhter, and especially Hrynko, and we must be sorry that among our emigration such a small number of persons realize the principles of

this "horizontal" complex planning which, if they were applied, would eliminate many confusions in the economy of the UkSSR existing between 1938-1952.

It is a pity that the scope of Holubnychy's work does not allow him to give a more definite characterization of such as Manuilsky, Korniyets, and Hrechukha as notable figures in the darkest period in the existence of the KP(b)U, the period of 1938-1952 . . . In general there are many dark and unexplained episodes in the history of the KP(b)U, and the author does very well when he refrains from leaning upon insufficiently tested reports, as that all feared Postyshev, including Kossior and Petrovsky, and the details about the liquidation of Postyshev and the arrest of Kossior.

The question of the several periods in the history of the KP(b)U and also in the history of the UkSSR is an interesting and disputed problem. In the majority of authors we find a very general division into the 20's and 30's. The 40's and the 50's are in general not divided into periods. The division into the 20's and 30's seems to us oversimplified and it could hardly apply to the whole situation in the USSR. In Ukraine it is necessary to break down the 30's into various subsections. Thus we know that in 1936 works appeared in some fields in Ukraine which gave the same evaluation of the facts of Ukrainian history as those, let us say, of 1928-1929.

On the other hand the division of the Ukrainian Communist workers into Shumskists-Khyvolovists and Skrypnykists, or as Holubnychy calls them, centrists, is uncomplicated and clear.

When we turn to the question of the title of Holubnychy's work, we believe that it should be "The History of the Communist Party of Ukraine" and not "of the KP(b)U." Obviously the Bolsheviks played the basic role in the formation of the Communist Party, but before the October Revolution there were other sections of the Communist Party which could scarcely be called Ukrainian, it is true, but which played an important role.

Holubnychy has relied upon an extensive literature, but the basic source of his conclusions are articles in the press of Soviet Ukraine and some of the more prominent works of the period of Ukrainization (*The History of the Party*, M. Yavorsky, N. N. Popov, etc.) and also the works of Podolyak, Lavrinenko and Maistrenko, published in the emigration. When in the future we shall need a more complete outline of the history of the KPU, then in preparing it the authors will need to use first the works of such outstanding historians of the Party as Y. M. Yaroslavsky and even L. Trotsky. Much factual material has been printed in the many special journals devoted to the history of the Party as the *Istoriik-Marksist (Marxist-Historian)*, *Borba klasov (Class Struggle)*, *Krasny Arkhiv (Red Archives)* and in Ukraine the *Prapor Marksysma (Banner of Marxism)*, *Litopys revolyutsyi (Chronicle of the Revolution)*, etc. Especially interesting are the yearly volumes of these journals published in the 20's and the early 30's. The materials found in the period of the increased Russian-imperialistic tendency (approximately after 1933-1934) must be approached with great caution and a survey (which must still be made!) of such publications as the *Bloknot agitatora (Notebook of an Agitator)*, *Partynaya Zhizn (Party Life)* or the *Communist* will not give much reliable data. There is a certain exception to this in the journal *Voprosy Istoriyi (Questions of History)*, which sometimes has published more original and deeper articles on the history of the Party. The numbers of this journal for 1955 and 1956 are especially valuable, for they contain original articles by such Soviet historians as E. N. Burdzalov, B. B. Grave and S. M. Bograd; these interpret the history of

the Party especially in the early period in a way differently from the dominant picture presented for many years in the USSR. New journals began to appear in the USSR after 1957, as the *Istoriya USSR (History of the USSR)* and *Voprosy Istorii KPSS (Question of the History of the KPSS)*, and students of the history of the KPU will have to analyze and comment on the materials contained in these.

In conclusion we must again stress the value of the publication of Holubnychy, for he has certainly shown that we must not isolate it from other topics, as many of us in the emigration have been inclined to do, but we must study it in detail and work hard to inform wider circles on the actual state of affairs in Ukraine. We can say boldly that only a fundamental study of the modern history of Ukraine, including the history of the Communist Party in Ukraine, in all its aspects can be really a preface to the creation of a science which can compete with the willy-nilly often strong and attractive slogans of Bolshevism.

S. Y. PROCIUK

PROLOGUE QUARTERLY. Problems of Independence and Amity of Nations. PROLOG Research and Publishing Association, Inc. Vol. I, Nos. 1, 2 and 3, Summer 1957. New York (Munich-New York-Paris-Cairo).

The *Prologue Quarterly* is a new political magazine published by the Prolog Research and Publishing Association, Inc. and is devoted, as the sub-title indicates, to the "problems of independence and amity of nations." It is a highly specialized publication and is intended to discuss various facets of modern Soviet Russian colonialism with all its attendant features and ramifications. In the statement of aims of the quarterly, the publishers say, among other things:

"We have undertaken publication of this new quarterly journal in order to fill a definite need for this kind of publication. The need stems from the fact that during recent years the Kremlin has directed Soviet propaganda toward appealing to the nationalist feeling of Asian and African peoples, such propaganda being calculated to win ground which would be utilized to further Soviet expansion in these areas.

"Soviet propaganda of national and social liberation of colonial peoples is, however, only an export article preached outside the USSR, while within the Soviet Union the ruling class of Moscow is practicing upon its conquered and enslaved colonial peoples of Europe and Asia the worst kind of colonial oppression and exploitation ever witnessed by mankind.

"The outside world knows little or nothing about the submerged and sealed-off nations within the Soviet colonial empire which, for the past forty years, have been subject to exploitation, Russification, deportations and genocide. It is therefore one of the main purposes of this publication to unmask the hypocrisy of communist propaganda and to present the most possibly accurate picture of true conditions prevailing within that modern colonial empire, i. e. the Soviet Union, whose subject nations are numerous and varied: Slavs, non-Slav Europeans, Caucasians, Tatars, Mongols, etc. Among these non-Russian peoples there is a variety of cultures, traditions and religions, ranging from Christian of all denominations to Moslem, Judaic and Buddhist . . ."

Prologue's Volume I consists of three separate numbers, each dealing with a separate political topic as a unit. Thus No. 1 of *Prologue* contains a penetrating

article, "Strategy of Soviet Expansion into Asia and Africa," written by Prof. Kost Kononenko, professor and journalist, former high official in the People's Commissariat of Agriculture in the Ukrainian SSR and author of *Ukraine and Russia, 1654-1917*; *Social-Economic Background of the Ukrainian National Idea*, and *Agrarian Policy of the Bolsheviks*, as well as of numerous other articles and essays on social and economic subjects. The article deals with communist strategy with respect to the colonial peoples of Asia and Africa and provides an excellent analysis of Russian tactics and maneuvers and gives much substance to the present Soviet Russian championship of "freedom and liberation" movements which the Kremlin adroitly sponsors among the Asian and African peoples. (The "Asian-African Peoples Solidarity Conference" held in Cairo at the end of December 1957 could serve as a classic example of these Russian manipulations.

Dr. Myroslav Prokop, Ukrainian journalist and former leading member of the Ukrainian anti-Nazi resistance movement and author of *Ukraine and Moscow's Ukrainian Policy in the Period of Preparation for World War II*, provides the principal article for No. 2 of *Prologue*. The article, entitled, "Communist Moscow's Nationality Policy and Enslaved and Colonial Nations," constitutes an historical analysis of the much-acclaimed Russian "nationality policy" with respect to the non-Russian nations of the USSR, and its practical application. In the same number of *Prologue* is Dr. Lew Shankowsky's article, "Asiatic Renaissance," which dwells upon the genuine awakening of Asian and African peoples and their aspiration to freedom and independence and Soviet Russian attempts to capitalize upon this true yearning for freedom with the end of making it a vehicle for Soviet Russian communist imperialism and enslavement. Dr. Shankowsky, Managing Editor of *Prologue*, is a professor and journalist, former active member of the Ukrainian anti-Nazi resistance movement and author of *The Ukrainian Insurgent Army, 1942-1952, UPA and Its Underground Literature* and *Ukrainian Underground Art*, as well as of other essays dealing with the Ukrainian nationalist underground during World War II.

Finally, Yurii Lavrinenko, in the third number of *Prologue* contributes an article on "Moscow Centralism on the Defensive," which deals in essence with the evolution of Soviet Russian power in the USSR after the death of Stalin. It is a clear and comprehensive analysis of the multifarious moves and *demarches* of Khrushchev, all made with the purpose of saving the communist empire. The article is replete with facts and information relative to the Kremlin's "solicitude" and fears for the loyalty and political dependence of the non-Russian republics of the USSR. The latter's communist leadership was badly shattered as a result of the "de-Stalinization" campaign by Khrushchev and the events and anti-Russian revolts in Poland and Hungary. Author Lavrinenko is presently editor of the *Ukrainian Literary Gazette* and author of *Ukrainian Communism and Soviet Russian Policy Toward Ukraine*; he is a former prisoner of Soviet concentration camps in Siberia and has expert knowledge of Russian policies with respect to Ukraine.

Prologue, indeed, is a useful and much needed publication, with a novel approach toward Soviet Russian communism and its global objectives, and therefore is indispensable in any American college or high school library, newspaper or magazine office, and in the home library of those Americans who are interested in world problems of communism and the threat it represents to the United States and the free world at large.

UCRAINICA IN AMERICAN AND FOREIGN PERIODICALS

"WHY IKE BALKS AT TALKS WITH KHRUSHCHEV," a report. *U. S. News & World Report*, Washington, D.C., January 17, 1958.

Similar to the period preceding the ill-fated Geneva Conference over two years ago, the past three months have been marked by an organized campaign for another summit meeting. The position which was finally taken by President Eisenhower is a sound and indisputable one. Behind this position is a full recognition of the fact that the Russian imperialists cannot be trusted. This justified mistrust of the Russians is based on a long record of diplomatic chicanery and dishonesty. Deeds, not words, are in order.

A substantial part of this record is disclosed in this opportune report. A few years ago the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee produced an even more extensive record of Russian duplicity. Despite this, however, the report furnished here is unique and somewhat more comprehensive in that it incorporates vital data which cannot be found in the Senate production. In fact, this appears to be the first time that a major American periodical has unearthed and published the earliest agreements and pacts violated by the Russian Communists. For this the editors of *U. S. News & World Report* are to be highly commended.

In displaying the record of Russian promises and performances the report cites the independence of Ukraine and its recognition by Soviet Russia on December 20, 1920. As to performance, "The Ukraine was taken into the Soviet Union, dominated by the Soviet leaders who had concluded the 1920 treaty, on December 30, 1922." (p. 34)

These facts are noteworthy, but it should be pointed out that they do not complete this early phase of Russian duplicity. Prior to this communist-dominated Ukraine, there was a genuinely independent Ukraine which established itself on January 22, 1918. This Ukrainian National Republic also recognized by Soviet Russia and later, in 1920, was submerged under the violations and aggressions of Moscow. It was this Ukraine which expressed the popular will of the people and thus deserves a far more important place in the record than the communist-dominated one.

Nevertheless, in ways of popular enlightenment, this report represents solid progress. Its mention of both Georgia and the Transcaucasian Republic also attests to the report's contribution. Combined with other data, these early facts show that Soviet Russia existed from its very beginning on lies and fraud.

"WHO ARE THEY?", by the Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress. Committee on Un-American Activities, House of Representatives, Washington, D. C., Part I, July 12, 1957.

At the request of the House Committee on Un-American Activities the legislative reference service of the Library of Congress has prepared three short

pamphlets in regard to the backgrounds of six top leaders in the Communist Empire. The first pamphlet, issued as Part I, contains essential biographical notes on Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev and Nikolai A. Bulganin. The second, or Part II, deals in the same manner with Mao-Tse-tung and Chou En-lai. The third pamphlet covers the backgrounds of Georgi Zhukov and Ivan Konev of the USSR military forces. Other biographical sketches are in preparation. These three presentations provide excellent contrasts of deeds and words in the record of each of these men. They explain further why the U. S. balks at a summit meeting.

The biography of Khrushchev is particularly important because of the many misconceptions that are presently being formed of the man. It is incredible to think that after twenty years of bloody occupations Khrushchev suddenly appears as a morally chaste individual. His dramatics in the present are not without diabolical purpose and intent. Those who have naively come to regard him as a "good Communist," actually attest to the partial realization of his aim. American journalists who have voted for him as "the man of the year," performed well, according to Moscow's plans and designs. They saved Moscow's propaganda machine millions of dollars. But this first pamphlet should resolve any doubts one might have as to the criminal record of the man.

A good portion of this sketch is devoted to Khrushchev's bloody involvements in Ukraine, where he received his basic training as Stalin's henchman. "Because of his insistent attempts to subdue Ukrainian national consciousness and desire for self-determination, Khrushchev is among the men most hated in the Soviet Ukraine" (p. 2). The sketch continues, "His expert knowledge in enslaving other peoples was first tested with regard to the Ukrainian nation; and only recently, implementing his decision, heavy Russian armor, in combination with deceit and treachery, crushed the national aspirations of the Hungarian people" (p. 3). Such facts and more provide a wholesome antidote to the fantasies of our journalists and commentators.

"KHRUSHCHEV: THE KILLER IN THE KREMLIN," by Eugene Lyons. *Reader's Digest*, Pleasantville, N. Y., September, 1957.

The author of this well-written article certainly demonstrates his firm insusceptibility to much of the propaganda and misconceptions built about Khrushchev. He is too intimately conversant with many aspects of the Soviet Union. These aspects are vividly described to explode many illusory notions currently entertained with regard to the man and his regime. For example, one such notion is that Khrushchev is "of a less dangerous stripe than crafty old Stalin." Another is that Khrushchev is a Ukrainian.

The fact is that Khrushchev is not a Ukrainian. The author does not come out in this definite manner but largely contributes to the affirmation of this fact. He writes, "Because Khrushchev long served as Stalin's iron proconsul in the Ukraine, it is politic for Moscow to encourage the idea that he is Ukrainian, and probably he does have some Ukrainian blood." However, in spite of this questionable blood tie, the writer quickly points out that Khrushchev was born in 1894 in the "all-Russian village of Kalinovka in Kursk Province, which borders on the Ukraine, and still speaks little Ukrainian" (p. 104). All available evidence indicates that Khrushchev can scarcely speak any Ukrainian and that his immediate forebears were Russian.

The activities of Khrushchev in Ukraine, during the 30's and in the 40's, are accurately shown. As the author puts it, "It was the beginning of a ruthless

reign that was to last nearly 12 years and win him the hatred of the people of the Ukraine" (p. 106). The massacre of Ukrainians in Vynnytsia, the plea of Khrushchev for a resolute defense of Kiev in 1941, and his role as premier in Ukraine in 1943 are well depicted. How the Ukrainians felt about Khrushchev and Stalin is shown by the facts that "nowhere was the reception of the invaders as jubilant as in the Ukraine; nowhere did the people rush so eagerly to cooperate with the occupation forces. Red Army defections to the enemy, too, were particularly high in Ukrainian divisions" (p. 107). The importance of these facts for American strategy toward the non-Russian nations in the USSR should be obvious.

"MOSCOW'S GLASS HOUSE," an editorial. *The New York Times*, New York, December 30, 1957.

Under a highly appropriate caption this lead editorial packs some basic arguments which should guide our policy in relation to the Soviet Union. The editors of this internationally renowned publication employ these arguments quite effectively in their analysis of the motivations and forces underlying the recent Asian-African Conference in Cairo. The meeting was Communist-infiltrated and emphasized the familiar notes of anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism, the Western fashion, of course. It went so far as to provide a forum for spokesmen from the Soviet Union, an empire of the worst sort in itself.

But, as this editorial points out, "There is first, of course, the fact that the only remaining white, Western colonial power in Asia is Russia. From the Urals to the Pacific the Muscovite Russians rule territory stolen from Asian peoples and oppress Asian peoples." It goes on to enumerate many of these peoples. Then it poses some very real and basic questions. For instance, "Have Russians any more right in Siberia than Englishmen have in Kenya or Indians in South Africa?" The editorial rightly emphasizes that the "implications of extending this logic are truly great." Indeed they are. For, as the editors continue, "If Moscow is really such an enemy of imperialism, why does it not give up all the territory the Russian Czars and their successor, Stalin, conquered these past several centuries and really free a great many people?"

Any true believer in freedom cannot but support the views expressed in this remarkable and instructive editorial. He cannot but urge that these basic points become a foundation of our foreign policy. Upon sober reflection he cannot but come to realize that the real enemy against the national interests of our country is traditional Russian imperialism with all its messianic overtones, rather than the vague, unworkable theories of a Trojan Horse known as international Communism. It is heartening to observe that both the President and Secretary of State Dulles are coming more closely to an accurate designation of the enemy when now in their addresses they refer to "Communist imperialism" instead of vagaries such as "Soviet Communism" or "International Communism." Many close students of the problem hope that it won't be too long when both of our leaders would publicly raise the same question put forward in this editorial: "Is freedom any less the right of Latvians, Lithuanians, Estonians, Ukrainians, Byelorussians, Moldavians, Armenians, Georgians, and the like than it is of those about whom the Cairo meeting pretends to be so solicitous?" This would have far greater impact on the world situation than the establishment of several missile launching sites. It would mean striking at one of the foremost weaknesses of the enemy, namely, his hold over the captive non-Russian nations in the USSR. Persistent pressures on this vital point would have tremendous effect on the

multi-national armed forces of the Soviet Union which consist of about 43 per cent non-Russians.

"IMPERIALISTS TOO: DON'T PLACE HOPES ON RUSSIA'S SOLDIERS," by Nicolas de Rochefort. *The Sunday Star*, Washington, D.C., September 29, 1957.

At a time when far too many Americans were placing their naive hopes in Zhukov and even considering inviting him to the United States, this sober article appeared and logically demonstrated the illusion of such hopes. The writer shows the position of the military in the Moscow regime, its dedication to the imperialist objectives of Russia, and its relationship to the Russian people. He provides many historical examples of these relationships from the Russia of the past. The role of General Skobelev leading his Russian Cossacks to the "Roof of the World"—the plateau of Pamyr towering over India—and other military roles in Russian expansionism are cited. His thesis is really summed up in the sentence: "With the Konevs and Zhukovs in command in the Kremlin, we might have to face a different brand of imperialism, but it still would be aggressive, militant imperialism *semper idem*."

The writer appears to make a fundamental distinction in reality between Communist ideological imperialism and Russian imperialism to support his thesis. Actually, of course, the ideology is a weapon of the latter and the real difference between the Russian Khrushchev and the Russian Zhukov rests in the difference of degree to which each would employ this weapon. In kind, both are Russian imperialists and the threat confronting the United States would scarcely be altered if Zhukov had prevailed over Khrushchev. He would have the same support from the Russian people who actively perpetuate the totalitarian institutions of the empire. There are doubtless many, particularly in Siberia, who seek surcease from them.

"THE BBC'S RUSSIAN SERVICE," by Auberon Herbert. *The Spectator*, London, August 30, 1957.

The British Broadcasting Company has followed a policy of beaming broadcasts to the Soviet Union exclusively in the Russian language. Whether the broadcast reaches Ukrainians or Lithuanians or Turkestani, they are in Russian. This policy has produced considerable dissatisfaction in Great Britain because of its narrowness and perhaps ineffectiveness. Many prominent Britishers, like Professor Hugh Seton-Watson, have publicly shown the acute limitations of this policy. In this long letter Auberon Herbert, who is widely known for his knowledge of Eastern European politics, joins in the protest.

The points raised in this letter are incisive and forceful. The writer makes the important point that the Russian language is a secondary language in the non-Russian areas of the USSR and that many of these areas are not even familiar with it. He also points to the unfavorable psychological aspects of transmitting information to the captive non-Russian nationals in the language of their oppressor. This scarcely aids these peoples in preserving their distinctiveness. His argument concerning the separate character of Ukrainian or Byelorussian from the Russian language can hardly be refuted. Indeed, it is a source of wonder as to why it should be advanced in Britain. If, as the writer shows, the British carefully distinguished between Dutch and Flemish in their broadcasts during the war, then why should it be so difficult to distinguish between Ukrainian and

Russian which stand in the same relationship as Italian and French, or Dutch and German.

Fortunately, in this country the "Voice of America" operates on a far sounder basis and with more funds would undoubtedly expand its non-Russian services to the USSR. However, because of the economy pressure, some are giving thought to the possibility of imitating British in this respect. This maneuver should be strongly resisted. If economy is at stake, then we could with good reason cut down on the Russian broadcasts. It is questionable whether they make any imprint on the servile masses of Russia proper. Surely their record of resistance and opposition to their regime is an adequate measure.

"RUSSIAN ADVISERS ON MAINLAND WILL DESERT COMMUNISM," comment. *Free China & Asia*, Formosa, China, October 1957.

In this organ of the Asian Peoples' Anti-Communist League the comments of a Russian technician on his way to settlement in Brazil are highlighted by the optimism that over 95 per cent of some seven thousand Russian advisers on China's mainland would desert. The Russian "refugee" was stopping over in Hong Kong when he made these comments. He was born in Harbin.

Such statements on the part of Russians making their way to the Free World via Hong Kong should be received with extreme caution. There is sufficient evidence to indicate that this Hong Kong route is a channel for Russian spies into the Free World. A few years ago a Congressional group to the Far East unearthed a good deal of information on this and the United States is careful to screen these Russians carefully. Our friends on Formosa should likewise be very careful in dealing with them. It has been shown that in Latin America several of these settlers with Russian visas turned out to be spies. Congressman Feighan of Ohio has prepared a very illuminating report on this problem and spoke about it on the floor of the House in the last session.

"IN THE PILLORY," an editorial. *New Times*, A Weekly Journal, Moscow, March 1957

Perhaps no greater tribute can be paid today to the patriotism and vision of an American than the incessant criticisms and condemnation of his works by Moscow. The Honorable Charles J. Kersten has come under further attack by Moscow. In this editorial Moscow declares that "The name Kersten is notorious. When sitting in the House of Representatives in 1951, this arrant reactionary authored the scandalous Mutual Security Act amendment providing for appropriation of 100 million dollars annually for subversive activities against the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies."

What seems to have prompted this editorial was the testimony of Mr. Kersten in February before a Senate committee. Congressman Bentley of Michigan introduced the testimony into the *Record*. The testimony called for implementation of the Kersten Amendment and the declared American policy of liberation. It is most significant that these matters affect the sensitivities of Moscow deeply. Could it be that an implemented policy of liberation strikes at Moscow's gravest weaknesses?

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