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**Wilson and National Self-Determination**

Hon. Michael A. Feighan

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
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# WOODROW WILSON AND THE LIBERATION OF NATIONS

## *Editorial*

The one hundredth anniversary of the birth of President Woodrow Wilson (born December 28, 1856) is being commemorated, while the American political world is adopting a remarkable attitude towards him. Only one part of American thought is greeting the occasion with enthusiasm and sees in Wilson a prophet of a new political order in the world regulated first by the League of Nations and now by the United Nations. Some of his admirers praise him only for his reforms in education, others for his reforms in administration. Bernard M. Baruch, a personal friend, sees in him a reformer of the internal political life and of the international life on the principles of religious ethics and so of uncompromising justice. He writes: "Wilson believed democracy to be but the extension of ethical principles of religion."<sup>1</sup> But it is strange when at the same time Wilson receives sharp criticism, usually from his former enthusiasts and even co-workers. "Wilson's foreign policy in particular is under fire," states the editor of his speeches. "The intellectual leaders and publicists of the generation immediately following World War II have challenged the Wilsonian ideas; they have brought back the concept of the balance of power and emphasized the constricted role of foreign policy, as opposed to the universal mission which Wilson preached."<sup>2</sup>

Beyond this Wilson is criticized in the daily press for various failures in the political world which, it is claimed, were the results of Wilson's principles for the self-determination of peoples. C. L. Sulzberger, columnist of the *New York Times*, blames Wilson in an article "The Ghost of Wilson Walks the Brenner Pass" for the difficulties of Italy with the German South Tyrol, which was joined to Italy in 1919.<sup>3</sup> Others blame

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<sup>1</sup> "The Wilsonian Legacy to us," *New York Times Sunday Magazine*, December 23, 1956.

<sup>2</sup> *The Politics of Woodrow Wilson*, by August Heckscher. New York, Harper Bros., 1956.

<sup>3</sup> *New York Times*, July 13, 1956.

Wilson for creating the tinder boxes out of which World War II flared, as the Polish Corridor, the Sudetenland, etc. As a result they reject the idealistic principles of Wilson for the self-determination of peoples, on the basis of which he wanted to build a new idealistic world order. Further there has been a sharp criticism of Wilson's policy towards Russia at the outbreak of the Revolution there by George Kennan in his new book, "*Russia Leaves the War.*"<sup>4</sup>

It is surprising that the principle of the self-determination of nations set forth by Wilson has been criticized in his native land, while since 1919 it has been accepted in Eastern Europe as a new gospel of freedom and as a pledge that all oppression of people by people will cease once and for all.

It is hard for Americans even to imagine how the ideas of Wilson that every people forming a majority of the population in an area, has the right to establish its own government, were enthusiastically received in central and eastern Europe where two multi-national empires, the monarchy of Austria-Hungary and tsarist Russia were falling apart at the time (1918). Amid the post-war chaos on the lands of the Hapsburg Empire and the revolutionary chaos in Russia, the doctrine of Wilson, the great President of the great American democracy, became a true political gospel. It inspired the fighters for liberation, even among the weakest peoples, in their deep conviction that the doctrine of Wilson would be followed by action and that not power but moral law would finally triumph in these lands which were suffering from anarchy.

Unfortunately events did not follow along with the theory, even in America itself. The principle of self-determination (and that only in part) was merely applied to the territories of Austria-Hungary. But even there Galicia and Bukovyna, a region with an indisputably Ukrainian majority, was handed over to the rule of Poland resp. Romania. The Sudetenland, inhabited by an indisputable German majority, was included in Czechoslovakia. Both of these regions became major causes of the outbreak of World War II.

At the same time Wilson and, still more strongly, his Secretary of State Lansing, refused to apply the principle of self-determination of peoples to the multi-national territory of the old tsarist Russia. "When the conversation turned on the Wilsonian principle of self-determination, the application of which was claimed by the Powers of the Entente in justification of the discretionary dismemberment of the Hapsburg Empire," writes Arnold Margolin, Ukrainian delegate to the Peace Conference in Paris in 1919, "Mr. Lansing brusquely declared that Austria

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<sup>4</sup>Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1956.



and Hungary were our enemies in this war, whereas Russia was our ally. He added that he recognized only a single, indissoluble Russian nation and that this nation ought to be federated along the lines of the United States of America."<sup>5</sup>

There is no doubt that we must blame primarily the assistants of Wilson, Secretary of State Lansing, and also Colonel House, Prof. Robert H. Lord and Charles H. Haskin for the rejection of the Wilsonian doctrine of self-determination of peoples as applied to Ukraine and the other territories of the old tsarist Russia. The last three were especially responsible for the non-application of the Wilsonian doctrine on the former Austrian territory of Galicia-Bukovyna and were deliberately contradicting the ideas of their President. "The Ruthenians (Ukrainians) are indeed the majority in Eastern Galicia; the majority ought to rule; but it was very difficult to apply this principle in the particular case," wrote Ch. H. Haskin and R. H. Lord, both distinguished American diplomats.<sup>6</sup>

How far President Wilson was personally responsible for the violation of his own principles cannot be ascertained. We must rather lay the fault on the generally poor knowledge of President Wilson of the national relationships in the former tsarist Russia, as C. Hartley Grattam, once a great admirer of Wilson and now a severe critic, asserts.<sup>7</sup> "Wilson was a moralist in politics, not a power manipulator... Wilson knew nothing about Russia and cannot be held responsible for what happened there." As a further result of the policy of America under Woodrow Wilson towards Russia, Grattam goes on: "Just possibly Wilson has some responsibility for the sorry condition with which we struggle today."

This is an unusually severe statement, that the present situation not only in the old tsarist Russia but in the entire world must be ascribed to the fault of the administration of Wilson, because it did not apply the law of self-determination to all peoples on the territory of Russia and did not dispose of this empire menacing the whole world. On the other hand American policy, indifferent, if not opposed, to the struggle of the non-Russian peoples of Russia for liberation, helped red Moscow to destroy the young democracies, the finest flower of that same American doctrine of Wilson. On the ruins of the democratic national states which had been freshly awakened to life, grew the Soviet Union which now menaces the whole world.

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<sup>5</sup> *From a Political Diary: Russia, the Ukraine and America, 1905-1945*, by Arnold Margolin, New York Columbia University Press, 1947, p. 47.

<sup>6</sup> *Some Problems of the Peace Conference*, by Charles H. Haskin and Robert H. Lord. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1920, pp. 94-195.

<sup>7</sup> "The Tragedy of Woodrow Wilson," *The New Leader*, November, 1955.

We cannot blame Wilson too much for his ignorance of the national relationships of Russia. Even now after 40 years experience with Red Russia the most responsible American statesmen and scholars with prominent names still have confused ideas of the USSR and what could be expected then at the time of the Russian Revolution? The tsarist official science and the tsarist diplomatic propaganda were intended basically to convince the Western world that Russia was almost monolithic ethnically and to present the struggles of the peoples in Russia for liberation as an intrigue of Berlin to partition the country. Only a few specialists were then able to grasp the real truth about the multi-national Russia.

Only two months after the conclusion of the Brest Peace in a speech in Baltimore on April 6, Woodrow Wilson also attacked the Brest Treaty (also with Ukraine), although it was in harmony with his principles for the self-determination of peoples. Wilson saw in it only the action of the German militarists, who, against the will of the German civil government, wanted to make conquests in Russia. "At Brest Litovsk her (German) civilian delegates spoke in similar terms; professed the desire to conclude a fair peace and accord to the peoples with whose fortunes they were dealing the right to choose their own allegiances... their military masters... proclaimed a very different conclusion. We cannot mistake what they have done — in Russia, in Finland, in the Ukraine, in Rumania... they are enjoying in Russia a cheap triumph... A great people, helpless by their own act, lies for the time at their mercy..."

"Their purpose is undoubtedly to make all the Slavic peoples, all the free and ambitious nations of the Baltic peninsula (sic!) subject to their will."<sup>8</sup>

There is no question that we must ascribe the confused and exaggerated tales about the intentions of German militarism, and also the concealing of the true movements for liberation in Russia to the clever machinations of the Russian Anti-Bolshevik Committee in Paris, which influenced Lansing to present to the representatives of the independent Ukrainian National Republic in Paris a truly insulting proposition — to support the action of Denikin and to place themselves under the leadership of Admiral Kolchak, both irreconcilable foes of the very existence of separate Ukrainian nation.<sup>9</sup>

The misunderstanding and lack of help in the efforts of the non-Russian peoples of Russia to secure their liberation, indirectly aided the Bolsheviks not only to deal with the Russian counter-revolutionaries

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<sup>8</sup> *The Politics of Woodrow Wilson*, ed. by August Heckscher, pp. 307-8.

<sup>9</sup> Margolin, *op. cit.*, p. 48.

but also to crush the new republics from the military viewpoint and to communize them and actually join them in one gigantic Red Russia under the name of the USSR. With all the defects of the Wilsonian doctrine, it is still the only democratic and successful method of ordering the world in the most democratic and progressive manner for setting the relations between nations. Taking into account the divisions which arose in Europe and especially on the ruins of Austria-Hungary in central Europe, many of the former partisans of Woodrow Wilson, especially in America, lost faith in the value of the Wilsonian doctrine of the self-determination of nations, and, as we said in the beginning, have gone over to a policy of a balance of power. The loss of faith in the Wilsonian doctrine of the self-determination of peoples is shown in the fact that in this anniversary year of Wilson there has been almost no mention of this original idea of the great American, although outside of the United States Wilson is exclusively known as the author of this doctrine.

*There is no doubt that there is a marked decline in political thinking because the critics of Wilson's doctrine of self-determination do not take into account that it was not the doctrine of Wilson that was evil but that the evil lay in the fact that it was not applied logically and consistently everywhere and that this and not the doctrine produced the evil.*

The annexation of Galicia and Bukovyna against the will of the population created a revolutionary ferment which greatly weakened Poland. The inclusion of the Sudetens into Czechoslovakia against the will of the vast majority of the population, turned the irredentist Sudetens in favor of Germany, the South Tyrolean Germans toward Austria, etc. The rejection of the Wilsonian doctrine in Russia, gave, as we have said, catastrophic consequences in the final result.

So it is not surprising that the Wilsonian doctrine of self-determination is now the guiding idea of all anti-colonial struggles and struggles for liberation everywhere in the world. Very often these movements contain more negative dynamics against the colonizers than positive elements connected with nationalism. So there will certainly be more than one state founded on the ruins of colonial empires, that will go through ethnic, linguistic and religious conflicts but their solution so as to produce permanent peace can only be brought about by the acceptance of the doctrine of President Woodrow Wilson. There is no other just way for the solution of international problems, for the doctrine of Wilson of the self-determination of peoples is the application of the democratic process and the will of the majority of the population to international relationships.

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# THE NATIONAL PROBLEM AND THE WORLD WAR I

By VICTOR DOMANYCKYJ

In the year 1791 the German philosopher J. G. Herder<sup>1</sup> for the first time advanced the idea that every nation had the right to its own independent national life. His ideas had a very strong influence on the Slavic nations.<sup>2</sup> Napoleon's attempt to create a universal empire from the Atlantic to Moscow awakened a sense of self-respect and an urge for resistance — especially among the Germans.<sup>3</sup> The beginning of the 19th century found Europe divided among six great states which had extended their power over dozens of enslaved nations: Great Britain, France, the Spanish-Netherlands, Austria, Turkey and Russia. In Turkey and Russia the position of the enslaved nations was especially difficult. In 1804 the first Serbian insurrection broke out in Turkey, and in 1821 Greece rose in a spontaneous attempt to free itself; both were ruthlessly subdued. In the year 1815 the Congress of Vienna drafted a new political map of Europe, but the national principle was ignored.

In the next years Belgium became independent (1830), the first Polish uprising took place (1831) and in Italy the organization "Young Italy" came into being; with this organization as a model, emigrants from the enslaved nations founded a society called "Young Europe" (1834), that in all probability influenced Shevchenko and through him the Ukrainians.

In 1846 a revolt of the Caucasian nations against Russia took place.

In the same year a secret Ukrainian organization named "The Brotherhood of St. Cyril and St. Methody" was founded to advance the idea of a Slavic confederation (all of its members were arrested and deported in 1847).

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<sup>1</sup> J. G. Herder: *Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit*, 1791.  
P. Ioachimsen: *Vom deutschen Volk zum deutschen Staat*. Eine Geschichte des deutschen Nationalbewusstseins, 1916.

<sup>2</sup> John P. Sydoruk: *Herder and the Slavs* — *Ukrainian Quarterly*, vol. XII, No. 1, 1956. Page 58.

<sup>3</sup> G. Fichte: *Reden an die Deutsche Nation*, 1808.

THE FIRST RUSSIAN REVOLUTION (1905) AND REACTION

The Russian revolution of 1905 brought a limited constitution for the enslaved nations of Russia, the removal of the ban on printing anything in the Ukrainian language and a few other improvements. The movements for winning freedom for the Russian-dominated nations at once became more active, especially in Finland, the Baltic nations, White Ruthenia, Ukraine, Georgia and Armenia. But two years later a reaction started. Stolypin issued the "law concerning elections," that limited the rights of "non-Russians" in electing representatives for the "Duma" (State Parliament) and a great number of non-Russians were deported to Northern Russia and to Siberia.

On the eve of World War I there were still very many enslaved nations. According to S. I. Paprocki, Europe had approximately eighty six million (23% — nearly one quarter of the European population) of national minorities before 1914. This number is too small, because the Ukrainians alone numbered thirty five million. In 1912 the II. Congress of German Sociologists took place in Berlin and was entirely devoted to questions concerning the substance of a nation.<sup>4</sup>

In the same year (1912) The Union of Enslaved Nations (Union des Nationalités) was founded in Paris (chiefly by the efforts of the Lithuanian J. Gabris) and published "Les Annales des Nationalités" (No. 3-4 of 1913 were devoted to the Ukrainian question). In 1913 a collection of lectures on the enslaved nations of Central and Eastern Europe entitled "Autonomous Tendencies in Europe"<sup>5</sup> (with a foreword by the French historian G. Seignobos) was published in Paris. From these works and the articles of K. Renner,<sup>6</sup> R. W. Seton-Watson,<sup>7</sup> A. I. Kastelansky<sup>8</sup> we may form a picture of the development and the solution of the conflicts between state and nation in Europe up till the year 1914.

INTERPRETATION OF THE TERM "NATION" ON THE EVE OF WORLD WAR I.

A considerable amount of work was done in the period between Herder and the year 1914 in the field of national ideology and science. In our article it is impossible to analyze even the most important works

<sup>4</sup> *Verhandlungen des II. deutschen Soziologentags*, 1912.

<sup>5</sup> *Les Aspirations Autonomistes en Europe*, 1913.

<sup>6</sup> Karl Renner, *The Struggle of Austrian Peoples for Own States*. Vienna, 1900.

<sup>7</sup> R. W. Seton-Watson: *The Future of Austro-Hungary*, 1907; *Racial Problem in Hungary*, 1908; *The Southern Slav Question and the Hapsburg Monarchy*, 1914.

<sup>8</sup> A. I. Kastelansky: *Formy nacionalnavo Dvyzhenia v sovremennykh hosudarstvakh* (Forms of National Movements in Present Day States), 1910.

of this branch of knowledge and we must refer our readers to works by R. Muir, R. W. Seton-Watson, T. G. Masaryk, S. R. Steinmetz, P. Miliukov, O. I. Boczkowski.<sup>9</sup> Special periodicals were devoted to the national problem, as *Jahrbuch fuer Soziologie* (Yearbook of Sociology<sup>10</sup>), and *Ethnopolitischer Almanach* (Ethnopolitical Review) and others. We will confine our attention to the question of the substance of a nation and will attempt to explain the most important terms of Nationology.

A nation is a very complicated dynamically changeable communal phenomenon. The nation-forming process has not been entirely completed in any nation, nor has its form been completely crystalized.

The first attempt to systematize the objective traits of a nation was made by an Italian S. Mancini.<sup>11</sup> In his opinion they are the following: common territory; common descent; common language; common way of life and customs; common historical past (common experience); common jurisdiction; common religion. But he himself admits that these traits are but dead material, unless the breath of life, which is "national consciousness," is introduced (*la coscienza della Nacionalita*) i.e. a feeling arising from the substance of the nation itself and which gives it the strength to survive and to assert itself.

A Breton of French culture E. Renan,<sup>12</sup> did not consider objective traits to be of any importance. He says: "a multitude of people possessing a healthy spirit and a warm heart create a moral consciousness, that we describe as a nation." In his opinion: "a nation is the soul, a spiritual principle." Two elements, actually the same thing, create that soul, that spiritual principle. The first is the possession of a rich inheritance of a common past. The second is the present compliance and willingness to live together, to continue and renew that indivisible inheritance of the past. To Renan a nation is a daily plebiscite.

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<sup>9</sup> R. Muir: *Nationalism and Internationalism*, 1918; *National Selfgovernment, its Growth and Principles*, 1918.

R. W. Seton-Watson: *Europe in the Melting Pot*, 1919.

T. G. Masaryk: *The Small Nations in the European Crisis*, 1916; *The New Europe*, 1919.

S. R. Steinmetz: *De Nationaliteten en Europe*, 1920.

P. Miliukov: *Natsyonalnyi vopros* (The National Question), 1925.

O. I. Boczkowski: *Vstup do Natsiologii* (Introduction to Nationology), 1st edition 1934, 2nd edition 1947; *Grundlagen des Nationalproblems* (Einführung), 1936.

<sup>10</sup> "Nation und Nationalitat" (*Jahrbuch für Soziologie*), III. 1927; *Ethnopolitischer Almanach*. Ein Führen durch die europäischen Nationalitäten Bewegung.

<sup>11</sup> P. Mancini: *Della Nacionalita come fondamente del diritto delle Genti*, 1851.

<sup>12</sup> E. Renan: *Qu'est ce qu'une nation*, 1882.

A German scientist Max Weber in 1912 described a nation as "a sort of a spiritual community, the expression of which would be a state of its own — an end to which it (the nation) normally tends . . ." <sup>13</sup>

There is a considerable and constant confusion in the use of all the nationological terms, in the first place of the basic ones — nation (Nation) and people (populus, Volk). Up to now in the U.S.A., Great Britain and France the term "nation" means something else — the entire population of a state regardless of racial or ethnic origin, native language, native culture or national consciousness of the citizens. In this way the term was understood (and its use advocated by the Ukrainian historian and sociologist V. Lypynsky.<sup>14</sup>) In the view of most scholars in this field the modern nations have developed during the last two centuries from peoples, which have been formed during the last 10-20 centuries. A nation is a nationally and politically conscious people, i.e. the term "people" and "nation" are not synonymous.

#### NATIONAL PROBLEMS INFLUENCED BY WORLD WAR I.

Already by the year 1912 there was a definite feeling that a war was coming. Not only European diplomats, staffs and armies, but also the leaders of enslaved nations and even those of political parties e.g. the Russian "bolsheviks," prepared themselves for it. At a secret meeting, that took place in December 1912, the Ukrainian political parties of Galicia decided that "in case of war between Austria and Russia all the Ukrainians will support Austria against Russia, which is the greatest enemy of Ukraine . . ." In the same year the creation of the Ukrainian military organization "Sich" was begun.

At the end of July 1914 the First World War was declared. On one side there were the so called "Central Powers" (Austria-Hungary, Germany, later Turkey, and still later Bulgaria), on the other the "Entente" (Great Britain, France, Russia, later Italy, still later Romania and the U.S.A.).

During the first months of the war it was difficult to determine the national problems in it. But in 1915 they were impartially described by the Swedish linguist and expert in the field of political theory R. Kjelleen.<sup>15</sup> He pointed out five world problems, among them the Ukrainian. Later, in 1917, R. W. Seton-Watson<sup>16</sup> quoted the following

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<sup>13</sup> *Verhandlungen des II. deutschen Soziologentags*, 1912.

<sup>14</sup> V. Lypynsky: *Lysty do bratřv khliborobiv* (Letters to Brothers-Farmers), 1919-1926.

<sup>15</sup> R. Kjelleen: *Die politische Probleme des Weltkrieges*, 1915.

<sup>16</sup> R. W. Seton-Watson: Ukrainian Problem — *The New Europe*, No. 44, Aug. 1917.

five problems as causes of the war: 1. Anglo-German antagonism, or in other words the struggle to dominate the world markets, 2. The Alsace-Lorraine problem, 3. Constantinople and the Dardanelles, 4. The Jugoslav question and 5. The Ukrainian problem. Only two of these are of an economic character; the other three are old problems of a national character. All of them did not come into being suddenly, but developed for dozens of years. This was the reason why it was so difficult to solve them peacefully.

The diplomatic and military staffs of both the Central States and the Entente very well understood, that the national problem was the core of the political life of Europe and that in negotiating the future peace treaties it would be impossible to ignore national principles. But even when the national problem became prominent and threatening, attempts were made to diminish the blow for one's own state and allies, and at the same time to make use of it as a means of the decomposition, weakening and reduction of the military potentiality of the enemy. On both sides official proclamations as to the cause of the war were made, namely a struggle for the freedom of enslaved nations. Even in Russia the Supreme Commander of the Armies Grand Duke Nikolay Nikolayevich issued a manifesto to the Poles. All of these proclamations were immediately taken up, commented on and developed by the powerful press of the countries at war, thus stirring an interest in national problems. But actually both camps had the liberation of nations under the rule of the enemy in mind, and ignored the existence of persecuted nations under their own rule. The national problem for both camps was only a tactical manoeuvre or a political weapon for the purpose of diminishing the potentiality of the enemy.

The attitude to the national problem in the neutral European states (Switzerland, Holland, Sweden) and in the United States of America was completely different. In these countries during 1914-1918 there were numerous impartial and just individuals, well informed about the fate of the enslaved nations — scientists, diplomats and politicians. With the beginning of the war Switzerland (Lausanne) became the headquarters of the enslaved nations (Office des Nationalités). It continued to publish its Annals (*Les Annales des Nationalités*), which concentrated on the national problems in Russia. At the end of the war the Office published a bibliography of works on national problems printed in the years 1914-1918. In 1916 the Office organized the III Congress of Enslaved Nations. In Holland (the Hague) the result of the efforts of The Central Organization for Durable Peace (*Organization Central pour la paix durable*) was a "Collection of Reports Concerning the Vital Points in the Programs of the Enslaved Nations" — a publication pre-



pared on the basis of a special questionnaire of the Paris-Lausanne Permanent Commission, that was to have been discussed at the Berlin "Congress of International Studies" (Congrès International d'Etudes) in 1915, (which did not take place for technical reasons).

The national problems that became most prominent during the war were the Czech, Polish, Slovak, Croatian, Finnish, Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian, White-Ruthenian, Ukrainian, Georgian, Armenian, Irish, Flemish and Israeli (Jewish). The size of this article does not permit us to give a complete characteristic of each of these.

At the beginning of the war one of the most prominent men in the Czech nation, T. G. Masaryk, a professor of philosophy and a representative in the Parliament in Vienna, travelled through Holland to France, Great Britain, the U.S.A. and later Russia. In Holland he met R. W. Seton-Watson and together they drafted a plan for the overthrow of Austria-Hungary. Masaryk visited all the countries where there were strong groups of Czechs and Slovaks, and organized them into Czechoslovak National Independence Committees, raised funds, and helped to form the Czechoslovak Legions in France and Russia. Beginning with the year 1916 together with R. W. Seton-Watson he published a popular scientific weekly "The New Europe" in London; the actual editing of the weekly was the work of Masaryk. Even before Masaryk's visit to France, Czechoslovak national independence committees and legions were being organized there (Stefanik). The same was being done for the Polish cause by Haller.

At the beginning of the war, the government of Russia began to persecute the Ukrainians; it deported the Metropolitan A. Sheptytsky and Professor M. Hrushevsky. But in spite of this three important works in the branch of Ukrainica appeared in Russia during the war years in Russian.<sup>17</sup>

Germany developed a great activity in the field of national problems. Numerous societies specializing in the study and propagation of various national problems were formed e.g. Ukrainian, Polish, Georgian, Armenian, Irish, Flemish, Prussian, Pan-Islamic, etc. Special organizations for the publishing of various informatory and propagandistic materials were founded. A number of German magazines issued special numbers devoted to different national problems.

On August 1, 1914 three Ukrainian political parties in Galicia formed a Central Ukrainian Council, that on August 3 issued a pro-

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<sup>17</sup> The Knowledge of Ukraine, by V. Doroshenko, published by The Imperial Academy of Sciences, St. Petersburg, 1915; The Ukrainian Nation in Its Past and Future, edited by O. Efimenkova, Moscow, 1915; The Ukrainian Question, Moscow, 1915.

clamation to the Ukrainian people calling them to rise against Russia. The Council also united the executive groups of the "Sokil" and "Sich" organizations into the Ukrainian Military Headquarters, which was planned as a future General Staff of the Ukrainian Military Forces. This Council organized the "Ukrainski Sichovi Striltsi" (USS). There were 10,000 volunteers, but the government gave permission for only 2,500 to serve in these units, and subsequently 10 squadrons ("sotnia") — 2 independent battalions — were formed, under the tactical command of General Hofman. In September 1915 two more squadrons were added and the whole reorganized into the "First USS Regiment." Also the press headquarters of the USS were organized, a new Ukrainian military tradition was created, new "striltsi" songs raised the national consciousness not only of the USS, but also of those Ukrainians, who served in other units of the Austrian Army, to a very high level. The USS considered itself a political military organization — an asset to the Ukrainian political representation and the defence of the rights of the Ukrainian people before the Austrian government. This was the course of action of those Ukrainians, who were citizens of Austria.

Simultaneously Ukrainians, who had emigrated from Russia, founded in Lviv on August 4, 1914 the "Soyuz Vyzvoleniya Ukrainy" — SVU<sup>18</sup> (Union for the Freedom of Ukraine). SVU maintained that "the Union endeavored to renew the independence of the Ukrainian State, and considered the realization of this closely connected with the military fall of the Russian empire" and for that reason "Ukrainians had to be on the side of the enemy of their greatest enemy — Russia, especially as one of these enemies was Austria, where the Ukrainian people found a possibility for a national-political and cultural development . . ." Emigrant Ukrainians in Germany founded a branch of this organization (SVU), called "Zentralstelle." At the end of August 1914 the SVU headquarters were moved to Vienna, and were expanded and reorganized. It maintained an independent attitude as it did not wish to become a weapon in the hands of people connected with the Austrian government. The Austrian government, on the other hand, offered considerable amounts of money to the members of its headquarters, if they would consent to move to Switzerland and support the Austro-Hungarian cause.

The organization leaders did not consent to this and so lost the financial support of Austria, and carried on their work with the support of Germany. The SVU carried out a tremendous task: in Vienna it published "Ukrainische Nachrichten" (Ukrainian News) in the German

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<sup>18</sup> Volodymyr Doroshenko: "Soyuz Vyzvoleniya Ukrainy" (The Union of the Freedom of Ukraine) memoirs in the daily *Svoboda*, New York, No. 140-155, 1954.

language and "La Revue Ukrainienne" (The Ukrainian Review) in Switzerland in the French language; besides this it published over 25 books and pamphlets in other foreign languages. Among these works there were four written in German in a spirit of strict scientific impartiality.<sup>19</sup> The SVU sent memoranda to the governments of the Central Powers, had its representatives in neutral countries, and published a weekly in the Ukrainian language "Vistnyk" (News) (1914-1918). The number of books and pamphlets in the Ukrainian language amounted to more than 50. But the greatest merit of the SVU was its extensive work among the Ukrainian prisoners of war from Russia. To quote V. Doroshenko: "The camps brought up thousands of conscious Ukrainian citizens, who became completely different people after having gone through the camp schools, courses and the experience of the camp itself." As soon as the armies of the Central Powers occupied a territory formerly held by Russia, the SVU extended its activities to these areas (Pidlyasha, Volyn) and organized its schools and educational societies.

#### WILSON'S DOCTRINE ON A NATION

National ideology and national theory during the war reached its culminating point in the doctrine of Woodrow Wilson. This was not only a summary of the 125 years' of the work of national ideologists and scientists of the whole world, this was not just another project of an ordinary man of learning, this was something much greater — a perfected scientifically impartial project of an international code of law covering national questions and an international institution, which was to supervise the realization and the adherence to the laws of this code. The program of President Wilson was based on a principle that went beyond state and beyond time; and what is most important it was impartial and non-profit. Wilson had no intention of overthrowing any state, or causing its fall. His campaign was against every kind of imperialism, every subjugation of one nation by another, without any consideration of the fact which nation was doing it or where, be it an enemy of the U.S.A. or its ally. His national-theoretical opinions and his national-political work sprang from his highly moral and pure ethics, and from his sense of justice and expediency — from his understanding of the ways and means of preserving a lasting peace and perfecting world progress. For that reason the whole world and in particular mil-

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<sup>19</sup> M. Hrushevsky: *Narys istoriyi ukrainskoho narodu* (An Outline of the History of the Ukrainian Nation), Vol. I.; S. Rudnycky: *Geografiya Ukrainy* (The Geography of Ukraine); M. Korduba: *Pivnichno-Zachidni ukrainski zemli* (North-western Ukrainian Territories); Rev. Titus Voynarovsky: *Polsko-ukrainski vzajemyny* (The Polish-Ukrainian Relations).

lions of enslaved peoples remember the name of Wilson with such gratitude and respect. By way of an example, the Ukrainian sociologist and nationologist O. I. Boczkowski calls him "a great American idealist, who had the courage to present the national problem in its actual extent without the traditional diplomatic machinations."<sup>20</sup>

World War I was a period of a far-reaching and more profound understanding among the enslaved nations of Russia as well as of those of Austria-Hungary. The reflection of this process were the international conferences and congresses. Lausanne (Switzerland) in June 1916 was the scene of the III. Congress of Enslaved Nations, conducted in the spirit of the 14 points of Wilson. The Congress passed a resolution in the form of "The Declaration of the Rights of Nations"; Ukrainians took part in it too. During November 21-28, 1917 a Convention of Nations of Russia took place in Kiev, organized and initiated by the Ukrainian Central Rada, which decided to reorganize Russia into a confederation of free nations. At that time Ukraine was a center for the newly-formed national republics on the territory of Russia and their leader.

In the spring of 1918 a Congress of Enslaved Nations took place in Rome under the auspices of the Entente. At this congress the programs of freeing and developing the nations, especially those under the rule of Austria-Hungary, were drawn up. These served as a basis for the work of the peace conference in Paris. The reports from these conferences and congresses familiarized the reader with the definite political demands of each enslaved nation and showed the deepening of the national-independence struggles under the influence of the war.

#### THE SOLUTION OF NATIONAL PROBLEMS INFLUENCED BY WORLD WAR I.

The solution of the national problems, that became prominent during World War I did not come at once and not in the same manner. The problems of Eastern Europe (former Russia) came up in 1917 and were solved by means of national revolution. The nations of Central Europe became independent at the end of October and the beginning of November 1918.

The peace conference in Paris with the exception of the President of the U.S.A. Woodrow Wilson, consisted of personalities addicted to the old methods of diplomacy: for Great Britain Lloyd George, for France Clemenceau, for Italy Orlando and others. Wilson was prepared theoretically, but was not well informed about the details of the national-territorial problems of Europe; Great Britain was more interested in non-

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<sup>20</sup> O. I. Boczkowski: *Vstup do natsiologii* (Introduction to Nationology), 2nd edition, 1947. Page 24 and 41-42.

European problems and Clemenceau ruthlessly and egoistically supported a policy to strengthen the victory of France and ensure for her favorite allies — the Poles, Czechs and Serbs — a maximum of rights and positions. Wilson as a practical politician — a diplomat, was not able to put through his 14 points in their full strength. The diplomatic technique, tactics and strategy of Clemenceau overcame the scientific and moral integrity of Wilson. The results of the peace negotiations were really a compromise and thus contained numerous reasons for future national misunderstandings and conflicts.

In order to prevent these conflicts R. W. Seton-Watson wrote an article (June 1919) <sup>21</sup> in which he criticized the organization (and the decisive part assumed by them) of “the self-appointed councils of Five or Ten (later in the same part the council of Ambassadors — V. D.), the lack of information which the chief members displayed on the national-territorial problems which they had to decide, and the mechanical system of territorial compensation (e.g. The London Pact with Italy). The principle of the right of self-realization of nations was festively proclaimed, but “the nation continued to be a figure on a chessboard.” The Paris conference tried to maintain “the fiction of absolute individual sovereignty” although at the same time it organized “the League of Nations,” that constricted and reduced the sovereignty of its members.<sup>22</sup> The conference limited the voice of the representatives of enslaved nations — whose fate was being decided — too much. In the end the New Europe that was created, in spite of the fact that it was definitely a step ahead of the pre-war Europe, nevertheless was politically imperfect and thus promoted a new acute situation in national problems. This completely fair criticism was unfortunately not heeded.

Definite results and changes, that took place after the treaties of Paris, Brest and Riga were the following: small (100,000 population) Iceland was freed from Danish rule; Southern Ireland was separated from Great Britain; Great Britain received a mandate to control an autonomous Palestine and this was supposed to solve the Jewish problem of Europe for the future; Austria-Hungary ceased to exist and on its ruins the following independent states were created: a small Austria with Vienna, Hungary, the Czechoslovak republic (which was joined on autonomous principles by Carpathian Ukraine). The state of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (Yugoslavia) came into being, and also the Polish republic, composed of Polish lands that had been under Russian, German and Austro-Hungarian domination. It was also given Ukrainian

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<sup>21</sup> R. W. Seton-Watson: *The Big and Small Nations; The New Europe*, 1919.

<sup>22</sup> Fr. Weyr: *Soudoby zapas o nove mezinarodni pravo* (The Presentday Campaign for a New International Law), 1918.

lands — Volyn, Cholm, Polyssya and Pidlyashya, and from the year 1923 (as the result of a decision of the Council of Ambassadors) Galicia on condition that Galicia would have territorial autonomy and a Ukrainian University; Poland also received a corridor to the Baltic, where the port of Gdynia was built, the capital of Lithuania, Vilno and the western White-Ruthenian lands.

Poland did not keep its word as far as Galicia and the Ukrainian University were concerned, and Czechoslovakia gave autonomy to Carpathian Ukraine in the autumn of 1938, when it was absolutely clear to everybody, that it would be occupied by Germany. In Eastern Europe (former Russia) the first to gain freedom was Finland, then Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania; these states lived an independent life till the year 1940. A little later the following independent republics were born: White-Ruthenian, Ukrainian (in 1917 federal, from January 22, 1918 an independent and from January 22, 1919 an independent united state, that included Galicia and Bukovyna); the republic of the Great Army of the Don, of the Kuban, Crimea, Azerbajdzan, Georgia, Bashkiria and others. Three newly formed Central European states, namely Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Romania formed a defence alliance called the Little Entente.

No national states in their pure form, as suggested by the Swiss Brunschli,<sup>23</sup> were formed. In nearly every European state national minorities existed. They had existed before the war of 1914-1918, but at the time the problem was considered as one purely internal and concerning a given state alone. After the war this problem became international and the League of Nations in Geneva took over the defence of the minorities. But the term "national minority" was used to describe two radically differing types: nations that live scattered and do not form a majority of the population on any territory (e.g. Jews) — which can be given only a cultural-national autonomy; and nations that are a minority in a given state, and inhabit their national territory compactly, and form a majority of population on it. They have all the essentials for a territorial autonomy.

The question of national minorities in post-war Europe may be vividly illustrated by statistics. We have already mentioned, that according to the figures given by S. I. Paprocki, Europe prior to 1914 had 86 million (nearly 23% of the total population) of national minorities, but this figure is definitely too small. After the war in 1919 according to Paprocki Europe had only 36 million (9.7%) of minorities. But other authors mention other figures, e.g. Lord I. Dickinson — 30 million, the

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<sup>23</sup> Brunschli: *Die Nationale Staatsbildung und der moderne deutsche Staat*, 1870.

Czech scientist I. Auerhan<sup>24</sup> — 60 million (15%). The minorities organized in the Congress of National Minorities (E. N. M.) numbered 40 million (10%), so in all probability Auerhan came nearest to the truth in mentioning 60 million.

Contrary to a unified state of a given nation is its dismemberment. Before the war of 1914 the dismembered nations were: Polish, Ukrainian, German, Catalanian, Basque, Flemish. After the war the Ukrainians and Germans became the leading ones in that respect. The Ukrainian nation, numbering 40 million, had a minority of 12 million (30% of its people) in the position of national minorities in Poland, Romania and Czechoslovakia; in the USSR the position of the main body of the Ukrainian people was much worse than that of the minorities in Western countries.

The Institute for the Defence of National Minorities was a creation of the peace conference of 1918-1919. Only 16 countries belonged to it and these were not the most influential ones. It had no influence as far as Germany and the Romance world (France, Italy, Spain) were concerned.

After the war an important part was played by the Congress of European National Minorities, that consisted of representatives of 40 million of national minorities, belonging to 40 different national groups in 14 European states.

#### THE NATIONAL PROGRAM OF THE BOLSHEVIKS

The revolution in St. Petersburg forced the enslaved nations of Russia, the majority of which at the time had plans for autonomy, confederations or federations, to take the path of separatism and create independent national states. The Bolshevik party, that now became the Russian Communist Party (RKP), began a struggle with these newly formed states. The plan of campaign was identical everywhere: at the beginning the communist party of a given nation was organized (e.g. The Communist Party of Ukraine — KPU); this party created a Government of the Socialistic Republic (e. g. government of the UkSRR), that proclaimed the already existing national government to be capitalistic and bourgeois and “called for help” from the Russian Red Army and CHEKA. The national state was conquered under the slogan of liberating it from capitalist-bourgeois elements. That was the practice of the RKP in the national question. And what did the Bolshevik theory have to say? The main sources are the works of the party leader V.

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<sup>24</sup> J. Auerhan: *Jazykove menshiny v Europe*, 1924.

Lenin,<sup>25</sup> who throughout his life was very much interested in national problems. Then there are the works of Bukharin — the theoretician of Bolshevism, and the Bolshevik “nationologist” I. Safarov<sup>26</sup> and M. Skrypnyk.<sup>27</sup> All of them consider a nation under the sole aspect of class distinction, ignoring its all-class structure. Bukharin says: “The concept of a nation includes all social classes of a community. Therefore if we (Bolsheviks) take into account only proletarian dictatorship I think that we cannot afford to support the idea of the rights of nations for self-determination.” I. Safarov says about this problem: “Comrade Bukharin, though he admits the right of self-determination for colonies — for Hotentots, Bushmen, Negroes, Hindus — for the rest (of nations) he proposes the self-determination of the working classes . . .” The practical method in dealing with nations very often used the slogan “self-determination of nations” in the most radical of editions (“including the separation”).<sup>28</sup>

In the Declaration of the Rights of the Nations of Russia issued November 2, 1917 “the equality and sovereignty of nations” is emphasized, “the abolishment of all and various national privileges and limitations”; the right to complete national independence is acknowledged — political separatism included. Even Lenin mentioned a few times “national equality” and “a fraternal unity on a completely voluntary principle . . .”

This difference between “word” and “deed” is apparent in the resolutions of the conventions of the RCP. At the III. convention (January 1918) the following resolutions were passed: “A Soviet republic is being built on principles of the voluntary understanding of free nations, as an allied state” and at the VII. convention (March 1919) it was decided: “We consider the federal union of states of the soviet type one of the transitory stages, that has to lead to a complete union . . .” i.e. the same imperialism and centralism as was carried out by Tsarist Russia.

Before the revolution of October 1917 Bolsheviks considered the nations of Asia and Africa their allies. They were very well informed about the wrongs done to them, their dissatisfactions and their complaints — about “the sparks of the world conflagration” that even then smouldered in Asia and Africa. For that reason the national policy was

<sup>25</sup> V. Lenin: *Natsyonalny vopros* (The National Question) Vol. XIX; *O Kitaye* (About China), 1926.

<sup>26</sup> I. Safarov: *Natsyonalnyi vopros y proletariat* (The National Question and the Proletariat). 1922.

<sup>27</sup> *Natsionalni pytania na Schodi Evropy* (National Questions in Eastern Europe), Materials and Documents, 1925.

<sup>28</sup> *Natsionalno-kulturnoye stroitelstvo v RSFSR* (The National-Cultural Development in RSFSR — Articles edited by A. R. Kakhymbayev, 1933.



not the same in the various enslaved countries of the European type (Baltic nations, Ukrainians, White-Ruthenians, Georgians) and the different native tribes and colored peoples. To the latter the Soviet government had always had a more favorable attitude (more in the spirit of Bukharin's doctrines), spreading national consciousness and national revolutionary ideas among them. All of this was done not for the welfare of these peoples, but only to undermine the strength of the colonial power and to expand their own control over the whole of the world ("to call forth the world revolution").

Asia was the recipient of the special attention and favor of the III. Communist International, that was actually the organ of the foreign propaganda and undermining policy of the RCP. As early as 1919-1920, attached to the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, at that time headed by Prince B. Chicherin, there was a "School of Consuls for Asiatic States." In Moscow (1920) the author heard the following description of this school from a professor of the Moscow University, who was also teaching at this school: "In the morning we, the professors of the Universities, lecture on consular subjects, and in the afternoon — professors of the General Military Staff Academy. The students are an ideal choice, they are either members of Asiatic nations or people, who were born there or lived there for years. All of them are experts on conditions there and listen to lectures very carefully and dilligently. After every lecture two or three students come up to you and very politely tell you, that your information concerning a given territory is a little out of date! It is true that the situation was as you have described it until a certain year, but after that the following changes had taken place and the situation is as follows . . . What a school! You do not only teach there, you learn a great deal yourself . . ." Later the Institute of Eastern Nations was founded in Moscow (Eastern University), where Bolshevik propagandist cadres of colored origin were trained. The results of the work of both these institutions could be plainly observed later, during the "Storm over Asia," that completely changed, and is still changing before our very eyes, the political map of Asia.

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## NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION—ITS POLITICAL ORIGIN

By MICHAEL A. FEIGHAN

*Member of the U.S. Congress — Representative from Ohio*

As we near the end of the centennial of President Woodrow Wilson, it is appropriate that we examine his most important political statements in the light of events which likely inspired him to make them. With the passage of years, the strong emotions which attend any crisis in which great judgments are made become mellowed and experiences of the passing years serve as spotlights on judgments of truly great and historic moments. This is especially true in the case of President Wilson's policy statements on the basic rights of nations which are summed up in the phrase — National Self-Determination. In our times, national self-determination carries great meaning and indeed reflects the hopes and aspirations of millions and millions of people and many nations throughout the world. It is for this reason, I believe, we can chart a wise course in the field of international affairs by understanding events and opportunities of the past in the light of present day problems.

The era immediately preceding the outbreak of World War I has long been referred to as the era of great empires. These great empires had been in contest with one another over a long period of years. From time to time wars between these empires occurred which altered their geography and human complexion. All these wars were caused by reasons deemed to be of vital interest to one or the other empire.

Each of these so-called great empires was made up of a number of nations. In each empire there were "lesser nationalities" and "a superior nationality." The superior nationality engaged in the practice of throwing small bones to the lesser nationalities and the development of a functionary class among the lesser nationalities which was willingly subservient to the superior nationality. To maintain the empire, it was necessary that the position of the superior nationality be preserved and extended. This led to chauvinistic practices by the superior nationality and a great deal of suffering and deprivation on the part of the so-called lesser nationalities. There was a constant effort to superimpose a common language, common customs, common traditions, and a common

folklore upon all the people of the realm. In each case the common characteristic was that of the superior nationality and the victims in each case were the so-called lesser nationalities.

The superior group within each empire went to great pains in trying to blot out the history and aspirations of the other nations within the empire. Elaborate steps were taken to suppress the spirit of nationhood. There was no hesitancy when circumstances required, to use the most brutal methods in crushing any and all movements which sought to keep alive the national spirit.

The functionary class developed from the lesser nationalities was also held responsible for keeping the empire together. This new class of people was imbued with a spirit of empire and a willingness to recognize that the empire could be preserved only by maintaining a superior class. In return for their services, this new class of people enjoyed a superior economic status and a social station uncommon to persons of their national origin. These were the major rewards the superior group of the empire provided for those who were willing to do their bidding.

A long history of these practices, together with wars between the empires, brought widespread discontent among all the lesser people of the realm. It brought forth unusual leaders of the national spirit, but it also produced many theorists and activists of socialism. It also accounted for a large number of radicals and anarchists whose principal function appeared to be the stirring up of and spreading of public disorder.

Socialism originally claimed as one of its objectives the disintegration of all empires. The Socialist International, before and during World War I, made many statements on the rights of nations and people. Lenin particularly presented socialism as the enemy of empires and he frequently referred to Tsarist Russia as the prison of nations.

Within the ranks of international socialism, the question of national independence for the oppressed nations of each empire was a lively subject of writing, discussion and debate. The Poles, Czechs, and Hungarians in particular who were members of the Socialist party viewed international socialism as one means to destroy imperialism and to open the road to national independence. Conversely, the Russian socialists viewed socialism as the key to preserving and extending the Russian empire. The Russian socialists were constantly quarreling with the socialists of other nations on the question of national independence. This became an insoluble problem and led to violent differences within the Socialist International.

During this same era there were genuine national independence movements at work within the great empires and as well on the American

scene. A goodly number of the leaders of the national independence movements took their political inspiration from the great American Revolution and its impact upon the whole world. On the American scene, significant activities in support of these national independence movements were carried out by Americans who traced their ancestry back to Poland, Hungary, Ukraine, Slovakia, Czechia, Lithuania, Latvia, Armenia, and Georgia. The work of these groups on the American scene did much to develop and crystalize a public spirit of anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism during and after World War I.

When World War I started, it was, for all practical purposes, necessary for each empire to take a stand in the conflict. The alternative was death for the abstaining empire. War held the prospect of extension for the victorious empires.

The war aims of the warring empires were all very nebulous and negative. The superior group in each of the empires took a very narrow view as to the objectives of the war; limiting their thinking to a preservation, and wherever possible, extension of the empire. The contending sides in the war had failed to present a unified statement of war aims, and consequently the people who were called upon to fight the war had only the vaguest ideas of its purposes.

When the United States entered into World War I, it became necessary for President Wilson to develop a sensible and understandable set of war aims. Desiring to tell the American people our objectives and as well to be on record before the statesmen of Europe, he addressed Congress in a joint session and set forth his famous fourteen points. It was at this time that the fundamental concepts of national self-determination were clearly and forcefully enunciated as public foreign policy of the United States. To be sure, we had always been willing to support nations seeking to break off from empires and establish their national independence. The basic political motivation for the conduct of our foreign affairs sprang from our own history which so well expressed the rights of all people to self-government and national independence. In many public addresses during the war, while attending the Paris Peace Conference and later in speeches throughout the United States, Woodrow Wilson provided sharp definition to the rights of all nations by his constant espousal of the political principle of national self-determination.

The ending of World War I witnessed the complete collapse of three of the great empires — the Russian Tsarist, the Austro-Hungarian and the Ottoman empires all toppled and disintegrated in the immediate wake of the conflict. The British and French empires suffered reverses and entered upon a new course leading to the destruction of the old

concept of empires. Out of the ruins of the Russian, Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires arose many independent nations.

Most Americans are well aware that Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, Hungary, united Romania and Yugoslavia sprung up as independent nations after World War I. Fewer Americans today are aware that Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia broke away from the Russian empire and established their national independence following World War I. Unfortunately, there are relatively few Americans who realize that Ukraine, Byelorussia, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Turkestan, among others, declared their detachment from an empire and established their national independence.

It is interesting in this connection to recall that many of these newly independent nations patterned their Constitutions and forms of government after the American Constitution and Bill of Rights. There can be no doubt that the political impact of the great American Revolution had reached the native soil of all these many lands and its inspiration played a major role in stimulating the people in their long desire for national independence. The inspiring speeches of President Woodrow Wilson in support of the basic rights of all nations added impetus and determination to these well rooted aspirations.

In looking back over the years, it is reasonable to judge that during and following World War I the national independence movement was the strongest political force of that era. It was a far greater force in the affairs of nations than socialism which then commanded a small following and was understood by relatively few intellectuals. In retrospect, the great tragedy of that era becomes more apparent. If the great powers of that period had been wise enough, and this applies particularly to Great Britain and France, to give their support morally, politically, and militarily to these newly independent nations, the restoration of the Russian empire under the international flag of communism would have been prevented. Unfortunately the sudden return to power politics on the part of Western statesmen at the end of World War I and the failure of the American government to become a positive force in international affairs in support of the Wilsonian principles were major contributing factors in the spread of communism. The International Socialists first seized Russia and then set about restoring the Russian empire under the banner of communism. If the Western statesmen had given their support to these national independence movements, the young nations that were born under that banner would today be thriving centers of democracy where today they suffer the anguish of imprisonment and national slavery.

Notwithstanding all these mistakes and lost opportunities, the greatest enemy of the Russian communist empire today is the popular

aspiration for national independence which still is the dominant force in each of the non-Russian nations of the vastly expanded Russian empire. The Wilsonian principle of national self-determination still remains a source of great inspiration and hope to millions and millions of enslaved people. It is the slogan of the patriots of today and tomorrow who ultimately will take their stand in support of the national independence of their native homelands. Despite over thirty-five years of intensive efforts by the Russian communists to wipe out all aspirations for freedom and national independence within the many nations now subjugated by Moscow, the most hated concept throughout their empire is that of communist imperialism.

The inspiring revolt of the Hungarian patriots against the Russian communists reflects the hatred of people against the enslavement of communism and the tremendous power which can be generated by the cause of human freedom. This revolution against Russian communism has brought about the greatest defeat suffered by international communism since it took hold in Russia in 1918. The Russians have lost in Hungary. The Russians may win a temporary victory by bringing the revolution under their control, but the beginning of the end of the Russian communist empire has been sounded by the Hungarian patriots. With little arms and against tremendous military odds, the Hungarian patriots have defied the Kremlin despots. The myth of invincibility which the Russians have long proclaimed has been smashed. The heroic Hungarian patriots have demonstrated that the wave of the future does not belong to communism and that human freedom shall follow in the wake of communism just as surely as night follows day.

The great victory of the Hungarian patriots will stand as a symbol to all the oppressed non-Russian people within the empire of communism. Other nations will take strength from this Hungarian victory. The desire for national self-determination in each of these subjugated nations will increase every day until freedom and national independence is won by all of them. Failure to understand these basic facts accounts for the free world being unprepared to help the Hungarian fight for independence. No valid reasons now exist why we should not be prepared for future freedom revolutions even more violent in character than the present Hungarian one.

It is encouraging to note that the conference of the North Atlantic Treaty Organizations which concluded on December 14th proclaimed its support of the political principle of national self-determination for all the nations of Central and Eastern Europe. This stand for a positive principle should be the primary objective of all the nations associated in NATO. The winning of this objective will prevent World War III and

bring us closer to that era of peace and freedom which is the hope and prayer of all Americans.

President Woodrow Wilson crystalized the hopes of the American people for all other people of the world when he enunciated the principle of national self-determination. As a great scholar of human events as well as world affairs he knew well that this great principle sprang from both the natural and moral laws which inevitably govern all nations. He also knew that mankind for centuries had struggled upwards toward the great ideals which he so well expressed by the phrase — Self-Determination.

It is up to this generation of Americans to understand better the aspirations of all subjugated people and to rededicate ourselves with unwavering support to the right of all nations to national self-determination. We, as good Americans, must never believe in “greater people or lesser people” and therefore we must stand opposed to all forms of colonialism. That is the destiny of America today and forever.

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## A NEW LOOK AT NATIONALISM

By EDWARD M. O'CONNOR

*(Staff Director of the Select Committee to Investigate Communist Aggression)*

One of the most misunderstood political forces at work in the world today is nationalism. For many years nationalism has been unjustly tarred and feathered by loose thinkers for a wide variety of human abuses and international crimes. In the United States it has been generally described as the companion of isolationism and a symptom of anti-internationalism. All too frequently it has been confused with super-nationalism and therefore accused of a long list of the very crimes against nations and people which give rise to and stimulate nationalism. Unfortunately there has been little or no scholarly attention or objective investigation given to this dynamic political force which has been increasing its power in the world arena by leaps and bounds. Consequently a deep seated ignorance of the basic nature of nationalism has imposed severe handicaps on the development of national policy to meet critical international problems. Moreover, this ignorance has seriously limited the government in taking positive political action in a great many situations of opportunity.

On the other hand the Russians are in every sense of the word experienced experts on the subject of nationalism. Nationalism has been the special target of the ruling class of the Kremlin for several centuries. In point of fact the Treaty of Pereyaslav, entered into between Russia and Ukraine in 1654, stands as a cornerstone in the Russian edifice of anti-nationalism. This treaty which was intended to guarantee the independence of Ukraine from foreign domination actually was used to reduce Ukraine to the status of a colony of the Russians. In 1848 the Russians invaded Hungary in order to put down the revolt against the Hapsburg Monarchy led by Kossuth because of fear that nationalism then rampant in central Europe would spread throughout the Tsarist empire.

These are but two significant episodes of previous centuries. In the period 1918-20 this same spirit of Russian imperialism was an even more dominant force than Marxism as both the Bolsheviks and Men-



sheviks were opposed to nationalism as represented by the democratic national republics established in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Byelorussia, Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Turkestan, the Caucasus and Cossackia. Only Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania managed to survive this period of Russian imperialism. In the period 1939 through the present, the Russians have established their right, without challenge, to the infamous position as destroyer of nations by crushing the national independence of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Albania, East Germany, North Korea, North Viet Nam and several other nations less familiar to the average American.

This long history of Russian conduct toward other nations reflects a strong basic spirit of imperialism. In no sense may it be regarded as associated with or sympathetic to nationalism. It is in fact an undisputed record of anti-nationalism. More correctly stated, it is a history of super-nationalism.

But this long history of suppressing the natural rights of nations has given the Russians a unique understanding of nationalism. They have been confronted over a period of many years with the necessity of breaking the national spirit in their non-Russian colonies in order to preserve their empire. Thus they have been compelled to acquire an expertness on the subject of nationalism.

Contrary to this, Americans generally have had little opportunity, until somewhat recently, to concern themselves with world problems. In the period of World War I and its immediate aftermath, the great Wilsonian principles of national self-determination and equal rights of nations, large and small, inspired oppressed nations and people in every quarter of the globe. The golden era of national independence movements which sprang up upon the ruins of the Russian, Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires is directly attributable to the public pronouncements of President Woodrow Wilson during that period of world crisis. It seemed for a time that the evils of empires and the consequent plague of war would be lifted from the overburdened shoulders of all humanity. But these great hopes were soon shattered by the wave of isolationism which gripped the United States shortly after the armistice with Germany was signed and the leading Western European powers drifted back into their games of power politics and intrigue. Soon the American people withdrew from the world arena and a great political vacuum occurred.

The tyrannical leaders of Communism, Nazism and Fascism quickly arose and each struggled to fill that political vacuum. The result was World War II. We were soon driven out of our cell of isolationism and

became involuntary participants in the war between two diametrically opposed dictatorships.

Following the defeat of one branch of the dictatorship, the Nazis and Fascists, we were then called upon to lead the world in a struggle to prevent the domination of the world by the Russian Communists. We were ill prepared to lead this cause because we had by a strange paradox been so-called partners or allies of the Russian imperial dictatorship in defeating the Axis dictatorship of the Nazis, Fascists and Tojoists. Our greatest weakness in this greatest hour of national peril was that we had been led out of our long sleep of isolationism under the heavy propaganda barrage of imperial Russian communism.

The worldwide propaganda program of the Russians had established Nazism as nationalism and Communism as democracy. This was a major propaganda victory for the Kremlin because both premises were exactly contrary to the facts. Nazism was a form of imperialism, violently opposed to nationalism and preaching a vicious doctrine of super-racism. Communism was and remains a violent form of imperialism, anti-democratic in nature and guided by a vicious doctrine of Russian super-racism.

Immediately following the hostilities of World War II, nationalism became the dominant political force in vast areas of the world where colonialism had long held control. National liberation movements sprang up almost over night in those areas. The old empires could no longer postpone decisions having to do with the demands of awakened people for self-determination and national independence. To postpone such decisions meant the outbreak of violence and civil war. Civil war did break out in those colonial areas where an effort was made to preserve the old status quo. The threat of violent civil war hung over all the colonial powers.

The United States undertook some significant political actions to meet this crisis. The Philippines blossomed into full and sovereign national independence, a fitting climax to years of careful preparation by the Philipinos and Americans. In the case of Indonesia, we used our good offices in and outside the United Nations to help complete the inevitable transition from colonial status to national independence. We took other steps, particularly within the structure of the United Nations, in an effort to bring about some element of order without attempting to inhibit the inevitable political trends in most of the colonial areas.

The Russians, on the other hand, were very busy during this same period attempting to put their special brand of colonial saddle on the national liberation movements throughout the free world. Comintern agents who had been in the service of the Kremlin for years suddenly

emerged as indigenous "national patriots." Well disguised and well heeled financially, these agents had the following assigned objectives:

- 1) Capture leadership positions in the national liberation movements.
- 2) Stir up hatred for the Western colonial powers and associate the United States in the minds of the colonial people as an imperial power.
- 3) Incite violence and public disorder while developing cadres of subversives indoctrinated with communist ideology.
- 4) Prepare the way for final and complete subservience of the colonial people to the new colonialism of the Russian Communists.

Thus a unique political paradox was created, worthy of the most intensive study by all who believe in human rights and the dignity of man. The most violent enemies of nationalism, the concepts of national independence and a democratic form of government identified themselves in the minds of large segments of humanity as the champions of the national liberation movements on three continents. The tragic contrast to this was that the United States, birthplace of the great political ideals of self-determination of nations, national independence and a democratic form of government, allowed itself to become identified in the minds of great numbers of colonial people as an enemy of or at best unsympathetic to these same ideals. This accounts for the strange statements and actions of many leaders in the newly independent nations of Asia with respect to the conspiracy of communism and the efforts of the United States to preserve and extend human freedom throughout the world. We still have a long way to go in exposing this paradox and thus opening the eyes, minds and hearts of millions and millions of people who should be our warm friends and dependable associates in building a just and lasting peace.

This same narrow and misguided thinking on nationalism has served as a severe handicap to our understanding the basic power factors at work within the Russian Communist empire. The Soviet Union is still confused with Russia and the people of the Soviet Union are often referred to as Russians, even by people whose station in life should compel them to know better. Even the so-called constitution of the Soviet Union states that Russia is only one of the nations of the Soviet Union and that there are many other nations in the "Union." Ukraine is by far the largest nation, next to Russia, in that involuntary union. Other nations according to the language of the constitution, such as Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Byelorussia, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenstan, Tadjikstan, Kirghistan, Uzbekstan and Kazakhstan are called Soviet Republics. In point of fact, the Russians are the minority people of the

Soviet Union and the non-Russian people strongly resent our referring to them as Russians.

The so-called constitution of the Soviet Union also creates the illusion that it is made up of a large number of independent nations, each enjoying equal status and reserving to themselves the right to secede from the Union while granting to the Russian Federated Soviet Socialist Republic all authority for the conduct of foreign affairs and the raising, maintenance and use of the Red Army. A more recent development in communist dialectics accords the non-Russian nations of the Soviet Union their national independence — a goal which every Russian knows has been the primary objective of these non-Russian nations over a period of centuries. However, this national independence is restricted to a “form” providing that the so-called independent nations are socialist in substance. It is also interesting to note that this communist dialectic was launched on the occasion of extensive celebrations commemorating the 300th anniversary of the Treaty of Pereyaslav which took place in 1654 between Muscovy (Russia) and Ukraine. All of these trappings are nothing more than a typical Russian camouflage to conceal and contain the national independence movements which are the most dominant political force throughout the entire Russian empire.

A more favorable situation prevails with respect to our understanding of the desires for national independence held by the people of Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria. We fortunately do not refer to them as Russians even though they currently are imprisoned within the Russian communist empire. Public statements by responsible American leaders in support of the national independence movements in those countries have been uniformly constructive and meaningful to the oppressed people of those nations. There have been times, however, in the confused situation which has developed over Titoism and the anomaly of “national communism” that we appeared to be wavering in our support for those nations and might be willing to settle for a status best described as half independent and half colony.

The most recent outbreak of the freedom revolution in Hungary brought with it many lessons that can be of great benefit to us in understanding the aspirations of all the people within the Russian communist empire. To be sure, it exploded the myths that there was any degree of finality to the Russian occupation of those lands and that whole generations of youth have been lost to the cause of human freedom due to communist indoctrination and brainwashing. But equally important, it brought home with unmistakable clarity the stark facts that the people of Hungary will not settle for any brand of communism, that they want absolute independence and that national patriotism is the

driving force behind the Hungarian determination to die rather than continue their present position as a colony of the Russian communists.

There is another important lesson that we can learn from the heroic fight of the Hungarians for their national independence. There now seems little doubt that the Russian occupation of Hungary during these past twelve years, accompanied as it was with a violent program of exploitation, Russification, and national degradation, has stimulated the spirit of nationalism in Hungary to a point where it was beyond the control of the Russians. The mood and temperament of the Hungarian people would hardly permit them to favor as their political objectives, anything less than absolute national independence. This is a political reality which must be understood with all its implications by the leaders of the free world. Moreover, there now seems little doubt that this same situation prevails in all the other non-Russian nations within the Russian communist empire. There may be differences in the degree of nationalism prevalent in those captive nations, but there should be little disagreement that nationalism is the dominant political factor in each and every one of those non-Russian nations.

This suggests the urgent need for American re-thinking on the limited concepts of a United States of Europe. Thinking up to date on this subject has been that the nations of free Western Europe should form the nucleus of a United States of Europe and that eventually by its economic, political, and cultural attractions the so-called satellites would be drawn into this orbit. Such limited thinking neglects the powerful political force represented by the many other non-Russian nations of the Russian communist empire who want political independence just as much as do the so-called satellites. With the inevitable collapse of the present day Russian empire, all these nations will certainly desire a new arrangement of their own making. The present arrangement exists by force alone. When those nations are free they are certain to want an arrangement calculated to prevent a restoration of the Russian empire.

Now is the time when we should be thinking of alternatives to the present unnatural arrangement of nations in the Russian orbit because if we wait until the collapse of the communist empire, we may not have time to offer such alternatives, let alone accord them calm and constructive study.

There now can be no doubt that time is clearly on the side of the national independence movements within the Russian communist empire. These are dynamic and contagious political movements. They are made up of the mass of enslaved people who are united by a common state of mind and await only a spark to put them into violent action. Their greatest strength rests in the fact that they symbolize the struggle of

oppressed and exploited people against the Russian despots, and the hope for a free and better future life. Time and the brutal reality of communist tyranny has broken the virtual monopoly the Russians held on these symbols of political revolution. Therefore the more the Russians are exerted to maintain their communist empire, the stronger will be the response of the national independence movements. The end result is both evident and inevitable; the complete disintegration of the modern day Russian empire.

The position of the United States in relation to the life and death struggle between the national independence movements of these non-Russian nations and the Russian-communist empire is a matter of the greatest importance. It is impossible for us to stand aloof from the struggle. The importance of the outcome to the peace of the world and the long range security interests of the United States denies us the luxury of neutralism. We must stand for one side or the other with no hedging or attempting to keep one foot in each camp. The choice is whether we want to associate our destiny with a cruel, corrupt and dying imperialism or whether we want to associate our destiny with a great crusade for human freedom which takes its strength from the same moral and political principles that inspired our founding fathers.

The speed with which this great crisis moves towards its climax leaves us no choice but to raise our sights and reappraise the capabilities of political actions as a weapon to prevent World War III and at the same time bring victory for the cause of peace and freedom. We would do well to accept the political lessons taught by the heroic Hungarians. The first of those lessons is that to suggest there is a finality to the Russian occupation and exploitation of the many non-Russian nations of their crumbling empire is to demonstrate a dangerous ignorance of the political realities of that slave empire. The second is that communism, which has been the mortar of the present day Russian empire, has not only lost its appeal but has brought on a violent revulsion which threatens the future existence of the Russian nation. The third is that the leaders of the free world must be prepared for more outbreaks of freedom, and the prospect that each will be successively more violent than the former.

This prospect for the future suggests we should be better prepared to undertake political actions in support of the national independence movements within the communist empire than we have been up to date. In order to correct this situation the following steps are suggested, as a minimum:

1. A complete re-examination of the political potentialities of the national independence movements directed at and working within the Russian-Communist empire. This should be undertaken by people who

understand the historical fight of the people of the non-Russian nations against enslavement by Moscow. Confidence in the cause of human freedom along with ability to see beyond the very limited concepts of "containment" and over the barricades of Russian propaganda in the United States are also essential qualifications.

2. An intensification of our efforts to reassure the people of vast areas of the world that we shall continue to support the right of all nations to self-determination. Such an effort is necessary in all the newly independent nations of Asia as well as in the nations still under colonial rule, particularly those within the Russian-Communist empire. The McCormack Resolution, introduced by the Honorable John W. McCormack of Massachusetts, expressing our support for self-determination and opposition to colonialism, which was passed unanimously by the last session of Congress, could well form the basis for a world wide educational campaign.

3. American sponsorship of the ideal of free regional federations of co-equal nations, all of whom will receive rewards for holding membership in same. This is a democratic answer to the need for cooperation between nations in the fields of economics, communications, transportation, common defense and mutual progress. This would supply one constructive possibility to the many problems which will occur with the disintegration of the Russian-communist empire. It will also provide a desirable goal for the national independence movements for the period after they win their immediate objective of national independence. We can afford to point to the Association of American States as a practical example of what we mean by a free regional federation.

These are but few of the steps which, if undertaken, will help us to shake loose from the paralyzing notion that there is little one can do about the enslaved nations without causing World War III. While they are preliminary in character they could well open the way to a political action program which would spare the world the horrors of another war. Another feature is that they would cost the taxpayer very little and could well help reduce the heavy burden of our foreign aid program. They are at least worthy of study by political scientists, students of international affairs and all others interested in a better future world than the first half of this century has produced.

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## THE DOCTRINE OF WILSON AND THE BUILDING OF THE UKRAINIAN NATIONAL REPUBLIC

By ALEXANDER CHOULGUINE, Paris

The proclamation of the 14 Points of President Wilson, the official statement of the principle of self-determination of peoples, made of course a great impression upon Ukraine in 1918. This noble speech gave hopes both for the speedy ending of the World War and for the victory of the Ukrainian national idea. Although these hopes deceived us and although the principle of self-determination was not carried out in full measure, especially for the Ukrainian people, President Wilson remains in the memory of all enslaved peoples as a noble figure in history. I had the honor, as a delegate of Ukraine (UNR) to the Paris Peace Conference, to see and hear the President when our entire Ukrainian delegation was received by the Council of Four in the building on the Place des Etats-Unis in Paris, where the President resided. Although I did not succeed in having a long conversation with him, yet the personal contact left its mark in my memory and strengthened my general impression of his activity as a great humanist and a very sympathetic personality, a tragic figure of modern times.

Although the principle of self-determination of nations was taken into consideration at the Peace Conference in Versailles, at least so far as Central Europe and especially the land of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy was concerned, it was not applied consistently, especially in the case of the Ukrainian population of Eastern Galicia and also of Volyn.

Ukraine as a state was defeated in 1919 in Versailles. For the long period since the 18th century, it had been reduced to the role of a Russian province. Europe and the world had forgotten Ukraine's strivings for independence which were well known in Europe in the 17th century in the time of Bohdan Khmelnytsky and in the 18th century, thanks to the heroic struggle of Hetman Ivan Mazepa and his successor, Hetman Pylyp Orlyk.

All the great powers which made the Versailles Treaty, were very hostile to the Communist Russian government. In their view the communization of Russia was a temporary phenomenon. They believed that an indivisible Russia (only democratic) would come out on top and



they were not even willing to hear that this Russia was composed of a larger number of nations than was the partitioned Austro-Hungarian Empire. The latter they divided but Russia had to remain untouched. The Russian anti-Bolshevik delegation, which consisted of well known figures of the old Russia resolutely supported them in this mood. The Poles, thanks to their claims to the Western Ukrainian lands, were likewise hostile to the idea of Ukrainian statehood up to 1920. After the conclusion of the unfortunate Warsaw treaty of 1920 with the Ukrainian National Republic, Poland, although it insisted upon its plans to extend its frontiers at the expense of Ukraine, stopped, however, all hostile attacks on Ukrainian statehood and even sympathized with it. Eventually the delegation of old Russia lost its prestige and became less dangerous for Ukraine and the Russian emigration broke into irreconcilable groups, some of which were definite opponents of Bolshevism and all national movements within the former empire of the tsars; others wavered in their anti-Bolshevism and criticizing sharply the internal policy of the Soviets, yet (as it became clear in 1945-6) admired the successes of the foreign policy of Moscow. But the international influence of the White Russians fell lower and lower and approached zero. All this was much later but in 1919, when all questions were to be decided, we were surrounded by very hostile influences or by complete indifference and the disregard which the creators of the Versailles Treaty felt.

Meanwhile in Kiev self-determination was actually carried out in 1917-8. This was either not known in Paris or the people did not wish to know it under those influences which I have mentioned. They were not willing to believe us, the members of the Ukrainian delegation, despite all our efforts; we were a new nation, little known, at times the victims of hostile slanders, and we had for a long time to work very carefully both in Paris and especially in Geneva, for them to begin to listen to us. But the further course of events compelled people to believe that we were right. It was only at the end of the 20's that we could say that the delegations of the UNR, especially in Geneva, succeeded in placing on the order of the day the Ukrainian question. We did not succeed in this in 1919.

Actually the Ukrainian Central Rada, in proclaiming the Ukrainian National Republic on November 20, 1917, and in declaring the full independence of Ukraine January 22, 1918, was relying upon its legal historical rights. In 1654 Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky in the name of Ukraine *voluntarily* made an agreement with the Moscow Tsar Aleksey Mikhailovich, and acknowledged his protectorate over Ukraine on the condition that he would preserve the sovereignty of the Hetman and very much of the state character of Ukraine. But the Moscow tsars during the 17th and especially the 18th century began to destroy the principle of the sovereignty of Ukraine; Catherine II finally destroyed Ukrainian state-

hood and changed Ukraine into a Governor Generalship of the Russian Empire.

This unilateral violation of the treaty between Ukraine and Moscow naturally gave Ukraine the right to break with Russia at any moment. Besides Ukraine was bound in 1654 not to Russia but to the *tsar and the Romanov dynasty*. So, the Russians by destroying the last representative of the dynasty, Nicholas II, definitely from the legal point of view unbound the hands of Ukraine.

These facts were in the past. The natural expansion of the Ukrainian population broadened significantly the territory of the historical Ukraine to the south on the lands taken from the Tatars. It was therefore necessary in 1917 to *show the will of the Ukrainian population, i.e. to apply the principle of self-determination*. I have already told that this happened and how it was done.

At the beginning of the revolution in 1917, in April, there was called in Kiev a National Congress, which set up the revolutionary parliament of Ukraine, the Ukrainian Central Rada. Every district of Ukraine (the guberniyas into which Ukraine was divided in tsarist times) had its representatives chosen by the village communities, municipalities and agricultural cooperatives. At first it consisted only of representatives of the Ukrainian parties but in July, 1917, it was entered by representatives of the parties and organizations of the national minorities of Ukraine, Russians, Poles and Jews. The minorities in Ukraine were clustered chiefly in the cities and formed 20% of the total population of Ukraine, but the Central Rada gave them 25% of its members.

Later the Central Rada included representatives of the Peasant Union, workers' syndicates and soldiers' organizations.

In May-June, 1917 the Central Rada was recognized by the whole of Ukraine as its Supreme Representative Organ, and in June there was formed the General Secretariat — the first government of the restored Ukraine.

So the Central Rada was the organ which proclaimed, as we have said, on November 20th the Ukrainian National Republic and on January 22nd, it announced the complete independence of the country.

Did the Central Rada have the right to do this and was it the actual expression of the will of the Ukrainian people?

Our answers to these questions are wholly positive, because:

I. The Provisional Russian Government first of Prince Lvov and then of Kerensky adopted great reserve toward the Ukrainian national aspirations, — not to say simply — hostility. In any case it could not be suspected of a desire to support this movement and to favor its development. But taking account of the actual state of affairs in Ukraine and the enormous authority of the Central Rada, four of the most influential

members of the Provisional Government, Kerensky, Minister of Justice, Tereshchenko, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Tseretelli and Nekrasov appeared in Kiev and carried on official negotiations with the Head of the Central Rada, Prof. Michael Hrushevsky and the Head of the General Secretariat, Volodymyr Vynnychenko. An agreement was made by which the Russian Provisional Government recognized *the regional authority of the Central Rada* and entrusted to its General Secretariat the execution of *the supreme authority in Ukraine*. It is true that this resulted in a crisis in the Russian Provisional Government and the Cadet Ministers, i.e. the partisans of Milyukov, left the government. But a month later the Provisional Government issued instructions to the General Secretariat, which aroused deep dissatisfaction in the Central Rada, for it limited the number of General Secretaries and extended the power of the General Secretariat over only five Ukrainian guberniyas, and left out the four in the south. It was also said in the Instructions that these guberniyas through their communal and municipal organs (zemstvos) had the right to join Ukrainian territory — *and this happened during the next month*. The Provisional Government officially confirmed the composition of the General Secretariat of Ukraine, which was given to it by the Central Rada. From this time on until after the fall of the Provisional Government in its various modifications this government of Ukraine continued on its own territory and when that was occupied, it continued in the emigration. So the attitude toward the Central Rada of the almost hostile Russian Provisional Government is a *striking proof of the great authority of the Central Rada in Ukraine*.

II. But there is another proof, if, as we have seen, the Central Rada was not formed on the basis of normal democratic elections, these elections were held in Ukraine in 1917. First of all there were elections to the democratized zemstvos, i.e., the local autonomous institutions. In these 80% voted for the Ukrainian parties represented in the Central Rada. Then there were elections on the democratic formula (equal, direct, general, secret and proportional) to the All-Russian Constitutional Assembly and then to the Ukrainian Constitutional Assembly. Although, thanks to the violence of the Bolsheviks, neither of these bodies could meet, the fact of these elections is very interesting as an expression of the will of the population; in both cases the Ukrainian national parties received 75-80% of the votes in Ukraine. The elections to the All-Russian Constituent Assembly are especially interesting, for then the Russian parties in Ukraine showed the maximum energy and put forward their best candidates and yet the party of Kerensky (Socialist-Revolutionist and Workers) received in Ukraine only 13% of the votes, while in Russia this party received an absolute majority. We have mentioned the existence in Ukraine of minorities (20%) but they, (not only the Russians but also the Poles and

Jews) put up a number of candidates and so the Ukrainian parties could naturally not receive more than 75-80%. It was only in the urban municipalities of Ukraine that they could not receive a majority, for the minorities were clustered in the cities of Ukraine; in the smaller towns the Ukrainian parties had 50-60% of the votes, but in entire Ukraine over 75%. The remaining 25% were by no means all Russian votes. Especially the Jewish parties elected in Kiev many deputies, among them Zionists, who, among other points strongly supported the Ukrainians in their demands for independence.

*The elections of 1917 were the only actually free and actually democratic elections which have ever taken place in Ukraine. They gave the victory to the same parties which formed the overwhelming majority of the Central Rada. More than this, even the same persons who were sitting in the Central Rada in the vast majority were again elected to both Constitutional Assemblies.*

*Thus the acts of the Central Rada which formed the Ukrainian National Republic and declared its independence were and remain the true expression of the will of the Ukrainian people and were the acts of the true national self-determination of the Ukrainian people.*

The self-determination of Ukraine, the principle proclaimed by President Wilson, was brilliantly carried out in Ukraine in 1917.

What happened later? In accordance with their usual methods the Soviet Moscow government at the end of 1917 formed a government of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republics on the same formula and by the same means which they later applied in the Baltic countries, Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria, etc. This government was formed first beyond Ukraine's borders, in Moscow, and only later was transferred to Kharkiv on the peripheries of Ukraine, and thanks to the Russian Red Army did it occupy the whole of Ukraine.

Thus two governments were formed: the legal democratic government by the will of the people which after a long and bloody struggle went into the emigration with Symon Petlyura and his successors at the head and which still has not ceased its protests against the Moscow occupation of Ukraine. The other Communist government of Soviet Ukraine was not elected by the will of the people but appointed by Moscow. So far for the government.

But we see that even Soviet Ukraine was *de jure* from 1918 to 1923 juridically an independent government. In 1923 the government of the Russian Soviet Republic and the Soviet government of Ukraine formed together with other Soviet republics the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. On the basis of the Treaty (Art. 44), Ukraine had the right to secede from this Union but this, of course, was a dead letter in view of the terrible Moscow terror in Ukraine.

This "union" of 1923 is not legal since the Ukrainian Soviet government itself was merely made by Moscow as the later "Soviet" governments of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, and did not and does not have any legal title to speak and act in the name of the people of Ukraine.

But juridical facts also have their importance; the fact that Moscow did not annul Ukrainian statehood is very symptomatic and shows that even Moscow could not fail to take into account the existence of the Ukrainian Republic.

Before the occupation of Ukraine by the Soviets, the government of the Ukrainian National Republic secured the recognition of Ukraine by France, England (1918), and also Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria. These recognized the Ukrainian National Republic juridically and had diplomatic relations with it. Juridically Finland, Latvia, and Poland recognized the Ukrainian National Republic and *de facto* or *de jure* Ukraine was recognized by Estonia, Latvia, Romania, Georgia and all the Caucasian Republics. In 1922 Argentina also recognized the Ukrainian National Republic.

We must say also that Moscow before it occupied the Ukrainian National Republic, also officially recognized it by the armistice agreement made in May, 1918 in Kiev and published in the *Documents of the First Assembly* of the League of Nations (No. 88).

During its existence in 1920 the Ukrainian National Republic declared its desire to enter the League of Nations. The Ukrainian petition was officially accepted by the League of Nations and the delegate of Ukraine appeared at the appropriate meetings of the League. But the question was postponed because the Russian Communist Army was then occupying Ukraine. In 1945 Ukraine — this time a Soviet state — was accepted into the *Organization of the United Nations as a charter member*. By this all the states which are members of the UN evidently have recognized Ukrainian statehood.

Taking all these facts into consideration, we see that Ukraine has long since passed through the stage of self-determination. It is no longer a question of applying to it that principle which was proclaimed by President Wilson; it took place in 1917.

It is the same question now that the Western Powers have in the case of Germany. It is a question of introducing *free elections* into Ukraine and Byelorussia, the Baltic states, Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. These elections must lead to the formation of new governments which will correspond to the will of their peoples.

Only in this modified manner can there be now applied to the enslaved nations and first of all to Ukraine the Fourteen Points of President Wilson — the principle of self-determination.

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# WOODROW WILSON AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

By CLARENCE A. MANNING

The one hundredth anniversary of the birth of President Woodrow Wilson is being commemorated this year under curious and ominous circumstances. The problem of the Suez Canal and the ruthless murder of the Hungarian patriots by the Russian Communists have cast the same kind of a dark shadow over the United Nations that met the League of Nations at the beginning of World War II when the Soviet Union in connivance with the Nazis occupied the Baltic Republics and the Western Ukrainian lands and delivered an unprovoked attack upon Finland. It raises anew the question of the American position in the crisis and the attitude towards the teachings of Woodrow Wilson nearly forty years ago on the new world order.

The first decade of the twentieth century was decisive for the history of the United States, for it saw a peaceful shift in the American attitude toward the world. It saw also epoch-making changes in the internal life of the American people. Under President Theodore Roosevelt the government undertook the task of compelling the American capitalists to conduct their business with some regard for the welfare of the people as a whole and by so doing it removed slowly but surely those sources of abuse and exploitation which have been the breeding ground of European radicalism.

Roosevelt's attitude was well expressed by his refusal to meet the Russian radical writer Maxim Gorky. "He represents the very type of fool academic(?) revolutionist which tends to bring to confusion and failure the great needed measures of social, political and industrial reform. I have scant sympathy for that maudlin sentimentality which encourages these creatures abroad, when at home, as Gorky instantly showed by his action when he came here, they would be the special sympathizers with, for instance, the peculiarly foul assassins who are now rallying to the support of the men indicted for the murder of the ex-governor of Idaho. In addition to this, Gorky in his domestic relations seems to represent with nice exactness the general continental European revolutionary attitude, which in governmental matters is a revolt against order as well as against tyranny, and in domestic matters is a

revolt against the ordinary decencies and moralities even more than against conventional hypocrisies and cruelties.”<sup>1</sup>

At the same time Roosevelt inaugurated a foreign policy which on occasions proved to be disinterested and liberal. Thus he withdrew American troops from Cuba and proclaimed that island an independent republic in accordance with the Treaty of Peace that followed the Spanish-American War. In the Philippines he set up free institutions that were intended to train the population in democratic principles. His Secretary of State, John Hay, who had been the private secretary of President Abraham Lincoln, proclaimed the principle of the “open door” and the integrity of the territory of the Chinese Empire and brought about the settlement of the Russo-Japanese War. Thus despite the question of the validity of his actions in the building of the Panama Canal, Roosevelt had shown through his administration a recognition of the American position in the world and had with fair consistency used American power for the good of the human race.

Roosevelt was not a political theorist in the broader sense of the word. He had superabundant energy and a keen understanding of human nature but he was often impulsive and he was determined to have his own way. Still he and his advisers were not by any means limited in vision and he was not inclined to accept all foreign attitudes as of necessity the truth.

In almost every respect President Woodrow Wilson was the opposite of Theodore Roosevelt. A rigid Presbyterian, he had been brought up in the South and appreciated the misery and devastation of war. He was a political theorist intent upon the formulation of those principles for which Roosevelt almost unconsciously fought. When he left the presidency of Princeton University to become Governor of New Jersey and then President, he had a definitely set policy for internal and external affairs but little practical knowledge of the world of Europe or of the claims and aspirations of the various nations and oppressed peoples of the area. To him they were intellectual problems rather than personal and he did not want to use the American power to maintain his sway over smaller nations. Hence almost from the beginning he had difficulties in Mexico and various other South and Central American countries and saw himself compelled to solve them with the least difficulties to his theoretical position.

He further burdened himself by his nomination of William Jennings Bryan of Nebraska to be Secretary of State. Bryan was perhaps the greatest orator in the United States but he had already failed twice

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<sup>1</sup> We may note that one of the men involved, Big Bill Haywood, later became the only American to have a successful career on a minor scale in the USSR.

to be elected President on the Democratic ticket thanks to his advocacy of free silver or the equation of 16 ounces of silver to one ounce of gold in the coinage, an unrealistic equation. He was an ardent advocate of peace and during the first years of his tenure of office he worked for a long series of treaties for arbitration and avoidance of war.

When World War I broke out, the great central portion of the United States had little interest in foreign affairs. The people were interested in various domestic problems and cared relatively little for foreign politics in which the East was vitally interested, while the Far West was concerned with the problems of the Pacific.

Wilson had won the presidency largely because of the clash between Roosevelt and Taft. Roosevelt had split the Republican Party because he believed that Taft was too deeply involved with the conservative wing. The campaign had been fought purely on internal affairs and it was naturally with these that Wilson was most vitally concerned.

When the war came, Wilson tried to uphold neutrality. After the first few weeks, Roosevelt felt that the United States should enter the war on the side of Britain and France and, as was natural for him, he promptly announced his decision and threw all of his energies into preparing the United States to enter the war. He denounced Wilson's policy after the sinking of the *Lusitania* by the Germans and when Hughes was nominated in 1916, Roosevelt with his prestige as an ex-President tried to force Hughes to campaign for war or at least to take a strong position against Germany. He failed in this and Hughes lost the election.

When war did come to America, the Republicans warmly supported Wilson in his measures for carrying it on, but they succeeded in electing a Republican Congress in 1918. The Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, Henry Cabot Lodge, was one of the main ideological opponents of Wilson and it was obvious that he would give serious consideration to any Peace Treaty and perhaps oppose some of the details linking it with the League of Nations which was Wilson's fondest dream.

This actually happened but in the meanwhile on January 6, 1919, Roosevelt died and his place of leadership in the opposition was left vacant. Wilson also collapsed on September 26, after his return from Europe and he had no spokesman for his cause and from his sick bed he refused to allow any compromise or reservation on the part of the United States. Thus in a sense both parties were left leaderless at a crucial period. Senator Lodge steadily became more bitter in his opposition to the League of Nations and after his death in 1922 Senator William E. Borah of Idaho led the struggle to disentangle America from foreign affairs and any sort of a world organization.



This clash of personalities goes far to explain the American reaction to events in the east of Europe. Roosevelt himself was eager to reach the Western front and take an active part in the fighting. He was pressing steadily for victory and cared little about a reorganization of the world. To Wilson the plan for reorganization was everything, almost more important than victory and he motivated all of his actions on that reorganization and a new system of diplomacy and of international relations.

This was where his *Fourteen Points* entered the picture. Out of the 14, Points 1-4 and 14 actually deal with his plans for the future world. Point 5 for a "free, open-minded and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims" with a consideration of the interests of the populations concerned undoubtedly dealt with the disposition of the former German colonies in Africa and China. Point 6 called for the evacuation of all Russian territory and aid for the people of Russia with no recognition of any nationality problem except that Point 12 demanded that there be a restored Poland on "the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations." Point 10 called for "the fullest possible autonomy to the peoples of Austria-Hungary" and in the same way Point 12 demanded that "the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development."

Later on February 11, 1918 in his *Four Principles* speech, he said "All well-defined national aspirations shall be accorded the utmost satisfaction that can be accorded them without introducing new or perpetuating old elements of discord and antagonism that would be likely in time to break the peace of Europe, and consequently of the world." It can be at once seen that such words would appeal to those nations which were struggling to free themselves from the ruins of the Russian Empire and eagerly grasped at this doctrine of self-determination. The effect of this was still further increased when he formally recognized the independence of Czechoslovakia and Poland and the union of the Jugoslavs even during the war.

Yet these three states had prominent spokesmen and representatives in the United States. Thomas G. Masaryk, Ignace Paderewski and Prof. Michael Pupin were indefatigable in securing friends among the American people of both political factions and they stirred up strong popular support in both parties, even while the United States declined to declare war on the fourth member of the Central Powers, Bulgaria, despite the urgings and protests of those people who insisted that the Central Powers should be treated under one heading.

*At no point was serious consideration given by either side of the Americans to the fate of the oppressed peoples of the Russian Empire. The one group, regarding the Bolsheviks as the agents of the Germans, was only too willing to support the white Russian armies in their campaign against the Bolsheviks. Wilson consistently spoke of Russia and the people of Russia, even while he used the plural in the cases of Austria-Hungary and Turkey.*

That was the language of Point 6 but he employed the same terminology in the aide-memoire that was given to General Graves at the start of the Siberian intervention. "Military intervention would, in its judgment (of the American government) even supposing it to be efficacious in its immediate avowed object of delivering an attack upon Germany from the east, be merely a method of making use of Russia, not a method of serving her. Her people could not profit by it, if they profited by it at all, in time to save them from their present distresses and their substance would be used to maintain foreign armies, not to reconstitute their own. Military assistance is admissible in Russia, as the Government of the United States sees the circumstances, only to help the Czecho-Slovaks consolidate their forces and get into successful co-operation with their Slavic kinsmen and to steady any efforts at self-government assistance. Whether from Vladivostok or from Murmansk and Archangel, the only legitimate object for which American or allied troops can be employed, it submits, is to guard military stores which may subsequently be needed by Russian forces and to render such aid as may be acceptable to the Russians in the organization of their own self-defence. For helping the Czecho-Slovaks there is immediate necessity and sufficient justification. Recent developments have made it evident that that is in the interest of what the Russian people themselves desire, and the Government of the United States is glad to contribute the small force at its disposal for that purpose. It yields, also, to the judgment of the Supreme Command in the matter of establishing a small force at Murmansk, to guard the military stores at Kola and to make it safe for Russian forces to come together in organized bodies in the north. But it owes it to frank counsel to say that it can go no further than these modest and experimental plans . . . It proposes to ask all associated in this course of action to unite in assuring the people of Russia in the most public and solemn manner that none of the governments in action either in Siberia or northern Russia contemplates any interference of any kind with the political sovereignty of Russia, any intervention in her internal affairs, or any impairment of her territorial integrity either now or hereafter, but that each of the associated powers has the single object of affording such aid as shall be acceptable, and only such aid as shall

be acceptable, to the Russian people in their endeavor to regain control of their own affairs, their own territory, and their own destiny.”

The tone of this remarkable document dated July 17, 1918, shows that Wilson did not recognize any national problem in Russia just as the United States representatives declined in the Treaty of Paris signed on July 28, 1920 to recognize the union of Bessarabia to Romania on the ground that there was no Russian present to present Russia's side of the case.

Thus both before and after the incapacitation of Wilson, he carefully avoided any measures which would indicate the existence of any nationality problem within the former Russian Empire save for the two cases of Poland and Finland. Any suggestions of popular choice in Russia were to be left until there was established a free and democratic government of Russia, even though the prospects for the establishment of such a government steadily receded into the background.

On the other hand with the administration of President Harding, despite his lack of theoretical base, the last of the states carved out of the Russian Empire by the will of their people free Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, were duly admitted to the League of Nations and were recognized by the United States as *de jure* government. By this time however Ukraine and most of the other national republics that were at all in contact with the Western world had been overthrown.

Yet the validity of the principles stated by President Wilson was not affected. The stormy period that followed the World War I had secured independence for the peoples of Austria-Hungary and had trained the peoples within the old Russian Empire to think for themselves and to have the opportunity even if for a short time to handle their own affairs in their own way. The provisions for minority clauses in the various treaties, Versailles, St. Germain, Trianon and Sevres, had given minority peoples the right to appeal to an international organization and they made good use of their privileges. By the end of the twenties, their representatives appeared regularly at Geneva and at many other meetings and demanded their rights and the suppression of persecution. Eire won its liberty except for the six northern counties in 1921 and the agitation for self-determination spread through the Near East and Asia. The process went further after World War II when a large number of states in Asia secured their independence. Now it is attacking Africa.

On the debit side was the post-war period when the countries which had secured their freedom after World War I were engulfed by the Soviet Union and became satellite states under the iron control of the USSR. Still events in Hungary and Poland in the last days have shown

that Moscow cannot maintain intact its control of East Central Europe except by the use of naked force. The situation is no better within the USSR itself for there too the enslaved nations are finding their voice on all possible occasions. Ukraine, a nation of some forty million people, has been in an almost constant state of war with Moscow centralism since the days when the Ukrainian National Republic was overthrown and the situation became worse after World War II when the Ukrainian Insurgent Army fought bravely against both the Nazis and the returning red Russians.

Throughout the world the cry for self-determination has steadily gone up as an inalienable part of the democratic movement in international relations, and all in the name of the principles proposed by Woodrow Wilson. As the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* puts it, Wilson in the final analysis proved himself rather a prophet than a statesman. He succeeded in putting into words a barely whispered aspiration of all the enslaved peoples and his words have found an answer even in those regions of the world which he had not expected. It was Wilson's tragedy that he could not hear that message in time to take effective action, that he remained to the end of his life a preacher of the new world rather than an active builder of it.

After the German defeat (1918) a little American help would have created miracles, a new political order on the ruins of Tsarist Russia and consequently an era of peace, which would allow them to develop his own plans for a true association of free nations. Instead, allowed them to be swallowed up by insatiable maw of red Moscow until World War II resulted.

Then again the blindness of his successors failed to see the real cause of the defeat of the Nazis and they once more allowed Moscow with American lend-lease support to be the conqueror. Let us hope that they will find the way in the United Nations to check that steady and persistent greed of Russia, red and white, for more territory without waiting for the beginning of World War III, for we can be sure that there will never be a real and lasting peace in the Eurasian landmass until the Wilsonian principle of self-determination is firmly established and Moscow is forced to disgorge its ill-gotten gains during its expansion of more than four centuries. Then Ukraine and the other peoples that have fallen into slavery will share in the liberty that is slowly coming to the other oppressed nations, as they grow conscious of their rights as human beings and as peoples. The liberation of Ukraine will be but the culmination of those principles which Wilson proclaimed but failed to put into practice, the principles expressed so clearly in his words and speeches.

## AFTER HUNGARY – WHAT?

By LEV E. DOBRIANSKY

In the minds of many Americans, it is a depressing fact that the heroic and patriotic revolution in Hungary failed to stimulate a proper and adequate liberalational response on the part of the free world, particularly the United States. It has, however, served to raise in numerous thinking circles the general question, "After Hungary — What?" Posed in this manner, the question seems to reflect a growing impatience, not to say intellectual displeasure, with the stock answers given in the past as, indeed, now, to the effect that there isn't much we can do without risking the sudden outbreak of global military hostilities. In some quarters, it is being bluntly asked whether this type of answer, aside from rationalizing inaction or lack of imagination, isn't progressively moulding an unwholesome public psychology of peace at any price. In others, the point of assuming a minimum of risk now, if really any at all, as against a certain maximum of risk later is being intensively discussed. In all, the question of policy and its practical applications appears to receive daily treatment of examination and debate.

Doubtlessly, there are many implications that come to the fore when this general question is put forward. But, on close analysis, these can be logically ordered and examined in the contexts of the following areas of discussion: (1) a studied appraisal of the paramount causes underlying the upheavals in Poland, Hungary and elsewhere; (2) a critical assessment of the notions, theories and opinions of foreign policy influences and groups in the United States, relative chiefly to the objective forces of anti-Communism behind the Iron Curtain; and (3) a concrete evaluation of our present foreign policy in relation to the entire Russian Communist empire, especially in the field of application. Some measure of calm reflection will show that no matter what particular aspect related to the general question, "After Hungary — What?", is considered, it is bound to fall into one of these three categories of thought. Whether it be the mirage of national communism, the destalinization program, the role of the Voice of America or Radio Free Europe, the exposure of the blatant errors of Kennanism, the dilemma of the present Administration on the liberation policy or any other significant

topic of current discussion, these categories serve to accommodate it and, therefore, undoubtedly contribute to a coherent presentation of the problem which will be so necessary for the anticipated controversies and acts of the forthcoming session of Congress.

## (2) THE DOMINANT FORCE OF NON-RUSSIAN NATIONALISM IN EASTERN EUROPE

As one carefully analyzes daily reports on the striking developments in Hungary, Poland and in the Soviet Union itself, he cannot but be impressed by the anti-imperialist and anti-colonial tones of these events. In Hungary, notably, the popular stress is on "Russkie go home," symbol of the Hungarian national flag, the sacredness of the Hungarian nation and culture, in short, on all evidences, positive and negative, of the national patriotism of the Hungarian people. For fundamental reasons of geography and internal structural conditions, the manifestation of these national patriotic evidences was blown to full proportions in Hungary as compared to Poland or any other area. It was facilitated by the geographical condition of Hungary's immediate proximity to the Iron Curtain and to the free world. It was aided, also, by the blundering economic and political management of this Russian-occupied colony by Hungary's native Communist quislings. The existence of Hungarian military forces and other internal forms, separate in entity but captive in status, provided the possibilities for mass desertion and abetment of any revolutionary outburst which, as we observe, have been realized in the furnishing of arms to the courageous rebels and in sympathetic encouragement of their patriotic opposition.

It is exceedingly important to bear these environmental conditions in mind if one is to understand the differences in magnitude, depth and intensity of the revolt in Hungary as compared to the uprisings in Poland and even, recently, in various parts of the Soviet Union. Geographically, Poland finds itself in a vise, between the Soviet Union and East Germany where heavy Russian divisions are maintained. Politically, Poland is exposed to the threat of a revision in the Polish-German boundaries — which all Polish parties hold vital for Poland's future. Such revision can be prevented only by a Polish-Soviet alliance. The supervision and control of Poland's economy and resources have been more closely tied in with Moscow's plans for global conquest than has been the case in the less economically rich Russian colony of Hungary.

When one turns further east, to Lithuania, Ukraine, Georgia and into Central Asiatic Turkestan, the difficulties presented by geography and peculiar politico-economic arrangements for large-scale revolutions become proportionately magnified. In substance, the problems of these

captive non-Russian nations are the same as those located outside the Soviet Union. Taken in the aggregate, these Russian colonies are more important economically and strategically to the world imperialist plans of Moscow than the economic combination represented by the misclassified satellite states. To an informed mind, it goes almost without saying that a revolution in Ukraine of the proportions seen in Hungary would simply and decisively spell the death-knell of the Russian Communist empire and the hopes of Moscow to extend it about the world.

Moscow is fully aware of this and spares no effort both to closely control and appease Ukraine and the other non-Russian nations that constitute its base empire. It makes sure that they possess no separate military division. Surely, if Ukrainian officers and personnel seize the opportunity of assisting and joining with Hungarian patriots, they are more than likely to offer arms in aid of the patriot's cause in Ukraine. Dispersion is the rule both in the military and civilian fields of the Soviet Union. Moreover, Moscow takes full advantage of the relatively remote geographical position of these nations and virtually seals them off from the free world. It keeps them under the closest surveillance and vigilant watch. For example, current reports from the Soviet Union indicate that this is particularly true in regard to Ukrainian intellectuals and students. It is reported that the Moscow-controlled Union of Ukrainian writers in Kiev "censured two of its leading members for making anti-party remarks and forced them to confess their errors in public."<sup>1</sup>

These general facts are by no means new, but they must be borne in mind if the total picture of developments in the Russian Communist empire is to be accurately viewed. Beyond question of doubt, the tremendous significance of the Hungarian revolution lies in the fact that its electrifying character has once again awakened the United States and many parts of the free world from a consuming stupor brought on by skilful Russian Communist propaganda, the naive accessions to it by the George Kennans and other proponents of "peaceful coexistence," and the material absorption of peoples inclined toward peace at any price in our time. The course of a patriot in any foreign-dominated country is definitionally marked by daring, blood and death, and these sacrifices of the patriotic Hungarian people are by no means being made in vain. They form, in reality, another necessary stratum in humanity's ascent toward complete world freedom. They actually constitute another national link in the extending chain of patriotic revolt and resistance against imperialist and colonial Moscow.

Dramatic and imposing as it is, the Hungarian revolution must, nevertheless, be viewed in historical perspective and with sound inter-

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<sup>1</sup> Associated Press, Moscow, Dec. 5, 1956.

pretative judgment. The reactions of many statesmen, officials, journalists and commentators during the tensest day of the Hungarian revolution would seem to suggest that this event occurred without a background and, equally, without a future. Vague and misleading notions about Titoism and national communism, about merely a fight against communism and also the triggering influences of the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe, were capriciously aired. But all such disconnected notions are clearly misleading and confusing when they are closely examined in the light of certain perspectives founded on massive fact and sound theoretical interpretation.

The first and most important perspective is that the Hungarian revolution represents another powerful expression of the dominant force of non-Russian nationalism in Eastern Europe. This force, as has been argued by many students for years, is the chief invincible source of opposition and challenge to the colonialism of imperialist Russian Communism. It is a force hallowed by nature and tradition, and forms the very roots of the patriotic, national movements in all the captive non-Russian nations of the Russian Communist empire. It is plainly this natural force for true national independence and the survival of national traditions that is at the very basis of the succession of revolts, uprisings and other forms of mass dissent against Moscow rule in this decade as well as in previous ones. In this decade, the Hungarian revolution is a part of this series that includes also the Polish Warsaw and Poznan uprisings, the revolt in Georgia last spring, the Ukrainian eruptions in the slave labor camps of Vorkuta, Karaganda etc. in 1954 and 1955, the East German revolt in 1953, and the various acts of national resistance among several non-Russian nations both within and outside the Soviet Union back to 1950.

This series of revolts, then, forms our second perspective which, doubtlessly, will be of further application in the years ahead. Even during the Hungarian upheaval, it was reported by Near East sources that uprisings occurred also in Central Asia among the Turkestanians, only to be crushed by Russian tanks as some of the participants managed to make their escape to Iran and Turkey. Although confirmation of this is still lacking, the reported event would be only another factual instance added to the long record of similar events in this region in the past. It is this historical record of national opposition to foreign Moscow rule in Central Asia as well as in Eastern Europe that founds the ruling perspective on the force of non-Russian nationalism. This is the basic force explaining events in Poland, not Titoism or the self-contradictory notion of national communism. It is the force that, of course, opposes communism in an ideological sense, but more so opposes the enemy employing the



Trojan Horse of communism, namely Russian totalitarian imperialism. And whether the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe were in existence or not, this natural force of patriotic nationalism, which understandably is of world-wide character, would still be operative, expressing and manifesting itself in a cumulative sequence of national revolts and outbreaks.

## (2) THE FINAL COLLAPSE OF RUSSOPHILE KENNANISM

In the contemporary period the patriotic Hungarian revolution is unprecedented in many ways. Its scope, depth, intensity and perseverance are unexampled. However, its manifold significance and unmistakable impact are seen in the following effects: (1) the demolishing of the naive and recurring misconceptions that the Russian Communist empire is a monolith and that the persistent indoctrination of the youth insures the impregnability of the empire, (2) the critical undermining of the dangling notion that the enemy is ideological international communism and (3) the final collapse of Russophilic Kennanism and all that this immoral doctrine implies.

The first effect should be quite obvious, but to many a trained observer it would seem that the impressive events of non-Russian revolts in other areas, in the present and in the past, within the Soviet Union and outside of it, have more than amply demonstrated the complete invalidity of the conceptions on monolithic empire and indoctrinated youth. Concerning the second effect, the slogans headlining the uprisings in Budapest, Warsaw, Tiflis and elsewhere adequately show the paucity of the sky-dangling argument on ideological international communism. A Khokhlov may rant endlessly that these eruptions "are merely a struggle against Kremlin domination" and "that these uprisings do not originate in nationalism," but the stubborn facts of Russian Communist imperialism and colonialism, the struggle for national independence, love of God, country and native traditions are manifestly clear as they always have been.<sup>2</sup> Actually, it hardly speaks well for the interviewer's judgment to seek out the warped opinions of this former Soviet intelligence officer whose answers reveal the typical traits of an imperialist Russian mentality, despite a professed anti-communism. Indeed, any attempt to minimize or obscure the basic nationalist and patriotic urges of the captive non-Russian peoples, both in and out of the Soviet Union, in a welter of gibberish about undefined Communism is, especially today, cause enough for hard, intellectual suspicion. In this regard, with tongue in cheek even Mr. Kennan is beginning, at least to some degree, to re-

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<sup>2</sup> "The Masses Are In Revolt Against Red Rule," *U.S. News & World Report*, Nov. 2, 1956.

nounce certain doctrinal elements of Kennanism by acknowledging at long last the struggle for national independence everywhere.

The Hungarian revolution really signalizes the final collapse of Russophilic Kennanism. Here, again, for the informed observer developments in Eastern Europe and Central Asia in the past thirty years furnish more than sufficient evidence contradicting the unrealistic tenets of Kennanism. The persistent presentation of this factual evidence in many quarters of our society fortunately kept the body of Russophilic Kennanism in a doubtful and tottering state: the Polish and Hungarian outbreaks in recent months have sealed its doom. The removal of Russification and of the teaching of Russian in schools of Poland and Hungary, are the leading revolution slogans of both countries.

It is not possible here to recount all the battering charges against the unsound and even fantastic notions of Kennanism that have been advanced these past few years. But those made at the Congressional hearings on U.S. diplomatic representation in Ukraine and Byelorussia, in July, 1953,<sup>3</sup> those registered by Ambassador William C. Bullitt last June,<sup>4</sup> and the indictment offered by Vice President Nixon in October,<sup>5</sup> all have formed the intellectual background of sound skepticism to the journalistic fiction created by the Alsops and Restons as to America's "No. 1 expert on Russia." The striking editorial on "Russia Seen 'Thru A Glass, Darkly'" (Weds., Dec. 5, 1956) in the *Chicago Daily Tribune*, the organ which featured in July, 1953 the criticism launched against Kennanism at the Congressional hearings, summarizes the spirit of this background superbly in its treatment of the Kennan interview that appeared in the Nov. 24th issue of the *Saturday Evening Post*.

This interview, when placed under critical analysis, represents clearly the indirect and askewed confessions of a man as to his own deep errors in relation to the Soviet Union and American foreign policy toward the Russian Communist empire. A full analysis of it here is precluded by limitations of space and topical arrangement, but a few major points may be elaborated to indicate the motives underlying the interview and the nature of its content. This writer is certain that when these and other points are presented in simple language to the American public, questions and doubts bearing on moral stature and intellectual integrity will inevitably arise.

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<sup>3</sup> "Favoring Extension of Diplomatic Relations With the Republics of Ukraine and Byelorussia," H. Con. Res. 58, U.S. Govt. Printing Office, Wash. 1953.

<sup>4</sup> "What Should We Do About Russia?," *U.S. News & World Report*, June 29, 1956, Wash., D. C.

<sup>5</sup> Address, Milwaukee, Wisc., Oct. 2, 1956.

First, the obvious aim of the interviewed is to impress upon the mind of the unwary reader that right along his analyses and observations pointed to the break-up of the Russian Communist empire. Indeed, as long ago as 1945 he foresaw this eventuality; and for evidence he digs up an obscure and unpublished memorandum allegedly written for State Department study. The editors of the *Post*, then proceed to validate this with the blatantly untrue observation, "His prescience did not fail him, either, in the years that followed," while Mr. Alsop taxes his authority by attributing a "lonely prophecy of 1945" to the interviewed. For those familiar with Kennan's writings and thoughts these many years, this contrived performance of face-saving and salvage-making is an act of intellectual desperation. Only last May 3, the author of containment and the consistent advocate of appeasement, peaceful co-existence and the doctrine of evolution mused that "there is a finality, for better or worse, about what has now occurred in eastern Europe" and urged the restoration of "an atmosphere of normalcy to the environment of Soviet-American relations." These quotes are not improperly taken out of context, so the usual Kennanist recourse to the cover-up of being misunderstood will simply not do.

Kennan's comments on "two separate and distinct processes" at work today in the Russian Communist empire, on Gomulka and other current data are reviewed in the *Ucrainica* section of this journal and need not be treated here. However, it should be emphasized here that, in the light of his *published* material these past nine years, it is most curious to find him now stressing the fact of "the drive for independence everywhere." It is also most strange to find him placing now considerable emphasis on the rule of moral principles in public and international affairs. In his work on "American Diplomacy 1900-1950" he told us that "... the most serious faults of our past policy formulation lie in something that we might call the legalistic-moralistic approach to international problems." The late Father Walsh surely had not misread this and similar statements out of context to criticize strongly Kennan's condemnation of moral principles in the field of international relations. In brief, then, the oblique confession of error seen in this interview provides additional testimony to the final collapse of Russophilic Kennanism.

### (3) LIBERATION AND "AFTER HUNGARY — WHAT?"

It need scarcely be pointed out that those who for years have theoretically developed the policy of liberation and concretely have shown the steps of its implementation, can now well take pride in their analyses and prognoses. The Hungarian revolution and the many uprisings preceding it firmly attest to the soundness and truth of the liberationist's

position. They verify and justify it. Thus, the problem today is not one of questioning the liberation policy but, instead, of determining the course of its concrete implementation and applications. We lost a great opportunity in the Hungarian revolution, and this writer for one believes that had we been prepared to conduct a Berlin air-lift type of operation in Hungary prior to November 4, the full measure of Russian bluff and bluster would have been exposed to the world. Carefully planned in the United Nations and in Western Europe, the operation would have been in line with our policy of *peaceful* liberation by its intent to insure peace and order in Europe. The sad fact is that our policy suffers from the lack of an operational arm and this is the concrete problem that faces us today.

To meet this problem, the following directions of action appear necessary for the immediate future. One, it would serve a most useful purpose to have the next Congress stage a Great Debate on American foreign policy, for such a debate would air out before the public eye the deficiencies of our foreign policy operations. It would clarify for the public the meaning and significance of the liberation policy. It would reveal the dangers involved in the baseless complex of fear regarding another world war, especially when Moscow is least prepared today to engage in any such conflict. Second, a Joint Congressional Committee on Information is indispensable in order to achieve the necessary coordination of VOA, RFE and Radio Liberation, as well as to strengthen our other psychological weapons. Third, the establishment of a Select House Committee to Investigate the Disintegration of the Communist Empire, patterned after the famous Kersten committee, would bring incalculable favorable results both nationally and internationally. Its first object of study would be, of course, the Hungarian revolution.

In pursuing these basic directions of action, the Nation would profit from much fertile thought and imagination which doubtlessly would lead to the formation of an operational arm for the execution of our foreign policy. As the foresighted have predicted before, there will be opportunities in the form of other revolts and uprisings within the Russian Communist empire. There is no finality about the captivity of the non-Russian nations in this empire. The burning question, however, revolves about our trained ability to seize these opportunities in behalf of the cause of world freedom. We muffed the opportunity of Hungary, but we can succeed in capitalizing on the inevitable future opportunities. This is the only reasonable and courageous answer to the pending question — After Hungary — What?

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## Dr. ARNOLD MARGOLIN

(1876-1956)



An unfortunate automobile accident on a Washington street ended the life of Dr. Arnold D. Margolin, an unusual figure in the modern history of Ukraine. He was not a Ukrainian by birth since he belonged to the Jewish minority in Ukraine. Yet as a man of high intelligence and a crystally clear character, he was able to find his place in the Ukrainian community and to deserve the approval of his fatherland on the same level as the best Ukrainians.

It was not easy to find the suitable post for a high intellectual of the Jewish minority in Ukraine in the times in which he lived. The Jewish masses who formed a large percentage of the population of Ukraine lived by tradition in harmony with the Ukrainian masses but the rule over Ukraine by the alien Russians in the east and the Poles in the west often placed the Jews in a very difficult position between the Russian or Polish hammer and the Ukrainian anvil. In the catastrophic revolutionary period the local population, the natural owner of the Ukrainian land, demanded from Jews loyalty to themselves and the occupying powers called for the same loyalty. In this situation the position of the Jewish masses became extremely difficult.

The Jewish intellectuals in Ukraine under Russia were russified almost without exception; under the tsarist regime, where "*there is no Ukraine, there never has been and never will be,*" it was hard for a Jewish intellectual to get to know the interests and culture of the autochthonous population and to decide where his place was. To achieve this, he had to possess great intelligence and a resolute character to find the truth and become a fighter against the existing evil. Arnold Margolin was this fortunate type of Ukrainian Jew and so he found in his life not only personal harmony, honesty with himself, but also the gratitude of the Ukrainian people. In his own person he represented the traditional,

good-neighborly friendship between the laboring Ukrainian and the Jew from Ukraine.

Arnold D. Margolin was born in Kiev, the capital of Ukraine, in a wealthy Jewish family and this gave him the possibility to study not only at the Kiev University of St. Volodymyr but also abroad in Germany and France. He returned to Kiev as a trained lawyer and devoted himself to his profession not for money but rather with an eye on the relative freedom of his profession in tsarist Russia. Dr. Margolin used this freedom as well as he could to defend the Ukrainian Jews during bitter times for them. It was the period of reaction both before and after the first revolution in Russia (1905) which was marked by the savage Russian nationalism of the so-called Black Hundreds which showed itself in pogroms against the Jews.

As a young lawyer, Dr. Margolin acquired fame by his defence of the Kievan Jew, Mendel Beiliss, who was tried for the ritual murder of an Orthodox boy. He won the case but the tsarist government deprived him of the right to practice law for several years.

The outbreak of the revolution in Russia placed before a Jewish intellectual the question as to the party with which he would side: with the Ukrainian people who were beginning their struggle against Russian centralism for their own state; or with the Russian democracy, which took an extremely negative position toward statehood for Ukraine, or perhaps with Russian Bolshevism which had ruined the entire former mode of living for the Ukrainian people and its Jewish minority.

The last two conceptions claimed many Jewish intellectuals and alienated them from the Ukrainian masses. Only a small group of Ukrainian Jews identified the interests of the Jews in Ukraine with the Ukrainian people, and among these Dr. Margolin took the first place. He established contact with the Ukrainian Central Rada, learned the Ukrainian language and as a high class specialist put himself at the service of Ukraine. He received an appointment as a member of the Supreme Court in Ukraine and later entered the diplomatic service as a member of the Ukrainian Mission to England and later as a member of the Ukrainian delegation to the Peace Conference in Paris (1919). In all these Ukrainian posts, he fulfilled his obligations not only intelligently but with true idealism.

After the fall of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic and the communization of Ukraine, Dr. Margolin moved to the United States for good in 1922 and worked as a legal adviser and an interpreter. He never gave up his connections with the Ukrainian question but became its spokesman before the American people and their officials.

The best monument of his life in the United States is his volume, *Ukraine and the Policy of the Entente*, published by the Columbia University Press. This work is still a handbook for Western diplomacy and shows how it can avoid those mistakes which the Western powers made in the year 1917-1922 and which gave birth to the good and strengthening of the Soviet colossus.

Dr. Margolin made it the special task of his life to clear up and bring into order the relations between the Ukrainian people and their Jewish minority, for these were again disturbed by events during the civil war in Ukraine and also by the murder of Symon Petlyura, the Supreme Commander of the Ukrainian Army and President of the Republic, in Paris by a Jew Schwarzbart. This gave some Jewish circles the possibility of imputing anti-Semitism to the late President.

Dr. Margolin not only cleared up the role of Symon Petlyura as a democrat, innocent of the inappropriate actions in Ukraine during the revolutionary turmoil but he tried to think in terms of the historical perspective of the normalization of Ukrainian-Jewish relations in the future in a free Ukrainian state and to a large degree he succeeded in this.

It was only natural that Dr. Margolin could not easily find understanding among all classes of the Ukrainian community. As a liberal of the pre-war school from the circles of Russian democracy, it was not easy for him to understand the dynamics of modern Ukrainian nationalism and the fact it is these currents that determine modern political life in many countries of the world.

On the other hand it was hard for the young Ukrainian patriotic generation to understand the real fact that a non-Ukrainian by birth and in fact a man of Jewish origin could be as deserving a patriot as a Ukrainian by birth, for the old and modern history of Ukraine have shown very few examples of such. Dr. Margolin worked for Ukraine in the emigration exactly as in Ukraine Prof. Hermayze, O. Kurylo and many other Jews who died at the hands of the Russian Cheka as Ukrainian patriots.

For the most part the Ukrainian people valued the patriotism and self-sacrifice of Arnold Margolin and gave him their confidence as a Ukrainian patriot. The Ukrainian Free University in 1950 awarded him an honorary Doctorate of Law. It was one of the finest moments in the life of this writer when he in the name of the Ukrainian Free University could perform this honorable commission and confer the degree on this Ukrainian patriot of Jewish descent. The death of Arnold Margolin was considered by all responsible Ukrainians as a great loss for the Ukrainian cause in the USA.

NICHOLAS D. CHUBATY

## THE KOLYMA PRISONER AFTER HIS RELEASE

By PETRO KOLYMSKY

(In the first issue of our publication for 1956 we published an article, "Liberation of the Kolyma Prisoner" by Petro Kolymsky. This was the conclusion of his memoirs on his two year confinement in the concentration camps of Kolyma. The present article pictures the hard life of a Soviet political prisoner in freedom after his release from confinement until he landed as a German prisoner in the free world. — Editor.)

When I was arrested in 1937 and taken to prison, two men of the NKVD remained in my home to search my quarters. They collected all my documents, manuscripts and printed works. My wife was worried over my fate. She did nothing about the documents which had been seized, for no one returned them during my imprisonment. Neither my wife nor I knew what had happened to these documents and other materials.

The document, which I was given on my release, stated at the top in large letters that this document was not an "authorization for residence." It could not therefore take the place of a passport even for a short time. But living without a passport meant that sooner or later I would land again in prison as a person who had no passport. Therefore, even before I had rested from my hard experiences, I went on the third day to the headquarters of the NKVD to get into contact with my last investigator and to ask him about my old documents. This I succeeded in doing with great difficulty. He told me that he knew nothing about them and advised me to return in three or four days.

Since I had only a paper on my release from prison with the remark on it that it was not an "authorization of residence" I was on pins and needles at home these days. I was afraid to go out on the street. Each day seemed longer than a month, for I hoped that I would be given back my old documents and thus have a passport.

On the day set by the investigator, I went to the headquarters of the NKVD. I was greatly surprised when the investigator told me that all my old documents had been burned and that I would have to secure them again from those institutions which had issued them to me.

### THE PROBLEM OF SECURING A PASSPORT

The superintendent and manager of a house have certain obligations to the NKVD for they are their permanent agents. When I returned home after three years of arrest, I found the same superintendent but there was



a different manager. Two weeks after my return the manager and the superintendent asked me why I was living there without being registered in the passport division. I told them that the NKVD had burned my old passport and that I still did not have a new one. They advised me to go at once to the passport division in the regional militia of the Pechersky quarter or they would soon have to inform the militia.

The next day in company with the superintendent I went to the passport division, where I filled out an application for a passport. They told me to wait until the settlement of the question of the passport and told the superintendent that the passport division knew of my residence without a passport in their region.

About two months passed — but not a word about a passport. I kept going often to the passport division. Each time I was told: “Your case is still not decided.” I became frightened over my future and I assumed that I would be sent away from Kiev as “socially dangerous.”

Being in this uncertain position over a passport, I could not look for work and I devoted my entire time to the question of the passport. Almost every day I went to the region and city passport divisions and always without result. My wife advised me to go to the commission of state control. All the lower offices had given me hopeless answers, and I was plainly told that I had no right to live in Kiev the capital city. After this I went back to the NKVD and told them: “Either give me a passport or arrest me again.” The investigator answered me that the question of my passport was coming to a decision.

After this more than a week passed, but I still got no passport. Once on leaving the NKVD where I always spoke by telephone with the investigator, I met the procurator who had been in charge of my case and whom I had seen twice when I was on a hunger strike in the prison. I told him the whole story about the passport and he advised me to go with him to the Procurator’s Office of the Kiev Military District, where he was working as procurator. While I was sitting in the waiting room I heard him talk with the NKVD and the city passport division. Then he came out into the waiting room and told me that the case would be settled in the next few days and in a positive way. He told me that there were many persons like me in Kiev and that all were allowed to live in the capital.

In fact, in a few days I was called into the first section of the militia of the city of Kiev and given a passport. This ended my struggle for a passport and I continued to live in Kiev.

#### A BAN ON WORKING IN SCIENTIFIC INSTITUTIONS

Before my arrest in 1937, I was a senior scientific worker in the *Research Institute for the Study of Soils and a docent in the University.*

Up to April 19, 1939 there was a regulation that persons liberated from prison for lack of proof of the charges against them were given back the positions which they had had before their arrest and were to receive pay for the entire period of their imprisonment.

When the political atmosphere changed in the country the course of the savage bloody terror to a "relatively" moderate tempo, it was planned to release a certain number of those arrested to please the eyes of the rest of the population. This involved considerable expense for back salaries. So the then procurator of the USSR, A Vyshinsky, issued in April 1939 a new decree that irrespective of the time passed in prison, the rehabilitated and also those who were completely innocent would receive pay for only two months. Nothing was said about restoration to work, as if it was self-understood.

But there were secret instructions and in many cases the former prisoners were not taken back to their old positions; that happened to me. At the Research Institute and the University I received my pay according to the decree of A. Vyshinsky for only two months. In both the University and the Institute they did not want to tell me the truth, that I was forbidden to engage in scientific work, and they kept thinking up other excuses. In the Research Institute for the Study of Soils I was told that an order of the Narkom of Land Affairs of the USSR, Benediktov, limited the number of agronomists in the Research Institutes. In the University they motivated their refusal by saying that the university year had commenced and that the professional and lecturing staff was full.

Thinking that this was the work of the directors of the institutions who wished to rid themselves of politically marked persons, I made an appeal to the Scientific Sector of the Narkomzem of Ukraine. I categorically asked to be returned to my work in the Research Institute for the Study of Soils but the Scientific Sector made the same answer as the director of the Institute. Not being satisfied with their arguments I appealed to Butenko, the Narkom for Agricultural Affairs of Ukraine. He told me directly that the objection to my return to work in the Research Institute was not the order of the Narkomzem of the USSR but the instructions of "other" officials. I had previously assumed the intrusion into the affair of these "other" officials but after the statement of the Narkom, I finally understood that I would not be reinstated into scientific work either in the Research Institute or the University.

One of my old friends learned that the *Research Institute on the Geography of Ukraine* needed the work of a specialist on soils; I told him my last conversation with the Narkom of Agricultural Affairs of Ukraine, yet he advised me to apply. Without losing time, I went at once to the Institute and talked with the assistant director of the scientific section. I deliberately kept silent about my arrest and mining for gold

in Kolyma and I only told him what I had done and where, the number of my scientific works and my degree.

After listening to me the director in the scientific department told me that my candidacy was appropriate and I could take the blanks, fill them out and hand them in to the Institute. I took them and went home. I filled out the application blanks and the next day took them to the Research Institute for the Geography of Ukraine. In the blanks I wrote out all that had happened to me. I left the material with the secretary and agreed to come on the next day for the result.

I went the next day to the same secretary who had given me the application blanks the day before, but he only glanced at me and at once changed his manner. The day before he had been polite and friendly but now he became uncommunicative and sharply official. In answer to my greeting, he only dropped his eyes and said through his nose that he would announce me to the scientific director. In two or three minutes the latter called me into his room and in a strained and shamefaced manner began to ask my pardon. I did not know what it was all about and I told him that he had no reason to apologize. But he explained to me that there had been a bitter misunderstanding. When he had offered me a position the day before, the director of the Institute had not been in Kiev but had been on official business in Moscow. He had since returned to the Institute and told his assistant that he had arranged with a scholar in Moscow to come to work in the Institute and so my application was rejected. I knew well the true reason for this and that I had been refused permission to work in the Institute but I could do nothing about it.

Yet there are some good people in the world. Even under the conditions of the awful terror, we find people who despite the risk are willing to help the persecuted. One day I met on the street an acquaintance and he told me that there was a position for a person with a knowledge of soils in draining swamps in the *Hydromelioprojekt of Ukraine*. Since this was an operating organization, they would give me work. I told him about the Institute for Geography but he assured me that there they had talked about me and that my arrest and banishment would not be a hindrance. I accepted this news with great joy and quickly went to the Hydromelioprojekt. When I saw the director, I told him that my friend had sent me and I began to tell him of my arrest and banishment but he told me that that did not concern him. They needed a technical man in soil study and so they would give me work.

In getting into new surroundings, it was very pleasant for me to feel that all my associates even though they knew about my past were very polite and friendly and never avoided me as a former prisoner. Such a friendly atmosphere healed that open wound which had remained festering so long. I felt the sympathy of the people around me and it became

easier for me to enter the circle of normal living. I plunged headlong into the working out of the materials of the past years and after six months of work I did two or three times more than I could have done in the Research Institute for the Study of Soils.

Eight or ten days before the beginning of the war, I gave a scientific report at a session of the Geological-Geographical Faculty of the Kiev University "On the Draining and Agricultural Development of the drained swamps of Ukraine," the theses of which were printed in a Collection of Kiev University. The report was based on many years of study of the swamps of Ukraine and attracted a certain attention among students of swamps.

But this attitude toward me was from the people around me and it was quite different from that of the NKVD. In releasing me the NKVD kept close watch upon me and followed my every movement. It is possible that among the courteous and friendly people in my work there were agents who were carrying out certain tasks set by the NKVD, but they were doing this quite skilfully and I noticed nothing. In my professional work I watched every statement and word so as to give them no pretext for any accusations against me.

The fact that I was followed all the time when I was at liberty is shown by the following incident. My wife had a friend whose husband had also been repressed. She lived on the land of the Pecherska Lavra. Once in visiting her, we passed the Instytutaska Street near the dwellings of the members of the Rada of People's Commissars of Ukraine. It was in the evening and we noticed a man's figure run from one tree to another along the path we were taking. Noticing his costume we got into a trolley and went to the Lavra. Near the Lavra we got out of the trolley and went into a courtyard. There we waited for the next car. From the courtyard we watched everything on the street but no one on the street could look into the courtyard. The same person who was running from tree to tree on Instytutaska Street was on the next trolley. Whether he had lost our trace or only pretended to have lost it, at any rate he did not get off near the Lavra but went further.

#### THE PERIOD OF PREPARATION FOR WAR AND THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR

In April, 1941 there was a survey of all men liable to military service up to the age of 50 and these received red tickets, the so-called mobilization instructions. The announcement of the call to examination was general with details of the reporting points and the areas. It was stated on my ticket that I had been under arrest. In spite of this, I like all the men was given a medical examination and received a red card which meant that I was subject to military service in case of war. It was impossible to find

in the Soviet press in April, 1941 any sign that would indicate that war was coming. But the mass distribution of mobilization cards showed that war was not far distant.

On June 23, 1941 at 7 A.M., a young soldier brought me word that I had been mobilized. On that day I had to settle my accounts in the institute where I was working and on June 24, appear with the required papers at the bureau of the Viyskomat of the Pechersky region at the Kruglouniversytetska Street in the city of Kiev.

The authorities collected from every one who reported to the Viyskomat his passport and military ticket. From the latter they tore off the mobilization instructions. Groups were rapidly formed and assigned to different points in Kiev for final formation and assignment to the front. I was put into a group of 40 men who were formed into a column and taken from the Viyskomat. We were first led through the city to Korolenko St. No. 33 to the building of the NKVD UkSSR. We stopped on the street and the commander who headed the column went into the building of the NKVD. Most of the mobilized men were uneasy because we had stopped not at a military unit but near the NKVD. In a very guarded form I asked those who were in the group whether they had ever been arrested. I at first got the idea that they had collected in this column all those who had been repressed but the answers of those who were with me convinced me that this was not true.

After some time the commander came out of the building of the NKVD UkSSR and took us toward the Khreshchatyk. Then we were taken along Instytutska Street to the gate of the Special Division of the Kiev military District which was in the building occupied by the NKVD UkSSR in 1937. After passing the gate we were at the complete mercy of the NKVD. We passed three lines of guards and entered the cellar of the building where I had been kept in 1937. I knew all the places and the turns, for I had been taken through them every day for two months in 1937. I felt that we would never be let out of there.

Leaving us in the corridor, the commander of the column went into one of the rooms. In a short time they began to call us into a room. We were given only two questions: 1. "Had the person been repressed, and 2. Had any member of his family"? They called person after person and then the commander of our column came out with a package in his hands and ordered us to follow him. He took us from the building into the courtyard of the NKVD and led us to the gate. Having given the pass to the guard, we were let out on the street.

Most of our column were relieved and each felt himself happy that he had left the walls of the NKVD. We were taken back to our Viyskomat. We went into the same room where our documents had been collected. The chief of the section, opening the package and reading it,

began in alphabetical order to call us and to give us back our passports and military cards from which they had torn the mobilization instructions. When we asked what this meant, we were told that we would return home for special instructions.

#### EXPECTATION OF A NEW ARREST

Every one to whom his passport and military card had been returned and who had been sent home was in an uncertain condition. On the one hand he was glad that he had not been sent at once to the front and in the next days and perhaps weeks he would be at home with his family, but on the other hand he was afraid that he would be arrested at any moment by the NKVD and locked up in its cellars. On June 25, 1941, I again returned to work in the institute. The men were glad of my return until they knew the reasons but when they learned of them, each one sympathized with me and felt sorry for me. The most daring began to tell me about the arrests of former repressed persons and advised me to leave Kiev as rapidly as possible.

An improvement party of our institute was working in the swamps of Ukrainian Polissya, including four technicians in the study of swamp soils. I had the direction of the work of these students of soils and so I had a reason for leaving Kiev at once. I received everything necessary and went to the swamps of the River Ostra and the great swampy depression of Doch-Haly. In June there was a great deal of water in the swamps and they formed a kind of fortress in which it was not so easy to find any one. Inspecting the different points of study, I never told any one in what direction or where I was traveling or going. I did this to hide my trail from the NKVD if they were looking for me. In Nizhin, the central point from which a search could be started, there was a sympathetic person who knew of my situation and sympathized with me. He was to warn me in case of danger.

I was practically hiding in the swamps of Polissya until the day of the pathetic speech of Stalin. On hearing his speech on July 3, 1941, all of us, including myself, understood that the position of the Communist dictatorship was critical. Instead of mourning, all became more cheerful and each man smiled inwardly when the executioner called for the defense of the fatherland enslaved by Communism. Each man impatiently waited for the end of Communist slavery. It was obvious from the speech that the leadership was broken up and the hour of anarchy approaching. I put on a mask and continued my normal work on the study of the swamps. I was convinced that in such a situation there would be no search, for those who were called upon to seek us out, were saving themselves and their families, and those who had no families, were busy

with the destruction of archives, the liquidation of the prisons and the evacuation of plants and factories.

The mobilization of the men for the army made a break in the tempo of the work for draining the swamps. All physical labor was taken over by the members of the expedition and these were busy from morning to night. The general mobilization of men up to 50 proclaimed on right bank Ukraine and Polissya found us at work.

Since we were not natives, we were not subject to mobilization there. All the local men up to 50 were sent off and we, who were comparatively young, remained at work. When the last detachment of the mobilized men left and we were watching it, one woman complained in a loud voice: "It's obvious, not all the men are protecting their 'fatherland.' We've sent the old men to the front and these young fellows are having a good time." That evening the head of the Community (Silrada) came to us and advised us to stop further work and either enter the army on the spot or quickly return to Kiev. On July 14, we returned to Kiev and on the 15th made our last reports.

#### GENERAL MOBILIZATION IN KIEV

The overwhelming part of the men subject to mobilization were on July 16 either on their way to base camps or to military units. The remains of the police, the NKVD and women's security detachments began to stop men of military age on the street and inspect their documents. If any one was caught without proper documents, he was called a deserter and handed over to the NKVD. There was thus no possibility of avoiding mobilization. Women whose husbands or sons had gone to the front, revealed all those who tried to hide. So on July 16, I again bade farewell to my family and went again to the Viyskomat.

This time no one asked any questions. Our passports and military cards were not taken from us. We were formed into a large column of more than 1000 men and sent on foot to the base camp in Poltava, some 300 kilometres east from Kiev. All men who were included in the general mobilization after the memorable speech of Stalin on July 3, 1941, were sent on foot across the Dnieper although there were dozens of empty railroad cars also passing across the Dnieper but we were officially forbidden to travel on them. Unaccustomed to long marches, many got sore feet and they either stayed in the villages of the Pokrovska district or got to a railroad station and of their own accord climbed into the empty cars, which were going uninterruptedly to the east.

Our column marched 45 km. to the city of Boryspil and here it actually broke up into small groups. There was a considerable number of people who thought it better to wander around the villages than to lie

in trenches at the front. All who had sore feet boarded a train in Boryspil and travelled on it to Poltava. That was what I did.

If on the march it was easily possible to hide from the German bombings, this was absolutely impossible on a train. Between Boryspil and Poltava our train was under fire 7 times and bombed twice and there were men killed and wounded in these attacks.

#### MILITARY ORGANIZATION IN POLTAVA

The majority of those mobilized from the right bank districts of Ukraine reached the Poltava district and so all the villages and cities were overcrowded. All the schools, theatres and other public buildings were filled with soldiers mobilized from Right Bank Ukraine. The formation of military units took place in the stadia; I was placed in an Engineer Battalion. The next day after the formation we were sent into a forest near Poltava, some 12 km. away. On the fifth day that we were in the woods, we were taken to the nearest village and given uniforms and weapons. We returned with the weapons to Poltava and the same night we were loaded in a train and sent to the front.

#### NEAR THE FRONT AND AT THE FRONT

When we were leaving Poltava, we were told that the Germans were in Galicia and that we were moving toward Shepetivka. When we reached the station of Hrybinka, our train was sent south of Kiev to Zolotonosha-Kaniv. At the station of Zolotonosha we met three echelons of regular troops, who were being brought from Lviv. These selected military units were not being sent to the front but withdrawn into the interior of the country. Those sent to the front were the newly mobilized men between 35 and 50, poorly trained in military methods. The soldiers told us that the front was much nearer to us than our commanders said and that when we crossed the Dnieper, we might find the front line. In fact on the road to Kaniv still on the left bank of the Dnieper, we were unloaded with all our ammunition and our train returned to the station of Zolotonosha. From this point we marched to Kaniv, hiding our movements, so as not to be detected by the German reconnaissance planes. We crossed the Dnieper under cover of darkness and stopped on the right bank near the city of Kaniv.

Kaniv had already been much destroyed by the German planes which bombarded every day the bridges across the Dnieper. We were held in Kaniv one day to wait for the crossing of the river by the entire Kiev Division, of which our Engineer Battalion was a part. Accepting the truth of the statement that the front was somewhere near the old frontier, I went the next day to the postoffice and wanted to write a letter



to my family. But the postmaster told me that the letter would take a long while to be delivered through Cherkasy, because the stations of Myronivka, Bila Tserkov, and Fastiv had already been occupied by the Germans. So at Kaniv we were in the forward zone. The front line was approaching the Dnieper. The same day we heard artillery fire and saw freshly wounded men being brought back directly from the front.

When our whole division had crossed the Dnieper, it was sent to the front. Our Engineer Battalion had special missions and no fixed sector but was moved from one place to another. Our base was the village of Tahancha, from which we received operating orders to mine roads and bridges over which the German army was to pass.

The front and the area behind it were showered with notices in Russian, urging the men not to fight for Stalin but to surrender. Every soldier read these notices and understood that at the moment there could be a choice between surrender or death. In the region of Kaniv, we were not allowed to see those units which had been withdrawn from the front for rest. There was a general abandonment of the whole front and absolutely no replacement or resting of a unit.

The new reinforcements from the left bank of the Dnieper checked for a while the German advance and in some places even compelled them to retreat and we occupied the villages. The civilian population which had already seen the Germans, began to say that they had seen the Germans send home prisoners and that this was producing a willingness to surrender and a disinclination to fight in a war which was being carried on in the interests of the Kremlin clique. Besides this, the newly formed units had no experienced commanders who could have directed their movements skilfully. The majority of the middle and lower officers had been taken from work in industry and were insufficiently trained. The company and battalion commanders were completely lacking maps and were not oriented as to the regions where they were. As a result there was confusion and wandering in the city. The Germans who were coming as conquerors had excellent maps of our country on a scale 1:100,000 and in some cases they were better oriented in a foreign country than our commanders were in their own land.

In such a situation it was the fate of the larger part of the army to surrender. The Germans destroyed in Kaniv the railroad bridges and constantly bombarded the pontoons and so there was absolutely no way of crossing to the left bank of the Dnieper. Almost the entire Kiev Division was captured in the region of Kaniv. Our battalion was captured August 14, 1941 in the village of Stepantsi, near the Dnieper. Thus I escaped from under the jurisdiction of the Soviets and the Kremlin clique.

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## ENGLISH ECHOES IN THE STORIES OF TARAS SHEVCHENKO

(Posthumous Publication)

By IVAN WELYHORSKYJ, TORONTO  
*Literary Echoes*

During his exile in the Novopetrovsk Fortress, Shevchenko obtained permission from the commander Irakly Uskov to write in Russian. At this period Shevchenko wrote some 20 stories<sup>1</sup> under the pseudonym of Kobzar Darmahray (Idle Player). But we only have nine of these stories.<sup>2</sup> In reading these we find a great number of names of foreign poets, writers, artists, etc. In this article we will consider only the names of English authors. On the basis of these stories we can compile a list of the English authors whose works Shevchenko mentions in his writings. They are:

Scott, Sir Walter: *The Antiquary, Woodstock, Quentin Durward, The Fair Maid of Perth.*

Dickens, Charles: *David Copperfield, Nicholas Nickleby.*

Richardson, Samuel: *Clarissa (Harlow) or the Adventures of a Young Lady.*

Shakespeare, William: *A Midsummer Night's Dream, Othello, The Tempest, Hamlet, King Lear.*

Goldsmith, Oliver: *The Vicar of Wakefield*

Swift, Jonathan: *Gulliver's Travels.*

Defoe, Daniel: *Robinson Crusoe*

Young, Edward: *The Complaints.*

Byron, George Gordon: *Don Juan.*

MacPherson, James: *Fragments of Ancient Poetry.*

We must first take up the references to Sir Walter Scott, the novelist. Shevchenko mentions him in the following stories: *The Hired Woman, Music, The Twins, The Unfortunate Man, The Artist, The Wanderer*; also in a letter of 5. 20. 1856 to the artist Mykola Osypov and in the

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<sup>1</sup> Letter to Panko Kulish of Jan. 28, 1858.

<sup>2</sup> The chronological order of these stories is as follows: *The Princess, The Convict, The Hired Woman, Music, The Unfortunate Man, The Captain's Wife, The Twins, The Artist, The Wanderer* but this is not without possible errors.

preface to the so-called *Second Kobzar*.<sup>3</sup> Shevchenko liked to read the works of Scott and in *The Artist* (VII, 56,66) he says: I have been rereading almost all the novels of Walter Scott along with Karl Bryulov and Vasil Shternberg. He took Scott as his model and knew much about his life. In *Music* (VIII, 143) he says of him: "There are people whom all love and whom all admire, whom—so they say—even mad dogs do not bite; the celebrated W. Scott was one of these people."

Shevchenko imitated the habits of Scott. In the *Wanderer* (IX, 215) he writes, "The morning was very fine, and I, like my Walter Scott, threw on my shoulder a leather bag with pencils and paper, armed myself for the journey with a staff and set out for the pond and the mills." In preparing to write *Music*, he says: "One word is all which is needed for a complete romantic figure usually under the pen of some Walter Scott or some observer of nature like him" (*Music*, VIII, 45). In his three stories, *The Hired Woman*, *The Twins* and *The Wanderer*, he calls himself an antiquarian after the title of one of the best known of the novels of Scott, *The Antiquary*. In the artistic description of the vision of the storm at night on the sea, Shevchenko introduces the old Scotch servant of the king so vividly portrayed by Scott in *The Antiquary*. "By some miracle," he wrote again, "an old servant of the king had been brought from Scotland to Budishchi and he had almost been captured at Sevastopil. But the English are a weird people; for they at war do not avoid the comforts of home" (*The Wanderer*, IX, 198-200).

It will not be superfluous to add that Walter Scott was a special friend of K. Bryulov<sup>4</sup> and admired his pictures (*The Artist*, VII, Commentary of P. Zaytsev).

The novel of Charles Dickens, *Nicholas Nickleby*, Shevchenko mentions twice in his *The Artist* (VII, 16,66) and calls it his famous novel. He mentions *David Copperfield* in *The Twins* (IX, 146). We may assume that *Nicholas Nickleby* interested Shevchenko because of its dealing with education and *David Copperfield* as an autobiographical novel ("it is what may be called seasoned autobiography, fiction certainly founded on fact").<sup>5</sup>

Again Richardson's novel in letters, *Clarissa*, interested Shevchenko because of its epistolary form. "I recently (really for correspondence)

<sup>3</sup> See *Complete Edition of the Works of Shevchenko*, Vol. III, p. 150.

<sup>4</sup> Karl Pavlovich Bryulov (1792-1852), a prominent artist, teacher and friend of Shevchenko, took a lively interest in the liberation of Shevchenko from serfdom.

<sup>5</sup> See: John Drinkwater, *The Outline of Literature*, p. 706.

read *Clarissa*, the translation of Jules Janen.<sup>6</sup> I really liked only the preface of the translator, but the letters themselves are somehow sweet, somehow good, too good, God grant it. How can a person have the patience to write such long winded letters." (*The Artist*, VII, 103). Shevchenko was also attracted by the heroine of the novel because she was a servant ("It is a novel idea in the XVIII century that a servant girl simply became a heroine of romance" (*Drinkwater*, 488). Richardson is a moralist. He taught "the passions to move at the command of virtue".<sup>7</sup> But Richardson was also a sentimentalist "squeezing the last drop of bitterness out of every incident."<sup>8</sup> He was also a defender of woman's honor. The analogies with Shevchenko are obvious.

Oliver Goldsmith's *The Vicar of Wakefield* is mentioned by Shevchenko in his *The Artist* (VII, 87). He gave to Pasha to read<sup>9</sup> "this very moral and very well-known book. *The Vicar of Wakefield* by Goldsmith. A good translation and a fine edition" (*The Artist* VII, 105, 106). *The Vicar of Wakefield* is a moralizing novel and Shevchenko as a story writer also gave himself the task of instructing.

Shevchenko knew the *Gulliver's Travels* of the satirist Jonathan Swift but the quotation in *The Unfortunate Man* (VIII, 197) is taken not from *Gulliver's Travels* but from a letter of Swift to Lord Bolingbroke and is "Not die here in a rage, like a poisoned rat in a hole."<sup>10</sup> Shevchenko says "dies like a poisoned rat in a hole" (*The Unfortunate Man*, VIII, 197).

The immortal work of Daniel Defoe, *Robinson Crusoe*, is mentioned by Shevchenko in *The Artist* (VII, 120) where he gives it to Pasha to read and rejects the idea that girls should not read novels. He says that "a good novel trains the mind and ennobles the heart" (*The Artist*, VII, 108). He also mentions *Robinson Crusoe* in a letter of 5. 20. 1856 to M. Y. Osypov. He also gave this novel to his nieces, Ruza and Prisyta, the daughters of Vart. Shevchenko.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>6</sup>. Jules Janen (1804-1884) translated Richardson's *Clarissa* into French and shortened it from 8 vols. to 2 vols.

<sup>7</sup>. See, *Drinkwater*, p. 411.

<sup>8</sup>. See *Drinkwater*, p. 487.

<sup>9</sup>. Pasha, a young girl, an orphan, one of the characters in the story, *The Artist*.

<sup>10</sup>. Letters to and from Dr. J. Swift, D.S.P.D. from the year 1714 to 1738, Dublin, 1741. Letter XXXV to Lord Bolingbroke, Dublin, March 2, 1729, p. 99.

<sup>11</sup> Letter to Vartolomey Shevchenko, of Sept. 10, 1859, XI, p. 232, 245.,

In a letter to Bronislaw Zaleski,<sup>12</sup> Shevchenko mentions the poet and satirist E. Young. "I am writing to you after midnight, i.e. at 4 A.M. and at this time I think that even the thoughts of Young were not in order."<sup>13</sup>

It is true that Shevchenko mentions only four plays of Shakespeare in his stories: *The Tempest* (*Music*, VII,55), *Hamlet* (*Music*, VIII, 97), *A Midsummer Night's Dream* (*Music*, VIII, 121) *Othello* (*The Wanderer* IX, 224) but we can assume that he knew many more plays. Panko Kulish tells that "Shevchenko carried with him Shakespeare wherever he went." We know also that he illustrated *King Lear* (P. Zaytsev, XI, 304). He refers to the works of Shakespeare in his *Diary* for 3. 21. 1858 and in letters to A. Lyzohub of 12. 11. 1847 and 3. 1. 1848 and to V. M. Lazarevsky in letter of 1. 21. 1858 and 2. 22. 1858. He also calls by the name of Prospero (*The Tempest*) his benefactor, I. M. Soshenko<sup>14</sup> (*Music* VIII, 58) who had carried through to a successful conclusion the redemption of Shevchenko from serfdom. The actress Maria Tarasevych dreamed day and night of Ophelia (*Hamlet*, *Music*, VIII, 97). The serf musician Taras Fedorovych wanted "to base a wonderful symphony on the play *A Midsummer Night's Dream* for piano and violin (*Music*, VIII, 121).

"During work I drove away the gnats with my hands which were stained with the pencil and I made my face a la Othello (*The Wanderer* IX, 224). Shevchenko also knew very well Ira Aldridge,<sup>15</sup> a negro tragedian who appeared in 1858 in Petersburg. In a letter to M. Shchepkyn<sup>16</sup> of 2. 6. 1858 he wrote: "Now the African actor is producing wonders for us on the stage. He shows the living Shakespeare" (*Letters*, XI, 222).

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<sup>12</sup>. Zaleski Bronislaw (1820-1888) a Polish historian and artist, was banished to Orenburg where Shevchenko became acquainted with him in 1849.

<sup>13</sup>. Young, Edward (1683-1765) an English poet whose fame rests on his *The Complaints: or Night Thoughts on Life, Death and Immortality*. A lofty but gloomy poem, which had great influence in its day and from which have come many proverbial sayings as "Procrastination is the thief of time." Perhaps Shevchenko had this piece in mind (See XI, 91, letter to Br. Zaleski of 1854).

<sup>14</sup>. Soshenko, Ivan Maksymovych (1806-1876) a portraitist, finished in 1839 the Academy of Arts and became teacher of painting in the Nizhin, Nemiriv and Kiev gymnasia. He was the first to interest himself in the fate of Shevchenko.

<sup>15</sup>. Aldridge, Ira (1805-1867), a negro tragedian, born in Senegambia. He made his debut in London in 1826 as Othello.

<sup>16</sup>. Shchepkyn, Mykhaylo Semenovych (1788-1863), a talented actor, a liberated serf. He founded the realistic theatre.

Shevchenko knew the works of Byron in the Russian and Polish translations of V. Zhukovsky and A. Mickiewicz but he only mentions *Don Juan* twice (*Diary* X. 9. 15. 1857 and *The Wanderer*, IX, 159-198). He also mentions Byron in his poem *The Funeral Feast* (VI, 117) when he says of the hero of the poem that he "did not reveal the wounds of his heart and he did not let loose the darkness of various visions and the Byronic fog; he did not appeal to the worthless mob of his friends; he did not value ranks and power."

In the story "*The Wanderer* (IX, 159) Shevchenko also says: "They say and even write that the well-known Lord Byron had carved somewhere in Greece on a cliff his famous name. Should not such petty, worthless arrogance be alien to this outstanding man?"

Shevchenko knew the so-called *Poems of Ossian* published by James MacPherson<sup>17</sup> as if they were the poems of a legendary Scottish bard Ossian. Shevchenko mentions Ossian in a letter of 6. 6. 1854 to Br. Zaleski: "I have sent many sincere prayers to the throne of God for an hour spent with you in a murmuring pine forest amid the soothing song of its widespreading and wise branches, like the soul of Ossian under the firs." And again, "Do not forget to invoke Ossian, he is perhaps in a French translation. You can reread him with pleasure. You have the setting for the famous Ossian."

In the story *The Twins* (IX, 87) he again mentions Ossian: "He, (Capt. Nykyfor Fedorovych Sokyra) went to the guslya, opened it, tested its strings, stroked his thick, broad, silvery beard (he had worn it for three years) and like my Ossian, touched its strings and they warbled off wise words."

#### CONCLUSION

On the basis of these references and quotations from the works of English authors, we can boldly assert that Shevchenko knew the best in English literature. It is not excluded that he knew also other works and other English authors, although he does not mention them in his stories.

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<sup>17</sup>. James MacPherson (1736-1796), a Scottish author, published in 1760 with translations a collection of old Gaelic poems as *Fragments of Ancient Poetry*.

# QUARTERLY CHRONICLE OF UKRAINIAN LIFE

## I. IN UKRAINE AND BEHIND THE IRON CURTAIN

### ADMINISTRATIVE RESHUFFLING IN UKRAINE

After the visit of N. Khrushchev to Kiev at the end of August, there followed important changes in the government of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic: the Minister of Public Security, Tymotey Strokach, a Ukrainian, who during World War II had been the organizer of Red partisans in Ukraine behind the German front and a trusted agent of the Kremlin was replaced by a Russian, Aleksey N. Brovkin. This change was connected with the inability of Strokach to suppress the still continuing nationalist underground movement in Ukraine. Hryhoriy Butenko (Ukrainian), Minister of the Food Industry, was made Vice-Premier of the Soviet of Ministers of Ukraine; his place was taken by a Russian, Ivan G. Apostolov. A. Kuzmych, Minister of the Coal Industry, was replaced by Alexander F. Zasyadko, a man from the centre, member of the Central Committee of the Party and previously Minister of the Coal Production of the entire USSR. This change was made perhaps in connection with the fact that the Donbas is not able to fulfill the quota of production imposed on Ukraine by Moscow.

There were also other changes in the administrative machinery of Ukraine. These changes show clearly the actual position of the Union Republics in the USSR. There has been recently great emphasis laid on decentralization in the USSR, and an increase in the administrative, economic and cultural autonomy of the Republics but as a result Moscow just as before is ruling in the Union Republics as in ordinary provinces.

### THE REHABILITATION OF MYKOLA SKRYPNYK

In connection with de-Stalinization in the USSR, in Ukraine there has been rehabilitated in the press Mykola Skrypnyk, a Ukrainian Communist and friend of Lenin, Ukrainian Commissar of Education who, during Stalin's terror, was compelled to commit suicide (1933). For long years Mykola Skrypnyk was branded by officials as a "bourgeois nationalist." Now the journal, *The Communist of Ukraine*, in October published an article by M. Suprunenko, which rehabilitates the Commissar Mykola Skrypnyk as a good Communist, although he could make mistakes.

### IT IS NECESSARY TO KNOW THE UKRAINIAN LANGUAGE IN UKRAINE

The journal *The Communist of Ukraine* for October also contains an article by H. Yemelyanenko, "*Lenin's Principles for the National Policy of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.*" In this he expresses the view that in Ukraine the Ukrainian language must predominate in public life, in administration and in the Party. In comparison with the previous russifying trend under Melnikov, General

Secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine, this is a step forward. Only it is not known whether after this affirmation of the principles of the policy of Lenin, there will be any practical application of them.

#### KIEV CELEBRATES THE ANNIVERSARY OF THE UNITED NATIONS

The Kiev Radio reports that on October 23 there was in that city a celebration of the 11th Anniversary of the foundation of the United Nations, of which Ukraine is also a founder member. In the State Library of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic there was opened an exhibition on the history of the United Nations. It is obvious that the first representative of Ukraine in the United Nations, Manuisky, was the author of the Preamble to the Charter of the United Nations, which in an idealistic manner sets forth the task of this organization to guard freedom and human rights throughout the entire world. As if in irony, these human rights were broken chiefly by Moscow in Ukraine and even a mass genocide was committed by Kremlin in this Republic.

The Ukrainian people are proud of their place in the United Nations as a proof of the status of Ukraine as a state, but unfortunately the delegates of Ukraine in the United Nations have never represented the true will of the freedom-loving Ukrainian people, but have been only usual stooges of despotic Moscow.

#### THE CELEBRATION OF THE 700th ANNIVERSARY OF THE FOUNDING OF LVIV IN LVIV

The exact date of the foundation of the city of Lviv, the capital of Western Ukraine, by the Ukrainian King Danylo is not known; yet Lviv is mentioned in the *Galician Volynian Chronicle* of the 13th century in the course of the sixth decade of that century. So the Ukrainians in the emigration celebrated this event two years ago, but the government of Soviet Ukraine assigned the celebration of the 700th anniversary of Lviv to October 27, 1956.

These celebrations were carried out with great pomp in Lviv. The Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian Republic honored a long series of residents of Lviv, artists, writers and scholars. On that day there was a commemorative session of the deputies of the Lviv district and the Soviet of the city of Lviv. The head of the Executive Committee of the Lviv District, S. Stefanyk, delivered an address in which he emphasized the great industrial and cultural growth of Lviv under the Soviet government. In the evening there was a gala concert in the theatre of the Lviv opera which was attended by representatives of the Kiev government and representatives from Moscow.

#### ALEXANDER DOVZHENKO DIES: SOVIET UKRAINIAN FILM DIRECTOR

Alexander O. Dovzhenko, movie director, known often as Russian but actually a Ukrainian, who helped to bring worldwide attention to Soviet films, died in Moscow November 26th, the Soviet news agency Tass reported.

As reported in a Reuters dispatch to the *New York Times*, Mr. Dovzhenko made movies from 1928 onward, mainly about the civil war and the collectivization period after the Russian Revolution.

His production *Arsenal* was shown here in 1929. In 1938 his picture *Ivan* came to the Acme Theatre. *Schors* was shown at the Cameo Theatre in 1939.

During World War II he made documentaries of the scorched-earth regions of Ukraine. One of these, *Ukraine in Flames*, was seen here in 1944.



## THE SERB PATRIARCH IN KIEV

On October 25, Vinkenti, head of the Serb Orthodox Church, visited Kiev. He was met by representatives of the Moscow Patriarchal Church in Kiev and of the Soviet government. The Patriarch visited the ruined Pecherska Lavra, the shrine of Ukrainian Christianity and the Cathedral of St. Volodymyr. Later he examined the architectural monuments of Kiev and saw the film, *Ukraine is Singing*.

It is noteworthy that all the ecclesiastical delegations to the USSR are directed by the Moscow Patriarch to Kiev so as to see "the flowering Christian life in the USSR."

## THE DEATH OF BISHOP NYKYTA BUDKA IN A SOVIET CONCENTRATION CAMP

Reliable sources have confirmed the long circulating reports that Bishop Nykyta Budka, Assistant to the Metropolitan of Lviv, died in a Soviet concentration camp in Karaganda, Asia, in 1949. Bishop Nykyta Budka was the first bishop in Canada for the Ukrainian Catholics (1912) and later was General Vicar and assistant to Metropolitan Andrey Sheptytsky. In 1945, he was arrested along with the entire episcopate (seven bishops) of the Ukrainian Catholic Church of Western Ukraine and deported to Karaganda, where he died.

## THE UKRAINIAN SATIRIST OSTAP VYSHNYA LIVES NO MORE

On September 28, the very talented satirist Ostap Vyshnya (real name — Pavlo Hubenko) died in Kiev in the 67th year of his life. He took part in the years 1917-1920 in the struggle for an independent Ukraine. After the forcible communization of Ukraine, he stayed in the country and with his scorching satire mocked the Soviet system ("Cherry Smiles") until in the 30's during the Soviet terror he was arrested and sent to a concentration camp.

During the war, so as to encourage the spirit of the Ukrainian Red Army soldiers, the Soviet government needed the talent of Ostap Vyshnya and returned him to Ukraine. He continued to write, but the years of imprisonment had destroyed his old typical Ukrainian humor. His war collection, *Hunting Smiles*, did not have the same fire as his *Cherry Smiles*.

## THE CULTURAL LOSSES OF WESTERN UKRAINE

Dr. *Volodymyr Levytsky*, a mathematician and former President of the Shevchenko Scientific Society in Lviv (1931-1934) and a member of the Mathematical Society in Paris, died in Lviv in the 81st year of his life. He left several works on mathematics which are highly valued by European advanced scholars.

Dr. *Roman Cehelsky* died in Lviv as the result of an unfortunate accident. He was Professor of Experimental Physics in the Ivan Franko University and for many years Secretary of the Shevchenko Scientific Society in Lviv.

On September 23, in the 76th year of his life Dr. *Ilarion Svyentsitsky* died in Lviv. He was Director of the Sheptytsky National Museum, a scholar and historian of Ukrainian art. He was Professor in the University of Lviv and an elected member of the Shevchenko Scientific Society.

## THE FESTIVAL CELEBRATION OF IVAN FRANKO IN CHINA

To commemorate the 100th anniversary of the birth of Ivan Franko, Ukrainian poet and writer, the Society of Chinese Writers in Peking published a volume

of the selected works of Ivan Franko in Chinese translation. On September 28, the Chinese writers arranged a formal meeting at which Ho Bao Tsuan, the head of the Society, delivered an address; artists from the theatre recited the verses of Franko.

#### UKRAINIAN SONG IN CHINA

In China there are visiting members of the State Dance Assembly of the UkSSR. The group has given concerts in Ukhan, Canton, Handjou, Shanghai, and other cities. A number of concerts have been held in factories, plants, military units and agricultural productive cooperatives.

#### THE CULTURAL EXCHANGE OF INDIA AND UKRAINE

In September, there visited Kiev, under the leadership of the Indian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Kutir Chad, a delegation of leaders of Indian culture. They gave a series of artistic concerts, featuring dances, music and singing.

#### A NEW PETROLEUM FIELD IN UKRAINE

Near the historical city of Poltava there have been discovered large areas for the developments of oil wells. This is of tremendous importance, for the highly industrialized and fertile land has had previously small oil reserves. Likewise in the Crimea work has been resumed on old oil wells, which promise in the future to increase greatly the production of Ukrainian oil.

#### CONCESSIONS OF MOSCOW TO UKRAINE IN THE LITERARY SECTOR

With the permission of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, the Association of Writers of Ukraine is slowly coming to the rehabilitation of the Ukrainian writers condemned and liquidated under Stalin. According to reports in the *Literary Gazette* for September 20, there have already been rehabilitated the works of the writers Mykola Kulish, Hnat Khodkevych, Hryhoriy Epik and Vale-riyan Polishchuk.

Obstacles are no longer put in the way of efforts of students of the Ukrainian language to cleanse the Ukrainian language from the Russicisms which corrupted it during the time of Stalin. Because of a lack of dictionaries suitably free from Russicism, permission has been given to print a new edition of the pre-war *Dictionary of the Ukrainian Language* by Borys Hrinchenko which was formerly banned as a "bourgeois nationalist dictionary."

#### MOSCOW'S FEAR OF HISTORICAL TRUTH

Amid all the relaxations in Ukraine, one aspect of Ukrainian culture, the history of Ukraine, has been granted no concessions; on the contrary the historical sciences have been still further centralized in Moscow and placed under the protection of Molotov, the cultural dictator of the USSR. Moscow is afraid that independent researches in the historical sciences in Ukraine will strengthen the political ambitions of the Ukrainian people and that the efforts of Moscow to create one Soviet nation will find an insuperable barrier in the study of history.

At the present time all the archaeological finds in Western Ukraine are not given to the Kievan Academy of Sciences but to the Moscow Academy of Sciences through their members from Moscow and Leningrad. The excavated objects are

taken to the north to Leningrad, just as all the articles found in the excavations of the Greek colonies on the Black Sea were taken out of Ukraine several years ago. The organ of Soviet historical science, *Voprosy Istorii* (*Questions of History*), has become the spokesman for the political plans of Moscow based on an appropriate interpretation of the history of Eastern Europe.

#### A DECADE OF UKRAINIAN CULTURE IN POLAND

During the last days of September and the beginning of October, there was arranged a decade for the manifestation of Ukrainian culture in Poland. A delegation headed by the Minister of Culture of the UkSSR, R. V. Babiychuk, went from Kiev to Warsaw. The delegation included the dean of Ukrainian poets, Maksym Rylsky, L. Kyzya, M. Derehus, and the composer Mykola Kolesa.

There was also a group of artists from the stage. An introductory Academy was held in the Warsaw State Opera with speeches by the Ministers of Culture of both republics. The Soviet radio also took part in this decade of Ukrainian culture. Speeches were broadcast by the poet Pavlo Tychyna, head of the Supreme Soviet of the UkSSR, and Dr. Aleksander Shcherban, Secretary of the Academy of Sciences in Kiev.

#### A POLISH EXPOSITION IN KIEV

In the State Historical Library of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic there has been an exhibition dedicated to the cultural relations of Ukraine and Poland. The first section contained works of Polish writers in Ukrainian translation, articles on the new friendly relations between the Polish and Ukrainian peoples and also newspaper articles on the recent Decade of Ukrainian Culture in Poland. The second part, Modern Polish Literature, showed the Polish publications and journals which the Library possesses.

## II. OUTSIDE UKRAINE

#### THE AUSTRALIAN UKRAINIAN SOCIETY IN MELBOURNE

In Melbourne, Australia, there has been founded the first Society of Australian-Ukrainian Friendship. The Society consists of 80 Australians and 40 Ukrainians, almost all newly arrived in the Australian continent. Mrs. Winn has been chosen President and Mr. Brown First Vice-President, Prof. T. Lyakhovych was elected Second Vice-President. After the elections there was arranged an artistic program with performances by soloists M. Evsevsky, I. Klodzinsky, V. Uhrynovych, and the violinist O. Bulka.

#### BOOKLOVERS HEAR DR. YAR SLAVUTYCH

Dr. Yar Slavutych of the Ukrainian Department of the Army Language School was the speaker at the monthly meeting of the Carmel Foundation Town House November 12. He spoke on the subject: "The Ukrainian Literary Renaissance of the 20's and the Attitude of the Red Kremlin Toward It." It was a thrilling story of national heroism in the face of cruel repression.

Dr. Slavutych was educated at the Pedagogic Institute of Zaporozhzhya, the Ukrainian Free University, and the University of Pennsylvania. His latest publication, *The Muse in Prison*, is his first book in English. (*The Carmel Pine Cone-Cymbal*, Carmel, California).

### THE ORGANIZATION OF A REGULAR PROVINCE OF THE UKRAINIAN CATHOLIC CHURCH IN CANADA

Word has just been received from Rome that the previous 4 exarchates of the Ukrainian Catholic Church in Canada have been changed into regular dioceses with bishops assigned to these capitals, Winnipeg, Edmonton, Toronto and Saskatoon. The difference between exarchates and dioceses in the Catholic Church of the Eastern Rite is that exarchates are provisional dioceses in the mission territories while dioceses are permanent organized church units. In connection with this the new province of the Ukrainian Catholic Church in Canada has received its own Metropolitan.

### THE BISHOP OF WINNIPEG MAKSYM HERMANYUK APPOINTED FIRST METROPOLITAN OF THE UKRAINIAN CATHOLIC CHURCH IN CANADA

The Pope has appointed the Most Rev. Maksym Hermanyuk of Winnipeg as the First Metropolitan of an ecclesiastical province for Ukrainian Catholics in Canada.

The new Metropolitan is a graduate of Louvain University, Belgium with a doctorate. In 1948 he was appointed vice-provincial of the Ukrainian Redemptorist Order in Canada and the United States. He was consecrated Auxiliary Bishop at Winnipeg in 1951 and served under the late Archbishop Vasyl Ladyka of Winnipeg.

### A SECOND EXARCHATE OF THE UKRAINIAN CATHOLIC CHURCH IN THE USA

The Holy See has divided the previous Ukrainian Catholic Exarchate in the USA with its see in Philadelphia into two exarchates. The new ecclesiastical unit includes New England and New York. The seat of the new exarchate has been located in Stamford, Connecticut where there is already a Ukrainian Catholic Seminary and St. Basil's College. Bishop Amvrosiy Senyshyn, previously Assistant Bishop of the Archbishop of Philadelphia, has been appointed exarch.

### A NEW UKRAINIAN CATHOLIC BISHOP IN THE USA

The Holy See has appointed Monsignor Josef Shmondyuk Assistant Bishop for the Exarch of Philadelphia, Archbishop Konstantyn Bohachevsky. He is the first bishop of this Church born in the United States.

### THE CONVENTION OF THE UKRAINIAN YOUTH LEAGUE OF NORTH AMERICA IN BUFFALO

On Labor Day weekend the Ukrainian Youth League of North America which is composed of the young people born in the United States and Canada, held its annual convention in Buffalo. The League was founded in 1933 in Chicago.

This year the convention was attended by more than 400 delegates from all the cities in the United States and Canada where there are settlements of Ukrainian emigrants. The chief speaker was the Canadian Senator of Ukrainian origin, Hon. William Wall. Alex D. Pronchik of Philadelphia, the National Commander of the Ukrainian American Veterans, was elected President for the next year.

THE DEATH OF YEVHEN YULIAN PELENSKY

In Sidney, Australia, there has died at a relatively early age, for he was 48 years old, Dr. Yevhen Yulian Pelensky, a Ukrainian Slavist and historian of Ukrainian literature. He was a man of great publicistic energy and an elected member of the Shevchenko Scientific Society in Lviv.

THE THIRD SOBOR OF THE UKRAINIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH IN THE USA

There was held in October the Third Sobor of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in the USA. It was conducted by Metropolitan Ivan Teodorovych and the head of the Consistory, Archbishop Mystyslav Skrypnyk. Several hundred clerical and lay delegates represented about one hundred religious communities of the Ukrainian Orthodox in the United States. It discussed questions of a Scientific Theological Institute, an Archive and Library in Bound Brook and questions concerning the League of Orthodox Youth.

DID RUSSIA REALLY DEFEAT AMERICA AT THE XVI OLYMPIAD  
IN MELBOURNE?

The final results of the XVI Olympiad held this year in Melbourne by official announcements gave "Russia" the victory over America by about 100 points (702 for "Russia" and 604 the USA). But did Russia really defeat America in this year's competitions? A basic analysis shows that Russia not only did not defeat the United States but was far behind it. The reason? The reason lies in the incorrect enumeration of the victories of Russia and the United States.

The rules of the International Olympiad Games accept the participation only of state sport units, but under the name "Russia" it counted not only Russian Soviet Republic but also several other states; in the best case it included under the term "Russia" two member states of the United Nations: Ukraine and Byelorussia, which should have appeared as separate state groups, as the Ukrainians outside of Ukraine demanded, but without result. In the Olympic Games at Melbourne there were 36 entrants from Ukraine, who won the greatest prizes and were mistakenly counted for Russia. From the whole USSR there were 225 entrants.

In this group a Ukrainian, Volodymyr Buts, won world renown, for he gained two gold medals for the distance run of 10 kilometres and 5 kilometres and broke the previous world record. Yuri Kutenko, also a Ukrainian, threw the discus the furthest, 156 feet ½ inch. The Ukrainians also won important prizes in Greco-Roman wrestling. Altogether Ukrainians won 15 gold, 5 silver and 4 bronze medals, or 230 points. Therefore the Russians and the other people of the USSR won only 472 points.

Among the champions in these Olympic Games Russia received credit for the victories of the Georgians (Chukarine), the Armenians (A. Azarian) and the Byelorussian Kartoz and many others. If these points had been correctly counted to their appropriate nationalities, the "Russian" score would certainly have been reduced by some 300 points and not "Russia" as the press reported, but the United States would have become the world champion in the last Olympic Games in Melbourne.

The luxury steamship Georgia carried the Soviet contestants; they were told to stay together and were taken back by the same ship to Odesa. From this ship only a Ukrainian stewardess Nina Paranyuk was able to escape and she chose freedom in Australia.

## BOOK REVIEWS

DIE MITTELMACHTE UND DIE UKRAINE 1918, by Hans Beyer, Muenchen, Isar Verlag, 1956.

World War I in the first months of that world conflagration brought to the world scene the Ukrainian problem. Vienna and Berlin were not oriented on Ukraine, while one of the causes of the outbreak of the war was the desire of Russia to occupy Eastern Galicia, the Ukrainian Piedmont, and thus prevent the growth of a desire for Ukrainian independence. Vienna, Berlin and Budapest chiefly considered the Ukrainian problem in connection with their planned solutions for the Polish question.

On entering the war, Vienna promised the Poles the union of the Kingdom of Poland then controlled by Russia with Galicia and the formation of a triallistic Austria. (The Austro-Polish solution). Berlin was against this, for it believed that it would weaken the German-Austrian alliance, since the Poles also wanted the province of Poznan which belonged to Germany. Berlin preferred to make of the Kingdom of Poland a weak, independent buffer state under the protection of Germany and Austria. Budapest was also against the Austro-Polish solution, because it feared the weakening of its own importance in Austria-Hungary. This solution annexing Ukrainian Eastern Galicia to Poland was also strongly opposed by the Ukrainians on whom both Berlin and Vienna counted as a factor able to weaken Russia militarily.

The author of this work, Hans Beyer, on the basis of hitherto unknown Vienna archival documents shows what a role was played by the Poles (Minister Bilinski), the Ukrainians (Kost Levytsky) and the Germans through their Polish agent Count Hutten-Czapski. The last named supported the German solution but privately he planned that the future Poland created by Germany would be much larger and include Lithuanian, Byelorussian and some Ukrainian territories in the east.

In Germany in general, views on the Ukrainian question were very confused largely because of German Russophiles who insisted upon the preservation of the unity of Russia (Hoetsch, Schiemann, etc.); the Ukrainophile Paul Rohrbach from the beginning tried to break the ice of German ignorance on the Ukrainian question. But this general ignorance about it became catastrophic, when the Russian Revolution broke out and Germany was compelled to carry on a policy of independence for Ukraine and compete both with the Entente and even with her own ally Austria.

Of the Entente states after the Russian Revolution France made Ukraine a region for her influence, thanks to the French Free Masons, whose interests in Ukraine were fostered by their agent Pelissiers and Morkotun, a "Little Russian" who organized in Ukraine the Masonic lodge Narcissus. Pelissiers maintained good relations with the friends of the Entente in Ukraine, especially the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Central Rada, O. Shulhyn. Beyer asserts that both Pavlo Skoropadsky and Symon Petlyura belonged to this lodge.

Yet events in Ukraine did not develop according to the French plans, for the seizure of power by the Bolsheviks in Muscovy, the laying down of arms and the peace negotiations in Brest presented the Ukrainian problem in its full dimensions. Ukraine became an independent state, and by making peace in Brest, it entered into close relations with Berlin and Vienna.

On the basis of hitherto unknown German documents Beyer explains the fall of the Central Rada and the coming into power of Hetman Pavlo Skoropadsky. He shows how unwillingly Austria came to a recognition of a Ukrainian state and what a chaos reigned in the German General Staff, which mostly looked at the Ukrainian state as a temporary creation until the building of a democratic Russia with autonomous provinces.

The ignorance of the German forces of occupation led not to normalization but to disturbed relations with Ukraine to the disadvantage of both parties, for Berlin and Vienna could not obtain from Ukraine the grain which they so badly needed and the Ukrainian Government could not secure permission to organize a Ukrainian army. A favorable solution of the problem how to organize this came only in October, 1918, when Germany and Austria were tottering.

The work of Hans Beyer is interesting and critical and reveals many hitherto unknown incidents in 1918 in Ukraine, but it has some defects. The author often falls under the influence of German sources which did not evaluate the national dynamics of Ukrainianism. He even accepts as truth such an absurd thesis of these German sources as to say that there was a clash between the Greek Catholic Ukrainians of Galicia and the Orthodox Ukrainians of Eastern Ukraine which threatened a fight between the two parts of the Ukrainians (p. 50). As a proof the author cites the fact that when Metropolitan Sheptytsky appeared in Kiev and the Ukrainian Church Rada wished to proclaim him Metropolitan in Kiev, all the bishops of Ukraine sharply protested. The fact proves quite the opposite that there was complete harmony in the confessional field between the Eastern and Western Ukrainians if the plan could be made by the Ukrainian Orthodox to proclaim a Greek Catholic Metropolitan from Lviv in Kiev in the Eastern solidly Orthodox part of Ukraine. The Orthodox bishops of Ukraine protested because every one of them was a Russian and an enemy of an independent Ukrainian state.

Except for such false explanations, the work of Hans Beyer is a valuable contribution to the latest historical and political literature on modern Ukraine.

*New York*

NICHOLAS D. CHUBATY

SOVIET RUSSIAN NATIONALISM by Frederick C. Barghoorn. New York, Oxford University Press, 1956, 330. pp.

There is an abundance of literature in the West defining Russian Communism and its characteristic elements, be they national Russian or international. Professor Barghoorn seems to have a clear perception of this problem. He does not trace Communism to the national character of the Russians exclusively. But he does believe integral Russian nationalism of the Soviet type, deeply rooted in the historical past of the Russian empire, to be the motive power behind the present regime in the USSR. He believes that modern Soviet-Russian nationalism is intimately connected with such traditional elements of Russian history as the "Byzantine-Russian absolutist heritage," revolutionary-utopian tendencies of the radical Russian intelligentsia of the 19th century whose typical product was Lenin, "primitive anarchism of Russians" which manifests itself alternately in apathy and passive submission to power, and again in revolt against it, and finally xeno-

phobia, chauvinism, militarism and messianism. For all her messianism, Moscow believes, or feigns to believe, that the foundation of messianism is communism which will ultimately win the world. But, adds the author, this concerns the Russian communist world, organized and directed from Moscow.

The ascendancy of Soviet-Russian integral nationalism has been particularly noticeable since the early 1930's when Moscow began a ruthless attack against autonomous institutions of the non-Russian republics of the USSR. A decree was issued in April 1933 prohibiting separate national organizations of writers in the republics and in 1934 all writers of the USSR were put under direct control of Moscow. During this period traditional elements of Russian tsarist history were restored to a position of favor by official pronouncements and Russians as such were elevated to a position of "the first nation in the USSR." Russification and unification and the entire march upon non-Russians was camouflaged under such deceitful labels as "Soviet people," "Soviet culture" or "proletarian internationalism."

The author believes that the course of the 12th Congress of the RCP(b) of 1923 was decisive for this subsequent march of Russian great-power chauvinism, because it was there that a clash occurred between the national communists of non-Russian republics (Skrypnyk, Mdivani, Macharadze) and spokesmen for Russian centralism. Whereas the former strove for the real equality and independence of all republics of the USSR, the latter imagined the USSR as a centralized empire and accused the non-Russians of "separatism" and "bourgeois nationalism." Stalin took the side of the great-power Russians and this fact subsequently caused the liquidation of leaders of the non-Russian republics. Thus were liquidated: the prominent Ukrainian economist M. Volobuyev who opposed Moscow's colonialism; H. Petrovsky, nominal "President" of the Ukrainian SSR was imprisoned because he demanded that Ukrainian be the official language of party meetings; forced to commit suicide were: the Ukrainian writer M. Khvylovy who advocated orientation of Ukrainian culture on the West, and the outstanding communist M. Skrypnyk who demanded the reconstruction of the USSR into a free alliance of socialist republics.

Russification became more intense after World War II when Moscow was forced to rely primarily on the Russians because the non-Russians had not displayed too much enthusiasm in defense of the USSR. Stalin's toast of 1945 in honor of the Russian people provides an adequate clue to all post-war purges of "bourgeois nationalism" in the non-Russian republics.

Prof. Barghoorn devotes particular attention to changes which have taken place in Ukrainian-Russian relations since Stalin's death, or more exactly, since the 19th Congress of October 1952. Since that time Moscow has been very busy trying to woo the Ukrainian people by all sorts of concessions. With this object in mind Moscow removed from office the First Secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine, the Russian Leonid Melnikov on official charges that he Russified Ukrainian schools, and the Ukrainian O. Kirichenko was appointed in his place. The Crimea was annexed to Ukraine and Ukrainian communists began to appear in various positions of responsibility throughout the USSR. The author believes that this signifies Moscow's attempt "to elevate the Ukrainians to the rank of 'junior elder brothers.'" He thinks that this course may create serious problems for Moscow because it will increase the power of Ukraine.

The author's objective valuation of existing contradictions between the interests of non-Russian nations and their liberation struggle on the one, and Russian centralism on the other hand, are nevertheless in contradiction with the



author's appraisal of the specific gravity of the nationalities problem in the USSR. In the balance sheet of strengths and weaknesses of Moscow, Prof. Barghoorn advises us to rate the liberation struggle of non-Russian nations as only a secondary factor. He believes that the non-Russian nations have very slim chances of winning because Russian centralism is too powerful, and because Moscow has succeeded in Russifying a major part of the intelligentsia of the non-Russian nations, and because Moscow is capable of crushing any opposition at any time by her large apparatus of terror.

The danger of Russification should not under any circumstances be underestimated, but it must also be borne in mind that Russification is kept going only by means of terror, and when it ceases its consequences will cease, too.

The author has also overlooked the following factors:

1) The Ukrainians and other non-Russians of the USSR have already survived Stalin's horrible reign of terror in the 1930s and 1940s and have not been crushed. On the contrary, during World War II they displayed ability to survive and desire independence.

2) At the October 1952 Nineteenth Congress, the CC Presidium was forced to admit the bankruptcy of Stalin's nationalities policy in the USSR. Speaking in the name of the ruling elite, L. Beria declared that there were no backward nations in the USSR any more, and that Ukraine showed remarkable development equalling such nations as France or Italy. This was the beginning of Moscow's wooing of Ukraine.

3) The economic, cultural and political power of the non-Russian republics of the USSR has grown considerably during the past decade. Khrushchev declared at the 20th Congress in February 1956 that the national republics of the USSR no longer require Moscow's supervision in details and that the administrative apparatus must be decentralized.

4) Prof. Barghoorn doubts whether Ukrainian or Georgian "separatism" has any power, but it is generally known that the liberation struggle in Ukraine continues in various forms and that recent disorders in Georgia were sparked by slogans of Georgian independence from Russia.

5) We are witnessing a period of a huge dynamism of national liberation movements all over the world. To believe, that at a time of the disintegration of the last of the European colonial powers, and when even the most backward colonial peoples are asserting their independence — Moscow would be capable of destroying or unifying the highly developed nations of the USSR — is to say the least, hazardous. Today we are witnessing a directly opposite process going on in the Soviet satellites. One does not have to be a prophet to foresee that this process will have considerable influence upon a widening of powers and an increase of the liberation struggle also in the non-Russian republics of the USSR. It is also incorrect to assume that had Moscow's policy during the past 40 years been more liberal the Ukrainians and White-Ruthenians would today be completely assimilated. Suffice it to recall that Moscow conducted this kind of experiment in Ukraine in the 1920s. The result was that even Ukrainian communists proclaimed a slogan "away from Moscow" and wanted complete equality for the Ukrainian republic with Russia.

Thus, the author's underestimation of the dynamism of the liberation processes of non-Russian nations of the USSR has detracted considerably from the value of this undoubtedly interesting work based on sound source material.

Francis Dvornik. *THE SLAVS, THEIR EARLY HISTORY AND CIVILIZATION*. Boston, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1956, pp. 394.

This is an important book, for Prof. Dvornik has given for the first time in English a coordinated history of the rise of the Slavic peoples until approximately the middle of the 13th century. He has done his best to present a clear picture but the rise of the Slavs is still an unsolved question and the history of their movements is still obscure.

This is especially true of the expansion of the Slavs into the Dnieper valley and to the east. The Neuroi and the Budini and perhaps the Scythian ploughmen mentioned by Herodotus were "probably Slavic" (p. 13), but it is curious that he does not touch the question of the Trypyllian culture which was very little earlier than the Lusatian culture which he mentions several times as possibly Slavic. At the same time in tracing the Iranian influences on the early Slavs, he considers that the Antes were perhaps originally Iranian, although by the fifth century A.D. they were the centre of a Slavic federation which he considers the first Slav state. At the same time he believes that the proto-Croatians and possibly Serbs were also Iranian tribes ruling over lesser but powerful Slav confederations.

The chapter is conservatively written but it serves as a warning of the difficulties in identifying the prehistoric cultures with any of the later historical groups based upon language, for the archaeological and linguistic and skeletal data of a given area do not always coincide and prejudice and feelings play a wilful part in the identifications.

The history becomes vastly different with the appearance of the Slavic and other tribes on the borders of the Roman and Byzantine Empires. Here Prof. Dvornik is in his element for he has succeeded in collecting an amazing amount of data and in coordinating the Eastern and Western sources on such subjects as the Moravian Empire, the careers of Sts. Cyril and Methodius and the Christianization of the Southern and Western Slavs at the time when the Germans and the Byzantines were struggling for their control. For the crucial period, he rests upon his theory which he has previously published that the second excommunication of Photius never took place but was a figment of later historians.

To a certain extent the clarity which he brings into the affairs of Central Europe and the Balkans deserts him in his treatment of the Eastern Slavs, for he equates Rus' and the Russians. He is a convinced Normanist and attributes the development of an independent Rus' (Russia) to the work of the Scandinavian invaders. He believes that they first established contact with the East via the Gulf of Finland and the Volga (p. 192) but their real influence and the opening up of the country to Byzantine and Western influences came with the discovery of the route of the Volkhov-Dnieper, the Varangian Road. (p. 195).

His treatment of the cultural life of Kiev is very sympathetic for he stresses again and again that Kiev was equally open to influences from Byzantium and the West. He accepts the creation of a bishopric in Kiev in 864, although it was of short duration, thanks to a pagan revival held by Oleg. He believes that Olha was baptized in Constantinople. Throughout he gives a very well balanced account and he does not believe that the Schism in the Churches had any striking effect until about the time of the Latin capture of Constantinople which awoke the people of Kiev to the real situation that existed in the world.

His treatment of the origin of the different East Slavic peoples is less satisfactory. He notes at a very early period (p. 52) differences between the Krivichi and Novgorod and the tribes to the south under Iranian influences and the marked

differentiation in the development of the principality of Suzdal,' largely inhabited by Finns, "most of whom had been assimilated by Russian colonists from Novgorod and the South... Nevertheless the ethnical differentiation of the Eastern Slavs into Ukrainians, Byelorussians (White Ruthenians) and Great Russians was not yet perceptible at this stage, although dialectical differentiation was already perceivable" (p. 251).

Here of course he is following the traditional scheme of historiography which he has been willing to discard in his treatment of both the Central and Southern Slavs under the leadership of modern scholarship. His endorsement of the traditional Russian view is the more surprising, because he like all other scholars is struck by the widely different spirit existing in Kiev and the north.

There may be minor details questioned by specialized scholars but with the exception of his unfortunate explanation as to the reasons for the sudden change of the peace-loving and hospitable Kiev to Moscow with its iron curtain, the author has done an amazing task of presenting the role of the Slavs up to the middle of the thirteenth century in their European setting. It is an involved story of the origin of modern Europe in an area that has far too often either been treated as non-existent or dismissed with a few words written from the standpoint of the invaders of the area. As such it should be widely read and considered.

*Columbia University*

CLARENCE A. MANNING

THE MUSE IN PRISON, by Yar Slavutych. New Jersey, 1926.

Most material given in this book is very rare: even fresh from the press, the book is truly a collector's item. In a spirit of extreme and sincere regard for the soul of a poet, I earnestly advise each reader of this brief announcement to acquire a copy of *The Muse in Prison*.

In his Foreword, Prof Clarence A. Manning writes, "(The) knowledge of the present genius of a nation is all important at the present time with the growing interrelation of the world. Yet it has never been more difficult to secure the needed information, and that information is still more lacking in the case of Ukraine, where the dominant and occupying power has decided that the works of the Ukrainian Renaissance shall be plunged into non-existence."

"We must therefore especially welcome this little volume by Yar Slavutych who has sought to bring to the American public some knowledge of that great intellectual movement which burst into bloom after the liberation of Ukraine and which continued for about a decade, steadily developing and increasing, until it was ruthlessly crushed and its workers liquidated by order of red Moscow."

In a trenchant introduction, Mr. Slavutych outlines the literary and political history of this persecuted country, from about 1798, when "Eneida" by Kotlyarevsky was published, in which the speech of the villager was first introduced into literature, commencing the task of making the folk language a literary medium of expression. Taras Shevchenko (1814-1861), the great Ukrainian national poet, continued this idea, followed by others; but the Tsarist government imprisoned them and forbade the publication of books in Ukrainian.

Persecution, plunder and pillage continued under the Communist regime, until in the twenties a false sense of independence was achieved under the banner of a "Ukrainian Soviet Republic." It was during this respite of ten years that precious cultural seeds sent up shoots and soon blossomed, and produced the "Renaissance" in all sphere of life. But Moscow looked on in dismay, and finally Stalin gave the signal for the general attack upon Ukraine, liquidating the intel-

lectual elite and breaking the peasants. Thousands of arrests and deportations followed; some escaped through suicide; many writers were executed; many sent to concentration camps from which they never returned. From then on, through World War II, history of unspeakable horror was made.

The main body of this book is devoted to brief biographical sketches of the eleven selected poets, most of these accompanied by a photograph, and each followed with examples of poetic writing, translated by Yar Slavutych.

*Long Beach, California.*

ENID DANIEL JONES

SOVIET IMPERIALISM by G. A. Tokaev. New York, Philosophical Library, Inc., 1956, pp. 73.

The Philosophical Library has just come out with an unusually interesting book of lasting value on Soviet problems, *Soviet Imperialism* by G. A. Tokaev. It seems that this small and almost unnoticeable book could not have appeared at a better or more propitious time and acquainted us in succinct form with the ruthless tactics of the Soviet communist and military machine.

G. A. Tokaev's book is not a conventional collection of information; it is rather a textbook of guiding principles of Soviet military strategy and tactics. In view of the present global situation this topic is of the greatest interest to everyone. So far very little has been written on this subject that is based on factual material and first hand knowledge; for that reason this essay is unusually valuable in that the author himself assisted for almost fifteen years in the formation and practical application of most of the fundamental military-technical doctrines of the USSR. As engineer, as theoretical scientist and as aerodynamics expert, Colonel G. A. Tokaev occupied from 1940 onward a series of important technical posts in Soviet war machinery, and in 1948 served in Berlin as Soviet expert on modern aviation when he decided to cross to the West.

From his multilateral observation one learns that the Soviet Union is a vast military state with four military fronts that, in the order of their geographical importance, embrace the Far East and South Asia, south-western Asia, western Europe, and the Arctic, and that these fronts grew out to be of permanent nature. The aims and objectives of these fronts were not designed for peace, in our way of thinking. They were tailored for and based on the technique of directing great masses of peoples toward the attaining of a few clear objectives in the deadly conflict with the main adversary, the capitalist world. These few objectives are the modern stepping stones of penetration into the free world — the satellites — in order to protect its own soil according to Voroshilov's theory.

*Soviet Imperialism* is a timely and welcome book. Although it is not light reading, it may be appreciated by anyone who likes to think and profit from the material read. And, as the editors believe, "this work may help the average reader to understand some of the problems with which the free world is now faced."

An endpaper map in color with detailed information on the Soviet strategy of the 30th parallel with a numbered list of Soviet "republics," Soviet satellites in Europe, Soviet allies in Asia, indirect Soviet armed intervention and the activities of the Kremlin columns helps one to understand better the political implications of the USSR as explained in the book.

*Beloit College*

NICHOLAS M. PALEY

## UCRAINICA IN AMERICAN AND FOREIGN PERIODICALS

SIGNS OF WEAKNESS IN SOVIET DICTATORSHIP, by Allen W. Dulles, Director of Central Intelligence Agency. *U.S. News & World Report*. Nov. 23, 1956.

Speaking of the American Central Intelligence Agency, its Director, Allen W. Dulles, states that its duties are: "to coordinate the work of finding of the facts in the international situation without bias or prejudice and to make those facts available to others in our government." Those facts are: 1) the physical assets of a particular country, the so called 'hardware'; 2) its industrial potential; 3) the "basic intention of a particular country, and how it is likely to react in a given situation." The author is correct in thinking that the last facts are the most important and the most difficult to ascertain.

In our opinion it is most difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain the basic intentions and the likely reactions of a definite country without a fundamental knowledge of the country's population, and its ethnic and cultural composition; and further a basic knowledge of spiritual and political trends of the population at the present time. Only an intelligence officer armed with such knowledge is able to evaluate the assembled facts and to draw conjectures as to the intentions and likely reactions of the nation in a definite situation. Without such knowledge his surmises will be vague, uncertain, accidental and as a result — worthless.

Unfortunately we are in the very painful position of realizing that the author of the article "Signs of Soviet Weakness" make some misstatements in asserting the following: "*A little relaxation in freedom in the Soviet Union — where the Russians were ruling Russians — was a very different thing from Eastern Europe, where Russians were ruling the peoples who once were free and came to be dominated and controlled by a hated foreign power.*"

This statement is mostly correct as concerns the Russian Soviet Republic, a part of the Soviet Union, inhabited by a half of the population of the Soviets. But does Mr. Allen Dulles think that in Ukraine the Russians are ruling over the Russians, in Georgia over the Russians, and in Turkestan also over the Russians? There are 15 such republics in the USSR; what about Armenia, Azerbaijan and the others?

Mr. Allen Dulles is also convinced that the hatred of Russians in the non-Russian territories of the Soviet Union is less than in the satellite countries; this is hard to prove. Among the satellites only the Hungarians and the Poles have traditional hatred for the Russians based on their past history; the other satellite nations, especially the Bulgarians, Serbs and Czechs, traditionally russophile peoples, have only in the last years started really to know the Russians and therefore it is doubtful if their antagonism towards Russians could be compared with the hatred of the peoples for long years subjugated by Moscow, as Ukrainians, Georgians and Turkestanians. Knowledge of history in this situation is very helpful.

DAS SOWJETISCHE NATIONALITAETENPROBLEM DER EUROPAEISCHEN OSTEN by Dr. Hans Koch. Muenchen 1956, Vol. II, No. 8.

The well known German student of East European History and Cultural affairs analyzes different problems of the internal life of the Soviet Union. Concerning the statistical data, Dr. Koch comes to the conclusion that at present the number of Russians in the USSR is not higher than 50%, rather lower, but the Russians hold a dominating position. Communism has its strongest base in the Russian Republic, especially in the Russian ethnic territories. In the region of Moscow 6.75% of the population are members of the Communist Party, in the Lenin-grad region 6.48,% while in Ukraine only 2.14% of the population are in the ranks of the Communists.

Dr. Koch analyzes Khrushchev's famous anti-Stalinist speech and states that a relaxation of pressure in the non-Russian republics of the USSR was almost ignored by Khrushchev, and touched very slightly by Mikoyan. This proves that the new Collective Leadership does not intend to introduce major changes in the nationalities policy. This very sensitive problem was almost omitted.

DER PROTESTANTISMUS BEI DEN SLAVEN, by Dr. Hans Koch. Ostdeutsche Wissenschaft, B. II, 1955. Muenchen.

Dr. Koch, makes in his work a survey of Protestant elements in the cultural life of the different Slav nations. The German Protestants gave also some outstanding men to the Ukrainian people. In modern Ukrainian literature there are two writers of Protestant background: the Ukrainian novelist Michael Johansen, who was born in Kharkiv and liquidated by the Russian Communists in 1938. The other, Yuriy Klen (real name Dr. Oswald Burghardt), was a Ukrainian poet from the German Protestant colonists in the Odesa region. He died in Germany as a Ukrainian political emigrant from the USSR.

In the past Feofan Prokopovich the adviser of Tsar Peter I. was under very strong Protestant influences.

SOME REMARKS ABOUT THE STRATEGICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE NEW AND THE OLD SOVIET-POLISH BORDER, by Franciszek Arciszewski. *The Polish Review*, No. 1. New York, 1956.

The Polish expert on military science, F. Arciszewski, reconsiders the Polish-Ukrainian (respectively Soviet) borders. In his opinion Stalin demanded the former eastern provinces of Poland (Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia, only for strategic reasons, because he wanted to move the Soviet borders toward the Carpathian Mountains and eventually further south into the Carpatho-Ukraine. The author thinks that this was catastrophic for Poland because Eastern Galicia and Volyn were for centuries the strongest line for Polish defence in the east.

It seems to us as rather unusual that the author treats this area densely populated by a majority of pure Ukrainian population for over one thousand years, as a vast colonial land which can be treated only from the economic or strategic angle. The author, we hope, knows about the right of self-determination; he surely knows about the unquestionable Ukrainian character of these Western Ukrainian provinces which were in 1919 annexed to Poland only by force against the express will of the majority of the population. Therefore their unification with Ukraine was just, despite the fact that the Ukrainian people reject the Communist regime dominating at present the whole of Ukraine.

"THE SOVIET WILL NEVER RECOVER," George Kennan, as told to Joseph Alsop. *The Saturday Evening Post*, November 24, 1956, Philadelphia, Pa.

This interview is a partial renunciation of certain strands of Kennanism itself. It is more fully discussed elsewhere in this issue in the article, "After Hungary — What?"

"RUSSIA SEEN 'THRU A GLASS, DARKLY,'" an editorial. *Chicago Daily Tribune*, December 5, 1956, Chicago, Illinois.

This large organ of the Midwest presents a rather lengthy examination of Kennan and his peculiar views.

On the matter of drawing necessary distinctions, Kennan insists here that with regard to present happenings in Eastern Europe, there are at work two separate and distinct processes that must not be confused. As he observes, "One of these processes we might describe as the fight for national freedom, for freedom from Soviet control. In this native fight communists have joined enthusiastically." The other process is the fight for personal freedom, liberties etc. "This process is anticommunist," he says. It comes from the mass of the people. He continues, "These two struggles should not be confused; they do not necessarily always go together." No doubt, the processes are logically distinguishable, but in reality — the reality of non-Russian captivity both in East Europe and Asia — they are empirically indistinguishable.

That "they do not necessarily always go together" applies poignantly in the current situation to Russia whose problem, rationally, is one of eliminating the totalitarian forms of Russian society. On the other hand, the dominant problem confronting all of the captive non-Russian nations, both within and outside the Soviet Union, is the elimination of Russian Communist imperialism and colonialism. With this achieved, the environment for greater personal freedom and liberties emerges as the transmitted totalitarian forms of Russia vanish with the realization of national independence and sovereignty. The history of Soviet Russia and its subsequent imperialist expansion into the present non-Russian areas of the Soviet Union and, later, into Central Europe clearly shows the transmission of these "communist" forms through the media of imperialist control and colonialism. The patriot in any captive non-Russian country knows this. Once the media are destroyed, the forms will evaporate. In his eyes, thus, the processes are really two dimensions of a single process; it is thoroughly anti-communist; it affords no long-run comfort to so-called native communists who are supposed to "have joined enthusiastically" because the single process in reality is fundamentally grounded on firm and natural bases of patriotic nationalism. The article contains an impressive account of the charges launched against Kennan's views during the Congressional hearings on possible American diplomatic representation in Ukraine and Byelorussia. The editors are well informed on the vagaries of Kennanism and expertly display their grasp of it here.

The concluding sentence of the editorial gives the result of their examination: "Kennan, on his record, is about as dependable an authority on American-Soviet relations as Owen Lattimore." Within the limits of an editorial, they demonstrate this well, indeed. Against the deceptive picture drawn in the *Saturday Evening Post*, the editor simply enumerates some of the essential facts concerning recent Kennanist exhortations. First, the classic observation made by Kennan to the Pittsburgh Foreign Policy Association on May 3 — just eight weeks before the Poznan riots — is aptly quoted in full: "No one in this country has deeper

sympathy than myself with those moderate and democratically minded people — many of them my good friends — who have been driven into exile by the sickening intolerance of these regimes. But there is a finality for better or worse, about what now occurred in eastern Europe; and it is no form of service to these people to encourage them to believe that they could return and pick up again where they left off 10 or 20 years ago."

Second, they cite a further passage of this May 3 address wherein Kennan urges the restoration of "an atmosphere of normalcy to the environment of Soviet-American relations." Third, they correctly point out that this advocate of peaceful coexistence and the doctrine of evolution "proposed unification and neutralization of Germany" and that he contended that the presence of American bases in Japan "may have had more to do than we suppose with the outbreak of the Korean war." They could have pointed out that he advocates also the admission of Red China into the U.N. Fourth, they quote from a talk of his at a State Department round table discussion in which he held, at the very time when China was half occupied by the Reds, that the real danger in China was not a Communist advance but Japanese influence.

"THE MASSES ARE IN REVOLT AGAINST RED RULE," an interview. *U.S. News & World Report*, November 2, 1956, Washington, D. C.

It seems that as soon as one anti-communist Russian myth-maker is fully discredited and vanishes from the Washington scene, another, by sheer circumstance, arises. For a short time Boldyrev held many naive persons in a trance about the actual anti-communist movements behind the Iron Curtain and also about the adventures of a fictitious Russian anti-communist underground. Now Nikolai E. Khokhlov, a former Soviet intelligence officer, plays the role. The play is pretty much the same — disinformation, discoloration of the real and indubitable forces at work, and clever deception. These seem to be the vogue of interviews nowadays.

Khokhlov, with the typical imperialist Russian mentality that is at the essence of both Russian Communism and anti-Communism, spares no effort in minimizing the anti-Russian character of the non-Russian uprisings in Eastern Europe and in deprecating the natural force of patriotic nationalism in this momentous outbreak. According to him, "they are not merely a struggle against Kremlin domination" and "these uprisings do not originate in nationalism." To an informed and critical analyst, it is abundantly clear that under the vague cover of fighting against Communism, he is out to rationalize for the inertness of the Russians and, indirectly, for the maintenance of the territorial empire of Russia in the form of the present Soviet Union. His techniques are not new and his arguments are by now warped.

For Khokhlov, the struggle is simply against Communism, whatever that means. He emphasizes that "the Poles and Hungarians want independence — any country does," but, with brash illogicality, he is quick to say that this has no basic relation to nationalism. It is patently evident that Khokhlov, as most anti-communist Russians, is most fearful of a general recognition of the operative force of nationalism in the Soviet Union itself, which, of course, means the end of "Holy Mother Russia," the empire within an empire.

So for the other parts of this misleading interview, Khokhlov plays the Russian roulette of confusion of peoples and nations and many, as surprisingly enough this otherwise reliable organ, lose on black disinformation.



"SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES," testimony by Yuri Rastvorov. Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act, United States Senate, April 12, 1956, Washington, D. C.

The testimony of this former officer in the Intelligence Service of the MVD is a most valuable source of information, particularly in regard to the status and function of the Russian Orthodox Church. Those many naive American churchmen who in their solicitations and utterances behaved toward the dignitaries of this Church as though the latter were independent and free-thinking agents, would profit immensely from a careful reading of this extended testimony. It solidly confirms the position of those who with fact and reason objected strenuously against the political naivete of some of our church leaders.

For instance, in the section dealing with Major General Karpov, the witness identifies Karpov as the head of the so-called religious section in MVD headquarters and also the chairman of the religion committee of the Council of Ministers of U.S.S.R. He unequivocally states that "the church in the Soviet Union is not independent, as, at the present time, the Soviet Union Government is trying to prove. It is completely dependent on the state, and the state conducts all activities of the church in the Soviet Union. Moreover, they not only conduct activities of the Orthodox Church in the Soviet Union, penetrated by MVD agents . . . but many people . . . from MVD headquarters were sent to the seminaries as students."

With frank honesty Mr. Rastvorov continues: "They sent officers, counter-intelligence officers, to these seminaries, and later they became bishops in many churches in the Soviet Union." Questioned about his own experience in this area of religious control, the witness reveals that in Japan in 1945 he was assigned to work aimed at infiltrating the Russian churches there.

These few examples from this instructive testimony are certainly enough to indicate, even for the uninformed, the usefulness of the Russian Orthodox Church for Russian Communist imperialism. It is enough to leave in the minds of the readers valid doubt as to the reliability of the world-wide branches of this church.

"ON FORCED LABOR," report of recent developments. The Lithuanian Situation, Lithuanian Legation, November-December, 1956, Washington, D. C.

Highlighting the most recent developments on the issue of forced labor in the Russian Communist empire, this highly respected organ of information presents the views of Congressman Thomas J. Dodd of Connecticut on the subject and quotes at length from the testimony given before the Senate Labor Committee by Dr. Lev E. Dobriansky of Georgetown University. In his remarks Congressman Dodd stresses the fact that "we must not be deceived by the information reported to have been given by a MVD official to a group of French Socialists, led by Marceau Pivert. Whether forced-labor camps are near the homes of prisoners or not, the very existence of such camps deserves the strongest censure of free world opinion."

The quoted portions of Dr. Dobriansky's testimony dwell on the generally non-Russian composition of the inmates in the Russian slave labor camps, the relationship between forced labor and genocide, and certain institutional precedents of the Tsarist Russian empire to present Russian Communist totalitarianism. The two classic documents funneled through the Iron Curtain by the Ukrainian underground and now in the hands of American representatives at the United Nations

fully confirm the interpretations contained in the quoted testimony. They were written by Ukrainian political prisoners and in every respect are bona fide and historic.

“WHY ONLY NOW?”, editorial. *National Review*, November 24, 1956, New York, N. Y.

The tremendous impact made on the world by the Hungarian revolution can be roughly measured by the intense activity of the United Nations, the volumes of journalistic output and commentary scripts, the time and breath devoted to it over the radio and TV and numerous other forms of concerned expression. The editors of this nationally-read journal ask “What is the fuss about?” They evince wonderment about the extent to which the free world has been rhetorically galvanized by the Hungarian episode.

Indeed, why are so many people aroused by Hungary? Is it because this episode is so spectacular and Russian Communist butchery is open to public view? These questions are not meant to detract from the heroic greatness of the Hungarian people. On the contrary, they are meant to forestall an emotional denouncement that once again will lead us into a Geneva Conference superficial projects of “cultural” exchanges and a host of other unrealistic ventures.

The probability of our future behavior is along former lines of easy forgetfulness, passive acquiescence and repeated shows of appeasement. Many will teach that in time the Communist empire will disintegrate completely of its own making. All that will be required of us is merely to contain Russian Communist imperialism. These and others will continue to preach that we cannot do much unless we wish to bring on a third World War which would destroy us all. In the meantime, Moscow will re-consolidate its position, possibly work toward some sort of commonwealth of communist nations, and continue its military and economic build-up to our long-run detriment. Disintegration will not come of itself.

“IS NATIONALISM SWEEPING THE RED EMPIRE?”, editorial. *Freedom's Facts Against Communism*, November 1956, Washington, D. C.

This well written editorial in the publication of the nationally known All-American Conference to Combat Communism suggests the idea of a commonwealth of communist nations resulting from the present movement for some independence of Moscow. It points out the expression of nationalism in Poland and Hungary and shows that similar “open expressions of nationalism have come recently from even deeper inside the Communist Empire — from the Ukraine.” Reactions against Moscow’s attempts to russify Ukraine, to reduce the Ukrainian language, and other forms of colonial control are registered in the open.

“IVAN FRANKO,” by Mark Polyakov. *Volks Bulletin*, August 1956, Moscow, USSR.

While in the free world Ukrainian communities everywhere have been observing the centenary of the birth of Ivan Franko in the spirit of his immense contributions toward the real independence of his native Ukraine, in the Soviet Union certain forms of observance have been enacted but with an understandably different slant. This article illustrates the peculiar slant decreed by Moscow. The many works of Franko are commented on in a laudatory vein, but the interpretation in complete literary conformity with the political directives of Moscow. His greatest significance — the demand for the independence of Ukraine from Russian domination, remains concealed.

L. E. D.

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