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Freedom for Nations! Freedom for Individuals!

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New Russian Law on Religious Freedom is a Step Backward

Msgr. Mario Zenari, Holy See Permanent Representative to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, spoke in Vienna recently on religious freedom in Russia during a debate in the Permanent Council of the OSCE.

In his speech entitled *"The new law of religious freedom in the Russian Federation: A step backward on the path to religious coexistence,"* he expressed the Holy See's concern for the law, approved earlier this year by the Duma, the Russian parliament.

Following is the entire text of Msgr. Zenari's intervention:

"The Holy See has learned with regret of the approval, on the part of the Duma and the Federation Council, of the law on religious freedom in the Russian Federation.

In this regard, my delegation wishes to note that the observations which Pope John Paul II made to President Boris Yeltsin, as well as the interventions of the apostolic nuncio and the apostolic administrator for Russian Europe, have not been sufficiently taken into consideration.

What is particularly worrisome is Art. 27 of the law and the bureaucratic route for the registration of non-Orthodox religious communities which, from what can be deduced from the text, undergo discrimination and are exposed to the arbitrariness of local officials.

The Holy See joins those who have lamented this step, which certainly does not represent progress on the path to religious coexistence in that great nation. It must also be remembered that President Yeltsin himself, in sending the bill back to parliament several months ago, pointed out its lack of coherence with the constitution.

I believe that we are still far from the letter and the spirit of the OSCE documents, which have done so much to make freedom of religion and conscience become realities in all of reconciled Europe."

The Fourth Universal of the Ukrainian Central Rada

The words *"From this day forth, the Ukrainian National Republic becomes and independent, subject to no one, free, sovereign state of the Ukrainian people"*, emerge in the memory of every Ukrainian wherever the Ukrainian Central Rada (UCR) and the building of the Ukrainian state during the second decade of the twentieth century is mentioned. These words are from the Fourth Universal of the Ukrainian Central Rada. They signify not merely the juridical formulation of Ukraine as an independent state, but also the return to the international scene of a nation with a thousand-year state tradition, with its roots in the state of Volodymyr the Great (980-1015).

The Fourth Universal of the Ukrainian Central Rada was the outcome and culmination of its previous state-building activity. It was proclaimed on the basis of certain legal foundations, which were formulated when the UCR was established¹ as the representative organ of the entire Ukrainian population. The legal validity of the Fourth Universal has to be understood in the context of the entire activity of the Central Rada during the Ukrainian revolution.

The Ukrainian state of 1917-20 was born as part of the revolutionary events which overthrew the Russian Tsarist regime. For the young Ukrainian democracy, social and national justice was not simply a matter of fashionable jargon, but the true foundation of its activities. The UCR, which was headed by the notable Ukrainian historian and civic activist Mychaylo Hrushevskyi, became, in the course of a few months, the centre of national life, and the spokesman of national hopes and expectations, deriving its authority and power from the people.

From the very beginning, the Central Rada included political activists from various Ukrainian parties, which were united by a

¹ The Ukrainian Central Rada was founded in Kyiv on 17 March 1917. Originally, it was envisaged as a pan-Ukrainian umbrella for existing political, community, cultural and professional organisations. Following the meeting of the All-Ukrainian national Congress (Kyiv, 17-20 April 1917), it became the proto-parliament leading and directing the Ukrainian national movement.

powerful national element in their programmes. But, quite understandably, these parties were not supported by the entire Ukrainian population. On 17-20 April 1917 the All-Ukrainian National Congress was convened in Kyiv under the auspices of the UCR. This was attended by representatives of political, cultural and professional organisations (of workers, peasants, the intelligentsia, military, clergy, etc.) from various part of Ukraine. The Congress reorganised the Central Rada and elected a new presidium, consisting of a president, Mykhaylo Hrushevskyyi, and two vice-presidents, Volodymyr Vynnychenko² and Serhiy Yefremov³.

To deal with day-to-day matters, the Rada elected an executive committee, later renamed the Little Rada, consisting of members of the presidium, secretariats of the Rada, and two representatives from each political party. The Congress, which directly or indirectly represented in the person of its delegates the whole of the contemporary Russian-ruled Ukraine, did not simply become a festival of Ukrainianess, but also gave the Central Rada a legal legitimacy in the name of the majority of its population. Later, the membership of the Central Rada was increased by coopting members delegated by the Second All-Ukrainian Military Congress (23 June 1917) and members of the Council of Peasant Deputies, elected at the First All-Ukrainian Peasant Congress (15 June 1917), and representatives elected at the First All-Ukrainian Workers Congress (24-27 July 1917), as well as representatives of Ukraine's ethnic minorities, thus consolidating the representative basis of this proto-parliament of Ukraine from the social and ethnic point of view.

² Volodymyr Vynnychenko (1880-1951) - writer, statesman and politician. In 1917, while being the leader of the Ukrainian Social Workers Democratic Party (USDRP) he was elected to be one of the two Vice-Presidents of the Central Rada, and subsequently head of the General Secretariat, the government of Ukraine. Under the Hetman government which followed, he led the opposition, the Ukrainian National Union, and then (from its inception on 14 November 1918 until February 1919) the Directory of the Ukrainian National Republic.

³ Serhiy Yefremov (1876-1939) - writer, historian and politician. He was one of the leading members of the Ukrainian Democratic Radical Party and its successor, the Society of Ukrainian Progressives. In 1917 Yefremov became a Deputy Chairman of the Central Rada, a member of the Little Rada and General Secretary of International Affairs in the General Secretariat.

Analysis of the political demands of the UCR, as expressed in its First (23 June 1917) and Second (16 July 1917) Universals, reveals that during the period when the Rada coexisted with the Russian Provisional Government, Ukrainian aspirations to statehood went no further than national-territorial autonomy within the Russian state. This limitation should not be attributed simply to weak instincts of statehood in the Ukrainian people and its leaders. One must take into account that, for a century and a half, Ukraine formed part of the Russian imperial state, and this created a stereotype of that state in public opinion. The moral and legal principles which bound the leaders of the Ukrainian movement to the central authorities likewise played a significant role.

However, the great-power chauvinism of the Provisional Government and subsequently the Bolshevik terror quite quickly oriented the interests of the Ukrainian people towards an independent state. The Bolshevik Revolution in Petrograd on 7 November 1917 put paid to the hopes of the leaders of the Central Rada of achieving the social and national liberation of the Ukrainian people on the basis of autonomy and a federative link with Russia. The voluntarism of the Bolsheviks headed by Lenin was leading Russia, and with it Ukraine, to ruin and a bloody, all-encompassing anarchy. Under these conditions, and fearing for the fate of Ukraine, the UCR issued its historic Third Universal on 20 November 1917. The epochal significance of this document for Ukrainian statehood and the establishment of Ukraine as a national-democratic state can hardly be overestimated. It proclaimed the creation of a Ukrainian National Republic (albeit within a federated Russia of equal and free peoples), which would be governed by a legislature – the Central Rada, and a government – the General Secretariat, until the convocation of the Constituent Assembly of Ukraine. It set 9 January 1918 as the date for election of the Assembly and 22 January as the day of its convocation. Furthermore, it defined a wide range of socio-economic issues: to abolish the death penalty and the ownership of land by non-toilers; to declare all land the property of the working people without compensation to its former owners; to introduce an eight-hour working day and state control over all production to grant full amnesty to all political prisoners and national-personal autonomy to Ukraine's ethnic minorities; to direct the government to strengthen and broaden the local self-government rights; to affirm the freedom of speech, the press, religion, assembly and association, the right to strike, and the inviolability of the person and home, and to call upon

the citizens to struggle against the Bolsheviks.

The eighth session of the Central Rada, which opened on 25 December 1917, welcomed the 'consolidation of democratic authority and the proclamation of Ukraine as a free National Republic' laid down in the Third Universal. Concluding the session, the head of the Central Rada, Mykhaylo Hrushevskyy, stressed:

While with regards to social issues we have not yet achieved our objectives, with regards to political objectives we have achieved more than we thought possible. We stand and still stand for the principle of federation, but circumstances have arisen so that Ukraine has in fact become a truly self-governing and independent state. This is already beyond dispute, and even the most stubborn and least supportive among us do not argue with this.⁴

The words of an eminent Ukrainian are an eloquent testimony that the delegates of the Central Rada were well aware that the Third Universal was, effectively, a document at state level, and *de facto* a proclamation of independence of the Ukrainian state. The federative association which it mentions between the Ukrainian National Republic and Bolshevik Russia, since it was not embodied in any concrete form, remained no more than a declarative concession.

The juridical formulation of the sovereign existence of Ukraine was accomplished by the passing of the last, Fourth Universal on 22 January 1918. What impelled the Ukrainian Central Rada to take such a step was a matter of international politics. Hrushevskyy explained the situation in an article entitled '*Ukrainian Independence and its Historical Necessity*', written after the signing of the Brest-Litovsk peace treaty, which brought peace between Ukraine and the Central Powers. The making of peace, according to Hrushevskyy, was the first motive for the declaration of independence.

This motive was justified fully, and the most proximate facts clearly assured the historical inevitability of the declaration of independence of Ukraine. According to the most recent information, the Great-Russian "peoples' commissars" have broken off the peace negotiation and simultaneously declared full

⁴ Ukrayinska Tsentralna Rada, *Dokumenty i materiyaly* (Kyiv, 1997), vol. 2, pp. 38-7.

demobilisation – which left Russia completely at the mercy of Germany. The Ukrainian delegation, acting as the representative of the Ukrainian Republic as an independent state, has achieved a peace with honour, dignified, democratic...

The second motive behind the proclamation of an independent Ukrainian Republic was the need for a more decisive policy to defend Ukraine against the attacks of Great-Russia under the leadership of the people's commissars. Until this final word of Ukrainian statehood was spoken and the Ukrainian Republic was clearly and decisively separated from the other provinces of the Russian state, there were still some people willing to regard the struggle of Ukraine against the Bolshevik government of Great-Russia as a party struggle. This was envisaged as being between advocates of Ukrainianness on the one side, and supporters of Bolshevism on the other, with those who favoured neither side remaining neutral. After the declaration of the independence of the Ukrainian Republic, all its inhabitants irrespective of their views and beliefs are obliged to support the Ukrainian government.⁵

Hrushevskiyi also mentions a third motive, which triggered the proclamation of the Fourth Universal – the need for full freedom to put in order the social, economic and financial affairs of Ukraine. These motives are fairly important, too: they testify that the declaration of the full independence of the Ukrainian Republic was a necessary demand of the moment, conditioned by the historical situation.

Surprisingly, not all the members of the Little Rada, which carried out the legislative activities between sessions of the Ukrainian Central Rada, considered the enactment of a Universal proclaiming independence to be appropriate at that time or even necessary at all. Some, like Mykhaylo Tkachenko⁶, who, along with

⁵ M. Hrushevskiyi, *Na porozi novoyi Ukrainy: Hadky i mriyi* (Kyiv, 1918), p. 74.

⁶ Mykhaylo Tkachenko (1879-1920) – politician and activist. He was a member of the Revolutionary Ukrainian Party (1902-4) and then the USDRP, becoming one of its leading ideologues. In 1917 he became General Secretary of the Central Rada, and Minister of Justice (November 1917 to March 1918) and Minister of the Interior (to April 1918) of the Ukrainian National Republic. From January 1919 onwards, he led the left, pro-independence wing of the USDRP, which in 1920 became the Ukrainian Communist Party.

Oleksander Shulhyn⁷, considered the declaration of *de facto* sovereignty by the Third Universal fully sufficient for Ukraine to become a player in the international arena. Others, like Oleksander Zarudnyi⁸ and Mykola Porsh,⁹ proposed deferring the enactment of such a Universal until the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly had been convened. Active opposition to the Fourth Universal also came from representatives of the ethnic minorities – they were worried that an independent Ukraine might not ensure them free development in accordance with their traditions and aspirations.

The need to pass the Fourth Universal before the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly became apparent to the majority of activists of the Little Rada and the General Secretariat early in January 1918. On 22 January, three drafts of the Universal: one by Hrushevskyyi, one by Volodymyr Vynnychenko and a joint one by M. Soltan and Mykyta Shapoval¹⁰ were submitted to the Little Rada.

These drafts were considered by a constitutional commission which drew up a final version, incorporating what was common to all three. In the process of the discussions it became clear that the ethnic minorities linked their support of the Universal with the ratification by the Central Rada of a Law on National-Personal Autonomy.

⁷ Oleksander Shulhyn (1889-1960) – historian, sociologist and politician. After the February Revolution he was elected to the Central Rada and the Little Rada. From July 1917 to 30 January 1918, he served as General Secretary for Ethnic (later International) Relations.

⁸ Oleksander Zarudnyi (1891-1918) – politician. He was a leading member of the left-wing of the Ukrainian Party of Socialist Revolutionaries, a member of the Central Rada and a Minister for Land Affairs under the Ukrainian National Republic. After the Bolsheviks seized Kyiv in 1918, he was executed during their reprisals.

⁹ Mykola Porsh (1879-1944) – economist and civic activist of German-Jewish descent. He was a leading member of the Revolutionary Ukrainian Party and the USDRP. He became a member of the Central Rada and the Little Rada, and in January 1918 was appointed Minister of Defence and Labour of the Ukrainian National Republic.

¹⁰ Mykyta Shapoval (1882-1932) – politician and publicist. He was a co-founder of the Ukrainian Party of Socialist Revolutionaries and head of its central committee. He was a member of the Central Rada and the Little Rada (1917-8), and after the Third Universal (November 1917), became Minister of Post and Telegraph. He took part in the drafting of the Fourth Universal.

On 24 January the Little Rada produced a draft of such a law and ratified it.¹¹ Only when this was done did the delegates resume their consideration of the Universal. At 1 am on 25 January at the session of the Little Rada, and in the presence of numerous guests, Hrushevskiyi read the final text of the Universal, on which the delegates had worked since 22 January. In the Universal, after a description of the internal and external situation: anarchy, ruin, Russo-Ukrainian war, Hrushevskiyi proclaimed the words sacred to every Ukrainian: "People of Ukraine! By your efforts, your will, and your word, a free Ukrainian National Republic has been created on Ukrainian soil...". The Fourth Universal renamed the General Secretariat the Council of National Ministers of the Ukrainian National Republic and directed it to negotiate a separate peace with the Central Powers. It underlined the obligations, assumed by the Central Rada and the government in the Third Universal; announced an immediate end to war and that the army would be replaced by a people's militia after the ratification of the peace treaty; prescribed new elections to rural-districts, country and urban councils; affirmed that a land law would soon be ratified and that all land would soon be transferred from the land committees to the people before spring tilling; nationalised all the natural resources of Ukraine and the most important branches of commerce; imposed state controls over banks; reaffirmed all democratic freedoms and national-personal autonomy, etc.

Following the proclamation of the Universal, which the members of the Rada and those present rose to their feet to hear, there was a roll-call vote, in which 49 members of the Rada took part. The results were as follows: 'for' – 39 (members of all the Ukrainian parties represented in the Little Rada, and the representative of the Polish 'left'); 'against' – 4 (3 Russian Mensheviks and the representative of the Jewish Bund); and 6 abstentions (members of the factions of the Polish Central, Jewish socialists, Poale-Zion, and Russian Social Revolutionaries).

The proclamation of the Fourth Universal was an act of recognised political importance. The independence of the Ukrainian National Republic, declared by a legitimate legislative organ according to the laws then in force, was and remains a historical fact.

¹¹ Under this law, the Jewish, Russian and Polish 'nations' (i.e. ethnic minorities) in Ukraine were granted the right to govern their own cultural and community affairs through what were termed 'national unions'.

In matter and form, the Universal met accepted international norms. Whether or not other states recognised the independent Ukrainian republic was a matter of political pragmatism – not law. Henceforth, Ukraine, even after losing its independence, remained, although subjugated, *de jure* a state. The fight for its freedom became the task of Ukrainian patriots for the next seven decades.

Today, once again, there has appeared in the world political arena a free sovereign independent state of the Ukrainian people – the legitimate successor of the Ukrainian National Republic, hallowed by the historic Fourth Universal.

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Book on the Victims of Stalin

The Vezelitsa Publishing House in Belgorod, the regional administrative center situated close to Ukraine, has published a book under the title "*Victims of Repression*".

It contains names of the region's citizens who were sentenced to capital punishment by non-judicial bodies in the 1920s-1950s. All in all, 45,000 people were subjected to repressions in the Belgorod Region, over 1,000 of them were shot down.

The book has been published by the regional association of victims of illegal repressions together with the administration of the Federal Security Service for the Belgorod Region. Along with articles written by journalists and officers of the law enforcement bodies, it contains rare documents, including search warrants, questionnaires of the arrested, extracts from records of interrogations and death certificates.

Part of the edition will be distributed free of charge among relatives of the victims of repressions.

A CHARTER OF PARTNERSHIP AMONG THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE REPUBLICS OF ESTONIA, LATVIA AND LITHUANIA

Following is the text of the Baltic Charter released by the White House:

Preamble The United States of America, the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Latvia, and the Republic of Lithuania, hereafter referred to as Partners.

Sharing a common vision of a peaceful and increasingly integrated Europe, free of divisions, dedicated to democracy, the rule of law, free markets, and respect for the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all people;

Recognizing the historic opportunity to build a new Europe, in which each state is secure in its internationally-recognized borders and respects the independence and territorial integrity of all members of the transatlantic community;

Determined to strengthen their bilateral relations as a contribution to building this new Europe, and to enhance the security of all states through the adaptation and enlargement of European and transatlantic institutions;

Committed to the full development of human potential within just and inclusive societies attentive to the promotion of harmonious and equitable relations among individuals belonging to diverse ethnic and religious groups;

Avowing a common interest in developing cooperative, mutually respectful relations with all other states in the region;

Recalling the friendly relations that have been continuously maintained between the United States of America and the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Latvia, and the Republic of Lithuania since 1922;

Further recalling that the United States of America never recognized the forcible incorporation of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania into the USSR in 1940 but rather regards their statehood as uninterrupted since the establishment of their independence, a policy which the United States has restated continuously for five decades;

Celebrating the rich contributions that immigrants from Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have made to the multi-ethnic culture of the United States of America, as well as the European heritage enjoyed by the United States as a beneficiary of the contributions of intellectuals, artists, and Hanseatic traders from the Baltic states to the development of Europe;

Praising the contributions of U.S. citizens to the liberation and rebuilding of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.

Affirm as a political commitment declared at the highest level, the following principles and procedures to guide their individual and joint efforts to achieve the goals of this Charter.

Principles of Partnership

The United States of America has a real, profound and enduring interest in the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity, and security of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.

The United States of America warmly welcomes the success of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in regaining their freedom and resuming their rightful places in the community of nations.

The United States of America respects the sacrifices and hardships undertaken by the people of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania to re-establish their independence.

It encourages efforts by these states to continue to expand their political, economic, security, and social ties with other nations as full members of the transatlantic community.

The Partners affirm their commitment to the rule of law as a foundation for a transatlantic community of free and democratic nations, and to the responsibility of all just societies to protect and respect the human rights and civil liberties of all individuals residing within their territories.

The Partners underscore their shared commitment to the principles and obligations contained in the United Nations Charter.

The Partners reaffirm their shared commitment to the purposes, principles, and provisions of the Helsinki Final Act and subsequent OSCE documents, including the Charter of Paris and the documents adopted at the Lisbon OSCE Summit.

The Partners will observe in good faith their commitments to promote and respect the standards for human rights embodied in the above-mentioned Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) documents and in the Universal Declaration on Human

Rights.

They will implement their legislation protecting such human rights fully and equitably.

The United States of America commends the measures taken by Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania to advance the integration of Europe by establishing close cooperative relations among themselves and with their neighbors, as well as their promotion of regional cooperation through their participation in fora such as the Baltic Assembly, Baltic Council of Ministers, and the Council of Baltic Sea States.

Viewing good neighborly relations as fundamental to overall security and stability in the transatlantic community, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania reaffirm their determination to further enhance bilateral relations between themselves and with other neighboring states.

The Partners will intensify their efforts to promote the security, prosperity, and stability of the region.

The Partners will draw on the points noted below in focusing their efforts to deepen the integration of the Baltic states into transatlantic and European institutions, promote cooperation in security and defense, and develop the economies of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.

A Commitment to Integration As part of a common vision of a Europe whole and free, the Partners declare that their shared goal is the full integration of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania into European and transatlantic political, economic, security and defense institutions.

Europe will not be fully secure unless Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania each are secure.

The Partners reaffirm their commitment to the principle, established in the Helsinki Final Act, repeated in the Budapest and Lisbon OSCE summit declarations, and also contained in the OSCE Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security, that the security of all states in the Euro-Atlantic community is indivisible.

The Partners further share a commitment to the core principle, also articulated in the OSCE Code of Conduct and reiterated in subsequent OSCE summit declarations, that each state has the inherent right to individual and collective self-defense as well as the right freely to choose its own security arrangements, including treaties of alliance.

The Partners support the vital role being played by a number of complementary institutions and bodies - including the OSCE, the European Union (EU), the West European Union (WEU) the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), the Council of Europe (COE), and the Council of Baltic Sea States (CBSS) - in achieving the partners' shared goal of an integrated, secure, and undivided Europe.

They believe that, irrespective of factors related to history or geography, such institutions should be open to all European democracies willing and able to shoulder the responsibilities and obligations of membership, as determined by those institutions.

The Partners welcome a strong and vibrant OSCE dedicated to promoting democratic institutions, human rights, and fundamental freedoms.

They strongly support the OSCE's role as a mechanism to prevent, manage, and resolve conflicts and crises.

Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania each reaffirm their goal to become full members of all European and transatlantic institutions, including the European Union and NATO.

The United States of America recalls its longstanding support for the enlargement of the EU, affirming it as a core institution in the new Europe and declaring that a stronger, larger, and outward-looking European Union will further security and prosperity for all of Europe.

The Partners believe that the enlargement of NATO will enhance the security of the United States, Canada, and all the countries in Europe, including those states not immediately invited to membership or not currently interested in membership.

The United States of America welcomes the aspirations and supports the efforts of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania to join NATO.

It affirms its view that NATO's partners can become members as each aspirant proves itself able and willing to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership, and as NATO determines that the inclusion of these nations would serve European stability and the strategic interests of the Alliance.

The United States of America reiterates its view that the enlargement of NATO is an on-going process.

It looks forward to future enlargements, and remains convinced that not only will NATO's door remain open to new members, but that the first countries invited to membership will not be the last.

No non-NATO country has a veto over Alliance decisions.

The United States notes the Alliance is prepared to strengthen its consultations with aspirant countries on the full range of issues related to possible NATO membership.

The Partners welcome the results of the Madrid Summit.

They support the Alliance's commitment to an open door policy and welcome the Alliance's recognition of the Baltic states as aspiring members of NATO. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania pledge to deepen their close relations with the Alliance through the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the Partnership for Peace, and the intensified dialogue process.

The Partners underscore their interest in Russia's democratic and stable development and support a strengthened NATO-Russia relationship as a core element of their shared vision of a new and peaceful Europe.

They welcome the signing of the NATO-Russia Founding Act and the NATO-Ukraine Charter, both of which further improve European security.

Security Cooperation

The Partners will consult together, as well as with other countries, in the event that a Partner perceives that its territorial integrity, independence, or security is threatened or at risk.

The Partners will use bilateral and multilateral mechanisms for such consultations.

The United States welcomes and appreciates the contributions that Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have already made to European security through the peaceful restoration of independence and their active participation in the Partnership for Peace.

The United States also welcomes their contributions to IFOR, SFOR, and other international peacekeeping missions.

Building on the existing cooperation among their respective ministries of defense and armed forces, the United States of America supports the efforts of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania to provide for their legitimate defense needs, including development of appropriate and interpretable military forces.

The Partners welcome the establishment of the Baltic Security Assistance Group (BALTSEA) as an effective body for international coordination of security assistance to Estonia's, Latvia's and Lithuania's defense forces.

The Partners will cooperate further in the development and expansion of defense initiatives such as the Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion (BaltBat), the Baltic Squadron (Baltron), and the Baltic airspace management regime (BaltNet), which provide a tangible demonstration of practical cooperation enhancing the common security of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, and the transatlantic community.

The Partners intend to continue mutually beneficial military cooperation and will maintain regular consultations, using the established Bilateral Working Group on Defense and Military Relations.

Economic Cooperation The Partners affirm their commitment to free market mechanisms as the best means to meet the material needs of their people.

The United States of America commends the substantial progress its Baltic Partners have made to implement economic reform and development and their transition to free market economies.

Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania emphasize their intention to deepen their economic integration with Europe and the global economy, based on the principles of free movement of people, goods, capital and services.

Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania underscore their commitment to continue market-oriented economic reforms and to express their resolve to achieve full integration into global economic bodies, such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) while creating conditions for smoothly acceding to the European Union.

Noting this objective, the United States of America will work to facilitate the integration of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania with the world economy and appropriate international economic organizations, in particular the WTO and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), on appropriate commercial terms.

The Partners will work individually and together to develop legal and financial conditions in their countries conducive to international investment.

Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania welcome U.S. investment in their economies. The Partners will continue to strive for mutually advantageous economic relations building on the principles of equality and non-discrimination to create the conditions necessary for such cooperation.

The Partners will commence regular consultations to further cooperation and provide for regular assessment of progress in the areas of economic development, trade, investment, and related fields. These consultations will be chaired at the appropriately high level.

Recognizing that combating international organized crime requires a multilateral effort, the partners agree to cooperate fully in the fight against this threat to the world economy and political stability.

Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania remain committed to developing sound legislation in this field and to enhance the implementation of this legislation through the strengthening of a fair and well-functioning judicial system.

The U.S.-Baltic Relationship In all of these spheres of common endeavor, the Partners, building on their shared history of friendship and cooperation, solemnly reaffirm their commitment to a rich and dynamic Baltic-American partnership for the 21st century.

The Partners view their partnership in the areas of political, economic, security, defense, cultural, and environmental affairs as contributing to closer ties between their people and facilitating the full integration of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania into European and transatlantic structures.

In order to further strengthen these ties, the Partners will establish a Partnership Commission chaired at the appropriately high level to evaluate common efforts.

This Commission will meet once a year or as needed to take stock of the Partnership, assess results of bilateral consultations on economic, military and other areas, and review progress achieved towards meeting the goals of this Charter.

In order to better reflect changes in the European and transatlantic political and security environment, signing Partners are committed regularly at the highest level to review this agreement.

Washington D.C. January 16, 1998

Russian Economic, Political and Cultural Expansionism in Ukraine

During an official visit to Ukraine at the start of 1998, Victor Chernomyrdyn, the Russian Prime Minister, discussed a series of important questions on bilateral relations. Chernomyrdyn's main task was to prepare a forthcoming official meeting of the two presidents in Moscow and, perhaps, "to prepare" President Kuchma for all the possible agreements which could be created during this meeting. Alongside this but no less important a task for the Russian Premier was the lobbying of interests of the Russian companies who plan to take part in the privatization of important Ukrainian (oil, coal and electricity) and in the first place the lobbying of the Gazprom interests of which he believes he is the boss. It is pointless to hope that the Russian Premier, on whom depends whether Turkmenian gas will be available on the Ukrainian market or not, which is essential for Ukraine in order to liberate its politics (both internal and external) from Moscow, would do something to reduce the monopoly that Gazprom has. Although, this also depends a lot on the "Ukrainian" government and the President, who do not seem to be trying to liberate Ukraine from Moscow (who then would support the elections).

Therefore, judging from everything, Chernomyrdyn's lobbying of the economic interests of the Russian companies in Ukraine will be successful. Nobody intends to go against the influence of the Russian capital, quite the opposite, the President will encourage the Russian companies to take part in the privatization of the Ukrainian economy. This can be called economic (and also political) submission, and so for the first time since the fall of the USSR, Moscow will be able to seriously influence (read control) the economic (and political) situation in Ukraine. More than that, apart from the economic and political expansionism in Ukraine, the Ukrainian culture is also being destroyed. This can be seen, in particular, in the aggressive russification of the Ukrainian people. And this, unfortunately, assists the government, which is anti-Ukrainian in its own way. From this, one may conclude that Moscow's ideological elite have initiated Gramsci tactics in order that one nation overthrow another. All this confirms the idea that the Byelorussification of Ukraine is happening at an ever increasing rapid pace.

The continued publishing of Russian publications in Ukraine was also to be discussed during Victor Chernomirdyn's working visit. The question of distribution of Russian publications would be quite normal if it were not for one "BUT"...

BUT, there is already a large predominance of Russian newspapers, radio stations, TV studios and periodicals in Ukraine which are usually pro-Moscow.

BUT, the majority of Ukrainian periodicals which are printed in the Ukrainian language are also printed in Russian.

BUT, in Kyiv, the capital of Ukraine, it is a real problem to find a book written in Ukrainian, because the majority of books that are printed, are in Russian.

Such extensive distribution of Russian periodicals in Ukraine is of "great sustenance" for the Ukrainian spirit. Such "sustenance", unfortunately, only destroys the Ukrainian culture, transforming the ethnic Ukrainian into an assimilation of a lackey of the Russian culture. This raises the question: is this the safeguarding of human rights or the strangulation of the Ukrainian nation's roots?

There exists, of course, forces in Ukraine trying to work against this economic, political and cultural Russian expansionism. These forces oppose the existing government and that is why, on an official level, disinformation is circulated about them. This disinformation comes from the so-called "national-democrats" who supposedly oppose the existing government structures. In key questions pertaining to internal and foreign politics they completely supports today's government and the President's politics. This was proven by the "Friendship and Cooperation between Ukraine and the Russian Federation" agreement recently ratified by the *Verkhovna Rada* (Ukrainian parliament).

The longer the government continues down this road, the more anti-national become the politics, and bit by bit, the nation will be sold and given away. It will be no surprise then, if one fine day, after the signing of the 10-year economic cooperation agreement between Ukraine and Russia, the President will sign "an act of unification due to the fact that the Ukrainian economy is so strongly integrated into the Russian economy that it can not exist independently". This could be the outcome of "cooperation".

Ukrainian Digest

No. 2

National State Institute

Dr. Inamullah Khan Passes Away

Dr. Inamullah Khan, former Secretary General of Motamar Al-Alam Al-Islami, died in Karachi on 1st December 1997. He was 83. His burial took place in the Milk Plant graveyard after Maghreb prayers. He is survived by a son and four daughters.

Dr. Inamullah was born in 1914 in the capital city of Burma, Rangoon, and later he immigrated to Pakistan. He graduated in Arts and Law from the Rangoon University and in 1985 he got a Ph.D. in Humanities from the Islamic University in the Philippines. He was also awarded an Honorary Doctorate of Law by Myongyi University in Seoul, South Korea. In 1949 he moved to Pakistan where he revived the Motamar Al-Alam Al-Islami to bring the Muslim nations together. He was the Secretary General of the Motamar and performed the responsibilities of this post until 1992. Owing to his relentless struggle for global peace, Motamar was awarded the Japanese Niwano Peace Prize in 1987. In 1988 he won the Tempelton Award for his work as a coordinator for peace and inter-faith relations.

Dr. Khan was a widely travelled person and well-known in the Islamic world for his Islamic zeal. He launched a campaign to collect signatures for the freedom-loving Kashmiris the result of which was a total of one million signatures from all over the world.

Dr. Khan was also elected president of the World Conference on Religion and Peace (WCRP).

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Freedom for Nations! Freedom for Individuals!

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Beware of Our “Kind” Neighbor

Latvian-Russian relations, of late, have received world-wide publicity. Unfortunately, the Russian Soviet-style information has reached the world press, and the latter have, on the whole, accepted the contrived Russian version of events as being true. Numerous international commissions have visited Latvia and have not found any breaches of Human Rights. Only Russia finds fault with Latvia, although its own Human Right's record is more than unsatisfactory.

Nevertheless, Latvia wishes to have good relations, and also to secure well defined borders, with Russia.

In August 1996, Latvia's parliament made a formal declaration, that in June 1940 Latvia was unlawfully occupied by the Soviet Union. Latvia, together with Estonia and Lithuania, has refused the proposed security guarantees from Russia, as the proposal produced echoes of the Stalin-Hitler pact of 1939.

The government of Latvia is striving to become a member of the European Union and NATO. It also wishes to have closer relations with the USA. To this end, the Baltic-American Charter of Partnership was signed in Washington, 16 January 1998, by the President of the United States and the Baltic Presidents of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Prior to this, Latvia joined the Partnership for Peace Programme. Latvian soldiers also participate in the peacekeeping operations in Bosnia.

The Skrunda radar station's lease ends 31st August 1998. The government of Latvia is not prepared to enter into new agreements. Russia has dismantle the station and get out of Latvia.

The government of Latvia has ordered the preparation of the “White Book” which will document crimes against Latvia committed by the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany during the years of occupation. Photographs and documents of the events of that period are displayed in The Fifty Year Occupation Museum, in Riga.

The examination of Russia's overall policy towards Latvia, as it has not relinquished centuries old Czarist and Soviet expansion attitudes.

May 1998

*Latvian National Council
Latvian Welfare Fund*

Pre-election Manoeuvres

The International Republican Institute of America has sent their own delegation to Ukraine to observe the parliamentary elections on 29th March 1998. The observers will visit hundreds of polling stations in 11 *oblasts*. There is a fierce battle going on between different parties who are trying to influence certain regions, in particular, the mood of the people in these certain regions. Some regions in Ukraine are turning into a firing range. The political situation in Odessa is heading in this direction. A tense situation is being created through this political rivalry.

There is an open battle going on between the chairman of the city council, Edward Hurwitz, and the chairman of the Odessa State County Administration, Ruslan Bodelan. This conflict consists of the two politicians blaming one another of involvement in organised crime with all necessary proof available. So far, there has been no appropriate reaction from the General Prosecutor.

A similar situation in the election run up is surfacing in the Crimea where the Crimean Tartars are trying to establish their right to vote in these elections. The President, absorbed with the "Crimean" elections, has reduced the situation to an explosive level, and the Ukrainian parliament has not helped ease the tension on the peninsula, which is regarded by OSCE experts in Ukraine as a problem that has the potential to escalate and turn the Crimea into a political hot spot in Europe.

Today's move by the mass unrest of the Crimean Tartars was the subject of the Ukrainian parliament's last meeting on 24th March this year. In the project concerning a change in the Ukrainian law on "Election of Deputies to the Crimean Parliament" it was expected, that all those deported in 1941-1944 from the Crimea and since had returned but had not yet received Ukrainian citizenship, even though they were registered on the peninsula, would be able to vote. The Crimean Tartars promised to block the elections on 29th March 1998 if their demands were not taken into consideration. One of their main demands, as stated earlier, is to be able to have a say in their future, in their homeland – to vote in the elections. At the moment, according to the Constitution, the Crimean Tartars, 90,000 of them (half of which are potential voters), do not have this right because they do not possess Ukrainian citizenship. This project concerning a change in the law was refused. The Left along with the Communists were the ones who were mainly responsible for this

negative outcome. Many MPs say that this was a big mistake. As a result, the Crimean Tartars organised mass unrest which ended in clashes with the police. Hundreds of Crimean Tartars gathered at the Crimean Communist headquarters, smashed windows and destroyed propaganda stands. Seventeen policemen were injured in the clashes. The number of injured Tartars was not reported.

Who are the people interested in such tense political situations. Well, first of all, the communists themselves. Because the Crimea is a bastion of the Left, not one of the Tartars would vote for them. Therefore, if the Crimean Tartars cannot vote in the elections, it is to the communists' advantage.

It is also to the communists' advantage that the situation in Odessa is unstable – it is practically the only southern region where the communists have little or no influence.

This is also convenient for the President who is trying to show that the situation in Ukraine is not under control and that in order to put an end to this instability it is necessary for him to have more power. This is all accompanied by attacks on the parliament.

By ignoring the existence of the Crimean Tartars' problem, parliament, at the end of its working life, has planted a bomb of great magnitude in the Crimea. A whole nation has been left without political or social rights. If the Crimean Tartars block the elections, does this mean that the elections will be invalid only in the Crimea, or throughout Ukraine in general? Only the President can know the answer to this question. The Ministry of Internal Affairs announced that their departments will do their utmost to make the elections in the Crimea happen and that is why they are sending reinforcements to the peninsula.

If the Crimean problem is not solved soon this will not only leave a mark on the elections but on the future of Ukraine as a part of Europe. All these events happening in the Crimea are being observed by the same "peacemaker" who was at Nahirnyj Karabas in Abkhazia, South Ossetia. And if the Ukrainian parliament does not find it in its power to solve the Crimean Tartar problem, this same element has enough ambition to try to do some "peacemaking" in the Crimea in order to protect the Russian speaking population.

Ukrainian Digest
National State Institute

Moscow's View

“The elections to Verkhovna Rada (Ukrainian Parliament) are perhaps our last opportunity to determine optimum political security for Russian interests in Ukraine”. This is a quotation from the article *“The forthcoming elections and the choice for the future”* published in the Russian daily newspaper *Izvestia*. This article will, undoubtedly, draw attention not only to those who are interested in the bilateral relations between Ukraine and Russia, particularly from Russia's point of view.

Recognizing that the geological location of Ukraine makes Russia hugely dependent on Ukrainian foreign policy, the article tries to prove that Kyiv is trying to take advantage of its position for its own benefit (which could be quite logical and normal) to the detriment of Russia, conducting an anti-Russian foreign policy: There is a violent “ukrainianization for Russian speakers” policy being conducted forcing cultural assimilation and the abduction of the Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol etc. On the other hand, Russia is supposedly making economic concessions by increasing the sugar quota for Ukraine and cancelling VAT (Value Added Tax) which is unprofitable for the Russian budget. The article provides so-called accurate information which is, in reality, totally inaccurate:

1. “Ukrainianization”

The policy of “Ukrainianization” (the renaissance of the Ukrainian culture) is only being conducted verbally. For example: in the Donbas region where the population is nearly 8 million (5,104,800 in the Donetsk *oblast* and 2,737,300 in the Luhansk *oblast*) there is only one Ukrainian school. There was an attempt to open a Ukrainian Grammar school in edition, but with the help of the local authorities this attempt was successfully thwarted. The reason given for the refusal for the opening of the Ukrainian Grammar school was that it was a violation of the national minorities rights.

2. The abduction of the Russian Black Sea Fleet or the Ukrainian Naval Forces?

Let us turn our attention now to the problem of the Black Sea Fleet (a foreign army) in Sevastopol. The Russian Black Sea Fleet is actually controlling Sevastopol, the Russian flag can be seen everywhere, the whole of the city is working for the benefit of the

Russian sailors. There are eight bays in the port of Sevastopol. In accordance with the agreement signed by the presidents of both countries, six of these bays have been handed over to Russia, amongst them is the Sevastopol bay which is the main bay and the most modern of them all. Ukraine has all of two bays – Kamishova Bay, where Ukraine’s fishing fleet is based, and the Balaklavaska Bay, where Ukraine’s Naval Forces are based. There was a shocking and unpleasant incident for Ukrainians in the city recently when sailors from the Russian Black Sea Fleet forcibly evicted Ukrainian Naval Forces officers from their own apartments. There was not even any reaction to this from the local authorities. The visits to Sevastopol by the Mayor of Moscow, Luzhko, and other Russian politicians who openly conduct an anti-Ukrainian policy in the Crimea demonstrate just who is in charge of the city. The Ukrainian government has not reacted to any of these visits. In order to understand how the situation has deteriorated to this point, which can only be the fault of the Ukrainian leadership’s spineless policies, one has to look at the events preceding it.

During the division of the former Soviet Union’s assets, all property, movable and immovable, situated on the territories of the republics went into the possession of each of the respective republics. This was acknowledged by a number of different agreements which were ratified by all the former Soviet republics including Russia.

In accordance, the Black Sea Fleet of the USSR, which was situated at Ukraine’s naval bases, became Ukraine’s property. Russia acknowledged this in 1991 by ratifying the December 10 agreement in which the CIS was created. But, following the signing of a series of agreements by President Kravchuk, 50 percent of the fleet was handed over to Moscow. At that time the fleet was worth 80 billion dollars. In effect, Ukraine gave 40 billion dollars to Russia. But these agreements were not ratified by *Verkhovna Rada* of Ukraine, therefore, this means that they were not valid. However, in 1995, President Kuchma signed yet another agreement (also not ratified by the *Verkhovna Rada* of Ukraine) according to which Ukraine handed over another 32 percent of the total number of ships to the Russian Federation. Therefore, altogether, 82 percent of the Soviet Union’s Black Sea Fleet found itself under Russia’s control. These agreements cost Ukraine 65 billion dollars. This is if you do not take into account the value of the infrastructure of the naval bases on land which Russia uses gratis, in other words at Ukraine’s cost. In comparison, Ukraine’s debt to the Russian Federation is three billion dollars. In addition, Russia has received 84.9 percent of

the Soviet Union's Black Sea Fleet (read: Ukraine's National Naval Forces) buildings and structures in Sevastopol and 90.8 percent of the total territory occupied by the Soviet Union's Black Sea Fleet (read: Ukraine's National Naval Forces).

3. Ukraine's economic "concessions"

Ukraine and the Russian Federation agreed to abolish VAT on goods exported from Ukraine to Russia and vice versa. This is advantageous, in principle, for both countries. However, the increase in the sugar quota that Russia has allowed Ukraine can be seen from a different angle. Russia buys sugar from Ukraine at a very reduced price, not seen in any other country in the world and which cannot be of any advantage to Ukraine. Russia then sells this sugar on its own market at higher prices which creates additional revenue for Russia's budget.

4. Are there no problems?

There more interesting facts yet to come. The Russian daily newspaper *Izvestia* made the following comment on the large-scale agreement between Ukraine and Russia: *"the final goal of the whole campaign employed by the Ukrainian side should be the ratification of the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership signed by Yeltsin and Kuchma on the 25th May 1997, which is, in fact, an act of acknowledgement of Ukraine's borders, leaving the Crimea, Sevastopol and Russians at the mercy of the Kyiv leadership"*. And, furthermore, it concludes that *"the subject of Ukrainian politics is not the 'Ukrainian nation' (that does not yet exist) and not the Ukrainian State (an abstract idea cannot have the power to function), but the Ukrainian elite whose goal is the construction and the final consolidation of the 'Ukrainian political nation'"*. From this one may conclude:

- a) Moscow does not want to acknowledge Ukraine's borders;
- b) Moscow does not acknowledge that the Crimea and Sevastopol are part of Ukraine's territory and has no wish to do so;
- c) Moscow does not acknowledge the Ukrainian nation or the Ukrainian state such as they are;
- d) Russia does not want to sign an agreement which although is not to Ukraine's advantage (where borders are not defined; the presence of a foreign army on the territory is not prohibited, etc.) but for

conditions to formulate any agreement Russia will have to pay large sums of money in order to lease Ukrainian bases.

5. Will the nationalists lose?

The article, having analysed the political situation in Ukraine, gave a rating for the Ukrainian political parties (even Russia's anti-Ukrainian oriented mass media do not deny that the nationalists have a high rating in Ukraine):

1. The Communist Party of Ukraine	25.4%	
2. Narodnyj Rukh of Ukraine		10.7%
3. The Socialist Party of Ukraine		9.65%
4. The Liberal Party of Ukraine		8.4%
5. The National Democratic Party of Ukraine	7.94%	
6. The Rural Party of Ukraine	5.57%	
7. The Ukrainian Republic Party		4.62%
8. The Civil Congress of Ukraine		4.6%
9. The Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists	4.27%	

The Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Republican Party are united in one block called the National Front, so the sum total of their rating is 8.89% which puts them in 4th place, if one does not include the Ukrainian Conservative Republican Party which is also part of that block.

6. In conclusion

The conclusion of the article sounds quite logical: *"elections to the Verkhovna Rada is perhaps the last opportunity to determine optimum political security for Russian interests in Ukraine. Otherwise, Ukraine led by nationalists, will become a real counterweight on the whole of the post Soviet territories, an obstacle to ideal Russian foreign policies, an independent center of force and power"*. It will only be possible to realise Ukrainian policies when the leadership of the state has the political will, when a strong opposition does not condone a wrong move made by the ruling authorities, because *"tolerance towards crimes and criminals perpetuates new crimes"*.

Ukrainian Digest
National State Institute

The Elections '98

Although there is a battle raging in the run up to the elections in Ukraine, in the end, it will turn out to be a very straightforward thing. And that is why, practically everything that happens in the country, dissolves through a prism of the next elections. Especially, if it concerns the activities or the initiatives of the executive or legislative authorities, on the surface, with the President and the Prime Minister on one side and the parliament speaker on the other. nevertheless, any inactivity in today's situation is an activity in the worst possible meaning of the word. In order to not fall under this definition of activity, some people try to present their inactivity as an activity (productive) and then their own productive inactivity they write off as the work of others.

This is how it is also possible to value the storm of criticism by the President of Ukraine, Leonid Kuchma, and the Prime Minister, Valeriy Pustovoitenko, on the subject of the government's economic block and the Ministry of Economics. What the "government's economic block" is, neither the President nor the Prime Minister have explained. Victor Suslov, Ukraine's Minister of Economics, said, in his reply to this same question, that he does not know what the economic block is, such a concept does not exist in any official documents. It is always easier to find guilty parties in other ministries. And this is done in order to divert the dissatisfied gaze of the impoverished people from the ruling National Democratic Party. This is now not economics but the clear water of politics.

So as not to be left on the sidelines, Serhij Tehipko, the vice-premier of Ukraine, has tried to "wash his hands" of the government's unsuccessful economic policies, just as Valeriy Pustovoitenko has. Tehipko's way was to declare to the press that Ukraine has practically no legalised debts. But at the moment Ukraine's debts are growing and the funds to repay them do not exist. the stable and progressive growth of the foreign debt, as a rule, results in the loss of the state's economic independence. it looks as though this process has already begun for Ukraine. It is known that Ukraine plans to pay back part of its debt to Russia by offering shares in its important and strategic oil and energy industries. This is foreseen in the 10-year economic and cooperation agreement

signed by Ukraine and the Russian Federation. But this is probably not the whole story. At the present time six out of nine sugar factories in the Kirovohrad *oblast* already belong to Russian companies.

The further it goes the deeper Ukraine gets into debt. And it seems to be trying especially hard to get into gas debts with Russia. Tehipko declares that he knows nothing about the existence of state guarantees for Ukrainian gas traders in the years 1996-7. But the former Prime Minister, Pavlo Lazarenko, also confirmed such things in his own time, although, it is now known, he himself gave such orders for such guarantees and Russia bases its debt pretensions towards the Ukrainian government, to a large extent, on these same guarantees. And the present government refused to have anything to do with the obligations of the last government. It looks as though deceit is becoming a firm tradition in our semi-professional, semi-coalition government in which, as in other state structures, the process of crime has begun and is rapidly developing. This process has embraced all branches of government and has become a great characteristic of executive structures that put into practice the privatization and redistribution of property. They are people in an ideal position for such abuse of power.

There is, in fact, a criminal war going on which has gone public. The brightest manifestation of this process is today's pre-election campaign. In a list of regions, the facts are established, crime has been cultivated alongside authoritative structures, using methods of intimidations, blackmail and physical abuse on candidates which clear the roads for their henchmen.

On 17th March 1998, in the 14th constituency in the Vinnytska *oblast*, such an incident happened. Vadym Koval, a candidate from the National Front standing for election in this district, had a meeting with voters in Bar. After the meeting five young men attacked him while he was getting into his car. His arm was injured. A couple of days before this meeting he received an anonymous telephone call where it was suggested that he stand down. It is only due to the lack of proof that he has not named the people responsible for this threatening behaviour. Despite these threats, he has no intention of standing down.

And this is not the only incident. At the moment, obstacles are thrown in the path of all forces who are hungry for change. The experts' prognosis and sociological surveys say that these elections could turn into the most undemocratic with the most fabricated

results. These elections prove themselves to be different due to the lack of information available. And this situation is created on purpose and in an organized fashion.

The following data was recently gathered and processed by the Ukrainian National State Institute:

68% of the voters are not sufficiently informed about the President's activities;

66% of the voters are not sufficiently informed about the parliament's activities;

69% of the voters are not sufficiently informed about the Prime Minister's activities;

66% of the voters are not sufficiently informed about the activities of their local administration.

Only 14-18% of the voters receive sufficient information about everybody's activities.

It was also revealed that 41% of the voters do not know that this time, for the first time, the elections will accommodate a mixed system.

At the time when this survey was conducted there were only ten days left to the elections. As a result of all this, the same thing may happen again where people, who do not reflect the mood and the wishes of the electorate, come to power. The hopes of these "national" parties and movements are straight forward – to cut off the electorate from the political parties and movements that offer them an alternative.

On 29th March 1998 we will see if the information blockade created by today's "popular" political parties help them to realise their hopes and dreams.

Ukrainian Digest
National State Institute

Will the World Hear Ukraine's Voice?

In 1997, when Ukraine's *Verkhovna Rada* (parliament) was discussing the blueprint on the law for the "Election of Members to Parliament", the question, of whether it was necessary or not to include the law that would decide that the elections could only be declared valid if there was at least a 50% turn out, was looked at. From the point of view, that the present *Verkhovna Rada* was not elected in full, the result of which today means that several thousand voters have been left without their representative to parliament, it was decided that this section should be discarded. Therefore, as an example, now, even if only 10 voters appear at the voting office, the voting will be declared valid. It is believed that, the electorate who did not vote in the elections, supported the results desired by those voters who took part in the elections. The question arises, how will this influence the situation in Ukraine?

In the first place, this change will allow the electorate on the day of the voting to elect a full body to parliament. But this, with the help of the President, was put under the scrutiny of the Ukrainian Constitutional Court, naming some sections of this law as being anti-constitutional. Such conditions create a great premise, so that if the results of the voting do not please the President, he can declare the voting invalid and dismiss the newly elected parliament.

Secondly, thanks to this change, less money from the state's budget for the elections will be used for this purpose than before. So, things, like reruns of elections, which were also considered a burden on the state's budget (in the 1994 elections to parliament, reruns of elections were staged up to five times in certain regions and even then this did not attain to a full body of parliament) will be dropped as well.

From another angle, this change could also act as a threat to democratic processes in Ukraine because a very small number of voters can determine the political destiny of Ukraine. That means, that even only a couple of hundred voters in an electoral district have the power to decide the population's political destiny for the whole district.

Several sociological surveys testify that only 55-60% of the electorate will turn up to vote this time. This phenomenon is quite understandable. First of all, the material standing of the average citizen in Ukraine for the last four years has deteriorated. Sociological studies show that only 5% of the people asked said that their material standing had improved over the past 10 years. Secondly, the leader of the Ukrainian government has changed five times over the past six years – this confirms that the country has no stability neither politically or economically. The people continue to lose faith in everything. Based on the facts of other sociological

research, seventy-five percent of the adult population in Ukraine does not believe that life will improve in the next five years. The perpetual changing of one Prime Minister for another also underlines the fact that, for the time being, the leaders of the country are not ready to take responsibility for the processes taking place in the state and try to push all of this onto the amateurism of others. And practically every political official, whether in the government or parliament or in the President's administration have shown their incapability to work to improve the economic situation in Ukraine.

It is also important to remind oneself that President Kuchma's politics discredits the constitution and the parliament's politics discredits the President, all of which has played a role in the country's politics leading to today's present situation. Over seventy percent of the population believes that the elections, regardless of who wins, will, in no way, influence the situation in the country.

That is to say, all these manipulations in political circles subconsciously create, in the mind of the Ukrainian, the conviction that the electoral process cannot, in any way, help them.

In Ukraine, the general view in the community is one of cynicism. Although, only quite recently, just after the fall of the Soviet Union, the majority of the people were happy that the perspective for them, as a state, and especially as an individual was immeasurable. But, the development of the mafia rings and the corruptibility of political structures killed the hope of the Ukrainian, who inspired to improve his/her life and the life of their families. And the impression is formed that such a situation is created purposefully in order to destroy the wish in the mind of the Ukrainian to have his/her own state, and to plant in the consciousness of the people, that it is not possible for Ukraine to exist independently.

This process has already gone a long way. And its patrons and executors are not so much in the shadows now. It is only necessary to look closely in order to see them. And these are the people who, in the first place, are compromising the state with their efforts to plot with their "brotherly" neighbour. And all this is now done completely out in the open.

How the electoral marathon ends will be seen on 29th March. But there are great doubts as to whether the elections can change the Ukrainian psychological attitude towards its own future. And if the "integral" politicians win again, then doubts will be raised as to whether the world will want to hear Ukraine's voice as an independent force for its own politics.

Will it be possible to buy the Ukrainian Voter?

With three days left to the Ukrainian elections, the laws pertaining to the procedures of the elections and the rules of overseeing them is big news. Up until now, the Central Elections Commission has received over 2,200 accusations, grievances and complaints, twenty-five percent of which relate to the violation of the law on "Election to Parliament". The most frequent violation today is the attempt by candidates, who are standing for election to parliament, to "buy" voters. This is happening in practically all *oblasts* (counties). These candidates are giving out or selling, at largely reduced prices, food products. Those candidates who hold high positions in the community are using threats to induce the electorate to vote for them. One such incident happened in the Vasylykivskij district, very close to Kyiv, in constituency № 93. The chairman of the agricultural company "Svitanok", and candidate for the Agricultural Party, Tetyana Zasukha, is standing for parliament in this area. Her husband, Anatolij Zasukha is chairman of the Kyiv *oblast* state administration. Whilst campaigning, she announced: *"If you don't vote for me you will lose your jobs"*.

Another incident, which has come to light, is connected to the national Movement of Ukraine (*Rukh*). In the newspaper *Rio*, which is delivered free to every household, *Rukh* made an announcement about compensation being paid from a special fund to all trust companies who had lost money. This is a violation of paragraph 11, statute 35 of the Election Law. This work by *Rukh* could be interpreted as an attempt to buy votes.

The candidates in Odessa are no less insolent. Hundreds of people, who claim they are representatives, are going from household to household and collecting voter's signatures and passport information in exchange for "gifts". The householders are told that they have already cast their vote and do not have to go to the polling station on 29th March. A pre-election situation, such as the one in Odessa, could result in a complete falsification of voting.

There are also "wealthy" candidates who hope to gain votes for themselves in the same way at single mandate polling stations. Present MP, Vadym Lytvyn, standing in the 150th constituency, is busy handing out medicine and other essentials to pensioners, with the support of his close friend, the chief surgeon at the Ministry of Health – Oleksander Shamilova, all the while reminding the old people that they should vote for him.

Another candidate from this same region, Karluvskyj N^o 150, the president of “AT Ukrnafta” – Yaroslav Kozak, is handing out sugar and flour to pensioners, and giving doctors “gifts” of boots and overalls. And, of course, the candidate is counting on a show of gratitude from the voter.

There is yet another “philanthropist” in the 150th region who is standing for parliament. It turns out that he is chairman of the executive board of “AT Promenerhoexport” (exporter of energy) Victor Hryniuk. He has also violated the Election Law by giving “gifts” to potential voters during the election campaign. He is guilty of giving the administration staff of the Kobyljanskyj Children’s Home a “gift” of \$500 and has also promised them a bus in the near future.

These are just a few of the stories that have surfaced on the ways in which the candidates, standing for election to parliament, have tried to influence the voter’s choice.

In order to understand why these “acts of charity” are aimed at children and pensioners it is simply necessary to look at the following data: pensioners make up 41 percent of the population of Ukraine, they are the most vulnerable socially and the poorest section of the population. And, it is well known, that pensioners are the most politically active section of the population. Children (to the age of 18) make up approximately 38% of the population. So if the candidate can get to a voter through their kids then the candidate will try, no matter what the laws say.

As we can see, there are many violations of the law. The central election committee appealed to the General prosecutor, who is responsible for making sure that the candidates and parties do not attempt to buy votes through bribes, threats, the giving of “gifts” or selling of products at reduced rates to vulnerable sections of society. Any violations proven will mean the deregistration of the candidate or party involved. But here, there exists the threat, that the General Prosecutor could be selective in his work. What criteria will he use when doing this? Perhaps the views of the President and his administration will influence his decision, who can tell?

On the 29th March, there will not only be Ukrainian observers, representatives of various parties and candidates, but also international observers from 30 different countries, checking that the elections are held in an honest and law abiding fashion. But will they be able to ensure that the elections are run honestly?

Observing the Elections

As first time international observers of the General Elections in Ukraine, which took place on Sunday, 29th march 1998, we did not observe any major violations during our tour of the different constituencies. There were cases where members of the election committees and local observers, who represented parties and individual candidates, did not always do things accordingly due to lack of experience and the fact that they did not possess full knowledge of the new election laws. However, when their mistakes were pointed out to them they were always ready to correct them. Generally, everybody was willing to impart information and to work with the observers.

Within a time frame of 15 hours (7 am - 10 pm, the time during which the polling stations were open to the electorate) we managed to visit 28 polling stations in various constituencies in three boroughs in the city of Kyiv, and one small town and two villages situated in the county of Kyiv.

Some of the polling stations were set in hallways of hostels – a space totally unsuitable for such a large and serious event as the General Elections. In the small outer lying towns and villages of Kyiv, the polling stations were much too small to cope with a large electorate. One local observer told us that it took forty minutes for a person to cast his vote. In one polling station, we heard a man say to his friend: *"I'm not going to vote. There's a queue and it will take ages"*. This queuing, inevitably, made the observers' job very difficult at times – he/she could not always see what was going on because of the crowds and so it was difficult to observe if and when any irregularities were happening.

Our day started before the official opening time of the polling stations. As official international observers we had the right to witness the sealing of the ballot boxes and this we did. At the first polling station that we visited at 6:45 am, № 16 in the Zaliznychnyj borough of Kyiv, everything was in place as it should have been, but the room was tiny – too small to hang up official information on each of the candidates and parties (a violation) – *"there is no room"* said the chairman of the election committee with a big smile. *"You understand?"* he asks, and we understood...

The second polling station nearby was still not ready to receive its voters at 7:10 am. The chairman of the election committee obviously had trouble delegating work. When we arrived he was balancing on a stool, hanging up official information about the various candidates and parties standing for election. When he finally realised that we were from the West he stopped everything to register our names. This polling

station was situated in the vestibule of a hostel – the space was totally unsuitable. The entrance obscured the view of the ballot boxes (a violation) – we made this observation and the chairman, after some fuss, moved them. There was no place to sit the observers who were there to witness the events of the elections from beginning to end – from 6:45 am till 2-3 am the next morning when the votes were counted. The chairman said that he had enough to do and the observers would have to find themselves a place. When a local observer (born in Ukraine) made the observation that the curtains on the voting booths should not be decorative but serve the purpose of allowing the voter to vote in secret, and should therefore be rehung, he ignored her. When five minutes later, I (born in the west but born a woman) made the same observation, he ignored me. When, finally, my colleague (born in the West and, luckily, born a man) made the same observation, the chairman immediately stopped registering the local observers, jumped up, ran over to the booths and began waving his arms about frantically, and promised faithfully to rehang the curtains just as soon as he had finished registering the local observers. We left wondering just where the other members of the election committee had got to?

At one polling station in the town of Vyshhorod, the election committee had chosen a suitably large school hall for the elections. The ballot boxes could be seen by the election committee and observers despite the crowds of people queuing to cast their vote. However, one of the candidates for the Kyiv County Council was present – a violation of the law. He told us that he was present as he wanted to register a complaint. His name along with another democratic candidate's had been printed at the end of the list of candidates on the other side of the election ballot sheet. he claimed that this worked negatively on the electorate - that their names could be over looked and that this had been done on purpose. This may sound a bit far fetched but when you consider that this was the only ballot sheet out of six that were being filled out that day that was printed on both sides and that two of the other ballot sheet were at least 65 centimeters long, then, just maybe, he had something.

We then ventured further into the countryside to see what we would find. In one polling station in the village of Staro Petrivka, a room measuring approximately 50 square meters, was chosen to process 2,758 voters! Whilst talking with local observers we were told that they had appealed to the election committee when it was decided to use this room for the elections, and had suggested the large school across the road as a sensible alternative. Why this alternative was not taken up was not made clear – the chairman of the election committee simply said: “*the*

people came all at once to vote just to annoy me!" At this same polling station the number of requests to vote at home from people who were too sick or old and infirm to come to the polling station personally to vote was 120! On inspection of these requests it was revealed that most of them had been typed by the election committee. The chairman told us that this was done to make it "easier" for electorate. *"We have a lot of very old people in our constituency"*, she added.

On our way back towards Kyiv our trusted driver suggested that we might like to go to "datcha country". We drove to a large datcha settlement where there were not only weekend residents but 1,261 eligible voters living. We drove around the village of Osorsky looking for the polling station. The first person we found to ask directions had not even heard that there were any elections going on! The second person could not tell us where the polling station was situated. The third person told us what the story was. The elections used to be held in a school in the village but there had been a flood and the authorities (not quite clear which) had decide to make the polling station in a school, across a busy main road (almost a motorway!) that leads to Kyiv International Airport, in a nearby housing estate. Not so nearby really when you consider that the majority of the 1,261 voters were older rather than younger.

We drove to this estate which was massive and where every building looked the same. After some time we managed to locate two schools where five polling stations were situated. Both schools were built to exactly the same design which we found very disorientating. We found the polling station that the Osorsky village had been assigned to. In all, there were 2,883 voters on the electoral list – 1,261 of them from the village. The chairman of the elections committee could not tell us just how many of these villagers had made it to the polling station (by now it was around 7 pm). When we broached this subject he immediately began explaining that it was not his decision to assign this village to this polling station, that somebody else was responsible etc, etc.

The last polling station that we visited looked just fine on the surface. When we asked the local observes if they had any complaints about what they had seen during the day, they all looked at each other and said *"almost not"*. Then we turned our attention to the chairman of the election committee who was busy being interviewed by a camera crew from the national television station. After many questions and answers with many people, we were given a statement by the secretary of the election committee. The voting ballot sheet for the candidates for the Kyiv County Council had been incorrectly printed. The box designated for the vote for the candidate from the (United) Social Democratic Party of Ukraine was missing. Above her was the box for the

candidate of the Communist Party and below her was the box to mark if the voter did not want to vote for anyone. Whilst talking to the public earlier, they had said that someone had heard members of the election committee explaining to voters that if they wanted to vote for the (United) Social Democratic candidate, that they should put their mark in either of the boxes, above or below. Because of this, somebody had called the television crew who, in turn, had informed the General Prosecutor, who was also now present. The members of the election committee vehemently denied this accusation and produced a document signed and stamped by the chairman that such a ballot sheet was delivered and that it was decided to validate it and to allow the voter to use his/her common sense to place their vote (if they wanted to vote for this candidate) opposite the candidate's name. Even though it was not in a box, as the election law dictates, it would be counted. Another detail which aroused suspicion was the fact that 118 sheets too many of this ballot were printed than were needed.

In general, it was felt that both observers and members of the election committee were not completely familiar with the new election laws. Some of the observers also seemed unsure of their responsibilities and power to change anything should they feel an election law was being violated. In the city and towns by and large, the observers took an active role and enthusiastically criticized members of the election committee when they fell short of their obligations. The fact that the observers represented the interests of parties and individual candidates, seemed to work positively in the city and towns by not allowing manipulation of the elections.

Unfortunately, this could not be said of the situation in the polling stations in the villages. There, the rules of hierarchy are different. In such small communities people know each other better and have to work together in order to survive. This leaves little room for individualism. People, who are already in power, are more likely to remain in power. No matter how democratic the elections looked in these places, there was an underlying feeling that the man at the top before the elections, had everything under control on this day, and would be at the top after these elections. The process of voting looked lawful enough on the surface to us, but as outsiders we could not judge exactly what was going on in these intimate communities and we came away with the feeling that maybe something was amiss.

Lesya TERLETSKA (London – England)

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Ukrainian Parliament adopts New Election Law

(*ABN PRESS, KYIV*) – On 24th September 1997, 226 members of the Ukrainian parliament voted in favour of the long awaited proposed Electoral Law. The new law is to reorder the manner in which Ukrainian voters will seek their future representation.

The "mixed electoral system", so called because half of the 450 seats in parliament will be chosen according to a proportional representation formula and the other half will be elected in single member majoritaria districts, was highly favoured by many in Ukraine.

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
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Belarus Marks Stalin Executions

MINSK, Belarus, 2 October 1998 (AP) - About 2,000 demonstrators marched Sunday to the site of mass executions carried out under Soviet dictator Josef Stalin, and called for an end to political persecution in Belarus.

The march to Kuropaty - an annual event since 1988 - has taken on an anti-government tinge in recent years. Sunday's march brought together many opponents of Belarus' authoritarian president, Alexander Lukashenko.

"We have been unable for a while to conquer the system that soaked our land with blood," said Yuri Khodyka, a professor who addressed the rally. "We still have much to suffer."

Lukashenko has increasingly clamped down on dissent, and many of his political opponents have been arrested during frequent demonstrations against his rule. Recently, Parliament - which largely serves as a rubber stamp for Lukashenko - made it a crime to insult the president. Lukashenko has long advocated the revival of the Soviet Union, which collapsed in 1991. He has done little in his country to promote human rights and democracy, and his government has downplayed the severity of Stalin's mass executions.

The country's general prosecutor says no more than 7,000 people are buried in the mass graves at Kuropaty, and maintains there is no evidence that they were Stalin's victims. However, the opposition says as many as 250,000 people died there during Stalinist purges in the 1930s and 1940s.

Demonstrators on Sunday marched six miles to the site from downtown Minsk, the capital. Many carried red and white national flags banned by Lukashenko's government. Some held pictures of people they identified as political prisoners. At Kuropaty, more people joined the marchers, and a crowd of about 3,000 listened to speeches and laid flowers on the mass grave and at the foot of a monument to the victims.

An opposition politician told reporters that the inaugural march 10 years ago was the first mass rally against totalitarianism in Belarus in the postwar period. "It was then that the spiritual health of the nation started to recover," said Zintsuk Vyachorka, deputy chairman of the National Front. "Not all is good with it now."

The Crimea

On November 22, 1991, some of the deputies of the Crimean ASSR Supreme Soviet put forth a proposal to appeal to the president of the USSR. They wanted to ask the Soviet president to repeal the 1954 USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium's *ukaz* on "*The transfer of the Crimean province from the RSFSR to the UkrSSR.*"

From 1954 until Ukrainian independence was proclaimed in August 1991, the judgments of that transfer were unanimous: the decision of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium in 1954 was historically justified. It was heralded as a testament to good Ukrainian-Russian relations; a triumph for sober thought; a recognition of objective realities.

However, these views quickly disappeared following the Ukrainian declaration of sovereignty in July 1990. The leaders of the USSR, the CPSU and the Crimean province began to emphasize that the 1954 *ukaz* was merely a 'gift' to Ukraine in honour of the three-hundredth anniversary of Bohdan Khmelnytsky's treaty with Russia.

The territory of the Crimean Peninsula was transferred to Ukraine in accordance with the USSR Constitution of 1936. Article 49 of that document outlined the powers of the USSR Supreme Soviet, among which no mention was made regarding the transfer of territory. However, Article 14, subsection '(d)' stated that "*ratification of any border changes between Union republics*" is a prerogative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Furthermore, Article 31 included the following clause:

"The Supreme Soviet of the USSR cedes the implementation of all rights granted the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in accordance with Article 14 of the Constitution, insofar as they are not explicitly included in the powers granted by the Constitution, to the responsibility of the subordinate organs of the USSR Supreme Soviet, the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, the USSR Council of Ministers and all USSR ministries."

Therefore, such an act could only have been legally carried out by the USSR Supreme Soviet. It must also be noted that the USSR Supreme Soviet was not granted arbitrariness in these questions. Thus, Article 18 of the Constitution included a clause stating that "*territories of Union republics may not be changed without their consent.*"

The question of why such attention was paid in the Constitution to the issue of state territory may arise. This is due to the fact that the question of transferring legal and public authority on a given territory of a given state carries international legal implications. When such a transfer occurs in violation of international legal norms or national legislation, it must be considered legally invalid. It is therefore naive to maintain a question of legality as the motivation for the transfer of the Crimea to Ukraine.

Why, then, and how, was the Crimea 'given' to Ukraine? Answering the question 'why' will help in clarifying the economic factor considered in the 1954 act, while answering the question 'how' will explain the legal and procedural process of the transfer. Only when considering the two questions in tandem can one arrive at any conclusion as to whether or not the 1954 act contradicted the norms of international law. This is a point of view that is presently maintained.

In order to proclaim state jurisdiction on any territory, it is not legally sufficient to do so in a legislative act. The questions of effective government, concerns of the people living on this territory, and economic responsibilities must be resolved. Of course, it is more convenient to assert authority over a territory through the use of repression, the enforcement of a police state or through terror. However, these methods invariably lead to economic collapse; and from economic collapse to a state in crisis.

This was the path chosen by Tsarist Russia in its policy towards the Crimea. Moreover, Soviet Russia in essence repeated the same mistakes committed by imperial Russia. Their common and perhaps greatest mistake was to sever the historical ties between the Crimea and Ukraine. The proclamation of Soviet Russian statehood in the Crimea led to this interruption, henceforth any relations Ukraine wished to conduct with the Crimea were forcibly channeled through Russia proper. The inefficiency of such a relationship soon became evident in the Crimean economy and, more importantly, in the severely decreased material well-being of the Crimean population. For instance, in 1919, while the population of Crimea was faced with the threat of Famine, Ukraine sent flour and sugar directly to the Crimea, and the situation was alleviated. However, when the Crimea became a territorial part of the RSFSR, this same aid would have to be channeled through Russia proper first in order to arrive there.

Ukraine thus delivered material aid and encouraged the development of a strong infrastructure for relations with the Crimea. Ukraine also knew that sanctions from Moscow would soon be forthcoming. Yet the Soviet Russian government was unable to liquidate existing economic laws. Thus, many of the decisions made by Russia ended up being mutually excluding. For example, Lenin and the RKP(b) Central Committee adopted a resolution recognising the complete subordination of the Crimea exclusively to the Russian *Sovnarkom* and the All-Russian CEC. Meanwhile, on May 20, 1919, the Deputy Postal Commissar, Liubovich, the Ukrainian Postal Commissar, Khalepsky, and a Crimean representative, Izvekov, announced the following:

"Considering the limited number of postal-telegraph offices in the Soviet territories of Bessarabia and the Crimea and their direct subordination to Soviet Ukraine, the postal administrations of these republics are uniting with the People's Postal Commissariat of Ukraine which will have jurisdiction in these territories."

Gradually, ties between Ukraine and the Crimea begin to renew and develop. Yet the greatest obstacle, Moscow, still intended to carry out its own plan for the Crimea.

At the May 1921 plenary session of the RKP(b) Central Committee it was reported that the revolutionary committees had succeeded in fulfilling their tasks and that the Crimea had officially become a part of the RSFSR. The price exacted for this success was enormous. Because of the civil war raging in the territories of the former empire and the miscalculations of the new Soviet government, a famine besieged Crimea. A large number of industrial enterprises ceased activity altogether. However, the civil war was not the sole factor contributing to the famine. There existed in addition to all the other ills of the time, a severe labour shortage. The Tatar population simply did not take to the cities and factories, while the Tatars' subsistence-level economic activity had no consideration in the plans of the soviet government. Moreover, a campaign was waged to eliminate the stratum of small, private businesses and the 'bourgeoisie', resulting in many Ukrainians fleeing persecution and Russification by moving to the southern provinces of Ukraine. This left a large economic gap in the Crimea, since these Ukrainians represented the main agricultural force in the Crimea.

For those who remained behind in the Crimea, there was a lack of farming equipment, horses and landholdings. To exacerbate

the dilemma, grain, meat and dairy product deliveries from Ukraine were suddenly decreased. Between 1921-22 more than 150 thousand Crimeans died as a result of the famine. Despite this, Lenin stated at a meeting of the Moscow RKP(b) organisation in December 1920:

“Even though after three years of war we still cannot catch all those loose pigs, it must still be said that these people have no place in the governing of a state. We are tackling immeasurably more difficult tasks. For example, there is a 300 thousand-strong bourgeoisie in the Crimea. This is a source of future speculation, espionage and all kinds of aid for the capitalists.”

Most of the ‘loose pigs’ mentioned by Lenin were indeed eliminated, decreasing the Crimean population by 300 thousand. In order to replace such great losses in the labour force (in 1922 there were eleven workable tractors in all of the Crimea), even more developed countries would require decades. However, the fight against ‘banditry’ still continued in the Crimea. The campaign publicly rationalised that the Tatars were ‘barbarians’ who must be raised to the level of consciousness embraced by the world revolution. Ukrainians were similarly depicted as racial hybrids, who contained a wild mixture of northern tribal and Tatar blood. Russian workers and peasants in the Crimea were described as ‘freeloaders and drunkards’. Anyone who dared offer any opposition to the imposition of the new Soviet regime was immediately labeled a “White Guardist” and condemned to destruction. All of the instances of physical liquidation carried out by Bolsheviks against the population were then widely blamed on the ‘White Guardists’.

In response to these developments representatives of various nationalities (which numbered nearly seventy at the time in the Crimea) formed a united front to fight the Bolsheviks: Ukrainians rallied around *Rada* supporters; Tatars rallied around the ‘Milli-firk’; Jews rallied around the *Bund*, while Russians rallied around the Kadets, Octobrists and other groups. This in turn elicited a harsh response from the Bolshevik authorities.

Peasants were refused the land they were promised by the Bolsheviks. The Crimean sowed land decreased by thirty percent, while peasants were allowed only two *desiatyny* for their own use – 6.3 *desiatyny* in the steppe regions. The plan to reconstruct the Crimean industry that was proposed by the Crimean party *obkom* completely fell through and still remained unrealised at the end of the twenties.

This created the impression that the emissaries sent by Moscow and the local population lived in completely different realities. For instance, while the famine struck the Crimea, the Crimean party obkom was devoting all its attention to preparing and distributing preelection campaign literature. Thus, the 1926 level of industrial output was a mere 58.6% of the 1913 level.

The mishandling of the economy and the demographic and cultural policies of the Bolsheviks also resulted in the destruction of the local cultural traditions and lifestyle. In a very short period of time, there remained only a small fraction of the formerly indigenous population. The trend towards the eradication of national minorities lasted until the beginning of World War II. In 1926 national minorities comprised 10.1% of the Crimean population, while by 1939, the figure dramatically dropped to 5.2%.

The 'mobilization of forces' designed to collectivise the peasant in the whole USSR resulted in 104 anti-Soviet manifestations in 1930. This was quickly answered with a campaign of mass arrests of kulaks. Ukrainians, Tatars, Germans, Jews and others began to flee back to the Crimea hoping to avoid arrest. However, their flight only resulted in the generation of a new campaign of arrests aimed at liquidating "elements with resettlement aims." Regardless of the fact that by 1931 the stratum of successful peasantry was all but eliminated, 1.5% of the peasantry were still considered to be kulaks and were subsequently arrested or deported to labour camps.

In order to give primacy to the collectivised farms, peasants were deprived of their grain and a new wave of famine began. The peasant was in essence completely broken. Those who survived remained as mere serfs in the eyes of the Soviet state.

The working class did not fare much better than the peasants had. A wave of arrests swept the Crimean working class in 1931, because of 'saboteurs' who were discovered at the Kerchensky State Metal Works and the Simferopol Naval Factory. In 1932 'saboteurs' were again discovered at the Kerchensky Metallurgical Plant, Saksy Chemical Plant and various other factories throughout the Crimea. The nascent Crimean working class was thus also practically liquidated by the beginning of the Second World War.

Whole echelons of new recruits were being sent into the Crimea to replace the eliminated workers and peasants, which resulted in a Crimean population rise from 714.1 thousand in 1926

to 1.13 million by 1939. The Russian population concurrently increased from 301.4 thousand to 558.5 thousand. This meant that for the first time the Russian population of the Crimea outnumbered all other groups from amongst the indigenous population.

In addition to all of the above, the lack of appropriate material resources in the established administrative-command system meant certain doom for the Crimean economy. A large portion of these resources was transferred by Moscow from Ukraine to the Crimea. This resulted in the demand for certain necessary changes in Moscow's policy. Moscow soon began to create new ties or renew long-abandoned ones between Ukraine and the Crimea. The Kerchensky iron ore basin was thus made a responsibility of the Donetsk-Kryvorih coal and metallurgical administrative structure. The Simferopol rail station with its huge Dzhanko junction was given over to the Stalin Railway, which fell under the administration based in Dnipropetrovsk. The road transport system was given over to the joint control of Ukrainian and the Crimean administrations. In this manner a large part of the Crimean infrastructure gradually came under Ukrainian jurisdiction. Food production, light industry goods, water and electric energy were all exported to the Crimea from Ukraine.

However, Moscow still did not suspend the campaign to eradicate the Ukrainian element in Crimean life. Ukrainians in the Crimea were gradually eliminated from positions of authority (by 1927, the Crimean CEC consisted of only 6.7% Ukrainians). Ukrainians were also ignored during the rezoning of the Crimean national/regional borders. In 1930, sixteen regions were created in the Crimea; of these, five were Tatar, one was Jewish, nine were Russian and one Ukrainian. In 1935, on German and no Ukrainian ones. Despite Moscow's administrative arbitrariness towards Ukrainians in the Crimea, relations between Ukraine and the Crimea continued to grow and develop.

It would be erroneous to imply that only Ukrainians suffered from Moscow's Crimean policies. The process of Russification and the penetration of the Russian state structure into the Crimea also negatively influenced the development of other nationalities. In 1939 Moscow imposed the Russian alphabet on the Tatar language; many nationalities were deprived of the right to their own schools, cultural institutions or press.

The coming of the war dealt a serious blow to the Crimean economy. The whole peninsula had only 99 high schools and 342

economic enterprises. The population decreased to 780 thousand, equal to the 1926-27 level. However, the State Defense Committee headed by Stalin adopted a resolution on May 11, 1944 regarding the deportation of the Crimean Tatars, Armenians, Bulgarians and Greeks. As a result, 228,543 people were removed from the Crimea, among them 191,088 Tatars. Ruined by the war, the Crimea was deprived of more than a third of its economic resources.

The Crimea, therefore, had neither the material nor the human resources to realize the program for reconstructing its economy. In order to cover up the artificially-created demographic vacuum in the Crimea, the Soviet government began to recruit settlers for the Crimea in the RSFSR and Ukraine. Families and even whole collective farms were forcibly uprooted and transported to the Crimea. At the beginning of 1945, 17,040 families were resettled in the Crimea and from 1950-54, an additional 57 thousand people were moved there.

The resettled collective farms were unable to adapt to their new surroundings and new conditions. The essentially feudal environment that existed in the Crimea, coupled with a drought in 1946, forced many of those resettled simply to flee the Crimea. The Crimean party *obkom* adopted a resolution at its plenary session in July 1946 in order to prevent any further flight from the Crimea. Nevertheless, in 1947 the party *obkom* adopted harsher measures to deal with the fleeing refugees. This had little effect in decreasing the tide, and a cyclical dynamic was created, whereby new settlers were constantly brought in to replace those constantly escaping. It was thus hardly possible for the authorities to even dream of any effective plan for economic recovery under such unstable conditions.

Ukraine came to the Crimea's aid at this time, offering considerable assistance in reconstructing the latter's beleaguered economy. Ukrainian engineers designed and built special mining equipment for the Crimea, Ukrvodbud began the reconstruction of the Simferopol and Staro-Krymsk reservoirs and the North Crimean Canal. Several metallurgical plants in Ukraine merged with counterparts in Kerch and Balaklava; industrial production and food were sent to the Crimea from Ukraine.

In essence, the economies of the Crimea and Ukraine gradually became one indivisible mechanism in the post-war years. However, this merging of economic infrastructures was not accompanied by a corresponding legislative framework. The disaffection of the Crimean

population due to low standards of living, prompted various leaders of local councils to inform the Crimean *Oblast* Executive Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers that the people were demanding the unification of the Crimea and Ukraine and an end to administrative incompetence. The authorities could thus no longer afford to ignore the people of the Crimea.

There are those who maintain that "*the Crimea was given to Ukraine as a present by Khrushchev*", ignoring the fact that Khrushchev played little or no part in the transfer. At that very time, Khrushchev was engaged in a bitter and ominous power struggle. The September 1953 CPSU Central Committee plenary session saw an entrenchment of Khrushchev's power amongst the rank and file of Soviet society, but the international community continued to view Georgy Malenkov as the more influential of the two figures. In these conditions Khrushchev risked losing all that he had worked for decades to achieve, and thus devoted all his attention to his own political survival. He had risen to the post of party First Secretary at a time when the Central Committee was replete with individuals whom Khrushchev could not trust. Moreover, while collecting evidence with which to attack his pro-Stalinist opponents, Khrushchev had a damaging card in his hand with Stalin's deportation of the Crimean Tatars. Thus, a sharpening of tensions in the Crimea was not at all conducive to Khrushchev's political plans. As a result, he distanced himself from the whole Crimean affair and allowed his rivals to deal with its solution.

It is evident that Khrushchev's political rivals were no less cunning than he. Albeit with political maneuvering in mind, for perhaps the first time in Soviet history a matter was approached in strict accordance to existing legislation (regarding the nationalities question). Firstly, the Crimea was discussed in the RSFSR Council of Ministers, which, after considering all the available evidence, concluded as to the necessity "*of the transfer of the Crimean province to the Ukrainian SSR*". The Council of Ministers presented its proposal to the Presidium of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, which then consulted the leaders of the Ukrainian republic regarding the Council's proposition. Having received tentative agreement from the Ukrainian leaders, the Presidium adopted the following resolution:

"The Presidium of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet in conjunction with representatives of the Crimean provincial and Sevastopol City Councils of Workers' Deputies has studied the proposition put forth

by the RSFSR Council of Ministers regarding the transfer of the Crimean province to the Ukrainian SSR....Considering the commonality of the economic and cultural ties between the Crimean province and the Ukrainian SSR; in addition considering the agreement of the Ukrainian Republic Supreme Soviet Presidium, the Presidium of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet finds it purposeful to transfer the Crimean province to the territory of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic."

The RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium forwarded a copy of its resolution to the Ukrainian SSR Presidium. In reply, on February 13 1954 the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet Presidium began deliberations on the question of the former's resolution. The following resolution was adopted:

The Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium resolves in reply to the resolution of the Presidium of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet to:

"Request the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium officially transfer the Crimean province from the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic."

This resolution was sent to the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet. Noteworthy is the fact that since the Presidia of both the Russian and Ukrainian Supreme Soviets adopted these resolutions, this created a certain 'agreement in principle' between the two republics. In terms of international law, this in turn made the resolutions a legally binding set of documents, since they were adopted by authoritative organs mandated to enact them.

The Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium had acted in strict accordance with Article 15(b) of the 1937 Ukrainian SSR Constitution. Concurrently, the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium was in adherence of Article 16(a) of the RSFSR Constitution. These articles gave the respective Presidia full power and legal right to conclude such agreements. Thus, a nullification of the agreement was only possible in the case of a new agreement being concluded between the two republics. In addition, this agreement involved the question of a modification of borders between the two republics. Since these questions were by law deferred to All-Union organs of power, the final ratification of the agreement lay with the USSR Supreme Soviet.

A meeting of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium was called for February 19, 1954, with representatives of all the involved parties being invited as well. The meeting was not attended by

Khrushchev and its outcome was completely beyond his influence. After the RSFSR Presidium Resolution was read, the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium was asked to ratify the transfer.

The Presidium then ratified an *ukaz* relating to the transfer. However, this was not yet the final word. The Collection of Ukrainian SSR Laws and Supreme Soviet Presidium Resolutions includes a legally incorrect addendum on page 33, which state that, "*the Crimean province was transferred from the RSFSR to the Ukrainian SSR by the Ukaz of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium on February 19, 1954.*" However, as has been noted above, the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium did not have the authority to do so under the 1936 USSR Constitution. It was the USSR Supreme Soviet alone that had this authority. At that very time the "Third Calling of the USSR Supreme Soviet" had concluded its proceedings and a preelection campaign was under way in the USSR. The transfer of the Crimea to Ukraine became the subject of debate with the electorate at candidate meetings all over the USSR. On April 26, 1954, following a discussion of the transfer, the USSR Supreme Soviet unanimously ratified the law.

As is evident, Khrushchev had very little to do with its passing. Others maintain that "*Russia gave Ukraine the Crimean province as a gift in commemoration of the three-hundredth anniversary of the 'union' of Ukraine and Russia.*" The adopted resolution concerning the transfer made no mention of the transfer being a 'gift'.

Attempts to find any violation of international legal norms in the transfer legislation have also been invariably fruitless. Contemporary international law recognises the legality of a voluntary transfer of sovereignty over a given territory between two governments according to an agreement of the two. The only prerequisite stipulated by international law demands that the state receiving territory must provide inhabitants of that territory the opportunity to choose either to maintain their former or their new citizenship. In the case of the Crimean transfer, however, this prerequisite did not apply because Article 21 of the 1936 USSR Constitution stated that "*[a] single Union citizenship is established for all citizens of the USSR.*"

There is, nevertheless, one further important consideration regarding the 1954 transfer of the Crimean province to Ukraine. Presently, many of those who are in support of returning the Crimea to Russia are hopeful of a referendum. Yet, according to the norms of

international law, territorial questions involve the holding of a plebiscite. The terms 'plebiscite' and 'referendum' are often mistakenly employed interchangeably. Although the two processes do indeed have much in common, there are as many differences as there are shared traits between the two.

Juridical science and legal practice define referendum as concerning national questions, while plebiscite refers to international questions of law. The aim of the referendum is to resolve questions of a constitutional and legislative nature.

Concerning territorial questions, a referendum can legally resolve only questions of an internal, territorial-administrative character. Questions regarding the transfer of territories from one state to another may only be resolved by a referendum when the process involves a voluntary agreement between the states involved in the transfer and only if the inhabitants of the given territory do not protest such a decision.

Those, who are promoting the transfer of the Crimea to Russia are attempting to squeeze the matter under the rubric of a territorial-administrative question. However, when all interested parties expressed their views on the Crimea, especially following the declaration of Ukraine's independence, the possibility of resolving the matter through a referendum was categorically dismissed. Under the present conditions, which find Ukraine as an independent state, it is possible to resolve the question exclusively through a plebiscite on the basis of international legal norms. The mechanism for holding a plebiscite is substantially different from the one that governs the holding of a referendum. The plebiscite must be carried out according to these, and not national, norms; otherwise the results can be declared invalid and not legally binding.

What are the necessary conditions under which a plebiscite can be held? In the first place, international law considers states, nations and their peoples as legal subjects under a plebiscite. The nation and people in question must occupy a common territory, have a common historical past, language, culture and the common aim of self-determination. Even this first condition is not applicable in the Crimean case.

The overriding factor remains that a separate, singular nation has never formed in the Crimea, and thus the only legal subject of a plebiscite is absent. The more than million people who were resettled in the Crimea in the forty-five years after World War II cannot be considered a nation. This is not to imply that the

population of the Crimea is without any international legal rights or defence. Effective in the Crimea are all the conditions of international pacts, conventions and other human rights documents that apply to Ukraine as a member of the international community.

International law requires the establishment of optimal democratic conditions for the holding of a plebiscite. In order for this to be realised, there must be complete stability on the territory in question, as well as an absence of any military presence; this would mean the withdrawal of all presently stationed troops in the Crimea. Such a condition is necessary not simply to avoid the electoral influence that such troops would have, but also to avoid the possibility of using military coercion to affect the outcome.

The present government in the Crimea must also suspend its activity and dissolve itself, due to the fact that it has existed under a former regime and could not be honestly expected to carry out a fair plebiscite. In its place, it would be necessary to establish a provisional governmental structure with representatives democratically elected exclusively from the local population. This provisional government would be solely responsible for the complete plebiscite process.

Any external influence in the preparation and holding of the plebiscite must be categorically prohibited. The plebiscite cannot be held if borders with contiguous states are not finalised and these states are not officially informed of the Crimea's territorial intentions. The legal rights and responsibilities of the electorate must also be clearly defined under appropriate legislation. The wording of the plebiscite must be succinctly formed.

The right to participate in the plebiscite is given to all legal citizens of the territory in question. Therefore, a plebiscite is inherently impossible until such time as all Tatars, Ukrainians, Russians and others who had been forcibly removed from the Crimea are allowed to return to their native territory. This also includes all those, who due to persecution or threat, were forced to flee the Crimea.

The structure to be created for the organisation and carrying out of the plebiscite, as well as the police force that must be present to maintain order, must be created from amongst the local population as well. A working system of control must also be in place. It is imperative that the whole process meet with accepted international legal norms. In the event that local authorities are unable to meet this condition, they have the right to seek the aid of the United Nations in

order to ensure the strict legality of the plebiscite and the determination of its results. Representatives of the international mass media must be allowed to follow the process in order to attest to its objectivity.

A plethora of other conditions relates to holding of a democratic plebiscite. As noted above, however, a plebiscite cannot legally be held in Crimea since the population of Crimea is not considered a legal subject for determining the transfer of public authority on a given territory, or between one state and another. The only legal subject that has the right to do this in the Crimean case is Ukraine.

The 30th WLF D Annual Conference

This year the World League for Freedom and Democracy held its 30th Annual Conference in Bangkok, Thailand on August 28-30.

Since the Chairman of the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of nations, Mrs. Slava Stetsko, was indisposed at this time and could not attend, it was Dr. Kaimur, who is the chairman of the Afghanistan Chapter, who had the great honour of participating in this very significant meeting.

The seminar, which took place on August 27-30 at the Sheraton Hotel in Bangkok, was attended by 45 representatives and about 300 delegates who had travelled from all the corners of the globe to take part in this momentous occasion.

All representatives and delegates were invited to take part in a round table discussion on the 30 August entitled: "The Role of Democracy in Every Country". Representatives of the Russian *Duma* (Parliament) and delegates from the Latin American countries were seen to be very active during this particular talk.

There was an extra, very special, event that was organised by the World League to meet the King of Thailand. Unfortunately, due to bad health, the King was unable to attend but his son, the Crown Prince, was present. It was a most gracious and unforgettable moment for all those who attended.

Facing our Yaltas

With independence restored and problems enough in the present day, Lithuanians want to look to the future. And yet the unresolved business of the recent past keeps coming back to demand our attention.

I have no solutions to offer. But I do have some questions and suggestions for ways of discussing these issues - approaches that may help us end bitter name-calling and sterile confrontations. And avoid the growth of very dangerous misconceptions about Lithuania and her people that may endanger her security and prosperity.

Just before the fall of the USSR there was a major effort amongst students of the Nazi Holocaust to deal with the question of 'Uniqueness' for the Jewish experience. A major international conference and subsequent papers opened up previously explosive topics where heated slogans too often obscure understanding¹. Ten years later we have masses of new, previously hidden evidence, and some survivors able at last to tell their tales.

Do we need a new effort to come to grips with the wider dimensions of the Years of Terror - one where we can discuss Soviet and Nazi atrocities without falling into competitive casualty list comparisons or a more-crucified-than-thou stance? Or even worse, bitter exchanges accusing whole peoples of collective guilt?

I think, we do. Apart from anything else, to avoid the growth of very dangerous misconceptions about Lithuania and her people, as I have pointed out before. Misconceptions that we may impose on ourselves, as well as those held by others.

I think we can start by looking soberly at the Yalta mindset. This comes about when impossible decisions arise, when huge pain and suffering are the only options. It means (whatever the choice) trying to escape the pain by believing the choice is not so acute.

Lithuanians like to believe that they have a relatively good record under Nazi occupation - we say that no Lithuanian SS Legion was raised, and that Nazi officials complained about Lithuanian reluctance to join in anti-Semitic Atrocities. In doing this we are making a very strong and remarkable claim - that Lithuanian society provided such moral and perhaps spiritual resources that millions of

¹ Conference at US State Department 23-25 February 1987 convened by the US Holocaust Memorial Council. Major papers published in BERENBAUM, M. (ed) 1990. *A Mosaic of Victims: Non-Jews Persecuted and Murdered by the Nazis*. London and New York: I.B. Taurus & Co Ltd. ISBN 1-85043-251-1.

individuals were helped to make decent choices in extreme circumstances. And to make those choices with very little accurate information to guide them.

I think we need to start a search to rediscover these moral resources, for we need them now. To do this we also need to look at the mistakes made at the time, and the mental accommodations made to survive horrors. For example, face the reality of the 'Yalta mindsets' that plagued the various communities in the years of horror. These raise more uncomfortable questions about what happened. We need to face these questions. Openly, actively.

Lithuania needs to face all this because the slow and painful archaeology of buried records and survivor reports is building up a moving and harrowing picture of Jewish life under the Nazis in Lithuania. And because we are not dealing with the question actively, the interpretation being evolved is the most unfavourable for Lithuania². The current exhibition on the Kovno Ghetto in the Museum of the Holocaust in Washington DC is a case in point. It seems accurate, but incomplete. The incompleteness is deadly. If we allow this to grow, responding only with dismissive comments about Soviet Propaganda or side swipes at Israel, or even worse with accusations that Jews are uniquely responsible for Communism and in some way deserved punishment, we will do the work of our enemies and make ourselves mental slaves of Hitler and Stalin for another generation or more.

We need to face these issues ourselves, not with apparent reluctance when prodded by foreign agencies, but because we need to reclaim our own history, take our own responsibilities, and perhaps rediscover our own heritage of important resources. Facing the issues ourselves, accepting the true horrors of the situation, we can ask others to rethink their accounts of history. To ask why so many outside accounts of the desperate days of June, 1941 always begin on the 22nd, for example. Why this denial?

It parallels perhaps another denial. I suspect that for most of the Lithuanian population outside the ghettos the way to cope was to deny a special status of suffering to those in the ghettos. "*We are suffering, they are suffering*". And so the stories about specially terrible actions against the Jews must be Soviet Propaganda. That reduced the choices from the utterly unspeakable, choices that could drive people mad if faced squarely, to choices that were appalling but just about liveable with.

These are examples of the Yaltas in our soul. This coping strategy is like the mental states analysed by Milosz in "*The Captive Mind*". Perhaps we need to look at what it means to be under occupation. So that new generations can learn.

² For examples of the deeply moving and at the same time disquietingly incomplete current publications see: ELKES, J. 1997, *Values, Beliefs and Survival; Dr. Elkhanan Elkes and the Kovno Ghetto*. London: Vale Publishing. ISBN 0 9531249 0 8.

Jacobson, D. 1998, *Heshel's Kingdom: a family, a people, a divided fate*. London: Hamish Hamilton. ISBN 0 241 13927-9.

“Yalta” is a reproach hurled by Balts at the Western wartime powers. They knew they were allied to a monster. To cope with this they had to invent hopes – that for example the behaviour of the Soviet Union in the territories it acquired would not be as bad as feared. The consequences could be delayed until future and meanwhile duty called. And so whole peoples were in effect traded.

But for the people in the middle there was no delayed action device. Each and every person in the lands between the empires of the night had to make a decision. What that decision was might determine whether one’s family lived the next half hour. It could determine the history of their country for a century to come. And they might have to make that decision not once but innumerable times. At any time, with no preparation, and within the same length of time it takes to read this sentence.

It helped if a straw could be grasped, so the decision looked a little less stark. Like with Yalta on the grand scale. We, too, have our Yaltas.

The whole world needs to face up to the consequence of the Yalta Mindsets. And learn to reject them. Here Lithuania could make an international lead. By insisting on an honest accounting of the dark histories of all Europe, by facing and rejecting the false comfort of our own Yaltas, we can help Europe, the Americas and the Jewish world to move ahead. Without denying that the basic truth that the Jewish experience has a unique core of horror, we can help each other deal with all the horrors that seem now to be discounted or denied by a continuing Yalta mindset in the world at large.

After all, where would it be more appropriate to start such a process than Lithuania, the largest home of the largest and most vibrant Jewish community of Europe? We have small scraps only of our extraordinary rich heritage. Can we treasure these and share instead of completing the destruction?

Should we get on with this? And if so, how?

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The following text is a translation of the speech made by Slava Stetsko on the occasion of taking the oath, on behalf of her fellow Members of Parliament, for the opening of the new parliament on 19th March 1998 after the General Elections in Ukraine of the same year:

Stetsko, Y. Y.:

Fellow countrymen, honourable Members of Parliament!

The idea of: "*securing a free Ukrainian State or dying while fighting for it*" has been with me, wherever I was, since my youth. Indeed, this is the first paragraph of the the Ukrainian nationalist's decalogue. With the restoration of the free Ukrainian State, we nationalists, from the very first year of Ukraine's independence, have participated in its reconstruction, always reminding ourselves of the tenth paragraph of our decalogue: "*you should aim at procuring power, glory and riches for the Ukrainian State*".

We are convinced that the nation can only develop, enriching the spiritual and material welfare of the family and the individual, in its own independent state.

I never wondered about which role I would play in the Ukrainian State, but I solemnly believed in the future of the Ukrainian nation, I believed that Ukraine would be free one day because so many millions had died in its fight for independence. I believed in God's justice. I am grateful to the constituents who voted for me and I am aware of the fact that it was not I who won this election. This victory belongs to Stepan Bandera, General Roman Shukhevych, Yaroslav Stetsko, thousands of unknown OUN¹ members, UPA² soldiers and the ideals of Ukrainian nationalism. Millions have died but we are alive. The blue eyes of the nation are looking at us and asking "when will you deliver us from this economical, political and social crisis? When will you pay the teachers, the doctors, the armed forces, the pensioners? When will the young people be able to not only study but work in Ukraine, without having to look for jobs abroad? When will you pass tax laws that will allow farmers and small businessmen to stand on their own two feet? When will there be law and order in the country and the fight with corruption and organised crime be seen to be done and not only talked about? When will organisations that sanction anti-Ukrainian and anti-state activities be banned? When will historical justice be done for those who fought for the Ukrainian State – members of the OUN and UPA – when will they be honoured by the Ukrainian State for which they sacrificed their blood?" Those, who were exiled by the Bolsheviks to live in Siberia are looking to us to allow them to return to Ukraine if only for a short while before they die. The Ukrainian diaspora is waiting for the

¹ Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists.

² Ukrainian Partisan Army.

laws to be passed that will allow them to invest in Ukraine. My constituents are waiting for the symbol of the bolshevik state, which no longer exists, that hangs above the Ukrainian parliament to be replaced by the symbol of the Ukrainian State. Yes, we are a great nation and our people are hard-working. It is necessary for us to awaken the patriotism that lies deep within the soul of every Ukrainian. I believe that the Ukrainian nation will become the keeper of its castle, I believe in the strength of Ukrainian nationalism, I believe in the Ukrainian nation! Glory to Ukraine!

(Applause)

Yes, and now comes a very exciting moment for me, I will take the oath.

I swear to be true to Ukraine. I am bound in all my deeds to defend the sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, to protect the blessed fatherland and the well-being of the Ukrainian nation!

I swear to remain faithful to the Constitution of Ukraine and the laws of Ukraine, and to perform my duties in the interest of all my fellow countrymen!

(Applause)

Chairman of the Ukrainian Parliament:

Honourable Members of Parliament, let us welcome our new colleague and wish her every success in the execution of this oath.

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Russian Nuclear Cooperation with Iran

Iran and Russia signed a cooperation accord to speed up completion of a controversial Iranian nuclear reactor on the Gulf and study possible joint development of other power plants. Russia has agreed that completion of the first phase of the Bushehr plant would be brought forward by three months, while a joint committee will look at the financial issues involving the second phase of the project, state radio reported.

Under the accord, signed at the end of a visit to Tehran by Russian Atomic Energy Minister Yevgeny Adamov, the two countries also agreed in principle to study the construction of more power plants in Iran, the radio said.

Qolam-Reza Aqazadeh, the head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organisation, said that the 778 million dollar project would be completed on time "despite external political pressures," the official IRNA news agency said.

Adamov also said his country was determined to continue its nuclear cooperation with Iran. "In our relations with other countries, we will not be influenced by interference from third parties," he said, apparently referring to the United States and Israel which have opposed Russian cooperation with Iran on nuclear and military matters. They fear the Islamic republic may acquire the technological know-how to build nuclear weapons.

Russia signed a 1995 agreement to build the 1,000 megawatt light-water reactor at Bushehr, after the project was abandoned by the German company Siemens following the 1979 Islamic revolution.

Both Moscow and Tehran insist the plant is for non-military use and say its activities will be subject to inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which monitors nuclear programmes around the world.

In October, Iran set aside 140 million dollars for the construction of the plant's first phase after Russia voiced concern over whether Iran could afford the project.

The KGB and the tragedy of the Ukrainian Catholic Church

The reasons why the Ukrainian Catholic Church was forced to go underground nearly fifty years ago can only be objectively studied now because of the recently-allowed limited access to KGB archives in Moscow. These documents paint a tragic picture of the planned destruction of the Ukrainian Catholic Church which commenced under Stalin and continued until Ukraine gained its independence.

In 1989, the weekly magazine *Argumenty i Fakty* wrote that the many documents which tell this tragic tale were thought to be destroyed until recently. Another article from this same periodical uncovered the facts about the assassination of Father Oleksander Menya, after it was discovered that he had in his possession documents which showed the extent of KGB manipulation in the church. A cover-up of the facts remains today, since the former Communist rule of the Russian empire is not eager to disclose the planned destruction of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, especially since this church did not succumb to the totalitarian regime and always stood for Ukraine's national interests, while the priests of the Russian Orthodox Church sold out to the interests of maintaining the empire.

An analysis of the archive documents evokes the image of the dark corridors of the Stalin-Beria structures where the poisoned meal was prepared. Today, as our society is healing itself as it builds an independent state; the questions remain. How could this have happened? What caused the long, dark, "polar night" in our history which began with Stalin and his henchmen? What provoked them to wage a cruel war against the nations imprisoned in their state? How did the "emperor" of this land succeed in manifesting himself as a living "god"? One of the secrets of Stalin's success, after having created a religious vacuum, was to unite the atavistic and spiritual quests of the individual. Another aspect was to instill in people the concept of a mythological figure as ruler who had god-like features and unlimited power. With the benefit of analysis of this period, our society can heal itself of the negative effects of this process and manipulation. In Tsarist Russia, the church and monarchy had a tenuous relationship which varied from tolerance to despise. The

October revolution of 1917 initiated a new era of confrontation between the church and those in power, although there was a law introduced which separated church from the state. Nonetheless, revolutions tend to liberate a groundswell of aggressive force and action. One of the institutions which was most closely linked to the old Tsarist regime was the Russian Orthodox Church, and hence it suffered from negative backlash. The decree on the separation of church and state illicit protest from religious activists, who called this decree discriminatory, especially on the issue of the state disposing of church assets and valuables.

The church had viewed its assets as belonging to society, however, the way in which the church was forced to dispose of assets caused rebellion, protest and bloody struggles. Churches and monasteries, and religious schools were closed, church publishing was halted, and the Bible was no longer printed. Church monuments and buildings were demolished, religious books and icons were burned. Anti-religious propaganda became widespread. Atheist extremists staged demonstrations where some were dressed up mocking clergy.

During revolutions when an old regime is destroyed and there is a lack of civil order, there is the danger that those who seek power for its own sake may benefit from such a period. Such was the "Machiavellian" character of Stalin, who tried to then build an absolute dictatorship, and thus eliminated all obstacles and persons which blocked this path. His persona was forcefully tied in with every aspect of life: education, culture, art, even religion. However, this was not enough. Stalin believed that there should only be one god - the one in the Kremlin and the faith in him should become the dominating ideology, over and above Marxism. The last battles were won by Stalin, when a change was passed in the constitution forbidding religious propaganda and the symbol of Stalin's victory was the physical demolition and blasting of many well-known churches. Stalin had decided that this religious vacuum that he created was sufficient. However, the creation of a new religion was on the horizon as Stalin, the self-proclaimed "father of nations" raises himself to an even higher plane on Mount Olympia towards the kind of absolutism, not even dreamed of by Emperor Augustus.

The Second World War drastically changed the position of the Russian Orthodox Church. There were many reasons for this change. The occupying armies of Nazi Germany did not oppose the re-opening of churches, and this was accepted favourably by the people and

forced Stalin to follow suit later (purely from a propagandistic-political perspective). Taking into account the overt rebirth of religious faith during the war, Stalin decided to utilise this to his benefit with the help of the puppet Moscow Patriarchy.

Stalin, realising that he is the uncrowned emperor, decided that it would be to his benefit to have the "blessing" of the same church which sanctified the rule of Russian Tsars since the sixteenth century. And thus, the church that was on its way to complete destruction, suddenly gained approval. How did Stalin manage to have the Russian Orthodox Church leaders "eating out of the palm of his hand?" It started out quite simply – from a casual conversation on September 4, 1943. When it was becoming clearer how the war would end, Stalin summoned the KGB officer responsible for religion, H. Karpov, to his *dacha* (country residence) to get information about the Russian Orthodox Church. L. Beria and Malenkov, who was responsible for ideology, were also present. Karpov was well versed in this area and reported extensively – from the health of the metropolitans, to the number of believers and about the relations with other orthodox churches in Rumania, Bulgaria, etc. When all of Stalin's questions were answered, he wanted to know more about Karpov.

Stalin then decided that it was necessary to form a separate state structure at the governmental level which would act as a liaison between the authorities and the Russian Orthodox Church, and thus, would precipitate more control over church activities. Stalin then told Beria, Malenkov and Karpov that he wanted to immediately meet with the Metropolitans Serhij, Aleksij, and Mykolaj. Karpov called Metropolitan Serhij and told him that the intention of the meeting was to discuss the needs of the church.

The Metropolitans arrived at the Kremlin on that same day, and were quite surprised by the hospitable and accommodating treatment from the "Father of all nations". Stalin thanked the Metropolitans for the church's patriotic contribution to the war effort. Little did they know that their belief in this deception would have grave consequences for millions of followers of the Russian Orthodox Church as well as of other religious denominations.

As a token of his gratitude, Stalin asked the Metropolitans if he could assist the church in any way. Metropolitan Serhij, the patriarchal representative, had said that the biggest problem facing the patriarchy is the lack of centralised authority, especially since there had not been a church synod allowed since 1935. He asked for

permission to call a synod (a meeting of church leaders) in order that a patriarch be chosen. The Metropolitan of Leningrad Aleksij and the Exarch of Ukraine and Metropolitan of Kyiv and Halych Mykolaj supported the proposal of forming a synod. The Metropolitans stated that this synod would be canonical. But how could a synod, that was organised inside the walls of the Kremlin under the watchful direction of history's worst tyrant, be considered even remotely legitimate? In fact, the outcome of the planned synod was decided by Stalin – Metropolitan Serhij would be the next patriarch. And so it was. The script for the theatrical spectacle that called a canonical synod was written by the "omnipotent" Stalin with the KGB as the supporting actors. To further add to the show, the patriarchy would have an appropriate title – the Patriarchy of Moscow and all of Russia. Stalin's cast of henchmen had even assisted with quickly assembling together all of the Russian Orthodox Church leaders within a record time by providing air transportation. This enabled the date to be set for as quickly as September 8, 1943.

The deal with Satan was almost complete. The Russian Orthodox Church became Stalin's puppet and transformed itself into a government apparat as it received privileged status. Requests for further assistance resulted in promises for the re-opening of religious seminary schools, permission to publish church literature and the re-opening of several churches. However, later, this last request was altered in such a way that state authorities decided which churches could be opened. A request was also made that the church receive financial assistance which would directly flow into church coffers for the activities of the patriarch and the synod. This was also granted, as well as permission to reestablish autonomous church enterprises, such as, for candle-making, etc. When the Metropolitans became more confident with Stalin, they even requested the release from prisons and concentration camps of imprisoned priests.

Stalin assured the Metropolitans that all the church's needs would be met and that the church could count on the support of the government for its development throughout all of the Soviet Union. Although this new direction violated the former laws on the separation of church from state and church from schools, it was in keeping with the specific socio-political situation of the time and it was acceptable in terms of Stalin's further plans. By offering a subsidy and support, Stalin managed to make the church a servant of state ideology.

After the church needs were taken care of, Stalin moved to the personal realm by offering larger apartments, automobiles, deliveries of scarce food supplies, etc. The clever politician Stalin realised that he had fully manipulated the church leaders. Now the true reason for the meeting was revealed. Stalin turned to the Metropolitans and said, "If there are no other requests, than we will go to the task at hand – the creation of a Soviet of the Russian Orthodox Church, which will be headed by comrade Karpov." The church representatives agreed to this proposal and the deal was completed. After such a decision there could be no question of the existence of an independent church. The Russian Orthodox Church leaders, who succumbed to their own personal interests, were aware of this as they embarked upon a path that led them to being an instrument of the state, or rather the Soviet-Russian empire, and which later led them into direct conflict with other denominations, especially the Ukrainian Catholic Church.

The next day, September 5th, 1943, Molotov had written a communiqué for radio and press about the decision to hold a meeting of bishops (synod). Metropolitan Serhij made a public statement that day expressing gratitude to Stalin.

Archive documents explicitly unravel the tragic tale that began with this first meeting where the Russian Orthodox Church sold out its beliefs and integrity for material gain. The recently-disclosed documents portray a vivid picture of this irrevocable relationship between the Soviet-Russian empire and the KGB infiltrated church that was supported by personal gifts of large sums of money to the Metropolitans (some as large as 35,000 rubles in 1943!). As far as Karpov was concerned, he remained an officer of the KGB. To his staff he also coopted to other KGB officers. The government structure responsible for church affairs had final say on all candidates for religious education in seminaries, for selection of priests, etc. This connection of the KGB with the Russian Orthodox Church remained until the recent fall of the empire.

However, the biggest victim in this historical sell-out became the Ukrainian Catholic Church, which was prominent in western Ukraine, and also existed in western Belarus and in the Baltic states. The Ukrainian Catholic Church remained true to its ideals in spite of Stalin's tyranny. After the Second World War, western Ukraine came under the rule of the Soviet Russian empire. Under Stalin, the Ukrainian Catholic Church ceased to exist legally

but not in reality. The main orchestrator of the church's *de jure* demise was KGB officer Karpov. He had called a synod on March 8-10, 1946 in Lviv with the intention that this political farce would erase the church from existence.

Before Soviet Russia overtook western Ukraine, the Ukrainian Catholic Church had 4,440 churches, an academy, 5 seminaries, 2 schools, 127 monasteries, 3 weekly newspapers and 6 monthly publications. The church was headed by a Metropolitan, and had 10 bishops, 2950 priests, 1090 monks and 540 seminarians. The Ukrainian Catholic Church had experienced great development during the time when Metropolitan Andrej Sheptytskyj led the church from 1901 until his death on November 1, 1944, at which time, Metropolitan Josyf Slipyj was chosen to head the church.

The Soviet Russian occupation of Ukraine saw the the physical destruction of thousands of Ukrainians and forced resettlement to remote areas of the empire. In order to stop the physical torture and killing, shortly before his death, Metropolitan Andrej Sheptytsky had responded to the request for a meeting with Soviet governmental body on "religious cults" with the intention of "normalising" relations. Metropolitan Josyf Slipyj sent a delegation to Moscow in December, 1944. The results of the meeting were accurately reported to Stalin by Molotov, Beria and Khrushchev, especially since the Ukrainian Catholic Church leaders had demanded that the Red Army immediately halt its path of destruction. When the church delegation asked for a guarantee of its right to continue its activities, the delegation received a positive reassurance.

There were two reasons for this. At first, there was a law passed in 1944 by the *Radnarkom* of the U.S.S.R. on the "reopening of prayer facilities for religious cults", (under which jurisdiction came the Ukrainian Catholic Church) stating that religious unions must register their intention to hold services. Secondly, Stalin did not want to openly initiate a conflict with the Ukrainian Catholic Church during the war. However, it was difficult for Stalin to forgive the church's role in supporting the national movement for an independent Ukraine and the support of the church for the Declaration of Ukraine's Independence on June 30, 1941.

Shortly following, Molotov asked Karpov to devise a plan for the liquidation of the Ukrainian Catholic Church. Karpov had decided that this should be done at the synod called for March, 1946, by infiltrating the church, creating conflicts among the church leaders, presenting the Russian Orthodox Church as the only solution and

blaming the church itself for its own demise. The plan detailing the extent of involvement of the Russian Orthodox Church on an international level to the type of insults and libel that should be hurled at the church, was submitted as document no. 58 on March 15, 1945. Among the arguments to be presented to support the motion to withdraw from the Catholic Church ranged from labelling the Pope as pro-fascist and the Vatican as anti-democratic.

The plan called for at least 6 months preparation, since orthodox church leaders were to be invited from all over the world. They were to be prepared before the synod, therefore, they would be told that it was for the good of the orthodox church that certain directives were followed. Also, much focus was also placed on strengthening orthodox brotherhoods so that they would pressure church leaders to only support the orthodox church. However, the most important part of the plan in preparation for the synod, was the forming of an initiative group within the Ukrainian Catholic Church that would be convinced that it should vote for a separation from the Vatican.

The archival document shows the extent to which this plan was masterminded. The KGB-devised strategy would be utilised by the Russian Orthodox Church to expand its power at the cost of other religious denominations. The plan was approved by Stalin on March 16, 1945 and by the next day, Karpov's plan for the liquidation of the Ukrainian Catholic Church and directives to the Supreme Council's committee on "religious cults" were sent by his first assistant, I. Poliansky, on May 8, 1945. Six copies were sent with strict instructions that the incriminating copies must be returned after the information had been studied. All six copies remain in the KGB archives today.

The use of the Russian Orthodox Church to fulfill the directives of the KGB is the beginning of the cooperation that would exist until recently. The tactical directives and argumentation: The Vatican was strongly opposed to the Soviet Union during the war. The Vatican is theocratic in nature. The Vatican meddles in international politics, and has a political role through the existence of diplomats/papal nuncio. Among the diplomats to the Vatican are representatives from the "bourgeois" Lithuania. The Vatican has a strongly organised political "*apparat*" in every country which informs the pope of all Catholic activities. In 1943, the Vatican had strived for a "peaceful compromise" to end the war – this could only

have been interpreted as support for Hitler's fascism. Pope Pius XII, in his papal letters, is calling for forgiveness for the wrong-doing of Hitler's Germany. And the final reason – the Vatican has always expressed a "dislike" for the Slavic nations of Eastern Europe, and specifically for Eastern orthodoxy.

The strategy consisted of discrediting the Pope, Roman Catholicism and the initiative group comprised of "orthodox catholics" would then propose allying with the Russian Orthodox Church, rather than with the Roman Catholic. Karpov and Poliansky then planned to discredit those who would form the opposition. A member of the delegation sent by Metropolitan Slipyj to Moscow, Dr. H. Kostelnyk of the Metropolitan order, was to be discredited because of an article he wrote in 1933 titled "Napoleon and Stalin", which was published in *Meta*. In 1934, the same newspaper published a sermon he gave at the commemorative Holy Mass for the millions who died during Stalin's forced famine in Ukraine. Excerpts from the articles would be used to discredit Kostelnyk.

Needless to say that it was Kostelnyk who was the most demanding and asked the difficult questions during the meeting with Poliansky in Moscow. At that meeting, the KGB officers understood that Kostelnyk would be the one who could influence and lead the Ukrainian Catholic clergy. Furthermore, he had consistently and energetically stated the legal and juridical arguments for the Ukrainian Catholic Church's right to existence.

However, another member of the delegation, I. Vilhowyj, had tried to bend over backwards to be accommodating to the Soviet Russians. Vilhowyj had requested permission to initiate a group which would give financial and moral support to wounded Red Army war veterans. However, permission was not granted.

In the meantime, the KGB was also busy initiating false conflicts between the Roman Catholic and the Ukrainian Catholic Church. One of the most "extensive" accounts of this forced "unification" of the Ukrainian Catholic Church and the Russian Orthodox Church is found in the book "*Dijanja Soboru Hreko-Katolyckoji Tserkvy 8-10 bereznya 1946 roku u Lvovi*" (The Synod of the Ukrainian [Greek] Catholic Church March 8-10 1946 in Lviv) was prepared and published by the KGB. On page 13, the authors cynically wrote that only the truth is written in this book.

On the streets in Lviv in 1946 were signs of the first post-war spring, which did not bring the anticipated hope of renewal for millions of Ukrainians. The liquidation of the Ukrainian Catholic

Church for which Stalin laid the foundation, was underway and the blame for it would be placed directly on the initiative group of Ukrainian Catholic clergy.

Such was the case with so-called Soviet historians and scholars, who claimed that the Ukrainian Catholic Church had seceded its right to exist. However, the analysis of the documents which were alluded to in this article clearly indicate that the initiative group was set up by the KGB.

This group was formed in Lviv on May 28, 1945 at the end of the war. It was comprised of: Rev. Dr. Kostelnyk, Rev. Dr. M. Melnyk, and Rev. Plevetsky. The aim of the group was expressed as such, "Our church now finds itself in a state of flux and disorganisation. This situation has negative effects on our church life. That is why we, the undersigned, have decided to lead our church out of a state of anarchy".

On May 28, 1945, the initiative group asked to be acknowledged officially. This in itself is testimony to the fact that there was anarchy in the church. But why? Simply because it was created by the KGB. On April 11, 1945, Metropolitan Josyf Slipyj, Bishop Budka, M. Czarnecky, H. Khomyshyn and I. Latyshevsky were arrested. The guilt of the accused was resolved without a trial.

With the help of the KGB, an interview with the head of the initiative group, Kostelnyk, was printed in *Lvivska Pravda* on March 1, 1946, where he stated that the church leaders of the Ukrainian Catholic Church were arrested for their involvement and aid to the occupying German army, and they have been accused by a Military Tribunal". Ukrainian Catholics, believing that justice would prevail, wrote a petition to Molotov. Many were later arrested and sent to concentration camps. The Ukrainian Catholic Church went underground in Ukraine. After many of years of torture and imprisonment, Metropolitan Josyf Slipyj was released from the Soviet gulags, and continued to lead the Ukrainian Catholic Church in exile as Patriarch. He resided in Rome until his death.

The Ukrainian Catholic Church remained a vibrant church in the diaspora. The many believers in Ukraine, who gathered in forests and privately in homes to worship must always be remembered for their undying spirit and their refusal to sell out to the Soviet Russian empire.

The Need to De-communize the Ex-Communist States

After the Allied powers defeated and occupied Germany in 1945, they promptly instituted a process of the de-Nazification meant to exclude persons who had been actively engaged in the Nazi regime from responsible posts in government and education. At the same time, through the international Nuremberg Tribunal they tried leading Nazi civilians and military personnel for crimes against humanity: several of the Nazis were condemned to death. Subsequently, democratic German authorities tried personnel who had served in the concentration and extermination camps.

No doubt, the great majority of Germans and Austrians responsible for Nazi crimes escaped punishment and quietly integrated into post-war life. But a point was made and enforced: The Nazi regime was a criminal organisation and persons actively involved in it were disqualified from either serving the democratic republic or educating its youth. The Nazi party and the display of its symbols were outlawed; denying the holocaust became a criminal offence.

Nothing like this has occurred in the post-communist states of Eastern Europe. *The Black Box of Communism*, a recently published French study edited by St. Ephane Courtois, found that communist regimes worldwide have claimed the lives of between 85 and 100 million human beings - approximately four times the number of deaths visited by Hitler. Yet the countries that have managed to shake of communist dictatorships have not punished those guilty of such monstrous crimes.

True, Stalin's murderous henchmen, Lavrentii Beria, along with some of his associates, was executed immediately after Stalin's death. Some time later, several other of Stalin's comrades were retired. But these actions were taken by Stalin's successors for their own political interests, not to purge the Soviet Union of politicians with criminal records.

Since the dissolution of the U.S.S.R. and its empire in 1989-1991, only one action was taken to punish those responsible for the crimes of the communists. In October 1991, Czechoslovakia adopted a

law of "lustration"¹ that effectively barred citizens who had been active in the communist regime from holding office.

Neither Russia, nor Poland, nor any other ex-Soviet dependencies has followed this example. Thus, individuals, responsible for mass murder, torture and repression on an unprecedented scale, are allowed to lead peaceful lives and even to participate in political and intellectual life. Not one of the tens of thousands of Gulag administrators and guards has been brought to justice. The communist parties are active in all these countries (albeit sometimes under different labels) and are permitted to display the hammer and sickle emblem.

Why should this be the case? An obvious answer is that unlike Germany and Japan, the communist empire was not defeated in war and occupied by the victorious powers. Thus, it would not be foreigners who would judge political criminals but natives, a fact creating considerable difficulty because under totalitarian regimes that lasted anywhere from 45 to 70 years (in contrast to Nazi Germany's 12 years) nearly every adult was in some way politically compromised. A leading Polish journalist with an impeccable record as a dissident explained to me his opposition to laws calling for lustration because they would open so many wounds and to make the transition to democracy still more difficult.

But even making allowances for this complicating factor, it seems a terrible mistake for the new Eastern European democracies not to purge themselves of those responsible for their suffering. As a result, ex-communist officials of high rank occupy preeminent positions in government and education. The security organs of democratic Russia are staffed by old functionaries of the KGB who bring to their task their old habits. The same applies to the diplomatic service. Thus, no real break with the past has happened. The old has been integrated, as it were, with the new. Old attitudes survive and fester: contempt for human rights and the law, anti-western attitudes and dreams of restoring the old empire.

To purge of itself of its terrible legacy, Russia and her ex-satellites should face their recent past and, emulating the Czech Republic, ban those guilty of political crimes from the country's political life. Failure to do so burdens the fledgling democracies with criminal heritage.

¹ To "lustrate" is an archaic verb meaning to purify ceremonially as a means of removing bloodguiltiness and cleansing a house.

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Editor's note: *Estonia's President Lennart Meri told journalists on 13th May 1989 that Estonia was going to establish a commission to investigate crimes against humanity committed in the country between 1939 and 1991. Meri's announcement followed the summit in Riga at which the three Baltic presidents agreed to set up such commissions in each country. Meri said at the time, "Certain forces that are not interested in the Baltic States' stability are manipulating some tragic incidents in our past and are using (them) against us."*

In Lithuania, the Parliament (Seimas) resolved on 27th May 1998 that mass deportations to the USSR are to be treated as war crimes. Suitable amendments have been made to Lithuania's Penal Code. Torture, murder, deportation and similar actions are acts of genocide and are not subject to the statutes of imitations. The people of Lithuania have been asked to submit evidence to the Procurator-General.

On 25th June 1998, Seimas passed a law, banning former KGB agents from holding positions in government and state bodies for 10 years. The law, which was initiated by parliamentary speaker Vytautas Landsbergis, also recommended that such persons not be allowed to work as lawyers or in key industries, private security companies, or the communications sector. The law was not to apply to those who left the KGB before 12th March 1990. At the request of President Adamkus, however, Seimas agreed on 16th July 1998 not to enact this law until 1st January, 1991. In the meantime, the Constitutional Court will be asked to rule whether this bill is constitutional. The only earlier attempt to pass a lustration law in Lithuania failed in 1991.

In September, 1998, Lithuanian President Valdas Adamkus set up an international commission to examine war crimes committed during the Nazi and Soviet occupation of Lithuania. The commission's main function is "to investigate the World War Two period and the immediate aftermath in order to come up with answers to various questions concerning Jewish and Lithuanian genocide." The commission will be headed by parliamentary deputy Emanuelis Zingeris.

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The Church in Occupied Lithuania: An Alternative Political Order?

"Churches served an important dual role as both spiritual and political centerpieces of the community". This "dual role" of the Church, in combination with other factors, was central to the maintenance of a Lithuanian ethnic identity and contributed to Lithuania's ability to make the Declaration of Independence on March 11, 1990. Catholicism, and its importance in the maintenance of identity led one writer to put it that under Soviet occupation,

the Church still remained 'obstacle number one' to the country's political subjugation.²

It is this link between the church and the political which I wish to explore. For Smith,

a nation is a political community only in so far as it embodies a common culture and a common social will.³

Arguably, the Church in Lithuania was a mediator and disseminator of part of the "common culture"; transmogrifying and reinforcing the "common social will" which was the drive to independence. Thus, the move towards the "national state" of independent Lithuania in 1990 was facilitated in both a cultural *and* a political sense by the Church in its role as a fundamental "ethnic identity marker".

¹ G. Hartman, "The Origins and Growth of Baltic Nationalism as a Force for Independence" *Lituanus: The Lithuanian Quarterly* vol. 38, no. 3, 1992, pp. 69-87.

² V. Matusaitis (trans.), "Catholics in Soviet-Occupied Lithuania", *Chrétiens De L'Est*, vol. 27, 1980.

³ A. Smith, "National Identity and the Idea of European Unity" in P. Gowan and P. Anderson (eds.) *The Question of Europe*, London: Verso, 1977; pp. 318-342.

Michael Bourdeaux puts it that

Catholicism in [Lithuania] has for hundreds of years been the religion of the people, rather than of the government, and of an oppressed non-Russian nation, as opposed to the Russian colonial power⁴.

During the interbellum period of independence, the Catholic Church was involved in a lot more than just the dissemination of religion. It had societies, youth organisations, publishing houses, schools, libraries, monasteries and charitable institutions. All these activities became illegal under the post-1940 Soviet rule⁵ as part of a wider plan of Lithuanian de-ethnicisation⁶.

Today, this would be called a form of 'ethnic cleansing'. Yet, Hartman argues that when the Soviet Union annexed Lithuania, the Kremlin's recognition of each Baltic State as "a distinct political subordinate" ('*autonomous*' republic) was "tacit acknowledgement of the right to exist as an individual entity"⁷. Such *political* considerations were drawn sharply into focus by the Soviet occupation; as was "the synthesis between church and nationality"⁸.

The Church was seen as anti-Soviet, and was thoroughly persecuted as such. Senn puts it that

throughout the years of Soviet rule, many Lithuanians [saw] the Roman Catholic

⁴ M. Bourdeaux, *Land of Crosses*, Chulmleigh, UK: Augustine Publishing Company, 1979, p. 294.

⁵ L. Bourdeaux and M. Bourdeaux, *Ten Growing Soviet Churches*, Northampton, UK: Marc Europe, 1987, pp. 152-153.

⁶ V. Taskunas, "The Importance of Lithuanian Ethnic Identity during Russification" in Fennell, T G (ed.) *Baltic Studies in Australia*, Adelaide: AABS (Australian Section) vol. 3, 1997.

⁷ G. Hartman, "The Origins and Growth of Baltic Nationalism as a Force for Independence" *Lituanus: The Lithuanian Quarterly* vol. 38, no. 3, 1992, p. 78.

⁸ M. Bourdeaux, *Land of Crosses*, Chulmleigh, UK: Augustine Publishing Company, 1979, p. 295.

*Church's struggle for survival in the land as a part of their own national consciousness*⁹.

Not surprisingly, the 19th century tactics of underground publication were revived in the face of the Soviet regime, one of the most successful of these being *The Chronicle of the Catholic Church in Lithuania*, a record of Soviet attempts to destroy this Lithuanian identity marker.¹⁰

Bourdeaux puts it that

the *Chronicle* became the linchpin of the whole movement of human rights and religious liberty in Lithuania from the moment the first number appeared on 19 March 1972¹¹.

The *Chronicle* started in obscurity, but quickly gained influence both within Lithuania, and more importantly, abroad¹². As much as it was a record of Soviet suppression of a *specifically* Catholic agenda, the *Chronicle* became an important focus of Lithuanian ethnic identity from within the framework of the Church.

Senn argues that, in addition, "the Church provided an institutional alternative to the Soviet order"¹³. The Soviet order monopolized the *political* discourse and prohibited the free competition of political ideas, as well as brutally suppressing the expression of faith. The Church became an *alternative political space* within a totalitarian regime. It was, for many, a symbol of the

⁹ A. Senn, *Lithuania Awakening*, Berkeley, USA: University of California Press, 1990, p. 8.

¹⁰ T. Remeikis (ed), *The Violations of Human Rights in Soviet Occupied Lithuania (in) 1981*, Melbourne, Australian Lithuanian Community, 1982, p. 16.

¹¹ M. Bourdeaux, *Land of Crosses*, Chulmleigh, UK: Augustine Publishing Company, 1979, p. 253.

¹² P. Dauknyš, *The Resistance of the Catholic Church in Lithuania Against Religious Persecution*, Rome: Pontificia Studiorum Universitas, 1984, p. 58.

¹³ A. Senn, *Lithuania Awakening*, Berkeley, USA: University of California Press, 1990, p. 8.

political struggle. The groups identification of believers became synonymous with that of the nation's aspirations via such an ethnic identification, in the same way that environmental concerns were to become charged with "a common enemy – the Soviet Union – and a common goal – independence"¹⁴.

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Lithuanian Talks of Communist Ban

VILNIUS, Lithuania, 9th December 1998 (AP) – Parliament Speaker, Vyatautas Landsbergis, has introduced a bill to ban former Communists from serving in high-level government positions. Landsbergis, a top leader of the drive for independence from the Soviet Union, succeeded this year in passing a bill banning ex-KGB members from any public and private-sector jobs, but the measure was vetoed by President Valdas Adamkus, who says Lithuanians must start abandoning resentments brewed in their troubled past.

The law, submitted on Tuesday, 8th December 1998, would prevent ex-Communists from serving in parliament, national government and a wide range of other official posts. The ban would not apply to current members of parliament or government, and it would only remain in effect for five years.

Landsbergis was quoted by the Baltic News Service as saying that the law was needed to set the historical record straight about abuses during the Communist era. But a top opposition politician, Ceslovas Juršenas, characterized the bill as unconstitutional and "an act of revenge," the Baltic News Service said.

¹⁴ A. Banks, "My Country, My Nature", *Australasian Political Studies*, 1997, Adelaide: Flinders University of South Australia, 1997, pp. 19-41.

The 125th Anniversary of the Founding of the Shevchenko Society and the 80th Anniversary of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences

One hundred and twenty five years ago, the Shevchenko Scientific Society was established in Lviv on the initiative of distinguished scholars and leaders from both Russian and Austrian occupied Ukraine on December 11, 1873. Eighty years ago, on November 14, 1918, the Ukrainian Academy was established in Kyiv. On July 14, 1921, the Academy was renamed the All-Ukrainian Academy on Sciences in order to underscore the fact that membership in the Academy is open to all Ukrainian scholars and scholars of Ukrainian studies from around the world.

The Shevchenko Scientific Society gained wide recognition and scholarly prestige during the presidency of the preeminent Ukrainian historian, Mykhailo Hrushevsky, in the years of 1897-1913. In the period between the First and Second World Wars, it continued to perform a leading role, not only in the development and expansion of the sciences, but also in culture and literature. Thousands of volume from various fields of scholarship were published by the Society. When, in the autumn of 1939, western Ukraine was occupied by Soviet troops, one of the first targets of the new Soviet regime was the Shevchenko Scientific Society as a "centre of bourgeois Ukrainian nationalism," and was liquidated early in 1940. many esteemed members of the Society were arrested and deported without trial into the interior of the USSR. The society's rich library was ransacked; much of it was destroyed, while priceless old books and rare manuscripts were plundered away.

In 1947 the leading members of the Society, who found themselves in West Germany, decided to revive the Shevchenko Scientific Society under the leadership of Professor Dr. Ivan Rakovsky, the last legitimate President of the Society in Lviv. Subsequently, separate Shevchenko Scientific Society organisations were established in Europe, the United States, Canada and Australia, each functioning within the existing laws of their respective countries, yet jointly acting under the coordinating organ of the Supreme Council of Shevchenko Scientific Societies. In reality, all these individual Shevchenko Scientific Societies are the same institution, based on the same principles and have the same basic objective: to develop Ukrainian scholarship and science. The Shevchenko Scientific Society renewed its activities in Lviv on October 2, 1989.

The activity of the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, especially during the 1920's, earned worldwide recognition. Initially, the Soviet regime regarded the work of the Academy with suspicion, but it was not until the late 1920's that it began to intrude into the Academy's affairs. In the end, the mounting ideological attacks resulted in an annihilation of Ukrainian culture and scholarship. Innumerable Academy members and co-workers, particularly those in the humanities, were liquidated or deprived of the possibility to pursue their scholarly endeavours. The Soviet regime prohibited even the mention of their names and their contributions; their manuscripts were confiscated and destroyed. By 1930, the Academy was turned into an organ of the Soviet government and a political and ideological tool of the Communist Party.

On November 6, 1945, in a displaced persons camp in Augsburg, West Germany, the Free Ukrainian Academy of Sciences (UVAN) was established with the mission of continuing the traditions of the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. The distinguished historian, Dmytro Doroshenko, was elected its first President. Thereafter, it has upheld and furthered free and genuine Ukrainian scholarly traditions. In 1950, the seat was moved to the United States and incorporated in the State of New York. A branch was formed in Canada.

Since Ukraine's independence in 1991, both the Shevchenko Scientific Society and the Ukrainian Free Academy of Sciences have established close cooperative ties with Ukrainian scholars worldwide. Currently, during this rebirth of the Ukrainian State, the Shevchenko Scientific Society and the Ukrainian Free Academy of Sciences are focusing upon the major task of furthering the growth of science and scholarship in Ukraine while continuing their scholarly endeavours in the West. The Ukrainian Congress Committee of America congratulates both institutions on the anniversaries of their founding and calls upon all Ukrainian-Americans to support their important efforts.

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