

# ABN

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## CORRESPONDENCE

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*Freedom for Nations! Freedom for Individuals!*

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## ABN CORRESPONDENCE

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Zeppelinstr. 67, 8000 München 80.

Editorial Staff: Board of Editors  
Editor-in-Chief: Mrs Slava Stetsko, M.A.  
Zeppelinstr. 67  
8000 München 80, Germany

Tel: 48 25 32

Fax: 48 65 19

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## A word from the Editor....

In this issue of ABN Correspondence we commemorate the tenth anniversary of two sad events – the world's most tragic nuclear catastrophe in Chornobyl and the death of one of the founders of ABN and long-time president Yaroslav Stetsko.

The cover-up of the Chornobyl disaster by Moscow is described in an article by Ihor Diaboha and the long-range psychological effects are detailed in the article "The Chornobyl Nuclear Catastrophe and the High-Risk Potential for Mental Retardation" by Ivan Holowinsky. To this day, the long-range effects of the nuclear disaster are not clear. However, some political analysts claim that it was Moscow's cover-up of the immediate dangers of radiation not only to the West but to the populations of Ukraine and Belarus and the total disregard for human life that in the end propelled the ongoing struggle for national independence which led to the imminent collapse of the Soviet Union.

In the article "How Yeltsin's Exploitation of Ethnic Nationalism brought down an Empire", Roman Laba writes that many believed that Ukraine would never part from Russia. But, in fact, Ukraine's subsequent secession could be credited with precipitating the eventual fall of the Soviet Russian Empire.

The Soviet empire fell, but Russia's imperialistic desires have not ceased. If Yaroslav Stetsko were alive today, he would probably insist that the work of ABN continue steadfastly until all the nations still imprisoned in Russia's new empire attain not only the right to self-determination but the right to national independence.

As a tribute to this great leader, we have reprinted an article written by Volodymyr Mazur after Yaroslav Stetsko's death in 1986.

With four years left to the turn of the century, Tunne Kelam offers some comments for thought on the future of the European Union, the integration of Eastern Europe into the EU and the role that Russia should play within these new political configurations.

Volodymyr MASUR

## **Yaroslav Stetsko Prominent Statesman of the 20th Century**

*(The following article first appeared in ABN Correspondence in 1986 after the death of ABN President Yaroslav Stetsko. As a 10th anniversary commemoration of the ABN leader's death, ABN Correspondence is reprinting this revised version for its readers.)*

In his lifetime, he was the head of the Ukrainian National Government proclaimed in Lviv, Western Ukraine, on June 30, 1941; Head of the Leadership of the OUN for many years; co-founder and President of the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations (ABN); member of the Honorary Presidium of the European Freedom Council (EFC); and member of the Executive Board of the World Anti-Communist League (WACL). In Ukraine, Yaroslav Stetsko was already an active member of the Ukrainian Military Organisation (UVO) and the OUN at a very early age. Having become a member of the National Executive of the revolutionary OUN in Ukraine, he was made responsible for ideology. In 1937 Col. Yevhen Konovalts authorised Yaroslav Stetsko to organise the OUN Congress in Rome. From 1940 he was Deputy Head of the Leadership of the Revolutionary OUN, becoming a member of the Presidium of the Leadership of the OUN in 1945, and then the head of the Leadership of the OUN abroad. While still a young man, Yaroslav Stetsko edited the underground publications of the OUN. For his underground activities he was arrested several times and spent many years in Polish and Nazi German prisons and concentration camps. He was an ideologue of Ukrainian nationalism who actively developed nationalist teaching in both theory and practice, but always in the spirit of a Christian world view. Yaroslav Stetsko was also one of the most notable strategists of the Ukrainian liberation struggle. In addition, the late Ukrainian leader was also a notable publicist and author of many articles and essays which were always known for their deep analysis of events or issues and their treatment of the matter of the sovereign Ukrainian state. He did not only write under his own name, but worked under several pseudonyms, among them E. Orlovsky, B. Ozersky, Z. Karbovykh, Yu. Pidlesetsky and S. Osinsky. In his book June 30, 1941, he left us a program of political directives for the continuing struggle for further advance and progress. His works in Ukrainian and other languages formulated Ukrainian political thought, influenced various political statesmen of many nationalities, and waged the world struggle against communism.

Yaroslav Stetsko proved himself to be a distinguished diplomat, statesman and organiser of the worldwide forces for the struggle against the Russian empire in the form of the USSR and the independence of every subjugated nation.

He was a man of principle. He was humane, warm and kind to his friends, but unyielding in the fight against the enemy of Ukraine. To us he was very demanding, but from himself he demanded even more. He was a deeply religious person and, therefore, constantly propagated the establishment of a Ukrainian Patriarchate and strove towards its realisation, as a faithful son of the Church and as a statesman who was aware that a Patriarchate is part of the renaissance of the Ukrainian state. It was he who constantly urged the Ukrainian people to strive for the establishment of the Patriarchates of both Ukraine's historical Churches – the Ukrainian Catholic Church and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church. He always strove towards the unification of all parts of Ukraine, ascribing a prominent place for the capital of Ukraine, Kyiv. As Prime Minister of Free Ukraine, Yaroslav Stetsko was prepared to hand over power to the Ukrainian government in a liberated Kyiv.

Yaroslav Semenovych Stetsko was born on January 19, 1912, in Ternopil, in Western Ukraine, into the family of a priest. He studied at Cracow and Lviv Universities. Already as a young man Yaroslav Stetsko joined the UVO and later the OUN. For his activities in these organisations, he was arrested several times by the Polish occupational regime in Ukraine. In 1932 he became a member of the National Executive of the OUN in Ukraine. He was responsible for ideological matters.

During the Lviv Trial in 1936, the Leader of the OUN, Stepan Bandera, fearlessly stated the following words to the Polish judge: "The OUN has a high regard for the life of its members. But our idea is so great that in order to achieve its realisation, not individuals, not hundreds, but millions of victims have to be sacrificed."

During the same trial, the young nationalist and political activist, Yaroslav Stetsko, who worked very closely with Stepan Bandera, said the following: "I believe that the Ukrainian state exists. It has a potential existence in the hearts of the Ukrainian nation. Although it does not exist in practice, it exists morally and rightfully in our souls. The substance of my whole life is, has always been and always will be, a free Ukraine, a unified Ukraine – a Ukraine without slaves and without masters. I believe in victory. I believe in it so strongly that I am prepared to die for it. Nothing will make me turn off this path, neither torture, nor the hell of prison, nor even death..."

Such was the character of Yaroslav Stetsko – a man of iron determination, although weak in health, a man of principle, a man dedicated to a great idea – the idea of nationalism which will overcome all opposition.

In 1937 Yaroslav Stetsko was released from Polish prison due to an amnesty and once again deeply engaged himself in the core of OUN activity. In 1939, together with Stepan Bandera and others, he played an active part in organising the Second Great Congress of the OUN. He was also active in the new Great Congress of the Revolutionary OUN held in Cracow in 1941.

International events developed very rapidly and it soon became clear that they would lead to a clash between the two imperialist powers of that

time: Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia. War between Germany and the Soviet Union grew closer but only the Revolutionary OUN made any realistic preparations to meet the oncoming situation. After WWII passed onto Ukrainian territory and the NKVD was still shooting innocent Ukrainians in the prisons of Lviv and other towns of Western Ukraine, a Ukrainian battalion under the command of Roman Shukhevych entered Lviv. At this time, the OUN Marching Groups were making extensive preparations for a long expedition to the Dnipro and Don Rivers. Under these circumstances, Yaroslav Stetsko, in conjunction with the Leadership of the OUN, was making his own preparations for the formation of a Ukrainian government and the declaration of the restoration of the Ukrainian state, irrespective of the hostile stance of Berlin and Moscow. In his book *June 30, 1941*, Yaroslav Stetsko mentioned the measures taken with a view to creating a National Assembly – a Council of Elders based “on the model of the old historic Ukrainian councils in the Princely and Hetman eras”,... On July 6, 1941, prominent Ukrainian activists were called together and a Council of Elders was elected. The President of the Ukrainian National Republic, Kost' Levytsky; archpriest Rev. Yosyf Slipyj; Rev. Julian Dzerovych and Prof. Volodymyr Radzykevych were among the many other distinguished Ukrainian activists from various walks of life who were among the elected to the Council. The National Council of Elders gave its full support to the Act of June 30, recognizing it as an Act which had re-established a Ukrainian state – an Act which demonstrated to the whole world that Ukraine refused to collaborate with either fascism or communism. In one of its resolutions the Council made the following statement: “Those gathered here... urge all Ukrainian patriots to unite at this historic moment in order to re-establish the Ukrainian independent state and to recognize the leadership of the government proclaimed in Lviv on June 30, 1941”.

Both Ukrainian churches fully supported and blessed the Proclamation of June 30, 1941, as did all the leading forces of the Ukrainian nation. In Kyiv, people put up blue and yellow flags, reading and discussing for hours the information about the restoration of the Ukrainian state which the OUN had disseminated.

News that Petlura had died in Paris, but that an army commanded by Bandera was marching into Ukraine, spread in Eastern Ukraine. Ukrainian prisoners-of-war broke out of Nazi camps in order to serve in the army of Bandera.

That is why Dr. Dmytro Dontsov wrote in his article entitled *June 30, 1941*: “The Act of June 30 was an act which clearly stated that Ukraine does not renounce its legitimate right to rule over its own land, nor its own Truth, irrespective of sacrifices!”

We know that Hitler and Himmler demanded that the Act of June 30 be revoked immediately, and we also know that Nazi Germany received a dignified Ukrainian refusal. Neither the Leader of OUN, Stepan Bandera, nor the Prime Minister of the Ukrainian government, Yaroslav Stetsko, revoked this great Act. Both they and other members of the Ukrainian

national, independent and sovereign governments, as well as hundreds and thousands of nationalists, men and women, preferred to suffer in concentration camps rather than revoke the Ukrainian Truth and the Ukrainian Right.

In his work, *The Historic Act of a Nation*, Yaroslav Stetsko said: "The revolutionary army of a nation – the Ukrainian Insurgent Army – arose out of the initiative of a political organisation – the OUN. None of the independent insurgent otamans, the modern Zelenys and Makhnos, could or did initiate or lead an armed struggle against the occupant on a wide, national scale, without the political direction of the struggle to establish a state. Only the UPA, under the commandment of Gen. Roman Shukhevych-Chuprynka, was the military-political and revolutionary-national force which formed the political reality on the Ukrainian territories under its control, and potentially throughout the whole of Ukraine".

After a difficult term in Nazi concentration camps in Berlin and Sachsenhausen up until the late autumn of 1944, Yaroslav Stetsko was able to escape from the German police and Gestapo control in Berlin, in December of that year, just as the Commander-in-Chief of the UPA, Roman Shukhevych-Chuprynka, was able to escape the Gestapo at a railway station in Lviv in 1941. Having made his way to Munich, Germany, Yaroslav Stetsko remained in hiding up until the end of the war.

In 1945, he was elected member of the Presidium of the Leadership of the Revolutionary OUN, and from 1946 headed the ABN, which had been restored in the free world. The formation of the ABN reaches back to the forests of Zhytomyr where, under the initiative of Gen. Roman Shukhevych, the first conference of the subjugated nations took place in 1943. From the very beginning of the restoration of the ABN, Yaroslav Stetsko was actively and notably assisted by his wife, Mrs. Slava Stetsko, who was elected Executive Chairman of the ABN in 1982.

It was particularly in the field of Ukrainian foreign policy and of ABN that the Prime Minister of Ukraine clearly demonstrated his diplomatic talent, his abilities as a great statesman, and his creative initiative. He was also the co-founder of the World Anti-Communist League (WACL), as well as the European Freedom Council (EFC), over which he co-presided for many years.

Yaroslav Stetsko visited many countries, concluded political agreements and searched for new friends and allies of Ukraine. All his work was in close cooperation with the Leader of the OUN, Stepan Bandera. He also kept in contact with the Commander-in-Chief of the UPA, Leader of the OUN in Ukraine, and Head of the underground movement in Ukraine (Supreme Ukrainian Liberation Council – UHVR), Gen. Chuprynka-Shukhevych, up until his death in battle in Bilohorshcha, Ukraine, in 1950.

Together with his wife Slava, Yaroslav Stetsko made many, often tiring trips, meeting with representatives of various governments, members of parliament, military men, such as Gen. J. F. C. Fuller, Gen. John K. Singlaub and others and with prominent journalists. He gave many radio

and television interviews. At the same time, as Leader of the OUN since 1968 Yaroslav Stetsko consistently paid careful attention to and strove towards the further development of the organisations of the Ukrainian Liberation Front, thinking of new ways of strengthening their position, of increasing their influence and of how to give active assistance to people inside Ukraine fighting against Soviet Russian tyranny and oppression.

The height of Yaroslav Stetsko's political-diplomatic activity was his meeting with the President of the United States, Ronald Reagan, in the White House in 1983, during the commemoration of the 40th anniversary of the proclamation of Captive Nations' Week. President Reagan had been prepared for this meeting by various memoranda from the Leader of the OUN and was aware that he was speaking with the Prime Minister of the Ukrainian government of 1941. The President and his government placed great value on the alternative developed and propounded by Yaroslav Stetsko, of revolutionary liberation uprisings of the subjugated nations in place of nuclear war, which would only lead mankind into the abyss. Shortly afterwards, in the presence of Ukrainian representatives of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America and the organisations of the World Ukrainian Liberation Front, President Reagan remarked in a White House statement: "Your struggle is our struggle, Your dream is our dream!"

The late Yaroslav Stetsko was a distinguished statesman on an international scale. His colossal assiduity is clearly shown in the joint conference of the ABN and EFC, held in London in November 1985, which was attended by 287 delegates and hundreds of observers from all over the world, including the subjugated nations, as well as spokesmen from the freedom fighters of Afghanistan, Vietnam, Nicaragua, Cuba and other countries. Various members of parliament and ministers from free countries – the USA, Canada, Great Britain, Germany, Italy, India, France and Scandinavia also took part in the conference. It is no easy matter to organise and put into motion such a vast complex and complicated international "machine". It required much knowledge, time, energy, enthusiasm and complete dedication.

In his work, *The Historic Act of a Nation*, Yaroslav Stetsko noted that "in an era such as this there is no room for people with the hearts of rabbits, who have pretensions to be lions". He also stressed that "a nation with high ideals loves, strives for and is enraptured by greatness and great men" and that "the governing of a state is an art rather than a science".

Working at the very heights of political and diplomatic thought, Yaroslav Stetsko never forgot about the daily needs of life, about the development of the Ukrainian community outside Ukraine and about the help needed by the Church and its faithful in their struggle for complete recognition of the Ukrainian Patriarchate.

The Soviet Russian press constantly followed up the public appearances of the Head of the Leadership of the OUN and President of the ABN, at times to a greater degree than some of the Ukrainian press abroad. Moscow attempted to assassinate this Ukrainian activist, hated by the

Kremlin, and to undermine his authority and influence in the Ukrainian community and the Western world in general by means of slander, defamation and lies. *Literaturna Ukraina*, a publication from occupied Kyiv, often attacked him, distorting his ideas and thoughts. For example, on April 26, 1984, in an article entitled "Reagan's Economy and Unemployment", *Literaturna Ukraina* wrote: "Yaroslav Stetsko constantly repeats that in order to attain victory over Bolshevism, it is necessary to prepare arms and not trade!" At least here his idea has been accurately conveyed, although with a dosage of Russian impudence. On June 27, 1985, *Literaturna Ukraina* wrote the following distorting truth: "Bourgeois-nationalist obscurantists assure us that they will never cease to orientate themselves on foreign powers, or serve the interventionists... 'Nuclear war', as the OUN Leader, Yaroslav Stetsko, points out; can save Christianity..."

It is evident here that Moscow feared the anti-nuclear ideas of the Leader of the Revolutionary OUN, in particular. The propagation of national-liberation revolutions of the subjugated nations was, after all a direct contradiction of nuclear war!

The following are quotes taken from statements by the late Yaroslav Stetsko delivered on various occasions throughout the world:

"The OUN was, is and will be a great guiding light, as it was 50 years ago, up until the restoration of an independent sovereign Ukrainian state."

"Western officials are increasingly leaning towards the concepts of the OUN – the national-liberation revolutions of the subjugated nations."

"Our liberation strategy of coordinated national revolutions is correct, and the West is increasingly beginning to accept our concepts. This is the sole alternative to an all-destructive nuclear war."

"The issue of the Patriarchate is a national issue. It is a matter of spiritual Ukrainian statehood. We support every measure taken in this direction by both of Ukraine's historic Churches."

"To the question on unity and cooperation: there cannot be any unity with those who capitulate or are potential turncoats."

"Wars of liberation are holy wars for freedom and justice. If the West supports us then it will help itself in turn... The Kremlin is already living on a volcano."

"The decay and downfall of empires, the victory of national principles in every aspect of international politics in the entire world are characteristics of our era."

"If the US gives aid to the subjugated nations then it will become a revolutionary liberation force, whereas the Soviet Union is a reactionary force."


"The idea of nationalism is a solution to current world problems because nationalism solves problems on the basis of national communities. All other ideas – the balance of power and containment, will fail. Nationalism alone can oppose a false system backed by Russian imperialism and chauvinism."

These are only a few excerpts from statements by the late Yaroslav Stetsko. His work must be read and reflected upon. They are a continuation and the epitome of Ukrainian nationalist thought and doctrine. They are also a guide for us along the hard, but never retracting victorious road of struggle for the rights of our nation – for our rights!

What distinguished Yaroslav Semenovych Stetsko from others was his sharpness of mind, his quick reactions, his clear treatment of every issue, and his firm belief in the victory of Kyiv in the struggle against Moscow, of St. Sophia against the false Soviet Russian atheist Zagorsk. As a person he was also distinguished in the warmth and kindness he showed to his friends – to political adherents.

Throughout his active life, his works, his contacts with the foreign world, his part in the struggle against Moscow, and his development of the Ukrainian national-liberation idea – his great work and enormous personal sacrifice – the Prime Minister of Ukraine, Yaroslav Stetsko, proved to be an equal to other great historic Ukrainian figures.

Let the honor and glory of this son of Ukraine be eternal and our destiny: to continue in his spirit.



January 19, 1912 — † July 5, 1986

## Chornobyl 1986-1996

Though it wasn't as instantly devastating as were the first nuclear explosions over Hiroshima and Nagasaki, nor was it as stressfully threatening as the Three Mile Island incident in the United States, the nuclear accident 10 years ago in Chornobyl earned its own place in history by becoming synonymous with mankind's most negligent, irresponsible and malicious abuse of atomic energy.

The obvious horrible results of this calamity were the widespread nuclear contamination of the environment in Ukraine, Belarus and Russia as well as development of serious health problems for anyone who came in touch with the irradiated precipitate. On the positive side, the accident raised international civic consciousness about the fragility of nuclear energy and the need to deal with it responsibly, forced the reappraisal of several national nuclear energy programs.

Furthermore, it changed the shape of the world. Had the Kremlin even superficially suspected the possibility of the fourth, then still obscure outcome of the accident and its designs to conceal it from the world, the former Soviet bosses would have chosen to be totally forthcoming with their information and guilt. Political observers and government officials are convinced that everything associated with Chornobyl became the final cause of the demise of the feared seven-decade-old Soviet Union.

"Without a doubt," declared Yuriy Shcherbak, Ukraine's ambassador to the United States. "Chornobyl, to a great extent, contributed to the collapse of the Soviet empire."

"I saw the process of destruction of the Communist Party from the inside, when that, which cemented the party, discipline and more-or-less belief in what it was doing, fell apart in front of my eyes after Chornobyl," Shcherbak described in a telephone interview. "Massively people in Ukraine understood that the party deceived them, endangered the lives of their children, exposed them to danger, and brutally cheated. For the first they believed what the Western propaganda had been telling them all the time that the regime was harsh, the kind that would mislead the people."

The undoing of the workers' paradise and the rearrangement of the political make-up of the globe at the close of the 20th century was an irresponsible, unlawful act committed by unskilled personnel.

"The reason Chornobyl happened is because of an illegal event, when certain technicians undertook it upon themselves to perform certain experiments, which they were unauthorized to do and which they

had no right to do," explained Dr. Herman Glaser, professor emeritus of physics at Hofstra University and former chairman of the department.

"Russia (sic) acted like an outlaw nation. They didn't care. They were a nuclear power. They had the fire power. Nobody was going to challenge them," Glaser continued, displaying irritability in his voice. "They behaved irresponsibly and got away with it."

On April 26, 1986, at about 1:24 in the morning, mankind came perilously close to experiencing the world's first peacetime nuclear detonation and a day and a half later the name Chornobyl, which translates as the worm wood weed, located in marshlands 105 kilometers north of the capital of Ukraine, Kyiv, was burned into the civilization's memory.

Ten years ago Chornobyl, the namesake of the facility some 15 kilometers away, had a population of 12,500 people while Prypiat, three kilometers away, had 45,000. In the capital there were 2.5 million inhabitants. The streams and rivers in the region feed not only the surrounding farmlands but the river Dnipro, one of the longest in Europe, which empties into the Black Sea and the remainder of the planet's bodies of water. The people and environment were exposed to dangerous levels of radiation has irradiated dust particles settled on men, women and children, their food, livestock, land and equipment.

The RBMK-1000 nuclear reactor in unit 4 of the Chornobyl Atomic Energy Station, built in 1977, was considered to be the most modern in the Soviet Union, but, according to Glaser, it was known to the industry for its innate instability. The reactor exploded in a blast of steam, flaming graphite and deadly radionuclides and vented radioactive dust into the atmosphere. The cloud not only covered Ukraine, Belarus, Russia and Eastern Europe but also portions of other regions of the world.

David Marples of the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies at the University of Alberta, Edmonton, Alta., described in his 1988 book, titled "The Social Impact of the Chornobyl Disaster," what happened that fateful day:

"It was rather like driving a car with the accelerator floored and the brakes on — it was abnormal and unstable. Indeed, it is a very serious error in this reactor design to try to run with all the control rods out. The main reason is that some of these same rods are used for emergency shutdown, and if they are all pulled out well above the core, it takes too long for them to fall back into the high-power part of the reactor in an emergency, and the shutdown is very slow."

Marples continued: "In any event, within 4 seconds, the power had risen to perhaps 100 times full power and had destroyed the reactor.

"The power surge put a sudden burst of heat into the uranium fuel and it broke up into little pieces. The heat from these pieces caused a rapid boiling of the cooling water, and a number of pressure tubes burst under the strain. The steam escaped from the pressure tubes, burst the metal container around the graphite, and lifted the concrete shield on top of the reactor. This broke all the remaining pressure tubes.

"The power surge destroyed the top half of the reactor core, the building immediately above the reactor, and some of the walls on either side. The Soviets commented somewhat ironically that the leaktight compartments below the reactor survived intact.

"Some burning fragments of fuel and graphite were thrown out in the explosion, and landed on the roof of the adjacent turbine building, causing about 30 fires on the asphalt roof and elsewhere. The Soviets' first priority was to put these out, so the damage would not spread to the three reactors operating nearby. Local firefighters had extinguished all the fires by 5 a.m., but at a terrible personal cost: many of them were overexposed to radiation and were among the early casualties."

During a recent interview in his office in Hofstra's Adams Hall, Hempstead, N.Y., Glaser expressed dismay at what happened a decade ago: "It's well known throughout the whole industry that they built plants that were of great danger. They knew, they disregarded it, they didn't care, they had little regard for people's lives." Seated behind his desk, from which he is barely visible what with the stacks of envelopes and papers on top of it, Glaser, an archetypical scientist with grey-white, combed-back hair and buttoned cardigan, persisted with his accusations against the Soviet regime: "The whole world was well aware of it. There's a big danger there, especially because the Russians were irresponsible."

Glaser emphasized that the biggest danger of the RBMKs was the lack of safety mechanisms. "It was known that the reactor could run wild. In Russia they didn't care," he said. "When you're dealing with irresponsible people, irresponsible events happen."

Dr. Donald Rhodes, an occupational safety and health expert, said Ukraine experienced 10 years ago incredible devastation and today all of the country is still affected.

"A Russian researcher at MIT spent 18 months studying the remains of the reactor and determined that the initial explosion did lead to a complete core meltdown," Rhodes explained in a telephone interview. "The actual amount of radioactive materials released into the atmosphere was as much as four to five times greater than preceding estimates."

Rhodes, president of Comco Inc., a Bellflower, Calif., consulting company, and adjunct professor at California State University and visiting professor at the International Science and Technology Institute in Kyiv, said, "185-250 million curies of radioactive materials were released in the first 10 days of the Chernobyl disaster, not the 50 million that was claimed by the officials." By comparison, he clarified, 1 curie is the amount of radioactivity in 1 gram of radium and the U.S. Department of Energy estimates that if as little as 10 millionths of a curie of plutonium is inhaled, it can cause cancer.

"The amount of energy that was released was estimated by the Soviet Atomic Energy Institute to be 10 times greater than the amount of radioactive substances released at Hiroshima, with the addition of 1,000 lbs. of plutonium," continued Rhodes, who has visited Ukraine five times

since 1991 and is in constant touch with Ukrainian nuclear scientists. "They were estimating that about 50 tons of radioactive particles were distributed over an area, inhabited by 5-7 million people."

Radioactive material and equipment, used to remove the contamination, have been deposited at more than 800 locations and now they also need to be monitored and cleaned. The radioactive lifespan of this equipment is comparatively short, at most months or a few years, Glaser said, but the 205 tons of nuclear fuel buried in the sarcophagus will remain dangerous for centuries.

In the first days after the explosion, 14,000 children were exposed to very high doses of radioactive iodine, more than 200 rems. Twelve out of 25 oblasts of Ukraine were contaminated by the explosion and the Dnipro river continues to be recontaminated because it receives water from small rivers in the contaminated areas of Ukraine and Belarus.

Ultimately, about 3.2 million people were affected by radiation, according to Chornobyl Ministry and independent monitoring sources, nearly 200,000 people were evacuated from the 50,200 square-kilometer zone around the reactor and officials established a 30-kilometer exclusion area. The Chornobyl Ministry, quoting Health Ministry statistics, reported that of the affected population more than 125,000 people had died as of January 1 of this year. In excess of 20,000 of the deceased were individuals who were directly associated with the clean up and lived on the contaminated territory, the Ministry said.

"From the moment of the catastrophe, we have seen an annual increase in illnesses among the affected population. According to experts, Ukraine is approaching the time, when a new wave of sicknesses, provoked by Chornobyl, is possible," The Ministry said in a statement faxed from Kyiv.

"The main health disorders have been: gastrointestinal, which were noted to be inflammatory in the years immediately following the accident and ulcerative in later years; immunological, the homeostasis (natural balance) of which can be said to be genetically determined; metabolic, with disorders appearing 5-6 years after the accident; respiratory, primarily chronic obstructive bronchitis; and haemopoietic, blood disorders characterized by an increase or decrease in the number of white blood cells," Prof. Volodymyr Bebeszko, director of Ukraine's Institute of Clinical Radiology, wrote in a 1995 report for a symposium of the Uranium Institute. He also found that some patients demonstrated a reduced mental capacity, an inability to estimate their own abilities or to work.

Visitors to Ukraine still hear incredible stories about the former regime's careless reaction to the accident. One person recounted how during the height of the venting elementary school children in the town of Vyshhorod, some 15 kilometers north of Kyiv, closer to the site of the

accident than the capital, were not excused from their daily out-of-doors pageantry in honor of Lenin. The grand communist May Day parade in the capital city five days later one way or another brought out the throngs. Experts agree that if the people in the affected area were told of the accident and given a few drops of iodine in their beverages, the danger to their health would have been minimized. And then there was the unexcusable delayed evacuation, except for those fortunate enough to know someone in right the places who were quietly told, without explanations, to send the kids to relatives on the farm, far away from Kyiv, or to take a prompt vacation in the Carpathian mountains, to the west, or the Black Sea shore, to the south.

Wrote Marples: "However, as Lyubov Kovalevska, the former editor of the Prypiat newspaper *Trybuna Energetyka*, noted, no word was broadcast on the local radio until 12 noon on April 27, which was almost 35 hours after the accident occurred. Then, without explanation, the citizens were informed only that they were to be evacuated for three days."

Anatoliy Oliynyk, former first secretary of the Permanent Mission of Ukraine to the United Nations in New York City, currently reassigned to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Kyiv, recently bitterly recounted the events that spring, "Because my family and I were in Kyiv when the accident occurred, I do not have the moral right to sidestep the question of whether the people were informed in a timely manner of the impending life-threatening danger they faced."

Though Moscow and its surrogates in Ukraine hoped to conceal the accident not only from its citizens but also from the world, the demise of communism and the Soviet Union and the establishment of independence for Ukraine and Belarus opened the door to the hidden truth that the Kremlin leadership from Communist Party General Secretary and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev down to local party bosses did their utmost to cover up the Chornobyl accident.

Citing reports and memos from the once-powerful Communist Party Politburo, published in the April 16, 1992, edition of *Pravda Ukrainy*, Oliynyk said Soviet leaders were fully informed of the scope of the disaster but distorted the information for the people.

"Gorbachev ordered state-run media to avoid critical reporting on the Chornobyl explosion shortly after the disaster, according to secret documents, signed by Gorbachev. Soviet authorities claimed only 31 or 32 deaths. Western experts have said that anywhere from 500 to 7,000 people have died from cancer or other radiation-related illnesses. At greatest risk were an estimated 29,000 soldiers, workers, drivers and other persons recruited to clean up the area around the destroyed reactor," Oliynyk said.

"Many of these facts were kept from the public at the time of the accident. In a resolution dated May 29, 1986 — a month after the explosion — Gorbachev ordered the state-run media to stop concentrating

on the causes of the accident and to find positive aspects of the clean up. Gorbachev instructed state television, the state news agency TASS and other organs of the central press to devote more attention to such things as patriotism of workers involved in the clean up and the conditions of those who were evacuated. Gorbachev also ordered the state press to 'strengthen counter-propaganda measures' in order to 'unmask false inventions of the bourgeois press and the reports of special (intelligence) services on the Chornobyl events.'"

In recent years scores of people have been returning to the so-called hot region. The Chornobyl Ministry reported that some 200 families have returned to the restricted zone, while more than 10,000 families have resettled in the voluntary exclusion district.

Hofstra's Glaser said, "I think that whole region should be declared out of bounds over a wide enough area to get people away from there and keep them away," adding that people should be discouraged from returning.

Safety expert Rhodes seemed sympathetic if not fatalistic about their reasons for returning. "A lot of people, who are moving into Chornobyl, are older people who have spent most of their lives there. They want to be back in their homes. They would be happier to live out their lives there, in familiar surroundings."

"They're old and they're going to die soon and it's a way of life to be expected and they would rather die in their dachas, eat the vegetables they grow in their gardens," Rhodes pointed out.

As to be expected, life in the contaminated area is not safe, Rhodes said, "Let me put it this way, I would not want to live there."

Rhodes, referring to the famous Ukrainian black earth, which spawned the country's nickname of "the breadbasket of Europe," said radionuclides were transported "into the soil and the root systems and because so much of the area is arable land and grazing lands, dairy cattle and beef cattle feed and it just works its way up the food chain."

Without a doubt the region poses dangers to human health, he emphasized. "Radionuclides that were released include things like iodine 131, plutonium 239, cesium, strontium, all of which are causing mutagenic effects and cancer," Rhodes detailed.

The contamination has also hastened genetic mutations, he pointed out, citing a discovery of mutations in first and second generation yellow pine trees, when scientists usually consider the development of a mutation after five generations.

"One scientist also told me that there was a form of lizard there that went through a series of mutations that would have required 10,000 years to produce," Rhodes said. "So do I think it's dangerous, I think it is."

The government of Ukraine attempted to control the dispersion of radioactivity by building in October 1986 a huge concrete and stainless steel structure around the damaged reactor, sardonically known as a

sarcophagus. Ironically, the structure has not fulfilled its goal but rather has been a source of additional anxiety.

Though the Chernobyl Ministry claims the shelter is safe, Rhodes declared otherwise: "The sarcophagus is probably the most dangerous structure in the world. It's deteriorating. It was constructed quickly and my understanding is that it is deteriorating because of the speed with which it was constructed and the fact that the materials are being subjected to a lot of radiation."

Rhodes' self-proclaimed "greatest fear" is the sarcophagus' collapse. "If that structure falls or if the reactor's floor, which is sitting, propped up against rusted pipes inside the reactor, falls, that's going to release a huge cloud of radioactive particles. I've heard various amounts but 10,000 pounds would not be an inordinate estimate, but that might be conservative," he offered.

Tatyana Serbina, manager of the Chernobyl 10th anniversary preparations for Greenpeace-Ukraine, adamantly said the station continues to be a source of contamination and it must be closed. "All the work of our nuclear campaign is devoted to one main idea — close Chernobyl as soon as possible because it is still dangerous not only to Ukraine but to the whole world," Serbina said in a statement e-mailed from her office in Kyiv.

Greenpeace Ukraine, founded in 1990, is a direct outgrowth of the Chernobyl calamity. It evolved from the Children of Chernobyl project into a group consisting of more than 3,600 followers that provide material support to the organization, Serbina said. "Greenpeace Ukraine is financed only by the supporters of this organization and by the public. It is conducted in the form of annual membership dues, voluntary donations of private persons, subscription to the printed matter, at the expense of money obtained as a result of fund-raising actions and sales of some goods," she explained. "Greenpeace-Ukraine tries to achieve complete independence and doesn't receive any money from either business or state organizations. Special attention should be given to the fact that despite critical economic situation in the country, we get financial support from the citizens of Ukraine. Each day this support becomes much greater."

Serbina listed the following reasons for the organization's conclusion about the facility's persistent inherent hazard:

- There is a high and dangerous level of radiation in the zone;
- There is no one nuclear reactor in the world which is safe;
- The type of Chernobyl reactor RBMK was dangerous and not perfect from the very beginning;
- In the whole world there is still the unsolved problem of exhaust nuclear fuel, and this is a very big problem for Ukraine because its storage areas are overfilled and they are really not suitable for that;
- The technology on Chernobyl is old fashioned and the first reactor must be closed in 1997 due to this technology;

- The body of the reactor and sarcophagus has many cracks due to the process of aging and this is very dangerous to the people and nature, and
- Maybe the main factor is the human one which plays the main role in 99% of the time. There are no specialists in Ukraine or nuclear personnel skilled in solving appropriate questions and working on nuclear power plants. The nuclear school and nuclear specialists which helped Ukraine earlier remained in Russia.

Glaser concurred with the analysis of the threat posed by the unit and added that not only the facility should be sealed but the region, as well. He warned that if the cracks in the sarcophagus allow rainwater to enter the damaged reactor, pollution will drain into the countryside. "As water comes in, it increases the danger of polluting the water supply," he explained. "As water seeps down, you'll have radioactive water dispersing all over the place and therefore contaminating much of the supply."

Rhodes further noted that radioactivity is dispersed via rainwater and melting snow not only throughout the affected region, but well beyond. "(Radionuclides) entered the Prypiat river and so they're in the Dnipro and probably in the main reservoir because that water is taken from the Dnipro," he said. Then it winds up in the tapwater of all households in the area.

Principally because the Chornobyl Atomic Energy Station is today located on the territory of independent Ukraine while a decade ago the facility was the property of the Soviet Union, Kyiv is charged with the arduous task of simultaneously decontaminating the station and producing enough electrical energy to satisfy the needs of its 52 million inhabitants. The West, which is offering more concern than practical help, wants the unit shut and sealed, and Kyiv agreed to comply in November last year but since then has vacillated on its commitment because of a lack of money and a surplus of energy demands. The Chornobyl AES is capable of producing 11 billion kilowatts/hour of electricity, the Chornobyl Ministry said, or 6 percent of the country's needs. That's enough electricity for two cities the size of Kyiv, it noted.

Ambassador Shcherbak explained that Ukraine's virtually singular responsibility for cleaning up Chornobyl was sealed when in the wake of the USSR's break up in 1991 Kyiv was not given a share of Soviet Union's resources. The Politburo in Moscow and the Academy of Sciences, he said, did not allow Ukraine to assume a portion of the USSR's wealth and debt. "By way of a legal division of the debt and savings of the Soviet Union, we should have received our percentage for liquidating the effects of the Chornobyl catastrophe. Unfortunately that did not happen and Ukraine is forced to trudge alone."

The financial burden is calamitous. With economic hardships that are similar throughout the former Soviet Union, Ukraine is earmarking its own funds for the project. Ambassador Anatoliy Zlenko, Ukraine's chief delegate to the United Nations, in an interview in his mid-

Manhattan headquarters, broke down the statistics: "It is worthwhile to note that the principal weight for implementing all Chornobyl programs rests with the government. Recently new figures were published that show that since 1992 more than 5 percent of the national budget has been earmarked annually for the liquidation of the effects of the disaster. In dollar amounts this equals \$600 million. For 1993-1995 \$3 billion were spent. For that amount of money we could have built 50,000 apartments. During that period the allocations for the Chornobyl program were five times greater than for financing cultural and health programs."

Experts are convinced that the task of controlling the situation is too big for Ukraine to handle alone and Glaser and others are in agreement that the endeavor requires an international campaign. However, as Greenpeace's Serbina noted, the world is not especially interested. "As we could see from some of their statements they appreciate the danger but we do not see any attempts from their side to change the situation," she observed.

According to Zlenko, Ukraine looks to the United Nations as "the principal coordinator of the international efforts to liquidate the effects of the disaster." A senior diplomat, Zlenko, who was independent Ukraine's first foreign minister until the election of Leonid Kuchma as president, explained, "Today we regard as our main assignment to tap the opportunities of the U.N. system in order to draw attention of the international community to the Chornobyl problem."

Unfortunately, the international organization's funds are being quickly depleted, which poses one of two complications. "Over time the attention of the international community to the problems, connected with Chornobyl, has been ceaselessly falling," Zlenko noted, while, "International organizations and commissions of the United Nations are eager to give Ukraine needed assistance, however, they do not have the required funds." He fears that without additional aid on the part of the international community the United Nations' efforts in this respect will have to be terminated.

Nonetheless, international response to alleviate the effects of what he called "a great human tragedy" has not been absent but it came with strong reservations attached. "It must be stated that the help, which is given to Ukraine, has been predicated on the necessity of closing it, which, without a doubt, complicates the receipt of financial and material support," Zlenko said.

In a recent meeting with U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher, Zlenko's boss, Foreign Minister Hennadiy Udovenko said it was unreasonable for the West, notably the G-7 countries, to demand that Ukraine close the facility without providing alternative energy sources or funding for the country.

Udovenko said Ukraine's President Leonid Kuchma and the government are committed to decommissioning the plant. "However, we

would like to underscore that this would be an important technological, political and social challenge. Unfortunately, Western experts hold that shutting down the operative units will solve the safety problem," Udoenko said at a March 19 press conference in Kyiv. "And this is a totally wrong approach. More important is what to do with the damaged reactor and the shelter site."

The Foreign Minister emphasized that Ukraine is not able to handle all of the problems connected with closing the facility. "Without assistance, and a substantial one, we are not capable of doing this," he said.

Secretary of State Christopher, who met with Ukrainian officials in mid-March, gave the country an additional \$10 million in assistance with the Chernobyl humanitarian relief effort.

In addition to its own project, the International Scientific and Technological Center for Nuclear and Radiological Accidents, Zlenko said, "Right now in Ukraine foreign assistance is financing in whole or in part 49 projects and programs, geared toward studying the effects of radiation on the human being and the environment, safeguarding the population against radiation, diagnostics and remedies, treatment of radioactive waste. The total cost is \$20.5 million."

Shcherbak said the government of Ukraine has appealed to the United Nations for assistance but categorized its response as "meager."

The United States, he contends, understands the hazard due in great part to the efforts of the Ukrainian American community but it is not too deeply concerned. Shcherbak believes that the U.S. government's opinion was swayed from greater assistance by the predominant belief that the accident could only have happened in a communist country because of its backward technology. "I fear that this is a harmful illusion. In fact, it could happen in any atomic station on Earth."

Dr. Glaser, on the other hand, is confident that it could only have taken place in a communist country. "What happened in Russia (sic) will not happen elsewhere because they were out of control. It was a totally illegal event which should never have occurred and probably will never occur elsewhere because there is no other plant establishment like that in the world," he said.

Could it happen in the United States? Glaser was emphatic in his reply: "It cannot happen. It will never happen. There are laws, it's totally against the law."

Rhodes insisted that the level of international support to contain the contamination has been woefully inadequate. "This is not a crisis of Ukraine, this is a crisis of world proportions. Given the condition of their economy, they need assistance to do this," he said. Rhodes was particularly critical about the United States' ambivalent posture about the continuing threat posed by the effects of the Chernobyl disaster.

"We're taking a typical, very myopic, nationalistic view that if anything happens outside the United States, it really doesn't concern us,"

he said, noting that the Soviet Institute of Geography's estimate that as much as 60 percent of the former USSR is an "ecologic disaster zone" cannot be overlooked.

"You can't take one-sixth of the world's land mass and have that be an ecologic disaster zone and not have it affect the rest of the world," Rhodes said. "I think that this is something that we should be more concerned about as a nation but we can't even get our own country concerned about our own ecological problems."

Despite what happened in Chornobyl, Glaser maintains he is not opposed to the responsible development of nuclear energy. "The lesson to be learned is that you can't be irresponsible in the world and expect things not to happen. Irresponsible events lead to irresponsible conclusions," Glaser opined. "Responsible scientists wouldn't have allowed it to happen, irresponsible people were in control."

Nuclear power will play a role in mankind's future, he predicted. "It is inevitable and probably a very benevolent thing in the long run. Renewable power has a place and fossil fuel will ultimately be consumed. Nuclear fuel will play a role and a legitimate role and a proper role and there's nothing wrong with that as long as it is done in a responsible manner," Glaser offered. "Nuclear power will play its proper role in the future and we should keep that in mind looking at the consequences of Chornobyl."

On the positive side, Ambassador Zlenko is convinced "that the Chornobyl disaster significantly impacted the development of atomic energy around the world. Many nuclear programs, especially in European countries, were eliminated or curtailed. Many standards of radiation norms and food production were also reviewed."

Furthermore, Zlenko noted, "Chornobyl offers many lessons, not only for the countries which suffered because of it, but also for nuclear specialists and directors of the atomic sector. Chornobyl became a lesson for all of mankind about its responsibility for the fate of the world and future generations. It showed the kind of danger the atom carries, even though peaceful, and the effects of irresponsible behavior with the accomplishments of science and technology. Chornobyl demonstrated that there are global problems which can only be resolved by mutual efforts with the help of the entire international community."

Rhodes hopes the 10th anniversary of the disaster would force people to focus on Chornobyl again. "We are all a common humanity and we must help each other to prevent something like this from ever happening again. We must also work together as a common humanity to try to clean up the continuing legacy of Chornobyl so that more children are not affected by it," he said. "Chornobyl may be passed, but it's not over."

## **The Chernobyl Nuclear Catastrophe and the High-Risk Potential for Mental Retardation**

### **Introduction**

The Chernobyl nuclear explosion was a catastrophe of unprecedented dimensions in terms of health risk, sociopolitical implications, psychological impact, and scientific interest. Since May 1986, there have been more than 150 scientific publications in Western medical and academic journals about the health impact of Chernobyl in various countries, strange as it seems, while much appeared in Western medical and academic journals about the health impact of Chernobyl in various countries. Strange as it seems, while much appeared in Western scholarly journals about the catastrophe in 1986, 1987; the review of 1986 issues of *The Herald of Ukrainian Academy of Sciences*, did not reveal a single reference to Chernobyl. Part of the answer is provided in *The Herald of Ukrainian Academy Sciences*, 1990, 12, p. 35 where we read in part "...owing to the conditions of the command administrative, necessary early procedures were not utilised for the ecological safety of the population... only recently did the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR declare the republic as a zone of ecological disaster." Keep in mind that this has been written four years after the catastrophe and five years after Gorbachev's declaration of "*glasnost*". The same rationale for the cover-up utilised by the ruling Communist Party and "command-control" structure, was responsible for the secret trials of those responsible for the catastrophe. As explained by Medvedev in *The Legacy of Chernobyl*, proceeding of the trials were kept secret, not because classified information was divulged, but because the incident was too embarrassing.

The Chernobyl nuclear catastrophe also has strong sociopolitical ramifications since the "command-control" center responsible for the blunder is located in Moscow, while most of the victims are Ukrainians. This concern was mentioned in *The New York Times* report dated December 30, 1990. The report quoted Professor Hrodzinsky, a biologist at the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences as saying that "The public welfare demands that the republic have a primary role in the clean-up phase." Dr. Hrodzinsky also pointed out that the nuclear plant was put in a dangerous place, a highly populated region close to the capitol of Ukraine, Kyiv near "a major water system used by 46 million people." This was "an unforgivable blunder" as stated by Medvedev. However, in spite of past blunders and tragedy, Moscow still insists that the Ministry of

Power and Electrification of the USSR should retain control over all nuclear power plants on Ukrainian territory.

This paper will discuss the chronology and the magnitude of the nuclear catastrophe and its ramifications on health, and the high risk potential for mental retardation. Demographic data in reference to the incidence will be discussed, as well as remedial efforts, which may be needed in the future.

### **Chronology of The Catastrophe**

The explosion of the reactor occurred at 1:24 a.m. on April 26, 1986. In 4.5 seconds the power level of the reactor rose more than 2,000 fold according to Flavin in *Reassessing Nuclear Power: The Fallout from Chornobyl*. At that moment the 1,000 tonne concrete slab over the reactor was blasted away and the long-range ecological disaster and contamination began. A detailed chronology of the events leading to the explosion and the explosion itself have been documented by Snel in the introduction to Marples' *The Social Impact of the Chornobyl Disaster*.

It was more than twenty hours after the original explosion, according to Medvedev, when it was established that the graphite of the reactor core was burning and that the reactor continued to release enormous quantities of radioactivity and heat. With complete regard for public safety the Party Regional Committee in Pripyat instructed public schools to hold normal classes on Saturday, April 26, 1986. It was only at 2 p.m. on April 27, nearly 36 hours after the explosion, when 49,000 residents from Pripyat and others within a ten kilometer radius from the plant were evacuated. By that time the level of radiation emission reached its maximum. That maximum collective dose of external radiation, as reported by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission of the Chornobyl accident, received by the 135,000 evacuees was about 12 rems per person. It was not until Monday, April 28, when Swedish experts detected the radioactivity, that the Soviet government was forced to admit to the catastrophe. It seems that at the time when the worst danger was over, only then did officials in Kyiv take action to protect the population. The evacuation of children up to fourteen years of age did not begin until May 15. Children, their mothers and pregnant women were sent to summer camps. By that time the effects of initial exposure had occurred. For some unexplained reasons authorities paraded children through the streets of Kyiv on May 1, at the height of the contamination. It is clear that political expediency superceded concern for the children's health and safety. The decision to hold the parade was especially tragic since the radioiodine content in the air over Kyiv had peaked on May 1 (Medvedev).

The magnitude of the explosion was initially difficult to imagine. Medvedev reported that "hot debris of the Chornobyl reactor covered an area more than 5,000 km.sq. with nearly 20 millions curies of radionuclide."

Shemshuchenko *et. al* in the *Herald of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR* provided the following information on the contamination: in Ukraine 4,320 km.sq. were contaminated by cesium; 2,434 km.sq. by strontium and 412 km.sq. by plutonium. The danger zone includes 1,200 communities. Officially 90,251 persons were evacuated from the Ukrainian contaminated zone and 18,000 from the Belarussian zone. The nuclear explosion released several tons of uranium dioxide fuel and fission products. It has been estimated by experts, according to Medvedev, that Chornobyl caused more contamination in Europe than all the nuclear weapons tests since 1945 combined. Eleven regions, with a population of nearly 17 million people, of whom 2.5 million are children below the age of five, suffered some degree of radioactive contamination. Hrodzinsky divided the contaminated region into three zones: 1) radiological catastrophe; 2) radiological disaster; 3) special radiological circumstances (Marples). He suggested that the zone includes 1,200 population points with over a million inhabitants. The most debatable issue remains that of what a safe dose of radiation for the average individual is.

In the context of this discussion, it should be mentioned that in the past two years massive efforts have been undertaken by the Ukrainian community in the United States, as well as other nations on behalf of the Chornobyl victims (*The Ukrainian Weekly*, 12-30-1990). In the Spring of 1990, 51 children and three firefighters from Ukraine travelled to Israel for medical treatment. In the summer months of 1990 Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Cuba, France, Germany, Poland and the United States hosted children, victims of Chornobyl, for medical treatment.

### **Potential Risk for Mental Retardation**

At a conference in Kyiv in May, 1988, the chairman of the Soviet Radiological Committee reported that approximately 50,000 people received 50 rad or more and some 4,000 people had received, on the average 200 rad irradiation. An exposure of about 100 or more can cause symptoms of radiation sickness and the number of people in this category could be 10,000. According to Medvedev in an interview on April 26, 1989, the deputy minister of health in Ukraine, Y. Sizhenko, M.D., said that of the 260,000 inhabitants of Ukraine who had been checked at the Radiological Center, 38% were found to require some form of treatment in hospitals. As reported by the *New York Times* (12-30-1990) Professor Hrodzinsky stated that perhaps 150,000 people suffered some sort of thyroid illness among whom 60,000 were children. Dr. Gale, an American cancer specialist suggested that the Chornobyl catastrophe could cause up to 60,000 additional cancer deaths world wide over a fifty year period. In a real sense it might not be possible to remove the consequences of the accident for generations to come. Efforts to assess the extent of the catastrophe have been obstructed by Soviets reluctant to

discuss the effects of radiation on newborns and children (Marples). This secretive attitude prevents the possibility of the accurate assessment of mental retardation attributed to this nuclear explosion.

Irradiation as an etiological variable in mental retardation has been studied since the 1920's. Murphy's (*American Journal of Obstetrics and Gynecology*, 1929) pioneering research on 625 pregnancies subjected to pelvis x-rays established a relationship between radiation exposure during pregnancy and later disturbances and growth in the development of infants. In 1944, James and Neil (as reported by Menolascino and Egger, 1978) studied mental retardation, which occurred after irradiation of the fetus with doses commonly used in the treatment of pelvic cancer. They estimated that mental retardation occurred in 20% of the infants irradiated before the fifth month of fetal development. An etiological explanation for mental retardation was provided by Hicks (*American Journal of Roentgenography*, 1953), of the fetus with doses who reported that developing nerve cells from the sixteenth day after conception until two weeks after birth are so radiosensitive that they can be destroyed by exposure to radiation as low as 25 rads.

More directly relevant to our discussion are studies of the effects of the nuclear bombing in Japan discussed by Miller, 1956; Hollingsworth, 1960; and Yamakazi, 1966. Hollingsworth reported that pregnant women in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, who were within 1,200 meters of the center of the explosion had children with a significantly higher incidence of mental retardation.

Miller (*Pediatrics*, 1956) reported that the group most susceptible to mental retardation in Hiroshima were children, who were between seven and fifteen weeks of gestation at the time of the explosion. He suggested that the incidence of the neurological defects associated with nuclear bombing was related to three factors: the intensity of the radiation; the gestational age of the fetus; the distance of the mother from the center of the explosion. Yamazaki (*Pediatrics*, 1966) provided us with a comprehensive review of the effects of irradiation on the developing nervous system, and the most critical time for mental retardation potential. Based upon Yamazaki's suggestion, in the case of the Chernobyl catastrophe which occurred on April 26, 1986, the highest risk group for mental retardation would have been children conceived between approximately January 15, 1986 and March 20, 1986. It also means that children conceived earlier or later than this crucial time may not be at high risk for severe or profound retardation, but they nevertheless may be moderately or mildly retarded. In Ukraine most of these children will have begun kindergarten in the fall of 1991 and first grade in the fall of 1992. For the next couple of years they should be studied and followed up as a group most at risk for mental retardation.

There are considerable problems in identifying mentally retarded children among those born in Ukraine approximately between October

1986 and December 1986. Some of these problems were identified earlier by Marples. For example, he reported that virtually no information on possible birth defects and potential mental retardation came from Soviet sources, and frequently information received was contradictory. Furthermore, official sources tended to play down the danger of birth defects. For example, the former Minister of Health Romanenko commented in March 1987, that more than 1,500 pregnant women who lived in the Chornobyl area had given birth to healthy children. Yet at the same time, Lukyanova informed journalists in Kyiv that the "vast majority" of children born to evacuees had not been affected by radiation. This can only lead to the interpretation that many were affected but that no numbers were provided. Furthermore, during the neonatal period, visual medical examination and even the use of the Apgar scale can only identify those infants who subsequently become profoundly and severely retarded. This would suggest that many more are alive with the potential for mental retardation. As a matter of fact, based upon the normal probability curve, the prevalence of mental retardation with the moderate and mild range is five times higher than within the profound and severe range. I would like to suggest that in order to arrive at a rough estimate of the potential mental retardation, the number of known cases of birth defects and severe retardation associated with the Chornobyl catastrophe should be multiplied by five.

Another method of obtaining an estimate of mental retardation associated with the Chornobyl catastrophe is first: all children with Hrodzinsky's danger zone, who were born between October and December 1986 should be tested using standardised individual intelligence tests. From that number, the incidence of the mentally retarded normally found within the population for that age group should be subtracted. We can then assume that the remaining number became retarded as a direct result of the Chornobyl nuclear explosion and not due to random etiological variables.

However, there are a number of problems that have to be considered before embarking on such a demographic study. To begin with, baseline data on prevalence of the mentally retarded in Ukraine is based upon the psychometric assessment which does not exist. The problem is related to the history of the testing movement in the Soviet Union. This issue was discussed previously by Holowinsky (1984, 1986). In the 1920's a strong movement known as "pedology" emerged. Its purpose was to identify and assess individual differences in abilities and cognitive skills and to develop a "science of the child." Among the supporters of pedology in the Soviet Union were such leading psychologists of that time as Vygotsky and Blonsky. However, pedology did not conform to the expectation of those Soviet psychologists, who attempted to create a "True" Marxist psychology. At the time of Stalin's purges and antiwestern xenophobia, pedology became an easy target.

Strong opposition to pedology was led by Makarenko and Medinsky. Medinsky especially, strongly criticised intelligence and achievement tests: "Intelligence and achievement tests were made with such calculations that the children of the indigent parents should appear as weakly endowed and underachieving. Those tests claiming objective proof were in reality the means to enable the children of the bourgeois to continue their education and not to accept the children of toilers" (Medinsky, *Public Education in the USSR*, 1954). Owing, in part to such political and ideological arguments, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR declared on July 4, 1936, that pedology was a pseudo-scientific and an anti-Marxist science (Shore, *Soviet Education: Its psychology and philosophy*, 1947). In the past decade, however, a movement has been noticed in the Soviet Union directed at the development of standardised tests and the establishment of school psychology as a separate profession (Pambookian and Holowinsky, 1987).

The second problem refers to the consensus as far as the acceptable prevalence rate of mental retardation within the general population. In the 1960's Dingman and Tarjan predicted from the normal distribution of I.Q.'s that the prevalence rate of mental retardation within the general population to be between 1% and 2%. However, a more recent review (1987 by McLaren and Bryson) of twenty one prevalence studies reported lower percentages. Two important conclusions were evident: there was a much higher prevalence of retardation among males than females; and the highest concentration occurred between ten and twenty years of age. The trend for higher incidence among males rather than females was also found in the Soviet Union (Holowinsky, 1990). In an earlier study, Holowinsky reviewed international trends in the incidence and prevalence of mental retardation. He cautions, that any attempt at international comparison of terminology, prevalence and classification should take under consideration several factors: such as cultural differences that determine how behaviour is perceived in a given culture, specific social philosophy that influences terminology, level of socio-cultural and economic development of a given society, difficulty in direct transition of terminology, limited availability of primary source information.

Literature on prevalence suggests that prevalence is directly related to terminology. For example, we obtain a different estimate of prevalence based on a statistical quantitative model, rather than a nonquantitative one. Wide differences in percentages have been reported in the past in the United States as well as abroad. Stevens and Herber (*Mental Retardation: a review of research*, 1964) described mental retardation as a condition that affects from 2% to 3% of the total population. On the other hand, Tarjan (*Mental Retardation: a handbook for the primary physician*, 1964) suggested that the prevalence rate for mental retardation in the general population is closer to 1% than 3%.

Recent revision of the AAMD classification system (Grossman, *Classification in Mental Retardation*, 1983) yields a 2.3% prevalence. Other estimates not based on psychometric models suggests a prevalence of cognitives disabilities as a .5%, or a high as 5.8% of the general population. Apart from psychometrically based estimates, we do not have a precise knowledge of the actual number of mentally retarded persons in the United States. A main problem for the lack of data is the absence of a nationwide system of reporting health statistics (Martini & MacTurk, *Mental Retardation*, 1985).

It should also be mentioned in the context of the discussion that even if it would be possible to determine the incidence of retardation for a population within Hrodzinsky's "danger zone", it still leaves the question open as to how many more children may become mentally retarded outside of "the zone."

In conclusion it should be stressed that the chronology of the Chornobyl catastrophe clearly revealed a pattern of neglect, disregard for human life, health and safety, bureaucratic blunders and a cover-up by the central authorities in Moscow. Unnecessary delays in notification to the population and initiation of safety measures, as well as the parading of thousands of children through the streets of Kyiv at the height of contamination is inexcusable. Even the authorities in Ukraine contributed to the cover-up out of fear for the central government in Moscow.

To this day no clear answer has been provided for such behaviour. Graham (1991) in a review of Medvedev's *The Truth About Chornobyl*, 1989, stated: "Authorities in Moscow, fearing panic, prohibited a timely evacuation of population." This obviously is an assumption not an explanation. All the direct and indirect victims of Chornobyl are entitled to know who the authorities were that decided to prohibit a timely evacuation and why such a decision was made. This was more than a bureaucratic blunder. This was criminal negligence. As a matter of fact, Barringer reported more recently in *The New York Times Magazine*, (1991), of the existence of two high-level Soviet government orders. The 1987 order classified "as secret any information on the extent of radiation contamination." The 1988 order prohibited to relate any diagnosed medical illness to the Chornobyl radiation exposure.

Projecting into the future, we may anticipate that the Ministry of Public Education of Ukraine, in cooperation with the Ministry of Health will initiate studies to determine the high risk potential for mental retardation among children currently five to six years of age. Additionally, remedial programs and long range rehabilitation services should be planned for this segment of the population.

## International Colloquium: “The EU on the Eve of the 21st Century”

Europe has experienced wars between nations as well as, in counterbalance, two kinds of integration.

The two outstanding examples of the *totalitarian type* of integration are, of course, that of Nazi Germany with its allies and the Moscow controlled Soviet Union with its satellites. This type of integration is typified by a centralized total dictatorship achieved by the use of military force and subsequent occupation, terror, and the absolute suppression of those being united. The hallmarks of unification via dictatorship as inflexible centralization and the subjection of the union to expansionistic military aims.

The *democratic type* of unification began with postwar European economic and political unification, which encompassed both winners and losers (the latter having first to unequivocally demonstrate genuine and viable democratization). This type of unification began in 1951 with the European Coal and Steel Community, followed by the signing of the Rome Treaty creating the European Economic Community in 1957. This development was enhanced, promoted, fostered and stabilized by the fact that most of the members already had been cooperating since 1949 within the framework of NATO. It would not have been possible to foster integration in any other way in light of the Soviet empire's military threats and hostile foreign policy.

In the second half of the 1980's these two models of integration – intersected and then began to develop in diverging directions. Just when the Soviet Union, having fallen decisively behind the Western democratic system, openly admitted its crisis by beginning a so-called restructuring under Gorbachev's leadership, The European Economic Community took decisive steps toward a greater and more purposeful political integration. We can list here the 1983 Stuttgart Declaration on strengthening and developing cooperation and collaboration among the members of the EEC (the idea of the European Union); the approval of the plans for the European Union by the Europarliament in 1984; the coming into force of the Single European Act in 1987. This all is followed from the other side by the tearing down of the Berlin Wall in 1989.

The culmination of the divergence in development between the totalitarian and the democratic models of integration was reached in the year 1991. The European Union agreement was signed at the Maastricht summit. Shortly thereafter the formal collapse of the totalitarian model of integration – the Soviet Union – took place.

The total failure of the totalitarian integration model meant a surprisingly clear victory for the Western democratic form of cooperation.

Together with the easing of the military threat from Moscow, this victory created a new situation, for which no one – least of all, most Sovietologists – was quite ready. A situation, in which the challenge to the Western model of integration had apparently ceased to exist and in which former Communist states proclaimed that their new goal was to integrate into the West, created a tidal wave of hope and idealism. On the other hand, there was a drop in the tonus, or fitness, created by years of security challenges and ideological opposition to the Communist model.

And now, a uniting Europe is about to step into the 21st century – without a very clear message, with a large number of applicants for membership, as well as doubts whether it will succeed in permanently leaving behind military-political confrontation and creating conditions for the unlimited expansion of the free trade integration model. The latter presupposes the genuine acceptance of this model by the nations and cultures currently at the borders of the EU. This is by no means clear at the moment.

Some of the major choices facing us before the end of the century are:

1) whether to take a clear course toward federalism or to continue the present looser forms of cooperation;

2) the preservation or the erosion of the national cultural identity and sovereignty or finding a reasonable compromise between the two; (this problem is brought more to the fore by the addition of numerous potential new members – nation states which are sensitive in this area due to their recent tragic experiences in the totalitarian model);

3) a defense policy concept and future ties with the Western defense system – i.e., the continued US defense presence in Europe or Europe's own defense system;

4) effective future leadership of the EU and problems of democratic decision-making, or, in other words, the tension between the central bureaucracy and the needs of participatory democracy;

5) the control and regulation, in a modern industrialized society, of the areas of the environment, crime, immigration, social problems; the problems of subsidies to member nations. It is a hopeful sign that public opinion in the member nations strongly supports the solution of these kinds of problems within the framework of the EU.

6) over and over again we come up against the basic question: how far can the borders of the European democratic model of integration extend and how great is its capacity to assimilate? How adaptable is it to relations with Russia and the non-European cultures?

For another perspective, let us consider how European integration is seen by an applicant nation, Estonia.

I have to admit, Estonia's first instinct in moving toward Europe is connected to the necessity of achieving geopolitical security. This is characterized by the following:

1) fleeing as quickly as possible from the totalitarian, existentially dangerous model of integration;

2) preserving and developing its own identity, sovereignty and national culture;

3) seeing the European-democratic model of integration as the only counterweight to the still imminent danger of the totalitarian, military model.

That initial existential emergency – whether to sink or swim – gave impetus to Estonian radical reforms. Within a year or two after independence Estonia had reorientated its foreign economic policy and relations from East to West. This becoming free of one-sided economic dependence upon Moscow was precisely what prevented Russia from dictating political conditions to Estonia based upon economic pressure. The confusion in the East bought time for Estonia, to take powerful steps on the way to integration in the West. The concept of Estonia as the “little nation that could” became well known – a small, feisty nation which applied the principles of free market economy with textbook precision, faithfully carried out painful economic reforms, created a stable monetary system pegged to the Deutsche mark, restrained inflation, set up a balanced budget (required even by the Constitution), and, in great measure succeeded in bringing in a Western style of operation as well as Western capital.

However, this all – as great and even miraculous as it may be – is only a good start, not any kind of a guarantee for the future. The first milestone of the good beginning was the signing of the association agreement – unique in that this sees no transition period for Estonia – with the EU in the summer of 1995. This was reaffirmed by the unanimous ratification of the agreement by the Estonian RK just a few weeks later.

Estonia embodies the new phase of EU expansion, which must be decided by the IGC, which begins this year. The previous phase came for the first time into close proximity with Estonia by including such northern European states as Sweden and Finland.

With this, a basic geopolitical shift took place. Since 1995, the EU borders Russia along the Finnish-Russian frontier. Where, however, should the eastern border of EU run after its next wave of expansion? Historically and cultural-geographically it would be logical for it to run south from Finland along the border between Russia and the Baltic States. Naturally, this border must not be divisive, but a zone promoting civilized relations.

This reminds me of the German government's statement of 1994, which let the world know that Germany wished to see expansion carried out so that the eastern border of unified Germany would not remain the eastern border of the EU. This has now been achieved. But we must keep in mind that in the part of Eastern Europe in question, political-economic and defense integration naturally overlap.

The admission of Eastern European nations to the EU in fact prepares them for admission, or in the least, very close cooperation with the

NATO system. It is clear, that in the face of what is happening in Russia, the security issue remains central for the Baltic States as well as other East and Central European candidates for EU membership. The parallel orientation toward both the EU and NATO was noted by Werner Link in his article in *German Comments* of January 1996:

*"The states in this geopolitical interim zone are being pulled by both western gravitational fields. Western interest – especially German interest – in stability in this area is in accordance with the original interest of the states in the region in becoming members of the Euro-Atlantic stability zone... and to ward off the danger of renewed Russian hegemony. The greater this threat appears, the more the countries of Central and Eastern Europe strive for balancing protection through timely integration into the West. That is, both for EU and NATO enlargement towards the east."*

This same message was brought to Brussels by U.S. Under Secretary for Commerce Stuart Eizenstat on February 8:

*"NATO and the EU must quickly end their years of mutual disregard and start to liaise on their plans for eastward enlargement. This is vital for the future security of Europe. Both NATO and the EU have almost identical Central European and Baltic countries interested in future membership at the earliest possible date."* Europe accords concluded with these countries hold the promise of future membership, noted Eizenstat, who feels that it is important for enlargement of both the EU and NATO to run at the same pace.

It is interesting that, according to a 1993 poll of residents of EU member states, almost the strongest support – 77% – was for developing a unified defense policy according to the Maastricht Treaty. We can be quite sure that current candidates for membership support this even more unequivocally.

Now, at the turn of the century, Estonia has made its choice – geopolitically, economically, culturally, as well as in security. Having existed for centuries on the border between eastern and western cultures, in a zone influenced by contrasting and opposing mindsets, political styles and economic models, Estonia is especially aware that it belongs to Western Europe – I use this term in its broader socio-political sense.

For Estonia, there is no alternative to integration with Western systems. Sceptical and often cynical attitudes are an expression of the former Soviet nomenklatura, of the mentality of the previous system, which are not limited to Communist party veterans. A typical slogan: those favouring integration into Europe do not value independence, but are ready to sell out Estonian interests to Western monopolies for a song. The result will be, they warn, just like the Soviet times, but in reverse – when in the past everything depended upon Moscow and the permission of the officials there, now soon everything will repeat itself. Only now Brussels will replace Moscow.

The main fear for Estonia, as a small nation, is that of losing its identity in the process of European integration. In this regard, it appears that Ireland's experiences in the EU could be a source of optimism for

Estonia. The soup being cooked in the big European pot is consumed and flavored in one way or another by all European countries. It is important to become one of the official cooks in order to have the authority to add one's own special ingredients as well as the right to partake of the soup. Thus, small nations can add to the soup some of their own unique herbs and spices (in the form of national character, unique cultural values, etc.) which are not needed in huge amounts in order to add distinctive flavor and freshness, perhaps even an anti-oxidant effect, enriching the entire soup.

In this regard, I have noted that, among representatives of the totalitarian and the democratic unification model, the final bastion of national identity which resists change is that of special, traditional foods. In the sixties, under Khrushchev, they tried to communalize life down to the very family unit. This involved plans to put 100% of the children into state nursery schools and even to have families taking their daily meals in cafeterias. One veteran Estonian Communist confessed openly that in this there was for him, a limit. Namely, he felt quite sure that no cafeteria could duplicate or replace the special bread dessert with raisins and sour cream that his own wife made for him. Interestingly, this year, before the EU's IGC, Mr. and Mrs. Kohl published their joint cookbook full of typical German recipes.

I'm sure that Estonia, too, has its own cultural-political cookbook for the EU, which could serve to provide greater variety to the European family menu. One such opportunity could lie in making use of the historical experience and expertise of countries such as Estonia with regard to Russia – especially in order to be able to more thoroughly, accurately and realistically to assess what is going on there.

And this brings me to the third perspective we need in order to predict what will happen at the turn of the century – the EU's relations with Russia. This interests Tallinn at least as much as it interests Brussels, Berlin, Paris or London.

Let us return to our discussion of what followed the events of 1991. As stated, the Western model of integration was not prepared for such a complete and easy external victory over the totalitarian model. The result was a loss of tonus, of fitness, replaced by a kind of inebriation, of believing in democracy's inevitable further expansion eastwards and even in other directions. The people newly freed from Communism initially joined and helped to strengthen this inebriation, even the Communists joined in. All of this helped to fuel unreal hopes of creating international security and cooperation systems based simply on the good will of all participants. It was assumed that the freed peoples would automatically rush to follow the democratic economic model.

Throughout history, huge victories and great losses have often created paradoxical situations. The huge triumph of the victors may turn out to be a stumbling block and reduce their ability to use the advantages gained from the victory. The losers have nothing left to lose. On the other hand, based upon previous experience, they know they have a lot to gain from the

democratic gentlemanly behavior of the winners. The winners, seeing their fearsome opponent flat on his back, feel pity. In addition, sensing the reservoir of strength still there, the democratic winners still feel fear and are seized with a missionary zeal by the declarations of the prostate loser that he is now ready to convert, to be christened into the religion of free market religion and democracy.

Perhaps it is that missionary zeal, that Western idealistic-imperialistic tendency to believe and to act as if there is no question that the rest of the world will follow its model, because it is clearly seen as the best one – perhaps it is this missionary zeal which has prevented an accurate assessment of what is taking place in the former communist societies. One could say that in some ways, the West is a prisoner of its own missionary goals and good faith.

This is well illustrated by the clinging of Western governments first to Gorbachev then to Yeltsin as the only defender of continuing reforms. Both of these have by now completely disappointed their defenders. In the case of both, Western policy ignored the fact that true democracy presupposes the existence of alternatives. If the hope of democracy is but one leader, development stops and the hopes can be for, at best, an enlightened dictator. This is what has happened in the case of Yeltsin. His policies can no longer be differentiated from those of Communists. This is not surprising considering the fact that both Zhuganov and Yeltsin belonged to the same Communist party leadership. Yeltsin's declarations about his wish to develop a democratic system merely made it possible to get economic aid from the West for several years – something that was vitally necessary for the revival of the bankrupt Soviet Union.

Now we have reached the point where the development of democracy in the Western style of economic reform in Russia has reached an impasse in which the Russian parliament is made mostly of nationalist and communist forces, an impasse in which the leading presidential candidate, Gennady Zhuganov, has openly announced that the Western model does not apply to Russia, stresses Russia's uniqueness and natural opposition to the West, considers it natural and inevitable that Russia will again restore its historic borders, and, an impasse in which President Yeltsin's positions do not differ from those of his opponent of those very reforms, concludes William Safire in his *New York Times* editorial February 9.

The question remains – what part has the West's uncritical, good faith support played in all this? Western support, instead of taking a carrot and stick approach has instead become something much more akin to appeasement, saying: we have to support this one who, although he is not an ideal democrat, is the lesser of two evils. Otherwise the worst one will come and ruin everything. Perhaps what has actually happened is that partially with the help of this attitude, the "lesser of two evils" has gradually and almost unnoticeably become the *real* "bad one".

In conclusion:

1) The EU has to define more closely its goals and message both for itself and for the outside world;

2) We must not forget what was written into the text of the Maastricht Treaty itself, "in order to safeguard the European identity a common foreign and security policy has to be developed."

3) It follows that, more in-depth evaluation of European cultural and historical identity is needed.

4) The EU as a Europe-centered organization with its culture and tradition of political democracy is an island in today's world – an exception rather than a rule.

5) Above all we need to have faith in our own European model. But having faith means the courage and the will to take a balanced approach to solving the problems of expansion and integration. It is unprecedented hopes and historic experience and political realities which require balancing.



The late Yaroslav Stetsko speaking on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the death of the OUN Leader, Stepan Bandera, in Munich in 1984.

## How Yeltsin's Exploitation of Ethnic Nationalism Brought Down an Empire

At the first public meeting of the Lithuanian National Front, Sajudis, in 1988, a poet asked, "Can a mouse defeat an elephant?" Everyone present knew what he meant. "Yes" he answered, "one only has to wait for the moment when the elephant is balancing itself on its little toe."<sup>1</sup> How did the ethno-national mice topple the Soviet elephant?

In assessing the role of ethno-nationalism in the fall of the Soviet Union, there is a distinction to be made among the mice, between those who could leave the union without crippling it severely and those whose departure would destroy it. The ethno-national movements in the Baltics, Transcaucasus, Moldova, and Kazakhstan first pried the lid off the Soviet ethno-national problem. It was they, who pioneered the strategy, tactics, and organisational forums in 1988 and 1989. They called for nonviolence, the use of the Soviet constitution, and Soviet and international law. They created national fronts. They put state sovereignty, self determination, and the future of the union on the political agenda. More ominously, in the riots and pogroms of Almaty, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Sumgait, the ethno-national movements introduced communal violence and offered a terrifying view of the war of all against all that might follow the end of the Soviet Union.

Nonetheless, even if the Baltics, Moldova, and the Transcaucasian republics left, the Soviet Union would remain. Only two countries by themselves could in leaving bring down the USSR: Russia and Ukraine, which together comprised 70 percent of the Soviet Union's population and even more of its gross national product. The two eastern Slavic peoples – Russians and Ukrainians – provided a sufficient base to hold power in the USSR. In this sense, the union's other republics were on the periphery.<sup>2</sup> As destructive forces, Russia and Ukraine entered the political scene only in 1989, after the power of the Communist Party had been eroded and the periphery nations had started their drives for independence.

The forces for Russian sovereignty, Boris Yeltsin and his allies, were a faction of the Soviet communist elite who used the Russian Federation as a way station on their road to central power in the Soviet Union. Just when they thought they had achieved central power in the Kremlin, they found instead that they had destroyed the USSR – an unexpected consequence of their actions. The 16 autonomous republics and other ethno-national formations within Russia played an important role in facilitating Yeltsin's rise to power by way of the Russian parliament and presidency. In order to establish his power base, Yeltsin made far-reaching promises to them. At the same time, he accidentally facilitated and provoked Ukrainian ethno-nationalism. Ukraine's refusal to join Russia in a new super-state unexpectedly destroyed Yeltsin's plans.

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<sup>1</sup> S. Geda, Vigis Park, Vilnius, 9 July 1988, from the documentary film *Rebirth of a Nation*, Kapso Video, 1988.

<sup>2</sup> See John A. Armstrong's 1968 study, "The Ethnic Scene in the Soviet Union: The View of the Dictatorship," reprinted in *Journal of Soviet Nationalities*, Spring 1990, pp. 14-65.

Members of the elite used ethno-nationalism to take power at the center from the General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev and the Communist Party.<sup>3</sup> That is only in part an instrumentalist interpretation: Yeltsin did play the ethno-nationalist card in his conflict with Gorbachev, but in so doing he started a chain of misperceptions and miscalculations forged from Russian and Soviet imperial identity. Such an interpretation explains Russian elite behaviour before and after the fall of the USSR better than explanations from civil society, democracy, economy, or simply ethno-nationalism. It also makes more specific the uncertain nature of Russian ethno-nationalism, entwined as it is more deeply rooted imperial and Soviet identities in the Soviet Union. A major part of that uncertainty is the peculiar relationships with the Ukrainians, the Siamese twins who until 1991 were bound to the Russians in what seemed – to Russians, at least – to be an indestructible tie. Gorbachev's chief aide, Valerii Boldin, noted that toward the end of 1990, "some old Ukrainian friends of mine told me that one should not worry too much about the agitation among representatives of the Transcaucasian region, Moldava, and the Baltic Republics. But real trouble could start as soon as Ukrainian nationalism reared its head. That would mean the end of the USSR. Such a notion was unthinkable to me. How could our Ukrainian brothers, bound to our homeland by many centuries of friendship and years spent struggling for our common cause, betray the union?"<sup>4</sup>

### Impasse at the Center

In September 1989, at the end of the first session of the Congress of People's Deputies, the entire country had been glued to the television for 13 days as the anti-party forces, composed of a heterogeneous band of democrats, anti-communists, reform communists, and nationalists, broke the taboos of the Soviet system in spectacular fashion. It was good theater and propaganda, but the Interregional Group of Deputies, which united the opposition forces, numbered at best 15 percent of the congress. Its members had been excluded from the Supreme Soviet, which would be the sitting parliamentary body creating the new laws for the union. As planned in advance, the congress elected Gorbachev chairman – the Interregional Group of Deputies proved incapable of putting forward a counter-candidate. The aim of Gorbachev and the Communists to manufacture a democratic mandate for their rule seemed to have been accomplished. The opposition faced a long political war of position before the next union-wide elections to the Congress of People's Deputies, five years hence. Even more galling, in spite of all their brave orations, it seemed the opposition deputies had been turned into democratic decorations for Gorbachev and the Communist Party.

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<sup>3</sup> For the instrumentalist interpretation in the field of ethno-politics, see Crawford Young, "The Dialectics of Cultural Pluralism: Concept and Reality," in Crawford Young, ed., *The Rising Tide of Cultural Pluralism* (Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1993), pp. 3-35. See also John A. Armstrong, "The Autonomy of Ethnic Identity: Historic Cleavages in Nationality Relations in the USSR," in Alexander J. Motyl, ed., *Thinking Theoretically about Soviet Nationalities* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), pp. 23-44.

<sup>4</sup> Valery Boldin, *Ten Years That Shook the World* (New York: Basic Books, 1994), pp. 271-272.

There was only one way out of the impasse. The elections at the republic level were due in March 1990. If it could present a viable program and candidates, the opposition had a chance to contest power in the Russian Federation. At that point in 1989, it had the candidates, who had established themselves in the Interregional Group of Deputies. Their leaders were household names after the 13-day session of the congress: Boris Yeltsin, Andrei Sakharov, Gavril Popov, Yurii Afanasev, Anatolii Sobchak, and others. But because they were Soviet elites, they did not have a Russian program.

As a supra-ethnic ideological state, the Soviet Union closely controlled expressions of ethno-nationalism among all its peoples, including the Russians. On the one hand, an ethno-national Russia with its own political institutions was bound to burst the political formula on which the Soviet Union rested. It was too big and powerful. But on the other hand, the Russians already dominated in the central institutions. They were the only ethnic group for which all of the Soviet Union was home, and they identified the multinational state as their own ethno-national state.

As the communist state began to unravel, prestigious Russian nationalists began to speak of a Russia that was the greatest victim of communism. There were two visible currents. One asked for Russia to jettison not only communism, but also the empire. Leading dissident Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, in his letter to Soviet leaders in 1973, was the first in recent times to decouple Russia and the Soviet Union, saying that in order to save itself, Russia had to abandon the empire.<sup>5</sup> In 1990, in a widely read and discussed pamphlet, *Rebuilding Russia*, he took up that thesis again.<sup>6</sup>

In both works, there was ambiguity surrounding what Russia was to comprise in terms of territory. Ultimately, Solzhenitsyn expected Ukraine, Belarus, and ethnically Slavic northern Kazakhstan to be included in a Great Russia, united by common blood, history, and the Russian Orthodox faith. Still, he admitted that the borders of Russia should be based on a free vote of self-determination.

With the second current of Russian nationalists, there was no such ambiguity. For them, Russia was the Soviet Union. Why not say it openly, why not abandon the communist ideology and system that held Russia down and allow Russia to dominate the Soviet Union – or simply be the Soviet Union?

In 1989, the vocabulary of Russian resentment, of a “Russian ethnic state” or a “Russia with its own state institutions,” was employed only by the right. In 1988-89, Russian nationalists had already brought into public life some of the symbols that came to signify Russian statehood. The right-wing Russian National Front was the first to use the final chorus from Glinka’s 1830s opera, *A life for the Czar* (in which the “perfidious” Poles fall on their knees before the czar), as the national anthem.<sup>7</sup> They also were the first to fly the commercial flag of the Russian Empire – the blue, white, and red tricolor – as the flag of Russia at their rallies.

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<sup>5</sup> Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, “Pismo vozhdiam Sovetskogo Soiuzna,” *Publisistika* (Paris: YMCA Press, 1981), in English translation as *Letter to the Soviet Leaders* (New York: Harper and Row, 1975).

<sup>6</sup> *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, 18 September 1990; Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, *Rebuilding Russia: Reflections and Tentative proposals* (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1991).

<sup>7</sup> Sergei Krayukin, “What a Tradition?” *Izvestiya*, 22 February 1990.

During the session of the Congress of People's Deputies in 1989, Valentin Rasputin, a writer identified with Russian nationalism, spoke for Russia. "I keep thinking," he said, "maybe Russia should secede from the union. Then we could use the word 'Russia' and talk about national self-awareness without fear of being called nationalists."<sup>8</sup> Met with derision at the time, Rasputin's speech was remembered only months later as the first public call for a "Russia First" program.

In autumn 1989, the Soviet Communist Party moved to co-opt Russian patriotic feeling and consolidate its own position in its most important base, ethnic Russia. At a plenum of the Central Committee devoted to nationalities, the party proposed a Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Russian academies of science and medicine. It also recommended forming specially Russian social and political organisations, with a Central Committee bureau for the Russian party as their capstone.<sup>9</sup> Significantly, it also recommended increasing the importance of the ethno-national formations within Russia and eventually dividing the republic into regions. Most likely it feared losing control of the Russian Federation.

In sum, Gorbachev and the party decided to support Russia and republic sovereignty (within limits) as a device to tie the hands of the secessionist republics. It would be done by means of a new union accord that would eliminate the ambiguities and embarrassments of the present constitution – which was not at all clear on the limits of sovereignty of the republics and even guaranteed them the right to secede.

The Russian nationalists created a political program. The Soviet communists facilitated the entry of that program into public life. Now a third group, which had never shown attachment to Russian nationalism – the Russian "democrats" – took it over.

### **The Movement and the Candidate**

The extent to which many of the Russian "democrat" and reform communists were denatured of conscious national feeling is difficult to imagine today. Afanasev, who with Yeltsin was one of the leaders of the Interregional Group of Deputies, offered some unintended insight into this ethno-national awareness in interviews given in 1989. Said Afanasev: "Russian nationalism, if you push it to its extreme consequences, leads to the vision of Russia's exit from the Soviet Union. This idea has been openly expressed at the Congress of People's Deputies by the writer Rasputin, for example. The same idea is defended by Solzhenitsyn. It is, in my opinion, unrealistic because it will encounter many adversaries, powerful adversaries, now and in the future. If the tendency should strengthen, we should expect very serious disturbances and veritable bloodbaths."<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> "The Congress of People's Deputies Verbatim Report, 10th Meeting," *Izvestiya*, 8 June 1989, cited in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, no. 29, 1989, pp. 21-22.

<sup>9</sup> "The Party's Nationalities Policy in Today's Conditions," (Soviet Communist Party platform), *Izvestiya*, 17 August 1989.

<sup>10</sup> Youri Afanasev and Jean Daniel, *Cette Grand Lueur a L'Est* (Paris: Maren Sell, 1989), pp. 114-115.

In answer to the question “Do you consider yourself Russian?” Afanasev answered “yes”. He was then asked, “More than Soviet?” His reply was: “That is difficult to say. I am Russian certainly. I have been educated and brought up as a Russian. But I am more a Soviet, perhaps even a European, because it does not seem either necessary, useful, comfortable, or even polite to be in the first place a Russian.”<sup>11</sup>

Boris Yeltsin, like Afanasev, was a product of the same Soviet milieu where the confusion of Russian and Soviet led to an assumption that one stood for universal values. If you were from the other republics, your voice was parochial. If you were from Russia, like Yeltsin, Popov, Sobchak, or Afanasev, you spoke for the entire Soviet Union. That is representative of the “cultural imperialism of Great Nations – large ethno-national groups that preach universalism and see in their own assimilationist, triumphalist progress the inevitable unfolding of Reason History.”<sup>12</sup>

Born in 1931, Yeltsin had been trained as a civil engineer and was drafted into party work at the age of 31. He had spent his entire career in the heartland Russian city of Sverdlovsk, where he rose to become first party secretary. In 1985, he was appointed party secretary of Moscow and became a candidate member of the Politburo. His campaign against party and state corruption and privileges eventually aroused such ire in the party that he was forced to resign as Moscow first secretary and Politburo member. But he was now famous across the country as a champion of the people against the party. In the 1989 elections to the Congress of People’s Deputies, he was elected by a huge plurality (5 million votes) in a special national territorial district in Moscow. He boasted that 2,000 factories had nominated him. With his *apparatchik* past, he was viewed suspiciously by the other leaders and members of the Interregional Group of Deputies, but there was no denying his popular appeal. He was like a battering ram next to the professors and writers who predominated among the anti-communist opposition.

Up until autumn 1989, the concepts of Russia, Russian sovereignty, and Russian pride and humiliation had not crossed Yeltsin’s lips.<sup>13</sup> A Russian journalist asked him whether his feelings about Russia were not like hers, explaining: “I do not yet have a national self-awareness. I have no sense of Russia – not only its statehood and history, but also the feeling of territorial space.” Yeltsin answered, “I used to have the same feeling as you have. I used to see myself as a citizen of the country and not Russia and also as a patriot of Sverdlovsk *oblast*, since that is where I worked.”<sup>14</sup>

Yeltsin’s speeches at the Congress of People’s Deputies were framed in a populist vocabulary of combat against the party. He stood against the party’s monopoly of power. He condemned the luxury, privileges, and incompetence of the *nomenklatura*.

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<sup>11</sup> Ibid., p. 120.

<sup>12</sup> Shlomo Avineri, “Comments on Nationalism and Democracy,” in Larry Diamond and Larry F. Plattner, eds., *Nationalism – Ethnic Conflict and Democracy* (Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1994), pp. 29-30.

<sup>13</sup> See the public record of Yeltsin’s speeches and interviews from 1985-1990. For an accessible example, see Yeltsin’s autobiography, *Against the Grain* (New York: Summit Books, 1990), translated by Michael Glenny.

<sup>14</sup> Alla Lukovskaya’s interview with Boris Yeltsin, *Soyuz*, September 1990, as cited in John Morrison, *Boris Yeltsin: From Bolshevik to Democrat* (New York: Dutton, 1991), p. 142.

Perhaps even more than Gorbachev, who bungled at every step, Yeltsin and his advisers from Sverdlovsk, such as Yurii and Gennadii Burbulis, lacked any practical experience of the national question in the Soviet Union.

As Russia moved towards its elections, Yeltsin began his transformation into a Russian patriot. Calling for the abolition of the party's monopoly of power, he asked for a voluntary union of peoples and a voluntary union of republican communist parties, including Russia's. At the first Congress of Democratic Russia (the popular front organised by, among others, Yeltsin and Afanasev to support Yeltsin and other "democratic" candidates for office in the Russian Republic), the manifesto called for a new Russian constitution, a new treaty of union, and real statehood for Russia.<sup>15</sup>

Week by week, Yeltsin raised the register of his ethno-national message. By May 1990, he was saying: "The issue of primary importance is the spiritual, national, and economic rebirth of Russia, which has been for long decades an appendage of the center and which, in many respects, has lost its independence."<sup>16</sup>

In the March 1990 elections to the Russian parliament, the anti-party opposition united around Democratic Russia, which did significantly better than it had at the union level. It won about 30 percent of the seats in the parliament, as opposed to about 15 percent in the Congress of People's Deputies. Soon after, despite or perhaps because of Gorbachev's personal intervention in the vote against him, Yeltsin was elected chairman by a narrow plurality. That gave him an institutional base for his struggle with Gorbachev and the center. On 11 June 1990, the parliament ratified a declaration of sovereignty by a nearly unanimous vote. With that action, the fate of the Soviet Union was practically sealed. The declaration opened the door to an avalanche of similar declarations. Even republics that did not want to leave the union were compelled to vote for sovereignty in their parliaments as they maneuvered for position in the negotiation of a new unity treaty.

Ukraine voted its declaration of sovereignty on 16 July and surprised many with its declaration of intent to become a nuclear-free neutral state and to form its own army. The other member of the Slavic heartland, Belarus, followed on 27 July. By the end of 1990, all fifteen republics had voted declarations of sovereignty. Of those, the three Baltic states, Moldova, and the three Transcaucasian states had preceded Russia and were already on the way to independence.

As Yeltsin consolidated his power base in the formerly moribund structures of the Russian Federation, he forged interrepublican ties, signing comprehensive treaties with the other republics that included guarantees of existing borders. At a decisive moment of crackdown in the Baltics in January 1991, he flew to the scene to oppose the repression. The Russian Federation engaged in a "war of laws" with the Soviet Union for institutions, power, and revenues on the principle that Russian laws had priority over union-wide laws.

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<sup>15</sup> "'Democratic Russia' Election Bloc Formed," *Ogonyok*, February 1990, in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, no. 6, 1990, p. 26.

<sup>16</sup> Moscow Radio, 3 May 1990, as cited in Morrison, *Boris Yeltsin ...* p. 184.

## The Ethno-National Question

Because the 31 autonomous republics and other ethno-national formations covered about one-third of the federation's territory, they were very important for Yeltsin in his struggle to establish a power base within Russia.<sup>17</sup> Some, such as the Yakuts, controlled vast areas of Russia, while others, such as the Volga Tatars, were numerous and strategically placed at the heart of the Russian Federation.

Yeltsin promised autonomy and independence to all peoples of Russia. Non-Russians remembered his words to the Bashkirs: "Take as much power as you yourselves can swallow."<sup>18</sup> When he spoke of the future of Russia, he said it had to begin with the declaration of the economic independence and sovereignty of each autonomous republic. "The autonomous republics should be granted the right to leave the federation." In fact, he said, Russia should not be a federation but a "confederation."<sup>19</sup>

By late 1990, half the 16 autonomous republics (Kareliya, Komi, Tatarstan, Udmur-tiya, Yakutiya, Buryatiya, Bashkortostan, and Kalmikiya) had ratified declarations of sovereignty. Even more submerged groups in the Soviet hierarchy of nations, such as the Adygei, the Chukot, the Koryak, and the Yamal-Nenets, which did not even have the status of autonomous republics, now declared sovereignty.

Yeltsin's close aide, Pavel Voshchanov, explained Yeltsin's ability to win decisive votes within parliament despite having only 30 percent of the deputies as his supporters. The parliament in 1990 was divided into three groups: those for reform, and a "large group of deputies who defend narrow professional or national interests but do not yet have a particularly clearly defined political orientation." Yeltsin brought over some of them by "his consent in the event of his election to hand over a number of key posts in the new administration to representatives of national autonomous formations."<sup>20</sup> Those peoples of Russia, of whom even specialists knew little at that time, were much more important than their demographic numbers within the population of Russia (about 18 percent, or 27 million people) might have suggested.

## Yeltsin's Election

Faced with an onslaught of republics, the central bureaucracies struck back in autumn 1990. Pressing Gorbachev and forcing him to jettison his erstwhile allies, such as Aleksandr Yakovlev and Eduard Shevardnadze, in late 1990, they mounted an offensive

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<sup>17</sup> See Jim Nichol, "The Russian Federation: Will It Hold Together?" *CRS Report for Congress*, Washington, D.C., Congressional Research Service, 5 October 1992, as cited in Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott, *Russia and the New States of Eurasia* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 360. See also Eil Payin, "Separatism and Federation in Contemporary Russia," in Heyward Isham, ed., *Remaking Russia* (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1994) pp. 185-202.

<sup>18</sup> Moscow Television, 12 August 1990, as cited in Morrison, *Boris Yeltsin ...* p. 184.

<sup>19</sup> "Yeltsin Interviewed on Economy, Nationalities," *Duma* (Sofia), 17 May 1990, FBIS-SOV-101, 24 May 1990, p. 39.

<sup>20</sup> Pavel Voshchanov, "When There Is No Consensus Among Comrades ..." *Komsomolskaya Pravda* (Moscow), 12 June 1990.

that they hoped would lead to a union-wide crackdown. But bloody incidents in Vilnius and Riga in January 1991, provoked by security troops, failed in large measure because of Yeltsin's decisive interventions in defense of the Baltic peoples.

Yeltsin's opponents almost succeeded in removing him at an extraordinary session of the Russian parliament in February 1991. But they failed, thanks to a mobilisation of popular support by labor, which included nationwide miners' strikes and a huge rally that drew 400,000 in Moscow. Having turned back its enemies, Yeltsin was able to win a vote from the now-subdued parliament to add a referendum on the popular election of a Russian president to Gorbachev's 21 March union-wide referendum on the preservation of the union.

In the subsequent election on 21 June 1991, Yeltsin won a popular mandate as Russian president against eight other candidates. Unlike Gorbachev, the Soviet president who never faced an electorate in his entire political career, Yeltsin won democratic legitimacy in the largest constituent republic. Power now resided at multiple levels in the increasingly ramshackle Soviet Union. As one commentator put it: "The ground has dropped out from under the union institutions of power."<sup>21</sup>

At the first inauguration of a popularly elected Russian president that July, several symbolic elements came together. The former apparatchik Yeltsin invited the head of the Russian Orthodox Church, Archbishop Aleksii, to give an address – a clever political move because of the deep identification of Russia ethnic identity with orthodox religious identity. Moscow was worth a mass. The flag that flew over the ceremony was the blue, white, and red commercial flag of the Russian Empire, which had been flown in 1988 by the Russian National Front, the opponents of Yeltsin. The band played Glinka's final chorus from "A Life for the Czar" as the new national anthem, but there were no words and so all stood silent during the music. The moment was eerily evocative of the uncertain political identity not only of Yeltsin and his political associates, but also of the undefined ethno-national identity of Russia itself.

In key ways, Yeltsin's policies repeated Lenin's tactics and assumptions regarding the ethno-national issue. Until after the August 1991 putsch, Yeltsin's basic strategy was to call for national sovereignty and/or independence for all the peoples of the Soviet Union. In 1917, Lenin had issued a call to national self-determination, thereby exploiting ethno-national discontent in order to seize central power. After he attained power, it turned out that self-determination was subject to the higher interests of the proletariat as defined by Lenin. What would Yeltsin appeal to when he finally, triumphantly, entered the Kremlin? Yeltsin also believed that resistance to the national movements would cause separatism, while concession would encourage integration. Speaking of the separatist movements, he said at one point, "Imagine that if you resist the people, then the people will further intensify their counterpressure ... Those [ethno-national] events would have passed off more easily, significantly more easily, if there had been no resistance."<sup>22</sup> Here again, he showed the effects of a long career in the Communist Party and a certain debt to Lenin, who also believed that repression bred

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<sup>21</sup> A. Migranyan, "An Indissoluble Union? On the Prospects of the Soviet State System," *Izvestiya*, 20 September 1990.

<sup>22</sup> "Yeltsin Discusses Republics' Sovereignty, Health," Moscow Television, FBIS SOV-90-212, 1 November 1990, p. 79.

resentment, while concessions to the symbolic and cultural realms dissolved ethno-national sentiment. Finally, like most Marxists and Western liberals, Yeltsin assumed that economic ties would eventually prevail over the temporary “irrational” fever of separatism.<sup>23</sup>

A naive, even juvenile, anecdote recounted by Yeltsin tellingly captures his mindset. It occurred during the negotiation of nine republics for a new union treaty in summer 1991.

“While I was defending Russia’s interests at the negotiating table, my aides had to defend them in other, less enjoyable circumstances. They would usually try to put my car [the limousine of the president of Russia] first in line at the entrance. But one evening my automobile ended up at the end of a line of government limousines. My security people sprang forward in alarm, made an incredible U-turn, digging up the Novo Ogaryovo lawn in the process, and finally put the car back at the head of the line – Russia first! Of course, boys will be boys. The manager of Novo Ogaryovo was furious and threatened to fine us for the ruined patch of grass. Later, he backed off for some reason.”<sup>24</sup>

The assumption was that Russia and Yeltsin would rule. There were two possibilities: Russia would encompass the union, or Russia would dominate through the facade of a union. Yeltsin was perfectly aware of that. In September 1990, he said, “God forbid [Russia] should rise up. ... Understandably, a small republic could not affect the entire union. But with the giant Russia, if it were to assume its real position, it would be difficult to fight it, or rather impossible.”<sup>25</sup>

The negotiations at Novo Ogarevo finally ended in a new union treaty, which was to be signed by Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, plus the union center (Gorbachev) on 20 August 1991. Full of gaps and imprecise formulations. It was publicly released only days before the signing was to occur. Six republics – Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, Moldova, Armenia, and Georgia – did not take part in the negotiations at all, as they were on their way to full independence. Ukraine was not planning to sign in August, as it held out for a looser federation or confederation.<sup>26</sup>

The union treaty pushed the defenders of the old-style Soviet Union into desperate action. On 19 August, the union elites around Gorbachev, including the vice-president, the ministers of defense and internal security, and the head of the KGB, proclaimed that Gorbachev’s temporary incapacity due to ill health and the desperate state of the Soviet Union compelled them to create a State Committee for the Extraordinary Situation, which took the Soviet Union to the brink of civil war. In three days, Yeltsin pitted the legitimacy of the Russian Federation fought and defeated the plotters of the August coup. In defending Gorbachev, Yeltsin pitted the legitimacy of the

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<sup>23</sup> For an analysis of Lenin’s instrumentalist approach to ethno-nationalism, see Walker Connor, *The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Strategy* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984).

<sup>24</sup> Boris Yeltsin, *The Struggle for Russia* (New York: Times Books, 1994), translated by Catherine Fitzpatrick, p. 37.

<sup>25</sup> Alla Lukovskaya, interview with Boris Yeltsin, in Morrison, *Boris Yeltsin ...* p. 143.

<sup>26</sup> The full text was published in *Izvestiya*, 15 August 1991.

Russian Federation and its democratically elected president against the self-proclaimed legitimacy of the union centrists.

At the end of three days, Yeltsin and Russia seemed to be masters of the Soviet Union. Rescuing Gorbachev from his murky and still-unexplained sequestration at his vacation estate in the Crimea, Yeltsin hauled him before the Soviet parliament. Now the hitherto unstated assumption that Yeltsin and Russia would call the tune in the refurbished union became plain. At the end of the long session of scolding, Gorbachev undiplomatically revealed what should have been left unsaid: "Boris Nikolaevich knows my position. When we formulated it in December [1990], I said the president of the country and the prime minister should be representing Russia. The vice president ... perhaps best of all ... from Central Asia."<sup>27</sup> As the country watched, at Yeltsin's bidding, the heads of the three key security ministries of the Soviet state (army, KGB, and internal affairs) were changed, while Ivan Silaev, who until then had been premier of Russia, became the prime minister of the Soviet Union. To Russians, it meant a historic "democratic defeat" of the communists. To non-Russians, it signified an open Russian hegemony over the nations of the multinational country in which they all lived. The Russians made up half or just less of the population, but in a renewed union, whatever it might be called, the orders would come from Moscow.

### Ukraine Makes Its Move

Just as Yeltsin and the Russian "democrats" began to seize the central institutions of power in the Soviet Union, Ukraine smashed their expectations. On 24 August, the same day Gorbachev made his indiscreet revelations before the parliament, the Ukrainian parliament voted 346 to 1 for independence. Russia wanted to be the Soviet Union; Ukraine wanted to leave it. Both political formulas – the old one, the Soviet Union as ideological state, and the new one, a union ruled by Russia behind a facade of union or commonwealth – were now dead.

Ukraine would hold a referendum on independence on 1 December 1991. In the meantime, the parliament took legal steps to seize control over the huge body (nearly 1 million men) of the Soviet armed forces on its territory. In September, an unknown general of the Soviet air force, Konstantin Morozov, started work as Ukrainian minister of defense. He had one secretary, a few aides, and one telephone.

The Russian reply was characteristic. In separate statements, Yeltsin, his press secretary, Voshchanov, and his foreign minister, Andrei Kozyrev, threatened Ukrainian state borders unless Ukraine remained in union with Russia.<sup>28</sup>

The contrast between Yeltsin during his "striving for power" stage, when he and Kozyrev freely signed a treaty guaranteeing the inviolability of the Russian border with Ukraine, and Yeltsin and Kozyrev in their new "imperial stage" was more than embarrassing. It was too late and counterproductive, as Gorbachev's indiscreet revelation

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<sup>27</sup> *The New York Times*, 24 August 1991.

<sup>28</sup> Boris Yeltsin, Dunlop, *The Rise of Russia ...* p. 270; Pavel Voshchanov, "Statement by the Press Secretary to the President of Russia," *Rossiskaya gazeta*, 27 August 1991; and "Views on Recognition of Baltics, Ukraine," Budapest Kossuth Radio Network interview with Andrei Kozyrev, FBIS-SOV-91-168, 29 August 1991, p. 100.

to the parliament and Yeltsin's and Kozyrev's threats only stiffened Ukrainian resolve to leave the union.<sup>29</sup> It was also premature, because Russia had no army and needed time to take control over the still-dangerous Soviet armed forces, which had lost their political masters. To enter into a quarrel with Ukraine might open Russia to a disastrous attack from those who still hung on to the Soviet Union.

As Yeltsin strove to be more subtle and diplomatic, Gorbachev and the union became fronts for Yeltsin and Russia. Yeltsin supported Gorbachev as he maneuvered and cajoled to negotiate a new union treaty in which the union institutions would be run by Russia. In the background, there was an economic threat, as Russia took control of the Soviet economy on its territory and promised it would impose world market prices on all who left the union. Specifically, Yeltsin unveiled a program for the reconstruction of a new union center. Praising Gorbachev, he called particularly for a unified economic space and the preservation of the union armed forces controlling the Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal. The republics could do what they wished, but the army and economic system would be centralised.<sup>30</sup>

At the elite level, almost everyone wanted the union to continue; not only Gorbachev and the union power ministries, but also Yeltsin and the Russian "democrats." That was also true of the Central Asian republics and Belarus, where popular movements were much weaker than in the other republics. Perhaps more surprisingly, the Western democratic states did all they could to help Yeltsin and Gorbachev. As U.S. President George Bush put it in his July 1991 speech in Kyiv, Ukraine, which was addressed to all the nations of the Soviet Union, "Freedom is not the same as independence. Americans will not support those who seek independence in order to replace a far-off tyranny with local despotism. They will not aid those who promote a suicidal nationalism based upon ethnic hatred."<sup>31</sup> Bush's stunned incomprehension as the Soviet Union disappeared before his eyes was shared by British Prime Minister John Major, who in autumn 1991 said he could see no reason why the republics of the Soviet Union might need their own armies.

Within Russia, Yeltsin's appeals to the nations of Russia to take all the freedom they wanted were replaced by attempts to stifle their drives for more autonomy or independence. On 15 November 1991, his decree ordering internal troops of the KGB to seize the breakaway republic of Chechnya was thwarted by opposition in the Russian parliament and the all-too-visible Chechen determination to fight. Three years passed before Russia finally invaded Chechnya, which refused from the very beginning to sign any federation treaty with Russia.

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<sup>29</sup> See the statements by President Kravchuk and other Ukrainian politicians cited in FBIS-SOV-91-167, 28 August 1991, pp. 100-101.

<sup>30</sup> "Speech by Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic President Boris Yeltsin at the Extraordinary Session of the USSR Congress of People's Deputies," Moscow Central Television First Program Network, FBIS-SOV-91-171, 4 September 1991, p. 9.

<sup>31</sup> For a study of the domestic politics U.S. foreign policy toward Ukraine, see Susan D. Fink, "From Chicken Kyiv to Ukrainian Recognition," master's thesis (Monterey, California: Department of National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, 1994), forthcoming in *Nationalities Papers*, 1996.

As the Ukrainian independence referendum drew near, the Russian and Soviet leaders still refused to believe it. They placed their hope in eastern and southern Ukraine, which had large ethnic populations. To them, it seemed impossible that the 12 million ethnic Russians living mostly in the southeast and the Russian-speaking Ukrainians who formed the majority in Ukraine would reject union.

On December 1, the Ukrainian population voted overwhelmingly for independence. Even the Crimean *oblast*, where ethnic Ukrainians were in the minority, voted for it. As Yeltsin's adviser for ethnic issues, Galina Starovoitova, admitted: "The size of the Ukrainian vote for independence came as a shock to most Russians, as well as to the union leaders."<sup>32</sup>

After the Ukrainian vote, Yeltsin had no further use for Gorbachev. In fact, he had to act against him because the Soviet armed forces were still intact and might follow Gorbachev, the Soviet Commander in Chief, as the Soviet Union crumbled.

On 7-8 December, Presidents Stanislau Shushkevich of Belarus, Leonid Kravchuk of Ukraine, and Yeltsin of Russia met near Minsk. It was clear that Ukraine was leaving the union. Yeltsin proposed they form a Commonwealth of Independent States, which would have no executive or decision-making power over its members. For the Russians, it was something to build central institutions on in the future. In the meantime, they could claim that unity had been preserved. For the Ukrainians, it was a way to manage the split. When Kravchuk returned home, a suspicious Ukrainian parliament heaped even more restrictive conditions and clauses on the toothless document.<sup>33</sup>

Meanwhile, late on the afternoon of 10 December, Gorbachev met with the top leaders of the Soviet armed forces at the Ministry of Defense in Moscow. He appealed to the commanders, saying, "The union must be preserved." But they were already a president and an army without a country. Like Stalin, who had appealed to Russian nationalism and the Russian Orthodox Church for help in 1941, Gorbachev appealed not to the legitimation of the Soviet Union and socialism, but to "our responsibility toward our 1,000-year past."<sup>34</sup>

In an emergency meeting called the following morning, Yeltsin spoke to the same military high command. He, too, appealed to the 1,000-year history of Russia – that is, the Russian Empire – but he said that the commonwealth agreement signed in Minsk preserved the unity built up over 1,000 years. He promised that Russia would not create its own army or Defense Ministry but would support the unified military of the Soviet armed forces. He then extended a 90 percent pay increase to the entire armed forces on the spot – including those outside the territory of the Russian Federation.<sup>35</sup>

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<sup>32</sup> Galina Starovoitova, "Modern Russia and the Ghost of Weimar Germany," in Isham, *Remaking* ... p. 134.

<sup>33</sup> Viktoria Vinogradova, "Another Version of the CIS Agreement Has Appeared," *Rossiskaya gazeta*, 14 December 1991.

<sup>34</sup> V. Litovkin, "M. Gorbachev and B. Yeltsin Search for a Common Language With the Military," *Izvestiya*, 11 December 1991.

<sup>35</sup> V. Yubashev, "M. Gorbachev and B. Yeltsin Search for a Common Language With the Military," *Izvestiya*, 11 December 1991. The extreme delicacy of these two meetings is suggested by the strange manner of attribution. Two separate articles about two separate meetings by two separate authors have the same title (see previous footnote).

On 25 December, Yeltsin took over the Kremlin, and the blue, white, and red flag of Russia replaced the red flag of the Soviet Union. Yeltsin had attained his goal – the seat of power in the Kremlin – but because of Ukraine, the geographic area he ruled was cut back to a truncated Russia, much like the borders before Peter I. The Russian “democrats” now began to understand that democratic reform meant not only the end of the Soviet Union, but also the end of the Russian Empire. As one of their more perceptive thinkers, Aleksandr Tsipko, ruefully put it, “If democracy means the end of the empire, then democracy is too high a price to pay.”<sup>36</sup>

### The Ghost in the Machine

Every year before the anniversary of the Battle of Poltava in Ukraine in 1709, where Peter the Great defeated Charles XII of Sweden and his ally, Ukrainian Cossack leader Mazepa, the Russian Orthodox clergy thanked God for preserving Ukraine in the bosom of the empire, blessed the csar, then pronounced an anathema on Mazepa for trying to separate Ukraine from Russia. The reasons Ukraine played the role of the ghost in the machine in the destruction of the Soviet Union are closely tied to Russian ethno-national identity. With its population of 52 million people, Ukraine was the only republic besides Russia that could destroy the Soviet Union. But the Russian elites blindly ignored the threat as Ukraine rose up in 1990 and 1991. Even after the fall of the Soviet Union, they continued to deprecate the Ukrainians, hoping as much as believing that they would soon come to their senses and return to Russia.

Subjective and objective factors prevented Yeltsin from making an accurate assessment of Russia’s relationship to Ukraine. The most important reason goes to the core of the definition of ethno-nationalism. If ethno-nationalism is an imagined blood or kinship bond, then most Russians had grown up believing in their kinship with the Ukrainians. Indeed, the very origin of the Russian people was tied, they assumed, to the medieval state centered in Kyiv: were not Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians all descendants of a single Kyivan Rus? The other two major components of Russian ethnic identity were the Orthodox faith and empire, which also offered little help to Russians in differentiating the Ukrainians from themselves. Orthodoxy and empire spilled over into a wide definition of the Russian nation, which included Ukrainians and Belarusians. On the 300th anniversary of Ukraine’s “reunification” with Russia, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union reinforced the lesson, together with the USSR’s Council of Ministers and Supreme Soviet, when they proclaimed “the consanguineous bond” of the two “fraternal peoples” – Ukrainian and Russian.<sup>37</sup> This was most un-Marxist, a pure expression of the common blood myth of ethno-nationalism. As a nation-builder, the Soviet party’s major effort for decades had been the attempt to gradually fuse the three slavic nations into one. Practically, this meant russification, with great pressure on culture and language, which intensified under Krushchev and Brezhnev and continued up to *perestroika*.

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<sup>36</sup> *Ya i Mir*, no. 1, 1992, as cited in Vera Tolz and Elizabeth Teague, “Is Russia Likely to Turn to Authoritarian Rule?” *RFE/RL Report*, 24 January 1992, pp. 1-8.

<sup>37</sup> “Statement Proclaiming Ukraine Anniversary,” *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, no. 49, 1954, p. 10.

There were nuances in the relationship. If the Ukrainians and Russians were blood brothers, one was superior and one inferior. Since the 18th century, the “Little Russian” was a stock figure for ridicule in Russian popular humour, functioning as the ignorant country cousin. The Ukrainian language was seen as a degraded form of Russian. The language’s disappearance from public life in Ukraine by 1990 (when approximately 60 percent of all Ukrainians spoke Russian) was seen by Russians as a natural phenomenon caused by the superiority of the Russian language. Prior to *perestroika*, attempts to speak Ukrainian in public in Kyiv, the capital of Ukraine, were likely to be met with derision by Russian speakers. When Ukrainian President Kravchuk went on a state visit to Germany before the August *putsch*, “democrats” from the Moscow intelligentsia burst into guffaws at the idea that the official language of discourse, in addition of course to German, would be Ukrainian. It was, they said, as if Kohl had insisted that his language of state be that of a remote Alpine village in Bavaria.<sup>38</sup> Ukrainians and Belarusians do not occupy the same place and role as Poles in Russian ethno-national identity. It is also worth noting that at one of the few centers for ethnic studies in the Soviet Union, the Institute of Ethnology of the Academy of Sciences, as of 1990 there were specialists for the tiny minority of the Gagauz people, but none for the Ukrainians. The same situation prevailed in other faculties of research institutes and universities.

There were powerful objective reasons to believe that there could not be a strong separatist movement in Ukraine. To those who knew it well, Ukraine seemed terrorised and broken. One of the deputies from Ukraine alluded to this at the first Congress of People’s Deputies. He said: “[I come from] a very meek and loyal republic.”<sup>39</sup> Vitalii Korotich, supporter of *perestroika* and editor of the *perestroika* journal *Ogonyok*, was even more explicit. When asked about Ukraine in March 1990, he replied: “It will be possible to discuss [the real movement for independence] in Ukraine only in the middle of the 1990s, because all Ukrainians experience is punishment. It was punishment, it was execution, it was really terrible years.”<sup>40</sup>

Ukraine had been the most closely controlled of all the provinces of the union. It was the fief of the most reactionary part of the Soviet *apparatus*. Only when longtime republic party boss Yuri Shcherbitsky retired in autumn 1989 did *perestroika* really begin there. Its national civic front, *Rukh*, a movement for the support of *perestroika*, only fully came into being after the republican election of March 1990.

There were other reasons besides the hold of a conservative *apparatus* for Ukrainian weakness and passivity. For over 100 years, each political generation in Ukraine had undergone a purge and repression. Some had been entirely wiped out. Ukraine was in many ways the most awful part of Europe in the 20th century. It was the theatre of World War I on the eastern front, the main battleground of the Russian Civil War, the place where the Soviet peasantry was annihilated from 1929 to 1933 – and then in World War II it was again the main theater of the war in the east.

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<sup>38</sup> Interviews in Moscow, autumn 1992.

<sup>39</sup> Boris Oleinik, “Congress of People’s Deputies,” *Izvestiya*, 2 June 1989, pp. 1-10, translated in *Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press*, no. 26, 1989, p. 6.

<sup>40</sup> “Yeltsin, Presidency, No ‘Competitor’ to Gorbachev,” ITV, FBIS-SOV-90-046, 8 March 1990, p. 78.

Both the 1989 elections to the union-wide Congress of People's Deputies and the elections to the national parliament in 1990 occurred prior to the formation of a mass movement capable of proposing non-communist candidates and monitoring elections, as had happened in Russia. Communist Party elites maintained control in their bastions, particularly in the countryside. Despite this, the elections showed that western Ukraine was a cauldron of national feeling. But the four *oblasts* of western Ukraine only comprised about 10 percent of the entire population. The democratic separatists also did well in central Ukraine, especially in Kyiv.

But both elections also showed that many areas of Ukraine seemed practically untouched by national feeling. That was, in particular, true of the Crimea, but also of the eastern region, the Donbas, and the southern *oblasts* of Ukraine – Odessa, Mykolayiv, and Kherson. On a national level, surveys showed that only 13 percent of the national population supported an independent Ukraine before the August putsch.<sup>41</sup> So how was it possible that 93 percent of the Ukrainian population voted for independence on December 1 of the same year, thus dooming the Soviet Union?

Part of the answer lies in the rapid evolution of popular opinion in 1990-1991 and in the opening of political vistas that only madmen and dreamers could have imagined just one or two years earlier. The price increases of 1989 enacted by Soviet Premier Nikolai Ryzhkov, which were followed by sudden increases announced by his successor, Valentin Pavlov, in April 1991, played an important part. Coming from Moscow, they gravely weakened unionist sentiment, strengthening the already widely held opinion that Ukraine could do better managing its own economy. The sovereignty debates, which had been started by the Baltic fronts and facilitated by Russia's actions, fomented such thinking. Sovereignty was especially attractive to engineers and administrators of an economy where over 90 percent of the enterprises depended on commands from Moscow.

Thus, sovereignty and independence were not dependent on ethnic, cultural, linguistic nationalism of the cultural elites of Kyiv or the western Ukrainians. It became a territorial argument for political and economic self-determination, which had been the main current of Ukrainian ethno-nationalism since the suppression of Ukrainian autonomy in the 18th century. That affected Russian and Russian-speaking Ukrainians, which is why arguments using linguistic or ethnic statistics turned out to be so mistaken. (In November 1991, the author asked Russian-speaking youths on a railroad platform in Kharkiv why they considered themselves Ukrainian, since they did not speak Ukrainian. They replied with the question, "Are the Irish English because they speak English?") Public opinion supported a looser federation or confederation with Russia. There was a nationalism *du pays* in Ukraine independent of ethnicity. Popular prejudice held that Ukraine was harder-working and better-ordered than Russia, which was lying untended in ruins – and drunk, to boot.

Ukraine also benefited from the powerful miners' movement in the Donbas, which, in alliance with Siberian miners in the Kuzbas coal basin, shook the Soviet Union in July 1989 and June-July 1990. The miners spoke a language of class conflict and stood against party privilege. Their powerful demands for popular participation and bureaucratic accountability prevented the key area least touched by Ukrainian patriotism, the industrial east, from becoming a fortress of reaction.

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<sup>41</sup> Interview with Valerii Khmelko, head of the Analytic Department of the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, 15 November 1991, Kyiv.

Nonetheless, the key to Ukrainian developments in 1991 was the elites. That had been expected by astute observers of the ethno-national situation in the Soviet Union. With a weakening of the center, the indigenous elites were expected to reach out for power. Although meant to be the instruments of central power, they would opt to exercise it themselves.

The decisive events occurred in the parliament after the March 1990 elections. The democratic opposition only had 25 percent of the votes in the house, some 155 members, against the "Group of 239" – the communist majority out of a total of 442 deputies. As the debate over sovereignty developed in the Ukrainian parliament in 1990-1991, the communist majority began to split into two factions: the centrists and the "national communists."

During the August coup, Kravchuk and most of the "national communists" equivocated, waiting to see who would win. After the coup, with those communist elites loyal to the center in disarray, they jumped into independence. It was a *quid pro quo* with the "democratic nationalists." The patriots and nationalists of Kyiv and Lviv now supported Ukrainian statehood, temporarily (they hoped) giving up democracy and reform for the sake of independence.<sup>42</sup>

The "national communists" lifted the vocabulary, symbols, and ideology of statehood from the patriots. They now had real political power and control of the state and economy, instead of being the local bosses for Moscow. The two elites together were able to engineer a massive shift in public opinion in favour of a complete break with Moscow. The alliance of "national communists" and democratic nationalists was aided by missteps on the part of Yeltsin and Gorbachev. From a Ukrainian perspective, the coup was yet another example of how events in Moscow, over which Ukrainians had no control, affected their lives and destiny. Gorbachev's disclosure that he and Yeltsin had divided up the rule of the country confirmed those fears. Yeltsin's attempt to bring Ukraine into line by threatening its territory simply backfired, uniting disparate elites of a very divided country. What Russian Orthodox priests had prayed against since the Battle of Poltava in 1709 came to pass. Ukraine separated from Russia.<sup>43</sup> The union was dead.

Yeltsin's opportunistic use of ethno-nationalism was in large part due to his and Russia's uncertain national identity. That influenced his assumptions and his expectations. As Yeltsin and his associates rode Russian nationalism (and transitional sentiment across the Soviet Union) to central power, they destroyed the basis of that power. They did that by inciting Ukrainian ethno-nationalism. They were unable to make an accurate assessment of that threat to their aims because they thought Ukraine was bound to them by 1,000 years of history and an unbreakable tie of consanguinity. Consequently, the immediate causes of the breakup of the Soviet Union are found in the ethno-national questions in Russia and Ukraine.

*Roman Laba is an associate professor at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. He is the author of a book on Poland's Solidarity movement, The Roots of Solidarity.*

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<sup>42</sup> For a concise account of these elite developments and full documentation, see Taras Kuzio and Andrew Wilson, *Ukraine: From Perestroika to Independence* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), p. 174.

<sup>43</sup> For a more extended discussion of the relationship of Russia and Ukraine, See Roman Laba, "State, Nation, and Identity in the Russian-Ukrainian Conflict," *European Security*, Fall 1995.



Yaroslav and Slava Stetsko meet U.S. Vice President George Bush in Washington in 1983.

# ABN

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## CORRESPONDENCE

*Freedom for Nations! Freedom for Individuals!*

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## **Symon Petlura** **Head of a State and Commander-in-Chief**



Symon Petlura was born into a simple, poor family in the time-honored city of Poltava in 1879. At the age of twenty he joined the Ukrainian Revolutionary Party, and from this time on he played a significant role in underground Ukrainian organizations. When still a pupil at the seminary in Poltava, he organized a Ukrainian youth movement whose objective was the liberation of Ukraine. On account of this he was persecuted by the school authorities and finally compelled to leave.

In his youth he formed the opinion that Ukraine could only acquire national freedom and independence through a national uprising and the ousting of the Tsarist regime. He became an extremely active organizer. Petlura founded secret associations in the most remote parts of the large province of Poltava, and his name soon became known throughout Ukraine. When revolutionary uprisings threatened to bury Tsarist Russia and Russia lost the war against Japan, so that Russia's imperial might seemed on the brink of collapse, Petlura moved to Kyiv, which at this time was the headquarters of all the groups in the Ukrainian freedom movement. There he founded an ideological organ which was to become the main publication of the Ukrainian Socialist Democratic Party.

The first problem Petlura had to face was the question of Ukraine's relations with the Social Democratic Party of Russia, which at that time (1904-1905) was divided into two camps. These two Russian parties, however, were in full agreement with regard to the Ukrainian problem. Like all other Russian imperialists, they opposed Ukraine's aspirations for freedom. Petlura maintained decisively against the predominant attitude of the Russian Socialists: "The social freedom of a nation can never be reached without its national liberation."

Between 1904 and 1906 Petlura was generally recognized as the spokesman of the Ukrainian freedom movement. He dedicated himself

above all to the ideological education and training of the younger generation and the vast masses of the people – workers and peasants – for he was firmly convinced that the Ukrainian freedom movement must have a solid social and political base and that the strengthening of national consciousness amongst the workers and peasants was an undisputable prerequisite for the success of Ukraine's struggle for freedom. However, when the Russians' oppressive measures reached their climax under the regime of Stolypin in 1910, Petlura was forced to leave his homeland in order to avoid imprisonment. He went to Moscow, where he obtained a lowly position in a co-operative organization. But here, too, he continued his political activities and founded amongst the fairly numerous Ukrainian residents in Moscow the "Kobzar" movement. When all Ukrainian publications were forbidden in Kyiv, Petlura started up a Ukrainian periodical in Moscow, published in Russian – *Ukrainskaya Zhizn* (Ukrainian Life). In a series of excellent articles which appeared in this magazine, he stood up for Ukrainian independence and national freedom along with various other prominent Ukrainians.

During the First World War, too, Petlura continued his political activities. He worked ardently on those parts of the Russian front to which thousands of Ukrainian soldiers and officers had been sent in the hopeless struggle against the enemy powers by the Tzarist government.

The extent of Petlura's organizational skills can be truly appreciated when one realizes that the Tzarist army contained no less than three million Ukrainian soldiers scattered over various sections of the Russian front line.

In February, 1917, on the eve of the great Revolution, Petlura succeeded in linking up all the groups of the Ukrainian freedom movement in the Russian army. He and his supporters were completely permeated with the vision of a free Ukraine, of an independent Ukrainian state, with the idea of the Ukrainian nation and her energies unfurling themselves in the spheres of national culture, politics, and economics. This unfurling was to take place in complete harmony with the historic national traditions of the country. But meanwhile the fateful crisis in the East was approaching with gigantic strides.

A democrat and opponent of violence, Petlura, whose convictions and attitude to life were determined to some degree by the idealism which still reigned at the end of the nineteenth century, had already accumulated certain political experiences when the revolution broke out at the end of February, 1917, and the Tzarist empire collapsed. He was thus able to estimate with objectivity and realism the situation which followed the downfall of the Russian empire. The new men who seized power in Russia, Prince Lvov, Milukov, Kerensky, Chernov, and later Lenin and Trotsky, who represented all the streams of Russian political thought, were determined to suppress the Ukrainian freedom movement by force. The only difference between them with regard to Ukraine was that each had an

individual conception of the problems which obtruded on them and gave different reasons for their hostile attitude towards Ukraine.

In view of the united hostility of the Russians towards Ukraine, Petlura proclaimed the basis of the national consolidation of the Ukrainians, together with all that this involved. he dedicated himself utterly to the organization and formation of the first unit of the new Ukrainian military forces. Within two months of the February Revolution he became head of the Ukrainian General Military Committee of the army, which performed the important functions of a general staff. With his *haidamaks* he stormed the Kyiv arsenal, which had been occupied by Russian Bolshevik troops, and suppressed the revolts which Lenin had triggered off in the city. Petlura's quick action meant a decisive step forward in Ukraine's struggle against Russia, since it contributed considerably to the stabilization of the Ukrainian state.

Thanks to Petlura's untiring activities as leader of the Ukrainian National Army, the Ukrainian Central Council was in the position to proclaim on 22nd January 1918, in Kyiv, the historically important resolution declaring the sovereignty and independence of the Ukrainian National Republic. The power which Petlura had at that time was amazing. It is no wonder that Lenin found himself forced to dispatch strong units of the Soviet Russian Army from Moscow and Leningrad against the Ukrainian National Republic and to make a formal declaration of war, in spite of the fact that his government had recognized the independence of Ukraine in a previous proclamation, Lenin's original plan, that of kindling the flames of revolution in Ukraine, proved to be misconceived. And so the Russian Army, marching under the Red Flag, moved from the north against Ukraine, crossed the Ukrainian frontier, and began to set up Soviets in occupied Ukraine.

It was in these troubled times that Petlura proved his extraordinary capability and skill as a statesman. he managed to overcome all difficulties, and to lead his fellow-countrymen to national freedom and sovereignty. In December, 1917, France and Great Britain gave *de facto* recognition to Ukraine's independent statehood. Italy and Romania followed their example. In January 1918, Germany and Austria-Hungary, together with Turkey and Bulgaria, recognized independent Ukraine *de jure*. Thus the young Ukrainian National Republic became the subject of international politics. Here, too, Petlura proved that he was a far-seeing politician. He opposed the idea of a one-sided alliance between Ukraine and any one of the warring powers. But when Lenin created a new political situation by sending a Russian peace delegation to Berestye Lytovske (Brest-Litovsk), Petlura realized that if Ukraine signed a peace treaty with Germany and Austria-Hungary, she would be able to limit Soviet Russia's sphere of influence to ethnographic Russian territories.

On the other hand he foresaw that this would cause difficulties. For this reason he established links with the representatives of France and Great Britain, in order to avoid the dangers of one-sided alliance. Further, he conducted negotiations with representatives of the non-Russian nations of the former Tzarist empire who hurried to Kyiv after the October Revolution in order to unite themselves with Ukraine, to build up a democratic and free alliance, and to organize effective resistance to Soviet Russian dictatorship. Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Moslem Turkestan, White Ruthenia, the Tatars and the Don Cossacks – all these peoples turned to Kyiv, and tried, together with Ukraine, to safeguard their rights and their future. Petlura regarded the realization of this idea as one of the most important tasks which the government of the new Ukrainian state had to perform. Later, too, during his bitter period of exile, he stuck to this idea as the effective basis of preparation for a united struggle against Soviet Russian imperialism.

After the manifesto of 29th April 1918, when General Groener supported the seizure of power by General Skoropadsky and his troops, Petlura withdrew from active politics. But his popularity was so great that the Congress of Communal and Local Administrations, which was then in session in Kyiv, elected him its President. Skoropadsky had Petlura arrested. However, under the pressure of public opinion he was released again after two months. But when Skoropadsky issued his proclamation declaring union with Russia in November 1918. Petlura marched into Kyiv at the head of his troops as the head of the Ukrainian National Federation. In a appeal directed to the Ukrainian people, he declared Skoropadsky's proclamation invalid and admonished Ukrainians to continue the struggle for freedom and national independence.

The National Congress of Ukraine, convened in Kyiv in January 1919, ratified Petlura's complete authority as Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Army (*Holovnji Otoman*) and elected him a member of the Council of State of the Ukrainian National Republic. Shortly afterwards Petlura took up the position of President of the Council of State. At the same time the Congress proclaimed the union of West Ukraine (the Ukrainian territories of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire) with the Ukrainian National Republic (22nd January 1919). Through this union with West Ukraine all Ukrainian territories were united as one state. The political task which Petlura had made his goal in his youth in Poltava was thus realized; Ukraine was free and independent.

But a new danger menaced Ukraine from the north, from Russia. Soviet Russia once again took to warlike activity against Ukraine. Simultaneously those Polish divisions which had been well armed by France in order to fight the Soviet Russians began to attack and occupy West Ukraine. The military position of the Ukrainian Army became all the more serious when the counter-revolutionary Russian General Denikin started an offensive from the south with the aim of re-

establishing the Tzarist empire. The victorious powers, Great Britain and France, had failed to grasp the true state of affairs, and supported Denikin because they saw him as the future ruler of Russia.

And so there was an unequal struggle on three fronts: in the north with Lenin, in the west with the Poles, in the south with Denikin, and, on top of everything, with a typhoid epidemic. In view of this unfavorable state of affairs, Petlura decided to try and negotiate an armistice with the Polish Marshal Pilsudski. At the end of September 1919 he despatched a delegation to Warsaw, which after long negotiations signed an armistice with the Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Army. Seven months later, in April 1920, an alliance was formed between Poland and Ukraine. As a result of this alliance the united Ukrainian and Polish forces advanced to the Dniro (Dnepr). But they were unable to withstand the counter offensive organized by Marshal Tukhachevsky, and retreated towards Poland.

Only when Tukhachevsky had almost reached the gates of Warsaw could he, after a bitter struggle, be thrown back. The cause of the defeat of the Polish and Ukrainian Armies is to be sought in the fact that the Polish Generals under Sikorski rejected Petlura's orders that every Ukrainian liable to military service should be mobilized, and refused to supply arms to these Ukrainian military units when mobilized. The Polish Generals were afraid that the army under Petlura's command would exceed the Polish Army in strength and numbers if it were reinforced with fresh troops from Ukraine, and this would have had consequences with regard to Polish-occupied West Ukraine. Furthermore, Poland ended her alliance with Ukraine in 1921 by signing a separate peace with the Soviet Russian Government in Riga. The political clauses of the Warsaw Alliance of April 1920 thus became null and void.

During 1920 and 1921 Petlura tried to reform the numerous Ukrainian revolutionary groups and to bring them under central command. An expeditionary force from West Ukraine belonging to his army broke through the Soviet Russian front and operated for a whole year under the command of General Omelanovych-Pavlenko in the territories of Central Ukraine. Some years later continual rebellions broke out in Ukraine and the Soviet Russian Government was compelled to concentrate large forces in Ukraine in order to force the incorporation of Ukraine into the Soviet Union. When Tukhachevsky reorganized the Red Army, there were thirty-four infantry regiments stationed in Ukraine. In this way Soviet Russian military potential was tied down in Ukraine and the expansion of the Soviet Union westwards was prevented. It must be pointed out that the Ukrainian Army under Petlura's command stopped Soviet Russia's conquering hordes from lending support to the Communist *coups* in Hungary (led by Béla Kun), Bavaria, Berlin, and Hamburg, which were already threatening to Bolshevize Central and Western Europe at that time.

After the West had yielded Ukraine and other nations which had gained their independence (Georgia, Turkestan, Azerbaijan, White Ruthenia, etc.) to Russian colonial imperialism, however, the Bolshevization of Central Europe came only during and after the Second World War.

At the moment it looks as if, what with the West's present anti-liberation and capitulating policies, Russian imperialism is well on the way towards subjugating those parts of Europe which are still free.

Long after Petlura had gone into exile (finally to Paris), armed rebellions broke out in Ukraine. In fact, even today his name is still a symbol of the struggle for freedom amongst the Ukrainian masses, a symbol of just reorganization in Eastern Europe and of the future rebirth of the 45-million-strong Ukrainian people in freedom and independence. When Petlura was murdered by the Soviet Russian agent Schwarzbard in Paris in May 1926, the Kremlin rulers were almost certain that his death would mean the end of the Ukrainian independence movement. But they overlooked the fact that a noble idea cannot be eradicated by killing its initiator and champion. Mikoyan, one of the Kremlin's ruling clique, had reason enough to speak of the dangers of "Petlurism" at the 20th Party Congress. For even today, after many years, the name of Symon Petlura is the symbol of a permanent revolution against Russia's dictatorial power in Ukraine.

\* \* \*

*Mr. Sourwine: On May 25, 1926, Gen. Symon Petlyura, then leader of the Ukrainian nationalist movement was assassinated in Paris.*

*Mr. Deriabin: I have heard it said in the Emigré Department of State Security that Petlyura was assassinated by Soviet State Security.*

*Mr. Sourwine: Col. Evhen Konovalets, killed by explosion of a parcel bomb in Rotterdam.*

*Mr. Deriabin: I heard that his killing was organized by State Security when he was working with the Ukrainian nationalist movement. These Ukrainian nationalist leaders were a particular danger before World War II, and especially so right after World War II, which is why Soviet State Security kidnapped or killed such persons as Petlyura, Bandera and Rebet – because the nationalists, especially in West Ukraine, were very active in 1946, 1947, 1948, and as late as 1949.*

Murder International Inc. – U.S.-Senate Documentation, 1965.

*ABN Correspondence, Vol. 17, No. 3.*

*Enn TARTO*

## **Forty Years Ago**

On March 12, 1956, an underground youth organization – the Estonian Youth League – was formed in Tartu, in the territory of the occupied Republic of Estonia. This organization set the restoration of the independent Republic of Estonia and the establishment of a democratic system of government as its final goal. Its nearest aim was to unite loyal persons, to organize counterpropaganda against occupants and their local supporters, etc.

We, and the Estonian youth in general, were deeply moved by the 1956 heroic uprising of the Hungarian people and its suppression by Soviet occupants. Our youth organization prepared and spread leaflets in support of the uprising on November 4, 1956 in the town of Tartu. In the middle of November a propagandist from Moscow came to Tartu Secondary School No. 3. The headmaster and the Moscow propagandist demanded that the general meeting of students publicly condemned the patriots of Hungary. At my and other more active students' initiative, students started to whistle and stomp their feet at such a demand. The headmaster and the Moscow propagandist were constrained to leave the hall.

On December 25, 1956 the KGB arrested the key members of our youth organization. In 1957 eight young people were convicted to various sentences of years of imprisonment by the supreme court of the Estonian SSR. The 17 and 18 years old convicts were Jaan Isotamm, Enn Tarto, Voldemar Kohv, Jüri Lõmus, Tõnis Raudsepp, Jüri Rebane, Lembit Soosaar and Enn-Kaupo Laanearu.

I served my time, sentenced by the occupants, in various prison camps in the territory of our kindred nation – the Mordvinians. A group of Estonian youth organized there a new illegal organization – the Estonian Nationalists' Union which set as its aim the co-ordination of the fight for freedom of the Finno-Ugric people. In Mordvinian prison camps Estonians, Finns, Hungarians (from Transcarpathia), Karelians and Komis had good relations. Together we observed common holidays and we also had a joint basketball team.

Unfortunately, the KGB destroyed our Estonians' secret organization and we were sentenced to various years of confinement. At the end of 1967, I returned to Estonia and dedicated myself to the organization of an open and righteous resistance movement. In 1983 I was arrested for the third time, being once more accused of the so-called anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda. As a political prisoner I have spent a total of fourteen years in prison, covering the following periods 1956-1960, 1962-1967, 1983-1987.

I was elected to the 7th membership of the Riigikogu of the restored Republic of Estonia. At present I am a Member of the 8th membership of the Riigikog.

*October 14, 1996.*

*Enn Tarto – Member of the Republic of Estonia Riigikogu (Parliament)*

\* \* \*

Unofficial translation from Estonian

*Extract, material of the Estonian Youth League  
Branch of the Estonian State Archives, Fund No. 130  
The original manuscript by Enn Tarto*

The Estonian Youth League was founded in the town of Tartu,  
in the occupied Republic of Estonia on March 12, 1956

**ELY (principles) Programme**  
An Extract from the Programme

**LONG-RANGE PROGRAMME**

We have set our final aim to overthrow the communist dictatorship by a nation-wide revolution and to drive out the Russian occupants, to establish a democratic Republic of Estonia. Under present circumstances it is almost impossible to achieve our aims by our own strength but still we have to be ready and prepare the others in order not to rely on others' assistance in moments of need but rather to stand up for our freedom by ourselves.

\* \* \*

Unofficial translation from Estonian

*An extract from the materials of the Estonian Youth League  
Branch of the Estonian State Archives, Fund No. 130  
The original manuscript written by Jaan Isotamm*

**Young People of Estonia!**

The winds of freedom are blowing already in the vicinity. In spite of the Red Army terror and the treachery of the communist government, the heroic fight for freedom of the Hungarian people, especially the young, is going on.

The time has come for us to draw closer our lines. The Estonian people have gone through many times of trial and let us hope that we shall persist also this time. During the recent fifty years our youth has been one of the first among the fighters for freedom. Let us carry on with their activities.

Unofficial translation from Estonian and Russian

Photographic copies

*of typed anti-Soviet leaflets by J. E. Lõhmus*

Leaflets of the Estonian Youth League

Branch of the Estonian State Archives, Fund No. 130

**DOWN WITH RUSSIAN COMMUNIST DICTATORS!**

Estonian brothers and sisters!

The time of freedom is at hand! The events in Western Europe are testifying to that. Let us show the "tiblas"\* that man's courage is not dead in Estonia! Let us show the Sarmatian murderers how Luke made beer!

We wish the communists a happy "Toper" Day\*\* and a prompt resettlement to their "Vast Fatherland"!

Long live free Estonia!

Let us not forget our brothers and sisters who are suffering in Siberia!

Senior investigator of the KGB  
(Nikitin)  
/signature/

---

\*tibla – an abusive name for a Russian

\*\*Red October Day, i.e. the anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution

## Problems of Ukrainian Diaspora in Russia

The term “diaspora” was and is a completely new notion in Russia – the empire. There, a nationalities policy did not exist. The question of a national diaspora as solved by brutal force and by emperor’s order (*ukazy*). For many Russians now, and especially for middle-level officials, old methods of solving nationality problems continue to be employed. For them, the Ukrainian national minority in Russia does not exist. This is the main reason why Ukrainians in many centers of their compact settlements have no facilities to congregate and organize their community activities.

During the Soviet era, policies concerning national minorities changed. They underwent a three-stage development. This can be gleaned from Soviet policies dealing with nationalities’ in schools. After the revolution till the middle of the 1930s education in native languages increased at all levels in public schools. It reached its peak in 1934 with the teaching of 104 native languages in Soviet schools. However, in the academic years of 1939-40, a radical change was introduced. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR issued an ordinance to introduce the Russian language into all educational institutions of the multinational state. From that time until the end of the 1970s, the number of native-language schools dropped to 44 languages spoken in the country. In the 1980s, and at present, education in Russia is conducted in 77 languages of Russia’s national minorities on their ethnic territories. But in diaspora-situations outside these ethnic territories in cities with dense populations of minorities, education in native languages is neglected. At best it is conducted in Saturday or Sunday schools, in private homes or in rented facilities without official support. The tax-paying parents are entitled to have their children educated according to their wishes in the language of their origin. By paying extra for children’s education in their native language they bear a double burden of taxation, consequently they are demanding redress. But local authorities offer little help. Ukraine, burdened with its own problems, has no provisions for the Ukrainian diaspora’s needs, yet on its own territory it completely funds all schools, cultural activities and facilities of the Russian minority. Russia, on the other hand, has designated 9 billion roubles of its diaspora’s needs plus an additional 3 billion roubles to support its Russian-language press and media. The support for minorities on Russia’s own territory is meagre if not neglectful. As an example, the Ukrainian situation may be illustrative. This year, the Association of the Ukrainian National Movement has issued an Appeal to the international community for help. It is very disappointed that “the Russian authorities do not even notice the Ukrainian diaspora that

includes millions of Ukrainians. Otherwise, how is one to understand the fact that Russia has neither state-financed Ukrainian schools, nor Ukrainian periodicals, nor radio and TV programs in the Ukrainian language?" Discouraged, they fear that "there isn't any hope that this situation will change for the better in the future." The help of 42 million roubles that the city of Moscow has designated this year for the cultural activities of Ukrainians is worse than miserly. In the press it is generally estimated that over one million Ukrainians live in Moscow, but the statistics that came from the mayor's office state that in the city records there are 255,000 registered Ukrainians in Moscow (five of them work in the mayor's administration). If these 42 million roubles of assistance were applied to the official 255 thousands Ukrainians then, at the present exchange rate of 5500 roubles to one American dollar, they would receive about 3 cents per person per year and four times less if one million persons of Ukrainian background were taken into consideration. This predicament is even worse for the Ukrainians in other cities of Russia: Ufa, Chelabinsk, Tumen, Habarovsk. In Vladivostok, Ukrainians meet on the street in the city center to discuss their sizable community's affairs or to meet visitors, as it happened during my visit.

Ukrainian parents in the diaspora are now concerned that their children, having no opportunities to study Ukrainian, will lose their family continuity, their heritage, and their venerated national traditions. To counteract this process, the Ukrainians in Moscow try to find legal ways to assure their children's education in the Ukrainian language and traditions. Through their associations: "Ukraina," "Slavutich," Ukrainian National Movement, Ukrainian Historical Club, they have forwarded some general resolutions to the Russian authorities for consideration: that the government officially recognize Ukrainians in Russia as its most numerous national minority, that, therefore, in places of sizable Ukrainian settlements a network of state-funded Ukrainian-language schools and cultural centers be established in the Russian Federation; and that official visits be assured to the Ukrainian government; and private citizens-delegations to come for visits. While asking the Ukrainian government to help advance these requests to the Russian authorities, the Ukrainian diaspora in Russia intimate that they would welcome a program developed by Ukraine which would endeavor to assure them the inalienable human rights and freedoms in the Russian Federation.

This last, somewhat pessimistic, appeal to Ukraine is motivated by the fact that Russian political parties have no programs nor show any interest in developing civilized policies respecting their numerous non-Russian nationalities which live in Russian cities as diasporas. The only part which has included in its platform a short program devoted to the nationalities' question in Russia is Russia's Democratic Choice, headed by Egor Gaidar. In it are included provisions for education in the native

languages for having representation in the government consisting of nationalities' delegates, and for the formation of such structures which could conduct a continual dialogue with government authorities. Although the influence of Gaider's party, as was shown by the results of the last elections, is quite small, still this plank has provided a model which could be emulated. Moreover, Ukrainians in the diaspora have applicable models from the West. In Canada there is a law according to which funds are provided for minorities' language and culture instruction if in that region 10% or more residents of that minority reside. And in America, the state of New Jersey has a legal provision to offer instruction in public schools in some nationality's language if a group of parents in that school district makes such a request. Having these possibilities to model themselves on, the recognition-demands of the Ukrainian diaspora in Russia continue.

And so, the Ukrainian associates in Moscow in collaboration with associations of other non-Russian nationalities have decided to come together and unite themselves into a "Congress of Nationalities' Associations of Russia" to coordinate their activities directed at their relations with the Russian government. Under their initiative a conference was immediately organized devoted to "Nationalities' Schools and the Peoples, which have no Government Formations in the Russian Federation." Government officials were invited to attend and participate in the deliberations. There, the First Vice-Minister of the Federal Ministry of Education addressed the audience and made a memorable statement that in questions of diaspora-education one deals not so much with "nationalities' schools" but with "ethnocultural schools" where not only language but also the totality of native culture would be inculcated. However, for such instruction qualified teachers are unavailable... Another representative from the Russian Ministry dealing with national minorities and federal public relations revealed that now it has become a necessity for the government to introduce a federal law which would guarantee the social rights of national minorities in Russia and would provide a model of juridical regulations in the sphere of minorities' language, culture, and education. Similar provisions were also discussed in the Duma (Russian parliament), where a "National-Cultural Autonomy"-law was deliberated and was actually accepted at its first reading. This law has defined national-cultural autonomy as a *sui generis* social association of citizens who declare themselves as belonging to a national minority which aims to preserve its national culture and requires for it appropriate government support. This law has the following specific provisions which secure:

- 1) the right to acquire general education in the native language;
  - 2) the right to take part in the elaborative process, preparing standards and programs for schools, offering teaching in native languages.
- (This is the first of such laws which has ever been provided for national minorities in Russia).

3) the right to turn to laws which regulate and distribute budgetary funds for the cultural-educational needs of national minorities.

Many in the diaspora feel that the national-cultural autonomy law, however is only valid on paper. Dr. V. Antoniv expressed his disappointment in the *Ukrainian Courier* (a Moscow-based Ukrainian newspaper, number 4-5 for 1995) where he stated "our cultural autonomy is worth nothing here. Nobody cares about us in Russia, nobody asks us how we live, what rights we have. Russia does not help us." For the diaspora, and the Ukrainian diaspora in particular, the problems in Russia arise when they come to request that local authorities provide them with facilities to conduct their school and cultural activities. "None available," is the usual answer. Yet in the Soviet Union, such facilities were provided for all such activities of Soviet people, lumping all the nationalities together. Now, all these "Soviet" facilities have been taken over by the Russians even in places where national minorities reside. Organized diasporas thus feel that they also have a legitimate right to some former Soviet cultural and social facilities which they, as Soviet citizens, helped to build. But in these demands there is little understanding from local officials in Moscow and other Russian cities. Consequently, the struggle goes on.

On September 19, 1996, the Organization of the Ukrainian National Movement (OUN Ruh) of Moscow, which reflects the circumstances and expresses the interests and expectations of a considerable number of Ukrainians in the diaspora, issued a press-release addressed to the Moscow Press Conference pleading for media support in resolving the national-cultural status of Ukrainians and other national minorities in Moscow and its environs. It calls for better international relations between the Russian Federation and Ukraine. The following is the rendition of this press-release:

### **Introduction**

The Ukrainian diaspora in Russia came into being as a result of the resettlements from Ukraine both during the Tsarist times (based largely upon economic and political grounds) and during the Soviet period, occurring as a result of compulsory resettlements due to repression, planned starvation in Ukraine (in the years 1922, 1933, 1947), and the recruitment of a labor-force to open and explore the vast natural resources and economic development of the Russian North, Siberia, and the Far East region. Aside from resettlements, it must be pointed out that there are considerable regions and enclaves with compact Ukrainian populations in Russia which arose due to an arbitrarily established border between the Soviet Russian Federation and Soviet Ukraine in the early 1920s. This pertains to the regions of Kuban, sections of the Northern Caucasus, the Don region, the Belgorod, Kursk and Voronezh provinces. Ukrainians are also settled in Southern Ural, the

Tuman, and Vorkuta provinces, in the Far East as well as in other parts of the Russian Federation. A large number of Ukrainians live in the cities of St. Petersburg and Moscow in their *oblasts*. Official Soviet census data list over 6 million Ukrainians in the Russian Federation. However the actual number of Ukrainians in Russia is much higher. Media information lists more than 20 million Ukrainians in Russia. The abridged census numbers occurred as a result of Soviet assimilation pressures which caused many Ukrainians to feel it more advantageous to conceal their nationality and register themselves as Russians.

During the course of centuries after the Russian incorporation of Ukraine which occurred as a result of devious actions of the Russian government respecting the Union Treaty of Pereyaslav concluded between Ukraine under Hetman (Chief of State) Bohdan Khmelnytsky and Moscow Tsar Alexei in March 1654, the Russian authorities systematically took from Ukraine the most active and talented people into the tsar's service. Much of the Russian achievement in economics, science, culture and art was due to those newcomers from Ukraine. Nevertheless, the Ukrainians were never given full credit for their efforts in Russia as Ukrainians. Many of them, scholars, scientists, culture and art workers were simply declared Russian, as were, for example, the authors Hohol and Korolenko, the artists Repin and Yablonskaya, the composers P. I. Tchaikovsky and Bortnyansky, the singers Ivan Kozlovsky and Yury Gulyaev, the scholars Vernadsky and Zasydko and many others. This situation existed under the tsars, under the General Secretaries of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and it exists under the present Russian democratic government. It also should be pointed out, that in the bylaws of the city of Moscow, there are no provisions for minorities in that multinational Russian metropolis.

### **The Living Circumstances of Ukrainians in the Moscow Region**

The living-social situation of the Ukrainian diaspora in the Moscow region may be characterized by the following statements:

– The national minority status of the Ukrainians is not determined in the Constitution of the Russian Federation;

– The national-cultural autonomy law recently accepted by the Duma is meaningless for it lacks a mechanism to be put into operation;

– There is a complete absence of Ukrainian-language educational institutions with programs to teach the Ukrainian language, literature, history and art. For the sake of comparison, in Ukraine there are 5,293 Russian-language schools and out of 149 lyceums, gymnasia and colleges half of them are Russian language institutions and all of them are financed totally by the Ukrainian State Treasury. In addition, the Ukrainian government has adopted a special statute which provides financial support to national minorities' publications (including Russian);

– There are no Ukrainian cultural establishments, no Ukrainian-language media centers, no Ukrainian theaters, concert halls, museums, no Ukrainian language newspapers, journals, radio and TV programs financed by Russian authorities. In contrast, in Ukraine, almost every *oblast* has a Russian language theater, Russian museums in many cities, and more than half of the publications in Ukraine are in the Russian language;

– The Russian information media provide only scanty, too often distorted or contemptuous releases about Ukraine which offend its people and government, and which offend Ukrainians in Russia;

– Ukrainians find it difficult to subscribe to most periodicals from Ukraine and experience difficulties with the delivery of subscriptions due to interference at the customs offices. There are no Ukrainian literary journals in Moscow at all. It is quite the opposite in Ukraine. Russian newspapers, journals, and books are subscribed and delivered regularly to subscribers or to the distribution points. Furthermore, 40% of periodicals in Ukraine are published in Russian;

– Orthodox Ukrainians who constitute a majority of the diaspora's believers, have no facility to conduct their Divine Services in the Ukrainian language and the Ukrainians of the catholic confession have no church at all in which to pray in Moscow. The only Orthodox church of the Kyivan Patriarchate in Noginsk (Moscow area) is experiencing persecution instigated by the Moscow Patriarchy which, together with the local authorities, exert pressure on the Noginsk parish to sever its jurisdictional ties to Kyiv: In comparison, in Ukraine, there exists and freely operate more than 6,500 churches under parish priests subordinated to the Moscow Patriarchy who officiate their Holy Services in Church Slavonic rather than the Ukrainian language and who, with total disregard for Ukraine, preach the reunification of Ukraine with Russia.

### **Russian Relations with Ukraine**

Most recently, Russia began to exert increasing political and economic pressures upon Ukraine, attempting to gain some principal political concessions that could compromise Ukrainian state sovereignty. A number of Duma parliamentarians and some high ranking Russian government officials came out with openly provocative denouncements regarding Ukraine as a nation. Deserving mention is the desecration of the Ukrainian flag during the Duma's assembly, open pretenses to Ukrainian territories in Crimea, Sevastopol and some Eastern regions of Ukraine, the summons to conduct in Ukraine regional referendums calling for their unification with Russia or even to partition Ukraine into Eastern and Western parts and then to incorporate the former into the Russian Federation. Statements of this kind have become more numerous during the election campaign and especially after the victorious election of the

communists to the Russian Duma. Some high officials of the Russian government, taking advantage of the open border between Russia and Ukraine, crossed the demarcation lines from Russia and illegally conducted anti-Ukrainian activities, as did Mr. Zatulin, the former head of the Duma's citizenship committee, who opened an office in Crimea for the local people to sign up for Russian citizenship. The Russian Consul General in the Crimea (Ukraine!) actively sponsored that activity. The Moscow mayor, Mr. Luzhkov, while visiting the Crimea, and subsequently in Moscow, pronounced that the city of Sevastopol in the Crimea belongs to Russia. Announcements and activities of this kind, unfortunately, have not found rejection by neither the President of the Russian Federation, nor by its government, nor by the Russian Duma.

Members of the Russian Duma have formed a Commission to Defend the Russians in the near-abroad countries i.e. in the former Soviet Republics. This Commission has become a cause of interference in the internal affairs of those countries. From it originates inspiration to pro-Russian forces in Ukraine, especially in the South Eastern regions and in the Crimea, to conduct actions leading to the actual elimination of the Ukrainian language (which is the state language) from regional, local and municipal offices, educational institutions, media and cultural centers in Ukraine.

In the long-awaited plan for the international treaty between Russia and Ukraine, the Russians advanced several troublesome demands: to grant the Russian language in Ukraine the status of an "official language" i.e., the status of "the second state language;" to accept the principle of dual Ukrainian-Russian citizenship; to recognize the special territorial status of the city of Sevastopol as well as of Crimean autonomy. To an objective observer, these demands are nothing but the former imperial policies of Russia exhibiting its eternal desire to totally absorb Ukraine.

It should be pointed out here that the activities of the pro-imperial forces in the Russian Federation are extremely dangerous for peace and stability in Europe. The result of such activities is unpredictable and may lead to tragedy. It is the duty of the world and the democratic governments to condemn them and do everything possible to stop this downslide toward another world catastrophe.

### **OUN Ruh Proposals to Improve the Relations and Circumstances of the Ukrainian Diaspora in Moscow and the Russian Federation**

The Organization of the Ukrainian National Movement in Moscow, basing itself upon the International Human Rights Convention and the Helsinki Accords, has advanced to the Government of Moscow and the Russian Federation (a member of the European Union) a number of proposals:

1) To determine the constitutional status of national minorities and of the Ukrainian minority in particular.

2) To adopt laws pertinent to national minorities. To develop and put into practice the law of national-cultural autonomy.

3) To introduce a law by which national minorities may delegate their representative to the Duma of the Moscow City and to the Parliament of the Russian Federation.

4) To repeal the binding instruction of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR, signed by J. Stalin and V. Molotov in 1932, as well as all other similar Soviet instructions which liquidated the cultural-educational institutions of Ukrainians on the territories of their historical settlements in Kuban', Don River, Northern Caucasus and in other regions of Russia.

5) To put into effect state financial support for the cultural-educational needs of the Ukrainian minority on the level of support that the Russian minority has in Ukraine.

6) To institute Ukrainian radio and television broadcasts into regions of the Russian Federation on parity with the Russian broadcasts in Ukraine where Russian ORT and RTV teleprograms widely operate as well as radio "Mayak" and "Radio Russia."

7) To introduce Russian radio and TV programs which would regularly inform about the activities of the Ukrainian diaspora in Russia.

8) To establish Ukrainian cultural centers, libraries and schools in Moscow and in other locations of Ukrainian settlements.

9) To establish a museum of Ukrainian art in Moscow, using works of Ukrainian masters which are presently stored or scattered in various museums of the Russian Federation, including those works which were unlawfully relocated to Russia from Ukraine.

10) To reestablish the Ukrainian musical drama theater which operated in Moscow during the 1920-30s (known presently as Ermolova's Theater).

11) To reassign for the use of the Ukrainian diaspora the structures erected in the past by the Ukrainian community in Moscow such as the Mazepa's palace, the Rozumovsky's estate as well as similar properties in other regions of the Russian Federation.

12) To help all religious communities of the Ukrainian diaspora to acquire churches in the city of Moscow and in other regions of Ukrainian mass settlement.

13) To discontinue recent discriminatory employment practices regarding Ukrainians in certain Northern and Siberian enterprises.

14) To conclude, observing parity basis, the International Treaty between the Russian Federation and Ukraine which, hopefully, would find a civilized solution to the problems of the various diasporas in both countries, and would include provisions for pensions to those citizens who want to return from their places of employment to their home-countries for retirement.

## **OUN RUH Proposals to Improve Russian-Ukrainian Relations**

Taking for granted that the improvement of international relations between the Russian Federation and Ukraine is of interest to both countries and their peoples, OUN Ruh presents to the President, the government, and the Duma of the Russian Federation the following proposals for consideration:

- 1) To establish a relationship with Ukraine based on the recognition of its sovereignty, mutual understanding, and friendship.
- 2) To declare the inviolability of state borders with Ukraine and its sovereignty over the whole Crimean peninsula.
- 3) To discontinue interference in Ukrainian internal affairs and for the future prohibit economic and political pressure aimed at gaining political concessions for Russia.
- 4) To discontinue and in the future, disavow offensive statements regarding Ukraine in the Russian media.
- 5) To disallow anti-Ukrainian activities by Russian citizens, political leaders, their parties, and other public organizations.
- 6) To resolve in the nearest future the problems of the Black Sea Fleet on the basis of the actual input of each country into the Sea Power of the former Soviet Union and to resolve the stationing of the Russian navy on the territory of Ukraine in accordance to the Ukrainian constitution.
- 7) To conclude in the nearest future a full-scale Treaty with Ukraine.

Here it seems only proper to bring to the attention of all the media at this Moscow Conference, that similar proposals have been presented to President B. N. Yeltsin, to the Government of the Russian Federation and to the authorities of the city of Moscow in October 1993 by the First Congress of the Association of Ukrainians in Russia. There has been serious correspondence established between the Moscow mayor, Mr. Luzhkov and his Cabinet, and the Organization of the Ukrainian National Movement concerning the national-cultural needs of Ukrainians in Moscow. As a result, one of our requests for the Ukrainians in Moscow has been partially resolved.

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## Belarus 1991-1996

Belarus became the first victim of the Russian Duma's resolution, which condemned the dissolution of the Soviet Union and demanded the restoration of a single union.

The country's suicide, prompted by its President Aleksandr Lukashenko's decision to sign a broad integration treaty with Russia that in two years will lead to one government, one capital, one army, one national symbol and one anthem, offers a bounty of lessons.

Granted, Belarus has been struggling in vain to solidify its independence and sovereignty for the past five years and Lukashenko has been virtually throwing himself at Yeltsin's feet, so the Russian legislature's resolution, adopted on March 15, 1996, and Lukashenko's announcement on March 23, may not have been directly connected. But they came close enough to make the world stop and listen. Especially when Kazakhstan and Kyrgystan have immediately taken their places in the line to exchange their national symbols for the two-headed eagle.

In the two weeks since the 250 Russian lawmakers — almost three-quarters of the lower legislative house — publicly declared their imperialistic views, Ukrainian officials in Kyiv and abroad have matter-of-factly dismissed the resolution saying it was an internal document that has no basis in international law and has no jurisdiction in Ukraine. Former President Leonid Kravchuk, President Leonid Kuchma and the Foreign Ministry decried it as the beginning of the collapse of the Commonwealth of Independent States.

In an interview with *Der Spiegel* Kravchuk said it was a "farce" and an "irresponsible act intended to confuse and deceive people." He naively argued that a new union could be formed only if all newly-independent states adopted similar resolutions. "Today, the situation is absolutely different. New states have emerged, which are exerting difficult efforts to build a new life," he told the German weekly.

What is going on in Russia has direct consequences on Ukraine and it is the height of folly to disregard the resolution as an internal Russian document. Three-quarters of the Duma, representing at least as much of the Russian electorate, is unabashedly raising the specter of Russian imperialism. Russian voters have a greater choice from among Russian imperialists for their president. While the lone, wobbly democrat Yeltsin is turning into what is commonly referred to as conservative by appointing former KGB types and other hardliners to his government.

Yeltsin's actions should not be surprising but rather predictable. Any serious politician, be he American, Russian or Ukrainian, who wants to preserve his job will lean toward the electorate or else he will find

himself on the unemployment line. And today the Russian electorate is vocally in favor of returning to Russia's glorious past.

This doesn't mean that Kuchma et al are ready to give away the country or that there are hordes of Russians at the Golden Gates of Kyiv. If there were, it would be too late.

On the other hand, Ukrainian officials cannot hide behind international legal and diplomatic niceties, choosing instead to look at Russia as the elephant in the room that no one wants to see or talk about. Kyiv must raise the stakes in its diplomatic relations with Russia by pointing out without any reservations that further talk of reanimating the Soviet Union or any union will have negative ramifications on every aspect of bilateral relations—no treaty. In addition, Kyiv must unequivocally declare that Moscow's dreams of "reintegrating two fraternal Slavic peoples" will bring the issue before The Hague and the U.N. Security Council. The International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the European Union, the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development will undoubtedly frown upon any implicit or explicit threats that will destabilize the region. And talk of an ostracized Russia should not be far behind.

United States' Secretary of State Warren Christopher's finger waving at Russia was on the mark. Christopher appropriately chose Kyiv as the site to tell Russia before it was too late that any theoretical or practical encroachment on Ukraine's or anyone else's independence would not be tolerated.

Even Japan, the epitome of diplomatic manners, expressed its concern: "We support the sovereignty and independence of the CIS member-countries and are highly concerned over the resolution which runs counter to this line."

Kyiv cannot be less vociferous. Another tombstone is not needed.

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*Bertil HAGGMAN*

### **Latvia "Forest Brother" Tells Story**

On 30 October 1945 Janis Zalcmāns left Latvia for Sweden never to return. "And I will never return", he says today. On 8 May 1945 he and around 70 other Latvians left for the forests to fight the Soviets. The area of the operations was the marshy Courland Peninsula (one of the four provinces of Latvia, the other three are Livonia, Semgallia and Letgallia) near present day Ventspils (47,000 inhabitants). They called themselves *Mezabrāļi*, the Forest Brothers, and operated in small groups of four to five. The first period they often heard firing close by. Soviet soldiers were "combing" the woods. They never engaged in guerilla warfare like their Lithuanian cousins on the other side of the border. They just remained in hiding and were on the move to avoid Soviet patrols.

Thirty thousand Latvians were deported and "disappeared" when the Soviet Union occupied free Latvia on 17 June 1940 in accordance with the Hitler-Stalin Pact. Latvia lost 450,000 during World War II including the 180,000 who escaped.

*DESTA Vol. 14, No. 5.*

## Father “*Kadylo*” – Military Chaplain of the UPA (Ukrainian Insurgent Army)

*This paper is written within the framework of Slavic studies and focuses on the personality and the activities of the only military chaplain of the UPA, Father “Kadylo”. It makes public for the first time quite a few facts about the man unknown until now.*

### 1. Introduction

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the breakup of Eastern Europe, the unification of Germany, and the breakup of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, the whole situation in Europe, in its political, geographical, and economical dimensions, has been completely changed. These new circumstances allows us to look into, verify and unveil matters that either have been cloaked in secrecy or have been regarded as some kind of political taboo that one should never even think of bringing up as the matter of research. Thus this paper dares to touch upon one taboo in the relations between the two neighboring Slavic nations of the Poles and the Ukrainians, and for the first time deals openly with the personality and the activities of the one and only one military chaplain the UPA ever had: Father “*Kadylo*”.

The aim of this paper is twofold. First, instead of evaluating father “*Kadylo*” politically I shall concentrate on his personality and try to comprehend why he as a parish priest in the Uniate Ukrainian Orthodox Rite joined the UPA to become its chaplain. Secondly, I shall investigate why it is that the present hierarchy of the Uniate Ukrainian Orthodox Rite is on the one hand so ostentatiously celebrating the 400th Anniversary of the Union of Brest and is happy to exchange in public warm hugs with the Roman Catholic hierarchy of Poland in Jaroslav (in southeastern Poland) on 16-18 August, 1996<sup>1</sup> and on the other hand is so afraid to mention in public even a word about Father “*Kadylo*” to the same Roman Catholic hierarchy of Poland. The Uniate Ukrainian Orthodox Rite hierarchy seems to treat the matter of Father “*Kadylo*” as something that belongs to the distant past, something that should never be brought to public attention again. This paper is an explicit attempt to forestall such a relegation to obscurity.

In researching this delicate matter the author had to face enormous problems in order to obtain information about Father “*Kadylo*”. Since over 50 years have passed since the UPA was formed, one would expect that some materials concerning it that are kept in the archives in Poland, Ukraine, or the former Soviet Union would be

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<sup>1</sup> *Nashe Slovo*, No. 35 (2040), 1.09.1996, p. 1 and p. 7.  
declassified by now and open to the public, but for one reason or another

they have not been declassified. In such a situation I tried to search through other publicly available materials concerning UPA matters, but information concerning Father "Kadylo" is scarce. Mindful of the fact that many direct participants, especially former UPA soldiers, were sentenced and executed<sup>2</sup> or else perished in prisons,<sup>3</sup> I decided to see if I could trace the whereabouts of surviving former UPA soldiers, men who personally might have known Father "Kadylo" if they served as UPA soldiers in the same battalion (*kuryn*) as the one of which he was the chaplain. Though it turned out to be not an easy task, I managed to locate a few of such former UPA soldiers, and thanks to the information they gave me, I was able to trace a member of Father "Kadylo"'s family. This family member was more than happy to cooperate in providing me information concerning the facts of his life before he joined the UPA. Thus this paper is an unusual one, because it is written and based on firsthand information: primary and reliable sources.

Still, the fact that the materials kept in the above-mentioned archives have not been declassified put some limitations on this paper, with the result that many questions concerning Father "Kadylo" remain to be answered and further research will be needed to answer them.

## 2. Father "Kadylo" before he joined the UPA

Who was this Father "Kadylo"? This is the question that has bothered many scholars nowadays, scholars trying to find out more about this unusual priest of the Uniate Ukrainian Orthodox Rite.

In the many volumes of the *Litopys UPA* (The History of the UPA), which were published in Canada, only two volumes (the 13th and the 14th) provide some limited information about Father "Kadylo". This information is scattered in bits and pieces here and there in the two volumes. Moreover, the information concerning this priest relates to him only after he joined the UPA. Nothing is written about his life prior to that.

The same thing can be said about the books published by the *Archiwum Ukrainskie* (Ukrainian Archives) or by the *Zwiazek Ukrainc6w w Polsce* (Association of Ukrainians in Poland). These books do not throw much light upon the personality and life of Father "Kadylo" before he joined the UPA.

The information provided below is being published publicly for the first time, and it was provided by a member of Father "Kadylo"'s family. It represents the first reliable source we have for hitherto unknown facts about his life.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> E. Misilo, *Akcja "Wisla"* (Warszawa: *Archiwum Ukrainskie* 1993) pp. 462-467.

<sup>3</sup> Interview conducted on 28 March 1989 with a former UPA soldier, the 4th squad (*ryj*) commander "Nechaj", of the "Iwasek" platoon (*chota*), company (*sotnia*) "Homa".

<sup>4</sup> Letter, dated 14.12.1995, to the author from a member of Father

"Kadylo"s family.

Father "Kadylo"s real name is Vasyl Shevchuk. He was the firstborn son of Ivan and Ursula Shevchuk (who were of the Uniate Ukrainian Orthodox Rite), the eldest of six children born to them. he was born on 12 August 1903 in Stryj. He had two brothers: Mikhail (born in 1908) and Jaroslav (born in 1912), and three sisters: Maria (born in 1905), Stefania (born in 1910), and Irina (born in 1922). Maria and Mikhail were born in Stryj, the same as Vasyl, but Stefania, Jaroslav, and Irina were born in Drohobych, where the Shevchuks moved when Vasyl was seven years old.

In 1915, at the age of twelve, Vasyl Shevchuk enrolled at the state high school (called at the time the "gymnasium") in Drohobych, where he finished three years of his schooling (grades 1-3). Then he transferred to the state high school in Peremyshl, where he finished grades 4 and 5 of his schooling. The final years of his high school life, grades 6 to 8, he spent at the state high school in Stryj, whence he graduated on 5 October 1923.

After graduation from high school Vasyl decided to become a priest of the Uniate Ukrainian Orthodox Rite, so in 1923 he entered the Uniate Ukrainian Orthodox Rite Seminary in Peremyshl. In the fourth year of his studies at the seminary, he had to attend the death of his father, who asked him personally to take care of his brothers and sisters after his death.<sup>5</sup>

On 30 March 1930 Vasyl was ordained as an unmarried priest of the Uniate Ukrainian Orthodox Rite. He celebrated his First Holy Mass in Drohobych on 6 April 1930.<sup>6</sup> After that he was assigned to carry out his first pastoral work in the village of Dorozhyv Dolyshnyj, which is about 18 km away from Sambir City in the Lviv area. Later he became the parish priest in the village of Hrushtychy (not far from Nyzhankovychy), and then from 1932 he worked as a parish priest in Smerekivci.<sup>7</sup> At the outbreak of World War II, Father Shevchuk was a parish priest in Piatkova Ruska.<sup>8</sup>

Needless to say, while working as a priest he fulfilled his deceased father's request and helped as much as possible to ensure all his brothers and sisters obtained a proper schooling at distinguished schools in Peremyshl. As the older brother of his younger brothers and sisters, he was also fulfilling the role of head of the family in place of his deceased father.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> Letter, dated 26.01.1996, to the author from a member of Father "Kadylo"s family.

<sup>6</sup> Letter, dated 09.05.1996, to the author from a member of Father "Kadylo"s family.

<sup>7</sup> S.Dziubyna, *I Stwerdy Dilo Ruk Nashyh*, (Warszawa: *Archiwum Ukrainskie*, 1955), p. 71.

<sup>8</sup> *Litopys UPA* (Toronto: *Litopys UPA*, 1986), Vol. 13, p. 14.

<sup>9</sup> *Litopys UPA* (Toronto: *Litopys UPA*, 1986), Vol. 13, p. 14.

### 3. Father Vasyl Shevchuk's entry into the UPA and his position as military chaplain-Father "Kadylo"

Military and political events during World War II and the years following it further bittered the already existing animosities between the two neighboring Slavic nations of the Poles and the Ukrainians. Both nations were trying to create their own independent countries, and as a result they clashed on matters regarding their borders and also over mutual claims to the territory known as Zakerzonia.<sup>10</sup> Both sides formed their own military units. The Ukrainians in Zakerzonia formed units known as the UPA (Ukrainian Insurgent Army); this army eventually numbered 19 companies (*sotnia*) belonging to the Sixth Military Region code-named "San" ( *Voyenna Okruha "San"*), within the sphere of influence of group UPA-West.<sup>11</sup> Well-trained, well-disciplined, well-commanded, and with a high fighting morale, the UPA units in Zakerzonia<sup>12</sup> not only represented a real obstacle to the repatriation of Ukrainians from this territory to the Soviet Union, but more than anything else they also were the only Ukrainian military units to stand up to Stalin and his puppet government in Communist Poland in order to defend the Ukrainian population.

The Polish Communist Government at the time also had great expectations that it could finally oust the Ukrainians from the territory of Zakerzonia as a result of the 22 September 1944 agreement between Poland and the Ukrainian Republic of the Soviet Union concerning the repatriation of poles from the Ukraine to Poland and of Ukrainians from the territory of Zakerzonia in Poland to the Ukrainian Republic of the Soviet Union.<sup>13</sup> In order to eject the Ukrainians from this territory as soon as possible and to avenge the "depolonization" of Volhyn (Western Ukraine)<sup>14</sup> both regular units of the Polish army<sup>15</sup> and parliamentary Polish units carried out an anti-Ukrainian terror campaign in Zakerzonia. Many kinds of atrocities were committed on the civilian Ukrainian population by both these Polish groups;<sup>16</sup> together with this civilian population, at least 24 priests belonging to the Uniate Ukrainian Orthodox Rite and the Greek Ukrainian Orthodox Rite were ruthlessly murdered.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> H. Pajak, *Za Samostijna Ukraine* (Lublin: Wyd., retro, 1992), p. 5.

<sup>11</sup> *Litopys UPA* (Toronto: *Litopys UPA*, 1983), Vol. 6, pp. 17-23.

<sup>12</sup> H. Pajak, op. cit., p. 22.

<sup>13</sup> E. Misilo, op. cit., p. 12.

<sup>14</sup> H. Pajak, op. cit., p. 86.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 86-87.

<sup>16</sup> M. Siwicki, *Dzieje Konfliktów Polsko-Ukraińskich* (Warszawa: *Nakładem Autora*, 1994), Vol. 3, p. 66.

<sup>17</sup> E. Misilo, op. cit., p. 13.

In such circumstances Father Vasyl Shevchuk left his post as parish priest of Piatkova, which by then belonged to the Peremyshl region,<sup>18</sup> and joined the UPA as its military chaplain. The exact date of his joining the UPA units is not known, but since Volume 13 of the *Litopys UPA*, (page vii) lists him as the chaplain of the Peremyshl battalion (*kuryń*), which was established in 1945 as part of the 26th military district (TV) UPA "*Lemko*", it is most probable that the year of joining the UPA was 1945.<sup>19</sup> He had two military code-names: "*Kadylo*" and "*Plastun*"<sup>20</sup>; only the first one was commonly used, however.

Upon joining the UPA units, Father "*Kadylo*" took care of the spiritual needs of both the Ukrainian civilian population and the UPA units. His main pastoral duties included saying Holy Mass,<sup>21</sup> paying pastoral visits to wounded UPA soldiers cared for in underground field hospitals,<sup>22</sup> holding memorial services for UPA soldiers and commanders killed in action,<sup>23</sup> preaching sermons to UPA soldiers,<sup>24</sup> and hearing confessions of ordinary UPA soldiers,<sup>25</sup> of soldiers dying from wounds,<sup>26</sup> of soldiers sentenced to death by the UPA,<sup>27</sup> or of members of the civilian population.<sup>28</sup>

After the successful ambush carried out on 28 March 1947 by the two UPA companies of "*Hryn*" and "*Stah*" near the village of Jablonka, in which the Polish Deputy Polish Minister of Defense, Army General Karol Swierczewski, was killed,<sup>29</sup> the Polish Communist Government retaliated with the genocidal known as Operation "*Wisla*" (*Akcja "Wisla"*), which began on 28 April 1947 against the Ukrainians living in Zakerzonia.<sup>30</sup> The reign of terror, mass arrests, and forced deportation of the Ukrainian population by Polish military units resulted in completely cutting off the UPA units operating in this territory of Zakerzonia from their backup system, the Ukrainian population.

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<sup>18</sup> *Litopys UPA*, Vol. 13, op. cit., p. 14.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, p. vii.

<sup>20</sup> *Litopys UPA*, (Toronto: *Litopys UPA*, 1987), Vol. 14, p. 57.

<sup>21</sup> *Litopys UPA*, Vol. 13, op. cit., p. 14.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 19.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 29.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 233-234.

<sup>25</sup> *Litopys UPA*, Vol. 14, op. cit., p. 78.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 84.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 63.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 62.

<sup>29</sup> H. Piecuch, *Siedem rozmów z generałem Władysławem Pozoga* (Warszawa: *Czytelnik*, 1987), p. 48.

<sup>30</sup> *Nashe Slovo*, No. 42 (2047), 30.10.1996, p. 6.

Suffering enormous defeats but still putting up a fierce struggle against Polish units, UPA units decided to leave Zakerzonia by crossing the border into the territory of Czechoslovakia to get to the American-occupied zone of Germany.<sup>31</sup> On 10 June 1947 Father "Kadylo" was part of the "Hromenko" company that crossed the Polish-Czechoslovakia border and set out on a long march marked by continuous fighting with Czechoslovakian military units, before finally reaching Germany.<sup>32</sup> While marching through the territory of Czechoslovakia Father "Kadylo" became physically very weak from a lack of food; he tried to keep up his physical energy by eating blackberries found in the forest.<sup>33</sup> Finally on 30 June 1947, completely exhausted physically, he decided not to go on to Germany, but to stay in a parish with a Roman Catholic priest in the village of Hrubov in Czechoslovakia. After a few days there he was arrested by Czech Security Forces<sup>34</sup> and imprisoned with other UPA soldiers and commanders captured in Czechoslovakia.<sup>35</sup> On 3 May 1948 Father "Kadylo", together with 68 other former UPA soldiers and commanders caught and imprisoned in Czechoslovakia, was extradited to Poland and handed over to the Polish Security Police, the notorious UB (*Urząd Bezpieczeństwa*).<sup>36</sup>

From 3 May 1948 Father "Kadylo" began the life of a political prisoner in the Polish Security Police Prison (the UB Prison) in Rzeszów in the southeastern part of Poland. There the UB agents exceeded themselves in performing torture on this priest. The UB agents were notorious for the methods and the scale of torturing former soldiers of the UPA and anybody who cooperated in one way or another in supporting the UPA. But the methods and scale of torture used by these agents on Father "Kadylo" were beyond human imagination. Quite often after the tortures were over, they would carry his unconscious and bruised body wrapped in a blanket and throw it like a piece of garbage onto the cement floor of the prison cell.<sup>37</sup> When prison meals were served to the prisoners they were allowed to walk on their own legs to receive them, but in Father "Kadylo"s case he was not allowed to walk up to receive his meals, he had to go to receive them on his knees. Moreover, other UPA political prisoners were often forced to take part in the UB agents' orgy of torturing Father "Kadylo". At these times the UB agents put on a gruesome show in the investigation room in Rzeszów prison. Father "Kadylo" was ordered to kneel down and then he had to put both his hands on the floor in order to look like a donkey. Then fellow prisoners (UPA

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<sup>31</sup> B. Huk, *Zakerzonia* (Warszawa: *Archiwum Ukraińskie*, 1994), p. 28.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 388.

<sup>33</sup> Interview conducted on 23. 03. 1993 with a former UPA soldier "Pidkova" from company "Hromenko".

<sup>34</sup> *Litopys UPA*. Vol. 13, pp. 74-75.

<sup>35</sup> Interview conducted on 24.03.1993 with a former UPA military nurse "Skala", platoon "Marko", company "Burlaka".

<sup>36</sup> *Litopys UPA*. Vol. 14, p. 58.

<sup>37</sup> Letter dated 18.07.1996 to the author from a member of Father "Kadylo"s family.

soldiers who were being held for investigation themselves) had to sit on his back and Father "Kadylo" had to "give them a ride" in the investigation room; the UB agents looking on laughed and shouted obscene words at "the donkey" and the prisoner who "was getting a ride" on his back.<sup>38</sup>

Prison life did not last long for Father "Kadylo", since he was soon sentenced to death and executed in Rzeszów. At the moment the exact date and manner of his death is unknown. The prison file on Father "Kadylo" has not been disclosed yet, and there is no telling if it ever will be.

While the *Litopys UPA* states that the death sentence was carried out on him by simply murdering him in the prison cell in Rzeszów prison on 10 September 1948,<sup>39</sup> other publications give the date as 13 September 1948<sup>40</sup> without stating the circumstances of how the death sentence was carried out. Thus there is more than one version of how he died, and it is hard to tell which one is the correct one. For example, it is said that all the UPA prisoners at that time being held in Rzeszów prison were forced to witness the death of Father "Kadylo" in order to make his execution a "more spectacular view".<sup>41</sup>

Needless to say, the present prison authorities in Poland should disclose as soon as possible all the available files in their possession. This would prevent further versions of Father "Kadylo"'s imprisonment, torture and execution from circulating. They should also reveal what happened to his body after the death sentence was carried out and where his body was buried. There is a good reason for believing that it is buried in the cemetery located in that part of Rzeszów called Pobitne, where the bodies of all the UPA soldiers who were either executed or murdered by the UB agents in Rzeszów were buried.<sup>42</sup> However, unless the necessary information concerning Father "Kadylo" is provided by the ruling Polish authorities, there cannot be much progress in the betterment of relations between the Poles and the Ukrainians.

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<sup>38</sup> Interview conducted on 25.03.1993 with a former UPA soldier "Kamin", platoon "Marko", company "Burlaka".

<sup>39</sup> *Litopys UPA*, Vol. 13, p. 75.

<sup>40</sup> *Kalendar "Blahowist" (Górowo Ilaweckie: Blahowist, 1996)*, p. 22.

<sup>41</sup> Letter dated 18.07.1996 to the author from a member of father "Kadylo"'s family.

<sup>42</sup> Interview conducted on 23.03.1993 with a former UPA soldier "Soloveiko", platoon "Marko", Company "Burlaka".

#### 4. The official stance of the Uniate Ukrainian Orthodox Rite

The official stance of the Uniate Ukrainian Orthodox Rite about military chaplain "Kadylo" appears to be, as unbelievable and incomprehensible as it may seem, complete silence about Father "Kadylo". For almost 49 years the top hierarchy have not said a word, are not saying a word, and, as far as anyone can tell, may never say a word about Father "Kadylo". The highest church authorities simply prefer silence to speaking out about him. Why is it so?

There could be a few reasons for such an attitude, but the main one seems to be that the bishops and the archbishops of this rite are more interested in their personal gains, which serve them and only them, than in trying to find out who Father "Kadylo" really was and how in those troubled times he responded as a priest to the spiritual needs of his fellow countrymen fighting for independence. A second reason is that the top hierarchy of this rite in Poland studied for the priesthood in seminaries run by the Polish Catholic Church, where in one way or another they were brainwashed in such a way that now they are afraid to speak up about their own nation even now that they have become the top hierarchy of the Uniate Ukrainian Orthodox Rite. Such is the case of the newly nominated metropolit Ivan Martyniak and the newly appointed bishop Teodor Majkowicz in Poland. For them, keeping silent in public about Father "Kadylo" and the UPA is a way not only to acquire personal gain but also to please their former seminary professors and to prove that, after all, their studying in the Polish Catholic Church-run seminaries "bore the hoped-for fruit". A third reason is that the priests recently ordained as bishops and appointed as auxiliary bishops in Lviv are also "educated in Poland," with most probably the same attitudes engraved in them as the top hierarchy have. A fourth reason is that even some of the bishops of the Uniate Ukrainian Orthodox Rite who were born, educated, studied for the priesthood, and ordained as bishops in Ukraine had, because of Soviet Union propaganda, no chance whatsoever to learn the full history of their own Ukrainian nation. The text books used at the time in the Ukraine always deliberately distorted the UPA struggle so as to portray it in the worst possible light. Thus such top authorities in today's Uniate Ukrainian Orthodox Rite are also, not through their own fault, brainwashed as much as the others are. As a result the top hierarchy in Ukraine most probably does not even know that in the past there was a priest called Father "Kadylo".

It is even more difficult to comprehend why the Uniate Ukrainian Orthodox Rite intelligentsia in Poland, especially these who are in charge of publications of the Uniate Ukrainian Orthodox Rite, maintain complete silence about Father "Kadylo". Such is the case of the periodical known as *Peremyskie Dzwony* published in Peremyshl and a monthly newspaper known as *Blohowist* published in Górowo Ilaweckie in Poland. Although

these publications are under the strict control and direct censorship of metropolit Martyniak, who personally forbids anything being printed in them about the UPA, still, such a situation should not serve as an excuse for the editors of these publications to keep silent about Father "Kadylo".

## 5. Conclusion

As the English saying goes, "The sooner, the better", so the same should be said about the matter of Father "Kadylo". The sooner the top authorities of the Uniate Ukrainian Orthodox Rite in Poland and in Ukraine speak out in public about Father "Kadylo", the better it will be for those authorities themselves and for the Uniate Ukrainian Orthodox Rite. The sooner the present day Polish government discloses all the facts concerning Father "Kadylo" kept in secret Polish files, the better it will be for straightening out the twisted relations between two Slavic nations of the Poles and the Ukrainians.

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## Moscow Building Huge Military Complex

Russia is building a massive underground military complex in the Ural Mountains, spending hundreds of millions of dollars despite its cash-starved economy, the 'New York Times' said.

The secret installation, covering an area larger than Washington city is hidden inside Yamantau mountain in Beloretsk and apparently was begun in the era of Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev, Western officials and Russian witnesses told the daily.

"It is being built on a huge scale and involves a major investment of resources... at a time when the Russians are complaining that they do not have the resources to do things pertaining to arms control," a senior official was quoted as saying.

The Russian defence minister, in response to written queries by the daily, has replied with a denial to provide the media information.

"It is a possible command and control center. It is a possible project to maintain the capability to carry out wartime production after a nuclear strike. It is a possible storage area for weapons they do not want us to know about," speculated a senior US official.

*The Muslim World, Vol. 33, No. 48 & 49.*

## **The Rights of Peoples to Self-Determination and its Application to Peoples under Colonial or Alien Domination or Foreign Occupation.**

Statement was made on behalf of the World Muslim Congress by M. Ahmed, WMC's Hony. Representative to the U.N. at the 52nd Session (this summer) of the "Commission on Human Rights" at UN's Geneva Office. Brother Maqbool Ahmed said as follows:

"Thank you Mr. Chairman. I begin my presentation by drawing your attention to the Republic of Chechnya, where the Chechen people, who are colonized since the 19th century are struggling for the recognition of their right to self-determination.

The response of the government in Moscow to their demand has been terrifying. To see the way Chechnya is being bombed into annihilation and to appreciate the reality of destruction and suffering of Chechen people, you would need to visit the devastated and rubble strewn capital Grozny, the second largest city Gudermes in shambles, the decimated town Novogroznensky, the ravaged and obliterated Caucasus villages like Sernovodsk and Pervomaiskoye, the dead, dying and those in agony strewn on the streets and the dazed villagers looking with resignation at the total destruction of their life's belongings and the obviously bleak future of deprivation. 50,000 civilian deaths in a population of 1.3 million, in 15 months of war, is a record of destruction.

Chechens are culturally different and autonomous people. They are not Russians; but Russia wants to dominate them. Their history to this date tells us that they have always been treated by Moscow as subjugated aliens.

In Russia, today, the Chechens are identified with words of hate and detestation. They are portrayed as 'thieves', 'robbers', 'criminals', 'rebels', 'terrorists', 'bandits', and so on. Now, one may ask why does Kremlin even want Chechnya when the Russians so much despise the Chechens. The answer is simple. There is oil and natural gas in the Caucasus – that is why. This proves beyond doubt that, even for Russians, Chechnya is a colony whose natural wealth is to be exploited.

Under the UN Charter, the Chechens have a right to self-determination by a political process, through an exercise of freely expressed democratic will. They may choose independence, or they may opt for full autonomy within Russia.

An extract from an article which appeared in *The Muslim World*, Vol. 34, No. 3 & 4.

## Balkan Enigma

When atrocities connected with World War II are mentioned, people tend to think of the horrendous nature and scope of Nazi Germany's war crimes.

Equally abhorrent, however, are barbaric acts committed by some of America's allies, particularly in the period just after the war when Eastern European communist regimes were consolidating their power in areas of Yugoslavia where the anti-communist Croat population became victims of one of the history's most vicious peacetime purges.

This second edition of *"Operation Slaughterhouse"* tells the story through a series of eyewitness accounts describing suffering of the Croatian population at the hands of the Yugoslav Partisans.

The book documents indiscriminate slaughter of hundreds of thousands of Croatians, both civilian and military. Authors Prcela and Guldescu travelled over much of the world to collect information from survivors.

It explains why a mysterious silence about the massacre at Bleiburg, Austria, prevailed for so long in the West. Partly the authors argue, this was because the Allies sought to protect the reputation of some of their leaders believed responsible for turning captured Croatians over to the Serbs after the Croatian surrender at Bleiburg in 1945.

The reason so many Americans remain ignorant of the story, research shows, can be traced to post-war concentration on the guilt of the enemy for atrocities committed. Victors in war have never been eager to acknowledge their own atrocities.

The authors are well qualified to carry out an investigation of these events. Prcela is a retired teacher of history in public schools in Lyndhurst, Ohio. He was born in 1922 in Kosute Trilj, Yugoslavia, was conscripted into Tito's army in 1945 but escaped by way of Trieste. He has studied at the International College of St. Anthony, in Rome; John Carroll University and Case Western Reserve University, both of Cleveland and is co-founder of the Committee for Investigation of the Bleiburg Tragedy. He is the author of *"In Tito's Death Marches"* and *"Archbishop Stepinac in His Country's Church-State Relations."*

Guldescu, born in Trieste in 1908, studied history in several Central and East European countries and in Zagreb, Madrid and Chicago. He has taught at the University of Shanghai, New Mexico State University, the extension division of Indian State University, Washington and Lee University and Fayetteville State, N.C.

His articles have appeared in numerous books and magazines and his book, *"History of Medieval Croatia,"* was published in 1964. At the

time of his death, he was working on a history of Croatia, Slovenia and Dalmatia for the years 1526 to 1814.

*The reviewer, Eck Spahich of Borger, managing editor of Balkan News Service, is a survivor of the Bleiburg Massacre. He was 4 months old when he escaped by lucky chance after Croatian forces, seeking to flee from communist Serbs and Russians, surrendered to British forces at Bleiburg. Instead of maintaining custody, according to terms of the Geneva Convention, the British turned the Croatian prisoners over to forces of the Yugoslav communist dictator Tito and the massacre ensued. Eck's parents had become separated in their flight from their homeland and his father eventually ended up in the United States, a resident of Dumas, where he spent the rest of his life. His mother returned to Tuzla in Bosnia. The baby boy, left by his father in the care of a Slovenian farm woman, was recognized by an uncle (a member of the Croatian military). The uncle found a note directing the baby to be taken to his grandmother in Tuzla, and it was there he lived for 15 years before coming to this country in 1960 to join his father and stepmother in Dumas. He is a graduate of West Texas A&M University and worked for many years in the journalism field in Amarillo and Borger. He lives in Borger with his wife and two children.*

Title:            Operation Slaughterhouse  
Authors:         John Prcela and Stanko Guldescu  
Publisher:       Dorrance Publishing Co., Inc.  
Price:           \$ 26 US

This book may be ordered from:     Balkan News Service  
  PO Box 696  
  Fritch  
  Texas 79036

## **Leader of the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists in Washington, D.C.**

*Washington, D.C. (UNIS)* – During her tour in the United States, Slava Stetsko, leader of the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists, spent two days in Washington meeting with officials in the U.S. Department of State, members of the House of Representatives International Relations Committee, members of the Senate Republican Policy Committee, the American Foreign Policy Council, the Ukrainian Ambassador to the United States, and colleagues such as Edward Derwinski (former U.S. representative from Illinois) and Zbigniew Brzezinski, a well-known advocate of Ukrainian issues. Beginning her tour in Washington on Tuesday, October 22, 1996, Mrs. Stetsko attended a press briefing at The Heritage Foundation where Hennadij Udoenko, Minister of Foreign Affairs for Ukraine, was the keynote speaker. Mrs. Stetsko had an opportunity to greet Minister Udoenko and thanked him for his resounding work for the promotion of Ukrainian issues throughout the world.

Immediately following the press briefing, Mrs. Stetsko had the opportunity to meet Jim Jatras, a member of the Senate Republican Policy Committee. Mr. Jatras is responsible for monitoring policy decisions of the U.S. Senate that arise during Congressional deliberations. In her comments, Mrs. Stetsko acknowledged the importance of the U.S. Senate, in particular Sen. Mitch McConnell (R-KY), earmarking foreign assistance to Ukraine in the amount of \$225 million for FY 1997. Noting the disproportional amount of assistance provided to Ukraine in the previous years, Mrs. Stetsko reminded Mr. Jatras of the strategic importance of Ukraine to overall European security and stability. The eventual enlargement of NATO was also discussed as Mrs. Stetsko emphasized that NATO, as a political and military alliance, has the right to expand without the "veto privilege" of a non-NATO country.

Mrs. Stetsko was also invited to participate in a round of discussions at the American Foreign Policy Council, a Washington think-tank organization dedicated to the formulation of conservative politics throughout the world. Many of the Council's policy members are familiar with Ukraine and invited Mrs. Stetsko to update them on events occurring within the country, as well as current relations with the United States and Russia. Mrs. Stetsko referred to the increasing wave of positive reforms happening in Ukraine, beginning with the ratification of the new Constitution, the continued process involving privatization of state-owned enterprises, and the introduction of the Ukrainian currency, the hryvnia. As for relations with Russia, Mrs. Stetsko acknowledged that since the outbreak of fighting in Chechnya, many minorities in the Russian Federation have developed enthusiasm for their own independence. Mrs. Stetsko proposed to hold a conference in Kyiv that

would attempt to bring all Ukrainian reform-oriented parties together, along with policy groups from Washington, to analyze how effective policy can be formulated in the Ukrainian Parliament.

Beginning in the early morning hours of Wednesday, October 23, Mrs. Stetsko presided at a meeting at the U.S. Department of State with the Senior Officer of the Ukraine Desk, Bruce Connuck. The constructive discussion ranged from NATO expansion to increasing U.S.-Ukraine bilateral relations. A luncheon with former U.S. Congressman Edward Derwinski, an old acquaintance of Mrs. Stetsko, resulted in a meaningful dialogue about the current situation involving the participation of ethnic Americans in U.S. domestic politics. Congressman Derwinski thanked Mrs. Stetsko for her involvement of informing the West about the plight of Ukraine during its years under Soviet control.

The highlight of the visit by Mrs. Stetsko was a meeting with Zbigniew Brzezinski, a well-known advocate of Ukrainian issues. Mrs. Stetsko, along with former Ukrainian Prime Minister Evhen Marchuk (also in Washington that week), began an earnest conversation with Mr. Brzezinski about the domestic political situation in Ukraine, discussing issues such as the role of the military and Ukraine's participation in the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, the reform efforts of President Kuchma vis-a-vis the leftists in Parliament, and the structure of Ukraine's security apparatus. Mr. Brzezinski briefed the attendants about the meeting in Kyiv of the American-Ukrainian Advisory Committee, which is composed of senior officials and public figures from both countries. Both Mrs. Stetsko and Mr. Marchuk were frank in their conversation with Mr. Brzezinski about the current political layout on Ukraine and the future of U.S.-Ukrainian relations.

Mrs. Stetsko was also afforded the opportunity to meet with Yuri Shcherbak, Ambassador of Ukraine to the United States. The Ambassador welcomed Mrs. Stetsko to the Ukrainian Embassy and engaged her in a lengthy conversation regarding the economic assistance provided to Ukraine for FY 1997, the activities of the Ukrainian Embassy, and a synopsis of Ministers Udovenko's official visit to Washington. Ambassador Shcherbak mentioned the positive relationship between the Ukrainian Embassy and the Ukrainian-American community, in particular, the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, Inc. (UCCA) and its office in Washington, D.C. In her dialogue with the Ambassador, Mrs. Stetsko, as leader of the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists, spoke about the difficulties in Parliament with attempting to pass legislation for reform programs and the work that the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists has done throughout Ukraine.

On Thursday morning, October 24, Mrs. Stetsko met with Mark Gage, senior member of the U.S. House of Representatives International Relations Committee, who openly spoke about the current political situation in Ukraine. Mr. Gage discussed the amount of corruption in Ukraine and how the U.S. Congress views the negative ramifications it has

upon the reforms efforts in Ukraine. Furthermore, when asked about Mrs. Stetsko's perception of relations between Ukraine and Russia, Mrs. Stetsko acknowledged that actions taken by the Russian Duma proclaiming Sevastopol as a Russian city will increase tensions between the two countries. According to Mrs. Stetsko, the United States Congress has shown great resolve in its allocation of \$225 million for Ukraine for FY 1997. This action alone demonstrates to the Ukrainian nation and its government that the United States is committed to the future well-being, security, and sovereignty of Ukraine.

The three-day visit of Mrs. Slava Stetsko to Washington, D.C. was both very productive and conducive to increasing future relations between the reform party of the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists and government officials in Washington, D.C. During her visit, Mrs. Stetsko also met with several Ukrainian-American activists in the Washington, D.C. area. Attending a community-wide dinner were Ambassador Popadiuk, the first U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine, the honorable Judge Bohdan Futey, George Nesterchuk, former Executive Director of the Ukrainian National Information Service (UNIS), and staff personnel of the UNIS office. Ambassador Popadiuk and Mrs. Stetsko discussed how Ukraine has developed economically and politically since 1991, and the work that remains for the country to become more secure.

*Ukrainian National Information Service  
Washington, D.C.  
October 29, 1996*

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## **Maskhadov Vows**

Muslim leader Aslan Maskhadov vowed to consolidate Chechnya's independence from Russia on Wednesday 12 February, as he was sworn in as President of the tumultuous Muslim Republic of Chechnya.

*'I swear to reinforce the independence of the Chechen state, to respect the constitution and laws and to defend the rights of all citizens,'* he said in an oath taken on the Holy Koran, at Grozny.

*The Muslim World, Vol. 34, No. 35.*

## Ukrainian Press Law

A few weeks before the fifth anniversary of proclaiming the long-awaited independence of Ukraine, the Verkhovna Rada (Supreme Council), the parliament, adopted on June 28, after a tumultuous all-night, 36-hour session, the independent country's equally long-awaited, post-Soviet Constitution.

Even the Communists and their left-wing allies, after opposing the draft of the Constitution, specifically the articles on private ownership and the codification of historical symbols as seals sovereign statehood — the Trident seal, the blue-and-yellow flag and anthem — joined the euphoria and turned on the “yes” light on their parliamentary desks. By dawn, word had spread throughout the capital city of Kyiv that the lawmakers were close to adopting the constitution. Despite economic hardships associated nascent statehood, the Ukrainian people, hoping for salvation from a new constitution, held their breath for the ultimate announcement that from now on they will be ruled by their own law.

Quite expectedly, the throng that waited outside the parliament building turned their quiet anticipation into boisterous revelry, when at 9:30 in the morning the adoption of the Constitution was reported.

The Constitution, which was approved by a vote of 315 to 36, with 12 abstentions, took effect immediately and replaced the older version, created in 1978, when Ukraine was still a Soviet republic.

According to insiders, President of Ukraine Leonid Kuchma, who sought adoption of a single law of the land in order to enhance his position vis-a-vis parliamentary leaders, was a personal winner in this tussle.

*“ However, whether his victory is as unambiguous as it seems at first glance is far from clear,”* wrote Markian Bilynskyj, director of the Pylyp Orlyk Institute for Democracy, which was established by the U.S.-Ukraine Foundation.

*“ President Kuchma’s track record through the constitutional process suggests a man who never quite knew what he wanted but was absolutely certain about what he did not want: A Verkhovna Rada, or more generally a system of radas (councils) that was configured to exercise an almost suffocating control over the executive branch rather than the classic oversight functions of a genuine Western-style parliament.”*

Another winner, Bilynskyj said, was Oleksander Moroz, the speaker of the parliament, who *“within the space of 12 or so hours shot from being a political creature, staring extinction in the face, to something of a parliamentary statesman, relentlessly pushing for the adoption of the constitution out of, in his own words, higher motives, transcending narrow party concerns.”*

Coming on the heels of the communist debacle in the Russian presidential elections, the adoption of the Constitution turned Ukrainian

communists into losers, as well. Bilynskyj continued: *"The Left are bound to try to exploit the Constitution's many inherent weaknesses and contradictions in the near future. But their tactics are again likely to be generally negative rather than goal-oriented in a positive sense. Moreover, it would come as no surprise were today's defeat to lead to a series of enervating internal power struggles."*

Though it is not the first constitution or national code of laws in the 1,000-year history of the Ukrainian people, the 1996 Constitution is the latest attempt by the people of now independent Ukraine to codify the relationship among the people, the government and President. The Constitution is composed of 161 articles, divided into 14 chapters. Some 30 percent of the articles, deal with rights and duties of individuals and citizens. According to Petro Matiaszek, executive director of the Council of Advisors to the Verkhovna Rada, *"much of the language in this area is taken virtually verbatim from the various European human rights conventions."*

Ihor Derkach, a former national deputy (legislator) who is currently a legal consultant to the Council of Advisors of the Presidium of the Verkhovna Rada, believes that looking at Ukraine's latest attempt at carving out its own Constitution, the document, despite its inconsistencies, *"creates a favorable condition for the development of a law-based state, for further political and economic reform, and for the further integration of Ukraine into Europe."*

Though replete with many enviable freedoms and rights, and short on privileges for the high and mighty, the new Constitution's true application in day-to-day life remains to be determined.

For media practitioners, the section on freedom of the press, can be found in Chapter 2. However, the single passage that *"censorship is forbidden"* in Ukraine precedes it as Article 15 of Chapter 1. While the entire spirit of the Constitution seems to grant citizens and individuals many rights and freedoms, many of the articles' subsequent fine tuning formally designates that these rights and freedoms are in effect so long as they do not violate anyone's freedom, individually or collectively threaten the government or the existence of independent Ukraine.

(Writer's translation) Article 34:

*"Everyone is guaranteed the right to freedom of thought and word, of free exchange of his opinions and convictions.*

*Everyone has the right to freely collect, maintain, take advantage of and disseminate information orally, in print or by any other means — based on his choosing.*

*The fulfillment of this right can be restricted by law in the interest of national security, territorial integrity or civic order for the purpose of avoiding uprisings or crimes, for safeguarding the health of the population, for protecting the reputation or rights of other people, for circumventing the dissemination of information, obtained*

*confidentially, or for upholding the authority and impartiality of the judicial system."*

Though it is not as succinct as "*Congress shall make no law abridging freedom ... of the press,*" Ukraine's Constitution begins with the all important recognition of the concepts of freedom of speech, thought and press, and the freedom to collect and disseminate opinions and information by any media.

The latter point, "*by any other means — based on his choosing,*" is a farsighted idea, what with today's ubiquitous information superhighway and the accompanying legal wrangling over the dissemination and ownership of opinions and information in cyberspace. The Constitution of Ukraine jumps ahead of contemporary society and states that regardless if you speak it, think it, collect it, print it, broadcast it or upload/download it, your right to do so is protected by the Constitution.

However, the hidden danger with Article 34 comes in the immediately following explanatory paragraph, the one that defines when and under which conditions that freedom can be suspended or overturned.

Each government, democratic or totalitarian, likes to keep "*the interest of national security*" idea as its ace in the hole, to use in order to stop news from being published or broadcast. The United States did so recently during the invasions of Grenada and Panama; White House and Pentagon spinmeisters control news by creating press pools for battlefield stories and by staging "*media shows*" for combat correspondents.

However, if suspending freedom of speech or press is an effective way to protect its armed forces from beachfront annihilation or its citizenry from a terrorist attack or to stem ethnic hatred, governments may find it acceptable to occasionally do so.

To be sure, if used carefully and not abused for political ends, the explanatory paragraph can be harmless. But it is difficult to ascertain what is in a bureaucrat's mind and heart. Unfortunately, Ukraine's two-centuries of practical journalistic, legal and governmental development added many restrictions and procedural clarifications, both on the national and local levels.

The "*Congress shall make no law ...*" phrase originally may not have foreseen prior restraint, revealing sources, gag rules, sunshine laws, etc. in the legal tango between the courts, defendants, plaintiffs and the press. On the other hand, for better or worse, the Ukrainian article immediately sets up the opposing sides by stating that reporters can be gagged and information can be kept in the shadows.

The Ukrainian government has the authority to suspend freedom of the press in order to protect the reputation of an individual, stop a newspaper from printing an article based on reliable, unnamed sources, and bar the dissemination of information that can prejudice a trial.

Leonard Sussman, senior scholar specializing in international communication with Freedom House, New York, finds the explanations worrisome. While the general statement prohibiting censorship in Chapter 1 follow the *"usual formula"* in Ukraine, the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, Sussman pointed out during a recent telephone conversation that there are *"wide loopholes"* and the *"'however's' are troublesome."* According to him, *"rights are restricted."*

*"The problem is the manner in which they're used. They can distort prohibition of censorship,"* he said. *"There are many ways to restrict the press and this flows from the restrictions of Article 34."*

Though the stipulations look innocent and can be found in many covenants and constitutions, Sussman said the basic difference between the Ukrainian and American constitutions is a *"case history of libel law on a civil basis."*

In Ukraine, the restrictions could look like a normal approach to freedom of the press because there is no applicable history, he added. The absence of a track record leaves room for broad interpretations which can undermine the freedoms, Sussman warned.

Judge Bohdan A. Futey of the U.S. Court of Federal Claims, a Ukrainian American who commented extensively on the drafting of the constitution, concurs, noting that what he calls *"claw backs"* are dangerous. *"The Constitution gives with one hand, while taking back with the other,"* Futey observed during a recent conversation.

*"The problem is that the Ukrainian Constitution wants to be democratic and provide all the guarantees that were not had under the Soviet Constitution or were listed in name only. Now it guarantees all the rights but controls still exist,"* he said.

In the Spring and Summer 1996 edition of East European Constitutional Review, Futey wrote: *"Many of the protections guaranteed by these rights (listed in the Constitution) have been curtailed with 'claw back' provisions — where, on one hand, the Constitution purports to ensure a particular right but, on the other hand, certain qualifications nullify that protection."*

Futey expressed concern in his analysis that, while stating that constitutional rights and freedoms cannot be abolished, the Constitution actually created a mechanism for the parliament to override the guarantees. *"A simple majority of the Verkhovna Rada could enact a statute that alters constitutional property rights. This would allow the Verkhovna Rada to circumvent the two-thirds majority needed to amend the Constitution, as well as the prohibition on limiting rights as expressed in Article 157,"* he pointed out in his treatise.

Article 34, he continued, is an example of *'claw back'* provisions: *"With so many exceptions, especially when stated in general terms, the government would be able to limit any speech. Only time will tell as to the status of these rights."*

In a country such as Ukraine, where recent history is brimming with examples of totalitarian behavior of the Communist Party, while today men and women are straining to reach democracy, the rules of the road between the press and government/courts is not yet paved. This can leave the door open for someone in authority to abuse his rights and privileges.

The Constitution's Chapter 2 guarantees a variety of rights to its citizens and non-citizens, as well. Among them are articles that guarantee that

- all citizens are equal in their dignity and rights;
- the rights of citizens and non-citizens listed in the Constitution are not exclusive;
- citizens of Ukraine cannot be denied their citizenship or the right to change citizenship;
- foreigners or resident aliens are granted the same rights as citizens;
- every person has the inalienable right to life; the right to freedom and personal inviolability as well as inviolability of his living quarters; the right to secrecy of their correspondence; the freedom to profess a religion or not to profess a religion, to foster ethnic cultures and languages.
- every person has the right to freely and peacefully assemble and join any political party (so long as its existence does not threaten the existence of independent Ukraine), to petition the government;
- every person has the right to possess and disseminate intellectual property; the right to create artwork, literature and technology; the right to education (secondary education is mandatory); and the right to know his rights and obligations; etc.

Furthermore, catchall freedom sections are the Constitution's Article 24, which states that privileges or restrictions cannot be granted on the "*basis on race, color, political or religious beliefs, sex, ethnic or social origin, wealth, residence,*" and Article 64, which notes that "*Constitutional rights and freedoms of the person and citizen cannot be restricted, except in cases foreseen by the Constitution of Ukraine.*" And then there are the more than one dozen "*claw back*" provisions.

Controversial as the practice is in the United States, in Ukraine the Constitution openly does not permit desecrating national symbols and gay marriages. Article 65 states: "*Defending the native land, the independence and territorial integrity of Ukraine, respecting its state symbols are responsibilities of the citizens of Ukraine.*" Consequently, tearing up the flag or dunking the Trident in a jar of urine may not be considered artworks, protected by Article 54 (artistic freedom), but submersing a crucifix in the same medium, despite its tastelessness, enjoys constitutional protection.

The first step has been admirable — a generally democratic Constitution of Ukraine has been adopted. Now that document must be

given life so that it can evolve into a true guardian of the common man's freedoms. Ukrainian society, government leaders, lawmakers and legal experts should not fear that a democratic, liberal constitution can subvert the state, government or society. Rather they should take their cue from U.S. Justice Louis Brandeis who argued for a living constitution, whose meaning and application would evolve over time and circumstances and would be interpreted by judges knowledgeable of the contemporary social and economic impact of their decisions.

If people are given the opportunity to choose for themselves, why should they conspire to overthrow their leadership?

## Why War in Bosnia and Chechnya?

Dr. Yusuf Ali Eraj, well-known Muslim leader of East Africa and a reputable surgeon of Kenya in a letter to *'The Muslim World'* weekly says, *inter alia*, as follows:

“What made the mighty Russian army to start a war in Chechnya and with that ferocity will remain for the future generation to write about. It appeared that the Russians had lost all the sense of human values and strive to continue this senseless and merciless war. The European nations and Americans which have the power to persuade the two sides to sit for a dialogue, did not appear concerned to bring this war to an end.

While in Bosnia every male above the age of 6 years in the areas under the occupation of the Orthodox Christian Serbs were slaughtered. Close to 50,000 innocent women have been systematically raped to implant a new Serbian race and the brutal killing of men and women and innocent children had been carried out with impunity. Millions of Muslims have been displaced with the backing of the so-called 'Civilized' western values. We wish there could be some forceful, impartial and effective organization to stop what was happening. Our coming generations will find it difficult to hide the fact that if the Western nation wished this butchery could have been stopped.

Why is there a difference of approach between the American public and the American elitist minority which provide leadership for these nation. There is obvious difference in the values of the American ruling hierarchy and the American citizens.

Why was the war started in and around that area anyway? Can we have a justifiable answer?”.

*The Muslim World, Vol. 34, No. 14.*

# The Washington Notebook

*Washington, D.C. (UNIS)* — As the 5th anniversary of Ukrainian independence is celebrated, we at the Ukrainian National Information Service (UNIS) thought it would be useful to interview several prominent and influential policymakers in Washington.

During the past six months, leading to the 5th anniversary of Ukrainian independence, the country of Ukraine has been receiving a substantial amount of increased attention from the global community, among them, the United States. People and governments are realizing the importance of Ukraine within the Eastern European region, which in the past has been overshadowed by its northern neighbor.

This first independence interview of "*The Washington Notebook*" is with Mr. Richard Murphy. Prior to the declaration of Ukrainian independence, Murphy was frequently involved with Ukrainian issues. Currently at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Murphy is a Senior Associate and the Executive Director of the American-Ukrainian Advisory Committee, a body established by CSIS to provide recommendations for the reform policies in Ukraine. Murphy was most recently in Ukraine as an international election monitor in the *Kharkiv* region.

Through the course of the interview, UNIS tried to comprehensively cover many of the important issues dealing with Ukraine's past, present, and future. The topics discussed range from the current political situation to the economic status of Ukraine, its national security, and the problems facing the enduring consequences of Chernobyl. In "*The Washington Notebook*", UNIS paints an overall picture facing Ukraine and offers the insights of Murphy and his recommendations.

Summarizing his opinion of Ukraine's status following five years of independence, Murphy states, "*Ukraine is still a sovereign independent state and is recognized as such by virtually every major country in the world and that in itself is a tremendous achievement. Ukraine and we [the United States] cannot rest on our laurels, but the longer Ukraine is able to celebrate its Independence Day, the more likely it is going to be a preeminent fixture on the world scene as an independent state... and I think that's great.*"

## Election Laws and Parliament

As an election observer, Murphy saw many of the problems in the process (i.e., too many candidates to choose from) and the structures surrounding the elections. Murphy expressed the problems in the Ukrainian Parliament that stem from an election law which is not voter friendly, and at times archaic. Unfortunately, according to Murphy, much emphasis has not been placed on the restructuring of the election law.

## **Economics**

Ukraine has made significant progress with the economic situation, yet Murphy feels that the pace of privatization has to pick up, especially with agricultural property. Since progress will not happen overnight, there needs to be a change in the mentality of the people towards a market based economy. The key, reiterates Murphy, is the people themselves must have the feeling that progress is continuing and will eventually benefit them. Ukraine needs to further develop a tax structure and a legal framework to attract foreign investment and also create incentives for Ukrainian entrepreneurship.

## **Security Issues**

Ukraine has taken many important steps toward reaffirming its position in the realm of the European community of states. President Kuchma has repeatedly stated that Ukraine is not a Eurasian country, but a European country. Murphy states that with the support of the United States, Ukraine should continue its economic dialogue with Russia and continue reforms towards the establishment of a market economy and a democratic political system necessary to secure and consolidate its independence. *"We [the West] can provide help, we can provide advice, but it's the Ukrainians themselves that have to implement these steps and take the initiative."*

Focusing on the West, Murphy states that, *"Western European countries must realize that Ukraine is an important actor in Europe."* He also hopes that the member-states of the NATO Alliance will pay closer attention to Ukraine and establish a type of special relationship, which would call for increased bilateral relations with Ukraine and other NATO countries. *"The more ties that can be established multilaterally and bilaterally between the West and Ukraine, the greater [the opportunity that, sic] Ukrainian security will be enhanced."* One thing that is for sure, the proposed expansion of NATO toward Ukraine will not happen in the very near future. *"Whatever situation can develop a framework for democratic and economic development should be welcomed."*

## **Chornobyl**

When asked about the Chornobyl nuclear accident and its detrimental effects on the Ukrainian nation, Murphy understands that Ukraine will ultimately face a significant portion of the economic burden associated with its clean-up. Realizing, however, that Chornobyl is but one of a handful of inefficient and poorly constructed nuclear reactors in the former Soviet Union, Murphy emphasizes that Chornobyl, therefore, is a problem for Europe as well.

Following the decision to close the Chernobyl nuclear power plant by the year 2000, Ukraine's greatest dilemma remains to be the exploration of alternative sources of power. The G-7 commitment to provide financial assistance to Ukraine for this aspect of the Chernobyl closure emphasizes the responsibility that all the industrial nations have towards the relief efforts associated with Chernobyl. It was important that the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was signed by the G-7 nations in Halifax, Canada in December 1995 but the negotiations must continue to establish a mutually satisfactory program of assistance. According to Murphy, technical assistance is the crucial component of relief which the West should provide Ukraine.

### **De-Nuclearization**

In Mr. Murphy's opinion, the events of June 1, 1996 was only the icing on the cake concerning de-nuclearization. The aspects of Ukraine's disarmament pledge was witnessed by the ratification of the Salt I Treaty, the signing of the Trilateral Agreement among Russia, Ukraine and the United States, as well as the endorsement of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). These events opened up Ukraine's relations to the West in a positive manner.

Murphy, however, did express concern regarding the continued respect and attention that Ukraine should receive from countries following its de-nuclearization. *"We [the United States] have stated officially and...endorsed by the G-7 countries that Ukraine's independence and sovereignty and territorial integrity are important to the peace and stability of Europe and therefore, are in the interests of the U.S. and their Western allies."*

### **The Ukrainian Constitution**

The passage of the Ukrainian Constitution is an important milestone for Ukraine and especially its people. *"It [the constitution] is not the be all and end all for progress toward a market economy and democratic political system"*, stated Murphy. The growing national consciousness is vital to Ukraine's survival and success in its reforms. That notion, as evidenced by the overall excitement among the average Ukrainian citizen who cheered the provisions of the new constitution which proclaimed Ukrainian as the official language of the state, exhibits the desire that the Ukrainian people have to reform their political and economic structures.

### **President Kuchma**

The questions posed to Murphy led into an interesting discussion about President Kuchma and his successes as Ukraine's second

democratically-elected president. Murphy stated that President Kuchma has demonstrated great skills in dealing with a fragmented Parliament, as evidenced by his skillful handling of the ratification of the Ukrainian Constitution. On several occasions Murphy has had the opportunity to meet President Kuchma, whom he holds the greatest admiration, and describes the president as very personably and a decision-maker. In Mr. Murphy's opinion, President Kuchma must remain open to the criticisms of opposition members in the Parliament and approach such characteristics in a democratic fashion.

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*Bertil HAGGMAN*

## **Soviet Nuclear Operations Against Sweden**

The Swedish archipelago was a perfect training ground for the Soviet Navy. On the dark, uneven bottom of the Baltic Sea Soviet minisubmarines placed torpedo traps and remote-controlled nuclear mines. Two former Soviet submarine officers have now come forward with their story. For obvious reasons the two officers wanted to remain anonymous when they told their story on Swedish TV in the beginning of November.

In a comment former Swedish Minister of Defense Anders Bjorck confirms that Swedish naval authorities have long suspected that there was a special Soviet interest in the Swedish Baltic Sea coast harbors. There is a continuous check of all harbor entrances in Sweden for unidentified objects.

At the end of the 1970s, according to the two Soviet officers, laid mines in the Swedish archipelago. The former Soviet agent Oleg Gordievsky, who also worked for the British M16 revealed these Soviet operations already in 1976. They mines contained tactical nuclear explosives and were placed close to larger mountains and rocks. Small and contained in plastic they were almost impossible to detect. The weight was around 160 pounds.

When the Soviet U 137 was stranded in the Karlskrona archipelago on 27 October 1981 Swedish military experts concluded that it was carrying nuclear cargo. One Soviet interest could have been to train crews in the handling of a nuclear cargo with its special security and safety problems. Nuclear mines have surfaced on Swedish coasts during recent years but it is believed that they are all well moored. There have been speculations that the Swedish navy is trying to hide the fact that nuclear mines have been found, but it is not likely.

The Soviet minisubmarines were part of *Spetnaz* commando units that were stationed along the Soviet Baltic coast from Leningrad to Kaliningrad.

## Ukraine's Sevastopol and Crimea Legal Fact Sheet

*The World Community should be concerned about recent events in Russia, Once again, attempts at foreign adventurism and expansionism by Russia threaten the peace, stability and security of Europe. Both houses of the Russian Parliament, as well as senior Russian government officials, have openly claimed sovereignty over the Ukrainian city of Sevastopol and the Crimean region of Ukraine. This is in direct violation of international norms and recognition of state borders by the world community.*

**5 February 1954:** The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR) issues a decree by which the RSFSR cedes the entire Crimean *oblast'* – including Sevastopol – to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (Ukr. SSR).

**13 February 1954:** The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukr. SSR issues an analogous decree confirming the transfer to Ukraine of the Crimean *oblast'*, including Sevastopol.

**19 February 1954:** The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) issues a decree confirming the change of republican borders between the RSFSR and the Ukr. SSR as required by the Constitution of the USSR (II, 73).

**26 April 1954:** The Supreme Soviet of the USSR passes a Special Law of the USSR by which it ratifies the change of borders between the RSFSR and the Ukr. SSR.

**The RSFSR Constitution of 1978:** Article 71 lists only two cities with Russian republican status – Moscow and Leningrad. Sevastopol is no longer listed.

**The Russian Federation Constitution of 1993:** Article 70 lists only two cities with Russian federal status – Moscow and St. Petersburg. Sevastopol is no longer listed and Sevastopol representatives do not sign the Federation Treaty.

**The Ukr. SSR Constitution of 1978:** Article 77 lists Kyiv and Sevastopol as Ukrainian cities with republican status.

**Ukraine's Constitution of 1996:** Article 132 lists Kyiv and Sevastopol as Ukrainian cities with special national status which is determined by law.

**19 November 1990:** A separate treaty signed between the RSFSR and the Ukrainian SSR confirms a mutual recognition of existing borders between the two republics.

**24 August 1991:** Ukraine declares independence and secedes from the Soviet Union.

**1 December 1991:** In a national referendum almost 92% of Ukrainians support the Declaration of Independence.

**1 December 1991:** Canada leads the world community in recognizing Ukraine as an independent nation.

**8 December 1991:** The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) is created by the Minsk Accords. All the signatories – including the Russian Federation – recognize and pledge to respect the inviolability of existing state borders of CIS members (Article 5).

**16 November 1994:** Ukraine's Parliament passes Ukraine's Law on the Accession to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NNPT).

**5 December 1994:** At a meeting of the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in Budapest, the President of Ukraine, Leonid Kuchma, signs on behalf of Ukraine the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NNPT).

**5 December 1994:** After Ukraine acceded to the NPPT, the Russian Federation, the United States and Great Britain sign a Memorandum on security guarantees for Ukraine pledging to respect Ukraine's independence and sovereignty and the existing borders of Ukraine (Article 1). The Memorandum was signed by President Leonid Kuchma (Ukraine), President Boris Yeltsin (Russia), President William J. Clinton (U.S.A.) and Prime Minister John Major (Great Britain).

\* \* \*

Russia continues, without letup, its political warfare against Ukraine over Crimea and Sevastopol in direct violation of all legally and politically binding international treaties, accords, laws and memoranda that it has signed from 1954 to the present. Alarmed by Russia's actions, the international community – including the UN Security Council, NATO, the European Union and the OSCE – have openly and formally declared their support for Ukraine's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, including the Ukrainian status of the city of Sevastopol and Crimea.

*League of Ukrainian Canadians*

## **As Russian Reforms Diminish, I.M.F. Cash Transfers Multiply**

The imminent \$10.2 billion International Monetary Fund cash transfer to the Russian Central Bank recently is the clearest indication yet that the level of Western aid to Moscow has been inversely proportional to the pace of reform. Since 1993, the Clinton administration has pushed the IMF to increase its lending to the Russian government. But pro-Western reformers insist that the IMF has hurt—not helped. Now that IMF Managing Director Michel Camdessus has admitted that the money is being used to finance the carnage in Chechnya (see *Foreign Aid Advisory 14*, March 4), it is time for the United States Congress to pull the plug.

*IMF cash transfers to the Russian government, 1991-1996*  
1991: zero;  
1992: \$ 1.1 billion;  
1993: \$ 1.5 billion;  
1994: \$ 1.5 billion;  
1995: \$ 6.3 billion;  
1996: \$10.2 billion.

*Source: International Monetary Fund. Figures are shown at 9 February 1996 rate of SDR = \$1.46174.*

The argument that IMF loans are crucial to further Russian reform is disproved by the facts. The above chart shows that the loans did not begin to flow in earnest until after President Yeltsin smashed parliament, signed an aggressive new military doctrine and sacked Acting Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar in 1993, purged most other reformers, heated up anti-American rhetoric, launched the Chechnya war 1994, and sold nuclear technology to Iran and more high-tech weapons to China in 1995. IMF loans are harming American interests in at least three major ways:

\* They undermine reform. The more reformers purged, the greater the loans have grown. IMF funds are a disincentive to fiscal responsibility. The loans finance Russia's deficit spending to subsidize Soviet-style industry, agriculture, and bureaucracy. Russia's 1996 budget increases military spending and state subsidies, and relies on IMF funding to close the deficit gap.

\* They fuel corruption. Billions of dollars in direct cash transfers to the Russian Central Bank are completely fungible in a government that tolerates high-level, large-scale graft. Former Finance Minister Boris Fyodorov says the IMF loans reward "incompetence and corruption."

\* They fund the Russian military. IMF Managing Director Michel Camdessus said in the February 24 *Washington Post* that the money goes straight to the Russian military. He acknowledged that the funds have been financing the war in Chechnya, and that Russia cannot be expected to tighten its belt on military operations: "You know perfectly [well] that all governments going to war, particularly this kind of war, they cut everything but the expenses for war."

## Maskhadov Wins Chechen Elections

Newly elected Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov called on the world to recognise Chechnya's independence, on Tuesday, 28 January.

"Chechnya is an independent state which has declared sovereignty. Now this independence has to be recognized by all countries, including Russia," Maskhadov told reporters at his first press conference at Grozny since winning Monday's election.

Maskhadov said "we are ready for (negotiations) even tomorrow, or the next day."

Asked if he would accept less than recognition of independence from Russia, he replied: "no." Chechnya, a tiny Muslim republic in the North Caucasus mountains, declared itself independent just before the collapse of the Soviet Union.

This was not recognized by Moscow and in December 1994 Russian President Boris Yeltsin sent troops to restore rule.

In a brutal 21-month war, the Russians were unable to establish control and last August a peace deal was signed stopping the war and provided a five-year cooling off period to define the republic final status.

Aslan Maskhadov, 45 years, got 70 per cent of the vote, war-lord Shamil Basayev got 16.3 per cent and Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev got 14.8 per cent.

The election of Aslan Maskhadov as Chechen president provides "a serious chance" for Moscow to reach an agreement with the Chechen leadership on the future status of the republic, Russian President Boris Yeltsin said on 28 January.

Yeltsin, who discussed Chechnya in the Kremlin with Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, said he was "satisfied" with the way Monday's elections had been organized, and noted the high turn out.

Maskhadov and other Chechen leaders have always insisted on independence for the North Caucasus republic – a demand never accepted by Moscow.



**Slava Stetsko talking with Ukrainian MP Roman Kroutyuk  
outside the Parliament building in Kyiv during one of her lecture tours  
in Ukraine in 1996.**