

*The*  
**UKRAINIAN  
REVIEW**



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# THE UKRAINIAN REVIEW

A Quāterly Magazine devoted to the study of Ukraine.

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
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Spring 1972

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**A Quarterly Magazine**



**WE APPEAL TO THE CONSCIENCE OF ALL MEN OF GOOD  
WILL IN THE WORLD TO HELP SECURE THE RELEASE  
FROM SOVIET RUSSIAN PRISONS AND CONCENTRATION  
CAMPS OF ALL UKRAINIANS — FORMER RED CROSS  
PERSONNEL, POLITICAL PRISONERS AND ALL THOSE  
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PEOPLE IN THE SOVIET UNION!**

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DOCUMENTS FROM BEHIND THE IRON CURTAIN

## “NEW REPRISALS WILL BE NEW BOOMERANGS!”

### IN LIEU OF THE FINAL SPEECH

In Ukraine a new document entitled as above by Valentyn MOROZ is disseminated on a wide scale. He submitted this in written form to the court before his second trial in November, 1970, at which he has been sentenced altogether to 14 years imprisonment.

Ukrainian Central Information Service, London.

I shall not quote the Criminal Code and argue my innocence. I am to be tried not for committing any crime and you know this well. We are being tried because of the role we play in processes which you do not desire. There are people for whose arrest you have more formal and legal grounds than for my arrest. But for you it is convenient that these people remain free because they lower the tone of the Ukrainian renaissance and slow down its momentum, simply not knowing what they are doing. You will never touch these people and would free them immediately, if they were to fall into your hands. You have come to the conclusion that V. Moroz raises the temperature of processes in Ukraine which you don't want. Therefore you think it is better to separate him from society by prison bars. Well, this would be quite logical except for a single "but"...

Beginning from 1965, you have put behind bars several dozens of people. *What have you achieved by that?* I shall not mention the general trend, for nobody has been able to stop it. But have you been able at least to eradicate its concrete material manifestations? Have you stopped, for example, the flow of unofficial, uncensored literature that is already known under the name of "Samvydav"? No! This has been beyond your power. "Samvydav" is growing, being enriched by new forms and genres, spreading to new authors and readers and, what is most important, it has extended its roots so widely and deeply that no expansion of the staff of informers and no number of Japanese tape-recorders will help. Your efforts have led to nothing and what you do could be called, as the Russians say, "monkey labour". But the problem is not that "monkey labour" is of no use to anyone, a labour without result. One cannot say this about your work which has already produced a tangible effect, though completely contrary to that expected by you. It is apparent that you have *not succeeded to frighten, but provoked an interest*. You wanted to put out the fire, but instead you only poured oil on it.



Nothing assisted the intensification of civic activities in Ukraine more than your repressions. Nothing drew the attention of the public to the process of Ukrainian renaissance as much as your trials did. To tell the truth, it is these very trials that demonstrated to the public at large that social life has revived in Ukraine. You wanted to conceal people in the Mordovian forests, but instead you placed them in a wide arena — and the whole world has seen them. Most of those active in the Ukrainian renaissance have become so exactly because of the atmosphere of awakening provoked by your repressions. In short, enough time has passed to make clear at last that these repressions *do harm to you* most of all. But you still conduct trials . . . What for? To fulfil the plan? In order to satisfy your official conscience? Or in order to take revenge? More likely just from inertia. You have introduced in the present post-Stalinist stage of the Ukrainian renaissance that factor without which it would have been still unripe and half-baked; you have introduced the *element of sacrifice*. Faith is born where there are martyrs. You have given them to us.

Each time, as soon as something alive appeared on the Ukrainian horizon, you threw a stone at it. And it became apparent each time that it was not a stone but a boomerang. Inevitably it returned and hit . . . you! What then has happened? Why don't reprisals produce the usual effect? Why has this well tried weapon become a boomerang? *Times have changed* — this is the whole answer. Stalin had enough water for putting out fires. But you are in an entirely different situation. You have to live in the era in which the reserves have become exhausted. And when there is not enough water then it is better not to disturb the fire. Because it then burns even better, as every child knows. You took a stick in your hands to scatter the cinders, but you only managed to stir them into life. You have not the strength for more than that, and this means that the social organism in which you live has entered a phase of development in which reprisals produce *contrary effects*. Now each new reprisal *will be a new boomerang*.



### MR. V. BOHDANIUK

On his departure to USA, Mr. Volodymyr BOHDANIUK has relinquished — with the appearance of No. 4 issue of "The Ukrainian Review" in 1971 — his duties of Executive Editor of this Quarterly. He will, however, continue his association with the magazine as one of its Associate Editors.

We wish to take this opportunity for expressing our thanks to Mr. V. Bohdaniuk for his contribution — in many ways and during a period of many years — to the founding and life of "The Ukrainian Review". He knows more than anyone else those divers difficulties which daily confront an emigré publication of this type and size. While wishing Mr. V. Bohdaniuk and his family the best of luck in the new place, we hope for his continuous and fruitful co-operation for many years ahead.

The Publishers and the Board of Editors

Having put me behind bars on 1st June, 1970, you again threw a boomerang. What will happen next — you have seen it already. Five years ago I was put in the dock and an arrow shot out from there. Later I was put behind the barbed wire in Mordovia and a bomb burst out from there. Now, having understood nothing and learned nothing, you start again from the beginning. Only this time the effect of the boomerang will be more powerful. In 1965 Moroz was an unknown history teacher. Now he is known . . .

So now Moroz sips the prison cabbage-soup. As a Jew would say: "How will you profit from this?" The only Moroz who would be *extremely useful* to you would be a submissive Moroz, one who would write declarations of repentance. This would really deal a shattering blow to the entire conscious Ukrainian public.

But you will *never* have a Moroz of this kind!

If, however, you are counting on creating some kind of vacuum in the Ukrainian renaissance by putting me behind bars, you cannot be serious. You must understand at last that *there will never again be a vacuum*. The power of the spiritual potential of Ukraine is sufficient to fill any vacuum and provide new public figures in place both of those put in prison and those who have given up public activities. The '60s have injected considerable enthusiasm into Ukrainian life and the '70s will also not be a vacuum in Ukrainian history. Those golden times when the entire life was squeezed into an official mould have passed irrevocably. There now exists a culture outside the Ministry of Culture and a philosophy other than that of the periodical "Voprosy filosofii" ("The Problems of Philosophy"). The phenomena born without official permission will now exist for ever and their effects will grow in force year by year.

I shall be tried in secret. All the same this trial will become a boomerang, even if nobody hears me, even if I am kept silent in a Vladimir prison cell isolated from the world. *Silence can sometimes be louder than shouting*. You will not be able to stifle it even by liquidating me. It is quite easy to destroy, but have you considered this truth: the destroyed sometimes are more important than the living. The *destroyed become banners*. They are the flint of which impenetrable fortresses are built in pure souls.

I know that you will say: Moroz has too high an opinion of himself. But it is not a matter of the person of Moroz. It concerns every honest human being in my place. After all, if people are prepared for a slow death from some poisonous chemical administered in Vladimir prison, there cannot be room for petty ambition.

The national renaissance is the most profound of all spiritual processes. It is a phenomenon of many facets and strata, and it can manifest itself in thousands of forms. Nobody can predict them and make a net large enough to contain the process in all its broadness. Your dams are strong and reliable, but they stand on dry land. The

streams simply have by-passed them and found new channels. Your barriers are lowered, but they will stop nobody, for the routes have long ago been blazed far away from them.

The national renaissance is a process with unlimited resources because the national conscience lives in the soul of every human being, even in one, it would seem, who had died a spiritual death a long time ago. This had become apparent, for example, during the debate in the Writers' Union when some people, of whom nobody expected it, voted against the expulsion of I. Dzyuba.

You repeat stubbornly that people put behind bars are nothing but criminals. You close your eyes and give the impression that there is no problem. All right, perhaps it would be possible for you to drag on in this situation for some ten years more. But what then? *It is only the beginning* of the new processes in Ukraine and the whole Soviet Union. The Ukrainian renaissance has not assumed a vast scale yet. But do not content yourselves that this will always be so. In the epoch of universal literacy, when in Ukraine there are at present 300,000 students and radio sets can be had by all, in such an epoch every social phenomenon of importance acquires mass support. Do you not realise that soon you will have to deal with social tendencies on a mass scale? The new processes are just beginning and your repressive measures have already lost their effectiveness. What will happen next?

There is only one way out: to reject the obsolete policy of repression and to find *new forms of co-existence* with the new phenomena which have already established themselves in our reality for good. Such is the reality. It has emerged without asking permission and brought with it new matters which *demand a new approach*. There is much to ponder on for people called to manage the affairs of State. But you still play with boomerangs...

There will be a trial. Well, let us have a fight. It is just at this time, when one person has written a declaration of repentance and another took up the vocation of translator, that it is necessary for somebody to show an *example of steadfastness* and to clear, by a single stroke, the oppressive atmosphere obtaining after the departure from active civic work of certain people.

It has fallen to me... It is a difficult mission. It is not easy for anyone to sit behind bars. But it is even more difficult not to have any respect for oneself. Therefore, we shall have a fight!

There will be a trial and everything will start from the beginning: new protests and appeals, new material for the press and radio all over the world. The interest will grow tenfold to what has been written by Moroz. Briefly, a new lot of oil will be added to the fire which you wish to put out.

This is indeed a subversive activity. But do not blame me for this, for it was not I who put Moroz behind bars and threw the boomerang.

Valentyn Moroz

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# VIOLENCE AGAINST DEAD

## CHORNOVIL DEFENDS THE GRAVES OF UKRAINIAN SOLDIERS

(UCIS, London 14. 1. 1972) The world has just learned of yet another Moscow's crime against Ukraine, the arrest of many Ukrainian intellectuals and prominent Ukrainian patriots in general. As in the past, the KGB accuses them of "spreading anti-Soviet propaganda".

It is reported that among the arrested are two men who have already tasted the life in Soviet prisons. One of them is a talented literary critic, **Ivan Svitlychnyy**, the other likewise talented and fearless critic and journalist, **Vyacheslav Chornovil**. The latter is known to students of Soviet affairs through his reports of the secret trials of many Ukrainian intellectuals, workers and peasants following a wave of arrests in 1965 and after. These reports were later published in a book form in several West European languages under the title "The Chornovil Papers".

Before the news of his re-arrest reached London, we came into possession of a very interesting document which has been circulating in the Soviet Union. It is an appeal by Vyacheslav Chornovil against the barbaric destruction by the occupation authorities of the graves of Ukrainian Soldiers in the Yanivsky cemetery, Lviv, to the Praesidium of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine and the Council of Ministers of the Ukr.SSR. Below is the full text of Chornovil's appeal.

It is hard to imagine something more savage, inhuman and horrible than the violence against the dead. Perhaps it is more "humane" to shoot a human being dead, than later to raze to the ground by bulldozer his grave and to unearth his bones . . .

That which is now taking place at the Yanivsky cemetery in Lviv, almost in the centre of Europe, could only be measured in relation to the most savage medieval Asiatic deeds. Under the supervision of the specially detailed persons the bulldozer razes the soldiers' graves, while the spades of gravediggers unearth human remains. It is said that this is being done with the approval of the chairman of Lviv Oblast (regional) executive committee, Telishevs'ky. I do not know what administrative talents possesses this man, to whom such a responsible post has been entrusted, but this one savagery is sufficient in order to degrade the bestial functionary to a swineherd.

Let's ponder on what is being done. Firstly, the outrage against the graves of the direct enemy is a sacrilege rejected by the civilised world. Death equalizes outlooks and ideologies. And death commands respect for itself. The Criminal Code of the Ukr.SSR contains the article 212 which envisages criminal sanctions for the cruel treatment of graves. Secondly, were the Galician youths who lived towards the end of 1918 and laid their lives in the struggle against the Polish legionaries defending Galicia against the colonial subjugation by the aristocrats' Poland the enemies of the Soviet regime? It is not known

where they would stand, had they not fallen in those days. Perhaps they would have joined the Army of the Ukrainian National Republic, or perhaps the Red Ukrainian Galician Army. By the way, the amateurs of quotations find positive expressions about these soldiers in Lenin's writings. For what then is the revenge taken against those who have fallen over 50 years ago? For the fact that they tried to save Galicia from Polish oppression? We, who show no solidarity with the Pilsudski's followers, the pacification\* and Bereza Kartuzka,\*\* have seen that even Poles did not violate the soldiers' graves having occupied Galicia and hating the soldiers as their enemies. Even under Stalin they did not come upon an idea of overt destruction of the graves, though they did violate them. What have you and we come to?

Much is being said now about the bourgeois ideology intrigues. I do not think that all bourgeois publishing houses and radio stations combined could be able to make anti-Soviet propaganda of such force as did one bulldozer in Lviv which has cut off the tops from the soldiers' crosses.

After the burning down of the State Library of the Ukr.SSR Academy of Sciences in 1964 and the political arrests for open expression of convictions during the years that followed, it would be difficult to name an action which undermined the authority of the Soviet rule to the extent as does the present-day outrage in Lviv. The results are there already to see. Thousands of Galician people have filed past the desecrated and ravaged graves during the past few days. There is consternation and indignation among the population. There are rumours about intentions, also far removed from humanity and perhaps even of provocative nature, to smash up, in retaliation, the graves of Party and military leaders and so forth. Are we coming to the point when we are to introduce the state of siege in the cemeteries?

I refrained from one-person appeals to the Party and Soviet leaders after the fact that in 1967, for just remarks on the violation of the norms of socialist legality, I was first thrown behind bars and later made, from a critic and journalist, a railway worker. But I cannot stay silent today. In the name of humanity I appeal to you to intervene in the activities of the provincial stupid despots and stop the cruel treatment of the soldiers' graves, restore the number of ravaged burial places and transfer from there the remains of those buried on other people's bones. Thus renounce the crime which is being committed in Lviv now.

(Sig.) *Vyacheslav Chornovil*,  
Spokiyna Street, 13, Lviv.

16. 8. 1971

\* The Polish authorities' outrages against the Ukrainian population.

\*\* Place of incarceration of the Ukrainian patriots by the Poles before the last war.

# AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE THERMONUCLEAR WAR

*By Jaroslav STETS'KO*

## POSITIONS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY UKRAINIAN LIBERATION MOVEMENT (OUN)

*Our goal* is the re-establishment of a sovereign and independent united Ukrainian State through the liquidation of the Russian empire, namely by its dismemberment into national, independent, democratic, ethnic states of the nations, presently subjugated, and the destruction of the Communist system.

Re-establishment of Ukrainian independence, as well as of other nations in the Russian empire, would result in revolutionary changes on the political map of the world. Russia would lose access to the Mediterranean Sea, the Near and the Middle East, Africa and, with a possible independence of Siberia, also her position on the Asian continent.

The geo-political situation of independent Ukraine, the Caucasian republics and Turkestan would have exceptional significance for a new arrangement of political forces in the world.

The revolutionary anti-Russian and anti-communist concepts propagated by Ukraine — the indestructible human potential and natural resources of Ukraine — are component elements of the exclusive position enjoyed by Ukraine at present and in the future.

*Our road to liberation* is synchronized national liberation revolutions and armed uprisings in Ukraine and in other subjugated countries. The reality of this road, even under a terroristic, totalitarian system, was confirmed by the Hungarian Revolution, the uprisings in Poland and East Germany, and, in particular, by the uprisings of Ukrainian and other prisoners at various times in various concentration camps in Siberia and Kazakhstan. A subsequent failure of these uprisings does not mean their permanent failure or their unfeasibility as the means of liberation. In the West the very possibility of an uprising in the USSR has been questioned for decades. But life has shown otherwise. Now we are not concerned with proving the feasibility of an uprising as such, but with the possibility of a successful, victorious uprising. The failure of the Hungarian or East German uprisings was caused by their isolation and lack of co-ordination with Liberation movements in other subjugated countries, as well as *total orientation* upon armed assistance by the West. It is



not enough to appeal exclusively to the West. The Hungarian insurgents should have concentrated their attention combining the interests of other subjugated nations and of the Hungarian people. They should have supported the liberation of all subjugated nations. An appeal to the non-Russians in the Soviet Army would have brought more success than the desperate cries for help to the West which was not able to render political support.

An opportunity for an uprising behind the Iron Curtain could be provided by either a favourable external or internal political situation, or both simultaneously. The Berlin blockade (an uprising in Vorkuta in 1948), the death of Stalin, the liquidation of Beria, the war in the Middle East, an armed conflict between Russia and her external enemies — all these are opportunities for insurrections, provided the situation in the empire is ripe and the peoples are prepared psychologically for a revolutionary act, either spontaneous or organized in advance. From this side of the Iron Curtain it is necessary to conduct systematic, long-range ideological training and activization of the broad popular masses in order to create an internal revolutionary situation of preparedness to take advantage of any favourable opportunity or to create psychological and moral preconditions for a revolutionary act. It is impossible to predict the time of the outbreak of a national uprising or to determine the components of a situation. The potentials of human or national soul cannot be made to conform to some fatalistic or rationally calculated principles. Neither of the national liberation uprisings of the past have been rationally calculated, but came as the result of the strenuous, many-sided preparatory struggle, in particular the ideological mobilization of the people and the accumulation of revolutionary dynamics and agitation. All the more, under a totalitarian, terroristic regime the frontal and multiple pressures of the oppressor in all spheres of life and on each individual create the situation of resistance of each and all oppressed members of the subjugated nation. Through the accumulation of hatred and systematic passive resistance and parallelly more and more intensive outbursts, the conditions are ripening for a nationwide explosion. An opportunity cannot always be foreseen. It can be created.

The territories of Siberia, Turkestan and the Caucasus are in particular well-suited for insurgent activities, for they are populated by millions of nationally and politically conscious Ukrainians, who were deported from Ukraine — an element which is particularly capable of engaging in revolutionary acts. The political mobilization of Ukrainians and members of other subjugated nations, who live in these countries as well, must be part of our plan of psychological warfare.

A possible spontaneous explosion does not necessarily mean an uncalculated outburst, but a discharge of concentrated revolutionary

potential, which had been steadily accumulated by the leading political and cultural revolutionary elements through their activities. They do not have to be members of an underground revolutionary liberation organization. The leading cadres of revolution — both political and military — exist regardless of the fact whether it is possible or impossible to organize them into an old-type underground organization. In the course of struggle the leading revolutionary elements — military and political — will assume organized forms under the protection of their armed force.

In a terroristic State system a revolutionary organization must limit itself to the following three elements which make up a revolutionary organization:

- a) an agreement of its cadres as to principles,
- b) an agreement on political guidelines of action,
- c) technical and organizational contacts, which are to serve for a successful realization of tasks *a* and *b*.

But according to our concept of the liberation revolution in which we are not staking on a palace revolt of the Pretorian Guard or on some plot, but on the struggle of the people, the technical and organizational ties are not decisive. Here the development of dynamic national and political consciousness and self-reliance of the broad popular masses, with the accent on aggressive mass action, comes into play. It is hardly necessary to conceal such actions, when the masses are taking part in them. For this very reason it is necessary to have adequate technical means for the organization of struggle and the transmission of instructions—guide-lines. A description of this or that action on the radio becomes a guide for action in various parts of Ukraine and elsewhere. Even a radio description of a demonstration by our youth in front of the Russian Embassy in London or Ottawa, transmitted to Ukraine or Turkestan, becomes a stimulus for a modified but similar action in Kyiv or Tashkent. The young people in Ukraine are technically well-trained and it is not a chance occurrence that hundreds of radio hams, who transmit foreign broadcasts with the help of their own transmitters, are being arrested in Ukraine as "hooligans of the air".

Therefore it is enough to have hitching posts. An organizational network is not absolutely necessary in this age of technological progress. We should be concerned with efforts in the direction of psycho-moral, political and ideological revolutionization of all strata of society, differentiating the psychological struggle of relatively different elements within the subjugated peoples: a) the youth, b) members of the Soviet Army, c) members of the Komsomol, d) workers in the field of culture, e) technocrats, f) blue-collar workers, g) collective farm workers, h) intellectuals, i) members of the Communist party, j) civil servants, etc. Within the empire the conflicts are going to become bigger and bigger. They are stemming

from its multi-national composition and the anti-naturalness of the Communist system as the particular Russian way of life. Thus, there we see the oppressed nations and the ruling nation; the terrorist state system and the human longing for freedom; the threat of a permanent explosion engineered by the oppressed individual and nation; the intensification of contradictions and the widening of gaps and conflicts between the ruling Russian and the quisling strata on the one hand, and the freedom-loving forces of the peoples on the other; social injustice and wrongs and the new class of exploiters and Communist magnates; many-sided resistance to the anti-natural collectivistic system on the part of the subjugated nations and individuals, and so forth.

### **THE SUBJUGATED NATIONS — A KEY ISSUE IN WORLD POLITICS**

In practice, a battle is being fought to win over the subjugated peoples, although they are never spoken of and no reference is ever made to them, in negotiations between the super powers. The essential problem is not arms limitation, but the winning over of the souls of those who carry the weapons, in order to make them turn them against the Russian oppressor. The non-Russian peoples make up the majority of the population of the USSR and for this reason the majority of soldiers in the Soviet Army are non-Russians. Together with the satellite countries the power ratio is way above 1:2 in favour of the non-Russians.

Thus, the free world should place its stakes upon the break-up of the Russian empire and the despotic Communist system from within, on the national liberation revolutions, culminated by an armed uprising. The British Gen. J. F. C. Fuller's concept of modern warfare should not only be the object of study by military experts in the free world, but of practical application. In essence it is close to our revolutionary liberation concept. Ideas, says Gen. Fuller, are stronger than atomic bombs. Atomic bombs cannot be dropped on revolutions and revolutionaries, on uprisings and insurgents, for the Russian occupation forces would be destroyed at the same time and the radioactive fall-out would also kill the Russians, not only in Ukraine, but also on their own ethnographic territory. Therefore, the national liberation revolutionary and armed uprisings are also an alternative to thermonuclear war. Moreover, the situation in Vietnam has proved how hard it is, even for a super power, to be victorious in a practical confrontation with a guerrilla-insurgent concept of war, the most modern type of warfare in the thermonuclear age.

The Thermonuclear age is at the same time an age of ideological struggle. The insurgent-guerrilla war is adequate for the ideological

age. The importance of the armed people (with simple weapons at times) increases with the growth of military technology, its modernization and the ever newer inventions of more and more destructive weapons. This is comprehensible and life-saving for humanity, for, regrettably, the ethical and cultural armament of the human race, its morality and spiritual culture, do not go hand in hand with technological advance. The more powerful and all-destructive the thermonuclear weapons become, the greater becomes the role and the significance of an individual in the struggle for freedom or in defence of freedom.

The support by the West of the revolutionary liberation processes inside the USSR will not lead to thermonuclear war but, instead, will make the latter more unlikely, since the Russians are going to be threatened by a possible attack from outside, for example, by Red China. Russia is politically and militarily supporting the so-called national liberation "anti-colonial" guerrilla formations and their actions in Asia, Africa and Latin America— and no nuclear war ensues. Russia is building up an internal front in the USA (student revolts, Negro unrests, marches on Washington to protest against White House policies, and so forth) — and no nuclear war ensues. The pro-Russian front is penetrating the entire free world, cutting across free nations, parts of whose members are supporting the Russian interests, opposing their own national interests.

The hopes of Communism's evolution towards democracy or the fall of the Russian empire of itself are dangerous illusions for which the free world could pay with total thermonuclear destruction or capitulation before the Russian tyranny.

With their presence alone the NATO armed forces are not always capable of stopping the Russian expansion. For example, the presence of the Russian fleet in the Mediterranean Sea and the construction of military bases around it, prove this clearly. Only a confrontation, as was the case during the Cuban crisis, could be successful. But where is the *casus belli* of a democratic power — is often hard to determine even for its government. Under such conditions Russia can commit the error of miscalculation, as Hitler miscalculated with his attack on Poland. He also did not take the central problem of that time into consideration which is even a greater problem today: the subjugated nations.

The Russian empire is growing in the age of so-called peaceful co-existence. Russia's constant drive forward under pressure from the subjugated nations, without a counteraction by the USA, in the sector of Ukraine and other oppressed nations in the Russian empire, will lead sooner or later to an armed clash between Moscow and Washington. The concept of the polarization of the world is unrealistic, for new forces are always arising which cannot be controlled by force. This concept requires that the USA together with Russia

act as bogeyman for all. But this is contrary to the nature of the American people and in the long run is objectively incapable of being maintained. The American nation, which is composed of citizens with various ethnic backgrounds, more than any other nation in the world, must base its policies on ethnical principles, for otherwise it would be hard for it to find a common denominator for its citizens of English, Irish, German, Jewish, Polish, Ukrainian, Latvian, Slovak, Hungarian, Italian, etc. descent in their defence of the interests of their former homelands. It is most probable that the United States might have to go to war against Russia in order to keep Israel from a defeat. In the Cuban crisis the same threat was present. And how many more such situations are awaiting the USA in view of the systematic, continuous aggression of Russia which now has a fleet second only to that of the United States and submarine bases on various continents? And yet, not so long ago, Russia could hardly be considered a sea power, only a land power.

In order to stop Russian expansion (which now extends to the Indian Ocean and Latin America, her submarines appear in Australian waters, and even in those of the USA and Canada, all the more since Great Britain — regrettably — is giving up its military bases and Russia is filling the vacuum here and there, for the USA, it seems, cannot be present everywhere) it is mandatory to support the national liberation revolutionary processes within the Russian empire in order to bring about its dissolution from within and consequently the fall of Communism, without an atomic war. The subjugated nations are the Achilles' heel of every empire and even more so of the despotic Russian prison of nations and individuals. To count upon them is to count on something permanent, for the striving for freedom and state independence cannot be stifled by any tyrannical system of rule, which is clearly proved by the present processes in Ukraine and in other subjugated countries (the struggle of the intellectuals, cultural leaders, poets, youth, etc.). Prisoners never defended their prison. For this reason the subjugated peoples are not going to defend the empire under any conditions, but are going to search for ways and means of its destruction, undertaking in extreme cases, a two-front war, as was done by the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) in its fight against both Germany and Russia, should the conditions prevalent in World War II repeat themselves.

It is a historically proven fact that Russia was always defeated in internal revolutions, not in external wars. Some examples: In the 1904-5 war with Japan and in 1917-18 Russia, a member of the victorious Entente, lost the war because of national uprisings and liberation wars of the subjugated peoples, which, headed by Ukraine, re-established their independent states. Napoleon and Hitler lost their wars against Russia because they did not take into consideration the

Achilles' heel of the empire — the subjugated nations, and ignored their national aspirations.

The hopes of some in the West that Russian expansion can be stopped by a Russo-Chinese war may be erroneous, for both sides are conscious of the fact that in this type of a situation the USA would be victorious. On the other hand, a common front of the USA and Russia would be a repetition of the Allies' error in World War II: a common front with the Russian tyranny against the Nazi tyranny. Churchill aptly remarked later, "We have slaughtered the wrong pig". In our view, it was necessary to slaughter "both pigs" in a common front of the Allies and the peoples subjugated by Berlin and Moscow. The West had that chance when the USA joined the great alliance.

The war between Russia and Red China could be either thermo-nuclear or conventional. It cannot be a guerrilla war on the territory of the USSR on the part of Red China. Red Chinese guerrillas cannot expect any support from the people of Ukraine, Turkestan, the Caucasus or Byelorussia. They cannot expect this support in Siberia either, where there are millions of nationally and politically conscious deportees from Ukraine and other subjugated countries. A guerrilla war of the Red Chinese is only possible in Asia, where there are Chinese settlements and sections of nations sympathetic to Communism which are racially close to the Chinese (Red Vietnamese, Cambodians, Thais, etc.), but so far, conscious of anti-Chinese sentiments among the Asian peoples threatened by Red China, the Red Chinese did not export their guerrillas anywhere in large numbers.

A Russo-Chinese conflict is in our interest, as are all complications faced by Russia in the field of foreign policy, but we do not share the view that the enemy of our enemy is necessarily our friend. Hitler was not our friend, although he was an enemy of Moscow.

Ukraine is not going to fight for the preservation of the Russian empire, nor for its "democratization", but for its liquidation. However, she will not fight on the side of Red China either, whose colonial aims are similar to those of Nazi Germany. We are going to take advantage of all conflicts in which Russia is involved in order to topple the empire. We are not going to defend the prison of nations. All external difficulties for Russia are creating a favourable situation for the revolutionary liberation movements in their attempts to unfold revolutionary activities and to intensify the liberation struggle. The dispatching of Soviet divisions to the Far East, their decrease in Ukraine, the opening of an American and Red Chinese fronts against Russia — all these are in our interest. The more fronts Russia has, the better for us. But this does not mean at all that we are relaying ourselves upon any of Russia's enemies. We are orienting ourselves upon our own forces, upon the common front of the subjugated nations, which share our fate. And finally, the counting of



some upon a Russo-Chinese war is only one of the possibilities, which may not come true, when Russia will facilitate Peking's southward expansion and its expansion into South-East Asia, as was contended by Gen. J. F. C. Fuller. Then the USA might have to fight a two-front war against Russia and against Red China.

The USA does not only have the alternatives: to side with Russia against Red China, or with Red China against Russia; it has also the most lasting, anti-imperialistic alternative: to side with the subjugated nations against the aggressors. This very alternative was ignored by the Allies in World War II, thus helping the Russian aggressors to conquer not only half of Europe, but in fact to build Russia into a world power.

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Each year for its last December issue, *TIME*, the weekly magazine, nominates MAN OF THE YEAR. Yosyf Cardinal Slipyy was proposed as MAN OF THE YEAR for 1971 in the following letter to *TIME* by Orest Szczudluk of Boston, Mass., USA.

Sir:

For *TIME*'s Man of the Year for 1971, I propose Josyf Cardinal Slipyi, Archbishop Major, Primate of the Ukrainian Catholic Church. His contributions to mankind and to the Church are many: Prince of the Church, teacher, scholar, confessor of the faith, defender of persecuted Churches in the Soviet Union, promoter of freedom and justice for captive peoples.

For 18 years, Josyf Cardinal Slipyi was incarcerated in Communist slave labour camps, both for his faithfulness to the Catholic Church and for his staunch belief in God-given rights that men and nations can live in peace, with liberty and justice for all. Following his release from prison and arrival in the Vatican in 1963, Cardinal Slipyi built St. Sophia Church and established a cultural and educational center in Rome for theology and the humanities.

His activity at the October Synod of Bishops received world-wide attention, where he eloquently pleaded for freedom and justice for 46 million Ukrainians. His undaunted presentation at the Synod of the persecution of religion in the Soviet Union strengthened man's belief that all peoples, including Ukrainians, are entitled to freedom of worship. His plea received world acclaim and respect (*TIME*, Religion, November 15, 1971).

I strongly believe that *TIME*'s consideration and eventual nomination of JOSYF CARDINAL SLIPIYI as MAN OF THE YEAR for 1971 would be a just honour and tribute to him for his enduring faith and his fearless leadership. He has demonstrated, in words and in deeds, that freedom and justice are inherent to all, regardless of race, creed and nationality. Josyf Cardinal Slipyi came from Ukraine; his spiritual strength, his work and his leadership serve as an inspiration to all of us.

Respectfully,  
**Orest Szczudluk**

"*The Ukrainian Review*" is in complete agreement with Mr. Szczudluk's arguments.

## OPPRESSION OF NON-RUSSIAN PEOPLES

In October 1971 Mr. James K. ANDERSON, Editor of the *V.E.W. Magazine*, made a speech at a reception in Madison Heights, Mich., USA, commemorating the 30th anniversary of the proclamation of the restoration of the Ukrainian State. Below we report the speech in excerpts.

Mr. Anderson's comments on the situation in the Soviet Union, and in Ukraine in particular, are both of great interest and constant topicality.

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"It may well be that in the United States we tend to overestimate our crises because they do impinge on our everyday lives. At the same time we overlook or ignore, even if it is ever mentioned, the situation of our adversary, the USSR. There, the captive peoples, led by the Ukrainians, are becoming ever more restive. Dissent there — unheard of a few years ago — is real and it no longer can be silenced.

"Repression of intellectuals is now being widely exposed, though certainly nothing is new in their fate, except that instead of being shot forthwith they are condemned to a living death or sent to insane asylums. Minorities, such as the Jews, are clamouring to leave that prison of nations. The Soviet economy, with its chronic shortages — for the masses anyway, however, not for the Communist classes — is just barely creaking along.

"I might say here parenthetically that, while many in the West may resent what may seem like excessive publicity given the plight of Soviet Jewry to the exclusion of others in the Soviet empire — how many of your loved ones would like to join you here — it is my feeling that exposure of the Communists for what they really are can only help the free world. Not only are the Communists unmasked as anti-Semites, and therefore true to Karl Marx, but their system of oppression of non-Russian peoples is called into question. And as far as I am concerned anything that weakens Soviet imperialism in any way strengthens the United States and thereby the entire free world. And in the long run a strong United States can only benefit the captives of Moscow. If one group is hindered in the exercise of its religion — and what of the Ukrainian Catholic Church? — is discriminated against in the retention of its cultural values and is denied the full rights of citizenship, are not all the others?!

"Earlier I mentioned American domestic concerns. It may well be that, as some have predicted, this country will return for the next

few years to the isolationism of Fortress America. I sincerely hope this does not come to pass, but it may materialize out of frustration over the Vietnam experience.

"It is because of this possible inward turning that Ukrainians in the free world — as well as Armenians, Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians, Poles, Slovaks, Czechs and all the other peoples whose ancestral roots are in Moscow's grip — will have to redouble their efforts to maintain interest in the fate of Russia's captives. This has to go beyond pious pronouncements of political leaders, important as they are. It is vital that grass roots sentiment be developed and nurtured outside of large industrial areas . . . but in the small towns that dot the land, where public opinion really counts. In the overriding concern for domestic problems, the cause of all the captive peoples must not be allowed to wither away. I can't urge you too strongly to work within non-Ukrainian organizations, church, veterans, civic, labour, patriotic or in any others that influence public opinion purely on the local level. For all of us the next few years may prove to be the most critical since 1917-1918 when the Ukrainian National Republic was established and 1941 when Mr. Stetsko and his organization proclaimed the re-establishment of the Ukrainian state, only to become a Nazi victim for his heroic role.

"Unquestionably, the nationalities problem in the Soviet Union is becoming a major internal concern for Moscow. One only has to recall two years ago the serious rift that occurred when the Tartars were put on trial in faraway Tashkent for simply demanding their rights as a nationality. And what happened to one of their most outspoken supporters and vigorous champions of civil rights in the Soviet Union, Gen. Grigorenko, with the Ukrainian name? He was put in an insane asylum again. Just wanting your rights according to Soviet law in the prison of nations is a symptom of "madness".

"Less than a year ago the secretary of the party committee in Chernivtsi, Havrylyuk, was forced to recognize Ukrainian unrest in his domain, Bukovina . . . Among the people in the Chernivtsi area, he wrote, 'individual signs of national narrowmindedness can be ascertained today from time to time'.

"In other words the Ukrainians want to be free of Moscow domination. While this worthy denied there is a basis for complaints, he explained that propaganda carried out against it will be in the Ukrainian, Russian and Moldavian languages, though he insisted there is no Russification in Bukovina. But 'certainly the Russian language has made strong inroads into our reality, into the lives of the Bukovina citizens. This is a progressive manifestation of great historical importance. A reflection of the objective process of rapprochement between socialist nations, it favours and speeds up the solution of the complicated tasks of the construction of Communism'. Emphasis on the youth in this campaign is a sure sign that

the young people have not been deluded. When men like this talk of "proletarian internationalism" they mean submission to Russian hegemony. At the same time they forbid contacts with ethnic brethren even in other Communist states. You will recall that at the time of the Czechoslovak crisis, Ukrainian-language publications from eastern Slovakia, where there is a strong Ukrainian minority, were forbidden to be shipped to the Soviet Ukraine. You will also recall that Peter Shelest, one of the hawkiest of Kremlin hawks, was one of the most vigorous in his demand that action be taken against Czechoslovakia lest its pristine liberalism infect the Ukrainian people in his captive domain.

"One of the most notable developments in Ukraine in recent years is the underground press. Through this medium the West has become well informed about events. A recent issue of 'Ukraïnskyi Visnyk' tells of the expulsion of Leopold Yashchenko from the Ukrainian Institute for Art, Folklore and Ethnography for protesting injustices and the pressure against the chorus Homin which he directed. Singers left the group to avoid being fired from their jobs. In another account it was reported that the militia conducted regular round-ups of singers who have revived the custom of singing old folk songs (Ed. shchedrivky) at homes on New Year. Some were students harrassed in their studies later at the Kyïv University.

"A group of bandurists\* presented a concert of old songs and a patriotic demonstration nearly developed. They were forced to move from Kyïv and they and their relatives fired from their jobs.

"The KGB actively prevented the formation a chamber orchestra in Kyïv, contending that its director was "undependable" and his project was under the influence of "nationalists". An art exhibition was closed after two days. Thousands had attended its opening. Ancient iconography apparently was too much for Moscow's quislings in Kyïv. There is no reason to believe that other instances of this cultural genocide are not taking place among the other nationalities.

"Last spring at writers' congresses in the various republics, the party was faced with the dilemma essentially of how to make propaganda interesting and the tendency of writers in the republics in central Asia to draw on events of the past, as themes for their novels. This does not set well with the party since the cultural bureaucrats would prefer that event of the days before Communist rule be ignored or put in an unfavourable light. Historic topics made up half the novels published in the Turkmen republic. Significantly the portion of the speech given by Oles Honchar, author of the banned "Cathedral", dealing with censorship, was suppressed.

"Returning to the Ukrainian underground press, I think it is important to cite the recent case of an arrested and imprisoned

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\* Bandura, traditional Ukrainian musical instrument.

scholar, Bedrylo. Entitled "To the Peoples of the World", his letter described a fire [Ed.-protest self-immolation] in Kyiv during the October Revolution festivities. As the flames engulfed one man, he screamed 'Down with Colonialism in Ukraine; long live the free Ukraine!'...

"Reach out your helping hand to me, but not only to me but to other people in my fatherland as well, who have fought for freedom, friendship, independence and joy", Bedrylo wrote.

"So anxious or so ignorant are the KGB agents, that books published legally have even been confiscated. On the other hand, banned books have been ignored. Valentyn Moroz, whom all know and whose work "Chronicle of Resistance" the V.F.W. Magazine published last winter, wrote of KGB agents who confiscated even children's books, saying 'we will sort them out later'. In his young son's diary the KGB found the words "Mauser pistols and eight shells". Moroz tried for hours to convince the KGB the notation was childish fantasy.

"One of the really amazing developments in all these protests is that the people are not afraid to sign documents addressed to the Politburo or the party leadership... While youthful intellectuals are in the majority — a good sign because it shows that the spark of freedom is not dead after all these years — many elements of society are represented. They have a daring contempt for the KGB. They attack Russification. One young defendant in Dnipropetrovsk could prove the Ukrainian language had been banned from the schools there. The antipathy toward anti-Semitism in the face of a revival of it is another healthy sign among these young people.

"In their thirst for freedom, they have turned to the United Nations for help, a futile move... Some have even sought help from Communist parties in the West.

"The KGB... has adopted, according to the underground Ukrainian press, the tactic of organizing its own underground press. This has taken the form of anonymous letters denouncing the dissidents and are sent to major cultural or political figures. This was done in the case of Ivan Dzyuba, whom you all know. It was done against Ivan Franko's granddaughter, Zinoviya. When Chornovil was being attacked by the KGB warnings were sent out accusing him of responsibility for Grigorenko's arrest. Charges against Miss Franko were that she had stolen packages intended for the prisoners in the Mordovian camps and had pocketed money that was to be sent them. Similar accusations have been made against others too. Thus the KGB... is attempting to discredit intellectuals in the eyes of their compatriots. All of these incidents are proof of the concern this active resistance is causing.

"Let us return to the subject of the Ukrainian language. In their spring congress the Ukrainian writers recognized this problem. Even

those who toe the Party line slavishly attempted a defence of the rights of the language and urged that its use be encouraged. The party apparently is realizing that resentment against the suppression of the Ukrainian tongue — especially in the cities — is too strong to be ignored. The Ukrainian minister of education, A. M. Marynych, in his first public speech since being appointed to that office last March, told writers 'in the coming school year a deeper teaching of the Ukrainian language and literature is going to be introduced in some schools in the republic'.

"On the nationalities' scene, however, there are some disturbing developments. Most threatening at the moment perhaps is the growing discussion of "integration" of the nationalities. This word "integration" until recently had pretty much been avoided after Stalin's death. One such suggestion of "integration" has come from a professor at the Yakut University. Confusion over "integration" and "rapprochement" of the nationalities has its roots in Leninist doctrine and other writers on nationality questions attempt to skirt the essentials of the problem, the basic ethnic, historical and cultural differences among the captive peoples from the Russians. Regardless of how the subject is approached, it is highly apparent that the nationalities' issue is a major one and certainly not as communists contend a 'figment of the imagination of bourgeois nationalists'. Attacks on "nationalists" and "revisionists" only prevent an honest and realistic discussion of the nationalities' problem.

"While we are all aware of the troubles and the persecution which Moroz has been experiencing, as well as the 200 and more other Ukrainian writers, the prisoners of conscience, languishing in the Mordovian camps, there is another I would like to mention, Svyatoslav Karavans'kyi, whose letter protesting the Czechoslovak invasion was published in Munich last summer. You will remember that Karavans'kyi, like Horbovyi, has been in prison since the end of World War II. The latter had represented Ukrainian nationalists in trials in Poland before the war. He had committed no crime for which the Poles could punish him, so they turned him over to the Russians who had no such qualms. In his letter Karavans'kyi described the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia as creating "a state of moral dehumanization and degradation, as was typical of the people of the USSR during the era of Stalin's personality cult". There is much more, too much for us to repeat here, but can you imagine the courage it must have taken to write those words?

"Let us hope that in the coming years all in the West will have the same courage when it comes to facing up to the challenges thrown down by Moscow and not allow the current era of "a search for peace" to degenerate into a "search for peace at any price'."

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# SOVIET NATIONALITIES POLICY IN UKRAINE, 1920-1930\*

(Continuation — 2)

BY W. MYKULA

## 9. The National Problem and the Insurrections in Ukraine.

The defeat of the forces of the Ukrainian People's Republic, led by Petlyura, did not mean that the Bolsheviks had regained complete control in Ukraine, for the resistance offered by large numbers of groups of insurgent peasants made the rule of the Bolsheviks in Ukraine extremely insecure. These detachments of rebels, large and small, fighting in the name of various political slogans, or often simply against any outside interference in the life of the village community, were evidence of the peasants' hostility to certain aspects of Bolshevik rule, especially to their ruthless requisitioning of food-stuffs and to the terror regime of the Cheka. This was the elemental force which the Revolution had unleashed in Ukraine, and which no political authority was able to control. The spirit of rebellion against the State (which for the peasants of Ukraine had always meant an aggressive foreign power), was common, and was particularly evident in the case of the Anarchist, Otaman Makhno, who roamed in the South of Ukraine, where the free spirit of the Zaporozhian Cossacks was still alive. Other peasant partisan units were frequently influenced by Ukrainian and Russian Socialist Parties of various shades of colour. The greater proportion of these groups came into existence during the Rising against the Hetmanate. This rising was initiated by the Ukrainian Opposition Parties; the Directory Government tried to control it, but failed owing to the Bolshevik advance at the beginning of 1919. The groups of peasant insurgents who at first offered little or no resistance to the Bolsheviks, since their slogans of land distribution and peasant Soviets appealed to them, soon turned against the communists when the requisitioning began, and the harsh rule of the Commissars was established. By May, 1919, the peak of insurgent activity was reached. Makhno, Hryhoriyiv (Grigoriev), Zelenyy, and a host of minor *otamany* were making it impossible for the Soviet regime to establish a firm foothold in Ukraine. In April, 1919, alone, the Bolsheviks recorded 93 centres of peasant rebellion in Ukraine. Nearly half of them were in the *gubernia* of Kyïv.<sup>1</sup> Typical slogans,

\*) B. Litt. thesis, Faculty of Social Studies, University of Oxford (St. Antony's College), 1960.

<sup>1</sup>) Lykholat, *op. cit.*, p. 33.

popular among the insurgents at that period were: "For People's Soviets, but without the Bolsheviks!" (Hryhoriyiv), "For an independent Soviet regime!", "For Free Soviets!" "For a Free and Independent Soviet Ukraine!" It must be remembered that the word "Soviet", as well as its Ukrainian counterpart "Rada", means "council", and what the insurgent ideologists meant by it were freely elected representations, not the Bolshevik-imposed "Soviets". When, in August 1919, the armies of the Ukrainian People's Republic (U.N.R.) were advancing towards Kyiv from Podolia, the insurgents in Right-Bank Ukraine co-operated with them in fighting the Bolsheviks. The most outstanding leader among them was Tyutyunnyk, formerly Chief of Staff of Hryhoriyiv's troops.

Taught by experience, the Bolsheviks, on their return to Ukraine at the end of 1919, modified their policy towards the peasants. They discarded their insistence on the establishment of *sovkhozy* and agricultural communes. On February 5th, 1920, a new Land Decree, according to which all former large estates, as well as State, monasterial and domain lands were transferred to the peasants without redemption payments was published. Land formerly set aside for the State farms was now to be distributed among the peasants.

In spite of this, the dictatorial and arbitrary methods of the Bolshevik Commissars, the brutality of the Cheka, the continued presence of the Bolshevik Russian soldiery in Ukraine, and the unrelenting requisitioning of foodstuffs, brought back resentment and stimulated partisan activities. The hopes of the peasantry, especially in Right-Bank Ukraine, turned towards Petlyura who was the embodiment of the Nationalist cause. His alliance with Pilsudski and the advance of the Polish forces into Ukraine coincided with the intensification of insurgent activities. The slogan of an Independent Ukraine began to gain greater popularity, as the experience of various regimes showed that they were all, in their own way, oppressive, and that the only way to get rid of them was to support the force that claimed to stand for the local interests. By that time, too, the leadership of the insurgent groups has passed, to a large extent, into the hands of former Petlyurist officers, or members of the village intelligentsia, who were often former members of various Ukrainian Socialist Parties. Their political outlook was, naturally, clearer than that of the bulk of the peasant rebels, and they saw that the need for united action with the Petlyurist forces was much greater than it had been earlier.

A Soviet author, Dukel'skiy, in his book on the "Cheka-G.P.U.", described the activities of the Ukrainian insurgents during 1920 in the following words: "The second half of August, and the early months of the autumn, the period of our great disasters on the external front, were marked by the greatest upsurge of Petlyurist bandit insurrection in Right-Bank Ukraine. In the region of Alek-

sandria, a Petlyurist District Insurgent Committee was formed. It had under its command 15,000 armed bandits at the peak of its strength. In the Chyhyryn and Cherkassy districts, the bands of Holyy, Khmara, Nehrayiv, and Sokolov were formed quite openly. The bands of Levchenko, Kolyberda, and Chornyy also moved here from the *gubernia* of Poltava. Kholodnyy Yar (near Kremenchug), a wooded region, became the headquarters of the Petlyurist *otaman*. Small gang-leaders united themselves under the command of Petlyurist insurgent bandit chieftains and built themselves up into wide-spread organizations. *Otaman* Holyy, having gathered a band of kulaks 7,000 men strong, extended his influence to the Kaniv district and captured the neighbourhood of Trypillya (South off Kyiv). *Otaman* Levchenko with 3,000 men roamed all over the district of Zolotonosha (in the *gubernia* of Poltava). In Tarashcha, Zvenyhorod and Uman' (*gubernia* of Kyiv) were the following Petlyurist colonels: Hryzlo (500-600 men) Tsvitkivs'kyi (200-300 men) Svyats'kyi (150-200 men). Bohatyrenko operated in the region of Bila Tserkva (near Kyiv). To the north (off Kyiv) Struk and Shevel' had their nests. In Podolia and the *gubernia* of Odessa, the Petlyurist *otaman*, Zabolotnyy developed widespread activity (500 men)".

The same author gives further figures about the intensity of the activity of the insurgents:

"In June (1920), there were 11 bandit raids in the *gubernia* of Kyiv, in July — 51, and in August — 106. For the same months, the figures for the *gubernia* of Poltava are: 76, 99, 92. At the end of August, the centre of the bandits' activity moved to the Kyiv area, where, since the very beginning of 1920, the detachments of the Insurgent Committee of the district of Radomyshl', under the command of *otaman* Mordalevych had operated with the utmost fierceness".<sup>1</sup> The chief of the G.P.U. in Ukraine, V. Balyts'kyi, wrote that "The kulak bandit organization in Ukraine in 1920 numbered about 38,000 people".<sup>2</sup>

Official reports give the following figures concerning the numbers of arms captured from the insurgents in Ukraine during the period between May 20th, 1920 and the end of the year: 205 machine-guns, 13 artillery pieces, 23,714 rifles, 207 handgrenades, 342 sabres, and other military equipment. Trophies captured from Makhno (over 600 machine-guns, 20 artillery pieces and other equipment) are not included in these figures.<sup>3</sup>

After the conclusion of the Armistice with Poland on October 12th, and the defeat of Wrangel in the Crimea in the middle of November, 1920, the problem of the numerous partisan units, which were disrupting the Soviet regime from within, still remained. The plans of the remnants of Petlyura's Ukrainian Army in Podolia, now allied

1) Dukel'skiy, *Cheka-G.P.U.*, pp. 81-82. See also Popov, *op. cit.* pp. 243-244.

2) 'Radyans'ka Ukraina', December 1927, No. 12 (37) p. 19.

3) Annual Reports of the Council of People's Commissars for 1920. Kharkiv, 1921. Quoted in I. Mazepa's *Ukraina v vohni i buri*. Vol. 3. p. 85.

with Poland, to break the Armistice and to launch an offensive against the Red Army, were frustrated when Kotovskiy's cavalry brigade made a surprise attack north of Mohyliv, on November 10th, and penetrated the rear of the forces of the U.N.R. On November 21st, up to 30,000 of the U.N.R. troops fought their way out of the encirclement, crossed the frontier river Zbruch at Volochyska and were interned by the Poles.

One detachment of the Petlyurist Army, however, about 300 men strong, under the command of Hulyy-Hulenko, remained in the Red Army's rear, and made an unsuccessful attempt to unify the various detachments of insurgents.

While during the winter months of 1920-21 partisan activities somewhat declined, they broke out again in early spring, 1921. The economic ruin of the country, and the dissatisfaction with the Soviet regime were such that both the peasantry and large proportion of the workers in the towns were hoping for an early end to the Bolshevik rule.

However, during the winter, the Bolsheviks themselves had not been inactive, but had been working out an intensified programme for the suppression of "banditry" and the establishment of the Soviet regime in Ukraine on a firm basis. The Fifth Conference of the C.P.(b).U., with the help of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(b)., had mapped out the general directives for the line to be taken in combating Ukrainian Nationalist tendencies, both within the Party, and, above all, among the Ukrainian population, especially in the rural areas. The same problem was the subject of the directives of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(b)., which were approved on December 7th, 1920. They urged:

"Before the Soviet military and Party organs in Ukraine lies the task, parallel to that of army organization, of liquidating, within a definite limit of time, Anarcho-Makhnovist, Nationalist-Petlyurist, and criminal banditry, not only by the physical destruction of the bands now operating, but also by forestalling the possibility of the emergence of banditry in the future, namely, by means of the systematic disarmament of the village, by rendering its kulak elements harmless, and by strengthening the local machinery of civil and military government in Ukraine".<sup>1</sup>

The same document speaks about Soviet Nationality policy in Ukraine as follows:

"Keeping to the basis of its Resolution of December, 1919, concerning the Ukrainian question, the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(b) proposes to the Central Committee of the C.P.(b).U., that while continuing its unswerving struggle against the nationalist petty bourgeois Parties and the nationalist intelligentsia, who, supported

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<sup>1</sup>) *Istoriya K.P.(b).U. v materiyalakh i dokumentakh*, p. 660.

by the co-operatives, the *Prosvita*<sup>1</sup> clubs, etc., are yearning for the restoration of the bourgeois government in Ukraine, it should also develop the Ukrainian Socialist Workers' and Peasants' statehood, spreading Ukrainian Socialist culture in the villages, and attracting the services of the better elements from among the Ukrainian intelligentsia, those who wish to serve honestly the Ukrainian Workers' and Peasants' regime",<sup>2</sup>

Preferring not to incite an even greater opposition in Ukraine, Moscow thus offered an opportunity for the Ukrainian intelligentsia to capitulate, by extending a vague promise of a "Ukrainian Workers' and Peasants' statehood", while at the same time asserting its determination to combat Ukrainian nationalism.

The struggle against Ukrainian "Kulak banditry" and Nationalism was also discussed at the Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the C.P.(b).U. on February 24th, 1921, at which the Chief of the Cheka, Dzerzhinskiy, was present. During the intensified struggle against the insurgents between January and March, 1921, the Cheka and the Red Army forces under Frunze had (according to a Soviet historian) carried out 87 active operations. 17 *otamany* and 4,225 "bandits" were arrested; 80 *otamany* and 4,936 "bandits" were killed during the fighting; 28 underground organizations of insurgents were discovered; 27 *otamany* and 3,794 "bandits" took advantage of the amnesty.<sup>3</sup> The Cheka in Ukraine at this time (1920-21) was directed by Marshchev, V. Balyts'kyi and Yevdokimov. Naturally, not all of the insurgent *otamany* were conscious Ukrainian Nationalists, but a considerable number of them did use Nationalist slogans in their fight against the Bolsheviks, although it is difficult to determine the exact proportion who did so, in view of the inadequacy of the data available today. The problem of the struggle against "banditry" was also dealt with by the Fifth Congress of Soviets of the Ukrainian S.S.R. held in February, 1921, which announced an amnesty for all insurgents if they surrendered by April 15th.

The widespread resistance of the peasantry, not only in Ukraine, but also in other Soviet Republics (e. g. Antonov's rising in the *gubernia* of Tambov), as well as the growing discontent with the Soviet regime even among the workers (e. g. the disturbances in Kharkiv, the Kronshtadt rising), compelled Lenin to introduce the New Economic Policy, which was announced at the Tenth Congress of the R.C.P.(b). in March, 1921. The Ukrainian Party Conference,

1) The *Prosvita* clubs of popular education were founded in Western Ukraine in 1878, but shortly before the Revolution of 1917, and during the Revolution itself, they spread to Central Ukraine as well. They did a considerable amount of work in spreading literacy, and the knowledge of Ukrainian literature and history among the peasantry.

2) *Istoriya K.P.(b).U. v materiyalakh i dokumentakh*, p. 660.

3) M. M. Popov, *Narys Istoriyi K.P.(b).U.*, Kharkiv, 1931. pp. 248-249.

held in May, 1921, discussed the new situation that arose from the introduction of the N.E.P. The Conference was attended by, among others, the new Party Secretary Manuil's'kyy, who replaced Molotov when the latter was transferred to a more responsible position in Moscow, in February, 1921, and Frunze, who had been appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Red Army in Ukraine and the Crimea in December, 1920, and Deputy Chairman of the Ukrainian Sovnarkom at the beginning of 1921. Against the stubborn opposition of the right wing of the Party, the leadership carried through a Resolution favouring the continuation of the policy of splitting the village by giving privileges to the *Komnezamy* and relying upon them. The Conference verbally confirmed the Nationality policy laid down by the Resolution of December, 1919, but placed the main emphasis on the struggle against Ukrainian Nationalist deviations within the Party. This was stated in the following passage:

"While dealing in a most cautious and tolerant way with the sickly symptoms of National sentiment among the backward Ukrainian masses outside the Party, the Central Committee of the C.P.(b).U. must continue a most uncompromizing struggle against the Nationalist deviations within the Party. Our Party can make compromises with the petty bourgeois peasant masses which are outside it, but it does not do the same with regard to the petty bourgeois opportunist elements which are within the Party. It cannot permit Party organizations to become an arena of the Nationalist conflicts which have occurred outside the Party among the petty bourgeoisie, both Great Russian and Ukrainian. Only by a simultaneous struggle against both the *Russotyapstvo*,<sup>1</sup> and Ukrainian Chauvinism would our Party be able to unite its ranks more closely around the ideal of international Communism and the brotherly solidarity of the workers".<sup>2</sup>

In the spring of 1921, the growing discontent of the Ukrainian peasants towards the Bolshevik regime, especially in the Western *gubernii* (Podolia, Volynia and Kyïv), resulted in a fervent renewal of insurgent activities, and a general turning of sympathies towards Petlyura. Many delegates were sent by the various groups of insurgents to Tarnow in Poland, where the exiled U.N.R. Government had its headquarters. Their reports on the widespread insurgent movement convinced Petlyura and his staff that a general uprising would have some chance of success. The experienced partisan leader, Yurko Tyutyunnyk, was accordingly charged with planning a raid into Ukraine that was to initiate a general anti-Bolshevik uprising. At that time, about 20,000 former soldiers of the Ukrainian Army were

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<sup>1</sup>) A term close in meaning to "Russian Chauvinism". It means a tendency to Russify everything, to regard with contempt the culture of other nationalities, and to obstruct their development.



interned in Polish camps, under difficult conditions. Many of them wished to return to Ukraine to take part in the fighting, rather than to starve in idleness. Secret negotiations were begun with the Poles, and with groups of Russian Whites. Originally, it was planned that four divisions of troops should be organized, but the Polish General Staff was prepared to supply arms for only about 1,000 men, and the delivery of these arms was delayed until well after September 1st, 1921, the date when the raid was originally planned to begin. When at last arms were obtained, and about 900 people, clothed in rags, many barefoot, with one rifle between two, crossed the Polish-Soviet frontiers on November 4th, 1921, the peak of insurgent activity in Ukraine had passed, and the Cheka had managed in the meantime to discover and arrest many of the underground organizations. The newly announced N.E.P. brought about some pacification in the villages. On the other hand, the approach of winter and the bad weather conditions were unpropitious for the success of the raid. Nevertheless, the expedition, under the command of Tyutyunnyk, penetrated deep into northern Ukraine, capturing, for a few hours, the town of Korosten in the neighbourhood of Kyïv, but failing to supply themselves with either clothes or arms from the enemy. Severe winter conditions, long retreats, and constant pursuit by the Soviet cavalry quickly exhausted the insurgents, and brought about their rout on November 17th, 1921, when very few of them escaped. 359 of the captured were summarily tried and sentenced to be shot, and were buried in a mass grave near Bazar, a little town in Volynia, on November 21st, 1921.

This disastrous raid was the last attempt of the Petlyurists to regain their lost footing in Ukraine. The reasons for its failure were, timing, the exhaustion of the Ukrainian countryside after incessant privations, and its growing apathy. Perhaps the latest moment when an uprising might have had some success was the previous summer. Much had happened since the spring to make such an enterprise doomed to failure. The announced abolition of *prodrazverstka*, and the introduction of a measure of free trade in grain made the Soviet policy towards the peasants less oppressive, and thus reduced the intensity of the discontent. At the same time, energetic measures were taken to repress the insurgents and their sympathizers, and the improved efficiency of the Cheka began to pay dividends. Insufficient precautions taken by Tyutyunnyk in his preparations for the raid enabled the Soviet counter-intelligence to learn all about the underground organizations in Ukraine, and to uncover them and wipe them out. Thus, at the end of July the Kyïv *Gubcheka* had discovered and arrested the members of the so-called All-Ukrainian Insurgent Committee (Vseukraïns'kyi Povstankom).<sup>1</sup> Some of its members

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1) *Pravda*, September 14th, 1922. "Seriya petlyurovskikh protsessov".

escaped arrest and tried to rebuild the organization under the name of "The Cossack Council of Right-Bank Ukraine", and aimed at unifying the insurgent units operating in the *gubernii* of Kyïv, Podolia, Volynia, Odessa, and Mykolaïv (Nikolayev). The All-Ukrainian Insurgent Committee had its headquarters in Kyïv, and maintained contact with Petlyura. By the middle of August, with the help of *agents provocateurs*, all this elaborate underground organization had been smashed, hundreds of people arrested, and those who escaped arrest immobilized for some time. Tyutyunnyk's plan to coordinate an incursion from outside with the sabotage from within of railways and Red Army lines of communication in Right-Bank Ukraine thus could not be carried out.

During 1921, Frunze, who was in command of Soviet troops in Ukraine and the Crimea, applied effective methods for combating the partisans. Besides the Army units, the Party, the Komsomol, and the members of the Committees of Unprosperous Peasants were mobilized. The psychological approach was also very important. In March, 1921, the 5th Congress of Soviets of Ukraine proclaimed an amnesty to those insurgents who would surrender. In May,<sup>1</sup> one of the first show trials was held in Kyïv. Its purpose was to discredit the former leaders of the Ukrainian Socialist Revolutionary Party, the party which had once enjoyed the widest following among the peasantry, and which, together with the smaller Socialist Democratic Party, had led the struggle for independence. The accused were former members of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Socialist Revolutionary Party (belonging to its right wing, known as the "Centre", in distinction from the Borot'bisty, who originally formed its left wing). They included N. Petrenko, the President of the Central Committee; V. Holubovych, the former Ukrainian Premier, of the period of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk; and also Lyzaniv's'kyy and I. Chasnyk. They were not directly connected with the underground movement, and had declared their loyalty to the Soviet regime, but they had attempted to make their Party legal, and were arrested during the negotiations in October, 1920.

The trial was so arranged as to represent the Ukrainian Independence movement as a series of machinations directed against the well-being of the workers and peasants. During the pre-trial investigations, a Soviet report states, "the accused used to fulminate and object to the accusations, protesting the 'savage lawlessness of the Bolsheviks who, out of their Party spite, were persecuting a Socialist Party'", during the trial itself, they behaved moderately, and admitted certain "mistakes and misunderstandings committed in the

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1) From May 22nd — May 31st, 1921.

past".<sup>1</sup> Although the sentences were comparatively light, and some of the accused were even freed, the very admission of guilt and the statements of repentance by the former leaders of the foremost Ukrainian Party had a confusing effect on S.R. adherents, whether insurgents or not. It caused consternation and disorientation at the very moment when a strong moral stand was required, if resistance was to continue. A Bolshevik report states: "At the time of the trial, emissaries of various *otamany* roamed in the vicinity of Kyiv, and some of them even tried to penetrate into the courtroom in order to follow the trial. Full capitulation of their "ideological leaders" made a depressing impact on the "practical men" of the highway. Ukrainian village teachers, who were, almost to a man, former S.R.'s were at a loss. The (partisan) bands were left without an ideological bond, and soon began to disintegrate. No other way out was left for the *otamany* but to give up their arms voluntarily".<sup>2</sup>

Among the *otamany* who, under the pressure of defeat, gave themselves up, was the well-known Mordalevych, on whose assistance Petlyura had laid great hopes, and who figured prominently in the trial of the S.R. leaders, who were accused of having maintained contact with him. A Soviet source states that during 1921 about 10,000 members of partisan bands made use of this amnesty.<sup>3</sup> Under these conditions of ideological disorientation, it was easy for the G.P.U. to infiltrate its agents into those underground organizations which still continued to defy the regime. Thus, for instance, at the trial of the so-called "First Insurgent Area", which extended over several districts of the Ielisivet (Elisavetgrad) region, held in September, 1922, it was revealed that, in December 1921, G.P.U. agents had infiltrated into the organization which had existed since 1920 and which was under the leadership of a certain Nesterenko-Orel. These agents carried on secret investigations for eight months. In the middle of July, 1922, 200 people, connected in one way or another with the organization, were arrested.<sup>4</sup> During the winter of 1921-1922, similar investigations on a much larger scale were carried out in connection with the so-called "Cossack Rada", and the "8th Insurgent Area". In March, 1922, hundreds of people suspected of contact with these organizations were arrested, and mass trials were held at the end of August. The Communique issued at this time stated: "The Revolutionary Tribunal found that the Rada aimed at an armed uprising directed against the Ukrainian S.S.R., and acted with the help of the Insurgent General Staff of Petlyura and Tyutyunnyk, as well as of the Intelligence Department of the Polish Sixth Army". The Rada, whose centre was in Bila Tserkva near Kyiv, organized detachments of insurgents on two "Fronts", the Southern,

1) *Pravda*, June 4th, 1922. "Itogi protsessy ukrainskikh eserov".

2) *Ibid.*

3) Lykholat, *op. cit.*, p. 593.

4) *Pravda*, September 14th, 1922.

under the command of Bessarabenko, and the Northern under Fedortsiv-Shamulenko. Members of the Rađa included Hayduchenko, Mykola Lozovyk, Mykhailo Simak, L. Vynokuriv, and others. After a two-days' hearing, 48 of the accused were sentenced to death by shooting.<sup>1</sup> The trial of the members of the "Eighth Insurgent Area" followed immediately afterwards. The activity of this organization was said to have extended over six districts of the Kyiv *gubernia*. Its leader, Lt. Yakubovych, had been sent to Ukraine by Tyutyunnyk, and had worked in close contact with Petlyura's emissary, Karyy-Yavors'kyy. Eighty eight of the accused were sentenced to death by shooting, 27 to forced labour for up to five years, and 23 were freed.

There was also a trial in Kyiv of 16 people accused of being members of the so-called "Petlyurist counter-intelligence" which was allegedly headed by Col. Alekseyev, who had arrived from Poland with Tyutyunnyk's mandate. Similar trials of underground organizations took place in other *gubernii*, including the *gubernia* of Kharkiv.

In the middle of September, 1922, the Soviet Press announced that "the last nest of the bandits" had been destroyed. (It was referring to the action taken against the insurgents of the Kholodnyy Yar near Kremenchug). Thus, by the end of the summer of 1922, all major insurgent areas had been cleaned up by the Red Army and the G.P.U., although small groups continued to operate for many years.

One of the many insurgent detachments which continued to exist during 1922 was that under the command of *Otaman* Hal'chevs'kyy. About 65 men strong, it operated from January, 1921, until September, 1922, in the Vinnytsya region of Podolia, fighting against Russian domination and Communism, under the slogans of Ukrainian independence. They made frequent attacks on Communist officials and Red Army garrisons in the small towns and villages of Podolia, killed the prominent Communists and burned down their local Headquarters. In retaliation, the Cheka and Red Army troops terrorized the local population, arrested and shot many hostages; there were numerous cases of violence and torture.

Hal'chevs'kyy, in his statement, issued after he crossed the border into Poland in September, 1922, in order to refute the charges laid against him by O. Shums'kyy, the then Soviet Ukrainian plenipotentiary in Poland, accusing him of "criminal banditry", recounted his exploits in detail. He stated, among other things, that four members of his family had been shot by the Communists, in reprisal for his anti-Communist activities. Likewise, many other members of his unit had suffered similar family losses at the hands of the Communists. He gave examples of the shootings which had taken place in the villages of Ukraine as Communist reprisals for the help and support

<sup>1</sup>) *Pravda*, September 1st, 1922. "Delo kazachey rady pravoberezhnoy Ukraïny'."

given to the insurgents. Thus, according to him, in the village of Lityntsi, 25 people were executed in July, 1922. In the *volost'* (rural district) of Bahrynivtsi alone the Communists killed: in the village of Bahrynivtsi — 40 people in 1921 and 11 people in 1922; in the village of Lozni — 10 people; in Verb. Maydan — 7 people; in Sakhny — 7 people. About 150 people had been arrested in the latter three villages. Hal'chevs'kyy estimated that in the course of numerous skirmishes, his men had killed in all, about 1,000 Communists. This number included Sokolov, the chief of the Cheka of the *gubernia* of Podolia; the Chairman of the *gubernia* executive committee; Sedukov, the special plenipotentiary in charge of the struggle against "banditry" in the *gubernia* of Podolia; and a number of Russian Red Army Commanders, troops, Communist secret agents, spies, Party representatives, etc.

Although these number may be exaggerated, the fact remains that the struggle was characterized by great ruthlessness on both sides. Hal'chevs'kyy also stated that the Bolsheviks regarded almost all peasants as actual or potential "bandits", and applied the most extreme measures to impose their regime on the unwilling population. He refuted the accusation that his "band" had engaged in robberies and anti-Jewish pogroms. He stated that he took only as much food and equipment as was necessary to maintain his unit in fighting order, and that they did no harm to the peaceful Jewish population.<sup>1</sup>

#### 10. Bolshevik Suppression of the Ukrainian Peasants' Revolt and the Famine (1921-1923).

Owing to a prolonged drought, by August, 1921, it was certain that there was a complete failure of the harvest in Southern Ukraine. As a result of World I and the Civil War which followed in its wake, and also owing to the Bolshevik policies of Militant Communism, there had already been a serious decline in the agriculture of Ukraine. By 1920, the area under cultivation was 15% less than before the War, and the yields had declined by 38.5%, as compared with 1913. In the five southern *gubernii* of Ukraine which were most affected by the drought, the total crop in 1921 amounted only to 7.7 million centners, or 10% of the average pre-war figure.<sup>2</sup> In other *gubernii* the yield was only one-third of the pre-war average, and the total grain crop in Ukraine in 1921 was only 45 mil. centners, or 25% of the pre-war figure.<sup>3</sup> Owing to the lack of seed-corn in autumn, 1921, and spring,

1) From a manuscript copy of Shums'kyy's note to Narutowicz, the Polish Foreign Minister, dated September, 1922, and of Hal'chevs'kyy's "open letter" of September, 30th, 1922 (43 pages).

2) *Ocherki razvitiya narodnogo khozyaystva Ukrainskoy SSR*, p. 225.

3) *Ibid.*

1922, and the death of 50% of the draught animals owing to lack of fodder, the area under cultivation and the yields in 1922 were again far below average. Thus the famine which had devastated Southern Ukraine in the winter of 1921-1922 reoccurred in 1922-1923.

The Ukrainian nationalist and emigré camp has often accused Moscow that its Nationality policy, unfriendly towards Ukrainian "separatism", was responsible for the failure to take adequate measures to limit the disastrous extent of the famine.<sup>1</sup> By allowing the famine to develop, and by hindering relief work from abroad, the Bolsheviks, it is alleged, were able to strike a blow at the armed resistance of the Ukrainian peasantry. The Bolshevik writers place the blame for the famine on the Civil war and on natural causes. Whatever the truth of the matter, it remains an indisputable fact that the tragedy in Ukraine, in which approximately 2,000,000 people perished, was overshadowed by the famine in the Volga provinces which affected an even greater number of people, and that the Bolshevik State gave top priority to the relief work being done in that area, which was, incidentally, inhabited predominantly by Russians. Already in May, 1921, the Soviet Press was sounding the alarm about the dangerous situation in these areas and a widespread campaign was launched for the organization of assistance. The outside world, i. e. workers' organizations, Governments, Churches and the League of Nations, was alerted, and their help was welcomed in the Volga regions. With Ukraine, however, the case was different. Nothing in the Soviet press suggested that there might be a threat of famine and the need for assistance in Ukraine. The letter of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(b). to all its Branches about help for the starving,<sup>2</sup> as well as the issue of *Pravda* for July 23rd, 1921, which was entirely devoted to the problem of fighting the famine, did not mention Ukraine. It is true that in the northern *gubernii* of Ukraine, the harvest was comparatively satisfactory, but in the South, the situation was ominous. The Soviet Ukrainian Government was concerned with fulfilling the grain delivery tasks allotted by Moscow, and did not heed the danger signals from below. Thus, the Commissar for Food, Vladimirov, speaking in Kharkiv (July, 1921), stated that the grain collection campaign showed "considerable results" and that "more than 70 mil. poods of foodstuffs... had been collected" (*Pravda*, July 27th, 1921). Moscow pressed the Ukrainian Government to fulfil the delivery quota, which had been set at 117 mil. poods, of which 60 mil. had to be delivered to the R.S.F.S.R., this figure amounting to 25% of the annual plan of food supply to the R.S.F.S.R.<sup>3</sup>

1) As, e. g. Ivan Herasymovych in his book *Holod na Ukraïni*. (The Famine in Ukraine), Berlin, 1922.

2) Published in *Pravda*, July 21st, 1921.

3) *Pravda*, August 30th, 1921. Khalatov, "Ukrainskiy khleb i Donbas".

Grain purchasing agencies from the R.S.F.S.R. were permitted to operate freely in northern Ukraine, where they bought up all surplus grain for Russia.<sup>1</sup> In addition, Ukraine was burdened with the task of feeding and supplying with seed-corn certain Russian provinces on the lower Volga and in the Urals. Large numbers of refugees from those areas, particularly children, were moved to Ukraine, where their presence aggravated the food situation.

The failure of the harvest and the widespread famine affected the *gubernii* of Zaporizhya, Katerynoslav, Odessa, and Mykolayiv (Nikolaev), as well as parts of the *gubernii* of Kremenchug, Poltava, and Kharkiv, but the requisitioning of grain was still carried on in these areas. The crisis in Southern Ukraine was not admitted until the end of 1921, by which time it was already too late to organize any effective help.

As late as the middle of September, 1921, Commissar Vladimirov declared confidently: "The progress of the food tax collection campaign in Right-Bank Ukraine (with the exception of the *gubernia* of Odessa, where the scheme is only just getting into full swing, and the *gubernia* of Nikolaev, where the situation is very bad), permits us to hope that this year we shall be able not only to plan and carry out a strict plan of production for the first time, but also to stage a considerable recovery of our economic life"<sup>2</sup>. And although the head of the Government, Rakovskiy, found it necessary, a month later, to publish an article on "How to sow, gather, and utilize maize",<sup>3</sup> extolling the value of that crop, no real effort was made to organize the internal resources of Ukraine, or to ask for help from abroad to check the approaching famine. Any collection of foodstuffs for the starving Ukrainian population was actually discouraged because the eyes of the Government were set on fulfilling the Moscow-imposed target for the food-tax collection campaign, and it was thought that the collection of relief for the starving would undermine this food-tax campaign.<sup>4</sup>

By the middle of December, the Soviet Government of Ukraine realized that the famine in Ukraine was a most pressing reality. Manuil's'kyy, the Commissar for Agriculture, stated that "there are no words to convey the completeness of the ruin of Ukrainian agriculture", and Rakovskiy confessed: "Now we have to bow before the invincible reality of recognizing the fact of the famine in Ukraine"<sup>5</sup>. But it was not an easy task to convince the higher authorities

1) *Pravda*, February 12th, 1922. "Pis'mo iz Kiev".

2) *Pravda*, September 25th, 1921. "Na Ukraine. Rezul'taty khlebnnykh Zagotovok".

3) *Pravda*, October 30th, 1921.

4) This is alleged in a "Letter from Kremenchug" published in *Pravda*, May 20th, 1922, in which a local correspondent blames the higher Government organs for this "tactical mistake".

5) *Visti*, Kharkiv, December 16th, 1921.

in Moscow of the impossibility of Ukraine's fulfilling her grain delivery obligations to the R.S.F.S.R., for the attention of the Moscow Government was focussed on the Volga region, and Ukraine was regarded as a grain surplus area. Appeals from local authorities were not heeded. The Mariupil (Mariupol) Famine Relief Committee, appealing for help to the Soviet Government, stated: "It is impossible to obtain any help from the local organs, and the majority of the population is doomed to a cruel death from hunger".<sup>5</sup> Kalinin, while on a visit to Ukraine, appealed in Kyiv for help for the Volga region, but did not mention the fact of the famine in Ukraine.<sup>1</sup> Moscow demanded that Ukraine should fulfil her appointed task of supplying seed-corn to the Volga region.<sup>2</sup> Whereas the American Relief Association, (A.R.A.) was operating in the R.S.F.S.R. from July, 1921, onwards, an agreement to extend its sphere of activities to include Ukraine was delayed until the middle of January, 1922.

This rigid attitude on the part of the Moscow Government finally evoked some mild protests on the part of the Ukrainian Bolsheviks, who, as for example, Petrovs'kyy, the Chairman of the V.U.Ts.I.K., explained that Ukraine must no longer be considered as a country abounding in grain. However, Petrovs'kyy blamed the population itself for the present failure: "The worker and the peasant have cut down productivity and limited it only to their needs. Others, hostile to the regime, joined the bandits, ruined the country, and killed Soviet functionaries. Now they are punished a hundredfold". This theme, that the famine was a punishment for the resistance of the peasants to the Soviet regime, recurred frequently in the press. On the other hand, Petrovs'kyy argued that Ukraine had already delivered to the R.S.F.S.R. more than her proper share, and some consideration ought to be paid to the fact that there was a difficult food situation in Ukraine. "The representative of the American Relief Agency declared (in Zaporizhya) . . . that what he had seen there was even more shattering than the situation in the Volga area. Nevertheless", Petrovs'kyy continued, "in the *gubernii* where the harvest was good, in spite of the shortage of land and the poverty of the peasantry, the Ukrainian *Narkomprod* has collected 60 mil. poods, while the whole of Russia (i. e. the R.S.F.S.R.) has collected only 90 mil. poods". He explained the late awakening to the reality in Ukraine: "The picture of Ukrainian agricultural wealth was extremely exaggerated. On this account, mistakes were made not only in Moscow. This illusion was shared also by us Ukrainians. And only at the end of August, when long strings of peasants appeared from the Donets, Katerynoslav, and Zaporizhya *gubernii* in search of food, did we realize that a great disaster was impending. However,

1) *Byuleten' Tsentral'noy Komissii Pomoshchi Golodayushchim pri V.U.Ts.I.K.* Nos. 5-6, Kharkiv, 1922. Letter of December 29th, 1921.

2) *Pravda*, February 18th, 1922.

3) A reminder was published in *Pravda*, January 25th, 1922.



one must confess that even then there were hopes that some bread had been hidden. Now the situation is quite different".<sup>1</sup> According to the figures of the Famine Relief Committee of Ukraine, quoted by Petrovs'kyi, the number of people suffering from starvation had increased from 2½ millions to 4½ millions between November 5th, 1921, and the end of January, 1922. In spite of appeals from the affected areas, and the suggestions of the Famine Relief Committee of Ukraine, Moscow continued to regard Ukraine as a grain surplus area, and the food-tax collections were continued.

A similar situation to that in Southern Ukraine was prevailing in the Crimea. A correspondent in *Pravda* complains of the lack of understanding in Moscow regarding the difficulties in that region in the following words:

"In May, 1921, they talked about the approaching famine in the Volga provinces. In the middle of July, an intensive Famine Relief campaign was already under way. Not so in the Crimea. Only on February 22nd, 1922, did the Central Statistical Administration agree to admit its mistake and recognize the harvest for the year 1921 as amounting to 500,000 poods instead of 2,300,000; i. e. 3 poods per *desyatina*, whereas, in previous years, the yield in the Crimea was 17 poods per *desyatina*".<sup>2</sup>

The burden of supporting the Russian provinces was lifted from Ukraine only on May 20th, 1922, when Ukraine was already almost completely exhausted, and the maximum of the *prodna-log* had been collected.<sup>3</sup> In the meantime, the Ukrainian peasants had contributed 71 mil. poods of grain as *prodna-log* i. e. 60.7% of the task set, while the entire R.S.F.S.R. (excluding Turkestan) had collected only 118 mil. poods, or 49% of the task.<sup>4</sup> Captain Quisling, the representative of the Nansen mission for Ukraine and the Crimea, wrote that the requisitioning of farm produce in Ukraine had a particularly burdensome character, and that the collection of the tax in kind, as stipulated by the N.E.P., was protracted too long, particularly in view of the famine.<sup>5</sup> A representative of the French Committee for Children's Relief, Professor Etienne Gilson, also testified: "Worst of all, Ukraine was not recognized as a starving country by the Russian Government. Moreover, Russia's habit of regarding Ukraine as an inexhaustible source was so deeply ingrained in the minds of the

1) *Pravda*, February 1st, 1922, "Dyela ukrainskiye"...

2) *Pravda*, April, 5th, 1922.

3) After a report of Vinokurov, Chairman of the Famine Relief Committee, who stated that in 5 *gubernii* in Southern Ukraine, out of a total population of 8 mil., 3.7 mil. people were suffering from starvation. (*Pravda*, May 21st, 1922).

4) *Pravda*, May 24th, 1922.

5) Information Bulletin of the "Comité International de Secours à la Russie". Geneva, April 30th, 1922.

Central Government, that it exported bread from Ukraine to "the starving on the Volga"<sup>1</sup>.

When relief from the West, mostly from the U.S.A., began to arrive in the Black Sea ports, in the beginning of March, 1922, Ukraine received only a very small proportion of it, for the bulk of it was destined for the Volga regions.

In conclusion, it may be stated, that Moscow's policy of extracting food from Ukraine, without due regard for the consequences to her population, led to the aggravation of the famine, which was, moreover, regarded in Moscow as a punishment for the resistance offered by the peasantry.

### CHAPTER III.

#### THE CREATION OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE EARLY PHASE OF THE "UKRAINIZATION" POLICY (1923-1925).

##### 1. The Role of the Ukrainian Communists in the Preparation for the Formation of the Soviet Union.

Having emerged victorious, though ruined, from the Revolution and the Civil War, Soviet Russia needed to mobilize all her strength and resources to keep her position in a hostile world, and to prepare herself for the great cataclysms which, Lenin had prophesied, would result from the clash between the Socialist and Capitalist camps. An immediate problem was that of centralism and Nationalism. Many of the Russian Bolsheviks (who held dominant positions in all the Soviet Republics), openly expressed their uneasiness at having to act the part of supporters of fictitious National Republics, after the tactical need for their existence had passed; and they demanded the restoration of what they regarded as the "normal" situation, namely, the inclusion of these border areas in the R.S.F.S.R. This opinion was also shared by some of the leaders, e. g. Zinoviev, Larin and others. Lenin himself was well aware of National susceptibilities, and his approach, therefore, was rather cautious. Stalin, who as Commissar for Nationalities, was directly responsible for the implementation of the Party's Nationality policy, was charged with a self-contradictory task. On the one hand, he had to safeguard the rights of the non-Russian peoples to a measure of autonomy, and, on the other hand, as a good Communist, and, since February 1922, as General Secretary of the Party, to ensure their fullest possible subordination to the central Russian authority. He solved this dilemma by formal concessions to autonomy, while safeguarding, in fact, the basic principles of subordination.

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<sup>1</sup>) *Ibid.*

The restoration of the unity of what had been pre-Revolutionary Tsarist Russia (though deprived of Poland, the Baltic States and Finland), entered its last phase when, after the reconquest of Georgia (March 1921), the Transcaucasian Federation was imposed by Moscow on March 12th, 1922. In the meantime, on February 22nd, 1922, a protocol had been signed by the governing bodies of all the existing Soviet Republics, entrusting their diplomatic representation at the forthcoming Conference of Genoa to the delegates of the R.S.F.S.R. Thus all pretence to the "independence" of the National Republics was dropped, and unity with regard to foreign affairs was at last formally sealed.

The economic chaos and the famine was then at its peak, and the Ukrainian Communist leaders may have realized that the Ukrainian economic system was at a disadvantage because of the vagueness of relations between Ukraine and Russia, so that Moscow could interfere or disclaim all responsibility for the conduct of Ukrainian affairs, as it suited her at any particular moment. This may have prompted the February 1922 Plenum of the Central Committee of the C.P.(b)U., in their expression of the desire for a closer bond between Ukraine and Russia, as well as for the definition of the State relationship between Ukraine and Russia. A Commission, headed by Stalin, was then appointed by the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(b). to work out proposals. The C.P.(b)U. was represented in the Commission by Frunze, Manuil's'kyy, and others. The Commission's proposals, approved at the end of July by the Central Committees of the R.C.P.(b). and the C.P.(b)U., defined the scope and competence of the Commissariats of Food, Finance, Foreign Trade, Foreign Affairs, Justice, G.P.U., and the administration of the Co-operative associations.

In the meantime, one after another, Bolshevik organs of other Soviet Republics had expressed their desire to regulate their relations with the R.S.F.S.R., so that in August 1922 a Special Commission of the Representatives of the Central Committees of the Communist Party branches in all the Republics was set up in order to elaborate the project of unification. Lenin being ill, the Commission was headed by Stalin, who secured the acceptance of a project of his own. This scheme, known as "autonomization", envisaged the incorporation of the hitherto "independent" Republics into the R.S.F.S.R., as autonomous Republics. This was regarded by the non-Russian Communists as involving the surrender of the sovereign rights of the non-Russian Republics, which they had won during the Revolution, in favour of Russia, and was therefore opposed by them. Lenin saw the danger of such a solution, which would, from the point of view of propaganda, lay the Bolsheviks open to the charge of restoring the Russian Empire. He criticised it, therefore, in his letter to the Politburo, dated September 27th, 1922, and suggested a more subtle form of unifica-

tion, namely, that of a formally voluntary federation of all Soviet Republics on a basis of equal partnership, to form a Union of Soviet Republics. "We consider ourselves [i. e. the R.S.F.S.R. — W. M.] to be of equal status with the Ukrainian S.S.R. and the other Republics, and together with and equally with them, we enter into a new union, into a new federation".<sup>1</sup>

Lenin's project was a compromise plan, suggesting that the unified State should have a federative form. Stalin's project was revised on the lines indicated by Lenin, and an appropriate resolution was accepted by the Central Committee on October 6th, 1922. The controversy, however, did not end there, for there were still many details to be settled before the fears of the "nationals" would be alleviated, and the centralist demands satisfied. In the middle of October, a campaign was begun, that was designed to swing public opinion in favour of the project. At a session of the Ukrainian Ts.I.K., Kviring, now Party Secretary for the Donets area, made a declaration "on behalf of the *gubernii* of Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Donets", demanding that the authorities should "define clearly and fully the relations between the Soviet Republics . . . which ought to consist of a genuine unification of all our resources in every field against our common enemy".<sup>2</sup> Rakovskiy, replying on behalf of the Sovnarkom of Ukraine, stressed that "Undoubtedly, we ought to have a common front in our internal policy. In our foreign policy we ought to cement our Republic even more . . . In matters of organization, there ought to be a genuine union between us, genuine common organs for dealing with economic affairs and questions of concessions, as well as foreign policy. But these will not be organs of Russia, of Ukraine, nor of Georgia. These organs will be organs of the Soviet Socialist Union, which will express the will of the entire Federation. The Communist Party will not be so stupid and crude as to try to interrupt the chain of historical development by declaring that these Republics do not exist, that they have been miraculously transformed into Russia"<sup>3</sup>.

The play on the word "genuine" was meant both as a warning to the Russian "chauvinists" and as a reassurance to the sceptical Ukrainian "nationalists", who were clamouring that an end had now been put to any form of Ukrainian independence, however unreal. The resolution of the V.U.Ts.I.K. stressed the full equality of the Republics participating in the Treaty, the fully voluntary nature of the union, and the necessity of entering into negotiations with the Governments of other Republics about the formation of Federal organs, both legislative and executive, especially organs directing

1) V. I. Lenin. *O nats. i nats.-kolonial'nom voprose*, p. 592.

2) *Pravda*, October 21st, 1922.

3) *Pravda*, October 21st, 1922.

foreign policy and foreign trade.<sup>1</sup> In an interview with the Moscow correspondent of *Pravda* in the middle of November,<sup>2</sup> Rakovskiy outlined his proposals for the form of the federation.

"It seems to me that, if the federal organs are to be authoritative, they must be distinct from the Russian central institutions. As regards the unified Commissariats, these must be, first of all, the Commissariats for War, Foreign Affairs, and Foreign Trade. Independent representation abroad of the separate Soviet Republics ought to be abolished. Instead, plenipotentiaries of all members of the Union should be delegated to single federal diplomatic missions. The same with trade delegations. Here, naturally, operational commercial autonomy is not excluded, but the first essential is a single plan and general supervision. In some Republics, there may be no separate Commissariat for postal services and railways. People's Commissariats for Financial Affairs in the separate Republics ought to have powers of drawing up their budgets, although the general federal supervision and federal policies on budgets and taxation would have to be safeguard. Industry and food supplies would come under a unified system of planning, but with safeguards for the local autonomy. Other Commissariats would be absolutely independent"<sup>3</sup>.

Although, on the surface, Rakovskiy's proposals did not differ substantially from those outlined by Stalin in an interview published in *Pravda* two days later, there were certain signs that they implied different things. While Rakovskiy and his Ukrainian Communists were constantly stressing the need "to regulate relations between the Soviet Republics", and to safeguard their rights in the future federation, Stalin kept silence over these matters, and talked only of "unification". There were minor points of difference, for example, Rakovskiy did not include the Commissariats for Post and for Railways unconditionally among the federal commissariats, nor the Commissariats for Labour and Inspection among the "supervision" Commissariats. Also, his plan differed from that of Stalin in the matter of the suggestion of including plenipotentiaries of the Republics of the Union in the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, as well as in his insistence on the budgetary rights of the Republics.

Rakovskiy, though not himself of Ukrainian origin, saw a chance of checking the growing centralism of Moscow by insisting on certain safeguards for the rights of the Republics.<sup>4</sup> In the Declaration of the 7th All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets, which was opened on December 10th, 1922, it was noted that Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was to safeguard "the independence of national cultural

1) *Pravda*, October 21st, 1922.

2) *Pravda*, November 16th, 1922.

3) *Pravda*, November 16th, 1922.

4) O. Yurchenko. "Do pytannya sovyetyzatsiyi natsional'nykh respublik S.S.S.R." *Ukrayins'kyi Zbirnyk*. Vol. 1 p. 65, Munich, 1955.

development, and give the necessary guarantees for the expression of the economic initiative of every member of the Union".<sup>1</sup>

As a result of good Party discipline, the Congress passed the necessary declaration about the formation of the Soviet Union. After the Congresses of the other Republics had done the same, the Congress of the R.S.F.S.R. was transformed into an All-Union Congress, which opened on December 30th, 1922 and, after hearing Stalin's report, accepted the famous Declaration and Treaty concerning the formation of the U.S.S.R. A new Central Executive Committee was elected for the U.S.S.R., but the Constitution had yet to be elaborated in detail. Certain differences of opinion concerning the Constitution were already apparent, as, for example, the matter of the projected second Chamber, which was to consist of equal numbers of representatives from the different nationalities of the Union. This project was, at first, rejected by Stalin.<sup>2</sup> By April 1923, however, the Central Committee, including Stalin, had been converted to the view that a Second Chamber was necessary. Frunze, reporting this decision to the members of the Ukrainian Ts.I.K., added that "the Ukrainian Government has worked out a number of essential amendments to the project". In the discussion, the Ukrainian Communist, Porayko,<sup>3</sup> criticised the practice by which the Commissariats of the R.S.F.S.R. fulfilled, at the same time, the functions of Commissariats of the Union. Blakytyny<sup>4</sup> hinted at doubts as to the practicability of the Second Chamber, because it was apparent that, according to the terms of the project, the R.S.F.S.R. would have a majority in the Second Chamber as well as in the first. While Deputies to the First Chamber were to be elected in proportion to the population, those to the Second Chamber were to be sent in equal numbers from every Republic, including the "autonomous" Republics directly subordinated to the R.S.F.S.R. Thus the deputies from Ukraine, Byelorussia, and Transcaucasia would be in a small minority compared with the Delegates from the R.S.F.S.R.

The delegate from the *gubernia* of Volynia, Dubrovyy, reported that among the peasants in the border districts, "agents of the Entente" were causing disquiet by suggesting that in joining the U.S.S.R., Ukraine would lose her independence. "The peasantry is showing keen interest in this matter. Of course, they give no credit to these sinister agitators. We know that the interests of Ukraine will be safeguarded in the future Union in the best manner", he assured himself. In reply, Frunze said that "The Ukrainian Government

1) *Obrazovaniye S.S.S.R.*, Sbornik dokumentov pod redaktsiyey Genkinoy. Moscow, 1949, p. 299-300.

2) *Pravda*, November 18th, 1922.

3) The former Commander-in-Chief of the Galician Ukrainian Red Army.

4) At the time, Editor-in-chief of the principal Ukrainian language newspaper, *Visti V.U.Ts.V.K.*, published in Kharkiv.

defends the viewpoint of the parity of all the Republics", and that "Quite consciously we proceed in the direction of curtailing the rights of the formerly imperialist Russian nation, and increasing the rights of the other nations".<sup>1</sup> This was in the period before the 12th Party Conference, at which a completely new departure in the National question was to be made. Resolutions approving the inclusion of the National question on the agenda of the Congress, and asking for its early solution, were, for example, adopted by the meeting of the Kyiv *gubernia* Party organization in the middle of March, when the argument was put forward that "Chauvinist tendencies" still persisted in the Kyiv *gubernia* because there still remained certain things for them to feed on. The culmination of these meetings was the 7th Conference of the C.P.(b).U. which met in Kharkiv, between April 4th-10th, 1923. In his speech on the National question, Frunze stated that "The immediate reason for placing the National question on the agenda has been the need to consider the Constitution of the U.S.S.R."<sup>2</sup> It can be supposed, therefore, that the famous Ukrainian counter-project, advocating the creation of something like a confederation of States, rather than a one-state federation, was elaborated during, or as a result of this Conference of the C.P.(b).U.<sup>3</sup>

The counter-project was submitted by the Representatives of the Central Committee of the C.P.(b).U., Rakovskiy and Skrypnyk, to a special Commission of the plenum of the Central Committee in Moscow.<sup>4</sup> The authors of the "Ukrainian counter-project" crossed out from Stalin's official project the phrase that the Republics should "unite into one federal State" substituting instead that they should "form a Union of Socialist Republics". They also proposed that the Commissariat of Foreign Trade be transferred from the category of "unified" Commissariats to the category of "supervision" Commissariats. Another change was the elimination of the phrase that the Presidium of the Ts.I.K. was "the bearer of supreme power in the intervals between the sessions". They suggested the division of the powers of the Presidium of the Ts.I.K. between the Presidia of both Chambers. i. e. also that of the Nationalities.<sup>5</sup> In addition, the authors of the "Ukrainian counter-project" objected to the term "Constitution" of the U.S.S.R., and wished to call its legal basis a "Treaty".<sup>6</sup>

1) *Pravda*, April 13th, 1923.

2) *Pravda*, April 13th, 1923.

3) See Stalin's speech at the 4th Consultation of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(b). with the responsible workers of the National Republics and regions, June 12th, 1923, in I. Stalin, *Sochineniya*, p. 335-336, Moscow, 1947.

4) This Commission had been created at the end of February, 1923, and was charged with the elaboration of practical proposals concerning the Constitution of the U.S.S.R.

5) I. V. Stalin, *Sochineniya*, pp. 340-341.

6) Yurchenko, *op. cit.*, p. 65.

These proposals were rejected by the Commission, of which Stalin was Chairman, but the differences between the Politburo of the R.C.P.(b), and that of the C.P.(b).U, continued. There is some reason to suppose that, at this time, there was no unity within the Ukrainian Politburo,<sup>1</sup> but it appears that the Ukrainian "confederative" line managed to obtain a majority, although the Ukrainians there were in a minority.

With the formation of the Soviet Union, a new, more liberal policy towards the nationalities, especially in cultural matters, was inaugurated by the 12th Party Congress, which was held between April 17th-25th, 1923. As early as December 1922, there had been faint signs that something of this nature was contemplated. In the latter stages of the preparations for the creation of the U.S.S.R., the safeguarding of national rights was often mentioned. In Stalin's project of the resolution concerning the unification of the Soviet Republics,<sup>2</sup> a proviso is included, urging that there should be, in the elaboration of the draft of the federal treaty, "full safeguarding of the interests of the national development of the peoples of the Republics participating in the Treaty". Preparations for the new shift in Nationality policy became apparent soon after the Treaty of Union was accepted. In January, the problem of the reorganization of the *Narkomnats* was discussed. On February 21st, 1923, the project of the "theses" to be submitted to the 12th Party Congress was discussed at the plenum of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(b). On March 22nd, the "theses" were approved by the Politburo, and were published soon afterwards. The key statement of the "theses" was that... "a decisive struggle against the survivals of Great Russian Chauvinism is the foremost task of our Party"<sup>3</sup>. The necessity of a Second Chamber in the supreme organ of the U.S.S.R. was admitted, as was also the necessity that "the Commissariats of the Union be constructed on principles that safeguard the satisfaction of the needs and requirements of the peoples of the Union", and that "the organs of the National Republics and regions be formed largely from local people, who know the language, life, customs and habits of the respective peoples"<sup>4</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup>) At the 4th Consultation, Stalin hinted that Manuils'kyy followed the "Centralist" line, in opposition to Skrypnyk and Rakovskiy.

<sup>2</sup>) See his speech at the 10th All-Russian Congress of Soviets, December 26th, 1922. (I. V. Stalin, *Sochineniya*, pp. 153-154).

<sup>3</sup>) *ibid*, p. 187.

<sup>4</sup>) *ibid*, p. 191.



## 2. The 7th Conference of the C.P.(b).U. and the defeat of the so-called "Theory of the Struggle of Two Cultures".

The "Theory of the Struggle of Two Cultures" was the name given to the view, held by most Russian Communists, that the peasant culture of the Ukrainians was inferior to the proletarian culture *par excellence* of the Russians, and that therefore, in the last reckoning, former would succumb to the latter. From this point of view, it was only necessary to leave the outcome of the struggle of these two cultures to time. Any attempt to shield Ukrainian cultural life from Russianizing influences, and to try deliberately to develop it to meet the requirements of modern life was regarded as out of place. This "Theory" was but a modified version of the "Nihilism" towards the national question preached by Rosa Luxemburg and Pyatakov, which, earlier, especially at the Party Congress of 1919, had also been supported by Bukharin and Rakovskiy,<sup>1</sup> who, however, later modified their views. Similar ideas were expressed by Zinovyev, at the 5th Conference of the C.P.(b).U., in November, 1920.

One of the most outspoken exponents of this theory was a Secretary of the Central Committee of the C.P.(b)U., D.Z. Lebed'. His speech at the Kyiv Regional Party Conference (at which the "theses" for the forthcoming 12th Congress of the R.C.P.(b). were discussed), was published in the Kharkiv periodical, *Kommunist*.<sup>2</sup> Its purpose was, evidently, to provide a respectable "platform" for the defenders of Russian predominance in Ukraine against the Ukrainian wing in the C.P.(b).U., in particular against Skrypnyk and Hryn'ko, who received, also, some support and protection from Rakovskiy. Lebed' proposed a "platform" which seemed fair, and which, if accepted, would have watered down the proposals of Skrypnyk and Rakovskiy for the legalization of Ukrainian political and cultural aspirations. Lebed' wrote:

"... We know, theoretically, that the struggle of the two cultures is inevitable. Here, in Ukraine, owing to circumstances of history, urban culture is Russian, peasant culture is Ukrainian. .... To set oneself the task of actively Ukrainizing the Party, and consequently the working class as well... would be, at the present time, a reactionary measure from the point of view of culture, because "nationalization" (i. e. the artificial fostering of the Ukrainian language in the Party and in the working class) under the present conditions

<sup>1</sup>) Speaking at a meeting in Kyiv on February 13th, 1919, Rakovskiy, the head of the Soviet Ukrainian Government, said: "The decreeing of the Ukrainian language as a State language is a reactionary measure. Who stands in need of it? Maybe that improvised intelligentsia and bureaucracy which the "independent" Ukraine was creating?"

(Quoted by V. Vynnychenko, *Vidrodzhennya natsii*, p. 310.)

<sup>2</sup>) *Kommunist*, No. 73, March 27th, 1923. "Nyekotoryye voprosy partiynogo syezda".

of political and cultural relationship between the towns and the countryside, would be tantamount to defending the inferior culture of the village as against the superior culture of the city . . .

"... *As there are times when the peasant demands that his children be taught in Ukraine, and as there are times when it is necessary to go to the village and to explain to the peasants, in a language they can understand, questions which interest them, we are led to the conclusion that our Party should master the Ukrainian language and by its means transmit culture*".<sup>1</sup>

The main clash occurred at the 7th Conference of the C.P.(b).U. Frunze, who delivered the main speech on the National question, based the need for the C.P.(b).U. to learn Ukrainian and make use of it in administration and cultural activities on the necessity for finally defeating "Petlyurism", and for attracting other nations into the Soviet Union. "The final victory over Petlyurism is possible only when we have mastered its main weapon — the Ukrainian language . . . The Union of Soviet Republics, in the longterm view, ought to expand and receive new members. This view will be realized the earlier, and the more completely, the more we are able, in policy and in everyday practice to guarantee the free and unhampered development of every nationality, within the bounds of unitary Soviet whole . . .".<sup>2</sup>

At the plenary session of the conference, Lebed' defended his point of view. He was almost alone in holding the view that "the raising of the national question is ill-timed",<sup>3</sup> but in the committees, blunt statements were made, as, for example, "that Ukraine has played the role of a label and a fiction, that Ukraine ought to be liquidated as a state, etc."<sup>4</sup>. However, with the support of Rakovskiy, Skrypnyk was able, using the authority of Lenin, to carry through a resolution on the national question which went much further than Moscow (particularly Stalin and Zinovyev) thought advisable. Skrypnyk hoped, apparently, that Lenin would be able to address the 12th Party Congress, and would support the view of the Ukrainians and Georgians. But as Lenin could not attend, Stalin was able to quote old statements of Lenin, which paralyzed the effect of his recent pronouncements on which the Ukrainian delegates had based their more far-reaching demands.<sup>5</sup>

However, the net result of the Conference was that the theory of the Struggle of Two Cultures was, for the time being, defeated, and that the way was cleared for a relative freedom for the Ukrainians to continue the development of their culture, though within certain limits.

1) Italics by W. M.

2) *Izvestiya*, April 13th, 1923.

3) *Bud. Rad. Ukr.* p. 163.

4) Mentioned by Skrypnyk, *Statti i promovy*, p. 33.

5) Stalin, *op. cit.* Vol. 5. pp. 268-269.

### 3. The 12th Congress of the R.C.P.(b).

At the 12th Party Congress, which was held in Moscow between April 17th-25th, 1923, Stalin encountered considerable opposition from the "Nationals" (especially from the Ukrainians and Georgians), towards his high-handed treatment of the "peripheries" and his disingenuous balancing of the respective evils of "Great Russian Chauvinism", and "local Nationalism". The point of view of the Ukrainian Communists was put forward by Skrypnyk and Rakovskiy, the latter having now grown accustomed to his role as champion of the Ukrainians.

Before the main National issue came up for discussion, Rakovskiy, in his criticism of Trotsky's report on industrial administration, read an extract from the Resolution of the 7th Conference of the C.P.(b).U. demanding the decentralization of industrial administration to the regional level.

"The experience of the past has shown that attempts to conduct operational direction from one centre for the entire U.S.S.R. have, in view of the poverty of the country and the ossified bureaucratic apparatus, usually produced exactly the opposite effect, i. e. a complete lack of any direction. It follows, therefore, that the question of decentralization demands a speedy and fundamental solution.

"This refers, however, also to those branches of industry, which have All-Union significance, and are under the immediate direction of the Central organs of the Union, for example, coal, iron, sugar, and other branches of heavy industry in Ukraine. The Conference considers it necessary to strengthen the influence of the central organs of Ukraine, both Party and Soviet, regarding the above-mentioned branches of industry in Ukraine".<sup>1</sup>

On April 23rd, Stalin delivered his report on the National question, arguing the necessity of checking the domination of the Russian chauvinist bureaucracy in the national republics. The reasons he gave were opportunist, namely: 1) to impress the peoples of the East with the solution of the National problem in the U.S.S.R. and thus to "revolutionize" them, 2) to win over the non-Great Russian peasantry to the Soviet order and prevent the growth of local nationalism, 3) to counteract the growing Russian nationalist forces, which were thriving on the N.E.P. and wished to restore the "one and indivisible Russia". Stalin accused the "Great-Russian chauvinism" of being the force which hampered unification of the State by provoking local nationalism.

In the discussion of this report, the Georgian and Ukrainian delegates expressed their dissatisfaction with the Party's National policy, and demanded more practical implementation of the Party's promises. Mdivani, the Georgian delegate, like Rakovskiy, fell back

<sup>1</sup>) *Izvestiya*, April 22nd, 1923.

on the terms of the 7th Conference of the C.P.(b).U., stating that: "the National problem cannot be reduced to questions of language and culture and national autonomy. The economic aspect plays the most important role. One ought to start from this, and all the rest will follow".

Hryn'ko, formerly Commissar for Education in Ukraine, stressed that "the success of our Nationality policy depends on whether or not the Party will take into its own hands the initiative and its implementation. It is necessary to overcome a certain centralizing tendency, and to deal more honestly with the national and cultural question".

Skrypnyk chose to criticize the treatment of the 7,000,000 Ukrainians in the R.S.F.S.R., beyond the borders of Ukr.S.S.R. i. e. in the southern parts of the Kursk and Voronezh regions, in the Kuban area, in the *gubernii* of Saratov and Samara, as well as in Siberia, where they were deprived of education in their native language. He criticized the attitude of the Party officials in these areas, who generally refused to consider the cultural needs of Ukrainians. Skrypnyk described the Red Army as an instrument of Russification, and denounced the discrimination against Ukrainians which had resulted in Ukrainians constituting only 4.7% of the delegates to the Congress (though they constituted 20% of the population of the U.S.S.R.). He reproached Manuil's'kyy and Stalin for their late conversion to a new departure in Nationality policy, and expressed his fear that the constant endeavour to balance the condemnation of "Great Russian chauvinism" with a condemnation of "local nationalism" would serve as an excuse for a continued lack of equality in the treatment of the nationalities.

In very sharp words, Skrypnyk accused the Party: "The chauvinist prejudices of the Great Russians, which had been imbibed with their mothers' milk have become instinctive in many a comrade".<sup>1</sup>

Rakovskiy spoke about the indifference to the National question among the Party, "an indifference the more dangerous since it has a Communist veneer", and criticised the attempts of the bureaucratic apparatus to liquidate the autonomy of the republics.

While Yenukidze, Ordzhonikidze, Yakovlyev, Zinovyev and others defended Stalin's position, Bukharin took Rakovskiy's line and demanded that the main attention be paid to the struggle against Great-Russian chauvinism:

"To some extent, the discontent which arises among the peasantry due to our imposing taxes on them... receives a National form and formulation, which is exploited by our enemy... If we make a mistake in the matter of the National question in Ukraine, we thereby give direct help to Petlyurism. Our main task in Ukraine is work

<sup>1</sup>) M. Skrypnyk, *Statti i promovy*, p. 36.

among the Ukrainians. The same holds good for the other peripheries. What is the essence of Leninism in the National question? It consists, in the first place, of the fight against the main form of chauvinism which we have, namely, Great-Russian chauvinism. If Russians permit themselves to take a wrong line, then another nation, e. g. Georgia, will allow itself to adopt a national line".<sup>1</sup>

The 12th Congress also dealt with problems of the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. One of the most important questions which was discussed was the problem of the membership of the proposed Federation of Soviet Republics. In order to increase the role of the non-Russian nationalities in the U.S.S.R., the delegates from the non-Russian Republics, above all from Ukraine, led by Skrypnyk and Rakovskiy, suggested at first that the Russian Federation (R.S.F.S.R.) which included 8 National Autonomous Republics and areas, and the Transcaucasian Federation, which comprised Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, should first be divided into their components, which would then enter as equal partners into the proposed union.<sup>2</sup> This proposal, which had already been opposed by Stalin at the 10th All-Russian Congress of Soviets (held from December 23rd-27th, 1922) was rejected.<sup>3</sup>

Debates on the draft Constitution of the U.S.S.R. continued in the so-called National section of the Congress, where the Ukrainian delegation reiterated its views on the composition of the Second Chamber. On behalf of the delegation, Rakovskiy put forward the argument that the Second Chamber ought to be composed not of representatives of all the nationalities of the Soviet Union, but of the four member-republics, i. e. the R.S.F.S.R., Ukraine, Byelorussia, and Transcaucasia, since, under Stalin's alternative project, out of 360 members of both Chambers of the Ts.I.K. of the U.S.S.R., 280 or more would be delegates of the R.S.F.S.R. which had both the largest population and included a large number of national minorities, and only 80 members would come from the other three Republics. In the Second Chamber, in which, according to Stalin's project, each nationality was to be represented by 4 delegates, the R.S.F.S.R. would have 64 delegates, whereas Ukraine, Byelorussia and Transcaucasia would have only 4 each. Thus the equality of the republics of the U.S.S.R. was jeopardized from the very beginning. Another manoeuvre on the part of the Ukrainian delegation was to introduce an amendment to the "theses", stressing the need, in solving the nationalities' problem, "to look not only to the East, but also to the West". This meant as a warning not to underestimate the effect of the reduction of the status of Ukraine on the western peoples, particularly on the large Ukrainian minorities in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Rumania, at a time when,

<sup>1</sup>) *Izvestiya*, April 25th, 1923.

<sup>2</sup>) Stalin, *Sochineniya*, Vol. 5. pp. 150-151.

<sup>3</sup>) A. Taranov, *Istoriya Konstitutsiyi U.S.S.R.*, Kharkiv, 1957. p. 72.

it was hoped, the apparent equality of the various small nationalities with the major ones would have a favourable effect on the Eastern colonial peoples".<sup>1</sup>

Although Stalin remained adamant over the matter of representation in the Second Chamber, he agreed to a number of amendments in matters of general principle. He could hardly do otherwise in view of the latest letters of Lenin, which were revealed to a close session of heads of national delegations, and whose contents leaked to other delegates.<sup>2</sup> The most important amendments were the following:

1) The condemnation of the "theory" of the inevitability of the victory of Russian culture over the cultures of other nationalities. This "theory" excused indifference and a contemptuous attitude towards the development of the cultures of non-Russian peoples. "In these conditions, the talk about the advantages of Russian culture, and assertions about the inevitability of the victory of the more developed Russian culture over the cultures of the more backward peoples (Ukrainian, Azerbaijanian, Uzbek, Kirghiz, etc.) is nothing but an attempt to strengthen the domination of the Great Russian nationality".<sup>3</sup>

2) The re-assertion of the equality of rights and obligations of the member-republics, and of the permanence of the republics.<sup>4</sup>

3) Certain economic safeguards, especially Point 10 (g): "that Republics be given wide financial and, in particular, budgetary rights, assuring them of the possibility of expressing their own governmental, administrative, cultural and economic initiative."<sup>5</sup>

4) The promise of the formation of national units in the Red Army.<sup>6</sup>

In his report to the Congress on the work of the National section, Stalin spoke against Rakovskiy and Bukharin, who had tried to eliminate the point about the "dangers of local "chauvinism".

Rakovskiy once more submitted to the Congress his proposed amendments concerning the composition of the Second Chamber, and the "orientation towards the West", now allowing the R.S.F.S.R. 2/5 of the votes in the Soviet of Nationalities, but Stalin, in his reply, categorically rejected them, and reaffirmed his "orientation towards the East". "I consider this amendment of cardinal importance. If the Congress accepts it, I must say, the "theses" will be turned upside-down... The Eastern peoples, organically bound up with China and India, and tied to them by language, religion, customs, etc., are of

1) Stalin, *Sochineniya*, Vol. 5. pp. 270-271.

2) "K voprosu o natsional'nostyakh ili ob avtonomizatsii", Lenin, *o nats. i nats.-kolonial'nom voprose*, pp. 546-552.

3) Stalin, *Sochineniya*, vol. 5, p. 271; also V.K.P.(b). *v rezolyutsiyakh*, 6th Edition, Part I, p. 494.

4) Amendments to Points 8 and 9 of the Resolutions, see Stalin, *Sochineniya*, vol. 5, pp. 272-273.

5) *ibid*, Vol. 5, p. 274.

6) *ibid*.

foremost importance to the Revolution. The proper weight of these nationalities is much greater than that of Ukraine.

"If we commit a small error in Ukraine, it will not be greatly felt in the East. But if we make one mistake in a small country like Adzharistan (pop. 120,000) this will have repercussions in Turkey and throughout the entire East, for Turkey is closely tied to the East. Should we make the smallest mistake in connection with the small region of Kalmyks, who have ties with Tibet and China, the repercussions on our work will be far worse than from a mistake with regard to Ukraine".<sup>1</sup>

Needless to say, Rakovskiy's amendment was defeated. However, even so, the Resolutions of the 12th Party Congress fixed a whole of changes in Soviet policy towards the nationalities, which had consequences for Ukraine. The official condemnation of the chauvinist attitude of the Russian bureaucracy towards the political and cultural aspirations of other nationalities, which had expected the Revolution to give them complete social and national liberation, was a step towards a larger measure of equality. The firm assertion of the necessity of maintaining the new national political units, and of assisting their cultural development was an advance on the former widespread "nihilist" attitude.

At the same time, however, the warning against "local nationalism" proved to be a paralyzing instrument, impeding the genuine shaking off Russian predominance in the national republic, particularly in Ukraine, since it could be used at any moment against anyone who became too vocal in pointing out the existing inequalities.

#### **4. "The 4th Consultation of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(b). with the responsible workers of the National Republics and Regions".**

After the 12th Party Congress, the change in the Party line towards the nationalities soon became apparent. In Ukraine, one of the first indications of this change was the appearance of a sizeable magazine dealing with political, cultural, social, and literary affairs, *Chervonyy Shlyakh*, with the former Borot'bist, Hryn'ko, as editor-in-chief. This periodical became an important medium for directing the Ukrainian cultural and national revival into communist-controlled channels.

After the 12th Congress of the R.C.P.(b), during April and May, 1923, the Commissions of the Central Executive Committees (Ts.I.K.'s) of the National Republics worked on the project of the constitution of the U.S.S.R. At the beginning of June, the Ukrainian project of the Constitution was submitted to the augmented Constitutional

<sup>1</sup>) *Ibid.* Vol. 5, pp. 277-278.

Commission of the Presidium of the Ts.I.K. of the U.S.S.R.<sup>1</sup> The principal authors of this project were Skrypnyk and Rakovskiy, and it contained certain proposals which were designed to check the centralizing tendencies in the Constitutional proposals which had been put forward by Stalin, and approved at the 12th Congress of the R.C.P.(b).

Between June 9th-12th, 1923, the so-called "4th Consultation of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(b). with the responsible workers in the National Republics and Regions" was called, in order to deal with the practical measures for implementing the outline decisions agreed upon by the 12th Party Congress, as well as to approve Stalin's projected Constitution.<sup>2</sup> In his report<sup>3</sup> Stalin laid great emphasis on educating the national Party cadres in the republics, and promised that Moscow would no longer interfere directly in the management of local Party cadres, but would endeavour to work through the national Party organizations. "Until very recently, the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(b) usually carried out manoeuvres in the peripheral regions directly, over the heads of the local Communist organizations, sometimes even avoiding those organizations altogether, recruiting all and every kind of more or less loyal national element into the general work of Soviet construction. Now this work will have to be done by the peripheral Party organizations themselves".<sup>4</sup>

Stalin further outlined a programme for integrating non-Russian peoples in the Soviet system by drawing the local intelligentsia into the service of the Soviet State, by making the local languages into languages of administration, education and cultural life, and by developing the local economy. In this report, Ukraine figured as one of the regions most in need of a radical change of Nationality policy.

"The task consists of carrying out this line of a... gradual nationalization of governmental institutions in all National republics and regions, and first of all, in such an important republic as Ukraine".<sup>5</sup>

And again (after speaking about Turkestan in his closing speech): "Ukraine must be considered the second weak spot of the Soviet regime. The situation in the fields of culture, literacy etc. is the same, or almost the same, as in Turkestan. The State apparatus is just as distant from the language and life of the people as in Turkestan. Meanwhile, Ukraine is of as great an importance for the peoples of the West, as Turkestan is for the peoples of the East... To transform her into an exemplary republic, in view of her tremendous importance for the peoples of the West, is an obligatory task".<sup>6</sup>

1) A. P. Tarnov, *op. cit.*, p. 73.

2) See the "Project of the Platform concerning the National question" in Stalin's *Sochineniya*, Vol. 5, pp. 293-300.

3) *ibid.* pp. 313-316.

4) *ibid.* p. 318. 5) *Ibid.* p. 320. 6) *Ibid.* pp. 329-330.



It would appear that since the 12th Party Congress, Stalin had been forced to alter his position slightly, at least in his words, towards "orientation to the West", and to concede that degree of cultural autonomy for Ukraine which he was reluctant to yield in the political sphere. At the same time, he sharply attacked Rakovskiy and Skrypnik on account of their Constitutional proposals:

"It is not true that the question of confederation and federation is a trifling one. Is it an accident that Ukrainian comrades, in considering the well-known project of the Constitution, which was accepted at the Congress of the Union of the Republics, have crossed out from it the phrase stating that the Republics should "unite themselves into a federal State"? Is it an accident, and have they not done it? Why have they crossed out that phrase? Is it an accident that the Ukrainian comrades, in their counter-project have proposed not the amalgamation of the People's Commissariats of Foreign Trade and Foreign Affairs, but their transference to the rank of "supervision" Commissariats? Where is the one federal State, if in every Republic there remain People's Commissariats of Foreign Trade and Foreign Affairs? Is it really an accident that the Ukrainians in their counter-project have reduced the powers of the Central Executive Committee to zero, dividing them between the presidia of two Houses? All these amendments of Rakovskiy have been noted and discussed by the Commission of the Plenum of the Central Committee and rejected. Why, then, repeat them here? I see in this insistence of certain Ukrainian comrades a wish to achieve, in the definition of the nature of the Soviet Union, an intermediate stage between confederation and federation, with more weight on the side of confederation. Meanwhile, however, it is clear that what we are building is not a confederation, but a federation of republics, one federal State, uniting military, foreign, trade and other affairs; a State whose existence does not diminish the sovereignty of any republic".<sup>1</sup>

Though the "Ukrainian comrades" protested that Stalin was trying to recreate the "one and indivisible" Russia, and that they were basing their demands on the decisions of the 12th Party Congress, this availed them nothing.<sup>2</sup>

In the middle of June, the work on the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. was completed, and at its final session of June 16th, 1923, the Constitutional Commission passed a Resolution that the Declaration and the revised text of the Treaty concerning the creation of the U.S.S.R. constituted the Basic Law (Constitution) of the U.S.S.R. After the approval of the draft Constitution by the Ts.I.K's of the Union republics, the Ts.I.K. of the U.S.S.R. approved the Constitu-

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<sup>1</sup>) *Ibid*, pp. 340-341.

<sup>2</sup>) See Stalin's reply to the discussion, *ibid*, pp. 340-341.

tion (July 6th, 1923), and brought it into operation immediately. On January 31st, 1924, the 2nd Congress of Soviets of U.S.S.R. gave the final approval to the Constitution.

### **5. The Inauguration of Ukrainization.**

The 12th Party Congress was a turning point in the Soviet nationality policy. Previously, national movements of the non-Russian peoples of the former tsarist Russian empire had been at best tolerated as necessary evils, which at times might be allies in the struggle against tsarist and the Provisional governments, and later the Whites, but which more often proved obstacles for the unity of the "proletariat and the peasantry" under the leadership of Moscow, and as such showed counter-revolutionary tendencies. Now, however, a bold attempt was made to control them, by championing their less harmful cultural strivings and directing them, in the political sphere, along communist lines. Communist Party organizations in all the national republics and regions were to cement "the alliance between the Russian proletariat and the national peasantry" by adapting themselves to local conditions, i. e. by learning to speak the local languages, by giving more power into the hands of the local Communists, so as to acquire the maximum influence on the masses which were to be led to the communist goal. The N.E.P., a temporary retreat of the Bolsheviks in the economic field, was to have its parallel in the new nationality policy. After the ravages of the Civil War the Soviet State was in need of internal political stability and economic recovery, and no factors were more dangerous to both these aims than the opposition of the peasants to the economic policies of militant Communism, and the resistance of the nationalities to Russian domination. Both of these disruptive forces overlapped in the non-Great Russian border regions, and the Bolshevik oppressive measures against the peasants in these areas were identified with Russian aggression. In Ukraine "banditry", both "Petlyurist" and criminal, was still, in 1923, a factor to be reckoned with; and the presence of a sizeable and irreconcilable Ukrainian Nationalist emigration across the border in Poland, as well as of about 7.5 million indigenous Ukrainians in West Ukraine (which was now divided between Poland, Czechoslovakia and Rumania) could not be overlooked. In fact, the Bolsheviks hoped that the latter could be won for the Soviet cause, if sufficient incentives in the form of National concessions in Ukraine could be provided. No one realized this more than the Ukrainian Bolsheviks themselves, hence their pedantic insistence on formally correct relations between Ukraine and Russia in a federal Soviet Union. Though Stalin was much more interested in the greater prospects of utilizing the anti-colonial national movements in Asia, fostering to this end the national republics of the Central Asiatic peoples to serve as an attraction, he nevertheless let himself be

persuaded that Ukraine, also, should become an "exemplary republic" for the peoples of the West, particularly for those who resented the *status quo* in Central Europe and the Balkans.

To implement the modified nationality policy after the 12th Party Congress, decrees were issued by the Soviet Government of Ukraine promising a number of measures to raise the Ukrainian language from its, in fact, underprivileged position to a favoured position in Ukraine.

On July 27th, 1923, a decree entitled "Concerning the measures for Ukrainization of Educational and Cultural Institutions"<sup>1</sup> was issued supplementing the decree of 1920 "concerning the introduction of the Ukrainian language into schools and State establishments".<sup>2</sup> On August 1st, 1923, another and more important decree entitled "Concerning the Measures to Guarantee the Equality of Languages and the Assistance for the Development of the Ukrainian Language", was issued by the Soviet government of Ukraine.<sup>3</sup> Its key passage read as follows:

"While leaving the knowledge of the Russian language obligatory for officials, since this is the means of intercourse with the largest minority in Ukraine and with the peoples of the entire Union, particularly with the Russian people, and taking into account that under the present circumstances the Russian language has ceased to be the instrument of oppression in the hands of the privileged classes, but to the contrary, has become a means of bringing Ukrainian culture nearer to the highly developed Russian culture, which is of world importance, government of the Workers and Peasants of Ukraine nevertheless deems it necessary to concentrate the attention of the State during the forthcoming era on spreading the knowledge of the Ukrainian language. The previously recognized formal equality between the two most widely used languages in Ukraine — Ukrainian and Russian is not sufficient. As a result of a comparatively weak development of Ukrainian in general, the lack of the necessary educational textbooks and the absence of sufficiently trained personnel, everyday life, as experience has shown, causes in fact a preponderance of the Russian language. In order to remove this inequality, the Government of the Workers and Peasants is introducing a series of practical measures which, while respecting the equality of languages of all nationalities on Ukrainian territory, must guarantee the Ukrainian language a place appropriate to the strength and proper weight of the Ukrainian people on the territory of the Ukrainian S.S.R."<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup>) *Zbirnyk uzakonen'*..., 1923, No. 29. Part 1. Art. 430; pp. 896-900. *Visti VUTsVK*, September 4th, 1923, No. 196.

<sup>2</sup>) *Ibid.*, 1920, No. 24. Art. 509.

<sup>3</sup>) *Ibid.*, 1923, No. 29, Art. 435; pp. 913-919. *Visti VUTsVK*, August 28th, 1923, No. 190.

<sup>4</sup>) *Ibid.*, p. 914.

During the second half of 1923, plans were announced for the "Ukrainization" of the bureaucratic apparatus. All lower Party and Government officials were obliged to learn Ukrainian and to pass appropriate examinations before being accepted for employment. The Southern Bureau of Trade Unions was renamed Ukrainian Bureau, several new Ukrainian newspapers were started and the "Ukrainization" of higher educational establishments began to advance.

This change in attitude of Moscow towards the development of the Ukrainian language and culture had a considerable effect on the nationally minded Ukrainian intelligentsia both in Ukrainian and abroad, who had been hitherto hostile to the Bolsheviks. "The 12th Party Congress has finally put an end to all "national" doubts. National-cultural autonomy has been proclaimed as a revolutionary slogan, and this could not remain without an effect on the entire life of Ukraine which is in the state of reconstruction", wrote *Izvestiya*.<sup>1</sup> A large number of emigré Ukrainian scholars and educational workers, like many of the Russian emigrés who followed the "Smena Vekh" trend, made their peace with the Soviet authorities and returned to Ukraine to take part in the awakening of the nation and in educating the youth in the Ukrainian language. Optimism and confidence in the future moved them to disregard all dangers which might be awaiting them.

An emigré, A. Kharchenko, a prominent figure in the Cooperative movement, after his return to Ukraine wrote in an emigré Sovietophil journal an open letter appealing to his colleagues to return to Ukraine: "All that we, nationalists, had once wanted and for which we had fought, now lies before us. Come, build, work, there is room enough for you! All I fear is that in our society there will not be enough strength, wisdom and farsightedness to match the demands of the present historical moment".<sup>2</sup>

Another letter from a repatriate to Soviet Ukraine who had nationalist leanings described the atmosphere in his circle as follows: "Our energy and a capacity for adjustment to every situation are extremely great and therefore we think that we shall win, because we must win, because we do not imagine it otherwise . . . You know, sometimes when I ponder on it, and especially when I think about the vitality of our people, nothing frightens me, neither thunder, nor lightning, nor 'the comrades', nor the Devil".<sup>3</sup>

## 6. The Ethnic Composition of Ukraine at the start of Ukrainization.

For the Ukrainians, the new nationality policy meant an opportunity to fill in those gaps in their social, cultural and political development, which, owing to centuries of life under foreign rule, they had

<sup>1</sup>) September 25th, 1923.

<sup>2</sup>) *Nova Hromada*, Vienna, August 1923.

<sup>3</sup>) *Zahrava*, L'viv, April 15th, 1923.

been, up till now, unable to bridge. More than two centuries of tsarist oppression and Russification had left the Ukrainians as a peasant nation in which the non-peasant classes had become atrophied or Russianized. Now, at last, there was an opportunity for them to make up the ground they had lost, and, in particular, gradually to de-Russify the towns.

In 1924, Soviet Ukraine had a population of 27,600,000, of whom 5,000,000 lived in the towns. Out of 41,664 settlements, 612 were towns or urban settlements. There were 4,800,000 peasant households, comprising a peasant population of 22,500,000, of whom well over 80% were Ukrainians.<sup>1</sup> Whereas Ukrainians constituted something between 3/4 and 4/5 of the total population of Soviet Ukraine, their proportion in the population of the towns was under 50%, and in the larger towns, this was very much less. The following table illustrates the distribution of population by nationality, according to the type of settlement, the figures being taken from the incomplete census of 1920.

Types of settlements	Ukr.	Russ.	Jews	Germans	Others
Gubernia towns	14.0%	44.0%	35.0%	0.7%	6.3%
Other towns	40.5	29.2	25.6	0.4	4.3
Urban settlements	52.4	21.8	21.0	0.4	4.4
Villages	83.9	10.2	00.9	1.5	3.5

The figures in the table express the proportion of each nationality as a percentage of the total population of the settlement.<sup>2</sup> Nor was the ethnic composition constant from one *gubernia* to another, as we can see from the following table:<sup>3</sup>

Gubernia	Ukr. %	Russ. %	Jews %	Germans %	Others %
Donets	47.8	39.1	2.5	2.5	0.1
Katerynoslav	78.6	11.7	6.5	1.6	1.6
Kyiv	77.5	7.9	11.7	0.2	2.7
Odessa	53.6	20.3	13.2	3.4	9.5
Poltava	92.0	2.1	5.3	0.1	0.5
Kharkiv	79.2	17.1	2.5	0.1	1.1
Chernihiv	87.9	8.6	2.8	0.3	0.4
Average over the 7 gubernii	72.5	15.4	7.1	1.2	3.8

These figures, however, must be treated very cautiously, as they were based on the census of 1920, which had serious shortcomings. It was carried out under wartime conditions and, therefore, could not hope to give a true picture of normal times. It did not include

1) V. Chubar', *Sovetskaya Ukraina. Doklad v Prezidium Ts.I.K. Soyuz S.S.R., 5 dekabrya 1924 goda*, Kharkiv, 1925, p. 5.

2) *Ibid.* p. 36.

3) *ibid.*

the 4 *gubernii* which were held by hostile armies or by the partisans. Furthermore, the number of Russians was greatly exaggerated, not only on account of the large number of Russian troops stationed in Ukraine at the time of the census, but also because many Ukrainians in the large cities, as well as in the Donets *gubernia* registered as Russians. This was due partly to their weak national consciousness, opportunism and partly for security reasons, since at that time it was dangerous to take an active part in Ukrainian national organizations.

That the number of Ukrainians was actually higher than the figures of the 1920 census can be demonstrated by a comparison of the figures for 1920 with the census figures for 1897 and 1926 which, being compiled in peacetime and under comparatively settled conditions, are much more reliable. These give the following composition of Ukraine:<sup>1</sup>

Ethnic Group	1897 %	1920 %	1926 %
Ukrainians	76.4	72.5	80.0
Russians	10.5	15.4	9.2
Jews	7.8	7.1	5.4
Others	5.3	5.0	5.4

Thus, though the figure for the percentage of Jews for 1920 lies within the expected range (5.4 — 7.8%) and the figures for "others" falls only 0.3% below the lower bound of the expected range, the percentage of Ukrainians for 1920 falls 3.9% below the lower bound of the expected range (76.4 — 80%), whereas the percentage of Russians falls 4.9% above the upper bound of the expected range (9.2 — 10.5%). Moreover, considering the period 1897-1926 as a whole, we find that the percentage of Ukrainians increased, and the percentage of Russians decreased. Yet from considering the figures for 1920, we would expect the opposite trend to be occurring, and it is, at most, extremely unlikely that such a radical change of trend could have occurred during the six years 1920-1926.

It is interesting to make a brief survey of the distribution of nationalities in certain important categories, especially in the Communist Party, the industrial workers and the administration, the intelligentsia and the schools, as this explains the problems of Ukrainization.

### Ukrainians in the C.P.(b).U.

The C.P.(b).U., after the Purge of 1921-22 numbered, on April 1st,

1) Figures for 1897 are taken from the article of A. Khomenko, "Natsional'nyy sklad naselennya Ukrainy po novishykh danykh", *Ch. Sh.* Nos. 6-7, September-October 1923, pp. 80-92. "Yezhegodnik Kominternu" estimated the ethnic composition of Ukraine in 1923 as follows: Ukrainians — 74.1%, Russians — 14.1%, Jews — 6.9%. Others — 4.9% (*ibid*, p. 81).

1922, 54,818 members.<sup>1</sup> The composition according to nationality was, as follows:<sup>2</sup>

Nationality	Number of members	Percent.
Russians	27,490	57.3%
Ukrainians	11,920	23.2%
Jews	6,981	13.7%
Poles	1,241	2.4%
Others	3,604	7.0%

Of the 11,920 registered Ukrainian Party members, only 6,074 actually spoke Ukrainian and could really be considered Ukrainians. The bulk of the Party, 42,741 members, preferred to speak Russian.

Due to its predominantly Russian character and its entirely alien ideology, the Communist Party had little organic connection with the greater bulk of the population of Ukraine, and did not know or care much about the specific needs of Ukraine.

In the Russian Communist Party as a whole, the Ukrainians constituted only a small fraction of the membership, which was far below the percentage of Ukrainians in the total population of the Soviet Union. Thus, at the 12th Party Congress, where 408 delegates represented a membership of 386,000, the Ukrainian delegates constituted only 4.7%, thus coming after the Russians (60.8%), Jews (11.3%), Latvians and Estonians (7%). On this occasion, Skrypnyk complained that the small number of Ukrainian communists was the result of discrimination, particularly against those who had formerly been members of the Borot'bists. According to him, out of 4,000 Borot'bists who had joined the C.P.(b).U. in April, 1920, three years later only 118 remained in the Party. Many of the Party members who were registered as Ukrainians were such only in name, for even a number of Jewish members had, for tactical and opportunist reasons, adopted Ukrainian names and declared themselves Ukrainians.

At the 12th Party Congress, and later at the so-called 4th Consultation of the Central Committee with the Responsible Workers in the National Republics, the leading Ukrainian communists demanded that a greater proportion of positions of responsibility be given to Ukrainian communists, and also that access to the Party be made easier for Ukrainians. These demands were granted in theory, but were never fully put into practice. Thus the so-called "Lenin recruitment" of a great number of workers to the Party, in the first half of 1924, soon after the death of Lenin, resulted in the admission

<sup>1</sup>) Kom. Part. bol'shevikov Ukrainy. *Itogi partiynoi perepisi na Ukraine*. Izd. Ts.K. K.P.(b).U. Kharkiv, 1922.

<sup>2</sup>) These figures do not add up to the total membership. They account for only 51,236 members.

of 32,153 new members in Ukraine. Their distribution according to nationality was, as follows<sup>1</sup>. Accordingly, Party membership

Ukrainians	29%
Russians	68%
Jews	5%
Others	2%

(including candidate members), was 92,713 on July 1st, 1924, as against 56,936 on January 1st, 1924. The number of Ukrainian-speaking people in the Party must have been about 13,500 at the beginning of 1924, and about 23,800 on July 1st, 1924, which latter figure amounted to about 25.6% of the total membership of the C.P.(b).U. In 1927, Kaganovich, who had by then become Party Secretary in Ukraine, claimed that in 1924 (presumably on January 1st, 1924), Ukrainians constituted 33% of the Party, and in 1925 — 38%. This, as is clear from the above calculation, seems unlikely. In January, 1925, the total membership of the C.P.(b).U. was 101,852, i. e. in six months it increased by only about 9,000 or 10%. This increase must have consisted entirely of Ukrainians, if we are to believe Kaganovich's claim of 38%. This is rather unlikely. Thus the Kyïv newspaper *Proletarskaya Pravda* wrote in 1925 that in 1924 the proportion of Ukrainians in the C.P.(b).U. amounted only to 29%<sup>2</sup>. (This probably referred to actual members and excluded the candidate-members).

In addition to the comparatively small number of Ukrainian Party members, their comparatively recent admission barred them from the most important positions, which were the strongholds of the Party's old guard, who were, for the most part, non-Ukrainian. For this reason, the extensive resolutions of the Party about "Ukrainization" could not be carried out in practice to the fullest extent; they were unobtrusively shelved, not acted upon, or carried out only nominally. Ukrainization in the Party meant, in reality, that the propaganda section dealing with the peasants had to make rather more use of the Ukrainian language, that courses in Ukrainian became obligatory for some of the lower Party bureaucrats, and that a number of Ukrainian communists were given posts in the Party organs, especially in the Press and propaganda sections, and in the lower organizations of the Party. It did not mean that Ukrainian communists were allowed to play a predominant role in the C.P.(b).U., although their influence there did, in fact, become greater.

The proportional composition within the Party reflected, to a considerable extent, the degree of Russification of the industrial

1) *Pravda*, November 19th, 1924. "Kompartiya Ukrainy".

2) *Proletarskaya Pravda*, Kyïv May 24th, 1925. No. 116 (1127). Editorial article entitled "The Party must be in the front ranks".



working class and the bureaucracy in Ukraine. An investigation into the membership of the Trade Unions in Ukraine, which was carried out in 1924, yielded the following results:

Nationality	Percentage
Ukrainians	40.1%
Russians	37.6%
Jews	14.5%
Others	7.8%

On the other hand,  $\frac{3}{4}$  of the workers were found to have been born in Ukraine, which implies that many of the "Russians" were probably of Ukrainian origin.<sup>1</sup>

The coal-mining and industrial region of the Donbas had 51.5% of locally-born labour. National composition, or perhaps rather national consciousness seems to have been very unevenly distributed among the workers in the largest cities, as is demonstrated by the following sample investigation<sup>2</sup> (the figures being expressed as percentages of the total number of people investigated in each region):

City or District	Ukrainians	Russians	Jews	Others
Kharkiv	64.5	28.5	3.8	3.2
Kyiv	49.5	32.5	10.2	7.8
Donbas Region	44.1	50.3	—	5.6
Odessa	23.7	36.4	31.6	8.3

### Ukrainians in the Administration

In the Soviet administrative system in Ukraine, the Ukrainians themselves were in a small minority. Thus, for example, in the Odessa *gubernia* (which had been enlarged to comprise almost all southern Ukraine between the lower Dnister and the lower Dniro), out of the 3,000 Government employees, there were only 2,100 Ukrainians, and of these only 566 could speak Ukrainian really well.<sup>3</sup> In the central government apparatus in Kharkiv, the situation was not much better. *Pravda* reported (October 3rd, 1924) that only 55% of the top officials of the People's Commissariats and 66% of the top Party functionaries could speak some Ukrainian. Among the technical personnel, only 44% were familiar with the Ukrainian language. To improve this situation, courses of instruction in the Ukrainian language were inaugurated, and all government officials were required to

<sup>1</sup>) *Pravda*, October 11th, 1924. "Natsional'nyy sostav ukrainskikh profsoyuzov".

<sup>2</sup>) F. Korniyushin, *Natsional'nyy vopros v profdvizhenii Ukrainy*. Quoted in *Visti*, October 2nd, 1923.

<sup>3</sup>) *Pravda*, February 9th, 1924. "Kak prokhorit ukrainizatsiya".

attend, those who tried to avoid them being threatened with reprisals.

The following table<sup>1</sup> illustrates the ethnic distribution of the leading Party officials in the Ukrainian S.S.R. at the beginning of Ukrainization:

### NATIONALITY OF THE LEADING CADRES IN THE UKRAINIAN S.S.R. IN 1924

	Russians		Jews		Ukrainians		Others		Total	
	N <sup>o</sup> of persons	%	N <sup>o</sup> of persons	%	N <sup>o</sup> of persons	%	N <sup>o</sup> of persons	%	N <sup>o</sup> of persons	%
1) In the leading Party organs of C.P.(b).U.	103	42.0	61	25.0	60	24.5	21	8.5	245	100
2) In the Government organs:										
a) central	15	40.0	10	26.3	9	23.7	4	10.0	38	100
b) gubernia	46	47.0	22	22.4	25	25.5	5	5.1	98	100
c) district	156	42.4	47	12.8	139	37.7	26	7.1	368	100
3) In the leading economic organs	65	51.2	28	22.0	22	17.3	12	9.5	127	100
4) In the financial & banking institutions	24	45.3	20	38.0	6	11.3	3	5.4	53	100
5) In cooperative centres	28	32.9	28	32.9	26	30.5	3	3.7	85	100
6) In Trade Unions	47	38.8	47	38.8	21	17.3	6	5.1	121	100
TOTAL	484	42.6	263	23.2	308	27.1	80	7.1	1135	100

### Ukrainization in the Red Army

The new National policy also made provision for a partial re-organization of the military system on a territorial basis. This meant that the Red army units in Ukraine would be composed, for the most part, of Ukrainians, and that political and cultural activities, therefore, would be carried out in Ukrainian. In addition, a number of special national units were to be created in the national republics, including Ukraine, for purposes of propaganda. This idea of national units was not new. As early as June 1920 a "Red Officers' Training School", with Ukrainian as the language of instruction, had been established near Kharkiv. This school was too small,

<sup>1</sup>) Calculated on the basis of the data published in *Izvestiya*, No. 76, 1924, by M. Shapoval, *Nova Ukraina*, Praha, June-July, 1925, Nos. 2-3 p. 3.

however,<sup>1</sup> to make much difference in the composition of the Red Army officer cadres, and its real purpose in existing at all was for reasons of propaganda. Its members often carried out guard and parade duties.<sup>2</sup>

The new system of organization on a regional basis was welcomed by the Ukrainian population, but the transition was to be very gradual. According to a plan revealed at the end of 1923 by Frunze, the Chief Commanding Officer in Ukraine and the Crimea, Ukrainian was to become the language of command in divisions in which there was a preponderance of Ukrainians.<sup>3</sup> However, his remark: "Of course, no deviations towards national chauvinism will be permitted", meant that the overall command and control would be firmly held in the hands of non-Ukrainians.

Skrypnyk, as one of the leading Ukrainian communists, championed this transition to a territorial system. In a speech delivered at the 2nd Regional Party Conference of the Ukrainian Military District, in April 1924, he compared the Red Army's occupation of Ukraine to Kipling's colonial conquerors who, "fully conscious of the dominance of their race and their nation, imposed, with weapons in their hands, the culture of the ruling nation... And I considered what we... must do in order that our Red Army should not resemble in any way whatsoever the army of Kipling... Victory has been achieved by the forces of the workers of all nations of our Union. That is clear to everyone. Why then, comrades, do we still go on saying that our Army is a Russian Army? What does it mean?... There was no stronger, no more powerful national oppression than within the army, that very army into which thousands, tens of thousands and hundreds of thousands of workers are being conscripted, and where Russophiles have influenced the heads and brains of the workers of all the oppressed nations..."<sup>4</sup>

He went on to explain the advantages of the territorial system:

"First of all, the transition to the territorial system... means that the military units will be manned with workers from a given territory, that every single territorial unit will be manned by the workers of the nation inhabiting that particular territory. It means applying to the territorial military unit as the language of command, the language of that nation to which belong the workers of whom the territorial unit is composed. It means transferring to that language all political work and the work of the leading organs of the political department, Party commissions and communist cells. It also

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1) There were approximately 400 cadets in the school in 1922.

2) *Pravda*, February 23rd, 1923, "Ukrainskaya chast".

3) *Pravda*, December 2nd, 1923, "Ukrainizatsiya armii".

4) M. Skrypnyk, *Statti i promovy*, pp. 40-43.

means making the appropriate changes in formulating the programmes of instruction".<sup>1</sup>

He also announced the decision of the Party and military leadership of Ukraine concerning the gradual introduction of Ukrainian as the language of instruction in military schools, and the change-over to the Ukrainian language in certain territorial and first-line units "so as gradually to make our army an army which would... use the Ukrainian language in its work".<sup>2</sup>

During the course of 1923 and 1924, these reforms brought about certain changes in the national composition of the Red Army in Ukraine. Whereas in 1922 only approximately 25% of the Red Army stationed in Ukraine were, in fact, Ukrainians, by the beginning of 1924, Ukrainians accounted for more than half the troops stationed there.<sup>3</sup> Of the commanding cadres, Ukrainians constituted less than 25%.<sup>4</sup> By the beginning of 1925, there were already 75% Ukrainians in the Red Army forces in Ukraine,<sup>5</sup> and in June, 1925, the figure was given as between 80-90%.<sup>6</sup>

In the Military Academies in Ukraine, Russians were in the majority. A news-letter published in Kyiv in December, 1922, stated that the National composition of the cadets at military academies in Ukraine was:<sup>7</sup>

Russians	58.5%
Ukrainians	28.0%
Jews	4.8%
Poles	1.6%
Others	7.1%

There are no figures available for the later period of Ukrainization.

## Education

The revolution brought about changes in the educational system in Ukraine. It was in this sphere that the Ukrainian intelligentsia had the greatest scope for their work. Once it had started, the demand for Ukrainian-language schools spread rapidly. Ukrainization of the primary schools made considerable progress, particularly in the central and western areas of Soviet Ukraine. In the south and east, however, particularly in the Odessa and Donbas regions, this process

1) *Ibid.*, p. 44. 2) *ibid.*, pp. 45-46. 3) 54.7% *Pravda*, Feb. 17th, 1924.

4) 23.3% at the beginning of 1924. M. Skrypnyk, *Statti i promovy*, p. 45.

5) *Pr. Pr.*, Feb. 10th, 1925, No. 32 (1043). Report by Radkov (a political Commissar) at the 3rd conference of the military correspondents of the troops of Ukraine and the Crimea.

6) *Pr. Pr.*, June 18th, 1925. "Ukrainizatsiya v chastyakh Krasnoy Armii".

7) *Dyen' krasnogo kursanta*, Kyiv, December 1922. Quoted in B. T. "Pryzabuti zlochyny Moskvyy" (The Forgotten Crimes of Moscow), *Vyzvol'nyy Shlyakh*, London. Vol. 2. No. 11. November, 1955. p. 46.

was very slow. Thus whilst in the Kyiv *gubernia* Ukrainian primary schools amounted to 90% of the total,<sup>1</sup> in the Odessa *gubernia* they amounted only to 35%, and in the Donets *gubernia* only 129 schools were to switch over to Ukrainian as the language of instruction by December 1st, 1923.<sup>2</sup> In the Kharkiv *gubernia*, the schools were divided, according to the language of instruction, as follows:<sup>3</sup>

Ukrainian	29.1%
Russian	20.1%
Mixed (Ukrainian and Russian)	49.2%
Others	1.6%

The following table<sup>4</sup> shows the changes brought about in elementary education during the early period of Ukrainization:

Year	Total number of schools	Information about	Ukrainian schools	%	Mixed Ukr.-Rus. schools	%
1922	20,587	12,109	6,105	50	1,966	16.1
1923	17,110	14,983	7,604	50.7	2,230	14.9
1924	15,715	15,177	10,774	68	1,128	7.1
1925	15,555	15,209	11,839	77.8	667	4.4

The higher and technical education was still, during the period 1923-1927, predominantly Russian, as can be seen from the following table:<sup>5</sup>

Type of Educational Institute	Total Number	No. with Ukrainian as language of instruction	%
"Institutes of Higher Education"	39	11	28
Technical Schools	158	34	21.5
"Vocational Schools"	429	195	40

In the Institutes of Higher Education, Ukrainians constituted only 25% of the total number of students. Half were Jews, and the remainder were Russians.<sup>6</sup>

1) *Pravda*, January 15th, 1924.

2) *Izvestiya*, November 14th, 1923.

3) *Komunist*, September 7th, 1923. Quoted in *Vyzvol'nyy Shlyakh*, loc. cit., p. 49.

4) *Ukrayinizatsiya radyans'kykh ustanov*, No. 2. Kharkiv, 1926. p. 64.

5) *Komunistychna osvita*, No. 10, 1932, p. 30. A. Zil'bershtein: "15 rokiv borot'by za yedynu proletars'ku systemy osvity".

6) Ya. Riappo: "Vyssha shkola i ukrainizatsiya", *Kommunist*, Kharkiv, June 24th, 1923. Quoted in *Vyzvol'nyy shlyakh*, loc. cit. p. 46.

In the different faculties, too, the distribution was extremely varied. The largest percentage of Ukrainian students was that of students attending agricultural and pedagogical institutes (49% and 32% respectively), the smallest in the socio-economic and industrial-technical institutes (10.6% and 15.5% respectively)<sup>1</sup>. The reason for the percentage of Ukrainian students being so small was not only that few of them were prepared to take a course of higher education, but also because of the difficult material conditions prevailing in the towns, and the discrimination against the children of the more prosperous peasants ("kurkuls" or "kulaks") who would have had the qualifications and who could have afforded to continue their studies.

The following table<sup>2</sup> gives an example of the situation regarding the academic staff in the institutes of higher education:

#### LECTURERS IN PEDAGOGICAL INSTITUTES

City	Total no. of Lecturers	No. of Ukrainians	% of Total
Kharkiv	142	24	17
Odessa	128	21	16
Katerynoslav	95	15	16.7

#### Newspapers and Books

From the spring of 1924 onwards, there was a continuous rise in the number of newspapers published in the Ukrainian language, although the circulation of these papers lagged far behind that of the Russian papers.

#### THE CIRCULATION OF NEWSPAPERS IN SOVIET UKRAINE<sup>3</sup>

	March 1924	Sept. 1st, 1924
Ukrainian	75,000	205,000
Russian	505,000	720,000

In the U.S.S.R., as a whole, there were 560 newspapers being published at the end of 1924, the total issue amounting to 6,000,000 copies<sup>4</sup>.

1) *Ibid*, p. 45.

2) *Ukrayinizatsiya radyans'kykh ustanov*, No. 2. Kharkiv. 1926 p. 67.

3) V. Chubar, *Sovetskaya Ukraina*. Doklad, 5. xii. 1924. Kharkiv, 1925.

4) *Pravda* 27. I. 1925 "Pervyy vseukrainskiy syezd rabotnikov pechati".

NEWSPAPERS PUBLISHED IN THE UKRAINIAN S.S.R.<sup>1</sup>.

Date	Total No. of papers	No. of Ukrainian papers	% of Total
1. IV. 1924	64	24	37.5
1. XI. 1925	74	37	50.0
1. III. 1926	82	50	61.0

At the 1st All-Ukrainian Conference of Press Workers in January 1925, Ravich-Cherkasskiy declared that the Central Committee of the C.P.(b).U. planned to reduce the number of Russian newspapers to a minimum so as to achieve the final Ukrainization of the Press. This plan was never carried out in full, although the number of Russian newspapers circulating in Ukraine was very much reduced in the late 1920's and early 1930's when Ukrainization was at its height.

PUBLICATION OF UKRAINIAN BOOKS BY THE STATE  
PUBLISHING HOUSE OF THE UKRAINIAN S.S.R. (in percentages  
of the total number of books)<sup>2</sup>

Year	Ukrainian	Russian	Other Languages	Total
1923	52.6	42.9	0.5	100
1924	76.6	22.1	1.3	100
1925	73.2	19.2	7.6	100

(To be continued)

<sup>1</sup>) V. Chubar, *Ukraina v 1926 rotsi*, p. 13.

<sup>2</sup>) *Ibid.* p. 13.

Protest Writings from Ukraine

**AMONG THE SNOWS**

By VALENTYN MOROZ

London, 1971, 65 pp. Price 50p (\$1.75)

**Contents:** The Trial of V. Moroz; How the Trial of Moroz was Prepared; Letter to KGB from Raïsa Moroz; V. Moroz: "Among the Snows"; List of Ukrainian Political Prisoners; The Tragic Fate of Alla Horska, and other material.

## THE TRADITIONAL AND THE CONTEMPORARY IN UKRAINIAN EMIGRE LITERATURE

*By Dr. ROMAN KUCHAR (Kukhar)*

In the early twentieth century, following a prevailing trend in the West, Ukrainian literature adopted a new realism, more devoted to describing life than to guiding it. This refreshing development, being accompanied by spontaneous national reawakening and liberation processes in the years 1917-21, met, however, soon after the collapse of the newly re-established Ukrainian statehood, with fierce attacks from the communist commissars for literature guarding the emerging Soviet system. Ideological spokesmen demanded that all the writers within the Soviet boundaries function as "engineers of souls" of the citizens, that is to say, as promoters of the state's interests, propagators of communist values. The police regime left no room for the free development of thought or literary activity. From that time on, the Soviet literary production has been justly considered as a "state literature" or "nationalized literature".

This circumstance alone might have discouraged many a sincere writer. In addition, there was gradually intensified social and political oppression suffered by the Ukrainian and other nationalities at the hands of the Soviet Russian rulers whose aim was ultimately to mould all entities into one "Soviet nation" under Russian supremacy. One can see what an ordeal the spiritual and intellectual leaders of the captive nations had been subjected to. Those were indeed gloomy days for Ukrainian writers. Those who were able to do so, went into exile, even before a misleading Bolshevik slogan came into circulation, prescribing for each Soviet republic a culture "national in form though socialist in content".

The traumatic twenties were just passing by, accompanied by a short-lived period called "Ukrainization" which gave pride to the nationals and awoke false hopes among the writers for a possible co-existence with the system. Instead, grave events followed: the beginning of the collectivization programme, extermination of millions of Ukrainian peasants in the wake of it, ruthless course of Russification, executions by the thousands of nationally conscious persons, repressions, concentration camps and incarcerations for



innumerable Ukrainian citizens resisting sovietization. The homeland, having turned into a death mill, with life and literature under the full sway of the dictates of Russian communists in Ukraine, no wonder a call "away from Moscow!" resounded in a literary pamphlet authored by an able writer M. Khvylovyy. A Ukrainian product of communist ideology, he recognized, though too late, the mortal danger it brought to the freedom of his country. Neither he, nor his comrade M. Skrypnyk, the commissar for education, could bear any longer the disastrous results of their pioneering work in favour of an unrealizable idea that had brought waves of terror upon their countrymen. By a demonstrative suicide both of them protested against and escaped from an unbearable reality which they had helped to bring about.

There were a few breaks within the reign of terror for Soviet literati after 1933 that resembled periods of "thaw" of a later time, the nineteen fifties. Their literary efforts, however, were colourless, depersonalised dithyrambs of "personality cult" and a glorification of the Soviet way of life. Nevertheless, numerous Ukrainian authors had been constantly censured (through the nineteen forties and later) for having failed to direct their writings toward the promotion of sovietization in literature.<sup>2</sup> This trend continues even to our day and, significantly, no matter how strong the party control under the slogan "socialist realism" (the name given to the doctrine current in Soviet art and literature since 1932), proletarian cultural workers succeed occasionally in finding their own means of expression. Intellectual stagnation and moral suffocation caused by government policy of absolute control brought a spectacular break in the early nineteen sixties, whereby a new generation of Soviet writers clearly identified their mode of writing with that prevailing in the West. To be sure, they came under fire soon enough. It is important to emphasize at this point, however, that young intellectual leaders, under new conditions opposing the lack of fundamental freedoms in their country, are gaining strength and are insisting fearlessly on their rights still denied them, though secured by the constitution. Their firm stand in defence of their cultural freedom as well as their civil rights is actually a resolute struggle on the part of Ukrainian intellectuals for Ukraine's national survival, and it is threatened by both the dead letter of Bolshevik dogma and the renewed Russification pursued by the régime.

The rigid situation in the homeland described above preceded the several phases of emigration of two generations of Ukrainian men of letters and still faces them even at the present moment. This will explain the motivation and inherent "high-strung consciousness" of cultural and national mission of many an émigré writer whose life was spent under the rule of the despotic communist doctrine.

The social and political climate in which the émigré writers from Eastern Europe are presently living and working resembles the conditions of life the Polish political exiles endured after 1831. Similar motivations for leaving their oppressed countries sustained the émigrés of both periods in their harsh existence abroad. Similarly, the later émigrés doubled their efforts to maintain values destroyed in their homelands and to create new ones on behalf of a better future for their own kin and humanity. Émigré writers in various foreign countries could enjoy liberty, whereas back at home they would be considered "enemies of the people", prisoners, or merely tools for enslaving their own people. Living abroad allowed them to serve their country in a way that was unthinkable at home. A Polish scholar, discussing the literature of the "Great Emigration" (in the eighteen thirties), underlined the typical literary situation of the émigré: literature in exile became the platform to defend the endangered positions of the destroyed country and to express its claims for liberty. Poetry and prose were used for political ends. Émigrés needed state institutions such as parliamentary tribunes and the journalistic press. These institutions which they lacked were replaced by literature with its characteristic by-product, homesickness and nostalgia. Émigrés created their own world within the boundaries of which the individualistic, the national and the all-human were moulded into one. The problem of the personality was set against the background of a broader unit, the nation, the European civilization, the universe.<sup>3</sup>

Émigré writers had immense problems and they were determined to give them expression in their works. To blend the problems of the individual with those of the suffering nation was the chief goal of the Ukrainian writers in exile after the end of the second world war. The writers associated under the name the Artistic Ukrainian Movement (MUR) did not encompass all the active writers abroad, but the Movement did represent the aspirations of these uprooted persons (Displaced Persons) in that troubled and turbulent period. The central organization that united Ukrainian writers of various literary trends was brought to life in 1945 in Bavaria,<sup>4</sup> under the chairmanship of an active novelist of the period, Ulas Samchuk, author of the trilogy "Volhynia". The organization soon became instrumental in stirring interests and cultural activities among the people hitherto engrossed in problems of daily living. A series of art and literature journals, such as "MUR" (literary problems), "MUR" (Almanac), "Khors" (fiction and art), "Arka" (literature, art, criticism), and a multitude of other publications<sup>5</sup> related by genres, themes and a common idea, began appearing. This type of early post-war literature, in addition to the individual output of members of the movement and non-members alike, could be broadly defined as "traditional" because of its undercurrents of patriotic feeling and common denominator of national

heritage. The many-coloured turmoil of émigré life came into focus in the writing of a single author usually illuminated from the central position of the exile community, as a whole. This community was of primary importance because it was thought to be all encompassing, a sort of microcosm representing the entire nation. Certain basic ethics, a moral colouring based on an idealistic philosophy, common tune, even themes and topics of various works identifiable with positive, constructive values relevant to the needs of their captive country, had been mutually shared by a majority of the writers. At the same time the organization "MUR" nurtured an intense desire for supreme dignity in art — its prospective entrance into the world of "great literature", attaining a position of honour in the history of literature. To create works that would measure up with the great literary achievements of other national cultures and justify the "great exodus" by a "great period" in its own literature, became an unwritten law and moral obligation of "MUR's" inspired membership. There was a feeling among writers, however, that this degree of elevation could not be reached simply by imitating foreign models. It was believed, the writers worthy of the name ought to walk their own sacred paths of national duties. Such a classic concept of greatness in literature was, of course, not easily attainable, nor had all of the Ukrainian émigré writers been equally determined or able to follow that extreme line. Many could not possibly avoid the powerful influences coming from all directions in their new environments. And was such an idealistic attitude correct, after all? Who and where are we, anyway? So began the questioning. In the classically formulated precepts of the Movement one perceived its weakness, some argue, which is the inability to express the true spirit of modern times. The traditionalists fired back: Would not all this cosmopolitan, modern infatuation lead one astray? Those were the first nuclei of discontent within the body of the central émigré literary organization. This resulted eventually in an open conflict between the partisans of two opposed literary orientations and led, in consequence, to an inevitable split in the previously united front. Then followed the final departure of many traditionalists and modernizers from the shores of the old continent, and their subsequent resettlement, mainly in the New World, that was completed by the early fifties. The ideological confrontation in the ranks of "MUR" foreshadowed two extreme paths entered by adherents of either in the future development. Strict traditionalists became in the course of time headstrong conservatives, while modernists, if not radical themselves, might have opened the gate for the younger supporters of such modern radicalism in literature as a complete disregard for either form or content.

The ardent hopes of the founders of "MUR" to produce great works of literature did not materialize. Their endeavour proved too short-lived. Soon their energy vanished and people were destined to disperse all over the world.<sup>6</sup> Even though "MUR's" literary activity

did not accomplish the goals which had been obviously set too high, the organization nevertheless initiated a valuable literary platform for the exiled to discuss literary issues and inspired innumerable Ukrainian literati to repeated efforts in the future on behalf of their common cause. Among the active members of the discussed literary movement were the poetess O. Lyaturyns'ka, poet V. Shayan, known mainly as prose writers I. Bahryanyy, I. Kostets'kyi, literary critic Yu. Sherekh and poets V. Barka and Ya. Slavutych. Ukrainian émigré literature of those post-war years produced, not necessarily in connection with "MUR's" activities, some outstanding work in poetry as well as in prose, to mention a few "The Ashes of Empires", a work of epical dimensions by Yu. Klen, "The Poet" by T. Os'machka, "Children of the Traders' Road", a novel-tetralogy by D. Humenna, and other novels such as "The Tiger Hunter" by I. Bahryanyy and "Sons of the Soil" by I. Kyriyak, earlier emigrant, from Canada.

The works of the authors of the preceding period, identifiable with the literary group around the journal "Visnyk" ("The Herald"), or with the so-called "Prague Literary School" respectively (from the nineteen thirties and early nineteen forties), cannot receive more space than they have received here in view of the limited topic of this article. Yet it is an undeniable fact that the Ukrainian literature of the twentieth century had been richly adorned by manifold contributions of such accomplished poets or prose writers in exile, as Yu. Darahan, Yu. Lypa, E. Malanyuk, O. Olzhych, O. Stefanovych, O. Teliha, L. Mosendz, O. Lyaturyns'ka, none of them alive any longer. Significant prose works were also written in that period by two more female authors, N. Koroleva and H. Zhurba, not directly connected with the two literary groups mentioned above.

Following the footprints of the Kievan neo-classicism of the nineteen twenties, highly poetic, individualized and directed to the classical sources of inspiration, the Western Ukrainian literature of the nineteen thirties displayed a noticeable growth in artistry and, together with the Prague School of writers, reached its flowering point and artistic self-determination.<sup>7</sup> The poets, like B. Antonych, B. Kravtsiv, S. Hordyns'kyi, had considerable achievements to their credit in West Ukraine as yet free from Soviet control. By that time, although not in direct contact with Western European centres, Ukrainian literature had been integrated into the main stream of the literary currents in the West. It experienced various stages of its development, via neo-classicism, neo-romanticism, symbolism, to a lesser degree futurism, later on urbanism, expressionism, objectivism, imaginism, and the surrealism of the present day, which some of the modern émigré authors are just venturing on.

As to literary criticism in exile, good work in this and related areas, such as the literary essay, was done, especially in the nineteen forties, by the profoundly erudite O. Hrycak, the temperamental ideologist D.

Dontsov, the classical scholar V. Derzhavyn and a proponent of the organic basis on which to build, Yu Sherekh.

It is extremely difficult to present an objective evaluation of the more recent periods in the Ukrainian émigré literature (the nineteen fifties, the sixties, and the early seventies), owing to some symptomatic factors that affect clear vision. Let us point out the most articulate. First of all, there are no materials available that would encompass recent processes in the Ukrainian literature in exile in their entirety. The prevailing practice, as displayed by casual critics and reviewers (from lack of specialists) is fragmentary, subjective and exclusive rather than inclusive. Because of the absence of professional literary criticism, anyone can try his hand in writing and venture now and then in this very complex field of specialization, applying mainly one's own set of values that have nothing to do with exact literary criteria. A book under review is judged frequently from a position of religion, morality, patriotism, ideology, rather than from an objective universal standpoint. This, unfortunately, is also true with regard to critical attempts practiced by men of letters turned critics. Whether of Eastern or Western Ukrainian origin, the author's camp, party or group adherence, his association with a literary school, his aesthetic mode of thinking, those are determinant factors on the basis of which an author is appraised. Overrating one author and completely ignoring another became typical of such partisan criticism. Hardly a single émigré critic worthy of the name would agree with another's opinion of a particular author or his work. Personal encounters among critics, interested more in polemics than in objective literary evaluation, have been amply recorded.<sup>8</sup> The sufferer is, of course, literature. The sad truth is that several important writers in exile have not yet received a fair appraisal of their work, since a critic knowledgeable about all émigré periods and the authors involved has yet to be found. Consequently, some writers, owing to considerable publicity received from their ranks, may appear in larger proportions on the émigré scene, while the other lacking partisan backing, may remain unnoticed.

The émigré situation is also created by lack of a large reading public. This is explained generally by the symptomatic indifference on the part of the average busy émigré to literature as a whole. At the same time, however, literature from Soviet Ukraine finds here both an eager reader and ready publisher,<sup>9</sup> not on account of its literary merits alone, to be sure, but rather because of its political implications. This is, after all, a Political Emigration. If things are far from satisfactory speaking of most general type of literary production, no wonder they are even more discouraging, sometimes devastating, in relation to the experimentative type of writing. If an able author cannot afford to finance his own work, he finds it necessary under prevailing conditions to leave the literary scene temporarily or for ever. Many such losses have been registered in the émigré literature.

All this certainly contributes to lowering of the literary standards of mass production, based upon expressed demand for lighter works, and coloured usually by sentimental patriotism and nostalgia congenial to a general reader. The chances are also that the best émigré works have not yet been published, whether for lack of funds or reading public. Such was the case with "The Last Prophet" by Mosendz, or "The Ashes of Empires" by Klen, the outstanding works that have been published posthumously, decades after having been written. Many a literary gem, on the other hand, has been buried in numerous periodicals difficult to obtain.

To sum up, the struggles for survival of Ukrainian as well as other émigré writers (particularly in the early nineteen fifties), the absence of systematic literary criticism, the lack of sophisticated readers and of publishing funds (authors, as a rule, published their works by whatever available means) slowed up the production of émigré literature. Incomplete information and limited perspective regarding the latest period (the nineteen sixties and the present decade) also makes it difficult to draw a genuine picture of the most recent developments and achievements in the work of an ever increasing number of writers. Most remarkable of all, it is interesting to note, despite hardships and drawbacks or because of them, the steady growth in the ranks of Ukrainian poets, prose writers, even playwrights nowadays active in exile. Even though a few dozen representative Ukrainian émigré authors (both prose writers and poets) have died, there are over one hundred more or less established poetry writers and nearly as many essayists, short story writers and novelists among the living émigrés. Dramatists are few in number, as indeed they have always been, but even so a good dozen of them still try to make an impact. "There are more literati than good literary works",<sup>10</sup> writes one author turned critic, and there is truth in his observation. He further contends, there are no "great" writers left in exile since the death of the novelist and short story writer, V. Vynnychenko (1951). He defines "great" writers as masters of the word who create an epoch in the history of literature with their works and their ideas. In his view, there are few such poets, playwrights, or prose writers presently in exile who create new literary values.<sup>11</sup>

It is impossible to undertake here a review of the total literary production in the Ukrainian diaspora, whereby writing among Ukrainian émigrés came to be regarded as a sort of sacred duty towards freeing the enslaved country, along with the secondary motivation of recording events, saving things from oblivion. Hence, such an abundance here of the "memoir" type of literature. Another striking thing about a Ukrainian émigré writer is the variety of genres that he deals with, sometimes simultaneously: poetry, short story, drama, essay, book review, literary criticism, all and everything, with the disadvantage for him that he has no field of concentration.

At this point we shift attention to a controversial issue, that constitutes the theme of this paper, "Traditional" versus "Contemporary". In such aspect, at least, things are looked upon from the Ukrainian émigré angle, provided "Contemporary" is closely related to "Modern". The émigré writers in their majority resent being linked in any way with the "modernism", claiming their writing to be contemporary though based on the traditional principle. They believe the traditional standpoint should be in accord with the contemporary writing, a perfect blend of past experience with an existing reality. A critical character of the present time, it is felt, requires from a conscious writer, perhaps more than ever before, loyalty to both his endangered country and the entire humanity. This could only be accomplished by adhering to constructive, positive values, justified as such in the whole course of history. "The Contemporary", being accepted simply as statement of the fact, is taken as the period's emphasized timeliness with its grave problems, calling for renewed moral pledge of contemporaries and compatriots, at the same time. In this sense, contemporary émigré writers, being aware of their obligations, retain primarily a traditional position of responsibility, possibly more so now than even a few decades ago. The characteristic reaction of a patriotic reader who approves traditional attitude and mistrusts any modern trend supports them in their stand. The lines between the "contemporary-traditional", on the one side, and the "modern", on the other, are drawn in this context sharply enough and interpreted as two different ideologies, national, self-identifiable, and cosmopolitan, foreign, respectively, both of them not necessarily sensitive to each other. Confrontation of the "modern" and the "traditional", as strictly literary means of expression, presents still another angle, more related to conflicting aesthetic perceptions. In this respect one can actually speak in terms of more understandable and appealing traditional way of presentation versus rather perplex, often considered as offensive, its modern counterpart, within the main stream of the contemporary émigré literature. Writing style branded "modern" proves to be much less popular than the traditional type among Ukrainian émigrés. A relatively small school of writers referred to as "modernists" constitutes for the time being merely a group or at the most few groups of individuals recruited mainly from the youngest generation of refugees, albeit not without a blessing or guidance of some older writers.<sup>12</sup> The mode of expression of the "modernists", regarded by an average reader as shocking, is understandably restricted to limited public. According to popular connotation, the émigré modern school is notorious for its hunt for sensationalism, a good deal of mannerism, importunity and linguistic excesses; besides, by too much leaning toward the extreme foreign patterns, it reveals its own epigonism, groundlessness, confusion, offering nothing but indigestible nonsense, bizarre, formless and devoid of substance. Some extravagances of

this type of modern proselytism are considered a direct affront to the reader. Critical attitude of this sort, shared indiscriminately by laymen as well as disapproving literati, has met with equally uncompromising front of those comparatively few who defend the modernism in the émigré literature. In their apology of the young modernists whom some patrons prefer to call innovators, they do not refrain from charges of retrogression, obscurantism, primitivism, directed against many an aggravated opponent.<sup>13</sup> The patrons of modernists also claim, without visible factual basis however, that the advancement of the modernistic trend in the émigré literature is parallel and in tune with new developments noticeable in the literature of the nineteen sixties in Ukraine. By and large, the two opposite poles, "traditional" and "modern" (the latter, to avoid ambiguity, is substituted for "contemporary") could not be treated on equal terms, for the literary output of "traditional" writers by far outweighs that of the "modernists", not only in its bulk, but also in social responsiveness.

A topic related to the subject of this article, namely "Traditional and Innovation", came under discussion on a symposium held during the second meeting of the "Slovo" Ukrainian Writers' Association in Exile in 1964. Tradition and innovation were presented in the light of typical conflict between two generations, the parents and the children. Tradition, although a tremendous force and mainstay against destructive attacks, it was argued, contains some inborn weaknesses, such as mechanization of consciousness, retardation of progress.<sup>14</sup> Modernism, as part of innovational programme, may coincide with a general crisis of man and humanity, but laying bare an abhorrent abyss of present dehumanization should not be considered its fault, on the contrary, thus a new modernistic trend in the émigré literature was defended by its ardent sympathizer.<sup>15</sup> A desirability of mutual impregnation with outcoming synthesis of both traditionalism and modernism was voiced by several other authors.<sup>16</sup> In this direction led also a statement of another speaker to the effect, that innovators of tomorrow always reconciled with the traditionalists of yesterday, no matter how bitter was a feud between both as contemporaries<sup>17</sup>. That such feelings were moving not only the members of the said panel, proves a well taken point in this respect, illustrated in an article "Classicism and Modernism in Ukrainian Poetry" years later, a result of another literary forum.<sup>18</sup> Reconciliatory thinking is, however, for the time being limited to casual literary platforms, the prevailing atmosphere in this question having not changed after a lapse of several years.

The latest (fourth) meeting of the "Slovo" Ukrainian Writers' Association in Exile, represented a large body of writers from the United States, Europe, Australia and Argentina, about 150 of them. The conference, characteristically, reflected even now the validity



of the above mentioned problem, traditionalism versus modernism, whereby a noticeable intensification of the latter among the members could be felt. The meeting took place in November 1970, in New York. Repeated calls for a more unified front in view of widened breach between two opposed concepts, warning voices of further estrangement among the now associates, dim reports of writers' gradual isolation from the readers, along with a firm determination to advance the cause of free literature abroad, such was the general undercurrent of the conference.<sup>19</sup>

The organization "Slovo", headed by H. Kostyuk, came into existence in 1954, with some known authors, like V. Miyakovs'kyi, Y. Lavrynenko, I. Kernyts'kyi, O. Tarnavs'kyi, M. Ponedilok, M. Shlemkevych, S. Hordyns'kyi, V. Lesych, among its initiators. "Slovo" professed in its declaration to continue the artistic ideals of the former central literary organization MUR and to provide a channel for Ukrainian literary process in the free world. All the Ukrainian émigré writers, it proclaimed, from the most traditional realists to the modernists at the extreme left, from the oldest to the youngest, should find place in the organization's ranks.<sup>20</sup> The Association's four voluminous Almanacs of poetry, fiction, art, essay, bibliography and documents appeared in 1962, 1964, 1968 and 1970.

In close relationship to "Slovo" a separate group of younger writers with strong modernistic affinities emerged in 1958, the so called New York Group of poets. The Group's writings move in a wide compass, from modernistic traits within a conventional framework to surrealist ruin of traditional grammar, bordering on the absurd and literary tantrum. Representative of the group is the poetess Emma Andiyevs'ka who began to write in the early nineteen fifties and sometimes achieved striking effects with her grotesque and goblin-like imagery. The New York Group, with its particularly active poets-modernists B. Boychuk, B. Rubchak, Y. Tarnavs'kyi and more temperate V. Vovk, enjoys considerable support from some older poets, e. g. baroque-symbolist V. Barka and "classical modernist" V. Lesych. In 1959 began appearing poetry collections of the Group, *New Poems*. To this group's determined modernism a typical equilibrium is given in expressly conservative type identified in the émigré poetry with the names of O. Babiy, M. Matiyiv-Melnyk, P. Savchuk, A. Granovs'kyi.

The very active life of the Ukrainian émigré writers, in terms of individual initiative or organized team-work, is by no means restricted to one framework of literary affiliation. Several other associations, societies, and groups dedicated to literature and art should be mentioned.

In 1965 a Ukrainian Cultural Workers' Association was chartered in Toronto, Canada.<sup>21</sup> It assembles creative persons of all spheres of cultural activities guided by the principle of sovereignty of Ukrainian

nation and its culture. The Association's large and steadily growing membership began in 1970 the publication *Estafette*, a journal profusely illustrated, of considerable artistic and literary standard, and rather broad scope. Art, poetry, prose, drama, art gallery, literary portraits, bibliography, book reviews, chronicles of current events in art and literature are well balanced and knowledgeably presented in the journal's 254 pages. Compared with both conventional and modern features represented in the almanac "Slovo", this publication presents a more traditional point of view, emphasizing the national aspects of culture. Several known figures in various cultural areas of Ukrainian social life, such as artists and essayists M. Kushnir and B. Stebels'kyi; writers O. Kerch, V. Havrylyuk, O. Lysyak, were among contributors to the first issue of *Estafette*. The name of the journal came apparently from the title of a meaningful poem by Lina Kostenko, an able Soviet Ukrainian poetess, now being politically suppressed. The ranks of the Association were recently joined by a strong group of literati and artists, active in the Institute of Ukrainian Culture in Detroit, Mich. In 1962 this group began with the publication of *Terem*, an illustrated journal of Ukrainian cultural problems, edited by a versatile prose writer Y. Tys-Krokhmaluk. Each of the three issues of *Terem*, that appeared, was dedicated to one representative feature (vol. 1, 1962, concentrating on archeology, vol. 2, 1966, on modernism in Ukrainian literature in exile, vol. 3, 1968, on art). The purpose of this journal is to gather information on the status and growth of Ukrainian culture in countries of the free world and to provide knowledge for the benefit of future researchers on the contributions of Ukrainians in the Americas, Europe and Australia.<sup>22</sup>

Besides several research institutes, museums, branches of the Shevchenko Scientific Society and the Ukrainian Free Academy of Sciences that are numerous and widely scattered all over the emigration area, cultivating literature as one of their fields of specialization, many literary groups exist independently or in some kind of affiliation with press organs, journals, literary almanacs and gazettes. Here could be named but a few of them, representative of their traditional or modern viewpoints respectively.

A periodical similar to this (also in English), edited by W. Dushnyck, with more emphasis on social and political issues presently, the *Ukrainian Quarterly*, appears since 1945 and is published by the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, in New York. There are still other publications available in English and other languages with regular literary features, but those discussed below and marked by traditional or modern priorities, appear in Ukrainian.

Suchasnist' (Contemporaneity), journal of literature, art and social life, published in Munich, Germany, since 1961, is obviously promoting modernistic trends under the editorship of I. Koshelivets,

essayist and translator. This journal is sponsored by the Foreign Representation of the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council.<sup>23</sup>

Vyzvol'nyy shlyakh (Liberation Path), a political, social, scientific and literary magazine, published over a period of more than 20 years by the Ukrainian Publishers Ltd. in London, and edited by H. Drabat, on the other hand, emphasizes the traditional point of view; it gives ample space to literary essays and poetry, and is a favoured forum for publicists and authors of memoirs.

Closely related in content as well as in general direction is the organ of the Organization of Four Freedoms for Ukraine, a monthly journal of social and political thought, *Visnyk (The Herald)* that is in its 25-th year of existence. Here belongs also *Avantgarde*, a monthly publication of the Ukrainian Youth Association that appears in Belgium and is particularly interesting by its regular feature of literary panorama.<sup>24</sup>

A provocative publication of a group of publicists headed by the late M. Shlemkevych could be classified as a protestant type of literature, with iconoclastic overtones directed against imperfections of some kind within religious and social institutions in exile. This journal, *The Letters to Friends*, published from 1952 until recently, reflected literary and philosophical interests.

A special place in the literary activities of Ukrainian émigrés, mainly in the United States, was occupied till 1964 by an independent literary and art magazine *Kyiv* that functioned as bi-monthly since 1950. Its publisher and editor, a scholar and literary critic, B. Romanenchuk, provided a suitable literary platform for many an author of traditional and, to some extent, modern bend of mind. Poetry, essays, short stories, book reviews were the regular features of this journal. Its board of editors was of the opinion that only émigré writers and artists can truly represent a free Ukrainian culture, since the Soviet men of culture have been serving in the interests of Moscow and the Communist Party.<sup>25</sup> Eternal Christian values in the best traditions of Western civilization were stressed here, as the journal's main point of view. Although *Kyiv*, after 15 years of literary services, ceased to appear, it was in a degree replaced by another literary publication authored by the same editor, namely *Azbukovnyk (Alphabetarion)*, a concise illustrated encyclopedia of Ukrainian literature and literary terms. Its purpose is to serve as an orientation tool within Ukrainian literature (past and present) and to provide biographic as well as bibliographic information.<sup>26</sup> Its first volume of 472 pages appeared in 1966.

Another journal, free from any party affiliation and strong in traditional motivations, is *Svitannya (The Predawn)*, dedicated to poetry, literature and literary essay specifically, in addition to art and philosophy. It resumed its publication in 1968. The editor, V. Shayan (Volodymyr), considers this to be a continuation of the previous work

done in the nineteen forties by the ideological literary movement apart from *MUR*, *Svitannya*, striving for a deeper and more meaningful sense in the Ukrainian literature. Among its initiators were prominent poets Y. Klen (O. Burghardt), M. Orest (M. Zerov), and the notable literary critic, V. Derzhavyn.<sup>27</sup> Poetic works and short prose, mainly by its editor, together with L. Murovych, a poetess-interpreter of Ukrainian antiquity, R. Volodymyr, author of lyricophilosophical poetry and prose; L. Roman and H. Mazurenko, both noted for intellectual content of their poetry, and productive writers, emotional or classical respectively, Y. Buryakivets' and I. Kachurovskyy, constitute a pre-eminent program of this serious magazine. Exploring, through literary creativity, the Ukrainian past traced back to prehistory distinguishes this quarterly publication from the others.

These are merely some typically selected vehicles of intensified group feelings, those of traditional or contemporary origin, given expression in a great family of Ukrainian émigré writers herein or elsewhere participating. The titles of organs dealt with do not exhaust the complex of creative work in existence. A huge literature, ranging from literary anthologies (anthology of Ukrainian poetry dedicated to the Freedom Fighters, *With Word and Arms*, 1968; an anthology of poetry and prose, *Literary Boykoland*, 1969; an anthology of Ukrainian émigré poetry in 2 volumes, *Co-ordinates*, 1970), multifarious almanacs, such as *Northern Lights*, published since 1964 by the poet and linguist Y. Slavutych in Edmonton, Canada, also literary supplements to the periodical press organs, e. g. *Ukrainian Echo* in Toronto, *Canadian Farmer* in Winnipeg, Canada, or *Svoboda* in Jersey City, N. J., down to a lighter sort, viz. literary gazette *Volosozhar*, published by the fable writer and parodist, I. Manylo, is an eloquent proof of the indestructible spirit moving a legion of Ukrainian literati.

One more unique publication should be mentioned at this place, namely a quarterly for art, poetry and fiction, *Original Works*, devised to provide an outlet for creative writing in foreign languages.<sup>28</sup> Edited by R. Flores of the University of Victoria, B. C., Canada, the journal has appeared since 1964, and offers an additional avenue of expression to a score of Ukrainian émigré poets.

The contribution of an individual Ukrainian writer in exile is frequently prolific, as well as versatile; it often amounts to several collections of poetry, short stories, with possibly a few novels in addition, for one person. There are undeniable achievements in the field of prose and poetry, characteristic of minute observation of life and more refined intrinsic qualities, that mark the last few decades of Ukrainian literature in exile. Poets, as usually before in Ukrainian literature, have a recognized lead in it. There is undoubtedly a poetry cult among Ukrainians, says a known prose writer, "our national consciousness grew out of our poetry".<sup>29</sup> The canvass of the Ukrainian

émigré poetry is broad and diversified: from a modified classicism, represented by poet-philosopher M. Orest and carried on by other poets sensitive to the word culture, through symbolic responsiveness to reality in a work permeated by the dark expressionism of T. Os'machka or ethereal quality of V. Barka, far into realms of ever-traditional and ever-contemporary combined, with national accents imprinted by E. Malanyuk, O. Lyaturyns'ka, or universal overtones of O. Stefanovych, V. Lesych, on different poles.

Compared to a vast number of poets or poets who write prose, there are relatively few authors dedicated completely to prose writing.<sup>80</sup> The émigré prose remains faithful to a modernized version of realism. Its compass is considerable: a profound account of his time given by F. Meleshko in his trilogy *Three Generations* (of which the third volume is to be published posthumously); actual themes in Ukrainian émigré literature centering around gruesome existence under the Soviets (works by O. Mak, O. Zvychnayna together with M. Mlakovyy, Z. Donchuk, etc.); conventional fiction, social novels, of manners, such as D. Yaroslavs'ka, Y. Ostruk, U. Samchuk, O. Kerch, O. Parfanovych, V. Haydarivs'kyi, A. Halan present; a lyrical decorative prose of V. Barka, M. Ponedilok, L. Kolens'ka; historic and biographic novels by D. Humenna, H. Zhurba, N. Koroleva, Y. Tys-Krochmalyuk; and even science-fiction, as in case of V. Vynnychenko, L. Kovalenko. This type of literature badly needs its historian but the only historian of this category who did his work sincerely and objectively, V. Radzykevych, died a few years ago.

Not much can be said about dramatic literature written by Ukrainian émigrés. Those writers, few as they are, write mainly for entertainment or to answer the patriotic requirements of the public. A work dealing with a problem of universal significance, offering new ideas and deeper psychological insight, has yet to be written. For this type of drama, however, there is neither an émigré public, nor a ready dramatist. In fact, there is no theatre available in exile to undertake a task that requires not only dedicated author, but professionally engaged director as well as actors.

There is one important matter that this writer would like to stress in conjunction with difficulties of creating Ukrainian émigré literature. Indiscriminate criticism, fragmentary and cliquish as it appears at the present stage, seems to be partly responsible for the unsatisfying attainment in some of the literary production. Critically disposed men of letters consume their energy in attacking each other, be it in such controversial issues as "traditional" and "modern" respectively, or in denying an opponent's competence, and a disliked author's ability. Besides, they often focus their literary evaluation around purely formal aspects of a period, author or work, dwelling on matters related to pedantic purity of language, schools of writing, classification schemes in which to relegate an author,<sup>81</sup> or his objec-

tionable style, syntax, technique of versification and the like. Thus, they often neglect essential things, raising questions of the work's profundity, universality, inherent artistic values.

It is too early to pass a final judgment of what should be considered a great or just a mediocre work in the maze of recent literary production of the Ukrainian émigré symbiosis. Neither the traditional camp, nor any groups of modernists seem to have produced lately an outstanding work of art that could be generally recognized as such. Works in exile most spoken of display some kind of utilitarian basis rather than strictly artistic quality, as a rule. Others, unknown or surrounded by silence, would have to wait for their future appreciation. One thing is certain, though: Ukrainian émigré literature is worthwhile reading and studying. It is an earnest, honest, ingenuous literature, perhaps unequalled in its sincerity and simplicity of the sentiment. Thanks to its moral content, ideals, constructive objectives and traditional aesthetics (even the extreme modernists are not quite free from the impact of a heritage), it might be able to fertilize and enrich the world literature in the present stage of its crisis, should only the Western world become cognizant of the existence of Ukrainian émigré literature.

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## NOTES ON UKRAINE'S HISTORY

# THE AGE OF GRAND DUCHESS OLHA

*By A. W. BEDRIY, M.A., M.S.*

1969 marked the 1000th anniversary of the death of a great Ukrainian ruler, the Grand Duchess Olha, sometime later proclaimed Saint. In the human mind the space of time between that date and the present is great, for if one were to measure social life in terms of generations, then it would amount to 50-70 generations. However, when one considers the fact that the period of Olha's rule was the period close to the zenith of the might of the Ukrainian State and realizes that the age of her rule came as the result of the life of countless generations, whose beginnings could be traced to the pre-historic antiquity, then the mention of this date gives us an opportunity to view the thousand-year-old life of the Ukrainian nation, to recall its age of grandeur and to gain from this new strenght to overcome the grave situation in which Ukraine finds herself today.

In 945 when after the death of her husband, the Grand Duke Ihor, Olha became the regent of the Ukrainian State, the traditions of state life in Ukraine were strong and already had a long past. Let us recall the age of the Grand Dukes Oleh and Ihor (882-945), who established a sovereign, united state not as a national politico-military force, but as a nationally conscious original state on the basis of the statehood aspirations of the foregoing generations. Let us recall the initial formative period of this state during the reign of Prince Askold in the 9th century, whose chief aim was to free Ukraine from the domination of the Khazars. Let us recall the two-hundred-year long period of maturation of the forces demanding a Ukrainian state under the Khazar domination. Let us recall the stormy, although little known, period in the life of the Ukrainian nation, under the names of Antes and Slavs, after the departure of the Huns and the Goths from the Ukrainian territories. Finally, let us go back to the Greco-Ukrainian, that is, Hellenistic Bosphorus State, which lasted for 840 years, beginning with the 5th century B.C. One can go back even further into antiquity, through the little-known epoch of the Cimmerian state, as far back as the beginnings of the Ukrainian nation in the so-called Trypilian culture in the fourth-third millennia B.C.



The greatness of Olha stems first of all from her understanding of the then geo-political, cultural and economic position of Ukraine and her application of a wise policy with respect to the three major aspects of state life. Olha grasped the essence of the inherently Ukrainian state-constitutional, spiritually cultural and social processes. One chronicler aptly remarked: "She was the wisest among all people".

Olha's predecessors built the state upon the conservative, pagan Ukrainian nationalism, oriented upon the Khazar concept of cultural and religious tolerance, the paramount importance of international trade as the power basis of the state, and the Viking concept of a military ruling class. Olha de-facto started a revolution in the Ukrainian concept of state: converting to Christianity, she accepted an inherently Ukrainian concept of Christian nationalism. By the christianization of foreign policy, she introduced Ukraine into the circle of the Christian states of Europe, but, on the other hand, preserved "the Khazar heritage", i. e., ancient Ukrainian traditions of internal federalism, pluralism, cultural tolerance; in other words, she rejected the Byzantine caesaro-papism, imperialistic centralism, and the despotic and totalitarian outlook. Ukraine was to become a separate political and cultural entity between Europe and Asia and was to stop playing the role of a satellite of Byzantium and Khozaria.

The change of policy followed by Ukraine reflected the change in the international situation. During the reign of Oleh and Ihor the power of the Khozars and the Pechenigs, who always served as Byzantium's allies against Ukraine, had eroded. The dissolution of this anti-Ukrainian alliance was largely brought about by the military victories of Oleh and Ihor, as well as Olha's diplomacy. Her trip to Byzantium (957) was the greatest diplomatic success in this direction. It seems that during Olha's reign Ukraine achieved the best position in relation to Byzantium, as the climax in the hundred-year growth of Ukraine as a rival of Byzantium for the hegemony in the Black Sea area. Symbolically this alliance was manifested by the Byzantine emperor, when he became Olha's godfather.

In Central Europe Christianity was fast expanding. The "Christianization" of Ukraine's policy meant that Olha turned her attention to the West and from her date Ukraine's continuous ties with Central European states. In 959 Olha sent a mission to the Roman Empire of the German People with the request to send missionaries to Ukraine. The German emperor viewed this important diplomatic move with favour and a mission under the leadership of Adalbert left for Ukraine, although it never reached its destination. The sole remnant of this mission is a church in Peremyshl'.

Prior to Olha, Ukraine's contacts with Western Europe went through Byzantium or Scandinavia. Now Kyïv established direct diplomatic relations with the countries of Central Europe. The ties

with Germany helped Ukraine to achieve a stronger position in relation to Byzantium, and from the time of Olha's reign dated a long-time friendship between Ukraine and Germany, which at times was directed against Poland.

It is interesting to note, that the first German attack on Poland took place in 963, i. e., at the time when the Ukrainian-German coalition was being established. Polish prince, Mieszko, understood the threat to Poland posed by this alliance and immediately became friendly with the German emperor, Otto I, and already in 965 the Polish state officially accepted Christianity of the Latin Rite. One of the insignificant yet meaningful facts is Mieszko's gift to the German emperor in the form of a camel which got to Poland as the result of trade between Ukraine and Bohemia and Germany. In 965 a Jewish diplomat and merchant from Spain, Ibrahim ibn Jacob was at the court of Emperor Otto the Great and noticed that "Ukrainian and Slav merchants" came from Cracow to Prague.

As the result of the flourishing trade between Ukraine and Central European states, Novgorod began to decline: from now on trade with Ukraine went through Western routes. Prior to Olha's reign, Ukrainian international relations were greatly influenced by Khozaria, Byzantium and the Vikings. During Olha's reign Ukraine assumed an independent position in international relations, as the result of the discovery of new balancing factors.

Under Olha's leadership an internal transformation of Ukraine was taking place, from the original isolationism, the provincialism of the preceding generations, and the deep conservatism of state and social forms, into a new, modern, European nation. These internal changes were taking place by way of evolution, which signified a high level of social and cultural development and differentiation. The new was not implanted by force, and the old did not become reactionary: the conservative and progressive forces organically united themselves into a new state-national synthesis.

During the time of Princess Olha a constitutional reform was put into effect: the Ukrainian State changed from a confederation of provinces-tribes into a federative State. A dramatic proof of this change was the abolition of semi-independence or rather de-facto independence of the Derevlyany tribe. It must be remembered that, as early as the reign of Oleh, all Ukrainian provinces-tribes recognized Kyiv as their capital. Oleh formulated the then confederative concept of Ukrainian State, calling Kyiv "the mother of all Ukrainian cities". In 884 he passed a law which said that no Ukrainian territory should pay tribute to the Khozars anymore. Outward independence of the entire Ukrainian territory was confirmed by the treaties of Oleh and Ihor with Byzantium, in which Byzantium recognized the de-facto existence of the Ukrainian State, which extended over all Ukrainian provinces.

During Olha's reign Kyïv became not only the formal, but the actual capital of Ukraine. Before her reign the leading statesmen from the provinces remained in their provincial capitals, and all state power was concentrated in the hands of the people of Kyïv, the Polyany tribe and the Vikings. Olha called the leading individuals from the provinces to the central government and in turn sent her officials to the provinces. During Olha's reign the influence of the Vikings began to decrease, remaining only with the military. The national government in Kyïv was influenced to some degree by a large local Jewish colony. The Jews were the promoters of Ukraine's international trade, the bearers of some cultural influences. Everything contributed to the establishment in Ukraine of a non-despotic, anti-totalitarian political and social order. The provinces, *i. e.* the local population began to participate more actively in international relations. Oleh and Ihor treated Kyïv as a political capital of Ukraine; Olha added to this the characteristics of a cultural capital. For this reason a complex of a Ukrainian Christian messianism began to take shape in Kyïv during Olha's reign. Oleh and Ihor built the State on military power and economic strength, including trade.

Princess Olha paid much attention to the development of national economy and domestic trade. She journeyed through the provinces in order to acquaint herself with local conditions. Because of her state visits, the memory about Olha lingered on for generations. She was pictured as a wise administrator and an outstanding social leader. Olha systematically organized large-scale hunts for animals whose furs brought the greatest profits in international trade. The chronicles note that Olha set rules for hunting regions and established a uniform system of taxation for all provinces-tribes.

The Ukrainian State of the time also helped in the planning of agriculture. Its economic policy served as a great unifying force for the whole nation.

By her conversion to Christianity, Olha gave an example to her subjects, but she did not try to make Christianity the state religion by force. Her Christianity was the Christianity of deeds, a striving for improvement and was characterized by a high level of social responsibility. Nevertheless individual Ukrainians were not forced to accept Christianity against their will and foreign minority groups were not persecuted because they practiced different religions.

While in Byzantium, Olha presented the emperor with a gift made by Ukrainian craftsmen: a golden plate, inlaid by pearls and with the engraving of Jesus Christ. This fact proves that at that time artists-Christians were working in Ukraine. In Ukrainian cultural life an original neo-hellenistic age began: Ukrainian artists were brought up on Byzantine ideas and examples, but immediately adapted them to the national culture, which was under the influence of Byzantium, but was not her cultural province.

It goes without saying that Olha played a significant role in Ukrainian history. She was largely responsible for the transformation of the Ukrainian nation into one of the most modern, progressive and cultured nations of the world of the Middle Ages. In the interval of over 100 years, beginning with the second half of the 9th century, Ukraine gave out a number of unusually able rulers: Askold, Oleh, Ihor, Olha, Svyatoslav. Each of them took over the achievements of his predecessors and added his own contribution, so that with the reign of each of these monarchs Ukraine became more powerful, grew and developed. In this succession of rulers, Grand Duchess Olha occupies a prominent place. She contributed to the reinforcement of the foundations of the Rus'-Ukrainian State, which kept its sovereignty, although in varying degrees, until the middle of the 14th century, that is, for the next 400 years. She emerges from history as a figure with the qualities which are inherent to Ukrainian rulers: a truly federative concept of a Ukrainian State, a geo-political concept at the crossroads of various cultures and forces, a Christian outlook, reconciled with an ancient national conservatism, humanitarianism and toleration of differences, national sovereignty, the grandeur of Kyiv as a national, European and Christian capital.

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### MYKHAYLO SOROKA REMEMBERED

A new work from Ukraine, entitled "Bilmo" (Cataract) has recently appeared in the West.

"Bilmo" — is the autobiographical tale of its author, Mykhaylo Osadchyy, professor at the University of Lviv, who was arrested on August 28, 1965, and subsequently sentenced to two years of imprisonment on April 18, 1966, for his alleged "anti-Soviet propaganda and agitation". M. Osadchyy was released in 1968 and supposedly wrote this book at this time. In it the author relates about his arrest, the interrogations, his stay in prison and in Mordovian concentration camps. Special attention is warranted by his accounts of meetings and conversations with various political prisoners.

Below we are reprinting a passage from "Bilmo" about Mykhaylo Soroka, long-time political prisoner in the pre-war Poland and Russian prisons and concentration camps after the last war.

Mykhaylo Soroka 'died' in Mordovia on June 16, 1971.

"I always approached Mykhaylo Mykhaylovych (Soroka) from the rear", states Mykhaylo Osadchyy in "Bilmo". "I wanted to greet him first. Greeting someone first was also his cunning. But he suddenly appeared from the side, — one has to be able to do that too. He liked the slope above the stadium and the harbour stationed upon it. Hereha's\* flowers as well as a birch tree grew there. I often liked to

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\* The name of another Ukrainian political prisoner. — Ed.

be amusing and was rather inclined to making analogies. I saw the incline clearly and on it the teachers, who nevertheless could not solve the mystery of the school bird.

"Mykhaylo Mykhaylovych", I thought. Sometimes we become so fascinated with something, but we don't know why.

I crept up from behind and greeted him first. He raised his eyes in wonder and contracted them craftily. "How is your boring and chiselling machine? Have you furnished Danilyev yet, carpenter?"

"Mykhaylo Mykhaylovych", I thought. What bright eyes he has! You notice them on his face first. Then when he walks on the snow, he never slips. After twenty-eight camp winters he has learned to walk upright and to place his feet correctly. He is a sceptic. And furthermore, a sceptic, a yogi. He has perfected himself in all ways, even his mind. He has frozen it above the drab everyday humdrum. Tell him, that tomorrow at nine the gates will be open and all — go to blazes! 'Ah, yes', says he, 'surely!' and craftily narrows his eyes. He doesn't believe in anything, this non-believer, who stands above everything, leaning on the cane of scepticism. One can see him like this, and run away from him, like the teachers down the slope.

"Mykhaylo Mykhaylovych", I thought. It is impossible to figure him out. As soon as you fall into bed and close your eyes, you immediately see — a great bird perched on a small cliff. Him... His knowledge is not of a camp sort, but one cannot survive in camp without it. Ten years of yoga exercises, ten years of alienation. Flowers live elsewhere, the brain — there, and the body on a different shore. They can blend into one. This is also yoga. Yoga and decades of years salvaged from death. There exists an uncontrollable desire to survive and to become free. Twenty-eight years of concentration camps and prisons! "Mykhaylo Mykhaylovych", I thought. Five years of Polish 'defensive'. And then — different, more native, inexpressible. Altogether twenty-eight. I had only two years and almost went mad at times. I was a teacher, I ran down the slope: how? How long can one survive on watered-down soup? The years terrified me. Somewhere here, there was a great bird and a small cliff. I saw this clearly. It was enough for me to close my eyes at night. And furthermore — fate. His wife, Kateryna Zarytska, has been in concentration camps for nineteen years. At present she is in the Vladimir prison. She also survived. Once in a while, their son comes to visit them. He is an artist; he grew up without his parents.

"Mykhaylo Mykhaylovych", I thought. When he receives news from him, he forgets about yoga for a month. He walks about and smiles at everyone. He forgets about his scepticism and becomes talkative. He relates of his meetings with the poet Oles';\* he reads his poetry. Their meeting took place in Prague, in an ancient coffee-house. There they drank Pilsen beer, and now there stands a

\* A Ukrainian poet. — Ed.

commemorative plaque over the table, where the great Oles' once sat.

Now from time to time, they take Soroka to Kyiv or Lviv. They dress him up in a black tuxedo and take him to the theatre. He watches Korniychuk's "Pages of a Diary". They lead him to the Institute of Cybernetics, where gray-haired professors shake his hand and acquaint him with science. Then Mykhaylo Mykhaylovych laughs. "They shake my hand", he says, "but they don't know that this is the hand of a convict. They would have forgotten their science", he says, "had they known what a 'Canadian' this is!"

He was escorted around Lviv by elegantly dressed men. He recalled everything and it was very painful for him. This was not an attempt to acquaint him with the beautiful life, but rather an act of cruelty. They confronted him with the fact that he may never see all this again, but perhaps... It was his choice. It's frightening — for twenty years not to walk down the sidewalk, not to inhale human fragrances. He has aged. He is no longer accustomed to all this and it tires him now. Happiness ages him. "His bright face doesn't get any younger", I thought. And when he gradually quiets down, when he withdraws to his small cliff, one can again see him leaning on his cane of scepticism. He then sneaks up from the side again and greets you first. He again craftily narrows his eyes. Then he tells you of how he was executed once. For a few months he awaited sentence and imagined his own shot-up chest and a wall full of holes, for the soldiers do not always hit the body.

And then he would remember his son, Bohdan. He became excited at seeing him in his souvenir tie. He grew emotional, suddenly coming across his unwashed garment. And then he wanted everything to change; for day to begin not in the morning, but at night, if only for an instant. Then he would be able to see his own death and thus know beforehand what awaits him. It would be easier to live that way. All that night, he imagined he was sewing on missing buttons on his son's coat.

"Mykhaylo Mykhaylovych", I thought. He knows several foreign languages; he knows contemporary literature very well, and even has his favourite authors. "I can count them on the fingers of one hand", he says, and then raises his hand. He shows it to all and declares that the nightly rotation of the universe is not worthy of a single steady hand which holds a spoonful of watery soup. Even the creator of the world stands perplexed and raises his shoulders helplessly. Even Einstein says: "Everything in the world is so complicated, that I have discovered the theory of relativity but can't really say what it is..."

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The book "Bilmo" (Cataract), supposedly written by Mykhaylo Osadchyy, was smuggled to the West without the knowledge or the agreement of the author. This underground publication has been circulating in Ukraine since 1968.

# Quo Vadis, Occidente?

## RADICALISM AND SECURITY

*By Ivan Matteo LOMBARDO*

*Chairman of the European Freedom Council,  
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Individual and collective liberties, the stability and security of a community, can only thrive when law is sovereign and order is the frame within which human beings are competing in the political, economic and social fields.

The fabric of a society, and mainly when same is economically and technologically developed, cannot stand for long time the strains and stresses of violent agitations, of internecine struggles, of disorderly conduct, of the withering out of law: it will start to decay with an accelerating tempo that will inevitably lead to its disintegration.

The greatest foe of human social order is violence as an outlet of rabid instincts, as a substitute to norms and laws. In organized societies it stems from the radicalization of the political and social struggle. Throughout history, numerous indeed have been the tyrants, the adventurers, the madmen, the sophists, the demagogues who have exalted violence as the most creative fact of historical progress. And every time, invariably, they have found people eager to listen to them and ready to put into deeds their words, and active minorities allured and ensnared by all sort of irrational and criminal paeans and gospels of hatred and havoc.

One should not forget that, after all, man's instincts are what they are. If not restrained by self-discipline and constrained by the rules of organized societies, primeval urges and lust for power, domination, unfettered licence, let such instincts loose so that they become homicidal, rapacious and destructive.

Possibly, it befits only to "homo sapiens" to indulge in the defilement of his own image and to revert to the troglodytical caveman incapable of behaving according to elementary rules of co-existence within a clan, a tribe, a community. In the animal reign sheer hatred, and lust of violence "per se", are the uncanny prerogatives of "homo sapiens" who, quite often indeed, would deserve the more appropriate definition of "homo insapiens". Inasmuch as he never learns, even from his own experience...

Any community (and more so an organized society) must be an orderly one, lest the worst mishaps and misery may befall upon the whole of that human congregation, because of the misconduct and misdeeds of a portion of it. Moreover when human beings damage and tear the weft and filling of the society

they are living in, they are substantially hurting and imperiling themselves together with the society they combat. It seems they are unable to realize the point. Paradoxically enough, the paramount stupidity of sawing the branch upon which one is sitting, could only bloom in the mind of the "naked ape".

An organized society may not be suicidal, cannot prescind from the imperatives of self preservation and survival, must not fall prey of violence and chaos; therefore it ought to prevent by every means that anarchy which could install itself in its midst. Order being the pre-theoretical condition upon which all civilized political alternatives rest, governments are obligated to maintain that essential condition. Violence in itself is sterile, but when it is being exercised against order, upon which civility and freedom are based, it is essentially criminal.

We can concede that the shrill advocates of the use of violence are generally bred by an ethical-political crisis, caused by the weakening of the beliefs and creeds and values which are at the basis of the institutions ruling the community. The motives for such an anomalous and devastating situation ought to be traced in some ethical deficiency, or in excessive permissiveness, or in the insufficient — maybe wrong — utilization of the means at the disposal of a community for its preservation and continuity. That situation is never accidental, but represents the consequence of a series of wrong actions or inactions, of inconsiderate will or lack of it, of dejection or omissions, or of a combination of them all.

Even strong social structures, guaranteed by liberal-democratic institutions and established governments, could be ultimately wrecked by the mushrooming of groups of action stirring continuous agitation and aiming at the destruction of the system.

If a state, wherein such happenings take place, does not exercise surveillance of the disruptive groups; does not prevent the degenerescence of labour conflicts into unlawful and high-handed acts; does not check the subversive infiltrations in its police and armed forces and civil service; does not prevent the misuse of the modern mass communication media (and more so when they are stateowned monopolies); does not quell violence — timely and with the necessary energy, using the instruments of law and legal force at its command — that state cannot escape a dire fate.

Permissiveness breeds licence, licence breeds violence, violence culminates in anarchy and terrorism. Both destroy the fabric of society, by creating insecurity and fear in civil life, the further weakening of governments, doubtful loyalty in its forces of order, lack of security in the military defence of the country. Finally, in the wake of anarchy and terrorism, guerrilla warfare and/or civil war will inevitably blaze a wild fire throughout the country.

Sad omens indicate that the phenomenon of the explosion of extremism in the most acute forms we are confronted with in the present epoch, is liable to settle in most of our countries as a permanent feature of disorder, as a cancer gnawing at their vitals.

The globality and suddenness of the expanse of this phenomenon is rather new in the history of mankind, in the sense that it is not limited and/or justified by some specific motivation related to a single country, but has been spreading



as an epidemic among the people of societies, either actually affluent, or still bent on expectations. It has reached every level of the society; it derides and antagonizes respectable and consolidated traditions; it aims at destroying the established system, its foundations and structures, its protagonists and makers; it questions and indicts every value of our society; ethical, religious, cultural, political, economical and social.

We are confronted with clamorous expectations bordering upon revolt, with repudiations and negations exploding into an iconoclastic fury, with such excesses and mischievous conduct as to be identifiable with sheer anarchy.

Political frontiers fail nowadays to protect the people from the spirit of subversion, from the anarchical and terroristic endeavours which are promoted, supported and fed by common matrixes, at a world level.

It seems as if a substantial portion of mankind has cancelled the word to-morrow from its mental schemes; it is for to-day that **everything**, no better specified, has to be acquired, and "pronto"!

Numerous human beings hysterically repudiating superior ethical laws, and trampling on every valuable tradition, are blindly yielding to an urge of irrational, unlimited violence. Mesmerized by the audio-visual means, which are universally and simultaneously feeding their crass ignorance, and their aping and parrot-like dispositions with somebody's else words and deeds reacting as a drug on their neurotic and woozy minds, they seem to be going amuck.

Technical progress and economic development are nothing more than instruments at the disposal of men and communities for the purpose of ensuring them a wider freedom, a stabler order, a most equitable justice. When law is abused, order is trampled, freedom is downgraded to licence, a crisis derives, and it breeds various aspects and forms of slavery, in accordance with the circumstances in which coercion is being exercised on man: then comes the end of a society organized along liberal-democratic lines. As Will Durant reminds us: "Civilization begins with order, grows with liberty, and dies with chaos", and "when liberty becomes licence, dictatorship is near".

The anarchical movements having suddenly exploded (and mainly in the Western world, and more so in societies fully affluent, or on the way of becoming such) are something different from the ancient patterns of classical anarchism: either an emotional "anti-exploitative" brand motivated by the poverty of the past century in the under-developed countries of those times; or a bloody gesture against symbols of despotism, accomplished by austere and often self-sacrificing individuals.

Instead, most of the contemporary species of parlour and campus neo-anarchism of youthful millionaires, of well fed mini-"nihilists", burgeoning in the midst of the widespread prosperity of industrial countries in this second half of the century, are freakish exhibitionists expatiating between masochism and sadism, dope and violence, ignorance and arrogance. A few exceptions do confirm the rule.

It is worth remarking that, eventually, the resurrected anarchist vogue has very little to do with the character of formerly libertarian individualistic anarchism. The present trend is connotated by a type of authoritarian caste

anarchism. Most of the Italian neo-anarchists, f. i., stem from the bosom of the so-called upper classes, therefore giving credit to a Lenin's aphorism according to which "ideologically, an anarchist is just a bourgeois turned inside out".

The self-advertised "revolutionists" of the movements, groups and grouplets of the "New Left" and "Extra parliamentary opposition" don't have enough nerve to openly proclaim that their struggle against the liberal-democratic, pluralistic, western-type of society, aims at a single-centered, anti-democratic, illiberal, totalitarian one. We have already something of the kind almost half a century, ago, in Italy, and it was called Fascism and it pretended to be a "revolution"...

These New Left "revolutionists" generally belong to "bourgeois" social layers of society, with a prevalence of the most well-off ones. They claim to be, or pose, as "intellectuals", and "elitists", and take easily hold of a half-educated mass of students, University "drop-outs", and followers of some more or less learned cranks who adore publicity. They all have in common, essentially, two traits: they despise the toilers, as their noisily mingling with or enticing the workers to join them, is merely instrumental; they feel to be the only anointed ones for the task of participating (tomorrow, in the "new order") in the ruling class or caste. In fact, the ill-defined "revolution" configured by the "New Left" appears to be of a peculiar brand: it appeals to those who have much, and is slated to be imposed upon those who have less — or nothing. But its essential and awesome feature is that it has to be thoroughly destructive of the present system, with the inescapable result that it would lead to an uncompromising despotical pattern.

As Gilbert Seldes wittily remarked time ago, "there is nothing more old-fashioned than the radical revolutionary; revolution as a method is 5.000 years old and 100 years too old"... In fact our rabid leftist extremists are chewing with a Marcussian denture the cud of Bakunin's one century old primitivism, of Tkachev's and Nechayev's lust for power, violence and murder. And since the three have contributed a good deal to Lenin's thinking for his organizational model of the Bolshevik Party, and for its pattern for the conquest of power, no wonder these extremists proclaim to be, or are in their core, full-blooded Leninists.

The New Left wholly negative "philosophy" about the present society is essentially determined by its scorn for democratic institutions. And the petulantly requested blind act of faith in the character of the world that would eventually emerge out of their arrogant and wild assumptions, does not conceal notwithstanding all the chattering — that through sheer violence and instinctual rioting, the veritable aim is the outcome of a system heading towards a totalitarian tyranny which they consider, implicitly, as the best thing for the masses. Their high-pitched heralding for "participatory democracy" is nothing different from the well known pattern of "Soviet democracy" or "popular democracy", which are the bouncing checks by which are settled the wonders promised, but not fulfilled, in terms of freedom, justice and prosperity...

At the roots of rampant neo-anarchism, of the multi-faceted New Left, of freakish forms of dissent, one finds as common denominator the total refusal

of the ethical values — be they in the realm of the supernatural, or within the boundaries of the natural, or related to living realities — of the societies based on the Western liberal-democratic pattern.

Those who are old enough, are able to recognize old tunes in contemporary refrains; to acknowledge the revival of the methods of a “topsy turvy democracy” by which small minorities lay down their law which the greatest majority should have to suffer and to abide to; to witness the violent and disruptive means adopted once again for creating havoc and for grabbing power.

The common features of Communism, Fascism, Nazism, and of other movements akin to them, have been borne to mankind by Bolshevism. They are the natural offspring of the same Leninist matrix of horrors. The political and behavioural chromosomes and genes of the contemporary explosion of extremism, acknowledges that kinship. Even when it pretends to disprove or antagonize muscovite Communism, it is practically playing in its hands; and while pretending, or feigning, not to be moulded by a totalitarian mentality, it is striving hard for opening the way to a system which cannot prescind from a despotic, totalitarian rule.

Nothing is new under the sun.

When in my country I hear ruffians of the New Left hurl at somebody the “dirty” word “Fascist”, I cannot refrain from smiling because they avow the same mentality, they follow the same methods, they relish the same lust for violence, they denounce the same shallowness of thought which were the peculiar traits of the rowdy bullies of 50 years ago in their struggle for power allegedly for the sake of “Giovinezza” (Youth).

When one reads a sentence of this kind: “Down with the state, the state of yesterday, today and tomorrow, the Bourgeois State and the Socialist State. There remains for me now nothing but the consoling religion of Anarchism”, one wonders who wrote it: it was Mussolini in 1921 (vid. “Popolo d’Italia”), and in 1922 he had grabbed power! Yet, as a practical example of humbuggery it sounds so strikingly coeval.

And when one is being taught that: “The one means that wins the easiest victory over reason: terror and force” and “The very first essential for success is a perpetually constant and regular employment of violence”, and realizes that they are embedded in Hitler’s “Mein Kampf” (1935), one is well fixed about the antecedents of the “philosophy” of the present New Left.

The contemporary extremists of the entire spectrum relish — as did the Fascists in the ‘20s and the Nazis in the ‘30s and the Communists since half a century — such words that can create tensions, fan hatred, stir up riots, all of which will lead to the use of the weapons of mob violence and massive civil disorders.

It becomes, therefore, sort of gibberish to try to assess fundamental differences between political extremisms. Inasmuch as they can be interchangeable as it has been often proved in my country: f. i., when after the “march on Rome” — and for number of years thereafter — the once most rabid communists and leftist extremists flocked in the Fascist Party; and when, after Liberation, quite a host of former “black-shirts” turned their allegiance to the Communist

Party. And today too, individual transmigrations between the followers of leftist extremism and those of rightwing radicalism, are not uncommon.

What is highly distressing, in my country, for an unbiased observer with an instinct for pertinence is to witness how History can be repetitious and how it fails to teach something, out of past experience, to human beings. The democratic institutions are weakening day by day, their strength is sapped, their charism is on the wane because the civilian leadership, far from taking corrective measures and mustering the necessary toughness, which is indispensable for the safeguard of a liberal-democratic system, left things actually decay, banking upon some miracle and hoping for the best...

Events and developments, general situations and specific trends, bear an ominous resemblance to happenings which took place in the early '20s in Italy, beliving Premier Facta's trust in a turn for the better, and led to dictatorship; to what occurred throughout the lifetime of the Weimar Republic until it floundered disastrously; to the three years which saw President Benes's Czechoslovakia relentlessly undermined and eroded until its model democracy ultimately expired under the "coup d'état" of 1948.

To strive to abolish legal authority is the quickest way for destroying the liberal democratic institutions and means of keeping in shape a pluralistic society. In the absence of law and order the community and the individuals are exposed to such abuses, coercion and impairing of personal freedom that they are inevitably led to react by eagerly invoking a strong authority. I have witnessed in my country the phenomenon of leftist extremism in the early '20s, which provoked and eventually justified the inception of Fascism, the creation of a totalitarian state, and the ensuing dictatorial adventurism. And again, when on the brink of another lapse into chaos, heading towards red totalitarianism — because of Communist and Socialist extremism — in the late '40s: luckily the memory of the Italian people was still vivid enough about one score years of dictatorial regime, and they prevented the catastrophe by defeating the "popular front" at the general elections of 1949. We are witnessing again, since some years, the unmitigated folly rampant in Italian politics and trade-unionism, and I can honestly state that the very wish, either explicitly formulated or deeply nurtured within his bosom by the man-in-the street, pleads for a return to strong authority.

I can testify about white and blue collars, petty civil servants, housewives, craftsmen, store-keepers, retired persons, grumbling today about the necessity of a "strong man" for restoring order, no matter how. Many of them, either advocate an authoritarian rule by some "colonels", or are frankly nostalgic about the "orderly old times", meaning the fascist dictatorship... In a recent poll by a demoscopic institute ("Doxa"), at a question put forth by the interviewers in a rather edulcorated and tranquilizing way for gathering the sincerest answers, 63.7% of males and 67.6% of females have expressed their aspiration for a Providence-sent strong man. (i)

- (i) The question was formulated as follows: "If a disinterested, honest, strong man, solely concerned about the welfare of all the Italians, were to be found, would you vote for temporarily investing him with full powers for the purpose of accomplishing the most urgent reforms?"

Conversely, there are managers, entrepreneurs, magistrates, administrators, technicians — who are agonizing over the general situation, the anarchists' threat, the general climate of disorder and unruliness — who aren't loath at admitting that the communists may be the ultimate solution for quelling the extremists' fury and putting in order the house! Their reasoning is that, after all, compared to the nonsensical and disruptive agitation of the so-called "New Left", the C.P. has its own logic in terms of enforced discipline and limitation of freedom for stamping out anarchy: something which is worth "trying" ... Of course, they don't realize that it is not a matter of a "trial", but of a "final solution", and an irreversible one!

Therefore, utter confusion in the minds and hearts of the majority of the Italian people: for putting an end to unruly and rowdy extremism, which creates an unbearable situation and aims at destructive solutions, the final recourse should be a dictatorial rule. Those who want law and order to be restored are, thus, contradictorily advocating another undemocratic, illiberal, despotic solution, either by the so-called "right" or by a communist take-over... Extremism either by vicarious, or by direct ways, leads inevitably to the instauration of a tyrannical outcome, regardless of what this would mean in terms of human freedom, security of the free political institutions, stability and efficiency in the economic field, security for the defence of the independence and integrity of the country.

Affinities of conduct between the insurrectionary tyranny of the leftist extremists and the potential excesses of a so-called right-wing radicalism lead of course to reciprocal antagonism and clashes. But the one thrives on the other, and the inter-acting and counter-vailing effects of the two extremisms have a strong impact upon the attitude of the populace and in the formation of a political climate.

For the Communist Party the existence of a neo-fascist one (MSI) is a boon indeed, because it motivates once more the insisently heralded but stale slogan for a choice between Fascism and Communism: the choice between black fever and red cancer.

It cannot be denied that, in Italy today, those who have the guts to counterparade against, and sometime attack the leftist bullies, are the followers of the MSI, together with elements from other groups and grouplets of right-wing radicalism. As they are generally dealt with by the Police, with greater energy than is the case when it deals with the leftist extremists, they thus acquire a halo of victimised which may have some future bearing on the public.

Flying the national colours against the black and the red flags of the leftists, and chanting "Italia, Italia" when their opponents holler the names of Ho Chi-min, Mao, Guevara, Lenin, they certainly exert an influence on numerous men-in-the street who view with distaste the antics of New Left extremists; with repulsion the terroristic activities of the neo-anarchists; with a longing for a more orderly daily life, the succession of strikes, the outburst of violence, the meek and resigned behaviour of the forces of order when they have to confront the reds.

Should general elections have taken place after the Milan bomb, and follow-

ing the events of the "hot Fall", I have no doubts that the MSI would have reaped a considerable increase in votes. Parenthetically, while the Communists and the whole leftist establishment are making a daily fuss about an alleged shift of the country, to the far left, they have been furiously and aptly manoeuvring for avoiding that the Legislature would come to an end...

Moreover, between the two extremisms does not exist a strong and sedate center. The antonym of extremism is "moderatism" but this has become in my country another "dirty" word. Its veritable meaning has gone astray among the proliferation of generalities and catchwords, all redundant of leftist demagoguery. Even among sensible people, extremist trends and jargon have got a right of citizenship which is denied, instead, to the "moderate" ones. Most of the non-communist Parties are undergoing a process of fragmentation and involution, mostly on account of a process of radicalization on their left. Two, three, four "left" sprouts may burgeon in formerly organized and balanced political congregations, setting in a trend of further deterioration.

Parties, once well defined in terms of moderate political philosophy and/or behaviour, look today as queer birds wingless at their right side, with multiple wings on their left one, a big paunch and a voracious beak. No wonder the freakish animals cannot soar from ground level and are compelled to feed up-on their own droppings!

One has to admit that even in the domain of generalities, platitudes and catchwords, Italian politics are heavily conditioned by the Communist Party, by the communist-led trade-unions, by their "front organizations", as well as by the mass-media dutifully infiltrated by "commies" and leftists of every denomination.

It is not dissent in itself, even with its eventual oddities and shrills and nonsensical recitals, that should worry us. It is the institutionalization of violence, of that "socialism for the fools", that matters at the utmost.

And not only as an aspect of the neo-anarchists' and neo-nihilists' negation of the society in which they enjoy the freedom of striving at destroying it; may provoke imitations and stir up counter-action on the opposite side of the political spectrum, but mainly because it is being adopted on a general scale for any sort of protest, vindication, claim — in the labour field, and in the political domain as well — and is being shrewdly and deftly manipulated by the Communist Party, on behalf and for the benefit of the Kremlin's policies.

The gist of the politics of the Communist Party, trying by every possible means to climb to power, could be summarized in the concept: "Tanto peggio, tanto meglio" ("The worst things go, the better off we are"). From this mentality derive most of our present and future evils.

It is true, in a sense, that the "established" organizations represented by the Communist Party, and those akin to it, and their subsidiary organizations, derive political headaches and some worries for their official image, from the often miscreant and accusatorial behaviour of portions of the New Left.

But they derive also fundamental benefits towards their ends from the manipulation of the New Left violence and from the hypocritical attitude of appearing, in comparison and in contrast with it, something sedate enough, disciplined and "constitutionally" minded. Nothing can stand comparison with

the Communists' double-talking, double-dealing, double-scheming capacities: they are the embodiment of multi-duplicity.

As a matter of fact, a full and open support by the Communist Party for the extremists of the various groupings of the New Left, would have revived the identification of Communism with lawlessness and wholesale violence, which would be quite detrimental for the C.P. seeking to conquer power via parliamentary means.

On the other side, lack of support of any kind, and open proclamation of total antagonism to the leftist extremists, would have allowed them to usurp for themselves the exclusivity of the revolutionary "spirit" and slogans of the communist patrimony.

The middle course the C.P. has chosen is the one of showing off the granting of a restrained, supercilious sympathy to the claims and vociferations of the extra-parliamentarian movements, trying to identify them with its own slogans against the "unjust, violent, repressive societies whose leaders insist on imperialistic policies". Besides, the C.P. finds leftist extremism convenient, and rather useful, for its "broad anti-imperialistic campaigns"; for relentless attacks on NATO, on the Atlantic Alliance, on the U.S. etc. etc.; for the "struggle for peace", and against "militarism, neo-fascism and neo-nazism"; for clamouring for the "relaxation of tensions", "active neutralism", anti-Israeli policy, anti-Zionism, support in favour of the "fedayeens" etc. etc.

But the most cunning and proficient utilization by the C.P. of the extremists' lust for violence, in my opinion, has been its harnessing to labour agitations by exploiting their methods and means, attributed to the "spontaneous creativity" of the masses, though practically imposed on the workers and mainly upon the reluctant ones.

The radicalization of the public opinion is not centered anymore by the communists on ideological motivations, which are less and less appealing to the people. It is being fostered by the agitators and trade-unionists, in favour of the struggle for immediate interests. There, the violence of the extremists has found a convenient outlet under labour labels.

To the progressive deterioration and depreciation of the traditional role of the political parties in their functions of the choice and trends made by the people for being governed, corresponds the progressive interference, and an effort of replacement, by the trade-unions which are heavily politically conditioned. The most important of them is the communist-dominated one (CGIL) which has always been, and remains, the "transmission belt" for the C.P.'s policies. The second and third in importance, are the formerly free and democratic ones (CISL and UIL, originally of catholic and social-democratic orientation respectively), created for breaking the communist monopoly on labour of the CGIL: now they are practically led by the latter.

During the last autumn (and one may foresee the same events liable to happen this springtime and next summer) the phase of collective bargaining has been very hot and made more vehement by the syndicalists with political issues, either openly declared, or camouflaged, in accordance with the Unions' strategy. That phase has been heavily marked by a crescendo of lawlessness, disorders, violence and extremistic language. After that, the syndicalists,

supported by their henchmen in Parliament, and powerfully aided by our notorious TV "desinformazia", as well as by the timidity of most of the non-communist political forces, have engineered another confrontation versus the democratic institutions: a high-pitched protest against an alleged "repression" by the Police and the Courts, for the crime and offences committed throughout the period of unrest, disorder and violence during the labour agitation. They have also decided to circumvent and mock the law, by forcing the Parties supporting the coalition government to yield to their imposition for a general amnesty.

The political callisthenics and the show of strength of the unions (or the weakness of the Government, if you prefer) have considerably accrued to the power of the syndicalists (and, in the shadow, to their puppeteer's one) which are aiming at replacing in the decisional domain the role erstwhile played by the political parties. Neither the representation, nor the mediation of the latter, in Parliamentary regime, appear to them necessary any more. Under certain aspects the Italian socio-economic structure is practically reverting to corporativism with a salty sprinkle of that anarcho-syndicalism which had enjoyed some popular favour almost six decades ago.

It is in the monopoly of the utilization of large masses of people — under the sham of labour interest, but practically for a sort of future political test of strength which the C.P., with all the leftist fringes of every denomination, may decide to engage into — that lies, in my opinion, the greatest threat for the defence capabilities of our society and the security of the country.

Should we have to gauge the threat posed by right-wing and left-wing radicalism to military preparedness and defence obligations, there is no doubt that one should exclude the existence of any menace from the first, and should admit that the most dangerous one is posed by the second.

Neo-fascists, monarchists, right-wing movements uphold military traditions and are respectful of ideals which are connotated with some of the essential values of a society. Maybe they are still a bit too much rhetorical, but they still cling to concepts hitherto held as deeply honorable.

They favour military-preparedness, they are strongly concerned about the Armed Forces and their efficacy towards the country's defence obligations. Notwithstanding their ingrained nationalism, they are not — in their majority — negative in terms of supranational commitments in the European sphere. Maybe they feel that way, in opposition to the Communists who are against the European unification and relevant supranational structures.

Up to now there is no indication of neutralist and isolationist currents of some importance, among the right-wingers. They are, as a whole (even when they voice technical or contingent political criticisms) in favour of the Atlantic Alliance, of NATO, of the necessity of strengthening collective defence. Reserves have been expressed by them as far as the adhesion of Italy to the "Non-proliferation Treaty" was concerned, and when advocating greater, more responsible, more autonomous European collective strength for defence, within the Alliance.

Rumours are spreading from time to time about the existence, within the right-wing radical movements, of strong quasi-military organizations, but one should



discount them as exaggerations. Some veterans and former military men have not forgotten their ancient training, drilling and fighting experience but it does not seem there is any sort of an OAS being organized in the shadow.

There are, undoubtedly, strong feelings of dissatisfaction and uneasiness within the veterans' associations, mainly in consideration of the persistent decay of traditional ethical values in the conscience of the nation, but this cannot be construed as right-wing extremism, inasmuch as such feelings are merely vented at conferences and congresses quite exclusively by bursts of rhetoric and lyricism.

Yet, one should not disregard the possibility that, mounting the bad mood about the political situation, among the people forming the "silent opposition", rebellious impatience may be brewing to the point that right-wing radicalism would blaze. I am mentioning a "silent opposition" and not the "silent majority", though they both combine quite extensively, because I wish to point out the growing impatience of the people with the despicable conformism of the alleged non-conformists, the people's dissent from the dissenters and their mute protest against the protesters. But, at present at least, it is hard to imagine that the "silent opposition" could impair the security of the country and slight the defence obligations and the country's commitments with the Alliance.

Totally different is the situation about the impact on the security and military defence of the country, if viewed from the angle of left-wing radicalism.

First of all it vents with wrath and hatred its enmity against the "military establishment", the Armed Forces, the Police. The soldier is portrayed as a negative symbol of inhumanity, suppression of freedom, destruction and death. Naturally these feelings are one-sided, since no reference whatsoever, on this count, is being made in the direction of the Soviets, the Chinese, the Warsaw Pact Armed Forces, the Viets, the Arabs, the Cubans etc. etc.

One should not forget that left-wing extremists are on the forefront in the so-called "anti-imperialistic" and "struggle for peace" campaigns; that they are the regular chanters of slogans of the kind of "Make love, not war", but also "No to war, yes to guerrilla"...

Their hatred against the military shows off not only in some slanderous campaigns, but eventually also in nasty squabbles organized against individual, or groups of, soldiers and sailors, by using the variegated bunch of ruffians they can throw in (the Italian versions of the beatniks, hippies, yuppies, provos, etc. etc.). Many incidents have taken place in cities like Pisa, Leghorn, La Spezia, when leftist rowdies have provoked and attacked paratroopers, sailors, marines, draftees. There is no doubt that their continuous abuse and slandering of the Armed Forces, their mouth-to-ear propaganda, their subversive seduction of the comrades — when some of them, being drafted, join the troops — have negative consequences. It is quite easy to brew discontent among recruits and, one step after the other, turn it into anti-militaristic feelings. A method rather extensively applied is, e. g., the one of the letters to the Editor of their abundant printed sheets, by which they make believe the reader any sort of slanderous humbug about military life, its discipline, its miserable aspects, and so on. Besides, one has to be on the watch about possible espionage, eventual

mutinous attitudes sparked by some "activists", chancy endeavours, theft of arms, ammunition and explosives.

But, more essentially, there is something worth meditating upon. Those extremists (neo-anarchists, New Left groupings, violent "pacifists", "one-way" neutralists etc. etc.) rally, and eventually even precede, the undisguised communists and disguised pro-communists, for indicting the Atlantic Alliance, blasting at NATO, rejecting our defence commitments, advocating "active neutralism" for Italy, intimating a reversal of her foreign policy, denouncing the dangers of war ("inevitably" bound to turn into the nuclear holocaust) on account of the "capitalistic system" and the belonging of my country to the "Western bloc".

Even our "maoists", trotskyites and other communist heretics — generally embattled against the "Moscow revisionist clique", the "Kremlin's new czars", "Russian social-imperialism" etc. etc. — never fail to join the C.P. and its "front organizations" and political allies, when it comes to vituperate the Atlantic Alliance and to lambaste at the defence of the Western world. None of them object one jota to the Warsaw Pact, to the Russian tremendous militaristic build-up. The military and dictatorial regimes aligned in favour, or mere satellites and "proxies", of the Kremlin's policies, are never discussed. The worst slander, the outrageous abuses, the vitriolic invectives are heaped upon the United States and "imperialistic allies". But they become hysterical when it is question of Greece, Portugal, Spain, South Vietnam, South Africa, and what not!...

Nothing new or unusual in this behaviour, nothing we may look upon as unexpected; but nothing that might be considered exclusively Italian and not connected with an international strategy inspired from afar. There are too many facts on file and too many, even trifling, episodes confirming that aspect. Just an example at the end of November of last year, an "Anti-NATO Congress", promoted by Left-Wing Youth Organizations, has convened in Amsterdam. Fifteen hundred participants from quite a number of countries — and supposedly not all of them belonging to the most rabid species — participated for a few days in an orgy of anti-NATO hysteria. I'll not deal with all the superficial, nonsensical, biased, unilateral blah-blah disgorged there.

But I wish to point out, as I consider them ominous in view of the coming events, a couple of sentences embedded in their resolutions: "The progressive forces in Europe and America are called on to give practical and material aid to movements which are against NATO and which fight against the policy of NATO and against the activities in Asia, Africa and Latin America which are assisted by NATO" and: "This Congress is the first push to a longterm action against the whole of NATO as a military and economic system. It will be a longterm action because of the **great interrelation of NATO and the existing structure of society. An action against NATO must be an action against the actual political and economic order**".

The security of a country does not merely rest on the military structure. This one is fundamentally correlated with, and conditioned by, the country's morale, the psychological and political situation, the economical and financial upgrowth, the scientific and technological developments, the stability and normal func-

tioning of the institutions. Well, there are three aspects putting security in true jeopardy, we must be aware of:

- A) It is not solely question of Italy (albeit she is in a rather difficult situation) when we try to estimate the consequences, and gauge the impact, of left-wing extremism on the military and political security of the country. The onslaught is general. The aim is global. The danger is common and inter-dependent. One should not make the mistake of comparting it. Of course some nations are going to be attacked first and fiercest because they offer — at least apparently — most alluring and promising result to the communists: and this may be the case of my country. Just recently, according to a quotation by the well informed French daily "Le Monde", Brezhnev in a "classified" speech has stated: "The Communist Party could conquer power in Italy by a continuous succession of strikes apt at seriously impairing her economy".
- B) The leftist extremists should not be considered separately from the so-called "established" Left. They may become the "shock troops", the "commandos" of the struggle against the system and the security of the country, but the essential threat is posed by the whole leftist alignment of which the New Left is merely an active component.

The great assault will be launched by means of the great masses, coalesced in a "unitarian" labour front, under communist spur, against NATO and the participation in it of my country. "NATO out of Italy, Italy out of NATO" is not a new chant: it strictly derives from the directives imparted at the Karlovy Vary Conference of the Communist Parties in 1967.

Taking advantage of the labour mobilization for syndicalistic motivations, the attack will turn political, and the fundamental target will be the Atlantic Alliance.

Playing upon the war-scare, abusing our allies for their allegedly "imperialistic aims", deluding the masses with the wonders of a neutral "status" which would preserve Italy from a possible nuclear war, uproariously exalting the benefits that would derive to "peace" from the proposed Pan-European Security Conference, they might be able to create such an intimidating, perturbing, pervasive atmosphere as to obtain, by sheer pressure of political agitation and social rioting, the result they are aiming at.

- C) I see leftist extremists settling in for a long-term action based upon every sort of plots and subversive endeavours, specializing in wild riots, terroristic activities, and urban guerrilla. Cities and towns are extremely vulnerable to the latter, on account of the complexity of the highly organized, electrified, mechanized character of the big and medium-sized human conglomerations and of the way of life in modern societies. The wholesale use of bombs, "molotov cocktails", road blockings, strikes of public utilities, the clogging of street-traffic, the invasion of public offices and so forth and so on, would paralyze them. Urban guerrilla is an immeasurable threat to the security of a civilized country. It would be the inevitable follow-up of the violent and intimidating activities of the left-wing extremist "commandos".

And urban guerrilla, again, in something which derives from an international strategy of subversion, with an international scone, and an international implementation, adapted to a national scale.

When violence culminates in terrorism and anarchy — no matter whether “per se”, or harnessed to the support of supposed labour disputes and/or specious political campaigns however motivated — it is inadmissible to view at, and comment upon, what is happening as “political” extremism.

There are acts which fit into the pattern of sheer gangsterism of the worst possible species. Bombs like those having exploded — or having been planted in buildings — as in Milan, Rome, Frankfurt, New York; arsonism like the one which destroyed a Belgian Department Store; kidnapping of individuals for ransom; sky-jacking of airplanes and the planting of bombs in them; sabotage and attacks on foreign airports; abduction and murder of foreign diplomats; blackmailing of governments with requests of ransom money and/or the release of prisoners on trial before the courts or already convicted, or else the helpless and innocent hostages would be slain; terrorism in whichever way inflicted upon peaceful citizens, do not belong, nor can be considered as belonging to political action, but to mere and unmistakable criminality.

No sympathy, indulgence and tolerance should be shown to such bandits. They are outlaws both in the juridical and ethical acceptations, and they have to be dealt with as such.

And this not only because, after all, any common burglar, arsonist, killer, forger, madman could easily claim a “political” motivation for his dastard actions (there has been a few recent clamorous examples of that in my country), but also because a modern democratic society ought to *moralize* politics, safeguard them from contamination, constrain the political competition to a basis of civilized co-existence, civic discipline and responsible behaviour.

It is about time that the romantic halo which is so easily and irresponsibly placed on the heads of cranks, criminals, outlaws, posing as “revolutionaries”, should be replaced by a brand of disrepute and indictment.

Probably, this work of sanisation has been delayed too much; probably the involuntary process has progressed to such an extent as to have become irreversible.

Yet it seems to me that for dealing with the scourge of terroristic and anarchical wave of violence and destruction sweeping over so many countries, our democratic societies, for defending themselves, and for surviving, ought to adopt a concept of “selective intolerance”.

Crimes of the kind I have just listed as examples, deprived of the fraudulent and unwarrantable connotation of “political”, ought to be considered as capital offenses; those having committed them, as criminals; the criminals, persecuted wherever is possible and prosecuted, when caught, for felony and criminal action. No extenuating circumstances should be considered under the pretence of a “political” motivation or justification.

But since those capital offenders belong to, or are associated with, an international web, there must be an internationally organized counteraction.

Just as there is in existence a “Criminalpol” and an international co-operation for stamping out the traffic of drugs, there must exist among the civilized

nations full co-operation for their defence against the drug of violence and terrorism, the intoxicated extremists.

We establish international agencies for combating pollution of the atmosphere and of the waters, but we disregard the pollution of human minds. We take, internationally-wise, drastic dispositions for combating human epidemics and, eventually, aphtha and other animal diseases, with the purpose of protecting human societies, but we are disregarding the far more hideous and destructive consequences of the lust for violence and the practice of terrorism.

Someone has once quipped that a Conservative is one who is enamoured of existing evils, while a Radical is one who wishes to replace them with other evils...

One may be enamoured of existing evils, and may have battled all his life against them and yet not feel upset at all, today, at being labelled with a word which, in our hectic and nonsensical present times, sounds sort of derogatory: conservative.

Because, taking into consideration what kind of evils are in store for mankind, on account of what is being advocated with the vilest demagoguery by self-proclaiming "progressists", "revolutionists", radicals, pseudo-"liberals", and by New Left extremists and neo-anarchists, in conjunction with old-line leftists, it seems logical and sensible to choose to preserve some of the existing and tried evils, rather than to contribute to the advent of the new ones, the most hideous features of which can be unveiled since now, to show the ghastly future they reflect.

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Documents smuggled out of Ukraine

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DOCUMENTS OF OUR TIMES

## FROM THE COMMITTEE FOR UKRAINIAN PATRIARCHATE (GREAT BRITAIN)

### TO THE WORLD SYNOD OF BISHOPS

Your Beatitudes,  
Your Eminences,  
Your Excellencies,

The entire Christian World places great hopes and expectations in the World Synod of [Catholic] Bishops. These days, in response to Holy Father's call, prayers are offered to the Lord that your synodal deliberations and decisions bring beneficial results for the entire Christian Church. Among this ecumenical offering of prayers, prayers of the Ukrainian People of God are not lacking. This People of God, apart from reasons common with all the Christians in the world, has in addition its own reasons, filled with pains and sufferings, to regard hopefully the Synod of Bishops as "one of the important hours for the Church", as was termed by the Holy Father.

We know that the Synod has chosen two themes for its deliberations and decisions, namely: "De Sacerdotio ministeriali" (the priestly ministry) and "De iustitia in mundi" (justice in the world). The first theme, undoubtedly, is essentially an internal Church problem, and as such is considered in accordance with the criteria of the Christian Revelation, Church Tradition and pastoral needs. On the other hand, the second subject, "justice in the world", in our humble opinion, or more precisely the attitude which the Synod will take towards it in its conferences, and above all in its decisions, will also overstep the boundaries of the Synod, the Church, and will concern to a greater or lesser degree all men. From the declaration of the principles, and even more so from the practical instruction regarding the achievement of justice in the world, they will recognize the spirit of the Church.

We, representatives of the organized Ukrainian community, believe that the Synod will profoundly and from all possible aspects consider the real situation of justice in the world, its comprehension in the light of Christ's Gospel and the doctrine of the Church, will issue instructions for practical action towards its realisation, and will certainly emphasise the appropriate places of the encyclicals: "Mater et Magistra", "Pacem in Terris", "Gaudium et Spes", and "Populorum Progressio".

We also believe that the world will hear the voice of the Synod of Bishops in this matter, as the voice of the authentic Church which the Divine Founder has made the "sign" and source of God's presence among the people. The following prophecy has been said about Messiah: "I have put my Spirit upon him, he will bring forth justice to the nations... He will not fail, or be discouraged, till he has established justice in the earth" (Is., 42, 1-4, RSV). Yes, Christ came into the world to free men from every kind of enslavement. His Church has to and must continue to carry on this cause. In our times, in particular, she must be a "sign", visible to everyone, of the realisation of justice in accordance with the principle, "give to each his own".

Sympathizing with all the wronged, enslaved and humiliated people and peoples in the world, we feel it our special duty, to ask the Synod to take a clear position, in accordance with the principles of Christian teaching, with regard to that terrible total enslavement of man and peoples, which had been established by the Soviet Union, and in fact by the godless Russian empire. According to our deepest conviction we admit that, if in discussing various forms of political, class, racial, religious and cultural enslavement and injustice in the world, the Synod will fail to condemn all these forms of oppression in the most modern slave-owing empire in the world, Russia, the Synod would show that it fears people more (blackmail, intimidation, provocations, etc.), than it fears God. Here we are reminded of the words said by Christ's disciples, Peter and John: "whether it is right in the sight of God to listen to you [people] rather than to God?" (Acts, 4, 19).

We remind the Synod of Bishops that, having enslaved Ukraine, Soviet Russia has surpassed in its perfidy the most cruel tsarist oppression of the Ukrainian people and its Church. In the 1930s Stalin and his henchmen have murdered (starved to death) about 7 million Ukrainians, and the present-day Kremlin potentates, for whom, at present, unfortunately, the officially recognised Russian Orthodox Church, serves as a tool, have resorted to spiritual genocide — by means of a 'diabolic alchemy'. They are trying to mutilate spiritually the entire nation, that is to create "homo sovieticus" from a Ukrainian, a human being without the feeling of personality, a man-slave. This man, however, like all men, has been created in God's image! On their own land, God-given to them, the Ukrainian people are forbidden to speak their own language, they are forbidden even with a word to state publicly that which is "formally" allegedly guaranteed by the Soviet Constitution, i. e. the right to independent State life within its own ethnic frontiers: a Ukrainian is not even permitted to say loudly that he loves his Ukraine, because this, in the opinion of the Russian occupier, is a crime, "bourgeois nationalism"; a Ukrainian may and must only love Moscow! The powers that be in

the rest of the world know well what is happening in Ukraine but keep silent, because this is demanded by "practical politics". Have the Fathers of the Synod to keep silent about it, too, those who deliberate on justice in the world? We pray to God that He give you, Most Reverend Fathers, Princes of the Church, the courage of Christ's Apostles. Do not be silent, we beg you, for "*qui tacet consentire videtur*"! Speak your authoritative word, that Christ's Church stands up in defence of all the peoples, that she desires peace in the world, but that peace must not be the fruit of violence, but the fruit of justice. Issue your appeal to the world forum demanding that the Russian empire, the most cruel in the world, be dismembered in the spirit of justice for every nation enslaved in it. If such a dismemberment does not take place, Russia will always remain a great danger to the world.

Last year, Ukrainian Catholics throughout the world marked the sad 25th anniversary of the arrest of their entire hierarchy in their native country. It was carried out by the Russian secret police whose agencies are, as a matter of fact, undermining all the countries in the world. This was the first cruel step in the plan to force the Ukrainian Catholics under the supremacy of the state-sponsored Moscow patriarch. The subsequent fate of our Catholic Church is known to the entire world. A living witness of its sufferings and its living symbol is its Primate, His Beatitude Metropolitan Archbishop-Major Joseph Cardinal Slipyj, Confessor of Faith.

A similar fate befell earlier the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church whose hierarchs, headed by the Metropolitan Archbishop Lypkivskyj and Boreckyj, were killed by the atheistic Russian regime.

May we remind you, Most Reverend Fathers, that since 1595 the Ukrainian Catholic Church united with the Apostolic See has been the strongest part of Eastern Christianity in union with the successors of the Apostle Peter. Many martyrs and confessors of faith have given their lives for this unity. Cardinal Joseph Slipyj spent 18 years in Russian prisons for this unity. Archbishop Vasyl Velychkovskyj, hundreds of priests and thousands of faithful are suffering in prisons for this unity which, nevertheless, is preserved in modern catacombs throughout Ukraine. It is known in the Church circles that the Russian Orthodox Church, at its [recent] Synod in Zagorsk, "legalised" the crime she committed together with the secret police when they destroyed the visible structure of the Ukrainian Catholic Church in Western Ukraine, by "abolishing" in a brazen manner, the Union of the Ukrainian Catholic Church with Rome. But, to our great regret, we have not heard so far of any condemnation of this illegal criminal act by the Apostolic See. Therefore we appeal to you, Fathers of the Synod: Condemn before the world this injustice inflicted on the Ukrainian Catholic Church!



Some people explain that "ecumenism demands caution with Moscow so as not upset her". However, we state with deepest conviction before God that ecumenism cannot be created by tolerating lawlessness, crimes and all that derives from them. Yes, they can be pardoned in the name of Christian love, but first there must be repentance and satisfaction of justice.

It is painful for us to state the fact that ecumenism is not understood in the sense of seeking unity with the catacomb Churches including the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church.

The world knows that although our Church is persecuted and humiliated, it is alive and militant. Nevertheless, it needs sympathy, understanding and concrete help from the entire Christian world. In particular, at the present moment the Apostolic See ought to come with an all-out assistance to the Ukrainian Catholic Church. In the spirit of traditions of the Eastern Churches, in the spirit of decisions of the Ecumenical Vatican Council II, in view of the wishes of the entire hierarchy and the People of God, the time has come to complete the structure of the Ukrainian Catholic Church with patriarchate, because everything points to the fact that only Patriarchate can preserve the Ukrainian Catholic Church in diaspora and to prepare it for the great mission in our enslaved country. We address you, Most Reverend Fathers of the Synod: kindly beg the Holy Father to listen to our pleas to erect the Ukrainian Catholic Patriarchate.

We know that the difficulties, possible in this case, do not concern the essence of the matter, because there is a legal basis for the erection of a Ukrainian Catholic Patriarchate and justifications commensurable with it. It is true that we are alarmed because we know that Moscow is taking many direct and indirect steps in order not to permit the erection of the Ukrainian Patriarchate. The world knows, however, that Moscow is always against everything which does not agree with its imperial interests, and in the religious sphere — which does not agree with the interests of the "Third Rome". If this is so, then should its spirit of violence be active in the Catholic Church too, from the positions of the "Third Rome"? We are reluctant to believe this. We believe, however, that the Synod of Bishops, assisted by the prayers of millions of Christians, will be a genuine voice of the Church of Christ, and that not politics, not diplomacy or other human methods and factors, will be its strength, but her Divine Founder who said: "I am the way, the truth and the life".

We remain with the expressions of our filial devotion,

Yours faithfully,

For and on behalf of the Committee

(Mr.) M. Bilyj-Karpynech  
Chairman

(Mr.) I. Dmytriv  
Secretary

(—————)

d/d 25th October 1971

## BOOK REVIEW

## KIEVAN PRINCES WERE NOT RUSSIANS

By THEODORE MACKIW (Mats'kiv)  
(University of Akron, USA)

Yuriy M. Ovsianikov wrote a monograph "*Novodevichiy monastyr*" (New-Maiden Convent), Moscow 1968, (published by *Iskustvo*), about the 16th and 17th century Russian art monuments in the Novodevichiy convent located at the Moscow Kremlin. His work is a result of intensive research in the cultural history of that time. The bibliography is impressive as are the numerous carefully selected footnotes, as well as the 64 sketches and photographs of pictures artistically prepared by J. Neskvernov. The pictures are printed on a high quality paper. In addition, there are carefully prepared resumés in English, French and German, as well as explanations in these three languages to all pictures, which are helpful for non-Russian readers.

Ovsianikov writes well, in plain language and clear sentences; however, it is very unfortunate that this valuable work is marred by numerous and unnecessary mistakes, such as the following:

Discussing the historical data, the author states that the brothers, Saints Borys and Hlib (in original Boris and Gleb), were "Russian Princess". Ovsianikov should know by now that Borys and Hlib were sons of Volodymyr the Great, Grand Prince of the Kievan State or Rus' (Русь). When Nestor wrote his chronicle "*Povest' vremennykh let otkudu yest' poshla rus'kaya zemlya, kto v Kiyeye nacha perviye kniazhyty i otkudu rus'kaya zemlya stala byt'*", he did not write about Russia (the term "Russia" (Россия) was introduced by Czar Peter I, on November 11, 1721), but Rus'. Nestor refers this term to the Normans or Varangians, who lived in Kyiv and who served their princes, and for this reason the name "Rus'" applied to Kyiv and its area. (For details see Michael Hrushevs'ky's "*A History of Ukraine*", edited by O. J. Frederiksen, published by Yale University Press, New Haven 1948, pp. 39-48). Even such great Russian scholar as Professor B. D. Grekov, member of the Russian Academy of Arts and Sciences, emphasized in the introduction to his work "*Rus'kaya Pravda*" that the term Русь and "Русский" should not be translated as "Russia" and "Russian", but should be transcribed as "Rus'" and "Rus'ky". Therefore, his further works, such as *Kiyevskaya Rus'* and *Kultura Kievskoy Rusi* have been translated even in the Soviet Union as *Kievan Rus'* and *Culture of Kievan Rus'*, (Moscow, 1959 and 1947 respectively). Not only Grekov, but other Russian scholars, such as Professor B. Rybakov in *Anty i Kiyevskaya Rus'* (*Vestnik Drevnostey Istorii*, Moscow 1939, Vol. I-II), the late Professor M. Tikhomirov, member of the Soviet Academy of Arts and Sciences, in his work *Proiskhozhdeniye nazvaniy "Rus'" i "Russkaya Zemlya"*, (*Sovetskaya Etnografiya*, Moscow 1957, Vol. VI-VII), and other made the very clear distinction between "Rus'" and "Russia". Up to 1713 officially foreign governments used the term "Muscovite state", and that is the reason why Peter I asked other governments to use the term "Rossiyskiy" (Russian), (for details see S. Solovyev, *Istoriya Rossii s drevneyshikh vremen*, Vol. XVII, p. 409). Already in 1904 the Russian Academy of Arts and Sciences accepted and approved the scheme of the origin of the Byelorussians, Russians and Ukrainians, (for details see M. Hrushevs'ky's "*Zvychayna skhema 'russkoj' istorii i sprava ratsionalnoho ukladu istorii Skhidnoho Slovyanstva*", *Stat'i po Slavyanovedeniyu*, published by the Imperial Academy of Sciences, St. Petersburg 1904, pp. 298-301.)

existing Polish *Hetman* Chodasiewicz. Yet Pozharskiy defeated the Lithuanian *Hetman* Chodkiewicz.

Ovsiannikov writes that the Great Prince of Moscow, Vassiliy III (1505-1533), founded Novodevichiy convent in Moscow in 1524, therefore "streltsy" could not defend the convent at that time, since these soldiers were not established until 1550 by Ivan IV the Terrible.

Boris Godunov was not elected in Novodevichiy convent, as Ovsiannikov writes, but in the Kremlin by *Zemskiy Sobor* (February 17, 1598); however, Boris Godunov, having visited his sister Irene, the last wife of Ivan the Terrible, in the Novodevichiy convent, expressed his agreement to accept election on February 21, 1598.

Ovsiannikov writes that Czar Peter I sent his first wife, Yevdokiya Lopukhina to the Pokrovskiy convent in 1689, and then transferred her to the prison in Schluesselburg. In fact, Peter I married Lopukhina in 1689, and only after nine years, on September 23, 1698, he sent his first wife to the convent. Yevdokiya Lopukhina was transferred to Schluesselburg not by Peter I, but by his second wife, Catherine I after his death (January 28, 1725). Incidentally, Yevdokiya Lopukhina lived in Novodevichiy convent for four years, 1727-1731, and not five as stated by the author.

Discussing the historical development of Muscovite czars, Ovsiannikov writes that Yuriy Dolgorukiy was the son of Andrey Bogolyubskiy, yet the true fact is just the opposite.

Despite these errors, Ovsiannikov gave quite an accurate account of the enormous collection of icons, crosses, and other cultural monuments of the 16th and 17th century at the Novodevichiy convent. It should be said that the book must be judged for what it is — monograph of interest for a professional as well as for a non-professional reader.

---

## “LONG LIVE FREE UKRAINE!”

*By Dr. Ivan M. CHYNCHENKO*

Vasylkiv is a town 27 kilometres south of Kyiv. It is a small town and a regional centre. It was named after a Ukrainian prince, Vasylko.

We moved on from the town of Fastiv at the beginning of August. Two days earlier a fierce battle was fought half way between Fastiv and Vasylkiv. The earth shook from artillery fire. As a result of the battle, the field was covered with corpses of Red Army soldiers. The local population and the Red Army prisoners of war were given the job of burying the corpses. German soldiers were nowhere to be seen, for they were immediately withdrawn so as not to create panic. In the same way damaged cars and tanks were towed away from the roads to show the German soldiers that "we alone are destroying enemy weapons".

Entering Vasylkiv, our marching group saw that the town was almost deserted. But we unfurled our Ukrainian national sky blue and yellow flag. Without advance preparation (as there was no time) we chose as our camping grounds the yard of a new high school. The new school building and the yard with an orchard measured approximately 3.7 acres. Young apple trees were cut down to camouflage cars.

Now the people began crawling out of their hiding places. Using the experience gained at the town of Fastiv, we again sent our truck with two youths on the platform holding an unfolded national flag and in this way assembled 1,500 persons.

They assembled in front of the school. The meeting was directed by three members of our marching group, Yosyp Pozychanyuk, Sak and the author. The latter was in the chair.

The first item on the agenda of our meeting was information about the course of military events. Y. Pozychanyuk was the reporter.

The second item — a lecture on the main periods of the history of Rus'-Ukraine. The lecture lasted for over an hour. The majority of those present were trying "to catch and to swallow" almost every word from the lecturer. The speaker hardly finished when the Russian aircraft came from the side of the Dnipro and began to shell the town. The participants dispersed. German "Messerschmidt" aircraft appeared, fought back and almost destroyed the Russian aircraft. Several participants in the meeting were wounded. But this did not frighten the people away. The air battle ceased and the people reassembled in the school yard, the place of the meeting.

The next item on the agenda was the reading of the Declaration of 30th June 1941 proclaiming the re-establishment of the Ukrainian Independent United State. I hardly finished reading, when the singing of the national anthem "Ukraine has not died yet" broke out. After the singing of the anthem joyous shouts of "Slava" (Glory) continued. 'Long live the free Ukrainian State!' Glory to our national prophet, Taras!' People shouted joyful slogans... People applauded... They were pleased and sure that the centuries long slavery had come to an end and, in particular, the people were glad that the modern 20th century serfdom — the kolkhoz system, had also come to an end.

At this time we consulted the local teachers, who were also present at the meeting, as to the most suitable candidates for the town and the regional councils. The town and the regional councils were elected, as well as their chairmen. The chief of police was also elected. (As it turned out later, this choice was very unfortunate).

In the evening the author of these lines consulted the elected members of the town and regional councils. A commission for the disbandment of kolkhoses was set up. A former regional agronomist was appointed chairman of the commission. Local Ukrainian administration was organized and began its work. Both councils worked for the Ukrainian State until August 30th, 1941, the time when the SS Command came from Zhytomyr and carried out mass arrests in which members of both councils were also included.

The happiness of the Ukrainians in Vasytkiv and the Vasytkiv region was short lived — only one month. The brutal invader reinstated the kolkhozes, introduced slavery and the people were destined to slow destruction...

---

## UKRAINIANS IN SLOVAKIA

RUM stands for "Ukrainian Youth Council" in the Pryashiv region. This is not the name of a coordinating centre or an educational institution, as some might think, but the name of the organization of Ukrainian youth in Slovakia.

During the summer of 1969 I visited various countries of Europe, including Slovakia, or more precisely, the Pryashiv region, which today is part of Slovakia. Hence I would like to give my impression from my meeting with RUM.

The city of Pryashiv is the centre of Ukrainian life in Slovakia. Amidst green gardens and parks and clean streets of this city with a population of 50,000 are situated the Ukrainian cathedral of St. John the Baptist, the buildings of the former seminary — now managed by the state government, the former residence of the bishops of the Ukrainian Catholic Church and the editorial and administrative offices of *Nove Zhyttya* (New Life), the Ukrainian Cultural Association

and other Ukrainian institutions and organizations, including the Ukrainian Youth Council.

"You are a Ukrainian youth from America?" — they asked me everywhere with interest, when I introduced myself. They questioned me; they told me about themselves, as if I were one of them, who had spent some time in this strange America, and had just returned to them, my own close friends.

Today, approximately 150,000 Ukrainians live in the Pryashiv region, of which about 10,000 live in Pryashiv itself. In the past, there were many more of them, both in the Pryashiv region and in the city itself. But after World War II a large number of them (some voluntarily, the majority under compulsion) migrated to the Ukr. SSR. There they encountered economic privation, Russification and political terror. In order to save themselves they "explained" that they were victims of a misunderstanding: they were allegedly not Ukrainians, but "Greek Catholic Slovaks" and therefore they wanted to return to Slovakia. The Slovak government interceded for them. They returned — but as "Greek Catholic Slovaks." Frightened by their experience, thousands of other Ukrainians from the Pryashiv region also declared themselves "Greek Catholic Slovaks." (It must be emphasized that both Greek Catholic Ukrainians and "Greek Catholic Slovaks" are firmly adhering to their Greek Catholic faith and their Eastern Rite.) Thus, bitter fate forced some 300,000 Ukrainians in Slovakia to become "turncoats"... But approximately 150,000 openly declare themselves to be Ukrainians and are demanding the same rights for Ukrainians as are enjoyed by Czechs and Slovaks in Czecho-Slovakia.

The force of national consciousness was expressed first of all by the youth. When the "thaw" set in Czecho-Slovakia four years ago, the Ukrainian youth of the Pryashiv region began to organize their own, Ukrainian youth groups and societies. Who was the first to bring up the idea? Nobody knows, for there were many who were "first" — in general, and locally. Several conferences and meetings took place. The more active ones became interested in the life of the Ukrainian youth in the free world. They obtained literature, youth periodicals and statutes of the Ukrainian youth organizations. They read everything through, carefully analyzing and discussing it.

And they decided unanimously that it is necessary to organize the "Ukrainian Youth Association in Slovakia."

The charter of "SUM in Slovakia" was drafted and it was sent to the Slovak government for confirmation; they promised to confirm it.

But the Russian invasion came as "an unexpected storm" and everything changed. All ties with organizations in "capitalist countries", including youth organizations, were prohibited, and correspondence with foreign countries was placed under police censorship. The name "Ukrainian Youth Association (SUM) in Slovakia" was forbidden. Then the name "Ukrainian Youth Council" was proposed. This was acceptable. But of course, there are to be no ties with the Ukrainian Youth Association (SUM) in other countries.

Thus, the "Ukrainian Youth Council" — RUM, a Ukrainian youth organization in Slovakia, was founded. Of course, all ties with SUM had to be broken, with the exception of the same idea and the sincere youthful love for Mother-

Ukraine, which burns the same way in the hearts of SUM members in the free world, as in the hearts of RUM members in the hills and valleys of the Ukrainian Carpathians.

In the first year of its activity RUM in Slovakia has done an impressive job. Several dozen branches were organized in Ukrainian villages of the Pryashiv region, a systematic program of education was began, two congresses were held (the third was to have been held at the end of July and the beginning of August), a youth camp was organized and plans were laid for the publication of the much needed educational and training manuals.

Since 1969 however, the tightening political squeeze in Slovakia has made RUM an almost powerless body completely dependent on the Slovak Communist Youth League in Bratislava.

*Roman MIRCHUK*

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We regret that for technical reasons the next installment of the Monograph MAZEPA IN WORLD LITERATURE by LaVerne R. and Prof. Dr. John P. Pauls had to be held over till next issue. — Ed..

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by

**Major-General J.F.C. Fuller**

C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O.

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
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# Ukraine and the Dialectics of Nation-Building\*)

By OMELYAN PRITSAK and JOHN S. RESHETAR, JR.

## EAST OR WEST?

In the late eleventh century two opposing cultural spheres emerged in Europe: the Western-Catholic-Roman and the Eastern-Orthodox-Byzantine. Only the former provided the basis for a culture characterized by a degree of universality — that of Western Europe. A people converted to Catholicism became an equal member of a large family united by a common cultural language and an understanding of the need to learn from the works of the ancient Greeks and Romans. Each people had an opportunity to learn from the ancient model and to make its own contribution to the development of this common culture. Originally the leadership was exercised by the clergy, which was interested in learning and was motivated by the idea of *ora et labora*; this brought the church closer to the people and raised their cultural level. The acceptance of Roman Law and the rise of autonomous cities (for example, the Magdeburg Law) created the basis for coexistence and the later emergence of the third estate in addition to the clergy and nobility. Concessions obtained by the nobility led ultimately to the development of the constitutional order. The wars of investiture, on the one hand, preserved the independence of the church from the state and, on the other hand, led to the churches' acquiring a national character. Humanism and the Reformation secularized culture and promoted the development of popular literary languages along with the progress in the exact sciences and geographical discoveries. These developments in their ultimate form came to constitute Western culture, which is based upon individual freedom.

Byzantium knew but one universality: the idea of a single ruler of the Rhomaioi and of all Christians — the Byzantine emperor. It viewed the world as divided into Rhomaioi and "barbarians". The Orthodox Church, being dependent upon secular authority, concerned itself with the salvation of individual souls; *ora et labora* was replaced by the anchorite and hermit. The monastic communities did not become centres of learning in the full sense. The Slavs who

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\*) Slightly abridged; original transliteration of Slav names changed to that accepted in "Ukr. Review". — Ed.

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accepted Christianity from Byzantium never participated fully in the high Byzantine culture, for they were regarded as inferior and their cultural development was largely limited to the sphere of the monastic communities. For the Slavs there was prepared a translation of selected religious texts in the Slavic ("Church-Slavonic") language — a language not possessing a literary tradition and often not capable of conveying the subtleties of higher learning and secular culture.<sup>1</sup>

Although the classical Greek tradition persisted in Byzantium, the Slavs, especially the Eastern Slavs, derived little benefit from this fact for the reason discussed above. As the Eastern Slavic languages developed, Church Slavonic — the sole source of culture — became less and less comprehensible. The Reformation — as a reaction — was possible only in a Catholic milieu; conditions in the Orthodox world were not conducive to the secularization of culture. Thus it is not surprising that Marxism remained a body of social and political theory in the West, while in Russian Leninism it assumed the form of a quasi religion.

Does Ukraine belong to the East or the West? At the time of the emergence of Western culture, between the thirteenth and seventeenth centuries, Ukraine, though of the Orthodox faith,<sup>2</sup> constituted a component of states of the West European type. The Galician-Volhynian King Danylo sought a union of the two churches and received his crown from a papal legate in 1253. Earlier, in 1245, the Kyiv metropolitan, Petro Akerovych, went to Lyons and concluded a Union with the Church of Rome. The Galician-Volhynian state employed Latin in its official documents. With the demise of the dynasty (1340) part of the Ukrainian lands came under the Hungarian state and later under the Polish state; part joined the Lithuanian state, which originally (1386) entered into a real union with Poland, which later (1569) became a personal union.

<sup>1</sup> For example, see the viewpoint of G. P. Fedotov as described by Georges Florovsky in "The Problem of Old Russian Culture", *Slavic Review*, XXI (March, 1962), 9.

<sup>2</sup> In this context mention should be made of the cult of St. Clement, Pope of Rome, in Kyiv. He was the patron of the Kyiv Cathedral, the Tithe Church of the Virgin, built by Volodymyr the Great. In his honour there was compiled a book of miracles, *Чудо* (two known versions date from the twelfth century). Михайло Грушевський, *Історія української літератури*, III (Kyiv and Lviv, 1923), 105-9. When in 1147, as a result of political tension between Kyiv and Byzantium, the question arose as to how to obtain a new metropolitan, the Bishop of Chernyiv, Onufriy, offered an interesting solution. He proved that just as the patriarch of Constantinople in consecration employs the sacred relic of the hand of St. John, so in Kyiv a metropolitan could be consecrated with the reliquary of Pope Clement. It is significant that when this method was approved by all six bishops of Southern Rus' (the present Ukrainian territory) the Kyiv Orthodox Metropolitan Klym Smolyatych («книжникъ и философъ», так якоже в Руськой земли не бѣшетъ» — *Hypatian Chronicle*, s.a. 1147) was consecrated by means of the pope's reliquary. The bishops of Northern Rus', under the leadership of Nifont (who effected the Novgorod separatism discussed elsewhere) refused to recognize the validity of this method.

The various cultural achievements of the West did reach Ukraine, though with some delay or without the possibility of full development. Humanism, the Reformation, and the Counter Reformation all left their mark in Ukraine. Thus the Reformationist Mykhaylo Vasylevych (1556-61) and the Unitarians Symeon Budnyy (1562) and Vasył' Tyapyns'kyi translated parts of the Scriptures into the living Ukrainian language of their time.<sup>3</sup> That Church Slavonic was not replaced by the Ukrainian language for another two centuries was due in no small part to the authority of the apologist for Orthodoxy, the anchorite from Athos, Ivan Vyshens'kyi.<sup>4</sup> It is well known that the Kyiv metropolitan, Petro Mohyla (1596-1647) introduced the study of Latin in the College founded by him as a means of combating the Jesuit Counter Reformation. The distinctive Ukrainian baroque in architecture, literature, and the arts also testifies to a unity with the West.<sup>5</sup>

The tragedy of the Ukrainians is that since the fifteenth century their territory has been a "borderland" between East and West, incapable of committing itself entirely to either side and denied a free choice because it has been coveted by both.<sup>6</sup> Yet, if the Ukrainian nation exists to this day, it is not only because of the linguistic differences between Russian and Ukrainian but mainly because of a distinctive cultural tradition.

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<sup>3</sup>) Михайло Грушевський, *Культурно-національний рух на Україні в XVI-XVII віці* (2nd ed.; n. p., 1919), pp. 46-57. Also see Грушевський, *Історія української літератури*, V (Kyiv, 1926), Part I, and the preface by D. Čiževsky in the *Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U.S.*, III, No. 1, (1953), 485-87.

<sup>4</sup>) Indicative of Vyshens'kyi's quaint and intolerant attitude is the following statement (1599-1600): »Евангеліа и Апостола в церкви на литургии простым языком не выворачайте. По литургии ж для зрозуменя людского попросту толкуйте и выкладайте. Книги церковные всѣ и уставы словенским языком друкуйте. Сказую бо вам тайну великую: як диавол толикую завист имаєт на словенский язык, же ледве жив от тнѣва; рад бы его до щеты погубил и всю борбу свою на тое двигнул, да его обмерзит и во огиду и ненавист призведе«. Иван Вишенский, *Сочинения* (Moscow and Leningrad, 1955), p. 23.

Significantly, the language used by Vyshens'kyi was far from being Church Slavonic; it was rather the Ukrainian language of that time. As a product of Humanism and the Reformation, philological studies emerged in Ukraine of the late sixteenth century. Two of the most important works should be mentioned here: The *Slavenorosskii* (Church Slavonic-Ukrainian) dictionary by Parnvo Berynda (Kyiv, 1627) and the first grammar ever written of the Church Slavonic language, by Meletius Smotryts'kyi (Eviu, 1619).

<sup>5</sup>) Дмитро Чижевський, *Історія української літератури: Від початків до доби реалізму* (New York, 1956) provides a discussion of the baroque in Ukrainian literature, pp. 248-317. A separate province of Ukrainian literature from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century consists of that written in Latin. For a brief characterization of this literature see *ibid.*, pp. 318-20.

<sup>6</sup>) This problem is discussed at length in Eduard Winter, *Byzanz und Rom im Kampf um die Ukraine, 955-1939* (Leipzig, 1942).



### “NONHISTORICAL” OR “INCOMPLETE” NATIONHOOD?

Rudnyts'kyi's use of the term “nonhistorical” with reference to the Ukrainian nation in the nineteenth century is not entirely accurate.

The Ukrainian national rebirth began in the latter part of the eighteenth century among the Left Bank gentry descended from the officer class of the former Hetmanate. It is from this milieu that the *Istoriya Rusov* emerged to demonstrate that the rupture in historical continuity was far from complete. The Ukrainian national movement in the nineteenth century, instead of being “nonhistorical”, can be said to have been “incomplete”<sup>7</sup> in terms of the Hetmanate state form following the fall of Mazepa (1709).

The Ukrainian Cossacks, both the Zaporozhian Host and the “town Cossacks”, acquired significance in the second half of the sixteenth century. Originally this was a social or corporate movement without political or religious overtones. The Host acquired a national character during the second decade of the seventeenth century when it intervened, under the leadership of Hetman Petro Sahaydachnyi (1616-22), in the struggle of the Orthodox Rus' against Catholicism and Church Union in the Polish state. Their crowning achievement in this sphere was the re-establishment in 1620 of the Ukrainian Orthodox ecclesiastical jurisdiction, under the Host's military protection, in the person of a metropolitan and five bishops consecrated by Patriarch Theophanes of Jerusalem.<sup>8</sup>

Ecclesiastical circles soon appreciated the worth of this new ally and began to see in the Host not only defenders of the Orthodox Church, but also the direct descendants of the Princely Rus'. However, when the Orthodox hierarchy, under the leadership of Metropolitan Yov Borets'kyi (1620-31), began to develop a plan for an alliance of Orthodox rulers ostensibly directed against the Ottoman Empire, but in fact against Poland, they relied not on the strength of the Zaporozhian Host, but on the more effective power of an Orthodox ruler — the Muscovite Orthodox tsar. However, the Kyiv clergy viewed the tsar from a distance in highly idealized terms.

The Orthodox College established in Kyiv in 1632 by Metropolitan Petro Mohyla (later known as the Mohyla-Mazepa Academy) played an important role in raising the educational level, but its membership, with certain exceptions, regarded the issue of Ukrainian statehood with equanimity, once serious political difficulties arose. Like the

<sup>7</sup> The definition of “incomplete” nationhood as applied to eighteenth-century literature is discussed in Чижевський, *op. cit.*, pp. 322-23.

<sup>8</sup> After the annexation of Kyiv by Lithuania the Grand Prince Olgerd re-established the Kyiv metropolitanate in ca. 1354. However, until 1448 the Moscow and Kyiv metropolitanates were often occupied by the same person, who was usually of Greek origin. From the Union of Brest (1596) until 1620 the Kyiv metropolitanate was Uniat.



socialists in the nineteenth century, the Ukrainian elite of the Orthodox Church in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were interested not in local but in "universal" problems. In order to attract the support of the most powerful Orthodox ruler, the Muscovite tsar, the Kievan Orthodox Church elite manufactured — or at least gave their approval to<sup>9</sup> — the historic conception of the "transfer" of the princely seats: Kyïv — Vladimir-on-the-Klyazma-Muscovy. This concept was most precisely formulated in the *Synopsis*, which was first published in 1670 or 1674 and was reissued in approximately thirty editions and used as a history textbook until the mid-nineteenth century. In this first textbook on East European history no mention was made of the Zaporozhian Host, although the author or authors of the *Synopsis* had lived under the protection of the Cossack State. It was only in 1904, 230 years later, that the Kyïv historian Mykhaylo Hrushevs'kyi demonstrated the unscholarly and harmful effect which this artificial scheme of lineage had upon both Russian and Ukrainian historiography.<sup>10</sup>

Despite its generally apolitical attitude, the Kyïv clergy actively collaborated with the revolution led by Hetman Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi which began in 1648. Its success confronted the hetman with numerous problems. Beginning as a Zaporozhian military dictatorship, the enlarged new state required a broader form of government. At this time the representatives of the old elite of Rus' and Lithuania-Rus', the magnates and gentry (both Orthodox and Catholic), came in great numbers to serve the new state.<sup>11</sup> Thus emerged the concept of a tradition-based complete state — of the type of a hereditary Rus' principality — with religious tolerance and cooperation between social classes. The nature of this state — unique for its time — was most fully reflected in the Swedish-Ukrainian treaty of 1657 and in related documents.<sup>12</sup>

<sup>9</sup> Two recent studies on the *Synopsis* are: И. П. Еремин, «К истории общественной мысли на Украине второй половины XVII в.», *Труды Отдела древнерусской литературы*, X (Moscow and Leningrad, 1954), 212-22, and С. Л. Пештич, «'Синописис' как историческое произведение», *ibid.*, XV (Moscow and Leningrad, 1958), 284-98. According to data cited by Peshtich, the 1674 edition was not the original. There are indications that two other editions, of 1670 and 1672, existed, which unfortunately have not been investigated. Peshtich also demonstrated that the *Synopsis*, before being printed in Kyïv, was subjected to Muscovite censorship. Not having the text of the original uncensored version, we are not in a position to determine what additions or deletions in the text resulted from censorship.

<sup>10</sup> See Hrushevs'kyi, "The Traditional Scheme of 'Russian' History...", *Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U. S.*, II, No. 4 (1952), 355-64.

<sup>11</sup> See W. Lipiński, *Z dziejów Ukrainy* (Kiev, 1912) and also Вячеслав Липинський, *Україна на переломі, 1657-1659* (Vienna, 1920).

<sup>12</sup> *Архивъ Юго-Западной Россіи*, Part III, Vol. VI (Kyïv, 1908), 332-37; Липинський, *op. cit.*, pp. 48-49; 282, n. 185; and Михайло Грушевський, *Історія України-Руси*, IX (Kyïv, 1931), Part II, pp. 1392-97; X (Kyïv, 1937), 64-69.

However, Khmel'nyts'kyy was unable to consummate this effort. During the limited tenure of his rule (1648-57) numerous wars on various fronts compelled the hetman to conclude treaties with his neighbours. One of these treaties, that with Muscovy concluded at Pereyaslav in 1654, proved to be a heavy burden impeding the development of the Cossack State. The Muscovite tsar Alexei Mikhailovich, finding it easier to extend his domain by means of direct negotiations with Poland than by waging war, quickly forgot about the terms of the Pereyaslav Treaty and hastened to conclude a profitable settlement at Vilna (1656), ignoring the Ukrainians and their interests. This occurred because the tsar chose to interpret the quasi-protectorate relationship between himself and Khmel'nyts'kyy (stipulated in the text of the Pereyaslav Treaty) as an act of submission by the hetman (see note 34).

After Khmel'nyts'kyy's death, Muscovy succeeded in inflaming class and religious differences within the Hetman State and, employing the so-called *chern'* and part of the Orthodox clergy, provoked a civil conflict — the so-called Ruina (Ruin) between 1663 and 1674. As a result, the aristocracy and gentry, the bearers of the concept of the complete state, were physically liquidated. The re-emergence of a gentry-officer class under Hetman Ivan Samoylovych (1672-87) led to the renewal of the idea of a Rus' principality during the hetmanate of Ivan Mazepa (1687-1709) and to his treaty with Charles XII of Sweden. The defeat at Poltava in 1709 destroyed forever the idea of a Rus' principality.<sup>13</sup> The repressive measures of Peter I led to the decline of all independent political thought. There emerged the notion of a *modus vivendi* in which an incomplete "Little Russian" state would exist as an autonomous part of the Russian Empire.

The plight of Ukraine lay not so much in the fact of the destruction of the Hetmanate State and the Zaporozhian order (historical discontinuity) as in the fact that after 1709 the use of harsh and repressive measures by Peter I and the emergence of Russian imperialist centralism caused the concept of a *complete* Ukrainian Cossack State to be replaced by a Cossack class autonomy which could be defined as an *incomplete* state. Under these circumstances the granting to the Ukrainian Cossack officer class of rights equal to those of the "All-Russian nobility" in 1835 was a way of satisfying, to a certain degree, the needs of this "incomplete" nation.

The ideas of romanticism, democracy, and socialism reached Ukraine and influenced the gentry youth. However, not having inherited from their parents the national and political ideas of a "complete nation", they limited their efforts to enlightening the local peasants or were attracted to democratic or socialist movements on the imperial level. The so-called Ukrainophiles and *khlopomany* are of particular interest. They viewed the nationality question in class

terms, identifying their gentry status with the Russian (or Polish) nation; by associating themselves with the serfs they were severing their old ties as identified in terms of class and nation. However, their ideal was not nationalization of the gentry but their own individual "democratization".<sup>14</sup> Despite their dedication and their love for the Ukrainian people, the "Ukrainophiles" perpetuated the concept of the "incomplete" Ukrainian nation. During the second half of the nineteenth century the Ukrainian populist movement was taken over from the gentry by persons from other classes, the intellectuals or so-called "conscious Ukrainians". However, this group unconsciously followed in the footsteps of the gentry and also preserved the "incomplete" nation. The socialist element devoted its energies to opposing the Ukrainization of the nobility and the emerging bourgeoisie and in this way hindered the process of advancing the Ukrainian nation to a state of "completeness".

### SEPARATISM

The term "separatism" in the sense of a cultural-political secession of a part of the territory of ancient Rus' is frequently associated by publicist and even by specialists in East European history with the Ukrainian movement of the nineteenth century. In actual fact separatism in Eastern Europe commenced much earlier — and in the north.

Great Novgorod and Vladimir-on-the-Klyazma departed from the Kievan model to such a degree that they can be said to have set a separate course for themselves early in the twelfth century. Novgorod became wealthy as a result of its intermediary role in east-west trade and soon found a common language with the other centres of Baltic commerce. The German Hansa, which was emerging at this time, was closer to Novgorod than was "continental" Kyiv after the decline of the trade route "from the Varangians to the Greeks". In 1136 Novgorod — under the ideological leadership of Bishop Nifont (1130-56) — dethroned Prince Vsevolod Mstyslavych, sent from Kyiv, and laid the groundwork for the unique (in Eastern Europe) republican system of "Great Lord Novgorod" and of "Saint Sophia". Authority now reposed in the representatives of the commercial aristocracy, in the *veche*. The *veche* elected the bishop (*vladyka*), who, as head of the "Council of Lords", became the *de facto* head of the state; it also elected the executive in the persons of the mayor (*posadnik*), the head of the town militia (*tysyatskiy*), and the prince,

<sup>13</sup> On Ukrainian political thought during the Cossack State see Олександр Оглоблін, «До історії української політичної думки на початку XVIII віку, »Записки історично-філологічного відділу. У.А.Н., XIX (1928), 231-41.

<sup>14</sup> Typical of this approach is В. Антонович, «Моя исповѣдь», in *Основа*, Vol. I, 1862, pp. 83-96. An interesting characterization and criticism of the so-called "conscious Ukrainians" is provided by Липинський, *Листи до братів-хліборобів* (Vienna, ca. 1926), pp. 1-62.

who was now in fact only a military commander. Great Novgorod demonstrated its independence by establishing its own *svod* or revised collection of chronicles, the *Softyskiy vremennik*. The other attribute of independence in the Rus' of that time — a separate metropolitanate — was not acquired, but the *vladyka* did obtain the title of Archbishop in 1165.<sup>15</sup>

As a result of being located very advantageously on trade routes far removed from the chronic danger presented by Turkic nomads, the colonial part of ancient Rus' — the Vladimir-Suzdal territory — flourished during the second half of the eleventh and first half of the twelfth century. The cities and population grew, and the conditions of a colonial way of life were conducive to the strengthening of princely authority. In place of the Kievan system of a *veche* and a class of boyars, there arose a system of rule based upon a military service class derived from various lands and classes and loyal to the prince.

It was Andrey Bogolyubskiy (1157-74) who effected the separatism of the Vladimir-Suzdal territories. Andrey's father, Yuriy Monomakhovich, still recognized the primacy of Kyiv in Rus'; and when, after various attempts in 1149 and 1150, he finally obtained the throne of Kyiv in 1155, Andrey as his son obtained the Kievan Vyshhorod in accordance with the traditional system. However, Andrey fled from Vyshhorod to the North that same year, without his father's knowledge, in order to take over the Vladimir-Suzdal territories within two years. After the death of the father, Andrey refused to reign in Kyiv. This demonstrative act was the first manifestation of a reappraisal of values in Kievan Rus'<sup>16</sup> and was soon to be reinforced by another act. The Polovetsian hatred for Kyiv and its cultural worth prompted Andrey-Kitay (Andrey Bogolyubskiy's mother was a Polovetsian, and in addition to his Christian name of Andrey he had the Polovetsian name of Kitay)<sup>17</sup> to plunder and ruin Kyiv in 1169, employing these barbarous means to cause this older centre to lose its attraction. Thus, the Vladimir-Muscovy period of East European history began not with the acceptance of the Kyiv tradition but with its negation and destruction. In order to separate his territories from

<sup>15</sup> See Д. С. Лихачев, «'Софийский Временник' и новгородский политический переворот 1136 года», *Исторические записки*, XXV (1948), 240-65. Also see *Очерки истории СССР, IX-XIII вв.* (Moscow, 1953), pp. 334-57.

<sup>16</sup> Andrey's refusal to accept the Kyiv throne is regarded by the Russian historian S. Solov'yev as a "sobytie povorotne". С. Д. Соловьев, *История России с древнейших времен* (Moscow, 1959), I, 529-34.

<sup>17</sup> Andrey «иже прежде крещенія нарицашеся Китай, а потомъ отъ великіе ревности и вседушныя любве своея к Бору, прозванъ бысть Боголюбскій». *Синописис* (5th ed.; St. Petersburg, 1762), p. 107. Cf. Д. С. Лихачев, *Повесть временных лет* (Moscow and Leningrad, 1955), II, 432: "Syn polovchanki Andrey Bogolyubskiy imel polovetskoe imya Kitay".

Kyiv Andrey attempted to obtain from Byzantium approval for the establishment of a separate metropolitanate in Vladimir, but these efforts met with failure.

However, the other attribute of sovereignty — a separate *svod* of chronicles — was achieved by Andrey's successor, Vsevolod (1176-1212), in 1177. In this revised chronicle, preserved in the Laurentian Chronicle of 1377, the Kievan tradition is accepted only up to the time of Volodymyr Monomakh (1113), that is, up to this formative period of the Vladimir-Suzdal dynasty.<sup>18</sup> The northern chronicles came to reflect a declining interest in southern affairs, and after the ruination of Kyiv by the Tatars in 1240 the fate of the southern Rus', especially the Galician-Volhynian state, receives no mention. This silence was all the more remarkable in view of the fact that the northern Rus' and southern Rus' remained within the same ecclesiastical jurisdiction, that of the metropolitan of "Kyiv and all Rus' and, in addition, were subordinated to the same political order — that of the Golden Horde, which had a highly developed postal system.

Thus, it was not Mongol domination which separated the northern Rus' from the southern Rus' but rather the lack of any sense of community and the absence of mutual attraction and interest. The attempt to lay claim to the Kyiv tradition manifested itself in Muscovy only in modern times under the influence of the imperialist political design.

In contrast, it should be noted that the attitude in the southern Rus' toward Kyiv and its tradition was very different. When Roman of Volhynia acquired Galicia in 1199 he became the most powerful ruler in southern Rus', and it is not without reason that the contemporary chronicler termed him the "autocrat of all Rus'". However, neither Roman, nor his successor inflicted ruination upon Kyiv. Roman accepted the entire Kyiv tradition. The Hypatian Chronicle, which transmitted the Galician-Volhynian *svody* (the last of which was edited in 1289), preserved in its entirety the Kyiv *svod* of the twelfth century (to 1198).

The entire question of the relations between the northern and southern Rus' might be better understood in terms of a geographic analogy and a historical model. Let us assume for a moment that the southern mother Rus' territory (the present Ukrainian territory) was divided from the northern colonial territory of Rus' (the present Russian territory) by a sea in the same way that the mother country England was divided from the colony of New England by the Atlantic Ocean. Let us further assume that George Washington, after having proclaimed the independence of the colonies, had plundered and ruined London (as Andrey Bogolyubskiy had sacked Kyiv in 1169),

<sup>18</sup> М. Д. Приsselkov, *История русского летописания XI-XV вв.* (Leningrad, 1940), pp. 64-78.

and that five centuries later the head of the renewed state of the mother country had concluded a quasi-protectorate agreement with the head of the United States government. Let us also assume that the United States interpreted this quasi protectorate as an act of submission and as a perpetual union of the two "English" countries in a manner analogous to that which occurred in Eastern Europe after the Pereyaslav Treaty of 1654. Let us in addition assume that the Americans now imposed an official politico-historical concept regarding the transfer of the state centre in accordance with the scheme: London-Boston-Philadelphia-Washington, D.C. (in a manner analogous to the official Russian scheme: Kyiv-Vladimir-on-the-Klyazma-Moscow-St. Petersburg). Let us in conclusion assume that, relying on the fact that English colonists came and settled in the United States before and after it declared its independence, American political leaders officially proclaimed the entire culture and history of England prior to American independence to be the first period of American history and culture; Englishmen in the mother country are permitted to begin their history and culture approximately two centuries after the proclamation of American independence.<sup>19</sup> Under these hypothetical but analogous circumstances if English historians (England has now become Britain just as southern Rus' has become *Ukraina*) were bold enough to treat the history of England-Britain as a single whole commencing with the beginnings of English history and culture (Beowulf, Chaucer, Shakespeare) — which the Americans had now appropriated — such historians would be officially branded as "nationalists"<sup>20</sup> and would be imprisoned or exiled. To complete the analogy, any political movement which would attempt to liberate Britain from foreign occupation would be denounced as "separatist".

<sup>19</sup>) According to official Soviet historiography, the Ukrainian nation and its culture are said to have begun in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Pre-revolutionary Russian historiography was based firmly on the assumption of the transfer of centres, and consequently had no place for the history of Ukraine except to associate it with separatism in the modern period. Beginning with the *Замечания по поводу конспекта учебника по истории СССР И. Сталина, А. Жданова и С. Кирова* (Moscow, 1937) the following scheme has been dominant: prior to the thirteenth century there existed a common Old-Russian nation (*sic*), which during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries developed into three East European nation — the Russian, Ukrainian, and Belorussian — but for the period prior to the fourteenth century the terms "Old Russian" or "Russian" are used interchangeably, and this period is in fact appropriated for the Russian nation by official Soviet historiography. Research on this early period is centered in Moscow and Leningrad. Studies published in Ukraine are permitted to deal with this early period only in a cursory manner.

<sup>20</sup>) A curious practice is occasionally encountered in the works of certain American specialists on the history of Eastern Europe. In bibliographic annotations a double standard is sometimes evident: tendentious works of Russian and other historians are frequently cited without any qualifying adjectives, while Hrushevs'kyi is referred to as a "nationalist" because he dared to demonstrate the incorrectness of the concept of the "transfer" of centres. In

## REUNION?

Histories of Eastern Europe have reflected a particular methodology. The linguistic term "Old (or "common") Russian language" (*drevne-russkiy yazyk*, used for "Old Eastern Slavonic") — which is as much of a linguistic abstraction as a "common West Slavic language", a "common Indo-European language", and the like — has frequently been adopted by historians as a historical datum for the purpose of defining the first stage of the so-called "Old Russian nationality" (*drevnerusskaya narodnost'*).<sup>21</sup>

By way of contrast, no historian of Poland or of the Czech lands commences his history with the period of "common West Slavic linguistic unity". Nor do these historians write of a common culture of a hypothetical "common West Slavic nationality" but rather of separate Polish and Czech cultures. However, the term "Old (or "common") Russian culture" is used in spite of the fact that the cultural "unity" of the Russian and Ukrainian lands between the eleventh and thirteenth centuries was not different from that of the Poland and Bohemia (Czech lands) of that period. This cultural "unity" was based on the fact that Ukraine (in its modern sense), like Bohemia, was the donor, while Muscovy, like Poland, was the recipient. Poland received Christianity from Bohemia just as the Kyiv missionary, Saint Kuksha, was converting the Vyatichi — ancestors of the present Russians — in the second half of the eleventh century and was martyred by them.<sup>22</sup> The eastern counterpart of Latin, as the cultural (foreign) language of the Western Slavs, was

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actual fact Hrushevs'kyy was, in his politics, not a "nationalist" but a socialist and a leader of the Ukrainian Social Revolutionary Party. Clearly, if the adjective "nationalist" is to be employed it should be on the basis of the same standard. In accepting unquestionably the terminology of official Soviet Russian historiography, American scholars should know that the Soviet use of the epithet "nationalist" does not correspond to the Western meaning of the same term, since a former member of the Central Committee of the CPSU can also be branded as a "nationalist" if his viewpoint should conflict with the current general line of the party.

<sup>21</sup>) See, for example, the chapter on the emergence of the "Old Russian nationality" in *Очерки истории СССР: Период феодализма IX-XV вв.*, I (Moscow, 1953), 251-58. It is worth noting that in this chapter, as in other works of this character, the terms "Old Russian" (meaning "Old Rus'") and "Russian" are used synonymously. In this context one is prompted to ask if it is not time that American historians of Eastern Europe abandon the terminology used by Russians (for reasons of their own) and employ one that is strictly objective. For example, the term "Kievan Russia" connotes a nonexistent relationship of Kyiv with a Russia which emerged several centuries later; obviously the accurate term is "Kievan Rus'", since Rus' is not identical with Russia.

<sup>22</sup>) An account of Saint Kuksha is to be found in the *Kievan Patericon*. For a Russian translation see *Художественная проза киевской Руси XI-XIII вв.* (Moscow, 1957), pp. 158-59.

the alien Church Slavonic language. Similarly, the ancient Russian literary language of Muscovy and its literature developed under the influence of the literary language and literature of the Ukrainian lands (Kyiv, Chernyiv, Halych) in the same way that the Polish literary language emerged as a result of Czech influence. The East Slavic — West Slavic parallel should be qualified to the extent that in the Ukrainian and Russian lands there were two branches of a single dynasty, while Bohemia and Poland had their own dynasties — although at times these dynasties were united in marriage. Thus on occasion both countries were ruled by the same king (for example, Boleslaw I of Poland, Wenceslaus II of Bohemia). Poland also acquired its own archbishopric in the year 1000, just as the Vladimir-Suzdal lands, after their separation, endeavoured to obtain their own metropolitanate (which occurred only at the end of the thirteenth century).

It is generally accepted that the Vyatichi provided the basis for the Muscovites (later the Russians), while the Polyany were the ancestors of the Rus' (later Ukrainians).<sup>23</sup> The Kyiv Chronicler Nestor, author of the *Povest' vremennykh let* (written approximately in 1113, or fiftysix years prior to Andrey Bogolyubskiy's separatism) did not express any sense of unity with the Vyatichi. Nestor constantly emphasized that the Polyany existed apart (*osobo*); he did not regard the Vyatichi as an Eastern Slavic tribe but as having emerged from the Western Slavic *Lyakhi*. While the Polyany, according to Nestor, had civilized customs and laws and knew the institution of marriage, the Vyatichi "lived in the forests like beasts, ate unclean food, employed foul language in the presence of their fathers and [*de facto*] daughters-in-law, did not practice marriage..."<sup>24</sup> Since in Nestor's time Volodymyr Monomakh (1055-1125) waged war against the

<sup>23</sup>) On the Vyatichi as the basis of the later Muscovite or Russian literary language *akan'e* etc.) see the various works by A. A. Shakhmatov, for example: A. A. Шахматовъ, *Введение въ курсъ исторіи рускаго языка* (Petrograd, 1916); *Очеркъ древнѣйшаго періода исторіи рускаго языка* (Petrograd, 1915); *Древнѣйшія судьбы рускаго племени* (Petrograd, 1919). See also П. Н. Третьяков, *Восточнославянские племена* (2nd ed.; Moscow, 1953), pp. 221, 238-41.

A lengthy polemic on the character of the language of the Polyany and the Old Kievan language resulted in acceptance of its Ukrainian character. See Л. А. Булаховський, *Питання походження української мови* (Kyiv, 1956), pp. 104-24.

It is known that the Russian philologists N. P. Pogodin and A. I. Sobolevsky propounded the thesis that the inhabitants of Old Kyiv, were Great Russians who migrated to the north after Kyiv was seized by the Mongols in 1240. Bulakhov's'kyu has cast doubt upon this hypothesis in the following terms: "The linguistic facts do not support the hypothesis of Pogodin and Sobolevskiy regarding the 'Great Russian' population of Old Kyiv and the Kievan Principality (Kyivshchyna)"; *ibid.*, p. 217.

<sup>24</sup>) *Повесть временных лет*, edited by Д. С. Лихачев, I (Moscow and Leningrad, 1950), 14-15.



Vyatichi, their chief Khodota and his clan and since Christianity came to the Vyatichi only in the second half of the eleventh century or in the first half of the twelfth century, it is clear that in the eleventh centuries there was no sense of oneness which could have later served as the basis for the emergence of an "old (or "common") Russian nationality". Similarly, if the nations of Western Europe had not yet emerged in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, why should an "old (or "common") Russian nationality" have existed at that time? Indeed, is it not, at long last, time to identify this anachronism as the legend that it is and lay it to rest?

During the course of more than four centuries from 1240 to 1654, the ancestors of the Russians and Ukrainians lived in different states and in entirely different cultural spheres. Before 1620 there were no significant regular contacts between cultural representatives of the two peoples.<sup>25</sup> In 1954, as part of the Soviet tercentenary of the Pereyaslav Treaty, there occurred in the Soviet Union a reaffirmation of the political thesis regarding the "eternal oneness" of the Russian and Ukrainian peoples based on the legendary common "Old Russian nationality" of the eleventh and twelfth centuries discussed above.<sup>26</sup> Thus the 1654 treaty was interpreted as a "reunion" of the Ukrainian and Russian "fraternal peoples" by applying to an event of the seventeenth century populist ideas which emerged under the influence of nineteenth-century romanticism. In actual fact the Pereyaslav Treaty, like all other treaties of that time, was between two rulers or two states and not between two peoples. It is evident that "reunion" in 1654 would have had to be preceded by a previous act of union of which, as we have indicated, there is no record.

Let us turn to this meeting of Russians and Ukrainians in 1654.<sup>27</sup>

<sup>25</sup> It is for this reason that in the Pereyaslav Tercentenary edition of selected documents none is dated prior to 1620. See note 27.

<sup>26</sup> It is significant that both nations, the Muscovites and the Ukrainians, developed different messianic concepts: while in Muscovy the political "Third Rome" concept emerged, one finds in Ukraine the Kyiv religious concept viewing that city as the "Second Jerusalem". See R. Stupperich, "Kyïv — das Zweite Jerusalem", in *Zeitschrift für slavische Philologie*, XII, No. 3-4 (1935), 332-54.

<sup>27</sup> The collection of selected documents on the "reunion" is: *Воссоединение Украины с Россией: Документы и материалы в трех томах* (Moscow, 1953); Vol. I (1620-47), 585 pp.; Vol. II (1648-51), 559 pp.; Vol. III (1651-54), 645 pp.

In our discussion of the differences between Muscovy and Ukraine in the mid-seventeenth century we have relied almost exclusively upon this official Soviet selection of documents designed to demonstrate the thesis of "reunion". The representative quotations from these documents included in our discussion are not footnoted separately; reference is made in parentheses in the text to specific citations from these volumes. (The title of this collection is hardly accurate in view of the fact that prior to 1654 the term *Rosïia* was applied to Ukraine and not to Muscovy, for which the term *Rusiïa* or "Muscovite state" was used).

The accounts of foreigners who visited Ukraine and Muscovy in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and who were impressed with the many basic differ-

Let us commence with the alleged feeling of oneness. For the Russians of that time the Ukrainians were foreigners or *inozemtsy* (I, 318), "Cherkas-foreigners" (I, 463), "foreigners of the Lithuanian lands" or *inozemtsy litovskoy zemli* (I, 258), "Lithuanians" or *litvin* (I, 252), "Cherkasy of the Lithuanian people" or *iz litovskikh lyudei cherkasy* (I, 260). The Russians always distinguished between themselves and these "Lithuanians" or "Cherkasy" (for example, II, 244; III, 532). At the time of the Ukrainian Cossack uprising led by Khmel'nyts'kyy in 1648 the tsarist government ordered a reinforcement of the frontiers for defence "against the Cherkasy and Tatar advance" (II, 51). Ukraine was, for the Russians, either the "Lithuanian land" (I, 252) or "White Rus'" (II, 152, 303), while the Russians referred to their country as the "Muscovite state" or *Moskovskoye gosudarstvo* (II, 208, 281). The Ukrainians sharply distinguished themselves from the Russians, calling the latter *Moskali* (III, 88) or as *narodu moskovskoho lyudy* (III, 215). The Ukrainians, using the old terminology, referred to themselves as (singular) *Rusyn* (III, 344) or (plural) *Rus'* (II, 66, 255; III, 264) and their land as either *Rosiya* (III, 157, 215) or *Ukraina* (II, 379). Thus Khmel'nyts'kyy refers to the Muscovite tsar as *tsaru moskovskyy* (II, 35), and only after being instructed by the Muscovite envoy Unkovskiy (March 13, 1649 — II, 144) does he commence to address the tsar by the official title of *vseya Rusi samoderzhets* (II, 132).

The differences between the Ukrainian and Russian language were sufficiently great to require that documents written in Ukrainian (*beloruskim pis'mom*) be translated into Russian (see "*perevod s lista beloruskogo pis'ma*" — II, 350, 370; III, 128, 277, 354). The negotiations had to be conducted with the aid of interpreters. Thus the Muscovite delegation headed by Buturlin in December, 1653, included two Ukrainian language interpreters (III, 417) — Bilial Baitsyn (probably a Tatar) and Stepan Kolchitskiy (a Galician trained in the Kyiv Mohyla College). The Ukrainian delegation headed by Bohdanovych and Teterya (March, 1654) included an interpreter for Russian, Yakov Ivanovich ("*tolmach' voiskovyy*").<sup>28</sup> Illustrative of the linguistic relationship of the time was the account of the Muscovite diplomat-monk Arseniy Sukhanov of 1649. Khmel'nyts'kyy had granted refuge to a pretender to the Muscovite throne, Timoshka Akundinov, who claimed to be Ivan Shuyskiy, grandson of tsar Vasiliy Shuyskiy (1606-10). Sukhanov attempted in vain to persuade the Ukrainian government to extradite the pretender and endeavour to use the influence of the Patriarch of Jerusalem, Paisius, with whom

ences between the two nations can be found in В. Січинський, *Чужинці про Україну* (Lviv, 1938), pp. 36-135. An English translation is available: V. Sichyn'skyy, *Ukraine in Foreign Comments and Descriptions* (New York, 1953), pp. 39-138.

<sup>28</sup> *Акты, относящиеся къ исторіи Южной и Западной Россіи*, X (St. Petersburg, 1878), 427.

he was travelling in Ukraine. He asked the Patriarch to write to Khmel'nyts'kyy; the Patriarch consented but asked Sukhanov to prepare a draft of the letter to be sent. Sukhanov states that he "wrote in Russian and the Russian was translated into Greek and the Patriarch ordered a translation into Latin for the Hetman [Khmel'nyts'kyy]" (II, 184). It is clear that Khmel'nyts'kyy knew Russian only poorly and required a letter in Russian to be translated into Latin, a language of which he had a good knowledge. In addition, Latin was widely used in the Cossack State of that time.

It is common knowledge among specialists that literary intercourse between Ukraine and Muscovy in the seventeenth century was that of two peoples totally foreign in language and in spirit. Muscovy's low cultural level at that time led to the persecution of Ukrainian literature and its authors.<sup>29</sup>

Ukrainian and foreign ecclesiastic as well as the Ukrainian administration in the 1649-54 period regarded the Cossack State as an independent political unit, the equal of the Muscovite State. Thus Sukhanov reported to the tsar on May 9, 1649, that the visiting Orthodox high clergy, the metropolitans of Corinth and Nazareth, "in the prayers for long life and in the litanies pray for the Hetman as Sovereign and as the Hetman of Great Rosiya" (II, 187). In correspondence between Ukrainian and Russian authorities in the 1649-53 period it is clear that the Ukrainians assumed complete equality between Muscovy and Ukraine. Thus the form of titling the hetman was the same as that of titling the Muscovite tsar — both were referred to as "By the Grace of God Great Sovereign".<sup>30</sup> Trade between Muscovy and Ukraine was attributed to the fact of consent both rulers — "your tsar and our Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyy Hetman of the Zaporozhian Host".<sup>31</sup> When the Muscovite frontier authorities in 1651 addressed correspondence to Polish officials in Ukraine in accordance with previous practice, they were informed that the Polish officials had fled three years before and that correspondence should be addressed to the Ukrainian authorities if they wished to

<sup>29</sup> See, for example, В. Эйнгорнъ, *Сношенія малороссійскаго духовенства съ московскимъ правительствомъ въ царствованіе Алексѣя Михайловича* (Moscow, 1894-99); И. П. Еремін, «К истории русско-украинских литературных связей в XVII веке», in *Труды Отдела древнерусской литературы АН СССР*, IX (1953), 291-96. See also А. Н. Пыпинъ, *Исторія русской литературы* (4th ed., St. Petersburg, 1911), Vol. II.

<sup>30</sup> See the *intitulatio* in the letter of the *sotnyk* of Hlukhiv S. Veychuk to the Muscovite *voevoda* of Sevs'k Prince T. I. Shcherbatov (April 22, 1651; III, 25): »Божію милостию великого государя нашего пана Богда[на] Хмельницкого, пана гетмана всего Войска Запорозкого... Божію милостию великого государя царя і великого князя Алексія Михайловича, всяя Русіі самодержца...« The letter also contained the following Ukrainian admonition: »Теди живіт з нами подружкий і знайте як писатє«.

<sup>31</sup> Cf. the Russian translation from Ukrainian (*perevod zhe z beloruskogo pis'ma*) of the letter of the *sotnyk* of Kotel'nytsya, H. Tripolev, to the Muscovite *voevoda* of Vol'noe V. Novosiltsev of March 2, 1653 (III, 254).

have friendly relations (III, 25-26). In dealing with frontier incidents the Ukrainian local government refused to act except upon an order from the hetman.<sup>32</sup>

The uprising led by Khmel'nyts'kyy occurred at a time when the idea of dynastic legitimacy was dominant in Europe. Since Khmel'nyts'kyy was from the gentry but was not a member of a ruling dynasty, his sole means of obtaining support was to enter into a treaty with a sovereign on the basis of a quasi-protectorate, protectorate, or vassal relationship. In order to launch the uprising Khmel'nyts'kyy required the military support of the Crimean khan, a vassal of the Ottoman Porte (in the Ottoman Empire the system of vassalage was highly developed and widely used), and thus himself became in 1648 a quasi-protected ruler under the Ottoman Porte. This relationship was never annulled by either side. Two years after the Pereyaslav Treaty, Khmel'nyts'kyy decided to participate in an anti-Polish coalition of states led by Sweden (including Prussia, Transylvania, Moldavia, Walachia, and Lithuania), and he concluded a treaty with Sweden which established a quasi-protectorate relationship with the Swedish king.

Although Sweden was in conflict with Muscovy, the Muscovite tsar did not protest categorically against the Ukrainian ties with Sweden, and Khmel'nyts'kyy did not regard his accepting a Swedish protectorate as being incompatible with a continuation of the tie with Muscovy. Thus, after the Pereyaslav Treaty Khmel'nyts'kyy continued to conduct his own foreign policy, which was based on the establishment of good relations with all neighbouring states except Poland. This meant that he had to enter into a (quasi-) protectorate relationship with each of these neighbouring rulers. At the end of his life Khmel'nyts'kyy was simultaneously a quasi-protected ruler of three sovereigns — the Ottoman Porte, Muscovy, and Sweden — who were engaged in mutual conflict.<sup>33</sup>

32) Cf. a letter of the *polkovnyk* of Poltava, M. Pushkar, to the *voevoda* of Belgorod Prince I. P. Pronskiy of June 5, 1650: »Прислал ти ко мні воєвода в Полтаву станічнова голову Єпіфана с товарищи для сиску москаля Мишкої, што збежал з Білагорода, воровство зділавши. Єст у нас тот москал Мишко; але я не могу без росказаня его милости пана гетмана видат, єстлі грамота от его милости пана гетмана до мене будєт, і я его зараз видам...«

33) In June, 1657, Hetman Khmelnyts'kyy insisted upon maintaining the tie with Sweden, in a statement made to the Muscovite envoy Buturlin, in the following terms: "I will never sever my ties with the Swedish king because our alliance, friendship, and understanding are of long duration having commenced more than six years ago before our subjection to the high hand of the tsar"; *Акты, относящиеся къ исторіи Южной и Западной Россіи*, III (St. Petersburg, 1861), 568.

In April, 1657, the Ukrainian envoy to the Ottoman Porte, Lavryn Kapusta, presented a diplomatic note in which the sultan was addressed as "our highest lord" (*dominum nostrum supremum*) and in which emphasis was placed on "testifying to our old friendship, sincere fidelity and service" (*ut nostram antiquam imicitiam ac sinceram fidelitatem ac servitia erga eandem Portam declararemus*) *Архивъ Юго-Западной Россіи*, Part III, Vol. VI (Kyiv, 1908), 216-17.

Khmel'nyts'kyy was reared in the Polish-Lithuanian gentry-democracy in which the bilateral acts of ruler and subjects and such political institutions as the personal and real union, protectorate, and the like were rooted in tradition; he also knew, through personal experience, the political practices of the Ottoman Porte. When in 1653 Khmel'nyts'kyy required Muscovite military aid, he decided to submit to the "high hand of the Orthodox tsar" of Muscovy.<sup>34</sup> However, despotic Muscovy, representing a very different tradition, could

<sup>34</sup>) There is a vast literature dealing with the nature of the Pereyaslav Treaty, discussed in Грушевський, *Історія України-Руси*, IX, Part II (Kyiv, 1931), 865-69; H. Fleischhacker, "Aleksej Michajlovič und Bogdan Chmel'nickij", in *Jahrbücher für Kultur und Geschichte der Slaven*, N. F., XI, No. 1 (1935), 11-52; А. Яковлів, *Договір Богдана Хмельницького з московським царем Олексієм Михайловичем 1654 р.* (New York, 1954), pp. 64-69.

Various interpretations have been offered: personal union, real union, protectorate, quasi protectorate, vassalage, military alliance, autonomy, incorporation. In our opinion the Pereyaslav Treaty, which was a result of lengthy negotiations between two signatories having different systems, cannot be subsumed under a single category. In view of our discussion it is reasonable to conclude that in substance, from Khmel'nyts'ky's point of view, it was a military alliance (Hetman Orlyk termed the Pereyaslav Treaty implicitly "le Traité d'Alliance", see the end of this note) like others he had with the Ottoman sultan and the king of Sweden. In a formal sense the Pereyaslav Treaty had as well elements of a personal union and of a quasi protectorate. It can be regarded as a personal union, since the treaty had been concluded with the tsar (and there were no common institutions apart from the person of the tsar) and because of the preservation of a separate Cossack State and its continuing to be a subject of international law capable of imposing tariffs.

There is also a basis for regarding the Pereyaslav Treaty as a quasi protectorate in view of the following considerations: Since the tsar as an absolute monarch identified his person with the state, the Pereyaslav Treaty was not only an agreement between two rulers but was also a treaty between two states. This is also evident in the fact that in addition to Khmel'nyts'kyy, the Zaporožian Host appeared as an official treaty partner whom Hetman Orlyk described as "les États de l'Ukraine" (see end of note). If it were only a personal union there would have been no place for a hetman and the tsar could have assumed the title of hetman. Instead, Khmel'nyts'kyy remained as hetman and was empowered to conduct foreign relations (having full competence with certain precisely defined limitations); had Pereyaslav established a complete protectorate (as contrasted with a quasi protectorate), the hetman would not have had the right to conduct foreign relations. In addition, Ukraine preserved her full state apparatus after 1654, and the Muscovite troops stationed in Ukraine were circumscribed in their rights in the same way that American troops stationed in Western Europe under NATO have been forbidden to intervene in the internal affairs of the host country.

The duration of the treaty had been determined as *voveki*; in the Russian language of the seventeenth century this word did not have the meaning "eternity" but "perpetual" in the sense "for life", for example, in a document of 1641 the word *voveki* is explained by means of *do smerti zhivota svoego* ("to the end of his life"; I, 318). Therefore, each of Khmel'nyts'kyy's successor was supposed to renew the treaty.

Hetman P. Orlyk gives in 1712 the following definition of the Pereyaslav Treaty: "Mais l'argument et la preuve la plus forte et la plus invincible de la Souveraineté de l'Ukraine est le Traité d'Alliance solennel conclu entre le Czar Alexei Mikailovitch et le Duc Chmielnicki et les États de l'Ukraine. Ce Traité

not comprehend any contractual relationship between the tsar and his subjects.<sup>35</sup> Muscovy knew only a unilateral submission to the tsar, and Khmel'nyts'kyy could not conceive of such a relationship. For this reason the ceremonial aspects of the establishment of this treaty relationship commenced very dramatically on January 8, 1654. Khmel'nyts'kyy was dumbfounded by the statement of the Muscovite envoy Buturlin, who refused to take the oath on behalf of the tsar and declared that in Muscovite practice it was unthinkable that a subject could demand an oath from the tsar. Khmel'nyts'kyy refused to take the oath and walked out of the church in Pereyaslav in which the ceremony was to take place (III, 464-66, and note 38 *infra*).

After the conclusion of the treaty, on March 21-27, 1654, a joint military campaign was undertaken against Poland. Both armies operated in White Ruthenia but independently of each other. Thus began the strange phenomenon of "a battle of two Rus' for the third".<sup>36</sup> The Ukrainian Cossack Army, in response to the request of the local population of White Ruthenia, introduced the Cossack system establishing a White Ruthenian military-governmental region (*polk*). The Ukrainian army attempted to outmanoeuvre the Muscovite army in taking White Ruthenian territory under its protection, and this even led to armed clashes between the two "allies".

All of the documentary evidence makes it perfectly clear that Khmel'nyts'kyy's relations with Muscovy were rationalized not by any sense of common national, linguistic, or other ties, but only by the fact of a common religious faith. Nowhere in the Pereyaslav documents is there any reference to "reunion" or to dynastic claims of the Muscovite tsars to the Ukrainian lands. It should also be borne in mind that the various Eastern Slavic branches of the Orthodox Church of that time had developed their distinctive characteristics, even though all, including the non-Slavic Rumanian principalities of Moldavia and Walachia, used the Church Slavonic language. As a result, the dialectic manifested itself here as well: thus the Kyïv Orthodox ecclesiastical leadership, which between 1620 and 1648 had been interested in obtaining support from the Muscovite Orthodox

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fut arrêté en 1654 et signé par les Plenipotentiaires nommez de part et d'autre pour cet effet. Un Traité si solennel et si précis qui étoit appelé Traité Perpétuel..." Philippe Orlik, *Deduction des droits de l'Ukraine: D'après un manuscrit, conservé dans les archives du chateau de Dinteville avec une introduction et des notes* (Lviv: publié par I. Borstchak, 1925), p. 9.

<sup>35</sup> See, for example, H. Fleischhacker, *Die Staats- und völkerrechtlichen Grundlagen der moskauischen Aussenpolitik (14.-17. Jahrhundert)* (2nd ed., Darmstadt, 1959), pp. 168-69.

<sup>36</sup> В Липинський, *Україна на переломі*, I (Vienna, 1920), 35-39; Fleischhacker, *Die Staats- und völkerrechtlichen Grundlagen...*, pp. 176-90. See the decree (*universal*) of Khmel'nyts'kyy of February 2, 1656, appointing Ivan Nechay as governor (*polkovnyk*) of White Ruthenia in the collection of Khmel'nyts'kyy's documents published in 1961 by I. Krypyakevych and I. Butych (cited in note 37), pp. 470-71.

tsar for an Orthodox alliance, categorically refused — in the person of the Kyiv metropolitan, Sylvester Kosiv — to take an oath to the tsar apart from that of Khmel'nyts'kyy (III, 481-82). Nor did the Kyiv clergy wish to leave the jurisdiction of the patriarch of Constantinople and accept that of the Moscow patriarchate.<sup>37</sup>

The Ukrainians understood the Pereyaslav Treaty as obligating both signatories<sup>38</sup> and as a military alliance in the form of a personal union and (quasi) protectorate. For the Muscovites the treaty was simply the first step toward the military occupation of the Ukrainian Cossack State. Conflict was inevitable. Within four years, in 1658, Ivan Vyhovs'kyy, Khmel'nyts'ky's successor (who had been chancellor at the time of the Pereyaslav Treaty), directed a manifesto in Latin to the rulers of Europe (*Regibus, Electoribus, Principis, Marchionibus, Rebus Publicis*) in which he explained what had prompted his decision to oppose Muscovy:

We, All of the Zaporozhian Host, do declare and testify (*Nos Universus Exercitus Zaporovianus notum testatumque facimus*) before God and the entire world... Our Host, having received promises and obligations from the Grand Prince of Muscovy and having expected — because of a common religion and having voluntarily accepted protection — that the Grand Prince would be just,

<sup>37</sup>) Metropolitan Sylvester Kosiv, speaking through his representative, Inno-kentius Gizel, in July, 1654, based his refusal to submit the Ukrainian Church to the jurisdiction of the patriarch of Muscovy on the following considerations: Kyiv ties with Byzantium were said to date from the times of the Apostle Andrew (the old Kievan legend of the Princely Period); only a decision of an Ecumenical Council could determine a change in the jurisdiction of a metropolitanate. *Акты, относящиеся к истории Южной и Западной России*, X (St. Petersburg, 1878), 751-54.

The frequently expressed view that the existence of a common religious faith between Muscovy and Ukraine was a determining factor in bringing about the Pereyaslav Treaty must not be accepted without question. Indeed, before 1685 religious ties were with the Constantinople patriarchate and not with the patriarch of Moscow. A revealing letter sent to the Sultan Mehmet IV by Khmel'nyts'kyy on December 7, 1651, gives evidence of this: "Since all Greece accepts the suzerainty of Your Imperial Majesty, my gracious Lord, all Rus' [Ukrainians] which are of the same faith as the Greeks and having their [religious] origins with them, wish each day to be under the rule of Your Imperial Majesty, my Gracious Lord". *Документи Богдана Хмельницького*, edited by I. Крип'якевич and I. Бутич (Kyiv, 1961), p. 233. Thus it is clear that in emphasizing religious ties Khmel'nyts'kyy was simply employing a stylistic element of his political lexicon.

<sup>38</sup>) Although the text of Buturlin's account to the tsar (in the form in which it is available) does not refer to any official promises made to Khmel'nyts'kyy on behalf of the tsar in place of the oath which the hetman wanted Buturlin to take, it is apparent that such promises were made. Gizel's petition addressed to the tsar in connection with the Pereyaslav Treaty, written but six months after the conclusion of the treaty, emphasizes in two separate passages official promises made to Khmel'nyts'kyy by Buturlin on behalf of the tsar. «О семъ прежде въ Переяславль гетману вашего царского величества запорожскому бояринъ твой Василей Васильевичъ Бутурлинъ извъщал и имянемъ вашего царского величества обѣщаль, яко не токмо войску Запорожскому, но и всѣмъ намъ духовнымъ права и волности ваше царское величество потвердити изволить... По обѣщанью Василья Васильевича Бутурлина, именемъ вашего царского величества...» (*Акты ЮЗР*, X, 751-54). It is impossible to question the accuracy of this source.

sympathetic and generous towards us; that he would act honestly, that he would not persist in the destruction of our liberties but would actually enhance them in accordance with his promises. But our hopes were not to be fulfilled... In Kyiv, our capital (*in civitate nostra principali Kiieviensi*), this was not the case even during Polish rule — a fortress has been built and a Muscovite garrison stationed there in order to place us in bondage. We have seen examples of such bondage in White Ruthenia where two hundred gentry families — though sympathetic to them [the Muscovites] — were forcibly deported to Muscovy; 12,000 free men from the Mohyliv and other parts of White Ruthenia were deported to the forests of Muscovy and in their places were brought Muscovite colonists... Following the death of Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyy of eternal memory, Muscovy determined to ruin the entire Little and White Rus'. Upon the election of Hetman Ivan Vyhovs'kyy Muscovy introduced dissension among us, planting rumors that the Hetman is a Pole and favours Poland more than the Zaporozhian Host... The [Muscovite] commander Romodanovskiy, under the pretext of maintaining order, intervened in our internal affairs: he had the audacity to distribute the Hetman's titles and insignia, replacing [Ukrainian] military governors, instigating subjects against the Hetman and destroying cities which supported their own Hetman... In this way there has been revealed the cunning and deception of those who — first with the aid of our civil war (*nostro interno et civili bello*) and later openly turning their weapons against us (without any provocation on our part) — are preparing for us the yoke of bondage. Declaring our innocence and invoking Divine succor, we are compelled in order to preserve our liberties to have recourse to a just defence and seek the aid of our neighbours so as to throw off this yoke. Thus it is not we who are responsible for the war with Muscovy which is everywhere becoming inflamed".<sup>39</sup>

The first actual meeting of Russians and Ukrainians in 1654 was a meeting of two different worlds, which, in spite of the superficial aspects of a common Orthodox faith, led not to "union" (let alone "reunion") but to chronic misunderstanding and mutual conflict.<sup>40</sup>

<sup>39</sup> *Архивъ Юго-Западной Россіи*, Part III, Vol. VI (Kyiv, 1908), 362-69. See also the statement made by Hetman I. Mazepa (1708) in which he announced his decision to annul the treaty with Peter I (as is known, in the Muscovite-Russian interpretation his act of annulment was regarded as "treason" — *izmena*): "I had decided to write a letter of thanks to his tsarist highness (Peter I) for the *protection* [*protektsiui*], and to list in it all the insults to us, past and present, the loss of rights and liberties, the ultimate ruin and destruction being prepared for the whole nation, and, finally, to state that we had bowed under the high hand of his tsarist highness as a *free people for the sake of the one Eastern Orthodox Faith*. Now, *being a free people, we are freely departing*, and we thank his tsarist highness for this protection. We do not want to extend our hand and spill Christian blood, but we will await our complete liberation under the *protection* of the Swedish King". «Письмо Орлика къ Ст. Яворскому» in *Основа*, Листопадъ, 1862, p. 15.

<sup>40</sup> A similar conclusion has been drawn by Klyuchevskiy: "Not comprehending each other and not trusting each other, both sides in their mutual relationship did not say what they thought and did what they did not wish to do... Therefore, the Little Russian [Ukrainian] question, so falsely posed by both [Russian and Ukrainian] sides, encumbered and corrupted Moscow's foreign policy for several decades..." В. О. Ключевский, *Сочинения*, III: *Курс русской истории*, Part III (Moscow, 1957), 118-19.



## RUS', MALOROSSIYA ("LITTLE RUSSIA"), UKRAINA

The term *Rus'* (from a grammatical point of view a Slavic collective noun derived from *rus*; the singular form being *rus-in*) is derived from the name of the Norman Varangians, who in the middle of the ninth century became soldiers of fortune and, later, rulers of all Eastern Europe. Kyïv became the centre of their rule, and the Kyïv territory came to represent the land of *Rus'* par excellence. The princes of *Rus'* in the broadest sense included all lines of the *Rus'* dynasty (the Ryurikovichi), their retinues (*druzhina*) and territories. After the acceptance of Christianity, the metropolitanate which united all of Western Europe in a single ecclesiastical jurisdiction was termed "of all *Rus'*" "pases Rosias". Since the metropolitan was usually a Byzantine Greek, an agent and guardian of the idea of the universal rule of the Byzantine emperor and his interests, the political concept of a single *complete Rus'* state did not emerge in the Kyïv period.<sup>41</sup> The sole unity which *Rus'* possessed at that time was limited to the metropolitanate "of Kyïv and of all *Rus'*".

The process of creating a political concept of the state related to the name *Rus'* began only in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries when on the peripheries of the *Rus'* territories there emerged two states: the *Regnum (Ducatus) Russiae* (the Galician-Volhynian State) and the Great Muscovite Principality. The rulers of the latter, beginning with Ivan Kalita (1325-41), titled themselves Princes "of all *Rus'*" (since Ivan the Terrible: *vseya Rusii* "of all *Rusii*") imitating the metropolitan's title. Before the reign of Peter I both in the East and in the West the term "*Rus'*" (*Russi*, *Rutheni*; *Russia*, *Ruthenia*, *ar-Rūs*, etc.) was customarily applied to the present Ukrainian territory and its inhabitants; for what is today known as the centre of Russia proper the term "*Muscovy*" was employed.

The term *Malorossiya* ("Little Russia") was of Greek origin (e *mikra Rosia*; in Latin, *Russia Mynor*). The term was employed by the Byzantine Patriarch to identify the second *Rus'* metropolitanate established in 1303 at the insistence of the Galician-Volhynian rulers in response to the decision of the then metropolitan of Kyïv "and of all *Rus'*", the Greek Maxim, to take up residence in Vladimir-on-the-Klyazma in 1299. In adopting the title of metropolitan, the rulers of the Galician-Volhynian State called themselves the rulers of "all Minor *Rus'*" as, for example, Boleslav-Yuriy II: "*Dei gracia natus dux tocius Russie Mynoris*";<sup>42</sup> in the same way the princes of Muscovy

<sup>41</sup> М. Дьяконов, *Очерки общественного и государственного строя древней Руси* (4th ed.; St. Petersburg, 1912), p. 388. Ф. И. Леонтовичъ »Національний вопросъ въ древней Россіи«, *Варшавскія университетскія извѣстія* (1894), IX, 1-16, (1895) I, 17-65. С. В. Бахрушин, »Держава Рюриковичей«, *Вестник древней истории* (1938), No. 2 (3), pp. 88-98.

<sup>42</sup> See photo plate IX in the symposium *Волеслав-Юрій II: Князь всей Малой Руси* (St. Petersburg, 1907).

claimed to be rulers "of all Rus'".

It is important to note that this assumption of the title of the metropolitanate testifies to the fact that sovereignty in Eastern Europe until the fifteenth century (Ivan III) was closely related to the metropolitanate.<sup>43</sup>

The Byzantine concept which lay behind the use of the terms Major Rus' and Minor Rus' is a matter of conjecture. It is known that amongst the Greeks the *metropolis* or mother *polis* was denoted with the adjective *mikros* ("minor") in contradistinction to the *colonies* which were termed *megas* ("major", "great"), as, for example, "Magna Graecia" in reference to the Greek colonies in Southern Italy. An analogous situation exists with reference to the term "Asia Minor". This interpretation is also supported by the fact that the Lithuanian Prince Olgerd in 1354 referred to Kyiv as "Mala Rus'".<sup>44</sup>

Under the influence of humanism the Greek term *Rosia* (adopted by Muscovy as a result of its interpretation of the Pereyaslav Treaty of 1654) came to be used among Kyiv clergy in the fifteenth century and became prevalent in the Mohyla College in Kyiv during the seventeenth century.<sup>45</sup> The ancient name *Roxolania* also was used at that time with reference to the Ukrainian territories.<sup>46</sup> There then developed the concept of three Rosiya's: the Major Rosiya, the Minor Rosiya, and the White Rosiya (as in the *Synopsis*). Under the influence of these ideas of the Mohyla College the Muscovite tsar Alexey Mikhaylovich, after the conclusion of the Pereyaslav Treaty of 1654, changed his official title from tsar "of all Rusiya (*vseya Rusii*)" to "of all Great and Little and White Rosiya" (*vseya Velikiya i Malyya i Belyya Rosii*).<sup>47</sup> This change, effected in 1655, elicited considerable

<sup>43</sup>) The Fathers of the Synod of the Church of Constantinople in 1389 declared: "Since it was impossible to concentrate secular authority in Rus' in one person, the Holy Fathers of the Synod established a single spiritual authority". *Acta patriarchatus Constantinopolitani*, ed. F. Miklosich and I. Müller (Vienna, 1860), I, 520. A monastic rule of the late fifteenth and early sixteenth century prescribes that prayers shall be offered on behalf of «князей наших, а не царя, зане нѣсть царствія здѣ, въ нашей Руси». В. Иконниковъ, *Опытъ русской исторіографіи*, II, Part II (Kyiv, 1908), 1085.

<sup>44</sup>) Грушевський, *Історія України-Руси*, V (Lviv, 1905), 389.

<sup>45</sup>) П. Житецький, *Нарис літературної історії української мови в XVII віці* (Lviv, 1941), p. 5.

<sup>46</sup>) Chancellor Vyhov's'kyi insisted during negotiations with Sweden in 1657 that the basis of the treaty should be "das Jus totius Ukrainae antiquae vel Roxolaniæ, da der Griechische Glaube gewesen und die Sprache noch ist, biss an die Weixel . . ." Липинський, *Україна на переломі*, p. 282, n. 185.

<sup>47</sup>) In the middle of the seventeenth century in Ukraine the term *Rosii* was employed, while in Muscovy the term *Rusii* was used. The Kyiv Metropolitan Sylvester Kosiv bore the title "Mytropolyt Kyievskiy i vseya Rosii" (III, 215) or "vseya Malyya Rosii" (III, 157). The title of the tsar of Muscovy was "vseya Rusii" (III, 7, 60, 372). Also in the documents relating to the Pereyaslav Treaty the tsar called himself "vseya Velikiya i Malyya Rus(s)ii Samoderzhets"; *Полное собрание законов Российской Имперіи* (1830), I, doc. no. 119, p. 325. After May 8, 1654, the tsar completed the title as follows "vseya Velikiya i Malyya i Belyya Rossii Samoderzhets"; *ibid.*, p. 338.

opposition in European diplomatic circles at the time.<sup>48</sup>

The hetmans of the Ukrainian Cossack State prior to 1709 did at times designate the people of their territory — which they commonly called *Ukraina* — as *malorossiyskiy*, as Mazepa did in 1707.<sup>49</sup> In 1713 Peter I by means of a decree established the practice of referring to the old Muscovy State as *Rossiia* and using the term *Malorossiia* instead of *Ukraina*.<sup>50</sup> Prior to this the term *Ros(s)iya* had been used only in the tsar's title and not with reference to the Muscovite state. The association of the term *Malorossiia* with the incomplete nature of Zaporozhian Cossack statehood, as a result of the repressive measures employed by Peter I and his successors, caused the term to become unpopular among Ukrainians. *Malorossiia* when employed by the Russians, especially in the nineteenth century, was felt by the Ukrainians to be derogatory.

The term *Ukraina* in the Kyiv (twelfth century) and Galician-Volhynian (thirteenth century) Chronicles is used in a general sense to refer to "country" or "borderlands" (1187, 1189, 1213, 1268, 1280, 1282). In the sixteenth century *Ukraina* was used as a more specialized geographic term to refer to the Middle Dnieper region; accounts of the period refer to the inhabitants of the territory as "Ukrainians". The prominent polemicist Meletius Smotryts'kyy (1587-1633) in enumerating in his *Verificacia* the various Rus' (Ukrainian and White Ruthenian) "tribes" in the Polish State mentions the Volhynians, Podolians, Ukrainians, and others.

Since the Middle Dnieper region became at that time the centre of Ukrainian Cossackdom (the town Cossacks, as distinct from the Zaporozhians) they came to be called "Ukrainian" in a manner comparable to the Russian practice of calling both the urban and Zaporozhian Cossacks *Cherkasy* after the city of the same name. The term *Ukraina* became intimately associated with the Ukrainian Cossacks. They began calling Ukraine their "mother" and "fatherland", and some of

<sup>48</sup> See Грушевський, *Історія України-Руси* (Kyiv, 1931), IX, Part II, p. 1396; cf. p. 1113. As a result of the unhappy experience after the Pereyaslav Treaty, the hetmans endeavored to guard against the usurpation of the Ukrainian name in a foreign monarch's title. In the treaty between Mazepa and Charles XII there was a special provision dealing with this matter: "5. L'on n'innovera rien à ce qui a été observé jusques à présent au sujet des Armes et du Titre de Prince de l'Ukraine, S.M.R. ne pourra jamais s'arroger ce Titre ni less Armes". Philippe Orlik, *Deduction des droits de l'Ukraine* (see note 34), p. 11.

<sup>49</sup> See »Письмо Орлика Стефану Яворському«, *Основа*, Листопадъ, 1862, pp. 13-14.

<sup>50</sup> В. Січинський, *Назва України* (Augsburg, 1948), p. 22. It was only after the uprising led by Mazepa that Peter I changed the little of "vseya Velikiya Malyya i Belyya Rossii Samoderzhets" (quoted for the last time in a document on Nov. 1, 1708, in *Полное собрание законов Российской Империи* (1830), IV, 424, to the new form of "samoderzhets Vserossiyskiy", which was used for the first time in the *Gramota malorossiyskomu narodu* of Nov. 9, 1708. *Ibid.*, IV, 426.

the hetmans and even colonels of the Zaporozhian Host even used the term in their titles.<sup>51</sup>

As the Cossack movement broadened, the term *Ukraina* was extended to all lands embraced by the movement. *Ukraina quae est terra Cosaccorum* or *l'Ukraine ou Pays de Cosaques* of the Western authors of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries is not only the name of the territory, but designates the relation of the land to the people inhabiting it.<sup>52</sup> This meaning of the term "Ukraina" penetrated the masses.

The Khmel'nyts'kyy Era elicited an emotional upheaval of a kind never before experienced by the Ukrainian masses; this elemental force, misled by demagogues in foreign service after Khmel'nyts'kyy's death, was more destructive than creative (especially during the *Ruina*, 1663-74), but it aroused an individual and collective feeling which was to leave an indelible mark. The Ukrainian masses idealized Khmel'nyts'kyy's struggle against the "Polish lords" and yearned for this "Ukraine" — a utopian state of ideal Cossack freedom. Hence it is not surprising that after the term *Malorossiya* became discredited (because it had become a symbol of the colonial policies of the Russian state after 1709), the son of the people, Taras Shevchenko, associated his great talent not with the name *Malorossiya*, but with *Ukraina* and thus resolved the question of what his people should be called.

### STAGES AND THE DIALECTIC

The process by which the Ukrainian national movement acquired a political character can be understood more readily in terms of certain aspects of the dialectic. Its emergence occurred in spite of its having been consigned (prematurely) to the historical archives and written off as a "lost cause". What began as an apolitical and cultural movement was transformed into a political phenomenon, although few of its earlier nineteenth-century proponents had this as their professed goal. The movement developed in a series of stages, each of which often gave the appearance of being self-contained and inconsequential but actually contained the seeds of further development and provided the basis for the following stage. A series of official policies designed to keep the Ukrainian masses helpless, voiceless, and submerged gave the appearance of being very effective in the nineteenth century but in the end bred the very forces which these harsh measures were designed to eliminate entirely or render impotent.

<sup>51</sup> Грушевський, *Історія України-Руси* (2nd ed., Kyiv and Lviv, 1922), VIII, Part I, p. 263.

<sup>52</sup> See the numerous maps by the Beauplan, Homann, and others. For a recent account in English which surveys this cartographic documentation see Bohdan Krawciw, "Ukraine in Western Cartography and Science in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries", *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, XVIII (Spring, 1962), 24-39.

If, as Rudnyts'kyi suggests, the Ukrainian peasant masses were barely touched politically by the national movement prior to 1905, it is hardly surprising in view of their inertia and benighted condition as serf prior to 1861 — thanks to Catherine II. In the period between the emancipation of the serfs and the 1905 Revolution, any political activity under the conditions of an autocratic monarchy could only be conspiratorial. The peasantry, in spite of its willingness to rebel sporadically, was hardly qualified for sustained political activity. Indeed, it is surprising that some of them were able to participate in the First and Second Dumas and defend Ukrainian rights in spite of Russian efforts to destroy Ukrainian national identity in the name of an artificial "All-Russian" nation.<sup>53</sup> This vain effort embraced a wide range of policies and techniques.

The attempts to outlaw the use of the Ukrainian language in print began as early as 1720, when Peter I forbade publication of all books except those dealing with religious matters, and these had to be verified with the Russian texts.<sup>54</sup> The need for more effective measures led to Interior Minister Peter Valuev's secret circular of July 20, 1863, prohibiting publication of Ukrainian scholarly and popular books except for belles-lettres. The Ems Decree of Alexander II (May 18, 1876) forbade the importation of Ukrainian publications from the Western Ukraine, which was under Austrian rule, and permitted only historical works and belles-lettres to be published by Ukrainian living under Russian rule (on the condition that Russian orthography be used) and forbade theatrical productions and publication of Ukrainian folk songs and lyrics. Other techniques for denationalizing Ukrainians included the development and propagation of a distorted "All-Russian" historiography centered on Muscovy and claiming the Kyiv Principality as the cradle of the Russian state. The official use of the term "Little Russian" served to create an invidious effect. The absence of public Ukrainian-language schools retarded the emergence of a national intelligentsia, although it could not deprive the Ukrainian masses of their native tongue in daily life.

A most damaging technique, though one which failed in the end, was that of corrupting the Ukrainian upper classes with titles, rewards, estates, and serfs in return for their joining the ranks of the "All-Russian" nation. This process resulted in formidable losses for the Ukrainians and gains for the Russians. Thus the composers Maxim Berezovs'kyi and D. S. Bortnyans'kyi were appropriated by Russian music; Bortnyans'kyi was taken from Ukraine in 1759 at the age of eight to sing in the choir of the royal court. Teofan

<sup>53</sup> J. S. Reshetar, Jr., *The Ukrainian Revolution 1917-1920* (Princeton, N. J. 1952), pp. 34-36, 40.

<sup>54</sup> П. Пекарокій, *Наука и литература при Петрѣ Великому* (St. Petersburg, 1862), II.

Prokopovych and Stefan Yavors'kyy, alumni of the Kyïv Mohyla-Mazepa Academy, were induced by Peter I to come to Russia and aid in implementing his reforms; these two Ukrainians, whose names symbolize this phenomenon, made their not inconsiderable talents available to the monarch and in return received high ecclesiastical office.<sup>55</sup> This willingness to serve resulted, in part, from the fact that Muscovy in 1685 had succeeded in obtaining the approval of the patriarch of Constantinople for its annexation of the Kyïv metropolitanate, which had been within the Constantinople jurisdiction before that time.

The Petrine practice of recruiting talented foreign personnel wherever it could be found was a vital aspect of the creation of an "imperial culture" embracing various nationalities. For those recruited to serve this empire it was easy to identify with a larger integrating unit — one which enjoyed success and which, to its instruments, represented a new and "higher" development. If certain of the Ukrainian higher clergy played a role here, it was because they had been educated abroad and were indispensable to Peter I in his efforts to Europeanize Muscovy at a time when the less educated Russian clergy were resisting reform. The Ukrainian higher clergy were also attracted to this service early in the eighteenth century by the prospect of enjoying the support of a very firm political authority — something which was lacking in Ukraine at times.

Rudnyts'kyy's tripartite periodization of the development of the Ukrainian national movement (in terms of the ages represented by the nobility, populism, and modernism) is useful, but it does not reveal fully the range of contradictory forces which shaped the movement. To appreciate the distinctiveness of each and to understand their mutual relationship it is necessary to distinguish between at least five stages.

The *first stage* might be called the Novhorod-Siversk stage, after the region in the northern part of the Left Bank in which the *Istoriya Rusov* was apparently written. The author of this unique work cannot be identified with absolute certainty, but it is clear that he was a member of the Ukrainian gentry, a man of considerable erudition who wrote with wit and sarcasm.<sup>56</sup> The *Istoriya Rusov*, a historico-political tract disguised as a chronicle, was written in the late eighteenth or very early nineteenth century in a language close to

<sup>55</sup> See К. Харламповичъ, *Малороссійское вліяніе на великорусскую церковную жизнь* (Kazan, 1914).

<sup>56</sup> For data regarding the controversy over the authorship of *Istoriya Rusov* see Andriy Yakovliv, "Istoriya Rusov and its Author", and Olexander Ohloblyn, "Where Was *Istoriya Rusov* Written?" in *Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U.S.*, III, No. 2 (1953), 620-95. Also see Elie Borschak, *La légende historique de l'Ukraine: Istoriya Rusov* (Paris, 1949). For a general work on the Novhorod-Siversk stage see Олександр Оглоблин, *Люди старої України* (Munich, 1959).

the literary Russian of the time but abounding in purely Ukrainian expressions and proverbs.<sup>57</sup> The work first circulated in manuscript form among the Left Bank gentry and was not published until 1846. It traces Ukrainian history back to the princely period and stresses the earlier ties with Lithuania and Poland but deals primarily with the Ukrainian Cossack State and with Khmel'nyts'kyy and Mazepa. The author is very critical of the Muscovites and their mistreatment of the Ukrainians. He has Mazepa, in a speech, declare that Muscovy appropriated from the Ukrainians their ancient name of Rus'.<sup>58</sup> In a speech attributed to Hetman Pavlo Polubotok, Peter I is referred to as a hangman and "Asiatic tyrant".<sup>59</sup> *Istoriya Rusov*, in lamenting the fate of the Ukrainians, implied the right of each people to self-development free from foreign domination, but it also conveyed a certain feeling of resignation. *Istoriya Rusov* was far removed from the arid *Synopsis* of 1674 (earlier attributed to Innokentius Gizel). Thanks to its colorful style and its emphasis on the Cossack State, *Istoriya Rusov* was to have an influence far beyond the narrow circle within which it first circulated.

The second or Kharkiv stage, originally centered on the Left Bank in the Poltava region, is characterized by the development of modern Ukrainian literature. Representatives of the gentry or persons associated with them decided to write in Ukrainian rather than in Russian. These included Petro Hulak-Artemovs'kyy, Hryhoryi Kvitka-Osnovyanenko, and, above all, Ivan Kotlyarevs'kyy. Thus Kotlyarevs'kyy, like the other Ukrainian authors of the late eighteenth century, wrote as the representative of an "incomplete" literature wishing to complement the new complete Imperial Russian literature. His travesty on the *Aeneid* became an epopee of Ukrainian Cossackdom and breached the confines of the "incomplete" literature; this made him, in retrospect, the father of an independent modern Ukrainian literature. While these belletrists were apolitical and did not challenge Russian rule, the fact that they wrote in Ukrainian — whatever their motives — was of great consequence. In the end it overcame the pessimism expressed by Alexander Pavlov's'kyy, the compiler of the first Ukrainian grammar in 1818, who regarded Ukrainian as a "disappearing idiom".<sup>60</sup>

The 1840's witnessed the emergence of the third or Kyiv (Right Bank) stage, which saw the Ukrainian movement begin to assume a political form and acquire its most eloquent literary spokesman. The impetus provided by the originally apolitical Left Bank gentry and by

<sup>57</sup> Чижевський, *Історія української літератури*, pp. 304-5.

<sup>58</sup> *Історія Русів*, ed. O. Ohloblyn and trans. V. Davydenko (New York, 1956), p. 275.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 308-9.

<sup>60</sup> М. Грушевський, *Очеркъ історіи українського народа* (St. Petersburg, 1906), p. 411.

*Istoriya Rusov* led to the formation, early in 1846, of the secret Saints Cyril and Methodius Society (*Bratstvo*).<sup>61</sup> Rudnyts'kyi's discussion of this first consequential Ukrainian political group, which had no more than a hundred members, correctly stresses its political nature. Several distinctive but neglected aspects of its programme merit attention. The Society was Christian in its outlook as reflected in its programme, Kostomarov's *Books of Genesis of the Ukrainian People*. In addition to the basic freedoms and republican government, it advocated the absolute equality and fraternal union of all Slavic peoples, but it also glorified the Ukrainian past, especially the Cossack State, and was critical of Muscovy and its tsars.<sup>62</sup> The emphasis on Slavic unity based on genuine national equality should not obscure the Society's insistence (in verse 104 — or 109 in the later enumeration) that "Ukraine will be an independent Republic *Rich Pospolita*)." Quite clearly, the failure to achieve complete national equality would imply a solution outside a Slavic union. The arrangement advocated was not federalist in fact (though called that), because it did not provide for a Slavic central government but was more in the nature of a loose confederation. However, Kostomarov's *Books of Genesis* depicted the Ukrainian as willing to forgive Muscovy and Poland their depredations. Indeed, the Cyril and Methodians preached a bening kind of Ukrainian messianism with which the *Books of Genesis* concluded: "Then all peoples, pointing to the place on the map where Ukraine will be delineated, will say: Behold the stone which the builders rejected has become the cornerstone".<sup>63</sup> Thus the Ukrainians were to play a leading role in the pro-

<sup>61</sup>) An early secret political group among the Left Bank gentry in the Poltava region at the time of the Decembrist movement was the Lukashevych Circle, whose members were said to have advocated an independent Ukraine. See Юліян Охримович, *Розвиток української національно-політичної думки: Від початку XIX століття до Михайла Драгоманова* (2nd ed., Lviv, 1922), pp. 7-8, and Д. Дорошенко, *Нарис історії України* (Warsaw, 1933), II, 289.

<sup>62</sup>) Thus in verse 84, in discussing Khmel'nyts'kyi's Pereyaslav Treaty with Tsar Alexey Mikhaylovich: "Ukraine soon perceived that she had fallen into captivity because in her simplicity she did not realize what the Muscovite tsar signifies, and the Muscovite tsar meant the same as an idol and persecutor". Regarding Peter I and Catherine II the *Books of Genesis* had this to say: "the last tsar of Muscovy and the first [St.] Petersburg emperor [Peter I] destroyed hundreds of thousands [of Ukrainian Cossacks] in ditches and built for himself a capital on their bones". "And the German tsarina Catherine [II], a universal debauchee, atheist, husband slayer, ended the [Zaporozhian] Cossack Host and freedom because having selected those who were the *starshyny* [elected elders] in Ukraine, she allotted them nobility and lands and she gave them the free brethren in yoke, she made some masters and others slaves". Микола Костомаров, *Книги буття українського народу* (Augsburg, 1947), pp. 20-21, 22. For an English translation see Kostomarov's "Books of Genesis of the Ukrainian People" with a commentary by B. Yanivskyi [Volodymyr Miyakovskyi] (New York: Research Program on the U.S.S.R. Mimeographed Series, No. 60, 1954).

<sup>63</sup>) Костомаров, *op. cit.*, p. 24.



jected Slavic union, since they were the least corrupted and most democratic Slavic people as a result of not having their own gentry (apart from those who were Russified or Polonized) and of having suffered national oppression and foreign rule.

The suppression of the Cyril and Methodius Society in March, 1847, and the arrest of its members constituted an important turning point. Some, like Kostomarov, were frightened into conformity. The impact which this experience had on Taras Shevchenko was profound, and, as Rudnyts'kyy points out, the poet's role as national prophet had consequences which were to be felt long after his death in 1861. In the mid-nineteenth century the Ukrainian movement was at a crucial juncture. Shevchenko's decision to write in the Ukrainian language and to combat tsarist Russian rule rather than accommodate himself to it meant that Ukrainian was to develop fully as a literary language and that the banner of national liberation was to have a worthy bearer.

Cultural Russification had by now become a very real threat. This had not been the case in the eighteenth century, because culturally the Russians had little to offer the Ukrainians at that time. The works of Kotlyarevs'kyy and Lomonosov could compete as exponents, respectively, of the Ukrainian and Russian languages, and Lomonosov even studied in Kyïv. However, with the appearance of Pushkin and the full and rapid development of the Russian literary language the balance shifted in the nineteenth century to the detriment of Ukrainian. This is well illustrated in the case of Nikolai Gogol, who wrote in Russian as the leading representative of the "Ukrainian School" of Russian literature; however, his father, Vasyl' Hohol'-Yanovs'kyy (1780-1825), wrote in Ukrainian. Shevchenko's decision to devote his great talent to the preservation and enrichment of the Ukrainian language made possible the course of events which followed.

If there may be some uncertainty regarding where a dialect ends and an independent language commences, it is an indisputable fact that an independent literary language is not so much a linguistic as a cultural phenomenon. A prerequisite for an independent literary language is the creativity of a poet of genius who shapes the raw linguistic material into an instrument capable of conveying the most sensitive feelings and abstract ideas. This poet of genius who assured the existence of an independent Ukrainian literary language was — in the spirit of dialectical development — not a member of the gentry with a university education, but the self-taught, redeemed serf, Taras Shevchenko. However, Shevchenko's role was not confined to literature. Relying upon the heritage of the three preceding stages (as exemplified in *Istoriya Rusov*, Kotlyarevs'kyy, and the Cyril and Methodius Society) and also upon the popular tradition and interpret-

ation of the Ukrainian Cossack revolution, Shevchenko created in fully developed poetic form not only the vision of an independent Ukraine (separate from Catholic Poland and Orthodox Russia), but also the idea of an armed struggle for its attainment.<sup>64</sup>

If prophets are not theologians, poets of genius are not political ideologists. Shevchenko's visions, which transcended the limited horizons of his contemporaries, could influence Ukrainian political thought only with the passage of time and the advent of appropriate conditions. The second half of the nineteenth century saw the Ukrainian movement limited to an apparently apolitical cultural Ukrainophilism. The *Hromada* (community) movement grew, emphasizing education in the Ukrainian language and love of the Ukrainian past and of the peasantry. The first such *Hromada*, formed among Ukrainians in St. Petersburg, published the journal *Osnova* in 1861-62 with the financial support of the Ukrainian gentry. The *Hromada* movement quickly spread to the Ukrainian cities and led to the *fourth or Geneva stage*, in which the Ukrainian movement acquired a clearly political character. This occurred as a result of the removal by Alexander II of Mykhaylo Drahomanov from his professorship at the University of Kyiv. Drahomanov went to Switzerland in 1876 and with the financial support of the Kyiv Community began to publish *Hromada*, the first Ukrainian political journal, as well as brochures designed to develop Ukrainian political thought and to inform Europeans of Ukrainian problems and of the plight of his countrymen under Russian rule.<sup>65</sup> He was the first to appreciate the true content and the political essence of Shevchenko's works and took the first steps to realize in political practice Shevchenko's poetic visions. Drahomanov's contribution was to insist that the Ukrainian movement could not remain apolitical and purely cultural, that all political movement in Ukraine had to have a Ukrainian national character, and that the Ukrainian nation had a right to complete equality.<sup>66</sup>

Drahomanov's work bore fruit in the form of the *fifth or Galician stage*, in which, as a result of his influence, the first Ukrainian political party was formed in 1890. The Galician Radical Party took an important step forward and laid the groundwork for the demand for independent statehood, although Drahomanov personally favored a genuine East European federalism based on national equality. In 1895

<sup>64</sup>) Shevchenko's attitude towards Russian rule and the misbehaviour of Russians in the Ukraine is especially evident in the poems «Кавказ», «Великий лях», «Катерина», «Иржавець», «Суботів», «Розрита могила», and «Сон» (1844). It is also significant that Shevchenko consistently referred to the Russians as «Moskali».

<sup>65</sup>) On the Ukrainian publishing house in Geneva see Євген Бачинський, «Українська друкарня в Женеві», *Науковий збірник*, II (New York, 1953), 58-104.

<sup>66</sup>) See Mykhaylo Drahomanov: *A Symposium and Selected Writings*, Vol. II, No. 1 (1952), of *The Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U.S.* Also see Охримович, *op. cit.*, 89 and 111.

this demand was expressed by Yuliyān Bachyns'kyy in his *Ukraina irredenta*, whose Marxist conclusions and naïveté Rudnyts'kyy criticizes without recognizing the significance of his having advocated Ukrainian political independence as a goal.<sup>67</sup> The circle is closed with the advent of Ukrainian political groupings within the Russian Empire, beginning in 1900 with the founding of the Revolutionary Ukrainian Party (RUP) by a group of students in Kharkiv. Significantly, the founder of this political party, Dmytro Antonovych, was the son of the typical apolitical Ukraïnophile, Volodymyr Antonovych (see note 14). Although RUP was to split over the issue of whether it should be socialist, its beginnings reflect the close contacts which had developed between the two parts of the Ukraine under Russian and Austrian rule. These had begun several decades earlier, as, for example, when Elizabeth Miloradovych of the East Ukrainian gentry financed the purchase of a printing press for the scholarly publications of the Shevchenko Scientific Society, which had been founded in Lviv in 1873. As a result of Hrushevs'kyy's endeavours, the Shevchenko Society soon acquired the status of a national academy of sciences.<sup>68</sup> The development of Ukrainehood now reached a new stage at which Shevchenko's poetic vision began to approach realization.

The fact that the Ukrainian movement developed in spite — and in part because — of the existence of the Austro-Russian political frontier which divided the Ukrainian territories reflects an important aspect of this broad topic which Rudnyts'kyy has avoided. Thus he has chosen to define Ukraine's role in modern history in terms of the origins of its struggle for self-determination and the background of its efforts to extricate itself from the toils of Russia's empire. However, he has eschewed consideration of the implications which any significant change in the status of the Ukrainians has for an understanding of the international relations of East Central Europe.<sup>69</sup>

Rudnyts'kyy has also exercised the historian's prerogative of confining his treatment to the events preceding 1917. This has enabled him to offer some important guideposts to an understanding of the origins and nature of Ukrainian claims, but has obscured somewhat the interplay of conflicting forces which has been at the heart of Ukrainian development. It is in the understanding of this contradictory process that the dialectic can be of use.

<sup>67</sup>) Юліян Бачинський, *Україна Irredenta* (Lviv, 1895), pp. 74, 131-32. Also see Yaroslav Bilynsky, "Drahomanov, Franko and Relations between the Dnieper Ukraine and Galicia", *Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U.S.*, VII (1959), 1542-66.

<sup>68</sup>) See the discussion in Dmytro Doroshenko, "A Survey of Ukrainian Historiography", in *Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U.S.*, V-VI (1957), 261-75.

<sup>69</sup>) See, for example, Leon Wasilewski, *Kwestja-Ukraińska jako zagadnienie międzynarodowe* (Warsaw, 1934).

In addition to being characterized by struggle and the conflict of opposites, the Ukrainian movement has time and again led to the emergence of forces quite the opposite of those intended either by the movement's supporters or detractors. Thus the literati who wrote in Ukrainian early in the nineteenth century were loyal subjects of the tsar but unknowingly made possible the later political manifestations of nationalism. It was among the largely Russified Left Bank gentry that the movement had its modern origins; yet a class which gave every appearance of having been bought off by the Russian regime actually served an opposite purpose. Another example is provided by the Orthodox theological seminaries, which, though designed to serve as instruments of Russification, produced some of the leading exponents of Ukrainian nationalism as well as the clergy who affirmed the autocephaly of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in 1921. The Union of Brest (1596), unlike preceding efforts to this end, was brought about by Polish pressure on the Ukrainians, but the Ukrainian Catholic Church which resulted from it became an important means for preserving the nation and resisting Polish (and Russian) encroachments.

Nor has the post-1917 period been exempt from this dialectical process. The anti-Communist Ukrainian People's Republic (UNR), led by Symon Petlyura, was supposedly defeated, though it won a victory in compelling the Russians to abandon the practice of calling Ukrainians by the derogative term "Little Russians" and to concede, at least in theory, that the Ukrainian SSR was "sovereign". The Ukrainian SSR, the UNR's most bitter antagonist, soon found itself compelled to defend Ukrainian rights. Khristian Rakovsky, who helped destroy Ukrainian sovereignty in 1919-20, became its advocate in 1922-23. Mykola Skrypnyk, Mykola Khvylovyy, and other enemies of the UNR found it impossible to be loyal executors of policies made in Moscow.

There are numerous paradoxes and contradictions, not the least of which is that in spite of frequent Russian collective expressions of antipathy to manifestations of Ukrainian self-reliance, there have been individual Russians who have devoted themselves to the Ukrainian cause. Thus the historian Mme Efimenko was of Russian descent but identified herself with Ukrainians. Kostomarov was partly of Russian descent. The Russian philologist Shakhmatov and Korsh, along with others, were instrumental in obtaining recognition for Ukrainian as a Slavic language distinct from Russian. Herzen and Bakunin expressed sympathy for the Ukrainians. Bryullov was responsible for obtaining Shevchenko's redemption from serfdom, and the governor-general Nikolay Repnin encouraged the poet in his career and treated him as an equal.

A dialectical approach also recognizes the need to avoid being misled by appearances. Thus an ethnography and a "Southwestern

Geographical Society", which on the surface appeared to be harmless and apolitical, led to a greater appreciation of Ukrainian distinctiveness. Galicia remained under Polish rule for centuries but became at one time the indispensable centre of Ukrainian nationalism. The Russian monarchy appeared to have reduced Ukraine to the status of a province, but subsequent events were to confirm the prognosis offered in Kostomarov's *Books of Genesis*: "And the Ukraine was destroyed [by Catherine II]. But it only appears to be so".<sup>70</sup> If the larger Ukrainian cities have contained substantial numbers of Russians in spite of Stalin's promise of March 10, 1921, that they would "inevitably be Ukrainized",<sup>71</sup> one cannot judge Ukrainian developments exclusively in terms of superficial aspects of urban life.

The struggle for and against Ukrainian national identity, in addition to being fierce, is taking place on many levels and is assuming varied forms, although it is often not recorded directly. Yet it is no less meaningful for that fact. It would be naïve to underestimate the modern counterpart of the "splendid Juggernaut" and its willingness to employ any and all means to stunt Ukrainian cultural development and render the nation "incomplete". Yet 37,000,000 Ukrainians chose to declare their nationality in the 1959 Soviet census, and who can say with certainty that the Ukrainian cause may not receive new form and meaning from quarters from which such aid would appear least likely to come? May not Ukrainian membership in the United Nations and in other international bodies also, in the long run, have objective results different from those intended by Stalin in 1945? The role of Ukraine is fraught with imponderables and even risks — as it has been in the past — but it is also the embodiment of promise. Such a nation as Ukraine has had to be both refractory and resilient in order to survive, and in surviving it makes possible the ultimate fulfillment of its hopes.

<sup>70</sup>) Костомаров, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

<sup>71</sup>) И. В. Сталин, *Сочинения* (Moscow, 1952), V, 49.

In English translation

## REVOLUTIONARY VOICES

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# THE UKRAINIAN SSR: A SOVEREIGN AND INDEPENDENT STATE?

## A JURIDICAL APPROACH

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Soviet political leaders, diplomats and jurists maintain that the Soviet republics are independent and sovereign states. On the basis of this claim, Andrei Gromyko, then the Ambassador to the United States, made his initial request at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference (1944) to seat the sixteen Union Republics in the projected world organization. At both Yalta (1945) and San Francisco (1945), Moscow cited the constitutional amendments of February, 1944,<sup>1</sup> as proof that the republics were independent in foreign affairs therefore could

<sup>1</sup>) On 1 February, 1944, the Supreme Soviet amended the USSR Constitution by adding to it Articles 18a and 18b which read respectively: 'Each Union republic has the right to enter into direct relations with foreign states, to conclude agreements, and exchange diplomatic and consular representatives with them'; 'Each republic has its own republican military formations'. Appropriate amendments were introduced into the republican constitutions, including the Ukrainian. *Istoriya sovetskoy konstitutsii: sbornik dokumentov, 1917-1957*, Moscow, 1957, 405, 406.

The terms 'sovereignty' and 'independence' although sometimes used interchangeably, do not have the same meaning. According to one writer 'sovereignty of a State is its supreme power over its territory and inhabitants, as well as its independence of any external authority'. Marek St. Korowicz, *Introduction to International Law*, The Hague, 1959, 23. The same author says that 'independence does mean sovereignty, it implies sovereignty. ... It is a negative concept: the State is independent of any other state, and may not receive orders from anyone. Sovereignty... is a positive concept expressing the idea of what the State is authorized to do, and of what is its legal competence'. *Ibid.*, 83. Both 'sovereignty' and 'independence' may have either legal or political connotations; that is, there is legal and political sovereignty as well as legal and political independence. Both sovereignty and independence may be limited or reduced; there are states not fully or only partially sovereign, not fully or only partially independent.

As for the Soviet concept of sovereignty, according to Vyshinskiy, 'sovereignty means the supremacy of state authority, by virtue of which that authority appears unlimited and autonomous within the land and independent in foreign relationships'. Andrey Vyshinskiy, ed *The Law of the Soviet State*, translated from the Russian by Hugh W. Babb with an introduction by John N. Hazard, New York, 1948, 275-76. Professor Levin follows Vyshinskiy and defines sovereignty as 'the supremacy of state authority inside the country and its independence from whatever other authority in international relations'. D. B. Levin, *Osnovnyye problemy sovremennogo mezhdunarodnogo prava*, ed. D. A. Haydukova, Moscow, 1958, 200. It seems that the definition given by Korowicz does not differ much (in words, anyway) from the one presented by Soviet writers.

qualify as founding members of the UN. However, the entry of only Ukraine and Byelorussia into the international organization spelled out an obvious inconsistency in the juridical position, for one could legitimately ask why the remaining republics, which possess no more and no fewer constitutional rights, were excluded from UN membership. Professor Dallin notes that: 'Moscow has apparently not been bothered by the illogical situation that led to the separate membership and dual representation of two republics (by their own missions and by the USSR), while the remaining "sister republics" — legally on an equal footing with Ukraine and Byelorussia — have only the Soviet Union as their spokesman'.<sup>2</sup> Be that as it may, before examining the claim about the sovereignty and independence of Ukraine we must answer an even more basic question: is Ukraine a state?<sup>3</sup>

Ukraine is one of the republics of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, described by the Soviet Constitution as a federation.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>2</sup>) Alexander Dallin, *The Soviet Union at the United Nations: an inquiry into Soviet methods and objectives*, New York, 1962, 107.

<sup>3</sup>) By the word 'state' is meant 'a people permanently occupying a fixed territory, bound together by common laws into a body politic, possessing an organized government, and capable of conducting relations with other states... States, generally speaking, may be broadly classified as sovereign or independent or semi-sovereign states'. Green Haywood Hackworth, *Digest of International Law*, I, Washington, 1949, 47. Charles Cheney Hyde, dealing with the problem of the capability of a state to have relations with other states, wrote that 'there must be an assertion of right through governmental agencies to enter into relations with the outside world. The exercise of this right need not be free from external restraint. Independence is not essential. It is the possession and use of the right to enter into foreign relations, whether with or without restriction, which distinguishes State of international law from the larger number of political entities given that name and which are wholly lacking in such a privilege'. Charles Cheney Hyde, quoted in Hackworth, *op. cit.*, 47-48.

<sup>4</sup>) Article 13 of both Union and Ukrainian Constitutions speaks of the USSR as a Union State. In the same Article the word 'federal' is used only in reference to the Russian republic.

What is a federation? Comparing federation with confederation, one Soviet scholar notes that 'in a federation there are several states united in one new state... In a confederation two or several states, although united with one another, do not form one new state. In short, a *federation is a Union State*, while a *confederation is a union of states*'. (Italics in the original). D. L. Zlatopol'skiy, *Gosudarstvennoye ustroystvo SSSR*, Moscow, 1960, 6.

What is a Soviet federation? Speaking about 'the political form of the state organization of the USSR', Vyshinskiy states that 'the Soviet Union State is a federative state. Both by its class essence and by its organizational structure it is sharply distinguished from all existing forms of federation, confederation, and unitarianism formerly or now existing in the capitalist world. It is a type of state without a precedent in history. It emerged from the problems of the worker class dictatorship in a multi-national country. It is the realization and expression of the general will and mutual confidence of the toilers of nations with equal rights. The nationality principle at the basis of the creation of the Soviet Union State is the distinctive characteristic of the Soviet type federation'. Vyshinskiy, *op. cit.*, 228-29.

David Zlatopol'skiy points out that: 'the peculiarity of the USSR as a federal state consists in the fact that its subjects are *sovereign states*; sovereignty of the members of the federation stipulates the principles of their unification in one state and their rights as subjects of the federation'.<sup>5</sup> It follows from this statement that the Ukrainian republic, in spite of the fact that it is a constituent part of the Union, is a sovereign state. Leaving the question of sovereignty aside, what ground is there for considering the Ukrainian SSR a state at all? For a legal answer to this query one must look at both the All-Union and the Ukrainian Constitutions.

The first Article of the Ukrainian Constitution states that 'the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic is a socialist state of workers and peasants'. The territory, one of the essential elements of statehood, is referred to in Articles 6, 15 and 18. Another indispensable element of statehood, the people or its citizenry, is mentioned in Article 17 and in Chapter VIII, entitled 'The Basic Rights and Duties of Citizens' (Articles 98-113). The existence of the third necessary element of statehood, the government or state power, is asserted in Articles 3 and 19; in Chapter III, 'The Highest Organs of State Power of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic' (Articles 20-38); in

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Edward Mousley, a Western jurist, defines federalism as 'that principle of union of political societies called states whereby the central or federal government operates for particular purposes directly on the subjects of the component states and not indirectly on them through the medium of the states united in the Federal Union, the authority of such states, each over its citizens, being confined to all remaining matters'. E. Mousley, 'The Meaning of Federalism', *Federal Union*, ed. M. Chaning-Pearce, London, 1940, 21. Some Western scholars express doubt about the Soviet Union being a truly federal state. Professor Hazard says that 'the Soviet federation has some special characteristics. It is not as loose a federation as that of the United States, and by no means as decentralized as Canada or Australia'. John N. Hazard, *The Soviet System of Government*, Chicago, 1960, 76. The author thinks that the powers of the Soviet Republics within the federation are quite limited. *Ibid.*, 87-88. Wheare regards the Soviet state as quasi-federal. He is of the opinion that 'if the full powers conferred by Article 14 of the Constitution upon the All-Union Government are exercised in practice — and there seems every reason why they should be — very little of the federal principle remains in the government of the USSR'. K. C. Wheare, *Federal Government*, 3rd ed., London, 1953, 26-28. Professor Korowicz writes that the USSR 'is a federal state of a special type, because it has many legal features of a confederation of States, and even more features of a *highly centralized State*... The USSR is neither a confederation nor a federation; it is virtually a unitary State'. (Italics in the original). Korowicz, *op cit.*, 279-80. Towster, whose opinion in part is similar to Korowicz's claims that 'in its federal features the USSR resembles more the United States than the British Commonwealth, but by written constitution and unwritten attitude it has also some confederative and strongly unitary characteristics. The nationality aspect of Soviet federal arrangements, which distinguishes the USSR from all other federal states, constitutes a unique contribution to political theory and practice'. Julian Towster, *Political Power in the USSR 1917-1947; the theory and structure of government in the Soviet State*, New York; 1948, 379.

<sup>5</sup>) Zlatopol'skiy, *op. cit.*, 113. (Italics in the original).



Chapter IV, 'The Organs of State Administration of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic' (Articles 39-53); and in Chapter V, 'The Local Organs of State Power' (Articles 54-79). The capability of maintaining relations with foreign states, which may be taken as the fourth and last element of statehood, is enumerated in Articles 15b, 19z1, 30j, 30k and 43h. Constitutionally speaking — and the Ukrainian Constitution is the fundamental law of the land, juridically determining the structure of its society — the Ukrainian republic appears to be a state. However, such a conclusion is premature, for the Ukrainian SSR is not a separate entity, but a part, a member of the Soviet 'federation'. In order to ascertain the true nature of this entity one cannot possibly disregard the relevant provisions of the Union Constitution.

It appears that Article 6 (identical with the same Article of the Ukrainian Constitution) ascribes the entire land or territory of the USSR, including that of Ukraine, to the Union state. It is the property of the Union. This can only mean that one of the intrinsic qualities of the Ukrainian state — and it cannot be otherwise in any federation — not only belongs to Ukraine, but also to the USSR. Such a territorial status of the Ukrainian republic, the double ownership of land, imposes restrictions on the Ukrainian state. Article 21 stipulates that 'uniform Union citizenship is established for the citizens of the USSR. Each citizen of the Union republic is a citizen of the USSR'. It follows from this that a citizen of Ukraine is a citizen of the Soviet Union and this is stated explicitly in Article 17 of the Ukrainian Constitution. But the reverse is also true: a citizen of the USSR, residing on the territory of the Ukrainian republic, becomes its citizen, as, again, Article 17 of the Ukrainian Constitution declares. If the citizenry of the republic is of such a fluid nature, faults must arise about the permanency of its population, thus contributing instability to one of the essential ingredients of statehood.

The All-Union Constitution, in Chapters IV, 'The Higher Organs of State Power in the Union Republics' (Articles 57-63), and VI, 'The Organs of State Administration of the Union republics' (Articles 79-88), refers to machinery of government of the republics on their respective territories, but this Constitution makes it clear that, in addition to the republican governments, there is an All-Union government, whose authority extends to all the Soviet republics. For example, Article 19 states that 'the laws of the USSR have the same force on the territory of all Union Republics'. Articles 30 and 67 state respectively that 'the highest organ of state power in the USSR is the Supreme Soviet of the USSR' and that 'decisions and orders of the Council of Ministers of the USSR are binding throughout the territory of the USSR'. In the case of Ukraine, these constitutional provisions simply mean that, side by side with a Ukrainian government exercising its authority over its own territory, there is another

government, that of the Union, which rules over the same territory. In fact, there are two governments in the Ukrainian republic.

Finally, Article 18a provides that 'each Union Republic has the right to enter into direct relations with foreign states, to conclude agreements and exchange diplomatic and consular representatives with them'. However, this capacity of the republics to conduct foreign relations is circumscribed by that section of Article 14a which ascribes to the jurisdiction of the Union 'representation of the USSR in international relations, conclusion, ratification and denunciation of treaties of the USSR with other states...'. It is obvious, that, since the Soviet Republics are integral parts of the USSR, the latter, by directing its relations with foreign countries, also directs the external relations of the Union republics. Applied to Ukraine, such a constitutional arrangement spells out the double jurisdiction over the management of its foreign affairs; in other words, there are two authorities in the Ukrainian SSR capable of guiding its relations with foreign states.

Taking into account the stipulation of both the Ukrainian and Union Constitutions, the Ukrainian SSR seems to be legally a peculiar kind of state, a state *sui generis*,<sup>6</sup> within the Soviet-type federation. Needless to say, this peculiarity amounts to a legal deficiency.

Can this type of state be sovereign and independent? Part of Article 13 of the Ukrainian Constitution makes it clear that 'outside of Article 14 of the USSR Constitution the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic exercises state power independently, fully preserving its sovereign rights'. Article 15 of the Union Constitution says that 'the sovereignty of the Union republics is limited only in the spheres defined in Article 14 of the Constitution of the USSR. Outside of these spheres each Union republic exercises state power independently. The USSR protects the sovereign rights of the Union republics'. Thus the significance of Article 14 cannot be overlooked. According to it, a wide variety of powers belong to the jurisdiction of the Union, including the following: 'The representation of the USSR in international relations, the conclusion, ratification and denunciation of the USSR with other states, the establishment of general procedures governing the relations of the Union Republics with foreign states; questions of war and peace; control over observance of the Constitution of the USSR, and the insuring of the conformity of the Constitutions of the Union Republics with the Constitution of the USSR; the confirmation of alterations of boundaries between Union Republics; the organization of the defence of the USSR, the determination of directing principles governing the organization of the military formations of the Union Republics; foreign trade on the basis of state monopoly; approval of the consolidated state budget of the USSR

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<sup>6</sup>) The constitutional status of all the other Soviet Republics is the same.

and of the report on its fulfilment; the determination of taxes and revenues which go to the Union, Republican and local budgets'. All these matters are within the juridical competence of the USSR.

Notwithstanding these limitations imposed on the Ukrainian SSR by Article 14 of the All-Union Constitution, the various provisions of the Ukrainian counterpart show definite of sovereignty and independence. Its own Article 14 speaks about the right of secession of the Ukrainian Republic from the Union. Article 15 states that the Republic's territory may not be altered without its consent. Articles 15a and 15b, respectively, point out that Ukraine 'has its own military formations' as well as 'the right to enter into direct relations with foreign states, conclude agreements and exchange representatives with them'. In Article 17 we learn that 'every citizen of the Ukrainian SSR is a citizen of the USSR. The citizens of all other Union Republics enjoy on the territory of the Ukrainian SSR all the rights of citizens of the Ukrainian SSR'. The jurisdiction of the Republic is enumerated in Article 19 which declares that 'its highest organ of state power and organs of state administration' are changed *inter alia* with '(a) the establishment of the Constitution of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and control over its observance; ... (w) conferring the rights of citizenship of the Ukrainian SSR; ... (z) the establishment of the manner of organizing the military formations of the Ukrainian SSR; (z1) the establishment of the representation of the Ukrainian SSR in international relations'. Article 43 stipulates that the Council of Ministers of Ukraine, among other things, 'directs the organization of the military formations of the Ukrainian SSR' (43g) and 'exercises direction in the sphere of relations of the Ukrainian SSR with foreign states, following the generally established procedure by the USSR in mutual relations of the Union Republics with foreign states' (43h). Somewhat intricate and lengthy but important is Article 50 which asserts that: 'the Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR issue within the competence of appropriate Ministries orders and instructions on the basis and in pursuance of the acting laws of the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR, of the decisions and directions of the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR, of the orders and instructions of the Union-Republican Ministers of the USSR, and verify their execution'.

The right to secede from the Union (Article 17 of the USSR Constitution) strongly suggests the voluntary nature of the Soviet multi-national state. Soviet writers maintain that this right cannot be abrogated or changed or limited by the Union.<sup>7</sup> The right to withdraw from the USSR 'means that for each union republic a practical possibility is created to freely express its will about the form of its statehood, and the will of the people within the Soviet Federation

7) A. P. Taranov, *Osnovni pryncypy konstitutsiyi Ukrains'koyi RSR*, Kyiv, 1962, 105. Zlatopol'skiy, *op. cit.*, 155. This assertion notwithstanding, Vyshinskiy wrote that 'an amendment to the draft of the Constitution of the USSR,

constitutes the basis of sovereignty of nations'.<sup>8</sup> Applying the constitutional criterion only, the right of secession contained in the Constitution of the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR looks impressive and greatly enhances the argument in favour of Ukrainian independence and sovereignty.

However, when one examines the section of the Criminal Code of the Ukrainian SSR, under the heading 'Crimes against the State', the value of the secession clause takes on a different meaning. Article 56 of this section, entitled 'Treason to the Fatherland' unequivocally states that a citizen of the USSR is faced with severe punishment if he acts against 'the territorial inviolability' of the Union. An identical declaration is made by 'The Law of the USSR concerning penal responsibility for the Crimes against the State' (Article 1).<sup>9</sup> In a textbook on Soviet criminal law it is explained that an attack upon the inviolability of the territory of the USSR constitutes an act of treason against the fatherland.<sup>10</sup> One must conclude that while the Constitutions of the Ukrainian republic and the Union permit Ukraine to withdraw from the Soviet 'federation', Soviet criminal law, operating throughout the USSR including Ukraine, prohibits under severe penalties even the advocacy of any such undertaking. This state of affairs is contradictory and under it the right of secession is a dead letter.

The constitutional provision which explicitly denies to the Union jurisdiction over the alteration of the territory of the Ukrainian SSR without its consent, seems to be a strong legal safeguard of Ukrainian independence and sovereignty. Taranov explains: "Territory is one of the integral features of the nation that formed the union republic, and together with this, the material basis of its independence. Hence it follows that the territory of any union republic may not be changed without its consent. The Union's jurisdiction as regards the territory of the union republics amounts only to confirmation of the decision of the union republics' organs about the border changes among them".<sup>11</sup>

In the last sentence the author clearly refers to Article 14e of the All-Union Constitution and it should be pointed out that such a provision limits the right of Ukraine as regards its own territorial

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introduced while it was being considered by the entire people, proposed to exclude Article 17 from the draft. Stalin pointed out in his report at the Extraordinary Eighth All-Union Congress of Soviets that this proposal was wrong and should not be adopted by the Congress". Vyshynskiy, *op. cit.*, 285. It is conceivable, therefore, that at some future date, an amendment to annual Article 17, which would abrogate the right of secession, could be successfully proposed.

<sup>8</sup>) Taranov, *op. cit.*, 105.

<sup>9</sup>) *Ugolovnoye zakonodatel'stvo Soyuza SSR i soyuznykh Respublik*, vol. I, Moscow, 1963, 188, 44.

<sup>10</sup>) *Sovetskoye ugolovnoye pravo*, Moscow, 1962, 23.

<sup>11</sup>) Taranov, *op. cit.*, 104.

changes. As one jurist phrased it: 'The territory of the republics may not be changed without their consent, but it also may not be changed without the consent of the USSR for the confirmation of the border changes among the republics belongs to the USSR . . .'<sup>12</sup>

The proviso in the Ukrainian Constitution which asserts the existence of 'Republican military formation'<sup>13</sup> is a clear and powerful manifestation of Ukrainian independence and sovereignty. Yet the paragraphs of Articles 19 and 43, mentioned above, which deal with the organization of Ukrainian military affairs, besides being vague, are the only ones in the whole Constitution that concern themselves with the armed forces of Ukraine. The Ukrainian Constitution is silent on such important matters as the institution of military ranks, the appointment and removal of the high command of its armed forces, the proclamation of general or partial mobilization — matters that belong to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Soviet of the Union, specified in Article 49 of its Constitution. Since it is the Union which determines the 'directing principles governing the organization of military formations of the Union Republics', and since it also 'directs the general organization of the Armed Forces of the country' (part of Article 68e), the clauses in the Ukrainian Constitution concerning the organization of military formations of the Republic do not amount to anything more than a declaration of power subordinated to the USSR jurisdiction. Since, again, the question of war is outside the constitutional rights of the Ukrainian SSR, it is hard to conceive of any independent action on the part of the Republic's military forces.

A revealing statement is made by Article 112 of the Ukrainian Constitution: 'Universal military service is the law. Military service in the ranks of the Armed Forces of the USSR is the honourable duty of the citizens of the Ukrainian SSR'. This provision makes no reference to the armed forces of Ukraine but only to the forces of the Union, as if the former, contrary to Article 15a, did not exist at all. The logic of this significant constitutional omission becomes clear when one reads part of Article 68e of the Union Constitution which stipulates that the All-Union Council of Ministers 'fixes the annual contingent of citizens to be called up for military service . . .'. Since according to Article 67 of the Union Constitution 'decisions and orders of the Council of Ministers of the USSR are binding throughout the territory of the USSR',<sup>14</sup> and since no provision corresponding to that part of Article 68e is to be found in the Constitution of the

<sup>12</sup>) V. Lysyy, 'Derzhavnyy status USSR ta inshykh soyuznykh Respublik SSSR', *Vil'na Ukraina*, No. 34, 1962, 17.

<sup>13</sup>) Article 18b of the All-Union Constitution says that 'each Union Republic has its own Republican military formations.'

<sup>14</sup>) See also Articles 50 and 51 of the Ukrainian Constitution, which, among other things, state the subordination of the Ukrainian Ministries to the Union Ministres.

Ukrainian SSR, it is clear that, juridically speaking, only the organs of the Union are empowered to deal with the maintenance of armed forces. In conclusion, one must say that the constitutional claim concerning Ukraine's military establishment appears to be extremely slim.<sup>15</sup>

One of the strongest legal arguments for regarding Ukraine as an independent and sovereign state within the limits of the 'federation' is supplied by Article 15b, supported by Articles 19z1, 30j and 30k<sup>16</sup> of the Ukrainian Constitution. Article 15b (Article 18a of the Union Constitution) states the right of Ukraine to be a member of the international community, that is, the right to participate directly in international discourse among states; it gives the right separately to conclude international agreements; and finally, it allows the Republic to send its diplomatic and consular representatives to foreign states as well as to receive foreign diplomatic and consular mission at home. These are, of course, broad juridical powers suggesting strongly that Ukraine has an international legal personality or is a subject of international law.

Articles 19z1, 30j and 30k state in more specific and functional terms the competence of the Ukrainian SSR in foreign affairs, stressing the matter of Ukrainian representation abroad and foreign diplomatic representation at home. It should be noted that no specific reference is made in these articles to the competence of the Ukrainian organs of state power and administration regarding international agreements, but it may be argued that no special mention is required in the light of Article 15b, which treats this important matter. If one were to take into consideration only the above-mentioned constitutional provisions, overlooking other clauses, or their absence, in the Ukrainian Constitution and the decisive Articles of the Union Constitution, then juridically speaking, Soviet claims for Ukrainian independence and sovereignty would appear valid in this context.

But after further studying the pertinent stipulations of both constitutions, a different and less optimistic conclusion appears inevitable. First of all, Article 43h of the Ukrainian Constitution declares in unequivocal terms the subordination of the Ukrainian Council of Ministers to the USSR in the exercise of its leadership in relations with foreign states. Also Articles 50 and 51 which discuss the subordination of the Ukrainian Ministries including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to the Council of Ministers and Ministries of the

<sup>15</sup>) It is curious that both Taranov and Zlatopol'skiy speak about the rights of the republics to have their own military formations rather than about the existence of such formations, distinctly mentioned by the All-Union and the Union Republic Constitutions. See Taranov, *op. cit.*, 108 and Zlatopol'skiy, 159, 166. In fact the Ukrainian military formations were never created.

<sup>16</sup>) Articles 30j and 30k affirm respectively that the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Ukrainian Republic 'appoints and recalls plenipotentiary representatives of the Ukrainian SSR to foreign states' and 'receives the letters of credence and recall of the diplomatic representatives of foreign states accredited to it'.

USSR, plainly reveal the existing constitutional relationship between Ukraine and the Union in the field of international affairs.<sup>17</sup> This relationship is made even more vividly manifest in the provisions of the Union Constitution.

Article 14a, which assigns to the Union the 'representation of the USSR in international relations', including the representation of Ukraine as one of the constituent members of the 'federation', points out the double jurisdiction of the Union and the Ukrainian SSR over foreign affairs.<sup>18</sup> The same Article asserts that it is the Union which establishes the rules to be followed by the Soviet republics, including Ukraine, in their relations with foreign states, again demonstrating the supremacy of Union jurisdiction over the Ukrainian republic. This Article also empowers the Union to conclude, ratify and denounce treaties of the USSR, Ukraine included, with foreign states, which besides indicating double jurisdiction in the matter of making treaties reveals two additional important items in the Union's juridical arsenal. Reference is made to the process of ratification and denunciation of treaties which, according to Article 490 of the Union Constitution, are performed by the Praesidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. No such provisions are to be found in the Ukrainian Constitution, although in practice the Supreme Council has exercised the right of ratification.<sup>19</sup> Constitutionally, how-

<sup>17</sup> Texts on Soviet administrative law clearly state that the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the Union Republics follow the direction of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR. See V. A. Vlasov and S. S. Studenikin, *Sov'yetskoye pravo*, Moscow, 1959, 223; also *Administrativnoye pravo*, ed. A. E. Lynev, Moscow, 1967, 526.

<sup>18</sup> This double jurisdiction is not equal, as Article 68d of the Union Constitution shows: 'The Council of Ministers of the USSR exercises general guidance in the sphere of relations with foreign states'. Corresponding provisions of the Union Constitution to Articles 30j and 30k of the Ukrainian Constitution are contained in Articles 49p and 49q.

<sup>19</sup> In 1947 the Ukrainian SSR ratified the peace treaties with Bulgaria, Italy, Rumania, Hungary and Finland and in 1963 it also ratified the treaty prohibiting the testing of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere, outer space and underwater. Besides treaties, many other agreements, conventions, characters, etc., have been ratified by Ukraine. See N. M. Ulyanova, 'Uchast Ukrain'skoi RSR u mizhnarodnykh konferentsiakh i mizhnarodnykh dohovorakh', *Ukrains'ka Radians'ka Socialistychna Respublika*, ed. M. P. Bazhan et al., Kyiv, 1965, 632-34. Yanovskiy suggests that the Constitutions of the Union republics should have provisions giving the republics the right to ratify international treaties or agreements. He also proposes that the right to denounce treaties should be included in the Union Constitutions. See M. N. Yanovskiy, 'Sov'yetskiye soyuznyye Respubliki — polnopravnyye subyekty mezhdunarodnogo prava', *Sov'yetskoye gosudarstvo i pravo*, XII, 1962, 59. A somewhat ingenious explanation regarding the absence of ratification and denunciation powers in the Ukrainian Constitution is presented by Korets'kyy. He says: 'Although the Constitution of the Ukrainian SSR does not mention the right to conduct ratification and denunciation of treaties, this does not mean that such a right does not exist. It is logically connected with the right to conclude treaties'. V. M. Korets'kyy, 'Mizhnarodno-pravna subyektivnist' Ukrain'skoyi RSR', *Ukrayins'ka Socialistychna Respublika*, 628.

ever, the lack of ratification and denunciation powers limits the competence of the Ukrainian republic with respect to international treaties.

The question of war and peace (Article 41b of the Union Constitution), certainly very important prerogatives of any sovereign and independent state, belong to the exclusive jurisdiction of the USSR. Article 49m of its Constitution stipulates that, 'in the intervals between sessions of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR', its Praesidium 'proclaims a state of war in the event of military attack on the USSR, or when necessary to fulfil international treaty obligations concerning mutual defence against aggression'. Discussing Ukraine's lack of constitutional powers to deal with the problem of war and peace, Academician Korets'kyy writes: 'The Constitution of the Ukrainian SSR does not mention the right of the Ukrainian SSR to declare war. The Constitution of the USSR ascribes to the jurisdiction of the USSR the questions of war and peace... This follows from the basic aims of the voluntary union of equal Soviet Socialist Republic created for mutual aid, including defence (Article 13 of the Constitution of the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR).

'An attack on one of the Republics would mean an attack on the entire Soviet Union. The Ukrainian SSR, together with the Soviet Union, participated in the Great Patriotic War, 1941-1945, and in the conclusion of peace treaties. But the Ukrainian SSR (as well as other Union republics) cannot separately solve questions of war and peace. Only in the solidarity and unity of all Union republics lies the guarantee of security, integrity and sovereignty of each Union republic and the Soviet Union'.<sup>20</sup> This reasoning notwithstanding, the sovereignty and independence of the Ukrainian republic is sharply reduced in law by the simple fact that its Constitution is deficient in matters of war and peace.

The jurisdiction of the Ukrainian SSR, as specified by Article 19w of its Constitution, contains the right to confer citizenship of the Ukrainian republic. This right appears to be still another juridical guarantee of Ukrainian sovereignty. Since Article 17 of the Ukrainian Constitution refers to a citizen of Ukraine as being also a citizen of the USSR, bestowal of the right of citizenship by the state organs of Ukraine would mean not only citizenship of the Ukrainian SSR, but also of the entire Union. The conferring of citizenship on Ukrainian territory is a matter for the Praesidium of the Supreme Council of the Ukrainian republic, authorized in Article 3 by the law of 19 August, 1938.<sup>21</sup> The same article also declares that it is the Praesidium

<sup>20</sup>) V. M. Korets'kyy, *op. cit.*, 628.

<sup>21</sup>) This law is entitled 'Citizenship of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics' which was passed by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. *Sbornik zakonov SSSR i ukazov Presidiuma Verkhovnogo Sovieta SSSR (1938 — July 1956)*, Moscow, 1956, 64. Article 30g of the Ukrainian Constitution mentions the power of the Praesidium of the Supreme Council of the Ukrainian SSR to bestow its citizenship.



of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR which extends citizenship of the USSR, including Union citizenship on the territory of the Ukrainian SSR, which makes it plain that there are two agencies on this territory able to impart the right of citizenship.<sup>22</sup> Such a state of affairs limits the jurisdiction of Ukraine concerning the right to extend citizenship, but this restriction is not the only one. According to Article 4 of the Citizenship Law of 1938, only the Praesidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union can terminate the right of citizenship of the USSR, including citizenship of the Ukrainian SSR, for no such authorization is vested in the Praesidium of the Ukrainian Supreme Council either by the law of 1938 or by the Ukrainian Constitution.<sup>23</sup>

The last point to be considered in our discussion of the constitutional nature of Ukrainian sovereignty and independence is the Ukrainian Constitution itself. According to Article 19a of this document, the Ukrainian SSR establishes its own Constitution and the controls over its observance. Article 127 states that it is the Supreme Council of the Ukrainian republic, and no other body, which enacts amendments to the Constitution. Since the Ukrainian Constitution is the Fundamental Law of the land, legally determining the social, political, economic, etc., structure of the republic, it is of the greatest importance to know whether this basic law of Ukraine is juridically independent of the basic law of the USSR. 'The Union republic', maintains Zlatopol'skiy, 'adopts its own Constitution independently, and also independently makes in it the necessary supplements and amendments, which, as also the whole Constitution itself, must conform to the basic law of the USSR'.<sup>24</sup> Having cited the pertinent clauses of the All-Union Constitution, the clauses in the Ukrainian Constitution should be scrutinized. Two articles are important here: Article 14d, quoted above, and Article 16. The latter reads: 'Each Union republic has its own Constitution, which takes account of the specific features of the republic and is drawn up in full conformity with the Constitution of the USSR'. It is instructive that the Ukrainian Constitution is entirely silent on the matter of its

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<sup>22</sup>) It is obvious that a foreigner given Union citizenship on the territory of Ukraine by the Praesidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR automatically becomes a citizen of the Ukrainian republic.

<sup>23</sup>) It may be argued that there is still another limitation of Ukrainian juridical sovereignty and independence here. As we have seen, Article 17 of the Ukrainian Constitution additionally stipulates that citizens of all other Soviet republics have the rights of citizens of the Ukrainian SSR when they are on its territory, which simply means that they become citizens of Ukraine just by crossing its borders, without any action on the part of the Ukrainian authorities.

<sup>24</sup>) Zlatopol'skiy, *op. cit.*, 163.

'full conformity' with the fundamental law of the Soviet 'federation', but the illusion of the independent jurisdiction of the Ukrainian republic in regard to its own basic law is easily dispelled by reading the Union counterpart. How can anyone do anything independently if one must move within prescribed areas of activity? There is a strict legal limitation imposed on the powers of the Ukrainian SSR to adopt and change its own basic law, and since this law, as the name implies, serves as the juridical groundwork for the whole state system of the Ukrainian republic, the conditions under which it operates singularly restrict the formal exercise of Ukrainian sovereignty and independence in general.<sup>25</sup>

In summary, the study of Soviet constitutional and municipal law demonstrates that the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, a member of the Soviet 'federation', is a peculiar kind of state with sharply limited sovereignty and independence.

Having shown the status of the Ukrainian republic from the standpoint of Soviet internal law, its position in the light of the law of nations must be analysed, keeping in mind the findings of the previous analysis. Two closely related questions must be answered: first, whether the Ukrainian SSR is a subject of international law and second, what legal significance, if any, is to be attached to the presence of this Union republic among the member states in the United Nations Organization?

Generally speaking, the subjects of international law or international legal personalities are considered to be states — meaning sovereign states.<sup>26</sup> Can Ukraine, which has been shown to be a deficient state only partially sovereign and a member of a Soviet

<sup>25</sup>) It is of course possible to cite still other Articles of both the Ukrainian and Union Constitutions to show the juridical limitations of Ukrainian sovereignty, but enough has been said to warrant a definite conclusion.

The argument of Soviet writers (see Taranow, *op. cit.*, 109, Yanovs'kiy *op. cit.*, 56) that the sovereignty of Ukraine, or of the Union Republics in general, is constitutionally exercised — and therefore apparently enhanced — by the fact that they are represented in the All-Union organs of government as, for example, in the Soviet of Nationalities (Article 35 of the Union Constitution) does not, in my opinion, in any way, change the existing constitutional situation in the Soviet 'federal' state. The legal restrictions on Ukrainian sovereignty and independence remain unaffected by the participation of representatives of the Ukrainian SSR in the Union government organs.

<sup>26</sup>) 'The classical doctrine of International Law generally regarded only civilized, sovereign States as international persons and therefore as subjects of International Law. The Law of Nations was defined as the body of rules governing independent States in their relations with one another'. Kurt von Schuschnigg, *International Law: an Introduction to the Law of Peace*, Milwaukee, 1959, 69; 'International law is generally defined or described as being applicable to relations between states. States are said to be the subjects of international law...', Philip C. Jessup, *A Modern Law of Nations: an Introduction*, New York, 1948, 15. Besides states, individuals, international organizations, etc., are considered by many Western jurists as having an international personality. Soviet writers as a rule maintain that only sovereign states and nations fighting for their independence are subjects of international law. See F. I. Kozhevnikov, ed. *Mezhdunarodnoye pravo*, Moscow, 1957, 86-87; L. A. Modzhorian, *Subiekty mezhdunarodnogo prava*, Moscow, 1958.

'federation', be qualified as a subject of the Law of Nations? First, it must be decided (assuming that the USSR constitutes a certain form of federal state) whether a member of any federation can be regarded as a subject of international law. Professor Korowicz says that 'it is generally accepted that a member-state of a federal state, whatever may be its internal organization and autonomy, has no international personality, being represented in international relations by the central government of the federal state'.<sup>27</sup> He also points out that 'in contradistinction to the confederation of States which is a subject of international law as also all the States belonging to the confederation, the federal State, and not its component parts (called States or provinces etc.), is the exclusive subject of international law. A component part of a federal State is not a State from the point of view of international law, and this is explicitly provided in constitutions of federal states'.<sup>28</sup> However, many international jurists would take exception to such a view by arguing that the member states of a federation have a limited international personality and therefore may be regarded as partial subjects of international law. Patrick Ranson writes that 'states members of a federation for many purposes enjoy the rights and fulfil the duties of International Persons. They are, in the words of Professor Oppenheim, "part sovereign states and they are consequently, International Persons for some purposes only". What these purposes are depends on the division of powers that exist in the particular federation'. The author illustrates the last point by citing Switzerland as a federal state in which 'member states are free to conclude treaties not only between themselves, but also with foreign states in certain specified matters'. He also mentions the United States as an example of a federation whose members are not international personalities, since the federal government alone exercises control over foreign affairs.<sup>29</sup> It is the field of external relations which seems to be decisive in determining whether a member of a federation can be considered as a subject of international law. 'It will therefore be seen', Ransome states, 'that, while the

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<sup>27</sup>) Korowicz, *op. cit.*, 82.

<sup>28</sup>) *Ibid.*, 277. It must be said that the USSR Constitution neither explicitly nor implicitly refers to the members of the Union (claimed by the Soviets to be a federation) as not being states under international law.

Korowicz of course, is not only scholar who thinks that members of a federation cannot be treated as subjects of the law of nations. Dolan, dealing with the matter of our concern, is of the same opinion. He relies on Josef Kunz's judgement (J. Kunz, *Die Staatenverbindungen*, Stuttgart, 1929, 664), and writes that 'only federations and not their members are subjects of international law...'. See Edward Dolan, 'The Member-Republics of the U.S.S.R. as Subjects of the Law of Nations', *The International and Comparative Law Quarterly*, IV, 1955, 633.

<sup>29</sup>) Patrick Ransome, 'Federation and International Law', *Federal Union*, 240.

provisions of International Law are normally binding on fully sovereign states only, they also regulate the actions of states members of a federation in so far as those states retain control over relations with foreign states'.<sup>30</sup> Von Schuschnigg notes that 'in contrast to sovereign States, which are the perfect subjects of International Law, States that are not fully sovereign, that is dependent States, are the imperfect or partial subjects of International Law. They are the protectorates, mandates, trusteeship territories, and the member States of a federal Union'.<sup>31</sup> Wesley L. Gould maintains that in a federal state 'the assignment of powers in international relations, hence of international personality, is a matter of constitutional law'. While he asserts that foreign affairs would usually be the domain of the federal government, he nevertheless holds that examples may be found which would show that members of a federation retain 'a degree of international personality'.<sup>32</sup>

Two important points emerge from this discussion: first in some federations members may be considered as being partial subjects of international law, that is, as possessing an international jural personality to a limited degree only, and second, such a status is derived from the constitutional arrangement within a federal state. The last statement is reaffirmed by Gould when he says that 'in respect to both confederations and federations international law generally does not undertake to assign degrees of personality to the union and its members. It accepts the arrangements made by the members'.<sup>33</sup>

If we accept the view that the members of at least some federations, or the members of composite states resembling federations, are to be recognized as having a degree of international personality and that it is the constitutional law of a particular federation which decides whether its members are to be subjects of international law, we may conclude that the Ukrainian SSR is some sort of restricted international person or is a partial subject of the law of nations. The reason for this is quite plain: both the Union and the Ukrainian Constitutions assert the right of Ukraine to have relations with foreign states, thus making it a subject of international law.<sup>34</sup> To

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<sup>30</sup>) *Ibid.*, 240.

<sup>31</sup>) Von Schuschnigg, *op. cit.*, 72.

<sup>32</sup>) Wesley L. Gould, *An Introduction to International Law*, New York, 1957, 200.

<sup>33</sup>) *Ibid.*, 200-01.

<sup>34</sup>) Discussing the heart of our problem Professor Halaychuk writes: 'If a member of a federation is to be subject in international law, it is necessary for the member to have the proper power recognized by the federal constitution. Is a constitutional provision alone sufficient?' ...Soviet authors believe that a

be sure, some Soviet scholars would like us to think that the Ukrainian republic, like any other Union republic, is a full subject of the law of nations, as for example, Modzhorian, who writes that, 'after giving to the Union republics the rights of foreign relations they are, side by side with the Union, the sovereign subjects of international law'.<sup>35</sup> Such a view is based on the assertion that the Soviet republics are sovereign states in spite of the limitations of the previously cited constitutional articles.

The Ukrainian SSR (as well as the Byelorussian SSR) became members of the United Nations Organization through the diplomatic efforts of the Kremlin leadership, with Stalin and his associates arriving at the successful completion of their labour not so much by legal as by political means. As Gould put it: 'the Ukrainian SSR and the Byelorussian SSR were admitted as original members of the United Nations as a concession to a Soviet political demands'.<sup>36</sup>

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constitutional provision suffices. S. Krylow stated: 'The law of 1 February, 1944, clearly confirms that the Soviet republics are subjects of international law'. The matter was even more clearly stated by Tunkin. In the course of the UN International Law Commission's work on the codification of diplomatic law, the Austrian scholar, A. von Verdross raised the question whether mention should be made of members of federations who enjoyed the right of legation. Tunkin answered: 'As stated by Mr. Verdross, the question whether a member-state of a federation has the right of legation depends on the federal constitution and is not a question of international law'. See Bohdan T. Halaychuk, 'The Soviet Ukraine as a Subject of International Law', *The Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Art and Sciences in the United States*, IX, 1961, 170-71.

Korets'kyy maintains that the Ukrainian SSR retained its international legal subjectivity (subjektnist') even after joining the USSR and transferring the conduct of its foreign relations to the Union. This would mean that Ukraine was a subject of international law before the constitutional changes of 1944. The noted Ukrainian jurist seems to explain this legal *tour de force* by stating that the Ukrainian republic, as well as other Soviet republics, had the right to take part in the Union organs of external relations (and thus apparently to participate in foreign affairs). See Korets'kyy, *op. cit.*, 627. Brovka, arguing against many of his Soviet colleagues, maintains that it is a mistake to attribute international legal subjectivity (pravosubyektnost') to the Union republics simply on the 'strength of the USSR law of February, 1944. Basing his conclusion on the decisive importance of sovereignty, he declares that 'the Soviet republics arose as independent sovereign states. They preserved their sovereignty even after entering the USSR. Therefore, their international subjectivity was not interrupted in the course of their development. With the adoption of the Law of 1 February, 1944, it received still clearer expression'. See Brovka, *Mezhdunarodnaya pravosubyektnost' BSSR*, Minsk, 83-84. It is possible to admire the legal ingenuity of the Soviet writers, without agreeing with them.

<sup>35</sup> Modzhorian, *op. cit.*, 64. Brovka says that 'the USSR and the Union republics manifest themselves on international arena independently and are full subjects of international law'. See Brovka, *op. cit.*, 89. As the title of Yanovskiy's article indicates, its author regards the Soviet Republics as full subjects of the law of nations. See Yanovskiy, *op. cit.*, 55.

<sup>36</sup> Gould, *op. cit.*, 201.

Despite this fact, the legal or constitutional argument showing that these republics were capable of having direct relations with foreign countries and therefore were to be considered as states and subjects of international law, was not only useful, but perhaps made the difference between acceptance and rejection of the Communist request. In other words the juridical argument had to be invoked to make the political transaction look legitimate. Once that was accomplished the presence of these two republics in the international organization assumed legal significance in its own right.

The juridical position of Ukraine in the United Nations is quite strong and is based primarily on the provisions of the United Nations Charter. Article 3 affirms that the founding members of the world organization 'shall be states' and Article 4, Paragraph 1, declares that 'membership in the United Nations is open to all peace-loving states which accept the obligations contained in the present Charter, [and which] in the judgment of the Organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations'.<sup>37</sup> Article 2, Paragraph 1, declares that 'the Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members' and Paragraph 4 of the same Article stipulates that 'all Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat of use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state', implying that all members of the UN have the capacity to wage war.

Since all these references apply to the Ukrainian SSR — there being no exception in the Charter — the juristic status of the Ukrainian Republic in the United Nations is clear: Ukraine, in spite of the fact that it is a member of a 'federation', is a sovereign state, equal to other members, having an international legal personality and being a subject of the law of nations.<sup>38</sup> Wrestling with the same

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<sup>37</sup> Article 34 (1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice provides that 'only states may be parties in cases before the Court'. The Statute is part of the UN Charter and the International Court of Justice is the principal judicial organ of the UN. All the UN members are *ipso facto* parties to the Statute.

<sup>38</sup> It would perhaps be of some interest to cite the legal opinion of several Western scholars concerning the presence of Ukraine (and Byelorussia) in the United Nations. Goodrich writes that 'the principle that states alone would be members of the Organization was never applied in any narrow sense. In fact it would be difficult to justify the inclusion of Ukraine and Byelorussia under any generally accepted definition of a state in international law'. Leland M. Goodrich, *The United Nations*, New York, 1959, 86. Dealing with the Stalin Constitution and the presence of the Ukrainian and Byelorussian republics in the international organization, von Schuschnigg asserts that 'the constitutional language and the separate UN membership of the two Russian member state are, from a legal point of view, manifestly irrelevant; they constitute one of those anomalies which demonstrate the frequent incongruence of juristic theory and political practice'. Von Schuschnigg, *op. cit.*, 77. Having in mind Ukraine

problem Verdross wrote: 'Es kann daher kein Zweite darüber bestehen, dass ein Gliedstaat, der als Mitglied der Vereinten Nationen aufgenommen wurde, auch ein *eigenes Völkerrechtssubject* darstellt. Diese Stellung, nimmt er aber nur gegenüber *dritten* Staaten ein, während seine Stellung *innerhalb* seines Gesamtstaates ausschliesslich nach der Verfassung dieses Staates zu beurteilen ist'. (Italics in the original). After noting that in the past international subjectivity of the members of a federation (Bundesstaat) played an insignificant rôle, the Austrian scholar continued: 'Ganz anders, steht es aber im Falle der völkerrechts-subjektivität der Ukraine und Weissrusslands, da diese im Rahmen der Charta der Vereinten Nationen den anderen Staaten gegenüber vollkommen gleichberechtigt sind daher alle Rechte ausüben können, die den Mitgliedern der UNO zustehen'.<sup>39</sup>

It appears that the legal status of the Ukrainian SSR is much stronger in the forum of the United Nations than within the Soviet 'federation'. The Charter of the international organization is much more generous towards Ukraine than either the Ukrainian or the Union Constitution: it makes the Ukrainian Republic a fully-fledged member of the international community. As the Belgian jurist P. De Visscher put it: 'Sur le plan de l'ONU la situation de Ukraine paraît juridiquement très forte puisque sa présence au sein de l'organisation n'est à rien liée à la présence de l'U.R.S.S. ou à la forme de son gouvernement'.<sup>40</sup> Such a juridical paradox makes the Ukrainian SSR both a partial and a full subject of international law, but one should not overlook the fact that it is only in the United Nation Organization and nowhere

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and Byelorussia, Gould notes that 'an anomaly is introduced when an entity lacking the status of a state is admitted as a member of an international organization of states'. He further comments that 'whatever the degree of international personality that may be derived from membership in the United Nations, the Ukrainian and Byelorussian republics are not states'. Gould, *op. cit.*, 201.

All these statements, true or false, in no way affect the stipulations of the Charter.

<sup>39</sup>) There is no doubt that a constituent state, accepted as a member of the United Nations, also possesses individual international law subjectivity. However, this position holds true only *vis-à-vis* third states, while its position within the federal state is judged exclusively by the Constitution of that state... This legal international personality appears to be entirely different in the case of Ukraine and Byelorussia because, within the framework of the United Nations Charter, they possess full equality of right in relation to third states, and therefore can exercise all the rights belonging to members of the OUN. Alfred Verdross, 'De Völkerrechtssubjektivität der Gliedstaaten der Sowjetunion', *Osterreichische Zeitschrift für Öffentliches Recht*, I, 1946, 218. See also Romain Yakemitchouk, *Ukraine — droit international*, Louvain, 1954, 43-44.

<sup>40</sup>) Paul de Visscher, 'A propos de la personnalité juridique de l'Ukraine', *dans le cadre de l'Est Européen*, Louvain, 1957, 104-05.

else that Ukraine is invested with this distinctly normal international personality.<sup>41</sup>

<sup>41</sup>) An interesting question which presents itself in connection with the membership of Ukraine in the UN is whether this country was given recognition by the other members of the international organization. Concentrating his attention on the United States, Halaychuk maintains that since Washington agreed to the UN membership of Ukraine and Byelorussia, it definitely recognized them. 'The rule of international law permits no doubt that the United States have recognized Ukraine and Byelorussia *de jure*'. The author builds his case on the opinion of many jurists. See Bohdan Halaychuk, 'Has the United States Recognized Ukraine?' *Ukrainian Quarterly*, XI, 1955, 24-28. However, the United States Government has a different view on this matter. An official publication of the US Department of State declares that 'although Byelorussia... and Ukraine... have status as members of the United Nations, they are regarded by the US Government only as constituent parts of the Soviet Union'. This publication further states that 'the US Government does not recognize Byelorussia and Ukraine as independent states...'. *Status of the World's Nations*, Geographic Bulletin No. 2, Washington, 1967, 8, 13. The entire problem of the relationship between recognition and UN membership received a brief exposition in a memorandum 'Legal Aspects of the Problem of Representation in the United Nations', prepared in 1950 for Trygve Lie, then Secretary-General of the Organization. The authoritative conclusions of this memorandum, based on the unbroken practice of the UN members, left no doubt that '(1) a member could properly vote to accept a representative of a government which it did not recognize or with which it had no diplomatic relations and (2) such a vote did not imply recognition or a readiness to assume diplomatic relations'. Security Council, *Official Records, Fifth Year*, Supplement for January, February, March, 1950 (Doc. S/1466), 18-23.

### Protest Writings from Ukraine

## AMONG THE SNOWS

By VALENTYN MOROZ

London, 1971, 65 pp. Price 50p (\$1.75)

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# CATARACT

*By Mykhaylo OSADCHYY*

*(Essay)*

"Cataract" is a work which is circulating in Ukraine (in transcripts) in several versions, which also found their way abroad. The authorship of this work is attributed to Mykhaylo Osadchyy, who was born in 1936 in the village of Kurmany in the Sumy region. Earning a degree in journalism at the Lviv University, he worked for the press and television. In 1960, he became a senior lecturer at the Lviv University's Faculty of Journalism. In June 1965, he defended his doctoral dissertation on the subject of "Journalistic Activity of Ostap Vyshnya". However, he never did receive his Ph.D. degree, for he was arrested on August 28th of that year and sentenced by the closed Lviv Oblast Court to two years of concentration camp for "anti-Soviet nationalist activity". Released from a Mordovian concentration camp (Yavas) in August 1968, he returned to Lviv, but was barred from following his profession. Arrested again in mid-January 1972 during a new wave of arrests and persecution of Ukrainian intellectuals.

Prior to his first arrest, M. Osadchyy was a member of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and a deputy secretary of the party organization at the Faculty of Journalism.

Below we publish one of the version of the work "Cataract" with minor omissions (marked by dots in brackets).

**Editor's Note**

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We are surrounded by lights. Nothing but lights. They were artfully placed on both sides of the road which we were told to follow. This road is also very cunningly paved with a phosphorescent material and, like a magnet, it attracts human sight to itself. The lights and the paving are of matching colour. This colour is strong in nature. Having entered your being somehow, it takes you into its captivity. You become disproportionately large and . . . as hollow as a jar. You feel light and joyful. You can follow that phosphorescent road for one, two, ten years, your whole life. And nothing can dampen the assured stride, for on top of that jar there is a tight lid. But somehow I happened to jump for joy, and the lid came off, and rash thoughts came running into my being, into my empty jar. They disturbed the submissive little creature in me, and suddenly I longed to see what was happening out there, beyond those lights. I shielded my eyes from the glaring light with my hand and for a moment cast a glance behind the coulisses of light. Only for an instant and out of the corner of my eye. Still, I had to pay dearly for this. The little people got fidgety and out of fear turned the glare of all the lights upon me. It blinded me, and unseeing I continued to toss and turn until I became totally exhausted in that bewitched den. Then I sat down on the road and saw that there was no paving at all, but ordinary sand which reflected the light of the lamps. On that sand I began to write all sorts of words just for amusement. Strictly speaking, only one

word — man. At first I wrote it thus: man. And then in capital letters: MAN. And suddenly I was seized by such laughter that I cried like a small child. However, by this I only hurt myself, for that laughter was worse than theft, treason, murder. And then I jumped on that sand like a madman and scattered it. I did not leave one speck of dust upon the other. But by doing so I did not feel any better . . .

That frenzy is inside me still. That wicked phantom which caused so much distress. I almost became mad. I had to save myself. And in that despair a piece of paper served as a straw. I gave to it my sleepless nights, my hurt and my human dignity. I told it the truth. That truth should not be bypassed through indifference. That infernal, desperate truth . . .

*The Author*

### *Part One*

#### THE COMEDIANS

The electric bell rang annoyingly. Then once again. Somebody was trying to get into the apartment, impatiently shuffling from foot to foot. "At this hour of the morning?" — I thought — "Who could it be?" A certain anxiety stole over me: something must have happened to someone. I opened the door . . . Pushing me aside lightly, a tall man with an ugly face, entered the room. He smiled mysteriously, and studied me, and suddenly I was struck by his strange, piercing stare and his mask of selfassurance. Before I had time to close the door, two other entered the apartment. They quickly jumped to the windows and closed them. "Sit down", — they told me. "Here, next to your wife. And do not move!"

— "But . . ." — I tried to say something, but the man indignantly interrupted me in the middle of a word and thrust some document in front of my eyes. "Predyavitel etogo imeyet pravo nosit oruzhiye" (The bearer of this has the right to bear arms), — I managed to read and was horrified at the thought: an armed gang? Robbery at that time of day? I even thought: me, a proletarian? — and immediately began to laugh hysterically. The tall one, without taking his watchful eyes off me, nervously held out a search warrant. I felt relieved, although I still could not understand anything. "Surely, there must be some mistake — I thought — possibly they have confused the numbers of the apartments, that's probably what it is . . ." But they did not pay any attention to me, painstakingly they ransacked the books and moved them from one heap to another in a disorderly fashion. They were in an ever greater hurry and I noticed that their dissatisfaction grew with every minute. "What are they looking for so persistently?" — I thought. The telephone rang, but they did not allow me to go near it. The telephone kept ringing, ceaselessly, while

they continued to turn over my books and notebooks. And suddenly I felt myself to be a tiny caged animal, whose body is unpleasantly gripped by the cold. My wife was sitting beside me, frightened and alarmed, and also small. "It's only a premonition", I thought. From time to time, they threw annoyed glances at me and then I felt myself shaking with cold. Then one of them joyously shouted and — without concealing his excitement — the youngest held up the article "On the Occasion of Pohruzhal's'kyy's Trial". This quite rejuvenated the strangers; it seemed as if any moment they would leap up and dance and, unintentionally, would push me, with my frozen feet, into their ring. A protocol was drawn up; "The Black Council" by P. Kulish, "The History of the Ukrainian Literature" by M. Hrushevs'kyy, several collections by B. Lepkyy and some old pamphlets were thrown into a suitcase. On top, with unusual ritual, they placed the above-mentioned article. And the next moment I was sped away in a sky-blue "Volga", blue — someone's lucky colour. They sat alongside me, corpulent and proud, and exchanged significant glance time and again. At times, these glances focused on me and then their bodies pressed against mine like pincers, causing me pain and repugnance. I could not stand it any longer and closed my eyes. Later, I was pulled by the shoulder and, when I opened my eyes, I saw that we had come to a grey, three-storey, corner building at Myr (Peace) and the former Stalin Street...

I was a table now, small and clumsy, for which no place could be found. They grabbed me with their bare hands and quickly pushed me along in front of them; they put me down and then they returned and moved me to a new spot. The corridor, the offices, the corridor... It all began to dance before my eyes and everything began to drift: both the floor and the ceiling. The people and the faces changed: it seemed that they wrapped me up in a roll of cloth and rolled me across the floor. They kicked me and from above somebody's reproachful voice thundered:

— What else did you want? — You are young, you defended your dissertation, you only had to live!...

— The kid played with fire and it got burned! Oh, you son of a bitch...

— What I? — I tried to cling to something and could not. Roll, roll. I tried to resist, I wanted to be as stubborn as an elephant, but I became utterly exhausted and only murmured helplessly: "What I!..." "What?..."

At last all was quiet. I was hastily dumped somewhere, pulled out from the roll, and I saw a cold room and before me, a young, tired blinking person who looked at me, bored, involuntarily at his eyelids. Young and bald, bald and young, thought I and shriveled at his playful jerking of his lower lip. "Sit down!" — he said and, turning away from the table, moved slowly towards me. "God, — it came to my

mind, — I must have, indeed, committed some crime, without even being aware of it myself. A new Herostratus?" Then he unexpectedly turned around and fixed his half-crazy eyes on me.

— And do you know, little post-graduate, that thousands of leaflets were typed on your typewriter? .. that you are only pretending to be honest... discreet. But we have known everything for a long time... You won't admit it? We'll force you! And how we'll force you! There were other beauties, much more dignified, and they too fell on their knees and tearfully begged for mercy. Not like you, you dirty...\*)

Still not understanding anything, I forced myself to remember at least some words of that tirade, but this was a vehement tirade, and my efforts were fruitless. Words came flying at me like hail, and I only listened attentively to those painful bits which pertained to me. Afterwards, wearily and dully, like a person half-drowned, I watched people jumping into the room and suddenly running out again and shouting something, shouting like a flock of hungry pelicans...

Before me drifted the simple rectangular surface of the table — the only silent and peaceful thing in the room, which by its stability still managed to recall reality, to float to the surface out of the violent Kafkaesque confusion. I tried to find some distinguished features in the faces and voices, which stubbornly demanded something of me, but they were all so alike as one copper coin is to another. Five, three, one... It seemed that in the background, behind the table, the scenery of some grandiose play was changing, and somewhere from the side, instead of the threatening bases and tenors, a broken-down tape recorder, its tape tearing from time to time, played its own tune aggressively from the prompter's box...

I attempted to say something to these people. Perhaps, I even said something, contradicted them, because they harped on my words, and as a consequence I fell off the seat, which was nailed to the floor and backed by a blank wall, which it was impossible to overlook.

— What, Malanchuk? .. We'll bring the secretary to the Oblast Committee here too, in no time, and you, his sh... little worker, will tell him what you did. About all your vile deeds...

— What, (you're) a genius? (You've) lectured at a university, (you're) a graduate of science? Ha-ha! .. We know you, graduates! In the thirties the pretty little heads of greater ones were twisted, like those of chickens! ..

— Why tell him — he knows it himself. He even wrote a Ph.D. dissertation about one of these: about a sh... humorist, he wrote about Vyshnya... Ha-ha! ... Are you immortalizing nationalists?

I contradicted this; I really spoke up, but it was a hodge-podge of thoughts and words.

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\*) Here and further on unprintable words of coarse Russian curses are omitted. — Ed. Note.

— But, still . . . How dare you . . . a prominent Ukrainian . . . seven volumes of his works are being published . . . Nominated to receive Lenin Prize . . . rehabilitated long ago . . .

— Rehabilitated? . . . — they started at me as if I had said something about the new Pompey. They just would not believe my words. And then they began to roar with laughter. They even had to hold their stomachs. They found it so funny. They pointed fingers at me, as if I were a madman, and roared with laughter. And did they roar.

I looked at them in confusion and imagined them to be people, small and carefree, who had come here from another planet in order to boast about their youth, their cruelty and their insolence. They knew their worth, these authoritarian protectors, dominant and exalted. They were not ashamed of it at all. On the contrary. And instantly a bright idea occurred to me: God, they are great jokers; they decided to play a little game and they are amused. And I have been resisting them with all my strength, as if they were serious. I was so overtaken by this mood that before I could collect my wits I was laughing too. Surely, at that moment I must have resembled the old Vyshnya, who never could get accustomed to treating the police investigation quite seriously and invigorated it by jokes: "But, gentlemen, why do you consider me a terrorist? If you so long to convict me, would it not be better to try me for raping Clara Thetkin" . . .

The rectangular surface of the table continued to mark itself out before me, and embodiment of stability in this confused activity which was taking place all around: it was the sole thing which kept me on the ground a little, prevented me from falling into some deep hole, which I could at times definitely feel beneath my feet; then I was even afraid to move so as not to slip and go tumbling down. And the robust men, who by their physique must have tempted the imagination of many a woman, hovered around me in confusion; I heard their annoying laughter, caught their puzzling glances, fragments of phrases which either rushed in suddenly in great numbers or retreated, and I, like a fool, watched it all, unable to grasp anything. At long last, and perhaps at that very moment, I was far away from this building, in some square, locked in chains, and patiently awaited an executioner who would cut off my head. The people were whispering, spitting, crying. Everything merged into one, while I stood naked on a platform and shook with cold. And then the executioner arrived and called to the crowd: "Who wants to save the life of this thief and to marry him?" They all became agitated, someone shouted "I", — but everything became quiet again and I wondered: "Why? Why did she not reach me and why was her voice suddenly lost?" — "Who wants to marry him? . . ." There was the executioner, there was the platform and several old, lost people, who hastened to lower their eyes . . .

I was amazed at the silence which unexpectedly encompassed the room. There was no one left around me. I did not even notice when they left. I was all alone. My head, flattened like an old man's, ached and I thought: "You left and took me with you". I thought about the fact that it was already dark outside, that the noise in the street was gradually dying down, that I did not have a bite to eat since morning. I had several kopeks. With these it would at least be possible to buy some buns and to have a snack somewhere in the doorway. I was so fascinated by this idea that I even heaved myself up in order to start going. Most likely I even made one or two steps, but unexpectedly barred windows appeared before me and somebody sarcastically asked: "Where are you going, Sir?" Indeed — "where?" — I thought to myself and leaned against the table. "If I did not buy the buns, I could then take a cab and go home. There my worried wife was waiting for me. If I were to spend money on buns, then surely there won't be enough left even for a tram". I glanced at the windows, then back at the door. I was a naïve loner, who amused himself by empty prattle, like gossip women.

Somebody came in. Yes. I did not even turn my head. "Sleduyte za mnoy" (Follow me), — I heard somebody say authoritatively and, without hurrying, obediently followed him.

I finally found myself in a large room. I was politely greeted by an outwardly peaceful-looking man, who called himself my investigator. I immediately sensed an inner liking for him. At least this person became for me that straw which I, like a drowning man, could grab. "At last, I thought, — after all these hours of maltreatment, I shall find out something about myself. What could it be?" ...

— You, Mykhaylo Hryhorovych, — he said after some time, kindly offering me a seat next to him, — are suspected of circulating anti-Soviet nationalist literature in the city of Lviv. At present, we are clarifying the matter and you have nothing to worry about. A little more suffering — and you will go home. But... all will depend on how sincerely you are going to confess to everything ...

I had nothing to confess. I told him so.

He listened to me reproachfully, quickly writing something down now and again; he questioned me, got up from his chair and, folding his hands behind his back and starting fixedly out of the window, which was barred, played with a typewriter... Then he slowly turned to me, very slowly, and looked steadily into my eyes. I sensed some mute distrust in his glance, some scepticism, at times even open cynicism. I felt it particularly when he wearily cast his eyes on the bars, unambiguously hinting at their purpose: oh, well... there was an opportunity to get more familiar with them ...

Later, our conversation went so far that we could not even determine the aim of our talk. Like old friends who had not seen each other for a long time, we soon told each other everything with-

out reserve, and having parted we racked our brains to find out what we had been talking about... We touched upon the problems of art and literature, but the conversation would break off suddenly, because he was interested in something else, about which neither I, nor he had any knowledge. I had the feeling that having started this conversation, he had to force himself to keep it up, for the sake of courtesy.

We talked about the freedom of speech, about the new meaning of the dictatorship of the proletariat, which, according to the Programme of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, "has performed its historic mission and from the point of view of the tasks of internal development has ceased to be necessary in the USSR", that "at the present stage of development... the state has turned into an all-people's state, into the organ of expression of the interests and will of the whole nation..." I quoted from memory almost the whole CPSU Programme, but he interrupted me in the middle of words, nervously biting his lips, and immediately raised his voice. But I no longer paid any attention to this; I became completely indifferent to the conversation.

— There was, there is, and there will be dictatorship, — he said cunningly, closing his piercing eyes.

— But, excuse me, — I made an attempt to contradict him, — I'm a young Communist and, surely, I'd rather believe the Party than you.

— Communists, even young ones, are not to be found here, — he smiled out of the corner of his thin, lightly trembling lips. — And as far as your words are concerned, it is not yet clear who said them — the Party or Khrushchov...

Frankly, I was quite shocked by such a distinction. I did not even attempt to contradict him. It was so impertinent! At that time I, as an official of the Lviv Oblast Committee of the Party, knew that Khrushchov had been on account of the deterioration in the state of his health. I even knew from official sources that he allowed errors to creep in certain questions of domestic and foreign policy. But the notion of the party and Khrushchov, finding themselves on opposite sides, was a paradox to me.

— But, forgive me, is it possible to make such a distinction? — I asked in astonishment. — For ten years Khrushchov had guided the Soviet state and party; for ten years he was a "faithful Leninist", a top authority in the world Communist movement, such an active leader...

— Shame on you, stop it! — he grimaced. — Do not pretend to be a naïve fish who is trying to jump out of the hot cooking pot. The place for such leaders is you know where...

He was playing with the typewriter, swaying a bit. I waited for him to continue with his thoughts, but no, he did not say anything more.

As it had seemed to me earlier on, he was staring with an ambiguity peculiar to him at the window whose bars could be seen in the evening twilight — the sole creation of artists which had not undergone any changes throughout millenia.

At about 9 o'clock I was taken to the adjoining room and told to undress. They searched me painstakingly, even in places about which it is awkward to speak. Again that same annoyance on the lean faces, which occurs in people who persistently look for something and do not find it. I was powerless and half asleep. I was brought out of this state from time to time by cold, almost unpleasant, strange fingers, which crawled all over my body like live, restless leeches. I could not remember anything, except that time and again one and the same thought came and went: to sleep... to sleep... I could hardly keep on my feet and when I was taken to cell M-64, small, noisy, with stuffy air, which made me even more dizzy, I fell without undressing upon the mattress, bare and dirty but so dear to me at that moment, threw over myself an old quilt, much soiled by human palms, and fell into an uneasy sleep. I dreamed about sick, lean horses, which in the midst of snow, breathed steam over me in order to warm me... I thought that perhaps now it is easier for them for the soggy earth is the best cover of all.

In the morning I was awakened by banging on the door. An unfamiliar voice shouted, as if at the Odessa dock: "*Padyom! Padyom!*" (Rise!) I lay there, still not understanding anything, and this voice reminded me of another one: it had resounded in our village long ago, when a rag-man rode down the street in a rag-cart and shouted like mad at the top of his voice "Any old rags! Any old rags!" I jumped up and immediately gasped with pain — my whole body was covered with red spots which burned and itched unbearably. What could it be?.. But I was again caught up by unaccustomed words which issued from the corridor:

— *Apravlyatsa! V tualet! Apravlyatsa!* (Get dressed! To the toilet! Get dressed!).

For me, this was a strange music of words which I heard for the first time, and which, at last, brought me back to reality. Now I recalled what had happened yesterday and recognized the cell. It was filled with the sound of scraping feet, which came from an unknown direction, hissing and hasty, — the people were hurrying somewhere, working, but their work demanded secrecy and therefore an insistent whisper penetrated to me from everywhere.

— *Sh-sh-sh-sh! Tishe, tishe, tibye gavyaryat!.. Nye polozheni!* (Silence, silence, I tell you!.. Against regulations!) The top and bottom bolts thundered; the massive lock squeaked like an old man on top of a cottage stove, suffering from arthritis: I was being guarded like a mummified pharaoh in a tomb, weighed down with a huge stone slab; this idea suddenly made me laugh and I could feel how my cheeks were filling with air, how my chest was expanding, how my



legs were becoming elastic, — the pharaohs had been nothing; what are their tombs under heavy slabs? On my iron doors there are countless cumbersome bolts and locks! . .

— *Apravlyatsa!* — sternly shouted from the door a tiny man resembling a Russian marionet with red-striped epaulettes.

— *Mevalis?* . . (Have you washed?).

"*Malchik-spalchik*" handed me two pieces of paper and politely said: "*pozhaluysta*" (please), and then patiently stumbled after me. The pharaohs really had been nothing in comparison to me. Hardly were they told "*pozhaluysta*" and hardly was their journey to the toilet so carefully guarded.

*Balanda* (a watery soup) . . I am looking at it, as if bewitched. It seems that it is glued to the metal bowl which is black, burned, deformed: this kind can be found at any garbage dump in the city. I dipped a wooden spoon in the greenish-yellow liquid and raised it to my mouth. But I stopped half-way and looked at it carefully — the eternal companion of prison. This brand-name dish also must have been invented by an artist long ago, who must have spent many a night over the book "*O vkusnoy i zdorovoy pishche*" (On tasty and healthy food). This invention had outlived all revolutions of the world, all the wars and had remained unchanged to this day. Leonardo da Vinci invented the sewing machine, but it was so imperfect that it cannot even be compared with those of the present, on which countless operations can be performed. One can stitch, make button-holes, sew on buttons, darn and embroider. But the name of the inventor was not forgotten. We hold it in high esteem. But what an injustice that the inventor of the *balanda* was forgotten with such lack of gratitude. Still, his invention was perhaps the most perfect of all the inventions of mankind . .

I raised the spoon still closer to my mouth and suddenly I let the bowl drop: Such a bouquet of "perfumes" struck my nose that my face became distorted unintentionally. I turned my back on the *balanda* and thought once more, with gratitude and extreme respect, about its inventor; if I had been at the old common council, I certainly would have awarded him the "*Otlichnik kulinarnogo dyela*" (Excellent student of culinary art) badge . .

I thought about the fact that my next post-graduate's thesis would be about the *balanda*, which can be savoured in any country, regardless of its social way of life; the name of the inventor must be discovered. I became delighted with the idea of doing this and that the immortalization of the inventor would be linked with my humble name.

My scientifically historical contemplation was interrupted quite inopportunately by the Kostromian (O-ing: "Here O!.. here O!..")

Somebody's kind face peeped at me through the door, beckoning me "Here O!..." Only at this time did I become aware of the fact that in prison, in order to prevent the prisoners from finding out who is confined to the cell, the surnames are not called, only the first letters. In such instances it is necessary to run up to the door and to name oneself in a whisper. I ran up obediently and named myself, although this was rather funny, since I was alone in the cell.

— "*Paydom! Ruki nazad! Ruki nazad tebye gavaryat!...* (Let's go! Hands behind your back! Hands back, I tell you!).

My escort followed me, stopped from time to time, ran as far as the corner, looked carefully to see if anyone was there, and then again tramped behind me continuously clicking the fingers of both his hands. He did this so skillfully that I even envied him, as a pharaoh, who long ago was escorted only by the feeble and artificial sounds of drums and fanfares would have envied me at this solemn moment.

My acquaintance of yesterday, with whom I talked so 'cordially' last night and who opened my eyes to our social life, sat behind a massive table supported by two pedestals and covered with blue cardboard. I have always liked that colour. It was the colour of the sky and space, and it always calmed me down, inspired me to contemplation and cheered me up. The investigator smiled at me and my spirits rose immediately. Perhaps, as he had promised yesterday, everything had been cleared up and I would be sent home immediately, since there was no sense in keeping me here any longer. I sat down opposite him, gazed confidently into his face, and smiled back at him: honest to God, I liked this man. In his presence my heart was getting lighter. I hardly restrained myself from telling him about my observations. This, most likely, would have cheered him up quite a bit.

— Right away, right a-way... — the investigator bent over the table and began to fill out a report. — Everything is becoming clear, a few more questions, then we shall spank you across your bare bottom with a little oak cane and... home at the double, but don't let us catch you again... You have not done anything, but others have created quite a...

I did not know what the others had done. I was just pleased by the fact that everything had been clarified so quickly, that I was innocent and would go home soon. Home, far away from the darkness and the stifling air of the cell, far away from this grim building, far away from the "*apravlyatsa!*" Soon I would be out in the street, would breathe in fresh air and, most likely, would not take a taxi, would not even take a tram, but would take the Suvorov, the Dzerzhinskiy, and the Lenin streets, would turn right at Mechnikov Street and would hit my long-awaited Nekrasov Street...

— Y-e-s... — said the investigator and raised his grey eyes at me, in which I unexpectedly caught a shade of unconcealed hostility.

— What literature of anti-Soviet content have you received from Ivan Svitlychnyy in Kyïv and from Bohdan Horyn' in Lviv?... (During the conversation he always used the familiar form of "thou", but when he was asking a forward question he addressed me with "you" in the polite form).

I knew these people very well. I liked Svitlychnyy since he was an intelligent well-balanced person, a talented critic, who (unlike others) never reached a compromise with his own conscience. I sensed his great erudition, envied his knowledge of Ukrainian cultural history. I admired his literary taste, his aesthetic inclinations, his sense of humor. I was also attracted by his purely human traits of character.

— I have not received anything from him, — I said calmly and was instantly sorry for having uttered these words: the investigator — tall, corpulent, grim (he reminded me of Peter I at that moment) — jumped from his seat (where had his calmness and composure, the smile and the playfully gentle voice disappeared to?) and obscured my view of almost the whole room. His eyes pierced me. I could even feel his breath on my face. He could hardly control himself (but he restrained himself; his will had been trained).

— Carefully, carefully, now!.. Your words are your fate. Everything depends on you. You must remember that.

He paced the room in silence, sat on the table, picked up the typewriter and stated emphatically:

— I wanted to release you today, and what are you doing? I want to close the case, and you are holding your tongue, posing as some kind of a fool, turning into a dumb fish! What did you receive from Bohdan Horyn'?

— If you are so interested in such things and if my fate depends so much on this, then perhaps I can say...

— *Vot umnitsa! Gavari...* (That's a smart boy! Talk...).

— I recall that once I borrowed a book on the works of the artist Novakivs'kyi, a research study "Napoleon and Ukraine", and "Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi's Treaty with Tsar Aleksey Mikhaylovich of 1654" to read...

— Stop, stop... You are rushing like a naked man to (...) interrupted me, — we shall record it thus: "... *bral ot Bogdana Gorynya anti-sovyetskuyu literaturu* — "*Dogovor Bogdana Khmel'nitskogo s tsarem Alyeksyeiem Mikhaylovichem ot 1654 goda*"... ("... took anti-Soviet literature from Bohdan Horyn' — "Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi's Treaty with Tsar Aleksey Mikhaylovich of the year 1654").

I recalled one terribly jealous man who almost drove his innocent and honest wife to madness... Lovers who were tempting his wife and not even paying the miserly kopeks for it, appeared all around. He called her a whore, although adultery was far from her. He beat

her — and she meekly kept silent, not daring to contradict him in anything, for he did not even want to listen to any words, any arguments, any evidence. He had an inner need for jealousy — and he was jealous, like an artist, a poet, seized by the creative urge, in whose captivity he leaves the reality of the world and thinks only in pictures, as for instance the picture of jealousy. These are well-known complexes — the persecution complex, the jealousy complex, the death complex... That woman had gone off on a spree; she acquired countless lovers and is enjoying their beauty and strength; from a withdrawn, terrified and obscure being, she again turned into a human being. I envied her; I envied her fanatically, senselessly. I was already getting a jealousy complex. I began to hate that woman who managed to do everything with such ease: she left the house for an hour or two and acquired lovers. But I could not escape these walls, could not awaken someone's desire for me by my flirting eyes and shaved legs. And, moreover, I did not have such a need...

They want to turn an honest man into a criminal, stubbornly, consistently, with the aid of a spectacle thought out in advance where the spectators are acting and an actor must listen. The spectators were performing without any show of talent, although they would not admit this and do not want to know this. They are performing, while the actor had closed his eyes and in his utter inability to accomplish a purpose was tearing out his hair in an empty theatre...

I have never committed any crime. I did not even know how to treat people basely. But I was being convinced of the contrary. They tried to prove that I was guilty and that I was skilfully concealing it, like a small child who has broken a glass and tells everyone that it broke by itself. Major Hal's'kyy stubbornly tried to convince me. He did this with such ingenuity, with such a yearning for discovering something, on which he could not lay his hands, but in which he nonetheless firmly believed, that at times I felt sorry for him. I sincerely wanted to help this man, wanted to turn myself into a criminal, wanted to satisfy his fancy, the fancy of a maniac, who, as if under the influence of a narcotic, in his dreams turns even an ordinary telegraph post into a criminal. He, like a sculptor, is moulding Venus, that world's most beautiful woman, and rages at the fact that she is beautiful, that she does not have the traits of criminality, although he wants to create just that; he is prepared to chop off his hands, which are creating against him.

Oh, how I envied that woman who let herself be seduced and who at last became what her husband imagined her to be.

I was filled with such an uncontrollable desire to help Major Hal's'kyy in some way, that I could hardly restrain myself from rushing to the window, breaking the bars, running up to the Lviv stadium one-hundred meter (track), where the intellects of our society — the football fans constantly meet, to scatter with force their

maniacal, sectarian shacks and, climbing on to a stand, to shout: "People! . . . I am your enemy! I am a servant of the West German imperialists! I am a spy. You are probably not aware of this, but I, not having been born yet, was already carrying out the infamous instructions of the *Obersturmführer*. Major Hal's'kyy, tell them his name! Besides, people, I am a member of a "small circle" involved in the preparation of an illegal congress in Eupatoria: Major Hal's'-kyy, please! Stand beside me and say what you have in mind. Tell them, for apart from us, no one, even the participants, do know a thing about this congress" . . .

Oh, how I envied that woman! . .

I was again on a raised platform, and my executioner stood beside me, having raised the red axe. Suddenly it jumped up and down before my eyes and I was forced to close them. "Who wants to marry this robber?" — I heard somebody's voice, but it died immediately and everything became still. But, no. The sound of wicked laughter came somewhere from the side, was interrupted, and then I distinctly heard somebody reciting. Familiar lines, close and dear to me, crept into my consciousness. Major Hal's'kyy, assuming a Pushkin-like pose, recited my poem "I stood in the midst of the Carpathians" from memory, which had been printed in *Vilna Ukraïna* (Free Ukraine). He paused for a while, his breath caught by laughter, and then continued to recite. Close by, the smirking, unpleasant, gloating faces, into which one wanted to hurl something insulting . . .

I was not thinking about the poetical quality of the poem. It could have been most primitive, after all. But in it, I expressed my love for Ukraine, my native land. And now, when Hal's'kyy was mocking it, I realized that they were not laughing at the poem, oh no! Far from it. They were laughing at my love for Ukraine . . .

— The universe and Ukraine! Ha-ha-ha! . . . you pitiful son of a bitch!

Major Hal's'kyy had not graduated from the Gorkiy Institute of Literature. He did not know anything about literary criticism . . . He was as crude, as a pint of "*Moskovskaya*" . . . Leaning against the table, he continued to recite, stopping from time to time to give everyone a chance to laugh. He knew by heart even those of my poems, about whose existence I had almost forgotten by now. I was completely paralyzed by the excellent memory of Major Hal's'kyy and by his literary erudition and enthusiasm for my poetry. For the first time, I saw such an ardent admirer before me.

— F . . . your mother! You double dealer! Political prostitute! An accomplice of West German imperialism! Who carried out instructions of the *Obersturmführer*? . . Who was a member of a "small circle" engaged in the preparation of an illegal congress in Eupatoria? We know everything! From where? Our microphones, little graduate, were in your behind! . .

It seemed to me that I was a small, rather shy, youngster. I saw a large barrel nearby and I could not resist getting into it. It was such an urgent desire that I could not control myself. Quickly climbing a tree, I closed my eyes and jumped into the barrel. And suddenly the unforeseen occurred: the barrel trembled like a sleepy horse, shook... galloped down hill, wildly kicking the rocks and tree stumps. It turned over, straightened itself out, fell down somewhere, stood upright again, all with breath-taking speed. I was completely numb with fear. I could neither shout, nor cry. Opening my eyes wide, I could only watch how the barrel, like a young horse, took the bit between its teeth and soundlessly galloped to the place of no return...

"What horse?" — I thought, — "and why such silence?" I began diligently to examine the walls of the barrel, which did not move, but remained steady before my eyes. The walls, I noticed, were sooty, grey and very dirty, like those of an old barrel. A ray of light peeked in from the background, which was cut off by bars. Why does a barrel need a grill? And then I saw before me a short, stout man, who, enveloped in a cloud of smoke, passionately argued with me:

— Do you know, — he said, — I sold that raven-black horse. It had white spots, generally a very nice animal. And at one time, I was walking along a road and I saw: the cart had halted . . . No matter how the driver was O-ing, the horse did not budge. I turned round, and it looked at me, you know, just like a man, it recognized me, the little idiot. Well, the horse was rich . . .

Surely, I must have been regaining consciousness. I began to feel better at once and I even sighed with relief: it seems the investigation was over and I was back in the cell, yet not alone. The sturdy fellow continued to smoke savagely one cigarette after another and did not stop talking about horses.

— And why are you here? — he watched me carefully and stuck out his lips. Where have you worked up till now?

— I? I was a lecturer at the University, at the Faculty of Journalism. Have you read anything of Vyshnya's, have you ever heard of that humorist? Yes, he wrote . . . — Unexpectedly, I became cheerful and carefree. Without even noticing it, I began to tell about Vyshnya, then turned to someone else, and the more I talked the quicker did I come back to reality. I was glad, feeling how the shapeless weight which oppressed my head was slowly moving away and in its place my sanity was returning.

— And why have you been jailed. Have you taken a bribe? Have you tried to sneak somebody into the university?

— Come, now! I'm charged with Article 62 . . .

— Did you have a printing shop? Leaflets, ha-ha . . .

— What do you mean? printing shop? What leaflets? They came, they took several books dealing with literature and art . . .

— Ha-ha... Books — and that Article? They try under it for belonging to an illegal organization, for an attempt to topple the government, for disseminating illegal... There is something fishy! Perhaps, you were stuffing the students with improper little ideas?...

What do you mean? Only with what was in the instructions manual of the *VUZ* (higher educational establishment)...

Then he raised his head and began to roar with laughter.

— Tomorrow, old man, you will go home, provided you are not lying to me, — he half shut his eyes and became silent for a moment. — Come now, people are not taken away for nothing... It seems, there must be something, what? I understand, if something is not quite in order, then we take to the bushes and try to conceal things. I am also one of those. For three month I hampered the investigation, and they, it turned out, had known everything all along. — He deeply inhaled from the cigarette and then added angrily, with some belated repentance: "I have hurt myself so swinishly, awkward fellow that I am. Now I could tear myself to bits, and without any remorse at that!"

I began to feel an inexpressible sympathy for him. At home somewhere, the wife and a couple of children were waiting for the prisoner; the wife — without a husband, the children — without a father. One can feel this unusually sharply in a cell, cut off from the entire world, driven into the four walls, mute and non-participating, cold and inaccessible.

— Do you know, — he said, — today I again dreamt about a clock; it was standing on the table, and it stopped. Most certainly, my wife has again betrayed me this night. It always happens. When you dream about a clock, a woman is betraying someone. But I do not blame her; what can you do — mother nature, you cannot change it. It is true that Michurin managed to, but he was not a woman... Are you married?

— Almost, — I said, — almost...

— And, do you know, these horses are like people. I have not seen one for five years; it stopped; the old peasant was flogging it with a whip, and it was standing there and smiling. Such funny animals, with their affection for people.

— Aren't you going to treat me to a cigarette? Let me light it from yours...

— Here are the matches, please...

— No, I would like to, if you don't mind... to...

"You are young and beautiful, with a university education, a mathematician, to whom are you trying to tie your fortune? He will rot in jail, and you... how can you manage without a man? Have you not experienced a woman's lonely nights?"...

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## POEMS FROM UKRAINE

*Ihor KALYNETS*

*From the cycle "RECAPITULATING SILENCE" dedicated to  
Valentyn Moroz.*

### TO VALENTYN MOROZ

I would wish this book might become  
if but for an instant for thee  
Veronica's veil on thy Via  
Dolorosa.

I would wish this book might become  
like Veronica's veil to recall to us  
the holiness of thy  
countenance.

20 November, 1970

### INTRODUCTION TO THE CYCLE "THE STONE WINDMILL"

Whenever I recollect  
Thine image

it seems to me that  
Thou hast emerged  
from a dark aperture  
of flame

and always canst Thou  
return again  
back to Thine own home

though the scrap of Thy country  
lying under  
Thy feet is called  
only a prison cell

and to overcome space  
is to gnaw at stone

and to overcome time  
is but to tilt against  
fossilized, petrified  
stony windmills.



**THRENODY**

*once again walking over the Via Dolorosa*

*First Station*

on the Golgotha  
of a provincial courthouse  
Thy radiant face  
by a close fence of rifles  
was barred and encircled

lone Thou art  
bearing the Cross  
so very powerless  
still are our backs

*Second Station*

from her eye Ukraina  
wiped off a teardrop shed  
secretly

Lord, how they shine  
transparent  
that small group of women  
lamenting

and that poor mother has  
suckled  
with her marrow  
legions of spies

*Third Station*

and those two  
who were crucified once  
together with Christ

today  
are masking  
that lofty Golgotha  
with green boughs of law-codes  
the procurator's toga  
is hiding  
the foot-pad's keen knife

*Fourth Station*

a fresh cross

and weeping, not vainly,  
from it  
the resin of Kosmach

O this  
may still serve us  
for an ikonostasis  
here in our  
desecrated temple

*Fifth Station*

O strange nation that can  
peacefully go about  
your daily round  
indeed today  
the earth  
like ashes  
untimely  
upon your head is now  
falling  
you still  
cannot perceive

*Sixth Station*

unbetrayed  
He was sold  
just by our weakness

many too, brothers true,  
today yet  
will forsake Him  
and without pieces of silver

perhaps you feel pity  
indeed  
for the biblical Judas

*Seventh Station*

our father speaks not  
our mother  
presses close where the footprints  
are bleeding

do thou aid us,  
Mother of God,  
that now art  
also our mother, watch  
over us

grant that we  
also may touch these  
unquenchable footprints

*Eighth Station*

over thronging crowds  
like metal  
were raised high  
the anguished arms of  
the faithful

Veronica  
thou wert wishing to wipe clean  
that wounded bloodcovered face

they are trampling underfoot  
thy veil

which will be  
a banner

*Ninth Station*

turn away Thy countenance  
from them

but let it be so  
that within my soul  
for ever remains  
an image of thee  
bearing that crown of thorns  
on Thy head

*Tenth Station*

from love towards us  
He took on Himself  
so dread a  
sentence

So to save us  
from the greatest of  
all sins

indifference  
to *the fire*

**Translator's note**

The Eighth Station presents somewhat a crux. At this point, the parallelism between the trial of Christ and the trial of Moroz breaks down, due to the presence at the latter of Moroz's wife, Raisa. The poet seems to have attempted to reduce the lack of parallelism by using the word "**druzhyna**" which has two meanings: 1) a spouse, 2) the band of retainers of a prince of the heroic age.

I have attempted to reproduce the ambiguity by translating "**druzhyna**" as "the faithful". This would also cover another possible interpretation, in which "**druzhyna**", as referred to the trial of Christ, means not only His immediate disciples (as in the Old English **Andreas**, where the apostles are called "twelve glorious heroes"), but to the whole church as the "bride of Christ".

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*Valentyn MOROZ*

**UKRAINE**

Crimson of sunshine and heavy blackness  
are thy colours

arching eyelashes of poplars in flight  
is thy shining

intertwined sceptres of triple-horned gods  
are thy emblems

out in the grey steppe the whisper of night is  
thy praying

fireburst of sunshine upon azure heavens  
thy banner

### BELATED FLIGHT

The muscles call to roam.  
Beyond the naked forests  
winter's steely bell  
rings through the world anew.  
Now the wild honey seethes.  
The deaf drum of alarming  
drives us confusedly forth  
the warm sun to pursue.

The days are ripe.  
And with its final music  
through the bare sound of treetops  
leaf - fall is whispering.

It is time, it is time! —  
a breath of snow already,  
the silver fox of winter  
is catching at the wing.

### THE BOWSTRING

The wind, grey grandson of Svaroh, sounds trumpets  
like a Jarl's horn that calls one out to sea,  
through torn-hemp clouds the silver depths shine blue,  
Moon through the mist, like a deer, darts and speeds.

The sail booms in the night, wind-filled it bellies tautly,  
through the clouds' chaos the silver horn shines blue.  
The moon-hound darts. The bow-string twangs like copper.  
Dian's taut bow. Now seethes the frenzied view-haloo.

The roof of dream has bent. Shaft on the bowstring trembles.  
My boat speeds into night through wadded clouds.  
The taut bow of intent will sunder the grey curtain;  
through the deaf wall of dreams will break a squall of power.

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*Vasyl' SYMONENKO*

\* \* \*

Carry me upon your wings, my happiness, and come  
Where on hill and slope there clinged the torrent of the sun.  
Where in their white newness stand, in their clean garments shine,  
Native homes, white homes, with windows clustered by hop vines.  
Where the dreaming girls down to the well-spring make their way,  
Where by the earth-track fields are spread, in silkiness displayed.  
Where I, as a lad, a rosy wonder, switch in hand,  
Was once nipped by an angry gander in my fine new pants.  
Bless me then, good fortune, wilful, changeful though you be,  
That on this soil to live and here to die be granted me.

#### **ELEGY FOR A CORN-COB THAT DIED AT THE DEPOT**

There is no wailing heard. The orchestras grow rusty.  
Orators have grown tired from their own roar.  
This coffin holds no leader, nor no maestro,  
It is a corn-cob lies here — nothing more.

Stupidity the coffin, impotence that palls it.  
Wandering after it the tired thoughts flock.  
And whom do they bewail? And whom should I judge for it?  
From whose heart must I wrench away the lock?

By the lapel and soul, who should I shake now?  
And whom should I curse for this senseless death?  
The cob is dead, and I must cry its wake now,  
With grief and anger brimming in each breath.

O my poor cob, why are you spurned to dung now?  
O my poor cob, you have offended — whom?  
O my poor cob, the harvest-fields' abundance  
And human toil lie with you in the tomb.

The sleepless nights, the peaceless days, hands withered  
And calloused, sweat and thoughts of burning pain,  
There in the coffin lie with you together,  
And rot away beneath the heavy rain.

You evil brood, I curse you to damnation!  
What noble ranks by you are not yet worn!  
You kill all human hopes and aspirations  
In the same way you killed this cob of corn.

*Hryhoriy CHUBAY*

**KOSMACH — 1970**

Our dwellings and shrines are all in the valley  
but on the hill there sits  
a dragon that watches the valley  
and now it is starting to paint Hutsul-fashion  
Easter eggs so that they'll think in the valley  
that the dragon's a native.

Now it has started working hard at its painting  
and down rolled the Easter eggs from the hill foetid  
and stinking  
we all ran out to the gates so that we could see  
these strange Easter eggs  
and upon every egg  
a prison was painted.

*Vasyl' STUS*

**IN MEMORY OF ALLA HORSKA**

Burst into spring, my soul, and do not wail.  
A frost of white Ukraine's bright sun is palling  
Go, seek the guelder's rose's shadow fallen  
on the black waters — seek the red shadow's trail

where there are few of us. A cluster small.  
Only for prayers and hopes expressed in sighing.  
We all are doomed to an untimely dying.  
For crimson blood is sharp as any gall,

it stings as if within our veins forever  
in a grey whirlwind of lamenting, twist  
clusters of pain which fall in the abyss,  
and, in undying woe, tumble together.

*Translated by Vera Rich*

# MAZEPA IN WORLD LITERATURE

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## 1. English (Part 2)

Before we discuss the figures of Mazepa in American drama, let us become acquainted with the origin of a most spectacular hippodrama, Milner's *Mazeppa*, (1823). It was already a considerable success in England and France, before finally landing in America. There it found many imitations and achieved dazzling fame in the performance of the beautiful Fannie Louise Buckingham and Adah Isaacs Menken, who were the daring female performers of Mazepa's sensational ride, so well romanticized by Byron. The Mazepa figure continued to appear on the American stage, throughout the 19th century and sporadically in the 20th century, until 1960, with the appearance of Sophia Loren in the film, *Heller in Pink Tights*.<sup>18</sup>

It was generally believed that this equestrian melodrama, inspired by Byron's pathos, was written first in 1825 by Léopold Chandezon and Cuvelier, published under the title, *Mazeppa, ou Le Cheval tartare*, and first performed at the Franconis' Cirque Olympique, on 11 January, 1825, in Paris. The story of the drama had two sources — Voltaire's *Histoire de Charles XII* and Lesur's *Histoire du Cosaques*.<sup>19</sup> But Saxon has found evidence that Milner's *Mazeppa* was written in the early 1820's, was not anonymous (as was sometimes said), and that the Royal Coburg Theatre began its new season on 3 November, 1823, and in its programme had also Henry M. Milner's *Mazeppa; or, The Wild Horse of the Ukraine*, which was advertised as "an entirely new hippodramatic romantic spectacle".<sup>20</sup> From the review (original text is not preserved) we know that "the scene in which the wild horse runs off with Mazeppa attached to him, is one of most striking effect; [...] and also the scene] in which Mazeppa arrives amongst the Cossaks is one of equal splendour and effect".<sup>21</sup>

<sup>18</sup>) Coleman, *op. cit.*, p. 56 ff.

<sup>19</sup>) Quinn, A. H., *A History of the American Drama from the Beginning of the Civil War*, New York, 1923, p. 165.

<sup>20</sup>) Saxon, *op. cit.*, p. 174.

<sup>21</sup>) *Ibid.*, p. 175.



According to Saxon, Milner's *Mazeppa* was forgotten in England for eight years, but it was revived in France, by the imaginative Cuvalier, 1825, when the subtitle *The Wild Horse of the Ukraine* was substituted by *Le Cheval tartare*, possibly because Byron called Mazeppa's horse "a Tartar of the Ukraine breed". It seems there was some exchange of ideas (probably the play of 1823 reached Paris), because the similarities between the French and English dramas are too obvious.

Cuvalier changed Byron's poem into an intriguing romantic hippodrama with "a happy end", so little known in Slavic literatures. Alas, Mazeppa's nationality was senselessly changed, making of him "a Tartar prince", without consideration of historical reality, the hostility caused by constant Tartar raids on their Slavic neighbours, and the Moslem hostility to Christians, so distasteful to the Slavic peoples. The Tartars, as nomads, lived from plundering the Slavic agricultural population. Thus, the love of a Catholic, Polish princess, for a Tartar, around the year 1650, is almost inconceivable. But let us follow the intentions of the author.

Once upon a time, a Polish Castellan, Laurinski, found, on the battlefield, a Tartar baby, apparently of higher class. He baptized him Casimir, and reared him in his castle, together with his own beautiful daughter, Oleńka (in the play, mistakenly called Olinska).<sup>\*</sup> Casimir played in childhood with Olenka, learned to like her, and later the Castellan made him her page. Casimir was a handsome, brave young lad. They developed a secret, deep love for each other. When Castellan Laurinski wanted to marry his beautiful daughter to the rich, older Count Palatine Premislas, Casimir dressed in an armor and helmet of an unknown knight, appeared in the Gothic apartment of Premislas to challenge him to a duel. Premislas was badly wounded, and Casimir is arrested in order to be punished like a slave. He is disrobed and bound to the wild, untamed steed. Oleńka implores her father on her knees not to do this. But the angry Castellan sent the fiery steed with "the Tartar-Casimir" into "the steppes of Tartary", anyhow.

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<sup>\*</sup>) One who knows Slavic languages, is shocked by the nonsensical usage of a surname for first name — Olinska for Olenka. In Polish, the daughter of Mr. Laurinski would be Miss Laurinska. Olinska is a surname, the feminine counterpart of Olinski. Thus, Olinska indicates that she was a Mr. Olinski's daughter, rather than Mr. Laurinski's daughter. This is obviously a distortion of the pet name, Olenka, diminutive of Olga.

Also, A. H. Saxon, in his book, on page 173, speaks erroneously about "the repulse before the walls of Moscow", whereas Charles XII of Sweden was actually repulsed by Peter I, at Poltava in 1709, and never reached the walls of Moscow.

There the Tartars found him, and the lonely, old Abder Khan recognized in him his long-lost grandson, Mazepa (in Milner's play — son). Jubilantly, Mazepa is now proclaimed the future Khan of Tartary. On a white steed (a privilege reserved for the Khan alone) he hurriedly leads a band of Tartar warriors to save his beloved Oleńka from marriage to old Premislas, to punish her father, and the hated Poles. In disguise, as Tartar dancers, they disrupt the wedding preparations. Mazepa kills Premislas. Outnumbered, Castellan Laurinski, after his daughter begs him to stop the fighting, reluctantly gives his blessing to Mazepa and Oleńka,<sup>22</sup> in the light of his burning castle.

This highly dramatic, vivid and vibrant play, did not enjoy as much success in France, as later in England and America, where superb horsemanship was added. Six years later, exactly on 4 April 1831, a similar but more effective drama about Mazepa triumphantly re-appeared on the English stage. Its title *Mazeppa*, "a romantic drama in three acts, dramatized from Lord Byron's poem, by Henry M. Milner, and adapted to the stage under the direction of A. Ducrow".<sup>23</sup> This splendid drama was first produced at the Royal Amphitheatre, Westminster Bridge, under the management of Andrew Ducrow (1793-1842), whom Coleman called "the greatest master of the equestrian spectacle of his day".<sup>24</sup> He equipped the stage with moving panorama, including "the flowing" Dnieper, added the best actors, such as Pope, Gomersal and Cartlich, brought it closer to the original descriptions of Byron and his dazzling horse ride. Critics called it "terrific". Saxon rightly stated: "The plot of Milner's play is similar to Cuvelier's, but its structure is tighter and it contains more sensational elements and, rather curiously, Olinska's (sic!) nurse, as in Payne's manuscript, is now called Agatha".<sup>25</sup> This time, Milner's old drama, played at the Coburg Theatre in 1823, had undergone some revision in detail, but not materially. In Saxon's opinion, it was probably Ducrow who compared the old drama with Cuvelier's text, and Payne's (the American playwright and actor) and made some changes.

(To be concluded)

<sup>22</sup>) *Ibid.*, p. 178.

<sup>23</sup>) Milner, H. M., *Mazeppa*, London, n. d. (Samuel French), in: *Lacy's Acting Dramas*.

<sup>24</sup>) Coleman, *op. cit.*, p. 59.

<sup>25</sup>) Saxon, *op. cit.*, p. 181.

## NON-RUSSIAN NATIONALITIES OF THE USSR IN AMERICAN STUDIES

By Dr. Stephan M. HORAK

My purpose in this paper in critically evaluating East European studies, with special emphasis on history, produced in the United States, is to focus on the non-Russian peoples of the USSR from the perspective of 1972.

The first attempt to evaluate an impressive rise and growth of American studies in the last three decades has been undertaken by a panel of leading experts on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, including Cyril E. Black, Robert F. Byrnes, Charles Jelavich and Donald W. Treadgold, back in 1959.<sup>1</sup> They produced an exhaustive report of American achievements for the years 1945-1956. Their conclusion urged a greater and broader concentration on this vital area.

With the rapid development as reflected in a steadily growing number of publications, the number of Ph.D. dissertations reaching 440 titles during the 1970-1971 period, the membership of the AAASS is approaching 2,500 experts and courses offered in our universities (up to 85 per cent of all the institutions of higher learning), more attempts were made to locate loopholes and to register high scores.<sup>2</sup>

Critical analysis advanced in the past by such experts as Charles Jelavich, the late Philip E. Mosely, S. Harrison Thomson, Ralph Fisher Jr., Marshall D. Shulman and Stanley B. Kimball reveal the danger of over-concentration on the Russo-Soviet aspect at the expense of other East European nations. As a result of this criticism several improvements took place in recent years as reflected in the topical and area distributions of the Ph.D. theses, the number of monographs, articles and papers presented at the various meetings of the AHA, AAASS, AATSEEL and other professional associations, including offering more courses in this particular area. Despite a prevailing imbalance, one may suggest that in addition to other qualities, the American system is able to adjust, to correct and take criticism in good faith.

With this in mind, one should be entitled to expect that a similar change toward improvement within the most neglected area of East European and Soviet studies — the non-Russian nationalities of the

<sup>1</sup>) "An Appraisal of Russian Studies in the United States", *The American Slavic and East European Review*, Vol. 18, No. 2 (1959) 417-441.

<sup>2</sup>) A short review of all previous assessments is available in a most recent and perhaps most valuable analysis done by Prof. Stanley B. Kimball: "On Redressing the Balance in Slavic Studies", *East European Quarterly*, Vol. V, No. 4, 1972. Missing there is Prof. John S. Curtiss "Russian History in the United States: Vistas and Prospectives", *Canadian Slavonic Papers*, Vol. XII, No. 1 (1970) 23-29.

USSR — is bound to come provided that just criticism will reach a larger number of persons involved.

In order to present a general background on the one hand, while being sufficiently specific for analytical purposes on the other hand, the selection of several crucially important items in regard to their importance within the academic pyramid will be employed in this paper. The analysis will be based on findings in such areas as bibliographies, Ph.D. dissertations, the *Slavic Review*, university curricula, and the question of the terminology and periodization of the history of Eastern Slavs. For reasons of space and time some other aspects will be mentioned only in passing note or put aside altogether.

### Bibliographies

For our immediate purpose the most essential tool in determining the quantity of available literature printed is obviously the *American Bibliography of Russian and East European Studies* for the years 1945-65. This bibliographical tool, while listing monographs, concentrates mainly on articles published in more than two hundred journals which are available to the compilers in charge. The great number of these periodicals is to be classified not as scholarly but rather as opinionated publications. Being most generous in listing all articles written in English or by American experts, this bibliography does not necessarily reflect the scholarly aspect of publications, hence it should be seen rather as an indicator of quantity than quality. There are more than 20,000 items listed. A careful count of entries listed reveals (for our purpose) the following picture:

#### 1945-1965

Republics	History	Lang. & Lit.	Econ.	Gvment & Pol.	Other	Total
Estonia	7	31	4	6	27	75
Latvia	9	30	9	8	31	77
Lithuania	39	92	12	20	48	211
Byelorussia	2	5	3	3	2	15
Ukraine	198	423	22	45	84	772
Moldavia	—	—	—	—	—	—
Armenia	6	3	—	—	4	13
Azerbaijan	—	—	1	—	2	3
Georgia	6	2	—	—	2	10
Kazakhstan	2	3	1	—	4	10
Kirghistan	—	—	—	—	1	1
Tadjikistan	—	—	—	—	1	1
Turkmenistan	1	—	—	—	—	1
Uzbekistan	4	2	2	1	—	9
Total	274	581	54	83	206	1,198

The total of 1,198 entries for all non-Russian republics of the USSR against 20,000 items listed amounts to only 5.5 per cent, whereby the Moldavian SSR has not yet been "discovered" and three Central Asiatic republics exhibit only one entry each. Entries on Ukraine and Baltic republics are taken mainly, up to 90 per cent, from journals like *Ukrainian Quarterly*, *Ukrainian Review*, *Baltic Studies*, *Lituanus*; *Lithuanian Quarterly*, where contributors are chiefly native scholars of these respective nationalities. So far the main suppliers of our knowledge of the non-Russian peoples are mostly foreign-born who are in command of subject and languages required. A quite similar situation prevailed in the 1920 and even 1930s in the area of Russian studies, and still exists to a very significant degree in the case of East Central Europe and the Balkan countries. The pressing need for improvement in this neglected area is also visible from a short review of Paul L. Horecky's *Russia and Soviet Union; A Bibliographical Guide to Western-language Publications* (U. of Chicago Press, 1965). Out of 1,960 entries listed only 147 directly, and 50 indirectly, or approximately 10 per cent, deal with the non-Russian republics.

It is to Horecky's credit that his bibliography includes the highest percentage of non-Russian publications of all available bibliographies. In terms of subjects, history is represented with some 30 titles, however Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are listed with one title each. Seven other republics, including Moldavia, Armenia, Byelorussia and others are there still not recorded with national histories. Ukraine, thanks to Dmytro Doroshenko and Mykhaylo Hrushevs'kyi, is represented with 24 titles in areas of history, diplomatic history and foreign relations.

Another Horecky bibliography, *Basic Russian Publications: An Annotated Bibliography on Russia and the Soviet Union* (U. of Chicago Press, 1926) regrettably is almost exclusively limited to the Russian language area. The twenty-nine items on the non-Russian aspect, out of 1,396, represent only 2 per cent. The compiler, Professor Nicholas V. Riasanovsky in charge of history, would not include one single title and, by doing so, he totally identified Russia with the USSR. A similar display of complete ignorance prevails in American paperbound books. Lednicky's list of paperbacks as of 1963, showing some 800 entries, does not even include one title related to the history or problems in general of the non-Russian republics of the USSR.<sup>3</sup> There is no need to research other available bibliographies since those discussed here are typical.

In conclusion, and as far as bibliographies are concerned, it can be suggested that the area of non-Russian nationalities is still in an

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<sup>3</sup>) Rudolf Lenicky, "A List of Current Paperbound Books in the Slavic Fields", *Slavic Review*, Vol. 22, No. 2 (1963) 403-410.

infantile stage and only a major and instant revision of our programmes, concentration, curricula and general attitude may elevate this unknown vista onto a more satisfactory level. Yet, the immediate prospects are altogether discouraging. With two exceptions, there is no university in the United States, that offers a meaningful programme related to the history of non-Russian peoples. Only Harvard's Ukrainian Study Center and Columbia's Program on Soviet Nationality Problems, organized quite recently by Professor Edward Allworth, are seen as the two most promising stars on the otherwise "Russian horizon" of American universities.

### Ph. D. Dissertations

Jesse J. Dossick, our exclusive expert and record keeper on Ph.D. dissertations indeed deserves our appreciation for his loyalty to the "mission assigned", as well as for his role as a barometer and guidepost in determining directions, accomplishments and shortcomings. His *Doctoral Research on Russia and the Soviet Union* (New York, N.Y.U.P., 1960), together with continuous updating in *Slavic Review*,<sup>4</sup> exposes not only the great achievements of American scholarship, but at the same time reveals its defects.

According to Dossick's findings, between 1876 and 1960 American universities produced 851 doctoral dissertations related to Russia and the Soviet Union, out of a total of 150,000; of these 600 had been accepted in the previous seventy-five years. This typical American performance in the assembly line style testifies to the ability to accomplish whenever needs emerge. Yet even the assembly line approach is not without faults or singular shortcomings. So, for the years 1964-1971, Dossick's list includes 2,088 titles comprising various subjects and areas, including auxiliary theses. Of that number, approximately 1,200 are directly or indirectly related to Russian and Soviet Communist topics (60 per cent). On the other hand, dissertations covering all non-Russian nationalities of the USSR, which account for 50 per cent of the Soviet population, amount to only 78 titles, or less than 7 per cent of the 1,200 items. This academic disaster reveals an even darker picture when the total is identified by nationalities and subjects accordingly: Ukrainian — 20; Jews — 12; Latvian — 5; Lithuanian — 6; Armenian — 4; Byelorussian — 2; Georgian — 2; Estonian — 2; Uzbekistan — 3; Baltic Germans — 1; Bessarabian — 1; Poles (in Russia) — 1; Tadzhikistan — 1; Kurd — 1; Tatar — 1; General and other — 10. A further distribution by subjects presents the following picture: Education — 3; Economic — 3; History, Political Science and International Relations — 41; Langu-

<sup>4</sup> *Slavic Review*, Vol. 24, No. 4 (1965); Vol. 25, No. 4 (1966); Vol. 26, No. 4 (1967); Vol. 27, No. 4 (1968); Vol. 28, No. 4 (1969); Vol. 29, No. 4 (1970); and Vol. 30, No. 4 (1971).

ages and Literature — 20; Geography — 2; Religion — 1; Anthropology — 1.

In analysing the findings within this most essential area of scholarship, several immediate conclusions can be drawn. One can speak here about overproduction, especially in such areas as radical movements in Russia during the nineteenth century, Menshevism, Bolshevism and liberalism. Without sounding too sarcastic one may insist that there are more dissertations on Russian liberalism than there were liberals themselves. By now all leading radicals have their biographical record and in case of Lenin the only missing one seems to be "Lenin and Sex".

In addition to shortcomings, as reflected in the statistical data, there exists in certain places an intolerable ignorance and discrimination symptomatic of political motivations. For instance, titles such as "Revolutionary Banditry; An Interpretation of the Ukrainian Cossacks in Their First Rebellion, 1590-1596", by Irene Linda Gordon, Yale U., 1970, or "The Life and Thought of Russia's First Lay Theologian Grigorij Savic Skovoroda (1722-1794)", by Stephen Patrick Scherer, Ohio State U., 1969, are offensive and biased. Obviously, Skovoroda was not a Russian theologian and "banditry" is not exactly proper nomenclature. Hopefully, American universities do not wish to compete in obscurity with Soviet political institutions and vocabulary. As for dissertations, one can conclude that there is still a "whole world" to be discovered, including such essential issues in the realm of history, as the critical evaluation of the Russian historical scheme, the question of periodization and terminology, national, cultural, socio-economic histories of numerous nationalities of the USSR, the treatment of non-Russians in Tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union, the contribution of non-Russians to Russia's educational, cultural and economic advancement. Instead of producing five dissertations on Nicholas I, why not to direct our curiosity toward his policy of Russification of Lithuania and Byelorussia. We are now well acquainted with the oppressor, let us now study the fate of the oppressed.

### Slavic Review

Another equally less encouraging and perhaps even less appreciative task is an attempt to appraise the *Slavic Review*, the official organ of the AAASS. If one takes into account the fact that over 15 per cent of the members of the AAASS have a direct or indirect relationship to and interest in the non-Russian peoples of the USSR, one may expect that this Journal, in its editorial policy, to a certain degree would reflect a formal obligation to the membership at large. Yet despite all internal as well as external factors present, the *Slavic Review* is, in this respect, so far scoring worse than Ph.D. dissertations.

An accurate count of S. R. articles for the last ten years produce the following percentage: 36 per cent in the category of Marxism-Soviet system-Communism; 35 per cent related to the Russian national aspect; 25 per cent of the articles deal with all other East European countries, and only 4 per cent represent non-Russian peoples of the USSR. In terms of numbers, *Slavic Review* exhibits for the years 1962-1971, 360 articles, notes and comments and of that only 15 on the non-Russian topics, or less than 4 per cent. Of 1,760 book reviews only 64 are in the category of our concern, or 3.5 per cent of the total. The number of articles broken down by nationalities offers no comfort: Ukrainian — 6; Jews — 2; Lithuanian — 2; Turkestan — 2; Latvian — 1; Azerbaijan — 1; General — 1. So far, *Slavic Review* has not acknowledged the existence of 12 million Byelorussians, a nation with a colorful tradition and long history. Incidentally, there has not appeared one single article or even a book review related to the Moldavian SSR. A similar treatment of numerous other nationalities testifies to the need for change. On the other hand, one should be aware of all difficulties leading to the existing situation. Lack of linguistic competency, absence of sources and documents, no immediate demand, never fully disclosed political aims of certain powerful groups — just to mention a few alibies.

However, subscribing to the notion that the historian must be aware and consider all contributing elements, additional causes should be explored too. The impact of Russian-born historians, such as Michael Karpovich, M. Lobanov-Rostovskiy, A. Mazour, G. Vernadsky, M. Florinsky, upon the formation of American East European historiography is well known and of no surprise. Additionally, the alliance with the USSR against Hitler, including an ideological penetration of pro-Soviet sympathies into the American thinking should not be discounted. The result of all those background factors has found its explicit result in 1959.

On July 17, 1959, the U.S. Congress passed Public Law 86-90 dealing with the captive nations. This political act found no sympathy in Moscow and certainly not among Russian nationals living in the Western countries. Upon the initiative of Professor G. Tschebotarioff and, in addition to a number of other Russian-American professors, such as N. P. Poltoratzky, Gleb Struve, N. S. Timasheff, Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, S. P. Timoshenko, and Sergei A. Zenkovsky, eight native American professors signed "A Statement on U.S. Public Law 86-90" (*Russian Review*, Vol. 20, No. 1, 1961), protesting vigorously the Captive Nations Law as an attempt to disintegrate the USSR by prompting the principles of national self-determination to all non-Russian peoples of the Soviet Union. The fact that five persons who signed such a highly politically controversial document are associated with the *Slavic Review* minimizes the effectiveness of arguments on



the part of those who eloquently would try to discount the importance of such a political identity.

Since the statistics speak against them, there is obviously a need for more re-assuring evidences in years to come by bringing about a balanced distribution of articles and book reviews. The presence of scholars representing this aspect of the East European studies on the Editorial Board of *Slavic Review* will be an asset to the objectivity and purpose as well.

### Some problems of the periodization and terminology

As far as the history of the Soviet Union is concerned, and in particular the three largest Slav nations — Russians, Ukrainians and Whiteruthenians (Byelorussians), the issue of periodization and terminology is of paramount importance, if one is to present and interpret the history of those peoples in an objective as well as meaningful fashion. Almost all textbooks used in our colleges follow a basically Russian nationalistic historiography of the eighteenth and the nineteenth century. This Russian historical school treats all past events which took place on the territory of the Russian Empire, as it emerged into the nineteenth century, as an integral part of Russia's national history. Hence, discussion of the Cimmerian and Scythian era (1000-200 B.C.) through the Sarmato-Gothic epoch (200 B.C. — 370 A.D.) and the Hunno-Antic period (370-558) includes territories which only in the eighteenth century became "Russian", but were incorporated into Russia's history by M. Karpovich and G. Vernadsky in their work *A History of Russia*, which in turn became the unquestioned model for many other authors, including M. Florinsky, Jesse D. Clarkson, Melvin C. Wren, Ivar Spector and Nicholas V. Riasanovsky. More critical and aware of the complexity of terminology and periodization, including the Kyiv-Rus' state, is Herbert J. Ellison in his *A History of Russia*. American authors completely ignore Mykhaylo Hrushevs'kyi's and M. Dovnar-Zapol's'kyi's challenge of the "Russian scheme", perpetuating the notion of one "*Russian nationality*" in the Middle Ages. On the other hand, the Soviet historiography, beginning with Michael Pokrovsky, the foremost Marxist historian, refused to see Russia as a national state and interpreted Russian imperialism as a mere "collection of Russian lands". Instead, he has seen Tsarist Russia as "the prison of nations", and he states: "It does not matter that Witte through his own ignorance included Ukrainians among Russians and even called them 'Little Russians' ... What does matter is that even Witte ought to have properly written the name "Russia" in quotation marks ... for the 'Russian Empire' was not at all a national state. It was a collection of several dozen peoples, among whom the Russian constituted a

clear minority (about 47 per cent), peoples who were united by the general exploitation . . . Even the Muscovite state of the seventeenth century, in spite of the opinion of bourgeois historians, was no longer the state of the Great Russian tribe".<sup>5</sup>

Soviet historiography, under the pressure of historical evidence and being caught in the promise to eliminate national discrimination at least to a certain degree, recognized the fact that "the history of Ancient Rus' was not a history of the Ukraine, nor of Byelorussia, not yet of Great Russia alone. It was the history of a state that enabled all three to mature and gain strength".<sup>6</sup> Obviously, Grekov is a representative of the second generation of Soviet historians, who in Stalin's time began to re-russify history in order to please the emerging Soviet Russian ego, however, considering the territorial approach of Soviet historiography in writing history of the USSR, as well as all limits imposed by the CPSU, the Soviet scheme is still closer to Hrushevs'kyi's defence of the Ukrainian claim to a successor of Antes and of Kyiv-Ukraine-Rus' than the American authors in their treatment of Eastern Slavs history. For instance, Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, among others, asserts that "the territory inhabited by the Russians directly west of the Kyiv area was divided into Volynia and Galicia. . . . Galicia became repeatedly a battleground for the Russians and the Poles".<sup>7</sup> Having populated Ukraine with "Russians" back in the twelfth century, then without any explanation, from the seventeenth century on, Riasanovsky distinguishes Ukraine from Russia in all areas, including literature, art, education and religion (p. 217 ff). Thus Professor Riasanovsky's treatment amounts to the sudden birth of a nation — Ukrainians, sometime in the seventeenth century, while ignoring a linguistic, ethnogenetic, socio-economic and cultural rise, formation and evolution of a nation. According to the author, the Russian nation possessed all the above mentioned characteristics and periods and Ukrainians emerged in history suddenly and perhaps to the surprise of the Russians.

Such curiosities violating a logical mind is the result of improper periodization and terminology introduced by Russian historians for political and state reasons.

Similar Russification is extended into the twentieth century. It is indeed a quite confusing experience to see a title like *Twentieth Century Russia*, authored by Donald W. Treadgold (Chicago, 1964), since the Russian Empire came to an end, at least officially, in 1917.

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5) *Russia in World History: Selected Essays by M. N. Pokrovskiy*. Ed. with an Introduction by Roman Szporluk (Ann Arbor; U. of Michigan Press, 1970) p. 109.

6) B. Grekov, *Kiev Rus*, (Moscow, 1959) p. 12.

7) Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, *A History of Russia*. 2nd ed. (New York; Oxford U. P., 1969), pp. 97-98.

One may assume that Professor Treadgold is in fact writing about the *history of the RSFSR and not of the USSR*. However, he talks of the USSR in the text with main emphasis on the Soviet Russian aspect at the painful expense of all non-Russians. For example, in Chapter on "The Great Purges", the author does not even mention losses of Ukrainians which went into millions and, by any standard of comparison, affected this nation, as a whole, in a more severe manner than the Russian. Of course, there is no intention to question the scholarship of Professor Treadgold, therefore this criticism is to be taken only as an example of the treatment of the non-Russian nationalities in American historiography.

The prevailing confusion, or perhaps in some instances intentional distortion, could easily be prevented by accepting a uniform scheme for all three nationalities and by using the correct nomenclatures as they were known in the past and in the present time. Against this background, the national-state framework by respecting the ethno-genetic base, emerges as the most desirable form of writing histories of Russia, Ukraine and Whiteruthenia.

Henceforth, "Rus'", "Rusychi" or "Ruthenians" and finally Ukrainians. A Ukrainian has been known in the past as "Rusyn" (in the U.S. there are still living "Karpato-Rusyny") and not as "Russkii", while on the other hand, we speak of "Moskvich" (in Ukrainian and Polish "Moskal") and Russia (since 1713) and Russian ("Russkii"). Sigismund zu Herberstein, as other travelers of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, went to the "Moscowitern".<sup>8</sup>

This same ethno-genetic, linguistic and territorial identity should be given to Whiteruthenians, who, also known under various names, occupied a large territory for over one thousand years. They are entitled to share the great heritage of Kyïv Rus' to a greater degree than the Russians, and their contribution to the civilization of Lithuania must not be sacrificed to satisfy the Russian ego.

It is also a dubious scholarship to incorporate the Antes and Poliane states, dating back to the fourth century, into Russia's history, since both tribes lived in Ukraine and Moldavia and recent archaeological excavations, as revealed by Soviet experts,<sup>9</sup> are unmistakably proving it. These territories were incorporated into Russia only during the second half of the seventeenth century (1667) partly and after 1793 almost completely, except for Galicia, Bukovina and Bessarabia.

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<sup>8</sup>) Sigismund zu Herberstein, "Reise zu den Moskowitern, 1526". Herausgg. und Einleitung von Traudl Seifert (München; Bruckman, 1966). Otherwise see: Francesca M. Wilson, *Muscovy: Russia through foreign eyes, 1553-1900*. (New York; Praeger, 1971).

<sup>9</sup>) See map in B. Rybakov, "Cherniakhovskaia kultura". *Materialy... arkheologii*, No. 82. AN SSSR (Moscow, 1960).

The ethno-genetic formation of the Russian nationality has been accomplished in areas which in relationship to Kyiv Rus' were just "cetera dominia",<sup>10</sup> hence, Hrushevs'kyi's comparison of the situation as it existed between Rus'-Ukraine and Muscovy-Russia with the relationship between the Roman Empire and the Gallic provinces is basically correct. The whole issue known as "heir and successor" within the framework of the history of Eastern Slavs is ignored in our textbooks, or better to say, has been resolved on Russian terms.

Consequently, we consider it an immediate academic necessity to produce new textbooks of the history of the USSR for American students which will take into consideration not only the Russian history but also the history of one hundred million peoples who refuse to be labeled "Russian", since they were and, significantly enough, do not intend to become Russians, not even in the 1970s.

Finally, several footnotes related to the issue under discussion are appropriate. The areas mentioned and projected in statistical data impose upon American East European studies an obligation to extend into topics which are still to be classified as unknown vistas. With this in mind, one becomes appreciative of such scholars, as the late Nicholas P. Vakar, Stanley W. Page, Alfred E. Senn, Stanley V. Vardys, Firuz Kazemzadeh, David M. Lang, Arthur E. Adams, John A. Armstrong, Clarence A. Manning, John S. Reshetar, and only a few others for their contribution and appreciation of non-Russian area studies. Going once again through the number and quality of knowledge available, it would be wrong to conclude on a pessimistic note. For in the last few years a number of new titles have been added. In addition to such essential studies as John Kolasky's *Education in Soviet Ukraine* (Toronto, 1968) and Richard G. Hovannisian's *Armenia on the Road to Independence* (U. of California Press, 1967), we gained a number of monographs on non-Russian nationalities compiled by Erich Goldhagen (*Ethnic Minorities in the Soviet Union*. New York, 1968) and Edward Allworth (*Soviet Nationality Problems*. Columbia U.P., 1971). George Demko's *The Russian Colonization of Kazakhstan, 1896-1916*, published as Vol. 99 within Uralic and Altaic Series at Indiana University; *The Chornovil Papers*; Ivan Dzyuba's *Internationalism or Russification: A Study in Soviet Nationalities Problem*, and several studies on Jews in the Soviet Union, one will have to agree that the recent events in the Soviet Union, as related to non-Russians, will provide a stimulant for further studies and writing. This optimism seems to be appropriate after reading Lowell

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<sup>10</sup> The Byzantine writer, Constantinus Porphyrogenetus (around 950), in his work "About Administration of the Empire", Part VII, describing Kievan Rus', explained that the Kievan Rus' State was composed of Kievan Rus' proper and territories outside, "they are not Rus', but belong to Rus' and pay tributes to Rus'". (*De Administrando*. Ed., Moraesic, Budapest, 1942).

Tillett's outstanding contribution, *The Great Friendship: Soviet Historians on the Non-Russian Nationalities* (University of North Carolina Press, 1969). It is a work which should inspire younger scholars to go into an area, where so much is waiting to be accomplished.

Another spark, that is needed to bring about a change in university curricula, is gradually emerging students of East European descent. After all, according to statistical estimates, there are some 25 million Americans who do not object to be identified as East European ethnic minorities of non-Russian extraction. Having overcome many obstacles and initial difficulties, this large group is by now better represented on campuses than ever before. Several universities already responded to their demand for courses related to countries and peoples of their origin and obviously, as taxpayers, this group is equally entitled to be offered courses of their interest instead of the courses related to their former oppressor. Ethnic awareness known as search for identity resembles the Black American movement and has all the potential to play a significant role in the development and expansion of East European studies. Too often these students have been exposed to discrimination and insult in classrooms by over-russified and misinformed instructors. Moreover, numerous ethnic academic and scholarly institutions, some of them very respectable and creative, should also become involved into a new approach toward programmes and courses offered on campuses. The fact that the U.S. Congress is still in the process of passing a bill known as Ethnic Heritage Act testifies to the increasingly popular demand for change. It is totally wrong and wasteful to offer dozens of courses in Russian history and none in Baltic, Ukrainian, Caucasian or Central Asian history as is the case in several major universities. If we are not to reach a state known as "brainwashing" or indoctrination, it should be in the interest of all of us to begin immediately with the de-Russification of our East European studies.

## THE GUN AND THE FAITH

Religion and Church in Ukraine  
under the Communist Russian Rule

A Brief Survey by  
W. Mykula, B.A. (Lond.), B.Litt. (Oxon)  
Ukrainian Information Service,

200, Liverpool Road, London, N1 1LT.

1969

48 pp. + 37 illustrations.

Price: 30p (USA and Canada \$ 1.00).

## NEW WAVE OF TERROR IN UKRAINE

### UKRAINIAN INTELLECTUALS ARRESTED IN UKRAINE

According to various reliable sources, the Soviet Secret Police (KGB) arrested many leading Ukrainian dissident intellectuals on January 11, 1972. Later the number of those arrested had grown to over 100. The following is a brief list and description of some of the arrested Ukrainians.

**CHORNOVIL Vyacheslav.** 34-year old journalist, author of "**The Chornovil Papers**", a dossier on persecuted Ukrainian intellectuals arrested in 1965-66 and sentenced to terms of hard labour camps for criticism of Soviet Russian national policies in Ukraine. Chornovil was sentenced to 18-months of hard labour in 1967 for his part in exposing the violations of legality and the abuses of the police during the 1965-66 arrests and convictions. He was released in 1969 and continued to take an active role in speaking out against political injustices in Ukraine. He has recently protested the destruction of the graves of Ukrainian soldiers in Lviv. Arrested in Lviv, January 1972.

**DZYUBA Ivan.** 41-year-old literary critic, author of "**Internationalism or Russification?**" This work was sent by Dzyuba in 1965 to various Soviet officials as an exposé and protest of the Russification policies in Ukraine. Dzyuba accused the Soviet Russian authorities of pursuing a systematic campaign designed to eradicate all traces of a distinct Ukrainian language and culture. The book was smuggled abroad and published in an English translation in 1968. One of the most articulate essayists in Ukrainian modern literature, Dzyuba is widely read in Ukraine and has been active in protesting against political repressions and violations of legality in Ukraine. Arrested in Kyiv, April 1972.

**SVITLYCHNYI Ivan.** 42-year-old literary critic and writer, whose literary articles and essays have been widely published and read in Ukraine. In 1966 he spent 8 months in prison for allegedly smuggling out the diary of Vasyl Symonenko, deceased young Ukrainian poet who has become a symbol of the rebirth of Ukrainian poetry in the 60's. After his sentence, Svitlychnyy was barred from publishing any more articles in Ukraine and was forced to exist by doing odd literary jobs. He was active in protesting against the Russification of Ukraine and the undermining of Ukrainian culture and language. Arrested in Kyiv, January 1972.

**SVERSTYUK Evhen.** 44-year-old literary critic whose essays and reviews appeared in Kyiv newspapers and magazines before his fall into disfavour with authorities in 1965. Several years ago he wrote "**Cathedral in Scaffolding**", a series of commentaries on the national and spiritual issues raised in Oles Honchar's novel "**Sobor**" (Cathedral). The work circulated underground in Ukraine and was eventually published abroad. Sverstyuk was also active

in protesting against violation of legality in Ukraine, as well as the Russification of Ukrainian culture and language. Arrested in Kyiv, January 1972.

**PLYUSHCH Leonid.** Engineer and mathematician, active in protesting against political and cultural repressions in Ukraine, as well as in all of the Soviet Union. In 1968 sent a letter to Party officials protesting against the official silence on the famine in Ukraine in 1933, the harassment of Soviet dissidents, and the repressive measures taken against outstanding dissident Soviet writers. Arrested in Kyiv, January 1972.

**OSADCHYY Mykhaylo.** 36-year-old former lecturer in journalism at the Lviv State University, a specialist in literature, a poet and writer. Former member of the Communist Party. First arrested in 1965 and sentenced to 2 years hard labour for "anti-Soviet propaganda and agitation". After being released in 1969, he was further persecuted. During his short period of freedom, he wrote another work — "Bil'mo" in which he describes the life of political prisoners in the Russian concentration camps, especially investigations and the Soviet law-system, and also signed petitions in defence of Valentyn Moroz. Arrested again in Lviv, January 1972.

**STASIV Iryna.** Born 1940. Poetess. After completing her studies at Lviv University, she taught at a secondary school. Later, she taught Ukrainian language and literature at the preparatory faculty at the Lviv Polytechnic. In 1970 she fell into the hands of the KGB and was sacked from her job. She then worked as a weaver. In November 1970 Iryna and her husband, poet Ihor Kalynets, sent a written protest to the Supreme Court of the Ukr.SSR in defence of Valentyn Moroz. Since then her poems have been censored and prevented from being published. Arrested in Lviv, January 1972.

**SHABATURA Stephania.** Born 1938. An artist specialising in carpet designing. Together with Iryna Stasiv-Kalynets and others she applied to the regional court at Ivano-Frankiv'sk for permission to attend the trial of Valentyn Moroz, November 1970. Arrested in Lviv, January 1972.

**HULYK Stephania.** — A student. Formerly worked at the Institute of Historical and Cultural memorials. Sent written protest to the Supreme Court of the Ukr.SSR against the unjust sentence of V. Moroz in 1970. Arrested in Lviv, January 1972.

**Rev. ROMANYUK Vasyli.** An Orthodox priest. While taking a course at the Theological Academy in Moscow, he was a parish priest in the village Kosmach, Ivano-Frankiv'sk region. In connection with the case of Valentyn Moroz, in June 1970, the KGB carried out a search in his home and confiscated a large amount of literature, including religious books. In November 1970 he sent a written protest to the Supreme Court of the Ukr.SSR in defence of V. Moroz. Before this he was suspended for a month from ecclesiastical duties, being accused of preaching sermons in which he was to have urged his parishioners to keep up the traditions of the Hutsul region. Arrested in Lviv, January 1972.

- HEL' Ivan.** Born 1937. In 1954 he completed his secondary education after which he was employed as a fitter at a Lviv factory. Army service 1956-59. In 1960 he went to the evening classes at the Faculty of History — Lviv University, but did not complete his studies owing to his arrest, in August 1965. Sentenced at a closed sitting of the Lviv Regional Court to 3 years hard labour for "anti-Soviet subversive activities". Released in 1969. In December 1970 he was granted permission to attend the funeral of Alla Horská in Kyiv, but on his return, under pressure from the KGB, was reprimanded and punished for his "neglect of duty". Arrested in Lviv, January 1972.
- CHUBAY Hryhoriy.** A poet. His poems were made widespread through the Samvydav underground publications in Ukraine. According to the "Ukrainian Herald" — No. 4, Chubay was put under KGB investigation in the Summer of 1970 in connection with the case of H. Dudykevych. Arrested in Lviv, January 1972.
- STUS Vasyl.** Born 1938. A poet and literary critic. After completing his studies at a Pedagogical Institute in Donetsk, he served in the Red Army, then taught in schools, worked as a miner and wrote literary-critical works. In 1964 he became a postgraduate at the Institute of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukr.SSR, but in 1965 he was thrown out for taking part in a Kyiv protest meeting, which was staged in defence of the imprisoned Ukrainian writers and cultural workers. In 1966 — dismissed from his position as senior educational assistant of the National Historical Archives in Kyiv. In 1968 he sent a written protest to the Presidium of the Writers' Union of Ukraine against the adversity of O. Poltorats'kyy on the subject of the imprisoned writers. His literary-critical essays have stopped being published in the various journals. His collection of poems, "Winter Trees", was published in the West in 1970. Together with Dzyuba and others he sent a written protest in defence of V. Moroz in 1970. Arrested in Kyiv, January 1972.
- PLAKHOTNYUK Mykola.** Doctor. Senior laboratorian at one of the Kyiv Medical Institutes. In 1969 he was called for questioning by the KGB on several occasions. In 1970 — dismissed from his post as senior laboratorian. Arrested in Kyiv, January 1972.
- SERHIYENKO Oleksander.** A teacher. Well-known for his speech at the funeral of Alla Horská in Kyiv, December 1970. Arrested in Kyiv, January 1972.
- SELEZNENKO Leonid.** A chemist by profession. Also a musician. Arrested in Kyiv, January 1972.
- MINYALO Hryhoriy.** Formerly worked at the Kyiv Institute of Microdevices. In 1969 he organised in Kyiv a debating club for young people on sociological problems, and for this he was dismissed from his job. Arrested in Kyiv, January 1972.
- KOVALENKO Leonid.** Assistant lecturer at the Institute of Literature of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukr.SSR. In 1969 he was strongly reprimanded by the party for signing a written protest against arrests of Ukrainian intellectuals in Ukraine during 1965-66. This declaration was signed by over 150 intellectuals and workers. Arrested in Kyiv, January 1972.



**KOCHUR Hryhoriy.** Born 1908. Completed his education in Kyïv in 1932. Lecturer in foreign literature. Translator from Polish, Czech, English and French into Ukrainian. He has translated "Hamlet", "Dr. Faustus" and many other works. Member of the Writers' Union of Ukraine. In November 1968 his home was searched by the KGB. Arrested in Kyïv, January 1972.

**ANTONYUK Zinoviy.** Arrested in Kyïv, January 1972. No other information available.

**SHUMUK Mykola.** Formerly served 27 years in pre-war Polish prisons and later in Soviet camps. Arrested again in Kyïv, January 1972.

**SEREDNYAK Luba.** Arrested in Kyïv, January 1972. No other information available.

**ROHYNS'KYI Volodymyr.** Arrested in Kyïv, January 1972. No other information available.

**RESHETNYK Anatoliy.** Born 1937. Completed his higher education at a Moscow Pedagogical Institute. Member of the Communist Party. Is well-known for voicing his objections to the methods used in teaching Marxism and to the local party leadership. He was lately a lecturer in political economy at the Sverdlovsk Technical College. He wrote an open letter to the Russian literary newspaper in defence of A. Solzhenitsyn. He was then released from work. Arrested by the KGB in Kyïv. Stood trial in the first days of April 1972.

**RYZNYKOV Oleksa.** Arrested in Odessa, November 1971. Probably stood trial at the beginning of April 1972.

**PRYTYKA Oleksander.** Doctor. Arrested in Odessa, July 1971. Probably stood trial in April 1972.

**STROKATA-KARAVANSKA Nina.** Wife of Svyatoslav Karavanskyy, a long-standing prisoner of Soviet camps, sentenced to 25 years for his allegedly nationalistic views. Nina refused the demands of the KGB to disown her imprisoned husband. Arrested in Odessa on 8th December 1971, and stood trial at the beginning of April 1972. Details of trial unknown as yet.

**SHUKHEVYCH Yuriy.** Born 1933 in Lviv. First arrested in 1948 and sentenced to 10 years. Almost immediately after his release in 1958 he was sentenced to further 10 years imprisonment. His crime — son of the late General Roman Shukhevych, Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army in 1942-50. His second arrest and prison sentence was carried out by order of the General Prosecutor of the USSR — M. Rudenko; he was charged with spreading "anti-Soviet propaganda". During the captivity the KGB tried to make him renounce his father's deeds. This he refused to do. In 1967 he sent a written protest from the Mordovian camp to the Supreme Council of Ministers of the Ukr.SSR in which he very strongly protested against the unjust sentence passed upon him and the violation of the Soviet law-system. Released in 1968, but without permission to return to Ukraine. He then settled down in Caucasus. In 1970, along with others, he

signed a protest letter to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Ukr.SSR in defence of V. Moroz. Arrested in Nal'chyk, near Caucasus, March 1972. Probably stood trial at the beginning of April 1972.

**FRANKO Zinoviya.** Born 1925. The grand-daughter of the famous Ukrainian poet and writer Ivan Franko. Interrogated by the KGB in January 1972, and under duress wrote a letter of repentance which was published in "Literaturna Ukraïna" in Kyïv. Arrested in Kyïv on 27th April 1972.

**SVITLYCHNA Nadya.** Sister of Ivan Svitlychnyy. On 15th November 1967 she witnessed the trial of Vyacheslav Chornovil in Lviv. In mid-January 1972, when her brother was arrested, Nadya was obliged to report daily to the KGB. Arrested on 19th May 1972 by the KGB in Kyïv.

### REPRESSIONS IN UKRAINE

In the last few months, the KGB in Soviet Ukraine increased repressions and the persecution of Ukrainian cultural and educational leaders. Many scientists have been dismissed from work, including such renowned men as Yevhen Konstantynovych Lazarenko, until 1951 rector of the University of Lviv and until recently a professor of geology in Kyïv, and the author of many works.

The prominent Ukrainian botanist, Dmytro Konstantynovych Zerov, was persecuted. He was an active member of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences since 1948, and died of a heart attack during a Party meeting at which he criticized the Kremlin's policy of Russification in Ukraine. His funeral, which took place on December 20, 1971, actually became a protest demonstration.

Also dismissed from work was the director of the Kyïv choir "Homin", L. Yashchenko.

Pressure was increased on the younger generation of Ukrainian intellectuals. Even prior to their arrests in mid-January, Yevhen Sverstyuk was dismissed from work, and the works of Ivan Svitlychnyy, Zenoviya Franko and others were refused to be published. The continuous repressions resulted in Vasyl' Stus writing a letter of protest, dated December 10, 1971, to Yuriy Smolych, the chairman of the Union of Writers of Ukraine, and to Fedor Ovcharenko, a secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine. In it, Stus accuses the executive committee of the Writers' Union of discrimination against young Ukrainian poets, prosaists and literary critics, whose works are refused to be published. V. Stus quotes in his letter a number of examples from the personal experiences of Ivan Svitlychnyy, Mykhaylyna Kotsyubyn's'ka, Zenoviya Franko and others, at the same time affirming that the executive of the WUU does not allow the younger writers to have a voice in the WUU and restricts membership for them in the Union. In the 20-page letter mention is also made of the prohibition and liquidation of clubs of creative youth, the "Suchasnyk" (Contemporary) and others, which had sprang up in various towns of Ukraine during the 1960's. V. Stus also accuses the executive of the WUU of failing to take a stand to date to the Russification policy continued by the occupant. The letter is currently in circulation in Ukraine. Vasyl' Stus was arrested in the middle of January, 1972.

Prior to his arrest in January, 1972, the literary critic, Yevhen Sverstyuk, was dismissed from work directly following his speech at the funeral of Prof. D. K. Zerov, on December 20, 1971. A 30-page essay by Yevhen Sverstyuk, entitled "Ivan Kotlyarev's'kyi Laughs" was published in *Samvydav* form in 1969 and is being circulated in Ukraine. In this essay, Y. Sverstyuk explains the reasons, of why and how there appeared the life-giving laughter of Ivan Kotlyarev's'kyi "on the trampled wasteland of our history".

## THE KGB IS PREPARING RELIGIOUS TRIALS

Most recent reports indicate that preparations are being made in the Ukrainian SSR for open and closed trials, in order to terrorize people who continue to practice their religion. The trials are also intended so as to seize from the religious leaders of the underground Ukrainian Churches their sons and daughters and bring them up in an atheistic type of environment.

The KGB, together with the public prosecutor and the anti-religious society "Knowledge", has strengthened anti-religious propaganda by provincial radio stations, particularly against Ukrainian catholics and Ukrainian evangelists. (Against the latter especially in the provinces of Odessa and Kyiv, because they pass on their faith to their children and do not wish to enter into the Moscow-controlled central "Society of Evangelist-Baptists", where the Russian language dominates and everyone must be registered). The attacks against practicing catholics have been greatly increased by the provincial press in Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk and Zakarpatya provinces. The Kyiv news agency RATAU in its broadcasts of March 1-3 to the press of the Ukrainian SSR, went the farthest, when it announced the following insinuation:

"Various facts indicate that leaders of the Uniates-repentants, under the guise of religion, mask their propagation of anti-communism, anti-Semitism, and Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism".

A trial of a religious nature will begin soon in Kolomyia, where the Ukrainian-Catholic family of Ivasyuk and others, who are charged with propagating "Uniatism" among their children, and in particular to their daughter Mariya. Mariya Ivasyuk, a young girl from Liskiv, was forcefully separated from her family by the Soviets and made to live and study in a boarding school in Kutsik. However, the girl became ill, was greatly disturbed at hearing anti-religious lectures at school, and fled back home. In protest against anti-religious pressures and persecution, Mariya Ivasyuk went on a hunger strike for several days, drinking only water. She lay on a hard wooden bench in her home so that her peasant neighbours could see her. Mariya announced that she wanted to atone for the sins of her countrymen and therefore spends all her time in praying to the Virgin Mary. Mariya's parents were accused of "forcing" their adult daughter to pray.

In Ivano-Frankivsk practicing Ukrainian catholics publicly worship the Virgin Mary of Serebry, as the Mother of God, who appeared miraculously to some of their fellow believers on the Serebry Mountain in Kalush district in 1954, is called.

The Communist agitators attempt to intimidate the practicing catholic population with the name of Hnat Soltys, a former student of theology. The Communists claim that he was "an activist of Banderivtsi" (the Ukrainian nationalist underground movement; followers of Stepan Bandera). Soltys was one of the first to see the miraculous figure of the Virgin Mary on the Serebry Mountain. His fate is unknown.

## IN DEFENCE OF THE UNSUBDUED UKRAINE

### An Appeal by the OUN Executive to the Entire Ukrainian Community

Following disturbing reports from the concentration camps of Mordovia and the Russian prisons about the treacherous murders of Ukrainian and other political prisoners and about the systematic poisoning of the creators of culture in order to break their will and their creative ability, or even to kill them physically, — a new wave of open Stalinist Russian terror is sweeping across Ukraine.

The shameful mock trial of Valentyn Moroz, the assassination by the KGB of the late Alla Horska, the murder of the late Mykhaylo Soroka in a concentration camp, the recent arrests of the cultural leaders — Ivan Svitlychnyy, Vyacheslav Chornovil, Yevhen Sverstyuk, Ivan Dzyuba and others — prove that Russia is reverting anew to the dreadful terror, which is the essence of her domination over the subjugated nations. Russia has not changed in any respect. The Russia of Ivan Kalita, Peter I, Catherine II, Nicholas II, Lenin, Stalin, Khrushchov, Brezhnev, the Russia of Malyuta Skuratov, Dzerzhynsky, Yezhov, Beria or Shelepin, Serov or Andropov is always the same.

An evolution of her terrorist system toward a system of freedom and respect for human and national rights is impossible. Her empire, her prison of nations, can only be maintained by brutal, barbarous terror and for some time — hand in hand with terror — by deception and promises of “paradise on earth” for those who let themselves be deceived. This had been the case with the so-called defence of the Orthodoxy from the Turks; this had been the case with Pan-Slavism; this had been and still is the case with the “defence of the proletariat of the whole world”; this is now the case with the “support of the national liberation wars and revolutions of peoples subjugated by Western imperialists”... Deception and brutal force — this is Moscow's path. Worthlessness and baseness, a danger and a Nagant revolver, treacherous murders and the breaking of wills and characters with the aid of the most perfidious methods and means of modern science, medicine, psychology and technology in order to “convert” its victim to its diabolical faith, to the service of the Russian antichrist — this is Moscow's path. Every free thought, every smallest manifestation of a different opinion, even prayer must conform to the ideas of the Russian satraps, executioners and barbarians. Anyone who does not think, who does not believe as the Russians do, who does not worship the same idols as the Russians do, must be imprisoned, tortured and annihilated. Homicide and genocide — the mass arbitrary murder of the entire nations — this is the historic path of Russia...

Ivan Franko, whom the Russians have also stolen for their Communism, wrote the following about Russia:

“A decaying bog among the countries of Europe, covered with  
mildew, thick verdure!

The hotbed of stupidity and stagnation, oh Russia! Wherever you  
erect your pillars,  
There creeps deception, extortion, the lamentation of the people, as  
mildew from the wall.  
You oppress and shout: "I'm granting freedom!", you fleece and say  
"I'm promoting culture!"  
You do not cut to pieces, flog, send to Siberia, you only suck the fluid  
from the heart as a vampire.  
Your filth only stifles the heart and the soul. Only a snake or slime  
grow and get stronger within you,  
The free spirit must either flee, **or dies alive in your grave!**

The leaders of the free world do not want to understand this spirit of Russia, unchanged for centuries, failing to see that the Russian deluge will inundate them, if they fail to revive in their countries the patriotic spirit, the heroic style of life, militant Christianity and faith in God and morality based on it and on the service to the nation. It is a tragedy for the world that the Churches of the free world have also begun to collaborate with the genocidal and atheistic Russia, which invariably continues to persecute Christians and those who believe in God generally. Even the Vatican is silent when Archbishop Velychkovskyy is being tried, when Moroz is being tried, when Alla Horska is being murdered, when new victims for human rights, for creative freedom, for the rights which God has given to every nation, are being sacrificed at the altar of the Russian Moloch. The Vatican and other Western Churches were silent when the Ukrainian creators of culture wanted to express their patriotic, Christian ideas, views and convictions only in their thoughts, only in their words, only by pen, paintbrush and chisel... And for this they are imprisoned, for this they are murdered, for this they are tortured... The Pope, the Archbishop of Canterbury, the Patriarch of Constantinople and others are silent when Valentyn Moroz, great in spirit, thought and faith, is brutally tortured for writing the following: "The Church — the mainstay of the spirit — must be preserved!" or "The main thing is to defend the Church!"... In these ominous times, it is more important for Western Churches to carry on a dialog with atheistic tyrants and perpetrators of genocide, with Kremlin's "Church" of Pimen, than to carry on a dialog with Christians and martyrs, a dialog with Velychkovskyy and Moroz.

There is no militant official Christianity in the West. There is only consumable Christianity, just as there is a consumption-oriented society, a society of gain, a spiritless society of siesta and slumber...

And only with the coming of a hurricane, and it is already approaching, will come an awakening. The society will awake in flames.

The contemporary conscience of the mighty of this world respects force alone! **We must show them such force!**

We are counting first and foremost on our community, on the communities of nations subjugated by the Russians.

Thus, today, in view of V. Moroz's final plea, which is a document of his personal courage, worthiness, dignity, and heroic conduct as a Man,

— in the face of new repressions in Ukraine by vandalic Russia,

— in the face of resurgence of terror, more perfidious than the Stalinist one, even Stalin had not dared to excavate the graves of the Sich Riflemen\*) in Lviv, as is said by V. Chornovil,

— in view of the subsequent attempt by the Russians to seal the lips of Ukraine, even on the level of the most modest freedom of speech, conscience, cultural creativity, linked with the nation's past,

— in view of the fact that in the free world the highest awards are granted for literary works, which are comparable in quality to the works of V. Moroz,

— and in view of the fact that the most prominent authors of the West, having familiarized themselves with the fragments of translations of literary and historiosophical works of the arrested Ukrainian creators of culture, state that the free world does not have such quality and the profundity of moral, ethical and artistic creativity,

— it is time, it is high time for a UNITED MIGHTY NATIONWIDE CAMPAIGN OF THE UKRAINIAN SOCIETY IN GENERAL, OF THE WHOLE UKRAINIAN COMMUNITY IN EXILE, without regard to party and political convictions, confessions and views, of the entire Ukrainian independence-minded camp IN DEFENCE OF THE UNSUBDUED! At this crucial moment, every Ukrainian patriot must rid himself of all prejudices and the SPIRIT OF THE COMMON STRUGGLE OF THE NATION must predominate, for our action is IN DEFENCE OF THOSE WHO ARE AT THE FRONT!

There are various types of heroes. There are heroes who carry arms. But there are also heroes without weapons, without rifles and machine-guns, only with their own will and burning with ideas, with a character which can withstand a tyrant, armed from head to foot. This is the highest quality of a hero and martyr.

V. Moroz's motto is — do not spare the body, so as not to kill the soul, as was said by Hryhorii Skovoroda.\*\*\*) "The spiritual death" (according to Skovoroda) occurs when a knight avoids a struggle and fails to carry out the inner duty imposed upon him. This is "a cruel death". Thus died the Zaporozhian Cossacks — says Skovoroda — having become tsarist noblemen, instead of defending the Sich, the liberty, the honour and the truth of Ukraine...

A warrior's weapon — Skovoroda teaches — is not only his sword. More important is the spirit which guides his hand, more important is God's attitude to the cause which the knight's spirit serves.

Such warriors, imagined by Skovoroda, are all the creators of culture of Ukraine imprisoned by Russia, who without arms, only with their spirit, their creative mind strive to serve in their vocation as Man, a creature like unto God. "With God even a (warrior's) short life fills long years... And a deed with God is in itself the highest award". ("The Alphabet of the World", an essay by H. Skovoroda).

And V. Moroz says: "The point here is not Moroz. The point is every honest man in my place. Besides, in a place like Vladimir prison where people are prepared for a lingering death from some kind of secretly administered drug,

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\*) Ukrainian soldiers during World War I.

\*\*) Ukrainian philosopher (1722-1794).

there is no place for petty ambitions". This is what V. Moroz says. — "The court will try me behind closed doors. But it will turn into a boomerang anyway, even if no one hears me, even if I stay silent in an isolated cell in Vladimir prison. There is a silence that is louder than shouting. And even if you will destroy me, you will not be able to stifle that silence..."

Do not these words of V. Moroz remind us of the words by Socrates at his trial? And does not Socrates cup of poison remind us of the Russian poisonous injections at the Vladimir or the Mordovian prisons? Even if Moroz would not write anything else, — his ideas, his thoughts, his words, his heroic conduct, his crystal soul will remain an impregnable fortress in the soul of the whole nation, its component part. His proud: "The only kind of Moroz who would be of any value to you would be a submissive Moroz who wrote a declaration of guilt. But you will never live to see such a Moroz" — is eternal. Socrates spoke in this spirit to the court of the dishonest...

And thus in foreign countries we are standing in the shadow of the Titans of the Spirit, who were again thrown into prisons and casemates, in the shadow of those who found themselves "among the snows", in "the Beria reservation", who write "the chronicle of resistance" with the fortitude of their spirit, not with a sword, nor arms, but with a courageous desire to manifest their Human identity, to realize the Truth of Symonenko and Skovoroda. — "We are not countless standard 'I's', but countless diverse universes"... Or Skovoroda's: "'I' is the basis of everything, even God's Kingdom, and even God HIMSELF is nothing other than a full-valued 'I'. He who knows himself has found the desired treasure of God... A true human being and God are one and the same"...

We find ourselves in foreign countries, but can we remain silent?

Moroz said: "There will be a trial. Well, we shall fight... At this time it is necessary for someone to provide an example of firmness... The lot has fallen on me... It is a difficult mission. To sit behind bars is easy for no one. But not to respect one's self is even harder... And that is why we shall fight! The trial will come and everything will begin anew: new protests and petitions, new material for newspapers and radios of the whole world. The interest in what Moroz wrote will grow tenfold. In a word, a new portion of oil will be added to the fire which you want to put out".

This was said by Valentyn Moroz on his own behalf and on behalf of all those who are behind bars today. The world must hear about those who are behind bars today. The world must hear about those who are suffering for defending their dignity and their rights, for defending our rights and the rights of the world of great ideas, which also must join in the defence of those who are standing unbroken in the first row "among the snows" of despotism and violence...

The word is ours. The word belongs to the entire Ukrainian community in exile, to our Churches, to our scientific, art, journalist, literary, youth, veteran, women's and political organizations and monastic orders. An ardent protest across the free world against the new wave of terror in Ukraine and in defence of the imprisoned must come from the entire Ukrainian independence-minded political world, from Church, academic, youth, civic, professional, and from the

organized Ukrainian life in exile in general. Non-stop mass actions of the public must be continued and must flare up anew.

The imprisoned champions of national and human rights cannot feel abandoned. It is necessary that spontaneous struggle in their defence should include old and young, children and men, boys and women, that all and each individually should fight in their defence, each in his own way and by his own methods, in order that Moroz's forecast — that his silence will be louder than shouting — will come true all over again every day, every minute.

Everything Ukrainian that lives must join the ranks of the action, without regard to parties or confessions. At the same time, let the works of V. Moroz and others now imprisoned be published in hundreds of thousands of copies in various languages of the world, and in Ukrainian in particular. Let the **Ukraïnskyy Visnyk** (The Ukrainian Herald) become known to all in the free world who have a national soul. Let the children recite the works of the Unsubdued in schools, at concerts, celebrations, and mass rallies. Let it be a national honour for every Ukrainian not only to own their works, but also to disseminate them among foreigners... Let pupils, students, old and young study "Among the Snows", "The Chronicle of Resistance", the poetry of V. Moroz and others, just as they study Shevchenko, Franko or Lesya Ukraïnka.

Our poets in exile should translate the poetry and literary works of the Unsubdued to foreign languages. Translated to foreign languages, the works of Moroz and others, should find their way to the desks of politicians, statesmen, writers and scholars of the free world. Through the efforts of our academic and literary circles, Valentyn Moroz should be proposed as candidate for the Nobel Prize. Let the golden names of the history of our days, the names of heroes who stood up to fight — without weapons, only with the power of their spirit, in defence of their divine, human and national "I", undertaking suffering voluntarily and consciously, be imprinted in the minds of all and let it burn like fire.

Let hundreds of thousands of protest telegrams be dispatched to governments of the free countries of the world. Let hundreds of thousands of telegrams bury Nixon in the White House, who is planning a visit to the centre of the perpetrators of genocide — Moscow, at the very time when in the USSR a Stalinist type terror is being intensified... A march on Washington should be organized together with members of other subjugated nations along ABN lines and it should be transformed into a huge demonstration against Moscow. At the same time, a written petition as well as the documentation in the case of the imprisoned Unsubdued should be submitted to President Nixon.

In this action one should not omit the anti-Bolshevik labour unions. And our scientific and literary and art organizations must engage analogous circles of the free nations of the world in the action.

The foreign-policy aspect of the action must be accentuated in particular. The broadest and the most diverse circles of free nations must be included in the action. The campaign must not be allowed to simmer down; it must get hotter and hotter.

**Every form and method is good** when it reminds of the fact that some



countries are still in slavery. They are fighting at a time when the comfortable world sinks in affluence and forgets about its human dignity.

**There, freedom and life are being sacrificed. And what are we sacrificing here?**

Let each of us ask our conscience. Let it be our constant judge as to our unfulfilled duty to those who suffer punishment and torture, but who DO NOT REPENT.

Let us not dash their hopes. — "Five years ago I was put in a prisoner's dock, — writes V. Moroz — and the result was an arrow. Afterwards I was put behind a barbed wire fence in Mordovia and the result was a bomb. Now, once again, having understood nothing and learned nothing, you are beginning all over again. Only this time the momentum of the boomerang will be much stronger. In 1965 Moroz was an obscure instructor of history. Now he is known..."

**UKRAINE AWAITS THE ACTION OF THE ENTIRE UKRAINIAN COMMUNITY IN THE WHOLE WORLD!**

January 1972

**The Executive of the  
Organization of the Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN)**

### **ABN IN DEFENCE OF FREEDOM FIGHTERS**

The Central Committee of the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations (ABN) calls on all national liberation organizations of nations subjugated by Russia in the entire world to join in a common front with Ukrainians in their defence of Ukrainian intellectuals, the creators of culture of other nations and all fighters for national state independence and human rights, persecuted by barbarous Russia.

The cultural leaders recently arrested in Kyiv and Lviv — Ivan Svitlychnyy, Vyacheslav Chornovil, Yevhen Sverstyuk, Ivan Dzyuba and others — are widely known for their works in defence of human and national rights.

The CC ABN appeals to all state, political, church and civic leaders of the free countries of the world, in particular to the anti-Russian and anti-Communist circles, to youth and various patriotic organizations, to the combatants, to the International Red Cross, the International Commission of Jurists, the International Court at the Hague, to the UN Human Rights Commission and the European Council in Strassbourg, and Amnesty International, to become active champions of the creators of culture and all the political prisoners — the fighters for national and human rights — imprisoned by the Russian tyrants.

The CC ABN calls for mass actions to protest Russian terror and to obtain the release of Valentyn Moroz and all the other imprisoned cultural leaders, as well as all fighters for national state independence and human rights.

The CC ABN denounces the infamous secret mock trial of Valentyn Moroz and his confinement of 14 years to a harsh prison and hard labour camp as well as his systematic poisoning in the Vladimir prison, in order to break his will and his creative ability.

All the nations subjugated by Russia have a tragic experience with her

genocidal policy toward the peoples which she enslaves and with the extermination of their national substance by various means.

Therefore, the crimes committed against the Ukrainian cultural leaders, not only move the Ukrainian community to the depths of its soul, but also inspire to a joint action, utilizing all methods, of the emigrations of all nations subjugated in the Russian prison of nations.

January 1972

**The Central Committee  
of the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations (ABN)**

### **DEFEND THE UNSUBDUED!**

Moscow has struck again. It has again thrown Ukrainian patriots in jail — those who on their own Ukrainian soil desire liberty for the Ukrainian people, those who are fighting for the Ukrainian language, the Ukrainian cultures, the Ukrainian identity, i. e. for all those things which are enjoyed by every free nation.

But the Ukrainian nation is deprived of all this, because the Russian occupying power does not tolerate it. And those who are demanding it are arrested, confined to prisons, concentration camps or insane asylums.

Valentyn Moroz, the fearless fighter for the right of the Ukrainian people to an independent life, has become known to the whole world. "We shall fight!" — he told the Russian bandits to their face.

And just recently news spread around the world that Russia has arrested 21 Ukrainians, among them some widely known — Ivan Svitlychnyy, Vyacheslav Chornovil, Yevhen Sverstyuk and Ivan Dzuba.

New names are always being added to an endless list of the arrested, the imprisoned, the banished and the tortured to death fighters for Ukraine's liberty.

The Ukrainian people are carrying on a struggle for the right to live freely on their own land, just as they fought in the past with the same enemies of Ukraine. The new generation of Ukrainians is taking up the struggle, following boldly and courageously in the footsteps of their parents.

Let us stand together with those who are fighting on Ukrainian soil.

Let us rise in defence of those whom Russia is persecuting, arresting, destroying. Let us stand up in defence of the Ukrainian people.

We urge all our organizations and all our members to take part in the campaign in defence of those imprisoned and persecuted.

Let us engage in this action all national groups, our fellow-citizens, the press, radio, television, the parliamentarians, and various local Ukrainian and non-Ukrainians organizations.

Our action must be so loud that the whole world and all of Ukraine would hear us. That those behind bars and barbed wire would hear us. And that the enemy would hear and feel it.

Let us give fitting assistance to those who are fighting!

Let us all join the action.

January 1972

**The World Ukrainian Liberation Front**

## EUROPEAN FREEDOM COUNCIL IN DEFENCE OF ARRESTED WRITERS

The Executive Board of the European Freedom Council held its meeting on 11 and 12th March, 1972, and passed the following statement in connection with the newest arrests in Ukraine:

The Ukrainian historian, Valentyn Moroz, sentenced to 14 years imprisonment, now in Vladimir gaol, for publishing essays on cultural and historical problems, is critically ill and is being slowly poisoned by the KGB in order to break his willpower and force a declaration of repentance from him.

In January 1972, over 100 Ukrainian cultural leaders — defenders of human and national rights — were arrested in Kyiv and Lviv, including poets, writers, artists, literary critics, scientists, among them the well known Ivan Svitlychnyy, Vyacheslav Chornovil (author of "The Chornovil Papers") and Yevhen Sverstyuk.

Unable to put these Ukrainians on trial for alleged "violation of the Constitution", the KGB decided to link them with a Belgian student tourist, Y. Dobosch. The latter is being accused of associating with the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists abroad which the Soviets falsely represented as being in contact with Western intelligence services. Such are the measures adopted by Russia against Ukrainians and other nationals who are fighting for human rights and national independence.

The monstrous era of Stalinism is returning, recalling similar accusations and the torture of prisoners to force false confessions from them. Will the new persecutees, like those executed before them by order of Stalinist Courts, be rehabilitated, once again demonstrating how such charges are pure invention?

### **The European Freedom Council:**

- Defends Human Rights and the right of all nations to independence;
- Condemns Russian terrorism, wholesale persecution, imprisonment of freedom fighters;
- Appeals to national, civic, church, youth and other organized bodies in the free world namely to:

International Red Cross,  
International Commission of Jurists,  
International Court at the Hague,  
United Nations Commission on Human Rights,  
European Council of Strasbourg,  
Amnesty International,

to strive to set free all political prisoners in the Soviet Russian Empire  
— including writer Valentyn Moroz and the Belgian student, Y. Dobosch.

**Executive Board, European Freedom Council**

## **DIEFENBAKER HEADS AN INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR THE DEFENCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS**

On the invitation of the Ukrainian Canadian Committee, in the name of the World Congress of Free Ukrainians (SKVU) and its Commission of Human Rights, on February 17, 1972, the former Prime Minister of Canada, John Diefenbaker, agreed to call to life an International Committee for the Defence of Human Rights and stand at the head of the Committee as its founder and President.

Announcing his decision during a press conference of the UCC in Winnipeg, Canada, Mr. Diefenbaker, renowned for his defence of human rights and support of the captive nations on the Canadian forum, as well as on the forum of the United Nations, stated that he will do everything possible to turn the light of truth on the violation of human rights and the enslavement of entire nations under the tyranny of the Soviet Russian regime.

In reading the statement of the Ukrainian Canadian Committee, its president, the Rev. Dr. V. Kushnir, announced that the purpose of the Committee would be to study the incidents of political incarceration and examine the sentences of Soviet courts in Ukraine and other countries, and to inform the entire world of the impartial legal appraisal of these cases.

As its founder and President, former Prime Minister J. Diefenbaker will invite prominent statesmen and lawyers of international fame to co-operate by acting as members of the executive board of this International Committee.

During the press conference, Dr. J. S. Kalba, Executive Director of the UCC, read out the declaration of the Ukrainian Canadian Committee on the subject of the recent Soviet Russian repressions in Ukraine, which contained an appeal to all Ukrainian Canadian organizations and all Canadian citizens of good will in general, to condemn the persecution of Ukrainian cultural leaders.

The summoning of former Prime Minister Diefenbaker to the post of President of the International Committee for the Defence of Human Rights was announced as a major news item by Canadian television and radio stations. The following day, extensive articles about this event appeared in the Canadian daily press.

### **EXCERPTS FROM A SPEECH IN THE FEDERAL PARLIAMENT BY THE RIGHT HONORABLE JOHN G. DIEFENBAKER, FORMER PRIME MINISTER OF CANADA**

**Mr. Diefenbaker:** Now, Sir, I will move away from Canada to the international field, but only for a short time. I do not think I have ever known my country to be lower in prestige internationally than it is today. The statement by the Prime Minister that we feared the United States militarily was one that shocked the sensibilities not only of Americans but of free men everywhere in the world.

Then, there was the other statement made by the Prime Minister when he was asked by Ukrainian Canadians, and Ukrainians from other parts of the world, to bring to the attention of the Soviet authorities what was taking place

today, not only in Ukraine but throughout the captive nations of the world. Kosygin, when he was here, said he loved peace. How he must have laughed when he said that. Today Brezhnev and Kosygin are reviving the Stalinist repression that seemed to end with the elevation of Khrushchev to authority.

In the case of the Ukrainian people, 11 of their leaders have been arrested, not because of their advocacy of revolution but because they have been critical of the Soviet government's failure to live up to its pledged principles in the United Nations. There is a new wave of Russian persecutions against Ukrainians. The intellectuals who speak out are accused of dealing in anti-Soviet propaganda. The Soviet courts are applying a new rule and imposing additional sentences for acts allegedly committed against Soviet society while an accused is in prison. I can give example after example. One is Valentyn Moroz, a young Ukrainian historian, who was sentenced in 1970 to nine years of hard labour for writing a report about Beria Reserve while serving a previous sentence of four years in that prison camp. I have the list of free men, many of them communists, who are being put in jail without trial.

The World Congress of Free Ukrainians wishes to have this matter fully investigated. I intend to do what I can in that connection, it having honoured me by naming me as the national chairman. I will do what I can to assure those who love freedom, as we love freedom, in Ukraine and in the Baltic countries of Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia, and in other countries that are under communist domination, that what is wrong will be revealed.

People ask where does the Prime Minister come in on this? I do not want to quote at length, but I will quote what he said when he was asked by the hon. member for Edmonton Centre (Mr. Paproski) what he was going to do about it, and what he had done. As reported on May 31 he said he had little sympathy with nationalists in Canada or the Soviet Union. He said:

I quite frankly avoided talking about that. I tried to get some data which would permit me to talk about it on a basis on which I felt really involved and convinced, and — quite frankly — couldn't take up the causes, several of which were put to me, that I should protest in favour of so-and-so and so-and-so who had been jailed because of their nationalistic beliefs.

My position in the Soviet Union or in Canada is that anyone who breaks the law to assert his nationalism does not get too much sympathy from me.

In 1958, he said that everyone had the right to oppose any law if he did not agree with it.

Again, according to the report on May 31, he said:

I didn't particularly feel like bringing up any cases which would have caused Mr. Brezhnev or Mr. Kosygin to say: 'Well you know, why did you put in jail certain FLQ leaders? After all they think they are only fighting for the independence of Quebec. Our people say they are fighting for the independence of Ukraine. Why should you put your revolutionaries in jail and we shouldn't put ours?'

That statement was an insult to every Canadian of Ukrainian origin and to every other Canadian.

**Some hon. Members:** Hear, hear!

**Mr. Diefenbaker:** It is equating the murderers and kidnappers with intellectuals who are simply advocating that the law be lived up to. Then, when the Prime Minister got into difficulty about that he said "I really didn't mean that". The same old equivocal course. Say the thing, have the accolade of Kosygin placed upon the brow for having said it, then say "I really didn't mean it". If I say that he must have meant it somebody might say that I have partisan reasons, but I will quote from the **Winnipeg Free Press** of June 2, 1971. This newspaper is an avowed and dedicated supporter of the Liberal party but an article in it reads:

Prime Minister Trudeau's unfortunate comparison between the Ukrainian nationalists and the FLQ in Quebec is beyond comprehension.

And later, in the same article:

The Ukrainian nationalists were arrested because they strove to keep alive Ukrainian culture, language and literature in an increasingly Russian environment.

Perhaps the Prime Minister has forgotten the millions of dollars spent on the B and B commission for an analogous performance if he is really seeking analogies. Then, in the same article:

To compare these Ukrainian martyrs with a misguided band of kidnappers and assassins is not only an insult to the Ukrainian intellectuals and their kin, but a slap in the face of every democrat who abhors totalitarian tyranny.

Having got himself in that difficulty, he followed his usual course. He brought the leaders of the Canadian Ukrainian Committee to Ottawa and told them that he loved them, that what he said was misunderstood. But no amount of charisma can explain away what took place when he dared say this to people with that little flame of freedom before them. Many of them were martyred. Today thousands are in danger and hundreds have been picked up recently. Why has the Canadian government not pointed this out at the United Nations? They have never said a word, not one word. When Khrushchev was there in September, 1960, I mentioned the awfulness of the course of these people, and I was told by the highest ecclesiastics that the change that took place thereafter was amazing because public opinion in every other part of the world does affect the Soviet Union. This country has half a million Ukrainians, some of whom are our finest citizens and have served our country tremendously in days of war as they served in peace. It is beyond me to contemplate why the Prime Minister should have engaged in the blackmail of untruth.

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## CHRONICLE OF EVENTS IN DEFENCE OF UKRAINIAN INTELLECTUALS

### Britain

#### Hunger Strike and Mass Demonstration in London

January 29th and 30th, 1972, were days of mass protest by the Ukrainian community in Great Britain against the new wave of Russian terror in Ukraine. Over 100 members of the Ukrainian Youth Association (SUM) began picketing the Russian Embassy in London in the afternoon on Jan. 29th. Simultaneously 75 of them went on a 24-hour hunger strike. In the course of the action, they managed to get into the courtyard of the embassy where they chanted anti-Russian and anti-Communist slogans and sang Ukrainian patriotic songs. The police, alarmed by the embassy guards, soon exceeded the number of protesters, who were then led away from the embassy grounds with great pomp and ceremony and allowed to continue their picketing at the main gate. There they remained all night and most of the following day.

On Jan. 30th, a mass rally, attended by over 3,000 persons, was held at the Speakers' Corner. It was opened by J. Zablocky, Chairman of the Committee in Defence of Ukrainian Political Prisoners, which sponsored the demonstration. M. Hryniuk delivered the main speech in Ukrainian, while I. Krushelnysky spoke in English. The guest speakers included Mr. Velta Snikere — Secretary of the British League for European Freedom, Mr. David Orme — Chairman of the International Federation for Victory over Communism, Mr. T. Zarins — a Latvian representative, Mr. A. Pranskunas — a Lithuanian representative, and Miss Sh. Pinkhas — a representative of the Israeli community in London. Greetings from Albanians and Croats, as well as a resolution were read. Then an impressive march to the Soviet Embassy followed.

\*

A delegation of four Russian women arrived to Nottingham on Wednesday, March 8. They were greeted at city hall, and that evening a reception was held for them by the Anglo-Soviet Friendship Society. Five Ukrainians also appeared at the reception, and took an active part in the question-and-answer period which followed. They plied the four Soviets with demands as to why the recent arrests of Ukrainian cultural leaders, why is there forced Russification, and so on. Finally, the chairman, noticing that the atmosphere was getting terribly uncomfortable for the Soviet "guests", cut the discussion period short and proceeded with serving tea. The Ukrainians left the building with cries of "Freedom for Ukraine!" In the interim, three young girls distributed leaflets outside the building.

\*

Nottingham was also the scene of a demonstration of some 100 persons, late in January of this year. The demonstrators gathered at the old Market Place, in order to voice their protest against the arrest and imprisonment of Ukrainian intellectuals in the Soviet Union. Following the demonstration, petitions with over 450 signatures were submitted to the United Nations Organization in New York.

**Winnipeg, Canada**

On Saturday, January 29 1971, Ukrainian Canadian students and youth in the city of Winnipeg organized a demonstration to protest the persecution of Ukrainian youth in Soviet Ukraine.

Students and members of Ukrainian Youth Organizations SUM and PLAST, bearing national and organizational banners, gathered on an extremely cold day at the Cenotaph of the Unknown Soldier. The crowd was addressed by student, Stepan Welhash, who finished with the words: "Their ideals are also our ideals!" A student from Minneapolis and the Rev. Sas spoke, sharply protesting against the current arrests in Ukraine and the persecution of Ukrainian youth and intelligentsia. The demonstration ended with a mass for the dead and the suffering, held by the Rev. Semen Yizhyk and Rev. A. Pakosh.

Reports about the demonstration were carried by local press and radio.

**United States**

A huge demonstration of Ukrainian American youth in protest of the arrest and persecution of cultural leaders in Soviet Ukraine, was held on March 11 in New York. The demonstration, which was organized by the Ukrainian Youth Organization PLAST, attracted some 1,000 participants, chiefly youth, from such centres as New York, Newark, Jersey City, and even more distant cities as Syracuse, Philadelphia, Buffalo, Washington, Cleveland, and Chicago. The demonstrators gathered at Hammarsjold Plaza near the United Nations Buildings. They marched around the square shouting watchwords and the names of imprisoned Ukrainian intellectuals. A group of 12 youths, dressed in prison garb and bound with chains, walked about the square under the supervision of two "guards". Each bore a sign with the name of the Political prisoner he represented. Several speakers addressed the large crowd in both the English and Ukrainian languages. The demonstrators were greeted by Congressman James Shoyer of the Bronx, who was himself expelled from the Soviet Union during a recent trip for ties with the Jewish minority. Thousands of leaflets were distributed and a Soviet flag was burned. The demonstration ended with the singing of the Ukrainian national anthem.

Members of the news media filmed portions of the demonstration and excerpts of these films along with interviews with participants of the protest demonstration were shown on television news broadcasts.

**Chicago**

A similar demonstration in protest against the recent Soviet arrests of Ukrainian cultural leaders took place on Saturday, March 18, in Chicago, also with mass participation. The demonstration was organized by The Association of Ukrainian Students named after Mikhnovs'kyi (TUSM), renowned Ukrainian nationalist ideologist.



**Australia**

On February 14, 1972, a Ukrainian delegation was received by Mr. McMahon's personal secretary in the absence of the Prime Minister. The delegation voiced the protest of Ukrainians in Australia against the admittance of the Russian Metropolitan Nikodim, Exarch of the Russian Orthodox church in Soviet Ukraine, into Australia and permitting him to spread Soviet propaganda. The Ukrainians of Australia were particularly outraged at the presence of Nikodim in view of the recent wave of arrests in Ukraine.

**France**

The Executive Committee of the Organization of Ukrainians in France has appealed by letter to the General Secretary of the United Nations, Kurt Waldheim, to take measures for the question of the mass arrests in Ukraine to be investigated and subsequently condemned by the Human Rights Commission. The OUF also asked that the Commission adopt a resolution with the recommendation for the USSR to respect human and national rights.

The Executive of the Central Ukrainian Committee in France sent a letter, dated March 3, to the French Minister of External Affairs, in which it appeals for the intervention of the French government on behalf of the arrested cultural leaders in Soviet Ukraine. Enclosed with the letter were resolutions adopted at an assembly of protest in Paris, February 13.

**Strasbourg**

Four students, three females and one male, of the Strasbourg university, members of the "Valentyn Moroz" club, completed a three-day hunger strike. The hunger-strike was held February 10-13, as an indication of solidarity with the arrested intellectuals in Ukraine and in protest of the persecution of young Ukrainian intelligentsia.

**UKRAINIANS ASK CANADIAN GOVERNMENT FOR HELP**

On February 28, 1972 a peaceful demonstration and candlelight march were held by Ukrainian Canadians on Parliament Hill in Ottawa, with some 150 persons participating. Following this, a delegation of the Ukrainian Canadian Committee and the Ukrainian Students Association met External Affairs Minister, Mitchell Sharp, to whom they presented a brief asking that the Canadian government bring to the attention of the United Nations the new wave of arrests of Ukrainian intellectuals in the U.S.S.R. which "constitutes but another link in the long chain of Soviet violations of human rights". Taking an active part in the demonstration and the presentation of the brief were the following parliamentarians: Senators Muriel M. Fergusson, Eugene A. Forsey, Rhéal Bélisle and Paul Yuzyk, as well as Allan Sulatycky, M.P. Mr. Sharp promised the delegation that Canada would intercede with the Soviet Union on behalf of the numerous intellectuals arrested in January for "anti-Soviet activities" within Ukraine. Mr. Sharp said that the Canadian Government would appeal to Russia through its ambassadors. He said that the key would be "quiet diplomacy".

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## INDEPENDENCE DAY CELEBRATIONS

During the celebration of the 54th anniversary of Ukrainian National Independence, several Canadian cities joined the festivities, proclaiming January 22 "Ukrainian Independence Day" and allowing the flag of the Ukrainian National Republic to be flown from government buildings during the course of the day.

Such a celebration took place in St. Catharines, Ontario, with the Hon. Robert Welch, Ontario's Minister of Education and Provincial Secretary for Social Development, participating in a banquet arranged by the Ukrainian Canadian Committee of the city of St. Catharines. In his address, Mr. Welch extended greetings on behalf of the Province of Ontario and stated: "Tonight we are made aware that we celebrate far more than historical fact, for this anniversary represents the spirit of a people, its valour and its values — the love of freedom, the maintenance of human dignity and individual identity and the ideal of democracy". He paid tribute to the 'pioneering spirit' of those Ukrainians who, possessing the same ideals and valour, took part in the early shaping of the Canadian nation.

The Canadian city of Kitchener also participated in these celebrations and allowed the national flag of Ukraine to be flown from the City Hall. The city council made this decision in spite of objections from a few individuals that the city's resolution could be considered an affront to Canada's foreign policy, and to Canada's trading partner, the Soviet Union. A local 'independent' newspaper, the **Kitchener-Waterloo Record**, stated that "The co-ordinator and city council have, in effect, committed Kitchener to give official recognition to an event intended to publicize a movement to free the Ukraine from the Soviet Union".

Another 'independent' citizen insinuated that "the Ukrainian group is a small body who apparently think more of their national flag than they do of the Canadian flag".

It is well to point out to these gentlemen, that Ukrainians have proven their allegiance to Canada and its flag in the last two world wars, in which over 50,000 served and many gave their lives. It should also be brought to their attention, that the celebrations of Ukrainian Independence Day in Canada, coincided with a new wave of arrests in Soviet Ukraine, in which over 100 Ukrainian intellectuals, the champions of human and national rights, were victimized by the KGB. Can indifference and passivity be allowed on the part of Canada and the Canadian people in the light of these violations of human rights?

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We regret that for technical reasons the next installment of the Study **SOVIET NATIONALITIES POLICY IN UKRAINE, 1920-1930** by W. Mykula had to be held over till next issue. — Ed.

*The*  
**UKRAINIAN  
REVIEW**



**III**

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
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# THE FORGOTTEN SUPERPOWER

*By Yaroslav STETSKO*

## **The Primacy of the Spiritual and National Element**

Let us recall some of the major principles of ABN's liberation policy which we have been stressing continuously:

1) In the organisation of the world, the concepts of national liberation and the establishment of nation states have become the general tendency as opposed to the idea of forming larger units. The national principle — nationalism — is the predominant feature of the present era.

2) The two superpowers, the USA and the so-called USSR, whose power position was determined by the possession of the atomic or hydrogen bomb, were later joined by the third superpower (Red China); and today one can almost say that there are five of them if one takes into consideration Japan and Western Europe, whose economic complex is now being joined by Great Britain with her economic "club" of smaller states (EFTA).

We can see here the continuous process of the division of the world. The rapid development of technology does not prevent the emancipation of nations and thermonuclear arms are incapable of arresting the triumphant march of the national idea and its realization, which is tantamount to the dissolution of empires. The very formula of "thermonuclear stalemate" among the superpowers signifies the self-neutralization of the nuclear threat. Thus, the theory which we expounded for years is being confirmed, namely that thermonuclear war is an anachronistic concept, alien to the spirit of the time. On the other hand, the concept of an armed people, of national liberation revolutions, of guerilla warfare, has become characteristic of our age. Hand in hand with the development of military technology, comes an increase in the significance of man as a spiritual being and of human communities as free nations. And although in the Western world, technological progress does not always correspond to the ethnical and moral perfection of man, to a Christian and spiritual way of life and the eradication of materialism and hedonism, we can discern in the countries behind the so-called Iron Curtain subjugated by Russian imperialists, in particular in Ukraine, a clear process of spiritual renaissance of the individual and of the nation. As in the

past, so today, it is those deprived of freedom, the persecuted and oppressed, those who suffer and are ready to make sacrifices in defence of national and human rights and freedom, who in the day to day struggle realize the heroic concept of life; and they are more strongly inspired by national ideas than men who are free, content and self-satisfied.

Today, thermonuclear weapons "neutralize" themselves and all the more so from the moment when their possessions extended from the "club of two" to the "club of five". Technological progress facilitates the cheap production of thermonuclear arms, which in turn means that in time thermonuclear weapons can be produced by smaller states as well. The utilization of the atomic bomb at the end of World War II (Hiroshima and Nagasaki) was possible only because at the time the USA had the monopoly of it. But later, neither in Korea nor in Vietnam, was it possible to employ thermonuclear arms for victory over the adversary. The Russian empire now finds itself in an analogous position. It cannot use thermonuclear weapons against an uprising of the subjugated nations, for instance, because it would destroy itself in the process.

Thus, in conformity with established principles, everything continues to remain within God's Providence, which cannot be changed by any human force. The annihilation of mankind does not depend on the will of man, but on a Higher Power which guides the whole world. The universe is governed by unalterable laws and man is incapable of guessing the plan of his Creator. Here is the source of our great unshakeable belief that a nation which fulfils the mission designed for it by God, cannot be the object of destruction.

It can be seen quite clearly that in subjugated Ukraine, spiritual and godly values are dominant today. The Russian executioners have exterminated Soroka, have murdered Alla Horska, have condemned Valentyn Moroz to hard labour; but the spiritual grandeur radiates from the life of those who refuse to submit and from the death of those who fall in battle. How very wrong are the pragmatists and the sceptics who define the role of Ukraine in technical and material terms alone, i.e. compare the economic and technical potential of Ukraine with that of the Russian empire, the USA or Red China. Small-minded men always degrade what is idealistic, spiritual and eternal in the life of the individual and nation. We can see from historic experience that the greatest world empires of the past, as for instance the Roman and the British, no longer exist, but the people and nations continue to live.

Spiritual values are eternal. Faith in truth, faith in ideals, in victory of spirit over matter, is of decisive importance for a subjugated nation, for otherwise it will be overcome by lack of confidence in itself and by underestimating its own strength in relation to the mighty technical, material power of the adversary — the occupying



power. Therefore the theory that "inevitably" the liberation struggle and politics will function without an ideological basis, is a knife in the back of every liberation movement. Even the Marxists, the greatest materialists in the philosophical sense had to become idealists in their psychology and ethics when they wanted to dominate the masses of workers and to lead them to the barricades. Even in the struggle for an eight-hour work day, a vision of a different social order was concealed. Here the major stimulus was the sense of wrong as an ethical phenomenon. And none, even from among the "proletarian revolutionaries", would go to die on the barricades for some petty material benefit alone, if he did not see in the struggle itself a more profound spiritual meaning, a great vision of an idealistic character. It is the contradictions between the philosophical materialism and ethical idealism in the struggle for a different world, which have driven the Communist movement into a blind alley, into a dead-end street from which there is no way out. Obviously, there are other reasons as well which are responsible for the bankruptcy of Communism, but they are beyond the subject under discussion.

To deprive a subjugated nation of the ideology of its struggle is tantamount to disarming it, to robbing it of its symbols of truth and faith, to forcing it to forget that man does not live by bread alone. A sense of justice is particularly developed in a subjugated nation. Therefore, it has at the same time a very strong sense of wrong. And the sense of justice and the feeling of wrong do not belong to the material but to the spiritual and ethical sphere. There is not a single nation in the world which does not have its great visions and these are based on its ideology.

Those who are searching for reasons why the contemporary free world has found itself in a hopeless situation will see that first and foremost it is a consequence of the spiritual crisis. Today in particular, spiritual revival is essential. Great statesmen, men of vision, ideologists and leaders are needed, who unconditionally believe in great truth and pass their faith on to others.

Our age is not only the thermonuclear age, but also the age of ideology. Those who flee from ideals, from the system of ideas which determines our relationship to the surrounding world and to the potential world, are perplexed by the chaos of relativism, scepticism and disbelief, and this in turn leads to the "vision" of the world of hippies and drug addicts. Those who in this day and age say that our liberation struggle must do without ideology, have failed to comprehend the lofty processes of the spiritual revival in contemporary Ukraine, its return to its traditions and the regaining of the Ukrainian identity. There, in Ukraine, are the cult of the Golden Gates, the cult of the Cathedrals, the cult of the Zaporozhian Sich — at the time the only Orthodox Christian order of knights comparable to the

Knights of Malta. All this is neither material, nor pragmatic, nor "real" under present conditions, and he who is a "realist" will never be a Ukrainian. Present-day Ukraine is "a flower among the snows". Is this perhaps "reality" or "pragmatism"? No, here faith comes into play first of all, and faith above all. When Ukraine's renaissance, its struggle, is "de-ideologized", only sceptics, pragmatics, relativists remain. And where will Ukraine be then?

### **Symbols in the External Liberation Policy**

Does the above have any relation to the foreign policy of a subjugated nation? Yes, because its own forces are the basis of its foreign policy, which (forces) develop and grow stronger only when they have a definite, clear motivation. No nation, especially no subjugated nation, can remain without a helm and sails. It must draw its strength from the spring of eternal values and fight for them, if it is striving for victory. This was so in the past, when Ukraine regenerated itself and our Zaporozhian knights fought "for Christian faith and fatherland", marched "to liberate brethren — to win glory".

Ukraine has its own world of ideas and in our age this is what makes us different from the Russian world. Among all peoples there exists a national egoism and national interests are dominant. National egoism exists among us as well, but it has never assumed the genocidal character of Russian chauvinism. Therefore the path followed by Ukrainian nationalism is in no way identical with the road of chauvinist Russian nationalism. We are not advocating a struggle for the sake of struggle, only a struggle for the victory of certain national and universal human values. The ideals of Shevchenko, Skovoroda, Lesya Ukrayinka, Franko, and in our day those of Moroz or Sverstyuk, are completely different from the ideals of Gorky or Dostoyevsky, from the Russian ideals in which the sin of Sodom is intermingled with the immaculacy of the Madonna, fratricide with the crocodile tears of a penitent, tyranny with slavery. Our ideals stem from the millennial tradition of the Ukrainian nation. They became a projection of the just order in the world, built on the national principle. Russia rejects the national principle, recognising only the imperialist principle and attempting to create a "nationless society", to merge all nations and to drown them in the "Russian sea". This means in effect the total destruction of culture among the nations of the world because culture only grows on organic national soil. The disappearance of culture and nationhood leads to the loss of the heroic element in life, while de-Christianization results in the destruction of the traditional national structures, in the elimination of spiritual values in life, which then loses the aspect of eternity. The immortality of spirit, both of the individual and of the nation as a society of the living, the dead and the unborn. The ideals of Kyiv are in direct opposition to those of Moscow and of every modern

Babylon, deprived of spirit and traditions, in opposition to the pseudo-industrialized society which is used as a camouflage by those who attempt to liquidate nations because they, allegedly, do not fit in the contemporary atomic age, although in reality the atomic age is no less favourable to the development of nations than the Middle Ages were.

Just as in the past, Christianity grew out of the catacombs, so today the spiritual revival comes from the catacombs of Ukraine, from the underground, from the concentration camps, from St. Sophia at Kyiv. At a time when a considerable part of the free world is being Bolshevized, in Ukraine and in other countries subjugated by the Russian imperialists, Bolshevism-Communism is becoming bankrupt. Despite the fact that our age is also an ideological age, in the free world thermonuclear power alone is being stressed as a dominant force, while the more important, the spiritual, the ideological force, is "forgotten" completely. This is the result of the fact that statesmen have become pragmatists-empiricists. Our age requires new Richard Lionhearts, new men like Cromwell, Volodymyr the Great, Khmelnytskyi, Cato, Leonidas and Mucius Scevolli. But instead of anti-Lenins it has brought forth only Brandts, instead of a Moses who led his people through seas and deserts to the promised land, it has produced Pierre Trudeau, instead of the Crusader-Popes, we have Popes who engage in "dialogues" with the enemies of Christ, the perpetrators of homicide and genocide. Instead of the cross and the sword, a combination of the cross and the hammer and sickle is now being suggested. Instead of a new Churchill who would oppose Moscow and Bolshevism with the same firmness with which he opposed Hitler and Nazism, we have a Nixon, who is balancing between the beast and the dragon. Instead of the cult of ancestors and the standards of morality which were instituted by Confucius, instead of the national principles of Sun Yat Sen, there came Mao Tse-tung — an imitator of the world alien to the Chinese nation, a pupil of Marx and Lenin. None of the above-mentioned statesmen, including Pompidou, has the courage to repeat Cato's words: "Ceterum censeo Cartaginem delendam esse!" — "Carthage (Moscow) must be destroyed!"

In the free world, a lack of understanding of the essence of our epoch can be sensed, and along with it, a light-hearted attitude towards the Russian-Bolshevik threat to nations and individuals. In the world a contest is in progress not for the expansion of the geographic boundaries of this or that empire, as was the case in the past, but for the preservation of nations and free men, because imperialistic Russia attempts to dominate the whole world and to force upon it its way of life. And mistaken are those who consider democracy as the sole instrument against all types of evil, both national and personal, because democracy as such is only the framework into which the essence of life must be instilled. The idea of freedom also loses its meaning without the appropriate content.

Freedom provides an opportunity to choose ideas and the substance of life, and having selected them, to put them into effect. The free world enjoys freedom; yet the quality of its ideas and the content of its life are a different matter. First of all, freedom is not an end in itself. Those enjoying freedom must have a higher purpose for which to live and work. For those who have such a goal, the service to God and the nation, the lofty ideals of Justice and truth come first; while for the hedonist, selfishness, their own interest and self gratification are of prime importance. For them national heroism and martyrdom for great ideals become the object of ridicule. Thus, they take advantage of freedom and demoralize society.

In Ukraine, the concept of freedom has a different meaning. There, a struggle is being waged for the great spiritual values, for Ukraine's ideological position in the world. For this reason Symonenko says: "Be silent, America and Russias, when I am talking with you (Ukraine)" . . . And Yuriy Lypa wrote: "Forward, Ukraine! You have heavy feet, Burning houses are smoking beneath them: Neither Russia, nor Europe is destined to understand your sons!".

At a time when the free world, impoverished ideologically and ethnically, is relying exclusively on technological and material power when thermonuclear arms and the number of human robots are considered of decisive importance, we must recall the "forgotten" different world which forms a component part of this contemporary age we live in, which is atomic and ideological at the same time. What we have in mind is the individual, ideas, and the subjugated nations. General J. F. C. Fuller wrote that ideas are stronger than atomic bombs. Therefore the guerilla-partisan war of an armed nation is an alternative to the nuclear war. When today one speaks about five superpowers, it is impossible to pass over in silence the sixth one — the subjugated nations, headed by Ukraine. In the future, this sixth superpower will be decisive, for it enjoys superiority over the others by virtue of its noble and just ideas, and cultivates the heroic concept of life, which elevates the dignity of man and nation. In addition to this, the sons of the subjugated nations who are serving in the army of the Russian occupying power, have weapons in their hands; hence they also have technology at their disposal.

### **The Concept of the "Balance of Power"**

The United States, the greatest power in the Western world employs the concept of the "balance of power" among the super powers in its world policy, having completely disregarded the nation subjugated in the USSR. In its very basis such a concept is erroneous and results in ruin. It does not lead to victory, but to the defeat of the free world. In the past, Napoleon lost the war with the Russia

empire because he failed to see the potential power of subjugated Ukraine, which was striving to liberate itself from the Russian yoke. Hitler not only ignored the subjugated nations, but wanted to transform Ukraine and other nations into his colonies. Today the US is making a similar mistake and this will also lead to tragic consequences. Why does the US ignore a power (the subjugated nations) which at a critical moment can alone save the USA and the free world from disaster?

The first reason is that the Americans do not understand the meaning of an ideological force. They define the elements of a superpower in terms of yesterday and fail to grasp the essence of the age in which they live. They pay no attention to the fact that today wars are won first in the hearts of men and then on the battlefields. Nixon's policy is influenced by Kissinger, a great admirer of Metternich and an expert on the age of the "Holy Alliance". Kissinger transferred Metternich's concept (to play the European powers of the time against each other, thus assuring a leading position for the Austrian empire) to today's world politics. This was also the old British concept of the "balance of power" in Europe, which was often advantageous for smaller nations too, as for instance for Poland, Belgium and others. But the application of Metternich's and London's concept to our age is a complete anachronism. When the "spring" of European nations came in 1848, Metternich lost in a confrontation with Kossuth, and the "Holy Alliance" of empires left the world political stage with Metternich. Today, in the age of the world spring of nations and the downfall of empires, in the age of the triumph of the national idea on a universal scale, the concept of the "balance of power" is an entirely useless survival in world policy. Outdated concepts are most damaging when they are transferred from the time long past into a completely different age, a modernized age. Can an oil lamp compete with electricity? Can the prison of nations compete with the idea of the construction of the free world upon a national principle?

The United States is living by the ideas of yesterday. Thermo-nuclear arms, as the world's decisive power, also belong to yesterday. Of course, neither science nor technology is an anachronism, but only a manifestation of the progress of human inventiveness, provided that the spiritual development of nations and individuals is being perfected at the same time. Besides technology and civilization, there exists culture and above all — the spirit, the human soul, the moral, ethnical, national and religious values. There are no contradictions between technology and culture, between technology and the spiritual values, but technology is the product of the human spirit and not vice versa. It is impossible to cultivate civilization while forgetting the world's Creator. What would the world be like if destructive weapons, which would make all nations and individuals tremble, were concentrated in the hands of a few homunculus

intellects? What would become of man's will, of his soul, of nations as the highest forms of human society? However, people and nations are God's creations, and this should not be forgotten.

Pragmatists and empiricists, "realists" and sceptics, relativists and disbelievers may say that we are introducing mysticism into the national politics instead of concrete factors. But every rejuvenation of a nation and every liberation movement must have its own mystique in order to return to the almost forgotten eternal truths of nation and man, which are the substance of their existence. And in a time like ours, when the world stage is occupied either by crusaders or by emissaries of the devil, by the champions of nationhood or the perpetrators of genocide, by those who regard man as an individual or those who see him as a cog, by those possessed by eternal truth or by the beards of eternal evil — the "realists" and disbelievers will find a place neither for Ukraine, nor for the Ukrainian people. Only the possessed can "cultivate a flower among the snows", states Moroz.

The forgotten superpower itself, which is composed of the subjugated nations, is not only a mystical force, but also an immense human potential, dozens of nations, enormous wealth above and underground vast areas, unusually important from the struggle and geopolitical point of view, a huge accumulation of explosive force within the Russian empire, which can topple it and remove it from the face of the earth.

At one time, the official Jewish and Roman world had not accepted Christ with His new world of ideas. But in spite of the fact that Ananias and Caiphas, Pilate and Herod, Nero and Diocletian officially had not recognised either Christ or the Christians, a new world superpower was born — Christianity. In spite of the fact that Russia and other "powerful of this world" do not recognise nations and nationalism, but consider them as "survivals", — nationalism has become the outstanding characteristic of our epoch, as the most just and progressive idea. Nietzsche said that "God is dead" and was quite wrong. Hand in hand with the development of civilization and the exploration of the universe, the belief that God lives is confirmed.

Together with the development of human societies and civilizations, the national principle becomes a cornerstone of just law and order in the world. Therefore, when we speak of a forgotten superpower (nations subjugated under a tyrannical regime, in particular the Russian), we are not projecting the problem of empires as the sign of the epoch, but the significance of the nation as the standard of our age. In particular, we emphasise the importance of national liberation with its noble ideas which become the basis for the reconstruction of the world.

In his interview of last year, published in *Life*, President Nixon, as the "man of the year" declared that the time had come to put into effect what neither Eisenhower nor Kennedy was able to do — to establish a lasting peace on the basis of the "balance of power"

among the superpowers. It is this "balance", based on Metternich's formula, which would constitute the "peace of the dead" for the subjugated nations, because for Nixon the world of subjugated nations does not exist. With that aim in mind, Nixon set out for the "forbidden city" of Mao Tse-Tung, and later for the den of the Russian chieftains, in order to reach an agreement with the greatest enemies of mankind and of God about a "lasting peace" on the basis of the "balance of power" and the division of the world into spheres of influence. The naïve know-alls consider Nixon's trip to Peking as a consolidation of the anti-Russian front, but in reality it is only a "balancing act". Nixon is walking a tightrope between the bear and the dragon. In line with the outdated concept of Metternich, he wants to maintain "the balance of power" with the help of separate treaties about a "peaceful coexistence" with Peking and Moscow. Therefore, the political innocents, who, having seen new prospects, think that Peking or Washington is going to bring us liberty, are cheering prematurely. Freedom guaranteed to foreign bayonets is the freedom of those who bring it and not of those who receive it. It is one thing to take advantage of every conflict encountered by Moscow, including that with Peking, and quite another to place one's reliance on liberation by a foreign power.

### Our Prognoses Are Justifying Themselves

The invasion by the Communist armies of North Vietnam of the territory of South Vietnam is also a consequence of the "balance of power" politics. At the time when Nixon was negotiating his visits to Peking and Moscow, the Russians supplied the Vietnamese Communists with the most modern weapons, while the Red Chinese helped. With Russian and Red Chinese weapons, the Vietnamese Communists are killing American troops. And here we can see the greatest paradox of our time — Nixon is shaking hands with chieftains whose weapons kill the flower of the American nation.

Our political activity in Asia has justified itself completely, for its primary aim was to show the Asian peoples, that for them, too, the main enemy is Russia. For many this seemed unbelievable, but facts have convinced them and the subsequent course of events confirmed the correctness of our political predictions.

Ukraine is the revolutionary problem of the world. Together with other subjugated nations, it is the forgotten superpower. The detractors and sceptics are accustomed to treating Ukraine as an appendix to something "great" and "important". Therefore for them, as Moroz puts it, there is always Pushkin *and* Shevchenko, Nekrasov *and* Lesya Ukraïnka, and so forth, and never Shevchenko *and* Pushkin. Orientation upon Peking means the Ukr. SSR is tending to become a Maoist satellite, as a manifestation of the remnants of spiritual Little-Russianism. We are not going to join one side or

another; we have our own liberation concept and orient ourselves on the subjugated people's own forces, on the national liberation revolutions. Hence, we are combating at the same time both Russian imperialism and the Communist system, which was forced upon Ukraine and the other subjugated nations by Russia, as a way of life and a means of subjugating other nations.

Our liberation revolution is simultaneously a national and a social revolution. He who advocates national revolution alone and ignores the social one, fails to understand the meaning of the national liberation revolution, which encompasses all phases of life of a subjugated nation. He who rejects a social revolution in Ukraine will consequently arrive at national Communism, at the preservation of the contemporary collectivist Russian system, imposed on our people by force. Social revolution goes hand in hand with national revolution, as essential components of the anti-Russian revolution. National revolution must bring basic changes in all spheres of life of the nation, weed out everything Russian, everything alien and hostile to Ukrainian spirituality. These same views are held in Ukraine itself, where it is emphasized that de-Christianization, collectivization, industrialization at the cost of the destruction of the spiritual values of a people, forced migration from the village to the city and the ruining of the traditional Ukrainian structures are most tragic for Ukraine.

Ukraine has its own spiritual values. It believes in itself and unfolds an anti-Russian and anti-Communist front across the world, fights for the liquidation of the Russian empire and for the reestablishment on its ruins of national states with their own social order. Every sovereign nation should build its own state according to its own will and adopt a system of government which is most suitable for it.

First of all, it is necessary to answer the major question: what other reasons exist for the conflict between Moscow and Peking, aside from the competition for the leading position in the Communist world? It is above all a clash of two imperialist powers over the so-called frontier strips which were taken by the Russians from the Chinese, hence a struggle for colonies. Red China wants to regain territories, which are not its own, which are now occupied by Russia, but which are not Russian either. Why should parts of Siberia, West Turkestan or other frontier regions belong to China? Why should Vladivostok, the Green and the Grey Wedges be under Chinese occupation? It is obvious that here only a change of the occupant is at stake — from the Russian to the Chinese. All these lands are neither Russian nor Chinese. The Chinese imperialists are laying claim to the non-Chinese lands which were conquered by the Russian imperialists. Hitler also launched an attack against the Russian imperialists with similar claims in mind. He wanted to take Ukraine and turn it into his colony, for in the past Normans or Germans and other



mercenaries of Ukrainian rulers allegedly lived there. What right does China have to Tibet, Manchuria, Inner Mongolia?

Red Peking wants to exploit Ukraine for its own imperialistic interests. Its aim is not, for instance, independence for Siberia or the unification of the two parts of Turkestan — the western, now under Russian occupation, and the eastern (Sinkiang) which is under Chinese occupation. The "Maoists" make no mention of the fact that Red China subjugates the non-Chinese peoples and puts forward its imperialist claims to other territories as well. They, on the other hand, criticize us for cooperating with Spain which subjugates the Basques, with Great Britain which rules in Northern Ireland. And what about Tibet, Manchuria, Mongolia? The Chinese rule over them. What about the Croats, the Slovenes, the Macedonians? They are ruled by the national Communist, Tito. Hence, for the "Maoists", Communist domination over other nations is an obvious "taboo". Therefore, some people find it possible to cooperate with them (the Communists) and to look up to them as to the "liberators" of Ukraine.

To the phrase-mongers who attack us with regard to the Basques we reply: We are building a world anti-Russian front, not a world front opposing every nation which contains a national minority. The Basques are not interested in Russian imperialism, have not recognised the right of the Ukrainian people to their sovereign national state, nor are they supporting the anti-Russian front of nations subjugated in the USSR. From the moral aspect, we recognise the right of all nations to their independence. This is our principle of the construction of a new world on a just basis. From the purely Ukrainian point of view, we centre our attention on the interests of Ukraine, on its liberation struggle for freedom from the Russian occupation. Therefore, we do not deem it expedient to oppose all states of the world, to organise a front against them and thus turn them against Ukraine, its people and its liberation struggle. We are not going to fight against Spain for the Basques, against Italy for Southern Tirol, against Portugal for the African colonies, against Great Britain for Northern Ireland, against the USA for Negroes, Indians and so forth. The question of Northern Ireland is first of all a question for the Irish themselves. After all, it is also an internal religious conflict among the Irish of two denominations, both inhabiting Northern Ireland. We are neither organising nor supporting religious wars, for we consider them an anachronism in our time. What do the critics want from us? To create a front against Great Britain, France, Italy, Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Spain, Portugal, Canada, the USA and so on, allegedly for the sake of liberating "the subjugated"? Hence, that we "liberate" everyone except ourselves?! One of the saboteurs and demagogues has made yet another "revelation": "the people of Formosa" are oppressed by Chiang Kai-Shek... The critics and saboteurs must really have lost their senses, or they are counting

on the naïvete of the readers of the poison they write. The idea of a struggle on all fronts, instead of a concentration of forces against the prime enemy (Russia) is a subversive anti-Ukrainian concept, planted by adversaries of Ukrainian statehood. We put forward our principle of world order, the national principle versus the imperialistic. This means that from the moral point of view we uphold everywhere and always the idea of national liberty and national independence. However, in order to liberate Ukraine we organise a political and military front throughout the entire world against the Russian imperialists and conquerors, and he who is at that front is with us. He who supports us, our liberation struggle, our concept of the dissolution of the Russian empire and the construction on its ruins of sovereign national states, will also be supported by us within the framework of our guidelines based on principle.

The dissolution of the Russian empire is in the interest of all the subjugated nations, even of those in the Western sphere of influence. Russian imperialism expands continuously and threatens all nations, in particular those which are liberating themselves from colonial dependence on Western great powers. Russia promises them support, "bearing Greek gifts" for which they must pay very dearly, for they fall under her influence and subsequently into her slavery, far worse than the one from which they have liberated themselves. The enemy of freedom is the one most to be feared, even at a time, when for instance he gives the Basques weapons for their "liberation".

Today, only one empire — the Russian empire — remains in the world, the most infamous and barbaric. The British empire granted independence to dozens of nations. It even considers the unification of Northern Ireland with the Irish Republic, although against the will of the Protestants of Northern Ireland. And what about the Russians and the Red Chinese empires? To whom have they granted freedom and state independence? Great Britain and France are giving up colonies, while Moscow and Peking are acquiring new ones. In this, we can see a basic difference. In the West, the empires are falling apart, while in the East a forcible integration into the imperial structures is taking place. Each year Great Britain grants independence to some of its last colonies, while Russia crushed with tanks the Hungarian revolution, the emancipation of the Czechs and Slovaks, and brutally avenges itself on every freedom-loving movement both in the so-called USSR and in the lands of its satellites.

We do not defend any imperialists, for our concept is national and hence anti-imperial, but we do point out how deceptive and harmful is the "suggestion" of various saboteurs and critics of creating fronts against those states which themselves are surrendering their imperialistic positions, instead of concentrating our forces against Ukraine's oppressor — the Russian empire.

No less nonsensical are the "suggestions" of abandoning our anti-Communist positions in order to take advantage of the conflict

between Moscow and Peking. We have already mentioned that our world of ideas is quite the opposite of the Russian world, with its obshchina (commune) and Communism. Therefore to fight only for formal Ukrainian statehood, while denying the spirit which should inspire it, means to capitulate and to accept a system alien and hostile to Ukraine. To deprive the national revolution of its ideological content and to strip it down to only one objective — to take over the government with the help of national Communists or Maoists — is tantamount to the establishment of the Ukrainian "Socialist Republic" as a colony of Peking, instead of a colony of Russia.

Of course, every conflict between Moscow and any other power or state is of benefit for it weakens our enemy and assists in the psychological and moral mobilization of revolutionary forces in the Russian empire. But this does not mean that freedom and statehood will be brought to us by foreign forces on their bayonets. We have still not forgotten that German bayonets only brought us new slavery. Therefore, taking advantage of every conflict between Russia and other states, we must remember that we cannot repay any potential "ally" by accommodating ourselves to his own political, social and ideological system, for we should then become a colony of the new "liberator".

Ukraine, together with other nations subjugated by Russia, is for the time being the forgotten superpower of our age. But its lofty ideals are not fading. On the contrary, they are shining ever brighter and pointing to the only road to be followed by those who search for a way from the blind alley of the world's political, ideological, social and even religious crisis.

In English translation

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## SOVIET-RUSSIAN DOMINATION OF EAST-CENTRAL EUROPEAN SATELLITES

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### I

The chief purpose of my paper is to show *how* and *why* the Moscow leadership controls and dominates the East-European satellite states. In this context, by satellites I mean the following East Central European countries: East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria. I exclude from my discussion Albania and Yugoslavia, for the simple reason that neither of these Communist states can be regarded as part of the Soviet power preserve.

Yugoslavia, which is composed of many nationalities, such as Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, etc., ceased to be Moscow's client state in 1948 — the revolutionary year in the Communist revolutionary movement. It was in that year, almost a quarter of a century ago, that a dangerous crack first occurred in the edifice designed by Joseph Stalin. The Yugoslav Communist leader Tito stood up against Stalin because, among other things, he saw quite clearly that traditional Russian imperialism, so often denounced by the Russian Communists, was re-emerging in the treatment of this Balkan country. Stalin was outraged; how could he, the Kremlin master who outsmarted Roosevelt and Churchill, and whose pronouncements and decisions became the holy writ of Communists everywhere, be challenged by the Moscow-trained Communist from such an insignificant state. It is reported that as late as 1947, when the Tito-Stalin feud had entered the point of no-return, the latter stated "I will shake my little finger and there will be no more Tito." It is not known how many fingers Stalin shook, but Tito is still there and his Communist Party is independent from Moscow.

As to the Communist mini-state of Albania, it too, has thus far successfully withstood the various pressures from the Kremlin. Since 1961 this little mountainous country is no longer in the Soviet Russian camp and receives help in its dispute with the Russian leadership from Communist China. Peking, having a dispute of its own with the Soviets, might, if it so desired, and if the Albanian regime would so permit, establish a real presence in this strategically located area. If that were to happen, it would mean that for the first time in world history Chinese power would appear in Europe and in the

Mediterranean basin.

My concern, therefore, will be with these six East Central European countries that are in one way or another dependent on the Soviet Union and controlled by it, bearing in mind the gradations or intensity of such control. Before discussing how and why the Kremlin leadership keeps these satellites within its political orbit, it would be useful to describe the actual absorption of these nations within the Soviet power zone.

## II

Although it would be untrue to say that the satellites were solely a product of the Yalta Conference of February 1945, the Soviet blueprint for their creation probably preceded this last wartime meeting of the Big Three. Undoubtedly, both Roosevelt and Churchill would not have consented to the satellization of Poland or Czechoslovakia, but their subsequent actions reflected no substantial attempt to stop Stalin from achieving his undisclosed goals. In point of fact, the apparent strategic innocence of our Chief Executive and the strategic impotence of the British Prime Minister in that part of the world played advantageously into the hands of Lenin's heirs. Although the might of the Red Army was there, the combined military power of the United States and Great Britain as well as the greater industrial and military potential of the United States could have deterred an even more daring leadership from outright domination of East Central Europe. But then, unlike Lenin and his heirs, the American decision makers had not done their homework on von Clausewitz. The purely military goals — to win the war as fast as possible with the indispensable help of the Soviet Union — postponed the extremely important political aims. For Clausewitz war is but a continuation of politics by other means, in this case, military ones. Thus it was inevitable that while the Western Allies did win the war against Hitler with the Red Army's cooperation, the Kremlin statesmanship won not only the war through decisive American contributions, but also secured strategically and economically important areas in East Central Europe, by using military means to achieve its political objectives. It was not from Marx, but from Clausewitz that the Russian Communists took their cue.

By May 1945 the war was over in Europe and the Allies were justifiably jubilant over its outcome. However, the jubilation for the Western part of the Grand Alliance did not last long. The Grand Alliance was, after all, also called the Strange Alliance. This was not without reason. Besides being the coalition of Western democracies and totalitarianism, its strangeness was reinforced by the very unwelcome news emanating from the areas under Soviet control. It is not my purpose to describe in detail the techniques employed by

Moscow to establish its hegemony in Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia and East Germany. Anyone with a special interest in this effective and ruthless undertaking can consult innumerable articles. One of several excellent books by an English scholar is Hugh Seton-Watson's *The East European Revolution*.

It may be stated in general that the satellization of that part of East Central Europe with which our concern lies proceeded in three stages or phases. However, not all of the six countries under discussion experienced all three of them. Taking into account variations of timing and the circumstances of Sovietization in different countries, the first stage signified the political system in which a coalition, real or authentic, constituted the government of the state. Here several political parties rubbed shoulders with each other and the expression of political freedom was not hindered. However, the groups considered to have been German collaborators in the past, were not allowed to function and nothing critical could be voiced about the policies of the Soviet Union. Also, at this stage, native and "imported" Communists (the latter came from abroad following the victorious march of the Red Army)<sup>1</sup> began occupying decisive posts in the government, such as the Ministry of Interior, which controlled the security police. The second phase of satellization could be identified as the period of the sham coalition. Political parties, other than the Communist, were still part of the government, but their power was more nominal than real. As a matter of fact, the leaders of these parties were chosen by the Communists. During this "twilight" period of creating obedient, Moscow-dominated nations, the parties driven to opposition were still permitted to function and publish their papers. Finally, when the third and last phase of Sovietization made its appearance, all the important features of the two previous transitional stages disappeared into the "dust bin" of history. Now the monolithic regime emerged; it was distinguishable, *inter alia*, by the fusion of the Socialist parties with the Communists and the destruction of the opposition. Some of the non-Communist leaders were now discovered to be dangerous agents of Western imperialism and punished accordingly. The Stalinist revolution from above was complete; the satellites, as an extension of Soviet Russian power, stood on the frontiers of the new imperium. It took Moscow only a few years to accomplish the Stalinization of the six countries. By the end of 1948, with the possible exception of East Germany, the third phase was consummated. East Germany was caught up in this process in 1949.

Two of the six countries, East Germany and Poland, did not go through the first phase. Here no real political coalition of the various political parties ever existed. Both East Germany and Poland passed through the subsequent two periods. Czechoslovakia had the first stage, but the second and the third became one and the same.

<sup>1</sup> Stephen D. Kertesz, "The Methods of Communist Conquest: Hungary 1944-1947", *World Politics*, III (October 1950), 24-25.

Hungary, as well as Rumania and Bulgaria, passed through all the three phases.<sup>2</sup>

### III

What were the reasons for Moscow's triumph in its satellization drive? This question is important not only for identifying the instruments by which Stalinization was achieved, but also the means by which the six East Central European states are still kept within the Soviet power zone. In other words, one of our essential tasks is to establish how the Kremlin leadership dominates this area at the present time. Without much effort on my part to search for an answer let me cite the words of the late Professor Philip E. Mosey. In his book *The Kremlin and World Politics* he writes: "The principal instruments by which Moscow consolidated its domination over most of East Central Europe between April 1944 and February 1948 were Soviet military might, the Soviet-dominated (except in Yugoslavia) Communist parties, and, when less direct means of manipulation or intimidation failed, the intervention of the Soviet secret police." The author states that the Russian Communists were also the craftsmen of older tools of imperialist penetration. He continues: "The tactics of the direct or indirect seizure of many 'commanding positions' in the economies of the satellites, borrowed in part from Hitler's technicians, was carried to a high point through the confiscation of real and alleged German assets, the extraction of unilaterally defined restitution and reparation, the setting up of joint stock companies, and the manipulation of the terms of trade. An additional wedge for Soviet and Communist penetration was provided by the many conflicting national claims and rivalries."<sup>3</sup>

To sum up, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, using its military forces and other instruments of power, such as the police or various forms of economic leverage, had decisively contributed to the victories of the Communists in all these countries known now as People's Democracies. In the shadow of the Russian Communist might Sovietization became reality, while the Western powers stood by, protesting in such a manner that even the most timid of rulers would not have paid much attention to it.

In their method of subjugation, the Kremlin rulers were not averse to employing even the crudest means and the brutality of their actions stunned many. Writing about the Hungarian experience of the Soviet style empire-building, Stephen D. Kertesz, then the

<sup>2</sup>) Hugh Seton-Watson, *The East European Revolution* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1956), 3rd ed., chapter 8; see also his *From Lenin to Khrushchev* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960), chapter 13.

<sup>3</sup>) Philip E. Mosely, *The Kremlin and World Politics: Studies in Soviet Policy and Action* (New York: Vintage Books, 1960), pp. 221-222.

Hungarian Minister to Italy, who in 1947 defected to the West, states that "at first it was difficult to understand the apparently senseless Russian behaviour, which seemed extremely harmful even for the Communist cause. After a while, however, it became obvious that behind the most absurd action there had been an overall scheme. Gradually it appeared that all the abuses and atrocities were carried out in a systematic way, to frighten the population and to weaken its moral and economic resistance." The former Hungarian diplomat maintains that Moscow was not interested in being loved; it cared nothing for such feelings; it was fear of the Soviet might by the population that it was after. He says: "The abuses of the Red Army made the Russians and the Communists extremely unpopular but at the same time created a feeling of helplessness in all social classes . . . It was demonstrated all over again that there was no protection against the Russians. And this . . . was greatly facilitated by the passive attitude of the representatives of the Western powers."<sup>4</sup>

It should be stressed that the Stalinization process in East Central Europe in which the military factor played a predominant role took place in the era of American military superiority. The United States, being the sole nuclear military power, had a unique advantage over the Soviet Union, which had been partially crippled by tremendous losses of both manpower and industrial capabilities. Moscow almost lost the war against the German military machine; its tightly controlled population, especially such nationalities as the Ukrainians, Byelorussians, Latvians, Estonians, Tartars, etc., was in no mood to again accept the Communist rule. The Soviet soldiers saw life in East Central and Central Europe, especially in Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Germany and undoubtedly made some unfavourable comparisons with the life in their own country. Had there been a strong and far-sighted Western leadership, there was a golden opportunity not only to save East Central Europe, but to extend liberty and human dignity towards the East. A Western threat of utilizing atomic weapons would have been sufficient to deter the Soviets in their attempt at domination in the East Central European area. But none of this was done and the present situation bears the imprint of those exciting and lost years. It may truly be said that never in the annals of military history was so much military power wasted or simply misused for the fulfillment of the goals of freedom, dignity, justice and the pursuit of individual happiness. It is frightening to consider that if the shoe were on the other foot and the Soviet Union, instead of the United States, had the nuclear monopoly Khrushchev's boastful prediction that our grandchildren would live under communism, might have happened some time ago. The "Pax Sovietica" would have become a grim reality.

The means which were marshalled by the Kremlin rulers in their

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<sup>4</sup>) Kertesz, *World Politics*, III (October 1950), 32-33.



quest for satellization are, on the whole, the ones that remain in force today. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet government, either through the party or another channel is exercising control over the so-called People's Democracies, with the possible exception of Rumania, which since 1963 tends to maintain an independent foreign policy. However, Rumania remains within the political and strategic constellation of Moscow. The military power is still the main element in the Russian Communist arsenal of domination, and the Russian armed forces were used on several occasions to suppress unacceptable trends in the satellites. In 1953 the Soviet Army crushed a mild uprising in East Berlin. In 1956 the much more serious Budapest revolt was also put down. And in 1968 the recalcitrant Dubcek regime in Czechoslovakia found itself a prisoner in its own house: Soviet troops, together with some other military forces of the Communist states, invaded and occupied the country.

The Soviet armed forces are not the only ones that defend the Moscow power preserve in East Central Europe. In 1955, the Warsaw Treaty Organization, which integrated the military forces of almost all the Communist states in East Central Europe, came into being. The signatories to this Treaty were the following countries: The Soviet Union, East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria and Albania, which today is only a nominal member. Yugoslavia stayed out of this Pact. The WTO, established as an organization for "Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance" constitutes both a political and a military organization. It should be mentioned that the Czechoslovak unopposed *blitzkrieg* of 1963 in which a member of the Warsaw Pact was attacked by other members of the same organization, is an interesting contribution to the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance. Rumania, to its credit, did not participate in this undertaking.

The Warsaw Pact, so far, has been headed by three commanders, all of them from the USSR. At the present time, Marshall of the Soviet Union, Ivan Yakubovskii, is the Pact Commander. Speaking about the Warsaw Organization's military strategy pursued by Moscow's military decision-makers, Richard F. Staar in his work *The Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe: An Introduction* says that "The WTO was at first devised and regarded by the U.S.S.R. as a defensive alliance, the forward area of which would provide a buffer and absorb the anticipated NATO attack. This attitude, however, has undergone a drastic transformation in the course of the qualitative build-up of the East European armed forces." The author then cites Marshall Grechko, at that time the Warsaw Pact commander who granted an interview to the Soviet press agency Tass in February 1966. This interview followed the military manoeuvres of some of the Pact members in East Germany. Grechko, who today is the Soviet Defence Minister, told the press that "... One

must above all note the uniform military doctrine of the socialist countries united in the Warsaw Pact... In case of aggression, our armies are ready not to conduct a passive defence but to engage in active military operations, which would be immediately transferred to the territory of the enemy."<sup>5</sup>

Risking the charge of being repetitive and talking about the obvious, I nevertheless would like to state that in the Warsaw Pact military forces, composed of the satellite troops and, of course the Soviet forces, the Kremlin leadership has an instrument of power which would be enough not only to crush any uprising in its East Central European theater, but also to give some worries to the NATO political and military decision makers. However, the Czechoslovak and Rumanian troops could perhaps not be relied upon in a new crisis.

An important tool of Soviet domination in the East Central European satellittes is also economic control, as was mentioned by Prof. Mosely in his description of the Stalinization process. Only a few observations will be offered in this field. In the beginning of 1949 the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance, Stalin's answer to the Marshall Plan, was created. It was not very active until 1954 when a decision was made to coordinate the economies of the satellite countries. At the time of the formation of the CMEA, also called the COMECON, the following states became charter members: The Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria. Later in 1949, Albania and East Germany joined the organization. In 1961, Albania stated that it was no longer interested in taking part in COMECON's activities. Since 1964, Rumania, although a member of the COMECON, endeavours to pursue independent economic policies. On the whole, it must be said that, although the Council for Mutual Assistance made some important strides towards the economic integration of the East Central European satellites, dominated by the Soviet Union, the Russian Communist leadership has considerable difficulty in this area of power leverage. In spite of the fact that the Russian Communists claim to be the only true Marxists, to whom economic factors assume all-important considerations, economically Moscow cannot match the free, non-Marxist economies of the West. However, as far as economic domination of their satellites is concerned, taking into account only foreign trade, there is no reason for the Kremlin leaders to be pessimistic. In his article "Russia in Eastern Europe: Hegemony Without Security" Professor Robert F. Byrnes writes that "from 60 to 75 per cent of the foreign trade of the East European states is committed to the Soviet Union by long term agreements, so they have little freedom of action. The agreements which the Soviet Union has established constitute a form of imperial-

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<sup>5</sup>) Richard F. Staar, *The Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe: An Introduction* (Stanford, California: The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, 1967), 264.

ism which further cripples the Poles, the Hungarians and others with the West: generally the East European states are obliged to ship their finest material products to Moscow, receiving in return various raw materials..."<sup>6</sup>

#### IV

Why does Moscow insist on controlling or dominating the satellite states? Why not let them be as they would wish to be? Why is domination at any price so important and attractive? Is freedom of choice for your close neighbours a crime? Why not do what the United States did in Western Europe? Why not be generous? For people schooled in *Macht Politik*, where only power counts, such questions must appear quite naive. This is also how they appear to Soviet rulers, whose only morality is to be powerful and victorious; to be able to control the levers of power; to be at the top of the political pyramid. After the events in Czechoslovakia in August 1968, Anatole Shub in the January 1969 issue of *Foreign Affairs* published an article "Lessons of Czechoslovakia." In it the author states that Moscow has "shown less concern for 'bourgeois morals' and for 'formalistic judicial' concepts of international law than for power. Lenin crystalized its fundamental outlook in the famous question Kto kovo? (Who rules whom?). Stalin asked "how many divisions has the Pope?" Brezhnev declared on the fiftieth anniversary of Bolshevik rule that Marxism-Leninism was the science of 'how to win' — and the Soviet press after the invasion of Czechoslovakia did not hesitate to quote Bismarck: 'Whoever rules Bohemia holds the key to Europe.'"<sup>7</sup>

There may be several reasons why the Kremlin masters hold the commanding position in the East Central European satellites. First, one can argue that traditional Russian expansion caught their fancy and that additional territory means additional strength for the Soviet state. Expand and be more important and influential in the world. Second, the control of this strategic region could be interpreted by Stalin's heirs as vital to the security of the USSR; it must be held because it constitutes the buffer zone between the Western powers and Moscow's empire. The requirements of military strategy would be paramount; in case of war Soviet political and military leaders would have enough time to be better prepared for military operations than in the last war with Germany. Third, one should not discount

<sup>6</sup>) Robert F. Byrnes, "Russia in Eastern Europe: Hegemony Without Security". *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 49, No. 4 (July 1971), 692.

<sup>7</sup>) Anatole Shub, "Lessons of Czechoslovakia", *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 47, No. 2 (January 1969), 266.

the economic advantages which accrue to the Soviet Union through the possession of such a potentially rich area. The economic exploitation of the satellites does help the Russian Communists in the maintenance of a big military establishment, as well as in their own industrial development. Fourth, and here I am entering a controversial field, it could be argued that the six East Central European countries we are discussing are not ends in themselves. To be more specific, after Tito's departure, there could emerge in Yugoslavia opportunities to extend Moscow's domain. Professor Byrnes, in the article cited, reasons that the Kremlin "must assume that the end of Tito's rule will expose the Yugoslav Federal Republic to very heavy internal pressures and that the Republic may break up, providing the Soviet Union with an opportunity to make arrangements with one or another of the republics or with groups of Yugoslav communists who seek Soviet support to advance their own interests. An action such as this would have enormous advantages for the Soviet Union. It would end the threat of the heresy and even the examples posed by Tito. It would encircle Rumania and bring it back into the Soviet fold. It would strengthen Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe and provide a new threat toward Albania, Greece, Italy and the Mediterranean. It would increase enormously the threat to Western Europe, while at the same time it would diminish the attraction of national communism and would vault the Soviet Union into a stronger position throughout the Communist world."<sup>8</sup>

But the fifth and last reason for keeping the satellites in submission, especially East Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia, could be the future of Germany. I, personally, have no doubts that the constant Soviet goal is to see the whole of Germany under Moscow's rule. It would be a very difficult task, but who would have thought that the weak and isolated Soviet state of the 1920's and 1930's could raise its flag in Berlin in 1945? The road to control of the entire German state lies through the satellites mentioned above and it is here that the crux of the matter dealing with the domination of certain countries may be found. I am not suggesting, of course, that the Russian Communist leadership would unleash a war to capture Germany; this would mean a confrontation with the United States and an eventual Soviet defeat. It is by avoiding such a war with American military might and its concomitant nuclear threat, that the successors of Lenin and Stalin have exercised their art of advancing Moscow's aims. They have done quite well so far and hope to do even better in the future.

Chancellor Willy Brandt's *Ostpolitik*, for which he received the Nobel Peace Prize, may already have opened some doors to unwelcome Soviet visitors in the German Federal Republic. It is true that Willy Brandt's options to deal with East Germany and the German

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<sup>8</sup>) Byrnes, *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 49, No. 4 (July 1971), 695.

eastern frontiers were few, due to the lack of creative alternatives offered by the Great Western Powers. However, his faith in the correctness of his path could have been misguided and instead of creating a positive *Realpolitik* he could have laid the basis for *Verlorene politik*. Now Brezhnev and Kosygin are attempting to organize a European Security Conference from which they could try to exclude the United States as a non-European state. The withdrawal of American power from Europe, which is a constant goal of Soviet leadership, could open a Pandora's box for Russian penetration of Germany. Musing about Willy Brandt's *Ostpolitik* and his Nobel Peace Prize, Professor Josef Korbel, in a *New York Times* Op-Ed article "But Does He Deserve It?" expresses the sober thoughts: "Some of Moscow's intentions are fairly obvious. Besides the efforts to create in Europe for the time being an atmosphere of pacification so that it can focus its political and military strength on China, the Soviet Union wants to consolidate, through the policy of detente, its hold over its allies in Eastern Europe and may apply if necessary (without the risk of Western counter-measures) the Brezhnev doctrine of military intervention in other Communist countries." The author further says that the Kremlin's goal is "to eliminate or at least weaken American presence in Western Europe, to paralyze NATO and sow mistrust among its members." Better relations with West Germany could be used by the Soviets to foster these aims. In the remainder of the article Prof. Korbel goes on to point out that there "is nothing to indicate that Mr. Brandt is unaware of Soviet intentions but he appears confident that the risks are not too great and that the West can maintain its solidarity... [However] it may happen that Mr. Brandt's *Ostpolitik* may yet in the long run create problems more difficult than the ones he is attempting to solve."<sup>9</sup>

Finally, I would like to point out that one can hardly ignore the importance of the six East Central European satellites since their total population exceeds 100,000,000 and their area is more than 380,000 square miles, which is approximately as large as Ohio, New York, Indiana, New Mexico, Oregon and Tennessee combined. East Central Europe proved to be an explosive area in our century; the First and the Second World Wars, as well as the Cold War had their origins in this region. Only 28 years remain until the end of this century and they may yet contain many surprises. Some of these may occur in the strategic area discussed in this paper.

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<sup>9</sup>) *New York Times*, November 28, 1971.

## The Concepts of Humaneness & Democratism in the Criminal Law of Princely Ukraine<sup>1</sup>

By Dr. Yaroslav PADOKH\*

**"Do not permit the strong to destroy the weak".  
Prince Volodymyr Monomakh**

### I.

The researchers of our antiquity have indisputably proven that profound humanism was rooted in the nature and character of our forefathers.<sup>2</sup> In grey antiquity, when cruelty and inconsideration were thought to be the attributes of a man and a warrior, Nestor, our first chronicler, stated, not without satisfaction, that "among the Polyany, the custom of their fathers is gentle". A strange and almost incomprehensible admission, in the light of the cruelty of the age and the threatening neighbours, whom the Polyany were destined to face at all times. But what a menacing and ominous contrast to the characteristic of the Polyany by Nestor is provided by the expressive words of the Lavrentiv Chronicle about their neighbours, the Polovtsi, who "preserved their fathers' custom — to shed blood".

But, still, the external conditions were unable to change this trait of national character of the ancient Ukrainian man, which remained unaltered through centuries as the greatest treasure, preserving the noble, yet so impractical, "custom of the forefathers". From Volodymyr Monomakh ("Do not permit the strong to destroy the weak"; "Do not kill yourself and do not command to kill anyone, although he deserves death") to Shevchenko ("embrace, my brothers, the youngest brother"), from the initial stages of the early Kyïvan State to its re-establishment in the 20th century, this basic attribute of the Ukrainian spirituality has manifested itself constantly and invariably, in spite of all the damages it caused Ukraine in view of her partners, so different in character.

This organic trait of the Ukrainian viewpoint could not help but manifest itself in Ukrainian jurisprudence as well, in particular in criminal law, which more than any other branch of law reflects the society's ideology, its views upon an individual, upon human societies and state, upon their relations and the basis of the latter — law. In

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<sup>1</sup>) This article is part of a greater work entitled "The Leading Concepts of Criminal Law of Princely Ukraine".

<sup>2</sup>) I. a. see Eduard Winter: *Byzanz und Rom im Kampf um die Ukraine*, Prague, 1941, p. 24 and subs.

all areas and in every age, it was one of the most characteristic signs of that law. This can be said even about the period of blood feud, no matter how paradoxical this might sound.

The age of blood feud is, as far as time is concerned, the oldest period in the history of criminal law. It occurred in all nations without exception, and partly is even alive today, when one takes into consideration the contemporary primitive (natural) peoples, which, before our very eyes, are going through the very stages of development which the civilized nations of today have passed in the past. In this respect all nations are equal. The differences exist only in the following: of what contents was the bloody feud and how long did it play a dominant role in the criminal law of a given nation, that is, when was it replaced by more modern institutions. Having considered these two questions, we are of the opinion that Ukrainian criminal law, even of that primitive period, the age of blood feud, exhibits distinct traces of intense humaneness.

Revenge<sup>3</sup> was long considered in science as the expression of the thirst for retaliation, deeply rooted in human nature. It was only supposed to satisfy the desire for vengeance for the suffered wrong, and this was to have been its nature and aim. Today, the dominant view among scholars recognizes blood feud as a legal institution, namely, as the original form of legal proceedings, whose aim was the preservation of the legal order of tribes and clans. Out of necessity, it rested on the mutual help to the wronged party and the circle of his near ones, for there was no one else who could take care of this: the state either did not exist yet, or it was not yet strong enough to take into its own hands the preservation of legal order in relations occurring among its citizens.

The blood feud, as a legal institution, was not only the right, but also the duty of the wronged parties, and it was in this that its power to keep order was to be found. From it developed the later, more modern institutions; from it also originated the contemporary criminal law.

As the oldest form of law enforcement, vendetta goes back to times immemorial, to the initial stages of human co-existence. Possibly, at that time it primarily had the character of repayment, but in historical times its nature changed. This pertains particularly to the period of the appearance of the state. At that period bloody retribution still exists, but is being replaced gradually by other means of preserving law and order: private — the ransom system, and public — state penalties. With the consolidation of the state, revenge slowly disappears. As an institution of self-help and self-defence, it loses the need to exist, for these tasks are taken over from the individuals and clans by the state organization.

<sup>3</sup>) I. a. see Dr. J. Padokh: *Einführung in die allgemeine Rechtsgeschichte*, München, 1946, pp. 43-45.

But this process occurs very slowly. The notion about the right to self-help and the privately legal nature of crime and punishment is too deeply rooted in the consciousness of nations, to make it possible to substitute state institutions for revenge. Revenge continues to exist alongside of them. Among some peoples longer, among others shorter, while self-help has not completely withered away even now. But in the age of the state, revenge becomes ever more precisely defined by the state-approved and state-controlled legal institution. Its implementation and the method of implementation are determined by the state, revealing at the same time an invariable tendency to restrict the right of revenge more and more, until its complete abolition.

We come across vendetta in this restricted form in Ukraine in its early period of history. The already existing state managed to define the limits and the substance of revenge, including it in the system of state criminal law. In the early times, we find it in the form of pre-trial revenge, which, apparently, required court control and approval *ex post*, after the execution of revenge,<sup>4</sup> and later post-trial revenge, when the act of revenge amounted to the carrying out of the sentence imposed by the court after a trial.<sup>5</sup>

In Ukraine, even in a relatively very early period, retribution had not taken on very severe forms. The oldest edition of the *Rus'ka Pravda*, which still recognizes retribution, discloses some important signs of its mitigation. First of all, *Rus'ka Pravda* does not make revenge mandatory. When those having a legal right to exact retribution do not want to carry it out, they can accept ransom (Articles 1, 2 and others, according to the 1st Academic copy).

Further: a proof of crime is needed before retribution is carried out. Without material evidence or witnesses, revenge is not permitted. One cannot apply revenge to all types of crimes, only to major ones (murder, some forms of maiming and injury to health, and ruining the reputation), allowed by law. The extent of revenge is not unlimited. Injury received through revenge should correspond to the degree of injury perpetrated by the criminal. Death — only for murder; for less serious crimes — milder forms of revenge.

This mitigation of inherently harsh institution of revenge confirms the proposed thesis on the humaneness of the criminal law of Ukraine, even in the period when retribution reigned supreme. But the most important proof of this is the fact of relatively unusually quick abolition of revenge and its replacement by the system of compensations, i. e. ransom. This occurred after the death of Prince Yaroslav

<sup>4</sup>) See the article of Prince Oleh's treaty with the Greeks of 911: "Should a Ukrainian kill a Christian, or a Christian a Ukrainian, let him die where he has committed the murder".

<sup>5</sup>) See Art. 13 of Prince Ihor's treaty with the Greeks of 945: "A murderer should be held by the relatives of the victim, so as to kill him later" (i. e. after the verdict of the court) and *Rus'ka Pravda*, Art. 2 of the Akad. Scroll I.



the Wise (1054), which is proved by Art. 2 of *Rus'ka Pravda* (according to the Troits'kyy copy I).<sup>6</sup>

Regulated by the state and mitigated by the possibility to substitute ransom for it — blood feud from the period of the early princes of Kyiv — is completely abolished in the middle of the 11th century, and its place is taken by a cash payment, either as a privately-legal compensation fine exacted by the lord for the crime committed by the serf (lesson), or as a publicly-legal penalty (indemnity, sale). In this way, a decisive historic event in the early history of criminal law and proceedings of every nation — of transition from self-defence and self-help to a state judicial system and public punishment, occurred in the Kyivan State as early as mid-11th century. This fact quite expressly proves not only the high cultural level of that state, but also reveals the genuine humaneness which was deeply rooted in the world outlook of its population.

This assertion will become even more convincing against the background of the history of vengeance among other European nations, in particular the neighbouring Polish and advanced, for the Middle Ages, German peoples.

In Poland, vengeance was effective immeasurably longer than in Ukraine.<sup>7</sup> For a long time it was unlimited, as far as the circle of persons which it included, as well as the extent of the revenge. As late as the 15th century, entire clans participated in vengeance, while toward the end of the 14th century, state laws were required in order to ban the application of revenge to third parties, outside the offender. Thus, mutual responsibility intensified the legal institution of revenge even more. At a latter date, the gentry began to consider the right to retribution as its exclusive class privilege. This, although bringing the abolition of revenge for people without the rank of nobility, at the same time popularized revenge even more among the leading stratum of the state, and the gentry guarded this privilege, just as it defended all its aristocratic "freedoms" with a diligence worthy of a better cause. In the 15th century, an attempt was made at least to restrict the right to retribution, but in spite of this, it remained in force until the very end of the Polish state.<sup>8</sup> In addition, the substance of the right to retribution was undefined for a long time. At first there were no restrictions on revenge, and it served to satisfy the thirst for retribution. Also, there were no principles as to the method of the administration of revenge. This state of affairs improved a bit only in the 15th century.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>6</sup>) This and other quotations were taken from the new edition of *Rus'ka Pravda* entitled *Pravda Russkaya. Uchebnoye posobiye*. The USSR Academy of Sciences, Institute of History, Moscow-Leningrad, 1940.

<sup>7</sup>) Dr. Józef Rafacz: *Dawny proces polski*, Warszawa, 1925, pp. 2-3.

<sup>8</sup>) Stanisław Kutrzeba: *Dawne polskie prawo sądowe*, Lviv, 1927, p. 14.

<sup>9</sup>) *Ibid.* p. 10.

In Germany, revenge and self-help have been preserved throughout the Middle Ages, and not only *de facto*, but also as legal institutions.<sup>10</sup> The right of self-help, adopted from the Frankish era, revived in the light of new conditions and became unusually widespread, in particular within the knightly class, competing successfully with state and regional judicial systems, or in certain periods bringing them to nought. Nothing was accomplished by the resistance of the Church (the proclamation of the so-called Peace of God), nor the state ("regional peace" and corresponding legislation), particularly determined in the reign of Friedrich I (12th century). Strictly prohibiting revenge and self-help, they were forced to reach a compromise and to recognize them as legal institutions at the price of some mitigation of their cruel forms. Only at the very end of the 15th century (Landfrieden of 1495) were these institutions deemed illegal and banned without regard to anything.<sup>11</sup>

Besides retribution, in the German criminal law of the Middle Ages we come across clear traces of the viability of the right of talion, often in its most brutal forms, taken over from the ancient Hebrew law.<sup>12</sup> Hence, independently from the undeniable achievements of the German Middle Ages in other spheres of law, the foundations of criminal law had not undergone basic changes.<sup>13</sup> It continued to be dominated by the spirit of cruelty of the early periods.

Following the removal of vengeance from the system of penalties, its place was taken by compensation. The criminal redeemed himself by paying damages to the injured party or his near ones and a fine to the state. Only in exceptional cases was exceptional punishment applied: 'potok' and sacking. With time, side by side with the compensational system criminal penalties are developed everywhere, which as a rule are applied when the criminal is not able to make restitution for his crime in money. Among them are the death penalty, imprisonment and slavery.

We find the death penalty in ancient Ukraine only for a short time, during the reign of Prince Volodymyr the Great. He introduced it at the instigation of the Greek clergy, whose hierarchy must have used the most serious canonical and theological arguments in order to convince the prince of the need and the justness of this punishment. Volodymyr's indecision, moreover in the age of the existence of the law of revenge (but apparently rarely applied at that time) and in the state of his neophytism, best illustrates how alien was the

<sup>10</sup>) Heinrich Brunner: *Grundzüge der deutschen Rechtsgeschichte*, 7th edition, Munich-Leipzig, 1919, p. 174.

<sup>11</sup>) Dr. Yaroslav Padokh: *Istoriya zakhidno-evropeyskoho prava*, Munich, 1947, p. 206.

<sup>12</sup>) Dr. Richard Schröder: *Lehrbuch der deutschen Recthsgeschichte*, 3rd edition, Leipzig, 1898, p. 747.

<sup>13</sup>) Dr. Claudius Freiherr von Schwerin: *Grundzüge der deutschen Rechtsgeschichte*, 2nd edition, Berlin, 1941, p. 221 and others.

death penalty to the ancient Ukrainian legal consciousness. Therefore, it is not surprising that shortly after the introduction of this penalty Prince Volodymyr himself, on the advice of the military, abolished it, replacing it by the *vyra*, i. e. a fine.

There is no evidence to prove that the death penalty became part of the public penal system of Princely Ukraine, as some researchers attempted to prove. Although some non-legal sources mention individual cases of punishment of criminals by death, in my opinion, in no case does this have the character of the carrying out of the verdict of a secular court. Involved are either instances unapproved by law, or verdicts of ecclesiastical courts. The most outstanding monument to the law of the age — the *Rus'ka Pravda*, whether of the earliest or the latest edition, does not mention death penalty at all. On the basis of this, we can be justified in presuming that besides the short period of existence of the death penalty in the time of Prince Volodymyr the Great, the death penalty did not exist legally as an institution of state criminal law of Princely Ukraine. When it was adopted, first in ecclesiastical courts, and later began to penetrate to the secular legal system, this, of course, occurred under the influence of Byzantine law, and further of the Mongolian (Tatar) customs, ravishing the legal consciousness of the ancient Ukrainian population imbued with profound humaneness, so well expressed in Prince Volodymyr Monomakh's *Pouchennya dityam* (Advice to children): "Do not kill yourself and do not command to kill anyone, though he deserves death".

A similar thing can be said about corporal punishment in the old Ukraine, especially about the penalty of maiming. In spite of the reputation of such researchers of the age, as Vladimirskiy-Budanov,<sup>14</sup> and others, we believe that there is no significant evidence to prove that corporal punishment was inflicted in the pre-Tatar era in the Kyiv and the adjoining territories. Had it been used, then mention of it would have been preserved in the juridical and non-juridical documents of the age. In particular, it should have been mentioned in the *Rus'ka Pravda*.

The supporters of the theory of the existence of corporal punishment in Princely Ukraine base their arguments on two references in *Rus'ka Pravda*, namely on Art. 88 and Art. 159 (3rd Edition by Sergiyevich).<sup>15</sup> The first of the named articles deals with the beating of a slave who assaulted a free person. When one considers that the party in question is a slave, who was not a person in the legal sense, but a thing, that he could have avoided beating by paying a fine ("a fine of martens, fur skins of an animal related to a weasel, for disgrace") and that sanctioning of beating does not appear in the *Rus'ka Pravda*

<sup>14</sup> M. F. Vladimirskiy-Budanov: *Obzor istorii russkago prava*, 6th edition, Petersburg-Kyiv, 1909, p. 329.

<sup>15</sup> V. Sergievich: *Russkaya Pravda v chetirekh redaktsiyakh*, 2nd edition, Petersburg, 1911.

again, one is justified in rejecting this article as proof of the existence of corporal punishment.

Article 159, taken from the Karamzyns'kyy scroll which stems from the end of the 15th century, under a general title "Torture", speaks about torture in the prison of a nobleman and about a whipping at the belfry. Disregarding the fact that this torture is not a punishment, only a part of the inquiry, and that *Rus'ka Pravda* itself imposes a penalty for it; hence it does not approve bodily extortion, this article should not be considered as authentic at all, as has been convincingly proven by the author of the greatest work on *Rus'ka Pravda*, L. K. Goetz.<sup>16</sup> This article, together with some others, was added at the time of the copying of the *Rus'ka Pravda*, no earlier than the 13th century, which directly indicated by its language, in particular the terms: *knut*, *dvoryanyn*, *kolokol'nytsya*, (knout, nobleman, belfry), which had not been used in the period of the appearance of the *Rus'ka Pravda*. Undoubtedly, corporal punishment came to Ukraine at a much later date, only after the invasion of the Tatars. But even then, the main areas in which it spread were the north-eastern Slavic lands. Corporal punishment, as something alien to Ukrainian spirituality, was never part of the criminal law of Princely Ukraine.

The absence of the death penalty and the corporal punishment in the system of means of punishment of the Kyivan State, at the same time also excludes the application in criminal law of the law of talion, so widespread in other countries. This certainly great, considering the time, achievement of the ancient Ukrainian criminal law reflects in the best way possible the judicial ideology of our ancestors and the degree of their spiritual culture.

These attributes of the Ukrainian criminal law of the Middle Ages take on a special significance against the background of the law then prevailing in other European nations.

The Polish criminal law knew and applied death and corporal punishment. Even in the epoch of the domination of the compensation system, the death penalty was used simultaneously with the compensations, recognizing the principle of general prevention, i.e. discouragement of crime.<sup>17</sup> This punishment assumed diverse, often very cruel forms, such as breaking upon a wheel, stoning, letting out of the intestines, burning at the stake and so forth. In Poland, no less popular were corporal punishments, both in the epoch of the compensation system and prior to it. The most commonly used forms of this punishment were: dismemberment of the body (hands, feet, genitals, teeth, nose, tongue), scourging and branding.<sup>18</sup>

<sup>16</sup> Dr. Leopold Karl Goetz: *Das Russische Recht. (Russkaya Pravda)*. vol. III, Stuttgart, 1912, pp. 449-51 and vol. IV, p. 114 in the footnote.

<sup>17</sup> Romuald Hube: *Prawo polskie w wieku trzynastym*. Warszawa, 1874, p. 160 and others.

<sup>18</sup> Stanislaw Kutrzeba: *Dawne polskie prawo sądowe*, pp. 44-47, and Romuald Hube: *Prawo polskie w wieku trzynastym*, p. 164-8.

No less popular were death and corporal punishments in Germany. Alongside the right of vengeance, these punishments were also applied, often assuming subtly cruel forms. Among the methods of the death penalty the most outstanding were: burying alive, blinding, impaling, quartering, etc. Even the relatively mild criminal law of the 'Saxon Mirror' knows the punishment of burning at the stake. The Golden Bull even introduced the death penalty for the offender for *crimen laesae majestatis*.<sup>19</sup> The harshness of the German Middle Age and even later criminal law is proven by the fact that well-known penal ordinance of Charles V, the so-called *Constitutio Criminalis Carolina* (16th c.), also known in Ukraine for its cruelty, is a considerable mitigation of the law existing prior to that time.<sup>20</sup>

The punishment by imprisonment as well, was not very popular in Ukraine. Even when imprisonment was applied, then not as a punishment, but only as a preventive measure, to detain the criminal until the time of the passing of the sentence and the carrying out of the punishment. Imprisonment was also used with regard to prisoners of war. The *Rus'ka Pravda* makes no mention of this type of punishment.

However, it is possible to believe that alongside the ransom system there also existed the punishment of slavery. We do not have any direct evidence for this. In particular, there is no distinct mention of it in the *Rus'ka Pravda*. Only one treaty from the early 13th century mentions the punishment by slavery. But on the basis of indirect references and the analogy with other legal systems, is it possible to conclude that in the event that the property of the criminal did not suffice to cover the indemnity of the injured party and the fine to the prince — he was returned to slavery, most likely temporarily, thus substituting the labour of the liable party for compensation and punishment. Similarly, the punishment of *potok* and sacking<sup>21</sup> could turn into the punishment by slavery. When one considers, that the slave still had the opportunity, at least theoretically, to work to pay for damages and punishment, or having paid it at a later date, to liberate himself from slavery and to become a free man again, this type of punishment can hardly be considered a contradiction of the concept of humaneness of ancient Ukraine, so clearly expressed in other institutions.

Of particular importance to our question are the norms of criminal

<sup>19</sup> R. Schröder: *Lehrbuch der deutschen Rechtsgeschichte*, p. 742.

<sup>20</sup> H. Brunner: *Grundzüge der deutschen Rechtsgeschichte*, p. 302.

<sup>21</sup> Stepan Borysenok: *Karnyy zmist "potoka" Ruskoyi Pravdy v "Pratsyakh Komisii dlya vyuchuvannya istoriyi zakhidno-rus'koho i ukrains'koho prava*. All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, Series I, Kyiv 1925, p. 27.

law of the princely era in relation to semi-free and totally unfree people, i. e. *zakup*s (debtors) and *kholops* (serfs).

A *zakup*, although (temporarily) limited in his legal capacity, still enjoys the protection of criminal law on a par with free citizens.

»Яко же в свободнемъ платежъ, тако же и в закупе« —

— this principle of Art. 62 of the *Rus'ka Pravda* (according to the Troyits'kyy Scroll I), although relating to only one case (*Rus'ka Pravda* is the creation of the casuistic method dominant earlier in jurisprudence), namely, a groundless beating of a *zakup* by his master, has a much broader meaning, generally characterizing the legal position of a *zakup* in criminal law. It guarantees a *zakup*, on an equal footing with a free man, his life, health, reputation and property, and not only in relation to third parties, but basically to his landlord as well. Some limitations in relation to the latter stem from the nature of relations in the *zakup* system, first of all, the *zakup's* obligation to work for the benefit of the landlord and to be obedient to him. The protection of the *zakup* from exploitation by the victorious position of the landlord goes so far that for the attempt to acquire his property the landlord loses his right to grant credit, which was the cornerstone of the *zakup* system, and together with a compensation, also pays a fine, and in the case of an attempt on his although limited freedom (selling into slavery), a *zakup* regains his freedom completely.

When one considers the social position of a *zakup*, a temporary (and in most cases a permanent) slave, then the protection by law and the state of his interests from the one in whose power he finds himself, is an expression of both the humaneness of the society of the time and the comprehension of the role of the state as an above-class, impartial guardian of order and justice.

Even slaves, *kholop* and *roba*, enjoy some protection of criminal law. Only some, of course, for, following the dominant Roman example, slaves were not considered as persons but as things in the eyes of the law. But, nevertheless, their position in the princely state was far better than in Rome. The law guaranteed them some personal and property rights,<sup>22</sup> which Vladimirskiy-Budanov considers to be the result "of national softness of Slavic law".<sup>23</sup> The *Rus'ka Pravda*, apparently following the dominant Roman theory, does not grant these rights to slaves, but as other documents convincingly prove, slaves were not deprived of all rights, and therefore scholars do not hesitate to analyze slaves in the study about the subjects (not the objects) of law. Moreover, *Rus'ka Pravda* is also not consistent in

<sup>22</sup>) Compare Prof. Dr. Mykola Chubatyy: *Ohlyad istoriyi ukrains'koho prava*, No. 1, 3rd edition, Munich, 1947, p. 57 and subs.

<sup>23</sup>) M. F. Vladimirskiy-Budanov: *Obzor istorii russkago prava*, p. 404.

viewing a slave as a thing. For instance, it permits him in some instances to testify, demands that he be present during an agreement which transfers the right of ownership of the slave, etc.

But in the *Rus'ka Pravda*, so strict when it came to slaves, some decisions are preserved which prove that the generally prevailing mildness of criminal law of the princely era of our history had not by-passed slaves either. Art. 89 of that book of law, basing its argument on the position of principle, i. e. that the murder of a slave as a non-person does not draw a penalty of a fine, further emphasizes that when a slave "is killed without guilt", then it is not only necessary to compensate the owner for him, but also to pay the state the second highest, after *vyra*, fine of 12 hryvnyas.

Art. 65, which deals with a slave's hitting of a free man, goes even further in protecting the person of a slave. There we find mention about the fact that Prince Yaroslav (the early *Rus'ka Pravda* of Yaroslav) had permitted in such a case to kill a *kholog*, but that his sons reversed this decision, extending the compensation system to such cases as well, as a further consequence of the general decision of Art. 2 about the change by Yaroslav's sons of capital punishment by a ransom ("martens"). The application of this decision as well to a slave, who raised his hand against a free man is a glaring proof of the early humaneness which established itself in Princely Ukraine not later than mid-11th century.

Of particular significance to the question of humaneness of the ancient Ukrainian law are its decisions dealing with foreigners.

The legal status of foreigners in the Princely State, in comparison with West European countries and, reaching further into history, with the ancient Oriental and Greco-Roman law, was different to such a degree that it is of unusual significance in ascertaining the cultural face of ancient Ukraine. In the very early times (10th century) Ukraine already guaranteed (in treaties) not only their immunity but almost complete legal capacity and competence. The ancient Ukrainian law of the historic epoch was neither familiar with the German institution of the so-called *Wildfangrecht*<sup>25</sup> — (the right to subjugate any foreigner who entered the territory of a country and who spent a year and a day there), nor the right of the sovereign to the legacy of the foreigner, the so-called *Heimfallsrecht*.<sup>26</sup> The well-known institution of the Romano-German *Strandrecht*, which grants the owner of the sea shore the right to the property, and even to the person, of a foreigner who sought refuge there, after the sinking of his vessel, although earlier known in Ukraine, was abolished in the early 10th century on the basis of international treaties. (See Prince Oleh's Treaty of 911).

<sup>25</sup>) K. Brunner: "Der Fremde im germanischen Rechtsstaate" in *Zeitschrift für vergleichende Rechts- und Staatswissenschaft*, No. 2, p. 65 and R. Schröder: *Lehrbuch der deutschen Rechtsgeschichte*, p. 825.

<sup>26</sup>) R. Schröder: *Lehrbuch* ... p. 524.

The ancient Ukrainian law not only did not restrict foreigners, but often, to the contrary, granted them a privileged status, better than that of the local citizens. This related first of all to self-government and autonomy of foreign communities (merchants' trading stations in Kyïv, for example, of the merchants from Regensburg; separate autonomous districts of town, for instance "the Polish gates", "the Jewish gates" in Kyïv), to alleviations during court proceedings (milder requirements as far as evidence is concerned), to the guarantee of property and the ability to extend credit of foreigners who enjoyed the right of priority of satisfaction, even in competition with the claims of the prince, etc.

This general trend of humaneness and equal rights, or even preferential treatment of foreigners, remained intact in criminal law as well. A foreigner was completely equal to the local free population. He could be the object of a crime, recognized by law, on an equal basis with the citizens of the land and had an equal right to the state's protection.

This principle of equal rights was expressed not only in international treaties, but also in domestic law. The *Rus'ka Pravda* makes no distinction between foreigners and local population, as far as criminal decisions are concerned. Whether a subject or an object of a criminal action, a foreigner is fully subject to the general decisions of law. Against the background of the restrictions on foreigners in the criminal law of Western Europe, in particular the intensification of the procedural norms and the meting out of punishments for foreigners — criminals, this equality of rights is particularly eloquent. In our opinion, alongside the reasons of economic nature, a prominent part in this was played by the humaneness, so typical of the ancient Ukrainian individual and state, which as an organic and absolute mental and moral national attribute was incapable of and did not consider it possible to limit itself to its own population, applying certain measures to its own citizens and others to foreigners.

(To be continued)



# SOVIET NATIONALITIES POLICY IN UKRAINE, 1920-1930

(Continuation — 3)

By W. MYKULA

## 7. The Constitutional Struggle

At the 3rd Session of the V.Ts.I.K. of the U.S.S.R. in Moscow, November 11th-12th 1923, which discussed the statute of the central organs of power, Skrypnyk stated in the discussion that the Ukrainian delegation had tabled a motion that in order to safeguard the division of powers between the Council of People's commissars, (*Sovnarkom*), the Presidium and the Ts.I.K. of the U.S.S.R., all the decrees of the *Sovnarkom* essentially changing the political and economic life of the U.S.S.R. were to be approved by the Ts.I.K. of the Union. Likewise, the *Sovnarkom* should issue its decrees only in development of the legislation of the Ts.I.K. of the Union. This motion, Skrypnyk informed, fell through in the Presidium of the Ts.I.K. Later, at the end of the session, Yenukidze, the spokesman of the Commission for discussing the "Statute" about the central organs of power of the U.S.S.R., stated that the Communist faction opposed the proposal of the Constitutional Commission (in which Skrypnyk played an important role), to limit the legislative functions of the *Sovnarkom* and the right of the *Sovnarkom* to decide the disputes between itself and the *Sovnarkom* of the Union Republics.<sup>1</sup> At the same session, Sokolnikov, the People's Commissar of Finance of the U.S.S.R. rejected the suggestions for a greater budgetary independence of the Union Republics.<sup>2</sup>

Despite the adoption of the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. in a form which went only part of the way to meet the decentralizing tendencies of the Union Republics and particularly of Ukraine, the constitutional struggle did not end there, but continued over the question of the interpretation of the Constitution and the problem of what meaning should be given in real life, to the letter of the law. Basically, the approach to the Constitution on the part of Moscow on the one hand, and of the Union Republics on the other, was different. While Moscow was interested in the creation of the U.S.S.R. in so far as it furthered the unification and centralization of the Soviet State, many non-Russian Communists in the National Repub-

<sup>1</sup>) 1-y Sozyv. Tret'ya sessiya Ts. I. K. S.S.S.R. Stenograficheskiy otchet. Moscow, 1924, pp. 19-23, 108-109.

<sup>2</sup>) Ibid., pp. 77-78.

lics saw in the creation of the U.S.S.R. the possibility of guaranteeing the internal independence of the Union Republics and the placing of the relations between the Republics and Moscow on legal and ordered foundations. That this was so can be seen from a speech by Rakovsky delivered before the City Soviet of Kharkiv on February 16th, 1923.<sup>1</sup> He stated that the conclusion of a federal union was necessary because the agreements were very vague and did not differentiate clearly between the functions of the unified Commissariats and the functions of the purely Russian Commissariats, and that the R.S.F.S.R. played too predominant a role. He argued against centralization and the establishment of a single centralized State, and for the economic, political and administrative initiative of the Republics.

At the 4th session of the V.Ts.V.K. in Kharkiv, (November 1st-4th, 1923), Skrypnyk made a report about the central Governmental institutions of the U.S.S.R. explaining the distinctions between the unified and the "supervision" Commissariats of the U.S.S.R. In the discussion which followed, certain Ukrainian delegates continued to press for decentralization. Thus, for instance, *Solodub* demanded decentralization in the domain of foreign trade, the management of transport and of post and telegraph, as well as the creation of independent trade organizations for the Republics. *Odynets* thought that the rights of the People's Commissars of Foreign Affairs of the Union Republics should have been widened, *Hryn'ko* considered that the most important National interests of Ukraine must be safeguarded, and the representatives of Ukraine must have a decisive vote in all legislative commissions. Likewise, Ukraine must have all rights regarding the distribution of budgetary means,<sup>2</sup> A Commission was then elected to formulate and elaborate the directives for the Ukrainian representation in the All-Union Constitutional Commission.

The struggle of the Ukrainian Communists for the widening of the budgetary rights of the Ukrainian S.S.R. after the formation of the U.S.S.R. continued throughout the 1920's. In the early 1920's they did not insist on them so much because the finances of the Soviet system as a whole were in a very precarious situation, inflation being the main plague. However, since 1923-1924 when the financial situation began to be stabilized, and especially since the financial reform of 1924 when the monetary system was again based partly on the gold standard, (the *chervontsy* notes), they considered themselves entitled to claim a proper share in the distribution of the financial resources of the U.S.S.R.

At the 8th All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets, January 17th-20th 1924), debated in both its Chambers the project of the statute stated that the project of the budget of the Ukrainian S.S.R. could not be submitted for the approval of the Congress since the problem

<sup>1</sup>) Reprinted as the article "Novyi etap v radyans'komu soyuznomu budivnytstvi", in *Chervoniy Shlyakh*, No. 1, April, 1923.

<sup>2</sup>) *Izvestiya*, November 3rd, 1923.

of the budgetary rights of the Ukrainian Republic had not yet been solved.<sup>1</sup> A few days later, at the 2nd All-Union Congress of Soviets (January 26th-February 2nd), the spokesman of the Commissariat for Finance, Vladimirov, pleaded that the decision on this problem be postponed.<sup>2</sup> The resolution of the Congress on this subject stated: "The Congress recommends the People's Commissar for Finance of the U.S.S.R. to continue his work on the exact delimitation and fixation of the budgetary rights of the Union and of the individual Union Republics, submitting a corresponding project at the next session of the Ts.I.K. of the U.S.S.R."<sup>3</sup>

This 2nd session of the Ts.I.K. of the U.S.S.R. (October 17th-29th, 1924), debated in both its Chambers the project of the statute regulating the budgetary rights of the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of the Nationalities, which was worked out under the supervision of the Commissar for Finance of the U.S.S.R., Sokolnikov. In the Soviet of the Union, the People's Commissar for Finance of the Ukrainian S.S.R., Kuznetsov, criticised the distribution of the finances for Ukraine regarding the expenditure of the Unified Commissariats, as "not satisfactory by any means". He criticised the project for its lack of interest in the balancing of the budgets of the Union Republics and for allowing their budgets only that portion of the income of the Republics not derived from taxation, demanding that a fixed proportion of the Union tax levied on the territory of any given Republic should go to balance the budget of that Republic. He also demanded that the Union organs should not interfere in the matter of allocation of the Republican resources between various departments.<sup>4</sup> Chubar, the new Chairman of the *Sovnarkom* of the Ukrainian S.S.R. pointed out that this project should have been worked out immediately after the 12th Congress of the R.C.P.(b), at which wide budgetary and financial rights for the Republics were envisaged. Now, he stated, the projects were tending to limit rather than to widen the budgetary rights of the Republics. Moreover, even the existing rights were interpreted so as to limit them.<sup>5</sup>

In the Soviet of the Nationalities, the debate became even livelier when Skrypnyk, who regarded himself as the spokesman not only of Ukraine but of all the non-Russians, reiterated the demand for a fixed budgetary allocation for the Republics from every taxable source. He rejected Sokolnikov's suggestion that the grants from Union budget would be given to help balance the Republican budgets. "No, Comrade Sokolnikov, we do not wish to be poor relations in the Union. We wish that our budget be constructed in such a way that it should not show a deficit..." He also rejected

1) *Pravda*, January 20th, 1924.

2) *Pravda*, February 2nd, 1924, p. 5.

3) *Pravda*, February 7th, 1924.

4) *2-y sozyv 2-ya sessiya Ts. I. K. S.S.S.R.*, *Stenograficheskiy otchet*, pp. 283-286.

5) *Ibid.*, pp. 305-310.

the proviso that the Union Government should have the right to modify the distribution of the resources between various Republican departments. "Here I would like to say: let us not let you do that . . . Let us know our needs ourselves".<sup>1</sup>

Butsenko, the Secretary of the V.Ts.I.K., pleaded that the Republics should be left full rights and independence as regards the fashioning of the local *rayon* (district), and village budgets.

Reikhel, a member of the Commissariat for Finance of Ukraine, complained that the tendency existed on the part of the Government of the U.S.S.R. to ignore the recommendations of the Budgetary and Constitutional Commissions of the Ts.I.K. of the U.S.S.R. (in which the non-Russians played a considerable role — W. M.). He tabled several amendments to the project and insisted that "According to the sense of the Constitution, the immediate direction of all local finance ought to belong to the Union Republics and not the Union. The Union can only issue general directives".<sup>3</sup> His amendments were, on the whole, accepted. The "statute" about the budgetary rights of the U.S.S.R. and the Union Republics which was adopted by the session<sup>4</sup> did not fully satisfy the Ukrainian delegates, and the struggle to widen the budgetary rights of the Republics was revived again from time to time.

At the same session of the Soviet of Nationalities, the problem was also debated of what part the Republics should play in the administration of justice. The projected "states" of the Government of the U.S.S.R., which dealt with the administration of justice,<sup>5</sup> was sharply criticised by the representatives of the non-Russian Republics, (and, in particular, of Ukraine),<sup>6</sup> who maintained that it overstepped the provisions of the Constitution, which envisaged that U.S.S.R. was to lay down the basic principles for the administration of justice, while the Republics were to have the right to work out their own codes of law for themselves. Krylenko, the People's Commissar for Justice of the U.S.S.R., who delivered the main report, took up an intermediate position, inclined somewhat to the side of the non-Russians. On the insistence of Reikhel, who had pointed out that the disputes of the Constitutional Commission over this matter had not been reported to the session, Krylenko admitted that the existing Government project went against the directives of the 12th Party Congress, which made provisions for wide powers for the Republics in the domains of justice and its administration. He stated that he saw in this project an attempt to give to the Supreme Court

1) *Ibid.*, pp. 326-333.

2) *Ibid.*, pp. 333-338.

3) *Ibid.*, pp. 338-346.

4) S.S.S.R., Ts. I. K., *Postanovlyeniya*, 2-y sozyv, 2-ya sessiya, pp. 19-32.

5) The "statute" was apparently drawn up by Vinokurov, the Head of the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R., and Antonov-Saratovsky, the Head of the Commission for Legislative Proposals.

6) The Ukrainian representatives were Skrypnyk and Reikhel.

of the U.S.S.R. the right of directing policy in the field of justice, whereas, so far, this right had belonged to the Commissars for Justice of the Republics.

Reikhel further criticised the project on several grounds, in particular, because it included the clause that the Government of the U.S.S.R. could issue any decrees in development of this "statute" without necessarily having to submit them for approval to the Ts.I.K., i.e. the legislative organ. In a similar way, Skrypnyk, in his speech, stressed the fact that he regarded the Constitution not simply as a formality which could be changed at will, but as something inviolable. "With a deep hatred and contempt, we remember the old Tsarist empire, the 'one and indivisible' State. We no longer have that 'one and indivisible' State... We stood fast, and will continue to stand fast to our double-prolonged line, rejecting, on the one hand, all attempts to divide the single will of the Union, and, on the other hand, suppressing any attempt to suppress, distort, or destroy the will of any nation which is a member of our Union... Tell me please, dear Comrades, is not our Union becoming a 'one and indivisible' State, if, according to one project, the Union Republics have no citizens (as was stated in the original project of the law on Union citizenship), and, according to another project, they possess no territory, (since, according to that project, there was only a single territory of the Union, and as a Union Republic is a member of the Union, her territory is merely the territory of the Union, and, consequently, the Union has the possibility and the rights to make decisions about her territory over the head of, and without consulting, any Republic?)" Skrypnyk complained that there were forces which were striving for the restoration of the 'one and indivisible' State, and for the ruthless centralization of the bureaucratic apparatus. He expressed his doubts about how well the sovereign rights of the Republics would be defended by the Supreme Court, if the very first statement of the Head of the Supreme Court and the project he proposed were aimed at changing the Constitution. Skrypnyk's arguments were derided by Kalinin, who declared: "All the vociferation of the Jurists about sovereignty and independence as regards rights is either mere vociferation, or else a play on the feelings of the people". Larin stated that the working class could only regard the State as an instrument of the "Dictatorship of the Proletariat", which was entitled to interfere in everything. Both Larin and Vinokurov accused Skrypnyk of "National Deviation".

As a result of this debate, the project formulated by the Government was adopted as the basis of the law, but a few concessions were made to the Republics.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>) For the debate, see *2-y sozyv, 2-ya sessiya Ts. I. K. S.S.S.R.: Stenograficheskiy otchet*, pp. 406-407, 570-627.

## 8. The Territorial Administrative Reform.

The division of Ukraine into *gubernii* was introduced by two decrees of the Empress Catherine II, the first in 1781 when the old *Hetmanshchyna*, i. e. roughly the part of Ukraine east of the Dniro (Dnieper), which had been ruled by the Ukrainian Cossack *Hetmany*, was divided into *gubernii*, as one of the measures to abolish the vestiges of Ukrainian autonomy, and again in 1791, when a general Administrative Reform in the Russian Empire aimed to create *gubernii* comprising about 500,000 people each, was introduced. By the end of the 19th century many Russian scholars advocated an administrative reform in Russia that was more fitted to the changed conditions. By the time of the Revolution of 1917 the territory that was to become the later Soviet Ukraine embraced 9 *gubernii*, 89 *uyezdy* and 1652 *volosti*. The Russian temporary government took certain steps in the direction of an administrative reform, but it fell before it could accomplish anything. The President of the Ukrainian Central Rada, Professor M. Hrushevs'kyi, suggested a division of Ukraine into 30 Lands, but, under the circumstances, this could not be carried out. In 1919, Bilimovich, the Minister for Agrarian Affairs in the Denikin Government of the Russian Whites proposed a Division of Ukraine into 3 *oblasti* (territories), with their centres in Kyïv, Kharkiv and Odessa, in order to abolish the administrative unity of Ukraine. This idea was also supported by many Soviet Russian administrators. When the Bolshevik regime was finally established in Ukraine, certain local changes in administrative divisions took place, so that by the end of 1920 the Ukrainian S.S.R. was divided into 12 *gubernii*, 102 *povity* (Russian — *uyezdy*), 1,898 *volosti* and 15,696 village councils.<sup>1</sup>

At the 8th All-Russian Conference of the R.C.P.(b) in December 1919, the question of territorial administrative reform was discussed and a resolution was adopted, advising the V.Ts.I.K. to work out a project for reform. The 5th All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets (February 25-March 3rd, 1921) adopted a series of decisions about reconstructing the national economy and about local government, and on the basis of these decisions, the V.U.Ts.I.K. created the Central Administrative-Territorial Commission (Ts.A.T.K.), attached to the Peoples' Commissariat for Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian S.S.R. and gave it the task of carrying out the projected territorial administrative reform.<sup>2</sup> This Commission collected all the necessary data and request from the local organs. A discussion of the principles of the reform developed. On the one hand there were projects advance-

<sup>1</sup>) *Sovetskoye stroitel'stvo*, *Sbornik* II-III, izd. Komakademii, Moscow, 1922 p. 182.

<sup>2</sup>) The Head of the Ts. A.T.K. was Cherylnchakevich.

by Russian economists who tended to divide Ukraine into large economic units to suit the framework of the former Russian empire as a whole, and, on the other hand, there were Ukrainian projects which were concerned, above all, in consolidating the State interests of Ukraine, and envisaged a subdivision of her territory in order to further this aim.

One of the projects advanced by the State Planning Commission of the R.S.F.S.R. was that of an economist, Professor Aleksandrov, who envisaged the division of Ukraine into two *oblasti*, the "South-Western", covering roughly the (mainly agricultural) Right-Bank Ukraine, and the "Southern Mining and Industrial Oblast", extending over Left-Bank Ukraine, including the Donbas and the Kryvyi Rih (Krivoi Rog) basins. This project alarmed the Ukrainian Communists, who saw it as a scheme for abolishing the economic and political unity of Ukraine. A rival project from the Ukrainian side was put forward by Petro Solodub (a former Borot'bist), in several articles in the Press, published early in 1922. It envisaged the transition from the existing system of four administrative levels (i.e. *gubernia*, *uyezd*, *volost* and village soviet), to a system of three levels of administration, ("region", — Ukrainian, *okruha*, Russian, *okrug*; "district" — *rayon*, and village soviet). This project evoked many objections from the Central organs in Moscow, such as the Gosplan, (State Planning Commission) of the U.S.S.R.,<sup>1</sup> and the Russian administrative officials in Ukraine, but gained the support of the leading Ukrainian Communists, particularly H. F. Hryn'ko (Russian — Grinko), the head of the Kyiv *Gubernia* Executive Committee,<sup>2</sup> and also of Rakovsky, the head of the Government. In September, 1922, this project was published in a brochure entitled *The Economic "Regionalization" and the Administrative Redivision of Ukraine*. The 3rd Session of the V.U.Ts.V.K. resolved on October 25th, 1922, to go on with the reform as outlined in this project, although there was opposition to the abolition of the *gubernii*, which were therefore retained until August 1st, 1925. The idea behind this reform was stated by Solodub as follows: "... Ukraine must, above all, be considered as a State which is a separate entity within the borders of its territory, as regards all aspects of economic and political life. The problem must be dealt with so as to adjust the plan for the economic life of the Union to the economic systems of the individual Republics, and not to impose on the Republic an artificially composed harmonious system of development of the economy of the Union... She (Ukraine) is nationally homogeneous, and an artificial partition of her into two or three parts (*oblasti*) not only will fail to place her economic and political development on a firm basis but will also cause an intensification of the political struggle, which can have grave consequences

1) V. Chubar, *Ukraïna v 1926 rotsi*, Kharkiv, 1926, p. 20.

2) See his article "Novyi etap v rayonirovanii Ukraïny", in *Pr. Pr.* Nos. 228, 236, and 240 of October 5th, 15th and 19th respectively, 1926.

for her further development and for the consolidation of Revolutionary gains. Starting from this, Ukraine must be regarded as a national entity which is to achieve the future complete State unity".<sup>1</sup>

Objections to the Ukrainian project of reform on the part of the Bolshevik *gubernia* apparatus included the assertions that the purely agricultural *okruhy* would be unable to function without the great proletarian centres, that the new system was a petty-bourgeois deviation designed to increase the role of the peasantry in the administration of the country, that it was dangerous to allow the peasantry to exert pressure on the organs of power; and doubt was expressed whether it was possible for the proletariat to rule over the peasantry without the "Iron fist". These objections were answered, among others, by Kviring, the Secretary of the C.P.(b).U., in a letter to the local Party organs late in 1924, which was published in 1925.<sup>2</sup> Kviring answered that it was better to allow a certain pressure on the part of the peasantry, provided this were directed into lawful forms, than to be faced with a repetition of the Georgian "explosions".

On August 1st, 1925, the *gubernii* were finally abolished and the smaller administrative units, the *okruhy*, took their place. To replace both the *vyezdy* and the *volosti* an intermediate unit *rayon* was introduced. The number of the lowest units, the village councils, was reduced. As a first stage, in 1923, the number of *gubernii* was reduced to 9, and 53 *okruhy*, 706 *rayony* and 9,307 village councils were established. In the meantime on October 12th, 1924, the V.U.Ts.V.K. resolved to create the Moldavian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. (M.A.S.S.R.) within the limits of the Ukrainian S.S.R. Thus when the *gubernii* were finally abolished, the Ukrainian S.S.R. came to be divided into the M.A.S.S.R., 41 *okruhy*, 680 *rayony*, and 10,314 village councils. In addition there were 70 town and 155 urban settlement councils. By 1927 the number of the *okruhy* was further reduced to 40 and that of the *rayony* to 609. Several of these *rayony* and 1,007 village councils were designated as being *rayony* and village councils of national minorities.

The importance of this reform from the National Ukrainian point of view lay in the fact that the predominant role which the largely Russified *gubernia* towns had played earlier was now considerably reduced and numerous smaller provincial centres where the Ukrainian element was stronger acquired some importance. The second result was that it was much more difficult for the Central Soviet organs, whether of the Party or of the State, to exert a direct control over its subordinate institutions into such a large number of *okruhy*, as they had usually done in the former *gubernii*. Moscow was forced to rely now more on an indirect control through the Kharkiv government and this therefore gave the latter a certain measure of

<sup>1</sup>) P. Solodub, "Politychne znachynnya rayonuvannya Ukraïny", *Ch. Sh.*, 1925 Nos. 1-2, pp. 113-117.

<sup>2</sup>) *Pr. Pr.*, February 21st 1925, No. 42 (1053). "Tov. Kviring o rayonirovanni Ukraïny".



autonomy and self confidence which it had previously lacked.

In connection with the administrative territorial reform and making use of the favourable situation after the 12th Party Congress, the V.U.Ts.V.K. session on April 12th 1923, raised the problem of the rectification of the border between Ukraine and the neighbouring R.S.F.S.R. and the Byelorussian S.S.R., as the existing frontier did not entirely coincide with the ethnographic boundaries. There were still considerable tracts of territory inhabited by about 4 million of the Ukrainian population which was included in the R.S.F.S.R. as the southern parts of the Kursk and Voronezh *gubernii* and the Kuban area. On the other hand, certain small areas with Russian or Byelorussian population were included in the Ukrainian S.S.R. As far back as January 16th, 1919, the Sovnarkom of the Ukrainian S.S.R. had resolved to annex the Bilhorod, (Belgorod) *uyezd* of the Kursk *gubernia* to the Ukrainian S.S.R., "on the request of the Bilhorod Revolutionary Committee",<sup>1</sup> but this was apparently cancelled later. The matter of the unification with the Ukrainian S.S.R. of all those territories included in the R.S.F.S.R. but with a predominantly Ukrainian population, was frequently raised at the sessions of the V.U.Ts.V.K. and the other Soviet Ukrainian Central organs. A U.S.S.R. Commission, consisting of two representatives of the Ukrainian S.S.R. and two of the R.S.F.S.R., under the chairmanship of Chervyakov, the representative of the Byelorussian S.S.R., was charged with settling the matter, but the work was protracted, owing to the disagreements which had, naturally, arisen. The Ukrainian Communists bolstered up their claims with the evidence of deputations from the inhabitants of some of the areas in question, demanding their annexation to the Ukrainian S.S.R. Thus, for example, the Secretary of the V.U.Ts.V.K. Butsenko, in his report to the session of the V.U.Ts.V.K. on February 18th, 1925, stated:

"At the moment, Ukrainians who live outside the borders of the Ukrainian S.S.R. in the territory of the Voronezh *gubernia* and in various regions such as the Bilhorod (Belgorod) *Okruha* and others, come to the Ukrainian Government with their declarations, bring the demands of their villages, asking, if possible, to help them to join the Ukrainian S.S.R. In all these above mentioned *Okruhy* the Ukrainian population amounts to 90-99 per cent, and often 100 per cent. Even the enquiry carried out by the Voronezh *gubernia* planning commission shows that this population asks to be unified with the Ukrainian S.S.R."<sup>2</sup> Butsenko went on to mention also "the wish of the Ukrainians from Kuban to join the Ukrainian S.S.R.", but realiz-

<sup>1</sup>) *Uzakoneniya i rasporyazheniya R.-K. Pravitel'stva Ukraïny za 1919 g.* 3rd. ed., p. 32.

<sup>2</sup>) *Byulleten' 4-oyi sessiyi V. U. Ts. V. K. 8ho sklykannya.* No. 4, February 19th, 1925. p. 165.

ing that this demand was not acceptable to the R.S.F.S.R., he did not insist on it "for economic reasons".<sup>1</sup>

The R.S.F.S.R. resisted the Ukrainian demands and only minor adjustments in favour of Ukraine were made. On the other hand in July 1924, the handing over of the almost entire Shakhty and Tahanrih (Taganrog) *okruhy* to the R.S.R.S.R. was decided upon. The Eastern parts of these *okruhy* were populated by the Don Cossacks but the western parts, populated by at least 300,000 Ukrainians, were also detached from the Ukrainian S.S.R. This evoked ineffective protest on the part of the Ukrainians in the central organs of the Ukrainian S.S.R. and in the Donets *gubernia*. Among others, Anastas Mikoyan, the then Party Secretary of the South-Eastern regional Party Committee (in the Rostov and North-Caucasus region) was instrumental in this truncation of the Ukrainian S.S.R. He criticised the positions of the Ukrainian Communists as incompatible with economic expediency.<sup>2</sup>

Having failed to unite the adjacent territories populated by Ukrainians with the Ukrainian S.S.R., the Ukrainian National Communists attempted to extend the influence of Ukrainian culture among Ukrainians in the R.S.F.S.R. Some of them did not give up the hope that at a later stage it would be possible to unify these territories with Ukraine. This problem was repeatedly raised by the leading Ukrainian Communists in the late twenties and early thirties. There is some evidence that the irritation that this caused to the central Soviet authorities in Moscow was one of the causes of the downfall of Skrypnyk in 1933.

## 9. The Ukrainian Co-operative movement and the National problem.

The Co-operative movement had struck deep roots in Ukraine long before the Revolution. It attracted as its organizers members of the Ukrainian intelligentsia, partly on account of its semi-Socialist character, at a time when Socialism was popular, and partly because it was extremely useful as a form of self-organization for the Ukrainian peasantry, or what was generally regarded as "the people".

The oldest Co-operative alliance in Ukraine was *Soyuzbank*, which existed before the Revolution, and published *Komashnya*, ("The Ant-Heap"). After the Revolution, several Ukrainian co-operative centres, that were quite independent of the Russian centres, were created; such as *Tsentral*, *Ukrainbank*, *Dniprosoyuz*, and *Knyhospilka*. The leaders of the Co-operative movement were also prominent in Ukrainian political life during the period of Ukrainian independence. Thus the Chairman of *Ukrainbank*, Kh. Baranov'skyi, was Minister of Finance in the U.N.R. Cabinet, and the Chairman of the Central Ukrainian Co-operative Committee, B. Martos, was Premier for a

<sup>1</sup>) *Ibid.*

<sup>2</sup>) *Narysy z istorii derzhavy i prava Ukraïnskoï R.S.R.* (Kyiv 1957, p. 88).

short time in 1919. This independence of the Ukrainian Co-operative centres was won after a bitter struggle against the Russian Co-operative centres which had branches in Ukraine, such as *Poyur* (Consumers' Society of South Russia) in Kharkiv, and *Kraykom* in Chernihiv. The contributions of the Co-operative centres were one of the main sources of revenue for the U.N.R. government during its struggle against both the Bolsheviks and Denikin's forces. The lower ranks of the Co-operative leaders, together with the village teachers, formed the backbone of the Ukrainian Nationalist resistance to what was regarded as the Russian occupation of Ukraine, and numerous insurgent *otamany* were recruited from among them.<sup>1</sup>

The draft project of the laws regulating the Co-operative movement was drawn up by the All-Russian Co-operative Congress which was held in Kyiv in August, 1913, and this was officially approved by the Provisional Government in March, 1917. As early as this Congress of 1913, there were already disputes between the "Southerners" (Ukrainians), and the "Northerners" (Russians). The Bolshevik policy of nationalizing and centralizing all economic life dealt a serious blow to co-operation on a voluntary basis. The Soviet government transformed the Co-operatives into State organs of distribution, and made membership of the Consumers' Co-operatives compulsory. All kinds of Co-operative organizations were ordered to merge with the Consumers' Co-operatives to form one single State organization under the direction of the central State organ of Moscow, the *Tsentrosoyuz*, and subordinated to the People's Commissariat for Food of the R.S.F.S.R. Although, in May, 1919, the leadership of *Dniprosoyuz* fell into the hands of a pro-Soviet faction, it continued to oppose the policy of subordination to the All-Russian *Tsentrosoyuz*, and the Bolshevik principle of compulsory membership.

After the introduction of the N.E.P. the State Control of Co-operatives was gradually realized, but the damage done by this control could not be repaired quickly, and the Co-operative movement made a slow recovery. In Ukraine, already in 1920, a Ukrainian Co-operative Centre, (*Vukopspilka*), was established in Kharkiv, but it was subordinated to *Tsentrosyuz*. The decree of the Soviet Ukrainian Government of April 13th, 1921 restored the principle of voluntary membership of the Co-operatives, but the State retained the right to appoint some members of the management. This last clause enabled the regime to oust from the Co-operative organizations many of those whom they considered undesirable, in particular the Petlyuria elements, and to replace them by Communists or other loyal elements, particularly from the *Komnezamy*.

After the famine of 1921-22, whose effects dragged on long after the official emergency was over, the Soviet Government conceded

<sup>1</sup>) Ol. Lozovyi, "Natsional'ne pytannya i kooperatsiya na Ukraïni", *Chervonyi Shlyakh*, Nos. 9-10 (66-67) September-October 1928, pp. 187-195.

still more rights to the Co-operatives. The decree of August 28th, 1922 concerning Agricultural Co-operatives restored their legal status to almost the situation which had existed before the Bolsheviks took them over. The decree of July 11th, 1923, permitted the reorganization of Consumers' Co-operatives on a voluntary basis. Finally, the decree of May 20th, 1924 gave to the Republics the right to organize Co-operative associations on a Republican scale.<sup>1</sup> Since they now possessed a greater freedom of activity, the Co-operative movements naturally grew in strength, and the Agricultural Co-operatives once more became largely dominated by the Ukrainian element. Many of those who had formerly taken an active part in the old Ukrainian Co-operatives resumed their activities in the Co-operative movement. This increased the efforts to remove completely the control exercised by Moscow over the Ukrainian Co-operatives, which, in turn, provoked the accusation that the Ukrainian Co-operatives were being used as a shelter for Nationalists. To justify the position of the Ukrainians in the Co-operatives, A. Kharchenko,<sup>2</sup> a leading figure in the Co-operative movement, whom we have already mentioned, wrote in a polemic directed at a Soviet journalist who had accused the Ukrainian Co-operative members of Nationalism:

"They (the members of the Ukrainian Co-operatives — W. M.) fought for the National independence of Ukraine. Today the latter is a living fact. This slogan, as we see, did not contradict either the principles of the Soviet regime, or the tactics of the world proletarian Revolution. They insisted on the independence of the Ukrainian Co-operative centres, and now, in our Republic, this has become an axiom of the Co-operative movement".<sup>3</sup>

When, in March 1926, the question of the proposed reorganization of the Russian *Tsentrosoyuz* into an All-Union Co-operative centre was being discussed by *Vukopspilka* in Kharkiv, a resolution was passed to oppose this proposal. *Vukopspilka* suggested that *Tsentrosoyuz* should remain the central Co-operative organ of the R.S.F.S.R., but that *Vukopspilka* should cease to be affiliated to it, becoming, instead, an independent central Co-operative organ for Ukraine.<sup>4</sup>

1) M. Lytvits'kyi, "Suchasne stanovishche sil's'ko-hospodars'koi kooperatsiyi na Ukraïni". *Ukrains'ka sil's'ko-hospodars'ka kooperatsiya. Z nahody 10-yi richnytsi zasnuvannya "Tsentralu"*. Zbirnyk 1-yi. Poděbrady (Czechoslovakia).

2) Kharchenko was regarded as a traitor by the Nationalist emigration because he made his peace with the Soviet authorities, and returned to Ukraïne.

3) A. Kharchenko, "Vsyaki buvayut' istoriyi..." *Ch. Sh.* No. 1-2, 1925 pp. 95-98. Written in reply to an article by P. Vysochans'kyi; "Pravda pro neokooperatyzm Dniprosoyuzivs'kykh mriynykiv". *Ch. Sh.* No. 10, 1924.

4) *Pravda*, April 2nd, 1926. "Nuzhen-li obshchesoyuznyi tsentr potrebitel'skoy kooperatsii—".

## 10. Re-orientation of Ukrainian intelligentsia.

The policy of "Ukrainization", like the N.E.P. could not remain without an effect on the political attitude of the Ukrainian intelligentsia regarding the Soviet regime. This latter needed the Ukrainian intelligentsia in order to influence the peasantry and "Ukrainization" was the means to gain the co-operation of the Ukrainian intelligentsia and with its help strengthen the Soviet authority in the Ukrainian countryside. The futility of continued opposition to the overwhelming physical might of the Soviet Russian regime on the one hand, and the opportunity to work in the cultural field for the enlightenment of the Ukrainian people convinced numbers of the Ukrainian intelligentsia that they ought to try to co-operate with the Soviet regime. The material need to survive was perhaps decisive. Hopes that the regime would gradually mellow and become more humane and the prospect of helping to lay the foundations of a Ukrainian State contributed much to the relaxation of open hostility towards the Bolshevik regime.

In émigré circles this attitude of acceptance of the Soviet victory with the hope that the regime would gradually change was known as "smena vekh" (reorientation) and first started among the Russian emigration, but very soon spread also among a section of the Ukrainian emigration. The main centre of activity of its followers was in Vienna where already since 1919 several well known Ukrainian political figures organized Sovietophil organizations and published their views in journals and pamphlets. The most predominant personality among them was V. Vynnychenko former member of the Ukrainian Directory who founded the Foreign Branch of the Ukrainian Communist Party and in the spring of 1920 went back to Soviet Ukraine where he was given the nominal post of a deputy chairman of the Sovnarkom. In the autumn of the same year he returned disillusioned to the West and published an open letter to the Socialist parties of the world denouncing the Soviet regime in the most bitter terms. However, he was later silenced by the threat that if he continued in this vein he would forfeit the royalties from those of his works published in the Soviet Union, and in 1926 attempted to again flirt with the Bolsheviks by publishing a pamphlet "The Return to Ukraine" in which he advised Ukrainian intelligentsia to return home and try to co-operate with the Soviet authorities. Other Sovietophiles in Vienna included the well known historian, M. Hrushevs'kyi, Pavlo Khrystyuk, M. Shrah and others. P. Khrystyuk published the very well-documented book on the revolution in Ukraine (*Ukrain's'ka revolyutsiya*, Vienna, 1920) in which he asserted that the Ukrainian struggle for independence failed because of the hesitation of the Central Rada to carry out immediately a land reform and because of the underestimation of the importance of class organizations of the workers and peasants (p. 57 and 133). He expressed his satisfac-

tion that "the Soviets have carried out the Socialist Revolution", but resented the Russian aggression in Ukraine. His was the attempt to come to a compromise with the Soviet regime, if the latter in its turn would make certain concessions to the Ukrainian National aspirations. In Vienna existed the Ukrainian Communist publishing house, "Nova doba" (The New Era), which published dozens of pamphlets, but they did not have as much influence on the attitude of the Ukrainian emigré community as the work of the politicians and journalists who asserted that the Soviet regime had changed a great deal and that it had permitted the establishment of a Ukrainian state though based on somewhat different ideals than the fallen Ukrainian Republic (U.N.R.). The idealization of the possibilities of Ukrainian national development under the Bolshevik regime found some believers among the Western Ukrainian intelligentsia who were embittered against the policies of the Polish and Rumanian governments towards the Ukrainian minorities under their rule. Pro-Soviet sympathies started to spread among a section of Ukrainian emigré students in Prague and Vienna. In 1923 the first lists of those willing to return to Soviet Ukraine were made in Vienna and delegates were sent to report on the situation there. Soviet consuls in the countries where there were large Ukrainian emigrations were often well-known Ukrainians, e.g. Ovsienko, in Prague, Lapchyns'kyi in Lviv and Shumskyi in Warsaw, which made it easier for the Bolsheviks to influence and penetrate the emigration.

In the autumn of 1923 the former insurgent *otaman*, Yurko Tyutyunnyk, who led the disastrous winter raid in Volynia in November 1921, renounced his anti-Soviet activities, was pardoned by Moscow and returned to Ukraine. This was hailed by the Bolshevik propaganda as a clear sign of a surge of pro-Soviet feelings among the Ukrainian intelligentsia. Many others once prominent in Ukrainian cultural and political life followed suit. Professor M. S. Hrushevs'kyi, the great Ukrainian historian, former President of the Central Rada (1917-1918) and one of the leaders of the left wing of the Ukrainian S.R. party, also returned to Kyiv in February 1924, after he had received assurances that he might get a high post in the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. His return was a great shock to Ukrainian patriots, both at home and abroad, as he was regarded as a symbol of the Ukrainian National movement. He was cold-shouldered by his colleagues in Ukraine who began to regard him almost as a traitor to the national cause and resented his attempts to ingratiate himself with the regime. Hrushevs'kyi came to Ukraine with the expectation that the Bolsheviks would have to recognize his great authority and would negotiate with him and even that he would be able to resume his political activities. All this soon proved to have been self deception, and Hrushevs'kyi had to devote himself exclusively to his valuable historical studies and the work in the Academy.

To Ukraine went also Vityk, a left-wing Social Democrat from Western Ukraine, who had published the Sovietophil journal "Nova Hromada" in Vienna. Among the returnees were also Pavlo Khrystuk, M. Shrah, and many others.

The attitude of the Ukrainian intelligentsia who remained in Soviet Ukraine to the regime, was, on the whole, more suspicious than that prevailing among the returnees. They distrusted Ukrainization and believed it to be just another Bolshevik trick to discover oppositional elements in order to destroy them later. However, Soviet propaganda about the plans of carrying out Ukrainization considerably weakened their opposition. By far the largest section of the Ukrainian intelligentsia consisted of the school teachers, especially in the villages. A noticeable change in their attitude towards the Soviet regime became apparent in the second half of 1923. An even more favourable atmosphere was created by the appointment of Shums'kyi, a former Borot'bist, as People's Commissar for Education in October, 1924, but this in turn whetted the appetite of the Ukrainian intelligentsia for further changes. The first All-Ukrainian Teachers' Congress, which opened in Kharkiv on January 5th, 1925, was significant in that it could be considered a kind of Government-sponsored gathering of the leading strata of the Ukrainian nation. These people represented 50,000 educational workers of Ukraine, many of them enthusiasts of the Ukrainian National revival, people in closest touch with the Ukrainian village and often former members of the Ukrainian Parties or partisan detachments.

At that Congress, the Secretary of the Central Committee of the C.P.(b).U. E. Kviring, said in his opening speech that in the first years of the Revolution there had been specific National problems in Ukraine which were not favourable for an alliance between the working classes and the teachers. The majority of the latter had followed bourgeois slogans, not realizing that Ukrainian interests were best served by the proletariat, or that the question of National rebirth could only be solved by the Soviet regime.

V. Zatons'kyi, in his address on "The National Question and the School", remarked that "the Russificatory policy of the autocracy and the colonization of Ukraine have strengthened the striving among the Ukrainian population towards national self-consciousness. The solution of the national question in Ukraine is not only a tactical manoeuvre, but also an historical necessity".

In the discussion on Zatons'kyi's speech failures in the Ukrainization policy were pointed out. Ukrainization of the Red Army and of the urban schools was demanded and also the publication of Ukrainian literature on a large scale. Zatons'kyi, who was obviously charged with representing the Party's standpoint in the national policy, replied that the urban proletariat preferred Russian culture and that no-one would try to Ukrainize it. In his view, the Ukrainian

peasant masses were not chauvinistically inclined, they were satisfied with the Soviet nationality policy. Ukrainian chauvinism was, however, strong among the Ukrainian intelligentsia, including the teachers. He pointed out several difficulties for the implementation of the national policy, namely the poverty of Ukrainian scientific and technical terminology which hampered the Ukrainization of higher education, and the lack of Ukrainian army commanders, which prevented the Ukrainization of the Red Army divisions, even of those units where Ukrainians constituted 90%. The teachers congress ended with the drawing up of loyalty resolutions which in fact indicated that not everything was in order with the loyalty of the Ukrainian teachers of the regime.

### 11. Dissolution of the Ukrainian Communist Party. (U.C.P.).

At the beginning of 1925, the last non-Bolshevik Party remaining in Ukraine was forced to dissolve itself. This Party was called the Ukrainian Communist Party, (U.C.P.), and had been founded by the so-called "Independents", a splinter group of the left wing of the U.S.D.R.P., (Ukrainian Social Democratic Workers' Party), of their Constituent Congress, which was held in Kyiv, from January 22-25th, 1920. The split between the majority right wing and the minority left wing of the U.S.D.R.P. had begun to be noticeable as far back as 1917, after the victorious Bolshevik coup in Petrograd. Some of the left wing of the U.S.D.R.P., led by Vasyl' Shakh-ray and Neronovych, joined the Bolsheviks in establishing the rival (Communist) government of Ukraine in Kharkiv, at the end of December, 1927. Shakh-ray himself was made Secretary for War for a brief period, and later represented the Soviet Ukrainian Government at the Peace Conference of Brest-Litovsk. Another Left U.S.D.R.P. group, consisting of Petro Slyn'ko, Vrublevs'kyi and A. Butsenko participated as "guests" in the Conference of the Ukrainian Bolsheviks at Tahanrih (Taganrog), in April, 1918. Together with Skrypnyk and Lapchyns'kyi, Shakh-ray managed, at this conference, to carry through the resolution concerning the creation of an independent C.P.(b).U., although Shakh-ray's motion that it should be called the Ukrainian Communist Party (U.C.P.) was defeated. At the 1st Congress of the C.P.(b).U. in Moscow, in July, 1918, which cancelled the independence of the C.P.(b).U., Slyn'ko and his group joined the C.P.(b).U., and, in 1919, initiated the "Federalist" opposition. Shakh-ray, on the other hand, began to criticize the "colonial" policy of the R.C.P.(b)., and in 1919, he published a series of pamphlets which served as the manifesto of those Ukrainian national communists, who wished to retain their independence from Moscow.<sup>1</sup> In January 1919, another Left U.S.D.P.R. group, calling themselves "Independents" adopted

<sup>1</sup> V. M. Shakh-ray, *Revolutsiia na Ukraïni*, 2nd edition, Saratov, 1919 V. M. Shakh-ray and Serhiy Mazlakh, *Do khvyli Saratov*, 1919. Shakh-ray died in 1919. He was regarded by members of the U.C.P. as the founder of the Party.



the Soviet platform but continued to agitate against the Russian interference in Ukraine. On hearing of the rising of Hryhoriyiv (Grigoriyev) in May, 1919, the "Independents" formed the so-called "All-Ukrainian Revolutionary Committee", under the leadership of Antin Drahomyrets'kyi, at the town of Skvyra, south of Kyiv, and initiated a rising against the Bolsheviks. The head of the military department, Yuriy Mazurenko, issued an ultimatum to Rakovsky's Government to withdraw the Russian troops from Ukraine.<sup>1</sup> The well-known partisan leader, *otaman* Yurko Tyutyunnyk, who had earlier been Chief of Staff to Hryhoriyiv, accepted the authority of the Revkom, which was carrying on negotiations with the Ukrainian Directory, headed by Petlyura. Another partisan leader, *Otaman* Zelenyi, (his real name was Danylo Terpylo), also supported the "Independents". This rising petered out after a few defeats. During Denikin's occupation of Ukraine, the "Independents" accepted the Communist platform and appealed to the Comintern for recognition as the Party which represented the Ukrainian proletariat. This request was however, rejected.

In January 1920, the U.C.P., together with those Borot'bisty who had refused to join the C.P.(b).U., came to terms with the Bolsheviks, who tolerated them as they needed all the indigenous Ukrainian support that they could obtain in order to pacify the Ukrainian countryside that was torn asunder by anarchy and peasant uprisings. The founders of the Party were Mykhaylo Tkachenko, who had died on his way to Moscow to conduct negotiations late in 1919, Antin Drahomyrets'kyi, and Andriy (Pisots'kyi). While they agreed with the social programme of the Bolsheviks, the *Ukapisty*, as the members of the U.C.P. were called, nevertheless considered the official C.P.(b).U. to be a Russian agency in Ukraine, unrepresentative of the Ukrainian working-class movement, and the instrument of Moscow's colonial policy. Their aim was an independent Communist Ukraine, loosely allied to other Communist countries. Others to join the U.C.P. at this stage were Yu. Lapchyns'kyi and some of his followers from the "Federalist" opposition group in the C.P.(b).U. The General Secretary of the U.C.P. Central Committee was Antin Drahomyrets'kyi, and its leading members included Mykhaylo Avdiyenko — the former Political Commissar of Hryhoriyiv (Grigoriyev) Yuriy Mazurenko, Antin Prykhod'ko — a dissident Borot'bist, P. Kyyanytsya — the Chairman of the Kyiv *gubernia* Committee of the U.C.P., and Mykhaylivs'kyi — its Secretary. The U.C.P. numbered only a few hundred members, but it exerted a certain influence on the peasantry in the *gubernii* of Kyiv, Katerynoslav, Poltava, and Volynia, and on a section of the Ukrainian intelligentsia and students in Kyiv, Kharkiv, and other cities. It organized

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1) B. V. Kozel's'kyi, *Shlyakh zradnytstva i avantur*, Kharkiv 1927. pp. 27-28.

lively discussions which attracted great numbers of students, and tried to launch a Ukrainian youth movement, *Ukryus* (Ukrainian Youth League), in opposition to the official Russified Komsomol. The Ukapist, Mykhaylo Avdiyenko periodically raised Ukrainian National demands at the Congresses of the Committees of Unprosperous Peasants, which were, perhaps, the only wider forum where the Ukapisty could voice their views, although, even there, they were shouted down by an impatient majority. At the 2nd All-Ukrainian Congress of the Committees of Unprosperous Peasants (February 1922), Avdiyenko declared that Ukraine was in the position of a colony of Russia, and appealed to the peasants to organize themselves into "independent detachments".<sup>1</sup> The U.C.P. made a direct attempt to appeal to the Cominform in a memorandum of June 25th, 1920, in which it accused both the C.P.(b).U. and the Soviet government of Ukraine of gross errors regarding the National question, and stated that the insurgent movement in Ukraine did not consist of "Kulaks", but of the "Ukrainian proletariat and poor peasantry".<sup>2</sup> The U.C.P. demanded that it should be recognized as the only true representative of the Ukrainian proletariat, and as such, should be admitted as the Ukrainian section of the Comintern, on equal terms with the other National representations.

The establishment of the Soviet Union was greeted by the U.C.P. with an equivocal resolution describing the event as merely "a step forward in the realization of Marxist principles concerning the solution of the National colonial question, and a step forward in the search for practical forms of organization for the realization of a genuine equality of nations, organized as National Soviet republics"...<sup>3</sup> Having thus politely stated their views concerning the inadequacy of the "equality of nations" in the U.S.S.R., the resolution put forward the following proposals:

- 1) That the 2nd Chamber of the Ts.I.K. of the U.S.S.R. be constituted of representatives of Federal Nation-States, and not of representatives of ethnic groups;
- 2) That the R.C.P.(b). should both recognize the need for, and give actual help towards, the organizing of the *Ukrainian* proletariat as the leading force in the Ukrainian S.S.R. which must become an equal member-Republic of the U.S.S.R.;
- 3) That the unified Communist Party in Ukraine be recognized as a separate section of the Comintern;
- 4) That the organization of the Trade Union Movement in Ukraine be made independent of the Russian movement, and become a direct member in the Profintern;
- 5) That the Federal organs deal only with general questions.

1) *Izvestiya*, December 7th, 1923.

2) Lykholat, *Razgrom* ... p. 562.

3) *Nova Hromada*, No. 2, August, 1923.

(To be continued)

# CATARACT

By MYKHAYLO OSADCHYY

(Continuation — 2)

"You are young and beautiful, with a university education, a mathematician, to whom are you trying to tie your fortune? He will rot in jail, and you . . . how can you manage without a man? Have you not experienced a woman's lonely nights?

Don't you know what an agony it is . . . God, and you are still a young woman — born in 1943! Do you want to spoil your whole life? Let him go to the devil, find yourself someone else — a big strong fellow. Do you know what a real man can do for a woman? "Paradise to the bold and into a violent . . ." Yes, but not with a sweetheart; but with a real man. And of what good is he to you, even if he does come out of jail sometime? A dystrophy case with a stomach ulcer . . .

"But he will soon become a father" . . .

"Laugh, young and beautiful, laugh at that. All that can be done away with so cheaply nowadays . . ."

"Permit me, shall I help you to light it?"

I looked at his broad back; he was standing near the small window, his short legs wide apart and continued to talk about horses. I thought that I must write a poem about them without fail and give it to him as a present.

"My surname is Palyha. Volodymyr Petrovych Palyha. I am from Velyki Chuchmany, the ones near Buzk".

"I shall write a poem about your horses".

"Listen, when grooms are put in prison, every fool knows why. But what are you poets doing here? I suppose it's for those office booklets as you called them. Then these idiots are simply disgracing the fair name of the prison with you".

I am not convinced whether Campanella would have ever written his brilliant work about future society, if he had not spent twenty-seven years in prison. In some prison dog-kennel, where he was oppressed by state walls, — his spirit hovered far from there; he always left it in solitude, bathing in some shining far off places; he called his book "City of the Sun". It was the very city where his restless spirit wandered.

I thought about the fact that so many talents are lost in this world, lost only because an individual has no time for writing. In the daytime he is consumed by work, then by coffee houses, and later by the family. He only walks about and thinks; he is tormented by subjects, but — without ever being specified exactly — they disappear: undoubtedly searching for their real master. Here, in the cell, especially when you are not called out for an investigation for

weeks and you exist forgotten by all in the world, this unpleasant sense of unsteady spirit is constantly present in you. Then it is possible to write countless "Cities of the Sun", to invent new arithmetic and a second multiplication table. I thought: "So that we may have many good writers, mathematicians, physicists and candidates of science, let them be constantly thrust into prison for five — ten — twenty-five years and forgotten — let them create freely. Let them even starve to death, for that is not so important. The main thing is that their names and works, which are so important for our future, should remain . . .

I asked for paper and pencil, carefully placed all this on the table and became lost in thoughts. Stocky Volodya was sitting by the window and reading something. If he were sitting somewhere else, I thought, I would get some ideas; he shut me off from the world, or perhaps my spirit feared his broad shoulders and wandered under the windows, — I was a very bad Campanella. It is true that his window was not made of frosted glass (it had not been invented then surely) and he, at least, could take pleasure, if not in the "City of the Sun", then at least in the rays of the real sun. Now everything has been foreseen . . . It seems that my grandchildren will never see the new "City of the Sun" . . .

But I tried to receive myself in rain: I was not only a bad Campanella, but a bad defendant as well.

Amusing myself with paper illusions, I felt how unseen trepidation was further brewing in my breast, how the heart was choking deceptively, while the eyes were persistently watching the table. "Young and bald, bald and young" — I thought, — what is happening this minute in the place which should be covered by hair?

He cast his narrowed, piercing eyes at me, but then lowered them immediately; now they began to run quickly up and down the pages of a strange book, densely filled with calligraphic handwriting. The ink was green, but at this moment it did not soothe me at all; on the contrary, it confused and disturbed me: they have concocted something against me again!

— Well, well, there you have a Mykhaylyk . . . Quiet, modest, who could have thought . . . — He followed the lines with his finger and moved his lips. His brows went up in surprise at times and remained there; he either became brighter, or grim, folding his hands behind his back, and slowly raising his heavy eyes. — Now, as a matter of fact, it is not so important for you to say something. There is no need for it. You had already said what you had to say, and even if you had wanted to repeat your conversations with acquaintances, you could not do so. As it is . . . — He shouted with satisfaction, pressing both hands against a book, as fat as an ancient Bible — recorded here . . .

— What could *uheveyer* mean? — asked "my" investigator, hardly opening the door, from the threshold. It seems that so far he had

been carefully listening to our conversation in the corridor, and now, picking an appropriate moment, hastened to throw me off balance.

— “Uvyerhyer?” — I asked, not having understood the word . . . “whose name could it be?”

— “We are hiding, crucian, we are masking ourselves” . . . — said the investigator reproachfully and shook his head accusingly. — “We are having a bad time with you. We are pretending to be honest, and are forgetting about decency” . . .

He motioned to the “young and bald, bald and young” and the latter leisurely read from the “bible”: May 6, 1965. “Now all artists and talented poets are resorting only to the national form . . .”

I shrug my shoulders as if struck: how do they know these words so literally. It is true, sometime ago I said them in my own house to a young artist. Possibly, they asked him and he related it. But, surely not, word for word? And suddenly I turned cold from supposition and disgust: they have been eavesdropping! Yes, they have been eavesdropping! . . . But how? I am living on the fifth floor. — Then what: the telephone, the taperecorder, the microphone, the attic, an opened window? Everything is possible . . . I felt myself filling with contempt and disgust: They have been eavesdropping on me, a staff member of the Oblast Committee of the Party, a university lecturer. — What did they wish to know? I never discussed anything secret, which might appear anti-Soviet. I said what was in my heart, and I was not ashamed of this, — to my friends, to my associates in the department, in the Oblast Committee of the Party. I said the same thing to them at the inquiry, but this did not interest them in the least. Furthermore, this is not even political intrigue for them. Then why not believe a man, spy on him and make a criminal of him? Other people, too, have spoken out against the shortcomings in our society, much more sharply. I knew them to be honest and decent. They were scholars, men of letters, — are they here somewhere as well? Here, side by side, are they also being watched and even the number of minutes they spend in the toilet being recorded? Do they, also, have “listening devices in their arses” as Major Halsky had said? . . .

I gazed at the triumphant and shining faces of the investigators and felt that I was again in a barrel rolling violently downhill. I was small and helpless, and I thought that as such I had been snatched from life. It seemed there were stronger characters alongside of me, but they were left alone. But in order to frighten them, to deprive them of the dignity of a citizen, to persecute them, — they chose a weaker one, and on him demonstrated what is in store for them in the future, if they won't stop to point to somebody's canine eyes . . .

— “What do you want from me? What do you need?” — I shouted. Oh, now I could no longer restrain myself. I was boiling with rage.

— It seems that God Himself does not have anything against you! — I became silent; I was at a loss for words. For them, these self-

assured investigators, I was nothing, a "hivno" (shit), as was said into my face, but was it only I? They did not express themselves any better about Malanchuk, the secretary of the Lviv Oblast Committee of the Party, a doctor of science, the greatest Soviet Russifier and internationalist of Halychyna. Well and good, I could have said more than once that here in Ukraine, the Ukrainian language is propagated very little. I could have made enemies, not only in the person of the investigator, but of Malanchuk himself. Then, how can one explain such a contemptuous attitude toward him? Oh, no, I could not comprehend anything! . .

"When grooms are put in prison, then I know why they are there. When they put poets . . . they now disgrace the good name of the prison! . ."

In the morning it was always a bit easier: a fresh current of air burst in from the outside, or — perhaps — I simply imagined it, but the feeling of something bright did not abandon me till ten a.m. "Padyom", "pravlyatsa", "balanda" . . I lived by these melodious words, as you live in the theatre with the mysterious Grieg. I forgot about everything and only from time to time it occurred to me: something is bound to happen. What it was, was easy to perceive. But it disturbed me, amused me, condemned me, — "something is bound to happen", and then I began to hum softly the forgotten melodies, which seemed enchanting and amusing to me as a pretty girl. Then I closed my eyes, leaned against the wall and reeled off verses. I did just that, for at times I could not even grasp their essence, their authors, everything was jumbled up, changed, or else, mingled into one, and then gaiety, alternating with some unusual sadness, took hold of me and I began to laugh. Volodya watched me carefully and then his right eye began to shake in amazement. Later we sat down on the bed or near a night-table and began to play "matches". It was such a hazardous game that we spent hours playing. They were happy hours of forgetfulness. Everything was forgotten: the cell which reminded of a dog house of a bad master, forgotten were the crazy questions of the investigators (with what aim in mind did you drink tea? with what aim in mind did you ride in a tram? With what aim in mind did you change 20 kopeks, and not 10?), everything was forgotten, even the fact that "something was bound to happen".

A game like this could only have been invented in jail. In freedom it would have been colourless as the world of a colour-blind person. But here, within four walls, it seemed greater than all the football matches which a throng of fans has ever seen. Out of twenty-five matches, four had marks from one to four. Each mark meant five points. All the matches were placed in a standing box, then it was lifted abruptly and the matches remained together on the night-table. It was necessary to pick up each match individually, so as not

to disturb the rest. The winner was the one who gained a greater amount of points, who managed to pick out all the matches with marks.

But the game tired us out at last. Volodya and I quarrelled over nonsensical things, sat far away from one another and did not talk for a long time, harbouring unvoiced offence. But before even half an hour passed something began to come over me. It rested on my shoulders, depressed me, my eyes became blurry, and then I clearly saw an apparition before me, which reminded me of an octopus with hideous suckers creeping under the skin, penetrating inside; it was even possible to discern how they were moving about there. Then I laid down on my back on the second tier of my bed and closed my eyes. Later it became more frightening: the walls slowly drew together, slid down, the ceiling came tumbling down upon my chest, crushed it and I rushed down, as if scalded, and Volodya again winked at me in surprise with his blind eye.

— "What, are you afraid, is the dear wall crushing you? Ha! Consider, my dear, that this is not kindergarten with fat-arsed teachers. This is "paradise", only filled with tail-less devils — the KGB agents..."

At last, I received a parcel from home. This was on September 20th. Much has been forgotten, but this day will somehow be long remembered. Possibly, because the parcel not only disturbed me, but also made indignant. It reminded me of much which had troubled me in freedom. Not everyone is aware of the fact that in the past I have not been honest with myself, or with other people. But this is not for the investigators. They are not interested in this type of dishonesty at all. But now, in the cell, I was particularly sorry when this came to my mind. I remembered in Lviv not only that cream butter was not on the market, but even ordinary sunflower oil. I worked then for the Oblast Committee (Obcom) of the Party and along with all the other employees I could easily purchase them on the premises of the Obcom garage at 59 Zelena Street. Always before the holidays we left for home with packages stuffed with products that were in short supply. So as not to arouse suspicion among the passers-by, we were usually driven home in cars, in particular in the official Obcom car registration no. LVB-10-45. And who would have thought that I was going to accept these parcels, which reminded me of the Obcom packages, with such remorse? This analogy sneaked up upon me completely unexpectedly, or perhaps it was driven into my head by Major Halsky? "You are a Communist, by god, you divulged Obcom secrets! No wonder you were thrown out of there!" I never divulged and never sold Obcom secrets to anyone. I was a party member and adhered strictly to the character. I was only indignant at these "bundles" and sometimes in the presence of my close friends, I could not restrain myself and asked them and myself: why do not we, Communists, while pro-

pagating Lenin's modesty, want to adhere to these excellent traits of character in practice? And we were "distributed" among our homes by the Obcom car, with "bundles" . . .

Rummaging about in the parcel, Volodya found several onions and slyly winked at me: now, counter, we shall live. I did not comprehend anything, but I was immediately coerced by his mood. We decided to become gardeners. We might not have adequate preparation; but, we had an unrestrained desire: to discover a new kind of onion for anything in the world! We put an onion each in paper boats and "planted" them in a place with water. This was quite a game — to come up to the window every so often, to water the plant and to watch it beginning a new life, sprouting light-green shoots. Thus a new prisoner appeared in the cell, young and inexperienced like me, but who was not summoned for interrogations, who was not attributed with a "counter", but faced an ordinary death, like all of us, sinners. Consequently, the onion found it much easier than I, in as much as it was not aware of all this, and stubbornly climbed upwards.

Our menu, the yellow-green *balanda* now assumed a tempting appearance. Chopping up onion leaves into it, we changed not only its colour, but the taste as well. Then we even hesitated to call such splendid food a "balanda". This was a health-giving meal, full of calories and life. In freedom, onion cures seven illnesses, but here it surely cured everything which humanity could only invent.

But it could not cure one sickness, the sickness of suspicion. The warden in charge of the isolation ward almost got an epileptic fit, or so it seemed to me, when he saw it, young and cheerful, on the window sill. Every onion leaf reminded him of a sharp, cold weapon. He felt it all over, tested it for strength; I watched his industrious hands, holding my breath: in a moment he will take it away from us. We shall remain alone again and will again have to amuse ourselves with the game of "matches".

"Nda! (Uh, well)" he said, convincing himself that we nevertheless cultivated not steel knives, but ordinary onions. The regulations of internal order do not stipulate the growing of onions in the cell . . .

I was happy. The "prisoner" of nature was allowed to remain a prisoner. It continued to turn green on the window sill, dispersing boredom and bringing from the outside insolent life, which can be arrested only by trampling on it, by pulling it by the roots . . .

Volodya again began to talk about horses. I was lying, motionlessly watching the ceiling. At times I half closed my eyes and then the small lamp which was burning very close to my nose sank somewhere and burned. I turned myself over to the other side, feverishly rubbed my eyes, but the delirium failed to disappear. It promisingly settled within me. In front of me I saw a sunny field, or perhaps it was a meadow. Somewhere nearby flowed the River Sula and the horses were grazing along its bank.



— "There were 25 of them" — said Volodya.

— "Were they your horses?" — I asked the wall with interest.

— "Yes. I tended them by the river and drank its waters".

— "These were not your horses" — I contradicted him, offended. —  
"You could not have owned 25 of them. Kalnyshevskyy had 25 and he grazed them in his cave. It was deep and the sun never penetrated there. There were no bars and no frosted glass, but there was no sun either. That cave was designed by an engineer who surely completed higher education. That prisoner grazed horses for 25 years, sitting there on bare stone and begging for water from the tap — else the horses would have died of thirst. They grazed close to him, on the banks of that river which never had any water. He was an old herdsman. At 84, moreover, it is not so easy to tend horses, more so in thick fog, when disobedient horses can run away . . . How hard it must have been for him . . .

At 109, Kilnyshevskyy saw light for the first time after 25 years in a Siberian cave. He still managed to see the sun, but he never saw his horses again; the horses dispersed and he was blinded by the light of which he dreamed for a quarter of a century. Catherine II knew how to love men; she also knew how to hate them. How terrible is the hatred of "innocent" women! 25 years in a "stone sack". My stooped old man, how could you stand it, how could you survive there with your thirsty horses? What, aside from the "balanda", nourished your ailing and hopeless body? What cured your feeble legs and powerless mouth? Just consider, what were Jesus' sufferings in comparison to yours? He was crucified on the cross and He died peacefully. He was dying on a hill; He could see far in front of Him; the sun was shining for Him and the air was fresh for breathing. — It was easy for Him to die, even in suffering. You also suffered, but did not die. You lived and it was a greater suffering than Jesus'. Jesus became a saint. His sufferings were sanctified by faith and it nourishes believers for millenia. Perhaps he did not exist. He and his sufferings as well could have been invented by fanatics. But you are reality. You really lived and your sufferings also were real. You loved people; you loved their land, and they, ungrateful, have not only forgotten your name, but also for what you stood. They pray before going to sleep in front of pictures and do not even suspect that they could be praying not only to the Crucifixion of the Martyr, but also to you — the last chief of the Zaporizhian Sich. What you believed in was real, but what reality was feared, and prayers were not offered for it for a long time . . . Kilnyshevskyy in a twisted pit! This is more horrible than crucifixion: a person buried in the earth alive . . . I just could not fall asleep. It was long past midnight. The city was asleep; the prison was asleep; Volodya was asleep; his horses were asleep: he lied when he said that he had 25 of them and tended them on the banks of my river. He is not a nice prisoner, I thought. The wall was pushing me downward and I was feverishly holding onto

a plank-bed, so as not to fall. But, even if I were to fall, it is better to fall on the hands. I turned my back to the wall and instantly turned cold: the opposite wall stood next to me. I feverishly grabbed first the mattress, then the plank-bed, not knowing what to do, while the ceiling slowly rested on my chest and crushed it... I could not contain myself.

— "Hey, go to sleep!" — Hissed the warden from the door. — "Mumblin' at midnight, you'll wake everyone up!"

— "Listen, dear, don't think ill of me", — I feverishly climbed down from the plank-bed; something was blocking my way to the door, but I continued to creep like crazy. — "I'll give you everything" — I mumbled almost in delirium, not knowing what to do with my long arms. — "Let me out into the corridor. I am being crushed by moving walls... I do not want it for free; I'll pay you! Let me go, dearest"...

The corridor suddenly seemed to be something huge, spacious, bright, and I fanatically begged to go there. "Now all are asleep; no one will see, believe me!" — I murmured frantically. I was begging even when the warden was no longer by the door...

— "Carrion!" — roared Major Halskyy in a strange voice. — "Podlaya tvoya dushonka! (Your base little soul)... Bi-t-ch!... Mra-z yb..."

His fist hissed before my eyes. I hardly managed to move away. He raised his arm the second time, and I saw again, or rather felt, a wave pass by my very head. And he raised his arm time and again, getting angrier and angrier that he could not hit the tended spot: I miraculously managed to turn my face away at the last moment.

— "Khren! Nye boysya! (Horseradish! Don't be afraid!)" — he snorted somewhere from the side or already from behind. — "Bit nye budu! Kurva... (I won't hit you! Bitch...)"

And again his fist glided down my ear, and again I retreated violently, passing all corners of the room and not finding relief anywhere. And he, becoming excited, like a bull, red and strong, jumped up and down around me like some gigantic spider, turning his whole self like an acrobat. At a certain moment it appeared to me that he was already hanging over me, under me, thrusting his fists at me from all sides.

— "Nye boysya, khren, nye boysya, durak! (Don't be afraid, horseradish, don't be afraid, idiot!)" — He did not cease shouting and I just could not understand: is he really unable to hit me, or is he simply not even thinking of hitting me, just intimidating me, subjecting me to "psykhologicheskoy obrabotke" (psychological processing). However, it was enough for me just to look at his face, twisted with anger, and the words — "nye boysya, nye ydaryu" (don't be afraid, I won't hit you) — did not sound promising to me at all. It seemed to me that he was itching somehow "nye promazat"

(not to miss his aim)... At this moment he reminded me of a drunken lad, who — tearing the clothes off a girl — does not stop, panting, to promise her that he will not touch her... only... simply... it would be better... if she... were naked.

The investigator was restraining him, grabbing Major Halskyy's hand half way to my head and soothingly reproaching him, but he "treacherously cut himself loose" and everything began all over again.

— "What, Drach?" — he shouted. — "You're creating heroes from among yourselves, inflating authorities, while he is spinning some nonsense in delirium. Drach... Such sh... like yourself, like all of you with your Dzyubas and Svitlychnyys! What? Has some Khododnyy (literally: cold) appeared on the horizon as well? We shall turn him into a hot one! Repent, dirty scum, you shall lick the heels, but it will be too late... Lick up all the rot from inside yourself!"...

He ran out of the investigator's room, while I sat down on a stool and immediately things began to swim before my eyes: both the investigator, then the rectangle of the table, then the wall. Then it unexpectedly became stationary in a position which appeared strange to me, and then began to move in the opposite direction.

— "How dare he?" — I whispered. Is it possible to allow yourself such things with people?

— "Don't be angry with him. Major Halskyy is a nice man", — said the investigator calmly. — "It's just that there are so many anti-Soviet chiks around and the nerves of some employees just can't stand the strain.

"If someone's nerves are not in order, — he can go and chop wood for some widow; he can assume leadership of the swineherds. But to allow yourself things like this with people?..."

— "In your diary it is recorded that you visited Ivan Svitlychnyy once and talked with him about a variety of things. Of course, it is written here that the conversation only dealt with literature and painting, but would scarcely such an interesting person as you limit yourself only to that. You must have also been politicking a bit; he tried to prove something, you surely contradicted... We understand that you have not told him anything much, but even without it he... And now you, as an honest and decent man, tell us about it.

"You, for instance, have been working on the literary process of the 20's. You were undoubtedly interested, besides Ostap Vyshnya, in other writers as well. Your diary has an entry about Mykola Khvylovyy, about his part in the literary process, about his attitude to Ostap Vyshnya. You, most likely, exchanged those views with Svitlychnyy. What was his advice to you? Tell us..."

"He has a large library. Which books from that library did you read, which did he let you take home? Perhaps, he asked you to give them to someone else? Surely, in browsing through the library, you, as any educated man, would have noticed that it contained

quite a few rare books, which it would not hurt to donate to a library. Why hasn't he done so? Perhaps he wanted to circulate them? Obviously, yes. And there is nothing base in this, if it is confirmed... And another thing: all of you are lamenting (the article, "On the Occasion of the Trial of Pohruzhal'sky", was confiscated from you too) that a library was burned down, that priceless Ukrainian *incunabula* were burned, so vital for our people. Then why doesn't Svitlychnyy, if he is so concerned with its enlightenment, propose his, in place of the burned books? This would be a much more beneficial matter, than giving (a book) to somebody to read, and he — to still another... Such a frivolous ladder, you know..."

The investigator's voice was as gentle and indulgent as that of Bulhakivsky's cat, Azaz'olo. After the stormy "experimentation" of Major Halsky, such a change seemed to me like the "moderate" torture, when a person is pulled out of boiling water and carried naked, into the bitter cold, and there, without ever regaining consciousness, would become unconscious again, would sink into a deep ravine, would continue to see apparitions which smiled sweetly and tempted, as the coaxing Eve, allegedly, with the forbidden fruit, and you are not able to say "no" to them.

— "Write... write down whatever your investigative imagination can invent. Write down that I am a Petlyura follower, that I am a Bandera follower, that I am a Makhno follower, even that I am a Genghis Khan... Only leave my friends alone; they are not guilty of anything; they have not given me anything anti-Soviet, have not founded any secret organizations, have not organized any congresses..."

The investigator was carefully preparing the protocol, turning page after page, and then, leaning against the back of the chair, read: "... being in Ivan Svitlychnyy's apartment, I could not help but see his huge library, could not help but guess that he is certainly lending these books to others to read..."

The investigator was a wonderful stylist, whom even Folkner could envy. After he was through with them, simple things acquired paradoxical meaning. From what was written down it followed that I, having made a few steps, at the same time made a revolution in the state. I have not done it yet, but I could have thought about it unintentionally. I have not yet thought about it, but such an idea could occur to me... He was very pleased with his protocol and only asked me to put punctuation marks where they belonged.

Later, in order to dispel my suspicion completely, he called me over and in a low voice, secretly, having glanced at the door, whispered:

— "What separates you and me? I am the same as you. Only you sleep here, while I sleep at home. If you wish, I won't call out the guard, but will take you to the cell myself..."

This was the first time during my imprisonment that they did not

shout "stop", did not crack their fingers, that a friendly, smiling person walked alongside me and spoke about freedom. But I was not enjoying it; my whole being was captivated by the desperate yells of Major Halskyy: "What, honest? Even if such do find their way here, they never leave here the same way!..."

A bird at times gets so accustomed to his cage, that later he cannot live outside it. Try so set him free — and he will die. A human being is not a bird. It is a creature of a higher order. Still nature gave it many things in common with a bird: it often also cannot exist without a cage — the apartment cage, the work cage, the food cage, the prison cage. And in most cases, it is oppressed by everything, most of all the latter: the cell. This is almost a physical sensation — the feeling of the closeness of the cell's walls which always press down on your back! Suddenly four huge walls rest on them; and although in reality there is no weight at all, you can hardly restrain yourself from shouting...

— "Listen", said Volodya to me the other day, — "don't you want to correspond with one of those who share your fate?"

— "But is that possible?"

— "Of course", he said. — "It is quite simple. If you wish I, as an old prison wolf, will arrange everything for you".

— "No, you know, I do not have anybody. And what would I write about?"

— "You don't know anything about the toilet yet. They always check it after you to see if you have not left a mess, or have not scribbled anything on the wall. But I know such places which would not even occur to any warden".

He tried to convince me during that day and with such insistence, that it suddenly made me wary. After his unrealistic horses — suddenly a realistic subject.

— "No, you know, I do not want to".

Then he sat down on the bed insulted, and kept silent for some time.

— "If you, odd ball, are afraid of such a method, there is still another one which is also quite legal. Take out a book from the library and on the last page place dots beneath letters and thus you can compose any text".

This cheered me up more than usually.

— "But how can one pass it on?"

— "It's as simple as pie. We'll send a note through someone telling a friend to take out of the library the book which you had; let it be number 9 or whatever, ending in 9... Ignoramus!..."

I went to the window and saw how the onion was growing. Most likely, I took the cup and watered it.

— "Let me have the cup", — he said. — "Give me the cup and stand by the peep-hole in the door".

— "What for?" — I asked, without grasping what he said.

He positioned a book on his chest, as if to read. Then he placed the

bottom of the metal cup to the wall of Cell 66 and tapped the side twice with his middle finger. When a reply was received from there by two taps, Volodya clenched the cavity of the cup in his palm and shouted into it: "Who? . . . How many? . . . From where? . . . With whom? . . . What's the problem? . . . Roger". He hastily turned the cup with a hollow part to the wall and pressed his ear against its bottom. I watched his "conversation" with uneasiness. Then suddenly I heard a rustle in the peep-hole behind me. Volodya quickly hid the cup under his pillow and began to read the book. I began to pace the cell, from time to time glancing impatiently first at Volodya, then at the peep-hole. "Could they have heard?" — I wondered. But Volodya was lying quietly, as if nothing had happened, and I calmed down a bit. Yet, in a minute this very calmness began to annoy me.

— "Do you know anybody who works in a museum of some art?" — he asked me, peeking from under the book.

— "In a museum? But why? why?" . . .

— "Well . . . he has cracked . . . Somebody who sat with him transmitted this".

Cracked? . . . How, when, in what? . . . I was shocked by his words. And now, after the interrogations, after a horrible misunderstanding, when you are waiting for something all the time, when you are nothing but a warning, any little thing assumes crazy proportions and stymies you. The words of Volodya, skeptical, even cynical, baffled me completely . . . I could not find a place for myself in the cell: the wheel began to spin, to spin somewhere near by, as though Major Halskyy's clenched fist . . .

Unexpectedly I became as importunate as the investigator and the words which so far I thoughtlessly passed over, Volodya's words, took on greater significance for me; I felt in them a concealed query and even more . . . Then it occurred to me that Volodya was a "nasyedka" (stool-pigeon), an ordinary "woodpecker", who was even too lazy to change the questions with which he was stuffed by the investigator. Now I was between two fires and one of them was to consume me . . .

Suddenly Volodya began to shout without a pretext. This happened on the day after the "negotiations" via the cup.

— "You, odd ball! . . . I would hang all of you Communists as yourself on a dry branch. You lied to the people, and at the same time nurtured black dreams in your soul! . . .

Almost the same words were said to me by Major Halskyy. "What is it", — thought I, — "a telepathic transmission from one brain to another?" Volodya was bustling by the door, moving his clumsy hands about; then he gnashed his teeth and his chest heaved. I closed my eyes and quite unexpectedly arrived at a simple explanation: I am being "worked over" not by Volodya but by Major Halsky.

— "What is the matter with you Volodya", — I whispered and moved away to the wall. — "How dare you say that?" . . .

He came to his senses, became embarrassed, shrugged his shoulders. — "And you were afraid!" — he hastened to tell me. — "Afraid? I was only kidding. Just kidding, that's all. And you — hero! What are you going to do at an inquiry, when one-two and you'll be placed under a wall, under a little wall?!!!"

He could not extricate himself. Everything betrayed him: both his movements and his heart, and then, so as to smooth over his blunder he began to sing. Later it became clear to me that he was acting in a sly manner here as well, picking out the songs, aiming in a certain direction. An extra long pause ensued, then the eyes of a guard were spying on me . . .

"Hey, far away in the Volhynia  
The army of UPA was formed . . ."

\*

In my diary the name of translator Yuli Daniel was mentioned. I met him in Moscow quite by accident and we talked together no more than five minutes. I recall (this conversation was recorded in my diary which was confiscated during the search) that I told him an anecdote popular in Kyiv at the time about a horoscope forecast of number 12. In 1905, there was a revolution, in 12 years, in 1917, another, plus 12 — the consolidation of the cult of Stalin, plus 12 — the tragic 1941, plus 12 — the death of the "great" Stalin and the great cult, plus 12 and our 1965 . . . It seems that something is bound to happen . . . "What can happen now in this country? — Replied Daniel, — "We've had a revolution, we've had the cult . . .

The investigator stubbornly stressed the notes in my diary. Most of them were of no significance, although he was trying to find "political intrigue". But for some reason, he continued to skip over this incident. This made me unusually wary. Since, if one is to look for "political intrigue", would it not be best to seize at this anecdote?...

The other day, Volodya and I went for a "walk" to the toilet (this is a small trick of the prisoners: to stay as long as possible in the "spacious" toilet so as to be away from the crowded, stuffy cell for a moment at least). So far, we were always given clean pieces of paper for "official use", but this time, strange as it may seem, scraps of newspaper.

— "Listen", — he said lively, — "on my piece mention is made of some trial on the basis of your article".

The first thing that I noticed was the name of Juli Daniel. He was tried . . . Which Daniel? . . . From Moscow? . . . The same one who is mentioned in my diary? . . . But the report from Baku did not mention where the trial was being held; in it was only the account of some pensioner who strongly condemned the behaviour of the "unclean one". If it is really the same Daniel, then why does not the investigator examine my relations with him, why is he keeping silent?..

I raised my head and met eye-to-eye with Volodya's watchful eyes. He immediately turned them to the side and rushed to wash his hands under the faucet, but I was already beginning to understand a few things . . .

(To be continued)

## POEMS FROM UKRAINE

Ihor KALYNETS'

### SELF-PORTRAIT

*(for a painting of Oleksa Novakivs'kyy)*

He was majestic,  
pensive, having gathered  
to himself all the bright sun's expanses,  
he turned to men a face where hovered  
wise and keen glances.  
And she was somewhere there in perspective,  
she had her face upon a hand supported,  
a hopeless face of beauty in dejection,  
and she was his self-portrait.



*Self-portrait*



Ihor KALYNETS'

THE MUSE

*(for a painting of Oleksa Novakivs'kyy)*

All radiant with sunlight flooding her,  
from his canvas she looked, professing,  
with eyes that were overflowing,  
a grief past all expressing.  
And since he  
for revolt strove keenly,  
and for a  
knife-edge  
music,  
she must have been then  
his muse.



*The Muse*

Ihor KALYNETS'

**"THE AWAKENING"**

*(for a painting of Oleksa Novakivs'kyy)*

Little girl  
stretching out of half-dreaming,  
her naked warm knees exposing,  
all slim as a ray of sunshine,  
and herself among slim sun-rays enclosed there.  
Walls have spread themselves with sunshine.  
Ancient ikons have found resurrection,  
that had slept in a cobwebbed mustiness  
through the long ages.  
Their passive grace every face was forsaking,  
and with blessings their eyes were all brimming,  
for there came an awakening:  
little girl  
in a nightgown of linen.



*The Awakening*

Ihor KALYNETS'

**ST GEORGE'S CATHEDRAL, L'VIV**

*(for a painting of Oleksa Novakivs'kyi)*

Daylight is splashing with flames,  
spattering fire and winds over,  
fire of the crimson-red trees,  
fire where clouds, hundred-tongued, hover.  
Yet, where embattled hues shine,  
among fluidity, tempest,  
rising  
a gift for all time,  
St. George's stands, silhouetted.



*The Cathedral*

## Scandalous Provocations of Russian Imperialists

In the wake of a Russian-Bolshevik mock trial of Ukrainian intellectuals

By YAROSLAV STETSKO

The reason and circumstances leading to the shameful show trials which are being prepared by Brezhnev in Ukraine are known to everyone all too well. They are reminiscent of the twenties and, in particular, the Stalinist thirties — the years of terror of the Cheka, GPU, Dzerzhynsky, Myenzhynsky, Yagoda, Yezhov, Vyshynsky and their followers. Brezhnev is steadfastly following in the footsteps of his master, Stalin. Even Shelepin, the murderer of the late Stepan Bandera, cannot compete with him. The cult of Brezhnev's personality, as an infallible leader of the empire, is systematically cultivated on the model of the cult of Stalin. A sly, typically Russian barbarian, treacherous, base and brutal, Brezhnev is employing the same methods of extermination not only of the fighters for freedom and independence of the subjugated nations but also of the creators of the intellectual and cultural values who do not want to deny their national "I", their national traditions, but strive to foster the culture, the art, the literature, the folklore and the traditions of their nation.

Obviously, it is of no importance for the Russian occupiers that the leaders and workers in the field of culture in Ukraine have unfolded their activity within the framework of the (paper) rights guaranteed to them by the so-called constitutions of the USSR and the Ukr. SSR and within the framework of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which was signed by the USSR and the Ukr. SSR, as members of the UN. Every issue of the *Ukrainskyi Visnyk* (The Ukrainian Herald) carried a note to the effect that the authors are taking advantage of the rights guaranteed to them by the constitution, and are writing and acting within its limits. However, in line with the practice of the Russian oppressors and occupiers, all the rights guaranteed by the USSR — Ukr. SSR Constitution and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of the UN, in the Russian empire are destined only for export, for consumption abroad, as was expressed by a KGB officer in Mordovia. In the USSR, he said, the law of Stalin reigns, i.e. the law of violence and injustice.

The Organization of the Ukrainian Nationalists has never recognized and still does not recognize either the Ukr. SSR or the constitution of the USSR — Ukr. SSR, which it considers a bluff, a

perfidious provocation in order to catch fish in muddy waters. The USSR constitution is a Russian creation for provocation, as a means for the surfacing (?) and exposure of more courageous individuals, who wish to fight for its realization, so as to destroy them later or to confine them to prisons and concentration camps. Provocation and treachery, deception and terror — these are the roads and methods of Moscow's domination in Ukraine and in other countries subjugated by it.

Russia often attributes its crimes to another, dubious "offender" whom it forces to serve it. "Catch the thief" is an old, tired-out method of Russia — of the tsars and the Bolsheviks, of the Russian "nazis" and the Russian "democrats": Peter I, Catherine II, Nicholas II, Milyukov, Lenin, Kerensky, Stalin, Khrushchev, Shelepin and Brezhnev.

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The world press, including the *US News and World Report* of January 20, 1972, carried a report that according to the information of Western intelligence sources, the leadership of the USSR decided at the end of last year to accelerate the solution of the problem of the Jews who want to leave the USSR, and on the other hand to crush the activity of the intellectual élite of the subjugated nations, in particular, to liquidate the "Samvydav" (self-publication).

There is no doubt that Russia lost its duel with the Jews. The world Jewish power, which controls the mass media to a great extent, has great material and technical means and almost a decisive influence on policy of the United States, and simultaneously, a decisive support of the USSR Jews from the side of Israel have forced Moscow to yield to the Jews in order to have a free hand in settling accounts with nations subjugated in the USSR, in particular, with unsubdued Ukraine, as the greatest threat to the Russian empire.

Suffering a defeat in its clash with the Jews, Russia is saving its prestige by taking a harder course against the nations subjugated in the USSR in order to show its "unconquerable might". The "concessions" to the Jews and the intensification of repressions toward the nations held captive in the USSR are also caused by the fact that an economic crisis is becoming more acute in the Russian empire. Ukraine faces a new famine. Hence, it is necessary to find "the enemies of the people" and to put all the blame on them, or at least to turn attention away from the real cause of the calamity.

Moscow is changing its course very rapidly. The Ukrainian nationalists whom it labelled "the killers of the Jews", are rapidly becoming "the partners of the Jews". Only yesterday Stepan Bandera had allegedly "issued orders" to annihilate hundreds of thousands of Jews; only yesterday the UDP (Ukrainian state government) "had perpetrated" Jewish massacres in 1941, only yesterday "the candidate of history", a certain Kychko, had published in Kyiv, under the

auspices of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukr. SSR, a diatribe on "the anti-Semitism of the Ukrainians", in particular the nationalists, while today the *Visti z Ukraïny* (*News from Ukraine*, a propaganda newspaper published by the Russian secret service for Ukrainians abroad), as well as other Ukrainian-language Soviet press, prints "revealing" articles by that same Kychko about "a bloc of Ukrainian nationalists and Zionists", about their joint, coordinated effort. The proof? Here it is: the ABN and EFC held an International Conference in Brussels, and immediately afterwards the Jews held their World Zionist Congress in that same Brussels. Thus, for Moscow's lackey, Kychko, the "proof" is there. Allegedly the Ukrainian nationalists and the Jewish Zionists are inseparable friends and are "acting jointly", while Yaroslav Stetsko and the leaders of world Zionism are simply "Siamese twins". Yesterday Symon Petlyura had been "the killer of the Jews", while today, according to Kychko, he is "a sworn friend of Zhabotynsky".

What has happened? What has forced Moscow to take such dangerous leaps in its policy? The Israeli-Arab conflict alone, in which Russia is conveniently using the Arabs to further its own interests, does not play a decisive role here. The Russian chieftains are also wary of the resurgent Jewish patriotism in the USSR itself, which is partially devastating their tried methods of utilizing Jews for their interests, as had been the case in the past with Trotsky, Zinovyev and many other leaders and Cheka members of Jewish origin. They are aware of the fact that the growth of Jewish patriotism is directly reinforcing the anti-Russian front of the subjugated nations.

It is true that some Jews in the USSR hold prominent positions in industry, administration, technology, science, in the organization of culture and propaganda, even in the military. It is also true that the people of the countries subjugated by Russia, in particular of Ukraine, still remember the role played by the Kaganoviches, the Khatayeviches ("Mykhaylyky") who razed their monasteries and churches, the Trotskys, the Litvinovs, the Radekovs, Zinovyevs, Kamenyevs and numerous other Jewish lackeys of Russian imperialism. Therefore, there is nothing strange in the fact that prejudice against such Jewish lackeys exists among the Russian-dominated nations. At present Moscow is counting on this very resentment, attempting to link the Ukrainian nationalists with the Zionists, or more precisely — with Jews who hold important positions in certain spheres of life of Ukraine and who are servile to Moscow.

And so the Russian tactic of "catch the thief" is repeating itself. It is not the Russians who are responsible for the subjugation and the exploitation of the Ukrainian people, for genocide in Ukraine but — the Jews... The same tactic was applied in the past by the Russian tsars, and now it is being repeated by the Russian Communists — their followers. Russia is no longer able to conduct its destructive advance against the Ukrainian people under new

propagandistic slogans which would conceal the real objective of its great power chauvinism and imperio-colonialism. Therefore, it is searching for various pretexts for the persecution of Ukrainians on the one hand, and on the other is trying to evoke among the Ukrainian people an aversion for the Ukrainian nationalists, as "allies of the Zionists" or Jews in general, who have held in the past or are still holding prominent positions in the USSR... Nevertheless, in this old, albeit tried tactic, Russia is beginning to lose its balance and is in the state of confusion. The Trotskys, the Kaganoviches and the Radeks were not Zionists but Bolsheviks, the lackeys of Moscow; they were also not "friends" of Petlyura but of Lenin. They were destroying Ukrainians with fire and sword, together with the Russians, their employers.

The embarrassed Russian chieftains, having lost in their confrontation with world Jewry, want to salvage their "prestige" by demonstrating their power against the Zionists' "partners" — the Ukrainian nationalists, i.e. Ukrainians who do not enjoy such a strong position in the world as the Jews. These are the prime reasons why the Politburo of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union resolved to make concessions to the Jews and at the same time to intensify its terror against the nations subjugated in the USSR, in particular Ukraine.

The Russian anti-Semitic chieftains are completely indifferent to the fact that their lie (as every lie) has short legs. They are taking advantage of the current situation. For this reason, the above-mentioned Kychko for instance, has completely "forgotten" to add Schwarzbart, the assassin of S. Petlyura, who at the trial in Paris posed as a Zionist not as a Communist, to the Zionist Zhabotynsky. In reality, Schwarzbart was a Russian agent. Still, after Schwarzbart's death, the Jews brought his remains to Israel, where they were buried. Thus, Schwarzbart's intelligence activities and his services to the Russian GPU, upon whose instructions he had assassinated Symon Petlyura, were concealed. But the Jews officially took Schwarzbart's crime upon themselves — being a Zionist he killed Petlyura thus allegedly taking revenge for the massacre of the Jews. With the hands of a Jew, Schwarzbart, Russia murdered Symon Petlyura — a symbol of the anti-Russian struggle, and at the same time made a fool of the Jews, because they themselves have acknowledged Schwarzbart as a Zionist in spite of the fact that he was a Communist — an obvious agent of the GPU.

Russia no longer has enough strength to conduct an open ideological struggle with Ukraine, in particular with the Ukrainian nationalists-revolutionaries. At first it attempted to present the Ukrainian nationalists-revolutionaries as German "collaborators", but this provocation fell through quickly, for even Khrushchev had to acknowledge the two-front war of the OUN-UPA (Organization of the Ukrainian Nationalists — Ukrainian Insurgent Army). Then the

OUN was showered with false accusations that it was cooperating with "the American capitalists" and "the British and American secret services". But this insinuation also dissipated, for the policy of the OUN is completely contradictory to the American policy of "peaceful coexistence" and negotiations with Moscow. When Russia found itself in conflict with Israel (it was one of the first states to recognize Israel), it advanced a new provocation — "the alliance of Ukrainian nationalists with world Jewish capitalism", although world Jewry has not taken a positive stand to the concept of the dissolution of the Russian empire and the reestablishment on its ruins of independent national states, in particular of the Ukrainian state.

The very fact that individual Jews are favourably disposed to the renewal of the Ukrainian Independent United State and condemn the assassination of S. Petlyura, executed by Schwarzbart upon the orders of the GPU (for example, Alan Deroch, a French Jew, or Prof. Shufinsky, a prisoner in a Russian concentration camp for expressing his admiration for Ukrainian political prisoners) — does not signify a change in policy of the world Jewry and Israel with regard to the Ukrainian liberation struggle. Of course, it would be of advantage if some Jewish groups of the MAOZ type would assume a clear-cut anti-Russian stand and recognize the concept of the dismemberment of the Russian empire and the reestablishment of national states. Regrettably, reality is different. For instance, the centre uniting all Jewish organizations in Canada disassociated itself from our anti-Russian demonstrations because its aims are different. A similar thing occurred in England where only individual small Jewish student groups dared to put forward anti-Russian slogans.

Searching for ever new "guardians" for the Ukrainian nationalists, the Russian chieftains have become totally confused, themselves denying what they maintained earlier. Some new version appears every day, although the aim remains the same: to drum into the Ukrainian people that the OUN is not orienting itself upon the nation's own forces and the front of nations subjugated in the USSR, but on some outside "anti-Soviet" power. They pin one label after another on the OUN: allegedly, it is always serving "foreign powers" — Polish, German, American, English, the National Chinese, and finally — the Red Chinese and the Zionists. As it were, the nationalists are not counter-agents but agents, not partners but lackeys. In their drive against the "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists", the Russian chieftains and their stooges go as far as contradicting themselves. Thus, for instance, the renewal of the Ukrainian state in 1941 was proclaimed by the nationalists, who were "German collaborators", while the government of the renewed Ukrainian state "was dispursed by the Germans". The UPA "was created by the Germans", while Khrushchev was forced to confirm that the UPA waged war against both the Germans and the Bolsheviki.



The very fact that Moscow is attempting to reduce the entire, huge process of cultural renaissance of the Ukrainian nations to a provocative linkage with foreign "secret services" is proof of its greatest capitulation. It is such an incredible and shameful provocation that a normal person could hardly conceive it. But at the same time it is a boomerang that will turn against Moscow itself. Can one imagine that the entire social labour movement of the past century was made up of agents? Can one equate the national liberation movement of formerly subjugated Poland, with Kosciuszko or Pilsudski at the head, with the action of foreign intelligence? Can one at present link in any way the creativity of Svitlychnyi, Dzyuba, Sverstyuk, Chornavil, Moroz, Stus and many others with "intelligence services"? If so, then all people of great ideas, all of mankind's geniuses, all the creators of social and national concepts, all philosophers and ideologists should be considered as "lackeys" of some "foreign power", including such false prophets as Marx, Engels and Lenin, who have become the idols of the Russian Communists. If, on the other hand, the works of an individual living in a country of despotism, where there is no freedom of speech, where terror and lawlessness reign, find their way abroad and are published against the will of the author and without his agreement, can this be considered a "crime", and the authors punished by harsh sentences and long-term imprisonment in prisons and concentration camps?!

The realization of the Ukrainian cultural "I", the historic, traditional foundation of the Ukrainian nation, the attempt at free creativity, the effort to make use of the paper rights which are granted by the constitution of the USSR — Ukr. SSR, the Declaration of Human Rights, which the USSR and the so-called Ukr. SSR had signed at the United Nations — these were the limits within which the presently imprisoned Ukrainian cultural leaders had acted. None of them had transgressed in their activity the rights guaranteed to them by the constitution (albeit, only on paper). When the Russian autocrats are trampling their own constitution, this is not the fault of the Ukrainian cultural leaders. Not the cultural leaders, but the dictators and their stooges should be put on trial for violating human and national rights, guaranteed by their own constitution. The Russian "judges" fear that at an open "show trial" they will be unable to win a "dialogue" with the defendants on the question of who is violating the constitution: the autocratic government and the court, or the defendants? Therefore they attached to a fabricated "case" a comic pretext — a chance visit to Ukraine at the time of an innocent tourist, a student from Belgium, who is allegedly connected with the OUN (Bandera followers), who are supposedly serving foreign "intelligence services". Such fabricated accusation is particularly funny, and at the same time horrible. Creators and workers in the field of Ukrainian culture and... foreign "intelligence services"!

The charges against the Belgian student are an obvious provocation, as had already been authoritatively determined by the OUN Press Service. Instead of a Belgian student of Ukrainian descent, it could have been a tourist from Mars who appeared in the USSR on a "flying saucer" to spy for the "intelligence service of another planet". Upon orders from the Chekists, the "experts", the "brilliant" Russian scholars, would surely work out a whole version about the appearance of a "spy" from Mars and would link him to... the creators of Ukrainian culture. Proof? When the Russians could find "evidence" that America was not discovered by Columbus but by a "brilliant" Russian and therefore it should belong to the USSR, then they can fabricate "evidence" about the "espionage activities" of Y. Dobosh, regardless of whether he came from Belgium or Mars. Tukhachevsky, a USSR marshal and a faithful servant of the Red Russian empire, also "confessed" that he was a "German spy". At the SVU\*5 trial, the "witnesses" testified that SVU members were allegedly in the services of "Polish intelligence". It is not to be excluded that shortly the KGB will "authoritatively" confirm that Symon Petlyura, the head of the Ukrainian state, was assassinated by Schwarzbart, not as an agent of the GPU, but as an agent of world Jewry. In 1926-30 the so-called industrial party was crushed in the USSR, its members repented and "confessed" that they worked for "French intelligence".

In its subversive activity in the free world, Moscow relies everywhere on espionage and corruption. Therefore, it imagines that with the aid of provocation it is possible to attribute... to "foreign intelligence" every national liberation movement in its empire and all the cultural processes of revival of an enslaved nation. Let us suppose that Mickiewicz and Tov'yanskyi, our Shevchenko, the Italian Mazzini, the Bulgarian Bottev, the Hungarian Pöteffi, as dependent in their creativity on foreign "intelligence services". Could anyone, who is not in an insane asylum, believe this? We do not know whether Brezhnev and Andropov belong in the category of the mentally ill, but we know that Hitler and Stalin showed traces of insanity at the end of their lives...

Thus, time and again the contradiction between phrases and reality, between paper guarantees of human and national rights and a fruitless attempt to realize them can be witnessed in the USSR. Russia allegedly protects the rights of nations and individuals, refers to the UN Charter, but only where it has an imperialist interest (Bangladesh, Basques, Northern Ireland and so forth). In reality, it not only violates national and human rights, but punishes in the most brutal way anyone who dares to demand respect of these rights, allegedly guaranteed by its constitution. It is of no avail either, that quite a few of the illegally imprisoned Ukrainian creators of culture have called as the support not only of the constitution of the USSR — Ukr. SSR, but also the Russian idol, Lenin, quoting this or that

phrase from his works on particular problems. Ivan Dzyuba wrote his work "Internationalism or Russification?" as documentation for *gauleiter* Shelest. The Russian turncoats, the governors-general, themselves have demanded documentation about the lack of rights in Ukraine, and when they do receive it, they find themselves in incredible contradictions. Instead of checking out the facts of Russification and destruction of Ukrainian culture — they — upon the orders from Moscow, take vengeance upon the authors of the documentation. The above-mentioned work of I. Dzyuba, just as similar works of other authors, was not written from the standpoint of the revolutionary OUN, but on the basis of the constitution of the USSR — Ukr. SSR and the deceptive theses of Lenin. And for this alone the authors are confined to prisons and concentration camps, expelled from the writers' and artists' union, persecuted and harassed for "subversive anti-Soviet activity", and provocatively linked with the OUN centre abroad and foreign "intelligence services".

Yet, none of the arrested and the convicted are to blame for the fact that the constitution of the USSR — Ukr. SSR is a shameful deception. They had not drafted it, had not written the false Leninist theses, but are only trying to put into life that which is allegedly guaranteed by the constitution. It is not their fault that the Russian hypocrites are defending the rights of even such foreign Communist terrorists as Angela Davis who helped to kill people. Today, she is free (in the country of "capitalist hyenas") and can write and say what she wants. The creators of Ukrainian culture, on the other hand, who only wished to make use of the short, paper rights of the constitution of the USSR — Ukr. SSR, which allegedly guarantees freedom of thought and speech, found themselves behind bars. Can they be tried for the fact that the Marxist dialectic itself exposes the hypocrisy of the Russian Bolshevik system and that they are calling the attention of the "judges" who are trying them to it?

Finding themselves in a blind alley of contradictions in theory and practice, for they are already punishing harshly for innocent cultural creativity, which is unfolding within the framework of the constitution of the USSR — Ukr. SSR, the Russian occupants of Ukraine have no other choice but to revert, even formally, to the tsarist formula: "There never was (any Ukraine), there is not, and there cannot be". There is only one nation — Russia, while all the others are cattle and fertilizer for the "one and indivisible Russia" with the region bordering on the Vistula, Central Asia, Little Russia, the Baltic region and other ethnographic areas. Not a "Union" (not even a paper one, as is said by the NTS\*\*), but a Russian supnation, a unique phenomenon in world history, while the entire world is to be its fertilizer.

The growth of the resistance movement and the national forces of the nations subjugated in the USSR has become a moral danger for the Russian empire, for it can lead to its downfall. And the Russian

imperialists and chauvinists have found themselves in a blind alley — they can neither go forwards nor backwards; the provocative bomb directed against Ukraine is exploding in their own hands. The endeavours to accuse the Ukrainian cultural leaders and workers of activities “contrary to the constitution” has come to nought because the so-called constitution of the USSR even contains an article (17) about possible secession “of the sovereign Soviet republics” from the USSR. Therefore, the Russian occupants are making all the efforts to link the defendants with the OUN, which does not recognize any Russian Bolshevik constitutions, any occupation laws, any puppets of the type of the Ukr. SSR, any imperialistic structures of the type of the USSR. The so-called Ukr. SSR is considered by it as a mere colony of the despotic Russian empire. It neither takes advantage of, nor bases its arguments on, the paper constitution of the USSR — Ukr. SSR, having rejected such a “possibility” in principle. The deceptive articles of the USSR — Ukr. SSR’s constitutions are considered by the OUN as a vile trap for those who are trying to implement them openly, albeit in the minimal limits of freedom of speech.

The OUN respects every leader and patriot of Ukraine, who strives to serve his nation by such means which he considers appropriate under the existing conditions. But the OUN has no links to any known formations or people in Ukraine who are acting within the constitutional framework. It has an entirely different concept of national revival and Ukraine’s liberation from under the Russian Bolshevik occupation. The KGB attempts to link Ukraine’s cultural leaders with the OUN have provocation as their objective — to ascribe to them connections with a revolutionary underground, regardless of the fact that the OUN fully negates not only the Russian Communist system in Ukraine, but also the Russian *gauleiters* and governors-general, to whom the arrested turn themselves, pointing to the lawlessness, from the standpoint of human and national rights guaranteed by the constitution. Ivan Dzyuba, for instance, wrote his documentation for *gauleiter* Shelest. This the OUN has never done and will never do. Nevertheless, it considers all the Ukrainian patriots in Ukraine, including those under arrest and those harassed, as noble, brave and morally excellent people who are serving their nations in their own way. But their concept is not the OUN’s concept. As a matter of principle, the OUN does not dispatch any couriers to the cultural leaders in Ukraine who are acting publicly within the framework of the constitution, because its concept of liberation does not recognize any appeals to the laws and the constitution of the occupants.

Of course, various Philbys and Felfs can assist the KGB in preparing still another provocation at the trial of the arrested leaders of Ukrainian culture. Dzhugalo also never had anything to do with the OUN but nevertheless “testified” about “OUN’s lackeyism to

foreign intelligence"; hence, "testimony" which was fabricated in advance by the KGB organs. However, in Ukraine nobody believes anymore in the revolutionary OUN's services to foreign powers for it has the reputation of an uncompromising fighter for freedom and national rights. It will do the Russian occupants no good to link the Ukrainian cultural leaders with casual tourists to whom fantastic missions are attributed. Khrushchev himself had at one time exposed Stalin's terrorist methods, including the circumstances surrounding the preparation of court proceedings against the Kremlin doctors who "upon orders of foreign intelligence" were allegedly to poison the Russian chieftains. Later these doctors were "rehabilitated" and those who prepared the provocation were annihilated. Hence, they destroyed some in order to save other Russian despots. The convicted Ostap Vyshnya was also "rehabilitated", but now those who are popularizing his works are being sentenced.

It is simply impossible to enumerate all those who were found guilty by the Russian Stalinist courts of "espionage", "subversive activity", "high treason" and so forth, and who were "rehabilitated" after Stalin's death. They were convicted, executed or exterminated in prisons and concentration camps, and then . . . "rehabilitated".

Brezhnev and Kosygin with their *gauleiter* Scherbytsky are following in the footsteps of Lenin-Stalin-Ddzerzhynsky-Yezhov. Russia has prepared a great provocation against the Ukrainian nation, in particular against its cultural élite. The liquidation of the Ukrainian intelligentsia is in the offing. It is our duty to expose before the whole world as soon as possible the horrible provocation of the KGB which aims to destroy the Ukrainian creative intelligentsia which, under conditions of shocking terror, attempts to serve its subjugated nation selflessly. We must mobilize all the freedom-loving forces of the world, its cultural élite, in defence of those arrested and persecuted, and of the entire Ukrainian nation in order to put an immediate end to and to condemn the barbarity of the Russian tyrants of our century.

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## ARRESTS AND PERSECUTIONS IN UKRAINE

In Summer copy of the Ukrainian Review we published the list of arrested and persecuted. Since then, more information has reached us about new arrests in Ukraine. The latest victims are cultural and scientific workers from Lviv, arrested during the massive arrests at the beginning of the year.

**DASHKEVYCH Yaroslav** — an academician, a researcher in Ukrainian antiquity.

**IVANYSENKO Victor Panasovych** — born 2. 1. 1927 in the village Novopavlivtsi, Mezhyvsky region, Dnipropetrovsk district, into a teacher's family. **1944-49** — served in the Soviet Army. **1953** — completed his studies at the Faculty of Philology, Kharkiv State University. Later taught in the Sums'k and Donetsk districts. From 1953 onwards an active literary critic and a specialist in literature. He wrote biographies and several other works, including poetry. He is a member of the Communist Party of the USSR and worked at the Academy's Institute of Literature in the Ukrainian SSR. **1958** — completed his post-graduate studies and handed in a thesis on "Ukrainian Soviet Poetry in the post-war period". He was an Associate at the Ukrainian Academy's Faculty of Philology. **June 1970** — in the basis of evidence from an informer, the KGB searched his home and confiscated novels and articles from the Ukrainian and Russian "Samvydav" publications and the work "Internationalism or Russification" by Ivan Dzyuba. His wife, who works at the Institute of Literature, was accused of reprinting and hiding "Samvydav" materials. He was later thrown out of the Communist Party, given a lower-paid job and unable to complete his Ph.D. thesis. In addition the authorities of the local Kyiv writers' society expelled him from their organisation but he still belonged to the Ukrainian Writers' Union. **27. 6. 1972** — at a meeting of the authorities of the Ukrainian Writers' Union, the case of Victor Ivanyenko received special attention. He was thrown out of the Ukrainian Writers' Union for anti-social behaviour against the USSR. His recent expulsion from the Ukrainian Writers' Union is no doubt a prelude to his inevitable arrest, similar to that of Ivan Dzyuba who was first thrown out of the Ukrainian Writers' Union and later arrested.

**KALYNETS Ihor** — born in 1939 in Khodoriv, Lviv district. **1961** — completed his education in the faculty of Philology at Lviv State University. He worked at the Lviv State Archives and began writing poetry during his student years. **1964-65** — his poems were printed in such journals as "Zmina" (Change), "Zhovten'" (October) and "Dnipro". **1966** — his first book of collected poems was published by 'Molod' **1970** — his second book came to the West without his knowledge and was published under the title — "Poems from Ukraine". **1972** — arrested in the Spring of 1972.

**KENDZ'OR Yaroslav M.** — a Trade Union worker in Lviv. **1969** — at the beginning of January the KGB searched his home. They were searching for the works of V. Chornovil but found nothing. They confiscated "The Black Council" (Chorna Rada) by P. Kulish, written and published in 1857 and an "Open letter to 'Literaturna Ukraine'". Kendz'or protested against this. **1970** — he signed a collective protest letter in defence of V. Moroz. **1972** — at the beginning of the year, the KGB searched his home. He was later arrested.

**POPADYUK** — no data available.

**SHUKHEVYCH-BEREZOWSKY Jurko Romanovych** **1972** — he was arrested in Nal'chyk, near Caucasus at the end of March. His trial took place very recently and he was sentenced by the Soviet courts to 12 years imprisonment and concentration camps. Since the age of 14 (1948), he has spent 20 years in prisons and exile.

**VOLYTS'KA Alena** — an engineer at a pedagogical laboratory at Lviv University. **Nov.-Dec. 1970** — sent a protest letter to the Supreme Court of the Ukrainian SSR against the unjust and outrageous hearing of V. Moroz, demanding a revocation of the illegal sentence. She was later reprimanded for travelling to Ivano-Frankivsk for the trial of Valentyn Moroz. At work a KGB agent sent to work with her in the laboratory, kept watch over her. **1972** — the KGB searched her home and some time later arrested her.

### LABOR CAMPS AND PRISON SENTENCE FOR UKRAINIAN INTELLECTUALS

Moscow, July 18, Reuter News Service — Three Ukrainians have been given labour camps sentences in separate trials linked with a major security police drive against nationalists and their home republics, a usually reliable source said today.

Two of the men, were found guilty of anti-Soviet agitation and were believed accused of circulating underground literature, the sources said.

They were named as **Alex Serhiyenko**, sentenced to seven years in a labour camp and three years internal exile, and **Vol. Rohytsky**, who was sentenced to a labour camp for five years.

The third, 58-year-old **Danylo Shumuk**, was sentenced to ten years in a labour camp and five in exile. Exact charges against him were not known.

The trials, held in the Kyiv region this month and last, followed a report in the Chronicle of Current Events, an underground journal, that security police had arrested over 100 people this year in Ukraine.

The Chronicle, which conceded it had not fully checked the report, said a number of Ukrainians had written to the Supreme Soviet (legislative assembly) warning against the Soviet system's "suppression of national consciousness" in Ukraine.

Ukrainian poet **Volodymyr Diak** was sentenced to seven years of imprisonment last April in Lviv for writing and passing out "anti-Soviet" and "nationalist" literature, it was learned here recently in news item received from Ukraine.

Diak, who was graduated from the university in Lviv in 1955 with a degree in engineering, worked as a factory manager. He took active part in the literary life of Western Ukraine, both performing and publishing his poems. His work often took him away on business trips, which he is accused of having used for his own "illegal" activities. Diak was arrested towards the end of last year.

At his trial Diak was charged with keeping a secret apartment in Lviv where he printed leaflets and brochures under the pseudonym "Khorvat" (Croat). Witnesses testified that he traveled to Kyiv from where he mailed his appeals and pamphlets to schools and officials in Ukraine and the Soviet Union. Besides his leaflets Diak is said to have written "nationalist" brochures.

Diak's trial was closed to the public and lasted several days. He was further accused of hiding weapons and a large sum of money, which he was supposed to have collected among friends for "underground activities".

Several witnesses were to have testified favorably for Diak, emphasizing his exemplary and hard-working fulfilment of duties as factory manager. Attempts by the prosecution to connect his case to the arrests of Ukrainian intellectuals in January of this year failed.

Diak was born in Western Ukraine in 1931, is married and has two children.

### THE KGB FORCED TO BRING V. MOROZ BACK TO UKRAINE

The seriously wounded Valentyn Moroz was transferred at the beginning of October from the Vladimir prison in Russia to Kyiv where he was confined to a prison hospital. Although the injuries suffered by V. Moroz were not fatal, his life continues to be in danger. Imprisoned in the Vladimir prison since 1970, V. Moroz constantly suffered from a chronic anemia and an ulcer of the stomach without receiving appropriate medical treatment. The severe knife wounds inflicted by criminals who were confined to the same cell as V. Moroz undermined his state of health. V. Moroz was saved almost by miracle, when bleeding profusely and unconscious he was taken to the prison hospital at Vladimir. According to the most widespread reports from Kyiv, the assassination attempt was planned by the organs of the KGB.

### THE 6TH ISSUE OF THE UKRAINSKYI VISNYK AND A NEW WAVE OF ARRESTS

A subsequent wave of arrests is sweeping across Ukraine which began in mid-August, 1972. It is linked to the appearance and further dissemination of Ukrainian underground publications, the so-called samvydav. Hundreds of persons from various walks of life within the Ukrainian community are summoned for questioning by the KGB organs and detained for several days. The homes of many individuals, in particular students, are searched several times in an attempt to find the materials of Ukrainian samvydav; and people who have prepared the 6th issue of the *Ukrainskyi Visnyk*.

In Kyiv, mostly young people who just happened to pass near one of the Kyiv jails are detained very often. The agents of the KGB make this quite openly so as to intimidate the nationally conscious youth or sympathizers of the liberation movement. One of the Kyiv writers said: "Ukraine has not known such KGB violence since the Stalinist times... What a high price in victims must a nation pay in order to survive the hard times..."

Reports penetrating from the Kyiv and Lviv prisons speak about the application of tortures and beating of prisoners in order to force statement of repentance or testimony required by the KGB from them. Renowned for his cruelty in the application of Stalinist methods is KGB major Halskyi, who writes under the pseudonym Klym Dmytruk. Halskyi specializes in interrogating Ukrainian prisoners.

\*

19-year-old **Lidiya Serednyak** was sentenced in Kyiv to a year of concentration camp for alleged nationalist activity. **Vyacheslav Gluzman** was convicted together with her. Both of them are accused of "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda". They are said to be part of the group of 20 Ukrainians imprisoned in January.

#### Ukrainian Teacher Terrorized

**Bohdan Keyvan** a resident of Kutly in the Kosiv region of Ukraine was sentenced in 1970 to a year of forced labour.

B. Keyvan was a teacher of the English language at the Kutly secondary school. He was dismissed from work and deprived of the right to teach by the decision of the court on totally illegal grounds, namely that Keyvan's father had been a "kulak" at one time, that his father still has an "unhealthy" attitude and so forth.

Being an expert in the English language, B. Keyvan subsequently earned his living by private lessons and lived together with his father. He was found guilty of "idleness".

#### Punished for a Ukrainian Slogan

**Zhytomyr**. — The home of pensioner **Karpo Yavir**, whose son Mykola is a student of the Kyiv University, was searched and the entire library confiscated because some contained an ex-libris with the inscription "Ukraine has not perished yet". (The words of the Ukrainian national anthem — transl.).

### UKRAINIAN ENGINEER COMMITS SUICIDE

News has reached us from Ukraine that a young engineer, **Katala**, committed suicide in Lviv as a sign of protest against the arrests and repressions.

Katala was born in 1942. He was a close friend of **Stefania Shabatura**, a carpet designer. After her arrest, he was summoned for interrogation and urged to give false testimony against S. Shabatura, condemn his acquaintance and friendship with her and testify against her in court. Being under constant moral pressure, engineer Katala feared that under the influence of psychologically medical tortures he can break down and testify against his friends and acquaintances.



According to reports, engineer Katala was summoned on May 28th to the Lviv prison for a subsequent discussion. He was interrogated in the women's wing where an eye to eye encounter with Stephaniea Shabatura was to have been arranged for him. During questioning he dashed out of the room of the interrogator, found himself in the corridor and with shouts of protest plunged the concealed scissors in his heart. When the KGB officers caught up with him he was already dead.

Fearing that the news of Katala's suicide will spread throughout the city and cause disturbances at the very time of US President Nixon's visit to Kyiv, the KGB intensified security around the entire prison, suspended all visits and in the night of 28/29th May buried the body of engineer Katala in an unknown place without even notifying his closest relatives about it.

### **Writer Expelled from the Writers' Union of Ukraine**

As reported by *Literaturna Ukraina* of October 20, 1972, at the meeting of the Executive Board of the Kyiv Writers' Union of Ukraine, chaired by Yuriy Zhanatskyi, which was held in mid-October, aside from obvious "shortcomings" in the activity of members of the said Union "the case of V. Zakharchenko, a prosaist from Cherkasy, was considered. V. I. Zakharchenko was excluded from membership in the Union for anti-social conduct, which contradicts the Charter of the Writers' Union and is incompatible with membership in the writers' organization".

No concrete reasons for expulsion were provided. At one time the Ukrainian underground publication *Ukrainskyi Visnyk* wrote about repressions against Vasyl Zakharchenko. At the time of his journalistic work in Donetsk, his apartment was searched on June 8, 1970 in connection with the case of Ivan Suk, a lecturer at the Medical Institute, as the result of which an unfinished manuscript of a novel, private letters, notes and books were confiscated. Having moved to Cherkasy, V. Zakharchenko was dismissed from work in the editorial office of *Molod Cherkashchyny* (The Youth of the Cherkasy Region). When upon the assignment of the WUU he travelled to Donbas for appearances before the workers, his trip was interrupted upon instructions of the Donetsk Oblast Committee of the Party, allegedly because the miners were indignant that he speaks "in Ukrainian, a language not understood by them". For a biting remark on this occasion, expressed by V. Zakharchenko to a KGB agent assigned to him, he was dismissed from work. Vasyl Stus, a specialist of literature recently sentenced to three years of imprisonment and five years of exile, wrote a protest letter in the case of I. Suk and V. Zakharchenko to the Head of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR O. Lyashko, and the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine F. Ovcharenko.

Vasyl Zakharchenko was born in 1936 in Hutyryvka, a small settlement near Poltava. In 1958 he finished the Faculty of Journalism at the Kyiv University and worked for the press. His short stories "Spivuchyi korin" (Singing root) (1964), "Tramvay o shostiy hodyni vechora" (Trolley at 6 p. m.) (1966) and "Stezhka" (Trail) (1968) appeared as separate books.

## **TWO MORE WRITERS CONVICTED**

### **Vasyl Stus and Mykhaylo Osadchyi Sentenced — Kateryna Zarytska-Soroka Released after a Quarter Century in Concentration Camps**

It has been reported from Ukraine that in September 1972 the poet Vasyl Stus has been convicted in Kyiv on the basis of Article 187-1 of the Criminal Code of the Ukr. SSR to three years in prison and five years in exile. Approximately at the same time, the writer Mykhaylo Osadchyi has been sentenced in Lviv to 7 years of imprisonment and 5 years of exile. He was tried according to Article 62 CC Ukr. SSR.

On September 21, 1972, Kateryna Zarytska-Soroka was released after an imprisonment of 25 years. She returned to Lviv.

The poet and literary critic Vasyl Stus was born in 1938 in the Vinnytsya region. He studied pedagogics. In 1963 his works began to be published in Kyiv periodicals. In 1965 he did research work in the Institute of Literature of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukr. SSR. He wrote letters in defence of those repressed and arrested. In November 1970, he delivered a eulogy at the funeral of Alla Horska. A collection of poetry by V. Stus "Zymovi dereva" (Winter trees) was published in Brussels by the "Literature and Art" Publishers.

The writer Mykhaylo Osadchyi was born in 1936 in the Sumy region. He graduated from the Faculty of Journalism of the Lviv University where he became a lecturer later. He was first sentenced in 1966 to two years of imprisonment. In 1968 he returned to Lviv from Mordovia. He is the author of the collection "Misyachne pole" (Moon field), which was immediately destroyed after its publication by "Kamienyar" Publishers. The essay "Bilmo" (Cataract), the authorship of which is attributed to Osadchyi, was published in the West in several editions. At the trial in Lviv, the investigators were unable to prove that Osadchyi was the author of the said work. Therefore, he was tried only for poems of "anti-Soviet character", which were allegedly found in the writer's home during a search. After the passing of the verdict, on April 19, 1966, a son — Taras was born to the Osadchyis, and on the eve of the subsequent trial and the second conviction a daughter was born to them.

According to reports from Ukraine, all 1972 trials were conducted in secret and in most cases not even the closest relatives were admitted to them. All those convicted before October 1972 are said to be still in Ukraine.

**DR. KU CHENG-KANG, HONORARY CHAIRMAN, WORLD  
ANTI-COMMUNIST LEAGUE, DENOUNCES RUSSIA'S  
IMPRISONMENT OF UKRAINIAN INTELLECTUALS  
AS RETURN TO STALINISM**

The Ukrainian historian, Valentyn Moroz, sentenced to 14 years of imprisonment (now in Vladimir gaol) for publishing essays on cultural and historical problems, is critically ill and is being slowly poisoned by the KGB in order to break his will power and force a declaration of repentance from him.

In January 1972, over 100 Ukrainian cultural leaders, all defenders of human and national rights, were arrested in Kyiv, Lviv and other cities. They included poets, writers, artists, literary critics and scientists. Among them were Ivan Svitlychnyi, Vyacheslav Chornovil, Yevhen Sverstyuk, Ivan Dzyuba, Leonid Plushch, Vasyl Stus, Oleksander Serhiyenko, Irena Stasiv-Kalynets, Stefaniya Shabatura, Mykhaylo Osadchyi, Ivan Hel, Hryhoriy Chubay and Father Vasyl Romanyuk (Orthodox priest).

Unable to put these Ukrainians on trial for violating the Constitution, the KGB decided to link them with a Belgian student tourist, Y. Dobosh, and to accuse the latter of association with the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists abroad, which they falsely represent as being in contact with Western intelligence services. Such are the measures adopted by Russia against Ukrainians and other oppressed nations which are fighting for human rights and national independence.

If given the chance, those now being imprisoned would be able to prove to the court and the world at large that the charges against them are nothing but pure fabrication.

In my capacity as Honorary Chairman of the World Anti-Communist League, I condemn the Soviet revival of Stalinism by resorting to trumped-up charges and wholesale persecution as a means to silence opposition and eliminate leaders of the subjugated peoples.

Furthermore, I appeal to all national, civic, religious, youth and other organized bodies in the free world, such as the International Red Cross, the International Commission of Jurists, the International Court at the Hague, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, the European Council in Strassbourg, and the Amnesty International to do all they can to secure the release of all the Ukrainian political prisoners.

## CAPTIVE NATIONS WEEK IN GREAT BRITAIN

The British League for European Freedom organized Captive Nations Week from 25th June to 2nd July, 1972, in support of all nations subjugated by Communism and Russian imperialism.

### London Programme:

**Sunday, 25th June:** Interdenominational Service at All Soul's Church, Landham Place, London.

**Monday, 26th June:** Representatives of the British League for European Freedom handed a composite Memorandum from all European Captive Nations to the Foreign Office.

**Tuesday, 27th June:** Press Conference at St. Bride's Church Hall, Fleet Street, Reception at St. Stephen's Club, Queen Anne's Gate.

**Thursday, 29th June:** Public Meeting at Westminster Cathedral Hall, Ambrosden Avenue. Speakers: General Sir Walter Walker, KCB, CBE, DSO and Ian Greig.

**Friday, 30th June:** Ukrainian Reception at 154 Holland Park Avenue.

### What Is Captive Nations Week?

Every year all captive nations of the USSR commemorate Captive Nations Week. This is held to remind British people that nations of the so-called Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and other Communist-occupied countries are continually persecuted and enslaved by Russia. Being fortunate enough to live in such a freedom-loving democratic country as Great Britain, it is very easy to forget the plight of other nations who do not enjoy this kind of freedom and democracy. Captive Nations Week is an opportunity to expose the plight of the East European nations.

**British League For European Freedom**

## THE PATTERN OF RUSSIAN CONQUEST IN EUROPE

**Aide Memoire addressed to the British Foreign Secretary,  
Sir Alec Douglas-Home, on the occasion of the Fourth Annual  
Captive Nations Week 1972**

We representatives of the **British League for European Freedom** believe it is our duty in this the 50th anniversary of the formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to raise our voices in defense of the European Captive Nations, forcibly occupied and later incorporated into it by the Red Army and Red Guards. At a moment when *détente*, peaceful co-existence, European security and control of nuclear armaments signpost the future of Europe, we feel impelled to remind those who lead us of the true facts behind the annexation of thousands of square miles of territory, and the subjugation, persecution and genocide of many millions of European people by the Russians during half a century of brutal colonialism. We would also like to warn of similar dangers threatening all European countries from further Russian expansionism. Article VI of the Treaty of Brest Litovsk of 3rd March 1918 laid down that:

"Russia must immediately conclude a Peace Treaty with the Ukrainian People's Republic and recognize the one which exists between that State and the 4-Power Alliance: Ukrainian territory must at once be cleared of Russian troops and the Russian Red Guard, and Russian must cease all agitation and propaganda against the Ukrainian Government and her public institutions. Russian troops must likewise immediately be withdrawn from Estonia and Livonia".

The Treaty clearly establishes the fact that Russian forces were in illegal occupation of Ukraine, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. In the case of Ukraine,

occupation had followed closely upon the proclamation of Ukrainian Independence by the then Parliament on 22nd January, 1918, a proclamation officially recognized by Great Britain, France and other powers. In direct defiance and blatant violation of international law Russia, however, moved more troops into Ukraine. Three years of war followed, culminating in the incorporation of that country in the U.S.S.R. in 1922.

Byelorussia suffered a similar fate. After the first All-Byelorussian Congress of December, 1917, the country's independence was proclaimed on 25th March 1918. Twelve nations accorded *de facto* recognition to independent Byelorussia but the Red Army forcibly seized and occupied it on 1st January, 1919. The Byelorussian Government continued to function from Prague until the outbreak of World War II.

Under the so-called Riga Peace Treaty of 18th March, 1921, the Soviet Union illegally divided its newly-annexed territories, thus rendering them less able to resist.

By the same methods, and during the same period, Russia appropriated into the U.S.S.R. the Caucasian republics of Georgia and Armenia. Under the Treaty of Versailles of 1918, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania again became independent states, and the Western powers extended *de jure* recognition to them, and they were admitted to membership in the League of Nations. However, upon the withdrawal of the German army, Russian troops invaded Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. They were bitterly and successfully opposed by the three newly formed armies. The Estonians were supported by token Finnish and Danish volunteer forces, and by the British navy in the Baltic Sea. In the Tartu Peace Pact of 2nd February, 1920, Soviet Russia repeated her promises made (and swiftly broken) in the Brest Litovsk Treaty that she would forever renounce all claim to Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian territory. In less than four years, however, in a brief overnight coup, Russia again went back on her word, attacked Estonia and tried to annex her but the coup was firmly suppressed and for the next 22 years the three Baltic States enjoyed independence. The expansionist eye of the Kremlin was, however, upon them, and in the infamous Molotov/Ribbentrop non-aggression pact of 23rd August, 1939, the three countries were once again overrun and occupied by the Russian imperialists.

Turning to Poland, we recall her own proclamation of independence on 11th November 1918, and the swift Russian attack which was repulsed by the Polish army helped by well-equipped troops raised in France and former Austro-Hungarian territories. The Riga Peace Pact of March 1921, which illegally ceded the western territories of Ukraine and Byelorussia to Poland, ended the war.

The events of World War II and the terms of the Treaty of Yalta again threw Central and Eastern Europe into ferment, and the U.S.S.R. gained control by subversive propaganda and armed intervention of Hungary, Rumania, Czecho-Slovakia, Poland, Bulgaria and East Germany. Finally we saw Albania fall victim to internal Communist subversion and takeover, as Tito subjugated the ethnic nations within the federation of Yugoslavia.

Freedom, however, dies very hard indeed in the countries of Eastern Europe, and in the 1956 Poznan riots in Poland, the brutal suppression of the 1956 Hungarian national uprising, the subduing by 500,000 Red Army troops of the 1968 "spring" in Czecho-Slovakia, the growing individual and collective protests and demonstrations throughout the U.S.S.R. and its satellites, and finally during the last week or two, in the Lithuanian riots, we see a continuous, increasingly unyielding resistance to the Russian colonialist yoke. The pattern of Russian Communist conquest in Europe — and throughout the world — is there for all to see. **The British League for European Freedom** warns that if the Eastern half of Europe remains in bondage to the Kremlin, it can only frustrate and eventually wreck all British efforts to political, economic and social cohesion in Europe as a whole.

## AGAINST INCREASING TERROR IN UKRAINE

### Joint Political Rally of 15,000 Canadians and Americans Protesting the Recent Wave of Political Arrests in Ukraine, Toronto, June 25th, 1972

In the latest drive against dissidents in the Soviet Union more arrests have taken place in Ukraine than anywhere else in the USSR. Among the many arrested since January, 1972, whose total number exceeds one hundred, the following names have been so far disclosed: Ivan Dzyuba (author of **Internationalism or Russification?** published by Weidenfeld & Nicolson), Vasyl Stus, Ivan Svitlychnyi, Yevhen Sverstyuk, Mykola Shamuk, Zenoviy Antonyuk, H. Manylo, Iryna Stasiv-Kalynets, Stefaniya Shabatura, Stefaniya Hulyk, Vyacheslav Chornovil (author of **The Chornovil Papers**, published by McGraw-Hill), Mykhaylo Osadchyi, Ivan Hel, Hryhoriy Chubay, Rev. Vasyl Romanyuk, Hryhoriy Shukhur, Youriy Melnyk, Ihor Kalynets, Nina Strokata and Yuriy Shukhevych.

Why has the KGB singled out Ukraine as a special target? It is important to realize that national sentiments have been on the rise again in the various republics of the USSR. Nowhere, however, have national feelings been more strongly held than among the 50 million Ukrainians — the second largest East European nation next to the Russians. The entire history of Soviet Ukraine is one of continuous strife, of attempts on Moscow's part to come to terms with the country by methods ranging from invasion and open warfare (1918-1921) and outright terror (the 1930's) to policies of forced Russification and the banning of the Ukrainian language from institutions of higher learning, the assignment of Russians to key positions, etc.

Russia's difficulties were increased during and after World War II. The struggle for national independence of the Ukrainian people reached a new peak again, when approximately 200,000 men waged a relentless guerrilla struggle in the ranks of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) for a whole decade (1942-1952) — against the Nazis till 1944, and against the Russians thereafter. The scope of this struggle has been illustrated in Khrushchev's memoirs:

... After the war, we lost thousands of men in a bitter struggle between the Ukrainian nationalists and the forces of Soviet Power... It took a large-scale military and police operation, with all the paraphernalia of tanks, aircraft, and heavy artillery, to break up the rebel forces, composed of dedicated Ukrainian nationalists, deserters from the Soviet armed forces, former prisoners of war, and displaced persons of all kinds and many nationalities — all united in fear or hatred of Moscow".

(Khrushchev Remembers, p. 147)

Today's Rally also commemorates the 30th Anniversary of the official creation of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA).

At present, the strong-arm methods are superseded by cultural and administrative Russification which has today created a situation which the regime considers potentially just as dangerous as the military forays by the Ukrainian guerrillas in the recent past.

In the mid-1960's a new breed of concerned Ukrainians came to the fore, known as the "Men of the Sixties". The protest of these young intellectuals against specific policies of the Russian regime has **not** been voiced in anti-Soviet terms but rather in legal terms. They have not criticized the Soviet laws as such, but rather those who have consistently violated them — the carriers of Russian chauvinism, that is, the police, the courts, the censorship, the Russian-controlled Soviet bureaucracy.

To the extent that they have opposed forced Russification and have called

for unhindered culture development for their country they have done so on strictly constitutional grounds (Soviet Constitution, Articles 124 & 125). Others have either alluded to, or have openly come out in favour of separate Ukrainian statehood but, again, basing themselves on the constitution (Article 17) which guarantees the right of secession to all republics of the USSR, and on the civil and political rights recognized and adopted by the 21st Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations Organization. Consequently, in 1965-66 the KGB descended on these young intellectuals, arresting about one hundred of them. And it is the same breed of men and women who are being persecuted now.

While Ukrainian national aspirations have mainly been led by intellectuals (as they have been in every country over the past century), there is mounting evidence that have struck a responsive chord among the ordinary citizenry. The massive scale of present-day repressions in Ukraine (and in other republics) is an indication of how much Moscow fears what it rightly judges to be the beginning of a mass movement of dissident in the country.

In January 1971, workers' revolts broke out in the Ukrainian cities of Kharkiv and Kyiv, in part organized by former Red Army soldiers of Ukrainian nationality. Also, eight months before the Polish workers' rising (December 1970) the industrial city of Kharkiv had been on the verge of a workers' revolt which had summoned CP Secretary-General L. Brezhnev to the scene of trouble for purposes of appeasement.

What many in the West do not know is known to the Ukrainian and with them to the other 100 million non-Russians in the USSR: the fate of Polish workers as well as of those in the other satellite countries is decided not only in Warsaw, Prague, or Budapest, since only violent political and national seismic shocks in the economic and cultural centers of the second largest Slav nations, the Ukrainian, can develop the explosive force necessary to bring about any radical change in Eastern Europe, and these centers are: Kyiv, Lviv, Rostov, Odessa, Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, the Don Basin.

Furthermore, the social liberation struggle of all nations behind the Iron Curtain is organically connected with their national liberation struggle. The driving ideological and emotional force is a new nationalism — liberation nationalism. In this lies the dialectic of the anti-imperialist revolution in the East: social freedom not without national freedom, and vice versa: national freedom not without social freedom. Those voices of protest raised today in Kyiv, Lviv, Odessa, Kharkiv, Minsk, Riga, Vilno, or Szczecin and Poznan, are not only demanding bread but also to eat it in freedom.

What concerns all those taking part in today's Political Rally as citizens of Canada and the United States, is the obvious bias, lack of interest, and discrimination by the media which is for all practical purposes silencing this growing movement of political and social dissent behind the Iron Curtain, despite the vast flow of smuggled documents, pleas, petitions and underground publications. These materials obviously will not be published in *Pravda*, but it would certainly not hurt the circulation of Canadian or American newspapers nor upset our Radio and T. V. audiences. The words of such Ukrainian intellectuals in the USSR as the historian Valentyn Moroz or the literary critic Ivan Dzyuba, tried in secret courts, deserve at least an equal share of the publicity given to Angela Davis, Herbert Marcuse, or "The Chicago Seven". These intellectuals do not want to wait for another Hungarian Revolution or another Invasion of Czecho-Slovakia for the world to consider their testimony of a more real brand of imperialism, dictatorship, police brutality, and mock trials.

When placed in the perspective of the international balance of powers manipulated by expedient diplomacy, on the one hand, and those universal inalienable Human and National Rights sealed by U. N. Declarations, on the other — the International Human Rights Defence Committee, founded and chaired by the Rt. Hon. John Diefenbaker, has a unique value. Its aim is to sensitize world opinion, to awaken the conscience of mankind to an inhumane reality that has been camouflaged and smoke-screened from the eyes of the

world by high level power politics. Its work and endeavours will be conducive to positive actions that will some day guarantee and safeguard individual as well as national justice and liberty for all men and nations.

It is most appropriate that the man who introduced and implemented the Bill of Rights into the Canadian Constitution, should now take upon himself this important task for the benefit of all fellow men.

In concluding, let the words of Ivan Dzyuba, spoken at Babyn Yar before the mass graves of Ukrainian and Jewish victims of Nazism re-echo today from behind the bars of a Soviet prison:

"There are tragedies, whose immensity cannot be expressed in words and about which more can be said in silence. However, silence says much only where everything which could have been said has already been said. When everything is far from having been said, when in fact nothing has been yet said — then silence becomes a partner of lies and slavery. Therefore we speak, we must speak wherever possible, taking advantage of all the opportunities which come our way.

"At the same time we must remember that Fascism did not start with Babyn Yar and does not end with it. Fascism begins with disrespect of the individual and ends with the destruction of the individual, with the destruction of peoples".

(Revolutionary Voices, p. 142)

### UNREST IN UKRAINE

Over 10,000 people, rebelling against the Moscow rule in Dniprodzerzhinsk (Kamyans'ke, Dnipropetrovsk region), damaged the KGB and Ministry of State Security buildings, destroyed all the political documents, passports and citizens' personal data, smashed windows, damaged doors and tore down portraits of Brezhnev, Lenin and other Soviet leaders, killing one KGB agent during the uprising. Other groups of demonstrators destroyed the buildings that housed the regional administrative, party and military (including the Comsomol) bodies.

According to reliable sources, the uprising in Dniprodzerzhinsk on the 25th and 26th June, involved between 10 and 12 thousand people, half of whom were young people and women. The units of the KGB opened fire, killing 10 people and injuring hundreds of others. One Ukrainian died in the fire of the KGB building. Several of the KGB agents and the Military Police also died in similar manner, while about 50 were injured.

According to the information which reached the West, everything began with the arrests of several youths, who teased one of the military as being identified with the Russian occupation of Ukraine. The Russians used everything they had against the demonstrators — local military garrison, units of the KGB and fire brigades. Within two days 9 buildings were either destroyed or damaged. Many people were arrested after the uprising.

### STRIKE IN DNIPROPETROVSK (UKRAINE)

According to the latest information from Ukraine, on the 19th September, 1972, in Dnipropetrovsk, a large-scale strike broke out among the workers and the population which gathered in masses and surrounded the headquarters of the regional Communist Party, protesting and demanding a higher standard of living and more national freedom. The regional Communist Party called out military and police units which opened fire on the demonstrators. As yet there is no news about human sacrifices, which no doubt must have been heavy, nor is there a fuller account about the uprising in that place.

## PASTORAL LETTER

### of the Permanent Synod of the Ukrainian Catholic Church

At the conclusion of the first session of the Permanent Synod of the UCC, at which various important current problems of our church life were touched upon, we, the members of this Synod, address this brief word to you in the time of our national affliction in order to intensify even more our fraternal assistance to our still persecuted Church on the territories of Ukraine and to rise in defence of the leaders in the field of Ukrainian spirituality and culture, who today have become the objects of violent repressions from the side of the atheist leadership.

Increased assistance to our Church in Ukraine becomes all the more pressing today, since the atheist regime, and in conjunction with it the Russian Orthodox authorities, have launched an animated campaign in the civilized world, particularly among ecumenical circles, aimed at justification of the barbarous destruction of the Ukrainian Catholic Church. They attempt to convince the free and Christian world that the decision of the so-called Lviv Synod of 1946, composed of a very insignificant number of Ukrainian clergy and laity, terrorized by the police, to sever the Union with the Apostolic See and to pass under the jurisdiction of the Patriarch of Moscow, — had not been an act of religious violence, but allegedly “a spontaneous expression of free will” of the Ukrainian Catholics to return “to the bosom of their maternal Russian Orthodox Church”, from which they were supposedly forcefully separated by the Union of Berestya. At the same time, these authorities maintain that the arrest and conviction of all Ukrainian Catholic bishops, a large number of priests, monks, nuns and the faithful which was linked to this “return” of the Ukrainian Catholics to the Russian Orthodox Church, — did not stem from their religious convictions, but was dictated by their political collaboration with enemies of the “Soviet people” during World War II.

In this projection, this crime, — one of the gravest crimes of modern history of brutal and unscrupulous extermination of the Ukrainian Catholic Church by the atheist regime, — assumes in the eyes of the uninformed public a form of “return of normal and legal state” in church affairs on the territories of Ukraine. Dissemination of such glaring falsehood, which does such painful injustice to our Church and the whole Ukrainian nation, does not permit us to remain silent. We must, first of all in the name of truth alone, and then in the name of our Holy Church, mistreated in such a brutal manner, expose before the world the total falsehood of such information and place our cruel reality before the eyes of this world in its true light.

While defending the rights of our Ukrainian Catholic Church, we are also aware of the trampled rights of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church,



just as heartlessly liquidated by the atheistic Communist regime, as well as of the rights of various Ukrainian communities, and religious rights in general of all believers, deprived of the freedom of conscience and religion in the territories of Ukraine.

Another form of denying human rights, which had been applied in the past and which was revived with even greater cruelty by the Russian Communist regime in destroying Ukrainian spirituality, is persecution and repressions against leaders in the field of Ukrainian spirituality and culture. As it is now generally known, with each day the number of Ukrainians — scholars, writers, artists, particularly within the younger generation, who are arrested, indicted and tried only for the fact that they had the courage to defend the rights of Christ's Church in Ukraine and the Ukrainian language and culture, increases. All of them are charged with the "crime" of defending the human right to be oneself, i.e. to remain Ukrainian, which according to Divine laws is the most fundamental and natural aspiration of every society and every human being.

In the face of such denial of the most basic rights of the Ukrainian people, we cannot be silent either. We should rise in defence of those spiritual leaders of our nation who have the courage to fight for the fundamental values of its cultural and national existence. For at stake here is the general spiritual good of the Church and of our people as a whole.

In order to be able to conduct a successful defence of, and to give assistance to, the Ukrainian Catholic Church and other Christian Churches and cultural leaders we herewith request our bishops:

- 1) To proclaim the month of July as a month of prayer for freedom of Christ's Church in the territories of Ukraine. During that time all the faithful of our Church should sincerely pray, privately and in churches under the leadership of their priests, for this great intention. On Sunday, July 30th, in connection with the feast of Saint Volodymyr the Great, Prince of the Church on a par with the Apostles (July 28th), who made Christianity the state religion of Ru'-Ukraine, the reverend pastors should serve Divine Liturgies for the intention of the Ukrainian people and deliver sermons on the obligation of our faithful in the free world to defend the rights of their Church and other Christian Churches and to demand freedom for Ukrainian cultural leaders. After the Liturgies, Panakhydas (offices for the dead) should be said for all those who sacrificed their lives in defence of the rights of Christ's Church and their nation.

- 2) To intensify on the territories of all eparchies and spheres of action of our Church a defence campaign against further persecution of the Ukrainian Catholic Church and other Christian Churches in Ukraine, appealing to the conscience of the free world, in particular to the United Nations, to restore in the land of our fathers and forefathers the freedom of religion to all Churches and denominations and to cease repressions against the clergy, the faithful and the leaders in the field of the Ukrainian culture.

- 3) Also, it is necessary to instigate an informational campaign in various languages of the world on all these matters, refuting untrue and slanderous information provided by the regime and its spokesmen.

Together with our fraternal greetings, we extend to you our Pontifical benediction.

May the grace of Our Lord Jesus Christ, the love of God the Father and the presence of the Holy Ghost be with you.

Issued in Rome, in the Church of Our Lady of Zhyrovtytsi of SS. Sergius and Bacchus, on 8 June, Anno Domini 1972.

**Members of the Permanent Synod of the Ukrainian Catholic Church  
under the leadership of Archbishop Major and Cardinal Yosyf Slipy**

## ONE OF CANADA'S CENTRES OF UKRAINIAN STUDIES:

**Department of Slavic Studies, University of Manitoba**

*By Dr. BORYSLAW N. BILASH*

*Lecturer at Ukrainian Free University*

### I.

The Department of Slavic Studies at the University of Manitoba was founded in 1949. It was first proposed by the Ukrainian Canadian Committee which in the spring of that year discussed with the late Dr. W. Gillson, the President of the University of Manitoba, the establishment of a Chair of Ukrainian Studies. The problem faced by them was that of raising the necessary money, as the University of Manitoba was not a wealthy university.<sup>1</sup> It was planned to establish the department in 1951, thus allowing the Ukrainian community two years for collecting funds.

To everyone's pleasant surprise, President Gillson decided to broaden the planned department to a Department of Slavic Studies and to establish it immediately in 1949 from University funds without the assistance of the Ukrainian community. The new department would then include, besides Ukrainian, Russian, Polish, and Old Bulgarian languages and literature. It is generally accepted that President Gillson was prompted to make this important decision by the fact that Dr. J. B. Rudnyckyy, who resided in Winnipeg and therefore would have been available to chair the new department, was considering an invitation from the University of Alberta to join its staff as professor in the Department of Modern Languages.<sup>2</sup>

To the meeting held in the President's home in Fort Garry on June 7, 1949, were invited Dr. J. B. Rudnyckyy and Mr. Paul Yuzyk. They all agreed that the new department would be a Department of Slavic Studies. From 1949 to 1951 it was to consist of only one staff member, Dr. Rudnyckyy, paid exclusively from University funds. In 1951, after sufficient additional funds had been

1) "Department Slovyans'kykh Studiy v Manitobi" (Department of Slavic Studies in Manitoba), *Ukrainian Voice*, January 14, 1951.

2) "Professor J. Rudnyckyy mav sche odnu ofertu", (Prof. J. Rudnyckyy Had Yet Another Offer), *Canadian Farmer*, July 20, 1949.

collected by the Ukrainian Professional and Business Men's Club of Winnipeg, a second member would be added. This would be Paul Yuzyk, who by then would have completed his Ph.D. at the University of Minnesota. On June 13th, the Board of Governors having approved President Gillson's proposal, Dr. Rudnyckyy wrote his letter to the University of Alberta declining the position which had been offered him.<sup>3</sup>

On June 2, 1949, articles appeared in the **Winnipeg Free Press** and the **Winnipeg Tribune** announcing the establishment of a Department of Slavic Studies at the University of Manitoba and the appointment of Dr. J. B. Rudnyckyy as Assistant Professor. The announcement was received with great enthusiasm by the Ukrainian community and the Ukrainian Press.<sup>4</sup>

In 1951 the Ukrainian Professional and Business Men's Club established its Ukrainian Studies Fund. In the five-year campaign, under the able chairmanship of Mr. Mark Smerchanski and the eager co-operation of its members, the club collected approximately \$25,000.00, enabling the University to appoint Paul Yuzyk as a second member of the Slavic Studies staff. As a part-time lecturer the University accepted Dr. Mulyk-Lucyk, who later resigned when the University rejected his request for a raise in salary in a letter dated February 2, 1954.

The Ukrainian Professional and Business Men's Club is to be commended not only for the establishment of the Ukrainian Studies Fund but also for its continued interest, as is evidenced by its awarding of an annual prize of \$100.00 to the student proving himself most proficient in Ukrainian.

In 1959, in recognition for their work J. B. Rudnyckyy was promoted to full professorship and Paul Yuzyk to Associate Professor, the latter simultaneously in the Department of Slavic Studies and the Department of History. That year, which Professor Yuzyk spent in London on a research project, he was temporarily replaced by Dr. Michael Yaremko.

The years 1960 to 1963 saw several changes in the personnel of the Slavic Studies Department. Henry D. Wiebe was appointed part-time lecturer. Professor Yuzyk, now Dr. Yuzyk, resigned to accept a call to the Senate of Canada. During this period R. Klymash and B. Rubchak were appointed to the staff of the Slavic Department. Both eventually resigned. In 1963 Professor Rudnyckyy was appointed to the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism.

In 1964, Professors J. Rozumnyy and I. Tarnawewky were added to the staff.<sup>5</sup> In 1970, in connection with Professor Rudnyckyy's sabbatical two members were added to the staff: Dr. S. Pohorilyy and J. Petach as lecturers.

At present the staff of the Slavic Department of the University of Manitoba consists of Dr. J. B. Rudnyckyy, professor and head of the Department; Dr. J. Rozumnyy, associate professor; Dr. I. Tarnawewky, assistant professor; Henry

<sup>3</sup>) W. T. Zyla, *Postwar Slavistics in Canada: Slavic Studies at the University of Manitoba*, Winnipeg, 1959.

<sup>4</sup>) University of Manitoba Archives.

<sup>5</sup>) *Ibid.*

D. Wiebe, assistant professor; Dr S. Pohorilyy, and J. Peach, lecturers. In comparison to the 22 students enrolled in Slavic Studies in 1949, in the 1971-1972 session there were 178 students enrolled in Slavic Studies, 14 of whom were working toward the M.A. degree in this field.<sup>6</sup>

The Slavic Studies Department of the University of Manitoba has gained world-wide recognition and respect for the high level of its teaching, research and publication in the field of Slavic languages and literatures.<sup>7</sup> Many of its graduates occupy important positions with the Government of Canada, and with various universities and educational institutions in Canada and abroad.

<sup>6</sup>) *Ibid.*

<sup>7</sup>) *Ex. Readings in Slavic Folklore*, Winnipeg 1951-6, and *Readings in Slavic Literature*, Winnipeg 1958-1972, edited by Prof. J. B. Rudnycky.

## **Book Review**

### **WINNIPEG CENTRE OF UKRAINIAN STUDIES**

Besides academic teaching the Winnipeg Centre of Ukrainian Studies has been conducting an important research activity, in particular after the establishment of a Slavistic Graduate Programme at the Department of Slavic Studies in 1959. More than 15 theses were or are being supervised by the Staff headed by Prof. J. B. Rudnycky. Out of various titles 3 of them are reprinted in the following with his kind permission as abstracted by the authors of the theses themselves.

#### **"PSALTERIUM WINNIPEGENSE", a Cyrillic Manuscript: Paleographic and Linguistic Analysis; Omelan Kalieinsky, Univ. of Manitoba (M.A. Thesis), 1970.**

A brief account is given in the introduction of the translation of the Bible into Old Church Slavic by two brothers, Sts. Cyril and Methodius, the study of OCS monuments, the sources used in this study, the role of the Psalter among the Eastern Slavs, and the acquisition by the University of Manitoba of an unknown, undated, Cyrillic manuscript under a new appellation: **Psalterium Winnipegense**. In the next chapter, paleographic description of the manuscript is followed by the illustration and analysis of different variants of letters, abbreviations and contractions, and diacritical marks. Two styles of letters found in PW indicate the influence of two areas, the Northwest and the South, while the system of stressing is predominantly Russian. By using two other Cyrillic psalters, one from the eleventh century and the other a recent psalter, and applying the comparative method, certain linguistic features and peculiarities of PW were elucidated in the three chapters on phonetics, morphology, and syntax. Classification and analysis of corrections made by persons other than the scribes is covered in chapter six. In the final chapter, an attempt was made in evaluating the features of the manuscript in regard to Slavic Scholarship, and in approximating date and area of its origin. The appendix

contains a dictionary of words and their derivative forms used in PW as well as their meaning in English.

**MAXIM GORKI AND MYKHAILO KOTSIUBYNS'KYI: Personal Contacts  
And Literary Relationship; George Nicholas Duravetz, Univ. of Manitoba,  
(M.A. Thesis) 1970**

The closer contacts and literary relationship between Maxim Gorki and Mykhaylo Kotsiubyns'kyy began with their personal meeting in Capri on June 2, 1909 and continued until the latter's death in April, 1913. During this period the two writers established a close friendship based on common humanitarian ideals and a mutual interest in literature. The aim of this thesis specifically is to investigate their relationship as manifested in the personal, intellectual and literary aspects of their association.

An analysis of the literary works of both writers during this period reveals that they met after the formative period of their literary development and that their friendship did not significantly alter their lives. Furthermore, their mutual influences did not extend to their literary works as contemporary Soviet literary critics maintain. Both writers retained their own distinct style of writing. Though parallel themes, characters and ideas may be found in some of their works, Gorki was essentially a realist while Kotsiubyns'kyy had evolved to Impressionism while retaining certain realistic tendencies. The mood in Gorki's works is serious, rebellious and often depressing, while Kotsiubyns'kyy achieves a harmony of joy and sorrow against a background of colour and beauty as seen in nature.

Both writers are great literary figures who added much to the literatures of their respective nations and neither can be regarded as having written under the influence of the other. The correspondence between them provided a source of information which elucidated their relationship. It appears as an integral part of author's thesis.

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
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## THE GUN AND THE FAITH

Religion and Church in Ukraine  
under the Communist Russian Rule

A Brief Survey by

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# TERROR AND DECEPTION

*By I. VOVCHUK*

## **ON THE 50th ANNIVERSARY OF THE FOUNDING OF THE USSR — THE RUSSIAN PRISON OF NATIONS**

In the Russian socialist kingdom, the rulers of the imperial complex — the USSR — are very fond of jubilees marking some data or event. Aside from legal holidays established by the law of the land, the population must celebrate each year some anniversary connected with the building of socialism in the empire — the USSR. The Kremlin ideological staff of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) selects some date, the commemoration of which is intended to intensify the enthusiasm of the toilers in the building of socialism and to reinforce their imperial patriotism.

The planned anniversary date is passed on through government directives to the local cells, both party and government. The anniversary fever grips all corners of the empire in the span of which the "toilers", while singing praises to the party, swear to carry out its plans in the construction of socialism, to practice vigilance and irreconcilability toward the adversaries of the socialist fatherland, to raise productivity and political activity and determinately expose anti-Communist ideology, the anti-national activity of Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism, as it is demanded by the resolution of the plenum of the Central Committee (CC) of the Communist Party of Ukraine, dated July 22, 1972.

The 50th anniversary of the early stages of the creation of the imperial complex, as M. Bukharin called the newly founded USSR, falls on December 30, 1972. As early as January of this year, almost a year prior to the anniversary date, the CC of the CPSU resolved to commemorate "The 50th anniversary of the founding of the USSR — a great festival of our multi-national people". The above description defines the political essence of the concept by which an attempt is made to force yet another fiction on the subjugated nations in this jubilee year. The resolution does not speak about the festival of nations and peoples which, according to the 1936 Constitution, allegedly compose 15 sovereign republics making up the USSR, but about the festival of "our people". Another myth — that of a single "multi-national" people — is in the making.

On 16 pages of the official organ of the party, "Komunist", No. 3, which published the text of the resolution, detailed instructions on what is to be done by one and all are given, inflating the mythical "multi-national people" with "native" patriotism to the great-power empire. And the declaration on the founding of the USSR (1922) mentions that the union of states is being created upon the will of the nations and will be a worthy completion of the foundations of peaceful coexistence and fraternal "cooperation", most likely established as early as October, 1917 (*History of the Soviet Constitution, Collection of Documents, 1917-1957*). Dreaming about the liquidation of nations in the building of socialism, the leaders of the empire introduce a new fiction — that of the non-existent "our people", urging that during the preparations for the celebration, international education among the masses and their irreconcilability toward nationalism be intensified.

"Every Communist", says the resolution, "has the duty of all-round consolidation among the masses of their awareness of belonging to a single, socialist fatherland and their irreconcilability with nationalism". In order to put these demands into effect, "The Central Committee of the CPU urges all Party administrative, civic organizations and workers' collectives to *unfold* preparations for the 50th anniversary of the founding of the USSR, as a great nationwide festival of unity, friendship, and fraternity of nations and peoples of our country which build a Communist society, a triumph of the Leninist nationality policy of the CPSU, the proletarian internationalism". And so that these preparations do develop, "the Party central committees in the Union republic, and kray, oblast, municipal and district Party committees and the primary party organizations [are commanded] to *develop plans* in preparation for the 50th anniversary of the founding of the USSR and on their basis to unfold extensive organizational and political activity in every republic, kray, oblast, district, town, region, in every working collective".

As if fearing that all the above-mentioned party levels had not foreseen everything in drafting plans, the Central Committee indicates rather precisely what should be taken into consideration in preparing the anniversary celebrations. A separate section of the resolution is devoted to the press. Having enumerated the all-Union press organs and other information media, the resolution urges them "to organize extensive illumination of preparations for the 50th anniversary of the USSR, the achievements of the Leninist nationality policy, and its international significance". Academies, institutes, ministries, and executive boards of creative associations were assigned special tasks. The enumeration of all those who are bound by the resolution "to unfold", "to plan", and "to organize" takes up almost two printed pages.

For people who do not live in the world of Russian Bolshevism, it is hard to comprehend the operative confusion in connection with the preparations for the festivity. Thousands of agitators (whom hardly anyone believes) will drum into people's heads the dogmas of Leninist nationality policy, anathematizing "nationalist superstitions". Doctors, professors, and meritorious scholars will sweat out hundreds of "scientific" works, while writers and artists will attempt to prove the advantages of international unification and "conformity to the established principle" of the convergence and fusion of nations.

An illustration of the above: "The Donetsk oblast party organization developed a perspective plan of activity for the education of the population in the spirit of patriotism and the friendship of nations. Over twenty thousand lectures, about the triumph of Lenin's nationality policy and the universal historic significance of the founding of the USSR, were delivered to the workers of the oblast". *Pravda* is disturbed that the speeches about the achievements of the Leninist nationality policy "lack aggressiveness in exposing the ideology of bourgeois nationalism". (*Pravda*, No. 29, 1972).

The mammoth campaign which has been planned and which will last all year proves that the CC of the CPSU assigns special significance to the preparations for the anniversary celebration. By intensified propagandistic rattling about the veracity of the Leninist nationality policy and by swaying the workers' enthusiasm, the leadership of the drifting empire intends to smother dissatisfaction inside the subjugated countries, their indignation and struggle against the assimilation policy of the Bolsheviks who dream about the fusion of nations in the Russian sea of imperialistic socialism. These dreams are as old as the Russian imperialism. A. Pushkin, extolling the empire, asked while meditating on its future: "Will the Slavic rivers unite in the Russian sea? Or will it dry up? This is the question".

In the course of the national liberation revolutions (1917-1921) the Ukrainian and other nations of the Russian empire crossed out Russian imperialistic dreams about the "Russian sea". The national rivers which were channeled by Russian imperialism into the Russian sea formulated their own political currents, independent of the imperial sea. Having created the new imperial complex — the USSR — the Bolsheviks again began to divert them into the Russian sea. In half a century of construction of Russian socialism, the interests of which according to Lenin coincided with the national pride of the Great Russians, the national element not only failed to dissolve in the Russian sea, but rather became more definite and intensive. National problems have become more acute within the imperial complex. On the anniversary of the founding of the USSR, the beginning of the renewal of the imperial complex, the CC of the CPSU organizes a grandiose campaign whose task it is to implant

in the oppressed nations the imperial myth that allegedly, "In the years of construction of socialism and Communism in the USSR a new historical society of men — the Soviet people — has emerged". This supposedly confirms the conclusions of Marxism-Leninism that the national problem can only be solved in the socialist reconstruction of the world.

Having created a subsequent myth, the Central Committee attempts to force it upon the nations as reality with the help of a huge administrative and political apparatus, as it is demanded by the "Resolution". Myth-creating is quite common in the Bolshevik policy of building socialism, and even this construction, itself, is a myth. Myth-creation saw the light of day hand-in-hand with Bolshevik domination. Seizing power, the Bolsheviks created a myth about Soviet power, by which they camouflaged the domination of the party. The dictatorship of the party was concealed for a long period of time by the myth about the dictatorship of the proletariat, and more recently by the fiction of its "belonging to all the people". Myths thus created play a great part in party policy. Forcing them upon the subjugated nations, the party, as the spokesman of Russian imperialism, attempts to displace national thinking, and this, coupled with fear, helps it to retain authority.

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In his article, "The Essence of the Russian Revolution", M. Berdyayev maintains that "the Bolsheviks deal in fiction not in reality". Manipulating the created myths, the party leadership veils them with internal contradictions in the empire where, allegedly, socialism has already been built. Nationalist manifestations, according to *Radyanska Ukrayina* of March 28, 1972, are one of these contradictions. "They", it is said in the official organ of the "sovereign" colony, "cause a lack of understanding of the genuine reconciliation of national and international interests, upon which relations inside the socialist commonwealth of nations should be built".

The CC of the CPSU "Resolution" on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the USSR often emphasizes new relations which arose through the "steady convergence of nations". And *Pravda*, the official organ of the Party, sees convergence as the conformity to the established principle in the building of socialism. "The many-sided blossoming and the steady convergence of all nations and peoples of the USSR is determined by the very nature of our *system*, and appear as an objective conformity to the established principle in the building of Communism". (*Pravda*, No. 22, 1972). When systematic Russifiers of the non-Russian nations speak about their "many-sided blossoming" this seems like a mockery indeed.

By the theses on "the steady convergence of all nations", on the other hand, the inevitability of the convergence of nations is being stressed, for such, allegedly, is the law of social development and

this is mandatory for the building of Communism. And the material foundations for it are being laid down by the present Five-Year Plan. Hence, the non-Russian nations have no way of escaping determined social development in building Communism. Still prior to the usurpation of power by the Bolsheviks, Lenin emphasized that under socialism the striving for unity must be intensified and the toiling masses... "will gravitate with all their might toward a union and fusion with the great and vanguard socialist nations". The history of the construction of socialism has shown that in line with dogmas of "regularities" in social development, the building of Communism is being reconciled with Russia's imperial interests. They are now called "international principles".

Emphasizing social development's "conformity to established principle" on this 50th anniversary of the USSR, which allegedly is caused by the inevitability of convergence and fusion of nations, the CC of the CPSU masks its Russian imperialistic face and the programme of the party which at all times attempts to preserve the Russian empire as "one and indivisible". For Lenin, the multi-national empire, which tsarist Russia had been prior to its dissolution into national states as the result of national revolutions, was in itself an historically positive and progressive phenomenon. Therefore, the principal task of the Bolsheviks, after gaining control of the government, was to hold on to that historic heritage at all cost. In "Critical Remarks to the National Question", V. Lenin instructed the party: "As long as, and in as much as, various nations constitute a single state, Marxists should neither preach the federative principle nor decentralization, for a centralized state is a giant, historical step forward from medieval parcelling to the future socialist unity of the entire world".

Combatting federalism, Lenin defended the wholeness and indivisibility of the Russian empire ("the prison of nations"), in which the moulder of the Bolshevik party saw the bud of the "socialist unity of the world". And this thesis is today emphasized by academician I. Mints in "Komunist, No. 10". Great power centralization as a means of unifying various nations and peoples within the framework of a single indivisible whole had been a fundamental principle of the imperial policy of the Bolsheviks. Demanding radical changes in economic, political, and social relations during the revolution, the Bolsheviks sharply and decisively opposed the realization of the least national rights of the Ukrainian and other peoples, considering their attainment as reactionary.

Only under pressure of national revolutions did the Bolsheviks, with Lenin at the head, change their tactics, accepting the possibility of a federation under certain concrete socio-historic conditions. Seizing power in November, 1917, the Bolsheviks issued the "Human Rights Declaration", in which they proclaimed the right of the peoples of Russia to self-determination, including secession. This

had been announced at a time when, as claimed by Stalin in arguing for the inevitability of a federation, "a whole series of nationalities of Russia will actually find themselves in a state of complete separation". And in political life, Lenin and Stalin emphasized that the proclamation of this right being granted to the nations does not signify a need of its realization. The right to self-determination, so to speak, is not an absolute, but a thing subordinate to the class and social factor. Stalin, as Lenin's ideological heir, taught the party as late as 1923 that "It is important to remember that besides the right of nations to self-determination, there is also the right of the working class to consolidate its power, and the right to self-determination is subordinate to the latter. There are instances when the right to self-determination contradicts another, higher right, the right of the working class which has come to power. In such a case — this must be said plainly — the right to self-determination cannot and should not be an obstacle in the matter of realization of the right of the working class to its dictatorship. The former should make way to the latter". (J. Stalin, *Sochineniya* (Works), Vol. 5, p. 265).

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The Bolsheviks never deviated from their treacherous "dialectic" with regard to the right of nations to have their own national independence and to decide their fate by themselves, forcing the dictatorship of the North upon these nations. The present party leadership considers Stalin's interpretation as the dogma of Leninism and Marxism. "In this connection, from the point of view of Leninism, it is inadmissible to confuse the question about the right to self-determination with the question about the fact whether secession of this or that nation is expedient". And the expediency is decided by party dictatorship. "What is more", underscores the official organ of the party, "Marxists-Leninists never attributed an independent meaning to that right, but applied it with the aim of guaranteeing success of the socialist revolution". (*Pravda*, No. 22, 1972).

A perfidious tactic concerning the declarative self-determination of nations helped the Bolsheviks to gain power and to consolidate the dictatorship of the party, as the embodiment of Russian imperialism, allegedly for the purpose of building socialism. And "socialism", wrote Lenin, "makes easier and tremendously accelerates the convergence and fusion of nations". (*Complete Collection of Works*, Vol. 30, p. 21; *Pravda*, No. 4, 1920). Adhering to the principle of the indivisibility of the Russian empire, the Bolsheviks, in trying to prevent its dissolution into national states, placed one set of demands before the members of the party of the ruling (Russian) nation, and another set before those of the subjugated nation in preaching the right of self-determination. "The Marxists of the ruling nation", admonished Lenin, "while speaking about self-determination should



stress the freedom of secession, while the Marxists of the oppressed nation were to urge a voluntary union".

When in the course of national revolutions the peoples of the Russian empire formed themselves into national state formations, the Bolsheviks began to search for methods of putting together the broken pieces of the empire. The federalist concept at which the party leadership arrived was considered a temporary, war-time form of the reestablished empire. In 1918, in a draft of a new program, Lenin proposed a Soviet Federation as a form of closer unity of the workers. In the new party program adopted by the 8th Congress of the Russian Communist Party of the Bolsheviks (RCP/b) in March, 1919, a "federative union of states organized according to a Soviet model" was agreed upon, but only "as a form of transition to a complete unity", a unitary state.

Subsequent development of political relations between the RSFSR and the independent states which formed themselves through revolutions, as for instance the Ukrainian National Republic, the Byelorussian National Republic, the Transcaucasian Federation, and so forth, generally went along the following lines: After a military and political occupation of states which seceded from Russia, the Bolsheviks declared RSFSR's recognition of the independence of the Sovietized state creations. Then the Soviet government "imposed by the bayonets from the North", as it was said by the commander-in-chief of the Bolshevik-Makhno army upon conquering Kyiv, with its Sovietized Bolshevik organs declared its readiness to establish close political cooperation with the Bolshevik RSFSR.

In 1922, a federative union of four independent states was created. At the October plenum of the RCP(b) it was resolved to recognize as indispensable the conclusion of a treaty among Ukraine, Byelorussia, the Federation of the Transcaucasian Republics, and the RSFSR about their incorporation into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, reserving to each of them the right to secede from the union. On December 30, 1922, the First All-Union Congress of Soviets solemnly proclaimed the creation of the USSR and ratified a declaration and treaty about the unification of "the RSFSR, the Ukr. SSR, the Byelorussian SSR, and the TCSSR (Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia) into a single union state — the USSR". The constitution of the USSR, drafted and ratified in January, 1924, treated the new state form as a union state in which "a single union citizenship is established for the citizens of the union republics". (*History of the Soviet Constitution*, Collection of Documents, (1917-1957).

With the creation of the USSR there culminated the long back-stage struggle, following the first phase of so-called Sovietization of the national states, between the representatives of the non-Russian nations (Ukraine, Byelorussia, the Caucasian states, and others) and those representing the Russian empire, who attempted to reduce to a minimum the independence of the non-Russian republics. The

representatives of the Communist party of these republics tried to preserve state rights of the national republics, emphasizing that the USSR is not supposed to be a union state, but a union of states retaining all the powers and rights of the union republics.

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Later, in the years of consolidation of the Stalinist dictatorship, which was coupled with the growth and intensification of Russian centralism and great-power chauvinism, many of the "national" Communists were reminded of their opposition to centralization and accused of being bourgeois nationalists who attempted to sever Ukraine from the imperial complex, renewed in 1922. The comprehension of the new creation, its substance, was not by chance called by Stalin at a congress of soviets "a triumph of the new Russia", which transformed the red flag from the flag of the party to the flag of the state, and rallied the peoples of the Soviet republics around it in order to unite them into one state, the USSR, a prototype of the future world Soviet Socialist Republic.

Through the creation of the USSR the Bolsheviks gave impetus to the reestablishment of the imperial complex, allegedly a Soviet system in form, but with unlimited dictatorship of the Bolshevik party. In this constitutionally federal structure, a union of states, the party of the Bolsheviks (today the CPSU) became the sole, all-embracing centralistic force. It not only directs fully and indivisibly the political life, but is an unrestricted force in state, socio-political, and cultural life of the entire state system.

The structural form of the ruling power within the state — the Communist party — is thoroughly centralistic. There is no Ukrainian or Byelorussian, Lithuanian, Georgian, or other Communist party, only a single Communist party for the entire imperial complex of the USSR. Communist organizations of the treaty republics, officially called parties, are only branches of the RCP(b), today the CPSU. Departments or branches of the republican parties are subordinated to the party Central Committee in Moscow in line with the principle of "democratic centralism". Thus constructed, the centralized unity of the leading (sole) political force determines the substance and nature of relations within the state complex of the empire renewed by the Bolsheviks.

Half-a-century-long history of the USSR is a struggle of the Russian imperialism of the Bolsheviks with the nations incorporated into the imperial complex. The rights of the so-called union republics are becoming ever narrower and more limited, and the authority is being centred in Moscow more and more. The official organ of the party, drumming in the myth about "the new historic society", asserts in fulfilling the demand of the Central Committee about the proven "monolithness" of the multi-national people that "the Soviet

Union is not a conglomerate of national republics and oblasts, but their organic unity". (*Pravda*, No. 17, 1972).

The absurdity of the definition "organic unity" for a multi-national union of states, whose 50th anniversary the Central Committee has decided to mark, is obvious. A consequence of the so-called "organic unity" is the fact that the government of a "sovereign colony" into which the Ukr. SSR, just as all the other non-Russian republics, has been transformed has only six "important" so-called ministries: construction of roads, communal economy, local industry, public works, social security, and automobile transportation.

The "Resolution" makes no mention of the fact that the sovereignty of the union republics has been reduced to colonial status. It is only mentioned as an historic circumstance in order to emphasize the voluntariness of their joining the USSR which, allegedly, "was a glaring manifestation of their social sovereignty and assured it a promising guarantee". Nothing is said about the competency of the governments of the republics either, which in the words of the imperial anthem "were united forever by the Great Russian". The consistently long resolution impresses upon the reader the concept of the indivisibility of the "multi-national state", allegedly already composed of a single multinational people.

Moscow is perfectly indifferent to the fact that in the history of mankind there never was and never can be a "single" but "multi-national" nation. It has illusions about it, maintaining in the "Resolution" that "without the most closely knit union it is impossible to guarantee a steady growth of well-being of the toilers, the many-sided development of culture of all nations and peoples of the country". *Voprosy istorii* (The Problems of History), the official publication of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR applies the day-dreams of the Russian petty tyrants of the Central Committee to the whole world. "The Soviet people is the first society which paves the road of development for other international societies which will inevitably emerge on the road of the future international society". (*V.i.*, No. 9, 1971).

The "Resolution" stresses the "indissoluble unity of the socialist and national statehood of the republics on the basis of democratic centralism and socialist federalism of the Soviet socialist democracy" as the achievement of the last 50 years. And the imaginary unity, aside from the clever politics of the party, is caused by "socialist conformity to the established principle" in line with which the toiling masses "will gravitate with all their might toward a union and fusion with the great and vanguard socialist nations" (according to Lenin). The statehood of the Soviet nations and peoples, as asserted by E. Tadevosyan (who is a doctor of philosophy) has already become uniform. (*Pravda*, 6. 6. 72).

With the contrived "conformity to the established principle", the "scholars" are to help the Central Committee, in tune with the "Resolution", firmly to establish on this anniversary the unitary character of the imperial complex. Linking the present-day construction of unitary socialism with the tenets of Lenin, the official organ of the party maintains that, "under conditions of highly developed socialism the convergence of nations is acquiring an ever greater significance". (*Pravda*, 6. 22. 72). Those in the Kremlin, however, are well aware of the fact that in the consolidation of unitary policy they are playing with fire. Therefore, the "Resolution" does not refer directly to fusion. Citing the infallible Lenin, who supported a single Russia, the "Resolution" argues for the policy of assimilation through the fusion of nations. "We are in favour of large states and convergence, even fusion of nations, but on a truly democratic, truly international basis". (Lenin, *Complete Collection of Works*, Vol. 27, p. 28).

This is responsible for the intensification of the Russification policy, coupled with the attempt to Russify all phases of life in the union republics, including manners and customs. In a projected purge of the party, the Russification of the party apparatus will most likely be increased, and, of course, a still greater centralization of power, resting on the Great Russian nucleus, will be introduced. In the official organ of the government, E. Tadevosyan already foresees a road "to the one and only end". In an article bearing the above title the doctor of philosophy maintains that "all nations contributed their share to the consolidation and development of the multi-national Soviet society. But the leading role in this is played by the Great Russian people, the older brother among the free and equal nations and peoples". (*Izvestiya*, 3. 7. 72).

Similar assertions are made by other "scholars" on the pages of newspapers and magazines throughout the jubilee year. The tone for this has been set at the 24th Party Congress and in the anniversary "Resolution". At the congress the special role of the Russian people in the establishment of a unitary state was confirmed. "Its revolutionary energy, self-sacrifice, working capacity, and profound internationalism rightly found for it (the Russian nation) deep respect among the nations of our socialist fatherland", (L. Brezhnev. Report of CC of the CPSU at the 24th Congress, p. 93). The appraisal of the role of the "great" nation in the construction of the historical society is very reminiscent of the evaluation given to it by J. Stalin just after the war.

Speaking to the graduates of a military academy, the then "father of nations" pointed to the patience and humility of the Russian people, calling them great. Stalin's successor confers the quality of "profound internationalism" upon the "great" nation, which the Kremlin's imperialistic policy contrasts to the national idea, feuding with the nationalism of the non-Russian nations. On the 50th

anniversary( L. Brezhnev has repeated the racist thesis that the Russians are a "chosen" people ("profound internationalism"), just as the Nazis maintained that the Germans were a chosen race, although this did not stem from Hitler. The theoreticians of tsarist imperialism called the Russian nation a "bearer of God". In Stalin's time it became great, while today the proprietors of the Russian kingdom added "profound internationalism" to that nation.

Academician M. Mitkin, in refuting the valid accusations of the Jews about Russia's assimilation policy, "proves" that assimilation is also a thing occurring "in conformity with the established principle during the building of socialism". In times of capitalism it was evil and reactionary. But "in conditions of socialist, and later communist society, a fraternal unification, the convergence of nations takes place. Assimilation does not at all signify a loss of all national traits and individuality. It only indicates a natural and voluntary convergence of nationalities, the fusion of their better traits, individualities, culture, and many traits in the mode of everyday life". (*Pravda*, 12. 18. 72). How impoverished would the world become, if the day-dreams which are "justified" by the Russian "scholars" were to become reality.

In the formation and creation of a multi-national single society, which is envisioned by the leaders of the Kremlin, a great role is attributed to the Russian language. The "Resolution" says that "all nations have accepted it voluntarily as a common language for communication among themselves and the outside world". In Kremlin's international policy, which rests upon the "profound internationalism" of the chosen Russian people, the Russian language has become a powerful tool in transforming the USSR into a unitary state. Isolated from the civilized world, the national states — the Soviet republics — can become acquainted with the achievements of world culture only by means of the Russian language.

The above-mentioned periodical *Voprosy istorii* explains linguistic persecution by the fact that allegedly under the present conditions of life the native language has become a break (on the road) to the all-round mastering of knowledge". "It is generally known", says the official publication of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, "that the extent of human knowledge doubles every seven years. It is practically impossible to guarantee that the foundations of this knowledge, let alone the newest achievements, are made available immediately to the pupils in their native language. Because of this lack of complete and timely information, the boys and girls who graduate from national schools would actually find themselves in a worse situation than those who studied in the Russian language and for whom foundations of knowledge were presented more extensively".

It seems that the government's assimilation policy in the union republics, including the Russification of the system of education, is conducted for the good of the young people. This argument is absurd, typical of the Bolsheviks who consistently perpetuate the policy of Russian colonialism. In a systematic transformation of the USSR into a unitary state, the Russian leadership of the imperial complex broadly applies the policy of assimilation of the non-Russian nations. Ruining the thousand-year-old national cultures, breaking traditions and the whole national systems, the government puts into effect an extensive intermingling of nations as a means of so-called internationalization. Assimilation is considered a normal thing in the present stage of construction of socialism. The government sees it as "the incorporation into the socialist practice of the universal tendency toward convergence and fusion of nations".

The idea of intensified convergence of nations, leading to their liquidation, pervades throughout the entire "Resolution" of the Central Committee dealing with the 50th anniversary. It is a general line of policy of a unitary statehood in which the national form is reduced to the fact that in a single centralized state, national representation is permitted in local organs of government. It is not to be excluded that at the conclusion of the anniversary celebrations the toilers will "spontaneously" demand a change of the constitution so as to confirm by law the unitary status of the imperial complex, cancelling even the remains of a union. Moscow, formerly as Petersburg, does not recognize any union ties.

After the 24th Congress of the CPSU, at which the urgency of the intensification of the course of convergence of nations, the consolidation of the international friendship with the leading role of the "great Russian people", had been stressed, the Central Committee has launched a decisive advance on all remnants of a union in the imperial complex of the USSR. Lenin considered the Russian people as the "chief motivating force of the Communist revolution", while at the congress Brezhnev endowed the chosen people with "revolutionary energy, self-sacrifice, and profound internationalism".

Concocted in the laboratories of the imperial state, the "profound internationalism of the Russian people" was to have made it easier for the all-powerful party to oust the native languages of the nations of the union republics, replacing them by the language of the chosen people — for they are "profoundly international". By depriving the non-Russian nations of their national tongues, their national soul is being killed. Losing their native language, they become a fertilizer for a nation which allegedly already possesses "profound internationalism", since no nation in the world has created its own culture in a non-native language.

The policy of unification around the Russian core applied to the non-Russian peoples which, according to the dreams of the CC of the CPSU is to lead to the fusion of nations, is the most savage thing in

human history. It blocks human progress, for through a diversity of languages, national customs and traditions, and social order, one nation passes on its lifelong experience in its entirety to another whole nation. And this warns the entire nation against a useless, erroneous, or even destructive path. The political illusions of the CC of the CPSU about the convergence and fusion of nations kills this wonderful characteristic or ability of nations.

In his Nobel Prize "acceptance speech", rejecting the policy of the "levelling of nations", A. I. Solzhenitsyn says: "The disappearance of nations would impoverish us less than if all the people in the world would become likened to a single egg. A nation is the wealth of mankind, a generalization of its person, the smallest of them carries its own particular colors, conceals in itself a special facet of God's design".

In the anniversary year, together with the liquidation of the remnants of the union, the CC of the CPSU attempts through its policies to alienate the people of the non-Russian republics from their native land and nation. Instead, it tries to implant in them the sense of the fatherland and the allegedly created new historic society — the Soviet people.

For "scientific" elaboration and augmenting of the plan of the convergence of nations, just as of the entire policy of assimilation, special "scientific" conferences were organized in Tashkent, Pyatigorsk, Kyiv and Volgograd. Their subject matter best illustrates what the party demands from science. For illustration I shall cite several topics: "The Soviet people — a new historic society of men", Volgograd, 1969; "The construction of Communism and the problems of international education of workers", Kyiv, 1969; and so forth. Convergence was the subject of many works and research papers. All products of the Russian laboratory are being popularized, divided into doses, and injected as the great-power poison of Russian socialism into the national organisms of the subjugated nations.

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The intensification of the policy of "convergence" reinforces resistance of the subjugated nations. In Ukraine, as in the other republics, the policy of alienation from the nation and native land for the purpose of creating "social uniformity" under the name "new historic society — the Soviet people" is opposed by national forces united by the national idea. They contrast the nation, as historic reality, to the myth about the "organic incorporation" of nations into the allegedly already emerged "new historic society". "Nationality and one's native land are the principal things in the life of the world. When the native land dies, everything dies". These two realities are contrasted with the abstractions and myths in this anniversary year.

All conferences, long treatises, as well as the large-scale campaign in preparation for the festivities give evidence of the fact that the national problem is on the rise within the imperial complex and

inflicts painful blows to the totalitarian system of the Bolshevik imperial state. Calls to a struggle with nationalism do not disappear from the pages of the press, but rather appear more frequently. As if to overtake the "Resolution", the official organ of the party, *Pravda*, in its March 11th editorial, emphasizes that "international education is one of the central tasks of the party in the shaping of the spiritual face of the new man". And in the "Resolution" the new man was allegedly formed already and he created "an historic society" as well. In order to mould the face of the new "international" man (which does not and will never exist), the party says to one and all: "A militant irreconcilability with nationalistic superstitions must be developed in every patriot".

The Central Committee inflates all with "militant irreconcilability", in particular in this jubilee year. At the July plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, the new viceroy of Ukraine, V. Shcherbyts'ky, holding the rank of First Secretary, reproached the party dignitaries in a speech "On the preparations for the 50th anniversary of the establishment of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics" for the fact that in their propaganda and educational work party organizations 'inadequately expose the great advantages which the nations of our country received in a single union state". (*Radyanska Ukrayina*, 7. 28. 72). Recalling the party purge planned for 1973, V. Shcherbyts'ky urged the participants of the plenum to intensify their struggle with bourgeois nationalism, frightening them by the "activation of subversive activity of bourgeois nationalists abroad". "They", asserted the Secretary, "are attempting to discredit the national policy of the CPSU and shatter the fraternal union of the nations of our country".

It is said that a frightened crow is afraid of every bush. The Russian levellers of nations, increasing their pressure with respect to the convergence of nations in the anniversary year, encounter ever greater resistance against the policies of a unitary state and greatly fear the subversive activity of nationalists from abroad. The greatest discredit to the national policy of the Bolsheviks is that very policy during the last half century. The nations of the imperial complex and the entire socialist bloc of the USSR are well aware of this. Their resistance and struggle against Russian imperialism is growing stronger, undermining the imperial foundations. The leadership of the empire knows this and with feverish anniversary activity attempts to conceal the real state of affairs. Creating myths on "the monolithical unity of peoples", it wishes to protect the shaky Russian imperial complex from the blows of nationalism, which will lead to the dissolution of the Russian empire into independent national states of all the oppressed nations.

**For Bibliography to this article see inside back cover page.**

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# THE ETHICS OF PROMETHEISM

*By Yevhen SVERSTYUK*

The high, sorrowful forehead and the intense gaze, which tears away the curtain of history.

For Ukraine, Shevchenko is one of the greatest Titans of her spirit, her renaissance and self-consciousness, her most majestic song.

The Kazakhs regard him as the initiator of their national painting. All nations to whom he sang the legend of Prometheus — about the immortality of a nation, which was passed sentence upon and had a two-headed eagle set upon its torn breast, at the time of the subjugation of the Caucasus — accept him as their own. With the persuasiveness of a song, Shevchenko proved to them in the most difficult years that “The insatiable cannot till the fields in the ocean depths”.

With the invincible belief in the victory of the ideals of truth and liberty achieved by humanity through long suffering, and by the strengthening of these ideals by each word and a consistent irreconcilability with lies, Shevchenko grew to those heights from which the eternal hailing of geniuses resounds.

Humanity rose to culture and civilization by difficult work and struggle, at the cost of the burning of its greatest sons, who illuminated new horizons with their own flame. Shevchenko entered the circle of giants with his mighty song and his manly word as a poet who strengthened the word of truth and love by the great feat of his own life.

Our conception of Shevchenko greatly overstepped the limits in which even his most foresighted contemporaries thought. In the consciousness of the nation, the poet grew with the measure of the spiritual growth of the nation itself and its proximity to the great revolutionary ideals. In his *Autobiography* Shevchenko wrote: “The history of my life is a part of the history of my fatherland”. These words must be understood in their most profound meaning. His personal fate was entirely determined by the history of his sub-

jugated and enslaved nation. As the son of an unfortunate, he could not take advantage of freedom and stood on the thorny path of a champion of national liberty. Thanks to this, his rousing song about freedom became a bright page of our history.

"Shevchenko began to write his outrageous works in 1837", the gendarmes ascertained at the poet's arrest. And they did not err. Shevchenko's first lines known to us —

The Dnpr wide roars and groans,  
The sullen wind, it howls —

already astound us with their greatness and restrained mighty power. In the context of the "Kobzar", it is a symbolic prelude to a song about the menacing cry of the chained power of his nation. Consciously or unconsciously, Shevchenko sang the first song about the undefeated freedom of the elements . . . This is a symbolical fact. But in the basis of this symbol there lies regularity: the element of freedom was the only element in his life and in his creativity. The concept of freedom most fully characterizes the spirit of Shevchenko's poetry.

In this lies one of the riddles of that gigantic phenomenon which we call Shevchenko. He always knew how to feel like a free man internally.

So difficult it is to dwell in bondage,  
Though truthfully, freedom there was none.

And truly, in the 47 years of his life, 24 were years of serfdom under the slave-holder's watchful eyes, ten years of military service under the supervision of the first sergeant, the last four years out on bail and under the care of the gendarmes. Only nine years of freedom as a student at the Academy of Art in Petersburg and three summers of intense thoughts in his native land.

From childhood the cruel life bent Shevchenko and placed him in complete dependence on others. Under the most difficult circumstances, it left him in the absolute power and at the mercy of influential persons. Twice they did not allow him to die in the wolves' den of autocratic and serfdom arbitrariness.

One must be able to feel the solid earth beneath one's feet and possess an exceptional internal strength to lay a new path against the current for the millions of unfortunates. Shevchenko had not a moment of assurance for the future. All the same, without regard to anything, he entered into the battle.

Here the character of Shevchenko, the man and the poet, is vividly shown, the internal strength, the courage, and the despair.

Shevchenko rises to the most difficult struggle, not to luxury.

In his early childhood, having lost both his father and mother, he is left all alone, having no being on earth to care about his state of well-being. Yet, his late father had reason to believe that his meager

inheritance would be of no use to his younger son Taras, for the ten-year-old boy did not promise to follow in the already harrowed furrows but searched for people "to teach him the way". The boy did not yield before his stepmother but ran off to a brutal drunk (deacon), revenging himself upon him after two year of suffering and humiliation, and emerging with a truly Shevchenko-like lesson: "a life-long aversion and contempt for all violence of one person over another". He could not even last a year as a wage labourer. In his search for a teacher-painter, he comes across another deacon, but "he is betrayed by his patience by the fourth day". The seclusion of an antechamber was found least suitable for the boy: "With an inherent impudence of character, I violated the master's orders by singing lamenting Haydamak songs in a hardly audible voice and secretly painting over his paintings". Finally the master is convinced that it is best to send his unsuccessful "kozachok" to an artist. But even in this new situation the youth does not betray himself. He visits the master's domestics and teaches them to demand human rights. Obviously, the feeling of human dignity of the gifted youth was not the least of his traits which attracted the attention of such people as Bryulov and Zhukovskiy. Directly from the start, he becomes the pupil and friend of a wonderful artist, who was at the zenith of his glory.

It is known that Hugo wrote his pamphlets on Napoleon in exile in Brussels. Heine wrote his satire, "Germany", in Paris; and the poet, bought out of bondage in the country of despotism from time immemorial, interpreted the concept of freedom so broadly that he wrote his poem "Son" (The Dream) in the Academy of Art, across from the Tsar's palace.

In the third division of the imperial office, Shevchenko was charged with the fact that he "expressed lamentation at the fabricated enslavement and misery of Ukraine, and blazoned the glory of the hetman rule and the past freedom of the Kozaks, propagating with unbearable audacity lies and hatred towards the persons of the imperial house". He explained the reasons for his writing these oppositional works, not even attempting to justify himself. Characteristically, however, Shevchenko was riled by a sentence "without trial or inquiry", as if he were used to the order of a democratic country from childhood.

Thanks to his ability to be spiritually absent where others lost their human face, he served his term in the military (the so-called "soldatchyna") like a depressing dream, which consumed his health and ten years of his life. "Bitter experience passed me by unnoticeably", he wrote in his diary. "It seems to me that I am exactly the same person I was ten years ago. Not a single feature of my internal picture has altered. Is this good? Yes, good".

Shevchenko returned from exile after the "all-merciful release" at

the time when new favours and reforms were expected from the new tsar. He awaited the time when "the tsar would be led to the executioner..."

It is known that Shevchenko did not like to mention his past. Nevertheless, he readily gave his *Autobiography* to the editorial board of the *Narodnye Chteniye* (National Reader), considering that "similar information will make many conscious of their human dignity, without which the successes of social development are impossible..." This statement of Shevchenko is very characteristic of his humaneness and his entire world outlook. The poet regarded the awakening of the sense of human dignity, liberty, and honour, the awakening of the nation's self-consciousness as the goal of his struggle.

In a world of disregard of truth, of contempt for legality and for man in general, Shevchenko was nourished by faith in the lofty name of man. Probably, one of the greatest artistic discoveries he made was the disclosure of the great emotions connected with active civic position and active love.

Shevchenko's great love for goodness and his consistent irreconcilability with evil and falsehood are reflected in every one of his lines.

Young Shevchenko came and sang his song. Why was this song heard at once and passions began to run high? Perhaps, because the name "Kobzar" (Bard) reminded them of the romanticism of the Ukrainian song? Or perhaps, in the Kobzar's song, the reader recognized the somehow familiar picture of the great nation, which spoke of itself in a full voice?

In any case, he was attracted to the book, as if to a clear spring, and felt in it health-giving power and the aroma of freedom. It possessed a secret peculiarity: it liberated a person internally. Lost in the labyrinth of the colossal autocratic mechanism, bound by circumstances and responsibilities, a person was accustomed to accept life as a hierarchical ladder, a person in whom the inclinations towards greatness were withering.

In the poetry of the Kobzar, there was an element of great emotions. It was not comfortable on earth for Shevchenko's heroes, the Zaporizhian Kozaks and Haydamaks, the neophytes and the feeble-minded. But they live a full-blooded life and pass down their short path in full stature, never bending. They are able to throw themselves into the whirl of life, where a biting wind stings one's eyes, where endless sorrow and despair lurk, but behind all this bright, spiritually delicate melodies are concealed. These melodies form the basic lyrical background of Shevchenko's poetry. Even the terrible revenge of the Haydamaks is accepted against this background as the proud self-expression of people who cast off the chains of slavery and coercion in order to die free in battle. With a devil-may-care happiness, they celebrate their only day at the strange banquet of life and somehow their cry sorrowfully dies out, the cry of Zaliznyak to Gonta:

We'll fight them, my dove,  
Until we are perished!

In the picture of the national rebellion, the joy of freedom is confirmed — the greatest joy of spiritually developed people. It is true, however, that this joy is dependent on the yet unstable ground of the revolutionary wave.

But herein lies the strength of Shevchenko, who was able to consolidate for all times his concepts and feelings on this very foundation.

The entire structure of Shevchenko's morality is bound by his faith in the force of moral progress. Below it, there was no depository foundation, no traditional concepts, no approved principles.

In a world of trampled moral norms, lost through excessive drinking, in a world where serf-owners, coloured by Anglomania and banqueting before the very eyes of the hungry and blackened peasants, were considered intelligentsia, in a world where moral greatness and value did not interest anyone, or were measured by rank, decorations, and the extent of devotion to "the tsar and the fatherland" — in this world, Shevchenko restores the meaning of the obliterated and profaned words: truth, freedom, dignity, and love. Through life's storms, he bore intact the most vivid dreams of his childhood, the most viable sacred ideals of his nation, along with the memory of his mother's affectionate smile. These ideals matured in his consciousness and poured out into the revolutionary system in the form of personal and social morality. It is based on the poet's enduring concept of the moral greatness of man, his personal and his national dignity. Demoralization begins with the neglect of his responsibilities to his nation. For Shevchenko, the most sacred manifestation of humanity was the striving towards freedom and justice, an active love of the fatherland, a motherly kind of love. Shevchenko's boundless love for his people is the expression of his faith in their potential, hidden deposits of humaneness. He loved his people and his fatherland the way they lived in his imagination, in his soul.

"Oh no, there is nothing sacred on earth". This cry of despair escaped from his breast, but even then he did not cease to believe in his God, in the progress of freedom and justice.

The poet's fiery patriotism organically stems from his attitude to people. If the trampling of human dignity, the insult of the feelings of mothers or orphans incinerated his soul, then what type of hatred were the sowers of a dumb prosperity, the tyrants who trampled entire nations, or their servants, who betrayed nations and became their enemies, able to incite in him?

The despair of "poor dumb slaves", the pain of a downtrodden nation, the sorrow of an orphaned mother and the dishonoured daughter — the people saw all this in their own way and knew it, just as they knew that one can become accustomed to anything. But the dramatic depth of feelings which strike everyone who comes into

contact with them and do not allow him to remain the same as he was previously, such depths were first discovered by the genius of Shevchenko.

The concept of freedom following the great French Revolution, it would seem, did not require any amplification: it was secured by human blood. But in the bourgeois society it began to diminish along with that society and in the feudal-serfdom ground of autocratic Russia it was understood on the level of freedom from one of the numerous obligations.

"The first and truly national poet", Shevchenko revolutionized the concept of freedom and discovered within it a life-long active sense, in the struggle for the destruction of the autocratic regime of coercion. He taught to perceive the world in the red colours of the inevitable revolution and not to await the awakening of freedom, but "to go about awakening it now".

Freedom for Shevchenko was not merely the theme of a few rebellious poems, but a persistent idea, which crystallized into the conviction:

For where there is lack of sacred liberty  
Never shall there exist sweet prosperity.

Each line of his works was dynamite which ruined the foundations of the ruling order. Each of his works was a cry of protest of an internally free person against visible and invisible chains, an undeniable proof of the fact that the surrounding life was not a life worthy of man. The poet's consistent irreconcilability with spiritual or social slavery explodes with a flame of hatred, and at the moment when this flame begins to die, a quiet, restrained reminder escapes from his lips:

Oh people! People unfortunates  
Of what good to you are the tsars?  
Of what good to you are the whips?  
After all, you're people, not hounds!

Shevchenko's concepts of life substantially differ from that "stale, ancient world", from those concepts which were propagated by his contemporary liveried "education".

For industrious minds  
For industrious hands  
Fallows are ploughed  
To think and sow, not wait.

This was the creed by which he lived, by which the whole of Russia's revolutionary democracy lived, breaking with great efforts through centuries-old thickets of weeds in the face of slumbering, callous power of satisfied slaves who

... plough disaster  
And they sow disaster  
But what shoots spring up?

The poet and fighter, never bending, passed through all schools of humiliation and submission, as if to demonstrate by word and deed that the levelling, despotic regime was impotent before an internally liberated individual and hostile to all which was born once and endeavours to reveal its individuality completely. The village lad stands before the poet as a reminder of his own childhood and alarms him first of all by the fact that "He shall never see freedom sacred and sweet freedom".

... That he will not know what to do with himself  
In this wide and free world ...

The world for Shevchenko was always "wide and free", and the tight prisons in which he was locked never showed in his concepts and paintings. He never wrote a single line to facilitate the omnipotent despot. He regarded him as the greatest enemy of his life, who strove to regiment and direct its progress according to his sergeant notions. The despot regarded the development of life as he did the growth of the empire at the expense of levelling, the spiritual necrosis of nations and the oppression of each individual — "from top to bottom — all are slaves" (Chernyshevskiy).

Shevchenko throws the apt word "obstruction", like a stone upon the infamous grave of Nicholas I and all the successive tyrants. He did not regard them as living, those "sacred idols". In one of his last poems, the poet states with calm certainty:

Your sacred idol will pass away  
And you will be no more  
Weeds and nettle — nothing else  
Shall grow upon your corpses  
And pile on pile will turn into  
Fetid manure — and little by little  
All will be scattered by the wind  
While we shall pray to God  
Neither rich, nor really poor.

To what heights had one to raise himself in order to examine such a perspective? This height was inherent in Shevchenko already in his early works. His most beloved picture is that of the Kobzar, who is conversing with the wind about eternity:

The steppe, like the ocean  
Wide and blue around him;  
Behind the mound another mound  
There — he is only dreaming  
... Alone among us, like the distant sun,  
People know him for the earth carries ...

Shevchenko begins the poem "Haydamaky" with thoughts about eternity. His thoughts hasten from his small room into the kingdom of liberty:

In my house, as in the boundless steppe  
The Kozaks make merry, the ravine whispers;  
In my house the blue sea dances,  
The mound grieves, the poplar rustles.

In the poem "Dream", it was not by accident that he dreamt of himself as a flying phantom. Only from great heights was he able to examine the foundations of Nicholas' empire and already in 1844 to see the tsar as a pitiful bear cub, before whose very eyes these foundations were crumbling...

Even the sharpest confrontation with reality does not deprive Shevchenko of the ability to see the world through the eyes of a prophet. On the contrary, this ability becomes stronger. In the casemate of the fortress of Peter and Paul, the poet encourages his associates, and in his lucid lyrical reflections he speaks of the contemporary from a distant historical perspective and portrays his fatherland as if he were gazing at its fate from the depths of eternity.

He dedicated all the strength of his talent to the struggle for the liberation of enslaved individuals and nations, but he despised spiritual enslavement and its morality with the strength of his soul.

The national morality, which first shone in Shevchenko's words, spiritually nourished and inspired entire generations of champions for national independence. Shevchenko's name, symbolizing the public conscience of the nation, blazed during the time of the revolution as a banner, for only the revolution could confirm his ideals, his severe moral and ethical norms. Shevchenko's courageous love and his spiritual strength transpire into our substance even today, when his thoughts have become reality.

In English translation

## REVOLUTIONARY VOICES

### UKRAINIAN POLITICAL PRISONERS CONDEMN RUSSIAN COLONIALISM

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# CATARACT

By MYKHAYLO OSADCHYY

(Continuation — 3)

"On the Occasion of the Trial of Pohruzalskyy", which I had no time to read prior to the arrest, for I was overloaded with work in connection with the defense of my dissertation.

I wanted to say something else, but I was hastily interrupted from all sides by unfamiliar people.

"He worked in the Oblast Committee of the Party" . . . "He failed to notify us" . . . "He was concealing it" . . . "He had personal friends among our staff members and did not tell anybody about it" . . .

These voices blended into one and now the room sounded like a *sharvarok* (in feudal times, people working to keep roads in repair) as if somebody were hitting a barrel with an iron rod. Suddenly, everything quieted down, as if on command, and the pleasant, controlled voice asked again: "Do you have any complaints so far as the investigator is concerned?"

I could not get control of myself and out of irritation did everything backwards. I wanted to mutter something, but had no more time, as I was grabbed by the elbow and led away to the cell.

"Oh, you, idiot", I whispered, tossing and turning on my bed. How I hated myself at that moment. There had been such an opportunity to explain everything, at last, to prove to the people that I was innocent. He would have understood me; he would have ordered them . . .

Everything was confused in my head. I was like a youngster who has been given a candy bar, which is instantly taken away from him, and then told that he has stolen it. Then, unexpectedly, somebody's lingering, piercing lamentation came to me. A woman was weeping and weeping in peasant fashion. At one end of the village they weep in such a way for the deceased that at the other end one becomes awe-struck from that weeping.

"Volodya, do you hear crying of some kind?" I asked him, for I became frightened at the thought that I was losing my mind.

"Oh-h, she was howling yesterday already. As if somebody were slaughtering her . . ."

After that visit all began to converse with me in Ukrainian, and the investigator was sweating a great deal while writing the protocol.

"Have I placed the commas correctly?" he asked. "If you find a Russism (Russian form adopted in a foreign language) anywhere, cut it out".

In a moment he said, "I believe that we shall no longer include 'The Treaty of Bohdan Khmelnytsky with Tsar Oleksiy Mykhaylovych of 1654' in your indictment. We have consulted among ourselves and have decided that it is not an anti-Soviet work".

What a strange world of people. Nobody is able to comprehend it neither an artist, nor God. Nobody can say: "Here it stood, the little child, and went further, sacrificing itself, proudly dropping down its head". Only a short-sighted person dares to do this. Only he can fail to see how a person does not fit into his surroundings, how he projects from it as a beacon on a rocky summit. Dear and good Ivan. For some reason all were used to turning to him as to a close and sensitive person. The "luxury" of his tiny apartment: table, two chairs, and all four walls taken up by bookshelves. This was all his wealth, the wealth of a person who knows its true value. Here is the truth, established through centuries and wise mortals. It is possible to know everything in advance. A feeble day and the army of conformists. Things — and no more. Hollow bricks, who are drowning themselves in vodka. Nobody can expose a genuine human being, nor his self-sacrifice, neither an artist, nor God.

A man like Svitlychnyy is completely submerged in books. If only he knew that when he does not subscribe to them, he falls out like a separate body from his literary problems. Something is driving him away from here to the village, among the blooming buckwheat and trees, among the restless behives. It is even hard to believe that such a person would not be liked by bees. Of middle height, thin, outwardly calm, he radiates some simple human kindness. A demon never has a place in nature. To the contrary, it is dominated by even temper, wise concentration, and conviction in the righteousness of his vocation as a citizen.

Surrounded by a group of unfamiliar people who are guarding us, as a mausoleum, he entered the investigator's room and sat on the chair. Holding himself naturally and calmly, he did not harmonize with things here either, did not suit the grey, foreboding faces of the workers of the KGB, did not fit to the grated windows, and I again recalled the bee-garden and the village.

We were questioned in turn: when did we become acquainted, what did we say to each other. The questions were astonishingly petty and insignificant. The investigators were sounding us out the whole time, demanding something greater, themselves not knowing what it was. They threw piercing glances at Ivan Oleksiyovych, scornfully and without concealing their cynicism, from time to time resorting to seven-storey "jokes" which one can only hear from inferior-grade jurists. I was asked whether or not Svitlychnyy had tried to influence me, and if so, how and with what aim.

"When we made our acquaintance", said I, "we drank wine together".

"It was on August 23, 1963, and we drank Kabarne".

But Svitlychnyy was roughly interrupted: "You'll answer, when asked!"

"Svitlychnyy sent a note to you from Kyiv through some boy, in which he wrote that you can talk to him about everything. How did you interpret the contents of the note and what does the 'about everything' mean?"

"Yes", I said, "I had really received such a note from Svitlychnyy. But I cannot explain how I interpreted it nor what Ivan Oleksiyovych had in mind. Moreover, he is here and you can ask him about it".

"We shall ask him without you. But now the question pertains only to you. Please answer, how did you understand the contents of the note?"

They questioned me about the contents for an hour. I become completely exhausted from the senseless questions and became silent at last.

"I gave him my poems", I said. "Some of them were later printed in the press".

"What was the purpose of your giving him the poems to read?"

"He is a literary critic and I wanted to get his opinion".

"You could have given them to someone else; why did you have to give them to him?"

"I read many of his critical articles. I liked them for their objectivity, lack of compromise, the quality of his appraisals . . ."

I recalled to myself one of trials of Shevchenko in the time of Tsarist Russia. Then the investigators asked him the very same questions: "*S kakoy tselyu sochinyali stikhi? S kakoy tselyu vy pobudžali v Kiyevye Kostomarov? Kto takiye . . . i pochemy oni v svoikh nismakh nazivali vas?*" (With what aim in mind did you write verse? With what aim in mind did you influence Kostomarov in Kyiv? Who are . . . and why do they mention you in their letters?) This was 118 years ago. Still it became clear to me that nothing has changed in the practice of the courts to this day: neither the character of the questions nor the people themselves.

The tricky "*navodyashchiye voprosy*" (questions leading in a particular direction) were over and the investigator found himself in a dilemma. It occurred to me that they are not interested at all in where and how we had met, about what we had talked. They wanted to find out whether or not Svitlychnyy had influenced me, whether or not he had deliberately planted a seed of political intrigue in me.

He sat in front of me and I noticed his new, white woolen socks. He seemed to have understood my glance and said unexpectedly: "My wife sent these over for me; I am warmer than you".

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Italics in the text indicate phrases and sentences spoken in Russian as in the original (Ed.).

"*Zamolchitye!* (Shut up)" angrily shouted the prosecutor from Lviv. "*Yli vy khotitye, chtoby my perervali ochnyuyu stavku i vyveli vas von otsyuda?* (Do you want us to interrupt the confrontation and take you out of here?)

Now they stopped questioning me and turned to Svitlychnyy.

"You know, I do not remember this", he said "My sclerosis has increased so much in recent times. Just imagine, I could not even remember the last places of my work and had to record them on index cards".

At times, one had the feeling that he was beginning to be annoyed by all this senselessness, and then he helped the investigators in compiling the protocol. "Write", he said, "what is more convenient for you in view of the Code, I do not care. Only write down only that which pertains to me alone. I do not want to make others responsible for my actions".

At the end we were allowed a minute of free conversation.

"You are so rosy-cheeked, as if you had just come from freedom today", I told him.

Ivan Oleksiyovych smiled.

"Our 'length of service' is almost identical".

He left, leaving in me some quiet happiness, confidence in myself and at least in elementary justice. For a long time, I was under the impression of his smiling face, the only human and natural face, it seemed to me, in several months of imprisonment. He was "cheerful", although he was also "grated" by the investigation machine. Nevertheless, he obviously realized much sooner the Middle-Age senselessness of our "case", initiated by the comedians in civilian clothes. He knew that it was possible to falsify anything at all; that it was possible to convict for anything, even for the fact that we crossed the street in a permitted place. Everything depends on the "magic wand" which someone is holding in readiness in his hands. This "magic wand" had already done its black "deed" in the thirties. Now it finds itself in the same hands, with the same people: nothing had changed, except the numbers in the years. Suddenly it will wave, and then trainloads of Kalnysheskyys and Kurbases, Dray-Khmaras and Khvylovyys will go one after the other. And then... all can be rehabilitated, a label "victim of such-and-such" can be pinned on the dead, and they can even be recognized as prominent. Strange times. Children are playing politics. Conceited and proud, vengeful and cruel children.

When I remained alone again with the investigator, I asked him: "How do you like Svitlychnyy? Have you seen him for the first time?"

"*O! S nim nuzhno yeshcho mnoho porabotat!* (Oh, it is necessary to work with him quite a lot)", he said, "*Mozhet togda iz nevo i vyshel by nastoyashchiy lityeraturnyy kritik* (perhaps then he would become a genuine literary critic).

At this time I particularly felt my prisoner's inferiority.

Volodya, rearranging the matches, finally dared to tell me about his "adventure". His horses were nothing in comparison with his "fate". I cried out after hearing that he is "criminal of two republics".

At the beginning of the fifties, Volodya was suspected of connections with the Bandera Followers and was sentenced to a life-long deportation to Central Asia (then, even if they could not prove the "connection", 25 years of life were given just the same). He was there until the 20th Congress, and then after the great disturbances, his case was reviewed and he was allowed to return to the Lviv region. After some time he, together with friends, organized a group and they began to print, in secret, brochures and leaflets of anti-Soviet contents. One time the organs of the KGB caught up with him with a suitcase containing "his own production" and a revolver in his pocket. At that moment he was heading for the Transcarpathian region.

Volodya tried to defend himself in all possible ways. Allegedly, the suitcase with brochures and leaflets was not his, and the revolver was planted on him by the KGB agents. Then the pocket containing the revolver was cut out and the expertise determined that in this very pocket Volodya had carried the gun for quite some time. During the investigation it was revealed that, living in Central Asia, he had also committed a whole series of "crimes", in particular, he had propagated Ukrainian nationalist songs and ideas. For all this, he was declared to be "a criminal of two republics" and sentenced to 12 years of imprisonment. He was serving his term of punishment in Dushanbe, and now he was summoned, as a star witness in the case of Kupyak, a former chief of the Banderite Security Service who settled in Canada after the war and lives there to this day. The Soviet government more than once handed notes to the government of Canada for the latter to return Kupyak to the Soviet Union, where he will be tried as a wartime criminal.

I stared at Volodya with admiration! Until now he seemed to me, by his conduct, to be a thief or a black marketeer, and that most likely he was being tried for that. And he, as if realizing his superiority over my insignificant being, sprawled himself all over the bed and threw one leg over the other.

"If you like, I'll tell you how many years of 'prison' you'll get".

He drew a circle, encompassed it by another one, and divided it into seven parts, each part corresponded to a year, i.e., seven years as stipulated by the Article. In the middle of the circle he placed a cup filled with water, stirred it and threw a match. When the water calmed down, the match floated out from the whirlpool and hit its head against the part of the circle which contained the figure signifying the number of years. On the basis of this fortune-telling I received three years.

"I swear by my own and my grandfather's horses that you will not receive more".

On February 11th we were transferred to another cell, No. 70. It was spacious here. I measured the area accurately.

"Ha-ha", said Volodya, "we're in paradise; the only thing we need is women, yes-s".

Still another prisoner was quartered with us, a small, neat Jew, untalkative and quiet.

Several days ago, Volodya told me that soon, in a day or so, he shall leave my company forever, inasmuch as everything is "clear" with respect to him. But shortly after we had received reinforcements in the cell, he said that he is staying for no less than a month, since new, very unpleasant facts were uncovered. He said this with some inner stress, but I did not catch any anxiety in this.

Our "paradise" seemed to me an Hermitage, without pictures, it is true, but eight meters long. If one were to pace to and fro and carefully count one's steps, it is possible to make six kilometers in a day, the distance from TsUM to my apartment and back. I amused myself by these steps. I was pleased as a child with my discovery, and even "revived" a bit. The paces did not always come out even in length and then I took two for one. I cheated myself at this game, but this failed to turn my attention away from a woman's weeping, which persecuted my ears for days on end. For almost a week, somebody was lamenting sadly next door and everything turned within me from that, some frightful anxiety grew in my breast; I went up to the window, returned to the door, counted and counted steps, but the weeping did not cease.

It seems that we are not in prison, but in the jungle, that we are not prisoners isolated from the rest of the world, but foolish Tarzans whom the monkeys have decided to drive out of the thickets by wild lamentation.

Volodya read in silence; his lower lip moved rather amusingly all the time and from time to time he glanced stealthily at the new cellmate.

"Pardon me", he could not restrain himself any longer, "you're here on the basis of what article, if it's not a secret?"

"There are no secrets here", replied Naum quickly, but said nothing else after this. Volodya groaned in displeasure on the bed, swallowed his saliva, attempted to strike up the conversation anew, but did not get anywhere. On the following day he said that all is "clear", coldly bade me farewell, nodded his head to Naum, and started for the door, waiting to be called. He stood there for quite some time with his bundle, and then, as if remembering something said in passing, asking not to tell anybody about it:

"You'll remember me on a good word that you will get two years. Oh, do you know Dzyuba, the writer? He spoke in your defense somewhere, possibly in the (Writers') Union. There he was hissed

down, and Kozachenko said to him, 'Evil is the Writers' Union, not ours but yours, Dzyuba!' There was much hissing and laughter. Oh yes, I heard something else. In Lutsk, the likes of you were recently tried. The people were indignant, shouted from the hall: 'To prison with them, to prison!' And they lowered their heads and replied: We have been sitting already anyway repented!"

"This is a dishonest man, a rascal", said Naum as soon as Volodya left the cell, "I noticed that immediately, as soon as I came in, from the first glance. Furthermore, is this the way people say goodbye, who have spent six months together in a cell?"

He acted as if he had been replaced by someone else. From a taciturn, secretive man he suddenly became talkative. He talked, did not permit me to say one word but only gave advice on how to conduct myself in court, how to reply to questions.

I stared at him in astonishment. It was long past our bedtime, but we talked and talked in whispers. I thought about the fact that I cannot distinguish between good and evil people at all, that I do not know human psychology, that I do not know from whom to await goodness.

The lamentation which tormented me for so many days, of which I dreamed as something repetitious and living, which I tried to shake off so stubbornly by a primitive counting of steps, by verses, and pitiful humming suddenly fell out of my head during the conversation with Naum. It fell out as a useless stone falls out of a wagon, ceased as suddenly as a magnetophone tape, which I began to despise so much in these days.

A human being is created so that others write about it. It walks, loves, sleeps a blessed sleep, and at times it even dreams of something. In order to be a cultured and an educated person, a human being must read a great deal and everything. When it reads something which propagates only morning and forgets day and night, a human being becomes one-sided and its eyes squint, as those of the Folknerian Negro, when the Indans were leading him to bury him under the corpse of the chief.

It is written about this human being: it is interesting, it knows a great deal and it is being portrayed, one and the same, in various ways. The socio-realists in their own way, the surrealists in theirs, the imaginists in theirs, the impressionists in theirs. But no matter how they would portray a human being, either a negative type, such as a thief, a drug addict, or a rapist, or a positive type such as the milkmaid and her cow Manka, both of whom have taken a social duty upon themselves to milk and to be milked; a teacher who has taken upon himself to make outstanding students from failing students and, in reality, is giving them A's; an academician who loves children very much and even stops them on the street and gives them candy, asking their names, and when they tell him their last names instead of their first, he runs away struck, forgetting to give the children the candy.

He runs inasmuch as he heard the name of people whom he personally condemned in secret denunciations "in the past" to life imprisonment or "simply" to death, and now he fears human justice, smoothes down his grey hair and slants his wise eyes. As presented by them, a human being will always be nice and will sit somewhere high up in the clouds and will gaze with anxiety upon the white world, as Joyce's hero "Ulysses" had done, whom he invented in less than a day, several hundred pages long, by the stream of his consciousness and subconsciousness. This happens when genuine writers write. Without them it would be sad, uninteresting to live; the world would lose its color; we would not see any sense in our existence. We, surely, would not know how to love, were it not for writers.

Yet, there are writers of a different caliber, who write no less than the real ones, but who do not publish their works and who would not even want them to be made public. These works are safeguarded under huge, secret locks and they are guarded not by the horrible Cyclopes, but by unpretentious mortals with weapons in their hands. If these works were ever published, then all the realists and modernists would become gloomy from them, and even the great Hoffman, who liked to dream and to invent so much, he too would drop his eyes in embarrassment after reading several such pages.

And if, finally, some raise their negative and positive heroes to the clouds, then others (and herein is their greatest artistic value) necessarily drive such heroes into the ground. They are pushing them in front along the narrow, impassable labyrinths and leave them there at the mercy of their fate. One can imagine how horrible these novels are. It is true, they have very modest titles, but, after all, are titles that important for a good work? A novel about me, written by my investigator in six months, was called "Case No. 107". This was book No. 7 of the over-all epopee in 19 volumes. From the first page on it became clear who is a negative and who a positive hero (it must be mentioned that such classification is mandatory not only for socio-realist literature, but for them as well). Everything base people could have done in their entire existence, I had done. But, not even in the miniature, could I ever suspect what a hostile element I was, in what hostile terms I thought. I did not even think what I ought to about an ordinary needle.

In that voluminous novel, which was almost 400 pages long, everything which I could have done was mentioned.

It appears that any kind of an acquaintance, any kind of a meeting, any kind of a greeting on the May 1st holiday could be classified as criminal. Even if while greeting an acquaintance you were standing with your back to a building, or had kept your hand in your pocket, this was also viewed as a criminal act. And if you had shaken your head in addition (epilepsy is not taken into consideration), this was also a continuous political intrigue.

At one time I happened to attend a meeting of the literary club at



the Lutsk Pedagogical Institute and liked a poem by Anatoliya P. I had no time then to make her acquaintance and through my friends asked her to send me her poems. Several of them, with a short annotation by me, were printed in the Lviv newspaper *Lenins'ka molod'* (Leninist Youth). Not too long ago Anatoliya was in Lviv and came with a friend of mine to visit. I had no time then; we were just introduced and I gave her my address. All this was diligently recorded in the *dyelo* (case). When Anatoliya P. was asked: "What have you done in his apartment and what was the purpose of your visit to him in the spring of 1965?" she replied; "I read my poems to him".

"And what did he do, had he said anything?"

"No, he just shook his head". Had I not shaken my head, possibly this insignificant incident would not have won such fame for itself in the *dyelo*.

To some extent, life can be imagined as a mechanism, a mechanism packed with various levers and cogs. These cogs are friends. And if one were to exchange one cog for another, exactly the same, then the mechanism would continue to operate. These are cogs-twins, these are friends-twins, who, as you will ascertain after all, can be easily substituted and the mechanism will not stop because of their substitution. A genuine friend is a real cog. Change it and the entire movement of the mechanism will break down.

Sandurskyy is a cog in my mechanism (I beg his pardon for such a comparison), which, having been replaced, had not stopped the mechanism. On the contrary, it began to operate even better. In short, it purified itself. He and I were long-time friends, perhaps even ten years long. He was doing post-graduate work at the Department of Philosophy of Lviv University; he did a lot of reading, was very eloquent, knew a great deal from esthetics and literature. I helped him in quite a few things in life, and I am not ashamed to say it. I even trusted that man, as somebody close to me, as somebody who could help me in a crisis. But it was enough for me to find myself behind the senseless bars, when the cog not only fell out of my mechanism, but fell apart, breaking down the mechanism at the same time. He turned out to be a coward who for the purpose of reaping a benefit can lie no end about a person, if somebody demands it of him. He slept in my bachelor room (he had no other place), while he told the investigator that I invited him to my house and read him anti-Soviet literature. He named such books, which I cannot come across even now. This is not asked of just anybody. He spit on me from head to toe, having thus "helped" the investigation and, burying me alive, helped to drive me into the deceptive labyrinths of the dark underground. And he had done this with such passion that the investigators themselves could envy him. After all, they praised him; they could not stop praising him. "*Vot umnyy chelovyek, istinno sovyetskiy chelovyek*" (There's a smart man, a truly Soviet man). If the investigators think of a "Soviet man" only as being capable of

everything, both friendship and baseness, as Sanduskyy was, then this is a very primitive way of thinking.

This came to my mind when I was reading "Case No. 107". It also contained Sandurskyy's testimony and his philosophical generalizations of the social threat stemming from my actions, in the protocol dated October 15, 1965. Then I thought that when I'm freed sometime, I will have to meet him. How will he dare to look into my eyes?

At last I was allowed to familiarize myself with the act of the indictment. "An ideological saboteur... from isolated acts of anti-Soviet character passed to agitation for separation of the Ukrainian SSR from the USSR... received anti-Soviet literature from Ivan Svitlychnyy of Kyiv... Maintained criminal contacts with Mykhaylo and Bohdan Horyn... disseminated anti-Soviet nationalist literature in the city of Lviv..."

"But how do you dare write such a thing?" I asked the investigator, not understanding anything. "This does not correspond to reality one bit".

"Yes", replied the investigator calmly, "the majority really does not correspond to the facts, but the trial is ahead; it will sort things out".

"If this is the way you're telling me, then on what grounds are you taking me to court?"

The investigator did not know what to answer. Then the head of the investigation department dropped by the office. He looked at me carefully and said maliciously. "And did you think that we fed you state bread for eight months in vain? If we let him go, then he'll appear to all as a victim of high-handedness. But when you receive a few years, then you can't prove to God Himself that you're not a camel".

The holy inquisition — the Middle Ages cast it on the high bank, inaccessible and untouchable. Discarded were high sculptured tables, cumbersome chairs, and black robes. The cumbersome brought fear to the human being, meanness in view of the great, the black meant the enlightened strivings of the judges. The world has been changing. At present nothing can remind us of the age of chivalry; everything has changed beyond recognition; only the court has not changed. The same cumbersome things remained, the invariable attribute of the dreamy, sleepy Themis with bound eyes, and only here and there the black robes have disappeared. Elegant suits, made in first-class workshops, do not give the judges the sternness which they should have. Therefore the judges' faces must always be grim and insulting. Those whom indifference becomes can wear that too. The judges are judging, the judges are dozing. Today they are trying the opponents of the king, and tomorrow — the king. They are always trying opponents of someone. The judges are judging; the judges are tired of judging, but they have to, society demands it of them. Judges of the world. They are a perfect marionette, a small state, a toy in some-

body's sack, and a just toy. No matter whom or how they would try, they always adhere to the principles of justice. It is another matter that this justice can be such as someone imagines it to be. But this is also no concern of theirs, inasmuch as they are far above the very concept of justice.

The judges are not judged; condemned are only the times and the environment which had them on its shores. And the times and the environment are condemned by these same judges, who by now are in another dimension of time and in another environment. And they convict on the same principles of justice which prevailed in the Middle Ages.

The judges are judging, the judges are dozing. So that the spectators do not devour them with their eyes and do not prevent them from slumbering, they are making the trials closed. They are slumbering and are very insulted when the defendants or the witnesses are bringing them out of that lethargic state.

I protest against the closed court proceedings. The Constitution of the USSR and the 20th Article of the Criminal Code guarantee that a trial of this character must necessarily be open. The court is violating the Constitution and the Code, and therefore I consider the trial as not binding, refuse to testify and submit a declaration on this occasion.

This was a bolt from the clear blue sky. It shook the drowsy judges; it angered the stout-looking prosecutor. The prosecutor rushed from his seat as if burned and flung the declaration in Vyacheslav Chornovil's face.

"*Vy vrag* (you're an enemy)!" he shouted, and his breath stopped short from indignation.

The judge did not know where to hide his long arms with white cuffs, which have consumed many a kilogram of starch.

"Take him out!" he shouted from his place. "Take him out immediately!"

Vyacheslav was calm and even handsome in this calmness of his. An air of wisdom radiated from that calmness. Vyacheslav was somewhere far away from the courtroom. He found himself here for a moment, just to see what was going on. He did not even want to examine anything in detail, did not want to poke about in a pebble in order to extract a grain of gold from it. He knew that the pebble was empty, as empty as all those 19 volumes of the epopee, neatly written by the investigator. It was presently towering on the tables and the judges found it nice to slumber behind it. Vyacheslav was not angry with anyone, can one be angry at those insulted by God? His lively grey eyes radiated a certain slyness; his high forehead was as bright as a sunny day.

Vyacheslav approached the railing and placed on it a small bouquet of symbolic tulips. "This is for you from friends and acquaintances".

"*Nyemedlyenno ubrat tsvyety* (Take away the flowers immediate-

ly)" somebody's shrill voice was heard to say, and the confused guards rushed there as fast as possible, but they grabbed the flowers so awkwardly that they fell to the floor. Vyacheslav was led out, but the spirit, the atmosphere which remained behind him could not be dispersed.

"I also protest against the closed trial", said Mykhaylo Horyn, and insisted that it be made open as it is stipulated by Article 20 of the Criminal Precedural Code.

The judges are judging. They have been disturbed and now they cannot attain their semi-slumbering state.

Anatoliya P. entered the room. She is testifying in the case of Mykhaylo Horyn. She is as composed as if she had come for a visit.

"Did you take anti-Soviet articles from Mykhaylo Horyn?"

"No, I did not".

"But you have taken an article about the Russification of Ukrainian schools from him?"

"Yes, I have, but is it an anti-Soviet article?"

"What do you mean, not anti-Soviet? Haven't you read it?"

"I have read it. But it describes conditions as they really are".

"As they are?"

"Yes. For example, I did some practice teaching in the Crimean oblast and there the school principal said to teach the Ukrainian language in Russia".

"How? What are you doing, making fun of us?"

"Look at that, they don't believe me. Ask the principal himself, he'll tell you".

All burst out laughing. Even the judges cracked their lips in a smile for a moment, but immediately carefully extinguished it. The prosecutor looked around in confusion. The prosecutor had not felt so confused and deceived for a long time. The prosecutor was wiping off his bald spot and coughing angrily. A bomb was to explode, but it failed to go off.

"Go back to Lutsk, lass", said the no less "cheated" judge, "and here is a piece of advice from me: don't waste your time on trivialities anymore".

The court proceedings reminded one of a wheel in which a squirrel was running. It turned ever faster until everything mingled into one: both the squirrel and the wheel itself. It began to shimmer in the eyes, witnesses entered, said something, left. At times the squirrel stopped and an empty room, judges and witnesses, rose before the eyes.

Yaroslav K. was being interrogated. Tall, stately, with the stature of a sportsman, he conducted himself with ease, at times showing surprise at the petty questions which he was being asked.

"Do you know that you should be put on trial for the photocopy of the book which you had made?"

"Try me, if you deem it necessary", he said with indifference, as if he were buying a ticket on the tram.

The prosecutor was confusing everything. It seems that he was

little acquainted with the *dyela* (cases) and the questions which he should have addressed to someone else fell upon me for the fourth time.

"With what aim in mind did you have Yaroslav K. make a photostat of the book?"

"Which photostat?" I asked.

"I beg your pardon", the judge interrupted the prosecutor in embarrassment, "you are not questioning the appropriate party".

The prosecutor groaned as if he were again "cheated" at something. He wiped off his bald spot and shrugged his shoulders awkwardly.

The squirrel winked at the prosecutor. He stared at it. It winked again, and the wheel began to spin.

In the morning we were packed into cars, "the black marias", and taken to Pekarska Street to the headquarters of the *oblast* court. Myroslava Zvarychevskaya was in a good mood and read lines from Shevchenko's poem which he wrote in prison 120 years ago:

"Recall, my pals . . .

May that evil never return!

When nicely you and I

Peaked from under the grating . . ."

"*Tishe vy tam!* (Quiet you there!)" barked the guard but his shouting was lost in the midst of the uproar which unexpectedly surrounded our "maria".

"Glory! Glory! Glory!" yelled the crowd which filled the entire Pekarska Street (this occurred on all five days). Flowers were thrown to us. They fell on the metal top of the car and through the tiny opening in the door to us. When we were going to the court premises, we walked on the carpet of fresh spring flowers. We were sorry to spoil them, but we could not step aside, we were led firmly, our hands clasped until they hurt. I recalled one character upon whose cap a flower fell. It was a pot-bellied soldier who looked around him like a frightened rabbit. Somebody pointed to the flower and he shook it off from the cap with such hatred and fear as if a small bomb had been there.

"Mykhaylo, behave yourself!" shouted Ivan Dzyuba to Horyn from a group, "Behave yourself!" he shouted.

I only managed to see his face. I saw for a second how Lina Kostenko made her way through the guard formation and quickly placed a bar of chocolate in Myroslava Zvarychevsky's hand. The chief of the isolation ward rushed to Myroslava like crazy and snatched the bar away.

"*Chort evo znayet, mozhet ona otravlena?* (The devil knows, perhaps it has been poisoned)".

The squirrel stopped and glanced at the prosecutor in surprise. The latter, perfumed and solemn (only the damned perspiration spoiled everything), read from a pile of papers. "Comrades judges! The song of figures of the ever-growing successes of our industry sounds ever

mightier! Hundreds of tons of coal over the plan . . . iron and steel . . . wool and fibre . . . milk and eggs . . ."

The squirrel blinked its eyes in surprise. The prosecutor cast his glance at it in dissatisfaction, puffed his cheeks in anger, but it continued to blink at him. His eyelash began to shake and perspiration again thickly covered the bald spot. He grabbed the life-saving handkerchief, lost a line which he was supposed to read, the squirrel leaped — and the wheel began to spin again.

Lina Kostenko . . . They could do nothing here with her, nor with her poetry. They both lived at that senseless trial. They were both indignant, as only honest people, brave and genuine citizens, can be indignant. She was warned, intimidated, persuaded; suggestions were made to her; perhaps for the first time both friends and strangers talked to her about her great talent, which still had to blossom. She was told that her place is not here on Pekarska Street, but at home, in the office where there is peace and quiet. But she laughed into their faces. She was furious as only poets can be furious. She was a poet, a good poet. But suddenly she forgot about it; she forgot that she was a poet. Others, great and small graphomaniacs, locked themselves in their hovels—souls and coined *stikhi* (verses) which brought them fame and prizes, cognac and Volgas (Russian-made car). She looked people straight in the eyes. She searched in them for conscience, and let them forgive her.

The squirrel stopped. The wheel stopped shimmering. The prosecutor was at this moment taking an "excursion" into grey antiquity. No, let us say, he resorted not to such remote times, just to the times of Austria-Hungary.

"These renegades here, comrades judges, do not like the amicable Great Russian language. When I visited the Lviv University — I go there quite often — namely, into that temple of knowledge, in one department the comrades suggested a poem by Markiyan Shashkevych which I, as a matter of fact, had known for a long time. In the grey obscurity of Austria-Hungary such an enlightened figure. He drew on the Great Russian language in his examples. Let us hear what he wrote about it:

"The Rus'ian mother bore us,  
The Rus'ian mother nourished us —  
Why is not her language dear to us?"

The prosecutor spoke half in Russian and half in Ukrainian.

The squirrel stared in surprise at the member of the Writers' Union of Ukraine, Prosecutor Borys Antonenko. All burst out laughing and in doing so embittered the speaker.

"But he has not written this about the Russian language", said Myroslava Zvarychevska, "but about the Ukrainian. In the past Ukraine was called Rus'".

The judges dropped their heads, began to turn over papers which lay in front of them, while the prosecutor resorted to his life-saving

handkerchief. His baldspot was thickly covered with pearls of sweat. He shook his head in anger.

"Comrades judges", he said stuttering, "I cannot continue with my speech like this. Establish order!"

The judge rose, leaned against the edge of the table and fixed his slanted eyes into space.

"Order, please".

The squirrel winked at the prosecutor and he nervously turned his extensive speech.

"In the past, in the time of that dark, illiterate Austro-Hungarian monarchy, a genius, who seldom occurs, like Ivan Franko, who loved and propagated the Rus (Ukrainian) culture, was banned by the authorities from lecturing at the university. And who is lecturing in our universities now? Just look, before you is a former lecturer of that university, defendant Osadchyy. The latter is lamenting all over that a library burned down, that the national wealth of the Ukrainian people burned down".

Somebody giggled unexpectedly. The squirrel winked and the prosecutor became annoyed again. But, with the stubbornness typical of him, he came to his senses quickly.

"So, what could he have taught his students? Here he talked about Ostap Vyshnya a great deal. But who is Ostap Vyshnya? I know the thirties very well, and it is not for you, milk-suckers, to dig into some mysteries of the thirties! Who is Ostap Vyshnya! Only the fact that Ostap Vyshnya wrote by choice, in pure Ukrainian language influenced his readers, but Vyshnya's fame, you understand, was artificially inflated — to a diverse way of thinking. For this was received under the knot".

That funny squirrel with its wheel — it is not my whim, I did not invent it. It existed for real but it was perhaps even more comical than I have described it. It wiggled in its multi-colored wheel, demonstrating how all colors blend in motion into one: white. It twisted and turned, treading its little legs and moving its sharp mouth no less comically. It wiggled, showing how fast the time passes. On a hastily nailed-together stage, in the noisy market place the travelling actors from a noisy tent were staging a funny play of court proceedings. There was the awkward erudite-prosecutor, with the traditional baldness (the sign of human wisdom) and with the traditional rain of sweat on it. There were the judges, who dozed in the traditional manner, inasmuch as they were long tired of trying people, but they had to try them as tradition demanded, for this is why they were gods and judges. There were also the traditional defense attorneys, who did not defend anybody, for the very judges and the prosecutor were their superiors, and just try to move contrary to the wishes of the authorities and you will be removed yourself in line with tradition. The spectators were all the defendants. They stood in a group and laughed to tears, this was the traditional laughter in a traditional

comedy. They were captivated by the play to such a degree (the actors were amateurs and therefore their acting was not professional, as was customary, but nevertheless, it was very funny) that they forgot to guard themselves against pickpockets, who were just waiting for this decadent laughter and now embraced the spectators brazenly and took out everything they had. My pockets were empty; there was nothing to steal and therefore only two years were stolen from me. From Mykhaylo Horyn — six years; from Bohdan Horyn — three years; while that cursed squirrel did not cease to spin its traditional multi-colored wheel, and as a result all colors became white, the semi-cartoon prosecutor continued to sweat as tradition demanded, the fat judges and the skinny defense attorneys slumbered on tall-back chairs, holding their hearts, mumbled something continuously under their noses as rabbis. This was the prayer "God, carry..."

I was robbed primitively, as inexperienced peasants are robbed who come to a large city for the first time and look all about them as a goat staring at new gates. They find out much later about their loss, but out of shame and admiration for such "clean" work ride home in silence without complaining and without being angry at anyone in their heart.

I was also such a peasant and was struck no less than he by the "clean" work. In reality, the trial, possibly not so much the trial as the prosecutor and the judges, should be awarded the Nobel Prize. They did not even need to suck anything from their fingers (shame on you, for sticking fingers in your mouth!). Closing their eyes, they compiled such incriminating "sentences" in five days, that the poor judges could not measure up, gave it to Ostap Vyshnya under his very belly button for terroristic acts (not for raping Clara Tsetkin, although this would have been a much more serious accusation).

Mykhaylo Kosiv, my witness, said at the trial, "I did not read the article 'On the Occasion of the Trial of Pohryzhalsky' at Osadchyy's. He did not express ideas of anti-Soviet nationalist character, so that he did not exhibit a dissatisfaction with Soviet reality". (p. 85 of the transcript of the proceedings of the court hearing).

Mykhaylo Kosiv was told by the honorable judges not to be smart twice, he was freed from being under arrest (it lasted six months) but he could be confined again with pleasure. And in the verdict, in reference to Kosiv's statement, it was written: "Defendant Osadchyy gave Kosiv the article 'On the Occasion of the Trial of Pohruzhsalsky to read'".

Ivan O., a witness in my case, said five times during the investigation that he did not read the article "On the Occasion of the Trial of Pohruzhsalsky" in my apartment; he said the same thing convincingly at the court hearing as well (p. 91 of the proceedings of the court hearing), while the judges from the high bank of justice entered the verdict: "Defendant Osadchyy gave O. the article 'On the Occasion of the Trial of Pohruzhsalsky' to read".



My "best" friend, Ihor Sandurskyy, said at the inquiry that I gave him the article 'On the Occasion of the Trial of Pohrutzhalskyy' to read. Before the court he also said that I gave it to him to read, but when the prosecutor, infuriated by the squirrel and its wheel which turned in front of his eyes all the time, asked what did this article "look" like, S. suddenly forgot himself completely and uttered that he cannot tell this to the prosecutor because he had not seen it with his "own" eyes and had not read it, that Osadchyy "was a modest man who was interested in Ukrainian literature" (p. 89 of the proceedings of the court hearing).

Into the verdict the judges recorded: "Defendant Osadchyy gave Ihor S. the article 'On the Occasion of the Trial of Pohrutzhalskyy' to read". One of the judges, who began to laugh too soon, also entered the following in the verdict: "Defendant Osadchyy transmitted to Mykhaylo Masyutko the anti-Soviet nationalist article 'Eisenhower's Speech at the Unveiling of the Shevchenko Monument in Washington in 1964'. I had never met Mykhaylo Masutko. His name was never mentioned to me either during the investigation or at the trial.

In his book, *History of My Life*, Svirskyy mentions that when he was a 'tot he liked to lie very much. Yet he lied not just to lie *per se*, he always wanted to give the grownups a pleasant surprise: "Aunt Dvoyre, a woman has just given birth on the street. Such a tiny baby, it was screaming so much..." Aunt Dvoyre ran out into the street and returned furious, no woman had even thought of giving birth on the street. And the young hero sat in the weeds and cried bitterly, burning with shame for his lie. He cried and begged his good Hebrew God to help him not to lie anymore, but He did not want to help the small and unhappy child in any way.

I recall that little boy and his torments and wonder whether the judges and the prosecutors ever beg their goddess of justice — Themis — to direct them to the righteous course?

I got the impression that it is possible to convict to life-long imprisonment almost anybody and for almost anything. For instance, I sat on a bedbug and crushed it. Then Major Halskyy said: "*Ty prestupnyy prezervativ, tyebya nado unichtozhit, noskolku ty zloumishlyenno pazdavit chesnovo sovyetskovo klopa cvozey burzhuazno-natsionalisticheskoy zhopoy!* (You are the breaker of the law, you should be annihilated, inasmuch as you crushed, with an evil intention, an honest Soviet bedbug by your bourgeois nationalist ass!)" And this argument will suffice to give me under my very belly-button. To complain somewhere, to enter appeals — do it, if you please — the result will be just the same.

I appealed the unjust verdict of the Lviv Oblast Court in the Supreme Court of the Ukr. SSR. And what happened? I was cleared of the "illegally attributed" criminal relations with Mykhaylo and Bohdan Horyn, Mykhaylo Masyutko and Ivan Svitlychnyy. But I

was not cleared of the things arbitrarily attributed to me by the judges, which the witnesses denied. I was, so to speak, left with my prisoner interests.

"You should be glad", said "my" investigator to me after the trial. "What you received is less than a term received by children. Thank God that they did not hit you with more. And these two years will fly fast, you'll come back and together we shall catch fish on the Svytyaz".

A trial cleanses a person; it cleanses him of experiences, of sleepless nights, and of faith in at least the primitive decency and justice. It becomes surprisingly easy and cheerful; the term 2 to 10 years does not mean a thing anymore; it makes no difference to you, as it makes no difference when you commit a new "sin" after confession. And even the narrow, darkness-filled cell does not oppress as much, and the "dear" words — *apravlyatsa, padyom, balanda* — begin to sound different to you. You are beginning to feel yourself as a master of sorts and you are even disturbed at the thought that you have been robbed. You are again turning into that peasant who was "stripped to the skin" and who is going home in fear, but who all this time is prevented from "being afraid" by the network of lights of the tall buildings.

To all this was still added in the morning the attitude of "my" good investigator. I looked at him with gratitude. I was always under the impression that this man was superfluous in this factory of human souls, that his place is somewhere possibly in the good services office. Such people make good stewardesses. At least at present I considered these as professions of smile and politeness.

I lectured at a university; I was a journalist; I wrote verse, and everywhere I thought that I was a good judge of people, that I could penetrate their psychology by surprise, that I could understand them and figure them out, not in simple terms, but as bad and evil, sincere and insincere. And here I dropped my hands in confusion many a time. I could not tell the difference between good and evil, good-naturedness and common human baseness. Here everything reminded me of a giant chameleon, everything underwent a metamorphosis, as if in a kaleidoscope, raged as a tempest, and I discarded to the devil all attempts to determine anything and to get somewhere in my thoughts. Here I first began to lose confidence in the human goodness! Words, even the most beautiful ones, ceased to have any significance for me.

Who could have thought that at the time when the investigator consoled me with a meeting with my wife, who had been waiting for me for a long time on a floor below, that same investigator nervously blurted into the telephone, at the time when she was asking to have the meeting speeded up, "Wait a minute, I do not have time at the moment. I'm busy!" I do not know what important matters of state he was then deciding, perhaps he was then peacefully sleeping on the

couch or drinking coffee, but my wife was waiting, waiting from nine in the morning until half past four in the afternoon. My wife was very young, twenty years old. My wife was pregnant and was about to give birth today or tomorrow. The investigator knew this and even at times was concerned with her condition, "You know, you have such a nice wife".

She stood there pale and powerless. After a ten-minute conversation with me she fell on my chest and began to slip to the floor. I thought that she was acting that way out of emotion, because she had not seen me for a long time, but the investigator was much more farsighted than I. He hastily took her under her arm and led her to the exit. My wife managed to go by herself, inasmuch as she did not even have money for the tram. She reached the Medical Institute and gave birth, an hour after our meeting.

Let us assume that in the eyes of the investigator I am a criminal. Then, certainly, it is possible to treat me like a criminal. But why then subject my wife to such inhuman tortures? And not simply a wife, but a mother! And not simply a mother, but a mother who is about to give birth, and to give birth today!

I, for instance, cannot trust writer Oleksiy Poltoratsky, the editor of the periodical *Vsesvit* (Universal). I cannot trust him either as a man or as a public figure, who perhaps laments most of all on the pages of the press for honesty and cultivates love for humanism in his readers. Say, is it possible to trust him, the same one who in the thirties wrote about Ostap Vyshnya, "A class enemy... A bard of the kulak peasants... A conservator of the language... a zoological nationalist..." And in the sixties calls the great Ukrainian humorist "his closest friend and companion"? When was he a citizen? At the time when in the difficult moment for Ostap Vyshnya, he belied him on all sides, or now, when Ostap Vyshnya was rehabilitated, when his honest literary name was returned to him, when he was called one of the best humorists of Ukraine? Does Poltoratskyi, the great "psychoanalysis machine" of his time, have the right to call Vyshnya his friend? Who gave him the right to do so? Civic conscience or Soviet government? No, he is basely calling him his own, committing an even greater moral crime than in the thirties!

Such thoughts did not give me peace, confused my nonetheless wronged soul, tore me to pieces, so that at times I could not stand it any longer, approached the wall, closed my eyes, and angrily boxed with my fists in front of me. This was at the moment of my preparation for the first stay in my life in the camps of the severe regime.

*(To be continued)*

## The Concepts of Humaneness & Democratism in the Criminal Law of Princely Ukraine\*

By Dr. Yaroslav PADOKH\*\*\*

(Conclusion)

**“Do not permit the strong to destroy the weak”.  
Prince Volodymyr Monomakh**

### II

The criminal law of Princely Ukraine exhibits marked traits of democratism. Aside from some less important deviations, it is built on the principles of equality and generality. This democratism is not accidental. The entire socio-political system of the Kyivan State was democratic. Therefore, it had to penetrate into every sphere of life and law of that time as well.

The outwardly monarchist system of ancient Ukraine-Rus' was democratic in practice. The dualism of state leadership: the prince and the *viche* (common council) allowed the former to exercise superiority only in exceptional cases, and then only *de facto*, determined by the outstanding individuality of the monarch. Legally, the *viche* was the highest state organ, having a decisive broadness of powers. It called the princes to the throne; it concluded treaties with princes and reserved for itself the never obsolete right to execute the implementation of these treaties and, having determined their violation, to remove the prince. The person of a prince fell under the sanction of criminal law. He was answerable to the court of princely council.<sup>1</sup> Moreover, at times he was even subject to the jurisdiction of the popular *viche*. How far removed was the position of these ancient Ukrainian princes from the position of monarchs of other nations, whom we know from history, and whose exceptional status was determined by the formula: *princeps legibus solutus*.

This early democratism was so profound and strong, so organically bound with the viewpoint of a Ukrainian man, that it stood the test in a lingering, dramatic, and interesting struggle, which continued for centuries between the ancient Ukrainian *viche* doctrine of state

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1) Compare *The Ipat'skyi Chronicle* from 1177: «Рядъ нашъ такъ есть, оже ся князь извинитъ, то въ волость».

and the alien Byzantine theory of caesaro-papism, brought and spread in Ukraine by the Greek clergy and bishops.<sup>2</sup>

A particular light on the criminal law of the age is shed by the fact that it hardly knew anti-state crimes. Neither the *Ruska Pravda* nor any other monument of the age had preserved a reference to crimes, so popular in other places, such as high treason, violation of the majesty, and so forth.<sup>3</sup> This, of course, was caused not so much by the primitivism of the law of the time, but rather by the political and social conditions of life which did not raise a need for separate measures in order to guarantee a citizen's loyalty to the state, the land, and the monarch. A broadly democratic *viche* system of state government permitted a citizen a free attitude to the monarch, as a representative of popular government, and an act of disloyalty with respect to him (even an active one) was not considered a contemptible act in the eyes of the law.<sup>4</sup> The change of these patriarchal conditions of life, which was occurring rather quickly, raised the need for defining and sanctioning at least some segments of the citizens' relations to the state and prince, but a swift disruption of state life and development of the Kyivan Rus' did not permit it to crystallize and to formulate these aspirations.

The democratic system of state government was complemented by a democratic structure of society. Although the population of princely Ukraine was not homogeneous, it was not divided into classes, separated from each other. The basis for the inevitable social differences was, aside from the property inequality, primarily the services for the prince. There were no boundaries, at least legal ones, among these social strata. Entering into the service of the prince or acquiring a considerable amount of property, anyone could join the sphere of "better people" (landed boyars and boyar-legionnaires), and such transition from a lower to the higher class occurred quite often. Failing to develop separate, closed castes, these upper social classes acquired any class privileges guaranteed by law. In the eyes of the law, the entire free population — the boyars, the townspeople, and the peasants — was equal. Although *de facto* the upper classes had a considerably greater influence and significance in private and public respects, still until the end of the Kyivan Rus'-Ukraine the law (which not only in its terminology but also in the views of the population was considered as "truth" or "justice") had not legalized these *de facto* differences, and so they had never changed into binding norms.

This equality before the law remained intact in criminal law as

<sup>2</sup>) See i.a. the work by V. D. Grekov: *Die russische Kultur der Kiever Periode*, Moscow, 1947, p. 102 and subs.

<sup>3</sup>) Characteristic is the fact that the concept *crimen laesae majestatis* arose the earliest (12th century) in the Suzdal region where the system of government was very different from the system in the Kyiv region.

<sup>4</sup>) See i.a. Vladimirovskiy-Budanov: *Obzor*, pp. 320-21.

well, although with some insignificant deviations. In general, the subject of a criminal act has not been individualized, as had been the case in West-European law, such as German,<sup>5</sup> Polish, and others.<sup>6</sup> The degree and type of punishment are not based on the class membership of the criminal. Criminals of all classes are punished by the same types of punishment.

The only doubt in this respect can arise on the basis of a decision of art. 21 of *Ruska Pravda* (according to the Academic Scroll I) which contains the following text: «Адже убьють огнищанина<sup>7</sup> у клети, или у коня, или у говяди,<sup>8</sup> или у коровье татьби, то убити в пса место». This decision raised an interesting question, which so far has not been fully answered. It permits the killing of an *ohnyshchanyn* (the chief manager of the property of the prince) and a *tiun* (manager of the property of a prince, a boyar, etc.), caught in the act of stealing, without any restrictions, in spite of the fact that in principle the *Ruska Pravda* (Art. 40, according to the Troits'kyy Scroll I) permits the killing of any thief who was caught red-handed, only under clearly defined conditions, namely, when (a) he is caught by the owner of the threatened property (b) in his own manor house, near his granary or barn, and only (c) at night and (d) when the act of lynching was executed immediately. Because of these restrictions on the lynching of a thief, the view is widespread that the point in question here is not lynching, but the indispensable defence of life and property of the defenders of the legal system. And there are no grounds to reject this view, all the more since the variations of the cited norm in other transcripts of the *Ruska Pravda* admonish at great length that the act of lynching must take place directly within the limits of the court of the injured party or one threatened by an injury. When the feet of the slain thief find themselves beyond the enclosure (which allegedly meant that the thief was fleeing and therefore not a threat to the injured party), the killing becomes illegal and punishable by law.

The quoted decision about the slaying of an *ohnyshchanyn*, caught in the act of stealing, is understood by the researchers of the *Ruska Pravda* as incomplete and they surmise that the reference to the *ohnyshchanyn* is significant as an authentic explanation of the fact that the decision about the indispensable defence applies to all strata of society, including the men in the services of the prince.<sup>9</sup> It entered the *Ruska Pravda*, just as many other insignificant standards, because of the casuistic character of this legal book. As a consequence, these researchers believe that the general requirements

<sup>5</sup>) Rudolf His: *Deutsches Strafrecht bis zur Karolina*, Munich-Berlin, 1928, p. 70 and others.

<sup>6</sup>) Kutrzeba: *Dawne polskie prawo*, p. 50 and others.

<sup>7</sup>) In other scrolls, besides the *ohnyshchanyn* also the *tiun* is mentioned.

<sup>8</sup>) Large horned cattle.

<sup>9</sup>) Vladimírskiy-Budanov: *Obzor*, p. 313.

as to the mandatory defence apply to this case as well. But such explanation of this ambiguous place in our monument is unreliable. It has all the signs of a simple assumption. In our opinion, it would be much more logical to search for an explanation of this dark decision by making an analogy to other laws. A diverse application of law, in particular of penalties, to various social groups of the population is a widespread phenomenon. In the majority of cases, representatives of higher social strata are given lighter penalties than criminals belonging to lower strata.<sup>10</sup> But the reverse can also be true. For instance, the ancient Indian law punished criminals stemming from higher castes much more severely than other people.<sup>11</sup> This pertained particularly to theft. In science, the elements common to the law of all Indo-European nations have been emphasized more than once. Hence, it would not be surprising if similarities between the ancient Ukrainian and the ancient Indian law were to be found.

If our explanation of Art. 21 of the *Ruska Pravda*, which obviously requires a thorough establishment as to principle, would prove to be justified, then although contradicting the principle of full equality in the criminal law of Kyivan Rus', it would at the same time reinforce our thesis about the democratism of this law, placing higher requirements, as far as respect for the law was concerned, on representatives (even if only *de facto*) of the privileged classes of the population.

The object of a crime is not individualized either. Aside from a few exceptions, of which we shall speak later, a crime is punished uniformly, regardless of who the criminal might be. This equality is most emphatically stressed by the earliest editions of *Ruska Pravda*. The so-called first or small *Ruska Pravda*,<sup>12</sup> which is the oldest edition of this legal collection, does not know any exceptions to the principle of equality. In Article 1<sup>13</sup> it clearly declares that when bloody retribution is not being applied, then it is necessary to pay 40 hryvnias for the head of the slain person, regardless of the national or class differences of the person of the murdered: «Аще будеть русин, любо гридин, любо купчина, любо ябетня, любо словенин, то 40 гривен шоложити за нь».

On the other hand, the second<sup>14</sup> edition of *Ruska Pravda* indicates an exception to the principle of equality. For the murder of an *ohnyschanyn*, the prince's envoy (Art. 19 RP, according to Sergi-

<sup>10</sup> In Rome, for instance. For the same crimes the *honestiores* were punished by exile or deportation, and the *humiliares* by death or slave labour. It was the same in Germany, Poland and other countries.

<sup>11</sup> Dr. J. Padoch: *Geschichte des orientalischen Rechtes*. Munich, 1946, p. 26.

<sup>12</sup> According to the classification by Sergiyevich. See his "Russkaya Pravda v chetirekh redaktsiyakh". 2nd edition. S. Pb. 1911.

<sup>13</sup> According to the publication: "Pravda Russkaya, Uchebnoye posobiye", quoted earlier.

<sup>14</sup> According to Sergiyevich.

yevich, Art. 1), the prince's *tyvun* (manager of the estate) (Art. 22, according to Sergiyevech Art. 4), and a stable-boy Art. 23, according to Sergiyevech Art. 5), a fine (*vyra*) in the double amount (80 hryvnias) is due. Then follows the third edition of the *Ruska Pravda*<sup>15</sup> which contrasts the mass of the free population — "the people" — with the privileged class — "the men serving the prince" (compare Art. 3 & 11 RP according to the Troits'kyi Scroll I).

On the example of these three editions of the *Ruska Pravda*, one can see the marks of evolution undergone by the Kyivan Rus' and the developing among the population of ever stronger boyar class.

But it would be erroneous to believe that in the case of a double fine for the head of a representative of this class one sees some rank or class privilege. The criminal only paid a *vyra*, which was twice as high, but the amount of the *holovshchyna* (fine exacted by the lord for a murder committed by the serf) remained the same as for the entire population. Thus the restitution paid to the heirs of the slain person was not raised, but the state penalty paid to the prince. This is where the secret of this "inequality" is to be found in spite of the *Ruska Pravda's* consistent preservation of democratic equality before the law of the entire population of the state.

Here only the raising of a state fine for the murder of an official of the prince was involved, justified by the dignity of the prince's personal protection under which he found himself, and the official functions which the murdered person carried out as a representative of the prince's (state) authority. Thus only the need for a separate guarantee of respect for the state and its head, as well as for the smooth functioning of state administration, led to the deviation from the principle of equality of citizens before the law.

Of the same origin is the second exception, which is referred to in Art. 78 of the *Ruska Pravda*, and which imposes a penalty four times greater (12 hryvnias) than the ordinary fine (3 hryvnias), or the prohibited torture of a soldier in the prince's retinue during an inquiry. In both cases "the men in the services of the prince" are under special protection of the law not because of their belonging to a higher class, but because of their relation to the prince, as the head of state, the carriers of whose will and dignity they had been.

The law of the time in Western Europe followed an entirely different pattern. Beginning with the 12th century, the principle of rank plays a very prominent role in the German criminal law. Not only is the degree of punishment for the same crime different (greater punishment for the criminal of common birth, lesser for a nobleman), but also the type of punishment is chosen to suit the social rank of the criminal.<sup>16</sup> Besides inequality between people of noble and common birth, differences also arise among people of the same class. This differentiation also included aliens in a way that was typical of the Western world (excluding the Slavs), that is, in towns

<sup>15</sup>) According to the classification by Sergiyevech.



the guests paid a fine twice as high as that for the local townspeople.<sup>16a</sup>

The same was true of the law of Ukraine's western neighbour, Poland. The Polish criminal law adopted the class basis very early and together with it introduced legal inequality. A researcher of the Polish law of the 13th century, Romuald Hube, clearly states that already "the degree of punishment was modified, depending on the rank of the injured party and the one causing the injury".<sup>17</sup> A criminal of noble birth is punished less severely than the criminal of a lower class.<sup>18</sup> But the differences do not end at this. A higher penalty was also assigned on the basis of the class of the injured. When he was a nobleman, then the punishment was considerably higher than for a wrong done to a commoner. The highest penalty was in store for the criminal when he, being a member of the lower social stratum, committed a crime to the detriment of a person of the upper class. This triple basis of inequality in Polish criminal law was increased by still a fourth one: the difference in the social position of the injured party.<sup>19</sup> A titled official and a titled landowner (*possessionatus*) enjoyed a far greater legal protection than a nobleman who did not hold any office or who belonged to the propertyless masses.<sup>20</sup>

These differences assumed particularly harsh forms in connection with fines and compensation. The payment of *holovshchyna*, which in the 13th century was rather firmly established, rested on the difference in the class origin and the social position of the injured. Compensation for the head of the "official" nobleman was twice as high as that for an ordinary nobleman; the fine for an ordinary peasant was 20 and later 10 times lower than the payment exacted for the head of a nobleman.<sup>21</sup>

Some consider the decision in Art. 45 of the *Ruska Pravda*, which raised the amount of compensation for a horse belonging to the prince to one and a half of the price for horses of other people (from 2 to 3 hryvnias), as a contradiction to equality in criminal law. The researchers<sup>22</sup> of *Ruska Pravda* view the fact that his property was guaranteed higher legal protection as the prince's privilege. If this had really been the case, then even this exception would not be a contradiction of the principle of democratic equality of criminal law of the time. The prince was the head of state, while his property simultaneously constituted the property of the state. A privately legal principle prevailed at that time in the life and law

16) Rudolf His: *Deutsches Strafrecht*, p. 70. 16a) Ibid. p. 71.

17) R. Hube: *Prawo polskie*, p. 162.

18) Ibid. p. 39.

19) Later a fifth one arises: the difference in religion.

20) Kutrzeba: p. 51.

21) Ibid. pp. 40-41.

22) For instance, K. L. Goetz.

of the state, and not only in Ukraine. Let us cite for illustration the law of a medieval imperial state, which almost to the end of its existence did not differentiate between the private property of the king and the property of the state.<sup>23</sup> A similar thing was true of France, where, for example, the private property of the king became the property of the state at the moment of his coronation.<sup>24</sup> Moreover, in the Roman public law the privately legal principle reigned supreme for a long time.<sup>25</sup> Hence, this higher protection of the property of the prince was rather an expression of the understanding of the special significance of state wealth, destined for the general good, than a personal privilege of the prince.

Following the democratic line, however, consistently applied in the process of the construction of the state, especially in relation to the person of the prince, we believe that the raised rate for princely horses had a different cause. We know from the chronicles that princes assigned an unusual importance to horses as a working force in agriculture and as a foundation of the country's armament potential. The ancient monuments preserved quite a few reports about the large princely herds and the special love of the princes and boyars for good breeds of horses.<sup>26</sup> Foreigners were also aware of this and often sent thoroughbred horses to the Kyivan princes as a gift. Consequently, it is possible to believe that princely horses were generally more valuable than the horses of other persons (naturally, there could have been exceptions) and therefore in the tariff of damages their price was placed above others.

Furthermore, it is not to be excluded that princely herds could have been under special protection of the law, for the very reason that they were the basis of the country's armed forces which, in view of the state's great expanse, their steppe character, and the proximity of the nomads, rested primarily on the cavalry. But in that case should not this special protection manifest itself in an increased penalty for the theft of a horse, rather than in the amount of the damages? Certainly, special protection of the prince's men manifests itself in the raising of the *vyra*, i.e. a public punishment, and not in the *urok*, i.e. private compensation for his head. Summing up the conclusions of these reflections, one can say with certainty that the cited Art. 45 of the *Ruska Pravda* also does not represent any deviation from the general democratic line of the law of that time.

<sup>23</sup>) Dr. Ya. Padokh: *Istoriya zakhidno-evropeyskoho prava*, Munich, 1947, pp. 188 and others.

<sup>24</sup>) Henri Regnault: *Manuel d'histoire du droit francais*. 4th edition, Paris, p. 179 and others.

<sup>25</sup>) Stanislaw Wroblewski: *Zarys wykladu prawa rzymskiego*. Cracow, 1916, pp. 77, 311 and others.

<sup>26</sup>) Among others Stepan Borysenok: *Karnyy zmist "potoka" Ruskoï Pravdy*. The Works of the Commission on the History of West Russian and Ukrainian Law. The Free Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, Vol. I, Kyiv, 1925, p. 25.

The concept of democratic equality manifests itself not only with respect to the whole free population, but also with respect to persons temporarily, and at times even permanently, discriminated in law: *zakups* and slaves. It was already mentioned that aside from insignificant restrictions in the legal sense, the *zakups* were equal to free people. This is especially noticeable in criminal law which declares this equality in a well known formula in Art. 62 of the *Ruska Pravda*: «яко же в свободнемъ платежъ, тако же и в закупе».

“The slaves also enjoyed some protection of law, although not very great, by the nature of the thing. In particular, criminal law protected them from unlimited violence of the free, in spite of the fact that slaves were only considered as things. This obvious inconsistency was a logical result of the concepts of humaneness and equality, whose traces are evident in the entire life of Kyivan Rus'. The law which ordered that after the death of a free man freedom be granted to his slave girl, by whom he had children, together with the children,<sup>27</sup> could not leave slaves to unrestricted wilfulness of the free and to deprive them of all human rights. The above example shows how moderate in practice was the law as it applied to these two unequal groups of the population. And the slaves had many more opportunities to gain freedom.

One of the most characteristic signs of ancient Ukrainian life and law was the relationship within the family. It was imbued with the idea of equal rights. The relationship of a father to his wife and children was a relationship of equals. In it there was no trace of the paternal despotism of the Romans,<sup>28</sup> nor the predominance of paternal authority of the Germans. The wife was in charge of her own property and acquired the right to the common family acquisitions on an equal basis with her husband. In case of his death, she had a broader right to dispose of her property than her husband.<sup>29</sup> She arranged her life freely and separation depended not only upon the husband. Becoming a widow, it was she who takes the place of the husband in the family, assuming his paternal authority. In short, in principle women were recognized as equal to men in civil relations; they could become subjects of law and obligations on an equal footing with men, retaining their right and competency<sup>30</sup> without any basic restrictions.

<sup>27</sup>) Article 98 of the *Ruska Pravda*: “Should a man have children by a slave girl, they should be granted freedom together with the mother”.

<sup>28</sup>) One should not forget that the importance and dignity of the Roman matron, widely publicized in literature, does not find an analogy in law. The Roman woman was not only deprived of public rights, but was also very restricted in civil law.

<sup>29</sup>) Dr. O. Haymanivskyy: *Zamitky do kharakterystyky holovnykh rys ukrainskoho prava doby Ruskoï Pravdy* in “Zbirnyk” of the Ukrainian Scientific Institute of America, St. Paul, Minn. — Prague, 1939, p. 35.

<sup>30</sup>) Researchers see the sole doubt as to the full competency of women in Art. 37 of *Ruska Pravda* where “two free men” appear as witnesses, while there is no mention of women.

How differently constructed was the relationship between spouses in ancient German law can be proved by the legal proverbs of the time: "Man and wife do not have separate property to their body (name)" or "The property of a woman should neither grow nor dwindle".<sup>31</sup>

The German family was subject to the dominant authority of the father. He not only managed his wife's property freely, but everything which the two spouses, or even the wife herself had, acquired during their marriage became his exclusive property. For all legal acts a married woman required the assent of her husband and the well known *mundium* of the husband, since practices by the German people extended far beyond the boundaries of the normal guardianship of the family and the management of its property.<sup>32</sup>

The concept of equality of a woman in civil law also found expression in criminal law. Basically, a woman enjoyed the same protection of law as a man. The same punishment is in store for the murder of a woman as for a murdered man. Only in the case of a husband killing his wife for (most likely) infidelity in marriage, the penalty was cut in half (a half a *vyra*).

"He who murders a woman (resolved Art. 88 of *RP*) should be judged on the same basis as for killing a man; should he be found guilty,<sup>33</sup> then he should be fined half a *vyra*, 20 hryvnias". Hence, even for the murder of (one must assume) an unfaithful wife, the husband was not relieved of penalty — as had been the case in the law of so many nations, beginning with ancient law and ending with German law — only his punishment was mitigated. The German law permitted the killing of a wife who had committed adultery without any punishment. Later, the punitive right of the husband was limited to the event of his catching his wife *in flagrante delicto*.<sup>34</sup>

This sole exception to the concept of a woman's equality in criminal law should be attributed to the importance of the wife's chastity in guaranteeing the legitimacy of the offspring. In ancient Ukrainian criminal law, if there was unequal treatment of the sexes aside from this, then it was only in favour of the woman. Treaties with Germans, dating back to the 12th century, prove this beyond any doubt, stipulating a punishment equal to that for murder for active outrage against a woman, and for an insult (tearing off a kerchief from her head) a stiff fine of 6 hryvnias. The unusual severity of this penalty is revealed in its relation to other penalties. For example, for cutting off a finger (i.e. maiming) a fine of only 3 hryvnias was imposed.

The fact these decisions were not only due to a woman's lesser

<sup>31</sup>) Schröder: *Lehrbuch*, p. 721.

<sup>32</sup>) Brunner: *Grundzüge*, p. 225.

<sup>33</sup>) In the Pushkinskiy Scroll: *vynovata* (a feminine ending), meaning "guilty".

<sup>34</sup>) His: *Deutsches Strafrecht*, p. 148.

protective power against the violation of her health and population is revealed by the quoted standards of civil law. Thus we can say that the standards of criminal law for the protection of a woman are a result of the general Ukrainian attitude, according to which a woman, whether single, married, or widowed enjoyed a special high esteem. A comparison with other Slavic legal systems shows that the exceptionally favourable position of a woman in the community and under the law is a trait common to the majority of the Slavic peoples.

For example, in the Polish law of the Middle Ages the wife's position in the family was almost completely equal to the position of the husband. She retained an unlimited right to dispose of and to manage her dowry and other property (for example, property received as a gift). The income from housekeeping which the wife managed herself was usually considered as her sole possession, just like all the things which she bought with the money from that income. Becoming a widow, the woman did not need a guardian either for herself or for her children, retaining complete economic and juridical independence.<sup>35</sup>

The principle of democratic equality found application in the law governing foreigners as well. Although the non-citizens were divided into two groups: "chyuzozemtsi", i.e. people racially different, those of non-Ukrainian descent, whom the *Ruska Pravda* divides into the Vikings and the *Kolbyahs* (Art. 18 and 31), and "guests", travellers from other Ukrainian lands.<sup>36</sup> Within the framework of "chyuzozemtsi" there existed still another division into those residing permanently and temporarily. In principle, all of them were equal among themselves and equal in law with the local population. The very term "guest" eloquently proves the equalization of foreigners with citizens and their favourable position in the ancient Rus'. Hospitality in the daily relations with everybody, in particular with strangers, predetermined the contents of standards of civil and international law.

Concluding the analysis of the question: to what degree was the criminal law of princely Ukraine imbued with the concept of democratic equality of citizens and foreigners, we feel justified in stating that the said idea was put into effect consistently and almost fully. We are convinced of the accuracy of our statement, although we are aware of the fact that it contradicts the views of some experts of the law of that age, including Vladimirskiy-Budanov.<sup>37</sup>

The view about the varied position of the free population of the ancient Rus' is most often based on the above-mentioned decisions benefiting the prince and the prince's men and the mitigation of the

<sup>35</sup>) Hube, pp. 61 and 254.

<sup>36</sup>) Article 55 of the *Ruska Pravda*: ... "a guest coming from another town, or a foreigner" ...

<sup>37</sup>) Vladimirskiy-Budanov: *Obzor*, pp. 316-17.

criminal responsibility of a husband for the murder of his wife.<sup>38</sup> We attempted to expose the lack of grounds for these views, in particular pointing to the methodological error committed by the researchers, evaluating individual decisions more favourable to the prince's legionaires from the point of view of the interests of these individuals, rather than of the interests of the state (as it should have been done). In this aspect, in these disputable decisions we shall not find a trace of the privileged status of the boyar class in relation to the general population. Certainly, one should also not forget that among those "men of the prince" there were very often not only persons who were not boyars, but also slaves, who hardly had any rights, let alone privileges.

Furthermore, differences as to the law governing both sexes do not exist. Vladimirskiy-Budanov himself, first declaring a varied position of both sexes in criminal law, after taking a closer look limited himself to summarizing other people's view, with poorly veiled criticism at that.

Democratic equality of citizens before the law, an ideal of modern law as yet far from being realized, constitutes one of the more valuable marks of our ancient criminal law, moreover, not only the law of the princely age. The concept of equality in law was also alive in the age of class society of Hetman Ukraine. It was also in effect in the age of the Lithuanian-Ukrainian aristocratic state, where it very much restrained the tendencies toward inequality of citizens before the law, a situation which is usually inherent to and unavoidable in any society built on the class principle. This concept of equality is one of the most profound and basic concepts not only in criminal law, but also in the general outlook of the Ukrainian nation. It is all the more valuable and dangerous because it finds no analogy in the viewpoint (and law) of the neighbouring peoples.

We consider it necessary to emphasize that when the idea of democracy is favourably reflected in our legal background as compared with the then law of other nations, it is not an exclusive achievement of our ancestors. A broadly democratic council system was experienced by almost all civilized nations in the early period of their development. But later, under the influence of new ideas and conditions (not least important in this was the reception of Roman law), there began the process of differentiation of the population which resulted in inequality of citizens before the law, splitting them up into various classes and ranks. This process came to Ukraine later than in countries to the West of her, and therefore the idea of equality of all strata of the population (with the exception of slaves, of course, which were not considered part of it) and their equal rights was preserved in Ukraine longer than in other countries. A slower diffusion in Ukrainian lands of new trends which

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<sup>38</sup>) Ibid, p. 317.

become dominant in the Middle Ages, also had its good side, as we can see. The development of feudalism, the destruction of state unity, the rise of immunities and dominion rule, and the expansion of typically class German municipal law — all this brought basic changes in the composition of formerly homogenous society, which was split into separate groups and differentiated by the introduction of class law which took the place of the former general system of law and order. From this aspect, this system was lower than the older one, in spite of the fact that it was the product of an age with a much more modest culture. But even later, after the spreading of the idea of class inequality in Ukrainian territories, this inequality never reached such full development and never assumed such harsh forms in Ukraine, as it had in other nations. We can explain this phenomenon in various ways. We shall surely be close to the truth in assuming that the concept of equality was much more deeply rooted in the Ukrainian people than among other nations, and that it was able to put up stronger resistance than other to the progress of new times and new ideas, having become in the early hour of history an invariable component part of the viewpoint of the Ukrainian individual.

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### FIRST EDITION OF "ENEYIDA" PURCHASED BY HARVARD

The first edition of *Eneyida* by Ivan Kotlyarevs'kyy (St. Petersburg, 1798) constitutes the newest Ukrainian acquisition to the Houghton Library at Harvard University. The Houghton Library houses Harvard's collection of manuscripts and rare books. Mr. Roger Eliot Stoddard, Associate Librarian of Houghton Library, said that the book was offered for sale by an American Midwest book dealer. Its purchase was made possible through the Kilgour Fund at a price of \$850.00. This fund was established by Bayard L. Kilgour, Class of 1927, and includes many valuable works in Slavic literatures.

Kotlyarevs'kyy's first edition of *Eneyida* has an interesting history. It was published in a limited edition by M. Parpura in 1798 without the permission of the author. Parpura was a wealthy nobleman who obviously recognized the value of the work and decided to print it. Kotlyarevs'kyy wrote *Eneyida* as a travesty of Virgil's work. His talent transformed it from a mere travesty into a national epic poem which presents a rich panorama of the political, social and cultural life in Cossack Ukraine of the 18th century. Due to the fact that this was the first major literary work written in colloquial Ukrainian, it has become a landmark of modern Ukrainian literature. It is not certain whether there are any other copies of the first edition to be found outside of the Soviet Union.

(Harvard Ukrainian Studies Newsletter)

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## SOVIET NATIONALITIES POLICY IN UKRAINE, 1920-1930

(Continuation — 4)

By W. MYKULA

The activities of the U.C.P. were embarrassing to the Bolsheviks, and so pressure was applied to break up the Ukrainian Party from within. In January, 1924, a group calling itself "the Left Faction of the U.C.P." appealed to the Central Committee of the C.P.(b).U. to liquidate the Party and to accept its members into the C.P.(b).U. The leadership of the U.C.P. promptly excluded them from their organization, but, naturally, could not silence them. The softer "Ukrainization" policy of the Bolsheviks did not remain without influence on a section of the membership of the U.C.P., who became convinced that many of their demands had been, or soon would be fulfilled, and that they would be able to do more as members of the C.P.(b).U. than outside its ranks. The penetration of the U.C.P. by Bolshevik *agents-provateurs* cannot be excluded. A sharp internal struggle followed. Thus the district Conference of the U.C.P. at Verbivtsi near Berdychiv, (Volynia) declared that the resolution of the 12th Congress of the R.C.P.(b). had removed all the factors on which the opposition of the U.C.P. had been based, and the U.C.P. had therefore now become "the rallying point of anti-Soviet elements". Accordingly, the Conference demanded the immediate calling of a Congress of the U.C.P., and the liquidation of the Party and its unification with the C.P.(b).U. This resolution was given wide publicity in the Soviet press.<sup>1</sup>

In the autumn of 1924, a campaign of vilification of the U.C.P. commenced. Thus, for example, at a municipal election meeting of the Kyiv railway workers, a young member of the U.C.P. tried to put forward the views of his Party on the role of the Comintern, the necessity of having an independent Ukrainian Communist Party and independent Ukrainian Trade Union centre, a separate Ukrainian Red Army, and financial autonomy of Ukraine, but after a speech from a representative of the C.P.(b).U., the U.C.P. was "unanimously" declared a counter-Revolutionary Party.<sup>2</sup> In an interview given specially to the Kyiv paper, *Proletars'ka Pravda*, the Chief of the C.P.U. in Ukraine, Balyts'kyi, spoke of the Nationalist background and the counter-Revolutionary activity of the

1) *Pr. Pr.* No. 221 (734). January 26th, 1924. "Razval UKP".

2) *Pr. Pr.*, No. 245 (958), October 25th, 1924. "Perevybory gorsoveta".



Ukapisty, who even threatened to join the rival West European Socialist International, if they were not admitted to the Comintern. He made great play of the fact that in the village of Sukhachivka, in the Katerynoslav *gubernia*, Ukapisty had shouted anti-Communist and Chauvinistic slogans. He stated that some of the Ukapisty had been arrested, although he remarked that there were also "honest" people among their members.<sup>1</sup>

The resolution of the Comintern concerning the liquidation of the U.C.P. justified their decision on the following grounds:

"Under the leadership of the C.P.(b).U., a firm basis has been established for the development of the culture of the Ukrainian workers and peasants, and for the introduction of the Ukrainian language — the language of the majority of the working people — in the State apparatus and the schools. At present, work is in progress concerning the unification in the Ukrainian S.S.R. of all the adjacent territories which are part of the U.S.S.R. All the above-mentioned measures will remove, once and for all, the possibility of any further talk about any kind of colonial status of Ukraine".<sup>2</sup> The resolution remained silent about other political and economic demands of the Ukapisty.

A Commission, consisting of three members of the Central Committee of the C.P.(b).U. (E. Kviring, M. Skrypnyk and O. Shums'kyi) and of three members of the Central Committee of the U.C.P. (A. Drahomyrets'kyi, A. Richyts'kyi and M. Avdiyenko) decided on February 7th, 1925, to call a liquidation Congress of the U.C.P. for March 1st, 1925.<sup>3</sup> This Congress was preceded by prolonged regional meetings of the U.C.P., at which, rather incongruously, the past policies of the U.C.P. on the one hand, and the decision of the Comintern on the other hand were justified. The policy of the C.P.(b).U. was criticized, and, moreover, remarks were made that the resolution of the Comintern was not entirely satisfactory.<sup>4</sup>

The liquidation Congress of the U.C.P. (March 1st-4th, 1925) was attended by 53 delegates and many visitors. After a speech by Chubar, a resolution was adopted calling upon the workers and peasants of Ukraine "to unite and strengthen the Soviet regime, in order to liberate and unite all the workers and peasants of all the Ukrainian lands into one Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic".<sup>5</sup> After many appeals for unity, the Congress duly declared the U.C.P. dissolved, and Ukapisty were admitted to the C.P.(b).U.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.* No. 270 (1933). November 26th, 1924. "Kontrevolyutsionnaya deyatel'nost' ukapistov. Beseda s tov. Balitskim".

<sup>2</sup> *Pr. Pr.* February 20th, 1925.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>4</sup> As e.g. at the Kyiv *gubernia* Conference which opened on February 25th. *Pr. Pr.* February 27th, 28th, and March 3rd, 1925.

<sup>5</sup> *Pr. Pr.* March 4th, 1925.

<sup>6</sup> By 1936, most of the leading Ukapisty had been liquidated in the Purges. They were accused of having joined the C.P.(b).U. with the aim of continuing their "subversive Nationalist work". see *Bil'shovyk Ukraïny* No. 2. February, 1936, pp. 18-19. (Postyshev's report).

The ideology of the U.C.P. was curtly described by Skrypnyk: "Ukapism is national Bolshevism". As a deviation, it could have no place in the true Bolshevik totalitarian State.

Skrypnyk, in his criticism of the programme of the U.C.P., formulated their demands as follows:

- 1) That there should be an independent Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic;
- 2) That this Ukrainian Republic should enjoy complete equality with other Soviet Republics;
- 3) That all adjacent territories with a Ukrainian population should be annexed to the Ukrainian S.S.R.;
- 4) That an Ukrainian Council of Trade Unions be created;
- 5) That the U.C.P. should enter the Comintern as its Ukrainian section.<sup>1</sup>

The negotiators from the U.C.P. extorted from the R.C.P.(b). and the Comintern promises that some of their demands would be met, e.g. the annexation of territories with an Ukrainian-speaking population to the Ukrainian S.S.R., and the establishment of a Ukrainian Council of Trade Unions, but the most important of them were not fulfilled.

The U.C.P. viewed the federative form of unification of the Soviet Republics as the "final" form of unification, whereas, in the official Communist theory, according to Lenin, there was to come some further stage of a complete amalgamation of all national states into a single world state. The Ukapisty rejected the centralist unification of the Soviet Republics, *even* in the stage of the struggle against the bourgeoisie, during which complete unity was regarded as essential by the Bolsheviks. The Ukapisty spoke of "serving the interests of all mankind", and not just of that part which had been "liberated from the power of capitalism" (the U.S.S.R.). In their opinion, the October Revolution had not liquidated the colonial situation in Ukraine, and the U.S.S.R. was a temporary evil in which Russia predominated, pending the establishment of an "International Federative Union of Soviet Socialist Republics" in which Ukraine would be an equal partner.<sup>2</sup>

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1) Skrypnyk, *Statti i promovy*, pp. 65-66.

2) Programme of the U.C.P., referred to by Skrypnyk, *ibid.*

## CHAPTER IV.

### THE UKRAINIZATION POLICY AND THE BEGINNINGS OF THE NATIONALIST DEVIATIONS IN THE C.P.(b).U. (1925-26).

#### 1. The Stepping-up of Ukrainization.

Early in October 1924, the Kharkiv Government acknowledged that the progress of Ukrainization was unsatisfactory. Oleksander Shums'kyi, the former prominent Borot'bist replaced V. Zatons'kyi as Commissar for Education. This key position enabled Shums'kyi to carry out the Ukrainization drive with much greater vigor than had been applied earlier. Zatons'kyi was transferred to the Revolutionary Military Council of the Ukrainian Republic. The first step Shums'kyi took was to look into the problem of primary education. His report on educational matters, delivered to the October, 1924, Session of the V.U.Ts.V.K. was the first to be discussed by that body since 1921.

The programme of Ukrainization embraced not only the educational and cultural fields, but Party and State business as well. The Party and State officials, who were predominantly non-Ukrainians, were expected to learn the Ukrainian language, and to conduct in that language all correspondence with the local organs of those areas where the majority of the population was Ukrainian. The Russian and Russified officialdom in Ukraine strongly opposed this innovation, and met all attempts at Ukrainization with passive resistance, and often ridicule and scorn. Instructions from the Government in these matters were often fulfilled only formally, to avoid recriminations. This forced the top Ukrainian Communists to insist that the Government should apply measures for the enforcement of Ukrainization, even against the opposition of the officialdom. In January 1925, a programme was worked out for the Ukrainization of the Party, which set the time-limit at August 1st, 1925, but this was soon proved to be too optimistic. The Central Committee of the C.P.(b).U. discussed the matter at its Plenum, (April 5-7th, 1925), and issued a resolution urging that the Party should learn the Ukrainian language, and that Party work and correspondence be carried on in Ukrainian; that some Ukrainian workers and peasants should be given responsible posts, and that the leading Party newspaper, *Kommunist*, and other Party organs should be published in Ukrainian. The time-limit was now set for January 1st, 1926.<sup>1</sup> The Commissariat of Education was to introduce Ukrainian as the language of instruction in all Secondary schools, and in some higher educational institutions. The Trade

<sup>1</sup>) *Proletars'ka Pravda*, the important Party newspaper, published in Kyiv, appeared in Ukrainian for the first time on June 20th, 1925.

Unions and the Red Army were to publish their organs in both Russian and Ukrainian.<sup>1</sup>

The question of the administrative reform and the problem of Ukrainization were the most important questions at the Plenum, and they were debated heatedly. In his speech, Shums'kyi stated that the achievements regarding the realization of the decisions of the 12th Party Congress were, as yet, insignificant, and that the Russian proletariat engaged in Party and Government work in Ukraine, must be Ukrainized as soon as possible in order to bring about cultural unity between town and village. The representative of Moscow, Kaganovich, stressed in his speech that the main problem was the preservation of the hegemony of the proletariat over the peasantry, and for that reason it was necessary for the proletariat to be in close contact with the peasantry, and Ukrainization would serve that purpose.<sup>2</sup> The main decision of the Plenum was that the C.P.(b).U. must be "Ukrainized", in order to prevent the leadership of the Ukrainization movement falling into anti-proletarian and anti-Communist hands.<sup>3</sup>

Attacking the so-called "Luzemburgism",<sup>4</sup> i.e. a prejudiced attitude of indifference towards National demands, displayed in Ukraine by a wing of the Central Committee, represented by D. I. Lebed, and taking the book of the latter, *Soviet Ukraine and the National Question during 5 years*, as the immediate object of criticism, Skrypnyk said, at the Plenum:

"How did we defeat the Ukapisty?<sup>5</sup> Not by means of administrative measures, but by means of our entire work. Yes, Comrades, of course we shall also beat our enemies with the help of our State power, with the help of courts, prosecution, deportation, etc., but our main weapon which undermines any possibility on the part of our enemies and adversaries to exert any influence on the masses of the workers and peasants, is the entirety of our work, all our policy, educational activity, and the totality of all measures by means of which we solve the questions which arise in life".<sup>6</sup>

Skrypnyk argued for Ukrainization from above, in order to remove the immediately visible causes of the Nationalist opposition which was simmering below. He also revealed that the complaints of the Ukapisty to the Comintern, which alleged that Ukraine was "in a dependent position, and that the Ukrainian people were hindered from being re-united in one National state", had been silenced by

1) *Pr. Pr.* No. 102, May 8th, 1925. "Postanovlyeniye plenumi TsKKP(b)U ob ukrainizatsii". (The text of the resolution).

1) *Pr. Pr.* No. 81, April 10th, 1925.

3) *Pr. Pr.* No. 83, April 12th, 1925. Leading article, "The Ukrainization of the Party", by S. Shchupak.

4) The views attributed to Rosa Luxemburg.

5) The members of the opposition Party, the Ukrainian National Communists, U.C.P. dissolved ien March, 1925. see *supra*. pp. 190-199.

6) "Zlikviduvaly luksemburgianstvo". *Statti i promovy*, p. 24.

the promise formulated in the resolution of the Comintern of December, 1924,<sup>1</sup> which stated: "The R.C.P.(b). and the C.P.(b).U. are carrying out the re-unification with Soviet Ukraine of all territories adjoining Ukraine, which are inhabited predominantly by Ukrainians.' It must be remarked here that this promise was broken sooner than it was given. As early as July, 1924, Moscow had decided to detach parts of the Tahanrih and Shakhty regions, involving a population of over half-a-million, from Ukraine, and to join them to the North-Caucasian Territory of the R.S.F.S.R. In return some minor corrections of the Russo-Ukrainian frontier were made in favour of the Ukrainian Republic. The Putyvl and Troitsk *rayony*, of the Kursk and Voronezh *gubernii* respectively, were added to Ukraine, but there was no question of the addition of the major parts of the Kursk and Voronezh *gubernii* to Ukraine, although these areas were inhabited predominantly by Ukrainians.

The April Plenum elected L. Kaganovich General Secretary of the Central Committee of the C.P.(b).U. Being one of Stalin's most trusted associates (he had been sent to Ukraine to take charge of the Party), and being of Jewish origin, he could be relied upon to play his part shrewdly as between the Ukrainian and Russian wings of the C.P.(b).U. Kaganovich adopted the role of a "Ukrainized" Party leader, and made an attempt to learn the language, explaining that it was difficult to discover Petlyurists if one could not speak to the peasants in Ukrainian.<sup>2</sup>

At the April, 1925, Plenum, the last objections of the opponents to the Ukrainian administrative reform, the protagonists of the division of Ukraine into two large regions, an "agricultural" and an "industrial", were over-ruled. Likewise, the campaign to Ukrainize the propaganda work in the Red Army stationed in Ukraine began as soon as the Plenum ended.<sup>3</sup>

The resolution of the Plenum concerning Ukrainization found its concomitant in the decree of the Ukrainian Sovnarkom, dated April 30th, 1925, "On the measures for the carrying out of the Ukrainization of the State apparatus within specified time-limits",<sup>4</sup> and in the instructions of July 16th, 1925, "On the practical measures for the Ukrainization of the Soviet State apparatus".<sup>5</sup> A Central All-Ukrainian Commission for the supervision of Ukrainization was created, with local Commissions subordinate to it. The Chairman of the Central Commission was Chubar, Bulat and Serbychenko were vice-

<sup>1</sup> Published in *Pravda*, January 8th, 1925.

<sup>2</sup> *Pr. Pr.* No. 140. June 23rd, 1925. "Cherhovi zavdannya partiyi". Kaganovich's speech at the Plenum of the Kyiv *gubernia* Party Committee.

<sup>3</sup> A Party Conference of the Ukrainian Military District opened on April 10th, 1925. Kaganovich made a speech about Ukrainization. *Pr. Pr.*, No. 83. April 12th, 1925.

<sup>4</sup> *Visty VUTsVK*, May 20th, 1925.

<sup>5</sup> *Ukrayinizatsiya radyans'kykh ustanov. Dekrety, instruksii, materiyaly.* No. 2., Kharkiv, 1926, pp. 3-5.

Chairmen, and members included Shums'kyi, Poloz, Porayko, Vlasenko Prykhod'ko, Poznansky, Beha and Solodub. Several of them were former Borot'bisty. On the suggestion of the Commission, the Sovnarkom of Ukraine, on November 5th, 1925, resolved, among other things, to hold its meetings in Ukrainian, to introduce Ukrainian notice-boards on public and private enterprises and institutions, including railways, to make sub-titles in Ukrainian obligatory for films shown in Ukraine, to speed up the publication of Ukrainian academic and terminological dictionaries, to publish codes of civil and criminal law in Ukrainian, to suggest to all central and local institutions that they should carry out their cultural and educational work in Ukrainian, etc. Officials who still continued to refuse to learn the Ukrainian language were threatened with the loss of their positions.

Although Ukrainian was gradually becoming the official State language, parallel with Russian, some questions of its orthography had not yet been settled. A Commission was therefore set up by the Commissariat for Education in July, 1925, to formulate a generally acceptable orthography. The Commission consisted originally of 26 members, 10 more being co-opted later. Members of the Commission were, for the most part, eminent Ukrainian philologists and literary figures, but there were also some Communist critics and Party leaders.

The Communist Party set out to capture the lead in Ukrainian cultural life by the formal assimilation of its cadres with the Ukrainian milieu. At the 9th Congress of the C.P.(b).U., held from December 7-11th, Kaganovich<sup>1</sup> said:

"We ought to gain command not only of the Ukrainian language, but of Ukrainian culture as well. Up till now, we have some members of the intelligentsia, headed by Hrushevs'kyi, who are trying to monopolize the representation of Ukrainian culture. In particular, this very same Hrushevs'kyi has been trying all the time to preserve his neutrality, and has nowhere openly and directly recognized the Soviet Government. In his journal<sup>2</sup> he, as a historian, manages to ignore in a very subtle and clever way the very existence of the Soviet system".<sup>3</sup>

Hrushevs'kyi, in the eyes of the Bolsheviks, symbolized the Ukrainian non-Party intelligentsia, in whose reliability they placed little trust. Such people as Hrushevs'kyi believed that they had the monopoly in championing the cause of Ukrainian culture. They were to be replaced by "Ukrainized" Bolsheviks, or by a hoped-for new

<sup>1</sup>) It may be of interest to note that a recent book (published in 1958) by a Soviet author, about the 9th Congress of the C.P.(b).U. omits to mention Kaganovich at all. (V. Samofalov, *Dev'yatyi z'yizd KP(b)U*, Kyiv, 1958, p. 160.

<sup>2</sup>) *Ukraina*, published in Kyiv.

<sup>3</sup>) *Pravda*, December 10th, 1925, "IX s'yezd KP(b)U. Doklad tov. Kaganovicha".

generation of reliable Ukrainian intelligentsia. Of course, for the time being, statements such as that of Kaganovich were merely warnings and threats. The Communist Party's hold on the entire life of the country was still too weak, and the atmosphere of the N.E.P. was too relaxed to permit anything else.

A considerable part of Kaganovich's report to the 9th Congress of the C.P.(b).U. was devoted to the National question in Ukraine. He was primarily concerned with refuting the suggestion that Ukraine was ruled by "Muscovites". He accused the Ukrainian Nationalist emigration of spreading these rumours, but failed to mention that such views were being expressed more and more openly in Ukraine itself. This was the period when the more sensitive Ukrainian Communists were coming to realize the inevitably dependent role of Ukraine in the U.S.S.R.

## **2. Autonomist tendencies of the Kharkiv Government. The economic problem.**

One of the basic principles of the Bolshevik Party and the Soviet State was centralization. Since this was often carried too far, and therefore produced harmful effects, especially upon the economic life of the country, the Communists in charge of Ukraine from time to time made representations to the Moscow Government, pleading for greater consideration for local needs, and for wider local powers. These purely utilitarian motives which aimed at increasing the efficiency of the economic system and encouraging local initiative, were, under the conditions prevailing in Ukraine, mixed with Ukrainian National motives, with the attempts to ensure economic independence or autonomy as a matter of National pride, on the part of some of the nationally-minded Ukrainian Communists.

The central problem was the Republic's budget, and the management of the various branches of the national economy. The problem of budgetary rights was raised by the Soviet Ukrainian Government, shortly after the formal establishment of the U.S.S.R.<sup>1</sup> At the 2nd Congress of Soviets of the U.S.S.R., early in 1924, the question of the "precise delimitation and fixation of the budgetary rights of the Union and of the constituent Republics" was discussed and was referred back to the Commissariat for Finance and a special commission. As a result, the budgets of the Republics were somewhat increased, but the final settlement was postponed. The inadequacy of Moscow's budgetary allocations for Ukraine was a source of constant irritation in Kharkiv, and complaints about the inequitable treatment of Ukraine by Russia began to be raised openly. For example, *Pravda* reported that at the session of the V.U.Ts.I.K. in

1) See *supra* pp. 115, 127-128.

February 1925, "the participation of Ukraine in the union budget was qualified by some comrades as inadequate".<sup>1</sup>

Thus, while the Commissar for Finance of Ukraine, Kuznetsov, tried to reassure the Session that the real expenditure for the territory of Ukraine incurred by both Republic and Union Commissariats more than matched the receipts from Ukraine, the critics from among the leading delegates were not satisfied. For example, Dudnyk demanded that the Union reserve fund be distributed among the Republics according to a definite rule, that higher agricultural credits and allowances for the development of the metallurgical industry in Ukraine be given, and that the budget of the unified Commissariats be included in the Ukrainian budget. Poloz hinted that the Ukrainian S.S.R. had no financial policy. Bohuts'kyi stated that Ukraine did not yet participate in various receipts and expenditure which the Union possessed. He revealed that the Ukrainian S.S.R. had demanded 80,000,000 roubles from the Union budget and was given only 700,000. He was supported by Slyn'ko and Odynets'.<sup>2</sup>

In March of the same year, at the Session of the Union Ts.I.K., complaints were raised by the delegates from Ukraine, concerning the proportionally inadequate allocation of agricultural credits to Ukraine. Thus, out of 43,000,000 roubles for the entire U.S.S.R., Ukraine received only 1,000,000. Other complaints referred to the reluctance of the Union organs to grant relief to those areas in Ukraine that were affected by drought, and to delays in the carrying out of the electrification programme in Ukraine, particularly in the building of the Dnipro dam.<sup>3</sup> Poloz demanded greater participation of the Union Republics in the budget, and stated that the Ukrainian share in the budget for the non-unified Commissariats had decreased from 19% to 17%, while, according to the calculations of the Ukrainian State Planning Commission, it should have been 25%.<sup>4</sup> The Commissar for Finance of the U.S.S.R., Bryukhanov, rejected all talk about the expansion of the budgetary rights of the Republics.

At the 9th All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets in May, 1925, A. Odynets', speaking in the discussion of Kamenyev's report, welcomed the Nationality policy of the Union Government, which was "appreciated by all peasants", but at the same time, he raised the issue of the Dnipro dam again, as well as asking for the budgetary rights of the Ukrainian Government to be widened, and for greater independence to be granted in the management of industry situated in Ukraine. In his reply, Kamenyev promised that early consideration

1) *Pravda*, February 18th, 1925. "IV sessiya VUTsIK".

2) *Byuleten' 4-oyi sestyi VUTsVK*, No. 2, February 17th, 1925, pp. 71-96.

3) The delegates concerned were Fedotov, Odynets', and Lisovyyk. *Pravda*, March 7th and 10th, 1925.

4) *3ya sessiya Ts.I.K.* Verbatim report. (Tiflis, March 3-7th, 1925) Moscow, 1925, pp. 65-67 (Fedotov), pp. 166-169 (report of Bryukhanov), pp. 203-205 (Odynets'), pp. 215-218 (Poloz).



would be given to the problem of whether the construction of the Dnipro dam, or the rival project of the Volga-Don canal be actually carried out, and he held out hopes for the extension of the budgetary rights.<sup>1</sup> In the discussion of the report of the Ukrainian Council of National Economy, a Donbas worker, one Petrenko, remarked on "the limitation of the rights of the Ukrainian Government in the management of industry of so-called Union importance".<sup>2</sup> Two weeks later, at the 3rd All-Union Congress of Soviets, Chubar, the head of the Soviet Ukrainian Government, spoke against the attempts to manage all affairs from Moscow, and adduced several examples of how certain Central organs were trying "to circumvent the Constitutional rights of the Republics". He mentioned, for example, that in the question of national insurance, "there are taking place extremely sharp conflicts between the individual Republics". Further, he complained that the All-Union Commissariat for Foreign Trade had annulled all proposals made by the Ukrainian Government for the satisfaction of their own needs, and had cancelled all their orders abroad. He also criticized the extreme centralization in the organization of relief for the districts in which the harvest had been poor. This assistance was calculated on average yields, whereas, in fact, various localities were affected to varying degrees of intensity.<sup>3</sup> He further suggested that, in view of the general poverty of the Soviet Union, "regions with favourable economic possibilities ought to be served more fully than others, in order to obtain from them those resources which may help other regions to be developed..." He was obviously thinking of the Ukrainian Communists urgings to hasten the industrialization of Ukraine, a region rich in resources.

In the discussion on the budget, Poloz, the Chairman of the Administrative-Financial Commission demanded that "the Union Republics should be given the right of regular and active participation in the distribution of the Federal funds. They ought to be given the right and opportunity to build up their own Republican funds, in order to bring into being a lively Republican initiative, and to develop, as soon as possible, in the Union Republics... all productive forces... by trying out all those potentialities which exist in the Republics, but which are not taken into account by the Centre". In his reply, Sokolnikov stated that, apparently, there was no disagreement over the point that the Republic budget must be "strengthened", but it must also be "tied up" with the over-all Federal budget and general needs.<sup>4</sup>

The Ukrainian demands were not satisfied, and in October 1925, Odynets', speaking in the discussion at the session of the V.U.Ts.I.K., stated bluntly that the Union budget served to satisfy the Ukrainian

<sup>1</sup>) *Izvestiya*, May 6th, 1925.

<sup>2</sup>) *Izvestiya*, May 9th, 1925.

<sup>3</sup>) *Izvestiya*, May 17th, 1925.

<sup>4</sup>) *Izvestiya*, May 21st, 1925.

economic and cultural needs less than those of the R.S.F.S.R. Professor Yavors'kyi complained that the needs of Ukrainian science were not satisfied adequately. He stated that Ukrainian scientific establishments received one-tenth of the financial subsidies enjoyed by similar institutions in the R.S.F.S.R. In addition to these complaints, the resolution of this session of the V.U.Ts.I.K. included the instruction that the Government of Ukraine was to strive for a more active participation in the elaboration of questions concerning industry subordinated to the Union authorities, but situated in Ukraine.

The disadvantageous situation of Ukraine vis-a-vis the central government in Moscow from the economic standpoint was pointed out also by economists. In the Kharkiv journal, *Ukrainskiy Ekonomist*,<sup>1</sup> appeared the article "The role of subsidies in the local budget of Ukraine", by a certain Rzhhevusskiy, who compared the allocation of funds for the local budget of the R.S.F.S.R. and the Ukrainian S.S.R., and tried to reveal the partiality shown to the R.S.F.S.R. The Kyiv "fellowtravellers", (i.e. in fact, non-Communist) magazine *Zhyttya i revolyutsiya*<sup>2</sup> published an article by O. Popov, entitled "The National Economy of Ukraine and the Soviet Union", in which he pointed out, on the one hand, the enormous economic benefits which the U.S.S.R. derived from Ukraine, and, on the other hand, the disadvantageous position of the latter regarding allocation of expenditure. From a detailed analysis, based on official sources, he concluded that, while the Government revenue from Ukraine was at the level of between one-quarter and one-third of the total Government revenue of the U.S.S.R., the proportion devoted to Ukraine amounted merely to 16-18%. Furthermore, Ukraine's share of the bank credits did not exceed 12%. While Ukraine's share in the exports of the Union was 22.3%, her share in the imports was only 5.4% of the Union total.

Thus complaints against what was regarded as the economic exploitation of Ukraine by Russia were beginning to be expressed by Ukrainian Communists and non-Communists alike. These views were not new, as they had been stated many times by the Ukrainian Nationalist emigration, as well as by the Borot'bisty and the National-Communist Ukapisty. Now, some of the staunchest adherents of the regime were beginning to be critical of Moscow's policies towards Ukraine.

Of course, the logical conclusion of such considerations would be to demand at least the correction of the discrimination; it could, however, also lead to a demand for greater autonomy for the Government of Ukraine in conducting its economic affairs. While Moscow was prepared to go some way towards correcting certain discrepancies in the allocation of funds and resources, she was not

1) No. 211, dated September 16th, 1925.

2) No. 8. August 1925.

prepared to grant wider powers to the Governments of the Republics. The question of greater autonomy for Ukraine in economic matters was passed over in silence by Kaganovich who, addressing the 9th Congress of the C.P.(b).U., played up the Ukrainian demands for greater consideration for the needs of the Ukrainian national economy by declaring:

"... We are demanding that in the building of new plants... Ukraine should occupy one of the leading places in the general State plan... Ukraine is that part of the (Soviet) Union where the sources of raw material and power are located, and therefore we think that, in the construction of a tractor plant, a locomotive plant, and the new metallurgical plants, Ukraine should occupy one of the foremost places".<sup>1</sup>

The resolutions of the Congress reiterated this demand:

"... The Congress directs the attention of our whole Party and of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(b). to the enormous role which in this growth (of the Socialist economy — W.M.) is played and should be played in particular by the heavy industry of Ukraine, (metallurgy, coal, iron ore, electrification), directly adjacent to the sources of its raw material and power".<sup>2</sup>

Attempts were made from time to time by some of the leading Ukrainian Communists to obtain the agreement of Moscow for the increase of control of the Republic authorities over the various branches of the national economy that were located in Ukraine. Thus, for example, in March 1926, the Chairman of the State Planning Commission (Rus. — *Gosplan*) of the Ukrainian S.S.R., M. Hryn'ko, speaking at the Conference of the Gosplans of the Republics, complained that the Ukrainian Gosplan was "forced to plan only a part of the national economy of the Republic and not the entire economy", and demanded that the Republic Gosplans be given the immediate control over the industries under All-Union direction, that were situated on the territory of the particular Republics.<sup>3</sup>

Shortly afterwards, Hryn'ko published an article in which he argued against the continued attempts to split up Ukraine into economic regions, and demanded that the economic policy be aimed at the further consolidation of the Ukrainian S.S.R. He rejected the view that Ukraine should not be developed industrially, because it was a border region, as was argued by some Russian economists, and asserted that such a view was contrary to the political interest of Ukraine and of the U.S.S.R. as a whole. He argued in favour of a "horizontal" (i.e. by regions) analysis of the national economic problems, in addition to the "vertical" one (i.e. by branches of industry).<sup>4</sup>

1) *Pravda*, December 10th, 1925.

2) *Ibid.*

3) *Pravda*, March 14th, 1926.

4) *Chervonyi Shlakh*, No. 5-6 (38-39), May-June 1926, pp. 120-136. H. Hryn'ko, "Narys ukrains'koyi nkenomiky" (A sketch of Ukrainian Economy).

At the session of the V.Ts.I.K. in Moscow, which took place from April 12-25th, 1926, the problem of the budgetary rights of the Republics, which was raised by the Ukrainian delegation, was much debated. In the Soviet of the Union, Reikhel', the Chairman of the Commission for Legislative Proposals of the Ukrainian S.S.R., asked for a greater autonomy and responsibility for Ukraine regarding the management of her resources and means of production, to suit local conditions, interests, and needs. He stated that, at the moment, none of these conditions were fulfilled. He asked for the allocation of fixed sources of revenue to Ukraine, and for wider powers in matters of the budget. Other delegates<sup>1</sup> from the Ukrainian S.S.R. at the Session spoke in a similar vein. However, Bryukhanov, the Commissar for Finance of the U.S.S.R., in his reply to the debate, made only a passing and noncommittal reference to the demands of the Ukrainian delegates.<sup>2</sup> As a result of constant demands on the part of Ukraine, the budgetary allocation of items of revenue to the Republics was noticeably increased during the summer of 1926.

In July, 1926, however, Bryukhanov reiterated that the demands of the Republics, that they should have full rights in the elaboration of their budgets, while the U.S.S.R. would only approve the aggregate budget, could not be satisfied. On the basis of the necessity to have a single budget, the Government of the U.S.S.R. decided that the Union Ts.I.K. must approve the balance of revenue and expenditure in the budget of each Republic.<sup>3</sup>

The complaints about the inadequacy of the budgetary allocations and rights were rejected again at the November 1926, Session of the V.U.Ts.V.K.,<sup>4</sup> but continued to be voiced even as late as 1929. Thus, an official publication reviewing the work of the Government of the Ukrainian S.S.R. during the preceding two years complained that the Ukrainian S.S.R. was not allotted a fixed revenue to enable her to plan her budgetary expenditure, and stated that it was absolutely necessary for a correct allocation to be made between the All-Union and the Republic budgets.<sup>5</sup>

### 3. The Alliance with the Poor and Middle Peasants.

In Bolshevik eyes, Ukrainization was a part of the policy which aimed at securing the support of the Ukrainian peasantry. The N.E.P. in Ukraine was the economic part of this policy. During the war Communism years, the Bolsheviks had sought allies in the country among the poor peasantry, so as to be able to control the villages

1) Kuznetsov, Pavlyukevych, Bytsenko, Kattel', and Lisovyk.

2) *2-ya sessiya Ts.I.K., 3-go sozyva*, Moscow, 1926. Reikhel' — pp. 126-131; Pavlyukevych — pp. 144-146; Butsenko — pp. 153-158; Kattel' — p. 182; Kuznetsov — pp. 128-282.

3) *Pravda*, July 13th, 1926.

4) *Zbirnyk uzakonen'* . . . No. 73. December 18th, 1926, pp. 1260-1268.

5) *Dva roky roboty uryady U.S.R.R.*, Kharkiv, 1929, pp. 126-127.

with their help. In Ukraine, the Committees of Unprosperous Peasants (K.N.S. or *Komnezamy*), which had existed since May, 1920, were the instruments of Soviet authority in the villages. Originally, not many peasants had been members. For the most part, the *Komnezamy* were recruited from the proletarianized peasants, who had worked in the towns and factories, and had drifted back to the villages, when conditions became difficult in the towns. Many of their leading members were unstable, lacking in moral sense, or even criminals. In the towns, many of them had acquired the way of thinking of the Russified proletariat.

The degree of Russification of the leading members of the *Komnezamy* may be estimated from the figures which H. Petrov's'kyi gave concerning the percentage of K.N.S. delegates who addressed their Congresses in Ukrainian. Thus at the first Congress (October, 1920), only 22.7% of the speakers addressed the Congress in Ukrainian; at the 2nd Congress (February, 1922), the figure had increased to 24.7%, and at the 3rd Congress (May, 1923), 36%, or just over one-third of the delegates made their speeches in Ukrainian. However, the increase in the number of Ukrainian speakers also reflects the increase of Ukrainian national "consciousness" among the *Komzany*. The Ukrainian peasant Communist, Odynets', whom we have already mentioned, and who usually acted as representative of the *Komnezamy*, became, in 1925, one of the most outspoken critics of the discrimination in the treatment of Ukraine by Russia. Generally, however, the *Komnezamy* were the instruments of the Russified urban Bolshevik Party for the domination of the Ukrainian villages, and they were used to expose, destroy or terrorize all the active Ukrainian Nationalist elements in the villages. It was not difficult, as a rule, to brand the latter as "kulaks", as the more active were usually the better educated, and came from families which were not the poorest in the village. Though, after the introduction of the N.E.P., the former arbitrary dictatorial powers were somewhat curbed, nevertheless, they were still given various privileges, and were also given support for their domination of the village Soviets, (the lowest administrative organs). The *Komnezamy* were a constant source of irritation in the villages, and caused hatred and contempt for the regime which had created them.

Among the moderates in the C.P.(b).U., there existed, from the very beginning, a strong opposition to the *Komnezamy* policy. The demand for the liquidation of the *Komnezamy* was repeated soon after the introduction of the N.E.P. in May, 1921. A year later, the problem of the *Komnezamy* was again discussed by the Central Committee of the C.P.(b).U., which decided to deprive them of their administrative functions, but this had little practical effect. After the 13th Congress of the R.C.P.(b) (May, 1924), at which it was decided that something must be done to strengthen the influence of the Party in the villages, a Commission was set up to study the situation in the

countryside where, it was admitted, the Soviet organs were isolated from the masses. This resulted, in October, 1924, in the launching of the slogans: "Face the village", and "Enliven the role of the local Soviets". This meant, as far as Ukraine was concerned, reducing the role of the Komnezamy. By this time, the opposition of the villagers to the Komnezamy was stiffening. During the elections to the village Soviets in the autumn of 1924 in Ukraine, the lists of candidates sponsored by the Komnezamy and the Party were opposed in many villages by alternative lists of candidates, for which "kulaks" were blamed. In the Kyiv *gubernia*, two lists of candidates were put up almost everywhere.<sup>1</sup> In Volynia, the "kulaks" elected their own candidates in some villages, and in others, they pointedly left the election meetings. In the Poltava *gubernia*, there was passive opposition to the elections, and Red Army units "took an active part in the elections".<sup>2</sup> As for the general situation in Ukraine, *Pravda* reported that the Komnezamy were securing their preponderance everywhere, but that in some places, "it became evident that the Komnezamy were not on a sufficiently high level, that they had shown bureaucratic tendencies and isolation from the masses, being unable to rally the poor and middle peasants around themselves during the elections".<sup>3</sup> In the Kharkiv *gubernia* and in some other *gubernii* the election results were cancelled, allegedly because of the small participation, but probably because the "candidatures unanimously accepted at the election meetings of the Komnezamy had fallen through at the general meetings of the villagers".<sup>4</sup> The critical situation of the Soviet authority in the villages of Ukraine was revealed by Medvedev, a Secretary of the Central Committee of the C.P.(b).U., who stated that the fault of the Soviet village apparatus lay in its "seclusion and separation from the masses, its lack of planning, in administrative deviation, and in the confusion of the notions 'middle peasant' and 'kulak'".<sup>5</sup> Another speaker, Khalyavsky, revealed that out of the total peasant population of Ukraine, which amounted to some 23,000,000, there were only 17,000 Communist Party Members. Communist Party Cells existed in only 611 rural settlements out of 41,000. The greater campaign of "Lenin recruitment" had brought in 500 (!) new members from the Ukrainian countryside.<sup>6</sup>

Faced with the re-emergence of opposition in the villages and with the fiasco of the Komnezamy, the Bolsheviks were forced to recognize that "the middle peasant is the decisive force in the village".<sup>7</sup> The

1) *Pravda*, November 28th, 1924.

2) *Ibid.*

3) *Pravda*, November 22nd, 1924.

4) *Pravda*, December 9th and 10th, 1924.

5) *Pravda*, December 4th, 1924.

6) *Pravda*, December 5th, 1924. "Vseukrainskoye sovyeshchaniye o rabote na selye".

7) Commissar for Agriculture of Ukraine, Klymenko, *Pravda*, December 4th, 1924.

problem now was what to do with the Komnezamy. After the 14th Party Conference (held in Moscow, in April, 1925) had confirmed the orientation of the Party towards the middle peasant, pressure arose within the C.P.(b).U. for the liquidation of the Komnezamy. The July, 1925, Plenum of the Central Committee of the C.P.(b).U., which discussed this problem, decided to steer a middle course, neither maintaining the former status of the Komnezamy, nor giving in to the demands of the Right wing of the Party for their liquidation. The compromise solution was to transform them into voluntary social organizations, to deprive them of all privileges, and equalize their rights with those of the other poor peasants. The Plenum decided against any further "dekulakization". The Komnezamy were now to be responsible for the productivity of agriculture by founding collective farms.

This decision evoked a crisis. Many village Party Cells strongly opposed it. Especially bitter was reaction of the Komnezamy village bosses, who until then had exercised an arbitrary and authoritarian rule. The peasantry welcomed the change, and ridiculed the Komnezamy members, who were now almost completely discarded by the Government.<sup>1</sup> After the reorganization of the Komnezamy, their membership decreased by about 50%.<sup>2</sup>

#### 4. The Ukrainian Cultural Renaissance.

The Civil War and the early years of the Soviet regime were very unfavourable for the development of Ukrainian cultural life, but after the pacification of the country and the return to normal economic conditions, a national Ukrainian culture began to revive. The policy of Ukrainization favoured its growth. The dynamism given to it by the Revolution of 1917 had not been spent by the defeat in the political and military fields. A new generation of talented scholars, writers, poets and artists quickly filled the gaps, left by death or emigration, in the ranks of the older generation of the cultural elite. In scholarship, education, literature, theatre, the fine arts, music and even the cinema, the 1920's were a period of feverish growth. Dormant potentialities now received an opportunity for realization. There were, of course, certain limitations, which the framework of the official Marxist philosophy and the policies of the regime imposed on cultural life, but these were not yet as restricting as they became in later years. Ukrainian cultural life was stimulated, on the one hand, by the idea of Ukrainian National regeneration, and, on the other, by the transformation of the social order. The ideals of the 1917 Revolution continued to inspire the Ukrainian intelligentsia of the 1920's.

<sup>1</sup>) *Pravda*. January 12th, 1926. "Komnezamy organizuyutsya. Pis'mo iz Kharkova".

<sup>2</sup>) *Pravda*, April 18th, 1926.

### a. The Ukrainian Academy of Sciences.

Ukrainian scholarship was centred around the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences (Vseukrains'ka Akademiya Nauk — V.U.A.N.), which had been founded in 1918 by Hetman Skoropads'kyi, and recognized by the Soviet Government in 1919. During the 1920's, it was mainly concerned with the study of the Humanities, (Ukrainian philology, history, ethnography, etc.). Professor N. Polons'ka-Vasylenko, in her monograph on this Academy, writes:

"In the first years of the formation of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, the general public was mostly interested in Ukrainian studies, and therefore literature, history, and linguistics stood in the centre of its attention. The wide public needed detailed studies in the sphere of history, and the history of literature and the fine arts, and eagerly listened to every word. It was from the Academy of Sciences that they expected the answers to their searchings. The question of dictionaries for general use and also technical dictionaries was a particularly acute problem, especially when the use of the Ukrainian language in the administration became the order of the day".<sup>1</sup> The Historico-Philological Department of the V.U.A.N. was given the task of satisfying these demands.

This focussing of attention on the study of Ukrainian history, language, etc. indicates the reliance of political Ukrainian Nationalism on a specific cultural basis without which it would not exist. The struggle to develop Ukrainian cultural life with its own particular forms and content had a certain political significance, as it laid the basis for the political movement.

The work of the Academy was divided among a number of "Commissions". The most important of those of the Philological Section was the Commission for compiling the Dictionary of the living Ukrainian language, and the Institute of the Scientific Language. The Historical Section was headed by the eminent Ukrainian historian, Mykhaylo Hrushevs'kyi. A brilliant critic of the traditional Russian historical theory concerning the origins of Russia, Hrushevs'kyi had formulated an original concept of Ukrainian and Eastern Slav history, which he developed in his many-volumed "History of Ukraine", and other publications. At the outbreak of the Revolution, he had become President of the Central Rada, and one of the leaders of the Ukrainian S.R. Party. After spending several years as a political emigré, he returned to Ukraine early in 1924; he recognized the Soviet regime, but retained an attitude of aloofness to the Communist Party. Under his guidance, Ukrainian historical research showed a vigorous growth. He edited the historical journal *Ukraïna*, as well as several other publications, of which the symposia on

1) N. Polons'ka-Vasylenko, *Ukraïns'ka Akademiya nauk (Narys istoriyi)*, Part I. (1918-1930), Munich, 1955, p. 77.



regional history were of particular interest. In all his works, the history of Ukraine emerges sharply distinct from that of Russia. The continuity of Ukrainian National traditions, and no dominant role, is ascribed to class conflicts. For these "faults" Hrushevs'kyi and his school were often criticized by Party spokesmen, and, in the early 30's, they were condemned.

Among other outstanding members of the Academy were the philologists: A. Yu. Kryms'kyi, V. M. Hantsov, E. K. Tymchenko, M. F. Sumtsov, H. Holoskevych; the literary historians: P. I. Zaytsev, S. O. Yefremov, V. M. Perets; the historians: D. I. Yavornyts'kyi, M. E. Slabchenko, O. Yu. Hermaize; the archaeologist M. T. Bilya-shevs'kyi and the geologist P. A. Tutkovs'kyi.

The V.U.A.N. maintained close contact with Ukrainian scholars abroad, some of whom were made members of the Academy, and also with certain Western scholars. The V.U.A.N. saw its role as the focal point of Ukrainian studies for the entire Ukrainian nation, and therefore tried to unite all Ukrainian scholars. It strove to assert its independence from the All-Union Academy of Sciences, which was often described as a Russian institution. Thus, for example, Professor Hrushevs'kyi, speaking at the Plenum of *Holovnauka* (The Chief Administration of Scientific and Cultural Affairs of the Commissariat for Education of the Ukrainian S.S.R.), on January 29th, 1926, said that the V.U.A.N. must not remain a mere provincial Institute. He demanded that "The Ukrainian Academy, equally with the All-Union Academy, should be financed from the Union budget... It is necessary that contact with Europe be maintained, not only by the Russian Academy, but by Ukrainian scholars as well, and that the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences be enabled to work on the All-Union scale".<sup>1</sup> This demand of the V.U.A.N. was supported by the Kharkiv Government. V. Chubar, addressing the 2nd Session of the All-Union Ts.I.K. in April, 1926, emphasised the role of the V.U.A.N. as the All-Ukrainian national centre of learning. It must be remembered that, at that time, it was thought to be in the interest of the Soviet Union that there should be a centre of attraction for Ukrainian communities abroad, especially those in Poland, Rumania, and Czechoslovakia, as this would facilitate the exercise of a certain political influence. The entire Ukrainization campaign, and certain declarations of the Comintern had similar aims in view. Nevertheless, the fact remains that the output of the V.U.A.N. was considerable, and contributed a great deal to the widening of Ukrainian studies, thereby strengthening the cultural basis for the Ukrainian National movement. It did not remain without effect on the minds of students and of the general public.

#### **b. The Literary "Renaissance".**

While the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences was dominated mainly by the "non-Party" Ukrainian intellectuals, with populist Ukrainian

<sup>1</sup>) *Pravda*, January 30th, 1926.

rather than Marxist traditions, the literary world presented a checkered picture, with the dominant positions occupied by the writers of a national-Communist ideological background. This was the most vocal and numerous group, and the internecine polemics of the various literary organizations fill much of the history of the Ukrainian literature of that period.<sup>1</sup>

The literature of the 1920's developed under the twin impact of the national and social Revolution of 1917. Each new ephemeral writers' organization interpreted the concept of "proletarian" literature differently, in a spate of bombastic proclamations and declarations. In the early years of Ukrainization, i. e. between 1923 and 1925, the main quarrels were between the Organization of Proletarian Writers, "Hart", and the Organization of Peasant Writers, "Pluh". The latter was founded in 1922 by Serhiy Pylypenko, a fable-writer of average talent, and became a mass organization of writers and beginners, whose aim was to satisfy the Ukrainian peasants' not very discriminating appetite for literature. It propagated the union of the peasantry with the proletariat, and set itself the task of disseminating Communist ideas among the peasantry. Its rival, "Hart", founded in January, 1923, was led by the former Borot'bist leader, Vasyli' Ellan-Blakytnyi, who envisaged the organization as the literary mouthpiece of the Communist Party in Ukraine, but did not try to impose any rigid literary theory on its members. The two organizations clashed in 1924 over the problem of the organization of literature on the All-Union scale. While "Pluh" was prepared to subordinate itself to a centre in Moscow, and for this purpose to co-operate closely with the organization of the Russian writers in Ukraine, V.U.A.P.P. (Vseukrainskaya Assotsiyatsiya Proletarskikh Pisateley — The All-Ukrainian Association of Proletarian Writers), Blakytnyi and his Borot'bist colleagues in "Hart" opposed any such suggestion. The united attempts of V.U.A.P.P. and "Pluh" to bring "Hart" to heel were ineffective, as the latter managed to secure the intervention of the C.P.(b).U. which absolved "Hart" from the accusations of Nationalism. This gave Ukrainian literature a breathing-space in which to develop. The neutrality of the Party with regard to literary organizations was confirmed, for the time being, by the July 1st, 1925, resolution of the C.P.S.U. on literary matters.

At the end of 1925, "Hart" disintegrated owing to internal squabbles. In its place came "Vaplite" (Vil'na Akademiya Proletars'koï Literature — The Free Academy of Proletarian Literature), composed exclusively of writers with the National-Communist traditions of the Borot'bisty. Blakytnyi, up to the time of his death in December, 1925, and later the novelist, M. Khvyli'ovyi, and the dramatist M. Kulish played the leading roles in "Vaplite". Early in 1928, this organization was accused of Nationalism and dissolved. Khvyli'ovyi attempted to continue it unofficially by founding a

1) See G. Luckyj. *Literary Politics in Soviet Ukraine*. Ch. 2-3.

journal, "Literaturnyi Yarmarok" ("The Literary Fair"), and in 1930 a new literary organization "Prolitfront". However, the latter was forced, a year later, to merge with the officially sponsored V.U.S.P.P. (Vseukrayins'ka Spilka Proletars'kykh Pys'mennykiv — the All-Ukrainian Union of Proletarian Writers), which had been founded in 1927 as a rival to "Vaplite". After the famous Party resolution of April 23rd, 1932, foreboding the dissolution of all the different literary organizations in the Soviet Union and the subordination of all writers to a single writers' trade union, any free organization of writers became impossible and any signs of opposition tendencies were ruthlessly crushed. In the purges which followed, many Ukrainian writers were physically liquidated or imprisoned.

Beside the above-mentioned literary groupings in Ukraine in the 1920's, there were several minor groups which played a subordinate role. In Kyiv, a group of writers formed an organization on the lines of "Vaplite". It called itself "Lanka" ("The Link"), and, later, M. A. R. S. (Maysternia Revolyutsynoho Slova — The Workshop of the Revolutionary Word). Its members were Mykhaylo Ivchenko (b. 1890-1939), Valerian Pidmohylnyi (1901-1942), Hryhoriy Kosynka (1899-1934), Borys Antonenko-Davydovych (b. 1899) Yevhen Pluzhnyk (1898-1938), Dmytro Falkivs'kyi (1898-1935) and others.

The Futurists, chief of whom was Mykhaylo Semenko, eventually formed the "Nova Generatsiya" (the New Generation). The Young Communist League (Komsomol) had its own writers' association, "Molodnyak" and like V.S.S.P., this enjoyed the full support of the Party.

In the field of poetry, the most outstanding was the Neo-classicist school of Kievan poets, which originated before the Revolution. Among them were Mykola Zerov (1890-1941), Maksym Ryls'kyi, (1895-1963), Pavlo Fylypovych (1891-193?), Mykhaylo Dray-Khmara (1899-1939) and Yuriy Klen (1891-1947). None of them were Party members. They were not united in a formal organization, and were frequently accused by Communist critics of showing a negative attitude to Soviet reality by their withdrawal into the Classical past, and by their passive attitude to current politics. The Neo-classicists, particularly Ryls'kyi and Zerov (who was also a great literary scholar and critic) were true poets.

The main trend in prose writing was that of neo-Romanticism. The Revolution and the "Civil War" were inexhaustible sources of new themes. The National revival was also a source of literary inspiration. The Neo-romantic trend was represented by such writers as Mykola Khvyly'ovyi (1893-1933), Yuriy Yanovs'kyi (1902-1954), Dmytro Fal'kivs'kyi, (b. 1898. executed 1934), Olexa Vlyz'ko (b. 1908. executed 1934) and many others.

Mykola Khvyly'ovyi, whose influence on literature and political thought in the 1920's was outstanding, is an enigmatic and controversial figure. We know little of his youth and life before his appearance

as a writer. He wrote short stories, a novel, and above all, was a brilliant pamphleteer. There are a number of books and articles on Khvyl'ovyi. The most complete biography is "the Tragedy of Mykhola Khvyl'ovyi", by O. Han (a pseudonym), but this is not always reliable.

Mykhola Khvylovyyi (real name Fityl'ov) was born in Trostyyanets near Kharkiv in 1893. His father was a teacher from a Russian family of small gentry, and his Ukrainian mother was the daughter of a bookkeeper. Mykola's parents parted when he was about 10 years old, and he lived with his mother and her family. His secondary education was not completed, owing to his restless and self-assertive nature, but he read a great deal and tried to write. He served in the Army during the 1st World War, and on the outbreak of the Revolution, took part in the Soldiers' Committees. After his return home, he took an active part in local political life, it appears, first as a member of the Ukrainian S.R. Party, and later of its pro-Soviet Borot'bist wing. During the rising against Hetman Skoropars'kyi in the autumn of 1918, Khvyl'ovyi organized a group of insurgents in support of the Directory, but later his ideas and loyalties shifted more to the Left, and his partisans helped the Red Army against the National Ukrainian units. At one time he was captured by the latter, but managed to escape being shot as a traitor. He wholeheartedly embraced the Bolshevik slogans of "internationalism" and Communism, and took an active part, as a political Commissar, in the suppression of the Ukrainian peasant risings. At first he wrote in Russian, but in 1920 he published some Ukrainian verses, and in 1922, a collection of short stories, *Syni Etyudy*. With the introduction of the N.E.P., and the collapse of his romantic and passionately held hopes of a Communist Utopia, he began, in his short stories to castigate the opportunism and bourgeois self-satisfaction which he saw all around him, not least in the Communist Party with its careerists and bureaucrats. The final blow to his illusions was the pronouncement on building Socialism in one country, and he began to discern in the Soviet Union a reconstructed Russian Empire. In his disappointment, his interests became canalized towards the ideal of an Ukrainian cultural renaissance. He called for an orientation towards Europe, "away from Moscow". But while increasingly a Nationalist, he could not break completely his sentimental attachment to the distant goal of Communism. Torn between his two loves, Communism and Nationalism, and persecuted by the guardians of Party orthodoxy, he committed suicide in May, 1933. His inner tragedy was typical of that section of the Ukrainian intelligentsia who had been led by their socialist beliefs into the Bolshevik camp. Their acceptance of the doctrine that Nationalism was to be regarded as a thing of the past, and that their duty was to work for the World triumph of Communism, made them suppress their Ukrainian patriotic sentiments in order to participate in the imminent World Revolution. To these motives must be added the obvious wish to

survive in political life. They were prepared to pay the price of sacrificing purely national Ukrainian interests to the interests of the Revolution led by Russian Bolsheviks. However, doubts about the correctness of this attitude rankled in their minds. A very penetrating psychological study of this inner conflict is the novel "*Smert'*" (The Death), by Borys Antonenko-Davydovych, published in 1927. Its hero, Horobenko, is a Ukrainian Communist. As former Nationalist, he realizes that he is distrusted in the Party, and in order to resolve his doubts and prove himself a real Bolshevik, he decides to join the Cheka, to exterminate the Ukrainian enemies of the Party. The author shows the stages of his moral decay, his death as a man of humane feelings and his birth as a ruthless Party member. Khvyľovyĭ dealt with a similar theme in the story "Ya", (Myself). There the main character, a member of the Revolutionary Tribunal of the Cheka, kills his own mother in the name of the Communist ideal, and then realizes the monstrosity of his crime. The symbolism, Mother — Ukraine, is clear. This short story makes a shuddering impression. In some of his other stories Khvyľovyĭ hints at the same psychological drama. Thus in "Editor Kark" he depicts a Ukrainian editor of a newspaper who is constantly humiliated by his uneducated Russian superior, because of his alleged Nationalism. "Am I really superfluous because I love Ukraine madly?" he asks himself. He is frustrated in finding that his love for Ukraine cannot be reconciled with the Communist Party line.

Khvyľovyĭ's realization that the Revolution had been diverted into false paths, that instead of a regeneration of the world, there had merely been the re-creation of a society of Philistines in a form as vulgar as ever, pervades many of his stories. In "Sanatoriyna zona" (In a Sanatorium District), two disillusioned revolutionaries find life so stifling that they commit suicide. The Sanatorium here symbolizes the Soviet State, isolated from everything outside.

In the story "Sentymental'na istoriya" (A Sentimental Story), a young woman who comes from the village to the city falls prey to the corrupting influences of city life. Khvyľovyĭ does not spare dark colours in describing her disillusionment in what she thought was the new society of the builders of Socialism.

Khvyľovyĭ's final break with the illusions of the past is seen in his novel "Val'dshnepy" (The Woodsnipes), published in 1927, where the vehemently Nationalist heroine Ahlaya gradually undermines the beliefs of the Communist Karamazov, to the extent of winning him over to her viewpoint. The literary value of this novel is open to question, as it is primarily a political tract, but the ideas it expressed had a widespread influence on the reading public. "Val'dshnepy" became one of the main grounds on which the Party critics attacked Khvyľovyĭ.

(To be continued)

## POEMS FROM UKRAINE

Vasyl' SYMONENKO\*

### THE GATE

Unknown forms and images disordered  
Haunt the gate in dread alarming dreams,  
Where the keys are jangled by the warders,  
And the guard-door's hinges creak and scream.

Phantoms, bearing bloody swords, arrayed in  
Heavy mantles, black as night, unchecked  
With strange formless balls a game are playing,  
Balls of heads, new-severed from their necks.

From phlegmatic walls spilt blood is pouring,  
Groans upon the lips have long grown cold,  
Centuries of degradation, torture,  
Make turn in their graves the dead of old.

But the town does not see in the gloomy  
Night, guards, not with swords now at their sides,  
Hurl new victims where the walls are looming,  
With a dirty bandage round their eyes.

### CHORUS OF ELDERS FROM THE POEM "FICTION"

"We are the enlightened! Now  
We bring the radiant sun,  
Reveal the blessed light of truth  
To sightless little ones!"

*Taras Shevchenko: The Caucasus.*

Our race is wise; that is a law of nature,  
we know all, have attained all things, you see;  
he blinks at us in pride and sincere rapture,  
our happy ancestor, the chimpanzee.

He simply has to swing on creaking branches,  
and on the tropic winds play merry jinks . . .  
But we shall go, teach all the world's expanses,  
how one may sail upon broad seas of ink.

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\* All Symonenko's poems in this chapter have been translated by Miss Vera Rich.

In our land, all are over-wise, so clever,  
that we must ration ink and paper too;  
volcanoes act with might and frenzied fever  
on peaks of the high paper mountains now.

We know it all! Our knowledge always grasps it!  
What will tomorrow bring? Ask us! We know!  
Just as the fire upon dry dusty raspings  
of straw is fed, wisdom aye feeds us so.

We shall rise up, we shall lead up, advancing,  
We shall act, we shall conquer every height !!!  
In one go we'll decant to you entrancing  
truths in such numbers you'll be dumbstruck quite.

Why do you roam the world as drunkards wander?  
What do you seek? We've found it all! So why,  
when all roads of enlightenment lead under  
our sun, from out your regions where mists lie?

Here for long ages no one heard of sorrow,  
and other nonsense and such tales of liars.  
Only one care can cause our brow to furrow:  
What of wise paper mountains, if some morrow  
they're kindled by a little spark of fire?

\* \* \*

I am fleeing from self, from pain and exhaustion,  
From the shouting of goggling towns.  
And lonely I roam  
To the white bracken of dreams.  
I renounce everything.  
And ignore every being,  
For I wish to be nothing.  
I am wearied by all my own foolishness,  
I am murdered by all my own vaunting,  
I shall flee from myself  
To the white bracken of dreams,  
There — in dreams — gentle tigers  
Will tenderly kiss me on lips parched to dryness,  
And leopards, bewitching, will take off their skins  
And will give them to me of their bounty:  
"Take them!"  
I will take them.  
I'll forget everything in the world,  
Be a dream, dreamy-vision of sweetness.

How good that I am this dream,  
And how bad that I must awaken,  
And white bracken will change into green . . .

### THE BALLAD OF HAPPINESS

Into the entry she stumbled,  
from the room boredom blew,  
loneliness.  
In her hands the besom's laugh rumbled,  
she brushed her felt over-boots fresh.  
She stamped  
her feet on the mud flooring,  
and beat off the frost  
from her gloves.  
With her  
came in the wild roaring,  
and the snowstorm's mad laughter above.  
And the quiet children's  
life reawakened —  
stamping, wailing  
and squealing again.  
The moon will come,  
warm itself, maybe —  
draw its pale disc  
to the pane.  
It looks, curiously,  
at the platter:  
is your food so funny that I  
by your laughter  
and squealing and chatter  
am drawn into your house  
from the sky?  
Happiness in a wave  
bubbles silver,  
as if here for long years it had been —  
not real life at all,  
but an idyll,  
as in trashy books  
or the big screen.  
Where are camera-men?  
Where are poets?  
Hurry up, lads, a subject for you!  
A snap for the papers  
to show it;  
some horribly funny verse too!  
But what is this show situation:  
pretty mother, and three little dears;  
O what a sweet illustration,  
to confirm and support our ideas.



The happy statistics cavorting  
in articles learned, profound —  
but you'll not see,  
from this windy vortex,  
the toil of her drear daily round.  
Silent and ashamed, you will happen  
Somehow not to see what is plain,  
that this milkmaid, each night,  
(O so happy)  
has her hands and feet  
crying with pain.  
But under your  
peaked cap there enters  
like lightning a thought that rings:  
into the cosmos now  
venture  
not rockets  
but milk's streaming springs.  
But for her  
it is no great matter,  
for long she has known it clear:  
truly  
indeed, she is happy,  
only happiness is so drear . . .  
And so this Mariya  
or Nastya,  
will rouse folk with her milkmaid's bell,  
that such happiness  
may faster  
in the Soviet land cease to dwell.

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In the collections the lines:

But what is this show situation  
pretty mother and three little dears;  
O what a sweet illustration,  
to confirm and support our ideas.  
were omitted.

\* \* \*

Deep into your eyes, now, I am gazing,  
Blue and alarmed they are, like break of day,  
Red lightnings kindle fire-sparks from them, blazing,  
Of revolutions, risings and affray.

Ukraine! For me a miracle forever,  
Let year flow after year, my whole life through,  
For ever shall I, proud and lovely mother,  
Be enchanted and bewitched by you.

For your sake, pearls into the soul I scatter,  
For your sake do I think, create my verse,  
Let Russias and Americas cease their chatter  
When with you I lovingly converse.

False unfriends, be off, and quit my home, now,  
True friends, wait outside for me, I pray,  
I have a son's sacred right, alone now  
With my mother for a while to stay.

Rarely do I think of you, dear mother,  
The days are all too brief, are cut too small,  
Not all devils live in heaven above us,  
Enough of them on earth — fiend take it all!

You see, each hour against them I must battle,  
You hear the clamour of primeval fight!  
How could I manage without friends of mettle,  
Without their brains, without their eyes and might?

You are all my prayer, Ukraine beloved,  
You are my age-old despair, for strife  
Fiercely high above the earth hurls thunders  
In the contest for your rights, your life.

Let the beetroot-coloured clouds flame, glowing,  
Let their insults hiss me — all the same  
Like a drop of blood I shall be flowing  
On the sacred banner of your name.

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In the printed collections, only the first, second, fourth and eighth stanzas are given. In the collection *Terrestrial Gravitation*, the final line reads: "There on the red banner of your name". Symonenko called this work *Ukraine*.

## TERROR

Granite obelisks crawled like medusas,  
Crawled until their strength failed, weary-worn,  
In the cemetery of slain illusions  
There is no room for new graves any more.

Milliards of faiths in the black earth are buried,  
Milliards of joys are scattered without trace,  
The soul burns, angry reason flames, while merry  
Hate in the wind roars with a laughter crazed.

If only all deluded folk saw clearly,  
If all the slaughtered ones might live again,  
The heavens, grey from curses, then would surely  
Burst apart from blasphemy and shame.

Think, lackeys! Tremble, murderers, in confusion,  
Life was not cobbled to your last, for sure.  
D'you hear? The cemetery of illusions  
Has no more room for new graves any more.

For now the nation is one wound completely,  
And now the earth with blood is satiate,  
And for each henchman and each tyrant, meetly,  
The noose of a guerilla surely waits.

Those driven to despair, slain and downtrodden,  
Are rising to pass judgment on these deeds.  
Their maledictions, strange and evil-boding,  
Will fall on souls, bloated and mildew-sodden,  
And the trees will swing on their boughs as burden,  
The apostles of all crime and treachery.

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(According to Symonenko, this poem either has no name or is called *Terror*. In the collections: *Terrestrial Gravitation* and *Poetry*, to confuse the significance, it was given the title *Prophecy of 1917*, and two final lines were added:

And truth and love shall rise on earth, and warden  
Of truth and right the workers' toil shall be.)

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**EDITORS NOTE:** We regret that due to oversight the name of the Translator of Ihor Kalynets' poems — Vera RICH, pp. 68, 69, 70 & 71 in previous issue of U. R. (No. 3) has been omitted. We sincerely apologize to the esteemed Translator for this error.

## THIRTY YEARS AGO

### ANNIVERSARY OF THE UKRAINIAN INSURGENT ARMY (UPA)

*By Professor Ivan WOWCHUK*

The three letters — UPA — embody the whole epoch, spirit, and content of the armed political struggle of the Ukrainian nation during World War II and for a decade after its formal termination. Indeed, the Russian imperialists in the last few years have intensified their assault against the Ukrainian national ideal, in defence and realization of which the UPA fought so determinedly and gallantly.

Fully thirty years have elapsed since the Ukrainian Insurgent Army sprang into being. At that time, Ukraine was both the total war battleground and prize for two totalitarian behemoths: German National Socialism and Russian Communism.

Early in this all-out contest, the Russian occupation was replaced by the German occupation with its savage OSTPOLITIK. In reaction to these circumstances the Ukrainian nation, spontaneously and unaided, created an armed political force. Its appearance can be compared to the formation of a full river which, gathering waters from small streams, becomes a powerful and dynamic force. That it should have formed at all testifies to the undying sentiment for freedom in the Ukrainian breast.

In the fall of 1942 in the northern part of the western lands of Ukraine, the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), under the leadership of Stepan Bandera, began forming armed units for the struggle against the occupiers. The insurgent movement quickly engulfed the Western Ukrainian lands and part of Central Western Ukraine.

By their ruthless and unabashed colonial policy the German occupation forces rapidly evoked resentment and then hatred among the Ukrainian people. The German Eastern policy was responsible for the fact that, in the words of Peter Kleist, it generated the first anti-German partisans — the Ukrainian nationalists.

In organizing armed units for the struggle against the German aggressors, their creators had a double task in mind. The first and immediate one was to protect the Ukrainian youth from deportation to slave labour in Germany, to prevent the physical destruction of the people, and to forestall their economic exploitation. But the political future demanded another postulate: to create and develop one's own national forces in depth so as to give the nation a means

of defence against the two imperialistic powers, both of which were wholly hostile to the principle of Ukrainian statehood.

In Moscow, the Soviet Russian leadership quickly perceived in the senseless and cruel colonial policy of the Germans in Ukraine an unexpected boon. Their joy was tempered, however, by the swelling growth of the Ukrainian partisan movement. In consequence, Moscow set up large-scale plans to infiltrate and combat this menacing force. To Volhynia and Polisia, where the first Ukrainian insurgent groups had come into being, the Russian command dispatched its own Russian partisan units. Thus, in extremely difficult conditions, the Ukrainian insurgent groups had to wage partisan warfare against Russian partisans and German troops at the same time.

The need for the Ukrainians of a unified and coordinated center became evident. Small and scattered partisan groups merged to form a strong insurgent army, an indispensable military army for a nation seeking the establishment of freedom and national independence.

The strength and greatness of the UPA lay in the profound idealism of its soldiers and commanders, in their boundless patriotism, which generated a total and common understanding of the necessity to wage the struggle that, in turn, relied on the full and unqualified support of the Ukrainian people. This identification with the UPA on the part of the people, who instinctively sensed in it their own strength, provided the UPA with moral and material support, enabling it to wage the liberation struggle for several years.

Under unimaginably adverse conditions, without any outside help whatsoever, neither moral nor material, and against numerically vastly superior and technically better equipped armed forces, the UPA, under the political leadership of the OUN and the UHVR (Supreme Ukrainian Liberation Council), succeeded in creating its own highly heroic style of struggle. In countless battle encounters, the warriors of the UPA refused to recognize surrender and capitulation.

The noble and deeply humane ideas, embodied in the motto, "Freedom to peoples — and freedom to man," under which the UPA waged its struggle, reverberated among the other non-Russian peoples enslaved by Russian imperialism and Communism. Organized in UPA ranks were national units of Georgians, Azerbaijanis, Turkistanis, and others, who voluntarily came to offer their services in the struggle against Russian imperialism and for the re-establishment of their own independent states.

The UPA contributed greatly to the unity of the enslaved peoples in the struggle for their liberation. The Russian leaders in Moscow understood well the great danger to the Russian empire — the USSR — which the UPA represented in its political ideology. Hence the harshness of the struggle.

After the re-occupation of Ukraine by Russia, the Ukrainian people for two years (1946-1947) totally boycotted the elections to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR on the territory

that was under the jurisdiction of the UHVR, thus signalling their refusal to recognize the alien power of Russia. This development was unique in the history of the USSR. In order to mount a more effective campaign against the UPA, the Soviet Russian government concluded (1947) a tripartite treaty with Czechoslovakia and Poland. In the unequal struggle that ensued, weapons were literally knocked out of the hands of the UPA. In the fall of 1950 near the city of Lviv in Western Ukraine, ambushed and killed was General Roman Shukhevych (Taras Chuprynka), head of the underground government of the the UHVR and UPA commander-in-chief. The military operations came to a halt, but this did not mean the end of the liberation struggle. It only assumed different forms, and continues to this day.

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### **VOLODYMYR SHUMKA IN A CONCENTRATION CAMP FOR THE SECOND TIME**

Due to the information supplied by a secret agent in Kursk, a worker in a factory of tractor parts, Volodymyr Shumka, was arrested in the second half of 1971, and charged with past membership in OUN-UPA (Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists — Ukrainian Insurgent Army) and of active struggle against the occupants. After brutal interrogations by the organs of the KGB, V. Shumka was transported to the province of Ivano-Frankivsk, where he was sentenced for the second time to a term of 7 years in concentration camp under severe regime.

The following is made known from the indictment: He is by origin from the village of Kiydantsi, district of Kolomyya, province of Ivano-Frankivsk. In 1939 he first established contact with OUN and began to fight against the Russian occupants. He was the leader of the district OUN for the territory of Kosiv, and later for Snyatyn and Horodenka districts, where he appeared under the pseudonyms of "Kuryava" and "Kostyantyn-Yevshan". In 1943 as an officer, he organized sections of UPA and underground commands of OUN in the territories of Verkhovyna and Kosiv. He led numerous battles with units of the NKVD (today's KGB), defeating detachments of Russian partisans and punishing Russian lackeys for national injustices they committed.

In 1945, in a battle under unknown circumstances, he was captured. During brutal interrogations, he held out well, having presented himself as a rank-and-file UPA soldier by the name of Vasyl Fedyuk, from Romania by origin. At that time, he was sentenced to 8 years in a concentration camp. He underwent his punishment in Norilsk and, after having served his term, he moved to Kursk, where he made arrangements for a job and worked until his renewed arrest in 1971. The administration of the factory in which he worked gave him commendable character reference. But neither this, nor the fact that he had already served his sentence helped matters, and the court mercilessly sentenced Volodymyr Shumka-Fedyuk for a second time.

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## ARRESTS AND PRISON SENTENCES

### **IRYNA KALYNETS, STEPHANIA SHABATURA, IVAN HEL RECEIVE LONG PRISON TERMS; IHOR KALYNETS ARRESTED**

Three more Ukrainian intellectuals, all from the group arrested last January by the Soviet Secret Police, were sentenced to long terms of imprisonment and exile at a trial in Lviv last July.

**Iryna Stasiv-Kalynets, Stephania Shabatura, and Ivan Hel** were tried on charges of "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda" and meted out heavy sentences under Article 62 of the Ukr. SSR Penal Code.

At the same time, it was reported that **Ihor Kalynets**, the husband of Iryna Stasiv-Kalynets, was arrested in Lviv on August 11, as was Ivan Hel's sister.

**Iryna Kalynets**, the 32-year-old poetess, was sentenced to six years of imprisonment and five years of exile.

**Stephania Shabatura**, the 34-year-old artist in carpet designing, received a five-year prison term and three years of exile.

**Ivan Hel**, who was previously arrested in 1965 and sentenced to three years at hard labour in 1966, was now sentenced to ten years of imprisonment and five years of exile.

The maximum penalty under Article 62 of the Penal Code is seven years of imprisonment and five years of exile.

Hel has been working as a welder while attending evening classes in history at the Lviv University. Because of previous arrest, his sentence exceeded the maximum penalty under the Penal Code.

**Ihor Kalynets**, 34, is one of the brightest and most popular Ukrainian poets of the younger generation. Some of his poems have been disseminated and read widely abroad.

On September 12, 1972, UPI reported from Moscow that **Yuriy Shukhevych**, 39-year-old son of the former UPA Commander-in-Chief, the late General Roman Shukhevych — Taras Chuprynka, was sentenced to ten years at hard labour and four years of exile by a Soviet court.

The wife of Yuri Shukhevych is living in Nalchik in the Caucasus with the couple's two children. Her address was given in the clandestinely published "Chronicle of Current Events" as: Valentyna Trotsenko, Nalchik, Sovyetskaya Street 83, Rm. 13, USSR.

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### **MOROZ KNIFED BY CRIMINALS IN PRISON**

As reported by the United Press International, **Valentyn Moroz**, the 36-year-old Ukrainian historian who was sentenced in 1970 by a Soviet Russian court to nine years at hard labour and five years of exile, last July was assaulted and stabbed four times by four inmates of the Vladimir prison where he is being kept.

He is said to have been taken to the prison infirmary, his condition unknown. The report said that Moroz was stabbed in the stomach by "four criminals". There are many observers in the West who feel that the recent assault on Moroz was planned.

There were reports last year that Moroz was suffering from a liver ailment, possibly caused by deliberate food poisoning. There are numerous instances where Russian authorities have resorted to this and other methods to break the individual.

Two years ago, three Ukrainian intellectuals — Levko Lukyanenko, Mykhaylo Horyn, and Ivan Kandyba — in a letter smuggled to the West appealed to the United Nations to investigate food poisoning by the Russian authorities, citing their own cases as well as other instances.

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## MYCHAYLO SADOVS'KYY

God gives talent, but man himself must discover values and means. The creative process is one of change, development, viability and innovation in the organization of one's internal life. Thoughts search for the answer to life, according to the demands of the epoch. These demands state that the artist must first and foremost be a Ukrainian. Such a person in his entirety is Sadovs'kyy.

The artist does not create the epoch, but the epoch creates him, the epoch with all its commandments and events. K. Young once stated the following: "It was not Göethe who created Faust, but Faust created Göethe". The artist's imagination embodies wholly the spirit of his nation, which guides his brush. In the visual impact, the conscious reckoning disappears, and the Ukrainian heart, which knows no rest, searches for something new, joyous and hopeful in the troubled ocean of tragedy, something personified by the dawning of a new day. He possesses a sense of what must be done and the spontaneous means of expression, typical of a maestro. Concentration will not be of much assistance, if one is lacking in sensitivity, vision and inclination...

Art is a religion of sorts, where the artist exists spiritually together with his creation. He paints for someone and for something. He craves for his brush, as a drunkard for his bottle but devoutly, sacrificially, as the heroes of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) went into battle. The noted French poet, Paul Valerie, stated: "In order for a work to be effective, its creator and the viewer must be completely independent on one another".

Mykhaylo Sadovs'kyy loved art from childhood and, in spite of the ungratifying Soviet conditions, he managed to be accepted into the Art Institute in Kyiv. However, he was soon expelled, being the son of a "kulak". He changed his name and struggled for a livelihood in the Donbas region of Ukraine. He was forced to draw Stakhanovites and paint posters with Bolshevik slogans. In the evenings he attended lessons in a music school, in the field of composition and conductorship. In 1938 he was principal of a high school. In 1941 he lived through the retreat of the Red Army, the front line, capture as a German prisoner of war, and flight homewards. And again flight, this time with his family to distant Australia, where the conditions for nurturing art were not much better. Today M. Sadovs'kyy paints buildings and fences, and sends his two sons to school. Only in his spare time does he indulge in creative painting.

His studio is huge and wealthy in paintings. Over a hundred canvases amaze the viewer with their diversity. Sadovs'kyy has had two one-man shows of his works, one in Melbourne and another in Sydney, and has participated in a joint showing in Canberra. Being a member of the Australian Association of Artists, he also takes part in its exhibitions. He has donated many of his paintings to various institutions in Australia. His distinctive relief of Taras Chuprynka (famous leader of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army) can be seen in the Ukrainian Youth Centre in Sydney. He donated his canvas "Ivan Vyhovs'kyi at Konotop" to the national museum in Taipei, Formosa. This painting was shown on television and mentioned in the press, along with information about Ukraine. His "Kingirian Women" who march against Soviet tanks, demonstrates



that heroism of a nation which leads to the greatest sacrifice. His "Expatriated Kulaks" is the jolting Ukrainian tragedy. Even topics such as interplanetary travel and the ocean floor are not abstract for him, but an intricacy of metaphysical thought and untiring search for the idealistic solution to life.

Sadovskyy's style is reinterpreted realism. His oils blossom with bright spring colours, which emphasize his eternal longing for his native land. Sadovskyy creates not for himself, not for personal glory, but for his nation, its culture and its spirit. Everything of his contains Ukraine — his orchards, flowers and meadows are like Dovzhenko's "Enchanted Desna", or Kotsyubynskyy's "Fata Morgana".

R. Dragan

**NON-RUSSIAN ELEMENTS IN THE "DICTIONARIOLUM RUSSICO-  
ANGLICUM" Of 1618-1619 Hermann Rempel, Univ. of Manitoba (M.A.  
Thesis), 1970.**

The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the non-Russian elements in the "Dictionarium Russico-Anglicum of 1618-1619".

The "Dictionarium" is valuable for the following reasons: (a) The date and place of its entries (1618-1619, Northern Russia) as well as its author (Richard James), are well-known, and (b) its material falls into a period of Russian linguistic history that has not been satisfactorily documented and investigated.

The non-Russian elements are divided into two categories: foreign words, including loan translations, and Russian words with non-Russian phonological and morphological characteristics. For foreign words, a brief description is given according to the following plan: a) an English translation, b) the date of first attestation, c) the form of the word in the original language, and d) the form in the mediating language or languages. The foreign words are divided, according to the degree of certainty of their etymologies, into the following three groups: a) words with certain etymologies, b) words with etymologies that are not clear in all details, and c) words with obscure etymologies. The non-Russian words were found to be of Ukrainian, Turko-Tataric, Finno-Ugrian, West Slavic, Germanic, and Greek provenance. Besides the non-Russian words that constitute about one-fifth of the vocabulary in the "Dictionarium" a relatively large number of originally Russian words showed various influences of the Finno-Ugric substratum.

A semantic classification of the vocabulary was undertaken on the basis of "Der deutsche Wortschatz nach Sachgruppen" by F. Dornseiff. This classification showed that the different semantic groups are very unevenly represented in the "Dictionarium". Most numerous are the entries related to the material world, whereas those referring to abstract concepts are relatively few. The number of attested foreign words for each semantic group is shown in a table, divided into three historical periods, along with an indication of the donor languages.

Since the publication of the "Dictionarium" as an appendix to "Russko-Anglijskij Slovar — Dnevnik Ričarda Džemsa" by B. A. Larin, articles on various aspects of the material have been published; however, none of them are of the scope or extent presented in this thesis.

## IN DEFENCE OF CULTURAL LEADERS AND POLITICAL PRISONERS PERSECUTED BY RUSSIA

Whereas, the Russian-US and the Russian-German agreements while making firm the *status quo* of Russian domination, foster the intensification of terror, Russification, religious persecution, national discrimination, and socio-economic exploitation of Ukraine and other nations subjugated by Russian imperialism and Communism;

Whereas, in the course of 1971-1972 Russian terror in Ukraine became unusually acute, which manifested itself in mass arrests in January of this year of over one hundred well known Ukrainian cultural leaders, in clandestine liquidation of champions of national independence and human rights, in particular of members of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) (Bandera Followers), in harsh sentences, as for example, of *Valentyn Moroz*, a young Ukrainian historian, to 14 years' imprisonment; the arrest of *Nina Strokata*, a research worker from Odessa, for her petitions for the release of her illegally convicted husband, writer and translator of Shakespeare; *Svyatoslav Karavanskyi*, presently a prisoner in the Mordovian labour camps, who has been incarcerated for nearly 30 years in prisons and concentration camps; in the subsequent arrest recently of *Yuriy Shukhevych*, who spent 20 years in prison since the age of fourteen, only because he refused to denounce his father, Gen. Roman Shukhevych-Chuprynka, the Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA); and in the imprisonment of countless others fighting for freedom of speech, conscience, creativity, and human and national rights;

Whereas, the governments of the Western Great Powers show neither interest nor sympathy toward the national liberation struggle of Ukraine and other subjugated nations for their independence and human rights, which can turn into a tragedy for the free world in the face of permanent aggressiveness of Russian Communist imperialism and its carriers, who have reached parity with the USA, if they have not already surpassed it, in strategic arms, including a navy which dominates oceans and seas;

### Therefore, the 6th WACL Conference resolves:

- 1) To condemn Russian imperialism and colonialism and the multiple terror in Ukraine, the systematic forcible Russification and Ukraine's subjugation by Russia in general; to support and declare its solidarity with the liberation struggle of the heroic Ukrainian people for their national state independence and human rights;

2) To appeal to the governments and parliaments of the free countries of the world, to the UN General Assembly, the UN Commission of Human Rights, the International Court at the Hague, the International Commission of Jurists, the Amnesty International, the European Council in Strasbourg, and in particular to the US Congress and the President of the United States, to Churches and humanitarian institutions of the West, to the free labour unions, to political, civic, veteran, cultural, and youth organizations in the free world, to public opinion, especially to the journalists and mass media in general, to rise in defence of the cultural workers of Ukraine, in particular, I. M. Svitlychnyi, Vyacheslav Chornovil, Ivan Dzyuba, Yevhen Sverstyuk, Ihor Kalynets, Iryna Stasiv-Kalynets, Vasyl Stus, Svyatoslav Karavanskyi, Nina Strokata, Rev. Vasyl Romanyuk, and especially Valentyn Moroz, critically ill, with one lung removed, confined to the harshest Vladimir prison where he is systematically poisoned in order to break his will, and countless others, demanding their immediate release, in no less degree that the members of the OUN and the warriors of the UPA, who have languished in Russian prisons and concentration camps for over 25 years, as well as the release of political prisoners: Bohdan Khrystynych, Volodymyr Leonyuk, Yaroslav Hasyuk, and others suffering a similar fate; to call attention to the fact that the cultural leaders acted within the framework of the misleading constitution of the USSR and the Ukr. SSR, which guarantees on paper not only creative freedom but also secession of the Ukr. SSR from the USSR.

3) To urge and support a repatriation movement of Ukrainians forcefully deported to Siberia and Kazakhstan, as well as a return to their historic, native lands, of Ukrainians who were brutally driven out from the Western border-regions of Ukraine to the Polish territories by the Red Polish terrorist troops;

4) To urge patriotic circles of free nations to stage mass protest actions in defence of freedom-loving Ukraine and other subjugated nations, their cultural leaders and fighters for freedom and national independence in front of Russian diplomatic and consular institutions, to demand from members of parliament effective intervention of their governments in the case of subjugated Ukraine, its cultural leaders and fighters for national and human rights, to activate reporters in mass media, forcing them to show in films and television not only the horrors of the Nazi concentration camps, but also the Bolshevik ones and the hell undergone by intellectuals in insane asylums;

5) To demand the liquidation of all concentration camps and the release of political prisoners and those persecuted for their religious convictions, and the cessation of tortures by barbaric methods of political prisoners in psychiatric institutions; to support the initiative of the creation of the International Court, composed of independent jurists, church and humanitarian leaders, intellectuals and representatives of free labour unions, which, after conducting an inquiry,

would hand down its verdict about the sentencing of Valentyn Moroz, Svyatoslav Karavanskyi, Yuriy Shukhevych, Nina Strokata and others, as well as about a pending trial of I. M. Svitlychnyi and other imprisoned Ukrainian cultural leaders and fighters for national and human rights. The pro-Communist circles have organized an entire world movement in defence of the Communist terrorist, Angela Davis, but where is a patriotic movement in support of Valentyn Moroz, Yuriy Shukhevych, Svyatoslav Karavanskyi, Nina Strokata, fighters for humanistic ideas, freedom of cultural creativity, the rights of individuals and nations for religious freedom? Where is the free world movement of solidarity with the ideals of the great martyrs: Vasyl Makukh (Ukraine), Jan Palach (Czechia) and Roman Kalanta (Lithuania), who immolated themselves in protest against the subjugation of their native lands by Russia, analogous to the movement of solidarity with the self-immolation of Buddhist monks in Vietnam?

6) To render its firm moral and political support to the revolutionary Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (Bandera Followers) and its struggle against Russian imperialism and Communism for the re-establishment of the Ukrainian Sovereign State and the liberation of all subjugated peoples.

*Submitted by the Delegation of Ukraine  
to the 6th WACL Conference in Mexico  
City, August, 1972, and adopted unanimously  
by plenary sessions, 26 August, 1972.*

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### **ARGENTINIAN RADIO AND TELEVISION ABOUT ABN AND UKRAINE**

After the ceremonious unveiling of the memorial of Taras Shevchenko in Buenos Aires, Argentina, a delegation of the Organizations of the Ukrainian Liberation Front met with representatives of the RAEDA (Argentinian Federation of Democratic Anti-Communist Organizations), the president of which is the prominent anti-communist, Dr. Apalez Markez. The meeting and press conference were broadcast on television. In his speech, Dr. Markez named Ukraine as a model in the struggle against imperialistic Russia. Mrs. Slava Stetsko appeared with a brief speech in which she focused on the gravity of the Russian threat and urged all freedom-loving peoples to stand in defence of V. Moroz, V. Chornovil and other persecuted intellectuals in the captive nations. Following this, Mrs. Stetsko, with the aid of interpreters, participated in a radio show, in a discussion with Argentinian doctors about prisons and psychiatric hospitals for healthy persons in the Soviet Union. Two of the doctors attempted to deny this, but Mrs. Stetsko, a member of the Central Committee of the ABN, answered them ably, pointing at the perfidious Soviet Russian crimes against humanity. The Argentinian press covered all these events extensively.

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## WORLD CONFERENCE OF UKRAINIAN STUDENTS AIMS AND PRINCIPLES

The World Conference of Ukrainian Students (WCUS-CESUS) is an international coordinating centre of free Ukrainian student federations and organizations. It was founded fifty years ago and at present claims jurisdiction, through its national organizations, of more than 10,000 students of Ukrainian background, active on three continents.

The Ukrainian students and youth recognize as their guiding principle the ideal of the organization of mankind and human life based on national self-determination, as the sole guarantee for an unhindered political, socio-economic, and cultural development of nations and individuals, for a lasting peace and justice in the world.

The Ukrainian students and youth who form part of the vanguard of the Ukrainian people throughout the world in its struggle for a Free Ukraine, actively support the liberation activities of the captive peoples against Russian imperialism and Communist totalitarianism, and consider the dissolution of the USSR national independent states within their ethnographic boundaries as a vital priority.

The Ukrainian students, young intelligentsia and youth in Ukraine and abroad, stand spiritually united in the forefront of the struggle for the political, socio-economic, cultural, and religious rights of the Ukrainian people in Ukraine and elsewhere in the world, for the re-establishment of the Free and Sovereign Ukrainian state.

## ACTIVITIES

In response to the arrests, repressions, and persecutions perpetrated by the Soviet Russian regime against Ukrainians in the past years and at present, the Ukrainian students and youth in cooperation with other organizations have greatly contributed to unfolding massive actions in the Free World, protesting against the anti-Ukrainian terror, and in support of the persecuted. The following are some of the highlights of the direct actions which were either organized by students and youth, or in which they participated, since September, 1970.

**Sept., 1970.** An international conference of WCUS-CESUS was held in Montreal, Canada, followed by a demonstration in front of the USSR Consulate, with 300 participants.

**Oct.-Nov., 1970.** Students assisted the Canadian Freedom Council and the Canadian League for the Liberation of Ukraine to set up in the Toronto City Hall a very successful exhibit entitled "Lenin make-up", on the occasion of the 100th anniversary of Lenin's birth. Over 25,000 people visited the exhibit, which even drew an attack from *Pravda*. The exhibit was shown at the 5th WACL Conference in Manila in 1971.

**Jan., 1971.** Mass actions were held in defence of the incarcerated Ukrainian historian, Valentyn Moroz, and other Ukrainian political prisoners. Demonstrations took place in front of the United Nations and Soviet Mission buildings in New York (USA), with 300 participants; in Chicago (USA), with 600 participants; in Ottawa (Canada) in front of the USSR Embassy, with 1,500 participants. Student and Youth demonstrations also took place in England, France, and Germany.

**Apr.-May, 1971.** On the eve of the trip to the USSR of Canada's Prime Minister, Pierre Trudeau, numerous demonstrations took place across Canada, to induce the Prime Minister to make representations before the Soviet Government in defence of Ukrainian political prisoners. Demonstrations took place simultaneously in seven major Canadian cities, with a total participation of about 10,000 demonstrators. Also, in May, 3000 people demonstrated in front of the Soviet Embassy in London, England; and in front of the U.N. buildings in New York, with 1,500 participants. A demonstration took place in Adelaide (Australia) as well.

**July, 1971.** There was a demonstration in Buenos Aires (Argentina), with 200 participants, before the Soviet Embassy, in defence of Valentyn Moroz.

**Sept., 1971.** Committees for the defence of Valentyn Moroz, the Ukrainian historian, staged various demonstrations and rallies in Australia.

**Oct., 1971.** Mass rallies and demonstrations were held in Canada protesting against Kosygin's visit to that country. In Toronto and Ottawa alone, 15,000 demonstrators took part in these protests. A student's hunger strike took place to protest the murder of the Ukrainian artist, Alla Horska, and the mysterious death of a Ukrainian political prisoner, Mykhaylo Soroka.

Various forms of protest actions were carried out against the visit of Leonid Brezhnev to Paris, France.

Following a new wave of arrests and repressions in Ukraine, which began in January, 1972, the following action took place this year:

**Jan., 1972.** Demonstrations in New York (USA) in front of the United Nations and Soviet Mission buildings, with 3,000 participants. Other demonstrations took place in Washington (USA), London (England), Munich (Germany), and Montreal and Winnipeg (Canada).

**Feb., 1972.** A demonstration was held in Ottawa (Canada).

**March, 1972.** Demonstrations were held in New York (USA) with over 1,000 participants, and also in Chicago (USA).

**April, 1972.** A demonstration was held in Cleveland (USA).

**May, 1972.** On the eve of President Nixon's visit to the USSR, more than 3,000 people demonstrated in Washington, petitioning the President of the United States to intervene on behalf of the imprisoned Ukrainians in the Soviet Union. Another demonstration was also staged in Philadelphia (USA).

**June, 1972.** A mass manifestation of solidarity with the Ukrainian political prisoners, and in protest against the recent wave of arrests in Ukraine, took place in Toronto (Canada), under the auspices of the Canadian League for the Liberation of Ukraine, with 10,000 people participating. The main speaker at

the mass rally was the Right Honorable John G. Diefenbaker, former Prime Minister of Canada and now the Founder and Chairman of the International Human Rights Defence Committee.

The total number of Ukrainians taking part in all major and minor demonstrations throughout the world in the past two years was 60,000, of whom almost 60% were students and youth. Eighty students and youths were either detained or arrested while protesting the persecutions in Ukraine. All these events — during which a wealth of informative materials was distributed — have been fully covered by press, radio, and television in the respective countries.

Student and youth organizations are also making continuous efforts on the governmental and international levels to bring to the attention of those bodies the plight of Ukraine and other subjugated nations. In most major centres of the Western world, Ukrainian students and youth have organized committees for the defence of Ukrainian and other Soviet political prisoners. All member organizations and federations of the World Conference of Ukrainian Students, such as SUM and Plast, as well as the various Ukrainian political and community organizations, have been equally instrumental in contributing to the organization and manning of the above activities.

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### DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST THE TRAITOR YEVTUSHENKO

Yevgeniy Yevtushenko, a long-time critic of the United States' "aggressive war" in Vietnam, once again visited New York at the beginning of this year. One of the American poets, whom Yevtushenko urged to protest against the Vietnam war, publicly asked Yevtushenko why the latter did not condemn the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 with a single word. Yevtushenko was appearing at the Madison Square Gardens on January 28, 1972. Ukrainian students held a successful demonstration in defence of Ukrainian intellectuals persecuted in the new wave of arrests by the Soviets.

The American magazine "Life", of February 11, 1972, contained an article about the demonstration under the heading "The Russian Bard of Protest Met With Protest". The article mentions the fact that Yevtushenko's appearance coincided with public press announcements regarding the renewed arrests of Ukrainian cultural leaders in Soviet Ukraine. The article also adds that the following day, having drawn 2,200 dollars, "the green leaves of capitalism" Yevtushenko went shopping for a new suit, and includes several photographs of Yevtushenko in the 700 dollars-suit he bought. Towards the end of the article, mention is made of a Ukrainian demonstration in front of the United Nations' building during Yevtushenko's appearance there.

Yevtushenko also appeared in Minneapolis — St. Paul, Minnesota, on February 19, 1972, where students dragged him from the stage. The students attempted to size hold of the microphone and protest against the illegal arrests of Ukrainian intellectuals in the USSR. Two of the four demonstrators within the building were arrested. Outside the building about 40 picketers carried posters and distributed leaflets voicing their protests against the wave of terror persecution in the Soviet Union.

### **PROTESTS AGAINST YEVTUSHENKO**

According to reports by the newspaper "The Home News" from New Brunswick, New Jersey, of March of this year, The Hryhoriy Skovoroda Ukrainian Students' Club at Rutgers University held a demonstration in front of the McArthur theatre during the appearance there of the Soviet poet, Yevgeniy Yevtushenko. The protesters distributed leaflets in which they accused Yevtushenko of spreading Soviet propaganda and remaining silent about the truth regarding the Soviet campaign against culture and religion in Ukraine and the other captive nations under Russian rule, as well as calling him a janissary (turn-coat).

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### **RUSSIAN BANDITS IN LVIV**

The trial of four young Russians took place in Lviv at the beginning of February of this year. The four men: Sergey Yulin, O. Lebedev, V. Lisitskiy, and A. Ryazanov, were charged with attempted robbery and the wounding of two tellers of a credit union in Lviv, in September 1971. The men planned to rob the credit union and flee to the Caucasus area, where they wanted to establish a commune and call it "Hippyland". However, the militia discovered their tracks and arrested them all together with their accomplices. The court sentenced S. Yulin to execution by a firing squad on the basis of articles 69 and 208, Ryazanov and Lebedev to 8 years each in forced labour colonies, and Lisitskiy to ten years under severe regime. Their accomplices, two young men who had stolen a gun and ammunition for them, and two young girls who bought tickets for the get-away and had acquired rubber gloves to prevent traces of fingerprints, were given lighter sentences.

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### **UKRAINIAN DANCERS FROM MIAMI SEEN NATIONWIDE**

On New Year's Day, when the television stations broadcast the "Annual Junior Orange Bowl Parade", Ukrainian dancers from Miami, Florida, were viewed by millions of people across the United States, while some 100,000 local persons watched the parade live. They saw the huge poster carried by two young dancers, bearing the name of the dancing group. The Ukrainian float presented a winter scene, with a typical church from the Hutsul part of Ukraine, with bells in each corner of the float, and a great star which rotated displaying the nativity scene. The main float was decorated with massive bells gaily ringing out the "Carol of the Bells", while Ukrainian dancers in Hutsul costumes performed traditional folk dances. The Parade Committee praised the dancers for their performance and their beautiful floats. After two consecutive years in the parade, the Ukrainian dancers have now become permanent members of the "Junior Orange Bowl".

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## TERROR AND DECEPTION by L. Vovchuk

Continued from page 16.

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