


The UKRAINIAN REVIEW



I

1971

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C O N T E N T S

Centenary of Lesya Ukraïnka's Birth	
<i>Lesya Ukraïnka: AND THOU, LIKE ISRAEL, ONCE FOUGHT ...</i> Translated by Vera Rich	8
Voices of Protest from Ukraine	
THE TRIAL OF VALENTYN MOROZ:	
HOW THE TRIAL OF MOROZ WAS PREPARED	4
FURTHER DETAILS ABOUT THE TRIAL	10
"I AM ANXIOUSLY WAITING." Open letter to the Chairman of the KGB of the Ukrainian SSR from Raisa Moroz	13
<i>Valentyn Moroz: AMONG THE SNOWS</i>	15
EXAMPLES OF ADMINISTRATIVE PERSECUTION FOR CONVICTIONS	36
<i>Mykhailo Horyn: LETTER OF PROTEST TO CAMP COMMANDANT</i>	42
<i>Mykhailo Horyn: LETTER OF PROTEST TO MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE UKRAINIAN SSR</i>	44
KARAVANSKYI'S SENTENCE EXTENDED	47
THREE YOUNG UKRAINIANS CONVICTED IN DNIPROPETROVSK	48
TRIAL OF THE UKRAINIAN NATIONAL FRONT	50
Problems of Liberation Struggle	
<i>Yaroslav Stetsko: STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF THE NATIONAL REVOLUTION</i>	52
Ethnography	
<i>Olexa Woropay: CUSTOMS OF OUR PEOPLE (Conclusion — 6)</i>	79

NEW SUBSCRIPTION RATE

Owing to generally rising costs we have been compelled to raise the subscription rate for *The Ukrainian Review*, starting from this issue. We hope our subscribers will show understanding for this necessary step which has not been taken without regret.

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ON THE CENTENARY OF LESYA UKRAÏNKA'S BIRTH

Lesya UKRAÏNKA
(1871-1913)

* * *

And thou, like Israel once fought great battles,
O my Ukraine. For God Himself had placed
A force of sightless destiny, unblessed,
Contending with thee. He encompassed thee
With nations that, like lions in the desert,
Roared in their raging, eager for thy blood.
He sent on thee such darkness that within it
A brother could not know his true-born brother
And in the dark appeared one, undefended,
Some spirit of the time, willing the doom
"Death to Ukraine!"

Then there appeared on high
The right hand of Bohdan, the hostile nations
Scattered and fled like jackals slinking craven,
Brother once more knew brother and joined with him;
The spirit spoke, "Bohdan, thou art victorious,
And now, indeed, is thine the Promised Land
From end to end." A covenant of friendship
Was made, resounding, 'twixt him and the spirit
There in the gold-domed town.

And straightway the spirit
Betrayed him.

Darkness, terror, brothers' parting,
Captivity of Egypt came again
Not in a foreign land, but our own country.
But afterwards — once more the Red Sea parted,
Flowing asunder, in two halves divided,
And once more came together, flooding, drowning
Whom? Woe, alas! The new-made Pharaoh came
Living from out the waves of the Red Sea —

But with horse the Cossack drowned forever.
Rejoice and sing, base daughter of the foeman,
Beat on the drum, and whirl in dance ecstatic
For horse and rider in the sea have perished!
To thee remained an heirloom as adornment,
For thou wilt wear our Ukraina's jewels
Making a festal day to greet her conquest.

And thus for us the Exodus from Egypt
Like to the Deluge. The Red Sea raged fiercely
And then grew quiet, dried up, left remaining
A tract of joyless desert in its wake,
And through this desert the new Israel
Began to wander through its Promised Land,
Like some poor flock that cannot find a haven,
And with the flock the shepherds wandered too.
By night they walked in shade, by day in fire,
But when appeared to them a spirit mighty
That blazed, a fiery pillar in the dark,
And went by day like a cloud of dread whiteness
They were not scattered by untrodden pathways,
Nor fell as captives to the enemy.

How long, O Lord, how long that we must wander
How long that we must roam with yearning seeking
For our own country in our native land?
What sins have we committed 'gainst the Spirit,
That He His mighty Testament has broken,
That Testament, taken in the war of freedom?

Well then, complete this treachery, and finish,
And strike us, scatter us all the world over,
Then maybe sorrow for our native country
Will teach us, rightly, where and how to seek.
Then father to his son will teach the story
About his silver dreaming for the distance,
And say "Behold the land of thine own people!
Struggle and strive for the land of thy fathers
For else we are all doomed to perish, exiled
Far among stranger-peoples in dishonour."

And maybe a new Testament will be granted
The Spirit write new Tables of Commandments.

But as for now How are we to go seeking
The land of our own people? Who has smitten
Our heart's Commandments, Spirit's Testament?
When shall this great Captivity find ending
That holds us prisoners in the Promised Land?
How long this Egypt in our native country?
O when shall perish this new Babylon?

Translated by Vera Rich

THE TRIAL OF VALENTYN MOROZ

A 14-year sentence for expression of opinions



VALENTYN MOROZ, a Ukrainian teacher of history, has been sentenced altogether to 14 years imprisonment for daring to speak up against the present terror regime in the USSR and to expose Moscow's Russification policy.

This cruel and barbarous sentence flies in the face of the UN General Declaration of Human Rights which guarantees to each individual the right to voice freely his opinions (Art. 19).

The mock trial of Valentyn Moroz is typical of Soviet "justice." He is only one from among thousands convicted to long terms in prisons and concentration camps for attempting to voice their honestly held opinions. Even today there are still 500,000 political prisoners in Russian jails and forced labour camps, and the majority of them are Ukrainians.

HOW THE TRIAL OF MOROZ WAS PREPARED

(Information from the *Ukrains'kyi Visnyk*, No .3, unofficial journal, published clandestinely in Soviet Ukraine)

On June 1, 1970, the KGB again arrested the Ukrainian public figure, historian and writer, Valentyn Moroz, in Ivano- Frankivsk.

Valentyn Yakovych Moroz was born on April 15, 1936 in the village of Kholoniv, Horokhiv district, Volyn region of Ukraine, in a peasant family. After completing his secondary education he took a degree from the Faculty of History, University of Lviv in 1958. Later he worked as a teacher in his native district and afterwards taught history at the Lutsk and Ivano-Frankivsk teacher's training colleges. He was also carrying on research for M.A. thesis on the revolutionary

struggle of workers and peasants in Western Ukraine against the Polish bourgeois regime [before 1939].

On September 1, 1965, Valentyn Moroz was arrested at Ivano-Frankivsk and sent for preliminary investigation to Lutsk. He was charged with "anti-Soviet propaganda and agitation aimed at subverting or weakening the Soviet regime" (Art. 62, § 1, of the Criminal Code of the Ukrainian SSR) for reading and distributing unofficially published articles and foreign publications (the book by I. Kosheli-vets, *The Present-day Literature in the Ukrainian SSR*, the articles, "Concerning the Trial of Pogruzhal'skiy", "The Answer by Vasyl Symonenko's Mother", and others). Disoriented by the unexpected arrest and investigation methods, V. Moroz confirmed the testimonies by a number of people and partly admitted committing an offence by his actions. But he did not give up his views and at a trial in Lutsk in January, 1966 (his trial was open), he defended them. He was sentenced to four years of imprisonment in hard labour camps and sent to Mordovia. During his imprisonment he actively protested against his conviction and sentence and against the actions on the part of the prison camp authorities and was punished for it several times. Moroz spent only several months as ordinary prisoner in the concentration camp. The rest of the time he spent in penal cells, strict regime barracks (BURs) and prisons.

During imprisonment Valentyn Moroz finally formed his system of views. This is reflected in his publicistic work *Reportage from Beria Reserve* (dated 15th April, 1967) [which was smuggled out of the camp and was copied many times in Ukrainian and Russian clandestine publications.]

In autumn 1967 V. Moroz was transferred from Vladimir prison (near Moscow) to investigation prison of the KGB of the Ukrainian Republic in Kiev where he was kept for a time as witness in the case of V. Chornovil, and later as accused for preparing and disseminating the *Reportage*. V. Moroz fully boycotted the investigation which lasted more than a year and was closed at the beginning of 1969 owing to lack of evidence regarding his authorship. V. Moroz was then sent back to Vladimir prison from where he was released on September 1. 1969.

After the release and until his new arrest, V. Moroz was all the time unemployed. He made attempts to find a job (as an apprentice wood-carver, meteorological assistant, etc.), but obstacles were always put in his path. He was permitted only to work as building worker which he refused.

From his very first days at liberty, V. Moroz actively joined in the public life. He wrote three publicistic works ("Moses and Dathan",*

*) A negative personage from I. Franko's poem "Moses" (1905). Dathan leads a rebellion against Moses and tries to persuade the Jewish people to return to Egypt under the rule of the pharaohs.

"The Chronicle of Resistance" and "Among the Snows") in which he touched on the acute problems of the national existence of the Ukrainian people and national ethics.

Valentyn Moroz's articles written in a talented manner and dealing with crucial problems became popular and called forth lively, and sometimes sharp polemics among the Ukrainian intellectual circles (especially his article "Among the Snows" written on the occasion of I. Dzyuba's letter [of contrition] to the Presidium of the Union of Writers of Ukraine). Prior to his second arrest V. Moroz started to work on a big article about the national outlook of [the famous 19th century Ukrainian woman writer and poet] Lesya Ukraïнка (on the occasion of her 100th birthday).

In April, 1970, during Easter holidays, a provocation was staged involving V. Moroz in the village of Kosmach in the Hutsul area of Ukrainian Carpathians. Apparently following the instructions from above, local authority representatives wanted to arrest V. Moroz merely because he recorded the traditional Easter [or Spring] songs (*hailky*), but the inhabitants of Kosmach prevented the arrest.

As soon as Valentyn Moroz returned from the Hutsul area, a group of KGB functionaries from Ivano-Frankivsk regional HQ (Major Baranov, Capt. Pryhornytskyi, Capt. Basystyi, Sen. Lt. Ostrolutskyi) came to his room at the hostel belonging to the Teachers' Training College where he lived with his family, and carried out a search. They took away many old books (all of them he had in his room during three previous searches in 1965, 1967 and 1968, but they had not been impounded then), letters, notebooks, work diaries with various quotations and rough notes (most of them from the period of imprisonment, already checked by the KGB of the Ukrainian Republic), as well as tape recordings of folklore material.

During the search one copy each of the typescripts of V. Moroz's articles, "The Chronicle of Resistance" and "Among the Snows", as well as a number of letters or brief notes privately passed to V. Moroz where his articles had been mentioned, were also taken away. As became clear only later, a case against V. Moroz had already been initiated at that time, although Moroz himself was unaware of it.

In the middle of May, a search was carried out at the home of the Rev. Vasyl Romaniuk, the parish priest of Kosmach, in connection with V. Moroz's case. Note-books with various occasional notes and a great number of items of religious literature (mostly published prior to the Revolution) were taken away from him and have not been returned yet. Nothing relating to V. Moroz was found at Rev. Romaniuk's.

On June 1, 1970, Valentyn Moroz received the summons to appear at the regional office of the KGB where he was arrested. This happened exactly nine months after his release.

Simultaneously with the arrest of Moroz, on June 1, searches were carried out in Kiev, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, and Ivano-Frankivsk region, at the residences of former political prisoners: Lyubov LEMYK (Ivano-Frankivsk), Oksana MESHKO (Kiev), Iryna SENYK (Ivano-Frankivsk), Vyacheslav CHORNOVIL (Lviv). Searches were also made at little town of Yaremche in the Hutsul area, at the homes of Moroz's acquaintances, where Moroz sometimes stayed during holidays, as well as at the house of the parents of the literary critic Volodymyr IVANYSHYN in the Rozhnativ district (Ivano-Frankivsk region). Another search was carried out at V. Moroz's room, and all notes made during the month since the first search (especially the notes relating to the article about Lesya Ukraïnka) were taken away.

In Kiev and Lviv the KGB men behaved reasonably politely during the searches, but in Ivano-Frankivsk, where former members of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists movement were searched, they behaved in a rough manner, made use of threats and swear-words. For instance, the KGB men, Andrusiv and Zavhorodniy, who carried out a search at Lyubov Lemyk's house, used bad language (particularly Zavhorodniy), addressed her in a rude manner, and even carried out a body search, having completely undressed Lyubov Lemyk, her sister Maria and her niece Daryna, as well as completely strange person — Oksana Popovych, who accidentally came to see L. Lemyk, during the search. The brutal procedure of the body search was carried out with professional skill by a certain Anastasia Lavrentyeva [a Russian woman — Translator's note.] brought specially by the KGB men.

The KGB men behaved in a similarly brutal manner at Iryna SENYK's home.

During the searches, old editions of books, notebooks, manuscript notes, typescript material of a completely neutral character (poems, language and literary study articles, etc.), were taken away, and at V. Chornovil's even an old ikon has been impounded. Nothing forbidden, no article by Moroz, or anything relating to Moroz's case was discovered at the premises of those searched (papers and other belongings or a part of them have already been returned to some of them).

A few days after Valentyn Moroz's arrest it became known that he was charged under Art. 62, § 2 of the Criminal Code of the Ukrainian SSR which envisages a term of imprisonment from three to ten years. The case was conducted by the investigating officer of the Ivano-Frankivsk region KGB, Baranov [a Russian — Translator], assisted by the investigating officer Pryhornytskyi. Baranov is known as an old hand in the KGB where he was serving still in Beria's times. In 1949, for instance, he conducted a case of a group of students of the Polytechnical Institute in Lviv and of teen-age pupils from Zolochiv district in Lviv region. They had been accused of attempting to carry

on anti-Soviet propaganda. On the basis of the investigation carried out by him, the three-man OSO (Special Conference) sentenced the students to 25 years imprisonment each, and the teen-age pupils — to 10 years each.

In 1965-1966, Baranov conducted the case of the painter Panas Zalyvakha who was subsequently sentenced under Art. 62 (anti-Soviet propaganda) to 5 years' imprisonment. Considering the "crime" uncovered by the investigation, the sentence given to P. Zalyvakha is regarded as exceedingly cruel even compared to the then similar sentences. Baranov was also one of the investigating officers who conducted the case of the Ukrainian National Front in 1967 which also ended with very severe sentences (from 6 to 15 years imprisonment).

The indictment against V. Moroz originally made much of the articles, "Moses and Dathan", "The Chronicle of Resistance" and "Among the Snows", as well as the humoristic story "I Saw Mohammed", whose authorship has been ascribed to Moroz by the KGB without sufficient evidence. But in so far as the above mentioned articles could hardly be termed anti-Soviet and sufficient proofs as to their "dissemination" could not be collected, the KGB went for a very doubtful — from the legal point of view — as well as inhuman and cruel step — from the ethical point of view.

Having no fresh incriminating material or testimonies regarding the "Reportage from Beria Reserve" at their disposal, the KGB nevertheless arranged for the annulment of their own decision about the closing of the case in connection with which Moroz had been charged for having written the "Reportage...", adopted in Spring of 1969. It appears that the KGB thus smacked itself in the face and gave its signature under the fact that it did not recognise any guarantees of justice and inviolability of person. Consequently, it seems that it would have been perhaps "more humane" and "more decent" to convict Moroz for his "Reportage..." in 1969 than to close his case then, to lure the man by short-lived liberty — and then to throw him again behind bars on the identical charge. Some people connect this decision with the change of the boss of the KGB in the Ukrainian SSR (instead of Col.-Gen. Nikitchenko, dismissed in the summer of 1970, there came Fedorchuk).

About 30 people were questioned in connection with Valentyn Moroz's case. Testimonies by Volodymyr Ivanyshyn and O. Meshko (Kiev), O. Antoniv and Sheremetyeva (Lviv), D. Vozniak, L. Volyzniuk, L. Lemyk, R. Moroz [Valentyn's wife], O. Popovych, I. Senyk (Ivano-Frankivsk), B. Bobyak and Rev. V. Romaniuk (Kosmach) and a number of other persons have been more or less similar. All of them denied ever having read Moroz's articles or having heard about them. O. Antoniv, R. Moroz and L. Sheremetyeva who, apart from

that, were again questioned about the "Reportage...", stated that they could not give any new testimonies in addition to those given in 1968.

Testimonies by B. Antonenko-Davydovych, A. Hors'ka, M. Plakhotniuk, Yevhen Sverstiuk (all from Kiev) and V. Chornovil (Lviv) whose letters or notes had been taken away from V. Moroz, as well as by Ivan Dzyuba, to whom the article "Among the Snows" had been addressed were somewhat different. The painter Alla Horska stated that lines from her postcard mentioning "the flower among the snows" had been incorrectly interpreted, because they did not mean that she was acquainted with the article, "Among the Snows." Similarly, medical doctor Mykola Plakhotniuk denied any knowledge of Moroz's articles, having stated that he used several general phrases about these articles in order not to offend the author's vanity by admitting to Moroz that he had not read his articles. Vyacheslav Chornovil explained his letter in a similar way. He, too, refused to give any new testimonies about the "Reportage..." referring to the veracity of his statements in 1968-69. For several months before V. Chornovil refused to give any testimony at all until his papers and effects unlawfully taken away from him during the search were returned to him.

Only the critic Ivan Dzyuba and the writer Borys Antonenko-Davydovych confirmed that they were acquainted with some articles by Moroz. I. Dzyuba testified that V. Moroz gave him his article "Among the Snows", because that article had been written on the occasion of I. Dzyuba statement and was in fact addressed to him. B. Antonenko-Davydovych testified that V. Moroz gave him to read the unfinished article "Among the Snows" and "Moses and Dathan" and asked the writer to express his opinion which he did in a letter to Moroz.

It is noteworthy that all those questioned denied that Moroz's articles or conversations had anti-Soviet bias. V. Chornovil, in particular, insisted that his own statement on this matter be included in the record of the questioning, which was done. B. Antonenko-Davydovych, although viewing Moroz's ideas as mistaken, nonetheless denied that they were anti-Soviet. He also protested against the attempt to interpret the fact that Moroz turned to him for literary advice as a fact of "dissemination." None of the questioned persons admitted that he had read or even heard about the work "I Saw Mohammed."

Thus the investigation which ended in the middle of October 1970 failed to assemble any fresh evidence that V. Moroz was the author of the "Reportage from Beria Reserve" and in fact did not prove that he was the author of the humoristic story "I Saw Mohammed" either. It is not clear how the investigation has managed to prove that the article "Moses and Dathan", "The Chronicle of Resistance" and

"Among the Snows" had anti-Soviet bias. The fact that V. Moroz showed two articles which in one way or another touched on the literary process, to two members of the Union of Writers of Ukraine — is an absolutely insufficient ground to assert that it amounted to "dissemination" of his articles by him personally. Nevertheless, without even having collected some formally sufficient evidence of guilt, the KGB found it possible to hand over his case to the court.

It is known that Valentyn Moroz behaved steadfastly, in a manly and dignified manner at the trial. Immediately after his arrest he demanded that the investigation be transferred from Ivano-Frankivsk, basing his demand on the lack of competence and prejudice against him on the part of Ivano-Frankivsk KGB personnel. His demand was not satisfied. Then V. Moroz refused to take any part in the investigation. He departed from this principle only when B. Antonenko-Davydovych's testimony was read to him. Having denied the latter he nevertheless did not sign the record of the questioning. There was a confrontation arranged afterwards, during which V. Moroz again denied that he gave his articles to Antonenko-Davydovych personally. V. Moroz did not sign the record of the confrontation.

It is known that during the investigation V. Moroz wrote a letter to P. Yu. Shelest, in which he stated that his arrest was without any grounds, that it was the expression of powerless anger of the reactionary forces of society doomed to collapse. The letter was written in a sharp and principled manner without any requests to lighten his personal lot.

The "case" of Valentyn Moroz has now been handed over to the regional court. The date of the trial is not yet known. Moscow barrister Kohan (who conducted Sinyavsky's case in 1966) will defend V. Moroz. At first the well-known barrister V. B. Romm agreed to defend Moroz, but soon afterwards he was forbidden to hold brief at any political trials.

Ukrains'kyi Visnyk (Ukrainian Herald),
No. 3, October, 1970.

FUTHER DETAILS ABOUT THE TRIALS

The *Chronicle of Current Events*, No. 17 (31 December 1970), published clandestinely in Moscow, brings further details about the trial of Valentyn Moroz, the Ukrainian history teacher, now aged 35, about which we reported in the *Ukrainian Review*, No. 4 (1970).

Valentyn Moroz was arrested at his home in Ivano-Frankivsk (in Ukraine [60 miles SE of Lviv]) on 1 June 1970. The charge was brought under article 62 of the Criminal Code of the Ukrainian SSR (equivalent to article 70 of the Russian Code).

The case of V. Moroz was heard behind closed doors on 17-18 November 1970 by the Ivano-Frankivsk Regional Court. The prosecutor was the Regional Assistant Procurator Horod'ko, defence counsel was E. M. Kogan (Moscow).

A few days before the trial twelve inhabitants of Lviv asked the chairman of the court to admit them to the trial. Two days later many of them were warned at their place of work that if they went to the trial they would be dismissed. Opanas Zalyvakha was reminded by the police that he was under surveillance, and was forbidden to attend the trial. Nevertheless people came to the trial from various towns. They were not admitted to the court-room.

I. Dzyuba (Kyiv), B. D. Antonenko-Davydovych (Kyiv), V. Chornovil (Lviv) and V. V. Bobyak (Kosiv) (the latter had not previously known Moroz), were summoned by the court as witnesses.

The witnesses and the accused refused to give evidence at a trial held behind closed doors, which they regarded as unlawful. Antonenko-Davydovych, citing the works of Lenin, declared that the trial was anti-Soviet. He added that he himself had twice been tried behind closed doors, that both sentences had much later been annulled by the Supreme Court as unlawful, and that he, Antonenko-Davydovych, had no wish to take part in a case for which he might later be convicted.

Witnesses Dzyuba, Chornovil and Antonenko-Davydovych stated that they would give evidence only at a public trial, if such a trial were to be held. Despite a protest by the defence counsel, the court resolved to hear the evidence given by the witnesses during the pre-trial investigation.

During the pre-trial investigation the writer B. D. Antonenko-Davydovych had testified that the discovery at his home of a draft of an article by Moroz proved only that he (Moroz) had gone to an older, more experienced writer for advice, but not that the documents mentioned in the charge had been circulated. Neither did the discovery in Dzyuba's possession of the article "Among the Snows" prove that it had been circulated, since it was addressed to him. In addition Dzyuba insisted that "Among the Snows" was the personal affair of two people — the author and the addressee. (Moroz's article "Among the Snows" was written a propos of I. Dzyuba's statement in the newspaper *Literaturna Ukraïna* of 6 January 1970.

The Procurator demanded for Moroz ten years' imprisonment and five years exile. Defence counsel asked the court to change the basis of the charge to article 187 — 1 of the Criminal Code of the Ukrainian SSR (equivalent to article 190-1 of the Criminal Code of the Russian SFSR).

The court sentenced V. Moroz to nine years' confinement (six years in prison and three years in special-regime camps) and to five years' exile (V. Moroz was judged to be especially dangerous recidivist).

During the delivery of the sentence, party secretaries, directors of local establishments and officials of the KGB were present in court; of all the relatives and friends of the accused only his wife and father were admitted.

The witnesses submitted a protest to the appeal court.

Ukrains'kyi visnyk, No. 3 (October 1970), the clandestine publication appearing since Jan. 1970 in Ukraine, carries the following report:

"V. Moroz spent the night from 17th to 18th November, 1970, on the premises of the court. It seems that there were fears that attempts might be made to rescue him or to stage an ovation when he would be led out of the court-house... Valentyn Moroz was brought to the court-house under escort armed with automatic weapons. He turned to people who stood in front of the court-house with both arms raised and with clinched fists, which reminded one of Shevchenko's figure from the well-known picture by Opanas Zalyvakha.

The trial was accompanied with unheard-of in recent years in Ukraine security measures. Almost all the Ukrainians of Ivano-Frankivsk and Lviv, who were in the least likely to organise some sort of counter-action were put under the surveillance of secret police informers. Apart from maximum readiness of all the local security cadres, a great number of them arrived from other cities during these days, so that any possible opposition could be crushed in a quick operation.

Even before the trial KGB officials warned individual people that if they do not wish to be dismissed from their jobs they should not come near the doors of the court-house. The majority nevertheless elected to come to the court-house (e. g. Hrytsko Chubay, Opanas Zalyvakha).

Many leading people in Lviv and Ivano-Frankivsk responded to this trial behind closed doors with a great number of individual and group protests addressed to the appropriate government organs.

Apart from this response to the imprisonment of V. Moroz, there were other gestures, too. Two well-known Lviv poets (Ihor Kalynets and Hrytsko Chubay) devoted their new collections of poems to V. Moroz.

Valentyn himself was in good spirits (at least he made such an impression) and said that he was confident that changes would come as a result of which he would not have to spend full 9 years in those places to which he had been condemned by the laws of the "most democratic constitution" and of the "most progressive country in the world"...

Many witnesses were called to V. Moroz's trial, among them the well-known writer Borys Antonenko-Davydovych, Ivan Dzyuba, Vyacheslav Chornovil, who refused to give any testimonies."

“ I AM ANXIOUSLY WAITING ... ”

OPEN LETTER

To Chairman of the KGB (Committee of State Security) at the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR, comrade Fedorchuk.

From day to day I am anxiously waiting for the end of the investigation and trial of my husband, MOROZ Valentyn Yakovych, charged under Art. 62, § 2 of the Criminal Code of the Ukrainian SSR for “anti-Soviet propaganda and agitation.” While it is still not too late I beg you to intervene in Moroz’s case and, setting aside any prejudice, to consider well who will benefit from this trial. Will the condemnation of a person for openly expressed convictions, even if differing in many points from yours, contribute in any way to the strengthening of the prestige of our society, the prestige of socialist democracy?

I am wife and mother, you may consider my opinions biased. Therefore I do not express them. But I know that my husband’s arrest did not occur unnoticed. As Moroz’s wife I have been informed about a series of collective and individual statements in his defence addressed to various official bodies. It is likely that there have been more of them but I do not know about all of them. It means that a section of the society who signed the protests (for these people do not live in isolation and express not only their own opinions) regard Valentyn’s arrest illegal and even harmful to the moral sanity of our society. Is it worthwhile to throw away their opinion from the scales of consideration?

Finally, I have been greatly alarmed by the fact that the investigating officer of the Ivano-Frankivsk regional HQ of the KGB, having failed to find, of course, anything anti-Soviet in Valentyn’s articles written since his release, has again included in the indictment the “Reportage from Beria Reserve...”. After all Moroz has already been under investigation for a period of more than a year regarding the authorship and dissemination of this work. His case was then conducted by the investigation department of the Ukrainian Republic HQ of the KGB and at the beginning of 1969 found it possible to discontinue the investigation. At present, however, although the investigating organs of the KGB do not have any new evidence about the “Reportage...”, they — as has been stated to me — have included this work into the indictment. Can this not prompt in every thinking person the thought that there exist no permanent guarantees of justice and legality in our country, and that a man’s fate depends only on what trends take the upper hand at the given moment among these or those leading or investigating circles, or even on changes in the personnel of the functionaries of those organisations?

Are you also aware of the fact that foreign propaganda has already been utilising the very fact of Valentyn's arrest, and, without doubt, will utilise the fact of his condemnation to an incomparably greater extent? Or, perhaps, my husband will also be blamed for that and this will be taken as a reason for dealing with him more severely?

For four long years I waited with our small son for my husband and his father to come back from imprisonment the grounds for which still seem questionable to many people. And we were able to spend only nine months together. If one takes into account the article of the Criminal Code under which Valentyn is charged, long years of separation await us again, and prolonged physical and mental tortures wait for Valentyn.

Is this all really necessary for building the most just and the most humane society in the world?

In view of the fact that statements in defence of my husband have been addressed to various official bodies and may be unknown to you, I have decided to collect at least a part of them and to send them to you.

Again and again I appeal to your objectivity, justice and humaneness.

Raisa Moroz
wife and mother

8th October, 1970.
The city of Ivano-Frankivsk,
14 Naberezhna Street, Flat 85.

Ukrains'kyi visnyk
(No. 3, October, 1970).

BEDRYLO'S SENTENCE CUT

On 3 February 1970 the Supreme Court of the Ukrainian Republic declared its verdict on the appeal of *Bedrylo*, an agricultural economist from Lviv. The court met in closed session — even the mother of the accused was refused admission. *Bedrylo* was accused of distributing an appeal by seven Ukrainian writers sentenced earlier and a leaflet about the self-immolation of *Makukh*. The Supreme Court in its verdict removed the first point from the charge (anti-Soviet conversations) and sentenced *Bedrylo* to two years' imprisonment under article 62 of the Criminal Code of the Ukrainian SSR, thus reducing the original sentence — four years — by half. The charges were based on the testimony of *Bohdan Chaban*, from whom was taken a considerable amount of self-published material when his flat was searched (*Chaban* himself showed where it was kept). *B. Chaban* was released from arrest before the trial.

(*Chronicle of Current Events*, No. 12, 28th February, 1970).

Valentyn MOROZ

AMONG THE SNOWS

Translator's note. The polemic essay "Among the Snows" published below is circulating in manuscript form in Ukraine as one of the documents of clandestine literature. Valentyn Moroz is reputed to be its author. The clandestine *Chronicle of Current Events* published in Russian, No. 14 from 30th June, 1970, mentions "Among the Snows" among other writings by V. Moroz.

"Among the Snows" reflects the broad discussion which is carried on within circles of Ukrainian patriots in Ukraine about the contents, character and tactics of self-defence of the Ukrainian nation against the pressure of Russification and the gross violation of the natural right of Ukrainians to be masters in their own land. The immediate stimulus for writing this essay was provided, evidently, by Ivan Dzyuba's statement made at the sitting of the Presidium of the Union of Writers of Ukraine in Kyiv on December 26, 1969, which was published in the newspaper *Literaturna Ukraïna* on 6th January, 1970. As is known, Ivan Dzyuba made his statement under pressure after the wide dissemination of his work *Internationalism or Russification?* in the West.

March 1953. Moscow.

Crowds of sobbing people tightly pressed together, everybody is squeezed... Everyone presses on to get to the bier of the dead Leader. Scores of suffocated people and those trampled underfoot...

Many a foreigner, casual witness of the "nation-wide grief", was thinking: surely, it will take a hundred years before this fanaticism evaporates. But one did not have to wait very long. Three years later, the Leader (dead!) was put in the pillory and proclaimed a criminal. And... nobody breathed a word against. Of course, some people expressed their indignation, but privately... No one burned himself, no one even cut off his little finger. Where were all the fanatics — those who recently pressed on to get near to the sacred bier? There were none, it appears. There were only sleepy jades which did not even notice that they had been turned around and were being driven in a different direction. It became clear that the fanaticism was a *tickled* out one. It is easy to distinguish between false and genuine diamonds nowadays. It is more difficult to distinguish between genuine and *tickled* out emotions. By tickling oneself one can provoke not only artificial laughter. In the same way artificial tragicallness or fanaticism can be provoked. The greatest secret of the Stalinist

epoch consisted in that, despite the "tremendous pledges" of "loyalty" and "faithfulness", "readiness", it had nothing except the nihilist — the man who does not believe in anything. That meant that the jades thought they were really loyal, "faithful", "ready." They convinced themselves of it (it is easiest to convince oneself). But these were all tickled out feelings.

One cannot issue banknotes endlessly because they will become valueless. One cannot endlessly stuff a human head with words — because its result will be a similar devaluation. Devaluation of the word is the main moral problem which the Stalinist period has left behind. Epithets of the superior and superlative degrees, exclamation marks, appeals and summons — all this reached such a pitch of concentration that any real criteria disappeared. A huge air balloon, inflated to the limit, bearing boisterous slogans, left the earth and drifted away. And the leader himself did not know already where he would find himself and what winds were carrying him.

No one believed in any reality — neither in the reality of the obligations accepted by the collective farm brigade manager, nor in the reality of the evaluation given by a critic to a newly published poem. There came into being two worlds — finally differentiated from one another. The first consisted of week-days, where people breathed not only without heroism, but even without elementary honesty. And there was another world — the world of cinema and books, where Young Guardists¹ used to sing arias in front of the coal mine into which they were to be thrown down any minute [by the Germans]. The Young Guardists — as everything else which appeared in this inflated, unreal world — also had to become unreal.

No one said this loudly, but doubts gnawed all the time: Maybe all this is the same kind of "eye-wash" as the figure of yield in a collective farm, as the percentage of success in school exams, as the number of lectures organised by the "Knowledge" Society. "Sharks do not exist" — this logic of the excessively sober boy from Chukovsky's book became a tacit creed. A philistine very much liked to enjoy sensations of the kind that "Oleh Koshovyi² (did you hear that?) was not killed after all, but lives in West Germany, and that altogether all this is a pack of lies."

Devaluation of the word resulted in a terrible devaluation of all notions. Aim, ideal, heroism, heroic feat — all found themselves in the category of fancied notions. Firmly separated by his nihilism from anything spiritual, the "working man" threw everything overboard. Tychyna³ was known only as a poet who "writes in verse, each time worse." What could one say about Tychyna's genius in conditions when no one took the very notion of genius seriously, when the mark of genius was associated with Demyan Byednyy,⁴ when it was pinned to the trousers of any commissar.

For Ukraine — the tragedy was double — as was the case with all the “nationals” (i. e. non-Russians) of the Soviet Union. For such concepts as nation, patriotism, native language, Motherland, also found themselves in the register of the “fancied”, “bookish” fictions. A person who did not believe in anything was bound to become indifferent to Ukraine, too.

And so to this cold, burnt out place, from where even the ashes had been swept away by the wind long ago, there came the poets of the sixties — “Symonenko’s⁵ generation.” Not everything was of value and profound in their first works. Nevertheless their arrival was an epoch. For they restored the lost weight to words and concepts, they compelled people again to believe in the reality of the spiritual world. Theirs was a genuine feat: in an atmosphere of total loss of faith to believe in something. And to kindle the faith in others.

“And people are waiting for nothing else so much as for a living example of heroic civic conduct. People need this example not because without it they cannot imagine genuine civic action, but because they need certainty that even today such heroic action is possible, that even today it is not fruitless.”

These words by Dzyuba⁶ about Symonenko’s significance is in fact the evaluation of the role of the “poets of the sixties” as a whole. Each epoch had such awakeners who revived words and concepts after devaluation, gave them living contents again. Moral stupor was caused not only by the “cults” such as that of Stalin. It comes periodically when spirituality becomes senile, exhausts itself and gets covered with a hard crust. It happened so with the late Rome in which the sum of the old moral precepts, based on the worship of Venus and Jupiter, ceased to be obligatory, became formal, in which there was no longer a Mucius Scevola who calmly put his hand into fire.

Rome was renovated by Christians. What gave the strength to the illiterate Christian with his naïve preachings to overcome the Roman philosopher burdened with the load of Greek and pre-Greek wisdom? Maybe the Christian preacher knew something which was not known to the Roman philosopher? No, there was something quite different. The philosopher knew more than the Christian preacher. And in general: the essential difference is not what one knows and what the other one does not know. The essence of the matter consists in the degree of emotionality with which a person looks at this or that truth. One man simply knows it. Another lives by it. For one man this truth is simply information, knowledge. For another — it is a revelation without which life loses all meaning. A verity warmed in one’s soul to a certain “degree” becomes a value. Knowledge becomes faith. And only then a man begins to live. Lesya Ukraïinka termed this psychological state *oderzhymist’* (infatuation).

Infatuation is not artisticity. Nor scientificism. Nor even publicistic fervour. Infatuation is a completely different substance, along with others a necessary component for fully valued spiritual life. One can have wonderful ores but they will never become transformed into an alloy, will not become alive without the necessary temperature in an oven. One can have great spiritual values — but they will simply pass unnoticed as long as an infatuated person will not take hold of them and will not melt them in the hearth of his infatuation. The Finnish public in general did not realise what they possessed until Lönnroth collected the epic poem *Kalevala* and showed everyone what it was all about. There was Tychyna and there were his verses of genius — but even with such a treasure in his hands he was not strong enough to make Ukrainians even out of those nearest to him, to bring them up so that they would speak Ukrainian. What was lacking? No spark of infatuation remained still on the cold open field covered with Siberian snows, none of those sparks which once used to fly in golden waterfalls and kindled the fire of the Ukrainian renaissance of the 1920s. But Symonenko or Vinhranovs'kyi⁷ awakened the sleeping Ukrainian soul in people and made them alive again.

This was precisely the mission of the “poets of the sixties” — to carry a spark of infatuation into the frozen Ukrainian reality. Without it even Shevchenko was powerless. People used to read him but did not notice...

A tiny group of people in Kyïv scattered sparks all over Ukraine and where these fell — the age-old ice of indifference and nihilism thawed immediately. Their every word burned with infatuation, fanatical hatred towards the cold and slimy, with fanatical desire to speed up the end of the ice age in Ukraine.

You — loudmouths, haughty and fat-bodied,
Bribe-takers, stuffed with grease,
Who bow before a crayfish,
And march to meetings in formation.

You — potbellied monks without faith,
You — speculators with slimy tails,
You — thick-skinned kettle-drums
Pinned on ideological bones.

And the main thing was that the avalanche could not be halted. All that was put up against those people was built from ice — and ice instantaneously thawed from their sparks. The greatest surprise of the past decade was that the arrests of 1965 did not slow down, but rather speeded up the present-day Ukrainian rebirth. The era of the Great Terror has passed. The arrests did not frighten, but awakened tremendous interest — not only in Ukraine, but in the entire world. To apply reprisals against some people in the present-day conditions has meant to create an aureole for him, to make him a martyr

(irrespective of the fact whether this person suffered in actual fact or not).

This was a miscalculation . . . and they began to correct the mistake immediately. Ivan Svitlychnyi was released from prison although he was regarded as the "principal instigator." The tactics was changed continuously. Intimidation did not work? — this meant that it was necessary to compromise and disappoint people. The first achievement in this direction was I. Drach's article in *Literaturna Ukraïna*. It was necessary to force Drach⁸ to clean Poltoratsky's⁹ boots in public. This could be done by anyone, there was no shortage of candidates, but they wanted precisely Drach or someone from his circle to do it. *It was necessary to kill the legend about the poets of the sixties* — qualitatively a new kind of people, to show that there was nothing new in them, that Drach can write the same lampoons about "nationalists" as can Taras Myhal.¹⁰ It was necessary to kill faith, enthusiasm, to extinguish the spark of infatuation and to turn people back again into a state of jaundiced nihilism. It was necessary to rob people of the example which warmed them and to convince them that their god was no god at all but a stage prop. Ivan Dzyuba announced a boycott of Drach after this article in *Literaturna Ukraïna*. The *infatuated one* could not do otherwise.

Now I recall this fact, reading Dzyuba's statement in the same *Literaturna Ukraïna*. The same foul language borrowed from the vocabulary of Poltoratsky fellows ("provocative hallucinations", "politicomaniac waste of words"), the same anathema on "nationalists" . . . There is no doubt; the slimy-tailed ones can congratulate themselves on a new success.

I have read the arguments advanced by Dzyuba, and also listened to the defenders of his statement. I listened and wondered: how petty and immaterial all this is . . . Among the reasons cited by the defenders of the statement are advanced the following ones: had Dzyuba not written his statement, his translation which is about to be published would have been banned from publication. His expulsion from the Union of Writers would have automatically resulted in him losing his job. Well, if these are serious reasons — then in such a case it is necessary to give up any plans whatsoever. Each step, each new work which contains any deviations from the canons of the poor Demyan, automatically results in smaller or greater unpleasantness. And who wishes to avoid it — has to fold his hands altogether and to do nothing.

The main sin which the defenders of Dzyuba's statement ascribe to us, its opponents, is *Don Quixotism*, absence of realism. Well, there is no need even to answer by their own arguments. One can take them from Dzyuba's speech made in 1965 when he still was of a different opinion about Don Quixots and the "realists":

"While they were magnanimous realists, knew well what was permissible and what was not, which cause was likely to win and which was not — at that time, in their period of commercial sobriety, Vasyl Symonenko was a hopeless Don Quixot, in Lesya Ukraïнка's words, he refused to admit the "historical gap" as a real gap and demanded something quite impossible: "Let Americas and Russias be quiet when I am talking with you" — and with whom he was talking [Ukraine — Transl.] was well known, and that was that; how impossible and hopeless was this all from the point of view of the learned and all-wise piglet."

"From the point of view of the learned and all-wise piglet" Dzyuba's speech at the ["Ukraïna"] cinema [in Kyïv] on September 4, 1965 was stark madness. It was the apogee of Don Quixotism: in the middle of a wave of arrests to come out with protests. "Commercial sobriety" dictated otherwise: sit still, stay silent and rejoice that not everyone has been apprehended. But "hopelessly Don Quixotic" Dzyuba was not satisfied with that even. He also published his book... and it became clear that this Don Quixotism produced greater results than the "realism" of all the all-wise piglets taken together. It so happens that flowers sown in the frost grow best. Those who, disregarding the weather, are weather for themselves, catch a cold least frequently. Here the paradox is purely external. The "realist" and the infatuated do not represent logic and illogicality themselves. They are simply representatives of *two types of logic*. The "realist" makes use of the short-legged earth-bound logic of the *present day*. But the point is precisely that the future is built in accordance with a different logic — the logic of *tomorrow's day*. And it can be discovered only by the infatuated. All discoveries, inventions, all that was new — was the handiwork of the Don Quixots. It is not always that the Don Quixots gropingly find a path into the future, sometimes they go astray. But it is not possible to get off the ground at all with the caution of the "all-wise piglets." Not all the flowers sown in the frost, grow. The majority of them die. But there is no other way. For the nation which for hundreds of years has been living through an ice age, in conditions of permanent winter, this is the only way out: "I shall sow flowers in the frost." And Ukraine herself is a flower — which has grown in the frost. Ukraine is the flower, breakstone. Ukrainian vitality is an a-logism, irreality, paradox, if one is to apply the logic of the "realists" — in the same way as the flowering of the edelweiss on the icy peaks. Ukraine lives thanks to a different logic the logic of infatuation. Only the infatuated one could be a Ukrainian in the conditions of Kyïv or Kharkiv in the 19th century when Ukraine was considered inexistent, buried. Only the infatuated one can be a Ukrainian in the same Kharkiv today when "all-wise piglets" are convinced that all the nations will soon be merged together into one and that there will no longer be a Ukraine in the next Seven Year Plan period. "Realists" in Ukraine never were Ukrainians,

they inescapably became Little Russians. Let us fear a "realist" like fire, if we want to be Ukrainians! From the point of view of the "realists" the Ukrainian cause has always been hopeless. Therefore it was always espoused by those who said to themselves: "to hope without hope", those who were not frightened by the "hopeless reality" and stubbornly followed their dream "like Israel followed the pillar of fire."

It has become a tradition among us to complain about our weakness. In actual fact Ukraine has shown a unique example of strength. Other nations in our conditions have long ago disappeared, became a Provence.* We on the other hand have stood fast. What other prohibited language has produced such a rich literature? The firmness of the Ukrainian character must be truly considerable if both the Russians and the Poles said independently from one another the same: "Upryam kak khakhol" and "Uparty jak rusin" [Stubborn like a Ukrainian — Transl.] This is the basis of the strange Ukrainian firmness to find strength and hope in oneself, to be independent of outside sources of strength and hope. The command of Hryhoriy Skovoroda — "search for everything in yourself" — comes back to life in a Ukrainian again and again. A Jehovah witness once asked Levko Lukyanenko¹¹ in the Mordovian concentration camp: "Are you sure that your Ukraine is eternal?" He answered: "No, I am not sure because one cannot have any certainty in such matters." The Jehovah witness roared with laughter and drew the conclusion: "So you do not even know what you are fighting for. But I know that we, Jehovah's witnesses, will gain eternal life. What do you know then?" Lukyanenko then said: "Even if I remained the only Ukrainian in the world — I would continue my fight for Ukraine." Ukrainian vitality has been upheld precisely by this logic for several centuries already. Ukrainians who would not love Ukraine are miserably few. Ukrainians who would wish Ukraine to disappear from the face of the earth are fewer still. People are being Russified not because they do not love Ukraine or do not want her to exist. People are being Russified because they have not enough strength to believe in Ukraine, to keep up their faith in the filthy atmosphere of Kharkiv or Odessa where "dressing up in the language as in a suit — is not a shame, not a horror, but a norm." They need an example. "And people are waiting for nothing so much as for a living example" . . .

Not everyone discovered something new for himself in Dzyuba's book *Internationalism or Russification?* Nevertheless this book has become an eye-opener for everyone. That it was necessary to fight

*) It is interesting that Lunacharsky called Provence "French Ukraine", wishing thus to stress similar conditions which fell to the destiny of the two peoples. In these conditions, Ukraine survived while Provence ceased to exist as a nation and fell back to the level of a French province. — (The Author's note.)

against Russification — everyone knew. But this was not enough. It was necessary to see a real person who really fought against Russification. A spark was needed to kindle the bonfire in a man which was ready there long ago. It is precisely in this that lies the meaning of Dzyuba and of other poets of the sixties, in that spark of infatuation which they brought into the frozen Ukrainian reality. It is precisely here that an answer should be sought to the question why even some comparatively minor facts and events of the sixties have awakened such a great interest and evoked such a loud resonance. People searched in Dzyuba's book not for arguments — they searched there for *faith, a charge of infatuation*. From outside it looks as if a person is first being persuaded and then he begins to believe. In actual fact it is precisely the opposite: at first a person catches fire, is infected with faith — and only then arguments are selected for the already held conviction. In order to believe, arguments will be found. Sometimes they are naïve — but this does not matter.

Let us look around: are there many conscious Ukrainians in the Russified, shattered Kyiv? To increase their number means to fight really against Russification. Without it our work loses all meaning. A Russified, ruined Ukrainian, a person without his own "I", stands before us. What will awaken his sleeping Ukrainian soul? Arguments. It has not happened yet that an apostle converted anyone by arguments to his faith. Rhetorics and eloquence are powerless in this case. Christian apostles had neither.

"Limited, narrow-minded, uneducated, without any experience in the matters of propaganda, Jesus's disciples were small men in the full sense of the word." "The language of the authors of the New Testament is poor to such an extent that each of them has his own small vocabulary", Renan writes about them (E. Renan, *The Apostles*).

And those uneducated people without experience made the Roman Empire Christian within a short period of time. The Apostles! The present-day Ukraine needs apostles, not well-fed opportunists — "realists" with their arguments! No spiritual revolution happens without the apostles. Nor is the present-day Ukrainian rebirth possible without them.

The meaning of such figures like Dzyuba lies in their apostolic burning. Without it they vanish, become nothing. For them to become cool means to die. Let us be afraid of losing the sacred flame of infatuation! For only arguments will remain then, the fat monograph will multiply, but all this will not awaken anyone. A cool sceptic with his rhetorics has never kindled anyone nor ever will. Dzyuba himself said best about it in 1965: "There are epochs when decisive battles are waged in the field of social morality, civic conduct, when even elementary human dignity, resisting brutal pressure, can become an important rebellious, revolutionary force. In our opinion

our epoch, too, belongs to such periods (...) This is why nothing else perhaps is of such an importance as the standard of civic conduct."

Yes, one's position is more important nowadays than *word*. Words are no longer believed — they have been terribly devalued. One's word must be strengthened by one's position. We live through an epoch when both Sverstyuk¹² and Shamota¹³ utter identical words about Shevchenko:¹⁴ both call him a genius. The difference between them is determined therefore not by a word but by their position.

A lecturer once happened to attend a conference where Dzyuba made a speech. "Well, how was it?" he was asked. "Well, that chap wanted to show off", answered the lecturer. The short-legged realist will never understand what is a position. And will sincerely take it either as a theatrical posture or, in the best case, as naïve Don Quixotism. Defenders of Dzyuba's statement tell us now: "Enough of theatrical postures. It is necessary to work." And argue how important it is for Dzyuba to be in the Union of Writers, for many people like Dzyuba to be there, and in general to capture "posts." Only they waste their powder in vain. Nobody has any intention to deny what they say. Of course, we should very much like such people as Dzyuba to take the upper hand. And not only in the Union of Writers.

It would be ridiculous to deny also the need for methodical everyday work. Yes, infatuation will not replace talent or industriousness — but without it both the former and the latter will remain a dead slab. Talents have existed always and everywhere — why then are there epochs of flourishing and epochs of greyness? Infatuation is not extremism and not explosivity. It is tickled out emotions that are more frequently explosive. The flame of infatuation burns evenly and calmly. It is not obligatory to immolate oneself. I, for instance, am more fascinated by the philosophy of Shveyk who said: a good soldier is not one who dies for Fatherland, but one who compels his enemy to die for his Fatherland. So that accusations of Don Quixotism and lack of practical sense are not addressed correctly. We are not against work — including the dirtiest one. There must be someone to make idiotic official speeches in order to have the possibility to do something for a good cause utilising his official position. There must be someone to write worthless jubilee poems in order to retain his post with the same purpose in mind. But must it be Dzyuba? Not only he must not, he has no right to be. There are at least three reasons for it.

First, there has never been a shortage of people who wanted to love Ukraine a little and to have a little comfort. There has never been any need to specially cultivate Pavlychko¹⁵ — he always grows himself. No one says that Pavlychko does not love Ukraine. Pavlychko sincerely loves Ukraine and wishes to do as much as possible for her — on condition that it will not be necessary to sacrifice comfort for it. He feels that he is on a weak ground, he is tortured by his conscience, but he knows wonderfully well how to deal with it. Pav-

lychko has convinced himself that he, too, is a great martyr, that he is persecuted, that they look askance at him etc. In general: the more a person is afraid, the more he tends to look on himself as on a great martyr. And it is true — for he who fears most, is tortured most. Of course, Pavlychko will never in his life admit even to himself that the reason for his behaviour is ordinary prosaic fear. No, he will invent for himself an entire theory. You see, he takes upon himself consciously such an ungrateful, unheroic role — in order to serve the cause. There is nothing new in it. It always happens like this: the pettier stimulus that directs a man's actions, the more grandiose and more romantic reasons he invents.

We know that Pavlychko will reply to it with a sceptical smile. But we know too that the source of this scepticism are fear and tiredness. Dzyuba once said best about such people, about people who hide behind "melodramatised scepticism into which they eagerly and "elaborately" escape from heavy civic responsibility, they escape out of idleness, they escape out of fear, and out of blindness; behind the miserable scepticism of philosophising slave who wants to deceive himself and pretends that he is so fascinated by the play in paradoxes that he fails to notice the yoke on his neck." It always happens like this: at first a man gets tired of maintaining a position, and then finds for it a "theoretical basis": what is it all needed for, after all this is no position at all allegedly, but a theatrical posture, and altogether it is time to finish with Don Quixotism.

The infatuated and the sceptic are eternal antipodes. A squeezed out, enfeebled sceptic always ascribes to a man with elastic muscles: Don Quixotism and lack of practical sense. Tired by the burden of his erudition, the Roman philosopher could produce any number of "irrefutable" arguments against a Christian neophyte, and from the point of view of short-legged practical sense he was right. Christians did not overturn the world and did not build God's Kingdom on earth. But by building it they resurrected the moribund spirituality. And their opponent, the sceptic, with his irrefutable arguments has forever remained dead.

On the other hand there are epochs when scepticism is the most valuable thing. This has to be admitted. These are epochs of mass psychosis, periods of tickled out fanaticism.

We are living in different times, however. What the present-day Ukraine has to fear most is precisely the sceptic. There is nothing to extinguish in Ukraine as yet — it is still necessary to kindle. So that Dzyuba has become "reasonable" and said farewell to Don Quixotism somewhat prematurely.

No, it is not necessary to build special glasshouses for the cultivation of Pavlychko. HE will cultivate himself quite simply, and moreover with self-service ease — that is he will convince himself and his near ones that he, too, is a martyr, that he, too, is a victim. Not that we propose to proclaim Pavlychko an absolutely negative figure.

Pavlychkism — is a complicated and contradictory phenomenon, it carries within itself both negative and positive contents. Pavlychko will do a lot for Ukraine — we have to recognise it. But this is beside the point. What matters is that there are always a hundred Pavlychkos for one Dzyuba. Therefore it is simply not reasonable to re-qualify Dzyuba into a Pavlychko — not only from the point of view of Don Quixots, but also from the point of view of all-wise piglets. There are too few people in Ukraine who have within them a spark of infatuation and are able to kindle others. And another point is that Pavlychkism is an attacking, aggressive phenomenon. Psychologists know it well: he who finds himself in a quagmire, always wishes (mostly subconsciously) to pull to himself one who stands on dry land. It is precisely this desire which is dangerous with the Pavlychkos. No one else but they have “inspired” Drach to write his article. Now they have “inspired” Dzyuba to produce his statement. It is namely the point that Dzyuba made a concession not to the *Kozachenkos*¹⁶ but to the *Pavlychkos*. It is easier to resist an external pressure. It is more difficult to fight against one who is corrupting from within. And Dzyuba has not proved himself to be up to it.

As we see, arguments taken from Dzyuba's speech are sufficient to justify the first reason. They are also sufficient to justify the second. A few words more from the same speech made in 1965:

“After all, the majority of young poets and literateurs started and are starting from not a worse level than Vasyl Symonenko, and quite certainly they did not have any less “spontaneous talent.” Thus many of them could have become such as became Symonenko, but only a few individuals equalled him. The others do not go up but down. How many talents have become petty, banal and declined in front of our eyes! What is the matter? (...) When a person speaks at full voice — his voice grows stronger. When he accustoms himself to speak in half-whisper — this half-whisper becomes his normal voice. Vasyl Symonenko spoke truth in a manly fashion, and the truth made him ever greater and greater. A poet needs space to apply his forces in order to multiply his forces. Who however narrows this space for himself, who does not use his forces, does not strain them to the limit and continually, his muscles unnoticeably become weaker, his strength declines, he becomes feeble. There is a medical term “idle heart”.”

How dangerous it is: to regulate one's voice so as not to be expelled from the Union of Writers.

How many “talents have become petty, banal and declined” already by relying on the logic: now I am writing for printing but the true thing will come later. Life has passed, however, and the true thing just did not appear!

No, we do not call for recklessness. It is not necessary to found “The Secret Union of Sword and Eagle.” Someone has to adapt his voice to the Union of Writers, and to the journal “Notebook of the

Agitator." Someone — but not Dzyuba. There are too few people like him in Ukraine. Endless hard times have given birth in Ukraine to a flat, one-dimensional person. If infatuation — then guerilla-like anarchist. If practicicism — then obligatorily a slavish one, without any principles. Let us be more profound at last. Let us learn to accomplish everyday, prosaic matters *without losing the pure flicker of infatuation*.

And, at last, the third reason. It so happens that the most weighty document of the present-day Ukrainian renaissance, its condensed expression, has become Dzyuba's book. The world now studies Ukraine "through Dzyuba." Dzyuba has become a symbol. He has become an example — and he himself said about the significance of an example. An idea is not enough. An idea is bare and dry as dust — what is needed is its living embodiment. The truth is known — what is needed is *faith*. The shabby Ukrainian fate has chosen Ivan Dzyuba. The shabby Ukrainian fate has placed upon his shoulders the *burden of the symbol*. And it is not dignified to hurl it underfoot. Dzyuba has written and said too much to carry now around written excuse to Kozachenko.

Dzyuba has forgotten about thousands upon thousands of people all over Ukraine for whom he has already become a god. O, I understand, I understand how ridiculous this sounds to some people "god", "symbol." For him who "elaborately escapes into scepticism" all this is "primitive." But let us remember: there are forty million of these "primitives"! They make up the Ukrainian nation. And as long as they are not awakened, as they are not unfrozen, — they will be generals *without an army*. I do not know, may be they are "primitive"! But I know firmly something else: *those who have a god are happy!* "No God — no people" — I heard these words first from a woman in Polissia region, and only later read in a work by a European philosopher. Dzyuba has become a god for people and they believed. His statement has breathed a frosty gust of nihilism on the third shoots of faith. One can hear the following said: "There was once a principled man in Ukraine — and even he has written a statement" [of renegation]. This was precisely what they wanted: that Dzyuba should poison the awakened faith and turn people again into a state of dead nihilism. Therefore his statement was immediately published in a great number of copies. Would it have seen daylight if it was to our advantage, if it was not compromising us? Would Kozachenko and Korniychuks¹⁷ have voted against his expulsion if he had not made a mistake? Let us not be naïve . . .

Well, let us suppose for a minute that the destiny of mankind depends on Dzyuba's stay in the Union of Writers and that for its sake one can sacrifice principles. It appears, however, that he did not achieve anything by having written his statement! It appears that his statement is being considered "merely as the first step", and his continued membership in the Union will depend on the second, third

and fourth... Has Dzyuba not yet comprehended the elementary police verity: he who has said "A" is put under three times greater pressure to get "B" out of him. Many a man has already said "B" having entered upon this path.

Ukraine expects new work from Dzyuba. But the first page written not in Demyan Bednyy's key will again place the problem of his expulsion from the Union of Writers on the agenda. As a matter of fact it is already on the agenda. Another routine "anti-Dzyubist" article by I. Bass in the latest issue of *Radyans'ke literaturoznavstvo*¹⁸ considers *post-statement* Dzyuba the same "nationalist" as the *pre-statement* one, impudently demanding that Dzyuba should prove his innocence "not by verbal declarations" (p. 70). Ink has not yet had time to dry in the spot where Dzyuba wrote "A", when a pressure has begun to be put on him to write "B." What then has the statement achieved? As we see, the logic of the "infatuated" is more *realistic* than the logic of the "realists." He who reproaches others of Don Quixotism has shown himself to be naïve and impractical.

Ukraine has already seen many who first spoke and then crossed out, then again spoke and crossed out their own words. May be it is for this reason that there occurred loss of faith on a mass scale, that the highest ones fell down before everyone's eyes. Pigmies have always licked the heels of the corporals. But probably never before has it happened that such giants as Tychyna bowed to "sergeants who without a warrant put on generals' shoulder-straps." And — who knows — it is perhaps this which has inflicted the deepest wound on the people? What and in whom is one to believe when *everyone* renounces, when gods become batmen?

Ukraine has already seen Ostap Vyshnya who came out of prison and immediately announced that he had never been there and that "nationalists are lying." Ukraine has already had Epik who wrote in 1935:

"In preparing terrorist actions we, with an innocent look, assured the Party of our loyalty and honesty and in the course of many years played such roles, in comparison with which the activities of a highway robber are examples of honesty and humaneness. I have come to understand that the most merciful verdict of the proletarian court would be to deal with me as people deal with a rabid dog, to destroy me as a horse sick with foot and mouth disease, to take me out of the body of society. The Communist Party has magnanimously believed in my repentance. The Party has granted me my life, having given me thus the greatest from all the possible prizes on earth — the right to life, to joy of work."

Enough of it. Ukraine is thirsty for such people who do not renounce anything and do not make excuses before anyone. We have a great many people who, having said a good word about Ukraine, immediately make three curtsies towards Russia. They will never write

"Shevchenko and Pushkin." Always it becomes "Pushkin and Shevchenko" with them. Not intentionally, no. This happens with them mechanically. The slavish feeling of *secondariness* has firmly eaten into their blood. There is the word "and" before anything Ukrainian Pushkin and Shevchenko and Franko, Nekrasov and Lesya Ukraïna. Their subconsciousness could never get rid of the feeling that Ukraine was an *appendix* before which there must stand something more important, separated by the word "and." Some of these men voted against the expulsion of Dzyuba from the Union of Writers. Many sincere thanks for it to them. Perhaps, for the first time in many years, they felt themselves to be men, having mustered enough courage to defend Dzyuba. They can have talent, work a lot and be of great use to Ukraine. But they will not thaw the Ukrainian winter. For a vaccine has been introduced into their organism, which serves as a reliable guarantee that a spark of infatuation will not burst into flame there.

The Ukrainian rebirth needs *people of new quality, aristocrats of spirit*. We have got used to roar with laughter at the word "nobility" and have forgotten that "nobleness" also originates from it. The greatest tragedy of Ukraine consists in the fact that permanent bad times have made of us a *nation of plebeians*. But only an aristocrat can have *constructive*, elitarian qualities. This was well understood.. Stalin assured us that the main force of history was "proletariat", but for some reason he destroyed our intelligentsia, our elite. When religion was dominant and socialism was persecuted — a decent person did not say a word against socialism even if he considered it unworthy of attention. This was namely an aristocrat. Now when socialism is dominant, and religion is being strangled, a decent person will not say a word against religion. He is an aristocrat of our epoch. Dzyuba has the right to view "nationalism" in any way he likes. But to come out against it in conditions when any decent person is called a nationalist (including Dzyuba himself) — this Dzyuba is doing for the first time.

In the Mordovian concentration camps there were Jehovah's witnesses. Having had a closer look at them we understood that they were our most fervent enemies, the most reliable agents of Russification, because, by becoming a Jehovah's Witness, a Ukrainian becomes hopelessly deaf to the national problem. Yes, Jehovah's Witnesses were extremely unsympathetic to us. Yet to write against them in the camp wall newspaper, to which exclusively informers contributed this would have been shameful. Dzyuba can evaluate the Ukrainian emigration in any way he likes — this is his own affair — but to write against it in the sergeant-major's newspaper with which Kozachenko cleans his boots, in the "*Literaturna Ukraïna*" edited like the wall newspaper of the district HQ of militia" — this was not expected from Dzyuba.

"I do not accept the name "nationalist" whatever one may put into it", writes Dzyuba and hastens to assure that in the nationality question he keeps to the "principles of scientific communism, the teaching of Marx-Engels-Lenin." But it is difficult to believe it. Absolute rejection of nationalism "whatever one may put into it" — is a *Stalinist* and not *Leninist* thesis. Lenin did not do like this. Lenin, as is known, put into nationalism of an oppressed nation positive meaning. Dzyuba departs in this not only from Lenin, but. . . from himself. Five years ago, in the book *Internationalism or Russification?* he wrote:

"One has to know and respect Lenin at least a little, to know his direct injunction about the inadmissibility of a formal approach to the question of nationalism "in general", his injunction about two types of nationalism, about the fact that the source of local nationalism is Russian big power chauvinism" (p. 223).

Five years ago Dzyuba opposed his present position — that is was against the rejection of nationalism "in general", "whatever one may put into it", strengthening his arguments with the words from the 12th Congress of the Russian Communist Party: "Survivals of nationalism are a peculiar form of defence against the great power chauvinism" (*Verbatim report from the 12th Congress*, p. 38).

It means that those who say that Dzyuba did not renounce his book, or his positions, are not right. They have perhaps read Dzyuba's book inattentively.

Having rejected the name "nationalism" whatever meaning one may put into it, one can find oneself not only in a ridiculous but also in a shameful position. For then we have to reject Shevchenko, too, about whom Lunacharsky wrote:

"Certainly, there is enmity in Shevchenko's nationalism, but only towards the oppressors. His nationalism, just as his entire tender soul, is first of all full of love. One cannot, however, deny that Shevchenko is not only a national poet, but also a poet-nationalist. The question about the destiny of the Ukrainian nationality occupies the first place in his poetry. This is understandable even from the political reasons which made Shevchenko's nationalism kindred with the nationalism of Mickiewicz, Foscolo, some Irishmen, with the nationalism of the great folk poetry of the Serbs" (p. 19).

"I used to place Shevchenko alongside other poets-nationalists, but none of them, even the greatest of the great — Mickiewicz, expressed his love of Fatherland in such a moving way, with such an almost demented strength!" (p. 20).

"Shevchenko as the *littérateur* supported Shevchenko the citizen in his nationalism" (p. 21).

"This democratic nationalism of Shevchenko does not contradict the new socialist world outlook in any way" (p. 25)

"... the noble nationalism which opposes any violence, which demands equal rights for all nations" (p. 30-31).

"Therefore we, socialists, ought to support deeply the popular, fraternal to other nations nationalism of such people as Shevchenko" (p. 26)*

And here are a few more evaluations of nationalism:

"the spirit of freedom as the consciousness of a nation, as *nationalism*" (p. 106); "in the national consciousness, in nationalism consists that force which can open the path to a better future" (p. 107); "Our nationalism ought to be positive, ought to be constructive nationalism" (p. 107); "Without nationalism there is no progress, without nationalism there is no nation" (p. 108).

No, I am not quoting from an emigré journal. All these phrases have been taken from Sukarno's book *Indonesia Accuses* published in Moscow back in 1961. As we see, in the Soviet Union such evaluations have been printed without commentaries for a long time already. Similar things have been published even prior to the 20th Party Congress. In Nehru's book *The Discovery of India*, published in Moscow in 1955, we read:

"In present-day India nationalism has been and remains inevitable; it is a natural and healthy phenomenon (...) Events of the recent period in the entire world have shown that the opinion according to which nationalism allegedly disappears under the pressure of internationalism and proletarian movements is incorrect. As before, it remains one of the most powerful stimuli motivating the nation (...) At the time when the stratum of bourgeois intelligentsia gradually departed from nationalism or was thinking that it was departing from it, the workers' and proletarian movement consciously relying on the principles of internationalism, increasingly tended towards nationalism" (p. 50): "the principle of nationalism has deeper and firm roots; it is not something obsolescent without any importance for the future" (p. 51).

One can add Sun Yat Sen's words from the above-mentioned book by Sukarno: "Nationalism is that priceless value which gives the strength to a given state to strive towards progress; it gives the strength to a given nation to defend its existence" (p. 103); and Pavlo Hrabov'skyi's¹⁹ words:

"Nationalism is a necessary condition of mankind's progress; not only a nation itself but all humanity in general suffers from the death of a nation."

Dzyuba rejected the "name "nationalist" whatever meaning anyone may put into it" — at the time when even in the official brochures dealing with the nationalities problem they have already started to

*) Lunacharsky, A. — *The Great Ukrainian Poet Taras Shevchenko*, Kyiv, 1961 [In Ukrainian].

write that the word "nationalism" is also used in the meaning of "patriotism." Thus in the above quoted article by Lunacharsky published in Kyïv in 1961, there is an editorial remark under the text in which it is stated that "when the author writes about Shevchenko's nationalism, what is meant is Shevchenko's love of his country" (p. 19).

Under the banner of nationalism (in the meaning of "patriotism") there takes place the national liberation movement in the whole world — the most significant phenomenon of the present day era. Dzyuba rejects "the name of 'nationalist' whatever meaning one may put into it" instead of asking: "How long shall we remain an anti-deluvial laughing stock? How long shall we go on asserting that the earth stands on a tortoise? How long shall we consider as swearing word a notion which the entire world uses in a positive meaning; which one half of mankind considers as its banner, about which one of the most outstanding marxists — Lunacharsky — wrote that it "does not contradict a new socialist world outlook?"

And a completely mysterious rebus is the so-called "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism" which Dzyuba also renounces. To renounce the so-called "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism" is about the same as to renounce contacts with devil in Middle Ages. In the Middle Ages godlessness was always "pinned" on an opponent. The Pope called Luther an atheist, and Luther called the Pope the same. And both together considered Calvin a godless man. And all the three of them believed in God. Whoever was not a "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalist"! Kostomariv,²⁰ Hrinchenko,²¹ Oles,²² Kosynka,²³ Mykola Kulish,²⁴ Ostap Vyshnya,²⁵ Antonych²⁶... All of them had the job of a "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalist." And then they were sacked without any explanation. Who after all was Hrinchenko? Among the "nationalists" there were for a time those who with their own hands defeated Petlura:²⁷ Skrypnyk,²⁸ Yuriy Kotsyubynskyi²⁹... The so-called "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism" is a label which was pinned on anyone who had to be destroyed — in the same way as the Nazis pinned a yellow patch on a Jew's back. One has to be deprived of any sense of humour altogether to renounce after all this the so-called "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism."

Five years ago Dzyuba also thought in a similar way:

"They attempt to justify the KGB violence with twaddle about "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism" (under which is understood any deviation from the Russified standard") (*Internationalism or Russification*, p. 223). This idea is reiterated several times in the book (pp. 109, 224).

Why should Dzyuba worry that some emigré newspaper described him as leader of the underground in Ukraine? Who said that Dzyuba must be held responsible for it? What if tomorrow someone will call him a money forger? an eskimo? Dalai Lama? Will he have to write

a statement again? For goodness sake, I have never thought that I would have to argue with Dzyuba about such ridiculously obvious matters!

Dzyuba had no right to forget also that with his statement he was putting other people into worse positions. For the fewer people there are in Ukraine who do not write statements — the stronger the pressure exerted on them. In six months' time Opanas Zalyvakha³⁰ is to come out of prison. How shall we be able to look him into the eyes having written such statements? If we, who are breathing free air, have the right to write statements *under duress*, then Zalyvakha has an even greater right to write them and to renounce "nationalism." But he has not yet written one and has not renounced anything.

It is a very dangerous logic: to place one's position in dependence *on the pressure*. If one is to consider it justified, then Levko Lukyanenko has the right to become an informer.

Zalyvakha will soon be free. But a burden of years of imprisonment still presses on Lukyanenko. Are we not ashamed to complain of pressure, remembering the situation in which this man finds himself? Are we not unlike that fat lady from a film comedy who loved to tell everybody how "awfully unhappy" she was? After all we are men. Let us have shame at least before those women³¹ who are serving to the end their 25 (!) year sentences and have not complained even once of pressure.

Have we not become off colour and shabby too early in the milieu of people whose enthusiasm lasted but five minutes, who renounce their signatures under protests after the first unpleasantness, and then nurture, all their lives, noble pretensions with regard to those who suggested such a "reckless adventure" to them: to sign a collective letter. How has Dzyuba grown up in their eyes, how wiser and more serious has he become, how has he gratified and bewinged them with his statement! Now they believe that their retreat is no retreat at all, no flight in panic. Now they carry Dzyuba solemnly and joyfully in front of them. They are carrying an idol — and a procession with an idol in front — is no longer a flight. Now they believe that their retreat — is no weakness at all, dictated by powerlessness and fear, but a clever strategic move. And now they will bite anyone's throat who will dare to oppose his statement.

I was also told the following: Dzyuba's statement is bad, but ... "One has to swallow this pill" — and that's that. No, a thousand times no. Ukraine has swallowed enough of these pills! And has badly poisoned herself — she is still sick. It is very difficult to understand the logic of those who considered the statement bad, were against its publication, but did not say anything to Dzyuba ... out of tactfulness (!?). Now they advise us to stay silent ... out of love for Dzyuba (!!).

Forgive me, this is no love. This is *false love*: to lick and smear tears. It is such people who have licked Dzyuba. True love is active. Love is not always warm compresses. Sometimes a cold shower is of better help. Chekhov was not ashamed to admit *that he was squeezing a slave out of himself drop by drop*. And we have to help one another to free ourselves from the burden of plebeianness. It is bad that there was no one near me to tell me bitter truth straight into the eyes — when during the first investigation I behaved not in the best manner. Drach was luckier — there were people around who sharply and intolerantly reacted to his article — and thus helped him to understand his mistake. There are such people at Dzyuba's side. But does he listen to their voice? This depends already on Dzyuba himself — on whether he will muster enough strength to examine himself with critical eyes, to step over his ambition, over petty egoism. The ability to recognise one's own mistakes is a mark of a strong personality.

Even if Dzyuba's statement were good in itself — he would have had to protest against such an impudent "framework" in which it was put. Some people think that Dzyuba ought to quit the Union of writers demonstratively. Others are less radical. I, for instance, belong to those who think that Dzyuba in one way or another has to renounce his statement in order to neutralise the tremendous harm inflicted by it. This is demanded by elementary ethics.

No one passes "a death sentence" on Dzyuba, as he writes in a letter. People do not die from truth. They die from "realism", from cold scepticism which has given birth to Dzyuba's statement. We, however, do not want Dzyuba to die. We want him to burst again into *pure flames of infatuation* — for this is the greatest wealth in the present-day Ukrainian state of frozenness.

February, 1970.

NOTES

1) *Moloda Hvardiya* (The Young Guard) — an underground Komsomol organization which allegedly existed during the German occupation in the town of Krasnodon in the Donbas.

2) *Oleh Koshovyi* — one of the Young Guard members executed by the Germans.

3) *Pavlo Tychyna* (1891-1969) — one of the greatest 20th C. Ukrainian poets whose work utterly deteriorated after he was forced to toe the Communist Party line in the 1930s.

4) *Dem'yan Byednyy* (1883-1945) — a Communist Russian "proletarian" poet, noted for his vulgarity, very much favoured by Moscow.

5) *Vasyl Symonenko* (1935-1963) — a leading Ukrainian "poet of the sixties" who became a symbol of opposition to Russification and official hypocrisy.

6) *Ivan Dzyuba* (1931 -) — an outstanding Ukrainian literary critic, outspoken opponent of Russian domination and Russification policy in Ukraine, author of the world-famous book "Internationalism or Russification?" (publ. in English by Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 1968, 240 p.).

7) *Mykola Vinhranovs'kyi* (1936 -) — Ukrainian film actor, film producer, an outstanding "poet of the sixties."

8) *Ivan Drach* (1936 -) — Ukrainian poet, critic and translator, one of the leading men in the "poets of the sixties" group.

9) *Oleksiy Poltoratskyi* (1905 -) — Soviet Ukrainian critic and writer, editor of the journal *Vsesvit* (Universe), notorious from his denunciations of Ukrainian patriotic writers as "bourgeois nationalists."

10) *Taras Myhal* (1920 -) — a notorious Communist pamphleteer in Lviv, specialising in denunciation of "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists."

11) *Levko Lukianenko* (1927 -) — a Ukrainian lawyer, founder of the underground organisation, Ukrainian Workers and Peasants Union, in 1960, sentenced in May 1961 to death, later to 15 years imprisonment in hard labour camps, under Art. 56 (1) and 64 of the Criminal Code of the Ukrainian SSR for attempting to propagate separation of Ukraine from the USSR.

12) *Yevhen Sverstyuk* — Ukrainian critic of the younger generation whose brilliant articles about the fate of Ukrainian culture in the USSR are spreading in manuscript copies in Ukraine. (See his "Cathedral in Scaffolding", *The Ukrainian Review*, No. 3, 1970, pp. 22-48).

13) *Mykola Shamota* (1916 -) — Soviet Ukrainian literary critic, notorious for his servile pro-Moscow writings.

14) *Taras Shevchenko* (1814-1861) — the greatest Ukrainian national poet.

15) *Dmytro Pavlychko* (1929 -) — Soviet Ukrainian poet from West Ukraine, translator, film script writer.

16) *Vasyl Kozachenko* (1913 -) — Soviet Ukrainian Communist writer, chairman of the Kiev branch of the Union of Writers of Ukraine, excessively loyal to the Party and the KGB.

17) *Oleksander Korniychuk* (1905 -) — Soviet Ukrainian playwright, chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR, an opportunistic servant of the regime.

18) (*Soviet Literary Criticism*) No. 1, Jan. 1970, pp. 61-70, "In the Campaign against the Truth."

19) *Pavlo Hrabovs'kyi* (1864-1902) — a Ukrainian writer persecuted by the tsarist Russian regime for his democratic and national Ukrainian convictions. Died in Siberian exile.

21) *Borys Hrinchenko* (1863-1910) — famous Ukrainian writer, folklorist ethnographer, philologist, pedagogue and public figure.

22) *Oleksander Oles* (literary pseudonym of Oleksander Kandyba) (1878-1944) — Ukrainian poet who emigrated in 1919 and until his death lived in Austria and Czechoslovakia.

23) *Hryhoriy Kosynka* (1899-1934) — Ukrainian poet, arrested by Soviet secret police under false accusation of participation in "terrorist" anti-Soviet activities and shot after a secret trial. "Rehabilitated" after Stalin's death.

24) *Mykola Kulish* (1892-1942) — Ukrainian playwright, accused of "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism" in 1933 and spent many years in prisons and concentration camps where he died in 1942.

25) *Ostap Vyshnya* (literary pseudonym of Pavlo Hubenko) (1889-1956) — outstanding Ukrainian humorist. Accused of "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism" in the early 1930s and spent many years in prisons and forced labour camps. Released during World War II. Tried to prove his loyalty by writing pamphlets against "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists."

26) *Bohdan Ihor Antonych* (1910-1937) — Ukrainian poet from Western Ukraine. Until recently banned in the USSR because of his attempt to stand above politics.

27) *Symon Petlura* (1877-1926) — Head of the Directory and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Ukrainian National Republic in 1919-21. Assassinated in Paris by a Communist agent.

28) *Mykola Skrypnyk* (1872-1933) — a Ukrainian Communist leader, Lenin's friend, one of the leaders of the Communist fifth column in Ukraine against the Ukrainian National Republic (1917-1921); occupied leading CP and government posts in Ukraine, tried to carry out the "Ukrainization" policy in Ukraine, shot himself in 1933 when realised his failures and mistakes.

29) *Yuriy Kotsyubynskyi* (1895-1937) — a Ukrainian Communist leader, son of the famous Ukrainian writer Mykhaylo Kotsyubynskyi, sided with the Bolsheviks against the Ukrainian National Republic, later attempted to promote a policy of Ukrainization in Ukraine. Arrested on accusation of "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism" and shot.

30) *Opanas Zalyvakha* (1925 -) — Ukrainian painter, arrested in 1965 and sentenced to 5 years imprisonment in severe regime hard labour camps for protests against the Russification policy in Ukraine.

31) *Kateryna Zarytska, Odarka Husyak and Halyna Didyk* — sentenced in 1947 and 1950 to 25 years of imprisonment each for their participation as Red Cross workers in the struggle of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army against the Soviet Russian occupation of Ukraine. Until recently they were imprisoned at the grim Vladimir prison near Moscow, but recently have been transferred to Mordovian camps.

* On March 26-27, 1970 leaflets were scattered in the Kyiv Polytechnic and Engineering-Construction Institutes protesting against the expulsion of Solzhenitsyn from the Union of Writers and the persecution of the Ukrainian writer Dzyuba.

(*Chronicle of Current Events*, No. 14)

* Borys Borysovykh Zalyvako, a priest born in 1940 in Leningrad, was sentenced in early 1970 by the Uzhhorod [West Ukraine, near the border with Czechoslovakia] Regional Court to eight years of strict-regime corrective-labour camps and five years' exile for attempting to cross the Soviet-Czechoslovak frontier. He is in camp No. 3 (ZHKH-385/3-1) [in the Mordovian Republic]."

(*Chronicle of Current Events*, No. 17, 31 December, 1970).

EXAMPLES OF ADMINISTRATIVE PERSECUTION FOR CONVICTIONS

1. **Ivan Svitlychnyi** — expelled from the Institute of Philosophy of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR at the beginning of 1964 for making a speech at the soirée commemorating [the poet Vasyl] Symonenko which took place at the Kiev Medical College on December 20, 1963; on July 12, 1965 dismissed from his job as head of the editorial board of the department of language and dictionaries of the "Naukova dumka" (Scientific Thought) Publishing House at the demand of Academician Bilodid whom he criticised in the article "Harmony and Algebra" (*Dnipro*, No. 3, 1965); after spending eight months in prison — unemployed.

2. **Mykhailo Kosiv** — during the preliminary investigation dismissed from his job as head of the Section of Franko Studies at the University of L'viv; after spending five months in prison, was unemployed for six months; at present he teaches in a L'viv region school.

3. **Ivan Dzyuba** — dismissed from his job at the "Molod" (Youth) Publishing House in September 1965 after making a speech at the "Ukraina" Cinema on September 4, 1965, protesting against political arrests; at present — literary editor of the *Ukrains'kyi biokhimichnyi zhurnal* (Ukrainian Biochemical Journal).

4. **Yevhen Sverstyuk** — dismissed from his job at the Institute of Psychology on June 4, 1965, for making a "heretical" speech in front of Volhynia region teachers. At present he is secretary of the *Ukrains'kyi botanichnyi zhurnal* (Ukrainian Botanical Journal).

5. **Matviy Shestopal** — at the beginning of 1965 a fine was deducted from his salary by Party officials and he was expelled from a teaching post at the Kyiv university for "nationalism."

6. **Mykhailyna Kotsyubynska** — M.A. (Philology), senior scientific worker of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR, expelled from the Party in April 1966 by the Kyiv city committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine for "ideological deviations" and for protesting against the arrests.

7. **Vyacheslav Chornovil** — in April 1965, at the signal from the KGB he was dismissed from his job as head of the ideological department of the newspaper of the Central Committee of the Komsomol of Ukraine, *Moloda Hvardiya* (The Young Guards), for making a speech at the "Ukraina" Cinema; for the same offence he was not accepted for postgraduate research studies at the Kyiv Teachers' College; on

May 5, 1966 "made redundant" from the editorial board of the newspaper *Druh chytacha* (Reader's Friend) for his refusal to testify at the closed trial in L'viv — at present *unemployed*.

8. **Vasyl' Stus** — expelled from the second year of postgraduate research course at the Institute of Literature of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR in September, 1965 for making a speech at the "Ukraina" Cinema; a collection of his poems was struck off the list of the planned publications of the "Radyans'kyj pys'mennyk" (Soviet Writer) Publishing House. In June 1966 he was dismissed from his job as senior scientific worker of the State Historical Archives; in September 1966 dismissed from work at the construction of the Kyiv underground because he allegedly did not work according to his profession.

9. A group of journalists working with Kyiv newspapers, journals and radio (**Polkovenko, Toichkyn, Lihostov, Tvorynskyi** and others) — were dismissed from their jobs in the spring of 1965 and Party and Komsomol fines were deducted from their salaries — for making a statement of protest against the dismissal of M. Shestopal.

10. A group of students of the Faculty of Journalism of the Kyiv State University (**Vadym Mytsyk, Bohdan Uniyat, Yuriy Parkhomenko**, and others) — were expelled from the university, and some of them from the Party, in the spring of 1965, for staging a protest against the dismissal of M. Shestopal.

11. **Alla Hors'ka** and **Lyudmyla Semykina** — were expelled from the Union of Artists of the Ukrainian SSR in May 1964 for creating a stained glass window at the university which was not approved by the Party (today restored in membership).

12. **Yuriy Badzio** — dismissed from the post of junior scientific worker of the Institute of Literature of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR in the spring of 1965 for participating in organising a soiree commemorating Shevchenko at the Automatic Machine Tool Works; for the same offence as well as for being present at the "Ukraina" Cinema on September 4, 1965 he was expelled from the party by the city committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine in April 1966.

13. **Mykhola Kholodnyi** — expelled from the fifth year course at the university for insubordination (speeches and poems of non-standard contents), spent a fortnight in prison on the grounds of a false charge of "making an attempt on the life of militia workers", expelled from Kyiv, and after temporarily working as watchman of a collective farm orchard — *unemployed*.

14. **Volodymyr Mishchenko** — dismissed from his job at the editorial office of the *Donbas* magazine; at the request of Donetsk prosecutor's office and the KGB a collection of his poems was taken off the printing presses because he allegedly read forbidden books.

15. **Rita Dovhan'** — was ordered to pay a Party fine and was forced in December, 1965 to resign from the editorial board of the newspaper *Druh chytacha* (Reader's Friend) — for her part in organising an evening of poetry at the Institute of Communications.

16. **Tetiana Tsymbal** — an artiste of the Ukrainian Concert Company, today a pensioner. Deprived of the right to appear on the stage... for making speeches from the stage.

17. **Antonina Matviyenko** — in February 1966 dismissed from her job as assistant lecturer at the University of Kyiv, deprived of the right to teach at the University of Kyiv by the decision of the Ivano-Frankivsk region court (she was a witness in Ozernyi's case), was rejected from teaching at the preparatory courses of the Kyiv Teachers' College (September, 1966) — at present *unemployed*.

18. **Yaroslav Dashkevych** — dismissed in April 1966 from the post of bibliographer at the Institute of Social Sciences (L'viv) for reading foreign publications and for publishing an article about the Polovtsi (Cuman) language in a foreign journal; at present — *unemployed*.

19. **Ivan Boychak** — dismissed from his job as head of the department of criticism of the journal *Dnipro* for publishing a number of articles, in particular by I. Svitlychnyi and I. Dzyuba.

20. **Pavlo Skochok** — dismissed in April 1966 from the editorial board of the newspaper *Radyans'ka Ukraïna* for criticising the line of the newspaper on a number of questions and for writing a statement to the Central Committee of the CP of Ukraine concerning the trial in Ivano-Frankivsk; at present — *unemployed*.

21. **Roman Kudlyk** — dismissed at the beginning of 1966 from the editorial board of the journal *Zhovten'* (L'viv) for asking a question about the arrests at a writers' meeting.

22. **Stefan Kozak** — expelled from the postgraduate course at the Kyiv State University and repatriated to Poland on suspicion of transmitting foreign publications.

23. **Volodymyr Danylenko** — "made redundant" in the spring of 1966 from the newspaper *Literaturna Ukraïna* for his independence of thought...

24. **Lidiya Mel'nyk** — 'made redundant' in the spring of 1966 from *Literaturna Ukraïna*.

25. **Lidiya Orel** — "made redundant" in the summer of 1965 from the film studio of the Kyiv State University for her presence at the debate on the questions of the national culture (April, 1965) which was dispersed, and for singing Ukrainian songs at the Shevchenko memorial on May 22.

26. **Ol'ha Borbot** — expelled in March 1966 from the fourth year course of the evening department of the Faculty of Philology for

asking the lecturer Kuznetsov a "heretical" question at the political economic seminar; the latter immediately reported it to the appropriate authorities; she was expelled from Kyiv.

27. **Hryhoriy Demyanchuk** — forced to pay a Party fine at the beginning of 1966 and dismissed from his job as head of the department of culture of the newspaper *Chervonyi prapor* (Rivne) for reading I. Dzyuba's speech at the soiree devoted to the memory of V. Symonenko; at present employed in the advertising department of the Regional Union of Consumer Cooperatives.

28. **Oleksandra Hromova** — "made redundant" in January 1966 from the Institute of the Advancement of Teachers for her acquaintanceship with the convicted persons.

29. **Henadiy Hrytsay** — literary critic (Moscow), dismissed from his job, and later expelled from the Party, for his acquaintanceship with Daniel, Sinyavsky, as well as with Svitlychnyi and other Ukrainian "rebels", at present — *unemployed*.

30. **Omelyan Mykhal'chuk** — expelled in the summer of 1965 from the fifth year course of the Kyiv Medical College for his refusal to take a military oath in Russian.

31. **Vadym Mytsyk** — in May 1966, at the demand from the Party committee, dismissed from his job at the Zhashkiv district newspaper in Cherkassy region. Earlier he was expelled from the university for making a speech in defence of Shestopal and for reading V. Symonenko's poems.

32. **Lyudmyla Sheremetyeva** — dismissed from the editorial board of the newspaper *Druh chytyacha only* for her acquaintanceship with the "rebels."

33. **Vasyl' Mykhaylyuk** — dismissed from his job as chairman of a village Soviet in the autumn of 1965 for erecting a bust memorial of Shevchenko at the village of Sheshory, Kosiv district, Ivano-Frankivsk region.

34. **Ol'ha Kontsevych** — was forced to resign from her job at the Zhytomyr Printing House. Her guilt was — making public the secret of the "namesday" album (see section 2) and her acquaintanceship with the "rebels."

35. **Lyubomyr Hrabovets'** — expelled from L'viv Conservatoire in autumn of 1965; an inter-college choir conducted by him performed in the Hutsul area, in the summer 1965, especially at the unveiling of the Shevchenko bust memorial in the village of Sheshory.

36. **Lyudmyla Tyshchenko** — dismissed in 1965 from her post as laboratory assistant of the Dictionary Department of the Institute of Philology of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR for her

refusal to collaborate with the KGB, dismissed from her teaching post at the preparatory course at the Kyiv Teachers' College (October 1966).

37. **Mykola Petrenko** — severely reprimanded for mentioning in one of the broadcasts of L'viv TV Studio the name of R. Kudlyk, who had earlier been punished for asking a question concerning the arrests, and a collection of his poems had been taken off the list of the planned publications of the *Kamenyar* (Stone-Cutter) Publishing House.

38. **Myroslava Zvarychevs'ka** — dismissed from work at the Regional Archives during the preliminary investigation. After coming out of prison — *unemployed*.

39. **Svitlana Popel'** — "failed to pass the competitive examinations", dismissed in June 1966 from the post of junior scientific worker of the Institute of Literature of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR for her acquaintanceship with I. Svitlychnyi.

40. **Ihor Sandurs'kyi** — dismissed in June 1966 from the post of lecturer in social sciences at the L'viv Agricultural College. At present — *unemployed*.

41. **Iryna Stakhiv** — dismissed from her job at the L'viv Ethnographical Museum in summer 1966 for her contacts with the convicted persons, at present — *unemployed*.

42. **Ol'ha Horyn'** — dismissed from her job at the L'viv House of Teachers for being the wife of the convicted M. Horyn'.

43. **Oleksander Serhiyenko** — student at the Kyiv Medical College, arrested at Ivan Franko jubilee commemorative evening, spent a fortnight in prison; groundlessly accused of "an attempt at the life of militia workers."

44. **Valeriy Nabok** — arrested on May 28, 1966 at the Ivan Franko jubilee commemorative evening, spent a fortnight at the Lukyanivka prison on groundless charge of "an attempt on the life of militia workers." During imprisonment expelled from the Party (in his absence, at the meeting of the Party bureau).

45. **Viktor Koval'chuk** — Kyiv river port worker, delegate to the last congress of the Komsomol of Ukraine, arrested on May 28, 1966 for poetry reading at the celebration of I. Franko jubilee, spent a fortnight at the Lukyanivka prison on a groundless charge of "an attempt on the life of militia workers."

46. **Ivan Ostafiychuk** — after completing in 1966 the L'viv Institute of Decorative and Applied Art remained as lecturer at the same Institute, because he was a talented artist. After reading the letter of the CC of the CP of Ukraine where his name was mentioned his appointment was cancelled and he was directed to go to the Donbas.

47. **Vadym Cherkas** — an artist, brother of the convicted M. Masutko. At a signal from the KGB he was dismissed from his lecturing post at the L'viv Institute of Decorative and Applied Art.

48. **Osyp Petrash** — literary critic, dismissed from lecturing at the Drohobych Teachers' College for his acquaintanceship with M. Horyn' — at present *unemployed*.

49. **Oleksander Kurinnyi** — poet, dismissed from his post of book-keeper of the collective farm at the village of Makarivka, Popil'nya district, Zhytomyr region, on a completely unfounded charge of "nationalism." At present — *unemployed*.

50. **Ivan Yushchuk** — "failed to pass a competitive examination" in June 1966 and dismissed from his job as junior scientific worker of the Institute of Literature of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSSR for contacts with the convicted persons, at present — *unemployed*.

51. **Mykhaylo Huts'** — "failed to pass the competitive examination" in June 1966 and was dismissed from his post of junior scientific worker of the Institute of Art Knowledge, Folklore and Ethnography of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR for contacts with the convicted persons, at present — *unemployed*.

52. **Yevhen Pronyuk** — transferred from the post of junior scientific worker of the Institute of Philosophy of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR to a librarian's post — for contacts with the convicted persons.

53. **Lidiya Sverstyuk** — "failed to pass the competitive examination" and dismissed from teaching at the Kyiv Teachers' College in July 1966 for the convictions of her husband.

54. **Leonid Cherevatenko** — expelled from the fifth year course of the faculty of Philology of the Kyiv State University for his convictions, at present — *unemployed*.

55. **Borys Tymoshenko** — expelled from the fourth year course of the faculty of Philology of the Kyiv State University for his acquaintanceship with I. Svitlychnyi, at present — *unemployed*.

56. **Pen'kovs'kyi** — dismissed from his job as scientific co-worker of the Sector of State and Law of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR for his contacts with the convicted persons.

57. **Pavlo Chemerys** — dismissed from his job at the L'viv Institute of Printing Art for his contacts with the convicted persons.

58. **Mykhaylo Ivanyshyn** — after his release from Ivano-Frankivsk isolation prison of the KGB, was unemployed for a long time. In the autumn of 1966 dismissed from the post of teacher at one of the schools of Yavoriv district, L'viv region, at a demand from above, at present — *unemployed*.

This list was compiled as of 1st November, 1966 and is by far not complete.

Mykhailo HORYN

LETTER OF PROTEST TO CAMP COMMANDANT

To the Acting Commandant of Camp No. 17-A, Senior Lieutenant Kyshka, and the Commandant of Detachment No. 6, Senior Lieutenant Rybchynski.

From political prisoner M. M. Horyn.

P R O T E S T

Political prisoners of the Mordovian camps have long since been aware of the fact that their stay in camps is determined not by legal norms, but by whims and efforts of the camp administration.

Sifted through the sieve of KGB wishes, only scraps from legal principles and international agreements and declarations on defense of human rights have entered into the camp instructions.

According to the criminal code, punishment by imprisonment does not foresee physical maltreatment or a threat to the health of the prisoner. But in the camps of Mordovia, prisoners are kept for months on the 10 "b" rations (1370 calories per day) in penal compounds and are completely deprived of walks in the fresh air, as is the case in Camp No. 385/11.

According to legal norms, it is forbidden to add to the prisoners' spiritual sufferings, but their term in camps has been turned into the process of continuous investigation with constant summoning of prisoners to the prisons of Saransk, as well as to Kyiv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv or other cities of Ukraine.

At every turn, Soviet legality is being trampled with impunity and the prisoners' elementary rights are being cynically ignored.

On the day of my arrival in Camp No. 17 you assured me that all possibility of punishment of innocent prisoners is excluded, but in a week's time you have deprived Mykhailo Masyutko and Valentyn Moroz of a private visit, and have found a way to punish me.

These days, those close to you are spreading a rumour that materials are being compiled on the three of us in order to send us to jail. At the same time you are talking about humanity and justice! You are indignant at the repressions by the Greek authorities; you are sympathizing with Manoli Glezos. Hypocrites!

On June 17-19, 1967, an incident occurred in camp which showed that your misanthropy is extended not only to prisoners. His old mother came to see political prisoner Bohdan Hermanyuk, who is completing his tenth year of imprisonment in the Mordovian camps, only because he dared to hold other views as a student.

During an unceremonious search of her luggage she suffered a stenocardiac attack. You did not pay attention to the doctor's warnings, left the sick woman to sleep by herself in the reception room, and on the morning of June 19th threw her out into the street. In the street she had a new stenocardiac attack. A group of prisoners, who were going to work, resolutely protested and demanded that the guard administer first aid to the sick woman. The warder, who was called by the guard, promised to take care of the woman. But after the prisoners left, he pulled her roughly toward the watch tower. The exhausted woman fell in the sand. The warder left her in the sand, and himself disappeared in the watch tower.

And when the prisoners who watched this scene of mockery of human dignity protested, you, as the worthy pupils of your predecessors have reached a Solomon-like decision: to punish them. They punished not that heartless warder-robot, who has lost all human feeling and left the sick woman in the sand, but people who dared to raise a voice of protest against the infamous act of violence.

After this you became well-aware that you have lost the remnants of moral capital even among those prisoners who have become your collaborators and agents. And it was not by chance that on Wednesday, June 21st, you did not dare to hold your political classes.

The only thing that you are not afraid of is to be punished for your shameful act, for your crime, because you are well aware of the fact that this kind of misanthropic morality was adopted not only by you, that you are going to be supported by the prosecutor of Mordovia, Overkin, who has sanctioned the confinement of mentally ill people to the penal compound, and by KGB captain Krut, who is an expert at the fabrication of false decisions.

You know that this incident is not going to bring about diplomatic problems between the governments of the Ukrainian Republic and the Russian Federation, that your names are not going to appear in the notes of protest. You know this very well.

But you must know that you will never be able to cleanse yourself of the shameful blot of criminals who exerted every effort to conceal the outrage toward the sick woman, that every honest man will show you his contempt and scorn for the unheard-of sacrilege, which is worthy perhaps only of the pupils of Yezhov and Beria.

And together with these people I am throwing into your eyes my own contempt and scorn.

June 23, 1967

Mychailo HORYN

LETTER OF PROTEST TO MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF UKRAINIAN SSR

To the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Ukr.SSR Bilokolos.

From political prisoner M. M. Horyn, sentenced to 6 years of imprisonment in the camps of severe regime, who is now at the halting place for convicts at the Vladimir prison.

STATEMENT

It is not a chance that I am turning to you in particular. Several thousand kilometres away from Ukraine, in the remote political camps of the Russian Federation, events are taking place which concern you directly, as Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Ukrainian Republic, of the Ukrainian people.

On the day of victory over Fascist Germany J. Stalin raised a toast to the exceptional achievements of the Russian people in winning victory over the enemy. Thus a green light was given to those who have long propagated the idea of Russian messianism, to those who have preached Russian chauvinism.

With the impetus characteristic of Stalin he proclaimed whole nations anti-Soviet and deported them to Siberia. In several days the Crimea was cleansed of the Tatars; the Chechens, the Ingushes, Karachays and others were resettled.

At the end of the 50s and the beginning of the 60s the Russian chauvinists went further and began to give a theoretical base to their policy. As if to order, Agayevs, Desherievs and Kammaris began to write. First of all they began to elaborate upon the question of language policy. Language is the spiritual treasure house of a nation, the source of its strength and power. As a rule, national revival of a people began with a language renaissance. The perfecting of the language and its enrichment always gave reliable immunity against assimilation, while the interest in the native language and its cultivation raised the national consciousness. On the other hand, those who tried to assimilate a people, put into effect linguistic assimilation first of all. In Ukraine the Ems ukase and the Valuyev circular are well-known, in Estonia the declaration by Count Rosen. Agayev is already propagating the idea that some languages have prospects while others do not. And when, for instance, the Ukrainian language is to be included in the number of those without prospects, then can one even dream of a better service to Russian chauvinism?

Anyone who is in favour of the expansion of linguistic development is very often proclaimed a nationalist. The new morality, according

to which the renunciation of the native language and the change-over to the Russian language of communication is not something amoral, but to the contrary, it is a manifestation of international consciousness, worthy of imitation, is being cultivated in many ways. Thus the consciousness of peoples is being moulded and parallel to it factories and a considerable number of schools of higher learning are being Russified and the artificial intermixing of peoples is being accomplished. Who will believe that the Rozdol sulphur works needs manpower [from outside Ukraine]? But they are brought in. And side by side with the newly arriving Russians, Russian schools and theatres come into Ukraine, and the percentage of Russian population is assuming dangerous proportions, which in comparison with the pre-war time has increased in Ukraine more than two times.

Far more tragic is the situation of some three odd million Ukrainians who live on the territory of the Russian Federation. Having no schools with the native language of instruction, cultural and educational institutions and periodicals, and being deprived of information about the fate of their countrymen in the neighbouring regions, Ukrainians of Vorkuta, Chita, the Volga region, Kuban, Siberia and the Far East are doomed to total assimilation. Not so long ago, the Kuban Ukrainians were building a monument to the founder of the Kuban Cossacks, feeling their blood unity with Ukrainian people, while today the percentage of Ukrainians in Kuban is falling drastically. This is how the Ukrainian affairs are treated in one of the socialist states — the Russian Federation, which is building relations on the basis of the Marxist-Leninist nationality policy, is criticizing Chinese chauvinism with respect to the Uigurs, Mongols, Kazakhs and other nationalities and is proclaiming the most humane principles of equality of peoples.

And when the Ukrainian intelligentsia protested against the oppression by Russian chauvinism, in many cities of Ukraine the doors of investigating prisons of the KGB opened before them; closed trials were organized for them and they were accused of slandering Soviet reality and of propagating the ideas of nationalism. In defiance of the article of the Constitution about the freedom of speech and press, in defiance of the "Declaration of Human Rights" proclaimed by the UN and ratified by the USSR, which guarantees the rights to propagandize your views by whatever means, we were tried for defending the legal rights of Ukraine, while among other things, the Constitution guarantees not only the equality of all the peoples of the USSR, but also their secession from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

In the Mordovian camps of the Russian Federation besides Ukrainians, you will find Byelorussians, Moldavians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Estonians, Circassians, Ingushes, Bashkirs, Tatars and others. In other words the Russian Federation has taken all political prisoners

under its safe wing. And far from their native land violence and lawlessness are waiting for them. The stay in the camps for political prisoners has been transformed into the process of continuous investigation. In defiance of all laws, people are sent from camps to jails, where by way of psychological pressure they try to obtain what the investigation or the trial failed to obtain: self-flagellation, repentance, the admission of your own guilt.

On the basis of complaints confiscated from Mykhailo Masyutko, V. Moroz and L. Lukyanenko and a questionnaire of psychological research from me, a case about "systematic writing by us of nationalistic lectures and their circulation among prisoners" was fabricated. Of course, camp commandant Major Kasatkin, who signed the order, declared that he did not read them. Nevertheless such "blind" solution of the case did not stop them from confining us to the penal compound for 6 months. Furthermore on July 16th the same documents served as an accusation against us at the visiting assizes of the Dubova-Polyana district. Without any advance notice Mykhailo Masyutko, Valentyn Moroz and I were called out right from work and without any prior notice were taken to the office. Of course, all this was done with the aim to stun us by the surprise.

I was tried first. When asked by the judge what were my claims to the court, I stated: I consider both the make up of the court as well as the procedure of the court hearing to be illegal. A representative of the administration: overseer of the regime, is sitting on the court; I, as a defendant, have not been notified in advance about the trial; I was not familiarized with the accusation or the request of camp administration, and as the result I cannot defend myself properly and cannot hire a lawyer. Therefore any kind of decision by the court at all, is considered by me to be illegal in advance.

In the course of the court proceedings it became apparent that I am being accused of circulating nationalistic literature. But, as it turned out, neither the prosecutor, nor the judge, nor the representative of the administration, had seen these "nationalistic documents". The representative of the administration excused himself by saying that this happened in Camp No. 385/1, the prosecutor stated that he heard from the prosecutor of Mordovia that these documents are nationalistic. For the second time I saw how they try "blindly". This did not prevent the judges from sentencing me to three years of imprisonment. But in camps for political prisoners, this is nothing sensational.

Upon demands from prisoner Masyutko (he was tried second) to acquaint him with the accusatory evidence, the prosecutor said that this is not a trial, but an ordinary change of regime. "Then — said Masyutko, — if this is not a trial, I don't want to hear the verdict." A female judge came to the aid of the prosecutor by declaring in Russian: "But this is a very real trial."

When the court was trying Valentyn Moroz, Masyutko and I were already sitting in the penal isolation ward, getting ready to be sent

to prison. At that time one warder was passing the order of the camp commandant to another warder out loud, to prepare a place for Moroz in the isolation ward. Political prisoner Daniel called out for the whole isolation ward to hear: "Dear friends, what kind of a trial is it — Moroz had not been convicted yet, and a place is already being prepared for him in the isolation ward!"

And truly. What kind of a trial is it? It is a shameful mock trial, which is hard to be believed by a contemporary civilized man. This is the most brutal means of punishment of political prisoners, who stand up for their rights, their human dignity, law. This is a new manifestation of the intellect of the KGB agents. In connection with this I would like to ask you, Minister, several questions: are you considering raising the following questions before the government of the Russian Federation: 1) on the incident with citizeness Hermanyuk; 2) on the cruel treatment of Ukrainian political prisoners in the Mordovian camps; 3) on the cessation of assimilation of the Ukrainian population which is living on the territory of Russia, and the creation for it of normal conditions.

Are you considering doing this? And you should, if you are troubled by the fate of the Ukrainian people and if you are thinking about its future.

KARAVANSKYI'S SENTENCE EXTENDED

S. I. Karavanskyi (a Ukrainian writer and translator) is a native of Odessa who was born in 1920. In 1944 he was sentenced to 25 years' imprisonment for taking part in an underground youth organisation (Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists) during the German and Rumanian occupation (the slogan of the organisation was "Down with the bloody terror of Hitler and Stalin!"). He survived the camps of Kolyma, Pechora, Taishet, and Mordovia. The amnesty of 1954 led to his term being reduced by half, but he was set free only in 1960, having thus served over sixteen years in prison, and spent about five years in captivity "for nothing."

In the camps Karavanskyi occupied himself intensively with literary self-education and wrote poetry. When he became free, he prepared for publication an extensive "Ukrainian Rhyming Dictionary", which was highly regarded by experts. He had verse and learned articles published on more than one occasion.

Observing a deep-rooted process of Russification in Ukrainian national culture, Karavanskyi considered it his duty to speak out against it, and wrote a series of articles on the subject. These articles led to summonses by the KGB and the Procuracy.

In 1965 he wrote a protest against the persecution of the Ukrainian intelligentsia and sent it to the heads of the Polish, Rumanian, Czechoslovak and Yugoslav Communist Parties, requesting them to discuss the problem. In October 1965 he was arrested and sentenced.

The motive given for this was that Karavanskyi was illegally set free, *as he had not served the sentence given him in 1944*, — although according to the law of 1959 the longest sentence possible is fifteen years. (As stated earlier, Karavanskyi himself had served nearly seventeen years in the camps).

In 1969, when 25 years had elapsed from the day of Karavanskyi's initial arrest, a lawyer who was invited to draw to the attention of the Supreme Court the illegality of Karavanskyi's further detention in prison refused to do this, referring to the "traditions of legal practice."

In the same year 1969, new criminal proceedings were instituted against Karavanskyi, then in Vladimir prison, under article 70 of the Russian Criminal Code (anti-Soviet agitation). This time the incriminating evidence was an article on the reconciliation of East and West and a history of the shooting of Polish officers in Katyn Forest in 1940, which he had taken down from statements by persons who had been fellow prisoners with a certain Andreyev (now deceased) and a certain Menshankin, former Soviet citizens who had taken part in the shooting.

On 23 April 1970 a court sentenced Karavanskyi to five years' imprisonment. The judge was Kolosov and the Procurator Abramov.

Karavanskyi has nine and a half years to serve, his two sentences totalling 30 years.

Just before the latest trial, a letter in Karavanskyi's defence was sent to the President of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR, comrade Lyashko, and the Procurator of Ukraine, comrade Glukhov. It was entitled "'Cell' case once again?" (i. e. cases, often involving stool-pidgions, against people already in prison), and was signed by sixteen former political prisoners, amongst whom were V. Chornovil, V. Moroz and B. Horyn.

(Chronicle of Current Events, No. 13, 28 April, 1970).

TREE YOUNG UKRAINIANS CONVICTED IN DNIPROPETROVSK

From 19 to 27 January [1970] in Dnipropetrovsk the trial took place of I. H. Sokulskyi, N. H. Kulchynskyi and V. V. Savchenko, accused under article 62 of the Ukrainian Criminal Code (which corresponds to article 70 of the Russian Criminal Code).

The judge was Tubelts, the assessors were Krikunov and Hrynevych. The prosecutor was the deputy-procurator of the region, Zhupinsky. The defence lawyers were Romm and Sarry (Moscow) and Ezholy (Dnipropetrovsk).

The case was heard in closed session. Only the mothers of the accused, the correspondents of several Ukrainian newspapers, and officials of the KGB were present. Sentence was passed in open court. The accused were charged with:

1. the preparation and distribution of an "Appeal from the creative youth of Dnipropetrovsk."* (Sokulskyi admitted authorship of the work. In this document, among other things, were discussed the dismissal from their work of persons devoted to Ukrainian culture, and facts about enforced Russification.)

2. the distribution of the document by V. Moroz, "Reportage from the Beria Game Reserve."

3. the distribution of the article by Academician Aganbegyan, "The Soviet Economy."

4. the copying of chapters from the book by Molnar "The Slovaks and the Ukrainians" (the books of this author have been published in the USSR, and the book in question has received positive reviews in the press).

5. keeping (at Sokulskyi's house) a letter addressed but not sent to the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party entitled "In the position of satraps of the Tsar."

6. (Sokulskyi only) his own verse.

7. verbal statements on the national question and on the military intervention in Czechoslovakia.

The procurator demanded: for Sokulskyi — six years' imprisonment; for Kulchynskyi — four years; for Savchenko — three years. (He was at liberty during the trial.)

The court passed the following sentences: on Sokulskyi — four and a half years' imprisonment under article 62 of the Criminal Code of the Ukrainian SSR (strict-regime); on Kulchynskyi — two and a half years' imprisonment under article 187-1, which corresponds to article 190-1 of the Russian Code; on Savchenko — two years suspended sentence, with three years probation, under article 187-1.

The article under which Kulchynskyi and Savchenko were charged was altered in the course of the proceedings. The accused pleaded guilty within the terms of article 187-1 of the Criminal Code of the Ukrainian SSR. Sokulskyi expressed his repentance.

(*Chronicle of Current Events*, No. 12, 28th February, 1970).

* From 5 to 10 December [1970] the traditional hunger strike was held by a number of political prisoners in the Mordovian camps (Nos. 19, 3 and 17), by 27 people being held in Vladimir prison, and by Natalya Gorbanevskaya and Vladimir Gershuni in Butyrka prison.

(*Chronicle*, No. 17)

*) See *The Ukrainian Review*, No. 3, 1969, pp. 46-52.

TRIAL OF THE UKRAINIAN NATIONAL FRONT

Chronicle of Current Events, No. 17, under the heading "Trials of Past Years", brings more details about one of the biggest trials in Ukraine in 1967, in which members of the underground organisation "Ukrainian National Front" were involved.

On June 8, 1966, the KGB of Ivano-Frankivsk region in West Ukraine arrested a Donetsk miner, Mykola Kachur, on the charge of spreading the illegal typewritten journal "Volya i Bat'kivshchyna" (Freedom and Country), organ of the Ukrainian National Front. In March 1967 the following people were arrested: *Dmytro Kvetsko* (b. 1935, graduate of the Faculty of History, University of Lviv, worked as teacher of history at a school); *Zynoviy Krasivs'kyi* (b. 1930, litterateur, author of the historical novel *Bayda* about the 16th C. Ukrainian Cossack leader Dmytro Vyshnevets'kyi. The novel was prepared for publication and edited by the writer M. Stel'makh, but was not printed owing to the author's arrest. In 1947, during mass deportations from Western Ukraine, Krasivs'kyi was deported together with his family, but he escaped while on the way to Siberia, was caught and spent five years in a concentration camp, later lived in Karaganda in Kazakhstan, where after a rockfall in a coal mine he became an invalid of the second category. Prior to his arrest he lived in Morshyn, (West Ukraine); *Mykhailo Dyak* (b. 1935, militia lieutenant); *Vasyl' Kulynin* (b. 1943, after serving in the army worked as turner at a factory in Stryi (West Ukraine); *Yaroslav Lesiv* (b. 1945, physical training teacher at a school in Kirovohrad region); *Hryhoriy Prokopovych*, history teacher; *Ivan Hubka*, an engineer from L'viv; *Myroslav Melen'*, a choirmaster from Morshyn. The three latter persons were 40 years old each. The four latter persons had previously stood trial for their participation in the national resistance.

The investigation against this group of members of the Ukrainian National Front was conducted by Lt.-Col. of the KGB in Ivano-Frankivsk, Dolgikh.

In September 1967, the L'viv regional court held a trial of Prokopovych, Hubka and Melen', sentencing the first two to six years imprisonment in concentration camps, and the latter one to five years. In October 1967, Ivano-Frankivsk regional court sentenced Kachur to 5 years deportation to concentration camps. It appears that during the investigation Kachur broke down because "for assisting in the investigation" he was released before the completion of his term in 1969. All the accused were charged with spreading the journal "Volya i Bat'kivshchyna" and other material of the Ukrainian National Front.

In the second half of November, 1967, the visiting session of the Supreme Court of the Ukrainian SSR presided by Stolyarchuk, held a trial of the leading group of "five" who were accused under Art. 56 (high treason) and Art. 64 (forming an illegal organisation). The prosecution was conducted by the deputy procurator of Ivano-Frankivs'k region, Chumak.

Defence lawyers called by the investigation differed little from the procurator. The accused were charged with: publishing the journal "Volya i Bat'kivshchyna" (which was published between 1964 and 1966, there appeared 15 issues, some issues were not submitted at the trial). A programme document "Demands of the UNF" was published in the first issue, and "Tactics of UNF" was published in the second issue — it was reprinted in the Ukrainian press in the West.

The chief publicist and theoretician of the journal was Kvetsko.

Apart from the journal, the Ukrainian National Front sent a "Memorandum of the UNF" to the 23rd Congress of the CPSU" addressed to the leaders of the CPSU and the central press organs in 1966, as well as published "The Declaration of the UNF" in connection with the press conference in Kyiv given by the former member of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists, S. Dzhugalo (probably kidnapped by the KGB in Salzburg). During the trial mention was also made of the spreading of OUN brochures and leaflets from the period 1947-49 found in three chests by Krasivs'kyi in the Carpathians, about 7,000 copies in all. The most active distributor of the leaflets was apparently militia lieutenant Dyak.

The court's verdict was that the three accused were guilty and deserved "the highest measure of punishment", but taking into account various reasons, it sentenced Kvetsko to 15 years of deprivation of liberty (including five years in prison), Krasivs'kyi and Dyak to 12 years (including 5 years in prison and the rest in a concentration camp), and Kulynin and Lesiv to six years' imprisonment in concentration camp.

Kvetsko and Krasivs'kyi are at present held at the Vladimir prison; Dyak, Lesiv, Kulynin and Melen' — at Camp No. 19 of the Dubrovlag system of camps (in Mordovia); Prokopovych and Hubka at Camp No. 3 of the Dubrovlag.

* Mykola Ruban, born in 1940, a resident of Konotop [124 m. NE of Kyiv] (in the Sumy region of Ukraine), was arrested at the end of 1968 and sentenced in 1969 by the Kyiv Regional Court to five years of special-regime corrective-labour camps for the creation of an organisation "of a nationalist character" (he was the only person to be tried) and for circulating leaflets. He is in camp No. 10 [in Mordovia].

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Yaroslav STETSKO

STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF THE NATIONAL REVOLUTION

The revolution is an organic, purposeful process, which aims at the realization of certain ideals and of a general way of life in accordance with the desires of the mass of the people. The revolutionary process represents not only a theoretical projection of the future, divorced from the present struggle, but it also represents the will to work constantly and in all fields of life for the realization of this non-fictional ideal of a future which corresponds to the needs and expectations of an intelligent human being. It is this that makes for the organic unity of our aim and the way to achieve it, i. e. the concept of liberation through revolution. At the same time it confirms the correctness of that concept and provides the justification for our ultimate aim which acts as the vitalising power in our struggle. The guarantee for the success of the Ukrainian revolution lies also in the fact that with the outbreak of the revolution our national-political and social programme becomes immediately effective and will be carried through in a radical manner.

The Ukrainian Government will at once declare all the social achievements of the Ukrainian national liberation revolution as legal and binding.

The simultaneousness of the national and social revolution is an established principle of our struggle. Our fight for liberation is tantamount to a national-political, spiritual, cultural, religious, legal, social and economic revolution. It is the fight of the mass of the Ukrainian people, organized by the political leadership of the OUN, the avant-garde of the people, and led in the military contest by the revolutionary army, the UPA.

It is of the utmost importance to our strategy that the following fact is fully understood: Our struggle is not a conspiracy, not a localized or palace revolution, not a plot by a Mafia reaching for power, it is rather the all-embracing fight for the clearly stated and unambiguous aims of our nation. The essential aim of our struggle is the

take-over of power as the prerequisite for making freedom and justice realities of the life we envisage. The political revolution must ensure that those who get the revolution under way will seize the power, introduce the new legal order, set up the new military and civil administrations and — in our case — put an end to the power of the occupant.

Due to the dominance of the national principles, our war against Russia will in its different forms be a permanent one. Our fight is against all enemies of Ukraine who conspire with the Russians to destroy our national ideals and our faith in Christ.

Russian imperialism is rooted in and supported by all classes of the Russian nation. The Ukrainian national revolution must and will be conducted by all social classes of the Ukrainian nation; it is not a question of a revolution by peasants, or workers, or the "bourgeoisie."

The credibility of the revolution depends on the realization of its aims. In the course of the revolution the main aims, including the abolition of the kolkhoz system, must be achieved. Not mere promises, but deeds alone will guarantee the continued support of the people in the further struggle and the frustration of hostile diversionist manoeuvres. The guarantee of success lies in the seizure of power by the people, i. e. the take-over from below, and in the practical measures to be devised by the people. In the transition period following the take-over of power these measures may vary from place to place in detail though never in principle, according to the judgment of the local revolutionary committees (administrative centres), consisting of nationalists (the national revolutionary elements) and spokesmen from the relevant spheres of life. By the promulgation of Ukrainian revolutionary and civil laws on the very first day of the revolution an entirely new basis, diametrically opposed to the Russian, will be established in respect of all spheres of life.

The fact that the national and the social objectives of our revolution are inseparable from each other rules out the two-stage principle of revolution, that is to say there will be no transition from an anti-regime to an anti-imperialist revolution, or from a social to a national revolution. The revolutionary climax, the armed offensive, will combine the maximum efforts of the two main elements of the revolutionary idea in order to prevent any diversionist scheme for installing forces which, though opposed to the present regime, are pro-imperialist and therefore hostile to us.

The strategy of revolution must not lose sight of the mystical elements of revolution, since these are frequently of crucial importance in gaining the victory. It is therefore essential not only to have a pragmatic solution and a detailed guarantee for the realization of given objectives, but to preserve a vision of the revolution which will kindle the imagination of the people. Communism provided such a

vision yesterday; it has now gone. The eight-hour day, for which men allegedly mounted the barricades, has never been a vision. What drove people onto the barricades was the desire for a more profound *truth*, for a visionary *order*, for *justice* as an idea and principle set against injustice. The dominant inspiration of our own revolution, which we must all further in every respect, is the vision of Kyïv, the eternal and sacred capital of Ukraine, versus Moscow; the vision of "Saint Sofia" (the eleventh century cathedral of Kyïv) versus the Kremlin.

Note: This idea seems to have an appeal of its own to "white" Russians, who possess a good deal of literature on the subject. At present they are translating into Russian the works of the Soviet Ukrainian writer Sklyarenko, "Svyatoslav" and "Volodymyr" and are printing them in their newspapers over here. These works contain many aspects of the vision of Old Kyïv, ignoring however the very special character of Kyïv's mission. Among other things the NTS puts forward the idea of Kyïv as the capital of the "Federation" and suggests the Trident (Tryzub) as the common symbol for all the peoples of the Empire. The first act of Muscovite "separatism", when the Suzdal-Volodymyr territory cut itself off culturally and politically from the greater Ukrainian state, was accompanied by a terrible massacre and the devastation of Kyïv in the year 1169. The Muscovite period in the history of Eastern Europe did not begin with the assumption by Moscow of the traditions of Kyïv, the Mother of Ruś Cities, but with the denial of the values of Kyïv and the destruction of that Mother of Cities. By their acts of aggression and murder the twelfth-century Muscovite "separatists" broke all links with Kyïv. As a consequence an entirely different spiritual, religious, cultural, national, social, economic and political world came into being where they ruled.

When the Ukrainian Prince of Galicia, Roman (1199-1205), assumed the title of "Ruler of All Ruś", the idea that Kyïv, the Mother of Ruś Cities, could be destroyed in a symbolic gesture was quite unthinkable. On the contrary, the patriotic Galician princes upheld the traditions of our eternal city and were proud of them. The rift between Muscovites and Ukrainians dates back to well before the Tatar invasion. They had become two distinct peoples. Ukraine, fully developed as a nation, ruled over the Muscovite masses, who in their turn were transforming themselves into a nation, though on principles other than the values cherished by Ukraine throughout her existence.

General observation: If non-Russians are often prepared to fight for the ideals of Moscow, why should others not fight on the side of the Ukrainians for the noble and creative ideals of Kyïv? After all, these ideals, if transformed into reality, save and deliver not only Ukraine but others from the Russian deluge in its varied manifestations!

Our strategy must aim at extending the front so that the concentration of Russian forces is not directed at Ukraine alone. An inspiring battle cry must mobilize our forces, and this is: KYÏV VERSUS MOSCOW!

II

We confirm that our revolution is both anti-socialist and anti-reactionary and that it is opposed to a restoration of the old — no longer existing — liberal-capitalist order of the landed proprietors. However this does not amount to a primacy of social considerations. First and foremost must be the national-political fight, since only after the occupant has been chased out of our country can a new social order be established. The oneness of the national with the social complex of ideals, and the simultaneousness of the national and social revolution must not be allowed to detract from the primacy of the national principle in the strategy of revolution. Phrases about latifundia and a capitalist order are bugbears which must not distract the attention from the reality which faces us in the Ukraine of today, namely the communist system. The strategy of revolution must be designed for the real circumstances of the situation, not for tilting at the windmills of imaginary dangers.

The present social-political order in Ukraine is a Russian order, whose destructive character is in quality and quantity directly associated with the Muscovite occupation power. The essence of the system is Russian, and this is why it must be eliminated root and branch. The solution is not a reshuffle of leaders, but a fundamental change of the system and in the staffing of leading positions. The Russian occupation of Ukraine is based on and maintained by the established system. For example: Decollectivization will automatically do away with many thousands of representatives of the Russian occupation of Ukraine and free for action millions of supporters of private enterprise, who in the social sense too are the mortal enemies of the Muscovites, since the latter want to rob them of their very land. Russian strategy has remained unaltered throughout the ages: Catherine II incited the so-called lower orders against "The Lord's Anointed", to the extreme horror of Frederick II; on the political plane she flirted with Voltaire. Decollectivization is of course only one of our objectives. What we are aiming at is the liquidation of the entire colonial system of economic exploitation, above all in agriculture and industry, internal and external trade, transport, and so on. We are not therefore fighting merely for the transfer of power from Russian hands into Ukrainian hands, preserving at the same time the so-called "socialist achievements", because this would mean accepting the premise that, apart from the fact that the power in Ukraine was in Russian hands, the system was good and advantageous

in all other respects, even though it was introduced at the cost of millions of lives.

The basic principles of the social revolution in Ukraine will be embodied in the following measures: Deconcentration of ownership of the means of production in certain industries and their wider distribution; restoration to the individual of the right to own property in its various forms; the gradual rearrangement of industry in all Ukrainian regions, stripping the enterprises of their colonial character. The revolution in Ukraine will move away from socialism not towards it.

The industrial centres of Ukraine, including Donbas, are for the most part russified only superficially, their labour force comprises a relatively large number of nationally conscious workers. In the days of the forcible introduction of collectivisation and the artificially created famine hundreds of thousands of nationally conscious peasants fled into industry, retaining not only their national traditions, but above all their burning hatred for the Russians and their desire for revenge. They joined with the local workers in a national-political alliance. The activist and revolutionary potential of our towns, especially the industrial towns, gives good grounds for hope, particularly when one takes into account the tremendous amount of work done in 1941 by the field groups of the OUN, the political army of the nation at that time. The Ukrainian workers will play their role in the liberation of the nation and will see to it that a part of the Russian labour force is neutralized by promising them opportunities for work and residence if they join the Ukrainian side and help to eliminate those elements who are opposed to Ukrainian statehood.

Our workers will have to carry out the following tasks: To take over and make appropriate use of radio stations and other instruments of power; to disarm military garrisons and to bring suitable groups of soldiers over to the side of the revolution; to organize and manage strike action, especially in transport enterprises, in order to paralyse the enemy and at the same time improve transport facilities for the revolutionary forces; to gain control of airfields or to assist the revolutionary forces in this task.

The workers will of course have to take industry out of the hands of the Russians, so that by immediate action the enemy is deprived of the centres of economic power. Members of the professions and higher technical grades (managers, directors, experts etc.) represent a strong and influential social-political sector of the population, and every effort must be made to enlist them on the side of the revolution. The majority of these people is against Russia in theory, but remains "neutral" in practice. The reason for this is that despite their acknowledged Ukrainian nationality they enjoy the favours of the occupant in the form of living conditions better than those of the rest of the population, and they are even given an illusion of actual power

within the framework of non-political leadership; and therefore the revolutionary spirit is lacking among them. It will be a matter of decisive importance to enlighten these groups about their role in the Ukrainian nation state and to convince them above all of the necessity of transferring the political power into the hands of the Ukrainian people. The socially uppermost class of the population is relatively the most loyal to the occupying power, yet there is no doubt that within this class too there are patriotic elements which must be made use of in carrying through the revolutionary action. This class must therefore not be excluded from our overall planning. We must aim at bringing this sector of society into effective opposition to the occupant by making clear to the individuals concerned their role in a nation state of our own and by stressing the national, as well as the social and political aspects of their position.

In the peak period of the revolutionary battle it will be a matter of the utmost importance to win over to our side a number of high officers of Ukrainian nationality, as well as of other non-Russian nationalities (as was the case in the past with men like Mannerheim, Skoropadsky, Petriv, Yunakiv, Omelyanovych-Pavlenko) so that their military know-how can be put at the service of the Ukrainian revolution.

Our revolutionary strategy must include the task of carrying through the social revolution as speedily as possible, a process which — starting from the grass roots upwards — is to ensure the immediate normalization of the conditions of production and the prevention of unhealthy social ferment. In this way all energies can be concentrated on fighting the external enemy, leaving no room for hostile diversion of any kind.

As soon as we have destroyed the present social-political order we shall remove the ground from under the feet of those elements who have been nurtured by that order and who, as the chief defenders of the Russian way of life, are anti-Ukrainian by nature.

On the other hand, the recruitment of positive elements will enable us to involve all sectors of the population, whether they are nationally conscious or not. We want to train millions of people to be economically independent, thereby gaining the material basis for our fight. Millions of people will then be prepared to defend every inch of soil, every workshop, in short their right to be master in their own house, their own native country. The main emphasis is on self-government, on decentralization, on the realization of "change from the bottom to the top" (village, district, province) the purpose of which is to involve the broad mass of the people from the very start in the revolutionary process, keeping in mind that it is not only in the capital and in the towns that the Russian occupant holds the instruments of power.

III

It will be of considerable importance to our cause to exploit the contradictions inherent in the Russian system, e. g.:

a) Moscow defends the political independence of ex-colonial peoples formerly under the Western Empires and constantly proclaims the indispensable attributes of their sovereignty, although in some cases these peoples consist of tribes that have no national or cultural cohesion. At the same time, as every Ukrainian schoolboy will notice at once, the peoples of the USSR are denied this political independence and sovereignty, a fact which is bound to produce an anti-Russian bias in the Ukrainian student. Hence the necessity for the Muscovites to create a Soviet nation, which in actual fact is to be a "Russian" nation (the complete identity of the NTS and CPSU positions is evident from the NTS Programme 1959, p. 14), so that in the face of such national unity the empty phrases about the sovereignty of the "Republics" can be dropped altogether, an approach in stark contradiction to the promotion of independent statehood for the former colonies of the Western empires. The situation becomes utterly impossible when Ukraine is described as a separate nation and founder member of the UN, etc., while the reality proves the opposite. These contradictions cannot be overcome and resolved by the Russian regime.

b) The regime encourages Russian chauvinism, wholesale russification and it revives the cult of the Tsars, at the same time denying the subjugated nations their own traditions, and this despite the fact that in their endeavour to revitalize national traditions the spokesmen of the subjugated peoples justifiably point to the example of the Russians who lay such stress on their historical tradition.

c) The permanent discrepancy between word and deed.

d) Despite the official policy of the forcible dispersal and resettlement of population groups, the ratio between non-Russians and Russians remains the same. This is particularly apparent in the armed forces, where non-Russians are discriminated against and where conflicts arise between Russians and non-Russians, as well as between officers and other ranks. Although the deportations weaken resistance in the homeland, they serve to spread and strengthen resistance among the peoples employed in the industrial complexes of Siberia, thereby opening up another front in the fight for the destruction of the Empire.

e) The so-called de-Stalinization may temporarily have saved the Empire from an internal explosion, but it has brought with it relativism in respect of dogmas, as well as revisionism and reformism, and these — although to a large degree mere window-dressing — cause further splits of opinion. The fact that new privileges are bestowed ex-

clusively on Party members and that the extent of privilege steadily increases as more and more of the people at the top of the power pyramid take advantage; and the further fact that the rehabilitation of victims of Stalinism is confined to Party members, and only to a certain category of these (from which e. g. the Ukrainian national-Communist writer Khvylovyi (d. 1933) and others are excluded); all these circumstances add to the inner conflict among Party members themselves and to the conflict already existing between Party and non-Party circles, and similarly between officers and men. By refusing to rehabilitate individuals who were persecuted on national grounds, the Party has further deepened latent antagonisms in this sector. A conflict of a permanent character exists also between the Party as the avant-garde of Russian imperialism and chauvinism on the one side and the subjugated peoples on the other. The revolutionary forces are adroitly shifting the borders between so-called revisionism and reformism in the direction of revolutionism, and are extending and exploiting "revisionism" for their own ends. As a result the rullers made a panicky return to Stalinism, only to veer away from it again afterwards. After Yevtushenko comes Sinyavsky, and after Vinhranovskyi appears Symonenko. To avoid being branded as traitors, men like Novychenko, Pavlychko and Korotych must make the best possible use of legitimate areas of criticism, area constantly widened by the Symonenkos of this age, by aligning themselves with "reliable reformers" and "de-Stalinizers." In this manner a magic circle comes into being. Having safeguarded their own persons — each for himself — against a new Stalin, the members of the Politbureau have created for each other a framework of immunity. Afraid of Molotov's inclination for one-man rule, Khrushchev summoned the Central Committee to his aid, in return for which he had to concede to it still wider powers, a measure which produced an automatic reflex of increased pressures from below. And so on.

In the opposite camp, rebel writers like Symonenko, are reflections of the national-revolutionary underground movement and of the mighty, elemental unfolding of the nation's struggle, which knows no compromise. They also reflect the mass strikes, the open attacks, the revolts in the concentration camps, the clashes in the streets of Novochoerkask, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kramatorsk and Odessa, the skirmishes of underground forces against the enemy regime, etc. Symonenko is a reflection but at the same time a driving force in shaping the future of Ukraine. It was not "liberalization" that made our opposition writers utter their mighty words — quite unlike the words of the Tychynas and Korniychuks — and it was not due to "liberalization" that our men of the opposition remained alive; it was rather the all-embracing offensive for national liberation, the dynamism of revolutionary action, that made these things possible and helped to shake the foundations of the Empire, and this

in the face of further suppression of free speech and similar repressive measures.

f) The conflict between the Communist Parties of the USSR, China, Yugoslavia, Romania etc. has thrown all the dogmas into confusion, and the intensification of the conflict creates favourable conditions for revolutionary action (which does not mean, however, political orientation towards outside forces). It points to the regime's untenable position and ideological shortcomings and its failure to maintain satisfactory relations with even so desirable a partner as the Communist Party of Romania.

In his assessment of the importance of the nationalist complex of ideas, the writer Dzyuba, in his Kyiv speech, pointed to the Chinese, Italian, and even the Russian Communists, an indication of how widespread dissensions are.

With Peking the emphasis is more on national liberation movements — that is to say those of the colonial peoples in conjunction with their nationalist "bourgeoisie" — while Moscow considers the Communist Parties as the most important force in all circumstances, the stress here being on Marxist social and class doctrines. This causes the subjugated peoples within the USSR to concentrate more on the national aspects of their liberation struggle.

g) When in the days of Khrushchev there threatened a synchronized rising of over ten million prisoners, Khrushchev undertook a reorganization of the concentration camps in order to save the Empire. This however led in 1959 to a strengthening of the forces of resistance in the homelands, and the prisoners subsequently sent back to Siberia carried the freedom bacillus with them to their new domiciles.

h) The subjugated peoples have become more conscious of their own strength, due to the fact that both super powers find themselves in an atomic stalemate and the double-edged character of atomic weapons makes it impossible to use them in combating a revolution. Furthermore these weapons are also at the disposal of non-Russians whose national-political consciousness is demonstrated by poets like Symonenko who stem from a generation whose fathers were themselves born in the "communist paradise." Moreover the Russians have developed a modern strategy of revolutionary and partisan warfare which they teach to the officers of the Frunze Military Academy with the aim of conquering the world by these means in this thermo-nuclear and ideological age of ours. The Russians themselves are showing the way to liberation, demonstrating in fact a realistic concept of liberation from the super powers and their atomic weapons. Vietnam may be repeated in Ukraine, but in reverse . . . Hungary, Poznan, Berlin and the risings in the concentration camps showed up not only a political but also a strategic Achilles heel of the Soviet empire.

i) Stalin is condemned, but not the system which the present leaders have helped to build, as Togliatti has rightly pointed out. The hopeless state of the kolkhoz economy has become obvious, while the economic success of the small private plots held by the kolkhoz peasants has had to be acknowledged. The profit element in the economy is being underlined. The principle of the necessity of competition in the state sector of industry is being stressed, while private competition is condemned. These are the obvious contradictions.

j) The basic inconsistencies of the imperial system are: the enslaved peoples on the one hand and the subjugating nation on the other; the monstrosity of communism, especially in the subjugated countries, and the small concessions granted one day and cancelled the next. The absolute superiority of the communist way of life and the communist doctrine are constantly emphasized, while the bankruptcy of the system is clearly evident.

k) As Ukrainian students are forced to go to Moscow and Leningrad for their studies, this makes it possible to spread the germs of freedom and resistance to these places. The indoctrination of students from other continents has been only partially successful. All the same the very presence of these students provides favourable conditions for undermining the system. The student demonstrations in the streets of Moscow and Leningrad on the occasion of the Siniavsky trial were inspired by Ukrainian and other non-Russian students. The sacrificial suicide of the Ukrainian student Didyk in front of the Dzerzhinsky monument was by no means intended as a protest against the Vietnam war but as a protest against the outrages inflicted upon the subjugated nations.

The contradictions are so many and so diverse that it is difficult to enumerate them. Even the mass deportations to Siberia and Kazakhstan cut two ways. The political and strategic answer to these measures taken by Moscow is the ABN — a common front of the subjugated nations no matter where their members are living.

The object of our strategy and tactics is to drive a wedge of revolutionary words and deeds into the consciousness of mankind and wherever some success has been achieved to drive that wedge still further in and widen the breach.

IV

Our strategy must be of such a character that each individual Ukrainian will find something that attracts him in our programme, that is to say in the struggle for the realization of our declared aims. He must become conscious of the fact that our struggle is as much for the daily bread of the Ukrainian people as it is for the fulfilment of our vision of a future Ukrainian State. Even in the prayer "Our

Father" there are the words "our daily bread..." This organic link between our present struggle and the aims to be realised in the future Ukrainian State strengthens the force of our revolutionary fight. The nation and every individual in it must by honest means be mobilized for the fight, and we must see to it that every Ukrainian individual and every citizen of the Ukrainian land are closely bound together in the common fight. Spiritual, social and economic aspects and values must be combined in the mobilization for the fight, so that everyone can be incorporated heart and soul in the fight. The lasting foundations of the revolutionary struggle are not provided by Hugenberg's "Nationalism of the Well-Fed", but rather by the amalgamation of national and social elements, the unity between Mazepa and Paliy, the conception of the Khmelnytskyi period, the unity of the aristocracy and the common people (Vyhovskiy and Kryvonis), the UPA as the ideological vanguard of the socio-economic principle. National Socialism was in many respects a criminal doctrine, but with regard to the internal conditions of the German nation it made a breakthrough in social reform. In short: without freedom and *national sovereignty* a country has no firm basis, without a firm basis there is no freedom, without statehood and *the power which that implies* there is no freedom and no firm basis! Away with collective farms! Return the soil to the peasants, back to private ownership! Away with state ownership of factories, the factories for the workers! *All this would remain an empty phrase were it not based on the watchword: all power to the Ukrainian nation on Ukrainian soil!*

Revolutions are made by the mass of the people. But revolutions for national liberation are logically brought to their conclusion with weapons, through the intervention of armies. The organizing political leaders of the revolution do not represent a narrow group of conspirators, but are the political organizers of the struggle of the masses in all spheres of life and, weapons in hand, are fighters fully conscious of the wide-ranging aims of the revolution. The revolutionary process of the masses will be stimulated and organized by these leaders. Never must the second rate get the upper hand in times of stress when the demands of the moment and shifting emotions disrupt planned action. These political leaders of the revolutionary organization must not become a conglomeration of diverse elements, must not turn into a "resistance", but must form a monolithic cadre of self-disciplined fighters who are spiritually, ideologically and politically in full accord. They must be an example of revolutionary and individual morality: they must together represent a revolutionary entity which will act according to the same principles in all circumstances and without further instructions. No "resistance" is able to achieve this. *The political organization will seize the initiative in forming the revolutionary army, of which it will itself be the backbone.*

Without the intervention of a national revolutionary army there can be no national revolution, that is to say it cannot be fully accomplished. *Only an army* can ultimately achieve and safeguard national statehood.

The main objective, which requires precise practical formulation, is the splitting up of the Soviet army into national armies of the subjugated peoples in accordance with the wider aim of the dissolution of the Soviet empire. This process is to crystalize around the formation of national revolutionary units outside the imperial army, which units the soldiers of the Soviet army can join. The army units of the occupying power consist to a greater or lesser extent of soldiers belonging to the subjugated nations. These will turn their weapons against the occupiers as soon as the Empire — following external or internal upheavals or failures — begins to disintegrate. The revolutionary units need not, however, be dependent upon such a failure of the Empire and its army.

The revolutionary units are in the main formed independently of the state of the empire and its army, yet there is no doubt that the dissolution of the imperialist army is of considerable and sometimes decisive help in recruiting insurgent troupes. Revolutionary units are primarily built up within the homeland of the fighters, but also outside it. These units will be joined in particular by underground members of revolutionary organizations — the political leadership of the revolution — and by volunteers from the population who have suffered most under the enemy yoke as well as by deserters from the Soviet army.

The nucleus of these national revolutionary armies will always be this armed force formed within the homeland, to which fighters from all corners of the empire will quickly attach themselves, having first helped to deal with the enemy wherever they are stationed, if there was any chance of liquidating the hostile forces.

Our battle cry shall be: soldiers of the Soviet army, turn arms against your oppressors! Split up the imperialist army! Form national units! Join the Insurgents! Wipe out traces of enemy domination! Smash all those who defend imperialism! Embrace all those who work for its destruction!

As soon as the first blows have been struck, the interests of the armed struggle will be paramount in all spheres. The main emphasis must be on the army, since it is the army that will be the main factor in the national revolution. Every aspect of life, everything we do, must be directed towards insuring victory. The economy, politics, education, etc., etc., must all take second place to the fight we must pursue with weapon in hand. This requires: wide-ranging armed action, acts of sabotage, in short offensive action on all sides. As a temporary step towards gaining statehood, a national dictatorship of armed forces is to be set up in which the decisive political role will be played by those national revolutionary elements who make no com-

promise with Moscow or anyone else to the detriment of the sovereignty of all Ukraine.

Immediately after the victory over Russia and all enemies of Ukraine, a legislative assembly will be convened in order to determine the constitution of sovereign Ukraine and the structure of the state. It will also review and where necessary correct emergency measures in social, economic and political fields which our revolutionary strategy had necessitated for safeguarding victory.

A national revolution encompasses of course a wide range of possibilities of revolutionary action, especially uprisings, which need not necessarily lead to immediate victory, but represent important stages in the revolutionary process (e. g. UPA, revolts in the concentration camps, mass strikes and street demonstrations, as for instance in Novocherkask, Kramatorsk, Odessa, Dnipropetrovsk). Failure in one uprising certainly does not mean the failure of the revolution.

V

In the case of an armed conflict between the USSR and an external enemy, consideration must be given to the attitude of that enemy with regard to Ukrainian sovereignty. There are three possibilities:

- a) a negative attitude towards our sovereignty
- b) " neutral " " " "
- c) " favourable " " " "

Re a) At a propitious moment we go ahead with our full revolutionary plans and create *faits accomplis*. By establishing a sovereign Ukrainian government on Ukrainian territory, protected by our army, we shall become a co-belligerent in the conflict, defending our territory with our own army. No foreign power will bring us our freedom with its bayonets; we shall have to seize our freedom with our own arms. For us there is always the risk of war on two fronts. Any attempt to impose upon the Ukrainian people an alien domination, alien political interests or a puppet régime will be regarded by us as just another occupation, and we shall combat it with the most suitable means available at the time. Our attitude to foreign powers will be in accord with their attitude to the problem of Ukrainian statehood, to our revolution, to the revolutionary struggle of the Ukrainian people, and to Ukrainian political and military organizations.

If, during the war, after the Russian troops have been driven out, foreign troops should march into Ukraine and try to restrict our sovereignty, then we shall have no choice but to fight for full Ukrainian sovereignty and independence from the foreign power. We must then gain control in all spheres of life and the political leadership of all the people at the grass roots, so that nothing can be done by the non-Ukrainian dominating power that runs counter to the interests of Ukraine. The only authority we acknowledge in Ukraine is one which is based on the will of the Ukrainian people and prepared to

defend its sovereignty, whether this authority stems from our own formations or not.

Re b) In the case of a neutral attitude towards us, achievements of the *fait accompli*, that is to say the establishment of our own organized power, is all the more necessary. We shall give the Western allies and other anti-Russian powers no cause for hostility towards us, but we shall defend the sovereignty of the nation, the integrity of its territory and the ethnic principle of the structure of nation states with all our might, and we shall not admit claims from any side to territory which is ethnically Ukrainian.

Re c) A favourable attitude of the free countries towards us would have to be proved by prior agreement with their governments whereby they would have to issue an official declaration as to the ultimate purpose of the liberation struggle, i. e. the destruction and disintegration of the Soviet empire. As a next step it would be necessary to spell out the principles of co-ordination between the revolutionary forces and those of the free world, ensuring our authority over all our own forces. Finally the sovereignty of the Ukrainian government over Ukrainian territory must be acknowledged by the friendly powers from the first day of its inception. Unless these prerequisites are fulfilled, we shall reject any kind of "Legion politics" and shall agree to no dealings whatsoever. No foreign intervention has so far brought freedom and independence to Ukraine; only revolution can achieve this, admittedly with the support and co-operation of an ally who treats Ukraine as a partner. We reject "intervention" as a means to liberation, for this is an imperialist concept of war. We reject an imperialist war, but we favour liberation wars because these are just wars, identical with national liberation revolutions, which will eventually be supported by the freedom-loving forces of the world.

VI

Apparently converted cadres of the CP or the Komsomol must never be allowed to become cadres of the national liberation revolution, since the former are by their structure and planning designed to serve the enemy. The revolutionary cadres must be formed by active revolutionaries, members and fighters of the underground, who are formally and absolutely opposed to the existing non-Ukrainian state of affairs in all its manifestations. These revolutionaries, who now have no legal standing, represent an entirely different revolutionary concept and envisage a pattern of life in stark contrast to the present situation in Ukraine (SVU, SUM, UVO, OUN, UPA and UHVR in the years 1944-1950).

The KGB, CPSU, the Soviet Army and the Komsomol are formations organized by the enemy on Ukrainian territory and opposed in their entirety by OUN, UPA and ABN. The KGB as an institution, as well as its members, are in all circumstances our enemies, with the

possible exception of a few infiltrated elements. In the same way the CPSU is our enemy, though again a different problem is posed by individual Party members who use their Party card as camouflage for their anti-Russian activities. SVU and OUN are Ukrainian formations, while the CPSU is not; Pavlushkiv and his SUM are Ukrainian, the Semichasny — Komsomol is not. The Soviet army, *as an organized* enemy formation, must be liquidated in the same way as the CPSU, but the majority of soldiers in the Soviet army, particularly the Other Ranks, are member of the subjugated nations, and these are our allies in the fight against this army of suppression, the tool of the occupying power. OUR ARMY IS THE UPA!

The Komsomol is an enemy formation which has forcibly enlisted a great number of our Ukrainian youth. We fight the Komsomol as an institution serving the enemy, but the members of the Komsomol in Ukraine are the children of our people, and they must be drawn out of the Komsomol and organized in another formation which opposes the system enforced by Moscow. For this very purpose Pavlushkiv has organized SUM (Association of Ukrainian Youth).

The revolution will destroy all enemy formations in Ukraine, but individual members of these formations are expected to come over to our side if they do not want to be considered enemies of Ukraine. The people in question, from all different walks of life, with the exception of obvious criminals, will be integrated into our revolutionary army of national liberation.

No leniency must be shown to members of the Secret Police, the KGB, since the blood of our fighters is on their hands, and just punishment will be meted out to criminal elements of other formations. Members of other organizations who have merely been misled and are willing to adapt and side with the revolution will be able to rehabilitate themselves in the fight against the enemy and will be pardoned. "Ukrainians for Ukraine!"

The OUN as an organization represents an entirely different conception of life, a many-sided fighting system. Through the ABN the OUN constitutes a power diametrically opposed to the CPSU and the NTS. The strength of the OUN and other cadres must not be measured and judged in terms of numbers compared with other political groupings in the emigration or with several other movements and resistance groups inside and outside Ukraine; the strength of the OUN must be measured by the strength of its ideals, the quality of its cadres, its dynamism and its attitude in relation to the CPSU, this avant-garde of the Russian nation in the fight against the Ukrainian nation, whose own avant-garde is the OUN. When we speak of the OUN we mean not only formal members of the OUN but also the leading anti-Russian and anti-Communist sections of the Ukrainian population, the battle élite of the Ukraine, who actively affirm and fight for the nationalist revolutionary cause without ever having been actual members of the OUN. Symonenko was never a formal member

of the OUN, but in spirit and political outlook he belongs to this great cohort of fighters.

Although the OUN is spiritually and morally, ideologically and politically a monolithic entity, the broad mass of the people gathered around it need not necessarily take up the OUN positions in every detail. But in our wide front there is a dynamic function for them, even for ex-members of the CP, as well as for non-Ukrainians who are Ukrainian citizens prepared to fight for the Ukrainian State. The battle cries "Ukraine for the Ukrainians", "Ukrainians for Ukraine" are not exclusive and do not preach xenophobia. No. Every Ukrainian citizen who is not an enemy of Ukrainian statehood and who contributes in however modest a fashion to the reconstruction of Ukraine has the same rights as a Ukrainian by blood. He will not be made a second class citizen by the catchword "Ukraine for the Ukrainians"; as he gives support to this same Ukraine and thus declares himself politically a citizen of that State. This entitles him to demand and receive from the Ukrainian State the rights safeguarded to him as a loyal citizen of that State even though he may be of a different nationality.

The main objective is the fight against the external enemy, but it must be remembered that the enemy's million-strong cadres work not only outside our country, but also in Ukraine itself. Thus the enemy is among us, together with his Russian and non-Russian fifth columns. The battle against the enemy and his fifth and sixth columns in our homeland will therefore be a difficult and strenuous one. No promises of equal status will serve any purpose, because those who oppress us now will never accept the fact that the *Ukrainians themselves want to rule in Ukraine*. For this reason it will be necessary to tackle the Russian minorities in Ukraine as well as their camp followers. Here one will have to distinguish between, on the one hand, strangers who have only recently settled in our country and, on the other hand, those "Little Russians" and some (politically indifferent) Russians who have been living in Ukraine for generations.

Let us never forget that we have at no time been defeated by foreign arms, but by so-called "Tatar subjects" in our history. These "Tatar subjects", inspired by alien influences, played into the hands of the enemy by exploiting social inequalities, and turned into side issues what should have been the main objective. The principal thing must always remain the nation's fight against the occupier.

We must endeavour to win back the "Little Russians" for the Ukrainian cause by stressing both the national and social issues.

The Ukrainian revolution will not turn away the generals of the Soviet army either, if they leave the army of the oppressor and come over to the side of the liberation, the Ukrainian army. A chance to rehabilitate themselves in battle will be given to all those who have erred, but have not been guilty of genocide or of murdering our

fighters for independence and freedom. But we shall rely for our strength not on the misled and converted, but on the faithful and steadfast.

The Ukrainian revolution will welcome Ukrainian Maleters, but the decisive role in the Revolution will be played by the Chuprynkas, by the Boyeslavs and not the Khvylovys, although we shall willingly take back our prodigal sons.

The success of the Revolution will not be guaranteed by a sudden attack of a secret, narrow, Mafia-type organization, which could at any rate easily be discovered and rendered ineffective, but by the irresistible penetration of revolutionary ideas throughout the whole population, who will again and again be swept into battle by the vitality and farsightedness of these ideas.

Three elements are essential for a national revolutionary underground organization, i. e. ideological unity, instruction about the political guidelines for action, and contact within the organization. Due to the appalling circumstances of the Bolshevik terrorist regime, these three requirements cannot be fulfilled to an equal degree.

The emphasis must therefore be on the first two elements, which can to a large extent compensate for the lack of systematic, organizational contacts. This is facilitated by the inherent contradictions of the existing system on the one hand and by the high technological level of modern communication media on the other, by means of which guidelines for political action can be transmitted. Occasionally this can be done by repeating accounts of actions successfully carried through which can serve as models for further actions. It is absolutely essential that Ukrainian technology inside and outside Ukraine is placed at the service of the Revolution. I refer here to individuals who are versed in the modern techniques and are expected to use them for the benefit of the national liberation. As I have said the disadvantages of the lack of a central organization will be counter-balanced by the contradictions of the Soviet system and by the modernized means of communication through which guidelines for political action can be openly and clearly got across. (A radio transmitting station is of high strategic importance and the numerous amateur transmitters in Ukraine, using the inconspicuous receivers of their listeners as relay stations for political instruction, compensate partially for the difficulties of maintaining direct contact within the organization under the totalitarian Bolshevik system.)

By virtue of the fact that we put our main hope of success on the fight of the broad mass of the people (for there is no other way to liberation), the conspiratorial element does not play a significant role in our strategy. The Hungarian revolution of 1956 was elementary in its inception. The heart of the matter lies in the stimulation of the psychological, moral and politically motivated willingness of the entire people to take up the fight and, above all, in the realization

that the aims of the Revolution must not be pursued in isolation and on too narrow a scale. The failure to realize this was the main cause of the defeat of the Hungarians, who set their hopes on neutrality and on the abandonment of the Warsaw Pact, and who openly declared their lack of interest in the liberation of other nations subjugated by Russian imperialism. The Hungarians should have looked to the underground of the East and not to the officialdom of the West which guards the status quo of Yalta, Potsdam and Teheran. The insurgent Hungarians should have planned and directed their political and military strategy eastwards.

The exact moment for national revolution cannot be foreseen or determined in advance. Conspiracies can be carried out according to precise plans, but revolutions cannot. The characteristic of revolutionary development is the fostering of the indigenous way of life of a nation in all its forms, while evolution attempts to work within an alien framework and in an alien, or partially alien atmosphere.

A revolution is a long drawn out process whose course and developmental stages cannot exactly be foreseen and planned. The Revolution involves two parallel and inseparable processes, i. e.:

a) The natural impulse of the subjugated nation (and of the subjugated individual) to liberate itself and

b) the purpose-directed, intellectual and ideological process led by political revolutionary organization representing the avant-garde of the revolution.

In the past thirty years three phases of the increasing political revolutionary potential of the Ukrainian nation could be observed, i. e.:

a) The first phase, the years 1942-1950: a widespread insurgent partisan action involving great numbers was the dominant element in the national fight on all fronts; spreading from the West-Ukrainian lands a massive rallying of forces in the entire Ukraine and far beyond its borders. At the same time, i. e. 1943-1950, there was armed and especially ideological- political support of this action by similar revolutionary elements in other enslaved nations.

b) The second phase, the years 1950-1955, began and was carried through, sometimes with the aid of weapons, by the rising of the prisoners (17-20 million) in the concentration camps, in which the deported nationalities played a leading role. This second phase was influenced by the ideological impulse of the first phase.

c) The 3rd phase, the years 1959-1971, is characterized by the shift of emphasis onto the homelands and the takeover of action by the workers and youth of the nation in the form of strikes, armed clashes with the occupier in several towns of Ukraine and other suppressed countries. The people have shed their fear.

This then is the course of events: the spread from West-Ukrainian lands of ideological-political action within the entire territory of

Ukraine, coupled with the action of revolutionary forces in other subjugated nations; the incitement of millions of prisoners in the concentration camps of Siberia and Kazakhstan, these new bastions of the national struggle; and the renewed emphasis on the fight in the homelands, this inexhaustible reservoir of revolutionary forces, but this time with Kyïv and the East-Ukrainian territories, Donbas, Odessa, Novocherkask, in the forefront. In short: from Lviv and Lutsk, via Vorkuta and Kingiri, to Odessa and Kyïv, which, as always, if the revolution is to be successful, takes the ideological and political lead.

A new progressive stage in the extension of the revolutionary liberation struggle came into evidence with the following phenomena: the activities of the underground movement and the open clashes of our workers and youth with the oppressor have had wide repercussions in Ukraine and among the prisoners in the concentration camps; the notable build-up of an indigenous Ukrainian ideology; the fight for the freedom of creative activity on the part of the young intellectual élite, and this in conjunction with separate yet continuous actions of other kinds; then the armed fight; the fight in the socio-economic field and opposition to the forcible displacement of hundreds of thousands of young Ukrainians from their homelands; the eradication of fear among the broad mass of the people; the emergence of new leaders, veritable heroes, who by their appearance in open action become objects of admiration for those around them. These are new elements in our revolutionary strategy. The young people of Ukraine, forced to study at Russian and non-Ukrainian universities, there constitute, together with the youth of other suppressed nations, an active revolutionary factor, and contribute to the dissemination of the ideology of the Ukrainian revolution, spreading beyond the borders of Ukraine. They form a revolutionary ferment which in some measure works upon the young generation of Russians and generally strengthens the potential of the Ukrainian revolution in the whole Empire. This leads systematically and naturally in the direction of the disintegration and final collapse of the Empire.

For our broadly based ideological, revolutionary offensive it would be a matter of great importance if we were to succeed in persuading our present-day Hohols (Gogols) to put their talents at the service of the Revolution and to work on our side for the dismemberment of the Empire. The role played by the men of letters and of the arts is often a decisive factor in the mobilization and realization of revolutionary ideas; of course this applies only to *writers and artists whose ideology is unambiguous and clearly expressed*.

The life patterns in Ukraine and Russia are based on two diametrically opposed conceptions, a fact which leads to a permanent confrontation of the two nations, in fact to daily skirmishes in all

spheres of life. This situation causes a continuous, qualitative and quantitative growth and ripening of the political revolution, with a clearly defined purpose, i. e. the take-over of power by the very forces who are carrying through the revolution.

As soon as the appropriate internal and external circumstances and conditions have developed and coincide, the moment for the outbreak of the revolution will have come. This is what B. Khmelnytskyi meant by the collision of two walls.

The 1948 blockade of Berlin gave the impetus for the first risings in Vorkuta; the death of Stalin and of Beria, as well as the upheaval in the Kremlin, caused a whole series of uprisings, strikes and revolts in the concentration camps and elsewhere.

The identity of the political aspirations and aims of the Ukrainian revolution with those of the liberation movements of other subjugated nations, as much as the absolute necessity of the concentration of our forces in the fight against the common enemy, i. e. Russia, and the stretching of the resources and splitting up of the forces of that enemy, require the coordination and synchronization of the national uprisings in all these countries. This constitutes the basis of the ABN conception: the principle of a country's own indigenous forces. An unreliable alternative would be to depend on foreign bayonets.

In the strategy of the revolution, the ABN concept signifies the lengthening of the enemy's front and the shortening of our own, our qualitative and quantitative fighting potential remaining the same. The aim, for instance, is to alter the ratio of 1:2 (50 million Ukrainians against 100 million Russians) to a ratio of 3:1 (all subjugated nations inside and outside the USSR against the Russians).

VII

Our enemy is at the same time the enemy of all freedom-loving human beings, a circumstance hitherto unknown in the liberation struggle of any enslaved nation. From this unique historical situation stem the remarkable missionary character as also the universal aspect of the strategy of our battle. The premises of this struggle are:

a) The subjugated nations now hold the key position and play the decisive role in the universal contest between freedom and tyranny. It is a battle for liberation, and the subjugated nations represent the vanguard of the free world. In the present unfortunate circumstances, however, the human and economic potential and geopolitical situation of the enslaved peoples increase the potential of the arch-aggressor, Moscow.

b) The division of the world into two camps — basic enemies of Moscow and of communism on the one hand and followers of Moscow on the other, active forefighters and those forced to cooperate with

Moscow under duress, nationalists and anti-nationalists, theistic and anti-theistic forces — gives us the chance, either directly or through the mediation of and in conjunction with emigrants from other subjugated nations, to form alliances with those forces and powers of the world which we can and must mobilize in favour of our ideology. The purpose is to open up a second front in the free world which is to be an extension of the first front already existing in the subjugated nations behind the Iron Curtain. This then is the second world-wide aspect of the ABN concept: the mobilization of the world's anti-Russian and anti-communist forces in support of the ideals of Kyïv, the penetration of that world by the Kyïv ideology, the confronting of the world of Moscow by the world of Kyïv.

c) The self-same strategy of fomenting revolutions and wars of "liberation" which Moscow uses in the free world should be employed among the peoples of the enslaved world. For this purpose we must try to win the support of the free world by opening up a second front and by lobbying in political, military and parliamentary circles. The fight must be carried from the sphere of contesting ideologies and political concepts into positive action and support for the struggle of the subjugated nations.

d) The offensive must be concentrated against the main enemy, the Russian empire, for the following reasons: Russia is the birthplace of Bolshevism and Bolshevism is an organically Russian and not a Chinese ideology, which goes to explain why it is of a temporary nature in China but permanent in Russia; the Russian empire is, after the USA, the greatest nuclear power in the world, and it is the centre of orientation for the great majority of the world's Communist Parties.

e) History has shown that it is an unforgivable mistake to make common cause with one tyranny against another, and of this we ourselves had bitter experience in the second world war. It is absolutely necessary to fight both tyrannies at the same time, and in present day circumstances this means the empires of both Moscow and Peking. The free world, allied with the subjugated nations, must wage a modern war, i. e. by revolutionary actions and uprisings, as an alternative to nuclear warfare. Moscow and Peking provide an object lesson for a successful strategy in the nuclear age: by initiating and supporting peripheral wars they tie up the forces of the USA and sap their strength, while they themselves, in no way engaged, simply sit back and fight to the last Vietnamese or Korean as the case may be.

f) The fact that in the present nuclear and ideological era the most promising and most humane form of warfare is partisan insurgency against aggressors of the type of Russia or Red China proves the overwhelming importance of the subjugated nations in the fight against imperialism and tyranny which threaten the freedom-loving world. Thus our revolutionary military strategy provides the solution

to the critical situation in the world today, and not only an ideological-political solution.

Our strategy must take into account the difficulties under which we have to operate: The Russian occupier has imposed upon us a tyrannical system of which the *totalitarian* aspect alone has attracted the attention of the free world, while it is the *imperialist* aspect which the subjugated nations are fighting against, irrespective of the régime behind it. When the Algerians and the Irish fought for their freedom, no-one at the time could pretend that they were fighting for a democratization of the regime. The difficulty in the national liberation struggle of Ukraine and of other nations subjugated by Russia arises from the fact that ill-informed or malicious elements tend to identify this fight for freedom with the fight merely against the regime, although the battle is against imperialism.

Our war of liberation against Poland could never be regarded as a war against the régime, but was always seen as a war of national liberation. Diem and Ben Bella in their fight against France could never be mistaken for anything but fighters for freedom. The attempts of certain circles in the free world to proclaim "democratization" as a panacea for imperialism must be seen as malicious propaganda, since the fight against imperialism does not mean a fight against the régime but against foreign domination. Although there have been distortions of fact concerning the liberation struggles of India and of Ireland, the true character of the actions of Ghandi and Nehru and of de Valera has been clear to everybody. Yet under the conditions created by a totalitarian imperialist regime, with its plans for world revolution and its messianism, it has been much easier to present an unclear, muddled, distorted and untrue picture of the character and purpose of fighters like Petlura, Chuprynka, Yefremov and Bandera.

In view of the fact that there is at present no coordination of political and military action between the free and the underground forces of the un-free world, it seems unavoidable that we should make use of the soldiers of Ukrainian origin in the Western armies for the purpose of supporting, at a given moment, future planned action of Ukrainian insurgent forces inside and outside Ukraine. Soldiers of our race and soldiers originating from other countries now behind the Iron Curtain who have been trained in modern methods of guerilla warfare, as for instance for the war in Vietnam, must be enlisted for the purpose of our liberation when the time comes.

Guerilla warfare, which in the nuclear age must be regarded as the most essential factor of modern military strategy, has for centuries been a typical Ukrainian national-revolutionary method of waging war which has grown out of the special circumstances of the development of our nation. Our coexistence with Russia had its

beginning on the battlefield and will have its end on the battlefield. The Cossack tradition, the military order of the Zaporozhian Cossacks, the "Sitch", the era of the Ukrainian Hetman Khmelnytskyi, the insurgency of the years 1919-1922, the UPA — all these are manifestations of the revolutionary, military-political liberation strategy of the Ukrainian nation, which now in the atomic age again proves to be the most effective form of modern warfare.

The plans for our offensive strategy include the following measures: the encirclement of the Russian sphere of domination by our action centres, with the help of radio (especially a strategic radio transmitter); the opening up of infiltration channels into the USSR; various methods of ideological penetration by means of political documentation and personal operations. Finally our plans will take advantage of any gap in the Iron Curtain in order to advance the decomposition process inside the Empire by systematic offensive methods.

Our planning must by no means neglect the Asian territories, especially those of the Near and Middle East, which at the moment are under a greater threat than the Western hemisphere, being in fact buffer states between the two camps. Our activities there are just as important as our activity in the USA. We must take advantage of the Communist threat to Asia in order to demonstrate that Russia is the source of all evil and that its Empire must be destroyed from within in the same way as the Bolsheviks try to destroy the free world from within. Civil war on the Chinese mainland and a movement of the liberation struggle into North Vietnam and North Korea would be an advantage to our strategy, for every weakening of Red Chinese power emphasizes that the supreme threat to the world comes from Russia, as indeed it does.

To use the conflict between Red China and Moscow for the strengthening of our revolutionary war of liberation would certainly be to our advantage, but an orientation towards Red China as an ally of Ukraine would be highly damaging, especially since at the moment Russia's back is covered in this conflict by the USA. There might well be a repetition, in a different version, of the treacherous manoeuvre of 23rd August 1939 (the non-aggression pact and later "friendship" between Moscow and Berlin) for the purpose of provoking a war e. g. between the USA and Red China, and thereby weakening both sides so that the third party, i. e. Moscow, would come out on top, as was the case at the end of the second world war.

Our strategy must take full advantage of the following: The existence of weak points brought about by the continued enlargement of the Empire and the fact that pressure is now distributed over a larger number of countries than before; hence the imperialist power has everywhere been weakened and the number of direct and indirect enemies of the Empire has increased. This side of the Iron Curtain, on the ruins of old empires, several countries have become

independent, sovereign, often anti-communist nation states, which ideologically and politically surround the last prison of nations with pincer grip. Finally this development process expands throughout entire world and spreads into the interior of the Empire, so that the ideopolitical and revolutionary potential of the subjugated nations receives new strength. Due to the dissolution of Western empires, new states, e. g. in Africa, have come into existence, some of which are pro-communist or neutral in their attitude and thereby temporarily strengthen the pro-Russian front. However this should arouse the highly civilized Ukrainian by confronting him with the fact that African tribes with little tradition have become independent while ancient civilized nations of Europe and Asia have been reduced to colonial status. Moscow's support of the former colonial peoples this side of the Iron Curtain could turn out to be a double-edged policy. Even the war in Vietnam may rebound like a boomerang. Yesterday a French colony, Vietnam today is fighting for its independence, re-unification and sovereignty, against Communism, or even against the USA (it is immaterial which). Whatever interpretation Moscow, Peking or Washington may put forward, this war constitutes an ideo-political blow against Moscow, against the centre of its Empire. This war clearly demonstrates the power of the ideology of national liberation, a force which Moscow tries to ignore and deny and whose exponents inside the Empire are persecuted with fire and sword.

The anti-Russian and anti-Communist world centre must be built up on the basis of our principles and our objectives, in accordance with the over-all strategic plan for the Ukrainian revolution, as a manifestation of world-wide importance in our ideological, atomic era. Its purpose must be a spiritual, ideological and ethnical renaissance of mankind, which is a pre-condition for the political and military offensive. It must strengthen the moral, ideological and political movement towards revolution of the subjugated nations and as a consequence help to hasten the outbreak of revolts among these nations, as the only realistic way of achieving liberation without an atomic war.

The Ukrainian revolution is not of European concern alone, it is as much the concern of Asia, Africa and America, since the Ukraine represents not a local but a universal problem and its strategy of liberation therefore involves the whole world. This is particularly true of our time.

The OUN, acting within the framework of the ABN, forms the corresponding power factor in opposition to the CPSU. The place and time of the outbreak of the Ukrainian revolution, which will be simultaneously anti-imperialist and anti-régime, cannot be foreseen, but the spark starting the fire may ignite either in Kyïv or in Odessa, Siberia or Kazakhstan. Of course the conflagration would start most rapidly in Ukraine, because the Ukrainian soil is already smouldering.

THE ENEMY AND HIS TOOLS

One thing must be made clear: our enemy is not only Russian imperialism, but the Russian nation as the exponent of that imperialism. From this it follows that:

a) Our people must not be misled into thinking that there are good Russians and bad Russians. This was the mistake made in 1918/19 when our fight for liberation so tragically miscarried, because our Socialists believed in the good will of the Russian Socialists and of Lenin.

b) The guilt for aggression, robbery and conquest, for genocide, for Communism and all the atrocities perpetrated by it must be ascribed by the entire free world to the Russians, just as the guilt for Nazism rests upon the shoulders of the Germans and not on the Belgians who followed Degrelle or the Frenchmen behind Laval and de la Roque. The entire German people were held responsible for Nazism, and the punishment — the loss of large areas of Germany, the expulsion of eleven million Germans from these territories, the division of Germany, as well as the payment of enormous sums in compensation to Israel — is borne by all Germans and not only by Nazis.

c) Responsibility for military aggression and all its consequences must be laid at the door of the Russians and their government. (A "declaration of war" is no longer the fashion, for communist states simply fall upon other states like brigands without previous announcement.)

d) Ukraine must be regarded as an ally like de Gaulle's France, not as an enemy like Petain's France.

In dealing with the Russians certain lines must be followed: the sowing of division among the Russians by recalling the traditions of Novgorod, Tver, Ryazan, whose populations were wiped out by the Muscovites in mass murders. "Great Lord Novgorod", the "Slav Nation of Novgorod", the Slovenes, and many others...

The granting of equal rights to Russians in Ukraine if they participate in the armed fight of the Ukrainians against the Russian occupying forces and show themselves loyal to the Ukrainian revolution and the Ukrainian State.

The recognition of the right of the Russians to have their own nation state within its ethnographic boundaries, provided that the strategically and economically important positions and territories where Ukrainians previously lived but from which they were forcibly evicted by the Russians are restored to the Ukrainian State. No Russian group ostensibly favouring self-determination should be accepted by us as an ally, since such an attitude is pure hypocrisy. Lenin not only claimed to be in favour of self-determination but even

went so far as to sanction the secession of federated nations from Russia—provided that this was also the will of the Russian proletariat. Any misguided trust would only cause confusion and weaken the front of our nation. The only Russians who could be considered as “rehabilitated” — and as yet there is no sign of their existence — would be those who in actual fact and in opposition to their own society had over a number of years stood up for the concept of the dismemberment of the Russian Empire into sovereign nation states formed by the now subjugated nations within their ethnographic borders, and who had for this attitude been persecuted by their own society, that is their own countrymen, and who would be willing to take up arms against their own countrymen, the Russian imperialists. Only under these conditions would any group of Russians be acceptable to us. As long as this is not the case we must assume that the Muscovites are uniformly and collectively against us. No-one, neither Ukrainian nor foreigner, must be allowed to confuse this issue by false formulae of compromise. Either one is for the dissolution of the Empire or one is against it. The choice is clear and simple.

In the Army the General Staff must be separated from the lower ranking officers and the men. The main point to be kept in mind here is the fact that the Soviet Army consists of many different nationalities. We must appeal to the officers, and even to the non-Russian generals, to come over to the side of the Revolution and must guarantee them equivalent positions if they genuinely embrace our cause. In short, we must wherever possible erect a front against the enemy and try by all available means to destroy the enemy apparatus from within.

The Komsomol members must not be treated as enemies but as individuals who have been forced by the enemy to join the Muscovite organization. Our attack is only against the leaders, the real traitors and Quislings, while the rank and file of the Komsomol must be urged to take the side of the Revolution. The watchword “away with the Komsomol” does not mean an indiscriminate condemnation of Komsomol members.

Discretion must also be exercised in dealing with Ukrainian members of the CP, not all of whom should be regarded as enemies. Action must however be taken against those who have become traitors to their native land, who consciously and ruthlessly and over the dead bodies of their compatriots aid and abet the enemy in establishing and maintaining the occupation of Ukraine. Those who turn against the occupier will be forgiven their errors if these do not involve murders committed against their own people. Judgment should be left to the local population, i. e. the local Ukrainian Courts, which will know best who deserves punishment and who, despite Party membership, may go free, or may even be given a position in the new government. If it is true that Symonenko held a Party card,

he nevertheless did more to arouse anti-Russian feeling than many cowardly non-Party members, "specialist", careerists in well-paid jobs. A distinction must be made between eager members and those who used the Party card as camouflage for subversive activities. The CP and the Soviet Army must be combatted as institutions, as the tools of the occupying power, but their individual members must be treated on their merits, so that the better elements can be sifted out from these enemy institutions and lined up against the Russian tyrants. The Party is a much more thorny problem than the Army, since the latter contains the sons of our people who have been forcibly enlisted. The majority of soldiers is on our side.

The general line of our strategy is to make our invincible ideology the spear-head of our offensive wherever Ukrainians and other non-Russians are forcibly or "voluntarily" gathered together.

The various social, cultural, professional organisations now monopolized and controlled by the enemy should be made the targets for the infiltration of our ideas and for our organized action. The purpose of course is to transform these organizations from within into a force acting against the enemy; we must turn them into instruments to be used in our struggle.

Our strategy and tactics must include a plan for eroding Russian morale from within, thus weakening the front which would otherwise face us as a solid formation. We must endeavour to demonstrate to the Russian people the senselessness of their continued conquest and occupation of other countries, and we must point out to them the consequences which would follow for them in case of defeat if they do not take a stand against their political and social leadership and if they do not content themselves with their own nation state within its ethnographic borders.

All mankind and each single individual is reminded that the punishment of Nemesis is inevitable. Historical responsibility for the alliance with tyrannical totalitarian regimes will rest with the politicians of the West, and not only of the West, and not only with the politicians — just as today many people bear the responsibility for collaborating with the Nazis and above all for the crimes committed by Nazism. How much more heinous are the crimes of Bolshevism and how much greater is the number of nations and individuals against whom they have been committed, and how much longer has the Bolshevik tyranny lasted: We lay the utmost stress on this historical responsibility everywhere and in all our actions, we who never have made and never will make a compromise with the ANTI-CHRIST, with tyranny and the negation of human dignity, with genocides and blasphemers!

NO-ONE CAN ESCAPE THE JUDGMENT OF HISTORY!

Olexa WOROPAY

CUSTOMS OF OUR PEOPLE

(*Conclusion—6*)

SPRING TIME

Introduction

When Nature wakes up after the winter sleep in our land, Ukraine, a cycle of spring folk festivals begins connected with old myths and beliefs. They are accompanied by songs, games and choral round-dances. The folk image of spring is an image of beauty, strength and hope.

The main festival of this season is Easter — the most important Christian festival in Ukraine. Choral round-dances of girls, gay gathering of young people on the streets in villages, children playing, the welcoming of the birds returning from southern countries, May festivals — all this is a charming fairy tale of old times when the world was young. All these Ukrainian spring voices of our ancestors, and their poetry of our Fatherland are dear to our hearts.

Our ancestors, ancient Slavs, like the Anglo-Saxons used to divide the year into two parts: winter and summer. That is why in old folk ballads and fairy tales winter fights not spring but summer, usually a beautiful young girl.

The ancestors of the Germans used to divide the year into three parts: winter, spring and summer. It is possible that with the development of relations between various countries the Slavs have borrowed from the Germans the three part year. Only much later did the Slavs begin to divide the year into four parts: winter, spring, summer and autumn.

“Stritennia”¹

On that day, they say, Winter goes in to the place that Summer was in and Summer comes instead of Winter. While they are changing places they meet and talk between themselves: “God bless you, Winter” — says Summer. “God bless you, Summer” — answers Winter. “You can see, Winter, what you have done” — grumbles Summer. “All that I have produced you have eaten up.”

¹ 15th February, N.S. (2nd Feb., O. S.).

According to people's beliefs Summer meets Winter twice a year: on the "Stritennia" — 15th of February in the spring and on the day of Saint Anna — 3rd of December, in the autumn. In the spring the winter is a very old woman and the summer — a young girl. Winter is led by grandfather Frost. Winter stoops, shakes all over and just, only just walks. Her furcoat is very old, all in holes, her boots are torn and in her shawl, which she has on her head, mice have made holes and from them one can see gray hair sticking out. In her hands Winter carries a broken pot full of ice and across her shoulders hangs an empty bag.

Summer has a flower crown on her head, a brightly embroidered blouse, and a green skirt. She is a gay and beautiful girl. She carries in her hands a sickle and a sheaf of rye, wheat and other agricultural plants.

When they meet on "Stritennya" old Winter and young Summer argue between themselves who has to go and who should return. If in the evening it becomes warmer — Summer has won. If colder — winter.

"But even if Winter kicks back it will not help her, because when Summer smiles the Sun will shine, the wind blow and earth will wake up" — says a fairy tale about the meeting of Winter and Summer.

Farmers try to find out what kind of a harvest they are going to have this year. They put a plate with corn out for the night. If in the morning it is covered with dew — harvest will be rich; if there is no dew it is a very bad sign.

In olden times on this day they used to bless water in the churches of the Ukraine. Together with water they used to bless candles. Candles blessed on this day have been called "thunder candles", because they burn them in front of the icons during thunderstorms to save people and farm animals from thunderbolts. These candles are also put into the hands of a dying man.

On "Stritennia" when people return home from church they light a "thunder candle" in order that "spring floods do not damage the corn and frost does not kill the trees."

When the priest has blessed the water in church, farmers put it into a new container, bring it home and preserve it. This water is supposed to have magic powers. According to beliefs it is a healing water. People massage painful places with it and believe that this will help.

With this water farmers sprinkle farm animals and give it to them to drink in order to save animals from sickness. Bee keepers keep this water and sprinkle bee-hives with it every first Sunday after the new moon.

In old times when a "chumak" (carter) started on his journey the owner used to give him bread and salt and sprinkle with "Stritennia"

water oxen, cart and the "chumak", saying: "God help you and keep you during your journey."

If the son was going to war, his father would bless him and sprinkle him with "Stritennia" water saying: "God keep you and save you." Strong belief in the power of "Stritennia" water still exists among the peasants.

"Forty Saints"²

On the day of the Forty Martyrs the magpie puts 40 small twigs in its nest, from the southern countries come 40 migrant skylarks. Housewives bake 40 cakes on this day in the form of birds and give them to children so that 'the poultry breed well.'

It can still happen at this time of the year that 40 corners will be covered with snow and one can still expect 40 frosts to come. "But it is only expectation because winter has already begun to loose its power."

If the spring comes early then farmers start to plant peas. There is much controversy in folk tales concerning this fact. Some people say that those who plant peas on Forty Saints day will have a rich harvest: 40 pods on one stem and 40 peas in one pod. Other people say that it is a sin to plant peas on this day because it is a religious festival.

Greeting the Spring

One of the most interesting customs of old Slavs, our ancestors, was the greeting of Spring.

Folk customs created a poetical image of Spring as a beautiful young girl who sits in the orchard with her needlework and sometimes as a young woman who soon will give birth to a daughter.

She, this beautiful girl or a woman, is very rich, people expect from her generous gifts and therefore watch for her appearance early in the morning before sun-rise: they go up hills, climb the gates, climb on roofs of store-houses or barns invite the Spring with songs:

Come, Spring, come,
Come, beautiful, come,
Bring us good harvest
And lots of flowers.

The people also ask Spring about gifts:

"Beautiful Spring, what have you brought us?"
— "I have brought you Summer and green herbs."

But people themselves also bring some gifts for Spring. On the "Forty Saints" day they bake cakes in the form of birds, skylarks, which at

²) 22nd March according to the new calendar and 9th March — according to the old (Julian) one.

that time come back from southern countries. This is a gift for Spring which has been known in different forms in various Slavonic countries.

Peasant women on that day, finish weaving their linen, go with a piece of it into the field, bow in all directions, stand with their faces to the sun-rise and say the following: "Here is a new linen for you, mother Spring." Then they spread the linen on the ground, put on it a pie and go away hoping that flax and hemp will give a good harvest this year." Spring is usually invited and greeted by women, girls and children. The Spring greeting ends the first period which includes March — the first spring month.

Lady Day (Annunciation)³

"It is a very big religious feast. One should not work on this day. Even the bird does not make its nest on this day" — people say.

Annunciation is considered to be an important feast. In the morning, when there is a service in the church, people let out birds which have been kept in cages "so that they sing and glorify God asking from Him happiness and luck for the people who freed them."

To free birds on Lady Day was considered to be a virtue. In olden times people specially used to buy birds in order to free them on Lady Day.

Coming home from church the farmer frees all animals, even dogs and cats are taken outside in the sun in order that they feel spring and look after themselves.

They bless the communal bread in the church on this day. When the bee-keeper feeds his bees he puts in the honey powdered communal bread blessed on Lady Day) in order that bees breed well.

Lady Day communal bread is mixed also with the soil and is buried in the four corners of the cornfield "in order that the rain cloud does not avoid the field."

Farmers' wives sow seeds for seedlings of cabbage very early in the morning on this day "in order that the cabbage grow quickly and be large."

God blesses plants on Lady Day and everything begins to grow. The first spring flowers — snow-drops (*Scilla L.*), primroses, cowslips, anemones begin to flower. "If you find cowslips on this day then pick them up, throw them under your feet saying: I walk, I walk on cowslips. Let God allow me to walk on you next year as well." "To walk on cowslips" means to live. "Not to walk on cowslips" — means to die. "It is very unlikely that he will walk on cowslips" — they say about a man who, they think, will die soon.

The same they say also about anemones (*Pulsatilla*). "Help me, my God, to walk on anemones next year as well."

³) April 7th, N. S. (March 25th, O. S).

If on Lady Day a girl, who is walking to get some water from the well, finds a primrose flower — it is a sign that she will marry this summer. "The primrose is a prophet of girl's wedding. It is a magical flower and there exist many legends and fairy tales about it.

The Snow-drop is a symbol of hope, happiness, young beauty. "If you find a Snow-drop on Lady Day, pick it up and put it near to your chest. At Easter when they start to sing in church "Christ is risen" — take it out and put it near the icon. It will bring you happiness." "On Lady Day put a Snow-drop in water and then with this water wash your face in order to be beautiful."

On Lady Day after lunch girls dance and sing near the church for the first time. This choral dance is called "Crooked dance." Holding each other's hands the girls in a long line run among three willow poles thrust into the ground and sing:

"We dance the Crooked dance
And cannot finish it."

Singing these words a row of girls run like a snake, winding in and out. At the end of the dance girls talk to the spring:

"The Spring has come back to life,
what have you brought for us?"

— "I have brought you dew
and maiden beauty."

Up till now they only waited for spring and called it, but now the spring is already here, it has come to power. By their "Crooked dance" the girls greet the spring, say: "Hallo" to it.

Archangel Gabriel (Blahovisnyk — Good news bringer)⁴

"Blahovisnyk" is what our peasants call Archangel Gabriel. People believe that Archangel Gabriel is a master of lightning. "Illya — is master of thunder, and Gabriel — of lightning. We respect both of them, because lightning and thunder are dangerous for us." They celebrate "Blahovisnyk" in order that Gabriel "would not burn their houses with lightning."

According to old beliefs on "Blahovisnyk" thunder and lightning wake up after their winter sleep, and therefore "after Blahovisnyk one can expect thunder every day."

In many regions of Ukraine there are many fairy tales and legends concerning thunder and lightning. In all these stories people try to express their own view and to give explanations of these phenomena.

In the village of Starosillya, Chernihiv region, children are told: "The thunder and lightning occur because God gives to Gabriel keys to

⁴ 8th April, N. S. (26th March, O. S.).

open the heavens so that the rain will water the earth." In the same village there is also another explanation of this phenomenon. They say: "The God Sabaoth throws stones in the heaven and they roll with such a force that it causes the lightning and peals of thunder."

In the Kiev region, in the village of Hromy, they explain those phenomena differently: "When the big cloud forms then archangel Gabriel mounts it as on a horse and whips it with a golden whip."

May

1st May as a National festival is not known in Ukraine. Nevertheless it was a gay festival of students during the Hetmanshchyna period (16-18 centuries) in Ukraine.

In Kiev on the 1st May all the students of the Kiev Academy together with lecturers and "lovers of science and arts" (patrons of literature, science and arts) would go outside the town on the Skavyka hill which is situated among valleys of Hlubochytsia. Lecturers of poetry had a duty to write comedies and tragedies every year especially for May recreation. Therefore they would put on some plays in the great wide open spaces and sing in a choir not only ordinary songs but religious cantatas as well.

"Lovers of science" were, as we can see from various sources, merchants, landowners, rich cossack officers. They used to be invited by the students on the understanding that they would bring something "for the glory and development of academic subjects." It could have been a barrel of beer or mead, it could have been a roast pig, a barrel of pig fat, fresh bread or some other proof of their "support for science and arts."

Such school recreations took place in May three times: on the 1st, 15th and 30th. Those were gay days for the Ukrainian young students. This festival declined after the forcible liquidation of Hetmanshchyna — at the end of the 18th century.

"Vesnyanky" — Spring Songs and Dances

Spring customs, songs and choral-dances at Easter in central Ukraine situated around the river Dnipro, are called "Vesnyanky" and in the Western part of the Ukraine — "Haïvky", "Yahilky" or "Hahilky."

"Vesnyanky" are sung from Lady Day to Whitsun or until the time when people go into the field to weed the millet. They are sung everywhere: on village streets, in the village square, near the church, in the forest, and in the fields, but more often in the green meadows near a river or a lake.

"Haïvky" in Western Ukraine are sung only during Easter week, in the square near the church or in the cemetery.

"Vesnyanky" and "Haïvky" are mainly songs for girls. Boys take part in them very rarely. Usually the boys only watch the girls, listen

to their singing, and from time to time jokingly break up the girls dances for several minutes.

Sometimes the boys play their own games near the place where girls dance. They wrestle, organize races or "build pyramids" by climbing on each other's shoulders.

When girls go to sing and dance "Vesnyanky" or "Hahilky" they wear white embroidered blouses and on their heads they wear flower crowns or just put some flowers in their hair.

When girls sing they hold each other's hands and in such a way form a ring, a semi-circle or a chain and in such formations dance to the rhythm of a song. The speed of their movement depends on the tempo of the song. Therefore it can be slow or quick.

"Haïvky" is a very old name for our choral round-dances. It probably has been left over from the time when our forefathers carried out ritual songs and dances around sacred trees.

"Vesnyanky" is a newer word, which, as one can guess, appeared in a period when the word "vesna" (spring) came into our vocabulary.

At the beginning of Christian times choral round-dances, as a part of pagan religious rituals, were forbidden by the Christian church. That is why, as our historians think, the chronicler calls "Haïvky" "devil's games."

The following is written in the "Nachalnyi litopys" (Primary Chronicle): "People gathered for games, dancing and singing devil's songs." Or: "... leaving all their work they gather for games."

"Haïvky" and "Vesnyanky" show layers of various historical periods and mythological beliefs. The majority of them are plays with the distribution of parts between two choirs in the form of a dialogue. When these plays are performed the titles of the songs are acted out.

Songs always have some content, they tell about some concrete event, but in form they are simple and short. The song plays a secondary part in the spring round dances. The main thing is not the song but rhythms and dance forms which aim to raise the mood of the participants, stir up energy and pass it on to the surrounding world in order to wake the powers of nature to a new life, action, movement and animation. That is why the majority of "Haïvky" and "Vesnyanky" have a gay optimistic character.

In all European nations a swallow is a symbol of spring who on its wings brings the first sunny days. In Greece children have for over a thousand years sung every spring, a song about a swallow. In our Ukrainian folklore there is also a song about a swallow which comes home from southern lands and wakes up a farmer urging him to prepare his farm for the coming spring. This song was collected in the 19th century as a carol but it is possible that it belonged in earlier times to the ritual songs.

Spring songs with a historical theme

Among spring ritual songs are songs which describe historical events and historical persons. They include songs even about an early — Kievan Ruś — stage of Ukrainian history. As an example of such "Vesnyanka" can be a song "Gate man."

Cult of ancestors

As it is well known, in olden times people believed that in spring, when all nature becomes alive, all dead people come "into this world" and during spring festivals enjoy themselves. They even feast together with living people. Many customs are connected with this belief (we will return to it later) but "Hahilky" are now, and were in the past, closely connected with this belief — the cult of the dead. To this end the custom is to dance and sing on the cemetery or near the church. At this time girls and young women sing and dance in the cemetery and boys play their games there in order to help the dead.

Agricultural themes

Our ancestors were farmers. The work of the field: ploughing, sowing, harvesting of corn or fruit and vegetables — all this was as it is now, the main preoccupation of the majority of the Ukrainian population. It is natural therefore that in customs, especially connected with spring ritual songs and games, agricultural themes occupy one of the most important places. Charming dances, songs and games of agricultural types belonged in the past, probably, to the complex of mimical and magic plays whose task it was to wake up and strengthen and develop natural forces and to make them increase the harvest. With time the elements of play, as a recreation for young people, began to prevail over the magical elements. Nevertheless the initial mimical and magical elements can be seen now quite clearly in many spring ritual songs, games and round dances.

Spring wedding motifs

Wedding motives can be seen in spring songs which we have classified as historical. In "Haïvky" with agricultural themes courting is mentioned almost always. But there are many "Vesnyanky" and "Haïvky" in which wedding motive: courting, engagement, weddings, loved and unloved, young loved and old unloved, duets of a young couple — are the main subject of the song.

Spring songs with travelling motifs

In the past spring was time of the year when in many countries military activity was revived. It was time of military marches. In old Rome the week from the 17th to 24th of March was a week of "cleaning the arms" when special military dances were performed.

Among Old Germanic tribes inspection of military forces also took

place in May. In the poetry of Old Germans spring is described as the time of war, battle and conquest of enemy territory.

In our, Ukrainian tradition spring also was the time of military marches. One of the "vesnyanky" says that spring brought for girls flower-crowns and for boys sabres:

"For boys it brought sabres
to fight in the war . . ."

The first furrow and beginning of spring sowing

Field work begins with the spring ploughing and sowing. On the success of this fundamental agricultural work depends the well-being of a farmer and his family during the whole year. Therefore it is understandable that the beginning of ploughing and sowing is a solemn occasion.

In our ethnological literature, to our regret, we have few descriptions of customs which are connected with the first furrow and beginning of sowing.

Remains of the old customs concerning the appeal for success of ploughing and sowing we have in Christians carols. During the New Year day children throw corn around saying: "Let this year harvest be better than the last year." We have detailed description of the customs connected with the first journey to the field with a plough from the southern part of the Ukraine in the later years of the 19th century. From this description we find that before going into the field all members of the farmer's family used to gather in the room, light candles in front of icons, pray and then sprinkled the oxen with blessed water so that they would be healthy and strong.

During the journey to the field and in the field farmers would sing, during ploughing, half-jocular songs. It is quite possible that after the first day of ploughing a festival dinner or supper took place. Asking old people about this I was told the following: "When I was still a boy I used to go with my father into the field to plough. We had horses, we did not keep oxen, and I led those horses during ploughing. I led the horses and father looked after the plough. In that manner we did our ploughing (we did not have tractors in those times). After a whole day of working and shouting at horses one would be dead tired in the evening. With difficulty one would get home in the evening where mother would meet us at door with bread and salt, as if we were important guests. In the room the evening meal would already be waiting for us on the table: cakes with honey and poppy seeds — that was for a good harvest. For father there would be a tumbler of *horilka* (vodka) and for me some present: a new cap, shirt or even new boots."

In early spring, when snow would melt farmers used to ask priest to organize a public prayer on the village green and to bless the seeds for sowing. During the time when farmers were preparing to

start sowing in a field for the first time they would wear the shirts in which they had last been to communion in the church. They believed that this would keep weeds away from the cornfield.

Before going to the field to sow — in the same manner as before the first ploughing — all the family prayed. The farmer would take a “cross” baked before Easter, during lent, seeds, and equipment and would go to the field. Coming to the field he would take the “cross” and put near the furrow where the plough made a turn. Then he would stand with his face to the East and say the “Our Father.” After this he would take in his hands seeds and throw them crosswise saying: “Give us, God, a yield that would be enough for everybody.” Then he would start to sow. Finishing sowing the farmer would start to harrow. When he would come to the place where he put the cross near the furrow, he would stop, take off his cap and cross himself. Then would pick up the cross, break it, pour some water over it then eat it together with all those present in the field including animals: horses, oxen and dog which usually would run after him to the field.

In other parts of Ukraine the farmer, before he started to sow, used to cross himself and would eat the Lady Day communal bread. It is considered that it is better to sow the first corn-field on an empty stomach — “for good yield” — and with prayer — “in order that the field is free from weeds.

He who swears while sowing will have a bad harvest, mostly thistles, because people believed in old times that behind the man who swears while sowing there walks the devil and sows thistles.

When the work on the field is finished the farmer would pray and then say: “Field, field, give me back the power I put into you.”

That was how the people used to conduct the first ploughing and sowing in Eastern Ukraine, on the left bank of the river Dniro. On the right bank and especially in Podillya those customs were slightly different. But everywhere it was a solemn occasion when people prayed and had deep respect for their honest agricultural work.

The day of Saint Ruf (Rufus)⁵

“On the day of saint Ruf everything pushes out of the ground: grass, all greenery etc. Everything that has been sown and planted on this day will grow very well. All reptiles crawl out of the ground from their holes and migrating birds return home.” That is what people say about the day of Saint Rufus in the Kharkiv region of Ukraine.

In the Kherson region people believe that on that day the cuckoo starts its journey back from the South: “a steward of the paradise where snakes and birds live in the winter.”

⁵) 21st April, N. S. (8th April, O. S.).

But the main point of this day is according to people's belief, that on that day one should not go to the forest because "there are snakes everywhere, this is their day."

However, after the snake has bitten someone it rushes to the water. If it is in the water before the person who was bitten then the man or woman has to die: "That is why if the snake has bitten you then leave everything and run to the nearest water — river or well. When you will come to the water wash the place which has been bitten saying: "On the Yenisei mountain there is owl's nest and in this nest there is a tsarina — owl. Call your servants, take out your teeth gray, white, striped, home, meadow, forest, earth and water, and the yellow ones." This one has to say nine times.

And if the snake bites a farm animal, then one also has to wash the bitten place with water and to say the following: "The blue sea overflowed. On the seventh sea there is an oak: under the oak lies the snake. Tell your landlords and foremen to come and take the teeth. Let them come and take the teeth from the spotted cow."

The snake is a "devil's creature" and therefore all that is the worst comes from the snake. "Snake-like and devil's — is the same" — says the proverb. The deep loathing of this reptile can be clearly seen in proverbs. For instance: "Do not keep a snake near to your chest because it will bite you", "If the snake will not bite it will hiss" "A snake breathes through his words", "He keeps a snake under his shirt", "Somebody else's hands are good only for catching a snake."

In the Lubni region Rufus is known as Saint Snake-man. On this day one should not go into the forest as was mentioned above.

"Willow" Sunday (Palm Sunday)

The Sunday before Easter is called "Willow" Sunday or "Floral" Sunday and week before it — "Willow week." According to the old popular belief during the "Willow week" one should not either sow or plant anything which grows in the soil: potatoes, beetroots, carrots, radishes, onions and garlic because all these plants would grow as tough as willow.

On "Willow" Sunday they bless willow and near the church several piles of freshly cut willow branches are prepared before. Many people and especially children attend service in the church. It is really children's festival. They take pleasure from willow as the first present to them from the spring.

After the church service the priest blesses the piles of willow branches and sprinkles them with holy water. After this children like ants attack the piles of willow and everybody tries to get the biggest branch he can, because, they say, it will bring luck. Children swallow several buds of blessed willow in order that "the throat does not get sore." When children walk home from the church they jokingly whip

each other with willow, saying: It is not I who whip — it is the willow that whips,

In a week's time we shall have Easter.
The red painted eggs are very near.

Or, when children lash one another they wish each other:

Be as big as a willow,
As healthy as water,
As wealthy as the Earth.

In Western Ukraine they say:

It is the willow that lashes — not I,
In a week's time we shall have Easter.

When children come home their mother puts one part of willow behind an icon. When they take the animals to the pasture-ground they will use this branch as a whip "to drive the devil away." Another part of blessed willow is taken by the father or eldest son to the garden and stuck into the damp soil "for luck" to the saying:

"Grow, willow, high
And deep into the soil."

"White" week

The last week before Easter is called "White", "Clean" or "Passion" week. During this week housewives have much to do. They make new garments, wash everything washable in the house: chairs, tables, windows, doors etc. and whitewash houses, store-houses and stables. There is the following proverb for this time: "I have to sew and to clean everything because tomorrow is Easter."

In the old times people faithfully believed that during the white week all plants which give harvest above the ground should be sown and planted: beens, peas, grain and especially flowers. If sown in this week all these plants would grow very well and would give a very good harvest.

Every day of this week has its own meaning, according to popular beliefs concerning pre-Easter rituals.

Every farmer tries to finish sowing early sown grains before Thursday in order to enjoy more the greatest spring festival-Easter.

Maundy Thursday

On this day everybody washes himself thoroughly and puts on clean clothes. In the house and outside it everything should be tidy and clean in preparation for the Easter festival. Girls, in order to have a nice clean skin wash their faces early in the morning and pour the water out after washing at a road junction. But it has to be done in such a manner that nobody sees this. Otherwise it will not help.

Grain sown on this day will be free of weeds. When the lady of the house makes fire she puts in it some salt in a piece of cloth. when the cloth burns they take the salt out and save it for the Easter Day. When they come home from the church on the Easter morning and sit at the table for a meal, the head of the family will put this salt on a piece of bread and place it in the "holy corner" under the icons. In the past this salt used to be given to farm animals as a medicine for stomach pains.

On Thursday in the evening a special service in the church is held during which they reproduce the events which led Christ to the cross. This is a very sombre day and especially evening: there is no laughter, singing or loud talk and peace and quiet reign everywhere in houses, on streets and other places.

When people return home from the church they try to bring burning candles home. In the house they make a cross on the beam of the ceiling with the flame of this candle and keep the candle itself till Maundy Thursday the following year. It is also used during the year. If somebody dies in the house they put this candle in his hands before his death. It also burns near icons if there is a bad storm. The bee-keeper goes to his bees in winter with this candle. It is a bad sign if this candle goes out on the way home from church. So that this will not happen people make special lanterns. This is usually made by children from coloured paper or glass. It can be in the shape of a star, moon, house or even a church.

Usually people return home from the church late in the evening when it is already dark and those multicoloured lanterns, which move from the church along village streets make a fairy-like carnival of lights which move from the church in all directions in a sleepy dark village.

Good Friday

On this day people do not eat till the image of dead Christ embroidered on a piece of material is taken out of the altar and laid on the table (tetrapod) in the middle of the church. This usually takes place at about 2 p.m. In some regions of Ukraine it is the custom to carry this image of dead Christ three times around the church. It is, as a rule, a very sombre solemn ritual. All the people, dressed in gaily embroidered white dresses stand around the church several rows deep. Girls have flower crowns on their heads and flowers in their hands. This would seem to be a gay appearance for Good Friday. But everybody behaves so quietly and solemnly that dresses and flowers do not spoil the sombre occasion.

In Western Ukraine the church bells do not ring from Good Friday till Easter Sunday, bell-ringer knocks on a thick wooden board with two wooden hammers and in this manner informs people that there is a service in the church. In Western Ukraine the image of Christ "Plashchanytsya" is everywhere carried around the church.

In a quiet peaceful mood people return home from the church. At home all family sits at the table for a meal. But the meal on this day is meatless and milkless. They usually eat sauerkraut with oil, freshly baked bread with garlic or potatoes baked in their skin with salt. It is a sin to sew on Good Friday. It is also sinful to chop wood. Women on this day bake Easter bread and cakes and paint eggs. Men go in the field to sow or plough. Small children do not play gaily on this day but help their parents with their work or play quietly in the sun outside in front of the house.

Saturday before Easter

On this day people do not work in the field. Farmer puts his farm in order: cleans his farm animals, prepares fodder for the whole festive season. His wife cooks and cleans the house. And so everybody is occupied till the evening. In some districts of the Podillya region parents dress their children up in the evening of the Saturday before Easter, give them presents and tell them old Christian legend of how, when people take "plashchanytsya" from the church to carry it around the church and there is nobody in the church, angels take Christ out of the grave and saints come down from icons and greet each other with the Easter greeting: "Christ is risen" — "He is risen indeed."

This legend used to be told very quietly and gravely in the candle light and it had a strong effect on the religious upbringing of the children.

In addition, on this evening before going to church, parents tell children about great suffering of Christ for all people, about his resurrection as a symbol of victory of good over evil and of truth over falsehood. Children listen with attention to parents, feel sad because of Christ's suffering and are happy hoping for this resurrection.

Mother, having already finished her work, washes, dresses in her best dress, prays before icons and then prepares Easter bread, cakes, cheese, butter, eggs, painted eggs, sausage, pig's fat, horse-radish sauce, salt, etc. for blessing in the church. All this she puts into a new basket, she also puts in a large candle and covers it with a clean embroidered towel.

Late in the evening father prepares the horses and the carts, puts a lot of fresh hay in the cart, and covers it with a rug, puts in the basket and together with mother gets into the cart and they go to church for the whole night service.

The boys and girls, dressed in their Sunday best, go to the village common to the bonfire.

Night before Easter

In the evening when it has become dark, on a high hill near the village the fire is laid out by young people. Around it in groups stand young boys and girls. The girls look with awe on the huge fire.

Long time ago in pre-Christian times, some researchers say, our forefathers held festivities connected with Lelya, supposedly the pagan god of love. Now Easter has become a Christian festival but even now young people, according to old customs, light a large open fire. Some people say that this fire symbolizes rise of the sun. Even so it is a very old and enjoyable custom. Almost everybody is out during this night (excluding children). Young people enjoy themselves around the fire and older people stand in the church and listen to the reading of the twelve stations of the cross and waiting for the hopeful gay announcement by the priest: "Christ is risen."

In Western Ukraine the custom of greeting this joyful announcement by a shot from a mortar has survived until the present day. On the green near the fire, not far from the church, boys prepare the home made mortar which they fire when priest announces: "Christ is risen." The old proverb, concerned with this custom, says: "The night before Easter for joy they fire cannon."

Easter

On the Easter morning the sun "plays." They say that it risen and hides again below horizon for a short while.

Through the night around the church stand many carts covered with rugs on which stand the baskets with Easter bread, cakes, painted eggs and whole roasted piglets. In the early morning, after the church service, the priest blesses all these baskets full of food which people put in a row around the church. In every basket a candle is burning. The priest accompanied by the choir walks around the church three times and during the third circuit he sprinkles the baskets with holy water. After this event people greet each other with the words: "Christ is risen" — "He is risen indeed", kiss each other three times and exchange painted eggs. Then they go to their carts and return home.

At home father takes several piece of blessed Easter bread, a lump of salt and goes to the stable. There he gives to cows, horses and sheep all that he has brought with him and after that he waters and feeds all animals. Then he goes around all his farm and sprinkles blessed salt everywhere so that "all evil will go away."

When father enters the house all the family wash their faces in a bowl of water with three red painted eggs at the bottom. The first to wash her face is the youngest girl, the last — father. They change water for every person but the eggs remain throughout. After the washing they dry themselves with a new face towel especially prepared for the occasion.

Then all pray and sit at the table which is covered with a white embroidered tablecloth. On the plates stand tall Easter bread with painted eggs around it. In a special bowl green oats have been grown especially for this day. Amongst these green oats can be seen painted

eggs of various colours: red, pink, yellow and blue. This is a symbol of a gay, sunny and rich life in the spring.

All the family have their Easter meal. At first they eat blessed Easter bread, eggs, butter, sausages. Elder members have some drink, of course.

At the beginning everybody takes his blessed painted egg and strikes father's egg with it. In Western Ukraine the father takes the blessed egg, cuts it in small pieces and with a knife gives a piece of it to everyone present at the table starting with the eldest members of the family: mother, eldest son or daughter etc. at the same time he says: "Let us, merciful God, greet next Easter alive and healthy."

During Easter our farmer is very glad to have a visitor. It is a very good omen when on this day a traveller comes to the house. He will be asked to the table and will be treated to the best food which is in the house. Famous Ukrainian ethnologist, Pavlo Chubynskyi, wrote that "On this day the warm hospitality of the Ukrainians can clearly be seen."

After breakfast the men go to the church to ring the bells "to ensure that buckwheat would yield a good harvest", and the children go to their relatives to greet them on this great day. At this time children get all kinds of presents. Children also play "with painted eggs" on the village green or play on the swings if young men agree to it.

Swings are a traditional means of entertainment for young people and children during Easter. Swings are built either on the village green or near the church. Every young man considers it his duty to push his girlfriend on the swings. Usually all young people go to the swings during the Easter festival. Here they also exchange their Easter eggs, dance the Easter dances and sing "Vesnyanky."

In Western Ukraine young people dance "Hahilky" near the church. "Hahilky" is another round-dance which is danced together with singing. "Hahilky" can be jocular, referring to life and history. In Western Ukraine young lads are allowed to ring church bells as much as they wish during the three days of Easter. That is how Easter is celebrated in Ukrainian villages.

Easter Monday

Early in the morning, soon after sunrise on Easter Monday boys go to their girl friends to greet them. Usually a boy goes to his fiancé. But today the greeting is unusual: the boy wants to throw cold water over his girl; and she not only wishes to escape this but she wants to throw cold water over him if she can.

People say that whoever throws cold water first will have supremacy in the future family. All this is done in fun but everybody would like to be the first. In old times boys sometimes just would carry their girls to the river "for a swim." But the result of this

joke was often resented. Nowadays in Ukraine boys still sprinkle their girls, not with cold water, but with perfumes. The origin of this custom was evidently the wish to bring rain for spring crops.

In Western Ukraine on Easter Monday young people dance "Ha-hilky" and in the Eastern Ukraine they dance round-dances near the church, rock on swings and, if the weather allows, go to the forest to gather flowers. Children run on green grass and play with their painted eggs.

Remembering the dead relatives

The Easter festival ends with a remembrance day when people remember all dead relatives and people who gave their lives for Ukraine. This remembrance takes place in the cemetery where people first hold a service and then have a feast for the remembrance of dead souls.

It is a very good custom. A week before this day people go to the cemetery and plant flowers, grass and trees on graves, put crosses and memorials in order — generally speaking tidy up the graves. Young people put in order mass graves and the graves of famous people or people who gave their lives for their country. Boys put graves into order and repair crosses or memorials and girls plant flowers: basil, marigold, French marigold and at the head — a traditional snowball-tree. Girls also make flower crowns and hang them on crosses.

On a certain day all the people of the village with crosses, wreaths, and flower crowns go with the priest to the cemetery. At first they go to heroes' graves, have a service there and then go to all the other graves. After the service they have meal on the grass near the graves. They drink wine or vodka, eat painted eggs, sausages, various kinds of meal and cakes. One egg, a piece of bread and the remains of other food they bury in the grave. They also pour there one glass of vodka saying: "Eat, drink and remember us sinful people that we are." Then they break the shells of eggs on crosses and give them to each other to eat "for the peace of the dead souls." At the heroes' graves they have communal meal.

"Rakhman Easter"

When people eat painted eggs during Easter they preserve the shell from them, carry them to the river and drop them in the water. They say that somewhere in the far away country live "Rakhmany." They do not know when there is an Easter and wait for the painted egg shells from the Ukraine. The water will bring it to them on the tenth Friday and then it will be "Rakhman Easter."

"Rakhman Easter" is an old Ukrainian traditional festival. According to people's belief the person who works on this day is severely punished. Near the town of Kamyanyets Podilskyi there is a big hill in the field. People say that long time ago on the "Rakhman Easter"

a brother and sister went to the field to plough and God punished them. Together with oxen and plough they fell underground and a tall hill appeared over them. Now, when one goes to this hill on "Rakhman Easter" and lies on it with his ear to the ground he will still hear: "Hey, hey..." It is brother and sister shouting at their oxen.

They also say that at night on "Rakhman Easter", when all people sleep, all the dead go to the church for a night service. There they sing their special songs and then have a communal meal with the food which was left for them on their graves by their relatives.

"Rakhman Easter" is on the 25th day after Easter. Some ethnologists think that this is a relict from some pagan custom.

Conclusions

The work of the Ukrainian ethnologist Dr. Olexa Woropay "The Custom of Our People" in the Ukrainian language consists of two volumes (902 pages). The work has the task of describing the folk-calendar customs during the whole year. The two volumes of this work are divided into four chapters according to the four seasons of the year.

Volume One was published by the Ukrainian Publishing House in Munich in 1958 and is divided into two parts: "Winter" and "Spring."

Volume Two was also published in Munich in 1966 and is divided into — "Summer" and "Autumn."

A considerable part of the information used by the Author in these books is new and has been collected by the Author himself.

In this work is shown close relationship of folk customs with the rich and varied nature of the Ukrainian land.

Here, in *The Ukrainian Review*, we have published in English only certain fragments from "The Customs of Our People" by Dr. O. Woropay. We hope that in the future this work will be translated into English in full and the English-speaking reader will have opportunity of studying it.

In English translation

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by

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II

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C O N T E N T S

V. Bohdaniuk: SITUATION IN THE SUBJUGATED COUNTRIES	2
VOICES OF THE UNBROKEN. EXCERPTS FROM THE UKRAINIAN HERALD: SHAMEFUL MOCK TRIAL IN IVANO-FRANKIVSK. VALENTYN MOROZ SENTENCED TO 14 YEARS	12
WITNESSES PROTEST TO THE MINISTRY OF JUSTICE	21
PROTEST TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UKRAINIAN SSR CHRONICLE	23
Ivan Svitlychnyi: STEEL DOES NOT RUST (Excerpts)	39
Lesya Ukraïka: IPHIGENIA IN TAURIS. A Dramatic Scene. Translated by Vera Rich	45
Olena Teliha: AN EVENING SONG, UNNAMED, THE IMMORTAL, 1933- 1939, MY KEEN EYES, JUST ANYTHING BUT THIS!, A REPLY, THE TRAVELLER. Poems translated by Zoria Orionna	51
Ilze Kalnāre: HEROES. A poem translated from Latvian by Velta Snikere	57
Anatol W. Bedriy: MIKHNOVSKYI AND LENIN. Leaders of Two Nations in Conflict	58
Hon. Paul Yuzyk: "WE MUST NEVER ALLOW A MENTAL COMPROMISE WITH MOSCOW". Speech in the Canadian Senate	76
John Graham: "HUMAN RIGHTS ARE STILL DENIED TO THE MILL- IONS IN THE CAPTIVE NATIONS". Address on the occasion of the Captive Nations Reception in Bolton, Lancs, U. K.	86
Roman Debryckyj: UKRAINIANS IN WEST GERMANY	90
Ukrainian Publishers Limited, London. A CATALOGUE OF BOOKS IN PRINT (ENGLISH)	93

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V. BOHDANIUK

SITUATION IN THE SUBJUGATED COUNTRIES

In reviewing the situation in the countries enslaved by Russian and other communist tyrannies we have to note those common features that prevail over all or parts of that enormous area behind the Iron Curtain, as well as the differences as regards particular countries or strata of the population. We are faced with many questions, for we have to discover the truth which is constantly being veiled by propaganda, lies and smokescreens with which Communist ruling cliques are trying to hide the real state of affairs and to mislead the enslaved nations, as well as the free world. In the first place we have to ask ourselves in what direction are the countries dominated by Russia and other communist regimes moving, what are the policies and intentions of Moscow, Peking and their satellites with regard to the captive nations, how far are they succeeding in them, and how far are they thwarted by the resistance of the popular masses of the enslaved nations. On the other hand we have to make an accurate judgment about the relative dynamics of the forces of suppression and those of liberation, the actual trends and possibilities in the liberation movements of the subjugated nations. We have to examine once again what ideas inspire the oppressed masses of the enslaved nations and what prospects do they have of realising these ideas. At the same time we have always to bear in mind that here in the West we cannot always perfectly know the whole picture of what is actually happening there, for our information cannot be complete and in every respect absolutely correct, and in many cases we have to rely on judgment from incomplete data. Despite all this we are in a better situation to give a balanced picture of the situation behind the Iron Curtain than even the best of Western or Communist observers, because our ties with the real moods of the enslaved peoples are close and intimate. Relying on verified reports which break through the curtain of silence in the east and through the conspiracy of silence in the West, and supplementing them with our intimate knowledge of the history, national character and national aspirations of our peoples, which are not of a passing nature, but are permanently imprinted on the consciousness of the great masses of the population, we can hope to arrive at a picture of the situation which is as close to reality as is possible under the circumstances.

Despite the shock of Stalin's death, the condemnation of some of his excesses, de-stalinisation in the USSR and satellite states has been carried out only partially. It was a process strictly controlled by the regime with better or worse success. Any hopes that it would lead to liberalisation or loosening of Moscow's hold over the subjugated nations have been largely disappointed. This has become even more clear after Khrushchev's fall when the triumvirate of Brezhnev, Kosygin and Podgorny came into power. The crushing of the Hungarian uprising was the prelude and warning of what was to be expected and the suppression of Prague's "spring" and its experiment with "socialism with a human face" sealed finally the process of the stiffening of the neo-Stalinist line pursued by die-hard Bolshevik Russian imperialist ruling oligarchy. Moscow has decided to hold, come what may, its main strategic positions in Europe and Asia at the cost of freedom of the enslaved nations. Moreover, Moscow's active foreign policy and military expansion and penetration of the Mediterranean, Middle East and the Indian Ocean show no sign of abating, but continue to grow from strength to strength, due to several factors, above all to West's passivity and resignation. In such a situation where the world is divided sharply into spheres of influence in Europe and East Asia, with a less clear boundary elsewhere, Moscow's power continues to expand in that latter area, while the West is satisfied with merely holding ground in the former, despite considerable opportunities to effect Russian withdrawal. The West's respect for the sacred "status quo" in Europe and East Asia even at the moments of Russia's weakness, strengthens Russia enormously and dooms the enslaved nations to permanent state of subjugation.

Despite the West's lack of support for the liberation strivings of the enslaved nations, the natural tendencies of the enslaved nations to assert their freedom and independence show themselves again and again in various forms. Under their pressure even the communist ruling cliques which slavishly follow Moscow's example and directions demand some room for manoeuvre, and if this does not pose a great threat to Moscow's overall control they sometimes are given a longer rope, as for instance some European satellites who then go around exhibiting their fantom "independence" from Moscow. Only with regard to China and Tito's Yugoslavia has Russia lost its direct control, although ideological enslavement of these regimes to Moscow is not by all means over. Peking's intentions in the long run worry the Kremlin considerably, for Mao Tse-tung and to some extent Tito, have split the apparently monolithic communist camp, have undermined the myth of Moscow's historical destiny to lead the communist world, and have thus made Moscow's absolute power over the enslaved nations less secure.

The astonishing changes and even reversals in the official Party line propagated by Moscow, but especially since Stalin's death,

increasing revelations of the crimes committed by Communist regimes against humanity, individual freedom and national independence, including genocide, have morally discredited Communist claims and shown them to be false pretences covering an urge to wield naked power without any moral restraints. The growing number of dissenting voices within Communist ranks have seriously undermined Moscow's authority as the main centre of the communist international movement, on which Moscow relied to justify its power politics. Communist ideology and practice have become discredited above all in the communist bloc itself, and also, to some extent, among the former communist sympathisers in the free world. Large number of people have realised that communist ideology is merely a mask for pursuing ruthless chauvinist policies under the cover of internationalist slogans, to better disarm the nation which is to become a victim, in the same way as the slogan of proletarian unity and class warfare is propagated to disarm those groups of people and strata of the population who are opposed to dictatorship and arbitrary rule, to destruction of tradition, religion and cultural values.

Like in the rest of the world, nationalism behind the Iron Curtain has not died in the 20th century, but to the contrary, is becoming an ever more potent force. Nationalism of the enslaved nations is opposed to any form of imperialism, be it red or white. This force has to be reckoned with, although sometimes, due to severe reprisals over a long period, it has to exist underground, and is hardly visible on the surface. This force runs deep, it is an elemental force with deep emotional roots, it exists so to speak everywhere and cannot be eliminated by any reprisals or terror. The more it is combatted the more implacable it becomes, the greater explosive potential it acquires. Even Moscow's stooges and sworn traitors of their own nations are not immune to it. They find themselves on the one hand bound with their interests with the power and ascendancy of Moscow or Peking, but on the other hand under the unrelenting pressure of the resistance of the enslaved population and its nationalistic demands and interests.

Given the overall picture of suppression of freedom and national independence of the enslaved nations by Moscow and other Communist regimes, there are still considerable differences regarding the degrees of dependence of the particular countries on their imperial centre. The extent to which particular Communist puppet regimes are expected to forgo their national interests and to act as traitors to their own nations varies considerably from nation to nation. While in the satellite states there is kept up some pretence at independence and internal autonomy, albeit within narrow confines of the dictatorial Bolshevik framework, in the countries enslaved by Russia or Peking within the USSR or the CPR the position of the enslaved nations is considerably worse, incomparably more tragic. But even regarding

them there are considerable differences. While some nations can still be said to exist and have some hope of future improvement of their situation, there are others which are on the point of complete extinction and disappearance from the face of the earth altogether. Among them are in the first place some of the so-called autonomous republics in the RSFSR which are thoroughly colonised and Russianised by Russians.

The somewhat discriminating treatment of different subject nations by Moscow and occasional playing on their national ambitions and interests, helps Moscow to keep an overall stranglehold on them all. To one nation Moscow has graciously added some territory, to another it gives certain economic concessions, to still another it allows some degree of cultural or religious tolerance, leaving at the same time various bones of contention always lying in potential presence. In this way Moscow has succeeded to a large extent in preventing a common front of all the subjugated nations against herself. Typical were the cases of those countries where revolts have become world famous, like Hungary or Czechoslovakia, or Poland, which were motivated by purely national aims, and there was a lack of a wider vision, there was no one to issue a wider appeal to all the nations under Moscow's boot to join in a common fight for freedom, on the basis of national equality and just ethnographic frontiers. Blame for this should be laid at the doors of the considerable part of the emigre leadership in the countries of the free world, in particular those who continue to entertain some hopes of some miraculous liberation of their countries without a real and sincere joint effort on the basis of fraternal solidarity, mutual recognition of equal rights and just aspirations. The pursuit of the badly understood national interest, in fact narrow chauvinistic ambitions or outdated political conceptions on the part of these emigre leaders, continues to hamper a common fight of all the oppressed nations.

As in her foreign policy, so in the internal policy within her Communist empire, Russia uses the tactic "one step backwards — two steps forwards." If Russia appears sometimes to retreat from some hard-line positions here or there, it is only to deceive the subjugated nations and to prepare for them an even worse oppression. Moscow's overall concern is to prevent the outbreak of a revolutionary movement anywhere in its empire, to consolidate her dominant position in the satellite states and to destroy the national consciousness of the subjugated nations within the USSR. The latter is being done by means of propaganda of Soviet (Russian) patriotism, Russian superiority, so-called proletarian internationalism, by causing the degeneration of the cultural development of these nations and allowing only Russian so-called socialist culture to grow more or less unhindered, by intimidating the intellectual elite of the oppressed nations, by physically annihilating their leading spirits and their

historical memory, by dispersing their populations throughout the vast expanses of the USSR, by colonising their territories with Russians and encouraging by every means an exodus of the youth of the enslaved countries to the Asian territories where they are forced to use Russian as language of communication and become russified.

Moscow's nationalities' policy is veering back to the main principles of Stalinism, especially in its slogan that the culture must be "national in form, socialist in contents", where under national form is understood a simple peasant folk culture which has no real prospects of growth, and socialist content is reduced to a narrow range of outdated and primitive Bolshevik ideas, above all about the predestination of Communist Russia to lead the world.

Colonisation of non-Russian territories of the USSR by Russians is favoured and the idea is fostered that frontiers between national Republics in the USSR are losing any importance altogether. The main streams of Russian colonisation are channelled to Siberia, Turkestan (especially Kazakhstan), the North Caucasus, as well as the Western Republics, Ukraine and the Baltic States. Already the Russians constitute more than a third of the population in Kazakhstan, nearly a third in Kirghizia, more than a quarter in Latvia, and nearly one fifth in Estonia, Turkmenia and Ukraine. The 1970 census of the population found over 9 million Russians in Ukraine. The territories of many of the so-called autonomous Republics, especially in the Volga-Ural area and in the North Caucasus have become thoroughly Russified or colonised by the Russians.

The attack against national cultures of the non-Russian nations in the USSR is systematically being carried out by the entire machinery of State and Party controls, censorship, curtailment of freedom in the literary, artistic and scientific life, in education, by means of a limitation of book production, destruction of important national archives and libraries, prohibition of possession and reading of all non-Communist or non-Russian books, and especially destruction of the historical memory of the subject nations. By every means of propaganda the view is being fostered that their history started largely only in 1917 when Lenin and the Russian Communist Party allegedly "liberated" them from capitalist oppression. The studies of what happened before 1917 are discouraged, research and publication of books on the pre-1917 period extremely limited and consciously falsified version of history is fed to the masses. Similarly, although the history since 1917 is dealt with in greater detail, it is a completely biased and distorted picture of real history, having almost nothing in common with the truth. As a result millions are growing up without a true perception of the past, of national tradition, national languages, national interest and aspirations, they grow up as pseudo-Russians, without true national consciousness, national pride and sense of honour. They are rootless, demoralised, materialistically — minded

philistines, a suitable material for janissaries against their own nations, spineless opportunists, toadies and traitors of their nations.

True enough the Communist Russians try to project to the outside world the picture of the Soviet Union as a multinational voluntary union of peoples where various national cultures are supposedly flourishing on an unprecedented scale. For this purpose they maintain various propagandistically useful appearances of national statehood and cultural life. Soviet constitution even proclaims the right of the national republics to secede from the USSR. But, as under Stalin, any slightest attempt to advocate the implementation of the constitutional rights of nations, as in the case of individual rights, is immediately cut short by draconic reprisals. There is plenty of evidence for it and I need not go into greater detail here. Suffice it to mention the arrests of the group of Ukrainian lawyers in 1960 who intended to demand the realisation of the right of the Ukrainian SSR to secede from the Soviet Union. Their leaders, Kandyba and Lukianenko, received harsh sentences of 15 years each. Since that time a number of other underground groups came into existence. And although their apparent aims were fairly moderate, — they merely protested against Russification of Ukraine and demanded greater political and cultural freedom, they were arrested and imprisoned for many years. A very famous case was that of over 20 young Ukrainian intellectuals and students who were arrested in summer of 1965 and secretly tried at the beginning of 1966, whose cases were described in such detail in the clandestine book by Vyacheslav Chornovil smuggled out of the Ukraine and published in the West. Chornovil himself served a prison sentence for his courageous act. It is an encouraging fact that despite the overwhelming pressure of official propaganda, full of distortions and lies, a number of clear-thinking individuals still manage to fight for the truth and are prepared to suffer terrible persecutions as a result. They stand on the guard of the national conscience of the subjugated nations, of their moral strength and honour. While they still exist Moscow will not be able to destroy the enslaved nations spiritually.

To understand the present situation in the enslaved countries it may be fitting to give a brief characteristic to the past three decades. The 1940s were the years of draconic oppression and nation-wide political and armed resistance in the Moscow-dominated countries culminating in the epic struggle in Ukraine led by the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists under Stepan Bandera's leadership and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army under the command of Gen. Roman Shukhevych. Those years were characterised by barbarous reprisals on the part of the Russian regime and its secret police amounting to genocide and wholesale deportation of the population from Ukraine, the Baltic States and other national areas, ruthless persecution of the national elites and large sections of the population. The 1950s

opened with the terrorised silence on the surface of Soviet life, the peace of a graveyard, but soon there began great upheavals in the vast slave empire of concentration camps scattered all over the northern wastes of Russia and Siberia. Their rumblings, although stifled as soon as the regime recovered from the shock of Stalin's death, have still not died down completely. The Ukrainian revolutionaries-nationalists who initiated these risings in Vorkuta, Karaganda, Taishet, Norilsk and other places, by their heroic deeds have made a great contribution to the overcoming of the fear of the regime which paralysed all life previously. From that time on the regime has had to take into account, however little or however grudgingly, public opinion which has begun to grow. Khrushchev, juggling with his various unsuccessful reforms, managed to achieve one thing, namely to arouse the people's expectations of some changes for the better, but failed to satisfy them. Therefore he had to go one way or another, and the Bolshevik leadership preferred to change him themselves to save the empire from collapse. By introducing the climate of immobilism, the new leadership wants to prevent the hope for changes overgrowing into uncontrollable pressures for the revolutionary overthrow of the entire system. Its greatest fear is popular revolution which may be brought about by a spontaneous explosion of pent-up hopes for a quick improvement of people's existence. However, the regime has failed to control the process of awakening of the enslaved nations and masses to a conscious political life. Their system of controls has begun to break down all along the line. For the isolation against the influence of ideas from the outside is no longer perfect, as it was under Stalin. There have been many breaches in the Russian "Chinese" wall constructed over half a century ago. Russians themselves are forced sometimes to make an opening here and there in order to keep up with the technological advance in the West, although this endangers the ideological isolation of their slave empire. This dilemma facing them will become increasingly acute as time goes on, for technical advancement will require greater contact with the West, this in turn will generate greater influence of Western ideas, and increasingly desperate attempts on the part of the regime to stamp them out. The regime will increasingly appear more and more obsolete even to the Russians themselves and they will be forced to introduce some changes. This will not satisfy the non-Russian nations, who will use any relaxation to press their demands for greater freedom, which in turn will cause reprisals against them and general tightening of the dictatorial regime. Thus the growth of nationalist revolutionary movements in the USSR appears inevitable whatever changes are introduced in Moscow. Only winning of complete national independence by the non-Russian nations will guarantee a stable peace and justice in Eastern Europe.

The 1960s marked a steady growth of an embryonic articulate public opinion in the USSR, both in Russia and in the non-Russian republics. It expressed itself in the underground literature, the so-called "self-publication" (samizdat), which continues to grow and spread above all among the intellectual circles in the big cities and among students. These clandestine activities reflect the deeply-critical attitude of the idealistically-minded minority of intellectuals of various nationalities and political convictions toward the oppressive Bolshevik system. While in the national Republics this literature directs its edge against the system as a whole, but especially against Russian great power chauvinism, Russification, and Russian colonial policies, in Russia itself it is largely concerned with problems of reforming and humanising the system within the existing framework of Soviet Russian empire. Common ground among the protesters exists only on general human plane, in so far as all of them demand greater democracy and liberties for the individual. However where nationalities problems are concerned, the great majority of Russian dissidents overlook and ignore this fundamental problem, undoubtedly because they cannot imagine Russia otherwise than as a big power ruling over other nations and peoples. In this respect they do not differ in principle from tsarist or Bolshevik Russians. For this reason any alliance between them and the non-Russian dissenters exists only *ad hoc*, it is temporary and for the future doubtful and illusory. For in the most important matter, that of the demand for all sovereignty and independence of the national republics, the Russian protesters do not quarrel very much with the Bolsheviks, with a few exceptions, viz. Amalrik, who understands the national problem fairly well. It should, however, be added that those of the so-called Russian dissenters who are comparatively favourably inclined towards the demands of the nationalities for greater freedom, tend to be on the whole people of non-Russian descent, who became culturally Russianised — such as Amalrik himself and so is Gen. Grigorenko (Hryhorenko), Daniel, Yakhimovich, Sinyavsky, and others, who are either Russianised Ukrainians, Jews, Poles, Balts, or whatever else. True Russians, like e. g. Academician Sakharov, simply demand certain reforms in the present system ignoring the nationalities' demands.

So far this intellectual ferment is limited to a narrow strata of the intellectual elite and evokes insignificant response among the masses, especially among the Russian masses, for among the non-Russian nations it finds wider support. Nevertheless the regime is greatly worried by it and is making every effort to stamp it out by persecution and terror, including harsh sentences, banning of the culprits to insane asylums and concentration camps. The fact that the masses are inarticulate, silent and apparently passive should not deceive us into thinking that they are content with the Soviet regime or support it freely. The fact is that they still live by inertia under the terrible impact of the Stalinist paralysis of free thought which has by no

means been dissipated and finished. They still refuse to believe any assurances that the regime has significantly changed and view a return to mass-scale brutal reprisals on the Stalinist model as by no means an unlikely possibility. And they have every reason to be wary, for there are certain indications that they may be right. The Soviet system contains no guarantees that would prevent a return to Stalinist reprisals if the Kremlin saw them expedient. For although the regime has condemned some excesses of Stalin and Beria (and only a selected choice at that), many outrageous crimes are still regarded as right and proper (expropriation and expulsion of peasants, organisation of famines, extermination of "class" enemies and "bourgeois nationalists" etc.) Stalinist crimes are supposed to have begun only after Kirov's assassination in 1934 and to have lasted only until his death in 1954. Even so they are alleged to have been merely some "distortions" which basically did not corrupt the "just" Soviet system. In this manner the evil existing in the Soviet system since the very beginning has not been eliminated in any way, this system is still based on force and terror.

The masses of the people are still silent, but their sufferings over the decades, caused by the inhuman policies of Moscow, are accumulating and cannot be forgotten. Dissatisfaction with economic shortages, poor living conditions, interference of the totalitarian government with every aspect of life, violation of the rights of individuals and of the subjugated nations — are growing in geometric progression in parallel with the growth of education and the increasing knowledge of the conditions of life and freedom in the West which cannot be hidden from them forever. Despite considerable successes of Russification national consciousness of the oppressed nations has not been extinguished entirely. To the contrary, it shows unmistakable signs of growth in parallel with its growth all over the world. Stalinist terror has atomised the population in general and especially the oppressed non-Russian nations. "*Homo homini lupus est*" was truly, and still is to a large extent, the description of social relations in the USSR. But the renaissance of free public opinion which began from the free discussion clubs — if one may call them that — in the concentration camps of Vorkuta or Mordovia — and which is now spreading to academic and literary circles, as well as universities and youth groups — has resulted in the growing confidence among small groups of people, which in turn are beginning to coalesce into bigger groups, movements and even organisations with their own political platforms and programmes. These underground organisations are a fact in the USSR. And although they may as yet be organizationally feeble and isolated from one another, and their work uncoordinated — they are on a fertile ground. The Russian empire has got itself into so many contradictions, internal and external difficulties, that it will be a miracle if it will survive the next decade without major violent

changes. The question which Amalrik has put, namely "Will the USSR survive till 1984?" may not be as absurd as it appears sometimes to those politicians in the West who are hypnotised by external Soviet power and Moscow's successes in space conquest. Moscow realises the dangers which threaten the empire from within and for this reason Russia plays the coexistence card with the West, entering into negotiations with the USA on the limitation of armaments, and with Germany, but trying at the same time to get the best bargain from the naive Western leaders who simply jump at the opportunity to shake Kosygin's hand.

The enslaved nations in the USSR constitute 50 p. c. of its population. Out of the total population of 240 million, the enslaved nations make up 120 million. The biggest nation enslaved by Russia is Ukraine with about 50 million population, followed by Byelorussia, Turkistan, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and others. The idea of national independence is not dead among them and all Russian efforts to assimilate those nations or destroy them physically or culturally have shattered. There is every indication that their struggle for freedom will not diminish but will grow. The enslaved nations will never reconcile themselves with their colonial situation in the Russian empire.

JUST PUBLISHED!

NEW!

VALENTYN MOROZ

AMONG THE SNOWS

Protest Writings from Ukraine

Ukrainian Information Service,

London, 1971, 65 pp. Price 50p (\$1.75).

Contents: The Trial of V. Moroz; How the Trial of Moroz was Prepared; Letter to KGB from Raïsa Moroz; V. Moroz: "Among the Snows"; List of Ukrainian Political Prisoners; The Tragic Fate of Alla Horska, and others material.

Voices of the Unbroken

EXCERPTS from *UKRAINIAN HERALD* No. 4

The following report appeared in the unofficially published clandestine quarterly journal in Ukraine, *Ukrains'kyi visnyk* (Ukrainian Herald), No. 4 (January 1971) about the mock trial of VALENTYN MOROZ, a Ukrainian historian, who was sentenced to 14 years in prison, concentration camps and exile for criticising the Soviet regime and demanding full rights for the Ukrainian nation. The trial took place on November 17-18, 1970, before the Ivano-Frankivsk Regional Court in Ukraine. After the trial Moroz was taken to Vladimir prison near Moscow to serve the first six years of his sentence there. After that he is to be sent to a strict regime forced labour camp for three years, and then to spend five years in exile, probably in Siberia.

Moroz has already served a four-year sentence between Sept. 1, 1965 and Sept. 1, 1969 in Mordovian hard labour camps for "anti-Soviet propaganda and agitation" — reading foreign books and clandestine publications, and giving them to others to read. The first trial took place in Lutsk, Volynia, in January, 1966.

Ukrainian Herald is a publication similar to the Russian-language *Chronicle of Current Events* published in Moscow.

SHAMEFUL MOCK TRIAL IN IVANO-FRANKIVSK (VALENTYN MOROZ SENTENCED TO 14 YEARS [IMPRISONMENT AND EXILE])

The previous issue of the *Ukrainian Herald* reported in detail about the second arrest of the historian and publicist, Valentyn Moroz at Ivano-Frankivsk on June 1, 1970, about the gist of the charge and the course of the investigation. It contained also the texts of the protests of the public expressed in connection with the unlawfulness of V. Moroz's arrest. Therefore we report below only about the trial itself.

The trial was preceded by "preventive" measures, not applied before, with regard to people who, in the opinion of the KGB might have wished to attend the trial at Ivano-Frankivsk.

In Kiev, the critic and translator, Ivan Svitlychnyi was summoned to the militia on the day of the trial for a chat about "idleness"; teachers were sent to a hospital to check upon the sick teacher O. Serhiyenko; at the T. B. sanatorium where M. Plakhotnyuk is one of the doctors, a meeting was hastily called and everyone was warned that no one should go away anywhere the following week, or even fall sick, under threat of dismissal from the job (!). The same warning

was received by N. Karavans'ka [wife of S. Karavans'kyi who is serving a 30-year prison term in Vladimir prison, near Moscow, for writing protests against Russification policy in Ukraine; a poet, linguist and translator] in Odessa.

In Lviv [capital city of Western Ukraine — Transl.], long before the trial, a group of people (it is known that among them were: writer journalist M. Osadchyi, poets — I. Kalynets, I. Stasiv and H. Chubay, the woman artist S. Shabatura, the teacher O. Horyn', and others) sent a phototelegram to the Prosecutor's office of the Ukrainian SSR and to the Ivano-Frankivsk Regional Court demanding that they be admitted to the trial of V. Moroz and that they be informed of the date of the trial. Already the next day they began to be summoned to see the managers of the enterprises or institutions where they were working, they were threatened and warned that the trip to Ivano-Frankivsk would mean dismissal from jobs for them. Precisely on November 17 the artist Oleh Min'ko was summoned by the Motor Inspection (he has his own car), from where he was taken against his will to the KGB for interrogation.

In Ivano-Frankivsk, several days before the trial, Maria and Daryna Vozniak, were summoned to the KGB. The painter Panas Zalyvakha who is under police surveillance in Ivano-Frankivsk [after his release from the Mordovian concentration camps where he spent 5 years] was officially, in the course of routine surveillance, forbidden to appear in the street where the regional court is situated for the duration of the week.

They behaved particularly brutally in the town of Dolyna (Ivano-Frankivsk region) with the nurse Maria Yukysh, who after receiving information about the date of the trial, was to inform a Kievan woman, O. Meshko, about it, too. In order to prevent it, the KGB immediately sent . . . a "doctor" to her flat, and he "discovered" that her completely healthy two-months old baby had a sprained leg, and forcibly took the mother and baby to a hospital. M. Yukysh was kept with her baby for a whole week among people sick with infectious diseases in a general (not even a children's) ward, and was not allowed to use a telephone. Doctors and nurses who were uninformed about the whole thing at first wondered why a healthy baby was kept in hospital, for it could have caught an infection from other patients. Later they learned, and someone from among them quietly told the worried mother, that her baby was alright, and that in the next ward a "sick" KGB man was given a bed so as to constantly keep an eye on her movements.

Despite these measures a group of people from Lviv and Lviv region, and several persons from Moscow and Kiev came to the trial. Inhabitants of Ivano-Frankivsk also came to the trial.)* On an aver-

*) For the sake of authenticity we give a description of the trial, combining oral reports of three persons who were present there.

age there were about 20-30 people present at the entrance to the court during the two days of the trial.

In the morning of November 17, a group of people made personal applications and sent telegraphic requests to the chairman of the Ivano-Frankivsk regional court for admission to the trial of V. Moroz in order to be able to convince themselves whether V. Moroz had committed in fact any offence regarding the Soviet laws. If specially selected people would be admitted to the courtroom, and friends and acquaintances of Moroz who have come from various towns, would not be admitted to the trial — the application stated — such a trial would have no right to be termed open. However, the KGB men and the judges were afraid to let into the courtroom even tested people. Contrary to the Soviet Constitution and the Soviet laws, the trial was closed. Even the guards were selected from among non-Ukrainian soldiers, mostly from the Caucasus, who understood poorly not only the Ukrainian but also the Russian language.

Apart from troops, many KGB personnel even from different regions (Lviv people recognised several of their "guardians") have been summoned for "the protection of order." It is said that no less than ten "guardians" fell to each person who was present near the court. No one was admitted farther than the main entrance to the court. During the two days the public was not admitted not only to the court, but also to the office of the College of Advocates and the Notary's Office situated in the same building.

Valentyn Moroz was tried by the court college for criminal matters of the Ivano-Frankivsk Regional Court, consisting of the judge, *KACHYLENKO*, *Ivan Ivanovych*, and the assessors *Galkin* and *Bazhaluk*. Assistant Procurator of the region, *Horod'ko*, acted as prosecutor.***) The accused was defended by a lawyer from the Moscow city college of advocates, *Kogan* (in 1966 he defended the Russian writer *Sinyavsky*).

Let us recall that the investigation in Moroz's case was conducted and the indictment was prepared by the Ivano-Frankivsk directorate of the KGB. Head of the directorate — Colonel *Holda*, head of the investigation department — Colonel *Dolgikh*, case investigator — senior investigator Major *Baranov*, assisted by senior investigator Captain *Pryhornyts'kyi*. The arrest warrant was issued and the indictment prepared by the KGB approved by the Regional Procurator *Paraskevych* (known from his illiterate conduct of the accusation against M. Ozernyi in February 1966).

Philological expertise of Moroz's articles in order to confirm his authorship was conducted by workers of the Institute of Philology

**) It is being pointed out that this *Horod'ko* "supervised" the investigation in Moroz's case on behalf of the Procuracy, was present at the interrogations, and to a certain extent directed the course of the investigation, while the defence lawyer was allowed to see the material of the case only after the conclusion of the investigation.

of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR, Master of Philology H. Yizhakevych (grand-daughter of the famous Ukrainian painter ...) and A. Hryshchenko.

As case witnesses were called: the writer B. Antonenko-Davydovych, the literary critic I. Dzyuba, the critic and journalist V. Chornovil, and a villager from Kosmach in the Hutsul area, V. Bobyuk who did not know anything regarding the essence of the matter.

In accordance with oral reports it has been possible to reconstruct the following picture of the trial.

The trial began at about 10 o'clock in the morning on 17th November 1970. To check upon the presence of the participants, witnesses were brought into the courtroom where there were only the accused, the judges, the prosecutor, the defence lawyer, secretary to the court and several armed soldiers. The identity of the accused was checked in the presence of the witnesses. Answering the question about his citizenship, V. Moroz said that he was a citizen of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (as is known there is only an all-Union citizenship in the USSR after all). To the question whether he had been tried before, he said that he had been unlawfully sentenced in 1966 to four years imprisonment for propaganda of separation of the Ukrainian SSR from the USSR permitted by the Constitution of the USSR. To the question about his wife's place of work, he replied that he was not certain whether she had a job at all because in our country it has become usual to take revenge on the family of the people arrested for political motives. To the question whether the accused had any objections against the composition of the court and the prosecutor, he replied that he had enough grounds to challenge them but he would not do that because his fate had been decided without that "court" and the procedure now taking place was of no importance.

After the witnesses had been led out and the court session resumed, Valentyn Moroz made a declaration of protest against the unlawful closed trial and demanded an open hearing of his case. The defence lawyer supported the demand of the accused. However, the court rejected his application without any justification.

The indictment was then read and the accused was given the opportunity to give his explanations regarding the substance of the accusation. To this Moroz made a statement the gist of which is as follows: a trial *in camera* is unlawful, therefore he refuses to give any explanations at such a trial and to answer any questions on the part of the judges or the prosecutor as sanctioning lawlessness. However, he reserved for himself the right to raise protests or bring up petitions as well as to answer the questions of the defence lawyer. In order that his decision should not be interpreted as an unprincipled attempt to deny in a cowardly manner the authorship of the publicistic articles with which he had been charged, Valentyn Moroz said that he at the same time was declaring that he was the author

of the articles "Reportage from Beria Game Reservation", "Moses and Dathan", "The Chronicle of Resistance", "Among the Snows", but the humoristic story "I Have Seen Mohammed" ascribed by the investigating organs to him did not in fact belong to him. He would not give any more testimonies at such a "trial." Nevertheless he was asked several questions to which he gave no reply.

I. Dzyuba was the first to be called as witness into the courtroom. Instead of replying to the questions posed by the prosecutor, he made a statement that he would not answer any questions for two reasons. First, one of the articles for which V. Moroz was standing trial, had been polemically aimed against himself, I. Dzyuba, therefore it was unethical to place him in the role of a witness against Moroz. Secondly, he could not take part in an illegal trial, because on the basis of Article 111 of the Constitution of the USSR, Article 91 of the Constitution of the Ukrainian SSR and Article 20 of the Criminal Procedure Code of the Ukrainian SSR the trial of V. Moroz could not be held *in camera*.

The witness B. Antonenko-Davydovych called next also stated that in view of utter illegality of a closed trial he would not give any evidence. After all, in his life he twice stood closed trials as a result of which he was cruelly punished (once he was even sentenced to death) on the most ridiculous fabricated charges. He therefore considered as inadmissible for himself to take part in such a "trial", because he did not wish to bear responsibility before descendants together with the judges and the prosecutor for participating in open arbitrariness.

After a prolonged interval caused no doubt by the court's confusion owing to the behaviour of the witnesses, the witnesses Vasyl Bobyuk was called to the courtroom. He answered completely irrelevant questions: how many more schools are there in Kosmach at present than there were during the Polish rule; was it really true that a geological prospecting derrick in the middle of the village was a nuisance, etc.

The witness V. Chornovil, called last, refused to give any evidence for two reasons. First of all, any trial for openly expressed convictions was such that undermined the foundations of socialist democracy and the Soviet order. Secondly, a closed trial was a violation of the Soviet Constitution and legal procedure.

Left without witnesses, the court after a conference decided, despite of a protest by the defence lawyer, to read witnesses' evidence given during the preliminary investigation. They read V. Chornovil's evidence in which the witness denied his acquaintance with the three latest articles by V. Moroz and stated that he, on his own initiative, had sent the work "Reportage from the Beria Game Reserve" to deputies to the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR, having received it from Mordovia, which was one of the reasons for his conviction in 1967 [V. Chornovil was then sentenced to three

years hard labour in concentration camps, later reduced to eighteen months — *Transl.*]. To the judge's question whether Chornovil confirmed this evidence now, the witness refused to answer owing to the fact that the trial was closed.

The witness I. Dzyuba called for the second time, having heard the evidence given by himself earlier, stated that if it was not for his attitude to the illegal closed trial, he could have brought up some essential points to make it more precise. However, he could do it even so if the accused and the defence lawyer gave him their permission. Having received such a permission, the witness said that he was indignant at the blackmail which the investigator Baranov allowed himself during preliminary investigation. By means of deceit he extracted from I. Dzyuba evidence which did not entirely correspond to reality. As a matter of fact, I. Dzyuba never received a written text of the article "Among the Snows" from Moroz, but only had an oral conversation on this subject with him. Already after the trial I. Dzyuba stressed that this statement of his did not mean his cancellation of his boycott of the closed trial at all, because it was made at the request of the accused, whereas Dzyuba did not answer any question of the judges or the prosecutor.

Former evidence of B. Antonenko-Davydovych was also read in the presence of the witness who had stated during the investigation that V. Moroz showed him unfinished variants of the articles "Moses and Dathan" and "Among the Snows" in the desire to obtain from him literary consultation. Having listened to the evidence read, Antonenko-Davydovych said that he could have introduced essential changes into his evidence, because the investigator recorded his statements in a distorted manner, but that he would not permit himself to do it because it would mean that he recognised the legality of a closed trial.

In this way the trial was in fact hampered by the boycott on the part of the accused and witnesses. The court had no possibility to put up any evidence. Nevertheless the court session continued.

The next day the court heard the experts who diligently justified the assertion *that Moroz was in fact the author of the four articles quoted in the indictment.****) It seems that the conclusions of some sort of an ideological expertise were read, which gave an evaluation of the contents of V. Moroz's articles. Who carried out this "expertise", defining as anti-Soviet even the article "Chronicle of Resistance", remains unknown.

The full text of the closing speech by the State Prosecutor Horod'ko is not known. It is known however that the prosecutor qualified the

***) The experts' testimony is not as innocent as it appears at first. During the preliminary investigation V. Moroz refused to give any evidence, and it was therefore impossible to produce an indictment against him and to bring him for trial without the conclusions of the expertise.

entire activity of V. Moroz and all his articles as anti-Soviet. The prosecutor emphasised the fact that the articles "Reportage from the Beria Reserve" and "The Chronicle of Resistance" had been published abroad, seeing in it an aggravating circumstance. The prosecutor also called an aggravating circumstance the fact that Moroz was being tried for the second time for "anti-Soviet propaganda and agitation." The prosecutor demanded a maximum punishment of 15 years permitted by section 2 of article 62 — 10 years imprisonment and 5 years banishment [from Ukraine]. The prosecutor demanded the most severe conditions of imprisonment — in a special prison, in order to prevent Moroz from writing anything or to pass anything to freedom.

The defence lawyer Kogan, in his concluding remarks, tried to prove the absence of *corpus delicti* in V. Moroz's activities, as envisaged by art. 62, section 2 of the Criminal Code of the Ukrainian SSR, i. e. "agitation and propaganda with the aim of undermining or weakening the Soviet regime." The defence lawyer considered the qualification of V. Moroz's articles as anti-Soviet unjustifiable, and their dissemination by the author himself as unproven. He, allegedly, called the prosecutor's arguments about aggravating circumstances as legally illiterate. The appearance of articles abroad, if the accused has nothing to do with their handing over, should neither serve to aggravate nor to diminish his guilt. Likewise, section 2 of art. 62 of the Criminal Code of the Ukrainian SSR only concerns those who are tried for the second time — therefore the repeated conviction cannot by itself influence the term of the sentence chosen by the court. The defence demanded acquittal of the defendant *or at least requalification* of the charge to art. 187-1 of the Criminal Code of the Ukrainian SSR with the maximum punishment term of three years.

Valentyn Moroz made a brief last speech the contents of which is not known. It is only known that he did not ask for any alleviation for himself and did not engage in disproving the accusation. His last word was a political speech of programmatic character.

In accordance with article 20 of the Criminal Code of the Ukrainian SSR, court verdicts in all cases are pronounced in an open session. V. Moroz's adherents present near the court demanded in their written applications and orally to be admitted to the courtroom during the reading of the verdict. The court however committed another gross violation of the law. Notwithstanding the great number of troops and KGB personnel, they were afraid to let anyone from among those present in front of the court into the courtroom. Instead they summoned by telephone specially selected public — deans and lecturers of social sciences of the Medical and Teachers' Training Colleges of Ivano-Frankivsk. Some of them were not even forewarned why they were being called to the court. Others were warned by the KGB men to say at the entrance to the court that they

were not going to the trial but to the Notary's Office or to the office of the College of Advocates. The deceit was soon revealed however, and the KGB men and soldiers cleared the way for those "specially invited" by roughly pushing away the people who for two days had been waiting to get into [the courtroom] at least for the reading of the verdict. KGB personnel were also let into the courtroom and stationed in the passage.

The verdict repeated all the statements of the indictment. Only the authorship of the humorous story "I Have Seen Mohammed" was dropped from the charge, as unproven. The circumstance that all the witnesses in the case refused to testify as a sign of protest against the closed trial, was not mentioned in the verdict, and other evidence from the preliminary investigation distorted. It is probably because of these lies that the witnesses were not permitted to be present at the reading of the verdict in the courtroom. Legally illiterate assertions of the prosecutor about aggravating circumstances were repeated in the verdict. The term of the sentence given to Moroz by the court was: 6 years of special prison, three years of special regime camps and five years banishment — altogether 14 years of punishment.

Valentyn Moroz met the verdict with ironic laughter, and the invited "scholars" — with confused silence. Then a KGB man from the passage gave a "signal" — began to applaud. Everyone remained silent — so he started to clap his hands more loudly. Here and there he received some scattered support . . .

Questioned by the judge whether he understood the verdict, Moroz answered: not entirely, because it was stated in the verdict that the trial was *in camera*, but he sees now many people in the courtroom. The presiding judge explained to him that, according to law, verdict is pronounced in an open session in all cases, and all those who so desire may be present at the reading of the verdict. Moroz, who was obviously only waiting for such an explanation, then asked: "Why in such a case there are none of my friends in the courtroom though they have been standing for two days outside the court, but there are people here whom you have roped in?" Instead of giving an answer the judge ordered the soldiers to take Moroz away and pronounced the trial ended.

During the pronouncement of the verdict there gathered suddenly a large crowd of Ivano-Frankivsk inhabitants near the court. They dared not come near the court for two days. Perhaps fearing a demonstration the KGB men placed several "black Marias" in front of the main entrance, and V. Moroz was taken away through a back door in an ordinary car.

Attention is being drawn to the cynical behaviour of the KGB personnel and non-Ukrainian soldiers who were specially incited beforehand. People were roughly pushed away from the doors, the

soldiers punched the pregnant woman, S. Hulyk, from Lviv into stomach, when she tried to carry a collective statement to the chairman of the regional court. The KGB men contemptuously told those who were near the court: "you are nothing", "gang", "we will do with you what we like", "we have enough room for you all" etc.

Immediately after the trial, the witnesses wrote and sent a protest letter to the Procurator of the Ukrainian SSR and the Ministry of Justice of the Ukrainian SSR.

[The **Ukrainian Herald** gives the full texts of the protest letters: 1) joint protest by the three witnesses, the writers B. Antonenko-Davydovych, I. Dzyuba and V. Chornovil, dated 18th November, 1970; 2) Phototelegram to the Supreme Court of the Ukrainian SSR from Olha Horyn; 3) a similar letter from Iryna Stasiv and Ihor Kalynets, dated 29th November, 1970; 4) likewise from Oksana Meshko, from Kiev; 5) from V. Drabata, Kiev dated 11 December, 1970; 6) from Stefania Hulyk, Lviv; 7) from Rev. Vasyl Romaniuk, Kosmach, Ivano-Frankivsk region, dated 27th Nov., 1970. Mention is made of other protest letters, from at least 30-40 individuals prominent in various walks of life in Ukraine. E. g. Iryna Stasiv and Ihor Kalynets in their letter compare the sentence given to Moroz with the 14-year sentence given to the English philosopher in the 12th C., R. Bacon, because he refused to agree with certain scholastic views of his time.]

The Supreme Court of the Ukrainian SSR in Kiev considered the case of Valentyn Moroz on 21st December, 1970. It is known that V. Moroz did not submit an appeal against the substance of the verdict to the Supreme Court, but only a protest against the illegal trial *in camera* and his demand for the consideration of his case once again in an open session. An appeal regarding the substance of the verdict was submitted by the defence lawyer of the convicted, Kogan, demanding Moroz's release or at least requalification of the charge to Art. 187-1 of the Criminal Code of the Ukrainian SSR.

Several Kievans who came to the Supreme Court to hear the appeal were not admitted to the courtroom on the grounds that the case was being heard in a closed session. In a corridor, before the beginning of the trial, the critic Dzyuba, the philologist, Zinaida Franko, and the medical practitioner M. Plakhotnyuk, buttonholed the Procurator of the Ukrainian Republic, Hlukh.

Asked why Moroz was tried in a closed court, the procurator replied that state secrets were considered, namely: "channels through which Moroz passed his articles abroad, and that, apparently, this cannot be discussed in public." This is a conscious lie. Moroz did not pass anything abroad, neither the investigation nor the trial turned on it, and no "channels" were investigated there. When medical practitioner Plakhotnyuk asked why then was his acquaintance, medical college student Yaroslav Hevrych, tried in a closed court in 1966, after all Hevrych did not write anything himself, nor was there any talk about any channels then, the procurator did not find any answer. To statements by I. Dzyuba, M. Plakhotnyuk and Z. Franko about the unbelievable cruelty of the sentence, the Procurator of the

Ukrainian Republic said the following: [not in Ukrainian but in Russian] "And when he wants to destroy me, tries to step on my throat, should I stand on ceremony with him? In our country there exists an apparatus of violence for defence from such people." They then retorted that if one was to think like that, then it was not enough to sentence people to 14 years imprisonment for such innocent things as "The Chronicle of Resistance", but it was necessary to execute them by shooting... The procurator also stated that he would demand that the verdict be confirmed because this was necessary to give a lesson to others. In answer to Z. Franko's words that the public would be compelled to send petitions to the United Nations, the Procurator ironically waved his hand: go on, send your [useless] petitions, so to speak...

The Procurator of the "sovereign" Republic at first made the attempt to speak Ukrainian, but as this was very difficult for him he changed into Russian...

The Supreme Court left the verdict of the Ivano-Frankivsk regional court without change. In January 1971 Valentyn Moroz was taken to Vladimir prison [near Moscow] where he will be kept in conditions of strictest isolation during the first six years.

WITNESSES PROTEST TO THE MINISTRY OF JUSTICE

To the Minister of Justice of the Ukrainian SSR,
comrade Zaychuk.

To the Procurator of the Ukrainian SSR, comrade Hlukh.

On 17th and 18th November, 1970, the regional court at Ivano-Frankivsk considered the case of *Valentyn Yakovych MOROZ*, charged under art. 62, section 2 of the Criminal Code of the Ukrainian SSR. We have been called as witnesses to this trial. Without any legal grounds, in violation of the Constitution of the USSR, the Constitution of the Ukrainian SSR and the Criminal Procedure Code of the Ukrainian SSR, the trial took place in a closed session. The chairman of the court personally and responsible people from among the guards guaranteed to us, as witnesses, our presence during the pronouncement of the verdict, in which our names could also have been mentioned. As a matter of fact, this is provided for by the legal rules envisaged in art. 20 of the Criminal Procedural Code of the Ukrainian SSR. However, in spite of our repeated reminders, we have not been admitted to the reading of the verdict, although at the same time many people with special invitations were allowed to be present at the reading of the verdict and passed us by. Some of them were not even aware why they were being invited to the regional court.

We wish to express our categorical protest against the illegal actions of the Ivano-Frankivsk regional court.

We reserve the right to appeal to the cassation court — the Supreme Court of the Ukrainian SSR, to the Ministry of Justice of the Ukrainian SSR and the Procuracy of the Ukrainian SSR with a justified complaint regarding the illegality of the closed trial of V. Ya. Moroz, and in this connection — regarding the verdict.

18th November, 1970.

B. Antonenko-Davydovych

I. Dzyuba

V. Chornovil

PROTEST TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UKRAINIAN SSR

At the end of November and the beginning of December, 1970, many people (at least 30 to 40 persons) sent individual telegrams and statements of protest to the Supreme Court of the Ukrainian SSR regarding the cruel treatment of V. Moroz, demanding that the unjust verdict of the regional court be annulled and the defendant acquitted.

It is known that petitions to the Supreme Court have been sent by the Kievans — the writer B. Antonenko-Davydovych, the critic I. Dzyuba, the artiste Alla Hors'ka, the philologists M. Kotsiubynska and Z. Franko, the pensioner O. Meshko, the medical practitioner M. Plakhotniuk, the teacher O. Serhiyenko, V. Drabata and others; from Lviv — the doctor O. Antoniv, a former worker of the Society for the Protection of Historical and Cultural Monuments S. Hulyk, the teacher O. Horyn, the engineer A. Volytska, the poet I. Kalynets, the artiste M. Kachmar-Savka, the telephone operator H. Kunytska, trade-union worker Ya. Kendzio, a former university student, the poetess H. Savron, the poetess I. Stasiv, the journalists P. Chemerys, V. Chornovil, the poet H. Chubay, the artiste S. Shabatura, and others. Appeals were also written by I. Hel' (the town of Sambir, Lviv region), N. Karavanska (Odessa), the painter P. Zalyvakha, M. Vozniak and L. Lenyk (Ivano-Frankivsk), the priest V. Romaniuk (Kosmach in Hutsul area), and others.

The most profound and legally best justified appears to be the extensive petition submitted to the Supreme Court of the Ukrainian SSR, the Procuracy of the Ukrainian SSR and the Ministry of Justice of the Ukrainian SSR by the witnesses in the case — B. Antonenko-Davydovych, I. Dzyuba and V. Chornovil. The authors refused to give their statement for circulation, considering that by this they would demonstrate to the authorities to which they appeal their sincerity and absence of any hind thoughts. The contents of the petition is known from a few people who read it at the authors'. The petition stresses that in the USSR during the post-Stalin period no person has ever been so cruelly punished who acted not clandestinely but openly expressed his views in literary and publicistic articles.

The court incorrectly qualified these articles as anti-Soviet. The authors of the petition think that when in 1969 the KGB men discontinued the investigation in the case of "Reportage from Beria Game Reserve" they had no doubts that it had been written by V. Moroz. The fact that the "Reportage..." has again been included in the indictment and the unbelievably cruel sentence testify, in the authors' opinion, that there is an offensive of the reaction, in particular in Ukraine. This is clear also when comparing the sentences in the case of V. Moroz and the Russian historian Amalrik, also tried for the second time for writing considerably more sharp articles than Moroz and sentenced to three years of concentration camps... It is known that authors of all other petitions also drew the attention to the closed trial and the unbelievably cruel sentence...

CHRONICLE

Kyiv

Oleksander Serhiyenko, an instructor of drafting and drawing at the Kyiv school No. 97 has been dismissed from work illegally.

The day before the trial of Valentyn Moroz in Ivano-Frankivsk, O. Serhiyenko became ill and did not show up for work. On the same day a delegation of teachers appeared at his home. Failing to believe that their colleague was at the polyclinic, they went there as well in search of Serhiyenko. When he recovered, the principal of the school a (Ukrainian) summoned Serhiyenko to a talk and was interested to know "how did it come about that he had to go to a trial" [the conversation was conducted in Russian — transl. note]. He frankly explained the reason for the teachers' visit: "The comrades were interested in you, and the faculty had to convince itself whether you are really sick." In order to save Serhiyenko from harmful influence, the principal first decided to increase his duties, adding the lessons is physics. This could not be done, since Serhiyenko did not have the necessary education.

On December 7, 1970 O. Serhiyenko spoke at the funeral of Alla Horska. On the next day the principal proposed to O. Serhiyenko to leave "at his own wish", because he was already sick and tired of the fact that "the comrades are constantly interested" in Serhiyenko, and he wants to have peace in school. Serhiyenko refused to submit such a petition.

On December 27th, with the permission of the principal (since he had no classes and no other activities were scheduled in school the next day) he went to his parents. When he returned to work, he was greeted by an order of dismissal... for neglect of duty on December 28th. The principal "did not remember" anything about his permission. Now Olekhander Serhiyenko is unemployed.

* * *

The amateur choir "Homin" is enjoying wide popularity in Kyiv. (Its director — *Leopold Yashchenko*, M.A., has been thrown out of the Institute of Art, Folklore and Ethnography at the Academy of Sciences of the Ukr. SSR in 1968 for signing a protest statement against the violations of socialist legality.) The repertoire of the ensemble includes old Ukrainian folk songs, predominantly ceremonial. The members of the choir are workers, office employees, students, and aspirants.

From the time of the choir's random founding, obstacles have always been placed before it (lack of quarters for rehearsals, a prohibition to perform the spring songs and dances on the streets, in the parks, and so forth).

When, having overcome difficulties, the choir established itself, an individual working over of its members began. The aspirants are being summoned for talks in the department, new singers are being asked who recruited them for this choir, from whom have they found out about it. As the result some have left the choir, fearing to pay with their job or education; some are coming to rehearsals with fear.

* * *

In October 1970 critic and translator *Ivan Svitlychnyi* had been summoned to the chief of the district department of the militia and it was proposed to him as an ultimatum to get a job, threatening to make him answerable for "idleness."

As is known, I. Svitlychnyi has completed his post-graduate work at the Institute of Literature of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukr. SSR at the end of the 50s and in the beginning of the 60s he has often appeared in the role of a literary critic. Repressive measures have been applied to him as early as the beginning of the 60s (dismissal from work at the periodical *Dnipro*, etc.). In early 1964 I. Svitlychnyi was dismissed from the Institute of Philosophy at the Academy of Sciences of the Ukr. SSR for appearing at an evening dedicated to the memory of V. Symonenko in the Kyiv Medical Institute on December 20, 1968. On July 12, 1965 he was removed from the post of editor in charge of language and dictionaries at the publishing house "Scientific Thought" on instructions of academician I. Bilodid, whose academic incompetence was exposed by I. Svitlychnyi in the article "Harmony and Algebra" (*Dnipro*, No. 3, 1965).

In early September 1965 I. Svitlychnyi was arrested together with a large group of Ukrainian intelligentsia. He was released from under investigation on April 30, 1966 as the result of active protests by the public both in Ukraine and abroad. From then on he could not find a job in his profession; he engaged in literary work at home. In 1970 the publishing house "Dnipro" published "Songs" by Beranger, most of which were translated by I. Svitlychnyi.

I. Svitlychnyi was called out for the second time, with analogical threats, when V. Moroz was being tried at Ivano-Frankivsk. I. Svit-

lychnyi proved that he had publishing contracts, received remuneration and was not "loafing" — and for the time being he was left in peace.

* * *

In October 1970, the literary critic and journalist *Yevhen Sverstyuk* found himself in danger of losing his job.

Ye. Sverstyuk was thrown out of research work at the Institute of Pedagogy in 1965 for a critical speech he made before the teachers of Volhynia. He found a job as executive secretary in the *Ukrainian Botanic Journal* and has been working there for over five years.

Now Ye. Sverstyuk has been told that he is not working in his profession and it was suggested to him to look for another job. The dates have been set several times and although Ye. Sverstyuk has not been discharged yet, a threat of this is constantly hanging over him.

No one doubts that the attempted repressive measures in relation to Ye. Sverstyuk and I. Svitlychnyi have been brought about solely by their public activity.

* * *

Every year the number of carollers on New Year increases in Kyiv. Over 20 "companies" of carollers greeted the Kyivans with the year 1971.

But even in this innocent custom, perhaps because of its Ukrainian character and the Ukrainian language, they continue to see "political intrigue."

In Darnytsya the company "Rukh" (movement), which was composed of students of the Kyiv Polytechnic Institute, was attacked by the head of the Dnipro District Executive Committee of the city of Kyiv with the militia. He was particularly annoyed for some reason by "Cossack Mamay" who was being carried by the carollers. "Surround and take, arrest the hooligans" — he ordered the militia. The students on their part demanded that the militia arrest the drunken official.

At the railroad station persons in civilian clothes stopped another group of carollers, brought them to the militia room, checked their passports and categorically forbade them to sing carols at the station.

At the closed party meeting of the Institute of Arts, Folklore and Ethnography of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukr. SSR the case of the Institute's research worker *Tamara Hirnyk* who went to sing carols with the choir "Homin" was examined. T. Hirnyk is studying folk customs; she is a member of the commission at the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukr. SSR dealing with the introduction of new customs. Wishing to see on the spot how carolling is being done now she reached an agreement with the choir "Homin", which even hired a bus officially. After this T. Hirnyk published an article on carols in the paper *Literaturna Ukraïna*.

The discussion of T. Hirnyk's "case" at the Institute ended with a verbal reprimand for her participation in carolling.

* * *

At that same Institute of Arts, Folklore and Ethnography of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR, administrative repressions were applied to a research worker whose last name needs verification. His first and middle name is Vasyl Mykytovych, and he who works in the folklore department. He wrote several dealing with folklore and gave them to his supervisor to look over. She decided that the works were written from a hostile position; the author was removed from research work and transferred to a low-paid post of bibliographer. During the examination of his "case" he was being asked under whose influence he was, to which the scholar answered: Kostomarov's, Drahomanov's...

* * *

The bandura player of the orchestra of Ukrainian folk instruments, *Vasyl Lytvyn*, was curtly punished. In the short time of its existence this orchestra gained popularity. This was largely due to bandura players from the Kirovohrad region, the brothers Vasyl and Mykola Lytvyn, whose performance was always received by the audience with great enthusiasm which spontaneously turned into a patriotic demonstration.

Fearing this enthusiasm, upon personal instructions of the deputy head of the Council of Ministers of the Ukr. SSR, P. Tronko, the Lytvyn brothers were prohibited from appearing with solo numbers and repressions were started against them. They were neither provided with living quarters, nor with a residence permit, although they were included in the orchestra as the result of a competition and were entitled to this. The wife of V. Lytvyn, *Antonina Harmash*, was dismissed from the publishing house "Molod", where she was working as editor, under the pretext that she did not have a Kyiv residence permit. Vasyl Lytvyn managed to find a halfruined shack 70 kms. away from Kyiv, where he placed his wife and two small children, and himself lived in a hostel. His wife found a job as a letter carrier.

The art director of the orchestra Orlov in the meantime gave the Lytvyn brothers to understand that he was going to throw them out of the orchestra at the first opportunity. In January 1971 Vasyl Lytvyn's children became sick and he did not come to rehearsals for several days. He handed in a note about the children's illness. Nevertheless Orlov ultimately demanded that V. Lytvyn submit an application about discharge at his own request, for otherwise he would be dismissed for absenteeism... V. Lytvyn was forced to file such an application — and he is unemployed as of the end of January 1971.

Besides a very high performance skill, the Lytvyn brothers themselves composed several songs. The most well known is "The roads have crossed in the steppe" to the words by Vasyl Symonenko.

* * *

On the initiative of the KGB the establishment in Kyiv of a chamber variety orchestra, which was to function at the Ukrainian choral society was banned. The organization of the orchestra was entrusted to a young composer *Vadym Smohytel* who prior to this directed a Vaudeville Company in the restaurant "Poltava." For two months the enthusiasts were rehearsing their numbers in the time free from work and study. Finally they were heard by a Commission of the Choral Society, headed by the society's head, composer Kozak. The ensemble received the highest rating and they were told that in the near future the orchestra will be officially approved. They proposed only a change of name to . . . "Chamber orchestra of Russian, Ukrainian and Byelorussian songs" and an introduction of corresponding changes in the repertoire. In order to save the ensemble, V. Smohytel was forced to agree to such a strange proposition.

However, on the next day the soloist of the orchestra was told on the telephone that a representative of the ministry who was waiting for her at the entrance to the Ivan Franko Theatre wanted to meet with her on the subject of the orchestra. Near the theatre the girl was approached by a self-assured, pampered man, who called himself *Arkadiy Petrovych*, showed a KGB identification card and suggested that they "talk." He was asking what kind of an orchestra were they creating, whether it had a nationalistic character. He said that V. Smohytel was a man of doubtful loyalty, etc.

The soloist told V. Smohytel about this conversation, and the latter became indignant and went to the Choral Society to inquire who was there in charge of art after all — the KGB or the art organizations. As the orchestra had been banned. V. Smohytel, who prior to this resigned his previous post, remains unemployed.

* * *

The philologist *Lidia Orel*, who in recent time taught at Kyiv school No. 49, has been subjected to repressions once again. L. Orel is a wonderful pedagogue and the faculty has evaluated her work highly. This was the case before the principal received information from appropriate organs. He summoned L. Orel for a talk and began to ask her in what kind of singing she was taking part, where suspicious persons were gathering, which were directed by some man who does not work anywhere (the choir "Homin" was meant, which is directed by Lidia Orel's husband, Leopold Yashchenko, who was brutally thrown out in 1969 from the Institute of Art). The principal put a condition: "Either singing, or school." L. Orel declared that she would attend rehearsals, that she would go carolling on the New Year, — and so early in 1971 she was forced to leave work.

* * *

The previous issue reported on the search carried out at the place of work on philology, the senior staff member of the Institute of Literature of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukr. SSR, member of the Writers' Union of the Ukr. SSR, *Viktor Ivanysenko*. It was thought that the matter would end with the expulsion from the party and criticism at the meeting. Yet, on somebody's directives, after a long pause they returned to this matter again. V. Ivanysenko was transferred to a low paying job of laboratory assistant, although he is actually doing the same work. The defence of his doctoral dissertation, which he had prepared, has been made impossible. Finally, at the meeting of the board of the Kyiv region writers' organization Viktor Ivanysenko was expelled from the Writers' Union (this expulsion should be confirmed by the Presidium of the Writers' Union of Ukraine). At the meeting of the board repentance was demanded of Ivanysenko and he was asked where he got the underground publications which had been confiscated from him. To this Ivanysenko expressed his astonishment that the writers' organization was engaged in questioning, which in the USSR was conducted by other organs. Ivanysenko was attacked particularly sharply by the member of the board of the Kyiv region writers' organization, Prof. *Arsen Ishchuk*... Writers *Borys Oliynyk*, *Hryhoriy Koval* and *Dmytro Mishchenko* voted against V. Ivanysenko's expulsion from the Writers' Union of Ukraine.

Although Viktor Ivanysenko has not been definitively expelled from the Writers' Union of Ukraine, in the book "The Writers of Soviet Ukraine, A Bibliographic Directory" (*Radyanskyi pysmennyk*) (Soviet Writer), Kyiv, 1970) pages 163-164 and 529-530 have been torn out from the entire edition and others pasted in — already without any mention of Ivanysenko.

* * *

On November 30, 1970 an evening of young Ukrainian Soviet poetry at the Kyiv Polytechnic Institute, which was to have been conducted by the actor of the Lviv Academic Theatre named after M. Zankovetska, *Svyatoslav Maksymchuk*, had been banned.

In October 1970 S. Maksymchuk gave two large concerts in Kyiv — at the Philharmonic Society and in the republican Architect's Building. The concerts had great success; favourable opinions appeared in the press, in particular in the paper *Moloda hvardiya*.

These concerts were attended by Victor Dyumin, a second year student of the mechanical and the machine building faculty of the Kyiv Polytechnical Institute. Dyumin is an excellent student, member of the Komsomol office of the faculty, a Russian by nationality. He liked Maksymchuk's performance very much and with the newspaper *Moloda hvardiya* in his hand turned to the faculty Komsomol office with a suggestion to invite Maksymchuk to its course, in order to continue the evening of poetry. The office supported Dyumin and

placed an official request to the bureau of propaganda of the republican Litterateurs' Building, which then invited S. Maksymchuk to appear at KPI on November 30th.

On November 30th notices have been posted about the fact that an evening of young Ukrainian poetry would be held in the assembly hall. And at 14.00 hours the Party Committee of the institute created a special commission which tore down all posters. Dyumin was called to the Party Committee and told that there would be no evening of Ukrainian poetry at the Institute. No clear-cut reasons were given. First it was said that Maksymchuk's program was nationalistic, then, to the contrary, they declared that some "nationalists are going to throw rotten eggs" at the actor. Dyumin replied that Maksymchuk's program had been approved, that he appeared with it at the philharmonic with a paid concert and that there had been no excesses there of any kind. Then in the Party Committee it was said that the course must not assign a hall, that a permit for this evening must be obtained from the Party Committee (although for similar evenings of Russian poetry nobody ever obtains a permit and conducts them in the assembly hall).

The evening was nonetheless prohibited. The assembly hall was closed and two ranks of guards were posted, who were to establish who was it that came to the evening of *Ukrainian poetry*.

Let us recall that in the Kyiv Polytechnic Institute no lesson is read in Ukrainian. The institute's rector is a staunch Russificator Georgey Ivanovich *Plygunov*.

After the said affair, Dyumin and other students were asked how often they went to Ukrainian evenings and why did they go there.

Dnipropetrovsk

In the previous issue it was briefly reported on the propaganda campaign in Dnipropetrovsk after the trial of Sokulskyi and others in January 1970. At present an opportunity exists to give more accurate and more complete data on the basis of an article by *F. Tsukanov* in the regional paper *Zorya* for July 31, 1970 and verbal reports.

In enterprises and institutions of Dnipropetrovsk and the oblast, meetings were organized for condemnation of "criminals" — "bourgeois nationalists" Sokulskyi and Kulchynskyi. At the same time the text of "The Letter of Creative Youth" had not been read anywhere, while the "crime" was discussed on the basis of information of secretaries of party organizations. Thus, for instance, in the lorry fleet 21-90, the secretary of the party office I. Shchurenko, who had not read "The Letter of Creative Youth", informed about the "predatory intentions of the nationalists."

The position of the convicted had been twisted, the contents of "The Letter..." falsified: allegedly, it contained calls for Ukraine's secession from the Union, propagated hostility toward the Russian

people, etc. (For "The Letter of Creative Youth of Dnipropetrovsk" see the first issue of *Ukraïnskyi visnyk*.) [Translation in *The Ukrainian Review*, No. 3, 1969, pp. 46-52.)

Donetsk

At the end of 1970 the inquiry in the case of the lecturer of the Medical Institute, candidate of Medical Science, Ivan Suk, arrested in the summer was still continuing. He was charged with making an unrealized attempt to collect materials and write a work dealing with the national question, in particular, on the situation in Ukraine. For the fabrication of charges and the blackmailing of the arrested, his wife — a student at the Medical Institute — is being used.

According to recent information, I. Suk has become insane in prison.

* * *

Accounts are also being squared with the wife of the convicted Valentyn Moroz *Raïsa Moroz*. She is irreproachably working for five years already at the Ivano-Frankivsk Medical Institute. where she teaches German. After the trial of Moroz, Raïsa Moroz was unequivocally given to understand that she is working in the institute for the last year. In the spring a competition is to be announced for the position which is filled by R. Moroz.

The Moroz family had been building an apartment for themselves on a cooperative basis. By the decision of the general meeting of the cooperative, they were permitted to obtain a three-room apartment; they paid the necessary sum and had moved in. Now upon directives of the KGB they demand of Raïsa Moroz to move from her apartment into a one-room one. The head of the cooperative makes no efforts to conceal at the meetings that this is being done because R. Moroz husband has been convicted for "politics."

* * *

The previous issues reported on the search of May 4, 1970 in connection with V. Moroz's case at the home of the parish priest of the village of Kosmach in the Hutsul region, *Vasyl Romanyuk*. After the trial of V. Moroz, only several religious books were returned to Romanyuk. The rest were confiscated by the Ivano-Frankivsk KGB as banned. Among the banned books were: a number of religious books, including some which were published at the end of last century and at the beginning of this century, a dramatic poem by Lesya Ukraïinka "The Noblewoman" (a photostat from a Soviet publication of the 20s), a book by M. Voznyak "The History of Ukrainian Literature, Vol. 2, 16-17 Centuries, 1921", "The History of Ukraine" by M. Arkas, published in 1909, a file of the newspaper *Nedilya* for 1934-1936, the book "World History", calendars, carols, poems by [Bohdan] Lepkyi, etc. Correspondence, various notes, abstracts of religious nature (V. Romanyuk is studying at the Theological Academy at

Moscow) were also taken. Upon the question by V. Romanyuk; can one really consider as anti-Soviet "The History of Ukraine" by Arkas, published in 1909 and permitted even by the tsarist censorship? — the captain of the KGB Pryhornytskyi replied: "Although it is not directly anti-Soviet, it can still lead to anti-Soviet thinking."

* * *

Speaking in the town of Kosiv of the Ivano-Frankivsk oblast to the teachers, a party lecturer called I. Dzyuba, I. Svitlychnyi, V. Chornovil and others "schizophrenics." The same type of "mentally deranged" people are, in his opinion, Gen. Hryhorenko, historian P. Yakir and academician A. Sakharov... About V. Moroz it was said that he managed to cause a lot of trouble in Kosmach, but he was rendered harmless in time.

* * *

Atena Volytska, an engineer at the soil research laboratory of the Lviv University, has been reprimanded for her trip to the trial of Valentyn Moroz in Ivano-Frankivsk. Her co-worker was engaged to spy on her — with whom she talks on the phone, who comes to see her.

* * *

Upon instructions of the secretary of the Lviv Region Party Committee Podolchak, the director of the natural science museum of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukr. SSR, scientist *Malynovskyi*, has been removed from his post. The reason: *Malynovskyi* has worked for the Germans. But the point in question is not some criminal collaboration with the occupants, but ordinary work to make a living. *Malynovskyi* is known to be a serious scientist, who — paying no attention to the directives of the party organs — eliminated from the museum academically unqualified careerists.

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A brutal punishment was meted out to *Halyna Dudykevych* and her family in 1970.

Halyna Dudykevych divorced her husband, who is the son of the prominent Bohdan Dudykevych, a former Russophile, later — a member of the Communist Party of Western Ukraine, later still — a Soviet party official. For some time now he has been the director of the Lviv branch of the V. I. Lenin Museum.

The Dudykevyches decided to take revenge upon the young woman and to take her son away from her. According to Soviet laws the deprivation of motherhood is permitted only in exceptional cases; this happens very seldom. But, having the support of the KGB and higher party officials behind them, the Dudykevyches did not stop at a crime. They talked the guardian council of the Lenin and then the Zaliznychnyi districts of town (the guardian council is made up of several pensioners, former party officials), who "have conducted an investigation" and completely groundlessly have accused *Halyna*

Dudykevych of "immorality", as well as of the fact that she is allegedly a member and even a leader of "an underground nationalist organization!". This last conclusion was reached on the basis of the fact that when they still lived together friends came to the Dudykevyches several times and talked about poetry and other things. Besides this, Halyna's ex-husband stole from her the poem "Vertep" (The Crib of Bethlehem) by H. Chubay, which figured at the trial as the sole proof of H. Dudykevych's counterrevolutionary activity.

It is on such "conclusions" of the pensioners that the Zaliznychnyi District Court of Lviv based its decision. The case was illegal to such a degree that some judges refused to conduct it, and the case was taken up by the head of the Zaliznychnyi District Court Khorunzhykevych, who did not have any pangs of conscience. Highly placed persons who lived in the regional executive committee building next to the Dudykevyches appeared as witnesses before the guardian council at the trial: the wife of deputy Sadov, the daughter of the hero of the Soviet Union Steblevska, the mother-in-law of the chief of the regional KGB Poluden, a military man, member of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Muzyka, and others.

At the instigation of Yuriy Dudykevych, false evidence about Halyna Dudykevych's "nationalistic activity" was given by the student of the Drohobych Teachers' College, Yevheniya Khomanchuk.

At the trial it was revealed that the minutes of the guardian council had been falsified, that the witnesses muddled up their memorized testimonies. Dissatisfaction with such a trial had been expressed not only by the defence attorney, but also by the prosecutor. Nevertheless the court decided to take the child away from H. Dudykevych and carried a separate resolution about her political unreliability, which it handed over court was confirmed by the regional court (there the case was conducted by judge Smirnova).

Not wishing to give up the child, H. Dudykevych took it to friends in Leningrad, and herself turned to the all-Union judicial institutions. There they felt sorry for the fact that "in Ukraine arbitrariness is taking place", promised to help, but had done nothing to this day.

In the meantime, as soon as H. Dudykevych brought the child back home, Yu. Dudykevych organized a group of young men, who broke into the apartment of Halyna's father, bound and beat her father and kidnapped the child. Halyna Dudykevych can find no one to administer justice to criminals, who have highly-placed guardians.

In the summer of 1970, poet H. Chubay was summoned for questioning to the KGB in the "case" of H. Dudykevych. They asked whether Chubay was acquainted with H. Dudykevych, whether he had given her his poem. The poem "Vertep" was declared anti-Soviet at the same time.

The second-year student of the Ukrainian department at the philologic faculty *Halyna Savron* — a young poetess, had been expelled from Lviv University.

Throughout 1970 Halyna had been called to the KGB several times for "dialogues" and they suggested to her an acquaintance with M. Osadchyi, V. Chornovil, H. Chubay and other "politically suspect", threatened her with expulsion from the university and even with arrest. They intimidated H. Savron's parents, who instituted house terror over the girl, including beatings, demanding that she write a repentance statement to the KGB and agree to cooperate with KGB agents.

In the winter semester H. Savron was given a failing grade in the history of the Party. The dean; *Ioltar*, did not permit the student to take further examinations and at the same time reported to the rector that she was not appearing for these examinations. On the basis of this false report, not wishing to take H. Savron's explanations into consideration, rector *Maksymovych* expelled her from the university. In a conversation with H. Savron, her witnesses and the poet R. Bratun, who interceded for the young poetess, the dean unequivocally declared that the real reason for the expulsion was not failing grades at all, but the views and the acquaintances of the student.

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On the day of V. Moroz's trial, the Lviv artist *Oleh Minko* had been called to the automobile inspection station as owner of a car, and from there was taken to the KGB for questioning. They questioned Minko twice or three times. The main theme of the interrogation was his meetings with foreigners. O. Minko is a very original and talented artist, whose works are not exhibited because he is considered a formalist here. Knowing about his talent, several Ukrainian cultural leaders from abroad did in fact visit his home, looked at his works and evaluated them very highly (see, for instance, the article by poetess Vira Vovk, published in the first issue of *Visnyk*). KGB agents warned O. Minko not to dare to meet foreigners any more, threatened to dismiss him from work (O. Minko holds the post of art director in the art workshop of the Artists' Union.) The chief of the operative department of the KGB Horban, known for the fact that he started his career with the beating of the arrested and later rehabilitated university students in Stalin's days, talked unusually coarsely with O. Minko.

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Over three years after his return from imprisonment, the writer and journalist *Mykhailo Osadchyi* is still being subjected to persecution. At first he was not allowed to live with his family in their Lviv apartment; at night he was "caught" at home by the militia; for several days he had even been under arrest for "passport violations."

In recent months he is being persecuted for signing protest statements against the "cell" case [trial] of S. Karavanskyi and the arrest of V. Moroz. M. Osadchyi was called to the regional committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, where they used coarse language and threatened him.

In August 1970 the sister of Osadchyi's wife who had passed her examination and had obtained necessary number of marks had not been enrolled at the Lviv Polygraphic Institute. It was explained to her that she had not been enrolled because her sister had such a husband, as well as because the first husband of her mother (not her father) had been a Bandera follower . . . The rector of the institute did not yield to the directive of the ministry on the enrolment of the girl. When Osadchyi wrote a protest about these infamies to the regional committee of the party, they called him out there and told him that his statement was written in the spirit of the BBC radio-broadcasts and threatened him with a new arrest.

When M. Osadchyi was travelling by bus to his wife's parents in the country, a KGB agent was placed by him, who at first struck up various kinds of provocative "anti-Soviet" conversations, and then right in the bus, having drunk two bottles of wine, admitted to Osadchyi who he was and why had he been sent, and repented before the people for doing such a canine job. When Osadchyi was returning from village the next day, the KGB agent, having of course, sobered up, and regretting his frankness, set the militia on Osadchyi. M. Osadchyi was forcibly dragged from the bus in the town of Radekhiv and although they had no claims against him of any kind, they held him for some time in the regional militia (headquarters) threatening to punish him for no apparent reason.

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Journalist *Roman Yanushevskyi* was illegally dismissed from the editorial office of the paper *Vilna Ukraïna*, the organ of the Lviv Region Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine. He is the member of the CPSU and worked for the paper for many years. The reason for his discharge was a sketch on the artist and restorer of the Lviv Museum of Ukrainian Art Petro Linynskyi, who worked very hard to restore unique Ukrainian icons. It seems that in his youth P. Linynskyi took part in the OUN movement, for which he had served time. And in spite of the fact that Linynskyi works unselfishly for the Ukrainian art for many years now (besides restoration, his own ceramic works are well known), P. Yanushevskyi was found to be at fault because he wrote several kind words about "an enemy" and was dismissed from work. Considering his discharge to be illegal, R. Yanushevskyi took the matter to court. Then he was called by the editor of *Vilna Ukraïna* Stupnytskyi who declared: "How dare you complain about me? Do you know who you are, and who am I? You are s . . t, and I am a member of the regional committee of the party!"

It is known that during the examination of R. Yanushevskiy's personal case in the editorial office that same Stupnytskyi and a worker of the ideological section of the regional committee of the party were forcing R. Yanushevskiy to fall on his knees (in the strict sense of the word) and to beg "forgiveness of the party" for his deed...

* * *

In December 1970, upon directions of the party organs, an exhibition "Ukrainian painting of the 14-18th centuries" had been closed on the day after the opening. The exhibition offered Ukrainian icons, a considerable number of which have been restored by the above-mentioned P. Linytskyi. More people than ever before came to the opening of the exhibition, who were enthusiastic about the unique creations of the national genius.

The sudden ban of the exhibition has been explained in various ways. Some, recalling the intensified attempts at popularization of the Russian icon painting of the Middle Ages in recent times, feel that the exhibition was prohibited so that the Ukrainian icon would not overshadow the poorer achievements of the "elder brother." Others report that party leaders were frightened by the enthusiasm of the viewers, which have inevitably taken on political colouring in connection with Ukraine's situation. At this opportunity it is mentioned that at the exhibition only an insignificant part of the icon art treasures of Ukraine have been shown, which in any other country would have been proudly shown to the whole world. In Lviv alone hundreds of beautiful ancient icons are to be found, unrestored, under lock and key, in the Armenian Cathedral, in unfavourable temperature conditions, without supervision and due protection. In recent years attempts had already been made to steal or to set the icons on fire.

* * *

At the Lviv Polytechnic Institute the KGB uncovered two illegal groups. The membership of these groups was made up of Russian and Jewish young people — the children of high-ranking military-men, party, Soviet, economic leaders. The group allegedly did not have a clear-cut program. Both the imitation of the Western "hippies", and the propagation of pornography and sexuality (motto: "down with shame"!), and the ridiculing of the system, the party and the Komsomol, and even the propagation of fascism were involved. Several typewritten almanacs have been published; for meetings and parties a house at the summer colony out of town had been hired; they had contacts with similar organizations in other cities.

Allegedly only the "president" of one group Yeresko had been arrested (according to other reports — three persons). Other participants were either expelled from the institute, or were reprimanded and warned. On this occasion meetings were held at the faculties of the institute. There was no mention about it in the press.

Although Ukrainians were neither members of the groups, nor was there anything Ukrainian in their activities (on the contrary, all this was deeply anti-national), rumours are being spread about "nationalists." In one of the districts of the Lviv region "the treacherous activities of bourgeois nationalists at the polytechnic institute" have already been discussed officially, from a rostrum.

* * *

On November 1st, just as on Whitsun, as part of a long-established custom, the memory of the dead is honoured at the cemeteries in Halychyna [Galicia]. On these days flowers are also placed and candles lit on the graves of the Sich Riflemen who died in the war with Poland in 1918-19, on the common graves of victims of mass execution by the NKVD of prisoners in jails in the first days of war in June 1941 and others. In particular a large number of people gather on November 1st at the Yanivskyi cemetery in Lviv by the graves of the Sich Riflemen. Flowers and wreaths with patriotic inscriptions are placed at the central symbolic grave; the people sing religious and riflemen songs, etc.

Although the authorities still do not dare to disperse people from the cemetery, nevertheless, specially sent persons note who is present at the cemetery, at times even photograph people. Cases of repressions for honouring the memory of the dead are known. Thus in 1967 as the result of a denunciation an able scientist *Pletinko* had been removed from a responsible research job at the polytechnic institute only because he spent several minutes among the riflemen's graves and placed flowers. When his action was being discussed, the scientist said that he saw nothing wrong in honouring the memory of people who fought against the Polish occupants.

On November 1, 1970 somebody stuck a banknote — a 100 karbovanets note of the Ukrainian National Republic money with a large trident in the centre of the note (done by a well known artists Yu. Narbut) — to the cross of the central grave of the riflemen's cemetery. After some time a raging man from among the "watchers" jumped up to the cross. Tearing down the banknote, crumpling and throwing it away, he climbed with his feet onto the grave and shouted to those present: "What, you want a trident? You want an independent Ukraine? You won't have your trident! You won't have your Ukraine! Well, disperse, disperse! ", and so forth. But nobody left. To the contrary, the people who stood further away, thinking that somebody was delivering a speech in honour of the riflemen, came closer. The "speaker" was forced to go empty handed.

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The Rivne Region

The village of Belyatychi (Bilyatychi?) of the Sarny district. There is accurate information that here in January 1970 several times in a row leaflets were scattered about the village and posted in frequent-

ed places. In particular in the village club handwritten leaflets were circulated with the signature "Freedom Committee."

The leaflets briefly informed about the de facto inequality of Soviet peoples in economic and political life, about the fierce Russification of Ukraine. The "Committee" urged the population to recall the struggle for freedom and independence, to honour the memory of fellow villagers and countrymen who laid down their lives in that struggle, and in their name to put up resistance to Russification.

In a short time three schoolboys (6-8 grade pupils) were arrested. They were lodged in the Sarny hotel where the KGB was conducting their interrogations. The questionings were conducted brutally. Later the schoolboys were released. One of them became insane after this.

In April 1970 the physical education teacher of the Belyatychi eight-grade school was arrested (he is an evening student of the Rivne Teachers' College). The investigation is still being conducted without the public's knowledge.

In the summer of 1970 the inspector of physical education of the Sarny district was arrested. In September-October he was secretly convicted to 10 years of severe regime camps.

There are reports that even after these arrests the leaflets of similar contents appeared in the village club.

Upon instructions of the Sarny District Committee of the Party and in line with its scenario the amateur theatre group of the village of Belyatychi appeared on November 6th with a musical and literary composition which was to have portrayed the history of the USSR for 53 years and the friendship of peoples. Songs and poems were solely Russian and were performed in the Russian language. And on November 7th compulsory festive demonstration took place. Eyewitnesses report: It was cold. The peasants were dressed in quilted jackets and high boots. All were sad, grim, bent. With a flag, in silence, with lowered heads the "festive" column moved from the school to the club...

To this day the atmosphere of blackmail and intimidation reigns in the village. The interrogations continue.

The Ternopil Region

Last year a group of people, in particular from the amature factory, were arrested in Ternopil and sentenced on political charges. Their names are unknown; only the name of engineer *Yaroslav Skyba* is mentioned.

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In the Ternopil region in November 1970 the KGB arrested young poet *Horbal* and an artist from the Borshchiv region *Ivan Balan*. It is known that in connection with this case searches were also conducted in Chernivtsi, where one of the arrested lives and works. The grounds for the arrest and the future fate of the arrested are not known.

Cherkasy

Writer *Vasyl Zakharchenko*, the author of several books of prose, member of the Writers' Union of Ukraine, has been thrown out of work in the editorial office of the newspaper for youth *Molod Cherkashchyny*. V. Zakharchenko has been searched and questioned as a witness in the case of I. Suk. Trying to save himself from harassment, he was forced to leave Donetsk and to move to Cherkasy. But the persecutions continued. When V. Zakharchenko, on a mission from the Writers' Union, went to Donbas for appearances before the workers, his trip was interrupted upon orders of the Donetsk Oblast Committee of the Party. The miners were allegedly indignant that he was speaking "in the Ukrainian language, incomprehensible to them." Returning from the mission, failing to restrain himself, he said something harsh to a KGB agent assigned to him, for which he was dismissed from work the next day.

On the brutal confiscation by KGB agents of the writer's archives from Zakharchenko see V. Stus' statement in the previous issue.

Chernivtsi

Second-year student at the philologic faculty *Yaroslav Pavulyak* has been expelled from the university.

Ya. Pavulyak managed to get Vasyl Symonenko's "Diary" somewhere and was reading it to students in the dormitory. January 11th had officially been the evening of Vasyl Symonenko at the university. Delivering a lecture, the instructor of the university Dobryanskyi was indignant at the fact that abroad excerpts from Symonenko's diary had been selected tendentiously and were being used for propaganda. Ya. Pavulyak asked to speak. He said that the best way to deprive bourgeois propaganda of the means of subsistence is to publish the "Diary" of Symonenko here without any kind of cuts. Ya. Pavulyak at the same time declared that he had read this "Diary" and told of its contents.

Interrogations were immediately started at the university. Students were asked to whom did Pavulyak read the diary, had it been a typewritten copy, or a book published in Munich. They threatened those who heard Pavulyak himself was threatened with jail and expelled from the university.

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It has become known that the Ukrainian political prisoners in Mordovia have greeted with unanimous indignation the arrest of V. Moroz nine months after his release and the inhuman 14-year sentence for writing publicistic articles. It is known that political prisoner *Mykhailo Horyn* (Camp No. 19) called a several-day hunger strike as a sign of protest against the mock trial of Moroz.

Ivan SVITLYCHNYI

STEEL DOES NOT RUST

(Excerpts)

Even in these jubilee days it is inappropriate for us to make out of Lesya Ukraïнка a genius from the cradle on and to paint her portrait only in pink colours. A severe realist, Lesya herself could not stand any reader lustre. Here one can more readily agree with I. Franko, who already at the end of the last century saw "genuine pearl" among Lesya's works, but was convinced that "one cannot speak about her continuous, straight-lined, so to speak, development"; quite a few rather weak and artificial works", pointed to the "rather monotonous style, verbosity and a lack of plastic scenes", to "the lack of clear-cut, strong feeling" of many poems of the time. But artistic value is one thing, and in particular of the early poems by Lesya Ukraïнка, and the community spirit, the social direction of her creativity is quite another thing. Even in Ukrainian literature, famous for its militant Shevchenko spirit, not many writers could be found at that time — with the sole exception perhaps of Franko himself — of such spiritual courage, of such firm determination not to compromise, of such exactness of poetical nature, the suitability of word and deed as was Lesya Ukraïнка. And it was not in vain that in that same article on Lesya, Franko, calling her "perhaps the only man in the modern united Ukraine", wrote: "From the time of Shevchenko's 'Bury me and rise, shatter your chains' Ukraine did not hear such strong, ardent and poetic word, as from the lips of that feeble, sick girl." And this is primarily because Lesya "does not succumb to pessimism. She slowly reaches the state where she can sing the hardest, the most desperate sobbing and with her singing not awaken despair and hopelessness, for in her own soul the strong fire of love to people, to her native land and to the broad ideals of mankind is burning, a strong faith in the better tomorrow is shining."

Lesya Ukraïнка herself, as if feeling possible reproach and being most concerned with the fighting spirit of her creativity, resolutely rejected the slightest accusations of weak-spiritedness and in one of her last poems declared:

Who told you that I'm weak,
that I'm resigned to my fate?
Is my hand trembling,
or the song and thought feeble?

These words were not written in order to find justification before posterity. They are the expression of the very essence of the poetry

of an artist-fighter, the bard of human courage and indestructibility. True poetry appeared to Lesya in the shape of a double-edged sword, made of steel that does not rust in the sheath by the rust of museums, but which is constantly in battle, is constantly "taking down enemy heads from shoulders."

I have not raised you, words
and given you the blood of my heart to drink,
that you would flow, as slow poison,
and conquer souls, as rust, —

declared Lesya Ukraïнка and turned to her "oud words" with a battle cry:

Strike, cut, even kill,
but don't be like autumn showers.
Blaze or burn, but do not wither!

Such optimistic, robust, fighting character could only be found in a person with strong spiritual power and unusual will. But together with this, of course, this was due to that favourable for creativity social atmosphere in which Lesya Ukraïнка lived. All her creativity, in particular her dramas, has first of all a political character.

Of course, artistic creativity in general is never non-political, and the one who proclaims "pure" art is no less biased than others — this is a well known fact. But there is political and political. There are politics objectively inherent to artistic creativity in general, politics which are inevitable and acting independently from the will and the desire of the artist. And there are conscious politics, when an artist openly raises questions of political character. Kropyvnytskyi and Tobilevych are not strangers to politics, but this is only *in the end result* and only because life and living conditions of their heroes have a bearing on politics. The creative work of Lesya Ukraïнка is quite another matter. Her dramas are primarily political, while the mode of life and everything else come to light only inasmuch as they are associated with politics. Her Rufins and Parvuses, Khuses and neophytes — are first of all political leaders; at times — aside from the religious character of their quarrels — they resolve even strictly party matters, the question of strategy and tactics.

"One of the most serious problems is how to make Ukraine a political force right now?" — wrote Lesya Ukraïнка at the end of the last century and from then on this question became a cornerstone of her creative work in general and her dramas in particular. Without any fear of exaggeration it can be said: if Lesya Ukraïнка's creative work was the pinnacle in the development of the Ukrainian pre- 1917 dramaturgy, this was because she elevated Ukrainian drama from the subject matter of everyday, family, psychological, and in a better event, spontaneously rebelling struggle to the level of conscious politics and open partisanship.

Open partisanship was not only an objective expression of high political quality of her creative work in Lesya Ukraïнка. The writer-

revolutionary also consciously raised and analyzed concrete questions of party struggle, considering it a higher form of political and literary activity. She sharply criticized M. Hankevych for his "view on party struggle, as at some antinomy (contradiction) to humanism", which "completely corresponds to its consideration as an elementary evil, just an earthquake, flood, etc." She resolutely rejected the idea, prevalent among the men of letters of the day, that allegedly all party struggle is inevitably dishonest and without fail leads an individual to the loss of elementary moral standards. In line with Lesya Ukraïнка's deep conviction, "party, as all other struggle, can be both honest and dishonest, depending on the fighters." As far as the social-democratic partisanship is concerned, she constantly fought for high ethical norms and her unchangeable motto was the principle: "a clean cause demands clean hands."

Both as a philosopher, as a theoretician of art and as an artist of verse, Lesya Ukraïнка was resolving in a modern way, on the level demanded by the times, also one of the most important socio-philosophical and ethical problems — the problem of human personality and its relationship to a collective, the society.

Characteristic of the reactionary literature and philosophy of the time was what M. Gorky aptly called "the ruining of a person." The deterioration of human personality typical for bourgeois society was accepted as a norm by philosophers and writers of the decadent type, and raised to the level of an aesthetic ideal. "Possibly, to the detriment of art, which without fail demands strict and lively individualization — wrote L. Andreyev, — I sometimes purposely avoid depicting characters. It is not important to me who 'he' is — the hero of my stories: a priest, an official, a good soul or a beast. To me only one thing is important — that he is a man and as such carries one and the same weight of life." For, allegedly, "all living things have one and the same soul, all living things suffer the same suffering and in great impersonality and equality fuse into one before the stern forces of life."

At the basis of such literary abstractionism lies a coarse notion about any society as about a military barrack that inevitably loses and annihilates human personality. For decadent theoreticians the problem of an individual and society was a real philosophical blind-alley. D. F. Filosoф, one of the members of the Black Hundred engaged with aesthetics, wrote: "Operating only with the concepts of person and society, you cannot leave the blindalley and will inevitably arrive at the Nietzschean subordination of society to an individual, or to the socialist subordination of an individual to his 'environment.'" "an antinomy between the freedom of an individual and the good of society, between individual and society always existed and socialism will not do away with it."

In contrast to this thoroughly pessimistic, thoroughly individualistic philosophy Lesya Ukraïнка placed the ideal of harmony between

individual and society. Supporting a human being's right to an all-development of his personality, and consequently, the principle of high individualization in part, she wrote: "Each man is unique and there is no other one like him in the whole world, there is no one, there was no one and there will be no one like him from now until eternity." But such great firmness of character of the human personality was imagined by Lesya Ukraïнка not as a God-given, not as a natural attribute of man, — the road leading to it was seen by the writer-revolutionary not in the contrasting of an individual to a society, but to the contrary, in the harmonious fusion of the interests of an individual personality with the interests of society, in the development of spiritual forces of man on the basis of collective experience.

Seen from this angle, her theory of "neo-romanticism", the theory of a new literary method, was in principle a new work in the history of aesthetical thought.

The general theme of literature of critical realism, — the death of a talented individuality, contrasted with a mob — in modern times, under conditions of revolutionary activity of the people was not the main thing anymore. Therefore the new art form, "neo-romanticism", in the words of Lesya Ukraïнка, "insults not the mob as such, that is persons who make up the mob, but that servile spirit which forces an individual to count himself as part of the mob voluntarily, as to something spontaneous which engulfs, levels down, erases the individuality, sacrifices it to the instinct, to the herd. A neo-romantic contrasts a mob not with a hero or a select person, but with a society of conscious persons, in which this mob would dissolve *without a trace*." Thus, "Neo-romanticism yearns to liberate personality in the mob itself, to broaden its rights, to give it an opportunity to find those similar to it or, if it is exclusive and at the same time active, to give it an opportunity to raise others to its own level."

"A society of conscious individuals" is for Lesya Ukraïнка not only an ideal of the future, but also a norm of human life which provides a real criterion for aesthetic evaluation of the heroes of literature. Corresponding to this, in Lesya's creative work itself we can find quite a few heroes who did not exist or almost did not exist in the literature of critical realism; we can see situations rarely found in the classical literature of the 18th century. She was least concerned with the fact how a man was oppressed, broken and brutalized by outward, so to speak, physical circumstances, how talented Chipkas [Chipka — hero in the novel by 19th c. Ukrainian writer Panas Myrnyi] turned into "lost force" in cruel living conditions. In the times of revolutionary activity of a people the spiritual steadfastness of a man became the norm, no moral downfall of an individual was justifiable by any circumstances, all blame passed to the man himself. Therefore Lesya Ukraïнка was more interested in voluntary oppression rather than in the forced one, in spiritual shackles on the heart and thought, not in physical ones, on hands and feet.

Johanna, the wife of Khus, is not subjected to any physical violence, yet she dutifully submits herself to the senseless whims of her husband — career man, for she is bid to do so by voluntarily assumed slavery — the Christian religion of obedience and non-resistance to evil by violence. On the contrary, a Hebrew slave from the dialogue "In the House of Labour, in the Country of Slavery", who would

Smash all stone beaters!
Throw away all corpses?
Dam the Nile and flood
this whole country of slavery! —

in spite of the chains binding his hands and feet, has the soul of a free man at the time when the Egyptian who works "not only because he is forced to do so, but also voluntarily", is slave in the spiritual sense as well. For this reason she so hotly mercilessly placed "under scientific doubt all kinds of orthodoxy, all kinds of pretension . . . to the exclusive monopoly of truth or wisdom." For this reason she was so cruel not only to the popes and jailers, but also to the educated, diploma-holding orthodox "Christians", who "fought exclusively with the spirit, but who could also kill the *spirit*, in such a way as no Caesar managed to do."

But, perhaps, Lesya Ukraïнка does not brand anyone so cruelly as the renegades of their people and cause. Mercenaries are more loathsome to her than outright and open enemies. With a scalpel of a merciless anatomist she dissects and shows to the reader the repulsive insides of Judas, who sold his teacher for thirty pieces of silver ("On the Field of Blood"), the national renegade Khus ("Johanna, the Wife of Khus"), the traitor of his fatherland and his people Stepan ("Boyar's Wife").

With a whole gallery of dramatic pictures of spiritual slaves and renegades, Lesya Ukraïнка confirms the idea which is a matter of principle to her: a slave remains a slave as long as he submits to his slavery; therefore slavery depends on slaves no less than on slave owners; the destruction of spiritual slavery is the first and the surest guarantee of liberation from physical slavery. In these pictures and ideas of Lesya's dramaturgy it is not hard to see an echo of revolutionary revival, when the matter of the liberation movement depended to a great degree on the self-consciousness and self-organization of liberators, on how free they were from spiritual slavery.

Extremely important for the evaluation of the character and place of Lesya's works in the history of Ukrainian literature is also the condition that Lesya Ukraïнка did not limit herself to merciless exposure of spiritual slaves and renegades, but also created pictures of internally free, courageous and uncompromising heroes — fighters for national liberation. Such is the celebrated slave Neophyt. Such is Nartal from "Rufin and Priscilla", that "slave in body, free in spirit",

who "did not learn to love his enemies" by any Christianity. Such is the above-mentioned Hebrew slave ("In the House of Labour, the Country of Slavery"). Such is also Oksana (from the play "Boyar's Wife") with her all-powerful love to her native Ukraine.

A severe realist and a conscious opponent of various philosophical and artistic utopias, Lesya Ukraïнка did not make arbitrary prognosis on the future socialist order and the people of the future. All the more valuable for us are the picture of fighters for national cause, all the more realistically do they embody these sprouts of the future which Lesya Ukraïнка could already see with her piercing eyes in the life of the time and immortalized it in the beautiful artistic works.

Lesya Ukraïнка imagined the socialist future, new relations among people, as a community of like-minded, brothers in spirit and in blood. Fighting for the elementary civil rights for an individual, Lesya Ukraïнка wrote: "We should see to it at the same time that the rights so achieved will not serve the interests of the ruling nation primarily, but would benefit the whole huge and varied complex of the Russian state; so that political freedom would be regional, national, decentralized and equally democratic for all."

An ideal of such democracy is constantly present in all creative works of Lesya Ukraïнка. She dedicated her whole strength, her whole short but so bright and meaningful life to the struggle for its realization.

Already at the end of last century I. Franko wrote: "Today, Ukraine, in our opinion, has no poet who with his strength and diversity of talent could equal Lesya Ukraïнка." This was said at a time when Franko himself admitted that Lesya Ukraïнка "only recently has ended the first stage of her development, her talent has only recently shaken off the diapers of that dependency which binds each poet taking his first steps." From then on the writer's talent became steadily more manly and more developed, and if we were to add to Franko's words about Ukraine's first poet of the time a small correction, it would be to add the name of Franko himself. And as far as some genres are concerned — as far as dramaturgy is concerned — even such corrections are not called for.

In her next to the last poem "About a Giant" (1913) Lesya Ukraïнка prophetically wrote:

And the giant will rise from the earth,
Will spread out his threatening arms,
And will instantly break upon himself
All iron fetters.

Lesya Ukraïнка herself did not see this with her own eyes. But her word in the hands of the people-giant was what she imagined it to be: a double-edged sword, a hardened steel which does not become dull through constant use and does not rust, but becomes even sharper and more striking.

(Dnipro, August 1963)

*Lesya UKRAÏNKA*Translated by *Vera Rich*

IPHIGENIA IN TAURIS

(a dramatic scene)

The action takes place in Tauris, in the town of Parthenite, in front of the temple of Tauridian Artemis. A place on the seashore. The sea has worn a bay into the rocky shore. On the very shore are bare, wild, grey-red crags, further off there are mountain slopes covered with luxurious vegetation, laurels, magnolias, olives and cypresses. A whole grove. High above the cliffs, there is a small, semicircular portico. Everywhere on the mountain-slope between the trees stairways gleam whitely, leading down to the temple of Artemis which has a Doric colonnade and broad steps. Not far from the temple, between two cypresses, is a statue of Artemis on a high double pedestal; the lower part of the pedestal makes a slight projection, like an altar, on the projection a fire is burning. A path, paved with marble, runs from the temple to the sea; it goes down to the sea by steps. From the temple comes a Chorus of Tauridian maidens, in white robes and green garlands. The maidens are carrying flowers, garlands, round wicker baskets with barley and salt, amphorae with wine and oil, goblets and phials. The maidens adorn the pedestal of the statue with flowers, and sing.

CHORUS OF MAIDENS

STROPHE

Goddess of mystery, O Artemis all-mighty,
Praise unto thee!
Praise unto thee, O bright one, pure and frigid,
Beyond our reach!

ANTISTROPHE

Woe unto him who insolently gazes
On the goddess's loveliness unveiled.
Woe unto him who with impure hand touches
The raiment of the goddess undefiled, —
Shadows created by the moon's refulgence
Will be far better than his face shall be,
And his own mother, when she looks upon him,
Never shall know him as her son again.

STROPHE

Powerful protectress of the well-loved Tauris,
Praise unto thee!
Praise unto thee, implacable and mighty
Maid of the hunt!

ANTISTROPHE

Woe unto him, who with his words imprudent
 Shall rouse her, the dread goddess, into wrath,
 Woe unto him, who will not bow down humbly
 Before the goddess his presumptuous brow.
 Swifter than moonbeam penetrates down, reaching
 To the deep places of the ocean floor,
 Artemis shall send fly her arrow, burning
 In the presuming heart of the bold fool.

(From the temple comes Iphigenia, in a long robe with a silver diadem on her forehead).

STROPHE

The priestess comes, beloved of the goddess, —
 Give her all praise!
 Give her all praise; her that the very goddess
 Bestowed on us.

ANTISTROPHE

From a far country, from an unknown country,
 Artemis brought the priestess to us,
 All remains secret in the noble maiden,
 Her race, her tribe and her very name.
 Where in the sacred grove, we in the night-time
 Offer to Artemis sacrifice due,
 There did the goddess herself show the maiden
 In her refulgence of silver to us.

(Meanwhile Iphigenia takes a great goblet from one of the maidens and phial from another; a third maiden pours wine into the goblet, a fourth pours oil into the phial. Iphigenia pours out the wine and oil on to the fire, then sprinkles the altar with blessed barley and salt, taken from the baskets which the maidens present to her).

IPHIGENIA

(offering the sacrifice)

O bright goddess, hearken to me,
 And incline thy ear unto me!
 The evening sacrifice, today offered, deign to accept.
 Thou who dost light a path for seafarers who the waves wander
 Grant light to our hearts!
 That we, thy worshippers, may stand before thee,
 Pure in our hearts and bodies and our thoughts,
 Here before thine altar.

CHORUS

Glory to thee!
Silver-throned maiden,
Ever-refulgent,
Wondrously-powerful,
Glory to thee!

IPHIGENIA

Thou, O victorious one, with thy shining arrows,
Dost battle with the hostile shades of night-time, —
Make shine thy favour on us!
Grant that we may conquer the dark spells, the secret
Charms sent by Erebus!

CHORUS

Glory to thee,
Silver-throned maiden,
Ever-refulgent,
Wondrously-powerful,
Glory to thee!

(Iphigenia gives back the goblet and the phial to the maidens, makes a sign with her hand, and the maidens go into the temple. Iphigenia rakes through the fire on the altar to make it burn more brightly, and tidies the altar decorations.)

IPHIGENIA

(alone)

O goddess of the silver bow, O huntress,
Of maiden honour and virtue the protectress,
Do thou now grant us thine aid! . . .

(She falls on her knees before the altar and stretches out her hands towards the statue in despair).

Forgive me, O most great and mighty goddess,
That I pronounce such words with my lips only
While in my heart there are none . . .

(She rises, turns away from the altar and looks out over the sea).

In my heart, you alone
Are there, my only, my loved native land!
All, all that beautifies man's little life
I left behind in you, my own dear Hellas.

My family, glory and youth and love
Remain there far away beyond the seas.
And I alone, here in this strange, strange land,
Like the dim shade of some forgotten soul
Who wanders, lost, amid the fields of Hades,
Am here, a sad, pale, strengthless, empty shade.

(She goes to the steps of the portico and leans against a column).

And this cold marble is my only refuge!
Yet once there was a time when I could lean
My head upon my own dear mother's breast
And listen to the beating of her heart . . .
And it was sweet to take into my arms
The slender form of my own little brother,
My dear Orestes with the golden curls . . .
Daughter of Lato, sister of Apollo!
Forgive thy handmaiden these memories . . .
If but the wind could bear some news to me,
My noble father — is he still alive?
And my dear mother . . . Electra, my sister,
Surely by now a wife? And dear Orestes?
Surely by now at the Olympic games
He's won the crown? How fine they must have looked,
The silver olive-leaves, a splendid sight
Contrasting with his handsome golden curls.
But he could never win it for the sprint,
May be the discus-throw! Achilles always
Won the crown for the sprint. Does he still live,
My own Achilles . . . But no longer mine, —
Maybe some Hellene girl or Trojan captive
Can call him hers . . . O Artemis, preserve me,
O save me, gracious goddess, from myself!

(She comes down again, and sits on the lowest step under the cypresses).

How mournfully these cypresses are rustling!
The autumn wind . . . And soon the winter wind
Will roar like a wild beast through all the oakgrove,
The snowstorm sweep whirling across the sea,
And sea and sky dissolve again to chaos!
And I shall sit beside a meagre fire,
Feeble and sick in body and in soul;
While there at home, in distant Argolis,
Eternal spring will bloom once more with beauty,
And Argive girls will go out to the woods
To pick anemones and violets,

And maybe . . in their songs they will remember
Iphigenia the renowned, who early
Perished for her native land . . . O Fate!
Does it befit you, stern and dread, to mock
And make a laughing stock of us poor humans?
And yet, be silent, proud and wounded heart,
Is it for mortals to oppose the gods?
And how can we contend against the powers
That shake the earth, that hurl the thunderbolt?
We that are made from clay . . . And yet, who made us?
Who gave us soul and gave the secret fire?
Thou, O Prometheus, great and unforgotten,
Gave us our heritage! The spark thou snatched
From the jealous Olympians for us,
I feel the flames of it within my soul, —
And like a conflagration, unsubmitive,
That flame of old dried up my girlish tears
When I went boldly as a sacrifice
For the glory and the honour of my Hellas.
O girls of Hellas, who wept when they led
Iphigenia to a glorious death,
Why do you weep not, when your heroine
Quietly fades, in vain and without glory?

(She stands before the altar).

Why didst thou, goddess, rescue me and bear me
Away into this distant foreign land?
Since thou didst need a Hellene maiden's blood
To quench the wrath that thou didst bear for Hellas,
Why didst thou not permit that blood to flow?
Take it now, goddess, it belongs to thee!
And let it burn within my veins no longer!

(She takes a sacrificial knife from the altar, throws back her mantle, and points the sword against her heart, but suddenly drops the sword).

No, 'tis unworthy of Promethean scions!
And one who dared go boldly to destruction
Must likewise boldly face all that can come.
If for the glory of my native land
Artemis demands such a sacrifice;
That Iphigenia must dwell in this land,
Without her kin, her glory or her name, —
Let it be so!

(She sadly drops her head, and goes towards the sea. Standing on the topmost of the steps leading down to the sea, she gazes for a while into space).

Argos, my own dear home,
I would prefer to die a hundred times
In you, than to live here. Nor Styx nor Lethe
Can quench the memories of one's own dear land!
Bitter thy heritage, O sire Prometheus!

Quietly, with even steps, she goes into the temple).

IPHIGENIA IN TAURIS — A NOTE ON THE LEGEND

Iphigenia, daughter of Agamemnon, joint leader of the Greek expedition to Troy and of his queen Clytemnaestra, is not mentioned by Homer. According to the classical dramatists, when the Greeks were preparing to sail to Troy, Artemis, the virgin-huntress moon-goddess, delayed them by contrary winds or a calm. The goddess's anger, due either to Agamemnon having killed a deer sacred to her (according to Sophocles), or because of a long-overdue vow of Agamemnon's to sacrifice to her the most beautiful thing to be born within his house in a given year (Euripides), could only be allayed by the sacrifice of Iphigenia. Accordingly, Agamemnon lured Iphigenia to Aulis, where the fleet lay ready, on the pretext that she was to be married to Achilles, but really to sacrifice her. Iphigenia was duly sacrificed, and, according to Aeschylus, she appears to have been killed on the altar (since he has Clytemnaestra cite the sacrifice of Iphigenia as one of her motives for murdering her husband, Agamemnon); according to Euripides, however, Artemis snatched Iphigenia away from the altar, leaving in her place a deer, and transported her to the land of the Taurians (in the Crimea), where she made her priestess of a sanctuary where any chance stranger coming to the land was sacrificed to the goddess. In due time, her brother Orestes and cousin Pylades arrived, fleeing from the Furies that pursued Orestes after he had killed his mother in vengeance for his father. Iphigenia discovered the identity of the strangers in time to rescue them from sacrifice, and they escaped together back to Greece, taking with them the statue of Taurian Artemis.

The *Iphigenia In Tauris* of Lesya Ukraïнка is set in the sanctuary of Artemis, some time after the arrival there of Iphigenia, but before the coming of Orestes and Pylades.

Vera Rich

Olena TELIHA

Translated by *Zoria Orionna*

AN EVENING SONG

Beyond the panes day is cooling,
Within them — the first gleams of fire . . .
In palms of my hands enfasten
Your enmity and your ire.

And onto my lap unburden
The boulders of brutal days,
The silvering of your absinthe
For me at my feet displace.

So that your unfettered, light heart
Woud sing as a songbird free;
And, strongest, on my lips resting
Replenish tranquillity.

And I with a kiss so tender,
And soft, as a baby's mirth,
Will gently the flaming hellfire
Of your thoughts and eyes unearth.

But when in the morrow, spaces
Are pierced by the first trumpet tone,
Into the black, murky darkness
I will prepare you alone.

You shall not take crying with you,
Till later my tears needs must wait,
To you I will grant a weapon:
A kiss as sharp as a blade.

That you, midst the iron whistling,
For shrieking and silence would
Have lips determined as gunshot,
Firm as the edge of a sword.

UNNAMED

D. D.

It is not love, not whim, and not adventure;
Not everything has yet received its name!
Not always yet in the abysmal waters
Is there a steadfast base to ascertain.

And when your resurrected soul bestirring
Once more will in resplendent journey soar,
Do not be asking whose were the inspired oars
That knew to push away the dismal shore.

It is not love, nor tenderness, nor passion;
Naught but the heart — an eagle roused aflame!
Do drink the spray, so sparkling and refreshing,
Of hidden sources, joyous but unnamed!

THE IMMORTAL

The light of lanterns fell amid
The calm and dying day,
Before demise it candles met
But with a laughter quaint.

Perhaps we all had sensed that laugh —
Unconquerable might,
Just like the candle carried off
Beyond horizon's site.

And this is why, as in a dream
In midst of streets I went,
And eyes, encountering, a gleam,
Glanced not, but meeting rent!

And I was passing all the fires,
Like lights of strangers' gates,
For I had felt: the long desired
Comes with immortal gifts.

1933-1939

D. D.

A flood of memories is drawing near.

V. Sosyura

They are unknown — beginning and the end,
The mystic measure we do not discern
When life, in floral wreath, does plaiting, blend
Heart and disheartenment in unknown turn.

A dark, black shadow of foreboding clouds
Falls on the clear day like a mourning veil,
A flaming morn in its embraces holds
The chilling night that is from trembling frail.

The iron might which knows no boundary
Will by the breath of God to tears be fused,
And ruthless fires with lash will wrested be
From small sparks that in ashes lie subdued.

And thus the steps, by us forever bound,
In God's design forevermore athwart.
Without warm words, without a twitch of brows
On a street corner somewhere we did part.

But yet it happens, through frontiers of flame
The bygone days return like memory.
Once more tomorrow we'll be not estranged
Accepting this God's pure gratuity.

* * *

My keen eyes are not close in darkness,
While the clock tolls the time: four, five . . .
And my heart is raging nightmares
That once more of my sleep deprive.

But come morn I shall rise serenely
Just as always, without a change,
And in life, like in dance that's carefree,
Till the hours of the night engage.

I shall vanquish my memory constant,
And with laughter and joy entertain;
Only those are endowed with conquest,
Who were able to laugh through pain!

* * *

* * *

Just anything but this! Not these calm days,
In which all words are of but one tone colours,
In which ideas are like unfanned flames,
And wishes lie within dustcovered fetters.

Some type of gale, or laughter, or ill-will,
So that the souls would tear through rusty grating,
So that "do love and hate" someone would yell,
Then worth it to be living or be dying.

Do not fear days within a tangle tied,
The sleepless nights and the demented mornings,
Let time incise the face with good and bad,
The heart be blazed by the most trifling mornings.

Avoid the shade. Endure in burning sport.
Do not take fright to gaze at light that's blinding —
Just when onstage awaited thunder roars,
From clouds escapes, with bayonet, the lightning.

A REPLY

Oh yes, I know, 'tis not befitting us —
With sword in hand, with sudden bursts of ire,
With martial step and with the huntsman's glance,
To march relentlessly through flood and fire.

But when your sails are beaten by your ships,
Indeed, we are your harbour, calm and bright;
Not Leo, Virgo — our eternal sign,
Not wrath, but tenderness our constant might.

No sooner does the weapon downward slip
From your enfeebled hands to foeman's feet,
When tenderness the legend's raven sips,
The battle's and the triumph's demon fierce.

To rive convention like the curtains old,
Our fingers, long and nimble, do so strive,
That we might seize the weapon from your hold
And there strike firmly, where need be to strike.

Alas, the resonant and sparkling sword
Will sense but your decisive touch again,
For us the clock will wonted pages turn,
Of love and passion . . . tenderness and pain.

THE TRAVELLER

You are only a casual traveller
On a fragrant and flowery byway.
L. Mohylyanska

I

You will rest and depart as always,
Well, and what! Come, do enter my house,
So that you the fatigue of your pathways
In my ruby red wine could immerse.

Acute joy in an outburst of splendour
Will be burning my soul through and through:
You are intimate, mine, not a stranger,
Yes, indeed! I have waited for you!

Like a sweet scented lilac in winter
On a plain day will jubilation bloom;
I shall yearn that a love, light and winged,
To eternity I could but turn.

You are leaving now? I am not crying.
And you, traveller, too do not grieve,
Someone for us predestined a byway
That's unknown and which we cannot leave.

I will dry my tears. Pain — I will shatter.
To a bleak night your paths must not speed,
Just my laughter upon the spring zephyr
Shall be running ahead in the lead.

II

A wondrous bliss burns low, to ashes turning . . .
The dreamy, hazy day in trouble grieves,
These thoughts of mine, inspirited and florid,
Are falling in September's yellow leaves . . .

So he has gone, an ordinary traveller.
Naught else. And I dare not to weeping take.
Into a soul so empty and defenseless
Just sorrow flies, invincible black snake.

Some folk will come — not casual, not strangers —
I'll live and laugh as I have done till late,
Though from my life's illustrious spring freshet
A chilling autumn did its first sip take.

III

Oh, why is this, my heart with mallet pounding,
And my lips — a blossoming bouquet?
And why is this, that every object sparkles
Within my room, with gold and flame?

You have returned although I did not beckon;
Thus together now — my spring that strayed
And in an intense fire away is burning
The every law that parting made.

Once more the autumn, struck with fear, is fleeing
Undeneath the March torrential rain.
This day it is the first time I am tearful,
I laugh not, for I am so gay.

Do stay! With chalice bliss I will have drunken,
Stolen bliss, or own — no matter be!
Your road without me for you will be rugged;
My life without you — perfidy.

EDITOR'S NOTE

OLENA TELIHA (1906-1942) — poetess and revolutionary, member of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, one of the leading poets grouped around the influential Ukrainian literary magazine *Visnyk* (Herald) published in Lviv, Western Ukraine, was born in St. Petersburg as daughter of Professor I. Shovheniv. As member of the Campaign Units of the O.U.N. she took a prominent part in the organization of Ukrainian cultural and political life in Kyiv during the German occupation in 1941. There she edited the literary and artistic journal *Litavry*. As a result of her Ukrainian nationalist activities she was arrested by the Germans and shot towards the end of 1942. The only collection of her poems *Dusha na storozhi* (A Soul on Guard) was published abroad after the war. Many of her poems have been reprinted in emigré publications.

Ilze KALNĀRE

HEROES

You insist on calling them heroes,
True sons of their fatherland,
Who shielded by Kurzeme's oaks
Fight with swords of faith in their hands.

No longer is hero a suitable name
They are carried along on the wings of fame,
So great have they grown by fighting.

You insist on calling them heroes
That fell in a battlestorm —
Daugava's brave and unvanquished hawks
With wings that are thundertorn;

The name of hero is far too small
When the native land has been given all,
So great have they grown by dying.

You call them heroes and say they are
Much decorated by scarring
And want to await them with flags unfurled
In a Latvia freed by their warring.

Then no more the word 'heroes' repeat,
But gently see to their weary feet;
So great have they grown by fighting.

Translated from Latvian by Velta Snikere

N. B. The author of this poem, Ilze Kalnāre, died recently in Latvia, her health having been broken in Siberia.
This poem was written in 1945.

THE GUN AND THE FAITH

**Religion and Church in Ukraine
under the Communist Russian Rule**

A Brief Survey by
W. Mykula, B.A. (Lond.), B.Litt. (Oxon)
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Anatole W. BEDRIY, M.A., M.S.

MIKHNOVSKYI AND LENIN

Leaders of Two Nations in Conflict

These two men were contemporaries. One of them received worldwide recognition, the other is still almost unknown beyond the border of his own country. However, the mutual influence of these two men had a tremendous bearing upon the course of history. The former was the Russian politician and empire-builder — Vladimir I. Ulyanov (Lenin), the latter Mykola I. Mikhnovs'kyi — a Ukrainian politician and national freedom-fighter.

1. The Beginnings

Lenin was born in 1870 in the heartland of Russia (Simbirsk on the Volga) in a low-ranking Russian aristocratic family. Mikhnovs'kyi was born in 1873 in the heartland of Ukraine (the Poltava province) in the family of a priest. Lenin's family descended from Russians, Tatars and Germans, all of whom were faithful servants of the colonialist tsarist regime. Mikhnovs'kyi came from an old Ukrainian Cossack-clergy family, the members of which staunchly defended the Ukrainian people's right to be free even in the times of worst enslavement and persecution by tsarist Russia. Lenin was reared in the Russian chauvinistic, messianistic and great-power traditions, while Mikhnovs'kyi was brought up in the Ukrainian Christian, individualistic and patriotic traditions. From Lenin's home town came the Russian historian Nikolai Karamzin, about whom Pushkin once said that he spent his whole life "proving the necessity of autocracy and the advantages of the knout", and the writer Goncharov, whose fictional figure, Oblomov, symbolized the fatalistic Russian national character. Both of these men had tremendous influence on Lenin's views. Mikhnovs'kyi's father, on the other hand, served as an example to his son of a Ukrainian patriot who resisted the Russification pressures of the imperial Russian Orthodox Church, while the population of his native village exemplified the heroic and noble resistance to ruthless Russian colonialism. Early in life Mikhnovs'kyi was imbued with the revolutionary liberation spirit of the greatest Ukrainian national poet, Taras Shevchenko. At the same time Lenin's idols were Russian writers Turgenev and Tolstoi.

Mikhnovs'kyi received his secondary education at the Pryluky Gymnasium (Poltava province). There he organized a Ukrainian students' club, the aim of which was to cultivate Ukrainian culture, which was under constant pressure of the Russian colonial regime to assimilate itself with the Russian culture. Lenin received his secondary education at the Simbirsk Lyceum, where he was indoctrinated with the ideas of Russian autocratic collectivistic and materialistic culture.

Mikhnovs'kyi entered the St. Volodymyr University in Kyiv with the intention of studying law in order to render legal assistance to his enslaved countrymen who were treated as second-class citizens by the Russian colonial regime. Lenin, on the other hand, shocked by the tsarist execution of his brother Alexander in 1887, studied law at St. Petersburg. He was prompted to work for the change of the regime in the Russian empire, but without even thinking of abolishing Russian domination over the enslaved nations.

In 1891 Mikhnovs'kyi, with a group of fellow-students, went to the grave of Taras Shevchenko and there founded the "Brotherhood of Shevchenko." In their "Profession de foi", the youthful activists resolved to work for: 1) *the destruction of Muscovite chains* and the liberation of the people from the oppressive despotism and centralism; 2) the revival of the campaign for stronger national consciousness; 3) the raising of the people's standard of living; 4) the development of a system in which there would be no place for exploiters and the exploited; 5) *the liberation of the Ukrainian nation*.

Meanwhile in the winter of 1888/9 Lenin obtained a copy of *Das Kapital* by Karl Marx and was fascinated by it. In 1890 he read through Engels' "The Condition of the Working Class in England" and several works dealing with Russian agricultural policies in the subjugated nations. Consequently, he became convinced that the agricultural system in ethnic Russia was socialist in nature and for that reason progressive, but that in areas settled by the non-Russians, i. e. Ukraine, the Cossack lands, the Caucasus and Turkestan, it was individualized or cooperative and therefore outdated and reactionary. He conceived the tsarist empire as one and indivisible Russia, but divided it according to Marx's theory into warring classes, cutting across nations, instead of into the oppressing and the oppressed nations. He perceived all phenomena in terms of economic-materialistic determinism. The ideology of the Ukrainian nationalists was to him an ideology of the Russian bourgeois class.

In 1893 Lenin wrote his first treatise entitled "The New Economic Movement in the Peasant Life", in which he discussed agricultural problems of Ukraine, calling it however "black-earth South Russia", "South-Russian peasantry", "South-Russian village." He treated the Ukrainian provinces of Kherson, Katerynoslav, Tavrida and Crimea as integral parts of Russia. For example, he stated that "the Tavrida

province is settled in addition to Russians, also by Germans and Bulgarians." This means that he regarded all Ukrainians, who formed the majority of the population there, as Russians. He designated these areas only as "other regions of Russia."

While Lenin was writing the above, the Russian tsarist police crushed the Brotherhood of Shevchenko and arrested many of its members. Its head, Yuriy Lypa later wrote (1925) that Mikhnovs'kyi became "the moving spirit and the pioneer of the new idea" of organizing an uncompromising revolutionary struggle of the Ukrainian people in order to destroy the Russian colonial rule in Ukraine and to reestablish a sovereign state. (*Literaturno-Naukovyi Vistnyk*, Lviv, 1925).

Lenin, in turn, wrote the treatise "Who Are the Friends of the People" in 1894, in which he argued that "*the establishment of national ties is nothing else than the establishment of bourgeois ties.*" This expression attests to his unqualified treatment of the Russian imperial state as a single, indivisible, organic unit, in which any movement or even the thought of separation and liberation of enslaved nations was regarded as a reactionary bourgeois invention.

In this early work, Lenin furthered the establishment of such a Marxist organization which would fight solely for the change of regime on the basis of the integrity and indivisibility of the Russian colonial empire. He argued: "It is the direct duty of the working class to fight... against absolutism and the reactionary estates and institutions — and the Social-Democrats must impress this upon the workers, while not for a moment ceasing to impress upon them that the struggle against these institutions is necessary only as a means of facilitating the *struggle against the bourgeoisie*..." It follows that the Marxist theory of class struggle was to be implemented on the basis of Russian domination and conquest of Ukraine, the nations of the Caucasus, the Baltic states, Turkestan, Poland and others. Lenin favoured the establishment of such a Marxist movement in Ukraine which would oppose the native anti-Russian liberation

Lenin continued: "... the achievement of general democratic demands is necessary for the workers only as a means of clearing the way to victory over the chief enemy of the toilers, over an institution which is purely democratic in nature, viz., capital..." This was *the great deception* and hoax, for not the socio-economic conditions were the chief enemy of the Ukrainian people, but their subjugation by the Russian imperialistic state.

In 1895 Mikhnovs'kyi translated T. Shevchenko's novel, "Muzyka" from Russian into Ukrainian, thus emphasizing the significance of the Ukrainian national culture and his opposition to Russification. In particular, he stressed that the Ukrainian language must prevail in Ukraine, not the Russian language. That same year Lenin read Plekhanov's book "On the Development of the *Monistic* Concept of History" and founded "The Group Fighting for *Liberation of the*

Working Class" in St. Petersburg. He wrote his subsequent work dealing with political economy under the title "Explanation of the law on fines imposed on workers at factories and shops" (1895) in which he talked about "a quick development of capitalism in South Russia" (meaning Ukraine), about "Russian laws" and Russian government" as "the law for the whole Russia", naturally including Ukraine.

The final quarter of the 19th century was characterized by rapid growth of industry, trade and communication in the Russian empire. The economic exploitation of Ukraine by Russia was rising quickly. The Russians were getting richer, while Ukrainians were remaining further and further behind. No wonder that Yulian Bachynskyi, a Ukrainian Marxist, wrote a book in 1895 entitled "Ukraine irredenta" in which he expounded the need to separate Ukraine from Russia so that Ukraine could become a wealthy nation under the rule of the Ukrainian workers.

It is interesting to note that prior to World War I the Ukrainian national liberation movement was most intense in Southern and Eastern Ukraine, where the peasantry was becoming restive as the result of Russian colonial exploitation, and the fact that the Russians were migrating to these areas en masse to take up jobs in the new industrial centres of the Donets Basin, Kryvyi Rih and Katerynoslav. Therefore in 1897, the militant Ukrainian Student Association was established in Kharkiv. It was inspired to a large degree by Mykola Mikhnovskyi and the members of the Shevchenko Brotherhood. The Ukrainian students resolved that "it is the duty of each Ukrainian to distinguish his own nation from others, to raise the national question and to defend the rights of the Ukrainian nation at every opportunity, but primarily, to strive for national freedom for his people."

2. The Lines Are Being Drawn

Being well aware of the rise of liberation tendencies among the subjugated peoples, Lenin wrote two works in 1897, "The Development of Capitalism in Russia" and "The Tasks of Russian Social-Democracy." In the first work he started with the premise that the Russian imperial economy must be considered as one indivisible economic unit. He did not regard Ukraine as a separate national unit but as an integral part of Russia. In this work the Ukrainian people are presented as Russians without any national characteristics of their own. He talked about "South-Russian steppe gubernias" and "Southern and eastern areas of European Russia." He applauded the colonialist policy of the tsarist regime as justified and normal: "The farming capitalism in Russia, in its historical significance is a large *progressive force*... Capitalism destroys the local isolationism and limitation substituting the small medieval plots of farmers by large divisions covering the whole nation..." He brought out "the progress-

ive historical role of Russian farming capitalism." In Lenin's opinion, the tsarist colonial economy was on the right course, the only adjustment being that its leadership should be replaced by imperialistically-minded Russian "proletariat." Exploitation and enslavement of Ukraine should be increased steadily. State capitalism was to be an excellent tool of Russia's aggrandizement.

In the second treatise Lenin employed the strategy of attempting to channel the anti-colonial, national liberational trends of the subjugated peoples into the anti-regime struggle on the basis of the indivisibility of the Russian empire. He wrote: "In the democratic, the political struggle... the *Russian* working class does not stand alone. Side by side with the proletariat stand all the opposition elements of the bourgeoisie, or of the nationalities or religions and sects which are persecuted by the absolutist government." One commentator stated: "We notice in this work much less the influence of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels than the influence of two earlier Russian revolutionaries. They were S. G. Nechayev (1847-1882) who wrote 'The Catechism of the Revolution' and was the first to demand that the professional revolutionaries take charge of the revolution... The second Russian revolutionary who influenced Lenin was P. N. Tkachov (1844-1885), who conceived the idea of a 'conspiratorial minority' united in a highly centralized and highly disciplined organization." (W. Scharndorff, "Moskaus permanente Säuberung", Munich, Olzog, 1964, p. 14).

Both the pro- and the anti-tsarist Russians were combating the anti-Russian national liberation movements of the peoples subjugated by Russia. But while the colonialist regime was totally opposed to all Ukrainian activities, the opposition was trying to involve the enslaved nations in activities directed against the regime. Indeed, Socialism of the revolutionary and so-called "all-Russian" type was rapidly spreading throughout the empire. When the Ukrainian nationalists, inspired by Mikhnovskyi established an all-Ukrainian union of student associations in 1899, their declaration reflected some views of the Russian imperialistic anti-regime Marxists: "The poor socio-economic and cultural conditions of our people derive from its national and political slavery resulting directly from Russian absolutism."

The rise of national liberation forces in Ukraine was countered by Lenin with an article "Concerning the 'Profession de foi'" (1899) which was a reply of a sort to Mikhnov'skyi and the "Profession de foi" of the Brotherhood of Shevchenko. He called for subordination of the struggle against economic exploitation to the struggle against the existing regime and the struggle for cultural freedom to the political and revolutionary struggle. His ideological reasoning was aimed at combating all autonomistic, separatistic and nationalistic trends in Ukraine by bringing all such trends under the control of

the Russian Marxists in the name of the utopian international Socialist society.

In the same year Lenin prepared "Our Program" in which he Russified Marxism arguing that Marxism must serve the Russian interests: "We are convinced that it is necessary for the Russian Socialists to work out the Marxist theory independently, because this theory is only a generalized guideline . . ."

The struggle between the two nations and the two national leaders was steadily intensifying and the discord among them growing. Under Mikhnovs'kyi's prime inspiration the first national Ukrainian liberation organization was established in Kharkiv on February 5, 1900 calling itself "The Revolutionary Ukrainian Party." Two weeks later Mikhnovs'kyi made public his famous work *Samostiyna Ukraïna* (Independent Ukraine), which was to be the ideological programme of the RUP.

This work starts with the statement that "the end of the 19th century has been characterized by phenomena which point to a new turn in the history of mankind . . . These phenomena are the *armed uprisings of the enslaved nations against nations-oppressors* . . . it becomes very obvious that the whole world-wide national question has fully ripened, although it is still very far from a necessary, real, and just solution." There is nothing of Marx's, Lenin's or Plekhanov's reasoning in this. In fact, it is contradictory to the ideas and policies of the Russian Marxists. Mikhnovs'kyi then states: "We declare that our people are lingering under conditions characteristic of a robbed nation . . . it is becoming very obvious that *state sovereignty is the main condition of national existence, and state sovereignty is the national ideal in the sphere of international relations.*" He puts the problem squarely: "Thus, a question arises, is liberation possible for us?" He outlines the history of Ukraine's sovereign existence and the periods of her subjugation by her neighbours. (See this treatise in full in *The Ukrainian Review*, Autumn, 1967, v. XIV, no. 3) Mikhnovs'kyi then goes on to attack various Russian imperialists: "The leading argument of our adversaries who try to prove the hopelessness of our endeavours, saying that we allegedly never constituted a state and, therefore, we do not possess any historical basis — is simply the result of their ignorance of history and law." He rejects the thesis that on the basis of the Pereyaslav Treaty of 1654 Ukraine fused herself with Russia and for ever renounced her independent national existence, but he accuses the Russians of violating Ukraine's sovereign rights and turning her into their slave colony: "Thus, we do not recognize the existence of 'a single indivisible Russia'." With these words he launches a direct attack against Lenin's chauvinistic concept of "an indivisible Russia": "First, whatever was seized by robbery or thievery cannot be considered as a lawful possession because of long neglect. Second, the nation of a long neglect cannot refer to the enslavement of freedom." He concludes: "our existence

is a protest against the violence perpetrated against us and against our ancestors; it interrupts the flow of neglect; it obliges us to destroy the chains of slavery in order that we — the heirs of Bohdan Khmelnyts'kyi — could legally use our inheritance!"

Mikhnovs'kyi then discloses the intentions of the Russian Monarchists, as well as of the Marxists and Lenin: "A black flag with the inscription: 'Political death, national death, cultural death to the Ukrainian nation', hangs over us." In contrast to this, Mikhnovs'kyi proposes: "we inscribe upon our banner: '*One, single, indivisible, free and independent Ukraine, from the Carpathians to the Caucasus.*' Our inhuman treatment at the hands of the Russians sanctifies our hatred towards them and our moral right to destroy the oppressor, defending ourselves from violence . . . the insulted sense of the nation and the harm done to the whole people are *fastidious in recognizing any moral connections with the Russian nation!* . . . Everyone in entire Ukraine who is not with us is against us. Ukraine for Ukrainians! As long as even one enemy remains on our soil, we have no right to lay down our arms."

Developments in Ukraine were of prime importance to Lenin. He immediately replied to Mikhnovs'kyi's liberationist nationalism, from a position of a Russian imperialist, in the Foreword to the brochure *May Days in Kharkiv* in which he applauded the Russian endeavours in Ukraine to contribute to the "liberation of the Russian people" from tsarism. In Lenin's opinion Ukraine comprised an indivisible part of the Russian state: "*Everything depends on the form of state government in Russia . . . workers should demand from the tsar the convocation of the people's representatives, the convocation of a land council.*"

At the time when Lenin was trying to convince the Ukrainian people that they were not Ukrainians but Russians and therefore must act like Russians and not attempt to propagate the national liberation struggle, Mikhnovs'kyi wrote (1900) an open letter to the tsarist minister Sipyagin on the occasion of the latter's prohibition to have an inscription in Ukrainian on the monument to a Ukrainian writer, Ivan Kotlarevs'kyi. In it he said: "You, Mr. Minister, and other gentlemen like you, have become accustomed to respect coercion alone . . . *the Ukrainian nation in Russia is really a nation of slaves-pariahs. Its destiny is to feed you, Mr. Minister, and other hundreds of thousands of foreign officials, beginning with a minister and down to the village clerk, to contribute men and money for the upkeep of the army, which is the instrument of your domination over our nation and is demoralizing it . . .*" The letter is composed with the intention to influence the whole nation to break all its ties with the Russian nation.

Lenin did not retreat a bit from his stand of the "indivisible" Russian empire. In the article "Immediate Tasks of Our Movement" (1900) he advanced the aim of "overthrowing autocracy" in name

only and advocated "the great historical mission: to emancipate itself (the proletariat) and the whole of the *Russian people* from political and economic slavery." If the Ukrainian people wish to be "emancipated" from "slavery" they must renounce their nationality, forget that they are a conquered nation, fully embrace the Russian nationality and accept the rule of the Russian Socialists. There was no doubt in his mind that the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party (RSDLP) was to be a Russian national movement on the imperial scale: "we combine all the forces of the awakening proletariat with all the forces of the *Russian revolutionaries* into a single party that will attract all that is virile and honest in *Russia*."

3. Both Men Rise to the Position of Prominence

Marxist propaganda and a tremendous ideological campaign conducted by the Russians of all party affiliations, including some members of other nationalities making up the empire who became faithful Russian janissaries and defenders of the concept of the "indivisible" Russian empire had some effect upon the budding and inexperienced Ukrainian national liberation movement. The RUP was split into two factions — those who placed the nation first and those who placed socialist ideas first. The Socialists received the majority. The nationalists then left the RUP and in 1902 established a new party — the Ukrainian People's Party (UNP) with Mikhnovskiy as its ideological and actual leader. From then on Mikhnovskiy worked on the premise that Russian Marxists and their collaborators among the non-Russian peoples, were enemies of Ukraine's national liberation.

He wrote the work "The Labour Question in the Program of UNP" in which he uncompromisingly attacked Marxism. He asked whether the slogan "Workers of all countries unite" would really bring salvation to the world. And his reply was: "No, the labour movement entered a new phase of development today, from a cosmopolitan it became a national one." He discusses the conditions in the Polish areas under German occupation and concluded that while German workers were not at all interested in assisting the Polish workers, "the ideal of the Polish workers is not to unite with the Germans, but to tear their country away from Germany, to create their own free state — independent, sovereign, democratic, on the grounds that *only in one's own state is it possible to arrange one's own life to one's liking*." On the other hand, the Polish workers in Western Ukraine, treat Ukrainian workers as masters treat their slaves. Therefore in 1902 the Ukrainian lower classes rose in general strikes against Polish oppression and discrimination. The same relations existed between the English workers and the subjugated Irish workers. And again the same story is repeated in relations between the dominating Austrian workers and the oppressed Czech workers.

Mikhnovs'kyi then summed up: "We see that the interests of dominant nations and of subjugated nations are so contradictory that they stir up feuds and violent conflicts... The feeling of personal dignity compels the *worker of the robbed nation to turn away with aversion from any moral contacts with members of the dominating nation*, regardless of whether it is a worker or someone else, since they do not recognize his rights... Today *workers of subjugated nations fight for the right of political independence on their own territory*, realizing well that without this condition it is impossible to achieve material benefits or a free spiritual development... Therefore, we propose a new slogan: *Workers of subjugated nations unite in a common struggle for your own national-political, spiritual, and economic interests against the imperialistic nations*, recognizing mutual national rights!" He prophesized: "Woe to a subjugated nation, which will experience domination by a democratized nation." If Ukraine were to come under the rule of the Russian proletariat, then "The Ukrainian will live in a den without windows and doors, without a bed, stove and bedspread, together with pigs, hungry and sick." The only rescue from such a horrible fate is to be found in the "fulfilment of the great national ideal: one, indivisible, independent, democratic Ukraine of educated working masses, the establishment of a large national state, encompassing all segments of the Ukrainian people."

In a 1901 article "Induction of 183 Students" Lenin suggested that the only remedy for those Ukrainian students whose nationalist activities were crushed by the colonial tsarist regime was to fight "for liberty of the people from despotism", but not to fight against Russian domination.

His grand scheme envisaged a great stratagem or deception of the anti-Russian liberation movements by attempting to promise them "freedom", "happiness" and well-being when they forget the anti-Russian struggle and join the Russian opposition with the aim to overthrow the bankrupt tsarist regime and to install a "better" regime in the Russian empire, in the form of the rule of the RSDLP. He suggested such a plan in the article "Workers' Party and the Peasantry" (1901): "It is quite natural that the public should celebrate March 3 (February 19) with particular enthusiasm, the anniversary of the fall of the old feudal Russia and the beginning of the epoch which promised Russia liberty and prosperity."

Lenin's empire-saving concept was further developed in his "Draft Programme for the Social-Democratic Labour Party of Russia" of 1902: "The RSDLP sets itself as an immediate political task: *to overthrow the tsarist autocracy and to supplant it by a republic on the basis of a democratic constitution...*" The imperialist concept is clearly concealed here, for Lenin equated the Russian empire with "one, indivisible" Russian national state, whose form has to change,

but whose substance, i. e. the indivisibility of the empire has to remain.

Lenin realized that he must break relations with Plekhanov, Martov and Axelrod, for the use of power was necessarily to be applied in order to crush the liberation movements, if the empire were to be saved. In 1901 he had already stated unequivocally: "We have never rejected terror on principle, *nor can we do so.*" ("Where to Begin?") Terror had to be the tool of the so-called class struggle, which in turn had to be the means of saving the Russian empire which was inevitably coming to an end.

The new imperialist concept of Russia was to be fulfilled by an imperialistic organization. Its shape was formulated in Lenin's important work "What Is to Be Done?" written in 1902. This movement was to be based on "the very idea of a militant *centralized* organization . . ." meaning an organization on the imperial scale with branches in the conquered nations, which in turn must be absolutely and totally subordinated to its Russian (imperial) center. He confessed that this Russian movement was not only to work within the Russian nation, but in the empire as a whole: "The Social Democratic movement is essentially an international movement. This does not merely mean that we must combat national chauvinism. It also means that a movement can be successful only on the condition that it assimilated the experience of other countries." "National chauvinism" meant the outdated and bankrupt tsarist form of Russian imperialism as well as Mikhnovs'kyi's brand of anti-Russian liberation movement. Lenin sought to establish a Russian movement of the type which would be capable of dominating other nations by means of appropriate "international" forms. He gave a messianistic vision to this movement: "The fulfilment of this task, the destruction of the most powerful bulwark not only of European but also of Asiatic reaction, would place the *Russian proletariat in the vanguard of the international revolutionary proletariat.*" He warned the national liberation movements more than the tsarist regime when he exclaimed: "The time has come when *Russian revolutionaries*, led by a genuinely revolutionary and spontaneously awakening class, can at last — at last! — rise to their full height and exert their giant strength to the utmost." He opposed Mikhnovs'kyi's concept of national organizations fighting Russian imperialists by proclaiming: "We must speak about a single all-Russian organization of revolutionaries . . ."

In contrast, in 1903 Mikhnovs'kyi wrote the "Ten Commandments of the UNP." The first "commandment" stated: "One, single, indivisible, independent, free democratic Ukraine from the Carpathians to the Caucasus — a republic of the working people." He wanted to neutralize the subverting and demoralizing influence of the Russian Marxists by keeping the Ukrainian workers within the ranks of the nationalist liberation movement. The second "commandment" said: "All the people are your brothers, however, *Russians, Poles, Hungar-*

ians, Rumanians, and Jews are enemies of our people *as long as they rule over us and exploit us.*" A genuine freedom-loving internationalism is proposed in contrast to Marxist genocidal internationalism, embraced by the Russians as a cover-up of their imperialism. Mikhnovs'kyi also courageously declared war on those Poles, Jews, Hungarians and Rumanians, who served the Russian imperialist aims in enslaving and subjugating the Ukrainian people. The third commandment was the logical consequence of the other two: "Ukraine for Ukrainians! Therefore, let us drive out foreigners-oppressors from all corners of Ukraine." This principle was primarily directed against Lenin and all those who wanted to keep Ukraine in Russia's slavery. Mikhnovs'kyi wanted to separate Ukraine from dependence on the Russians in general or any particular class and to free her from all their hostile influences. In the fifth commandment he demanded: "Honour active members of your native land, hate its enemies, despise turncoats-renegades, then well-being will come to your people and to you." He attacked those Ukrainians who collaborated with Russian chauvinists and perpetrators of genocide. The sixth point was directed against Marxism-Leninism: "Do not kill Ukraine by your indifference to national interests." And the seventh point commanded: "Do not become a turncoat-renegade yourself."

In Lenin's life the year 1903 was marked by unprecedented hate and enmity for the Ukrainian liberation movement. First of all, he upheld repeatedly his unwavering principle that his movement is engaged in an anti-regime struggle but wants to preserve the indivisibility of the Russian empire: "The first demand is that a *national assembly* of deputies be convened with the object of establishing a popular representative government *in Russia instead of the present autocratic government.*" ("To the Rural Poor") Then he wrote an important treatise, "The National Question in Our Programme" in which he gave the answer to Mikhnovs'kyi's liberation nationalism: "We included in our draft party program the demand for a *republic* with a democratic constitution that would, among other things assure 'the recognition of the right of *self-determination to all nationalities contained in the state* . . . Social-Democracy, as the party of the proletariat, considers it to be its positive and principal task to *advance the self-determination of the working class within each nationality rather than the self-determination of peoples and nationalities.* We must always and unconditionally strive to achieve the closest unity of the proletariat of all nationalities . . ."

Lenin formally acknowledged the existence of nations enslaved by Russia, but maintained that they must remain in his imperial state under a republican constitution. This new imperial state was to be ruled by Russian proletarians, to whom the proletarians of the subjugated nations must be subordinated, i. e. they must execute the orders of the Russian masters in their respective countries. He was very outspoken on this subject: "It is in the interests of this class

struggle that *we must subordinate the demand for national self-determination. The Social-Democrat will always and everywhere ruthlessly expose this bourgeois illusion*, whether it finds expression in an abstract idealist philosophy or in the *unqualified demand for national independence.*" Obviously, Ukraine's liberation had no place in Lenin's plans. He attacked Mikhnov'skyi's thesis as an "unqualified demand" for Ukraine's "national independence." In addition, he strived to stir up a fratricidal "class war" among the subjugated Ukrainians: "The antagonism of classes has undoubtedly relegated *questions of nationality far to the background.*" He showed the real worth of his "national self-determination right" by the example of the Poles: "That programme (of the R.S.D) does not preclude the Polish proletariat from adopting the slogan of a free and independent Polish republic, even though the probability of its becoming a reality before the introduction of socialism is infinitesimal." Lenin was very frank in saying that he was against the liquidation of the Russian colonial empire: "*The disintegration of Russia in contrast with our aim of overthrowing tsarism* is and will remain a hollow phrase as long as *economic evolution continues to unite the different parts of a political whole more and more closely . . .*" Accordingly he attacked any movement in the subjugated nations which was unwilling to follow his brand of Russian imperialism: "*We must not legalize this evil or sanctify this shameful state of affairs by establishing the 'principle' of the separateness of parties or the 'federation' of parties.*"

In the 1903 programme of the RSDLP, drafted mostly by Lenin, the hostility toward the liberation struggle of Ukraine and her non-recognition as a national entity was expressly stated: "For a broad local self-rule for localities which are distinguished by peculiar customary conditions and composition of population . . ." Ukraine was to be divided into small administrative units.

4. Continuation and Intensification of the Struggle

In spite of the brutal drive against the Ukrainian liberation movement by both the tsarist occupation regime and the Marxists, including Lenin, Mikhnov'skyi continued to fight. In 1904 he wrote the pamphlet "The Question of the Ukrainian Intelligentsia in the Programme of the UNP." In it he replied to the imperialistic Russian attitude: "Political and economic slavery is rearing Ukrainians with a mentality of spiritual slaves who cannot imagine the existence of an independent Ukrainian state, who cannot perceive the appearance of such a state, even in a distant future, to whom even the thought is ridiculous because of the impossibility to realize it, for they think of the power of the Russian nation as invincible, — they will obviously seek a better future not in antagonism but in compliance with the 'masters of the situation', with the Russians." Then Mikhnov'skyi turns to the Marxists and Lenin in particular, with the request:

"Perhaps the Russians did forsake the road of robbery and banditry in foreign countries, their historical mission, and are returning to the road of altruism? Oh no! . . . A Russian parliament, in which the Muscovites, due to their political and economic power, will have an absolute majority of representatives, will without control and ceremonies apply to Ukraine the same methods of exploitation and domination as does the present absolutist government." Mikhnovs'kyi suggested that Ukrainians should not embrace the false ideas of Lenin and should not work for the replacement of the tsarist regime by a socialist one, but should strive for independent statehood for Ukraine, completely free of any Russian imperialistic influence.

He urged: *"Let us end the sacrifices to the Muscovite 'Moloch' . . . What advantage is there from the 50 years in which the flower of the Ukrainian intelligentsia was sinking in the wide sea of Muscovite revolutionary democracy? . . . The Muscovite nation has become accustomed to look at Ukraine as its milk cow, as the source of its well-being and it will retreat only when force is applied, and nothing else . . . Independence is the only means of saving the enslaved nation . . . Nationalism is a tremendous irresistible force manifested vividly during the 19th century. Under its invincible pressure seemingly unbreakable chains are being broken, big empires are falling apart . . . The Ukrainian nation has to follow the same road . . ."*

The year 1905 was marked by rapid weakening of the Russian empire. Tsarist messianism began to show signs of bankruptcy and decay. A new party, the Constitutional Democrats, arose with the aim to save the empire by reforming it into a constitutional monarchy. But Lenin hoped to compete with it by showing that his was a new and the most messianistic Russian movement. In the article "Social-Democracy and the Provisional Revolutionary Government" he wrote: *"We shall succeed in making the Russian revolution not a movement of a few months' duration, but a movement of many years . . . then the revolutionary conflagration will spread all over Europe."* His chauvinism is even more apparent in the work "The Beginning of a Revolution in Russia": *"The eyes of the proletariat of the whole world are anxiously turned towards the proletariat of the whole of Russia. The overthrow of tsarism in Russia, began so valiantly by our working class, will be the turning point in the history of all countries, will facilitate the task of the workers of all nations, in all states, in all parts of the globe."* He spoke as the conqueror of the world and not as someone interested in giving national independent to the nations subjugated by Russia.

In the article "The Struggle of the Proletariat and the Servility of the Bourgeoisie" he expressed fears about the falling apart of the Russian empire: *" . . . the armed resistance of tsarism must be broken and crushed with an armed hand. Otherwise we shall never achieve liberty, otherwise Russia will meet the fate of Turkey: protracted and*

painful downfall for all the toiling and exploited masses of the people." Turkey was losing its empire, and Lenin was afraid that Russia will lose her empire as well, unless the Russian proletariat does something to save it.

At the end of 1905 Lenin presented a new formula for Russian messianism: "Complete cultural and political liberty for all the oppressed and disfranchised nationalities — the Russian people cannot win liberty for itself unless it fights for the liberty of the other nationalities." ("Boycott of the Bulygin Duma and the Insurrection"). From this it follows that the Russian proletarians will "liberate" Ukraine from the Russian tsarist regime, but not from the Russian "big brother custody."

Meanwhile, in 1906 Mikhnovs'kyi drafted a programme for his Ukrainian People's Party as a reply to Lenin's programme for his Russian SDLP(b). He stated: "The U.N.P. is a party of the labour masses of the *Ukrainian people*, a party of the Ukrainian urban and rural proletariat... The Ukrainian workers should remember at all times to *expel from Ukraine all foreigners-enemies* and to establish independent statehood. Therefore, a single national army should be organized of all Ukrainian workers with the aim of expelling *all invaders*... Ukraine with her wealth belongs to her people alone... Only after an *all-Ukrainian revolution*, as the result of which Ukraine would have achieved the right to self-determination, the right to arrange her destiny and her land problem freely, *only then* will it be possible to carry out the nationalization of land in Ukraine. The means of production, factories, and plants in the territories settled by the Ukrainian people must belong to the Ukrainian workers."

In 1906 Mikhnovs'kyi exposed Lenin and the Russian Marxists as imperialists with respect to Ukraine: "At this time, *democratic forces of the master-nations*, although suffering themselves from arbitrary rule and exploitation by their own ruling classes, *do not show the willingness to grant freedom to the enslaved nations*... When the democracy of the master-nation gains freedom, when it gains the reigns of government, then the enslaved nations can expect even less sympathy on the matter of their enslavement from the democracy of the master-nations. On this basis, domination by some nations over others should be abrogated in the whole world before the solution of the social question, before *demos* gains freedom." While Lenin advocated that the Russians should solve Ukraine's social problems, Mikhnovs'kyi advocated the reverse course: "*To wrench the social problem from the hands of foreigners, to take it into its own hands — is the main goal of every enslaved people. Wherever there exist nation-masters and nations-slaves, there are no common interests between them.*" Every sentence sounds almost prophetic.

Lenin responded to Mikhnovs'kyi's position immediately by stressing the absolute necessity for the Russian "proletarians" to maintain

their domination and control over Ukrainians and other subjugated peoples: "... it is all the more essential to attain the *practical unity* of all class conscious proletariat of the *whole of Russia and of all its nationalities*." (1906, "Appeal to the Party") His tactics was to bring the Ukrainian workers under the rule of the Russian workers, to demand from them a promise not to oppose the imperial unity, not to rise up against the Russians as a whole, but to create an internal conflict among Ukrainians themselves, namely between those who wanted to establish a national state independent from Russia and those who favoured a common state with the Russians which, in fact, would mean leaving the Russian nation sovereign over Ukraine.

In the "Draft Resolution 'Concerning the Unifying Congress of the RSDLP'" (1906) Lenin categorically demanded the liquidation of all Ukrainian and other non-Russian national movements and subordination of the non-Russian Socialists to an organization built on an imperial scope: "We avow and present to the conference for adoption: 1) the imperative need to use all means for the *fusion of all national Social-Democratic parties of Russia in a single Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party* as soon as possible..."

In contrast, Mikhnovs'kyi prepared a draft declaration in 1907 for the UNP Conference, which said among other things: "The Ukrainian proletariat in urban areas has the tasks: ... 2) to protect itself from foreign competition, primarily of the Russians, who, driven by spontaneous force of looking for a better life, are pouring in streams into Ukrainian cities, and in view of the cultural oppression of the Ukrainian nation, the attitudes of the Russian nationality, and the assistance from the capitalists, composed mainly of Russians (in Left-bank Ukraine), who willingly take their countrymen into their service, — take away employment from Ukrainians, pushing them out of all professions, factories, plants, and shops, and into the ranks of the unemployed proletariat, into the jaws of moral death and, later, starvation. — *The proletariat of the dominating nation and of the enslaved — are two separate classes without common interests.*"

Lenin in turn was forced to reply to Mikhnovs'kyi and the liberation demands of the subjugated peoples. He was willing to grant them no more than vague provincial status: "Our minimum programme demands when it calls for the self-determination of nations, for *broad regional local government*." ("Agrarian Programme of Social Democracy in the First Russian Revolution"). He did not even grant national autonomy, nor did he recognize the national entities of the subjugated peoples, but divided them into administrative units. This in itself was indicative of imperial oneness.

5. A New Low Prior to a Great Conflagration

Beginning with 1907 the tsarist regime was ruthlessly suppressing all traces of Ukrainian nationalism. In spite of this, the Ukrainian

People's Party succeeded in organizing a large anti-Russian demonstration in Poltava in 1909 in protest against the commemoration of the Russian victory over Ukraine 200 years ago. Simultaneously Mikhnovs'kyi's followers dynamited the monument to the so-called Ukrainian-Russian friendship in Kyiv, while an army detachment, made up of Ukrainians, paraded in front of the statue of the great 17th century national leader Bohdan Khmelnyts'kyi, with the Ukrainian blue-gold flag.

Meanwhile, Lenin manifested his great attachment to the Russian culture. He befriended novelist Maxim Gorky, about whom he said: "Gorky is undoubtedly the greatest representative of proletarian art . . . Gorky is an authority in the domain of proletarian art — that is beyond dispute." ("Notes of a Publicist", 1910) Lenin's wife, Krupskaya, added: "Wherever Gorky may reside, there is only one reality for him, namely Russia."

After the assassination of the tsarist minister Stolypin at Kyiv on September 1, 1911, the Ukrainian liberation movement began to show signs of regeneration. During 1912 Mikhnovs'kyi published a series of articles in the periodical "Snip" (Sheaf) which stimulated the anti-Russian, anti-colonial forces.

In the article "The Gospel in Ukrainian", Mikhnovs'kyi maintained that Ukrainians are a Christian nation, but that until recently the Russian imperialists had even prohibited the publication of the Gospel in Ukrainian: "The Church suddenly told the Ukrainian people: divine grace can only be acquired through the Russian language. He, who does not know Russian, is not worthy of this grace. In such a way a thirty-million-strong people was separated from the understanding of Christ's teaching . . . the Church appeared in the role of a Russificator . . ."

Mikhnovs'kyi's article "22nd January 1912, Kharkiv" began with the statement: "An old aphorism says: peel a Russian and you will find an Asian. But, it seems, it is more just to say: *peel a Russian progressive and you will find a Great-Russian chauvinist*. This is undoubtedly true when speaking of the attitudes of the Russian progressives towards the Ukrainian people." He ridiculed and rejected Lenin's urgings: "the appeals of the Russian progressives who said: 'Gentlemen, stop taking care of your own narrow national-cultural matters. It merely weakens the common movement.' Let us go together 'with united forces' against the common enemy' . . . In vain did the sceptics warn against a common front with the Russian and Polish progressives, which can only be undertaken when our own strong national cultural force has been established because without such a force we shall disintegrate without any trace, and to the harm of our own people." When many Ukrainians joined the Russian progressives the Russians repaid them as follows: "They did not even want to recognize Ukrainians as a nation . . . They proclaim-

ed Ukrainians as 'a real state and national evil?'" Their organ, "Russkaya Mysl" wrote: "The Russian progressive thought should energetically, without any ambiguities and indulgences, undertake a moral struggle against Ukrainianism." All Russian groups "are in happy harmony and are mutually supplementing each other — that is in the matter of hatred toward everything Ukrainian . . . At the time when Menshikovs are calling for use of state power of the Russian people against the Ukrainian people, Struves are calling for moral forces of Russian culture, but the aim of both is the same: to destroy the Ukrainian people as a nation."

In "Shevchenko's Anniversary", Mikhnovs'kyi praised the great poet as the prophet of the Ukrainian Christian nationalism. In the article "22nd April 1912, Kharkiv" Mikhnovs'kyi stated: "*Leftist and rightist, progressive and regressive elements in Russian society have the same negative attitude toward Ukrainianism as a movement which contains the seeds of strong independent life.*" He revealed Russian colonialist discrimination toward Ukrainians: "Now life has provided us with a new fact, when a Russian Zemstvo activist removed two female doctors from their jobs only because they subscribed to a Ukrainian newspaper . . . it stems from the most disgusting *Great-Russian chauvinism*; it is something basically inhuman since it disregards the most elementary rights of a Ukrainian as an individual and as a member of a nation."

Influenced by Mikhnovs'kyi's writings a new Ukrainian underground organization was established in Kyïv in 1912 called the Brotherhood of Independents.

Mikhnovs'kyi's powerful attacks upon the Russian chauvinists evoked a sharp reply from Lenin: "*Marxists should never let themselves be taken in by the national slogan* regardless of whether it is Great-Russian, Polish, Jewish, Ukrainian or any other." ("Kadets on the Ukrainian Question", 1913). In another well-known treatise of the same year "Critical Notes on the National Question" Lenin repeated his hostility toward the liberation movements: "*It is by no means our task to proclaim and tolerate the slogan of 'national culture'.*" This was a direct reply to Mikhnovs'kyi. Lenin attacked Ukrainian freedom-fighters as "narrow-minded and stupid bourgeois, . . . if they reject the interests of union, of *amalgamation and assimilation of the proletariat of two nations* for a passing success of the Ukrainian national cause." His dialectical approach could have misled a few, but it did not hide Lenin's hatred and enmity towards the Ukrainian anti-colonialist forces: "To a struggle against any national oppression we say absolutely 'yes' . . . To a struggle for any national development, for a 'national culture' in general, we say absolutely 'no'." He openly praised the Russian colonialist and genocidal state: "The large centralized state is a tremendous historic step ahead on the way from medieval disintegration to the future socialist unity of the entire world . . ."

Lenin attacked *any* activity which would benefit the subjugated Ukrainians. In 'How Bishop Nikon Defends Ukrainians' (1913) he demanded "... a wide local and regional autonomy and the principle of deciding all state questions by the will of the majority of the population (i. e. the principle of consistent democracy)." In other words, Lenin demanded that all questions pertaining to Ukraine should be decided by the will of the majority in the *imperial state*, i. e. by the will of the Russians who constituted the numerical (and power) majority. In the "Letter to the Bolshevik Shaumian", he steadfastly defended the indivisibility of the Russian colonial empire: "We are for autonomy for all *parts*, we are for the *right* to separation (but *not* for *separation* of all!) Autonomy — is our plan of the constitution of a democratic state. *Separation* — is not at all our plan. We do not preach separation at all."

Lenin wrote a letter to a Bolshevik, Lola Oksen praising him for being "a *centralist* who fights Donzov and Co... it is mandatory to *fight nationalists* of *this kind*..." (Dmytro Donzov delivered a speech at a conference of the Ukrainian students held in Lviv in 1913 entitled "The present political situation of the national movement and our tasks", advancing the goal of fighting for the reestablishment of a sovereign Ukrainian state. It is reported that Lenin, being alarmed by the rapid growth of anti-Russian liberation trends in Ukraine, requested the minutes and the resolutions of this conference. A resolution based on Donzov's speech was adopted at this conference).

Although the Russian empire was threatened by storms from the national liberation forces, Lenin's sole objective was to save it: "*It is no longer possible to restore the federation*..." The Party abandoned it forever. Where did it go? To the 'Austrian' federation! Or to the *complete refutation* of it? To the actual unity? We are in favour of the latter. We are opponents of the '*accommodation of socialism to nationalism*'." (From an article in the Polish periodical "Pismo dyskusyjne", 1913).

In succeeding years both Mykola I. Mikhnovs'kyi and Vladimir I. Lenin were steadfastly realizing their life programmes — the former was fighting for Ukraine's liberation from the Russian yoke, while the latter was busily reestablishing a strong, totalitarian Russian empire. *Both died in 1924 in their respective spiritual capitals: Mikhnovs'kyi in Kyiv, Lenin in Moscow.* Lenin died as a "saint" of the rebuilt Russian empire, while Mikhnovs'kyi died the death of a hero and the martyr of his Ukrainian people, having been hanged by Lenin's henchmen. However, the national liberation struggle inspired by Mikhnovs'kyi was then only beginning to take the shape of a total all-national struggle, which continues to the present.

Hon. Paul YUZYK

"WE MUST NEVER ALLOW A MENTAL COMPROMISE WITH MOSCOW"

SPEECH IN THE CANADIAN SENATE ON NOVEMBER 18, 1969

DEBATE ON THE SPEECH FROM THE THRONE

Hon. Paul Yuzyk: Honorable senators, the high calibre of the addresses of the mover and the seconder in reply to the Speech from the Throne which opened the second session of the 28th Parliament of Canada is a standing credit to the Senate. For their excellent performance, I am happy to congratulate our colleagues, Senator Desruisseaux of Quebec and Senator Douglas Everett of Manitoba. It is in order also to congratulate all the senators who have so far taken part in this interesting debate. Every speech has been a contribution to a better understanding of the great problems that face the Government, the legislators and the citizens of our great country, and will no doubt help to provide better solutions.

Honorable senators, I should like to speak today in reference to the following statement in the Speech from the Throne:

We will continue to be an active member of the United Nations. After a quarter of a century of radical changes in its functions and membership, the UN needs to be revitalised and strengthened. Canada is presenting its proposals for reform to the present session of the General Assembly.

On October 23 last several distinguished members of this chamber — namely, Senator Paul Martin, the Government Leader; Senator Jacques Flynn, the Leader of the Opposition; Senator Grattan O'Leary and Senator Arthur Roebuck — made appropriate remarks on the occasion of the 24th anniversary of the United Nations Organization.

In view of the fact that on November 7 the Soviet Union and communists in various parts of the world celebrated the 52nd anniversary of the Russian Communist October Revolution, and the fact that the Canadian Government is interested in making the United Nations a more effective instrument in carrying out the principles of the charter, I have chosen to deal with the policy of the Soviet Union in this world organization. Because of my academic background in the history of Central and Eastern Europe, I think that I shall be able to throw some light on this topic, which should help to give us a better understanding of what kind of relations Canada should have with this superpower, particularly in the United Nations. My speech will be a kind of sequel to Senator McDonald's excellent report on NATO on November 6. I sincerely congratulate him for his open-mindedness, frankness and logic.

Every country has its own view of the proper function of the United Nations and every country attempts to use the UN for its own purposes. In general, the prosperous countries of the West regard the organization in political terms; their view is that its function is to maintain peace, punish the aggressor and prepare the ground for world government; they pay little attention to the extensive welfare and technical programs. The United States tries to use the United Nations to contain communism and counteract left-wing revolutions. The Europeans see in it a useful forum to discuss grievances and a convenient centre for diplomatic contacts and negotiations with many nations. The Soviet Russians look upon it, at least on the surface, as a necessary evil in which

they must paralyze the plots of the "Imperialists." The newly developing countries which were former colonial states fervently support this world organization, using it as an instrument to voice their anxieties, so as to secure more economic, technical and educational assistance from the wealthy states. All are worried about preventing a third world war which, with the modern super weapons, could destroy mankind.

Broadly speaking, the member states of the UN are divided into two camps, the capitalist and the communist, but there are also regional groupings.

The "Fifty Years of Communism" that was celebrated in the Soviet Union in 1967 was certainly not communism envisaged by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, the founders of the theory. According to the concept of these ideologists, communism meant a state of affairs in which nation states would "wither away", the capitalist system would be destroyed and the conflict of classes would vanish. In this society, people would rid themselves of the "opium of religion" and would become educated so as to develop their full potential and organize their life on the basis of "from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs." This, of course, has not been achieved.

The "Fifty Years of Communism" is in reality the fifty years of the rule of the Communist Party in the U.S.S.R. and other parts of the world. The Communist Party was the creation of Lenin, whose ideas very often differed from those of Marx and Engels. Lenin established Bolshevism, which by means of a well-disciplined organization of professional revolutionaries destroyed Tsarist autocracy and the "Bourgeois" provisional government and set up what was called the "dictatorship of the proletariat" — the present Soviet system. This "dictatorship of the proletariat" was to be a transitional stage in the evolution to communism.

Many communist leaders outside Russia, although in sympathy with the Russian October Revolution, did not endorse Lenin's highly centralized dictatorship of revolutionaries and the

suppression of freedom. Rosa Luxemburg, a revolutionary in Poland and one of the founders of the German Communist Party, is proving prophetic in her criticism of Lenin's

Freedom restricted to the supporters of a government, freedom only for the members of one party, however numerous, is no sort of freedom. Freedom is always and only the freedom of those who think differently... Without the right of free speech, the life of public institutions will wither away, become a shadow and a masquerade and only bureaucracy will remain as the active component. Public life will gradually become anaesthetised while a few dozen leaders with unquenchable energy and boundless idealism direct, a dozen of the best brains rule and a working class elite is assembled in official meetings from time to time to applaud the speeches of the leaders, to vote unanimously for resolutions put before them — in fact an oligarchy... Under such conditions public life will take on a new savagery and will lead to political assassinations, the shooting of hostages, and so on.

With her passionate belief in democracy, freedom and the dignity of human life in the new society, Rosa Luxemburg did not live long enough to influence the communist movement, for she was murdered less than three weeks after the German Communist Party had been established in December, 1918. Her assessment of Bolshevik methods of fifty years ago describes quite accurately the situation in the Soviet Union today.

Although Lenin adhered to dictatorial control of his Bolshevik Party, he did not hesitate to issue promises of "land, bread and peace" as well as freedom, which, as subsequent events proved, were not intended to be kept, but were merely a means of obtaining power. Take, for example, one of the first decrees of the Soviet of People's Commissars dated November 15, 1917, concerning the subjugated peoples of the Tsarist Russian empire:

1. All peoples of Russia are equal and sovereign;

2. The peoples of Russia have the right of self-determination including the right of secession from Russia and of the establishment of independent national states of their own;

3. All national and religious-national privileges and restrictions shall be abolished;

4. The national minorities and ethnic groups in Russian territory shall be given every opportunity to develop freely.

When the Bolsheviks were in power under the leadership of Lenin, the various subjugated peoples asserted their "right of self-determination, including the right of secession from Russia and the establishment of independent national states of their own." One after the other, the non-Russian peoples proclaimed their independent states, sixteen in number, in the following order: Idel Ural (Tatar) — November 12, 1917; Finland — December 6, 1917; Ukraine — January 22, 1918; Kuban Cossacks — February 16; Lithuania — February 16; Estonia — February 24; Byelorussia — March 25; Don Cossacks — May 5; North Caucasus — May 11; Georgia — May 26; Azerbaijan — May 29; Armenia — May 30; Poland — November 11; Latvia — November 18 — all in 1918; Far eastern Democratic Republic (Siberia) — April 4, 1920; Turkestan — April 15, 1922. This was a democratic anti-imperio-colonial manifestation. Gradually, the Russian Communist regime subverted and conquered by force all independent states, and these nations are again part of the Russian empire under totalitarian rule, not much different from the autocratic Tsarist regime.

Not only did the Russian communist government make a general declaration of self-determination, but we also have its formal acknowledgment of this right with respect to Ukraine, dated December 17, 1917:

We, the Soviet of People's Commissars, recognize the Ukrainian National Republic and its right to separate from Russia or to make an agreement with the Russian Republic for federative or other similar mutual relations

between them. Everything that touches national rights and the national independence of the Ukrainian people, we, the Soviet of People's Commissars, accept clearly without limitations and unreservedly.

This declaration proved to be deceitful and perfidious, for at the time of its announcement the Russian Communist Government immediately had a Ukrainian Soviet Republic established in Kharkov, another city in Ukraine, in direct opposition to the democratic Ukrainian National Republic. This Ukrainian Soviet Republic claimed to possess the sovereignty of an independent state, but when it became a member of the Union of Soviet socialist Republics in 1922, it lost its sovereignty, including the rights of amending its own constitution, maintaining its own armed forces, conducting its own foreign policy, directing its own financial affairs, et cetera. Ukraine, as a consequence, became a mere province under the rigid control of the centralized Russian Communist Government in Moscow, similar in many ways to her position under the former Russian Tsarist regime.

To gain Ukrainian support for the final phase of World War II effort, to save his own face and have more votes in the newly-established United Nations, Stalin had the Soviet Constitution amended, restoring to the Ukraine and Byelorussia their own ministries of defence and external relations, but he did not allow the establishment of their embassies in foreign countries. These were the only two so-called "republics" of the U.S.S.R. which were given these rights and became founding members of the United Nations. None of the other members of the United Nations have given recognition to Ukraine and Byelorussia, knowing that these two countries have no sovereignty. The Soviet Government does not encourage such a step, undoubtedly fearful of the fact that official diplomatic relations between these two component "republics" and the sovereign states of the world could stimulate the movement towards independence.

This was obvious at Expo '67 in Montreal. Moscow refused a separate pavilion and exhibition for both Ukraine and Byelorussia, as this would have made necessary a state visit of these countries to Canada, implying the recognition of the sovereignty of the Ukraine and Byelorussia.

Communism, Lenin's brand, does not tolerate freedom and democracy. This becomes abundantly evident just from a mere reading of **The Theses and Statutes of The Communist International**, approved at the Second Congress of the Communist International (Comintern), which was held in Moscow in 1920 and has always been binding upon all communist parties throughout the world. The object of the Comintern is stated in the following sentence:

In order to overthrow the international bourgeoisie and to create an international Soviet Republic as a transition stage to the complete abolition of the state, the Communist International will use all means at its disposal, including force of arms.

To achieve this purpose all means were to serve the end, applying the Machiavellian principle that the end justified the means. This is how it was stated in **The Theses**:

It is especially necessary to carry on illegal work in the army, navy and police — on the other hand it is also necessary in all cases without exception not to limit oneself to illegal work, but to carry on also legal work overcoming all difficulties, founding a legal press and legal organizations under the most diverse circumstances, and in case of need, frequently changing names.

Anyone who has followed the work of the communist parties in the various countries outside the U.S.S.R., including Canada, will recognize that these instructions have been adhered to, to the letter.

The communist view of parliaments in capitalist countries was stated thus:

Communism repudiates parliamentarism as the form of the future... its aim is to destroy parliamentarism. Therefore it is only possible to speak of utilizing the

bourgeois State organizations with the object of destroying them... The Communist Party enters such institutions not for the purpose of organization work, but in order to direct the masses to blow up the whole bourgeois machinery and the parliament itself from within.

Stating that the work of each communist member in the bourgeois countries "consists chiefly in making revolutionary propaganda from the parliamentary platform", **The Theses** of the Comintern specifies only one loyalty. According to instructions:

The communist member is answerable not to the wide mass of his constituents, but to his own Communist Party — whether legal or illegal.

The Bolshevik leaders of the Soviet Union have made plans to conquer the whole world, some of which have already been implemented but some of which have also backfired. Many leaders of communist parties in bourgeois countries have undergone training to achieve this purpose. I have here a statement of Dmitri Manuilsky, Minister of External Affairs, who taught at the Lenin School of Political Warfare in Moscow in 1931, where several Canadian communists also took course. This is what he stated:

War to the hilt between communism and capitalism is inevitable. Today, of course, we are not strong enough to attack. Our time will come in 20 to 30 years. To win we shall need the element of surprise. The bourgeoisie will have to be put to sleep; so we shall begin by launching the most spectacular peace movement on record. There will be electrifying overtures and unheard of concessions. The capitalist countries, stupid and decadent, will rejoice to co-operate in their own destruction. They will leap at another chance to be friends. As soon as their guard is down, we shall smash them with our clenched fist.

It therefore comes as no surprise that after World War II this "spectacular peace movement" came in the form of "peaceful co-existence" and

every outward appearance was made to display co-operation. That this was merely a tactic to achieve ultimate victory is evident from the speech of Prime Minister Khrushchov to German communist leaders in 1955 in which he said:

People say our smiles are not honest. That is not true. Our smile is real, not artificial. But if anyone believes that our smile means that we have given up the teachings of Marx, Engels and Lenin, they are badly mistaken...

One cannot stop the course of history.

If the masks are stripped off the face of "Soviet Communism" and the propaganda balloons are pierced, it reveals the naked face of Russian imperialism, propped up by brute force as under the Tsarist Regime. The Red Army reconquered all the non-Russian peoples who had broken away from the Tsarist Russian Empire and formed their own independent states after the First World War. The second wave of Russian imperialism and colonialism commencing at the beginning of the Second World War absorbed the Baltic nations which were overrun by the Red Army. The third wave, since the Second World War, established Soviet satellite regimes in central and southern Europe, Asia and Cuba and intensive subversive activities in the Middle East, Africa, Latin America and Asia. The "peaceful co-existence" did not hold back the Russian communist regime from instigating aggression in Korea, Vietnam and elsewhere.

In his book **The Origin of Russian Communism**, Nicholas Berdyaev, the great contemporary Russian philosopher in exile, explains the real drive behind communism.

Russian communism is difficult to comprehend because of its two physiognomies. In some aspect it is an international and universal phenomenon; from other points of view it is Russian and national. It is particularly important for western minds to understand the natural roots of Russian communism and the fact that it was Russian history

which determined the limits and shaped its character. A knowledge of Marxism will not suffice to find the cue to it.

In another place Berdyaev stated that in bolshevism "the Russification and Orientalization of Marxism has been achieved."

Russian émigré leaders, even though they oppose communism, have been constantly upholding the Russian empire and adhering to the "one and indivisible Russia" of the Tsarist regime explains why Alexander Kerensky, the leader of the Russian provisional government in 1917, who was ousted by Lenin's Bolshevik Party, later in 1943, when Hitler's Nazis threatened to dismember Soviet Union, came to its defence with following statement:

Russia, a geographical backbone of history, should exist in all her strength and power, no matter who or how he is ruling her. (In this case it was Stalin, the greatest tyrant in Russian history — P. Y.) From this comes Miliukov's testament to us: to be on watchful guard of Russia — no matter what her name is — absolutely, unconditionally and to the last breath.

Deceit, as has already been noted, is a basic tactic of Soviet policy in the subversion of the free world. During the celebration of the 50th anniversary of the communist Soviet Revolution, and the "glorious" achievements of the Soviet regime, Alexey Kosygin, the Soviet Prime Minister, boastfully proclaimed, as reported in **Pravda**, June 20, 1967, that:

In the fifty years of her existence the Soviet Union has respected all other nations, great as well as small. Every nation is entitled to establish an independent national state of its own. This is one of the basic principles of Soviet policy. Supporting the right of self-determination of nations, the Soviet Union condemns and resolutely opposes the attempts of any power to conduct an aggressive policy and to work for the annexation of foreign countries... No country in the world could claim to have solved the nationality problem as successfully as the

Soviet Union... No nationality in our country is discriminated against.

Consider the sincerity of the resolution introduced in the United Nations in December 1965 by Andrei Gromyko, the Soviet Foreign Minister, who recently visited Canada:

No state has the right to intervene directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal and external affairs of any other state. Consequently armed intervention and all forms of interference of the state or against its political, economic and cultural elements are condemned.

These declarations of Gromyko and Kesygin are obviously false, for it did not deter the Soviet Government from sending the Red Army, together with the force of its satellite states, to invade and occupy its socialist satellite Czechoslovakia in August 1968, just as it had done during the uprisings in Hungary in 1956. The Soviet Russian Empire was established by force and will evidently be maintained by force under a totalitarian system which cannot allow "liberalization", democracy and freedom to make headway within its jurisdiction.

We have already noted that the ultimate goal of Soviet communism, as was spelled out in the Comintern Theses of 1920, was world conquest, which would employ all means at its disposal, including deceit and force of arms. Subsequently, dictator Joseph Stalin, in his book, **Marxism and the National Question**, outlined the methods of achieving this objective as follows:

1. Confuse, disorganize and destroy the force of capitalism around the world.
2. Bring all nations together into a single world system of economy.
3. Force the advanced countries to pour prolonged financial aid into the underdeveloped countries.
4. Divide the world into regional groups as a transitional stage to total world government. Populations will more readily abandon their national loyalties to a vague regional loyalty than they will for a world authority. Later, the regionals can be

brought all the way into a single world dictatorship of the proletariat.

The Comintern congresses of 1928 and 1936 formally adopted these intermediate goals of communism in their programs. When the U.S.S.R. entered the League of Nations in 1934 it began to carry out this broad program.

After achieving victory over Nazi Germany in the Second World War, which would not have been possible without the close collaboration and extensive aid of the allies — the United States, Great Britain and others — the Soviet leaders expressed no gratitude to the allies, but immediately laid plans to continue their efforts to dominate the world. On the eve of the inception of the UN, the communist pamphlet entitled **The United Nations**, published in 1945 in Bombay, India, advocated full support for this world organization, giving the four primary reason as:

1. The veto will protect the U.S.S.R. from the rest of the world.
2. The UN will frustrate an effective foreign policy of the major capitalist countries.
3. The UN will be an extremely helpful instrument in breaking up the colonial territories of the non-communist countries.
4. The UN will eventually bring about the amalgamation of all nations into a single Soviet system.

This is precisely the blueprint that was initially drawn up by Lenin, elaborated by Stalin and refined by Khrushchov for achieving world government and communist control of the world by exploiting the United Nations.

The use of such innocent-like tactics in the overall strategy of attaining a concealed goal is perhaps best illustrated by the story of the young married man working in a baby-carriage factory in Germany at the beginning of Hitler's regime. In his speech to the Senate of the United States on February 23, 1954, Senator William Jenner related how this young man had saved his money to buy one of the baby-carriages which he was helping to build, as his wife

was expecting their first child. When the factory refused to sell him the product, he began to collect the various parts secretly. When he obtained all the parts, he and his wife painstakingly put them together. What a shock they received, when instead of a baby-carriage, they beheld a machine gun! It is obvious that the blueprint of the final product had been planned years ahead. Many unsuspecting people helped to produce the product which could even be turned against them.

This is the way the Kremlin master planners are exploiting the UN for their purposes. The predesigned parts are being produced by many unsuspecting workers who believe they are helping to build baby carriages described to them with such slogans as "peace", "international co-operation", "world brotherhood", "human rights", "peace-keeping operations", et cetera. Little do many realize what the final product could be when the component parts are assembled.

Let us assemble some of the major parts of the Soviet Russian blueprint for the United Nations. Although the Third International repudiated parliamentarism, Communist members were instructed to enter bourgeois parliaments "to direct the masses to blow up the whole bourgeois machinery and the Parliament itself from within." Consequently, the Soviets have been constantly using the rostrum of the United Nations to spread communism over all the world and to inflame colonial people and underdeveloped nations against the western powers, particularly the United States. Testifying to the Committee on Un-American Activities, Dr. Marek Korowicz, a UN delegate from communist Poland who defected in 1953, stated:

We were all indoctrinated strongly with the Russian master plan to reach the working classes of the various countries in the western world over the heads of their governments... The organization of the UN is considered as one of the most important platforms of Soviet propaganda in the world... The UN offers a parliamentary platform to the Soviet politicians, and from this

platform they may preach to the populations of the entire world and do their subversive propaganda.

The Soviet Union has consistently used her veto in the Security Council to paralyze the work of the UN during international crises. Of the 109 vetos cast from January 1946 to October 1967, almost all of them were cast by the U.S.S.R., except France, four times; the United Kingdom, three; and China, one. The United States did not use its veto at all. The Soviet Union vetoed all resolutions relating to Soviet aggression in Hungary in 1956 and recently her invasion of Czechoslovakia. She has been attempting to make UN peace-keeping operations as ineffective as possible also by refusing to contribute her share. In such a way the U.S.S.R. has used the UN to frustrate the foreign policy of the major capitalist countries; consequently, the veto should be abolished, as advocated by Senator Roebuck, or at least must be drastically modified.

The part of the Soviet Russian blueprint that has been most successfully realized was the role of the United Nations "in breaking up the colonial territories of the non-communist countries", particularly in Africa. Commencing with 51 members 24 years ago, today the UN has 126 members, during which time some one billion people have achieved their independence, thanks to the efforts of the UN.

Hon. Mr. Martin: May I ask the honourable senator a question? Is he aware, notwithstanding the validity of contention, that there should be no difference in the power of members of the Security Council? The fact is that the Soviet Union is not the only great power that insists on the right to exercise the veto. This is the position of Britain, France and the United States.

Hon. Mr. Yuzyk: Yes, I am quite well aware of that, but it does not mean that the other countries of the UN should not insist that there be a reform in this respect.

Hon. Mr. Martin: That is right.

Hon. Mr. Yuzyk: Now, with the disappearance and disappearing of

imperialism and colonialism throughout most of the world, the great paradox of our age is the existence of a United Nations member, the Soviet Union, which has emerged as the world's greatest imperialist power. It is most ironical that the U.S.S.R. while steadily expanding has been the loudest in the United Nations in denouncing imperialism. The greatest threat to the freedom and independence of man and nations and to the peace of the world today is Soviet Russian imperialism, under the guise of spreading revolutionary socialism and communism to all peoples.

We can be proud that Canada was one of the first nations to challenge Russian colonialism in the United Nations. In his famous speech of September 26, 1960, Prime Minister John G. Diefenbaker reminded Khrushchov of the Soviet declaration for "The complete and final elimination of colonial regimes." Diefenbaker then presented the record of Britain and France regarding the elimination of colonialism, and I quote:

Since the last war, seventeen colonial areas and territories, comprising more than 40 million people, have been brought to complete freedom by France. In the same period fourteen colonies and territories, comprising half a billion people, have achieved complete freedom within the Commonwealth — this with the approval, the encouragement and the guidance of the United Nations, the Commonwealth and France. There are few here that can speak with the authority of Canada on the subject of colonialism, for Canada was once a colony of both France and the United Kingdom. We were the first country which evolved over a hundred years ago by constitutional processes from colonial status to independence without severing the family connection.

Later the Canadian Prime Minister posed the following questions: "How many human beings have been liberated by U.S.S.R.? ... How are we to reconcile the tragedy of the Hungarian uprising in 1956? ... What of Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia? what of

the freedom-loving Ukrainians and many other eastern European peoples?" ... And very emphatically he stated: "There can be no double standard in international affairs."

The United States took a firm stand against Soviet imperialism at the Sixteenth General Assembly in the fall of 1961. President Kennedy expressed American sympathy and support for the continuing tide of self-determination in the following statement:

But that is why there is no ignoring the fact that the tide of self-determination has not yet reached the Communist empire, where a population far larger than that officially termed "dependent" lives under governments installed by foreign troops instead of free institutions — under a system which knows only one party and one belief — which suppresses free debate, free elections, free newspapers, free books, and free trade unions — which builds a wall to keep truth a stranger and its own citizens prisoners. Let us have the choice and the practice of free plebiscite in every corner of the globe.

The American Ambassador to the United Nations, Mr. Adlai Stevenson, at the same session, on November 25, 1961, condemned all forms of colonialism and urged the United Nations to focus attention on the colonialism of the Soviet Union by applying the key of self-determination. He related the historical events of the Soviet conquest of several peoples who had established independent states after the fall of the Russian monarchy at the end of the First World War, noting how the Bolsheviks employed a double standard with complete impunity.

Ambassador Stevenson then explained how the Soviet Government justified the double standard:

The right of self-determination has never been accepted for its own dependent areas by the Soviet Government. Stalin in 1923 explained that "there are instances when the right of self-determination comes into conflict with another, higher right, the right of the working class

to fortify its own power. In such cases the right of self-determination cannot be and must not serve as an obstacle to the realization of the right of the working class to its own dictatorship. The former must give way to the latter." In short, self-determination is a right which can only be upheld when the peoples concerned have not fallen under communist domination.

Mr. Stevenson warned that the ascendancy of the smiling Khrushchov had brought no changes in the Soviet nationalities policy, whose announced design was to eradicate all national differences between the diverse nationalities and the great Russian model. The ambassador subsequently concluded:

This is the unique aspect of Soviet colonialism — an aspect that differentiates it from all other historical examples of one state's suppression of another's freedom. Through the total state controls of mass culture, propaganda, education and movement, the Soviets seek to wipe out forever the national characteristics that differentiate the Turk from the Ukrainian, the Kazakh from the Armenian, the non-Russian from the Russian. They not only seek the eradication of differences and the suppression of freedom, but the eradication of the desire for freedom.

In view of the harmony of Canada and the United States regarding Soviet Russian imperialism, one would have expected a stronger combined effort at the 18th General Assembly of the United Nations in the fall of 1963. The American delegate, Mr. Yates, delivered a speech on December 4, 1963, pointing out that "fortunately for the rest of the world, and fortunately perhaps for the Soviets themselves, in the long run, this new empire is tending to crack up." Referring to the fact that the United Kingdom, France and other powers had granted independence to their formerly colonial territories, he asked outrightly, "Can the Soviet Union point to one territory that it has surrendered?", and he answered, "It

cannot." He called upon the nations of the world "to make sure that every people now under colonial domination is given the chance to exercise the right as well as the pure form of self-determination" according to the promise of the United Nations Charter for all peoples. The Canadian Government and the other governments of the free world decided not to press the matter against the U.S.S.R., which thus has been allowed to violate the basic principles of the United Nations.

There is abundant evidence to show that the communists throughout the world, under the leadership of the Soviet Union, have been consistently carrying out the objectives of Stalin "to confuse, disorganize and destroy the forces of capitalism around the world" in the process towards "a single dictatorship of the proletariat." It is generally known that the advanced capitalist countries have been compelled by the United Nations "to pour prolonged financial aid into the under-developed countries", as part of the communist policy to weaken the western countries, while the Soviet Union and her satellites have given proportionately very little aid, and when they have given assistance it was usually in the form of weapons and ammunition to strengthen the communist and pro-communist forces, as was the case in Katanga during the Congo crisis. It is no surprise, for example, that when the General Assembly in 1953 created a special UN fund for world economic development, the United States found itself paying nearly 70 per cent of the \$5 billion.

In pursuit of the ultimate objective of establishing world government, the Soviet Union has concentrated on the Secretariat of the United Nations, particularly on the permanent staff members. The communists know that the resolutions and edicts passed by voting delegates of the General Assembly and the Security Council can be effectively neutralized and prevented from being realistically carried out by the thousands of international bureaucrats. J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), disclosed in 1960

that between 70 to 80 per cent of the iron curtain diplomatic representatives in the U.S. had "some type of espionage assignment", in spite of the loyalty oath to the UN. Here is how Congressman Fred Busbey explained the activities of iron curtain civil servants in the UN Secretariat to Congress on August 3, 1953:

Agents of Russia, Czechoslovakia and Poland, as employees of the World Organization, face little or no surveillance of the type Americans face in communist countries. They can talk to anyone. They can communicate with Moscow by secret radio code; they can travel back and forth between New York and their capitals freely, carrying secret documents with immunity. They are even free from arrest for minor crimes. And, if one is caught red-handed with secret U.S. documents, as was Valentin Gubitchev in the Judith Coplon case, he can count on merely being sent home, his passage paid by the UN.

It is often not realized that one of the most important positions in the United Nations is that of the Undersecretary-General for Political and Security Council Affairs, about which the public knows virtually nothing. Its importance can be judged from the main areas of its responsibility:

1. Control of all military and police functions of the United Nations peace-keeping forces.

2. Supervision of all disarmament moves on the part of member nations.

3. Control of all atomic energy ultimately entrusted to the UN for peaceful and "other" purposes.

It should be of concern to the free world that, since the inception of the UN, this tremendous power has been in the hands preponderantly of high-ranking communists — one from Yugoslavia and seven from the U.S.S.R.

Hon. Mr. Martin: May I ask the honourable senator whether he has the name of the official in the Secretariat who comes from Yugoslavia? Is that Mr. Proditch?

Hon. Mr. Yuzyk: I will look that up.

Hon. Mr. Martin: The honourable

senator can give it to me later. The man I have in mind is Mr. Proditch — who is not a communist, of course.

Hon. Mr. Yuzyk: I would have to check on the list that I have here.

The Soviet Union must not be allowed to monopolize this important position, which should be rotated on a more equitable basis also among the democratic powers, with more stringent supervision.

In order to prevent the Soviet Russian blueprint objective of using the UN to "bring about the amalgamation of all nations into a single Soviet system" — which, of course, is world government controlled by the Russian communists — the free nations must watch very closely all the activities of the UN Secretariat and have it reformed to make it more effective in carrying out the principles of the United Nations. It has been a fortunate turn of circumstances that Red China now challenges the ascendancy of the Soviet Union to world supremacy, which consequently has undermined that threat for a while. Red China is now a big thorn in the side of the Russian imperial state. It the Canadian Government is resolved to approve Red China's admission to the United Nations, it must as a prerequisite and condition secure the strengthening of the executive arm of the UN.

At this time, when the free world is confronted with the brute force of Soviet imperialism, it is well to remember the imperishable idea expressing the essence of the struggle of humanity for its highest values which was pronounced by that great President of the United States, John Fitzgerald Kennedy, who laid down his life at its altar:

The most powerful single force in the world today is neither communism nor capitalism, neither the H-bomb nor the guided missile; it is man's eternal desire to be free and independent.

In the struggle against this superpower, the U.S.S.R., the hope of the free world lies in the co-operation of the free nations and the effectiveness of the United Nations Organization.

We must never allow the free nations to fall into a mental state of compromise with Moscow which will undermine the highest value of democracy, culture, religion and humanitarianism. The defeat of Russian imperialist communism is possible only by the common mental and material effort of the free nations and the captive, oppressed nations. Consequently, much more must be done to take advantage of the spiritual contribution and experience of these captive peoples who are the victims of the new form of Russian imperialism.

After last year's celebration of the 20th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights it must be constantly stressed that the Soviet Union has violated most of these

rights, which had originally been sanctioned by the U.S.S.R. The foundation of the Charter of the United Nations is the recognition of the sovereign equality of all nations. Member nations are obligated to refrain from the threat and use of force against the territorial integrity and the sovereign independence of any state. In its work in the United Nations the Canadian Government must insist on the co-operation of the free nations to make the Soviet Union adhere to the principles of the Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. As strength is the only language that communists understand the concerted action of the democratic and free member states of the United Nations is our only assurance at this time that freedom, truth and justice will ultimately prevail for all peoples.

John GRAHAM

“HUMAN RIGHTS ARE STILL DENIED TO THE MILLIONS IN THE CAPTIVE NATIONS”

**Address on the Occasion of Captive Nations Reception in Bolton,
Lancs, U. K.**

Like many other North-Western towns Bolton gave sanctuary to scores of Central and East Europeans at the end of the second World War — and today — we can look back over 20 years of this miracle of assimilation.

I use the word miracle advisedly.

Between 1947 and 1950, some 30 thousand Ukrainians, as well as many Poles, and refugees from Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania and many other countries came here — seeking political sanctuary — and many settled in towns like Bolton.

We called them E. V. W's in those days — European Voluntary Workers — and most of them arrived here without being able to speak a word of English — they came without possessions — without money — and for many of them — something like despair in their hearts.

They assisted us in our post-war economic recovery — soon learnt something of our far from easy language — safety negotiated the intricacies

of British work-shop practice — and by their industry and willingness — commended themselves to those employers who had the good sense to give them jobs.

Outside working hours — they began to gather together some of the pieces of their shattered lives — so that today — I know I can say without fear of contradiction — the Central and East European refugees of 20 to 23 years ago are now among our most valued respected citizens.

There is hardly a town in which they have settled that has not benefited by their advent — they have given freely of their native cultures — their beautiful music and spirited dancing — they have inspired us with their loyalty, their devotion to their religious faiths, their loyalty to the political ideas which made them refugees in the late 1940's and which led them to seek freedom and independence with us.

My only regret is that over the past

twenty years, only a few local people have taken the trouble to find out why these political refugees came here in the first place; why they stay here; and why today there is still a steady trickle of political refugees travelling from East to West.

We cannot blame the Estonians, Latvians, or Ukrainians for our political ignorance — for over the past 20 years they have tried to inform us about their history — their aspirations — and about what they see as the greatest evil and danger in the world today — Soviet Communism.

As a working journalist — I am ashamed of the neglect of my profession in this regard — it is only comparatively recently that the more responsible news media have tried to penetrate the thick fog of Russian censorship to give us authentic information about the repression in the countries enslaved behind the Iron Curtain.

I spoke of the steady trickle of refugees today. In spite of the obscene Berlin Wall — in spite of the barbed-wire and the wide no-man's-land patrolled day and night by armed sentries and guard dogs — in spite of the high watchtowers guarding the perimeter of the prison of nations we call the Soviet Union — people still risk their lives to get out.

This is the only empire in living history that has needed to build a barrier in order to keep people from getting away from it.

The flood of 1947 and 1948, when tens of thousands fled to the West, is now a mere trickle — but every day along that long and fearful barrier — people still manage to get through — "voting with their feet" as a colleague once put it — voting against Communism.

In recent years — I have seen some of the transit camps where these refugees are kept until they can join relatives or friends in the free world — I have listened to some of their heartbreaking stories — and their numbers are quite staggering — increasing every day by anything from one to a dozen or more.

And sometimes at night — from the other side of the barbed wire — one hears the staccato rattle of a machine

gun — spelling out the frustrated hopes of yet another refugee — one who didn't quite make it.

And what of those who remain behind the Iron Curtain. For them there is unremitting toil for a very low standard of life; there is the possibility of a visit in the quiet hours of the night which could mean banishment to Siberia or Kazakhstan, or to the labour camps of Mordovia, or the strict regime camps of the North. There is this, without the comfort of religion, without the right of appeal to a human rights court.

Basic human rights, asserted as the right of every man in the 20th. Century are still denied to the millions in the Captive Nations and will go on being denied so long as the rest of the world is silent.

The extension and safeguarding of human rights is everyone's business and it cannot be left solely in the hands of statesmen and politicians.

As a journalist, I know that newspapers and journalists have a responsibility to provide the information about the deprivation of human rights anywhere in the world so that the public can arrive at an opinion.

But in the last analysis, it is up to every man and woman to understand as fully as possible what is being done in his or her name to wipe injustices out where they exist.

Many of the 22 nations held captive by Russian Communism have civilised histories as old as ours — many of them have strong cultural links with Britain and the West. The millions in the captive nations demand, and have a right to demand — that basic human rights be granted to them just as they have to much newer nations — as for instance the emerging nations in Africa. If Ghana and Nigeria can be free to work out their own destiny — then why not Ukraine — why not Latvia, or Lithuania — or Estonia.

And Britain, which bears a proud record in liberating former colonial peoples can help in the fight for human rights for the people behind the Iron Curtain.

There is in Britain, I am happy to say, a growing understanding that the problems of the Captive Nations are our problems too, and some indica-

tion of this understanding was shown in the Press Conference which Lord Carrington, The Secretary of State for Defence gave a week ago when introducing the Defence White Paper.

And a week ago, Mr. Mykula and I, in a delegation from the British League for European Freedom to the British Foreign Office, had friendly and informal talks with senior officials about some of the questions about which we are concerned. The talks are confidential — but I can say this. We were quite impressed by the measure of understanding of our point of view — and we were given some important assurances about aspects of British foreign policy which I know have been of some concern to the emigre communities.

Among these were the assurance that Her Majesty's Government will not give *de jure* recognition to the territories annexed by the Russians in 1940; the Government will not accept the Brezhnev doctrine, or give way on Berlin.

Well, ladies and gentlemen, such assurances are very gratifying, and with the growing support we are now getting from both Houses of Parliament, certainly augur well for the future.

Foreign policy has never been the most favoured subject in a British Parliamentary candidate's programme. As an Island race, we have long believed that we could rub along without distracting ourselves too much about what was happening in the rest of the world — even on the other side of the English Channel.

But the second World War finally disturbed our insularity, and the popular misconception "it can't happen here" was destroyed for ever. We can laugh now at 'Dad's Army', but those of us who are old enough to have been members of the Home Guard in the early 1940's found few occasions for laughing, with Hitler's armies poised on the French coast.

Nor could we find any comfort in the apparent lack of understanding in Whitehall of Russia's foreign policy intentions; the massive build-up of Russian armaments; the reach-

ing out of the Russian naval strength; all in recent years.

Because of our fears, we had written to the Foreign Secretary, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, pointing out that the Russians had never disguised their ultimate aim — the world-wide victory of Russian Soviet Communism and the defeat of all democratic systems. The concept of "peaceful coexistence" is seen by the Russians as a tactical device towards securing this aim, and this the Russians have stated repeatedly and clearly.

Using these tactics, and in spite of their internal difficulties with the captive nations illustrated by the street riots in Poland the Russians have been able to score success after success in their foreign policy.

The negotiations with Herr Willi Brandt, hailed as an achievement by some Western commentators, merely legalises Russia's conquests in central and East Europe and brings no advantage to the democratic governments of the West.

On the contrary, the Russians had grounds for hoping that the European Security Conference, which they have been so energetically promoting, would give further endorsement to their conquests.

So, as I have indicated, we were relieved, and I might say heartened, both by Lord Carrington and by the Foreign Office. They have a much better appreciation of Russian intentions than we gave them credit for.

That is a tremendous step forward in British Foreign Office thinking and one which we wholeheartedly welcome.

And we hope that through the annual observance of Captive Nations Week, started by us in 1968, we will be able to extend the area of understanding of what Russian Communism really is.

I think we have done remarkable well over the past three years. In 1969, we were able to pinpoint the persecution of the Churches in the Captive Nations — to show how it is possible in the year 1971 for a man or woman in countries behind the Iron Curtain to be deprived of liberty and to be imprisoned in a forced

labour camps for at least ten years, merely because that man or woman exercised a basic right to teach a child something about God — that is an offence against the State in Russian eyes — to be fought by imprisonment or banishment.

We were able to get help in publicising this from the British Churches, and to give only one example — of the 62 Anglican Bishops in Britain, 58 gave active support to the Week, and many organised weeks of prayer for the persecuted churches.

But persecution is not limited to religious thought. Gerald Brooke, the London lecturer who spent most of his time in prisons in the complex of special camps in Mordovia — has been able to give us valuable information about the persecution of ideas and independent thought.

Doctors, scientists, lecturers, teachers, skilled artisans, form the bulk of the population of these camps. Many of them are held for long periods without trial; many are serving sentences passed by so-called People's Courts after trials held behind closed doors; many have their sentences of ten to twenty years extended arbitrarily by the KGB without reference to any court. And the conditions in these camps are now well known to us — thanks to the Samizdat — the illegal newspapers passed from hand to hand, and thanks to the courage of men like Chornovil and Dzyuba and Solzhenitsyn whose works are now published here.

The mass of evidence of Russian breaches of the Chapter on Human Rights grows every day — and the world will soon find it extremely difficult to remain silent about these injustices — these offences to mankind.

Is it any of our business? I believe it is. Europe in the 1930's almost reached the brink which would have toppled our civilisation into the depths of barbarism — we were reprieved by the defeat of Hitler's Third Reich — it was, I'm afraid, merely a temporary reprieve...

The evidence from behind the Iron Curtain shows that unless we are prepared and ready, a new barbaric cancer will consume us. Stalin, the

monster is dead — but the system he helped to create is very much alive and spreading rapidly.

Fortunately, there are signs that we are at last waking up to the dangers which threaten us — let us hope it is not too late.

If I might address a word to the British members of this audience, you, ladies and gentlemen, are what Miss Jean Brodie would have called the 'creme de la creme' in the sense that you, as leaders and as representatives have a better opportunity than most to dig into the rich soil of emigre life.

I know there is a widely-held misconception that we might not be welcome if we enter the community centres created by the emigres from Central and East European countries. All over Britain, there are Ukrainian Clubs similar to this — but there are also many clubs which have been created by Latvians, Lithuanians, and even the smaller emigrations like Croats, Armenians, Czechs and Slovaks.

None of them are ghettos — obviously their main function is to provide a place where emigres can meet their fellow-countrymen — but, if your interests is sincere — you will be always welcome, and within these walls you can have some interesting and I might add, some educating discussions. Try it?

There is something else you will find in these clubs. Most of them have quite well-stocked libraries where you will find in English, books about the countries from which these emigres have come... they will welcome your reading them... and from these books you will learn that Russia is but one part of that vast complex of nations behind the Oder-Neisse line — only one of 22 nations.

I sincerely believe that by the time we come to observe another Captive Nations Week — we will be able to demonstrate to our emigre friends that their prayers and there endeavours have not been in vain.

It is in this sincere hope, ladies and gentlemen, that I ask you to rise with me to drink a toast to the Captive Nations — may their long agony be soon ended.

Roman DEBRYCKYJ

UKRAINIANS IN WEST GERMANY

When the second world war ended twenty five years ago, the world was divided into cheering and groaning peoples. There were victors and defeated, there were the persecuted, the expelled, refugees during the war and after the war, but there were also persecutors, the vindictive, and there were silent or rather ignored nations. To the ignored peoples belongs most of all the Ukrainian nation.

In Ukraine the towns and villages lay in ashes and ruins. The whole Ukrainian nation passed as a result of the war under the Russian yoke. Stalin, the inhuman Nero of our times, toasted the health of the great Russian people, the "hero nation" — as he said himself. The Ukrainian nation, affected itself most severely by the war, got nothing. In practice it belonged neither to victors nor to the defeated, but it belonged and belongs in the present day to the groaning and ignored nations.

The Ukrainians who after the end of the war lived in the three German occupation zones then had to experience bitterly what it meant to be a nation without one's own state. The Western victors recognized no ethnic nationality, they divided the so called "displaced persons" (DP) according to their state nationality. The Ukrainians were then allocated to these camps for foreigners, according to the state nationality they once possessed. Many protests, demonstrations, pleas, talks with authorities and endless explanations were necessary before UNRAA and the military administrations decided reluctantly to set up special Ukrainian camps. With what envy and emotion did the Ukrainians then observe the French, English, Dutch, Belgians and other Western nationals returning to their own countries, with their own national flags, singing their songs. In gross contrast to these happy scenes were seen the compulsory return to the Soviet Union of their fellow Ukrainians. The Soviet Russian Commission for the Return of Prisoners hunted in every camp, in towns and villages, in ruins and hiding-places for any Soviet citizens hiding from forcible return. The victims were loaded into enclosed waggons with the help of the military police of the Western allies and were 'displaced' once more.

How many Ukrainians were forcibly returned to the USSR? God alone knows their number and knows their names and the fate they suffered subsequently. The heart-rending scenes which took place during such forcible returns, the frequent breakings out of the trucks,

the suicides committed in despair, opened the eyes of the Western allies. The Western allies were not wicked, they were only not informed, indifferent and unaffected by the fate of these peoples, intent on not annoying their Russian allies. But they soon noticed that the women and children, the old men and also all other Soviet citizens could not be war criminals, as they were branded by the Soviet Russians. Gradually the forcible returns ceased.

The Ukrainians did not remain inactive. They formed themselves in various assembly camps into special groups, demanded again and again separate accommodation in their national camps and this also proved successful. On October 30, 1945 several Ukrainian representatives met in a barrack in Aschaffenburg and after three days of consultations founded the central representative body for Ukrainian emigrants. Step by step, in painstaking and hard work the Ukrainians built up the different branches of their organised life. The place of honour in this laborious work of development was due to the Ukrainian Church, both the Catholic and the Orthodox, which at first was the only body with access to the allied authorities, and which used it for the good of all.

When on October 8, 1947 the second conference of delegates of the Central Representative Body of Ukrainian emigrants met in Regensburg, the report on activities showed considerable achievements. The Free Ukrainian University was already in existence, as well as the Ukrainian Technical-Scientific Institute, the Ukrainian University for Economics, the Ukrainian Orthodox Theological Academy, the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Seminary for Priests, the Ukrainian Institute for Foreign Languages. In 30 Ukrainian high schools more than 600 teachers instructed over 5,000 pupils and 460 teachers taught over 3,500 pupils in 60 primary schools.

The Central Representative Body of Ukrainian Emigrants had registered about 180,000 Ukrainians in 1947 in all three western zones of Germany. The most diverse associations of Ukrainian exiles were founded and carried on activities, from political groupings to women's organisations, associations and clubs for veterans, sports, the professions, young people, as well as clubs and hobby associations.

But the Ukrainians knew that they could not remain in Germany in the long term. The country destroyed by war, torn apart by zone-frontiers, with indescribable housing shortages and the problem of some millions of its own refugees and displaced persons, was not then the land of promise and shelter. Eyes were turned to overseas countries, above all to the American countries, where there was already an organized life for Ukrainians from earlier times. Despite the lively activities in every field, the Ukrainians kept their packed cases ready to hand, ready to emigrate at the next best opportunity. At the end of the Forties the Western states opened their frontiers to the emigrants who had been sticking it out in German refugee camps.

A new wave of emigration began and with it also the new suffering of those who for the most diverse reasons were not allowed to emigrate. They were resettled from one place to another, from barracks to barracks and thus driven to the point of despair. Through these frequent moves from one place to another and overseas emigration organized life became almost completely disrupted. Only in the middle of the Fifties did the gradual revival and then the stabilization of the life of Ukrainian emigrants in the Federal Republic begin.

The organized life of Ukrainians in the Federal Republic of Germany is within modest limits. Although the Ukrainian emigrants in the FRG can be considered as political emigrants, since the causes which led to the entry of Ukrainians into Germany, as well as the reasons why the Ukrainians cannot return to their native country have a political origin, yet their organized life is not primarily political, at least not in the foreground. The principal tasks of the Ukrainians in the FRG are the maintenance and cultivation of their native cultural heritage, the education of the new generation born and grown up here in the consciousness of their belonging to the Ukrainian nation and not until then comes, in order of tasks, giving information on Ukraine and winning friends among the Western nations for the political aims of the Ukrainian nation in its own country.

Although the political activity of the Ukrainian emigrants in the FRG is hardly of great weight, yet the mere existence of these emigrants is a political fact. For a mass emigration from a country is always a sign that in this country unbearable political or social conditions prevail. But if over two and a half million emigrants in the western world alone exist, from a country, such as Ukraine, which is one of the most fertile and richest in minerals in Europe, then this means nothing else than that the most elementary human freedoms are lacking in this country. And the guilt for the lack of freedom in Ukraine is not that of the Ukrainian nation, least of all the Ukrainian emigrants. The guilt for this belongs to the foreign rule in Ukraine, which has always been expressed in a ruthless persecution of everything nationally Ukrainian and at present has reached a new climax in forcible Russification.

The Ukrainian nation in its home country is fighting for the realization of its ideals of freedom, for the establishment of a free, independent and united Ukrainian state. This ideal of freedom we, the Ukrainian emigrants, despite the quarter of a century which we have lived outside our country have not lost sight of. It has become the task, for us, the Ukrainians in emigration, in view of the situation of the Ukrainian nation in our own country, to make known the unfalsified will of the Ukrainian people to the Free World and to prepare our descendants for the continuation of this work. Our work is in no way directed against the interests of the Free Western World.

Let them try peaceful coexistence with Moscow, let them build bridges from the Western states to the Soviet Russian empire, if they think it useful. The Ukrainian nation is in no position to participate in peaceful coexistence, for it has to fight for its very existence! We, the Ukrainian emigrants, have been building bridges between nations for 25 years, not only bridges between the states and their regimes in the form of peaceful coexistence! Our watchword is "Freedom for the Nations! Freedom for Individuals!", and it would be much better to realize this watchword than simply to live in peaceful coexistence.

We can look back with satisfaction at our 25 years of activity by the Central Representative Body of Ukrainian Emigrants in Germany, however modest it may be. We have shrunk from no effort and been afraid of no exertion to cultivate and cherish the spiritual and cultural values of our nation which we brought with us abroad. We have used the freedom granted us to live, in order to create new values which are of benefit to us as well as to our people in our native country. Without exaggeration, but also without false modesty we can state that we may claim for ourselves that through our work in the Western states, including the FRG, we have done some good and something useful for these peoples also, in the same way that we owe thanks to these host countries and peoples for some good. We do not want to become a social and political burden for these peoples, and, thank goodness, we have not become one. May the good and the useful which we have exchanged find a worthy continuation on a broader and higher plane, in good relations between the people of the host country and our nation and in future between the people our free and reunited states. In this spirit the Ukrainian emigrants interpreted their tasks in Germany in the last quarter of a century, in this spirit we wish to continue our work.

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A CATALOGUE OF BOOKS IN PRINT (ENGLISH)

1. **RUSSIAN OPPRESSION IN UKRAINE.** Reports and Documents. Ukrainian Publishers Ltd., London 1962, 576 pp. + 24 pp. of plates. Cloth.
Price: £1.80 (\$8.00).

A collection of documentary reports and eye-witness accounts on Russian Communist reprisals against the Ukrainian national movement between 1917 and 1960.

2. **THE REAL FACE OF RUSSIA.** Essays and Articles. Ed. by Volodymyr Bohdaniuk. Ukrainian Information Service, London 1967, 267 pp.

Price: £1.25 (\$3.50) cloth-bound, £0.90 (\$2.50) paperback.

A number of authors (mostly Ukrainian) consider the forces inspiring and moulding Russian Bolshevism and imperialism.

3. **REVOLUTIONARY VOICES.** Ukrainian Political Prisoners Condemn Russian Colonialism. Publ. by Press Bureau of the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations (ABN), Munich 1969, 156 pp., illustrations.

Price: £0.60 (\$1.50), paperback.

Texts of original protest writings by Ukrainian intellectuals.

4. **THE SHAME OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY.** Bolshevik Methods of Combating the Ukrainian National Liberation Movement. A Documentary Report. Ukrainian Publishers Ltd., London 1962, 79 pp. Paperback.

Price: 50p (\$1.50).

Translation of a pamphlet published in Ukraine by the underground Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council in 1946. Numerous facts on mass terror, murders and reprisal actions by the Russian security forces, esp. between 1943-46. Included in "Russian Oppression of Ukraine", see item 1 above.

5. **MURDERED BY MOSCOW: PETLURA — KONOVALETS — BANDERA.** Three Leaders of the Ukrainian National Liberation Movement assassinated at the orders of Stalin and Khrushchov. Ukrainian Publishers Ltd., London 1962, 76 pp., paperback.

Price: 50p (\$1.50).

Little known facts and circumstances of brutal murders arranged by Moscow of the three leaders of the Ukrainian national resistance in 1926, 1938 and 1959, in Paris, Rotterdam and Munich respectively. Included in "Russian Oppression."

6. **Volodymyr Kosyk, CONCENTRATION CAMPS IN THE USSR.** Ukrainian Publishers Ltd., London 1962, 108 pp.

Price: 50p (\$1.50), paperback.

Story of the growth of Russian forced labour camps, estimates of numbers of inmates in various years, with particular reference to Ukrainian prisoners. Texts of appeals from Ukrainian prisoners in Mordovian camps, written in 1955 to the UN and the Ukrainians in the Free World. Included in "Russian Oppression in Ukraine", see item 1 above.

7. **KHRUSHCHOV'S CRIMES IN UKRAINE.** Mass-Murders of Ukrainian Political Prisoners. Ukrainian Publishers Ltd., London 1962, 93 pp., paperback.

Price: 50p (\$1.50).

Documented accounts and eye-witness reports on Russian Communist murders of thousands of Ukrainian political prisoners in Vinnytsia (1937-38), Lviv and many other Ukrainian towns (1941). Included in "Russian Oppression", see item 1.

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Texts of speeches and statements made on the occasion of the Conferences of the ABN and the European Freedom Council in London.

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The author scathingly castigates those in the UN and outside who in the West try to present Lenin as a "humanist" and reveals real Lenin whose hands are marred with innocent blood of victims of mass terror.
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A valuable introduction into the problem of the Ukrainian national liberation struggle in the 19th-20th centuries, but especially in the period starting with the First World War. The author, a participant in the Ukrainian political and military struggle for independence during and after

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The UKRAINIAN REVIEW



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C O N T E N T S

<i>Jaroslav Stetsko</i> : UKRAINE FIGHTS ON	2
THE STATE OF THE LIBERATION STRUGGLE. Position of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists	9
<i>Dmytro Donzow</i> : U.N. OR A.B.N.?	23
<i>Paul William Wood, Ph.D.</i> : REALITY VERSUS PROPAGANDA IN THE SOVIET UNION OF THE THIRTIES	26
<i>S. Welychenko</i> : CARPATHIAN UKRAINE IN EASTERN EUROPEAN POLITICS 1938-1939	34
<i>Renata Maria Sharan, A.B.</i> : TYPES OF ETHNIC IDENTIFICATION AND GENERAL POSITION: A STUDY OF THE UKRAINIAN IMMIGRANT GROUP IN THE U.S.A.	46
<i>W. Bezchlibnyk</i> : UKRAINIAN LIBERATION FRONT IN CANADA. Report from the Canadian League for the Liberation of Ukraine	79
JEWISH POLITICIAN ON CARDINAL SLIPYI AND DR. HORBOVYI. By <i>Volodymyr Lutsiv</i>	88
REPORTS FROM UKRAINE	91
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL CITATIONS OF UKRAINE IN THE A.B.N. CORRESPONDENCE	94
BOOK REVIEW	99

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Jaroslav STETSKO

UKRAINE FIGHTS ON

The USSR is now living through a pre-revolutionary era. On the one hand there is the moribund regime whose arteries are becoming ever more stiffened, change for it is becoming ever more difficult, and on the other hand there are growing numerous forces radically opposed to the present regime and the entire Bolshevik Russian imperial system.

The urge of human beings to win back for themselves those rights which man has for ages regarded as due to him, is not only not dead in the USSR and its imperial dependencies but is continually whetted by the increasing knowledge of the outside world through irrevocable improvements in communications and education.

In external relations the Soviet Russian empire is becoming increasingly embroiled in direct or indirect conflicts with the countries of the free world in numerous points of the globe. Although these conflicts have so far not involved Moscow in any large-scale wars, the possibility of such an involvement is always there and is more than likely in the future.

There can be little doubt that the policy of the so-called peaceful co-existence and talks about limitation of armaments, reduction of tension in Europe etc. are but tactical Russian manoeuvres to disarm and disorient the adversary. Moscow's ultimate aim, the spreading of its preponderance and domination throughout the world, remains intact, it will have to cause further conflicts in future, and provide also opportunities for revolutionary uprisings within the Russian empire.

The period since Stalin's death has witnessed the increasing differentiation as regards ideologies and policies of the ruling Communist parties both in the USSR and the satellites, which overgrew into divergencies, the drifting away from Moscow's leadership and even open enmity and hostilities. Apart from Yugoslavia, China and Albania, North Korea and North Vietnam, at one time or another critical situations have developed in the relations between the USSR and the client regimes in Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, Rumania, Hungary and others. The invasion of Czecho-Slovakia in 1968 was the most blatant example of direct suppression by the Moscow dictatorship of the slightest attempts at loosening their heavy-handed contro

over the satellites. The deviations of the political line pursued by the satellite communist parties from the line laid down by Moscow, are conditioned above all by the powerful spontaneous pressures building up among the masses of the subject peoples demanding national independence and real freedom for the individual. The communist regimes in those countries are willing tools in the hands of Moscow imperialists, but at the same time they have to reckon with the nationalist sentiments of the overwhelming masses of the population, and occasionally stray too far away from Moscow's lead only to be brought back sharply to heel. There is no doubt that given appropriate opportunity, these nations would rise in spontaneous revolutions to overthrow the present unpopular dictatorial regimes imposed on them by Moscow's diktat.

In view of the bitter experience of Western lack of interest in actively supporting revolutionary processes in those countries, so to speak Western contemplative though sympathetic neutrality with regard to those countries, on the one hand, and Russian ruthlessness and brutality in suppressing any local revolts on the other, a certain demoralisation has set in among these nations, signs of frustration and hopelessness are multiplying, and the communist regimes are able, by offering a carrot and by threatening with a stick, to keep these nations temporarily in check. How long they will succeed in it depends on several factors, but in the long run probably on the internal situation in the USSR itself.

The ruling force in the USSR, the CPSU, has not been immune from the internal strife not only for power, but also concerning ideological and political questions. Destalinisation and other reforms attempted and partially carried out by Khrushchov and the present triumvirate have broken the spell of the apparent "monolithic" unity of the Party and of its omnipotence and omniscience, have largely discredited it both at home and abroad. Slowly and gradually, but with an increasingly rapid pace, divergencies of opinions within the Party, as well as outside it among the intelligentsia, are coming into the open.

Since late 1950s the clandestine "self-published" literature has been growing among the intellectual and student circles. All of it is critical of the present regime, which is condemned for its dictatorship, oppression in the political, cultural, religious, economic and other fields. Solutions offered for the future differ, however, to a considerable extent between various authors and various groups of people represented. The main difference lies between the Russian opposition groups and the opposition and underground movements in the non-Russian national Republics of the USSR: Ukraine, Byelorussia, the Baltic States, the Caucasian countries, Turkestan, etc. While all the underground writers stress the necessity for the safeguarding and implementation of human rights in the USSR in all

their manifestations, the Russian authors see the future as merely democratisation or liberalisation of the present regime or the present empire, preserving its colossal structure intact. The non-Russian authors, on the other hand, stress the national oppression in the present USSR and demand, above all, national liberation and independence of the subjugated peoples as the most important guarantee of the realisation of human rights and democracy.

It is a most important feature of the recent decade: the growth of the realisation among the non-Russian nations subjugated by the USSR that the national idea is the most potent force able to arouse men for the struggle against a totalitarian imperialist regime for the rights of man, too.

The deceptive expectation that it is possible to realise human rights in the so-called democratic Russian empire in the form of a proposed Union of Democratic Republics advocated by the self-styled Democratic Movement of Russia, has also dissipated. The clandestine publication *Ukrainian Herald* No. 3 — underground organ of the nationally-minded and democratic circles of Ukrainian intellectuals denies that any Ukrainians have had anything to do with the said "Democratic" Movement of the Soviet Union or with the elaboration of its programme. This is also true of the Estonian, Lithuanian and Latvian intellectuals, who will certainly not give up the right of their Republics to sovereignty in favour of a future Russian non-Communist empire under the guise of a Union of Democratic Republics. The pamphlet "To Expect or To Act?" written by a group of technical intelligentsia of Estonia, criticises the programmatic positions of Academician Sakharov which owe a lot to Marx and Lenin. The Estonians defend spiritual, Christian values and show the bankruptcy of Marxism, dialectical materialism. They make precise the aims of the Baltic nations: a) sovereignty; b) primacy of spiritual Christian values; c) liberation through revolutionary armed struggle and not waiting for evolution of communism towards democracy or "humane communism."

The aims of the liberation movements of the enslaved nations are conditioned by: a) traditional background of revolutionary struggle and realisation of the great traditions — historical and cultural invincible will of each nation to live its own independent life b) world-wide victory of the national idea; disintegration of almost all the empires of the world, which mobilises morally and ideologically the nations enslaved within the Russian empire; c) insurmountable contradictions within the Russian empire.

A section of the opposition in the national republics makes an attempt to base its demands on the ambiguous clauses of the legally existing Constitution of the USSR and of the Union Republics, thus trying to minimise the risks of cruel reprisals by the regime.

Thus for instance in Ukraine, a group of lawyers which founded the underground Ukrainian Workers' and Peasants Union in 1960 tried to mobilise Ukrainian public for demanding secession of the Ukrainian SSR from the Soviet Union by utilising the appropriate abstract and perfidious articles of the Constitutions of the USSR and Ukrainian SSR. They had in plan to put demonstratively the motion for the secession of Ukraine from the USSR at a session of the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine.

The Ukrainian Workers' and Peasants' Union headed by the lawyers L. Lukyanenko, I. Kandyba and propagandist S. Virun, was discovered by the KGB in 1961 and liquidated — seven of its members were convicted — two of them to death, the death sentence was later commuted to 15 years imprisonment. One of the members of this group suggested action among the Soviet Army and preparation of an armed struggle. But on the whole the group attempted to utilise Soviet legal fictions.

"The Ukrainian National Front" — was a declared revolutionary organisation, ideologically akin to the old Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), and during the years 1964-66 published an underground journal "Freedom and Fatherland." In 15 issues this journal reprinted many publications of the OUN and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army from the years 1947-49. In 1967 this group was arrested and at a trial in Ivano-Frankivsk three of its leaders — D. Kvetsko, Z. Krasivskyi and M. Dyak — were sentenced to death. Later the sentence was commuted to 15-12 years imprisonment. Others were sentenced to shorter terms.

"The Ukrainian National Committee" which was liquidated in December 1961 was a revolutionary nationalist organisation. Two of its leaders — Ivan Koval and Bohdan Hrytsyna — workers from Lviv, were shot, the death sentences of two other people were commuted to 15 years imprisonment, and 16 other young workers and students also received long sentences.

In 1958/59 students and workers in Ivano-Frankivsk founded the "United Party for the Liberation of Ukraine." Its aim was sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. At a secret trial in March 1959 they were sentenced to terms of imprisonment ranging from 10 to 7 years. Their leader were Bohdan Harmatiuk, Yarema Tkachuk, Bohdan Tymkiv.

Apart from these, there were many less well known groups, some of them with a more radical revolutionary platforms, as e. g. the Ukrainian group from Novorossiysk, which advocated partisan struggle for independence and rejected the tactics of pseudo-legal struggle on the basis of the Constitution of the USSR.

Similar centres of organised struggle exist or are in the process of formation in other countries enslaved in the USSR and in the satellite states.

There is widespread opposition to Russification policies of Moscow. And it is not by chance that the Byelorussian writer Bykov criticised "great power assimilators" at the Congress of Byelorussian Writers, and the same was done by Abashidze — at the Georgian congress.

In Ukraine, Byelorussia, Georgia, Turkestan, Azerbaijan, North Caucasus, Lithuania, Latvia, Armenia, Estonia, as well as in Bulgaria, Hungary, Slovakia, Czechia, East Germany, Rumania, and Croatia, national-liberation struggle is growing in strength on the basis of traditional national and religious ideas.

A powerful stimulus to the national liberation struggle was given by the young poets and writers in the early 1960s, the so-called "poets of the sixties", especially in Ukraine where one of their leading lights was Vasyl Symonenko (b. 1935, d. 1963). In his strong-worded fresh poetry there was condemnation of the entire hypocritical dictatorial and oppressive system in the USSR and the policy of Russian domination. This movement penetrated even the ranks of the Communist Party and Komsomol in Ukraine and threatened to engulf the Russian colonial domination. A whole underground literature began to spread like wildfire in Ukraine.

In 1965 the regime dealt a blow in retaliation. Over 20 most active Ukrainian intellectuals with the critics I. Svitlychnyi and I. Dzyuba at the head were arrested. And although these two were released and punished only by dismissal from their jobs, the others were sentenced to several years of imprisonment each. Voluminous material about their writings, arrests, secret trials and KGB persecutions was collected by the journalist Vyacheslav Chornovil and published in the West (*Chornovil Papers*, McGraw Hill). A brilliant work by Ivan Dzyuba "Internationalism or Russification?", circulating in Ukraine clandestinely, also was published in the West (Weidenfeld and Nicholson). Chornovil himself was sentenced at a secret trial in Nov. 1967 to three years imprisonment, later commuted to 18 months. But even on coming out of prison, he continued to sign protest statements against persecution of Ukrainian intellectuals, secret trials and suppression of human rights in the USSR. Many Ukrainian intellectuals and students helped the former Canadian Ukrainian communist Party member, John Kolasky, to collect documentary material about the colonialist Russian policies in Ukraine, which were published on his return in Canada in two books (*Education in Soviet Ukraine*, and *Two Years in Soviet Ukraine*). The savagery of the sentences meted out to Ukrainian intellectuals in the trials in 1965 — the historian Valentyn Moroz (4 years), the painter O. Zalyvakhin (5 years), the poet and translator S. Karavanskyi (the remaining 10 years of his previous 25-year sentence interrupted in 1960 after 10 years of imprisonment), etc. shocked Ukraine. Far from intimidating the Ukrainian nationally minded people, it encouraged them to new acts of civic courage. Reports about arrests and sentences for "Ukra

inian nationalist propaganda and agitation" multiplied over the second half of the 1960s, coming not only from Kyïv, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Lutsk, but also from Donbas, Dnipropetrovsk, Chernihiv, and many other cities of Ukraine, and even from Ukrainian settlements in Kazakhstan.

The chairman of the Union of Writers of Ukraine, Oles Honchar, wrote a novel "The Cathedral" which tried to show the conflict between those who wished to preserve spiritual heritage of the Ukrainian people and those who out of servility to the occupying power worked to destroy that heritage. The novel evoked great commotion in Ukraine and the authorities took it out of circulation, condemned it and persecuted those who spoke up in favour of it. Particularly vicious persecution took place in 1969 in Dnipropetrovsk where several writers and critics were imprisoned, incl. the poet Sokulskyi who was sentenced to four and a half years of imprisonment in January 1970.

A deep philosophical commentary on the ideas expressed in Honchar's novel "The Cathedral" is contained in the pamphlets written by the young critic Yevhen Sverstyuk under the title "Cathedral in Scaffolding" and circulating widely in Ukraine. (Published in the West, too). Sverstyuk asks the Communists: "What have you created for your people to replace the insidious propaganda against religious faith and rites, old customs, traditions and feasts — i. e. all that which a foreigner had to respect in the past if he wanted to show his respect towards the people." Seeing the barbarity of the present day Russian occupants of Ukraine, he exclaims: "How much did it cost our forefathers to instil in their children humane ideals, faith, selfless love of truth and respect to God of their ancestors!"

In 1970 the first issue of the clandestine journal *Ukrainian Herald* appeared in Ukraine and was republished in the West. Since that time five more issues came out. This journal republishes material circulating among Ukrainian intellectuals, especially dealing with the regime's suppression of national and human rights in Ukraine.

Having come out of prison in September, 1969, the Ukrainian historian Valentyn Moroz, did not give up his views and his public activities. He again wrote articles which could not be published in the Communist press, but were circulating among his friends and acquaintances. In these articles, especially "Reportage from Beria Game Reserve", "Chronicle of Resistance" and "Among the Snows" he scathingly unmasked KGB terror, arbitrariness of the Russian occupation regime and Russian colonialism in Ukraine. In his most recent work "Among the Snows" Moroz writes: "No spiritual revolution has yet taken place without its apostles. The present-day rebirth is also impossible without them... One can have great spiritual treasures but they will remain unnoticed if an infatuated person does

not get hold of them and does not melt them in the hearth of his infatuation." He speaks against scepticism, opportunism, "realism", in favour of what he calls infatuation with a great idea of spiritual renovation and Ukrainian national rebirth. He calls for a tremendous civic courage against all the threats, reprisals and persecutions of the lawless regime of Russian oppressors. Arrested again on June 1, 1970, he stood a secret trial in November of the same year and was sentenced to 14 years imprisonment in prisons and concentration camps in Russia and Siberia far off from Ukraine. He refused to testify at the trial declaring all secret trials illegal, and refused to beg for pardon. All the witnesses refused to testify against Moroz. The unheard of sentence called forth a wave of protests not only in Ukraine, but throughout the free world.

Historian *Amalrik* who wrote politically explicit article "Will the USSR survive till 1984?" received a much milder sentence. This only shows how dangerous is the national question, esp. the Ukrainian national liberation movement, in the eyes of the Moscow imperialists.

The leading force of the Ukrainian resistance is the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), followers of the late Stepan Bandera, assassinated by a Soviet agent in Munich in 1959. Although the network of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists in Ukraine has suffered tremendous losses in the post-World War II years thousands of its heroic fighters fell in struggle, the ideas which it has sown, are sprouting out in multifarious forms in the most unexpected places and the trend towards the crystallisation of the organised liberation movement is becoming ever more apparent.

All the indications show that at the present time there is taking place a spontaneous eruption of a spiritual force enveloping all the subjugated nations — the elemental volcanic force of traditional spiritual values, faith in God and belief in national destinies, original and unfalsified, an invincible urge to realise profound human aspirations of freedom, justice, honesty, truth, national and individual rights and obligations. This elemental force cannot be halted by any prohibitions and persecutions by the rigid, rotten regime, built on lies, falsehood and perversion of truth, terror and compulsion. Sooner or later it will erupt in armed revolutionary struggle for independence of nations and freedom of individuals, and our task is to hasten the victory of this struggle by giving it every assistance from the Free World.

THE STATE OF LIBERATION STRUGGLE

POSITIONS OF THE ORGANIZATION OF UKRAINIAN NATIONALISTS

Ukraine in the Struggle for State Independence

The world, and in it the Ukrainian nation, subjugated by Bolshevism, a new form of Russian imperialism, has entered the decade of the 70s of the 20th century. The so-called Soviet Union, the most recent expression of Russian great — power expansionism with its totalitarian Communist dictatorship is now facing inevitable dissolution. Confronted with the contradictions of a disorganized, backward, totally centralized economy, under particular pressure from the national liberation revolutionary movements, the Russian despots are striving, by using brutal force, to achieve the assimilation of nations subjugated by Russia into the so-called Soviet society. Destroying their cultural and historical achievements and traditions, dissolving them in the Russian melting pot, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in the resolutions of the 24th Congress of the party has made plans to intensify the terrorist and violent measures in order to create upon the Russian historic element “the sole Soviet”, and in reality the Russian people.

The regime of the Soviet Russian empire is unable and cannot be able to put into effect basic changes, dictated by life itself, in the national political and economic relations, for these changes would at the same time spell its downfall. In order to keep the prison of peoples indivisible and to preserve their power, the Russian imperialists are intensifying the administrative and political repressions and are depriving the subjugated nations of all rights by fighting against the national idea. *The Ukrainian nation has entered the new period of struggle for its national independence and for the dissolution of the empire*, against the so-called proletarian internationalism by which the great-power policy of Russianism with its rampant chauvinism is being camouflaged.

Fifty Years of Struggle

The struggle of the Ukrainian nation against the modern form of Russian and other imperialisms — for the reestablishment of an Independent United Ukrainian State — has been continuing for over 50 years. Neither the Leninist nor the Stalinist terror, including the

hunger siege of 1933 and the man-made famine of 1946-47, nor the forcing into the catacombs of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox and the Ukrainian Catholic Churches, nor the continuous destruction of the leading political and culturally creative forces of the nation, have put an end to that struggle, have forced the nation to submit, have broken its spirit. The means and methods of struggle have changed; its tension has fallen and then risen again, but its aims have been and remain the same.

In the war of 1917-21, which was started by the Russian Bolshevik government of Lenin against the Ukrainian State, our nation faced four hostile fronts simultaneously and no support of any kind from the outside. Reconstructing the prison of nations, toppled in the process of national revolutions and liberation wars, the Bolsheviks transformed Ukraine into a fictitious state with a misleading sign of the Ukrainian SSR, but in fact into a part of the colonial creation — USSR — the greatest paradox of the mid-20th century, the age of de-colonization.

The Ukrainian SSR is in no way a continuation of the Ukrainian State which emerged as the expression of the will of its people in the national revolution of the years 1917-21. The so-called Soviet Ukraine is a Russian colony, as it is described by the Ukrainian patriots in Ukraine as well. After the fall of the Ukrainian Hetman State, after the fall of the Ukrainian National Republic, the armed struggle of our people for the realization of the national idea in their own independent united state continued for several years. This struggle renewed itself with new impetus against Hitlerite Germany, which in the second world war tried to turn Ukraine into its colony. In the first days of the war between recent allies, Germany and the USSR the Ukrainian National Assembly, called upon the initiative of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, proclaimed on June 30, 1941 in Lviv the Act of Renewal of the Ukrainian State. In order to continue the armed struggle for the Ukrainian Independent United State and as a reaction to the German repressions against the revolutionary and independence-minded forces, the Ukrainian nation, under the initiative of the OUN under the leadership of Stepan Bandera established its own political military force — the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), which together with the OUN, the liberation and independence-minded underground, founded the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council — UHVR, under whose leadership the war against the German conquerors and the Bolshevik hordes was being waged. Until 1953, already after the capitulation of Germany, the UPA was fighting with the Russian Bolshevik occupation forces, which operated in alliance with Communist Poland and Czecho-Slovakia, and although Russia was able to knock out the arms from the hands of the UPA in an unequal fight, our nation continues and intensifies the struggle more and more in changed forms.

The Deepening and Intensification of Revolutionary Liberation Activities

After the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, at which the theses on the merging of nations of the USSR were proclaimed to be "the general line" of the party in the further "construction of socialism", resistance among the peoples subjugated by Russia became stronger and more widespread. The policy of Russification, with the help of which the Russian imperialist government is destroying their cultural, historic and linguistic individuality, has called forth a distinctly nationalistic character of that resistance and protest, in particular in Ukraine. The Communist Party and government are covering up the Russification of Ukraine and other subjugated countries by internationalist slogans, which has as its aim their national and political annihilation.

The building of the so-called Soviet society under the protection of the "elder brother" — the Russian people, at the price of de-nationalization of other peoples, is the greatest crime in the history of mankind. All attempts by the Russian chauvinists from the CPSU "to merge" the Ukrainian people with the Russian in the so-called Soviet society, were answered by the faithful sons of their insubmissive nation in the words of V. Symonenko — the poet of the national idea: "My nation exists! My nation will always exist! Nobody will cross out my nation!"

These inspired words reflect the ideological program of our nation in its struggle for state independence and sovereignty. The Russian chauvinists surely did not expect this. Neither was this expected by the apostates of the national idea, the Red "Little Russians" and renegades, who, falling on their knees before the enemy of the Ukrainian people are declaring their loyalty to Russia and are mumbling that allegedly the national problem in the USSR has been solved positively and finally (Smolych, Novychenko, Poltoratskyi, Dmyterko and others). They and all the other renegades — the servants of the regime, that — as was said by Catherine II while imposing Little Russianism upon Ukraine, — have "a passion for titles and in particular for rewards", — were called by V. Symonenko "bastards of satanical executioners."

The young nationally creative forces of Ukraine, which proudly call themselves Ukrainians, are putting up a more and more decisive resistance to the Russian chauvinistic policy with its program of intensification and expansion of the Russian colonial empire under the false mask of the Soviet Union. To the "national pride of the Great Russians" (V. Lenin) they are contrasting their own Ukrainian national pride, without hesitating "to endure punishment, to suffer, but not to repent" in Mordovian concentration camps and distant places of exile, in the name of their Fatherland.

This ideological and political resistance, which is being manifested ever more clearly in the creative work of the young generation of Ukraine of our time, is the result and the response to the impressive revolutionary, liberation, political and military struggle of the UPA and the revolutionary underground — the OUN. Then the Ukrainian liberation nationalism mobilized our people to this struggle and realized in practice the idea of a common front of the subjugated nations against the Russian and German imperialisms, establishing in the forests of the Zhytomyr region the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations (ABN). The revolutionary liberation concept of simultaneous, coordinated uprisings and the toppling of the Russian empire from within became dominant, and it was raised by the contemporary young generation of Ukraine in its political and literary creative work.

According to a schematic division of one of the contemporary theoreticians of liberation struggle in Ukraine, the period 1942-1953 can be called the period of nationwide uprising, the period 1953-1959 — the period of strikes, mass actions of prisoners in concentration camps, which, had they been synchronized, would have gripped and toppled the whole empire. By reorganizing the system of concentration camps, Khrushchov saved the Russian empire for some time. In the third period, which began in 1959 and continues to this day, the centre of gravity of the entire struggle, which had been and is still being manifested in mass resistance and clashes with the occupying power (Novocherkask, Donetsk, Kramatorsk, Dnipropetrovsk, Odessa, Lviv, Kyïv and others), in the stand taken by the workers and students, is spreading to all Ukrainian territories. This many-sided ideological and political struggle, led by the young nationally-minded generation, rests on inherently Ukrainian elements, the cult of Ukraine's glorious past, clearly contrasting Kyïv, as the eternal, holy city of Ukraine, to Moscow, as the living symbol of evil, inhumanity, subjugation of other peoples and greedy imperialism and colonialism. Side by side with the activity of the young in the field of culture, arts, literature, the uncompromising action of the nationalist underground of OUN is being intensified, manifesting itself in various forms, in particular in concrete clashes with the enemy, in mass mobilization of the broad classes of the people, which strengthens and inspires the ideological and cultural front. Thus, our nation is striving for defence and preservation of its substance, for the achievement of its ideals in all spheres of its organic existence — historical, traditional, cultural, economic, political; for the right to believe in God and to worship Him in its churches, for social justice, for human dignity, which is being trampled and mocked by the Russian barbarians.

The myth and legend of the Gold-domed Kyïv is today becoming a mobilizing, anti-Russian, uniting force.

The young writers, poets, artists and intellectuals, turning in their works to the banned and destroyed spiritual heritage of "Sich — the defender of freedoms of the Ukrainian people", to the Ukrainian Christian Republic — the Cossack State — are formulating and molding the national and political ideology on the basis of traditions. "The time of maturity" has come; the national concept which for half a century was being corrupted with unrestrained force, is coming to the surface of life and encompassing ever broader circles of the people. Defending in a fight its own program of Independent Ukraine, our nation is aware of the fact that in Kyiv, and not in Moscow, as the young poet expressed it, "from among the stars' millennial clusters there rose here your Holy State."

The arrests and persecution of national cultural leaders have called forth a broad wave of protests in various cities of Ukraine. In the general movement in defence of human rights, the struggle for historical rights of Ukraine, for its state independence is being crystallised; the political contents of the struggle is revealing itself more clearly. The women — heroines of UPA and the Ukrainian Red Cross — who are languishing for 25 years in the Russian torture-chambers and concentration camps, have become living models and examples of inflexibility for the young generation.

The struggle is being waged for the fullness of the sovereign state life of the nation with all expressions of the national spirit of its genius, for complete freedom of all its creative efforts, which have enriched and are still enriching the world cultural treasury, but which are now being represented by the Russian occupant as the creative endeavours of the faceless "Soviet" or Russian people; for the sovereign right of the nation to accumulate the noble ideas and achievements of human genius of other nations, to melt them down in the spiritual furnace of national climate and to return them enriched into the world treasury of mankind.

The Universal Character of Ukraine's Struggle

Its universal character, its deeply humane contents, the national principle of organization of the world, the fullness of human rights and justice are essential for the ideological principles in the program of Ukraine's liberation struggle. In this lies the basic difference of the national liberation struggle, as of all the social and political processes in Ukraine, from the opposition movements and trends in ethnic Russia. The anti-regime opposition forces, just as the opposition to the regime in Russia do not disturb the foundations of the Russian colonial empire, which, resting upon the "Great Russian pride", conquered and "united" territories of neighbouring peoples in order to create the "great and one and only Russian people", which the Bolsheviks, concealing their imperialist aims, are calling "the great Soviet people." The opposition groups of Russia are only

demanding social and political reforms in the indivisible USSR, talking at most about the federative system of future Russia, headed, of course, by the "great Russian people", which is only a smoke screen in order to deceive once more and to impose the yoke upon the people subjugated by Moscow.

The Ukrainian national liberation forces, fighting for their nation to become a true master on its own land, are programming the renewal of sovereign states, conquered by the Bolsheviks and by force incorporated into the Russian imperial complex. The struggle is being waged to free the peoples of these countries from national, social, cultural and religious subjugation, the terror of imperialistic Moscow and to guarantee them a chance of free and unrestricted development, as is enjoyed by other peoples which are not subjugated by Communist conspirators. The relations among nations that are going to liberate themselves from Russian bondage must be based on equality, mutual respect, non-intervention in the domestic affairs of neighbouring states, on peace and friendship of sovereign, independent states within their ethnical boundaries.

The present-day conditions in the so-called Soviet Union are reminiscent in many respects of the pre-revolutionary times in tsarist Russia. The bureaucratic centralism of great-power politics of contemporary Russian imperialists with their deadly dogmatism of Marxism-Leninism and Stalinism, to which the present Soviet leadership is returning, is putting the brakes on the economic development of that artificially created monster state. And convinced of their infallibility, devoid of any creative ideas, the Leninist-Stalinist dogmatists, fighting with all means for the preservation of their power, cannot rid themselves of the fatal contradictions between imperialism, totalitarianism, utopian Communism and the growing aspirations of the subjugated peoples to freedom and independence. As time progresses the greater becomes the gap between the system of Bolshevik dictatorship and the peoples which it is holding in the clutches of physical and spiritual slavery.

The present national liberation struggle of the Ukrainian and other peoples subjugated by Russia is only a prologue of the future national revolutions — uprisings which are going to topple the rotten system of the monstrous Russian kingdom and are going to set at liberty the people imprisoned in that prison of nations. Then a new bright page will be opened in world history in relations among nations based on the principles of state independence and mutual respect and confidence.

Ukraine in Contemporary World

The present tense situation in the world has been created as the result of struggle among three major political forces: a) the greedy Russian-Bolshevik imperialism, which disguises its aggressive aims

of conquest and the transformation of the "capitalist world" on the pattern of Russian socialism by deceptive slogans of internationalism and "national liberation" of peoples outside the USSR, which are successfully liberating themselves without the help of Moscow, b) the democratic bloc of states, with the USA at the head, and c) liberation nationalisms of nations subjugated by Russian imperialism, which are fighting for their own states within the boundaries of their ethnic territories.

Discarding internationalism — a tool of Russian imperial policy, revolutionary nationalism contrasts it with ideological and political love to the fatherland, complete sovereignty of the nation and its unification, and places humaneness and mutual friendship among nations as the basic principle in international relations.

With the present structure of ideological and political forces in the world there are no chances for a lessening of tension. The struggle between Russia and the Western democratic bloc will continue and will become more and more intensive with periodic "thaws", regardless of the policy of peaceful coexistence and agreements about the division of the spheres of influence between the USSR and the Western states, in particular the United States. Constant Bolshevik expansion in various parts of the world will inevitably cause an aggravation of relations in one or another point of the globe, in particular in the Middle East, in South Asia, in the Far East and in Europe. The tension which is growing in the regions where Moscow is trying to consolidate its influence arises, to a considerable degree, due to the fact that the states of the democratic bloc, in particular the USA, in their policies still do not welcome the aspirations and do not support the liberation struggle of nations subjugated by Russian imperialism in the USSR and the satellite states, as well as are disregarding the threat from the side of Moscow which hangs over other countries. Russia is taking advantage of this first of all in the Middle East, where a dangerous state of shaky balance of power has been created: allegedly there is no war, but peace is still far off. The needle of the political barometre does not point to a storm in that area, but there are also no prospects for the weakening of pressure of the two politically opposing powers, which are standing behind the warring parties. At any moment this needle can move to the side of the storm.

It is also useless to expect a solution of the geopolitical conflict between Red China and the USSR, for in the basis of that conflict lie causes not so much of ideological nature, as the imperialistic interests of these two powers, which are fighting for hegemony within the Communist bloc and the domination of the world. As the result of several months of negotiations between them, although armed clashes have stopped, military preparations have been intensified on both sides instead. However, one cannot exclude their

reconciliation for a common struggle against the USA and the free world, in order to expand at its expense the sphere of their colonial domination and the final conquest of the world not as yet dominated by them. In that Far Eastern knot a particularly important part is to be played by Japan with her dynamic industry which, using predominantly foreign natural resources, has already reached the third place in the world. The economic might of that country, with stable internal conditions, based on deeply rooted traditionalism of the Japanese which is developing with spontaneous force in that nation, will direct its foreign policy toward the achievement of a joint decisive voice in world politics. Already at present the government of Japan is rightly demanding from Moscow the return to her of the Kurile Islands and other territories taken away from her. The political and military role of Japan is growing further.

The tension in the Far East and the internal revolutionary ferments in the USSR are pushing Moscow toward an apparent relaxation in relations with Western Europe, agreement with it, in particular with West Germany and France.

Of course, in the Kremlin they are not thinking about a lasting peace and the stabilization of the situation, but about the fact that with the help of West European technology and credits they could improve Soviet industry, fill the gaps in the centralized, anachronistic economy and obtain the final recognition of the political "status quo" of the countries conquered by Moscow, so as to clear the road to further conquests. The rapprochement between the USSR and West Germany and France will surely disturb the nevertheless unstable political situation in Western Europe and will increase tension in that area even more, assisting the Russian imperialists in the realization of their plans to conquer the world.

In recent years decentralization tendencies have become stronger in the so-called "people's democracies" — the satellites of Moscow. The national and socio-political disturbances before Christmas 1970 in Poland have given rise to Moscow's attempts to make Poland even more dependent on it and to intensify economic integration in the countries included in the Communist bloc COMECON, the "purge" in Czechoslovakia where 30% of members were expelled from the ruling party and where the makeup of the government has been almost totally changed, the growth of national liberation ferments and resistance among the subjugated peoples of the USSR and in all other satellite states — all this is a convincing proof that the foundations of the empire renewed by Lenin are shaking and that it is nearing its inevitable end as the result of victorious uprisings-revolutions. The colonial chains of Russian imperial socialism are cracking ever more audibly.

The processes of disintegration in the satellite countries of Russia have a clear national character and in their essence are in harmony

with the national liberation movements in Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, Turkestan, Byelorussia, the Baltic states and other countries subjugated in the USSR which create the key factor in the struggle for the downfall of the prison of nations — the USSR. The irresolute political state on the world chessboard, the incessant economic and ideo-political struggle between the democratic bloc of states headed by the USA, and the totalitarian dictatorship in the USSR, the above-mentioned disintegration processes in the states of the Communist bloc — all this creates favourable conditions for the unfolding of the liberation struggle of the Ukrainian and other subjugated nations. Oriented upon its own strength, in aspiring toward state independence the Ukrainian nation in alliance and with the cooperation of other subjugated nations and forces which recognize its natural and historic right to an independent united state, will fight until the victorious end.

Ukrainians in the Free World

An unusually significant rôle falls on the Ukrainian community in the free world. By its cultural and socio-political activity it must help its people in the Native Land in their struggle for state liberation. In their activity in foreign countries, dispersed throughout all continents, the Ukrainians have the following goals before them: to preserve themselves as a spiritually undivided national and cultural community; resisting and combating the assimilation and denationalization tendencies, to raise the standard of the cultural and political work utilizing the better examples and experience of other national groups and the surrounding environment; fostering national traditions, the life-giving roots necessary for the preservation and development of societies and nations, to adopt the better — the noble achievements of other nations. The strengthening of national consciousness will protect our emigration from the microbes of the "Little Russian sickness", which the enemy is injecting into the organism of our people in the Native Land, combating the national idea, while through his widespread network of agents and through his publications is attempting to inject it into the Ukrainian emigration.

Condemning and combating the policy of contacts and the so-called cultural exchange with representatives and envoys of the Moscow — imposed Kyïv general-governorship, who are coming to the free world, the Ukrainian community in exile must support by all means, including mass anti-Russian, anti-Bolshevik actions and demonstrations, the liberation struggle of its people, in particular of our youth in Ukraine, against Russian occupation, the Little-Russians-henchmen and all other national traitors. Ukrainians in foreign countries will also give an ever greater support to the fighting Ukraine, in particular to those uncompromising elements which, opposing the occupying power and combating Little-Russianism, through their

heroic acts, great dignity of public conduct, struggle and creative work are organizing the nation for the storming of the Russian prison of nations.

The socio-political activity of all Ukrainian institutions and organizations in the Western world has to be planned and conducted in such a way that it would assist the Ukrainian people in Ukraine in their defense of the national idea and the offensive struggle for it. Strengthening the spirit of this defense and struggle within the Ukrainian community, in particular among its young people, on the examples of courageous public conduct, high morality and readiness to take risks and to suffer for their convictions, for noble ideas, we are thus reinforcing the determination of our unsubdued people in Ukraine to bring their work to a successful conclusion — the renewal of an independent sovereign united Ukrainian State.

The Ukrainian youth in the free world manifested in its actions in recent years the noble aspirations to identify itself with the young fighters in Ukraine, to stand together with them in the joint ranks of liberation struggle. Let us give our all-round support to these aspirations; let us encourage our young people to revolutionary and political actions, to an active struggle for the good of Ukraine. By living examples of our public conduct and high principles, drawing our youth to cooperation, let us strengthen in it the confidence that the struggle for the liberation of Ukraine is at the same time the struggle for Christian and universal ideals of freedom and human rights, justice and the heroics of life, for victory of the national principle in the organization of the world, against the violent and imperialistic one. For good vs. evil, for heroic militant Christianity vs. militant atheism and decadent "Christianity" which is searching for a compromise with evil. For the Ukrainian eternal holy city Kyïv vs. Moscow, which is ruining the eternal values of man and nations! The idea of eternal Kyïv has captivated the spirituality, has strengthened the heroic morality and has given the incentive to our youth in Ukraine to undertake a selfless struggle.

The all-round support of the creative work of Ukrainian scholars, artists and writers to elevate our national culture and learning, which are being destroyed by the enemy, is a very great and responsible task of the whole Ukrainian community in the work and of every political emigré. To the "Soviet patriotism", which is being imposed by the occupying power in Ukraine, combating the Ukrainian nationalism, our community should contrast the love of Ukraine, work and struggle, imbued with the ever timely national idea.

The Ukrainian Churches are a tremendous treasure in the life of our people, in particular of our emigration. Being aware of the national contribution of our Churches to the history of the Ukrainian people, the Ukrainian community should exert every effort for their

permanent consolidation and development. In the struggle for the Particular Ukrainian Catholic Church, under the leadership of the Confessor of the Faith, the Archbishop Major Yosyf Cardinal Slipyi, for the dignity of the Patriarch of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, for the Patriarchate of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, the Ukrainian community is in accord. Consolidating the particularity of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, we are thus consolidating the Christian national traditions of the Church and are strengthening in ourselves the faith of our fathers and grandfathers which they professed and handed down to us.

1971 marks the 50th anniversary of the renewal of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church in the Cathedral of Holy Sophia in Kyïv, the autocephaly of which had been prepared under the Hetmanate and proclaimed by the government of the Ukrainian State in January 1919. The Orthodox Ukrainians and the entire Ukrainian community, celebrating this great event in the life of the nation, must exert every effort so as — having overcome all differences within the Ukrainian Orthodox Church — to unite them in a single Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, renewed upon the will of the people under the leadership of the Great Metropolitan Vasyl Lypkivskyi according to traditions and principles of Christianity of the Kyïvan Rus' — Ukraine.

Confirming the unity of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church and the particularity of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, the Ukrainian community will strengthen its Christian faith, for it was in it that "our ancestors baptized their children." The Ukrainian community will gladly welcome the patriarchal crowning of our Orthodox metropolitanates by the will of their Hierarchies.

A PROTEST AND DECLARATION OF THE UKRAINIAN NATIONAL POLITICAL FORCES

The Ukrainian national political world unanimously and most sharply condemns the barbaric methods of domination, unprecedented in the history of mankind, of the Russian conquerors over the subjugated peoples, as for instance the persecution of the Church and the clergy, including Bishop Velychkovskyi, a fiery lightbearer of the love of Fatherland and self-sacrifice for it; the laity, the creators of culture, and primarily the fighters for freedom and state independence of Ukraine, who are being cruelly sentenced to death or to many years of imprisonment in prisons and concentration camps by Russian tyrants; protests against the 25-year imprisonment of Red Cross workers (K. Zarytska, O. Husyak, H. Didyk and others), against

the systematic poisoning of food of Ukrainian political prisoners (Ivan Kandyba, Levko Lukyanenko, and others), against the draconic persecution of intellectuals and patriots (Dr. Volodymyr Horbovyi, S. Karavanskyi and others), against the treacherous murder by KGB of the steadfast defender of the rights of Ukrainian nation and man — the heroine and martyr Alla Horská who will remain in the history of Ukraine; against the recent barbaric sentencing to 14 years of imprisonment of the young historian Valentyn Moroz, an unbreakable fighter, for his defence of Ukrainian national traditions, the national honour and rights of a Ukrainian; against inhuman torturing of the members of O.U.N. and U.P.A., sentenced to many years of imprisonment for their fight for freedom and state independence of Ukraine (Soroka and others).

The Ukrainian political world sharply protests and severely condemns Russian violence, the Russification of Ukraine, genocide, the Russian destruction of cultural monuments and priceless ancient treasures of Ukrainian spiritual creativity, the barbarous crimes of Russia on Ukrainian territory, in particular in relation to fighters for the freedom of speech, thought, conscience, religion and the state independence of the nation.

The Ukrainian political world firmly protests against the physical extermination of Ukrainians and their deportation beyond the ethnic territories of Ukraine — to Siberia and other countries incorporated in the USSR, against the economic exploitation of Ukraine and the utilization of her riches, in particular of the human creative potential of Ukraine for the realization of Russian imperial, anti-Ukrainian interests.

The Ukrainian political world condemns most sharply the Russian government — organized assassination of the head of the Ukrainian state Symon Petlura, the head of the Executive of the Ukrainian Nationalists Col. Evhen Konovalets, the head of the Executive of the Organization of the Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) Stepan Bandera, as well as other criminal acts which are being organized and perpetrated by the Russian-Bolshevik government against the fighters and leaders of the revolutionary liberation struggle of Ukraine and the subjugated nations in general.

The Ukrainian political world condemns in the most strongest terms the bacteriological and chemical as well as other inhuman methods of extermination used by the Russian occupying power in combating the Ukrainian revolutionary liberation struggle, as for instance, the guerrilla activities of the UPA (Ukrainian Insurgent Army), in particular, under the command of Gen. Roman Shukhevych-Chuprynka, who died in battle against the Russian occupation forces of MVD on March 5, 1950.

The Ukrainian political world appeals to the freedom-loving mankind to initiate a campaign in defence of the rights to freedom and state independence of the Ukrainian nation and all other nations in the so-called USSR and the satellite countries, which are subjugated by Russian imperialism and Communism with the help of Russian military forces and the forcefully imposed Russian-Bolshevik system.

The policy of liberation of the subjugated nations must replace the policy of so-called peaceful coexistence, for it alone can save the whole freedom-loving mankind from subjugation by the Russian tyranny!

* * *

The Ukrainian political world considers the Russian emigré factors, groups, churches, as imperialistic and therefore having a hostile attitude to the idea of the Ukrainian Sovereign United State, as de facto allies of the Russian Bolsheviks in their attempt to maintain the indivisibility of the empire. The NTS is the most reactionary, imperialistic and chauvinistic Russian group which is preparing itself as a replacement for the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, with the aim to preserve the one and indivisible Russian prison of nations.

The Ukrainian political world most strongly condemns the cooperation with NTS of any Ukrainian political group or any leader, for this is tantamount to resignation from the idea of Independent United Ukrainian State and the concept of the downfall of the Russian empire.

"The Democratic Movement of Russia, Ukraine and the Baltic States" or the so-called Democratic Movement of the USSR is an ordinary imperialistic swindle of the new Russian conquerors who long to change the USSR into the "Union of Democratic Republics", that is — into the new form of empire. This is a misleading formula to deceive the free world with the thesis of the non-existent tendencies in Ukraine or the Baltic states to remain in the new federation, that is — in the new form of the Russian prison of nations, denouncing state independence and the final dissolution of the Russian prison of nations into independent states of all the subjugated nations. Sakharov's action, too, has a similar deceptive aim, when it comes to nations subjugated by Russian imperialism.

A document from Ukraine states: "In the Russian samizdat and abroad a document entitled "The Program of Democrats of Russia, Ukraine and the Baltic States" is being circulated . . . The Ukrainian democratic circles took no part in the formulation of this document which pretends to constitute a platform. The word 'Ukraine' in the said document was either inserted from conjunctural motives, or testifies to the relation to this document of Russian or Russified circles in Ukraine."

The Ukrainian political world will not undertake any cooperation with the Russian imperialistic anti-regime groups and movements,

for its cherished goal is to reestablish the Ukrainian Independent United State and to topple the Russian empire, upon whose ruins are to rise national, fully sovereign states of the subjugated nations within their ethnical boundaries.

* * *

The Ukrainian nation has entered the 1970s as a vanguard force in the struggle with the imperio-colonial monster — the USSR, a paradoxical product of our times. From persevering and creative work as well as heroic acts, based on traditions and examples of the glorious struggle of earlier times, the national socio-political thought grew and consolidated itself in Ukraine. Our great nation gave birth to a new generation of nationally conscious youth, its vanguard, and is taking an ever bolder stand in defense of its national truth and social justice.

The Ukrainian young people in the Native Land are at odds with the Russian occupying power; rejecting "Soviet patriotism" drummed into them by the enemy, denying deceptive internationalism, they are taking the road of uncompromising struggle for their own national idea, which rallies other peoples to the struggle as well. And this is the guarantee that the time of victory of the Ukrainian people and the Ukrainian truth is inevitably coming closer!

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VALENTYN MOROZ

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Dmytro DONZOW

U.N. OR A.B.N.?

He whose way of thinking dates from before the year 1914 does not understand the reasons of the unprecedented success of Russian aggression, and the retreat of the West which is also unprecedented. "Natural boundaries", markets, guarantees, protection against enemy aggression, as aims of international policy, the interests of a state, as the starting-point of that policy — these are categories which scarcely exist in international affairs at the present time.

It is ridiculous to assert that Russia must extend from the Pacific Ocean to the Atlantic Ocean in order to reach security and "natural frontiers." But it is also an absurdity, though many people do not understand it, *to maintain that nowadays all statesmen are guided by the interests of their countries.* Was it for example in the interest of Czechoslovakia to reject American aid in the year 1945 and to call upon the Bolsheviks? Certainly not! However, Beneš and J. Masaryk pursued just this policy.

Again, was it in the interest of the West to allow Russia to go to the Elbe? Was Morgenthau's plan — nearly realised — in the interest of the western countries: to leave Eastern Germany under Russian rule and to deprive Western Germany of its industry, to disarm and to divide it into two separate small states?

Was it in the interest of America to allow Chiang Kai-shek to weaken, and Mao Tse-tung to grow? Was the division of Korea, or the action against Syngman Ree, in its interest? Were Teheran, Yalta, Potsdam in the interest of the West? Was it in the interest of the West, at the conference at Quebec in 1943, to frustrate, for Stalin's sake, Churchill's plan of invasion of the Balkans? Or to allow Russia to gain a great ascendancy over China? It came about nevertheless, although in America there were military circles which — in their prophetic vision — as early as in 1943 pointed out that the policy "Retreat from Victory" might result in grave consequences to the West, in Europe as well as in Asia. Was it in the interest of the West to help the Bolsheviks in the Civil War in Spain, in the thirties, which in case of a victory of the "democrats" would have changed into a Russian province with Bolshevik bases in

Gibraltar and in Lisbon? It took place nevertheless! One could still ask whether it was in the interest of the West to destroy, one after another, all the strongholds against Russian expansion: Germany and Austria-Hungary in the West, and Japan in the East. It was done nevertheless.

Everything points to the fact that since 1914 the cabinets of the western countries have been strongly influenced by a secret force thinking of its own interests, that is, the interests of Russia, and not of those of their countries.

The same concealed force not only supported those interests in foreign policy, but also in the home policy of many countries of the West. Let us mention the infiltration of Russian (and Communist) influence into the western press, universities, churches, parliaments, state machinery, the most secret offices; let us mention such names as Fuchs, McLean, Burgess, Oppenheimer, Hiss, Rosenbergs, Rose, Ruth, Fischer, Greenglas, Eisler, Gold, Kohan, and others, and then we shall realise how strong must be the force which — despite the sharp eye of the state — manages to fill the command posts of the western world with its people. We shall see how fatal an influence is exerted upon the foreign policy of many a country of the West by those pro-Russian and pro-communist forces which often disguise themselves as “real democracy.” Finally, if we reflect upon the important part played by communist and fellow-travellers’ gangs in the parliaments of Western Europe, we shall realise that the western cabinets are completely anaemic and unable to resist Russian aggression. We shall understand the paradoxical fact that many a western government often pursues a policy which is inconsistent with the interests of its country. We shall realise that this secret force is a great hindrance to the western governments in their policy.

How have we reached such a pass? It happened after World War I, when along with the European monarchies the old aristocratic ruling élite was swept out of the political arena and replaced by Beneš-s, Caballeros, Weimar republicans, Bela Kuns, and in France Clemenceau — by Herriot and Blum. It was the leaders of ochlocracy who unsettled the ideological foundations of the state. God was dethroned; the native country was replaced by the conception of class, the conception of duty by an unlimited right, discipline by self-will, nation by the International, patriotism by material well-being, state by legalised anarchy. Europe became the sphere of action of demagogues or naïve people who were not fully aware of what they were doing, of shrewd managers who, having unsettled all the moral and physical foundations of the nations organised in states, aimed at a communist revolution or a “world government” of nations, a government of the despotic mafia which kept in touch with a Russia spiritually associated with it.

Once Dostoevski wrote: "Why do almost nine tenths of the Russians, during their travelling abroad, associate with those European left circles which, so to speak, reject their own culture? Is it not a characteristic feature of the Russian soul to which European culture has always been strange?" To some this culture was already strange, to others it became strange. When, thanks to Marx and La Salle, leaders of left circles in the West who rejected the entire political, cultural, and religious tradition of the West, gained the upper hand, they naturally began to flirt with Bolshevik Russia which, like tsarist Russia, hated the historic traditions of the Occident.

As a corollary of this, the West split into two camps, and civil war broke out between them: in Bavaria, in Hungary, after World War I, and then in Spain, in France in 1934 and in the forties, and in Italy. Civil war is a token of our time; it will mark the history of Europe (and not only of Europe) in the next centuries. The question is whether or not the Occident (and Ukraine with it) can breed new leaders who will begin a fight to the death against the rising tide of ochlocracy which, in union with Russia, intends to raze to the ground western Christian culture. It is certain that so long as this ochlocracy undermines the life of the West, the latter will be unable to fight successfully against Russian imperialism. To defeat Russia the West must first of all generate new forces which will bridle Russia's allies in their own homes. Quis capere potest, capiat.

It is such new forces of the West that would be allies of the A.B.N. If this Bloc finds allies also among anti-Russian circles of the Asiatic nations, these allies will be welcome.

Ukraine, whether or not we wish it, is being involved in the fight of the two camps into which the Occident is splitting. One of them is hostile towards us; it is the camp of the Bolshevik fifth column in the West, the camp of various internationalists and secret mafias sympathising with them. All of them are hostile to the traditional civilisation of the West, to its foundations in religion, nation, native country, morale, social hierarchy, law, and order.

Another camp is the camp of fighting nationalism which desires to see a national, traditional Ukrainian state, and not a satellite of one or another International which would turn our country into something like the present Ukrainian S.S.R., "Titoslavia" or North Korea.

To live, Ukraine must create an anti-Communist, anti-international, anti-"official", anti-Russian bloc. Not the U.N.O. which intends to build a "new world" with Russia and its dictators, but A.B.N. which intends to create a new free world against Russia, fighting her to the death.

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REALITY VERSUS PROPAGANDA IN THE SOVIET UNION OF THE THIRTIES

Of the many French writers and artists who became communist sympathizers in the thirties, André Gide (1869-1951) was one of the most famous and influential. Although Gide never went so far as to become a member of the communist party (he was too much of a non-conformist to give a total adherence to any doctrine.) he became an ardent defender of communism in the years 1932 to 1935 and because of his admiration for the program of communism, an unwitting propagandizer of a totalitarian government. He was an effective polemicist and spokesman for communism during these few years, since at this time he was at the height of his influence, representing particularly for the young "a vital force in aesthetic and moral philosophy."¹

Gide's service to the totalitarian government in the Soviet Union ended abruptly in 1936. At the invitation of the Soviet Union, Gide toured Russia in the summer of 1936 in the company of five of his friends, two of whom spoke Russian and had spent much time in the Soviet Union. Jef Last, a Dutch novelist and member of the Communist party was on his fourth visit and Pierre Herbart had been living in Moscow for six months.² Gide was grateful for Herbart's ability and willingness to call his attention to many things which would have gone unnoticed.³ In the same year, immediately after his return to France, Gide published his impressions in a volume entitled *Retour de l'U.R.S.S.* Despite some panegyric passages the work expresses a keen disillusionment. The contrast between what he had seen in comparison to what he had been led to expect from Soviet propaganda was too great.

1) Wallace Fowlie, *André Gide* (New York, 1965), p. 101. Fowlie notes that a group of Catholic writers *Union pour la vérité* found Gide's position so significant that they held a public meeting where the opportunity was given Gide to set forth and defend his views on communism. Prominent French writers, such as Jacques Maritain, François Mauriac, and Gabriel Marcel, were present at this meeting. In 1935 the statements of all the speakers were published by Gallimard in a work entitled *André Gide et notre temps*.

2) In addition to the above mentioned names there were Guilloux, Jacques Schiffrin, and Eugène Dabit.

3) André Gide, *Retour de l'U.R.S.S., de Retouches à mon retour de l'U.R.S.S.* (Paris, 1950), p. 178.

Since Gide was by vocation a novelist and essayist he was a very perceptive observer. He realized that the most valuable service he could perform during his visit would be to record his spontaneous impressions and personal reflections. Since his profession was not that of a political or a social scientist he stated that he would glance only indirectly at these questions. Accordingly *Retour de l'U.R.S.S.* is not a systematic study but a collection of personal observations recorded during his stay in the Soviet Union.

Gide's visit was lengthy encompassing many regions, and cities such as Moscow, Leningrad, Ordzhonikidze, Tbilisi, Batumi, Sukhumi, and Sevastopol. Gide arrived in Moscow the seventeenth of June, 1936 in time to give a speech at Gorki's funeral and he remained in the Soviet Union until the end of August of the same year arriving in Paris, September 3. He wanted to push on as far as Kiev but the unexpected death of his friend, Eugène Dabit, at Sevastopol and general fatigue on the part of the other members of his party prevented him. Although Gide followed a chronological order in narrating his reflections on the Soviet Union he did not always indicate his exact location, the side trips he took, and particularly how long he spent in each locale.

As much as possible Gide deviated from a planned itinerary and attempted to talk to as many people as possible. Since he did not speak Russian the presence of Russian speakers in his party facilitated these informal contacts. On the train from Moscow to Ordzhonikidze Gide, his six friends and their interpreter had at their disposal a special car which was in addition to their sleeping compartments. They were separated from the rest of the train by sealed doors. At the first stop, because of the Russian speaking companions, Gide was easily able to establish contact on the platform with a group of Comsomols who were in an adjoining car. They managed to open the door between the two cars in order to converse. Gide was delighted with this personal contact and pleased to discover that these young people not only recognized him from his photograph but also had read one or two of his books.⁴

Gide received a hearty welcome in the U.S.S.R. and his first impressions were enthusiastic and full of warmth for the peoples of the Soviet Union. Everywhere that he met people — in the factories, on the farms, in rest homes like the one for the Donbas miners at Sochi he felt instant bonds of sympathy. Even the crowds in Moscow and elsewhere pleased him; he likened crowd contact to a bath of humanity. By the end of his visit this same enthusiasm remained for the Russian masses but no longer applied to the Soviet system of government.

⁴) *Voyage au Congo* 1927 was his most well-known book in the U.S.S.R. because of the social content; Gide denounced the exploitation of natives by some large companies in French Equatorial Africa.

En U.R.S.S. le peuple est admirable; celui de Georgie, de Kakhétie, d'Abkhasie, d'Ukraine (je ne parle que de ce que j'ai vu), et plus encore à mon goût, celui de Leningrad et de la Crimée.⁵

After a few days in Moscow Gide had gone to Leningrad to meet several of his party who were arriving in Russia by boat. His impressions now began to be less surface and more reflective and critical. Of Leningrad he stated that it was St. Petersburg which he admired, that is the pre-revolutionary part of the city. On his return to Moscow he couldn't help but compare the two cities. Architecturally he found Moscow to be ugly and depressing, both the new and the old.

Gide however only spoke of architecture in passing; he had come to the Soviet Union to observe people. His observations became more critical and he began to ask probing questions. When the communist cure for indolence, "Stakhanovism", was explained to Gide and when he was introduced in a Moscow factory to a "Stakhanovite", who had succeeded in doing the work of eight days in five hours or vice-versa, Gide questioned if he had, initially, taken eight days to do what was expected of him in five hours. The question was left unanswered.

Crowds were everywhere in Moscow since it was summer; he noted wryly that the uniformity in dress (everyone was in white) doubtlessly reflected minds which had been programmed to think in a uniform fashion. The long lines which formed in front of many shops even before they were opened fascinated Gide. He questioned people and discovered the scarcity of consumer goods meant that one had to be first to succeed in buying many items. On entering a department store the objects on sale were of such poor quality that, although he wanted to purchase a few souvenirs for his friends, Gide found nothing. (He wondered what had become of the marvelous popular art of the various Soviet States when he saw the displays of unimaginative printed cloth.) People were willing to stand in line for hours and put up with poor quality of foodstuffs and clothing since they had no standards of comparison.

In Moscow as well as in Leningrad Gide was shown the park of culture (which he compared to a giant Lune-Park) as well as numerous factories. The large crowds composed almost entirely of the working class, were well-behaved and good spirited, the amusements were entertaining and educational. Gide was impressed to the point that his critical faculties seemed momentarily in suspense. While visiting an outdoor class he noticed that there was not the least attempt at mockery; a comparable situation in France would have aroused some unruliness and ridicule.⁶ He admired the proper

⁵ Gide, *Retour de l'U.R.S.S.*, p. 25.

⁶ In a footnote to this section Gide quoted the remarks of one of his friends who on hearing him describe a park of culture said that the submissive children whom Gide observed in the parks of culture would all become credulous youths and conformists.

demeanor of all of the visitors, their patience in waiting their turn to participate in the games, and the absence of rowdiness or dissoluteness. If Gide seemed overly impressed the reason was that the parks of culture were one of the first things Gide had visited in the U.S.S.R.; he was being given the "grand tour" and he had no time for more than surface impressions. Later, after the publication of *Retour de l'U.R.S.S.* Gide wrote *Retouches à mon retour de l'U.R.S.S.* in which he attempted to elucidate and support with statistics criticisms he had already made as well as qualifying and rescinding favourable comments. He asked himself how the appearance of happiness on the part of the crowds observed in various places, particularly in the parks of culture, could be reconciled with the miserable lot of the working classes. He found a partial explanation in the great capacity for joy and life on the part of the Russian people which had nothing to do with the existing form of government. Then, of course, the fear of denunciation played a role in preventing an obvious display of misery. Gide realized if he and his party had been permitted to leave the touristic routes they would have seen misery. "Ils parlent des régions où la détresse saute aux yeux."⁷

Gide observed after visiting a model kolkhoz that at least the masses were no longer being exploited for the good of a few people.

*Du moins ceci reste acquis: Il n'y a plus, en U.R.S.S. l'exploitation du grand nombre pour le profit de quelques-uns. C'est énorme.*⁸

His enthusiasm was dampened by the realization that many kolkhoz were poor (there was no mutual assistance) as well as by the absolute uniformity of the dwellings. There was the same picture of Stalin and the same dreary furniture in each one. In *Retouches à mon retour de l'U.R.S.S.* Gide even recanted his statement that the masses were no longer being exploited. The worker was worse off now than ever since he did not even know by whom he was exploited nor could he openly complain. He said, "C'est la dictature de la bureaucratie sur le prolétariat."⁹ Gide wanted to make clear to the French working class the true condition of the worker in the Soviet Union in contrast to the picture painted for them by communist propaganda.

Communication with the outside world was very limited. Thus Gide heard expressed some incredibly naïve opinions concerning the world beyond the frontiers of the U.S.S.R. One little girl stated that the Soviet Union had nothing further to learn from Germany and the United States so that the study of their languages was of questionable value. Some educated workmen greeted with scepticism Gide's statement that Paris had streetcars as well as a subway; they even questioned whether or not there were schools in France. At a camp for exceptional young girls in Artek the same naïvete

⁷ Gide, *Retouches à mon Retour de l'U.R.S.S.*, p. 169.

⁸ Gide, *Retour de l'U.R.S.S.*, p. 25.

⁹ Gide, *Retouches à mon Retour de l'U.R.S.S.*, p. 164.

was exhibited. A girl who guided Gide through the camp was continually pointing out the work that had recently been completed within a very short span of time. She was especially proud of a large retaining wall that had been completed in ten days time not noticing the fissures which were already appearing.

Gide was treated very well during his stay in the Soviet Union; he received the finest travel accommodations available, stayed in the most modern hotels, and banquets in his honour were given everywhere. He was enthusiastic about the fine hotels in which he stayed particularly at Sochi. At Sinop he was equally enthusiastic and the numerous rest-houses and sanatoriums impressed Gide since they had been erected for workers. He found, however, a curious anomaly in the miserable living conditions of the people who were constructing these buildings; they were poorly paid and miserably housed. Next to a model state farm in the same area there were four people crowded in a room eight feet by six feet who subsisted on a diet of bread supplemented with dried fish. The numerous toasts, the huge amount of food consumed at the many banquets sickened Gide, particularly when people were subsisting on such meagre fare. He stated later speaking of the banquets: "Ils ne sont pas seulement absurdes, mais immoraux — anti-sociaux."¹⁰ All the fine treatment and special accommodations reminded Gide of privileges and class differences.

*Mais ces faveurs mêmes rappelaient sans cesse des privilèges, des différences, où je pensais trouver l'égalité.*¹¹

He found a social strata to be reappearing based on conformity to the system and membership in the party.

Andre Gide was appalled at the thought control found in every aspect of life in the Soviet Union. When Jef Last proposed a toast at a banquet to the Red Front in Spain there was a certain amount of embarrassment since no official word had been spoken. Several days later at Sevastopol a wave of enthusiasm broke out, beginning with official pronouncements from Red Square, for the Loyalist forces in Spain. Thought control applied particularly to culture and education so that one studied the status quo and found reasons to be satisfied. An unnamed Russian artist, a very cultured man, explained in public to Gide that art needed to be popular (that is, a vehicle of Soviet propaganda) in order to be worthwhile. When Gide protested that the creative mind must be free to oppose, the unnamed artist shouted him down. Later the same man made a point to tell Gide in private that he (Gide) was absolutely right; people had been listening though and the artist had an exhibition opening soon. An example of art that is subservient to communist ideology was seen by Gide at Tbilisi.

¹⁰) Gide, *Retouches à mon Retour de l'U.R.S.S.*, p. 164.

¹¹) Gide, *Retouches à mon Retour de l'U.R.S.S.*, p. 163.

The artists had succeeded in their avowed goal of edification without creating anything of value. Accordingly Gide said very little about the exhibit stating that it would be more charitable to say nothing.

In Gide's opinion thought at that time was more rigidly controlled in the Soviet Union than anywhere else in the world even in Nazi Germany. Before going to the U.S.S.R. Gide had thought that self-criticism would prevent revolutionary reform from becoming stale. He found that so-called self-criticism consisted in petty comments like "the club room has not been properly swept" or in determining if someone were following the right line. However, the party line itself could not be criticized.

*Et je doute qu'en aucun autre pays aujourd'hui, fut-ce dans l'Allemagne de Hitler, l'esprit soit moins libre, plus courbé, plus craintif (terroisé), plus vassalisé!*¹²

Little things became significant for Gide in the context of freedom. He remarked that particularly in Georgia not even the humblest room was without a picture of Stalin. He wondered whether the ubiquitous presence of Stalin was due to love or fear. Then on the occasion of a brief stop in Gori, Stalin's birthplace, Gide thought that it would be fitting to send Stalin a telegram expressing sincerest thanks for the hearty welcome he had received everywhere. His translator and some important government officials who were present insisted that he add to the word "you" some phrase like "chef de travailleurs" or "maitre des peuples."¹³ Gide protested to no avail; he finally gave up and disclaimed all responsibility for the telegram. All of Gide's speeches given in the Soviet Union had been altered in translation with epithets being added or eliminated in accordance with Soviet propaganda.

After reflecting on Stalin's leadership Gide was forced to admit that he was a dictator since he had successfully imposed his will on all with the result that the people of the U.S.S.R were more oppressed than ever. According to Gide all of Stalin's then current decisions were motivated by two fears: fear of Germany and fear of Trotskyism. Gide believed these two forces were used to justify the suppression of all opposition thus insuring conformity.¹⁴

One experiment conducted by the Soviet Union which seemed eminently successful was that of Bolshevo. All of its inhabitants were former criminals, thieves, and murderers, and all seemed to have become excellent citizens with no direction from outside the community. Later, after the publication of *Retour de l'U.R.S.S.* Gide discovered that the people in Bolshevo were chosen to live there not

¹²) Gide, *Reour de l'U.R.S.S.*, p. 61.

¹³) Gide, *Retour de l'U.R.S.S.*, p. 65.

¹⁴) Gide, *Retour de l'U.R.S.S.*, p. 67.

only because they had repented but also because they had betrayed their accomplices. Gide observed that generally the people who received favours in the Soviet Union were the ones who had learned to conform.

In *Retouches à mon Retour de l'U.R.S.S.* Gide was more explicit about success within the Soviet system. He decried the fact that one had to become a party member, thus giving up the right to think, in order to advance in society. Another excellent means of advancement was informing on others; not to denounce unorthodox statements by others was to risk deportation. The only person a man could confide in was his wife, that is, if he got along well with her. When the party wished, for political reasons, to purge someone a friend was asked to denounce the person, not an enemy as would have been the case in France.

In *Retour de l'U.R.S.S.* Gide suppressed some material which would have been harmful to the image the Soviet Union wished to project for the rest of the world since as he stated in his introduction he was going to criticize the Soviet Union in the hope that all the promises that had been made would be fulfilled. By the time he had written *Retouches à mon Retour de l'U.R.S.S.* he had lost his political naïveté and all his hopes had been shattered. He mentioned Boukharine, a Soviet politician and theoretician whom he had seen at Gorki's funeral. Boukharine, a very popular figure at time, had spoken briefly to Gide stating that he would like to talk to him. Gide never saw him again. Then on the train he told how he had met a young Russian, a competent worker, who had been denounced and had become suspect. He had been forced to leave the factory where he was working and since that day had wandered from one job to the next. This had been going on for a year with the result that he and his family were impoverished. From desperation the worker was going to Moscow in an effort to clear his name.

Gide gave numerous talks in the Soviet Union, the principal one being delivered in Red Square on the occasion of Maxim Gorki's funeral. In this speech Gide stated that the future of culture was bound up with the Soviet Union since the so-called liberation of the masses had put culture in the reach of all of the citizens of the U.S.S.R. Culture, Gide stated, was not threatened by revolutionary and liberating forces but rather by fascism and narrow nationalism. Gide cautioned the reader that this talk and the others dated from the beginning of his visit, when he was still naïve enough to believe that one could speak seriously of culture and a free interchange of ideas in the U.S.S.R.¹⁵

¹⁵) See Yvonne Davet, *Littérature engagée*. (Paris, 1950) for a selection of speeches, letters, essays, etc. written between 1930-38 which chronicle Gide's thoughts and feelings toward communism and the Soviet Union.

Gide's last stop in the Soviet Union was at Sevastopol. Sevastopol captivated him, since there as in some of the other towns on the Black Sea (Sochi and Sukhumi) society was less rigidly controlled. However, precisely here one could see one of the negative effects of less control which Gide deplored. There were present in the city large number of besprizornis (abandoned children) who managed to live without any fixed domicile or source of food. Needless to say these children represented a social ill which the Soviet Union had neglected.

At Chérsonèse in the suburbs of Sevastopol Gide saw an archeological museum housed in a church. Under the picture of Christ there was a sign stating that he was a legendary figure who had never existed. Gide had earlier visited an anti-religious museum in the Leningrad cathedral of St. Isaacs where an attempt had been made to refute religious teaching with science exhibits. Gide felt that the campaign against religion attempted to create ignorance about Christ and the Gospels to the detriment of humanity and culture. (A skilful campaign while discrediting the church and rejecting the divinity of Christ would recognize Christianity as part of the heritage of the Soviet Union.) To describe what had happened in the campaign against religion in the Soviet Union, Gide repeated a German proverb which states that the baby had been emptied with the dirty bath water.

Two incidents which occurred after Gide's return to France reflect the immense deception the trip had caused him. On Gide's return to Paris in September he had dinner with one of his friends, Schiffrin, who had accompanied him on his visit. Schiffrin spoke of the disappointment the trip had brought him. After dinner Gide and Schiffrin tried to listen to some of the recordings which had been given them by the Soviet Union but the only one that Gide really wanted to hear, that of a Caucasian women's choir was somehow missing. Undoubtedly since the work lacked any propaganda value and thus any real content or value in the eyes of the U.S.S.R. it had been removed from the package of records given to him. Later in September at the burial in Paris of the remains of Eugène Dabit, the poet Lois Aragon, a longtime member of the communist party and active yet today, stated in his eulogy that Dabit was generally satisfied with what he had seen in the U.S.S.R. Gide's reply was, "Hélas!"¹⁶

¹⁶) André Gide, *Journal 1889-1939* (Paris, 1951), pp. 1252, 1256.

S. WELYCHENKO

CARPATHIAN UKRAINE IN EASTERN EUROPEAN POLITICS 1938-1939

"The Munich agreement gave Hitler the command of Eastern Europe;... It opened the way for him to move eastwards or westwards, either against the Ukraine and the Soviet Union, or against France and Britain."¹ Hitler chose the latter alternative, although had he wanted to do so he could have continued his successful drive eastwards.

Carpathian Ukraine played an important part in Hitler's diplomatic manoeuvring, and in this paper I will deal with the brief appearance on the international scene of Carpathian Ukraine.

The essay is divided into three parts. The first describes the immediate events of March 1939 and gives a brief history of the area; the second part deals with the policies of the various actors; and the third part shows how this small nation was used as a diplomatic tool.

Two themes underly my presentation:

- I) The strategical importance of Ukraine in European politics.
- II) The use of nationalist-political movements in Eastern Europe as weapons against established regimes.

I

On March 17, 1939, the *New York Times* wrote the following: "Of all the incredible episodes in the break-up of Czechoslovakia, what has happened during the last three days in the Carpathian — Ukraine is the most fantastic... On Tuesday this smallest sector of the tripartite Czechoslovak state was fighting the Czechs. On Tuesday night it proclaimed itself an independent state... and Ukrainian colors were flying from every window... By Wednesday afternoon the Hungarian tricolor had displaced the Ukrainian blue and yellow... as a Hungarian army advanced towards the capital.

Ten days later, *Time* reported: "Long have Poland and Hungary wanted a common border for protection against Germany. Last fall when Czechoslovakia was amputated they almost got it. Last week when Hitler wiped Czechoslovakia off the map they did get it." The Hungarians were reported to have attacked as soon as they learned "that the lid was off", and the Czechs were reported fleeing to Roumania." But the Ukrainian Nationalist guards... put up a stiff resistance... It took Hungary a full four days to occupy the territory, in contrast to a mere eight or ten hours it took the Germans to seize Czech territory..."

"Carpatho-Ukraine since Munich was the centre of Hitler's Ukrainian autonomy movement. Perhaps last week the Führer figured that since he was soon going to have all he wanted of eastern Europe anyway he might just as well let the Hungarians take Carpatho-Ukraine for him."

Although a small event in relation to the events of the period, the Carpathian-Ukrainian problem was significant in two respects: first, the area was of strategic importance to any political configurations in eastern Europe; second, the Carpathian-Ukrainian-Hungarian battles can be seen as the first battles of the second world war. The Czechs surrendered to Hitler without firing a shot. The legal Ukrainian government rejected all compromises with the occupying forces and went into exile.

The territory of Carpathian-Ukraine was known by various names: Ruthenia, Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia, Carpatho-Ukraine. For centuries the area was under Hungarian political rule. Although seeing themselves as culturally and spiritually different from the Magyars, it was not until 1849 that the first petition was made to the Austrian Emperor for territorial and cultural autonomy within Hungary. This was denied, and as a reaction to growing Hungarian nationalism the intelligentsia turned to Russophilism.

In 1900 however there finally arose a Ukrainian populist movement to counterbalance this growing Russophil trend. Although occurring later here than in other parts of Ukraine, it was capable — in 1918 when the Austro-Hungarian empire collapsed — of formulating a definite set of political objectives.

In 1919 the National Assembly voted in favour of union with the Ukrainian National Republic. By May however the U.N.R. was in serious trouble and the Carpathian Ukrainians (Ruthenes) passed a resolution favouring union with Czechoslovakia. The Paris Peace conference agreed with this action and Carpathian Ukraine became autonomous region of Czechoslovakia. "Beneš requested Ruthenia on the grounds of national self-determination... Ruthenian independence was out of the question because of numerical weakness... The Supreme Council feared particularly a union with Russia, (i. e. Ukraine) that would not only add to the area controlled by Bolsheviks, but which would expose the small states of Central Europe to a serious strategic danger, if Russia ever obtained a foothold to the west of the Carpathians. Most of the Ruthenian leaders did not desire a union with alien Roumania, and, above all, *sought to escape from Hungary*. [My underlining] ... On the other hand to Czechoslovakia, Ruthenia would be a welcome economic asset and would establish immediate territorial contact with friendly Roumania."³

The Czechs administered the area more justly, and as a result met with extremely favourable world opinion. "The Czechs, during the last

twenty years have administered Ruthenia in such an admirable way what time (sic) they have lifted the Ruthenes out of the primeval condition in which Hungary left them for a thousand years..."⁴

Beginning in the 1930's, however, a sharp increase in Ukrainian national consciousness among the population reflected itself in the elections to the Prague Parliament, by causing more votes for more Ukrainian candidates. This resulted in May 1938 in demands for self-government — a condition established at Versailles in 1919, to be granted when cultural — economic factors warranted it. The Munich agreement forced the Czechs to act, and on Nov. 22 the Prague Parliament reconstituted Czechoslovakia as a federal republic; Carpathian Ukraine emerged as one of the constituent parts under the premiership of A. Voloshyn. During the same period Polish and Hungarian agitation for a common frontier forced Carpathian Ukraine to begin organizing military forces for its own defence. Events now began to move quickly.

The Carpathian-Ukrainian government asked for Czech arms in order to fully equip its military forces, (*Karpat'ska Sich* — Carpathian Sich) Czech refusal resulted in fighting in the capital, Khust, on the night of the March 13th, 1939. On March 14 independence was proclaimed by the Carpathian Ukrainian Parliament and the first laws were passed. On March 15, Hungary sent an ultimatum to Carpatho-Ukraine demanding: 1) stopping of anti-Hungarian propaganda. 2) the freeing of Hungarian political prisoners. 3) arming of Hungarians. When the third point was refused, Hungary invaded — the first two points were conceded although these conditions did not exist. The invading army reached the Polish border on March 20. Guerilla warfare was waged in the north-east however until May when the whole country was finally occupied.

With this brief historical outline in mind, let us now proceed to analyze events.

II

There were three contenders for this area; Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Germany. Poland though not a direct participant, had definite interests in not allowing 'autonomy' for this area. Russia — ever fearful of Ukrainian Nationalism, because of the importance of Ukraine to her empire — also had it in her interest not to allow the existence of a Ukrainian state.⁵

Czechoslovakia was the link between France and the countries of the Little-Entente. Carpathian Ukraine provided the only link that Czechoslovakia had with the Little-Entente — and this was why the Czechs deemed Carpatho-Ukraine important.

A contemporary observer (1937) described the situation: "Czechoslovakia is the only attempt in Europe today to give really enlightened and liberal government to a poor, illiterate, long neglected

minority... if Ruthenia situated as it is had been reduced to fresh misery by repression and neglect, it would have become the likely starting point of a European war."⁶ — if one keeps in mind the fact that Germany appeared to back the Ukrainian nationalist movement; this final assumption was most probable.

Hungarian policy during this period was guided by two premises. The first was the maintenance of the established social order domestically. The second was the revision of the Treaty of Trianon abroad, deemed unjust by Hungary.

Carpathian Ukraine was one of the areas which fell under Hungary's irrendentist claims. In agitating for her claims Hungary claimed that Carpathian Ukraine was necessary to her for security. Hungary wanted a common frontier with Poland as a check against Germany (she hoped for Italian support in this claim). Later, with Germany becoming more powerful, Hungary turned around, saying that an extension of a common frontier against the U.S.S.R. was necessary.

Both these claims made no sense in the existing power structure. They served only as a cover for Hungary's policy of imperialism for reasons of prestige, — as defined by Hans Morgenthau (*Politics Among Nations*, Chapter 5).

The first position was a real, but untenable one. "Hungary, Roumania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia... [a]fter the annexation of Austria... had to recognise that they were in the German sphere of influence and must shape their policy accordingly. They could pursue tactics of procrastination and evasion and still attempt to play off Rome against Berlin, but this was the limit of their independence."⁷

The second, that of a common frontier using Carpathian mountains as a bloc against Russia is clearly an excuse. German archives refer to Russia only passingly during this period. Germany feared Polish exploitation of a common frontier much more than any Hungarian ideas along these lines over which they had control. Indeed, at this point Carpathian Ukraine fitted into Hitler's anti-Bolshevik plans better than any Hungarian offers in this direction. "The creation of a compact bloc of succession states on Germany's eastern frontier with lines of communication to South-East Europe will not be to our interest. Accordingly, a statement to that effect was addressed to the Führer by the supreme command of the Wehrmacht... saying that for military reasons a common Hungarian-Polish frontier was undesirable.

It is assumed that in the future the Czech and Slovak rump states will of necessity depend to a considerable extent on Germany. The conditions for this are now present... Moreover a strong tendency is certainly developing toward dissolving the relationship of the Czechs to the U.S.S.R. at the earliest possible moment."⁸

Although Hungary had claimed that the Trianon Treaty was unjust since its signing, active agitation for revision began only in 1934. Her first claims were against the Czechs.

From 1919 to 1934 the Little Entente feared Hungarian revisionism more than Germany. Hungary was isolated and therefore was in no position to press her claims. In 1934 three factors emboldened Hungary:

- 1) The weakening position of France.
- 2) Successful examples abroad, of Fascist and National Socialist movements.
- 3) Increasing social pressure for domestic reform. Hungary now openly pursued her revisionism. "Thus on Oct. 18, 1934 Gombös [the foreign minister] went to Poland. The not altogether concealed purpose of his trip was to discuss the question of joint action against Czechoslovakia."⁹

Initially Hungary looked to Mussolini for support.¹⁰ But when Germany again became a factor in Central Europe (since 1935), Mussolini conceded German dominance in this area, and at the same time Hungary saw in Germany a stronger ally. A trade agreement was signed between the two countries, which resulted in Hungary's complete economic dependence on Germany.

Sure of strong support now, Hungary voiced its claims in 1938:

"... Budapest would regard voluntary union of Slovakia, including Carpathian Ukraine, with Hungary, as the most practical solution of the Slovak question. In his [the foreign minister's] personal view Slovakia could be given territorial autonomy. Carpathian Ukraine... in view of the large Hungarian element of the population could only be granted national autonomy. This would also be in accordance with Poland's wishes as Warsaw fears a strengthening of Ukrainian Nationalism as a result of territorial autonomy."¹¹ Naturally, Hitler did not agree to this, but he did allow some concessions. The resulting 'Vienna Award' of November 2 was the first victory of Hungarian revisionism. Hungary received parts of Slovakia and Carpathian Ukraine. Even so, Hungary persistently demanded all of Carpathian Ukraine, and even threatened to invade (November 1938).

But Germany had to stop Hungary for two reasons: 1) Hungarian occupation would discredit the axis, whose Vienna Award Hungary had just accepted. 2) The outcome of possible Czech-Hungarian conflicts could not be foreseen, and Germany would probably be forced to intervene¹² — Hitler, acclaimed by all Germany as a peace-maker, could not afford to intervene.

Poland backed Hungarian claims for two reasons; her fear of the Ukrainian nationalist movement, and her desire for a common frontier (a necessary part to her own foreign policy).

As a result Poland based her diplomacy with Germany, in this area, on the following: "Carpathian Ruthenia was invented during the Peace Conference to supply Russia with a bridge into Europe . . . The language, religion and political concepts of these various Ruthenians of ours have very little in common with the real Ukraine; (i. e. Soviet controlled Ukraine) . . ." ¹³

Although receiving assurances that Germany was not agitating in this area, the Poles began talks with France, and Russia — just in case. ¹⁴

Polish foreign policy since Pilsudski's death involved the construction of a "region of security." Designed as a safeguard to Polish security — from Germany and Russia — this region was to consist of a neutral zone running from the Baltic to the Black Sea. Carpathian Ukraine, when looked at from the perspective, occupied an important position. And therefore, as far as Poland was concerned, it must be controlled by some power in the "region."

Poland was also against an autonomous Ukrainian state because of the reaction of seven million Ukrainians living under her. Poland, involved in an international crisis could not afford internal instability. She therefore intensified the existing repression, and the process of Polonization. ¹⁵ Once Carpathian Ukraine was removed as a centre of nationalist hopes, Poland could be confident of a much more peaceful internal situation.

I will now turn to Germany, by far the most important actor in the life of this small Ukrainian state.

German policy in this area was based on the following premises:

- 1) the establishment of a possible base for a future Ukrainian state, to be used in the break-up of Russia, and in the coercing of Poland.
- 2) the prevention of the formation of a Polish-led anti-German bloc.
- 3) military reasons, the opening of a route for expansion into the Balkans and Eastern Europe.

In October 1938 official guidelines were established and approved by Hitler. These included:

- a) The existence of a Carpathian Ukrainian state was not possible without support.
- b) It could provide a nucleus for a Ukrainian state which would be created in the future.
- c) A Hungarian-Polish frontier would facilitate the formation of an anti-German bloc.
- d) Best course open at the time was therefore leaving Ruthenia autonomous in Czechoslovakia and thus allow for future

possibilities.¹⁵ By December of that year it was generally accepted that Hitler was planning a Ukrainian state. The extent of German activity was reported in a Prague paper: "The Ukrainian problem has to be solved now. Does Europe understand this... leaders of the Ukrainian movement... are convinced that within two years... a great Ukraine will be realized. So far as we can judge these men are realists devoid of illusions... These are the verdicts of the people who prophesied the annexation of Austria and the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia."¹⁷

When the Germans occupied Bohemia and Moravia in March 1939, they permitted Hungary to occupy the Carpathian Ukraine. The Ukrainian government was informed of this decision and advised to submit to Hungarian rule. Forced with two alternatives, submission or resistance; the nationalists decided to risk resistance and sent to Berlin, on March 14th, their declaration of independence.¹⁸ On the fifteenth they requested the status of a German protectorate. They received this telegram: "As matters stand the German government regrets that it is not in a position to assume the protectorate."¹⁹

Why the sudden shift in policy? Carpathian Ukraine had become the Piedmont of all Ukrainians in the world. The reason lay in the sphere of Hitler's overall strategic planning. But before I examine this question I will turn to the activities of the Ukrainian nationalist movement which, if used as envisaged by Hitler's aids, would have been a major factor in drastically changing the course of events in 1939 and 1940.

The strongest and most influential Ukrainian political group between the years 1930-1950, both inside and outside Ukraine, was the "Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists" (O.U.N.) Established in Galicia, and based on a military organization formed after the failure of the attempt at Ukrainian independence, (1921), the O.U.N. evolved into a potent political force. An ideological-revolutionary organization, it became a highly conspiratorial, tightly disciplined movement whose aim was the establishment of a sovereign national state. For conspiratorial and operational reasons the organization was divided into two parts:

I. The P.U.N. (provid Ukraïns'kykh nationalistiv). This was the head of the *entire* organization and was located outside the Ukraine. P.U.N. maintained contacts with foreign governments and Ukrainian emigrés.²⁰ II. The K. E. (krayova ekzekutyva). This was the executive of the organization *in Ukraine*.

Nationalist sentiment, strongest in Western Ukraine, was stimulated by Polish repression. And as a result O.U.N. had widespread popular support.

It should be noted here that O.U.N. regarded Carpathian Ukraine as one of its administrative areas *within Ukraine*. But because the

Czech government was sympathetic towards the Ukrainians — indeed, Prague was one of the largest Ukrainian emigré centres — the O.U.N. did not engage in propaganda or subversion in Carpathian Ukraine.

The movement's first contacts in Germany were made in 1921 with Rosenberg — the future Nazi minister for eastern affairs. Initially, the German government supported the exiled Hetman Skoropadsky — for obvious reasons. But when the Nazis came to power they regarded the Hetman group as too senile, and their initial contacts with the more radical O.U.N. now became closer. Although the various ministries and the army soon had elaborate plans involving the use of O.U.N. in their intrigues against Poland and Russia, Hitler was sceptical.²¹

O.U.N.'s ideology did not exclude foreign assistance in the struggle for Ukrainian independence, but this reliance on outside help was to be kept minimal. O.U.N. desired to avoid future conflicts with 'interventionists' as occurred in Ukraine during the first World War.

Force of circumstance, however, had by 1939 caused O.U.N. to be almost totally dependent on Germany.²² Armstrong in his book *Ukrainian Nationalism*, states the situation as follows: "All considerations of power politics led the O.U.N. to seek German aid since Germany was the only power which had either the will or the means to attack its archenemies — Poland and the Soviet Union. The great problem, . . . was that of dealing with the Germans without becoming their helpless puppet, since the disparity of strength between the parties was obviously enormous."²³

When Germany allowed Hungary to invade Carpathian Ukraine however, O.U.N. found itself in exactly this position, and unable to use its "potential." The K. E. had the men, the desire and the geographical — proximity to be able to take direct action,²⁴ and the P.U.N. possessed the military expertise and the financial means necessary.²⁵ But even so, all O.U.N. could do was watch and help wherever and however it could.

I feel, that there were two factors which forced the O.U.N. into this position:

- 1) a lack of arms and munitions;
- 2) the influence of the central government of Czechoslovakia.

The first factor is definitely the more influential one. Dr. Rosocha, Dr. Malaschuk, and Mr. Seleshko, all vehemently pointed out that the only reason that a successful resistance could not be made, was because of a lack of material. Had arms and supplies been available the Carpathian Sich could have held out for at least three weeks. Although futile in itself the repercussions of a prolonged struggle in this area on world politics would have been resounding.

The second factor comes into play at two points; before March 1939, and during the events of March 13th. First, the central Czech government would obviously not allow the military staff of P.U.N. to come to Carpathian Ukraine and conduct a mobilization for defence. Second, the central government forbade Czech General Svatik — commander of the Czech army in Carpathian Ukraine — to fulfill an agreement he made with Premier Voloshyn to defend Carpathian Ukraine's borders.²⁶

III

I will now turn to the final question. The question of why Hitler changed his policy regarding Carpathian Ukraine seemingly overnight.

Carpathian Ukraine was used in order to facilitate the break-up of Czechoslovakia,²⁷ thus ultimately giving 'Germany dominance in Central Europe; and it was to be used as a threat against Poland and Russia.' "The German game in backwater of Eastern Europe roused sharp interest... especially in Moscow and Warsaw. Poland and Russia took the threat sufficiently seriously to discover a common interest, despite their inveterate hostility: political and trade talks were initiated and the pact of non-aggression between the two countries reaffirmed."²⁸

During the period from Munich to April 3, 1939, the weight of Hitler's diplomatic offensive fell on Poland. Carpathian Ukraine was used as a 'bogey-man' towards Poland. By threatening Poland with the spectre of Ukrainian nationalism he wanted to cajole it into accepting his Danzig proposals, and to become his partner for the move against Russia. Should Poland accept, Hitler would concede to Polish demands with regards to Carpathian Ukraine.

Poland, however, since Pilsudski's death was no longer desirous of expansion eastwards; and because she thought a German-Russian agreement impossible, Poland felt that security lay in a 'balancing' position between the two powers.²⁹

Unable to coerce Poland by threats, he now attempted to apprise her by forsaking the Ukrainians; and more directly, completely isolated her by occupying Czechoslovakia. He had "given" Poland a common frontier with Hungary, and at the same time saw to it that the conditions under which he had "given" it were such that they in no way could be used against him.³⁰

Hitler now waited. But England, suddenly awaking to the situation robbed him of his prize by signing an alliance with Poland. On April 3 Hitler decided for war. It would begin on September 1st.

As far as Russia was concerned, Carpathian Ukraine was of benefit as a tool only indirectly. By dropping the nationalist movement here the door was open for future Nazi-Soviet agreement. Stalin in his Party speech of March 10, 1939,³¹ showed that Russia now regarded

Germany as the future ally, rather than the West. Whereas previously Stalin was apprehensive of German-Ukrainian intrigues, he now saw them as nothing but plans for use against Poland. By letting Hungary conquer Carpathian Ukraine, Hitler reaffirmed Stalin's supposition.

When in March Hitler forsook the Ukrainian nationalists, his original doubts concerning Ukrainians covered his eyes to any other uses for them. Carpathian Ukraine had served its purpose against Czechoslovakia but had failed as a tool against Poland. By dropping it, he could approach the waiting Russians gracefully.

But what if, as I previously mentioned, Carpathian Ukraine had been able to hold out longer than for a few days?

The most probable immediate effect would have been an uprising led by O.U.N. in the Western Ukraine.³² Given the fact that Hitler had already forsaken the nationalists, the uprising would simply have hastened agreement between the Nazis and the Soviets, and given Hitler an excuse to occupy Poland, with Russia taking the Ukrainian areas. The results of such an action would not have changed the course of events drastically.

However if the various Nazi ministers — especially Rosenberg and Canaris — had been able to persuade Hitler, in face of the Ukrainian resistance, to put into effect their existing plans for O.U.N. by supporting them materially; a Ukrainian state backed by Germany would have arisen comprising Carpathian Ukraine, Galicia, Volhynia and Kholm.³³ Poland, pressed on three sides, would have found it expedient to widen her previous agreement with Russia rather than with far away England.³⁴ Stalin, faced with a German backed Ukrainian state on the one hand, and a Western world seemingly eager to sacrifice Russia to Germany on the other hand would have found himself in an uncomfortable position — to say the least.

From this point, speculation will lead almost anywhere. But what cannot be denied is the decisive effect such a situation would have had on future European, possibly world events.

The events which I have recounted remain seemingly trivial when looked at from perspective of European or world power politics.

Power politics however has need of pawns and if nothing else, the Carpathian Ukraine remains as an excellent example of how small and innocent states, wanting only to be left alone, are picked up, ruthlessly used, and then discarded like a piece of garbage.

From the perspective of Ukrainian politics however, the Carpathian Ukraine was simply a continuation of the long struggle for national self-determination.

Footnotes

1) *The New Cambridge Modern History*, XII, p. 725.

2) *Time*, March 27, 1939, p. 20.

3) F. J. Vondracek, *The Foreign Policy of Czechoslovakia*, p. 20.

4) H. Baerlein, "Ruthenia to-day and to-morrow", *Fortnightly*, 145: Feb. 1939, p. 172.

5) Stercho P. *Karpatho-Ukrains'ka Derzava*, pp. 200-203.

6) J. Griffin, "Podkarpatska Rus", *Fortnightly*, 142: November 1937 p. 572.

7) A. Bullock, *Hitler*, p. 422.

8) *Documents on German Foreign Policy*, p. 40 (October 5, 1938).

9) M. Szinai, L. Szechs, *Admiral Horthy's Papers*, p. 71.

10) R. Allrecht-Carrie, *A Diplomatic History of Europe*, pp. 434, 505.

11) *Documents on German Foreign Policy*, p. 32. Besides these claims on Czechoslovakia, Hungary also claimed areas which belonged at this period to Yugoslavia, Rumania, and Austria.

12) *Ibid*, p. 156.

13) J. Lipski, *Diplomat in Berlin*, p. 446.

14) *The New York Times*, January 10, 1939, p. 10. It is interesting to note that the Nazis feigned ignorance regarding the Ukrainians when talking with the Poles. (see J. Lipski pp. 250, 258, 479).

15) V. Kubijovyč (ed.) *Ukraine: a Concise Encyclopedia*, P. 848b.

16) *Documents on German Foreign Policy*, p. 49.

17) *The New York Times*, December 10 1938, p. 7.

18) *Documents on German Foreign Policy*, p. 251.

19) *Ibid*, p. 276

20) J. Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, chapters 1, 2, 3,

21) A. Dallin, *German Rule in Russia*, p. 114,

G. Reutlinger, *House Built on Sand*, p. 162.

22) B. Martynec *Ukrains'ke Pidpillia*, p. 276. The situation in 1938 in Carpathian Ukraine, and the steady growth of Nazi-Power, favoured a pro-German attitude. "The Ukrainians were aware of this ever growing leaning on Germany, and members of P.U.N. saw it was necessary, if not to break completely this growing dependency, to balance it.

But the apathy, and negative attitude of the world towards the Ukrainian situation, forced this predicament upon the Ukrainians, [i. e. O.U.N.] and also imposed upon the Germans a monopoly in the Ukrainian situation [i. e. the national movement].

23) J. Armstrong, *op. cit.*, p. 42.

24) (a) Interview 1. Dr. R. Malashchuk. (member of the K. E. in 1939) O.U.N. in the Western Ukraine was capable of giving very strong support in terms of manpower.

(b) P. Mirchuk *Narys Istorii O.U.N.*, p. 554. The K. E. had been making extensive preparations, and stood ready to send five thousand men. Withdrawal of German support served to neutralise any effect these plans might have had and P.U.N. could not allow them to be realized. Given the new political situation and implementation they would result in useless bloodshed in Western Ukraine. O.U.N. therefore tried to do what it could under unfavourable circumstances.

25) (a) Interview 3: Dr. S. Rosocha (Vice-president of the Carpathian-Ukrainian Parliament. Liason officer between the Carpathian Sich and the government). P.U.N. contained within it a military staff composed of the Ukrainian armies (1917-1921) and Ukrainian officers who obtained their military training in foreign armies. It was composed only of higher ranks, and if sent en masse, would have provided an invaluable source of leadership and organizational ability.

Before March the Czechs would obviously not have allowed this body to carry out its functions, and after March the staff could not have had enough time to do anything even if it had been sent.

(b) Interview 2: M. Seleshko (member of P.U.N. — press and financial branch — in 1939).

Sums of money had been forwarded to P.U.N. by Ukrainian emigrés specifically for the purpose of helping the Carpathian Ukraine state. Although in the tens of thousands, the factors of time and distance, plus the fact that Roumania

was the only possible supplier of necessary supplies, limited the use that could be made of these considerable funds.

²⁶) Interview with Dr. Rosocha.

²⁷) J. N. Wheeler-Bennet, *Munich*, p. 335.

²⁸) A. Bullock, *op. cit.*, p. 423.

²⁹) R. Debicki, *The Foreign Policy of Poland*, P. 131.

³⁰) Poland's ultimate aim, however, even before this (1939), was untenable without the support of a major power, and no such support was forthcoming.

³¹) "It looks very much as if this suspicious noise [allied accusations that Germany was aiming to create an independent Ukrainian State] is designed to incense the Soviet Union against Germany, to poison the atmosphere and to provoke a conflict with Germany without any visible grounds... The Soviet Union is not willing to pull chestnuts out of the fire for anybody else."

G. Reutlinger, *op. cit.*, p. 40.

³²) R. Malashchuk affirms that in the Ukrainian lands under Polish rule, the O.U.N. had sufficient strength; and the internal situation was becoming increasingly polarized, (with respect to Ukrainians and Poles) to make an uprising probable. *Without support however* this insurgency would have been ruthlessly suppressed.

³³) Hitler, with Hungary well under control, could easily disregard or re-orientate her.

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TYPES OF ETHNIC IDENTIFICATION AND GENERAL POSITION: A Study of the Ukrainian Immigrant Group in the U.S.A.

Thesis

submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the
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and Anthropology at Brown University

Introduction

On August 6, 1966, the *Montreal Star* published an editorial on the subject of ethnicity. A few days later, the same paper published a letter sent by an "ethnic", in answer to the editorial: "Mr. Debara's conclusion is, that assimilation is inevitable, and, as a result, that there is no need to trouble one's self with any kind of ethnic interests. In other words, death is inevitable for every person, and, therefore, why live at all, and why bother with anything . . ."¹ A year later, the Canadian province of Quebec organized a warm welcome for Charles De Gaulle. Many in the crowd jeered as an army band played, "God Save the Queen", but, sang whole-heartedly the French National Anthem.² In the United States, just a few weeks earlier, the American-Jewish community collected millions of dollars to aid the Israeli nation in its fight with the Arabs. Some young Jews went to Israel in the first days of the war to provide personal assistance.

Is assimilation inevitable? Is ethnicity a dead question? Some academicians still seem to think so. Others formulate theories in an effort to explain the persisting existence of ethnic groups. Neither side has succeeded in presenting a valid explanation.

Most of the work on ethnic groups focuses on the process of assimilation and on the conflicts engendered by such a change. The dominant theme is that of ethnic relations. Ethnocentrism, the nature of prejudice, the "marginal man", and related topics, constitute the crucial concepts for proposed theories.³ And yet, despite "marginality", prejudice, and conflicts, students of ethnicity find ethnic communities and organizations are continuously re-inforced by members of the second, the third, and the fourth generations of immigrants.

Milton M. Gordon, in *Assimilation in American Life*, approaches the problem of ethnic groups by postulating seven "assimilation variables."⁴ Each of these variables represents a stage or, a type of assimilation. Each, if realized, is a small progression along the continuum of complete absorption of the group. Application of this scheme to actual cases brings the following results: ethnic groups vary according to the degree to which they have, (1) assimilated culturally, (2) adapted to the behaviour patterns of the native culture, (3) shifted their attitudes to those of the native society, (4) have intermarried. All groups, however, have assimilated in these respects to a significant degree. None have assimilated structurally, i. e., all continue to have their own ethnic organizations and associations. None have undergone identificational assimilation, i. e., none have lost their sense of peoplehood.

In the last analysis, Gordon's scheme may prove to be useful for estimating how far a particular ethnic group has gone on the way toward complete assimilation. It enables one to compare and to contrast assimilationist tendencies among various minority groups in America. What Gordon's scheme does not, and cannot, do is to answer the "why" of a particular rate of assimilation.

If we look at Gordon's findings we see that structural and identificational assimilation do not occur in the grounds surveyed. It is not a coincidence that both, structural and identificational assimilation are absent. To quote Shibutani, "Structure reflects the extent of ethnic consciousness . . . The capacity of any category of people to mobilize for collective action depends upon their sense of identity."⁵ It would appear, that the absence of structural assimilation is a strong indication of continued identification with the ethnic group, from one generation to the next. Gordon has treated these two factors — that, of an ethnic social structure and, that of ethnic identification — as being somewhat independent of one another and, as being of equal importance. It is my contention that the crucial factor in terms of the continuity of an ethnic group is Ethnic Identification.

As Marshall Sklare very aptly points out, Gordon does not analyze the basic and the positive motives for maintaining group identity.⁶ It is assumed in *Assimilation in American Life*, as it is assumed in other major works, that all ethnic groups have an inherent, (or, sub-conscious) assimilationist tendency; that the members of an ethnic group face insurmountable conflicts which tip the scale, even against their will, to form a negative (ambivalent) attitude toward the ethnic group. Such an assumption causes the concept of ethnic identification to be disregarded and, thereby, also, the problem of generational continuity. It ignores the Why of ethnic socialization. And yet, the fact that assimilation in the United States has proceeded at so slow a pace, (in the sense of total assimilation), requires a reconsideration of the entire concept of ethnic identification; it requires the consider-

ation of the positive, as well as, the negative motives underlying such identification.

It is the question of ethnic identification which is of greatest importance in understanding ethnic continuity and its reverse process, assimilation of an ethnic group. It is the "why" question.

The Concept of Ethnic Identification

Sociological literature is conspicuously deficient when it comes to the topic of ethnic identification. The subject is continuously treated in very general terms, with little agreement among the authors or terminological usage, let alone any consensus on a dimensional scheme for the measurement of this process.

The general, and often-quoted definitions of ethnic identification are, consistently: "a sense of peoplehood", and "a consciousness of kind."⁷ On a more specific level, Daniel Glazer defines the concept as: "...referring to a person's use of racial, national, and religious terms to identify himself, and thereby, to relate himself to others."⁸ Ludwig Geismar, Judith Kramer and Seymour Leventman, (and others), hold that the initial basis of ethnic identification derives from a common origin, traditional values, and customs.⁹ The strongest of these according to Fishman and Nahirny, is the value basis, for, "...ethnic consciousness grows out of values", and, values are the organizing principles.¹⁰ (They are referring to traditional, group values. Here again, we see the link between ethnic structure and ethnic identity)

This framework serves as the starting point for most discussions of ethnicity. Its generality argues for its valid application to any ethnic group. On the other hand, its very generality results in its failure to explain the dynamics of an actual case of ethnic group identification or assimilation. This becomes clear when individual authors attempt to measure ethnic identification. Each ethnic group used for this purpose seems to call for the consideration of a different set of factors or categories. The result is, not only a difference in the set of factors used, but also, a difference in the theoretical explanation given by individual authors. Robert F. Winch, in the introductory statement to his work, *Identification and Its Familial Determinants* poses a number of questions facing one in the study of identification "What kind or size of unit, or slice of behaviour should we look for? For example, should we think of identification as including both mannerisms and the adoption of a philosophy of life, or the entering into an occupation?"¹¹ Researchers vary in their choice of variables. For some, the choice of a proper occupation by an ethnic group member is sufficient evidence to connote strong identification.¹² For others, a love for their native music and foods is sufficient.¹³ On the other hand, a researcher attacking the problem on more than one level of conceptualization — sociological, social-psychological, and

psychological — may feel that the above situations, if found in isolation, are clear examples of increasing assimilation. The solution lies in the recognition of the uniqueness of the cultural basis of each ethnic identity, as well as, in the isolation of constants to be found in the process of ethnic identification.

a. **Identificational Components —: Cultural Variants**

We have said that ethnic identification refers to “a sense of peoplehood” or, to “a consciousness of kind.”¹⁴ If there is a consciousness of kind, then, there have to be distinguishing group characteristics to permit the differentiation between one’s own group and other groups. *What* does a member of an ethnic group identify with, is the question which I will strive to answer here. (The question of “how” he identifies, in terms of objective criteria, requires an analysis of the resulting group structure).

Ethnic identification, like group identification in general, is a process by which an individual’s self-identity becomes related to a particular group; the individual sees himself as being part of the group, sharing in its triumphs and in its tribulations.¹⁵ This means that the norms and values of a specific ethnic group become the standards and ideals of the identifying individual.

Most of the work on ethnic identification has usually dealt with the actual measurement of the concept, the focus being on the attitudes of individual respondents to factors characterizing various aspects of ethnic group life. The work of Jewish scholars predominates in this area. This may be due to their recognition of the concept’s central importance for generational continuity: the Jewish community is one of the few ethnic groups which, as a group, consciously strives to stem assimilation. In any case, these studies illustrate the fact that a scheme for the measurement of ethnic identification must include direct references to the cultural-historical characteristics distinguishing an ethnic group.

The work of Ludwig Geismar serves as a good example of these studies.¹⁶ Geismar’s scheme for measuring ethnic identification consists of factors characterizing “belongingness” to the Jewish community. He postulates eight categories of identificational factors. These include: the religious, the quasi-secular cultural, the cultural-zionist, the socio-political zionist, the personal and social, the cultural-social, the bio-social, and the defensive identificational.¹⁷ Half of these categories are, obviously, derived from Jewish cultural-historical elements and, have meaning only in reference to the Jewish group, (identification with that particular group). But, even these categories are not sufficient to encompass the entire area of Jewish life and, consequently, all identificationally significant factors. As Chein has pointed out, “. . . fractionalization of the Jewish commun-

ity into innumerable factions and ideologies makes identification a somewhat complex phenomenon."¹⁸

Thus, in any measure of ethnic identification, consideration must be given, not only to the cultural-historical uniqueness of the ethnic group, as a whole, but also, to the characteristics of its major internal groupings.

We have already mentioned the significance of such internal differentiation as found in the Jewish community. (Consider the implications in the differences between the religious groups alone: the Orthodox, the Reformed, etc.). Another case in point is that of the Armenian community in the United States. Sarkis Atamian, in the *Social and Ideological Conflict of the Armenian Community and Its Politico-Historical Antecedents*, describes the development of two diverse orientations in Armenia, which have continued to split the community into two opposing sides with different political and social affiliations and convictions, even in diaspora.¹⁹ Here, identification with the community may be equally strong for members of both sides, but, measurement of this identification will require consideration of a number of factors not characteristic of both sides, but, peculiar to one or the other. (Invasion and occupation of the country by the Turks and the Russians resulted in the division of the people into two major religious, political, and social camps).

I would argue that the problem of ethnic identification involves two separate, but interdependent questions: the question of "ethnic identity" and, the question of "ethnic identification." Ethnic identity may be defined as a complex of ideas, images, beliefs, and values, arising from the group belief in common origin and from a common historical and social environment. Ethnic identification, on the other hand, is a process by which the individual members assume an identity. Ethnic identities vary in two ways: they vary in the degree to which they are crystallized in the minds of the people before emigration, and they vary according to the extent to which they are challenged or threatened by the political and social environment, both in the country of origin and in the receiving community.

A substantial proportion of the Eastern European immigration to America faced the problem of having to discover its identity after migrating. According to Nathan Glazer, peasant immigrants, such as the Slovaks, the Ruthenians, and the Croats, were able to identify themselves in terms of a nationality, only after chancing upon their fellow-countrymen here.²⁰ The identification process occurring in these ethnic groups, I would argue, followed a different pattern from that undergone by groups with strong ethnic ideologies at the time of arrival. Vladimir C. Nahirny and Joshua A. Fishman counted that many of these Eastern European peasants had only a very local sense of identity and, as a result, were quickly absorbed by other ethnic groups who spoke a similar language, (i. e., another Slavic

language); others retained their purely local ties, never recognizing the relationship between the locality of their birth and its national position.²¹

An immigrant group may also be subjected to threats to its identity from the following sources: (1) social-political changes in the country of origin, which serve to deny the continued existence and validity of a group identity and, (2) a negative (or, antagonistic) attitude toward the ethnic group, or toward all ethnic groups, on the part of the host society.

Discussing the patterns of settlement of Polish immigrants in Great Britain, Jerzy Zubrzycki emphasizes two factors which influence the rate, and the nature of adjustment of the immigrant group to its new environment.²² These two factors are important determinants of the kind of relationship that the immigrant group will have with the larger society; they are: (1) The existing predisposition to change on the part of the immigrant group. Whether a particular immigrant group is willing to change, or is not willing to change, is largely determined by the specific circumstances and motives surrounding the initial decision to emigrate. In other words, it is dependent upon the conditions in the country of origin which brought about the emigration. (2) The second factor is that of the prevailing attitudes toward the immigrant group on the part of the larger society. It is obvious, that the acceptance of a minority group will result in a different type of adjustment of that group than will its rejection by the native population.²³ Zubrzycki states that, depending upon the specific combinations of the two factors, the resulting adjustment may be one of three types: conflict with the native society, accommodation to it, or, assimilation of the ethnic group. For example, take the case of an immigrant group which tries to prevent the assimilation of its members; if the policy of the host society is assimilative (as was the situation in America during the early part of the Twentieth century, when "Americanization" was the policy), we might predict that the relationship between that specific immigrant group and the host society will be one of conflict.

Generally, then, these two factors — the predisposition to change on the part of the immigrant group and, the prevailing attitudes toward the immigrant group on the part of the receiving society — will affect the orientation of the ethnic group toward its own identity, and, consequently, this will affect the process of identification with the group.

The cultural and traditional elements, as well as the conditions prevailing in the country of origin and in the country of final settlement, are the variables which must be considered in any analysis of ethnic identification. Variations in ethnic identities result in variable rates of assimilation and, consequently, in variable degrees of identificational strength. In other words, the process of ethnic

identification is not identical for every ethnic group; unique group conditions can affect the process at various points in time. What each group is capable of transmitting, what each group wants to transmit to the next generation is, to a large extent, dependent upon the above variable conditions. Depending upon the group's resulting policy toward assimilation, these conditions may act as an aid or, as a hindrance to the group's socialization aims. These, then, are the variables. What are the constants in the proposition of ethnic group theory which can provide a starting point for the formulation of a theoretical scheme for the measurement of ethnic identification?

In this section I have tried to point out the necessity for being aware of the cultural and historical uniqueness of each ethnic group. This does not mean that each ethnic group is such a unique and different entity as to make any comparative and generalizing scheme useless. The differentiating characteristics are to be considered on a separate level of analysis; they are to be included in the factors used to measure ethnic identification. What will remain constant for each ethnic group is the set of categories into which the cultural and historical factors fall. These categories are derived largely from group theory. The importance of one category over another will vary according to its significance for the ethnic group, but, all categories will be found to some degree.

Perhaps the most important of these categories is that of values. The Polish sociologist, Stanislaus Ossowski, wrote that, social consciousness grows out of the values of the people.²⁵ The same may be said of ethnic consciousness, which forms the basis for identification. (Fishman and Nahirny have been quoted on page four: "Ethnic consciousness grows out of values . . .").

The ethnic value system is crucial, not only because of its central importance in the formation of ethnic consciousness, but also, because it is the basis for the ethnic group's assimilation policy. It is the standard, the guide, for minority vs. majority group interaction for the ethnic group. Although Louis Wirth does not concern himself directly with the question of ethnic identification or, ethnic ideology, he does point out the effects of differential ethnic assimilation policies; the significance of his work is precisely due to his recognition of this differential.²⁶ Wirth distinguishes four types of ethnic group movements: (1) pluralistic, (2) assimilationist, (3) secessionist, and (4) militant.²⁷ This typology of ethnic groups, focusing on minority-majority group interaction, segregates ethnic groups according to the extent to which they are trying to safeguard and realize their group goals. (Notice, also, that three of the four types, proposed by Wirth, are constructed on the basis of the degree of conscious effort on the part of the ethnic groups to maintain their ethnic continuity). On a higher level of analysis, these four typological categories differentiate ethnic groups according to their ideological

or value emphasis, i. e., according to the degree of emphasis placed on an ethnic ideology. The ethnic ideology may be derived from strong religious conviction, from a nationalistic orientation, or from cultural pride.

The other constants to be considered in the measurement of ethnic identification are: cultural and group norms, customs, and traditional behaviour patterns. These may be observed and analyzed by focusing on ethnic organizations and associations; (we may take the organizational structure to be the visible constant for every ethnic group). In essence, the organizational structure of ethnic groups, together with the attitudes of individual members of the ethnic community, can serve as the objective and the subjective measures, respectively, of the members' commitment and adherence to the ethnic group's particular value system. Shibutani has said that, each group has a different conception of life goals it thinks are worth pursuing.²⁸ These life goals or values, and the norms and standards of behaviour set up by the group to achieve these goals, pervade ethnic organizations. Thus, organizations are an obvious and logical source for the measurement of values and norms. Attitudes, on the other hand, are the subjective source for getting at these values and norms, as well as, for measuring the extent of the members' acceptance of the group's values and their adherence to the group norms. For, to quote Ludwig Geismar, "Particular attitudes toward the majority group and toward the members of the ethnic group themselves, depend largely on the concept of group identification . . ."²⁹

These, then, are the constants in the measurement of ethnic identification with reference to an ethnic group as a group, as a culture within a larger culture. The other necessary aspect of this problem, and another source of variables and constants, is that of an ethnic group as a going concern, as a self-perpetuating social system. The other problem is that of generational continuity, or, of ethnic socialization.

b. Generational Continuity —: A Question of Differences in Orientation Toward the Ethnic Group

Ethnic group identification, and its opposite result, assimilation, are primarily a problem of generational continuity. The value of an ethnic identity lies in its perpetuation, in its acceptance by succeeding generations. In Eisenstadt's terms, it is the conscious attempt at ensuring the stability and continuity of the ethnic community.³⁰ In other words, it is the problem of socialization, the effort of the adult members of the ethnic community to impart the ethnic identity to the members of the next generation.

In the previous section, I tried to show that the identification process is not the same for every ethnic group, an argument which

rested upon the historical and cultural uniqueness of every ethnic group. Sociological theory on generational continuity of ethnic groups focuses upon another source of variation in the concept of ethnic identification. This variation is based on the differential position held by members of succeeding generations; differential with respect to the original source of any ethnic identity, namely, the ethnic culture and tradition, as found in the country of origin. Although, at first glance, we encounter an additional source of variation, upon closer analysis, this proposition also offers a useful *constant*. The constant is: a particular generational position. The generational structure, and the basic problem of generational continuity is the same for every ethnic group. This, in itself, serves as a control in the comparison of ethnic groups on their socialization efforts, as they proceed to transmit their particular ethnic identities to the succeeding generations.

In the following pages I will propose a scheme for the application of this constant to a measure of ethnic identification. I will argue, that certain types of ethnic identification promote greater generational continuity than do others, and, that this implies a much smaller rate of assimilation for certain ethnic groups, in contrast to others.

A point of view predominating in American sociology in the past has been that the concept of ethnic identification lends itself to analysis along a unidimensional continuum. The overriding assumption here has been that there existed differences solely in the *degree* of identification. Since the appearance of Marcus Lee Hansen's article, "The Third Generation in America", however, the focus shifted to the examination of possible differences in the identificational factors of each succeeding generation.³¹ In his article, Hansen suggested that the factors which formed the basis of identification for the "Fathers" were not the same set of factors which came into play in the identificational complex of the "Sons", or, for that matter, of the "Grandsons." A recent article by Vladimir C. Nahirny and Joshua A. Fishman carries this idea to its logical conclusion: it is explicitly stated that each generation will differ from the others, not in the degree, but also in the *nature* of its identification with ethnicity.³² To paraphrase Nahirny and Fishman: The basic assumption underlying the idea of differences in the nature of ethnic identification between generations derives mainly from the fact that the generations are distinguished from each other by radical breaks in actual life patterns. The particular life pattern of each generation, in turn results in a distinct *mode of orientation* toward ethnicity. Thus, the ethnic identification of the "Fathers" is an outgrowth of past personal experiences, and constitutes something deeply subjective and specific. Here, the "old ways" survive as realities and are linked by the immigrants to the community of their contemporaries. The Sons, on the other hand, have no such store of memories from the country of

origin (the "Fatherland"). They are also, constantly influenced by a dominant "de-ethnicizing" society. If they do have a strong sense of ethnic identification, despite these negating factors, it would, hypothetically, be an identification transcending the concrete. Their identification would be based on selected and abstract values and ideals which *symbolize* the ancestral heritage.³³

To illustrate the mode of orientation of the second generation, and the nature of the resulting identification, Fishman and Nahirny draw upon a number of sources, particularly, upon two relatively recent studies of Jewish-American intellectuals.³⁴ These studies were an attempt to review the subject of individual self-identification of young Jewish intellectuals with their ethnic community. The editors summarize the findings by pointing out that these young members of the second generation felt themselves to be more truly Jewish than the community which called itself Jewish, by committing themselves to the "Ideal" of the ethnic culture and politics, rather than by adhering to the practices of customs and rituals.³⁵

The proposition is, then, that the first generation, no matter what the characteristics of the ethnic culture and tradition, will experience their identification, their ties with ethnicity, in terms of particular experiences in the country of origin. The second generation cannot have the same bases for identification as the first generation. The second generation, born and raised in a very different milieu, in a different country, can only experience its ethnicity in a segmented pattern, either in the home, at periodic meetings of ethnic organizations, or, during community events. The second generation is forced to sift and re-evaluate all that they have learned about their ethnic heritage and, to preserve that part of it which will have meaning and application in terms of the present way of life. The entire complex of cultural practices and traditional life styles cannot possibly be re-created in diaspora. What remains is the essence, the core of values and ideals, which give meaning to the particulars of the ethnic heritage, in the first place.

Thus, we have a particularistic mode of orientation toward ethnicity, which is characteristic of the first generation, and an idealistic mode of orientation, which is characteristic of the members of the second generation. The difference in the mode of orientation is, therefore, dependent upon the differential position occupied by a specific generation group. Although we are speaking about a "mode of orientation", we are not implying a subjective, or, purely psychological process. The dependent variable is "position in the generational structure"; it is a collective characteristic, a social variable.

To summarize all that has been said so far on ethnic structure and ethnic identification:

1. Ethnic groups are distinguished by unique cultural and historical characteristics.

2. Their cultural and historical heritage includes specific items and factors, which vary from group to group.
3. However, every culture is comprized of a number of general characteristics, such as "values", "cultural norms", "institutional patterns", etc.
4. The cultural and historical elements become, in part, symbolized and enter into the complex of ideas, images, and beliefs, which comprize the ethnic identity.
5. Variations in cultural items and historical events result in variations in ethnic identities.
6. Variations in ethnic identities are manifest in different degrees of their crystallization; variations may also be extended and perpetuated by the degree to which an identity is threatened.
7. Basically, the resulting difference in one identity as compared to another, lies in the emphasis that is placed on ethnic values, in contrast to ethnic customs and norms.
8. This difference in emphasis, it is here postulated, will result in different rates of assimilation by succeeding generations; (within the scope of the present work, this difference in emphasis will result in different rates of assimilation for the members of the second generation).
9. This would seem to be so (§8), because the process of ethnic identification, I will argue, differs according to the particular emphasis being made by an ethnic group, i. e., emphasis on values will result in a different pattern of identification than will an emphasis on norms, specific customs, etc.

Points 8 and 9 are the propositions which I shall attempt to substantiate in the following pages.

The Research Design

The general hypothesis of this thesis is, then, that there exist different types of ethnic identification; that this difference is due to differences in ethnic identities. Ethnic identities may be cultural identities, or, ideological identities (emphasizing group values). I propose that the different types of ethnic identification, resulting from different identities, will give rise to different rates of assimilation, specifically, with reference to the second generation. The assumptions underlying this proposition are stated in the following paragraphs.

The ideal situation for testing this hypothesis would be an investigation of two ethnic groups, identical in every respect, with the only difference being a difference in their orientation toward, in the one case, the ethnic values, and, in the other case, customs and norms. Then focusing on the second generation, whose mode of orientation is terms of values and ideals, we should find a greater degree of

generational continuity within the value oriented group, than within the group oriented toward specific customs. The other possibility is the use of a single ethnic group which manifests two types of orientation. The possibility for control is greater here. If we have a single ethnic group which is characterized by two orientations toward ethnicity, (i. e., emphasis on values vs. emphasis on specific customs and traditional elements), it is still a situation in which all of the members are exposed to the same cultural and historical conditions. Thus, cultural and historical factors are controlled. I have chosen this second alternative for testing my hypothesis. I will concentrate on one ethnic group, the Ukrainian immigrant group in the United States. My choice of the Ukrainian group is not solely based on the research rationale given above. I am of Ukrainian origin and, have lived in a large Ukrainian community for the major part of my life. As a result, many of the questions which have been posed here are questions that I have sought to answer, almost naturally, throughout my years as a "participant observer."

Specifically, then, the research design will be as follows: the focus of this thesis is on the second generation of a particular ethnic group. The general purpose is to discover if distinct types of ethnic identification can be found within this single generational group. The ethnic group chosen for the sample is a group which includes two types of orientations toward its identity: an ideological (value emphasis) orientation, and a cultural-traditional (norms and customs emphasized) orientation. Thus, a comparison of the members of the second generation will assume differential socialization: socialization to either, one, or the other orientation. This comparison should substantiate the existence of a different type of identification, if such a difference exists.

The situation of the second generation is, characteristically, a crisis situation, in terms of the choice to be made, a choice of an identity. In the context of generational continuity, the second generation is offered a certain type, (or, types, in the present case) of identity by the first generation. This identity may be perceived as either, a maladaptive identity, or as an adaptive one with reference to the larger societal environment. Perception of the offered identity as maladaptive, does not necessarily mean rejection of the identity. It may mean exactly this; those who reject the identity, probably reject it precisely because it is perceived as a maladaptive one. On the other hand, it seems that some of those who do identify, do so despite the fact that they perceive the identity as maladaptive. However, all members of the second generation must face the initial decision of either, accepting, or rejecting ethnicity, and subsequently, if the decision is to identify with the group, they must decide which aspects and elements of the ethnic identity, as it appears to them, are essential to the identity, i. e., which aspects are worth retaining and which are not.

Since the second generation is one which consciously faces the problem of choosing an identity — either, its ethnic identity, or that of the larger society, — it is the second generation which will provide a clearer, and more complete picture of the process of ethnic identification. (The identification of the first generation began in the country of origin, and at birth. It was much more, a mechanical process, with less of a chance of alternatives for identity choices).

A. The Sample

1. The Historical Background

The group which I have taken under scrutiny here, is the Ukrainian immigrant group. Qualification: concern will be exclusively with the second wave of Ukrainian immigrants — the Political Immigration — who came to this country under the Displaced Persons' Act of 1949.³⁶ This will exclude the members of the first wave — the Economic Immigration — arriving in the United States around the turn of the present century. The significance of choosing the Ukrainian Political Immigration lies in its' being an ideologically oriented group at the time of settlement. This immigration had left Ukraine when the Bolsheviks invaded the country. Many of the immigrants had been Freedom Fighters, political agitators, and active supporters of the opposition to the Bolshevik invasion. Most of them, as a result, had to flee the country after World War II, or, face the possibility of imprisonment or death. Upon arrival in the United States in 1949-1951, the majority of these people continued to hope to return to Ukraine in the future, when, and if the political situation had changed. Their first organizational efforts in America were in the direction of bringing about such a change, (i. e., bringing about the declaration of a free and independent Ukraine). (See, appendix for scheme of first immigrant organizations). To understand how the second immigration was able to organize itself along ideological lines, and to do so in the first two years of settlement, it is necessary to present a short history of Ukrainian immigration, as a whole, into this country. The fact is, that the first immigration, (the Economic) had provided the groundwork of basic institutions for ethnic life; the second immigration elaborated and built upon this existing institutional structure.

The first wave of emigration from Ukraine occurred in the late 1870's. At that time, Ukraine was divided between two large European powers, the Russian Tsarist Empire, to which, approximately, nine-tenths of Ukraine belonged, and the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Several generations before, the Ukrainian people, most of whom were peasants, had enjoyed a larger measure of freedom under the Ukrainian Cossack State, but, incorporation of Ukraine into the Russian Empire resulted in the introduction of serfdom, with the

peasants, suddenly, becoming the property of foreign landlords. In the middle of the 19th century, discontent among the peasants reached dangerous proportions, especially, after a number of native writers and poets dared to print their "revolutionary", nationalistic works. To avoid an outright revolt, the Austro-Hungarian emperor abolished serfdom, (*panshchyna*) in 1848. The Russian tsar, Alexander II, abolished it in the remaining areas in 1861. However, with the abolition of serfdom, and a greater degree of freedom, came even greater discontent. The people could not be appeased; the majority of the land was still owned by non-Ukrainian landlords. Faced with this situation, many of the men migrated to the United States, where they hoped to earn enough money to return to their homes and buy land. Many did return; others did not. Eventually, women joined the migration; they married, and settled in America.³⁸

The first organizational efforts of the growing Ukrainian community here, were churches, self-help insurance societies, and educational associations.³⁹

In 1917, with the fall of Tsarist Russia, the Ukrainian political organizations created the Central Council, which was to be the first step toward establishing a native and independent government. On January 22, 1918, the Declaration of Independence of Ukraine was proclaimed. As a result of this declaration, a series of intensive battles with the growing Bolshevik armies ensued. The Polish government, seeing an opportunity for gaining land, also attacked Ukraine. In 1921, the Polish and Russian governments signed a mutual treaty at Riga, dividing between themselves, the Ukrainian lands. Boundaries and ownership changed again in 1939; this time, Germany and Russia divided the country. Poland was occupied. When the German-Russian split erupted on June 22, 1941, Ukrainian underground forces succeeded in establishing a Ukrainian government again. The Premier of this newly-formed government was Jaroslav Stetzko, who, on June 30, 1941, proclaimed a free and independent Ukraine for the second time within the Twentieth century. This governing body existed only for a few weeks, (the German occupying forces arrested the Premier and the other government officials), but nevertheless a Ukrainian Insurgent Army came subsequently into being and continued to carry on the fight for Ukraine's independence until 1953.⁴⁰

The emigration of Ukrainians after World War II was not motivated by personal considerations; nor was it a voluntary emigration in most cases. When Germany occupied the country, the Nazi armies evacuated about three million people, forcibly, to fill the vacuum in the labour market in Germany. Toward the end of the War, thousands of other Ukrainians fled in the wake of the invading Bolshevik armies. Later, when the Red Army occupied East Germany, it succeeded in repatriating about 2 million Ukrainians. Those remain-

ing, fled to the protection of the American, English, and French forces; they were placed in Displaced Persons' camps in Western Germany and Austria. In these camps, the Ukrainian people began to organize themselves into a self-defensive front against the possible future repatriation by the Soviet Armies. The Central Representation of the Ukrainian Emigration in Germany was formed to represent the 206,871 Ukrainians in German and Austrian camps.⁴¹ (Quite a few Ukrainians were not living in camps, although they found themselves in Germany or Austria. They lived, temporarily, with local native families. Others had managed to flee to other countries, such as France and Switzerland. Numerical figures for these people are impossible to find. However, since the majority of Ukrainian political immigrants to the United States is composed of those who were in the German and Austrian camps, the 206,871 plus, will be our concern here).

Once in the camps, the people also began to establish communities (Before embarking for the United States, an average of about four years was spent by the immigrants in the Displaced Persons' camps). Kindergartens, primary schools, high schools, and various educational groups were organized. The grounds for a Ukrainian university were laid in München. (This institution, a state qualified Ukrainian Free University, is still in existence today). Many cultural and artistic groups were revived. Newspapers, magazines, and books were published. All of this, at least partially, was made possible by the professional composition of the immigrant group. The second Ukrainian immigration consisted of many academicians, intellectuals, medical doctors, engineers, etc., a personnel which would have been capable of teaching and publishing works. (This is a great contrast to the first immigrant group, which was mostly of peasant stock).

Toward the end of the four or five years of camp life, the masses of Ukrainian civilians were joined by many partisans, members of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, who had been sent abroad by their commanding officers in the face of an, otherwise, certain death. (These partisans constituted only a few divisions of the army. The rest of the forces remained in Ukraine; sporadic reports testified to their continued activity during the 1950's).

This, then, was the composition of the second immigration. When these DPs, as they were popularly referred to by Americans, found themselves in America, they immediately reestablished their various organizations. Within a few months (in 1949), each city of a larger Ukrainian settlement, had organized at least a small number of its youth into two organizations: the Ukrainian-American Youth Association (SUMA), and Plast, the Ukrainian Scouting Organization. Within five years, these communities boasted of three youth organizations, four student organizations, eleven political associations, and eight professional societies.⁴² The newer immigrants also re-enforced

the membership of community organizations founded by the first wave of immigrants, but mostly, they concentrated on building a new type of ethnic community. Seeing, at first hand, the rapid assimilation occurring within the earlier immigrant group, they founded and built Ukrainian parish schools in the already existing church parishes. They also started a Saturday and Week-day evening Ukrainian Language School system.⁴³ All of these educational institutions and the organizations were centralized, with a Board of Directors, or a central committee functioning in one city, and local boards acting in the other cities. The first areas of concentrated settlement were: New York City, Newark, Jersey City, Philadelphia, New Haven, Hartford, Syracuse, Rochester, Buffalo, Detroit, Cleveland and Chicago.

2. The Present Situation —: The Ethnic Way of Life

What constitutes an ethnic way of life? Sol Liptsin, a visiting professor of humanities at the Haifa Technion, in Israel, recently urged the American-Jewish Leaders to provide ever-increasing "Jewish experiences" for the children of the second and third generations: "To arrest the fading of our Jewish consciousness, the home, the Jewish school, the Jewish synagogue, the Jewish center, the Jewish camp, and — Israel, must provide opportunities for truly Jewish experiences."⁴⁴ This is absolutely necessary, argued Dr. Liptsin, if the Jewish community is to continue to exist. Otherwise, "the increasingly conformist American environment" would take its toll.⁴⁵ What then, constitutes the "Ukrainian experience"; what are the experiences which strengthen the consciousness of being Ukrainian in the members of this ethnic group?

One of the crucial factors providing an ethnic experience for any minority group is religion. Religion, for Ukrainian immigrants in the United States, is a particularly unique source of identity. Unique cultural and historical characteristics are responsible for making religion a major factor for in-group consciousness.

Ukraine became a Christian nation in 988 A.D., when its ruler, Volodymyr, rejected the ancient pagan religion and accepted Christianity under the sponsorship of the patriarch of Constantinople. A religious schism, later, divided the people into those who recognized the papacy and into those who wished to remain under the jurisdiction of the Greek church, — i. e., into (today's) Catholics and into Orthodox. Ukrainian Catholics, although falling under the jurisdiction of the Pope, are still of the Byzantine (not Roman) Rite. This means that they, as well as the Ukrainian Orthodox, draw upon the Eastern church tradition, which is very distinctive from the Western, Roman church. Both religions have a national character: Ukrainian language, exclusively is used in all church services and, both religious

rituals include elements of the national culture. (The church was the centre of communal life in Ukraine). Both religions, until 1964, followed the Julian calendar. Today, the Ukrainian Catholic church in the U.S.A. is gradually changing to the, almost universal, Julian calendar.

Approximately, two-thirds of the Ukrainian immigrants in America are Ukrainian Catholic, while one-third are Ukrainian Orthodox, (only 1.5% are of other religious affiliations).⁴⁶ Thus, as we can see, almost all of the immigrants are, at least professed, members of two traditional Ukrainian churches. The question that I am asking here is, what role does their religion play in their ethnic communities; what are the Ukrainian experiences emanating from their religion?

A major part of community life in the United States involves religious holyday observances. The most distinctive of these are Christmas and Easter, both of which are laden with numerous, religio-cultural rituals. Christmas is celebrated continuously for a period of four days, each day requiring a separate and distinctive set of ceremonial customs. (Christmas Eve, for example, is the occasion of a lavish, twelve-course, meatless supper, the twelve courses signifying the fact that Christ chose twelve apostles as his first disciples; each course, by itself, derives from a particular peasant food, each comes in a certain order, and is served with appropriate prayers and blessings. Following the supper, the family goes caroling to the homes of relatives and friends. The evening is concluded with a midnight Christmas Mass at the local parish church). These colourful and emotive holydays are the most treasured traditions of the Ukrainian people. Their observance in America has an added significance for the community members, because of the fact that their fellow-countrymen in Ukraine are not permitted to observe these church holydays; religion is persecuted in the Soviet Union. The young children of the ethnic community often consider the religious observances as the most distinctive characteristics of their descent, especially, when they have the opportunity to tell their American friends about the lengthy and beautiful rituals. This is not a paper on folklore and customs. I am including this short description to emphasize the fact that there are numerous, specifically prescribed occasions during the calendar year which provide a Ukrainian experience for the individual, from the religious aspect. It is not too unlike the yearly calendar of Jewish religious observances. And, whether a Ukrainian is Orthodox or Catholic, this means much more than a simple membership of supra-national religious significance; this means that he is a member of one of the two *national churches* of Ukraine.⁴⁷

Another critical factor providing ethnic experience is education. It is also the most important socializing agent, outside of the family unit. Each Ukrainian community has some form of educational

facilities for the children. (Nahirny and Fishman, in their work *Language Loyalty in the United States*, present an incisive analysis of the educational institutions existing in the Ukrainian immigrant communities.⁴⁸) Of the four major types of ethnic language schools discussed by Nahirny and Fishman, Ukrainian communities, throughout the United States, support the all-day school, (a parish school, which includes a programme of studies in the ethnic language, history and literature), the weekday school, (in which ethnic subject are taught after regular school hours), and the week-end school, (where ethnic subjects are taught for five or six hours every Saturday). Of course, communities vary in the number and the range of types of schools they can sponsor. Larger communities may have each of the above types of schools; smaller communities, on the other hand, may be able to support only one. Thus, for example, Philadelphia has four parish schools, one Ukrainian high school, a junior college, and six week-end schools; New Haven has two parish schools, two week-day schools, and a Ukrainian high school; Pawtucket-Providence, Rhode Island, boasts of one week-end school for its twenty, or so, Ukrainian children.

Whatever the situation in a particular community, the early school years of the children of the second immigration have been, (and are, at present), divided into two courses of study: the children are part of the American school system, and part of the Ukrainian school system. In the Ukrainian schools, they are taught the history, literature, geography, and the customs and folklore of their contry of origin; in addition, extensive study of the grammar and usage of the Ukrainian language is obligatory for all. The teachers in these schools are adult members of the community, (with some exceptions, they are the original immigrants), who hold degrees in education from Ukrainian universities, and have had many years of experience, teaching in schools in Ukraine.⁴⁹

In addition to this network of Ukrainian language schools, there is an institute of music, with branches in most of the large cities, and an institute of art. Both emphasize Ukrainian music and art forms.⁵⁰ In larger communities, the majority of children, especially, during their grammar school years, are enrolled, if only for short periods of time, into the institute of music. Instrument and theory classes are given weekly; semi-annual recitals are obligatory for all students. Many of the children also belong to choir and orchestra groups, which the institute directs. Here, again, frequent practice sessions are required.

There are two large youth organizations, with branches in every Ukrainian community in the United States and Canada: Plast, (the scouting organization), and SUM, (the Ukrainian Youth Association).⁵¹ Plast originated in 1911, in Ukraine, and was re-organized in America in 1950. After the Russian occupation of Ukraine, Plast became outlawed because of the anti-bolshevik activities of its members. It

existed as an underground group during World War II; many of its members formed the leadership of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, the organization responsible for the 1941 proclamation of Ukrainian independence, and the organization which ordered the formation of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. Today, Plast exists as more of a purely scouting group, but, it includes in its programme the socialization of the youth in a nationalistic spirit. The bulk of the membership ranges from ages, six to twenty-five, although, many of the members remain active in various leadership-counsellor positions, and in the Parents' Committee, for many years. The Board, or central ruling body of Plast, is still composed of people who have been members since their childhood, in Ukraine. Meetings for the children are held every week. The older members, those of college age, direct the weekly meetings and, hold sessions of their own once a month. All members of a local branch also meet during another, monthly meeting. Plast runs several summer camps throughout the country. Members are encouraged to attend these camps as often as possible; they are obliged to attend a certain number of camps to attain higher ranks in the organization. The camps provide the opportunity for the members to form friendships with people from various other Ukrainian communities. The emphasis in each Plast meeting, whether weekly, or during the summer, or at any other occasion, is on teaching the youth the historical, political, and cultural content of their Ukrainian descent. In connection with this programme, each local branch also sponsors a number of events during the year, to which the entire community is invited, such as, commemorative concert-lecture evenings, scouting festivals, evenings of customs and folklore, dances, and so on.⁵²

SUM has an almost identical organizational structure to that of Plast. The same network of weekly, monthly meetings, summer camps, and sponsorship of community-wide events, is conducted by an adult leadership for the youth members. However, SUM places its primary emphasis on the political awareness of its members. This organization had been founded in the midst of Ukraine's struggle for independence, in the late 1920's. It was an effort by students to take an active and organized part in the country's fight against the bolsheviks. Today, SUM is an integral part of the Political Immigration's "Freedom Front." This Freedom Front, also called the Liberation Front of Ukrainian organizations, in essence, consists of a large group of organizations which take, as their primary goal, the dissemination of information about the captive nation status of Ukraine and, about the Russification being enforced on the people remaining in Ukraine. These activities are taken as the indirect means of working for the future independence of the country. The member-organizations are age-graded: for the adults, there is the Organization for the Defense of the Four Freedoms of Ukraine, the Women's division of this organization, and the Organization of Former Members of the Ukra-

inian Insurgent Army; for the college students, there is the Students' Academic Association of Mykola Mikhnovskyi; and, for the youth, there is SUM.

In addition to SUM and Plast, and the student organization mentioned above, there are a Catholic students' group, an Orthodox youth group, another student organization sponsored by another national-political adult group, and SUSTA, a student organization encompassing all other student groups. Thus, a young, Ukrainian student may be a member of at least two student groups, (which is the usual case), or three or four, depending upon the extent of his involvement in the community's student life.⁵³ Whatever the individual case, all of these organizations hold monthly meetings, sponsor a number of events during the year, and hold a yearly conference and convention, at which delegates from every local branch participate.⁵⁴

And so, a child of immigrant parents who belongs to a Ukrainian parish, attends a Ukrainian school, and is a member of one of the youth groups, devotes quite a number of hours, each week, to exclusively ethnic affairs. Even then, this is only participation via membership, and does not include various events sponsored for the youth and for the entire community by other organizations, particularly, by adult organizations. Most of the adult organizations have a committee whose function is to initiate ways of communication between the younger generation and the older members, for the benefit of the younger generation. Thus, the women's associations concentrate on supplementing the cultural development of the young people; the Engineers' Society has formed a scholarship and stipend fund for the students; academic groups provide assistance for aspiring scholars; and, the insurance and mutual-aid societies concentrate on summer activities, geared at drawing the youth together for recreation in a Ukrainian setting.⁵⁵ These, and many other programs, are attempts at bridging the gap between generations while providing the opportunity for the young people to be socialized in various aspects of the ethnic adult life.

This, then, is the ethnic way of life of the Ukrainian group in the United States, when we focus on the community structure involving the children of the immigrants. As we can see, a large and pervasive factor of ethnic life is that of nationalism. A significant portion of the organizations focus on (and, are devoted to) the specific goal of actively working for Ukrainian independence. Many community events are of a nationalistic-political character: e. g., commemorative events of Ukraine's political struggle; or, supra-community, mobilized demonstrations against the Soviet Union, (occasions where entire communities, or several organizations from all communities, gather for a demonstration). At home, the parents often remind their children that it is their obligation to learn about Ukraine and to speak the language, etc., because they are to contribute toward helping their

fatherland achieve independence whatever small way they can, as immigrants. These are some of the factors which enter into the nationalistic, or political character of the second immigration. The question is, what implications do these political characteristics hold for the identification process of the second generation?

If we are to assume that the mode of orientation of the second generation toward ethnicity is in terms of the ideal and values of an ethnic heritage, then, the fact that the original immigrants, to a large extent, hold and stress an idealistic goal (freeing Ukraine), as being the essence of their identity, strongly suggests that there will be less of a conflict between generations and, greater degree of generational continuity; in other words, a slower rate of assimilation for the ethnic group. The first generation is goal-directed. The political situation in their country of origin has negated the cultural and social way of life that the immigrants knew as children. The present, and the immediate past realities of their homeland are hated and disputed by them. They have, therefore, set up an ideal to be realized in the future. The ideal, (not the present reality) are the basis for the immigrants' ethnic identification. Such a content of ethnic identification should be more salient to the mode of orientation toward ethnicity that is characteristic of the second generation, according to Fishman and Nahirny. In other words, in the case of an immigrant group which stresses an ideology as being the basis of its identity, (such as present political immigrant groups, including, Hungarian and Cuban refugees of the 1950's and the 1960's respectively), the second generation should feel stronger ties with its ethnic group than it would in an economic immigration, for example.

But, the matter is not simple. It would seem to me, that the above would hold true only conditionally, other factors being equal. For, there is the question of transmission of the ideology, (i. e., of the goal and its basic values, which form the rationale for achieving the goal). If the first generation usually emphasizes continuity in terms of an abstract goal-ideology and, less so in terms of concrete and specific elements of its culture and tradition, then the transmission of the goal-ideology becomes crucial for any significant continuity. Failure to transmit the stressed ideology leaves the second generation more open to assimilation. Giving the goal-ideology primacy in the ethnic identification complex and, understating the importance of culture and tradition, leaves the culture and tradition with less of a hold on the second generation. In other words, culture and tradition become less influential in stemming assimilation in the cases where the goal-ideology is rejected than they would be if they were initially given greater importance. This is not to say that the goal orientation of the immigrant group completely excludes culture and tradition. In fact, culture and tradition are part of the identificational complex for the group. But, primary importance is given to the commitment to a future goal — to freeing Ukraine from Russia.

The situation in Ukraine is not too hopeful at present, as far as a drastic political change is concerned. Ukraine is a satellite of Russia; it is one of the republics within the network of republics of the Soviet Union. Thus, the goal to which the Ukrainian political immigration was initially, as a whole, committed to, seems remote indeed. For this reason, those who remain committed to it are often looked upon as idealists, and their organizations are considered to be ideological organizations. Membership in these organizations, theoretically, entails complete personal commitment to the goal.⁵⁶

What has happened within the Ukrainian communities since 1949 is this: the once like-minded group is now characterized by two divergent views; there is no longer complete agreement as to the nature and direction of organizational and personal efforts to be undertaken by the immigrant group. A major portion of the immigrants is still upholding the goal of freeing the "Fatherland" and, sees this as the only "logical" basis for adhering to the Ukrainian identity. Others feel that they, as immigrants, cannot, "realistically" change the course of events, that they should settle for a comfortable life in this country and pattern their ethnic life on that of other minority groups in America. Essentially, they feel that it is no longer meaningful to continue making the distinction between the Ukrainian "political" immigrant group and, any other historical ethnic immigrant group.

For the purposes of this thesis, I will make a distinction between two types of ethnic orientations toward the ethnic identity: a goal-directed (or, ideological) orientation, and a cultural-traditional orientation.

B. The Theoretical Basis of the Sample Chosen —: The Second Generation

I contend that the goal-directed orientation will result in a different type of ethnic indentifications for the second generation members socialized by goal-directed adults, than will socialization into the cultural-traditional orientation. Specifically, I am hypothesizing that there is an ideological type of identification, and a cultural-traditional type of identification. Furthermore, I am arguing that these two types of ethnic identification will lead to different degrees of generational continuity for the second generation.

The basic assumption will be that the *mode* of orientation of the second generation is in terms of the values and ideals of the ethnic heritage. If this assumption is valid, then the goal-directed orientation will hold more of an appeal for the members of the second generation than would the cultural-traditional.


Why should this be so? The goal-directed orientation presupposes an attachment to the abstract and general symbols of the ethnic

heritage, i. e., the heritage, in toto, being symbolically transmuted. At the same time, it provides a fusion of the ideal of the past with a concrete, present-time, behavioural referent — striving today, for the attainment of a future goal. The cultural-traditional orientation is based on a valuation of specific items of the historical ethnic way of life, with more of a past-time reference, (the items being valued for their own sake). Now, each of these *orientations* holds vastly different implications in terms of their present day significance and applicability.

What are some of these implications of goal-directedness vs. cultural traditionalism? The first question would be, How wide is the range of items of culture and tradition which can be "meaningfully" adapted to the present way of life in the United States? Specifically, How many items have a significant behaviour referent in the present situation? Given a past-time reference, the ethnic group ties of the cultural-traditionalists would seem to lack the urgency and intensive involvement of the future oriented, goal adherents. Also, the goal-directed orientation seems to provide greater leeway for its adherents. The Goal-directed orientation implies present-day actions, whose consequences are to attribute to the realization of a future goal. Exactly what the actions are to be cannot be prescribed by the first generation. The original immigrants are much less familiar with American society than is the second generation. The shared bond between the two generations can be a strong sentiment and dedication to an abstract goal; the ways of achieving this goal need not be the two generations. Yet, whichever means the goal-directed members of the second generation choose to utilize, these means will strengthen their ethnic identification by virtue of being chosen for the Ethnic goal.

The specific methodological question to be asked is: With a focus on the second generation, which of the two orientations more frequently evokes a personally acceptable ethnic identity, and, in turn, which one results in a stronger commitment to ethnicity? To put it another way, which orientation is more prevalent among the members of the second generation, and which one produces a greater degree of ethnic consciousness in terms of the extent and type of participation in the ethnic community, and the types of attitude toward ethnicity, the particular ethnic group to which they belong, etc.


In terms of a theoretical proposition, then, I am arguing for the consideration of an intervening variable. Traditional theoretical arguments on the subject of ethnic identification and the problem of generational continuity were:



Where:

- " A = the unrestricted class of cases
 E = 'effect conditions' — the variable characteristics of
 i cases that the theory is intended to account for
 variations in, and
 C = the hypothesized 'causal' property."⁵⁸
 i

In other words, traditionally, variation in the strength of ethnic identification of the members of an ethnic group was explained by the generational position of a particular member. Thus, the strongest identification was characteristic of the members of the first generation, a weaker identification characterized the members of the second generation, etc. This was the theory, yet, the actual facts did not always uphold it. My argument is, that generational position, by itself, does not account for variable strengths of ethnic identification. What has to be considered is the type of orientation toward its ethnic identity, existing in a particular ethnic group. The "type of group orientation" is the intervening variable between generational position and the strength of ethnic identification. This argument would take the following propositional form:



The extension of this argument to the case under consideration in this thesis is: with a focus on the second generation, those members who adhere to the ideological orientation will exhibit a stronger degree of ethnic identification than will those who adhere to the cultural-traditional orientation. This will be so, because of the valusitic *mode* of orientation characterizing the nature of ethnic ties of the second generation.

On another level of analysis, we have three factors interacting together to form the resulting degree of identificational continuity: (1) the group orientation toward its ethnic identity, (2) the type of identification required to continue the particular ethnic identity, and (3) the generational modes of orientation toward the ethnic identity. The particular kind of group orientation(s) existing in an ethnic group results in a particular kind of ethnic identification. "Type of Identification" is not a purely generational phenomenon. Rather, it is the result of the interaction of the elements defining the group identity. The mode of orientation of a particular generation, on the other hand, together with the existing type of identification, is responsible for the degree of continuity, from one generation to the other. Thus, an ideological group orientation, as stressed by the first

generation, has a good prognosis for continuity into the second generation because of the second generation's valuistic mode of orientation.

A proposed scheme for the interaction of group orientation, mode of orientation, and type of identification, can be found in *Language Loyalty in the United States*, by Fishman and Nahirny.⁵⁹ The table is reproduced here:

Generational Differences in Orientation Toward Ethnicity

Generations:	1st Gen.	2nd Gen	3rd Gen.
Type of Identification	Primordial	Symbolic	Functional
Mode of Orientation	Personal-Affective	Symbolic-Affective	Cognitive-Appreciative
Object of Orientation	Tradition (Ancestral Past)	Ideology (Transmuted Past)	History (Historical Past)

The interaction of these three factors is the groundwork that the authors provide to illustrate how differences in ethnic identification (i. e., types) arise. Their argument hinges only on differences in generational position. What they do not consider is the possibility of differences in ethnic identities. In terms of Fishman and Nahirny's categories, my argument is that differential identities result in different group choices for the "object of orientation", and, therefore, in different processes of identification with ethnicity.

In the case of the Ukrainian political immigration, the object of orientation of the first generation is not tradition, as Fishman and Nahirny state, but, ideology; in their scheme, ideology is the object of orientation of the second generation, exclusively. Thus, taking their general typology, "type of identification", "mode of orientation", and "object of orientation" — I am arguing that the mode of orientation is the distinguishing characteristic between generations, as Fishman and Nahirny do, but, that the object of orientation depends upon the group as a whole, upon the group identity, rather than upon generational position. (That is, the object of orientation may be the same for all generations).

C. Methods of Sample Selection

To substantiate the existence of different types of ethnic identification on the basis of different group orientations toward ethnicity, and to argue against Fishman and Nahirny, that different types of identification are the products of differential generational position.

I have chosen a sample of fifty members of the second generation, living in the Ukrainian community in New Haven, Connecticut. Since, concern here is only with those who actually identify with the ethnic community, even minimally, and not with those who have been absorbed into the larger society, the sample was drawn from the membership files of Saint Michael's Ukrainian Catholic Church, and Saint Mary's Ukrainian Orthodox Church, the two Ukrainian churches in the New Haven area. (Of course, the fact that there may be people of Ukrainian descent who, for various reason, refuse to identify with the community, is very important for a complete theoretical explanation of the dynamics of ethnic identification vs. assimilation, but, such an attempt is not possible within the limits of the present research). The sample, as drawn here, is intended to provide an explanation of the processes of actual identification, and, as such, to serve as the first step in the development of a complete theory on ethnic identification. Future research, focusing on all members, those who identify as well as those who do not, I believe, will not contradict the present research findings, but rather, will supplement and uphold them.

Only those between the ages of 14 and 23 were included in the sample. Anyone over the age of twenty-three would not have fallen in the category of the second generation of the political immigration. ("Place of birth" served as another check on generational position). Of the sixty-two names comprising the initial list, forty-six people were contacted and interviewed during the spring of 1967, (from February through May). An additional attempt was made to contact the others during June; the final sample consisted of fifty people. Of the remaining twelve, seven were used to pre-test the interview schedule; the rest were students away at college and could not be reached. In effect, then, I managed to interview almost all of the members of the second generation of the Ukrainian community in New Haven, who were between the ages of 14 and 23. Why was the age bracket set at a lower limit of 14? An answer of secondary importance is — for practicability. Since the same interview schedule was to be administered to all, I felt that those who were below the age of 14 (freshman in high school) would not be able to understand the questions as well. The other reasons are to be found in the specific propositions that I have set out to prove.

D. Propositions

The basic purpose of this thesis is to prove that two distinct types of ethnic identification can be found within the same generational group. This hypothesis will be tested by examining the identificational components of second generation Ukrainian children. I am proposing that the children who belong to Plast and SUM will manifest a different type of ethnic identification than do the children who belong to various other groups within the community. It is

being assumed that Plast and SUM members are being socialized in the ideological orientation, while those who do not belong to these two organizations are being socialized in the cultural-traditional orientation.

As I have stated before, Plast and SUM are directed by the adult sector which actively works toward the goal of freeing Ukraine from Russian communist rule. The direction of the youth organizations consists primarily in socializing the children to take upon themselves the responsibility for achieving this goal, especially, as the future adults of the community. In fact, a major portion of the goal-striving efforts of the adults themselves is focused on the members of these youth organizations. This is partially the result of their realization that the goal cannot be achieved in the foreseeable future, almost certainly, not within their own lifetime. Those respondents who belong to either of these two organizations will be referred to as the "members." The "non-members", on the other hand, will be those respondents who participate in other spheres of the ethnic community, such as, the religious, the cultural, and the purely social. Thus, they are active members of the ethnic community. They differ from the youth organization members precisely in their lack of involvement in the political aspects of Ukrainian immigrant life. Their energies are directed to various cultural activities, such as a Ukrainian dance group which tours New England, such as the church choir, etc. It is hard to say whether they are more or less active ethnically than are the members. That they are, indeed, very active in the social and cultural spheres of the community is evidenced in the interviews. My specific propositions are:

1. The ethnic identification of the youth organization members will differ in the *nature* of the factors entering into it, from the ethnic identification of the non-members.
 - a. The factors entering into the identificational complex of the members will have predominantly political overtones; as, for example, negative attitudes toward communism, substantial interest in political developments in Eastern Europe and in the United States, etc.
 - b. The factors entering the identification of the non-members will be directed toward the historical past and toward specific cultural items.
2. For the members, differentiation between the Ukrainian ethnic group and other minority groups will be based on the existence of a political goal in the Ukrainian group, and an absence of an analogous goal in other groups.

The non-members will use "uniqueness of culture and tradition" as the differentiating factor.
3. The members will hold optimistic attitudes as far as the future continuation of the ethnic community is concerned. The non-members will tend to be pessimistic.

4. The object and the strength of conflict, grounded in the ethnic situation, will differ between the members and the non-members. The non-members will experience a greater amount of conflict with their parents; the members will feel greater conflict with reference to the wider social environment in which the Ukrainian community exists.
5. The members will have a greater amount of familiarity with other Ukrainian communities and national organizations. The non-members will tend to see ethnic interests in terms of their local community.

E. The Interview

1. *The Interview as an instrument for measuring ethnic identification*

The basic method used for measuring the ethnic identification of the members of the second generation was an interview-questionnaire schedule. Since the purpose of this thesis was to measure the degree of identification with the ethnic community and, to get at the proposed differences in the type of identification experienced by the individuals, it was felt that a simple questionnaire would be too restrictive and, probably, leading, for most respondents. Ninety questions were formulated, many of which were completely open-ended, and of a general character. The respondents were probed to expound their opinions on the issues touched in the interview. The intention was to allow the respondent free ground for expressing what he felt to be the significant and crucial factors in his identification with the ethnic group. (The interview-questionnaire is given in section A of the appendix).

The interview was divided into three sections: the demographic characteristics of the individual respondents, their participation in the ethnic community, and their attitudes toward various aspects of community life. The section on demographic characteristics included information on residence, place of birth of the respondent and of the parents, age of respondent, occupation and educational attainment of all family members, present level of education of the respondent, his future educational and professional aspirations, and family income.

The section on participation was formulated on the basis of the existing organizational and institutional structure of the Ukrainian community. It, therefore, included information on all organizational memberships, experience in the ethnic school systems, participation in specific types of community events, summer camp attendance, etc. Information on parental and sibling, as well as, peer group participation in these activities was also gathered. In essence, the section on participation was principally formulated on the consideration of the unique characteristics of this particular ethnic group. (See the discussion emphasizing the necessity of taking into account the

differentiating elements of a specific ethnic group: pp. 49-53 "Identificational Components —: Cultural Variants", of this paper). Questions on peer group participation were included to check for the possibility of peer group influence in the respondent's participational identification. If the peer group was a source of identification here, rather than wider community considerations, then we could question the respondent's commitment to the ethnic group orientations, to the value systems.

This section, then, reporting the respondent's organizational and associational activities, served as an objective measure of his ethnic identification. The section following, on attitudes, served as the subjective measure. The attitudinal questions constituted a corroborative measure, a check on the reliability of participation, as a form of identification. If the attitudes of a reportedly active respondent proved to be negative or antagonistic, one could question the matter of his identification with the ethnic community. This section was also intended to disclose, at least partially, the psychological processes, the motives, underlying identification with ethnicity. Questions on ethnicity in general, on ties with the Ukrainian community in particular, on individual opinions about generational continuity and the reasons for these opinions, were also included. (A detailed discussion and analysis of the questions will be presented in the next chapter of this paper).

2. The Pre-test: some changes in procedure

During January of 1967, the interview-questionnaire was pre-tested in New Haven. The interviews were conducted by the present writer. The pre-test sample consisted of seven respondents. Precautions were taken to include members of the two youth organizations, Plast and SUM, as well as, those who did not belong to either of these two youth groups. Thus, there were two members of Plast, three members of SUM, and two non-members. The first, very obvious, but, somewhat surprising finding was that almost all questions differentiated between the members and the non-members, with the interesting exception of the questions on demographic characteristics. The questions were general, yet, all members answered in terms of the "goal", (striving for the freedom of Ukraine, either, directly or indirectly), while, the two non-members consistently spoke of their pride for the past customs and traditions of the ethnic group. The interview was, therefore, retained in its original form.

Interviewing the pre-test sample, and the final sample, did not prove to be too difficult. With the exception of one individual, every person contacted, agreed to cooperate. I have to admit that this extent of cooperation may have been due to the fact that I introduced myself as being of Ukrainian descent. In the majority of cases, this proved to

be necessary. The initial contact was almost always made by telephone. Usually, one of the parents answered. When I began to speak in English, I either failed to be understood, and, as a result, encountered reluctance on the part of the parents to call their children, or, if the parents knew enough English to understand, they were still unwilling to have their children interviewed.⁶⁰ I, therefore, spoke in Ukrainian. My introductory remarks were simply this: that I was a graduate student at Brown University, that I had come to New Haven to gather data on the community life of Ukrainian youth and, that this was a research project which was being conducted in connection with my Master's thesis. I did not give the parents or the respondents any other information about myself or about the actual purposes of this thesis. Very often I was asked why I had chosen the Ukrainian group for study. My answer was, that much research had been done on other ethnic groups, but none so far, had been done with the Ukrainians; as recent immigrants, the Ukrainians could provide information on ethnic life in the milieu of present day America. This appeared to satisfy the inquisitive respondents. Many of the respondents were especially glad to participate in the interview; they looked upon this as a rare opportunity to let their feeling be known, their feelings about the adults, about the community, specific organizations, and so on.

As I have mentioned before, the Ukrainian immigrants are very anxious about their children. They make every attempt to safeguard the ethnic identity in the younger generation. This fact forced me to change the setting for the interview. Initially, I had expected to do the interviewing in the homes of the individual respondents. During the first day of interviewing, (the pre-test stage), I visited three homes. My trips to New Haven were made on week-ends. Thus, the parents of the respondents were usually at home. The first interview took place in the family living room, with only the respondent and myself present. The parents were in the dining room. After the factual questions had been asked, I proceeded to question the respondent about her attitudes on various ethnic issues. Very quickly, I became aware that the respondent was becoming increasingly tense. The parents were within hearing distance, and she kept glancing in their direction. At times, she asked if she could turn to her parents for advice on a particular question. I kept encouraging her to answer as best as she could, on her own, that this was all that the interview required, that I was interested only in her personal opinion. The same situation occurred in the other two homes. As a result, the rest of the pre-test sample, and the entire final sample was interviewed outside of the home. Each respondent was asked to come to a pre-arranged, and convenient place outside of the home, for the interviewing. Most of the interviews were obtained on Saturday and Sunday afternoons either, after the Language School sessions, or after church, and took place in the parish halls. This proved to be

the best setting, allowing the respondents complete freedom to answer as they wished. On the average, the interview lasted about an hour and a half.

(To be concluded.)

Footnotes

1) *The Montreal Star*, Aug. 8, 1966, No. 184; letter to the editor written by Mr. J. Oryschuk of Montreal.

2) *The Philadelphia Evening Bulletin*, Phila., Aug. 5-8, 1967; reports on De Gaulle's visit to the World's Fair being held in Montreal, Canada.

3) The most recent example is *Strangers Next Door*, by Robin M. Williams Jr., (Prentice-Hall, Englewood, N. J., 1964). I had personally asked the author why this was usually the case and, suggested that it might be due to our pre-occupation and concern with race, rather than, with ethnic groups. Dr. Williams agreed, saying that racial relations formed the main theoretical problem today.

4) Milton M. Gordon, *Assimilation in American Life*, Oxford Univ. Press New York, 1964, pp. 69-71.

5) Tamotsu Shibutani & Kiam Kwan, *Ethnic Stratification*, Macmillan Co. New York, 1965, p. 50.

6) Marshall Sklare, "Assimilation and the Sociologists", in *Commentary*, May 1965, pp. 63-66.

7) It is impossible to enumerate all of the authors who use this definition here. Each author mentioned in this paper either used this as his main definition, or quoted others who did.

8) Daniel Glazer, "Dynamics of Ethnic Identification", *American Sociological Review*, vol. 23, 1958, p. 31.

9) See, Ludwig Geismar, "A Scale for the Measurement of Ethnic identification", *Jewish Social Studies*, vol. 16, 1954, p. 33 and J. Kramer & S. Leventman *The Welcome Heritage*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1951, p. 72.

10) Joshua A. Fishman & Vladimir C. Nahirny, *Language Loyalty in the United States*, Mouton & Co., London, The Hague, 1966, pp. 326-29.

11) Robert F. Winch, *Identification and Its Familial Determinants* Bobbs-Merrill Co., New York, 1962, p. 11.

12) Kramer & Leventman, *op. cit.*, p. 73; the authors contend that choice of a particular type of occupation is related to the feeling of "Jewishness" for members of that minority group.

13) See, *Cultural Values of American Ethnic Groups*, by Sr. Frances J. Woods C. D. P., Harper & Brothers, New York, 1956.

14) (*Op. Cit.*) see footnotes, 7, 8, and 9.

15) See, Muzafer Sherif and Carolyn Sherif, *Reference Groups*, Harper & Brothers, New York, 1964, p. 59.

16) Geismar, *op. cit.*, especially, pp. 35-36.

17) *Ibid.*, p. 36.

18) Chain, (1955) as quoted in Victor D. Sanua, "Patterns of Identification with the Jewish Community in the U.S.A.", *Jewish Journal of Sociology*, No. 6, 1964 p. 191.

19) Sarkis Atamian, *Social and Ideological Conflict of the Armenian Community and Its Politico-Historical Antecedents*, phld. Master's Thesis, Dept of Sociology, Brown University, 1954.

20) Nathan Glazer, "Ethnic Groups in America: From National Culture to Ideology", in Morroe Berger, et. al. (eds.) *Freedom and Control in Modern Society*, Octagon Books, Inc., New York, 1964.

21) Nahirny and Fishman illustrate this situation in their book, *Language Loyalty*, cited above, and in their article, "American Immigrant Groups: Ethnic Identification and the Problem of Generations", *The Sociological Review*, vol. 13, No. 3, Nov. 1965 pp. 311-326.

22) Jerzy Zubrzycki, *Polish Immigrants In Britain: A Study of Adjustment*, Martinus Nejhoff/The Hague, 1956. This work is of special significance for this thesis because the author concentrates his analysis on a political immigrant group; the ethnic group chosen for the present thesis is also a political group.

23) Zubrzycki, *op. cit.*, see, chapters I. (Political Emigration), VI. (The Concept Adjustment), XI. (Assimilation), XII. (Accommodation), and XIII. (Conflict).

25) Stanislaus Ossowski, *Class Structure in the Social Consciousness*, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1963, p. 6.

26) Louis Wirth, "Types of Minority Movements", *Collective Behaviour*, R. H. Turner & L. M. Killian, eds., Englewood, N. J., Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1957.

27) *Ibid.*; this scheme is more extensively developed in Wirth's, *Community Life and Social Policy; Selected Papers*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956, pp. 237-60.

I would like to point out that this thesis argues for the consideration of ethnic groups who do not wish to assimilate. Of course, there are studies of groups whose policy aimed at assimilation. Some of the assimilationist groups, on the other hand, had the unique problem of not being able to assimilate because of structural factors, such as, for example, a tight network of traditional family ties, which mitigated against intended assimilation.

28) Shibutani, *op. cit.*, p. 58.

29) Geismar, *op. cit.*, p. 33.

30) S. N. Eisenstadt, *From Generation to Generation*, The Free Press of Glencoe, London, 1956, p. 15.

31) M. L. Hansen, "The Third Generation in America", *Commentary*, vol. 14, Nov., 1962.

32) Nahirny and Fishman, "American Immigrant Groups: Ethnic Identification and the Problem of Generations", *The Sociological Review*, vol. 13, No. 3, 1965.

33) *Ibid.*, pp. 314-323, and especially, pp. 316-317.

34) See, "Symposium: Jewishness and the Younger Intellectuals", *Commentary*, vol. 31, 1960, and "Jewish Culture and the Intellectuals", *Commentary*, vol. 19, 1955.

35) Especially see the Introduction to "Jewish Culture and the Intellectuals", by Norman Podhoretz, pp. 451-452.

36) The Displaced Persons' Act: passed by Congress in 1949, specifically, for the purpose of permitting refugees of the Second World War, who were, at that time, living in the Allies' 'Displaced Persons' camps, entry into America.

38) *History of Ukraine*, I. Nahayewsky, pbld. America, Inc., Phila., 1962.

39) *Ukrainians in the Free World; 1894-1954*, L. Myshuha & A. Dragan, eds., pbld, Svoboda, Jersey City, N. J., 1954.

40) *Ukrainian Insurgent Army In Fight For Freedom*, a collection of articles, documents and official addresses, pbld., the United Committee of the Ukrainian-American Organizations of New York, "Dnipro" publishing Co., N. Y., 1954.

41) *Ukrainians in the Free World*, *op. cit.*, pp. 115-117.

42) See the appendix for a listing of the names of these organizations.

43) For an incisive analysis of this type of ethnic institution, and, especially, with reference to the Ukrainian group, see *Language Loyalty in the United States*, by Fishman, *op. cit.*

44) *Evening Bulletin*, Aug., 16, 1966, Phila.

45) *Ibid.*

46) *Ukrainians in the Free World*, *op. cit.*

47) The struggle of the American Catholic church with various ethnic national churches (e. g., the Irish, Italian, Polish, etc.), provides a comparable illustration of the distinction between "religion" and national churches.

49) The teachers in these schools are frequently people who had been university teachers in Ukraine, and who find the immigrant schools to be the only areas for fulfilling their professional roles. In recent years, quite a number of younger people, (from the second generation) have begun to teach in these schools, also.

50) Ca. The center for the music institute is in New York City, while the art institute's center is in Philadelphia. There is also a series of ballet schools in the major cities of settlement.

51) The North American membership of these two organizations is about, 10,000, (for the U.S. & Canada). Both organizations are also found in the Ukrainian communities of Western European countries, (e. g., England, Germany, France, Belgium, etc.)

52) Each organization, (Plast & SUM) makes an effort to plan a schedule of activities for the entire year.

53) All of these organizations are national organizations, with central committees organizing their activities, co-ordinating their publications, calling national conventions, etc.

54) Conventions are held in a different city each year, and officers are elected from various parts of the country to further co-ordinative and communicative functions.

55) For example, the oldest Ukrainian immigrant institution in the United States, the Ukrainian National Association, an insurance company with almost a million subscribers, and a publishing company in one, owns a spacious mountain resort in the N. Y. Catskill mountains, which is the center of cultural, social, and recreational activity for all Ukrainians. Weekly activities, planned to attract various age groups succeed in drawing people from various parts of the United States & Canada.

56) For a treatment in depth of the nature of ideological ties see, V. C. Nahirny, "Some Observations on Ideological Groups", *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 67, No. 4, Jan., 1962, and V. C. Nahirny, "The Russian Intelligentsia: From Men of Ideas to Men of Convictions", *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, vol. 4, No. 4, July 1962.

57) General formulation of a theoretical proposition, adapted from Dr. M. Martel's scheme, as presented in his course on sociological theory, at Brown University, footnote 58 is an explanation of this theoretical scheme. It is taken from Martel, "Class Supplement #1: Vignettes on the Nature of 'Scientific' Theory for Sociologists", prepared for the course on Systematic Sociological Theory, Brown University, 1964. To quote Martel, "... a theory is an explanatory argument, consisting centrally of systems of elementary theoretical propositions. Each proposition may be viewed as having the following form: For all A's, C \xrightarrow{i} E, where:

A = unrestricted class of cases, E = "effect conditions",

C = hypothesized "causal" property, and

\xrightarrow{i} = connection or relation asserted between C and E
(e. g., certain stages of C predict certain stages of E)

See, page 8, for further explanation.

59) *Language Loyalty in the United States*, op. cit., p. 351.

60) This reluctance to be interviewed is, in part, related to the "political" nature of the Ukrainian group. Most of the parents had lived under Soviet occupation for some time, and the totalitarian conditions have not been forgotten; suspicion of any type of questioning still prevails. Significantly Jerzy Zubrzycki devotes a lot of attention to the fact that he had to change the procedure of his ethnic community study on the Ukrainians and the Dutch in Australia because of this distrust for questioning. In order to continue with the study he was forced to turn to the community leaders for support and legitimation. Only after the Ukrainian bishop, the intellectuals and the press, gave their public support, did the respondents cooperate. See, *Settlers of the Latrobe Valley*, by J. Zubrzycki, Cambridge Press, Sydney Australia, 1963.

W. BEZCHLIBNYK

UKRAINIAN LIBERATION FRONT IN CANADA

REPORT FROM THE CANADIAN LEAGUE FOR THE LIBERATION OF UKRAINE

In view of the necessity of a continuous and organized support for the liberation struggle of the Ukrainian people against Russian Communist enslavement, the Canadians of Ukrainian origin have set up an organization to provide both material and moral assistance for those who are struggling for their freedom and independence in Ukraine. This organization of Canadian Ukrainians is known as The Canadian League for the Liberation of Ukraine, under the presidency of Dr. Roman Malashchuk.

The organization was founded in 1949 and at present it has over 5,000 members in seventy-three branches, with thousands of supporters and sympathizers all over Canada. The chief purpose of the Organization is to organize our forces, as well as those of other Canadians who are willing to fight Russian imperialism and international Communism with appropriate means and methods. The tasks of CLLU have been specified as follows:

To enlist Canadian Ukrainians as well as Canadians of other national origin to the cause of liberation of Ukraine and other non-Russian nations, subjugated by Soviet Russian imperialism;

to popularize the idea of political independence and sovereignty of Ukraine and other enslaved nations, as the key to a lasting peace in Europe and in the rest of the world, and as the only way toward the elimination of the Russian slave empire once and for all — regardless of its colours, ideologies, etc.;

to stress the necessity of a united front of all the peoples subjugated by Moscow, and the need of close co-operation between the free and subjugated nations in their struggle against Russian imperialism and international communism.

To promote its ideas the CLLU has taken part in numerous activities over the period of existence, ranging from demonstrations and picketing to panel discussions, lectures, etc.; but above all publication and distribution of books, booklets, pamphlets, leaflets and other pertinent material. As it would be impossible to cover the 22 years of activity of CLLU in a short report, we will concentrate on the activities of our Organization for the last year period.

During the last year, in connection with UNESCO glorification of Lenin as humanist on the occasion of his 100th birthday, the CLLU as a principal organizational member of ABN-Canada initiated and patronized numerous protest actions all over Canada, denouncing Lenin through distribution of informative material throughout Canada, and by addressing letters to UN Secretary-General U Thant. Lenin was denounced as one of the main instigators of massive genocide, terror, and as the architect of enslavement of numerous nations in the USSR. Numerous street demonstrations were staged in major Canadian cities denouncing Lenin the "humanist" and his sponsor UNESCO. The Ukrainian youth from Toronto, Montreal and other adjacent areas travelled to Ottawa to demonstrate in front of the USSR embassy. The major Canadian daily newspapers carried extensive information about these actions. The young members of CLLU together with the representatives of other Canadian groups organized a very successful exhibit in the Toronto City Hall Public Library in Fall 1970 entitled "Leninism Without Make-up", which provided a documentary evidence of the true inhuman face of Lenin and atrocities during and after the Soviet Russian Revolution. The said exhibit attracted wide attention and publicity, and is in continuous use at the present time.

In connection with the persecutions, imprisonment and trials of many intellectuals in Ukraine, the CLLU is constantly active in their defense. The CLLU made representations before the Canadian Government by presenting a brief on the subject and by promoting the writing of protest letters to the United Nations and the Commission on Human Rights. Protests in defense of the Ukrainian historian Valentyn Moroz, the writer and journalist Sviatoslav Karavanskyi, the Red Cross worker Mrs. Kateryna Zarytska and others, were staged in many Canadian cities. The Ukrainian students and youth organized their own demonstrations before the Soviet embassy in Ottawa and other major centers in Canada on January 30th, 1971. Thousands took part in those mass protests.

The recognition of Communist China by the present liberal Government of Canada, despite numerous protests from the Canadian citizenry, was only the first step of the Trudeau government in the direction of recognition and cooperation with Communist regimes. Prime Minister Trudeau's next step was his visit to the Soviet Union in May 1971, in order to "diversify relations" and to help counteract the "overpowering" effects of the United States. Mr. Trudeau also signed a "protocol" between Canada and USSR on consultations which means a prolonged relationship with the USSR if Mr. Trudeau stays in power. During his visit to the capital of Ukraine, Kyiv, Mr. Trudeau in his speech compared Soviet "federalism" — based, as everybody knows, on coercion and force — with Canadian federalism, causing widespread and open dissatisfaction in Canada. After being

asked by Canadian Ukrainians to make representations to the Soviet leaders on the issue of the persecutions of Ukrainian intellectuals, during his stay in the USSR, Mr. Trudeau, on his return, declared that "my position in the Soviet Union or in Canada is that anyone who breaks the law to assert his nationalism does not get too much sympathy with me." He then compared Ukrainian nationalists with F.L.Q. (Front for the Liberation of Quebec) in Quebec. The said statement by Mr. Trudeau, and his comparison of Ukrainian intellectuals with the leftist F.L.Q. terrorists in Quebec also caused a great uproar in the country and a sharp reaction in the Canadian Parliament and in the news media. In Parliament, members of the opposition attacked bitterly the Prime Minister for failing to take up the cause of freedom for the Ukrainian intellectuals, and for his negative attitude toward this matter. The members of Parliament S. Paproski, W. Skoreiko, R. Thompson, R. Korchinski, E. Wooliams and many others, criticized the Prime Minister for his remarks and his ignorance of the basic differences between the Canadian and Soviet political systems, and other issues pertaining the Soviet Russian slave empire.

The Canadian press and television of Ottawa, Toronto, Montreal, Winnipeg, Edmonton and other Canadian cities openly declared themselves against Prime Minister's statements and stand in connection with his trip to the USSR. *The Toronto Daily Star* of June 1, 1971 pointed out in an editorial entitled "Trudeau insensitive" the difference between Canadian and Soviet systems. The *TDS* stated:

"In Canada, leaders of minority groups, and others who are discontented with the established order, are free to campaign for change by peaceful means — by speeches, articles and petitions or by organizing a political party to contest elections, as for example, Rene Levesque and his separatist followers have done in Quebec. Under these circumstances a resort to violence cannot be justified.

In the Soviet Union, the situation is altogether different. Under the Communist party dictatorship there are no genuine elections and no legal means by which the mass of the people can change either the government or its policy. Criticism of the state, or disagreement with the party line, are regarded as treason. The authorities are particularly keen in hunting down "dangerous thoughts" among national minorities such as the Ukrainians. This leaves no effective recourse but revolution."

The Toronto Telegram of June 2, 1971, in its editorial "Trudeau and Ukrainians" dwelt on Russification in Ukraine: "While the Russian constitution grants free cultural flowering to all minorities, the fact is that Ukrainian expression is under a deliberate campaign of Russification." The editorial concludes by calling on Ukrainians and Jews to fight together against a common adversary: "The truth

is that repression, whether of Jews or Ukrainians, is all of a piece in the Soviet Union. And an outcry from Canada would be far more effective as a Canadian demonstration against Russian tyranny. For tyranny, like freedom, is indivisible; when it touches one man, regardless of his origin, it touches all."

The morning daily *Globe and Mail* of June 1, 1971, in another editorial "There is no comparison", stated that "Mr. Trudeau speaks as though the difference between Quebec revolutionaries and Ukrainian revolutionaries — and their treatment by their governments — is purely academic." And then asked: "Does he (Trudeau) conveniently forget that the Ukraine was forced into the Soviet federation at some considerable cost to Ukrainians?"

The Winnipeg Free Press of June, 2, 1971, in its editorial "Mr. Trudeau and Ukrainians", on the issue of Trudeau's comparison of Ukrainian intellectuals with the Quebec terrorists, stated:

"Because the Ukrainian intellectuals advocate either autonomy or separatism, they are being held in camps under conditions such as existed under the Nazis and under Stalin, abominations for whose elimination thousands of Canadians fought and gave their lives. To compare these Ukrainian martyrs with a misguided band of kidnappers and assassins is not only an insult to the Ukrainian intellectuals and their kin, but a slap in the face of every democrat who abhors totalitarian tyranny. This, however, is the primrose path trod by all those who try to curry favour with ruthless dictators. First they turn a blind eye to the dictator's atrocities, and then they strive not to offend their new friends' sensibilities."

The known Canadian journalist L. J. Zink in his article in the *Toronto Telegram* of June 9, 1971, entitled "PM offended all Canadians", declared that:

"The captive people behind the Iron Curtain do not expect the democracies to wage a war for their liberation, but neither do they expect and certainly do not deserve, what amounts to cynical disregard of their suffering by an elected representative of free men . . .

What really matters are the implication of Mr. Trudeau's arbitrary Soviet policy and political foundations of this country and therefore affects all Canadians, . . ."

Another renowned Canadian journalist Peter Worthington also published in *The Toronto Telegram* a whole series of articles on the subject.

To complete the picture of our Prime Minister's political behaviour, it is necessary to mention here his refusal to send greetings on the occasion of the celebration of the 20th anniversary of CLLU in 1969. His motivation was that he cannot greet an organization whose

objectives — liberation of Ukraine and other subjugated peoples, and the reestablishment of their independent states — were contrary to the “interests” of Canada. It should be pointed out, however, that other Prime Ministers of Canada before the Trudeau era *did send* their annual greeting to CLLU, complying thus with a universally accepted etiquette. Most certainly the Russians did not bother with the Canadian rights as a sovereign state when they organized a spy ring in this country, as it was revealed by Ihor Gouzenko, (former Soviet cipher clerk in the Soviet embassy in Ottawa, who defected to the West). This state of affairs still persists.

However, a few “letters to the editor” giving approval to Mr. Trudeau’s policies did appear in the Canadian press. One of them was a letter from a small Communist organization in Toronto, which praised Mr. Trudeau’s actions as “timely and wise.” In a letter to the editor of *Globe and Mail*. June 11, 1971, a prominent Toronto lawyer, Mr. S. W. Frolick, reacted to the Communist statement as follows:

“I wonder how long it would take for our domestic Communists to crawl out of the woodwork to praise Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau’s statements and actions following his visit to the USSR and condemn those who disagreed with his equating of Ukrainian nationalists with the FLQ, drawing a parallel between our Canadian federal system and the Soviet Federation and, generally, by completely failing to comprehend the nature and essence of the Soviet totalitarian system.”

One can only wonder what is behind our Prime Minister’s utterances, ignorance of facts, indifference, misinformation or deliberate action to bring a Trojan horse of Russian “federalism” or the Russian way to “populate the Canadian north”, into Canada and North America in general, using at the same time a “Trudeauvian logic” to conceal the truth by twisting facts as long as it would be necessary. It is hard to believe that a head of state would speak on any subject pertaining international policy without doing a minimum of research on the subject he intends to speak about. It is true, however, that it would be most difficult to acquire the necessary objective information on the subject of Soviet Russian “federalism” by studying the Soviet sources only. Fortunately, there are many primary sources on Soviet Russian slave empire. By studying them, as well as the Soviet constitution, one can easily grasp the essence of Soviet Russian “federalism.” “For example, Section VIII, Article 103, of the Constitution states: “Equality of the rights of citizens of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, irrespective of their nationality or race, in all branches of economic, state, cultural, social and political life.” To a man like Mr. Trudeau, and to his advisers, it should be clear that the present regime denies the above rights to all Ukrainians by implementing a policy of Russification in Ukraine, and

other non-Russian republics of the USSR. Pertinent information on the situation in Ukraine can be found in many contemporary works on the USSR produced by writers residing in USSR (*The Chornovil Papers* by V. Chornovil, *Internationalism or Russification* by I. Dziuba, and the essays of the well known Ukrainian historian Valentyn Moroz, etc.), or by such disillusioned communists like the Canadian I. Kolasky who wrote the revealing *Education in the Soviet Ukraine* and *Two Years in Soviet Ukraine*, published in Canada. There are, obviously, many other works on the subject that cannot be ignored!

Let us return once more to the constitution of the Ukrainian SSR. In section VIII, Article 105, there is also a guarantee of freedom of speech. This right was violated by the Soviet Russian regime in Ukraine by arresting and sentencing of many intellectuals and common citizens precisely for using *that* right of free speech, and for taking the Soviet constitution seriously. It is also a fact that Ukrainians in the USSR have the "right" to demand complete independence for Ukraine, as guaranteed by the constitution. The Section II, Article 14 reads as follows: "The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic reserves the right of free withdrawal from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics." So it seems clear that in making representations on behalf of imprisoned Ukrainians before the Soviet Russian authorities, Mr. Trudeau *would have* defended the Soviet constitution and "socialist justice", which is *not* being broken by citizens of the USSR but by their dictatorial government and the "wise and progressive" Communist party.

The question now arises whether Mr. Trudeau is uninformed on the subject, misinformed, an indifferent fellow traveller, or a conscious manipulator on the international scene with far reaching plans? Whatever are the motives behind Mr. Trudeau's policies and actions, the real beneficiary is without doubt the USSR. As Provincial Secretary and Minister of Citizenship of Ontario John Yaremko put it: "Most of the events he (Mr. Trudeau) participated in have given a respectability to the Communist system as it exists in the USSR. His partnership agreement will equate Canadian democracy with that of a totalitarian dictatorship."

Even ignorance and lack of information does not excuse Mr. Trudeau from what he did, since ignorance in dealing with the Russians has always been, and unfortunately still is, a major cause for the centuries old Russian expansionistic thrust toward world domination. In this connection it would be only appropriate to quote Karl Marx, who, as reported in *The New York Times*, April 9, 1853, had said: "In all essential points Russia has steadily, one after another gained her ends, thanks to the ignorance, dullness and consequent inconsistency and cowardice of Western governments."

The disillusionment with Trudeau's internal and external policies did not start with his trip to the Soviet Union, where among other

things, he praised the founding of the city of Norilsk in Northern Siberia, not realizing, or maybe disregarding the known fact that Norilsk was built by slave labour and at the cost of countless of thousands of human lives. It began much earlier with the resignation, among other events, of two cabinet-ministers, Mr. P. Helyer and Mr. E. Kierans. After a period of silence and preparation Mr. Hellyer founded a new political movement called "Action Canada", and sits in the Parliament as an independent liberal. Another liberal member of Parliament, Mr. P. Ryan, left the liberal party and joined the conservatives.

The dissatisfaction with Trudeau's "liberalism" is not limited to his international pronouncements and policies. There is a growing concern that his "Moscow protocol of friendship and cooperation" might alienate Canada's neighbour to the South, United States, and put Canada in a position similar to that of Cuba. The dissatisfaction with Trudeau's government is further augmented at home by inflation and widespread, government-provoked unemployment. The following excerpts from the Toronto's *Globe and Mail* of June 30, 1971, will illustrate the growing concern of Canadians about the present state of affairs in Canada:

"The all-party (Commons External Affairs Committee) committee, most of whose members are liberals, assailed the Government for downgrading peace and security as a central objective of foreign policy. (...) "The Trudeau Government's foreign policy is 'confused and inward looking', according to the Tories on the Commons External Affairs Committee... It is 'totally inadequate in the world's present dangerous state', say the committee's new democrats.

A minority report issued yesterday by the eight Conservative members of the all-party External Affairs Committee said Canada's foreign policy has strained relations with other countries, disillusioned Canadians and damaged morale among the foreign and military services."

The membership of the CLLU has been also active on still another front. Although the front in question is the religious one, its influence on the political life of the anti-communist community in the free world cannot be denied. After the Ribbentrop-Molotov agreement, and because of its consequences, the Ukrainian Catholic Church — the largest Catholic group beside the Roman Catholics — was liquidated by the Soviet Russian invaders. Thirteen archbishop and bishops, thousands of clergymen and faithful were arrested, executed, and sent to Siberian concentration camps for their Faith and their loyalty to the Pope. Only after 18 years of imprisonment the surviving Archbishop Major Yosyf Cardinal Slipyi was freed on the intervention of the late Pope John XXIII. Cardinal Slipyi is regarded by all Ukrainians, regardless of their creed, as a martyr for the

Christian faith, "a living symbol of anticommunism, religious integrity and courageous loyalty" to the Roman Pontiff.

Cardinal Slipyi planned to organize the Ukrainian Catholics in the free world along the lines of the agreement of Berestya of 1595-6 (between the Ukrainian Church and the Holy See), and the pronouncements of the II-nd Vatican Council, which endorsed the organization of ALL Catholic Churches (including the Ukrainian CC) as autonomous bodies (units) responsible directly to the Pope. The desire of Yosyf Cardinal Slipyi to build the Ukrainian Catholic Church as an autonomous body led by its own patriarch was refused by the Roman Curia. Furthermore, the Vatican has recently refused permission to the Ukrainian Cardinal to visit his faithful in Canada. This unprecedented act of discrimination on part of the Vatican has made Cardinal Slipyi virtually a prisoner of Rome. It should be noted that there are some 5,000,000 Ukrainian Catholics, of whom 200,000 live in Canada. The Ukrainian Catholics, despite their numbers, were refused autonomy from the Vatican through their own Patriarchate, although there are far less numerous Catholic groups such as the Armenians, Copts, etc., who do have their autonomous churches headed by their own patriarchs. The refusal to create a Ukrainian Catholic Patriarchate has more political than religious overtones. It is seen by Ukrainians as a rapprochement between the atheistic Russia and the Vatican. The well known Canadian journalist, Peter Worthington, of *The Toronto Telegram*, June 12, 1971, analysed the row between the Ukrainians and the Vatican quite ably:

"Ukrainians see four main reasons why the Vatican is opposing Cardinal Slipyi's visit.

One, the Vatican's continuing rapprochement with Moscow, which stands against everything Cardinal Slipyi stands for, is seen as a factor. Pope Paul met Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in 1966 and President Podgorny in 1967, and there have been expanding relations ever since — which tends to make most Ukrainians suspicious anyway.

Two, they see the campaign against Cardinal Slipyi as a political play by the Vatican to keep in good standing with the Italian Communist Party, which has roughly one-third of the popular vote.

Possibly the Communist Party will one day be elected to office in Italy, and the feeling is that the Vatican doesn't want to unnecessarily irritate the possible future government by co-operating with the symbol of Catholic anti-Communism — which is what Cardinal Slipyi is.

Three, there is the natural resentment of a big corporation against a strong minority group seeking autonomy and a degree of independence.

And four, the Vatican probably sees time as being on its side, since when the Cardinal Slipyi dies there is no heir-apparent of his stature and magnitude.

The Vatican may feel that if it can hold out until Cardinal Slipyi is off the scene, the whole Ukrainian-rite movement for its own patriarchate will fade, and the body will become progressively more Latinized and assimilated.

It is an emotional issue for all Ukrainians, who are more conscious than many nationalities about their identity and culture."

Needless to say, that the Russian Orthodox Church in the USSR is an instrument of the Russian government. By liquidating the Ukrainian Catholic Church in the Western provinces of Ukraine in 1946, and by manipulating the Roman Catholic Church in the free world, Moscow endeavours to make further gains in its attempts to undermine the anti-communist forces in the world.

The Canadian League for the Liberation of Ukraine and all Ukrainians in the world will continue their struggle for the liberation of Ukraine and other enslaved nations by Communist Russia. We shall continue our struggle together and in co-operation with all the organizations of WACL, and with all those who realize the danger and threat that Russian imperialism and communistic dictatorship pose for the enslaved and still free nations of the world. With a common and united effort we shall overcome our common enemy!

TRUDEAU BEGS THE UKRAINIANS' PARDON

On June 7, 1971 the Canadian Prime Minister Pierre E. Trudeau received in Ottawa a 7-member delegation of KUK (the Committee of Ukrainians of Canada) under the leadership of Rev. Dr. V. Kushnir. The delegation was made up of members of the KUK Presidium from Winnipeg and members of the KUK and the Ukrainian Student Association Executive Boards from Toronto. After an hour-long discussion with the delegation, which presented him with a memorandum with suggestions and demands, Trudeau said at a press conference that he "begs pardon of the Ukrainians if he hurt their feelings" in connection with his visit to the USSR and his statements to reporters.

He said that he is aware of the difference between Ukraine and the Canadian provinces and did not mean to compare "the Ukrainian nationalists to FLQ." He, allegedly, "had not said what he wanted to say."

The subject of intervention with the government of the USSR to obtain the release of illegally convicted intellectuals was passed over with a statement that this can be attempted in conversations with USSR representatives "on a humanitarian basis."

Such solution to the problem is far from what is being expected and demanded by the Ukrainian community in Canada from its government. Canada should be the spokesman of freedom and equal rights for all nations and individuals, including the Russian-subjugated Ukraine.

JEWISH POLITICIAN ON CARDINAL SLIPYI AND DR. HORBOVYI

(Editor's Note: Volodymyr Lutsiv, a well known Ukrainian tenor and bandura player recently conducted an interview with a prominent leader of the Zionist Movement for the liberation of Jews in the USSR, Prof. Isaac Shufilinski. The interview was held in London).

Question: Dear professor, please tell me your name, your place of birth and a bit about yourself.

Answer: My name is Isaac Shufilinski, born in Leningrad. Prior to my arrest in 1952 I was a supervisor of one of the departments in the system of the Ministry of Arms Production. Arrested as a Zionist-American spy, I was given the death sentence. The sentence was commuted to 30 years of imprisonment, of which I spent 14 years in prisons and camps of Taishet, Kazakhstan and Mordovia. I was unexpectedly released in 1966 without being rehabilitated.

Q.: Where have you been living after your release from camp?

A.: I lived in Karaganda, for I was not permitted to go to Leningrad. In the years just before my departure for Israel, that is in January 1971, I lived in Ukraine. After my release from camp I devoted all my time to the problem of liberation of Jews from the USSR and now in the free world this question continues to interest me.

Q.: It is true that while in camps of the USSR you were personally acquainted with a number of Ukrainian leaders who shared the same fate as you?

A.: I shall tell you with pleasure about our mutual friends and acquaintances from camps in the USSR, in particular the Ukrainians. In 14 years in Siberia I had a number of friends among representatives of the *Ukrainian Independence Movement*, with whom I was not simply acquainted but very close. I do not remember the names of them all, but I can name the major ones: first of all my cell-mate for long years in the "spesh" (camp slang for special treatment area) in strict and "especially strict" regime had been V. Horbovyi. This is a man whom the Ukrainian Soviet officials systematically took to Ukraine and promised him all possible advantages of comfortable life, new apartment, pension, etc. All this was done to have him renounce nationalism. The Minister "of security" of Ukr. SSR took him around Kyiv and across Ukraine in his car, showed him collective farms, new structures, factories and so forth. His family was brought to him and his wife and children tearfully begged him to change his mind. Weeping, Dr. Horbovyi's wife asked her husband to look at C. F. (here a Ukrainian political prisoner is meant who having

spent 17 years in concentration camps and prisons broke down, received a new apartment and work, and lives together with his family). But *Horbovyi did not yield nevertheless*. He was brought from Taishet to Kyiv in camp "rags" which he refused to take off. And so after each such trip Dr. Horbovyi returned to camp a prisoner. All this time he conducted himself with such *dignity and honesty* that I cannot call it anything other than *heroism*. This is really a *great personality of the Ukrainian National Movement*. He is considered a leader of this Movement. Horbovyi and I were bound together by great friendship and common interests. And what a man he was.

Q.: What other Ukrainians do you still remember, professor?

A.: I often recall my other Ukrainian friends, one of them being Metropolitan Y. Slipyi, the present Cardinal. Both of us were first in strict regime in Taishet, or rather in Vykhorovka, and later we spent time together in "especially strict" regime. I had the honour of sharing a bunk bed with him. At one time he slept above me, then under me. This was a man who enjoyed *tremendous prestige* in camps. This was a man who by his posture and two or three words could turn due attention to himself not only on the part of his cell-mates who were confined together with him, but also on the part of the officers, the inhuman guards, who nevertheless saw and felt that a *great personality*, a great man was before them. I recall interesting discussions with Metropolitan Slipyi on theo-philosophical topics, as well as the fact that he did not agree with my views most of the time. In general an interesting group of people had been there. Besides Metropolitan Slipyi there were, for instance, two Polish priests: Archbishops Fr. Benedict and Fr. Ladislav. We conducted interesting conversations on various subjects. If you should have an opportunity to meet Cardinal Slipyi please give him my sincere compliments and tell him that after his departure from "10 shtrafnik" (Penal Camp No. 10) the wife of one of the prisoners came to us to camp, who heard on the radio from Rome the speech by the Metropolitan at the Council, in which he mentioned us, those who remained in camps after he was taken to Rome. We were all very happy to learn that he had not forgotten us. We also remembered him. Many people in camps loved and respected him. My most cordial greetings to the Cardinal. Shalom! (a Jewish form of salutation — Ed.).

I also had such friends as O. G. This was a man of great knowledge and intellect. In the beginning we were drawn together by the mutual study of the English language, and further the study of the question of Hinduism, later on the theo-philosophical questions and so forth. In general our meeting in camps did not have a social character but rather, I would say, fraternal. This fraternity did not end even after the camps.

I was released and he was released. After this we met and I had a chance to meet his family, his little boy, even his dog. He came to my house. O. G. is a man of whom the Ukrainian Nationalist Move-

ment and the Ukrainian nation in general can be proud. *He is one of the more prominent people of Ukraine.* When I visited him for the second time he told me that after my first stay he was called out by the chief of the town's KGB and asked: What do you want from that Jew; what have you got in common with that Jew?

This had happened on the eve of my departure to Israel. I went to O. G. with the Israeli flag on my chest. Seeing this the local Ukrainians fled from me as far as they could, most likely out of fear.

I also remember Shukhevych's son, Yuriy, very well. He is a *wonderful lad* who conducted himself like a hero in camps. I remember that when we were saying farewell to him before his departure for Vladimir (prison) it was almost a tragedy for us.

A wonderful boy, I do not know where he is now. When we are speaking about Shukhevych, then I know *Hryhoriy P.* very well, a former soldier of UPA (Ukrainian Insurgent Army) who took part in the battle in which General Shukhevych died. Hryhoriy conducted himself like a *real hero*. Seeing that all the fighters around him are dead, he fired a rifle at himself. Thus he wanted to end his life. Almost dead, he was taken to the hospital by the Chekists where his life was saved. After this the interrogations began. Now he is constantly sick. He barely exists, for his health is poor and he has to work in order to feed his family. This man is worthy of admiration.

Q.: Professor, now that the Bolshevik regime has intensified the persecution for all manifestations of aspirations for independence of Ukrainians, Jews and other peoples in the so-called USSR, is there a chance, in your opinion, that all nations subjugated by Russia will stand up together against the common enemy?

A.: The people in general are not divided into Ukrainians, Jews, Russians, but into scoundrels and honest men. As you can see, my opinion of Ukrainians is not stereotyped. I had and still have close friends among your countrymen and I am very glad of it and I can tell you without going into detail that some of them helped us Jews in our national activities, while we helped them in their activities. Frankly, this is a secret; it is impossible to mention names, for these people are still in the USSR. Such cases did exist and I can only be pleased. There is nothing strange in this. I have told you a few things about my Ukrainian friends, who lived up to their tasks in camps. For, as you know, not all in camps reached such heights, and this, of course, pertains to all nationalities.

Dear professor, thank you very much. Please accept our best wishes for the future from me and the Ukrainians in the whole world who cherish the idea of Independent Ukraine. We are glad that we have a sincere friend in your honourable person. Recently I visited your homeland Israel, which I liked very much. Therefore permit me to bid you farewell with your salutation. Shalom, shalom.

Volodymyr Lutsiv

London, 1971.

Report from Ukraine

UKRAINIANS IN RUSSIAN CAPTIVITY

Below we are publishing an additional list of Ukrainian prisoners, who were sentenced by Russian chauvinists to shorter and longer terms.

1) **Roman Semenyuk**, member of OUN (Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists) sentenced to 25 years. In 1965 additional 3 years were added on for an attempt to escape. His comrade **Anton Oliynyk** has been executed by shooting.

2) **Yosyf Tereza** sentenced to 8 years for "Ukrainian nationalist propaganda.

3) **Mykola Bohach**, born in 1944 in Kuban, a student at the Mykolaiv agricultural technical school, in which he tried to found an "Organization Fighting for Social Justice", sentenced to 4 years of strict concentration camp, which was lowered to 3 years by an appeals court.

4) **Lyuba Nastusenko**, a nurse, imprisoned in September 1969 in Kolomyia for "nationalistic agitation." According to unconfirmed reports, she was taken to a special mental hospital for forced treatment. The *Ukrainian Herald* feels that this is the first such case in Ukraine.

5) **Mykola Ruban**, born in 1940, from Konotop, imprisoned at the end of 1968, sentenced in 1969 in Kyiv to 5 years for founding an organization of "nationalist character" and for circulating leaflets.

6) **Petro Tokar**, born in 1909, a Jehovah's Witness, sentenced in 1947 to 25 years of forced labour camps.

Apart from this, among prisoners of the so-called union republics we come across many Ukrainian names, while in Ukraine, many non-Ukrainian names, some of whom can also be Ukrainians.

Lithuanian in Russian Captivity

Albanis Telkenis, born in 1924, had been imprisoned in 1969 and sentenced to 3 years for allegedly circulating a letter "slandering party policy in agriculture."

Further Arrests

According to reports received from Ukraine, arrests and repressions of nationally-conscious Ukrainians continue there, in particular in the Lviv region and in Kyiv. In one locality of the Lviv oblast, **Evstakhiy Pastukh** had been arrested for spreading false information on the basis of Article 187 of the Criminal Code of the Ukr SSR.

Semen Korolchak had also been arrested in the Lviv region; he is charged on the basis of Article 62 of CC Ukr. SSR with "anti-Soviet agitation" and with spreading underground publications.

In the town of Novyi Rozdil of the Lviv oblast the 18-year-old **Petro Medvid** had been arrested at the end of May of this year in connection with the raising of the blue and yellow flag (the Ukrainian national colours) on the tower of city hall of that town. In line with information received from Lviv, P. Medvid had absolutely nothing to do with the said case. In prison during an investigation the KGB agents are said to have beaten him severely.

On May 28th of this year, 37-year-old **Anatoliy Lupynis** had been arrested in Kyiv because during the Shevchenko demonstration at Shevchenko monument on May 22nd of this year he read his own poem. Lupynis spent 8 years of imprisonment in prisons and corrective-labour camps for "anti-Soviet activity."

TERROR IN UKRAINE CONTINUES

New reports have reached us from Ukraine about further repressions, arrests and the struggle of the KGB organs with young people and students.

According to the newest reports, **Semen Korolchuk** has been arrested in the Ternopil region on charges of organizing assistance to Ukrainian patriots imprisoned in Mordovia.

In Odessa, **Nina Strokata**, who held the post of scientist-microbiologist, was dismissed from work at the Medical Institute. N. Strokata, the wife of S. Karavanskyi, is the author of many scientific publications. When she refused to denounce her husband, pressure was applied to her to leave her job at the Institute "at her own request." When she did not agree to this, she was discharged "due to reduction of the staff", leaving her without any means of support.

The organs of the government dealt a bit differently with the wife of Valentyn Moroz — Raisa, a teacher of German language at Ivano-Frankivsk, who is of Greek descent. When upon demands to leave the job "voluntarily" she refused, a competitive examination for a teacher of the German language was held, in spite of the fact that **R. Moroz** taught there for a long time and that in such cases competitive examinations are not held. R. Moroz failed the "competitive examination", and her place was taken by a young, inexperienced teacher. Now it is demanded of R. Moroz to leave "voluntarily" the apartment in which she lives with her son and which had been acquired on communal rights.

In the Department of Social Sciences of the Lviv University, a well known scholar Prof. **Stepan Shchurat** has been dismissed from work, as well as able economist, assistant Professor **Obukhivskyi**. Also dismissed from work at the Lviv University were Prof. **Lukiya Humetska** (born in 1911), a well-known philologist, and specialist **Ratych**.

An attempt to dismiss **Atena Volytska** from work "at her own request", a chemical engineer, a lecturer at the Lviv University and an organiser of a professional association failed when the collective of her co-workers stood up for her. The threats that the laboratory in which A. Volytska is working will be closed, and all its employees will find themselves without a job, did not frighten the people and they continued to defend their rights. Some frightened workers advised A. Volytska to leave work voluntarily, but she refused.

May 22nd passed this year in Kyïv, just as in previous years, rather violently. In order to neutralize the demonstrations of young people and students near the monument to T. Shevchenko, the organs of the government brought companies of Komsomol members, who with their loud singing were to prevent patriotic or anti-Russian speeches. According to the Komsomol programme some girl student delivered a pro-Russian and an anti-Semitic speech near the monument. Reacting to such a provocative speech, a student of Kyïv University (whose name has not been determined as yet) spoke on behalf of the assembled youth, condemning anti-Semitism and emphasizing the great ideas of Shevchenko which call for friendship and cooperation among nations. His speech was interrupted and he was arrested on the spot by the KGB organs. Likewise, a group of his friends who defended him were allegedly also arrested.

Halyna Didyk, the former oblast leader of the Ukrainian Red Cross in the Ternopil region, returned to Lviv from imprisonment. H. Didyk, born in 1912, had been arrested on March 5, 1950 and sentenced to 25 years in prison. She spent a long time at Verkhnye-Uralsk, and later in the Vladimir prison. In 1968 prison was changed to camp imprisonment. Prior to her release H. Didyk was confined to camp No. 6 in Mordovia. Returning to Lviv she is said to have written a protest to the Supreme Soviet of the Ukr. SSR, which had become known in Kyïv. The contents of her letter is so far unknown.

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Letter from Ukrainian political prisoners, signed by some 70 intellectuals. The letter reached free world in a clandestine manner.

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Written by Ivan O. Kandyba, a political prisoner, secretly tried in 1961 by Russian government for demanding legal status for the Ukrainian SSR. Kandyba turns for help to the people of this planet for help!

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In Eastern Europe "revolt of the youth" is no longer merely a hollow phrase. Such most impressive movement — in Ukraine, where the youth try to awaken Ukrainian national consciousness.

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ISSUES EXAMINED: 1951 — 6/7, 11, 1952 — 3, 11/12. 1953 — 5/6. 1954 — 1/2. 1955 — 5/6. 1956 — 1/3, 4/5, 6/7, 8/9, 10/12. 1957 — 1/2, 11/12. 1958 — 1/2, 3/4, 5/6, 7/8, 9/10, 11/12. 1959 — 1/2, 3/4, 5/6, 7/8, 12. 1960 — 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6. 1961 — 1, 2, 4, 5, 6. 1962 — 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6. 1963 — 1, 2, 3, 5. 1964 — none. 1965 — 4, 5. 1966 — 4, 5, 6. 1967 — 2, 3, 4, 6. 1968 — 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. 1969 — 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6. 1970 — 1, 2, 3.

Book Review

Elie Wiesel: *DIE JUDEN IN DER UDSSR; Antisemitismus im Sowjetreich.* (The Jews in the USSR; Anti-Semitism in the Soviet Empire.) Bechtle Verlag, Munich and Esslingen, 1967, 153 pp. with appendix "Documents" edited by Henry Rouvier.

A well-known Jewish novelist, Elie Wiesel, went to the USSR with the intention to get better acquainted with the problems of the Jewish people living on the territory of the Russian empire. Subsequently his book "Les Juifs du Silence" appeared in Paris. It was promptly translated into German and published in Munich.

Mr Wiesel views the problems of Jews in the USSR through the ideological eyes of some Jews of 30 or 40 years ago. He does not realize as yet that we are no longer living in the age of mankind's struggle against Nazi racism and the alliance of Western powers with Stalinist Russian imperialism, but in the age of free-

dom-loving nations' struggle against Russian potentates who aspire to rule the world. The appearance of the Israeli national state, the Russian manipulations to crush that state and to dominate the whole Middle East, the national liberation movements inside the Soviet Russian empire — are some of the dramatic examples of the present age.

At the time when Israel boldly proclaims its resolve to fight Russian aggressive attempts to extinguish its national life, when in Ukraine, the foremost intellectual, Ivan Dzyuba, calls for reconciliation between the Ukrainian and the Jewish peoples with the aim to unite in a common struggle against the mutual

enemy, while the idea of a *world Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations* is gaining ground — Elie Wiesel hopes to win Soviet Russians' favours (?) for the Jews and bluntly attacks the Ukrainian people subjugated by Russia in the out-of-date racism manner, instead of trying to organize a common front of all peoples subjugated by Soviet Russia with the object of liberation from the oppressors and chauvinists.

This highly educated Jewish author reveals some basic historical and geographic ignorance when he writes that the Germans were massacring the Jews "on the occupied *Russian territory* — from Minsk to Kyiv, from Lviv to Vilno, from Zhytomyr to Kharkiv..." (p. 38, italics added — A. W. B.) All these cities are either Ukrainian or Byelorussian and were occupied by the Russians in consequence of aggressive wars. Does Mr. Wiesel condone and approve Russia's colonialism and imperialism?

In the chapter "Babi-Yar" the author writes: "Kyiv is Babi-Yar... Babi-Yar is a mass-grave." (p. 43) We notice a typically racist approach to the terrible massacre of Jews in Kyiv by Nazi Germans during World War II, which tries to connect the *national* capital of Ukraine with this genocide.

And then: "The capital of Ukraine is hospitable... A Jew however looks for dead souls who wander around in this attractive countryside, for the blood of the innocent which pulsates in this beautiful and murderous city." (loc. cit.) Hence Eli Wiesel attempts to transfer the crimes of Nazi German racism and genocide to the Ukrainian nation. Such blatant racist hatred and falsification of history is indeed rarely found! He shamefully writes: "into Babi-Yar the Germans with the assistance of native collaborators have thrown the Jews — dead and alive." He purposefully tries to pin this terrible crime upon the enslaved strongly anti-racist Ukrainian people.

On the next page we clearly perceive that Wiesel's prime aim is to distort Ukrainian history and to help Russian imperialists to enslave Ukraine (he apparently forgot his aim

to help the Jews): "The recent past mingled with distant past; Babi-Yar of 300 years ago... Each city has its deserved heroes. In Kyiv he is called Bohdan Khmel'nytskyi... He is the pride of the Ukrainian nation. That he strangled children, set synagogues afire, destroyed hundreds of defenseless Jewish communities — these are negligible trivialities... Ukraine never achieved her complete independence. His 'victories' as Jew killer are unaccountable; Babi-Yar was the most brilliant, the bloodiest." (p. 44).

Historically it is known that Ukraine had been an independent state much longer than Israel. In the Middle Ages Ukraine-Rus' sovereignty lasted for around 500 years. In that time a Jewish community was thriving in Kyiv. Again in the 17th-18th centuries there existed an independent Ukrainian state as well as in 1917-20.

Mr. Wiesel, let's apply your thesis "One should forget nothing, one should tell everything." (p. 14) When parts of Ukraine came under the Polish imperialist rule in the 15th through the 18th century, Jews, having received a favourable status from the Poles, were terribly exploiting the Ukrainian people. The then economic crimes of Jews against Ukrainians were innumerable. The Ukrainian Cossacks had every right to defend the defenseless population against Jewish exploitation. And when the Bolsheviks conquered Ukraine a large number of Jews massacred thousands of Ukrainians without pity. The crimes of those Jewish Bolsheviks against Ukrainian freedom fighters were also horrible.

Eli Wiesel has every right to argue "Jerusalem is a city which obtained its right to eternity." (p. 93) "Israel must remain pure, holy and just — as an idea and as the incarnation of this idea." (p. 101). We have right to maintain: Kyiv is a city which unquestionably won its right to eternity. Ukraine will and must remain pure, holy and just — which she has been most of the time during her several thousand year old history.

Therefore we suggest that Mr. Eli Wiesel discard his racist anti-Ukra-

inian stand and his tolerance of Russian genocidal colonialism and join the ranks of those who love, honour

and fight for "Freedom for nations! Freedom for Individuals!"

A. W. Bedriy

Zh. A. Medvedev, THE RISE AND FALL OF T. D. LYSENKO, translated by I. Michael Learner, Columbia University Press, 1969, \$10.00.

The recent incarceration in a mental hospital of Zhores Medvedev, one of the leading geneticists (by achievements, if not by accredited position) in the Soviet Union, has focused considerable attention on his history of the Lysenkoist school of genetics and the almost irreparable damage which it did to the training of several academic generations of Soviet agriculturalists. It would be easy, therefore, to appraise this book solely as a work of topical interest, particularly as it was refused official publication in the USSR and circulated only in *samizdat* form, before finally being published in English translation in the USA.

Yet this work is far from being a topical "scoop." It is well-reasoned, well-documented history of an episode in Soviet history and planning that might well seem incredible save for the undoubtable truth that this, in fact, did take place. Basing their views on a largely unfounded interpretation of the work of Michurin (deceased, and unable to refute them), the Lysenkoists, with their watchwords of "vernalization", the denial of intraspecific competition, and, finally, the denunciation of the Mendelian laws of genetics as a device of fascism, gradually infiltrated and overpowered not only the whole agricultural practice of the Soviet Union, but every department, institute and university faculty even remotely connected with the teaching of genetics. Having received Stalin's fiat of "Bravo, Comrade Lysenko", this pseudo-scientist became the infallible oracle of all Soviet agricultural planning — with what result, history knows!

To all who value scientific truth, this is an alarming book. It presents a horrifying picture of whole policies

built up on one doubtful, unrepeatable experiment, or even on no experiments at all (many of Lysenko's dicta present an entirely new "theory" with a simple and unrefutable "It is well-known that..."), of carefully-"jacked" Academy meetings, and of the almost-open falsification of results and production figures.

How did it happen? This is the question that the author himself poses in a closing chapter. The appearance of false doctrines, he says, is inevitable in science, "they are the extreme variants of essential hypotheses, assumptions and theories." But where there is free discussion, such hypotheses will be gradually revised, rejected or discarded on the basis of later work. In Lysenko's case, however, we see how "such false doctrines, under the condition of the personality cult, can apparently be amalgamated with a dominant, dogmatic philosophy and thus receive the strongest support from influential ideological circles."

Lysenkoism is, of course, out of favour now in the USSR. The famous statue of Stalin and Lysenko in the central square at Ostrih, in the Rovno region of Ukraine, was removed in 1961. In 1965, the Mendel centenary was honoured by Soviet science, the Czech monk featuring as a "son of a fraternal nation." Yet Lysenko himself is still at large and in charge of a powerful research team. Shortly after the publication in America of this book, Medvedev was dismissed from post as head of the Obninsk Laboratory of Molecular Radiology. After putting down this book, one is left with the uneasy impression that it is relating, not so much an episode of history, but an event of which we have not yet heard the final ramifications.

Vera Rich

The
UKRAINIAN
REVIEW



IV

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C O N T E N T S

<i>Wolodymyr Mykula: SOVIET NATIONALITIES POLICY IN UKRAINE, 1920-1930</i>	2
<i>Dmytro Donzow: LENIN AS THEORETICIAN OF "PROLETARIAN" ASSIMILATION POLICY</i>	39
<i>Mykola Plakhotniuk: TRUTH IS ON OUR SIDE (A Reply to the Slanderers)</i>	56
<i>LaVerne R. and John P. Pauls: MAZEPA IN WORLD LITERATURE</i> ...	62
<i>Mykhailo Masyutko: IVAN FRANKO — THE FIGHTER FOR FREEDOM AND UNITY OF THE UKRAINIAN PEOPLE</i>	70
<i>Valentyn Moroz: THE FIRST DAY</i>	75
<i>Renata Maria Sharan: TYPES OF ETHNIC IDENTIFICATION AND GENERATIONAL POSITION: A STUDY OF THE UKRAINIAN IMMIGRANT GROUP IN THE U.S.A. (Conclusion)</i>	77
FIFTH CONFERENCE OF WACL:	
Delegates Warn against Appeasement	107
Resolution Asking the Free World to Help Ukraine and Other Captive Nations	108
Statement of the WYACL Secretariat	109
WYACL Resolution of Support of Ukraine and Other Captive Nations	109
WYACL Resolution on Valentyn Moroz	109
Book Review:	
Igor Shankowsky: <i>Korotke lito</i> . By Dr. Olga Orechwa	111
WHAT INSPIRES THE YOUTH OF UKRAINE?	112

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Volodymyr MYKULA, B.A. (Lond.), B. Litt. (Oxon.)

SOVIET NATIONALITIES POLICY IN UKRAINE, 1920-1930*

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTION

The Revolution which took place in Russia in 1917 brought about a considerable change in the situation of the dependent nationalities. The sudden collapse of the strict controls of the former system, and of the hindrance which this system imposed on the cultural and political development of minorities, released the initiative of the subject peoples of the former Tsarist empire. The politically-minded intelligentsia of the national minorities began, first of all, to express the new-found freedom, which followed the February Revolution, by forming political organizations and new cultural institutions. Demands of political autonomy, and sometimes even of independence, were publicly expressed by representative gatherings of various sections of the population. The failure of the Provisional Government to re-establish a satisfactory state of law and order in the country favoured the growth of separatist tendencies in the frontier areas of the Empire, which had non-Russian populations.

The Bolsheviks, who had "picked up their power in the streets" of Moscow and Petrograd, were pledged to satisfy certain political and cultural aspirations of the subject nations of the former Russian Empire. In order to mobilize all the anti-Governmental forces, and to make use of them in their own struggle for power, the Bolsheviks, on assuming control, proclaimed the right of the non-Russian peoples to possess autonomous powers within a Russian Federation, and even to secede from Russia entirely, should they so desire. Lenin, the chief architect of this policy, expected that in the era of International Socialism, which, he thought, the Revolution in Russia was inaugurating, all national particularities would lose their sharp distinction, the old antagonism of the colonial peoples towards the Russian metropolis would disappear, and so the offer of the right of secession from Russia would serve merely as a reassurance, and as an encouragement to stay in a voluntary union with Russia.

However, events showed that his expectation, if it was indeed sincere, was not justified. The border countries began, one after another, to secede from Russia. The immediate cause of this process was different in each case. Thus, in the case of Poland and Finland,

*) B. Litt. thesis, Faculty of Soviet Studies, University of Oxford (St. Antony's College, 1960.

there was no doubt that these countries would choose to secede. Their Independence movements were very strong and of long standing, and once Russia was in a weak position, they took the first opportunity of proclaiming their national independence.

In the case of Ukraine, however, the situation was more complicated. Here, the tendency toward secession from Russia was not so strong in the past. But here too, a point was reached when the Ukrainian Central Rada, (Council), which consisted largely of representatives of the various Ukrainian political Parties, refused to recognize the Russian Bolshevik regime, which, they considered, had been established by means of violence and the suppression of political liberties. On November 20th, 1917, the Central Rada, in its Third Universal proclaimed the establishment of a fully autonomous Ukrainian Democratic Republic, in undefined federal relations with a (non-existent) Democratic Russian State, in effect, was a declaration of independence from the Bolshevik Government in Petrograd. Lenin and the Bolshevik Party refused to accept this secession of Ukraine, for the loss of this strategically very important territory, with its millions of population, would have meant, in all probability, a mortal blow to the world proletarian revolution, which the Communists were convinced was beginning.

Constitutional relations between Ukraine and the R.S.F.S.R. were moulded by two factors: firstly, the theoretical postulates governing the strategy of the R.C.P.(b), and above all, by the view of Lenin, and secondly, by the practical expediencies of the moment.

Thus, in his article, "Finland and Russia", written in May 1917, Lenin considered the advantages of transforming Russia into a series of republics:

"The freer Russia will be, the more resolutely will our Republic recognize the freedom of the non-Great-Russian nations to separate, the more strongly will other nations seek a union with us, the fewer will be conflicts, the less frequent the cases of actual separation, the shorter will be the period of separation of some of the nations, the closer and more consolidated in the end will be the fraternal union of the Russian proletarian and peasant Republic with the Republics of any other nation."¹ Lenin considered, in fact, the possibility of a temporary separation of the non-Russian nations, but expected that it would merely result in an even stronger union of these nations, and that the separation might actually never occur.

The Bolsheviks were determined to seize power in Ukraine as well as in Russia, but in view of their earlier proclamations of the "right to self-determination inclusive of separation, and the creation of independent States",² they were forced to maintain appearances.

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Sochineniya*, Vol. 24. p. 304.

² "Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia", November 15th, (November 2nd, O.S.), 1917.

Thus on December 17th, (December 4th, O.S.) while sending an ultimatum to the Central Rada, the Sovnarkom of the R.S.F.S.R. at the same time recognized the complete right of Ukraine to national independence. The Congress of the Soviets of Ukraine, meeting on the same day, was expected by the Bolsheviks in Moscow and Kyiv to overthrow the Central Rada, and to establish the power of the Soviets. However, the Bolsheviks at the Congress found themselves in a small minority.¹ Defeated, they walked out of the Congress, and most of them reassembled in Kharkiv, where the 3rd Regional Congress of Soviets of the Donets and Kryvyi Rih (Krivoi Rog) industrial region was meeting. This joint meeting,² styled the 1st All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets, which was held on December 24-25th, (December 11-12th, O.S.), 1917, proclaimed the Soviet Regime in Ukraine, elected a Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of Ukraine, and a People's Secretariat, which was a rival Government to the Central Rada's General Secretariat. While paying lip-service to the slogan of "self-determination" for Ukraine, this Congress declared itself in favour of federation with Russia, abolished all decrees of the General Secretariat in Kyiv, and adopted instead the decrees which were valid in the R.S.F.S.R. It also appealed to the R.S.F.S.R. for help in its struggle against the Central Rada. The Bolshevik organizations of the Donets and Kryvyi Rih region subscribed very reluctantly, and only under pressure from Moscow to the endeavours of the Bolsheviks in the Kyiv region to maintain the fiction of an independent Soviet Ukraine, as a tactical move to neutralize the rising Nationalist feelings in Ukraine.

Meanwhile, alarmed at the threat of Bolshevik interference in Ukraine, and realizing that effective help for the maintenance of Ukrainian independence would not be forthcoming from the Western Allies, France and Great Britain, the Central Rada began to negotiate for a Separate Peace with the Central Powers, and to seek protection. To stress the complete separation of Ukraine from Russia in the negotiations at Brest-Litovsk, the Central Rada proclaimed in its 4th "Universal", dated January 22nd, 1918, full independence of the Ukrainian People's Republic. (U.N.R.)³

From the formal point of view, the 1st All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets which proclaimed the Soviet Regime in Ukraine on December 25th, 1917, did not go any further than replacing one form of government by another, emphasizing that Ukraine was a member of the Russian Federation, and extending the decrees of the R.S.F.S.R.

1) About 130, (including supporters from other Parties) out of some 2,000 delegates.

2) Altogether about 150 delegates took part, most of them Bolsheviks together with a few left-wing Ukrainian S. D's and S. R.'s. 128 people signed the Resolution. (*Vseukrayins'ki z'yizdy rad*, Kharkiv, 1932).

3) Resolution was actually adopted in the night of January 24-25, 1918, and was backdated to January 22nd, when the Session of the Central Rada opened.

to the territory of Ukraine.¹ The People's Secretariat of the U.N.R. (Soviet), included the following twelve secretaries: Military Affairs, Internal Affairs, Industry and Trade, Agrarian Affairs, Food, Finance, Education, Post and Telegraph, Labour, Minorities, Justice and Communications.

In fact, however, the independence or autonomy of the Kharkiv Government was largely nominal. Delegates from Ukrainian *gubernii* who took part in the 3rd and 4th All-Russian Congress of Soviets² were not differentiated from their Russian colleagues. In January, 1918, a representative from the U.N.R. was included in the Sovnarkom of the R.S.F.S.R. The management of the Ukrainian economic system was centralized in the Moscow Council of National Economy whose Branch in Kharkiv was not even called Ukrainian but "Southern."³ The nationalization of industrial enterprises was carried out, not by the Ukrainian authorities, but by the All-Russian Government.⁴ The financing of the industry in the Donbas was conducted by the Russian State Bank. However, there was a vague realization among a minority of the Ukrainian Bolsheviks, in particular those from the Kyïv region, that relations between Ukraine and Russia ought to be established on a federal basis. At the beginning of January, 1918, some inconclusive talks were held in Moscow, to discuss the outlines of the forms of these relations⁵

In concluding the Separate Peace of Brest-Litovsk with the Central Powers, the R.S.F.S.R. was compelled to recognize the independence of Ukraine, and to withdraw her official support from the Soviet Ukrainian Republic. Retreating eastwards before the advancing Germans, the Ukrainian Bolsheviks, who had been instructed by Moscow not to embarrass the R.S.F.S.R. by armed resistance, formally proclaimed the Ukrainian People's Republic as an independent Soviet State. The 2nd Congress of the Soviets of Ukraine, held in Katerynoslav (Ekaterinoslav), March 17th-19th, 1918, declared:

"At the moment, the Peace Treaty forcibly imposed upon the Russian Federation formally breaks the federative link between Ukraine and the entire Soviet Federation. Ukraine becomes an independent Soviet Republic. But in essence relations between the Soviet Republics remain as before. The working masses of Ukraine believe that already in the very near future the formal federative

1) Resolution of the 1st All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets. *Obrazovaniye S.S.S.R.* 1949, pp. 72-74. (This is a collection of documents relating to the years 1917-1922).

2) Held respectively in Petrograd, January 23-31st, 1918, and in Moscow, March 14-16th, 1918.

3) *Natsionalizatsiya promyshlennosti v S.S.S.R.* Moscow, 1954, p. 631.

4) *Op. cit.*, above on, e. g. the confiscation of the Russian-Belgian Metalurgical Company, (December 15th, 1917), which was declared to be the property of the "Russian Republic." Similarly other enterprises.

5) O. L. Chistyakov, *Vzaimootnosheniya sov. respublik do obrazovaniya S.S.S.R.*, p. 10.

union ought to be restored, and all Soviet Republics be united in a single World Socialist Federation."¹

On April 18th, 1918, the Government organs of Soviet Ukraine were dissolved at a meeting in Tahanrih (Taganrog), and were replaced by an Insurgent Committee. The Party Conference of the Ukrainian Bolsheviks, held in the same town on April 19th-20th, 1918, resolved to create a Communist Party (of the Bolsheviks) of Ukraine, (C.P.(b).U.), independent of the R.C.P.(b).² Although the 1st Congress of the C.P.(b).U., held in Moscow in July, 1918, nullified the decision to make the C.P.(b).U. independent of the R.C.P.(b), and equated it merely with the other regional branches of the R.C.P.(b), the formal independence of Soviet Ukraine was not cancelled when it was re-established at the end of November, 1918.

Before the new advance of the Red Army into Ukraine, at the end of 1918 and beginning of 1919, as the fight continued against the Nationalist forces of the Directory of the Ukrainian People's Republic, (U.N.R.), a Bolshevik-sponsored Ukrainian Revolutionary Soviet was formed on November 17th, 1918, in Sudzha near Kursk. This Soviet was later renamed the Temporary Government of the Workers and Peasants of Ukraine.

After the recapture of Kharkiv, this Temporary Government, in a decree dated January 14th, 1919, renamed the Ukrainian People's Republic, calling it the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic,³ and from January 29th, 1919, the Government began to be known as the Council of People's Commissars,⁴ (in Russian — *Sovnarkom*; in Ukrainian — *Radnarkom*).

The 3rd Congress of the C.P.(b).U., held at the beginning of March, 1919, in its discussion on the subject of the Constitution of the Ukrainian S.S.R. resolved "to adopt, in general, the plan of the Constitution of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic, allowing for changes dependent on local conditions."⁵ The 3rd All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets, which subsequently assembled, gave its approval to the first Constitution of the Ukrainian S.S.R. on March 10th, 1919.

The first article of the Constitution stated: "The Ukrainian S.S.R. is an organization of the dictatorship of the working people and the exploited masses — of the proletariat and poor peasantry — over their age-long oppressors — the capitalists and landlords." The proportion of representation of the proletariat in the Soviets was

1) *Rezolyutsiyyi Vseukrayins'kykh Z'yizdiv Rad*, Kharkiv, 1932.

2) *Istoriya K. P.(b).U. v materiyalakh i dokumentakh*, Vol. 2, p. 283. This proposal tabled by M. O. Skrypnyk received 35 votes, defeating the proposal by E. Kviring, a Katerynoslav Bolshevik, which received 21 votes.

3) *Uzakoneniya i rasporyazheniya Rab.-Krest. Prav. Ukrainy za 1919 g.*, p. 24.

4) *Ibid.*, p. 59.

5) *K.P.(b).U. v rezolyutsiyakh yego s'yezdov i konferentsiy*, p. 53.

much higher than that of the peasantry. Article 4. of the Constitution stated the intention of the Ukrainian S.S.R. to become a part of the "One International Socialist Soviet Republic", and, for the time being, to enter into close political union with the existing Soviet Republics.¹

Article 6 defined the sphere of competence of the organs of central power in Ukraine as follows:

"6. To the competence of the Central Soviet Power in Ukraine belong:

I. All matters of general State importance, in particular:

- a) Approving, emending, and supplementing the Constitution;
- b) Determining and changing the borders of the Republic;
- c) Relations with foreign States, in particular, declaring war and concluding peace;
- d) Laying down the principles of the organization of the armed forces;
- e) General direction of internal policy;
- f) Legislation in civil and criminal matters and on matters of procedure;
- g) Laying down the principles of Socialist construction in the sphere of national economy;
- h) Management of the monetary system, and the organization of the finances of the Republic;
- i) State control over the activity of the Soviet power, in particular, over the correctness, legality and purposefulness of financial expenditure.

II. All matters not of general State importance which will be adopted for consideration by the organs of the central Soviet power."²

The supreme organs of political power, according to the Constitution, was the All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets. In the intervals between the sessions of the Congress, supreme power was to be vested in the All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee (V.U.Ts.V.K.)³ and the Council of People's Commissars.⁴

As can be seen from the above, the Constitution of the Ukrainian S.S.R., which was adopted in March, 1919, provided for the full sovereignty of Ukraine in all matters of State. In practice, however, things were very different, for not only was the policy of the Soviet Ukrainian Government dictated indirectly by the R.C.P.(b), by way

¹ *Uzakoneniya i rasporyazheniya Rab.-Krest. Pravitel'stva Ukrainy za 1919 g*, Kharkiv, 1923, art. 204, pp. 275-281.

² *Ibid.* Also in *Istoriya Sovetskoy Konstitutsii, (v dokumentakh) 1917-1956*, Moscow, 1957, pp. 192-198.

³ In Ukrainian: Vseukrains'kyi Tsentral'nyi Vykonavchyi Komitet; the Russian equivalent being; Vseukrayinski Tsentral'ny Ispolnitel'ny Komitet, (V.U.Ts.I.K.).

⁴ In Ukrainian: Rada Narodnykh Komisariv, (Radnarkom). In Russian: Sovyet Narodnykh Komissarov (Sovnarkom).

of the C.P.(b).U.), but in many cases, the Government organs of the R.S.F.S.R. overrode the authority of the Government of the Ukrainian S.S.R. In the spring of 1919, the tendency towards handing over many of the functions of the Soviet Ukrainian Government to the corresponding organs of the R.S.F.S.R. became very pronounced. The Ukrainian Red Army, for example, consisted largely of Russian and other (non-Ukrainian) units, and the *Revvoyensovyet* (Revolutionary Military Council) of the R.S.F.S.R. had a Ukrainian Department, with Stalin in charge. Decrees of the R.S.F.S.R. were automatically extended to the Ukrainian S.S.R. The decree of February 13th, 1919, extended the citizenship of the Ukrainian S.S.R. to the citizens of other Soviet Republics. Russian currency was made legal tender in Ukraine.¹

Centralization of the economic system proceeded at a rapid pace. The R.S.F.S.R. administered directly a number of industrial trusts and branches of economy in Ukraine, e. g. the newly-formed "South Russian State Metallurgical Trust", and claimed direct ownership of them. However, the nationalization of industry was now being carried out by the acts of the Republics themselves.

Usually, it so happened that the Ukrainian Government organs asked the corresponding organs of the R.S.F.S.R. to merge one function or another under the latter's control. Thus, "on the suggestion of the Ukrainian Sovnarkom" the V.S.N.Kh.'s² of both Republics concluded an agreement (March 25th, 1919), on a unified economic policy, which stipulated, among other things:

"1. The marketable funds of the R.S.F.S.R. and the Ukrainian S.S.R. are merged, and their distribution is carried out by the utilization Commission of the V.S.N.Kh., in which representatives of the Ukrainian S.S.R. are included.

2. A common production plan for both Republics is fixed through the corresponding organs of the V.S.N.Kh. (departments, chief administrations, centres);

3. For both Republics, common prices are fixed . . .

4. The industry of the Ukrainian S.S.R. is planned by the V.S.N.Kh. of the R.S.F.S.R. through the V.S.N.Kh. of Ukraine . . .³

On April 24th, 1919, the Ukrainian Sovnarkom published a decision on entering into an agreement with the R.S.F.S.R. as regards policy on tariffs and foreign trade.⁴

Similar developments took place in the military sphere and in other matters. Thus also "on the initiative of the Ukrainian Central

1) *Uzakoneniya* . . . za 1919 g, Art. 412.

2) *Vysshy Sovyet Narodnogo Khozyaystva* = Supreme Soviet of National Economy.

3) *Vestnik Sovyeta Narodnogo Khozyaystva Ukrainy*, No. 1, 1919.

4) *Uzakoneniya* . . . za 1919 g, Art. 459, p. 601.

Executive Committee",¹ and on the basis of a directive of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(b), the V.Ts.I.K. of the R.S.F.S.R. issued a decree on June 1st, 1919, concerning the unification of the Soviet Republics "for the struggle against world imperialism." This decree, while recognizing the independence of Ukraine, Byelorussia, Lithuania, Latvia, and Crimea, placed their military affairs, economy (V.S.N.Kh.), railways, finance, and labour under the control of the respective collegiate organs of the R.S.F.S.R.² On June 4th, 1919, the Revolutionary Military Council of the R.S.F.S.R. decided to dissolve the so-called Ukrainian front, (the Ukrainian Red Army)³ and to include Ukrainian units in the Russian Red Army. The Commissariat of State Control of the R.S.F.S.R. extended its authority over Ukraine. A Council of Labour and Defence was created in April, and, as a supreme political authority, was subordinated to a similar body in Moscow. Rakovsky, a Russified Bulgarian — Moldavian Bolshevik, became its Chairman, and its members were Russified Ukrainian Petrov'skyi and the Russian Jew Ioffe.

The summer offensive of Denikin in Ukraine speeded up the complete subordination to Moscow. On August 13th, 1919 Lenin sent a telegram to the Ukrainian Sovnarkom, urging it to merge all its supreme Governmental and Party organs into one body, and to abolish all Commissariats except those of War, Railways and Supply. In the following autumn, the Governmental apparatus of the Ukrainian S.S.R. disintegrated completely, and on October 2nd, 1919, even the Central Committee of the C.P.(b).U. was dissolved. All that remained of the separate Bolshevik organs for Ukraine was the so-called *Zafrontbureau* consisting of Kossior (a Pole), Drobnis (a Latvian) and Rafail Farbman (a Jew), which was to organize underground work in Ukraine on the instructions of Moscow.

1) Resolution of the Central Executive Committee of the Ukrainian S.S.R. of May 18th, 1919. *Istoriya Sovetskoy Konstitutsii (v dokumentakh), 1917-1956*, pp. 206-207.

2) Decree of the V. Ts.I.K. of June 1st, 1919. *Ibid.*, p. 207-208.

3) The Commander-in-Chief was Ovseyenko, while Podvoysky was Commissar for war.

CHAPTER II.

DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET NATIONALITY POLICY IN UKRAINE AFTER THE THIRD RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF THE UKRAINIAN S.S.R.

(1920-1922)

1. The final establishment of the Soviet Regime in Ukraine.

The decisive moment in the struggle of the Bolsheviks for Ukraine was reached at the end of 1919, when the defeat of the White Army under Denikin, and the disintegration of the army of the Ukrainian Directory left the field open to them.

In the summer and autumn of 1919, Ukrainian and Denikin's forces had driven the Red Army out of Ukrainian territory, except for the northern part of the *gubernia* of Chernihiv (Chernigov), and a part of Volynia around Zhytomyr. This offensive, however, was halted in the middle of October at Orel, and the Red Army then launched a counter-offensive in the direction of Kharkiv and Rostiv (Rostov-on-Don). On December 12th, Kharkiv was taken; on the 16th, Kyïv, and in the following weeks, the Donets Basin and most of Right-Bank Ukraine, (i. e. Ukraine west of the Dniipro) were reoccupied.

Meanwhile, the remnants of the Directory's Army, which since August 31st had been retreating westwards from Kyïv, constantly fighting with both White and Red forces, and which in November 1919 was occupying the western part of Podolia, disintegrated when the units of the Ukrainian Galician Army subordinate to it went over to the side of Denikin, thus laying open the entire right flank of its front. This blow, together with the havoc caused among the troops by the wide-spread typhus epidemic, and, in addition, several mutinies initiated by ambitious *otamany*, forced Petlura to abandon all hope of maintaining a regular war, and to adopt guerilla tactics. The most serious of the mutinies against Petlura was that led by *otaman* Volokh, of Left S.R. sympathies, who defected with his unit to the Bolshevik side. He was persuaded to stage a *coup d'etat* against Petlura by the pro-Soviet Left S.R. faction of the Borot'bisty in Zhytomyr, who hoped to make him Commander-in-Chief of the future Ukrainian Red Army, which they hoped to create with the connivance of the Bolsheviks. Their hopes, however, were soon dispelled by the firm opposition shown by the Bolsheviks to any such plans for a separate Red Army for Ukraine.

Although, after the rout of Denikin's army at Novorosiisk in March, 1920, the White Army entrenched in the Crimea under the command of General Wrangel was still to attempt a break-through in the

summer of 1920, and attack by Pilsudski's Poland in alliance with the remnants of Petlura's army in the spring of 1920 was still to come, these campaigns did not bring about any material change in the situation. The defeat of Wrangel in November 1920, and the conclusion of the Treaty of Riga with Poland in March 1921, only served to make the position of the Bolshevik regime in Ukraine more secure.

The advance into Ukraine and its subsequent reoccupation presented to the Bolshevik leadership the problem of choosing the policy by which they could best consolidate their military gains. The experience of the preceeding two years of struggle for the possession of Ukraine confirmed Lenin's belief that the National question in Ukraine could not be disregarded. The insecurity of any form of authority in Ukraine, owing to the activities of the detachments of insurgents, useful when fighting the enemy, but dangerous in one's rear, demanded decisive measures, not only in the military sphere, but also in the political.

It was clear that the transient successes of the Ukrainian Directory, as well as those of Denikin's offensive in Ukraine, were facilitated by certain weaknesses in the Bolshevik policy, and, in particular, by the lack of organic links between the C.P.(b).U. and the Ukrainian masses. The tendency of the C.P.(b).U. towards a "nihilist" attitude regarding the Ukrainian National question was a serious stumbling block to their making a really deep impression on the Ukrainian masses, and served as a target for anti-Bolshevik Nationalist propaganda. In addition, the emergency caused by the temporary defeats of the Red Army resulted, as a reaction, in increasingly stronger centralizing tendencies in Moscow, and consequently in the gradual liquidation of all appearances of Soviet Ukrainian autonomy. The policy towards the Ukrainian peasantry, namely the requisitioning of foodstuffs by a quota system imposed on each administrative area and household, the premature attempts at organizing state farms from the former large estates and creating peasant communes, irritated the peasantry, and were regarded by them as part of Moscow's policy of ruthless exploitation of Ukraine for the benefit of Russia.

The decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee (VTsIK) of June 1st, 1919, according to which the six most important government departments of the Ukrainian S.S.R. became merged with the corresponding People's Commissariats of the R.S.F.S.R., was but an example of a long series of centralizing measures. As in the government, so in the Party; owing to political and military defeats in Ukraine, the Central Committee of the C.P.(b)U. gradually lost all semblance of authority, and, on orders from Moscow, was dissolved by Rakovsky in Chernihiv (Chernigov) on October 2nd, 1919. At the same time was dissolved the so-called Council for the Defence of the Republic, which, in August 1919, had replaced the Council of People's

Commissars as the Emergency Government.¹ The members of the Central Committee were recalled to Moscow, from where they were sent to Party and Administrative posts in various parts of the R.S.F.S.R. Only a three-man committee, known as the *Zafrontbureau* (Bureau for underground work beyond the front), formed on July 28th, 1919, remained of all the central Soviet Ukrainian institutions. The "Zafrontbureau" consisted of Drobnis, Kossior and Farbman (Rafail), all three non-Ukrainians.

2. Ukrainian National Opposition within the R.C.P.(b) — the "Group of Federalists."

The retreat from Ukraine, and the disappearance of the last vestiges of autonomy of the C.P.(b).U. and of the Government of the Ukrainian S.S.R. spread among some of the leading Ukrainian Bolsheviks an atmosphere of defeatism, and a pessimistic approach to Moscow's direction of affairs in Ukraine. Many of them became convinced that the disasters in Ukraine were, in no small measure, caused by not sufficient consideration being given by the Party to the strength of national sentiment in Ukraine, with consequent mistakes in policy towards the National question, as well as in the economic policy towards the peasantry. The wide-spread anti-Bolshevik risings in Ukraine in spring and summer 1919 seemed to confirm the view that the isolation of the C.P.(b).U. from the masses of the Ukrainian peasantry, and the inability of the Party to adapt its policy to the conditions prevailing in Ukraine, were the roots of the trouble. A small group of Ukrainian Communists, (mostly former adherents of the Ukrainian Social Democratic Party, like Petro Slyn'ko and Pavlo Popov), who were dissatisfied with the growing centralism of Moscow, came into existence in Kyiv in summer, 1919.

This group formulated a political programme, the chief feature of which was the "recognition of the necessity of a fully independent Ukrainian Soviet Government, enjoying all fulness of power, not excluding the military and economic spheres, as well as of a Party centre, equally autonomous and independent of the R.C.P.(b), and of a decisive orientation in policy and in the selection of the leading Party cadres towards the 'internal forces of the country'."² Slyn'ko, the moving force behind this movement, remained in the part of Ukraine still occupied by Denikin's forces, hoping that the Underground fight would awaken a genuine Ukrainian Communist movement, which would have closer links with the Ukrainian milieu

1) The Council for the Defence of the Republic was created in May, 1919, when Trotsky, Kamenyev and Ioffe came to Ukraine to organize a defence against Denikin. It consisted of its Chairman, Rakovsky, with Petrovs'kyi and Ioffe as members. Later were added Bubnov, Voroshilov and Dzeval'tovskiy.

2) Yu. Lapchyn's'kyi, *Gomel'skoye soveshchaniye*, "Letopis' revolutsii", No. 6 (21), 1926. p. 40.

than the so-far dominant majority in the Russian-oriented C.P.(b).U. Other members of the group, Yuriy Lapchyns'kyi, Pavlo Popov and Lander went to Moscow, where they organized their adherents into a Ukrainian section of the Moscow branch of the R.C.P.(b), holding separate political meetings, and discussing proposals for placing the relations between Russia and Ukraine on a basis of greater equality. They criticised the interference of the R.C.P.(b) in supporting the Russophil elements in the C.P.(b).U., and proposed that a new Ukrainian Communist Party be formed from the pro-Ukrainian elements of the C.P.(b).U., the Borot'bisty and the pro-Soviet group of the "independent" Social Democrats. This Party should be independent of, but allied to the R.C.P.(b)., as distinct from the C.P.(b).U., which was merely a territorial subdivision of the R.C.P.(b). This group also upheld the view that Soviet Ukraine should be completely independent of the R.S.F.S.R.

These ideas gained a certain amount of sympathy in the Bolshevik *Gubkom* of Volynia in Zhytomyr, due, partly, to the presence there of the Borot'bist headquarters, and of the Galician Revolutionary Committee (*Galrevkom*), a Bolshevik-created body, which contained, among their members, a few officers of the former Ukrainian Galician Army, which had been ardently Nationalist. Among the leading Bolsheviks in Zhytomyr were: the Party officials: D. Z. Manuil's'kyi, Vasilyev, Borisov (Kogan), the Chekists: Lifshits and Balyts'kyi, and the members of the *Revkom*: Hamarnyk (*Gamarnik*) and Klymenko. Among the prominent Borot'bisty was Solodub, and in the *Galrevkom* were Porayko and Mykhaylyk.¹ On the initiative of the Zhytomyr Party *gubkom*, an unofficial conference of the leading Ukrainian Bolsheviks was held in Gomel',² just outside the northern Ukrainian border, in defiance of the express disapproval of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(b). The purpose of this conference, which was held on November 25th, 1919, was to discuss the programme of future Bolshevik policy regarding Russo-Ukrainian relations, in matters concerning Party and State. Those taking part included Dmytro Manuil's'kyi, Volodymyr Zatons'kyi, Yuriy Kotsyubyns'kyi, Stanislav Kossior, M. Musul'bas, as well as Yuriy Lapchyns'kyi with a few of his adherents. Lapchyns'kyi put forward an outline of his group's programme, but although most of those present were critical of the National policy of the R.C.P.(b). in Ukraine, they were not prepared to follow Lapchyns'kyi far enough. The leader of the "middle-of-the way" group, Dmytro Manuil's'kyi, refused to support the "extreme" demands of the Lapchyns'kyi group, and the Conference had reached an impasse, when a formal order for its dissolution was issued by Moscow.

On their return to Moscow, the Lapchyns'kyi group forwarded to the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(b) a memorandum, drafted by

1) Yu. Lapchyns'kyi. *Ibid.*

2) Otherwise Homiel. (Byelorussian).

Popov, which criticized the official political line of the C.P.(b).U. in Ukraine, and outlined their own programme for State Party relations between Ukraine and Russia. The Memorandum ended with a declaration that the majority of the Ukrainian Communist in Moscow refused to obey the directives of the Organizing Bureau of the C.P.(b).U., and that similar feelings were apparent in Kyiv, Poltava, and other Ukrainian cities. It asked the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(b) to clarify its Ukrainian policy in the light of the new surge of Revolutionary feeling in Ukraine. This Memorandum was later¹ published in Zhytomyr, under the title "Our Present Policy", with a foreword signed by the "Organizing Bureau of the Group of Federalists, Members of the C.P.(b).U." Although the existence of any such organization was later officially denied, the name "Federalists" has been adopted since as a convenient term of reference for this Ukrainian Communist Opposition.

3. The Bolshevik Alliance with the Borot'bisty — the U.C.P.(b).

The agitation of the "Federalists" and allied groups of Ukrainian Communists in Moscow, who demanded that the R.C.P.(b) should recognize the right of Soviet Ukraine to possess an independent or autonomous Party centre, and to develop its own cultural life, did not remain without results. On the eve of the re-occupation of Ukraine by the Red Army, Lenin drafted a resolution "Concerning Soviet Power in Ukraine", which was adopted by the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(b) on November 29th, 1919, and approved by the 8th Conference of the R.C.P.(b) on December 3rd, 1919. The resolution confirmed once again that the R.C.P.(b) recognized the right of Ukraine to independence, promised that the precise nature of the future close union between Ukraine and the other Soviet Republics should be decided by the Ukrainian workers and peasants themselves, stated that at the moment relations between Ukraine and the R.S.F.S.R. were regulated by the federative ties based on the decisions of the V.Ts.I.K. of June 1st, 1919, and of the V.U.Ts.V.K. of May 18th, 1919, and urged all Party members to help abolish obstacles hindering "the free development of the Ukrainian language and culture." It advised them to counteract the Nationalist tendencies among the Ukrainians "with the greatest tolerance and caution", by explaining "the identity of interests of the working masses of Ukraine and Russia." It further urged "the closest possible contact of the Soviet institutions with the native peasant population, and a careful adaptation of the *prodrazverstka* system to the conditions that prevailed in Ukraine, in order to win the confidence of the bulk of the middle peasantry. It advised the disarmament of the peasant partisan detachments, and the distribution of the former large estates among the

¹) February, 1920.

peasantry; the creation of state-owned farms was to be kept to the minimum, and the creation of peasant communes was to be on a voluntary basis.¹

This resolution was followed by a number of other pronouncements, which appeared to recognize the right of Ukraine to be independent, and promised greater autonomy for Ukrainian political and cultural development. On December 11th, 1919, the creation of a provisional Soviet Ukrainian Government, in the shape of the All-Ukrainian Revolutionary Committee (Revkom) was announced. It consisted of three Bolsheviks, namely the Chairman Petrovs'kyi, and two members, Manuil's'kyi and Zatons'kyi. To these were added later one representative of the Borot'bisty (H. F. Hryn'ko), and one representative of the Bor'bisty² (Yu. Terlets'kiy). In the provincial towns, Borot'bisty were also included in the local *Revkomy*.

The admission of the Borot'bisty to the organs of Soviet power was motivated by the need of the Bolsheviks to widen their support in Ukraine. Whereas the town could be controlled by the Bolshevik Party organizations, the countryside remained virtually outside their systematic control, and was often held by local bands of partisans. The Borot'bisty still retained traces of their former influence as the Ukrainian S.R.'s in some of the provincial towns and villages, especially in Right-Bank Ukraine, and were, therefore, a valuable asset to the Bolsheviks in the present collaboration. A formal agreement, admitting the Borot'bisty to the All-Ukrainian Revkom was signed in Moscow on December 17th, 1919. In return for their admission to the ruling Soviet bodies in Ukraine, the Borot'bisty agreed to drop their demand for the creation of a separate Ukrainian Red Army, and to give their support to what was described as the Russo-Ukrainian Red Army³.

A provisional Party centre for Ukraine was created once more on December 15th, 1919. It included three former members of the Central Committee of the C.P.(b).U., Stanislav Kossior, Volodymyr Zatons'kyi, and Khristian Rakovsky, as well as two co-opted members of the Ukrainian Revkom, Hryhoriy Petrovs'kyi and Dmytro Manuil'skyi.

In spite of the apparent alliance between the Bolsheviks and the Borot'bisty, distrust persisted between the two Parties. The Borot'bisty continued to agitate for a Soviet Ukraine independent of the R.S.F.S.R., and for a Ukrainian Communist Party connected with the R.C.P.(b) only through the Comintern. They criticized the C.P.(b).U., as being a mere instrument of the R.C.P.(b) for preserving Russian predominance in Ukraine, and continued to press for the creation of

1) *Rad. bud.*, pp. 3-5; V. I. Lenin, *Sochineniya*, Vol. 30, pp. 142-144.

2) A pro-Bolshevik group of the Russian S.R.'s in Ukraine.

3) *Rad. bud.* p. 22. This published text does not disclose the identity of the signatories.

a separate Ukrainian Red Army. On the other hand, the attitude of the Bolsheviks to this alliance was none too sincere. In December, 1919, in the "Draft Resolution concerning the Ukrainian Party of the Borot'bisty" Lenin wrote: "The Borot'bisty are to be recognized as the Party which violates the basic principles of Communism by their propaganda for splitting military forces and by their support of banditry, thus directly strengthening the hand of the Whites and of international imperialism.

Likewise, their struggle against the slogan of a close and closest union with Russia contradicts the interests of the proletariat.

Systematically and unflinchingly, all our policy is to be directed towards the liquidation of the Borot'bisty, which ought to occur in the near future. With this aim in view, no transgression of the Borot'bisty must ever be allowed to pass without immediate and severe punishment. In particular, information concerning the non-proletarian and most unreliable character of the majority of their Party members should be collected.

The moment of liquidation will be appointed shortly; it is to be decided by the Politburo, and will be communicated to the Ukrainian Revkom."¹

On January 6th, 1920, an article in the Kharkiv Borot'bist newspaper *Proletars'ka Pravda*, in its criticisms of the policies of the C.P.(b).U. and the R.C.P.(b) in Ukraine even went so far as to suggest that after the defeat of Denikin, the Ukrainian troops of the Red Army ought to drive out the Russian Bolsheviks from Ukraine. This brought sharp protests from the Bolsheviks, and they demanded the dissolution of the Kharkiv organization of the Borot'bisty.² The editors were arrested, and held in custody for a few days, and the newspaper was closed down.³ O. Shums'kyi, one of the leader of the Borot'bist faction closest in sympathy to the Bolsheviks, declared at a city conference of the Kyiv Borot'bisty that "the only support of the C.P.(b).U. in Ukraine is the army of 300,000 men", and that the Bolsheviks were carrying out a policy of terror in Ukraine.⁴

The Borot'bisty again made an attempt to out-manoeuvre the Bolsheviks by the ruse of applying for a separate membership of their Party in the Comintern at the beginning of January, 1920.⁵ They hoped thus to undermine the position of the C.P.(b).U. as the

¹ V. I. Lenin *pro Ukrayinu*, Kyiv, 1957, p. 630. Quoted in V. Chyrko, *Pyata konferentsiya KP(b)U*, Kyiv, 1958, p. 77.

² *Rad. bud.*, pp. 40-41.

³ In addition to *Proletars'ka Pravda* the Borot'bisty published *Chervonyi Styah*, (Editor — Hukovych), in Kyiv, and *Ukrayins'kyi Proletar*, (Editor — Lisovyyk), in Katerynoslav. Their central organ was *Borot'ba*, published in Kyiv. The Editor of *Proletars'ka Pravda* was Kalyuzhnyi. See also M. Ravich-Cherkassky, *op. cit.*, p. 196.

⁴ M. M. Popov, *Narys Istoriyi KP(b)U*, Kharkiv, 1931, pp. 214-215.

⁵ Their first application in August, 1919, had been rejected.

only Party representing the Communist movement in Ukraine. The recognition of the Borot'bisty as the Ukrainian section of the Comintern would have meant that its political programme of establishing Soviet Ukraine as a State fully independent of Moscow would be recognized. The negotiations were conducted on behalf of the Borot'bisty by Poloz, a leader of the right wing of the U.C.P. (Borot'bisty).¹ However, their application was rejected by Zinoviev, on behalf of the Executive Committee of the Comintern, on the ground that the Borot'bist Party deviated from the principles of Communism by carrying on "Counter-Revolutionary" activities against the Red Army "which had helped to free Ukraine from Denikin", by demanding a separate "National" army and by agitating against the Russian Communists in Ukraine. The attempts to create a second Communist Party in Ukraine was described as an "attempt to split the ranks of the working people", and the Borot'bisty were advised to join the C.P.(b)U., which was described, among other things, as "that Party which fully recognizes the independence of Soviet Ukraine."²

The ultimatum of the Comintern caused dissension within the Borot'bist Party, since the Borot'bist groups in Poltava, Katerynoslav, Volynia, and other *gubernii* refused to agree to the terms laid down by the Comintern. After negotiations with the leaders of the C.P.(b)U, the majority of the Borot'bisty decided, at the Party Conference held at the beginning of March, 1920, to dissolve their organization, and to join the C.P.(b)U. as individuals. The 4th Conference of the C.P.(b)U. which was held later that month, approved the decision to admit the Borot'bisty. According to Skrypnyk, over 4,000 Borot'bisty were admitted to the ranks of the C.P.(b)U.³ Those who were admitted had their Party status recognized as from 1918. Lenin noted this amalgamation with satisfaction: "We have carried out a re-registration of that Party, and instead of the uprising of the Borot'bisty which was imminent, we have reached the point where, thanks to the correct line of the Central Committee, . . . all that was best among the Borot'bisty have joined our Party, and the rest have disappeared from the political scene. This victory was worth a couple of battles."⁴ The amalgamation, in fact, took place at a time when the Ukrainian countryside had not been brought under proper control, and the possibility of an uprising presented a danger to the Soviet authority. The reason why the Borot'bisty decided to join the Party must be sought in their desire to be on the winning side, and their

1) M. Ravich-Cherkassky. *op. cit.*, p. 146.

2) The Resolution of the Executive Committee of the Communist International, dated February 26th, 1920. *Rad. Bud.* pp. 68-69.

3) M. Skrypnyk, *Natsional'ne pytannya*, Vol. II. Part 1. p. 37. Speech at the 12th Congress of the R.C.P.(b).

4) Lenin, *Sochineniya*, Vol. 30, p. 439.

belief that they might be able to influence the Party's policies from within. Rather than face disappearance from the political scene, the Borot'bisty chose to join the C.P.(b).U., to retain positions of political importance and to strengthen the Ukrainian elements in the Party. The Borot'bist leader, the poet Blakytnyi, was said to have wittily summed up their intentions in the catch-word: "We shall merge, surge, and submerge the Bolsheviks." In the 1930's this slogan was quoted in the accusations against the former members of the Borot'bist organization.¹

The Borot'bist decision may also be understood in the light of numerous Bolshevik pronouncements promising some kind of federative relationship between Ukraine and the R.S.F.S.R., with full autonomy for Ukraine in all cultural matters. In fact, the term "independence" was either used explicitly, or implied. Thus, for example, the 7th All-Russian Congress of Soviets, in its appeal to the "subjugated nations",² confirmed "the exclusive right of the Ukrainian workers and working peasants to decide the question concerning the final form of alliance with the working masses of other Soviet Republics."³ The manifesto of the All-Ukrainian Revkom of December 11th, 1919, declared: "A free and independent Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic rises again." It hinted, however, that the final form of relationship between Ukraine and the R.S.F.S.R. would be decided by the next All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets.⁴ The appeal of the Third International to the workers and peasants of Ukraine declared that "Ukraine will be a free country!", but at the same time hailed the "unification of all Soviet republics."⁵ Lenin in his famous "Letter to the workers and Peasants of Ukraine, on the Occasion of the Victories over Denikin", written on December 28th, 1919, likewise drew attention to the special tasks confronting the Soviet Regime in Ukraine as regards the National question, and discussed future relations between the Ukrainian S.S.R. and the R.S.F.S.R. He confirmed that the independence of Ukraine was recognised by the V.Ts.I.K. and by the R.C.P.(b)., and although he regarded the close union and coalescence of all the nations of the world into one Soviet World Republic as desirable, he appealed to the Bolshevik Party Members to exercise caution, patience and moderation with regard to the "survivals of Nationalist distrust." He wrote that the differences of opinion as regards the issue of Ukrainian independence should not be a hindrance to co-operation between the Borot'bisty and the

1) *Bil'shovyk Ukrayiny*, No. 3, 1936, p. 13. Postyshev's speech at the Plenary Session of the C.C. of the C.P.(b).U. January 29th, 1936.

2) December 15th, 1919.

3) *S'yezdy Sovietov v postanovleniyakh i rezolutsiyakh*. Moscow, 1935, p. 130. Also *Rad. bud.* p. 12.

4) *Pravda*, December 17th, 1919. Also "*Rad. bud.*" p. 12.

5) *Kommunisticheskiy Internatsional*, No. 7-8. November-December, 1919, pp. 1122-1126. Reprinted in *Istoriya K.P.(b).U. v materiyalakh i dokumentakh*, vyp. 2. pp. 539-541 and in *Rad. bud.* pp. 18-21.

Bolsheviks, for, even among the Bolsheviks, there were "supporters of full independence for Ukraine, of a more-or-less close federal union, and of complete unification with Russia."¹

The Bolshevik declarations about their recognition of Ukrainian independence, and their promises of tolerance of the Ukrainian cultural aspirations, were accompanied by political moves, which, on the one hand, re-established a number of supreme organs of power of the Ukrainian S.S.R., but on the other hand confined their authority within narrow bounds, and made them subordinate to direction from Moscow. Soon after the re-occupation of Ukraine by the Red Army, there began an organized agitation for the closest possible union with Russia. Local Party meetings discussed the future relationship between Ukraine and Russia, and passed resolutions demanding the amalgamation of many Government departments with those of the R.S.F.S.R. The objection of the Borot'bisty, as e. g. in Poltava, or of the Federalist group in Kyiv, were overruled. On January 27th, 1920, in development of the agreement between the V.Ts.I.K. and the V.U.Ts.V.K. dated June 1st, 1919, concerning the unification of governmental functions of the Ukrainian S.S.R. and the R.S.F.S.R., the All-Ukrainian Revkom decreed the annulment of all separate decrees of the Ukrainian S.S.R. which concerned the unified commissariats of the army, the economic Council, food procurement, communications, post and telegraph, social insurance, and finance. They were replaced by the corresponding decrees of the R.S.F.S.R.

On February 19th, 1920, the Provisional Revkom was abolished and the supreme state authority was again vested in the V.U.Ts.V.K. and the restored Council of People's Commissars, which had been elected by the 3rd All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets in March, 1919. The new government, in its declaration addressed to all the peoples and governments of the world announced "its firm will to defend the independence and inviolability of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic", and invited them to enter into economic and diplomatic relations with the Ukrainian S.S.R.² The solemn declarations expressing concern about the preservation of Ukrainian independence contrasted strangely with the continued trend to subordinate various Ukrainian institutions to the organs of the R.S.F.S.R. The Sovnarkom of the Ukrainian S.S.R., created on February 19th, 1920, included seven People's Commissariats, as follows: Chairman, and People's Commissar for Internal affairs — Rakovsky; Agriculture — Manuil's'kyi; Education — Hryn'ko, (a Borot'bist), Food — Vladimirov; Justice — Terletsky, (a Borbist); Social Insurance — Paderin; Health — Kost. Chubar was included also as Representative of the V.S.N.Kh. (Supreme Council of National Economy) of the R.S.F.S.R.

¹) *Pravda*. No. 3. January 4th, 1920. Quoted in *Rad. Bud.* pp. 7-12.

²) *Rad. bud.* pp. 65-66. Reprinted from *Izvestiya VUTsIK*, No. 39, February, 21st, 1920.

4. Discussion of the National Problem at the 4th Conference of the C.P.(b).U.

The re-establishment of the Ukrainian S.S.R., and of the C.P.(b).U., as well as the declarations promising that greater attention should be paid to Ukrainian cultural needs, marked the beginning of a new period of Soviet Nationality policy in Ukraine. The compromise solution, formulated vaguely by Lenin, to the Nationality problem in Ukraine, was only a legal framework which could, in the course of its practical realization, be interpreted in any convenient way. Everything depended on the men assigned to carry it out, and on the real intentions of the Party leaders, for the Party held the keys to supreme power. While nationally-minded Ukrainians regarded the Constitution of the Soviet Ukrainian State and its implementations as inadequate, and as a Bolshevik device to camouflage the real, centralizing policy of Moscow, the bulk of the Bolshevik Party membership in Ukraine, as well as the Russian or Russified functionaries of the administrative machine, regarded the apparent concessions to Ukrainian Nationalism as entirely unnecessary and harmful. They believed that Ukrainian national sentiment was not deeply ingrained in the peasant masses, and was not articulate enough to justify the continuation of the pretence of the existence of an independent Soviet Ukraine. The bulk of the Bolshevik Party in Ukraine had always regarded the Ukrainian national movement as something reactionary, which stood in the way of the proletarian unity of Russia, as something superfluous and dangerous. The Russian Imperial propaganda of the pre-Revolutionary period branded the Ukrainian national movement as "separatism", and did not recognize the Ukrainians as a separate nation. This could not remain without effect on the bulk of the Russian people. When the Party leadership decided, for strategic reasons, to cloak the "dictatorship of the proletariat" in Ukraine in the outward forms of Ukrainian statehood, this was accepted by the Bolsheviks as a necessary evil in view of the dangerous political and military situation, particularly in the countryside, where the mood of revolt was still very much alive.

The problems which the C.P.(b).U. had to face in Ukraine in 1920 were difficult to solve. The military struggle had not yet ended, and the war had yet to be won, the administration had to be reorganized, the ruined economy had to be set in motion, the last remaining pockets of resistance in the countryside had to be eliminated, and the "dictatorship of the proletariat" established. The Communist programme had to be put into practice, and given some form of reality. These problems created considerable divisions of opinion among the Party leadership.

The first occasion for a discussion of Party policy in Ukraine was the 4th Conference of the C.P.(b)U., held in Kharkiv from March 17th-23rd, 1920. The delegates of the Borot'bisty attended this conference. Stalin, who arrived as emissary of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(b), expounded the Party's economic policy. An opposition group, known as the "Democratic Centralists", who were led by Sapronov, a leader of the Bolsheviks in Kharkov, protested against the excessive centralization of Party and economic affairs, defeated Stalin's proposals regarding the militarization of industry, and managed to get several members of their group elected to the Central Committee of the C.P.(b)U. They also opposed the creation of the Committees of Unprosperous Peasants.

The Conference was marked by sharp clashes of opinion and stormy incidents. Lapchyn'kyi, who had appeared as delegate of the Party organization in Volynia, was accused by Yakovlev of "the Petlurist brand of Chauvinism", on account of the resolution which he had earlier proposed in Kyïv, in which he asserted that the Russian proletariat was interested in the former (Tsarist) system of location of industrial regions etc.¹ Lapchyn'skyi was thereupon excluded from the Conference, and, in June, 1920, was expelled from the Party, together with several of his "Federalist" accomplices.

In the discussion of Rakovsky's report concerning the political work of the Central Committee, several delegates, including Lifshits, Byk and Laponin, attacked the "servility" of the Central Committee towards Moscow. Others, however, like Sypev and Rachkovsky, demanded the abolition of the separate Party Central Committee and the separate Government of Ukraine, stating that "In any case, all political activity is determined in Moscow by the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(b)."²

The problem of the precise form of relationship between the Ukrainian S.S.R. and the R.S.F.S.R. was discussed on the lines of the existing arrangement, by which the six most important government departments were subordinated to the corresponding People's Commissariats of the R.S.F.S.R., namely the Commissariats for War, Foreign Affairs, Supreme Council of National Economy, Communications, Post and Telegraph, Finance and Labour, while other People's Commissariats, namely those for Education, Internal Affairs, Agriculture, Justice, Health, and Social Insurance were to remain under the jurisdiction of the Ukrainian S.S.R.³ Two delegates, Dashkovsky and Zalutsky spoke against formulating a resolution on those lines. Dashkovsky regretted that the Party had missed the opportunity "To throw away all pretence of a Ukrainian government, and to press openly and unambiguously for the unification of both republics in one

1) M. Ravich-Cherkassky, *Istoriya Kommunisticheskoy Partiy Ukrainy*, p. 149.

2) *ibid.*, pp. 150-151

3) *Istoriya KP(b)U v materiyalakh i dokumentakh*, Vol. 2. pp. 628-689.

Soviet Republic..."¹ He declared that "90% of the Ukrainian peasantry are not interested in having an independent Ukrainian Sovnarkom." Zalutsky insisted that "the dictatorship of the proletariat in Ukraine must be built in closest dependance on and under the guidance of the Russian proletariat, because the Ukrainian proletariat is dependent on the Ukrainian bourgeoisie and is incapable of organizing a strong dictatorship or a strong regime in the country."²

This attitude was widespread in the C.P.(b).U., and only the Party discipline and the realization that it was tactically necessary to maintain the outward appearances of Ukrainian statehood prevented its being expressed more widely. The head of the government of the Ukrainian S.S.R., Rakovsky himself, in answer to earlier criticisms of his meekness with regard to Moscow replied: "Are we for union with Russia, or for an independent Ukraine?", implying that the former was the right course.³ In the resolution which was finally accepted, it was stated that "a close union with Russia is a Revolutionary duty of every new Soviet state."⁴

The Conference approved the decision to admit the Borot'bisty to the Party on an individual basis and discussed the policy to be adopted towards the peasants. Rakovsky, in the political report, and S. Kossior, in his report on organization, admitted that the Party had failed to make any headway in the Ukrainian countryside. As a means of breaking the "banditry" and "kulak dictatorship" in the villages, Rakovsky suggested dividing the peasantry by forming Committees of Unprosperous Peasants, uniting landless and small peasants, and utilizing them to carry out Soviet policy in the villages. Their tasks were to be: the execution of the law concerning the repartition of land and its allocation to landless and small peasants, collection of the compulsory deliveries of foodstuffs and the distribution of part of the produce collected among the poor of the villages, as well as collaborating with the Soviet authorities in combating "banditry, illiteracy and kulak predominance."⁵ This project was opposed by Sapronov's Kharkiv group, and by the delegates from Katerynoslav,⁶ on the grounds that the creation of the Committees of Unprosperous Peasants, (Komnezamy) would alienate the middle peasantry. However, the resolution in favour of a policy of splitting the peasantry was adopted by a majority vote, the Borot'bisty voting in favour of it.

In his speech on economic problems, Stalin outlined a programme for the militarization of industry, abolition of collective management of enterprises and the introduction of one-man management. His

1) *ibid.* p. 625.

2) *ibid.* p. 625.

3) M. Ravich-Cherkassky, *op. cit.*, p. 152.

4) A. V. Lykholat, *Razgrom* . . . p. 435.

5) *Rad. bud.* pp. 95-97.

6) The delegation was headed by E. Kviring.

proposals were attacked by Sapronov's group, and defeated by 117 votes to 86.

In the elections to the Central Committee, the opposition elements, too, gained a victory over the centralists, who were, naturally enough, favoured by Moscow. Sapronov and several of his supporters were elected members of the Central Committee, while Rakovsky, Manuil'skyi and Stanislav Kossior were left outside.¹ The victory of the Opposition was, however, shortlived, for on his return to Moscow, Stalin persuaded the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(b) to deal with the opposition of the "Democratic Centralists" in a firm and resolute manner. At the 9th Congress of the R.C.P.(b), held in Moscow, March 29 — April 18th, 1920, this opposition group, led by Sapronov, was defeated, and on April 7th, 1920, the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(b) sent a Circular to all the local Branches of the C.P.(b).U., condemning the "Democratic Centralist" opposition, and dissolving the Central Committee of the C.P.(b).U. that had been elected at the 4th Conference, appointing in its place a new Temporary Central Committee of the C.P.(b).U, from which Sapronov, as well as the leaders of the extreme Left (Pyatakov) and Right (Kviring) wings of the C.P.(b).U. were excluded. To emphasize the "Centrist" character of Party policy, and to cement the union with the Borot'bisty, two former Borot'bisty, Blakytnyi and Shums'kyi, were included in the new Central Committee.²

The strength of the new "Democratic Centralist" opposition in Ukraine, as well as the necessity (in view of the war with Poland and Petlura) to search for some contact with the Ukrainian masses, led the Bolsheviks to rely more and more on the former Borot'bisty. The latter utilized this position to strengthen the position of the Ukrainian elements in the Party. On the insistence of the former Borot'bisty, Moscow ordered a purge of the "bourgeois-minded" and "corrupt" elements in the C.P.(b).U., as a result of which, many opportunists from the largest Russified towns in Ukraine, (Kharkiv, Katerynoslav, Odessa, Nikolaev), were expelled from the Party. The purge was conducted by Blakytnyi, Zaton's'kyi, and Feliks Kon. The Borot'bisty also made great efforts to expand the Party membership, in the Ukrainian countryside, in order to make good their claim to be the genuine representatives of the Ukrainian proletariat and semi-proletariat, but they met with only a limited success. By November

1) The following were elected: Pyatakov, Petrov's'kyi, Alexander Ivanov, Zaton's'kyi, Hamarnyk, Drobnis, Raffail Farbman, Kviring, Sapronov, Voroshilov, Minin, Hamzei, Vladimir Kissior, Blakytnyi, Shums'kyi and Chubar. The last three resigned, in protest against "fractionalism" in elections.

2) The following persons were appointed to the Temporary Central Committee of the C.P.(b).U: Artem (F. A. Sergeyev), V. M. Blakytnyi, P. A. Zalutsky, V. P. Zaton's'kyi, S. V. Kossior, F. Ya. Kon, S. K. Minin, D. Z. Manuil's'kyi, G. I. Petrov's'kyi, Kh. G. Rakovsky, V. Ya. Chubar, O. Ya. Shums'kyi, Yakovlev (Ya. A. Epstein). (*Istoriya KP(b)U v materialakh i dokumentakh*, Vol. 2. pp. 555-557).

1st, 1920, in 9 out of the 12 Ukrainian *gubernii*, there were 1,333 village Party cells with 10,452 Communists, which was but a modest achievement. The Borot'bist plan was to flood the C.P.(b).U. with Ukrainian members, so as to capture its leadership, and to establish a fully autonomous Ukrainian Communist Party and Soviet Ukrainian State. This plan miscarried, partly on account of the reluctance of the Ukrainian peasantry to support Communism. In spite of all the revolutionary upheavals and agitation, the greater bulk of the Ukrainian peasantry remained basically conservative in their outlook on social relations, and guardedly reserved or hostile to the Communist experiments. The policy of the Bolshevik authorities regarding grain requisitioning, the revolutionary terror, and the system of collective repressions, counterbalanced the gains from the repartition of the landed estates which was approved and encouraged by the Bolsheviks.

5. Soviet Policy towards Ukrainians in Eastern Galicia.

After the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in October, 1918, a West Ukrainian Republic had been established in Eastern Galicia, after a military coup in Lviv on November 1st, 1918, but it immediately found itself in armed conflict with the local Poles and the newly reborn Polish State. On January 22nd, 1919, the formal unification of this Republic with Eastern Ukraine into a single Ukrainian People's Republic, (U.N.R.), was proclaimed in Kyiv in St. Sophia's Square.

In July 1919, the Galician Ukrainian Army was driven out of Galicia by the Polish armies reinforced by General Haller's Corps, trained and equipped in France. Together with Petlura's forces, the Ukrainian Galician Army then continued the struggle in Right-Bank Ukraine against the Bolsheviks and Denikin, even managing to capture Kyiv for a brief moment on August 31st, 1919. On the defeat of the Ukrainian armies, the Galician army joined Denikin in November, 1919, and in February, 1920, it joined the Red Army, after a *coup d'etat* and the establishment of a Revolutionary Committee. These decisions were mainly brought about by the hopelessness of the political and military situation, and the hope of recovering Galicia from the Poles with the help of either the White or Red Russians.

The Ukrainian Galician Parties, i. e. the National Democratic Party, the Ukrainian Radical Party, and the Ukrainian Social Democratic Party, were, on the whole, more conservative in their outlook than the East Ukrainian Parties. Pro-Bolshevik sympathies were, however, noticeable among the left-wing Social Democrats.

Bolshevik agitation became vocal in Galicia at the turn of 1918-19. Among the returning prisoners-of-war and evacuees from Russia came Communist sympathisers. On the other hand, the left wing of the Polish Socialist Party, (P.P.S.-Lewica), and some Ukrainian left-

wing Social Democrats¹ embraced the Bolshevik slogans. Communist cells were formed in the most important industrial centres of East Galicia. On January 18th-19th, 1919, the first meeting of the Communist organizations in Eastern Galicia was held in Stanyslaviv², at that time the capital of the West Ukrainian Republic, and a Central Committee of the Communist Party of Eastern Galicia was elected, but no real unification was achieved because of the heterogenous character of these Communist groups. Soon afterwards, however, in April, 1919, the Central Committee of the C.P.(b).U. called a meeting of the representatives of the Communist cells which had been formed among the former prisoners-of-war from Galicia and Bukovina. A "Galician Organizing Committee of the C.P.(b).U." was created. It was headed by Feliks Kon, who was later replaced by Zatons'kyi. This Committee commenced the publication of the newspaper "Halyts'kyi Komunist", and between February-April tried to reorganize the Ukrainian Galician Army on Communist lines. Thus another centre of the Communist Party of Eastern Galicia, directly under the surveillance of Moscow, came into existence, and these two centres could not be easily unified.

In 1920, a serious problem arose: the conflict between the Polish Workers' Communist Party, (P.W.C.P.), and the Communist Party of Eastern Galicia. The fact that the now "Red" Ukrainian Galician Army was for a time fighting on the Bolshevik side somewhat strengthened the position of the Ukrainians in the Communist Party of Eastern Galicia, although, on the whole, the Bolsheviks did not believe in the sincerity of the Galicians, and split up their army units. On the outbreak of hostilities with Poland, in April, 1920, two thirds of the Ukrainian Galician Army, dissatisfied with the Bolshevik policies in Ukraine, went over to the side of Petlura, who was now an ally of the Poles, but they were promptly interned by the Polish authorities.

The initial Bolshevik reverses on the Polish Front did not last long, for at the beginning of June, 1920, the Budyonny cavalry effected a break-through, and on June 11th, they recaptured Kyiv. The Red Armies then advanced westwards, and, in the middle of July, entered Galicia. On July 26th, Ternopil' (Tarnopol) was taken, and soon L'viv itself was threatened. The problem then arose of what was to be done with this territory, which was populated predominantly by Ukrainians, but which possessed strong Polish and Jewish minorities, which, in the towns, often outnumbered the Ukrainians.

1) Among these was O. Krylyk, who was later known under the pseudonym of Vasyl'kiv, one of the leaders of the Communist Party of West Ukraine, prominent in the split with the Comintern and Moscow in 1927-28. Other prominent members were Nestor Khomyn, Siyak, Hruts', Mykhats', Ivan Kushnir, Vasyl' Kotsko, Bilen'kyi, Korf, and Nebylovych. (*Nasha Kul'tura*, Warsaw, No. 7. Nov. 1958; *Pravda Ukrainy*, Kyiv. 27. vi. 1958).

2) *Kommunisticheskiy Internatsional*, 1919, No. 4. pp. 559-560.

When the general Red Army offensive on the Polish Front commenced, at the beginning of July, 1920, the Bolsheviks decided to make use of the traditional enmity between Ukrainians and Poles in Galicia, while leaving the door open for negotiations with the Poles. They hoped, in fact, to use this enmity as a tool for propaganda. A skeleton government for Galicia, known as the *Galrevkom*, was set up in Kyiv, and Zaton's'kyi was appointed its Chairman and Commissar for Foreign Affairs, and was vested with virtually dictatorial power. The formation of the Revkom was completed in Zhmerynka in Podolia at the end of July, and at the beginning of August, it moved to Ternopil' (Tarnopol), where it established its headquarters, and proclaimed the Galician Soviet Socialist Republic. On August 4th, 1920, a Unified Central Committee of the C.P.E.G. was formed, and on August 11th, 1920, it gave its formal approval to the composition of the *Galrevkom*. In August 1920, too, the C.P.E.G. was admitted to the Comintern, where its representative was Mykhaïlo Levyts'kyi.

The decision to create a separate Galician Socialist Soviet Republic was taken on account of Moscow's reluctance to strengthen the hands of the Ukrainian "separatists" in Soviet Ukraine by unifying the two parts of Ukraine. On the other hand, due consideration had to be given to Polish feelings. Since the end of July, 1920, the Polish Communist Government¹ had been at Białystok (Bialystok), until the Red Army should capture Warsaw, and it was anxious to prove that the accusations hurled at the Communists by the Polish Press, that they were traitors to their nation, were invalid. Negotiations between the Polish and Galician Communist Governments were started in Miensk (Minsk), under the arbitration of Moscow. The Poles demanded that Eastern Galicia should be annexed to Poland, but by pressing the policy of an "independent" Galicia, Moscow managed to secure a temporary compromise solution, without offending either side. Zaton's'kyi strictly followed the Moscow line, whereas several members of his Revkom,² former members of the Galician Army, demanded a clear pro-Ukrainian policy. When the Soviet armies suffered a disastrous defeat at the gates of Warsaw in mid-August, Moscow agreed to the demands of the Polish Communists for the annexation of Eastern Galicia to Soviet Poland. The *Galrevkom* was ordered to carry out the directives of the Polish Soviet Government. Zaton's'kyi at once began to favour the Polish wing of the Party in Galicia. By chance, certain Ukrainian members of the Revkom, Fed' Konar, Omelyan Paliyiv and Mykhaïlo Kozoris learned of the instructions from Moscow, and protested against these secret negotia-

¹ Its chairman was Marchlewski, and Dzerzhynsky, Unshlikht, Feliks Kon and Prochniak were members.

² The Chairman of the *Galrevkom* was Zaton's'kyi, the Secretary was I. Nemolov's'kyi, and the members included M. Baran, K. Lytvynovych, F. Konar, M. Levyts'kyi, and others.

tions with the Polish Soviet Government. At this, Zatons'kyi retorted that he would not suffer any opposition to the directives of Moscow from the "Chauvinists" and "separatists." The Ukrainian officials of the Commissariat for War passed a resolution protesting against Zatons'kyi's policy, and demanded his resignation, whereupon Zatons'kyi ordered the arrest of the leading Ukrainian officers and the re-registration of the members of the Communist Party of Eastern Galicia. Paliyiv was dismissed, and Kozoris was sent to Kyiv. More arrests, and several executions followed. Konar was replaced as Commissar for Internal Affairs by Mykhaylo Levyts'kyi, a subservient tool.¹

On September 5th, 1920, the Bolsheviks abandoned Ternopil' and the Galician Government moved to Vinnytsia, where it continued to exist, until the signing of the Treaty of Riga, (March 1921). The Soviet Army had been welcomed by the Ukrainian peasants in Galicia during its advance, but very soon, the Bolshevik methods antagonized them and evoked hostility.

After the conclusion of the Treaty of Riga, pressure was applied by Moscow to the leadership of the C.P.E.G., urging them to become part of the Polish Communist Party. After sharp internal dissensions, and a split in the C.P.E.G. in March 1921, a special agreement was signed on June 9th, 1921, which defined the autonomous status of the C.P.E.G. within the P.W.C.P.² The C.P.E.G. thus ceased to be an independent section of the Comintern.

In August, 1921, an agreement was concluded between the C.P.(b).U. and the P.W.C.P. which stated that the C.P.E.G. would operate within the territory of Galicia as an autonomous territorial organization of the P.W.C.P. The Galician Ukrainian Communists, however, were not satisfied with this subordinate position in the P.W.C.P., and on several occasions, relations between them and the Polish Communists were broken off. In 1924, the C.P.E.G. was renamed the "Communist Party of Western Ukraine", and under this name the field of its activities was extended to Volynia, and other territories under Polish rule, in which the population was predominantly Ukrainian.

6. The 5th Conference of the C.P.(b).U. and the National Question.

The disciplinary measures which had been taken by Moscow, after the confusion caused by the opposition of "democratic centralism" at the 4th Conference of the C.P.(b).U. and at the 9th Congress of the R.C.P.(B), introduced a severe military-like regime in the Party, with

¹ Borys Kolodii, *Halyts'ka Sotsialistychna Radyans'ka Respublika; Spomyn z 1920 r.* L'viv, 1932, p. 28.

² *Entsyklopedicheskyi slovar' obshchestva "Granat"*, Vol. 36, part 2, pp. 70-75.

the suppression of criticism, and an increasing movement towards centralism in the management of affairs. Hundreds of Party members from the R.S.F.S.R. were sent to Ukraine, to replace the unreliable "oppositionist" functionaries, and to strengthen the Party and administrative apparatus. Thus, between March and November, 1920, the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(b) sent 1099 Party members to Ukraine, to take up various posts, of which 200 were not below District level. The largest number, 408, arrived in May, 1920.¹ Many more came as members of the armed forces. Since the C.P.(b).U. had the status of a regional sub-division of the R.C.P.(b), Moscow regarded this as a natural procedure, while the nationally-minded group of the Ukrainian Communists keenly resented it. The former Borot'bisty regarded Moscow's policy concerning the appointment of personnel as an infringement of the autonomous rights of the C.P.(b).U. and as an expression of Russian "colonialism." They were embittered by the policy which assigned to the nationally-minded Ukrainian Communists posts of only secondary importance, reserving the key positions for Russians or other Russified elements, to whom the cause of the national rebirth of Ukraine was alien. When, in the autumn of 1920, Moscow decided to ease the internal Party regime somewhat, so as to combat the drift towards bureaucracy, this pent-up criticism came out into the open again. On the one hand, there appeared in Ukraine, the so-called "Workers' Opposition", and the "Harsh Centralists' Opposition", chiefly in the Party organizations of the Donbas and Kuban areas. On the other hand, the former Borot'bisty, together with other like-minded Ukrainian Communists, resumed their criticism of the "colonial" policy of the R.C.P.(b) towards Ukraine. The Borot'bisty still hoped that Moscow could be persuaded to hand over power in Ukraine to them, or at least to direct Party policy in Ukraine along the lines they advocated. At the opening of the 5th Conference of the C.P.(b).U. in November 1920, Blakytnyi, the unofficial leader of the Borot'bisty, published an article criticising the C.P.(b).U. as a foreign plant in Ukraine, describing the policy of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(b) in Ukraine as "colonial", and demanding a fully autonomous Ukrainian Communist Party and Soviet Ukrainian State.² The views and demands expressed in this article, he repeated in the form of theses at the Conference.

Another Ukrainian Communist, I. Vrona, had produced similar theses at the Volynian Regional Party Conference a short while

¹) Report of the Central Committee of the C.P.(b).U. to the 5th Conference, covering the period from April 1st to November 1st, 1920. Published in the supplement to the journal *Kommunist*, No. 1920, and quoted by V. Chyrko in *Pyata Konferentsiya KP(b)U*, Kyiv, 1958, p. 87.

²) Article entitled "The Communist Party of Ukraine and Ways of Strengthening it", published in *Kommunist*, (the organ of the Central Committee of the C.P.(b).U.), Kharkiv, Nos. 258 and 260, November 17th and 19th, 1920.

before. In his theses, Vrona analysed the role of the C.P.(b).U. in Ukraine as follows: —

“The C.P.(b).U, having emerged from the non-Ukrainian element, — from the R.S.D.R.P.(b) and from the urban proletariat, which had never experienced National oppression — had, from the very beginning, set out on a disastrous path, in developing the Communist Revolution within the framework of old, unitary Russia, and in considering itself to be nothing more than an inseparable and indivisible part of the common Russian revolutionary stream, for it was not organically connected with the Ukrainian masses and their National Revolution. It was bound to seek support and direction from the Great Russian centre, and to come to Ukraine as an external, foreign body, imposing revolution from above, and considering the National aspect as an irritating complication and a misunderstanding. It regarded the National movement as “Petlurism”, considering it to be nothing more than a counter-Revolutionary movement which had to be combated, or, at best, ignored. It was incapable of trusting the local Ukrainian forces, for they were, allegedly, contaminated by Nationalism, Chauvinism, and the like. Having adopted such disastrous tactics in approaching the social revolution, and in particular, the National revolution in Ukraine, the C.P.(b).U was inevitably bound to lose contact with its social and economic basis, and with the life of the Ukrainian masses, and to develop, as time went on, a purely colonial policy of occupation, which consisted of a severe subordination of all the Party and Soviet apparatus to the Great Russian centre, and in the destruction of all local initiative and independence. Even after the march of the Revolution in Ukraine forced it to create, in the interests of a successful struggle against the bourgeoisie and against the Ukrainian National movement, certain Party and Soviet Central organs in Ukraine (e. g. the C.P.(b).U, the Ukrainian S.S.R) the view still persists that these centres are but temporary masquerades, far from anything serious. Likewise, attempts are still going on to reconstruct the economic system as part of the structure of the old Empire, to dilute the C.P.(b).U. with the (Russian) National element of the R.C.P.(b), (the struggle against the Ukrainian tendencies in the Party, against the Federalists, the Borot’bisty, etc.), and to de-nationalize, by gradual degrees, the Ukrainian masses by means of the Russian and Russified forces of the colonizing elements in the towns, etc.

The “Great Power” colonial policy in Ukraine, which is dominant at present, is extremely harmful to the interests and to the development of the Communist Revolution. In so far as it ignores the natural and lawful National aspirations of the Ukrainian working masses, hitherto enslaved, it is completely reactionary and counter-Revolutionary, for, to that extent, it is a symptom of the old Russian imperialist Chauvinism, which has not yet been discarded. And it is

carried out by the representatives of an oppressing nation against an oppressed nation, which is what the Ukrainian nation has been until now."¹

The 5th Conference of the C.P.(b).U. was held in Kharkiv, from November 17-21st, 1920. It was attended by 378 delegates (including 175 from the armed forces), and 129 delegates with advisory vote.² They represented, in all, 73,113 Party members, of whom 37,384 (i. e. slightly more than half) were members of the (mainly Russian) armed forces stationed in Ukraine.³

The agenda of the Conference included, in addition to the political and administrative reports of the Central Committee, economic problems, the situation in the countryside and the struggle against "banditry", problems of organization and Party work among various sections of the community, and so forth.

The Conference was marked by the emergence of the so-called "Workers Opposition", and the opposition shown by certain local Party leaders to the central policy. Likewise, the National problem in Ukraine aroused much conflict of opinion. This problem was raised by Blakytnyi, in his co-report to the address by Zinoviev, representing the Central Committee in Moscow, on the next tasks of the Party. Blakytnyi repeated the main points of his controversial article in the form of "theses."

After analysing the past failures of the Party in Ukraine, which he attributed to a lack of any real contact with the Ukrainian masses, and the Ukrainian National movement, and after severely criticizing the harm which the over-centralized "colonial" policy of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(b) had done to the Communist cause in Ukraine, by favouring the Russian element of the Party, Blakytnyi went on to propose a number of measures on behalf of his group of Ukrainian "autonomists", as they were now referred to. He suggested that all the direction of local Party work in Ukraine should be concentrated in the hands of "an authoritative autonomous Central Committee for this area, which would be a plenipotentiary representative of the leading centre of the Communist Party." This was, in effect, a demand for the virtual independence of the C.P.(b).U. from Moscow.

Further, Blakytnyi demanded: "It will be necessary then to carry out measures leading to the eradication (in the shortest possible time), of all national differences between the major social groups of the proletariat, and to the inculcating in the minds of the Russified urban proletariat an understanding of the tasks concerning the transforma-

1) M. Popov, *op. cit.*, pp. 240-241.

2) Ravich-Cherkassky, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

3) M. Popov, *op. cit.*, p. 228, and V. Chyrko, *op. cit.*, p. 50.

Ravich-Cherkassky gives a slightly higher total, but a lesser number of military Party members.

tion of the economy and psychology of the peasant millions, the successful fulfilment of which is impossible, without their previously being assimilated by the Ukrainian peasant element." This was a demand for the initiation of a policy favouring complete Ukrainization of the Russified urban proletariat.

Another of Blakytnyi's "theses" demanded: "The proletarian elements of the R.C.P.(b). now working in Ukraine must be *assimilated with the basic cadre of the C.P.(b).U.* and become its experienced *instructors* and foremost fighters in the Communist struggle and work, once they have rejected their *specifically Russian* peculiarities and have cut themselves off completely from the national influences of the bourgeois Russian element and the conservative historical inertia."¹ This was a demand that the C.P.(b).U. be transformed into a fully Ukrainized party.

Blakytnyi's demands did not find sympathy among the majority of the delegates. While the representatives of the official Party line (Zinoviev, Manuil's'kyi, Yakovlev and others) saw the Ukrainian problem merely in the light of the necessity of finding a foothold among the Ukrainian peasantry in the Committees of Unprosperous Peasants, and of undermining the resistance of the bands of partisans in the Ukrainian countryside, the opposition elements, such as the "Workers' Opposition" under its spokesman Perepechko, and the former "Democratic Centralists' Opposition", led by Kharechko, centred on the industrial areas of the Donbas and Kharkiv, resented this emphasis on the peasantry, and the Party's wooing of the Borot'bisty, seeing in it the decline of the privileged position of the proletariat in Ukraine. Thus, poised between the seemingly "extreme Nationalist" demands of the Ukrainian National Communists and the dissatisfied Bolshevik leadership of the Russian industrial proletariat in Ukraine, which demanded a "dictatorship of the proletariat" in fact and not only in theory, the official spokesmen of the Party wished to appear to steer a middle course.

Speaking on the National question in Ukraine, Zinoviev asked: "What is the essence of National policy in Ukraine?", and answered himself: "The first commandment is: never to adopt an attitude of Russian Chauvinism (*Russotyapstvo*) or of highhandedness (*golovotyapstvo*). We must proceed in such a way that no-one would be able to suspect that we wish to place any obstacles in the way of the Ukrainian peasants who wish to speak Ukrainian. At present, there are few people who would think of doing this, and only among a few die-hard individuals does the old attitude actually persist. We think that the language ought to be allowed to develop freely. After all, after a number of years, it will be the language which has deeper roots and is more viable and cultured which will prevail. Therefore our policy should be to demonstrate to the Ukrainian peasants, not

¹) Ravich-Cherkassky, *op. cit.*, p. 174.

by words, but by deeds, sincerely and honestly, that the Soviet regime does not put any obstacles in the way of their children speaking and being taught in school in any language whatsoever."¹

Zinoviev thus drastically simplified the problem, reducing it merely to one of permission for the peasants to speak their own language, and to have their children taught in any language they chose. Implied behind the suggestion of a fair contest of languages in Ukraine was the conviction that, in the end, the more "viable" and "cultured" Russian tongue would prevail. Zinoviev omitted to deal with the political implications of the National question, on which Blakytyni and the nationally-minded group of Ukrainian Communists had placed the primary stress.

The political aspect was, however, touched upon by Skrypnyk, who, in an attempt to conciliate the various factions, stated that the conditions in Ukraine called for a different Party line from the one appropriate in Russia. He insisted on the view that Party decisions must be made collectively, and criticized the C.P.(b).U. for its failure to make such collective decisions and criticized its members still further, on the grounds that they had not considered the problem of the mutual relationship between Russia and Ukraine at their Party conferences. "We know", Skrypnyk complained, "that this question was discussed at the All-Russian Conference in 1919. But what happened to the resolution passed at that Conference? It became a "vanished scroll."² Thus Skrypnyk implied that less than a year after the Party Resolution on Ukraine had been passed, (December, 1919), most of the promises implied in it had been forgotten.

The majority of the Conference was not, however, in the mood to discuss the principles of the National policy in Ukraine, and merely approved the admission of some of the former Borot'bisty to the Party, though not without opposition from delegates like Dashkovsky, Hamarnyk, Krapyvensky and others, who saw it as a concession to Ukrainian Nationalism. Blakytyni agreed to withdraw his draft resolution.

The resolutions passed by the Conference read as follows: "The National problem in Ukraine is the most important and acute problem, and without its satisfactory solution, the victory of the Proletarian Revolution in Ukraine would be impossible." It urged the continuation of the struggle against both Ukrainian Chauvinism and Russian Jingoism.³

After discussing and approving the policy of food-requisitioning, and the policies of splitting the Ukrainian village by the creation of Committees of Unprosperous Peasants, and strengthening the

1) M. Popov, *op. cit.*, pp. 236-237.

2) M. Ravich-Cherkassky, *op. cit.*, p. 175.

3) *Rad. bud.* Kyiv, 1957, p. 161.

struggle against the "banditry" of the peasants the Conference elected a new Central Committee of the C.P.(b).U.¹

The resolutions of the Conference dealt with the Party policy in military, National, and food matters, with the policy of splitting the Ukrainian peasantry, (which policy was described as "the first guarantee of the success of the Soviet regime in the countryside"), as well as with the absorption of the "better elements" from other parties, i. e. from the Borot'bisty, the Bor'bisty, the Mensheviks, and the Bund.² The main emphasis was placed on the struggle against "banditry", and in this respect, the resolution noted that whereas in 1919, "banditry" was "an insurrection of the politically united countryside against the working-class Communist towns, by 1920 the Party policy had managed to split the peasantry, and so the risings were now the handiwork either of obvious kulaks, members of the upper strata of the peasantry, open adherents of "Wrangelist" or "Petlyurist" ideology, or else of bands of robbers. The only exception, according to the Resolution, comprised certain areas of Right-Bank Ukraine, where often entire villages were in revolt against the Soviet regime, owing to the weakness of the Party and Soviet organization in these districts. The Resolution advised that the Komnezamy be included in the fight against "kulak banditry."³

Apparently as a result of his criticism of the National policy of the C.P.(b).U., Blakytnyi was dropped from the Central Committee, while such National "nihilists" as Pyatakov were re-admitted, and the Moscow nominee, Molotov, was appointed First Secretary of the Party. The Resolution warned the C.P.(b).U. that its work would be impeded by the fact that it had absorbed "in addition to the old proletarian Communist cadres, many elements, which, while sincerely desiring Communism, only gradually rid themselves of those prejudices which are reflected in the Ukrainian environment."⁴ After the failure of this attempt to establish the C.P.(b).U. as an autonomous body, independent from the R.C.P.(b), no similar direct attempts were subsequently made.

7. The Problem of Education and Language.

Although the former Borot'bisty were unable to place themselves in key positions as far as the real political power in Ukraine was concerned, nevertheless, they were left a more or less free hand to control the cultural and educational policies of the Soviet regime in

¹) The newly-elected Central Committee consisted of: Petrovs'kyi, Rakovsky, Manuil's'kyi, Zatons'kyi, Kón, Frunze, Voroshilov, Andrey Ivanov, V. Ivanov, Lebed, Minin, Molotov, Pyatakov, Feliks Kon, Chubar, Shums'kyi. Molotov was elected 1st Secretary of the C.P.(b).U. (Ravich-Cherkassky, *op. cit.*, pp. 177-178).

²) The Jewish Social Democrat Party.

³) *Rad. Bud.* pp. 160-164.

⁴) *Istoriya K.P.(b).U. v materiyalakh i dokumentakh*, Vyp. I. Kharkiv, 1933, p. 564.

Ukraine. This was largely due to the fact that there were not enough old Ukrainian Communists in the C.P.(b).U. who were acquainted with Ukrainian cultural problems. The Borot'bist Hryn'ko, who was appointed Commissar of Education, initiated a programme of drastic reorganization of the entire educational system. He worked out a system of school reform which would abolish the old Tsarist *gymnasias* (secondary schools) and replace them by a unified system of comprehensive primary and secondary education which would last seven years. The emphasis was to be on the teaching of mathematics and technical subjects. The Universities were to be abolished and replaced by specialized "professional schools." This system was promptly put into practice, and showed a remarkable contrast to the educational system of the R.S.F.S.R., which remained basically the same as the system which had existed under the Tsarist regime. While the educational system of the R.S.F.S.R. was built on the idea that a good general education was what was primarily needed, the Ukrainian Communists, in an endeavour to be even more progressive than Moscow, attempted to build an educational system that was designed to give a narrowly specialized professional training. In this attempt, they orientated themselves towards the prevailing trends in the U.S.A., the foremost "capitalist" country. The disputes between the educationalists in the Ukrainian S.S.R. and the R.S.F.S.R., regarding these different systems of education lasted right throughout the 1920's, until the problem was finally resolved by the Second All-Union Party Conference on Public Education which took place in April, 1930. At this Conference, an apparent compromise was reached, and a unified system of education was worked out, which combined certain features of both systems.¹

One of the chief problems facing the educational policy of the Soviet regime was the problem of the language of instruction. The Revolution of 1917 resulted, among many other things, in a spontaneous trend towards the introduction of the Ukrainian language in the schools of Ukraine, particularly in the rural areas. The Ukrainian Central Rada, the Hetmanate, and, later, the Directory actively favoured this trend and encouraged it. The Borot'bisty, whose membership included many teachers, likewise regarded the Ukrainization of the schools as one of the cardinal points in their programme. In the course of 1920, several Soviet Party and Government orders were issued which favoured the introduction of the Ukrainian language in the educational and cultural life of the Ukrainian S.S.R., and this was done largely on the insistence of the Borot'bisty.

Thus the Instruction of the All-Ukrainian Revkom, dated December 22nd, 1919, to the local Revkomy, recommended: "The Ukrainian Theatre, and the Ukrainian School must enjoy the widest possible

¹ *Vtoroye Vsesoyuznoye Partiynoye Soveshchanie po narodnomu Obrazovaniyu*, Verbatim Report, Moscow, 1931. Skrypnyk's report, pp. 29-53.

support from the local Revkomy. This also applies to the cultural-educational societies, so long as they do not set themselves any counter-revolutionary aims."¹ The Instruction of the People's Commissar of Education, Hryn'ko, of May, 1920, ordered the closing down of the Arts faculties of the Universities and the upper forms of the secondary schools, at the same time stressed the necessity of opening primary Ukrainian-language schools, and on "filling the Ukrainian National forms with Communist contents."² Another order, issued in July, 1920, demanded that at least 50% of the Teachers' Training Colleges were to have all subjects taught in Ukrainian, and in others, at least, the Ukrainian language was to be taught as a subject.³ On September 21st, 1920, the Ukrainian Council of People's Commissars issued a decree calling for an expansion of the Ukrainian-language schools, publication of school text-books in Ukrainian, and at least one Ukrainian-language newspaper in every gubernia city.⁴ Apparently worried that this development might go too far, the Collegium of the People's Commissariat of Education of the R.S.F.S.R., headed by Lunacharsky, pointedly expressed its hope that the Ukrainian People's Commissariat of Education would also take care of the preservation of Russian culture in Ukraine, and suggested that a closer contact between the two People's Commissariats be maintained.⁵

The problem of the language of instruction was of utmost importance in Ukraine, if the fact that about 75% of the population of Ukraine were illiterate in 1920⁶ is taken into account. Those who were able to read and write had been taught in Russian schools, since no Ukrainian schools had been allowed before the Revolution. Political and National consciousness cannot be very high among a people that is predominantly illiterate, and this consciousness can certainly be shaped, to a large extent by education.

8. The Ukrainian S.S.R. in Relation to the R.S.F.S.R.

From the formal point of view, the most important Act concluded between the Ukrainian S.S.R. and the R.S.F.S.R. in 1920 was the Treaty of Military and Economic Union, approved by the 8th All-Russian Congress of Soviets on December 28th, 1920. After the Session had discussed and approved the well-known plan for the electrification of Russia (GOELRO), in which the Ukrainian economic system was dealt with as part of the economic system of Russia, and before the Session was closed, Rakovsky, the Chairman of the Ukrainian Sovnarkom read "on behalf of the People's Commissariats of

¹) *Rad. bud.* pp. 26-30.

²) *ibid.* pp. 109-111.

³) *ibid.* pp. 134-135.

⁴) *ibid.* p. 150.

⁵) *ibid.* pp. 151-152.

⁶) *Istoriya Ukrayins'koi R.S.R.* Vol. 2, p. 280.

Russia and Ukraine", a brief draft of the Treaty between the two Republics, which provided for their military and economic union. Without any discussion, the Congress approved it as a matter of course.¹ The Treaty provided for the unification of the following People's Commissariats: 1) Military and Naval Affairs; 2) The Supreme Council of National Economy; 3) Foreign Trade; 4) Finance; 5) Labour; 6) Communications; 7) Post and Telegraph. The unified People's Commissariats were made part of the Sovnarkom of the R.S.F.S.R., and acted through their plenipotentiaries in the Sovnarkom of the Ukrainian S.S.R.²

In view of its very general character, and the lack of any reservations, or even discussion at the Congress, it seems obvious that the Treaty was composed hastily, without all the necessary thoroughness. The likely reason for producing this Treaty was the wish of the Ukrainian Communists to have the decree of the V.Ts.I.K., dated June 1st, 1919, legalized by a more authoritative body, and in this way to maintain the appearance of ordered relations between the Ukrainian S.S.R. and the R.S.F.S.R.

In the field of foreign relations too, the R.S.F.S.R. usually acted on behalf of Ukraine. However, there were numerous occasions on which Ukraine was represented separately, and concluded agreements alone or alongside the R.S.F.S.R. Already at Brest-Litovsk, Trotsky had produced a Soviet Ukrainian delegation. The Ukrainian People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs was created in 1919, but it did not show any activity until 1920. Its concern was the problems of the exchange of prisoners-of-war, and the repatriation of civilians. During the years 1920-21, there were a number of instances in which Ukraine, acting as a separate entity, concluded various agreements with foreign Powers. Rakovsky, the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of Ukraine, acted also as the Foreign Commissar of Ukraine.

To enumerate a few of these agreements, one can mention the agreement concluded by the R.S.F.S.R. and the Ukrainian S.S.R. with France, concerning the mutual return of Nationals (April 20th, 1920), an agreement with Hungary about the repatriation of Prisoners-of-War, (May 21st, 1920), and a similar agreement with Austria, (July 5th, 1920);¹ in June, 1920, the R.S.F.S.R. and the Ukrainian S.S.R. issued a joint protest against the Polish attack, in October, 1920, they signed an Armistice with Poland, in February, 1921, and agreement on the repatriation of Nationals, and on March 18th, 1921, a Peace Treaty. The Soviet Ukrainian Foreign Commissariat also sent a protest to Czechoslovakia concerning the support given by the latter to Petlura, and to Germany, (July 3rd, 1920), concerning the Ukrainian gold reserves which were kept there. At the end of 1920, protest Notes were sent to Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and Great

¹) *Pravda*, 30. xii. 1920.

²) *Istoriya Sovyetskoy Konstitutsii (v dokumentakh) 1917-1956*, pp. 259-260.

Britain, concerning their support of Wrangel.² In November, 1920, the two Republics issued a joint protest against the occupation of Bessarabia by Rumania. On December 7th, 1921, a provisional agreement with Austria was concluded, on December 26th, 1921, a preliminary agreement with Italy. In most cases, the representatives of the R.S.F.S.R. signed also on behalf of the Ukrainian S.S.R.

There were also, however, a number of agreements and treaties signed by the Ukrainian S.S.R. quite separately from Russia. Such was, for example, the treaty between Ukraine and Georgia on the mutual recognition of independence, and the repatriation and exchange of prisoners, which was concluded on January 31st, 1921. On April 23rd, 1921, an agreement with Germany was concluded, providing for the exchange of prisoners, and normalizing relations. In July, 1921, similar agreements were signed with Austria and Hungary, and on January 21st, 1922, a treaty of friendship and fraternity with Turkey was signed. On February 14th, 1921, a Peace Treaty with Lithuania,³ and on August 3rd, 1921, agreements with Latvia, and, on November 25th, with Estonia were signed. On June 6th, 1922, a provisional agreement was concluded with Czechoslovakia.

Thus between 1918 and 1922, the Ukrainian S.S.R. appeared formally, to be an independent State. However, its separate representation was usually extended only to neighbouring States. In relations with other countries, the R.S.F.S.R. also represented the Ukrainian S.S.R. In 1922, in connection with the Conference of Genoa, the Ukrainian S.S.R. surrendered her right of separate representation, and in future was to be represented by the R.S.F.S.R.

During 1921-22, the general trend was towards greater subordination of the economic and administrative apparatus of the Soviet regime in Ukraine to that of the R.S.F.S.R. In January, 1921, a decree of the Sovnarkom of the R.S.F.S.R. made it clear that the Commander-in-Chief of Red Army troops in Ukraine was directly subordinated to the Revolutionary Military Council of the R.S.F.S.R., though his appointment was to be approved by the Soviet Ukrainian Government.⁴ Foreign Trade was subordinated to the overall supervision. On the basis of the Treaty of Union, instructions for a common policy on Foreign Trade were worked out in July, 1921. The *Narkom* of Foreign Trade of the R.S.F.S.R. was represented by a plenipotentiary in Ukraine. Ukraine had her own trade agencies abroad, but frequently these became absorbed into the trade agencies of the R.S.F.S.R.

1) O. I. Chistyakov, *Vzaimootnosheniya Sovyetskikh Respublik do obrazovaniya S.S.S.R.*, p. 105.

2) P. Udovychenko, *Z Istoriyi Zovnishn'oyi Polityky U.R.S.R. (1919-22)* Kyiv. 1957, pp. 24-26.

3) Udovychenko, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

4) *Istoriya Sovyetskoy Konstitutsii (v dokumentakh) 1917-1956*, pp. 267-268.

In 1921, too, more industrial organizations in Ukraine passed under the management of the R.S.F.S.R. Thus, the Central Administration of the Donbas coal-mining industry was subordinated to the Chief Fuel Committee in Moscow. In 1922, several giant trusts were created in Ukraine, and put under the direct control of the V.S.N.Kh.¹ The Timber industrial trust, "Dnyeprolyes", absorbed all forestry and timber enterprises of the Dnipro basin, whether in Russian, Ukrainian, or Byelorussian territory. In July, 1922, the spirits industry was put under a unified control, the transport system was unified and reorganized into regions that were quite unconnected with the political divisions. The Black Sea mercantile marine and the railways in Ukraine came directly under the control of the People's Commissariat of Communications of the R.S.F.S.R. In September, 1922, a reform of the postal services divided Ukraine into two regions directly subordinated to the People's Commissariat of Post and Telegraph of the R.S.F.S.R.

The Central Organs of the R.S.F.S.R. controlled the working of the non-unified People's Commissariats in Ukraine through the budget, which was the same for all the Soviet Republics. A decree of the V.Ts.I.K., issued in December 1921, stated clearly that all estimates of the expenditure of the Republics of the Union were to be approved by the Budgetary Commission of the People's Commissariat of Finance of the R.S.F.S.R., the Sovnarkom and the V.Ts.I.K. of the R.S.F.S.R. The system of taxation of the R.S.F.S.R. was also extended to Ukraine. Often the orders of the People's Commissariat of Finance were sent directly to the Ukrainian *gubernii*, bypassing the central authorities of Ukraine, although, after June, 1921, the Ukrainian Government had to be informed about them. Even in the case of the "independent" Commissariats, unified agencies were formed. Thus, for example, the V.Ts.I.K. and the Sovnarkom of the R.S.F.S.R. issued a decree (August 4th, 1921), creating a Unified Committee on Agrarian Affairs, attached to the Commissariat of Agrarian Affairs. The People's Commissariat of Supply and Labour had complete control over this field in Ukraine, and the situation with regard to the Cheka was similar. Such organizations as the Central Statistical Department and the Russian Telegraphic Agency also established branches in Ukraine.

Thus, although on various occasions the independence of Ukraine was formally reiterated,² in practice, the autonomous powers of Ukraine were constantly narrowed, owing to the extension of the sphere of competence of the Governmental and Party organs of the R.S.F.S.R.

(To be continued.)

1) These were "Khimugol", "Ukrmetall", "Yugostal", and "Sel'mashtrest."

2) As in the project of the peace treaty with Poland, of October, 1920, in which Article 1 states: "Both negotiating parties, in accordance with the principle of the self-determination of nations, recognize the independence of Ukraine and Byelorussia" (*Pravda*, October 17th, 1920).

Dmytro DONZOW

LENIN AS THEORETICIAN OF “PROLETARIAN” ASSIMILATION POLICY

V. I. Lenin, *Statyi i rechi ob Ukraine* (Articles and Speeches about Ukraine), Partizdat TsK KPBU, Kiev, 1936)

Russia did not lack theoreticians of assimilation policy. During absolutism they were Katkov, Prince Meshcherskiy, Florinskiy; during constitutional tsarism they were P. B. Struve (a former Marxist) and P. Milyukov. They were doctrinaires of feudal and bourgeois assimilation policies. Lenin became a theoretician of the “proletarian” assimilation policy.

The collection of his articles and speeches on the Ukrainian question published by the *Partizdat* [Party Publishing House], acquaints us with the complicated argumentation which, in the eyes of the new ruling strata of the empire, was to justify the “legality” and inevitability of the existence of this empire — a mixture of pariah peoples harnessed to the historical wagon of the ruling nation.

Beginning from 1900 (the year of the foundation of the RUP — Revolutionary Ukrainian Party), the process of the political sobering of Ukraine went on at a quickening pace. Already several years before the Great War none of the Russian parties could disregard the centrifugal tendencies in Ukraine. Some of them — the Black Hundreds — proposed to suppress these trends with the well tried out methods of the tsarist regime. Others — the Liberals (Kadets) — hoped to win the moderate wing of the Ukrainian community (whose organ was the *Kyïv Rada*) by concessions of a cultural-national character. Lenin viewed the matter from a broader perspective. With the eye of a skilful political chess-player he immediately noticed a new chessman which stepped out of obscurity onto the all-Russian chess-board, he calculated — precisely, as it seemed to him — the direction and the strength of its possible impact on the game which was being played against tsarism — and decided to attract this force to his side.

Like the dissatisfaction of the workers due to economic oppression, like the dissatisfaction of the peasants due to agrarian misery, so he wished to utilise the dissatisfaction of the Ukrainians due to cultural and political oppression as a tremendous accumulator of energy for the struggle against tsarism — for the time being the main enemy of his party.

As genius of a demagogue he did not spare phrases and promises. Whether the Ukrainian question emerged in a Duma debate or on the international horizon (Austro-Russian rivalry), Lenin always spoke as "defender of the underdog", as prosecutor in a law-suit against the absolutist government. He spoke also against the Ukrainian "chauvinists", "unwanted protectors" of Ukraine, who, as he asserted, had the only sincere and selfless defender in the person of the Russian proletariat, well, and in its leader, Vladimir Lenin... He never let his eyes stray away from his chief aim: first, to take the political Ukrainian movement "in the tow" of the Party and with minor concessions to break the dangerous edge of the political Ukrainian movement, for the time being not very sharp, but capable of becoming more acute in time.

When Shevchenko commemorations were prohibited in Kyiv Lenin wrote a protest speech for a Party deputy to the Duma. Bishop Nikon spoke in the Duma in defence of the Ukrainian demands — true, in a clumsy and naïve fashion — but Lenin immediately *recognized* a competitor in him, therefore he came out with a speech against him, naturally in the interests of the Ukrainians themselves. And at the same time he, passingly, remarked that "only clericals and bourgeois can speak about a national culture. Working masses can speak only about an international culture of the world-wide workers' movement" (p. 225).

In 1913 there took place an all-student congress in Lviv at which delegates from Greater Ukraine participated. On the one hand Lenin rejoiced "that at the all-Ukrainian student congress in Lviv some social democrats spoke... against the social democrat Donzow who tabled a resolution about "an independent Ukraine" at the congress." He rejoiced that "an article by the centralist (V. Stepanyuk) who combats Donzow & Co." appeared because "it is very important to combat nationalists of this kind" (pp. 221-3). But on the other hand — he stood up in defence of this same Donzow against the central organ of the *Kadet* Party; because Rech' combating Ukrainian separatists made use of "swearwords from the vocabulary of the Black Hundreds", because one can and one ought to argue with national socialists like Donzow, but the base hounding of people for "separatism", hounding of people who cannot defend themselves is the limit of shamelessness" (pp. 222-3).

He who knows how poor and miserable were those *Kadet* houndings of their opponents as methods of struggle compared with the methods of the Bolsheviks and Lenin — cannot fail to see in this "defence" merely ordinary demagogy. On the occasion of this quarrel with *Rech'* and the Kadets, Lenin lifted slightly the veil which was hiding his own chauvinist ideology. He said that any democrat (at that time he pretended to be a democrat) ought "to fight for the recognition of complete and unconditional equality of nation and its

right to self-determination." But — "one can hold different views concerning the question, what sort of self-determination — from the point of view of the proletariat — should it be in every concrete case" (p. 222-3). A splendid formula for the naïve! An algebraic formula. There is, apparently, a "nation" (A), there is "the right to self-determination" (B), and a naïve person thinks that should one put these two quantities together something great will result: $A + B = C$. And the gullible Ukrainian painted this C for himself in the most lurid colours. Lenin however, said that one could accept this algebraic formula but — "in a concrete case" substitute such quantities for A and B that the sum resulting from them would either be minimal, or a negative quantity, or quite simply nil — nothing! Lenin and his party in Ukraine did substitute such "concrete" algebraic quantities for the concepts "nation" and "self-determination" later on. The principle remained inviolable, but in this "concrete case" the result was nil... For how to understand these concepts "from the point of view of the proletariat" — this was not decided by any proletariat, but only by the unerring interpreter of its will, V. Lenin, speaking *ex catedra* at a Party congress. Many of our countrymen who failed to grasp the sense of political mathematics, were very much surprised by it afterwards.

Even at that time, that is before the War and the Revolution, Lenin carefully laid the foundations for his assimilation policy theory. One of the marxist dogmas was that the direction of the entire social development is dictated by the development of capitalism. Capitalism has two tendencies: on the one hand it leads to national reawakening of "unhistorical nations", and on the other hand — "to the strengthening of all sorts of relations among nations, to the breaking down of any national barriers" (p. 226). What, in view of these contradictory "trends" of capitalism, should be the national policy of the proletariat? Lenin formulates it very simply: with regard to the *first* trend of capitalism — it is necessary to recognize *de jure*, verbally, all the rights ("up to and including separation") to the subjugated nation, but with regard to the second trend — it is necessary *de facto*, in practice to bind this nation even more closely to the dominant nation. This is how Lenin's formula looks like when purified from dialectic casuistry.

"The world-wide historical trend of capitalism" leads to the "wearing off of national differences, to the *assimilation* of nations" (Lenin's emphasis). This assimilation — "is one of the most powerful motors which transforms capitalism into socialism" (p. 227). Hence it would follow that whoever desires socialism must strive towards the assimilation of nations. Lenin came in fact to such a conclusion and held on to it until his death. But, as a skilful demagogue, he could not, naturally, come out openly with a programme of assimilation. This would have meant to condemn himself and his party to

the ungrateful role of a competitor of the Black Hundreds. It was necessary therefore to *think* "assimilation" but to *say* something else. An insoluble task, it would seem. But what was "marxist dialectic" for anyway? What was the fog of glittering phrases with which one could deceive Party blockheads for? Lenin argues thus: there exists in America for instance a huge "mill which grinds away national differences" — all immigrants soon become Americans. "Who has not been bogged down in nationalist superstitions cannot fail to see in this *process of assimilation* of nations by capitalism (my emphasis — D. D.) magnificent historical progress, destruction of national backwardness of various bear-infested corners." There are particularly many such "backwoods areas" in the tsarist empire. Obviously, in Lenin's opinion, Ukraine, too, belongs to them. "Take Russia and the attitude of Russians to the Ukrainians. It goes without saying that any democrat, and even more so a marxist, will resolutely fight against the unheard of humiliation of Ukrainians and will demand their full equality. But it would be an utter treachery to socialism . . . to weaken the presently existing within the borders of one state, *connections* and *union* (my emphasis — D. D.) between the Ukrainian and Russian proletariat" (p. 228). At the first sight — at least from the marxist point of view — it is logical! Meanwhile in this supposedly logical argument there is an ordinary swindle inadmissible in logic. For if Lenin drew a correct conclusion from his own premises he should have said:

A socialist stands for "historical progress" and for socialism (Lenin's first premise).

Assimilation of nations favouring the dominant nation speeds up "historical progress" and is "one of the most powerful motors transforming capitalism into socialism" (the second premise of Lenin).

Ergo, any socialist ought to strengthen assimilation. But he is afraid to say so (logically correct!) from the considerations of political tactics. Therefore, leaving aside the first and the second premises he makes the unexpected conclusion:

Ergo, a socialist ought to strengthen ("not to weaken") — "*connections* and *union* between the Ukrainian and Russian proletariat."

Whence have "connections" and "union" come in this context? There was no mention of them in the premises. Lenin introduces them by stealth into the conclusion making an ordinary logical mistake.

He has to perform this trick because otherwise the entire structure of his national programme would collapse. A dogma of this programme, its basis, is the contention that it was the big landowners and the bourgeois who were opponents of the liberation struggle of Ukraine, but the only "social force" "able to give a rebuff to those classes" is the working class (headed by Lenin). "Following its victory, national oppression will become impossible" (p. 229). To

speak about assimilation instead of "connection and union" would have meant to undermine the above stated dogma, would have meant to tell the truth, namely that not only the big landowners and the bourgeoisie, but also the all-Russian proletariat, in short the *entire Russian nation* are the bearers of the national oppression in Ukraine; it would have meant to state the truth inconvenient for himself, namely that the main fact is the struggle of species, of nations, not of classes. To recognise this fact, to make a logical conclusion from Lenin's premises, would have meant to blow up the entire artificial argument of Lenin and his entire idea about the noble, and pure as a dove, party of the Russian proletariat which has to introduce freedom and happiness in Ukraine . . .

Compressed by the tongs of the great living fact of the struggle of nations, Lenin accomplishes miracles of acrobatics in order to prove his absurd thesis. Therefore again and again he returns to the cursed question of assimilation which he desires so much in his heart but which he dares not to serve up to Ukrainian readers in the naked uncamouflaged form. He acknowledges rapid economic development of the South, that is Ukraine, which attracts scores of peasants and workers to capitalist estates, mines, and to the towns. The fact of "assimilation" of the Russian and Ukrainian proletariat within these limits is undoubted. And this *fact is undoubtedly a "progressive fact."* Even if a political frontier was drawn between Russia and Ukraine, he argues, "even in that case historical progressiveness of "assimilation" of Ukrainian and Russian workers would not be under any doubt, even as the fact of the melting together of nations in the USA is progressive" (p. 229). In this argument, too, here is the same artificiality, the same purposeful fog. First, in Ukraine independent from Russia, assimilation of the immigrant population would take place in favour of the indigenous population. In Ukraine — Russian province, there did not take place "assimilation of the Ukrainian and Russian proletariat" into some sort of a supranational amalgam, but — *assimilation of the Ukrainian proletariat in favour of the Russian.* This is a fact, and what Lenin regarded as fact (or wanted others to regard it so) is simply a fantasy, euphemism, adornment of a phenomenon harmful to us, Ukrainians, sweetening of a pill designed for the stomachs of Little Russian marxists. In the first case, instead of the assimilation of Ukrainian workers, Lenin substituted its "connections and alliance" with the Russians. In the second case — instead of the assimilation of the Ukrainian proletariat in favour of the Russian, he substitutes some fantastic "assimilation of Ukrainian and Russian workers", when — as he knew perfectly well himself — there could not be any talk about the assimilation of the Russian proletariat in such circumstances . . .

Where he needed it, Lenin could be very confusing.

Lenin's essential idea comes out more clearly in the following passage. He became indignant when he was asked to give an unambiguous "yes or no" answer to the question about "separation of every nation" (p. 233). Lenin did not want and could not give such an unambiguous answer. For this answer is subordinated in each case to another supreme criterion: "the interests of the class struggle" of the proletariat, "the strengthening of one's class." "Any national demand", "any national separation" is evaluated by him "from the point of view of the struggle of the workers" of Russia (pp. 233-4). In other words — Lenin had the task to overthrow the class of land-owners and bourgeoisie in Russia, to *take over power* in the empire in the name of the new privileged stratum — the Russian proletariat and to strengthen this power. When any national liberation movement, including Ukrainian, favours this take-over of power and its strengthening — it is an ally; if not — it is an enemy. This is why when — during the tsarist period — politically-minded Ukrainian movement opposed the landowners, it was a welcome ally. But when it began to come out against the regime of the "proletariat" (Lenin's party), against its monopoly of power — it became an enemy who had to be mercilessly destroyed. Of course, this had nothing in common with marxism, but had a lot in common with the way of thinking of any ruling stratum of the empire wishing to keep the subjugated nations in the state of permanent dependence. When the "proletariat" (Communist Party) became the ruler and the lord of the interests of this empire as a whole became its interests, "the interests of the proletariat." And any separatists had to bow their heads before them, they had to subordinate their national aspirations to these "interests."

From this point of view, the nation-wide bourgeois liberation movements of the Chinese, Turks or Negroes, by no means class or socialist movements — were for Lenin "progressive" and "revolutionary." *Identical* Ukrainian movement was for him a "reactionary" movement. For the former turned against the enemies of Russia, therefore did not clash with the "interests of the proletariat" — with the empire renovated by him. Marxist dialectic can walk along the most unexpected paths. Wandering along the twisted paths of this "dialectics", Lenin got into a rage when caught at his contradictions (as was done e. g. by the late Lev Yurkevych). He was even more enraged when his elaborate methods of the "solution" of the Ukrainian question — with which he hoped to win Ukrainians for himself — were taken over from him by other theoreticians of assimilation from the bourgeois camp. Thus, e. g., he threw the entire fury of his eloquence at the already mentioned Kadet (from among the Little Russians) Mykhailo Mohylyans'kyi who used to prove to Lenin that — "criticism of Donzow's prescriptions has nothing in common with the denial of the rights of nations to self-determination." Apparently, one can *theoretically* be in favour of national self-determination, but

in practice combat its "unhealthy tendencies". for "to unmask the latter does not mean to deny the right of nations to self-determination" (p. 240).

This assertion made Lenin blow his top off because it was exactly copied from his thinking (*theoretically* the right of self-determination "up to and including separation" is recognised, *but in practice* it is denied "up to and including assimilation")... Lenin did not like his adversary or competitor using clever tricks from his own "shop" in the game.

The polemical struggle with these competitors for influence among the Ukrainians, especially the polemics with the Kadets — pulls aside a little the curtain with which Lenin covered up the real reason for his verbal magnanimity with regard to the Ukrainians' "right to self-determination." He wrote: "Kokoshkin (a Kadet publicist) wants to assure us that the recognition of the right (of nation) to separation increases the danger of disintegration of the state... Quite the contrary: the recognition of the right to separation diminishes the danger of "the disintegration of the state" (p. 244), lectures Lenin. So when he proclaimed verbally "the right of self-determination" for Ukraine, he did so from fear of the disintegration of the empire; the fear which oppressed him perhaps more than the bourgeois liberals. He thought that petty concessions (language, school) in favour of Ukrainians, accompanied with loud and kind expressions of sympathy for the underdog (usually so responsive to lordly kindness) — will be sufficient to liquidate the Ukrainian question in the Russian empire. Such were the motives of his Ukrainophil declarations.

Defending himself against his patriotic compatriots from other parties and their accusation that he was working for the disintegration of the empire, Lenin wrote: "to accuse the adherents of the freedom of self-determination that is freedom of separation, that they encourage separatism, is the same stupidity, the same deceit, as to accuse the adherents of the freedom of divorce that they encourage the ruination of family ties" (p. 245). A remark to the point... As a matter of fact, it is to the same extent "stupidity and deceit" to blame Lenin for allegedly preparing the disintegration of the empire by his programme, or to praise him for bringing freedom and independence to every nation as to ascribe to the adherents of the right of divorce the intention to destroy the institution of marriage... In this case it was surely not the fault of Lenin if our gullible compatriots failed to understand the essence of his freedom-loving phrase-mongering...

In Lenin's opinion, the masses understood well "the importance of the economic and geographic ties, the advantages of a big market and a big state" (p. 245). Therefore "social democrats are enemies of *any* nationalism", "enemies of particularism", and altogether support the idea that "big powers are able by far more successfully than the small ones to solve the tasks of economic development and the tasks

of the struggle of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie." Hence logical conclusion would follow that the socialists ought to combat with all means the separatist tendencies of nations, including the Ukrainian, because they ruin those big powers. Although this conclusion would be logical — it would not be politic. For it would immediately reveal the rapacious face of bolshevism. Therefore, immediately after this tirade about the great importance of the "big powers" Lenin adds: "but we value the voluntary bond of nations, never the forcible one." (p. 253). So to speak, although our aim is not to permit separation, the methods of socialism for the attainment of this goal are of purely ideological character; violence is excluded. In the world, unfortunately, methods play a secondary role, the basic thing is the aim, the aspiration, the goal, the will to achieve it. Methods change according to circumstances. However flattering were the words which the forest king whispered to the poor child, when the latter resisted he ended with the well-known refrain: "Und bist du nicht willig, so brauch ich Gewalt", (And if you are not willing I shall use force).

"I shall use force" even if this entailed throwing marxist dialectics to the devils, for through this "principled" marxist spoke above all a Russian "baron" of the old type, permeated with the idea of a "third Rome" on the Moscow River, while his marxist "dialectic" was only a mask which hid from the gullible the lupine teeth of this "dogooder" — but this became evident only after the October Revolution of 1917. Although he was above all a sober practical man, sometimes a bookworm, a library theoretician who having got hold of an idea had to carry it on to its final logical limits, whether he needed it or not, crawled out of Lenin.

Therefore, following the phrase that the "masses" would feel "the advantages of the big market and a big state", he added: but "they will go for separation only when national oppression and national conflict would make common life utterly insupportable, when they would put a brake on everything and on every kind of economic relations. And in such a case the interests of the capitalist development and of the freedom of the class struggle would precisely be on the side of those who separate" (p. 245).

Whatever one might think about this passage, in it — as if led by a prophetic vision — Lenin presented precisely the situation of Ukraine under the rule of his party nowadays. Although, of course, he would never have admitted it. If the facts were inconvenient for him he simply denied them. When there was a conflict in him between the doctrine which required voluntariness and practical demands of the party which took upon its shoulders the burden of the empire — it was the doctrine that suffered. He could therefore argue for a hundred times the harmfulness of the violent forms of annexation, but when nothing else was expedient (as in the case of Ukraine) he blessed

violence. For this reason, too, he could argue a hundred times for the advantages of big markets, "the progressiveness" of big powers — in practice, when the interests of the party and the empire demanded it, he came out both against those markets and those powers. As in the case of the Crimea. Ukraine separated from Russia was bad from the point of view of marxist "dialectics." The Crimea separated from Ukraine was good — from the point of view of the same "dialectics." Korea separated from China and joined to Japan — this was bad, but Outer Mongolia separated from China and annexed by Russia — this was good. He twisted his "dialectics" as a shoemaker twists leather, or as tsarist government twisted its laws.

A similar attitude on the part of a practical, nationally-minded politician to "dialectics", to the doctrine when it turned a hostile face towards him, we see for instance with Ignacy Daszynski. Angered by the arguments of Rosa Luxemburg, who based herself on "historical materialism" speaking against Poland's independence, Daszynski shouted at a meeting: "I spit at such a historical materialism which permits Montenegrin pig-breeders to enjoy independence, and refuses this right to a nation of more than twenty million people." (*Nowy Dziennik*, 6. X. 1936). Lenin also "spat" on his own dogma when it suited him, only under his breath, not loudly. The predominance which Lenin and the PPS (Polish Socialist Party) gave to their own national instinct, when this instinct clashed with the marxist doctrine — was not known by many Ukrainian marxists. The *Vistnyk* already quoted words by V. Levynskyi who declared the readiness of Ukrainian socialists to renounce even their own language when "the ukase from Moscow" would prove to them that this was in the interests of the proletariat and revolution. These words, compared with the attitude of Lenin (and Daszynski) to their doctrine, illuminate clearly that deep spiritual abyss separating the politicians from the RCP(B) or the PPS from our children of politics.

When the Revolution broke out, Lenin at first continued his line of Ukrainian policy . . . For neither he, nor his party were yet in power, but only Prince Lvov, Kerensky, Milyukov and other "bourgeois." Thus, the task of the opposition, as understood by that unsurpassed demagogue, was to attack the ruling strata for its lack of principles and violence, etc. on the part of the Provisional Government in Ukraine. But Lenin was the least qualified to brand them. With the same deceit he repeated constantly that he was not "an adherent of small states" (Ukraine, too, was small for him); that he desired "alliance" with them, but that he wanted this "alliance" to be "voluntary." Ukraine should be "an ally and brother" in the "struggle for socialism." It was the same old soothing song of the alder king. And the same old anxiety about the integrity of the empire: "make concessions to the Ukrainians", he said to the Kadets, "this is dictated by reason, for it will be worse otherwise, you will

not be able to keep the Ukrainians by force, you will only make them angrier. Make concessions to the Ukrainians and you will open a path to confidence between the two nations, to their brotherly union as equals" (p. 272).

But lo, Kerensky's government falls, and from being an opposition the Bolsheviks become the ruling party. At that moment, when under the pressure of its turbulent national element the Ukrainian Central Council dared to come out against a "brotherly union" with Lenin's Russia, the latter suddenly changed his style. In the Manifesto of the Council of People's Commissars of Russia, edited by him, Lenin stresses once again that he recognises the "Ukrainian people's republic" and "its right to complete separation from Russia" (p. 277), but he cannot agree with the fact that this *sovereign* republic does not wish to carry out an internal policy dear to Moscow. He cannot agree with the fact that the Central Council refused to convoke a regional congress of Ukrainian Soviets; does not agree with the fact that the Central Council altogether "does not recognise Soviet authority in Ukraine."

Due to these crimes, "the Russian Council of People's Commissars cannot recognise the *Rada* as the legal representative of the working and exploited masses of the Ukrainian republic."

The Kazan logic of "Illich the genius" thus recognised Ukraine's right to sovereignty only in so far as the latter became a "voluntary" vassal of Moscow. If Ukraine would carry out Moscow's will, if it would avoid conflicts with the "brotherly people", if it would tolerate it in everything it did — let her have the props of independence.

Thus quite logically — not from the point of view of Marxism, but from that of Russian imperialism — Lenin arrived at the struggle against the Central *Rada*. For, as he thought, "only the Soviets of Ukrainian rural proletariat, workers and soldiers, can create in Ukraine a regime, under which conflicts between the "brotherly peoples" would become impossible" (p. 279). Lenin reckoned that, deprived of its ruling strata (intelligentsia), the Ukraine of the meek — as he imagined — and easily deceived peasantry and of the half-Russianised urban working class and soldiers, would never be a place of any "conflict between the brotherly peoples." To the contrary, one "brotherly people" (the people of Lenin) would completely bridle the other, and the other would "voluntarily" allow itself to be bridled. Both Marxist theory would then be saved (the right to self-determination), and the inconvenient implementation of that "right" would be avoided... In theory — "a divorce" is permitted. But — the "divorce" of Ukraine from Russia is harmful to Russia (officially: to "progress", "interests of the proletariat" and so on), therefore — in the given concrete case "the divorce" is not permitted. To the contrary, "the divorce" of the Crimea from Ukraine is favourable to

Russia (officially: to "progress" and the "class struggle of the proletariat"), therefore in the given concrete case the "divorce" is not only permissible, but even desirable . . .

I have already stated earlier that Lenin once scolded the Kadet newspaper *Rech* because the latter made di because the latter made differentiations: one can be in favour of the right of nations to self-determination *in general*, but in a *concrete case* to oppose "unhealthy trends" of particular separatist movements. Scolding the Kadets, Lenin later followed the same path. A similar thing happened to him a second time. The Central Rada demanded from the Provisional Russian Government a statement that the latter was "not against the rights of the Ukrainian people to autonomy." Kerensky's government refused to make such a statement on the grounds that, allegedly, such matters could not be decided before the convening of the All-Russian Constituent Assembly, without an understanding among the "brotherly peoples", by a unilateral act. Lenin savagely reproached the ministers of the Provisional Government for that. But then the Provisional Government falls. The Soviet of People's Commissars becomes the government now. Ukraine begins to form its own army, recalling Ukrainian units from the front. What does Lenin do? *The same as did the bourgeois-democratic government overthrown by him.* In its December 1917 Manifesto to the Central Rada, the Sovnarkom (Council of People's Commissars of Russia) protests against the "arbitrary" creation of the Ukrainian Army, because it is "a unilateral act", not based on "mutual understanding between the governments of the two republics" (p. 277). An argumentation stolen live from the Kadet bourgeois.

Political situation has its own logic stronger than the logic of Marxist "dialectic"!

After the break with the Central Rada, the situation crystallised itself favourably for the Bolsheviks at first. Soviet detachments cross over into the territory of Ukraine, occupy Luhansk and Debal'tsevo, and on this occasion Lenin (p. 283) sends Antonov-Ovseyenko, who conducted the advance, his "warmest congratulations" and two "hurrahs" ("hurrah" and "hurrah") — "congratulations" and "hurrahs" for the army which violently invaded the territory of a nation which made use of the "right to self-determination"; congratulations from one who still not so long ago declared that the annexation of Ukraine he understood as a "voluntary", but never a "violent" act . . .

The situation changes once again however. The Bolsheviks with their dialectic, self-determination and their army — are expelled from Ukraine. The Central Rada returns to Kyiv, from where on April 2, 1918, it addresses itself to Soviet Russia with a peace proposal. And Lenin, the same who refused to recognise the Central Rada because it did not permit the organisation of the Soviets in

Ukraine — now replies to Rada with an agreement. He sends Stalin, Rakovsky and Manuilsky as a delegation to the peace negotiations (p. 290). The dialectic of force, it appears, was the most efficacious in convincing the leader of Russian communism. In face of *this* dialectic the “interests of progress” and “the interests of the proletariat” and the demands “of big markets” and “big power”, fell into silence. “The genius of a dialectician” immediately grasped that his trumps were beaten, that his casuistry received a head-on blow, and that he had to hide them away.

In this theoretician — I repeat it once again — there was sitting a man who soberly viewed the facts, a man who though deceived others with his phrases, himself never submitted to their suggestion, realising their true worth. In this respect very characteristic is Lenin’s foreign policy report at the session of the Central Executive Committee and the Moscow Soviet on 14th May, 1918. The situation was difficult for Russia. Germans were in Ukraine. It was not known which borders of Ukraine the Soviets would be forced to recognise. And in this uncertain and alarming for the RSFSR situation, there appeared advisers at Lenin’s side who argued “that this uncertainty can easily be cleared up by openly demanding from the Germans to keep the Brest Treaty.” Lenin bitinglly ridicules those party politicians: “they forget”, he said, “that it is necessary to be victorious first, and then to demand something. As long as you are not victorious, the enemy can delay with his answer and even not to answer at all. Such is the law . . . of war” (p. 300).

As a realistic politician, he put the solving of any question into the plane of force. And his entire nationalities policy in Ukraine, in essence, was aimed at one thing: to weaken our strength, to disorganise our top leadership and our masses morally and politically, to break in them the spirit of resistance and struggle. The more naïve looked the politicians of the type of Vynnychenko, Hryhoriiv and others who seriously tried to discuss with Lenin the essence of various slogans such as the “interests of the proletariat”, “the cause of the revolution”, “self-determination of nations” and others, while the Moscow dictator in his heart merely jeered at those slogans and our poor marxists.

Lenin expressed himself even more drastically in one of his polemical articles against Kautsky in 1918: “Of course, it would have been much more pleasant if we simply overturned Wilhelm and Wilson by means of war. But this is a daydream, hallucination. We are not able to depose them by means of an external war. We can, however, advance their internal decomposition” (p. 302) . . . *To advance decomposition of an adversary* — this is what he was after in all cases, in particular as far as the struggle with Ukraine was concerned. Theories, doctrines, their interpretation, quotations from Engels and Marx — all these were instruments to achieve his main

aim: to bring his adversary down. It is this wish that was his *primum mobile*, and not at all the triumph of this or that idea, "liberation of the working people", "the kingdom of socialism", etc., as many of his adversaries, to whom God did not grant enough wisdom, imagined. Facing often just such adversaries, he underestimated them to such an extent that he almost exposed his weak side to the blows of the adversaries, had they been able to see and to hit back.

At one meeting on 13th March, 1919 he said: "Ukraine is now freeing herself from German imperialists who intended to take from Ukraine 60 million poods [about 1 million tons] of grain, but have taken only 9 million poods. Now we have the Soviet Ukraine. And the Soviet government in Ukraine, in relation to us, when the question of grain will arise, will not demand a usurious price, will not become a speculator... And the Ukrainian government said: "our primary task is to help the starving North." Grain reserves in Ukraine are enormous. One cannot *take* everything at once... One hears groaning on the part of Ukrainian comrades that there are not enough people, there is nobody to organise the Soviet regime... Kiev is not a proletarian centre... Having discussed the situation in the Central Committee of *our Party*, we have set ourselves the task — at first to do everything possible to organise the apparatus in Ukraine and to start work only when we shall have weapons in our hands and when there will be the apparatus, and in return to get 50 million poods of grain by June 1st" (pp. 307-308, my emphasis — D. D.).

There you have a speech which can hardly find a match in cynicism! Each word in it speaks whole volumes — about that *primum mobile* which dictated to the dictator his Ukrainian policy: both the praises for the "Ukrainian" government which consisted of miserable creatures imposed by Moscow... and such expressions as — "we *have* Ukraine"... And regret that, unfortunately, it was not possible *to take everything*", that, unfortunately, it would not be possible to fleece Ukraine bare... And the admission that this fleecing is decided upon unilaterally by "the Central Committee of *our Party*", i. e. Russian party... And the joyful statement that the "Ukrainian government", from purely altruistic motives, would regard as its primary task to come to the aid of starving Russia... And the recognition that in order to make this aid a reality, it was necessary "to get to work" only "when we shall have weapons" without which it would hardly be possible to take grain from the altruists of a "brotherly people"... And, finally, the monumental 50 millions! The Germans were hideous imperialists, oppressors of Ukraine, because they *wanted to take* 60 millions, Moscow was liberator because it *took* 50 millions... This is surely a brazenness which cannot be very frequently found in the history of conqueror nations.

The aim of Lenin's Ukrainian nationality policy was thus: "to have" Ukraine, and there an "apparatus" of his factotums, in order

to "take" from her as much as possible, and, moreover, for nothing — not at a "usurious" price. This is what lay at the bottom of the entire casuistry of his nationalities programme with its references to "backward bear-infested corners" which ought to unite with Russia, to his "big markets and big powers", his "voluntary, never violent bonds" between nations, his "international solidarity of the proletariat" and other flowers of his theory.

The same was Lenin's attitude to the Don Cossacks as well. In the same speech, in the same tone of Catherine's II field marshal joyfully reporting about the capture of a Turtukay, he said: "Apart from Ukraine, we have another source — the Don Region. The victories of the Red Army have accomplished miracles there already..." From the liberation of the proletariat "by its own hand" — to the soldatesque and a "liberated" country as a "source" of wealth for its aggressive neighbour. And further: "What does it all mean? It means that we have come up close to coal and grain without which we shall perish" (p. 308).

To many of his tirades about "self-determination of nations", about their "brotherhood" and the "solidarity of the proletariat" one could add this: "What does it mean?" And to answer likewise: it means that the "proletariat" and its prophet need coal and grain...

However, this was not the highest which Lenin knew how to take from the Ukrainian people. His "dialectic" was alright as long as there were people who let themselves be duped. In Ukraine, however — despite the gullibility of the socialists — this dialectic met with spontaneous and threatening mass protests, against which all tricks of casuistry shattered. A moment came when the dictator felt he was "at the end of his Latin." In such moments he resorted to his *ultima ratio*, to those methods for solving the Ukrainian question which had been employed by tsarism.

The matter with the "voluntary" help to "the North", apparently, did not go as smoothly as was provided for by the doctrine of the "solidarity of the working people." And so, already at the end of May, 1919, Lenin cabled the "Ukrainian" Sovnarkom: "decree and carry out full disarmament of the population, *mercilessly shoot on the spot for* [the possession of] any hidden rifle. The main task of the moment is a decisive victory in the Donets Basin, requisitioning of all rifles from the villages" (p. 313 — my emphasis — D. D.). The old method — so cruelly ridiculed at one time by Lenin himself — the method of the tsarist general Trepov — "do not spare cartridges" — this is how the "bond and alliance between the Ukrainian and Russian proletariat" were to be cemented now.

When Wrangel appeared in Ukraine, Lenin issued an appeal "to the poor peasants of Ukraine" on 2nd September, 1920: "Remember that what is at stake is the safeguarding of your families, the defence

of the peasant land and regime" (p. 349). In this appeal, as in others, too, the dictator's demagoguery is clearly transparent. He calls the peasants to defend the "peasant" land in order to confiscate that peasant land later for the Russian State! He calls for the defence of the family in order to destroy that family later, having invested the Russian State with the monopoly right to dispose of the body and soul of the Ukrainian child! He calls for the defence of the "peasant regime" in order to proclaim and carry out later on the slogan that the most important thing was "the interests of the proletarian dictatorship" and the "directing role of the proletariat with regard to the peasantry" (p. 336).

The essence of Lenin's Ukrainian policy was: to drive a wedge between the masses of the people and their top leadership, by compromising the latter before the former as hostile to it: this was also the policy of Peter I and his father. With this purpose in mind he tried to whet social appetites of those masses and their demands (preparing himself beforehand not to fulfil them) in order to represent himself and his party, the party of aliens, as the only defenders of the broad masses.

Like the Slavophiles earlier, he tried to give the conglomerate of the peoples of the Russian empire — one great hope which — overcoming language and religious differences — would have grouped them around the centre of the Slav world — Moscow. With the difference that instead of the "liberation of the Slavs" (from Ukrainian "magnates", Turkish sultans and Austro-Hungarian "feudal lords") — he put forward the "liberation of the working people" — but — in both cases — "liberation" from the native national elite in order to bring them over under the protection of the Russian elite. Anyone who opposed Moscow — opposed the interests of the big entity, "Slavdom" or "proletariat", consequently any reprisals against him were lawful, in order to "come up close to coal and grain", to restore the empire, to rebuild the common, one for all the peoples, "fatherland", to create "one Soviet people" which would have the same wishes and act in the same manner — in order to pass from political state assimilation to cultural assimilation. This was the main motor of Lenin's nationality policy in Ukraine. I have already mentioned that this "proletarian" assimilator borrowed some ideas from the Kadet Party, some methods — from the servants of tsarism. As is becoming clear, he borrowed from the Russian monarchists even the basic premise, the fundamental motive of his nationality policy in Ukraine. He wrote: "We are opponents of national enmity... the directing role of the proletariat with regard to the peasantry is important, much less important is the question whether Ukraine will be a separate State or not" (pp. 343, 349). In other words — what was the most important was to destroy the feeling of hostility of the Ukrainian with regard to Russia and — to wield real power in

Ukraine, that is demobilisation of Ukraine — spiritual and physical. And the props — the Ukrainian “government” (which would carry out Moscow’s will), the language (he even promised two languages to Vynnychenko in return for the recognition of the Russian regime in Ukraine) — all this was of secondary importance.

The monarchist Shulgin wrote in a similar vein. A paragraph which *Vistnyk* has probably quoted already, but which in the given context acquires particular significance. Shulgin preferred Ukraine but as a “Russian” State (just as Bavaria was a German state), to an ordinary — but *Ukrainian* — province of Russia. For — “the king of Little Russia will always after all come to an agreement with an all-Russian monarch, just as the numerous German kings came to an agreement with the Hohenzollerns. But when the Ukrainian people would feel themselves a completely different people, that people will in the end make a cruel uprising. For after all why should a community of 30 million of a completely independent people live a dependent life?” With Ukraine that is nationally hostile to Russia — “any federation is vanity.” “If the population of the South would feel as Little Russians, that is Russians it will continue to be a firm support of a single Russian State, even while creating their local southern culture and enjoying full freedom in its internal affairs. But the moment this consciousness is lost, the people of the black soil and whitewashed huts... will become a band of treachery, will become those who would “push a knife into the back” of the empire at the first opportunity. It is not the form of coexistence with Russia which is the most important in the Ukrainian question, the main thing is to keep the south Russian population in the consciousness of its Russianness” (V. Shulgin, “Hatred or Reconciliation”, *Vorozhdeniye* (Rebirth), No. 13, Jan. 1927, Paris). Lenin put the Ukrainian question precisely in the same way as did this monarchist. The main thing was not the form of coexistence of Ukraine with Russia. The essential thing was that the population of Ukraine should “feel themselves as Little Russians.” The point was — to destroy in the Ukrainian masses the feeling — at first of political, and later of ethnic “hostility” on the one hand, and on the other hand — to graft on them the feeling of belonging to a single whole: in the former case to the Russian, and in the latter case — to the Soviet people... The main thing was to carry out, at any price, the assimilation of Ukraine. Ukraine was to be (with language!) Ukrainian, but Ukrainianism was meant in the regional sense.

Previously, the necessity for assimilation was “justified” with “geographic unity”, common Slav origin, the theory of “three Russias” etc. This argumentation collapsed together with tsarism. Lenin’s task was to replace the bankrupt assimilation ideology with a new one. To promise and to give everything to cause Ukrainians to recognise the spiritual and leading (“regime”) hegemony of the Russians,

to make them drop that element which is essential to a nation, to make them renounce the feeling of hostility and hatred of Moscow; to make "the people of the black soil and whitewashed huts" cease to be "a band of treachery", to renounce their nationality and, having become assimilated, to become "a support of the Russian statehood", the foundation stone of the empire. The theory of the "solidarity of the working people" irrespective of their nationality was to serve this task.

A similar attempt on the part of the tsarism ended in an unexampled catastrophe. It depends on us that Lenin's idea plagiarized from tsarism should end in a similar catastrophe.

In all this there are things which we might learn from Lenin. These are: cool realism of thinking, loyalty to the fundamental-imperial — verities of his nation and the demands of its might, the emphasis on the feature of power, scorn of phrases, exclusive attention to the facts and essence of things, and finally the resoluteness with which he carried out his ideas. We cannot boast of having had many politicians who would possess these qualities.

Recognizing these features in Lenin, which it would be useful for us to acquire, I am not making an apology for him. For I would refer to him the words spoken by himself in 1914 at the address of his adversaries from the Monarchist and Kadet camp: "Nobody can be guilty for having been born a slave. But a slave to whom not only the striving for his own liberty is alien, but who justifies and adorns his slavery (for example calls the strangling of Ukraine... "defence of the Russian fatherland"), such a slave calls forth a lawful feeling of indignation, scorn and revulsion, such a slave — it a toady and a cad" (p. 258).

Well spoken!

JUST PUBLISHED!

NEW!

AMONG THE SNOWS

VALENTYN MOROZ

Protest Writings from Ukraine

London, 1971, 65 pp. Price 50p (\$1.75)

Contents: The Trial of V. Moroz; How the Trial of Moroz was Prepared; Letter to KGB from Raïsa Moroz; V. Moroz: "Among the Snows"; List of Ukrainian Political Prisoners; The Tragic Fate of Alla Horska, and other material.

Mykola PLAKHOTNIUK

TRUTH IS ON OUR SIDE

(A Reply to the Slanderers)*

"The Working Rhythm of the Jubilee Watch", "To Be Thrifty Masters", "Prospects of Unheard-of Changes", "The Vanguard of World Progress", "The Loyal Assistants of the Party" — among these major-key headlines of the Dnipropetrovsk regional newspapers of 7th and 8th February, 1970, there intruded suddenly in large black types the ominous headings, so well known to the older generation of the 1930s: "The Poisoned Pens", "The Mask and the Face of the Slanderers", "Yes, This Is Treason!"

Thus, it appears that some enemies, who wanted to disturb the quiet happiness of millions of the working people of the Dnipropetrovsk region, have been caught. Who are they: terrorists, bandits, agents of bourgeois intelligence services?

The young poets, Ivan Sokulskyi, Mykola Kulchynskyi and the assistant of the metallurgical institute, Viktor Savchenko, stood trial at Dnipropetrovsk at the end of January (1970), virtually behind closed doors. Two of them were punished very severely: I. Sokulskyi was sentenced to 4½ years imprisonment in strict regimen camps for political prisoners (in Mordovia), M. Kulchynskyi who was sentenced to 2½ years of imprisonment in general regimen camps — has been sent into the company of violent criminals, thieves and hooligans, and V. Savchenko received a suspended sentence.

What has frightened the Dnipropetrovsk KGB men and judges so much that they investigated the 'crimes' of the three young men for eight months, and finally punished them so sharply? What miraculous weapons did these young men possess, with which they hoped to "undermine or weaken the Soviet regime"?

The authors of the newspaper articles call these weapons "slanders", "poisoned pens." The three "criminals", however, did not possess their own radio stations or printing shops for spreading these "slanders", they merely copied and gave their acquaintances to read some, wisely not named in the newspapers, "samvydav" (self-publication) articles, as well as the "Letter from the Creative Youth of Dnipropetrovsk", which only a frightened imagination can regard as anti-Soviet.

*) This article was first published in Ukraine in *The Ukrainian Herald*, No. 2, (May 1970).

At the same time, in every house or flat in the Dnipropetrovsk region, there is a wireless set, and in the majority of them also a TV set, every day newspapers and journals are received. Many people are being educated in the networks of political education in schools, higher educational establishments, at the factories and on collective farms. Thousands of "correct" ideologically-educational words are pouring on the brains of every citizen each day. Why then did the words of these young men, even if they were 'slanderous', frighten some people so much? Whence come among us such a lack of confidence in man, in his sound sense, in his ability to make up his mind for himself without the help of KGB assistants, where is the truth and where a lie. Can it be really true that "slanders" by a few individuals so easily overcome the "truth" implanted on a large scale, that the only safeguard is the KGB, the prison and your newspaper curses on people deprived of the opportunity for a public defence?

But perhaps these three people were outstanding revolutionaries who carried to the masses some new ideologically-subversive bug able to corrupt marxism? No, they did not have any ideological positions of their own which would contradict marxist-leninist ideology. After all, you yourselves (although with disbelief and ridiculing) quote Sokulskyi's words: "If we are marxists, it is necessary to change our reality so that it corresponds to the leninist norms and Soviet laws."

You attack the three young thinking men particularly angrily because they were "nationalists." Let us consider, even on the basis of your preconceived accusations, in what way did this "nationalism" manifest itself.

First of all, you found it in their "unhealthy" anxiety about the Ukrainian language in Ukraine. One of you, Tsukanov, became angrily indignant that the "fact of the growth of the role of the Russian language" (you admit it after all!) is termed in the "Letter from the Creative Youth of Dnipropetrovsk" as the grinding "in the reliable, just as 50 years ago, millstones of Russification", as dirty trampling on the national dignity of the Ukrainian people by the Russificatory boot." But why should you, journalists, instead of hurling curses, not think about the following: Why is it that in the big industrial city a person who speaks Ukrainian everywhere is pointed out at? What is wrong with the fact that in Dnipropetrovsk "One also hears the Russian language"? — hypocritically asks Tsukanov. This is also an indication of your "sincerity." Ivan Sokulskyi and his friends were not worried by the fact that "not everyone speaks Ukrainian", as you attribute to them, but by the fact that, as a result of the chauvinistic predominance, no one in Dnipropetrovsk speaks that language...

"Russification" — is today the cleverest invention set into motion by our enemies. This is the bait on the hook of the ideological

saboteurs...”, Tsukanov continues his series of loud words. Russification is an invention... What cynicism has this person cultivated in himself over the many years of servility, having learnt to look on life through the spectacles smeared with the official colour!

Russification is an invention... And in Dnipropetrovsk you will not hear Ukrainian spoken as a language with full rights, or even as a language with equal rights — either in the kindergartens or schools, in vocational and technical schools, technical colleges. Russification is a slander... But the “state” language of the Ukrainian SSR has been expelled from the administrative, Party and economic institutions and establishments of Dnipropetrovsk. “Russification” is subversion... But in the cinemas which bear the names of Ukrainian figures of the past, as you mention, no Ukrainian-language film, even if made at “Ukrainian” film studios, is shown, etc. etc.

You thunder, where Ivan Sokulskyi could acquire such conceptions, and wag your finger at “ideological subversion.” But he did not have to go very far to find his “slanders” — even to that Russianised boarding school in the forest for Ukrainian children sick with TB from the entire region, where Ivan’s mother used to work as a cleaner.

Cleverly, but not very much so, you throw the sand of figures into one’s eyes. “Out of 1929 general education schools in the region 1255 have the Ukrainian language of instruction. A half of the 500,000-strong detachment of pupils (151 thousands) receive basic instruction in Ukrainian. In Dnipropetrovsk, where there are particularly many people of different nationalities, there are 35 Ukrainian schools”, writes Tsukanov. The arithmetic is simple. 250 thousands pupils are receiving instruction in their native language in 1255 schools of the region. And as many pupils receive instruction in 274 Russian schools. Thus, Russian schools are on the average five times bigger, and moreover much better equipped than the Ukrainian ones. Apart from that, in the Ukrainian schools in the cities so many parallel Russian classes have been set up, that only notice-boards remain from the so-called Ukrainian schools. But the Ukrainians of Dnipropetrovsk have only 35 of even such schools (predominantly on the outskirts of the city), and the Russians have three times as many... Only notice-boards remain on many of the “Ukrainian” kindergartens and creches.

Even more significant is the picture in the higher educational establishment, technical schools, vocational technical schools, which have been completely or almost completely Russified in the Dnipropetrovsk region. Just, as a matter of fact, in the entire Ukraine. Or will you perhaps call the minister of Higher and Secondary Special Education of the Ukrainian SSR, Dadenkov, a slanderer and propose that he be accompanied to Mordovia for “re-education.” In August 1965 he gave the following shocking figures: almost all the technical colleges in the Ukrainian SSR (except several with mixed languages

of instruction in Western Ukraine) are fully Russified, the universities are Russified by 4/5ths and even more, in the Ukrainian higher educational establishments, due to discriminatory practices during entrance examinations and studies, there are only 55 p. c. of Ukrainian students, the Ukrainians constitute less than a half of the number of lecturers in the higher educational establishments, and even they deliver lectures in Russian, and so on. Even Minister Dadenkov did not think these phenomena were normal. The Ministry has worked out a number of constructive measures regarding Ukrainization of the higher educational establishments which, as a matter of fact, have successfully collapsed under the pressure of [Russian] chauvinism.

Apparently we have made a good deal of progress on the road towards "internationalism" over the last five years, if what Minister Dadenkov, in a secret letter to the rectors, called an abnormal phenomenon at that time, is today being raised on the pages of the press (so far only on the regional level): "In the higher educational establishments the language of instruction is Russian", writes Tsukanov. "But what has it to do with Russification?" "What has it to do with common sense and elementary journalistic honesty?", one might retort to such people as Tsukanov.

Such is the eloquent picture regarding the Ukrainian language in the schools, higher educational establishments and institutions of the Dnipropetrovsk region, which is admitted by the authors of the pogrom articles themselves. I. Sokulskyi and his friends did not invent the "slandorous facts", they used the same data as did Shylo, Tsukanov and Vyblaya. The question is, however: who is it that draws slanderous conclusions from these facts: he who regard this situation as abnormal, calls it Russification and retreat from the Leninist norms, or those who proclaim it as successes of "internationalism" and grow indignant against "nationalism" and "ideological subversion." The facts are the same, only with Tsukanov they are progressive, and with Sokulskyi — "treasonable."

The reader is not a fool, from your article he will understand what is treason and what is to be feared.

One must be afraid to look into someone's face — but one has nothing to fear if one is looking a bit lower down.

One must be afraid of searching for people with similar ideas — but there is nothing to be afraid of if one is searching for drinking companions.

One must be afraid of saying the truth — and there is nothing to be afraid of if one declares: "the Russian language has become the second native language for all the peoples", "our brothers who came to the aid of the Soviet Ukraine in the Civil War spoke that language", "the soldiers of the Soviet Army who brought liberation to our Republic spoke that language."

One could repeat such phrases endlessly, but if I adopted your logic, imagine what a tedious list it would make: the henchmen of Peter I, who in 1708 did not leave a living soul in the capital of Ukraine, not even a baby, spoke that language; the Russian tsars and gendarmes spoke that language; the soldiers of Denikin and White Guardists who — you will not start to deny — strangled and Russified Ukraine, spoke that language. And the soldiers of the Soviet Army spoke the languages they knew; they, however, had the warning of V. I. Lenin: not to repeat “the invasion of the truly Russian man, Great Russian, chauvinist, fundamentally a scoundrel and a violator, which a typical Russian bureaucrat is.” Surely you will not start asserting that the soldiers of the Soviet Army came to Ukraine to impose “a second native language” on her?

You have, probably, read Lenin’s article “On the National Pride of the Great Russians” where Lenin boasts about his belonging to the Russian nation, and to some “international unity”, and teaches all the Great Russian proletarians to be proud: “Is the feeling of national pride alien to us, Great Russian proletarians? Of course, not! We love our language and our fatherland, we are doing our utmost to raise the working masses to the conscious life of democrats and socialists.”

While loving their own language and their own fatherland, such people as I. Sokulskyi and M. Kulchynskyi, know also the Russian language and culture, take all that is best from that culture. The outstanding Russian writers and artists do not need such defenders as yourselves at all. If they are strong enough, they will come to us on their own feet, without the controllers from the KGB.

You are defending not the language of the neighbouring people with which we live in one State, but the language of Russian bureaucrats and chauvinists whom V. I. Lenin branded for their base crawling before their superiors and for their violence over their inferiors. Such a slave, wrote Lenin, “for instance, calls the strangling of Poland, Ukraine, and so on “defence of the fatherland” of the Great Russians, such a slave is a toady and a cad who calls forth a lawful feeling of indignation, scorn and revulsion.”

It is against them, the Russian bureaucrats and chauvinists, that V. I. Lenin warned in his letter to the XII Party Congress. “We have to introduce strictest regulations regarding the use of the national languages in the national republics constituting our Union, and to check these regulations particularly carefully. There is no doubt that, under the pretext of fiscal etc. unity in our country, given the present-day apparatus, a whole lot of misuses regarding the Russian features, will seep through.”

Today you put forward a much more stupid “pretext” in defence of the Russification of the 20 higher educational establishments of Dnipropetrovsk, namely that “representatives of 22 nationalities” are studying at the university. Naturally, the Sorbonne in Paris is no

match to such an "international" centre as Dnipropetrovsk! But the Sorbonne proposes that all guests should study (mind this — not love, but study) French.

Shylo, certainly, did not blink an eyelid when he wrote about "the course at the florescence and drawing nearer of nations taken by the Party and the entire Soviet people." He even grows indignant that I. Sokulskyi and I. Dzyuba, from whom Sokulskyi allegedly borrowed his "slandorous" platform, see in it "nothing but 'Russification' tendency!" Has he, however, thought at any time before about how can "florescence" of a nation take place without the development of her national culture? And can a culture flower without its spiritual subsoil — the language. And where is this language to develop if not in the scientific establishments? Where is the Ukrainian technical intelligentsia to be formed, where is the Ukrainian scientific terminology to be worked out and polished if not in the higher educational establishments which are completely Russified in our country?

Due to the lack of facts of a "crime", Tsukanov quotes I. Sokulskyi's diary. As is known, criminals and scoundrels do not keep diaries. I. Sokulskyi wrote the diary for himself and not for "anti-Soviet propaganda" and for people like Tsukanov, who do not even understand the immorality and cynicism of their intrusion into the sphere of the intimate. Obviously the most "terrible" phrases have been selected from the diary, but they speak in favour of the poet who was going straight forward with an open face and searched for similar faces: "I very carefully study the faces of Dnipropetrovsk people", "have I been able to accomplish here at least a little from what I hoped to accomplish in coming here? I have, first of all, to make acquaintance with people of my convictions."

"This is already a programme", Tsukanov catches the poet by his sleeve. The iron logic of the "guardians of security" and their newspaper assistants is to look everywhere for a "programme" and "organization" — even in diaries!

One might think what business have the Tsukanovs with diaries and altogether with convictions in a country where the constitution guarantees democratic freedom? One person can study dress fashions, another — skirts, and still another — faces. Why do you get at someone who possesses the largest degree of what is human in him? Why do you wonder that a person looks for people who think like him? And why do you put a mask on the face of that person, if he marked himself precisely by the fact that he walked with an open face?

All the three newspaper articles are so similar to one another by their contents that one gets the impression that Tsukanov, Shylo and Vyblaya received apparently ready-made synopses of the articles, and were left with initiative merely for the invention of curses. Nonetheless the stresses in the articles have been placed somewhat differently.

(To be concluded.)

LaVerne R. and John P. PAULS

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MAZEPA IN WORLD LITERATURE

1. English

Byron's poem, *Mazeppa*,** an ardent creation of poetic imagination and swift verbal sketching, depicting a wild gallop through the endless steppes of Ukraine, has long provided a popular, Romantic theme in world literature, rivalled only by the immortal Prometheus, Faustus, and Don Juan.

Ukrainian patriots insist that it was the charm, wisdom and gallantry of their Hetman, Iván Mazépa-Koledýnsky (born about 1639, died 1709),¹ as well as his youthful adventures, dashing career, his daring but tragic involment in the mortal struggle of two crowned giants, Peter I, and Charles XII, during the Great Northern War (1700-1721), in order to win independence for his Ukraine, that made him well-known throughout all of Europe. His romantic past and stormy life soon captivated the imagination of many poets, painters, composers, such as Byron, Ryleyev, Pushkin, Hugo, Vernet, Boulanger, Slowacki, Shevchenko, Frich, Gottschal, Liszt, Tschaikovsky, Payne, Gipps, Lepky, Dudko and many of lesser caliber, who created outstanding works on the immortal theme of Mazepa.² This Ukrainian view is shared by some Western critics and historians as well, although there are those who strongly disagree. Even the great Russian poet, Pushkin, who, himself with great artistry described Mazepa as "a traitor of the Russian Tsar" had to admit in his preface

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** In Slavic languages, MAZEPA is spelled with one p.

to *Poltava*, that "Mazepa was one of the most remarkable persons of that epoch."³ The French literary critic and historian, Viscount de Vogüé, insists, however, that it was the poet, Byron, who enshrined this name "in gold and diamonds." As de Vogüé so beautifully said: "One day Lord Byron opened a volume of Voltaire, and there read a dozen lines which took form and colour in his imagination. From the English poet's verses, quickly famous, the predestined name rebounded into an *Orientale* of Hugo's, and then into one of Pushkin's masterpieces. The artists laid hold of it, popular pictures spread it abroad, and now, for the last fifty years, there is not a schoolboy ignorant of it. Mazepa personifies in himself a great country, Ukraine, and an historic people, the Cossacks. Each summer when I set out for those provinces, my friends never fail to exclaim: 'Ah, yes, Ukraine, Mazepa's country, where the Cossacks scour the steppes bound to wild horses!' But my friends, one must not ask you for any further details concerning the fantastic horseman's history! That which Lord Byron taught us is all we want."⁴ De Vogüé consulted historians of Ukraine and Russia, such as Bantysh-Kamensky, Kostomarov, Solovyov and found that "the Mazepa of the poem emerges from their critical studies, but very little diminished":

"He is a great figure in a great epoch, a man of powerful dreams and ardent passions, who flung romance across his policy, and drew down to the tomb with himself the last epic of the Oriental middle ages."⁵

Moreover, in his trips to Ukraine, de Vogüé discovered that:

"This epic, long before it inspired Byron, had been sung on the banks of the Dnieper, beneath the aspens, by the blind rhapsodists [*kobzars*] who frequent the villages of Ukraine; and these Homers of the steppe still transmit to each other, by oral tradition, a whole cycle of legends connected with the person of Mazepa."⁶

Glorification of Hetman Mazepa began still during his long reign in the Ukrainian Kozak State (1687-1709). Since he was an unsparing Maecenas of arts and learning, he spent huge sums for the cultural and religious needs of his people, such as building splendid Baroque churches and monasteries, supporting theatres and institutions of higher education, such as Mohyla's Academy in Kiev. The gratitude of learned men and artists was manifested in many ways — in verses, engravings and theatrical plays, still during his lifetime.⁷

However, the Poltava catastrophe of 1709 not only tragically ended his colourful career, but also ended a heroic page of Ukrainian history, which had been inspired by the liberating wars of Bohdan Khmelnytsky and opened up a new era of struggle and suffering for the Ukrainian people. Now, often the very same individuals who had written panegyrics for the Hetman, as for instance, the opportunist

Archbishop, Theophan Prokopovych, who once dedicated his tragedy, *Saint Vladimir* (1705), to Mazepa, after the unfortunate lost battle at Poltava, joined the tsarist propagandist in castigating his former benefactor. And there were still others like this, who often surpassed his enemies in vituperation and slander. After Mazepa's heroic but tragic attempt to liberate Ukraine, no effort was spared by the tsarist propagandists to brand him as "a new Judas." Since Mazepa was a member of an old Ukrainian noble family, born in Mazepyntsi, near Bila Tserkva, which was then occupied by Poland, the propaganda insisted that he was "a Pole, a secret Catholic", who, by chance found himself in the Russian part of Ukraine and there made his career.

As a youth, Mazepa served as a page at the court of Polish King, Jan Casimir, where he made for himself, a bitter enemy, Jan Chrysostom Pasek. Pasek was a swashbuckling Pole, a brawler and "an incredible liar" (as Bruckner called him),⁸ who, in his *Memoirs* (written about 1688, parts published in 1821, the first complete edition in 1836), under the year 1663, related the unforgettable story of Mazepa's ride. According to Pasek, a Polish nobleman, Falbowski, was informed by a servant that his wife was secretly meeting with her young neighbour, Mazepa. The husband, raging from jealousy, allegedly bound Mazepa naked to a horse and let the steed go to his own estate in Volhynia. Later, this gossip was embellished even more, with the addition of different names and variations. Historian Kostomarov mentions several similar stories, by Simonovsky, Stebelsky, Otninovsky and Pasek.⁹ One version says that, scared by shots, the wild steed brought the half-dead youth into the Kozak camp.

Mazepa, saved by the Kozaks, remained with them, distinguishing himself in several expeditions against the Tartars. Impressed by his valour and wisdom, they chose him as their leader, or *hetman*. One version of the wild ride found its way to Voltaire's history of the Swedish king, Charles XII. There are those who think that Voltaire got his information from a reader of Pasek's *Memoirs*, which is hardly possible, since, until 1836, they were unpublished. It is more probable that the story was brought to France by some courtier of the emigré Polish King, Stanislaw Leszczynski, who, as the father-in-law of King Louis XV, lived in Paris; or by one of Mazepa's officers, such as, for instance, Gregory Orlic, who, as an immigrant, was a general of the French King.¹⁰

George Gordon Byron (1788-1824) begins his poem, *Mazeppa*, with an "advertisement", that is, excerpts from Voltaire's *Histoire de Charles XII* about "*un gentilhomme Polonais* (sic), *nommé Mazeppa*." He got his "interesting particulars" from John Barrow's *Memoir of the Life of Peter the Great*. Possibly there was also oral information from the Polish Byronic poet, Antoni Malczewski (1793-1826), whom he met personally in Italy. This exaggerated story about Mazepa's

"ride" with all its fantastic additions, no doubt appealed to the Scotch bard, who, after his own romantic escapades (especially in Italy, as for instance, with the youthful Countess Teresa Guiccioli)** with his daring spirit and unique creativity, became the personification of that rugged Romanticism, which sought out everywhere, fascinating, superhuman themes.

The setting for Lord Byron's moving narrative with romantic plot is quite realistic and historical:

'Twas after dread Pultowa's day,
When fortune left the royal Swede,
Around a slaughter'd army lay,
No more to combat and to bleed.
The power and glory of the war,
Faithless as their vain votaries, men,
Had pass'd to the triumphant Tsar . . .***

Byron is quite philosophical and candid about human nature, when he compares "fortune", "glory" with "faithless men" who are usually on the side of the winner, in this case "the triumphant Tsar" — Peter I. After the Poltava Battle, 1709, "Moscow's walls were safe again", but only until 1812, when would come a more shocking "slaughter, shame, wreck", and "deeper fall" of "haughtier name" — Napoleon. But here the till-now invincible Charles XII is wounded and for the first time he "was taught to flee." Byron's anti-war and anti-monarchical feelings are evident in the description of the Swedish King, who had sacrificed so many thousands of his well-disciplined and gallant soldiers for the sake of his ambition:

For thousands fell that flight to aid:
And not a voice was heard t' upbraid
Ambition in his humbled hour,
When truth had nought to dread from power.

Still the poet admires Charles' royal dignity in defeat:

. . . but yet through all,
Kinglike the monarch bore his fall,

who, without comfort or complaint is resting with his survivors "by a savage tree", not far from the Borysthenes (— the ancient Greek name for the Dnieper, which Byron confused here with the Dniester, when he referred to its "Turkish bank", where they found refuge next day).

** There is some doubt if this experience influenced Byron's poem MAZEPPA, which was written in autumn of 1818. He met Teresa in April, 1819 and published his poem in June, 1819. So, he could have added her name as Mazeppa's paramour, but not all are convinced of this.

*** Byron's MAZEPPA is quoted here from: More, P. E. (ed.), THE COMPLETE POETICAL WORKS OF LORD BYRON, Boston, 1905, pp. 406-415.

Then the poet pictures stately Mazepa, among the King's chiefs:

Among the rest, Mazeppa made
His pillow in an old oak's shade —
Himself as rough, and scarce less old,
The Ukraine's hetman, calm and bold.
But first, outspent with this long course,
The Cossack prince rubb'd down his horse,
And made for him a leafy bed . . .

Charles XII admires Mazepa's valour, by saying:

"Of all our band,
Though firm of heart and strong of hand,
In skirmish, march or forage, none
Can less have said or more have done
Than thee, Mazeppa! . . ."

The King notices that Mazepa and his horse are "so fit a pair" as Alexander with his Bucephalus. In the course of a friendly chat, the king asked Mazepa to tell about "the school wherein he learned to ride" so well. After initial objections to revive the painful past the old Hetman began his shocking story with the ease and subtle humour of a wise and wordly man. He was yet a brave and vibrant lad of twenty and a page of Polish King, Jan Casimir, when he fell in love with young and beautiful Theresa, wife of an old Polish count, thirty years her senior. Once, surprised by the jealous husband, when dating his wife in a park, near his castle, almost at the break of day, Mazepa was grabbed and bound naked with ropes to a wild horse. The horse "a noble steed, a Tartar of Ukraine breed", struggled fiercely to tear away,

Then loosed him with a sudden lash:
Away! — away! — and on we dash! —
Torrents less rapid and less rash.

And here the pictures of their involuntary journey to the steed's native land — Ukraine:

"Away, away, my steed and I,
Upon the pinions of the wind,
All human dwellings left behind;
We sped like meteors through the sky,
When with its crackling sound the night
Is chequer'd with the northern light.
Town — village — none were on our track,
But a wild plain of far extent,
and bounded by a forest black;

Byron, in masterful words, painted this exhausting savage gallop, accompanied by wolves, vultures and ravens, in twenty stanzas. The immeasurable sufferings of man and beast, the plasticity of expression, the imitation of sounds, the harmony of words, and then, as

through a kaleidoscope, a rush of changing scenes, of steppe, of forest, of river, dashing in that breathtaking tempo "Away, away . . ." gives this poem the throbbing pulse of life, the wild staccato of the gallop, and a surging feeling of romantic adventure, which Lord Byron so much admired and propagated.

Rather unexpectedly, but in agreement with history and perhaps also with Anglo-Saxon optimism, Byron finished his fascinating narrative on a hopeful note. Still deadly exhausted by the long, long gallop, the wild courser fell dead. Mazepa was dying too, yet with his last spark of energy he scared away the black raven, ready for a macabre feast, and then he fainted. When he opened his eyes later, he was already lying in a chamber . . . A Cossack maid nursed him back to life:

A slender girl, long-hair'd and tall,
Sat watching by the cottage wall . . .

Now, Mazepa became "the Cossack's guest."

"They found me senseless on the plain,
They bore me to the nearest hut,
They brought me into life again,
Me — one day o'er their realm to reign!"

And here Mazepa stressed a philosophical possibility of fortune in misfortune thus:

"Thus, the vain fool who strove to glut
His rage, refining on my pain,
Sent me forth to the wilderness,
Bound, naked, bleeding, and alone,
To pass the desert to a throne, —
What mortal his own doom may guess?
Let none despond, let none despair!"

When Mazepa finished his story, a happy thought of safety from the pursuing Tsar's troops, flashed in his mind:

"To-morrow the Borysthene
May see our coursers graze at ease
Upon his Turkish bank, — and never
Had I such welcome for a river
As I shall yield when safely there."

To his listeners, Mazepa said: "Comrades, good night! . ." and threw his length beneath the old oak tree,

Himself as rough, and scarce less old,
The Ukraine's Hetman, calm and bold.

The wordly Cossack Prince was not a bit surprised, however, that Charles did not thank him for his tale, because "The King had been an hour asleep." The poem ends on a note of dry British humour, which some critics took for a rather frivolous attitude of the poet himself, because the defeated Swedish monarch and the Cossack

leader were certainly not in that jovial mood then, especially considering that the Russian Menshikov cavalry was pursuing them. Yet, it is a historical fact, that Cossacks, even under the gallows, did not lose their sense of humour.

Byron's poem, *Mazeppa*, conquered its readers at once. Still on the margin of the manuscript, (which was written in the autumn of 1818, at Ravenna), editor Gifford remarked: "a lively, spirited and pleasant tale." And the reviewer wrote: "*Mazeppa* is a very fine and spirited sketch of a very noble story, and is every way worthy of its author."¹¹

Also interesting is Pushkin's view on Byron's *Mazeppa*. He said that the British poet "was struck only by the picture of a man bound to a wild horse, dashing through the steppes. The picture, of course, is very poetical..." Pushkin, however, advised readers neither to seek there the historical Mazepa, or Charles, nor that "sombre, hateful, poignant character, who appears in almost all of Byron's works, but who [...], just as if intentionally, does not appear in *Mazeppa*. Byron did not even think about it; he displayed sequences of sketches, one more striking than the next — that's all: but what an ardent creation, what a broad, swift brush!"¹² And of course, Byron's Mazepa is not that typical Byronic hero, of a dark soul, selfish rebel, pessimistic, etc., prevalent in many of his works.¹³

The American slavacist and biographer of Mazepa, Clarence A. Manning, once made this statement: "It is the account of the ride on which Byron expends all of his undoubted talents and it is that picture of the mad rush of the crazed horse, over hill and dale, that remains in the memory and has completely confused and overshadowed that historic role of Mazepa, which the poet elsewhere pictures so fully and accurately."¹⁴ Manning, of course, refers here to the beginning of Byron's poem, where the aged Mazepa is represented in his correct historical role. It was, after all, the Hetman and his Kozaks, who brought the wounded Swedish King and his survivors of the Poltava Battle, through the dangerous steppes to the Turkish city, Bendery, beyond the Dniester, all the while pursued by the Russian cavalry.

Many authors of different nationalities, translated, modified and imitated the poem, *Mazeppa*. Under Byron's influence, in England alone, there were six works written on the theme. In Germany (1820-1888) there were published thirteen different translations and variations. Furthermore, the poem *Mazeppa*, was translated into French, Italian, Czech (by A. Klišterský), Slovenian (by Jovan Kosesky, 1868), Polish, Russian, and Ukrainian (by M. Starytsky, D. Zahul, 1928, and more recently by O. Veretenchenko, 1959).¹⁵

Byron's picture of the wild galloping horse, greatly impressed the English-speaking reader and gave stimulus for the most spectacular horse dramas, which were especially successful on the American stage throughout the 19th century. Recently there appeared two books, which each in a different way, treat the popularity of the

Mazepa theme in America and England. First, Marion Moore Coleman, in her short book, *Mazeppa: Polish and American* (1966), gives her own translation of Slowacki's *Mazepa*, together with a "Brief Survey of *Mazeppa* in the United States" (pp. 55-73).¹⁶ She traces the fate of H. M. Milner's *Mazeppa*, a romantic drama in 3 acts (1823), in America, and gives accounts of the many American actors and actresses who played Mazepa, including the Italian actress Sophia Loren, in the film *Heller in Pink Tights* (based on Louis L'Amour's novel, *Heller with a Gun*), 1960, in the role of Angela Rossini, once so successful as Mazepa. The second book, *Enter Foot and Horse*, by Arthur H. Saxon (1968), which records a broad history of hippodrama in England and France, contains a chapter, "The Wild Horse of Tartary" (pp. 173-204), which presents Milner's *Mazeppa*, as the most successful horse drama.¹⁷

(To be concluded)

NOTES

1) Manning, C. A., *Hetman of Ukraine Ivan Mazeppa*, New York, Bookman, 1957; *Ivan Mazeppa: Hetman of Ukraine*, (Collection of Articles), New York, UCCA, 1960; Ohlodyn, O., *Hetman Ivan Mazepa ta yoho doba*, New York, ODDFU, 1960.

2) Pauls, J. P., "Musical Works Based on the Legend of Mazepa", *Ukrainian Review*, X/4, London, 1964, pp. 57-65; — "Great Maecenas of the Art Glorified by Painters", *UR*, XIII/4, 1966, pp. 17-32; —, "Shevchenko on Mazepa", *UR*, XV/3, 1968, pp. 59-65; Jensen, A., "Mazepa in der modern europäischen Dichtung", *Ukrainische Rundschau*, VII/7, Wien 1909, pp. 299-305.

3) Pauls, J. P., *Pushkin's "Poltava"*, New York, ShSS, 1962, p. 75.

4) Vogüé, E. M. de, "Mazeppa: la Légende et l'Histoire", *Le Fils de Pierre le Grand*, Paris, 1889, pp. 203-290, p. 204.

5) *Ibid.*, p. 205.

6) *Ibid.*, p. 206.

7) Sichynsky, V., "Ivan Mazepa — Patron of Culture and Arts of Ukraine", *Ukrainian Quarterly*, XV/3, New York, 1959, pp. 271-280.

8) Brueckner, A., *Literatura polska*, Paris, 1947, p. 101.

9) Kostomarov, N., *Mazepa i mazepintsy*, (Istor. monogr., t. 16), 2nd ed., St. Petersburg, 1885, p. 3f.

10) Holubnychy, L., "Mazepa in Byron's Poem and in History", *UQ*, XV/4, N. Y., 1959, pp. 336-345. Author insists that Byron used Pasek's information about Mazepa's ride and refers to Pasek as a poet who "could not flatter." This is possible but hardly probable.

11) Collier, P. F. (ed.), *The Poetical Works of Lord Byron*, New York, n. d. (ca. 1850), p. 153.

12) Pauls, op. cit., p. 74.

13) Thorslev, P. L., *The Byronic Hero: Types and Prototypes*, Minneapolis, 1962, p. 3.

14) Manning, C. A., "Mazepa in English Literature", *Ivan Mazeppa*, N. Y., 1960,

15) Romanenchuk, B., "Ivan Mazepa v evropeys'kii literaturi", *Vistnyk*, kn. 5, L'viv, 1934, p. 366.

16) Coleman, M. M., *Mazeppa: Polish and American*, Cheshire, Conn., Cherry Hill Books, 1966.

17) Saxon, A. H., *Enter Foot and Horse*, New Haven, Yale Univ. Press, 1968.

Mykhailo MASYUTKO

IVAN FRANKO — THE FIGHTER FOR FREEDOM AND UNITY OF THE UKRAINIAN PEOPLE

Among the numerous questions which continuously troubled the great heart of Ivan Franko was one which became a cornerstone of his creative work: the problem of the future fate of his native land divided by great powers, the destiny of the subjugated and robbed people of Ukraine who in centuries-long bondage struggled under the whip of all kinds of conquerors.

To this question Ivan Franko devoted some of the best works of his fiery art, some of the best words of his passionate journalism.

At the dawn of his creative work, in 1876, i. e. as a lad of twenty, Franko wrote a poem "The Cross of Chyhyryn." In it in legendary scenes he depicts the fighters for Ukraine's liberation, in particular Nalyvaiko. In answer to the magnate Zholkevskyi who placed three gallows before the insurgents, Nalyvaiko orders to display a cross and to proclaim the words: "Peace to the peaceful! God Himself, and His cross — against the enemies!"

The proud noblemen were not influenced by the words of truth, for which Nalyvaiko raised his sword, and they paid dearly for their arrogance:

The holy sun was already setting in the West;
The jingle of steel, the breaking of spears
Were ending by Chyhyryn.
Near the gallows the army
Of the noblemen lay dead
Many corpses and blood went down the river.

In that same year young Franko wrote the poem "Sunrise" in which through the darkness of imperial and tsarist slavery he could see the happy day of awakening and unification of the Ukrainian people:

Rise, take a look, the night is passing!
Rise, take a look, day is dawning.
Rise to greet the sunrise,
To sing the morning hymn!
We are greeting a great day:
It will shine brightly over this land.
It's a day of light, it's a day of glory,
It's a bright day, not a bloody day,
It's a day of peace, not a day of fighting,
A day of songs and a day of love,
Oh my country, over you,
Greet in it the day of revival!

Franko wants to make that day come closer. His soul cannot make peace with darkness which for centuries covers his people. His heart rebels against force which divides by frontiers consanguineous brothers of his native land:

And the soul sinks into infinite space,
And opens its strong arms without limits,
The whole land, all the people it would like to embrace,
To gather around the heart its whole rich country,
To unite brothers by alliance of friendship,
To raise them up high among other peoples.

Imbued with burning pain for the present and future fate of Ukraine, Franko describes Ukraine's past and, feeling deep compassion for the people in its futile, centuries-long, bloody struggle, calls upon its descendants to free themselves from chains in his poem "It weighs upon me as a bad nightmare" written at the end of the 1880s:

It weighs upon me as a bad nightmare
Your past, my native people.
Your thousand-year sufferings
Disturb my dreams and my thoughts.

Streams of blood and deep wounds always peer at me
[unchangeably.

Frenzied sufferings, moaning, like a storm,
That rages over your boundless steppe,
Beautiful, poor mother Ukraine!
You flowed — oh, not with milk and honey!
You fed to their heart's content — but not your own
Children — hungry, naked, homeless —
You fed ravens, crows and dogs
With their unburied, cold corpses.

Love for his native land — Ukraine — in its past glorious struggle, in its subjugated and divided present, in its future unfication and freedom, organically combines itself in the great poet with love to all subjugated peoples, with love to the whole toiling humanity. In the poem "My love" from the series "Ukraine" of 1880 he writes:

After getting to know her, could I
Not love her wholeheartedly,
Not denounce my own pleasures,
In order to surrender myself to her completely?

And is this love contrary
To that other and holy love
To all who shed their sweat and blood,
To all those who are weighed down with fetters?

In his poem "Would it not be better for us, brothers, to begin", Ivan Franko condemns discord which was sown by enemies who

baited blood brothers of various regions of the native land against one another:

Let's tear out with roots that discontent
Which makes a mortal sin from a small sin.
Which oppresses brother by brother unexpectedly,
In order to sit at the table with an enemy.
Have we not moaned in shackles long enough?
Have we not devoured each other enough?
Have we not been driven long enough in basts?
Have we not died alone long enough?

I. Franko calls upon the workers to unite in a common struggle against enemies — both native and foreign exploiters.

He opposes the reactionary party of Muscophiles who, selling themselves to the tsarist troublemakers of the type of Milyukov and Purishkevych, attempted to drag the Ukrainians from Halychyna from one yoke to another. In the poem "To Antoshko P." Franko gives an answer to one of such Muscophiles — Anton Petrushevych, who published an article, "The Vain Labour of Separatists" in the newspaper *Halychyna* for 1902, where in order to justify his corruption, this base renegade used every effort to belittle Ukrainians, calling their language a dialect and a jargon. In his poem Ivan Franko crushed dullwitted Petrushevych's irresolute arguments, and looking into the future expressed a prophetic hope that the time will come when Ukrainians too will become equal with other peoples, achieving for themselves freedom without the tsar, the Milyukovs and the Petrushevychs:

Let it be a poor language in the famous family,
Let Russian, Polish, Czech be better, —
As long as it serves Mother in need,
It is not lost to culture.
Although at the neighbour's house there's much pomposity
Shining with porphyry and satin, —
We are not greedy for somebody else's riches, —
Greedy is only your impoverished soul.
We are as poor as the horses on leash,
We shall be enriched by hard work on our native field:
In a dialect, or albeit in a jargon
We shall be rich and happy.
Dialect, but we shall inspire it
With the strength of the spirit and the fire of love
And shall record its indelible trace
Independently among the cultured languages.

Speaking against loathsome turncoats who insulted their own people and belittled its language, calling it a jargon, Ivan Franko supported the creation of a literary language of the entire Ukraine and himself created it. Nevertheless, taking into consideration the hard circumstances for the development of the Ukrainian culture

under conditions of the division of the Ukrainian people, Franko was well aware that it will not be possible to create such literary language immediately. It can be created only under conditions of unification of all Ukrainian lands. Therefore, replying B. Hrinchenko, who in his article, "Halychyna Poems", published in the periodical *Pravda* in 1891, accused the poets of Halychyna of excessive use of Polonisms, Russianisms and Ukrainian Galician dialectisms, Franko wrote in his article "We are speaking against the wolf — let us also speak for the wolf" in the periodical *Zorya* for 1891:

"By my remarks I would like to add a small brick to the mutual understanding among [East] Ukrainians and Galicians in the field of language and in such a way add my share to the solution of one very grave question — *the future unity and unanimity of purpose of our literary language* — *future*, I repeat, for now we do not have it yet and cannot have it for obvious, very grave reasons."

Franko loved and actively disseminated in Halychyna (Galicia) the Russian, Polish and Czech literatures, as literature of brotherly nations. But he did not like all literature of these peoples. Franko hated and fought against the literature which insulted and belittled the Ukrainian people and which favoured the colonization plans of the Russian landlords and Polish magnates.

In his article "The Rural Poetry of P. A. Kulish" published in the periodical *Svit* in 1882, Franko outlined his real views on the relations which should prevail among the brotherly Slavic peoples. Answering Kulish who called upon the Galicians [West Ukrainians] to compromise with Poles in order to acquire culture from them, which in Kulish's opinion was on the higher level than Ukrainian, Franko wrote:

"We are in favour — we are saying once again — of unity with the Polish working people, we do not need any compromises: for such unity, for full, sincere and close brotherhood, we have already laid down foundations, albeit not very great, and, God permit, the further the work progresses, the better it will go. But with landlords, the wealthy, the idlers and the squanderers of our wealth the working people should not and what's more cannot reconcile, for here reconciliation would be tantamount to surrender, to the bending of the neck in the yoke.

"But why does com. Kulish necessarily demand compromise, and not brotherhood, as was already desired by Shevchenko?"

Protecting the Ukrainian culture and the Ukrainian people from those same "landlords, the wealthy, the idlers and squanderers", both the native ones, and those who swarmed to Ukraine from all sides for an easy bread, Franko called upon the toilers of Ukraine in his poems to defend their economy and culture, to defend themselves as a people. In the poem "The modern Haidamaks" (1903) the great Kamenyar ["Stone-cutter" I. Franko] urged ardently:

Oh, the Haidamaks have sounded loud bells:
 "Get ready, poor people, all for defence!
 For great hordes are advancing against us,
 Oh, for we have become an obstacle to our landlords.
 Upon us advances that force which always kneaded us,
 From Bohdan to Ivan, butchered us and choked us."

Understanding well to what a ruinous end the domination of Ukraine by foreign and native landlords-squanderers could bring and in some cases already did bring, Ivan Franko, side by side with the unrestrained Lesya Ukraïнка, who was constantly awakening her nation from centuries-long sleep, the nation which losing its eye-sight under pressure of the iron yoke of autocracy, "goes through fire and water for its enemies, has handed its leaders over to the executioners", — the great patriot calls in his celebrated poem "It is no time":

It is no time, no time, no time
 To shed your blood for ignorants
 And to love those who fleece our people!
 Our love [should be reserved] for Ukraine!

Ukraine, in I. Franko's understanding of the word, — meant primarily and solely the working people.

Fighting against the forces which corroded the Ukrainian people, I. Franko never ceased to hope that this people will become nationally conscious and, in spite of the hard yoke, in which it was harnessed, will take its rightful place among the peoples of the world.

Poor is your country, narrow and tight
 And it does not glow with riches?
 But it has forgotten, that tight and narrow
 Is the cradle of the greatest as well! —

wrote Ivan Franko in the poem "Moses." It is in this poem that the great Kamenyar outlined his firm expectations of the happy future of the Ukrainian people. In the allegorical Biblical scenes the poet depicted the hard road of struggle of the Ukrainian people for its liberation and unification. In that poem Franko said with conviction that the happiness of the Ukrainian people is hidden in the accord of its working people, in the firm faith in its destiny, in the determined struggle not only against foreign oppressors, but also against its own exploiters and turncoats who are sowing despair and disenchantment among the people.

The people cannot live long by deceiving ideas deprived of the living ground. And that segment of faint-hearted people who succumb to false promises of mercenaries, looks pitiful.

It loves the inachievable,
 Believes in the unknown;
 In order to achieve the fantastic,
 Tramples the dear and the familiar, —

wrote Franko with pain. However the hope that the deceived people will see light, will recognize traitors and will assume the right path of struggle did not desert him:

They will roar — and knead the sand of the desert into mud,
They will stone Aviron
And hang Datan.*

Franko hated those who betrayed the working people, those who traded with their interests "in order to sit at the table with the enemy." He branded them with the stamp of shame. In the novel "Zakhar Berkut" the writer clearly showed how loathsome does a turncoat look in view of the people's heroic struggle against the subjugators.

Thus, just as at the beginning of his creative life, so at its end — in one of his last poetic works "Moses" — Franko expressed his firm belief in the happy future of his people:

I believe in the power of the spirit
And in the day of resurrection of your uprising.

He prophetically foresaw the future united Ukraine:

And the time will come, and you as burning fire

Will shine in the circle of free peoples,

You will shake the Caucasus, you will girdle yourself with

[the Beskyd,

You will roll the sound of freedom down the Black Sea,

And will gaze, as the master of the house,

At your house and at your field . . .

(Dnipro, Sept. 1964)

*) The traitors of the Jewish nation appearing in I. Franko's poem, "Moses."

Valentyn MOROZ

THE FIRST DAY

The first day in prison is an eternity filled with pain. Everything — sounds, smells, dimensions, words — everything is filled with pain.

The first day in prison is a man without skin. Every memory is a scalding drop, every thought a hot coal.

The first day in prison is a world cleft into two parts. Every nerve is cut down the middle. Here is the stuff from which one's *I want* is born. And the roots through which this *I want* burrows into the fat of life have been left here, cut off. Routine *I want's* flow in their accustomed channels through the layers of living elements and

inevitably arrive at the place of rupture. And every time there is a new pain.

The first day is a plant with its roots hanging in the air, unable to attach themselves to anything in the emptiness. And this is the greatest suffering, for the nature of roots is to take root.

The worst thing is to daydream. Then oblivion brings two fresh ruptures together and the *I want* reaches its goal. But the sudden awakening tears the thin thread harshly, and the pain, which had begun to fade, flames up again.

* * *

The strong have a hard time of it. All of their *I want's* are very great: those that brought them behind prison grates and those that drive them to freedom. No, this is not a union of *I want* and *I must*. This is a struggle between two satanic *I want's*, both muscular and furious; both having strong, even pulses, with a strong appetite for life; both fed by a taut, full-blooded organism.

The weak are still. Their *I want's* are small and feeble and will never rouse a person from his place. Sometimes the *I want* also asserts itself in such persons. But then it becomes mute for ages, hypnotized by the fear of prison. Being afraid of bitterness, such people will never empty a cup to the bottom. They will never know *taste*.

* * *

The time will come when new roots will grow from the woundtips and will attach themselves to new soil and absorb new juices in order to feed the human *I want* that is eternally hungry. The pain will thicken and turn into an even, firm yearning, heavy and dark like pitch. And every day the pitch will become brighter and harder until it turns into the *crystal of expectation*. The most alluring of freedoms is the freedom glimpsed through its cloudy mass.

The axe of time strikes the crystal gate and suddenly you are outside and free again. But this is not the freedom which shone for so long behind the crystal wall. You have your freedom, drunk, confused and — again without skin . . . For it is impossible to squeeze through prison bars without scraping your skin on them. Though it be a hundred times, prison taken its toll every time.

* * *

Afterwards there will be reminiscences, stories, always facts, facts, facts: funny, disgusting and touching. But prison is not facts. Prison is a man without skin on the first day. Whoever knows how to describe this will know how to describe a prison.

But you cannot describe it,

Yet you will try anyhow.

It will be this — then, then . . .

But today is the first day.

Ivano-Frankivsk, KGB Prison.

June 1970.

(*The Ukrainian Herald*, No. 4, January 1971).

Renata Maria SHARAN

A.B., University of Pennsylvania, 1965

TYPES OF ETHNIC IDENTIFICATION AND GENERATIONAL POSITION: A Study of the Ukrainian Immigrant Group in the U.S.A.

Thesis

**submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the
Degree of Master of Arts in the Department of Sociology
and Anthropology at Brown University**

(Conclusion)

The Analysis

The major shortcoming of this study is the size of the sample involved. In one sense, all of the respondents who were included in the analysis constitute the universe of second generation members in New Haven, between the ages of 14 and 23. Only one individual had refused to be interviewed, and four were away at school. Nevertheless, fifty cases are insufficient to carry through a thorough analysis of all possible relationships between the variables. As a result, most of the analysis is done in terms of percentage and frequency distributions. A T-test for small samples was carried out to measure interrelationships between questions used in the interview, on the assumption, that a large proportion of the questions were inter-related in such a way that this set of questions would act as a predictor of the type of identification (goal-directed vs. cultural-traditional). These predictor questions would also differentiate (and predict) the membership status of a respondent; i. e., whether he was a "member", or a "non-member."

A. Demographic Characteristics

The analysis of the questions in this section, as in the other two, (on participation and on attitudes), was carried out with two foci in mind. Certain questions were relevant for determining the existence of ethnic identification. Others were geared at uncovering possible differences between the two subsamples, (members vs. non-members). In general, the demographic characteristics obtained in the interview

do not distinguish between the two subsamples; rather, they illustrate the homogeneity of the respondents. (This might not have been the case if the sample were much larger). There are, however, minor exceptions to this, and they will be treated in the following paragraphs.

Almost all of the respondents were children of parents born in Ukraine. There were four exceptions — two in each subsample — in which cases one of the parents had been born in a country other than Ukraine, (and other than the United States). All respondents were members of the two Ukrainian parishes in New Haven, either the Catholic, or the Orthodox. Although, the majority of Ukrainian immigrants are Catholic, I made special attempts to seek out all of the Orthodox faith as well, working on the assumption that religious differences may account for differential membership status. There have been historical conflicts on the basis of this difference; it was important to see if they had any influence on ethnic life in diaspora. The analysis, however, did not uncover any differences between the two religious groups; both were equally represented in each of the two subsamples. Thus, there were about 90.00% Catholics among the non-members, and the same percentage among the members; (10.00% Orthodox in each group). Neither did the cases of parental intermarriage (Catholic with Orthodox) show any differential influence. There were two such cases among the smaller, non-member sample, and three such cases in the larger, member sample.

Most respondents had lived in the New Haven area for more than ten years. Any differences in participation or attitudes, therefore, could not be due to the length of residence in the community.

The sex distribution of the two subsamples is only slightly skewed. There is a somewhat larger proportion of males in the non-member group than in the member group; (non-members, males = 42.85%, members, males = 33.47%). But, according to the T-value obtained, (0.088), this is not a significant difference. In the sample as a whole, there are proportionately more females than males: 31 females, and 19 males.

The age interval used for the study was 14 to 23 years of age. The age distribution of the subsamples shows that the member group has a nearly even representation of the ages within the interval: 44.82% are in the 20-23 age category, 20.68% in the 17-19 group, and 31.03% in the youngest age group. In the non-member group there is a tendency for the respondents to fall in the oldest age category: 66.66% are 20-23 years of age. This is a significant difference. One might ask if this age difference suggests that the non-members had previously been in Plast or SUM, and later fell out of this organizational membership. The interviews show that only three had previously belonged to one of the two organizations, but, the membership was only of a few months duration. They had been members because their friends had belonged, and quickly lost interest in the organizations. If they had belonged for a longer period of time, this

subsequent falling out from the organizational membership would have significant implications for my discussion of the appeal of the goal-directed orientation for the second generation. Since their membership had been so short, it is difficult to draw any implications. The rest of the non-members had never belonged to either Plast or SUM, in the past.

Birth order of the respondents is not a differentiating characteristic. The size of the family, on the whole, appears to have no effect either, although, the non-member group more often comes from families of four or more children than does the member group: in the non-member group of 21 respondents, there were five cases of families with four or more children; in the member group, totaling 29 respondents, there were four such cases.

Several questions had been asked about the past educational experience of the parents. Since it was assumed that a substantial number of the parents would have had their education interrupted by the Second World War, six categories of "educational level" were distinguished in the interview: (1) no formal education, (2) grade school, (3) some high school, (4) completed high school, (5) some college, and (6) completed college. In the non-member group, six parents — two fathers and four mothers — had received no education. There were no such cases in the member group. There were, however, a larger proportion of parents with only a grade school education in the member group than there were in the non-member group. There was also a greater percentage of parents with a college education in the member group.

All respondents had high educational aspirations, giving a variety of professional careers as their future goals. Focusing on the oldest age group, however, (20-30 years of age), I found that three respondents from the non-member group, who were out of school, were not strictly in higher level jobs: two could be classified as working in semi-professional areas, and one worked as an unskilled labourer. Of the three members who were working, all three were college graduates and each held a professional job. This difference between the two subsamples was significant at the 0.01 level.

The question on "present occupation of parents" proved to be an interesting one. The distribution of "father's occupation" of the members was almost identical to that of the non-members: there were approximately the same proportions of unskilled, skilled, and professional workers. It was the occupation of the mother that showed a significant variation between the two respondent groups. (The T-value was 1.938, which is significant at the 0.1 probability level.) Although, only 19.04% of the non-member mothers held unskilled jobs, 37.93% of the member mothers did so. Also, 14.28% of non-member mothers held professional jobs, in contrast to about 7% of the member mothers. Thus, the mothers of the members tend

to hold more menial jobs, despite the fact that their previous educational experience shows a higher level of education for them, as a group. Review of the individual cases shows a higher degree of (member group) and their present type of occupation, than for the non-member mothers.

The interview included a question on the income level of the family. Due to the high rate of non-response, especially, in the member group which had a large proportion of younger respondents, (14-16 years old), no valid comparison can be made on the basis of the obtained information. (The obtained responses indicate an almost identical income distribution for the two groups).

For tables, showing the various significant demographic relationships discussed above, are given on the next page.

Table I: Level of Educational Attainment — Both Parents

Education	Members			Non-members		
	No.	%		No.	%	
None	0	0.0		6	14.3	
Grade School	22	38.0	38.0	9	21.0	35.7
Some High School	8	13.8		3	7.1	
Completed H. S.	10	17.2		13	31.0	
Some College	10	17.2		4	9.5	
Completed College	8	13.8	31.0	7	16.7	26.2
Totals	58	100.0		42	100.0	

Table II: Level of Educational Attainment — Mothers only

Education	Members			Non-members		
	No.	%		No.	%	
None	0	0.0		4	19.0	
Grade School	10	34.5	34.5	5	23.8	42.8
Some High School	5	17.2		1	4.8	
Completed H. S.	5	17.2		6	28.6	
Some College	6	20.7	31.0	3	14.3	23.8
Completed College	3	10.3		2	9.5	
Totals	29	99.9		21	100.0	

Table III: Mother's Present Occupation

Occupation	Members		Non-members	
	No.	%	No.	%
Unskilled	11	37.9	4	19.0
Skilled	6	20.7	5	23.8
Professional	2	6.9	3	14.3
Totals	29	100.0	20*	95.2

* One non-member was deceased.

Table IV: Income Level of the Family Unit

Income Level	Members		Non-members	
	No.	%	No.	%
less than \$5,000	1	3.4	1	4.8
5,000 — 6,000	3	10.3	3	14.3
6,000 — 7,000	5	17.2	4	19.0
7,000 — 8,000	3	10.3	3	14.3
8,000 plus	10	34.5	9	42.9
Totals	22*	75.7	20*	95.3

* There were 7 no responses in the member group and one no response in the non-member group.

B. Language as an Identification Variable

Language is usually taken to be the key variable in a strong sense of identification with the ethnic group, both, by the immigrants themselves, and by the students of immigrant life; (Nahirny and Fishman had focused primarily on language in their work, pointing out various implications that the knowledge of one's ethnic language has for identity and for participation in the ethnic subculture). Because of its crucial importance this variable was included in all three sections of the interview; it has significance not only, as a demographic variable, but also, as a participation and attitude variable. (This significance will be analyzed under the separate questions intended to get information on, the degree of knowledge of the language, language usage in various spheres of community life, and status of the language in the ethnic identity). Because of its importance, language is analyzed here, in a separate section.

The function of the ethnic language is two-fold: it is an identificational component by virtue of being a significant cultural value, and, by virtue of acting as a vehicle for complete participation in the immigrant community. All respondents with the exception of one spoke Ukrainian; all, (except one), are attending, or have attended the Ukrainian language schools in New Haven. The respondents who were 18 years of age or older had attended the schools for ten years.

The respondents were asked which language they spoke at home, which language they used when speaking with their brothers and sisters, and, which language they used more often, and more easily, when speaking with their Ukrainian friends. These questions were not intended to be repetitious, or, even to be variations on the same theme. They were intended to provide a test of the degree of commitment to ethnicity. That is, they are not only sources of data on the extent of knowledge of the language, but also, indicators of the extent to which language was actually used in distinctive situations with other individuals of the ethnic community. It was assumed that almost all respondents would speak Ukrainian at home, with their parents. But, once the element of authority (or, necessity) of the parents was removed, to what extent did the respondents themselves strive to use the language? The two questions on language usage with siblings and with friends were seen as possible answers to this question.

Table V: Language Usage at Home

Language used	Members		Non-members	
	No.	%	No.	%
Ukrainian	27	93.1	17	80.9
Ukr. & English	1	3.4	3	14.3
English	1	3.4	1	4.8
Totals	29	99.9	21	100.0

The table shows that the non-members have a larger proportion of respondents who do not use Ukrainian, exclusively, when speaking to their parents. This would indicate that the parents of the non-members are slightly more lenient with their children when it comes to enforcing the use of the ethnic tongue in the home environment.

Table VI: Language Usage with Siblings

Language used	Members		Non-members	
	No.	%	No.	%
Ukrainian	13	48.1	8	36.1
Ukr. & English	6	22.2	11	52.4
English	8	29.6	2	9.5
Totals	27*	99.9	21	100.0

* The member group total is 27, because two of the respondents had no siblings.

This table would seem to indicate that the members more often spoke only Ukrainian with their brothers and sisters, than did the non-members. But, it also shows that a much larger proportion of the members speak only English with their siblings. How can we interpret the data? We may say that the members do not identify as strongly as do the non-members. This would be a negation of my hypothesis, that the members have a stronger identification with ethnicity than do the non-members. Let us look more closely at the subsamples. Recalling that the non-member group is composed of individuals who tend to be older than the member group: (non-members = 66.66% who are 20 years of age or older, while, the members are, on the average, less than 19 years of age, with 31.03% in the 14-16 age group), I reviewed the individual interview responses and found that all respondents who had answered that English was the predominant language used between siblings, were in the youngest age group. This was true for the members as well as for the non-members. Even so, it could be argued that the usual contention about ethnic groups is true, i. e., that the second generation will progressively lose its ethnicity. Here we have the youngest members of the second generation who do not use their ethnic language with their siblings, although the older second generation members do. And, orientation toward ethnicity seems to make no difference. But, two other points need to be taken into account. One is, that the younger age category is only half way through the Ukrainian language school, in contrast to the older respondents. This may make for less of an ability in language usage, and may change the data on these same individuals at a future time period. But, this is not a point to be argued further in this paper. The other point is that informal language usage is only one factor of the identification measure employed here. To reject my hypothesis, we need to have similar, negative data on the other questions used in the interview.

Table VII: Language Usage with Friends

Language used	Members		Non-members	
	No.	%	No.	%
Ukrainian	5	17.2	6	28.6
Ukr. & English	13	44.8	14	66.6
English	11	37.9	1	4.8
Totals	29	99.9	21	100.0

In connection with the above suggested implications of why the member sample, which is composed of many younger individuals, does not use Ukrainian as often as the non-member sample, (i. e., point one, in the preceding paragraph), the following data on self-evaluation of the respondents' proficiency in Ukrainian is interesting: (the question was, How well can you speak Ukrainian).

Table VIII: Self-Evaluation on Language Proficiency, by the respondents

Self-rating	Members		Non-members	
	No.	%	No.	%
a little	1	3.4	1	4.8
quite well	10	34.5	3	14.3
very well	5	17.2	3	14.3
fluently	13	44.8	13	61.9
Totals	29	99.9	20*	95.3

* One respondent from the non-member group did not speak Ukrainian at all.

Whether the evaluations are, in fact, statements of the actual condition of language proficiency of the respondents, or not, they do reflect the self-assurance that the respondents feel when speaking the ethnic language. Note, that a larger proportion of the non-members feel that they speak Ukrainian fluently. This might partially account for the non-members' greater use of the language outside of parental supervision. Or, it may be a situation of their re-affirming their ethnic identity in terms of a cultural trait; i. e., since the non members are culturally and traditionally oriented, it is important for them to profess to know one of the crucial cultural traits — the language.

The general picture presented here on knowledge of language and language usage, is one in which almost all of the respondents speak Ukrainian, and the majority of them uses it as the primary language

at home, and with friends outside of the home. If we take the two categories of language usage — Ukrainian, and Ukrainian + English — more than sixty percent of the members speak Ukrainian to some degree with their peers, while, more than 90 percent of the non-members do so. In the words of many respondents, "I speak Ukrainian and English, about half and half, depending upon the friends, and upon the situation."

C. Participation

Participation is here defined not only in terms of formal membership in the existing community organizations, but also, in terms of activity in the wider community events. All individuals included in the study belonged to several Ukrainian organizations and associations during the interview period. All had been active in various educational and religious institutions during their early childhood and adolescence. Thus, all fulfilled the requirement of "participational identifiers" with the ethnic group.

Various dimensions of organizational membership were reviewed: length of membership in present organizations, number of offices held by the respondent, perceived goals and functions of the organizations, amount of time devoted to organizational activities, membership of close friends in the same organization, and so on.

The average length of membership for the respondents belonging to Plast and SUM (the members) was seven years, while the membership of the respondents, belonging to other youth groups and clubs was, on the average, four years. (The organizations to which the non-member sample belonged were: religious youth societies, a group devoted to learning the art of Ukrainian folk-dancing, choir groups, community sports clubs, or youth sections of community adult associations). The difference in the average length of membership seems to be due to the fact that, membership in Plast and SUM is more persistent through time, while, membership in the other youth groups is of a more tenuous nature: whereas, only 13.8 percent of the Plast and SUM members had shifted their organizational membership from one group to another, 47.6% of the non-member group had done so. This has wide implications for socialization into group goals and value orientations.

The respondents were asked to state the reasons why they belonged to specific Ukrainian organizations. Four general categories of answers were given: (1) parental influence; "My parents made me a member when I was a child", (2) goal orientation, "Because I want to do something towards making Ukraine free", (3) personal identity, "I have grown up in a Ukrainian home, in a Ukrainian community, and want to continue doing something for the Ukrainian people, and (4) cultural pride, "I love the Ukrainian customs and traditions, such as our Christmas and Easter rituals, the folk-dancing, etc., and want

to continue these customs." These four categories of responses are presented in Table IX. Although the responses of both subsamples are scattered over the range of these categories, each subsample shows a point of concentration, i. e., a reply given most frequently by the particular subsample.

Table IX: Individual Reasons Given, for
Belonging to Ukrainian Organizations

Reasons	Members		Non-members	
	No.	%	No.	%
Parental Influence	7	24.1	1	4.8
Goal Orientation	12	41.4	4	19.0
Personal Identity	10	34.5	2	9.5
Perpetuate Culture	0	0.0	14	66.6
Totals	29	100.0	21	99.9

The table above, gives some evidence to a strong influence by parents, in the organizational membership of the member group. This corresponds to my earlier statement that, the goal-directed adults are quite anxious about their children and, therefore, strive to socialize them in their goal ideology, from early childhood. Categories two and three testify to the fact that the members of Plast and SUM are indeed more goal-directed than are the non-members; they also think of their organizational participation as being a facet of their personal identity. The last category shows that the major purpose of Ukrainian organizational activity among the non-members is the perpetuation of specific elements of culture. The non-members who answered in terms of freeing the Ukraine, rather than in terms of perpetuation of culture, demonstrate what I had said earlier about the Ukrainian political immigration; that is, originally, all of the immigrants had held to a nationalistic (goal) orientation, but, for some, the priority of this goal diminished through time. Nevertheless, it is still in evidence in their identity and in the identity of their children, and has to be present in some degree because of the political position of Ukraine today.

Two questions, geared at acting as possible indicators of the degree of personal commitment to the organizations, were asked. One was a question on the amount of time per week that the respondent devoted to organizational activities. The other was a question on the offices held by the respondent in the organizations to which he belongs. These two questions were asked in relation to the respondent's membership and activity in American youth organizations, as well as, in Ukrainian groups. Initially, it was assumed, that a

comparison between the two, (American and Ukrainian), would yield results showing greater activity in one area, in contrast to activity in the other. In other words, membership in American organizations might compete for the time and attention of the respondent, and might be an indicator of lesser commitment to ethnic affairs.

Table X: Time devoted to
American Organizations

Hours/week	Members		Non-members	
	No.	%	No.	%
less than 1	8	27.6	9	42.8
1-3	16	55.2	7	33.3
3-5	3	10.3	3	14.3
5-10	1	3.4	2	9.5
10 +	1	3.4	0	0.0
Totals	29	99.9	21	99.9

Table XI: Time devoted to
Ukrainian Organizations

Hours/week	Members		Non-members	
	No.	%	No.	%
less than 1	0	0.0	4	19.0
1-3	12	41.4	11	52.4
3-5	7	27.1	1	4.8
5-10	7	24.1	5	23.8
11 +	3	10.3	0	0.0
Totals	29	99.9	21	100.0

Table XII: Offices Held by Respondents
in all organizations — (Amer. + Ukr.)

Which Organizations	Members		Non-members	
	No.	%	No.	%
Both, Amer. & Ukr.	2	6.9	4	19.0
Only in Ukrainian	16	55.2	3	14.3
Only in American	3	10.3	1	4.8
No offices in either area	8	27.6	13	61.9
Totals	29	100.0	21	100.0

Thus, the members of Plast and SUM spend more time in American organizational activities than do the non-members (Table X). They also devote more time to the Ukrainian organizations. Before analyzing the table on "offices held", it is necessary to make note of two important factors. It should be remembered that the member group is composed of a relatively large youngest age category, (14 to 16 years of age). This, in itself, puts certain limitations on the possibilities for holding organizational offices, whether Ukrainian or American. It is more often the case that older members are elected to the offices of an organization. On the other hand, the American organizations, which most of the respondents mentioned as belonging to, were school related groups and clubs. Here, we could argue that age may not be as important, since many school organizations are restricted to a particular class cohort, (e. g., freshman class officers). But, the majority of school organizations mentioned, were not of this type; they were clubs or groups opened to the entire school. For this reason, age would be an important consideration. The other condition is that, a relatively large proportion of the non-members are past high school ages. They are often students in larger area colleges and universities, where attainment of school offices is not as easy as it is in a smaller, high school system. When we look at categories 1 and 2 of table X, we see that both, members and non-members participate, about equally, in American organizations. On the other hand, (see table XII), the members are much more restricted to exclusively Ukrainian organizational commitment than are the non-members: 55.2% of the members hold offices only in Ukrainian organizations, in contrast to 14.3% of the non-members. Then, the non-members, as a separate category, appear to be organizationally less committed in general, since 61.9% of this group does not hold offices in either, the Ukrainian, or the American organizations; this is in contrast to 27.6% of the members who hold no offices.

The respondents were asked to state the goals of the Ukrainian organizations in which they were members. The results show a clear-cut dichotomy, which is one piece of evidence to uphold my thesis, i. e., that there are two distinct orientations toward ethnicity in the second generation. Although the question asked was general and completely open-ended, the answers fell into two categories. The question was, "...could you briefly describe the goals and purposes of the Ukrainian organizations to which you belong at present." The answers of the members were: "The goal of Plast is to work for Ukrainian freedom", or, "The goal of Plast is to teach Ukrainian youth to love their country, and to help their country", or, "The purpose of SUM is to teach the children the truth about their fatherland; to bring them up in the Ukrainian spirit." This type of answer was consistently given by the members. No special coding procedure was necessary; there were no variations from this theme. The non-members, as a group, were also consistent in their replies: "The goals

of these Ukrainian organizations is to keep alive Ukrainian traditions", or, "Their purpose is to provide knowledge about the customs and traditions, about the Ukrainian heritage, so that the members can eventually teach these to their own children", or, "These organizations assist the church in uniting the Ukrainian people, and also perpetuate Ukrainian customs and traditions." Table XIII gives the distribution of these answers. I emphasize again, the respondents themselves created this dichotomous distribution; the categories are their own.

Table XIII: Perceived Goals of the Ukrainian Groups & Organizations

Perceived Goals	Members		Non-members	
	No.	%	No.	%
"To work for a free Ukraine"	28	96.6	4	19.0
"To perpetuate the ethnic culture & the ethnic group"	1	3.4	16	76.2
Totals	29	100.0	20*	95.2

* One of the non-members was unable to state the purposes of the organizations to which she belonged, even after probing.

An attempt was made to investigate factors which might have an explanatory value in distinguishing between the membership status of the two subsamples. The research question asked was, were there family background factors which would be predictive of whether a respondent is a member of SUM or Plast, or a member of the other youth groups? The respondents were asked to state which organizations and associations their parents belonged to. They were also asked to rate the extent of organizational and community involvement of their parents. The same questions were asked with reference to their siblings.

Parental participation, as described by the respondents, turns out to be one of the most interesting and significant differentiating factors. It is not the participation of both parents that is of crucial importance, but rather, the participation of the mother. Type of organization did not matter; it was the number of organizations to which the parents, and especially, the mother belonged to, that distinguished the members from the non-members. (Organization, refers to formal organizations, such as the Ukrainian Women's League of America, as well as to church societies, school committees, etc.).

Tables XIV and XV present the data on parental organizational activity and the mother's organizational activity.

Table XIV: Parental Organizational Membership

A. Fathers

Father

Membership	Mem.		Non.	
	No.	%	No.	%
belongs	27	93.1	16	79.2
Does not belong	1	3.4	4	19.0
Totals	28*	96.5	20*	98.2

*One parent deceased in each group

B. Mothers

Membership	Mem.		Non.	
	No.	%	No.	%
Mother belongs	24	82.8	12	57.1
Does not belong	5	17.2	8	38.1
Totals	29	100.0	20*	95.2

* One parent deceased

Tables XV: Extent of Mother's Organizational Activity — No. of Organizations

Number of Orgs.	Members		Non-members	
	No.	%	No.	%
None	5	17.2	9	42.9
1	12	41.4	7	33.3
2	10	34.5	4	19.0
3	0	0.0	1	4.8
4 plus	2	6.9	0	0.0
Totals	29	100.0	21	100.0

The extent of father's organizational activity turns out to be approximately the same for the fathers of the members, as for the fathers of the non-members. But, the mothers of the members were

significantly more active, organizationally, than were the mothers of the non-members. They were also much more involved in the community activities of New Haven than were the other mothers. The respondents' rating of their parents' community and organizational activity corresponds to the differentials evident in the preceding tables, with the members more often rating their parents as active or very active, than did the non-members.

When the respondents rated their brothers and sisters on their participation, it became clear that the families of each subsample (member vs. non-member) were homogenous with respect to organizational involvement of the children: 86.2% of the members rated their siblings as being active, while, only 52.4% of the non-members did so.

Thus, the influence of the family, particularly of the parents, is decisive in determining which individuals will become members of Plast and SUM, and which will not. In turn, and as a consequence, it is decisive in determining the orientation toward ethnicity of the second generation; (this will be shown clearly in the section on attitudes).

Another important factor related to the resulting organizational membership of young people is the influence of peer groups, especially, a core of close friends. The respondents were asked two questions: were their close friends in the same organizations as the respondents were, and, if they had to choose one organization in which the majority of their close friends were, which organization would it be? The initial assumption underlying these questions was, that a significant proportion of the respondents may have become members of specific Ukrainian organizations because their friends belonged to them. The interviews reveal that is not necessarily the case, whether we focus on the member group or on the non-member group. In the case of the members, we have seen that some of them became members of specific organizations because their parents made them members. Also, since, as a group, the members have been in the organizations for a considerably longer period of time, the opportunity for, and the probability of forming close friendships is great. Therefore, in the case of the members, one could argue that friendships ties operate after the fact of becoming members, and are not decisive in determining the direction of organizational participation, beforehand. The friendships could be responsible for future continuity of membership, and for greater commitment to the organization. As such, it would reinforce the influence that the members are getting from their parents, i. e., to be active in the specific organizations. The non-members, on the other hand, belong to their respective organizations much less because of any pressure from the parents. They have also belonged to their organizations for shorter periods of time. Thus, any close friendships ties that develop are not pre-determined by their organizational membership. One might say that often they

belong despite the fact that their reference group of close friends is not located in their organizations. In fact, many of their friends are the "members", people who belong to Plast and SUM. (Plast and SUM members often belong to the groups and organizations which form the organizational basis of the non-members). One thing is clear from the interview data: for the members, the core group of close friends is found mostly in Plast and SUM; for the non-members, the core group of close friends is not exclusively located in their organizations.

Table XVI: Question 53, "Are your closest friends members of the same organizations as you are?"

Which organizations	Members		Non-members	
	No.	%	No.	%
same organization	23	79.3	11	52.4
not same org.	3	10.3	10	47.6
some do*	3	10.3	0	0.0
Totals	29	99.9	21	100.0

* In category three, the respondents stated that about half of their friends belonged to their organization (SUM or Plast) and the other half were in the other youth organization, (SUM or Plast).

Table XVII: Question 54, "To which specific organization do your closest friends belong to?"

Which org.	Members		Non-members	
	No.	%	No.	%
same org.	23	79.3	10	47.6
either member org.	4	13.8	6	28.6
non-member groups	1	3.4	0	0.0
American org.	1	3.4	5	23.8
Totals	29	99.9	21	100.0

Table XVII demonstrates that the majority of members have closest friendship ties within their own organizations. Those who do not have friends in other Ukrainian organizations, more often than not, in the other member organization (Plast and SUM). The non-members are not as exclusive in their friendships, either organizationally, or ethnically, although, the majority is still limited to ethnic friendship ties. (Similar data had been obtained on friendship ties of the

past, especially, with reference to attendance of the Ukrainian language school, summer camps, etc. There has been a change in the pattern of the non-member friendship ties; their past friendships had been much more limited to their past organizational memberships.)

An extensive section of the participation questions was oriented toward obtaining information on other than formal participation in the community and outside of the local ethnic life.

All of the respondents in both subsamples attend and actively participate in wider community events. There were no exceptions to this. But, whereas 86.2% of the members stated that they attend such functions regularly (every event), only 47.6% of the non-members did so. To check on the reliability of their response, I also asked them to mention as many of the recent community events as they could remember. (I had been provided with a calendar of events by the local parishes). The members were much more accurate and prolific in their answers than were the non-members. However, all of the major events of the preceding months, involving the participation of the entire community, had been attended by all respondents. (It is important to note that the New Haven community sponsors some event at almost regular, weekly intervals).

The members were also much more familiar with events occurring on a non-local basis, that is events sponsored by various national organizations. The members, more often than the non-members, had attended these events. (For example, national commemorative events, youth conferences, etc.) In one sense, this difference between the two subsamples would be due to the nature of the youth organizations. Whereas, Plast and SUM in New Haven are branches of national youth organizations, the other youth groups are purely local. But, this is just the point; when one argues for the existence of different types of identification such a difference is significant. An orientation focusing on a goal, in this case, a nationalistic goal, involves a different type of collective effort; it involves a more extensive and organized effort on the part of its adherents. In the case of a cultural-traditional orientation, which attempts to perpetuate past customs and folkways, a predominantly local effort can be sufficient; it focuses, after all, on a past "community" way of life.

A related piece of data is "past attendance of Ukrainian summer camps." As I have stated before, (on page 29), summer camps bring together children from various communities and, thus, provide the opportunity for forming non-local (above local) friendships, in addition to their function of filling the summer period with new "Ukrainian experiences." 93.1% of the members have attended summer camp, many of them, regularly; 57.1% of the non-members attended. This difference, again, has similar implications to that on knowledge of and participation in wider community events.

Many of the differences on participation of the members vs. the non-members have consequences for the type of attitudes the

respondents hold, whether on particular ethnic issues, or on general topics of ethnicity and commitment to it. These will be discussed in the following section.

D. Attitudes

The major concern of this thesis is with differential orientations toward ethnicity. Thus, far, the data presented has been largely of an objective nature; I have examined a small part of the structural elements of the ethnic community, and particularly of the family unit, and have attempted to find differences in participation within them. It is however, the present section, which will either, uphold or, negate the hypothesis set forth in this thesis. The question of ethnic identification, I argue, is ultimately a question of attitudes and beliefs about ethnicity. The present structure and variations of participation within it, can reveal only a partial picture of what is involved in the ethnic experience, in the ethnic identity. To approach the core of the problem we have to turn to the individual, to his interpretations of the ethnic structure, to his perception of the role he is to play, or will play in the ethnic community. It is here that the question of ethnic identification can be answered.

The respondents were asked, "If you were asked, what nationality are you, what would you answer?" Every respondent answered "Ukrainian." Apparently, they all identify with their ethnic group, and without hesitation. Does this mean that we can safely assume a large degree of generational continuity? Does this mean that the future intentions of all respondents are the same with reference to their ethnic group? Not necessarily.

All respondents categorically state that they will be active in the ethnic community when they become adults. Some state that they will be more active. It was usually the presently-less-active non-members who said that they would devote much more time to the ethnic community in the future. Fewer members said this. But, when I asked everyone, how long they expected the Ukrainian ethnic community to remain as a distinct group, as an unassimilated group, the attitudes of the respondents differed markedly.

Table XVIII: Attitudes Toward the Possibility of
Future Assimilation of the Ukrainian Immigrant Group

Type of Attitude	Members		Non-Members	
	No.	%	No.	%
Assimilation inevitable after parents are gone	3	10.3	7	33.3
Assimilation, after our generation is gone	1	3.4	6	28.6
Never, maybe in a hundred years	25	86.2	8	38.1
Totals	29	99.9	21	100.0

These are the general categories which the respondents themselves supplied. It was a regular repetition of the same three themes, although the question was general and open-ended.

When, essentially, the same question was asked later, but, this time, purposefully, a very leading question, the differentials between the two subsamples greatly increased.

Table XIX: Question 88, "Many sociologists say that all ethnic groups will eventually cease to exist, in other words, will assimilate. Do you think that this applies to the Ukrainian group in the United States?"

Attitude	Members		Non-members	
	No.	%	No.	%
Agree with "sociologists"	9	31.0	15	71.4
Disagrees	20	68.9	6	28.5
Totals	29	99.9	21	99.9

When the respondents were asked, what it meant to them to say that they were Ukrainian, 82.8% of the members answered in terms of "political" factors. For them, it meant that they were "obligated" to work for the future goal of freeing Ukraine; this could be done, at present, by telling non-Ukrainians about the Russian oppression of Ukraine, and about the distinction between Ukraine and Russia. The non-members spoke about perpetuating the culture and the ethnic group; a substantial portion also added that they were to spread the Ukrainian "Spirit." When they were probed, as to the meaning of this "spirit", they answered by saying that it consisted of propagating the Ukrainian cause — telling Americans about Ukra-

ine's struggle for freedom; thus, they essentially meant the same thing by it as did the members. It was however, a vague attitude, which they were not able to describe readily; it was also not as pervasive an attitude as in the member group.

The respondents were asked what they thought the goals, the aims of Ukrainian immigrants in the United States were. Three categories of answers were given, (1) to free Ukraine, (2) to preserve Ukrainian culture, and (3) to better personal lives. The last category was often followed by vindictive remarks, such as, "some people think only of their own material welfare." A question was asked about the relationship between the younger generation and the adults of the ethnic community: "What is your attitude toward the older generation?"; the responses were definitely related to the question on perceived goals.

Tables XX and XXI, are presented together to illustrate this relationship. The members tend to give "positive" statements to both questions, while, the non-members persistently give evidence to a somewhat negative attitude toward the older generation. (There are individuals in both groups who deviate from the majority).

Table XX: Respondents' Perception of What the Goal of Ukrainian Immigrants in the United States is:

Perceived Goals	Members		Non-members	
	No.	%	No.	%
"To preserve the ethnic culture"	3	10.3	10	47.6
"To better their personal lives"	2	6.9	6	28.6
Totals	29	100.0	21	100.0

Table XXI: Attitudes of the Respondents Toward the Adult Generation of the Immigrant Group

Type of Attitude	Members		Non-members	
	No.	%	No.	%
"Respect & Admiration"	20	68.8	9	42.8
Qualified Respect & Admir.				
a. "Should be doing much more, too much talk and no action"	5	17.2	0	0.0
b. "Too old fashioned, seem to be living in Ukraine"	3	10.3	9	42.8
Neutral attitude	0	0.0	1	0.8
Very negative attitude	1	3.4	2	9.5
Totals	29	99.7	21	99.9

As we can see from table XXI, the members are much more positive toward the adult generation than are the non-members. Even, when we focus on the second category of responses, the qualified-positive attitudes, the criticisms of the members are not of the same type as those of the non-members. The members definitely identify more strongly with the ethnic community, as we can see from their perceived goals and obligations. They are critical of the adults because the adults do not seem to be doing as much as they should for these goals. Thus, the focus of conflict differs for the member group in comparison with the non-member group; (here, I am speaking of intergenerational conflict). For the non-members, the conflict is based on the outmoded attitudes of the parents, on a "living in the past" characteristic. This is a little ironic, since the non-members are committed to a cultural-traditional basis in their ethnic identification, as they themselves so often stated. This data on the area of inter-generational conflict in the non-member group provides a partial answer to the question I had posed earlier in the paper: how many elements of culture and tradition can be meaningfully incorporated into the present way of life? Not too many, it seems. On the other hand, the members, in an overwhelming majority, appear to have internalized the Ideal, the goal, which is a unifying symbol between them and the older generation. In connection with this evidence of conflict, a similar differential response occurred when the respondents were asked if there were any pressures or conflicts between parents and their children with reference to participating in ethnic affairs. The non-members, more often than not, answered, "an unqualified yes." Fewer members felt that there may be conflict. Of the members that did, many answered that this was the way it should be, that there should be more pressure, for, many young Ukrainians were not as committed to "the cause" as they should be.

On another extreme, in a question asking respondents how they felt about the changing of the Old style (Julian) church calendar to the N.S. (Gregorian) calendar, a large proportion of the members objected to the change than did the non-members. This was the case, despite the fact that the difference in calendar was a strong traditional factor.⁶¹ In general, then, the question on the attitudes of the respondents toward the adult generation provoked very strong feelings from all respondents, either in the defense of the older generation, or in a lengthy criticism of them.

The respondents were asked three questions which were directed at making them re-evaluate all of the elements of their ethnic identity, and asking them to make a choice of the most important

⁶¹) The difference between the two calendars is a difference of thirteen days. This meant, for instance, that Christmas fell on the 7th of January, instead of December 25th. The Julian calendar had been followed for hundreds of years in Ukraine; in diaspora, it served to differentiate the group from other minorities, throughout the church year.

factors. These were: (1) What is the most important part of your Ukrainian heritage?, (2) What contribution, do you think, the Ukrainian immigrants, have to offer to the United States?, and (3) Considering all the Ukrainian communities in the United States, what do you think they should take as their future goal and direction? The answers to the first question fell into three general categories: uniqueness, the particular richness and beauty of the Ukrainian customs, and, the Ukrainian fight for freedom and for universal principles. (Category three was often elaborated by the respondents, with such phrases as, "the Ukrainian people can tell American about the true nature of communism, etc.) Those answering "culture and tradition" were not as able to expound on that subject; in one sense, it would involve everything, in another sense, it would be the enumeration of specific customs and rituals.

Table XXII: Question 65, "What is the most important Part of your Ukrainian Heritage?"

Answers given	Members		Non-members	
	No.	%	No.	%
Uniqueness	2	6.8	3	14.3
Culture	8	27.6	14	66.6
Fight for "Cause"	19	65.5	4	19.0
Totals	29	99.9	21	99.9

Here, again, we see the dichotomy of emphasis in the two groups, with the members concentrating upon the goal and, the non-members valuing culture and tradition as the most important part of their ethnic identity.

Table XXIII: Contribution of Ukrainian Immigrants to the United States

Answers given	Members		Non-members	
	No.	%	No.	%
The "cause"	21	72.4	0	0.0
Culture	7	24.1	18	85.7
Other*	1	3.4	3	14.3
Totals	29	99.9	21	100.0

* The "other" category included such contributions as, individual talent, leadership, etc.

Table XXIV: Respondents' views as to what the future goal of the Ukrainian ethnic group should be

Suggested ethnic goals	Members		Non-members	
	No.	%	No.	%
"To free Ukraine"	26	89.7	3	14.3
"To attain greater unity"	1	3.4	4	19.0
"To perpetuate the ethnic group"	2	6.9	12	57.1
Totals	29	100.0	19*	90.4

* Two of the non-members could not think of a goal for the ethnic group. I feel, that this, in itself, is a suggestive result.

Table XXIII illustrates the existence of the two orientations very clearly. Table XXIV is of special interest: the members are strongly oriented to the goal in this question, as they were in previous ones; the non-members, on the other hand, carry divergent views, more here, than they did on other issues, (more than did in table XXIII). This is significant. Almost 33% of the non-members have switched to other views when we compare the two tables. Of special interest is the category on unity. Here again, there is an element of dissatisfaction with the adults, who are seen by the non-members as split on many issues and unable to act constructively for ethnic interests. The members had more often presented a picture of respect for the accomplishments of the older generation during their twenty-odd years of settlement in the United States.

The greater dissatisfaction of the non-members with respect to ethnic matters and the adult generation, is mirrored again in a dissatisfaction with themselves.

Table XXV: Respondents' Rating of themselves:
(Question — Are you as good a Ukrainian as your parents are?)

Rating	Members		Non-members	
	No.	%	No.	%
yes	20	68.9	9	42.9
no	9	31.0	11	52.4
Totals	29	99.9	20*	95.3

* There was one no response from a non-member;

The non-members often expressed a sense of guilt for not being as active as they should be, stating that they were pre-occupied with their personal needs and interests. The members, on the other hand, felt that they were doing as much as was possible, under the

circumstances, for the Ukrainian people. They were devoting a great deal of time and effort to specific ethnic affairs.

I felt that it was important to see how much the particular orientation held by respondents affected their behaviour and attitudes outside of the defined sphere of the ethnic community. Three questions were used to tap this information. The respondents were asked if they ever discussed their ethnic origin with their American friends, and, if they did, what was the usual topic of this discussion.

Table XXVI: Ethnic Topic of Discussion
with American Friends

Specific Topic	Members		Non-members	
	No.	%	No.	%
Goal	18	62.0	4	19.5
Customs	10	34.5	16	76.2
Both, goal and customs	1	3.4	1	4.8
Totals	29	99.9	21	99.5

Thus, the majority of the members discussed the recent political struggle and the present situation in Ukraine, while, the non-members drew upon specific customs to illustrate the content of their ethnic identity.

The respondents were also asked what they felt to be the attitude of the American community toward Ukrainian immigrants. The underlying assumption for this question was that the perceived attitude would indicate, First — the degree of in-group feeling and the extent of identification with the Ukrainian community, exclusively, and Second — whether a particular type of ethnic orientation fostered greater conflict with the larger (American) community, and therefore, offered less of an opportunity for assimilation; (see, Zubrzycki, page 9 of this paper).

Table XXVII: Respondents' Perception of the Attitudes
of Americans toward the Ukrainian Immigrants

Type of attitude perceived	Members		Non-members	
	No.	%	No.	%
positive	10	34.5	8	38.1
negative	12	41.4	5	23.8
neutral	7	24.1	8	38.1
Totals	29	100.0	21	100.0

A larger proportion of the members stated that American people held negative attitudes toward Ukrainians. (By negative, they meant that the American people most often did not understand the difference between Russia and Ukraine, and, as a result, often misunderstood the Ukrainian immigrants, seeing them as holding extreme views on politics, and as being argumentative). A large proportion of the non-members felt that Americans held, either positive, or neutral attitudes toward Ukrainians: 72.2% of the non-members, in contrast to 58.6% of the members. The positive and the neutral categories are the non-threatening perceived attitudes. They would involve less of a threat to the ethnic identity. This is a logical result. When a respondent talks about the customs and traditions of his heritage to a non-Ukrainian, there is no personal threat to his identity. The listener is likely to be interested in the uniqueness of the description of the ethnic customs. On the other hand, statements of a political nature, with ideological contentions, are more likely to be questioned by the non-Ukrainian listener. Thus, the members, who, more often talk about the "cause", the political goal of Ukrainian immigrants, are often faced with heated arguments and disputes which tend to undermine the basis of their ethnic identity. As a result, they are the ones who are likely to feel that the American community holds negative attitudes toward Ukrainians. They are also more often faced with situations which require greater commitment on their parts. They have to continuously defend their identity.

Conclusion

The specific hypothesis that I attempted to substantiate here was, that there exist different *types* of ethnic identification, that these types are not dependent upon generational position, but, may be found within the same generational group. It was postulated that the difference between identificational processes is based on differential emphasis being placed either, on the values of the ethnic identity, or, on the specific customs and norms. The proposition was that an orientation toward the ethnic values would be more acceptable to the second generation than would a cultural-specific orientation. This proposition was derived from Fishman and Nahirny's typology of generational identification, in which they characterized the second generation as being symbolically oriented toward ethnicity. From this proposition I further postulated that the ideological (value) type of ethnic identification would be a stronger identification, when compared to the other, the cultural type of identification.

What conclusions can we draw from the data presented in the preceding section?

First of all, almost all of the questions on attitudes and intentions revealed a distinct difference in the "object of orientation" of the

member subsample and that of the non-member subsample. When asked about various aspects of their identity, the members usually made references to the immigrant goal (i. e., freeing Ukraine), to the political struggle, and to their own contributions and responsibilities toward the goal. When the non-members responded to these same questions, they focused on specific cultural items, on traditional religio-cultural patterns, and on the historical past. It is important to note that the questions asked were open-ended, yet, all the respondents of the member group spoke of the "goal", and all of the respondents of the non-member group spoke of "culture and tradition." These are their words and their categories; these are the elements of their respective ethnic identities.

The evidence is overwhelming in proving that there are two distinct contents for the Ukrainian identity within the second generation. How does this difference in content influence other areas of ethnicity for the two groups; how does the process of ethnic identification differ as a result of difference in identity content.

There are a number of areas which illustrate differences in behaviour and attitudes between the two groups. The first of these is the general problem of conflict. The responses show that the spheres of perceived conflict are different for each group; (i.e., the areas of conflict distinguished by the members are not the same areas distinguished by the non-members). The members expressed criticism and negative attitudes mostly with reference to one question; this was the question on the attitudes of Americans toward Ukrainians. Here, a significant portion of the members felt that the American public was uninformed, indifferent, and often hostile toward Ukrainians. Only a small number of the non-members felt this way. On the other hand, the non-members stated that a major area of conflict and tension for them was the inter-generational relationship. This was true in the home environment, where the parents were often seen as pressuring the children to participate in Ukrainian affairs, as well as being old-fashioned in their attitudes toward the behaviour of the younger generation. This was also true in the relationship of the non-members with other adults of the ethnic community. The older generation was seen as being unrealistic, haughty, and argumentative, i. e., simply ignorant with reference to contemporary conditions. The members, in contrast, were never critical of the older generation; only a small group of the members felt that the adults were living in the past. On the whole, therefore, we can say that there was no perception of outright conflict between the members and the adult sector of the community. In general, we can present the difference in conflict areas, as follows:

Areast of Conflict

	Members:	Non-members:
Relationship with Parents	—	+
Inter-generational contacts	—	+
Ukrainian-American Relationships	+	—

(This scheme is, of course, a very generalized and simplified representation of the actual situation. But, it is a valid picture of the majority of responses in each of the two subsamples).

The second area of differences between the members and the non-members I will call, "consistency within the identificational process." It is closely related to the subject of conflict discussed above, because, lack of consistency can be a potential source of conflict. Two general topics seem to require treatment under "consistency." One of these is the degree of "meaningfulness" attributed to ethnic activities, and the other is the degree of commitment to ethnicity. These two topics are treated together because of their implicit interdependence.

When the respondents were questioned about their responsibilities toward the ethnic community, about the goals and purposes of the ethnic organizations, and about their future intentions toward ethnic affairs, the members consistently answered that they were fulfilling their obligations to the group "goal." They were specific as to the functional means of various activities. They illustrated ways in which their behaviour and involment was helping the achievement of this goal. (Specifically, they felt that their membership in the two youth organizations was both, giving them an opportunity to do something for Ukraine, and prepared them for future adult roles). Thus, for the members, their ideological focus appears to be consistent with their present behaviour. The non-members, in contrast, were faced with a problem of inconsistency. They spoke of a cultural ideal as being their chief identificational referent. Yet, they were not very successful in finding meaningful present-time behavioural referents. They insisted that they were deeply attached to Ukrainian customs, and considered them to be the most important part of their ethnic heritage; they insisted that they would teach their children to appreciate and accept these cultural ideals, yet, outside of the observance of the religio-cultural holydays, and their membership in dance groups, their cultural and ethnic activities were non-existent. Note also, the discrepancies to their answers on their identity, their replies to current changes and issues within the ethnic group, and their criticism of their parents for being too tradition-bound.

The extent of "meaningfulness" of the ethnic behaviour is also reflected in the attitudes that the two groups held on the possibility of future assimilation of the ethnic group. The members persisted in their belief that the Ukrainian community would remain a separate and distinct community for a very long period of time. The non-

members, on the other hand, believed that it would follow the fate of other ethnic groups and would be assimilated, "in a generation." This is a logical difference. The members, who are devoting much of their time and attention to ethnic activities could not believe otherwise; their present commitment would be fruitless. Thus, for them, their belief about the future and their present commitment to ethnic affairs are consistent with each other. For the non-members they are not. Even those non-members who are extremely active in various phases of organizational and community life, felt that the ethnic group would not endure for long.

The third area of difference between the two subsamples was a difference in the perception of what the Ukrainian ethnic group was like. The members described it as hardworking, politically sophisticated, of one mind, and devoted to the "cause." They felt that the strongest Ukrainian organization was the Ukrainian Congress Committee, or the conglomeration of adult and youth ideological organizations. They spoke often of all Ukrainian communities in America, and felt that the Ukrainians were a distinctively different ethnic group, not comparable to other minority groups. The non-members saw the Ukrainian group as disunited, as a community which had to change, to adapt to the environment, and as a group which was unique only in terms of its separate cultural and traditional background. The non-members spoke more often in terms of the local community. For them, the strongest ethnic institution was the church.

These then, were the other areas of ethnicity which differentiated between the two subsamples, in addition to the major area of identity content. Although, I cannot demonstrate a difference in the rate of assimilation on the basis of my data, (such a demonstration requires an analysis of the second generation group through their lifetime), the data strongly suggest that the member group has a deeper sense of ethnic identification and will, probably continue to have it for a longer period of time than will the non-member group.

Another factor that the data show is, that the key variable to the difference in identification is the family. This was to be expected. After all, the main problem of ethnic identification is generational continuity, and its basic determining social unit is the family.

I have been emphasizing that the Ukrainian group is characterized by two distinct orientations toward ethnicity. One group of parents adhere to the ideological (goal) orientation, and have been directing their efforts toward the socialization of their children in this same ethnic perspective. These parents were the individuals who organized Plast and SUM, formulated the programmes of these youth organizations, and continue to act as the organizational leaders. The result of this situation is that the children (the members) are getting a consistent socialization; the same ideals and the same behavioural patterns are taught in the home and in the organizations. It can be

argued that their socialization is almost perfect. The non-members, in contrast, are in a very different situation. Their home environment does not necessarily provide the same ethnic milieu as do the community groups and the organizations of which they are members. For this reason, it is difficult to argue that one type of identification is stronger than the other. The problem is that this argument can neither be proved, nor disproved on the basis of the present data, or, at the present time. However, there are two implicit arguments which, at least partially, substantiate the logic of my proposition about the superiority of the ideological type of identification. One is the fact that the ideological orientation *has been successful* in creating "meaningful" behavioural patterns in the Ukrainian member group. The other derives from the notion of a "political" immigrant group. With its inherently ideological perspective, such a group, theoretically, possesses an adaptive course of activity. Through its abstract values, it is adaptive to the larger American environment in a way that culture and tradition can never be.

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Fifth Conference of WACL

DELEGATES WARN AGAINST APPEASEMENT

Delegates to the joint conference of the World Anti-Communist League and the Asian Peoples' Anti-Communist League concluded their Quezon City meet with a warning against the dangers of appeasing Communist China and world communism in general.

The joint 5th WACL and 17th APACL conference, in its communique, issued on the final day of the five-day sessions, also called for immediate action by free Asian nations in forming an Asian-Pacific regional security system "more comprehensive than the existing military alliances to offset the progressive withdrawal of Allied forces from Viet-Nam."

"Whilst the Communist regimes are spreading and the policy of appeasement is attracting increasing attention, the free peoples of the world are nevertheless strengthening their anti-communist resolution.

The Conference therefore determined to give a clear indication of its supporters of the additional efforts which should be made to defeat every anti-communist threat, reverse the appeasement trend and thereby achieve ultimate victory for the freedom of mankind and the independence of all nations.

The communique paid tribute to the support extended to the conference by the Philippine Government and people. It was especially grateful for the attendance of President Marcos who delivered the opening address before the delegates. He was accompanied by the Philippine First Lady Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos.

In the spirit of demonstrating united, strong and consistent action against the Communists' aggressive and subversive schemes, the Conference declared that all free nations should support the following proposals:

A. In Europe, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization should be strengthened and the liberation fight for national independence and human rights of Ukraine, Byelorussia, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Georgia, Turkestan, Croatia, Rumania, Albania, Hungary, Czechia, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Poland, East Germany and all other nations subjugated by Russian imperialism and Communism should be given all possible support. In particular, action should be taken to eliminate concentration camps and political mental asylums and to achieve release of political and religious prisoners in the USSR and its satellites.

B. In the Middle East, every Communist and other destructive schemes and act of aggression, should be effectively countered.

C. In Asia, the Anti-Communist fight by Viet-Nam, Laos and Khmer should continue to receive practical support and collective strength of friendly nations must be used to halt Communist aggression to any other area. Immediate action should be taken by the free Asian nations to establish an Asian Pacific regional security system more comprehensive than the existing military alliances to offset the progressive withdrawal of Allied forces from Viet-Nam. Continued support should be extended to the Republic of Korea in her efforts to liberate the enslaved people of North Korea and in accordance with the spirit of the Charter of the United Nations to achieve the unification of the country.

D. In Africa, encouragement must be given to those nations where Communist financial resources are being employed for subversion. To further strengthen such nations every assistance is to be given to bring them into membership of WACL.

E. In Latin America, any further Communist attempt at infiltration and subversion, especially from Cuba and Chile, must be shattered.

RESOLUTION ASKING THE FREE WORLD TO HELP UKRAINE AND THE OTHER CAPTIVE NATIONS

Whereas, the Ukrainian nation is waging a heroic struggle for survival in the face of despotic Soviet Russian subjugation and, being in central position among the captive nations, has sacrificed a tremendous number of victims in her fight for liberation;

Whereas, Russia deliberately aims at the destruction of the Ukrainian nation by doing away with its leaders, writers artists and other intellectuals, and by suppressing the native Ukrainian language, culture and religion;

Whereas, freedom-loving people have been imprisoned in jails and concentration camps for 25 years without trial, like the prominent lawyer Dr. V. Horbovyi, and other intellectuals and writers have been convicted to 25 years, in prison, like the writer S. Karavanskyi;

Whereas, even female Red Cross volunteers of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, the Ukrainian women K. Zarytska, H. Didyk, O. Husyak, all sentenced to 25 years, have been suffering indescribable hardship at Vladimir prison and the Mordovian concentration camps;

Whereas, only recently the young Ukrainian historian V. Moroz has been sentenced to 14 years in prison and concentration camps, and a well-known artist Alla Horska has just recently been murdered in Kyiv without ever being tried;

Whereas, Moscow's propaganda obliterates the issue of the captive nations and Russia's smiles and peace-mongering conceal her primordial objective of world domination;

Whereas, by presently inciting and supporting peripheral wars like Viet-Nam, the Near East and elsewhere, Russia hopes to push the free world into the abyss of annihilation;

Whereas, it is the responsibility of the free world to help the subjugated nations in their struggle for freedom and independence, and the disintegration from within of the Russian empire and the whole Communist system will help to free the world from tyranny and disaster;

Whereas, justice and freedom are indivisible and a just order with full

guarantee of natural human rights and independent national states has to replace tyranny and imperialism;

Therefore, the Fifth WACL Conference resolves:

1. To raise a strong voice in defense of Ukraine and other captive nations and to consider the ideas of national liberation, national independence and human rights as the chief motivating forces in our age.

2. To protest against the destruction of churches, libraries, and cultural monuments, against deportations, slave labour and every violations of human and national rights.

3. To build up information media and to disclose all international fraud by Communist fifth columns and treacherous Russian diplomacy.

4. To encourage Ukrainians and other subjugated peoples by all means to fight for liberation and national independence and to stimulate the joint front of all captive nations and anti-Communist forces of the free world as the only solution to the problem of liberation and salvation of the world from annihilation by Russian imperialism and Communism.

5. To demand the withdrawal of all occupation forces from Ukraine, the liquidation of all concentration and slave labour camps, the release of all political prisoners, writers, priests and others and to protest against the brutal treatment of prisoners, the poisoning of food, secret court proceedings and placing of normal people in lunatic asylums.

6. To fight the spirit of defeatism, indifference, opportunism and coexistence, as intolerable ills of a free society.

7. To concentrate our attention on the youth and to bring it up in the spirit of eternal values, humanism and patriotism.

8. To work for a change of policy by the free governments by their adoption of the policy of liberation and to organize a global movement for freedom, national independence and social justice, and against Communism and Russian Imperialism.

STATEMENT OF THE WYACL SECRETARIAT

We, the youth united in WYACL, urgently appeal to the World Anti-Communist League and to all the nations of the free world to assist us in our efforts to secure the release of young intellectuals incarcerated in Russian concentration camps "political" mental asylums, especially the brilliant young Ukrainian historian, Valentyn Moroz, recently sentenced by the Russian Communist Regime to a 14 years term of hard labour for his active resistance to the policy of Russianisation of Ukraine and his defense of human rights and dignity.

We ask your staunch support of our campaign to give Ukraine and all Captive Nations in the USSR the same political, national, religious and cultural rights which all free nations possess, or should possess, according to the Declaration of Human Rights and the Charter of the United Nations.

We ask that a joint appeal be made to the Secretary-General of the United Nations that he put pressure on the government of the USSR to release Valentyn Moroz.

We must stop Russian terrorism in Ukraine!

WYACL RESOLUTION ON SUPPORT OF UKRAINE AND OTHER CAPTIVE NATIONS

Considering that for 50 years Ukraine and other countries of Eastern Europe have been subjected to Communist Russian control but have withstood the attacks on their national consciousness by this latest projection of Russian imperialism and colonialism;

Considering that while withstanding the regime's overt russification policy, Ukraine and other nations of the USSR so subjected have always looked towards recognition of their just rights to political freedom and sovereign independence as free societies;

Considering that WYACL believes in the ideal of freedom for nations — freedom for individuals;

The 3rd Conferences of WYACL meeting in Manila condemned the Moscow regime's exploitation and

repression of all subject peoples and nations, RESOLVING firmly to;

1. Support in every way any moves to obtain freedom and independence of Ukraine, Byelorussia, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Georgia, Armenia and Turkistan and other subjugated nations.

2. Enjoin the governments of the free world to take steps to condemn at international forums the continued subjugation of those captive nations by imperialist Moscow, and the accompanying doctrine of "limited sovereignty" applied to so-called satellite states of the regime in control of the USSR.

3. Rally opinion favourable to the cause of freeing the captive nations, by actions within and without Communist Russia's orbit.

WYACL RESOLUTION ON VALENTYN MOROZ

WHEREAS in Ukraine and other nations under communist oppression today, an ever increasing number of young people, from workers to intellectuals, are exposing the falsehoods, cultural oppression, individual terror and exploitation of nations carried

out by the Russian Communist Party, Mao's clique and the ruling elites subservient to them; and

WHEREAS the actions of such people as Valentyn Moroz, a Ukrainian thinker and historian twice imprisoned by the regime in the

USSR, but still defiant, is deserving of full recognition as a singular example of courage and is apostolical in nature; and

WHEREAS each generation needs an exemplary figure to identify which and hold up as an ideal of man's search for lasting values and a just existence of all nations and peoples — Moroz's words

The Third Conference of WYACL resolves therefore that:

1. Valentyn Moroz and his friends are the delegates' heroes and apostles of thought and action.

2. The delegates will do all in their power to project Valentyn Moroz as a champion of liberty, national culture and the personification of the inner man as against an inanimate cog in a communist society; particularly in their publications, rallies and activities of their organisations.

3. Valentyn Moroz has become our answer to the communist substitution of Che, Mao or Ho as the heroic figures and thinkers of our times.

4. Member units of WYACL shall popularise and hold up Valentyn Moroz as ideal to our members and to the youth of our countries

Book Review:

Igor Shankovsky, KOROTKE LITO. A book of poetry in Ukrainian (Edmonton: Ukrainian Book Store — 1970). 1500 numbered copies, 114 pp. The Library of Congress Catalogue Number 74-690139. \$3.75.

Shankovsky's book of collected poems KOROTKE LITO (A Short Summer) is a valuable addition to the wealth of Ukrainian poetry, more so if one is to consider that it was written by a Ukrainian poet in exile. There are 58 poems in this elegant collection which were written in the period from 1960-1968, except for 4 poems dated between 1952-1959. This book is divided into four sections. There is an introduction to the book entitled "Instead of Preface", written by Dr. Rostyslaw Jendyk, himself a renowned Ukrainian scholar and author of many books and publications, who gave very favourable evaluation of Shankovsky's poetry. Indeed, it was this "Preface" that aroused my interest and forced me to read the whole collection.

Although Ukrainian is not my native language, I am a native Byelorussian, I was, nevertheless, able to enjoy and admire the dynamic lyrical word of Shankovsky's poetry.

The first section of the collection goes by the same title as the volume (A Short Summer) and includes 19 poems. Here Shankovsky presents in a refined and spiritualized form the experiences which give to all of our lives their meaning with experiences such as love, friendship, joy and

loneliness. Poet's gift of selecting his metaphors, his symbols — extend his personal feelings into a perspective, a perspective that helps to produce associations in the reader's mind which echo with his own experiences. This could be, perhaps, best illustrated by the lovely poem and, again, name-sake of the book (A Short Summer) in which the poet, using symbols, captured on his canvas a beautiful but sorrowfully short summer as a passing fancy of the most memorable and profound experience in life.

The second section "Ukrains'ki motyvy" (The Ukrainian Motives) consists of 14 poems. Three poems of this section: "Zustrichannya" (Rendezvous), "Divchyna z barvinkom" (A Girl with a Myrtle) and "Pechers'ka Lavra" (The Pechersky Monastery) are noticeable for poet's skill to introduce rich symbolic associations in a very condensed context and at the same time show historical depth, tragedy of his native land and personal impressions and emotions with turbulence on account of his first meeting with the Capital of Ukraine — Kiev. This first meeting has unlocked fountains of the poet's inspiration, and it is there to feel that his happiness of the reunion with his native land is overshadowed by the Soviet reality. Among other

poems of this section outstanding is the somewhat longer poem "Kazka pro Ridnu Movu" (A Fairytale About Native Tongue). Shankovsky wrote this poem as if inspired by the great tradition of the famous Ukrainian bard Taras Shevchenko, he appeals to Ukrainian people at home and abroad not to trample down "Shevchenko's word" — the Ukrainian language. This poem shows poet's grief and despair over the fact that the most valuable national treasure — Ukrainian language — is in neglect, not only by the uprooted Ukrainian exiles, but in Ukraine as well, under the Soviet regime.

The third section "Amerykans'ki motyvy" (The American Motives) has 10 poems which are less attractive to me by their themes and associations, as in such poems as "Pravdyva istoriya" (A True Story) and "V hostyach" (While Visiting) the poet steps down in his concern to the very earthly and, perhaps, basal human matters. One poem in this section "Bili pivni ponad Mississippi" (White Roosters over Mississippi) drew my attention, and, in my opinion, deserves a special notation for its beautiful composition and splendid imagery skilfully interwoven with historical and present day scenery. Also very actual and interesting is the theme of the poem "Fantastychnyi fantom" (The Fantastic Phantom) in which the poet despairs and cries to civilization which lost all spiritual meaning and significance devoting itself to mechanical standards and material escapes. It is obvious here that here poet sides with humanity and hopes for it, but without great optimism.

The fourth and last section "V poshukakh prystanei" has 14 poems and as its title says is "in a search for new shores." Here poet's main preoccupation is search for poetry itself, search for sense of life.

In the poem "Poza vsesvitom" (Beyond the Universe) it is strongly

revealed that Shankovsky does not have negative attitude toward life, but that he hopefully and persistently searches for moral and spiritual values which seem to be so scarce nowadays.

I do not feel that I have much right, not being a native, to say anything about the language of Shankovsky's poetry. Nevertheless, I must say that he has a remarkable image-making faculty which always has been the mark of a true poet. He is capable both: in philosophic abstraction and in concrete image of ordinary life. There are many good and sound allusions in Shankovsky's poetry, as in the poems "Estafety" (The batons) and "Symonenkovi" (To Symonenko), that reinforce great ideas and say so much at the same time taking very few words and space in the poem. It is true also that Shankovsky makes great use of the "music" of the Ukrainian language by his choice of words and arrangements with sounds and accents and specially by his carefully selected, skilfully arranged rhymes.

I do agree with the statement made by Dr. Rostyslaw Jendyk in the "Preface" that Shankovsky is a lyricist. He is moderately conservative in the form of his poetry, showing at the same time in poems like "Modernistychny" (The Modernistic) and "Smert'" (Death) that he can be quite modern and cosmopolitan.

Finally, it should be pointed out that to the book's credit belongs also superbly tasteful and beautiful cover made by renown Ukrainian artist Petro Andrusiw. It mirrors the most important themes of Shankovsky's poetry and contributes to aesthetic satisfaction derived from the book. On the whole, this IS a beautiful book of genuine poetry and should be welcomed by anyone who values and loves true literature.

Mme. Dr. Olga Orechwa,
Southern Illinois University,
Carbondale.

WHAT INSPIRES THE YOUTH OF UKRAINE?

Below we are publishing expressions and quotations which reflect the viewpoint and the political attitude of the young people of Ukraine who grew up in Bolshevik reality. These expressions and quotations stem from various localities, and reveal the views of the young people who today still suffer enemy outrage, but who tomorrow can take the road of active struggle.

For the youth of Ukraine, the Ukr. SSR is only a cover used by the occupation forces, "a trademark of Ukraine", while the Russians are strangers, occupants who have to be gotten rid of as soon as possible. For them the Bandera followers are a synonym for independent Ukraine.

"We are here in our native land — they say, but it has not made us very happy. The Ukrainian SSR is only a stamp of Ukraine, for all government posts, all better jobs, all nice apartments are reserved for the Russians, for the party members. And you are told at every step that you (that is we) Bandera followers are nationalists (for we do not speak Russian). That's called freedom. We, who are living in our own country, in Ukraine, and are speaking Ukrainian are called nationalists, while they (the Russians) who have come here, are a superior race... Of course, we have always lived in our own house but we have been treated there as a disliked daughter-in-law, who can never please anyone, to whom nobody listens and whom nobody loves. As long as the history of Ukraine exists, a struggle is being waged for her, for her riches... We have not been born cruel. We trusted people (the Russians) and there were not enough people who would have loved Ukraine to such an extent that for her sake, for the sake of her freedom, they would have been ready to make a sacrifice."

"We know that it is not easy for you to imagine what our life is like, but believe us, Ukraine exists, the Ukrainian nation exists, there is

Shevchenko, Franko, and there are beautiful Ukrainian songs, culture, historical monuments. The Ukrainian people are hardworking and sincere, although perhaps unhappy. And do not believe those who say that there is no Ukrainian nation, for it exists and will continue to exist until the end of the world."

"In 1970 there was no Christmas tree in the centre of the city (Lviv) for the occupants said that Bandera followers were singing carols last year and making anti-Soviet proclamations. It is true that many people, in particular students, had gathered and sang carols by the Christmas tree, while the militia were dispersing them. For this reason no Christmas tree was put up this year. We had to work on Christmas, but on Christmas Eve we got together and sat around singing carols and remembered those who have departed from us, who have not lived to see this day, and talked about better days, about the future of Ukraine. Of course we cannot hold such solemn celebrations as you abroad, but the people here are also celebrating, in particular in the villages, and are not discarding their traditions. Remember, that we also believe, although this is not completely possible."

"We are always anxious for our 'Dynamo' (the soccer team of Kiev) not to lose while playing the Russians. They are nice boys and play very well... They should be congratulated for it. Although not very often, but still we are reminded that Ukraine has not died yet. And therefore you (abroad) must believe in our national unity, perhaps not always visible, even when not much hope remains..."

"... And no matter where you go — to Moscow or Leningrad, — when you say that you come from Lviv they will say that you are a Bandera follower. Oh, yes, this is an independent state. Bandera followers are identified with it everywhere."

No comments are necessary to the above. Of course, this is only a small

part of the material which could be used to show the spiritual and political attitude of the young generation in Ukraine, which not only knows the history and culture of the Ukrainian

people, but sees and feels all the differences of social character between the owners of the Ukrainian land and the invaders from Russia.

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by

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