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BASIC MISCONCEPTIONS IN THE U.S. MILITARY THOUGHT ON THE U.S.S.R.

PICTURE ON THE COVER: DR. EUGENE PETRUSHEVYCH, FORMER PRESIDENT OF THE WESTERN UKRAINIAN NATIONAL REPUBLIC (1918-1919). *Born on March 6, 1863 in Busko, Western Ukraine, he was a lawyer, political leader, member of the Vienna Parliament, head of the Ukrainian Parliamentary Representation in the Austrian Parliament, and President of the Ukrainian National* RADA. *In 1918-1919 he was President of the independent Western Ukrainian National Republic. He died on August 29, 1940 in Berlin, where he is buried in the Hermsdorf Cemetery.*

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

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CONTENTS OF VOLUME XIV

(*Book Reviews in Italics*)

RUSSIFICATION OF UKRAINE

Editorial

Five years ago the dismissal of Leonid Melnikov, first secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine, for his ruthless Russification of Ukraine, especially of the Western Ukrainian areas, created the impression that a new era in nationality policy would descend upon Ukraine and the other non-Russian countries of the USSR. This was the beginning of the de-Stalinization period and the rule of the "collective leadership."

But this impression was ephemeral. The events which followed the dismissal of Melnikov failed to justify the great expectations of the eager believers in Russian communist "liberalization." In fact, these expectations did not materialize at all. With the exception of a few critical articles in the Soviet press about the Russification of universities in Ukraine by Melnikov, written by Ukrainian writers—a step for which they soon had to recant and apologize—Russification continues on its ruthless and genocidal course.

Today, five years after the death of Stalin, the situation has hardly changed; in Ukraine, despite the constant trumpeting by Moscow about the "flourishing of Ukrainian culture," we have *a steady and systematic Russification drive, pressed by the central Soviet government in Moscow and implemented by those servile and obedient puppets who pose as the government of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic in Kiev.*

Fear, inspired by persecution by the Russians, has penetrated every phase of the life of Ukraine to such an extent that the Ukrainian language and culture in the "sovereign" Ukrainian republic are playing a woefully-weak secondary role, reduced to a convenient tool for the Moscow-directed Russification drive in Ukraine.

Discrimination Against Ukrainian Language

Behind the Soviet propaganda fanfare on the "flourishing of cultural and national life in Ukraine" are to be detected some tangible and trenchant facts which no amount of propaganda and noise can conceal or eliminate.

As an illustration, we may cite the publications of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences in Kiev, listed in the Soviet *Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga*, Catalogue Nos. 85 and 85A for 1956. The first catalogue lists *109 Russian publications*, while the second one has only *102 Ukrainian publications*. Thus, it appears that more than a half of the publications of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences appears in the Russian language!

But the matter does not end with the Russian language alone. If one takes the pains to analyze all these publications he will be appalled to discover that the books published in the Ukrainian language are of a secondary nature and importance, while those in the Russian language deal with solid sciences, technology, medicine, and so on. In the Russian language we find: 9 works on literature; 7—literary criticism; 34—technology and industry; 45—natural sciences; (including such subjects as mathematics, geodesy, chemistry, biology and geology); 7—economy, and 7—medicine.

The Ukrainian publications of the Academy on the other hand, are confined to the following: literature—5; literary criticism—15; philosophy—4; economics—13; history—7; archeology—5; philology—14; art, folklore and ethnography—20; bibliography—6; and biology—13.

These statistics clearly indicate that the Soviet government, as the former Czarist Russian government, is striving to place the Ukrainian language in an inferior role and make it the language of collective farmers. It is to be recalled that in 1863 Czarist Minister Valuyev decreed that there is no Ukrainian language and that in 1876 a circular of the Czarist government forbade the use of the Ukrainian language in the schools of Ukraine. The present tactic is somewhat more subtle.

And yet in June of 1953 the plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine issued the following:

> The plenum recognized as unsatisfactory the direction of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine and the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR in the Western *oblasts* of Ukraine. The plenum noticed that the Bureau of the Central Committee and the former secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, Comrade Melnikov, in their practical work admitted the twisting of the Leninist-Stalinist nationality policy of our party, which was revealed especially in the perverse practice of appointing to the leading positions of the Western *oblasts* of Ukraine workers from other *oblasts* of the Ukrainian SSR, and also in the factual introduction of the Russian language as the language of learning in the Western Ukrainian schools of higher learning.[1]

[1] D. Solovey: "The Nationality Policy of the Party and the Government of the USSR in Ukraine in the Light of Some Recent Figures," *Ukrainian Review*, No. 6, 1956, Institute for the Study of the USSR, Munich.

At that time it was officially reported that Melnikov Russified 77.7 per cent of all higher schools and 38.7 per cent of all technical schools in Ukraine.

This flagrant expression of Russian chauvinism was widely denounced by the Soviet Ukrainian press at the time, which period coincided with the official "thaw" initiated by Khrushchev.

But this reaction against the Russification policies was only a tactical maneuver, rather than any solid and fundamental decision on the part of the Kremlin.

Today it is quite evident that the scientific publications of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences do not represent an isolated phenomenon, but one which is part of an extensive and well-determined program. All other publications, including scientific, research and industrial reviews and journals, are mostly printed in the Russian language. This policy is also applied at the Ukrainian universities. The universities in Kharkiv and in Odessa, for example, print most of their publications in the Russian language. And even the universities of Lviv and Chernivtsi (Bukovina)—which have no previous history of Russian domination—have increased their Russian-language publications.

The Russification of Ukrainian universities is facilitated all the more as they are under the direct control of the Soviet government in Moscow, and not under the Ukrainian government in Kiev. In great measure this explains why 75 per cent of all higher schools of learning in Ukraine have become Russified.

Russification of Newspapers

In like degree Russification has transformed the Ukrainian press in Ukraine. There is no large city in Ukraine which does not have a Russian-language daily. This is even true of cities which prior to World War II had no Russians at all, for instance, Lviv, Chernivtsi and Uzhorod. Moreover, the Ukrainian newspapers are hard to obtain, even in Western Ukraine, or there are always some "unforeseen difficulties" which prevent the Ukrainian people from receiving regularly the newspapers in their native language. On the other hand, copies of *Pravda* and *Izvestia* are unfailingly available everywhere in Ukraine. This, of course, is deliberate. The policy is to encourage Ukrainians to read the Russian newspapers and magazines, until one day the absence of a Ukrainian paper is not minded.

A New Campaign Against the Ukrainian Language

The perfidious goal of the Soviet government is freshly revealed by an official document of the Central Committee of the Communist

Party of the USSR regarding reform of the Soviet system of education. The "theses" of the reform were elaborated on the basis of Nikita S. Khrushchev's address to the XIth congress of the Comsomol in September, 1958, but appeared in the Soviet press only on November 16, 1958.

Paragraph 19 of the "theses" reads as follows:

> In the Soviet schools teaching in the native language has been realized. This is one of the important achievements of the Leninist nationality policy. At the same time in the schools of the Union or the autonomous republics, *the children are seriously studying the Russian language, which is a powerful means for international relations, the strengthening of the friendship of peoples of the USSR and for their entry into the treasures of the Russian and world cultures* (Italics ours—ED.). But we must not forget that with regard to the studying of languages in the Union and autonomous republics the children are heavily over-burdened. In national (Union or autonomous republics—ED.) schools children must learn three languages—their native language, the Russian and one of the foreign languages. One has to investigate the matter of granting parents the right to decide to which school and with what language to send their children. If a child is attending a school with the language of a Union or autonomous republic, it can, if it wishes to, study also the Russian language. And, conversely, if a child attends a Russian school, it may, *if it so desires, study one of the languages of the Union or autonomous republics* (Italics ours —ED.). It is clear that it is necessary to have a contingent of children for the completion of classes with one or another language of learning.

On the surface, it looks as if the Soviet government is truly liberal in giving parents a choice of schools and languages for their children. In effect, however, the Russian language is described in such superlative terms that it would constitute a crime on the part of those parents who do not send their children to a Russian school. Those non-Russian parents brave enough to take advantage of this instruction and ignore the Russian language would be confronted with charges of "bourgeois Ukrainian nationalism," and their children would find it hard indeed to find employment upon graduation.

If we take into consideration that the Russians form a substantial per cent of the entire population of Ukraine, we see that a significant percentage of the children of Ukraine will not take any instruction in the Ukrainian language, since the Russians in Ukraine undoubtedly will avail themselves of the "right" not to send their children to a Ukrainian school.

This situation is even more catastrophic for the Ukrainian language in Ukraine than it appears, for before the proclamation of the new "theses," the Soviet government had already granted the Russians in Ukraine the "privilege" not to study the Ukrainian language. This was revealed in *Literaturna Hazeta* of Kiev on September 16, 1958, in an article entitled, "To Enrich the Ukrainian Lan-

guage." In it an unguarded reference was made to the fact that a "right was granted to students of the so-called workers' schools not to study the Ukrainian language." This was subsequently confirmed by a decree of the Central Committee, which sanctioned the Russian minority in Ukraine not to study the Ukrainian language—the official language of the Ukrainian SSR—in which these Russians work and live. If one takes into account the fact that such schools constitute from 50 to 80 per cent of all city schools in Ukraine, the new school plan of Khrushchev is the finishing touch of a gigantic Russification program of such extent and importance that it can be squarely compared to those savage Russification programs once pressed in Ukraine by the Czars.

Russian Colonization

Parallel to Russification Moscow is implementing the colonization of Ukraine and other non-Russian countries, including the Baltic States, with Russian settlers. Western Ukraine, Carpatho-Ukraine and Bukovina had hardly any Russians prior to World War II. The Russian newcomers include not only party and administration officials, but also factory workers, and even collective farmers. The overwhelming majority of the Soviet army personnel and security troops in Western Ukraine are ethnic Russians who have brought their families, and thus aid in promoting the process of Russification.

Soviet author D. F. Virnik in his book on the Ukrainian SSR[2] notes that "Russian workers" are working closely with Ukrainian workers in all the oil centers of Western Ukraine (Drohobych and Boryslav).

Uzhorod, capital of Carpatho-Ukraine, had a population of 35,000 people before the last war; now it has more than 125,000. The overwhelming majority of the inhabitants are Russians, being especially army and security personnel. The official bulletin of the Department of External Affairs of Canada, as far back as 1954, read:

> Such cities as Kiev and Kharkiv are rapidly being Russified, and it seems that the Soviet leaders deliberately are reducing the Ukrainian national element to the minimum by limiting it more and more to the rural localities.[3]

In a series of articles on his visit to Lviv, capital of Western Ukraine, Max Frankel, correspondent of *The New York Times*, re-

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[2] D. F. Virnik: *Ukrainskaya SSR. Kratky istoriko-ekonomicheskyi ocherk* (*The Ukrainian SSR. A Short Historic-Economic Outline*). Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR, Moscow, 1954.

[3] Quoted from *The Ukrainian Voice*, September 22, 1954, No. 38, Winnipeg, Man.

ported on September 20, 21 and 22, 1957, a new demographic picture of that ancient Ukrainian city. He wrote:

> About 20,000 to 30,000 Poles remain in Lviv. Forty-two per cent of the population is Ukrainian, *35 per cent Russian*, 10 per cent Armenian and 5 Lithuanian.

Thus today 35 per cent out of a total of Lviv's 400,000 inhabitants are Russians, a controlling and domineering minority. Yet in 1939 a Russian word was not to be heard in this ancient center of Ukrainian culture.

—oOo—

In view of this drastic and brutal Russification and colonization of Ukraine by the Russians, the reports of our habitual apologists of Soviet Russian politics and their acceptance of Khrushchev's "thesis" about coexistence must be viewed as a form of Russian propaganda destined to confuse the American people as to the true nature of the Soviet Union and its imperialistic and aggressive character.

A Cyrus S. Eaton can parrot Khrushchev's line without fully realizing what he is doing; a ingenuous Adlai E. Stevenson may be pardoned for not seeing anything else in the USSR but the "smiling faces of the Russians." But we cannot find it amusing or inconsequential when certain departments of our government engage in a so-called "cultural exchange" program with the Soviet Union. We are giving the Russians a genuine unadulterated picture of our scientific and technical achievements. In exchange, the Russians foist upon us a false picture of what they call "socialist achievements," a picture actually based on the genocide and Russification of the non-Russian nations, which had the misfortune to fall under the tyrannical heel of Moscow.

The lot of Ukraine is by no means unique. Whatever the Russian policy may be in Ukraine, it is also that in Byelorussia, Georgia, Armenia, the Baltic countries, Azerbaijan and the Moslem countries of Turkestan. Everywhere, in all the non-Russian countries, the Soviet rule is characterized by systematic Russification, by colonization of these countries with the Russian ethnic elements and by ruthless deportation, under various guises and ruses, of the autochthonous population to concentration camps or to "voluntary resettlement" in Kazakhstan.

Those leaders of the colonial peoples of Asia and Africa who are seeking genuine emancipation and liberation and who, either through ignorance or myopia, are dallying with the Kremlin, should study well the tragedy of Ukraine, since the same brutal and barbaric Russian rule is menacing them.

BASIC MISCONCEPTIONS IN U. S. MILITARY THOUGHT ON THE U. S. S. R.

By LEV E. DOBRIANSKY

In the past two years there has been an increasing amount of literature written for public consumption in the United States on the vital subjects of Russian Communist military strategy and the armed forces of the Soviet Union. A careful survey of the literature discloses the fact that much of the material adequately equips the reader with satisfactory descriptive accounts of these subjects. In the realm of close, detailed analysis many keen and fresh insights are provided into the weighty structure and operational capabilities of USSR's military forces. Moreover, the nature and characteristics of Russian military strategy are also brought into clearer focus and, as a result, seem to be better understood.

As shown below, this military thought with regard to our chief adversary is the product of both private individuals and institutions and our public agencies. Between these two general groups there is considerable interplay and an exchange of ideas which significantly culminates in similar, if not identical, patterns of thought. These patterns tend to share a common basis of assumptions and unquestioned premises. One is on fairly safe ground when he infers from the content of the accessible literature that the orientation and tone of thinking in the more restricted areas of public agency scarcely differs from what is found in readily available books and articles prepared by private individuals. The illustrative cases used below will well attest to this. As concerns problems of military tactics, there are, of course, vast differences of opinion between the two groups. Our concern here is strictly with conceptual frameworks in terms of which our understanding of the armed forces of the Soviet Union is pitted.

From a fundamental point of view, the conceptual framework in any area of systematic study is relatively more important than any other single item of studied consideration. This should be quite obvious. Whether in the physical sciences, or any of the social sciences, or in the numerous arts, be it medicine, business or public

administration, or military affairs, it is the broad, conceptual framework which infuses logical meaning into the assemblage of acquired facts and unravels the significance of the empirical data. Needless to say, without such a framework our thinking would be sharply atrophied since, in the first instance, we would be seeking facts in the blind. For purposes of public action, almost as bad is the existence of a defective framework which may result from faulty logic or an inadequate coverage and grasp of pertinent, determining facts. In the growing body of military literature dealing with the Soviet Union one is struck by the existence of a defective conceptual framework. The defects are primarily attributable to a marked unfamiliarity with some fundamental facts in the situation.

The three important cases examined below will, I believe, impress the reader with the basic misconceptions upon which their treatments of the military power and resources of our enemy rest. Two of the cases are privately written books, the third is an official report of the Department of the Army. The two books are used extensively in our highest military institutions. They are viewed as authoritative works and exercise considerable influence on the formation of high-level ideas concerning the armed forces of the Soviet Union. But certainly more important than either of these cases is the official Army report. It is an official document, it reflects the views of an essential arm of our government, and it commits, in a sense, powerful resources to the presumed truth of these views in the event of armed conflict with the Soviet Union. For this and other reasons the analysis undertaken here will concentrate on the third case.

Before plunging into this analysis it should be borne in mind that the prevalence and general acceptance of these misconceptions can lead to extremely serious consequences. One needn't tax his imagination to visualize the costs in human life and material equipment that would result from a blind adherence to these misconceptions. Most assuredly, this point is raised not as a threatening note to scare one into considering what the writer holds to be true conceptions, based both upon history and contemporary analysis; rather, it is raised as a simple, rational projection of current errors of thought and preparation into future incalculable costs. And in the light of past history the lesson would only be a repeated one. Both Napoleon and Hitler worked on false conceptual premises with reference to the subjugated nations of Eastern Europe and Central Asia and both, despite their imperialistic designs, met with disaster. With motivations of only self-defense and fitting retaliation it is

quite possible for us, operating on the same premises, to meet an equal fate.

In addition, it should be observed that these particular defects in military thought about the Soviet Union are ultimately but a reflection of fundamental errors in our political understanding of the USSR. Fortunately, in our highest military institutions there is a firm methodologic awareness that significant military thinking cannot be pursued in a vacuum. The heavy ingressions of economic, political and other factors have to be weighed and accounted for before sound military generalizations and conclusions can be formed. However, when it comes to the Soviet Union, the environment of our mortal enemy, this awareness becomes unfortunately beclouded by an uncritical acceptance of conceptual forms which are standardized by a non-military department. The operational interests of this department are clearly at variance with those of the military. Its ruling concepts can consequently mislead the military thinker. Thus, instead of piercing the legal framework and *status quo* condition of Eastern Europe and Russian-dominated Asia, which understandably constitute the context of thought for our diplomats, the military analyst by and large accepts them and permits the real elements of the situation to escape his primary attention.

This observation on our current military thinking can be easily substantiated. The three pieces of evidence considered here should prove to be sufficient. For the perceptive reader they should indicate far more than what they actually contain. Moreover, it is a bit frightening to observe men assuming policy-making positions with little or no knowledge of the ethnographic factors in the region of the dedicated enemy. It is no exaggeration to state that most come to know more about the Bantu tribes in Africa than about the peoples within the Soviet Union. Thanks to the insights of a few military leaders, some breach is being made in this wall of misplaced learning. Nevertheless, it is too little and too incidental. There is scarcely any serious work being done in connection with the demographic bases, the histories, and the potentialities of the majority non-Russian nations in the USSR. As of now, we lay out tactical plans to implement a strategy based on grave misconceptions. As so often in the past, when it is almost too late but certainly at immense cost, not to say sheer waste, it is on the field of battle and in direct conflict that the stubborn facts are at last faced. The present state of U.S. military thought fully exposes us to this exigency.

The Kissinger Outlook

The first case to be considered is the work by Henry A. Kissinger on *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*. The appearance of this book last year quickly precipitated widespread discussion on the variety of topics covered by it. Unifying his provocative exposition, the author propounds an able thesis on limited warfare and simultaneously seeks to establish an accord of thought between the liberation exponents and the relative passivists. Our comments on this work are directed at the couple of chapters devoted to the Soviet Union. They need only be brief since the work itself concentrates on other topics of military and political policy. However, these critical comments are essential in character for much that is advocated by the author as a proper build-up in policy and operation is ultimately predicated upon his understanding of the enemy as disclosed in the two chapters. In other words, the edifice of his thought is essentially founded on his evaluation of the requirements posed by the enemy.

A critical examination of chapters ten and eleven immediately shows the defective nature of Kissinger's outlook toward the peculiar character of the enemy. His outlook is the unrefreshing and borrowed orientation of the Department of State with its characteristic occupational bent toward *status quo* stability and equilibrium as concerns the Soviet Union. For those who stress an imaginative penetration into the real historical forces operating in Eastern Europe and so-called Soviet Asia, much of the ostensibly philosophical material on communist doctrine in these chapters may be regarded as practically useless. Moscow—as St. Petersburg before it— specializes in the use of baseless doctrinal elements to befog the real issues confronting it in its own imperial bailwick and, as this book well attests, usually succeeds in befogging the analyses of Western observers who follow the wagging philosophical tail.

Being successfully detoured, the author comes up with the usual fundamental errors that distort his framework of reference, one which is supposed to guide U.S. military thinking. Russia, for him, is the Soviet Union. Throughout his discourse the two are erroneously identified. One would think that the lessons of Napoleon, Wilhelm, and Hitler never existed. In one place, for example, he states that "The emerging middle class in Russia may, of course, in time ameliorate the rigors of Soviet doctrine" (p. 357). One may well ask "What middle class is emerging; and if there is one, what effect could this have on the traditional imperio-messianic bias of the Russian nation?" This is the real and significant element,

not the contrived misleading item of "Soviet doctrine." In this work many other examples of similar misplacement of thought could be mentioned. It must be remembered, however, that such examples can also be found in plenitude among our official bodies. From these few examples, particularly the basic misidentification of the USSR and Russia, one can logically deduce what the tactical planning boards and maps look like for purposes of so-called strategic bombing and the like. Inadvertently, we would be winning the war for the enemy. This has been done in the past. We are by no means immune to the same tragic mistakes. In fact, our current directions of military thought virtually guarantee a repetition of this mistake.

From the above errors it follows, of course, that there is no perspectival conception in Kissinger of the multi-nationality of the armed forces in the Soviet Union. The absence of such a conception in turn closes the door of further thought along imaginative lines of methodical preparation for the early and spontaneous disintegration of these forces in the event of war, whether global or limited. It thus deprives us of one of the most formidable and certainly the most economical weapon against the enemy. Instead of our advanced thoughts and ideas cultivating the skilled arts of military warfare, our technology determines the development of a megatonic mentality with no tolerance shown to the distinctions and niceties of political reality. Kissinger makes the forceful point that Russian training emphasizes the political and the conceptual, which unfortunately is a lagging feature of our own. However, due to his evident unfamiliarity with East European history, he fails to appreciate the fact that totalitarian Russian doctrine has always given scrupulous precedence to political and psychological pressure over direct military action. What we witness today in many areas of the free world was started by Moscow five hundred years ago. The cold war is an old Russian institution, not a product of Marxism or even Russian Leninism.

The Garthoff Treatise

This year another work was published and has since drawn a good deal of attention in this area of thought. The book is titled *Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age* and authored by Raymond L. Garthoff. In contrast to the Kissinger work, this treatise concerns itself almost exclusively with the military strategy and armed forces of the Soviet Union. Its tone is predominantly expository and descriptive. As far as they go, the analytic content and com-

parisons with U.S. military strategy are well developed and reasoned out convincingly. On the basis of USSR sources, the author persuasively demonstrates that even in this thermonuclear era the military high command of the USSR continues to adhere to the classical military strategic concept that victory lies in the decisive and complete defeat of the enemy's armed forces. Flexibility and balance punctuate USSR military thinking. Capabilities are being diversified for nuclear and non-nuclear global and limited wars. The major emphasis is nevertheless upon capacities for conventional war. For, quite rightly, USSR military thinking does not envision a quick and decisive victory with any surprise attack or reciprocal nuclear exchange. It furthermore, and also rightly, does not entertain the prospect of mutual devastation and defeat.

Here, as in the previous case, certain basic misconceptions emerge to distort the analysis in Garthoff's treatise. The distortion becomes even graver in view of his apparent acceptance of Moscow's belief that a nuclear exchange would involve a canceling out of initially expressed power. This phase would be a crucial one but not decisive. Yet, despite the swing of military balance to ground forces in which the USSR enjoys a distinct superiority at this time, this first phase would be marked by havoc, and with this condition one begins to wonder whether the armed forces of the USSR would remain in the compact and loyal condition that Garthoff uncritically assumes throughout his treatise. Again, past experience shows that this would not be the case. For Garthoff, too, the USSR is in effect Russia, the forces are "Soviet forces," and, quite fallaciously, we are supposed to regard them as unified and integrated nationally as we had in the past the enemy forces of Germany, Japan, and Italy.

For all the useful information it provides, this work is cast in a defective conceptual framework which, as indicated above, precludes vital planning consideration for an early disintegration of USSR forces. The author's constant use of the reference term "Soviets" blurs and conceals the multi-national character of these forces. It brushes aside the fact that twice in this century such disintegration took place along national lines and with scarcely any external inspiration and aid. Here, too, with evidenly no grasp of centuries of Russian cold war activities against Moscow's neighbors, the author fails to perceive the historical and traditional basis of Moscow's strategic concept. He predicts that in 1970 this concept will remain unchanged and states that the "new political strategic concept of deterrence plus pressure is accompanied by military preparation for any kinds of wars." The plain fact is that this con-

cept is not new in Russian history. As far back as Ivan the Terrible, precedent emphasis has always been placed on the political, the psychological, the subversive, and when the object of prey has been sufficiently paralyzed, the military would move in. Underlying this allegedly new concept has been Moscow's own frequently verified estimate of the intrinsic unreliability of its armed forces. This estimate is founded on historical experience and is fully justified by the empire nature of the Soviet Union. It is truly amazing that this fundamental factor is not even considered by our current thought. But false conceptions are like dikes which can only be pierced by time and stress.

The informative content of the Garthoff treatise is useful and interesting. The field is covered, and the primary importance of the 175 USSR army divisions is brought out clearly. The over 500 submarines at Moscow's disposal are properly interpreted in terms of long-range significance. One learns these facts and others within the conceptual framework set by the author. It is the same superficial legalistic one witnessed in Kissinger's treatment. Thus, for example, imprisoned by this context of thought, the writer is not free to consider the particular dispersion of the non-Russian components of these forces from their respective homelands as now embraced in the USSR entity. The provision in the USSR constitution for the establishment of separate war ministries in the non-Russian republics escapes his notice. The possibilities this provision poses naturally eludes his grasp, too. The further possibilities represented by such names as Skripko, Rudenko, Tatarchenko and others mentioned in the work are equally elusive. These and other consequences logically flow from the course set by the groundwork of conceptions.

The Department of the Army Assessment

If these basic errors were confined to the field of private inquiry and study, the situation would not appear so ominous. But, as indicated above, this is not the case. On May 15 the Department of the Army publicly released a study of *The Soviet Army*. This assessment of the military forces in the USSR, consisting of fourteen pages in all, obviously purports to treat of basic essentials. Its proximate aim cannot but necessarily be the formation of a general conception and understanding of the levels of power, quantity, quality, and capable use of these forces. Whether this assessment has adequately realized this aim is the sole question under consideration here. What the ultimate objective might have been

for the public release of the assessment actually bears no analytic pertinence to the critique.

With regard to technical military and technologic essentials the treatment in the assessment appears to be comprehensive and persuasive. It follows traditional Western lines of military analysis and evaluation which, as shown below, can be most misleading in relation to the Soviet Union. The usual emphasis is placed on quantitative magnitudes and technologic types. On these grounds, properly considering the vast expense and several difficult terrains of the Soviet Union, not to include the postwar extensions of this empire, much valid criticism may be offered against the study's marked underestimation of the transportational difficulties confronting Moscow, particularly in railroads. The logistics section in the report is deficient on this score.

From a military point of view, it is by no means an exaggeration to maintain that the transportational inadequacies of the USSR render this entity vulnerable to the point of quick paralysis. Moreover, regarding truck and general automotive transport, scarce critical consideration is given to the relative deficiencies in roads and highway networks and to their usability in likely hostile areas within the Soviet Union under conditions of war. In short, a broader picture of actual conditions in the USSR helps to reveal the exaggerated character of statements such as the one which appears on page twelve in the report: "The days of supply columns consisting of lend-lease trucks or Russian horse-drawn wagons, of reliance on foraging for rations and of primitive means of communication have passed." Needless to say, the sheer appearance of modern transport in Moscow parades hardly justifies generalizations of this kind.

General inferences drawn from simple technologic facts, which are considered in void of other determining factors, are hazardous enough, but to base a whole assessment on such an erroneous methodology, especially with reference to the Soviet Union, is clearly unwarranted. A critical reading of the report shows this to be the case. It shows the presence of an almost exclusive technologic and quantitative determination of the value of the armed forces in the Soviet Union, supported at the margin by several fallacious assumptions in history and contemporary politics. Thus, in the framework of basic essentials, the assessment is hardly a complete one. In fact, and quite regrettably, being developed in a vacuum of thought relating to the nature and history of the Soviet Union, it is unrealistic to a large degree and even dangerously misleading.

At first glance, this judgment may seem harsh and extreme. However, there is no motivation behind it except the intellectual desire to bring our concepts and thinking into conformity with facts and realities. Again, one need hardly stress the fact that in this case the price of failing to do so may well be paid in needless loss of human lives. This report plainly employs concepts and assumptions which not only fail to conform with fact and reality but also lead to false conclusions. If these misguiding concepts and assumptions are indicative of the dominant thinking in the Department of the Army about the enemy, then one cannot but wonder as to what extent we have come to learn the nature of the enemy, the composition and *quality* of his forces, the real subordinate role of these forces in his expansionist foreign policy, and the pointed lessons of both World Wars on the East European front, not to mention those of Russian military-political policy in the imperialist tradition of Moscow.

Since words and concepts are the mirrors of one's understanding, let us examine the dominant ones of this report. First, the title of the report is *The Soviet Army* and at the very outset, on page one, referring to it, it is stated that "In this capacity, it is prepared to inforce the national policies of the Soviet Union and the international ambitions of world communism." Lest one quickly counter that "this is just a matter of semantics," it is well to bear in mind that the art of semantics itself deals with the meaning of words. The monolithic terms used here would lead us to believe that the armed forces in the USSR are like the nationally united forces of Japan and Germany against whom we fought. Nothing could be further from the truth. The outstanding fact is that there is no nationally integrated Soviet Army. Approximately 43 per cent, very likely even more, of the armed forces in the USSR is made up of non-Russians derived from various nations now held captive in the Soviet Union.

It is not intended here to elaborate upon this crucial fact in terms of demography, history, and politics. Data in these fields are available for the asking. Instead, one begins to wonder again whether the writers of this assessment ever probed into the causes accounting for the disintegration of the forces of the Russian Empire in 1916 and also in 1941 under the legalistic guise of the Soviet Union. Among many significant questions which can be raised, one may ask, "Why in the face of constitutional provisions for war ministries in the various republics of the Soviet Union does Moscow rigidly follow the policy of dispersing non-Russian military personnel into areas away from their respective native

lands and of preventing at all costs the formation of compact and nationally united Georgian, Lithuanian, Ukrainian and other non-Russian divisions?" Complete and satisfying answers to this and cognate questions can only be found in the historically uninterrupted struggle of the non-Russian nations against imperialist Russian domination. Although the West has not fully understood this, this fundamental and grave weakness in the unnatural body politic of the USSR afflicts its multi-national armed forces, too.

In the light of these few fundamental considerations, accuracy in thought and concept would cause us to entitle a work of this sort *The Multinational Armed Forces of USSR.* This would semantically, and thus meaningfully, negate Moscow's purposeful usage of *Soviet* which we inadvertently and at disadvantage to ourselves have adopted. Little is it realized that in the same way the Czars, from Peter down, employed the term *Russian* to cover every colonial acquisition of Russia, the Russian Bolsheviks, at the very beginning of Russian Communist aggression in 1918, skilfully introduced the generalized use of *Soviet* to conceal from the outside world their early imperialist acquisitions of a number of newly independent non-Russian states. Specially for Free World consumption and thought habituations, the Russian masters have consistently urged and stressed such terms as "the Soviet people," "the Soviet man," "the Soviet army" etc., with the obvious and apparently successful aim of creating the impression of real union, a oneness of forces, and a monolith of strength in the USSR. Their crowning achievement is the steady deflection of interest in the living diversities and rock-bottom cleavages within this empire.

However, what one would clearly be unable to find in any Russian Communist literature is such a thoroughly incongruous and inept usage as "the *national* policies of the Soviet Union," which appears on page one in the report. By force of political circumstance Moscow cannot help but recognize the multinational character of its shaky empire. One would think that by force of self-interest and thus sympathetic study we would recognize the same. Moreover, whether world communism has international ambitions or, in realistic terms, these ambitions of world domination are nurtured by Russian Communist totalitarians with a national tradition of over 500 years, is rapidly vanishing as an issue in many areas of advanced thinking on these subjects. Here, too, one would think that the prime slogan in the recent Hungarian revolution, "Russki Go Home," would have suggestively led many to realize that ideologic communism is another tool in the arsenal of traditional Russian expansionism and "cold war" activity. It is perhaps sufficient

here to suggest the reading of the Marquis Astolphe de Custine's classic, *Journey For Our Time* (New York, 1951) for one to appreciate that the basic institutions of Russia itself have scarcely changed in the past hundred years.

A further point of essential criticism may be directed at a statement appearing on page fourteen in the report: "This *formidable* war machine is in a constant state of military readiness to fulfill *any* tasks which Soviet policy may require of them... They are subjected to *effective* political control." It is readily recognized that it is sounder to overestimate the enemy and prepare to meet his challenge in these terms than to underestimate him and find oneself ill-prepared. Despite this, however, in the complex of politico-military interrelationships an overestimation exaggerated by adjectives, as underscored above, can create many false impressions with unfavorable political effect. This approach, which admittedly has practical use for domestic objectives, provides unwarranted leverage to the enemy in his cold war demands and diplomatic offensives.

Again, for students of imperial Russian history all this is not new. In the 19th century and up to World War I, for example, the cold war activities of St. Petersburg succeeded in having the West believe that the armed forces of the Russian Empire constituted a formidable "steamroller," a term which evolved into general use. So long as there was no major conflict, the illusion built up had enormous political effect. When the wholesale debacles of the Russo-Japanese War and World War I occurred, this illusion came into full view for those who asked "Why was this so?" This report plainly supports the resurrection of the "steamroller" illusion.

The conclusions to be drawn from these criticisms obviously run counter in some degree to those stated on page forteen in the report. First, the USSR war machine is not as *formidable* as Moscow would have us believe. The Hungarian revolution itself provides us with the most recent evidence of significant Ukrainian desertions from the so-called Soviet Army, hundreds joining the patriots in Budapest in pursuit of a common cause. Second, by their very nature these forces are hardly able "to fulfill *any* tasks" posed by Moscow. Fully conscious of its own history and past policies, Moscow, more than anyone else, knows how fundamentally unreliable its polyglot forces are; and in the tradition of Russian imperial policy, it exerts maximum effort in avoiding any major commitment of its own forces. Third, these facts and more cause one to disaccept the groundless assumption that these forces "are subjugated to *effective* political control" or that "Political activity in the Armed Forces is intensive and *influential*."

On the basis of these critical conclusions, "the threat to the free world which the Soviet Army today presents is," contrary to the assessment, not so "obvious." It is concluded in the assessment that "The Soviet Army is capable of... supplying manpower as 'volunteers' and providing material support for operations in areas roughly contiguous to the Soviet Union and vulnerable to Communist exploitation. The Soviet Government can do any of these confident in the knowledge that initially it is the only major power in the world today which has the great preponderance of ground forces in being..." This conclusion is, of course, logically based on the contents of the report and their implied steamroller illusion, but it is unfortunately not based on evaluated fact. Indeed, the major elements of this conclusion serve to support some propaganda themes employed by Moscow.

Repeating one of the first criticisms in this analysis, the concept of capability embraces not only quantitative content but also, and in this case more important, the qualitative as well. To repeat further, concerning the USSR, the qualitative element refers not only to the skills of military training but also—and again more important—to the national and political diversities of the armed forces. In this realistic light Moscow is not as capable as it may seem to provide "volunteers," which, despite its propaganda boasts, it has not done when opportunities presented themselves. Moreover, as in the Hungarian case, its provision of material support was not without gaping holes which furnished the West with decisive opportunities for which it proved to be ill-prepared.

In conclusion, the assessment given by the Department of the Army is to a regrettable degree out of context in relation to East European and Central Asian realities. In this fundamental connection it is misleading and could be put to effective use by Moscow propagandists. Its broad qualitative significance is virtually nil. It offers further evidence of the critical lag in American thought concerning not only the Soviet Union but also the interwined relationships between the military and political factors in the modern scene. In the USSR, as in the previous Czarist Russian Empire, such relationships are basic to any assessment.

As Hobbes once pointed out, "Force and fraud are in war the two cardinal virtues." Whether in a cold war or hot one, the Russians surpass all in the second virtue. In this they are sustained by the perpetuated and lingering misconceptions that Westerners have of their empire. Our current military thinkers are abetting their skillful play on fraud.

THE ORIGINS OF NATIONAL COMMUNISM

By ROMAN SMAL-STOCKI

I

The established thesis that Tito originated "National Communism" as a heresy in orthodox Marxism-Leninism exists among most American scholars and political publicists. It is believed that this "national" aspect is his brand of Communism, which provoked his split with Stalin in 1948. This split spawned a rather extensive American literature of books and articles on the topic of "National Communism," often with a kind of hero-worship for Tito qualifying him for American aid and with the pious wish that he would pass through an evolution and join the camp of democratic European Socialism. In such fashion this year did *The New Leader*, the leading American journal fostering that political ideology, mark the tenth anniversary of Tito's "National Communism" in a special article.[1]

The writer challenged the thesis that Tito started the first conflict between a non-Russian Communist party and the Russian and the Russian Communist dictatorship inside Marxism-Leninism and that he inaugurated the so-called National Communism in the writer's book, *The Nationality Problem of the Soviet Union and Russian Communist Imperialism* (Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Co., 1951). The following is a summary of his criticism of this thesis, which is based either on disregard of historical facts or on ignorance about the causes of the Revolution in the Russian Empire.

To understand "National Communism" it must be kept in mind that one of the most important causes of this Revolution was the nationalism of the non-Russian nations, annexed into the Empire through the course of centuries by Russian imperialism. Prior to 1914 these non-Russian nations had a population majority of 57.3 per cent. Before coming to power Lenin first appealed to these non-Russian nations with his formula for the solution of their nationality problems in the old Russian Empire: "self-determination including

[1] Cf. A. V. Sherman, "Ten Years of National Communism," *The New Leader*, June 16, 1958.

separation." Shortly after the establishment of the Russian Communist dictatorship in Petrograd on November 7, 1917, sixteen non-Russian nations proclaimed themselves independent national republics. The most important of them (from an economic and geo-political point of view), Ukraine, was the first state which concluded the peace treaty in Brest-Litovsk with the Central Powers on February 9, 1918. But after coming to power Lenin shelved his old self-determination slogan, used only for tactical purposes, and, after the collapse of Germany, he inaugurated the drive toward the realization of the Marxist-Leninist world revolutionary program. Opposing the League of Nations by the organization of the Comintern (1919), he also started to attack Soviet Russia's democratic neighbor republics with their democratic Socialist or left wing governments, which had previously caused the disintegration of the old Russian Empire, and then applied for membership in the League of Nations at Geneva. This war of Russian Communism (officially still professing "self-determination including separation") against the national independent republics must be taken as a starting point for any objective investigation regarding the origin of "National Communism."

Against the Tito-thesis the following counter theses are opposed:

(1) The Russian Communist meaning of the term *"National* Communism," often presently used by Russian Communism for brainwashing purposes (a fact which the free world still does not grasp), implies the logical conclusion that a pure *international* Communism as an antithesis also exists and is represented, of course, by Moscow's Marxism-Leninism and, less recently, by Stalinism. The present Communist meaning of this term has only one aim: "to confuse the enemies." The original meaning of the term, coined by non-Russian Communists, had a different meaning, which shall be subsequently elaborated upon.

(2) Russian Communism-Leninism, in fact, was not an international movement, respecting the rights and equality of other nations. It was virtually *Russian National* Communism and was identified by the great Russian philosopher, Nicholas Berdyaev, as "the third appearance of *Russian autocratic imperialism,* its first being the Muscovite Czardom and its second, the Petrine Empire."[2] Thus (using the term "National Communism" in the meaning of the free world, implying that in such a kind of Communism are manifested some true *national* aspects of the nation in question)

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[2] Cf. *The Origin of Russian Communism* (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1949), p. 118.

we must state that Russian Communism is the *first* appearance of so-called National Communism and that it was merged with the highest potency of Russian nationalism, with aggressive Russian imperialism. The non-Communist part of the Russians, especially on non-Russian territories, gave it their fullest support as Russian patriots.

Consequently, to understand the historical consequences of Russian Communism's coming into power, one must qualify it as Russian *National Communism-imperialism in aggression*, decorated with socialist-internationalist slogans. It is, regarding *origin*, the primary National Communism; regarding its *character*, it is *aggressive* National Communism, which, according to Berdyaev, is a *continuation* of the old Russian imperialism and colonialism.

(3) That which is presently called "National Communism" in the meaning of the free world represented and represents only the *reactions*, the *opposition* and *resistance of the non-Russian* Communists, and partly non-Communists, *against that Russian National Communism-Imperialism* acting in the disguise of the infallible self-appointed leader of the Communist world revolution. It is, regarding *origin*, the *secondary* National Communism; regarding its *character*, it is the defensive National Communism which is, in fact, a *continuation* of the old national movements as social and political liberating forces pitted against the old Russian imperialism and colonialism.

This opposition and resistance of the non-Russian Communists included the *basic demand for equality* with the Russians, involving: (a) the right to form their own Communist parties, (b) the right to rule as dictators over their own states and nations, (c) in all relations with the Russians (which the non-Russian Communists regard as their *foreign* affairs), the elimination of the Russian dictatorship, respect for their equality with the Russians by the preserving of democratic procedure in these relations and their equal participation in all decisions inside the Communist movement as a whole.

From the *Communist* non-Russian point of view, "National Communism" is a struggle for the *democratic* majority principle in *Communist* interrelations, based on "National Communist parties" against the *Russian Communist imperialism* in the present form of the Russian dictatorship inside the Communist movement, which the non-Russians regard as Russian political, economic and cultural imperialism.

From the *democratic* non-Russian point of view the non-Russian Communist state organizations are only "customers," puppets of Russian National Communist imperialism. This Russian imperial-

ism, by terror and force, put these state organizations into power over the non-Russian nations, and without the backing of the military forces of contemporary Russian imperialism they could not survive a week because of the enmity of the masses. Moscow is very well aware of this complete dependency of the non-Russian Communist puppet regimes upon the forces of Russian imperialism and as tribute for this support over the decades Moscow demands the deepening of the cultural, economic and linguistic Russification of the non-Russian Soviet Republics. But the non-Russian Communist regimes are also well aware that Russian Communism is, in fact, aiming at the old ideal of the Russian "Black Hundreds," their complete Russification, and therefore they use the latent national forces to defend their own existence by underscoring *the nationality problems* in Communist ideology which it pretends to have solved.

Thus the non-Russian Communists are in a fatal dilemma. The very existence of their regimes is impossible without the backing of Russian Communist imperialism on the one hand, while on the other, their existence with the backing of these Russian terror forces in the long run means their own annihilation and that of their nations by gradual Russification. Thus, the appearance of "National Communisms" in these non-Russian nations is and always has been merely a proof of the continuous national resistance of the non-Russian nations against Russian imperialism and of the continuation of their struggle for freedom.

(4) Thus so-called National Communism, as a defensive reaction and resistance of the non-Russian nations, *originated immediately* after the aggressive Russian National Communism-imperialism came to power in Petrograd and attempted to again subjugate the previous victims of Russian Czarism for the reestablishment of the Russian Empire. This National Communism of the non-Russian nations is, in fact, proof of the existence of a new edition of the old nationality problem of the Czarist Russian Empire in the present sphere of dominion and influence of Russian National Communist imperialism. It is also a proof for the existence of the new edition of the old disintegration of pre-World-War-I Socialism[3] in the Russian Empire along national lines—at least below the surface also in contemporary Communism in the Soviet Union.

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[3] The history of Socialism in the Russian Empire and its role during the revolution as presented by Anatol Shub in his pamphlet, "Labor in the Soviet Orbit," *The New Leader* (Dec. 24-31, 1956) is contrary to historical facts with a complete disregard of the history of Socialism among the non-Russian nations.

II

For the facts backing the counter theses: When was the term "National Communism" first used and who coined it? Research traced this term to a book by two Communists in Ukraine which appeared in 1918 under the title, *To This Moment. What is going on in Ukraine and with Ukraine*, by Vasyl Shakhray, a leading Ukrainian Communist, in collaboration with Serhiy Mazlakh, another prominent Ukrainian Communist of Jewish extraction.

There did not exist in Ukraine a single homogenous Communist party. At this time there were three. The first was the Communist Party of Bolsheviks of Ukraine (CPbU). The co-founders of this party were Shakhray and Mazlakh, who in their book accused Lenin of violating the proclaimed principles of Bolshevik policy regarding the non-Russian nations and demanded the recognition of (a) a Ukrainian independent state, (b) an independent separate Ukrainian Communist Party, and (c) the equality of both with the Russian Communist Party and Soviet Russia. Both authors formerly were members of the Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik), which they left in order to organize this separate Communist Party of Bolsheviks of Ukraine.

The second Communist Party evolved from the left wing of the Ukrainian Party of Socialist Revolutionaries (UPSR), the *Borotbists* (so called after their paper, *Borotba—The Struggle*) who merged with the left wing groups of the Ukrainian Social Democratic Workers' Party (USDRP) to form a separate Ukrainian Communist Party of *Borotbists* (UKPb). Finally, the third was the Ukrainian Communist Party. All three of these Communist parties originally maintained the principle of complete Ukrainian national independence but did not exclude cooperation with Soviet Russia on equal terms. By infiltration, "engineering," merger, Russian Communism later managed to transform into the Communist monoparty in Ukraine the Communist Party of Bolsheviks of Ukraine (CPbU), as the official tool of Moscow; the Ukrainian Communist Party-*Borotbists* was merged with it in 1920, while the Ukrainian Communist Party (UKP) was dissolved by the Comintern in 1925.

The ideology of the *Borotbists*, as expressed in a quotation from an article by H. Ovcharov: "On the Occasion of Light Shed on the Problem of *Borotbism*," follows:

> ... Borotbism, a petty-bourgeois trend in community and political life, appeared in Ukraine in the period between early 1918 and March 1920. During the nearly two years of its existence, Borotbism developed its ideological and political platform which crystallized itself into a fine-woven, specifically borotbist

platform of Ukrainian nationalism, similar in many respects to modern "national-communism." The so-called party of Borotbists was the spokesman and leader of this ideological platform . . .

The main direction and content of the Borotbists activities was struggle against the Communist Party and the wresting from it of political hegemony in Ukraine, seizure of power and change according to principles of Borotbist-nationalist "independence . . ."

In their development of these "national-communist" tenets, the Borotbists maintained that the socialist revolution in Ukraine should develop along "its own" particular road, as a "national" revolution, completely "separate" and different from the revolution in Russia, as a "Ukrainian socialist revolution."

Desirous of driving a wedge into the war alliance between the Ukrainian and Russian Soviet Republics, the Borotbists spread the slogan, "establishment of Ukraine as a separate Soviet republic and independent member of the incipient federation of Soviet republics." At the same time, the sincere and brotherly aid extended by the workers of Russia to Soviet Ukraine in the fight against the common enemy, the Borotbists insidiously qualified as "protection" and outside "interference" in Ukrainian domestic affairs.

The Borotbists, being rabid petty-bourgeois nationalists, used all means to slander the victorious socialist revolution in Ukraine, describing it as the "drawing of Ukraine into the orbit of the communist revolution by means of occupation." In this connection, provocative charges were made against the Russian strata of the proletariat of Ukraine, alleging that they were the backbone of colonizing designs upon Ukraine and that the CPbU was an alien institution . . .

The Borotbists conducted a wide-scale and systematic agitation aimed at wrecking the alliance and friendship between the Ukrainian and Russian peoples. They were opposed to close military and economic unity, the centralization of forces in Soviet construction, and the struggle against counter-revolution and interventionists, i. e. they attempted to undermine all that constituted a guarantee of permanency and strength to the government of workers . . .

In their fight against Bolshevism the Borotbists even attempted to enter upon the world stage and make contact with opportunistic trends in the international communist movement. In this they used the same maneuvers of deceit that are now used by "national-communism," maneuvers calculated to undermine the prestige and influence of the Soviet state and to minimize the importance of Bolshevism's historical experience. In an article with the pretentious title, "Italian Borotbism," published in the borotbist newspaper *Krasnoye Znamya* (*Red Banner*) on February 17, 1920, we find the following: "The experience of socialist construction of the Russian Republic appears to be inadequate and requires an honest reappraisal."

Attempting to seize political hegemony in Ukraine, the Borotbists demanded admission to the Communist International. They demanded that the Executive Committee of the Comintern recognize them as a communist party, a party expressing and representing the interests of Ukrainian workers. These impudent claims were made by them in August, 1919, and again early in 1920 . . .

As a political force, Borotbism finally disappeared from the historical scene. Nevertheless, its nationalist ideology proved to be quite lively . . .

In November, 1920, one of the former Borotbist leaders, V. Blakytny, published a discussion article in the press "The Communist Party of Ukraine and Ways to Strengthen It (a conspective outline)." Subsequently, he raised

the basic theses of this article as an opposition paper at the 5th All-Ukrainian Conference of the CPbU. Both were directed against friendship between the Russian and Ukrainian peoples, saturated with a desire to discredit Russian party ranks and Russian workers who at one time had taken direct part in the struggle for the establishment of Soviet rule in Ukraine, and were now helping in the rebuilding of the economy...

The former Borotbists made another attack of vengeance which is known as "Shumskyism-Khvylovyism." This nationalist sortie was also directed at wrecking the friendship and unity of the Russian and Ukrainian peoples, of opposing Russian and Ukrainian culture and at cleavage. The Communists of Ukraine uncovered the nationalist essence of Shumskyism-Khvylovyism and dispersed it ideologically and politically...

Our historical literature has recently been enriched by works of authors who stand on Communist Party and Leninist positions and illustrate Borotbism as a totally petty-bourgeois, counter-revolutionary and nationalist trend...

Nevertheless some historians and literary experts, in raising the problem of Borotbism, unfortunately committed some serious omissions which are part of the plan of idealizing this opponent of the Communist Party. These omissions are peculiar to some works of M. Suprunenko and S. Kryzhanivsky and of other works written in recent times. They found reflection even on the pages of such important publications as volume II of the *History of the Ukrainian SSR* and volume II of the *History of Ukrainian Literature*...

In *History of the Ukrainian SSR*, for example, the Party of Borotbists is mentioned as though of itself it had never been the carrier of nationalism, and its active motive power is ignored. We read merely that at one period, at the beginning of its existence (in 1918), "it remained" under the influence of Ukrainian nationalism (p. 120)...

L. Novychenko went even farther in his narrowing and softening of accusations of Borotbists in nationalism. In his work, *Poetry and Revolution*, published in 1956, he makes this accusation not against the entire party of Borotbists, but merely against part (admittedly a majority) of its members, and even in this part he sees only "remnants of S-R-nationalist views" (p. 69).

The question of the nationalist essence of Borotbism was not satisfactorily explained in the comment about Borotbists published in the collection "Soviet Construction in Ukraine during the Civil War Years (1919-1920)" (chief editor: M. Rubach)...

S. Kryzhanivsky even paints the party of Borotbists as an internationalist party...[4]

The crisis between the Ukrainian Communists and Russian Communism soon deepened. On the one hand, it extended into the Socialist and Communist camp in Western Europe outside the sphere of Russian Communism's dominion. On the other hand, Ukrainian Communist opposition spread inside the Russian Communist sphere among the Communists and their sympathizers of the other non-Russian nations of the old Czarist Empire.

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[4] *Komunist Ukrainy*, No. 2 (February, 1958), pp. 36-42, cf. *Digest of the Soviet Ukrainian Press*, published by "Prolog" Research and Publishing Association, Inc., New York, Vol. II, No. 7, (May, 1958).

(1) In the winter of 1919-1920, the Ukrainian Communists persuaded one of the former leaders of the Ukrainian National government, Volodymyr Vinnichenko (1880-1952), an old Socialist and a distinguished writer, to "return home." He was even appointed vice chairman of the Communist government of Ukraine. But after six months he re-emigrated. In fact, as he personally told the writer, he was given the mission of returning into exile from the Ukrainian Communists to bring the truth about the situation in Ukraine to the emigration and to the European Socialist parties. On October 23, 1920, he published a public protest in the Socialist journal, *Nova Doba* (*New Age*) which illustrates what happened to all non-Russian nations under Russian Communist control.

> The policy of Russia towards the non-Russian nations of the former Czarist Empire, especially in regard to Ukraine, is the policy of the old "one and indivisible (Czarist) Russia." Never has a government more cynically fooled public opinion by lies than the government of Soviet Russia. In words are proclaimed "self-determination rights for nations," and a solemn proclamation is made outside the frontiers of Ukraine on the "Independent Ukrainian *Rada* Republic," etc.; but in deeds another policy is pursued, namely, the re-enslavement of all non-Russian countries, the rebuilding of the "one indivisible" by a brutal Muscovite centralization, exploitation and plundering of all borderlands by the center. And that is done under the slogan of Communism.

(2) The events in Ukraine had far-reaching repercussions amongst the Communists and Communist sympathizers of the other non-Russian nations who also had to face Russian Communism, "the third appearance of Russian autocratic imperialism."

Thus before the establishment of the USSR in the years 1922-1924, there was a widespread national opposition amongst the Communists of the non-Russian nations directed against the dictatorship of the Russian Communists and against any centralization in Moscow.

A prominent Tatar Communist, Sultan-Galiev, a high official of the Russian Commissariat of Nationality Affairs, as early as 1919 lost faith that Russian Communism could improve the lot of old Russia's non-Russian colonial nations because the dictatorship of the Russian industrial proletariat was interested in continuing the exploitation of the colonial peoples, and not in liberating them. Sultan-Galiev advanced the conception that the former colonial nations, not only of Russia but of the whole world, could achieve their liberty towards a social transformation of humanity only by establishing their own dictatorship over the metropolises, since their real war is not against the bourgeoisie, but against the imperialism of industrialized societies. Thus he propagated the idea that only by the establishment of a dictatorship of the previous non-Russian

colonies of the old Russian Empire over the once ruling Russian nation could they gain real freedom. Hence he also propagated the organization of a "Colonial International," comprising a common front of all victims of colonialism, as a counterbalance to the "Third International," dominated by the representatives of the Western industrial working class. Sultan-Galiev, who had extensive personal relations with all Moslems and Turko-Tatars, opposed Moscow's *divide et impera* policy regarding them and propagated the formation of a united Soviet Moslem or Turkic Republic with a Moslem Communist Party (which was liquidated in 1918 by the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party). Soon Sultan-Galiev was in contact with the Tatar Communist, Vakhitov, and the Basmachis in Turkestan who were in open revolt against Moscow. He was arrested by Stalin in 1923 (and subsequently liquidated); his case was discussed at a special conference in Moscow to which were invited representatives of the non-Russian Communists. At this conference the Ukrainian Communist, Skrypnyk, blamed Great Russian chauvinism in the Russian Communist Party and its unwillingness to honestly carry out its national program for Sultan-Galiev's opposition.

Another center of opposition against Russian Communism developed in the Caucasus among Georgian Communists, who previously had disregarded the nationality problem. After experiencing the Russian methods however, they developed a vociferous force under the leadership of Filip Makharadze and Budu Mdivani. The climax came in October, 1922, with the resignation of the entire central committee of the Georgian Communist Party.

Similar tensions also grew among Communists of the other non-Russian nations, and the *Communist movement* and the *Russian Communist Party became simply identified with the new phase of Russian imperialism and colonialism among the non-Russian nations.* Therefore the Tenth Congress (1921), to quiet the opposition, even passed a strong condemnation of "the danger of Great Russian chauvinism" in the non-Russian countries, while the stricken Lenin himself, in his three letters on the national question (December 30, 31, 1922), attempted to curb the tendency toward Russian-dominated centralism and to preserve self-rule for the non-Russian nations under the leadership of their Communist parties. But Stalin, who realized that the growth of Russian nationalism and imperialism would advance his personal power, already dominated the party; and, on July 6, 1923, the Central Executive Committee of the USSR approved the constitution, which, through ratification, became law on January 31, 1924, and united the independent national republics

of Byelorussia, Ukraine, the Trans-Caucasian Federation, and the Russian Federated Socialist Republic into the Soviet Union. Thus was established, in fact, as the expression of the contemporary form of Russian imperialism and colonialism, the dictatorship of Russian Communism over the non-Russian Communists, their nations and countries with a centralized economy, police control and single centralized party.

Since the occupation of the non-Russian republics by the Russian Red Army after 1920 and the establishment of the Soviet Union in 1922-24 up to the present day, Russian Communist imperialism has waged a continuous war against the so-called National Communism of the non-Russian nations. The real content of the history of the Soviet Union and of Russian Communism is the continuation of the Russification of the non-Russian nations and their transformation into a single Russian Soviet nation. The non-Russian nations are forced to forget their past, which is rewritten by Russian or Russified Communists, to forget their national aspirations, cultural traditions, and "voluntarily" to Russify their languages and cultures, which are degraded to provincial or parochial peculiarities. The real content of the history of the non-Russian nations in the Soviet Union is a continuation of their old struggle against Czarist Russification and a part of this struggle are also their "National Communisms," in which are manifest their nationalism in the given Soviet-Union realities. Thus non-Russian National Communism in the Soviet Republics has a two-fold content; first, it is the resistance of the non-Russian Communists against Russian Communism, and, secondly, it is the manifestation of nationalism by the non-Communists.

The second phase of defensive "National Communism" against this many-sided Russian imperialism was inaugurated by the Lebed theory.[5] This theory maintained that the Russian culture represented with its language a higher type than the cultures and languages of the non-Russian nations, especially of the Ukrainians, and therefore it would inevitably succeed in Russifying the non-Russian countries. Lebed, secretary of the Central Committee of the CPbU, was supported by Zinoviev, chairman of the Central Committee of the Comintern, Larin and Kviring, who coined the slogan, "The struggle of two cultures." The Ukrainian Communists and the Ukrainian intelligentsia took up this challenge and soon created (based on the

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[5] Jurij Lawrynenko, *Ukrainian Communism and Soviet Russian Policy Toward the Ukraine*—An Annotated Bibliography, 1917-1953 (Research Program on the USSR, 1953), p. 237.

People's Commissariat of Education, the Ukrainian State Publishing House and numerous cultural institutions) a powerful cultural revival, which came to be known as the "Ukrainian Renaissance of the Twentieth Century." A member of the CPbU, the noted author Mykola Khvylovy, elaborated its ideology, which had lively repercussions in other non-Russian Soviet Republics and climaxed in such ideas as the following:

> In our literature we have imbedded the theory of Communist independence. Is Russia an independent state? Of course! And we too are independent! We face the question: From which world literature should our literature take its cue? By no means and never from Moscow! That is definite and without reservation. From Russian literature, from its styles, Ukrainian poetry must flee as fast as it can.[6]

Against this second phase of the "National Communism" of the non-Russian nations annexed into the Soviet Union, Russian Communism, in 1929, started a systematically planned general *pogrom* of the non-Russian nations in their own "national republics" by all terroristic means of the Soviet Russian police state: mass purges of the non-Russians from the Communist Party and the national governments, mass liquidation of scholars, writers, journalists, enforcing of the Marr linguistic theory on all non-Russian languages, rewriting of the histories of the non-Russian nations, subordination of all non-Russian Academies of Liberal Arts and Sciences to Moscow, and the promulgation of the Stalin Constitution in 1936, in which the rights of the non-Russian republics were again reduced and the federal ties strengthened. Against Ukraine, the center of "National Communist" resistance, the Russian Communists used as a political weapon an artificially created famine (1932) which weakened the peasantry by five to six million victims.

The non-Russian nations gave their answer to this Russian terror in World War II after Hitler attacked the Soviet Union with the mass surrender of the mobilized non-Russian soldiers. Only on Russian ethnographic territory could Hitler's advance, partly because of the terrible and early winter, be stopped. Fighting with the German armies against Moscow later were 220,000 Ukrainians, 110,000 Turkestanians, 110,000 Caucasians, 35,000 Tatars, 82,000 Cossacks, 32,000 Kalmyks and 20,000 Byelorussians. These facts compelled Russian Communism to such concessions as the signing of the Atlantic Charter, the introduction of Ukraine and Byelorussia into the UN, the granting to the non-Russian republics of their own

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[6] Mykola Khvylovy, *Thoughts Against the Current* (Kiev: 1926); cf. also: George S. N. Luckyj, *Literary Politics in the Soviet Ukraine, 1917-34* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1954).

coats of arms, flags, anthems, their own decorations in part and, finally, the revocation of Marr's linguistic theory by Stalin himself.

Russian Communism is so frightened of this latent nationalism of the non-Russian nations in the Soviet Union and of their National Communisms, that after Stalin's death many of the liquidated national Communists' party members, writers and journalists were "rehabilitated" on the one hand, while on the other it attempted to establish between them and the Western world a denationalized *cordon sanitaire* of Communist puppet governments in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Yugoslavia.

It was, in fact, the third phase of National Communism which developed in these countries among the Communists of these non-Russian nations who had to face the Russian Communist imperialism. Tito gets partly undeserved credit because his split was originally not the consequence of any "national spirit of independence." After the war the Yugoslav Communists were aiming at the incorporation of Yugoslavia as a national Union republic into the Soviet Union but Moscow itself opposed this idea and insisted on the window dressing of her sovereignty and independence. Moscow also applied the same policy toward Bulgaria. In the writer's opinion, the Russian Communists feared to increase the number of the non-Russian nations inside the Soviet Union after the recent war experiences with their disloyalty to Moscow during the war; they feared to lower the percentage of the Russian population in the Soviet Union to around 40 per cent because it would deepen the resistance of the non-Russian nations to Russification.

In summary we may say that Tito's split with Russian Communism assumed a "national" motivation only later in the heat of the fray and became "National Communism" in order to get the backing of the intelligentsia and masses; thus it became an off-shoot of the original "National Communism" in the Soviet Union, which has a history of forty years and originated amongst the victims of the new Russian imperialism in Communist form.

III

We have traced Tito's "National Communism" and the outbursts of "National Communism" in the other captive nations (Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary) to its real cause, present-day Russian imperialism, and to the previous phases of "National Communism" inside the sphere of domination of Russian Communist imperialism.

But its roots can be traced further back into the pre-World War I period and even to the very beginning of Russian Socialism.

The present conflict inside Marxism-Leninism between the Russian and the non-Russian national interests is a second edition of the conflict inside Socialism which existed before World War I. At the basis of the conflict was the attitude toward "the nation." Two different attitudes to the nation as a social organization confronted each other which included far-reaching consequences for the organization of Socialist Parties and their planning for the future.

One was the Austrian school of R. Springer, O. Bauer and K. Renner which recognized nations as culturally and politically valuable and lasting social organizations, and placed these living nations at the foundation of the future world structure of Socialism not as a future union of states but as a community of peoples-nations. Internationalism was regarded by this school not as something against or above nations or nationality. Rather, nations and nationality were regarded as natural organs of mankind—of the future Socialist humanity. This attitude of the Austrian school to the living nations consequently expressed a moral respect for life itself, a respect which is the foundation of any culture. Therefore the Austrian school envisaged, for the solution of the nationality problem in Austria, either a territorial or an extra-territorial national cultural autonomy with self-rule in all cultural and linguistic matters which led to federalism in the structure of the Socialist Party of the state.[7]

The other point of view on the nation, partly elaborated by Marx and Engels and later on by Stalin, regards nations and nationalism as characteristics of the capitalist era which, in the socialist era of internationalism, would disappear. This view also maintained that capitalism was preparing this new era by its assimilation of nations and formation of large states. A good socialist-internationalist should speed up the assimilation or disappearance of nations for the advance of "internationalism," proponents said.

These Austrian ideas penetrated into the Russian Empire after the Bruenn Congress of the Austrian Socialists in 1899. Not only did the Russian Socialist Revolutionary Party (the competitor of the Russian Socialist Democratic Labor Party) declare itself in favor of national-cultural autonomy and federalism in 1905, but, in

[7] In 1917 the Ukrainian National Republic realized the ideas of the Austrian school by granting the Poles and Jews national cultural autonomy. Cf. Henryk Jablonowski, *Polska Autonomia Narodowa na Ukrainie 1917-1918* (Warszawa, 1948). This fact also contributed as a cause to the later aggression of Russian Communism against Ukraine.

the first line, also the non-Russian Socialists, the Jewish *Bund* and the Jewish Socialist Labor Party, the Armenian *Dashnaktsutiun*, the Byelorussian Socialist *Hromada*, the Georgian Socialist Federalist Party, and the Ukrainian Socialist Revolutionaries.

Lenin's attitude to the non-Russian nations inside the Russian Empire is objectively summed up by Richard Pipes:

> Lenin like most Marxists desired the eventual transformation of the Russian Empire into a national state, in which the minorities (the non-Russian nations, which constituted the majority of the population!) would assimilate and adopt the Russian tongue.[8]

Therefore, it is plain that Lenin immediately understood the far-reaching consequences of the Austrian ideas for the Russian Empire. If the non-Russian nations were granted national autonomy, Lenin realized, the same principle had to be recognized for the structure of the Party. Should that happen, he reasoned further, the Party and particularly the Party's Central Committee would not be a centralized but a federated body. In that form, the Committee would have to apply democratic parliamentarian procedures, thereby excluding any Russian dictatorship or domination. Finally, Lenin also realized that a "post-revolutionary Russia" would not be a centralized republic but a federated republic with a tendency to disintegration along national lines should the Russians attempt to dominate it. Lenin, whose mind was under the influence of von Clausewitz, concentrated always on the problem of power—how to seize it, to keep and expand it. He felt (a) the danger of Russian Socialism being limited to its Russian ethnographic territory and being banned from the non-Russian territories and (b) the danger for the integrity of the Russian Empire, to be saved only by a centralized Party. The disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, the situation in Austria-Hungary, Germany and the Russian Empire—all combined to put the nationality problem as a problem of imperialism on the agenda, and Lenin soon was forced to act. On the one hand, he eliminated Democratic procedures in the still united Russian Socialist Democratic Party (by the Prague Conference of 1912), the so-called "Sixth Congress," and established in the self-proclaimed Central Committee his personal dictatorship. On the other hand, he sent Stalin to Vienna with his notes to write a pamphlet against the Austrian school, which challenged Russian Socialism in its political, cultural and linguistic aspects.

In spite of the fact that since 1903 the party program of the Russian Social Democrats included "the right of all nations in the

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[8] Cf. Richard Pipes: *The Formation of the Soviet Union* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954), p. 45.

state to self-determination," the party regarded this point not as programmatic but as "declarative" election oratory calculated especially to gain prestige among Western European Socialists. Therefore not only the Bolsheviks but especially the Mensheviks opposed the Austrian ideas because they regarded federalism, respect for the rights of non-Russian nations, as "reactionary" and as delaying "political and economic unification." But it was Lenin himself who developed the technique of outsmarting the Austrian school and the non-Russian nations in the approaching events. In the competition of slogans and catchwords he bested the Austrian school by offering the non-Russian nations "more" than "autonomy"; he offered them "self-determination including separation that meant independence." The non-Russian Socialists and Communists in the first phase of the revolution considered Lenin as the only honest Russian Socialist politician with respect to the nationality problem and even sympathized with his coming to power. Only later did they learn that "self-determination including separation" semantically meant "self-liquidation including Russification," enforced by terror and concentration camps.

Russian Socialists always believed that Russian Czarism was forming the largest empire for their future inheritance of it. Not only for Russian Monarchists but also for the Russian Socialists, "Russia, the one and indivisible" was a dogma.

This conflict of Russian Socialism with the Austrian school has even a deeper root and can be traced directly to the founding father of Russian Socialism, George Plekhanov (1857-1918) and his Russian chauvinistic and imperialistic attitude toward the non-Russian socialists in his Swiss exile. For the attitude of Plekhanov there is a reliable Russian witness, L. Tikhomirov.[9]

> He (Plekhanov) literally hated any separatism (of the non-Russian nations). He treated Ukrainophilism with contempt and hostility. The Russian unifier and leveler was deeply rooted in him. A revolutionary and an emigre, Plekhanov could not openly oppose the Poles, who also were a revolutionary force, but he did not like the Poles and did not respect or trust them. He stated this openly in friendly conversations ... with Dragomanov[10] he was in

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[9] Cf.L. Tikhomirov, *Vospominaniya* (1927) pp. 90-92. See also: N. S. Russanov, *V Emigratsii* (Moscow, 1929) pp. 36-37.

[10] Michael Dragomanov (1841-95), Ukrainian historian, ethnologist, socialist, emissary of the Ukrainian underground in Russia to Western Europe, emigre, Professor of the University in Sofia (Bulgaria).

openly hostile relations... He treated Shevchenko[11] and the Ukrainophiles with decidedly greater hatred than even, for instance, Katkov.[12]

The early Ukrainian Socialists already fought against this Russian socialist imperialism and published in their journal, *Hromada* (Geneva, 1881) a history of the Irish fight against England, presenting it as an example to Ukrainians of how to fight Russian imperialism. Thus, from this period on, Ukrainian Socialism became a vehicle of Ukrainian nationalism, because, according to the opinion of the early Ukrainian Socialists, without national liberation from Russian colonial status, no solution of economic and social problems could be considered in Ukraine. This fundamental thesis is the root of the present-day "National Communism" which denies to Soviet Moscow the authority to enforce upon non-Russian Communist countries the status of Soviet Russian colonies.

Not only is the present-day Russian Bolshevism-Communism a continuation of this original Russian Socialist imperialism, but also Russian Socialism-Menshevism. Their patriarch and leader, Raphael Abramovich, in exile in the USA, wrote in his article, "The Enumeration of Enemies": "They (the Bolsheviks) are despots and tyrants; they are dictators and fire-spreaders; they are guilty of all crimes against the people save one: they did not dismember Russia."[13] The meaning is obvious.

Russian Socialism-Bolshevism and Menshevism, so far as the non-Russian nations and their natural rights are concerned, represent continuation of the old Russian imperialism.

"National Communism" is the defense of the non-Russian nations against Russian Socialism-Bolshevism as "National Socialism" (the national Democratic Socialist Parties of the non-Russian nations in exile) is their defense against Russian Socialism-Menshevism, which by its American-English publication decisively was and is influencing American foreign policy in the direction of upholding the "unity and indivisibility" of the new Russian Empire, of the Soviet Union, and of the colonial status of the non-Russian nations inside this new "prison of nations."

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[11] Taras Shevchenko (1814-61), national bard of Ukraine, an enthusiast of the American Revolution and George Washington.

[12] Michael Katkov (1818-87), Russian reactionary, university professor, hater of all non-Russian nations submerged by Russian Czarism, and their fanatic Russificator.

[13] *Socialisticheskii Vestnik*, 1-2, 1950.

SOVIET UNION'S NON-RUSSIAN NATIONS

JOSEPH S. ROUCEK

The use of the word "Russia," as a synonym for the Soviet Union has become a chronic affliction in Anglo-American parlance; unfortunately, the concept misleads the Anglo-Saxon people in regard to the ethnic composition of that empire. The professional assertion of the American geographers that Russia is not the same as the Soviet Union has also been disregarded, and the sacrosanct word "Russia" has been persistently propounded in the American press and studies—and even in scientific works. In fact, for most Americans the use of the word "Russia"—instead of the USSR—has been an old custom.

Yet the fact is that there are not 200 milion Russians in the whole world, as the USSR has a population of 200 million—and of these only 70 million are Russians, while the remainder not only are not Russians but many of these are violently anti-Russian as a consequence of centuries of oppression by Moscow. Indeed, several of these nations (of which this balance is composed) had their own and independent governments, their own advanced civilization, their own religion, their own culture, centuries before any Russia existed. When speaking of "Russia," the reference is usually to the USSR, the greatest empire in the world, a mosaic of subjugated peoples held together by the communist ideology and the Soviet system.

In fact, even the official political division of the USSR accents the existence of many non-Russian nations in that empire; there are 16 Union Republics within the USSR—and the largest, in both size and population, is the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (the RSFSR), which includes many different nationalities besides the Russian, nationalities which form "autonomous republics" and "autonomous regions." Some nationalities within the RSFSR, for instance, the Cossacks and Siberiaks, have no autonomy of their own (although such was proclaimed by these peoples in the course of the 1917 Revolution).

Second in size and population is the Ukrainian SSR (which, with the Byelorussian SSR, is a member state in the United Na-

of the various Slavic peoples has been different, their environment has been different, and hence their traditions, customs, cultures and religions have been different. More specifically, the Catholic Poles have entertained a traditional hatred of the Orthodox Russians, and the Catholic Croats base their nationalism on an antagonism against the Orthodox Serbs; and the Ukrainians claim that there is a Ukrainian nation, numbering 45 million people. Historically, culturally, in mentality and in language, the Ukrainians are independent of the Russian nation, and in their native tongue they refer consistently to their northern neighbors as *Moskals* ("Muscovites").[4]

Actually, the Ukrainians and the Cossacks, the Siberiaks and Poles have been striving for their liberation and against Russian efforts to "Russify" their culture and on behalf of their own individuality denied to them as nations.

The Character of the Russian People

The pro-Russian (and thus pro-Soviet) spokesmen have been trying to cover up the problem by propounding that there are three branches of the Russian people—Great Russian, Little Russian and White Russian. But actually these "branches" are separate Slavic peoples compounded of quite different elements. The Ukrainians ("Little Russians") and the Byelorussians ("White Russians") are peoples of exclusive Slav formation, with a history in depth. The Muscovites ("Great Russians") trace their history to the 12th century, arising from the mixture of Eastern Slavic tribes with Finnish and Turkic tribes which played a great part in the formation of the Muscovite nation. But a part of the Russians living between Lake Peipus and the Upper Volga are related to the Byelorussians; they are descendants of the Novgorodians—the fourth Slavic people in Eastern Europe who differ completely from the Muscovites by their language, their Hanseatic mentality and their exclusive Slavic stock.[5] There is a recorded history of Novgorod's struggle against the Muscovite aggressive designs, and Ivan IV, "The Terrible," liquidated this nucleus of the fourth Slavic nation in Eastern Europe.[6] In addition, the Cossacks are often thought of as being Russians; they are descendants of the native Slav popula-

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[4] Nicholas D. Chubaty, "The Meaning of 'Russia' and 'Ukraine,' *The Ukrainian Quarterly,* I, 4 (September, 1945), 351-364.

[5] Martovych, Op. Cit., 7.

[6] For the various ramifications of the Slavic concept and history, see: Joseph S. Roucek, Ed., *Slavonic Encyclopedia* (New York: Philosophical Library 1949).

tion in the northern Caucasus which had a state of its own in the Middle Ages (the Principality of Tmutorokan); they differ from the Russians in their language, their culture, and sometimes acted as frontier guards for the Czars of Moscow—and at times attacked the Czars in bloody uprisings (Razin, Bulavin, Pugachev). In fact, in 1917, the Cossacks of Don, Kuban, Terek and Astrakhan declared their independence of Moscow and even today their leaders are demanding a sovereign state, "Cossackia."

The Siberiaks are descendants of early conquerors in Siberia who were Cossacks. Siberia, furthermore, has some 170 groups of native population. The Buriats in the Lake Baikal area are Mongols by type and language. The Yakuts live in the Middle Lena Valley; they are Turkic-speaking peoples. The Tatars can be found in the Altai Mountains (Oirots) and in the Irtysh Valley of Western Siberia. The Old Asiatics, resembling the Eskimos and the natives of North America, live in the north, northeast and east of Siberia. There are also Jews in Birobidjan (in the Amur Valley of the Far East).

The Baltic peoples also are no Slavs. The Estonians belong to the Finnish group, and the Letts and Lithuanians to the Aestian (Baltic) branch of the Indo-European family. The Finnish people are settled in the northern and northeastern territory of the USSR, and many have become assimilated with the Slav population. From this Finno-Slav mixture emerged a new people named "Muscovites" (from the city of Moscow, the name "Moskva" meaning, in Finnish, "a putrid water"). And interestingly enough, it was only in 1713 that Peter I renamed Muscovy as Russia and his subjects as Russians; this was a step to adopt the history and traditions of the Old Kievan Rus which allowed him to claim all Ukrainian and Byelorussian territories for his "Russian Empire." But today most Finnish people in Russia are racially and linguistically different from the Russians. The Turkic peoples of the USSR belong to the Turkish Ural-Altanians, who from time immemorial lived in northern and Central Asia, the remnants of the Mongol invasion of the 13th century. As Moslems they have their own ancient culture; they often revolted against the Czars (as well as against the Bolsheviks); even today their Basmachi movement opposes the Soviet rule. The Caucasian peoples belong to the Indo-European, Japhetic, or Turkic family. The Daghestanians, for instance, consist of more than 30 nationalities speaking different languages. The region has many religious differences also; the Georgians are Greek Orthodox, the Armenians belong to the Armenian Gregorian Church, while the Azerbaijanians adopted the Shiite doctrine of the Mohammedans.

The independent Republics of the Caucasus fought against the Bolsheviks at the end of World War I and Georgia shook itself free; but the Red Army conquered it again in 1921. During World War II, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army was joined by national detachments of Georgians, Azerbaijanians, Armenians and Uzbeks. The Buryats of the Lake Baikal area and the Kalmyks in the steppes of the Volga are Mongols, having their own language and being Buddhist by religion. In the Far East, the USSR has to deal with some 80 national groups.

In the Southwest, the Moldavians proclaimed an independent Moldavian Republic in 1917 and joined Rumania in 1918; in 1940, the Bolsheviks occupied Bessarabia, making it a Moldavian SSR, with Kishinev as the capital. The Catholic Poles, were "liberated" by the atheistic "brother" Russian on the basis of the Hitler-Stalin Pact and the infamous Yalta agreement. Then another "liberation" took place at the end of World War II, when Czechoslovakia was forced to hand over to the USSR Carpatho Ukraine (also known as Carpathian Rus), inhabited by Slavic peoples and belonging in majority to the Ukrainian group.[7]

The Concept of "Minorities" by Moscow

The concept of national "minorities" in the USSR is also confusing to the Anglo-American mentality since majority rule is a democratic principle, and if the Russian people of the USSR comprised a majority of the population and the non-Russians were the real minority, there would be no reason to divide Russia into national states, for none of the minorities would form a state.[8]

The phrase "national minorities" is relatively new in its application in the USSR. It goes back to the proclamation of the doctrine of self-determination by President Wilson, who declared that every people have the right to form their own state on their own national territory, i.e., where a given people formed the majority of the

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[7] E. Day Carman, *Soviet Imperialism: Russia's Drive toward World Domination* (Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1950), is a good summary of the territorial acquisitions of Soviet Russia.

[8] Hans Koch, *Das Sowjetische Nationalitaetenproblem der Europaeischen Osten* (Munich: 1956), II No. 8, shows, for instance, that at present the number of Russians in the USSR is not higher than 50%, and is even lower, but that the Russians hold a dominating position, and Communism has its strongest base in the Russian republic, especially in the Russian ethnic territories; in the region of Moscow, 6.75% of the population are members of the Communist Party, in the Leningrad region, 6.48%, while in Ukraine only 2.14% of the population are in the ranks of the Communists.

population. But this principle was difficult to apply. In Central-Eastern Europe, on the borders of all new nation-states formed in 1918, there were regions with mixed populations. In these it was a question of determining the majority ethnic element in relation to others. In case of dispute as to an actual majority, there would be a plebiscite, and the Minorities Treaties (which in the end turned out to be an utter failure) provided for the protection of the minorities in regard to their civil rights and the right to cultivate their religion, culture and education.[9]

It must be noted, however, that the conditions in Central-Eastern-Balkan Europe differ from those in the USSR. While most national minorities in Central Europe lived in the border areas, in the USSR there are numerous nations, often older than the Russian nation, who have been living there for one or several thousand years on their own territories; and often these territories, ethnically, culturally, historically, and even economically, have been definite national units with an overwhelming majority of the population concerned and often far larger than the small independent states of Europe. For instance, Ukraine occupied (the census of 1939) an area with an undoubted Ukrainian majority of population of 728,500 sq. miles, with a total population of 49,500,000. Its area and population is, therefore, larger than those of France, and 73.5% of the population are Ukrainians, 9.7% Russians, 5.3% Poles, 5.9% Jews, and 3.8% others. "The Ukrainian population forms a definite whole with its own culture and history going back over a thousand years."[10] The same applies to White Ruthenia, or the Baltic states, or the Caucasian peoples and Turkestan. The history and cultures of these peoples have been distinct from Russia's culture and are a thousand years older than the Russian. Do these nations constitute minorities?

Frequent comparisons have been made by fellow travellers between the "Soviet minorities system" and that of the United States, composed of 48 states (and where all minorities employ mostly the English language). But this comparison is hardly valid, since the American nation was formed from waves of immigrants from other states (mostly Europe) who accepted the then existing American culture and enriched it with their cultural elements, thus forming

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[9] Joseph S. Roucek, *The Working of the Minorities Treaties under the League of Nations* (Prague: Orbis, 1928).

[10] "Minorities and Majorities in the USSR" Editorial, *The Ukrainian Quarterly* IX, 4 (Autumn, 1953), 293-308.

"One America."[11] No American national group is connected with any part of the American territory which it regards as its native preserve (and this includes the Indians). For an American the state of Connecticut or California is the same country, for it is part of America.

But in the Soviet Union, each nationality is connected with its own national territory, and the history of such groups has been intimately connected with that same area. The Soviet masters know this and hence they have employed the most severe measures to end such ties by the physical destruction or the violent removal of several ethnic groups. (In 1941 the Volga German ASSR was abolished, and the inhabitants "evacuated" eastwards. In 1945 the Kremlin announced that, because of "traitorous activities" during World War II, the Karachai "autonomous region" and the Chechen-Ingush ASSR, as well as the Kalmyk ASSR in the Caucasus, and the Crimean ASSR, were abolished, and the populations deported to Siberia). This process of genocidal extermination or Russification has no counterpart in American history (although it is often popular to find a rough comparison in the original but discarded policies of handling the native Indians). All in all, the Russian claim is spurious that the USSR is a Russian state with national minorities which, like all minorities, have no right to independent national existence but which are an inseparable part of Russia and as such are granted cultural autonomy under the communist leadership.

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[11] See: Francis J. Brown & Joseph S. Roucek, *One America* (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1, 1952).

ACADEMIC AND SOCIAL STATUS OF A STUDENT IN THE USSR

By NICHOLAS PRYCHODKO

It is now four years since I received my Canadian citizenship. Having lived through Soviet slavery in the so-called free life and in a Siberian concentration camp, I am grateful to be a free citizen of a free country.

At the same time I feel as though I were an American citizen, too, for in my childhood my parents taught me to love the country at whose gates stands the great Statue holding high the torch of Liberty. Later, in my youth I read and sensed with my whole being the unforgettable lines of our national troubador—Taras Shevchenko:

...Will we ever have a Washington,
With a new and just law ?...

These lines sank deep into my heart just as they did with millions of my brother Ukrainians who, in spite of incessant anti-American propaganda, are reaching out in their thoughts across the Atlantic to the great country of Washington, Lincoln and Jefferson.

In regard to the life of Soviet students I will relate facts from my nine years' experience as a student in Soviet Ukraine and set down my impressions, rather than statistical and official data, which if needed may be found in newspapers here.

I shall begin with the question: Can every Soviet citizen be a student in the USSR? In the United States and Canada only the possession of two requirements makes one eligible for becoming a student. Besides intellectual ability and financial resources there are no other obstacles; the rules and regulations apply to all alike. In the country universally publicized with the "highest social equality" it is a different matter.

Everyone desiring to enter a university in the USSR must, a few months before entrance examinations, submit an application to the admissions committee of the university of his choice, filling out an enormous questionnaire with questions relating not only to

the applicant but mostly to his parents and grandparents. The application form and the questionnaire must be accompanied by documents and recommendations from the party or other organizations with which the applicant was associated.

The greatest obstacle in the way of an applicant's entry into the university is his social background. If his father or grandfather was a priest, for instance, or an owner of a small business in the pre-revolutionary days, or some small enterprise where he employed two or three helpers; if he was an officer in the Czarist army, belonged to the so-called *kurkul* class, had been arrested for some anti-communist offense, and especially if a relative took part in the fight against the communist regime—the chances for such an applicant to study in a university are practically nil—regardless of whether or not such relatives were even still living.

It matters not that on the walls of universities and high schools prominently displayed is the slogan: "Chidren in the USSR are not responsible for their parents' offenses."

If the applicant's social background happens to be still more complicated, then his chances of becoming a university student are those of a camel passing through the eye of a needle. His application is returned to him by the committee with the laconic word, *Refused*, written in the upper right hand corner. No explanation is given and there is no appeal.

The more important the university or the faculty chosen the more rigid is the screening. A son of a former priest or small shop owner may reasonably hope to get in such studies as veterinary or forestry, and upon graduation be sent to work in some far off corner. But he can never hope to realize an ambition to study aeronautics, pursue a military career, enter into heavy industry, engineering or any other important profession, regardless of his knowledge and ability.

One who has managed to gain admittance by withholding unfavorable facts about his social background lives and studies in constant fear that his deceit will be discovered, for then he will be expelled from the campus and in all likelihood be arrested. Such cases are rare, however; the admissions committee works in the manner of police investigators and, when required, has the police records put at their disposal.

In connection with this I would like to mention my own case. Presenting my application to the university in 1928 (before collectivization) I wrote on the form that my father was a farmer (he owned 25 acres of land) and my mother a schoolteacher, but omitted the fact that before the revolution my father had sometimes

performed the duties of a sexton in the village church. About half a year after the beginning of the term I was called before the stern students' hearing body and questioned about the reasons for my "crime." The result was that I was expelled from residence and the matter of my expulsion from the university referred to the executive. Only the strong defense of the rector, Mykolenko, and the professor of literature, Denysenko, who favored me as a student, saved me from expulsion.

I was simply forbidden residence on the campus, since to a certain extent I was now considered a social enemy of the proletariat students. Besides a moral degradation, this created a housing problem for me. For two weeks I shared the bed of different friends. Then luckily I found a corner in a room occupied by a family of five. To possess such a luxury as a room all to myself, even the smallest one, was beyond hope.

I was very spry in those days in that compact room, not because I was much younger then, but because during cold weather my ink turned to a chunk of blue ice. Leaping from under the covers, I would dress myself in 30 seconds flat. But to me this was light punishment for my father's sin against the great communist morality and for my own offense. I was not sorry for having committed it; had I revealed on the application form what a great sinner my father was I would have gotten it back with the *Refused* stamped on it.

Students entering Moscow University are the most thoroughly screened. Nearly all of them come from privileged Soviet families or from families with a clear record who have rendered some outstanding service to the government. Moscow University also has several hundred specially picked students from different countries of the world. Its doors are always wide open for such students, for in the future they will be counted on to help the Muscovite Empire to dominate their homelands.

There is no place in Moscow University for descendants of the former upper class of the people. It is the most exclusive university in the Russian empire. That is why the Kremlin was so disturbed when on its campus anti-communist leaflets appeared at the time the tanks of the Muscovite empire were mercilessly crushing and shooting Hungarian intellectuals, students and workers on the streets of Budapest.

This important and significant development was hushed up by the Kremlin but a report later leaked through to the West that around one hundred students from Moscow University vanished without a trace as a consequence.

There is no doubt that at that time even greater numbers of students vanished from the provincial universities and especially from the University of Kiev. This operation is carefully carried out by the Soviet government and nothing appears in the Soviet press; to prevent the local population from seeing too much, arrests are generally made after midnight.

Moscow University is naturally a model university from every point of view. It is not only an educational institution but is maintained as a show place for foreign delegates.

Means of Livelihood

Going back to universities in general: if a student meets with all the requirements of the admissions committee and passes his entrance examination, and is finally accepted by the university, he is offered limited (though possible) means for existence; that is, if he is eligible for a scholarship and residence on the campus.

In dollars and cents the value of a scholarship amounts to about 15 or 18 dollars per month, but it is possible to get along on it. The residence costs almost nothing, books are available in the library and in the students' dining hall (where a special pass is needed), a very simple meal, without dessert, may be bought for about 20 cents.

About 50 per cent of the students are fortunate enough to enjoy all of the above-mentioned privileges—scholarship, residence and admission to the dining hall. They are either party members, members of the Comsomol or have illustrious backgrounds.

About a half of the remaining 50 per cent are allowed to live in the residence and buy their meals in the students' dining room. A small number live with their parents.

All the other students, possessing none of the privileges, find it extremely difficult to get by. They find such jobs as night watchmen, where in some cases they can study while on duty, or some others work from 4 o'clock in the afternoon until midnight. A few more enterprising ones make themselves makeshift carts and in the evenings wait around the railway stations, where they cart the travelers' parcels home from the train, thus earning a few rubles. We called them *vridlo*, the full meaning of which is: "temporarily performing the duties of a horse."

Surprisingly almost all those in the last category were the best students.

In my own case, having no scholarship, I worked in the kitchen of the so-called restaurant. My hours were from 4 o'clock in the

afternoon until midnight, six days a week. I carried in firewood, scraped and washed the huge kettles, swept the kitchen and washed the dining room floor. For these tasks I received the equivalent in rubles of about 25 dollars a month and free meals.

This job made me very popular among some of my fellow students. They would wait stealthily behind the woodpile near the back lane to receive from me a smuggled meat ball or a slice of bread. As a rule, I quit my job a month before final examinations, and was lucky to get it back the next term.

The summer vacation in Soviet universities lasts only two months. Two to four weeks of this is spent in training in the student's profession or at a military camp. Therefore it is impossible during this period to earn a substantial amount to offset the year's expenses.

Students who are party or Comsomol members and in addition get good marks in their studies are granted an additional privilege —after three years of study they can sign a contract with some state-owned factory. (Privately owned factories are non-existent in the USSR.) This contract assures the student of a position in his own profession at the said factory for a period of five years after his graduation, and the factory pays him a monthly sum equivalent to 40 or 45 dollars per month, starting from the time the contract is signed.

In this case the lucky student actually has a double scholarship. Behind their backs, we called them "Soviet bourgeois." This privilege brings to mind the slogan from *Animal Farm*: "All Animals Are Equal But Some of Them are More Equal."

Such good fortune was rarely offered to a non-party student, and then only if the factory was located in some very remote area. As regards a position, this had little meaning, for upon graduation every student is assigned to a job regardless of his personal wishes in the matter. He may change his position after a while only if the institution of his employment is agreeable or on order from above.

In the pre-revolutionary period, as well as today, universities and even high schools in the USSR did not have the so-called soft courses (arts, humanities, etc.). Homework is obligatory from the time a child first enters school.

Standard of Education

Before the revolution the standard of education was quite high, as it is again now, but immediately after the revolution the educa-

tional system in Ukraine and throughout all of the USSR fell to a deplorable level. For many years beginning in 1920 the high schools and universities remained half dead, and only gradually entered upon a period of reorganization and revivification.

Endeavoring to better the situation and to create some new "revolutionary-best-in-the-world" educational system, the People's Commissariat of Education introduced at the beginning of 1930 a brigade (collective) method of education in the universities and high schools. Accordingly, each faculty was divided into brigades of 4 to 6 students each. These brigades were obliged to work collectively and also sat for their examinations together, for which they developed militant tactics.

If a member of the brigade was asked a question to which he could not answer, one who did know the answer intervened without any invitation from the examining professor. If the examiner became stricter in his questioning, the brigade attacked him with their own questions. After the examination, if the professor tried to grade the members of the brigade differently, he was met with strong protests, such as, we all studied together in one brigade and should receive the same grade. (There were often students who never studied with their brigades at all.)

Frequently students would demand high marks for themselves, arguing that they were active in the party organization and could therefore not devote much time to their studies. This way one could pass all the examinations knowing nothing at all. Sometimes professors, wishing to avoid arguments with party member students, would give them high marks for complete ignorance.

I recall an incident with an intrepid Professor of History of Culture, M. Ozersky. After several arguments with the students' brigades about marks he asked the next brigade before him, without presenting the regular questions: "Do you all belong to the Committee of Poor Peasants, and are active in that organization?"

"Yes," was the prompt reply.

"Then I grant you all the highest marks possible!"

"Why?"

"Because why should you know the history of culture when you are good workers in your organization?"

The following day a general meeting was called, including the staff and the students, at which the professor was strongly reprimanded. Fortunately, that time his case ended not too tragically. He was merely suspended from the university for six months.

At about that time a very appropriate joke circulated among the students.

During a literature exam a professor turned to a student and asked: "Who wrote *War and Peace*?"

"I didn't," answered the student, alarmed.

Appalled at such ignorance, the professor reported the incident to the dean.

"Don't be so disturbed, Ivan Ivanovich," replied the dean, "maybe he really did not do it."

Ivan Ivanovich was so agitated now that on his way home he did not see an acquaintance of his approaching until he bumped right into him. The man was an NKVD officer who, sympathetically enough, asked the professor what was troubling him. After hearing the story the NKVD man wrote down the student's and dean's names and told the professor not to worry, that everything would be all right. The following day the student and the dean were not in the univeristy. Several days later the professor received a telephone call from his NKVD acquaintance.

"I told you not to worry, Ivan Ivanovich. Everything is all right. They both confessed last night."

After about two years of existence, the brigade method of education disappeared. In 1933 individual examinations at the end of every semester were introduced and compulsory individual diploma work assigned every student at the end of the course. Those students who previously avoided work and depended on a stronger friend in the brigade, usually a non-party member, now had to buckle down and study. The university party organization, obviously carrying out orders from above, threatened to cancel the scholarships of those who had low marks. It became compulsory to attend all lectures. At the same time a campaign was started to raise the educational standard.

Experimentation with the educational system was now over and the schools and universities almost completely returned to the pre-revolutionary methods.

Quite frequently on the seventh day of the week, the so-called day of rest, students would be "invited" to help with some manual labor, such as construction work, season work in the *kolhosp* (collective farm), cleaning army barracks, etc. No one dared refuse these *subotnyks* (Saturday workdays) although they were held always on Sunday and in spite of the fact that they were propagated to be voluntary and therefore not paid for (except that those working in the *kolhosps* and army barracks were given free meal).

I remember how excited we were once when after cleaning the Lukyanivsky army barracks we each received a large bowl of pea soup and a thick slice of heavy black bread.

This was at the beginning of the terrible year 1933 when at Moscow's command an artificial famine was organized in Ukraine. Over 7 million Ukrainian farmers perished in that scourge because they had refused to shoulder the yoke of collectivization.

Most of the students were then only half hungry, for we all carried ration cards that made it possible to keep body and soul together. Students who were party members or belonged to the Comsomol received extra food coupons.

Those students had still other advantages. Upon completion of their university courses they were eligible for post-graduate courses, the so-called "aspirant courses." These courses are given at all universities and their main purpose is to prepare scientists or leading professional men. A non-party student has a very slim chance of getting in on this course. Rare exceptions are sometimes made if a student is extremely gifted and has an acceptable social background as well.

These student-aspirants study under the best professors and consulting specialists. After completing their courses some are placed with different branches of the Academy of Sciences, while others become lecturers in universities. While they are studying, their scholarships are increased to about three times the value of regular scholarships.

In the universities as well as the "aspirant courses," a great deal of emphasis was placed on the study of Dialectical Materialism (the study of Marxism and Leninism). For example, in the university where I studied not Soviet philosophy but mechanical engineering, 360 lecture hours and 120 seminar hours were allotted to this subject. This course drums into the heads of the students that capitalism and landowners suck the blood from workers and farmers, that capitalism is decadent and that communist victory in the whole world is logically inevitable.

I still remember today from that course some of the slogans of that greatest prophet of Muscovite imperialism, Lenin. Here is one: "Three quarters of mankind may die if necessary in order to assure communism of the remaining one quarter."

And another: "To reach a goal all means are good. Sometimes it is advisable to take one step backward in order to be able to take two steps forward later." This slogan applies very well to the latest Soviet Russian peace maneuvers.

After the revolution, in 1917, Lenin said: "First we will take Eastern Europe, then the masses of Asia. Then we will encircle the United States of America, which will be the last bastion of

capitalism. We will not have to attack it; it will fall like an overripe fruit into our hands."

To master these slogans and theories demanded considerable time from the students. Most abhorred it, but failure to learn them or even a lack of interest would incur unpleasantness and possibly painful consequences.

In the lectures on Dialectic Materialism a small number of hours were given over to the philosophy of Hegel, Kant and other "bourgeois" philosophers. The purpose of this was to show that their philosophy is harmful, false, rotten and worthless, in comparison with the orthodox philosophy of Marx, Lenin and Stalin.

If I am not mistaken, it was in 1935 that the so-called Stalin Constitution was pompously declared. The items it contained had nothing in common with the laws then in effect. Obviously, the Constitution was written from a propaganda viewpoint, mostly for consumption abroad. However, as soon as the Constitution appeared in print (a booklet of about 15 pages), a course on Stalin's Constitution was introduced in all universities and high schools.

Forty lecture hours and 20 seminar hours were set aside for learning this masterpiece. The *leit-motif* of these lectures was the maxim: "The happiest people on earth are those living under the sun of the Stalin Constitution irradiated by the great genius of Big Brother."

During that period of Soviet life radio speakers carrying the programs from the central transmitting station opened every morning with the song to which the words, as translated, are:

> This wide native country of mine,
> With its many forests, steppes and rivers
> I know of no other such country,
> Where man breathes so freely.

It is a pity that Soviet students haven't the opportunity to read Orwell's, *1984*, for they would feel the tremendous impact of this work far more than those people who have not experienced communist domination. I can imagine the rush there would be to secure it, and its effect on them by confirming their own secret thoughts, never before voiced. They have witnessed so many tragedies perpetrated under humane slogans. During the mass starvation Soviet newspapers and placards carried the blatantly deceitful headlines: "Life Has Become Better, Life Has Become Happier, Comrades."

When the NKVD arrested and shot thousands upon thousands of innocent people in the middle of the night and without any hearing whatsoever, the slogans loudly proclaimed: "No One In the

USSR Is Arrested Without Having Committed a Crime, Nor Punished Without a Fair Trial And a Lawyer's Defense." Very similar to Orwell's: "War is Peace," "Freedom is Slavery," "Hatred is Love."

The Stalin Constitution was taught not only in the universities but also in the factories, on collective farms and in offices, probably to counteract any possible tendencies of dissatisfaction with the loss of freedom and poverty that the people were forced to endure for many years.

The Informers

These lectures also propounded such morals as that treachery was really a great virtue and should be practiced. Class alertness for all those who in any way revealed opposition towards the communist system was emphasized. Informing on relatives and the closest friends was explained to be honorable.

No other stratum of the population as that of the students was so infiltrated with informers. From my own observations and the information I later gathered in prison I would say that there was one spy to every ten or twelve students. The result was that suspicion and distrust reigned among the students, and even the closest of friends were afraid to speak frankly to each other on political matters.

This situation creates among the Soviet students an atmosphere of futility, constant alertness and fear and uncertainty of what tomorrow will bring. Besides their studies and the jobs to earn their keep, and perhaps some boring activities in a student club, they have no spiritual life.

Very popular with the students are the theatre, opera, philharmonic concerts and the movies, but rarely can they afford to buy tickets for these. Mostly they have to content themselves with the more simple forms of recreation—chess or walks in the park. No less than 50 per cent of the students like to read books, foreign authors being great favorites. Books about foreign countries, especially the United States, are in great demand.

In 1929 a book, *One-Storey America*, written by two Soviet journalists, Ilf and Petrov, who had visited the U.S.A., was published in the USSR. This book contained, besides some anti-American tirades, considerable objective information about life in the United States. When I asked for this book at the university library the waiting list already contained over 100 names. I remember how impressed I was with the descriptions of the American transportation system, its highways, service stations, etc. The most unbelievable

was that in an American drug store one could buy not only prescribed medicine but also fried eggs.

This book was in circulation for about a year and a half. Then the writers were accused of pro-American propaganda. The book was destroyed, Ilf was arrested and never heard of again. Petrov was luckier, dying about a month prior to the finale of this unusually popular book.

Religion and the Student

Religion plays no part in the life of a Soviet student. Almost all are atheists, whether outspoken or silent. Within the Soviet educational system religion is strongly attacked, beginning with nursery schools. *Religion is the opium of the people* is a famous anti-religious slogan.

The late V. Lunacharsky, outstanding former Minister of Education in the USSR and a close friend of Lenin, made the following official statement:

> We hate Christianity and Christians. Even the best of them must be looked upon as our enemies. They preach the love of our neighbors and mercy, which is contrary to our principles. Down with love of our neighbors—what we want is black hatred. We must learn how to hate and it is only then that we shall conquer the world.

It is clearly expressed and is one of the Ten Commandments of the Kremlin. It might be aptly reinforced with one of Khrushchev's latest utterances:

> Time is on our side and we will bury you, Mr. Capitalist.

This applies to all of us here now, but first of all to the real capitalists, like Cyrus S. Eaton, who is actually joining the Russians in denouncing such far-sighted leaders as John Foster Dulles who stubbornly refuse to surrender the U.S.A. to Khrushchev and Serov.

But in spite of the many years of relentless destruction of religion it had an unbelievable, marvelous revival in Ukraine in 1941 when the Germans occupied that country and allowed the churches to reopen. All churches were immediately packed to overflowing. Among the worshippers at that time in St. Andrew's Cathedral in Kiev I saw hundreds of students. They probably did not become believers overnight, but there was that longing to fill an old spiritual void in their hearts.

Some Western journalists, following the early example of Walter Lippmann, who expected imminent revolution in the USSR after Stalin's death, try to lull Westerners by writing that an internal upheaval will occur in the USSR and that it will be sparked by students and intellectuals.

For such a thing to happen it would be necessary for at least a small group of organizers to work together and make certain plans. Under present conditions in the USSR this is impossible, for even in a group of about twenty or thirty people there will most certainly be an informer. A spontaneous revolution may break out only in the event of external conflict, as, for example, during the Second World War, when during the first seven months of war 3,900,000 Red Army soldiers and officers surrendered; and in 1945 when the fighting ranks of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army numbered half a million brave soldiers, fighting against overwhelming odds on two fronts—the German and the Russian. The chief organizers of the UPA were students, thousands of whom gave their lives for man's ideal—freedom and a free Ukraine.

I am proud to mention here that my 18-year-old nephew, Yuriy, a first-year student at the University of Kiev, died battling the communist hordes in 1944.

With the aid of its myriad of informers, the Kremlin knows the true mood of the masses, no matter how well masked. It keeps a particularly watchful eye on the student population and young intellectuals. In every university and every factory and office there is the so-called *Spec-otdel*—special department. It may only be a room or a couple of rooms with barred windows and a steel reinforced door. The door has a peep-hole to enable the inmate to see who is approaching. Admittance to this enclosure is strictly forbidden to all except those who are appointed by the secret police to work there.

This special department has a file for every student in which are recorded all the details of his conduct, fragments of his conversations which may be of interest to the police, information regarding his social background, going back to his great-grandfather, and other data that the police consider important. The doors and windows of this special department are a sinister reminder for all the students.

Periodically the Kremlin carries on large-scale blood-letting, or purges, as they are called in more dignified language. During the different purges literally hundreds of thousands of students and scientists died in the ever-restless and till this day uncowed Ukraine.

Thousands of Ukrainian students died immediately after the Revolution fighting for the independence of their country. Other thousands vanished following the notorious trials of the "Union for the Liberation of Ukraine" in 1930. Masses of them were shot in 1934 after the assassination of Kirov, the Leningrad Communist overlord, who, as it was later disclosed, was shot on Stalin's orders for

his dangerous popularity and to justify mass executions. Later came the enormous purges of 1937-1939, and so on.

Perhaps it may be of interest to you to read in my narrative, *One of the Fifteen Million*, the story of a very brilliant student, Hawrosh Siry, the young scientists Sawchuk and Professor L., who were imprisoned with me by the NKVD during that purge.

If any reader believes that today some radical changes have come about in the situation or some semblance of justice has appeared in the USSR, I advise him to remember that Ivan Serov, the most dreaded hatchet man of the Russian Communist empire, is the contemporary chief of the secret police of the USSR, holding ministerial rank and the highest decorations the Russians can offer. He was one of the most trusted of Stalin's aides and now is Khrushchev's henchman, just as for many years Khrushchev himself was Stalin's henchman.

I remember how to my amazement, the day after we heard the news of the launching of the first Russian *sputnik*, a young engineer who until a year ago was a student in a Canadian University approached me and asked how much pay Soviet engineers were getting. From the tone of his conversation I realized that to his way of thinking he would be no worse off if suddenly Bulganin became Prime Minister of Canada. In this train of thought, prevalent among some liberal-minded intellectuals, resides the real internal threat to the Western world. Such a change automatically means slavery instead of precious freedom, unfortunately so taken for granted here.

When I was fleeing Ukraine in 1944 with many other refugees and passing through Budapest I recall how young people came up to our train, some of them students from the local university, and eyed us suspiciously and reproachfully.

"Why are you fleeing from the Brother Russians?" they asked.

Our explanations did little to change their friendly attitude toward the Russians. Finally they argued that even if what we said was true, it was of no consequence, for in their own country they would have their own government.

Today they understand very well why we fled from the "brother Russians" but for this understanding they have paid dearly. In their struggle to regain their country from Moscow's suzerain the Russian brothers mowed them down with tanks and machine guns on their own streets and around the massive walls of their university.

PASTERNAK AND KHVYLOVY

By CLARENCE A. MANNING

Forty years after the event we still lack a true artistic evaluation of the collapse of the Russian Empire in 1917. That collapse, which was hailed as the opening of a new period of democracy, heralded not a step forward in the history of humanity but the creation of a soulless tyranny, more rigid and unfeeling than any previously known in human history and which has succeeded in harnessing the age-old conception of slavery to modern techniques and scientific development. Of the many books that have been published abroad, few have tried with artistic value to picture this fantastic development. Within the Soviet Union the rigid Soviet censorship has doomed to silence if not to liquidation most of the men who could have expressed themselves from personal experience and through its theory of socialist realism has reduced all the writing of the last thirty years to a dull and monotonous level of hopeless mediocrity and flattery.

In this gloomy swamp, two men have stood out. One is Boris Pasternak with his novel, *Doctor Zhivago*. The other was Mykola Khvylovy, a Ukrainian veteran of the Civil War and the struggle for the establishment of a Ukrainian culture who was forced by the Soviet power to commit suicide in 1933, his sole alternative to arrest and liquidation. The difference in their careers and origin is enormous, but to the thinking reader they both conveyed the same truth and uttered the same warning to the world. Both men handled in their works the same period in history. From different motives, both told a small part of the truth of what was going on about them. Khvylovy paid with his life for his revelations; the end of Pasternak is yet to come.

The circumstances under which *Doctor Zhivago* appeared could not fail to attract world attention. Boris Pasternak, apparently a Jew who has accepted Christianity, is the son of a distinguished artist, who went abroad early in the Revolution. Boris chose to remain and became recognized as one of the outstanding poets of the modernist school. Completely apolitical, he was devoted to

literature in the most extreme sense, but since his style of writing did not find favor with the Communist authorities, he relapsed into a silence broken only by translations of world masterpieces and works from the non-Russian languages in the USSR. Then after the death of Stalin and the apparent easing of the censorship, he submitted the manuscript of his novel to the Soviet authorities. Encouraged by the changes of publication, he sent a copy to a publisher in Italy. When publication in the Soviet Union was banned, he was ordered to recover the manuscript for "revision and correction." The publisher refused to return it and issued a translation in Italian and then followed it up with translations into other European languages. Everywhere the novel became a best seller, and its fame increased the more when the Swedish Academy awarded it the Nobel Prize for Literature. Then the storm broke loose.

With the obvious approval of Khrushchev, the Union of Soviet Writers passed resolutions denouncing the book and the author. It cast out Pasternak from membership and called loudly for his expulsion from Soviet citizenship and his physical removal from the USSR. Pasternak, who had at first accepted the prize, had no desire to leave his native land and appealed to Khrushchev for permission to remain. He rejected the prize on the ground that he could not sympathize with the way in which his novel was being handled abroad as an anti-Soviet piece of literature. This explanation of course did not satisfy the world outside the Iron Curtain and it is still not clear what Pasternak's fate will be in the next years, but it promises not to be even as agreeable as it has been in the past.

Most of the action in the novel takes place between the Revolution of 1905 and the end of the period of Militant Communism and the beginning of the NEP, about 1922, and although Zhivago did not die until 1929, his fate was decided in these years. In a few pages Pasternak gives us a picture of his complete mental, moral and physical disintegration under the new regime and as a result of his past experiences. Yet the novel is almost as expressive for what it omits as for what it describes. Except for a few pages on Zhivago's experiences in the Russian army in Galicia during World War I as a surgeon, the scene is laid entirely in Moscow or the Urals, Great Russian territory, and Pasternak avoids any references to the nationality problems in either Russia or the USSR. In the same way, he scarcely mentions either the leaders of the Revolution or their opponents. So far as possible Yuri Zhivago avoids contact

with the leading men or movements on either side of the barricades. He is as apolitical as is Pasternak himself.

In this respect Zhivago and many of his friends are typical of the older intelligentsia so often pictured in the Russian literature before the Revolution. They are men of the highest ideals who enjoy talking *ad infinitum* about progress and dreams but have no interest in making any of their policies work in the cruel cold light of day. Zhivago and his friend Gordon and many others are under the influence of Zhivago's uncle, Nikolay Nikolayevich Vedenyapin, a man who is chiefly interested in the development of a newer and better philosophy of life and dabbles in all the causes of the day. Zhivago himself believes that the communications between mortals are immortal and furnish the chief meaning to life, that they are almost more important than the ordinary elements of livelihood, and he can honestly sympathize with the childlike but serious Lara who says of her husband, Pashenka Antipov, who served first in the Russian army and then as a Red commander: "He sulked at the course of events. He quarreled with history. To this day he is trying to get even with it. That's what makes him so insanely defiant. It's the stupid ambition that's driving him to his death" (p. 405).*

Zhivago had none of that spirit. A favored person under the old regime, he could not breathe freely and welcomed the new. He could have stood the physical hardship but not the senseless brutality and inhumanity that were revealed. He could not be happy and work or write successfully in a regime founded upon hate and violence and his experiences showed him that despite the promises of the Revolution, the moral condition of man had deteriorated still more. He could not stand the cynical advocates of the old regime like the lawyer Komarovsky, but he was equally depressed by the supporters of the new, even a friend like Dudorov who had adapted himself to the new times. "Dudorov's pious platitudes were in the spirit of the times. But it was precisely their conformism, their transparent sanctimoniousness that exasperated Yuri Andreyovich. Men who are not free, he thought, always idealize their bondage. So it was in the Middle Ages, and later the Jesuits always exploited this human trait. Zhivago could not bear the political mysticism of the Soviet intelligentsia, though it was the very thing they regarded as their highest achievement" (p. 482).

Yet it was this same Dudorov who to a trusted friend could say, "World War II came as a breath of fresh air, a purifying storm,

* The American edition of *Doctor Zhivago.*

a breath of deliverance. I think that collectivization was an erroneous and unsuccessful measure and it was impossible to admit the error. To conceal the failure people had to be cured, by every means of terrorism, of the habit of thinking and judging for themselves, and forced to see what didn't exist, to assert the very opposite of what their eyes told them. This accounts for the unexampled cruelty of the Yezhov period, the promulgation of a constitution that was never meant to be applied, and the introduction of elections that violated the very principle of free choice." (p. 507).

The novel, which is well written and well organized, flies directly in the face of the accepted doctrine of the socialist realism which prescribes a positive hero struggling against odds for the achieving of socialism and triumphing over the evil plots of the hostile bourgeois. Doctor Zhivago realizes the limitations of the latter and their artificial character. On his return to Moscow after the outbreak of the Revolution, he sees this. "His friends had become strangely dim and colorless. Not one of them had preserved his own outlook, his own world. They had been much more vivid in his memory. He must have overestimated them in the past . . . The moment the lower classes had risen, and the privileges of those on top had been abolished, how quickly had these people faded, how unregretfully had they renounced independent ideas—apparently no one had ever had such ideas." (p. 174f). But the Revolution did not give other ideas. It was merely a process of the disintegration of the old, of the loss not only of the trappings of empire but of the natural decent instincts of humanity as well, a disintegration which a man with the sensitiveness of a Zhivago could not struggle against in any sphere. He could not even make an attempt.

The only conclusion is that of Gordon at the very end. "It has often happened in history that a lofty ideal has degenerated into crude materialism. Thus Greece gave way to Rome, and the Russian Enlightenment has become the Russian Revolution. There is a great difference between the two periods." (p. 518). The effect is like that of Tolstoy's battle scenes in his war stories or in *War and Peace* where he pictures the fog of war and of battle and cannot and will not see the lines of thought and action that are producing the given result. Yet the novel shows the barrenness of Russian culture and leaves behind a message of futility. We can only wonder whether Gordon and Dudorov have any more roots in reality than Zhivago and the unfortunate Lara, who are doomed to be tossed about on the tides of life without making headway against the current. We can well see why the novel aroused the displeasure of the Soviet regime; it asserts that only human nature and its

ideals are lasting and constructive and not the logical and pedantic application of the ramblings of Karl Marx, Lenin, Stalin, and even Khrushchev.

After forty years Pasternak expressed his feeling in *Doctor Zhivago* that the Russian Revolution had been a process of disintegration, not of reformation, that it had not only devoured its children like Antipov-Strelnikov, but that it had deadened and perverted the dreams and ideals of humanity. That sense had been grasped thirty years earlier by Mykola Khvylovy, the ideological leader of the Ukrainian Renaissance in the nineteen twenties.

Khvylovy, who was only three years younger than Pasternak, could not accept this process of disintegration without a protest. Through a mistaken idealism and a belief in the teaching of Communist internationalism, Khvylovy had served in the Ukrainian Communist army in its war against the Ukrainian National Republic. He had looked forward to the creation of a new world in which each nation, each people and each person would have the right and the opportunity to develop its own qualities, its own mode of life. He was all too soon disillusioned when the ending of the war showed that Ukraine was to be forced to fit itself again into the Muscovite pattern. There was a great gulf, he realized, between the high ideals which he had served and the sordid reality that was to take the place of those ideals and to which he was asked to give a false coloration. He realized very soon that he was being asked to give up his faith not only in Ukraine as an independent state and the Ukrainian Communist Party as an independent political organization but also Ukrainian cultural life and all those features that had marked the development of the Ukrainian peasant throughout the ages.

It was ideals mistaken but ideals, nevertheless, that led Khvylovy into the ranks of the Ukrainian Communist Party at a time when it still looked as if that party would become a full-fledged member of the Communist International. Khvylovy fought it, only to be dismayed when the Ukrainian Communist Party was denied admission to the International and reduced to a Ukrainian branch of the Russian Communist Party, which presumed to speak for all citizens of the former Russian Empire. Yet although he had been mistaken in his political affiliations, Khvylovy loved Ukraine, the Ukrainian past, the Ukrainian Kozaks, and the Ukrainian mode of life. Few of his own day were more in love than he with the past and there were few who served their ideals any more stubbornly and positively. Not a man to be satisfied with a futile surrender,

to the end of his life Khvylovy remained an obstinate defender of all in which he believed.

A man of action as well as thought, Khvylovy saw the closest realization of his dream in the days of the civil war. That was the golden age of his life and activity; and he could look back upon those years in their more brilliant moments as a prototype of what the future should have brought. As Yurko, in the story of the same name in *Blue Studies*, writes to a friend, " I still hear the cannon, I still see barricades. I swear to you that I am a Communist. But I will not endure this quiet," which offered only more signs of man's inhumanity to man.

The prose of life was so different from the vision. Khvylovy early became convinced that something was wrong. He showed it in *I*, perhaps the greatest and most tragic of all his stories. The narrator sees himself forced into a terrible position: he is a member of the group investigating and punishing counter-revolution, and he realizes that that committee is headed by sadists and degenerates, that its sentences are based not upon justice but upon the lust for killing. I's mother, a harmless old woman, whom he sincerely loves, is arrested for being with a group of nuns and I is assigned to kill her "to save the revolution." Failure to comply would mean his execution as a betrayer of the revolution. To I, his mother, unjustly sentenced to death to satisfy the thirst for blood of a pack of degenerates, symbolizes Ukraine itself, bleeding and dying to satisfy the greed and bloodthirstiness of her neighbors.

Khvylovy saw that he had no hope of seeing Ukraine take its rightful place in the new communist constellation but he welcomed the movement for official Ukrainization, the attempts to improve Ukrainian culture which he interpreted in his own way. Thus he early joined the literary society *Hart*, which endeavored to form a Ukrainian proletarian literature. When Khvylovy saw that this was more concerned with quantity than with quality he left it and finally formed another group, the VAPLITE, the Free Academy of Proletarian Literature, around which there gathered the most important writers of the twenties. Inspired by Khvylovy, these men worked zealously to improve the quality of the literature, to introduce and examine new ideas and to work for the building up of Ukrainian life in the cultural field.

Step by step they were forced into active opposition to the Russian and Ukrainian puppets who were dominating Ukraine and trying to spread in the country that same sordid disregard of all higher values that Pasternak pictured in *Doctor Zhivago*. Khvylovy protested, and opened the so-called Literary Discussion, in which

he boldly challenged the tenets of Moscow that Ukrainian culture and Ukrainian literature were only the results of the beneficient actions of the older brother, the Great Russians. It finally led him to proclaim that the future of Ukrainian culture lay in cutting itself loose from the apron-strings of Moscow and turning for inspiration to Europe, the guardian of that sacred tradition of the human spirit that from the time of classical antiquity had led in the task of developing and freeing the human spirit.

This challenge, which was supported in a less violent form even by such an old Bolshevik as Mykola Skrypnyk, the Commissar for Education, aroused a storm in Moscow and called forth the direct interposition of Stalin as the First Secretary of the Communist Party. Stalin demanded the condemnation of Khvylovy, since at the very time Stalin was claiming that the workers of the world were looking to Moscow and its Communist leaders for guidance toward a new life, Khvylovy in Ukraine was denouncing Moscow for its blindness and its tyranny and insisting upon things that Moscow knew had to be abolished.

At the same time Khvylovy also preached that on the way was an Asiatic Renaissance, a new awakening of the nations of Asia under the leadership of those ideas of freedom that he was demanding for Ukraine. All this led to sharper and sharper disputes, and when Khvylovy wrote an article, *Ukraine or Little Russia*, the Communist dictators of Ukraine forbade its publication.

In 1928 Khvylovy commenced the publication of his novel, *The Woodcock*. This is a dialogue in the form of a novel incorporating those ideas which Khvylovy had indicated in his short stories and had expressed in essay form in his contributions to the Literary Discussion. The hero, Dmytri Karamazov, had formely fought in the Ukrainian Communist army and like Khvylovy himself, had become disgusted with the course of events. He began to sink into that slough of despond into which Doctor Zhivago slips so easily. His wife Hanna has already become committed to following the Party decrees unthinkingly, but still half alive in Dmytri are those ideals of the revival of his people for which he had struggled.

While his wife is trying to lull them completely to sleep, he meets Aglaya, a Russian girl who has learned Ukrainian because she finds among the Ukrainians those possibilities for understanding and development, for independent thinking, that she does not find among her own people. Aglaya sets out to fan the dying spark in Dmytri. He argues that he is for the renaissance of his people and that the way leads to the sharp differentiation of social classes and socialism; she in return assures him that all this is

nonsense. As she says, "The Communists, although they are sometimes people, are usually terribly limited. Their point of view—I can assert—goes no further than a Chamberlain in a monocle and a regular party cell." Later she amplifies her statement and says of Karamazov, "Karamazov has been fascinated by the social revolution, by its scope and the social ideals that it has written on its banners. In the name of those ideals, he would go to death, or in conditioning, to a thousand deaths. But how would Dmytri Karamazov feel if he, falling into a 'socialist' environment, saw that nothing came out of it and that the Communist Party was gradually changing into the usual 'collector of the Russian lands' and descending, so to speak, to be the brake on the interests of a clever ordinary bourgeois. This is too much, for in the view of Karamazov this average fellow always is and has been the threatening nightmare on the way to true progress and so, in his view, to pure socialism."

The second part of the novel was already in print when the Soviet authorities struck and compelled Khvylovy to destroy the rest of the work, so that it is only from fragments of the second part that we know something of the development. Aglaya, and apparently Karamazov with her, mince no words in pointing out that the whole of the Communist pattern as it was formulated in Moscow was nothing but a sordid and inhuman form of zoological nationalism, trampling on the most sacred rights of the individual in order to put in power the worse elements of the population—swindling, parasitical individuals who have learned how to misuse the aspirations of humanity to maintain the worst features of the old Czarist Russian rule. Aglaya called on the Ukrainians to rise against this colossal and all-devouring monster and at the risk of their very lives to overthrow the wretched sham that had been erected by Lenin through his false interpretation of the thoughts of Marx.

The constant Soviet threats of punishment had no effect upon the spirit of Khvylovy; he continued to seek ways and means for preaching in ambiguous forms the same doctrines which he had openly declared for. Finally, in 1933, when Stalin was carrying on the mass starvation of the Ukrainian peasants through the period of collectivization, it was decided to finish with this trouble-maker. Yet once again Khvylovy scored over the enemy: in May, 1933, he committed suicide before arrangements could be made to seize him.

Stalin was not to be thwarted. Within a short time he had liquidated, executed or exiled the whole school of Ukrainian writers who had been influenced by Khvylovy, for one and all had expressed in their works their conviction that the promises and dreams and

glorious pictures painted by Moscow were only devices to entrench the blackest reaction that mankind has ever known.

The writings of Khvylovy and his friends attracted little attention outside the borders of Ukraine. Neither did the artificial starvation of millions of Ukrainian peasants. Instead, scholars and political thinkers talked vaguely of the great experiment in human progress which was being made by the Communists. Later, during World War II, the leaders of the free world were only too willing to take Stalin at his own valuation. They catered to him on all possible occasions, only to find upon awakening that he had swallowed almost a half of Europe and a large part of Asia, bringing additional millions of people under his inhuman rule. They then realized that his plans were a universal menace, but even when he died, they again were only too willing to believe the best of his henchman Khrushchev.

A momentary relaxation of the censorship and the iron pressure that had been exerted by Stalin brought on the revolts in Poland and Hungary. It brought the penetration of the outside world by *Doctor Zhivago*, the supposed memoirs of a man who merely wanted to live without doing any wrong and to maintain his human dignity. It is almost the first novel of protest by a Great Russian, but it is in a way a futile protest, for throughout his entire career Doctor Zhivago was willing to suffer silently, while his friends are like those young industrialists and scientists who are met today on all levels of Soviet contact with foreigners, men who know and perform well the tasks assigned to them without raising any impertinent or misplaced questions which might involve them in difficulties with the Moscow juggernaut. They do not question as, thirty years ago, Khvylovy and his friends questioned; and paid the price.

The appearance first of Khvylovy and now of the novel of Pasternak shows the extent of the danger that faces the world. That danger demands a decisive answer of relentless opposition to the claims of Moscow, a stubborn and reasoned resistance and a firm desire on the part of the still free nations to tighten their own ranks, and to continue to resist until the curse of Russian Communism is eliminated. It is not a question of compromising to please the so-called neutralists. It is a question of convincing these of the truth of human dignity and freedom or of proceeding to the goal of destiny without them. It is a question of making freedom one and indivisible throughout the earth as the only base for a road leading to a better and more cooperative world.

THE UKRAINIAN STATE — A LEGALLY CONSTITUTED ENTITY

By BOHDAN T. HALAJCZUK

The Ukrainian state, re-established forty years ago, has returned to the international community: among the various manifestations of its international legal subjectivity is, in the first place, the use of the active and passive privilege of legality.

We speak of a return and not of an entrance into the international community because the Ukrainian state belonged to it in both the Middle Ages and recent times. The Grand Principality of Kiev maintained extensive diplomatic relations, especially at the end of the Xth and the beginning of the XIth centuries. The relations of the Galician-Volhynian Principality (which became a kingdom in 1253), had a narrower territorial range but were nonetheless extremely intensive and continuous. This was so because that state, which was the direct continuation of the Kievan State, constituted an integral part of Central Europe in the XIIIth and XIVth centuries, and along with the latter, formed part of the *Res publica Christiana* of the Middle Ages. But we do not consider it justifiable to apply to the relations of the Middle Ages such an international concept as the principle of legality, taking into consideration the fact that the present international order is a creation of modern times (concretely, of the so-called Spanish School of the XVIth and XVIIth centuries originated by Francisco de Vitoria), applied to modern relations (the end of the Middle Ages unity, seeing the parceling of Europe into national sovereign states.)

Therefore, we shall deal only briefly with the Ukrainian state of modern times—the Republic of the Zaporozhian Kozaks, 1540-1775, and the elective monarchy under the *hetmans*, 1648-1782—despite the fact that the diplomatic relations of that republic were much more modest in scope as compared with either the Kievan or the Galician-Volhynian State.

Although the Zaporozhian Republic was a unique state creation, especially at the beginning of the XVIIIth century (its state character was even questioned by some legal historians), from time

to time it received the diplomatic representatives of the Pope, the German Emperor, the Muscovite Czar (in the second half of the XVIth and in the first half of the XVIIth centuries) and, in turn, dispatched its own diplomatic emissaries (the Crimean Khan, the Prince of Wallachia, etc.).

The *Hetmanite* State initially developed an extensive and dynamic diplomatic activity, which eventually slackened off after the death of the first *hetman*, Bohdan Khmelnytsky (1648-1657) and came to an end at the end of the XVIIth century as a result of the consolidation of the Russian hegemony. On the basis of the first Ukrainian-Russian treaty, concluded at Pereyaslav in 1654, Ukraine lost the right of diplomatic relations with two nations, Poland and Turkey (Art. 5), but in reality this limitation was never implemented. In 1659 Russia again tried to deprive Ukraine of all diplomatic relations (Art. 9), but succeeded in attaining her purpose only after a series of wars in which the successors of Khmelnytsky (*Hetmans* Yuri Khmelnytsky, Ivan Vyhovsky and Petro Doroshenko) endeavored, with Polish and with Turkish assistance, to break off relations between Ukraine and Russia. Only after Russia managed to bring about the diplomatic isolation of Ukraine (once having divided Ukraine between Russia and Poland under the provisions of the Treaty of Andrusiv in 1667), was she able to cause Ukraine to lose her international legal significance. On the basis of the Ukrainian-Russian treaty of 1672 (Art. 8), Ukraine lost even the right to send its own plenipotentiaries, along with the Russian, to the international conferences dealing with Ukrainian matters.

In the *Hetmanite* State diplomatic relations were entrusted to to a General Military Secretary, a post which corresponded to that of Chancellor in Western European states at that time. He was empowered to dispatch diplomatic representatives, usually high-ranking military leaders (colonels). In Western Europe regular diplomatic missions had already been established by the XVth century, but in Eastern Europe they were still to be firmly established at the time of the creation of the Ukrainian *Hetmanite* State. For instance, the first Russian diplomatic mission (in Warsaw) was established only in 1673. It is then not surprising that the *Hetmanite* State did not maintain regular diplomatic missions, but contented itself with sending special missions to fulfill a concrete task or to sign a treaty. The Ukrainian government refused to accept the Russian proposal (in 1659 and 1669) to establish a permanent Ukrainian diplomatic representation in Moscow. In the XVIIIth century there appeared at the court of the *Hetman* Russian diplomatic representatives who were called residents and whose function was to control

the Ukrainian government, rather than represent the Russian government. This was the Russian practice in all dependent states.[1]

In the expansion of the network of diplomatic missions of the reborn Ukrainian state there are three separate stages:

(1) The first republican government (the Ukrainian Central *Rada*) entered into diplomatic relations with the *Entente* by receiving the diplomatic representatives of Great Britain, France and Rumania and sending its own diplomatic representatives to the Rumanian capital, mainly for liaison with the ministers of Great Britain, France, and the United States. It also signed a peace treaty with the Central Powers, which ruptured relations with France and Great Britain, but it did not succeed in exchanging diplomatic representatives with Germany and Austro-Hungary, its diplomatic contact being limited to German and Austro-Hungarian military occupational authorities in Ukraine.

(2) The *Hetmanite* government established a broad network of diplomatic missions by establishing Ukrainian representation in 10 different countries and by accepting accredited ministers from 11 foreign countries in Kiev. To begin with, it exchanged diplomatic representatives with the four nations constituting the Central Powers (Germany, Austro-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria), thus in great measure rendering itself independent of the German military command in Ukraine. Later on the *Hetmanite* government sent representatives to the new independent states which freed themselves of the Russian domination (Finland, Poland, Georgia, the Don and Kuban Territories) and also to some neutral nations (Switzerland, Denmark and Sweden).

(3) The second Republican Ukrainian government (the Directorate), which gave up its capital because of the shifting of the front lines, as a result could not receive foreign diplomatic representatives, with the exception of the commandant of the French Expeditionary Forces that disembarked in Odessa (who, however, did not possess a diplomatic character). The Directorate sent a Ukrainian delegation to the Peace Conference in Paris (the delegation constituted at the same time the Ukrainian diplomatic representation in France) and a series of other diplomatic missions to the nations of the *Entente* (Great Britain, the United States,

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[1] Andriy Yakovliv: *Ukrainsko-moskovski dohovory v* 17-18 *vikakh* (*Ukrainian-Russian Treaties in the XVII and XVIIIth Centuries*). Warsaw, 1934; Lev Okinshevych: *Lektsiyi z istoriyi ukrainskoho prava* (*Lectures on History of Ukrainian Law*), Munich, 1947, p. 46; Borys Krupnytsky: *Encyclopedia ukrainoznavstva* (*Encyclopedia of Ukrainian Knowledge*), Vol. II, pp. 458-9.

Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Greece), the Vatican and to the new nations established at the end of 1918 (the Baltic States and Czechoslovakia), as well as to the independent Hungary. When in exile the government of the Directorate designated a Ukrainian minister to Argentina, who did not, however, leave for his post.

Western Ukraine had sent a separate delegation to the Paris Peace Conference and a series of diplomatic missions to the states which once had formed the Austro-Hungarian empire (Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia), to Italy, and to the countries which had a sizable emigration from Western Ukraine: Canada, the United States and Brazil.

According to the generally accepted norms of customary international law, only states recognized *de jure* enjoy the right of legal entity, an active and passive right, which entitles them to the privilege of receiving official and plenipotentiary diplomatic representatives (in the rank of ambassador, minister, resident, or charge d'affaires). Eventually, an unrecognized state can exchange a semi-official representative, who is called chief of diplomatic mission, diplomatic or political agent, or commissioner, and who does not possess the normal diplomatic privileges (immunity of person or building, exemption from the jurisdiction of local courts and administration and from taxes, and an uncontrolled courier and telegraphic liaison with his own government, and the like). These privileges, to be sure, are granted only as a courtesy by the government involved. The political status of such an unofficial representative depends on the political situation of his own country (the degree of stabilization and consolidation, the prospect of maintaining independence, and so forth), the interest or the disinterest shown by the local government in maintaining friendly relations with the new country, and so on.[2]

Accredited to the Ukrainian government were the official representatives ("Envoys Extraordinary and Ministers Plenipotentiary") of Germany (its envoy in Kiev held the rank of ambassador), Austro-Hungary, Turkey, Bulgaria, and the Don. In all these countries (from the end of 1918—especially in Austria and separately in Hungary) there were accredited Ukrainian ministers. A Polish minister was accredited to Kiev, but the outbreak of the Ukrainian-Polish war for Galicia prevented the establishment of a Ukrainian legation in Warsaw. Moreover, a series of states accepted Ukrainian

[2] This matter is analyzed by the author in a work entitled, *Dyplomatychna sluzhba* (*The Diplomatic Service*), published under the pen-name of B. Halyniak, Innsbruck, 1945 (pp. 62-65).

representatives without sending in turn their own diplomatic representatives to Ukraine: Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Latvia, Finland (in Kiev there resided a Finnish diplomatic mission) and Georgia. The Ukrainian minister in Tiflis was also accredited to governments of Azerbaijan, the North Caucasus and the Kuban (both Georgia and the Kuban were represented in Kiev by diplomatic missions, Azerbaijan by a commissioner). Rumania exchanged a semi-official representative with Ukraine at the end of 1917; and at the end of 1918 Rumania received a Ukrainian minister and sent to Kiev a special mission (to conclude a treaty), but was unable to dispatch a diplomatic mission.

As we see, some of the newly-established states sent only diplomatic missions to Kiev, although they could have sent ministers as well, inasmuch as a mutual diplomatic recognition was enjoyed by Ukraine and these states. Also, there was only a Ukrainian mission in the Vatican, although the recognition of Ukraine by the Apostolic See could be interpreted as definite (*de jure*).

The French government was represented in Ukraine by a "Commissioner of the French Republic," the British government by a "Representative of Great Britain." Ukrainian diplomatic missions functioned in those countries which only temporarily recognized Ukraine (Switzerland, Denmark, Sweden); in those which revoked recognition of Ukraine (Great Britain and France) and in those which did not recognize Ukraine at all (the United States, Italy, Greece and Belgium).

On the other hand, Ukrainian ministers were listed in the directories of the diplomatic corps in those capitals to which they were accredited, and as a matter of routine, were members of the diplomatic corps as well (they were listed in the Almanac of Gotha). As a result of the abnormal conditions ensuing from the fall of the Central Powers there were two cases of violation of immunity: one on the Ukrainian legation building in Budapest(for which the Hungarian communist government of Bela Kun sent an official apology to the Ukrainian government) and the other in Constantinople (on the part of the occupation authorities of the *Entente*, before which the Turkish government was powerless).[3]

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[3] *Dyplomatychna istoriya Ukrainy v rr.* 1917-21 (*The Diplomatic History of Ukraine in the Years* 1917-21); Elias Bortschak: *La paix ukrainienne de Brest Litovsk*, Paris, 1934 and *L'Ukraine a la Conference de la Paix*, Paris, 1938 (reprints from *Le Monde Slave*), and an extensive work in the manuscript; Vasyl Kuchabsky: *Die Ukraine in Kampfe gegen Polen und Sowjetrussland*, Berlin, 1934; Dmytro Doroshenko: *Istoriya ukrainskoyi derzhavy* (*The History of the Ukrainian State*), Uzhorod, 1930-32 (Two volumes). There is an abun-

After the fall of the Ukrainian independent state some of the foreign governments suspended their relations with the Ukrainian diplomatic missions; others, as soon as they recognized the government of the USSR, proceeded to hand over the Ukrainian legation buildings and other properties to the Soviet government. In other countries the Ukrainian diplomatic missions ceased their activities gradually owing to lack of funds. Hence the Ukrainian government in exile was unable to preserve its diplomatic posts in foreign countries even to the modest extent managed by the present-day Polish government in exile in London.

The government of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, despite the fact it enjoyed a full international personality (juridical person) until 1923 and concluded a series of international treaties, had regular diplomatic missions only in Berlin, Prague and Warsaw.[4]

Since 1944 the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic has a theoretical right to maintain its diplomatic missions abroad, but could not avail itself of this prerogative (it rejected a British proposal to exchange ambassadorships several years ago). It has now a permanent delegation accredited to the United Nations which arrived at the U.N. in the middle of 1958.[5]

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dance of material on the same subject in the memoirs of A. Margolin, A. Lototzky, I. Mazepa, E. Onatsky and other Ukrainian diplomats of that time, as well as in the memoirs of foreign representatives and diplomats of that time, such as French General Tabouis and Austrian Foreign Minister Count Ottokar von Czernin, and others. For the legal bases of Ukrainian diplomacy and ordinances on Ukrainian foreign service, see: Khrapko, *Laws and Decrees of Ukrainian Foreign Service* (in Ukrainian); the legal international status of separate Ukrainian diplomatic missions, from the viewpoint of degree of recognition of the Ukrainian state, is analyzed in my work, *El Estado Ucranio del siglo* 20 (pp. 101-102) and bibliography (pp. 103-105), Buenos Aires, 1953. On the basis of the latter work and with the complementary work of Dr. Vasyl Markus, was written my article, "Diplomacy," for the *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, which is being published by the Shevchenko Scientific Society in Paris.

[4] The legal status of Soviet Ukraine before the establishment of the USSR is thoroughly analyzed by Dr. Vasyl Markus in his doctorate thesis presented at the Department of Law, University of Paris.

[5] Cf. Bohdan T. Halajczuk: "Has the U.S. Recognized Ukraine?", *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, Winter, 1955, pp. 24-28.

MARKO VOVCHOK: A UKRAINIAN SCOURGE OF RUSSIAN SERFDOM

(On the centenary of her *Tales of the Common People*)

By YAR SLAVUTYCH

Marko Vovchok (pseudonym of Mariya Markovych, a major Ukrainian writer) is generally credited as one of the most powerful voices in literature to have been raised against Russian serfdom. Her *Narodni Opovidannya* (*Tales of the Common People*), published in 1858 (the book was printed actually in December of 1857), exerted a great influence on public opinion and, it has often been pointed out, precipitated the issue of the so-called *krestyanskaya reforma* in 1861.

The 1850's were extremely difficult years for Ukrainian literature. *Kyrylo-metodiyivske bratstvo* (*The Society of Saints Cyril and Methodius*), a secret Ukrainian political organization which struggled for equal rights and independence for all Slavic nations,[1] was uncovered and dissolved in 1847 by the Russian government. Its members were exiled from Ukraine. Taras Shevchenko, for example, was deported to a camp near the Caspian Sea and there "forbidden either to write or paint." At the same time the Ukrainian language was denounced by the official government apparatus. In fact, Ukrainian literary life almost died out altogether. From 1847 to 1856 there appeared only nineteen publications in Ukrainian;[2] all were of minor importance. The Zaporozhian *Sich,* a Ukrainian military order considered as the army of the country, had been perfidiously destroyed by the Russian troops as early as 1775. Subsequently, almost the whole of once free Ukraine had gradually become a province of Russia. The free people were turned into serfs without any fundamental rights; they could be sold outright or exchanged for dogs or household items. This was serfdom as practiced in Russia. The Ukrainian elite, in the course of time, became Russian-

[1] Cf. John P. Sydoruk, *Ideology of Cyrillo-Methodians and its Origin,* Winnipeg: *Slavistica,* No. 19. 1954.

[2] O. Zasenko, *Narodni opovidannya Marka Vovchka...* in *Marko Vovchok: Statti i doslidzennya,* Kiev: *Akademiya Nauk Ukrainskoyi RSR,* 1957 p. 6.

ized, and the nation was all but extinct by the turn of the nineteenth century.

Among the Ukrainian writers, the first to picture the harsh life of the peasants was Ivan Kotlyarevsky (1769-1838). In his plays *Natalka Poltavka* (1819) and *Moskal-charivnyk*, he revealed the human qualities of the simple villagers, their love of freedom and work, the simple honesty and justice with which they conducted their affairs. This study was further developed by Hryhoriy Kvitka-Osnovyanenko (1778-1843), who in his novels, such as *Marusya* (1834) and *Serdeshna Oksana* (1841), showed himself to be a true defender of the peasantry. However, Kvitka-Osnovyanenko's criticism of Russian serfdom was mild. Taras Shevchenko (1814-1861) attacked it more powerfully: in a wholly unprecedented manner he shook serfdom with his fiery poems until he was arrested in 1847 and exiled. At that critical juncture Marko Vovchok arose as a determined disciple of Shevchenko and propagator of his ideas.

Marko Vovchok (maiden name: Mariya Oleksandrivna Vilinska) was born in 1834 of a Russianized family of Ukrainian descent in the Orel region of Russia. Although Russian and French were the languages ordinarily used at home, it is known that "Ukrainian proverbs, sayings, and songs were often heard there."[3] Mariya completed her education in Kharkiv, Ukraine, in a school for girls of the nobility. In 1851, while in Orel, she married Opanas Markovych, a Ukrainian ethnographer and former member of the Society of Saints Cyril and Methodius who had been forbidden to live in Kiev and had been exiled to Russia. The couple moved to Ukraine and lived there in Chernihiv, Nemyriv and other towns. Opanas taught in the schools and continued his work in ethnography. Mariya, influenced by her husband, a great Ukrainian patriot and defender of freedom, studied the peasant life and mastered Ukrainian, the language of her forebears. In 1854 she sent several newly found folk songs to poet A. Metlynsky, who published them in his collection of Ukrainian folklore the same year. This may be considered her literary debut. Also about this time she started working on her short stories.

The appearance of Marko Vovchok's *Tales* in 1858 was a sensation which provoked wide discussion among the rising Ukrainian intellectuals. Her publisher Panteleimon Kulish, a writer himself, enthusiastically greeted the young author:

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[3] Percival Cundy, *Marko Vovchok* in *The Ukrainian Quarterly, Vol. III* No. 2, 1947, p. 120.

The great merit of these *Tales* consists in the fact that they describe our people as they actually are, not as we see them from the outside, but as they regard each other... Such stories as these by Marko Vovchok (God grant there may be more of them!) will in time become fundamental in our national literature.[4]

Taras Shevchenko, who had spent ten years in exile and was then on his way home, greeted the author of *Tales* even more fervently:

> God sent to us in you a mild and tender prophet,
> A bitter scourge of all the greedy and ruthless men.[5]

Broken and exhausted by exile, with his "poor and shattered heart," Shevchenko at once recognized Marko Vovchok as his "holy star... and darling daughter" who was destined to continue his work.

The success and fame of *Tales* grew day by day. The book also attracted the progressive Russian intellectuals who protested against serfdom. Ivan Turgenev, the author of *Zapiski okhotnika* (*A Sportman's Sketches,* 1852), whose sentiments resembled those of Marko Vovchok, translated *Tales* into Russian, and the book appeared in 1859 under the title *Ukrainskiye narodnye rozskazy.* In his foreword the translator acknowledged that the name of Marko Vovchok had become "dear and familiar to all her compatriots."[6]

Tales consisted of only eleven stories. Human suffering and the brutalities of serfdom, introduced in the annexed Ukraine by Russia's Catherine II, were depicted here with an unprecedented strength and emotion. The narration is mainly in the first person, a woman, imparting to the stories a wonderful flavor of intimacy and candor. In *Horpyna,* for example, the author tells about a woman who with her husband and other serfs is compelled to work six days a week for her master. When her only baby gets sick, the master sends the woman to glean his harvest: "You must work for me! Don't fuss with your child!"[7] The baby left without care, dies, and the suffering mother goes insane. The story is a condemnation of serfdom and its bestiality. As scholar Clarence A. Manning has aptly noted, Marko Vovchok "does not hesitate... to emphasize the differences between the small proprietors and the serfs."[8] *A Kozak Woman* serves as a fine example. The young girl Olesya, daughter of rich Kozak Khmara, falls in love with Ivan Zolotarenko, a serf.

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[4] *Ibid.,* p. 116.

[5] Taras Shevchenko, *Selected Poems,* translated with an introduction by Clarence A. Manning. Jersey City: Ukrainian National Association, 1945, p. 189.

[6] O. Zasenko, *ibid.,* p. 83.

[7] Marko Vovchok, *Vybrani tvory,* Kiev: *Derzhlitvydav,* 1949, p. 33.

[8] Clarence A. Manning, *Ukrainian Literature,* Studies of the Leading Authors. Jersey City: Ukrainian National Association, 1944, p. 64.

Despite strong opposition, she marries him, and her children automatically become serfs by birth. When her oldest son has grown up, he is forcibly taken away to meet the needs of her master, and the mother dies in despair. Moreover, her master, a Russian, refuses to pay the burial expenses because she is not his "natural" serf.

A similar theme is found in the rest of Marko Vovchok's stories. Probably her strongest and most characteristic work is *Ledashchytsia* (*The Good for Nothing*). A free Kozak woman has been made a serf by fraudulent means. Unable to free herself, she uses all possible means to win freedom for her daughter, Nastya. In order to become free, Nastya lives with a man and has a child by him. When she finally realizes that she can never be free, she becomes a drunkard and dies soon after her child's death.

Marko Vovchok possessed an unusual ability to picture the peasant life. Her protagonists are usually of good character, mild, work-loving, obedient and religious. They live and suffer with humility. However, in the story *Karmelyuk*, published in 1867—i. e. after the appearance of *Tales*, the writer presented the historical outlaw Karmelyuk, a Ukrainian Robin Hood who was active in the 1820's. She characterized him as a noble knight who took from the rich and gave to the poor.

Her realistic approach to life was one of the best qualities of her work. The novel *Instytutka*, her longest effort, is a true mirror of nineteeth century life in Ukraine. Depicted therein are the brutal aristocrats and the hapless serfs who obediently work for them but who constantly dream of being free. Serfs by birth, they never give up their slow but stubborn struggle for freedom.

During the 1860's Marko Vovchok lived abroad, principally in Paris.[9] From time to time she visited Germany, England and Italy. Her story *Marusya*, translated into French by P. J. Stahl in 1875, probably in collaboration with the author, remained popular in France for a long time. Only recently it re-appeared in a new edition. This is a fine narrative of a small Ukrainian heroine who dies while discovering a Russian spy. The high moral qualities and a devoted love for the fatherland expressed in the story moved the French ministry of education to recommend it as compulsory reading for yougsters.[10] From the French *Marusya* was translated into English, German, Italian and other languages. Several of Marko

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[9] Cf. I. Borshchak, *Marko Vovchok ta yiyi zvyazky v Paryzhi*, in *Ukraina*, No. 1 ,Paris, 1949.

[10] Mykhailo Tershakovets, *Z nahody novoho vydannya "Marusi,' povisty Marka Vovchka*, in *America*, Ukrainian daily, Philadelphia, Pa., Spring of 1957.

Vovchok's stories, translated by Percival Cundy into English, appeared in *The Ukrainian Weekly,* Jersey City, in March and April of 1955.

The beginning of the 1860's was marked by the activity of Ukrainian writers, and this again alarmed the Russian imperialistic government. In 1863 Count Valuyev, Minister of the Interior, issued a special *ukase* which forbade publication of books in Ukrainian. 'There never has been, is not, and never will be a Ukrainian language" —these were the Minister's words. This was, of course, a heavy blow to Ukrainian literature, which for several decades thereafter was confined to a limited expression in the western part of Ukraine, then under Austrian domination.

To earn her living (especially after her husband's death in 1868) Marko Vovchok started to write in Russian and to translate from French into the Russian. In so doing she was influenced to some extent by Ivan Turgenev, who promised her laurels of immortality in Russian literature. Thus the remaining years of this gifted Ukrainian writer were not spent in the Ukrainian atmosphere.

Although her Russian writings were supported by the editors of *Otechestvennie zapiski,* they are of little value. In most histories of Russian literature the name of Marko Vovchok is not mentioned. But her Ukrainian stories are fundamental in the Ukrainian literature. Written in excellent folk language, they glow with beaty of form and depth of humanity.

The social importance of *Tales,* as well as its artistic significance for Ukrainian literature, is very great. *Tales* influenced many Ukrainian writers. V. Viedina[11] demonstrated that Marko Vovchok's ideas of liberation also influenced Polish authors as well as the participants of the Polish uprising of 1863. The Bulgarian writers Ljuben Karavelov and Todor Vlajkov (Veselin) admitted themselves that Marko Vovchok's works left deep traces in their consciousness and helped them obtain positions of realism in their own writings.[12]

Today there is a great demand for Marko Vovchok's works in Ukraine, especially in the collective farms; the *Tales* are now a scourge of the Soviet Russian modernized serfdom—*kolkhozy* (collective farms).

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[11] *Marko Vovchok: Statti i doslidzennia, ibid.,* p. 283.

[12] *Ezik i literatura,* Monthly, Sofia, 1957. Vol. XII, No. 4, p. 284.

BOOK REVIEWS

HITLER'S OCCUPATION OF UKRAINE, 1941-44. By Ihor Kamenetsky. The Marquette University Press, 1956, Milwaukee, Wis., pp. 101.

The past decade has seen a growing number of studies devoted to the German Nazi debacle in Eastern Europe. These have largely been in the form of monographs and articles. Actually, regardless of the form, there cannot be too much of such study. Among other reasons for this need, the lessons of this disastrous Nazi experience carry considerable weight for a solid formulation of U.S. foreign policy toward the Soviet Union. Albeit in the course of wartime conditions, the East European sector of the USSR revealed how the advantages afforded by war opportunity could be seized to demonstrate to the world the basic and permanent weakness of the present Russian empire. Even in the cold war the structural and organic maladies of the USSR are surely of prime concern in any sound diagnosis of the enemy.

The author of this pioneering systematic study of the subject was in Ukraine during the years of Hitler's occupation. He was forced to leave his native land in 1944 and, for most of the years since, has been studying in this country. The book adequately reflects his own direct experiences and observations, as well as his interpretative insights into this macabre phenomenon. On these bases the study excels the later work by Alexander Dallin on *German Rule in Russia*. In contrast with the latter work, Kamenetsky's study specializes in Ukraine during this period, is less cumbersome to read, provides a clear context of understanding unbeclouded by endless and even dispensable detail, and manifests a firm grasp of the political forces at work in Eastern Europe. Its treatment on the evaluative plane is more objective than the Dallin work which shows all the signs of the author's intent to minimize the significance of nationalism within the borders of the USSR. The Slavic Institute of Marquette University, under whose auspices this study was released, deserves creditable mention for this additional contribution to American scholarship on the problems of Eastern Europe.

In its approach to the actualities of Hitler's occupation the study succinctly describes the unusual economic importance of Ukraine and conclusively shows the economic prize that this country is for any foreign invader, including the Russian. Methodically and in lucidly written style, it then proceeds to develop the ideological and political background to the occupation. The three basic ideas of Nazi occupation policy are all shown to be set forth in *Mein Kampf*: (1) the inferiority of the Slav race, (2) the economic ideality of Eastern Europe, and particularly Ukraine, for German colonization, and (3) expansion through means of physical force and conquest. Supported by careful documentation, these ideas are traced back to sources like Otto von Bismarck, Emperor William I and others. One notable difference between Hitler's ideologic thought and the position of those who preceded him is the primacy that he attached to the peasantry as the core of a nation. Theoretically, this pointed

to a quick and presumably easy transplantation of German peasantry to Eastern Europe. The author's exposition of these ideologic strands in German political thought is logical, coherent, and quite persuasive for those who are prone to subsume or bury the ideologic factor in any discussion of this subject.

His concise portrayal of forces leading to Hitler's rapid rise is equally articulate and instructive. The Russian Communist menace and the force of national self-determination produced wide Western backing for a strong Germany. Whether he properly evaluated the depth of this favorable Western feeling or not, Hitler was placed in a position to do considerable good to both Germany and Europe. Without the fanatical ideas of racism and anti-Semitism and with greater sincerity in the moral and political principle of national self-determination, it was possible for the Nazi leader to ride the momentum of this feeling and to permit his successful struggle against imperialist Moscow compensate for any ill political effects resulting from the necessary transformation of these basic Nazi policies. As the author shows, duplicity and dishonesty lurked constantly behind the open pronouncements of Nazi intentions. For example, Hitler made it appear that his government was not only for the self-determination of Germany but also of other nations, particularly Ukraine. In the autumn of 1938 German stations in Vienna played on this theme in their broadcasts to Ukraine; yet, all the while, the Hitler regime was mapping its own colonial plans.

The description in the work of the attitude of Poland, Rumania, and Great Britain toward German aspirations in Eastern Europe is factually founded and well balanced in interpretation. The author could have pointed out in his footnote the historic significance of the Polish-Ukrainian march on Kiev in 1920. This event afforded Europe a breathing spell of twenty years from the direct threat of Russian Communist imperialism. The West scarcely recognizes this. Britain, for one, has been given to changed attitudes. As the writer correctly observes, British policy at the end of World War I supported the spurious integrity of a "Holy and Indivisible Russia," meaning the overbearing Russian Empire. There is evidence to demonstrate that Britain was even negotiating to deport Irish nationalists to the northern parts of Russia, i. e. true ethnographic Russia. In fact, concerning the non-Russian Wars of Independence against Russian domination—which represented the true state of affairs as against the author's misleading usage of "Russian Civil War"—France was practically alone in its concern for the subjugated nations which eventually were overcome by the Red Russian Army. In the thirties the picture was a changed one as British sentiment favored the independence of Ukraine and other enslaved non-Russian nations. It was, however, justifiably wary of specific German aims in Ukraine. The Nazi conquest of Czechoslovakia convinced the British that Nazi Germany only sought to exploit for its own imperial purposes the principle of self-determination.

"Action Barbarossa," the Nazi drive into the USSR, is vividly described in this study. The role of Rosenberg, the plans that were formulated for the break-up of the Russian Empire, and the fabulous blunders of Hitler are all competently explained. For an American reader, food for thought is provided in Hitler's firm decision not to determine anything politically in Eastern Europe until German victory is achieved. This reminds one of the present non-predetermination policy pursued by the State Department with reference to the USSR. In both cases, one during a hot war and the other in a cold one, the efficient cause of decisive victory over the Russian enemy is almost cynically brushed

aside. The Nazis paid dearly for this; we are only in the process of accruing losses. Despite the high quality of USSR arms, in the early phase of the Eastern campaign the German advances were rapid and easy. The major clue to this striking phenomenon rested in the lack of spirit shown by Russian and non-Russian alike, and for different reasons. The author explains these respective individual and national freedom reasons quite plainly.

The barbarous aspects of Nazi occupation policy in Ukraine are almost incredible; yet they are so true. Annihilation, biological reduction, dispersion, and deportation were all worked to realize *Lebensraum* for the incoming German colonist. With statistics and essential documentary fact the study discloses how these fiendish measures were applied. It shows, too, how economically and politically inane all this was. The mistreatment of prisoners soon led to stiffening resistance on the part of USSR forces; the nihilism displayed toward the natural national aspirations of the non-Russian countries in the USSR produced patriotic underground armies in Ukraine and elsewhere; and the combination of these and other factors spelled defeat for Germany well before Stalingrad. Authoritatively and with remarkable lucidity, this study interweaves all these factors into a pattern which gives the reader a clear picture of what transpired during these years in Ukraine under Nazi occupation.

The lesson taught by this German experience of gross political stupidity is that in the last analysis peoples determine, not weapons or mechanical superiority. Only in moments of final desperation, on March 15, 1945, two months before the end of hostilities, the Nazis began to see the light and supported a Ukrainian Liberation Committee to further the independence of Ukraine. Needless to say, too late, too little and, above all, too insincere and expedient. One wonders whether this will be repeated should we unwisely cling to our present non-predetermination policy in relation to the USSR. This brilliant study serves to intensify such wonderment.

Georgetown University LEV E. DOBRIANSKY

THE COURSE OF RUSSIAN HISTORY. Melvin C. Wren, Professor of History, Montana State University. The Macmillan Company, New York, 1958, pp. XIII & 725.

This new book on Russian history by Professor Melvin C. Wren of Montana State University differs in no way from other books on Russian history previously published in the United States. The author treats pre-revolutionary Russia as well as the present Union of Soviet Socialist Republics not only as one political unity, but also as one national entity which he calls the "Russians," and with whom he lumps not only the Great Russians, Byelorussians and "Little Russians" (who, he says, "Are called mostly Ukrainians," p. 13), but also all the non-Russian peoples who once inhabited the former Russian empire and who are now living in the USSR. He meticulously adheres to this nomenclature, despite the fact that the official Soviet terminology and for that matter, everyone else in the world no longer refers to the Ukrainian and Byelorussians as "Russians" and that the terms "Russia" and "Russian" refer to the RSFSR (Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic) exclusively.

Regrettably, Prof. Wren does not confine this view on "Russian unity" to terminology. He takes into consideration the histories of all the nations incorporated into the USSR only when they have any bearing on the general "history of Russia." The author fails to discuss not only the separate history of these peoples and the periods of their independent existence in the past, but

endeavors to ignore these matters altogether apparently so as not to weaken his thesis. Moreover, in writing about the modern history of the Soviet Union, Prof. Wren fails to provide any factual data on the major non-Russian republics of the USSR and hardly mentions their names, with the exception of a short reference on p. 574 to the national republics which constitute the Soviet Union.

As far as the history of Ukraine and the Ukrainian people is concerned Prof. Wren begins it only at the XVIth century with an insignificant reference on p. 187 to the Dnieper Kozaks, dumping the whole Ukrainian history up to the XVIth century in the category of "Russian history." But even to the Dnieper Kozaks Prof. Wren sparingly assigns but two pages (pp. 211-212), stating that they "were free communities of refugees and adventurers" or "bands," who lived in "Southern Russia," spending their time at hunting, trade and pillage and who, "banded together in a loosely knit, jealously free and fiercely democratic association," elected their *hetman*. The political history of the Ukrainian Kozaks is not known at all to the author; he refers to the Kozaks only casually in connection with the struggle between the Muscovite princes and Poland. Yet one can hardly be surprised at such treatment by the author of the Ukrainian Kozaks, inasmuch as all his knowledge of them is based on the book entitled, *The Cossacks*, by V. P. Kresson, published in New York in 1919 (cf. p. 223), a book of dubious scientific value, to say the least.

The author seems to be even less informed in his writing about the era of Bohdan Khmelnytsky, to which he devotes barely a page. The election of B. Khmelnytsky to *hetmanship* took place in 1648, and not in 1649, as he writes. Nor did the uprising against Poland begin in 1649, but in 1648. Baseless and without foundation is Prof. Wren's statement that as a result of the treaty of Khmelnytsky with Moscow in 1654, "slavery was legally extended to Ukraine, as it was recently introduced in Russia" (p. 238), because slavery was imposed in Ukraine by Moscow only in the XVIIIth century, after the Battle of Poltava.

For Prof. Wren the history of Kozak Ukraine ends with *Hetman* Mazepa, whom he mentions briefly in connection with the campaign of Charles XII against Peter I and the Battle of Poltava in 1709.

The Ukrainians are again introduced on the historical scene after two full centuries pass, in the years 1917-1920. In his treatment of this period of Ukrainian history Prof. Wren seems to follow the official Soviet line, writing about the "separatist movements in the peripheral countries" of Finland, Ukraine and Asia (p. 539). He calls the peace treaty of Brest Litovsk, after Lenin, "an obscene peace" (pp. 554-555) and the result of the treaty "a tragedy for the Russian nation," which, agreeing under a *diktat* to the independence of Ukraine, Georgia and Finland and giving Poland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to Germany and Austro-Hungary, lost "one and a quarter million square kilometers of its territory and 62 millions in population."

The paragraph devoted to the Ukrainian Central *Rada* in Kiev and the proclamation of the Ukrainian "National Republic" (the quotation marks are his) seems to be copied *verbatim* from some Soviet primer and it deserves to be cited *in toto*. In it the author despite the known historical facts—ascribes the decisive role in the suppression of the "separatist movement" to the "Ukrainian Bolsheviks." The entire period of Ukrainian history of that time is summarized as follows:

"Immediately after the abdication fo the Czar Ukrainian nationalists set up a thoroughly unrepresentative (?—B.K.) parliament, or *Rada* in Kiev. It named a cabinet, organized an army from stragglers drifting back to the villages from

the front, and claimed the power to administer the entire Ukraine. A few days after the Bolshevik coup in Petrograd the *Rada* proclaimed a 'people's republic' and announced elections for a Ukrainian Constituent Assembly. It arranged its own peace with Germany, exchanging foodstuffs for a promise of German support against the Bolsheviks. Ukrainian Bolsheviks fought the separatist movement and joined Russian troops in driving the nationalists out of Kiev in February, 1918" (p. 557).

This flagrantly biased and garbled account is topped by an unpardonable error in reference to Simon Petlura, supreme commander of the armies of the Ukrainian National Republic and head of its Directorate. On p. 560 Prof. Wren calls him a "general" and on p. 565 he refers to him as a "Ukrainian nationalist" who "prefered to collaborate with the Polies . . " and added that "Petlura supported Hitler in 1941." Today not only historians and publicists but every well-informed person knows that Simon Petlura, as head of the Ukrainian government-in-exile, was murdered on May 25, 1926, in Paris by a Bolshevik agent long before the advent of Hitler in Germany. This error is even more incredible inasmuch as Prof. Wren's book was read before its publication by some "specialists" from the various "Russian institutes" existing at a few American universities.

The fundamental position of the author and his Russian historical scheme, plus his obliviousness to the history of the non-Russian nations and the true history of their enslavement by Moscow, and the admitted or deliberate errors of fact, hardly qualify *The Course of Russian History* as an objective and scientific work. Moreover, several pages of the book seem to be scrupulously copied from the Soviet propaganda primers. This impression is strengthened by the use of Soviet propaganda illustrations (the Kremlin, the party congresses, an "exemplary" collective farm, etc.) which the author writes he received from *Sovfoto*, an official Soviet photographic agency.

In the suggested list of readings on "Russian themes" in English the author list only two book on Ukraine: W.E.D. Allen's *The Ukraine*, published by the Cambridge University Press in 1940 and John Reshetar's *The Ukrainian Revolution*, published in Princeton in 1952. Neither *A History of Ukraine* by Michael Hrushevsky, published by the Yale University Press in 1941, nor *The History of Ukraine* of Dmytro Doroshenko, published in Edmonton in 1939—the two basic English-language historical works on Ukraine—is listed.

It is a pity that such a deficient work has been sponsored by an institution as serious as Montana State University and published by such a reputable house as the Macmillan Company.

BOHDAN KRAWCIW

EASTERN EXPOSURE. By Marvin L. Kalb. The Russian Journal of a Young American in Moscow during "The Year of Thaw," New York, Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, 1958. Pp. 332, XV. $4.50.

This book is in the form of a diary by Marvin L. Kalb, a young American student of Soviet affairs and a press attache at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow in the critical year of 1956. Generally speaking, it is an interesting journal written in a light, engaging style and containing some valuable information on the present-day problems of the country. In addition to his assignment as a press attache, the author continued his research study on Count Sergei Uvarov, a thesis which he had selected at Harward University, which pursuit

provided him with an added incentive to probe the way of life and, specifically, to get acquainted with the mentality of the Moscow and Leningrad students.

His stay in the Soviet Union coincided with the period of the "thaw," which loosened the tongues of students, taxi drivers, library attendants and young scientists, who in fact constitute the principal characters of his diary, his main informers and debaters.

His conclusions regarding the situation in the USSR, based on his impressions and personal observation, are summarized in four points:

1) The Russian people want peace; 2) The Soviet economic and educational system, despite certain flaws, is working, although the peasantry is not happy, is always craving private land and is averse to working in collective farms; 3) the youth accepts the communist ideology with growing skepticism; 4) Russia is passing through a fluctuating state of changes "between the old and the new." Under the "old" the author understands "communism as practiced by Stalin and, to a somewhat modified extent, by Russian leaders like Khrushchev. The 'new' is a vague and distant dream which will require time to become formulated into a realistic alternative to present-day communism" (p. XIII).

Although the observations of the author with respect to the mood and attitude of the Moscow students and the Russians in general are to be taken at face value, nevertheless reservations must be made as to his attitude toward the non-Russian peoples and to the nationality problem in the USSR in general.

Above all one can notice in the author's writing indelible imprints of the American school of Soviet affairs which ignores the existence of the nationality problem in the USSR in its proper dimensions and which, though admitting the existence of the non-Russian nations in the USSR, nonetheless deems that their present situation and their national aspirations in general do not comprise a sufficiently strong movement to constitute a problem at all.

With such an attitude Kalb visited a series of non-Russian republics; he was in Tashkent, Samarkand, Bukhara; he visited Tbilisi, Baku and the ancient capital of Georgia, Mtskheta, and also spent a few days in Kiev. He even succeeded in discovering that "one best studies Uzbek history in Moscow" (p. 156). On leaving Central Asia the author stated:

"With only a day left in Central Asia... I feel as though I should have permitted Central Asia to remain a part of my historical fancy, never to have barged in on the reality of misery and unhappiness, of forced social and economic transformation, which is Central Asia today" (p. 170).

But this rather accurate description of the situation in the non-Russian republics of Central Asia has not prevented the author from making an absurd conclusion with respect to the nationality policy of the Soviet government. He states:

"Certainly, Russian nationality policy has been no raving success, but, at the time, it has not produced a seething kind of discontent. I saw no evidence of this at all" (p. 146).

One can hardly imagine the kind of "evidence" the author needed to conclude that the Soviet nationality policy not only does not satisfy the non-Russian peoples, but is directed against their well-being. Naturally, if he hoped that he as a foreigner would be approached by the non-Russian leaders who would fiercely complain about their oppression, the Russification of their countries and that the present Russian nationality policy has only fresh trap-

pings for the old Russian Czarist imperialist policy—he was doomed to disappointment. One could, for example, hardly expect a Jew, persecuted by the Nazis and concealing his identity behind a Polish name, to reveal his true name or feelings to any chance stranger.

Where Ukraine and the Ukrainians are concerned, one can readily sense the author's antipathy to this country and its people and, regrettably, a falsification of facts bordering on the willful. This is shown in the author's reminiscences about the tragedy of the Jews in Czarist Russia:

"The Czar had under his domination about four million Jews, which was about four million too many for his taste. Some Russians and Ukrainians felt the same way, and they organized clubs, whose purpose it was to cleanse Russia of all harmful influences, like liberalism, progress and Jews. Many pogroms took place, and Jews were killed by the thousands" (p. 28).

If Kalb the student of Russian history has in mind the "Black Hundreds" and their pogroms inspired by Purishkevich, he ought to know that just as the Negroes are not eligible for membership in the Ku Klux Klan, so Ukrainian patriots were not eligible for membership in and had no relations whatsoever with the "clubs" of the "Black Hundreds," of which he writes.

Furthermore, although the author for the most part employs the term "Ukrainians," it does not prevent him from writing about Ukraine also as "West Russia." In contrast to the overwhelming majority of foreigners who are enthusiastic about Ukrainian folklore and have high regard for the Kiev theater and opera, the author gives the worst possible depiction of the Kiev stage. Upon visiting a Kiev theater he wrote in his journal:

"Later in the day, we set off for the theater on Franka (!) Square to see a Ukrainian musical comedy, but after one act, we left. The singers appeared to have left music school before the end of their first lesson and the dancers who would have tipped any scale at 200 charged around the stage like dizzy elephants" (108).

The author's opinion about the Ukrainians is none too flattering when he writes:

"I got the impression that the Ukrainians are a very spontaneous people, very powerful physically and very simple. They seemed to be inhibited by no bonds of sophistication..." (p. 109).

Of all things Ukrainian the description of Kiev by the author is perhaps the most normal:

"There aren't many lights in Kiev at night, but there were enough to reveal a city with a distinct and proud figure... Kiev is very different from Moscow, and this was apparent even at first glance. Moscow is like a woman who is never sure if her seams are straight. Kiev knows they are straight... There is a greater sense of ease, of comfort, of relaxation. The girls all wear bright colors... Their entire appearance, like their geography, is much more south, more warm, more demonstrative. Even the color of Kiev is different" (p. 102).

Author Kalb writes about his book: "This journal is an attempt to record a personalized history of Russia." This goal is modest enough; it contains superficial pictures of various manifestations of the Soviet life recorded within a year's stay. Their validity lies only in a fixation of the moment; from this viewpoint the journal constitutes a successful reportage which contains a great deal of useful information, especially as far as the student youth and the social life are concerned.

LUBOMYR O. ORTYNSKY

VELIKAIA OKTIABRSKAIA SOTSIALISTICHESKAIA REVOLUTSIIA NA UKRAINIE. FEVRAL 1917—APRIL 1918. Sbornik dokumentov i materialov v 3-kh tomakh. Tsentralny Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Oktiabrskoy revolutsii i sotsialisticheskogo stroitelstva Ukr. SSR. Gospolitizdat, Ukr. SSR, Kiev, 1957 g.

(*The Great October Socialist Revolution in Ukraine, February 1917 — April 1918. Collection of Documents and Materials in 3 volumes.* The Central State Archive of the October Revolution and Socialist Construction of the Ukrainian SSR. Kiev, 1957).

As the 40th anniversary of the October revolution in Ukraine approached there appeared a great quantity of historical literature, but the above listed three great volumes of documents and reprints from various Bolshevik newspapers and from material on the October revolution in Ukraine must be considered the most important. Most of the documents are appearing in print for the first time, and they constitute very important source material for the study of the present history of Ukraine.

Although these three volumes are quite voluminous, they do not, however, include all documents and materials. The Bolsheviks do not consider it politically opportune to publish all the documens which are at their disposal. The purpose of such selection is, of course, obvious: a history written on the basis of these documents will show the Bolsheviks in a light favorable only to them.

Regardless of the evident one-sidedness of the published documents, one can find among them a great many interesting and important sources. Take, for instance, the new documents and materials on the establishment of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic which are found in the second and third volumes. From Document No. 548 we learn for the first time that Stalin was an active advocate of the creation of the Ukrainian SSR as a counterpart of the Ukrainian National Republic in 1917. Stalin, who was then a People's Commissar for Nationalities in the RSFSR, ordered through his agent in Kiev, S. Bakinsky, to call an All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets in November, 1917, with the purpose of establishing a Soviet government in Ukraine patterned after that in Russia. But at that time he underestimated the Ukrainian national movement and the Central *Rada* itself. It would appear from the documents that he thought that the Central *Rada* did not want more than autonomy and that it would agree to cooperate with the Bolsheviks and itself become an organ of the Soviet government. Therefore, he instructed the Bolsheviks to call the congress jointly with the Central *Rada*. Document No. 562 gives the qualifications of representation at the All-Ukrainian Congress elaborated by the Bolsheviks. It is interesting to note that the rules covering credentials allowed the admission of delegates of the "Peasant Unions" and other organizations which supported the Central *Rada*.

As is known, at the first congress of councils in Kiev an overwhelming majority voted for the Central *Rada*. The censored documents, as before, do not provide any clues as to the composition and the agenda of the Kiev congress, but limit themselves to giving a resolution of 124 Bolshevik delegates, who walked out when they saw their mistake in calling the congress, inasmuch as the congress solidly supported the Central *Rada*. The resolution of the Bolshevik delegates (Doc. No. 574) was published after much delay; a part of them (it is not known how many, Doc. No. 576) came to Kharkiv, where they were told to publish the resolution as a protest and thus to explain their defeat.

But the most interesting documents in this collection are those pertaining to the congress of the *soviets* (councils) in Kharkiv, which proclaimed the establishment of the Ukrainian SSR. The congress began as a Third Congress of Councils of the Donets and Kryvyi Rih Basins. Doc. No. 554 provides the composition of membership: it appears that the peasantry were not at all represented; only the delegates of the workers and soldiers are given. Document No. 576 is very important in that it gives a description of the congress. It stated that only 77 delegates, representing only 46 councils out of a total of 140 of the Donbas and Kryvyi Rih areas, attended. Because of the disproportionality a discussion arouse as to whether the congress was empowered to take any and all decisions. By the majority vote of 46 to 18, with 5 abstaining, the congress voted itself to be in force to pass any decisions. On the second day of the congress there appeared some delegates of the Kiev congress (the document calls them "a part") who proposed a merger and a new name, "The Congress of Councils of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies of Ukraine with a Part of Peasants' Deputies Participating."

But even this resolution was not passed unanimously: 43 delegates voted for it, 11 against it. This "congress," which was anything but representative of the Ukrainian people, proclaimed on December 25, 1917, the "Soviet government in the Ukrainian National Republic." The name of the "Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic" was adopted, as is known, only in 1919, while in 1917 and 1918 there existed a "Soviet Ukrainian National Republic."

From Doc. No. 576 it is evident that the principal role at the Kharkiv congress was played by S. Bakinsky, who already acted in the capacity of a "representative of the People's Commissariat" from Petrograd. It is possible that he represented the "People's Commissariat of Nationalities" of Stalin, which would mean that his actions and plans were conceived by Stalin himself. After the Kiev failure Stalin wrote and published four propaganda articles against the Central *Rada* within a period of three weeks, which constitutes an additional proof of his tremendous role in the Ukrainian politics of that time. Therefore, one can flatly assert that none other than Stalin was the spiritual father, organizer and inspirer of the proclamation of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic in Kharkiv.

On the other hand, it is a historical fact that from the very beginning of the establishment of the Ukrainian Soviet government in Kharkiv, participating in it were such founders of Ukrainian "national-communism" as Vasyl Shakhray and Yuriy Lapchynsky, and later on, Mykola Skrypnyk. Only a week after the establishment of this government a conflict of power arose between him and the Russian Red Guards under the command of Antonov-Ovsienko. The collection contains the texts of two telegrams from Lenin to Antonov-Ovsienko, of which only parts had been known heretofore. Lenin ordered Antonov-Ovsienko: "It is understood that our intervention in the internal affairs of Ukraine, if it is not motivated by military necessity, is undesirable... For heaven's sake, make peace with them and recognize any and all sovereignty for them... Here a supreme sense of national tact is needed" (Doc. No. 8, Vol. III).

The censored collection contains a great quantity of interesting and important documents of the time. For instance, there is a full documentation of the total failure of the Kharkiv government to create Ukrainian military units for warfare against the Central *Rada*. Other documents attest to the Russian composition of the Red Guards which launched an attack against Kiev from Kharkiv. What is conspicuously absent are the documents issued by the Kharkiv gov-

ernment itself (except those pertaining to the organization of the army and courts). It is not clear, for instance, whether the documents of that time were written only in the Russian language, as they are in the collections, or whether they were also printed in the Ukrainian language. On p. 185 of the third volume appears a photocopy of *Vistnyk UNR (The Herald of the Ukrainian National Republic)*, organ of the Kharkiv government—in the Ukrainian language. But the language itself is quite illiterate: almost a half of the words are Russian, superficially Ukrainized and more often than not used incorrectly.

VSEVOLOD HOLUBNYCHY

WEDEMEYER REPORTS. By General Albert C. Wedemeyer. New York, Henry Holt and Co. 1958. Pp. 497.

General Wedemeyer has written one of the most important volumes on World War II but it is not a conventional war book. By the force of circumstances Wedemeyer played an enormous role as an officer of the War Plans Division of the General Staff from 1940 to 1943. He was then transferred for a while to the staff of Lord Mountbatten in the Southeast Asia Theatre of War and then succeeded General Stilwell as commander-in-chief of the China Theatre and Chief of Staff to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. Naturally fond of military science and trained in the American Army Schools and then for two years on a special assignment to the *Kriegsakademie* in Berlin, he devoted himself so far as possible to the problems of the Grand Strategy which was needed, if the coalition against Hitler was to succeed and produce a lasting peace.

Wedemeyer's training, powers of observation and thought, and personal experiences showed him that the future of Europe would not be peaceful and unclouded, if the Western powers contented themselves with the complete military defeat and surrender of Germany and allowed Stalin and the Communists to penetrate into Eastern and Central Europe and establish there a Communist regime. He had no sympathy with the impulsive program of Winston Churchill who was only too glad to install Tito in Yugoslavia or with the ideas of President Roosevelt who "imagined that Stalin was, or could be induced to become 'his friend' and Soviet Russia a permanent ally." (p. 4). This feeling became even stronger when he was transferred to China and was brought even more directly face to face with the machinations of Moscow with the Chinese Communists and came to know how even the political advisers assigned to him by the United States State Department were going out of their way knowingly or unwittingly to press the cause of the Chinese Communists who had forbidden him to carry out the definite Sino-Russian treaty and to move government troops into Manchuria.

He realized that the catering to Stalin and the Russian Communists through the war would bring about a dangerous situation and he resented the fact, as did some of the more far-sighted leaders in England, that it was forbidden to question any of the Russian motives or plans, even after the Russians had deliberately violated agreements with the West in Poland and elsewhere. He was deeply hurt when General Marshall whom he profoundly admired went to China and there adopted the impossible policy of trying to force Chiang Kai-shek to form a coalition government with the Communists on practically their own terms. This leads him even to considerable criticism of President Truman and Dean Acheson who, though they stood out against Communist seizure of Greece, still refused to believe until it was too late that the Chinese

and other Asiatic Communists were as deeply engrossed in schemes for establishing their tyranny as were the leaders in Moscow who were breaking one agreement after the other, all in the name of the new democracy.

It was this feeling and his study of military history that led him so warmly to press General Marshall to bring about an earlier landing of American and British forces in France so as to penetrate Germany before the entrance of the Russians. In this he had the opportunity to see the difference in the functioning of the British and American staffs, for the British staff gave every evidence of working together to carry through the Prime Minister's decisions, were they right or wrong, while the American staff work was marked by a complete lack of coordination with the Department of State and the American officers had no instructions as to the definite goals which the military operations were to achieve.

There are a few passages in connection with Eastern Europe that may show the results of Wedemeyer's past training but on the whole the book maintains an extremely high standard of narration and observation. General Wedemeyer has not hesitated from beginning to end to point out cases where he misjudged the course of events or derived incorrect conclusions, for he is far from believing himself infallible. Yet he has in this volume put into words about the war, Hitler and Stalin views which were shared by many of his countrymen who were silenced or removed from various posts because they failed to agree with the roseate picture of "dear old Uncle Joe" Stalin that was made popular in intellectual, governmental, and wider circles to justify the ludicrous idea that Hitler's attack on Stalin was enough to turn that bloody dictator into an angel of light who was to support the Western strivings for a better world, for freedom and progress, even while he was daily proving the opposite. General Wedemeyer deserves the thanks of the American people for his book and we can only hope that its real meaning will be diligently considered now when Khrushchev is denouncing the very basic agreements of Stalin and the Allies and opening a new period of tension, in hope that the West will collapse before his bombastic claims and threats. The spirit shown by General Wedemeyer will guide the West to the repulse of the Russian and Chinese Communist hordes and aid the progress of the world to new liberty for all men everywhere.

CLARENCE A. MANNING

SOUTHEAST ASIA IN PERSPECTIVE. By John Kerry King. Macmillan Co., New York, 1956. Pp. XI & 309. $5.00.

FAR EASTERN POLITICS IN THE POST WAR PERIOD. By Harold M. Vinacke. Appleton-Century-Crofts. New York, 1956. Pp. X & 407, maps. index. $5.00.

John Kerry King's book is a good analysis of present conditions in this troublesome region of Asia and as such is very important for the free world in the ideological war with communism.

What is very important in the book is the author's deep understanding of the minds of the peoples, their aspirations, hopes and underlying conscience of their own culture and pride. For past centuries they were subjects of foreign rule and colonialism—now they are free and are very sensitive about any move or word which might touch their wounded pride.

In the foreword the author writes: "Let us seek to understand the new Asian spirit that has made our nation great . . . demand equality, respect, and prestige among nations and an end . . . to foreign-imposed spiritual, physical, and

intellectual eclipse" . . . and as to how these things are meaningful the author provides plenty of facts and ideas.

Underlining these inner spiritual and emotional moves, Mr. King comes to the significance of the undeclared war between the free world and the communist bloc. He gives a complete and probably the best illustrated book on the communist movement in Asia, how Moscow started to look in, how it made many blunders and, until the change in China, how it used its apparatus to destroy European colonialism and in this way to undermine economically Europe, its first target.

The author makes a correct analysis of the importance of the Chinese in Southeast Asia. In many countries there are large communities of them. Therefore, relations of these communities to the free world bear heavily on the stability in this part of Asia and its future.

H. M. Vinacke's book, together with the work by John Kerry King, provides us with a complete survey of communist penetration and subversive activities in Asia. The book covers the territory of the Far East—China, Korea and Japan particularly, and the countries formerly ruled by the West as colonies, from the South borders of China to Indonesia and Burma.

The largest part of the book is devoted to Japan and China and gives a good picture of developments from the end of the nineteenth century to the present time. It traces how the defensive character of nationalism of the Far East was formed and developed as a reaction to colonialism and imperialism (p. 3).

China, according to Mr. Vinacke, was a focal point of imperialism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries—here nationalism saved her from falling till the end (p. 7). In this aggression against China Russia played a very important and probably decisive role.

On p. II the author writes that "the conflict between nationalism and imperialism, especially in China, was a major theme of the overture to World War II which in its course and outcome shaped the development of the postwar years in the new Far East."

Relations with the USSR are given thorough discussions with descriptive touches.

In the text, especially on pp. 47-49, Mr. Vinacke uses without discrimination the terms—Russia and the USSR—interchanging them freely. As a result, we lose the proper distinction. But the author on pp. 49-72 explains with a good fund of knowledge how the USSR came to the Far East in the postwar time to gain more than the Russian Empire had ever intended to take.

China occupies nearly 100 pages in the book, yet the author keeps a proper perspective with imaginative understanding of the spirit of the people and their civilization. This is the best part of the book.

The latter portion comprises an analysis of the postwar era—the end of Western colonialism in the Far East (pp. 452 & ff.) and the menace of the new Soviet Russian imperialism. The role of the USA is treated in some detail. The author's guess about "American domestic hostility to communism" and therefore it being "hazardous for the administration at Washington to propose economic assistance as a possible means of enabling the new Central People's Government to free itself from . . . the Soviet Union" (p. 457) is wrong; Mr. Vinacke does not go along with it himself because he writes the following: "It cannot be asserted that a different policy would have met with success . . ." On the next page he explains accurately that "China had not civil war but international conflict." In this interpretation is a key to failure or success. JOHN V. SWEET

UCRAINICA IN AMERICAN AND FOREIGN PERIODICALS

"OUR ENEMY'S TWO FACES: 'What Makes the Russians So Friendly?,'" by Adlai E. Stevenson, and "What Makes Their Satellites So Grim?," by William Attwood. *Look*, New York, November 25, 1958.

The concurrent publication of these two articles under a common caption raises a couple of curious questions in the reader's mind. Was Attwood's report of a tour through part of Eastern Europe (he identifies the so-called satellite area with Eastern Europe) purposely included here to magnify the naivete and superficiality of Stevenson's report on his tour in the Soviet Union? If that wasn't the intention, the inclusion certainly produces this effect. Or did the editors of this popular magazine really believe, and still are under the illusion, that this dual publication portrays the alleged reality of the enemy's two faces? There are countless unsmiling faces within the Soviet Union but these would no more reach the visual range of an Adlai Stevenson than of that of an ordinary American tourist. Moreover, to consider the grim faces of captives both within and outside the Soviet Union as a composite of one of the enemy's faces is the pitch to the misleading features of these articles. After all, for a periodical of this type an attractive caption, some colorful pictures, and a few uninstructive observations are sufficient to satisfy its readers.

The sole reason for considering these articles here is the public influence wielded by Mr. Stevenson. He still is the titular head of the Democratic Party and his acquired biases cannot be entirely discounted. For him, as for many other unwary Americans, the Soviet Union is regarded as a nation with many different ethnic groups, so much like ours. If he knows nothing about the histories of the other non-Russian nations in this empire, you would think that he would recall how the Baltic nations were ensnared by Moscow. Such is not the case. His itinerary did not take him to Riga or Vilna. Instead, in this land of the "Soviet people" he toured exclusively among the Russians and the Moslems. In terms of history one could perhaps understand why the Russians are smiling but our twice defeated presidential aspirant gives us no inkling as to why his Moslem hosts were. He was obviously impressed by the few mosques which Mocow maintains as show-places for exclusively sightseeing visitors. Under one such picture Stevenson points out that his guide "went out of his way to assure us that Tamerlane did not qualify as a Soviet hero because of his 'warlike depredation.'" He apparently failed to meekly ask his guide why, then, do Peter the Great, Catherine, Suvorov and others qualify?

It cannot be said that Stevenson had to restrain himself on any pointed questions while he was the guest of Moscow. He did not hesitate to raise the question of Hungary in Khrushchev's presence. In fact, this deadened the smile of the "hangman of Ukraine." No, the reason for Stevenson's superficial observations rests in his evident lack of knowledge about the origins of the Soviet

Union and developments within it during the past 35 years. A quick tour of the USSR cannot make up for this deficiency. In the meantime he serves the Kremlin well, without even knowing it. The basic misinformation resulting from his lack of perspective is transmitted to the American people in reports such as this. Without tutored qualification and with rational abandon, Stevenson simply writes for the American reader that when "Khrushchev says he wants peace, I am satisfied that he means it." That's that—after all, he was there.

The article written by William Attwood, *Look*'s foreign editor, makes more sense. In covering these particular captive countries in the Russian Communist Empire it touches on most familiar aspects of Moscow's far-flung totalitarian rule. "It's hardly surprising," he writes, "that almost nobody likes the Russians." It would doubtlessly surprise both writers that this feeling extends deep into the Soviet Union. Why should the captive Lithuanian, Ukrainian, Georgian or Turkestanian like them more? Also without historical perspective, this writer claims that only a change in the Russians can give the captive peoples more freedom. The alternative is war, as he sees it; and no one wants this. One just wonders where our country would be today, if anywhere, if our revolutionary forebears were possessed of the same spiritual bent.

"SOVIET EDUCATION: MYTH AND FACT," by Eugene Lyons. *National Review*, New York, April 26, 1958.

In contrast to the fatuous character of many current reports being issued on the so-called subject of "Soviet Education," this article at least casts education in the USSR in balanced perspective. It doesn't reveal anything that has not been well known by students in the field. But, in a popular way, it presents near-hysteria on education in the Soviet Union. The author continues to be afflicted by the journalistic disease of misidentifying the USSR and Communist Russia and, in this respect, is no better than the authors of the current educational reports. Indeed, he is even culpable of worse criticism since he is fully aware of the basic error he's perpetuating. Nevertheless, his article is a worthwhile antidote to some of the hysterical strains gripping a number of circles in the United States. In it the writer shows the distorted nature of education in the Soviet Union and calls for our balanced thinking on the relation of education to the society in which we freely live.

It is rightly pointed out that we are actually giving more credit to Moscow than it itself claims in this respect. The statistical myth that the USSR has now more engineers and scientists than the U.S. is properly exploded. The writer relates that the seven-year primary schooling in the USSR was initiated in 1949 and is yet not available to millions of children. His point is that, logically, there is no supporting base for the amount of scientists and engineers which some claim to exist in the Soviet Union. His criticism is also directed at the qualitative companions being presently drawn. An "engineer" in the Soviet Union is a classification of people, in great degree, we would regard as technicians or skilled mechanics. Moreover, "workers in science" have been misinterpreted by many to mean "scientists," despite the fact that a goodly number of them in the USSR haven't even a university training.

The advances made by Moscow in technological and scientific training are, to be sure, not minimized. But much the same thing happened in Germany and Japan prior to World War I. Actually, the Soviet Union has a long way to go to compare with the United States in technological and scientific proficiency. It has contributed little or nothing in basic research, much of

the output of which has been overhauled and borrowed from the West. The fact that it raised the *sputniks* first proves nothing. As the writer soundly emphasizes, "The ancient Pharaohs built their pyramids. Hitler scored a lot of 'firsts,' sensational for their time, with Stukas and V-1's and V-2's." Education is one for the whole man, not the production of half-men as in the USSR. This has been the product of Western civilized growth since the Greeks. It is a treasure that must be preserved. Doubtlessly, we have our faults and we are in the process of correcting them. Unquestionably, educational development in the USSR is not the way.

"HOW WE STAND—MID-1958," a commentary. *Freedom's Facts*, All-American Conference to Combat Communism, Washington, D. C., July, 1958.

An excellent balance sheet appraisal of our foreign policy position is presented in the introductory section of this monthly publication. The Soviet Union, Western Europe, Latin America and other regions of the world are covered in summary account. In Latin America, for instance, it is shown how the Communist influence continues to expand. Recent Communist Party meetings in Argentina and Bolivia enthusiastically sounded notes of hope in forming united political fronts for the purpose of gaining political power in upcoming elections. One of the basic themes is "anti-U.S. colonialism."

Concerning the Soviet Union, it is regrettable that a leading observation is marred by a basic error which, it is certain, the editor didn't mean to commit. It is stated that "This is a nation at war today." As a matter of elementary fact, the Soviet Union is no nation. It is a state, entity or empire made up of numerous nations, one dominating and the others captive. Moreover, when it is stated that "The people are being spurred on to overtake and surpass America in every possible field," that they are "at war today," the question arises, "What people?" Hardly the subjugated non-Russian peoples. Here, too, the mistake was certainly not intended. The reason for these surmises may be found on page three. There the patient reader finds the following: "In all subjugated countries, including the 'internal satellites' such as the Ukraine, and in the Soviet Union itself, there are men and women who desperately want freedom from Russian Communst tyranny."

"REVIEW OF FOREIGN POLICY, 1958," Hearings Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Washington, D. C., February-June 1958.

This review of U.S. foreign policy has been issued in four parts. The hearings were conducted by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee with the aim of obtaining the most objective observations on our present foreign policy. The intent was most constructive and to a large extent the product is, too. The four brochures make for very interesting reading and consist of valuable material bearing on all the major sectors of the globe. However, after wading through the many testimonies and the queries and answers which they evoked, the reader cannot help but feel that much of the thought is piecemeal and needlessly isolated. Nowhere is any concrete attempt made to present the objective reality of our primary struggle in achievable totalistic terms so that we could not only understand the nature of the real enemy but also begin to comprehend his operations in an interrelated sense and be prepared to cope with them. In short, this intellectual action is only a reflection of our practical action in foreign policy—each affair on its own merit, each development played by ear.

The perspectives and contexts of analysis disclosed here are the usual sort, legalistic rather than historically real. They alone are enough to convince one of the fact that the West still fails to understand the nature of the enemy. One of the witnesses, General Nathan F. Twining, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, views all of the forces of the USSR as "Russian forces." Mr. William Benton, with some muddled ideas on cultural exchange, is overly anxious to reach the Russian people. He believes that if we could transmit the message of freedom and peace to the Russian masses, war would be prevented. In the rapture of his advertising bent Mr. Benton seems to forget that we had little trouble in making contact with the German people and yet a bloody war did eventuate.

Another witness, the Russian-born Alexander G. Korol, who is on the research staff of the Center of International Studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, expounds on education in the USSR and says that a "good analogy can be drawn between the educational system of the Soviet Union during its 40-year history and . . ." From this one is led to believe that the Soviet Union has been in existence since 1918 which, of course, is contrary to essential fact. His colleague, Dr. Walt Rostow, splatters his testimony with the fiction of "Russian peoples." Fortunately, amid all such inaccuracies and defects of thought, Mr. Allen, the director of U.S.I.A., infuses some sense of balance by stating that "if by any chance communism were to disappear from the face of the earth tomorrow, Russia would still be there as an important and strong power. There is no reason to think that those 200-year-old aspirations of Russia would suddenly disappear" (p. 223). However, Mr. Allen superficially interprets these aspirations in term of the discredited search-for-warm ports theory.

Doubtlessly it would require an extensive article to cover many of the grave misconceptions under which many of these "experts" on the Soviet Union labor. The above examples should be adequate to indicate that no intellectual appreciation is shown in regard to the vital subject of the captive non-Russian nations within the Soviet Union itself. As a result, no new and imaginative ideas for our foreign policy crop up in relation to the USSR. This, without question, is the serious gap in the coverage of these hearings. Moreover, it is obvious that because this important and primary area was not at all examined, the intelligent probings by Senator Fulbright went really unanswered in the entire course of the hearings.

In one place the Senator rightly says about the Russians that "what they did in Hungary should be examined carefully and exposed, and the way they act at home, not only now but as they have for 500 years . . ." (p. 66). In another place Senator Fulbright asks the witness, Alex Inkeles of the Russian Research Center at Harvard University, whether he had ever read the classic written by the Marquis de Custine, *Journey For Our Time*. The expert knows of it only by title. The Senator then remarks: "I know you would be interested in it, because in its description of how the Russian people think it sounds in many cases as if it was written yesterday. At least it impresses me that way, and it was written 120 years ago" (p. 191). These are the significant points. In considering the distribution of contracts for the forthcoming studies on U.S. foreign policy under the direction of his own subcommittee the Senator might well stay clear of the Ivy League scholars and seek answers to these points elsewhere.

"FOURTH OF JULY—WITH THE SPIRIT OF '76 FLICKERING LOW," by Clarence D. Manion. Manion Forum Network, South Bend, Indiana, June 29, 1958.

The ideas and sentiments expressed on this special program of American Independence Day cannot but receive the consent and endorsement of every thinking citizen. As the author so cogently puts it, "Those who wish to destroy Communism will find a simple and certain formula for that operation in the American Declaration of Independence . . . We can save this country by doing now what we did at the beginning of our history. We established the United States upon a great profession of faith in God and national independence . . . Let us proclaim it to the Poles, to the Hungarians, to the Lithuanians, to the Ukrainians, to each of the twenty God-fearing nations now held in materialistic slavery and who are desperately determined to be free." The message is one of universalizing our own Declaration of Independence. It is truly the key to victory.

"SOVIET POLICY A PARADOX," by William Randolph Hearst, Jr. *The Congressional Record*, Washington, D. C., July 18, 1958.

This report by the editor-in-chief of the Hearst newspapers is surely not a reassuring one. Citing shifting behavior in the most recent cases of the Geneva scientists' meeting, the East German kidnaping of nine Americans, the shooting of American planes over Armenia, and the Tito-Khrushchev discord, it holds that Russian behavior is a manifest puzzle. But is it? Keep them confused and puzzled is part and parcel of the proverbial Russian cold war game. It is obviously succeeding. This report is evidence of Russian success.

"UKRAINIAN NATIONALISM," excerpts from *Radyanska Ukraina*, October 9, 1958. Digest of the Soviet Ukrainian Press, "Prolog," New York, N. Y., November 1958.

The digest compiled by the "Prolog" Research group in New York in many high circles has become about the most important source of current information on developments in the Ukrainian SSR. This number presents unedited excerpts from Ukraine's leading organ dealing with Ukrainian nationalism. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, it is so reported, urged the Society for Dissemination of Political and Scientific Knowledge in the Ukrainian SSR to intensify its lecture program on subjects such as "the immortal ideas of Marxism-Leninism," "Soviet partriotism," and "proletarian internationalism."

Members of the Society met at their fourth convention in Kiev from October 7 to 9 this year. They were also called upon by the Central Committee to wage an "uncompromising struggle against revisionism" and to fight against "whatever form of reactionary bourgeois ideology, and *primarily* Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism." It appears that the threat of Ukrainian nationalism is omnipresent and unceasing. It couldn't be otherwise, while this rich land remains under Russian domination and its resources are exploited for cynical Moscow drives for nationalism in Asia and Africa.

L. E. D.

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