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The Grand Alliance and Ukrainian Refugees

Marta Dyczok



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The Grand Alliance and Ukrainian Refugees

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To my parents

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MARTA DYCZOK

List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

APRA	Administration of the Plenipotentiary for Repatriation Affairs – (Soviet) (Upravlenie Upolnomochenoho SNK SSSR po Delam Repatriatsii)
BAOR	British Army of the Rhine
CARE	Co-operative for American Remittances to Europe
CCG	Control Commission Germany (British Zone)
CCG	Control Council for Germany
CDPX	Combined Displaced Persons Executive
CHQ	Central Headquarters
CURB	Central Ukrainian Relief Bureau
CUSA	Canadian Ukrainian Servicemen's Association
DP	Displaced Person
ECOSOC	Economic and Social Council (United Nations)
ERO	European Regional Office (UNRRA)
FO	Foreign Office (United Kingdom)
GKO (GOKO)	Gosudarstvennyi Komitet Oborony (State Defence Committee)
GRU	Glavnoye Razvedyvatelnoye Upravlenie (Main Military Integlligence)
G5	Civil Affairs Section of the US Army General Staff
IGCR	Inter-Governmental Committee for Refugees
ILO	International Labour Office
IRO	International Refugee Organization
KGB	Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti (Committee of State Security)
KUK	Koordynatsiinyi Ukraiins'kyi Komitet (Coordinating Ukrainian Committee)
MP	Member of Parliament
MP	Military Police
MVD	Ministerstvo Vnutrennikh Del (Ministry of Internal Affairs)
NKGB	Narodnyi Komissariat Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti (Peoples' Commissariat of State Security)
NKO	Narodnyi Kommisariat Okhrony (Peoples' Commissariat of Defence)

NKVD	Narodnyi Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del (Peoples' Commissariat of Internal Affairs)
NTSh	Naukove Tovarystvo im. Shevchenka (The Shevchenko Scientific Society)
OUN	Organisation of Ukrainan Nationalists
OUN-m	Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists, Melnyk Faction
OUN-b	Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists, Bandera Faction
PCIRO	Preparatory Commission of the International Refugee Organization
PFP	Proverochno-Filtratsionnyi Punkt (Screening and Vetting Centre)
SEP	Surrendered Enemy Personnel
SHAEF	Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Exeditionary Forces
SMRESH	Smert' shpionam (Death to spies–Soviet Military Counter-Intelligence)
SNK	Soviet Narodnikh Komissarov (Council of Peoples' Deputies)
SP	Service Police
SPP	Sborno-Peresyl'nyi Punkt (Assembly–Transit Centre)
TsPUE-N	Tsentral'ne Predstavnytstvo Ukraiins'koi Emigratsii v Nimechchni (Central Representation of the Ukrainian Emigration in Germany)
UCC	Ukrainian Canadian Committee
UCC	Ukrainian Central Committee, 1943–44, L'viv
UCRC	Ukrainian Canadian Relief Committee
UCRF	Ukrainian Canadian Relief Fund
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNRRA	United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration
UPA	Ukraiin'ka Povstans'ka Armiia (Ukrainian Insurgent Army)
USFET	US Forces, European Theatre
USSR (SSSR)	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
UUARC	United Ukrainian American Relief Committe
UVAN	Ukraiins'ka Vil'na Akademiia Nauk

Note on Transliteration

This book uses the modified Library of Congress transliteration system. Ukrainian names and geographic locations are given in their Ukrainian transliteration. The same holds true for Russian and other languages.

1
Introduction

Over three million Ukrainians were involuntarily displaced during the Second World War. This was the largest migration in the history of the Ukrainian people.[1] Within the larger post-Second World War refugee and displaced person population, Ukrainians made up the greatest component of Soviet citizens repatriated voluntarily or by force at the war's end. They were also the second biggest group among the refugees who refused to return to their former homes. Hence, they were of great significance in the Grand Alliance deliberations on the refugee question in the last years of the war and the immediate postwar period. However, to date their history has not been comprehensively researched. This study attempts to demonstrate the importance of events from this period, both for Ukrainian history and the history of the development of refugee protection. In doing so it provides an insight from a new angle of the breakdown of the Grand Alliance.

Research agenda

This study has a twofold purpose. First, it aims to explore the role of refugees in the history of international relations. In chronicling the history of post-Second World War Ukrainian refugees, the book provides a case study of a situation where refugees were active participants in their situation of displacement. The second purpose of the study is to examine a period in the history of the Ukrainian people which was played out in the international arena. By analyzing the behaviour of displaced Ukrainians and the policies formulated towards them by the Grand Alliance, the issue of statelessness is explored, and specifically the difficulties facing a people with a sense of national identity but without a state.

This study hopes to make a contribution to two growing fields of academic interest: Refugee Studies and Ukrainian Studies.The relatively new field of Refugee Studies is expanding rapidly.[2] However, most of the research to date has focused on contemporary refugee situations and issues.[3] The lack of a systematic study of previous refugee crises and the responses to them has led to the lack of a historic or institutional memory within the refugee regime.[4] The limited scholarly attention paid to the history of refugee policies has led to the repetition of previous mistakes and inhibited the development of satisfactory mechanisms for dealing with victims of involuntary displacement.

The historical studies that do exist are often official accounts which lack critical analysis,[5] or general surveys which examine the larger political factors that influenced policy-makers.[6] This study focuses on the issue of refugee participation in the policy-making process. In examining the history of one group, the Ukrainians, the study demonstrates that, through their behaviour, refugees can have an impact on the decisions taken regarding their future.[7] Arguments presented here are aimed at the current debate on the need to include refugees in the international efforts to assist them.

Today's international refugee institutions are descendants of those set up by the leaders of the main powers during the Second World War and in the immediate postwar period. Since these institutions continue to grapple with the issues of international responsibility for refugees and definitions,[8] an examination of the origins of this debate may be useful in finding new solutions.

The second area of enquiry to which this study hopes to contribute, Ukrainian Studies, is not a new field, but until recently it has been an area largely overlooked by mainstream historical research. Because of the absence of a Ukrainian state until 1991, the history of Ukrainian people has been recorded only sporadically.[9] Many aspects of twentieth-century Ukrainian history are still largely unwritten, and the period surrounding the Second World War remains surrounded in controversy.

The history of Ukrainian refugees from this period has received some attention from a few Western scholars.[10] Most work, however, has been on specific aspects of the larger story.[11] Historians in Ukraine have left this subject virtually untouched.[12]

This study attempts to provide a comprehensive overview of the entire period, starting with an explanation of the causes of displacement and then exploring the difficulties faced by those who sought asylum and those who were repatriated. The fate of Ukrainian refugees is discussed within the larger context of international relations, and for the

first time the history of the returnees is documented on the basis of newly uncovered Soviet sources.[13]

It is hoped that this study will contribute to the process of re-examining Ukraine's history, which began when the Soviet Union began to teeter, and gained momentum once Ukraine became an independent state. It sheds new light on an aspect in the history of Ukrainians in the twentieth century as well on the attitudes of the Great Powers towards the Ukrainian question in the post-Second World War period.[14]

Theoretical framework

This study argues that Ukrainian refugees were active participants in the management of their situation within the multiple restrictions imposed by various authorities. They influenced not only the policies that were introduced to deal with them, but also had an impact on the development of international refugee protection and the expansion of the definition of a refugee. Based on this assertion, this study explores the issue of power in refugee situations, and hopes to add to the growing body of literature which challenges the widely-held practice of treating refugees as passive victims.

This argument applies only to the discussion of the handling of the refugee question by Western democratic states, which dominated decision-making on the issue in the international arena. In contrast, the discussion of Soviet policy towards refugees and displaced people demonstrates that in non-democratic societies refugees have much less input into the decisions taken regarding their future.

For analytical purposes this study is divided into three phases:

(i) the uprooting and involuntary migration;
(ii) the period of displacement; and
(iii) the resolution, either through repatriation, resettlement or integration into the host country.

The first phase, discussed in Chapter 2, explains why Ukrainians were uprooted and describes the preparations made by the international community to deal with the refugee issue during the war. Chapters 3 to 6 explore the next two phases, looking at the implementation of policies: how they were revised in response to the changing situation; and the role of Ukrainian refugees in this process.

The main issues addressed throughout the narrative are the changing attitudes within the international community towards the responsibility

for protecting and assisting refugees, the importance of definitions, the use of force in repatriation, and community building within refugee groups which transcend state boundaries.

In discussing the first two issues, this study demonstrates how political interests initially produced a common view among the Great Powers on the need to resolve the refugee 'problem', and examines the factors that led gradually to a divergence in their views. It introduces a new component to the analysis, by presenting evidence that the actions of Ukrainian refugees played a role in the alteration of Western policy.

It was during the period under examination that the refugee question was first considered within the larger context of international relations, and the definition of a refugee was expanded from identification through group affiliation to a focus on the individual asylum seeker. The impact of Ukrainians on these changes was that they comprised a significant portion of the refugee population that rejected the policies prepared by the wartime allies to deal with the refugee question, and through their actions contributed to a revision of these policies.

Until 1946 the international community was not prepared to take responsibility for large numbers of refugees, and continued to identify involuntarily displaced people by their former citizenship. The institution which took upon itself the responsibility of dealing with refugees, the Inter-Governmental Committee for Refugees (IGCR), was not granted sufficient funds nor included in the wartime preparations to be able to fulfil its mandate adequately. The preferred solution for reducing the size of the refugee population was repatriation, and a new institution, the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) was charged with this responsibility. Ukrainians comprised a large component of the East Europeans who refused to be repatriated, thereby prompting the Western powers to search for alternative solutions. This refusal, in combination with other factors that are discussed in the study, were an important factor that led to the acceptance of responsibility for refugees by the international community.

The second impact Ukrainians had on the development of refugee protection was on the expansion of the definition of a refugee. In order to facilitate repatriation, refugees and displaced people continued to be identified by their former citizenship, so that they could be returned to their former countries of habitual residence. Ukrainian refugees rejected this criterion and insisted on identifying themselves in terms of their nationality. Their refusal to accept the established citizenship criterion was one factor that prompted a reconsideration of the group definition of a refugee and led to the creation of a new individual definition.

In discussing the repatriation of Soviet citizens, new information is presented on the consequences faced by Ukrainians (and other Soviet citizens) after they were repatriated to the Soviet Union after the Second World War. Based on Soviet sources that have only recently become available, this book presents documentary evidence to support the long-held assertion that returnees were maltreated by the Soviet government. Furthermore, it shows for the first time that the numbers of returnees to the USSR were far larger than previously believed and that the Soviet Repatriation Campaign was a rather sophisticated operation. Challenging earlier narratives which suggested that returnees were killed or sent to the Gulag, it provides evidence that approximately half of the repatriates to the Soviet Union were released to their homes. The form of repression they experienced was a much subtler one – they and their children were marked for life as being tainted and discriminated against for the remainder of their lives, simply because they had been abroad. This case study adds to the body of literature that discusses the victimization of refugees and returnees by non-democratic governments.

The study also examines the role Ukrainians played in influencing a change in the policies of Britain, France and the United States of America on forcible repatriation of Soviet citizens. In addition to reiterating the evidence that through committing suicide rather than returning to the Soviet Union, refugees forced the Western military authorities to reconsider the use of force, this study suggests for the first time that the Ukrainian refugees' insistence on their national identity, combined with the border changes that had occurred, affected decisions on this issue.

The fourth issue that this study examines is the dynamic that operates within refugee groups which, often in defiance of policy decisions, causes them to organize their own communities. Using existing studies on Ukrainian refugee activities and new archival materials, this study demonstrates how they overcame the restrictions placed upon them, which denied them not only recognition of their separate identity but also permission to organize, and created an elaborate community structure engaged in self-help. It also looks at how national identity can serve as a binding force for individuals displaced from territories where their national group comprises a significant portion of the population. This study shows not only how Ukrainian refugees worked together to further their common interests but also how Ukrainian *emigrés* in established communities abroad contributed to these efforts. This supports the argument that national identity can be one important determinant of human behaviour.

The chronological framework for this study is the years 1943–52. These dates mark the creation of UNRRA, the first international institution responsible for dealing with people displaced by the Second World War, and the termination of operations of the International Refugee Organisation (IRO), the second such body and its Soviet analogue, the Administration of the Plenipotentiary of the Council of Peoples' Commissars of the USSR for Repatriation Affairs (APRA). But certain aspects of the story do stray outside this time-frame. These include the discussions of the causes of displacement of Ukrainians which began in 1939, and the fate of returnees to the Soviet Union, which extends into the early 1990s.

Historical background of international refugee protection

To address the problems of refugee institutions today it is essential to understand their origins. For this purpose, the years surrounding the end of the Second World War (1943–1951) are of great importance. It was during these years that new refugee organizations were created and for the first time truly integrated into the system of international institutions. The Second World War had one positive consequence in that the refugee question became linked to higher political issues.[15]

Previous attempts at refugee assistance by international bodies were limited in both scope and effectiveness because they were not included in the mainstream activities of international organizations. Instead they were treated as separate, strictly humanitarian institutions and as such received very little funding and attention.

The League of Nations Covenant did not contain any provision for rendering international aid to or protection of refugees. It did take the precedent-setting step of appointing a High Commissioner for Russian Refugees in 1919, but this was not envisioned as a permanent position, rather it was a temporary measure to assist those people displaced as a result of the Russian Revolution.[16] The Commissioner's mandate was gradually extended to cover other specific groups, such as refugees from the Greek–Turkish War, the Spanish Civil War and interwar Nazi Germany. In 1938 the first attempts were made at universalizing refugee assistance. The League of Nations further expanded the mandate of the High Commissioner for Refugees and a new initiative was launched by the United States, as a result of which the Intergovernmental Committee was created.[17] (It was later renamed the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees, (IGCR). These efforts were only marginally successful, since by 1938 the League of Nations had become a practically impotent

organization and the IGCR had few members and only slight funding. Consequently they made little impact in addressing the growing needs of refugees. It was not until UNRRA assumed responsibility for displaced people that this issue was addressed seriously.

This study examines the impact of the behaviour of refugees on the development of international refugee institutions at the end of the Second World War through a detailed study of one group from this period. It does not attempt to re-examine the institutional history of the international bodies dealing with refugee issues, but rather looks at the interaction between these institutions and refugees by focusing on the behaviour of one group.

Historical context of the Ukrainian refugees

Until 1991 a modern Ukrainian state did not exist, and general knowledge about Ukraine and the Ukrainians was very limited. Many of the officials and personnel who dealt with Second World War Ukrainian refugees in the various assembly centres and camps were unaware of the existence of a separate Ukrainian nation. Furthermore, the policies formulated to deal with displaced people at the end of the war were based on the principle that governments were responsible for their citizens, even when they were outside the boundaries of the state. Because no Ukrainian state existed at the end of the war and Ukrainian territories became a component part of the USSR, according to international law there was no government that could take legal responsibility for individuals who chose to identify themselves as Ukrainians but not Soviet citizens. Also, there had been no Ukrainian state in the interwar years and therefore no government in exile could intervene on their behalf.[18]

Difficulties surrounding Western dealings with Ukrainian refugees stemmed from the lack of policy provisions dealing with people who came from areas where borders and governments changed often, and consequently people identified themselves in terms of nationality rather than citizenship. During the first half of the twentieth century, ethnolinguistic Ukrainian territories were divided and ruled in at least five different ways. It was not unusual for a middle-aged Ukrainian post-Second World War refugee to have held four citizenships in his or her lifetime without ever having moved from one place of habitual residence. However, a Ukrainian national consciousness had developed and many people from ethno-linguistic Ukrainian territories identified themselves in national terms in addition to, or rather than, citizenship.



Ill. 1.1 Ukrainian lands during the Second World War.
Source: Reprinted with permission from Paul Robert Magocsi, *Ukraine : A Historical Atlas* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987).

In the aftermath of the First World War, when many East European nations achieved statehood in the wake of collapsing multinational empires, Ukrainians failed to maintain independence and Ukrainian territory was divided between four newly-formed states – the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; Poland; Czechoslovakia; and Romania.[19] Despite the lack of success in achieving statehood, the Ukrainian movement succeeded in raising the awareness of Ukrainian national separateness both domestically and internationally.[20]

During the 1920s Ukrainians were recognized as a separate national group in each of the four new states containing a Ukrainian population. In the Soviet Union a policy of indigenization (*korenizatsiia*) was introduced by the bolshevik authorities, with the aim of gaining popular support. This policy allowed the various nations of the newly created state to develop their cultural identity, which was in stark contrast to the repressive Russification policies of the previous tsarist regime.[21] Poland, Czechoslovakia and Romania recognised Ukrainians as an official minority group whose rights were to be respected in accordance with the terms of the Minorities Treaties signed with the League of Nations.[22] These policies served to advance further feelings of national awareness among Ukrainians. However, the larger political changes of the 1930s meant that policies aimed at protecting Ukrainian minority rights were discontinued and Ukrainians once again became subjected to various forms of repression by the various governments that ruled them.

Ukrainians living in Polish-controlled areas had the highest level of national consciousness, since they had previously experienced a high degree of political and cultural autonomy during the Habsburg rule. When the Polish government began curtailing their national rights the more radical elements of Ukrainian society created the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), whose aim was to achieve Ukrainian statehood.[23] This movement borrowed heavily from the fascist ideologies of the 1930s. During the Second World War, the Ukrainian Partisan Army (UPA), was created which led the, ultimately unsuccessful, efforts to set up an independent Ukrainian state.[24] After the war ended many participants of this movement and its sympathisers continued their activities in exile and became an active component of the Ukrainian refugee population.

The nationalists were only one group within the larger population of Ukrainians displaced by the Second World War. The larger group was by no means uniform despite the common characteristics of a shared language, culture and history. They were a diverse group divided broadly

into two categories: those who wanted to return home; and those who sought political asylum. Like many people displaced by wars, a portion of Ukrainians who found themselves abroad at the war's end simply wanted to go home. These people either made their way independently or were assisted in doing so by the various occupation authorities. Ukrainians who found themselves in areas of Soviet control were not given any options and were simply repatriated to the Soviet Union, although a small number escaped to Western-controlled territories.

Difficulties for the Western allies arose when people identifying themselves as Ukrainians refused to go anywhere, arguing that they had no home to which to return. These non-returnees also came from different political, cultural, religious, social, economic and educational backgrounds.[25] Some rejected the option of repatriation on the grounds of fear, claiming that they would be subject to persecution because of the totalitarian nature of the Soviet government. Others refused to return to a state in which they would be subjected to a lower standard of living, in both economic and political terms. The most vocal and organized opponents of repatriation were members of the nationalist movement, who were motivated by political ideology. They argued that they were members of a separate national group whose territory had once again been occupied by a foreign power. The fate of all these people was ultimately determined by larger political issues of East–West relations as they developed in the postwar era.

In contrast to the lack of general public knowledge, the activities of the Ukrainian nationalist movement in the interwar years, and the general situation of Ukrainians, was not unknown to Western leaders. Ukrainian refugees and *emigrés* from the First World War independence movement living in Western capitals engaged in lobbying efforts on behalf of the Ukrainian cause. The British Foreign Office (and its counterparts in other states) followed the 'Ukrainian Question' closely, but the issue was of relatively low priority on its political agenda.[26] Ukraine did not figure in preparations for the postwar order by the wartime allies.

Before the end of the war, the Soviet Union, Britain and the United States came to an agreement on the repatriation of each others' nationals in a secret clause of the Yalta agreement. This granted authority to the Soviet government over its displaced nationals and allowed for the use of force in their return.[27]

Even before the cessation of hostilities a dispute arose over the definition of a Soviet citizen, and this became a major issue of contention at the war's end. Border changes had occurred once again as a consequence

of the war, resulting in the incorporation of Western Ukrainian territories formerly under Polish, Czechoslovak and Romanian control into the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. Bilateral agreements were signed between the Soviet Union and each of the three countries on the exchange of their respective populations. These treaties legally deprived Ukrainians displaced from those Western territories of the right to avail themselves of the protection of their prewar governments. Subsequently, the Soviet government claimed jurisdiction over individuals displaced from these areas.

However, those Western Ukrainians who were not Soviet citizens and found themselves in areas controlled by Western Allies were not subjected to forcible repatriation to the Soviet Union on the grounds that citizenship could not be imposed by a government on individuals outside their territory. An effort was made to segregate Ukrainians holding pre-1939 Soviet citizenship from those holding other citizenships. This proved difficult, because the Ukrainian refugees acted as a group and assisted those among them who were threatened with forcible repatriation to assume false, non-Soviet identities.

By the fall of 1945 the use of force in repatriation was largely abandoned, and by early 1946 the refugee issue became a major point of contention between the Soviet, American, British and French authorities. This policy change was beneficial to Ukrainians, but had not been made out consideration for Ukrainian interests. It extended to all refugees from territories acquired by the Soviet Union during the war, and was adopted in response to a number of factors which will be described in later chapters. People identifying themselves as Ukrainians were not granted the right to their national identity for a further two years.

As early as May 1945, Ukrainians began congregating into communities, organizing committees and petitioning for the right to a Ukrainian identity. However, until mid-1947, in all official records kept by assembly centres and displaced persons camps they were registered according to their last-known citizenship, or were classified as stateless or 'undetermined'. Even after a 'Ukrainian' category was created, information explaining the new group was not adequately circulated to screening officials, and this led to the confusion cited above.

The policy of non-recognition of displaced Ukrainians by Western authorities has made research into this group difficult. It has also left a large margin for speculation about its activities, including the question of the concealment of Ukrainian war criminals in refugee camps after the war. An investigation of war crimes and Nazi collaboration is outside

the scope of this study, and the issue will be discussed only in so far as it pertains to the refugee question.

Sources

This study uses a variety of sources from Britain, Canada, the United States, France, Russia and Ukraine, including archival documents, oral histories of survivors from this period, published documents and memoirs, newspapers and journals, as well as secondary sources.

Unique materials were uncovered in the former Soviet Union. Because of political changes, former Soviet archives have become more open to Western researchers and a number of important documents could be consulted in the archival repositories of Russia and Ukraine. However, because only a small portion of the documents pertaining to repatriation have been declassified, all findings presented in this study must be regarded as preliminary. Statistics are provided but must be regarded with caution, since until all documents are made open to researchers, they are subject to revision. It is conceivable that exact statistics will be impossible to determine since, in 1946, an NKVD audit team cast doubt on the reliability of the record-keeping in repatriation activities.[28]

This study also benefited greatly from the openness of scholars, journalists and ordinary people in the former Soviet Union. Dr Victor N. Zemskov of the Russian Institute of History in Moscow, who has been researching this topic for a number of years, kindly made information available that was still officially classified. Copies of the secret rulings issued by the Soviet leadership regarding repatriation in the years 1944 and 1945, which contribute significantly to the understanding of the Soviet Repatriation Campaign, were provided by Dr Zemskov.

The Ukrainian journalist, Volodymyr Skachko, published an article on this study in one of Ukraine's prominent newspapers, *Holos Ukraiiny*, requesting returnees to respond to a questionnaire on their experiences as displaced people and repatriates. Their responses have provided an invaluable source of information on the implementation of the Soviet programme on the reception of returnees. The Memorial Societies[29] in Ukraine and Russia were also very helpful in assisting to locate Soviet citizens who were repatriated after the war, some of whom provided interviews that have contributed to this study.

The Western primary sources used in this study include interviews with former refugees in Britain, the USA, France and Canada, records of the oral history project on refugees conducted by Harvard University in the 1950s, interviews collected by the Ukrainian Canadian Research and

Documentation Centre at St Vladmir's institute in Toronto, Canada and personal papers of various UNRRA officials. In addition, the archival collections of IGCR, UNRRA and the IRO were consulted, as well as selected documents of the British, US and Canadian governments. The surviving records of the Ukrainian refugee committees located in archival repositories in New York, London and Paris were also examined.

This combination of Western and former Soviet sources has provided an expanded picture of the events under examination. However, a comprehensive study will be possible only when more information becomes available in Ukraine and Russia.

Conclusion

Many of the themes and factors presented above are relevant to a variety of refugee situations, past and present. As the world continues to witness the involuntary displacement of millions of people, and modern communications make information about them readily available not only to political leaders but to the population at large, the study of refugees is becoming more widespread. This work will add to the growing body of literature and contribute to the improvement of existing mechanisms and institutions designed to assist and protect refugees at a time when the international order is changing rapidly.

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War has transformed the global geo-political landscape radically. One consequence directly relevant to this study was the appearance of Ukraine as an independent state. As part of its state-building process, Ukraine is re-examining its history and aiming to fill in previous blanks. The Second World War period is of particular interest because it marks the shutting off all of Ukraine from the rest of the world. However, an entire generation of people who lived through those events is still alive in post-Soviet Ukraine and keen to share their experiences.

This study benefited greatly from the accounts of eye-witnesses and survivors of involuntary displacement and repatriation. Recently opened access to Soviet archival materials on this topic was also invaluable. These newly available sources, combined with the information obtained from Western archival repositories and interviews, permit a broader understanding of this period in the history of Ukrainians and the international refugee assistance community. It is hoped that this book will stimulate further interest and research into this topic.

2
Wartime Events and Planning (September 1939–Spring 1945)

By the end of the Second World War over sixty million people had been involuntarily displaced throughout Europe, North Africa, the Middle East and the Far East.[1] In May 1944 the Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Expeditionary Force estimated that there were 11 332 700 refugees in Western Europe alone, excluding displaced Germans.[2] Among them were approximately three million Ukrainians.[3] They did not constitute a cohesive group united by citizenship and not all had a strong sense of national identity. The reasons for Ukrainian displacement were also varied. Being citizens of four interwar states whose borders changed during the course of the war, many found themselves uncertain about which state would claim jurisdiction over them.

This chapter will describe the development and wartime implementation of policies by the Allied Powers, with a special emphasis on those aspects that were of relevance to displaced Ukrainians. In order to identify this specific group within the larger body of refugees, the various causes of involuntary displacement will be explained in detail.

Causes of displacement

Although there were displaced Ukrainians in North Africa, the Middle East and the Far East, the overwhelming majority of displaced individuals who identified themselves as Ukrainians at the end of the war were located in Central Europe.[4] They became displaced for a variety of reasons, and understanding these reasons is important in explaining their behaviour upon displacement.

Post-First World War refugees

A small number of these people had been refugees in the interwar period, having left their homes after the First World War. An estimated

60 000 Ukrainians, many of whom had participated in unsuccessful attempts to create an independent Ukrainian state, fled westwards after the war. Most of them retreated to Poland or Romania, and some further, to Austria, France, and other European countries.[5] A small number had fled as far as Canada, the United States and China.[6]

Of the 60 000, some obtained Nansen passports, but since Ukrainians were included in the statistics as part of the emigration from Russia it is difficult to determine how many Ukrainians gained official refugee status. In countries with large Ukrainian refugee populations, such as Czechoslovakia, it was possible initially to indicate Ukrainian nationality in Nansen passports. However, in 1928 the Nansen office took the decision to generalize the documents and classify all refugees from the Russian Empire as being of Russian origin. As a result, many Ukrainians refused the Nansen refugee identity documentation and petitioned for a separate status. This request was denied, on the grounds that Nansen documents were issued by the authorities of the states in which the refugees were resident, and 'that those states had a sovereign right to indicate the nationality of the refugee as they thought useful.'[7] Throughout the interwar period, Ukrainian organisations in exile continued efforts to gain recognition of their separate national identity and support for their aspiration towards the eventual formation of a Ukrainian state.

War conditions enable flight from the Soviet Union

The Second World War affected Ukrainian territory in two distinct phases: from 1939 to 1941; and from 1941 to 1945. The first group of Ukrainians who became refugees during the Second World War were politically-conscious Ukrainians who took advantage of wartime conditions to flee the Soviet Union.[8] Their flight westwards occurred in two stages. The first was after the German invasion of Soviet-controlled territory in June 1941, which created an opportunity for political dissidents to flee westwards, initially into German-controlled Western Ukraine. This pattern was a familiar one, as Ukrainians had often sought refuge among their countrymen in regions under control of different authorities.[9]

These Soviet Ukrainian refugees were primarily members of the intelligentsia, usually clergy, artists or academics, many of whom had suffered repression by the Soviet government. They were received by a specially-created refugee branch of the Ukrainian Central Committee (UCC) in L'viv, and through the assistance of the temporary relief committee they were quickly integrated into Ukrainian life under

German occupation.[10] They then migrated further westwards with the Western Ukrainians in the summer of 1944.

Once in Central Europe, this group, which in the contemporary definition of the word were *bona fide* refugees (fleeing from persecution or fear of persecution),[11] were not only denied assistance but were subjected to forcible repatriation to the Soviet Union because of their prewar Soviet citizenship. Most of these refugees renounced their Soviet citizenship and identified themselves as stateless Ukrainians. Those who resisted repatriation successfully did so through a combination of determination and luck.[12]

Western Ukrainians refuse to submit to Soviet rule

A second factor that caused Ukrainians to flee westwards was the nature of the Soviet occupation of Western Ukrainian territories in the years 1939–41. A large number of the Ukrainian displaced people who resisted repatriation successfully in the years 1945–7 were former inhabitants of Western Ukrainian territories, which had not been part of the Soviet Union before 17 September 1939.[13] Following the implementation of the secret clauses of the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact these areas came under Soviet rule. The 21-month period of Soviet control left a significantly negative impression on the local population, which affected their behaviour for the duration of the war and into the postwar era.[14]

Initially, the Soviet authorities attempted to gain local public support for their territorial expansion by portraying the annexation as a liberating action, freeing their Ukrainian brothers from Polish domination. They made Ukrainian the official language, improved education and health systems, and made promises of land redistribution.

Simultaneously, however, steps were taken to deprive Western Ukrainians of all means of political self-expression, with the systematic dissolution of political parties as well as educational, cultural and economic institutions, and the takeover of the press. By spring 1940, overt repression began, with forcible collectivization, persecution of Ukrainian churches (Catholic and Orthodox) and the introduction of the feared policy of deportation. As a final brutality before retreating in face of the German invasion in 1941, Soviet authorities massacred 15 000 prisoners. This had a tremendous impact in reinforcing anti-Soviet sentiment.

The brutality of this occupation confirmed the perception that the Soviet system was an enemy of the Ukrainian people. When the Red Army began advancing again in 1944 many fled westwards and, once abroad, refused to return. A large portion of those who were able to

escape were members of the Ukrainian intelligentsia, which had the connections and resources to enable them to flee. Many of them travelled in organized groups through Czechoslovakia, where they had acquaintances in the *emigré* Ukrainian communities.

Mrs Nina Il'nyts'ka, then a child, describes how her family left L'viv in August 1944 on the first train to evacuate civilians, organized by the Orthodox Bishop Mystyslav, a family friend. A hundred families headed first for Kracow, then Czechoslovakia and Austria, where the group was divided into smaller units.[15]

These civilian refugees had a clear sense of their Ukrainian identity and were determined not to return to their places of habitual residence as long as they remained under Soviet occupation. Because of their prewar Czechoslovak, Polish or Romanian citizenship they were not liable to forcible repatriation, and their experience in community self-organization proved to be a great asset in establishing community-building upon displacement. Vasyl' Mudryi, who later became an important leader of the refugees, was part of this group.[16]

Captured Red Army soldiers refuse to go home

A third small group of displaced Ukrainians were Red Army soldiers who had been captured by the German Wehrmacht and survived prisoner-of-war (PoW) camps. As early as November 1941, the Germans held an estimated 3.6 million Soviet PoWs, among whom were approximately 1.3 million Ukrainians.[17]

Certain elements within the Wehrmacht considered the Soviet PoWs as a possible auxiliary military force, while practical economists saw them as a potential labour source. Thus, in many camps, Soviet prisoners were forcibly or voluntarily recruited into the Wehrmacht's *Osttruppen* (Eastern Troops) or used as forced labourers. Those who left the PoW camps will be included in the discussion of foreign labourers or non-Germans in the German armed forces.

Since the Soviet Union did not become a signatory to the Geneva Convention on prisoners of war, Soviet PoWs suffered conditions of extreme deprivation in German captivity, and large numbers of them perished. Out of a total of 5.7 million Soviet soldiers who became German prisoners, as many as 3.3 million died in captivity.[18] Prisoners of War therefore comprised only a small portion of postwar refugees, but their experiences left them feeling betrayed by the Soviet government. Not only did they feel abandoned by the state they had been fighting for, but many of them were aware of Stalin's decree branding them traitors for having allowed themselves to be captured.[19] As military

personnel, they were not regarded as either refugees or displaced people, and were handed over to the Soviet military authorities upon liberation. However, in the generally chaotic circumstances of the summer of 1945, it was possible for some of these men to avoid repatriation and slip into the refugee population.

Forcibly conscripted workers choose to remain in Germany

The fourth cause of displacement was the German economic policy of conscripting foreign labour from the Eastern occupied territories in the years 1941–4. This caused the relocation of the largest numbers of Ukrainians.

To compensate for the increasing military losses incurred by the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front, the German Armed Forces conscripted more German workers, producing labour shortages in Germany. In response, Adolf Hitler expanded his programme of conscripting labourers from the occupied Eastern territories.[20]

German authorities were motivated by both ideological considerations and economic expediency in pursuing this policy. However, the brutality with which it was implemented seriously undermined both the military and political success of the German occupation of the East, and produced large numbers of refugees.

Initially, some Ukrainians volunteered to work in German industry to escape war deprivations or to learn a new trade. But the volunteers were packed into freight cars without food or sanitary facilities and shipped off to Germany. News of the conditions encountered in Germany by these volunteers reached Ukraine within a few months, and thus by the summer of 1941 force had to be used to meet labour quotas. People were arbitrarily rounded up in cinemas, churches and other public places and shipped to Germany. In the summer of 1942 a mandatory two-year labour service in Germany was decreed for all men and women in Ukraine between the ages of 18 and 20. Of the 2.8 million *Ostarbeiter* carried off to Germany, as many as 2.3 million were from Ukraine.[21]

For the most part, conditions endured by the *Ostarbeiter* were intolerable, and many of them dreamed of the end of the war and the possibility of returning home. However, recent revelations show that a significant number of these forced labourers encountered decent working conditions and were amazed at the high standard of living they saw in Germany, even in war conditions.[22]

Because most *Ostarbeiter* had not chosen to move to Germany, their attitude towards their displacement was different from that among individuals who had fled deliberately. The volunteers were reluctant to

return to Soviet rule, and for some the treatment they received while in Germany affected their decision regarding repatriation. However, most forced labourers from Eastern Ukraine chose to go home voluntarily, feeling that their lives were with their families in Ukraine.

Ukrainians in the German armed forces fear reprisals

A fifth factor in movement was German recruitment of non-German nationals into their armed forces. Opposition to the recruitment of non-Germans by most of the Nazi apparatus precluded a large-scale arming of Ukrainians by the Germans, and any cooperation between elements of the two groups was clandestine. Only a very few Ukrainian units were established in the German army. Their numbers have been greatly exaggerated because of the fact that after the war, for unknown reasons, the Western Allies described all the Wehrmacht's eastern units (*Osttruppen*), whatever their national origin, as 'Ukrainians'.

Most Ukrainians in the '*Osttruppen* were either forcibly conscripted or joined to ensure their survival, which was threatened by conditions in the PoW camps. However, since they had donned German uniforms, they feared reprisals from the Soviet government and therefore opposed repatriation.

There were also two known cooperative military efforts established by Germans and Ukrainians: (i) between German Admiral Canaris, head of *Abwehr* (Military Intelligence) and the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists in the early stages of the war;[23] and (ii) the Governor of the District of Galicia, Otto Wachter, and the Ukrainian Central Committee of Galicia in 1943. In both instances, each side hoped to use the other for their own goals, and neither was ultimately successful.

By far the most controversial group was the SS Freiwillingen-Division 'Galizien', (Diviziia Halychyna) set up on the initiative of Governor Wachter and the Ukrainian Central Committee. It was part of the Waffen-SS and was composed of volunteers. In spring 1945 this unit broke away from German control, renamed itself the First Division of the Ukrainian National Army, and on 8 May 1945 surrendered as a unit to the British forces in Austria. On 28 May they were transferred to Rimini, Italy, where they were designated SEP status[24] but were not demobilized.[25] The treatment this military unit received differed from that of other refugees and displaced Ukrainians, and remains a matter of controversy.[26]

Collaborators with the German occupation forces flee

A sixth factor was the participation and collaboration with the German occupying force by the local population. During the period of German

occupation, 1941–4, on Hitler's orders Ukrainian territory was divided into separate administrative units. The most oppressive occupation regime was in the *Reichskommissariat Ukraine*, a large portion of the former Soviet Ukraine. The German governor of this region, Eric Koch, set up his headquarters in Rivne and during his inaugural speech was reported to have said:

> Gentlemen, I am known as a brutal dog. Because of this reason I was appointed *Reichskommissar* of Ukraine. Our task is to suck from Ukraine all the goods we can get hold of, without consideration of the feelings or property of the Ukrainians.[27]

The Eastern areas of Ukraine closest to the front remained under military occupation for the duration of the war, while Bukovyna and a part of south-western Ukraine, including the port of Odessa, were placed under Romanian control.[28] If participation in civil administration under German occupation is taken as a measure of the level of collaboration, then in Soviet Ukraine collaboration was the lowest in occupied Europe, if only for the simple reason that the Germans did not allow it.

The Western Ukrainian territory controlled by Poland in the interwar years and occupied by the Soviet Union 1939–41 became the District of Galizia (administered by Otto Wachter) within the General-Gouvernement of Poland, under the authority of Governor Hans Frank. The district experienced a somewhat more lenient occupation, and while the Germans also held all the highest administrative posts, a much higher proportion of the local population was allowed to participate in the administration. Also, national groups within the General-Gouvernement were allowed to form representative committees which were to serve as a liaison between the communities and the German occupying forces. The Ukrainian Central Committee (UCC) was based in Krakow, its main functions being the provision of social services and cooperation with international charitable services through the mediation of the German Red Cross, as well as the organization of education and assistance to political prisoners.[29]

It should also be pointed out that when the Germans used the adjective 'Ukrainian' to describe the local administration and its officials they were referring merely to the territory of Ukraine. In fact, many officials were local ethnic Germans and Russians. If one also takes into account the systematic penetration of the local administration and police by Soviet personnel, then the number of Ukrainians who participated voluntarily in these institutions is considerably reduced.

A large number of Western Ukrainians continued their normal professional duties during the German occupation, such as teaching or nursing. Fearing reprisals from Soviet authorities for having worked in German authorized institutions, some of them chose to flee before the Red Army returned. Mr Orest Lysenets'kyi, a teacher of Physical Education trained in interwar Poland, explained that he continued teaching during the Soviet occupation (1939–41) and then under German occupation (1941–44). However, having witnessed the arbitrary ruthlessness of the Soviet regime, he decided not to risk remaining in Ukraine.[30]

The UCC organized an evacuation of its leading members, which included many of the Ukrainians who had earlier fled from the Soviet Ukraine.[31] This group of refugees was subjected to special screenings in the post-war period, as many were accused of collaboration by the Soviet authorities.[32]

The Ukrainian nationalist movement fails to create a Ukrainian state

A small but important group of Ukrainians who became refugees after the Second World War were members of the Ukrainian Nationalist Movement, which had attempted but failed to create an independent Ukrainian state. Of all the Ukrainian refugees at the end of the war, these people were the most vehement in insisting on the recognition of their identity as Ukrainians, since for them it was ideologically impossible to identify themselves as anything but Ukrainian.

The Ukrainian nationalist movement traces its origins back to the early twentieth century but did not come together as the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) until 1929.[33] Through its conspiratorial nature, it survived the various pressures and repressions of Ukrainian political life by Polish, Soviet and German authorities. Being the only group to have done so, the nationalists were left with a virtual monopoly of the Ukrainian movement throughout the Second World War. During the six-year conflict, the OUN engaged in various activities aimed at achieving independence, including early attempts at collaboration with the Germans, the declaration of Ukrainian independence in 1941,[34] and the creation of a military force – the Ukrainian Partisan Army – which fought against the Wehrmacht, the Red Army – and the Red partisans,[35] and the organization of expeditionary groups into Eastern Ukraine.[36] As far as is known, there was no successful contact with the Western Allies in attempts to win support for their cause.

With the impending Soviet defeat of Germany, they had to decide whether to continue their armed struggle against the Red Army or to

flee. Some decided that, in the face of Soviet totalitarianism, continued underground warfare was the only viable form of struggle available to them, while others chose to emigrate and continue their political struggle from abroad. It was this second group that joined the ranks of refugees in Central Europe. In 1947 a further portion of the UPA decided to stop fighting and try to flee to the West.[37]

Other members of the nationalist movement who became refugees were concentration camp survivors who joined the refugee population after being liberated. Although many Ukrainian concentration camp inmates were OUN members, their numbers also included some prewar refugees and Soviet nationals.[38]

Returning home or seeking asylum

Despite these many reasons why Ukrainians were displaced during the war, at the end of hostilities they divided into two groups: those who wanted to return home; and those who chose to seek asylum in the West. The cause of displacement often determined which choice individual Ukrainians made, and those who did not want to return worked together to find solutions to their predicament.

Wartime solutions: East and West

Soviet wartime solutions

While the Soviet Union existed it was impossible to gain access to Soviet information on their Second World War repatriation activities. Pre-1991 studies of this issue relied exclusively on materials available in the West, but with the opening of Soviet archives it is becoming possible to begin constructing a picture of the Soviet repatriation campaign based on documentary evidence. However, since only a small fraction of the materials on this issue have been declassified to date, these findings are of a preliminary nature and subject to revision as more archives open.

Based on the information available to date, it appears that Josef Stalin and his inner circle, the State Defence Committee (Gosudarstvennyi Komitet Oborony – GOKO or GKO) took the decisions on the issue of repatriation. This Committee was formed on 30 June 1941, shortly after the German invasion of the Soviet Union. Stalin himself headed the Committee, and the other members were his foreign minister, Viacheslav Molotov, who acted as the vice chairman; state security chief Lavrenty Beria, Marshall Kliment Efremovich Voroshilov, and Georgi

Maksimilianovych Malenkov. This small executive took control of the essence of the power structure: the party, state, security, the economy and the defence industry, including the military.[39] In mid-July 1941 Stalin took direct control of the Red Army, pronouncing himself Supreme Commander-in-Chief.

Initially Stalin seemed unconcerned with the fate of Soviet citizens who found themselves outside Soviet control, unless they had joined the German side or were perceived to pose a threat. No efforts were made to assist the *Ostarbeiter* or prisoners of War. To deter Red Army soldiers from falling prisoner to the Germans, on 16 August 1941 Stalin issued decree no. 270 proclaiming that any Red Army soldier who allowed himself to be captured by the enemy would be treated as a traitor and face the death penalty upon his return home.[40] As early as 1943 the internal security services NKVD-NKGB[41] was issuing a secret internal directive to arrest any individual who were collaborating with the enemy, spelling out the various categories of treason in great detail.[42] The first British enquiries regarding Soviet citizens coming under their control were dismissed.[43]

However, during the summer of 1944 Stalin and his circle decided that it would be prudent to assure the return of all Soviet nationals from abroad. This decision was communicated abroad through the Soviet ambassador to Britain, M. Gousev, in a letter to the FO dated 23 August 1944. The letter stated:

> The Soviet Government consider the Soviet nationals in question, most of whom have been forcibly deported to Germany by the German aggressors, should be sent to the Soviet Union at the earliest opportunity. In this connection the Soviet Embassy would be grateful if the British War Office would supply the Soviet Military Mission with a list of the Soviet nationals who are in British prisoner-of-war camps, state the location of these camps and also grant permission to visit the camps.[44]

Once the decision was taken that Soviet citizens were to return to the Soviet Union, Stalin and his apparatus pursued a relentless campaign to secure their repatriation which was to last into the early 1950s. Two main considerations undoubtedly prompted this decision. First was the desire to prevent the existence of another hostile emigration abroad, an issue about which Soviet authorities were particularly sensitive.[45] Second, large-scale reconstruction was necessary in the European areas of the Soviet Union which had suffered severe devastation during the

war. Returnees, who could be labelled as having been 'tainted' through exposure to the capitalist West, could provide the backbone for such a labour force.

The first ruling on returnees

The first-known formal Soviet ruling on repatriation took the form of a State Defence Committee Top Secret Resolution (*postanovlenie*). Dated 24 August 1944, GOKO Directive no. 6457ss outlined the organization of the reception of Soviet citizens returning to the Soviet Union.[46] Signed by GOKO vice-chairman Molotov, the instruction was sent to the People's Commissariat of State Security (NKGB), the Main Counter-intelligence Administration (GURK-NKO better known as SMERSH);[47] the Chairmen of the Soviets of Peoples Deputies in Byelorussia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine; the Ministries of Trade and Health; and the Head of The Military Health Department. Instructions were given to monitor (control) the USSR's Western border and set up screening centres along that border to receive and screen Soviet citizens returning to the 'Motherland'. Screening of returnees was to be conducted by security forces, the document stated that Ukrainian and Byelorussian Republican governments were to provide the NKVD with suitable premises for the establishment of screening centres within five days.[48] Three new NKVD battalions were created to act as security for the screening centres.

Nikita Khrushchev, then Chairman of the Ukrainian Council of Peoples Commissars, responded to this resolution on 11 September 1944 by creating a special division in the Ukrainian Council of Ministers on the Reception of Returning Soviet Citizens. This body was headed by I. Dzigomon and M. Zozulenko.[49]

Creation of the Soviet administration for repatriation affairs

In autumn 1944 further measures were taken to create an organizational structure for conducting repatriation. The first step was the appointment of a Plenipotentiary for Repatriation Affairs. Chief Col. Gen. Filip Ivanovich Golikov, one time Chief of Military Intelligence (GRU) who had remained in Stalin's good graces despite seemingly impossible obstacles, was chosen for the task.[50] This decision was formalized through the Council of Peoples' Commissars Resolution no. 13115–392s, dated 4 October 1944.[51] The Resolution named two deputies (*zamestiteli*): Gen. Col. I. V. Smorodinov and Lt. Gen. K. D. Golubev; and two assistants (*pomoshchniki*): Maj. Gen. V. M. Dragun and A. A. Smyrnov.

A few weeks later, on 23 October 1944, the body that would oversee repatriation was formally created. The Administration of the Plenipotentiary of the Council of People's Commissars of the SSR on Repatriation Affairs – APRA (Upravlenie Upolnomochenovo SNK [SovNarKom] SSSR po Delam Repatriatsii) was formally established by a Council of People's Commissars Top Secret Resolution no. 1482–456ss.[52] This ruling also authorized the creation of foreign branches/missions of the Repatriation Administration.

The structure of APRA seems to have undergone changes throughout its existence, but appears to have been composed of five main sections. The Administration itself coordinated activities over four other sectors: (i) Red Army groups (fronts); and (ii) Red Army military districts, who were responsible for repatriates in areas controlled by (liberated by) the Red Army, namely Eastern Europe; (iii) foreign branches/missions, who oversaw repatriation from areas controlled by Western allied forces; and (iv) Republican branches of the APRA, who were given responsibility for organizing the logistics for repatriates once they crossed into Soviet territory. Numerous Ministries (People's Commissariats) were also involved in the repatriation process (see Ill. 2.1a, Ill. 2.1b).

The very day APRA was created, Golikov sent a Top Secret letter to military and security service leaders.[53] In it he instructed all front commanders that they would be receiving a representative of the APRA, who was to be provided with a staff of three Lt. Col. assistants, one secretary and one serviceman for '*obsluzhivanie*' (service). Their responsibilities are outlined as:

(a) to publicize widely the location of centres for assembling and dispatching Soviet citizens to the Motherland in territories occupied and in the process of being occupied by our troops;
(b) to organize the reception, registration, sanitary treatment/processing, provision of food, and in cases of necessity clothing and footwear for individual Soviet citizens, and if some citizens are ill to provide them with medical care;
(c) to organize political-educational work among liberated Soviet citizens; and
(d) to organize the return of liberated Soviet citizens to the Motherland.

In the months between October 1944 and May 1945, the Red Army was to have set up fifty-seven assembly-transit centres (Sborno-Peresyl'nie Punkty – SPP) in the Baltic, Belorussian and Ukrainian Army Groups



Ill. 2.1a Soviet institutions involved in repatriation activities: Peoples' Commissariats and Departments (Russian original).

Source: GARF Fond R-9526, Opys 1, Delo 1118.



Ill. 2.1b Soviet institutions involved in repatriation activities: Peoples' Commissariat and Departments (English translation).
Source: GARF Fond R-9526, Opys 1, Delo 1118.



Ill. 2.2a Foreign branches of Soviet repatriation administration (Russian original).
Source: GARF Fond R-9526, Opys 1, Delo 1118.



Ill. 2.2b Foreign branches of Soviet repatriation administration (English translation).
Source: GARF Fond R-9526, Opys 1, Delo 1118.

(*fronts* in the Russian usage) which in total had the capacity to hold 300 000 returnees.[54]

During the same period repatriation teams were created and prepared to be sent abroad, to territories not necessarily controlled by the Red Army. The first teams were dispatched in November 1944: to Finland (3 November 1944); France (10 November 1944); Romania (11 November 1944); and Iran (16 November 1944). In total, the foreign branch of the Soviet Repatriation Administration (APRA) sent teams to twenty-three countries.[55]

During the busiest repatriation period, July to October 1945, the Soviet Repatriation Administration employed 50 755 people, of whom 44 827 were military personnel, and 5928 were civilians. Of that total, 46 971 worked on repatriating Soviet nationals. The remaining 3 773 military personnel worked on repatriating foreign nationals. The Repatriation Administration headquarters employed 874 people, of whom 55 were Ukrainian.[56] Army units utilized 36 872 men to transport people to the Vetting and Screening Centres (PFP); and a further 7 451 were employed in the military districts. In addition, 523 people worked in groups operated abroad and 1420 in republics outside Russia, with a reserve of 354 people to fill gaps. (These statistics do not include rear army units, NKVD, NKPS or TsULVOSO).[57]

Being aware of the fact that Soviet citizens abroad might be unsure of their government's attitude towards them, in November 1944 a propaganda campaign was started, aimed at reassuring Soviet citizens that it was safe to return. Gen. Golikov gave an interview to TASS in which he appealed to Soviet citizens to return home. The official newspaper *Pravda* published his interview on 11 November, which included the following emotional plea:

> People, with hostile predisposition towards the Soviet state, are engaging in deception, provocations etc and trying to poison the consciousness of our citizens and compel them to believe monstrous lies, that the Soviet Motherland has forgotten them, renounced them and no longer considers them Soviet citizens. Those people are frightening our fellow-countrymen by telling them that if they return to the Motherland they would be subjected to repressions. It is unnecessary to refute such nonsense... The Soviet country remembers and worries about its citizens, who find themselves in German slavery. They will be received home as sons of the Motherland. In the circles of the soviets (councils) it is considered that even those Soviet citizens, who under German pressure and terror committed acts

> which are contrary to the interests of the USSR, will not be held answerable, if they honestly fulfil their duty after returning to the Motherland.[58]

Starting in mid-November, the text of this interview was circulated to Soviet citizens in camps liberated by the advancing Red Army, as well as in camps in Western Europe. Two million copies of the interview were printed and circulated as leaflets, translated into Ukrainian, Byelorussian, Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian. This selection of non-Russian languages demonstrates that the campaign was targeted primarily at people from territories that had come under Soviet control during the war.[59]

Stalin's second secret ruling

While assuring Soviet citizens that it was safe to return home, Stalin issued a new secret resolution, outlining procedures and destinations for returnees.[60] The document, dated 4 November 1944, dealt with returning liberated prisoners of war and civilians, and demonstrates the degree to which the Security Services controlled the repatriation drive. The November 1944 resolution stated that all officers were to be transferred to NKVD special camps. Non-officers were to be assembled in Red Army assembly centres placed under the jurisdiction of the People's Commissariat of Defence (NKO), absorbed into special reserve sections of selected military districts and screened by SMERSH. After screening, those deemed 'not arousing suspicion' were to be returned to the front. Those discovered to have served in the German Armed Forces, in German special units, 'Vlassovites',[61] police officers and others arousing suspicion were to be sent immediately to NKVD special camps.

Civilians were to be transferred to Defence Ministry (NKO) border assembly-transit centres (SPP) and NKVD vetting and screening centres (PFP). After screening, those found suspect were to be transferred to NKVD authority. Those found 'not arousing suspicion' were divided into two categories: those who were healthy and of conscription age were to be reconscripted and sent to the front; and all others were to be sent to their places of habitual residence, unless they were from Moscow, Leningrad, Kyiv or the Western border areas, which remained closed to returnees – people from these areas were to be sent to the NKVD vetting and screening centres. Orphans were handed over to Republican authorities.

An interesting feature of this document is that it sheds light on the fate of the first shipload of Soviet citizens repatriated from England on 31 October 1944.[62] This first transport of repatriates arrived in

Murmansk on 6 November 1944, and consisted of 9907 people, of whom 8334 were military personnel and 1573 were civilians.[63] It was previously surmised that they were executed,[64] whereas it now appears that they would have been dealt with in accordance with this ruling.

While still lacking formal agreements on repatriation with countries holding Soviet citizens, the Repatriation teams wasted no time in beginning operations abroad. As early as 4 December 1944, Major General Dragun, Head of the Soviet Repatriation Mission in France, issued detailed instructions to repatriation liaison officers on the expected treatment of Soviet citizens. These instructions outlined the demands of the Soviet government regarding their nationals, which were repeated for years afterwards. In addition to reasonable requests for the respect of the rights of these individuals in terms of living conditions and prevention of abuses, the main demands were that Soviet nationals were not to be divided into groups, and that Soviet representatives were to be informed about their numbers and whereabouts, and granted access to them. The request specified that:

> All Soviet citizens must be collected into camps for further repatriation, without any distinction between ex-Prisoners-of-War or Displaced Persons, including the Soviet citizens from Baltic States, Western Ukraine, Western White Russia (Byelorussia), Bessarabia, Northern Bukovina, the Karelo-Finnish SSR, etc.[65]

Very soon this particular issue of non-segregation of Soviet citizens became a major point of contention between East and West in the issue of repatriation.

As the trickle of returnees into Soviet-controlled areas began increasing, preparations were made for their reception in the Central Asian Republics.[66] By the end of 1944 over 30 000 repatriated Soviet citizens had found their way to the Gulag (see Table 2.1).

From January 1945 all responsibility for screening returnees was in the hands of SMERSH and the NKVD, who were continuing to divide the repatriates into military or civilian categories. Military personnel were to be administered by the Red Army, while civilians were sent to the NKVD vetting and screening centres (PFP). All those determined as traitors were sent immediately to concentration camps.

A directive was issued to all front commanders on 18 January 1945 instructing them on the treatment of returning Soviet citizens. New instructions were also sent to NKVD branches in Ukraine, Byelorussia, Lithuania and Moldova, stating that screenings were to be complete in five days and the elderly, women and children were to be sent home,

Table 2.1 Soviet repatriates in the Gulag, 1 January 1945

Arrived from	Number
Finland	23 955
Italy	4 470
France	1 347
Sweden	533
Poland	318
Egypt	282
Romania	261
Germany	195
Hungary	153
Greece	41
United States of America	27
Denmark	2
The Netherlands	1
Total repatriates in Gulag	31 585
Total no. of inmates in Gulag	96 417

Source: Victor Zemskov, 'K voprosu o repatriatsii sovietskykh grazhdan 1944–1951 gody', *Istoriia SSSR*, no. 4, 1991, p. 30.

while, 'men arousing suspicion or requiring further screening are to be immediately sent to the NKVD special camps'.[67]

For the duration of the war, the numbers of returning Soviet citizens, either through repatriation by Western countries or from areas coming under Soviet control with the westward advance of the Red Army, were relatively low.[68] They remained in the tens of thousands, the large-scale repatriation occurring only after the cessation of hostilities.

Collective efforts

The first public suggestion that internationally coordinated relief and rehabilitation work would need to be performed in a liberated Europe was made by Winston Churchill on 21 August 1940, in a speech on the war situation to the House of Commons.[69] However, for three more years only small-scale solutions were implemented. In 1942, Britain created MERRA (Middle East Relief and Rehabilitation Administration) to deal with refugees pouring into the Middle East,[70] while the United States set up OFRRO (Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations).[71] By January of 1943 a Joint US and British Commission for Political Prisoners and Refugees was organized in Algiers.[72]

Gradually, as reports on the large numbers of displaced people increased, the issue of the homeless began to be considered within the framework of economic relief and reconstruction. It was realized increasingly that, without assistance, a large refugee population in Europe might be a destabilizing factor after the war. Following months of negotiations, an Agreement was reached to establish an international relief and rehabilitation agency.[73]

The creation of UNRRA

The United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) was created on 9 November 1943, through a common agreement signed by forty-four states.[74] It was the first United Nations agency, preceding the establishment of the United Nations Organization (UNO), and as such had an important precedent-setting role in addition to its defined purpose. As with all international agencies, UNRRA was limited in its activities and power by its members' interests.

Although UNRRA's activities eventually became focused on its Displaced Persons (DP) Operation, it was not set up as a refugee agency. Coping with the millions of displaced persons who moved into areas of Allied control was only one of the tasks of this intergovernmental body. Further, it needs to be underlined that the principal function of the UNRRA Displaced Persons (DP) Operation was to promote and oversee repatriation; it was given no power to arrange the resettlement of refugees and DPs to third countries, and it was authorized to give only temporary relief to those under its care. Responsibility for refugees was delegated to the Inter-Governmental Committee on Refugees (IGCR), both in the UNRRA Agreement and in Resolution 10.

Through negotiations between the heads of the two institutions, Sir Herbert Emerson and Governor Lehman, UNRRA agreed to take responsibility for refugees who could not be repatriated until the IGCR was prepared to remove them to new places of settlement.[75] UNRRA chose six months as a 'reasonable period' during which it would provide care for refugees who did not desire to be repatriated.[76] The six-month limit was chosen to accommodate the wishes of the Soviet Union, who opposed any UNRRA assistance to non-returnees.[77]

Within the structure of UNRRA, policy on Displaced Person Operations was to be formulated and implemented, on three levels. First, options were explored and formulated into proposals by five Committees. Second, these Committees' proposals were considered by the Council, UNRRA's main policy-making body, and formed into Resolu-

tions. (The first Council Session defined eligibility of DPs for UNRRA assistance in Resolution 10).[78] Third, a DP Operations Branch was created as part of the structure of the Administration, with the initial responsibilities of developing policies about and making arrangements for the identification and registration of DPs, their care and repatriation, or return to place of former residence.[79] This procedure changed numerous times in response to the situations that faced UNRRA.

By May 1944 it had become clear to the Director of DP Operations of the European Regional Office (ERO), Fred Hoehler, that close relations with military authorities were essential, working agreements with individual governments were necessary, and that the major activity would be in Germany.[80] Negotiations were initiated with the Western Allied military authorities, at first with the Combined Civil Affairs Committee and later with SHAEF, DP Branch of G-5, Civil Affairs Division. This culminated in the SCAEF/UNRRA Agreement signed on 25 November 1944 by Commander Eisenhower and Governor Lehman, which specified that military authorities would be responsible for the provision of supplies and transport for DPs for a period of six months after the liberation of Germany.[81] Interim agreements were signed with zonal commanders in Austria, for the period until a civilian government was restored.

The Standing Technical Committee on DPs for Europe (Subcommittee 4 of Committee iv) was based in London and consisted of representatives of the governments on the Committee of the Council of Europe. On 2 June 1944 the Committee asked all member governments whether they would require/desire UNRRA assistance. All members except the Soviet Union requested UNRRA aid, and separate agreements were then negotiated with each government.[82]

New definitions

As with previous institutions which dealt with refugees, a crucial issue was the definition that qualified people for assistance. The various UNRRA Committees and Sub-Committees chose not to build on existing definitions, but introduced new criteria for distinguishing between refugees and displaced persons (DPs).

Refugees were defined as:

> civilians not outside the national boundaries of their country, who desire to return to their homes, but require assistance to do so, who were:
>
> 1) temporarily homeless because of military operations
> 2) at some distance from their homes for reasons related to the war.

Displaced persons were:

> civilians outside the national boundaries by reason of the war, who were:
> 1) desirous but unable to return home, or find homes without assistance
> 2) to be returned to enemy or ex-enemy territory.[83]

UNRRA did not take responsibility for refugees, and undertook only to assist displaced persons according to this definition. Other categories of displaced people were considered to be outside the scope of UNRRA activities, excluding large numbers of the people displaced by the war from assistance. This omission was questioned by some members of UNRRA before the war ended.[84]

The decision to deny UNRRA assistance to displaced people who desired repatriation was made despite information obtained through an UNRRA commissioned report (which was substantiated by independent institutions) that there were anywhere between half a million to more than 2 million stateless people in Europe who would not want to return home because of fear of persecution,[85] and that resettlement would be necessary for 15–20 million people.[86] It was a political decision attempting to avoid 'a troublesome burden as well as a difficult political problem'.[87]

Furthermore, UNRRA was not authorized to deal with British or American prisoners of war, Soviet citizens in Germany and Austria, or Italians in Germany and Austria, who constituted a third of the DP population.[88] Thus despite being the official organization created by the Allied Powers to deal with displaced people, UNRRA was prevented from assisting at least a third of the people who found themselves displaced.

The first hints of difficulties with the Soviet Union

The attitudes and behaviour of the Soviet representatives in UNRRA influenced and restricted the Administration's behaviour on the issue of DPs from the outset. The Soviet Deputy Director for the UNRRA Bureau of Areas, Mikhail A. Menshikov, made clear the Soviet point of view, that providing UNRRA assistance to individuals who were allegedly acting 'against the interests' of a member nation, would be taking sides in political intrigues and could only embroil UNRRA in political activities, a result which the Administration, as an international organization, was obliged to avoid.[89] The UNRRA Administration

dodged making a definite decision on this issue by relegating care for the non-returnees to the IGCR and Allied Military authorities outside UNRRA-operated camps,[90] but the general problem could not be ignored indefinitely.[91]

The Soviet government also avoided issuing a clear response to the Standing Technical Committee in June 1944, when it asked whether UNRRA assistance would be requested for Soviet-occupied territories. M. Iliushchenko, the USSR's London Embassy specialist on repatriation, reported that the types of operation contemplated by UNRRA in regard to health, welfare and displaced persons would 'be carried out directly by respective authorities of the Soviet Union' within the USSR, and in countries temporarily occupied by the Soviet authorities, 'insofar as some other procedure is not established by agreement between the government of the Soviet Union and the government of the liberated territory.' With regard to Soviet nationals in enemy territories, Iliushchenko related that 'the government of the USSR will communicate with UNRRA when the necessity arises'.[92]

In June 1945, shortly before the dissolution of SHAEF, the French, British and US governments informed UNRRA that on 4 April (1945) the Soviet government had told the European Advisory Commission that they did not propose to invite UNRRA to work in the Soviet zone of occupation of Germany.[93]

This decision deprived people displaced in Soviet zones of occupation of access to UNRRA assistance, unless they were able to move independently to areas of Western control. The USSR did attempt to keep their options open, by stating that they would most certainly want supplies for their own occupied areas of liberation.[94]

Plans were made for the establishment of an UNRRA Mission in Moscow, to be headed by the Director General himself. However, shortly before he was to set out for Europe in November (1944), the Soviet government requested that the visit be postponed indefinitely, and the invitation was not renewed until the second Director General, Fiorello LaGuardia's visit to Stalin in Moscow, on 27 August 1947. (The Mission was never established.)[95]

UNRRA DP operations began in Western Europe before the end of the war, with the UNRRA teams following the Allied troops, setting up assembly centres and providing assistance to the homeless. Until the end of the war the organization could not begin large-scale repatriation efforts and was able to refer controversial issues to the military authorities. Therefore its initial efforts were successful, marked only by logistical difficulties.

The Western Powers and displaced Soviet nationals

While considering the need to address the refugee question through an international agency, Britain and the USA initially excluded Soviet nationals from these deliberations. British forces first came into contact with Soviet nationals who refused to return home in the Mediterranean military theatre in late 1942. After an exchange of telegrams between the British Representation in Cairo and the Foreign Office, it was designated a regional problem to be dealt with by local representatives. The Soviet nationals were repatriated through a temporary Commission set up by Soviet Major-General Sudakov, and although a certain degree of coercion was permitted, the use of force was not allowed against those who refused repatriation.[96]

The question of the treatment of captured Soviet nationals arose again during preparations for the launching of the Second Front in France. On 21 February 1944 the War Office prepared a 'Most Secret' report on the employment of Soviet nationals by the Germans in France. Among other categories of interest were

> 1. National minorities forming the so-called Eastern Legions, including Tatars, Kalmuks, Georgians, Ukrainians, Armenians and Azerbadjanians, [*sic*] under German officers, which were formed from population which either voluntarily or under compulsion followed the German retreat in 1942–43.[97]

At this point in the war, the only Soviet nationals the Western allies were expecting to deal with were military personnel captured in German uniforms on the Western front. The British War Office was concerned only with the strength of resistance these non-German military units were likely to offer the invading forces. However, their existence raised a series of other issues, which were eventually linked to the refugee question.

The first solution to this situation was to propose an amnesty to such men still under German command, provided they surrender at the first opportunity. This proposal was relayed to the Soviet Foreign Minister, Viacheslav Molotov, by the British Ambassador in Moscow, Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, in a letter dated 28 May 1944.[98] The response stated that 'the number of such persons is insignificant and a special appeal to them would not be of political interest.'[99]

In view of this response, the Foreign Office issued a directive that all captives should be treated as ordinary Prisoners of War until more was known about them. Upon capture, all prisoners were screened and

segregated according to citizenship, and in cases of uncertainty men were placed on a 'disputed list' to be verified at a later date.[100] It was at this time that the problem of classifying Ukrainians first arose, as some of the captured men insisted that they were Ukrainian and refused to identify themselves as Soviet citizens.[101]

During the screenings some prisoners expressed fear of repatriation, based on the belief that they would be punished harshly by the Soviet government on their return, and offered information on the treatment of the subjected nationalities by the Russians, which the Foreign Office noted with some interest.[102]

At this stage the Foreign Office and War Office disagreed on the policy that should be adopted towards these captured men. The Foreign Office was interested in repatriating Soviet nationals at the earliest possible time, with the use of force if necessary. Throughout the summer of 1944 they repeatedly asked the Soviet authorities to accept the return of their nationals.[103] They feared that the Germans might carry out reprisals against British or US prisoners or internees in their hands, but were concerned to ensure that only Soviet citizens were handed over to the Soviet authorities.[104] The War Office entertained ideas for practical uses for these men and opposed the use of force in repatriation.[105]

The decision to use force in repatriating Soviet citizens

This debate over the future of captured Soviet nationals ended when the Soviet government formally requested their return in a letter dated 23 August 1944.[106] Within days, the War Cabinet approved the Soviet request to repatriate the captured Soviet nationals and discontinue obtaining statements as to the prisoners willingness to return.[107] On 31 October 1944, the first 10000 Soviet citizens left British ports for Murmansk on British ships. Twelve of them displayed physical resistance but were subdued. Major S. J. Cregeen reported that on 7 November the repatriates were greeted in Murmansk by an armed guard.[108]

After the Cabinet decision, representatives of the Soviet Military Mission in London were granted access to internment camps in England. By October 1944 the Mission was lodging complaints that people whom they identified as Soviet citizens were not being repatriated pending investigations by the British authorities of their claims of non-Soviet citizenship.[109] The War Office contacted the Foreign Office (FO) concerning this matter, saying, 'an awkward development has arisen in relation to the Soviet nationals to be repatriated this month... a number have asserted in writing claims to nationalities other than Russian.'[110] The FO noted that:

> The point is that these cases, particularly the alleged Poles and Baltic state nationals, raise acute political issues and also very difficult legal questions depending in part upon the Soviet or other law in force in these territories at any given date.[111]

By the autumn the question was being discussed at a high level, along with the question of the new boundaries of Eastern Europe and the return of people to their homes after the cessation of hostilities.[112] During the Moscow conference of Foreign Ministers in October 1944, Eden and Stalin discussed the question of repatriation of each others' nationals, paving the way to the signing of the Yalta agreement four months later. They agreed that each government would repatriate the other's nationals at the end of the war, and being aware that not all Soviet citizens would want to return, a secret protocol was attached to the public Yalta accord which legitimized the use of force in repatriation.[113] Great care was taken to keep this policy concealed from the public.[114]

A confidential SHAEF memo was issued to all commanding generals, section commanders, commanding officers and headquarters commandants, informing them of the agreement on repatriation and discharging instructions regarding the care, maintenance and repatriation of prisoners of war and other citizens liberated by Soviet and US forces.[115] These instructions defined Soviet citizens as 'persons who claim Soviet citizenship', and allowed for those captured while serving with enemy armed forces unwilling to surrender their PoW status to be retained in US or British custody as PoWs.[116] This permitted a degree of choice in self-identification for people who found themselves under the jurisdiction of the Western Allies, of which some Ukrainians availed themselves.

The negotiations on repatriation of Soviet citizens started over the issue of captured military personnel, and therefore was not initially regarded as being related to the refugee issue. Preparations for dealing with refugees were occurring separately. However, once the war ended, the policies formulated to deal with Soviet citizens and those towards refugees became linked, since many civilian Soviet citizens refused to accept repatriation. Furthermore, at Yalta no final decision was reached on the USSR's western border, and this later led to disputes over who constituted a Soviet citizen and was therefore liable to forcible repatriation.[117]

Conclusion

The wartime planning in the early 1940s marked the beginning of a new era in the history of international refugee assistance. For the first time,

the governments of the major participants in a war included this issue in their agendas of both domestic and foreign policies when preparing to negotiate a peace settlement. Previously, the fate of people uprooted through military conflicts did not figure as a significant consideration in international relations. This new development was prompted by the hitherto unknown volumes of displacement and their implications for post-war stability.

However, these preparations were in many ways inadequate, because while the political leaders recognized that a large refugee population existed and required attention, they were not prepared to take full responsibility for these people. A new international institution was created, but given responsibility only to return people to their homes, and not to assist refugees. It was known that a large portion of the displaced people would not want to return home, yet no adequate provisions were made to address their needs.

Soviet citizens were in a particularly difficult situation, since a policy was adopted which denied them the right to asylum and subjected them to forcible repatriation. When this decision was taken at Yalta, the leaders of the Grand Alliance failed to agree on the details of which people would be considered to be Soviet citizens in view of the changed borders. In later months this oversight would lead to serious confrontations between the wartime allies.

The Soviet Union also failed to make adequate preparations for the reception of its nationals at the end of the war. Although detailed plans were laid for securing the return of all Soviet citizens abroad, and a repatriation campaign was launched in the autumn of 1944, instructions for dealing with returnees were unrealistic and therefore had to be changed in the following months.

3
The War Ends (May–September 1945)

Germany's surrender brought about two reactions among Ukrainians displaced as a result of the Second World War. For some a long ordeal was finally over and they looked forward to the prospect of returning home to their families and rebuilding their disrupted lives.[1] For others, who did not want to return home, it signalled the beginning of a period of uncertainty, during which they would struggle to establish their rights as refugees and obtain asylum.[2] In May 1945 approximately three million of the displaced people in Europe were Ukrainian, but by autumn 1945, the combined efforts of Western and Soviet repatriation officials had reduced that number to around 200 000.[3]

This chapter will examine how the internationally organized post-Second World War repatriation programme affected Ukrainians, particularly the Soviet repatriation campaign. It will then discuss the impact of the refugee issue on the Grand Alliance, and the organized response of Ukrainian refugees to the difficulties they faced because of their displacement.

The post-Second World War repatriation campaign

During the spring and summer of 1945, leaders of the four victorious allied powers were engaged in the daunting task of bringing order to war-torn Europe and arranging a peace settlement. Dealing with the millions of displaced people was only one item on their agenda. Preparations for dealing with the DP situation that had been made during the war[4] were in full swing, and a massive international repatriation programme was under way. However, a number of key issues remained unresolved, and the policies that did exist proved inadequate. One of the biggest problems was the lack of a satisfactory policy for dealing with

people unwilling to be repatriated to their former homes. It was this problem that Ukrainians found themselves in the midst of, and their activities contributed to its resolution.

The wartime planners operated on the assumption that most people displaced by the war would want to return to their homes when hostilities ended. This was a reasonable premise, but only if applied to citizens of Western democratic states. When the war ended, the overwhelming majority of the people who had been displaced did indeed desire speedy repatriation and availed themselves of the services of UNRRA and the military authorities to do so.[5] Others made their way independently. However, many citizens of the Soviet Union and East European countries did not want to return to their former homes, and it was these people who found themselves in a difficult situation at the war's end.

Displaced Ukrainians and the choice whether to return home

Western leaders were aware of the fact that not all people displaced during the war would want to be repatriated at the end of hostilities. The IGCR was charged with the responsibility of finding new homes for such refugees. However, Britain and the USA were unprepared to take responsibility for large numbers of refugees and unwilling to introduce a policy that would contradict the Soviet desire to secure the return of their nationals. Consequently at the end of the war all displaced people were considered repatriable. The desire to secure international stability, ensure good relations among members of the Grand Alliance, and proceed with economic reconstruction were considered more important than the interests of displaced people. Therefore, repatriation was believed to be the best solution to the displaced millions in Central Europe.

Ukrainians who were displaced by the war found themselves in the middle of the repatriation campaign. Some wanted to return home and others did not. However, because of the lack of accurate data it is impossible to determine how many Ukrainians returned voluntarily and how many were repatriated by force. The Western authorities did not recognize Ukrainians as a separate group and many events that occurred in the weeks immediately preceding and following Germany's surrender were never recorded. Therefore no accurate statistics on Ukrainians are available, and the following incomplete account is based on information from surviving records and the oral accounts recounted years later by survivors from this period. Based on the number of Ukrainians deported to Germany for forced labour, captured while serving in

the Red Army and other military formations, imprisoned because of their Ukrainian nationalist activities and fleeing the advancing Red Army in 1944 as refugees, it would be safe to assume that there were over three million displaced Ukrainians in Europe at the end of the war.[6]

Ukrainians who in May 1945 found themselves in areas controlled by the Red Army had little option but to return to the Soviet Union. Neither Western military authorities nor the international agency UNRRA were allowed entry into these zones, and one UNRRA official later wrote that:

> there was no DP problem in the Russian zone since the Russians did not acknowledge that such a problem existed, and there were in fact no DP camps and no UNRRA personnel anywhere under their jurisdiction.[7]

It is therefore impossible to determine how many of these Ukrainians returned voluntarily.

In areas controlled by Western occupying armies, large-scale repatriation occurred throughout the summer. Ukrainians who were forcibly repatriated were included in the statistics as Soviet citizens. Those handed over to Soviet authorities in illegal transfers or who repatriated spontaneously[8] bypassed official record-keeping.

The Ukrainians most predisposed towards voluntary repatriation were labourers who had been forcibly deported to Germany. Mykolai Burlak, a 20-year-old who had spent three years working in a German labour camp near Ilfeld, later wrote that, after being liberated by American forces, 'I returned to my Homeland, without which life was unthinkable.'[9] Lidia Val'ko-Cherednychenko returned because she 'could not imagine life far away from my mother, from my family and my village'.[10] Oleksander Mal'tsev, another *Ostarbeiter* liberated by the US army, initially decided to remain in the West, fearing that he would face mistreatment upon return. When he fell in love with a girl who insisted on returning, he decided to go with her.[11] Many *Ostarbeiter* liberated by Western armies were simply transferred to the Soviet authorities without being consulted about their wishes. American troops who liberated Hryhoryi Chevelcha near Bilifeld, 'immediately drove up trucks, loaded us on them and drove us to the Russians. They told us that they didn't want to have to bother about us'.[12]

One Soviet source suggests that 1 650 343 Ukrainians had been repatriated by March 1946.[13] Since large population transfers occurred during summer 1945, it would seem that most of these Ukrainians returned

at that time, either voluntarily or by force. Ukrainian research into this topic is still in its preliminary stages, and it is likely that this figure will be revised, shedding new light on the numbers of Ukrainian returnees.

Records of the Ukrainian refugee organizations estimated that autumn 1945 just over 200 000 Ukrainian refugees remained unrepatriated.[14] From these incomplete sources it appears that of the more than three million Ukrainians displaced by the war, only a small percentage remained in the West. Those Ukrainians who opposed repatriation began assembling and organizing for mutual assistance even before the end of the war. During summer 1945 they mounted a concerted campaign of opposition to forcible repatriation and this eventually contributed to its suspension.

The dispute over definitions

The Soviet government was intent on securing the return of all its nationals and pursued an organized campaign towards this end.[15] Western governments wanted to complete the repatriation of Soviet nationals within a few months of the war's end and charged the military occupation authorities and UNRRA with this task. However, even before the end of the war it was clear that the two sides had different definitions of what constituted a Soviet national.[16] Whereas the Soviet Union insisted that all people originating from areas within their new borders were Soviet citizens, and were thus subject to forcible repatriation under the Yalta accords, the Western Allies refused to repatriate forcibly people who had not been Soviet citizens before the outbreak of war.

Ukrainians born in the territories that before 1939 were Eastern Poland, Czechoslovakia and Romania and which after the war became Western Ukraine, were a large portion of the displaced people whose citizenship was being disputed by the wartime allies.[17] Therefore the behaviour of these Ukrainians had an impact on the course of policy changes over the following months.

One plausible explanation of this Western policy decision was that Britain and the United States refused to hand over refugees from territories newly acquired by the USSR to remind the Soviet government that it was precisely those territories that the USSR had occupied during its alliance with Germany between 1939 and 1941.[18] To ensure that only those people considered Soviet nationals according to the Western definition were repatriated, all military detachments in Germany, Austria, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Norway, Luxembourg and Italy were issued with copies of the SHAEF Administrative Memorandum no. 39 on Displaced Persons and Refugees in Germany. Popularly known as the

SHAEF Plan, this memorandum served as a guideline for military repatriation activities. In April 1945 it had been revised to include a special section entitled 'Dealing With Liberated Soviet Citizens' which instructed officials to conduct repatriation in accordance with the Yalta agreement; Soviet nationals were to be repatriated regardless of their individual wishes. Non-enemy DPs whose nationality was affected by territorial changes were to be referred to repatriation officers of their claimed nationality, and would not be returned against their will unless they were Soviet citizens or war criminals but rather were to be held pending further instruction from Supreme Headquarters.[19]

The first major difficulty with repatriating Soviet nationals arose in early May, when SHAEF and the Soviet Repatriation Administration (APRA) could not agree on a mutually acceptable plan for exchanging each others' nationals because of the different definitions of who constituted a Soviet national. Negotiations to resolve this dispute were held on 21–22 May in Halle, Germany, between US Maj. Gen. R. W. Barker and Soviet Lt. General Golubev.[20] After two days of talks, both sides agreed on a modified Soviet proposal in which SHAEF agreed to repatriate 'All former prisoners of war and citizens of the USSR'.[21] Although this was a logistical agreement between the two bodies charged with repatriation, the Soviet delegation accepted this as a policy agreement regarding definitions of a Soviet citizen. Subsequent refusals by Western authorities to hand over alleged Soviet nationals were considered to be a breach of this agreement.[22] In fact, the SHAEF delegation agreed to the Soviet plan, realizing that further delays 'would simply saddle the West with the continuing expense of caring for two million Soviet nationals as well as delay the return of British and US prisoners of war'.[23]

Following the Halle agreement the large scale-repatriation of Soviet nationals began. Over the next few weeks the SHAEF authorities transfered 50000 Soviet nationals daily.[24] By 4 July they had to suspend repatriation temporarily since the Soviet repatriation authorities were unable to receive such great numbers.[25]

While the military authorities had resolved the immediate obstacle preventing repatriation of Soviet nationals, no solution had been reached to resolve the problem of the conflicting definitions of Soviet nationals. In order to avoid confrontations, Western authorities publicly stated that they were complying with the Yalta agreement, while instructing their officers on the ground:

> For your own information and guidance (but *not* for communication to Russians) Latvians, Estonians, and Lithuanians and Poles whose

> homes are east of the 1939 line of demarcation of the Curzon line will *not* be repatriated to the Soviet Union unless they affirmatively claim Soviet citizenship.[26]

People who were not subject to repatriation under these criteria were retained under SCAEF control, and in areas where Western troops were due to withdraw in accordance with zonal agreements, they were to be 'discreetly withdrawn before SCAEF forces evacuate'.[27] This was viewed as a temporary measure, as the general policy was to consider all displaced persons as being ultimately repatriable pending a final decision at a later date after all relevant factors had been assessed.[28]

Recognition denied to Ukrainians

In summer 1945 the situation of Ukrainian refugees was of little interest to Western political leaders. It received attention only when it touched on larger political interests. The Ukrainian question was considered to have been resolved, in so far as most entho-linguistic Ukrainian territory had become part of the Soviet Union, and the Western Allies were not interested in any efforts aimed at establishing a separate Ukrainian state. The Foreign Office view was summarized by Thomas Brimelow, who commented that:

> Publicly, the troubles of the Ukrainians, now reunited at last in their own state, are at an end. Any manifestations of discontent will in future be the work not of Ukrainian patriots, but of fascist bands, black reactionaries and enemies of the people. Thanks to the brotherly protection of the Great Russian people, this centuries-old problem has now found a complete and just solution, and the enclosed minute . . . can be assigned to the limbo of forgotten things.[29]

Because Western leaders were not prepared to recognize any political claims of Ukrainians to a separate nationality, no separate policy to deal with Ukrainian refugees was deemed to be necessary. SHAEF and UNRRA instructions on displaced persons denied recognition to Ukrainians as having a separate nationality, and specified that Ukrainians were to be dealt with as Soviet nationals, nationals of other countries of which they may have been citizens, or as stateless persons.[30] In some cases orders were issued specifically forbidding the use of the label 'Ukrainian'.[31]

The fate of Ukrainian refugees received attention only because some of them had been displaced from the territories newly acquired by the

Soviet Union. The Soviet government demanded their return and the Western authorities refused to repatriate them by force.

Specific requests for the return of Western Ukrainians began appearing after the signing of the Soviet–Polish border treaty on 6 July 1945.[32] Four days after the agreement was signed, the Commander of Allied Land Forces in Norway received a letter from the Head of the Soviet Repatriation Administration in Norway, in which Major General Ratov said:

> I am likewise quite happy to inform you that the question concerning Western Ukrainians and White Russians has now become quite clear in view of the recognition by your government of the Polish Warsaw Government. Namely, these nationalities must be handed over to us without delay for despatch to their homeland where the question of their citizenship will be decided between the Soviet and Polish Governments.[33]

Since such decisions could be made only at the political level, UNRRA and the military occupation authorities continued to follow instructions of the SHAEF guide. However, British and US political leaders addressed the question, and throughout the summer refused to change their policy regarding people from the newly acquired Soviet territories. To avoid unnecessary difficulties, efforts were increased to segregate carefully Soviet citizens from others, with great care being taken in determining identity.[34] Military commanders once again were instructed to return only people whose homes were within the political boundaries of the Soviet Union on 1 September 1939, and that Ukrainian nationality was not to be recognized.[35]

Despite these measures, confusion continued to surround operations involving Ukrainians. Because instructions were issued to identify people according to citizenship, while Ukrainians continued insisting on their national identity, the Foreign Office received numerous requests asking, 'Which Ukrainians are, and which are not, Soviet citizens?'[36] In late August 1945 the Foreign Office Refugee Department prepared the following comprehensive guidelines to answer such queries:

1. All Ukrainians who come from inside the Soviet Union frontiers as they existed on September 1st 1939, must be repatriated.
2. Those who come from outside such frontiers will be sent home if they so desire. If they do not so desire, they will, at present, not be sent home.

3. It must be realised that these people are Disputed Persons. The Soviet Polish treaties of July 6th and August 16th, 1945, regarding nationality and frontiers may prove to have changed their legal status; we should, therefore, hold these people until their position is clarified. Unilateral disposal of them may well lead to trouble.
4. There have been complaints from Soviet repatriation officers, and also at the highest level at Terminal, about the activities of so-called Ukrainian organisations in Germany and instructions have been issued that we should not recognize any such organisations.[37]

Those who could not be identified conclusively continued to be placed on the 'disputed list' to which Soviet officials were not given access.[38] Throughout the summer no provisions existed regarding the future of such people, as witnessed by the comments of Thomas Brimelow of the Foreign Office, saying, 'we feel that some preliminary thought should be given now to their eventual disposal or absorption'.[39]

As has already been mentioned, the SHAEF instructions did not recognize Ukrainians as having a separate nationality. However, the occupation authorities were confronted repeatedly by individuals and groups claiming Ukrainian identity, organizing resistance to repatriation and causing tension with Soviet repatriation officials. On 2 July the Political Office of the British SHAEF Branch received a complaint from the Soviet Liaison Officer at a camp near Kassel, where he was 'roughly handled and threatened by the inmates of the camp as a result of anti-Soviet propaganda organised by the Ukrainian Relief Committee'.[40] Orders were issued that the propaganda be stopped and the camp staff replaced by other DPs who were not members of the organization.[41] Similar complaints were received by British, French and American authorities throughout the summer of 1945, with some of them reaching the highest political levels.[42] As a result, Ukrainian organizations were banned repeatedly, and orders repeated that 'Ukrainians are not to be recognised as a nationality'.[43]

Repatriation and the use of force

Before the end of the war, the British and US governments agreed to repatriate all Soviet nationals, by force if necessary.[44] Although some Soviet citizens were repatriated before May 1945, the large-scale repatriations began after the end of hostilities in Europe. The attitudes of the military authorities, who were charged with carrying out the forcible

repatriation, were gradually changed by the opposition of Soviet refugees to this policy, particularly by those who committed suicide rather than be forced to return to Soviet rule. This became an important factor which led to a change in policy. Ukrainians formed the largest contingent of the repatriates,[45] and therefore their actions played an important role in this change.

During the summer months it became clear that many soldiers and officers were unsympathetic to the plight of refugees and displaced persons. Often they were considered to be a burden, and that their care, maintenance and repatriation fell outside the scope of military duties. This attitude was fostered by the local German population, which was often required to provide housing and food for the displaced. In a confidential conversation, two senior British officers commented that the interests of the British troops and the Germans coincide on the need to reduce the excessive number of mouths to be fed in the area by getting rid of the non-German population.[46]

One sympathetic American officer criticized this attitude, explaining why displaced people were at a disadvantage:

> Through no fault of his own the DP makes a poor outward impression on an MG (military government) officer as he attempts to present his case. His 'home' is usually a barracks schoolhouse or barn and, usually, with common sanitary facilities. His wardrobe is usually what he wears plus a few pieces of clothing stuffed in a bag. He has developed a defensive attitude as protection against German brutality. He has learned to steal to supplement the German starvation diet. He has learned to distrust promises and pieces of paper. His world revolves around food and shelter. In American slang he looks and acts like a 'bum'. In contrast, the German is well-dressed, better fed and is living in a home. He is very correct in his manner when addressing an American officer. The contrast, I believe, influences MG officers to place more credence in the German complaints about DP looting, than in the DP's complaint about inadequate food.[47]

For the military authorities already antagonistically disposed towards displaced people, problems intensified when so many of them of them adamantly refused to be repatriated, and mounted a campaign of opposition. The refugees who refused to return to the Soviet Union were also vulnerable to accusations made by Soviet authorities against them that they were either 'collaborators' or 'idlers' who preferred to live in the

'comfort' of the Western assembly camps.[48] Many Western officials chose to believe these accusations of their wartime allies rather than the pleas of the refugees, whom they resented. For some who had no knowledge of the Soviet Union it seemed incredible that people would not want to return home.

The main desire of the military authorities was to complete repatriation as quickly as possible and, when faced with opposition from refugees, they used force, as instructed. The refugees who did not want to return home resisted in every way possible, and as a final resort committed suicide. A number of the scenes accompanying forcible repatriation were documented and have become public knowledge. One such incident occurred in Kempton, Germany, in August 1945:

> The soldiers entered the church and began to drag people out forcibly. They dragged women by the hair and twisted the men's arms up their backs, beating them with the butts of their rifles. One soldier took the cross from the priest and hit him with the butt of his rifle. Pandemonium broke loose. The people in a panic threw themselves from the second floor, for the church was in the second storey of the building, and they fell to their death or were crippled for life. In the church there were also suicide attempts.[49]

It was this kind of desperate opposition to repatriation that was an important contributory factor in the change in the military's attitudes towards refugees. Soldiers and officers who witnessed violent protests and deaths began complaining to their superiors that implementing such a policy was beyond the duty of a soldier.[50] Some high-ranking military commanders, such as Field Marshall Alexander, refused to order the use of force in repatriation and denied Soviet repatriation officers access to Soviet citizens unwilling to return, pending a response from the War Office.[51]

On hearing these complaints, an increasing number of American and British political officials began to express doubts about the repatriation policy, despite the argument that both countries were bound to it by the Yalta agreement. UNRRA's Director General Lehman, who had always opposed the use of force, continued to express his views on this matter both at Council sessions and in private talks with political leaders.[52]

By the end of the summer most Western nationals and recognized Soviet citizens had been repatriated,[53] the war with Japan was over, and there was an increasing threat of publicity over the violent clashes and suicides. General Eisenhower, who initially supported the forcible

repatriation policy, gradually became appalled by the 'suicides among individuals who preferred to die than return to their native lands'.[54] On 4 September 1945 he overstepped his authority and suspended the use of force in repatriation in the US zones of operation.[55] Two months later Field Marshal Montgomery introduced a similar suspension in the British zones.[56]

The Soviet Union and refugees

Once Stalin had taken the decision that all Soviet nationals were to be returned from abroad,[57] he became intent on securing their repatriation from areas of both Soviet and Western control. This insistence was motivated by a variety of reasons, the two most important ones being: (i) the desire to establish control over any possible opponents of the Soviet system; and (ii) the need for a labour force for postwar reconstruction. Although this issue was not Stalin's main priority in establishing a new postwar order, it ranked much higher on the Soviet agenda than it did on the Western one. Although originally it was the British who raised the issue of repatriating Soviet nationals and the Soviet Union was uninterested in pursuing it, towards the end of hostilities the dynamic shifted and it was the USSR that kept repatriation on the Grand Alliance agenda. Once the war ended in Europe, Britain and the USA were more interested in other matters, but Soviet officials repeatedly raised repatriation questions at high-level meetings, irrespective of the fact that it further increased tensions with Western Allies.

The Soviet repatriation campaign which started in autumn 1944 was a highly organized programme that employed both legal and illicit tactics. Bilateral repatriation agreements were signed with all countries likely to have Soviet nationals under their control. Such agreements were concluded not only with Britain, the United States and France, but also with Belgium, Switzerland, Norway and the East European countries occupied by the Red Army.[58] These agreements gave Soviet leaders a legitimate context for conducting repatriation, and a legal framework within which to advance their demands.

The Soviet repatriation campaign abroad

The Soviet Administration of the Plenipotentiary for Repatriation Affairs (APRA), created to oversee and facilitate the return of Soviet nationals,[59] was the official instrument used by Stalin to pursue his repatriation policy. Foreign Missions of APRA operated in twenty-three countries and used both legal and covert methods to repatriate Soviet citizens

from Western-controlled areas. Their official task was to receive Soviet nationals from Western officials, assist Western authorities in locating and identifying their charges, and safeguarding the rights of Soviet citizens under Western control. However, they regularly employed illegal methods to comply with their orders, including deception, kidnapping, bribery and threats.[60] Their secondary purpose was to collect information on Western countries, and many Soviet repatriation officials were likely to be from State Security organs.

The most common tactic used by Soviet repatriation officials was to claim individuals as Soviet citizens and demand their return without producing adequate evidence. Often British, French and American officers trusted their Soviet counterparts and handed people over without verifying their citizenship. A Canadian officer described an incident that occurred near Flensburg, just south of the Danish border:

> The Russian liaison officers convinced the British officers of the camp that all refugees were Russians; so they were taken in vehicles to the Russian zone. There were 250 Ukrainians who should not have gone. The Poles had informed the camp what was going to happen, therefore the worried ones from the Russian side went for the bush; those who thought they had no worries stayed. The English being convinced that all were Russians, loaded them all into trucks and sent them on.[61]

At times, in their desire to complete repatriation, Western officials actively collaborated in the Soviet illegal activities. Even before the war ended Western military officials conspired with their Soviet counterparts in illicitly exchanging each others' nationals.[62] Three interwar refugees appealed to the United Ukrainian American Relief Committee after enduring a joint French–Soviet raid on a camp in Metz, France. The camp housed various categories of displaced people. In their letter they gave the following account:

> During the night of September 3–4, between the hours of 1 and 3 AM we were besieged by French police acting in complicity with a Soviet mission. The sudden awakening and scare thrown upon us resulted in some of the women being sent to the doctor. Thirty of us were seized and taken to the Soviet camp, irrespective whether we were old or young immigrants. After about a twelve hour stay with no food, about four or five of the older immigrants were let go, the rest remained in the camp for evacuation to their native 'country'. The treatment of us was brutal.[63]

Other Western officials came to the assistance of the refugees who were being kidnapped. A group of thirty Ukrainians abducted by Soviet officers at Bad Kreuznach were being loaded on to a truck and driven away when a Ukrainian-speaking American officer heard their cries for help, stopped the vehicle and after questioning released them.[64]

Moscow also orchestrated a propaganda campaign to encourage repatriation which was aimed at both non-returnees and Western public opinion. Started in autumn 1944, by spring and summer 1945 it was in full swing. A new 30-page publication, *Domoi Na Rodinu!* (Home to the Motherland!) was widely circulated, replete with emotional images of the Motherland awaiting her children. They included text such as:

> The mother country remembers its children. Not for a minute did the Soviet people, our government, or the party of Lenin and Stalin forget about the fate of Soviet citizens who temporarily found themselves under the yoke of fascist oppression.[65]

Films designed to cultivate homesickness were prepared and screened.[66] Letters from relatives at home were often fabricated to convince people of safe conditions in the Soviet Union.

The diplomatic corps was engaged to sell the idea of repatriation to Western public opinion, and specifically to dispel fears of ill-treatment of repatriates. The Soviet Ambassador to France, Alexander Bogomolov, offered assurances that:

> the Motherland would not be a mother if she did not love all her family, even the black sheep... Every man will be given a chance to redeem himself at home – if he is of military age, in the army; otherwise in a factory. There will be no judgement here. All are accepted here; all return home; all are considered sons of the Motherland.[67]

Donald Lowrie of the YMCA War Prisoners Aid Branch was convinced by this reassurance from the charming ambassador, commenting that 'Bogomoloff [*sic*] is about forty-five, very pleasant, cultured, with a good sense of humour. He seems sincerely impressed by the work we have already done here for Russians.'[68]

Another tactic employed in the Soviet repatriation programme was an organized campaign of complaints about Western treatment of Soviet nationals and allegations of concealment of Soviet nationals by the

West. This was deliberately contrived to speed up the repatriation of Soviet nationals and to silence Western complaints about Soviet non-compliance with the Yalta accords. Even before the end of the war, on 30 April 1945 the Head of the Soviet Repatriation Administration, General Golikov, issued a public statement criticizing British treatment of Soviet nationals under their command. This complaint was left unanswered in an attempt to avert a campaign of public recriminations. When on 6 June he published another attack, the FO considered it impossible to leave it unacknowledged:

> without inviting the Russians to be even more truculent and even more offensive in this matter in the belief that the more they bully, the more cowed we shall be, nor without leaving the British public under the impression that these Russian charges are in some way embarrassing His Majesty's Government.[69]

By midsummer these allegations also began to annoy UNRRA officials, with Lehman commenting that, 'The Russians, as so frequently has been the case, are very difficult. They criticize unfairly and interpose objections on what appear to me to be very trivial matters.'[70]

This complaints campaign also included specific attacks on Ukrainians, claiming that anti-Soviet Ukrainians were impeding repatriation. This prompted Western authorities to recirculate the orders denying recognition to Ukrainians as a separate nationality, as well as to continue banning Ukrainian refugee organizations. The Central DP Executive sent assurances to the Soviet Repatriation Representative at USFET that: 'Instructions have been issued that... Ukrainians are not to be recognized as a nationality by this HQ.'[71] After 'several complaints by the Russians' against the Ukrainian Red Cross, UNRRA's Office of Strategic Services launched another investigation into 'all aspects of the organization'.[72]

A very effective tactic of this propaganda campaign was to portray all refugees refusing repatriation as war criminals. The official newspaper *Izvestiia* published an article which claimed that, 'The only persons who do not wish to return to their country are traitors... All honest people taken from their homes by the Germans wish to return.'[73]

In addition to their repatriation duties, the Soviet Missions provided a convenient cover for espionage activities. Repatriation officials had access to Soviet nationals as well as permits to operate in Western zones of occupation, which enabled them to obtain highly valuable intelligence information on the Western Allies. After defecting later, a few Soviet

officials admitted that while travelling freely in Western zones they 'collected a mass of useful information about the location and strength of allied troops, etc'.[74] While accusing the non-returnees of engaging in anti-Soviet activities and betrayal, NKVD officials posing as repatriation staff were well placed to coerce these people into working for them by threatening reprisals on their families back home.[75]

The information-gathering aspect of the Soviet Repatriation Missions provided Stalin with detailed information on groups of people whom he was determined to repatriate. One such example was the discovery of the Diviziia Halychyna[76] in a British PoW camp in Italy by a Soviet repatriation team. Having learned of their location, in Potsdam Molotov requested their return, stating that Soviet repatriation officials had interviewed the 10 000 Ukrainians and they had expressed a desire to return to the Soviet Union.[77]

Preparations for returnees

The domestic branches of the Soviet Administration of the Plenipotentiary for Repatriation Affairs were charged with organizing ever-growing wave of returnees coming under Soviet control. A new series of directives were issued, often overturning previous rulings.[78] On 15 May 1945 instructions were issued by V. V. Chernyshov, clarifying jurisdiction over various categories of returnees and expanding the logistical preparations for their reception.[79] All prisoners of war were placed under the control of SMERSH, the Soviet counter-espionage organization, while civilians were to be dealt with by the NKVD, with NKGB and SMERSH assistance. In areas where these organizations had no representatives, repatriates were to be dealt with by military security bodies.

Preparing to accommodate the growing numbers of returnees, the Red Army was issued with instructions ordering the creation an additional 100 camps (assembly–reception centres – SPP) along the Ukrainian and Byelorussian fronts, with each camp having the capacity to house 10 000 people. These camps were to be set up by 20 May 1945 and were intended to be reception points for receiving and assembling returnees in Soviet areas of control in Central and Eastern Europe. Of the 100 camps, 30 were to contain civilians, and 46 liberated PoWs.[80] To organize travel back to the Soviet Union, the resolution designated nine transit points.[81] Also at this time, Lavrentii Beria instructed that returnees were not to be held in these camps along the front for longer than ten days. After that they were to be sent home for further screening.

Although individual refugees making their own way home were stopped and sent into these screening camps, many of the reception

centres remained relatively empty until 22 May 1945, when SHAEF and APRA agreed on the logistics of handing over each others' nationals. Following the agreement, a flood of Soviet nationals began arriving, and within a week the Soviet officials had received 519 102 repatriates from the Western allies.[82] By July, APRA was forced to ask SHAEF to halt the transfers temporarily, since they were unable to receive the large numbers being handed over by the West.[83]

In order to relieve the congestion building up in the front-line camps and border screening camps, on 16 June 1945 Stalin issued Secret Resolution no. 9055S.[84] In it he ordered 'all physically healthy repatriates to be directed to march in order to the border of the Soviet Union to the border screening camps'. From there they would be transported further by rail. The only exemptions were for women with small children, children under the age of 15, the elderly, wounded and sick, who were to be transported by rail.

The front commanders were instructed to organize the marching columns and provide the returnees with food, medical attention and transport for their personal belongings, which were not to exceed 50 kg per person. The Soviet army was also to escort these columns. Vsevolod Nahaychuk remembers the shock of seeing soldiers armed with machine guns at the railway station where he and other repatriates had assembled for the trip home. They were encircled, instructed to leave their belongings in a designated area, and then escorted under armed guard to the border camp at Leninbad.[85] A number did not survive the trip home. Recounting the long march, one survivor wrote, 'We were organised into formations and instructed to walk back to the Homeland. After a while the weak ones started to die because they were still terribly frail.'[86]

The June directive also ordered officials at rail junctions and border camps to be prepared for the reception of 1 300 000 returnees by September, and ensure the provision of adequate medical care. Responsibility for reception at the borders was delegated to the Ukrainian, Byelorussian and Moldovan governments, who were also to provide transportation to their further destinations, plus employment and housing.

These orders instructed preparations for the reception of a far smaller number of people than the numbers being handed over by Western authorities. The inadequate preparations caused severe overcrowding in the Soviet assembly centres. Conditions in the assembly camps at the front were described by a Western Ukrainian who chose to return home voluntarily. On 28 July 1945, V. Hnatiuk, who was being held in Camp no. 300 in Austria, sent a letter of complaint to Gen. Golikov. In it he wrote:



Ill. 3.1a Stationing of Soviet repatriation branches (Organs) (1945)(Russian original).
Source: GARF Fond R-9526, Opys 1, Delo 1118.



Ill. 3.1b Stationing of Soviet repatriation branches (Organs) (1945)(English translation).
Source: GARF Fond R-9526, Opys 1, Delo 1118.

> We all impatiently await to be assembled and taken home. For two months already we have been fertilising Austrian ground, and we still don't know when we will be moved. We didn't believe any anti-Soviet propaganda that things would be bad if we returned... But looking at our life in camp no, 300, they were right.[87]

The letter went on to describe intolerably cramped accommodation, poor provisions, the high rate of child deaths, the spread of disease among adults, and suicides.

Similar bad conditions existed in the border screening centres. The Repatriation Administration Representative at the Sambir border camp, Comrade Trenin, reported in July that the camp housed between ten and twelve thousand people, with one dining room per 1500 people which had no dishes, and two toilets containing four cubicles per 1500 people.[88] Nikolai Frolik, who made his way independently to the Volkovisk border screening camp, described his first impressions years later. He said that the camp was housed in a large depot-like building with broken windows, cement floors covered with hay, surrounded by barbed wire and guarded by soldiers. On the first night the new arrivals slept where they stood – on their belongings if they had any. They were fed once a day, sometimes only once every two or three days. But the guards were not strict and people could slip out through holes in the fence to obtain food or escape. One day Mr Frolik was sent for disinfection, and returned to find that his belongings had been stolen. He then realized that he needed to band together with other returnees, since otherwise he would not survive. After some time the camp's inhabitants were assembled and told that they would be screened.[89]

Although initially an order had been given that returnees were not to be held in screening camps for more than ten days, because of logistical difficulties and inadequate transportation, many people spent one to two months in these centres, sometimes longer. An additional problem was the change in directives regarding their further destinations. Some were allowed to return to their homes, while others were temporarily used as labourers in Central Europe. Arsentii Fedorenko was part of group instructed to strip a factory in Kotbus and prepare its machinery for transportation to the USSR.[90]

As many repatriates waited return home, on 18 August 1945 Stalin issued Secret Resolution no. 9871S, in which he outlined new destinations for liberated prisoners of war and repatriates of conscription age.[91] The justification for the new measures was stated as 'providing an urgently needed labour force for the coal mining, black ore and timber

producing industries of the Kamsky Basin' and in view of this urgent need the document overturned previous rulings.[92] It is likely that this decision was taken earlier but at present it is the earliest available document signed by Stalin that formally states the point.[93] This new resolution stated that liberated PoWs were no longer to be remobilized or sent home, but conscripted into People's Commissariat of Defence (NKO) work battalions. It specified that all PoWs and undemobilized repatriates of conscription age who had not completed their full term of military service, and who had passed through the first screening, were to be directed for work in the three designated industries. After an additional 2–3 month screening period, during which repatriates will be working in the industries, those not sent to NKVD camps or resettled to special areas are to be included into the permanent work force of the industries in which they are working'.

Those found to have served in the German armed forces, 'Vlassovites' and police collaborators were not to be included in the work battalions but handed over to the Ministry of the Interior for work in the NKVD Special Battalions in the remote regions of the Norylsky and Uktynsky Kombinats, the Pechers'k Coal Basin, and the timber-producing factories in the Molotov oblast'. They were assigned the status of special resettlers and forced to remain in these areas for six years, although their families were allowed to join them.[94] The term 'special resettler' denied these individuals the right to return to their former homes, as they were forcibly resettled in slave labour camps, which most of them did not survive. These so-called traitors were given a punishment more severe than that assigned to remaining German PoWs.

Another portion of repatriates were allowed to return to their homes after being screened, deemed 'not arousing suspicion', and determined as being unfit for military service. These people had their previous identity documents confiscated at the screening centres and were instructed to report to their local NKVD authorities on their return home. They were not given individual identity papers, since an NKVD Directive from 1944 clearly stated that 'No individual certificates to be given after the screening, only lists are to be drawn up',[95] which were distributed to local NKVD branches.

This August 1945 Resolution determined the fate of many returnees, both those who had chosen to repatriate voluntarily and those who were repatriated by force. With some exceptions, these returnees were to become forced labourers in the most difficult industries of the Soviet Union. Those who were considered to be collaborators or traitors were to be sent to the hardest and most remote areas.

By the end of the summer, the Soviet Union had secured the return of most of their nationals from Western control. They were faced with the huge logistical task of transporting these people to Soviet territory and directing them to designated work battalions or resettling them in their previous places of residence. Despite being ill-equipped to deal with the returnees already in their charge, the Soviet authorities continued their campaign to secure the repatriation of all people they considered to be Soviet nationals.

The Grand Alliance and Ukrainian refugees

As has already been mentioned, leaders of the United States and Great Britain had no direct interest in the Ukrainians; they considered the Ukrainian question as having been resolved. For the Soviet leadership, the Ukrainian question was not only unresolved, it required resolution with great urgency. As a result of the war, the Soviet Union had incorporated all ethno-linguistic Ukrainian territory within its borders and was anxious to establish control over all Ukrainians. In the newly acquired territories, Stalin began an intense Sovietization campaign aimed at eradicating 'Ukrainian nationalist bourgeois sentiments'.[96] However, he feared the existence of an anti-Soviet, nationally aware Ukrainian community abroad, and therefore continued to pressure Western governments to return all Ukrainians to their former homes. This issue was raised at the highest political levels, and the question of the definition of a Soviet citizen became linked to Western recognition of the new Soviet borders.

Repatriation raised at Potsdam

Before the end of the war no agreement had been reached on Poland and the issue of Western recognition of the USSR's new borders was still unresolved. Therefore these two points were included on the agenda of the Potsdam Conference.[97] In preparing for the conference, the Western allies noted that, 'In any top level discussion between the Great Powers about inter-Allied policy and machinery as regards Germany, the question of displaced persons is pretty sure to crop up.'[98] Although they preferred to avoid a discussion of this issue, both the British and American delegations were briefed on the situation and prepared arguments to postpone the discussion of the repatriation of people from territories newly annexed by the Soviet Union until after the final territorial settlement.[99]

At the sixth plenary meeting of the Potsdam Conference, Molotov asked Winston Churchill for assistance in repatriating Ukrainians being

held in a British PoW camp in Italy.[100] Since Britain had already repatriated many Soviet citizens by this date, the Soviet delegation was probably expecting the handover of these Ukrainians without much difficulty. However, since Churchill had been briefed on the different definitions of Soviet nationals, before agreeing to hand over the Ukrainians he asked for urgent information on the group being requested for repatriation, particularly their citizenship and status.[101]

Within two days the FO had prepared a report which stated that most members of the Division were Polish citizens, and that they had surrendered as a military division and were therefore allowed to preserve their original regimental groupings for administrative reasons. Upon learning that the Ukrainians Molotov was asking for were not Soviet citizens according to the British definition, Churchill refused to hand them over, but agreed that any men who wanted to return home would be assisted in doing so.[102] Expressing impatience at having to have dealt with such a small matter personally, Churchill told Molotov that he 'should have been very glad if General Golikov had made his complaint to Field Marshal Alexander's Headquarters, since the Field Marshal would like to have received that complaint himself and to have answered it'.[103]

Six days later, Molotov gave official notice to the conference that the Soviet delegation requested that the issue of repatriation of Soviet citizens be included on the agenda as future business.[104] Simultaneously a Top Secret memorandum was delivered to the British and US delegations, complaining that Western military commanders were refusing to repatriate citizens of the Soviet Baltic Republics, as well as citizens who had emigrated from Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia. The memo concluded that,

> Drawing the attention of the Governments of Great Britain to these facts, the Soviet Government expects that the British Military Authorities will immediately issue instructions authorising the delivery of Soviet citizens who have emigrated from the Baltic Republics, the Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia.[105]

The Western delegations responded that the issue of repatriation would be discussed through proper diplomatic channels.[106]

Since the issue had been raised at the highest political levels, renewed attention was drawn to the need to resolve this dispute over definitions of Soviet citizenship and clarifying the status of Ukrainians. By September, Ernest Bevin decided to stop postponing the issue and address it at

the forthcoming Council of Foreign Ministers meeting. Going against the advice of the FO, he wrote, 'I am against keeping it off the agenda, better face it and let me have full paper of all the issues involved.'[107] In the mean time, in order to placate Soviet Repatriation officials, instructions were issued to all Corps districts 'that no recognition is to be given to any so-called Ukrainian organization'. In certain cases officials were taken into custody and further steps were taken with a view to breaking up Ukrainian organizations.[108]

Soviet allegations and espionage

Throughout the summer accusations were levelled at the Western allies for concealing Soviet nationals and denying Soviet officials access to them. Often the problem lay in the lack of accurate records on both sides. Following one request of the Soviet Ambassador in England to interview 173 alleged Soviet nationals, a FO Minute described this dilemma, admitting that,

> It is quite likely that, in the hectic weeks immediately following D Day, accurate records were not kept on all the Soviet citizens pouring into this country together with German prisoners of war; but I am fairly certain that a large number – and perhaps the majority – of these untraceable people either do not exist at all or have already been seen by the Soviet Military Mission, and possibly repatriated under a different name. Very many of these Soviet citizens change their name and their identity at will, frequently because they wish to avoid being sent home. Other Russians, in order to ingratiate themselves with the Soviet repatriation officers, profess to have seen all sorts of Soviet citizens whom, they say, the British authorities are hiding, but who in reality do not exist at all. Since these Soviet lists must primarily be based on the reports of other Soviet citizens, it is easy to see how wide discrepancies arise between Soviet and British records.[109]

Despite the numerous complaints from the Soviet side, evidence suggests that rather than concealing Soviet nationals, in many cases Western authorities handed over many people to their Soviet counterparts who were not liable to repatriation in an effort to reduce the DP population. Even before the end of the war informal exchanges of Soviet nationals for West Europeans were being conducted between officers in the field, taking great care to make these transfers appear to be incidental.[110] Most of these illegal transfers were not recorded, and in

the instances when protests against such operations were lodged no action was taken to stop them or reprimand the officers responsible.

The constant complaints and demands by Soviet repatriation officers began to cause irritation, particularly in view of breaches of the Yalta agreement by the Soviet side. At the request of the Secretary of State, the Foreign Office began compiling a folder listing 'Examples of Russian Bad Faith'. It described British grievances which included the refusal by the Soviet authorities to grant British repatriation officers access to sick British prisoners of war in various hospitals, lack of facilities for British contact officers, maltreatment of British nationals (including forced labour, robbery, and rape of British women) and slowness in evacuation. The concluding remark in the folder stated:

> that the best the Russians have done for our men has been considerably lower, in general, than the worst which we have offered to theirs, and the interpretations given to the Yalta agreement by the British and Soviet authorities respectively simply do not bear comparison.[111]

These British complaints were well grounded, since the archives now show that the NKVD's policy towards foreign nationals under their control was 'To prevent any possibility for these people to have contact with the outside world, communication or correspondence with consulates, representations or military missions of countries they were citizens of.'[112]

Furthermore, it was known that the Soviet Repatriation Administration was engaging in espionage activities under cover of their legitimate operations. In June, when General Barker turned down a Soviet request for the admittance of additional Soviet repatriation officers to Western Germany, the FO commented, 'It seemed obvious that this small army of Soviet officers would merely be using repatriation as a cover for other activities, and Gen. Barker staleed on the request, with our support...'.[113] Reports on 'irregular behaviour' such as Field Marshal Alexander's complaint of General Basilov's 'gross interference' in sending officers into prohibited areas received support from the War Office in 'taking a tough line with the Russians on this matter'.[114]

The Ukrainians organize

Even before the end of hostilities in the European theatre, displaced Ukrainians who did not want to return to their former homes began to organize themselves for mutual assistance. Throughout the summer

they found themselves threatened with forcible repatriation and arbitrary acts of both Western and Soviet authorities. This led some opponents of the Soviet system to conceal their true identities, making them vulnerable in different ways for years to come. Others created committees and engaged in a campaign to resist repatriation, lobbied for the policy to be changed, and sought recognition of their national identity and political asylum.

The first Ukrainian refugee committees

In the weeks before the surrender of Germany, groups of fleeing Ukrainian refugees were vulnerable, since they did not know details of the zonal agreements, and could only guess which army would occupy the areas in which they found themselves. Furthermore, with the collapsing local German administration, basic logistical services were unavailable, and in the words of one former refugee 'for several weeks we were left entirely to our own instinct for survival'.[115] Simon Kal'ba remembers the chaos vividly, since between the departure of the German town officials and the arrival of the French occupation troops his wife gave birth to their first son.[116]

In these conditions of general uncertainty, Ukrainians throughout Central Europe began congregating into small communities and forming self-help committees. Fearing the Soviet Army, they immediately began appealing to the Western military authorities for assistance. One of the earliest surviving documents shows that on 2 May 1945, an initiative committee in Munich appealed to the local US commander explaining that they were a group of Ukrainians who were seeking legal protection.[117]

Many such committees sprang up independently throughout Germany, Austria and Italy, and from the surviving documentation it is clear that they shared similar goals and a high degree of political motivation.[118] These early memorandums estimated that there were between three and four million displaced Ukrainians in central Europe.[119]

Regardless of their location, these committees looked to the Western authorities for protection. In areas where the American and British forces withdrew in connection with the zonal agreements, the Ukrainians followed them. Professor Mykhailo Vetukhiv, the leader of one group in that predicament, described their move;

> In July 1945 the American troops left Thuringia and the Initiative Group did its best to evacuate all the Ukrainians westward to the US zone of occupation. The people mostly travelled on foot, carrying

> their baggage in handcarts... they travelled westward or looked for UNRRA camps.[120]

The Ukrainians refugees soon realized that the main threat to their safety was the prospect of forcible repatriation to the Soviet Union. Yakiv Makovets'kyi, the secretary of the Bavarian Regional Ukrainian Committee OPUE,[121] reported that on 12 May 1945 posters appeared in Munich instructing all foreigners to go to assembly centres for repatriation. On that day 'they [US military authorities] captured people on the street and without any explanation took them to the bolshevik camps'.[122]

The Ukrainian Committee OPUE reacted by hand-delivering a letter to Captain Macdonald at the US Military Headquarters, informing him that for historic and political reasons Ukrainians did not want to return to their homes. Following this appeal, the local US military authorities secured the release of sixty-four Ukrainians from the Soviet repatriation camp near Dachau and agreed to allow the Ukrainians to set up their own refugee camp near Liem.[123]

Similar assembly centres for displaced people were being set up by the military authorities as part of the occupation plans. At first this was done haphazardly, providing basic housing and amenities, without much attention being paid to nationality. Therefore it was not difficult for Ukrainians to gravitate towards areas of known concentrations of their countrymen.[124] In some cases it was even possible to request the creation of separate camps for Ukrainians, where committees could operate more easily.

Coordination of efforts and a joint strategy

By June the leaders of Ukrainian committees began attempting to coordinate their efforts, both in resisting repatriation and in setting up assembly centres for Ukrainians. The earliest record of interzonal cooperation is from 25 June 1945, when Oleksa Lytvynenko travelled from Munich to the British zone to meet other leaders. During these meetings the community leaders produced the following list of common aims:

1. Protection of all Ukrainians who do not wish to be forcibly repatriated;
2. General registration of all Ukrainians in order to have accurate statistics;
3. Establishment of contact with international organizations and diplomatic representatives for assistance with (1) and with the aim of emigration;

4. Establishment of contact with Ukrainians in Canada, United States and other countries, for the same reasons;
5. Coordination of all Ukrainians aid/relief organizations that have sprung up or are being planned to prevent duplication of efforts, and the creation of an information network to keep everyone informed on all developments; and
6. Organization of tight network of local and regional committees in constant contact with the central representatives.[125]

Soon the Ukrainian leaders realized that their efforts at self-organization were being thwarted by the Western officials, who feared the political implications of their activities. In order to continue their efforts at organizing they decided that they must portray their activities as simply creating an administrative network, while continuing their efforts at resisting repatriation and lobbying for their national rights.[126]

This networking continued and preparations were made to hold a congress, where delegates representing all groups of Ukrainians could create a coordinating body and elect their representatives. In the mean time, the temporary leaders expanded their efforts at lobbying the various Western authorities. Appeals were sent to officials of both military authorities and the UNRRA at all levels, from local representatives to prime minsters, presidents, foreign secretaries and military leaders, including General Eisenhower.[127] Each of these appeals included a history of Ukrainians along with the list of requests for recognition and assistance.

Most of the letters addressed President Truman, Churchill, Bevin and other leaders were intercepted and never reached their destinations. The successful appeals were those addressed to local officials who had direct contact with the refugees. Most Soviet Ukrainians who avoided repatriation did so through the efforts of military commanders who responded to their requests. One group assembled in a camp at Hersfeld was saved from repatriation by US 1st Lt. Ralph J. Skogen. He not only refused to hand them over to Soviet authorities, but made efforts to move them to where they would be further away from 'the shadow of the hammer and sickle'.[128]

The greatest difficulty Ukrainians faced was the lack of information. Some military and UNRRA officials actively assisted Ukrainians in their efforts at self-assistance, by providing them with permits to organize, allocating premises for their activities, issuing travel documents, and even providing them with information on the policies of the occupying powers. A notable example of such assistance came from US Lt. Col.

Jaromir Pospisil. An American citizen of Czech nationality, he was the Deputy Military Government Officer of the Regensburg area, where a large group of Ukrainian refugees had assembled. Sympathizing with their anti-Soviet attitudes, he regularly intervened to assist them.[129]

Others even joined their efforts at protesting to higher authorities. On 31 July 1945 a letter was sent to the US Commanding General of the 102nd Artillery from 1st Lt. Suzanne Chalfour, strongly protesting against 'the forced departure of Ukrainians for Budweis'. It stated that the repatriating officer acted against the order that Ukrainians, as well as Lithuanians, Letons [*sic*] and Estonians would not be forced back into the Soviet zone.[130] However, these humanitarian gestures by Western officials were more the exception than the rule.

Throughout the summer, the refugee committees fought a largely uphill battle in their stubborn campaign opposing forcible repatriation to the Soviet Union. Using their ever-expanding communication network they overcame immense logistical difficulties to provide each other with information on the locations where forcible repatriation was occurring, and protest against each known incident. Realizing that the American authorities were on the whole more lenient towards non-returnees, they advised Ukrainians to make their way to areas of US control, which was still possible during the summer months.[131]

Witnessing the brutality that surrounded repatriation, and living in fear of becoming the next victims, caused Ukrainians to work together against the common danger. In the first months after the war, people of different backgrounds and political persuasions worked closely together.[132]

Organizing a community life

In addition to the task of pleading their case to the Western authorities, in summer 1945 these Ukrainian refugee committees played an important role in organizing the day-to-day lives of refugees. Before UNRRA established a presence in many areas, the initiative groups worked with military authorities to provide general maintenance and welfare. An UNRRA official described one case of this self-organization prior to the arrival of their team:

> In June of 1945 the British Army had collected about 700 Ukrainians from all parts of the British zone into this Cavalry Barracks and ran them under DP officers from the Hannover Garrison. The Ukrainian Red Cross (subsequently suppressed) was in nominal charge of providing medical and other services.[133]

A number of religious, cultural, medical, educational, social and political organizations were started up by the Ukrainian refugees. One of the first was the Ukrainian Red Cross, which provided much-needed medical assistance. Despite providing detailed information on their aims and activities, this organization was denied official recognition by the Voluntary Service Branch of UNRRA, and existed as an independent body without access to any international assistance. It nevertheless continued its activities, playing an important role in providing relief to Ukrainians. One concentration camp survivor later acknowledged that it was the only organization he turned to for aid, fearing that the international agencies would turn him over to the Soviet authorities.[134]

Because Munich rapidly became a focus of Ukrainian activities, both the Ukrainian Catholic and Ukrainian Orthodox Autocephalous Churches decided to locate their headquarters in the city. These churches not only coordinated religious life but also provided material assistance to refugees. In July, the Educational Branch of OPUE began organizing schools and holding teachers' conferences, and providing English classes.[135] Cultural leaders who assembled in a camp in Augsburg began planning the creation of a Ukrainian Literary and Artistic Organization. The League of Ukrainian Political Prisoners (German Concentration Camp survivors) formed a support group based in Munich, with branches in centres with large Ukrainian populations.

The Ukrainian diaspora rallies in support

Upon learning about the millions of destitute refugees in Europe, Ukrainian *émigré* communities in many Western countries had begun organizing efforts to aid their countrymen. Diaspora communities in Canada, the United States, Italy, Belgium and other states formed relief committees, which played an important role in the future of Ukrainian refugees in Europe. The two main aims of these voluntary agencies were to lobby their governments on behalf of the Ukrainian refugees, and to provide material assistance to those unable to avail themselves of international aid.

The United Ukrainian American Relief Committee (UUARC) was formed on 22 January 1944. It was accepted for membership by the American Council of Voluntary Agencies for Foreign Service (7 March 1944) and participated in relief work by the President's War Relief Control Board.[136] The Ukrainian Canadian Relief Fund (UCRF) was formed on 12 January 1945 and became the fund-raising and relief arm of the Ukrainian Canadian Committee. It joined the Canadian Red Cross so that it could assist Ukrainian displaced persons in

Europe.[137] By spring 1945 the two organizations had begun to exchange correspondence, with the aim of cooperation.[138]

Canadian and American Ukrainians serving in the Western occupation forces also became active in assisting refugees. During their tour of duty they came across destitute Ukrainians and became concerned about their fate. In summer 1945 they created the Central Ukrainian Relief Bureau (CURB) and elected Bohdan Panchuk as its first president.[139]

Ukrainians in the Vatican were also active, and on the initiative of Bishop Ivan Buchko, the Ukrainian Relief Committee for Refugees in Italy was formed on 14 June 1945 by the Eastern Congregation of the Catholic Church.[140] Other agencies that came into being at this time include the Ukrainian Relief Committee in Belgium, and the Ukrainian Social Services Committee of France.

During summer 1945 the North American diaspora agencies were unable to contact the refugees directly and therefore did not play an active role in providing assistance. The agencies in Europe were better located to assist the refugees but did not have large financial resources at their disposal. The most important role during this period was played by the Ukrainian Red Cross, based in Switzerland, but this was forcibly disbanded at the end of the summer by the Western authorities at the request of the Soviet Union.[141] However, the existence of these agencies provided important moral support for the refugees, who, on learning about them, often appealed for help. Over the following months the refugee committees succeeded in gradually establishing contact with these agencies.[142]

Other groups of Ukrainians

Not all Ukrainians who found themselves displaced in summer 1945 were civilian refugees looking for assembly centres. One group of Ukrainians from the Soviet Union serving in the Red Army were captured by the Germans, forcibly conscripted into the German armed forces and sent to France. Once there, they joined the French Resistance and formed Ukrainian units.[143] At the end of the war, at the request of the Soviet Embassy in France, they were demobilized. However, the French government refused to hand them over forcibly to the Soviet authorities. Instead, they were allowed to join the French Foreign Legion, which many of them did.[144]

Prominent members of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (both the Bandera and Melnyk factions) were also in a different situation. Because they were leading a movement that was engaged in armed

opposition to the Soviet government, they had connections with other resistance movements throughout East and Central Europe, and were well-informed of activities in Ukraine. Their political agenda consisted of establishing an independent Ukrainian state, and they were prepared to collaborate with Western authorities towards this end. In exchange for intelligence information, Western intelligence units occasionally assisted them. One surviving member of the 1945 OUN-b leadership, Mykola Lebed', then in charge of their Foreign Affairs Branch, described how his identity was changed many times, and the uncertainty that surrounded his status.[145] In some cases these Ukrainians became victims of the Soviet infiltration of the British intelligence service, a fact which, because of the sensitive nature of the issue, has received very little public attention.[146]

Another group in an unusual predicament, which has remained surrounded by controversy until the present time, was the former Diviziia Halychyna (Galician Division) of the Waffen SS.[147]

Conclusion

Discussing the history of Ukrainian refugees during summer 1945 is difficult because of to the lack of information on many events that occurred. However, based on surviving records, it is clear that it was a period of great chaos and trauma for people who had survived the dislocations of the war. In addition to the usual difficulties facing refugees, Ukrainians were denied their national identity and subjected to forcible repatriation to the Soviet Union. These people appealed to the Western democracies for the protection of their rights and were surprised by the reaction they received. The United States and Britain were preoccupied with negotiating a peace settlement and viewed the large population of displaced people as a problem that needed to be solved through repatriation so that reconstruction could begin. Ukrainian requests for protection and assistance were dismissed as obstacles to these larger goals, and the planned repatriation campaign was set in motion.

However, difficulties with repatriating Ukrainians arose. Ukrainians who did not want to return to their former homes began forming committees and organizing resistance to repatriation. In extreme circumstances they committed suicide rather than submit to the policy of repatriation, and through these actions prompted the military authorities to reconsider the use of force in repatriation. Furthermore, a dispute arose over the definition of a Soviet national, since the Western Allies

refused to repatriate people forcibly who were not Soviet citizens in 1939. This policy decision raised the question of which Ukrainians were repatriable, since people identifying themselves as Ukrainians held citizenships of many states.

Notwithstanding these difficulties, during summer 1945 the overwhelming majority of displaced Ukrainians were repatriated through the combined efforts of the Western and Soviet repatriation authorities. Despite their efforts at self-organization and occasional help from sympathetic officials, only a small percentage of the total uprooted by the war remained in areas of Western control by the autumn. However, the issues raised about their identity and right to asylum during the summer would continue to be debated for months to come.

4

The Uneasy Peace: Inadequate Solutions (Autumn 1945–Spring 1946)

As the post-victory chaos was brought under control by autumn 1945, Ukrainian refugees who had managed to avoid repatriation during the summer months began a new phase in their struggle for political refuge. They found themselves in the midst of a changing international situation which over the coming months would witness an increasing breakdown of the Grand Alliance. Denied the two rights they sought most – self-identification and asylum – they continued to be the subjects of an East–West tug-of-war while facing increasingly difficult prospects for survival.

This chapter will examine the activities of Ukrainians from autumn 1945 to spring 1946, and the evolution of Western policy on refugees with a particular focus on attitudes towards Ukrainians. It will show how these attitudes were shaped by the deteriorating East–West relationship, the doctrines espoused by the newly created United Nations (UN), and the behaviour of the refugees themselves. An attempt will be made to assess the impact of the problems of this particular group of refugees on the perceptions and definitions of a refugee.

The Ukrainians organize self-assistance

Although by autumn 1945 the large-scale forcible repatriation had ended, the coming months were a critical time during which Ukrainians struggled to establish not only their identity, but also their right to refuse repatriation and secure asylum. Western and Soviet policies towards the population of displaced persons continued to be geared towards repatriation, and as the emergency supplies of the International Red Cross became depleted, UNRRA and the military authorities were

increasingly reluctant to provide assistance to people who refused repatriation. This left many Ukrainians faced with a basic struggle for survival.

Official policy towards Ukrainians continued to deny them recognition as a national group. Further measures were taken to ban their organizations to prevent anti-repatriation activities, voluntary agencies created by Ukrainian *emigré* communities were denied permission to assist them directly, and some Ukrainians continued to face the threat of forcible repatriation.[1] Despite these restrictive circumstances, they continued their campaign – adamantly opposing repatriation, they requested the right to asylum, insisted on their Ukrainian identity, and proceeded to organize their own welfare, education, cultural and social services. These activities led to a gradual change in Western policies towards them and other refugees.

Ukrainian activities continued in two spheres: within the refugee committees which united into coordinating bodies in Germany and Austria, and within the voluntary agencies created by diaspora Ukrainians. The latter lobbied on behalf of the refugees and provided them with material assistance. Working together, they contributed to the gradual change in Western opinion towards the Ukrainians' position and influenced the growing willingness to grant their requests. Being the largest group of non-returnees, the refusal by Ukrainian refugees to accept repatriation affected not only their own future, but also played an important part in the international acceptance of responsibility for people in their predicament, thus affecting the fate of all refugees.

The situation in autumn 1945

By autumn 1945 the Western occupation authorities had began to establish order in their respective zones. For Ukrainian refugees this had a dual significance. On the one hand, they became less vulnerable to the arbitrary activities of both Soviet and Western repatriation officials, and were in a better position to appeal to administrative structures for the protection of their rights. On the other hand, their activities came under closer scrutiny and increasing restrictions, as the Western powers attempted to complete repatriation and took steps to ban anti-repatriation activities. Ukrainian refugees found themselves in direct conflict with the repatriation policy, as their goal was to establish their right to asylum and continue their lives outside the Soviet Union.

The most serious problem Ukrainians continued to face was the threat of forced repatriation, which hounded Soviet Ukrainians until 1947.[2] Almost equally threatening was the increasing reluctance by the

military and UNRRA authorities to provide assistance to people who refused repatriation. In late autumn 1945 screening boards were set up to determine which people in the established assembly centres were legitimate displaced persons, who by definition were required to desire repatriation. Those who refused repatriation were deemed ineligible for further assistance and forced to leave the camps. Individuals who were excluded from camps were forced to survive independently in deteriorating economic conditions, where they faced both difficulties in obtaining employment and hostility from local populations. Those who were able to remain in the camps faced continuous pressures to accept repatriation and experienced increasing economic deprivation, as food rations were continually reduced.[3] They were also subject to raids on the camps by military authorities, ostensibly for the purpose of detecting black marketeers, firearms, and stolen goods. However, the raids were at times conducted with brutality and violence, and often resulted in the seizure or theft by the raiding troops of the DPs' legitimate possessions.[4]

Soviet repatriation teams continued to be granted free access to the camps, leaving refugees open to coercion and allegations of collaboration or anti-Soviet activities. The Soviet officials also used information from eligibility screening forms as a means of blackmailing DPs or their relatives in the Soviet Union.[5] Partially in response to Soviet allegations and partially with the aim of preventing anti-repatriation activities, Ukrainian leaders were often arrested and their organizations disbanded. In an effort to speed up repatriation, efforts to deny the existence of a Ukrainian national identity were increased, since there was no Ukrainian government willing to take responsibility for these refugees. Restrictions were also placed on Ukrainian efforts to organize welfare and cultural activities.

The Ukrainian refugee community

Records on the exact numbers and location of Ukrainians during this period are incomplete, since they do not appear in official statistics as Ukrainians, and the refugees themselves were unable to compile precise statistics.[6] Nevertheless, from surviving sources it is possible to obtain a general picture of this group. Because during the summer months freedom of movement was not severely restricted, many Ukrainians travelled to the US Zone of Germany, since it was believed that the American authorities were most lenient towards Ukrainian interests and that the largest organized communities already existed there. By autumn 1945, 50 per cent of the Ukrainian refugee population was in

the US Zone in Germany, 25 per cent in the British Zone, and 5 per cent in the French Zone. Approximately 15 per cent of Ukrainian refugees lived in Austria. The majority of the Ukrainians in Germany lived in assembly centres, while in Austria about half of them lived privately.[7]

Of the total group, 30–40 per cent were political refugees who had made a conscious decision to leave their homes. By and large, these politically motivated refugees became the leaders of the group. The remainder were former forced labourers or prisoners of war who had refused to return home. In addition to this important differentiation, the Ukrainians were divided into two broad categories: (i) Eastern Ukrainians, holding Soviet citizenship,[8] Orthodox in their religious affiliation, many poorly educated and single, although this group included a significant number of intellectuals; and (ii) Western Ukrainians, holding Polish, Czech, Romanian or other passports, predominantly Catholic, many of whom had had a higher education and had fled with their families. This second category made up approximately two-thirds of the population. Other, smaller, categories included the post-First World War refugees, students who had been studying abroad, concentration camp survivors and Red Army soldiers who had been German PoWs.[9]

As such, they constituted a socially complex group including farmers, blue- and white-collar workers, artisans and intellectuals, originating from all regions of Ukraine, and espousing diverse religious, cultural and political traditions. They formed the largest emigration in Ukrainian history,[10] and at times their diversity led to conflict.[11] Living in the uncertain conditions of the postwar environment, which included the psychological traumas of war and dislocation, compounded by living in crowded or dilapidated housing, they had to contend with the constant fear of repatriation and uncertainty about the future. They nevertheless proceeded to organize their lives both within and outside their transitionary communities, overcoming the various differences between them.

Creating a coordinating body

The names the Ukrainian refugees chose for their organizations demonstrate how they perceived themselves and their situation. They did not use the label 'refugee' but considered themselves *émigrés*, who were unable to return to their homes because of their opposition to the Soviet government. Therefore they needed to find new homes where they could continue their lives free from oppression. Their identity as Ukrainians was a key element in defining their position, namely that their place of origin (to use their own terms their Ukrainian homeland) had

been occupied by a hostile foreign power which prevented them from enjoying political, religious, cultural and other basic freedoms. In order to retain their national identity as Ukrainians and secure their individual freedom, they believed that they had to continue their lives as emigrants in democratic states. Until they could find permanent homes, the main aim of the committees they created 'was to organize a normal life for Ukrainian emigrants providing them with welfare, education and a cultural life'.[12]

Individual Ukrainians who took the initiative in organizing committees operated on the basis of democratic principles, and made an effort to preserve the unity of the Ukrainian community in exile by making the committees representative. By September 1945, the leaders of Ukrainian refugee committees that had formed in the summer began holding regional conferences at which the need for a central representative body was discussed.[13] Preparations were started for the holding of a wider meeting of all committees in Germany. One very important aspect of these preparations was the selection of potential candidates who could lead such an organization, which was to unite many different groups of Ukrainians. After much deliberation, Vasyl' Mudryi, a politician from Western Ukraine who had been a member of the Polish Sejm (Parliament), was proposed as a person with the necessary experience and diplomatic skills for the job.[14]

A conference of representatives from all known Ukrainian committees in Germany was planned for 29 October 1945 to be held in Aschaffenburg. Arranging such a meeting was quite a logistical undertaking. These people had had their nationality denied, were strictly forbidden from organizing, lived in different zones of occupation with travel between zones restricted by military authorities, and Soviet repatriation teams were travelling freely and illegally kidnapping people. Nevertheless, preparations were made, and Vasyl' Mudryi obtained verbal permission from the local military and UNRRA authorities to hold such a conference.[15]

At the last minute the conference organizers ran into difficulties and were able to convene the meeting only through the intervention of the Chief of the UNRRA Voluntary Agencies Division, Marjorie Bradford, who later described the difficulties the Ukrainians faced:

> There were a lot of adventures in getting this meeting held. Permission had to be obtained from the military authorities. Something 'slipped' in those arrangements and when the delegates arrived they were not permitted to enter the camp and had to take to the woods.

> While they were running around in the woods a frantic delegation from Hanau came to see me at Hoechst. It was rather cold weather, night was coming on, and Charity Grant at Wiesbaden and Major Garnet and I had a busy few hours trying to get through to the appropriate military authorities who would determine their fate.[16]

Once the conference got started on 30 October, the thirty-three assembled delegates created the Central Representation of the Ukrainian Emigration (Tsentral'ne Predstavnytstvo Ukraiins'koi Emihratsii, TsPUE).[17] Vasyl' Mudryi was elected president of the new organization, and Mykhailo Vetukhi[18] from Eastern Ukraine became the first vice president. Thus the interests of both Eastern and Western Ukrainians were represented in the two main positions.[19] The conference adopted a statute to govern their activities, which consisted of a five-level pyramid system of elections (camp, district, region, province-land, and central), and defined the electorate as:

> every Ukrainian emigrant of voting age, who is morally and nationally untarnished irrespective of territorial origin, religious conviction, gender, political persuasion, social status, education or profession, in accordance with the electoral register.[20]

The electoral register specified that elections to regional and central bodies were to be free, general, and held by secret ballot.[21] The statute also outlined the two main aims of the new coordinating body as (i) providing legal, moral and material assistance to all Ukrainian refugees; and (ii) heading and representing all welfare and non-political organizations who join TsPUE.[22]

The importance of this umbrella organization TsPUE was not that it initiated activities, but rather that it provided a coordinating body and a unified voice for Ukrainian refugees. Not all Ukrainians supported the idea of creating committees or a coordinating body. Some feared that by organizing they would become easier targets for the Soviet repatriation teams. Many also distrusted the Western occupation authorities, and were afraid that by approaching them for permits to organize, they would be handed over to the Soviet authorities.[23] These fears were justified, since on numerous occasions Ukrainian leaders were arrested by Western officials, and at times they were simply transferred to Soviet control.[24] Often leaders went into hiding when they discovered that they were likely to be interned.[25] In many cases Ukrainian committees were forcibly disbanded and their offices impounded at the request of

Soviet officials, or in accordance with new military orders issued in December 1945.[26] Some Ukrainians felt that it was not feasible to administer their disenfranchized community on a democratic basis.[27] Nevertheless, a sufficient number of individuals believed that the only way to maintain a sense of national identity and dignity was to make TsPUE the most important Ukrainian refugee body, and succeeded in this aim. Although they were denied permission to exist as a central body,[28] they survived outside the law until 1947, when the IRO allowed refugees to organize along national lines.[29]

In Austria, a Ukrainian Central Relief Association was formed in Innsbruck, on the basis of the existing prewar Ukrainian *emigré* community in Austria.[30] The numbers of Ukrainians in Austria were smaller and few records from the early period of their operations have survived.

The organization of activities

At the conference of Ukrainian refugees in Aschaffenburg, where TsPUE was founded, eight committees were created, demonstrating the priorities set by the refugees in their efforts to normalize their life in emigration. The committees were for Culture and Education; Employment and Business; Legal Aid; Welfare Services; Finance; Information; Youth; and Women.[31] Since a large portion of Ukraine's intellectual, political and professional elite had migrated westwards, most of these committees were headed by experienced organizers.

Education was an important priority for Ukrainian refugees for a variety of reasons. It was a way of maintaining a Ukrainian identity (language, history, culture) and creating a semblance of normality under temporary conditions by providing children and young people with regular activities and ensuring that they received an education. It was also perceived as an important means of preparation for their new lives (vocational and language training), and for scholars it was a means of continuing their professional livelihood. Under the general guidance of Dmytro Doroshenko, who headed the TsPUE Culture and Education Committee, a comprehensive educational network was established, including kindergartens, primary and secondary schools, professional and technical schools, and institutions of higher education.

Ukrainian scholars from the many academic establishments in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe who found themselves among the refugee community played a leading role in the establishment of this network.[32] In addition to setting up new primary and secondary schools, vocational education and retraining of Ukrainian refugees was an important aspect of the educational activities. The Ukrainian Tech-

nical Husbandry Institute moved from Podebrady, Czechoslovakia and in June 1945 resumed its activities in Platting, Germany. Later it moved to Regensburg, where a larger Ukrainian community had sprung up. Having obtained permission from the US military authorities, its staff resumed their teaching activities and began to set up a retraining programme.[33] In areas of large concentrations of Ukrainians, branches of the Institute were set up and ran short-term or one-year courses. They played an important role in training Ukrainians in securing temporary employment as well as providing skills for future resettlement.[34] Numerous institutions of higher learning and research centres from the inter-war period were reopened, and new ones were created.[35] On the initiative of a handful of academics, primarily from Eastern Ukraine, a conference of Ukrainian scholars was held in Augsburg on 16 November 1945, at which time the Ukrainian Free Academy of Arts and Sciences (Ukraiins'ka Vil'na Akademiia Nauk – UVAN) was created.[36] It was recognized as the central scholarly institution in exile by TsPUE.[37]

Many of these activities were in conflict with UNRRA's policy on education, which stipulated that all educational activities within DP camps 'must be compatible with the repatriation programme of the Administration'.[38] Furthermore, vocational training was to be limited to short refresher courses, and the policy stated that, 'The Administration shall not encourage or participate in the development of universities or full university courses for displaced persons'.[39] As a result, most of these programmes were denied financial assistance by the military and UNRRA authorities, and forced to operate outside the law until 1947.

Cultural activities flourished among Ukrainian refugees during this period, since they provided a means for channelling creative forces after the destructive experience of the war. The refugee community was in many ways an ideal environment for the flourishing of the arts, since large numbers of people lived in closed communities with a great deal of leisure time at their disposal. The Ukrainian refugee population included a large percentage of creative individuals who had worked in the arts before the war, and sought artistic freedom as one of the motivations for fleeing their homes. Writers, musicians, actors, directors and artists grouped together to follow their creative pursuits, and enjoyed a high degree of support from the refugee communities and their leaders. Their role within the community was both in sustaining and developing the distinct cultural identity of Ukrainians as well as providing entertainment in mainly bleak conditions.

Writers were the first group to organize formally into an association. Following meetings in the summer, on 23 September 1945 they created

the Union of Ukrainian Writers (Mystets'kyi Ukrains'kyi Rukh – MUR).[40] In their declaration they clearly outlined their commitment both to Ukraine and to art, stating:

> Discarding all that is artistically imperfect and ideologically hostile to the Ukrainian nation, the Ukrainian artists are uniting in order to strive, in friendly cooperation, towards the summits of real and serious art.[41]

Very early theatre and music became important features of camp life, with professional actors, dancers and musicians providing the catalyst in the creation of ensembles. A number of choirs had fled as groups and continued their activities in exile, at times entertaining the occupation troops.[42] Although fewer restrictions were placed on cultural activities by the occupation authorities, they were forced to be self-financing and were subsidized only by a special Cultural Fund set up by TsPUE.[43]

The dissemination of information was a key issue in the lives of all the post-Second World War refugees, and Ukrainians began efforts to establish an independent press in the summer. The first newsletters were mimeographed and simply passed from hand to hand or posted in public places. By November, a cooperative publishing house had been set up in Regensburg. Cyrillic typesetting facilities were obtained through unusual circumstances, characteristic of the situation and attitudes of the Ukrainian refugees. Two young Eastern Ukrainian writers learned of the existence of cyrillic typesetting characters in a former German publishing house in Plausen, in the Soviet zone, which the Germans had used to print bulletins for Ukrainian *Ostarbeiter* during the war. Risking their lives, they borrowed a car and drove into the town one night and stole the equipment on the grounds that it was the property of the Ukrainian people. They brought it to their camp in Regensburg and set up publishing facilities for the refugees.[44] By the end of 1945 a total of forty-two newspapers and bulletins were being produced.[45]

In these activities the Ukrainians faced both restrictions from the occupation authorities and financial difficulties. Official policy towards refugee newspapers stipulated that they were subject to censorship and not allowed to contain any anti-repatriation propaganda. However, local authorities had varying attitudes towards issuing permits for publications. Vasyl' Chaplenko, the first editor of the weekly newspaper *'Nashe Zhyttia'* (Our Life) described the process of obtaining such a permit:

> It became apparent that for us to start publishing, we needed a permit. But nobody knew who could issue such a permit. After consultations, we approached the American military authorities, but they refused to allow even a notice board news-sheet. A few days later the local UNRRA official, Mrs Carpenter, gave us permission to publish... This [first] edition was technically poor and rather thin, because the censor prohibited us from printing anything with a political content.[46]

In some areas the local authorities refused to grant permission for the publication of any Ukrainian newspapers, while in others they were given a free hand, which left them open to Soviet allegations of anti-Soviet and anti-repatriation leanings.[47]

The legal aid branch of TsPUE pursued three types of activity. They petitioned the Western occupation authorities to grant Ukrainians legal status as a separate national group and political asylum. They also protested against forcible repatriation of Ukrainians and unfair screenings which were excluding Ukrainians from assistance, and lobbied for a change in these policies. Third, they provided legal counsel for individuals unfairly arrested and charged with collaboration and war crimes.[48] Often on allegations by the Soviet repatriation officials, UNRRA camps containing Ukrainians were visited by Western intelligence officers to investigate anti-Soviet activities, and the Legal Aid Committee was called to defend individuals thus accused.[49] The Legal Committee also created an internal judiciary system, whereby community courts could resolve disputes among the Ukrainian refugee population. The individuals engaged in these activities were lawyers trained during the interwar period, primarily from Western Ukraine, who continued their professional activities in this new situation of displacement.

Employment was an important concern for the entire refugee population. Again drawing on interwar traditions, Ukrainians set about forming cooperatives to provide short-term employment for camp residents. The initial emphasis was on manufacturing workshops, aimed at providing activities for refugees and necessary consumer items in a situation of general deprivation. The first cooperatives were organized in September 1945 in Munich. The Cooperative Association of Consumers (KOS) consisted of a wholesale business unit, a grocery store, a restaurant and a book store. The Zhinocha Pratsia (Women's Labour) Cooperative focused on producing folk art objects, and the cooperative Pratsia (Labour) worked in the field of construction, transportation, footwear,

maintaining a tailor's shop, a barber's shop, a watch repair shop, and a publishing house, as well as the manufacturing of folk art objects, chemicals, cosmetics and other items.[50] The first convention of Ukrainian cooperatives was held in Munich on 9 July 1946, where the centralization of procurement and distribution of supplies was discussed.[51] The organizers of these cooperatives had been leaders in the Ukrainian cooperative movement in interwar Poland.

Youth organizations which sprang up in the Ukrainian community were also by and large continuations or revivals of interwar groups. Plast Ukrainian Youth Association, formed in L'viv in 1912, resumed its activities in the autumn of 1945, in camps with large concentrations of Ukrainians.[52] Other groups which organized activities in late 1945 included the Association of Ukrainian Youth (Splika Ukraiins'koi Molodi – SUM), and a Ukrainian branch of the YMCA.[53] In December 1945, KODUS (Komitet Dopomohy Ukraiins'kym Studentam – Committee to Aid Ukrainian Students) was also created, forming a fund to enable students to continue their studies by providing loans.[54]

The Women's Branch of TsPUE was responsible for providing care for pregnant women and nursing mothers, as well as medical care to those unable to avail themselves of other assistance. They organized visits to hospitals, particularly for the elderly, orphans, and former soldiers who had refused repatriation. Many cultural activities, such as art exhibits and concerts, also fell within the competence of the Women's Committee, as did the organizing of kindergartens.[55]

Welfare activities were focused on providing assistance to those unable to avail themselves of official assistance, particularly people living outside camps or unable to obtain DP status, such as former prisoners of war.[56] Medical care was an important aspect of these activities, and a medical association was formed in the autumn.[57] One of the key roles of the welfare committee was the distribution of aid arriving from Ukrainian voluntary organizations.[58]

Political activities were strictly prohibited by the occupation authorities, but many political parties and associations continued their existence underground in this period. The biggest problem was coordination, since within the Ukrainian refugee population there were representatives of a full spectrum of political beliefs.[59] A series of meetings were held by the representatives of these parties in spring 1946 and through the mediation of Rev Kushnir of Canada, the Coordinating Ukrainian Committee was formed on 14 July 1946 in Munich, which was joined by all the parties.[60] These political activities were organized outside the main coordinating committee TsPUE-N.

The largest single difficulty facing all Ukrainian activities in this period was shortage of money. Because the efforts of the Ukrainian refugees did not receive official sanction from the occupation authorities, they were forced to operate outside the law. In order to raise funds, TsPUE introduced a community tax, whereby every member of the electorate was required to pay 20DM.[61] Furthermore, cooperatives were encouraged to donate 1 per cent of their profits to TsPUE, special collections were held at Christmas and on other special occasions, and admission was charged to cultural events. Of the total collected, 60 per cent was placed at the disposal of TsPUE, 25 per cent allocated to regional committees and 15 per cent to the local committees.[62] Finances were supplemented by black market activities, which were as widespread among Ukrainians as among the general refugee population.

The activities of Ukrainian refugees in this period demonstrate a surprising degree of cooperation and determination, resourcefulness and agility. UNRRA and the military authorities were still determined to complete repatriation and focused their efforts towards this end; they attempted to curb anti-repatriation activities, denied the existence of Ukrainians and took steps to ban their organizations. The Ukrainians, however, were clear in their goals of maintaining their national integrity and organizing self-help. Isolated from the outside world and deprived of official assistance, they created a complex social, economic, educational and cultural life, overcoming the restrictions imposed on them, and their determination eventually led to changes in policies towards them.

In addition to their efforts at self-organization, they kept up consistent efforts to establish contact with the military, UNRRA and other authorities. In February 1946 they began to communicate with the Inter-Governmental Committee on Refugees, and this was maintained until the dissolution of the IGCR.[63]

Ukrainian voluntary agencies

Paralleling developments within the refugee community and UNRRA operations, by autumn 1945 the voluntary agencies concerned with the fate of Ukrainian refugees also realized the need for more coordinated action. Although preparations had been made before the end of the war and early efforts at assistance began during the summer,[64] because of the chaos of the summer months they remained largely ineffective.

Throughout 1945 and 1946 most Ukrainian voluntary agencies continued to be denied access to the Ukrainian refugees by the British, US

and French authorities, because the Ukrainians were not recognized as a separate group of refugees. These organizations were not denied the right to exist. In fact, the two largest, the Ukrainian Canadian Relief Fund (UCRF) and the United Ukrainian American Relief Committee (UUARC), were recognized by their governments. Nevertheless, they were prevented from assisting Ukrainian refugees directly. The United Ukrainian American Relief Committee was granted a permit for operations by the US President's War Relief Control Board on 25 September 1945, but was denied direct access to refugee camps and required to work through other American agencies until 16 September 1946.[65] The Ukrainian Canadian Committee (UCC) was allowed to set up the Ukrainian Canadian Relief Fund only on the condition that money collected was entrusted to the Canadian Branch of the Red Cross for disbursement.[66] In addition to the external restrictions placed upon them, the Ukrainian organizations also faced internal divisions, and engaged in debate over the validity and form of assistance to be provided to the Ukrainian refugees.[67]

As a result of these restrictions placed on Ukrainian voluntary organizations, from autumn 1945 to spring 1946 the most influential relief efforts were conducted by Canadian and American Ukrainians serving in the occupation forces through the newly created Central Ukrainian Relief Bureau (CURB).[68] Through their professional duties they had access to both military and UNRRA refugee camps, and they used the organisational base of CUSA[69] for coordinating information and activities.[70]

Using their advantageous position as members of the occupying force, they worked with other agencies in developing a three-pronged plan of action. Seeking out the Ukrainian agencies located in Europe,[71] they set about providing assistance to refugees by skirting existing constraints placed upon the agencies. Second, they attempted to work with existing international organizations which could operate with the permission of the occupation authorities. Third, they lobbied their governments to change their policies towards Ukrainian refugees and lift the restraints on their activities.

Organizing assistance

One of the first tasks CURB undertook was the registration of Ukrainian refugees in order to collect accurate information on their location and situation. The organizer of CURB, Bohdan Panchuk, remarked in retrospect that they were unaware of the enormity of the task they had set themselves:

> We thought that there would be thousands, perhaps five to ten thousand. Actually it turned out that there were more than a million. Nobody at that time, when the war ended, realised how many Ukrainians there were. I don't think we still do.[72]

Simultaneously, CURB sent out an appeal to all members of the Servicemen's Association to compile and circulate all information on Ukrainian refugees they encountered.[73]

Many of these soldiers and officers knew little of the existence of Ukrainian refugees, and met them in chance encounters. One former New York City policeman serving in the American military police in Germany came across a group of children singing in Ukrainian, while taking a walk in a park in Ingolstadt. He was surprised to see that 'they played Ukrainian games, just as we used to in America, only they conducted these games in Ukrainian'. In striking up a conversation with some nearby adults he learned of their situation.[74] Others took time out from their duties to visit Ukrainian camps and reported their findings to CURB.[75] Some individuals who provided CURB with information were well placed to monitor the changing situation. One Ukrainian who served as a translator with the British occupation forces in Germany, Sgt George Luckyj, regularly assisted CURB. His activities drew criticism from Soviet repatriation officials, but these were dismissed by his superiors.[76]

CURB also engaged in collecting and distributing material aid to Ukrainian refugees. The CUSA newsletter issued an appeal to its members returning home to Canada on completion of their tour of duty, to donate items such as clothing, food, cigarettes and money for distribution to the refugees. As has already been mentioned, they had access to the refugee camps and communities because they were part of the occupation forces. They took advantage of this relative freedom of movement to distribute the aid they collected, as well as funds which were coming from UCRF and the UUARC to Ukrainian refugees. They had no permission to engage in such activities, and Bohdan Panchuk later explained: 'The only reason we were able to do anything was because we were in uniform, and who was going to stop me from sitting in my jeep and driving to Hamburg once a month?'[77]

In addition to distributing aid, the Canadian Ukrainians often directly intervened on behalf of Ukrainian refugees to rescue them from repatriation, at times employing unconventional methods. On a routine mission to Belgium, Bohdan Panchuk came to the rescue of fifteen Ukrainians who had been interned by Belgian authorities by explaining that as a Canadian officer he was taking responsibility for them.[78]

Another Canadian, Stanley Frolick (who became the second president of CURB), described how he gained access to Ukrainians who had been in the Polish Army and were being held in a PoW camp in England. Drawing the War Office's attention to the fact that under the Geneva Convention PoWs were entitled to spiritual aid, he obtained permission for a priest to visit the men and accompanied him. For the sermon, Frolick donned a priest's vestment and addressed the Ukrainian PoWs, explained that they faced forcible repatriation, and advised them to claim Polish citizenship. He also informed them of the activities of CURB and assured them that everything possible was being done to assist them. The British officer hosting the visit informed Frolick that the men had already been marked for repatriation as Soviet nationals, but years later in Kitchener, Ontario, one of the men who had been present at the 'sermon' came up to Mr Frolick and thanked him for his advice all those years before.[79]

Cooperation with other agencies

Because the capacity of these Canadian Ukrainians to distribute material aid to needy Ukrainians was limited, they and other Ukrainian voluntary agencies attempted to work through other international institutions. The Ukrainian Canadian Committee had links with the Canadian Branch of the International Red Cross since the Ukrainian Canadian Relief Fund was administratively affiliated to it. The United Ukrainian American Relief Committee donated US$10 000 to the International Red Cross and asked for the money to be earmarked for medical supplied to Austria.[80] They also donated money to CARE (the Cooperative for American Remittance to Europe), and attempted to direct the funds to Ukrainian refugees by participating in the management of the organization.[81]

The Catholic Church was another institution through which the Ukrainian voluntary agencies attempted to assist Ukrainian refugees. Chaplains had access to both PoW camps and UNRRA camps, and the Vatican had embarked on a programme of its own to assist all Catholic refugees. Ukrainians succeeded in creating two Catholic relief committees specifically to assist Ukrainians, one in Rome, on the initiative of Bishop Ivan Buchko, and a smaller one in Paris headed by father Perridon. Funds collected in North America were channelled through these two committees. Ukrainian churches in the diaspora also contributed money to Catholic relief agencies in their countries.

Generally speaking, these activities had a less direct impact on the Ukrainian refugees, since the international agencies distributed aid

according to their own policies, and the Ukrainian donors had no way of ensuring that their contributions were used according to their requests. Over time, the International Red Cross became increasingly reluctant to cooperate with Ukrainian organizations, on the grounds that Ukrainian requests were of a political nature. One agency, the Unitarian Service Committee, which had agreed to act as the UUARC representative in Europe, consulted the Soviet ambassador in Geneva to determine which Ukrainians should receive assistance, which led the UUARC to terminate their agreement.[82]

Lobbying

The most important aspect of the activities of Ukrainian voluntary agencies in the months from autumn 1945 to spring 1946 was their lobbying efforts on behalf of Ukrainian refugees. Because they were citizens of Western countries, and many of them had proved their loyalty to their state through participation in the war, they were in a reasonably strong position to appeal to their governments. They possessed the knowledge of the workings of democratic political process, including the power of public pressure and, in contrast to the refugees, were native English speakers and therefore able to compose articulate appeals. Whereas communications from Ukrainian refugees could easily be dismissed, when these same requests appeared from Canadian citizens and were forwarded to the prime minister by Members of Parliament, they carried much more weight.

In the lobbying campaign, the Ukrainian voluntary agencies employed a number of tactics. They directly petitioned political leaders, providing them with details on the situation of Ukrainian refugees and a historical background explaining why Ukrainians refused repatriation. Appealing to humanitarian principles, they appealed for the termination of forcible repatriation, the recognition of the Ukrainian refugees' right to self-organization, assistance and asylum, and proposed schemes for resettlement.[83]

Members of Parliament and influential political figures were presented with information on the Ukrainian refugees' predicament, and asked to forward the information to strengthen the case of the Ukrainian organizations. In October 1945 a group of twenty-five Canadian MPs visiting Europe sent a petition to Prime Minister Mackenzie King, stating:

> Despite appeals and protests by Canadian and American citizens against forceful repatriation of Ukrainian displaced persons...

> reports are reaching Canadians that forcible repatriation of Ukrainians continues... in the name of humanity to use full moral force of Canada's position with the other Allies to effectively and immediately relieve plight of displaced persons in British and American zones, especially of kin of Canadian citizens.[84]

In these lobbying efforts, CURB worked closely with the coordinating bodies of the Ukrainian communities in Canada and the United States.[85] They passed on their information and requested that petitions be sent to the Canadian and American governments from within the two countries. One such coordinated effort, had a significant impact on changing British policy towards Ukrainian refugee organizations. In late December 1945 CURB launched a series of protests against the order prohibiting the existence of all Ukrainian organizations. Simultaneously they petitioned Attlee and Bevin directly, and forwarded their petition through British MP Rhys Davies and the Ukrainian Canadian Committee. These three protests succeeded in drawing the Foreign Office's attention to the negative repercussions of a policy that prevented Ukrainian refugees from exercising self-help. Although the protests were perceived as somewhat overstating the case, and a response was sent only to the MP, the FO did concede that the military authorities had gone too far in banning all Ukrainian organizations. As a result, a letter was sent to the CCG suggesting that the policy be altered as it was causing unnecessary hardship and could lead to problems for Britain.[86]

At times, these lobbying efforts were successful through fortuitous circumstances. In the attempt to gain entry to the first session of the United Nations General Assembly, Stanley Frolick of CURB obtained press accreditation. Using his press pass he was able to visit the premises of the conference prior to its opening, where he found the address list of all the delegates. Over the weekend, CURB prepared a pamphlet entitled 'The Plight of Ukrainian DPs', which was circulated to all the delegates. Eleanor Roosevelt of the US delegation made use of information from this pamphlet in her address to the UN, strongly opposing forcible repatriation and arguing the need for international action on behalf of refugees.[87]

Although the numerous petitions and appeals by the Ukrainian agencies were usually left unanswered on the grounds that no organization could claim to represent the interests of Ukrainian refugees, they were filed as a source of information.

Another important feature of the lobbying campaign was aimed at drawing Western public attention to the situation of Ukrainian refugees

through the publication and dissemination of letters, appeals and pamphlets from the refugees themselves. The dual goal of the publicity drive was to build public pressure against the policy of forcible repatriation, and to collect funds from the Ukrainian communities for relief work in Europe. The Ukrainian Canadian Committee published and translated an eloquent explanation of an article by a young Eastern Ukrainian writer, Ivan Bahrianyi, with the title, 'Why I Do Not Want To Return To The USSR', which became the manifesto of all Ukrainian refugees. The essay opens with the sentence, 'I am one of those thousands of people, Ukrainians, who, to the bewilderment of the entire world, do not want to return home to bolshevik rule.'[88]

The essay describes the repressive nature of the Soviet system, including an account of the author's experiences in a Soviet prison. Such publications served to increase public understanding of the opposition to repatriation, but in many cases the Western authorities refused to believe the stories of the refugees. Fiorello La Guardia, the second Director General of UNRRA was reported to have told a group of refugees that he could not understand why they did not want to return home just because they disagreed with their government. He said, 'I haven't been in agreement with the system in my country for the past 30 years but I haven't left the country because of that.'[89]

The persistence of the Ukrainian voluntary agencies, particularly in their lobbying efforts, resulted in gradual changes in Western policies towards Ukrainian refugees.[90] Their activities also provided assistance for the refugees, primarily in the form of moral support, since the amount of material aid they could provide was limited by the restrictions of the occupation authorities.

Attitudes towards Ukrainians

In the months from autumn 1945 to spring 1946, attitudes and policies towards Ukrainians underwent a gradual change, from a complete denial of the existence of Ukrainians, to a growing recognition of the separate character of this group and acknowledgement of their interests. This was caused by both the transformations occurring in the international community, and the activities of the Ukrainians themselves.

Repatriation and the Ukrainian identity issue

In autumn fall of 1945 there was no Western policy dealing specifically with Ukrainians, and they were regarded, along with all other refugees, as repatriable. To enable repatriation each individual had to be

identified in terms of his or her last known citizenship so that responsibility for people could be transferred to their former government. Because no Ukrainian state existed, on 8 September 1945 instructions were once again circulated, stating:

> that persons styling themselves as Ukrainians are to be dealt with according to their nationality status as Soviet citizens, nationals of other countries, or as stateless persons, according to the facts in each individual case. Ukrainians are not to be recognized as a nationality.[91]

In order to prevent organized resistance to repatriation, the military authorities issued instructions that no permission was to be granted for the formation of organizations, committees or councils to aid those displaced persons who did not wish to return to their country. No representatives of previously existing organizations were to be recognized as speaking for all persons in such a group, and all committees were forbidden to engage in political activities.[92]

Despite these instructions, a great deal of confusion surrounded dealings with Ukrainians. This was both because of the inadequate circulation of information to officials responsible for dealings with the DPs, and to the Ukrainian refugees' insistence on their national identity. In some cases, Ukrainians were registered as Ukrainians and referred to as such in field reports and communications, although in reports compiled at the zonal level they were placed in the 'Stateless Persons' or 'Undetermined' categories.[93] During the first attempted registration of DPs under Western care in autumn 1945,[94] many reports included a category for Ukrainians. Once again a Memorandum was circulated which noted that, 'Certain categories have frequently and mistakenly been reported as nationalities',[95] clarified that Ukrainians were a national sub-group to be dealt with as nationals of countries of which they may have been citizens or stateless.[96]

In December 1945 the United States restricted the use of force in repatriation to three categories of Soviet citizen, which reduced the numbers of Ukrainians threatened with forcible repatriation.[97] (In the British and French zones the policy remained unchanged until summer 1946.)[98] However, partially in response to Soviet complaints against Ukrainian organizations and partially from a desire to complete repatriation, a series of orders were issued in December 1945, which repeated the restriction on Ukrainians and prohibited them from organizing. In the US areas of control, orders prohibited the recognition of any Ukrain-

ian Committee which registered Ukrainians, but allowed Ukrainian Welfare Groups to exist.[99] In some areas, existing Ukrainian committees were forcibly disbanded.[100]

In the British Zone, harsher measures were taken. In late December 1945 British military commanders received new orders, which instructed them to continue repatriating all Soviet nationals regardless of their wishes, including Ukrainians who had been resident within the Soviet Union in 1939. The directive also included orders designed to curb Ukrainian anti-repatriation activities, which had the consequence of denying Ukrainians not only basic rights of self-organization but also the usage of their language. The instruction specified:

> that no recognition can be given to any Ukrainian organisation or representative; that Ukrainians of other than Soviet citizenship are to receive education and other welfare facilities in the language appropriate to their citizenship;[101] that books cannot be published in Ukrainian; that all Ukrainian organisations are to be disbanded and their stationery confiscated.[102]

Deliberations on a 'considerable embarrassment'

Despite the official policy of non-recognition of Ukrainians and the harsh measures adopted to prevent them organizing against repatriation, there was disagreement in Western political circles over the policies being pursued. Proposals came from many quarters suggesting a change in the policy towards Ukrainians. Some, such as British MP, Rhys Davies, were motivated by humanitarian considerations in intervening on behalf of the Ukrainians. On receiving a letter from the Central Ukrainian Relief Bureau, he appealed to the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster to stop the use of force in repatriation and repeal the directive prohibiting Ukrainians from organizing. He explained:

> that in Germany Ukrainian DPs have developed their own welfare and cultural organisations in their own camps, started their own schools and even have their own University in the American zone... The order referred to denies them both freedom and tolerant treatment. They will not be allowed to use their language nor to run schools and welfare organisations in their camps.[103]

Bevin responded to the appeal by informing Mr Davies that he had received a similar letter from the Ukrainians, and the 'the future of such people is under active consideration, and our policy in the

meantime is that no one who was not a Soviet citizen on the 1st September 1939 is being compelled to return to his home'.[104]

While these discussions were taking place, the Western officials were reluctant to have any direct dealings with Ukrainian groups or representatives, on the grounds that they were a 'considerable embarrassment', and 'that His Majesty's Government have refused to recognise such "national" committees in Germany and Austria since they have on occasion been used as a cover for anti-Allied, especially anti-Soviet propaganda'.[105] Similarly, the Canadian Government was selective in the information it communicated to the Ukrainian Canadian Committee, as their actions were viewed as being potentially embarrassing.[106] One reason why official Western policy continued to deny recognition of displaced people as Ukrainians was to prevent political difficulties with the Soviet Union. When the Central Ukrainian Relief Bureau (CURB) requested visas that would allow foreign delegates to attend their conference in Britain, one FO official commented, 'I submit therefore that it is not only not in our political interest but also to our political disadvantage to facilitate the journey of delegates from Belgium and France for the proposed conference of CURB.'[107] After the point was made by another official that their presence may result in some relief and help in dealing with the disposal of the Ukrainian DPs in the British zone, the visas were issued.[108]

In many cases, letters from Ukrainians were not acknowledged,[109] and protests against forcible repatriation dismissed, even when forwarded by Western politicians.[110] The prime minister's secretary consulted with the FO when considering a response to the Central Ukrainian Relief Bureau's (CURB) letter containing requests for recognition as a national group and protection against repatriation. Initially, he was in favour of replying with 'a straight answer to these questions'.[111] The Foreign Office advised against responding to the letter, but suggested that 'if No 10 insists on answering' then in response to the request for recognition of a Ukrainian nationality should be that, 'The only Ukrainian national unit recognised by His Majesty's Government is the Ukrainian SSR as part of the USSR,' and regarding the request for asylum, 'It is not within the powers of His Majesty's Government to grant the second request.'[112] In the circumstances, Mr Addis decided that it was better to leave the letter from CURB unanswered.

Conflicting priorities

While deliberations on the wisdom of allowing Ukrainians to organize continued at high levels, officials directly dealing with Ukrainians were

faced with the immediate question of allowing or discontinuing permission for Ukrainian organizations to operate. A dilemma arose out of conflicting priorities. On the one hand, political interests dictated the non-recognition of Ukrainians as a national group, and the suppression of all politically-orientated activities of Ukrainian refugees, particularly anti-repatriation efforts. On the other hand, economic considerations motivated the policy of encouraging self-sufficiency among refugees, to reduce the burden on UNRRA and the military authorities.

Because Ukrainians continued to organize along national lines, instructions were repeatedly issued that Ukrainian organizations were not to be recognized. However, these Ukrainian committees, organized by both the refugees and by *emigré* groups, were providing much-needed welfare work among Ukrainians, which supplemented the inadequate services available. Officials directly dealing with Ukrainian refugees were less concerned with political interests more concerned with assisting displaced people in their charge.[113] Although efforts were made to ascertain eligibility for UNRRA assistance, many camp directors, field commanders and middle-level officials either openly assisted Ukrainians under their care or did not obstruct their efforts at self-organization.[114]

They were able to do this because the implementation of many orders was left largely to the various districts without any rigid or constant control from the zonal headquarters.[115] One UNRRA Regional Director informed a Team Director that officially he was not authorized to have contact with the Central Ukrainian Relief Bureau, but unofficially he should continue working with them in the hope that the cooperation would be legalized in the near future.[116]

In some cases recognition for the Ukrainian Committee (TsPUE) was obtained from the local military government without proceeding to higher authorities for more general recognition. UNRRA officials took it upon themselves to act as intermediaries between the Ukrainian relief agencies abroad and the Ukrainian refugees, informing the European Regional Office of the situation while providing assistance in contradiction to existing instructions.[117] This local assistance was in many ways crucial, as permission for all activities was issued at the local level. The October 1945 conference of Ukrainian committees in Germany was made possible through the intervention of numerous such officials, who provided the necessary permits for holding the meeting and travel.[118]

Local officials who helped Ukrainians were motivated by the desire to provide assistance to people under their care while avoiding controversy. Lobbying for permission for Ukrainian voluntary agencies to be

allowed to operate, the Chief of UNRRA's Voluntary Agencies Division, Marjorie Bradford, wrote to a colleague, stating, 'The Ukrainian organisations in the US and Canada are strong and active and would probably be good sources of relief supplies if a way can be found of using them without causing trouble.'[119] Reporting to London in autumn 1945 she wrote that she had met numerous delegations from Ukrainian groups 'of many different varieties, at least according to official definitions'.[120] In her opinion they showed considerable enterprise in welfare and educational activities, and she felt that those under UNRRA care should be treated as a separate linguistic group and provided with welfare in the Ukrainian language.[121] Others felt that Ukrainians were entitled to the privileges accorded to other voluntary agencies. In requesting permission for the Central Ukrainian Relief Bureau to operate in the US zone of Germany, an UNRRA regional Relief Services official argued that since its sponsoring organization was approved by the American War Relief Control Board, 'It is presumed that they would work under the same sort of agreement which we have with the American Polish War Relief'.[122]

Some UNRRA and military officers helped to organize camps for Ukrainians, or allowed them to engage in their cultural activities. One such camp was set up in May 1945 by permission of US Lt. Col. Jaromir Pospisil near Regensburg, and through his assistance the camp became one of the main centres of Ukrainian refugee activity.[123] Certain camp directors encouraged Ukrainian self-organization activities, since they provided the much-needed sense of purpose and enthusiasm among refugees living in difficult conditions. The director of one such camp in Ellwangen reported that:

> The first official election of a National Leader and a Deputy brought a new active spirit in the Camp. The pre-election activities took up the entire previous day and the election day itself was proclaimed a holiday. In the evening after the election, a big party with national songs and dance was arranged. And speaking of dancing – the Ukrainians are noted like all Slavic people – for their love of music, dancing and singing and this camp is no exception to the rule. A modern theatre was an excellent excuse to start almost immediately theatrical performances, dancing parties and other entertainments.[124]

Others developed sympathy for the situation of Ukrainians through contact with them. One eligibility officer described Ukrainians in the camp at Cornberg as 'a quiet, closely-knit, industrious, peace-loving

group made up for the most part of peasant people, all deeply embittered by their persecution and the subsequent domination of their homeland'.[125]

At times UNRRA officials intervened to protect Ukrainians from repatriation. The US Zone director in Germany protested to the Control Commission against the illegal eviction of 250 Ukrainians from the camp at Augsburg by the Army screening authorities, causing the reversal of the decision. Unfortunately, by the time the evictees were granted the right of appeal they had scattered, thus making the ruling ineffective.[126]

Independent voluntary agencies working in Austria and Germany were not restricted by the policies of the occupying powers from providing assistance to refugees who they considered to be needy. However, they had very little knowledge of the Ukrainian question, and were often perplexed when encountering Ukrainians. Margaret McNeill, who worked with the Quaker Friends Relief Service, later wrote that in the summer of 1945, 'we knew very little about the Ukrainians'.[127] After visiting camps housing Ukrainian refugees, a fellow relief worker commented, 'The more I see of them, the more confused I get.'[128] The Ukrainians explained to the relief workers that they were a nationality without a state, but since few of them spoke good English, they found it difficult to explain their complex history. Ms McNeill described the difficulties in conversing with one Ukrainian refugee, Dr Pilak, who 'knew and pronounced excellently a prodigious number of English words, yet somehow after one of his long statements I had the utmost difficulty in making out what he really meant'.[129] However, because the operations of these independent agencies were not dictated by political interests but by humanitarian considerations, they often intervened on behalf of the Ukrainians.

Allegations against Ukrainians

Not all UNRRA officials were helpful towards Ukrainians. Many of them were unsympathetic towards DPs who refused repatriation and insisted on their Ukrainian identity. At times the behaviour of such officials caused Ukrainians to complain to higher authorities. In one such case, the Ukrainian Orthodox Bishop, Mstyslav, sent letters directly to the Chief of UNRRA operations in Germany. The situation was investigated by an UNRRA Security Officer, and the Deputy Director of the camp at Offenbach who had misbehaved was transferred.[130]

Also working against the interests of Ukrainians were the numerous reports that portrayed them as dishonest, unruly collaborators. One

section of an UNRRA Information Report on the background of Ukrainian groups portrays them as a band of rabble-rousing terrorists.[131] In a list of recommendations, the chief consultant of the Welfare and Repatriation Division stated that a very high percentage of Polish and Russian Ukrainians were members of German military units during the war, or members of units who participated in hostilities against the UN. Someone had pencilled in the margin, 'Quite incorrect – an absolute minimum.'[132]

The Chief of the US Zonal Repatriation Division described Ukrainians as having clearly been involved with the Germans and a 'closely knit group, blindly following their leadership' in refusing repatriation.[133] Another senior repatriation officer described Ukrainians as deliberately not producing documents at screenings. Dismissing their statements of not having documents, he reported:

> the real reason for the lack of such documents on the part of these DPs is that they were not sent back by the Germans as compulsory workers but they left their countries or residence because of their fear of the Russians and their collaborating with the Germans.[134]

Perhaps the most damaging condemnations of Ukrainian refugees and voluntary organizations were the Soviet allegations that all Ukrainians refusing repatriation were Nazi collaborators, and that their committees were organized for the sole purpose of facilitating anti-Soviet and anti-repatriation propaganda. At times these allegations were made at the highest levels, including the UN, and meetings of the Committee of the Council of Europe. Often similar charges would be presented to various authorities simultaneously. Both military and UNRRA authorities took these charges seriously, and launched investigations to check their validity.[135] In winter 1945–6, many Ukrainian organizations were disbanded on the basis of such allegations, and their leaders arrested.[136] Co-existence of sympathetic and hostile attitudes towards Ukrainians continued into summer 1946. However, through their activities during these months, Ukrainians established themselves as non-repatriable, thus contributing to the recognition for the need for new solutions.

Impact of Ukrainians on general policy

The debate on how best to deal with Ukrainian refugees who refused to return to their homes was occurring within the larger context of

East–West relations and the evolution of a policy on international refugee protection. Their activities had an impact on both. As has already been stated, the main aim of the Western powers was to create a stable postwar system in which they could safeguard their interests. One component of this aim was the reduction of the size of the DP problem, which was considered to be an obstacle to reconstruction and continued to be a source of tension with the Soviet government. Reflecting the attitudes of the time, one historian described the refugees as 'a burden on the German economy and a constant source of trouble'.[137]

Debate on the resolution of the 'problem' of the remaining displaced people occurred in a number of separate but overlapping spheres. One was in the sphere of Great Power politics, where the Soviet Union continued to demand the forcible return of all people who originated from within its 1945 boundaries, while the Western powers limited their definition of Soviet citizenship to those people who had held it in 1939. This issue continued to be part of the debate over the recognition of new borders between the Soviet Union and Poland, and an ultimate peace settlement. Another sphere was in the realm of wider international relations, where new multilateral institutions were being created. One of the items that came on to this agenda was the international respect for humanitarian principles, including the protection of refugee rights, which was being discussed within the context of the newly-formed United Nations Organisation (UNO). A third sphere was the practical level of DP operations, where military occupation authorities, UNRRA and the IGCR, dealt directly with the refugee population.

Great Power politics: borders, citizenship and refugees

Although relations within the Grand Alliance were deteriorating, throughout autumn 1945 the Great Powers continued negotiations on unresolved issues through the Council of Foreign Ministers.[138] One such issue was the repatriation of people formerly resident in the newly-acquired Soviet territories.[139] Although this was not a major issue, it continued to be linked to the Western recognition of the new Soviet borders.

At Potsdam little time was devoted to the discussion of the repatriation of Soviet nationals, since many other pressing issues dominated the agenda. However, at the London and Moscow foreign ministers' meetings the issue was raised repeatedly. The dispute continued to revolve around the refusal by the Western allies to repatriate forcibly people formerly resident in territories newly acquired by the Soviet Union. Although it must have appeared irrational and insulting to the Soviet government, Britain and the United States insisted that people

who were not Soviet citizens in 1939 would not be forced to assume Soviet citizenship in 1945 if they were away from those territories when the annexation occurred. When preparing Bevin to discuss the issue, the FO briefed him that:

> If Monsieur Molotov should try to claim that the assumption of this authority dates back to September 1939, we most emphatically cannot accept that, since the Soviet occupation of the territory at that date is based on an agreement with our enemy, Germany, at the expense of our ally, Poland.[140]

This argument, however, was to be used as a last resort. Numerous memorandums and briefs were circulated in an attempt to prepare a reasonable and sustainable argument explaining Western policy. The difficulty continued to be that the issue of repatriation of these people continued to be linked to the question of Western recognition of the new Soviet–Polish border. The refusal to repatriate people from the Baltic States, Western Byelorussia, Western Ukraine and Moldavia was based on the non-recognition of the incorporation of these territories into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Although it had been decided that formal recognition would be postponed until the peace conference, by the autumn the Western allies were finding it difficult to sustain this position. After the recognition of the Polish Government of National Unity on 16 August 1945, it became difficult to deny the validity of the agreement on borders between two governments which were recognized by both Britain and the USA.[141] It was decided to try to separate the issue of repatriation from the issue of recognition of borders.

A new argument proposed was that, according to international law, such annexation could not against their wishes change the citizenship of persons who were outside the territory concerned at the date of annexation. As Britain and the USA recognised that the USSR assumed effective control of the areas in question in 1944–5, it could be argued legally that people who left their homes before the final Soviet advance could not be regarded as Soviet citizens. Countering the Soviet claim that the Soviet–Polish agreement provided an option for residents of ceded areas to give up their Soviet citizenship and move to Poland, the FO spelled out their position, that 'His Majesty's Government's view however, is that those who were *not* there on the relevant date did *not* become Soviet citizens, and that therefore there is no question of them opting out of such citizenship: they cannot give up what they never possessed.'[142] After taking legal advice, it was decided that since there

were few precedents in international law to support this line of argumentation, it could not be made forcefully. For the Moscow foreign ministers' meeting, the FO suggested to Bevin, that 'the legal arguments in which we have swathed our policy in the past will be swept away and we may have to admit that our practice of not forcing unwilling persons to return to the annexed territories is ultimately based on humanitarian and political rather than on legal considerations.'[143]

Another tactic used was to deflect attention from the contentious issue by focusing on the successful repatriation of Soviet nationals whose citizenship was not being disputed. Both the British and US delegations presented reports on the numbers of Soviet nationals repatriated successfully, and gave assurances that everything was being done to complete repatriation as quickly as possible. On 21 December 1945 the US delegation circulated a memorandum which stated that over 2 034 000 Soviet citizens had already been repatriated and the remaining 20 000 were awaiting repatriation.[144] Britain also claimed the need to consult with the Polish government for their view.[145]

During both the London and Moscow meetings, the Soviet delegation attempted to change the West's position on this issue and proposed resolutions to that end.[146] Molotov used opportunities during informal discussions to convince the Western leaders to alter their views.[147]

The issue was raised by Molotov again on the last day of the Moscow conference, and Bevin tried to avoid further discussion by pointing out the need for legal resolution and commenting 'that this was one of those very difficult questions which arose when territory was transferred'. Molotov responded that the Soviet government found it easy to reach agreement on this subject with the Polish government, but that it was difficult to do so with the British government. He went on to argue that, at Yalta, Britain and the USA had recognized the new Soviet border as the Curzon Line, and that the agreement 'contained no reservation on the subject of the Curzon Line and nothing about Parliament or the peace treaty'.[148] It was at this stage of negotiations that the changes that had occurred in the Western leadership became an issue. Churchill and Roosevelt, who had signed the agreement at Yalta, were no longer heads of government, and their successors began to face accusations of reneging on binding bilateral agreements signed by them on behalf of their governments.[149]

Attempting to introduce a conciliatory note for the end of the conference, US Secretary of State, James F. Byrnes, explained that the democratic process in the USA had to follow its procedures, 'But there was really no reason to argue since the Government of the US would

certainly stand by the agreement which the President had made'.[150] Bevin also assured Molotov that the British government accepted what Churchill had undertaken at that time. The Moscow conference ended without a resolution of the definitions stalemate.

In the continued attempt to resolve this question, further reports were produced, including a review of the precedents in international law for the justification of Britain's refusal to treat people from the annexed areas as Soviet citizens, and details of agreements concluded by the governments of the territories involved.[151] Information compiled for these reports, as well as others, provided a comprehensive picture of events in Western Ukraine and the other areas that had come under Soviet control. The Western governments were aware of the separate informal understanding between the Polish and Soviet governments, that the Ukrainians from south-east Poland were being deported to the Ukrainian SSR whether they wished to or not. On receiving information about the brutality with which these deportation were being conducted, the consensus in the FO was reflected in comments such as, 'One can hardly blame the Poles for wishing to rid themselves once and for all of their Ukrainian minority problem, but their methods are creating great hardship',[152] and 'we should steer clear of analogous disputes in respect of persons now in Poland who are not our concern'.[153]

Ukrainians from these areas who were under Western control, on the other hand, were the concern of Britain, France and the USA. As it became apparent that these Ukrainian refugees would not willingly return to such conditions, discussion of responsibility for their future and the cost of their maintenance became an increasing concern.[154] One course of action was to internationalize the problem, thus reducing the burden on the Western allies. The broadening of a definition of a refugee was desirable as a means of devolving responsibility on to an international institution.[155] However, concern was expressed that:

> the countries where the non-repatriables are normally resident will strongly oppose any attempt to place persons unwilling to go home under the care of a United Nations organisation, and that the countries not directly concerned will be unwilling to undertake financial obligations to pay for what they will no doubt regard as Quixotic humanitarianism on our part.[156]

Equally problematic was the prospect of securing agreement from the finance departments of the Western states to accept financial responsibility for the maintenance of the non-repatriates.[157]

However, the Western governments were coming under increased pressure to change their policy on repatriation and accept responsibility for Ukrainian refugees. The Vatican communicated a complaint against the forcible repatriation of Ukrainians to the British Legation to the Holy See. This was duly passed on to Bevin.[158] Various British MPs were forwarding letters and lodging complaints on their behalf.[159] Some were even raising the matter in Parliament, such as Sir Neven Spence, who on 17 December 1945 asked how many Ukrainians and Balts had been handed over to Soviet control.[160] After the passing of the UN resolution banning forcible repatriation, the question was once again posed to the FO as to whether Britain was complying with the resolution.[161] Although attempts were made to elude the question, at times the policy of forcible repatriation could not be concealed and was justified on the grounds of returning people the Soviet authorities accused of collaboration.[162]

A continuing source of tension was the behaviour of the Soviet repatriation officials. By mid-1946 there was a consensus to close down the Soviet repatriation missions on the grounds that most of the repatriation was complete and the majority of people they continued to request were not Soviet citizens by Western definitions, while the missions continued to be used as a cover for espionage activities. They were also causing a nuisance with their complaints.[163]

The Soviet government continued to raise the issue of the repatriation of its nationals at all high-level political meetings, and proceeded with its repatriation campaign throughout Europe, to the growing irritation of Western authorities. Soviet Ukrainian representatives to international institutions made claims regarding the interests of Ukrainian refugees, insisting that the government of the Ukrainian SSR was legally responsible for them. However, because Ukrainians were not recognized as a separate group, nor the Ukrainian government as an independent authority, these activities remained at the level of formalities.

Relations with the Soviet government were deteriorating steadily, and the issue of repatriation became the subject of dispute. For a variety of reasons, the United States, Britain and France became increasingly reluctant to use force in repatriating Soviet nationals, and within months stopped it altogether. From December 1945 in US-controlled zones, and by the summer of 1946 in French and British areas, repatriation became a voluntary option, which drastically reduced the numbers of people returning to the Soviet Union.

Facing increasing difficulties in pressuring Western governments to return alleged Soviet nationals to their country of origin, the Soviet

Union turned to the UN forum, where it attempted to block the creation of the IRO as a means of denying the non-returnees access to international assistance.

The need for new definitions and a new international refugee organization

While the members of the Grand Alliance were negotiating the terms of the peace settlement, the newly-created United Nations Organization was preparing to assume its role as the forum for resolution of international issues. As part of these preparations, certain individuals once again began to advocate the need for the United Nations to assume responsibility for refugees and displaced people.[164]

Based on reports coming in from the field, it became apparent that neither UNRRA nor the IGCR were capable of dealing with the large numbers of refugees refusing repatriation.[165] The need for UN involvement in the refugee issue was already being discussed at the Potsdam conference, but no action was taken at that time.[166] By autumn 1945, the British and American delegates to the IGCR and UN were actively lobbying for increased Western attention to the issue.[167] At an informal meeting in New York City in September 1945, the French, British and US delegates to the UN agreed on the need to create a new international agency to deal with the remaining refugees uprooted because of the war.[168] Even though the Soviet delegates had lobbied informally against this,[169] the UN did discuss the issue in the plenary sessions and in the Third Committee of the UN Assembly, which met in London from 10 January to 14 February 1946.[170]

Debates were heated. The fundamental disagreements were over the definition of a refugee, the freedom of choice for an individual to decide his or her own future, and international responsibility for those refugees who refused repatriation. Britain was preoccupied with the Palestine mandate and unable to bear the cost of supporting refugees under its control. Therefore it was in favour of internationalizing the situation. US President Truman and Eleanor Roosevelt, a UN delegate, presented more ideologically motivated arguments that basic rights were universal.[171] The Soviet delegation accepted the international scope of the problem, but refused to recognise non-repatriates as refugees or provide them with international assistance. This divergence of views led to one of the first open confrontations between the former wartime allies in a public forum.[172]

However, since the Western Powers were anxious not to allow a breakdown in relations with the Soviet Union over the issue of refugees,

an attempt at compromise was made. On 12 February 1946, the first session of the United Nations General Assembly unanimously passed a resolution accepting responsibility for refugees. The text of the resolution reflected the dual interests of its the UN member states, by reiterating that 'The main task concerning displaced persons is to encourage and assist in every way possible their early return to their countries of origin.'[173] However, it also took the important step towards granting recognition of the refugee status of many of the non-returnees, by stating:

> No refugees or displaced persons who have finally and definitively, in complete freedom and after receiving full knowledge of the facts, including adequate information from the Governments of their countries of origin, express valid objections to returning to their countries of origin... shall be compelled to return to their countries of origin.[174]

The resolution also expanded the definition of a refugee and displaced person, setting an important precedent by taking responsibility for individuals

> outside his country of nationality or former habitual residence, and who, as a result of events subsequent to the outbreak of the Second World War, is unable or unwilling to avail himself of the protection of the Government of his country of nationality or former nationality.[175]

For the first time, conditions for refugee status included,

> 'persecution or fear of, based on reasonable grounds, persecution because of race, religion, nationality, or political opinion, provided those opinions are not in conflict with the principles of the UN'.[176]

Carefully not stating that opposition to the Soviet government was grounds for refugee status, the definition was broad enough to allow for this particular case of political dissent.

The resolution also called for the establishment of a special committee to look into the situation.[177] Eleanor Roosevelt provided an important impetus for this decision by the UN in her capacity as a member of the US delegation. Her speech, in addition to lobbying strongly on behalf of the refugees, condemned the use of force in repatriation and called for

its abolition. In it she used information provided by CURB on the plight of Ukrainian refugees.[178]

The issue of war crimes

An important component of the debate on refugees and repatriation, both at the United Nations and at the Grand Alliance summit meetings, was the Soviet allegation that refugees who did not want to return to their former homes were Nazi collaborators and war criminals trying to evade justice. Soviet representatives regularly attempted to link these issues.[179] Since Ukrainians were a large portion of the refugees who did not want to return to the Soviet Union and whose citizenship was being debated, they became one of the prime targets of these Soviet accusations.

The need to punish Nazi war criminals was one issue on which the victorious allies agreed.[180] However, when the Soviet Union attempted to link this issue to the discussion of repatriation, difficulties arose. Although the Western allies were committed to bringing all Nazi war criminals to justice and included provisions for this in all policy statements regarding refugees and displaced people,[181] they were aware that the Soviet Union was using the charge of war crimes as a means of securing the forcible repatriation of as many people as possible. The FO noted that, 'We shall have to tread very carefully. We do not want to harbour criminals, but we do not want to hand over people whom we regard as innocent.'[182]

It was decided that the Soviet Union should be required to provide evidence on each specific allegation. The revised US directive on repatriation of Soviet citizens dated 20 December 1945 stated:

> Those who are charged by the Soviet Union as having voluntarily rendered aid and comfort to the enemy, where the Soviet Union satisfies the United States military authorities of the substantiality of the charge by supplying in each case, with reasonable particularity, the time, place and nature of the offenses and the perpetrator thereof

continued to be liable to forcible repatriation to the Soviet Union.[183] Recognizing that accusations of war crimes would be used as a means of locating Ukrainians leaders, one FO official commented,'My own personal feelings are engaged only in the case of Roman Smal Stocki, whose name is likely to be found on the list of "war criminals" although he is in fact an easy going and harmless person.'[184]

A number of Ukrainians were, in fact, charged with war crimes at the request of the Soviet Union, the most prominent among them being Volodymyr Kubiiovych, who stood trial at Nuremburg. Having been head of the Ukrainian Central Committee in Western Ukraine during the German occupation, he was accused of having collaborated with the Nazi regime. The committee had no political standing and was created to organize social services for Ukrainians, and on numerous occasions intervened on behalf of the Ukrainians to protect them from German brutality.[185] At the trial, a Memorandum of protest from Kubiiovych to Hans Frank, the Governor of occupied Poland and Western Ukraine, protesting against the killing of Ukrainian peasants in the Zamosc region for alleged resistance, was introduced as evidence that his activities were aimed only at defending the interests of the Ukrainian people. On the basis of this document he was acquitted.[186] Other less prominent Ukrainians were also arrested on the basis of Soviet allegations, but after submitting evidence substantiating in their innocence, most were released.

The main problem Western authorities faced in locating war criminals among the refugee population was that it was difficult to determine identities conclusively, particularly those of Soviet citizens. Many people who feared forcible repatriation concealed their true identities, which left them open to accusations of dishonestly and raised suspicions that they might in fact be guilty of war crimes. Furthermore, the chaos of summer 1945 made it easy for genuine war criminals and collaborators to change their identities and escape. As a result, people who were registered by Western authorities in refugee camps were often accused of war crimes because they could be targeted easily, while the guilty, who generally avoided military and UNRRA assembly centres, were able to elude justice. This has caused the issue of wartime collaboration to remain clouded in controversy to the present day, with many former Ukrainian refugees still facing the threat of allegations of Nazi collaboration. The Soviet government continued its campaign of portraying non-returnees as Nazi collaborators until the USSR imploded, assisting in Western investigations and often supplying false evidence.

Changes on the ground

In many ways, officials in the practical sphere of operations had the most direct impact on the changes that occurred in policies towards the refugees. In autumn 1945 Western political leaders considered the remaining 1 888 000[187] officially registered displaced people in Central Europe repatriable.

While political leaders debated the details of repatriation agreements and international responsibility for non-returnees, UNRRA and the military occupation authorities who were charged with implementing the repatriation programme began running into difficulties. In trying to resolve the problems they encountered, these authorities dealing directly with refugees introduced a number of changes to existing policies, thus prompting change higher up. Many of these changes resulted from the refugees' refusal to accept the decision of the Allies regarding their future, particularly that they return to areas of Soviet control.

The first major change coming from the ground was the suspension of the widespread use of force in repatriation. On 4 September 1945 General Eisenhower altered the policy of forcible repatriation of Soviet nationals, limiting it to three categories of people, These were Soviet citizens who (i) had been captured in German uniform (ii) had been in the Red Army on or after 22 June 1941 and who subsequently had not been discharged; or (iii) had voluntarily rendered aid and comfort to the enemy.[188] It was the actions of the refugees, among them many Ukrainians, who resorted to the use of force to demonstrate their opposition to returning to the Soviet Union, which caused the military authorities to refuse to carry out the policy, thus forcing it to be reconsidered at political levels.

Orders introducing this new policy were circulated to all commanders in the Western-occupied countries before the military leaders had obtained permission from Washington or London for such a move. The fact that this decision was taken by military commanders and was contrary to official policy caused concern among political leaders. On hearing of this decision, the British Foreign Office was 'both mystified and alarmed by this statement which is, of course, quite contradictory to His Majesty's Government's policy as recently confirmed by our Secretary of State'.[189]

These actions of the military commanders also added to existing problem of lack of coordination on policies among the Western powers. Eisenhower was the first to suspend forcible repatriation, thus compelling officials in both Washington and London to reconsider the use of force. When the United States officially adopted this policy on 20 December 1945,[190] Britain felt pressured to follow suit in order to bring its policy into line with the Americans. After much discussion, perhaps aptly summarized by the comment: 'We should get rid of as many as possible without being unjust',[191] the British Cabinet approved a similar policy on 6 June 1946.[192] However, despite the suspension and

eventual cessation of the policy of forcible repatriation, the use of force continued in a number of situations until May 1947.[193]

The second change in attitude towards repatriation also came from the ground. It was the refugees' refusal to return home, in combination with other factors, that eventually forced a change in Western policy from repatriation to resettlement. UNRRA, whose DP Branch had been created specifically to facilitate repatriation, had begun its operations even before the end of the war. However, it was not until the autumn that its presence in Central Europe was formalized. In September, UNRRA's Central Headquarters was established in Hoechst, Germany, and Lt. Gen. Sir Frederick Morgan was appointed Chief of UNRRA Operations in Germany. Zonal Headquarters were set up in Lemgo (British Zone), Pasig (US Zone) and Haslach (French Zone). Country Missions were also established in Austria (with a Central Headquarters formally established in Vienna on 26 November 1945) and many other countries.

Relations between UNRRA and the military authorities continued to be governed by the terms specified in the SHAEF/UNRRA agreement,[194] even though control in the zones had passed into the hands of separate authorities. New instructions were not considered necessary as the DP operations were expected to be wound up within a few months.

One of the primary objectives of both military and UNRRA officials was to establish control over the remaining refugees as a means of stabilizing the situation in occupied Germany and Austria. Another was to determine their identities to work with the repatriation missions of their countries of origin in facilitating their return. Furthermore, as German and Red Cross supplies were running out by the autumn months, both military and UNRRA officials became less willing to provide care to everyone, as had been done during the summer. For these reasons, the first registration of refugees aimed at determining their identity and eligibility for assistance was carried out in autumn 1945. This first screening was largely unsuccessful because of a lack of clear procedures and criteria, as well as a shortage of qualified translators.[195]

This first registration provided substantial evidence that most Ukrainians did not consider repatriation to be viable solution to their displacement. They continued to insist on identifying themselves as stateless Ukrainians, which made it difficult to designate them for repatriation.[196]

Other groups that made their anti-repatriation views known were refugees from the Baltic states, Yugoslav Royalists and some Poles. An UNRRA Field Supervisor reported that:

> The Baltic peoples repatriated in very small numbers while the Yugoslav 'Royalists' and Ukrainians refused to move at all. The living conditions of these people, in the meantime, were not improving and in fact conditions began deteriorating very much.[197]

By late autumn 1945 UNRRA had recognized that its repatriation activities would not be completed as quickly as they had anticipated, and new agreements between UNRRA and the military authorities were negotiated, while preparations were made to convert the temporary assembly centres for winter habitation.[198] They also realized that changes to their mandate were necessary to address the problem of post-hostility refugees, who were continuing to arrive in Western-occupied zones.[199]

Certain individuals within the UNRRA leadership began advocating that resettlement efforts should be considered by the Administration, arguing that 'It is imperative, therefore, that UNRRA make clear to the world that in the threshold of the new year we have in Germany a group of people who have chosen not to go home or cannot return to their former countries of origin or domicile.'[200] However, Soviet opposition within UNRRA to such a policy change, and the reluctance of Western governments to accept responsibility for such a large number of people caused the emphasis on repatriation to remain for months to follow.

An early attempt at addressing the problem of non-repatriable refugees was made by the military authorities in autumn 1945, by organizing an employment programme making available short-term contracts for work in French and Belgian mines. Recruitment teams visited UNRRA camps offering temporary contracts with a possibility for extension.[201] However, this scheme was soon terminated because of its theoretical, though not actual, clash with the repatriation programme. There were also preliminary talks on resettlement possibilities with Belgium, Canada, Britain, France and the United States, but serious efforts were not undertaken until the second half of 1946.[202]

The refusal by Ukrainians and other refugees to accept voluntary repatriation, combined with the reduction of numbers of Soviet citizens being repatriated by force, caused political leaders to consider new ways of reducing the refugee population. However, until a new policy was adopted, UNRRA and the military authorities were instructed to continue repatriation. Towards this end, a second round of questionnaires was circulated in winter 1945–6, but it again failed to produce satisfactory results. For the next few months, numerous questionnaires were circulated, in which Ukrainians were not reported as a group but were

recognized as comprising a large part of the stateless and undetermined categories which opposed repatriation.

Conclusion

The months from autumn 1945 to spring 1946 were in many ways critical for refugees. The international community, as represented by the United Nations, accepted responsibility for all people displaced from their homes and agreed to look for new solution to their predicament. Equally significant was the broadening of the definition of a refugee to allow individuals, regardless of their former citizenship, race or religion, to qualify for international refugee status. Previously, such status had been reserved only for individuals who were victims of specific political upheavals condemned by the international community, and refugee status was linked to former citizenship.[203] In the months following the Second World War the principle was accepted that any individual unable or unwilling to avail him/herself of the protection of his/her government was eligible for international assistance. This was a major turning point in the history of international protection of refugees.

This change was prompted by many factors, one important one being the behaviour of the post-Second World War refugees. These refugees refused to accept the solutions to their predicament proposed by the victorious Allied Powers, and through their refusal forced the development of new solutions.

The first change the refugees influenced was the suspension of the use of force in repatriation. This change first occurred in the US Zones of occupation in autumn 1945.[204] In other zones, refugees had to continue their struggle throughout 1946 to have this policy repealed. The second success of the refugees in effecting a change in policy occurred through their refusal to accept voluntary repatriation. Because a portion of the refugees refused to return to their former homes, Western leaders were compelled to search for new solutions to the refugee situation and began to consider seriously resettlement possibilities. A third impact that refugees had on changing policy was in expanding the definition of a refugee. Because a large number of refugees refused to accept the existing definitions for their identity, it was recognized that more general definitions were needed.

Ukrainian refugees had an important input into all these changes. They were the largest group of Soviet citizens who opposed forcible repatriation, and thus played an important role in having the policy revoked. Ukrainians were also the largest group opposing voluntary

repatriation, and because of their unusual situation following the border changes were influential in convincing Western leaders that repatriation was an inadequate solution. The insistence of Ukrainians on being identified according to their nationality rather than their former citizenship was an important contributory factor in the recognition that citizenship need not be a determining factor in refugee status. This in turn influenced the expansion of the definition to make it individually determined.

5
Changes and the Search for New Solutions (Spring 1946–Spring 1947)

The situation of the remaining refugees changed significantly as the relationship between Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union deteriorated from spring 1946 to spring 1947. As the rift between the former wartime allies grew, the refugees' issues of repatriation and political asylum gained prominence on the international agenda. Both East and West felt increasing pressure to resolve the refugee situation, albeit for different reasons. They charged the newly-created United Nations with the task, and within a year the International Refugee Organization (IRO) was formed.

This chapter examines how changes in the international community affected policies towards refugees. It looks at the divergences between the actions of the Western powers in the public international arena, and policies implemented on the ground. The difficulties Ukrainian refugees faced amid this changing situation are described, as is their success in finally achieving the right to recognition as a separate group and acceptance of their opposition to repatriation.

Changes in the international situation

Political changes

Spring 1946 marked the beginning of a new phase in the relationship between the former wartime allies. Rivalry and propaganda replaced previous attempts at cooperation, and Germany became the focus of the competition for European and global influence. Refugees became a political tool in the emerging competition of ideologies.

Regarding refugees, the Western Powers had conflicting interests. They were anxious to live up to their declared principles[1] and safeguard the rights of all individuals, particularly as they were waging an international public campaign in defence of these ideals. At the same time, they were interested in proceeding with the economic reconstruction of Europe, and a large refugee population was considered to be an obstacle to this goal.[2] A third consideration was the cost of supporting a large refugee population. No government was prepared to assume financial responsibility for a large number of refugees. Therefore, all felt it prudent to continue encouraging repatriation with the aim of reducing the numbers of people in need of assistance.

Changes in American foreign policy during the years 1946–7 had a decisive impact on the future of the remaining refugee population. Initially, the United States hoped to retreat into its pre-war isolationism, and was interested in winding up its commitments in Europe quickly, while maintaining cooperation with the Soviet Union.[3] In spring 1946, US Secretary of State, James F. Byrnes, announced that the US government was hoping to close down the refugee camps by the end of that year.[4] However, by summer 1946 it became clear that the USA could not easily disengage from the political and economic processes in Europe, and began to assume the role of a global power.

This change in US foreign policy had an important impact on the fate of the remaining refugees. Whereas in early 1946 they feared the withdrawal of US assistance and support, by spring 1947 they were less anxious that the Americans would abandon them. US participation in the United Nations was also critical, since the new international organization increasingly became the new sparring arena of the Great Powers. It also took upon itself to address the question of refugees through the Special Committee on Refugees and Displaced Persons created by the General Assembly. American financial involvement was an important component of resettlement plans.

Although in early 1946 the three major powers still had some reason to cooperate within the UN framework, particularly on issues of security, as the year wore on, consensus disintegrated increasingly. The East–West division over the refugee issue reflected the hardening ideological positions in each camp. The First Session of the UN General Assembly devoted more time to discussing the issue of refugees than any other question apart from security.[5] The fundamental disagreement was over the issue of the freedom of choice of the individual. But the sub-text of the debate rested on Western criticism of Soviet ideology and the desire to grant legitimacy to internal dissent within Soviet society. However, in

view of the desire to come to an agreement over security issues, the Western Powers strove towards achieving a compromise with the Soviet Union on the refugee question. The debate surrounding the creation of an international refugee agency also reflected the desire on the part of the Western Powers not to antagonize the Soviet Union over an issue of secondary importance.[6]

The creation of a new international refugee organization

The most important development for refugees in this period was the creation of the International Refugee Organization (IRO) as a temporary specialized agency of the UN. On 15 December 1946, the UN General Assembly approved the Constitution of the IRO, as prepared by the Special Committee on Refugees and Displaced Persons.[7] By 1 July 1947 the Preparatory Commission of the IRO (PCIRO) began operations, assuming responsibility for refugees and displaced people in Europe, Africa and Asia. The constitution of the IRO came into force on 20 August 1948, when the fifteenth permanent member of the UN ratified the constitution.[8] The process from the passing of the UN resolution on the need to address the question of refugees to the formal constitution of the IRO took two and a half years, demonstrating the complexity of the procedure of creating an international institution for the protection of refugees. This section will examine only the period from spring 1946 to the beginning of the work of the PCIRO in mid-1947.[9]

Following the unanimous February General Assembly resolution on the urgent need to address the question of refugees[10], a Special Committee on Refugees and Displaced Persons was created to work on the issue.[11] Although the General Assembly had agreed that the refugee question was the concern of the United Nations, that an international agency should care for those refugees who did not want to be repatriated, and had expanded the definition of a refugee, its resolution provided only general principles. The task of the new committee was to find a way of enacting these guidelines into a practical plan.

Since the General Assembly resolved that refugees should be cared for by an international agency, the Committee set about the task of creating such an agency.[12] During its first round of meetings, held between 8 April and 1 June 1946 the debates were once again heated, since the Eastern bloc was well represented on the committee. Although the Eastern delegates were unable to change the definition of a refugee that had been accepted by the assembly[13], they attempted to limit international assistance to people who accepted repatriation. The

Eastern delegates refused to agree that the new agency should assist people who did not want to return to countries they represented.

The other point of disagreement was over the nature of the new agency, specifically its relationship to the UN. On this issue, the USA and USSR agreed that the new organization should be non-permanent and created as a specialized, independent agency. By 7 June 1946 agreement on this issue had been reached by all delegates[14] and by mid-August the committee submitted a report to ECOSOC proposing a constitution and budget for the International Refugee Organization. The General Assembly discussed this report in December and accepted the proposals by a vote of thirty to five.[15]

Although the IRO constitution had provisions for repatriation, it was clear that the main goal of the organization was to facilitate resettlement. Some observers were concerned that the general nature of the definitions should not constrain the IRO from fulfilling this function. The British Refugee Defence Committee sent a letter to the IRO's director, expressing concerns over definitions and eligibility criteria, pointing out that:

> the vast majority of them are refugees from the regimes that have been set up by our Soviet ally and its satellite powers. It is true that considerations of diplomatic etiquette might have made it difficult to include these categories by name in the constitution of a sub-committee of the UN. But this still does not justify the employment of a formula which completely obscures the real nature of the problem.[16]

The issue of finances

The other critical question before the planners of the IRO was the issue of finances. Drawing on the experience of previous institutions that had been handicapped by a lack of funds, Western governments decided to provide the IRO with sufficient funds to deal adequately with the post-Second World War situation. Demonstrating the degree of political importance attached to the issue, the IRO was allocated an operational budget three times the size of its parent organization, the UN. The Canadian delegate to ECOSOC expressed the general opinion of all the delegates when he stated, 'We might as well understand from the outset that this is going to be expensive. It is going to cost money. Peace is costly – but nothing like the cost of war.'[17] The budget was divided into two sections, administrative and operational, and set at $4 800 000 and $151 060 500 respectively. The contributions of each state were set out

in Annex II of the constitution, with the USA being expected to provide 45.75 per cent of the operational funds.[18] At the time of the drafting of the constitution, the IRO was expected to operate for 3–5 years.

As a mechanism to hold governments to their financial promises, the architects of the IRO constitution stipulated that the organization would come into existence only after fifteen permanent members of the UN, whose budgetary contribution totalled no less than 75 per cent, had adhered unconditionally to the constitution.[19] This constitutional stipulation threatened to prevent the organization from coming into being.

During the debate on the creation of the IRO, domestic economic situations dictated the positions individual countries adopted regarding the nature of international assistance to be provided for refugees. The Soviet Union was not expected to make a significant contribution to the UN budget, in view of its damaged economy.[20] However, the Soviet delegation refused to commit their government to any financial contribution if the IRO insisted on providing assistance to people who refused repatriation. The Soviet Union considered such people to be traitors and argued that they were not entitled to international assistance. The Soviet Union and its satellite states maintained this position, did not join the IRO, and thus their projected contribution was eliminated.

Britain was interested in creating a multinational organization as a means of internationalizing the cost of resettlement, and was the only signatory to the IRO charter which made a full financial commitment to the organization in December 1946.[21] France was reluctant to participate in international efforts to assist refugees and only hesitantly contributed its designated 4.10 per cent of the IRO budget. The French Parliament made France the only signatory that limited its financial commitment towards the IRO to three years.[22]

The United States, which eventually contributed 60 per cent of the IRO budget,[23] was initially opposed to joining the organization. Throughout 1946 it was more inclined towards bilateral schemes which would give it control over the allocation of resources contributed towards resolving the refugee issue. By summer 1946, the USA was advocating the termination of UNRRA, as it felt disinclined to continue providing the bulk of the funds for an organization that distributed its contribution to states that had become unfriendly. Opinion remained divided on full financial support for the IRO until 1 March 1947, when the Under Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, convinced the US Congress of the prudence of internationalizing the funds for refugee assistance, since over 60 per cent of the refugees were in areas of US control, and without American participation the organization would not survive.[24]

Since securing financial contributions proved to be problematical, Article 8 was drafted into the IRO Constitution, which allowed for a Preparatory Commission to begin operations after only eight governments had signed the constitution. This occurred by 31 December 1946, and on 11 February 1947 the Preparatory Commission of the International Refugee Organization (PCIRO) met for the first time in Geneva.[25] An American, Arthur J. Altmeyer, was selected as its first Executive Director, and negotiations were started with the UNRRA, the IGCR and the ILO.[26]

After a series of agreements were signed on the transfer of responsibilitiy, on 1 July 1947 the PCIRO took over the responsibility for care, maintenance, repatriation and resettlement of refugees and displaced people from UNRRA and the IGCR.

Economic changes prompt short-term solutions

While these negotiations were taking place at the international level, it became apparent that the predictions for postwar unemployment were wrong, and by 1946 Britain, France, the United States, and other Western countries began to experience labour shortages. This factor made governments more receptive to the idea of accepting refugees as immigrants to meet their domestic economic needs, particularly as German PoWs were being repatriated. A number of resettlement schemes were set up to meet the short-term labour needs of European countries.

Belgium and France had already started short-term labour schemes, and continued to recruit workers for designated industries, including coal mining, construction of hydro-electric plants, and the steel, building and textile industries.[27] For the most part, one-year contracts were offered to men without dependents, and as such these were not a long-term solution to the refugee situation. However, they provided a method of relieving the refugee burden on countries such as Austria.[28]

In early 1946 the British government also began deliberations on recruiting workers from the refugee population to meet the critical shortage of labour in certain essential British industries. In April the Cabinet approved a scheme named 'Balt Cygnet', which recruited refugee women of Baltic origin for domestic work in British sanatoriums and hospitals. This decision was reached after consultation with the Ministries of Labour and Health, as well as the Home Office and trade unions.[29] The first group arrived in the UK in October 1946, but as there were difficulties in meeting the projected quota of 5 000 workers, the programme was extended to Ukrainian women in March 1947.[30] Because of the success of this recruitment in alleviating both the domestic worker shortage and the pressure of refugees in Europe, relief

organizations, industry and agriculture lobbied the British government to extend the scheme. At a Cabinet meeting on 17 January 1947 a decision was taken to implement a large-scale labour recruitment programme among the refugee population, code-named 'Westward Ho'.[31]

The FO expressed concern that Britain should act quickly to implement this scheme, or 'we may find that other countries will have skimmed the cream of the displaced persons, especially the Balts who are undoubtedly the elite of the refugee problem'.[32] As a result, the screening procedure for labour recruits was never clearly established, and the British government continues to face allegations that Nazi war criminals and collaborators entered Britain through these schemes. Furthermore, these labour schemes left the Western powers open to Soviet allegations that their citizens were being prevented from returning home because the capitalist countries wanted to exploit them as cheap labour.[33] These schemes nevertheless, provided temporary employment for thousands of refugees even though they were neither a comprehensive nor long-term solution. Over a million refugees remained in need of assistance.

The Italian and Austrian peace treaties

Another important development was the conclusion of peace treaties with Italy and Austria. The impending closing down of Allied missions in these countries created the need to transfer refugees, including Ukrainians, out of the two countries, albeit for different reasons.

Although the peace treaty with Austria was not concluded until 1955, the negotiations in mid-1946 touched on the issue of refugees. In the desire to assist the reconstruction process, both politically and economically, it was felt necessary to relieve Austria of the 'burden' of refugees. In the words of one British official, 'The continued presence of large numbers of DPs and refugees in Austria is causing some concern to His Majesty's Government and is also a cause of embarrassment in our dealings with other powers'.[34] A decision was taken to take vigorous action 'to ensure that the hard core of DPs and refugees reaches its irreducible minimum by 1 November 1946'.[35]

In Italy, the situation was different. In addition to economic considerations, Britain feared that the presence of anti-Soviet refugees in that country would prove to be a source of tension between the Italian and Soviet governments, and that the refugees might face the threat of repatriation once the peace treaty came into effect. The biggest group of Ukrainians in this situation were members of the Diviziia Halychyna.[36]

Because of their peculiar status,[37] control over the Ukrainian Division was jointly shared by the military authorities in Italy and the Northern Department of the FO. In late 1945–early 1946 discussion began on the future of such groups, but until a decision on their 'ultimate disposal' was reached, the FO suggested that they be kept 'as quietly as possible'.[38] The situation was difficult, since Britain did not feel a responsibility towards them, there was little probability of bringing them to Britain for civilian employment,[39] only dubious prospects of resettling them in other countries, and a high improbability of an international refugee organization taking responsibility for them. On the other hand, Britain felt uncomfortable leaving them in Italy because it seemed unfair to dump the Ukrainians on the Italian government, which had so many mouths to feed already, and, equally important, because they would create an internal security problem for Italy. The future of these men could become a point of tension between the Italian and Soviet governments. The Ukrainians could also become vulnerable to forcible repatriation, which Britain opposed, since most of the men were not Soviet citizens.[40] Petitions by the Division for the right to asylum and resettlement were ignored. However, some of their requests for welfare and education *were* considered.[41]

In spring 1947 the situation was regarded as being critical, in view of the impending Italian Treaty, which included a provision for extradition to the Soviet Union.[42] There were also fears of conflict between Italy and Yugoslavia, which would put the Ukrainian Division, which had fought against Tito's partisans, at risk. In February, Christopher Mayhew presented a Memorandum to Bevin, suggesting that all such groups[43] be transported intact to Britain as PoWs.[44] Overriding objections that transporting Ukrainians would divert shipping facilities from the repatriation of Poles and German PoWs from the Middle East, the FO's Refugee Department lobbied strongly for priority to be given to the Ukrainians, on the grounds that, 'With them it is now or never, and "never" would involve the most serious political complications; moreover they are limited to eight thousand.'[45] In view of the divided opinion over this matter, the prime minister was approached. He gave his approval to grant priority to moving Ukrainians out of Italy over the repatriation of Poles and German PoWs from the Middle East.[46] In May 1947 the Division was transported to Britain.

An interesting feature of the history of this Division is that they were identified as Ukrainians by the British authorities, and referred to as such in all correspondence and discussion.

Western public opinion

An increasingly important consideration in the development of refugee policy became public opinion, as the Western press and leading politicians took more of an interest in the issue. As early as February of 1946 numerous media reports on proceedings at the UN, including the handling of the refugee question, began to appear regularly.[47] Eleanor Roosevelt developed a profile for defending refugee rights, and numerous British MPs continued to raise the question in Parliament.[48]

Changing tactics in the renewed repatriation drive

The desire to complete repatriation

Until the IRO began operations in July 1947, the military occupation authorities and UNRRA remained responsible for the care of refugees. Western leaders were interested in reducing the size of the refugee population before the IRO came into existence, as a means of minimizing future resettlement costs. Towards this end, the two authorities dealing with refugees were instructed to continue the policy of inducing voluntary repatriation. In March 1946 Fiorello La Guardia replaced Herbert Lehman as Director General of UNRRA, and on taking up his post made it very clear that he intended to finish the repatriation job by the end of the year.[49] The military commanders were also keen to rid themselves of refugees so that they could get on with the task of reconstructing Central Europe. Therefore, while at the UN debates raged over the rights of refugees, on the ground the situation for refugees deteriorated.

Military authorities continued to carry out forcible repatriations, despite the UN resolution that condemned the practice. While denying publicly that the use of force was continuing, Britain, France and the United States repatriated hundreds of people in the period spring 1946–summer 1947.[50]

Those not liable to forcible repatriation were subjected to a series of measures designed to wear down their resistance to repatriation. An UNRRA repatriation officer reported that the attitude of military authorities towards repatriation:

> was too often on a negative basis, if the DPs had inadequate food, if they had to work under the Austrian Labour Laws (again a good thing, but not if approached negatively) if their education and vocational training opportunities were restricted, in short if their lives were sufficiently grim here, then perhaps they might go home. One

> officer of some authority stated that the Army would move one nationality group as quickly as possible from one camp to another 'until they couldn't stand it any longer' – then perhaps they would go home. In short, everything other than physical force, every kind of psychological force was used.[51]

Raids were conducted on camps containing refugees by the military authorities, often with the assistance of local German or Austrian police, usually on the pretext of uncovering black market activities, but frequently causing severe trauma.[52] During one such raid near Stuttgart, over 200 armed German police, under the supervision of a few SPs with no commissioned officer, and using a number of dogs on leashes, surrounded and attempted to search a camp of approximately 1500 Polish-Jewish refugees. This resulted in the fatal shooting by the German police of one Polish Jew (survivor of a concentration camp and only recently reunited with his wife and two children) and the wounding by gunshot of three other DPs.[53] These raids were conducted up to June 1947, usually without any warning to the refugees, and often without uncovering any incriminating evidence.[54]

Anti-repatriation activities continued to be suppressed. Even as the right to political dissent became widely recognized as legitimate grounds for refusing repatriation, the USA and Britain maintained that leaders of anti-repatriation activities should be denied assistance.[55] In spring 1946 a rumour was spread that the USA would be closing down the assembly centres, and the Soviet film 'Return to the Homeland' was widely shown.[56]

The Soviet Repatriation Missions continued to operate, but by mid-1946 they were coming under increasing criticism, and efforts were made to close them down at the earliest opportunity. Control officials from Germany and Austria wrote to the FO suggesting that the Soviet Repatriation Missions had outlived their usefulness and 'probably mitigate against repatriation instead of advancing it'.[57]

However, the most commonly used method for inducing repatriation was to deny assistance to people who refused repatriation. Further steps were taken to determine eligibility criteria for UNRRA DP status, and screening boards were the mechanism used to reduce the number of people eligible for assistance. On 24 June 1946, UNRRA Order no. 52 was issued, repeating that only those individuals who accepted repatriation were entitled to UNRRA care.[58] The military authorities adopted similar guidelines, and this led to a combined UNRRA/military screening programme.

The only significant change in eligibility criteria occurring at this time regarded ex-Wehrmacht personnel. This change reflected the new

attitude towards the Soviet Union. In June 1946, ex-Wehrmacht personnel of non-German nationality became eligible for UNRRA assistance if they were certified by military authorities as not being war criminals, not being Volksdeutche, having been completely discharged from military status or having entered the Wehrmacht involuntarily. Furthermore, ex-Wehrmacht personnel who had entered the Wehrmacht because of their opposition to the Soviet Union became eligible to qualify for assistance by Western military authorities.[59]

For other refugees, the minimal rights they enjoyed were further eroded over the following months. Many were excluded from assistance because of their refusal to repatriate, and forced into the local economies which could hardly sustain them. The more enterprising ones were arrested on charges of black marketeering. A Latvian archbishop wrote to US General McNarney describing the condition of refugees who were deprived of DP status:

> Being deprived of their DP status the evicted persons become totally lawless beings. They are at the complete mercy of the Germans who generally detest DPs and unprotected foreigners. Nobody takes any interest [*Sic*]for them. UNRRA is not taking any longer care of them. Military government does not feel obliged to protect them. But German Authorities are considering them as a superfluous burden.[60]

For those remaining under UNRRA care, in July of 1946 rations were cut further for those unwilling to be repatriated or work.[61] In the autumn La Guardia introduced a policy commonly referred to as 'the ration bribe', offering any refugee who accepted repatriation 60 days' rations.[62]

Difficulties with repatriating Ukrainians

In the renewed repatriation drive of 1946, the military and UNRRA authorities ran into increasing difficulties in their dealings with Ukrainians, as they became practically unrepatriable under Western policy guidelines of segregating refugees by former citizenship. The most curious feature of Western attitudes towards Ukrainian refugees in this period was the fact that although the Ukrainian SSR had become a member of the United Nations, a Ukrainian delegate sat on the UN Special Committee on Refugees and an UNRRA Mission was opened in Ukraine,[63] official policy towards the refugees remained unchanged. The word 'Ukrainians' continued to be banned from reports, and refugees continued to be identified according to their last-known

citizenship. The factors which led to the recognition of Ukrainians as a separate group were: (i) the Ukrainians' refusal to return to the Soviet Union or Poland; (ii) the Polish government's refusal to accept Ukrainians for repatriation; (iii) the growing concern for welfare of refugees; and (iv) Ukrainian requests for treatment as a separate national group.

Ukrainians who were formerly Soviet citizens could only be repatriated forcibly if they fitted into the categories of the Clarke–McNarney directive,[64] and those not liable to forcible repatriation adamantly refused to return to the Soviet Union. Repatriation of Ukrainians to the USSR was thus reduced to a small trickle by mid-1946.

Repatriating Ukrainians of non-Soviet citizenship posed problems of a different kind. According to UNRRA and COGA instructions, Ukrainians holding pre-war Polish, Czechoslovak or Romanian citizenship were destined to be repatriated to these countries. However, the areas in which Ukrainians had lived before the war were ethnographically Ukrainian, and at the end of the war became part of the Ukrainian SSR. As such, the areas of former habitual residence of these Ukrainians were no longer part of the territory of the states whose citizenship they held before the war.[65] Therefore, from the Ukrainian perspective, repatriation to Poland was akin to being sent to a foreign country, since they would have to be relocated to ethnographically Polish areas. Subsequently, most Ukrainians in this position refused to accept repatriation to the countries of their former citizenship on the grounds that, following the border changes their homes were no longer in those countries.

The Soviet government's position on this issue was that individuals born in areas that had become part of their territory, became Soviet citizens on the conclusion of border treaties with the countries who lost territory to them. The Western states accepted this change of citizenship for individuals who were physically present in those areas when the change of borders occurred, pending their own recognition of these border changes. However, a dispute arose over the validity of this change of citizenship regarding people who were outside the territories in question at the time of the change. Western governments refused to repatriate forcibly civilians from these areas to the Soviet Union.[66] In autumn 1946 the situation became more complicated, when Poland, Czechoslovakia and Romania stopped accepting Ukrainians from these ceded areas for voluntary repatriation.

The largest number of Ukrainian refugees affected by this development were those who formerly held Polish citizenship. Because according to official policy they were considered to be Polish, they were often housed in assembly centres with ethnic Poles.[67] In such mixed camps,

the strong anti-repatriation attitude of Ukrainians hindered the repatriation of ethnic Poles. In preparing to introduce the 60-day ration plan, UNRRA's legal adviser suggested that in order to enhance the success of the operation, Ukrainians should be removed from among ethnic Poles and segregated in separate camps.[68]

The Polish government was consulted to clarify who was, and who was not, eligible for repatriation. In November, the Polish Repatriation Mission replied to UNRRA, stating clearly that Ukrainians were not acceptable. This designated Ukrainians as hard-core non-repatriables, and Administrative Order no. 241 was issued to this effect;[69] instructions were issued to segregate Ukrainians from Poles.[70]

Segregating a non-recognized group

The decision to segregate Ukrainians from other refugees as a means of facilitating repatriation raised the question of distinguishing between nationality and citizenship, and the difficulty of defining a national group which, according to official policy, did not exist. After much consultation over the issue, the Repatriation and Care Division decided that it was:

> unfruitful to try to determine their meaning by reference to any general concepts. I think it is clear in this particular case, however, that by 'citizenship' the Polish Government means the formal political relationship between the person and the Government; and by 'nationality', the ethnic and cultural affinity of persons so designated.[71]

Although a preliminary report in December of 1946 provided rough estimates of the numbers of Ukrainians in the three zones of Germany,[72] numerous complaints were lodged by officials instructed to carry out the segregation. The British zone complained to UNRRA Headquarters,

> (a) There is, so far as we are aware, no definition of what constitutes a 'Ukrainian'. We are instructed to carry out a segregation and report the details and breakdown of 'Ukrainians', but we are given no guidance as to who are in fact to be considered as Ukrainians. So far as CCG are concerned there is no such category, and we are not acquainted with any UNRRA instructions on this subject. Consequently for our own purposes of segregation we use language and religious categories as our yardstick.

(b) CCG as mentioned above, will not recognise a category which has no official sanction, and consequently persons of 'Ukrainian' origin are classified as 'undetermined'.
(c) As most DPs are not in possession of adequate means of establishing identity, the only form of categorisation possible is by nationality claimed. Screening permits a certain check on such claims, but it could not be said that the results of screening are accurate in this respect.
4. It is suggested that CHQ establish rules by which a firm categorisation may be made.[73]

The UNRRA Welfare and Repatriation Division provided clarification, suggesting the following guidelines:

1) *Language*. There are, of course, two distinct languages, Ukrainian and Polish, and the fact that a person speaks Ukrainian is prima facie evidence that he is in fact of Ukrainian nationality. It would be sensible, therefore, to make first broad division between those who speak Ukrainian and those who speak Polish.
2) *Religion*. Whereas Polish nationals will for the most part be Roman Catholic or Jewish, Ukrainians will for the most part be practising Russian or Greek orthodox religion. The two factors of language and religion taken together should be the main determinants in deciding nationality.
3) *Profession of Nationality*. Profession of nationality may be taken as a useful guide since there will be few non-Ukrainians likely to claim Ukrainian nationality.
4) *Place of Origin*. This can only be regarded as a subsidiary factor, since, in the south-eastern areas of Poland there were both Ukrainian and Polish communities. However, some description of the community in which the person spent his early life, the type of school attended and the language spoken at school and at home, will be additional elements in arriving at a decision.[74]

Following field instructions, the US Zone in Germany was the first to report Ukrainians separately. In the British Zone they were not reported until March 1947, 'and only then in an aura of cloak and dagger tactics occasioned by the reluctance of the British authorities to recognize the Ukrainians as a distinct group'.[75] Although the Control authorities initially protested against the UNRRA registration of Ukrainians, eventually 'they were convinced that the presence of the Ukrainians was not a secret, and thereafter there were no restrictions'.[76]

However, despite the fact that UNRRA was segregating and reporting Ukrainians separately, the military authorities continued to prohibit the usage of the term "Ukrainian" for identification purposes on official documents. The term was to be used only to identify the geographic origin of people, and in reports Ukrainians continued to be reported by former citizenship, with their nationality in brackets afterwards, for example Polish (Ukrainian).[77]

Changing attitudes towards Ukrainians

By spring 1946, the situation of Ukrainian refugees began to receive more attention, as it became clear that most Ukrainians would not accept repatriation. An April 1946 report on population breakdown in the US zone of Germany listed Ukrainians as the second largest nationality and commented that:

> the legal and actual status of this group needs clarification. It is a cultural unit with a strong sense of national unity, increased by discrimination against it in pre-war times. Those who lived in Poland east of the Curzon line have lost their homes, and do not wish to return to Russia... Most have lost their nationality without becoming legally stateless.[78]

In the summer months, the IGCR began registering Ukrainians as Ukrainians, in their preliminary efforts at preparations for resettlement.[79] This demonstrated the growing awareness that Ukrainians were non-repatriable and therefore other solutions would need to be found for their predicament.

The concern for welfare

The first issue that prompted changes in attitudes towards Ukrainians was the growing concern for the welfare of all refugees. With the deterioration of general living standards among the refugees, officials dealing directly with them became increasingly concerned about their welfare. They expressed these concerns to political leaders. In the case of Ukrainians, opinions were voiced that the strict measures adopted by the military authorities prohibiting self-organization[80] might be counter-productive in the long run. The Ukrainians continued a persistent lobbying campaign, thus adding their voice to the those of the advocates of change. At times their persistence was perceived as an irritation which would be best dealt with by conceding to their requests.[81]

Although reluctant to interfere with the authority of the Control Commission, a number of officials began to believe increasingly that the military authorities had over-reacted to Soviet complaints that Ukrainian organizations were engaging in anti-Soviet propaganda.[82] While recognizing the need to take measures to prevent such activities, it was noted that:

> The Russians never asked for the suppression of Ukrainian organisation other than those established by the German 'Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories'. We, however, have taken steps to suppress *all* Ukrainian organisations, and to intern ordinary DPs and *all* Ukrainian representatives. It is difficult to see how adequate welfare work can be carried out amongst Ukrainians if they are prevented from exercising self help.[83]

Another reason for increased interest in the Ukrainians' welfare was the desire to assert control over their activities. Western officials were aware of the existence of an underground Ukrainian movement operating among the refugee population,[84] and were concerned that by not becoming involved in the welfare services Ukrainians were providing for themselves, and the authorities would have no means of monitoring their activities.

Faced with large numbers of Ukrainian individuals organized into an elaborate community structure requesting permission to continue providing their own self-help, while international resources and ability to provide assistance were limited, Western officials were increasingly responsive to Ukrainian appeals. Their big concern was how to grant Ukrainian requests on welfare matters without according political recognition to the group, or allowing any Ukrainian political activities, particularly anti-repatriation activities. Equally problematical was the dilemma of providing assistance to a group which, according to official policy, did not exist.

Responding to Ukrainian protests in late 1945 and early 1946, the FO had suggested to the Control Commission of Germany that measures taken to suppress Ukrainian activities had 'overstepped the mark' and advocated permission for Ukrainian welfare organizations to exist.

The loosening of restrictions

A letter was sent to the Control Commission for Austria and Germany in which the FO suggested a modification of this order, presenting an

argument which for the first time suggested the long-term considerations in granting certain rights to Ukrainians. The FO suggested:

> If the Ukrainians are not to be permitted to conduct welfare work amongst themselves, they will be dependent on the minimum welfare facilities afforded to DPs in camps. I understand that these minimum facilities are not inconsiderable and include schooling for children. It appears however from the order quoted by the Ukrainian Canadian Committee in their telegram to the Prime Minister that educational work amongst Ukrainians has to be carried out in Russian or Polish. This does not seem to be to me a necessary conclusion from the principle that we do not recognise the claim of the Ukrainians to be treated as a separate nation. Surely multilingual nations are common enough for us to admit the desirability for educational work in Ukrainian without prejudice to our policy of recognising only the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Poland as the homelands of these people.
>
> If, as seems most likely, large numbers persist in their refusal to return to their homes, there would presumably be advantage in promoting welfare work among them in order that they should not go to pieces as a result of forced inactivity.
>
> You no doubt realise that troublesome questions of finance may arise in connection with the maintenance of any non-repatriable Balts and Ukrainians, if the Refugee committee set up by the UN, in which the countries in the Soviet orbit are heavily represented, refuses to recommend that the UN should accept responsibility for the refugees claimed by the Soviet Union as Soviet citizens. In that event such persons might become a British responsibility and we should have to take into account not only the question of welfare work in the immediate future, but also that of their ultimate disposal.[85]

Requests for meetings by Ukrainian representatives continued to be denied, on the grounds that no organization could claim to represent Ukrainians or advance political demands on their behalf. However, by spring 1946 there was increasing willingness to permit voluntary agencies conducting non-political welfare work to operate. Great care was nevertheless taken not to grant recognition to any organization that might involve political questions.[86] Denying that Ukrainians were being refused the right to organize, one FO official pointed out, "Ukrainian organisations" does not mean "organisations of Ukrainians" so much as

"Ukrainian nationalist organisations". There is no objection to DPs organising themselves for their moral and physical welfare... but "national committees" of nations who have been incorporated, as least *de facto*, into the Soviet Union have ensued a great deal of trouble by conducting anti-Soviet propaganda.'[87] When CURB persisted in its requests for an interview with the FO, explaining that they were only interested in welfare matters, they were referred to the relevant administrative authorities of the Control Commission.[88]

Despite the refusal of direct contact with Ukrainians, their continuous petitions and those forwarded on their behalf started to have an impact, which caused a reconsideration of their status. Prompted by the FO's March letter to the Control Commission, debate on Ukrainians spread to military circles. Ukrainians were still not considered to have a separate nationality in terms of a legal concept. However, it was recognizsed increasingly that 'they speak Ukrainian and do not want to be treated as Poles, Russians or Czechoslovaks'.[89] Although the introduction of changes to existing policy was a Control Commission decision, certain elements in the FO began advocating for the provision of welfare services in the Ukrainian language. In a widely circulated letter, Lambert suggested:

> We are not suggesting that the Ukrainians should be entitled to special privileges. The only thought in our minds is that the denial to them of education facilities in the Ukrainian language and the practice of treating them as either Poles or Russians constitute a definite hardship which we should try to alleviate.[90]

The Austrian military government also continued to forbid Ukrainian organizations, although by spring 1946 they began allowing the Ukrainian Welfare Committee to conduct activities promoting the well being of Ukrainians in individual camps.[91]

By November 1946 the Control Commission was contemplating the creation of a Ukrainian Welfare Advisory Committee, on condition that it was under Military Government control and that its activities would be entirely confined to welfare and relief work. The United Ukrainian American Relief Committee was considered for participation in the project. However, it was stipulated that the agency 'would have to be carefully watched so as not to allow any political work'.[92]

By the spring of 1947, when the PCIRO was beginning its preparatory work, it was recognized that Ukrainians constituted a large percentage of the refugees for whom the IRO would assume responsibility.[93] This

expedited preparations by the Control Commission and UNRRA to create an official welfare organisation for Ukrainians, although one official acknowledged, 'It is appreciated that it is difficult to work out such an organisation when neither UNRRA nor CCG admit to the existence of a specific Ukrainian group of DPs.'[94] The first meeting of Ukrainian representatives from regions in the British Zone was held on 8 May 1947 in Kiel, where the Ukrainian Welfare, Education and Employment Organization was created.[95]

Changed attitudes do not alleviate confusion

The suggestions for granting Ukrainians certain rights caused confusion among the military authorities, since they not only contradicted existing policy but also remained rather vague. In subsequent correspondence one commander posed the valid question:

> We should like above all to know what the Foreign Office mean by Ukrainian. We have always told people here that there really is no such nationality – a Ukrainian is a Pole, or a Soviet citizen, or stateless according to his origin. Now I see from the correspondence enclosed... that the FO think... that we ought to allow Ukrainians to organise their own non-political welfare work in the British zone.'[96]

Another admitted, 'This is a question which puzzles us all in varying degrees', and enquired about the likelihood of the Control Office accepting the suggestions.[97] An important consideration for the military authorities was how these proposed changes would affect repatriation.

A top UNRRA legal adviser suggested that, until a solution was found, Ukrainians would continue to be regarded as 'Poles unless they want to be Russians'.[98] In cases where a determination could not be made, it was suggested that the zones should continue to report these people as Ukrainians, 'although we should lump them into our reports to European Regional Office as "undetermined"'.[99]

In April 1946 the head of the UNRRA Mission in Germany attempted to resolve the situation by instructing that while Ukrainians should be reported as either Poles or Russians, depending on which side of the Curzon Line they were born, their 'assertion of Ukrainian birth' should be noted. This ruling was to extend to all Ukrainians, including those who had resided in Czechoslovakia or other European countries.[100] Plans were also made to carry out a survey in May 1946 to determine how many Poles were refusing to go home because their homes were no longer part of Poland.[101] As part of the programme to work with

UNRRA's East European missions the Chief of Operations in Germany, Frederick Morgan, instructed all UNRRA teams to prepare a separate DP labour report form 'for the DPs in each of the following national groups: Poles, Latvians, Lithuanians, Estonians, Yugoslavs, Russians, Jews, so-called Ukrainians, and so-called Stateless'.[102]

On 27 May 1946 the Control Office accepted the FO's recommendations and sent a letter to the Allied Headquarters in Berlin stating that although Ukrainians were not to be officially recognized as a separate group,

> it is recognised that there is a need for welfare activities and facilities for teaching and entertainment in the Ukrainian language if the morale of the Ukrainian DPs is to be maintained. It has therefore been decided that there is no objection to the organisation of welfare work for their benefit provided that all organisations are of a non-political character.[103]

These activities were to be limited to local efforts aimed at promoting the well-being of Ukrainians in camps, and the existence of coordinating or central supra-camp committees continued to be 'expressedly and categorically forbidden.'[104]

It was noted that since Ukrainians did not constitute a separate nationality, 'It is not therefore possible to provide a precise definition of who are Ukrainians. It can only be said that they are those persons who speak the Ukrainian language and wish to be considered Ukrainians.'[105] Regarding repatriation, Ukrainians were to be treated according to their 'true nationality'. Anti-repatriation activities continued to be severely restricted, and both UNRRA and the military authorities continued their efforts at 'removing those persons agitating against repatriation.'[106]

Meetings between Ukrainian representatives and Western officials became more common, although they were deliberately kept at low levels to avoid overt recognition of the group and prevent allegations that the Anglo-Americans were supporting Ukrainian political activities. The Ukrainian voluntary agencies continued to be treated with suspicion, but at times they were approached with requests to curb anti-repatriation activities.

Ukrainians considered for labour schemes

By mid-1946 Ukrainians began to considered for short-term employment schemes. Earlier, Baltic refugees had been considered the most

desirable labourers, and Ukrainians were thought of as 'not particularly suitable candidates for employment'.[107] Gradually, in response to lobbying efforts by Ukrainians these attitudes changed. In autumn 1946 the Canadian Department of External Affairs was beginning to consider the possibility of allowing Ukrainians to enter Canada for employment purposes,[108] and decided to send a Canadian Ukrainian Member of Parliament on a tour of refugee camps to assess the situation.[109] Corresponding with the British Foreign Office regarding the visit, the Canadian High Commission in London also reported that the Ukrainian Canadian Committee was 'sensible and understanding', and could be of assistance in dealing with Ukrainian refugees in Europe.[110] Following this endorsement and requests from CURB to the FO that Britain should also consider Ukrainians for labour schemes, the FO decided, 'there would be no objection to the employment of such Ukrainians as we are not under obligation to hand over to the Russians'.[111]

Continued suspicions

Although attitudes towards Ukrainians were changing and becoming more positive, certain suspicions persisted. In numerous reports by screening boards, Ukrainians were criticized for not being able to produce documents. Comments such as 'It is my conviction that they do not produce any documents because they either served with the German Wehrmacht, or they collaborated in other fields with the enemy',[112] continued to appear on official reports.[113]

In considering long-term resettlement options for Ukrainians, fears were expressed about the group forming a corporate identity, and proposals were made that 'from the political point of view it would be desirable that Ukrainians and Chetniks should be dispersed as widely as possible about the world and that we should explore all possible outlets'.[114] The United States, Bolivia and Abadan were proposed as possible options.

The Soviet Union also continued its attempts to discredit Ukrainians who refused to return to the Soviet Union as Nazi collaborators, lodging complaints at every opportunity. Addressing the Third Committee of the UN General Assembly on 9 November 1946, the Soviet delegate Andrei Vyshyns'kyi claimed that pro-Nazi Ukrainians in Western assembly centres were organizing anti-Soviet propaganda. As an example he cited a non-existent 'Committee of Ukrainian Non-Returnees' which was allegedly operating under the leadership of a Mr Symchych. Mr Vyshyns'kyi claimed that Mr Symchych had been the *burgermeister* of Kharkiv under the German occupation.[115] In the same speech he

accused the Western authorities of harbouring these war criminals, naming individuals such as Stepan Bandera (whom he accused of conducting Jewish pogroms), and Andriy Mel'nyk, allegedly an agent of the Nazi intelligence division. Both men were leaders of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) which had led an armed struggle against the Soviet Union. Neither man had ever resided in an UNRRA or military DP camp.[116]

At a meeting of the ERO in June of 1946, the Soviet delegate claimed, 'that in the camp at Koln there exists a pro-fascist organisation or Ukrainian committee which takes orders from a central organisation of Ukrainians located at Augsburg in the US zone'.[117] These allegations were taken seriously and investigated. In this particular case it was reported that, 'Investigation is unable to reveal political activities in the camp at Augsburg. The most that can be uncovered is existence of various cultural and social organisations. These organisations are not known to be engaged in political propaganda'.[118]

However, as the relationship with the Soviet Union deteriorated, many Western officials dealing directly with refugees became more sympathetic towards the anti-Soviet views of the Ukrainians, and while any official activities were strictly prohibited, the UNRRA British Zone Director commented:

> It must... be acknowledged and recognised that individually Balts and Ukrainians have very definite opinions regarding the present conditions in the country of their origin. The fact that these views are openly expressed to Soviet liaison officers by the spokesmen of the groups is apparent from previous reports... Answering a specific question asked by the Soviet liaison officer with a forthright reply is not, however, considered to be anti-repatriation propaganda. If a spokesman, for his group, openly engaged in such statements to his fellow compatriots in the camps, it would be considered anti-repatriation activity and he would be relieved of any office he might hold... In conclusion, while individuals might harbour anti-communist feelings, there is no evidence of any open organised pro-fascist or anti-Soviet organisation or propaganda.[119]

An important factor leading to the more sympathetic treatment of Ukrainian anti-Soviet views was the behaviour of the Soviet repatriation officials. By mid-1946 Western governments were increasingly concerned that the Soviet repatriation missions were being used as a cover for espionage activities, and their complaints were creating a

nuisance.[120] A consensus grew among Western officials to close down the Soviet repatriation missions, on the grounds that most of the repatriation was complete and the majority of people they continued to request were not by Western definitions Soviet citizens.

Ukrainian refugee activities

During this period a number of changes occurred within the Ukrainian refugee group. Perhaps most important for historians, the refugees began compiling more precise records on their numbers, which allowed a clearer picture of the group to emerge.[121] Also, by spring 1947, Ukrainians began to appear in official records, confirming the figures compiled by the refugees themselves. Second, the focus of the organized refugee activities expanded from opposing repatriation to protesting against unfair screenings that deprived people of assistance. Also during this period the Ukrainians made progress in their attempts to establish relations with the various power centres that determined their fate – namely UNRRA, the IGCR and the military occupation authorities. The one negative development was that the prolonged displacement led to an intensification of political strife within the group.

A clearer picture of the group emerges

It is impossible to describe the Ukrainian refugee population with exact precision throughout their period of displacement, for a number of reasons. The greatest obstacle to exact record keeping was the uncertainty that surrounded this group of people during their refugee experience. Not only were they not recognized as a separate group by bodies compiling official statistics, but the composition of the group was in constant transition because of the nature of displaced populations.

However, during this period, a clearer picture of the size, location and composition of the group emerged. Three sources of information contribute to the increased data available for analysis. First, there are the improved records compiled by the refugees themselves; second, there is the information collected by Ukrainian voluntary agencies; and third, there are the preliminary statistics on Ukrainians included in official UNRRA, IGCR and military reports.

Although the Ukrainian refugee committees and voluntary agencies attempted to estimate their numbers from their earliest efforts at organization, the first detailed record compiled by TsPUE-N is dated 1 April 1946.[122] This report states that there were a total of 163 586 Ukrainians

living in West Germany and Austria. Of them, 83 219 lived in the US Zone in Germany; 40 430 in the British Zone; and 16 546 in the French Zone. The remaining 23 391 lived in Austria. A second report dated 1946 (no month indicated) cites slightly higher statistics, listing 206 871 known Ukrainian refugees in West Germany and Austria.[123] The second report also mentions that there was a large group of Ukrainians living in Italy (specifically mentioning the Diviziia Halychyna), a sizeable group in France, and small numbers in Switzerland, the Netherlands, Denmark and Sweden.

The information provided by the Ukrainian voluntary agencies from this period is less precise than that compiled by the refugees; however, it is based on visits of agency officials to the camps and thus useful as a secondary source. Until 1946, Ukrainian voluntary agencies (with the exception of CURB) were denied access to refugees in UNRRA and military assembly centres, and therefore had limited information on their numbers. In February of 1946 Reverend Kushnir of the Ukrainian

Table 5.1 Statistical report on Ukrainian refugees, 1 April 1946

	In camps	Living privately	Total
German Zone			
American	61 175	22 044	83 219
British	37 955	2 475	40 430
French	15 326	1 220	16 546
Austria	10 607	12 784	16 546
Total	**125 063**	**38 523**	**163 586**

	US Zone	British Zone	French Zone	Austria
Men over 20	41 610	19 406	8 108	11 696
Women over 20	24 966	12 938	5 129	8 187
Youths aged 14–20	9 986	5 938	2 151	1 871
Children under 14	6 657	2 426	1 158	1 637
Catholic	44 610	21 024	8 935	15 672
Orthodox	34 952	17 384	7 115	7 251
Other Religion	3 329	2 022	496	468

Source: TsPUE-N, Orhanizatsiinyi Viddil (Organizational Section), Statystychnyi Referat (Statistical Unit), 'Statystychnyi Oblik Ukraiins'koii Emigratsii (okhoplenykh), Stan na 1 kvitnia 1946 poku', (Statistical Report of the Ukrainian Emigration (those registered) for 1 April 1946) UVAN, New York City, TsPUE-N Archive.

Canadian Committee succeeded in getting around the various restrictions and visited a number of Ukrainian refugee camps in Germany. On his return he revised his estimates of numbers of Ukrainian refugees from between 500 000 and 1 million[124] to approximately 400 000 in Germany and 6 000 in Italy.[125] He also noted that many Ukrainians were classified as Poles.

A second visit by a diaspora Ukrainian to the refugee camps took place in December 1946, by Dr Walter Gallan of the UUARC. Also circumventing the regulations, he visited a number of Ukrainian refugee camps and concentration points in Austria. On completing his tour, he reported the presence of 10 996 Ukrainians in Austria.[126]

One of the first official records that listed Ukrainian refugees was the IGCR preparatory registration of refugees for resettlement in August 1946. This report listed 1500 Ukrainians desiring resettlement in the Hannover region.[127] In December 1946 UNRRA conducted a preliminary registration of Ukrainians in the three zones of Germany.[128] In its final report dated 31 May 1947, UNRRA reported 101 836 Ukrainians receiving assistance in Germany, and 8 064 in Austria.[129]

Despite the apparent discrepancy in these statistics, it is reasonable to accept the figures of TsPUE-N as being the most accurate. The Ukrainian refugee leaders were aware that not all Ukrainians were identifying themselves with their national group.[130] One outside observer explained that some refugees assumed a nationality that they believed would entitle them to greater protection.[131] Nevertheless, TsPUE-N had developed a sufficiently wide information network by 1946 that their report undoubtedly reflected a clear picture of the community.

The reports prepared by Reverend Kushnir and Dr Gallan were based on information gathered over a short period of time, and while their statistics are roughly in the same range as those of TsPUE-N, they are less complete. The UNRRA reports also list a smaller number than the TsPUE-N reports, since they include only the Ukrainians receiving official assistance who were identified as Ukrainians. Not only were many Ukrainians no longer receiving assistance by May 1947, but many of them were still being reported in other categories. From July 1947 quite detailed TsPUE-N statistics on the location and character of Ukrainian refugees are available.[132]

Two sociological studies of this group provide insight into the motivation and success of Ukrainian refugee activities during their period of displacement.[133] They explain one positive impact that displacement had on the evolution of Ukrainian national consciousness and community development. For most Ukrainians their lives in assembly

centres or communities in Germany, Austria and Italy were their first experience of living in an environment that was almost entirely Ukrainian. Previously they had lived under the political authority of non-Ukrainian governments, which to varying degrees prohibited the development of normal civic life.

In the refugee camps, there were no constraints placed on the language the refugees spoke among themselves. Despite the various restrictions, they succeeded in organizing educational, religious, cultural and recreational activities in their own language. As UNRRA increased the participation of refugees in the administration and running of the camps, the Ukrainians gained increasing influence over their lives. They were allowed to elect camp representatives, participate in the camp security forces, assist in the distribution of food and clothing, and organize leisure activities. Some observers have commented that they were able to create a micro-state which extended to most aspects of their lives.[134] This was for many the first time they had enjoyed such a degree of freedom over their own affairs.

As a result, the group developed an increasing sense of empowerment and strengthening sense of national identity, which they had maintained even after they had resettled in new countries.

The continuing threat of repatriation

For all refugees, including the Ukrainians, the period of spring 1946 to 1947 continued to be fraught with uncertainty regarding their future. While their day-to-day living situation deteriorated they continued to struggle to establish their legal status. Although forcible repatriation had been reduced to a trickle, the refugees lived in constant fear, since they were provided with very little information as to their status. They also continued to be subjected to the arbitrary acts of Western and Soviet officials. As UNRRA stepped up its summer repatriation drive, the screening boards increased their efforts to exclude from assistance all those who were unwilling to accept repatriation.

Although the use of force in repatriation had decreased considerably, it was still occurring and causing fear among the refugees. Some Ukrainians continued to be transferred forcibly to Soviet-controlled camps.[135] Soviet repatriation officials, who continued to have freedom of movement in Western zones, persisted not only in intimidating refugees but also in illegal kidnapping. In one such incident on 6 June 1946, Stepan Vanko from Western Ukraine managed to escape only because of fortuitous intervention by American military police. He described this incident in a written report:

On June 6, about 3:30 pm I was going along the Dudenstrasse in the town of Hersfeld. Near the town hospital I faced a motor-car in which two Soviet officers and a driver were sitting. Then the motor-car stopped, the [*sic*] *both armed officers got* out and approached me, saying:

'Good day, young man!'

I replied:

'Good day!'

One asked:

'Why do you not go to our home-country?'

'I have no home-country,' was my answer.

'Why not?'

'Well, I have not.'

'Let us step into the motor-car and go together!'

'For what purpose?' I asked.

The Bolsheviks rounded me up. One said with irritation:

'Step in.'

I pulled out my pen-knife and leaned myself on the wall. In the same moment a motor-car with four MPs approached us and stopped. They asked me:

'DP?'

'Yes, I am a DP,' I answered.

They asked me for a pass. I put my pen-knife aside and gave them my pass. The Americans said:

'OK,'

and made me a sign to go. Then one of them asked in German:

'What did the Bolsheviks want?'

I answered:

'They wanted to take me in their motor-car and carry me off!'

The MPs ordered the Bolshevik officers to step into American car, linked the Soviet car to their one and went on.[136]

The new threat that refugees faced were the repeated screenings they were required to undergo. Very quickly they realized that the screening boards were designed to facilitate repatriation by locating those still liable to the use of force and inducing voluntary repatriation. The presence of Soviet officials at many screening boards further frightened the refugees. The trauma surrounding these procedures caused the word 'skrinyng' to enter the Ukrainian refugee vocabulary.[137]

Because refugees were not provided with accurate information about the changing policy on the use of force, while forcible repatriation continued, they often did not trust officials. For those who continued

to live in fear of forcible repatriation, the only effective means of defence continued to be the denial of Soviet citizenship. Many Ukrainians in this position simply insisted that they were stateless. However, the new screening procedures were designed to determine citizenship, and refugees were required to fill out long forms answering detailed questions about date and place of birth, school attendance and employment history. It was not possible to answer honestly such detailed questions and at the same time conceal a former Soviet identity. Therefore, in an attempt to avoid being identified as former Soviet citizens, some Ukrainians assumed new identities and claimed former residence in Poland, Czechoslovakia or Romania.

In addition to filling out questionnaires, refugees were required to appear in person before screening boards composed of Western and Soviet officials. They had to answer questions about their prewar lives, and to verify their identities and answers on questionnaires. Refugees were questioned on details such as street names and locations of churches. For people desperate not to be forced to return to the Soviet Union, such procedures were difficult ordeals, particularly since Soviet officials did their best to claim as many people as possible as Soviet citizens.

Many Western officials were unsympathetic to Ukrainians, since they could not understand their opposition to repatriation. These officials employed various tactics, including threats, and conducted excessive screenings to wear down the refugees' resistance. The Ukrainian inhabitants of the camp at Hersfeld were required to undergo ten separate screenings in a period of one year.[138] Proper translation facilities were often not provided, results of the screening boards were not made available for long periods of time, and appeals procedures were not always made available.[139] These inefficiencies further increased the refugees' sense of insecurity and distrust of officials.

An organized response

In response to the continued threats to their security, Ukrainians reacted in a number of ways. On an individual level, the refugees from Western Ukraine helped the Eastern Ukrainians by providing them with information to help them assume new identities. Mr Shmigel, a former citizen of Poland, remembers teaching Soviet Ukrainians in his camp the detailed geography of his home town so that they could convince screening officials they were also from there.[140]

At the camp level a number of tactics were used to resist repatriation, unfair screenings and the presence of Soviet officials. The first step was usually a request for information about the procedures, submission of

explanations why the refugees refused repatriation, and organized protests against the presence of the Soviet officers. If this failed, intervention of friendly officials at higher levels was sought. At the camp near Hersfeld, Ukrainian residents had undergone nine screenings within one year. When the tenth screening was announced they voiced their protest to their UNRRA Repatriation Officer, Miss E. Gronert.[141] When their complaint was disregarded, they wrote to the military authorities. US Lt. Clark investigated the situation and removed Miss Gronert from her post.[142]

In another camp at Sommekaserne, Ukrainian refugees were told by their UNRRA repatriation officers that they were required to go before Soviet screening boards. They wrote to US Lt. Col. Gerry Sage for clarification of this order. He responded that the only screenings they were required to undergo were those organized by UNRRA or the US military authorities.[143]

In places where there were no helpful officials to clarify or intervene, the refugees sent written protests to high-level individuals and informed their coordinating committee TsPEU-N of violations. Demonstrations and hunger strikes were organized in camps where DP status was withdrawn from camp residents. Black flags were hung out on days when results of screenings were announced.[144] When forced to attend screenings by Soviet officials the Ukrainians would often refuse to answer questions. In other cases, they voiced their opposition by shouting anti-Soviet slogans at Soviet officers when they entered camps. Occasionally, out of frustration, they resorted to violence. After their attempts at peaceful protests failed to remove Soviet officers from the Ukrainian camp near Mittenwald, the residents chased them out by throwing stones at them.[145] When no form of protest proved effective, Ukrainians then simply refused to appear before further screening boards.

For those individuals who were evicted from camps by eligibility officers, Ukrainians mounted their own programme of assistance. Camp leaders who participated in the distribution of UNRRA food and clothing or donations from voluntary agencies discreetly distributed a certain amount to individuals expelled from camps, particularly to families that had been broken up.[146]

At the TsPUE-N level, a concerted campaign was launched to oppose unfair screenings. The biggest problem was the lack of information made available to refugees by the authorities on the requirements and procedures of the screenings. The TsPUE-N leadership wrote to various levels of UNRRA and military authorities requesting such information. Since their enquiries received few responses from official sources, they

enlisted help from Ukrainians working as secretarial workers in UNRRA offices in procuring details of policy instructions and changes.[147] Whatever information they were able to obtain was circulated widely through their established information network.[148]

A second issue TsPUE-N addressed was the language problem. Most of the screening questionnaires were in English and few Ukrainians knew the language. Competent translators were rarely available, and as a result the refugees often answered questions incorrectly, thus unwittingly threatening their eligibility for assistance. To get around this problem, the TsPUE-N translated all questionnaires that came available to them, and explained the significance of ambiguous questions.[149] In addition to details on screening procedures, TsPUE-N also circulated information warning refugees against bogus resettlement schemes.[150]

TsPUE-N also renewed their lobbying campaign to explain why they were opposed to repatriation. They appealed to officials dealing directly with refugees as well as to political leaders. By summer 1946, individual UNRRA and military officers began meeting TsPUE-N representatives to discuss the screening procedures. The results of these meetings were then circulated by the TsPUE-N leadership down to the regional and camp levels of the organization.[151] Despite the increase in contact between the refugees and the various authorities, the refugees continued to be treated as people without rights. During a meeting with a US military official, Col. Mickelson, the president of the Ukrainian refugee committee was reminded that Ukrainians and other refugees had no rights and therefore could not make demands but only polite requests, which the American authorities were free to refuse.[152]

Related difficulties

A new problem for Ukrainians that came out of the repatriation drive was, ironically, related to the proposal to segregate Ukrainians. Although Ukrainians had been lobbying for recognition as a separate national group and were pleased finally to be considered as non-repatriables, the proposed segregation entailed moving large numbers of people. Further transfers for a dislocated population that had been working towards creating a normal community life was not an appealing prospect. Also, since the segregation was a policy aimed at dividing people into camps according to former citizenship, Ukrainians with former Soviet citizenship feared they would be moved from camps housing Ukrainians of various citizenships to camps with other former Soviet citizens (including Russians, Byelorussians and other nationalities), and destined for repatriation.

TsPUE-N responded to this proposed segregation by protesting against the splitting up of Ukrainian communities. They argued that, irrespective of former passports, Ukrainians were all part of one national group and should be allowed to live together.[153] Arguments were also presented on the undesirability of breaking up the educational, cultural and religious communities established by the Ukrainians over the previous two years.

Another area of activity/protest connected with screenings was the arrest and detention of Ukrainians accused of war crimes. Information about individuals obtained through screenings was made available to all members of UNRRA. The Soviet and East European governments (who were members of UNRRA) often distorted such information to accuse people of war crimes. Julius Rewaj was a Ukrainian who had served as a member of the Czechoslovak Parliament in the interwar years, and at the end of the war became a refugee. After going through numerous UNRRA screenings, in 1947 he was accused of war crimes by the new Czech government. At their request he was arrested by US military authorities and threatened with deportation. In order to secure his release, the Legal Aid Branch of TsPUE-N provided evidence that had cleared Mr Rewaj of similar accusations made earlier to the War Crimes Commission.[154]

A third dilemma confronting Ukrainians, and all other refugees refusing repatriation, was that as a result of the screenings they were being found ineligible for further assistance and deprived of DP status. Ukrainians felt the only solution was to renew their efforts at requesting resettlement. TsPUE-N began lobbying for Ukrainians to be considered for the short-term labour schemes.[155] They also continued their efforts at forging contacts with other Western officials and organizations, particularly the IGCR. In May 1946 a number of letters were forwarded through USFET to IGCR. TsPUE-N described the Ukrainian refugee population, expressed their desire to work and emigrate, and requested that Ukrainians be allowed to resettle in groups in order to continue their community activities.[156] However, it was not until a year later that the TsPUE-N leaders, Vasyl Mudryi and Mykhailo Vetukhiv, were invited to an informal meeting to discuss the IGCR resettlement programme.[157]

In addition to these anti-repatriation and anti-screening campaigns, the Ukrainian refugees also continued the activities they had started earlier.[158] One of their increasing concerns was the lack of employment, which was having a negative effect on the morale of the group. They continued their efforts at creating employment for themselves, continuing to face many obstructions. Permits had to be obtained for

everything, including the registration of cooperatives and opening of bank accounts.[159] Their own efforts were not sufficient, and they TsPUE-N began directing appeals to UNRRA and the military authorities for assistance in finding employment. Another manner in which the Ukrainians sought to battle unemployment was to lobby UNRRA to hire a proportional number of Ukrainians in camps where they lived in large numbers.[160]

Political activities

Despite the strict prohibitions of political activities among refugees by both UNRRA and the military authorities, Ukrainians maintained a dynamic political life throughout their period of displacement. This was a result of the political nature of their involuntary migration (since claiming their Ukrainian identity and refusing to return to the Soviet Union was in itself a political act), and because the refugee population contained leaders and representatives of most Ukrainian political parties and groupings.

Furthermore, because the refugees had recently lived through a war during which Ukraine attempted to establish itself as an independent state, and partisan activities in Western Ukraine continued until 1952, their entire predicament was permeated with serious political overtones. Although only a small proportion of the refugees was involved directly in political activities, they were all affected indirectly by the political rivalry that occurred in their midst.

Because of the diverse reasons for the creation of the Ukrainian refugee population, it contained representatives of various political persuasions. The four main groupings were the centrists, nationalists, socialists, and monarchists.[161] However, the most powerful ideology in this period was nationalism, and the strongest political group was the Bandera faction of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN-b). They regarded themselves as the sole representative of the Ukrainian people in their struggle for national liberation.[162] The weaker OUN faction, led by Mel'nyk, strove to recover its influence by allying itself with the other political groups in the hope of emerging as the senior partner.

From the first Ukrainian efforts of self-organization, OUN-b attempted to assert control over the refugee population.[163] In the first months after the war's end, the desperate situation forced a degree of cooperation among the various political groups, but early 1946, the political disagreements were becoming a dangerously divisive factor in the community. Attempts were made to create a coordinating political body

where all political parties would determine jointly the future of Ukrainian political life. During his visit, Canadian Ukrainian Revd Kushnir played an important mediatory role in this process. On his initiative, a series of meetings were held in Offenbach in March 1946 attended by representatives of all the parties.[164]

At a meeting in Munich on 14 July 1946, all parties, including OUN-b, agreed to the creation of a Coordinating Ukrainian Committee (Koordynatsiinyi Ukraiins'kyi Komitet – KUK). The new committee issued a communiqué announcing that the difficult international situation and the uncertain status of Ukrainian *emigrés* required the consolidation of Ukrainian political forces on a democratic basis. The basis of political life was agreed to be the rule of law and Christian morality, terror and totalitarianism were condemned and the principle of fair play was to be observed in political discussion.[165]

However, two months later, at the first meeting of KUK on 4 September 1946, the OUN-b representatives announced that they would no longer participate in the committee,[166] on the grounds that since they were the only political force continuing armed struggle in Ukraine, they were entitled to a monopoly of political power.[167]

These political differences and efforts at gaining power over the group affected the lives of most camp inhabitants. As UNRRA and the military authorities granted refugees increasing rights of self-administration, and camp residents were allowed to elect representatives and camp administrations, the political parties attempted to gain control over these offices to increase their power. Although camp elections were administered on a democratic basis and often monitored by UNRRA officials, fights broke out on numerous occasions. Some candidates resorted to smear campaigns, and voter intimidation occurred in many places. The Churches were drawn into this conflict, and the divisions within the camps threatened to destroy the unity that had existed previously.

Perhaps the critical factor that prevented these political disputes from destroying the community were the actions of many apolitical Ukrainian leaders who strove to maintain normal relations within the community. Also, the continuing external threats that the community faced from the screening boards and repatriation officials held the community together.

One negative repercussion of the political activities of some of the group, was that the suspicions of political activities slowed down welfare assistance and recognition of the group as a whole. Also, innocent individuals were often held to be responsible and punished for the activities of others.

Difficulties facing the diaspora aid effort

The Ukrainian voluntary agencies were also in a difficult position during this period. Their aim was to assist Ukrainian refugees, yet they continued to be denied access to refugee camps and were therefore unable to fulfil their goals. Many Western officials treated them with suspicion, fearing that the Ukrainian voluntary agencies were fronts for political activities.

In summer 1946 representatives of all Ukrainian voluntary agencies met in Paris, where they agreed to coordinate their activities to improve their lobbying efforts. In order to improve communications, they decided to produce a regular newsletter.[168] To further strengthen their case for direct access to refugee camps, they recognized the need to forge links with other groups in a similar situation.[169]

As their requests for permission to provide direct aid to refugees were repeatedly denied, they began pursuing unofficial channels and ways to circumvent the restrictions placed on them. At times they engaged in deceptive tactics to obtain travel permits, and this only heightened suspicion about them. After Dr Gallan of the UUARC visited Ukrainian refugee camps in Germany by obtaining travel permits without authorization from UNRRA headquarters, he was accused of 'a direct attempt to evade channels and enlist the aid of local UNRRA officials in working with opposition to their higher headquarters'.[170] As late as February 1947 UNRRA field officers were reporting to headquarters that:

> The great political activity apparent among Ukrainian unofficial organisations in Germany and the degree to which Ukrainian organisations outside Germany appear to have stimulated and identified themselves with this by contacts through the mail or various unofficial channels have created additional difficulties as to the acceptability of an organisation or program.[171]

A second problem faced by these agencies was opposition from elements of the Ukrainian communities in Canada and the USA. Not all diaspora Ukrainians were positively inclined towards the refugees. Members of the Communist community in Canada assisted the Soviet Union in their repatriation efforts and in the campaign to portray all non-returnees as Nazi collaborators.[172] The voluntary agencies monitored their activities, and warned the refugees of the intent of these people.[173]

Despite these difficulties, the voluntary agencies continued in their efforts to assist the refugees, and CURB remained the most important agency throughout this period.

Conclusion

The year from spring 1946 to spring 1947 was one during which the policies formulated to address the refugee question at high political levels differed greatly from those being pursued towards refugees on the ground.

As divisions between East and West deepened in the international arena, preparations were made by the UN to create a new international organization to address the needs of refugees. Deflecting opposition from the Soviet Union, the Western democratic states succeeded in codifying the expanded definition of a refugee, securing refugee rights in a constitution of a specialized agency, the International Refugee Organization, and allocating significant funds towards a resettlement programme.

Simultaneously, efforts at reducing the size of the refugee population were increased through a renewed repatriation drive. UNRRA and the military occupation authorities continued to work with the Soviet Repatriation Commission to repatriate forcibly all refugees considered to be Soviet citizens according to the Western definition, and steps were taken to induce voluntary repatriation by denying assistance to those who refused to return home.

Ukrainian refugees responded to this situation by continuing to appeal to the Western democracies for recognition of their rights, and resisted repatriation. Because of their insistence they succeeded in establishing their non-repatriability. Despite growing tensions within the group, they continued their efforts at organizing a normal community life. Through their activities, particularly in providing their own welfare and education activities, they attracted attention to their need for assistance and were increasingly recognized as a separate national group. Nevertheless, confusion and suspicion continued to surround dealings with Ukrainians, particularly since their status remained officially undefined and the Soviet Union persisted in labelling them as Nazi war criminals. However, as relations with the Soviet Union soured, Western officials dealing directly with Ukrainians responded increasingly to their appeals and advocated a change in policy towards them.

6
The Last Phase of Displacement (Summer 1947–January 1952)

In mid-1947 the lives of most Ukrainians who had been displaced by the Second World War continued to be fraught with difficulties and uncertainty. Those who had managed to avoid repatriation to the Soviet Union remained suspended in a temporary situation without legal rights, in difficult economic conditions, and unsure what the future would hold. The millions who had returned to their prewar homes were regarded by the Soviet government as being tainted and were not allowed to resume their normal lives. Over the period of the next four years the situation of both the refugees and returnees changed. Most refugees were resettled to new countries and began new lives. Returnees to the Soviet Union were segregated, despatched to different destinations and forced to accept an inferior status in their own society. This chapter examines the last phase of displacement and dislocation for Ukrainians uprooted during the war and its aftermath.

The United Nations, refugees and resettlement

On 1 July 1947 the Preparatory Commission of the International Refugee Organisation (PCIRO) officially began operations. Within five years, this United Nations Specialized Agency had resettled over a million refugees, among them 113 677 Ukrainians.[1] This is generally regarded as being the most successful large-scale resettlement effort in history.[2] However, the activities of this organization were largely determined by larger political issues and governed by the interests of the leading members of the UN.

The large policy changes towards refugees, namely the international recognition of their plight and need for assistance, radically improved their situation in the long run. However, despite the impressive IRO

resettlement record, the lives of refugees during its years of operation remained very difficult. They continued to be regarded as a problem, as people who were not really entitled to rights but subject to policies that were imposed on them. A number of new measures were introduced which worsened their economic situation and restricted their civil rights. Although the definition of a refugee was broadened, many refugees continued to be denied assistance.[3]

The UN and individual governments had recognized the importance of addressing the refugee issue in 1946, and therefore created the International Refugee Organization(IRO).[4] The unique feature of the IRO was that, unlike its predecessors or followers, this organization was granted substantial operational funds to conduct resettlement.[5] Its aim was to bring about a rapid and positive solution to the 'problem' of bona fide refugees and people displaced by the Second World War, either by repatriation or resettlement and re-establishment.[6] The IRO was largely successful in achieving this aim because the member states of the organization demonstrated a common political will to address and resolve the particular refugee situation at hand.

This political will was motivated by various considerations. By 1947, economic reconstruction in Europe was a priority for Western governments, and the refugee population continued to be considered an obstacle to this process. Most Western leaders agreed on the need to move the refugee population out of the defeated counties. Second, with the heightening of the Cold War, the refugee issue gained political significance. Western governments became more receptive to the anti-Soviet attitudes of the remaining refugees and were no longer prepared to entertain Soviet demands for their forcible return. Third, humanitarian considerations became more important as the ideological conflict between East and West demanded that Western governments demonstrate a respect for basic rights. However, despite the concerted effort by Western governments to address the refugee situation through the IRO, the refugees continued to be considered a temporary 'problem' that required a 'solution'. The needs of the refugees remained secondary to the larger political and economic interests of the Western governments.

Limitations facing the IRO

As with any international agency, the activities and success of the IRO were to large degree governed by the interests of the member states, the receptiveness of the international community to their mandate, and the competence of their staff.

In one aspect the IRO was in a fortunate position, because the eighteen governments who became members had a shared desire to resolve the refugee 'problem'. The Soviet Union and its satellite states which did not consider the displaced people as legitimate refugees and opposed their resettlement, did not become members of the organization, and therefore could not obstruct activities from within, as had been the case with UNRRA. Other UN members uninterested in the issue had not joined the IRO.[7] The absence of conflicting interests among member states meant that the IRO executive and member governments were able to work together harmoniously, as one scholar put it, as a truly international bureaucracy.[8]

This common purpose, however, did not alleviate all problems inherent in the situation. For over a year after the Preparatory Commission of the IRO (PCIRO) began operations it was unclear whether the organization would continue to exist. The constitution required that 76 per cent of the operational budget be contributed before the organization could come into existence formally, and this happened only on 20 August 1948.[9] Furthermore, although the IRO appeared well endowed on paper, in practice the General Council operated in a state of constant financial crisis. Member contributions were not made regularly, and currency fluctuations diminished the value of many of the contributions. IRO operations were terminated in 1952 because member states were no longer willing to continue their financial commitment to the refugee issue.

Particularly in Germany and Austria, the scope of IRO activities was determined largely by the 'high politics' regarding the two states, and the refugee issue was always in a subordinate position.[10] The military occupation authorities continued to exercise substantial power over policy-making with regard to refugees, and introduced a number of new policies which further eroded the limited rights of the refugee population. Despite protests from the IRO, the policy of ensuring that refugees enjoyed a higher standard of living than the local population was changed, since it was thought that bad conditions in camps would encourage 'voluntary' repatriation.[11] Other measures included tighter control over refugee publications, and restrictions on the freedom of assembly.[12] By 1948 refugees were placed under the authority of German and Austrian court systems.[13]

Larger political interests also determined the eligibility criteria individual refugees were required to meet to qualify for IRO assistance. It was not the IRO but the influential members of the UN who formulated the definition of a refugee, and while these criteria were wider than any

previously used by international refugee institutions, nevertheless large numbers of destitute people who today would be classified as refugees were denied assistance.[14]

An equally important limitation was the dependence of the IRO on individual governments to accept refugees into their countries for resettlement. The IRO was charged with the responsibility of resolving the refugee 'problem' in a short period of time and with a fixed amount of funds. As an institution it was not in a position to create homes for the destitute refugees, but could only assist them in finding new places of residence.

The interminable conflict of most states between foreign and domestic policy affected the effectiveness of the IRO's resettlement programme. Many governments that recognized the need to resolve the postwar refugee situation and were prepared to allocate finances towards an international organization, were unwilling to accept many refugees for reasons of domestic politics. They recognized the 'problem', agreed on a need for its solution, but were unwilling to have the 'problem' land on their doorsteps.

Therefore, in its first year of operations, the PCIRO continued to emphasize repatriation as a solution to the refugee problem, despite the overwhelming evidence that most refugees did not want to return to their former homes. The PCIRO continued the 'ration bribe' policy introduced by UNRRA Director General LaGuardia[15] for a number of months, and gave it up only when it proved to be too expensive and achieved too few results.[16] In autumn 1947 the PCIRO Repatriation Division was still exploring possibilities of repatriating Ukrainians to Poland.[17] This was mainly because few states were opening their doors to refugee immigration.

The IRO was unable to embark seriously on its resettlement programme until governments agreed to liberalize their immigration policies. The first countries to conclude a resettlement agreement with the IRO was Britain, which in January 1948 agreed to accept 50 000 single refugees for manual labour.[18] The United States, which eventually accepted the largest number of refugees, did not change its domestic legislation to allow for increased immigration until 1948.[19]

Countries receiving refugees stipulated not only the numbers they were prepared to accept, but also the criteria individuals were required to meet to qualify for emigration to their state, as well as the conditions they would be subject to upon entry. The IRO had no means of influencing such policies and could only attempt to protect the rights of refugees through lobbying.

Yet another factor the IRO had to contend with were the attitudes of its employees. Many of its staff were former UNRRA officials who had already worked with the refugees for a number of years since the IRO took over responsibility for assembly centres previously administered by UNRRA. In some ways this was a benefit to the organization, since it inherited an experienced staff. A number of officials welcomed the creation of the IRO, since the new organization allowed them to address many of the refugees' problems that the narrow UNRRA mandate had prohibited.

On the other hand, some officials who had been working in the field for a number of years had lost sensitivity to the predicament of the refugees. A number of the former refugees do not clearly remember the change from UNRRA to IRO regimes.[20] Eligibility officers whose job it was to determine whether individual refugees qualified for IRO assistance were often unsympathetic to the sufferings the refugees had endured, as witnessed by comments such as, 'The screener should realise that overdramatisation and self-justification is part of human behaviour and excessively applied by refugees when screened.'[21] One refugee interviewed shortly after resettlement to the United States said, 'In the IRO a person who is quiet and who waits in line doesn't get anything. And the more brazen and pushing a man is the quicker he gets a new pair of shoes, for example.'[22]

The IRO and Ukrainians

For Ukrainians, the most significant policy change from UNRRA to the IRO years was on the issue of relations with national groups. Whereas UNRRA was prevented from recognizing and cooperating formally with Ukrainian groups, IRO policy was to work with any organizations that would assist it in furthering its mandate. Political changes at the international level made it possible for the IRO to stop denying that the Ukrainians were a separate national group and establish a working relationship with both the refugee committee TsPUE-N and the diaspora Ukrainian voluntary agencies.

Even before PCIRO began operations, steps were taken at various levels which improved the status of Ukrainian refugees.[23] Largely because of the continued lobbying by Ukrainians, gradually both refugees and diaspora community leaders were recognized as having a valuable role to play in the provision of welfare and the process of resettlement.

The first official request for a diaspora Ukrainian to assist in the work of international agencies dealing with refugees came in March 1947.

Following the trip of a Canadian Member of Parliament of Ukrainian origin to refugee camps in Italy,[24] the IGCR requested a Canadian or American Ukrainian adviser. Bohdan Panchuk, who had been active in creating CURB and assisting Ukrainian refugees for a number of years, was approached by Dr M. W. Royse to work in a liaison and advisory capacity concerning Ukrainian refugees.[25] On the suggestion of Panchuk, in late July 1947 Ukrainian Canadians began to be attached to PCIRO screening teams.[26]

However, no policy decision had been taken regarding the formal status of Ukrainian refugees. Debate on this issue resumed in August and September 1947, after TsPUE-N wrote to the IRO Secretary General in Geneva asking for Ukrainians not to be separated according to their former citizenship, but treated as a national group.[27] This letter, along with requests from the Ukrainian voluntary agencies for PCIRO recognition, stimulated discussion at the highest levels of the PCIRO for the need for a policy regarding Ukrainians and other nationalities whose territory had become part of the Soviet Union.

Recognition of Ukrainians as a separate national group

In a first step towards recognizing the requests of Ukrainian refugees, the PCIRO informed TsPUE-N that they would try not to move Ukrainian refugees without consultation with camp leaders.[28] Correspondence between the two organizations continued without much result[29] until May 1948, when the president of TsPUE-N was invited to a meeting with the PCIRO Care and Maintenance Division to discuss the relationship between the two organizations.[30]

A month later PCRIO issued its first policy statement on relations with national groups in the form of Provisional Order no. 74. This document stated that contact was to be established with existing national committees, and where none existed, national councils were to be set up with PCIRO assistance. A liaison service was set up which was to hold regular meetings between IRO officials and representatives of the national committees. However, the national committees were prohibited from engaging in political or profit-making activities.[31]

TsPUE-N received an official offer from PCIRO on 14 December 1948 to act as the representative body for Ukrainian refugees, pending their acceptance of the conditions of Provisional Order no. 74.[32] They agreed, naming Vasyl' Mudryi as their main liaison officer.[33] After this recognition, TsPUE-N was invited to attend various IRO meetings, as well as those held by the International Red Cross, the YMCA, the World Council of Churches and other voluntary agencies.[34]

Although relations between the Ukrainian refugees and the IRO improved significantly, the Ukrainians, like other refugees, often felt that they were not consulted adequately in policy-making. In late 1949 the Ukrainians, along with eight other refugee committees,[35] submitted a letter to the IRO requesting more participation in decision-making.[36]

It is interesting to note that the official IRO history comments on the fact that the Ukrainian refugees were well-organized, and discusses them along with other refugee groups, unlike the official UNRRA history, which does not mention them.[37]

In summer 1947 the PCIRO also began to consider the merits of accrediting Ukrainian voluntary agencies. Some officials who had worked with Ukrainian refugees and the diaspora voluntary agencies recognized that cooperation had been sought during the UNRRA period. One senior administrator noted that:

> It was not politically possible for UNRRA to make an agreement with the Canadian and American Ukrainian Relief Organisations, although UNRRA Field staff and military authorities were constantly requesting the aid of an organisation with the language and background and interest in DPs of Ukrainian ethnic origin.[38]

Because the IRO did not face the strict charter restrictions that UNRRA had, a number of high officials favoured granting Ukrainian voluntary societies official recognition in view of 'the lack of Voluntary Society assistance to certain groups of refugees in the US area of control in Germany, in particular the Ukrainian and Baltic groups'.[39]

As with the refugee committees, the PCIRO proceeded slowly in forging relations with the Ukrainian voluntary agencies. At this time, a number of Ukrainian voluntary agencies existed. The two largest and best endowed were the United Ukrainian American Relief Committee (UUARC) and the Ukrainian Canadian Relief Fund (UCRF). Both had close links with the Ukrainian communities in Canada and the United States, and had engaged in efforts to assist Ukrainian refugees since 1944, despite being denied official recognition.[40]

The PCIRO's first step in formalizing relations with the Ukrainian agencies was granting the UUARC permission in September of 1947 to operate in Germany.[41] The UUARC immediately appointed a Temporary Director of Field Operations and despatched him to Germany.[42] While negotiations aimed at securing a formal agreement continued, certain officials within PCIRO favoured signing a single agreement with Ukrain-

ian voluntary agencies to run a more efficient operation and save on administration costs.

Since the Ukrainian agencies had been cooperating for some time, it was not difficult for them to arrive at a combined agreement.[43] After many phases of discussion, during which PCIRO emphasized that these agencies would be working under their control, a formal agreement between PCIRO and UUARC/UCRF was signed on 15 April 1948, granting these agencies their long sought formal legitimation.[44]

Despite the improved relations between Ukrainians and the IRO, the status of the group remained uncertain. In statistical reports throughout 1948 Ukrainians appeared listed as 'Polish Ukrainians', 'Ukrainian SSR', 'Ukrainian' – and in some charts they are not mentioned at all.[45] Even after Administrative Order no. 152 was issued on 11 December 1948, and which specifically instructed, 'In addition to country of citizenship or country of last habitual residence write in the ethnic or nationality group for any of the following: Jews, Ukrainians, Volksdeutsche'[46] there was still debate at the highest IRO levels regarding the status of Ukrainians.[47]

Eligibility officers continued to receive requests for clarification, with some camp administrators expressing frustration with the Ukrainians. One official in Austria wrote, 'Most of the trouble is with the Ukraines: [*sic*] some are born Poles, some Russians, some Czechs, and they do not want to be written as such but as Ukraines [*sic*]'.[48] As late as 1951 some statistical reports did not include a separate category for Ukrainians, and eligibility officers were forced to type in a separate column in their charts for Ukrainian refugees.[49]

Despite these problems, after 1948 Ukrainians were accepted as a separate group and appeared in the statistics, albeit inconsistently.

The Ukrainians

The years 1947–52 brought many changes to the lives of Ukrainian refugees. By the end of this period, most of them were resettled and facing the challenges of beginning new lives in new countries. However, the four years were long ones, during which the refugees continued to encounter old uncertainties and were forced to contend with new ones.

During these years the refugee committees had to deal with a changing community, deteriorating material conditions, and increased internal strife. The role of the diaspora Ukrainians increased as their voluntary agencies became important intermediaries between the IRO, the countries receiving refugees, and the refugee community. Along

with their increased role came new pressures. The diaspora Ukrainians grappled with growing tensions amongst their different organizations and friction with the refugee community.

The changing refugee community

The largest change within the Ukrainian refugee community was a reduction in the size of the group. The only records available for the number of Ukrainian refugees in Germany and Austria on 1 July 1947 are those compiled by TsPUE-N. These records show that at the beginning of PCIRO operations there were 142 029 known Ukrainians in Germany and Austria. In just over a year that number had fallen to 105 082.[50] According to another source, by January 1950 only 59 183 Ukrainians remained in Germany and Austria.[51] IRO records show that between 1 July 1947 and 31 December 1951 a total of 113 677 Ukrainians were resettled with their assistance.[52] These figures suggest that about three-quarters of the Ukrainian refugees had been resettled with IRO assistance by 1952.[53]

Although the general trend was for refugees to leave their temporary homes to resettle in new countries, small numbers of Ukrainians joined the refugee population during this period; they were people fleeing from the Soviet Union or areas under Soviet control. One such group, which numbered only a few hundreds, were members of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) who had made their way to Bavaria in autumn 1947.[54] Some of them surrendered to the US military forces,[55] and others headed for refugee camps containing Ukrainians in search of assistance.[56] As soon as their whereabouts became known, they were all required to undergo screening by military authorities, and were not classified initially as refugees or eligible for IRO assistance. In some cases, leaders of the Ukrainian refugee community were allowed to visit them while they were under US military confinement.[57] Eventually, these UPA members were allowed to emigrate, and some of them resettled in the USA.[58]

Another small group that joined the refugee population were Ukrainians fleeing from Czechoslovakia in 1948. Many of them had been active in the Ukrainian independence movement of 1917–21 and had moved to Czechoslovakia in the 1920s, where they obtained Nansen refugee status.[59] Many of them were intellectuals and scholars. With the Communist takeover of Czechoslovakia they feared persecution once again and were compelled to flee further west. Through the efforts of the Comité de Secours aux Ukrainiennes in Geneva, the IRO intervened on their behalf and helped some of them to travel to France. The

Comité de Secours aux Ukrainienne and the Service Sociale Ukrainiennes in Paris, as well as other Ukrainian voluntary organizations, provided much of the finance as well as the logistical support for this move. From France, many of these refugees emigrated to Argentina, again with the assistance of Ukrainian voluntary agencies.[60]

There were also Ukrainians among the Soviet Red Army soldiers on occupation duty in Berlin who defected. These men were interrogated by the intelligence services of the various occupation administrations, and in most cases handed back to the Soviet authorities. In some cases, humane individuals helped these defectors escape into the refugee population.[61]

Deteriorating living conditions

While the Ukrainian refugee population changed and grew smaller, the long displacement was taking its toll on those awaiting resettlement. They had already spent a number of years away from their homes, living in temporary conditions without security, and encountering physical hardship.

Contrary to the general assumption in much of the literature on current refugee issues that the lives of post-Second World War refugees were not too difficult because of the large financial resources of the IRO,[62] in most cases the material situation of these refugees became worse during the IRO period.[63] This was partially because of the growing attitude that refugees were a problem, that their lives need not be too comfortable, and that they were in a position where they could only request that their rights be respected but not make any demands. It was this attitude which led to a revoking of the policy that ensured the living standards of the refugees were higher than those of the local population,[64] and the regular transferring of camp inhabitants from one location to another without concern for their wishes. One refugee later described such a move:

> I came into the IRO camp – 127 people had to be moved out of this camp to live on German economy. Some members of these families have already left for Australia. Everyone asks to be left in their old place but the IRO does not care. The order came from above – 'You must' says the IRO official and she does not want even to listen to the people.[65]

Another refugee reported nine moves in four years.[66] The refugee press reported such moves, often of entire camps,[67] and TsPUE-N protested, but usually to no avail.

As the reconstruction of Central Europe began, the refugees also became increasingly disadvantaged in the employment market compared to the local population. As temporary residents, often without proper identity papers, they were less desirable candidates for jobs that became available. In Germany, the revaluation of the Deutschmark hit the refugee population harder, further eroding their purchasing power.[68] It also substantially reduced to small financial resources collected by the refugee committees.

Refugees who were denied IRO assistance or living outside camps had a difficult time surviving. One man and his wife, who were denied IRO status because of their lack of proper identification documents, and for the same reason were unable to secure employment, survived an entire winter on one sack of potatoes which they bought with the last of their money.[69] Others who had no valuables to sell in exchange for food were forced by circumstances into black marketeering or petty crime.

Living conditions for those in IRO camps were not significantly better. The bureaucracy worked slowly and inefficiently, and often failed to meet the basic requirements of the camp inhabitants. One refugee described the difficulties he faced after the birth of his first child. When he applied for milk rations for the baby and received no response he began trading his other rations for milk. He was charged with black marketeering and his IRO identity card was revoked, thus depriving him of assistance.[70]

The food rations allocated to refugees were very small and their daily routine monotonous.[71] Most refugees were unable to find jobs and worried constantly about the next day, and about becoming parasites.[72] Health care was poor, and many women had abortions because it was too difficult to provide materially for children.[73] Some suffered from psychological trauma, others from drinking problems.[74] Many felt that they were living a life without a future and could not comprehend the lack of understanding by the democratic countries of their plight.[75] Fears of spies among the refugee population and the possibility of repatriation continued.[76]

The public image of the refugees also suffered at this time, and they increasingly came to be portrayed as untrustworthy, with criminal tendencies. The image of the refugee as a criminal was magnified by the behaviour of military occupation officials who, in their eagerness to prove their record of maintaining order, found the legally vulnerable refugees an easy target on which to blame disturbances. Local police records often listed unknown culprits as 'unidentified refugees'.[77]

Such widespread accusations led to investigations into the criminal activities of refugees, which often concluded:

> Such crime as there is caused by the fact that the DPs are hungry. Even though they are assured certain calories, they are not in fact getting them . . . A lot of the petty administrative punishments are for black market dealings – usually so people can get butter or lard.[78]

Emigration fever

The resettlement programme brought not only opportunities and hope, but also new pressures. Issues of identity and documentation once again came to the fore. Immigration criteria set by receiving countries threatened to break up families, and leave intellectuals, the old and infirm behind. The entire process involved much uncertainty and waiting. Often refugees encountered difficulties with bureaucracy and unhelpful officials. One Ukrainian refugee, P. Wrobel, wrote to the IRO Office in Prague with the following request:

> I beg to ask you for a big favour in answering my letter. I am registered with your organisation for a transport to Argentina, but have much difficulties to get my passport. All my personal papers are in best order, except the permission of the Czech Chef of 'Bezpecnost' here in Cheb. He refuses to give me the certificate, that he has nothing against giving me a passport and I don't know how to get now this certificate at all. I spendet [*sic*] already a lot of money for the stamps, but he still refuses and now he told me to go to Poland, from where I could get to Argentina as well. Please, will you tell me, what I should do to get the certificate, or perhaps another way to have my papers in order for you.
>
> Will you be kind enough to let me know, what to do, because I have not enough money to come to Prague again personally. I thank you very much in advance.[79]

A problem peculiar to Ukrainian refugees was the issue of proper documentation on emigration documents. Many of them had not been registered or listed as Ukrainians, and some of them had deliberately concealed their true identities in order to avoid forcible repatriation to the Soviet Union. When faced with the imminent prospect of emigration, some of them felt secure enough to return to their true identities and note their Ukrainian nationality before starting their lives again in a new country. Such individuals made sworn statements which were certified by the IRO legal division, documenting their reasons for earlier falsifications

and attesting to their real identities.[80] Ukrainian refugees who did not return to their real identities before emigrating were to face accusations of collaboration and war crimes in the future.

An added source of stress was the increasingly tense international situation unfolding around them. As the Cold War intensified, many became desperate to get as far away from the Soviet Union as possible. Because the refugees had limited access to information on international affairs (since they had limited possibilities of obtaining newspapers other then the ones they published themselves), reports about the worsening of relations between East and West led many to believe that another war was coming.[81] These fears were reinforced when new refugees began arriving from Soviet Ukraine and Czechoslovakia.

Increasing tensions within the community

Since anxiety was an everyday feature of the lives of the refugees, community relations came under serious strain. Infighting within the political parties intensified, and increasingly spilled over into non-political activities. The strongest Ukrainian political party, the Bandera faction of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN-b), continued its effort to gain control over the entire group. It attempted to increase its influence within the coordinating body, TsPUE-N, and to get its members elected into local camp administrations.

At the Second TsPUE-N Conference, held on 8–10 May 1948, OUN-b attempted to gain control of the organization. Their strategy was to try to change the *Statut*[82] (statute) to make the committee more centralized and to exclude representatives from the scholarly, cultural-educational, sports and cooperative committees from the General Council (Assembly).[83] The takeover attempt failed, and following heated debates the politically centrist Vasyl' Mudryi was re-elected for another term as president of TsPUE-N. A special commission was created to revise *Statut*. After a few months a new version of the document which satisfied all parties was accepted,[84] and sent to the IRO headquarters in Germany for approval.[85]

After Vasyl' Mudryi emigrated to the United States in 1949, the OUN-b faction gained control of TsPUE-N, causing their opponents to leave and form a rival coordinating body, the Soiuz Ukraiintsiv v Nimechchyni (SUN – Association of Ukrainians in Germany).[86]

The OUN-b's bid to gain control over the Ukrainian refugee population was not limited to the power struggle within TsPUE-N. They also continued to try to secure the leading positions in camp administrations. In addition to electoral campaigns, which at times included coercive tactics to ensure that their members were voted in to key

positions,[87] they appealed to the patriotic sentiments of the largely non-political refugees, arguing that they were the only political force still mounting armed resistance to the Soviet Union from within Ukraine, and used the newly arrived UPA fighters as evidence of their claim to a monopoly on political legitimacy.

These political quarrels were being fought among an already disheartened population. Years of forced inactivity and difficult conditions of communal living were causing increasing social friction. At times, personal disputes were drawn into the political debates. The political animosities between the various Ukrainian parties and groupings which developed among the refugee population were transferred to the new countries of settlement of the refugees, and continued to dominate Ukrainian *emigré* politics for years to come.

Assistance from the diaspora

Like the refugee community, the Ukrainian voluntary agencies underwent a number of changes during this period. Most important, they received official recognition, which enabled them to carry out their work more efficiently.[88] With the beginning of large-scale resettlement, the focus of their operations shifted from relief to immigration assistance. However, the earlier spirit of cooperation began to dissipate, reducing the effectiveness of their efforts, and new tensions appeared between the diaspora Ukrainians and the refugees.

Until the IRO period, Ukrainian voluntary agencies and organizations were forced to operate on the fringes of the law, not being prohibited from existing but denied an official status. Once the IRO embarked on its resettlement programme, its officials realized the potential usefulness of voluntary organizations, and accredited them formally.

This recognition enabled the Ukrainian voluntary agencies to set up official representations in Europe, which made their work much easier. They were allowed to appoint their representatives to various IRO teams in the field, to assist in the resettlement programmes and to protect the interests of the Ukrainian refugees.

Perhaps the most valuable work done by the Ukrainian voluntary agencies during this period was in assisting refugees to find sponsors, particularly for emigration to Canada and the United States. Both countries restricted the entry of IRO refugees to those individuals who had relatives already resident in their states, or those who obtained affidavits from American citizens guaranteeing that they would not become public charges. The IRO mandate did not include a provision of such services, and therefore many refugees were unable to apply for emigration.

The voluntary agencies took it upon themselves to facilitate the emigration of refugees by providing them with the necessary affidavits from members of the Ukrainian diaspora community.[89]

In addition to working with the IRO, the Ukrainian voluntary agencies began numerous independent efforts at resettling Ukrainian refugees, particularly those denied IRO status.[90] These included continued lobbying campaigns aimed at governments to accept Ukrainians as immigrants, at both national and local levels. The UUARC established close working relationships with many American local governors and state legislatures, and in the state of Michigan, John Panchuk, a leading figure in UUARC, headed the state DP Commission.[91] Such contacts were used to bring small groups of Ukrainians to the USA for labour schemes, particularly in agriculture and industry. DP commissions in North Dakota, Oklahoma, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan and Maryland agreed to accept Ukrainians.[92]

The Ukrainian Canadian Committee (the parent organization of CURF) continuously lobbied the Departments of Immigration, External Affairs, Labour, Health, and Mines and Resources, as well as Members of Parliament and government officials sympathetic to Ukrainians, to allow the refugees permission to enter Canada.[93]

Ukrainian communities were asked to assist in this process by sponsoring individual refugees to come to their countries of residence. Many Ukrainian Canadians and Americans volunteered to help refugee families to find new homes. One former refugee, Mr Il'nyts'kyi, who became a prominent engineer, owes his entry into Canada to a Ukrainian Canadian farmer who agreed to sponsor his immigration application, allegedly on the grounds that he needed an agricultural labourer. Once Mr Il'nyts'kyi arrived, the farmer told him that he was welcome to stay on the farm but was free move to a city in search of his fortune.[94] In Western Canada, some farmers of Ukrainian origin agreed to help single female refugees come to Canada by accepting them as brides.[95]

However, not all efforts were successful. Farmers in Maryland, USA, who had agreed to accept Ukrainian refugees as agricultural labourers in spring 1949, changed their minds when bureaucratic delays prevented the Ukrainians from arriving until after the autumn harvest season was over.[96] In some cases, the refugees misrepresented their skills in their efforts to be admitted on to resettlement schemes and leave the DP camps, and on arrival in their new places of work were unable to perform their duties adequately. There were also instances where the hosts or sponsors felt that the refugees were not grateful or hard-working after they had been helped to emigrate.[97]

A growing source of concern for the diaspora Ukrainians were the political activities within the refugee community. The Ukrainian voluntary agencies had great difficulty proving to their own governments and international institutions that they were engaged in strictly non-political, humanitarian work. They could not understand why the refugees persisted in pursuing political activities which threatened their access to assistance, and equally importantly the reputation of the voluntary agencies that were trying to help them. Some Ukrainian diaspora leaders were also afraid that the political infighting from the refugee camps would immigrate along with the refugees and destabilize their communities.[98]

Tensions within the voluntary organizations and among the Ukrainian diaspora community organizations also reached high levels during this period. This was partly because of the different organizational structures of the voluntary agencies, partly because of increasing divergence in approaches to the refugee issue favoured by Canadian and American diaspora committees, and also because of the strong personalities of leading figures in the voluntary agencies.[99]

Each organization wanted to have the decisive role in representing Ukrainian interests and coordinating resettlement efforts.[100] Although an agreement was reached in June 1947 which was to regulate relations between UUARC and UCRF, the alliance remained a stormy one. Under the guise of cooperation, it appears that the UUARC attempted to take over as the main Ukrainian relief and resettlement organization, at times taking credit for work done by Canadian Ukrainian agencies.[101]

These tensions were partially the product of the situation in which the voluntary agencies found themselves. On the one hand they tried to work together and coordinate their efforts to achieve greater efficiency and help the largest possible number of refugees. On the other, the policies of the European countries which housed the refugees as well as the immigration policies of the receiving countries varied, which necessitated a degree of diversification of tactics. Communications were imperfect and the nature of the work tended to give individuals in positions of responsibility inflated perceptions of their importance. Despite these difficulties, the voluntary agencies nevertheless accomplished a great deal in assisting refugees with resettlement.

The hard core

Despite the many difficulties, by 1952 most Ukrainian refugees had been resettled. Those who remained in Central Europe were designated the 'hard core' by the IRO. These were individuals who could not qualify for

emigration schemes because of their age, state of health or lack of skills requested by receiving countries. A small number of political activists chose to stay in Europe to continue their political activities, preferring to remain as close as physically possible to Ukraine in order to maintain contact with those still fighting for independence.

The voluntary agencies played an important role in assisting these people to rebuild their lives, through the construction of invalid homes and financial support for those in need.

Soviet attitudes towards refugees and returnees

Any inadequacies in the treatment of refugees and displaced people by the Western powers pale in comparison to the policies followed by the Soviet Union towards these people. Stalin was afraid of their potential power to undermine the Soviet system from abroad and within, and took steps to restrain them.

The big threat posed by refugees who refused to return was that they would try to organise an anti-Soviet revolution from abroad. One Soviet scholar described Soviet repatriation activities as the attempt to prevent the growth of a second hostile emigration.[102] Stalin was also afraid that the refugees would provide Western powers with information about the Soviet Union. Since very little information about the Soviet Union had been available before the war, the anti-Soviet refugees abroad threatened to expose the realities of Soviet life to the hostile capitalist states.[103] The Soviet government therefore went to great lengths to secure the return of its nationals, or, failing that, to discredit them as an information source by labelling them Nazi collaborators.[104]

The returnees posed a threat of a different kind. All Soviet citizens who had been outside the Soviet Union during the war had seen life abroad, and would no longer unquestioningly believe the state ideology of the superiority of socialism. Because the returnees numbered over five million, it is understandable why the Soviet government feared that such a large group of people could undermine the previous total state control over its citizens. Throughout the repatriation process great effort was expended on political education, and these documents are now open to researchers. This work was divided into verbal and printed agitation and propaganda, mass cultural work, and separate sections for work with youth, children and women. All repatriation centres were well supplied with political education literature.[105]

The post-war situation in the Soviet Union

Most Ukrainians displaced by the war headed homeward once hostilities had ended. Having survived the privations of the war and the difficult trip back, they were surprised by the reception they received. Forty years later, from a select group of returnees consulted, only one did not express regrets about her decision to return home.[106]

Ukrainian returnees (or repatriates)[107] returned to a situation where they were considered to be suspicious, for two reasons: like all repatriates, they were considered 'tainted' by their experiences abroad; and like all Ukrainians during this period, they were suspected of harbouring bourgeois nationalist sentiments.

In view of Stalin's political priorities and personality traits, it is not difficult to understand the attitudes and policies the returnees encountered.[108] His two important postwar domestic policy goals were beginning reconstruction and securing control over the newly-annexed Western borderlands. Reasserting control over the population, particularly in areas that had been occupied by the Germans, was considered a necessary measure to regain stability.

Soon after the cessation of hostilities, an official campaign which became known as 'Zhdanovshchyna' started to eradicate all Western influences that had crept into the Soviet Union during the war.[109] It was justified on the grounds that:

> During the war years several million people lived in territory temporarily occupied by the enemy. Millions were deported to Germany by Hitler's fascists. Many members of the Soviet Army were prisoners of war. The Hitlerite fascists tried to influence these people ideologically. During the anti-fascist liberation campaign Soviet troops advanced far into the West, and elements of the armed forces remained on the territory of capitalist states, where the forces of reaction strove to influence Soviet soldiers by all manner of methods. The Hitlerite fascists left behind bourgeois-nationalist groups in the Western regions Ukraine and Byelorussia and in the Baltic Republics to conduct anti-Soviet agitation among the population. A pernicious ideological influence was exerted on the Soviet people through all these and other channels. The majority spurned the reactionary bourgeois views that such elements tried to impose on them, but part of the population lacked ideological education and displayed an uncritical attitude toward capitalist conditions.[110]

Returnees to Western Ukraine were considered to be particularly suspect. The territories they were returning to had only recently been incorporated into the Soviet Union, and like the entire Western borderland, these areas were being subjected to intense Sovietization while the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (Ukraiins'ka Povstans'ka Armiia – UPA) opposed the Soviet presence through guerilla warfare.[111] Because the Ukrainian liberation movement was being portrayed as a Hitlerite fifth column,[112] and many repatriates had returned from Germany where a community of pro-Ukrainian anti-Soviet refugees continued to reside, they were suspected of harbouring Ukrainian nationalist tendencies.

Through the policy of Zhdanovshchyna, Stalin found a practical way of limiting the potential for opposition to the Soviet government by people who had been abroad by labelling them as 'tainted', and a labour force for reconstruction.

Segregation of the returnees

When they had first made contact with Soviet officials, all Soviet nationals were placed in temporary assembly centres for screening. While in these centres an attempt was made to segregate them into PoWs and civilians, and determine their identity and trustworthi-

Table 6.1 Soviet statistics on repatriation

Liberated (and handed over) by Allied Forces:	
PoWs	1 392 647
Civilians	960 039
Total	**2 352 686**
Liberated by Red Army:	
PoWs	433 127
Civilians	2 567 150
Total	**3 000 277**
Totals Repatriated:	
PoWs	1 825 774
Civilians	3 527 189
Men	1 293 095
Women	1 531 650
Children	702 444
Total	**5 352 963**[114]

Source: GARF, f. R-9526, op. 1, d. 1118, l. 223–6.

ness.[113] This process took a few months to complete. In total, the Soviet Administration of the Plenipotentiary for Repatriation Affairs processed a greater number of returnees than had previously been estimated. A 1946 Top Secret Report entitled the 'Implementation of Directives of the Leadership of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Conducting Repatriation of Soviet Citizens and Citizens of Foreign Governments During the Period of the Great Patriotic War' states that by 1946 a total of 5 352 963 Soviet citizens were repatriated (see Table 6.1)

According to the same source, of this total repatriated:

1 055 925	re-conscripted into the Red Army
3 259 857	sent to their former places of habitual residence (excluding Moscow, Leningrad, Kyiv and newly incorporated border areas)
608 095	sent to NKO work battalions
339 618	transfered to NKVD authority
89 468	remained in Central European assembly centres and used as labourers by Soviet occupation authorities.[115]

Of the total repatriated, 1 650 343 were identified as Ukrainians; 1 190 135 military personnel; and 460 208 civilians.[116] This was the largest national group among the Soviet repatriates.[117] Since not all Ukrainians availed themselves of the services of the Soviet Repatriation Commission and the availability of official Soviet records is still limited, it is safe to assume that the actual number of Ukrainian returnees was higher.

Because of the continued restrictions to Soviet documents pertaining to this issue, it is impossible to ascertain how many of the total Ukrainians repatriated were re-conscripted, or sent to NKO work battalions or to NKVD special camps. Research by Soviet historian Victor Zemskov shows that in the years 1944–7 the number of Ukrainians in the Gulag increased.[118] Ukrainian historian M. Buhai has documented the massive deportations from Western Ukraine that occurred in the months following the end of the war,[119] and there is some evidence to suggest that deported Ukrainians were sent to areas of special resettlement.[120] It is possible that Ukrainian repatriates formed part of those statistics.[121]

Conditions for repatriates sent to work battalions or the Gulag were very difficult. These conditions were described by Alexander Solzhenitsyn in *The Gulag Archipelago*, who also mentions repatriates coming into the Gulag in spring 1945.[122]

Returning home

From the above statistics, it is reasonable to estimate that over half of the repatriates were allowed to return to their former places of residence, except to Moscow, Leningrad, Kyiv or the newly-annexed western border areas.[123] At the screening centres any identity documents the repatriates had were confiscated and they were instructed to report to their local NKVD headquarters when they arrived home.

Nevertheless, for many, once they were allowed to return to their homes it seemed that their long ordeal was finally over. Their pleasure at homecoming was tinged with sadness as many found their homes in ruins or deserted, and relatives dead or missing. Maria Kovtun described her homecoming:

> When I saw my own house my heart began to hurt. The trees were all destroyed, having been run over by tanks, and instead of flowers the garden was full of weeds. The windows were broken and walls were charred. The door was open. I went inside and saw no-one. After a closer look, under the table I saw a small, thin girl, in a threadbare shirt, clutching a rag doll to her chest, staring at me. I guessed this was my sister, who had been three months old when I was deported.[124]

Sadness changed to fear once they began reporting to the local branches of the Interior Ministry. There they were required to fill out further questionnaires on their activities during the war. They were asked details of how they ended up abroad, and the conditions of their stay there. Based on their responses they were granted residency and work permits.[125]

Most of the returnees experienced difficulties at this stage. Even though they had been cleared of any allegations of collaboration, because of the policy of Zhdanovshchyna they were generally regarded as suspect, and the word 'repatriate' was considered to be synonymous with 'enemy of the state'.[126] Victor Lialiakin, a Soviet officer who had served in the Berlin Embassy before being captured by the Germans and becoming a PoW, found that once he returned to Moscow after the war none of his former friends would speak to him.[127] It was only with great difficulty that he found a menial job.[128]

Denial of employment, assignment to difficult jobs and restriction on access to higher education were widespread tactics used to isolate returnees from equal participation in society.[129] All application forms for work or training included a question on activities during the war, and

individuals who truthfully registered the fact that they had been abroad were turned down. This discrimination forced many returnees to conceal their wartime activities, and those who could moved to large cities in an effort to gain anonymity.[130] Membership in the Communist Party, which was the most important route to social mobility in Soviet society, was also denied to repatriates.[131]

In some cases, repatriates who were initially allowed to return to their homes were then either deported or forced to resettle in areas requiring heavy manual labourers. Lev Khapchuk wrote that after having been home in Polohy, Zaporizhzhia oblast' for one month he was forced to join a work battalion and sent to Novocherkask in the Rostov oblast' of Russia to help rebuild the city.[132] Others were arrested after having been at home for a short time. Ivan Chernets'kyi, from the Ivano-Frankivs'k oblast' in Western Ukraine was arrested in 1946 for having betrayed the 'motherland' and sentenced to five years heavy labour and another five years of forced resettlement. His parents were also deported at that time.[133] Maria Kovtun was accused of having worn a Ukrainian shirt during the German occupation and sentenced to seven years hard labour.[134] Petr Zadko wrote that in 1948 many returnees were arrested.[135]

The Repatriation Administration (APRA) formally concluded its activities on 1 March 1953, but the persecution of returnees did not end at that time,[136] and Stalin's death did not substantively change the fate of repatriates. Although amnesties shortened imprisonment terms, discrimination against returnees continued.[137]

The discrimination against repatriates was also passed on to their children. Descendents of those who had been abroad during the Second World War were also considered to be 'suspect' and application forms the question on wartime activities remained a standard feature of Soviet personnel application forms until the the collapse of the Soviet Union. Every Soviet citizen was required to answer the question, 'Were you or your relatives on occupied territories?' when applying for employment, higher education or entering military service. To protect their children, many repatriates concealed their fate during the war, even from their families. Yury Andrukhovych, a Ukrainian writer born in Ivano-Frankivs'k in 1960 was not told by his grandmother until he was in his late twenties that she had been in Austria during the war, to protect him from discrimination.[138] Some repatriates are still afraid to speak about their deportation to Germany. Prokop Kulyk was too frightened to respond to a questionnaire in 1991, and his son wrote on his behalf:

> He hid the fact that he was in Germany but was afraid his whole life that it could be found out. Just my mother knew and no-one else. He even hid it from me until last year even though I was already 27 years old. My mother told me that even in the 1980s when he applied for a new job and filled out the form he thought that he may be found out. He carried fear throughout his whole life.[139]

Conclusion

Contrary to the impression presented by the official IRO history and the contemporary studies on refugees, the period 1947–52 was a difficult one for refugees. Many of them were excluded from international assistance, despite the broadened definition of a refugee. Those who were granted official status were nevertheless denied the full rights guaranteed to them on paper.

In the Soviet Union the question of returnees was dealt with ruthlessly and successfully removed from public debate until the present time. Information is only slowly becoming available and a great number of the personal histories have been lost because many of the repatriates are no longer alive. From the newly emerging facts, it appears that many returnees were not executed, as had previously been believed in the West.[140] A large number of them were despatched to destinations which ensured a short lifespan for them, as they were slowly worked to death. Approximately half of those displaced by the war and their children were marked for a life of inferior status within their own society. The post-Second World War experience briefly brought the refugee issue to the attention of the Soviet authorities, but was quickly relegated to the concern of the hostile capitalist states. The Soviet Union did not consider becoming a member of an international refugee organization again until the perestroika period.[141]

7
Conclusion

The history of Ukrainian refugees at the end of the Second World War is interesting not only in and of itself but also for the larger issues it touches on. This study has attempted to demonstrate how Ukrainian refugees influenced the development of international refugee protection, and explore an aspect of Ukrainian history that was played out in the international arena. In doing so it looks at how the refugee question reflected the dynamics of the Grand Alliance and explores the nature of the Soviet Union by examining its policies towards refugees and repatriation.

The history of refugees, particularly of those groups who defy definitions, has received little scholarly attention to date. Ukrainians uprooted by the Second World War were one such group. The timing of their displacement was significant in that the handling of the refugee question in the post-Second World War years had important consequences for decades to follow.

Perhaps the most significant long-term impact was the expansion of the internationally recognized definition of a refugee, to one that legitimized each individual's right to asylum and assistance based on persecution or fear of persecution, regardless of former citizenship, race or religion. This laid the foundations for the current definition of a refugee.[1]

This study has attempted to demonstrate for the first time the contribution to this process of Ukrainians displaced by the Second World War. Although other factors were equally important, the refusal of a certain portion of Ukrainian refugees to accept repatriation to countries that denied them basic rights, and their insistence on identifying themselves in terms of nationality rather than citizenship, was a factor that led to the reconsideration of criteria for defining refugees.

A second important legacy of the post-Second World War period was the addition of the refugee question to the international agenda as part of a larger concern for stability and security. Before 1944, refugees were considered to be a by-product of repression or war, of interest to the international community only through humanitarian considerations. In the last years of the Second World War leaders of the Great Powers addressed for the first time the question of displaced people within the context of the larger discussions on the postwar peace settlement. This was both because of the size of the refugee population in Central Europe, which would affect economic and political reconstruction, and the conduct of military operations, which necessitated an agreement on population exchanges at the end of hostilities. Once the issues were raised at such a high political level it became difficult to dissociate them from questions of borders and the peace settlement.

As the machinery of the Grand Alliance was transferred to the United Nations (UN), these discussions became part of the international agenda in a new way. Although it took many more years before refugees were recognized as a permanent feature of international relations,[2] it was in the post-Second World War period that refugee issues were recognized as being clearly linked to political interests. The temporary international institution created to address the needs of refugees at that time set an important precedent for the future.

The role of Ukrainians in the process has not previously been discussed. This study has shown that they not only comprised a significant portion of the displaced people in Central Europe at the end of the war, but were also at the centre of the dispute that emerged among the wartime allies over exchanging populations from areas where borders had altered. Both the situation and the activities of Ukrainians contributed to the recognition that it might serve Western political interests to institutionalize international assistance to refugees.

The fate of Ukrainians displaced by the Second World War also contributes to the understanding of Ukrainian history in the twentieth century. It demonstrates that a sense of national identity existed among Ukrainians, despite their lack of statehood in the first half of the twentieth century. For a portion of the Ukrainians displaced by the Second World War their national identity was the key feature of their identity that motivated their activities. They acted as a group based on this identity, despite the fact that the situation they found themselves in was structured to prevent it – their national identity was unrecognized and even banned by the various occupation authorities and international organizations that governed their lives.

Furthermore, the activities of the non-returnees provide evidence of anti-Soviet attitudes among Ukrainians beyond the nationalist movement, both from Soviet Ukraine and western territories that had come under Soviet control. This contradicts the Soviet version of Ukrainian attitudes towards Soviet authorities, which portrays them as supporting the imposition of Soviet rule on their territories. Because the size of the refugee group that avoided repatriation was substantial, approximately 200 000 people, they could not be dismissed as merely individual dissenters or a handful of extremist nationalists. The composition of the refugee group did include members of the nationalist movement, but it also included various other political groups and politically non-aligned individuals.

Perhaps the most historically significant aspect of the events of this period for Ukrainians is that a portion of the refugees did eventually succeed in gaining political asylum. Defying the joint efforts of the Soviet and Western repatriation campaigns, large numbers of Ukrainians avoided repatriation and eventually continued their lives in new countries. This group is significant in that a good percentage of its members were from Ukraine's elite – intellectual, cultural, political and economic, and particularly from Western Ukraine. Had they returned to the Soviet Union their fate would have been a difficult one. As it was, they gained the opportunity to continue their intellectual and professional pursuits in other countries.

The importance of this post-Second World War Ukrainian emigration is visible in a number of ways. They became a source of information about activities in Ukraine and the Soviet Union. On resettlement these former refugees provided first-hand information on the nature of the Soviet system which was otherwise unavailable in the West at the time. Ukrainians were among participants in the Harvard University Refugee Interview Project and other studies compiling information on the USSR, which increased the understanding of the Soviet Union abroad. They also kept careful records of their own activities during their period of displacement and on resettlement transferred their archives to their new host countries. These were an important source for this study and contain valuable information on various related topics from the period.

The long-term impact of this group was that they made a positive contribution to developing diaspora communities, maintaining the Ukrainian issue in the minds of the international community for decades to follow, and eventually to the creation of an independent Ukrainian state. This new generation of *émigrés* often joined existing Ukrainian communities. In addition to providing information on the



Ill. 7.1 Ukraine in 1998.

Soviet Union they were civically very active and re-energized the existing communities with new initiatives and new organizations. Because of their experiences during and after the war, their sense of Ukrainian identity was very strong. They continued to organize a Ukrainian community life in the countries where they were resettled. Since their sons and daughters, children and teenagers, had spent a number of their formative years in the refugee camps that had been transformed into Ukrainian environments, this strong national feeling continued into the next generation.

A key aspect of their activities in their new homes was lobbying their new governments to support the cause of Ukrainian independence. These efforts have been most successful in Canada, for a variety of reasons.[3] The Canadian government supports many of the Ukrainian community's activities financially. In 1990 a Canadian of Ukrainian descent, Raymon Hnatyshyn, was appointed Governor General,[4] and Canada was the first Western country to recognise Ukraine's declaration of independence, only a few hours after the results of the referendum were released on 2 December 1991.[5]

A long-term negative repercussion for Ukrainians who avoided repatriation was that they continued to face allegations of collaboration with the Nazis and war crimes many years after they were successfully resettled.[6] Because so much manipulation of information occurred by all parties in the years immediately following the end of the war, it is difficult to obtain a clear picture of many events. Many identity documents were lost during the course of the war and it is now public knowledge that numbers of Soviet citizens deliberately concealed their identities in an attempt to avoid forcible repatriation to the Soviet Union. It was also possible for war criminals to avoid detection in the chaos of the victory celebrations and to escape punishment. However, this issue became more complicated because the Soviet government accused all Ukrainians[7] who refused to return to the Soviet Union of being war criminals. This was done not only to secure the forcible repatriation of these refugees, but also to discredit the non-returnees as an information source. In addition to providing evidence against an individual or group of individuals, the Soviet Union persisted in emphasizing the Ukrainian identity of accused war criminals, deliberately incriminating all Ukrainian refugees.

Looking at the history of Ukrainian post-Second World War refugees also provides an insight into the breakdown of the Grand Alliance from a new perspective. A little-known fact is that the United Nations General Assembly spent more time discussing the refugee question than any

other topic apart from security. Over time this question was overshadowed by larger geopolitical issues, but it demonstrates how conflicting value systems made postwar cooperation difficult and eventually impossible by the wartime allies. Agreement was secured on the larger political issues, such as the division of Europe into spheres of influence and creation of international organizations, yet no agreement could be reached on the refugee question beyond the point of providing immediate humanitarian assistance at the end of hostilities.

Although it was Britain that originally raised the issue of repatriating Soviet nationals, by the summer of 1945 the Soviet Union had taken over the initiative on keeping the question on the Great Powers' agenda. When the majority of displaced people had been repatriated to their homes, the Western Allies were more interested in pursuing postwar reconstruction than discussing the refugee question. However, the Soviet Union's insistence on securing the return of all its nationals contributed to the process of growing tensions among the Grand Alliance. As the Cold War deepened, the Western Allies became more receptive to the anti-Soviet views of the remaining refugees and this contributed to the search for alternative solutions, the creation of a new organization to resettle the refugees, and the allocation of significant funding towards this end.

This study also contributes to the understanding of the Soviet Union in the last years of the war and the immediate postwar years. It provides further evidence of the harsh attitudes of the Soviet government, particularly Stalin's, towards society. From the information currently available it appears that there were far greater numbers of people repatriated to the Soviet Union at the end of the war than had previously been assumed. Archival documents now show that upwards of five million people were repatriated to the Soviet Union, which is double the figure previously estimated.[8] Judging by the activities of the Soviet repatriation administration, it seems that the Soviet authorities themselves were unaware of quite how many of their nationals were abroad. The first British requests to the USSR to claim its nationals were dismissed and no institution was set up to deal with repatriation until autumn 1944. Even after the Soviet Repatriation Administration was set up, inadequate preparations were made for returnees in summer 1945.

However, it is now clear that despite this relatively late beginning, the Soviet repatriation campaign became a highly organized, complex operation. Resources were allocated towards this end and a multi-level organization, the Administration of the Plenipotentiary of the Soviet of Peoples' Deputies for Repatriation Affairs (APRA), was created, which

continued operations until 1952. This body worked closely with the security organs of the state, the Red Army and Republican governments. The chain of command and responsibility for repatriation activities remains unclear from currently available documents, but it appears to have changed over time. The APRA was a new institutional structure answering directly to the State Defence Committee. However, its powers appear to have been limited to logistical and coordinating activities. Responsibility for screening repatriates was in the hands of the security services – NKVD and GUKK-SMERSH – and it would therefore seem logical that these institutions in fact controlled the operation.[9] The Red Army provided manpower for transporting and controlling repatriated people in transit as well as constructing and organizing assembly centres. The Republican governments took over these responsibilities once returnees passed into Soviet territory.

Once Stalin decided to secure the return of Soviet nationals from abroad, resources were channelled into the repatriation effort and priority was given to this issue at international meetings, despite its contributing to rising tensions in the Grand Alliance. This policy was largely successful in that a very small percentage of Soviet citizens who were outside the borders of the USSR at the war's end avoided repatriation.

Stalin's determination to repatriate all Soviet nationals reveals his fear of these people remaining abroad because of their potential to discredit the Soviet state internationally. This fear is understandable, given the history of the Soviet Union and the role of socialist revolutionaries abroad in overthrowing the tsarist government during the First World War. In the effort to undermine their potential to do this, the Soviet Union introduced and maintained for decades a policy of portraying all non-returnees as Nazi collaborators.

Returnees posed a threat of a different kind. From the harshness of the measures followed towards those Soviet citizens who did return to the USSR it appears that Stalin feared their potential to destabilize the Soviet system by virtue of having been abroad. Ukrainians were regarded as being particularly dangerous, especially those from newly-incorporated Western Ukrainian areas.

However, the policies towards the returnees were more complex than has previously been assumed. Earlier assumptions that all returnees were either executed or dispatched to the Gulag now appear incorrect in view of new archival evidence. From the available statistics it now seems that approximately half of the repatriates were allowed to return to their homes. Although the policies changed slightly from 1944 to 1945,

returnees were categorized into two main groups: civilians and Prisoners of War and there were five destinations to which they were sent. Officers among the PoWs and civilians considered traitors were immediately turned over to NKVD authorities and either charged with treason or sent off to the Gulag. Some were transferred to NKO authority and sent to work battalions. Rank and file PoWs and civilians of conscription age were reconscripted into the Red Army, and for the duration of the war returned to the front, and after the cessation of hostilities used as labourers. A percentage of civilians who were in Central Europe were used as labourers by the Soviet occupation forces; the remainder being sent to their former places of habitual residence with the exception of Moscow, Leningrad, Kyiv and the newly incorporated western border areas.

However, all repatriates were considered by the Soviet authorities to be 'tainted', regardless of the reason for their displacement, and this suspicion was perpetuated by Soviet governments until the collapse of the USSR in 1991. Those individuals who were allowed to return to their homes were marked as 'repatriates' for the remainder of the existence of the Soviet Union and precluded from full participation in society. This discrimination was passed on to their children and grandchildren. This situation was unmentioned in the Soviet Union before until 1990 because the state was not interested in revealing the fate of returnees and the returnees, themselves tried to hide their past in order to protect their families.

The conclusion of this episode in history occurred in 1991, when the Soviet Union imploded and Ukraine became an independent state. The most immediate change occurred for survivors of these events, both in Ukraine and abroad. Following decades of separation by the Iron Curtain, families that had been torn apart by the war were reunited. Former refugees who had secured political asylum and continued their lives in new countries were able to return to their homes, many for the first time. This has contributed to the process of building bridges between residents of Ukraine and the diaspora, since minimal contact possible during the Soviet period combined with Soviet authorities portraying non-returnees as traitors led to misperceptions on both sides. For returnees, the collapse of the USSR has lifted the veil of fear. Many have begun to feel secure enough to talk openly about their experiences, to their families and researchers, thus beginning a process of reconciliation. Some who had been deported to Germany as *Ostarbeiter* are receiving compensation payments from the German government. Others who had been repressed have sought rehabilitation. This is contributing to

the larger process of re-examining history and the filling in of blank spots which is taking place in the new Ukrainian state.

This study has been able to draw only preliminary conclusions on the Soviet side of the history of Ukrainian refugees at the end of the Second World War, since archives in Ukraine and Russia are just beginning to be opened and the personal histories of people in Ukraine who lived through these events are only now being recorded. As the process of opening continues, a more comprehensive study of these events will become possible.

Appendix 1 Soviet Repatriation Branches Abroad

Table A.1.1 Soviet repatriation branches abroad

Country	Beginning of operations	Size of branch	Leader
Finland	3 November 1944	28	Col. Filatov
France	10 November 1944	49	Maj. Gen. Dragun
Romania	11 November 1944	13	Lt. Col. Bantsyrev
Iran	16 November 1944	10	Col. Semenov
Italy	13 December 1944	27	Col. Yakovlev
Poland	30 December 1944	16	Lt. Col. Vlasov
Belgium	1 January 1945	6	Col. Matveev Lt. Col. Melnikov
Egypt	4 January 1945	17	Col. Starov
Yugoslavia Greece Albania	18 January 1945	18	Col. Bragin
England	27 January 1945	20	Maj. Gen. Ratov
Pommerania (Germany)	19 February 1945	11	Lt. Col. Prutov
Brandenburg (Germany)	19 February 1945	11	Col. Miachin
Silesia (Germany)	19 February 1945	11	Lt. Col. Merkeshyn
East Prussia (Germany)	19 February 1945	12	Col. Ziuriaev
Austria (Soviet zone)	19 February 1945	11	Lt. Col. Fedorov
Sweden	21 March 1945	23	Lt. Col. Rogoznikov
Hungary	23 April 1945	9	Col. Starov
USA	2 May 1945	9	Col. Malkov
Nuremburg (Germany)	15 May 1945		Col. Chesakov
Norway	16 May 1945	23	Maj. Gen. Ratov
Czechoslovakia	9 June 1945	10	Col. Deev
Denmark	20 July 1945	3	Maj. Baranov
Switzerland	26 July 1945	12	Maj. Gen Vikhorev
Germany (US Zone)	13 August 1945	39	Maj. Gen Davidov
Germany (British Zone)	17 August 1945	42	Maj. Gen. Skrynnik
China, Korea	25 September 1945	21	Col. Mazunov
Austria (British Zone)	15 November 1945	5	Lt. Col. Tsibulnikov
Austria (French Zone)	1 December 1945	10	Col. Pitersky
Austria (US Zone)	17 December 1945	10	Lt. Col. Shyshenkov

Source: GARF, f. R-9526, op. 1, d. 1118, l. 25–6.

Appendix 2 Composition of the Soviet repatriation administration (APRA) leadership

Table A.2.1 Composition of the Soviet repatriation administration (APRA) leadership

	Central headquarters and domestic branches	Foreign branches
Total	351	523
Military Rank		
Generals	7	7
Colonels	24	20
Lt. Cols	40	62
Majors	56	162
Junior Officers	106	264
Sergeants and Rank and file	32	5
Civilians	86	3
Age		
Under 30	140	244
30–40	121	181
40–50	73	97
Over 50	17	1
Gender		
Male	267	509
Female	87	14
Political affiliation		
Communist Party	218	465
Komsomol	26	47
Non-party	107	1
Education		
Higher	24	112
Incomplete higher	106	282
Incomplete secondary	148	117
Primary	73	12
Nationality		
Russian	314	467

Table A.2.1 (contd.)

	Central headquarters and domestic branches	Foreign Branches
Ukrainian	23	32
Belarussian	6	12
Jewish	2	1
Armenian	1	3
Estonian	-	4
Latvian	–	2
Georgian	2	–
Abkhazian	1	–
Mordovan	1	–
Karelian		1
Bashkyrian	-	1

Source: GARF, f. R 9576, op. 1, d. 1118, l. 38 s.

Appendix 3 Ukrainian institutions of higher learning, scholarly societies and research centres created by refugees 1945–7

Table A.3.1 Ukrainian institutions of higher learning created by refugees, 1945–7

Founding date	Institution	Location	Initiators
12 June 1945 (revived)	Ukrainian Technical and Husbandry Institute (UTHI)	Regensburg Munich	S. Komaretskyi V. Domanytskyi B. Ivanyts'kyi
26 Oct 1945	Ukrainian Higher School of Economics	Munich	M. Velychkivski B. Martos
22 Nov 1945	Ukrainian Free University	Munich	A. Jakovliv V. Shcherbakivskyi
Nov 1945	Ukrainian Catholic Theological Seminary	Hirschberg	Revd Nicholas Wojakovskyi Revd Vasyl Laba
17 Nov 1945	Ukrainian Orthodox Theological Academy	Munich	Metropolitan Polikarp P. Kurinnyi

Source: See Table A.3.2.

Table A.3.2 Ukrainian scholarly societies and research centres

Founding date	Institution	Location	Initiators
June 1945	Historical-Philological Society	Transfelden	V. Miakovs'kyi
16 Nov 1945	Ukrainian Free Academy of Sciences	Augsburg	D. Doroshenko P. Kurinnyi V. Miakovs'kyi
22 Nov 1945	Ukrainian Scientific Society	Munich	V. Shcherbakivskyi
June 1946	Ukrainian Black Sea Institute	Kastel	L. Bykovskyi M. Miller
10 Aug 1946	Institute of Ukrainian Martyrology	Munich	O. Ohloblyn
August 1946	Ukrainian Geneological Institute	Frankfurt	M. Arkhypenko
30 Mar 1947	Shevchenko Scientific Society	Munich	V. Kubiiovych Z. Kuzela

Source: Lubomyr R Wynar, 'Ukrainian Scholarship in Exile: The DP Period, 1945 52', Paper presented at 'The Refugee Experience: Ukrainian Displaced Persons After World War II' Conference, University of Toronto, 1983.

Appendix 4 Ukrainian Political Parties in Exile after 1945

Table A.4.1 Ukrainian political parties in exile after 1945

Centrists
Ukrainian National Democratic Union (UNDO)
Ukrainian National State League (UNDS)
Union of All Ukrainian Lands

Nationalists
Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, Bandera Faction (OUNb)
Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, Mel'nyk Faction (OUNm)
Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, Foreign Branch (OUNz)

Socialists
Ukrainian Social Democratic Labour Party (USDRP)
Ukrainian Party of Socialist Revolutionaries (UPSR)
Ukrainian Socialist Radical Party (USRP)
(these three merged into the Union of Ukrainian Socialists (SUS))
Ukrainian Revolutionary Democratic Party (URDP)

Monarchists
Union of Hetmanites-Patriots

Source: Volodymyr Kubijovych (ed.). *Ukraine. A Concise Encyclopaedia* (Toronto, 1963), pp. 914–15.

Appendix 5 IRO Resettlement of Ukrainians

Table A.5.1 IRO resettlement of Ukrainians

Country of destination	Total
Argentina	2 382
Australia	[illegible]
Belgium	[illegible]
Brazil	4 609
Canada	14 877
Chile	319
Colombia	[illegible]
Cuba	[illegible]
Dominican Republic	[illegible]
Eire	[illegible]
France	3 542
French Guiana	[illegible]
French Morocco	[illegible]
Germany	[illegible]
Hong Kong	[illegible]
Israel	[illegible]
Italy	[illegible]
Luxembourg	[illegible]
The Netherlands	118
New Zealand	179
Norway	[illegible]
Pakistan	[illegible]
Paraguay	146
Peru	[illegible]
Southern Rhodesia	1
Spain	[illegible]
Sweden	[illegible]
Switzerland	[illegible]
Syria	[illegible]
Tunisia	138
Turkey	[illegible]
United Kingdom	[illegible]
United States of America	[illegible]
Uruguay	[illegible]
Venezuela	[illegible]
Miscellaneous	[illegible]
Not reported	[illegible]
Total	[illegible]

Source: Louise W. Holborn, *The International Refugee Organization. A Specialized Agency of the United Nations. Its History and Work 1946–1952* (Oxford, 1956), p. [illegible].



Ill. A5.1 International Refugee Organization (IRO) resettlement of Ukrainians, 1952.

Appendix 6 Description of Life on an Ordinary Day in a DP Camp in West Germany

Camp X lies very close to the woods and away from the populated points. The nearest village is at a distance of 2 km from the camp. The camp consists of 19 old wooden barracks. The barracks for Germans are divided into small rooms, but the barracks for foreigners are merely the dormitory type. Let's take for example the room in which I live. This is a large room (one quarter of the barrack). There are 11 double decker beds in one room and in every bed there is an old cotton mattress and 3 thin blankets. They give us no bed sheets, and we have to sleep directly on the mattress. There are 22 people in our room. All are foreign DPs – Ukrainians from Poland, Ukrainians from Russia, Poles. The representatives of every nationality gather in one of the corners and tell each other stories, or about their experiences.

Speaking of myself, I get up no earlier than 10 o'clock. There is no sense in getting up earlier – it's cold in the barracks and there is absolutely no comfort. After getting up I calmly proceed to do my morning toilet. When I am washed and shaved it's already time for lunch. What we have [*sic*] for lunch? The first course – some soup from pea powder or pearl-barley; the second – four potatoes boiled without being peeled, some sauerkraut on a little piece of blood sausage. After my lunch I lie down on my bed for half an hour. After that I get up and go to the other barrack where the other families are living, to listen to the radio. There I stay until supper, that is, till 6 o'clock. For supper we have 200 grams of bread with pork fat or butter, a small piece of cheese or sausage, and black coffee.

After having eaten I play chess or cards, and when I get a newspaper or a book no matter in which language it is: Russian, Polish or even German, I read until 9 or 10 o'clock in the evening. After that I go once more to listen to the Voice of America program and at 11 or 11:30 go to bed.

And so goes my daily life. There is no place to go. Four kilometers from us is a little town, Scheinfeld, where a movie may be seen. But I can afford it very seldom for lack of money. Nine marks of so-called *taschegeld* should be spared very accurately for purchases of tobacco and stamps. There is no possibility of earning some money. The life is dull and aimless!

Source: Harvard University Refugee Interview Project, Schedule B, Respondent 360.

Appendix 7 Questionnaire for Returnees to the Soviet Union after Return to Former Places of Residence

Interviews conducted by NKVD officials

Title: Questionnaire for returnees to the homeland from German captivity

1. Surname, name and patronymic.
2. Year of birth.
3. Place of birth.
4. Home address.
5. Where and in what position did you work before being driven off to German captivity?
6. When were you driven off (year, month) from which city, rayon, village?
7. Who of the Germans (Hungarians, Romanians and others) was in charge of the forcible deportation; who helped them?
8. Where were you sent to (country, city, region)?
9. Short description of conditions and circumstances on the route to German penal servitude.
10. How were you directed to your place of work upon arrival (purchasing and selling, inspection at labour exchange, allocation to place of work under convoy, confinement in concentration camp, etc.)?
11. Where did you work (detailed name of company/factory, surname and name of owner, proprietor, proprietress, their distinguishing marks)?
12. Address of place of work [company] (country, city, region, street, number of building).
13. Address of residence of proprietors (city, region, street, number of building).
14. Short description of work and living conditions in captivity (type of work, number of hours worked, payment, food, accommodation, availability of items such as footwear, clothing, security, etc.).
15. Short description of incidents of insult, violence, assault, torture and other criminal acts perpetrated by proprietors or their employees, farmers, or others against deportees to German captivity.
16. List of names of administrators of businesses, camps, dormitories, police officers and others, guilty of exploiting and abusing Soviet citizens (surnames, names, positions, if possible addresses and members of the families of farmers and their attitudes).
17. Other comments.

Signatures: Interviewer and respondent, Chairman of the SelSoviet (Local Soviet)

Stamp

Source: GARF, f. 7021, op. 67, d. 121.

Notes and References

Chapter 1 Introduction

1. For previous political migrations of Ukrainians see Orest Subtelny, *The Mazepists: Ukrainian Separatism in the Eighteenth Century* (Boulder, Col., 1981); Mykhailo Hrushevsk'kyi, *Z pochatkiv ukraiins'koho sotsiialistychnoho rukhu: Drahomaniv i zhenevs'kyi sotsiialistychnyi hurtok* (Vienna, 1922); S. Narizhny, *Ukraiins'ka emigratsiia: Kul'turna pratsiia ukraiins'koi emigratsii mizh dvoma svotivymy viinamy* (Prague, 1942).
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3. Many studies begin their analysis with the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. For example, see Elizabeth Ferris, *Refugees and World Politics* (New York, 1985); Guy Goodwin-Gill, *The Refugee in International Law* (Oxford, 1985); Harto Hakovirta, *The World Refugee Problem* (Tampere, Finland, 1991); James C. Hathaway, *The Law of Refugee Status* (Toronto, 1991); Gil Loescher (ed.), *Refugees and the Asylum Dilemma in the West* (Pennsylvania, 1992); Aristide R. Zolberg, 'Contemporary Transnational Migrations in Historical Perspective: Patterns and Dilemmas', in Mary M. Kirtz (ed.), *US Immigration and Refugee Policy. Global and Domestic Issues* (Lexington, Ky, 1983). For a selection of more recent articles, see Dennis Gallagher, 'Durable Solutions in a New Political Era', *Journal of International Affairs*, 47, 1994; Arthur Helton, 'Displacement and Human Rights: Current Dilemmas in Refugee Protection', *Journal of International Affairs*, vol. 47, 1994, Gil Loescher, 'The International Refugee Regime: Stretched to the Limit?', *Journal of International Affairs*, vol. 47, 1994.
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5. See George Woodbridge, *UNRRA: The History of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration*, 3 vols (New York, 1950); Louise W. Holborn, *The International Refugee Organisation: Its History and Work 1946–1952* (London, 1956).
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7. For other works presenting a similar argument, see Howard Adelman, 'Power and the Powerless', *Refuge*, vol. 8, 1989; E. F. Kunz, 'Kinetic Models and Forms of Displacement', *International Migration Review*, vol. 7, 1973, pp. 125–46; Gil Loescher and Laila Monahan (eds), *Refugees and International Relations* (Oxford, 1990), pp. 12–13; William Petersen, 'A General Typology of Migration', *American Sociological Review*, vol. 23, 1958; K. B. Wilson, 'Enhancing Refugees' Own Food Acquisition Strategies', *Journal of Refugee Studies*, vol. 5, 1992.
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9. The two best historical overviews on Ukraine in English are the recently published: Paul Robert Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine* (Toronto Buffalo London,1996); and Orest Subtelny, *Ukraine. A History*, 2nd rev. edn (Toronto Buffalo London,1993). Both contain very useful select bibliographies. For a more comprehensive English language bibliography of Ukrainian history and historiography, see Bohdan S. Wynar, *Ukraine: A Bibliographic Guide to English-Language Publications* (Englewood, Col., 1990).
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13. The first publications citing Soviet archives in detail were articles by Russian historian Victor N. Zemskov. His first article on this topic article appeared in 1991: 'K voprosu o repatriatsii sovietskikh grazhdan 1944–1951 gody', *Istoriia SSSR*, vol. 4, 1991. More detailed citations appeared in his 'Repatriat-

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25. For a discussion see Chapter 2 of this volume: 'Causes of Displacement'.
26. For example, detailed knowledge of the artificial famine in Soviet Ukraine is presented in the collection of documents, M. Carynnyk, B. Kordan and L. Luciuk (eds), *The Foreign Office and the Famine: British Documents on Ukraine and the Great Famine of 1932–33* (Kingston, 1988); see also Koshiv, J. V., British Foreign Office Files on Ukraine and Ukrainians, 1917–1948: with Supplementary Files from the War Office, The Cabinet Office and the Empire Marketing Board (Edmonton, 1997).
27. The forcible repatriation of Soviet nationals by Britain started as early as 1944, and will be discussed in detail in later chapters.
28. Document on Inspecting the Work of the Record-Keeping Section of the Division of NKVD Screening and Vetting Camps (Akt proverke raboty uchetnoho otdelenia OPFL NKVD SSSR), 26 January 1946, State Archive of the Russian Federation, Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Rossiskoi Federatsii – GARF, f. 9408, op. 1, d. 10, l. 27.
29. The *Memorial Societies* were set up throughout the Soviet Union in the late 1980's, with the aim of documenting blank spots in history, particularly the excesses of Stalinism, through the collection of interviews and documents.

For the Statute and Resolutions of the Founding Congress of the Memorial Society in Ukraine, see *Memorial*, comp. by Lubomyr Y. Luciuk and Alexandra Chyczij (Kingston, Ont., 1989).

Chapter 2 Wartime Events and Planning

1. Malcolm Proudfoot, *European Refugees, 1939–52* (London, 1957), p. 21. Other sources cite lower figures. For example, Mark Elliott, *Pawns of Yalta* (Urbana, Ill., 1982), 30 million, (p. 243); John Stoessinger, *The Refugee and the World Community* (Minneapolis, 1956), 29 million (p. 47); Michael Marrus, *The Unwanted* (Oxford, 1985), 12 million, (pp. 309–10).
2. These calculations were done in preparation for dealing with displaced people. See 'SHAEF Outline Plan for Refugees and Displaced Persons, 4 June 1944', IRO Archives AJ 43/76; Proudfoot, pp. 116, 147–52; George Woodbridge, *UNRRA*, vol. II, p. 477; Marrus, *The Unwanted*, p. 309.
3. For details, see Chapters 3 and 4 of this volume.
4. The available sources have enabled a detailed study only of those in Central Europe. Ukrainian refugees outside Europe received relatively little assistance, as witnessed by a letter from a Ukrainian National Group in a refugee camp in Tababao, Guiana, the Philippines, requesting assistance from Ukrainians in France, 31 January 1950. Columbia University Archives, Bakhmeteff Archive (BAR), Vetukhiv Collection, Box 27.
5. For a history of interwar emigration, see S. Narizhny, *Ukraiins'ka emigratsiia: Kul'turna pratsia ukraiins'koi emigratsii mizh dvoma svitovymy viinamy* (Prague, 1942); and for political activities see Ostap HryBai, *Ievhen Konovalets' to ioho doba* (Munich, 1974).
6. Sir John Hope Simpson, *The Refugee Problem. Report of a Survey*. (London, 1939), p. 115.
7. Ibid.
8. For details of the treatment of Ukrainians in the Soviet Union in the interwar years, see James Mace, *Communism and the Dilemmas* (Cambridge, 1983); Bohdan Krawchenko, 'The Impact of Industrialisation on the Social Structure of Ukraine', *Canadian Slavonic Papers*, vol. 22, 1980; Palij, 'The First Experiment of National Communism in Ukraine in the 1920s and 1930s', *Nationalities Papers*, vol. 12; 1984; Robert Sullivant, *Soviet Politics and the Ukraine 1917–1957* (New York, 1962); Robert Conquest, *Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivization and the Terror-Famine* (New York, 1986).
9. For example, in the first decade of the twentieth century, Ukrainian intellectuals fleeing tsarist persecution fled to Austrian controlled Galicia; see Orest Subtelny, 'Ukrainian Political Refugees: A Historical Overview', *The Refugee Experience*, p. 4.
10. See Volodymyr Kubijovyc, *Ukraiintsi v Heneral'ni Hubernii, 1939–1941: Istoriia Ukraiins'koho tsentral'noho komitetu* (Chicago, 1975); Kost' Pankivs'kyi, *Vid derzhavy do komitetu (New York/Toronto, 1957); Roky Nimets'koii Okupatsii (The Years of German Occupation, 1941–44)* (New York, 1965); *Vid komitetu do derzhavnoho tsentru* (New York/Toronto, 1968).
11. For the current definition of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, see Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 1951, *United Nations Treaty Series* (UNTS), vol. 189, 1954, p. 187; Protocol

Relating to the Status of Refugees, 31 January 1967, UNTS, vol. 606, 1967, p. 267.

12. For a discussion see Chapter 3 of this volume.
13. These Ukrainians, holding pre-war Polish, Czech or Romanian citizenship, found themselves at the centre of the controversy between East and West over the definition of a Soviet citizen. See Chapters 3, 4 and of this volume.
14. A similar situation existed in other territories which came under Soviet control through the Pact, including Western Byelorussia and the Baltic States. For descriptions of Soviet rule in Western Ukraine in the years 1939–41, see B. M. Babii, *Voziednannia Zakhidnoi Ukraiiny z Ukraiinskoiu RSR* (Kiev, 1954); David Marples, 'Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia under Soviet Occupation': The Development of Socialist Farming, 1939–1941', *Canadian Slavonic Papers*, vol. 27, 1985; Roy Medvedev, *Let History Judge: The Origins and Consequences of Stalinism* (New York, 1971); Milena Rudnyts'ka (ed.), *Zakhidna Ukraiina pid Bol'shevykamy*, (New York, 1958); Z. Sobieski, 'Reminiscences from Lwow, 1939–1945', in *Journal of Central European Affairs*, vol. VI, 1947; Orest Subtelny, 'Soviet Occupation of Western Ukraine, 1939–41: An Overview', in Yury Boshyk (ed.), *Ukraine During World War II. History and Its Aftermath*, (Edmonton, 1988).
15. Interview with Mrs Nina Il'nyts'ka, New York City, 8 October 1989.
16. For details see Chapters 4 and 6 of this volume.
17. *Krakivs'ki visti*, 11 November 1941; *Oborona Ukraiiny. Chasopys Ukraiins'koi narodn'oi revolutsiinoi armii*, 1 August 1942, as cited by Bohdan Krawchenko in *Social Change and National Consciousness in Twentieth Century Ukraine* (London, 1985), p. 154.
18. See Gerhard Hirschfeld (ed.), *The Policies of Genocide. Jews and Soviet Prisoners of War in Germany* (London, 1986), p. 21. Rudolf Hoess, *Commandant of Auschwitz. The Autobiography of Rudolf Hoess*, (Cleveland, 1959), pp. 133–4 states that from the camp in Auschwitz only 96 out of 10000 survived until January 1945.
19. For details, see Chapter 2 of this volume, Soviet Wartime 'Solutions'.
20. This policy had been established following the invasion in June 1941.
21. E. M. Kulischer and J. B. Schechtman, *International Labour Review* (International Labour Organization, 1944) estimated that there were 3000000 Soviet civilian workers and working Prisoners of war in Germany, but no separate statistics were provided on Ukrainians. Also the 1456000 workers from Poland would have included Ukrainians. See Alexander Dallin, *German Rule in Russia, 1941–45: A Study of Occupation Policies*, 2nd edn (Boulder, Col.,1981); Ulrich Herbert, *Fremdarbeiter. Politik und Praxix des 'Auslander-Einsatzes' in fer Kriegswirtdohaft des Dritten Reiches* (Berlin, 1985); Jeremy Noakes and Geoffrey Pridham (eds), *Naziism 1919–1945 Foreign Policy, War and Racial Extermination*, vol. 3 (Exeter, 1983–88).
22. Many accounts of positive treatment by German employers are recorded in the depositions of the *Memorial Society* set up in the former Soviet Union to document the victims of Stalinism, in Moscow and Kyiv. In the *glasnost'* period many Soviet citizens revived friendships they had formed with their former captors.
23. The Ukrainians involved in this effort later became part of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. For details see John Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism* (New

York, 1963); Myroslav Kal'ba, *'Nakhtigal' (Kurin DUN) u svitli faktiv i dokumentiv* (Denver, 1984).

24. The term 'SEP' was devised to cover all those taken prisoner at the end of hostilities, thereby depriving them of certain privileges under the Geneva Convention. Hence they received less satisfactory rations, no pay, and were liable for any form of work. For details see undated secret Notes on Military Commission Report, Allied Commission for Austria Executive Committee by Major Gen. W. H. Straton, PRO FO 371/56714. For an account of the experiences of the Division in captivity see V. Budny and O. Slupchyns'kyi (eds), *Rimini 1945–1947* (New York, 1979).
25. Throughout the text this group will be referred to as Diviziia Halychyna. For a recent study on this group see Michael O. Logucz, *Galicia Division. The Waffen-SS 14th Grenadier Division 1943–1945* (Atglen, Pa, 1997). For earlier accounts of their history, see Basil Dmytryshyn, 'The Nazis and the SS Volunteer Division "Galicia"', *American Slavic and East European Review*, vol. 15, 1956; for an account of the Division's only non-SS *Wehrmacht* officer, who served as its chief of staff, see W. Heike, *Sie wollten die Freiheit: Die Geschichte der Ukrainischen Division, 1943–1945* (Dorheim, 1973). This was originally written in 1947, translated into Ukrainian by Roman Kolisnyk (Toronto, 1970), and in 1988 into English, appearing under the title, *The Ukrainian Division Galicia 1943–45. A Memoir* (Toronto/Paris/Munich, 1988). See also Myroslav Yurkevych, 'Galician Ukrainians in German Military Formations and in the German Administration', in Yury Boshyk (ed.), *Ukraine During World War II*, pp. 67–88; Roger James Bender and Hugh Page Taylor, *Uniforms, Organization and History of the Waffen-SS* (San Jose, Calif., 1975). For the view of those who participated in the organization of the Division, see Volodymyr Kubijovyc, 'Pochatky Ukraiinskoi Divizii Halychyna', *Visti Bratstva kol. voiakiv 1-oi Ukraiinskoi Divizii UNA*, vol. 3–4, 1954; and Pan'kivs'kyi, *Roky nimetskoi okupatsii*, pp. 216–53; Wasyl' Veryha (ed.), *Ukraiins'ka diviziia 'Halychyna': zbirka chasopysnykh stattei pro diviziiu* (Toronto, 1975).
26. For a further discussion, see Chapters 3 and 5 of this volume.
27. Eric Koch's inaugural speech, Rivne, September 1941, cited in Jurgen Thorwald, *Wen Sie Verderben Wollen. Bericht des grossen Verrats*, (Stuttgart, 1952); cited by Alexander Dallin, *German Rule in Russia, 1941–1945: A Study in Occupation Politics*, 2nd edn (London, 1981); Krawchenko, *Social Change*, p. 162.
28. Ihor Kamenetsky, *Hitler's Occupation of Ukraine, 1941–44: A Study of Totalitarian Imperialism* (Milwaukee, 1956).
29. Ibid. For references on the history of the UCC, see Note 10 above.
30. Interview with Mr Orest Lysenets'kyi, New York City, 1 October 1989.
31. Pan'kivs'kyi, *Roky Nimets'koi okupatsii*, pp. 420–8.
32. See Chapter 4 of this volume.
33. For a discussion of the creation and ideological origins of Ukrainian nationalism, see Alexander Motyl, *The Turn to the Right* (Boulder, Col., 1980).
34. For a detailed description of the events leading up to and immediately following the proclamation, see Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism*; Iaroslav Stetsko, *30 Chervnia, 1941* (Toronto, 1967).
35. There is much discussion about the statistics on UPA membership, with estimates varying from a few thousand to 100 000. Based on a careful eva-

luation of the available evidence, Peter J. Potichnyj proposes the statistic of 40 000 as the most likely figure, in Peter J. Potichnyj and Yevhen Shtendera (eds), *Political Thought of the Ukrainian Underground, 1943–51* (Edmonton, 1988). More recent research by Peter Potichnyj includes the gathering of a large documentary collection of Soviet and non-Soviet archival materials on the UPA, entitled the 'Peter J. Potichnyj Collection on Insurgency and Counter-insurgency in Ukraine', on deposit at the University of Toronto's Robarts Library. See also Jeffrey Burds, 'Agentatura: Soviet Informants' Networks and the Ukrainian Underground in Galicia, 1944–1948', *East European Politics and Societies*, vol. 11, 1997.

36. For a history of these groups see Zinovii Matla, *Pivdenna pokhidna hrupa* (Munich, 1952); Lev Shankivs'kyi, *Pokhidni hrupy OUN (Prychyny do istorii pokhidnykh hrup OUN na tsentral'nykh i skhidnykh zemliakh Ukraiiny v 1941–45 rr)* (Munich, 1958); and Lev Rebet, *Svitla i tini OUN* (Munich, 1964).
37. For details, see Chapter 6 of this volume.
38. For example, see Petro Mirchuk, *In The German Mills of Death, 1941–1945*, 2nd edn (New York, 1985); Volodymyr Ianiv, *Nimets'kyi kontsentratsiinyi tabir: sproba kharakterystyky. Dopovid na pershu naukovu konferentsiiu NDIUM* (Munich, 1948). For a listing of similar memoirs, see Boshyk (ed.), *Ukraine During World War II*, pp. 280–1.
39. For recent studies on the GKO, see V. N. Danilov, 'Gosudarstvennyi Komitet Oborony i ispol'zovanie innostrannoi rabochei sily v SSSR (1941–1945 gg) *Voienno-istoricheskie issledovaniia*, vol. 1, 1997; A. A. Pechekin, 'Gosudarstvennyi Komitet Oborony v 1941 gody', *Otchesvennaya istoriia*, vol. 4–5, 1994.
40. The Decree, no. 270, dated 16 July 1941, was published only in 1988 in *Voienno Istoricheski Zhurnal*. However, knowledge about it spread by word of mouth, and many soldiers were aware of it: PRO FO 371/43382, WO 32/11137, WO 32/11119. In July 1945 the decree was overturned by Stalin's Order no. 193.22. Information provided by Dr Zemskov.
41. The names of the NKVD, KGB and the various security services changed during the course of the war. For an institutional history, see Sergei Z. Ostryakov, *Voyennye Chekisty* (Moscow, 1979); 'Glavnoie Upravlenie Kontrazvedki', *Sovetskaya voiennaya entsiklopedia*, vol. 2 (Moscow, 1976); John J. Dziak, *Chekisty. A History of the KGB* (Lexington, Mass., Toronto, 1988), pp. 105–124; Amy W. Knight. *The KGB. Police and Politics in the Soviet Union*, rev. edn (Boston, 1990), pp. 249–76; Raymond G. Rocca and John J. Dziak, *Bibliography on Soviet Intelligence and Security Services* (Boulder, Col. and London, 1985).
42. NKVD–NKGB Directive No. 494/94 dated 11 October 1943 outlined five categories of traitor who were to be arrested and tried on capture. These same criteria were later used in screening repatriates. GARF, f. 9408s, op. 1s, d. 1, l. 66. References to earlier rulings are made in 'Sud'ba voienniplennykh i deportirovanykh grazhdan SSSR. Materialy Kommissii po reabilitatsii zhertv politicheskikh represii', *Novaia i Noveishaya Istoriia*, vol. 2,1996, pp. 92–4, but no direct archival citations are provided.
43. See Chapter 2 of this volume, 'The Western Powers and Displaced Soviet Nationals'.
44. Letter from Soviet Ambassador, M. Gousev, to FO, 23 August 1944. PRO WO 32/11137.

45. The works of V. I. Lenin underline the danger to the Soviet state of a hostile reactionary emigration. V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Moscow edn, vol. 43. See also Alfred D. Low, *Lenin on the Question of Nationality* (New York, 1958); Gerhard Simon, *Nationalism and Policy Towards the Nationalities in the Soviet Union. From Totalitarian Dictatorship to Post-Stalinist Society*, trans. by Karen Forster and Oswald Forster (Boulder, Col./San Francisco/Oxford, 1991).
46. Top Secret Report on the Implementation of Directives of the Leadership of the USSR on Conducting Repatriation of Citizens of the USSR and Citizens of Foreign States during the Period of the Great Patriotic War (1941–1945) (Sovershenno Sekretno: Otchet o Vypolnenii Resheni Pravitel'stva Soiuza SSR po Provedeniu Repatriatsii Grazhdan SSR i Grazhdan Inostrannykh Gosudarstv Perioda Velikoi Otchestvennoi Voini (1941–1945 gg)) GARF, f. R-9525, op. 1, d. 1118, l. 21.
47. SMERSH was the acronym for Smert' Shpionam – Death to Spies, which was the well-known name of the Chief Directorate for Counterintelligence of the People's Commissariat of Defense GURK-NKO. Most of its officers came from the NKVD. For details, see Note 41 above.
48. It seems that the border Republics were responsible for the logistics and finances for setting up these border assembly centres, while control over them was in the hands of the Peoples' Commissariat of Defence (NKO). Byelorussia was to provide five centres, each with a capacity for 15 000 people, and Ukraine Six centres with a capacity for 20 000 people in each.
49. Ukrainian Soviet of Peoples Deputies, Resolution no. 1191 signed by Chairman Khrushchev, 11 September 1944. Tsentral'nyi derzhavnyi arkhiv vykonavchykh orhaniv Ukrainy (TsDAVOU) Kyiv, Ukraine, f. R-2, op. 2, sp. 1734, st. 67.
50. Filip Golikov was the Chief of Military Intelligence from July 1940 to October 1941, during the preparations and execution of Operation Barbarossa – Germany's invasion of the USSR. In the words of one historian, 'In this capacity he was fully responsible for the erroneous evaluation of German intentions on the eve of "Barbarossa".' For a brief biographical account, see Gabriel Gorodetsky, 'Filip Ivanovich Golikov' in Harold Shukman (ed.), *Stalin's Generals* (London, 1993), pp. 77–90. See also James Barros and Richard Gregor, *Double Deception. Stalin, Hitler and the Invasion of Russia* (DeKalb, Illinois, 1995), pp. 12–14.
51. Top Secret Report on the Implementation of Directives..., GARF, f. R-9525, op. 1, d. 1118, l. 21.
52. Ibid.
53. Top Secret letter from F. I. Golikov to Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Red Army, Commander of the Rear of the Red Army, Commander of the Political Division of the Red Army, Commander of the Main Counterintelligence Administration NKO-SMERSH, 23 October 1944. GARF, f. R-9526, op. 1, d. 1119, l. 40–1.
54. Top Secret Report on Implementation of Directives..., GARF, f. R-9526, op. 1, d. 1118, l. 28–9.
55. For a full list of Foreign Branches, Heads of Missions and beginning dates of operations, see Appendix 1 of this volume.
56. Top Secret Report on Implementing Directives..., GARF, f. R-9526, op. 1, d. 1118, l. 38–9. For details see Appendix 2 of this volume.

57. Ibid.
58. *Pravda*, 11 November 1944.
59. The records do not show the appeal being translated into Armenian, Georgian, Uzbek or other languages of Republics not on the USSR's western border.
60. State Defence Committee Secret Resolution no. 6884S, 4 November 1944, Moscow, signed J. Stalin. Top Secret Report on Implementation of Directives..., GARF, f. 1, op. 1, d. 1118, l. 63–4.
61. For a history of the Vlassov movement, see Catherine Andreyev, *Vlassov and the Russian Liberation Movement: Soviet Reality and 'Emigre' Theories* (Cambridge, 1987); Russian translation, *General Vlassov i russkoe osvoboditel'noe dvizhenie* (London, 1990).
62. See Chapter 2 of this volume, 'The Decision to Use Force in Repatriating Soviet Citizens'.
63. Zemskov, 'K voprosu ...', p. 29.
64. This suggestion is made by Nikolai Tolstoy, *Victims of Yalta* (London, 1978), ch. 6.
65. Instructions for Soviet liaison officers, issued by Major General Dragun, 4 December 1944. GARF, f. R-9526, op. 1, d. 5.
66. Zemskov, 'K voprosu', p. 29.
67. Secret Directive from Golikov and Gen. A. Khrulev, Commander of the Rear of the Red Army, 18 January 1945. The actual decision being communicated appears to have been taken earlier, as the directive refers to the decision of the Council of Peoples Commissars no. 31–13s from 6 January 1945. GARF, f. R-9526, op. 1, d. 1119, l. 44–9.
68. Before 22 May 1945 65 606 Soviet citizens were reported to have been received from Allied forces. Top Secret Report on the Implementation of Directives..., GARF, f. R-9526, op. 1, d. 1118, l. 79.
69. Great Britain, Parliament, House of Commons, Debates, (Hansard), vol. 364, 21 August 1940.
70. This organization was created on 12 June 1942 to care for Greek, Yugoslav and Albanian refugees, and staffed by approximately 200 British officers and soldiers. For details, see Proudfoot, p. 95.
71. [illegible] was established by [illegible] November 1942. See United States Department of State, *Bulletin*, 21 November 1942, p. 948; Proudfoot, p. 95.
72. See United States Department of State, 'Statement by the Joint Commission for Political Prisoners and Refugees in French North and West Africa in Algiers, 5 April 1943', Press release, Washington DC, 6 April 1943; *Christian Science Monitor*, 7 April 1943.
73. For details of the preparations, see Woodbridge, vol. II, p. 469; Marrus, *The Unwanted*; E. P. Penrose, 'Negotiating on Refugees and Displaced Persons, 1946' in Raymond Bennett and Joseph E. Johnson (eds), *Negotiating with the Russians* (World Peace Foundation, 1951), pp. 142–3.
74. The [illegible] were Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, the French Committee of National Liberation, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Iran, Iraq, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, the Philippines, Poland, South Africa,

the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland, the United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela and Yugoslavia. The entire Agreement is published in the UNRRA, *Journal*, as well as Woodbridge, vol. III, pp. 29–30.

75. UNRRA *Journal*, First Council, Report of Subcommittee, para. 10, and 8 November 1943, Memo, 'The Relations Between UNRRA and IGCR', UNRRA Archives, PAG 4/1.0.0.0.0:21, file 5.
76. Letter from Lehman to Emerson, 7 April 1945. UNRRA Archives, PAG 4/1.0.0.0.0:21, file 5.
77. Woodbridge, vol. II, p. 487. This UNRRA–IGCR agreement was extended after expiration by UNRRA Resolution 92, as the IGCR proved unable to take responsibility for refugees after the six-month period was over, due to lack of funding and support from member nations.
78. UNRRA, *Journal*, First Council, 'Report of the Subcommittees', Resolution 10, Relating to Policies with Respect to Displaced Persons', reproduced in Woodbridge, vol. III, pp. 50–2.
79. For the changing structures of UNRRA, see Woodbridge, vol. I, p. 195.
80. In January 1944, Hoehler established contact with the Refugee and Displaced Persons Section of the Civil Affairs Division of COSSHC; see Proudfoot, p. 106.
81. This agreement is reproduced in full in Proudfoot, pp. 136–8, Woodbridge, vol. III, pp. 180–2.
82. Agreements with individual governments were concluded: Czechoslovakia, 26 February 1945; Italy (First) 8 March 1945; (Supplemental) 19 January 1946; Poland, 14 September 1945; Ukrainian SSR, 18 December 1945; and Austria, 5 April 1946. The Italian and Austrian governments were not members of UNRRA, but received assistance. For a full list of agreements see Woodbridge, vol. III, pp. 210–350.
83. See UNRRA Resolution 10, UNRRA Archives, PAG 4/1.0.0.0.0:21, file D-3.
84. A note forwarded to Fred Hoehler, Director of UNRRA's Displaced Persons Division, commented, 'The main question here is whether (by accident or design) the definitions of DPs have excluded from UNRRA's care the groups of "non-repatriables" which will be found in Allied countries and will appear after the war in enemy countries. If Emerson's interpretation is right, too much definition of DPs has lost sight of the over-riding obligation to relieve "all victims of war"', UNRRA Archives, volume 1, PAG 4/1.0.0.0.0:21, file 5.
85. *A Study on Stateless Persons*, 21 February 1945, UNRRA Archives, vol. V, PAG 4/1.3.1.1.0:12, file P.300.12.
86. *Migration – A Vital Post-War Problem*, M Project, 28 February 1945, UNRRA Archives, vol. V, PAG 4/1.3.1.1.4:6, file M-206.
87. Historical monograph, p. 109, UNRRA Archives, PAG 4/4.2:78, file DP 1.
88. Letter from Leith Ross to Director General Lehman, 18 April 1945w, UNRRA Archives, PAG 4/1.0.0.0.0:21, file D-3, file 5.
89. Memo, Menshikov to Lehman, 21 April 1944, UNRRA Archives, PAG 4/4.2:78, file DP 1.
90. Memo, Lehman to Feller, 8 June 1945, UNRRA Archives, PAG 4/4.2:78, file DP 1.
91. Historical monograph, p. 109, UNRRA Archives, PAG 4/4.2:78, file DP 1.

92. Iliushchenko to Leith-Ross, 21 June 1944, UNRRA Archives, PAG 4/4.2:78, file DP 1.
93. Letters to R. G. A. Jackson from John G. Winant, US Ambassador to the UK, 21 June 1945; from Rene Massigli, French Ambassador to the UK, 22 June 1945; Sir Ronald Campbell, UK, FO, 28 June 1945, in Woodbridge, vol. III, p. 183.
94. Leith-Ross to Lehman, 5 June 1944, note of conversation with Iliushchenko, 22 June 1944, UNRRA Archives, PAG 4/4.2:78, file DP 1.
95. In the interim, two Soviet Republics, the Belorussian SSR and Ukrainian SSR, became members of UNRRA at the Third Council Session in August 1945, and on 18 December 1945 signed Agreements which included the establishment of Missions in their Republican capitals; see Woodbridge, vol. III, pp. 255, 332.
96. See correspondence PRO WO 32/11137; Tolstoy, *Victims of Yalta* (London, 1977), pp. 64–5, 70.
97. Most Secret Report prepared by the War Office, 21 February 1944, PRO FO 371/43382.
98. Letter from Sir Archibald Clark Kerr to Viacheslav Molotov, 28 May 1944, PRO FO 371/43382.
99. Telegram to the Chiefs of Staff from the Allied Military Mission in Moscow, 31 May 1944, PRO FO 371/43382.
100. See Minute by John Galsworthy, 11 April 1945, 20 April 1945, 23 April 1945; letters from R. Firebrace to Galsworthy, 11 April 1945, 14 April 1945, PRO FO 371/47897, PRO WO 32/11137.
101. Most of those who denied Soviet citizenship held Polish citizenship, but refused to be identified as Poles and be handed over to the authority of the Polish government in London.
102. 'Some of them have openly threatened suicide in preference to returning home', letter from R. Firebrace, WO, to P. Dean, FO, 14 April 1945, PRO FO 371/47897.
103. See letters from FO to Soviet Ambassador in London, 20 July 1944, 20 August 1944, PRO WO 32/11137.
104. FO memorandum, 17 July 1944, PRO WO 32/11137.
105. Ibid.
106. See Chapter 2 of this volume, 'Soviet Wartime Solutions'.
107. Meeting of the War Cabinet, 4 September 1944, PRO CAB.65.43.
108. Note from Major S. J. Cregeen, 2 December 1944, 'On 7 November, in Murmansk, I was in a car returning from the Naval Mission HQ to the War Port. En route, we were passed by a long column of Russian repatriated Nationals, who were being marched from their transport, the "Scythia" under armed guard to the camp just outside the town', PRO WO 32/11119.
109. See letter from Soviet Ambassador M. Gousev to FO, 22 October 1944, PRO WO 32/11137; record of discussion between M. Sobolev of the Soviet Embassy and Mr Warner of the FO about Soviets in the UK captured during the Normandy invasion, where the British position is spelled out that Soviet authorities have access to Soviet citizens and those Polish citizens who wish to go to the Soviet Union, 1 January 1945, PRO FO 371/50606.
110. Elves, WO to Patrick Dean, FO, 16 October 1944, PRO WO 32/11119.

111. Patrick Dean to Phillemore, regarding non-Russian nationality claimants, 9 November 1944, PRO WO 32/11119.
112. For details of these negotiations, see McNeill, *America, Britain and Russia*; K. Sainsbury. *The Turning Point... The Moscow, Cairo and Teheran Conferences* (Oxford, 1985), ch. IV, p. 308; T. H. Anderson, *The United States, Great Britain and the Cold War 1944–47* (Columbia, 1981); Anthony Gorst, 'British Military Planning for Postwar Defence', in Anne Deighton (ed.), *Britain and the First Cold War* (New York, 1990), pp. 91–108.
113. Britain and the USA signed separate agreements at Yalta, and the text of the Anglo–Soviet protocol differed slightly from the American–Soviet one, with the latter allowing that Soviet nationals captured in German uniforms could be held as German Prisoners of War with option to appeal to the Geneva Convention. Mark Elliot develops this point in *Pawns of Yalta*, ch. 2. For a discussion of the British reaction to this US policy decision, see folder N 5821 on Agreement between Soviet Union and the United States on liberated prisoners of war, 25 May 1945, PRO FO 371/47899. For the text of the Agreement between the United States and the USSR concerning liberated prisoners of war and civilians, see *Foreign Relations of the United States*. The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945 (Washington, 1969), p. 985.
114. For example, see Minute by Dean, FO, regarding a Soviet citizen who hanged himself in Liverpool rather than return to the Soviet Union, 'Brigadier Firebrace and Col. Tamplin are doing their very best to prevent any publicity, and have asked that the FO should speak to the News Department with a view to do all that is possible to prevent publicity', 28 March 1945, PRO FO 371/47897.
115. SHAEF, G-5 Division, Displaced Persons Branch, Administrative Memorandum no. 39 (Revised), *Displaced Persons and Refugees in Germany*, 16 April 1945, Proudfoot, pp. 445–75.
116. Ibid., para. 3.
117. See ch. 3, 4 and 5 of this volume.

Chapter 3 The War Ends

1. This group will be further referred to as displaced people.
2. This group will be further referred to as refugees. For discussion on definitions see Chapter 2 of this volume, 'New Definitions'.
3. These statistics will be explained later in the chapter.
4. See Chapter 2 of this volume, 'War Time Solutions'.
5. From 1 March to 30 September 1945, 10 054 000 Europeans were repatriated. See Malcolm Jarvis Proudfoot, *European Refugees, 1939–1952: A Study in Forced Population Movement* (Evanston, Ill., 1956), p. 228.
6. For details on the causes of displacement see Chapter 2 of this volume, 'Causes of Displacement'. The surviving records of the refugees most commonly use a figure of 3 million.
7. Report by Brigadier R. H. R. Parminter, Chief of Austria Mission for the Office of the Historian, September 1945. UNRRA Archives, PAG 4/4.1: 22.
8. Returned homewards independently, without inducement or assistance.
9. Letter from Mykolai Burlak, Kyiv, Ukraine, 7 October 1992.

10. Letter from Lidia Val'ko-Cherednychenko, Kyiv oblast', Ukraine, 4 September 1992.
11. Letter from Oleksander Mal'tsev, Kharkiv oblast', Ukraine, 13 October 1992.
12. Letter from Hryhoryi Chevelcha, Donets'k oblast', Ukraine, 5 October 1992.
13. Of this total, 1 190 343 were civilians and 460 208 Prisoners of War. Top Secret Report on Implementation of Directives... GARF, f. R-9526, op. 1, d. 1118, l. 227, 229.
14. This figure is based on the first detailed TsPUE-N report on numbers of Ukrainian refugees, dated April 1946, discussed in Chapter 5 of this volume. However, since after the summer of 1945 relatively few Ukrainians were repatriated, it is reasonable to use this figure here.
15. For a description of the Soviet Repatriation Campaign see Chapter 2 of this volume, 'Soviet Wartime Solutions', Chapter 3, 'The Soviet Union and Refugees'.
16. See Chapter 2 of this volume, 'The First Hints of Difficulties'.
17. The others were Byelorussians, Moldovans and citizens of the Baltic states.
18. This hypothesis was proposed by Yaroslav Koshiw during a discussion in the PRO in 1990. For further discussion on this point see Chapter 4 of this volume, 'Great Power Politics'.
19. SHAEF Administrative Memorandum no. 36, *Displaced Persons and Refugees in Germany*, (Revised) 16 April 1945, reproduced in full in Proudfoot, pp. 445–75. For a full description of Western repatriation plans, see George Woodbridge, *UNRRA: The History of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration*, 3 vols. (New York, 1950), vol. II, pp. 482–4, Proudfoot, pp. 168, 207.
20. Maj. General R. W. Barker, Associate Chief of Staff, SHEAF and Lt. Gen. Golubev, Deputy Director, Soviet APRA, Meeting in Halle, Germany, 21–22 May 1945. In preparing for the meeting, the British FO instructed SHAEF that 'No undertaking in regard to repatriation of Poles to Eastern Europe should be given.' See Saving Telegram no. 87, from the FO to SHAEF, 15 May 1945, PRO FO 371/47899.
21. The text of this agreement is reproduced in full in Proudfoot, pp. 208–210.
22. Victor N. Zemskov, 'K voprosu o repatriatsii sovietskykh grazhdan 1944–1951 gody', *Istoriia SSSR*, vol. 4, 1991, p. 32.
23. Proudfoot, p. 207.
24. Proudfoot, p. 210.
25. Summary of current DP Operations, USFET Main S-12448 to 7th US Army, 14 July 1945, UNRRA Archives, PAG 4/4.0:3.
26. Secret cypher telegram from AGWAR to AFHQ, 14 July 1945, PRO FO 371/47902.
27. Foreign Office brief for the UK Delegation to the Conference at Potsdam, 8 July 1945, PRO FO 934/6.
28. Ibid.
29. Comment by Thomas Brimelow (using a parody of Soviet jargon) on 'Report on Poland's Ukrainian Minority', prepared by FO Research Department, PRO FO 371/47788.
30. SHAEF Administrative Memo no. 39 (Revised), 7(g): 'Ukrainian nationality is not recognised. Persons claiming it will be dealt with according to their status as Soviet citizens, citizens of other countries, or stateless persons', Proudfoot, p. 243.

31. Undated report by Miss Lerigo, Historian of the UNRRA Austrian Mission. UNRRA Archives, PAG 4/3.0.1.2.2:2.
32. The first treaty between Poland and the Soviet Union was signed 26 July 1944 in Moscow, between the USSR and the Polish Committee of National Liberation. On 9 September 1944 the Ukrainian SSR and the Polish Committee of National Liberation signed an agreement on population exchanges. On 6 July 1945 the USSR and the Provisional Government of National Unity of Poland signed an agreement concerning the transfer of Soviet and Polish citizenship and exchange of populations. On 16 August 1945 the USSR and the Polish People's Republic signed a treaty confirming the new Soviet–Polish border. Poland ratified this treaty on 31 December 1945. See Robert M. Slusser and Jan F. Triska, *A Calendar of Soviet Treaties, 1917–1957* (Stanford, Calif., 1959), pp. 162, 163, 182, 194.
33. Letter from Major Gen. Ratov to Gen. Sir A. Thorne, 10 July 1945, PRO FO 371/47902.
34. Letter from Steel to Warner, 3 August 1945, PRO FO 371/47903.
35. USFET Statement on Repatriation of Soviet Citizens, USFET MAIN S-16517, to USFA and 3rd US and 7th US Armies, 9 August 1945, 7(g): 'Ukrainian nationality is not recognised. Persons claiming it will be dealt with according to their status as Soviet citizens, citizens of other countries, or stateless persons.' Also BAOR Order, 'Repatriation of Soviet Citizens from the British Zone, BAOR/16032/B/MGB8/(a), 30 August 1945, F(1): 'Persons coming from territories acquired by the Soviet Union since 1 September 1939 will not be repatriated against their will', Proudfoot, pp. 215–16.
36. Comment by Biltorsfield, Northern Department, FO, 28 August 1945, PRO FO 371/51234.
37. Minute by Pumphrey, FO, 30 August 1945, PRO FO 371/51234.
38. In a message dated 5 October 1945, Christopher Warner of the FO advised the Secretary of State against informing Soviet officials of the 'disputed list', arguing,'... for if we reveal their presence, the Russians may clamour to visit and "screen" them, with the possible result of unfortunate consequences to the families of some of them', PRO FO 371/47902.
39. Letter from Brimelow to Firebrace, 23 July 1945, PRO FO 371/49700. On 2 August 1945 Mason had a meeting with Earl Harrison, the US representative to the IGCR, to discuss the problem of non-repatriable refugees, PRO WO 2307/1/48, *Documents on British Policy Overseas*, Series I, vol. I, pp. 1232–5.
40. Secret letter from the Political Office, British, SHAEF, 2 July 1945, PRO FO 371/47902.
41. Ibid. The Ukrainian Relief Committee repeatedly applied to both military and UNRRA authorities for permission to operate, but were continually refered back and forth, UNRRA Archives, PAG 4/1.3.1.4.1:15, 16.
42. Complaint by Lt. Col. Melnikov, 18 July 1945. PRO FO 371/47902; letter from K. V. Novikov, on the instructions of Molotov to Sir W. Strang, was circulated to the British, American and French Delegations at Potsdam, 25 July 1945, PRO FO 934/5/42(5).
43. CDPX letter to the Chief of Soviet Repatriation Representative, USFET, 8 September 1945, UNRRA Archives, PAG 4/3.0.11.0.0:5.
44. See Chapter 2 of this volume, 'The Decision to Use Force'.

45. See Mark R. Elliott, *Pawns of Yalta. Soviet Refugees and America's Role in Their Repatriation* (Urbana, Ill., 1982), pp. 96–7.
46. Confidential report of conversation by Lt. Gen. E. Burke, Commander 8 Corps District, to 21 Army Group, 24 August 1945, PRO FO 371/47902. In the report Burke does expresses some understanding of the motivations of non-returnees.
47. Letter from Capt. C. E. Jack to the HQ DP Section, 2nd ECA Regiment, which was circulated in UNRRA US Zone HQ Team Bulletin no. 27, 8 July 1945, UNRRA Archives, PAG 4/4.1:79.
48. Confidential Report on the General Situation of the DPs to the Director General of UNRRA, September 1946, UNRRA Archives, Germany Mission, PAG-4/3.0.11.3.0:9, reproduced in full in Yury Boshyk (ed.), *Ukraine During World War II. History and Its Aftermath* (Edmonton, 1986), pp. 224–32. See also Joseph A. Berger, 'DPs Are People Too', Unpublished manuscript (31 July 1946), cited by Yury Boshyk, in 'Repatriation and Resistance: Ukrainian Refugees and Displaced Persons in Occupied Germany and Austria, 1945–48', in Anna Bramwell (ed.). *Refugees in the Age of Total War* (London and Boston, 1988), fn. 21, original deposited in National Archives, Canada.
49. Olexa Woropay, *On the Road to the West: Diary of a Ukrainian Refugee* (London, 1982), p. 33; Elliot, pp. 90–1; Iurii L.[avrynenko], "Rodina' i 'skryning": Damokliv mech taboriv', in *S'ohochasne i mynule* (Munich, 1949), vol. 1–2, p. 65; Boshyk, 'Repatriation and Resistance', p. 200–201.
50. Extract of Minute from DPW to DDPW, signed E. C. Gepp, DPW, June 1945, 'the British soldier would not be used to push into trains 2,000 men who did not want to go back to their country and who might be "done in" when they got there', PRO WO 32/11119. See also Elliot, p. 111.
51. Report by John Galsworthy, 15 September 1945, PRO FO 371/47902.
52. Herbert H. Lehman, diary entry, 13 August 1945, personal diary 5 July–30 August, Columbia University, New York City, Herbert H. Lehman Papers, Lehman Papers and Suite.
53. Although by the end of the summer most Western nationals had been repatriated, recent evidence suggests that some were retained, stripped of their Western citizenships and suffered the same fate as many Soviet repatriates. Russian President Yeltsin raised this during his US visit in the spring of 1992, following a US Senate House report into the matter raised by Mark Sauter in the *Washington Times*.
54. Dwight D Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe* (London, 1948), p. 479.
55. Elliott, p. 92.
56. Tolstoy, *Victims of Yalta* (London, 1977), p. 347.
57. For details see Chapter 2 of this volume, 'Soviet Wartime Rulings'.
58. Top Secret Report on the Implementation of Directives . . . , GARF, f. R-9526, op. 1, d. 1118, l. 25–26; see also Elliott, p. 137; Tolstoy, *Victims*, ch. 16; Zemskov, 'K voprosu', p. 27.
59. APRA was also responsible for repatriating foreign nationals from Soviet controlled territories, although this appears to have been treated as very much a secondary mandate.
60. Elliott, p. 139.
61. Letter by Canadian Occupational Forces Officer in Germany, 23 August 1945, *Plight of Ukrainian DPs* (New York, 1946), pp. 22–3.

62. Proudfoot, p. 207.
63. Letter, 5 September 1945, *Plight of Ukrainian DPs*, pp. 23–4.
64. Letter by a Ukrainian journalist, written in Frankfurt-on-Main, *Plight of Ukrainian DPs*, p. 9.
65. Nikolai F. Brychev, *Domoi Na Rodinu!* (Moscow, 1945).
66. Elliott describes one such film aimed at Armenian refugees in *Victims*, p. 147.
67. Conversation between Ambassador Alexander Bogomolov and Donald A. Lowrie, 20 October 1944, PRO FO 371/47859; see also Elliott, p. 148.
68. Ibid.
69. Minute by John Galsworthy, 7 June 1945, PRO FO 371/47900.
70. Lehman, diary entry, 23 August 1945, Columbia University, Lehman Papers.
71. CDPX letter to the Chief of the Soviet Repatriation Representative at USFET, 8 September 1945, UNRRA Archives, PAG 4/3.0.11.0.0:5.
72. Confidential report no. L-813 on the Ukrainian Red Cross in Southern Germany, Office of Strategic Services, Mission for Germany, 21 September 1945. UNRRA Archives, PAG 4/3.0.11.1.6:11. See also secret letter from the Political Office British SHAEF, 2 July 1945, PRO FO 371/47901.
73. *Izvestiia*, summer 1945, quoted in the *New York Times*, 1 August 1945.
74. See A. I. Romanov, *Nights are Longest There: SMERSH From The Inside* (Boston, Mass., 1972), p. 171; Elliott, p. 140; Tolstoy, *Secret*, pp. 427–8.
75. Romanov, *Nights*, p. 127.
76. See Chapter 2 of this volume, 'Ukrainians in the German Armed Forces'.
77. Top Secret Record of Eighth Plenary Meeting, Potsdam, 24 July 1945, PRO U 6179/3628/70, in *Documents on British Policy Overseas*, Series I, vol. I, pp. 652–4.
78. See Chapter 2 of this volume for wartime resolutions and rulings.
79. Resolution no. 11086, signed by V. V. Chernyshov, 15 May 1945, cited by Zemskov in 'K voprosu', pp. 31–2.
80. Directive of the Verkhovnoe Glavkomandovanie (Supreme High Command) no. 11086, dated 11 May 1945, GARF, f. R-9526, op. 1, d. 1118, l. 29.
81. The resolution named seven such transit points to be set up in Vismar, Kravlets, Parkhim, Magdeburg, Dessay, Torgau and Risa. The remaining two were to be named later.
82. Zemskov, 'K voprosu', p. 33.
83. Summary of current DP Operations, USFET Main S-12448 to 7 US Army, 14 July 1945, UNRRA archives, PAG 4/4.0.:3.
84. Secret State Defence Committee, Resolution no. 9055S, Moscow, signed by J. Stalin, 16 June 1945. Top Secret Report on Implementation of Directives..., GARF, f. R-9526, op. 1, d. 1118, l. 22.
85. Letter from Vsevolod Nahaychuk, Vinnytsia oblast', Ukraine, 9 September 1992.
86. Letter from Mykola Zapliava, Dnipropetrovs'k, Ukraine, 14 September 1992.
87. Letter from V. Hnatiuk to General Golikov, 28 July 1945, GARF, f. R-9526, op. 1, d. 5, l. 71–3.
88. Report by Comrade Trenin, Soviet Repatriation Administration Representative, Sambir Border Camp, July 1945, GARF, f. R-9526, op. 1, d. 62, l. 261.
89. Interview with Nikolai Frolik, Moscow, May 1991.
90. Letter from Arsentii Fedorenko, Zhytomyr oblast', Ukraine, 9 September 1992.

91. State Defence Committee Secret Resolution no. 9871S, Moscow, signed by J. Stalin, 18 August 1945, classified document provided by Dr Victor Zemskov.
92. For previous rulings see Chapter 2 of this volume, 'Soviet Wartime Solutions'.
93. This decision was probably taken earlier, since NKVD archives include references to rulings with similar instructions dated earlier: for example, NKVD Directive no. 39 from 1945; GOKO Postanovlenie No. 9525s, dated 18 July 1945; and GOKO Postanovlenie no. 9702SS dated 1 August 1945, GARF, f. 9408, op. 1, d. 10, l. 50, 52, 53, 55.
94. The Resolution stipulated that this category of people (the traitors) were to be sent to the designated areas no later that 20 December 1945.
95. OPFL NKVD Directive no. 53/2165, dated 26 December 1944, GARF, f. 9408, op. 1, d. 10, l. 50.
96. For details see Chapter 6 of this volume, 'The Post-war Situation'.
97. Herbert Feis, *Between War and Peace. The Potsdam Conference* (Princeton, NJ, 1967), ch. 16; Robin Edmonds, 'Yalta and Potsdam: Forty Years Afterwards', *International Affairs*, vol. 62, 1986; John Wheeler-Bennett and A. J. Nicholls, *The Semblance of Peace: The Political Settlement after the Second World War* (New York, 1972).
98. Displaced Persons in Germany, Brief for the UK Delegation to the Conference at Potsdam, 8 July 1945, in *Documents on British Policy Overseas*, Series I, vol. I, p. 72.
99. Ibid.
100. *Document on British Policy Overseas*, Series I, vol. I, pp. 545–6. The Ukrainians being requested were members of the Diviziia Halychyna. For details, see Chapter 2 of this volume, 'Ukrainians in the German Armed Forces'. In attempting to explain why the British military authorities had not previously repatriated this group of men and kept them mobilized, albeit under guard, one historian has proposed that British military authorities located the Division in an area where conflict with Tito's partisans was most likely to occur. This hypothesis is presented by John Armstrong, in Roman Kolisnyk, *Viis'kova uprava ta Ukraiins'ka Diviziia Halychyna* (Toronto, 1990), p. 132. This hypothesis appears credible in view of the fact that the Division had experience in fighting Tito's partisans in Slovenia in early 1945 (see Yurkevych, 'Galician Ukrainians in German Military Formations...', in Boshyk (ed.), *Ukraine During World War II*, p. 80) and a cryptic comment by one FO official in the discussion over their future: 'there is no prospect of our being able to get rid of them when our need for their services is over' (see letter from Lambert to J. E. Drew, 13 May 1946, PRO FO 371/56791).
101. Message from Field Marshall Sir H. Alexander to Gen. F. Morgan giving details of the statement, urgently requesting information on the prisoners' surrender, their nationality and status, 22 July 1945, PRO FO 371/47902.
102. In recent years Britain has faced criticism on its handling of the Diviziia Halychyna. Certain groups have alleged that the British government knowingly protected Nazi collaborators. In 1988 a House of Commons Committee was set up to enquire into this issue, and produced the *Report on the Entry of Nazi War Criminals and Collaborators into the UK, 1945–50*. However,

from the available evidence it appears that the main reason why Britain ended up taking responsibility for this group was the direct result of Molotov personally asking in Potsdam for their return. Once Churchill learned that the people involved were not Soviet citizens he refused to repatriate them forcibly to the Soviet Union, since that would have contradicted British policy on handing over nationals from the newly acquired Soviet territories. After Churchill had personally made the decision, military officials were unable to hand them over quietly to the Soviet Repatriation authorities, as had been done with other controversial groups.

103. Record of the Eighth Plenary Meeting, Potsdam, 24 July 1945. PRO U 6179/3628/70, in *Documents on British Policy Overseas*, Series I, vol. I, pp. 653–4.
104. On 30 July 1945, Molotov proposed that Repatriation of Soviet citizens from the Baltic, Western Ukraine and Byelorussia be included in future business, PRO U 6197/3628/70, in *Documents on British Policy Overseas*, Series I, vol. I, p. 1031.
105. Top Secret Memorandum by the Soviet Delegation, 30 July 1945, in *Documents on British Policy Overseas*, Series I, vol. I, p. 1034.
106. See *Document of Germany, 1944–85*, United States Department of State, pp. 54–65. Also 31 July 1945 message from Dean to Warner, PRO FO 371/47903.
107. Comment on Thomas Brimelow's Minute, 8 September 1945, PRO FO 371/47902. For further developments see Chapter 4 of this volume, 'Impact of Ukrainians on General Policy'.
108. Aide memoire from Harrison to Steele, 26 July 1945, PRO FO 371/51234.
109. Minute by John Galsworthy, 12 July 1945, PRO FO 371/47901.
110. Proudfoot estimates that 20 000 Soviet nationals were handed over in these informal transfers before this procedure was stopped; see *European Refugees*, p. 207.
111. Folder entitled 'Examples of Russian Bad Faith', 8 August 1945, PRO FO 371/47964.
112. NKVD Directive No. 53/3769, dated 8 May 1945, GARF, f. 9408, op. 1, d. 10, l. 52.
113. Minute by John Galsworthy, 30 June 1945, PRO FO 371/47902.
114. Complaint by Field Marshall Alexander, 17 September 1945; support for taking a tough line by Christopher Warner to Major General C. S. Sugden, 19 September 1945, PRO FO 371/47902.
115. Simon J. Kal'ba, Paper presented at the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Seminar, 19 October 1981.
116. Ibid.
117. Letter dated 2 May 1945. Archival Collection of the Shevchenko Scientific Society (NTSh), New York City, Vasyl' Mudryi Collection.
118. Copies of their letters that have survived are on deposit in the archival repositories of the Ukrainian Free Academy of Sciences (UVAN) and NTSh, New York City.
119. For example, see Memorandum of the Information Service, organization of Ukrainians in Europe, 27 June 1945. UVAN Archives, Augsburg Camp Collection; and letter from Vasyl' Mudryi to UNRRA Central Office, summer 1945, UNRRA Archives, PAG 4/3.0.11.1.6:11; report entitled 'Ukrain-

ians in Emigration after 1945', NTSh Archives, New York City, Mudryi Collection.

120. Short History of the Ukrainian Central Relief Committee in Germany, BAR, Vetukhiv Collection.
121. OPUE – Oblasne Predstavnytstvo Ukraiins'koi Emihratsii – the Regional Representation of the Ukrainian Emigration.
122. Report on the Relations with Occupation Authorities, Yakiv Makovets'kyi, Secretary of the Bavarian Regional Ukrainian Committee OPUE, p. 1, NTSh, New York City, TsPUEN Collection. Ukrainian refugees usually refered to Soviet authorities as 'bolsheviks'.
123. Ibid.
124. Interview with Lubov Drashevs'ka, New York City, summer 1989.
125. Report of trip by Oleksa Lytvynenko, 25 June 1945, 13 July 1945, UVAN Archives, TsPUEN Collection.
126. Letter from Mykhailo Vetukhiv to Vasyl' Mudryi, 3 August 1945, BAR, Vetukhiv Collection, Box 31.
127. One such example is the 8 May 1945 letter to Gen. Eisenhower from the Weimar Ukrainian Help Committee, UVAN Archives, TsPUEN Collection.
128. Letter from 1st Lt. Ralph J. Skogen to the Military Government in Alsfeld, 27 June 1945, BAR, Vetukhiv Collection, Box 36.
129. Memo by US Lt. Col. J. Pospisil, Deputy Military Government Officer, Detachment F1D3, Regensburg, outlining SHEAF position on displaced persons, underlining the fact that according to the definition these were people 'desirous to return home', and that forcible evacuation of Allied nationals who do not express a desire to return home is contrary to SHAEF policies, 31 May 1945, UVAN Archives, TsPUEN Collection. Another helpful official was Captain Macdonald, DP Division, Munich.
130. Letter from 1st Lt. Suzanne Chalfour to US Army Commanding General 102 Artillery, 31 July 1945, UNRRA Archives, PAG 4/3.0.11.0.0:6.
131. For this reason the American zone in Germany had the largest population of Ukrainians by July 1945.
132. This cooperation dissipated in later months; see Chapters 5 and 6 of this volume.
133. Report on Camp Lyssenko in Hannover, by UNRRA camp Director R. G. Morgan, June 1947, UNRRA Archives, PAG 4/4.1:84.
134. Letter from Tymish Mel'nyk, Hartford, Conn., USA, 25 November 1989.
135. Report of the Cultural-Education Branch of OPUE, 1 May 1947, UVAN Archives, TsPUEN Collection.
136. Ostap Tarnavs'kyi, *Brat Bratovi* (Brothers' Helping Hand. History of UUARC) (Philadelphia, 1971), p. 62.
137. Michael M. Marunchak, *The Ukrainian Canadians: A History* (Winnipeg, 1991), vol. 2, pp. 262–6. The Canadian Ukrainians had to overcome reservations within the Department of External Affairs regarding possible negative repercussions from the Polish and Soviet governments as a result of their authorizing such activities. See Bohdan S. Kordan and Lubomyr Y. Luciuk (eds), *A Delicate and Difficult Question: Documents in the History of Ukrainians in Canada 1899–1962* (Kingston, Ont., 1986), pp. 131–3.
138. Letter from Bohdan Panchuk to Walter Gallan, proposing this idea, 10 June 1945, UNRRA Archives PAG 4/1.3.1.4.1.

139. For a further discussion of the creation of CURB and their activities, see Chapter 4 of this volume, 'Ukrainian Voluntary Agencies'.
140. Report of the Ukrainian Relief Committee for Refugees in Italy, NTSh, New York City, Mudryi Collection.
141. See 'The Soviet Repatriation Campaign Abroad', above.
142. For a further discussion see Chapters 4, 5 and 6 of this volume.
143. They formed three units: the Ukrainian Bohun Division (820 men); the Ukrainian Shevchenko Division (546 men); and the Ukrainian Partisan Division. See unpublished monograph, 'Informatsiia pro ukraiints'iv u Frantsii', Shevchenko Scientific Society, Sarcelles, France.
144. Ibid.
145. Interview with Mykola Lebed', New Jersey, USA, summer 1989.
146. A rare public account in Britain of such an experience was a journalistic report on the story of Zigmas Kudirka, a Lithuanian recruited by an MI6 agent who turned out to be a KGB double agent; see Tom Bower, 'Back From the Dead', in *The Independent Magazine*, 22 September 1990, pp. 32–4; see also Kim Philby, *My Silent War* (London, 1968; reprint 1989).
147. See 'Preparations for Returnees' above, also Chapters 2 and 5 of this volume.

Chapter 4 The Uneasy Peace: Inadequate Solutions

1. See pp. 98ff below.
2. Ibid.
3. In the summer of 1945 food rations ranged from 2300 to 2600 calories per day. In the British zone this was reduced in March 1946 to 2170 calories per day, later to 1850, and by July 1946 to 1550. In US zones the daily rations did not fall below 2000 calories, but in Austria, by March 1947 the daily rations had dropped to 1200 – 1500 calories: based on UNRRA ERO Report, June 1947, cited by Malcolm Proudfoot, *European Refugees*, pp. 251–3; George Woodbridge, *UNRRA*, vol. III, p. 503.
4. Report by UNRRA Deputy Director US Zone, on military attitudes towards the DPs, 25 May 1946, UNRRA Archives, PAG-4/4.2.2:79.
5. Report by P. Nielsen, UNRRA Eligibility Officer, based on comments of USFET representative, May 1947, UNRRA Archives, PAG-4/4.2.2:80.
6. In the surviving records of the Ukrainian refugee committees, accurate record-keeping starts in 1946. See Chapter 5 of this volume, 'A Clearer Picture of the Group Emerges'. UNRRA records for 1945 include reference to 13 772 Ukrainians in Austria: Austria Mission Semi-Monthly Statistical Reports, 31 December 1945, UNRRA Archives, PAG 4/3.0.1.02; 10 701 Ukrainians are reported by UNRRA in Germany in 15 October 1945, UNRRA Central Headquarters for Germany, Displaced Persons Semi-Monthly Report no. 1, National Archives, Washington DC, RG 59, 800.4016 DP/10–1545, as cited by Ihor Stebel'skyi in 'Ukrainians in the Displaced Persons Camps of Austria and Germany', *Ukraiins'kyi Istoryk*, vol. XXIII; 1986, p. 57; 11 000 Ukrainians were reported in Italy: see SHAEF DP Report no. 37, p. 14, UNRRA Archives, PAG-4/2.0.6.2; 15 982 Ukrainians in Czechoslovakia, see SHAEF DP Report no. 35, Appendix B, p. 2, UNRRA Archives, PAG-4/2.0.6.2.:15, and 7 in the Netherlands, see SHAEF DP Report no. 39, p. 17, UNRRA Archives, PAG-4/2.0.6.2:15.

7. Ihor Stebelsky, 'Ukrainians in the Displaced Persons Camps of Austria and Germany After World War II,' in *Ukrains'kyi Istoryk*, vol. XXIII, p. 44, 1986.
8. This made them liable to forcible repatriation.
9. See Chapter 2 of this volume, 'Causes of Displacement'.
10. Earlier Ukrainian emigrations include the followers of Hetman Mazepa, who fled abroad after his unsuccessful attempt to break away from Russia in 1708–9; nineteenth-century intellectuals who came into conflict with the Russian imperial authorities; and individuals involved in the 1917–21 attempts to establish an independent state, who formed the bulk of the interwar Ukrainian refugees. See Orest Subtelny, 'Ukrainian Political Refugees: An Historical Overview', in Wsevolod W.Isajiw, Yury Boshyk and Roman Senkus (eds), *The Refugee Experience. Ukrainian Displaced Persons after World War II* (Edmonton, 1992), pp. 14–15.
11. For a discussion of conflict within the Ukrainian refugee community, see Chapter 5 of this volume, 'A Clearer Picture of the Group Emerges', and Chapter 6, 'Increasing Tensions'.
12. Father Bohdan Hanushevskyi, First Leader of the Ukrainian Relief Committee in Regensburg, 'Nad Synim Dunaiem. Ukraiins'ka Politychna Emihratsiia u Regensburzi i Regensburz'kii Oblasti v 1944–1949 rr', in Omelian Kushnir (ed.), *Regensburg. Articles and Documents on the History of Ukrainian Emigration in Germany After World War II*, p. 43.
13. Conferences of regional committees were held in the Regensburg area on 31 August–1 September; see Bohdan Hanushevs'kyi, 'Ukraiins'ka Politychna Emigratsiia', in *Regensburg*, p. 43; in Munich on 9 September, see Report of Mykola Bihun, Organisational Representative of the Ukrainian Committee in Munich, p. 10, in 'Reports', UVAN Archives, TsPUEN Collection.
14. For biographical details of Vasyl' Mudryi, see *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, (vol. III Toronto/Buffalo/London), p. 475. A second candidate, Col. Dmytro Doluda from Eastern Ukraine, was also initially proposed, but he withdrew his candidacy after being persuaded that he lacked the necessary political skills.
15. See 'Protokol Pershoho Ziizdu Ukraiinskkoi Emihratsii Zakhidnoi Nimechchyny' (Proceedings of the First Conference of the Ukrainian Emigration in West Germany), pp. 1–2, UVAN Archives, TsPUEN Collection.
16. Letter from Marjorie Bradford, Chief of Voluntary Agencies Division, to Mr Alpert, 21 August 1946, UNRRA Archives, PAG-4/3.0.11.0.1.0:1.
17. See 'Protokol Pershoho Ziizdu', pp. 1–2, UVAN Archives, TsPUEN Collection. The name TsPUE was changed to TsPUEN (the N for Nimechchyna–the Ukrainian word for 'Germany' at the second conference in 1946.
18. For biographical details of M. Vetukhiv, see *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, vol. V (Toronto/Buffalo/New York), p. 595.
19. As mentioned earlier, the Ukrainian refugees divided into Easterners and Westerners, and community leaders felt it important to include a representative from both groups in the leading positions of the new committee. For details, see 'Protokol Pershoho Ziizdu . . .', pp. 2 and 15.
20. 'Statut Ukraiins'koho Tsentral'noho Dopomohovoho Komitetu – Tsentral'noho Predstavnytstva Ukraiins'koi Emigratsii' (Statute of the Central Ukrainian Relief Committee – Central Representation of Ukrainian Emigration), Aschaffenburg, 1945, p. 1, NTSh Archives, New York City, Mudryi Collection.

21. Ibid.
22. Vasyl' Mudryi, 'Ukraiintsi na Emihratsii Po 1945 Rotsi', p. 2, NTSh Archives, New York City, Vasyl' Mudryi Collection.
23. Hanushevskyi, *Regensburg*, pp. 36–7; Il'nyts'kyi, "Politychna Kharakterystyka...", p. 17.
24. In July 1945 a Ukrainian committee was formed in Kaufbeuren, under the leadership of Mr Fedyshyn. On the request of the Soviet Repatriation official Col. Yevdokhimov, he was arrested by the US military authorities and transferred to Soviet control. For other such examples, see O. Zelens'kyi (ed.), *Na Hromads'ki Nyvi* (Munich, 1972), p. 9; Vasyl' Mudryi, 'Ukraiins'ka emihratsiia v Evropi', *Iuvileinyi kalendar Al'manakh Ukrans'koho Narodnoho Soiuzu na 1949 rik* (Jersey City, 1949), p. 107.
25. Hanushevsky, *Regensburg*, p. 54.
26. See Minute by Thomas Brimelow, 30 January 1946, PRO FO 371/56791; Hanushevs'kyi, *Regensburg*, p. 53; *Ukraiins'kyi Tekhnichno-Hospodars'kyi Instytut (Podebrady, Regensburg, Munkhen, 1932–1952)* vol. 2, (New York, 1962), p. 70. For details on December 1945 orders, see this chapter 'Deliberations on a Considerable Embarrassment'.
27. The main proponents of this view were members of the Bandera faction of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN-b), who attempted to assert control over the Ukrainian refugee population. For details, see Chapter 5 of this volume, 'A Clearer Picture of the Group Emerges', and Chapter 6, 'Increasing Tensions'.
28. Letter from Military Government HQ, DP Section, to Director, UNRRA DP Camp, Bauleiting, Villach, 'Any activities implying a so called central committee for Ukrainian DPs in Steiermark and Karnten together with registration of such persons, the use of rubber stamps and travel between camps on behalf of such a committee are expressedly and categorically forbidden', 21 March 1946, UNRRA Archives, PAG-4/3.0.1.3.2:1.
29. For details, see Chapter 6 of this volume, 'Recognition of Ukrainians'.
30. Vasyl' Mudryi, 'Ukraiintsi na Emihratsii po 1945 rotsi', p. 3, NTSh Archives, New York City, Vasyl' Mudryi Collection.
31. Ibid., p. 15.
32. Ukrainian scholars came from all parts of Ukraine and included former professors of universities and other institutions of higher learning in Soviet Ukraine, members of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences in Kiev, professors from the Ukrainian Free University in Prague, professors from the Ukrainian Technical and Husbandry Institute in Podebrady, members of the Shevchenko Scientific Society in L'viv, and members of other Ukrainian research institutions and learned societies in Prague, Berlin, Warsaw and other cities. See Lubomyr R. Wynar, 'Ukrainian Scholarship in Exile: The DP Period, 1945–1952', Centre for the Study of Ethnic Publications and Cultural Institution, Kent State University, Offprint Series no. 3, p. 50; also Volodymyr Kubiiovych, 'Suchasni problemy ukrains'koi nauky', *Siohochasne in mynule*, no. 1, 1948, p. 8.
33. *Ukrains'kyi Tekhnichno-Hospodarsi'i Institut*, vol. 2, pp. 55–6.
34. When emigration to South America became a possibility there was an increased demand for Spanish language and agricultural courses, Volodymyr Maruniak, *Ukraiins'ka Emihratsia v Nimechchyni ta Avstrii*, 1983, pre-publication manuscript, pp. 161–3.

35. See Appendix 3 on page 183.
36. Initiators of the idea include Petro Kurinnyi, Volodymry Miakovs'kyi, L. Bilets'kyi, Lev Chykalenko and others, *Biuleten' Ukraiins'koi Vil'noi Akademii Nauk*, no. 1, 1946, pp. 5–7.
37. V. Pliushch, 'Korotkui narys istorii Ukraiins'koi Vil'noi Akademii Nauk u Nimechchyni', *Ukraiins'ki Naukovi Visti*, no. 1–2, 1970–71, pp. 21–2.
38. ERO Order on Educational Activities in the Displaced Persons Operations, January 1947, cited by Woodbridge, vol. 3, pp. 402–3.
39. Ibid.
40. 'Khronika', *MUR* Zbirnyk 1, 1946, p. 98. This was the date of the meeting of the initiative committee, which called a congress on 21–23 September 1945 to elect an executive.
41. 'Dekliaratsia Ob'iednannia Ukraiins'kykh Pys'mennykiv ta Mysttsiv', UVAN Archives, MUR Collection.
42. Report submitted by Major E. Nelson Exton, Zone Protection Officer, 10 April 1946, 'Members of the Team and also Army officers do from time to time attend concerts and plays given by DPs for good will purposes', UNRRA Archives, PAG-4/3.0.11.2.0.1:2.
43. Vasyl' Mudryi, *Ukraiins'ka Emihratsia*, pp. 113–14.
44. Interview with Leonid Lyman, one of these writers, New York City, August 1989. The story is reported in *Regensburg*, p. 44, and referred to by Danylo Husar Struk, 'Organisational Aspects of DP Literary Activity', in *The Refugee Experience*, p. 226.
45. Roman Il'nyts'kyi, 'Kharakterystyka DP Presy', Unpublished paper presented at 'The DP Experience. Ukrainian Refugees After World War II', conference in Toronto, 1983, p. 5; September 1989 interview with Roman Il'nyts'kyi, New York City. For a complete listing, see Yury Boshyk and Wlodzimierz Kiebalo (comps), *Publications by Ukrainian 'Displaced Persons and Political Refugees: The John Luczkiw Collection, Thomas Fisher Rare Books Library, University of Toronto* (Edmonton, 1988).
46. 'Iuvileinyi pozacherhovyi dodatok do "Nashoho Zhyttia" ', pp. 4–5. The 'Mrs Carpenter' referred to was the UNRRA Camp Welfare Officer, who forwarded the request to the Augsburg Military DP Headquarters office, where Capt. Thomas Fleming approved the publication 'subject to censorship and to be free of propaganda', 18 October 1945 letter, from Editorial Board of *Nashe Zhyttia* to Military Government in Augsburg requesting permission for publication; forwarded with note 20 October 1945 by J. Carpenter, UNRRA Welfare Officer and (unintelligible signature) Camp Commander; undated approval by Capt. Thomas Fleming at bottom of page, UVAN Archives, TsPUE-N Collection.
47. The Ukrainian press in Augsburg was reported as being problematic: Report, Field Operations, prepared by R. Collins, September 1947, UNRRA Archives, PAG-4/4.2.2:79.
48. Iakiv Makovets'kyi, Zvit Heneral'noho Sekretaria OPUE v Miunkheni, p. 6, UVAN Archives, TsPUEN Collection: Mudryi, 'Ukraiintsi na Emihratsii...', p. 11. At times the Legal Aid Committee had to come to the defence of Ukrainians accused of black market activities. See 'Zvit z Diial'nosty Oblasnoho Hromads'koho Sudu pry OPUE v Miunkheni za chas vid kintsia lypnia 1945 to 30 kvitnia 1947', UVAN Archives, TsPUEN Collection.

49. In May 1946 CIC investigated the Ukrainian committee in Munich; see Iakiv Makovets'kyi, 'Zvit Heneral'noho Sekretaria OPUE v Miunkheni', p. 7. UVAN Archives, TsPUEN Collection.
50. Volodymyr Maruniak, *Ukraiins'ka Emihratsia v Nimechchyni*, p. 155.
51. Ibid.
52. See Orest Subtelny (ed.), *Istoriia Plastu* (Toronto, forthcoming).
53. Vasyl' Mudryi, 'Ukraiintsi na Emihratsii . . . ', p. 9.
54. *Regensburg*, p. 44.
55. Ibid., pp. 50–2.
56. From 1 November 1945 to 31 October 1946 the Welfare Committee in Munich was divided into five sections: Transportation; Heating Fuels; Mechanical Workshop; Maintenance; Warehouse: See Ivan Ianovych, 'Zvit Referenta Suspil'noi Opeky v Miunkheni', p. 1, UVAN Archives, TsPUEN Collection.
57. *Regensburg*, pp. 50–1.
58. This aspect of their activities became more important in later months, as the voluntary agencies were granted permits to operate, and the amount of aid getting through to Ukrainians increased. A discussion of this follows in Chapter 5. See also Vasyl' Mudryi, 'Ukraiintsi na Emihratsii . . . ', p. 9.
59. For details, see Chapter 5 of this volume, 'A Clearer Picture of the Group Emerges', and Chapter 6, 'Increasing Tensions'; and Appendix 4 on page 185.
60. For details, see Myroslav Yurkevych, 'Ukrainian Nationalists and DP Politics', in *The Refugee Experience*, pp. 130–2.
61. In some sources it is recorded that every emigrant of voting age was expected to contribute in this way; see Mudryi, 'Ukraiintsi na Emihratsii . . . ', p. 10, while other sources state that only the employed sector of the electorate was liable to pay this community charge.
62. Vasyl' Mudryi, *Ukraiins'ka Emihratsia*, pp. 113–14 and 121.
63. Iakiv Makovets'kyi, 'Zvit Heneral'noho Sekretaria OPUE v Miunkheni', p. 5, UVAN Archives, TsPUEN Collection. For a further discussion, see Chapter 5 of this volume, 'The Concern for Welfare'.
64. See Chapter 3 of this volume, 'The Ukrainian Diaspora Rallies'.
65. For details, see Ostap Tarnavsky, *Brat Bratovi*, pp. 62, 71, 75; Bohdan Panchuk, *Heroes*, pp. 72–3; Undated report, 'Organisation in the United States', UVAN Archives, UUARC Collection.
66. See Lubomyr Y. Luciuk, 'A Troubled Venture: Ukrainian–Canadian Refugee Relief Efforts, 1945–51', in *The Refugee Experience*, p. 436.
67. For a history of the divisions within the Ukrainian community in Canada, see Marunchak, *The Ukrainian Canadians*, vol. II, pp. 232–8; for the history of efforts to unite Ukrainian American relief efforts, see Tarnavsky, pp. 7–23 and 59–71; and for details of tensions among the various agencies see Chapter 6 of this volume, 'Increasing Tensions'.
68. For details on the creation of CURB, see Chapter 3 of this volume, 'The Ukrainian Diaspora Rallies'.
69. The Ukrainian Canadian Servicemen's Association was organized by Bohdan Panchuk in 1943. For details see *Heroes*, pp. 53–61.
70. Although formed in the autumn on 1945, CURB did not officially register until 31 December 1945. For details see *Heroes*, pp. 73–4; Bohdan Panchuk, 'Memoirs', in *The Refugee Experience*, pp. 498–503.

71. Ukrainian Relief Committee in Belgium, The Ukrainian Relief Committee for Refugees in Italy, The Ukrainian Catholic Aid Committee in Paris, Ukrainian Social Welfare Committee of France, The Ukrainian Central Relief Association in Austria, and the Ukrainian Relief Committee in Geneva.
72. *Heroes*, p. 82. Mr Panchuk here refers to the summer months and noted that the figures he cited are estimates: 'But I think pretty close to the truth'.
73. Bohdan Panchuk, 'Memoirs', in *The Refugee Experience*, p. 499.
74. Feeling the need to assist them, he wrote to a Ukrainian American newspaper appealing for them to take action, 20 September 1945 letter from Harry Polche to the editor of *The Ukrainian Weekly*, reprinted in *Plight of Ukrainian DPs*, (New York, 1946), pp. 16–18.
75. 'Arrived safe and sound via Brussels where I spent a half day, then on to Hamburg – where I remain for a period, how long I do not know. I am still with the same unit working out of Hamburg. Spent a day at Kiel, and while there got in touch with our DP Detachment and visited the Ukrainian camp', 20 August 1945 letter to Bohdan Panchuk, reprinted in *Plight of Ukrainian DPs*, pp. 25–6.
76. Criticisms of Sgt Luckyj were expressed by Soviet officials even before the end of the war. For example, see folder N 4051/G, Treatment of Soviet Nationals in the UK, 4 April 1945, PRO FO 371/47897.
77. Panchuk, Memoirs in *The Refugee Experience*, p. 500.
78. The situation of the interned Ukrainians was brought to Panchuk's attention by Mykola Hrab, the head of the Ukrainian Relief Committee in Belgium. In an interview years later Panchuk admitted that he had no right to use his position in that way, but 'That was how we commonly had to operate . . . We cared and so we worked', *Heroes*, p. 74.
79. Stanley Frolick, unpublished transcript from a round-table discussion at the conference entitled, 'The DP Experience', University of Toronto, p. 5.
80. Tarnavsky, p. 82.
81. One of the leading members of UUARC was on the Board of Directors of the Publishing Branch of CARE, ibid., p. 72.
82. Undated report, 'Organisation in the United States', p. 19, UVAN Archives, UUARC Collection.
83. For copies of these appeals, see UVAN Archives, TsPUEN Collection; NTSh Archives, New York City, Mudryi Collection.
84. Text of cablegram of petition by twenty-five members of the Canadian Parliament to Prime Minister Mackenzie King, to help relieve the plight of Ukrainian displaced persons threatened with forced repatriation by the Soviets, 21 October 1945, in *Plight of Ukrainian DPs*, pp. 30–1.
85. Ukrainian Canadian Committee (UCC), headquarters in Winnipeg, and United Congress Committee of America (UCCA), headquarters in Washington DC.
86. For details, see Chapter 5 of this volume, 'Difficulties with Repatriating Ukrainians'.
87. Stanley W. Frolick, 'Memoirs', in *The Refugee Experience*, pp. 492–3; see also 'The Need for New Definitions' in this chapter.
88. Ivan Bahriannyi, *Why I Do Not Want To Return to the USSR* (Winnipeg, 1946).
89. Martin Davidson, *New York Herald Tribune*, 21 September 1946.

90. Report of the Acting High Commissioner of Canada to the United Kingdom noted that the UCC and its representatives in Europe had decidedly changed British policy towards Ukrainian DPs in the British Zone, 9 August 1946, Public Archives of Canada, Canadian Department of External Affairs Records, DEA 8296–40C, cited by Luciuk, 'A Troubled Venture...', footnote 30.
91. Combined CDPX, USFET Restricted Report no. 43, 30 September 1945, UNRRA Archives, PAG-4/3.0.11.0.0:5.
92. Command of Lt. Gen. Truscott, HQ, Eastern Mil. District, 26 October 1945, UNRRA Archives, PAG-4/3.0.11.0.1.1:5.
93. For example, see cypher telegram no. 234 from Mr Mack, Diplomatic Representative in Austria, reporting on the presence of 1 353 Ukrainians, 13 December 1945, PRO FO 371/47910.
94. See 'The Need for New Solutions' in this chapter.
95. USFET Memo GEC 383.7 (General), on Determination and Reporting of Nationalities, 16 November 1945, UNRRA Archives, PAG-4/3.0.11.0.0:6.
96. Ibid. In this memo Balts were described as a regional group.
97. 'See Great Power Politics' in this chapter.
98. See Elliott, p. 115.
99. Instructions from Displaced Persons Officer, Major Infantry Frank Di Ciacommo, US Army HQ, to the Information Centres in Linz, Kirchdorf, Volkabruck, Brauhau, Scharding, Greiskirchen, Gimmden, Ried, Sreyer and Weld, 19 December 1945, UVAN Archives, TsPUEN Collection.
100. The Ukrains'kyi Oblasnyi Dopomohovyi Komitet in Regensburg was disbanded by the order of the regional military government, four weeks after the visit of Soviet Repatriation Officer Lt. Col. Fomenko, 14 December 1945, *Regensburg*, p. 53.
101. This meant Russian, Polish, Czech or Romanian.
102. Instructions issued by HQ 30 Corps District, 29 December 1945, PRO FO 371/56791.
103. Letter from Rhys Davies to Chancellor of Duchy, 20 January 1946, PRO FO 371/56791.
104. Letter from Bevin to Rhys Davies, 23 January 1946, PRO FO 371/56791.
105. Minute by Pumphrey, 22 January 1946, PRO FO 371/56791.
106. Confidential letter from Norman Robertson, Undersecretary of State for External Affairs, to G. Pifher, Director of Voluntary and Auxiliary Services, Department of National Services, 15 November 1944, cited in Bohdan S. Kordan and Lubomyr Y. Luciuk (eds), *A Delicate and Difficult Question: Documents in the History of Ukrainians in Canada, 1899–1962*. (Kingston, Ont. 1986), p. 132. In the letter Robertson advises Pifher that authorizing Canadian Ukrainians to represent the interests of refugees might be misconstrued by the Polish and Soviet governments.
107. Letter from Parkinson, Home Office Aliens Department to CURB (date not given in source), PRO FO 371/56791.
108. Ibid.
109. See the letter from John Addis, Secretary to the Prime Minister, to FO, 30 January 1946, 'In the circumstances I think it is better that the letter from CURB to the PM should be left without a reply', PRO FO 371/56791; letter from Pumphrey, FO to the British Embassy in Brazil, 12 February 1946,

instructing them that if they wished to respond to a telegram from a Ukrainian colony in Brazil to do so in noncommittal terms, PRO FO 371/56791.

110. A protest against forcible repatriation by Ukrainians at the camp in Regensburg delivered to the FO by MP Noel Baker was dismissed with the comment, 'The senders must be very silly to hope that weight will be attached to an unsigned document of this nature'; Minute by Thomas Brimelow, 12 November 1945, PRO FO 371/47908.
111. Letter from John Addis, 10 Downing Street, to Mr Giles, FO, 8 January 1946, PRO FO 371/56791.
112. Letter from Henderson to Addis, 29 January 1946, PRO FO 371/56791.
113. In time UNRRA increasingly began to represent the interests of the displaced people in its charge. A Confidential Report on the General Situation and Living Conditions of Displaced Persons and UNRRA, prepared by the Executive Staff of UNRRA US HQ in 1946 stated, 'It therefore remains for UNRRA, who has lived in close human touch with these unfortunate people for many months, to take the initiative in their behalf', UNRRA Archives, PAG-4/3.0.11.3.0:9.
114. Letter from Warren G. Fuller, Director, Team 56, Neumarkt, to Regional Director, Mr Matthews, suggested, '... why not correspond with this group (CURB) since they offer to provide services desperately needed', 21 December 1945, UNRRA Archives, PAG-4/3.0.11.0.1.1:5.
115. Report by P. Nielsen, UNRRA Eligibility Officer, May 1947, UNRRA Archives, PAG 4/4.2:80.
116. Letter from Warren G. Fuller, Director, Team 56, Neumarkt, to Regional Director, Mr Matthews, regarding cooperation with CURB, 21 December 1945; response to Mr Fuller, Team Director, Team 56, Neumarkt, informing him that 'we have found out that on an official basis are not able to authorise you to continue your contact with the above mentioned agency (CURB)... Unofficially we would propose that you go on with your contacts. We hope, however, that it will be possible for us to legalise the contact as soon as possible', 25 February 1946, UNRRA Archives, PAG 4/3.0.11.0.1.1:5.
117. Notes on a conversation with Mr Vasyl' Mudryi on the Ukrainian Central Committee by Paul Anderson, 7 November 1945, UNRRA Archives, PAG 4/3.0.11.0.1.6:11.
118. See 'The Situation in Autumn 1945' in this chapter.
119. Letter from Marjorie Bradford to Miss Pollak, 17 January 1946, UNRRA Archives, PAG 4/3.0.11.0.1.6:11.
120. Letter from Marjorie Bradford to Sir Michael Creagh, 21 November 1945, UNRRA Archives, PAG 4/3.0.11.0.1.6:11.
121. Ibid.
122. Letter from G. K. Rechman, Assistant Director, Relief Services Division, to UNRRA Central Headquarters, 25 February 1946, UNRRA Archives, PAG 4/3.0.11.0.1.6:11.
123. Dmytro I. Tromsa, 'Ukraiins'kyi Hromads'kyi Komitet v m. Regensbursi', in *Regensburg*, p. 77.
124. History of the Ukrainian Camp at Ellwangen District I, by W. V. Buckhantz, Director, Assembly Centre, March 1947, UNRRA Archives, PAG 4/4.2:80.

125. Report prepared by Miss L. Pillow, eligibility Officer District 2, 2 May 1947, UNRRA Archives, PAG 4/4.2:80.
126. Letter from US Zone Director to Deputy Director, German Operations, CHQ 'Report of Screening of Ukrainian DPs', August 1946, UNRRA Archives, PAG 4/4.2:79.
127. Margaret McNeill, *By The Rivers of Babylon. A Story of Relief Work Among the Displaced Persons of Europe* (London, 1950), p. 53.
128. Ibid., p. 60.
129. Ibid., p. 61.
130. Letter from Krane to Lt. Gen. Sir Frederick Morgan, including five documents regarding Mr Strehlinger, Deputy Director UNRRA Team 515, 20 March 1946, UNRRA Archives, PAG-4/3.0.11.0.1.1:5.
131. Memo from Harold S. Smith, District Eligibility Officer, Repatriation & Eligibility Division, to Ralph B. Price, UNRRA HQ Heidelberg, regarding Informational Report on the Background of 'Ukrainian' Groups, Appendix C, report by Pawel Sawicki, Area Team 1049, 10 February 1947, UNRRA Archives, PAG 4/4.0:4.
132. 10 October 1946, Report and Recommendations on UNRRA Programme for DPs in Germany, from R. Radin, Chief of Consultative Branch, Welfare & Repatriation Division, to Miss S. Gifford, Director, Welfare & Repatriating Division, UNRRA Archives, PAG 4/4.2:19.
133. Report by Ralph Price, Chief of Zonal Repatriation Headquarters, May 1947, UNRRA Archives, PAG-4/4/2.2:80.
134. Letter from Alexander Bedo, to UNRRA Vienna HQ, Chief of Eligibility and Repatriation Division, 17 January 1947, UNRRA Archives,PAG-4/4.2:24.
135. For example, see letter from P. E. Brown, Deputy Chief of Operations to Major Gen. Evelyn Fanshawe, Director, UNRRA British Zone, Lemgo, 5 August 1946, UNRRA Archives, PAG-4/3.0.11.0.1.1:5; full report of evidence presented in court in response to allegations of Marshall Sokolovsky, 2 July 1946; letter from P. E. Brown, Deputy Chief UNRRA Operations, to Whiting US Zone Director, relaying allegations, 5 August 1946; letter, Whiting to Brown, reporting on investigation, 14 August 1946, UNRRA Archives, PAG-4/3.0.11.0.1.1:5.
136. In an attachment to the July 1946 draft letter from Sir Sholto Douglas, Commander-in-Chief of the British Army on the Rhine, to Marshall Sokolovsky, Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Forces in Germany, 'There was a UKRAINIAN Red Cross which was suppressed by order of Military Government', UNRRA Archives, PAG-4/3.0.11.0.1.1:5.
137. Michael Balfour, 'Germany', in *Four Power Control in Germany and Austria*, Survey of International Affairs 1939–1946 (London: 1956), p. 117.
138. For a discussion of allied relations during this period, see Anne Deighton, *The Impossible Peace. Britain, the Division of Germany and the Origins of the Cold War* (New York, 1990); Patricia Dawson Ward, *The Threat of Peace: James F. Byrnes and the Council of Foreign Ministers, 1945–1946* (Kent, 1979).
139. For discussion of this issue at Potsdam see Chapter 3 of this volume, 'Repatriation Raised at Potsdam'.
140. Undated Circular no. 26, United Kingdom Delegation to the Council of Foreign Ministers, PRO FO 371/47906.

141. Undated, unsigned confidential FO Brief for United Kingdom Delegation to the Council of Foreign Minister, circulated before 12 September 1945, in *Documents on British Policy Overseas*, Series I, vol. II, pp. 141–3.
142. November 1945 minute by Pumphrey, PRO FO 371/47902.
143. Draft Brief for Mr Bevin on the repatriation of persons normally resident east of the present Soviet–Polish frontier, 11 December 1945, in *Documents on British Policy Overseas*, Series I, vol. 1, p. 683.
144. Memorandum circulated by the United States' delegation at the Seventh Meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, 21 December 1945, in *Documents on British Policy Overseas*, Series I, vol. I, p. 816.
145. 21 December 1945, British Record of the Seventh (Informal) Meeting of the Three Foreign Secretaries held at the Spiridonevka Palace, Moscow, PRO U 1374/20/70, in *Documents on British Policy Overseas*, Series I, vol. II, pp. 805–16.
146. See Memorandum by the Soviet Delegation to the Council of Foreign Ministers, 13 September 1945, in *Documents on British Policy Overseas*, pp. 146–7; Record of Third Meeting of Council of Foreign Ministers, 14 September 1945; Record of Nineteenth Meeting, 24 September 1945; Record of Twentieth Meeting, 25 September 1945; Memorandum circulated by the Soviet Delegation at the Twelfth Meeting, 25 December 1945; British Record of the Thirteenth (Informal) Meeting of the Three Foreign Secretaries, 26 December 1945, in *Documents on British Policy Overseas*, Series I, vol. II.
147. For one such example, see the discussion between Mr Bevin and Mr Molotov recorded by Sir A. Clark Kerr, 23 September 1945 in *Documents on British Policy Overseas*, Series I, vol. II, p. 318.
148. Ibid.
149. For details on the personal relationships between Attlee, Bevin, Truman and Byrnes, see Robert Murphy, *Diplomat Among Warriors* (London, 1964), pp. 326–44; McNeill, *America, Britain and Russia*, pp. 755–7; Alan Bullock, *Ernest Bevin: Foreign Secretary, 1945–1951* (London, 1983); Trevor Burridge, *Clement Attlee* (London, 1986); Walter Isdacson and Thomas Evan, *The Wise Men: Six Friends and the World They Made* (London, 1986); Ivone Kirkpatrick, *The Inner Circle* (London, 1959).
150. British Record of the Thirteenth (Informal) Meeting of the Three Foreign Secretaries held at the Spiridonevka palace, Moscow, 26 December 1945, PRO U 1374/20/70, in *Documents on British Policy Overseas*, pp. 886–94.
151. Folder N 74/G, on Repatriation of Soviet Nationals, 2 January 1946, PRO FO 371/56710.
152. Minute on cover of folder on Situation in Ukrainian-inhabited districts of Poland, 17 January 1946, PRO FO 371/56410.
153. Minute on folder on Expulsion of Ukrainians from Polish Territory, 14 September 1945, PRO FO 371/47607.
154. By October 1945 concerns about the effectiveness of UNRRA in dealing with the DP problem discussed, see 11 October 1945 private and confidential letter from Sir G. Rendel to Sir W. Strang, PRO WR 2581/1/48, cited in *Documents on British Policy Overseas*, Series I, vol. VI, pp. 205–7. In December 1945 discussions regarding speeding up the work of the IGCR were occurring within the FO. See the Folder on Non-repatriable DPs, notably Poles, 12

December 1945–22 January 1946, PRO WR 3682/4/48; WR 99/99/48; FO 945/689, cited in *Documents on British Policy Overseas*, Series I, vol. VI, pp. 456–7.

155. Minute by Mackillop, 'I think of capital importance is that the refugee problem *is* definitively now agreed to be one of international concern', 20 February 1946, PRO FO 371/56710.
156. Letter by Thomas Brimelow, circulated to numerous departments, 15 December 1945, PRO FO 371/56710.
157. Letter by Thomas Brimelow, circulated to numerous departments, commented, 'So far as I am aware, no approach has been made to the Treasury regarding financial provision for the maintenance of non-repatriables in the areas under British control and I think it most unlikely that the Treasury will welcome any suggestion that they should accept responsibility', 15 December 1945, PRO FO 371/56710.
158. Letter from the Secretariat of State of His Holiness to Sir Francis D'Arcy Godolphin Osborne, British Legation to the Holy See, reporting that Bishop Buchko has spoken to the Pope on behalf of Ukrainian DPs in Germany, 19 December 1945; letter from Osborne to Bevin, 20 December 1945, PRO FO 371/56710.
159. Letter from Rhys Davies, MP, to the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, forwarding a letter from CURB and protesting against forcible repatriation of Ukrainians, 29 December 1945, PRO FO 371/56710.
160. Great Britain, House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 1945, vol. 417, no. 56, p. 1055; for other enquiries about refugees in Europe see pp. 411, 782, 923; also 1946, vol. 418, no. 65, pp. 31, 686 and 1531.
161. Ibid., 1946, vol. 419, 19 February 1946, 20 February 1946; vol. 420, 4 March 1946, 5 March 1946, 13 March 1946, and 19 March 1946.
162. Letter from Stephen J. Thorne, Central Society of the Religious Society of Friends, London, to Atlee, protesting against forcible repatriation, 8 March 1946; comment by Thomas Brimelow: 'I think our answer should be ___ and frank. The teams run by the Society of Friends know too much for us to conceal our policy from them'; letter from Addis referring matter to FO, 15 March 1946; response by Hankey, PRO FO 371/56710.
163. Minute by Hankey, 21 June 1946; letter Crawford to Brimelow, 12 July 1946, PRO FO 371/56710.
164. The issue was raised at the San Francisco Conference in May 1945 but no action was taken at the time.
165. For a discussion of these reports, see 'Changes on the Ground' in this chapter.
166. See Chapter 3 in this volume, 'The Grand Alliance'.
167. Marrus, *The Unwanted*, p. 340.
168. Stoessinger, p. 62.
169. See Letter from L. Malaria, Member of Canadian Delegation to the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations to the Canadian Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 22 December 1945, reporting on a conversation between the head of the Canadian delegation, S. Knowles, and Soviet delegate, M. Manuilsky, of 15 December 1945 on the issue of refugees and Ukrainian Canadian activities in Kordan and Luciuk, *A Delicate and Difficult*, doc. 43.

170. E. F. Penrose, 'Negotiating on Refugees and Displaced Persons, 1946' in Raymond Dennett and Joseph E Johnson (eds), *Negotiating with the Russians* (New York, 1951), p. 140.
171. For example, on 22 December 1945 President Truman made a statement suggesting that US immigration laws be changed to facilitate refugee entry, stating, 'I consider that common decency and the fundamental comradeship of all human beings require us to do what lies within our power to see that our established immigration quotas are used in order to reduce human suffering', see *Documents on American Foreign Relations*. vol. III, July 1945–December 1946 (Norwood, Mass., 1948), pp. 407–8.
172. For details on the confrontation, see Stoessinger, pp. 60–76.
173. For the text of the resolution see UN Document A/15, 15 February 1946, cited in Stoessinger, p. 214; see also Definition of Refugees, Section A of Refugees and Displaced Persons within the Meaning of the Resolution Adopted by the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations on 12 February 1946, cited in *Documents on American Foreign Relations*, vol. VIII, p. 403.
174. Ibid.
175. Ibid.
176. Ibid.
177. For details, see Chapter 5 of this volume, 'The Creation of a New International Refugee Organization'.
178. For details, see Chapter 4 of this volume, 'Lobbying'.
179. For example, see the complaint by Mykola Bazhan, Ukrainian delegate to the UN to the Social and Economic Council, that UNRRA was harbouring Ukrainian war criminals, citing the camp at Augsburg as one example, PRO FO 371/56791; 13 February 1946, *Pravda*, article criticizing the Western powers for betraying UN principles and harbouring war criminals.
180. For a comprehensive listing of all Memoranda and Statements, see *Report by Robert H. Jackson, United States Representative to the International Conference on Military Trials* (London, 1945).
181. For example, the 12 February 1946 UN Resolution on refugees included a paragraph which stated, 'No action taken as a result of this resolution shall be of such a character as to interfere in any way with the surrender and punishment of war criminals, quislings and traitors in conformity with present or future international arrangements or agreements'.
182. Minute by Thomas Brimelow, 13 March 1946, PRO FO 371/56791.
183. The Clarke–McNarney Directive, 1 (c). This was later adopted by Britain and France. See also Chapter 4 of this volume, 'Changes on the Ground'.
184. Letter from Frank Savory to W. D. Allen, FO, 13 March 1946, PRO FO 371/56791.
185. For a history of the Ukrainian Central Committee, see Kost' Pan'kivs'kyi, *Roky Nimets'koi Okupatsii* (New York, 1983); Volodymyr Kubiiovych, *Ukrainstsi v Heneralnii hubernii, 1939–1941: istoriia Ukrainskoho tsentraloho komitetu* (Chicago, 1975); Myroslav Yurkevych, 'Galician Ukrainians in German Military Formations and in the German Administration', in Yury Boshyk (ed.), *Ukraine During World War II*, pp. 67–88.
186. International Military Tribunal, *Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal* (Nuremburg, 1947–9), vol. 27, pp. 298–324.

187. Proudfoot, p. 237. For details on locations, see table 14 in Proudfoot, pp. 238–9.
188. This became known as the Clarke–McNarney Directive, named after the officers who drafted it. For details see Elliot, p. 111. A similar policy was later introduced in British zones, see Tolstoy, *Secret*, p. 353.
189. Letter from Thomas Brimelow to Hammer, 6 December 1945, PRO FO 371/47910.
190. For a detailed discussion on the processes that led to this decision see Elliot, pp. 110–11.
191. Minute by Thomas Brimelow, 24 May 1946, PRO FO 371/56715.
192. For details, see Elliot, p. 115.
193. For descriptions of the last operations of forcible repatriation, see Julius Epstein, *Operation Keelhaul* (Old Greenwich, Conn., 1973); Elliott, pp. 116–18.
194. See Chapter 2 of this volume, 'The Creation of UNRRA'.
195. In the US Zone of Germany the registration was completed by November, but later in other zones; see Proudfoot, p. 241.
196. Some reports from this screening listed Ukrainians. See 'Repatriation and the Ukrainian Identity Issue' in this chapter.
197. Report by Harold A. Jambor, UNRRA Field Supervisor, 1 June 1947, UNRRA Archives, PAG 4/4.2:84.
198. For details of new agreements, see Proudfoot, p. 230; Woodbridge, vol. III, pp. 185–6. For preparations for winter, see Restricted Combined DP Executive CDPX, USFET, DP Report no. 43, report on camp conditions by Sir George Reid, former Director of the Welfare Division of UNRRA, ERO, 30 September 1945. UNRRA Archives, PAG-4/3.0.11.0.0:5.
199. Letter from Morgan to Gale, regarding Eastern European refugees infiltrating into Germany, 14 December 1945, UNRRA Archives, PAG-4/3.0.11.0.0:5.
200. Letter from Dr Alexander Bedo, Chief of Repatriation & Resettlement Services, to Lt. Gen. Morgan, 2 January 1946, UNRRA Archives, PAG 4/3.0.11.0.0:6.
201. Proudfoot, p. 256.
202. Ibid., pp. 294–6.
203. See Chapter 1 of this volume, 'Historical Background of International Refugee Protection'.
204. See Chapter 3 of this volume, 'Repatriation and the Use of Force'.

Chapter 5 Changes and the Search for New Solutions

1. Such as stated in the Atlantic Charter, the Charter of the United Nations, and US President Truman's statement on the four freedoms.
2. At the end of hostilities, a quarter of Germany's population was made up of refugees. For details, see Michael Marrus, *The Unwanted* (Oxford, 1985) p. 305.
3. For details, see John H. Backer, *Priming the German Economy, American Occupational Policies, 1945–1948* (Durham, NC, 1971); Richard M. Freeland, *The Truman Doctrine and the Origins of McCarthyism* (New York, 1985); Robert M. Hathaway, *Ambiguous Partnership: Britain and America, 1944–1947* (New

York, 1981); Melvyn P. Lefler, 'American Conception of National Security and the Beginnings of the Cold War', *American Historical Review*, vol. 89, 1984; Geir Lundestad, *American Non-Policy Towards Eastern Europe 1943–1947* (Tromso, 1978); William Hardy McNeill. *America, Britain and Russia. Their Cooperation and Conflict, 1941–1946*, Survey of International Affairs 1939–1946 (London, 1953).

4. Paraphrase of a restricted Cable received by USFET from the US War Department, 15 March 1946, UNRRA Archives, PAG-4/3.0.11.0.1.4:1; see also Marrus, *The Unwanted*, pp. 321–2.
5. See United Nations General Assembly, Official Records, First Part of the First Session; Second Part of the First Session, 1946; Plenary Meetings.
6. See Marrus, *The Unwanted*, p. 341.
7. UN Documentary Records, General Assembly, Second Session.
8. Holborn, p. 62.
9. For the further developments see Chapter 6 of this volume, 'The United Nations, Refugees and Resettlement'.
10. See Chapter 4 of this volume, 'The Need for New Definitions'.
11. This committee was established on 16 February 1946 by the Economic and Social Council of the UN, chaired by Hector McNeil of the UK and composed of twenty members, including seven from the Eastern bloc, four from countries hosting refugees, and seven from countries of potential resettlement. For a full list see United Nations, ECOSOC, Official Records, First Year, cited by Holborn. p. 34.
12. By this time it was clear that neither the IGCR nor UNRRA were capable of fulfilling this role.
13. See Chapter 4 of this volume, 'The Need for new Definitions'.
14. Special Supplement, United Nations, ECOSOC, Official Records, First Year, Second Session, 7 June 1946, Doc. E/REF/75.
15. There were also eighteen abstentions. See UN Documentary Records, General Assembly, *General Record*, First Year, Second Part, Second Session.
16. Letter from C. E. Heathcote-Smith, British Refugee Defence Committee to Altmeyer, 4 June 1947, IRO Archives, AJ 43/393.
17. UN General Assembly, Third Committee, Summary Record, Second Part, First Session, p. 92.
18. For a full list of the Budget and Contributions for the First Financial Year, Annex II of the Constitution.
19. IRO Constitution, Article 18, 1(b).
20. The Soviet Union was scheduled to contribute 4.69 per cent of the IRO's operational budget, the Ukrainian SSR 0.062 per cent, and the Byelorussian SSR 0.16 per cent. See IRO Constitution, Annex II.
21. This consisted of 14.75 per cent of the total proposed budget. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. Initially the US agreed to contribute 45.75 per cent of the budget, but because some signatories failed to honour their commitments, the US eventually paid close to 60 per cent of the costs. See also Holborn, pp. 103, 122; Stoessinger, pp. 92–3.
24. On 1 March 1947 the US Congress voted 63 to 13 to approve the US contribution to the IRO, United States Senate Resolution no. 77, 1 March 1947.
25. Holborn, p. 54.

26. Ibid., pp. 54–5.
27. The French Ministry of Labour conducted negotiations to this end with both UNRRA and IGCR. For an example, see a report on such negotiations, 25 February 1947, PRO FO 371/66657.
28. See FO folder on 'Recruitment of DPs for work in France', 1 March 1947, PRO FO 371/66657.
29. For details of this scheme, see J. Isaac, *British Post War Migration* (Cambridge, 1954); Diana Kay and Robert Miles, *Refugees or Migrant Workers? European Voluntary Workers in Britain 1946–1951* (London and New York, 1992); J. A. Tannahill, *European Voluntary Workers in Britain* (Manchester, 1958).
30. News Release, UNRRA Office of Public Information, British Zone, 11 March 1947, UNRRA Archives, PAG 4/4.2:81.
31. 17 January 1947, PRO CAB 47(9). Similar schemes were introduced by the Brazilian, Canadian and Norwegian governments.
32. Comment by A. W. H. Wilkinson, FO, 24 January 1947, PRO FO 371/66709.
33. For example, see Memorandum no. 193 to the Senior Liaison Officer with the Allied Missions in the British Zone, Brigadier Kartew, from Major General Konovalov, Head of the Mission of the Soviet Commander in Chief to the British Occupational Forces in Germany, and Colonel Brukhanov, Deputy Head, regarding the recruitment of Soviet citizens for labour in Britain, while restricting access for Soviet repatriation officers into DP camps, 21 April 1947, UNRRA Archives, PAG 4/4.0:4.
34. Letter from Col. Logan Gray, Director PoW and DP Division to UNRRA Zonal HQ, 26 September 1946, UNRRA Archives, PAG 4/3.0.1.0.2.2:3.
35. Ibid.
36. See Chapter 2 of this volume, 'Causes of Displacement', and Chapter 3, 'The Grand Alliance'.
37. For details see Chapter 3, 'The Grand Alliance'.
38. Minute by Thomas Brimelow, 8 December 1945, PRO FO 371/47053.
39. For example, see comment by Brimelow, 'I assume that there is also no probability of large numbers of Ukrainians being admitted to Canada', 4 November 1946, PRO FO 371/56793.
40. Britain had refused to repatriate this division in the summer of 1945. For details see Chapter 3 of this volume, 'The Grand Alliance'. However, because Italy was not a member of UNO it could not be made to respect the Yalta agreement on forcible repatriation of *only* Soviet citizens, and therefore could be pressured by the Soviet government into repatriating the Division. For a discussion of this situation see, folder N 6619, Disposal of Ukrainians in Italy, discussion of this matter between the Northern Department of the FO, Refugee Department, Western Department, CCG (BE), and WO, 22 May 1946, PRO FO 371/56791.
41. See Petition (undated) from Division in Rimini, discussion, folder N 14109, Franklin to Lambert, 4 December 1946, PRO FO 371/56793.
42. Article 45 of the Peace Treaty obliged the Italian government to hand over on demand any Allied subjects accused by their governments of being war criminals, irrespective of whether prima-face evidence was available.
43. There were also Baltic and Polish groups in a similar predicament.
44. Memorandum from Christopher Mayhew to Secretary of State Bevin, 26 February 1947, PRO FO 371/66710.

45. Minute by C. J. Edmonds, 31 March 1947. For preceding discussions see entire folder WR 1260, Transfer of Ukrainians from Italy to the United Kingdom, 9 April 1947, PRO FO 371/66710.
46. Letter from Hector McNeil, Refugee Dept, to Prime Minister, 1 April 1947; Attlee responds, 'I agree', 4 April 1947, PRO FO 371/56791.
47. For example see *New York Times*, 2 February 1946, 10 February 1946; *Christian Science Monitor*, 10 February 1946; New York Times, 6 March 1946.
48. See Great Britain, House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), vol. 419, 11 February 1946, 19 February 1946, 20 February 1946; vol. 420, 4 March 1946, 5 March 1946, 13 March 1946, 19 March 1946.
49. In the spring of 1946 UNRRA intended to finish its operations in Europe by the end of the year.
50. See Mark Elliott, *Pawns of Yalta* (Urbana, Ill., 1982), pp. 115–21.
51. Repatriation in the US Zone, report prepared by Miss Warner, UNRRA Archives, PAG 4/3.0.1.2.2:2.
52. For a description of one such raid, see 'The History of Camp Spittal'., UNRRA Archives, PAG-4/4.1:25.
53. General Situation of DP, US Military and German Authorities, 1946 report prepared by the Executive Staff of UNRRA US HQ, UNRRA Archives, PAG-4/3.0.11.3.0:6.
54. On 17 June 1947 such a raid was conducted by US military authorities at the Ukrainian camp at Hersfeld. See I. P. Dubrovs'kyi, 'Khochemo odnoho – buty vil'nymy!', *Ukraiins'ka zemlia*, vol. 13, 1986, p. 19.
55. Holborn, p. 37.
56. Proudfoot, p. 284.
57. Letter from Crawford to Brimelow, 12 July 1946, PRO FO 371/56717.
58. UNRRA Administrative Order no. 52. The original document is located in the UNRRA Archives, PAG-4/3.0.11.0.0:5. It is widely cited by scholars, including Proudfoot, pp. 243–7, Woodbridge, vol. II, p. 509.
59. Ibid.
60. Letter from Professor T. Grumbergs, Archbishop of the Latvian ex-Lutheran Church to General McNarney, 18 September 1946 (text in English), UNRRA Archives, PAG-4/4.1:80.
61. Proudfoot, p. 256.
62. UNRRA Executive Committee Resolution no. R-13, 1 October 1946. For details, see Stoessinger, pp. 52 and 68–71.
63. The Ukrainian SSR became a member of the United Nations on 24 October 1945. The UNRRA Ukraine Mission was set up in Washington in January 1946, and began operations on 29 March 1946. The Mission had two chiefs, Marshall Macduffie and Paul F. White. Over a period of sixteen months, $189 000 000-worth of goods were transferred to Ukraine by UNRRA. For details, see UNRRA Archives, PAG-4/3.0.22.0; 22-page History of UNRRA Mission to the Ukraine, prepared by Maurice Saiger, Chief of Finance and Administration, Columbia University, Lehman Papers and Suite, Marshall Macduffie Papers, file 39–42.
64. See Chapter 4 of this volume, 'Great Power Politics'.
65. See Map on page 8.
66. See Chapter 4 of this volume, 'Attitudes Towards Ukrainians'.

67. UNRRA's Repatriation Division had issued Administrative Orders 177 and 199 on the segregation of nationalities, but since at the time nationality and citizenship were considered to be synonymous, these orders often did not result in the segregation of Ukrainians into separate camps.
68. Letter from Manfred Simon, Chief Legal Adviser to Chief of Department of Field Operations, proposing the Segregation of So-called Ukrainians, 19 September 1946; letter by Myer Cohen, Acting Chief of Operations, 26 September 1946, UNRRA Archives, PAG-4/3.0.11.0.0:6.
69. UNRRA Austrian Mission Central Headquarters, Administrative Order no. 241, Vienna, 1 November 1946, Subject: Statement on repatriability to Poland of individuals of Ukrainian nationality and Volksdeutsch, signed by Parminter and W. Wolski, General Plenipotentiary of the Polish Government for Repatriation. UNRRA Archives, PAG-4/3.0.11.0.0:6.
70. Unclassified Cable dated 6 November 1946 signed Cyrus Greenslade, Brigadier, ACOG, Background information on Individuals of Ukrainian Nationality, sent to all 3 zones, UNRRA Archives, PAG-4/3.0.11.0.0:6.
71. Letter from Louis C. Stephens to Miss Radin, Chief of Repatriation and Care Division, regarding Repatriation of Polish Ukrainians, 2 May 1947, UNRRA Archives, PAG-4/3.0.11.0.0:6.
72. Report from Ivan Hasslocher, Chief, Reports & Analysis Division to Martini re: situation of Ukrainians in three zones, 9 December 1946, UNRRA Archives, PAG-4/3.0.11.0.1.0:1. For details, see Chapter 5 of this volume, 'A Clearer Picture'.
73. Letter from R. W. Dawson, Assistant Director Field Operations for Zone Director to UNRRA HQ Arsolen, regarding Segregation – Ukrainians, 13 January 1947, UNRRA Archives, PAG-4/3.0.11.0.1.0:1.
74. Letter from Roland Berger, Welfare and Repatriation Division, to UNRRA CHQ, Arsolen, regarding Statement on Ukrainians, 8 January 1947, UNRRA Archives, PAG-4/3.0.11.0.1.0:1.
75. Undated, Statistical Report, by S. K. Jacobs, UNRRA Archives, PAG-4/4.1:78.
76. Ibid.
77. See Weekly Bulletin, 19 May 1947, Distribution C, Index # 76:

    1. PW/DP Division Technical Instruction No 19, issued 2 May 1947 regarding Ukrainians provides that:
        a) The word 'Ukrainian' will *Not* be used to describe the nationality of a person on any official documents
        b) The word 'Ukrainian' may be used to describe in general all persons coming from the geographical area of Ukraine.
        c) If it is desirable to refer either to former inhabitants of the Ukraine by nationalities or to nationalities by their geographical relationship, the expressions Soviet (Ukrainian), Polish (Ukrainian), Roumanian (Ukrainian) or Czech (Ukrainian) may be used. For persons formerly living in the Ukraine but whose nationality has not yet been established, the expression 'Undetermined' Ukrainian may be used until such time as they are classified as being of a definite nationality.
    2. As a result of this instruction Ukrainian (by nationality) will, in future, be shown on all statistical publications issued by UNRRA Zone and Area HQ." UNRRA Archives, PAG-4/3.0.11.2.0.1:53.

78. Population Breakdown, UNRRA Administered DP centres, US Zone, Germany, 10 April 1946, UNRRA Archives, PAG 4/3.0.11.3.0:9.
79. Letter from E. A. Reich to Morgan, 7 August 1946, which reports that, 'Thus far, about 1,500 (mostly Ukrainians) have been registered in the Hannover region only, and it is expected that it will be six months before all the undetermined nationality persons are registered', UNRRA Archives, PAG-4/3.0.11.0.1.4:2.
80. See Chapter 4 of this volume, 'Attitudes Towards Ukrainians'.
81. Commenting on the repeated requests by Volodymyr Korostovetz of CURB, J. L. Henderson of the Refugee Department of the FO wrote, 'Monsieur Korostovetz has alas become a minor plague of my existence. I will await a phone call from Captain Frolack', Minute, folder WR 1425, 25 May 1946, PRO FO 371/57828; see also Minute by Miller, 'The Ukrainians certainly seem to dispose of a great deal of paper, judging by the sheaves which reach this office almost daily', 10 October 1946; letter by H. Hynd, MP for Central Hackney to C. Mayhew suggests that although many of the requests touch on 'high politics', issues such as education and welfare could surely be addressed, 29 October 1946, PRO FO 371/56793; confidential letter from P. Tiarks, Voluntary Societies Liaison Unit to Marjorie Bradford, 'We have been having a certain amount of trouble with one Dr. Gallan of the United Ukrainian American Relief Committee . . . I give a summary of the interview for your warning and information in case he turns up by a back door', 28 November 1946. UNRRA Archives, PAG-4/4.1:80.
82. See Chapter 4 of this volume, 'Attitudes Towards Ukrainians'.
83. Minute by Thomas Pumphrey, 30 January 1946, PRO FO 371/56791.
84. See Minutes by Brimelow, Miller, folder N13485, 22 October 1946, PRO FO 371/56793.
85. Letter from Thomas Brimelow, FO, to Miss Croscer, Control Office for Germany and Austria, 12 March 1946, PRO FO 371/56791.
86. Letter from Sir Waldron Smithers, MP to Alexander Cadogan, FO, requesting interview on behalf of CURB representatives Frolack and Andriewsky, 12 February 1946; response by O. G. Sargent, saying that no interview would be granted, 27 February 1946, PRO FO 371/56791.
87. Minute by Pumphrey, 30 January 1946, PRO FO 371/56791.
88. Letter from Sir Orme Sargent, FO to Waldron Smithers, MP, 18 March 1946, PRO FO 371/56791.
89. Letter from Lambert to Crawford Control Office for Germany and Austria, Norfolk House, 10 April 1946, copy to Young, King and Hammer (WO), PRO FO 371/56791.
90. Ibid.
91. Letter from Military Government HQ, DP Section, to Director, UNRRA DP Camp, Bauleiting, Villach, 21 March 1946, UNRRA Archives, PAG-4/3.0.1.3.2:1.
92. Memorandum from Crawford to Brimelow, 9 November 1946, saying that the Control Commission is prepared to set up a Ukrainian Welfare Advisory Committee in the British Zone, PRO FO 371/56793.
93. In a 12 March 1947 Memorandum prepared by Herbert Emerson on refugees in Italy, he reported that at least a third were Ukrainian Poles, IRO Archive, AJ 43/1038.

94. Letter by R. W. P. Dawson for the Zone Director, 8 April 1947, UNRRA Archives, PAG-4/3.0.11.2.0.1:19.
95. April 1947 instruction PWDW/58390/I/A stating that a meeting of representatives from Ukrainian camps in the region was called for Thursday 8 May 1947, at Somerset House, Kiel, UNRRA Archives, PAG-4/3.0.11.2.0.1:11.
96. Letter from Cecil King Main HQ CCG (BE) Lubbecke to Ivor Pink, Advanced HQ, Berlin, 16 April 1946, PRO FO 371/56791.
97. Undated letter from Hilary Young, Advance HQ CCG (BE) Berlin to Thomas Brimelow, FO, PRO FO 371/56791.
98. Germany Mission Legal Adviser Jay Krane's comments on Whiting's letter, 3 April 1946, UNRRA Archives, PAG 4/3.0.11.0.0:7.
99. Ibid.
100. Letter from Morgan to Director of US Zone, Passing, 9 April 1946, on Reporting Policy Regarding 'Stateless' persons and displaced 'Ukrainians', UNRRA Archives, PAG-4/3.0.11.0.0:6
101. Germany Mission Legal Adviser Jay Krane's comments on Whiting's letter, 3 April 1946, UNRRA Archives, PAG 4/3.0.11.0.0:7.
102. Memorandum from Morgan on Implementation of Resolution no.92, 14 May 1946, UNRRA Archives, PAG-4/4.1:5.
103. Letter from R. S. Crawford, General Department, Control Office for Germany and Austria, to Office of Deputy Military Governor, Allied HQ, Berlin, 27 May 1946, PRO FO 371/56792.
104. Ibid.
105. Ibid.
106. *Stars and Stripes*, article by Richard S. Clark, 15 May 1946, reporting that UNRRA and the military authorities were in complete agreement over this issue.
107. Letter from Lambert to J. E. Drew, 13 May 1946, PRO FO 371/56791.
108. For details, see Harold Troper, 'The Canadian Government and DP's, 1945–1948', in *The Refugee Experience*, p. 385–401; Canadian Institute of Public Opinion, Public Opinion News Service Release, 30 October 1946; Gerald E. Dirks, *Canada's Refugee Policy: Indifference or Opportunism?* (Montreal, 1977); Irving Abella and Harold Troper, *None Is Too Many: Canada and the Jews of Europe, 1933–1948* (Toronto, 1988).
109. Cable from Military Permit Office London to Control Office for Germany and Austria, 24 September 1946, 'High Commissioner for Canada has been requested by Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada to obtain a permit for Mr. Anthony Hlynka Member of Parliament for Vegreville Alberta to visit Germany and Austria. Mr. Hlynka of Ukrainian origin represents constituency which contains large percentage of Ukrainians', PRO FO 371/56793.
110. Letter from John Holmes, Canadian High Commissioner to Brimelow, 13 September 1946, reporting on communication to Ottawa concerning Ukrainians in Germany, PRO FO 371/56793.
111. Hankey to A. B. Bartlett, Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, 28 September 1946, PRO FO 371/56793.
112. See report by Alexander Bedo, Chairman of the Screening Board, UNRRA Mission to Austria, to Col. C. S. Miller, Deputy Chief of Mission, 28 January 1947, UNRRA Archives, PAG-4/4.2:24.

113. For example, see undated report by Dorothy M. Marshall, Eligibility & Care Officer, British Zone, UNRRA Archives, PAG-4/4.2:81.
114. Discussion on this issue, between the British Secretary of State and General Morgan, 29 March 1946, comment by Morgan, PRO FO 371/56791.
115. A. Vyshyns'kyi's address to the Third Committee of the UN General Assembly, 6 November 1946.
116. Stephan Bandera continued to be hounded by Soviet authorities and was assassinated by a Soviet agent in Munich in 1957.
117. Letter from P. E. Brown, Deputy Chief of Operations, to Maj. Gen. Evelyn Fanshawe, Director, UNRRA British Zone, 5 August 1946, UNRRA Archives, PAG-4/3.0.11.0.1.4:1.
118. Report by Whiting, Director US Zone to P. E. Brown, Deputy Chief of Operations, 14 August 1946, UNRRA Archives, PAG-4/3.0.11.0.1.4:1. For details of Ukrainian political activities, see Chapter 5 of this volume, 'Political Activities', and Chapter 6, 'Increasing Tensions'.
119. Comment of Maj. Gen. Evelyn Fanshawe, UNRRA Director, British Zone, in 20 August 1946 letter from P. E. Brown, Deputy Director of UNRRA Operations, to Gale, ERO, reporting on the findings of an investigation of Soviet complaints, UNRRA Archives, PAG-4/3.0.11.0.1.4:1.
120. Minute by Hankey, 21 June 1946, letter Crawford to Brimelow, 12 July 1946. PRO FO 371/56710.
121. Records were kept before spring 1946, however no detailed statistics on the entire group are among the various documents available from earlier months.
122. Statystychnyi Oblik Ukraiins'koi Emigratsii (Okhoplenykh), Stan na 1 kvitnia 1946 roku, NTSh Archives, New York City, Vasyl' Mudryi Collection. For details see Table 5.2 on page.
123. Vasyl' Mudryi, 'Ukraiintsi na Emigratsii', pp. 4–5, NTSh Archive, New York City, Mudryi Collection. Unfortunately, the report is only dated '1946', and as such it is impossible to ascertain when exactly these statistics were compiled. This report was first published in 1949 in an article by Vasyl' Mudryi, 'Ukrains'ka emigratsiia v Evropi', in *Jubilee Calendar-Almanakh of the Ukrainian National Association* (Jersey City, 1949), and is most commonly cited by all researchers to date.
124. Cypher Telegram no. 46, 2 February 1946, from Office of the Political Adviser to the Commander-in-Chief Germany to FO, citing a letter from CURB, PRO FO 371/57828.
125. Memorandum by Ian L. Henderson, FO Refugee Division, 15 April 1946, on Ukrainian DPs, based on interview with Reverend Kushnir.
126. Zvit Dr-a Volodymyra Galana z poiizdky v Avstrii v tsili vidvidyn taboriv zameshkanykh ukraiins'koiu emigratsieiu ta bil'shykh skupchen' ukraiins'kykh emigrantiv, meshkaiuchykh pryvatno v Avstrii, UVAN Archives, TsPUE-N Collection.
127. Letter from E. A. Reich to Morgan, 7 August 1946, 1500 Ukrainian reported registered in the Hannover region, UNRRA Archives, PAG-4/3.0.11.0.1.4:2.
128. Report from Ivan Hasslocher, Chief, Reports & Analysis Division to Martini, 9 December 1946, regarding situation of Ukrainians in three zones:

    A. French zone:Estimated number of Ukrainians between 7 and 8 per cent of the total Polish population, 1350–1540 persons.

B. English Zone:Considered likely that 88 per cent of the undetermined may be Ukrainian, 23 851–20 990. Proportion of Ukrainians among classified Poled considered high.
C. US Zone:Polish Ukrainians, 51 155; Russian Ukrainians, 2398; undetermined Ukrainians, 13 021; total as of Nov 30, 66 574.
UNRRA Archives, PAG-4/3.0.11.0.1.0:1.

129. UNRRA Central Committee, Seventh (Final) Report on Displaced Persons Operations under Resolution 92, 31 May 1947. UNRRA Archives, PAG-4/3.0.1.02.0.
130. See Vasyl' Mudryi, 'Nova Ukraiins'ka Emigratsiia', in L. Myshuha and A. Dragan (eds), *Ukrainians in the Free World* (Jersey City, 1954), p. 117.
131. See H. B. Murphy (ed.), *Flight and Resettlement* (Paris, 1955), p. 174.
132. UVAN Archives, TsPUE-N Collection; NTSh Archives, New York City, Mudryi Collection.
133. See Ihor V. Zielyk, 'The DP Camp as a Social System', in *The Refugee Experience*, pp. 461–70, and Wsevolod W. Isajiw, 'Community, Class, and Social Mobility as Dynamic Factors', in ibid., pp. 471–9.
134. For example, see Vasyl' Sofroniv Levyts'kyi, *Respublika za drotamy. DP Camp Republic. Notes of a Displaced Person* (Toronto, 1983).
135. Memorandum to Headquarters of USFET, Political Adviser, on Forcible Transfer of Ukrainians to Soviet Camps, 21 February 1946, BAR, Vetukhiv Collection.
136. Report on the Soviet Officers who tried to pick me up, by Stepan Vanko, 9 June 1946, (Text in English), BAR, Vetukhiv Collection, Box 36.
137. In their records the words 'skryning' and 'vyskryninguvaty' appear in 1946, as a transliteration of the English words. See Iurii L.[avrynenko], 'Rodina' i 'Skryning': Damokliv mech taboriv,' in *S'ohochasne i mynule* (Munich, 1949), vol. 1–2, p. 66.
138. Letter from the camp administration at Hersfeld to TsPUE-N Headquarters in Frankfurt, 2 February 1947, BAR, Vetukhiv Collection.
139. UNRRA provided for an appeal process for refugees who felt they were unfairly deprived of assistance.
140. Interview with Mr Shmigel, New York City, summer 1989.
141. Letter signed by 24 Hersfeld camp residents to Miss E. Gronert, DP Officer at Hersfeld, 27 January 1947, UNRRA Archives, PAG-4/4.2:80.
142. UNRRA investigation report, by H. Frank Brull to Chief Protective Officer, US Zone Headquarters, Heidelberg, 14 February 1947, UNRRA Archives, PAG-4/4.2:80.
143. Letter from Vasyl' Mudryi to Headquarters of USFET, G-5 Branch, 1 December 1946, BAR, Vetukhiv Collection, Box 36.
144. See Boshyk, 'Repatriation and Resistance . . . ' pp. 209–10; Lavrynenko, p. 65; M. Kushnir (ed.), *One Year in Ukrainian DP Camp Ellwangen (Odyn rik v tabori Ellwangen)* (Ellewangen, 1947), p. 3.
145. *Ukrainian Bulletin*, vol. 4, 1948, p. 4.
146. Interview with Orest Lysenets'kyi, New York City, summer 1989.
147. In an UNRRA report there is reference to a Ukrainian DP, Mr. Pohorilyi, who instructed his replacement in the UNRRA office at Hersfeld to make a daily report on the activities of the screening office to the Ukrainian

Committee. Report of the UNRRA Protective Service Branch, Bad Wildungen, to the Chief Protective Officer of the US Zone, Heidelberg, 14 February 1947, UNRRA Archives, PAG-4/4.2:80.

148. Communiqué to Regional, District and Camp Branches of TsPUE-N on Screening, 6 September 1946; Memorandum to Regional Branches of TsPUE-N, Regarding Screening, 25 November 1946, UVAN, TsPUE-N Collection.
149. Undated Ukrainian translation of UNRRA 20-point questionnaire, UVAN, TsPUE-N Archive. The original English version of the questionnaire has an answer sheet attached, informing the screening official which answers denote that the individual is eligible for assistance. No Ukrainian translation of this second page has been located, UNRRA Archives, PAG-4/3.0.11.0.0:5.
150. Undated letter from the Resettlement Commission of the Ukrainian Central Assistance Committee in Germany, to regional Branched of TsPUE-N, warning of bogus resettlement and work schemes, UVAN, TsPUE-N Collection.
151. TsPUE-N Communiqué to Regional, District and Camp Representatives on the 26 August meeting between TsPUE-N leadership and US officials, 6 September 1946, UVAN, TsPUE-N Collection.
152. Report on the 13 February 1947 meeting between Vasyl' Mudryi and Col. Mickelson at the US military Headquarters in Frankfurt, NTSh, New York City, Vasyl' Mudryi Collection.
153. Letter from Vasyl' Mudryi to Headquarters of USFET, Branch G-5, 1 December 1946; letter from Vasyl' Mudryi to EUCOM HQ Branch G-5, 25 June 1947, BAR, Vetukhiv Collection.
154. Legal documents prepared by Stefan Vytvyts'kyi of the Legal Aid Branch of TsPUE-N, 24 January 1947, NTSh, New York City, Mudryi Collection.
155. Letter from Vasyl' Mudryi to Brigadier-General Mickelson, 22 April 1947, NTSh, New York, Mudryi Collection.
156. Letter from TsPUE-N Welfare Commission to IGCR, 12 May 1946; letter with report on Ukrainians from TsPUE-N to IGCR, 27 May 1947, BAR, Vetukhiv Collection.
157. Letter from Elliott M. Shirk, IGCR US Zone Director to Mr W. Mudryi, 5 May 1947, NTSh, New York City, Mudryi Collection.
158. See Chapter 4 of this volume, 'The Ukrainians Organize'.
159. Letter from St. Ortynska and C. Gardecka to General Mickelson, HQ European command, 2 April 1947, requesting permit for Ukrainian Volk Art Women's Cooperative; letter from Vasyl' Mudryi to HQ European Command, 3 April 1947, 'I beg kindly [*sic*] to grant me the permission to open in any German bank current-account with authority to make disbursements as necessary', NTSh, New York City, Mudryi Collection.
160. Letter from Vasyl' Mudryi to Brigadier-General Mickelson, 3 April 1947, on conditions in DP camp at Mainz-Kastel. The letter explains that whereas 1933 Ukrainians and 192 Baltic nationals resided in that camp, 105 of the 120 white-collar UNRRA jobs were held by Balts, and requests that Ukrainians be proportionately represented in UNRRA employment, NTSh, New York, Mudryi Collection.
161. For a full list of all the parties see Appendix 4 on page 185.
162. This was adhering to the nationalist ideology set out by Volodymyr Martynets', 'My i ukraiins'ki politychni partii', *Rozbudova natsii*, vol. 5, 1928, pp.

235–41. For a history of the development of OUN and the split in 1940, see Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism*; and Motyl, *Turn to the Right*.

163. For details, see Theodore Bohdan Ciucura, 'Common Organizational Efforts, 1945–52: Structure and People', in *The Refugee Experience*, pp. 94–5; O. Zelenetsky (ed.), *Na Hromadskii nyvi (do 25-littia TsPUE-N)* (Munich, 1972), pp. 9–10; Maruniak, *Ukraiins'ka emigratsiia*, p. 123; Zynovii Knysh, *Na porozi nevidomoho* (Paris, 1955).
164. Yurkevych, 'Ukrainian Nationalists...', p. 9. Also Mudryi, 'Ukraiintsi na emihratsii', p. 12.
165. This communiqué was published in by the Koordynatsiinyi Ukraiins'kyi Komitet, *Za lednists'*, no. 1 (January 1947), pp. 22–3.
166. *Komunikat Provodu Zakordonnykh Chastyn OUN* (n.p., March 1947), pp. 6–7.
167. OUN-b stated that the two preconditions for political consolidation were (a) the acceptance of Ukrainian state sovereignty as a common political goal, and (b) revolutionary struggle against Moscow as the sole means of its attainment, and other political forces should join them in this. This position was outlined by Bandera under the pseudonym S. A. Siryi in *Vyzvol'na polityka*, vol. 4–5, 1946, and reprinted using his name in Danylo Chaikovs'kyi and Stepan Lenkavs'kyi (eds), *Perspektyvy Ukraiins'koi Revoliutsii* (Munich, 1978), pp. 27–8.
168. Report of Conference of Representatives of Ukrainian Aid Committees, Paris, 29–31 July 1946. The report includes a list of addresses for Aid Committees and representatives in twenty-three countries (Canada, USA, Great Britain, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, Turkey, Switzerland, Norway, Liechtenstein, Argentina, Paraguay, Brazil, Egypt, Tanganyika, China, Palestine, Lebanon and Indo-China), BAR, Vetukhiv Collection.
169. One such example is listed in a confidential UNRRA report, '...a recent development now taking place in the United States–an effort to form a union of Lithuanian, Ukrainian, Latvian and Estonian relief bodies and the Tolstoy Foundation in an organisation to be known as "United Committee for the Aid of Central and Eastern European Refugees",' Report by Carl H. Martini to the Chief of Field Operations in the US Zone, 5 February 1947, UNRRA Archives, PAG-4/4.2:80.
170. 13 February 1947 report of UNRRA US Zone Director, UNRRA Archives, PAG-4/4.2:80.
171. Confidential Report from Carl A. Martini, Department of Field Operations to Chief, Field Operations, US Zone, 5 February 1947, UNRRA Archives, PAG-4/4.2:80.
172. For a history of the Ukrainian Communist Community in Canada, see John Kolasky, *The Shattered Illusion: The History of Ukrainian Pro-Communist Organizations in Canada* (Toronto, 1979).
173. CURB Newsletter, 31 December 1946, pp. 2–3, UVAN, TsPUE-N Collection.

Chapter 6 The Last Phase of Displacement

1. Louise Holborn, *The International Refugee Organisation: Its History and Work 1946–1952* (London, 1956), p. 439.

2. For example, see Leon Gordenker, *Refugees in International Politics* (London, 1987), pp. 26–7; Shelly Pitterman, 'International Responses to Refugee Situations: The UNHCR', in Elizabeth Ferris (ed.), *Refugees and World Politics* (New York, 1985), p. 44.
3. The largest group excluded from assistance were the 15 million Volksdeutche, who although truly destitute refugees, were denied any aid. For details, see Alfred M. de Zayas, *Nemesis at Potsdam. The Anglo-Americans and the Expulsion of the Germans. Background, Execution, Consequences* (London, 1979), p. 89; Otto Kimninich, 'The German Refugee Problem', *The Refugee Problem on Universal, Regional and National Levels* (Thessaloniki, 1987), pp. 683–99; Theodore Schieder (ed.), *The Expulsion of the German Population from the Territories East of the Oder-Neisse Line* (Bonn, 1954). In 1948 the IRO refused to take responsibility for refugees from the Arab–Israeli conflict; see George Stoessinger, *The Refugee and the World Community* (Minneapolis, 1956), p. 98.
4. For details, see Chapter 5 of this volume, 'The Creation of a New International Refugee Organization'.
5. See Chapter 5 of this volume, 'The Issue of Finances'.
6. See 'Preamble of the Constitution', Holborn (1956), p. 575.
7. These included Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Ethiopia, Haiti, India, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Syria and Turkey; United Nations, General Assembly, *Official Records*, First Year, Second Part, First Session.
8. Stoessinger (1956), p. 90.
9. Holborn (1956), p. 62.
10. Unpublished manuscript by L. Michael Hacking, 'Draft History of the International Refugee Organisation', (unpublished document in mimeograph form, n.d.), Part II, 'Conditions under which IRO Functioned in Germany and Austria', p. 1, IRO Archives, Archive Nationale, Paris, AJ/43/85.
11. Hacking, p. 2.
12. In September 1947 the military authorities introduced a new ban on mass demonstrations by refugees without prior permission, 9 September 1947, *Shchodenni Visti* (Daily News) no. 59, daily newspaper from Somme Kaserne Ukrainian Camp, UVAN Archives, Augsburg Collection.
13. Hacking, p. 20; Stoessinger (1956), p. 98.
14. See Footnote 3.
15. See Chapter 5 of this volume, 'Difficulties with Repatriating Ukrainians'.
16. Hacking, p. 3.
17. See correspondence between F. C. Blanchard, Acting Director, Repatriation Division PCIRO; John Widdicombe, Acting Chief, PCIRO, Poland; and R. D. Mockler, Chief Repatriation Division, PCIRO, 9 September 1947 and 30 September 1947 and 14 January 1948. The matter was closed only in January 1948. IRO Archives AJ 43/1073.
18. The scheme was called 'Westward Ho', and applied to all Western zones of Germany and Austria. See Stoessinger (1956), pp. 115–16; Holborn (1956), pp. 366, 391, 421, 474.
19. The Displaced Persons Act of 25 June 1948 (Public Law 744, 80th Congress) allowed for the entry of 205 000 refugees by 30 June 1950. It was amended on 16 June 1950 (Public Law 555, 81st Congress) and 29 June 1951 (Public Law 60, 82nd Congress). However, it placed numerous restrictions and

conditions on entry. For details see 'The DP Story', *Final Report of the United States Displaced Persons Commission* (Washington DC, 1952); Jane P. C. Carey, 'The Admission and Integration of Refugees in the United States', *Journal of International Affairs*, vol. I, 1953; Norman L. Zucker and Naomi Flink Zucker, 'From Immigration to Refugee Redefinition: A History of Refugee and Asylum Policy in the United States', in G. Loescher (ed.)*Refugees and the Asylum Dilemma* (1992).

20. Interviews with Leonid Lyman, Oksana Radysh, Lubov Drashevska, Orest Lysenetsky, New York City, summer 1989.
21. Letter from S. E. Streeter to Mr Selby, IRO Archives, 26 June 1948, AJ 43/1038.
22. Harvard University Refugee Interview Project (HURIP), Schedule B, Respondent 66, Harvard University, Russian Research Centre Library.
23. See Chapter 5 of this volume, 'The Loosening of Restrictions'.
24. Member of Parliament for Vegreville, Alberta, Canada, Anthony Hlynka.
25. Correspondence between M. W. Royse, IGCR, Bohdan Panchuk and the Ukrainian Canadian Committee regarding Panchuk's employment with IGCR, 3 March 1947 and 28 March 1947 and 3 April 1947, IRO Archives, AJ 43/1036. M. W. Royce subsequently became a Senior Eligibility Officer for the IRO.
26. These officials were financed jointly by CURB and the IRO. See letter from M. W. Royse to Gordon Hutchings, IRO Personnel Director, informing him that two Ukrainian Canadians attached to the Screening Team as experts on Ukrainians are Byblow and Mykytczuk, 29 July 1947; letter from Byblow to Office of Eligibility, PCIRO, Rome, reporting on activities with screening commission, 28 August 1947, IRO Archives, AJ 43/1036.
27. Letter from TsPUE-N, signed by Mudryi and Leonid Romaniuk, to IRO Secretary General, Geneva, 1 August 1947, IRO Archives, AJ 43/393.
28. Letter from W. Hallam Tuck, IRO Secretary General to TsPUE-N, 25 August 1947; Letter from Myer Cohen, Assistant Secretary, Care and Maintenance Department, to Paul B. Edwards, Acting Chief, PCIRO, US Zone, forwarding the TsPUE-N letter and asking DPs not to be moved without consultation with camp leaders, 25 August 1947, IRO Archives, AJ 43/393.
29. See IRO Archives AJ 43/807, folder 31/6, 3.13.15.
30. Letter from M. A. Brause, Deputy Chief, IRO Department of Care and Maintenance to Vasyl' Mudryi, President, TsPUE-N, 10 May 1948, IRO Archives AJ 43/807.
31. Undated memorandum by Otmar Pirkmajor, IRO Liaison Officer to National Committees, entitled 'Relationship of IRO with the National Groups of DPs', IRO Archives, AJ 43/808.
32. Letter from Philip E. Ryan, PCIRO Chief of Operations to TsPUE-N (Ukrainian Central Relief Committee), 14 December 1948, IRO Archives AJ 43/807.
33. Letter from TsPUE-N to Philip E. Ryan, PCIRO Chief of Operations, listing all Liaison Officers, 4 February 1949, IRO Archives AJ 43/807.
34. See correspondence, NTSh Archives, New York City, Vasyl' Mudryi Collection.
35. The other committees were: Czechoslovakian Alliance of Political Refugees; Estonian National Committee; Hungarian National Committee; Latvian Central Committee; Lithuanian Central Committee; Polish Union; Central

Representation of the Russian Emigration; and White Ruthenian (Byelorussian) National Committee.

36. Joint letter to P. E. Ryan, asking for formalization of relationship of National Committees with IRO, with very specific proposals and requests, including 'nothing should be decided and done about us – without us', 4 December 1949, IRO Archives AJ 43/807.
37. Holborn (1956), p. 224. Other groups mentioned are Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Poles, Hungarians, Russians, Czechoslovaks and Byelorussians. The official Woodbridge UNRRA history, does not discuss the Ukrainians as a group.
38. Note from Marjorie Bradford, Voluntary Agencies Division, to Wing-Commander Innes, 11 October 1947, IRO Archives, AJ 43/389.
39. Letter from Paul B. Edwards, Acting Chief of US PCIRO Mission, to Hallam Tuck, Secretary General, IRO, 20 August 1947, IRO Archives, AJ 43/389.
40. See Chapter 3, 'The Ukrainian Diaspora Rallies in Support'; Chapter 4, 'Ukrainian Voluntary Agencies'; and Chapter 5, 'Difficulties facing the Diaspora Aid Effort', in this volume.
41. Letter from Arthur C. Ringland, Executive Director Advisory Committee on Voluntary Foreign Aid, Washington DC, to Roman I. Smook, informing him that UUARC has received permission 'to enter Germany to carry on welfare services on behalf of DPs of Ukrainian origin', 16 September 1947, IRO Archives, AJ 43/389.
42. Letter from Walter Gallan, Executive Director of UUARC, to Roman I. Smook, officially appointing him UUARC temporary Director of Field Operations in Germany and Western Europe, 16 September 1947, IRO Archives, AJ 43/389.
43. Disagreements grew after the signing of the combined agreement.
44. PC/CM/4, Agreement between the PCIRO and the Ukrainian Canadian Relief Committee and United Ukrainian American Relief Committee Inc.; exchange of letters, October 1947 (Germany and Austria), 15 April 1948, Holborn (1956), p. 679. Agreements were also concluded with Polish, Armenian, Lithuanian, Jewish and Italian committees, and various religious organizations.
45. For details, see IRO Archives AJ 43/1097.
46. Administrative Order no. 152, Appendix II, 'Instructions For Completing Form CM/1' (Revised), 11 December 1948, IRO Archives AJ 43/1038.
47. See monthly Narrative Report for January 1949, US Zone HQ, Bad Kissingen, APO 62 – US Army, 'it has been the opinion of this office for some considerable time that the citizenship status of DP/R of Ukrainian ethnic origin and formerly citizens of Poland, who have been residing previously in Eastern Poland (now part of the Ukrainian SSR) still needs clarification'; letter 24 March 1949 from P. Weis, Legal Adviser, Protection Division, IRO to APO 62, US Army, Bad Kissingen, Germany, regarding the nationality status of persons from the territories of Eastern Poland ceded to the Soviet Union, IRO Archives AJ 43/572.
48. Letter from P. Kroll, AC Administrator Camp 701 to F. A. Sewell, Director Area Team 2, attention Mr D. Segat, Eligibility Officer, 14 February 1949, IRO Archives AJ 43/978.
49. See Schedules of Applications for IRO Assistance, IRO Archives AJ 43/1100.

50. For 1 July 1947 the TsPUE-N records show 73 646 Ukrainians in the US zone of Germany, 34 987 in the British zone, 9 992 in the French zone and 23 404 in Austria. For 1 September 1948 the records show 59 380 Ukrainians in the US zone of Germany, 23 795 in the British zone, 4 207 in the French zone and 17 700 in Austria. Report prepared by Vasyl' Mudryi, 'Ukraiintsi na Emigratsii po 1945 rotsii', NTSh, New York City, Vasyl' Mudryi Collection. Slightly higher figures are cited by Ihor Stebelsky, using CURB records (total of 167 977 in August 1947 and 137 528 in February 1948). For details, see Ihor Stebelsky, 'Ukrainian Population Migration', in *The Refugee Experience*, p. 42.
51. Volodymyr Maruniak, *Ukrains'ka emigratsiia v Nimechchyni i Avstrii po druhii svitovi viini* (Munich, 1985), p. 46. TsPUE-N records are available only until 1949.
52. Holborn (1956), p. 439. For details see Appendix 5 on page 186 of this volume. According to Stebelsky's calculations, the figure was slightly higher, at 125 017. See Stebelsky, 'Ukrainian Population Migration . . . ', p. 52.
53. For details of monthly emigration statistics of Ukrainians, see IRO Statistical Records. AJ 43/1096 to 1132; Mudryi, 'Ukraintsi na emihratsii', emigration records, NTSh Archives, New York City, Mudryi Collection; Stebelsky, 'Population Migration', pp. 52–60.
54. For details on the Ukrainian Insurgent Army and why a portion of these guerilla fighters decided to escape to the West in 1947, see Peter J. Potichnyj and Ievhen Shtendera (eds), *Political Thought of the Ukrainian Underground 1943–51* (Edmonton, 1988).
55. By 28 October 1947, 95 of these UPA fighters were interned in Degendorf. See Mudryi, 'Nova Ukrains'ka Emihratsiia', p. 125.
56. Interview with Peter Mel'nyk, New York City, summer 1989.
57. Mudryi, 'Nova Ukraiins'ka Emihratsiia', p. 125.
58. The full history of this group of UPA members who made it to the West in 1947 has not yet been fully researched or written. They were of great interest to both the Western governments and the Ukrainian community in exile, albeit for different reasons. Some members of this group were recruited by Western intelligence organizations and used in missions against the Soviet Union. This is a particularly sensitive issue for Britain, in view of the Soviet penetration of their intelligence services at the time. For Ukrainians, these people represented opposition to the Soviet Union and were therefore regarded as heroes.
59. For a brief history of Ukrainians in Czechoslovakia in the interwar period, see Orest Subtelny, *Ukraine. A History*, pp. 448–51; Myroslav Shkandrij, 'Prague as a Resource for the Study of Ukrainian Literature', *Journal of Ukrainian Studies*, vol. 15, 1990, Symon Narizhny, *Iak riatuvaly Muzei vuzvol'noi borot'by Ukrainy* (Zurich, 1959).
60. Correspondence between the Service Sociale Ukrainienne in Paris and the Comite de Secours aux Ukrainienne in Geneva is located in the Archives of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, 186 Blvd St. Germain, Paris, France. For the correspondence between IRO Prague and Geneva and the Comite de Secours aux Ukrainiens for the resettlement of Ukrainian refugees from Czechoslovakia to Argentina in the year 1948, see IRO Archives, AJ 43/197, AJ 43/393, AJ 43/1085 and AJ 43/1093.

61. Interview with George S. N. Luckyj, Toronto, February 1987, former sergeant in the British Armed Forces who acted as translator during a number of interrogations. See also George S. N. Luckyj, 'Memoirs', in *The Refugee Experience*, pp. 508–12.
62. For example, see Ronald Scheinman, 'Refugees: Goodbye to the Good Old Days', *The Annals of American Political Science*, vol. 467, 1983; James C. Hathaway, 'A Reconsideration of the Underlying Premises of Refugee Law', *Harvard International Law Journal*, vol. 31, 1990.
63. On 12 July 1947 the new IRO Director of the Ukrainian Camp in Augsburg notified the camp inhabitants that the material situation in the camp was about to worsen. Reported in the daily camp newspaper, *Shchodenni Visti*, no. 37, 12 July 1947, UVAN Archives, Augsburg Collection.
64. See 'Limitations Facing the IRO' in this chapter.
65. HURIP, Schedule B, Respondent 147.
66. HURIP, Schedule B, Respondent 288.
67. At times they reported rumours of impending moves or transfers, and one article speculated that a camp was about to be moved because the US Army wanted the premises for its own purposes, 23 August 1947, *Shchodenni Visti*, UVAN Archives, Augsburg Collection.
68. Hacking p. 1.
69. HURIP, Schedule B, Respondent 446. When asked whether the respondent knew of various ways of preparing potatoes, he answered: 'There are only two ways: Pure (chisti) or not. It is said that from potatoes you can make one hundred different dishes. I don't know whether that is true, because we had only potatoes, nothing else to cook with them.'
70. Interview with former refugee who asked to remain anonymous, Toronto, Canada, December 1993.
71. For a detailed description of an average day in the life of a refugee in an IRO camp, see Appendix 6 on page 188.
72. HURIP, Schedule B, Respondent 313.
73. HURIP, Schedule B, Respondent 108.
74. Many of the men distilled their own vodka. For example, see HURIP, Schedule B, Respondent 121.
75. HURIP, Schedule B, Respondent 136.
76. HURIP, Schedule B, Respondent 639.
77. *Chicago Daily News*, 1 April 1948.
78. Report on crime in Aschaffenburg, Civil Affairs Division, European Command, US Army, August 1947 to January 1948, IRO Archives, AJ 43/806.
79. Letter from P. Wrobel to IRO Office in Prague, IRO Archives, AJ 43/1093.
80. For example, see Sworn Statement by Pylyp Szumko, 16 November 1949, which states:

> I, Shumkow Filip (false Szumko Filip), son of Josuf Shumkow and Kateryna ... was born on Nov 27 1902 at Vierkhnaja Tokya, district Krasnokamsk, Bashkirian Autonomous Republic, USSR.
> Therefore I have had until now the citizenship of USSR.
> As I did not want to return to my native country and was afraid of the extradition to Russian Authorities in the year 1945 I reported to the Authorities in Germany that I was born in Holowko district, Turka, Poland,

as a Polish Ukrainian. My name was therefore entered as Szumko (Polish transcription) and on my identity Card my nationality was entered as 'stateless'.

Now I want my personal documents in order and I request you to change my birth place and my nationality on my Identity Card and other personal documents.

IRO Archives, AJ 43/822.

81. For example, see HURIP, Schedule B, Respondent 446, who said that 'people were talking a great deal about the possibility of a war starting again soon'.
82. Charter or Constitution.
83. For details, see Theodore Bohdan Ciuciura, 'Common Organisational Efforts, 1945–52: Structure and People', in *The Refugee Experience* . . . , p. 96; S. Baran, 'Dictate and Centralization of the TsPUE', *Ukrains'ki visti*, vol. 130, no. 72 ; 1947.
84. The new *Statut* was accepted on 16 November 1947 at a conference in Dillingen. See Mudryi, 'Nova ukraiins'ka emihratsiia', p. 121.
85. The *Statut* was also sent to the military occupation authorities, and while the *Statut* was noted on 12 July 1948, the Civil Affairs Division of the Headquarters of the US European Command responded negatively to the request for recognition, stating, 'As you have learned from frequent discussions with representatives of this division, recognition of such societies is not contemplated', 12 July 1948 letter from Captain Reaford L. Robinson to Vasyl' Mudryi, NTSh Archives, New York City, Mudryi Papers. See also Mudryi, 'Nova ukraiins'ka emigratsiia', p. 121.
86. The first Conference of SUN was held in Munich on 29–30 October 1949. For details, see Ciuciura, 'Common Organisational Efforts . . .', p. 102. This division within the community remained among the Ukrainians who were not resettled and became permanent residents of Germany.
87. See Levyts'kyi, pp. 88, 104, 107, 120, 133.
88. See 'Recognition of Ukrainians as a Separate Group', in this chapter.
89. Upon resettlement to Canada or the United States, a number of Ukrainian refugees then provided affidavits for their friends or relatives who remained in the camps in Europe.
90. Particular efforts were made on behalf of those individuals whose status remained controversial, such as former members of the Diviziia Halychyna. For details see Myron Momryk, 'Ukrainian DP Immigration and Government Policy in Canada, 1946–52', in *The Refugee Experience*, pp. 421–5.
91. Ostap Tarnavsky, *Brat Bratovi* (Philadelphia, 1971), p. 116.
92. Myron B. Kuropas, 'Ukrainian-American Resettlement Efforts, 1944–54', in *The Refugee Experience* . . . , p. 398.
93. For details on Ukrainian Canadian lobbying efforts, see Momryk, 'Ukrainian DP Immigration', pp. 413–34.
94. Interview with Mr Il'nytskyi, Toronto, June 1990.
95. See letter from Anthony Hlynka, Member of Canadian Parliament, to Vasyl' Mudryi, 15 February 1948; letter from J. Pyndyk to TsPUE-N, a Canadian Ukrainian farmer from Grimsby, Ontario who married a Ukrainian refugee woman after she responded to his advertisement of 16 September 1948, NTSh Archives, New York City, Mudryi Collection.

96. See Kuropas, 'Ukrainian–American Resettlement', p. 398; Tarnavsky (1971), p. 118.
97. This is discussed in a letter from Walter Gallan to Mudryi, 20 July 1948, NTSh Archives, New York City, Mudryi Collection; Tarnavsky (1971), p. 118.
98. See Lubomyr Y. Luciuk, 'A Troubled Venture: Ukrainian–Canadian Refugee Relief Efforts, 1945–51', in *The Refugee Experience*, p. 441.
99. The greatest tensions were between Walter Gallan of UUARC and Bohdan Panchuk of CURB. See correspondence between Gallan and Panchuk, 25 April 1947, 12 May 1947, 23 June 1947 and 24 July 1947 cited by Luciuk, 'A Troubled Venture', pp. 445–7.
100. Ibid., pp. 444–5.
101. According to Eustace Wasylyshyn, the Director of CURB 1949–1950, the UUARC letterhead included the UCRF Headquarters Address in the British Zone of Germany, implying that they represented both organizations. Eustace and Anne Wasylyshyn, 'Final Report of Activities of Ukrainian Canadian Relief Fund Mission in Europe', 2 October 1950, cited by Luciuk, 'A Troubled Venture', p. 450.
102. Viktor Zemskov, 'Rozhdennie 'vtoroi emigratsii' 1944–1952', *Sotsiologicheskie issledovanie*, vol. 4, 1991, p. 3.
103. A research study was in fact conducted at Harvard University in the years 1950–3, collecting oral histories from refugees who fled successfully from the Soviet Union. The study was entitled, 'Project on the Soviet Social System', and provided the first comprehensive database on living conditions in the Soviet Union. The results of this study are on deposit at the Russian Research Centre, Harvard University, and were consulted for this study.
104. The Soviet Union continued to publish books and articles accusing Ukrainian emigré community leaders of collaboration with the Nazi regime until the mid-1980s.
105. For a summary, see Top Secret Report on the Implementation of Directives of the Leadership of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Conducting Repatriation of Soviet Citizens and Citizens of Foreign Governments During the Period of the Great Patriotic War, GARF, f. R-9526, op. 1, d. 1118, l. pp. 120–43.
106. Approximately 1000 returnees recounted their experiences, by responding to questionnaires or granting interviews. Lidia Val'ko-Cherednychenko, Kyiv Oblast', Ukraine, was the only one who did not express regret at having returned to the Soviet Union, Letter, 4 September 1992.
107. The term 'returnee' and 'repatriate' are used interchangeably.
108. For a discussion, see Robert H. McNeal, *Stalin: Man and Ruler* (New York, 1988); Alan Bullock, *Hitler and Stalin: Parallel Lives* (London, 1993); Alec Nove, *The Stalin Phenomenon* (London, 1993); Alan Wood, *Stalin and Stalinism* (London, 1990).
109. This campaign became known as Zhdanovshchyna, after Andrei Zhdanov, who was responsible for the campaign. See Werner G. Hahn, *Postwar Soviet Politics. The Fall of Zhdanov and the Defeat of Moderation, 1946–53* (Ithaca and New York, 1982), ch. 1, 2 and 3; Gavriel D. Ra'anan, *International Policy Formations in the USSR. Factional Debates During the Zhdanovshchina* (Hamden, Conn., 1983).

110. Geschichte der KPdSU, (Berlin, 1960), p. 312, cited by Borys Lewytzkyj, *Politics and Society in Soviet Ukraine, 1953–1980* (Edmonton, 1984), pp. 1–2.
111. For an overview, see David Marples, *Stalinism in Ukraine in the 1940s* (New York, London, 1992); Yaroslav Bilinsky, *The Second Soviet Republic: The Ukraine After World War II* (New Brunswick, NJ, 1964). A more recent article describes Soviet efforts to combat the UPA: see Jeffrey Burds, 'Agentatura: Soviet Informants Networks and the Ukrainian Underground in Galicia, 1944–1948', *East European Politics and Societies*, vol. 11, 1997. A collection of archival documents on this subject has been deposited at the University of Toronto; see the Peter J. Potichnyj Collection on Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Ukraine.
112. One tactic the Soviet government used to discredit the Ukrainian liberation movement was by labelling them 'Ukrainian–German nationalists'. According to David Marples, this phrase was coined by Nikita Khrushchev (then First Secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine) or his secretary for propaganda, K. Lytvyn, in 1944. For details, see Marples, *Stalinism in Ukraine*, p. 102.
113. For details, see Chapter 3 of this volume, 'Preparations for Returnees'.
114. Top Secret Report on the Implementation of Directives . . . , GARF, f. R–9526, op. 1, d. 1118, l. 223–6. Victor Zemskov cites slightly lower figures, with a total of 4 199 488 repatriated, basing this figure on documents in the same Fond but different Opysy, 3 and 4a, which the author was not granted permission to view by GARF authorities. See V. N. Zemskov, 'Repatriatsiia Sovietskikh Grazhdan i ikh dal'neishaya sud'ba (1944–1956gg)', *Sotsiologicheskie Issledovanie*, vol. 5–6, 1995, table 6. Statistics on PoWs are also cited in 'Sud'ba Voiennoplennikh i Deportirovanykh Grazhdan SSSR. Materialy Komissii po Reabilitatsii Zhertv Politicheskikh Represii', *Novaia i Noveishaya Istoria*, vol. 2, 1996, pp. 91–112; however, no direct citations to archival documents are provided. All these figures must be treated with caution and as subject to revision until full access to the papers of APRA is made available.
115. Ibid., pp. 74 and 225–6. Again, Zemskov cites slightly lower figures, but the breakdown of destinations is similar.
116. Ibid., pp. 227, 229.
117. The second largest group were the Russians, followed by the Belarussians and Georgians.
118. Viktor Zemskov, 'K voprosu o politicheskikh repressiiak v SSSR (1917–1990 gody)', *Izm Nizhnii Tagil*, vol. 1, 1994; 'O podliinosti statisticheskoi otchetnosti GULAGa', *Sotiologicheskie issledoviania*, vol. 6, 1992; 'Gulag (istoryko-sotsiologicheskyi aspekt)', *Sotsiologicheskie issledovania*, vol. 7, 1991.
119. M. F. Buhai, 'Deportatsii naselennya z Ukrainy (30–50ti roky)', *Ukraiins'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, vol. 10, 1990, pp. 32–8.
120. Viktor Zemskov, 'Spetsposelentsi (po dokumentatsii NKVD-MVD SSSR)', *Sotsiologicheskie issledovania*, vol. 11, 1990, p. 8.
121. A few other studies have appeared on the Gulag, using recently opened archival sources. They include Edwin Bacon, *The Gulag At War: Stalin's Forced Labour in Light of the Archives* (London, 1993); A. N. Dugin, 'GULAG: otkryvanya arkhiviv', *Na boevom postu* (Moscow, 27 December 1989), pp. 3–4. However, they do not provide information on numbers of Ukrainian repatriates who ended up in the Gulag.

122. See Alexander Solzhenitsyn, *The Gulag Archipelago 1918–1956* (London/New York, 1974), trans. by Thomas P. Whitney, ch. 6, 'That Spring'. See also Semen Samuilovych Vilensky, *Resistance in the Gulag: Memoirs, Letters, Documents*, English version ed. and trans. John Crowfoot, Frederick Choate and Tatyana Isaeva (Moscow, 1992).
123. This point is somewhat unclear. The APRA directives state clearly that repatriates were not allowed to return to the newly acquired territories of Western Ukraine, yet a number of questionnaire respondents wrote that they did in fact return to these areas.
124. Letter from Maria Kovtun, Kyiv oblast', Ukraine, 1 February 1993.
125. Many of these questionnaires are deposited in GARF, Fond 7021. Many of the responses were filled out by one person, presumably the interviewer, and on numerous forms it is noted that the people questioned were illiterate and signed only 'X'. For the full text of the questionnaire, see Appendix 7 on page 189.
126. Letter from Borys Chumak, Dnipropetrovs'k oblast', Ukraine, 20 September 1992.
127. Victor Lialiakin managed to avoid being sent to a special work battalion only through his personal friendship with Molotov. Interview with Victor Lialiakin, Moscow, 29 May 1991.
128. Ibid.
129. In the Soviet Union, denial of employment was a severe punishment, since all citizens were required by law to work. For details, see Martin McCauley, *The Soviet Union, 1917–1991*, 2nd edn (London/New York, 1993), pp. 90–6; Alex Nove, *An Economic History of the USSR* (London, 1992); Nicholas de Witt, *Education and Professional Employment in the USSR* (Washington DC, 1961); V. Andrle, *Workers in Stalin's Russia, Industrialisation and Social Change in a Planned Economy* (Brighton, 1988).
130. Interview with Irina Motskobili, Moscow, 6 May 1991; letter from Tetiana Tukhlyk, Donets'k oblast', Ukraine, 11 September 1992.
131. Letter from Mykola Tarasenko, Luts'k, Ukraine, 10 November 1992.
132. Letter from Lev Khapchuk, Mykolaiv, Ukraine, 10 October 1992; Ol'ha Uliana Pyrih was sent from her home in Kirovohrad to do construction work in Stalingrad, Letter, 14 September 1992; Oliksii Honcharenko was forced to go to Donbas to work in the mines, Letter, 14 September 1992.
133. Letter from Ivan Chernets'kyi, 17 October 1992.
134. Letter from Maria Kovtun, Zhytomyr oblast', 16 September 1992.
135. He was sent from Sumy, Ukraine to Irkuts'k, Russia to work in construction and denied permission to travel; Letter, 14 September 1992.
136. The Administation of the Plenipotentiary of the Council of People's Commissars of the SSR for Repatriation Affairs was formally terminated by Council of People's Commissars Directive no. 5305–2071s, dated 29 December 1952, GARF, f. R-9526, op. 1, kratkaya spravka (brief information at beginning of collection).
137. 'Sud'ba voennoplennykh i deportirovannykh grazhdan SSSR...', pp. 107–10.
138. Interview with Yury Andrukhovych, Moscow, May 1991.
139. Letter from Oleh Kulyk, Dnipropetrovs'k oblast, Ukraine, on behalf of his father, Prokop Kulyk, 10 September 1992.

140. Indeed, a portion of the returning population was executed on the grounds of treason, but a smaller number than had previously been believed.
141. In 1992 Russia became a signatory of the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 UN Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. See Rosemary Rogers and Emily Copeland, *Forced Migration Policy Issues in the Post-Cold War World* (Medford, Mass., 1993), p. 23.

Chapter 7 Conclusion

1. For the current international definition of a refugee, see 'Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees', 28 July 1951, *United Nations Treaty Series (UNTB)* vol. 189, 1954, Treaty No. 2545, p. 137 and 'Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees,' 31 January 1967, *UNTS*, vol. 606, 1967, Treaty No. 8791, p. 267, reproduced in Guy Goodwin-Gill, *The Refugee in International Law* (Oxford, 1996), pp. 389, 409.
2. UNHCR became a permanent UN institution only in 1956. See James C. Hathaway, *The Law of Refugee Status* (Toronto, 1991), pp. 6–29; Louise W. Holborn, *Refugees. A Problem of Our Time: The Work of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees* (Metuchen, NJ, 1975); Gil Loescher, *Beyond Charity. International Cooperation and the Global Refugee Crisis* (Oxford and New York, 1993), pp. 55–74.
3. Ukrainians had established a presence in Canada before the Second World War. They were a large group of the pioneers who had settled the western provinces at the turn of the century, and proportionately are a sizeable portion of Canada's population (in 1991 the fifth largest ethnic group: 1 million out of a total of 27 million). Therefore Ukrainians in Canada are considered to be an important part of the electorate and various governments pursue policies to gain their vote. For a history of Ukrainians in Canada, see Michael Marunchak, *The Ukrainian Canadians* (Winnipeg, 1991).
4. The appointment was announced 24 November 1990, *The Globe and Mail*, p. A16. Mr Hnatyshyn's term ended in 1995.
5. The Ukrainian community in the United States has also been influential in lobbying the US government to provide aid to the newly independent Ukraine.
6. See House of Commons (UK) *Report on the Entry of Nazi War Criminals and Collaborators Into the UK, 1945–1950* (London, 1988); Canadian Commission on Enquiry on War Criminals, *Report*, Honourable Jules Deschenes, Commissioner (Ottawa, 1986); the case of Ivan Demjaniuk.
7. And other national groups of non-returnees to Soviet territories such as Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians and Byelorussians.
8. Previous estimates were in the 2 million range, based on Western statistics on repatriation to the Soviet Union. These included Soviet nationals handed over by Western authorities and did not include repatriation from areas in Eastern Europe occupied by the Red Army. Further opening of Soviet archives may revise this figure in the future.
9. This suggestion was made by former a SMERSH employee who defected to the West, A. I. Romanov, *Nights Are Longest There: SMERSH From the Inside* (trans. Gerald Brooke) (London, 1972), pp. 170–1.

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This study is based primarily on archival materials and personal histories. Individual accounts of the events from this period are used to complement and at times complete information available from documentary sources. They are often subjective in nature and are therefore used with caution, and no conclusions are drawn solely from interview or questionnaire materials. However, they do serve to illustrate, confirm and at times augment points raised by the study.

Archival materials were consulted in five countries. Most documents pertinent to this study in the Public Record Office, London, are open to readers. However, certain folders from the War Office, Series 32, have been recalled by the Ministry of Defence and were unavailable during the last months of 1994.

Records of the Soviet Administration of the Plenipotentiary of the Council of People's Commissars on Repatriation Affairs (APRA) and related/relevant sources in Russia and Ukraine are in the process of being declassified and therefore only a select few were available for consultation. A number of still-classified documents cited in this study were provided by Russian historian Victor Nikolaievich Zemskov; however, the author has been unable to verify their authenticity.

The United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) and International Refugee Organization (IRO) Archives located in France and the United States respectively provide a rich resource for scholars of this period. However, because of the large number of documents available it is possible that some materials were overlooked by the author.

Archival materials of the Ukrainian refugee committees and leaders on deposit in archival repositories in New York, Toronto and Paris are rich yet incomplete and have therefore been used in connection with other sources.

Primary sources 1. Unpublished

(a) Interviews, replies to questionnaire and oral histories

(i) Interviews

Over a period of five years, over a hundred people were interviewed in Canada, Britain, France and the United States. They were primarily former refugees, although a few Western officials were also among the group. The following list identifies the select few who can be considered prominent actors in this study:

Alexander, Bernard, Oxford, 1989 (Member of British Expeditionary Force in Europe).

Andrukhovych, Yury, Moscow, May 1991 (Writer, grandson of Ostarbeiter, learned family history only during *glasnost'*).

Drashevs'ka, Liubov, New York City, summer 1989 (Translator, Central Representation of the Ukrainian Emigration in Germany, 1945–9).

Il'nyts'kyi, Roman, New York City, summer 1989 (Secretary, Central Representation of the Ukrainian Emigration in Germany, 1945–9).
Kal'ba, Iaroslav Simon J., Toronto, 1989 (Ukrainian refugee committee leader in France, UUARC representative 1948–9).
Kossyk, Volodymyr, Paris, summer 1990 (Interwar citizen of Romania, member of Ukrainian Underground during war, Ukrainian *emigré* scholar).
Lebed', Mykola, Newark, New Jersey, summer 1989 (Foreign Minister, Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, Bandera faction 1945–8, co-leader of the breakaway faction of OUN-Z, commonly known as the 'Dviikari').
Lialiakin, Victor, Moscow, May 1991 (Former Soviet Diplomat in German Embassy, officer in the Red Army, during combat captured by Germans, at war's end repatriated, avoided work battalion through personal friendship with Molotov).
Luckyj, George S. N., Toronto, 1986 (Ukrainian with Polish citizenship, studied in London in interwar period, joined the British Armed Forces during Second World War, acted as translator for the British during interviews with refugees).
Lyman, Leonid, New York City, summer 1989 (Resident, UNRRA Ukrainian Camp, Augsburg, founding member Ukrainian Writers Association (MUR) 1945).
Lysenets'kyi, Orest, New York City, summer 1989 (Ukrainian camp director, UNRRA Ukrainian DP Camp, Somme Kaserne, Augsburg).
Mel'nyk, Tymish, Hartford, Conneticut, 1989 (Concentration camp survivor, Organizer of League of Ukrainian Political Prisoners).
Motskobili, Irina, Moscow, May 1991 (Returnee to the Soviet Union, later active in Memorial Society).
Mytrovych, Kyrylo, Paris, summer 1990 (Interwar citizen of Czechoslovakia, later Carpatho-Ukraine, member of Ukrainian Undergound during war, in Soviet zone of Germany immediately after war).
Radysh, Oksana, New York City, summer 1989 (Daughter of founder of Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1945).
Zhukovs'kyi, Arkadii, Sarcelles, France, summer 1990 (Interwar citizen of Poland, involved in Ukrainian student movement during and after war, Ukrainian *emigré* scholar).

(ii) Written responses to questionnaires

Over 1000 responses were received to a questionnaire published in the Ukrainian newspaper *Holos Ukraiiny*, 4 September 1992, of which 65 are cited in this study.

(iii) Oral histories

(a) Harvard University refugee interview project On deposit at Harvard University, Russian Research Center Library and Columbia University, Bakhmeteff Archive. They are divided into Schedules A and B. Case numbering for interviewees goes up to 1745. However, full personal interviews were fewer than this, since some interviewees were given numbers and then were unable to participate.

(b) *Herbert H. Lehman Collection* On deposit at Columbia University, Oral History Research Office.

(c) Ukrainian Research and Documentation Centre, Toronto. On deposit at the Ukrainian Canadian Research and Documentation Centre, St. Vladimir's Institute, 620 Spadina Avenue, Toronto, Canada. One hundred and fifty interviews were conducted in connection with a project on Ukraine During Second World War.

(b) Documents

(i) Britain

Public Record Office (PRO), London
Cabinet Papers,
CAB 65
Foreign Office Papers,
FO 371
War Office Papers,
WO 32

(ii) France

Archives Nationales de France (AN), Paris
International Refugee Organization Papers, AJ43, Boxes 85–1219.
Inter-governmental Committee on Refugees Papers, AJ43, Boxes 1–84.
Shevchenko Scientific Society (NTSh), Sarcelles
Uncatalogued papers of individuals involved with voluntary agencies in the post-Second World War period.
Ukrainian Catholic Church in France, Paris
Uncatalogued papers of various Ukrainian voluntary agencies from the post-war period, including Entr'Aide, Comité de Secours Aux Réfugiés Ukrainiennes.

(iii) Russia

Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Rossiskoi Federatsii (GA RF) (State Archive of the Russian Federation), Moscow, formerly Tsentral'nyi gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Oktiabr'skoi Revoliutsii vysshikh organov gosudarstvennoi vlasti i organov gosudarstvennogo upravleniia SSSR (TsGAOR SSSR), (Central State Archive of the October Revolution, High Organs of State Power, and Organs of State Administration of the USSR), Moscow:

Upravlenie Upolnomochenovo SM SSSR po delam Repatriatsii (Administration of the Plenipotentiary of the Council of People's Commissars SSR for Repatriation Affairs)
Fond R-9526, Opysi 1–5.

Chrezvychaynaya Gosudarstvennaya Komisiia po ustanovleniu i rassledovaniu zlodeianii nemtsko-fashystskykh zakhvatchykov i ikh Soobshchynkov i Prychynennovo imi ushcherba grazhdanam, kolektivnym khoziaistvam (kolkhozam), obchshestvennym organizatsiiam, gosudarstvennym predpreiatiam i uchrezhdeniam Soiuza SSR (UChK), 1942–50 (Special State Committee for Documenting and Researching Crimes Committed by the German-Fascist Occupation Regime)
Fond 7021, Opys 67.

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Fond 8581, Opys 1.
Otdel Proverochno-Filtratsionnykh Lagerei MVD SSSR 1941–1945gg (Division of Screening-Filtration Camps of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) USSR 1941–1945)
Fond 9408, Opys 10.

(iv) Ukraine

(a) Tsentral'nyi Derzhavnyi Arkhiv Vykonavchykh Orhaniv Ukrainy (TsDAVOU), (Central State Archive of Administrative Organs of Ukraine) Kyiv, formerly Tsentral'nyi derzhavnyi arkhiv Zhovtnevoi revolutsii, vyshchykh orhaniv Ukraiins'koi RSR (TsDAZhR URSR) (Central State Archive of the October Revolution, Highest Organs of State Government, and Organs of State Administration of the Ukrainian SSR), Kyiv:
Viddil v spravakh repatriatsii pry Vykonavchim Komiteti Ukraiins'koi Verkhovnoi Rady Deputativ trudiashchykh (Division on Repatriation Affairs at the Executive Committee of the Ukrainian Supreme Rada of Workers' Deputies)
Fond R-2, Opys 7.

(b) Derzhavnyi Arkhiv L'vivs'koi Oblasti (DALO) (State Archive of the L'viv Oblast') formerly Tsentral'nyi derzhavnyi istorychnyi arkhiv Ukrains'koi RSR u m L'vovi (TsDIA-L) (Central State Historical Archive of the Ukrainian SSR in Lviv):
Otdel po delam repatriastii pri Ispolnitelnom Komitete L'vovs'kovo oblasnovo Sovieta deputatov trudiashchykhsia (Division on Repatriation Affairs at the Executive Committee of the L'viv Regional Soviet of Workers' Deputies)
Fond R-221, Opys 2.

(c) Derzhavnyi Arkhiv Ivano-Frankivs'koi Oblasti (Ivano-Frankivs'k State Oblast': Archive):
Otdel po delam repatriastii pri Ispolnitelnom Komitete Stanislavskovo oblasnovo Sovieta deputatov trudiashchykhsia (Division on Repatriation Affairs at the Executive Committee of the Stanislav Regional Soviet of Workers' Deputies)
Fond R-740, Opys 2.

(v) The United States

(a) Columbia University Library, New York City
Bakhmeteff Archive
Mykhailo Vetukhiv Collection
Lehman Papers and Suite
Herbert H. Lehman Papers
Hugh Jackson Papers
Robert G. A. Jackson Papers
Marshall Macduffie Papers.

(b) Shevchenko Scientific Society (NTSh), New York City
Vasyl Mudryi Collection
Ukrainian DP Camp 'Orlyk', Berchtesgaden, Collection
(c) Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences Archival Collection
Augsburg Collection
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